The criminal question in the public sphere. Cesare Beccaria and Eighteenth-Century England - Diciottesimo Secolo Rivista della Società Italiana di Studi sul Secolo XVIII.

Rosamaria Loretelli

The focus of this collection of essays is the two-way relation of Cesare Beccaria's "On Crimes and Punishments" with Britain. It is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to be entirely devoted to this subject.

Diciot tesimo Secolo Rivista della Società Italiana di Studi sul Secolo XVIII Vol 4 (2019) ISSN 2531-4165 FIRENZE UNIVERSITY PRESS «Diciottesimo secolo» is the official international open access journal of the Società Italiana di Studi sul Secolo XVIII (SISSD). It is committed to hosting critical debates covering a full range of eighteenth century subjects: from literature to history, from law to religion, from philosophy to science, from anthropology to the fine arts, from linguistics to ethics, from theatre to music. It is also intended as an instrument for providing updated information about current Italian research in eighteenth-century studies. Published annually and double blind peer reviewed, the journal is divided into three sections: “Essays”, “Critical Notes” and “Reviews”. Editors in Chief Andrea Gatti, Università di Ferrara, Italy Rolando Minuti, Università di Firenze, Italy Editorial Board Patrizia Delpiano Alessandra Di Ricco Marina Formica, Giovanni Iamartino Lucio Tufano Scientific Committee Beatrice Alfonzetti, Lodovica Braida, Riccardo Capoferro, Alessia Castagnino, Gabriella Catalano, Domenico Cecere, Francesco Cotticelli, Walter Curzi, Rosamaria Loretelli, Chiara Lucrezio Monticelli, Sebastiano Martelli, Gianenrico Paganini, Pasquale Palmieri, Alberto Postigliola, Paolo Quintili, Anna Maria Rao, Silvia Tatti, Valeria G.A. Tavazzi, Duccio Tongiorgi, Corrado Viola Editorial Secretarial Staff Lucia Berti, Massimo Galtarossa, Daniela Mangione, Elisabetta Mastrogiacomo, Valeria Merola, Cinzia Recca, Danilo Siragusa, Valeria Tavazzi Journal Contact: Rolando Minuti, E-mail: rolando.minuti@unifi.it; Andrea Gatti, E-mail: andrea.gatti@unife.it Diciot tesimo Secolo Rivista della Società Italiana di Studi sul Secolo XVIII Vol. 4 (2019) Firenze University Press Diciottesimo secolo Published by Firenze University Press – University of Florence, Italy Via Cittadella, 7 - 50144 Florence - Italy http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds/index ISSN 2531-4165 (online) Direttore Responsabile: Rolando Minuti Copyright © 2019 Authors. The authors retain all rights to the original work without any restriction. Open Access. This issue is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY-4.0) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication (CC0 1.0) waiver applies to the data made available in this issue, unless otherwise stated. Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Citation: R. Loretelli, J. Dunkley (2019) The criminal question in the public sphere. Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments and Eighteenth-Century Britain: A Two-Way Perspective. Introduction. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 3-9. doi: 10.13128/ ds-25433 The criminal question in the public sphere. Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments and Eighteenth-Century Britain: A Two-Way Perspective Introduction by Rosamaria Loretelli and John Dunkley Copyright: © 2019 R. Loretelli, J. Dunkley. This is an open access, peerreviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress. net/index.php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. … jamais, dans aucune autre période de l’histoire, le problème pénal n’a été aussi débattu qu’au Siècle des Lumières. Matière autrefois confidentielle et hautement spécialisée, le droit criminel s’ouvre brusquement à une sphère plus large de discussions publiques. Jadis formulée en latin dans d’épais volumes de doctrine, la question pénale ‘tombe dans le domaine public’. […] Or, il est à la fois banal et frappant de constater que l’événement déclencheur de ces débats est la publication des Délits et des peines1. It would be difficult to find more apposite words than these by Philippe Audegean and Luigi Delia to set the background for the present collection of essays. In the eighteenth century, the question of criminal law and practice not only sparked furious debates among specialists but also entered public opinion in general, appearing in newspaper articles, in journals and letters, and even in dictionaries and novels. The focus of this collection of essays is the two-way relation of On Crimes and Punishments with Britain. It is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to be entirely devoted to this subject, although a conference, organized by the Società italiana di studi sul secolo diciottesimo, the British Society for Eighteenth-century Studies and the Associazione Antigone preceded it in 2017, on the 250 th anniversary of the first English translation of Beccaria’s treatise. Some, though not all, participants in the conference are also contributors to the present volume. Dei delitti e delle pene was first published in Livorno in 1764. The event caused an instantaneous sensation in Europe: the first edition sold out immediately and, in the course of less than two years, three more authorised Italian editions appeared, each with new additions by the author. Over the same period, many pirated editions also circulated. In the summer of 1765, the French philosophes discovered Beccaria, and started corresponding with him. They promptly invited him to Paris, where he went in 1766 accompanied by Alessandro Verri, and was fêted and hon- 1 Ph. Audegean and L. Delia, Introduction, in Ph. Audegean and L. Delia (eds.), Le moment Beccaria. Naissance du droit pénal moderne (1764-1810), Liverpool University Press, Liverpool 2018 (Oxford University Studies in the Enlightenment, s.n.). Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 3-9 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25433 4 oured in the most prestigious salons2 . In the meantime, the first French translation had been published in December 1765 (although dated 1766), a few months before the Italian fifth edition, the last to be edited by the author himself3. This French translation, authored by philosophe and éncyclopédiste André Morellet, gave a powerful boost to a further dissemination of Beccaria’s book and ideas in Europe. In 1766, Voltaire published his Commentaire sur le Traité des délits et des peines. Other European countries responded just as rapidly. In October 1765, Switzerland honoured the book with a medal, at the initiative of the Berne Patriotic Society. In 1766, Catherine II invited its author to go to Russia as her advisor on the penal reform she was planning. Beccaria, however, declined. Reforms along the lines the book had indicated were passed in Europe. In Prussia, Frederick II promulgated a new criminal code. In 1786, in Tuscany, Grand Duke Leopold, the future Leopold II emperor of Austria, promulgated a new code which abolished the death penalty4. Judicial torture declined5. In England, where stories about real criminals were very popular and, since the previous century, had given rise to a thriving production of printed matter, the interest in criminal legislation grew considerably and the need for reform was felt by a growing number of people6. In North America, Beccaria was immediately popular, and many editions of Dei delitti were published at a very early date. Before Independence, William Penn tried to pass a humane criminal code in Pennsylvania, 2 P. e A. Verri, Viaggio a Parigi e Londra (1766-1767), a cura di G. Gaspari, Adelphi, Milano 1980, p. 38 ff. 3 Franco Venturi established the fifth Italian edition as the authoritative text, the last to be supervised by Beccaria himself. Letteratura italiana. Storia e testi, vol. 46/III. Illuministi italiani. Riformatori lombardi, piemontesi e toscani, a cura di F. Venturi, Ricciardi, Milano-Napoli 1958; L. Firpo, Le edizioni italiane del Dei delitti e delle pene, in Edizione nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria [hereafter EN], vol. I. Dei delitti e delle pene, a cura di G. Francioni, Mediobanca, Milano 1984, pp. 466-473. 4 For the information in this paragraph, see M. Maestro, Cesare Beccaria and the Origins of Penal Reform, Temple University Press, Philadelphia 1973, pp. 134 ff; F. Venturi, Beccaria, Cesare, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, VII, 1970, pp. 463-465; and, by the same, Introduzione a Cesare Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene: con una raccolta di documenti relativi alla nascita dell’opera e alla sua fortuna nell’Europa del Settecento, a cura di F. Venturi, Einaudi, Torino 1965, pp. xxxii ff. 5 See W.F. Schulz, Introduction, in The Phenomenon of Torture. Readings and Commentary, ed. by W.F. Schulz, Forword by J.E. Méndez, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2007; and the illuminating E. Motta, Verità del maleficio. Alle origini dell’abolizione della tortura giudiziaria, in Il caso Beccaria. A 250 anni dalla pubblicazione del Dei delitti e delle pene, a cura di V. Ferrone and G. Ricuperati, Il Mulino, Bologna 2016, pp. 231-334. 6 L. Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law, vol 1. A Movement for Reform, Stevens & Sons Ltd., London 1948. Rosamaria Loretelli, John Dunkley but the attempt was thwarted by the Crown. After Independence, however, Beccaria’s influence surfaced in the decisions taken by the legislatures of the new states, as John Bessler, one of the contributors to the present collection, has amply demonstrated in his books The Birth of American Law: An Italian Philosopher and the American Revolution and The Celebrated Marquis: An Italian Noble and the Making of the Modern World 7. The impulse to translate Dei delitti into the European languages was not slow to arrive8. After France, there followed Britain, with two 1767 editions, one issued in London and one in Dublin. The Swedish translation was published in 1770. In Poland, where Beccaria’s ideas had already found much fertile ground, the first translation appeared in 1772. In Spain, the book was translated in 17749. The first German translation, based on the French version, was in print as early as in 1766; while another translation, based on the Italian original, was published in 1778. Within less than ten years after its first publication, Beccaria’s text had been translated into the principal European languages. Other translations followed a short time later. The Danish translation appeared in 1796; while Prince Michail M. Ščerbatov authored the first Russian translation during the last quarter of the eighteenth century10. The first Greek translation was published in 1802, during that country’s Enlightenment. It was based on Morellet, entitled Perì amartimàton kaì pinòn and authored by Adamántios Koraïs. The second edition was partially corrected by Cesare Beccaria’s daughter, Giulia Beccaria, and appeared in 1823 under the title of Perì adikemàton kaì pinòn11. In Italy, Dei delitti e delle pene was put on the Index librorum prohibitorum in 1766; and, in 1777, the Madrid 7 Published, respectively, in 2014 and 2018 by Carolina Academic Press, Durham. See also, the even more recent The Baron and the Marquis: Liberty, Tyranny, and the Enlightenment Maxim that can remake American Criminal Justice, Carolina Academic Press, Durham 2019. 8 Maestro, Cesare Beccaria, cit., pp. 129 ff; and Venturi, Beccaria, cit. 9 Maestro, Cesare Beccaria, cit., pp. 129 ff. 10 In manuscript until 2007, when it was published by Ettore Gherbezza. See E. Gherbezza, Dei delitti e delle pene nella traduzione di Michail M. Ščerbatov, Firenze University Press, Firenze 2007. The first scholar to research on the Russian reception of Beccaria and to mention this translation was F. Venturi, Beccaria in Russia, «Il Ponte», IX, 1953, pp. 163-174. For this, see G. Ricuperati, Franco Venturi, Luigi Firpo e la riscoperta storiografica di Beccaria, in Il caso Beccaria, cit., pp. 25-60. 11 I. Di Salvo, L’opera Dei delitti e delle pene di C. Beccarla nella traduzione di A. Koraïs, in Studi Bizantini e Neogreci, a cura di P.L. Leone, Congedo, Galatina 1983, pp. 561-574. The context and the modalities of reception have been convincingly illustrated by Giorgio Stamboulis in his presentation L’Illuminismo nei Balcani: sviluppi e prospettive di ricerca at the annual conference of the Società italiana di studi sul secolo XVIII, Marina di Massa 2018. Explaining the change of words in the two titles, Giorgio Stamboulis noted that the term ‘amartimàton’ implies sin, while ‘adikemàton’ refers to injustice. 5 The criminal question in the public sphere Inquisition condemned its Spanish translation. There were enthusiastic responses, but also fiercely polemical reactions. In France, Italy and elsewhere, debates continued during and after the French Revolution. In time, Beccaria’s treatise became one of the classics of criminal law, known to be at the foundation of modern penal theory. In the words of Luigi Ferrajoli – another contributor to our collection – Dei delitti e delle pene a fondé le garantisme pénal en définissant le droit pénal comme un système de garanties pour l’individu, c’est-àdire comme un ensemble de limites rationnelles opposées à l’arbitraire et aux excès du pouvoir répressif et destinées à minimiser la violence punitive12, a model which, even in democratic countries, has been absorbed more into their legislation than into their actual penal practices. It is highly significant that a new edition of Dei delitti appeared before the end of Second World War, edited by Piero Calamandrei, an opponent of Fascism, a partisan and a jurist who at the end of the war would be elected to the Constituent Assembly to draw up the Italian Constitution. This edition was published in Florence in January 1945, five months after the liberation of that city, and three months before the end of the war. In his long introduction, Calamandrei explained the reasons for taking his initiative precisely at that moment. He wrote that «this slim volume» which aspires neither to show nor to erudition13 was addressed not to specialists but to «those who look to books [...] for a refuge from the sorrows of their tormented humanity. Now this little book may therefore, at this moment more than any other, offer a source of consolation»14. The general reader will be painfully surprised, as he becomes aware that the moral problems relating to crimes and punishments are still largely live and still hurting us. These pages, Calamandrei continues, do not contain theories pulled out of the air by jurists for dialectical fun, rather, they mirror this impending daily reality in which each and every one of us, as recent experience has shown, from one moment to the next, can see 12 Note de L. Ferrajoli, in C. Beccaria, Des délits et des peines, Préface, traduction et notes de Ph. Audegean, Editions Payot & Rivages, Paris 2014, p. 23. 13 P. Calamandrei, Prefazione, in C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, a cura di P. Calamandrei, Felice Le Monnier, Firenze 1945, p. 17. 14 In order to preserve the flow and the emotional impact of Calamandrei’s argument, we have chosen to give the English translation directly in the text. The original runs: «si rivolge a quelli che ricercano nei libri […] un rifugio e un conforto della loro dolorante umanità. Ora questo piccolo libro può essere appunto, e in questo momento più di sempre, una lettura consolatrice» (ibidem, p. 9). danger crushing our homes, our freedom, our dignity and our very lives15. The book should be a warning, says Calamandrei, to peaceful people, intent on enjoying the benefits of civilization, which they think are established once and for all, and do not feel threatened by the possibility of a relapse into barbarism. They are not aware of this unseen juridical atmosphere which is the basic condition of our shared lives and which they take for granted like the air they breathe. But the day will come when out of the blue this air will be whipped into hurricane. […] The assassins sit on the judges’ bench, and purity of conscience becomes a lift to the scaffold16. He referred to the recent Nazi and Fascist regimes, but at the same time he warned future generations, which might take peace and protection of the law for granted as if they were set in stone. According to Calamandrei, the radical penal reform which Dei delitti proposed also questioned traditional societies and put forward a new idea of human beings and of the psychological impulses which lead them to action. His interpretation was shared by Franco Venturi, the historian who inaugurated the post-war wave of academic studies on Beccaria and who, as a youth under Fascism, had followed his father to France, returning in 1943 to fight in the Resistenza17. Venturi established the fifth Italian edition as the authoritative text, the last to be supervised by Beccaria himself. Since then, much research – not only Italian, of course – has focussed on Dei delitti. A further impetus came from the National Edition of Beccaria’s works, a project conceived by Franco Venturi and Luigi Firpo in the early sixties, which opened with Gianni Francioni’s critical edition of Dei delitti e delle pene in the first volume. Francioni then became general editor of the whole project with Luigi Firpo, whose name he retained as editor even after Firpo’s death. 15 «non hanno per tema teorie campate in aria per svago dialettico dei giuristi, ma questa incombente realtà quotidiana, in cui ciascuno di noi, come la recente esperienza ci ha mostrato, può da un momento all’altro trovare in pericolo il proprio focolare, la propria libertà, la propria dignità, la propria vita» (ibidem, p. 13). 16 «Gli uomini pacifici, tutti intenti a godere i benefici di quella civiltà che stimano stabilita per sempre e senza la possibilità di ricadute nella barbarie, non si accorgono più di questa invisibile atmosfera giuridica che è condizione della vita sociale, come non si accorgono dell’aria che respirano. Ma arriva inaspettato il giorno in cui quell’atmosfera è sconvolta dall’uragano […]. Gli assassini salgono ad assidersi al banco dei giudici, la purità di coscienza diventa titolo per essere portati al patibolo» (ibidem, pp. 14-15). 17 Categorie e identità : Franco Venturi e il concetto di Illuminismo, «Rivista storica italiana», 108, 1996, 1-3, pp. 550-648. 6 In the essay which opens the present collection, Francioni draws on his exhaustive knowledge of Beccaria’s writings to provide an overview of the presence in his work of British philosophy, and also lists the books by English authors in his library, mostly either in Latin or in French translations. In addition, he offers information about the English books mentioned in Il Caffé, the periodical written and published from June 1764 to May 1766 by Beccaria and his friends of the Accademia dei Pugni and which was overtly modelled on The Spectator. Francioni also draws attention, albeit briefly, to two questions, central to recent scholarly debate: the balance between contractarianism and utilitarianism, and the question of whether Beccaria was a follower of the theory of natural law or not. Francioni had addressed the first of these questions in essays which many scholars consider definitive, showing how, before Bentham, utilitarianism and contractarianism were not felt to be mutually exclusive, and how they were connected in Helvétius18. In her essay, entitled Beccaria e Bacon: una fonte inglese alle origini del Dei delitti?, Marialuisa Parise presents the results of her research on Beccaria’s autograph manuscript of the excerpts from Francis Bacon’s works19, and on his pencilled annotations to his copy of the in folio volume of Bacon’s Opera Omnia. These are the two main testimonia of Beccaria’s in-depth reading and studying of Francis Bacon. The legislatore dell’intelletto, as he called him, was one of the authors who influenced Beccaria’s ‘conversion’, to philosophy. Beccaria was reading the English philosopher and making excerpts precisely at the time when he was writing Dei delitti, in which at least eight excerpts appear almost verbatim, besides the exergo and other parts definitely echo Bacon. In Droit naturel et droit à la vie. Beccaria lecteur de Hobbes, Philippe Audegean discusses a fundamental point for the interpretation of Beccaria’s idea of the social contract. In contrast with the traditional – and by some scholars still accepted – interpretation20, which 18 G. Francioni, Beccaria filosofo utilitarista, in Cesare Beccaria fra Milano e l’Europa, Atti del convegno di studi per il 250° anniversario della nascita (Milano, 15-17 marzo 1989), Prolusioni di S. Romagnoli e G.D. Pisapia, Cariplo-Laterza, Milano-Roma-Bari 1990, pp. 69-87. A slightly modified French translation appeared under the title of Beccaria, philosophe utilitariste, in Le bonheur du plus grand nombre. Beccaria et les Lumières, sous la direction de Ph. Audegean et al., ENS Éditions, Lyon 2017. 19 On the importance of these still partly unpublished notebooks of excerpts from Bacon’s Works, see also M. Fattori, Baconiana: Nuove prospettive nella ricezione e fortuna delle opera di Francis Bacon, «Rivista di storia della filosofia», 3, 2003, pp. 405-422. 20 For a recent example, see P. Costa, “Non è dunque la pena di morte un diritto”: alle origini di un dibattito ancora aperto, in Il caso Beccaria, cit., pp. 167-207. Rosamaria Loretelli, John Dunkley maintains that Beccaria was a follower of John Locke’s theory of natural law, Audegean has been arguing over the last nine years that Beccaria was indeed not a follower of the theory of natural law. Since his book La Philosophie de Beccaria. Savoir punir, savoir écrire, savoir produire (2010), he has produced increasing evidence to support his hypothesis that Beccaria’s was a version of the social contract which ran counter to the theory of natural law21. Slightly later, Dario Ippolito sided with him in some finely argued essays, bringing more evidence to this position22. In the essay in the present collection, Audegean brings crucial hermeneutic evidence for his thesis, to an extent that cannot hereafter be overlooked when considering Beccaria’s contractualism. It will be impossible in future to maintain the natural law thesis without first challenging Audegean’s arguments on their own ground23. In Anglo-Italian Interdisciplinary networks 17651767. Frisi, Beccaria, the Verris and the Fellows of the Royal Society, Mauela D’Amore shows how Father Frisi, one of the friends of the Academia dei Pugni and a member of the Royal Society, was at the centre of a transnational cultural bridge between Milan and London. Despite their stronger ties with Paris and the philosophes, Beccaria and the Verri brothers benefited from these exceptional contacts, which can be traced through countless letters in French, Italian and Latin. In the years 1765-1767, when Dei delitti e delle pene was being discussed and translated, the Italian members active in the Royal Society were about thirty in number. They were politicians, men of the Church and men of learning, who belonged to the Universities of Turin and Pisa, to the Crusca and the Apatisti Academies, to the Turin and Bologna Academies of Sciences. D’Amore reports that, enhancing humanistic and scientific studies, they managed to create a direct link between these Italian centres and the London Society. 21 In the Italian translation of the book, titled Cesare Beccaria, filosofo europeo (Carocci, Roma 2014), this subject is at pp. 33-64. Audegean restated his position in Cesare Beccaria, in Enciclopedia italiana, vol. VIII. Appendice, Filosofia. Il contributo italiano alla storia del pensiero, a cura di M. Ciliberto, Istituto dell’Enciclopedia italiana, Roma 2012; and in Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments: the meaning and genesis of a jurispolitical pamphlet, «History of European ideas», 43, 2017, 8, pp. 884-897. 22 D. Ippolito, La philosophie pénale des Lumières entre utilitarisme et rétributivisme, in L. Delia et G. Radica (eds.), Penser la peine à l’âge des Lumières, «Lumières», 20, 2012, pp. 21-34. By the same, Contratto sociale e pena capitale: Beccaria vs. Rousseau, «Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto», 4, 2014, pp. 589-620 ; ‘Pour qu’une peine ne soit pas une violence’: formes et modalités des sanctions pénales dans la philosophie des Lumières, in Le Moment Beccaria, cit., pp. 159-189. 23 From some brief statements in Francioni’s and Ferrajoli’s essays in the present collection, it seems clear to us that he has already won them over. The criminal question in the public sphere Lia Guerra’s A member of the Accademia dei Pugni translates Frances Brooke’s The History of Lady Julia Mandeville. From Giambattista Biffi’s manuscripts presents the results of part of her research on Giambattista Biffi’s unpublished manuscripts. Biffi was the only member of the Academia dei Pugni who knew English well. Lia Guerra’s essay follows on from a previous article24 of hers in which she explored Biffi’s manuscripts in order to trace the relations between the Milanese periodical Il Caffé and the English papers The Spectator, The Guardian and The Idler. She demonstrated how Biffi actually collected and translated English texts for his friends and acted as a direct link with British culture. Guerra’s essay in the present collection examines his partial translation of the epistolary novel The History of Lady Julia Mandeville (published anonymously in 1763) and hypothesises Biffi’s reasons for translating it. It also delineates Biffi’s life and role in the group of friends of the Academia dei Pugni. The second part of this collection opens with Philip Schofield’s and Luigi Ferrajoli’s essays. Schofield is the director of The Bentham Project and the general editor of The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham25. On the basis of unpublished manuscripts from different periods in Bentham’s life, Schofield offers new information about an additional number of evocations of Beccaria’s name and of the presence of themes discussed in Dei delitti in the context of Bentham’s reflections. Schofield focusses particularly on an important manuscript headed Critical Jurisprudence Criminal, which consists in working notes from the mid to late 1770s not intended for publication. In significant portions of this manuscript, Schofield identifies a response, sometimes unacknowledged, to ideas found in Dei delitti. In this way, Schofield brings to light new and more detailed evidence of the fact that, since his formative years, Bentham worked closely and critically through Beccaria’s book. He concludes, however, that if in the end Bentham assimilated and systematised some Beccaria’s positions and rejected others, it was because they chimed in with his own ontology and epistemology. In Beccaria e Bentham, Luigi Ferrajoli – to whom we owe one of the most important contemporary theories of criminal law, which he elucidated in Diritto e Ragione. Teoria del garantismo penale 26 – highlights within a 24 L. Guerra, Giambattista Biffi and his Role in the Dissemination of English Culture in Eighteenth-Century Lombardy, «Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies», 33, 2010, 2, pp. 245-264. 25 University College, London. Most of Bentham’s manuscripts are there, and some in the British Library. Over thirty volumes of The Collected Works have so far appeared, several of them edited by Philip Schofield. 26 Laterza, Roma-Bari 1989. Ferrajoli is also the author of an important general legal theory. See Principia iuris. Teoria del diritto e della democrazia, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2008. 7 broad perspective the fundamental similarities and differences between Beccaria’s and Bentham’s thought. As to the similarities, he draws attention to their both being against jurisprudential and for positive law, for penal parsimony and for a criminal law based on the offence and not on the person who committed it, as well as for proof grounded on inductive logic. As to the differences, Ferrajoli develops his argument that, although both Beccaria and Bentham were exponents of utilitarianism and were liberal thinkers, Beccaria’s adherence to the theory of the social contract led his utilitarianism to be more radical. Beccaria was warmly received in England – says Jeanne Clegg in her essay entitled ‘Piecemeal, incremental, ad hoc’: ‘Beccarian’ experiments in law enforcement in late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century England – because in a sense he preached to the converted. In a perspective which runs from the Glorious Revolution to the mid-eighteenth century, Clegg illustrates the measures which were introduced in England for the prevention of crime and for law enforcement, drawing a parallel between those measures and Beccaria’s suggestions in some chapters of Dei Delitti. She also draws attention to the fact that they were implemented, «piecemeal, incremental and ad hoc», thanks to the agency of countless magistrates, lawyers, merchants, ordinary people, the poor, and even of criminals. From her essay, we can understand the reasons why Beccaria commended England in Dei delitti. He admired England for its jury system and for being a country in which judicial torture was not applied, a country «in cui la gloria delle lettere, la superiorità del commercio e delle ricchezze, e perciò della potenza, e gli esempi di virtù e di coraggio non ci lasciano dubitare della bontà delle leggi»27. Beccaria’s admiration for England found an amplified echo in Alessandro Verri’s letters to his brother. In December 1766, at the end of their stay in Paris, while Beccaria went back to Milan, Alessandro proceeded alone to London, where he stayed until February 1767, informing his brother of his impressions. In a recent article, in which she examines this group of letters, Lidia De Michelis notes that Alessandro’s gaze was 27 C. Beccaria, Des délits et des peines – Dei delitti e delle pene, Introduction, traduction et notes de Ph. Audegean, Texte italien établi par G. Francioni, ENS Éditions, Lyon 2009, chap. XVI: Della tortura, p. 196. In the modern translation by Thomas and Parzen, this passage runs: «... whose glory in letters, superiority in commerce and in wealth, and therefore in power, and whose examples of virtue and courage leave no doubt as to the goodness of its laws» (C. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments and other writings, ed. by A. Thomas, transl. by A. Thomas and J. Parzen, Introduction by A. Burgio, University of Toronto Press, Toronto-Buffalo-London 2008, p. 35). 8 Rosamaria Loretelli, John Dunkley uncritically positive28. His enthusiasm for England led him to praise the English penal system for more reasons than Beccaria. As a matter of fact, he commended England as the incarnation of a fundamental tenet of Dei delitti, namely that punishments should be determined exclusively by the law, since laws are fixed and impartial; while nothing should be left to the magistrate’s discretion, which is arbitrary and could verge on the tyrannical. This was more myth than reality, but Alessandro stated it repeatedly. A letter in which he describes two executions is particularly noteworthy: … vi darà la relatione del modo di farsi appiccare alla inglese … Non mi sento il minimo rimorso di ciò: questo spettacolo qui non ispira l’orrore come da noi […] I rei erano dunque quattro: due falsari di lettere di cambio, due ladri di strada […] Tutta Londra è in gran moto per tal funzione, della quale sono curiosi gl’inglesi anco più di noi. Vi sono gran palchi di legno dall’una e l’altra parte del patibolo, per montare I quali si paga un tanto. Sono sempre pienissimi […] per la strada correvano sempre palle di neve che il popolo si divertiva di scagliare alle carrozze e a’ pederasti incessantemente. Questa si chiama libertà […] le guardie, che stanno attorno al patibolo, e che altro non sono Borghesi I quali per torno fanno lo sbirro, non d’altro armati se non di un grosso bastone […] L’impertinentissimo inglese lascia fare: e non si rivolta contro un uomo così male armato perché teme le leggi […] Il timor delle leggi è grandissimo. […] Ieri è stato appiccato un uxoricida. Ecco la proporzione fra i delitti e le pene in Inghilterra! Pochi giorni fa fu appiccato un Capitano, come vi scrissi, che ha fatta una falsa cambiale di 20 ghinee. Così è lo stesso rubare venti ghinee e ammazzare la moglie. In questa parte non ammiro codesta legislazione […] Ma qui le leggi fredde e in differenti condannano, e non gli uomini e le loro passioni […] Non si può chiamare tiranna che la legge29. 28 L. De Michelis, Letters from London: A ‘Bridge’ between Italy and Europe, in F. O’Gorman and L. Guerra (eds.), The Centre and the Margins in Eighteenth-Century British and Italian Cultures, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne 2013, pp. 36-55. On Beccaria and Britain, by the same, also: ‘Una rete immensa lega tutte le verità’: Cesare Beccaria’s Lectures on Public Economy and Sylvester Douglas’ Traslation On Public Oeconomy and Commerce, in L. De Michelis, L. Guerra and F. O’Gorman (eds.), Politics and Culture in 18th-Century Anglo-Italian Encounters: Entangled Histories, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne 2019, pp. 76-90 (ch. 3). 29 Letters of January 25 and 26, 1767 in P. e A. Verri, Viaggio a Parigi e Londra (1766-1767), respectively pp. 251 ff and 271 ff: «I shall give you a relation of the English way of being hanged […] I do not feel the slightest remorse about it. The spectacle does not inspire here the horror it does in our country. […] The cuprits were four: two forgerers of bills of exchange and two highwaymen […] London is all in great stir for such a function, of which the English are even more curious than we are. There are big wooden benches on both sides of the scaffold. One has to pay to sit on them. They are always packed with people […] along the way [from the prison to the place of execution] the populace enjoyed throwing snowballs at carriages and pederasts incessantly. This In point of fact, much was left in England to the discretion of judges, and the 1767 translation of Dei delitti seems to have intervened in a debate about the magistrates’ power which was already under way, but which acquired greater force in the light of Beccaria’s book. A forceful challenge came on different occasions for instance from Charles Pratt, Lord Camden. The most famous was probably that against general warrants in 1763, in which John Wilkes was involved.30 On another occasion, Camden pronounced words which chime with Beccaria’s ideas and which would later be frequently quoted, even in Parliament. In 1765, during a case debated in court, he said: The discretion of a judge is the law of tyrants; it is always unknown; it is different in different men; it is casual, and depends upon constitution, temper, and passion. In the best, it is often times caprice; in the worst, it is every vice, folly, and passion, to which human nature is liable”31. In The first English translation of Dei delitti e delle pene. A question of sources and modifications, Rosamaria Loretelli presents the results of a collation of the first English translation with one of the sixth Italian editions and with Morellet’s French translation, defining once and for all the question of the sources for the 1767 English translation32. She proves that the unknown English translator not only used both those texts for his/her translation, but also introduced ideologically relevant differences of his/her own, all tending to a more radical interpretation of Beccaria’s words. John Bessler’s essay, The Marquis Beccaria: An Italian Penal Reformer’s Meteoric Rise in the British Isles in the Transatlantic Republic of Letters, underpinned by a is freedom […] the aldermen, who stand around the scaffold and are nothing else but civilians who in turn act as keepers of the peace are armed only with sticks The very impertinent Englishman lets them alone, and does not turn on men so poorly armed, because he is afraid of laws. […] The fear of the law is very great […] Yesterday a wife-killer was hanged. This is the proportion between crimes and punishments in England! A few days ago a Captain was hanged who, as I wrote to you, had forged a bill of exchange dor 20 guineas. So, stealing 20 guineas and killing a wife is one and the same thing. In this I do not admire this legislation. […] But here punishments are imposed by cold and indifferent laws, not by men or their passions. […] Only laws can be called tyrants here. (Our translation). 30 P.D.G. Thomas, John Wilkes: A Friend to Liberty, Clarendon Pr., Oxford 1997, ch. 3. 31 J. Almon, Biographical, Literary, and Political Anecdotes, Printed for J. Almon, opposite Burlington-House, London 1797, vol. I, p. 398. 32 In a previous essay, entitled The First English Translation of Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punshiments. Uncovering the Editorial and Political Contexts («Diciottesimo Secolo. Rivista della Società Italiana di Studi sul Secolo XVIII», II, 2017, pp. 1-22), Loretelli shed light on the editorial, political and cultural environments in which this translation came into being. The criminal question in the public sphere comprehensive bibliography, charts aspects of the reception of Dei Delitti. He documents its enhancement by the prestige of the Commentary of 1766 from the pen of Voltaire, written in the wake of the La Barre execution of the previous year. Voltaire’s revulsion matches that of the prominent Anglophone writers, cited by Bessler, to the Bloody Code, which Beccaria’s treatise clearly calls in question. The favourable reaction of a number of divines, expressed in sermons and letters, is also documented, and implies a fertile field for ongoing research. In examining the relationship between Beccaria and Hume, in Mille choses de sa part. Hume, Ramsay and Beccaria, Emilio Mazza addresses a question particularly relevant to the subject of the present collection. Beccaria mentioned Hume as one of the philosophers he studied, and his presence can clearly be detected in Beccaria’s thinking. What is more difficult to detect is what happened in the other direction. Beccaria and Hume did not meet in Paris, as Hume had just left when Beccaria and Alessandro Verri arrived. While in a letter to Beccaria Morellet informs him that Hume sends him «mille choses de sa part», Beccaria is never actually mentioned in Hume’s letters. And Mazza indicates that what Morellet had said in his letter – now held in the National Library of Scotland – was more than likely untrue. Basing his hypothesis on Hume’s philosophy in general and on a letter in which Ramsay comments on Dei Delitti, in the second part of his essay, Mazza speculates on the position Hume may have held with regard to the text. In her article entitled Crime, Punishment, and Law in eighteenth-century British Encyclopedias, the linguist Elisabetta Lonati examines entries related to crime and punishment in a sample of reference works such as some editions of British universal dictionaries of arts and sciences before and after the publication of the 1767 English translation of Dei Delitti. What emerges, she concludes, is that the notions of law and justice underwent noticeable changes in those dictionaries after 1767. Lonati recognises that this is possibly attributable to the publication of Blackstone’s Commentaries, but also shows how Beccaria is explicitly mentioned too. In Oliver Goldsmith’s The Vicar of Wakefield and Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments, Barbara Witucki examines the probability of a direct or indirect influence of Beccaria’s ideas as they are reflected in the narrative of the Vicar of Wakefield, especially in chapters 26 and 27. Goldsmith is recorded as «tinkering» with the novel over several years both before and after its publication in 1766, a period which coincides with the publication of Beccaria’s treatise in Italian, French and English. While the novel’s ‘opacity’ precludes definite assertions about Goldsmith’s adoption of Beccaria’s ideas, 9 Witucki finds plausible grounds in the events and tenor of the novel to suggest that Beccaria’s ideas had at least sufficiently engaged contemporary intellectuals to have prompted Goldsmith to offer a demonstration of them in action. Goldsmith may have wished to signal, in fiction, his Protestant slant on the issues involved. It may not be insignificant that John Almon, the publisher who published the first English translation of Dei Delitti, was also a journalist who wrote for the Gazetteer, and a rival of Goldsmith, who worked for the Public Ledger33. In Tra filosofia e diritto. Il pensiero critico-riformista di Manasseh Dawes, studioso di Beccaria, Alberto Carrera turns to the jurist and philosopher Manasseh Dawes’s comments on Dei Delitti in his An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, with a view of, and Commentary upon Beccaria, Rousseau, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Fielding and Blackstone, which was published in London in 1782. Dawes, along with Eden, Blackstone and Dagge was among those reformist jurists who, from their different perspectives, proposed changes to English criminal law. Carrera examines the parts of Dawes’s essay specifically devoted to Dei Delitti and provides yet further illustration of the penetration of Beccaria’s ideas into English thought. The aim of the present collection is to open up lines of inquiry into the relationship between Dei delitti and Britain. On one hand, this collection reassesses, specifies and in some case modifies scholarly perspectives as to some English sources for Beccaria’s thinking, on the other it unearths the subsequent repercussion of Dei delitti on and development of English thought, including legal theory and practice and literary, hortatory and epistolary writings. It is clear, from the sample presented here, that Beccaria’s ideas were diffused and absorbed on a hitherto suspected but under-researched scale34, and that material so far underexploited invites further academic scrutiny and promises highly stimulating results. 33 See D.D. Rogers, John Almon and the Politics of Eighteenth-Century Publishing, Peter Lang, New York-Berne-Frankfurt 1986, p. 6. 34 The very few articles published on this subject are mentioned in the essays in this collection. Here we want to draw attention only to a most recent one, unreported in this collection: Ch. Béal, Beccaria et le réformisme pénal en Engleterre (1764-1790), in Le Moment Beccaria, cit., pp. 45-64. Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Saggi Beccaria e l’Inghilterra Citation: G. Francioni (2019) Beccaria e l’Inghilterra. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 11-18. doi: 10.13128/ds-25434 Copyright: © 2019 G. Francioni. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index. php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Gianni Francioni Università di Pavia Abstract. This essay investigates Beccaria’s ideas on Great Britain and his contacts with British intellectuals and their published works. His interests were not restricted to philosophy but included history and fiction. Particular attention will be devoted to all those authors – either acknowledged or not – that are to be listed among his sources – namely Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Hutcheson, Hume, and Ferguson. While Beccaria’s debt to French culture is self-evident, it is useful to address the impact of British culture on thought, although he read British authors mainly in French translations or in the Latin. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Keywords. Beccaria, Great Britain, Philosophers, Historians, Men of Letters. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. 1. Cesare Beccaria sembra essere stato immune dall’anglomania di altri esponenti dell’illuminismo lombardo1. Conosceva molto poco l’inglese (come del resto la gran parte dei suoi amici, a eccezione di Giambattista Biffi e Alessandro Verri) e non mise mai piede in Inghilterra. Come è noto, il viaggio da lui intrapreso nell’autunno del 1766 in compagnia di Alessandro avrebbe dovuto portarlo a Parigi e a Londra, e durare fino alla primavera dell’anno seguente. Ma Beccaria, in preda alla malinconia per aver lasciato a Milano la giovane moglie e la figlia quattrenne, lo interruppe dopo aver soggiornato nella capitale francese poco più di un mese, per rientrare precipitosamente in patria. Alessandro Verri, invece, dopo Parigi andò a Londra, e vi rimase felicemente sessanta giorni, maturando un crescente entusiasmo per gli inglesi, il loro carattere, la loro cultura e il loro stile di vita2. Poco prima di Alessandro, è da registrare una permanenza di un mese a Londra da parte di un altro esponente della cerchia del «Caffè», il matematico Paolo Frisi; e l’anno successivo vi fece un breve viaggio quello che può essere considerato un ‘allievo’ di Beccaria e di Pietro Verri, Giuseppe Gorani3. 1 Oltre all’ormai ‘classico’ volume di A. Graf, L’anglomania e l’influsso inglese in Italia nel secolo XVIII, Loescher, Torino 1911, cfr. F. Rossi, La cultura inglese a Milano e in Lombardia nel Seicento e nel Settecento, Adriatica, Bari 1970, e F. Pesaresi, La scoperta dell’Inghilterra: epistolari e diari dei viaggiatori italiani del Settecento, QuiEdit, Verona 2015. 2 Le vicende del tour degli illuministi milanesi si possono ricostruire sulla base delle lettere di Alessandro al fratello Pietro: cfr. Viaggio a Parigi e Londra (1766-1767). Carteggio di Pietro e Alessandro Verri, a cura di G. Gaspari, Adelphi, Milano 1980. Durante il soggiorno parigino Beccaria e Alessandro avevano studiato un po’ l’inglese; il secondo se ne era impratichito maggiormente nella capitale britannica (cfr. ivi, pp. 60, 104 e 188) e aveva raggiunto un buon livello di conoscenza negli anni successivi. 3 Cfr. F. Venturi, Nota introduttiva a Paolo Frisi, in Illuministi italiani, t. III. Riformatori lombardi, piemontesi e toscani, Ricciardi, Milano-Napoli 1958, p. 294; Id., Nota introduttiva a Giuseppe Gorani, ivi, p. 483. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 11-18 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25434 12 I contatti personali di Beccaria con intellettuali britannici dovettero essere scarsissimi. Nel suo carteggio è presente un biglietto datato 20 novembre 1766, scrittogli per invitarlo a pranzo, quando era a Parigi, dal celebre uomo politico e giornalista John Wilkes (che era riparato nella capitale francese alla fine del 1763 per sfuggire all’arresto, dopo aver pubblicato un violento attacco contro re Giorgio III). La conoscenza tra Wilkes e Beccaria avvenne proprio allora, anche se non è da escludere che si fossero già incontrati l’anno prima, quando l’inglese aveva fatto un viaggio in Italia, fermandosi qualche giorno a Milano4. Altre due lettere gli furono inviate, il 1° giugno 1769 e il 10 luglio 1770, rispettivamente da Sylvester Douglas, l’autore della traduzione inglese della sua Prolusione nell’apertura della nuova cattedra di Scienze camerali (1769)5, e da Henry Herbert, decimo conte di Pembroke (anche questi conosciuto a Milano), che gli annunciava il prossimo invio di due opere che Beccaria gli aveva chiesto di procurargli, i Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-69) di William Blackstone e An Essay towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language (1668) di John Wilkins6. Per nessuno dei tre corrispondenti si conservano risposte di Beccaria. Se restiamo ancora al gruppo dei collaboratori del «Caffè», altri, che pure non avevano visitato l’Inghilterra, non mancarono di manifestare i loro sentimenti filo-inglesi: primo fra tutti Pietro Verri, che la indicherà costantemente come la patria della libertà. Già nelle sue Meditazioni sulla felicità (1763) non è difficile cogliere un’implicita allusione a Inghilterra e Olanda nella descrizione di quei «paesi liberi» i cui «avantaggi [...] sono andati sempre crescendo in Europa», al punto da porre gli altri sovrani europei «nell’alternativa o di vedersi come tributari delle nazioni libere o di abolire ogni schiavitù nella loro nazione»7. Principio ribadito nella lettera al fratello dell’8-10 febbraio 1767, dove si sottolinea che gli Inglesi 4 Cfr. C. Beccaria, Carteggio, parte I, a cura di C. Capra, R. Pasta e F. Pino Pongolini, Mediobanca, Milano 1994 [Edizione Nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria, vol. IV], p. 485 e la relativa nota di commento. Alessandro Verri da Parigi definiva Wilkes «uno de’ miei amici» (Viaggio a Parigi e Londra, cit., p. 119). 5 Cfr. C. Beccaria, Carteggio, parte II, a cura di C. Capra, R. Pasta e F. Pino Pongolini, Mediobanca, Milano 1996 [Edizione Nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria, vol. V], pp. 57-60. La versione inglese della prolusione di Beccaria era uscita senza il nome del traduttore: A Discourse on Public Economy and Commerce, by the Marquis Caesar Beccaria Bonesana, J. Dodsley & J. Murray, London 1769. 6 Cfr. Beccaria, Carteggio, parte II, cit., pp. 164-165. 7 P. Verri, Meditazioni sulla felicità, in Id., Scritti letterari, filosofici e satirici, a cura di G. Francioni, con la collaborazione di E. Chiari et al., Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma 2014 [Edizione Nazionale delle opere di Pietro Verri, vol. I], p. 760. Gianni Francioni hanno una superiorità decisa su tutto il continente d’Europa e non hanno torto di guardare i forestieri come schiavi, giacché la maggior parte lo sono, per le istituzioni della Politica europea [...]. Dunque, o deperire ed essere oppressi dalle forze esterne, ovvero dare la libertà civile ai popoli: questa è l’alternativa in cui si trovano gli Stati d’Europa8 . Il bresciano Giuseppe Colpani (un marginale collaboratore del «Caffè») farà eco a queste diffuse convinzioni nel poemetto Il commercio (dedicato nel 1766 a Pietro Verri), dove l’Inghilterra è cantata come «terra beata, amica sede | all’aurea libertà», «da ferme leggi | entro il giusto confin retta e librata»9. Se sfogliamo le due annate del «Caffè», è tutto un susseguirsi di accenni alla libertà dell’Inghilterra, alla sua opulenza economica e commerciale, ai suoi grandi contributi in campo filosofico, scientifico e letterario. L’acme è rappresentato dall’articolo di Pietro Verri Sulla interpretazione delle leggi. Ha la forma del resoconto di una conversazione tenutasi nella bottega di Demetrio, nella quale l’io narrante (lo stesso Verri) alla fine si fa rimbrottare da uno degli interlocutori per la sua insistente anglofilia («Sempre quell’Inghilterra, sempre Inghilterra!»)10. Qui viene esaltata, come sicura garanzia della libertà politica contro il dispotismo, l’applicazione letterale della legge da parte dei giudici inglesi, contro l’interpretazione del suo ‘spirito’, che stravolgerebbe uno dei capisaldi di quel sistema politico: la netta separazione fra potere legislativo e potere giudiziario, teorizzata da Francis Bacon e dopo di lui da Montesquieu (entrambi citati da Verri)11. Pietro aveva già valutato positivamente la legislazione e il sistema giudiziario inglesi, lodando in particolare l’abolizione della tortura, nelle Considerazioni sul commercio dello Stato di Milano (1763), nell’Orazione panegirica sulla giurisprudenza milanese (1763) e nell’almanacco Il Gran Zoroastro per il 176412. Beccaria condivide posizioni del genere, anche se le manifesta meno frequentemente e con toni più misurati. In Dei delitti e delle pene (1764) l’abolizione della tortura giudiziaria è presentata come una prova dei progressi compiuti in Inghilterra, «nazione in cui la gloria delle lettere, la superiorità del commercio e delle ricchezze, e perciò della potenza, e gli esempj di virtù e di coraggio, 8 Viaggio a Parigi e Londra, cit., pp. 262-263. Colpani, Il commercio, in Id., Poemetti e lettere in versi sciolti, Giammaria Rizzardi, Brescia 1769, p. 66. 10 Cfr. «Il Caffè» (1764-1766), a cura di G. Francioni e S. Romagnoli, II ed. riveduta, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino 1998 , pp. 695-704: 704. 11 Ivi, p. 698. 12 Cfr. P. Verri, Scritti di economia, finanza e amministrazione, a cura di G. Bognetti et al., tomo I, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma 2006 [Edizione Nazionale delle opere di Pietro Verri, vol. II/1], pp. 236, 245, 292-293, 303-304 e passim; Id., Scritti letterari, filosofici e satirici, cit., pp. 424-426, 444, 545. 9 G. 13 Beccaria e l’Inghilterra non ci lasciano dubitare della bontà delle leggi»13. L’autore non nomina l’Inghilterra, ma sicuramente è a essa che pensa, laddove (seguendo la descrizione del sistema giudiziario e più in generale il ‘modello inglese’ delineato da Montesquieu nel libro XI, cap. VI dell’Esprit des lois) scrive che è ottima legge quella che stabilisce assessori al giudice principale presi dalla sorte, e non dalla scelta, perchè in questo caso è più sicura l’ignoranza che giudica per sentimento che la scienza che giudica per opinione14. e laddove nota che «è utilissima legge quella che ogni uomo sia giudicato dai suoi pari, perchè, dove si tratta della libertà e della fortuna di un cittadino, debbono tacere quei sentimenti che inspira la disuguaglianza»15. Ha in mente, ancora, l’Inghilterra quando stabilisce che, se si vuol «prevenire il pericoloso addensamento delle popolari passioni», «le arringhe destinate a sostenere gl’interessi privati e pubblici» devono essere tenute solo «nelle adunanze della nazione, nei parlamenti o dove risieda la maestà del sovrano»16; o nel passaggio in cui esalta la libertà conquistata con le guerre civili: quando, calmati gli animi ed estinto l’incendio che ha purgata la nazione dai mali che l’opprimono, la verità, i di cui progressi prima son lenti e poi accelerati, siede compagna su i troni de’ monarchi ed ha culto ed ara nei parlamenti delle repubbliche17. Nella Prolusione proclama che «Elisabetta in Inghilterra, e la sapienza de’ suoi Parlamenti, portano al colmo la superiorità delle manifatture e l’impero del mare»; e negli Elementi di economia pubblica (1769-73) sostiene che «non v’è parte più agricola dell’Inghilterra, e nessuna nazione ha giammai viste nel suo seno più trionfare le arti e le manifatture»18. 2. Sulla base di quali opere Beccaria e i membri dell’Accademia dei Pugni (un gruppo di giovani abituati alla lettura collettiva e certamente allo scambio dei libri) maturano la loro conoscenza della cultura inglese? I maggiori autori che vengono citati nel «Caffè» sono Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Newton, Swift, Addison, 13 C. Beccaria, Des délits et des peines / Dei delitti e delle pene, introduction, traduction et notes de Ph. Audegean, texte italien établi par G. Francioni, ENS Éditions, Lyon 2009, p. 196 (d’ora in poi: Delitti). 14 Ivi, p. 184. 15 Ibidem. 16 Ivi, p. 176. 17 Ivi, pp. 288, 290. 18 C. Beccaria, Scritti economici, a cura di G. Gaspari, Mediobanca, Milano 2014 [Edizione Nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria, vol. III], pp. 94 e 261. Steele, Pope, Hume; più altri minori, scrittori di cose tecniche (trattati di agricoltura, di ottica, di meccanica, ecc.), per i quali i «caffettieri» fanno ricorso sicuramente a traduzioni, se non addirittura a citazioni di seconda mano (Pietro Verri, ad esempio, nomina una sfilza di scienziati e di medici inglesi nell’articolo Sull’innesto del vaiuolo, ma non per conoscenza diretta)19. Beccaria doveva aver letto gli autori più importanti. Ne abbiamo certezza nel caso di alcuni libri, presenti in inventari parziali della sua biblioteca (che fu in gran parte rivenduta quando egli era ancora in vita)20: oltre agli Opera omnia di Bacon nell’edizione in-folio pubblicata a Copenhagen nel 169421, vi si trovavano il De cive di Hobbes22 e una non meglio identificata traduzione latina settecentesca («De intellectu humano») di An Essay Concerning Human Understanding di Locke, al quale Beccaria fa più volte riferimento23. Di Locke, si può poi ipotizzare che avesse anche gli scritti economici nell’edizione fiorentina del 1751, dal momento che li cita già nel suo primo scritto, Del disordine e de’ rimedi delle monete nello Stato di Milano nel 176224; e specialmente 19 Cfr. «Il Caffè», cit., pp. 756-803. Cfr. M. F. Turchetti, Libri e «nuove idee». Appunti sulla biblioteca illuministica di Cesare Beccaria, «Archivio storico lombardo», 139, 2013, pp. 183-236. Il saggio si basa su un elenco di circa 130 libri della biblioteca familiare di Beccaria e sull’inventario di vendita ai librai milanesi Reycends di 195 volumi, ceduti da Beccaria nel 1777 (entrambi i documenti – segnalati per la prima volta da F. Pino Pongolini, Contributo alla biografia di Cesare Beccaria: le vicende economiche e patrimoniali della famiglia, in Cesare Beccaria tra Milano e L’Europa. Convegno di studi per il 250º anniversario della nascita promosso dal Comune di Milano, Cariplo-Laterza, Milano-Roma-Bari 1990, pp. 590, 618, 622, 633 – sono conservati alla Biblioteca Ambrosiana di Milano). 21 Francisci Baconi ... Opera omnia, cum novo eoque insigni augmento tractatuum hactenus ineditorum..., Christianus Goezius, Hafniae [Copenaghen] 1694. 22 Elementa philosophica de cive, auctore Thom. Hobbes Malmesburiensi, editio nova accuratior, juxta exemplar Amsterodami, F. Grasset, Lausannae 1760. 23 Si vedano, ad esempio, gli Elementi di economia pubblica: «Locke [...] a traverso della nebbia dei termini, ha portato la fiaccola dell’analisi nei più segreti nascondigli dell’intelletto umano» (Beccaria, Scritti economici, cit., p. 282). Anche in un passo delle Ricerche intorno alla natura dello stile non arrivato alla stampa, Beccaria riconosce a Locke «il merito immortale di aver fatto epoca nello spirito umano» (C. Beccaria, Scritti filosofici e letterari, a cura di L. Firpo, G. Francioni e G. Gaspari, Mediobanca, Milano 1984 [Edizione Nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria, vol. II], p. 211). 24 Ragionamenti sopra la moneta e l’interesse del danaro, le finanze e il commercio, scritti e pubblicati in diverse occasioni dal signor Giovanni Locke, tradotti la prima volta dall’Inglese, con varie annotazioni, 2 voll., A. Bonducci, Firenze 1751 (cfr. Beccaria, Scritti economici, cit., pp. 21 e 26). L’opera faceva comunque parte della biblioteca di Pietro Verri: cfr. C. Capra, Pietro Verri e il “genio della lettura”, in Per Marino Berengo. Studi degli allievi, a cura di L. Antonielli, C. Capra e M. Infelise, FrancoAngeli, Milano 2000, pp. 619-677 (in appendice, l’inventario dei libri di Pietro Verri posti in vendita dopo la sua morte, redatto dal libraio milanese Luigi Galeazzi su incarico della vedova, Vincenza Melzi; il documento è conservato nell’Archivio Verri presso la Fondazione Raf20 14 il secondo dei Two Treatises of Government (in una delle tante versioni francesi impresse nella prima metà del Settecento)25: un’opera che gioca un ruolo non secondario nell’impianto concettuale dei Delitti. Ancora: possedeva i Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica e La methode des fluxions, et des suites infinies di Newton (ma di entrambi non sappiamo in quale edizione), nonché An Essay on Man e altri scritti di Pope26, la History of England e i Political Discourses di Hume (tutti in traduzione francese)27. Da altra fonte sappiamo che si era procurato gli Opera philosophica di Hobbes28. Quanto a Swift, era stato lodato da Verri fin dal Gran Zoroastro per il 1759 come autore di «taccuini» satirici (e il riferimento era con ogni probabilità ai cosiddetti Bickerstaff-Partridge Papers, parodie di almanacchi pubblicate da Swift tra il 1708 e il 1709, di cui Verri doveva aver avuto qualche notizia, anche se non una diretta conoscenza)29; e viene nominato ancora nel primo numero del «Caffè» come modello per chi voglia «spargere delle utili cognizioni fra i nostri cittadini divertendoli, come già altrove fecero e Steele, e Swift, e Addisson, e Pope ed altri»30. Verri possedeva una traduzione francese dei Gulliver’s Travels, ai quali si allude sia nel suo articolo Gli studi utili, sia nel Tentativo analitico su i contrabbandi di Beccaria, che dunque doveva averli letti31. Non sappiamo molto di più dei gusti letterari inglesi dell’autore dei Delitti, e pertanto dobbiamo limitarci a segnalare che, oltre a una versione francese del Iulius Caesar di Shakespeare32 (un autore che però non faele Mattioli, Milano); ripreso (ma senza l’inventario) in C. Capra, La felicità per tutti. Figure e temi dell’Illuminismo lombardo, Aracne, Roma 2017, pp. 189-227. 25 Ad esempio, Du gouvernement civil, où l’on traite de l’origine, des fondemens, de la nature du pouvoir et des fins des sociétez politiques, traduit de l’Anglois, nouvelle édition, Du Villard et Jaquier, Genève 1724. 26 Essai sur l’homme, poëme philosophique par Alexander Pope en cinq langues, savoir: anglois, latin, italien, françois, et allemand, Amand König, Strasbourg 1762; Œuvres diverses de M. Alexandre Pope, Arkstée & Merkus, Amsterdam-Leipzig 1753. 27 Histoire d’Angleterre, depuis l’invasion de Jules César jusqu’à l’avènement de Henry VII..., traduite de l’Anglois par M.me B*** [Octavie Belot], 18 voll., s.e., Amsterdam 1763-1766; Discours politiques de Monsieur Hume, traduits de l’anglois par M. de M**** [Eléazar de Mauvillon], 5 voll., J. Schreuder & Pierre Mortier le jeune, Amsterdam 1754-1757. 28 Thomae Hobbes Malmesburiensis Opera philosophica, quae Latine scripsit, omnia..., 8 voll., J. Blaeu, Amstelodami 1668. L’opera era stata spedita a Beccaria, su sua richiesta, dal libraio reggiano Mosè Beniamino Foà (cfr. Beccaria, Carteggio, parte II, cit., pp. 146-147, 154-155, 160161: Foà a Beccaria, 18 maggio, 8 giugno e 5 luglio 1770). 29 Verri, Scritti letterari, filosofici e satirici, cit., p. 542. 30 «Il Caffè», cit., p. 11. 31 Voyage du Capitaine Lemuel Gulliver en divers pays éloignez, 2 voll., P. Gosse & J. Neaulme, La Aye 1741; e cfr. «Il Caffè», cit., pp. 317 e 174. 32 Jules-César, tragedie de Shakespear [sic], traduite de l’Anglois par M.r De Voltaire, et L’Héraclius espagnol, ou la Comédie fameuse ... par Don Pedro Calderon de la Barca, traduite de l’Espagnol par le même, François Grasset, Lausanne 1774. Gianni Francioni gli piaceva, mentre ne erano lettori entusiasti Pietro e Alessandro Verri – quest’ultimo si cimenterà nella traduzione di Hamlet e Othello)33, nella sua biblioteca erano presenti, in lingua originale, la Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded di Samuel Richardson34 e una commedia di John Vanbrugh, The Relapse, or Virtue in Danger 35. Al principio del 1766 aveva chiesto al suo stampatore livornese Giuseppe Aubert di procurargli The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy di Sterne, ma non sappiamo se i volumi usciti a Londra fino a quel momento gli furono effettivamente inviati36. Tra i periodici citati nel «Caffè» – dal «Journal britannique» (pubblicato all’Aja per aggiornare i lettori sulle novità culturali, scientifiche, editoriali provenienti dall’Inghilterra), a «The Craftsman» (di cui veniva impressa ad Amsterdam una versione francese), al «Gentleman’s Magazine» e alle «Philosophical Transactions» (questi ultimi due per il tramite di altre fonti) – primeggia ovviamente «The Spectator», sicuramente letto dai «caffettisti» in una delle traduzioni francesi che cominciarono a circolare dal 1716 (forse nella quinta edizione del 1744): Le Spectateur, ou le Socrate moderne37. Anche se nessun documento lo comprova, questi volumi avevano sicuramente fatto parte, se non della biblioteca di Beccaria, almeno di quella di Verri38. «The Spectator» costituisce infatti il modello dichiarato del «Caffè» (come del resto afferma Beccaria nella lettera ad André Morellet del 26 gennaio 1766: «nous faisons imprimer des feuilles à l’imitation du Spectateur, ouvrage qui a tant contribué à augmenter en Angleterre la culture de 33 «Io non conosco un uomo solo a cui piaccia Shakespeare; non a Carli, non a Beccaria; noi due soli siamo di questo umore» (Carteggio di Pietro e Alessandro Verri, vol. XI, a cura di G. Seregni, Giuffrè, Milano 1940, p. 72: Pietro ad Alessandro, 20 maggio 1780). Su Alessandro Verri traduttore di Shakespeare cfr. S. Colognesi, Shakespeare e Alessandro Verri, Nicola, Milano-Varese 1963; P. Musitelli, Le flambeau et les ombres. Alessandro Verri, des Lumières à la Restauration (1741-1816), École Française de Rome, Roma 2016, pp. 201-206. 34 Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded. In a Series of Familiar Letters from a Beautiful Young Damsel to her Parents..., 4 voll., G. Ewing & G. Faulkner, Dublin 17416. 35 The Relapse, or Virtue in Danger. Being the Sequel of The Fool in Fashion, a Comedy acted at the Theatre-Royal in Drury-Lane written by Sir John Vanbrugh, R. James et al., London 1727. 36 «Farò anzi fo di tutto per trovarle il The life of opinion by Tristan Shandy (l’autore è a Napoli), e quando mi tradisca la speranza che ho di rinvenirlo qui, lo commetterò a Londra, ove ho degli amici puntuali ed esatti» (Beccaria, Carteggio, parte I, cit., p. 241: Giuseppe Aubert a Beccaria, 8 febbraio 1766). Cfr. The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman, 9 voll., R. and J. Dodsley et al., London 1759-1767. 37 Le Spectateur, ou le Socrate moderne, ou l’on voit un portrait naïf des mœurs de ce siècle, traduit de l’Anglois, 6 voll., Wetsteins et Smith, Amsterdam 1744. Cfr. L. Negri, «Le Spectateur de l’Italie». “Il Caffè”, “The Spectator” e il giornalismo settecentesco, tesi di laurea, Università di Pavia, a.a. 1996-1997. 38 Non è tuttavia presente nell’inventario di vendita di cui dà conto Capra, Pietro Verri e il “genio della lettura”, cit. 15 Beccaria e l’Inghilterra l’esprit et les progrès du bon sens»)39. «The Spectator» è seguìto fin dalla mutuazione, nel primo numero del «Caffè», del personaggio di un caffettiere greco 40, ma specialmente ispira direttamente diversi articoli: da De’ fogli periodici (memore di analoghe considerazioni sulla loro funzione svolte da Addison nel n. 124 del giornale inglese)41 e I piaceri dell’immaginazione di Beccaria (che riprende, fin dal titolo, quanto Addison aveva pubblicato nei nn. 411-421)42, al pezzo Sul ridicolo di Pietro Verri (che trae dallo «Spectator», n. 47, un’osservazione di Hobbes sul riso)43. Si tenga poi conto della presenza, negli zibaldoni manoscritti di Giambattista Biffi (che possiamo immaginare essere stati, in certi momenti, a disposizione dei membri dell’Accademia dei Pugni), di trascrizioni di articoli di Addison e Steele, accanto a citazioni, estratti e versioni (parziali o integrali) da George Berkeley, John Boyle, Frances Brooke, Richard Cumberland, Wentworth Dillon, John Dryden, David Hume, Samuel Johnson, John Milton, Alexander Pope e William Shakespeare44. 3. Altri indizi sulla cultura inglese di Beccaria ci vengono dai riferimenti impliciti che si possono rinvenire nelle sue pagine. Il filosofo milanese, come è noto, è assai parco e cauto nel nominare gli autori. Nei Delitti cita solo Montesquieu e allude copertamente a Rousseau e (forse) a Helvétius45. Nel preambolo A chi legge – scritto però non da Beccaria, ma da Pietro Verri, e inserito nella «quinta» edizione del 176646 – compare poi un riferimento a Hobbes a scopo difensivo, laddove si precisa che lo stato di guerra tratteggiato all’inizio dei Delit39 Beccaria, Carteggio, parte I, cit., p. 224. Caffè», cit., pp. 11-14; Le Spectateur, cit., vol. I, disc. I. 41 «Il Caffè», cit., pp. 411-419; Le Spectateur, cit., vol. II, disc. XXIV. 42 «Il Caffè», cit., pp. 476-480. Le Spectateur, cit., vol. IV, disc. XLII-LII. 43 «Il Caffè», cit., pp. 560-566. Le Spectateur, cit., vol. I, disc. XXXV. 44 Cfr. G. Dossena, Introduzione a G. Biffi, Diario (1777-1781), Bompiani, Milano 1976, pp. xxii-xxiii; R. Sgariboldi, Giambattista Biffi: un anglomane nella Cremona del XVIII secolo (con una appendice di testi inediti), tesi di laurea, Università di Pavia, a.a. 1998-1999; L. Guerra, Giambattista Biffi and His Role in the Dissemination of English Culture in Eighteenth-Century Lombardy, «Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies», 33, 2010, 2, pp. 245-264. 45 Montesquieu è esplicitamente nominato in Beccaria, Delitti, pp. 144, 146 e 188; un’allusione a Rousseau è senza dubbio nel passo: «Un grand’uomo, che illumina l’umanità che lo perseguita, ha fatto vedere in dettaglio quali sieno le principali massime di educazione veramente utile agli uomini...» (ivi, p. 292); Beccaria intende forse riferirsi a Helvétius laddove afferma che «merita la gratitudine degli uomini quel filosofo ch’ebbe il coraggio dall’oscuro e disprezzato suo gabinetto di gettare nella moltitudine i primi semi lungamente infruttuosi delle utili verità» (ivi, p. 142). 46 Cfr. G. Francioni, Notizia sul manoscritto della seconda redazione del «Dei delitti e delle pene» (con una appendice di inediti di Pietro Verri relativi all’opera di Beccaria), «Studi settecenteschi», 7-8, 1985-1986, pp. 229-296: 272-274, 285-287. 40 «Il ti non va preso «nel senso hobbesiano, cioè di nessun dovere e di nessuna obbligazione anteriore, in vece di prenderlo per un fatto, nato dalla corruzione della natura umana e dalla mancanza di una sanzione espressa»47. Su questo punto ritornerò; ma intanto, annotiamo che l’unica opera in cui Hobbes viene apertamente nominato da Beccaria è il Disordine delle monete, dove osserva che quello stato di guerra in cui Hobbes ha creduto essere le genti, si verifica nel commercio e nelle monete, dove ogni nazione cerca d’arricchirsi coll’impoverimento altrui, e combatte più coll’industria che colle armi48. Vi è però un altro autore, inglese, di cui Beccaria fa esplicitamente il nome nel frontespizio dei Delitti, e precisamente nella citazione, posta in esergo fin dalla prima edizione, tratta dal saggio XLV (De officio judicis) dei Sermones fideles di Francis Bacon49: frase che stava ad indicare che non era possibile sperare in una riforma immediata e complessiva della legislazione penale dei diversi paesi europei, ma che bisognava comunque proporla e prepararla con costanza e fermezza. A Bacon, dunque, vien riservato nell’opera maggiore una sorta di posto d’onore. Non altrettanto avviene (ma la cosa si spiega, tenuto conto della nazionalità dell’interlocutore) nella citata lettera di Beccaria ad André Morellet, vera e propria – seppur rapidissima – autobiografia intellettuale del Nostro: qui, l’unico autore non francese elencato fra coloro che sono stati alla base della sua «conversione alla filosofia» (Montesquieu, Helvétius, Buffon, Diderot, d’Alembert, Condillac; manca Rousseau, ma solo perché con lui i philosophes parigini avevano appena rotto ogni rapporto) è David Hume, di cui Beccaria loda «la metaphisique profonde», «la vérité et la noveauté» delle idee, e di cui dice di aver letto da poco e con gran piacere i 18 volumi della Histoire d’Angleterre, trovandovi «un politique, un philosophe et un historien du premier ordre»50. Ho però molti dubbi che, nonostante l’apprezzamento rivolto qui alla filosofia di Hume, si possa ravvisare negli scritti di Beccaria una reale influenza di A Treatise of Human Nature o di An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding; mentre è accertata, e comprovata da una puntuale nota dell’autore in calce al Disordine delle monete, quella dei Political Discourses51. 47 Beccaria, Delitti, p. 138. Scritti economici, cit., p. 31. 49 «In rebus quibuscumque difficilioribus non expectandum, ut quis simul, et serat, et metat, sed praeparatione opus est, ut per gradus maturescant». 50 Beccaria, Carteggio, parte I, cit., p. 223. 51 Id., Scritti economici, cit., p. 38. Cfr. M. Baldi, David Hume nel Settecento italiano: filosofia ed economia, La Nuova Italia, Firenze 1983, specialmente pp. 40 ss., 165 ss. 48 Id., 16 A Bacon, Beccaria accenna solo di passaggio alla fine della lettera a Morellet (dove lascia cadere l’informazione: «il Baccone che io posseggo è in-folio»)52; e l’inciso non rende giustizia del fatto che il lord cancelliere deve essere annoverato a pieno titolo tra i motivi della sua conversione filosofica, se si pensi che Beccaria, la cui pigrizia era nella sua cerchia proverbiale, si sobbarcò fra il 1762 e il 1763 alla fatica di compilare un codice di estratti dal De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum e dal Novum organum53. Se i brani tratti da quest’ultimo sono mere trascrizioni funzionali allo studio dell’opera, quelli ricavati dal De dignitate si rivelano proposizioni utili alla stesura dei Delitti (che viene avviata in quello stesso 1763), perché riguardano la problematica giuridica. Ricopiandoli, Beccaria si esercita altresì all’uso dell’aforisma, che tanto rilievo avrà nella tessitura letteraria del suo libro. Mi limito a menzionare una curiosità: l’aforisma «Qui celat dictum quærit amicitiam, sed qui altero sermone repetit, separat fœderatos», viene copiato da Beccaria, per un vero e proprio lapsus freudiano, sostituendo «delictum» a «dictum»54. Segnalo infine che otto brani del codice di estratti vengono ripresi (talvolta pressoché a calco) nei Delitti55; ma il nome di Bacon può essere fatto in sede di commento ad altri passaggi dell’opera56. Accennavo prima a Hobbes e a Locke. Non vi è dubbio che Beccaria abbia una precisa conoscenza, come ho già sottolineato, non solo degli scritti di Locke sulla moneta, che cita nel Disordine57, ma anche del secondo dei Two Treatises of Government, al quale è da ricondurre in primo luogo il dispositivo contrattualistico a minima cessione di libertà naturali che consente agli individui di uscire dallo stato di natura, di cui è parola nel § I dei Delitti (ma il trattato informa altresì diversi passaggi dell’opera maggiore); mentre An Essay Concerning Human Understanding esercita un’importante influenza, in particolare sulle Ricerche intorno alla natura dello stile (1770), dove Beccaria fa propria la gnoseologia lockiana e tenta di dare un’originale versione della teoria empiristica delle idee58. 52 Beccaria, Carteggio, parte I, cit., p. 225. Id., Scritti filosofici e letterari, cit., pp. 459-471. 54 Cfr. F. Bacon, De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum VIII 2, in Id., Opera omnia, cit., col. 218; Beccaria, Scritti filosofici e letterari, cit., p. 467. 55 Cfr. Id., Delitti, pp. 148, 152, 184, 194, 212, 224, 230 e le relative note di commento. 56 Cfr. ivi, pp. 140, 146, 152, 318 e le relative note di commento. 57 Id., Scritti economici, cit., pp. 21 e 26. Anche alcuni brani degli Elementi di economia pubblica possono essere accostati a passi di Locke: cfr. ivi, pp. 108, 301, 312, 317-318, 327, 332, 336, 365, 375 e le relative note. 58 Cfr. G. Gaspari, Beccaria, Leopardi e la crisi del sensismo, in Id., Letteratura delle riforme. Da Beccaria a Manzoni, Sellerio, Palermo 1990, pp. 201-231. 53 Cfr. Gianni Francioni Anche il nome di Hobbes viene fatto più volte dai commentatori in calce a determinati luoghi dei Delitti. Quanto poi al singolare amalgama presentato nel primo paragrafo, tra una condizione di stato di natura come stato di guerra sicuramente mutuata da Hobbes e un contratto istitutivo della società di stampo sicuramente lockiano (ma la combinazione era già in una pagina di Helvétius, che Beccaria riprende con significativa aderenza)59, è questione che non cessa di appassionare i critici; così come è ancora oggetto di discussione se quello fra contrattualismo e utilitarismo non sia, in Beccaria, un «difficile equilibrio»60 (se non, addirittura, una «confusione» di due correnti teoriche distinte e di fatto incompatibili61) oppure, come io ritengo, la ‘normale’ compresenza di idea di utilità e idea di contratto che caratterizza tutto il filone utilitaristico sei-settecentesco (da Hobbes a Hélvetius, per intenderci): una tradizione di pensiero da tener distinta dal successivo assetto della dottrina (quale si determina da Bentham in poi), in cui l’assunto di un contratto sociale sarà esplicitamente rifiutato62. Un ulteriore problema viene a complicare il quadro: l’adesione di Beccaria al contrattualismo utilitarista comporta anche una sua adesione alla teoria dei diritti naturali? Oppure (dal momento che per lui, propriamente, non si ha ‘legge’ se non all’interno della società civile) non è, la sua (come anche a me pare), una versione della teoria in chiave nettamente antigiusnaturalistica?63 Per restare alle fonti dell’utilitarismo beccariano, vi è, in Dei delitti e delle pene, una proposizione che consente di fare il nome di Francis Hutcheson. È il notissimo slogan «la più grande felicità per il più gran numero», che diverrà la parola d’ordine dell’utilitarismo settecentesco e verrà infine codificato, quale formula-base del sistema, 59 Cfr. Beccaria, Delitti, p. 147; Helvétius, De l’Esprit, Durand, Paris 1758, disc. I, chap. 3, p. 21, nota c. 60 F. Venturi, Introduzione a C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene. Con una raccolta di lettere e documenti relativi alla nascita dell’opera e alla sua fortuna nell’Europa del Settecento, Einaudi, Torino 1965, pp. xii-xiii. 61 R. Mondolfo, Introduzione e commento a C. Beccaria, Opere scelte, Cappelli, Bologna 1925, pp. xviii e 5. 62 Rinvio in proposito al mio Beccaria, philosophe utilitariste, in Le bonheur du plus grand nombre. Beccaria et les Lumières, a cura di Ph. Audegean et al., ENS Éditions, Lyon 2017, pp. 23-44. Cfr. inoltre H.L.A. Hart, Beccaria and Bentham, in Atti del convegno internazionale su Cesare Beccaria promosso dall’Accademia delle Scienze di Torino nel secondo centenario dell’opera «Dei delitti e delle pene», Accademia delle Scienze, Torino 1966, pp. 19-29; G. Zarone, Etica e politica nell’utilitarismo di Cesare Beccaria, Istituto italiano per gli studi storici, Napoli 1971; L. Gianformaggio, Su Helvétius, Beccaria e Bentham, in Gli italiani e Bentham. Dalla “felicità pubblica” all’economia del benessere, a cura di R. Faucci, FrancoAngeli, Milano 1982, vol. 1, pp. 49-54; D.B. Young, Cesare Beccaria: utilitarian or retributivist?, «Journal of Criminal Justice», 11, 1983, pp. 317-326. 63 Cfr. Ph. Audegean, La Philosophie de Beccaria. Savoir punir, savoir écrire, savoir produire, Vrin, Paris 2010 (trad. it., Cesare Beccaria, filosofo europeo, Carocci, Roma 2014). 17 Beccaria e l’Inghilterra nel Fragment on Government (1776) di Bentham. Hutcheson l’aveva enunciato per primo nel 1725 nella Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue («that action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number»)64. Volta in francese nel 1749 da Marc-Antoine Eidous nella sua traduzione della Inquiry; riadattata nel 1751 da Duclos nelle Considérations sur les mœurs de ce siècle (e di lì, quasi alla lettera, recepita nella voce «Gouvernement» del cavaliere de Jaucourt per il vol. VII dell’Encyclopédie); ripresa nel 1755 da Maupertuis nell’Éloge de Montesquieu, l’espressione di Hutcheson viene fatta propria nel 1758 da Helvétius in De l’Esprit e approda quindi nel 1763 – prima attestazione in italiano – alle Meditazioni sulla felicità di Pietro Verri («la pubblica felicità significa la maggiore felicità possibile divisa sul maggior numero possibile») e l’anno seguente a Dei delitti e delle pene («la massima felicità divisa nel maggior numero»)65. Dopo i Delitti, lo slogan verrà utilizzato, in vari modi, nel «Caffè» (nel Frammento sugli odori di Beccaria, nelle Considerazioni sul lusso e nell’Interpretazione delle leggi di Pietro Verri, nelle Osservazioni su i fedecommessi di Alfonso Longo)66. Beccaria lo aveva sicuramente ripreso dalle Meditazioni sulla felicità, anche se è molto probabile che egli conoscesse la traduzione francese della Inquiry di Hutcheson. Non credo invece che la stesura dei Delitti possa essersi direttamente giovata del System of Moral Philosophy, dato alle stampe dal figlio di Hutcheson nel 1755, ma apparso in francese solo nel 177067. Le proposizioni di questo testo cardine dell’utilitarismo settecentesco (che presentano tratti vicinissimi alla ‘filosofia della pena’ di Beccaria: concezione della pena come deterrente, necessaria proporzionalità fra le pene e i delitti, responsabilità penale strettamente personale, educazione come strumento di prevenzione dei delitti, ecc.) avevano 64 An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, in Two Treatises..., The Second Edition Corrected and Enlarg’d, J. Darby et al., London 1726, vol. II, pp. 177-178. 65 F. Hutcheson, Recherches sur l’origine des idées que nous avons de la Beauté et de la Vertu, en deux traités ..., traduit sur la quatrième édition Angloise, 2 voll., s.e., Amsterdam [Paris] 1749, vol. II, p. 155; Ch. P. Duclos, Considérations sur les mœurs de ce siècle, nouvelle édition revûë, corrigée et augmentée, Aux dépens de la Compagnie, Amsterdam 1752, pp. 359-360; Encyclopédie, vol. VII, Paris, Briasson et al., 1757, p. 790a; Œuvres de M. de Maupertuis, nouvelle édition corrigée et augmentée, 4 voll., Jean-Marie Bruyset, Lyon 1756, vol. III, p. 407; Helvétius, De l’Esprit, cit., disc. II, chap. 17, p. 175, e chap. 23, p. 222; Verri, Meditazioni sulla felicità, cit., p. 750; Beccaria, Delitti, p. 142. La storia della formula utilitaristica da Hutcheson a Bentham, passando per Verri e Beccaria, è stata in gran parte ricostruita da R. Shackleton, The greatest happiness of the greatest number: the history of Bentham’s phrase, «Studies on Voltaire», 90, 1972, pp. 1461-1482. 66 «Il Caffè», cit., pp. 42, 157, 695, 131 (ma si veda anche p. 117). 67 Système de philosophie morale de Hutcheson, traduit de l’Anglois par M. E*** [Eidous], 2 voll., Regnault, Lyon 1770. peraltro avuto una loro prima enunciazione nel De cive di Hobbes. 4. Vi è un altro gruppo di autori d’oltremanica ai quali Beccaria volse lo sguardo fra il 1765 e il 1770, quando la sua attenzione si focalizzò sulle differenze fra popoli selvaggi e popoli barbari, sull’origine degli americani, sulle trasmigrazioni dei popoli, sulle colonie europee, sulle religioni del vecchio e del nuovo mondo; sul problema, insomma, della nascita della civiltà. Fra i libri che si procurò o di cui trattò l’acquisto coi librai, si segnalano (in latino o in traduzione francese) alcuni volumi della celeberrima Universal History68 e opere di John Barrow69, William Burke70, Thomas Hyde71, Humphrey Prideaux72 . In quel quinquennio Beccaria progettò, abbozzò e infine abbandonò un lavoro di ampio respiro che avrebbe dovuto intitolarsi Saggio sul ripulimento delle nazioni73. Ce ne restano pochi frammenti, mentre qualche altra scrittura attinente a questo laboratorio è probabilmente rifluita in un momento successivo nelle Ricerche e negli Elementi. Tra il § XLII dei Delitti (con il suo excursus sul progresso delle scienze)74 e le lezioni di economia si 68 Histoire universelle depuis le commencement du monde jusqu’à présent, traduite de l’Anglois d’une société de gens de lettres, voll. I-XIV dedicati alla parte antica, P. Gosse et al., La Haye - Arkstée et Merkus, Amsterdam-Leipzig, 1732-1753; voll. XV-XLVI dedicati alla parte moderna, Arkstée et Merkus, Amsterdam-Leipzig - Merigot le jeune et Denain, Paris, 1760-1802 (dell’invio del «26e vol. que vous manque» dava notizia a Beccaria il libraio ginevrino Barthélemy Chirol il 4 marzo 1767, e dell’avvenuta spedizione dei voll. XXVII e XXVIII è prova in una lettera dello stesso mittente del successivo 14 ottobre: cfr. Beccaria, Carteggio, parte I, cit., pp. 520 e 589). 69 Abrégé chronologique, ou Histoire des découvertes faites par les Européens dans les différens parties du monde, extrait des rélations les plus exactes et des voyageurs les plus veridiques, par M. Jean Barrow, traduit de l’Anglois par M. Targe, 12 voll., Saillant, De Lormel et al., Paris 1766. Cfr. Beccaria, Carteggio, parte I, cit., p. 521 (Chirol a Beccaria, 4 marzo 1767). 70 Histoire des colonies européennes dans l’Amerique ... traduite de l’Anglois de M. William Burck [sic] par M. E. [Eidous], 2 voll., Merlin, Paris 1767. Cfr. Beccaria, Carteggio, parte I, cit., p. 498 (Chirol a Beccaria, 10 gennaio 1767). 71 Th. Hyde, Historia religionum veterum Persarum eorumque Magorum..., E Typographeo Clarendoniano, Oxonii 1760; Id., De ludis orientalibus libri duo, E Theatro Sheldoniano, Oxonii 1694. Cfr. Beccaria, Carteggio, parte I, cit., pp. 565 (Joseph Albert a Beccaria, 10 agosto 1767), 585 (Albert a Beccaria, 26 settembre 1767), 594 (Albert a Beccaria, 21 novembre 1767). 72 Histoire des Juifs et des peuples voisins depuis la décadence des royames d’Israël et de Judas jusqu’à la mort de Jesus Christ, par Mr. Prideaux ..., traduite de l’Anglois. Nouvelle édition, 6 voll., Arkstée et Merkus, Amsterdam-Leipzig 1755. Cfr. Beccaria, Carteggio, parte I, cit., p. 558 (Albert a Beccaria, 28 luglio 1767). 73 In proposito rinvio al mio Il fantasma del «Ripulimento delle nazioni». Congetture su un’opera mancata di Cesare Beccaria, «Studi settecenteschi», 5, 1984, pp. 131-173. 74 Beccaria, Delitti, pp. 286, 288, 290. 18 dipana dunque una riflessione sulla storia delle diverse forme sociali, dei diversi stadi dell’umanità; riflessione che è percorsa da un elemento «parallelo, simile alla contemporanea visione della storia sociale dei pensatori scozzesi»75, che finisce per collocare inequivocabilmente Beccaria tra gli esponenti della cosiddetta ‘teoria dei quattro stadi’ (da lui chiaramente delineata in apertura della quarta parte degli Elementi, dedicata al commercio)76. È la teoria secondo cui le società umane progrediscono attraverso quattro distinti e successivi modi di sussistenza (caccia, pastorizia, agricoltura, commercio), presentando ogni stadio sue peculiarità per quel che concerne i molteplici aspetti della vita associata, dalle istituzioni alle leggi, alla proprietà, al governo, nonché ai modi di pensare, ai costumi, alle usanze, ai princìpi morali. Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson e John Millar rappresentano il punto più alto dell’elaborazione di questa teoria negli anni ’60-70, ma Beccaria poté conoscere solo in minima parte le loro opere. Smith aveva esposto compiutamente la teoria stadiale forse già nelle lezioni di giurisprudenza tenute a Edimburgo nel 1750-51 e a Glasgow nel 1751-52, certamente in quelle impartite a Glasgow nel 1762-63 e nel 1763-64, che verranno però pubblicate postume, nel 197877. Mentre nessun cenno esplicito ai quattro stadi è nella sua Theory of Moral Sentiments, che Beccaria acquistò nella traduzione francese del 176478 (di An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, uscita in prima edizione a Londra nel 1776, non mette conto parlare, perché è fuori dell’arco cronologico che stiamo considerando). Di An Essay on the History of Civil Society, pubblicato da Ferguson nel 1767, il Nostro non ebbe conoscenza diretta in quel momento, perché la versione francese dell’opera non apparve che nel 178379. Non è però da escludere che fosse riuscito a raccogliere informazioni sul contenuto del libro (probabilmente grazie a qualche recensione), specie dopo che d’Holbach, che aveva mes75 F. Venturi, Nota introduttiva a Cesare Beccaria, in Illuministi italiani, tomo III, cit., p. 15. 76 Beccaria, Scritti economici, cit., pp. 299-302. E cfr. R.L. Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1976 (trad. it., Il cattivo selvaggio, il Saggiatore, Milano 1981. Meek peraltro nega che Beccaria possa essere annoverato fra i teorici dei quattro stadi). 77 A. Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. by R. L. Meek, D.D. Raphael and P.G. Stein, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1978. 78 Métaphiysique de l’âme ou Théorie des sentimens moraux, traduite de l’Anglois de M. Adam Smith ... par M. *** [Eidous], 2 voll., Briasson, Paris 1764. 79 An Essay on the History of Civil Society, by Adam Ferguson..., A. Millar & T. Caddell, Edinburgh - B. Grierson, Dublin, 1767; Essai sur l’histoire de la société civile, par M. Adam Ferguson ..., ouvrage traduite de l’Anglois par M. Bergier, 2 voll., Veuve Desaint, Paris 1783. Gianni Francioni so a parte dei suoi progetti di lavoro a Parigi, glielo ebbe segnalato e raccomandato in una lettera del marzo del ’6780 (non a caso, considerazioni molto simili a quelle che fa Ferguson per fissare le categorie di rude nations e di polished nations si trovano nel frammento beccariano Sopra la barbarie e coltura delle nazioni e su lo stato selvaggio dell’uomo)81. Infine, le Observations concerning the Distinction of Ranks in Society di Millar apparvero nel 1771, e la traduzione francese due anni più tardi82 , quando Beccaria aveva ormai abbandonato il suo progetto. Erano tuttavia arrivati alla teoria stadiale (autonomamente dagli scozzesi) alcuni pensatori francesi – Quesnay, Goguet, Helvétius – i cui libri erano sicuramente noti al filosofo milanese83. L’economia politica rappresentò per Beccaria lo sbocco di una ricerca che, partita dal diritto, si era poi trasformata in una più ampia meditazione filosofica, seguendo un percorso non dissimile da quello di altri autori del Settecento (è il caso, per restare in Italia, di Antonio Genovesi o, fuori d’Italia, dello stesso Smith)84. I diversi elementi di questa ricerca potevano unificarsi in quella che il Beccaria delle Ricerche aveva chiamato la «scienza dell’uomo», dalla quale a suo parere derivavano «le scienze del buono, dell’utile e del bello»: «una scienza sola e primitiva» di cui occorreva «rintracciare i primitivi principii»85. 80 Beccaria, Carteggio, parte I, cit., p. 528 (d’Holbach a Beccaria, 15 marzo 1767). 81 Id., Scritti filosofici e letterari, cit., pp. 284-292. 82 Observations concerning the Distinction of Ranks in Society, by John Millar..., T. Ewing, Dublin 1771; Observations sur les commencemens de la société, par J. Millar..., traduit de l’Anglois d’après la seconde édition, Arkstée et Merkus, Amsterdam 1773. 83 Mi riferisco alla Philosophie rurale, ou Économie générale et politique de l’agriculture (Libraires Associés, Amsterdam [Paris] 1763) di Victor de Mirabeau e François Quesnay, e agli scritti di Quesnay raccolti da Pierre-Samuel Du Pont de Nemours in Physiocratie, ou Constitution naturelle du gouvernement le plus avantageux au genre humain, 2 voll., Merlin, Paris 1767 (Du Pont ne aveva preannunciato l’invio a Beccaria in una lettera dell’8 aprile 1770: cfr. Beccaria, Carteggio, parte II, cit., p. 132); a De l’origine des loix, des arts et des sciences et de leur progrès chez les anciens peuples (3 voll., Desaint et Saillant, Paris 1758) di AntoineYves Goguet, che Beccaria poteva anche aver letto in traduzione italiana: Della origine delle leggi, delle arti e delle scienze, e dei loro progressi presso gli antichi popoli, 3 voll., Vincenzo Giuntini, Lucca 1761; e al già citato De l’Esprit di Helvétius (il disc. III, chap. 9 contiene un’esplicita esposizione della teoria dei quattro stadi). 84 Cfr. F. Venturi, Nota introduttiva a Cesare Beccaria, in Illuministi italiani, tomo III, cit., pp. 17-18. 85 Beccaria, Scritti filosofici e letterari, cit., p. 71. Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Saggi Beccaria e Bacon: una fonte inglese alle origini del Dei delitti? Citation: M. Parise (2019) Beccaria e Bacon: una fonte inglese alle origini del Dei delitti? Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 19-31. doi: 10.13128/ds-25435 Copyright: © 2019 M. Parise. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. Marialuisa Parise Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia Abstract. Francis Bacon’s works were a strong influence upon Cesare Beccaria in his formative years, contributing to inform his ideas and style. The chief testimonia are two: the autograph ms. of Excerpta from Bacon in the Ambrosian Library of Milan (Becc. B 201) and the in folio volume of Bacon’s Opera Omnia (Hafniae edition, 1694), which belonged to Beccaria, also held at the Ambrosian (Becc. C 158). This essay retraces the history of the ms, from its first discovery by prof. Amati to subsequent studies, focusing on its relation to the in folio, and on the Beccaria-Bacon relationship at large. Careful attention is placed on the excerpta from the Novum organum: since it was transcribed almost in its entirety, it is of signal interest to examine what omissions were made. Keywords. Cesare Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, Ambrosian Library. Montesquieu, Elvezio, Buffon, D’Alembert, Condillac, Morellet, Voltaire, Rousseau, Hume erano l’oggetto, come scrive, delle sue occupazioni nel giorno e delle sue meditazioni nel silenzio della notte; ma il suo autore, il suo duce, quantunque egli non lo confessi, e quantunque non lo abbia avvertito nessuno de’ suoi commentatori e biografi, fu veramente Francesco Bacone da Verulamio1. Queste le parole del professor Amato Amati all’indomani della scoperta del codice autografo degli Excerpta baconiani di Cesare Beccaria. Due sono i testimonia principali attraverso i quali è possibile sostenere che il giovane Beccaria lesse attentamente e studiò in modo approfondito le opere di Francis Bacon: il codice autografo degli Excerpta baconiani, conservato oggi nella Veneranda Biblioteca Ambrosiana di Milano2, e il volume in folio degli Opera Omnia di Bacon, Hafniae 16943, appartenuto a Beccaria e che presenta alcune sue sottolineature, oggi ancora conservato in Ambrosiana. A questi si aggiungono due lettere, molto conosciute, all’amico Giambat- 1 A. Amati, Vita ed opere di Cesare Beccaria, in A. Amati e A. Buccellati, Cesare Beccaria e l’abolizione della pena di morte, Vallardi, Milano 1872, p. 24. 2 C. Beccaria, Francisci Baconis de Verulamio De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum et novo organo scientiarum libris excerpta (Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Becc. B 201). 3 F. Bacon, Opera Omnia, J.J. Erythrophili, Hafniae 1694 (Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Becc. C 158). Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 19-31 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25435 20 tista Biffi (agosto 1762)4 e ad André Morellet (26 gennaio 1766)5. L’interesse di Beccaria nei confronti del filosofo inglese, «legislatore dell’intelletto» nella lettera all’amico Biffi, è noto e numerosi studiosi ne hanno riconosciuto il debito auspicando una ricerca più approfondita6. 1. LA SCOPERTA DEL CODICE AUTOGRAFO DEGLI EXCERPTA BACONIANI. Il primo a scoprire e ad illustrare il manoscritto fu Amato Amati (1831-1904)7 che, impegnato in una ricognizione dei documenti e delle carte di Beccaria conservate presso gli eredi al fine di redigerne la biografia8, individuò il prezioso codice autografo. Amati ne diede pubblica comunicazione nell’Adunanza del 7 febbraio 1867 del Reale Istituto Lombardo di Scienze e Lettere9. Colpisce nel suo resoconto l’emozione per la scoperta e la consapevolezza dell’importanza del ritrovamento10, alla quale fa però seguito l’estremo sconforto per l’impossibilità di continuare le ricerche e lo studio. L’ispezione delle «preziose carte» era stata infatti estremamente rapida: «Non mi vi intrattenni più di due ore, e per tema di non riuscire importuno, e perché aveva fatto disegno di ritornarvi presto, approfittando delle profferte della nobil donna; ma, ahimè! quella fu la prima ed ultima visita»11. Infatti la marchesa Olimpia Antonietta Curioni, vedova di Giulio Beccaria (1775-1858)12 , gra4 Cesare Beccaria a Giambattista Biffi, Milano, agosto 1762, in Edizione Nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria, vol. IV. Carteggio (parte I: 1758-1768), a cura di C. Capra, R. Pasta e F. Pino Pongolini, Mediobanca, Milano 1994, pp. 62-63. 5 Cesare Beccaria ad André Morellet, Milano, 26 gennaio 1766, in ivi, pp. 219-227. 6 Cfr. M. Fubini, Beccaria scrittore, in Id., Saggi e ricordi, Ricciardi, Milano-Napoli 1971, pp. 121-143: 137-138; cfr. E. Garin, Storia della filosofia italiana, Einaudi, Torino 1978, vol. III, p. 982; cfr. G. Natali (a cura di), Storia letteraria d’Italia. Il Settecento, Vallardi, Milano 1929, p. 269; cfr. C.A. Vianello, La vita e l’opera di Cesare Beccaria con scritti e documenti inediti, Ceschina, Milano 1938, pp. 245-249: 246; G.D. Pisapia, Presentazione in C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, a cura di G.D. Pisapia, Giuffrè, Milano 1964, pp. v-xxx: viii-ix; cfr. Id., Prolusione, in Cesare Beccaria tra Milano e l’Europa. Convegno di studi per il 250 anniversario della nascita, Cariplo-Laterza, Milano 1990, pp. 16-24: 16. 7 Per la sua biografia: cfr. R. De Felice, s.v., in Dizionario Biografico degli italiani, II (1960), p. 669. 8 Cfr. Amati, Vita ed opere di Cesare Beccaria, cit. 9 Cfr. A. Amati, Di un manoscritto finora ignorato intorno a Bacone di Verulamio, «Rendiconti del Reale Istituto Lombardo di Scienze e Lettere. Classe di Lettere e Scienze morali e politiche», IV, 1867, 1-2, pp. 14-31. 10 Già sottolineata da M. Fattori, Nuove prospettive nella ricezione e fortuna delle opere di Francis Bacon, «Rivista di storia della filosofia», 3, 2003, pp. 405-422: 407. 11 Amati, Di un manoscritto finora ignorato, cit., p. 18. 12 Unico figlio maschio di Cesare nato dalla seconda moglie, Anna Bar- Marialuisa Parise vemente malata, che gli aveva concesso la consultazione delle carte, morì a breve. La raccolta Beccaria venne quindi donata per legato al commendator Angelo Villa Pernice (1827-1892)13, uomo d’affari e politico, presidente della Camera di Commercio di Milano dal 1867 al 1876, deputato al Parlamento per tre legislature e appassionato bibliofilo, di tutt’altro avviso circa la consultazione delle carte da parte dei privati. Amati dunque «ebbe alle mani il prezioso autografo, ma una volta sola e per brevi istanti, in cui si affrettò di copiarne il titolo e di rilevarne alla sfuggita il contenuto»14 e cercò di dar risposta ai suoi interrogativi per stabilire «quali passi e quali aforismi di Bacon entrino come elemento nel libro dei Dei Delitti e delle pene»15, attraverso uno studio comparativo dei due filosofi, compilando una sinossi dei passi e delle teorie dei due autori16. Lo studioso non ebbe modo di verificare l’esistenza, nella medesima biblioteca, dell’edizione in folio degli Opera omnia di Bacone, Hafniae 1694, alla quale Beccaria fa riferimento nella lettera a Morellet: «La divina Enciclopedia è in folio ed il Bacone che io posseggo è in folio»17. Amati descrisse il codice18, cursoriamente visionato, come «un libro di non piccola mole, tutto e con singolare diligenza scritto di mano del Beccaria»19 e ne trascrisse solo il primo frontespizio, aggiungendovi del secondo le parole «Anno MDCCLXIII ab instauratione litterarum primo»; secondo Gianni Francioni il piccolo falso sarebbe stato costruito per celare la divertente indicabò, sposò nel 1821 Antonietta Curioni de Civati, dalla quale non ebbe prole, e che gli sopravvisse fino al 1866. Antonietta ebbe però una figlia, Rachele, nata nel 1836 da una relazione con Cesare Cantù, che nel 1851 andò in sposa a Angelo Villa Pernice: C. Capra, Il gruppo del “Caffè” nelle carte dell’Ambrosiana, in M. Ballarini et al. (a cura di), Tra i fondi dell’Ambrosiana. Manoscritti italiani antichi e moderni, Cisalpino, Milano 2008 (Quaderni di Acme, 105), vol. II, p. 719. 13 Sulla figura e carriera di Angelo Villa Pernice: cfr. G. Maifreda, Governo e rappresentanza degli interessi. Angelo Villa Pernice (1827-1892), Rubettino, Soveria Mannelli (cz) 2001; cfr. M. Ballarini, Uomini e libri di una grande Milano (Cesare Beccaria, Giuseppe Parini, Federico Fagnani, Pietro Custodi), in G. Ravasi et al. (a cura di), Storia dell’Ambrosiana, vol. III. L’Ottocento, IntesaBci, Milano 2001, pp. 131-140: 137; cfr. Capra, Il gruppo del “Caffè” nelle carte dell’Ambrosiana, cit., p. 719. 14 Amati, Vita ed opere di Cesare Beccaria, cit., p. 24. 15 Id., Di un manoscritto finora ignorato, cit., p. 21. 16 Cfr. ivi, pp. 25-31; cfr. Amati, Vita ed opere di Cesare Beccaria, cit., pp. 27-34. Cfr. Fattori, Baconiana, cit., p. 407. 17 Cesare Beccaria ad André Morellet, Milano, 26 gennaio 1766, in Beccaria, Carteggio (parte I: 1758-1768), cit., p. 225. 18 Per una descrizione del codice autografo degli Excerpta di 142 cc. e con due frontespizi: cfr. G. Francioni, Nota al testo. Materiali non pubblicati, in Edizione Nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria, vol. II. Scritti filosofici e letterari, a cura di L. Firpo, G. Francioni e G. Gaspari, Mediobanca, Milano 1984, pp. 459-471: 459; cfr. F. Mecatti, Aforisti italiani del Settecento. Pensieri al crocevia della modernità, Società editrice fiorentina, Firenze 2005, pp. 131-187: 135, n. 13. 19 Amati, Di un manoscritto finora ignorato, cit., p. 19. 21 Beccaria e Bacon: una fonte inglese alle origini del Dei delitti? zione editoriale del Beccaria, «Paris MXII chez François Scapetinud», evitando così di dover fornire una spiegazione circa l’esistenza dei due frontespizi20. Più fortunato fu il professor Achille Crespi (1881-?) che, a suo dire, casualmente21, ebbe l’opportunità di studiare il manoscritto e il volume in folio grazie alla concessione di Donna Rachele Cantù (1836-1919)22 , vedova Villa Pernice, che mise a sua disposizione i «cimeli» del Beccaria. Egli fu il primo ad analizzare il manoscritto degli Excerpta baconiani, a vederne le rispondenze rispetto al volume in folio di Bacone e a formulare ipotesi, il primo a trascrivere nella sua interezza la «bizzarra inscrizione» del secondo frontespizio23. Crespi informava inoltre dell’esistenza del volume in folio e di come, sul frontespizio, Beccaria vi avesse siglato sopra il suo possesso, ponendovi il suo titolo nobiliare e di come poi lo avesse cancellato: «Sopra il frontespizio aveva scritto: “Le Marquis de Bonesana”, poi forse vergognatosi di firmarsi con quel titolo nobiliare, lui, pensatore democratico, cancellò la scritta con minute lineette oblique, non così tuttavia che l’occhio non intravedeva ancora le lettere»24. Nel 190925 Donna Rachele fece dono alla biblioteca Ambrosiana dell’intera collezione di Villa Pernice, «splendida biblioteca di ben 30.000 volumi, con una cinquantina di incunaboli e diverse edizioni aldine, giuntine, del Gryphius, edizioni veneziane rare, edizioni di Basilea, elzeviriane e cominiane»26 , adempiendo alla volontà testamentaria del Pernice che aveva scritto: «se non avessi disposto durante la mia vita per la conservazione perpetua e sicura degli autografi di Cesare Beccaria incarico mia moglie di provvederci, destinandoli ad 20 Cfr. Francioni, Nota al testo, cit., pp. 459-460. ad un caso l’aver potuto esaminare tanto il manoscritto quanto il volume a stampa» (A. Crespi, Il pensiero filosofico-giuridico di Beccaria [Le fonti di Cesare Beccaria], «Rivista di filosofia e scienze affini», X, 1908, pp. 92-97, 214-232, 692-708: 704 la citaz.). 22 Pittrice e fondatrice dell’Accademia dei Pedanti, le cui riunioni si svolgevano nel salotto di casa sua, tra le socie fondatrici della Croce Rossa Italiana e del patronato per la libertà dal carcere, partecipò, già anziana, nell’aprile del 1907 a Milano al Convegno femminile indetto dalla rivista «Pensiero e azione»: cfr. M.C. Gozzoli e R. Farina, Dizionario biografico delle donne lombarde 568-1968, s.v., Baldini & Castoldi, Milano 1995, p. 261. 23 Cfr. Crespi, Il pensiero filosofico-giuridico di Beccaria, cit., p. 703. Di questa attestazione non vi è traccia nell’Edizione Nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria. 24 Crespi, Il pensiero filosofico-giuridico di Beccaria, cit., p. 704. 25 Cfr. A. Colombo (a cura di), La Raccolta Beccaria della Biblioteca Ambrosiana, p. 1 <http://ambrosiana.comperio.it/sites/ambrosiana/ assets/Ambrosiana/Raccolta-Beccaria.pdf> (04/2019). Carlo Capra sostiene la donazione sia stata fatta 15 anni dopo la morte del marito, nel 1906: Capra, Il gruppo del “Caffè” nelle carte dell’Ambrosiana, cit., p. 719. Concorda su questa data anche M.F. Turchetti, Libri e “Nuove idee”. Appunti sulla biblioteca illuministica di Cesare Beccaria, «Archivio storico lombardo», s. 12a, 139, 2013, pp. 183-214: 196. 26 Ballarini, Uomini e libri di una grande Milano, cit., p. 137. un pubblico istituto o biblioteca a sua scelta»27. Nel 1912 ebbero luogo il trasporto e la sistemazione del fondo. Eugenio Laundry nel 1910, nell’enumerare gli autografi conservati nella Raccolta Beccaria, al n. 4 tenne conto del codice, descrivendolo come «lunghi estratti da Bacone da Verulamio»28; la notizia potrebbe essere stata desunta dal catalogo della biblioteca stilato da Angelo Villa Pernice29, nella sezione Autografi di Cesare Beccaria. Cesare Augusto Vianello nel 1938 diede notizia del codice autografo e trascrisse in modo parziale i due frontespizi, riconoscendo la notevole importanza del manoscritto per mettere in luce il ruolo di Bacon, come fonte meno nota rispetto alle francesi, nella formazione di Beccaria30. Nel secondo volume dell’Edizione Nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria, nella sezione Materiali non pubblicati, è ricostruita la storia dei due testimonia beccariani ed è pubblicato in parte il manoscritto degli Excerpta31. Delle due sezioni che compongono il codice è pubblicata solo la prima parte, riguardante gli estratti tratti dal De augmentis scientiarum; la seconda, riguardante il Novum organum, è stata tralasciata perché, secondo i curatori, trattandosi «di una mera trascrizione funzionale allo studio dell’opera», è di minore interesse32. La trascrizione del Novum organum è una trascrizione pressoché integrale dell’opera33 ed è utile approfondire il lavoro di trascrizione compiuto da Beccaria. Nella lettera dell’agosto 1762 Beccaria fa menzione a Giambattista Biffi del lavoro di trascrizione dalle opere del filosofo inglese, del quale si dichiara grande estimatore: «Ma questa volta bisogna che tu abbi la flemma di avere una lettera corta perché sono tutto assorto a ricopiare alcune opere di Bacon di Verulamio, al quale, oltre 21 «Debbo 27 Maifreda, Governo e rappresentanza degli interessi, cit., p. 34, n. 63. E. Laundry, Cesare Beccaria. Scritti e lettere inediti, Hoepli, Milano 1910, p. 8. 29 Cfr. Raccolta Beccaria. Catalogo delle edizioni delle opere di Cesare Beccaria, in Norme per l’ordinamento delle biblioteche e catalogo della libreria di Villa Pernice, Tipografia Galli e Raimondi, Milano 1890 (mdccclxl), pp. 265-272. L’accurata catalogazione per materie fu considerata «un modello del genere»: Maifreda, Governo e rappresentanza degli interessi, cit., p. 34. 30 Cfr. Vianello, La vita e l’opera di Cesare Beccaria, cit., p. 246. 31 Cfr. Francioni, Nota al testo, cit., pp. 459-471. 32 Ivi, p. 460; cfr. Fattori, Baconiana, cit., p. 408, la quale auspicava invece uno studio anche sui passi tratti dal Novum organum. 33 A differenza di quanto scritto da Mecatti, Aforisti italiani del Settecento, cit., p. 135: «Nella sezione che segue il secondo frontespizio si trovano invece gli estratti del Novum organum, una trascrizione dei punti salienti dell’opera che include le pagine della Prefatio all’Instauratio magna ma generalmente omette o sintetizza i passi troppo analitici, privilegiando, invece, le sentenze baconiane». Lo stesso in G. Ruozzi, Il piacere dello spirito. Aforisti italiani del Settecento, in M.A. Rigoni (a cura di), La brevità felice. Contributi alla teoria e alla storia dell’aforisma, Marsilio, Venezia 2006, pp. 241-266: «una raccolta di citazioni di Bacone composta tra il 1762 e il 1763» (p. 255). 28 22 a essere nella classe dei geni più sublimi, si può dare il nome di legislatore dell’intelletto»34. Amati segnalò per primo la singolarità di uno studio così paziente e faticoso per un uomo come Beccaria, «sì pigro e restio allo scrivere, che fin le lettere famigliari, quando il poteva, per risparmio d’incomodo dettava a qualche buon amico»35, facendo riferimento ad una sua lettera a Pietro Verri, Gessate 13 dicembre 1764, il cui incipit era: «La scrittura è di Visconti; ma le parole sono del pigro Beccaria»36. E che l’avversione alla scrittura fosse una caratteristica precipua dell’uomo si coglie dall’allusione del nipote Alessandro Manzoni in una lettera a Giulio, figlio di Cesare: «Se mai tu ti trovassi restio allo scrivere (che potrebbe essere un male di famiglia)...»37. Crespi, oltre a segnalare anch’egli l’eccezionalità del documento data la nota pigrizia di Beccaria nello scrivere, mise in luce il suo peculiare modus operandi nel trascrivere le opere baconiane, rivelatore del grande interesse nutrito per il filosofo inglese: «E con quanta pazienza l’uomo che si atteggiava a “pigro alla fatica dello scrivere” ricopiò lunghissimi brani, anzi, intieri libri del filosofo che ammirava! E quante volte, stanco, ometteva qualche mezza pagina, e poi pentito aggiungeva in margine con un richiamo ciò che aveva tralasciato»38. Da questo punto di vista, secondo Amati, non può non tenersi conto infine del fatto che tra i suoi manoscritti non ve ne siano altri di sua mano riguardanti i filosofi francesi, dei quali si vantava di essere discepolo39, tanto che Crespi sostenne che il riconoscimento tributato da Beccaria ai soli autori francesi, nella lettera al Morellet, fosse dovuto a ragioni di opportunismo: temendo l’influenza degli Enciclopedisti francesi, e comprendendo che, se li avesse blanditi, essi avrebbero fatto buona accoglienza all’opera sua e favoritane la diffusione, credette bene di citarli e lodarli con tali parole, che tutti fino ad oggi, fidandosi dell’apparenza di quelle lodi e non badando al loro riposto significato, dissero e sostennero essere il Beccaria discepolo di quei filosofi, e confermarono il loro asserto né più né meno che con le parole istesse dell’autore all’abate Morellet40. 34 Lettera di Beccaria a Giambattista Biffi, Milano, agosto 1762, in Beccaria, Carteggio (parte I: 1758-1768), cit., p. 62. Cfr. Francioni, Nota al testo, cit., p. 470; cfr. Fattori, Baconiana, cit., p. 408. 35 Amati, Vita ed opere di Cesare Beccaria, cit., p. 24. 36 Ivi, p. 24, n. 1. 37 Ibidem. 38 Crespi, Il pensiero filosofico-giuridico di Beccaria, cit., p. 703. 39 Cfr. Amati, Vita ed opere di Cesare Beccaria, cit., p. 24. 40 Crespi, Il pensiero filosofico-giuridico di Beccaria, cit., p. 92. Marialuisa Parise 2. IL BACONISMO TRA PARIGI E MILANO. L’interesse di Beccaria per Bacon fu senz’altro anche indotto dagli elogi del filosofo inglese tessuti dagli enciclopedisti41 ed illuministi francesi: «quando si riflette che la scuola degli Enciclopedisti acclamava Bacone “il restauratore, il padre, il creatore della filosofia sperimentale, il più grande, il più universale, il più eloquente dei filosofi” è ovvio di congetturare che Cesare Beccaria abbia voluto conoscere il maestro di quei che sanno»42. Nella Francia del XVIII secolo l’influenza del pensiero di Bacon, o meglio, come suggerisce Malherbe43, del baconismo, giocò un ruolo di primo piano. L’esempio più noto è l’elogio di Bacon che D’Alembert fece nel Discours préliminaire dell’Encyclopédie: A la tête de ces illustres personnages doit être placé l’immortel Chancellier d’Angleterre, François Bacon [...] on seroit tenté de le regarder comme le plus grand, le plus universel, et le plus éloquent des Philosophes. Bacon, né dans le sein de la nuit la plus profonde...44. Richiamandosi poi a quanto già dichiarato da Diderot nel Prospectus del 1750, D’Alembert aveva ricordato il debito degli enciclopedisti nei confronti del filosofo inglese relativamente all’ordine delle conoscenze alla base dell’arbor scientiarum dell’enciclopedia45. L’ordine storico delle facoltà umane, tripartito in Bacon in memoria, immaginazione e ragione, fu da essi modificato con un ordine logico nel quale vi era stata l’inversione di ragione e immaginazione46. Secondo Enrico De Mas, l’elogio di D’Alembert dipendeva dal giudizio già espresso su Bacon da Voltaire nelle Lettres philosophiques 47. Nella dodicesima lettera, intitolata Sur le 41 Beccaria possedeva un’edizione completa dell’Encyclopédie: cfr. Crespi, Il pensiero filosofico-giuridico di Beccaria, cit., p. 214. 42 Amati, Vita ed opere di Cesare Beccaria, cit., p. 24. 43 Cfr. M. Malherbe, Bacon, l’Encyclopédie et la révolution, «Les Études philosophiques», 3, 1985, pp. 387-404: 388. 44 J.B. D’Alembert, Discours Préliminaire des editeurs, in Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des Arts et des Métiers, t. I, BriassonLe Breton, Paris 1751, pp. xxiv-xxv. 45 Per l’accusa di plagio e infedeltà al pensiero di Bacon mossa loro dal padre gesuita Berthier nel Journal de Trévoux (1751): cfr. M. Fattori, Phantasia nella classificazione baconiana delle scienze, in Linguaggio e filosofia nel Seicento europeo, Olsckhi, Firenze 2000, pp. 37-57: 37-38; cfr. Id., Études sur Francis Bacon, P.U.F., Paris 2012, pp. 61-85; cfr. Malherbe, Bacon, l’Encyclopédie, cit., pp. 396-397; cfr. W. Tega, Arbor scientiarum. Enciclopedie e sistemi in Francia da Diderot a Comte, Il Mulino, Bologna 1984, pp. 102-109. 46 Cfr. M. Da Ponte Orvieto, L’unità del sapere nell’illuminismo, CEDAM, Padova 1968, pp. 35-39. 47 Voltaire, Lettres philosophiques ou lettres sur les Anglais, Amsterdam (Paris et Rouen) 1734, Édition électroniques, Les Échos du Maquis 2011, pp. 35-38. Cfr. F. Bacone, Scritti politici giuridici e storici, a cura di E. De Mas, UTET, Torino 1971, vol. I, p. 9, n. 1. Beccaria e Bacon: una fonte inglese alle origini del Dei delitti? chancelier Bacon, il filosofo inglese veniva presentato come colui che in tempi ancora di barbarie aveva aperto la strada del metodo («Le Chancelier Bacon ne connaissait pas encore la nature; mais il savait et indiquait tous les chemins qui mènent à elle»), il precursore, colui che aveva reso possibile il distacco dal passato, che aveva «méprisé de bonne heure» lo scolasticismo: «le père de la philosophie expérimentale». Il giudizio di Voltaire è in parte diverso e in un certo modo più limitativo di quello di Diderot e D’Alembert. Egli infatti, secondo Cesare Luporini, accentua l’aspetto sperimentalistico rispetto a quello sistematico-programmatico: «de toutes les épreuves physiques qu’on a faites depuis lui, il n’y en a presque pas une qui ne soit indiquée dans son livre»48. Il libro del Novum organum elogiato come «le plus singulier et le meilleur de ses ouvrages est celui qui est aujourd’hui le moins lu et le plus utile» veniva poi descritto però come «l’échafaud avec lequel on a bâti la nouvelle philosophie; et, quand cet édifice a été élevé au moins en partie, l’échafaud n’a plus été d’aucun usage»49. Secondo Nerio Zanardi, l’elogio di Bacon tessuto da D’Alembert permetterebbe di identificare in Francis Bacon «quel filosofo» cui Beccaria rende omaggio nella introduzione della sua opera50 e che il padre Facchinei per primo aveva identificato con Rousseau51. Alcune locuzioni quasi identiche52 a quelle usate da Beccaria per designare «quel filosofo» e, soprattutto, i motivi dell’omaggio accrediterebbero tale identificazione53. La ricezione del pensiero di Bacon nella Francia del XVIII secolo assunse una forte coloritura ideologica. Ciò diviene manifesto se si esamina l’opera di Alexandre Deleyre, l’Analyse de la philosophie du chancelier François Bacon54 , dove egli parlava in luogo e al posto 48 Voltaire, Lettres philosophiques XII, cit., p. 37. Cfr. C. Luporini, Voltaire e le «Lettres philosophiques». Il concetto della storia e l’illuminismo, Einaudi, Torino 1977, pp. 76-77 (rist. dell’ed. Sansoni, Firenze 1955). 49 Voltaire, Lettres philosophiques XII, cit., p. 36. 50 «Merita la gratitudine degli uomini quel filosofo ch’ebbe il coraggio dall’oscuro e disprezzato suo gabinetto di gettare nella moltitudine i primi semi lungamente infruttuosi delle utili verità» (C. Beccaria, Introduzione [a Dei delitti e delle pene], in Edizione Nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria, vol. I. Dei delitti e delle pene, a cura di G. Francioni, Mediobanca, Milano 1984, p. 24). Per l’attribuzione del Mondolfo a Helvétius, ibidem, n. 1. 51 Cfr. Note ed osservazioni sul libro intitolato «Dei delitti e delle pene», s. l. 1765, p. 15. Cfr. infra, n. 90. 52 «Ce grand Philosophe a ècrit plusieurs de ses Ouvrages dans une retraite à la quelle ses ennemis l’avoient forcé [...] C’est ainsi que les personnages illustres, souvent trop au-dessus de leur siècle, travaillent presque toujours en pure perte pour leur siècle même; c’est aux âges suivans qu’il est réservé de requeillir le fruit de leur lumieres» (D’Alembert, Discours Préliminaire, cit., p. xxv). 53 Cfr. N. Zanardi, Amici e nemici. Dalla nascita di Gesù agli albori della Rivoluzione Francese, Pitagora editrice, Bologna 2002, pp. 281-305: 291-292. 54 Analyse de la philosophie du chancelier François Bacon avec sa vie, Amsterdam-Paris 1755, 2 voll. L’opera fu pubblicata anonima. Cfr. 23 di Bacon, e che ebbe un considerevole successo, nonché numerose ristampe55. Gli enciclopedisti e Deleyre contribuirono a diffondere l’immagine di Bacon come pensatore materialista e sostanzialmente ateo56, un’immagine confutata da Gerdil57 e, alla fine del Settecento, dall’abate Émery58. Giacinto Sigismondo Gerdil59 ricorse infatti al pensiero di Bacon, autore da lui grandemente stimato 60, come possibile ‘antidoto’ contro i ‘liberi pensatori’. Nel «Discorso preliminare» alla sua Introduzione alla storia della religione, opera che però non ebbe molta diffusione nel corso del Settecento61, il fulcro dell’argomentazione fu il motto baconiano: «leves gustus in philosophia movere fortasse ad atheismum, sed pleniores haustus ad religionem reducere»62, attraverso il quale Gerdil giustifiA.A. Barbier, Dictionnaire des ouvrages anonymes, Féchoz et Letouzey, Paris 18823, t. I, p. 166; cfr. Fattori, Introduzione a Francis Bacon, cit., p. 179. 55 «Deleyre procède en recomposant la pensée baconienne, et mélange extraits, paraphrases, collages, commentaires, sous des titres qui son en partie de son cru: il ne cite jamais, ne passe pas au discours indirect, même quand l’emprunt est manifeste». Malherbe, Bacon, l’Encyclopédie, cit., p. 391. 56 «Così a poco a poco il nome di Bacone divenne quasi una formula di riconoscimento fra gli atei» (Crespi, Il pensiero filosofico-giuridico di Beccaria, cit., p. 703). 57 Cfr. G.S. Gerdil, Introduzione allo studio della religione, Stamperia reale, Torino 1755 (d’ora in avanti cito da questa ediz.). L’opera più volte ristampata ricevette la sua forma definitiva nel 1784: Id., Delle opere, Nuova edizione illustrata di note, e accresciuta di opere inedite, Instituto delle scienze, Bologna 1784, tt. 1-6. 58 Cfr. Le christianisme de François Bacon, chancellier d’Angleterre, ou pensées et sentiments de ce grand homme sur la religion, Nyon et Belin, Paris an. VII [1799], tt. 1-2. L’opera fu pubblicata anonima; per l’attribuzione all’abate Jacques André Émery cfr. Barbier, Dictionnaire des ouvrages anonymes, cit., p. 594. Cfr. Fattori, Introduzione a Francis Bacon, cit., pp. 179-180. 59 Su Gerdil si vedano gli studi di Carlo Borghero: Gerdil e i moderni: le strategie apologetiche di un anti-illuminista, in L. Sozzi et al. (a cura di), Nuove ragioni dell’anti-illuminismo in Francia e in Italia, ETS, Pisa 2001, pp. 31-61; Religionsapologetik, in J. Rohbeck und W. Rother (hrsgg.), Die Philosophie des 18 Jahrunderts. Band 3. Italien, Schwabe Verlag, Basel 2011, pp. 238-243; e L’anti-Voltaire de Gerdil ou la stratégie apologétique d’un malebranchiste, in Id., Les Cartésiens fàce à Newton. Philosophie, science et religion dans la première moitié du XVIIIe siècle, traduit de l’italien par T. Berni Canani, Brepols, Turnhout 2011, pp. 23-41. 60 Del filosofo inglese sostenne che il suo nome: «risuona oggi più chiaro che mai, siccome di quell’uomo, che da’ moderni filosofi viene a gara celebrato, qual primo ristoratore delle scienze, e che nel mondo filosofico, quale altro Colombo, additò e scoprì felicemente regni e terre incognite, abbondevoli d’inesauste miniere di nuove cognizioni» (Gerdil, Introduzione allo studio della religione, cit., p. 21). 61 Cfr. Borghero, Religionsapologetik, cit., p. 243; cfr. Id., L’anti-Voltaire de Gerdil, cit., p. 23. 62 L’espressione, resa celebre dal libro I del De augmentis scientiarum nel 1623 (The works of Francis Bacon, vol. I. Philosophical Works, ed. by J. Spedding, R. Leslie-Ellis and D. Denon Heath, Longman, London 1857, p. 423) è presente in Bacon sin dalle Meditationes Sacrae (1597) e ricorre anche nell’Advancement of Learning (1605) e nel saggio Of Atheisme (1612). Cfr. Gerdil, Introduzione allo studio della religione, cit., p. 21. 24 cava la possibilità di un’apologetica fondata sul pensiero moderno63. Lo studio che Beccaria aveva così lungamente e accuratamente riservato al Novum organum e al De augmentis scientiarum64 fu condiviso con i fratelli Verri, soprattutto Pietro, e con l’ambiente dell’Accademia dei Pugni, della quale Bacon era uno degli autori preferiti65. Pietro Verri fu assiduo lettore ed estimatore delle opere di Bacon; si legga quanto scriveva in una lettera a suo fratello Alessandro, dove nel tracciare un’analogia fra i tipi di libri – quelli «artisti», quelli «maestri» e quelli «sommi» – e i tipi di uomini, «gli Artisti, i Sapienti e i Ministri della prima sfera», riconosceva alle opere del filosofo inglese il posto fra i libri «sommi» dal forte valore per l’intera umanità: I libri poi sommi, i libri legislatori, quei che decidono col tempo del destino d’un Regno e di più Regni, sono della sfera de’ Ministri grandi. La rivoluzione che succede attualmente [...] è l’opera di alcuni di libri di questa classe. Gli Enciclopedisti pretendevano troppo ma molto hanno fatto. Tali sarebbero alcuni scritti stoici che influirono a conservare della virtù anche sotto il dispotismo de’ cesari, tali sono gli scritti del Secretario Fiorentino, di Bacone, di Montesquieu e dell’autore della Congiura di Galeazzo, scritti che non hanno oggetto semplicemente di solleticare graziosamente l’animo nostro, ma che si propongono di animare gli uomini, di togliere loro gli errori, di riscaldarli alla ricerca del vero; all’acquisto del bene, alla dissipazione delle larve tormentatrici della specie nostra66. Pietro Verri riteneva che per essere pienamente europei occorresse adottare una prosa priva di ornamenti, e proclamava perciò di trovarsi «assai meglio col Novum Organum Scientiarum di Bacone che cogli Asolani di messer Pietro Bembo»67. D’altronde il passo baconiano posto come epigrafe del Dei delitti e delle pene, «In rebus quibuscumque difficilioribus non expectandum, ut quis simul, et serat, et metat, sed preparatione opus est, ut per gradus maturescant»68 63 Cfr. M. Parise, Moderni contro moderni. L’uso di Bacon e di Galilei nell’apologetica cattolica tra Sette e Ottocento, in Pensare la modernità, a cura di G. Grimaldi, Limina Mentis, Villasanta 2012, pp. 433-474: 434435. 64 «... aveva lungamente ed accuratamente studiato Bacone» (Garin, Storia della filosofia italiana, vol. III, cit., p. 982). 65 Cfr. Turchetti, Libri e nuove idee, cit., p. 189. 66 Lettera di Pietro Verri ad Alessandro Verri, 21 giugno 1783, in B. Anglani, «L’uomo non si muta». Pietro Verri tra Letteratura e autobiografia, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma 2013, p. 2. 67 Cfr. ivi, p. 3. 68 Sono le ultime parole del saggio XLV, intitolato «De officio judicis»: F. Bacon, Sermones fideles ethici, politici, oeconomici, sive interiora rerum, Lugduni Batavorum 1641, p. 227. Cfr. F. Bacon, Opera omnia, Hafniae 1694, p. 1219. Uno dei saggi presenti sin dalla 1a ed. degli Essayes del 1592 con il titolo Of Negotiating; nella 3a ed. con il numero XLVII, cfr. Marialuisa Parise si deve a Pietro Verri69, che lo sostituì a quello di Persio presente nel primo manoscritto, «Virtutem videant, intabescantque relicta»70. 3. GLI EXCERPTA DI BECCARIA E LE SOTTOLINEATURE71 SULL’IN FOLIO BACONIANO. Di questa trascrizione pressoché integrale del Novum organum è utile segnalare le omissioni72 e analizzare i brani. Crespi aveva già fatto presente che Beccaria, nel ricopiare i passi delle opere di Bacon, aveva omesso «scrupolosamente tutte le allusioni a Dio»73. Al passaggio tra Settecento e Ottocento Antoine Lasalle, autore della prima traduzione francese degli Opera omnia di Bacon (1799-1803)74, ometterà tutti i passaggi che sembravano avere una sia pur tenue coloritura religiosa, denominandoli gli oremus75, convinto che Bacon celatamente abbattesse la religione mentre fingeva di venerarla76. Questa fu l’accusa rivolta da uno dei tre censori del Santo Uffizio, il domenicano Giulio Maria Bianchi, che nel censurare il De augmentis scientiarum si esprimeva così: «l’Autore del libro ha tentato con grande abilità di nascondere gli errori sparsi nella sua opera e si esprime con tale accortezza e circospezione che a mala pena può essere criticato nel dettato»77. Bacon fu da Bianchi considerato un autore pericoloso e scaltro, un vafer «che insinua, dissimula, sparge astutamente dottrine senza espli- The Oxford Francis Bacon, vol. XV. The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall, ed. by M. Kiernan, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000 (1a ed. 1985), pp. 145-147: 147. 69 Si veda la seconda redazione del Dei delitti e delle pene, ms. B, di mano di Pietro Verri: G. Francioni, Notizia sul manoscritto della seconda redazione del «Dei delitti e delle pene» (con una appendice di inediti di Pietro Verri relativi all’opera di Beccaria), «Studi Settecenteschi», 7-8, 1985-86, pp. 229-296: 235-236. 70 Persius, Saturae, III, v. 38: N. Scivoletto, L. Zurli (a cura di), A. Persi Flacci Saturae, Herder, Roma 2010, p. 16. 71 Il volume in folio, J.J. Erythrophili, Hafniae 1694, presenta alcune sottolineature a penna, linee verticali, sui margini dei passi ritenuti importanti, verosimilmente di Cesare Beccaria: cfr. Francioni, Nota al testo, cit., p. 470; cfr. Fattori, Baconiana, cit. p. 406; cfr. Mecatti, Aforisti italiani del Settecento, cit., p. 134. 72 Per i brani omessi: Francioni, Nota al testo, cit., p. 470. 73 Crespi, Il pensiero filosofico-giuridico di Beccaria, cit., p. 703. 74 Cfr. A. Lasalle, Oeuvres de François Bacon, chancelier d’Angleterre, 15 voll., De l’imprimerie Frantin, Dijon 1799/1800-1802/03, con note critiche, storiche e letterarie. Di questa traduzione esiste un esemplare con annotazioni di Vincenzo Gioberti conservato nella Biblioteca della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell’Università La Sapienza di Roma, fondo Gentile, Pr. 1043/1-15: cfr. Fattori, Baconiana, cit., pp. 410-422. 75 Cfr. Fattori, Introduzione a Francis Bacon, cit., p. 179. 76 Cfr. Crespi, Il pensiero filosofico-giuridico di Beccaria, cit., p. 703. 77 M. Fattori, «Vafer Baconus»: la storia della censura del De augmentis scientiarum, «Nouvelles de la République des lettres», II, 2000, pp. 97-130: 106, 113-119. 25 Beccaria e Bacon: una fonte inglese alle origini del Dei delitti? citarle, cerca di occultarle»78. Nel trascrivere gli Excerpta, Beccaria omette in modo costante tutti quei passi che possono per lo più ascriversi a due tematiche principali: innanzitutto, e in modo preponderante, omette tutti quei brani nei quali Bacon mostra il parallelismo sussistente tra il mondo così com’era stato creato da Dio prima della caduta di Adamo e il regnum hominis che attraverso il nuovo metodo l’uomo fonderà e del quale potrà tornare ad avere il dominio, divenendo minister et interpres. L’unità originaria di realtà e sapere propria del mondo prelapsario potrà essere ricostruita grazie alle nuove scienze che permetteranno di ‘restaurare’ il dominio e la potenza dell’uomo sulla natura, qualora egli ottemperi ai necessari e graduali procedimenti di metodo79. Tra gli interpreti vi fu chi, come Enrico De Mas e Benjamin Farrington, sostenne che la giustificazione stessa della scienza in Bacon procedeva dalla Bibbia affondando le radici nell’etica della salvezza80 e che la scelta del termine instauratio, insieme al suo esplicito riferimento al Genesi e al passo di Daniele, rivelasse questo disegno81. Per Beccaria, a distanza di più di un secolo, in un contesto culturale ormai estremamente differente, questo parallelismo non aveva più ragione d’essere. Della Praefatio all’Instauratio magna, cc. 1r-6v, egli pertanto non trascrive il passo: «nec ordinem divinum imitata est, qui primo die lucem tantum creavit, eique unum diem integrum attribuit; neque illo die quicquam materiati operis produxit, verum sequentibus diebus ad ea descendit»82 e il lungo brano: Quamombrem, quum haec arbitrii nostri non sint; in principio Operis, ad Deum Patrem, Deum Verbum, Deum Spiritum, preces fundimus humillimas, et ardentissimas [...]. Atque illud insuper supplices rogamus, ne humana divinis officiant; neve ex reseratione viarum sensus, et accensione maiore luminis naturalis, aliquid incredulitatis et noctis, animis nostris, erga Divina mysteria oboriatur [...] fidei dentur, quae fidei sunt. [...] Peractis autem votis, ad homi78 Ibidem. 79 Su queste tematiche: cfr. G. Giglioni, Francesco Bacone, Carocci, Roma 2011, pp. 195-215; cfr. J.A.T. Lancaster, Francis Bacon on the moral and political character of the Universe, in G. Giglioni et al. (a cura di), Francis Bacon on motion and power, Springer, Switzerland 2016, pp. 231-248. 80 Cfr. E. De Mas, Scienza e creazione. Studio sul tema trinitario e sulla terminologia biblica nel corpus baconiano, in M. Fattori (a cura di), Francis Bacon terminologia e fortuna nel XVII secolo, Seminario internazionale (Roma 11-13 marzo 1984), Edizioni dell’Ateneo, Roma 1984, pp. 73-90: 73. 81 Cfr. B. Farrington, Francesco Bacone filosofo dell’età industriale, Torino, Einaudi 19763 (1a trad. it.: 1952), p. 141. 82 F. Bacon, Praefatio, in The Oxford Francis Bacon, vol. XI. The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum organum and Associated Texts, ed. by G. Rees with M. Wakely, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004, p. 16. nes conversi, quaedam et salutaria monemus, et aequa postulamus. Monemus primum (quod etiam precati sumus) ut homines sensum in officio, quoad divina, contineant [...] Postremo omnes in universum monitos volumus, ut Scientiae veros fines cogitent [...] Ex appetitu enim Potentiae, Angeli lapsi sunt; ex appetitu Scientiae, homines; sed Charitatis non est excessus; neque Angelus, aut Homo, per eam unquam in periculum venit [...] Praeterea, ut bene sperent, neque Instaurationem nostram, ut quiddam infinitum, et ultra mortale, fingant, et animo concipiant; quum revera sit infiniti erroris finis, et terminus legitimus; mortalitatis autem, et humanitatis, non sit immemor83. Per le stesse ragioni Beccaria omette poi alcuni passi degli aforismi 65 e 129 e l’intero aforisma 93 del I libro del Novum organum. Beccaria tralascia quindi integralmente l’aforisma 93, dove è la citazione dal libro di Daniele (12, 4), una delle più note citazioni bibliche presenti nell’opera di Bacon, riportata nel cartiglio in margine all’illustrazione del frontespizio dell’edizione del Novum organum del 162084. Principium autem sumendum a Deo: Hoc nimirum quod agitur, propter excellentem in ipso Boni naturam, manifeste a Deo esse, qui Author Boni et Pater luminum est. [...] Neque omittenda est prophetia Danielis de ultimis Mundi temporibus: Multi perstransibunt et multiplex erit scientia: Manifeste innuens et significans esse in Fatis, id est in Providentia, ut pertransitus Mundi (qui per tot longinquas navigationes impletus plane aut jam in opere esse videtur) et augmenta Scientiarum in eandem aetatem incidant85. Dell’aforisma 129 omette il passo nel quale Bacon definisce le invenzioni degli uomini come delle nuove creazioni che imitano le opere divine «Etiam Inventa quasi novae Creationes sunt, et divinorum Operum Imitamenta [...] Atque videntur notatu dignum in Salomone [...] sed ita pronuntiaverit: Gloriam Dei esse, celare rem; gloriam Regis, investigare rem»86. Nell’aforisma 65 omette con dei puntini di sospensione la citazione biblica Luca (24, 5) e il passo conclusivo dove Bacon afferma la necessità di tenere distinti gli ambiti della filosofia e della religione: inter viva quaerentes mortua. Tantoque magis haec vani83 Ivi, pp. 20-22-24. L’omissione è segnalata nell’in folio con la dicitura «omesso con puntini». 84 Bacon modificò la citazione biblica per adattarla ai suoi interessi: cfr. De Mas, Scienza e creazione, cit., p. 85. 85 F. Bacon, Novum organum I 93, in Id., The Instauratio magna part II: Novum organum, cit., p. 150. L’omissione non è segnalata nel volume in folio. 86 Ivi I 129, pp. 192 e 194. Nel volume in folio l’omissione è registrata con la dicitura: «omesso senza puntini». 26 tas inhibenda venit, et coercenda, quia ex Divinorum et Humanorum male-sana admistione, non solum educitur Philosophia phantastica, sed etiam Religio haeretica. Itaque salutare admodum est, si mente sobria, fidei tantum dentur, quae fidei sunt87. Bacon affronta questa distinzione in numerosi passi del Novum organum e del De augmentis scientiarum; una mossa che fece di lui l’autore prescelto dagli apologeti cattolici fra Sette ed Ottocento in Italia e in Francia88. Beccaria stesso poi, o Pietro Verri per lui89, nell’avvertenza A chi legge ricorrerà a tale distinzione per difendersi dalle accuse del monaco vallombrosano Ferdinando Facchinei (1726-1817), sostenendo la necessità di tenere distinte la sfera di azione del teologo da quella del pubblicista90: Sì tosto che questi principii essenzialmente distinti vengano confusi, non v’è più speranza di ragionar bene nelle materie pubbliche. Spetta a’ teologi lo stabilire i confini del giusto e dell’ingiusto per ciò che risguarda l’intrinseca malizia o bontà dell’atto; lo stabilire i rapporti del giusto e dell’ingiusto politico, cioè dell’utile o del danno alla società, al pubblicista91. Gli altri brani che Beccaria omette sono quelli nei quali Bacon discute del metodo in generale. L’Instauratio magna di Bacon era un progetto ripartito in sei sezioni, che riguardava tutto lo scibile umano, mai finito e impossibile da portare a termine, e finalizzato alla rifondazione totale delle scienze, della filosofia della natura, del diritto e delle istituzioni in generale92. Pertanto soltanto alcune tematiche potevano risultare interessanti e pertinenti alla riforma proposta dall’illuminista lombardo. Beccaria omette le ultime righe della praefatio, nelle quali Bacon è ben consapevole che il proprio grandioso progetto, incompleto e con errori, possa e debba essere portato avanti da altri: et inquisitionem abrupimus; nihilominus iis modis, res nudas et apertas exhibemus, ut errores nostri, antequam Scientiae massam altius inficiant, notari et separari pos- Marialuisa Parise sint; atque etiam ut facilis et expedita sit laborum nostrorum continuatio93. Beccaria inoltre omette dalla premessa generale al Novum organum, il cui incipit recita Franciscus de Verulamio sic cogitavit e intitolata Altera Prefatio negli Excerpta, il periodo più autobiografico di Bacon: Quod neminen hactenus invenit, qui ad similes cogitationes animum applicuerit; decrevit prima quaeque, quae perficere licuit, in publicum edere. Neque haec festinatio ambitiosa fuit, sed sollicita; ut si quid Illi humanitus accideret, extaret tamen Designatio quaedam, ac destinatio Rei quam animo complexus est; utque extaret simul Signum aliquod honestae suae et propensae in Generis Humani Commoda voluntatis94. Bacon, ormai certo di non poter portare a termine il progetto nella sua interezza, decise di pubblicare il Novum organum, preceduto e seguito da piani, prefazioni e indicazioni di come sarebbe dovuta essere l’opera dell’Instauratio magna nel suo insieme95. Le difficoltà incontrate dal filosofo furono dovute ai suoi molteplici impegni pubblici, alla salute precaria e alla condizione di solitudine, di cui era ben consapevole, nella quale si trovò nel perseguire la sua missione96. L’opera di Beccaria seguì vicende totalmente diverse, per le differenti condizioni del suo autore e per l’ambito di rifondazione della riforma da lui avanzata, inerente esclusivamente al sistema giuridico. Anch’essa tuttavia, proprio perché proponeva drastici cambiamenti ed era rivoluzionaria, fu costretta ad attendere tempi più propizi. Come aveva scritto un recensore del Dei delitti, Beccaria sapeva troppo bene infatti che: «les vérités nouvelles germent lentement, que le temps et les circostances peuvent seuls achever leur maturité et hâter leur développement»97. Beccaria omette quindi quei brani nei quali Bacon espone il nuovo metodo, ad esempio il passo nel quale contrappone il metodo dell’‘interpretazione della natura’ a quello prematuro e temerario delle ‘anticipazioni della natura’98 e l’intero periodo relativo alla critica alle anticipationes naturae che chiude la prefazione all’Instaura- 87 Ivi I 65, p. 102. L’omissione è registrata nel volume in folio, con la dicitura: «omesso con puntini». 88 Su questo argomento: cfr. Parise, Moderni contro moderni, cit. 89 Cfr. Francioni, Notizia sul manoscritto della seconda redazione del «Dei delitti e delle pene», cit., pp. 272-274. 90 Cfr. Note ed osservazioni sul libro intitolato «Dei delitti e delle pene», s.l. 1765; cfr. Risposta ad uno scritto che s’intitola: Note ed osservazioni sul libro Dei delitti e delle pene, s.l. 1765. 91 C. Beccaria, A chi legge, in Id., Dei delitti e delle pene, cit., p. 20. 92 Cfr. M. Fattori, Francis Bacon in La rivoluzione scientifica. Storia della scienza, vol. V, Istituto dell’Enciclopedia italiana G. Treccani, Roma 2002, pp. 275-282: 275. 93 F. Bacon, Praefatio, in Id., The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum organum, cit., p. 20. L’omissione è segnalata nell’in folio con la dicitura: «omesso con puntini». 94 F. Bacon, Franciscus de Verulamio sic cogitavit, ivi, p. 4. L’omissione è segnalata nell’in folio con la dicitura: «omesso con puntini». 95 Cfr. Fattori, Introduzione a Francis Bacon, cit., p. 59. 96 Cfr. infra, n. 123. 97 «Gazette littéraire de l’Europe», 15 febbraio 1766, nr. 29, p. 428; cfr. F. Venturi (a cura di), Illuministi italiani, vol. III. Riformatori lombardi piemontesi e toscani, Ricciardi, Milano-Napoli 1958, p. 27, n. 1. 98 Cfr. Fattori, Francis Bacon, cit., p. 275. 27 Beccaria e Bacon: una fonte inglese alle origini del Dei delitti? tio magna99. Lo stesso accade per la prefazione al Novum organum, di cui Beccaria non trascrive i brani dove Bacon descrive le due vie della scienza: ti alla giornaliera prudenza...»105. Il secondo segno è al periodo: multo minus, quid a singulis tentatum sit, et secreto agitatum. [...] Atque apud populum plurimum vigent doctrinae aut contentiosae et pugnaces aut speciosae et inanes, quales videlicet assensum aut illaqueant aut demulcent. Itaque maxima ingenia proculdubio per singulas aetates vim passa sunt; dum viri captu et intellectu non vulgares, nihilo secius existimationi suae consulentes, temporis et multitudinis iudicio se submiserint106. Sint itaque (quod foelix faustumque sit utrique parti) duae doctrinarum emanationes [...] sit denique alia Scientias Colendi, alia Inveniendi ratio [...] optamus ut ijs foeliciter, et ex voto succedat, quod agunt, atque ut quod sequuntur, teneant100. E contrappone appunto le interpretationes alle anticipationes: Atque ut melius intelligamur, utque illud ipsum quod volumus ex nominibus impositis magis familiariter occurrat; altera ratio, sive via, Anticipatio Mentis; altera Interpretatio Naturae, a nobis appellari consuevit. Est etiam quod petendum videtur. Nos certe cogitationem suscepimus, et curam adhibuimus, ut quae a nobis proponentur, non tantum vera essent, sed etiam ad animos hominum (licet miris modis occupatos et interclusos) non incommode, aut aspere accederent101. Omette infine nell’aforisma 63 del I libro del Novum organum l’ultimo periodo nel quale vi è la critica ad Aristotele, accusato di aver corrotto con la sua dialettica la filosofia naturale102. Nel volume in folio vi sono due segni di Beccaria relativi alla praefatio all’Instauratio magna. Il primo, al margine del brano iniziale: «Videntur nobis homines nec opes nec vires suas bene nosse [...] quae ad summam rei faciant, non experiantur»103. Si tratta di un brano, secondo Amati104 , richiamato da Beccaria nell’Introduzione quando scrive: «Gli uomini lasciano per lo più in abbandono i più importanti regolamen99 «Postremo etiam petendum videtur [...] ut videant homines, quatenus ex eo quod nobis asserere necesse sit [...] de his nostris opinandi, aut sententiam ferendi, sibi ius permissum putent: quum nos omnem istam rationem humanam praematuram, anticipantem, et a rebus temere, et citius quam oportuit, abstractam, (quatenus ad inquisitionem Naturae) ut rem variam, et perturbatam, et male extructam, reijciamus. Neque postulandum est, ut eius iudicio stetur, quae ipsa in iudicium vocatur» (Bacon, Praefatio, in Id., The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum organum, cit., p. 24. L’omissione è segnalata nell’in folio con la dicitura «omesso con puntini»). 100 Bacon, Praefatio, in Id., The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum organum, cit., pp. 56, 58. 101 Ivi, p. 58. Il brano non è tra quelli segnalati come omessi da Francioni, Nota al testo, cit., p. 470. 102 «Ut hoc etiam nomine magis accusandus sit, quam sectatores eius moderni (scholasticorum Philosophorum genus) qui experientiam omino desuerunt», Bacon, Novum organum I 63, in Id., The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum organum, cit., p. 100. Nel volume in folio l’omissione non è segnalata. 103 Bacon, Praefatio in Id., The Instauratio magna part II: Novum organum, cit., p. 10. 104 Cfr. Amati, Di un manoscritto finora ignorato, cit., p. 27. Anche Beccaria ricorre alle opiniones vulgares, che in Bacon possono attaccare violentemente «quasi instructas acies» ed infatti ha tenuto a precisare che la sua opera è stata scritta in «indipendenza dalle opinioni volgari»107, con uno stile che «allontana il volgo non illuminato ed impaziente»108. Assente negli Excerpta l’epistola dedicatoria al re Giacomo I: questo potrebbe anche provare la tesi, sostenuta da Crespi e avvalorata dalla diversa divisione dei capitoli da lui notata, che Beccaria, prima di venire in possesso dell’edizione Hafniae 1694, stesse trascrivendo i passi del Novum organum da un’altra edizione, datagli in prestito e successivamente restituita109. Infine, del II libro del Novum organum, dedicato alla esposizione del metodo induttivo in re e i cui aforismi sono spesso assai lunghi, Beccaria omette brani degli aforismi nei quali Bacon elenca le tabulae che servivano a costruire gradualmente i momenti dell’induzione ‘vera e legittima’ attraverso un esempio del suo uso, la ‘scoperta’ (inventio) della forma del caldo. Gli aforismi dai quali sono omessi brani sono quelli numero 11, 12, 13, 14 (totalmente omesso), 18. Vengono ugualmente omessi brani dagli aforismi che trattano della vindemiatio prima: sono quelli numero 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29 (ultima frase), 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 48110. È banale sottolineare che si tratta di aforismi che, esemplificando la parte operativa della nuova via baconiana, non hanno alcun interesse per Beccaria. 4. IL DEI DELITTI E DELLE PENE E IL NOVUM ORGANUM E IL DE AUGMENTIS SCIENTIARUM. Dell’Instauratio magna, progetto molto articolato e complesso di una totale rifondazione delle scienze, del 105 Beccaria, Introduzione, in Id, Dei delitti e delle pene, cit., p. 23. Bacon, Praefatio, in Id., The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum organum, cit., p. 14. 107 Beccaria, A chi legge, cit., p. 17. 108 Ibidem. 109 Cfr. Crespi, Il pensiero filosofico-giuridico di Beccaria, cit., p. 704. 110 Le omissioni per lo più non sono registrate sul volume in folio. 106 28 quale il Novum organum, costituisce la seconda parte delle sei previste, Beccaria condivide l’impalcatura del progetto. Si tenga presente che le varie prefazioni che precedono il Novum organum, il preambolo Franciscus de Verulamio sic cogitavit, la praefatio all’Instauratio magna e la praefatio al Novum organum, sono tutte trascritte pressoché integralmente negli Excerpta e fatte proprie da Beccaria. Il sistema in aforismi del Novum organum, il loro rigore linguistico e la chiarezza cercata da Bacon come caratteristica necessaria per la scienza, è presa a modello da Beccaria che ne imita lo stile, volutamente secco, asciutto, senza orpelli. Foscolo elogiò Beccaria tra coloro che egregiamente scrivevano le loro meditazioni, onorando il ‘materno idioma’, per «lo stile assoluto e sicuro» del Dei delitti e delle pene111. Amati sostenne che il Dei delitti e delle pene procedeva «esso pure per aforismi» e che questa fosse la ragione per cui «la materia del suo libro» avesse potuto «andar soggetta a distribuzioni diverse»112 . Secondo i curatori, del resto, gli Excerpta vanno intesi come «una sorta di esercitazione all’uso dell’aforisma»113 e per Francesca Mecatti in essi si trova la testimonianza di un «gusto peculiare per la brevità e l’autorevolezza della prosa baconiana»114. Dal Novum organum Beccaria assume anche alcuni sintagmi, alcune metafore e immagini, utili al suo intento di colpire o di ‘illuminare’ la ragione dei suoi lettori. Mario Fubini avvertì in alcune immagini del trattato di Beccaria che rimangono impresse nelle menti dei lettori, quali ad esempio «l’opinione che è forse il solo cemento della società», o a proposito della tortura l’assurda esigenza che il «dolore divenga il crociuolo della verità» e non in esse soltanto, un «gusto formatosi nella lettura di Bacone»115. Nel Dei delitti varie le occorrenze di termini legati al mondo ‘cantieristico’ e all’immagine della costruzione dell’edificio116, metafora importante per il progetto baco111 Cfr. Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di Ugo Foscolo, vol. VII. Lezioni, articoli di critica e di polemica (1809-1811), a cura di E. Santini, Le Monnier, Firenze 1933, p. 32. Cfr. Mecatti, Aforisti italiani del Settecento, cit., p. 146. 112 Amati, Di un manoscritto finora ignorato, cit., p. 21. Il riferimento è, ad esempio, alle diverse modifiche apportate alla suddivisione dei paragrafi nella traduzione francese del trattato ad opera di Morellet. 113 Francioni, Nota al testo, cit., p. 460. Come già segnalato da Marta Fattori, appare insolito per l’uso dell’aforisma valutare il De augmentis scientiarum e non il Novum organum dove è volutamente ed espressamente usato in tutta l’opera: cfr. Fattori, Baconiana, cit., p. 408. 114 Mecatti, Aforisti italiani del Settecento, cit., p. 136. 115 Cfr. Fubini, Beccaria scrittore, cit., p. 137. Cfr. Mecatti, Aforisti italiani del Settecento, cit., p. 146, n. 85. 116 «Che se non esiste uno stabile monumento del patto sociale, come Marialuisa Parise niano del sapere, simbolo del Novum organum e dell’Instauratio magna. L’uso dell’immagine dell’intelletto come ‘fabbrica’ in Beccaria – «Egli è dimostrato che l’unione delle idee è il cemento che forma tutta la fabbrica dell’intelletto umano»117– richiama l’immagine baconiana, trascritta negli Excerpta, «Ex quo fit, ut universa ista ratio umana, qua utimur quoad inquisitionem naturae, non bene congesta et aedificata sit, sed tanquam moles aliqua magnifica sine fundamento»118. Comune a Bacon e Beccaria è l’idea che la riforma proposta abbia per obiettivo il miglioramento delle condizioni di vita degli uomini, che si tratti cioè di un’impresa che recherà vantaggio all’intera umanità. Sin dal preambolo Franciscus de Verulamio sic cogitavit, Bacon dichiarava il fine della sua impresa: «quam Viventibus et Posteris notam fieri, ipsorum interesse putavit»119. Bacon esplicitava che la sua volontà era «propensae in Generis Humani Commoda voluntatis»120 e che il fine della sua opera non fosse l’ambizione di gettare le fondamenta di una setta ma di promuovere «utilitatem et amplitudinem humanam»121; entrambi i passi sono omessi da Beccaria negli Excerpta. Eppure anche per Beccaria l’obiettivo finale della riforma era appunto quello di procurare vantaggio al genere umano: pochissimi hanno esaminata e combattuta la crudeltà delle pene e l’irregolarità delle procedure criminali [...] pochissimi, rimontando ai principi generali, annientarono gli errori accumulati di più secoli [...] Me fortunato se potrò ottenere [...] i segreti ringraziamenti degli oscuri e pacifici seguaci della ragione, e se potrò inspirare quel dolce fremito con cui le anime sensibili rispondono a chi sostiene gl’interessi dell’umanità122. Bacon era ricorso poi al termine protopirus, calco dal greco, per indicare il suo stato di pioniere, non avendo trovato nessuno che condividesse con lui la strada della riforma123; celebre l’altra immagine da lui utilizzaresisteranno le leggi alla forza inevitabile del tempo e delle passioni?» (Beccaria, Dei delitti, § V, cit., p. 39). 117 Ivi, § XIX, p. 71. 118 Bacon, Franciscus de Verulamio sic cogitavit, in Id., The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum organum, cit., p. 2. Segnalato già da Francioni in C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, cit., p. 71, n. 1. 119 Bacon, Franciscus de Verulamio sic cogitavit, in Id., The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum organum, cit., p. 2. 120 Ivi, p. 4. Cfr. supra, p. 20 e n. 94. 121 Bacon, Praefatio, in Id., The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum organum, cit., p. 24. 122 Beccaria, Introduzione a Dei delitti e delle pene, cit., pp. 24-25. 123 «Si qui diffidant, me videant, hominem inter homines aetatis meae civilibus negotiis occupatissimum, nec firma admodum valetudine (quod magnum habet temporis dispendium), atque in hac re plane protopirum, et vestigia nullius sequutum, neque haec ipsa cum ullo mor- 29 Beccaria e Bacon: una fonte inglese alle origini del Dei delitti? ta, nella quale paragona la propria impresa a quella di Colombo124. Anche Beccaria pone l’enfasi sulla novità della strada da lui percorsa: Se io non avessi altro merito che quello di aver presentato il primo all’Italia con qualche maggior evidenza ciò che altre nazioni hanno osato scrivere e cominciano a praticare, io mi stimerei fortunato; ma se sostenendo i diritti degli uomini e dell’invincibile verità contribuissi a strappare dagli spasimi e dalle angosce della morte qualche vittima sfortunata della tirannia o dell’ignoranza, ugualmente fatale, le benedizioni e le lagrime anche d’un solo innocente nei trasporti della gioia mi consolerebbero dal disprezzo degli uomini125. Nell’avvertenza A chi legge vi sono numerosi richiami baconiani. Questa premessa fu scritta nel febbraio del 1765 e non fu accolta nella 3a edizione Dei delitti pressoché ultimata, ma vide la luce solo nel marzo 1766 come premessa alla 5a edizione. Gianni Francioni e Philippe Audegean ritengono fortemente probabile che l’avvertenza sia di Pietro Verri126. Se così fosse sarebbe un’ulteriore conferma del ruolo di Verri come tramite dell’interesse baconiano. Innanzitutto nell’incipit condivide con il filosofo inglese l’expurgatio, momento primo e necessario della riforma proposta e la critica all’autorità: «Alcuni avanzi di leggi di un antico popolo conquistatore [...] formano quella tradizione di opinioni [...]. Queste leggi, che sono uno scolo de’ secoli i più barbari»127. In queste prime righe si trova subito la critica alla legislazione vigente e al sistema delle sue fonti e viene dichiarata guerra al principio d’autorità delle antiche leggi e massime penali. A questo proposito sembra significativa la trascrizione che Beccaria fa negli Excerpta, c. 47v, della citazione presente nell’aforisma 97, del I libro del Novum organum e in parte sottolineata: nos nil magni fecisse, sed tantum ea talium communicantem» (Bacon, Novum organum I 113, in Id., The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum organum, cit., p. 170. Cfr. R.L. Ellis, General Preface, in The works of Francis Bacon, vol. I., cit., p. 24. Cfr. M. Marchetto (a cura di), Francesco Bacone la grande instaurazione. Parte seconda Nuovo organo, Rusconi, Milano 1998, pp. viii-ix. 124 Cfr. Bacon, Novum organum I 92, in Id., The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum organum, cit., p. 150. Cfr. G. Rees, Commentary on Novum organum, ivi, p. 532. 125 Beccaria, Dei delitti, § XI, cit., p. 54. 126 Il preambolo è assente nel manoscritto B di Pietro Verri. Nel suo archivio però Francioni ha individuato una sola carta dal titolo Notizie preliminari indispensabili per criticare ragionevolmente gli scritti politici che sembrerebbe richiamare quelle Notizie preliminari al quale aveva fatto riferimento, nelle sue lettere, l’editore Giuseppe Aubert: cfr. Francioni, Notizia sul manoscritto della seconda redazione Dei delitti e delle pene, cit., pp. 272-274. Cfr. P. Audegean, Il problema Beccaria, «Rivista storica italiana», 116, 2004, pp. 834-871: 836. 127 Beccaria, A chi legge, cit., p. 17. quae pro magnis habentur minoris fecisse128. Bacon aveva già sostenuto che per il nuovo metodo, l’interpretatio naturae, nella filosofia della natura, bisognasse abbattere il principio d’autorità, porre fine cioè all’esagerato atteggiamento di venerazione verso il passato, la reverentia antiquitatis129 e sbarazzarsi delle vermiculates quaestiones e degli idola. Lo stesso procedimento Bacon lo aveva indicato però anche per la riforma del corpus giuridico affermando fosse necessario «quam ut scripta authentica intra fines moderatos coërceantur, et facessat multitudo enormis authorum et doctorum in jure; unde laceratur sententia legum, judex fit attonitus, processus immortales»130. La liberazione dei pregiudizi era pertanto momento necessario e fondamentale anche in ambito giuridico. Bacon aveva concepito l’idea di redigere un digesto delle leggi inglesi131, le Maxims of the Law132 che furono pubblicate solamente postume nel 1630133, edizione conosciuta e utilizzata da Thomas Hobbes134. Bacon inserì gran parte di queste tematiche nel libro VIII del De augmentis scientiarum. Si tenga presente poi che la spiegazione e l’origine giuridica del termine aforisma è espresso per la prima volta da Bacon, nella prefazione ai Maxims of the Law: Thirdly, whereas I could have digested these rules into a certain method or order [...] yet I have avoided to do so, because this delivering of knowledge in distinct and disjoined aphorisms doth leave the wit of man more free to turn and toss, and to make use of that which is delivered to more several purposes and applications. For we see all the ancient wisdom and science was wont to be delivered in that form [...] but chiefly the precedent of the civil law, which hath taken the same course with their rules, did confirm me in my opinion135. 128 Bacon, Novum organum I 97, in Id., The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum organum, cit., p. 154. 129 Parallelo già sottolineato da Amati, Di un manoscritto finora ignorato, cit., pp. 27-28. 130 F. Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum VIII, 3, af. 78, in The works of Francis Bacon, vol. I, cit., pp. 821-822. Cfr. F. Bacone, Opere filosofiche, a cura di E. De Mas, Laterza, Bari 1965, vol. II, p. 501. 131 Bacon partendo dalla esperienza di 300 casi trattati personalmente voleva sottoporre la common law alla regolamentazione di certe massime o regulae juris concepite in analogia con quelle del diritto romano e trovate attraverso un processo induttivo: cfr. Fattori, Introduzione a Francis Bacon, cit., p. 15. 132 F. Bacon, Maxims of the Law, in The works of Francis Bacon, vol. VII. Literary and professional works, ed. by J. Spedding, R.L. Ellis and D.D. Heath, Longman, London 1859, pp. 307-387. Cfr. Bacone, Scritti politici giuridici e storici, cit., II, pp. 21-36. 133 Cfr. Fattori, Introduzione a Francis Bacon, cit., p. 15. Su Bacon giurista: cfr. P.H. Kocher, Francis Bacon on the science of jurisprudence, «Journal of the History of Ideas», 18, 1957, 1, pp. 3-26. 134 Ibidem. Cfr. P. Carrive, La pensée politique anglaise de Hooker a Hume, P.U.F., Paris 1994, pp. 209-247. 135 F. Bacon, Preface to Maxims of the Law, cit., p. 321; cfr. Bacone, Scrit- 30 I brani delle opere di Bacon riguardanti il metodo da seguire per attuare la riforma legislativa, la liberazione dai pregiudizi, costituiscono quelli di maggiore interesse per Beccaria. Nel passo finale dell’avvertenza A chi legge vi è poi un calco di un passo di Bacon presente nella Praefatio all’Instauratio magna e integralmente trascritto negli Excerpta; appare infatti indizio evidente la trascrizione in italiano amatore della verità136 del sintagma latino di Bacon Nos certe aeterno Veritatis amore devicti137. Nell’Introduzione al Dei delitti Beccaria scriveva che gli uomini «dopo essere passati frammezzo mille errori nelle cose più essenziali alla vita» provano a riconoscere quelle palbabili verità138 che sfuggono per la loro semplicità alle menti volgari «non avvezze ad analizzare gli oggetti ma a riceverne le impressioni tutte di un pezzo, più per tradizione che per esame»139. Interessante notare il parallelo con la critica baconiana alla cattiva astrazione delle prime nozioni delle cose compiuta dalle menti umane, alla quale sono da attribuire la maggioranza degli errori invalsi nell’uso: «propterea quod Notiones Rerum Primae, quas Mens haustu facili et supino excipit, recondit atque accumulat (unde reliqua omnia fluunt) vitiosae sint, et confusae»140. Inoltre in Beccaria è ripreso il sintagma confuse nozioni. Le confuse nozioni sono quelle sulle quali si sono fondate le critiche del Facchinei: «Le mal intese critiche pubblicate contro questo libro si fondano su confuse nozioni»141 e all’origine dei cambiamenti di sorte dei cittadini nei vari tribunali: «dall’attuale fermento degli umori d’un giudice, che prende per legittima ti politici giuridici e storici, cit., II, p. 32. Cfr. Kocher, Francis Bacon on the science of jurisprudence, cit., p. 7; cfr. Fattori, Introduzione a Francis Bacon, cit., p. 16. 136 «Chiunque, lo ripeto, volesse onorarmi delle sue critiche, non cominci dunque dal supporre in me principii distruttori o della virtù o della religione [...] e invece di farmi incredulo o sedizioso [...] non tremi ad ogni proposizione che sostenga gl’interessi dell’umanità [...] troverà in me non tanto un uomo che cerca di rispondere quanto un pacifico amatore della verità» (Beccaria, A chi legge, in Dei delitti e delle pene, cit., p. 21). 137 «Nos certe aeterno Veritatis amore devicti, viarum incertis et arduis et solitudinibus nos commisimus; et divino auxilio freti et innixi, mentem nostram et contra opinionum violentias et quasi instructas acies, et contra proprias et internas haesitationes et scrupolos, et contra rerum caligines et nubes [...] ut tandem magis fida et secura indicia viventibus et posteris comparare possemus» (Bacon, Praefatio, in Id., The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum organum, cit., p. 20). 138 In Bacon vi è un’unica occorrenza dell’aggettivo palpabilis riferito alla natura: «Quandoquidem eadem natura, quae in aliis videtur latens et occulta, in aliis manifesta sit et quasi palpabilis» (Novum organum I 88, in Id., The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum organum, cit., p. 142). Cfr. M. Fattori, Lessico del Novum Organum di Francesco Bacone, Ateneo e Bizzarri, Roma 1980, vol. I, p. 361. 139 Beccaria, Introduzione a Dei delitti e delle pene, cit., p. 23. 140 Bacon, Franciscus de Verulamio sic cogitavit, cit., p. 2. 141 Beccaria, A chi legge, in Dei delitti e delle pene, cit., p. 18. Marialuisa Parise interpretazione il vago risultato di tutta quella confusa serie di nozioni che gli muove la mente»142. Beccaria legge in Bacon l’elogio dell’invenzione della stampa, ai suoi tempi scoperta recente, che il filosofo inglese giudica come una delle tre scoperte meccaniche che più hanno cambiato il volto del mondo e le condizioni di vita sulla terra, riconoscendole un enorme influsso sulle vicende umane143, avendo cambiato il modo di comunicare fra gli uomini e contribuendo alla diffusione del sapere. Beccaria ne evidenzia in particolare il significativo ruolo politico e culturale: rendere pubblico quanto prima restava sconosciuto ai più: «Si sono conosciute le vere relazioni fra il sovrano e i sudditi, e fralle diverse nazioni [...] si è accesa [...] una tacita guerra d’industria [...] Questi sono frutti che si debbono alla luce di questo secolo»144 e «Da ciò veggiamo quanto sia utile la stampa, che rende il pubblico e non alcuni pochi, depositario delle sante leggi, e quanto abbia dissipato quello spirito tenebroso di cabala e d’intrigo»145. Il De augmentis scientiarum, in particolare la sezione di aforismi di argomento giuridico, presente nell’VIII libro, dal titolo Exemplum Tractatus de Justitia Universali, sive de Fontibus Juris, in uno Titulo, per Aphorismos, attirarono l’interesse maggiore di Beccaria, come già segnalato da numerosi studiosi146. Questa sezione, che in effetti è un rifluire di temi concepiti per l’opera Maxims of the Law, poi non pubblicata, apparve talmente autonoma e importante che, in Italia, questi aforismi furono pubblicati autonomamente; numerose ne furono le edizioni fra Settecento e Ottocento147. Dal De augmentis scientiarum Beccaria trae proposizioni riguardanti la legislazione e la scienza giuridica, passi che risulteranno in diversa misura utili alla stesura del Dei delitti. 142 Id., Dei delitti, § IV, cit., p. 37. «Haec enim tria rerum faciem et statum in orbe terrarum mutaverunt […] unde innumerae rerum mutationes sequutae sunt; ut non imperium aliquod, non secta, non stella, majorem efficaciam et quasi influxum super res humanas exercuisse videatur, quam ista mechanica exercuerunt» (Bacon, Novum organum I 129, in Id., The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum organum, cit., p. 194). 144 Beccaria, Introduzione a Dei delitti e delle pene, cit., p. 24. 145 Beccaria, Dei delitti, § V, cit, p. 40. 146 Cfr. Amati, Di un manoscritto finora ignorato, cit., pp. 24-27; cfr. Id., Vita ed opere di Cesare Beccaria, cit., pp. 26-30; cfr. Crespi, Il pensiero filosofico-giuridico di Beccaria, cit., pp. 704-707. 147 F. Bacon, Tractatus de justitia universali…, Pisa 1765; Id., Le leggi delle leggi ossia saggio sui fonti del diritto universale tratto dall’opera dello istesso autore della dignità e dell’incremento delle scienze, traduzione con commenti di F. Arrò, tipi della Vedova Ghiringhello e Comp., Torino 1824; Id., Tractatus de justitia universali, sive de fontibus juris in uno titulo per aphorismos. Appendix ex Baconis sermonibus: De officio judicis, Bizzonii, Ticini Regii 1827; Id., De fontibus juris, Bizzoni, Pavia 1827; Id., Della legge comune, o sia dei fonti di diritto. Aforismi..., tradotti da A. Ragazzi, Tipogr. della ven. Cappella del SS. Sacramento, Urbino 1855. 143 31 Beccaria e Bacon: una fonte inglese alle origini del Dei delitti? Quando Beccaria, nel paragrafo III, sostiene che la dignità del governare è proporzionata alla dignità dei sudditi, scrive che la ‘ragione illuminata’ «preferisce il comandare agli uomini felici più che a una greggia di schiavi»148. Il tema era stato già affrontato da Bacon149 nel I libro del De augmentis scientiarum e la scelta dell’immagine del ‘gregge’ da parte di Beccaria rende manifesto il debito: «Videmus, dignitatem imperandi sequi dignitatem eius, cui imperatur. Imperium in belluas et pecora, quale bubulcorum aut opilionum, res vilis»150. Uno degli esempi più significativi però è il tema della necessità della certezza della legge. Bacon nella epistola dedicatoria che, precede le Maxims of the Law, indicava il suo compito e desiderio: stabilire e fissare un senso certo del diritto che a suo parere ondeggiava troppo nell’incertezza151. Per Bacon era il requisito fondamentale perché la legge potesse definirsi giusta e, nel De augmentis scientiarum, paragonava la voce della legge al segnale del trombettiere che annuncia l’inizio della battaglia: «Legis tantum interest ut certa sit, ut absque hoc nec justa esse possit. Si enim incerta vocem det tuba, quis se parabit ad bellum? Similiter, si incertam vocem det lex, quis se parabit ad parendum?»152 . Anche Beccaria, nel paragrafo IV sulle Interpretazioni delle leggi, tratta il tema ed usa la stessa immagine della «voce della legge», sostenendo che qualora un giudice: «sia costretto, o voglia fare anche soli due sillogismi, si apre la porta all’incertezza. [...] Quindi veggiamo gli stessi delitti dallo stesso tribunale puniti diversamente in diversi tempi, per aver consultato non la costante e fissa voce della legge, ma l’errante instabilità delle interpretazioni»153. A questa tematica era connessa l’altra della necessità di un’applicazione letterale e rigorosa della legge. Che il giudice debba essere un mero esecutore della legge e non debba interpretarla fu già detto da Bacon nei due aforismi che Beccaria trascrive: «Non est interpretatio sed divinatio quae recedit a littera» e «Cum receditur a littera, iudex transit in legislatorem»154. Come sottolineò Amati, Bacon, più di un secolo prima dell’autore dello Spirito delle leggi, che teorizzò la divisione dei poteri, aveva già 148 Beccaria, Dei delitti, § III, cit., p. 35. Cfr. Francioni in Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, cit., p. 35, n. 2. Il passo baconiano non è negli Excerpta ma segnato al margine dell’edizione in folio da lui posseduta. 150 Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum, in The works of Francis Bacon, vol. I, cit., p. 481. 151 Cfr. Bacon, To her sacred Majesty, in Maxims of the Law, cit., p. 316; cfr. Bacone, Scritti politici giuridici e storici, cit., II, pp. 27-28. 152 Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum VIII, 3, af. 8, in The works of Francis Bacon, vol. I, cit., p. 805. 153 Beccaria, Dei delitti, § IV, cit., pp. 36 e 37. 154 Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum, VI, 3, exemplum XLVI, in The works of Francis Bacon, vol. I, cit., p. 706. Cfr. Francioni in Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, cit., p. 37, n. 2. 149 espresso quelle idee di ordine generale155. Interessante notare infine che il tema della contrapposizione tra vita attiva e vita contemplativa o oziosa, nel quale Bacon aveva identificato gli oziosi nella società con i claustrati-religiosi156, passo che fu oggetto di censura157, viene ripreso da Beccaria e anch’egli subirà le accuse del Facchinei158: Io chiamo ozio politico quello che non contribuisce alla società né col travaglio né colla ricchezza, che acquista senza giammai perdere, che, venerato dal volgo con stupida ammirazione, risguardato dal saggio con isdegnosa compassione per gli esseri che ne sono la vittima, essendo privo di quello stimolo della vita attiva che è la necessità di custodire o aumentare i comodi della vita, lascia alle passioni di opinione, che non sono le meno forti, tutta la loro energia159. Beccaria usa il termine ‘claustrale’, nel paragrafo VIII, riguardante la Divisione dei Delitti: Mi basterà indicare i principii più generali e gli errori più funesti e comuni per disingannare sì quelli che per un male inteso amore di libertà vorrebbono introdurre l’anarchia, come coloro che amerebbono ridurre gli uomini ad una claustrale regolarità160. Beccaria si forma pertanto anche alla cattedra di Bacon. La lettura e lo studio attento delle sue opere, dalle quali compie lunghe e pressoché integrali trascrizioni, stabiliscono una nuova era della sua ‘restaurazione letteraria’, ossia della riforma dei suoi studi. Tutto questo avviene nel momento in cui prepara la stesura del Dei delitti e delle pene, in cui di Bacon troviamo lo stile aforistico, alcune immagini e soprattutto il metodo da seguire nella riforma giudiziaria che gli stava a cuore. 155 Cfr. Amati, Vita ed opere di Cesare Beccaria, cit., p. 26. Hoc genus doctrinae minus sanae, et seipsam corrumpentis, invaluit praecipue apud multos ex scholasticis, qui summo otio abundantes, [...] (quippe quorum mentes conclusae essent in paucorum authorum, praecipue Aristotelis dictatoris sui, scriptis, non minus quam corpora ipsorum in coenobiorum cellis) [...] ex non magno materiae stamine, sed maxima spiritus, quasi radii, agitatione (Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum, in The works of Francis Bacon, vol. I, cit., p. 453). 157 Cfr. Fattori, «Vafer Baconus», cit., p. 118 e n. 70. 158 Cfr. Francioni in C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, cit., p. 78, n. 3. Sulla censura del Dei delitti: cfr. G. Orlandi, Beccaria all’Indice, «Spicilegium Historicum Congregationis SS.mi Redemptoris», 58 (2008), pp. 179-218; cfr. G. Imbruglia, Illuminismo e religione. Il Dei delitti e delle pene e la difesa dei Verri dinanzi alla censura inquisitoriale, «Studi Settecenteschi», 25-26, 2017, pp. 119-161; cfr. Dizionario storico dell’Inquisizione, diretto da A. Prosperi con la collaborazione di V. Lavenia e J. Tedeschi, Edizioni della Normale, Pisa 2010, I, pp. 167-168 (stranamente né Imbruglia né il Dizionario tengono conto dello studio di Orlandi, dove è riportata la trascrizione integrale del voto del gesuita Pietro Lazeri). 159 Beccaria, Dei delitti, § XXIV, cit., p. 78. 160 Ivi, § VIII, p. 47. 156 Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Saggi Droit naturel et droit à la vie. Beccaria lecteur de Hobbes* Citation: P. Audegean (2019) Droit naturel et droit à la vie. Beccaria lecteur de Hobbes. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 33-45. doi: 10.13128/ds-25436 Copyright: © 2019 P. Audegean. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index. php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. Philippe Audegean Université Nice Sophia Antipolis Abstract. Although in the section A chi legge he suggested otherwise, Beccaria owes much to Hobbes. This is evinced by three theses advanced in Dei delitti e delle pene: human beings are by nature unsociable; there is no natural law prior to the establishment of the civil society; natural rights derive from our inborn tendency to selfpreservation. From these assumptions, however, Beccaria draws three conclusions that contradict Hobbes: even the most fundamental rights, being guaranteed only by the civil law, are in fact created by it; sovereignty, which is intrinsically limited, is legitimate only insofar as it acknowledges the right to live; the death penalty is illegitimate because it brings men back to the state of permanent war they meant to overcome. Keywords. Beccaria, Hobbes, Natural Law, Criminal Law, Death Penalty. 1. HORRESCO REFERENS. BECCARIA CONTRE HOBBES. L’édition définitive des Délits et des peines, parue en 1766, s’ouvre avec un avis au lecteur destiné à répondre aux critiques émises contre le livre depuis sa première édition en 1764. Comme l’a démontré Gianni Francioni1, l’auteur de cette préface n’est cependant pas Beccaria, mais, selon toute probabilité, Pietro Verri, sans doute avec l’aide de son frère Alessandro. Il n’est donc pas exclu de voir apparaître certains décalages, voire certaines dissonances théoriques entre l’avis A chi legge et l’ouvrage proprement dit. L’auteur de l’avis éprouve ainsi le besoin de mettre en garde contre toute confusion entre le sens du concept d’état de nature chez Beccaria et celui qu’il avait chez Hobbes: «Ce serait une erreur d’entendre qui parle d’état de guerre précédant l’état de société comme s’il le prenait au sens de Hobbes, * Je souhaite dire ici ma gratitude à Luigi Ferrajoli, Gianni Francioni et Dario Ippolito pour leurs observations critiques sur une version précédente de cet article, dont j’ai essayé de tenir compte dans cette nouvelle version. 1 G. Francioni, Notizia sul manoscritto della seconda redazione del «Dei delitti e delle pene» (con una appendice di inediti di Pietro Verri relativi all’opera di Beccaria), «Studi settecenteschi», V, 1985-1986, pp. 229-296: 274; Id., Nota introduttiva [de la section IV, Scritti relativi a «Dei delitti e delle pene»], dans Edizione nazionale delle opere di Pietro Verri, vol. I. Scritti letterari filosofici e satirici, éd. G. Francioni, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, Rome 2014, pp. 781-794: 788-789. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 33-45 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25436 34 c’est-à-dire de nul devoir et de nulle obligation antérieurs...»2. Nombreux sont en effet les auteurs des xviie et xviiie siècles qui, reprenant le concept d’état de nature inventé par Hobbes, tiennent à souligner qu’ils ne l’entendent pas dans le même sens que lui3. Mais la précision de Verri prolonge aussi une ligne de défense plus spécifique et déjà développée dans la ‘troisième’ édition des Délits, parue en 1765, par Giovanni Gualberto De Soria, qui remarquait à propos de Beccaria: «En effet, quoique sa manière de penser en matière politique et morale soit aux antipodes de la manière de penser de Hobbes, il est néanmoins apparu à certains comme un hobbesien»4. Il n’est cependant pas facile d’identifier la cible visée par ces mises au point. Le Giudizio de De Soria et la préface de Verri ont surtout pour but de répondre aux accusations contenues dans le pamphlet de Ferdinando Facchinei, un moine vénitien de l’ordre des bénédictins de Vallombreuse, paru en janvier 17655. Or, on ne trouve dans cet écrit aucune allusion à Hobbes, dont le nom ne figure pas non plus dans l’opuscule polémique de Pietro Camillo Almici paru peu de temps après, en mars 1765 (et que De Soria ne pouvait donc pas connaître)6. Dans 2 C. Beccaria, Des délits et des peines. Dei delitti e delle pene, trad. fr., introd. et notes par Ph. Audegean, texte italien établi par G. Francioni, ENS Éditions, Lyon 2009, Au lecteur, p. 139 («Sarebbe un errore a chi, parlando di stato di guerra prima dello stato di società, lo prendesse nel senso hobbesiano, cioè di nessun dovere e di nessuna obbligazione anteriore»). Dans cette édition bilingue, le texte italien précède toujours d’une page sa traduction française. Toutes les italiques des citations sont dans les textes cités. Pour éviter toute confusion avec les autres éditions de Dei delitti e delle pene citées dans cet article, ce volume sera désormais abrégé DP. 3 Emblématiques à cet égard sont ces lignes de J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government III 19, in Id., Political Writings, éd. D. Wooton, Hackett, Indianapolis/Cambridge 2003, p. 270: «And here we have the plain difference between the state of nature and the state of war, which, however some men have counfounded...». 4 G.G. De Soria, Giudizio di celebre professore sopra il libro «Dei delitti e delle pene», dans C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, éd. F. Venturi, Einaudi, Turin 1965, pp. 198-205: 199 («Di fatto, quantunque il di lui modo di pensare nelle materie politiche e morali sia agli antipodi del modo di pensarne di Hobbes, contuttociò egli è comparso ad alcuni un hobbesiano»). L’auteur consacre l’essentiel de ce texte à distinguer la conception de Beccaria de celle de Hobbes. Comme l’allusion à Hobbes ne figurait pas encore dans la première version de l’avis A chi legge, rédigée en février 1765 (P. Verri, Notizie indispensabili preliminari per criticare ragionevolmente gli scritti politici, dans Id., Scritti letterari filosofici e satirici, cit., pp. 858-860), il est possible que Verri ne l’ait ajoutée qu’après avoir pris connaissance du Giudizio de De Soria. Aucune allusion à Hobbes non plus dans la Risposta de Pietro (et Alessandro) Verri à Ferdinando Facchinei, également parue en février 1765 avant la publication du Giudizio (fin février 1765). 5 F. Facchinei, Note ed osservazioni sul libro «Dei delitti e delle pene», s.n. [A. Zatta], s.l. [Venise] 1765. 6 P.C. Almici, Osservazioni critiche di Callimaco Limi sul libro intitolato «Dei delitti e delle pene», «Nuova raccolta di opuscoli scientifici e filologici», t. XIII, S. Occhi, Venise 1765, pp. xiii-xlvii. Bien que la parution Philippe Audegean le cas de Facchinei, l’auteur désigné comme le principal inspirateur des Délits et des peines n’est pas Hobbes, mais Rousseau7. Il est singulier que ni De Soria ni Verri ne prennent la peine de distinguer l’entreprise du Milanais de celle du Genevois. Tout au plus peut-on rappeler que les deux premiers adversaires de Beccaria ont âprement censuré l’hypothèse du contrat social et de l’état de nature, attribuée sans autre précision aux «publicistes»8 et «naturalistes modernes»9. Pour Facchinei, la raison dément ainsi formellement l’hypothèse absurde consistant à imaginer des êtres humains «nés comme des champignons» et «privés de ce que nous appelons loi de nature»10, c’est-à-dire l’obligation d’obéir à ceux qui commandent par nature. Pour Almici, cette fictio mentis est du reste évidemment contraire aux intentions de Dieu, qui nous a rendus dépendants les uns des autres et a placé dans notre cœur un principe inné de charité11. Chez l’un comme chez l’autre, toutefois, la dénonciation d’un concept de nature privé de normativité intrinsèque demeure marginale et n’est pas autrement développée: De Soria et Verri auraient donc pu l’ignorer. Pourquoi ont-ils choisi d’y répondre et pourquoi, ce faisant, ont-ils souhaité prendre leurs distances avec Hobbes? Je crois que deux raisons peuvent avoir motivé cette décision. La première est stratégique et tient à la grammaire des débats philosophico-juridiques de l’époque. Au xviiie siècle, Hobbes fait en effet unanimement figure de repoussoir12: il est la bête noire de la pensée politique moderne. Sa doctrine est non seulement jugée fausse et inacceptable, mais dangereuse, parce que sournoisement séduisante, souterrainement influente. Il ne suffit donc pas d’en montrer l’incohérence rationnelle ou l’irrecevabilité morale: il faut en traquer partout la présence, déchiffrer ses influences inaperçues. Aucun sentiment de solidarité accrue ou redoublée ne résulte ainsi de cette lutte qui, pourtant menée de front contre de ces Osservazioni soit postérieure à la rédaction de la première version de l’avis A chi legge, on ne peut exclure que, au moment de la révision finale du texte, Verri (et Beccaria) aient aussi en tête les arguments d’Almici. On ne trouve en tout cas aucune allusion à Hobbes dans le texte inédit de Verri contre Almici (P. Verri, Contro il padre Almici in difesa di «Dei delitti e delle pene», dans Id., Scritti letterari filosofici e satirici, cit., pp. 876-887). 7 Facchinei, Note ed osservazioni, cit., pp. 4, 15, 188. 8 Ivi, p. 9 («moderni pubblicisti»); Almici, Osservazioni critiche, cit., p. xvi («giuspubblicisti moderni»). 9 Ivi, pp. xvi, xviii («moderni naturalisti»). 10 Facchinei, Note ed osservazioni, cit., pp. 17-18 («nati come funghi», «privi di quella che noi chiamiamo Legge di natura»). 11 Almici, Osservazioni critiche, cit., pp. xvi-xvii. 12 J.-F. Spitz, John Locke et les fondements de la liberté moderne, P.U.F., Paris 2001, p. 284. Droit naturel et droit à la vie. Beccaria lecteur de Hobbes* un ennemi commun, aiguise au contraire les tensions (ou les exprime), puisque les détracteurs de Hobbes ne cessent de s’accuser mutuellement de hobbisme. Dans ce contexte, il était donc réaliste de redouter qu’une telle accusation finisse par être adressée à Beccaria. Ses premiers critiques n’avaient sans doute pas encore brandi cette arme, mais certaines de leurs objections menaçaient de pouvoir être exploitées à cette fin13. Aussi convenait-il de prendre les devants. Il existe cependant une seconde raison pour laquelle il convenait de le faire: cette seconde raison est le fait que le livre de Beccaria prêtait effectivement le flanc à l’accusation de hobbisme, comme l’a souligné Gianni Francioni14. Il est donc légitime de se demander si la tentative de dénégation faite dans l’avis au lecteur est vraiment convaincante. En effet, la ligne de défense adoptée par De Soria et synthétisée par Verri ne trouve pas de confirmations textuelles dans Des délits et des peines. L’état de nature de Beccaria se présente comme un état de guerre très proche de celui de Hobbes: un état de guerre qui invalide tout devoir et toute obligation15. Telle est du moins la thèse que je vais tenter de défendre dans les pages qui suivent. 13 De fait, dès 1766, le censeur de l’Inquisition romaine ne manque pas de citer Hobbes parmi les inspirateurs de Beccaria (Il voto del p. Lazeri S.J. sul «Dei delitti e delle pene», dans M. Pisani, Cesare Beccaria e l’«Index librorum prohibitorum», Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Naples 2013, pp. 51-70: 56, 57; Avis du père Lazeri de la Société de Jésus sur «Des délits et des peines», trad. fr. M. Tomcik, «Beccaria. Revue d’histoire du droit de punir», III, 2017, pp. 292-312: 294, 295). De même, en 1770, les autorités ecclésiastiques toscanes refusent l’imprimatur aux Ricerche intorno alla natura dello stile au motif que l’ouvrage contient des «propositions ouvertement et franchement hobbésiennes» (G. Aubert, lettre à P. Verri, 22 juillet 1770, cité par G. Gaspari, Nota al testo, dans Edizione nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria, vol. II, Scritti filosofici e letterari, éd. L. Firpo, G. Francioni et G. Gaspari, Mediobanca, Milan 1984, p. 383: «proposizioni hobbesiane schiette schiette»). 14 G. Francioni, dans Edizione nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria, vol. I. Dei delitti e delle pene, éd. G. Francioni, Mediobanca, Milan 1984, p. 20, note 1: «In realtà l’immagine beccariana dello “stato di guerra” è in gran parte riconducibile a un “senso hobbesiano”...». Voir aussi P. Costa, Beccaria e la filosofia della pena, dans R. Davies et P. Tincani (éd.), Un fortunato libriccino. L’attualità di Cesare Beccaria, L’Ornitorinco, Milan 2014, pp. 33-49: 35; Id., Lo ius vitae ac necis alla prova: Cesare Beccaria e la tradizione contrattualistica, «Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno», 44, 2015, pp. 817-895: 841. 15 Beccaria a possédé une édition du De cive (Th. Hobbes, Elementa philosophica de cive, F. Grasset, Lausanne 1760) qu’il a vendue avec une bonne partie de sa bibliothèque en 1777 (voir M.F. Turchetti, Libri e «nuove idee». Appunti sulla biblioteca illuministica di Cesare Beccaria, «Archivio storico lombardo», CXXXIX, 2013, pp. 183-236: 229). Difficile de savoir s’il a également eu entre les mains le Léviathan qui, sauf erreur de ma part, semble également absent de la bibliothèque de Verri (voir C. Capra, Pietro Verri e il «genio della lettura», dans L. Antonielli, C. Capra et M. Infelise (éd.), Per Marino Berengo. Studi degli allievi, FrancoAngeli, Milan 2000, pp. 619-677). 35 2. BELLUM OMNIUM CONTRA OMNES. L’ÉTAT DE NATURE SELON HOBBES. En inventant le concept philosophique et anti-aristotélicien d’état de nature, Hobbes poursuit un but rhétorique et politique: sa terrifiante description de l’absence mortifère d’autorité civile doit effrayer les lecteurs et les persuader de se soumettre à l’ordre politique. Elle a pour but de justifier l’autorité de l’État. Hobbes montre que, sans pouvoir souverain, la condition humaine bascule inévitablement dans un épouvantable état de guerre: une guerre sans quartier, où tous les coups sont permis. Chacun y possède en effet un jus in omnia, un droit universel à toute action qui est en son pouvoir. L’état de nature désigne donc une condition fondamentalement contradictoire, puisque si chacun a droit à tout, alors nul n’est obligé à rien et nul n’a donc droit à rien16, au sens d’un droit assuré, opposable et garanti. Mais comment puis-je avoir le droit de faire quelque chose sans que les autres aient le devoir de ne pas m’en empêcher? Et surtout, comment puis-je avoir le droit de voler, d’agresser, de tuer même? N’existe-t-il pas des lois naturelles, des maximes universelles de moralité qui valent toujours et partout? Hobbes ne le conteste pas. Il décrit même avec une grande précision le contenu normatif des lois naturelles. Sa thèse est pourtant que, dans l’état de nature, nul n’est obligé de leur obéir. Pour comprendre cette thèse paradoxale, il faut partir de la définition du mot droit, qui «ne signifie autre chose que la liberté que chacun a d’employer ses facultés naturelles conformément à la droite raison».17 De cette définition, il devrait s’ensuivre que je ne suis pas autorisé à faire ce qui n’est pas rationnel et que j’ai le devoir de faire ce qui l’est. Cette déduction est exacte, dit Hobbes, mais elle est inapplicable dans l’état de nature. En effet, les êtres humains poursuivent tous des buts différents et incompatibles. Or, nous ne voulons pas quelque chose parce que cela nous semble bon, mais cela nous semble bon parce que nous le voulons18. Chacun adopte donc sa propre définition du bien, qui diffère de celle des autres. Mais puisque les individus sont tous naturellement égaux, il n’existe aucun critère permettant d’établir une hiérarchie entre ces définitions: le concept de bien n’est 16 Th. Hobbes, Du citoyen I 11, trad. fr. Ph. Crignon, Flammarion, Paris 2010, p. 104 (De cive, éd. H. Warrender, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1983, p. 96). 17 Hobbes, Du citoyen I 7, cit., p. 102 (De cive, cit., p. 94: «Neque enim Juris nomine aliud significatur, quam libertas quam quisque habet facultatibus naturalibus secundum rectam rationem utendi»). 18 Hobbes, Du citoyen I 10, cit., p. 103: «En effet, quoi que veuille un homme, cela lui paraît bon précisément parce qu’il le veut » (De cive, cit., p. 95: «Quoniam enim, quæcunque quis voluerit, ideò bona sibi videntur quia ea vult»). 36 pas universalisable. Ce pluralisme éthique rend alors impossible la déduction des devoirs à partir des droits: nul n’a le droit de faire prévaloir ses préférences et sa conception du bien au nom de leur prétendue supériorité rationnelle. En dépit de leur pluralité polyphonique, évolutive et conflictuelle, les désirs humains partagent toutefois un objet commun. La condition de réalisation de tout désir quel qu’il soit est en effet la vie même. L’ensemble des tendances humaines est donc réuni et soutenu par le désir de conservation de soi. Il en résulte que le premier devoir de chacun est la préservation: chacun a l’obligation de conserver son corps et sa vie. Ce devoir ne découle pas du fait que la vie est un don de Dieu et ne nous appartient pas, ni du fait qu’il existe une loi naturelle antérieure à tout droit possible. Si chacun a le devoir de se conserver, c’est simplement parce qu’il le veut nécessairement et qu’on n’est pas libre de ne pas vouloir ce que l’on veut. Mais il en résulte également que la préservation est le tout premier droit de chacun: la conservation de soi est en effet le but rationnel de toutes les actions, l’unique but universel dans l’état de nature. Or, le droit à la fin suppose le droit aux moyens qui sont nécessaires pour l’atteindre19. Chacun a donc le droit naturel de faire tout ce que sa raison lui fait juger nécessaire à sa propre conservation. Mais dans l’état de nature, cette proposition signifie que chacun a un droit illimité de faire tout ce qu’il veut. Le contenu virtuellement infini et rationnel du droit de chacun annule celui, tout aussi rationnel mais normativement fini, de son devoir. La loi naturelle prescrit en effet de faire tout son possible pour mettre fin à l’état de guerre, puisqu’il est évident que la guerre ne peut être le meilleur moyen de préserver la vie. Or, la situation de guerre rend hautement imprudent tout geste de prudence: dans l’état de nature, comme l’a fait remarquer Norberto Bobbio, «le comble de l’imprudence serait de suivre les règles de la prudence»20. Pour sauver sa peau, nulle autre solution que de recourir aux moyens de la guerre: nulle autre solution que de mettre en péril sa propre vie. Chacun, dans l’état de nature, a rationnellement intérêt à agir contre la raison. Cette contradiction existentielle et anthropologique se traduit sur le plan juridique par le fait que chacun a le droit de désobéir à la loi. Il ne serait en effet rationnel d’obéir à la loi que si l’on avait la certitude que tous les autres y obéiront aussi. Mais une telle certitude, dans l’état de nature, est inaccessible. La loi 19 Hobbes, Du citoyen I 8, cit., p. 102 (De cive, cit., p. 94). N. Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes, Einaudi, Turin 1989, p. 46 («Lo stato di natura [...] è quello stato in cui sarebbe il colmo dell’imprudenza seguire le regole della prudenza»). 20 Philippe Audegean de nature nous enjoint donc de rechercher la paix, mais seulement si nous sommes déjà en paix: elle ne nous prescrit de la chercher que si nous l’avons déjà trouvée. En situation de guerre, elle nous ordonne seulement de la désirer dans notre cœur, dans notre for interne, non de la réaliser par nos actes et dans notre for externe. Hobbes aboutit alors à la conclusion que les lois de nature ne sont pas de véritables lois. Elles ne désignent pas un ordre normatif pré-civil, mais seulement certains moyens que la raison considère comme les plus adaptés pour atteindre nos objectifs: Cependant, ces lois que nous appelons lois de nature ne sont rien d’autre que certaines conclusions que la raison tire eu égard à ce qu’il faut faire et ne pas faire. Or une loi, au sens propre et précis du terme, est une parole proférée par quelqu’un qui commande légitimement à d’autres de faire ou de ne pas faire quelque chose. Ce ne sont donc pas des lois au sens propre, en tant qu’elles procèdent de la nature21. Les lois de nature ne sont que des théorèmes de la raison. Mais ces théorèmes nous aident à comprendre comment instituer de véritables lois, dont le fondement est toujours la volonté de celui qui commande et non la raison ou la rationalité de ses prescriptions. Les lois de nature ne deviennent de véritables lois que lorsque la loi civile existe et prescrit de leur obéir. 3. HOMO HOMINI LUPUS. BECCARIA AVEC HOBBES. Si Beccaria ne reprend évidemment pas l’intégralité de cette description, il en recueille cependant certains aspects essentiels. À la faveur d’une expression hardie et qui tranche avec les usages courants du temps, il emprunte d’abord à Hobbes le thème de l’insociabilité humaine. À deux reprises, il souligne en effet que, privés du lien artificiel que noue entre eux la justice humaine, les intérêts particuliers «se dissoudraient dans leur ancien état d’insociabilité», c’est-à-dire dans leur «premier état d’insociabilité»22. Cette formule anti-aristotélicienne prend pour 21 Hobbes, Du citoyen III 33, cit., p. 141 (De cive, cit., p. 121: «Naturæ autem quas vocamus leges cùm nihil aliud sint, quam conclusiones quædam ratione intellectæ, de agendis & omittendis; lex autem propriè atque accuratè loquendò, sit oratio ejus qui aliquid fieri vel non fieri aliis jure imperat, non sunt illæ propriè loquendo leges, quatenus à naturâ procedunt»). 22 DP, § 2, p. 149 («si scioglierebbono nell’antico stato d’insociabilità»), § 42, p. 289 («nel primo stato d’insociabilità»). La formule évoque également la critique du principe de sociabilité faite par J.-J. Rousseau, Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes, éd. J. Starobinski, dans Id., Œuvres complètes, vol. III, Gallimard, Paris 1964, Préface, p. 126. 37 Droit naturel et droit à la vie. Beccaria lecteur de Hobbes* cible la tradition du droit naturel moderne héritée de Locke et Pufendorf. Beccaria ne se borne pas en effet à rappeler que l’homme n’étant pas un animal politique, l’ordre politique doit être conçu comme un artifice servant à pallier les insuffisances de la sociabilité ou de la bienveillance naturelle (et non comme le prolongement institutionnel d’une tendance naturelle). Il affirme en outre que si, par hypothèse, on ôtait toute forme d’autorité civile, on ne trouverait pas même parmi les membres de l’espèce humaine cette forme instable et insatisfaisante de coopération sociale que Locke déduisait de leur nature rationnelle (qui les rend capables de connaître la loi de nature) et que Pufendorf faisait dériver du principe de sociabilité (lui-même né du besoin réciproque que la fragilité de l’espèce humaine instaure entre ses membres). Il n’existe aucune tendance humaine spontanément sociable. En l’absence d’État ne règne que la guerre: l’état de nature, soutient Beccaria d’une manière qui évoque irrésistiblement les descriptions de Hobbes, est un «état de guerre continuel»23. Cette idée plonge ses racines dans une anthropologie pessimiste que Beccaria hérite en réalité moins de Hobbes que d’une constellation d’auteurs qui, des jansénistes et moralistes du xviie siècle à Mandeville et Helvétius, ont décrit l’être humain comme une créature essentiellement mue par l’amour-propre et l’égoïsme. Beccaria en déduit que seul le ressort intéressé de l’avantage personnel a pu mettre fin à l’état de nature. L’hypothèse jusnaturaliste d’un renoncement rationnel et moral aux intérêts immédiats en vue des intérêts futurs et du bien commun doit donc être abandonnée comme irréaliste: «Aucun homme n’a fait le don gratuit d’une partie de sa liberté en vue du bien public: cette chimère n’existe que dans les romans...»24. 23 DP, § 1, p. 147 («continuo stato di guerra»). Cet état de guerre persiste entre les nations, puisqu’elles n’ont pas de supérieur commun. Voir Ivi, § 2, p. 149: «... l’état de guerre se transporta de l’individu aux nations...» («lo stato di guerra trasportossi dall’individuo alle nazioni»). Beccaria considère cependant que la concurrence industrielle et commerciale a fait reculer la guerre proprement dite, explicite et violente, dans un passé sanguinaire: «... entre les nations a éclaté une guerre tacite, une guerre d’industrie, la plus humaine et la plus digne d’hommes raisonnables» (Introduction, p. 143; «si è accesa fralle nazioni una tacita guerra d’industria la più umana e la più degna di uomini ragionevoli»). 24 Ivi, § 2, p. 149 («Nessun uomo ha fatto il dono gratuito di parte della propria libertà in vista del ben pubblico: questa chimera non esiste che ne’ romanzi»). J’ai commenté cette thèse de Beccaria dans Ph. Audegean, La Philosophie de Beccaria. Savoir punir, savoir écrire, savoir produire, Vrin, Paris 2010, pp. 47-51. Le lien entre pessimisme anthropologique, principe de l’utilité et antijusnaturalisme fait également la substance philosophique et polémique d’un article publié en 1766 par A. Verri, Di alcuni sistemi del pubblico diritto, dans Il Caffè 1764-1766, éd. G. Francioni et S. Romagnoli, Bollati Boringhieri, Turin 1998 (première éd. 1994), vol. II, pp. 725-739. Si l’on passe à présent des origines anthropologiques et historiques de l’autorité civile au fondement de sa légitimité, la question se pose de savoir si, dans l’état de nature, il existait déjà des droits et des devoirs. Y régnait-il, comme le voulaient Locke, Pufendorf et la plupart des auteurs de l’école moderne du droit naturel, des lois accessibles à la raison et dont l’ignorance ou la transgression n’étaient dues qu’à la «corruption de la nature humaine» qui, selon la version défendue par Verri dans la préface Au lecteur, impose de remédier à «l’absence de toute sanction expresse»25? Chacun y disposait-il au contraire, comme le voulait Hobbes, d’un droit absolu et entier à toute chose? Mais peut-on même parler de droits avant l’établissement de la convention civile? En d’autres termes, il convient de se demander si, d’une part, l’autorité civile résulte selon Beccaria de la cession de droits préexistants ou si elle apparaît au contraire comme la source de tout droit existant – et donc d’une nouvelle réalité humaine désignée par le fait d’avoir des droits, de revendiquer des droits, d’accorder des droits, etc. –, et si, d’autre part, la mission qui lui a été confiée consiste à rendre effectives les lois naturelles, à leur donner les moyens de se réaliser ou, selon le mot de Locke, de s’exécuter, ou si au contraire les lois qu’elle promulgue répondent à des critères intégralement déterminés par le pacte. 4. LEX. BECCARIA ET LE CONCEPT DE LOI NATURELLE. En première analyse, une réponse significative peut être fournie par des observations lexicales, d’abord sur le terme de loi, puis sur celui de droit. On remarque d’abord que Beccaria ne fait pas la moindre allusion verbale à l’existence d’une loi de nature. Dans Des délits et des peines, si l’on exclut la préface de Verri, le mot loi désigne toujours la loi civile. L’unique exception ne contredit pas cette observation, puisqu’elle concerne un passage où l’expression «lois de la nature» ne se réfère pas à des valeurs morales, mais aux lois physiques qui gouvernent les mouvements des corps26. Ce simple constat tend donc à faire penser que Becca25 DP, Au lecteur, p. 139 («corruzione della natura umana», «mancanza di una sanzione espressa»). Sur la source de ces expressions chez Locke, voir Francioni, dans Edizione nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria, vol. I, cit., p. 20, note 1. 26 DP, § 41, p. 285: «... les lois constantes et très simples de la nature...» («le costanti e semplicissime leggi della natura»). Tout au plus peut-on remarquer que Beccaria caractérise ici les lois naturelles au moyen des mêmes adjectifs qui lui servent à caractériser les lois civiles (voir ma note 297, DP, pp. 395-396), comme si la forme des secondes (mais non leur contenu) devait prendre pour modèle celle des premières. 38 ria adhère à un concept volontariste de loi comme commandement d’un supérieur: les seules lois qui précèdent l’état de société sont les lois physiques. Les lois civiles ne puisent donc pas leur fondement de légitimité dans des lois de nature qui leur préexistent, mais uniquement dans le pacte, dans l’accord artificiel établi entre celles et ceux qui ont décidé de s’associer en une communauté27. Il est vrai cependant que le pacte ne peut autoriser n’importe quelle loi: il existe des normes injustes qui, à ce titre, sont exclues du concept même de loi – bien que les annales juridiques en soient remplies au point que l’histoire humaine n’a peut-être jamais connu de véritable loi 28. On constate en effet que deux séries de contraintes lient et limitent les normes civiles. 1) En premier lieu, ces normes ne sauraient déroger au principe cardinal de l’utilité publique, défini de manière distributive ou individualiste: a) la condition de départ (l’égalité naturelle) et le but de l’association (la liberté) impliquent que les mêmes droits doivent être également accordés à chacun; b) cette condition et le fondement utilitariste de ce but impliquent également que le souverain doit viser au plus grand bonheur du plus grand nombre; c) ce qui implique enfin que les individus ne s’engagent jamais qu’à condition de subir les moindres contraintes possibles. Beccaria ne soutient pas cependant que du pacte social peuvent émerger des normes injustes parce que contraires à la loi de nature, mais qu’aucune norme injuste ne peut émerger du pacte correctement entendu. Le pacte n’est en effet pas un événement réel (obéissant par exemple à une règle majoritaire). Il n’est pas une donnée positive ou empirique, mais une fiction juridique déduite de la nature humaine et permettant d’évaluer la justice des lois positives: ... si nous appelons facultés de la nature humaine toutes les tendances de nos sens et de notre organisation; si nous appelons droit tout ce qui est un résultat, un effet nécessaire de ces tendances, le droit pourra être défini comme une conséquence nécessaire de l’usage de nos facultés, et la justice consistera à ne pas empêcher l’usage égal de ces mêmes facultés chez autrui...29. 27 On doit sans doute interpréter ce silence dans le contexte de l’opposition de Beccaria au courant «traditionaliste» qui, hostile au contractualisme, critiquait le jusnaturalisme moderne au nom d’un concept ancien et religieux de loi naturelle: voir Audegean, La Philosophie de Beccaria, cit., pp. 42-45. 28 DP, § 28, p. 241: «Heureuse l’humanité si, pour la première fois, on lui donnait des lois...» («Felice l’umanità, se per la prima volta le si dettassero leggi»). En toute rigueur, cette phrase signifie qu’on n’est jamais sortis de l’état de nature. Il est en tout cas remarquable qu’elle oppose aux lois positives un concept normatif de loi qui ne se confond pas avec celui de loi de nature, mais qui désigne seulement des lois au sens propre du terme. 29 C. Beccaria, Ricerche intorno alla natura dello stile, chap. XVI, dans Edizione nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria, vol. II, cit., p. 205 («se Philippe Audegean Cette analyse de l’essence du droit et de la justice permet par exemple d’invalider les privilèges des nobles, qui forment pourtant «une grande partie des lois des nations», au motif de l’égalité de tous face à la loi déduite de la logique même du pacte social: «Il est vrai que de tels décrets ne furent pas promulgués dans une diète du genre humain, mais de tels décrets existent dans les rapports immobiles des choses...»30. Il permet également d’invalider la peine de mort, malgré «l’exemple de presque tous les siècles»31, au motif du principe de la cession minimale lui aussi déduit de la logique du pacte: «... on ne peut appeler légitime une société qui ne tiendrait pas pour un principe infaillible que les hommes ont voulu s’assujettir aux moindres maux possibles»32. Le consentement qui rend le pacte légitime est donc une norme rationnelle à laquelle nous devons consentir parce que nous ne pouvons pas ne pas consentir à ce que nous voulons. Mais ces «rapports immobiles» ou cette essence de la justice ne peuvent-ils pas alors être définis comme une loi de nature? S’il est difficile de répondre à cette question, c’est sans doute parce que Beccaria lui-même ne la pose pas sous cette forme. Il me semble néanmoins que, chez lui, ces exigences formelles (principe d’égalité et principe du minimum) ne précèdent pas l’association mais dérivent de son projet. Si elles étaient des lois naturelles, elles s’imposeraient dans l’état de nature et l’association apparaîtrait comme un moyen pour les réaliser. Or, Beccaria semble au contraire récuser les deux modèles disponibles pour penser une telle antériorité de la loi naturelle sur la loi civile. Il rejette en effet nettement l’hypothèse selon laquelle les individus possèderaient au moins en droit la capacité rationnelle de comprendre que la réunion en société est conforme à leur intérêt, parce qu’elle leur est plus avantageuse que l’état de guerre. Au contraire, il insiste sur la «nécessité» qui seule a pu conduire hors de l’état de nature des êtres humains qui, par conséquent, ont ressenti la perte de leur indépendance naturelle comme un «sacrifice»33. Mais il refuse également noi chiameremo facoltà dell’umana natura tutte le tendenze de’ nostri sensi e della nostra organizzazione; se noi chiameremo diritto tutto ciò che è un risultato, un effetto necessario di queste tendenze, il diritto potrà essere definito una conseguenza necessaria dell’uso delle nostre facoltà, e la giustiza sarà il non impedire l’uso eguale delle medesime facoltà in altrui»). 30 DP, § 21, p. 211 («Egli è vero che tali decreti non emanarono in una dieta del genere umano, ma tali decreti esistono negl’immobili rapporti delle cose»). 31 Ivi, § 28, p. 239 («l’esempio di quasi tutt’i secoli»). 32 Ivi, § 19, p. 207 («non si può chiamare legittima società quella dove non sia principio infallibile che gli uomini si sian voluti assoggettare ai minori mali possibili»). 33 Ivi, § 2, p. 149 («Fu dunque la necessità…»); § 8, p. 169 et § 28, p. 228 («sacrificio»). 39 Droit naturel et droit à la vie. Beccaria lecteur de Hobbes* de concevoir l’état de nature comme un état purement théorique qui ne peut durer faute de combattants parce que ceux-ci s’entre-détruisent immédiatement. Tel est le sens de l’évocation, empruntée à Helvétius34 , de la lassitude qui s’empare des individus dans l’état de nature et suscite leur volonté d’en sortir: à la crainte de la mort qui, chez Hobbes, les contraint à obéir à la loi de nature s’oppose chez Beccaria la fatigue, qui les détermine à changer de mode d’existence35. Dans ce modèle, la nécessité de l’association civile ne peut plus apparaître comme une loi objective de la nature qui la prescrirait comme une condition de survie. Non seulement chacun peut en effet espérer satisfaire son intérêt en dominant les autres et non en s’associant avec eux, mais l’histoire universelle est là pour nous rappeler que cet espoir n’est pas entièrement vain, puisqu’elle offre le spectacle de la domination ininterrompue des plus forts36. Il n’en reste pas moins que l’intérêt de tous est bien de former une société digne de ce nom, seul moyen de sortir de l’incertitude perpétuelle qui, produite par le règne de la force, réduit quiconque à l’esclavage, maîtres compris, puisque leur domination n’est jamais assurée, jamais exempte de crainte et de méfiance37. C’est ainsi que les esprits éclairés et les âmes sensibles savent reconnaître, en dépit du goût de sacrifice à jamais inséparable de la vie sociale, que des lois bien faites sont toujours préférables à l’indépendance naturelle38. En ce sens, et en ce sens seulement, on peut reconnaître que Beccaria ne se dégage pas complètement d’une normativité inscrite dans la nature, puisque les normes métalégislatives de toute législation positive apparaissent comme des conditions de réalisation de la tendance naturelle de chacun à poursuivre son utilité particulière. Toutefois, il est important de préciser que ces règles ne s’appliquent pas dans l’état de nature, puisqu’elles n’ont de sens que pour une communauté, non pour des individus indépendants: elles ne disent pas comment chacun doit se rapporter aux autres dans un état où il n’existe que des individus indépendants, mais seulement comment les individus doivent se rapporter les uns aux autres dans un état où ils sont assemblés en communauté. C’est en ce sens qu’elles ne sont pas proprement des lois de nature, puisqu’elles ne préexistent pas au pacte. L’apparition de ces règles restera donc à jamais une énigme: aussi la fiction juridique du pacte social, 34 C.-A. Helvétius, De l’esprit, Fayard, Paris 1988, Discours II, chap. ix, p. 291: «... las de vivre dans une crainte perpétuelle...». 35 DP, § 1, p. 147. 36 Ivi, § 8, p. 163; § 28, p. 239; § 31, p. 251; § 34, pp. 265-267. 37 Ivi, § 8, p. 169; § 41, p. 283. 38 Ivi, § 42, p. 287. dont la fonction est normative et non descriptive, s’accompagne-t-elle chez Beccaria de différents récits plus réalistes de la genèse des premières sociétés, qui se sont vraisemblablement formées par tentatives et tâtonnements successifs39. 2) En second lieu, non seulement les normes civiles s’exposent à être incomprises et méprisées lorsqu’elles contredisent la morale particulière tirée des mœurs, des habitudes sociales et des coutumes d’un peuple, mais elles ne doivent en aucun cas violer les règles de la «morale universelle»40. Par ce terme, Beccaria se réfère aux normes issues de nos sentiments moraux, telle que la conviction qu’il est plus grave de tuer un être humain qu’un animal. Ces prescriptions ne sauraient cependant être assimilées à des lois naturelles. En effet, elles ne sont pas naturellement présentes dans les cœurs et dans les mœurs, puisqu’elles apparaissent au contraire comme le produit d’une histoire lente et violente, l’«ouvrage de tant de siècles et de tant de sang»41. Si les mauvaises lois peuvent détruire ces sentiments, ceux-ci sont néanmoins déjà le produit de la civilisation et non leur cause ou leur source. Seule la conviction que la vie de chacun devrait être entre les mains du seul destin et non de la volonté humaine est au contraire associée par Beccaria à notre «ancienne nature» 42 . L’universalité des autres sentiments montre d’ailleurs à l’évidence que leur naissance et leur génération, même lorsqu’elle est occasionnée par des circonstances historiques, répondent à une virtualité inscrite dans la nature, selon un modèle largement diffusé dans la pensée des Lumières. Le caractère exceptionnel des sentiments moraux véritablement originels et le caractère explicitement dérivé des autres, présentés comme des produits culturels et non comme les sources naturelles du droit, me semblent toutefois interdire de les assimiler à des lois naturelles antérieures à la loi civile – même si, certes, tout résidu d’une normativité inscrite dans la nature n’est évidemment pas éliminé. 5. JUS. BECCARIA ET LE CONCEPT DE DROIT NATUREL. Une semblable observation lexicale peut être faite si nous passons maintenant des devoirs aux droits. Pas plus qu’il ne parle de loi naturelle, Beccaria ne parle en effet jamais de droits pour décrire la condition humaine 39 Ivi, § 2, p. 149; § 9, p. 171-173; § 42, pp. 287-289. Voir aussi Beccaria, Ricerche, chap. XVI, cit., pp. 204-205. 40 DP, § 23, p. 215 («morale universale»). 41 Ivi, § 33, p. 263. 42 Ivi, § 28, p. 239 («vecchia natura»). 40 à l’état de nature, mais seulement de liberté inutile et d’action universelle43. Privée de toute limite normative, la liberté de chacun dans l’état de nature ne pouvait se heurter qu’à des limites factuelles, aux résistances objectives de la nature ou aux obstacles volontaires ou involontaires des autres. Mais pas plus que ces derniers ne pouvaient fonder leur action sur un droit, aucun droit ne pouvait être revendiqué face à eux. Dans l’état de nature, les conflits avaient la forme non d’un contentieux entre prétentions juridiques, mais d’une opposition physique entre forces concurrentes 44 . Ainsi, lorsque Beccaria caractérise la condition naturelle des êtres humains, il ne parle pas de jus in omnia ou de «droit illimité»45, mais de «cette action universelle sur toutes les choses qui est commune à tout être sensible et n’est bornée que par les forces de chacun»46. Selon Hobbes, la construction de l’État répond essentiellement au souci qu’ont eu les individus de protéger leurs droits – au premier rang desquels le droit à la vie –, que l’état de nature était incapable de garantir. Mais selon Beccaria, elle répond à leur soif de liberté, c’est-à-dire de droits. Elle répond en effet à leur souci de rendre leur liberté utile ou effective, c’est-à-dire de devenir véritablement libres, ce qui ne peut être obtenu qu’au moyen de garanties juridiques transformant la liberté naturelle en liberté politique47. Alors que, pour 43 Ivi, § 1, p. 147, § 8, p. 168. Dans le manuscrit des Delitti, Beccaria décrit l’état de nature comme celui des «désordres de la liberté musculaire» (Prima redazione, dans Edizione nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria, vol. I, cit., p. 152: «disordini della muscolare libertà»). 45 Voir J.-J. Rousseau, Du contrat social, éd. R. Derathé, livre I, chap. 8, dans Id., Œuvres complètes, vol. III, cit., p. 364: «Ce que l’homme perd par le contrat social, c’est sa liberté naturelle et un droit illimité à tout ce qui le tente et qu’il peut atteindre...». 46 DP, § 8, p. 168 («quell’azione universale su tutte le cose che è comune ad ogni essere sensibile, e limitata soltanto dalle proprie forze»). 47 La liberté politique doit être conçue à la fois comme une réduction et comme une transformation de la liberté naturelle. Le passage de l’une à l’autre relève bien d’une transformation qualitative: l’indépendance naturelle n’est pas une véritable liberté. Voir Rousseau, Du contrat social, livre II, chap. IV, cit., p. 375; Lettres écrites de la montagne, éd. J.-D. Candaux, dans Id., Œuvres complètes, vol. III, cit., p. 841: «On a beau vouloir confondre l’indépendance et la liberté. Ces deux choses sont si différentes que même elles s’excluent mutuellement. [...] Il n’y a donc point de liberté sans lois». Cette dernière formule est empruntée à Locke, Second Treatise VI 57, cit., p. 289. En l’absence de garantie juridique, la crainte d’autrui retient en effet d’accomplir certaines actions: on ne fait donc pas ce qu’on veut, on n’est pas libre. Beccaria reprend ainsi la définition de Montesquieu, L’Esprit des lois, livre XI, chap. 6, éd. R. Derathé, Garnier, Paris 1973, p. 169: «La liberté politique dans un citoyen est cette tranquillité d’esprit qui provient de l’opinion que chacun a de sa sûreté...». Cependant, le souverain a reçu mission de rendre possible la liberté en réduisant le moins possible l’indépendance naturelle. Cette norme du minimum possible impose donc de comprendre également le passage de l’une à l’autre comme une réduction quantitative. Dans Des délits et des peines, le concept de liberté est équivoque, puisqu’il désigne aussi bien un état de l’âme (caractérisé par la convic44 Philippe Audegean Hobbes, l’État a garanti des droits, pour Beccaria il les a rendus possibles. La liberté de chacun n’est en effet utile – et ne s’accomplit dès lors effectivement comme telle – que lorsque quiconque a obligation de la respecter, donc lorsqu’elle est devenue un droit. Or, ce résultat ne peut évidemment être atteint qu’en réduisant la liberté naturelle, c’est-àdire l’étendue des actions que chacun était virtuellement libre d’accomplir avant l’institution des lois. Au moment du pacte, les actions humaines acquièrent ainsi une qualité ou une qualification juridique en se divisant entre actions licites et actions illicites, puisque chacun s’engage à ne pas accomplir les secondes afin de pouvoir accomplir librement les premières. Nul ne cède ni ne conserve des droits qu’il possédait auparavant: il est plus juste de dire que le renoncement de chacun à la liberté d’accomplir certaines actions transforme ces portions de liberté en droits cédés au souverain et crée les droits que chacun peut revendiquer. Si la liberté naturelle est illimitée, ce n’est donc pas, comme le soutenait Pietro Verri, parce que l’état de nature ignore les sanctions, mais bien parce qu’il ignore purement et simplement les lois. Dans l’état de nature, pas de lois, mais pas non plus de droits: la théorie de l’état de nature et du contrat social développée par Beccaria est antijusnaturaliste. Cette théorie, héritée d’Helvétius, est en effet utilitariste48: elle repose sur l’idée que le concept de droit n’a de sens qu’à partir du moment où nous voulons rendre possible la maximisation des désirs d’individus naturellement égaux. Le mot droit ne peut donc s’appliquer dans l’état de nature, où les individus étaient encore «indépendants et isolés»49, mais seulement dans le contexte d’une communauté déjà existante: «Remarquez que le mot droit n’est pas contradictoire avec le mot force, mais que le premier est plutôt une modification du second, c’est-à-dire la modification la plus utile au plus grand nombre»50. Pour bien me faire comprendre, je dois cependant ajouter une importante précision de méthode. L’un de mes arguments en faveur de cette lecture antijusnaturaliste de Beccaria – outre l’analyse interne des thèses tion subjective que nul ne peut légitimement entraver mon action) qu’une situation objective (caractérisée par l’absence d’obstacles factuels ou normatifs). Mais comment peut-on diminuer ce que par là même on crée? Rousseau avait échappé à cette équivoque au moyen du concept d’«aliénation totale». 48 G. Francioni, Beccaria, philosophe utilitariste [éd. originale italienne, 1990], dans Ph. Audegean, Ch. Del Vento, P. Musitelli et X. Tabet (éd.), Le Bonheur du plus grand nombre. Beccaria et les Lumières, ENS Éditions, Lyon 2017, pp. 23-44. 49 DP, § 1, p. 147 («indipendenti ed isolati»). 50 Ivi, § 2, p. 149 («Osservate che la parola diritto non è contraddittoria alla parola forza, ma la prima è piuttosto una modificazione della seconda, cioè la modificazione più utile al maggior numero»). Droit naturel et droit à la vie. Beccaria lecteur de Hobbes* positives soutenues dans le texte et l’étude du contexte polémique où ce texte avait vocation à intervenir51 – est en effet la rareté inédite des références au lexique et aux valeurs du droit naturel dans Des délits et des peines52. Je ne dis donc pas (et n’ai jamais dit) que ces références sont inexistantes, mais qu’elles sont rares. Or, cette rareté tranche avec la culture juridique du temps. Écrire sur le droit pénal en 1764 sans jamais prononcer le mot de loi naturelle et en se contentant de rares allusions à l’idée de droit naturel creuse une distance significative avec les conventions discursives de l’époque. Il me paraît donc plausible d’interpréter ce silence, ou du moins cette sourdine, comme un geste polémique de rupture et de prise de parti dans les controverses contemporaines53. Certes, Beccaria ne peut entièrement abandonner l’idée d’une axiologie naturelle, d’un contenu normatif déductible des finalités observables de la nature – idée profondément enracinée dans la culture européenne et qui, en dépit des doutes sceptiques exprimés contre elle à la Renaissance, ne sera vraiment remise en question qu’au xixe siècle54. Mon impression est toutefois qu’il fait un effort remarquable pour s’en détacher ou s’en éloigner, comme en témoigne l’exceptionnelle rareté de ses références à une dimension importante des discours sur le droit et notamment sur le droit pénal. 51 Sur ces deux premiers arguments, voir Audegean, La Philosophie de Beccaria, cit., pp. 39-78. Le second justifie à mon sens le préfixe anti-: Beccaria est antijusnaturaliste parce qu’il prend parti dans un contexte de discussions et s’oppose délibérément à une tradition jusnaturaliste parfaitement identifiée comme telle. 52 Cette approche se situe à la croisée des deux précédentes, puisqu’un silence n’a de sens que sur le fond d’un contexte où il se fait entendre: sur ce troisième argument, voir ivi, pp. 127-128. Dans les pages qui suivent, je vais m’efforcer de mieux le présenter, en corrigeant ce que j’ai dit un peu hâtivement dans mon livre de 2010. J’espère ainsi répondre à la critique légitime qui m’est faite par G. Silvestrini, Non solo Beccaria. Il diritto di punire fra utopia e riforma, «Filosofia politica», 3, 2015, pp. 533-546: 537-539. Sur le cas particulier de l’adhésion de Beccaria au paradigme «pufendorfien» du droit de punir comme droit du souverain et non comme droit naturel, voir D. Ippolito, Contrat social et peine capitale. Beccaria contre Rousseau [éd. originale italienne, 2014], dans Ph. Audegean, M. Campanini et B. Carnevali (éd.), Rousseau et l’Italie. Littérature, morale et politique, Hermann, Paris 2017, pp. 147-176: 161165; G. Silvestrini, Fra diritto di guerra e potere di punire: il diritto di vita e di morte nel «Contratto Sociale», «Rivista di storia della filosofia», LXX, 2015, 1, pp. 125-141: 139; P. Costa, «Voilà le sophisme qui a séduit tant de publicistes». Lectures contractualistes des «Délits et des peines» dans l’Italie du second xviiie siècles, dans Audegean et al., Le Bonheur du plus grand nombre, cit., pp. 197-224. 53 Sur cette question de méthode, voir Q. Skinner, Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas, dans J. Tully (éd.), Meaning and Context. Quentin Skinner and his Critics, Polity Press, Cambridge 1988, pp. 29-67: 62; Id., Some problems in the analysis of political thought and action, ivi, pp. 97-118: 105. 54 À l’époque même de Beccaria, en Italie, on observe cependant quelques mouvements de résistance: voir Verri, Di alcuni sistemi del pubblico diritto, cit., et C.A. Pilati, Della legge naturale, dans Id., Ragionamenti intorno alla legge naturale e civile, Zatta, Venise 1766, pp. 25-43. 41 6. VIVERE MILITARE EST. AUTODÉFENSE ET DROIT À LA VIE. Regardons maintenant de plus près ces références, qui sont au nombre de trois. Il est frappant de constater que, recueillant manifestement un héritage venu de Hobbes, elles concernent toutes le droit à la vie. 1) La première d’entre elles se trouve dans la contexte ironique d’une prosopopée de la loi. Faisant parler la loi qui prescrit l’usage de la torture dans le procès pénal, Beccaria montre que, obligeant le prévenu à s’accuser lui-même, la torture viole le droit naturel de se défendre: Hommes, résistez à la douleur, et si la nature a créé en vous un inextinguible amour-propre, si elle vous a donné un inaliénable droit de vous défendre, je crée en vous un affect tout contraire, c’est-à-dire une héroïque haine de vous-mêmes, et je vous ordonne de vous accuser vousmêmes en disant la vérité même lorsqu’on vous déchire les muscles et qu’on vous disloque les os55. La même idée revient dans un autre passage, toujours à propos de la torture. Cette fois, cependant, l’idée que l’autodéfense soit un droit de nature est attribuée par hypothèse au législateur. Pris isolément, ce passage ne permet donc pas de déterminer si Beccaria la partage, puisqu’il se borne à faire ironiquement observer que la norme législative autorisant la torture contredit un principe dont le législateur avait pourtant déduit une autre norme législative. Pourquoi en effet les lois interdisent-elles d’interroger directement un prévenu, qu’on ne doit interroger que de manière indirecte sur l’infraction dont il est l’auteur présumé? Peut-être, répond Beccaria, «parce qu’il semble contre nature qu’un coupable s’accuse immédiatement de luimême». Mais dans ce cas, la loi se contredit en autorisant simultanément la torture, «parce que si un interrogatoire spécial porte un coupable à se confesser contre le droit de nature, les spasmes l’y porteront beaucoup plus facilement»56. 55 DP, § 16, p. 199 («Uomini, resistete al dolore, e se la natura ha creato in voi uno inestinguibile amor proprio, se vi ha dato un inalienabile diritto alla vostra difesa, io creo in voi un affetto tutto contrario, cioè un eroico odio di voi stessi, e vi comando di accusare voi medesimi, dicendo la verità anche fra gli strappamenti dei muscoli e gli slogamenti delle ossa»). Beccaria vise ici Hobbes, Du citoyen, II 19, cit., p. 119: «Mais bien que nul ne soit tenu par un pacte de s’accuser soi-même, il peut néanmoins être contraint de répondre à une enquête criminelle par la torture» (De cive, cit., p. 106: «Similiter neque tenetur quisquam pactis vllis ad se accusandum, vel alium cujus damnatione vita sibi acerba futura est»). 56 DP, § 38, p. 277 («sembra contro la natura stessa che un reo si accusi immediatamente», «perché se una interrogazione speciale fa contro il diritto di natura confessare un reo, gli spasimi lo faranno molto più facilmente»). 42 2) Une deuxième référence au droit naturel se trouve dans un passage où Beccaria précise que les infractions pénales se divisent en deux catégories: ... je distingue deux classes de délits: la première est celle des délits atroces, qui commence avec l’homicide et comprend toutes les scélératesses qui vont au-delà; la seconde est celle des délits mineurs. Cette distinction a son fondement dans la nature humaine. La sûreté de sa propre vie est un droit de nature, la sûreté des biens est un droit de société. Le nombre des motifs qui poussent les hommes au-delà du sentiment naturel de pitié est largement inférieur au nombre des motifs qui par avidité naturelle de bonheur les poussent à violer un droit qu’ils ne trouvent pas dans leur cœur, mais dans les conventions de la société57. Comme Hobbes, Beccaria affirme qu’«il n’y a pas de place pour le mien et le tien» dans l’état de nature: «la propriété a donc commencé avec les États eux-mêmes»58. Avant l’état civil, selon une distinction fameuse de Rousseau, on peut parler de «possession», non de «propriété»59. Beccaria récuse ainsi l’identification postulée par Locke entre la nécessité de se maintenir en vie et celle de s’approprier des biens. Comme l’auteur du Discours sur l’inégalité, il établit une dissociation et même une hiérarchisation entre le droit à la propriété et le droit à la vie: le premier est subordonné au respect du second60. Invention sociale, le droit de s’approprier et d’accumuler des biens n’est pas «nécessaire»61. À sa légi57 Ivi, § 30, p. 249 («distinguo due classi di delitti: la prima è quella dei delitti atroci, e questa comincia dall’omicidio e comprende tutte le ulteriori sceleraggini; la seconda è quella dei delitti minori. Questa distinzione ha il suo fondamento nella natura umana. La sicurezza della propria vita è un diritto di natura, la sicurezza dei beni è un diritto di società. Il numero de’ motivi che spingon gli uomini oltre il naturale sentimento di pietà è di gran lunga minore al numero de’ motivi che per la naturale avidità di esser felici gli spingon a violare un diritto che non trovano ne’ loro cuori, ma nelle convenzioni della società»). 58 Hobbes, Du citoyen VI 1, cit., p. 166 (De cive, cit., p. 136: «neque locum habet illud meum & tuum»); § 15, p. 178 (p. 144 : «sequitur proprietatem initium sumpsisse cum ipsis civitatibus»). 59 Rousseau, Du contrat social, livre I, chap. 9, cit., p. 367. Voir C. Beccaria, Elementi di economia pubblica, IIe partie, vi 70, dans Edizione nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria, vol. III. Scritti economici, éd. G. Gaspari, Mediobanca, Milan 2014, p. 237: «la propriété est la fille aînée, non la mère de la société; [...] avant l’union plus étroite et plus intime des hommes et des familles, il y avait des possessions, mais incertaines et précaires; un usage des choses, mais pas de propriété certaine et assurée; un usage de fait et non de droit...» («la proprietà è figlia primogenita, e non madre, della società; [...] avanti l’unione più stretta e più intima degli uomini e delle famiglie, eravi possedimento, ma incerto e precario; uso delle cose, ma non proprietà certa ed assicurata; uso di fatto, e non di diritto»). 60 Voir B. Bachofen, La Condition de la liberté. Rousseau, critique des raisons politiques, Payot, Paris 2002, p. 125; voir aussi p. 203. 61 DP, § 22, p. 213: «... le droit de propriété (droit terrible, et qui n’est peut-être pas nécessaire)...» («il diritto di proprietà (terribile, e forse non necessario diritto)»). La formule semble faire référence à Rous- Philippe Audegean timité relative s’oppose la légitimité absolue du droit naturel à la vie. La référence à la «pitié» et à l’«avidité naturelle de bonheur», qui rappelle l’«inextinguible amour-propre» de la prosopopée sur la torture, évoque ainsi la Préface du second Discours, où Rousseau réduit les «règles du droit naturel» à l’effet de deux inclinations, l’aspiration à se conserver en vie et la «commisération», qui sont naturelles au sens où elles n’exigent pas de l’homme, pour y obéir, qu’il soit «un très grand raisonneur et un profond métaphysicien»62. Dans l’état de nature, les êtres humains trouvaient donc en eux-mêmes, dans leurs tendances naturelles, des règles qui les portaient spontanément à respecter la vie d’autrui. Cependant, à la différence de Rousseau et à la suite de Hobbes, Beccaria ne décrit aucun premier état de nature antérieur à l’état de guerre (même s’il évoque, d’une manière qui le rapproche du premier plus que du second, des «hommes indépendants et isolés»63). Par conséquent, de son point de vue, les conditions n’ont peut-être jamais été réunies pour que les membres de l’espèce humaine puissent tirer des règles de droit de leurs tendances naturelles. Comme on l’a vu, Beccaria n’évoque en effet jamais l’existence de droits lorsqu’il décrit l’état de nature. Comme Rousseau, il fait alors peut-être référence ici à des «règles que la raison est ensuite forcée de rétablir sur d’autres fondements», non sans doute parce que «par ses développements successifs elle est venue à bout d’étouffer la Nature»64, mais parce que les conditions ne se sont jamais trouvées réunies pour qu’elles s’actualisent véritablement. 3) Enfin, c’est dans un passage dont l’interprétation est malaisée qu’on trouve une troisième et dernière référence, implicite cette fois, à la catégorie de droit naturel. Cette allusion fait l’essentiel du second argument de jure de Beccaria contre la peine de mort, dénoncée comme contradictoire avec le principe de l’indisponibilité de la vie: «... comment un tel principe [le droit que s’attribuent les hommes de trucider leurs semblables] s’accorde avec cet autre, qui veut que l’homme n’est pas maître de se tuer, ce qu’il devait être, s’il a pu donner ce droit à autrui ou à la société tout entière?»65. Jugeant ce raiseau, Discours sur l’inégalité, 2de partie, cit., p. 164: «Que de crimes, de guerres, de meurtres...», et p. 184: «De plus, le droit de propriété n’étant que de convention et d’institution humaine, tout homme peut à son gré disposer de ce qu’il possède; mais il n’en est pas de même des dons essentiels de la nature, tels que la vie et la liberté, dont il est permis à chacun de jouir, et dont il est au moins douteux qu’on ait droit de se dépouiller». 62 Ivi, Préface, pp. 125-126. Voir Bachofen, La Condition de la liberté, cit., p. 122. 63 DP, § 1, p. 147 («uomini indipendenti ed isolati»). 64 Rousseau, Discours sur l’inégalité, Préface, cit., p. 126. 65 DP, § 28, p. 229 («come si accorda un tal principio [il diritto che si attribuiscono gli uomini di trucidare i loro simili] coll’altro, che l’uomo 43 Droit naturel et droit à la vie. Beccaria lecteur de Hobbes* sonnement contradictoire avec l’antijusnaturalisme des Délits et des peines, Dario Ippolito a plaidé pour une lecture rhétorique de ce passage: Beccaria ne développerait pas ici un argument auquel il croit, mais dénoncerait la contradiction de ses adversaires – et des normes pénales de son temps –, qui admettent la peine de mort tout en considérant le suicide comme un crime – ce que Beccaria, justement, conteste, puisqu’il plaide pour sa dépénalisation66. Cette lecture d’une grande finesse me paraît la plus convaincante jamais donnée de ce passage. Je crois néanmoins possible de développer quelques éléments en vue d’une autre interprétation possible, sur la base des deux observations suivantes. a) Pour la troisième fois, la catégorie de droit naturel est liée à celle de conservation de soi. Les trois seules références (dont deux seulement sont littérales) à la catégorie de droit naturel qu’on trouve dans Des délits et des peines concernent toujours la sûreté, la défense ou la conservation de la vie 67. Cette cohérence paraît donc inviter à interpréter l’argument du suicide comme une idée propre à Beccaria. S’il avait voulu dénoncer la contradiction de ses adversaires, ne l’aurait-il pas fait de manière plus explicitement ironique, comme dans le cas de la torture? b) À la différence des deux autres passages, Beccaria fait cependant référence à un droit civil, non à un droit naturel. Si nous pouvons opposer au souverain notre droit à la vie, c’est même en raison d’un droit naturel que nous n’avons pas. Or, Beccaria ne dit pas exactement que nous n’avons pas le droit de nous ôter la vie, mais que nous ne sommes pas maîtres de le faire. Il en déduit que nous n’avons pu transformer cette liberté que nous n’avons pas sur nous-mêmes en droit transféré au souverain. Du côté de la nature, nous avons donc une indisponibilité, plus qu’un devoir ou une loi proprement dite. Je me demande alors s’il n’est pas possible d’interpréter cette indisponibilité de la vie dans un sens hobbesien: nous ne pouvons vouloir ce que nous ne voulons pas, nous ne sommes pas libres d’agir contre notre volonté, qui nous porte toujours, par un «inextinguible amour-propre», à nous aimer nous-mêmes et à rechercher notre bonheur. Le suicidaire lui-même est animé non è padrone di uccidersi, e doveva esserlo, se ha potuto dare altrui questo diritto o alla società intera?»). 66 Ivi, § 32, pp. 257-263. Voir D. Ippolito, Beccaria, la pena di morte e la tentazione dell’abolizionismo (2007), dans Id., Diritti e potere. Indagini sull’Illuminismo penale, Aracne, Rome 2012, p. 77-102: 83, et surtout Id., Contrat social et peine capitale. Beccaria contre Rousseau, cit., pp. 165167. Voir aussi Costa, Beccaria e la filosofia della pena, cit., pp. 37-38. 67 De ce point de vue, Gabriella Silvestrini (Non solo Beccaria, cit., pp. 538-539) a raison de situer dans la continuité de ces passages l’argument de Beccaria en faveur du port d’armes (DP, § 40, pp. 281-283). par son «avidité naturelle de bonheur»: s’il se donne la mort, c’est parce qu’il croit que la vie n’est plus capable de le rendre heureux. Mais il se trompe, puisqu’il élimine la condition même de tout bonheur possible. Seul l’égarement peut donc le conduire à vouloir ce qu’il ne veut pas. Autrement dit, la connaissance de la nature humaine interdit de penser qu’au moment du pacte, les êtres humains aient pu accorder au souverain un droit sur leur propre vie, non seulement parce qu’ils n’ont pu concéder que le minimum possible (qui, selon le premier argument abolitionniste de Beccaria, ne peut comprendre la vie), mais aussi parce que la vie est la condition même de toute liberté possible et qu’ils n’ont donc pu accepter d’en confier le dépôt à autrui. 7. CONCLUSION. À l’évidence, comme le montre la cohérence de ses rares références au droit naturel, toutes centrées sur le droit à la défense de sa propre vie, Beccaria tente de concilier sa démarche antijusnaturaliste avec la reconnaissance de droits inaliénables, incessibles et imprescriptibles. Conformément au postulat fondateur du droit naturel moderne, ces droits fondamentaux et absolus se réduisent au droit individuel de se maintenir en vie. Cette idée n’affleure que rarement dans les Délits, parce qu’elle est contradictoire avec sa démarche antijusnaturaliste. Mais elle est bien présente et me paraît représenter le trait le plus typiquement hobbesien de la pensée de Beccaria. Chez Hobbes, cette idée se traduit par le fait que «les conventions par lesquelles on s’engage à ne pas défendre son propre corps sont nulles»: les sujets ont le droit de défendre leur corps même contre ceux qui les attaquent légalement. Ainsi, si le souverain nous commande de nous abstenir d’une chose nécessaire à sa vie, nous avons la «liberté de désobéir». Nul n’est en outre tenu de s’accuser soi-même, de se tuer ou de tuer. Hobbes va même jusqu’à préciser que des sujets rebelles, s’ils sont nombreux, ont le droit de «se prêter l’un à l’autre défense et assistance», c’est-à-dire de recourir aux armes, y compris contre un souverain légitime 68. Mais comment caractériser ce droit visant la préservation de la vie et que conservent les sujets? [Ce] n’est pas un droit acquis par le pacte social ni un droit naturel opposable au souverain et qui contiendrait juridiquement l’action de ce dernier, mais la continuation, dans 68 Th. Hobbes, Léviathan, chap. XXI, trad. fr. par F. Tricaud, Sirey, Paris 1971, pp. 230, 232 (Leviathan, éd. N. Malcolm, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2012, vol. 2/1, p. 336: «Covenants, not to defend a mans own body, are voyd», «the Liberty to disobey»; p. 340: «assist, and defend one another»). 44 l’état civil, d’une partie du droit naturel que les hommes ne peuvent aliéner. Ce droit correspond à une absence d’obligation, qu’aucun droit positif ne peut annuler. Il constitue en ce sens une limite de la puissance de leur propre consentement: nul ne peut vouloir ce qui nuit à sa vie, à ses proches ou à ses biens, précisément parce que la préservation de ceux-ci est la fin visée par l’institution civile69. Au sein des droits naturels intégralement aliénés au profit du souverain, Hobbes découpe ainsi une zone inaliénable soustraite à toute obligation possible. La position de Beccaria est différente. Pour lui, il est douteux qu’on puisse parler de droits naturels car, dans l’état de nature, seules des forces et des passions se déchirent. En cas de conflit ou de combat, nul ne peut revendiquer un droit auquel un autre droit serait opposé sans solution possible: ce qui se dénoue chez Hobbes par la force en raison de l’équivalence des droits commence chez Beccaria par la force en raison de leur inexistence. Mais, inspiré par la leçon du philosophe anglais, le réformateur milanais découpe au sein de l’«action illimitée» qui ne se mesure qu’aux forces de chacun une zone qui ne pourra faire l’objet d’aucun calcul utilitaire de la part du souverain, parce qu’elle est la condition même de toute action possible, de toute liberté possible. Une fois la société créée, un statut spécial d’immunité absolue devra donc être reconnu à cette zone franche qui, rétrospectivement, pourra être considérée comme un droit naturel, au sens où toute autorité civile est obligée de la reconnaître comme «naturellement» soustraite à son emprise – puisqu’on ne peut vouloir ce qu’on ne peut vouloir –, et même si cette dénomination est manifestement en tension avec la démarche de Beccaria, puisqu’à proprement parler cette immunité juridique ne préexiste pas au souverain mais succède à sa constitution. En ce sens, on peut dire avec Leo Strauss et Luigi Ferrajoli que l’abolitionnisme beccarien est la conséquence logique de la fondation hobbesienne du droit sur la préservation de la vie: Hobbes in fact admitted that there exists an insoluble conflict between the rights of the government and the natural right of the individual to self-preservation. This conflict was solved in the spirit, if against the letter, of Hobbes by Beccaria, who inferred from the absolute primacy of self preservation the necessity of abolishing capital punishment70. 69 J. Saada, Hobbes et le sujet de droit. Contractualisme et consentement, CNRS éditions, Paris 2010, p. 186. 70 L. Strauss, Natural Right and History, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago/Londres 1950, p. 197, cité par P. Costa, «Non è dunque la pena di morte un diritto»: alle origini di un dibattito ancora aperto, dans V. Ferrone et G. Ricuperati (éd.), Il caso Beccaria. A 250 anni dalla pubblicazione del «Dei delitti e delle pene», Il Mulino, Bologne 2016, Philippe Audegean Tel est bien le fondement philosophique le plus solide et le plus irréfutable du refus de la peine de mort: l’argument contractualiste de la protection de la vie qui, justement parce qu’il constitue la seule justification de tout l’artifice juridique, ne peut être contredit par la justification, quelle qu’elle soit, de la peine de mort. [...] Le fondement du refus de la peine de mort se confond ainsi avec la justification et la raison d’être du droit lui-même, selon le paradigme hobbesien tel qu’il a été formulé aux origines de la civilisation juridique moderne. C’est en effet la protection de la vie, soutient Hobbes, qui est la raison de l’artifice politique et du pacte de coexistence71. Il me semble néanmoins que si Beccaria parvient à ce résultat, s’il parvient à déduire l’abolitionnisme du «paradigme hobbesien», c’est aussi et plus profondément parce qu’il renverse sa signification politique. Alors que Hobbes avait déduit de l’état de guerre la nécessité de renoncer à tous nos droits – puisqu’ils sont la cause de la guerre –, justifiant ainsi l’institution d’un souverain absolu, Beccaria renverse cette conclusion en déduisant de l’état de guerre une théorie des limites de la souveraineté72. Chez Hobbes, la loi naturelle prescrit de créer de l’obligation là où il n’y en a aucune, puisqu’elle-même n’en est pas une73: la raison enseigne à subordonner sa liberté à un souverain absolu. Tout l’édifice juridique repose donc sur le consentement d’un sujet rationnel. Mais pour Beccaria, au contraire, ce sont la fatigue et les passions, non la raison, qui poussent les sujets à sortir de l’état de nature. Telle est la raison pour laquelle ils vivent cet événement comme un «sacrifice», que Beccaria oppose – non sans paradoxe – au «don gratuit» du roman jusnaturaliste. Certes, les sujets devenus citoyens ont tort et l’association civile, comme on l’a rappelé, leur est évidemment avantageuse. Mais ce que Beccaria veut dire, c’est que le sujet entre en société avec le sentiment de renoncer à une liberté plus grande: son consentement est inséparable d’un goût amer qui se mêle au soulagepp. 167-190: 184; voir aussi Id., Lo ius vitae ac necis alla prova, cit., p. 890. 71 L. Ferrajoli, Il fondamento del rifiuto della pena capitale, dans P. Costa (éd.), Il diritto di uccidere. L’enigma della pena di morte, Feltrinelli, Milan 2010, pp. 57-68: 61 («È proprio questo il fondamento filosofico più solido e inconfutabile del rifiuto della pena di morte: l’argomento contrattualistico della tutela della vita, la quale, proprio perché è la sola giustificazione dell’intero artificio giuridico, non può essere contraddetta dalla giustificazione, quale che sia, della pena di morte. [...] Il fondamento del rifiuto della pena di morte si identifica così con il fondamento e la ragion d’essere del diritto medesimo, secondo il paradigma hobbesiano quale fu formulato alle origini della civiltà giuridica moderna. Giacché è proprio la tutela della vita, sostenne Hobbes, la ragione dell’artificio statale e del patto di convivenza»). 72 Audegean, La Philosophie de Beccaria, cit., pp. 76-78. 73 Sur cet aspect de la théorie de Hobbes, voir Saada, Hobbes et le sujet de droit, cit. Droit naturel et droit à la vie. Beccaria lecteur de Hobbes* ment de la paix74. S’il craint de perdre la vie dans l’état de nature, il craint aussi de perdre quelque chose d’essentiel en entrant dans la vie civile. La société, chez Beccaria, d’une façon qui annonce peut-être le romantisme, est perçue comme une réalité collective potentiellement aliénante pour l’individu. Chez lui, l’édifice juridique est en tout cas fondé sur le moindre renoncement possible des sujets. La source de l’obligation n’est pas comme chez Hobbes la conviction rationnelle d’avoir sauvé sa peau, mais le sentiment de s’être sacrifié le moins possible. Loin de rendre nécessaire une autorité sans limites, les passions humaines opposent donc des limites sévères, drastiques et inconditionnelles à l’exercice de l’autorité. En particulier, elles soustraient à son empire leur condition de possibilité même, la condition de possibilité de tout consentement, de tout désir, de toute liberté: la vie même. 74 J’espère ici répondre à l’objection qui m’est faite par W. Rother, La maggiore felicità possibile. Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Aufklärung in Nord-und Mittelitalien, Schwabe, Bâle 2005, p. 151, note 34. 45 Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Saggi Citation: M. D’Amore (2019) AngloItalian interdisciplinary networks 17651767. Frisi, Beccaria, the Verris and the Fellows of the Royal Society. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 47-55. doi: 10.13128/ds-25437 Copyright: © 2019 M. D’Amore. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index. php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. Anglo-Italian interdisciplinary networks 17651767. Frisi, Beccaria, the Verris and the Fellows of the Royal Society Manuela D’Amore Università di Catania Abstract. The aim of this paper is to shed light on an under-researched area of study: that of the relations that the leading members of the «Caffé» – Paolo Frisi, Cesare Beccaria and the Verri – established with the Royal Society’s Anglo-Italian circles in 1765-1767. These were generally men of science, even though it is also possible to detect the signs of their interest in the socio-legal topics underlying the iconic Dei delitti e delle pene. Building upon a complex epistolary network, as well as a series of unpublished materials, we shall try to show that Father Frisi was at the heart of the creation of a transnational cultural bridge between Milan and London, and that despite their stronger ties with Paris and its philosophes, Beccaria and the Verris benefited from these exceptional contacts. The picture that we shall draw will clarify the role of learned academies in eighteenth-century Europe, on the interdisciplinary nature of intellectual exchanges, particularly on the international milieu where the «book of crimes» was translated into English. Keywords. Paolo Frisi, Cesare Beccaria, Pietro and Alessandro Verri, The Royal Society, Eighteenth-Century Anglo-Italian Relations. 1. INTRODUCTORY ISSUES. The Milanese Enlightenment has always been associated with France and its great tradition of philosophes. Academic contributions have thoroughly investigated the influence that Montesquieu, Voltaire and Diderot exercised on the «Caffé» circle in the mid-1760s1, yet there is documentary evidence that England and its learned academies were equally important, and that their members actively contributed to the debate on the latest scientific acquisitions, as well as on the most controversial civil issues2. 1 Aside from Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di Cesare Beccaria, a cura di L. Firpo e G. Francioni, Mediobanca, Milano 1984-1994, voll. 1, 2 and 4, and G. Francioni e S. Romagnoli (a cura di), «Il Caffè» (1764-1766), Bollati Boringhieri, Torino 1993, see R. Abbrugiati (ed.), Le Café, Textes réunis par Raymond Abbrugiati, ESN, Lyon 1997, pp. 11-29; and V. Ferrone, Lezioni illuministiche, Laterza, Bari 2014. 2 See S. Romagnoli and G.D. Pisapia (a cura di), Cesare Beccaria tra Milano e l’Europa, Laterza, Bari 1990; L. Guerra, Giambattista Biffi and His Role in the Dissemination of English Culture in Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 47-55 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25437 48 This side of Italian relations had its roots in the European Republic of Letters3. It was made of exceptional intellectual circles and university institutions, which utilized “polite conversation”, epistolary exchanges and pamphlet-writing as tools to create a common framework of cultural-ethical values. Thanks to its members, Britain became closer to the southern regions of the Mediterranean, and learned more about the Bel Paese’s multi-layered national identity. At a time, however, when – after the discovery of the buried city of Herculaneum (1738) – Rome and Naples were at the heart of Anglo-Italian relations4, the north continued to play a key role. Milan and London were obviously appreciated for their artistic treasures, but the reason why so many of their men of letters and of science were in contact was that the two cities were perceived as the new laboratories for liberalism. Rich in learned academies and literary salons, they offered special stimuli to all those who wished to participate in the elaboration of thought in a cosmopolitan milieu. Thus, the intellectuals’ activities in the second half of the eighteenth century cannot be detached from such important cities, particularly from their centres of learning. In fact, if we consider their long traditions and their European ties, we shall realize that especially the most prestigious ones were always in contact. A British icon of scientific excellence, for instance, the Royal Society (1660-) had always considered Italy a model in the field of experimental learning5, and had promoted its cultural events; since its foundation, its journal, «Philosophical Transactions» (1665-), had even enlarged the Fellows’ network of relations6. Evidence that the north provided rich intellectual resources can be found in the numerous «Transactions» on the Bel Paese, which appeared Eighteenth-Century Lombardy, «Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies», 33, 2010, 2, pp. 245-264, as well as F. O’Gorman and L. Guerra (eds.), The Centre and the Margins in Eighteenth-Century British and Italian Cultures, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle 2014, particularly L. De Michelis’s Letters from London: A “Bridge” between Italy and Europe, on pages 36-55. 3 See A. Van Dixon and S. Speakman Sutch (eds.), The Reach of the Republic of Letters: Literary and Learned Societies in the Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe, Brill, Leiden 2008. 4 Information about this particular phase of the Grand Tour can be found in M. D’Amore, The Royal Society and the Discovery of the Two Sicilies: Southern Routes in the Grand Tour, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2017. 5 See T. Birch, The History of the Royal Society for Improving Natural Knowledge, London 1756-57, 4 vols; and M. Boas Hall, The Royal Society and Italy 1667-1795, «Notes and Records of the Royal Society», 37, 1982, pp. 63-81. 6 See J. McDougall-Waters, N. Moxham and A. Fyfe, Philosophical Transactions: 350 Years of Publishing at the Royal Society (1665-2015), The Royal Society, London 2015. Manuela D’Amore in 1700-18007, particularly in the list of Italian Fellows, who were active when, in 1765-1767, an iconic work such as Cesare Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene was discussed and translated into English8. There were almost thirty of them: politicians, men of the Church and of learning, who also belonged to the Universities of Turin and Pisa, to the Crusca and the Apatisti Academies, or to those of Science of Turin and Bologna. Enhancing humanistic and scientific studies, they managed to create a direct link between these Italian centres and the London Society. The latest research has shown that these relations dated to the Restoration period9 and that, in a period when Natural Philosophy and Rationalism were perceived as barriers against religious extremism and obscurantism, they became even stronger. Still, focusing only on how learned academies and universities collaborated – even the impact that Freemasonry had on their activities10 – may not be enough to deeply understand the most stimulating years in the Italian Enlightenment. It is also important, in fact, to research even on smaller but influential intellectual circles, thus on the contacts that the most prominent members of the «Caffé» – Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794), the physicist Paolo Frisi (1728-1784), as well as Pietro (1728-1797) and Alessandro (1741-1816) Verri – established with the Royal Society. Their epistolary exchanges demonstrate that, although Paris was far more familiar to them, and French was 7 See the complete list of those special articles in D’Amore, The Royal Society and the Discovery of the Two Sicilies, cit., pp. 140-145. 8 They were Giambattista Albertini (1717-1788) (FRS 1760), Carlo Ludovico Allioni (1728-1784) (FRS 1758), Giovanni Battista Beccaria (1716-1781) (FRS1755), Ruggero Giuseppe Boscovich (1711-1787) (FRS 1761), Domenico Caracciolo (1715-1789) (FRS 1765), Giovanni Carafa di Noja (1715-1768) (FRS 1759), Giovanbattista Carburi (1722-1808) (FRS 1765), Gaspari Cerati (1690-1769) (FRS 1736), Giovanni Francesco Cigna (1734-1790) (FRS 1764), Giulio Fagnani dei Toschi (16821766) (FRS 1723), Paolo Frisi (1728-1784) (FRS 1757), Giovanni Marsili (1727-1773) (FRS 1758), Antonio Matani (1730-1779) (FRS 1763), Giovanbattista Morgagni (1682-1771) (FRS 1722), Lorenzo Morosini (17141793) (FRS 1763), Antonio Maria Niccolini (1701-1769) (FRS 1763), Giovan Battista Passeri (1694-1780) (FRS 1747), Falco Rinuccini (d. 1769) (FRS 1747), Paolo Antonio Rolli (1687-1767) (FRS 1729), Giuseppe Angelo Saluzzo di Monesiglio (1734-1810) (FRS 1760), Giovanni Salvemini di Castiglione (1708-1791), Giulio Toschi (1682-1766) (FRS 1723), Marsilio Venturi di Parma (d. 1783) (FRS 1751), Filippo Venuti (1709-1769) (FRS 1759), Francesco Maria Zanotti (1692-1772) (FRS 1741) and Eustachio Zanotti (1709-1782) (FRS 1740). 9 E. Chaney, The Evolution of the Grand Tour: Anglo-Italian Cultural Relations since the Renaissance, Routledge, Abingdon 2000, pp. 1-40 and 161-167; and M. D’Amore, Learned Letters from Italy: Classical Rome, Vesuvius and Etna in Philosophical Transactions 1665-1700, «Annali di Ca’ Foscari - Serie Occidentale», 49, 2015, pp. 145-162. 10 See among others G. Giarrizzo, Massoneria e illuminismo, Marsilio, Venezia 1994; and R. Lomas, The Invisible College: The Secret History of how the Freemasons Founded the Royal Society, Random House, Reading 2009. 49 Anglo-Italian interdisciplinary networks 1765-1767. the only foreign language that they could master, Paolo Frisi and Alessandro Verri in particular were irresistibly attracted to London, and sojourned there not only to know its civilization, but also to become appreciated by its intellightentsia. The textual path that they created will shed light on the complex environment where the English version of Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene came into being, as well as on the cultural experiences that the most distinguished intellectuals in the two capitals shared in those years. 2. CONNECTING MILAN TO «ILLUMINATED» LONDON: SCIENCE AND TRAVEL IN PAOLO FRISI’S LETTERS. We shall start from Paolo Frisi. Certainly one of the most cosmopolitan figures in the Milanese Enlightenment, he built on his scientific excellence to create a link between the «Caffé» circle and the Royal Society. His election as a Fellow in 1757 explains why his De inaequalitatibus motus planetarum (1761) immediately became part of the Society’s library, and the rest of his production is still housed at its Centre for the History of Science. Yet, as Franco Venturi confirms, mathematics and physics represented only a portion of his cultural interests11: he was fond of literature and published philosophical pamphlets, furthermore, he contributed to the most advanced European movements, which made Milan more international. Pietro Verri in Memorie appartenenti alla vita e agli studj del signor don Paolo Frisi (1787)12 shows that he had contacts in most Italian regions, as well as in Austria, Germany, France and Portugal. As for England, apart from Charles Walmesley (1722-1797), vicar apostolic of the western district and mathematician, his reference point was definitely London, particularly the Royal Society and the Fellows «Morton, Waring, Maskelyne [and] Maty»13. Franco Venturi and Antonio Gentili14 are clear on his special human qualities. He was far more open than Cesare Beccaria and Pietro Verri, but his wide cultural network derived both from his determination to con11 Regarding Paolo Frisi’s wide cultural interests, see F. Venturi (ed.), Illuministi italiani, vol. III. Riformatori lombardi, piemontesi e toscani, R. Riccardi Editore, Milano-Napoli 1969, pp. 289-290. 12 P. Verri, Memorie appartenenti alla vita ed agli studj del Signor don Paolo Frisi, Milano 1787. 13 Ibidem, p. 79. 14 Here we refer to Venturi, Illuministi italiani, cit., p. 289, as well as to A. Gentili, Paolo Frisi barnabita, in G. Barbarisi (a cura di), Ideologia e scienza nell’opera di Paolo Frisi (1728-1784), Franco Angeli, Milano, 1987, vol. I, pp. 11-16. tinue to separate Rationalism from religious faith despite the emerging philosophical trends15 and his 1766 voyage to London. Pietro Verri says that he wanted to cross the English Channel for scientific purposes, that is to say, to see how the principles of mechanics and hydraulics had been applied in England16; precise information about his new exceptional encounters and experiences, though, can only be found in his partially edited diary17. Starting his journey on 28 April 1766, and finding the time to discuss with Father Gerdil (1718-1802) Rousseau’s and Helvetius’s textual influences on the «book of crimes»18 , Frisi sojourned in Paris until 12 August, and arrived in Dover on 18 August. He made a short visit to «Canterbury, Rochester [and] Darford», finally, he stopped in «illuminated London»19. It was Thursday 21 August when he met with Matthew Maty (1718-1776), the Chief Librarian of the British Museum and the Royal Society’s Secretary, and went to the Royal Society. Thanks to the exchanges he had with other distinguished Fellows – James Douglas Earl of Morton (1702-1768), the Society’s President since 1764; the Royal astronomer Nevil Maskelyne (1732-1811) and the Ambassador of Naples Domenico Caracciolo (1715-1789) – he learned more about the latest astronomic observations in England, and acquired precious information about the scientists Ruggero Giuseppe Boscovich (17111787) and Joseph-Jérôme Lalande (1732-1807). An ingenious physicist and Frisi’s most fearsome competitor, the former, who was Professor of Mathematics at the University of Pavia, had been elected a Fellow in 1761, and would soon be sent to observe the passage of Venus in California20. Frisi continued to write about his stay in London. The accounts related to 22-24 August include his new experiences at the Royal Society and his close relation with the «Marchese Caraccioli», the only Italian Fellow 15 Venturi, Illuministi italiani, cit., p. 290. Memorie, cit., p. 33. 17 Today an Estratto delle note fatte da P.e Paolo Frisi nel suo viaggio di Francia e Inghilterra: da un libretto di Sue memorie scritte nel viaggio medesimo is housed at the Biblioteca Ambrosiana in Milan [Y 163 sup]. Some of the most significant entries, those related to 12-24 August 1766, however, are included in Venturi, Illuministi italiani, cit., pp. 310-314. We shall consider both Venturi’s edited version and the original manuscript. For further information about the Italian intellectuals’ learned letters from London, see De Michelis cited essay Letters from London: A “Bridge” between Italy and Europe, pp. 36-55. 18 Writing on 1 May 1766 while he was in Turin, Father Frisi reported Father Giacinto Gerdil’s conviction about Beccaria’s pamphlet. See the cited Estratto, sheet 43: «P. Gerdil [...] per un’occhiata al libro dei delitti vi ha riscontrato varie proposizioni di Rousseau tradotte letteralmente, e varie altre di Helvetius, nelle quali si considera l’uomo come un essere meramente sensibile». 19 Venturi, Illuministi italiani, cit., p. 311. 20 Ibidem. 16 Verri, 50 with whom he shared his exceptional routine. In that period, as Giuseppe Rutto explains21, they really enjoyed each other’s company, and spent their time talking about d’Alembert, Fontaine and the American Fellow Benjamin Franklin. However, there was also room for other extraordinary encounters. On the 23 August22, for example, they were with President Morton and his Secretary Matthew Maty; with the cardiologist William Heberden (1710-1801) and the future President John Pringle (17071782), as well as the mathematicians Patrick Murdoch (d. 1774), Edward Waring (1736-1798) and George Witchell (1728-1785). These latter had all been elected Fellows between 1745 and 1763. Frisi’s notes clearly show that these Italian and English Fellows systematically discussed scientific topics during their meetings. It continued to be so on 26 and 27 August, even though, according to the original manuscript, on 30 August Frisi and Maty also exchanged their views on corruption, and agreed to call it «the Earth’s daughter»23. The Italian physicist left London on 2 September after a meeting with Hume and Pringle at the Ambassador of Spain’s residence24: his personal correspondence will help us to understand to what extent he and the «Caffé» circle were related to the Royal Society, and also the impact that this had on the intellectual debate connected to Dei delitti e delle pene. The complete list of Frisi’s letters is given by Rosy Candiani as an appendix of Gennaro Barbarisi’s Ideologia e scienza di Paolo Frisi25. Divided into sections, it shows that most of them are located at the Biblioteca Ambrosiana in Milan, and that they have never been collected and edited. From this point of view, in order to have a complete picture of this special section of his network, we believe it is important to identify the Italian and English Fellows in 1766-177726, as well as to see if some of them were among Frisi’s regular correspondents. Definitely larger than Beccaria’s and Alessandro Verri’s, we can immediately say that, covering the years 1753-1780, this epistolary corpus includes Frisi’s exchanges with five influential English Fellows: Earl Macclesfield (1695-1764), who had been the Royal Soci21 G. Rutto, La corrispondenza scientifica e letteraria di Paolo Frisi e Domenico Caracciolo, «Rivista storica italiana», XCVI, 1984, I, pp. 174175. 22 Venturi, Illuministi italiani, cit., p. 313. 23 None of these entries has ever been edited and published. See sheets 46-48 of the cited Estratto. 24 Ibidem, p. 48. The exceptional meeting took place on 1 September. 25 R. Candiani, Catalogo dei manoscritti e bibliografia, in Barbarisi, Ideologia e scienza, cit., vol. II, pp. 533-706. 26 See the complete List of Fellows of the Royal Society 1660-2007, The Royal Society, London 2007, also available at <https://royalsociety.org/ media/Royal_Society_Content/about-us/fellowship/Fellows1660-2007. pdf> (Last consulted on 22 April 2018). Manuela D’Amore ety’s President until 1764, Nevil Maskelyne, Matthew Maty, James Morton and Edward Waring 27. We should not be surprised that Frisi met with the majority of them during the period he spent in London, and that he wanted to share their friendship with Alessandro Verri at the end of 1766. He had known them for a long time, and his work was highly appreciated 28, so he would continue to correspond with them on the latest acquisitions in astronomy and physics until 177129. Aside from these five exceptional correspondents, however, Frisi had fruitful exchanges with other Fellows of the prestigious Society: the above-mentioned Ruggero Giuseppe Boscovich and Domenico Caracciolo; Gaspare Cerati (1690-1769), Antonio Matani (1730-1779), Antonio Niccolini (1701-1769), as well as Francesco Maria (1692-1777) and Eustachio (1709-1782) Zanotti. They had all been admitted between 1736 and 1763, and belonged to different Italian cultural institutions: the University of Pisa, the Apatisti Society and the Academy of Sciences of Bologna, which certainly helped to enhance the Anglo-Italian relations within the European Republic of Letters. We have already mentioned Frisi’s relations with Boscovich and Caracciolo: we can now add that they too spent time in Paris and London between 1760 and 176730, and that they were both highly esteemed at an international level. A distinguished contributor to the «Philosophical Transactions» since 175931 and to the «Caffé» in 176632 , Boscovich, for example, who exchanged five letters with Frisi between 1765 and 27 Candiani’s above-mentioned list shows that Paolo Frisi only received seven letters from the Royal Society’s Fellows: one from Earl Macclesfield (London, 04-03-1756); two from James Douglas Morton (London, 10-02-1767-London, 05-02-1770); two from Matthew Maty (London, 05-08-1768-London, 01-09-1771); one from Nevil Maskelyne (Grenovia, 03-04-1770) and one from Edward Waring (Cautab. [?] 31-10-1770). 28 Evidence of Frisi’s excellent reputation within the Royal Society’s circle can be found both in Maty’s and Morton’s letters. In 1768, the former enthusiastically promised that he would always support the Italian scientist’s contacts with the Fellows; in 1770, Morton wrote to him in Latin to praise his work. See manuscripts Y 154 165 and Y 154 181. 29 See Maskelyne’s and Waring’s 1770 letters. They are still held at the Biblioteca Ambrosiana [manuscripts Y 154 166 and Y 154 180]. 30 Detailed information about those fruitful periods can be found in F. Ricca, Elogio storico dell’Abate Ruggero Giuseppe Boscovich, Marelli, Milano 1789, pp. 72-73; S. Laudani, Un ministro napoletano a Londra: Domenico Caracciolo e le sue “Memorie”, Sciascia Editore, CaltanissettaRoma 2000, pp. 41-56; as well as R. Anderton, D. Stoilijkovich, Roger Boscovich, the Founder of Modern Science, Lulu Press, Raleigh 2015, pp. 1-8. 31 See R.J. Boscovich, De Proximo Veneris sub Sole Transitu, «Philosophical Transactions», 51, 1759, pp. 865-888; and Abbé Boscovich, Account of a new Micrometer and Megameter. By Abbé Boscovich, «Philosophical Transactions», 67, 1777, pp. 789-798. 32 For Boscovich’s Estratto del trattato astronomico del signor La Lande see «Il Caffè, o sia brevi e varj discorsi già distribuiti in fogli periodici», I, 1766, pp. 430-432. 51 Anglo-Italian interdisciplinary networks 1765-1767. 176733, was particularly close to Franklin. As regards Caracciolo, we know that he was constantly in contact, again, with Franklin, also with Douglas Morton and Matthew Maty. Most of his correspondence may have been lost 34, yet we know that he took an active part in the intellectual debate of the time, which was very important for him when he became Viceroy of Sicily in 1781, and started his liberal project of social reforms35. Dated the 10 October 1766, for instance, the letter that he addressed to Frisi shows that he was utterly against Rousseau, and that, together with Maty and Maskelyne, he did his utmost to hinder his relationship with Hume36. Exchanging twenty-three epistles with Frisi between 1753 and 176837, Gaspare Cerati was another key figure in this extraordinary cultural network 38. Rector of the University of Pisa from 1733 to 1768 and an influential Jansenist, he had stayed in London in 1743, and had always been fascinated by Locke’s theories. His 1755 contribution to the «Transactions» «concerning the Books and antient Writings dug out of the Ruins of and Edifice near Herculaneum»39 testifies to his commitment to the creation of stable relations both with the London intellighentsia and the Royal Society. As for his main contacts, they were Martin Folkes (1694-1754), Premier Grand Lodge of England in 1724-1725 and President of the Royal Society in 1741-1752, as well as James Bradley (1693-1762), a skilled astronomer, who had won the Copley Medal in 1748. Pietro Verri in his Memorie maintains that Cerati was always close to Frisi, and that he generously supported his career40; more recently, 33 According to Candiani, they date Pavia, 26-01-1765; Pavia, 04-021765; Pavia, 21-06-1766; Milano, 08-11-1766; and Pavia, 20-12-1767. Today they are held at the British Library. 34 Rutto, La corrispondenza scientifica e letteraria di Paolo Frisi e Domenico Caracciolo, cit., pp. 173-176. 35 Laudani, Un ministro napoletano a Londra, cit., pp. 52-56. 36 See manuscript Y 154 9 of the Biblioteca Ambrosiana. Interestingly, in this letter Caracciolo calls Rousseau «Lucifero d’orgoglio di Ginevra», and is clear that «non deve sorprendere alcuno che qui non si accorda meriti di sorta veruna a Rousseau, perché l’incantesimo è tutto nella sua penna». 37 Considering Candiani’s above-mentioned list, we find that in 17651767 Frisi received only four letters from Cerati: Pisa, 27-01-1766; Montecchio, 27-01-1767; Pisa, 21-05-1767; Firenze, 12-09-1767. They are held at the Biblioteca Ambrosiana, but at the time of this research they did not seem to be available. 38 On Frisi’s international relations and exceptional correspondents, see G. Rutto, Alcune note su Paolo Frisi e il suo carteggio, in Barbarisi, Ideologia e scienza, cit., vol. II, pp. 221-230. 39 Anonymous, Copy of a Letter from a learned Gentleman of Naples, dated February, 1755, concerning Books and ancient Writings dug out of the Ruins of an Edifice near the old City of Herculaneum; to Monsignor Cerati of Pisa, F.R.S., sent to Mr. Baker, F.R.S., «Philosophical Transactions», 49, 1755, pp. 112-115. 40 Verri, Memorie, cit., pp. 20-21. Giuseppe Rutto has drawn the reader’s attention to their philosophical exchanges on science and religious faith. In fact, even after Frisi left the University of Pisa in 1764, they continued to exchange their views on the Bulle Unigenitus’s severe implications, as well as d’Alembert’s public position against the Jesuits41. Prominent members of the so-called Christian Enlightenment, Frisi and Cerati shared their principles with Antonio Niccolini. He had lived in London in the mid-1740s, and had been elected a Fellow in 1747. A member of the Hannoverian Lodge of Florence, he was close to the Presidents Hans Sloane (1660-1753) and Martin Folkes: there is historical evidence that they defended a group of illustrious masons from the Catholic Inquisition in 173942, and that in the following years their main topics of discussion were antiquarian culture and politics. This may have also facilitated the connections between the «Caffé» circle and the Royal Society, also possibly the diffusion of the philosophical ideas underlying Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene. From this point of view, the three letters that Niccolini exchanged with Frisi between 1761 and 1764 43, as well as Pietro Verri’s references to his illness and death on the 20th September and the 7th October 176944, demonstrate that it is very difficult to detach the most prestigious learned academies’ evolutionary phases from scientific-professional collaborations and Freemasonry. This latter in particular was a key component of eighteenth-century civilization. Frisi’s list of correspondents, however, also includes the scientists Antonio Matani, Francesco Maria and Eustachio Zanotti. None of them was ever mentioned in Beccaria’s and the Verris’ epistolary exchanges, which confirms that although they shared most of their acquaintances, science really represented a bridge for the “Sig. Abate” to differentiate and enlarge his personal cultural network. Antonio Matani was part of it. A Professor of Theoretical Medicine of Tuscan origins and an expert on inoculation, he was especially remembered for his Ragionamento filosofico istorico sopra la figura della Terra (1760) and De aneurysmaticis praecordium mor41 Here we refer to Rutto, Alcune note su Paolo Frisi e il suo carteggio, cit., pp. 232-233. 42 On the Catholic Church’s severe measures against Freemasonry in those years, particularly on the role that Martin Folkes played in the foundation and defence of the Florentine lodges, see Giarrizzo, Massoneria e illuminismo, cit., pp. 75-85. 43 They are respectively dated 18-03-1761, 27-06-1761 and 21-01-1764. Written in Florence, they are still held at the Biblioteca Ambrosiana. 44 Here we refer to letters XXX and XL. See F. Novati and E. Greppi (a cura di), Carteggio di Pietro e Alessandro Verri dal 1766 al 1797, Cogliati, Milano 1911, pp. 75, 100. 52 bis animadversione (1761). His election as a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1763, thus his collaboration with such an important institution, was based on his international reputation45, especially on his friendship with the historian Thomas Birch (1705-1766), the Society’s Secretary in those years, and the diplomat John Strange (1732-1799), a Fellow since 1766. Frisi exchanged only one letter with Matani46 probably because, however close, they had a different approach to science47. As for Francesco Maria and Eustachio Zanotti, in the years 1753-1780 they were far more frequent correspondents48. Both eminent members of the Academy of Sciences of Bologna, they were putting a great deal of effort into the construction of solid relations with the Royal Society, which Frisi must have appreciated. Marta Cavazza49 has demonstrated that Eustachio in particular was close to the Fellows James Bradley, John Strange and Edward Waring, who were also distinguished members of the Bolognese Academy. Yet, if we consider the years 1765-1767, we realize that, within the Royal Society’s Anglo-Italian circle, Boscovich, Caracciolo, Cerati and the Zanottis were his closest contacts. Going beyond scientific and religious issues, however, we may presume that he confronted the main socio-political issues of the time especially with Boscovich, Caracciolo and Morton. On 27 August 1766, for instance, the former was mentioned in Saverio Bettinelli’s letter concerning Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene 50 ; as regards Caracciolo and Morton, they were both residing in London and were sensitive to the pamphlet’s core issues. Although the Royal Society never included it in its archives, Frisi’s relations may have contributed to the circulation of its English version. His commitment to the creation of a transnational cultural bridge continued in the following years. An internationally known philosophe and a generous friend, 45 See the anonymous Elogio del Dottore Antonio Matani, «Antologia romana», VI, 1779, pp. 123-128. 46 According to Candiani, it dates Milano, 01-07-1767. 47 M. Torrini, Paolo Frisi in Toscana, in Barbarisi, Ideologia e scienza, cit., vol. I, pp. 295-296. 48 The Biblioteca Ambrosiana’s archives show that Eustachio and Francesco Maria respectively addressed fifteen and thirteen letters to Frisi. If we consider the years 1765-1767, though, we shall find that they only wrote to him on three occasions: on 04-05-1765 (Y 148 sup. 64), on 02-09-1765 (Y148 sup. 43-44) and on 05-08-1766 (Y 148 sup. 45-46). Although their favourite topics were scientific, they also focused on d’Alembert and his pension, and shared information about their publishing deadlines. 49 On the Zanottis’ work from this point of view, see M. Cavazza, The Institute of Science of Bologna and the Royal Society in the Eighteenth Century, «Notes and Records of the Royal Society», 56, 2002, 1, pp. 10-13. 50 On Boscovich’s possible meeting with Beccaria, Andrea and Andrea Giulio Cornaro, as well as Lucrezia Pisani, see Edizione nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria, cit., vol. 4, pp. 376-377. Manuela D’Amore he would utilize Alessandro Verri’s stay in the British capital as a new opportunity to reinforce the links between the «Caffé» circle and the Society. Beccaria’s and the Verri brothers’ correspondence in those years will help us to understand the evolution of their members’ relations, particularly if there was any significant reference to Dei delitti e delle pene. 3. TORN BETWEEN PARIS AND LONDON: CESARE BECCARIA, THE VERRI BROTHERS AND THE FELLOWS. Science, for instance, continued to be at the heart of the connection between Beccaria and the four Fellows he knew or simply corresponded with: Ruggero Boscovich, Gaspare Cerati, Matthew Maty and the radical politician John Wilkes (1725-1797). Aside from Saverio Bettinelli’s letter, Maty’s report on a new inoculation case proves that Paris, London and Milan were tightly connected, and that socio-political engagement systematically combined with the new discoveries in the various branches of Natural Philosophy. It was 20 December 1765 and Condillac was eager to forward the note that he had received on «la petite verole de madame de Boufflers»51. The medical treatment for smallpox had been a major focus of scientific research since the 1720s52, however, the Fellows were also discussing the implications of more liberal social reforms. Even though, again, it is not possible to find evidence of this part of their intellectual activities in Beccaria’s epistolary corpus, there were certainly informal occasions when they could exchange their views. The short letter of invitation that John Wilkes addressed to Beccaria on 20 November 176653 will help to have a clearer picture of such a complex, stimulating environment. At this time the English radical activist was in exile in Paris, and was regularly attending d’Holbach’s intellectual salon, which had put him in contact with Beccaria and the Verri brothers. Building upon their correspondence, Rosamaria Loretelli has recently showed that «Beccaria is mentioned as a person Wilkes was well acquainted with»54, also that 51 The complete text can be found ibidem, pp. 172-176. The Fellows’ interest in inoculation started in the early 1720s. See among others Benjamin Gale’s and Hans Sloane’s contributions to «Philosophical Transactions», 49, 1755, pp. 516-520; and 55, 1765, pp. 193204. 53 Edizione nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria, cit., vol. 4, p. 485: «Monsieur Wilkes fait bien ses compliments à monsieur le marquis de Beccaria, et le prie de lui faire l’honneur de diner samedi à deux heure. Rue des S.ts Peres, jeudi, 20 novembre». 54 R. Loretelli, The First English Translation of Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments. Uncovering the Editorial and Political Contexts, «Diciottesimo Secolo», II, 2017, pp. 1-22: 16. 52 53 Anglo-Italian interdisciplinary networks 1765-1767. they – Wilkes, Beccaria and the Verris – shared the same philosophical views55. In the following years, Pietro and Alessandro mentioned Wilkes, who played an active role in the translation of Dei delitti e delle pene56, in their letters too. On 23 September 1769, for instance, Pietro wrote about the recent dispute between the King and the Parliament over his election as a Member of Parliament57; a few days later he confessed that sometimes he could not understand him because he was not very fluent in French58. However close, these contacts always had French roots, which shows why Frisi remained the most cosmopolitan figure in the «Caffé» circle, and why Alessandro relied on him only during his stay in London. The letters that he exchanged with Pietro on this occasion, from 9 December 1766 to 16 February 176759, not only provide a colourful picture of his cultural life there, but also tell us how Italian intellectuals gained access to the most exclusive international circles, especially how they created fruitful relations with their most distinguished members. Alessandro offered this type of information since he arrived in London. However confused by its chaos and dubious about the implications of its advanced intellectual freedom60, he immediately used Frisi’s letters of introduction to meet with Domenico Caracciolo and President Morton. As for his contacts with the Royal Society, he attended his first meeting on 25 December 176661. Everything was new to him – the Fellows, their manners and their small meeting room – yet, this also represented a great opportunity for him to understand what was behind the Society’s decision to make «Boscoivik» a Fellow62. This latter, as previously argued, was Frisi’s most fearsome competitor, worst of all, he benefited from a clear position of privilege at the University of Pavia63: President Morton could not but confirm that he was a great scientist, and that he had deserved his fellowship64. There may be envy and resentment in some of Alessandro’s letters65, but his main focus of attention in that 55 Ibidem, pp. 17-18. p. 18. 57 F. Novati and E. Greppi (a cura di), Carteggio di Pietro e Alessandro Verri dal 1766 al 1797, Cogliati, Milano 1911, p. 73. 58 Ibidem, p. 90. 59 We shall consider P. e A. Verri, Viaggio a Parigi e a Londra (17661767), a cura di di G. Gaspari, Adelphi, Milano 1980. 60 Ibidem, pp. 168-169. 61 Ibidem, pp. 175-176. 62 Ibidem, p. 176. 63 Ibidem, p. 282. Letter XLIX is dated 14 February 1767. Here Pietro is clear that the University of Pavia was treating Frisi and Boscovich differently. 64 Ibidem, p. 176. 65 Ibidem, p. 148. Letter XXIX, for instance, expresses Alessandro’s resentment for Beccaria and his conviction that Dei delitti e delle pene could never become popular in such a liberal city as London. 56 Ibidem, period was definitely cultural and scientific. On 6 January 1767, for instance, the possible existence of a population of monstrous giants in Patagonia was at the heart of his new exchange with President Morton and his Secretary Matthew Maty66. At a time when academic institutions were competing for scientific excellence, he could see how England and France were fighting to demonstrate that they had been first to discover those curious creatures. Alessandro corresponded with Pietro until the end of his stay in London. He continued to discuss scientific topics with the Fellows of the Royal Society even during their meetings, and what is more important, he continued to be grateful to Paolo Frisi67. He had introduced him to the protagonists of this special Anglo-Italian environment, but dated 27 January 1767, his visit to Benjamin Franklin, «[the] Newton of electricity»68, had been inspiring: his experiment combined theory with practice, which he found of great interest. As for his specific enquiry about Father Giovanni Battista Beccaria (1716-1781), a physicist from the University of Turin who had entered the London Society in 1755, it shows that although the two scientists had never met, they knew each other’s scientific works and regularly corresponded. Academic research has demonstrated that Beccaria would enthusiastically promote Franklin’s most controversial theories within the University and the Academy of Sciences of Turin for many years to come69. This letter, however, does not only reveal new aspects of Alessandro Verri’s exceptional encounters. It also includes an account of his new experience at the Royal Society, where he could see the head of a curious veal-calf with «two mouths, two noses and three eyes» coming from Spain, as well as new details of the building where the Fellows actually met. Probably following Frisi’s scholarly interests – his Elogio del Cavaliere Isacco Newton would appear in 1778 – he was impressed by «two portraits of Newton», «an antique pendulum clock» and the Society’s «Museum of Natural History»70. Still, Alessandro’s concluding remark about the Royal Society’s «precious library», which had been 66 Ibidem, p. 220. Ibidem, p. 233. Dated London, 12 January 1767, Letter XLIII reads: «Frisio è contentissimo di me perché ho assistito alla sessione della Società Reale [...]. Si rallegra di cuore con me perché sappia viaggiare come si deve. Io sono obbligato al suo buon cuore [...]. Devo a lui tutte le lettere che ho avute per Londra. Le ha scritte con grandissima premura». 68 Ibidem, p. 277. Alessandro’s account of his meeting with Benjamin Franklin dates 27 January 1767. 69 On Father Beccaria’s choice to disseminate Franklin’s theories in Italy, see B. Cohen, Benjamin Franklin’s Science, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1990, p. 138. 70 P. e A.Verri, Viaggio a Parigi e a Londra, cit., p. 278. 67 54 donated by the King of Hungary71, should be considered symbolic. It testifies to the links that the Fellows had established all over Europe and the excellent reputation that they benefited from. The letter that Frisi sent to Pietro Verri on 16 February 176772 confirms that Alessandro was now highly regarded by Dr Morton, Nevil Maskelyne and Edward Waring. He was truly happy, and, although he and Alessandro had spent the whole day together «talking especially about rich and powerful England»73, it was important for him to forward Morton’s note. Written in Latin, it overtly praised him as an «ingenious and very illustrious young man»74. This section of the Verris’ epistolary exchanges and President Morton’s final praise are extremely important. They show that learned travel in the 1760s implied a wide and solid network of relations, and that letters of introduction were crucial to gaining access to the most exclusive circles in a foreign country. From this point of view, a generous friend, Paolo Frisi had carefully planned Alessandro’s stay in London, and had put him in contact with the leading figures of the Royal Society. The reason why this represented a great opportunity for him – Alessandro – as a young intellectual is that it was the most prestigious British academy, furthermore, thanks to its ties with Freemasonry, it was at the heart of the European cultural debate of the time. Although there is no textual evidence of a discussion between the young Verri and the Fellows on any of the issues related to Dei delitti e delle pene, those special relations may have contributed to its circulation. Allan Ramsay (1713-1784) and Sylvester Douglas (1743-1823), for example, represent two opposite views about Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene. A prominent Scottish portrait-painter, the former, who had contributed to «Philosophical Transactions»75, was utterly against the pamphlet. The long letter that he addressed to Diderot just after its publication76 shows that he appreciated its «ingenious observations», but firmly believed Manuela D’Amore that it had «fondements trop incertains, trop en l’air, pour soutenir un edifice utile et solide, que l’on puisse habiter en sûreté»77. Writing from Paris on «17–30 July 1766»78, André Morellet (1727-1819), the economist who translated Dei delitti e delle pene into French, informed Beccaria about such negative criticism, and, again, on «14-15 March 1767»79 suggested that he should consider it carefully80. It seems clear that he feared the negative impact that this could have on the pamphlet’s reception81. A young intellectual who became part of the Accademia dei Pugni in 1767, and who would be admitted to the Royal Society in 1795, Sylvester Douglas saw «De’ delitti e delle pene» differently82. Dated 1 June 1769, his letter expresses strong enthusiasm not only for the Italian tradition of thought, but also for Beccaria’s human and intellectual qualities. For him, «the Italians» represented a model for «science and art»; as for the Milanese philosophe, he had successfully combined «solid metaphysical principles» with his deep «love for humankind»83. Allan Ramsay and Sylvester Douglas, also President Morton and the Fellows Maskelyne, Maty and Waring continued to correspond with the leading members of the «Caffé» circle, particularly with Paolo Frisi, even after Dei delitti e delle pene was translated into English. The latest research has showed that in those years the connection between Milan and London became even stronger84, and that, following the new revolutionary trends, Benjamin Franklin extended it to the other side of the Atlantic85. Again, learned academies and literary salons – not only in Paris, but also in Milan and London – were at the heart of the major changes in the history of the eighteenth-century. 77 Ibidem, p. 537. p. 350. 79 Ibidem, pp. 522-525. 80 Edizione nazionale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria, cit., vol. 4, pp. 341355. 81 Ibidem, p. 524. 82 See Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, cit., pp. 548-549. 83 Ibidem, p. 548. 84 See L. De Michelis, “Una rete immensa lega tutte le verità”: Cesare Beccaria’s Lectures on Public Economy and Sylvester Douglas’s Translation of his «Discourse on Public Œconomy and Commerce», in L. De Michelis, L. Guerra and F. O’Gorman (eds.), Entangled Histories: Politics and Culture in Eighteenth-Century Anglo-Italian Encounters, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle (forthcoming 2019). 85 In this case, it was Filippo Mazzei (1730-1816) who acted as a ‘cultural mediator’. See J. Bessler, The Birth of the American Law. An Italian Philosopher and the American Revolution, Carolina Academic Press, Durham 2014; and Loretelli, The First English Translation of Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments, cit., pp. 11-12. 78 Ibidem, 71 Ibidem. 72 Ibidem, pp. 477-478. Here we refer to one of Paolo Frisi’s letters to Pietro dated 16 February 1767. 73 Ibidem, p. 477. 74 Ibidem, p. 478. The opening phases in particular read: «Gratias ago tibi maxime pro DD. Comite de Verri, juveni ingenuo et vere illustri. Si plures habes eiusdem fabricae (quod valde dubito) omne quaeso mihi mittas». 75 See C. Paderni, Extracts of Two Letters from Sigr Camillo Paderni at Rome, to Mr. Allan Ramsay, Painter, in Covent Garden, concerning some antient Statues, Pictures, and other Curiosities, found in a subterraneous Town, lately discovered near Naples. Translated from the Italian by Mr. Ramsay, and sent by him to Mr. Ward, F.R.S., «Philosophical Transactions», 41, 1740, pp. 484-489. 76 C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene. Con una raccolta di lettere e documenti relativi alla nascita dell’opera e alla sua fortuna nell’Europa del Settecento, a cura di F. Ventura, Einaudi, Torino 1973, pp. 536-545. Anglo-Italian interdisciplinary networks 1765-1767. 4. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES. Made of countless letters in French, Italian and Latin, as well as private diaries and travel accounts, our textual path has showed that the «Caffé» and the most prestigious British academy, the Royal Society, were unexpectedly interconnected. At the time when Cesare Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene was being translated into English, the physicist Paolo Frisi, who was at the heart of a wide cosmopolitan network, distinguished himself by creating solid Anglo-Italian relations. His cultural activity represented a model for the young Alessandro Verri, who soon decided to follow in his footsteps, and discover intellectual London. The two intellectuals’ extraordinary experiences and encounters can be found in their exchanges with the Fellows. They were mostly scientific, also related to the civil debate of the time, yet they do not provide evidence of their commitment to the promotion of Beccaria’s work in England. John Wilkes, for example, had first met the leading members of the «Caffé» at d’Holbach’s literary salon; as regards Allan Ramsay and Sylvester Douglas, they too were primarily close to the French philosophes. Despite its limitations, however, we are convinced that this under-researched area of study has already offered useful insights into the history of eighteenthcentury Europe: it has drawn our attention to the major English and Italian cultural institutions, particularly to their active role in the dissemination of liberal ideas and in the connection between interdisciplinary knowledge and civil engagement. Furthermore, it has emphasized Frisi’s effort to change the Paris-centred cultural axis, which must have reinforced the link between Milan and London. Beccaria and the Verris could not but benefit from this side of his international contacts. Of course, much research remains to be done in this field. The physicist’s correspondence will always represent a key documentary resource, but the Fellows’ writings will need to receive closer attention: they may reveal some hidden signs of the «Caffé»’s and the Royal Society’s relations, thus adding vital information about the rich terrain which also favoured the circulation of Beccaria’s «book of crimes» in England. A complex and fascinating chapter of the history of the Enlightenment, it will certainly be continued. 55 Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Saggi Citation: L. Guerra (2019) A member of the Accademia dei Pugni translates Frances Brooke’s. The History of Lady Julia Mandeville. From Giambattista Biffi’s manuscripts. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 57-64. doi: 10.13128/ds-25438 Copyright: © 2019 L. Guerra. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. A member of the Accademia dei Pugni translates Frances Brooke’s The History of Lady Julia Mandeville. From Giambattista Biffi’s manuscripts Lia Guerra Università di Pavia Abstract. The present essay intends to address an aspect of Biffi’s anglomania as it appears from his partial translation from the original English language of the epistolary novel The History of Lady Julia Mandeville (1763), found among his manuscript papers. The name of Frances Brooke, the author of the novel, is not given with the title in the manuscript and was probably totally ignored by Biffi and by the Italian readership at large. The paper explores the reasons that might have led Biffi to start such an enterprise, the kind of appeal Brooke’s novel could have to his curiosity, and also why he suddenly dropped the experiment and left the translation at a very early stage. Keywords. Biffi, Great Britain, Translation, Epistolary Novel, Manuscripts. «Se il mondo letterato è stato francese nel principio di questo secolo, verso la metà è diventato affatto inglese» (C. Denina, Lettere Brandeburghesi)1. In 1766 Pietro Verri commissioned Antonio Perego an oil picture meant to celebrate his group of friends of ‘I Pugni’, the Academy he had established in Milan in 1761: the table on the left of this conversation piece known as «L’accademia dei Pugni» has Cesare Beccaria and Alessandro Verri seated and intent on reading and writing respectively. Behind Alessandro, a hand on his shoulder, stands a less well known figure, that of Count Giovan Battista Biffi from Cremona (1736-1807). At the table on the right Luigi Lambertenghi and Pietro Verri are playing tric-trac. We have learnt to match this picture with the Lombard enlightenment since Franco Venturi used it for the cover of his Settecento riformatore I of 1969, and more recently we tend to associate it with the periodical «Il Caffè» in the Francioni-Romagnoli sec- 1 C. Denina, Lettere brandeburghesi, a cura di F. Cicoira, Centro Studi Piemontesi, Torino 1989. Letter from Dresda, October 23, 1782, quoted in A. Stauble, Luci e ombre dell’anglofilia nella cultura italiana del tardo Settecento, in G. Bardazzi et A. Grosrichard (éd.), Denouement des lumieres et invention romantique. Actes du Colloque (Genève, 24-25 novembre 2000). Librairie Droz, Genève 2003, pp. 277-298: the quotation is on p. 277. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 57-64 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25438 58 ond edition of 19982 . Gianmarco Gaspari has revealed that the pattern of this picture owes much to the illustration by Hayman and Grignion in the facing title-page of the First Volume of the seven-volume Tonson and Draper edition of the «Spectator»3. That «Il Caffè» was conceived and developed following the pattern offered by English papers like the «Spectator», the «Guardian» and the «Idler» is acknowledged in the early pages of the Italian periodical and is confirmed by many common features. What is less well known is that Biffi, the man portrayed near Cesare Beccaria and Alessandro Verri in the picture, was the only one in the group who spoke the English language, who collected and translated English texts for his friends and for his own delight without the French mediation4, and who therefore was one of their direct links with the English culture. The present essay intends to address another aspect of Biffi’s anglomania: his partial translation of the anonymous epistolary novel The History of Lady Julia Mandeville (1763), found among his manuscript papers5. The novel had been translated into French in 1764 and received a favourable review by Voltaire. It is neither clear when Biffi undertook the translation, nor how and when he first came in touch with the text: the itineraries of translation are, generally speaking, rather complex for the period, for reasons that this paper will hopefully contribute to clarifying, even though a great deal still 2 F. Venturi, Settecento riformatore, vol. I. Da Muratori a Beccaria, Einaudi, Torino 1969. G. Francioni, S. Romagnoli (a cura di), «Il Caffè» 1764-1766, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 1998 (prima ed. 1993). 3 G. Gaspari, Il secolo delle cose. Appunti su modelli e generi della divulgazione letteraria nel «Caffè», «Archivio storico lombardo», CXL, 2014, pp. 95-123, the comment on p. 105. 4 I have dealt with Biffi’s role as mediator between the two cultures for the benefit of the Milanese group around the Verris and Beccaria in L. Guerra, Giambattista Biffi and His Role in the Dissemination of English Culture in Eighteenth-Century Lombardy, «Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies», 33, 2010, 2, pp. 245-264. 5 Information on Biffi can be found in F. Venturi, Un amico di Beccaria e di Verri: profilo di Giambattista Biffi, «Giornale storico della letteratura italiana», 134, 1957, pp. 37-76; Id., Il viaggio a Genova di Giambattista Biffi nel 1774, Noviero, Genova 1958; Id., La letteratura italiana, vol. 46/ iii. Illuministi italiani. Riformatori lombardi, piemontesi e toscani, Ricciardi, Milano-Napoli 1958, pp. 386-390; Id., Settecento riformatore, vol. I, cit., e vol. V/1; L’Italia dei lumi (1764-1790). La rivoluzione di Corsica. Le grandi carestie degli anni sessanta. La Lombardia delle riforme, Torino, Einaudi 1987; G. Dossena, entry in the Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, 10 (1968), pp. 378-380; Id., Per il diario del Biffi, in G.B. Biffi, Diario (1777-1781), a cura di G. Dossena, Bompiani, Milano 1976; C. Cremonini, Giambattista Biffi, un ‘cosmopolita di provincia’ nella Cremona del Settecento, in G. Rumi, G. Mezzanotte, A. Cova (a cura di), Cremona e il suo territorio, Cariplo, Milano 1998, pp. 33-45. After the Diario, also Biffi’s travel letters have been edited in G.B. Biffi, Lettere itinerarie 1773, 1774, 1776, 1777, a cura di E. Carriero, Pensa Multimedia, Lecce 2011. They include Viaggio a Venezia (1773), Viaggio di Genova (1774), Viaggio in Piemonte e parte della Francia (1776) and Viaggio di Ferrara (1777). Lia Guerra needs to be done in terms of research6. He certainly had connections with people who moved English texts to and from Britain, among them Giuseppe Baretti until at least 1770, when contacts between the two ceased. But Biffi was also familiar with well furnished Milanese private libraries, like Count Karl Firmian’s, even though more has to be ascertained as to the content of that library. The novel could have reached him also thanks to his activity in the Cremonese book market, where he became censor in 1769, and where his contacts with the man who was to become a very prominent publisher, Lorenzo Manini, were fairly strong7. The name of Frances Brooke, the author of the novel, is not given with the title in the manuscript and was probably totally ignored by the Italian coeval readership8. Frances Brooke, née Moore (1724-1789) was fairly well known in London as a translator from French, as a poet and as an essayist. Under the pseudonym of Mary Singleton, Spinster, she even edited The Old Maid, a periodical that ran for 37 weeks, from 15 November 1755 to 4 July 1756, but she was also a novelist and a playwright, and had become part of a net of London literary people who circulated their manuscripts and discussed each other’s work. Samuel Johnson, Samuel Richardson, Hannah More, and Anna Seward were people she was in touch with: she had been living in London since 1748 and Baretti entered Johnson’s group in 1753, introduced by Charlotte Lennox who was then learning Italian from him. So the two might have easily met: she in fact happened to be in London and to try her hand at the literary world exactly at the time – «a small period of grace» – as Paula Backsheider defines it, for women writers, around mid century 9. She first signed herself as Frances Brooke in 1756 when she married the Reverend John Brooke and published her first tragedy, Virginia, in a valuable edition that also included Odes, Pastorals and Translations. Both her periodical and her novels instead appeared without her name: in 1763 The History of Lady 6 Stauble, Luci e ombre, cit., has contributed to shedding light on the matter of translating English poetry into Italian but for the novel more is needed. 7 The activity of the bookseller Lorenzo Manini started at the beginning of the 1770s, first with two Milanese publishers, later by himself with Biffi’s cooperation, which resulted in the publication of Francesco Algarotti’s works between 1778 and 1784. 8 A book recently published by Alessandra Mita Ferraro, Il diritto e il rovescio. Giambattista Giovio (1748-1814) un europeo di provincia nel secolo dei Lumi, Il Mulino, Bologna 2018, reveals however that another of Brooke’s novels was translated into Italian but through the French mediation. Biffi and Giovio knew each other and corresponded: still it is amazing that they both felt interested enough in epistolary novels to translate them. 9 P. Backsheider, Introduction to F. Brooke, The Excursion, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington 1997, p. xl, note 11. The History of Lady Julia Mandeville. From Giambattista Biffi’s manuscripts Julia Mandeville, a two-volume novel, was characteristically inscribed «By the translator of Lady Catesby’s letters»10. Lady Julia Mandeville is an epistolary novel «after the fashion Brooke herself contributed to spread for French epistolary novels»11. At the time of its publication, it became immediately popular running to six editions by 1773, which testifies to a large commercial and critical success. In the same year 1763, at the end of the Seven Years’ War, Brooke sailed for Canada in order to reach her husband who had been appointed chaplain to the Detachment of Quebec. On her return to London in 1768, Brooke produced more translations from the French, more novels and in 1773 she turned again to the theatre, purchased the King’s Theatre (the Haymarket Opera House) with the help of her family, and jointly managed it with her friend, the famous tragic actress Mary Ann Yates until 1778. She was able to see her own production on stage only after 1781, thanks to Covent Garden’s manager Thomas Harris, and became immediately popular12 . Brooke’s literary work has recently received attention mainly for her second epistolary novel, Emily Montague (1769), signed by her and providing interesting matter in relation to the birth of the Canadian novel. The practice of anonymity in eighteenth century female periodicals and novels contributed to a development of women’s writing. These two genres, in England as in Italy, quite typically addressed adjacent topics; but both had a lower reputation if compared to the nobler genres of tragedy or epic, and were rarely present on the shelves of ‘serious’ libraries and it is therefore difficult to trace their presence13. It is to be doubted that Biffi knew Brooke’s name, or that she was a woman, or that he would have cared to find out. James Raven has 10 A very popular book translated from the French of Madame Riccoboni: Letters from Juliet Lady Catesby, to her friend Lady Henrietta Campley, published anonymously and claimed as translated from the English, Printed for R. and J. Dodsley, London 1760. 11 E. Donkin, Getting into the Act: women playwrights in London, 17761829, Routledge, New York 1995, pp. 47-48. 12 Biographical references can be gathered from The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (“Frances Brooke” by Mary Jane Edwards); at <www-chawton.org> (by Rebecca Garwood; last consulted in March 2019) and in Introductions to her novels recently reprinted: The History of Lady Julia Mandeville edited by Enit Karafili Steiner, was published by Pickering and Chatto in 2013. Her works are available also at the Eighteenth-Century Poetry Archive (ECPA), at Project Gutenberg and at Internet Archive. 13 R. Turchi, Primi sondaggi per un commento della “Toelette, o sia Raccolta galante di prose e versi toscani dedicata alle dame italiane”, in S. Capecchi (a cura di), Giornali del Settecento fra Granducato e legazioni, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma 2008, pp. 125-136. A considerable amount of research is being done in Italy with a view to rescuing from oblivion and destruction a large number of eighteenth-century female periodicals. 59 shown that about «80 per cent of British novels were published anonymously in the late eighteenth century, and the writers remained largely unknown to readers»14. As Mary Helen McMurran has stressed, «eighteenthcentury fiction translation relied at least in part on the concealment of origins; novels were especially mobile because they did not bear the stamp of the author or nation»15. According to her, this accounts for the mobility of the novel, also because of the ‘murky’ nature of this market. McMurran suggests that such mobility and malleability justify the question of whether the novel actually rose – not only in prestige but in quantity as well – thanks to this indifference as to the origin of single texts or in spite of it. The novel, in short, might have consolidated itself as an independent genre because of this quality of being stranger to no country, in fact as a ‘circulatory’ phenomenon capable of linking languages and places, marginality allowing for greater freedom16. Biffi published nothing in his lifetime, but wrote extensively. The amount and variety of the topics he addressed, as witnessed by the collection of manuscripts held by the State Library of Cremona, testify to his several interests and to the encyclopedic culture so typical of the educated eighteenth-century man. His manuscripts actually provide a concise catalogue of the eighteenth-century English culture which fascinated Italian readers (essays, poetry and the novel) – in fact a crosssection of English publications before the 1770s. Biffi’s papers were collected in files brought together after his death by his friend, Abbot Antonio Dragoni. Two of them host English material and were given the following titles: A) Raccolta di Sentenze e memorie morali cavate dai classici greci, latini, italiani francesi, inglesi per sua istruzione dal conte G.B. Biffi cremonese («Zibaldone Minor» as Giampaolo Dossena entitled it, covering the years 1761-177717): it includes the first 36 whole numbers (and the beginning of the 37th) from Johnson’s «Idler» and 24 fragments mainly from the «Spectator», later to be exploited by the Caffetisti. B) Miscellanee Astronomico-Politico-Critico-Storiche scritte in Milano negli anni 1764-65, ossia «Il Caffè» con in fine la Traduzione dall’Inglese della Storia di Lady 14 J. Raven, The anonymous novel in Britain and Ireland, 1750-1830, in R.J. Griffin (ed.), The Faces of Anonymity: Anonymous and Pseudonymous Publication from the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2003, pp. 141-166: the quotation is on p. 49. 15 M.H. McMurran, The spread of novels. Translation and prose fiction in the eighteenth century, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford 2010, p. 50. McMurran’s focus is mainly on French-English translations. 16 Ibidem, p. 51. 17 G. Dossena, Introduzione, in G. Biffi, Diario (1777-1781), a cura di G. Dossena, Bompiani, Milano 1976, cit., pp. vii-xxxiii: xxiii. 60 Giulia Mandeville fatta nel 1770 («Zibaldone Maior»): a cardboard volume of cm.17 x 26, comprising 109 numbered leaves – the numbers having been added in recent times18. It was probably bound by the same Dragoni19, who must also have added the apocryphal/invented titles for all but the two texts I am interested in here. The curious title, with that reference to the periodical «Il Caffè»20, was suggested perhaps by the multifarious content of the file. My focus here is the section of folder B with the title la Traduzione dall’Inglese della Storia di Lady Giulia Mandeville fatta nel 1770 on the title page, an announcement which gives the translation in a foregrounded position as regards the rest of the papers. However, such an emphasis is rather undermined by the shortness of the translated text, which occupies the final section of the folder – leaves 76 r to 95r. It is preceded by a preliminary leaf in Biffi’s handwriting announcing «Storia di Lady Giulia Mandeville tradotta dall’inglese» but no date is added (which suggests that «fatta nel 1770» is a debatable addition). The translation is interrupted abruptly, leaves 96 to 109 being left blank. Biffi, the member of an aristocratic family with large land properties in south Lombardy, a very good friend of the Verris (especially Alessandro) and Cesare Beccaria, had been educated in Milan (Collegio dei Nobili, 1746-1756) and in Parma (1756-1760). He had a very good knowledge of the English language and of contemporary English literature, which he was able to read without the help of a French translation. Back in Milan between 1760 and 1762, bound to a diplomatic career thanks to Count Firmian’s support, Biffi was able to participate in the discussions prior to the publication of «Il Caffè» (June 1764 - May 1766), but was actually physically present in Milan only between the end of 1760 and the summer of 1762, and made only short visits to 18 For an analysis of the content of folders A and B, see Guerra, Giambattista Biffi and His Role, cit., passim. 19 Folders A and B are marked AA.3.17 and AA.3.18 respectively in the Library of Cremona catalogue of manuscripts. The texts collected in the Miscellanee date back to different years so that the years suggested in the title on the cover of the folder are not valid for all texts, as for instance in the case of the translations we are dealing with here. 20 The original edition of Volume One of the Milanese paper had this title, reproduced in: G. Francioni, S. Romagnoli (a cura di), «Il Caffè» 1764-1766, cit.: Il CAFFE ossia BREVI E VARI DISCORSI distribuiti in fogli periodici. Tomo primo: dal Giugno 1764 a tutto Maggio 1765. The edition in two volumes includes «tomo secondo dal giugno 1765 per un anno seguente». BREVI E VARI DISCORSI becomes in Dragoni’s title Miscellanee Astronomico-Politico-Critico-Storiche while the years indicated are exactly the same. Dragoni collected autograph pages by Biffi, in Italian and English, with no indication of sources. Whole papers are copied or translated (or both) not in a mechanical sequence, but according to a selection that shows a degree of emphasis on peculiar themes (like women and feelings). Lia Guerra Milan between 1764 and October 1766, when Beccaria and Alessandro Verri left for Paris, and in 1768. In fact, he contributed nothing to the periodical directly: by the time «Il Caffè» started publication, he had already left Milan, obliged by his family to go back to his home town, Cremona. Here, he covered public offices and started to carry on some kind of silent ‘ghost’ activity, bent on private readings, also of English texts when available, and – in a metaphorical way – on compiling his own ghost periodical – a personal enterprise along the same lines as the actual Milanese paper. The peculiar characteristic of this private Caffé is quite distinct: a clear mark of Biffi’s personal attitude emerges first of all from the choice of English texts copied or translated; but above all from the strong sensibility he displays, together with his lively intelligence and unassuming attitude, as his correspondence with Beccaria testifies21. Biffi would consider the literary field as no more than a gentleman’s elevating pastime, an activity that provided comfort for daily life, in the style of Latin otium, and that therefore did not imply publication – a fairly common attitude, but certainly not in the style of his Milanese friends, the Caffetisti 22 , particularly of Pietro Verri’s. The ‘militant’ quality of the engagement of the friends of the Accademia dei Pugni suggested, in fact, an active participation in the current debates and political involvement: the enlightened intellectual should publish and exploit the printing press in all possible forms in order to spread the new ideas, confident in the strength of reason to be disseminated through his writings. But Biffi’s name does not appear among the signatures of «Il Caffè». He stays in the background, a «Spectator». The only essay he sent Pietro Verri when the publication of the periodical had already started, was judged too risky for the censor23: it 21 All his friends testify to his qualities in the rich correspondence collected in Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di Cesare Beccaria, voll. 4 e 5. Carteggio, a cura di C. Capra, R. Pasta, F. Pino Pongolini, Mediobanca, Milano 1994 («Parte I: 1758-1768») e 1996 («Parte II: 1769-1794») respectively. 22 In his travel letters some aspects of Biffi’s shy character emerge, namely his contemplative manner and his penchant for daydreaming that constantly led him to sadness and pain, to the point that he felt they were leading him to insanity: in letter XIII in Viaggio in Piemonte (Lettere itinerarie, cit., p. 249) he mentions feeling something similar to the uneasiness of the English. See the comments in G. Panizza, Tra Arisi e Biffi: un percorso nella cultura a Cremona nel secolo dei Lumi, in Storia di Cremona, vol. 7. Il Settecento e l’età napoleonica, a cura di C. Capra, Bolis, Azzano San Paolo (bg) 2009, pp. 233-244. His Milanese friends left a number of examples of the way in which this attitude of Biffi’s weighed on their relationship. A private man, the solitary ‘Spectator’, eager to communicate among his friends only, he felt a closer connection was easier with Cesare Beccaria, himself sober and unambitious. 23 The information comes indirectly from Pietro Verri’s negative reply to Biffi in a letter of 30 October 1764, in G. Sommi Picenardi, Lettere inedite di Pietro Verri, «Rassegna nazionale», XXX, 1912, 185, p. 55. The History of Lady Julia Mandeville. From Giambattista Biffi’s manuscripts dealt with forced monastic vows and frustrated feelings – topics familiar to Biffi’s Diario and present in many of the English passages (copied or translated) in folder B. It is in point of fact the English content of folder B that clarifies many of Biffi’s choices, starting from his abortive contribution to «Il Caffè». Themes that appeal to his sensibility take shape in his approach to the ‘woman question’ that figures fairly frequently in his English manuscript notes. The woman question was in the agenda (and mainly in terms of female education) not only of «Il Caffè» but also of the «Gazzetta Veneta» (1760-1761), where Gasparo Gozzi advanced propositions similar to those endorsed by Biffi and his Caffetisti friends exploring important issues debated in English papers like «The Spectator» or «The Guardian»24 . But it was first and foremost the topic of the woman victim of an abusive maledominated society that especially appealed to him. This can easily be gathered from some pages in his journal that hint at unfortunate love affairs where he himself seems to be involved and whose failure was not so much the women’s fault, but a consequence of external factors, conventions, social duties, as entries n.6 and n.40 – written in a broken English in order to escape prying eyes – testify25. 24 The «Spectator» showed considerable interest in the theme and Addison even provided – in no. 205 – a list of numbers of the paper where women were the subjects; Biffi copied out and translated no. 198 of the «Spectator» on the topic of two different categories of women, the salamander and the victim, where quite clearly Addison’s sympathy goes to the latter, a victim to a sexist and male-dominated society. For more information, see Guerra, Giambattista Biffi and His Role, cit. 25 Biffi, Diario [6], cit., pp. 8-9 (21 novembre [1777]): a passage in macaronic English where the story of a girl from his town («My dear little gearl») is hinted at, and her destiny of seduction is compared to that of Yarico’s in the famous tale narrated by Steele in the pages of the «Spectator». The girl is said to have been betrayed by a local Incle («A cremonese Thomas Incle»), or a Ioseph Leman (an echo of the servant in Clarissa’s family who betrays her: see Richardson’s Clarissa, 1748, first Italian translation 1783, French translation 1751). Biffi claims to have saved her from shame hiding her until she had the baby and afterwards taking her back home. He confesses to feeling «a strong affection for this handsom mead». The tale of Inkle and Yarico became famous over the eighteenth century and it must have struck Biffi’s attention because I have found other hints of it in other manuscripts, as in CIV 36 (Cremona State Library), where the name is first dropped on page 8r in the course of a letter, and later resumed at page 14r in an unfinished text titled «L’ingratitudine». The passage reads as follows: «Anche i ritratti del vizio possono indurci ad amare il buono e l’onesto. Così può essere utile il racconto, tratto da uno scritto inglese, della vicenda di Thomas Inckle. Un giovane mercante inglese, durante un viaggio in America, per sfuggire agli indiani si rifugia in una foresta dove viene aiutato e amato da una giovane indigena, Yarico. Dopo alcuni mesi giunge una nave e i due vengono soccorsi. L’avido Inckle, dimentico di quanto Yarico ha fatto per lui, per recuperare i soldi persi, la vende al mercato degli schiavi e, per il fatto che attende un figlio, spunta un prezzo più alto» (CIV 36 paper 8r-v). In entry [40] of Biffi’s Diario, pp. 42-43 (25 luglio 1778) the news is reported in English of Miss Pallavicini’s marriage with Count Scotti. Biffi regrets he is not the lucky guy because of his «cir- 61 Frustrated love, the persecuted female victim of social prejudice, and the topic of free choice in love account for the interest aroused in Biffi’s translation of Alexander Pope’s Eloisa to Abelard – in the same folder B immediately following «Spectator» n.198 – together with the motif of the convent-prison that was becoming a common literary topos in gothic novels. Fiction, as Ruth Perry has demonstrated, did make use of «the conditions of women’s lives»26 and Lady Montagu famously commented that Richardson’s Clarissa reminded her of her own youth – her clandestine letters to her future husband 27. Folder B includes twelve pages hosting the autograph prose translations of Lettera d’Eloesa ad Abailardo (leaves 70r to 75v) and about twenty pages with the Storia di Ladi Giulia Mandeville (leaves 76r to 95r). The authors’ names are not given, but of course if Pope’s was familiar to Biffi (the manuscripts include also a translation of Universal Prayer), Brooke’s name was probably unknown. Pope’s translation of Eloisa, according to Michele Mari 28, is fairly certainly based on a French version. If we follow Mari’s chronological reconstruction, Biffi must have translated it after 1774, and therefore the translation of Brooke’s novel, which in the manuscripts follows Pope’s, must have been started (or copied) after that date, contradicting the date inscribed on the title page of the folder (1771). I am tempted to link the two translations because both are in Biffi’s handwriting, and both employ the epistolary form in prose, a medium Biffi privileged in his writing activity and which, according to Mari, has contributed to transform Pope’s epistolary cumstances» and «the strange manner of thinking of mi uncle, a empty, rougthly man [...] She is a tall ioung woman all lovely and blooming; pretti if not handsom; she has declared that I only and no other... Poor thinck, my heart is torn in pieces at the consideration of motives of my denial. I who wold not maring the greatest princess on heart if I were not assured that she loved me above all the mens where I deserve it or not: I had met a woman suitable to that manner of thinking». He also regrets the «unhappy passion for a deceitful woman, ow many wrongs have brought to me», thus hinting at an unhappy love story mentioned in the Diario four times until he comes to believe she is a vicious and hellish figure, a true villain, and can therefore put a stop to his passion. 26 R. Perry, Women, Letters, and the Novel, AMS Press, New York 1980, ch. VI. 27 In Clarissa she found herself. Its «first volume soften’d me by a near ressemblance of my Maiden Days»: R. Halsband (ed.), The Complete Letters of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, vol. 3. 1752-1762, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1967, p. 9 (Letter of March 1, 1752 to Lady Bute); indeed, as critics have noted, Clarissa’s early plot uncannily reproduces Lady Mary’s courtship. 28 M. Mari, Riflessi della fortuna di Eloisa nelle traduzioni italiane del Settecento, in Id., Momenti della traduzione fra Settecento e Ottocento, Istituto Propaganda Libraria, Milano 1994, pp. 7-45: Mari sketches the tradition of the ‘Eloisa’ translations in Europe over the century. In 1774 Biffi also translated the most Rousseauesque play by Diderot, Le Fils Naturel, 1757. 62 poem into a short epistolary novel. Besides, by connecting Pope and Brooke, Biffi was perhaps inadvertently connecting patterns that the novel was about to exploit. The first Italian version of Pope’s poem was produced in 1717 by Antonio Conti, immediately following the publication of the original29, but was published only in 1760: between Conti’s and Biffi’s versions nothing else appeared in Italian. Conti’s version had erased all the sensuality and the passion – besides changing the conclusion – that play such an important role in Biffi’s version. The 1770s are also interesting years for Alessandro Verri’s reflections on the writing of novels: in a letter to Pietro of 10 November 1770 he speaks about a project to educate the female readership meant to address Contessa Margherita Boccapaduli. But why did Biffi use a French prose version of Pope’s poem when he was perfectly able to translate directly from the original30? Mari’s hypothesis is convincing – in my opinion – in so much as it can receive support by the translation from Brooke’s novel. He believes that Biffi’s interest in experimentation and his «espressionismo verbale» must have directed him to Cailleau’s prose translation which allowed for more freedom of expression and chimed with the new sentimental epistolary narrative Biffi so much cherished. Mari adds: «il Biffi doveva inoltre trovare in quella stessa parafrasi, molto meglio che nell’originale, i caratteri di un ‘romanzo’» and he probably was ready to «rivivere la vicenda di Eloisa appunto nei termini di un romanzo epistolare settecentesco» as suggested by «[le] numerose testimonianze di illustri contemporanei sulla sua personalità rousseauiana» (p. 28). In particular, the addition in Pope’s translation of many details pointing to a pre-Romantic taste for natural landscape in its horrid peculiarities, and their presence in the last part of Brooke’s novel, are to be read as homage to the growing fascination for those English authors whose popularity was on the rise even in Italy. Brooke’s novel appears to have been translated directly from the English: the kinds of flaws listed in an Appendix at the end of this paper support this hypothesis. The manuscript is oddly clean, with very rare instances of erasures or corrections, or change of ink – almost a fair copy – in fact the opposite of the Eloisa manuscripts which appear as working papers. Therefore, no instances of doubts or uncertainties – as if this were a clean copy ready for the printing press. The final blank pages add to the mystery. The story of Eloisa foreshadows the tragic plot of Brooke’s novel of 1763, anticipating not only its gothic 29 This rules out any possible influence of French versions. He had done so with Pope’s Universal Prayer which he also transcribed in his manuscripts in the original version. 30 Lia Guerra conclusion, but a pattern bound to become paradigmatic for so much eighteenth-century fiction. In appropriating the legend attached to the famous couple of antiquity, Pope’s Eloisa, dominated by a fatal passion, was able to entrust the eighteenth century with the topic of the conflict between passion and social conventions that also rules many English heroines of the rising novel, and which plays a leading role in Brooke’s narrative, where both action and discussion revolve around this topic. Moreover, it introduced the peculiar atmosphere of solitude and melancholy that was to suit the subsequent heroes of sensibility. The amount of Brooke’s novel that Biffi managed to translate (the first 8 letters and the beginning of the 9th, out of 82) is too limited an essay to provide important issues for comment. However, we can notice that the translation runs smoothly, as if the translator were set to do it all. Being the first part of a long novel, it provides the reader with the general issues that are being dealt with. The setting is England, the Castle of Belmont, of Shakespearean memory, in the Summer of 1762, the ‘actors’ a group of «anime belle» enjoying the natural beauty of the place and the artificial beauty of their guests’ exquisite education and sensibility31. The pleasures of a country mansion run by intelligent and educated people are described from the very beginning in detail, together with the features of the castle, built after Inigo Jones’ design. The first four letters and the seventh are written by the male protagonist, Henry Mandeville, to his privileged addressee, Cavalier George Mordaunt, who, we are informed in a reasonably concise summary in letter 4, accompanied Henry in his Grand Tour but missed that part of it in which Henry became the victim of his own excessive passion and fell desperately in love with the wife of his Roman guest, Countess Malispini. The sad experience of falling for the wrong woman is told with guilty tones: the stern reprisal of the Countess engenders a reaction of shame and pain, so that, like Milton’s Satan, Henry felt «how awful goodness is, and saw /virtue in her own shape how lovely». Having tasted the «avvelenata [sua] tazza» of love, Henry believes that his present feelings for his cousin Julia is just friendship, only to realize a few days later how wrong he is. Biffi’s translated passages include also letters written by a very different character and probably one of the best portraits in the whole novel, Lady Anne Wilmot, 31 This sort of utopian place has many points of contact with Pietro Verri’s «Le delizie della villa», addressed in Volume One of «Il Caffè», while the theme of the «Buona compagnia» (the title of another essay by Pietro Verri in Volume Two of «Il Caffè») came to be strictly connected with the idea of happiness produced by welling up in a company of friends. 63 The History of Lady Julia Mandeville. From Giambattista Biffi’s manuscripts whose life also provides an exemplary situation: she and Henry are the main narrators in the text (no letter is written by Julia). The widow of a disparaging rich landlord only interested in hunting32 and eating, Lady Anne is a good friend of Lady Belmont’s, although very different in character and attitudes. Her past experience as a wife – providing a tale within the tale of forced marriage and conjugal unhappiness – enables her to run the young people’s lives from the outside as far as love is concerned. Such a role echoes the fictitious role Brooke had attributed to herself through the voice of the Spinster in her journal The Old Maid: there, choosing the stance of the observer (as in Addison’s «Spectator»), programmatically experiencing by proxy, she had dealt with love and marriage through the experience of her fictional niece Julia, but without renouncing a strong feminist voice that came through in spite of the fragmentation linked with the format of the journal. The role of the «Spectator», detached but empathic, and just as fragmented (fragmentation in fact being the hallmark of Biffi’s writing), also characterizes the Cremonese count, as can be gathered from an interesting letter, where he describes a dinner in Casa Litta in the company of people who had travelled to Paris and London and feels a «Spectator» living through the words of other actors33. Biffi’s interruption of the translation of the novel is probably also part of his habit of trying his hand (at genres, topics, feelings) without concluding in order to attune them to his own perception of reality. His Diary is another strong instance of both fragmentation and of the practice of addressing hot topics as if they regarded someone else, as a «Spectator» would do34. What might have engaged Biffi’s attention in this novel? The style of the writing, to start with, which was rather new, especially in Lady Anne Wilmot’s letters, and challenging as well. Then the tone, which is probably a very interesting point, given the early date of the novel. Only Sarah Fielding a few years earlier (1760) 32 Biffi himself had very bad feelings for his uncle Stefano who was a habitual hunter: in Diario [46], cit., pp. 49-50 (27 agosto 1778), he announced his death and noticed that his love for hunting and agriculture had made him a stingy and hard man, lacking all kinds of sensibility and, in fact, friendless. 33 Lettera II. Milano, venerdì 20 settembre 1776 (Viaggio in Piemonte, in Lettere itinerarie, cit., p. 201). 34 It should be mentioned that both Biffi and Brooke had a strong interest in the theatre. Many of the major authors who contributed essays to «Il Caffè» also had shared experiences connected to the theatrical world: comedy was, for the authors of the Italian periodical, a means to bring about a reformation of costumes (also after the example of the «Spectator», where Steele had played an important role). And to this goal they moved devices, aims and methods typical of the theatre into the frame of the periodical. Even the language employed in «Il Caffè» owes something to the world of the theatre. had introduced gothic elements in her Ophelia, which, according to recent criticism, should be valued as a precursor to Walpole’s Castle of Otranto. Brooke’s novel emphasizes those gothic motives arranging them within a pattern which is also theatrical, the death of the two lovers being a strong quotation from Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet35. As he had done with the original «Spectator» for the benefit of his friends engaged in the revolutionary effort to produce a new periodical for Lombard enlightenment, Biffi was now busy with the form of the novel, that was to fascinate Alessandro Verri in the next decades. A brief description of the few flaws – especially ‘translation loans’ – present in the Italian word-by-word translation allows to confirm first of all that Biffi moved directly from the English original, but also that his proficiency was rather high. In some passages, however, as the Appendix below testifies, he probably felt at a loss with the originality of the style, with the novelty of the content and of course with the lack of a tradition of sentimental epistolary novel in Italy. APPENDIX VOL. 1, letter 1, p. 1: Biffi translates a future where the English has a past tense: «nor did it ever excite in my bosom» becomes «né ciò potrà mai eccitare nel mio petto»; «[my father] taught me [...] that virtue [...] would command through life that heart-felt esteem [...] which [...] wealth alone could never procure» becomes: «[mio padre mi ha apreso che ] la virtù [...] dominerebbe per tutta la vita col mezzo di quella stima...», instead of a more obvious «destinata a ispirare». Apparently, he does not recognize the use of «would» as future in indirect speech. «the sweet, the young, the blooming Lady Julia, who is this instant stepping into her post chaise with lady Anne Wilmot» is misrepresented as «la dolce, la giovane, la florida lady Giulia, la quale adesso sta facendo un giro nel suo biroccio con lady Anna Wilmot», thus losing that «writing-on-the-spot» effect which is so typical a device of the epistolary form in narrative. Letter 2, p. 2: «Lady Belmont, [...] with all the strength of reason and steadiness of mind generally confined to the best of our sex, has all the winning softness becoming the most amiable of her own; [...] she joins the graces of a court to the simplicity of a cottage; and, by an inexpressible ease and sweetness in her address 35 The hint that parents can turn out to be the ruin of their beloved children also sounds as a quotation from Shakespeare’s tragedy, while of course the name Julia reverberates from Shakespeare to Rousseau to the Old Maid’s niece. 64 makes all who approach her happy; impartial in her politeness, at her genial board no invidious distinctions take place». The long description of lady Belmont misses a few points here, where Biffi first has: «Ledi Belmont, [...] con tutta la forza della ragione e stabilità di mente confina colle migliori teste del nostro sesso» instead of «con tutta la forza della ragione e stabilità di mente che normalmente si trovano solo presso le migliori del nostro sesso»; in the next phrase he misses the sharp contrast court/cottage by translating «congiunge le grazie di una corte alla semplicità della vita familiare» which, however, maintains some contrast; while the next is almost lost in translation «sweetness in her address» becomes «amorevolezza nel fare inchieste e udire ricorsi» where «dolcezza nel modo di parlare» would have been enough. «At her genial board» becomes «al geniale suo abordo» which could imply a sweet kind of approach, but misses the hint at the table where the lady entertains her guests independently of their social status. p. 3. The term «romantic» appears in connection with «the gardens and park» that are defined «romantic beyond the wantonness of imagination». Here and in other instances the term is translated as «romanzesco». Also repeatedly Biffi translates «parents» with «parenti». Letter 4, p. 5: Henry reports to his friend about his unhappy and impossible love for his guest, the Countess Malispini – a name Biffi adjusts in his translation in Malaspina. «You will not therefore wonder that the warmth and inexperience of youth, hourly exposed in so dangerous a situation, was unable to resist»: Biffi has «il calore e l’inesperienza della gioventù, così di buon’ora esposta» missing the implication of repetition that in the end wins over Henry. Biffi renounces translating a quotation from Milton Paradise Lost IV 830. Letter 5 from Anne Wilmot to her lover Colonel Bellville, describing Henry. At the end of the letter, Anne mentions the present position of Henry’s father colonel Mandeville, «meeting with some ill usage from a minister on account of a vote in parliament». Biffi has «avendo avuto un incontro cattivo con un ministro sul particolare di un voto in parlamento» which misses the meaning of «meeting with» as «suffering from». Letter 6 from Anne Wilmot on the same topic: Biffi seems to have more difficulties with Anne’s register in her letters to Colonel Bellville, and in the opening paragraph «[Henry] has scarce been himself since he parted with his father yesterday» becomes in the Italian version «a mala pena si è contenuto egli stesso di non partire ieri con suo padre» which entirely misses the meaning. «I know some few sons» immediately after, becomes «conosco ben pochi figli» which is exactly the opposite of the «conosco qualche altro figlio invece». The term Lia Guerra «cit» is introduced and frequently employed in the text to describe the Westbrooks: Biffi translates it as «cittadino» but perhaps the implication of merchant man is lost. Also below «city vivacity» in connection with the description of the daughter, is translated as «vivacità citadinesca». According to the OED, cit, «short for citizen n. 1c; usually applied, more or less contemptuously, to a townsman or ‘cockney’ as distinguished from a countryman, or to a tradesman or shopkeeper as distinguished from a gentleman»; Johnson has «A pert low townsman; a pragmatical trader». In describing the wife of Mr Westbrook for some reason Biffi has «donna di gran condizione» to translate «a woman of great erudition». What really seems to baffle him, however, is the style of Anne’s letter: «she sung, for the creature sings, a tender Italian air» is flatly rendered as «essa canta, tutte le creature cantano», while the implied meaning was «she does also this». Letter 7: At the end of the letter Anne admits that «It was with difficulty Lord Belmont forced us at night from this charming retirement», where Biffi has «non riuscì se non con difficoltà a sforzarsi ad abbandonare» whereas it is the guests that must be forced out. Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Saggi Citation: P. Schofield (2019) «The first steps rightly directed in the track of legislation»: Jeremy Bentham on Cesare Beccaria’s Essay on Crimes and Punishments. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 65-74. doi: 10.13128/ds-25439 Copyright: © 2019 P. Schofield. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index. php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. «The first steps rightly directed in the track of legislation»: Jeremy Bentham on Cesare Beccaria’s Essay on Crimes and Punishments Philip Schofield Bentham Project, Faculty of Laws, University College London Abstract. Scholars have long recognized the debt owed by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) to Cesare Beccaria (1738-94). Ignoring Beccaria’s appeals to the social contract and natural law, Bentham took the more practical positions that he had found in Beccaria’s Crimes and Punishments and, by adopting a consistently utilitarian approach, produced a more systematic and coherent theory of punishment. Scholars have also pointed out that, by his own admission, Bentham owed a vital aspect of his conception of the principle of utility, namely the elements of value of pains and pleasures, to Beccaria, while it is generally accepted that he found the phrase with which his name is closely associated, namely ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’, in the English translation of Beccaria’s treatise. This overall interpretation is accepted here, but I suggest that Bentham’s debt to Beccaria was even more profound and extensive than has generally been recognized. Bentham read Beccaria closely and critically, working out the extent to which the positions he found there made practical sense, and might be incorporated within his own framework of penal law and legal theory more generally. The reason that Bentham was able to accept certain positions taken from Beccaria and reject others was related to the philosophical foundations of his thought in a materialist ontology and subjectivist epistemology which did not owe anything to Beccaria. Moreover, later in life, Bentham came to the view that his own work had superseded that of Beccaria. This was not to belittle the achievement of Beccaria, but rather reflected his view that he had incorporated Beccaria’s insights into his own categorization of the main ends of punishment, namely deterrence, reformation, incapacitation, and compensation, just as he had incorporated Beccaria’s insights into moral calculation into his own principle of utility. Keywords. Utility, Punishment, Penal Law, Happiness, Logic. I. In an unpublished manuscript written in the mid-to-late 1770s Jeremy Bentham expressed his opinion that, «The best treatise by far the world has seen hitherto on the subject [of legislation] is that of the Marquis of Beccaria Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 65-74 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25439 66 Philip Schofield on Crimes and Punishments»1. The general consensus amongst scholars is that Bentham developed a systematic and coherent utilitarian theory of punishment based on the inchoate ideas that he found in Cesare Beccaria’s Essay on Crimes and Punishments2 . In short, Bentham rejected the contractarian and natural law elements of Beccaria’s work, while accepting the general utilitarian thrust of Beccaria’s more practical arguments. Scholars have, moreover, drawn attention to Bentham’s admission that he took the elements into which the value of pains and pleasures were to be analysed from Beccaria, and are in general agreement that he discovered the phrase «the greatest happiness of the greatest number» in Beccaria’s work. None of this will be challenged here. I will, however, argue that, at the beginning of his career, Bentham’s debt to Beccaria was profound and extensive, but that, as he established a reputation as a major jurist in his own right, he believed that his own work had superseded that of the Italian jurist. Moreover, the reason that Bentham was able to assimilate and systematize certain positions advanced by Beccaria and reject others was because of a deeper philosophical commitment to an ontology that underlay his utilitarianism. Nevertheless, having integrated aspects of Beccaria’s thought into his own utilitarianism in general and penal theory in particular, Bentham’s legacy to the nineteenth-century owed a substantial, albeit covert, debt to Beccaria3. II. Beccaria’s Crimes and Punishments was first published in the original Italian in 1764, in Morellet’s French translation in 1766, and in English translation in 17674. Bentham seems to have had access to all three versions. In the single reference to Beccaria’s work in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham cites the relevant section in both the 1 University College London Library, Bentham Papers, Box xxvii, fo. 111 [hereafter UC xxvii. 111]. 2 See E. Halévy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, transl. M. Morris, Faber & Faber, London 1952, pp. 21, 33, 58-60, 64, 71-72; H.L.A. Hart, «Bentham and Beccaria», in Id, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1982, pp. 40-52; A.J. Draper, Cesare Beccaria’s influence on English discussions of punishment, 1764-1789, «History of European Ideas», 26, 2000, pp. 177199; and F. Rosen, Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill, Routledge, London 2003, p. 164. 3 The point is also made in E. de Champs, Bentham et l’héritage de Beccaria: du Project d’un corps complet de législation (1783-88) aux Traités de législation civile et pénale (1802), in E. Salvi and M. Porret (eds.), L’héritage de Beccaria, Presses universitaires de Rennes, Rennes 2014, pp. 99-110. 4 Unless otherwise noted, quotations in the present essay are taken from the English translation of 1767. original Italian work and in Morellet’s French translation5. Given Bentham’s fluency in French, one would have expected him to have read Morellet’s translation, but since he is not known to have studied Italian, at first glance it seems doubtful that he would have read Crimes and Punishments in its original language. However, in an essay on «Pæderasty» written about 1785, Bentham quoted in full, and in Italian, Beccaria’s paragraph beginning with the words «L’Attica Venere» on the punishment of male same-sex relationships6. Furthermore, in an essay of August 1817 in which Bentham provided a précis of the contents of a projected essay that became the third volume of Not Paul, but Jesus (of which only the first volume was published pseudonymously in 1823), Bentham noted: «The mode of sexuality, termed by Beccaria the Attic, the most prominent – why: – absurdity of the epithet unnatural as applied in this case». There is no equivalent phrase in either Morellet’s French translation of 1766 or the English translation of 17677. There seems little doubt, then, that Bentham read the work in the original Italian. The question whether he read the English translation is linked to the origin of the phrase that is commonly associated with Bentham, namely «the greatest happiness of the greatest number». The answer is not straightforward in that, in later life, Bentham was apt to state that he had discovered the phrase in a pamphlet by Joseph Priestley8, although on an earlier occasion, in a remark which Bentham’s literary executor John Bowring claimed to have extracted from «Bentham’s Commonplace Book» of 1781-85 (now lost), he had written: «Priestley was the first (unless it was Beccaria) who taught my lips to pronounce this sacred truth: – That the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation»9. In the most detailed study of the subject, Richard Shackleton comes to the 5 J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. by J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, Athlone Press, London 1970, p. 166 n. 6 See UC lxxii. 200. For further discussion of this passage see below. 7 See J. Bentham, Of Sexual Irregularities, and other writings on Sexual Morality, ed. by P. Schofield, C. Pease-Watkin, and M. Quinn, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2014, p. 132 & n. 8 See, for instance, J. Bentham, Deontology together with A Table of the Springs of Action and Article on Utilitarianism, ed. by A. Goldworth, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1983, pp. 291-292, and Official Aptitude Maximized; Expense Minimized, ed. by P. Schofield, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1993, pp. 349-350. Bentham might have had in mind a passage in Priestley’s An Essay on the First Principles of Government; and on the nature of Political, Civil, and Religious Liberty, London 1768, p. 17: «the good and happiness of the members, that is the majority of the members of any state, is the great standard by which every thing relating to that state must finally be determined». 9 The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. by J. Bowring, 11 vols., William Tait, Edinburgh 1838-43, vol. X, p. 142. Jeremy Bentham on Cesare Beccaria’s Essay on Crimes and Punishments conclusion, now generally accepted, that Bentham had in fact found the phrase in the English translation of Beccaria, where – possibly for the first time – the exact words «the greatest happiness of the greatest number» had appeared10. The original Italian phrase «la massima felicità divisa nel maggior numero» is more literally translated, as it is in modern English editions, as «the greatest happiness shared among the greatest number». Hence, if Bentham did derive the phrase from Beccaria’s work, it was, to be accurate, from the unknown English translator, who perhaps had difficulty in conceiving how the greatest happiness could be shared, since this seemed to imply a confusing mixture of aggregation and distribution. Passages elsewhere in the English translation of Crimes and Punishments similarly express the notion of promoting the greatest happiness of the greatest number, of which the most striking is the following: It is better to prevent crimes, than to punish them. This is the fundamental principle of good legislation, which is the art of conducting men to the maximum of happiness, and to the minimum of misery, if we may apply this mathematical expression to the good and evil of life11. The sentiments expressed here would have been fully endorsed by Bentham12. As well as deriving the phrase «the greatest happiness of the greatest number» from Beccaria, Bentham stated that he had derived from him a further major ingredient of his philosophy. In an unpublished manuscript headed «Critical Jurisprudence Criminal», written in the mid-to-late 1770s13, he noted: «Mem m. Dimensions of Happiness [...] collected from Beccaria»14. He explained the point in more detail in another unpublished manuscript in a passage headed «Pleasures and Pains – how measured» and written around the same time: 10 R. Shackleton, The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number: The History of Bentham’s Phrase, «Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century», 90, 1972, pp. 1461-1482. For a recent endorsement of Shackleton’s account see J.H. Burns, Happiness and Utility: Jeremy Bentham’s Equation, «Utilitas», 17, 2005, pp. 46-61. 11 Beccaria, Crimes and Punishments, cit., ch. LXI, p. 164. 12 For the ‘economic’ approach to psychology and ethics that characterized the Milanese intellectual circle to which Beccaria belonged, and which Bentham found so congenial, see Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings, ed. by R. Bellamy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995, Introduction, pp. ix-xv. 13 «Critical Jurisprudence Criminal» originally consisted of nearly 400 pages, though nearly a quarter of them appear now to be missing. It consists of a series of short discussions, from a few words to a few pages in length, not composed in any systematic order, but added to as occasion arose, and from which Bentham drew when writing his more formal works. 14 UC clxix. 137. 67 The idea of considering happiness as resolvable into a number of individual pleasures, I took from Helvetius: before whose time it can scarcely be said to have had a meaning. [...] The idea of æstimating the value of each sensation by analysing it into these four ingredients I took from M. Beccaria: gleaning up those several articles from different places in which I saw them made use of in æstimating the force and utility of punishments. Considering that punishment is but pain applied to a certain purpose, that the value of a pleasure is composed of the same articles, and that pains and pleasures, and actions in as far as they had a tendency to produce or prevent the one and the other were all that morals and politics, or so much as was of any use or meaning in those sciences, had in view, it seemed to me that such an analysis was the very thing that was wanted as the foundation for a compleat system of moral science15. Much later, in a manuscript dated 16 October 1814, in a section headed «Elements or dimensions of value in regard to pleasures and pains», part of a chapter provisionally entitled «J.B’s new ideas derived from Logic» and destined for a work on «Logic», Bentham again acknowledged his debt to Beccaria: It was from Beccaria’s little treatise on crimes and punishments that I drew, as I well remember, the first hints of a principle by which the precision, clearness and incontestableness of mathematical calculation is introduced for the first time into the field of morals – a field to which, in its own nature, it is applicable with a propriety no less incontestable, and when once brought to view manifest, than to that of physics, including its most elevated quarter, the field of mathematics16. The dimensions of happiness in question were «the elements or dimensions of value in pleasure or pain» famously outlined in the fourth Chapter of An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation17, consisting of intensity, duration, certainty, and propinquity. Beccaria did not give a systematic list of these elements, but they did appear at various points, as Bentham claimed, as features of punishment. Beccaria noted, for instance, that «It is not the intenseness 15 UC xxvii. 34. British Library Bentham Papers [hereafter BL], Add. MS 33,550, fo. 8, reproduced in Bowring, vol. III, pp 286-287. E. de Champs, Réforme juridique, réforme politique: le jury populaire chez Beccaria, Condorcet et Bentham, in P. Audegean and L. Delia (eds.), Le moment Beccaria, Naissance du droit pénal moderne (1764-1810), Voltaire Foundation, Oxford 2018, argues that Beccaria, Condorcet, and Bentham shared a probabilistic approach to the role of the jury based on a methodology which they might have derived from Helvétius. 17 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, cit., pp. 38-41. There were in fact seven such dimensions, the three others being fecundity, purity, and extent, but these latter three were not strictly elements of the particular pleasure or pain itself. 16 68 Philip Schofield of the pain that has the greatest effect on the mind, but its continuance»18, thereby suggesting the elements of intensity and duration; he referred to the «uncertainty of crimes», and stated that «moral certainty is only probability», that the more immediately inflicted, the more just and useful the punishment, thereby avoiding «the criminal and cruel and superfluous torment of uncertainty», and that «Crimes are more effectually prevented by the certainty, than the severity of punishment»19, thereby suggesting the element of certainty; and referred to the promptitude of punishment as «one of the most powerful means of preventing crimes»20, thereby suggesting the element of propinquity. III. When, in addition to the idea of maximizing happiness and minimizing suffering, the connection had been made between happiness and suffering on the one hand and pleasure and pain on the other, the essential structure of Bentham’s utilitarian system was in place. Bentham found this essential structure in Beccaria, for as well as calling for the maximization of happiness, Beccaria also made the connection between happiness and pleasure. Recognizing this, Bentham identified Beccaria as an adherent of the principle of utility: Before it [the principle of utility] was mine it was M. Beccaria’s. Before it was his, it was Helvetius’s: before it was Helvetius’s, it was in some sort everybody’s. Though Helvetius for placing it in full light was persecuted. The light shone in the darkness but the darkness comprehended it not21. Again, in «Critical Jurisprudence Criminal», Bentham claimed that Helvétius had been the first philosopher to adopt the principle of utility as the sole basis for morality in general, and that Beccaria had then applied it. Bentham speculated Beccaria’s failure openly to acknowledge his debt to Helvétius was borne of prudence, given that De l’esprit had been censured by the «ruling powers» in France22 . Another adherent of the principle of utility was Voltaire, «but this authority, however forcible with some, would contribute very little to give it currency with the bulk of moralizers, who had rather be wrong with any one else than right with Mr Voltaire»23. In another passage in «Critical Jurisprudence Criminal», Bentham again linked Beccaria to Helvétius, but with a particular emphasis on Beccaria’s contribution to legal theory. Beccaria had followed Helvétius in employing the principle of utility as the sole standard of right and wrong, but while Helvétius had applied it to morality in general, Beccaria had applied it to censorial jurisprudence, that is to law as it ought to be (which Bentham opposed to expository jurisprudence, that is the description of law as it is). Beccaria’s achievement had been to reduce censorial jurisprudence to a single, master principle, and thereby had «advanced» the science near «to its perfection»24. This is reminiscent of the passage in which Bentham mentioned Beccaria in A Fragment on Government (1776), his first major published work. Having distinguished expository and censorial jurisprudence, and having complained about the general conservatism of the age, Bentham observed that the rarity of the «disposition» to subject «rude establishments to the test of polished reason» was indisputable: The truth of it may be seen in the multitude of Expositors which the Jurisprudence of every nation furnished, ere it afforded a single Censor. When Beccaria came, he was received by the intelligent as an Angel from heaven would be by the faithful. He may be styled the father of Censorial Jurisprudence25. It is impossible to say whether Bentham derived the distinction between expository and censorial jurisprudence through reading Beccaria, but it is difficult to discern any other candidate. It is worth remembering that Bentham’s clear statement of this distinction represents a pivotal moment in the history of the general philosophy of law, and not merely the theory of punishment, since the distinction between law as it is and law as it ought to be gave rise to what became the dominant strand of legal philosophy in the Anglo-American tradition in the second half of the twentieth century, namely legal positivism26. Bentham was not, however, an uncritical admirer of Beccaria. He would, for instance, have found much 23 UC 18 Beccaria, Crimes and Punishments, cit., ch. XXVIII, p. 105. 19 Ibidem, ch. XI, p. 41; ch. XIV, p. 49; ch. XIX, pp. 74-75; ch. XXVII, p. 98. 20 Ibidem, ch. XXX, pp. 120-121. 21 UC xxvii. 100. The allusion is to John 1:5. 22 For the condemnation of De l’esprit by the Parlement of Paris see R. Birn, Royal Censorship of Books in Eighteenth-Century France, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2012, pp. 25-32. clix. 270. lxix. 17. 25 J. Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, ed. by J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, Athlone Press, London 1977, p. 403 & n. 26 For a critical assessment of the view that Bentham was himself a “legal positivist” as understood by twentieth-century legal philosophers see P. Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s Utilitarian Tradition in Jurisprudence, «Jurisprudence», 1, 2010, pp. 147-167. 24 UC 69 Jeremy Bentham on Cesare Beccaria’s Essay on Crimes and Punishments to object to in Chapter II «Of the Right to punish» of Crimes and Punishments. Beccaria began by generalizing a proposition found in Montesquieu: «Every act of authority of one man over another, for which there is not an absolute necessity, is tyrannical». It followed, claimed Beccaria, that the sovereign’s right to inflict punishment was «founded [...] upon the necessity of defending the public liberty, entrusted to his care, from the usurpation of individuals; and punishments are just in proportion, as the liberty, preserved by the sovereign, is sacred and valuable»27. Bentham would have disagreed with this account on several grounds, but his main point, perhaps, would have been that the legislator was right (in contrast to «possessed a right») to impose sanctions not merely in cases of «absolute necessity», or where there was «a necessity of defending the public liberty», but wherever it was beneficial to the community to do so28. In the fifth paragraph of Chapter II, Beccaria stated: Thus it was necessity, that forced men to give up a part of their liberty; it is certain then, that every individual would chuse to put into the public stock the smallest portion possible, as much only as was sufficient to engage others to defend it. The aggregate of these, the smallest portions possible, forms the right of punishing: all that extends beyond this is abuse, not justice29. Beccaria was, of course, drawing upon the notion of a social contract, whereby society was founded when subjects entered into an agreement with rulers, and rulers’ actions were legitimate insofar as they did not violate the terms of the contract. Bentham rejected what he described as the «fiction» of the original contract on three grounds. First, since such a contract had never actually been entered into, it could have no binding force. Second, a contract, like any promise or set of promises, was binding only insofar as it conformed to the principle of utility, and hence any appeal to a contract in order to justify opposition to government was otiose, since one might simply appeal directly to the principle of utility. Third, contracts were the product of law, and hence of government, and so government could not be the product of a contract30. Beccaria claimed that men entered society, and hence agreed to the social con- 27 Beccaria, Crimes and Punishments, cit., ch. II, p. 7. for instance, Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, cit., p. 74. 29 Beccaria, Crimes and Punishments, cit., ch. II, p. 9. 30 Bentham, Comment/Fragment, pp. 439-448, and Rights, Representation, and Reform: Nonsense upon Stilts and other writings on the French Revolution, ed. by P. Schofield, C. Pease-Watkin, and C. Blamires, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2002, p. 332. tract, in order to protect their liberty. Bentham would have agreed with this up to a point. For Bentham, liberty was a negative idea, that is the term «liberty» described a situation in which an individual was not subject to coercion, whether in the form of restraint or constraint. While liberty was, from the point of view of any one individual, desirable, in that it implied the ability to do precisely what one wanted to do, it was not an unalloyed good when considered from the perspective of the community as a whole, since an individual who was free to do what he wanted might act in such a way as to produce evil overall, as much as to produce good overall. Indeed, government, insofar as it created law, restricted liberty, since every law imposed some degree of coercion, in order to create security, which consisted in legal rights protecting person, property, reputation, and condition in life31. Bentham would have been perplexed as to how adding up small portions of liberty could constitute the right of punishing, since it made no sense to talk about liberty being divided up into portions or added up into a mass. From Bentham’s point of view, Chapter II contained a good deal of confusion. Having said that, Bentham would have agreed with Beccaria’s remark in Chapter XLII, that «Men of enlightened understanding [...] compare, with the highest satisfaction, the inconsiderable portion of liberty of which they are deprived, with the sum total sacrificed by others for their security; observing that they have only given up the liberty of injuring their fellow creatures»32. Beccaria seems to have assumed that the social contract would have necessarily achieved the requisite sacrifice of liberty in order to produce security, whereas for Bentham, it was an object to be aimed at by the legislator through a utilitarian code of laws. IV. Bentham drew explicitly on Beccaria in some instances, and yet rejected other elements in his thought. That Bentham had read Crimes and Punishments very closely is confirmed by a detailed consideration of «Critical Jurisprudence Criminal», which indicates that significant portions of it consist in a response to ideas found in Beccaria’s work, even though Beccaria himself is mentioned by name on only a handful of occasions. Bentham appears to have been critically assessing the implications 28 See, 31 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, cit., p. 148; Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, ed. by P. Schofield, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 75-76, 129-130, 288-289; and Bowring, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, cit., vol. I, p. 302. 32 Beccaria, Crimes and Punishments, cit., ch. XLII, pp. 167-168. 70 Philip Schofield of positions he had found in Crimes and Punishments, in order to decide which, from his own point of view, made sense and which did not. Take, for example, Beccaria’s statement in Chapter XIX «Of the Advantage of immediate Punishment» that, «The more immediately, after the commission of a crime, a punishment is inflicted, the more just and useful it will be». It was more just, in that the offender would suffer for a shorter length of time both the «torment of uncertainty» and the loss of liberty, while it was more useful «because the smaller the interval of time between the punishment and the crime, the stronger and more lasting will be the association of the two ideas of Crime and Punishment», such that the former would be seen as the cause and the latter as the effect33. In «Critical Jurisprudence Criminal», Bentham noted that, «Promptitude in the execution of a punishment has been said to be advantageous on two accounts: to the delinquent, and to the public», but did not acknowledge that it was Beccaria who had said it. Bentham went on to explain that promptitude was beneficial to the delinquent in that it shortened the period during which he would suffer «a pain of apprehension», which was itself «an additional punishment» that had not been «denounced by the Law». Such additional punishment was so much pointless evil, since it contributed nothing to the «apparent magnitude» of the punishment, «which is all the good of it». He pointed out that the rule of promptitude was not universal, since it only applied in the instance of corporal punishment, and not in the instances of pecuniary or infamous punishment. In relation to pecuniary punishment, he noted that, where a fixed sum was to be paid, «to pay later is to pay less», but qualified this statement by admitting that, where the sum was not fixed, it was likely that the offender would fear that he would be made to pay a greater sum than he would in fact be made to pay, and his greater anxiety would outweigh the pleasure he gained from any use he could make of the money during the delay. Bentham then attempted an involved calculation, whereby he tried to offset the uncertainty suffered by an offender liable to pay a fine against the interest he might accrue on the sum that he might eventually have to pay, but concluded: «These speculations might be carried to a further nicety: but it would hardly be worth the while, for any use that could be made of them in practise». The point was that where the pecuniary penalty had been settled by the law, delay was beneficial to the offender; where not settled, there was no general rule that could be adopted in all cases. In relation to infamy, it was obvious that delay benefited the offender. In relation to corporal punish- ment, where there were no permanent effects, promptitude was advantageous to the offender: the sooner the punishment was inflicted the better. If it were objected that where some permanent effect would result, such as the loss of a hand, the greater the delay, the better, it would probably still be the case that it would be more beneficial to the offender to avoid delay, since the apprehension suffered in the meantime would be great. It was because the idea of corporal punishment would be «more formidable on account of it’s intensity» than either pecuniary or infamous punishment that «promptitude in the execution will be advantageous to the delinquent»34. Here Bentham took a position advanced by Beccaria, albeit without explicitly acknowledging his source, and subjected it to a more detailed and rigorous analysis than that provided by Beccaria, in order to tease out the extent to which it made practical sense. Having discussed the effects of the promptitude of punishment from the perspective of the offender, Bentham scrutinized the question of promptitude from the point of view of its general utility. Beccaria had argued that promptitude was useful in that it established an association of ideas between the crime and the punishment. Bentham did now mention Beccaria by name: Beccaria seems to lay great stress on it [promptitude]. He seems to think that the disposition in men to associate in their minds the idea of the punishment with that of the offence, to look upon the former as the consequence of the latter, is, in a great measure, dependent upon this circumstance. [...] Men would expect the former as a consequence from the latter, with the same assurance that, from natural causes, they expect natural effects. He would no more think of venturing upon a crime than he does of holding his finger in the candle. In contrast, Bentham argued that «the efficacy which M. Beccaria seems to attribute to the promptitude of a punishment, seems with better reason, I think, to be referable to the certainty of it». Bentham suggested that Beccaria’s confusion arose from the fact that the certainty of the punishment would depend to some extent upon its promptitude, since the longer the time between the commission of the offence and the execution of the punishment, the more the opportunities which would arise for the punishment to be evaded. Bentham’s point was that obedience to the law would be greater in a situation in which punishment was invariably inflicted, albeit delayed, than in a situation in which it often failed to be inflicted, even though, when it was inflicted, it was done so promptly35. 34 UC 33 Beccaria, Crimes and Punishments, cit., ch. XIX, pp. 74-77. 35 UC cxl. 7-8. cxl. 8. Jeremy Bentham on Cesare Beccaria’s Essay on Crimes and Punishments Bentham continued with a discussion of the respective intervals of time between the commission of the offence, the commencement of the prosecution, the conviction, the passing of the sentence, and the execution of the sentence. The interval between the commencement of the prosecution on the one hand and the conviction on the other, he noted, was «apt to be so long», that the length of the interval between the pronouncement of the sentence and the execution was «of no great consequence», and again between the commission of the offence on the one hand and the conviction, passing of sentence, and execution on the other, «it signifies little the being at any extraordinary pains to make the execution follow quick upon the conviction». For this to take place, the procedure would need to be summary, and «more so than the forms to which we are so much attached in this country [i.e. England] will permit»36. The mischief of delay was more serious in civil than in criminal causes, in that delay in the former increased both the length of time that a person with a just claim was denied his right and the insecurity felt in the community as a whole. Where the punishment was «short of capital, any advantage that might be hoped for from the circumstance of promptitude in the way of adding to the terror of the punishment might be attained with much more certainty by adding to the magnitude of the punishment». Finally, in the case of capital punishment, which was «the only sort of punishment that is totally and in every shape absolutely irreparable», any advantage from promptitude was offset by «the danger of injustice. On this account, nothing could be more mischievous than to fix a time for execution in all cases by a general and standing Law». New evidence, Bentham pointed out, might come to light, and so the judge should be given time, should he think it necessary, to receive it 37. This passage, with its distinctions between the stages of procedure, appears obscure until it is compared with Chapter XXX «Of Prosecution and Prescription» of Crimes and Punishments, where Beccaria returned to the question of the promptitude of punishment, and laid down a number of principles concerning the relationship between the severity of the crime and the promptitude of the punishment in relation to the time required for investigation and trial. After a rather involved discussion, Beccaria concluded that, whatever the crime, the length of judicial procedure («the time 36 Bentham presumably had in mind the nisi prius system, where the trial and hence the conviction took place in a county town, usually at six monthly intervals, while sentencing took place at the beginning of the following law term, when the justices had returned to the central courts in London. 37 UC cxl. 8-10. 71 for inquiry and for justification») should be the same, and that time «should be fixed by the law, and not by the judge, who, in that case, would become legislator»38. By shifting the focus from promptitude to certainty, Bentham avoided the difficulties and complexities that Beccaria had encountered in relation to the fairness of the trial procedure, and made room for the flexibility that characterized his own thinking on the subject39. The instances where Bentham’s comments in «Critical Jurisprudence Criminal» appear to be a response to passages in Of Crimes and Punishments might be multiplied – there are passages which seem to relate, for instance, to Beccaria’s view that the probability of an offence is inversely as the atrocity of it40, that the legislator and not the judges should possess the authority to make penal laws 41, that a scale of crimes and punishments be devised and that actions not found in the scale should not be punished42 , that offences be classified according to whether they injure the sovereign, private security, or the general good43, that punishment should be made analogous to the crime44, that robbery be punished by pecuniary compensation45, and that infamy be employed as a punishment in cases of injury to reputation46 – but enough has been said to illustrate the point that Bentham read Beccaria closely and critically. He used Beccaria’s ideas as a starting point for his own reflections and subjected the propositions that he found in Beccaria to the test of utility, in order to see to what extent they might be accepted, modified, or rejected. It might be objected that too much emphasis should not be laid on such an obscure set of manuscripts as «Critical Jurisprudence Criminal», on the grounds that it consisted of working notes that Bentham never intended to publish in the form in which it was written. «Critical Jurisprudence Criminal», nevertheless, represented Bentham’s attempts to work out his foundational ideas, which were then presented more methodically in writings that were intended for publication (although they often never did get published). Given that «Critical Jurisprudence Criminal» was, to a significant extent, a response to and commentary on Beccaria, it reveals 38 Beccaria, Crimes and Punishments, cit., ch. XXX, pp. 120-125. Having placed stress on promptitude in this passage, Beccaria elsewhere stressed certainty: see ch. XXVII, pp. 98-102; ch. XXXV, p. 147. 39 W. Twining, Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 1985, pp. 66-75. 40 Beccaria, Crimes and Punishments, cit., ch. XXX, p. 122, compare with Bentham’s commentary at UC cxl. 1. 41 Ibidem, chs. III-IV, pp. 10-17; ch. XXIX, pp. 117-118, cf. UC cxlix. 6 42 Ibidem, ch. VI, p. 23, cf. UC clxix. 23, 35. 43 Ibidem, ch. VIII, p. 30, cf. UC cxl. 19-20. 44 Ibidem, ch. XIX, p. 78, cf. UC cxl. 4-5. 45 Ibidem, ch. XXII, p. 83, cf. UC cxl. 10. 46 Ibidem, ch. XXIII, pp. 85-7, cf. UC cxl. 6-7. 72 the way in which Beccaria’s ideas influenced Bentham’s approach to penal theory, and hence to penal theory not only in England, but everywhere that Bentham’s ideas were transmitted. A further striking example where Bentham expands on a hint in Beccaria is in relation to sexual morality. According to the précis of Not Paul, but Jesus mentioned above, Bentham proposed to discuss the attitudes displayed by Hume, Voltaire, and Beccaria to «irregular» sexual practices. Bentham had been struck by Beccaria’s attitude to homosexuality, which, like that of Hume and Voltaire, appeared to be more forgiving than most of his contemporaries47. In the passage beginning «L’Attica Venere» mentioned above, Beccaria suggested that sexual activity between males occurred in «those public seminaries, where ardent youth are carefully excluded from all commerce with the other sex», and it was, therefore, little wonder that «the vigour of nature» was «consumed in a manner [...] useless to mankind». Beccaria’s point was that it would be unjust to punish such activity given that the young men in question had been placed in this situation by the laws themselves. Bentham went much further than Beccaria in advocating sexual freedom, calling for the removal of punishment, and indeed of moral condemnation, from all forms of consensual sexual activity. Nevertheless, he seems to have appreciated the liberal sentiments that informed Beccaria’s position, compared to the traditional Christian view that sexual activity should be restricted to one male and one female within marriage, for the procreation of children, and the position under English law where «the crime against nature» was subjected to the death penalty, and William Blackstone had described it as a crime of «a still deeper malignity» than rape48. It is also worth noting that Beccaria went on to sympathize with the plight of the unmarried mother, who, being faced with the choice between «her own infamy, or the death of a being who is incapable of feeling the loss of life», was tempted to commit infanticide49. In material written around the same time as the third volume of Not Paul, but Jesus, Bentham noted that, given the present state of public opinion, it would be better for an illegitimate child to be killed than for the mother to be shunned by society, forced into prostitution, become diseased, and face an early death. Bentham made a point strikingly similar to that made by Beccaria: «Supposing the discovery made, the whole life of the woman will but too probably be a life of bitterness: by the being whose life is finished as 47 Bentham, Of Sexual Irregularities, cit., p. 141 & n. W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1765-1769, vol. 4, p. 215. 49 Beccaria, Crimes and Punishments, cit., ch. XXXI, pp. 131-132. 48 Philip Schofield soon as begun, pain will not be felt in any shape, there not being a time in which it can be felt»50. V. The title of the present essay is a partial quotation. The full quotation, which appears in a manuscript of 4 August 1819 written for a section entitled «French Philosophers» in Book of Fallacies is as follows: By the little work of Beccaria – though, unless succeeding labours in the same vinyard have been fruitless, much instruction would not at present be to be reaped from it, the first steps rightly-directed were made in the track of penal legislation. He too was of the number of the French Philosophers: he, as the last edition of his book shews, was invited by them to Paris from his native Italy, and received by the whole fraternity with open arms51. Two points are worth remarking upon. The first is Bentham’s association of Beccaria with the French Enlightenment, with which he allied himself52. We have seen how Bentham linked himself with Helvétius and Beccaria in taking the principle of utility as the sole standard of right and wrong. The second was the fact that he thought that all that was worthwhile in Beccaria could now be found in his own work. He perhaps felt entitled to say this because he had worked through Crimes and Punishments in minute detail in his formative years and had assimilated all that he had considered valuable. In relation to this second point, in the first of his «Letters to Lord Pelham», written in 1802 with a view to highlighting the deficiencies of transportation to New South Wales as a mode of punishment when compared with his proposed panopticon prison scheme, Bentham identified five ends or objects of punishment: first, example (by which he meant deterrence); second, reformation; third, incapacitation; fourth, compensation; and fifth, economy. The first four (which were «direct» ends) he had taken «from Blackstone and from everybody»53, while he himself had added the fifth 50 Bentham, Of Sexual Irregularities, cit., pp. 7, 100. Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, ed. by P. Schofield, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2015, p. 483. For Beccaria’s visit to Paris in the autumn of 1766 see Beccaria, Crimes and Punishments, ed. Bellamy, cit., p. xxxii. 52 For Bentham’s relationship to the general Enlightenment movement in favour of legal and in particular penal reform see E. de Champs, Enlightenment and Utility: Bentham in French, Bentham in France, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015, pp. 55-91. 53 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, cit., IV, pp. 11-12, states that the end of punishment is to prevent future offences either by means of «amendment of the offender himself», or «by the dread of [...] example», or «by depriving the party injuring of the power to do future mischief»: in Bentham’s terms, by reformation, or example, or incapaci51 J. Jeremy Bentham on Cesare Beccaria’s Essay on Crimes and Punishments (which was the «indirect» end)54. He might have more properly said «from Beccaria», but perhaps he had his English readership in mind when mentioning Blackstone, in that the latter’s name would have had more immediate resonance with them. In Crimes and Punishments Beccaria had stated: Crimes of less importance are commonly punished, either in the obscurity of a prison, or the criminal is transported, to give, by his slavery, an example to societies which he never offended; an example absolutely useless, because distant from the place where the crime was committed55. Bentham’s arguments in condemnation of transportation to New South Wales were in effect an elaboration of a basic point that had been made by Beccaria nearly forty years earlier. Nor should it be overlooked that there are hints in Beccaria about the need to improve prisons, a project to which Bentham devoted a decade of his life with his panopticon prison scheme. Nevertheless, in Bentham’s estimation, all that was valuable in Beccaria had been incorporated into his own thought. VI. The way in which Bentham extracted the four elements of intensity, duration, certainty, and propinquity from Beccaria’s work is a suggestive example of the keenly critical awareness with which Bentham read Beccaria, extracting what suited him in order to form a more coherent, complete, and consistent system of his own. It also implies that Bentham had an underlying methodology by which he was able to recognize those elements in Beccaria – and other writers – which he found it appropriate to adopt, and those which he needed to reject. This point is related to the fact that the principle of utility did not lie at the foundation of Bentham’s thought, or at least was not its sole foundation, but was itself developed as part of a broader ontology, expounded most fully in his writings on logic and language in the mid-1810s, but present from at least the early 1770s. H.L.A. Hart speculated that Beccaria had anticipated Bentham’s ideas in this respect in the following sentence in Crimes and Punishments: «We should be cautious how we associate with the word justice, an idea of any thing real, such as a physical power, or a being that actually exists»56. Bentham argued that propositation. Blackstone did not mention compensation in this context. 54 Bowring, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, cit., vol. IV, p. 174. 55 Beccaria, Crimes and Punishments, cit., ch. XIX, p. 78. 56 Ibidem, ch. II, p. 9. Hart refers to Bentham’s «theory of fictions», which was the name given to this aspect of Bentham’s thought by C.K. 73 tions only made sense insofar as they could ultimately be related to substances, that is to «real entities», existing in the physical world. Hence, for Bentham, the term «justice» designated a «fictitious entity», since there was no physical thing corresponding to justice. The notion of justice made sense when it appeared in a sentence which could be translated into another sentence that did bear reference to physical things or «real entities», a process that Bentham termed «paraphrasis». Bentham would have agreed with Beccaria about justice, but not with his statement that «a physical power» was a real thing, since «power» was as much a term that represented a fictitious entity as «justice». Although Beccaria’s influence on Bentham in relation to both his utilitarianism and his theory of punishment was profound, it is implausible to think that such a short hint in Beccaria could have given rise to Bentham’s most important philosophical discovery. In some of the passages in which Bentham acknowledged his debt to Helvétius and Beccaria, he also stated that he found the notions of real and fictitious entities in d’Alembert57; where he found the notion of paraphrasis remains unknown, unless it was, as he claimed, his own invention58. Rather than attribute Bentham’s logic and language to a single sentence in Beccaria with which Bentham would only have partly agreed, it seems more plausible to suggest that the similarity resulted from the fact that both Bentham and Beccaria were drawing on John Locke’s theory of language. Bentham was influenced by Locke, though he went beyond Locke with his notion of «paraphrasis». Hence, it was Bentham’s ontology and epistemology that gave him the critical perspective that allowed him to decide which elements he wished to take from other writers, such as Beccaria, in order to build up his own system59. One final point is worth making. Henry Sidgwick, usually recognized, along with Bentham and John Stuart Mill, as the third of the triumvirate of great classical utilitarian philosophers, claimed that Bentham was the pre-eminent representative of the Enlightenment and that Benthamism was «the legacy left to the nineteenth century by the eighteenth», being the force against which the new «philosophy of Restoration and Reaction Ogden in the 1930s, but is a misleading and inaccurate expression, since it confuses the notion of a fiction (a lie) with that of the name of a fictitious entity (an abstract term). This confusion has been repeated in much of the Bentham scholarship in the last fifty years. 57 UC xxvii. 144, 148. 58 See BL Add. MS 33,550, fo. 4-5, reproduced in Bowring, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. III, p. 286. 59 For Bentham’s theory of real and fictitious entities see P. Schofield, Utility and Democracy: the Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006, pp. 1-27. 74 has had to struggle continually with varying success»60. The eighteenth-century Bentham, influenced by the radical French Enlightenment, but then seeing on the one hand the emergence of stable democracy in America and on the other hand the rejection of his panopticon prison and other schemes by the British political establishment, was transformed into the politically radical Bentham of the nineteenth century, advocating at first «democratic ascendancy» within the British Constitution, and then a democratic republic, stripped of monarch, aristocracy, and established church61. As J.H. Burns expressed it, Bentham’s career can be characterized as a move from «radical Enlightenment» to «democratic radicalism»62 . The hopes of the Enlightenment for a rational basis for social organization, which seemed to have been dashed by the excesses of the French Revolution, were kept alive and given systematic form, appropriate for a democratic, liberal age, by Bentham’s programme for political, legal, and ecclesiastical reform, which, at the same time that it aimed to promote the interest of the community as a whole, did not threaten, at least in the short to medium term, the existing distribution of property. If Bentham was indeed the main channel for this transmission, then a significant part of the content of that transmission was inspired by Beccaria. 60 H. Sidgwick, Bentham and Benthamism in Politics and Ethics, in Id., Miscellaneous Essays and Addresses, Macmillan, London 1904, p. 136 ff. 61 See Schofield, Utility and Democracy, cit., pp. 109-170, 221-249. 62 J.H. Burns, Jeremy Bentham: from Radical Enlightenment to Philosophical Radicalism, «Bentham Newsletter», VIII, 1984, pp. 4-14. Philip Schofield Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Saggi Beccaria e Bentham Citation: L. Ferrajoli (2019) Beccaria e Bentham. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 75-84. doi: 10.13128/ds-25440 Copyright: © 2019 L. Ferrajoli. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Luigi Ferrajoli Università degli Studi di Roma Tre Abstract. The philosophies of Beccaria and Bentham have a number of features in common: the juspositivist principle of legality, the project of minimizing criminal law, the dependence of punishment on types of action rather than types of actors, the idea of the trial as an inductive ascertainment of truth. Beccaria’s thought, however, is more radical both in its utilitarian conception, which hinges on the idea of the social contract that underpins the critique of the death penalty, and in its liberal conception, which forecloses the association of freedom and property that we find in Bentham. Keywords. Crime, Punishment, Penal Trial. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. 1. DUE PENSATORI ALLE ORIGINI DEL GARANTISMO PENALE. Un capitolo della riflessione sul rapporto tra Cesare Beccaria e l’Inghilterra riguarda certamente l’influenza esercitata da Beccaria su Jeremy Bentham e, attraverso Bentham, sulla cultura giuridica e politica inglese. È al confronto tra questi due grandi padri del liberalismo e del garantismo penale – alle loro convergenze e alle loro divergenze – che sarà dedicato questo mio intervento1. Prima di parlare di queste convergenze e divergenze, mi sembra opportuna un’osservazione sul rapporto tra Jeremy Bentham e la cultura italiana. Philip Schofield ha curato una nuova edizione, filologicamente rigorosa, delle opere di Bentham. Ebbene, questa nuova edizione potrebbe fornire l’occasione per proporre e promuovere anche in Italia una pubblicazione delle opere complete di Bentham, o quanto meno di quelle giuridiche e specificamente di quelle di diritto penale e processuale, le quali tutte segnano una svolta in senso liberale e garantista nella cultura penalistica inglese2. È un invito che 1 Sul rapporto tra Beccaria e Bentham, si vedano H.L.A. Hart, Beccaria and Bentham, in Atti del convegno internazionale su Cesare Beccaria promosso dall’Accademia delle Scienze di Torino nel secondo centenario dell’opera “Dei delitti e delle pene” (4-6 ottobre 1964), Accademia delle Scienze, Torino 1966; E. De Champs, Bentham et l’éritage de Beccaria: du Projet d’un corps complet de législation aux Traités de législation civile et pénale, in M. Porret e E. Salvi (éds.), Cesare Beccaria, La controverse pénale XVIII-XXI siècle, P.U.R., Rennes 2015, pp. 99-110. 2 Si ricordi il saggio di G. Tarello, Le poche luminose origini dell’illuminismo penale nell’aerea inglese, «Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica», V, 1975, pp. 173-200, dove Tarello identifica le origini del moderno pensiero penale inglese nelle dottrine di Joseph Butler, di Francis Hutcheson e di Henry Fielding, accomunati dall’opzione per un diritto penale massimamente severo e di fatto diretto, soprattutto, alla criminalizzazione della povertà. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 75-84 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25440 76 dovremmo rivolgere soprattutto ai giuristi, in particolare ai teorici del diritto e ai penalisti. Bentham, infatti, è noto in Italia soprattutto come filosofo, cioè come il principale esponente dell’utilitarismo morale. Assai meno conosciuto è il Bentham giurista, al quale si devono opere fondamentali: non solo l’Introduction to the principles of Moral and Legislation del 1789, ma anche, e direi soprattutto, le opere penalistiche, conosciute in Italia soprattutto nella loro versione francese, ovviamente assai meno rigorosa del testo benthamiano originale: in primo luogo i Traités de législation civile et pénale, pubblicati in tre volumi nel 1802 dal suo collaboratore Etienne Dumont sulla base dei manoscritti affidatigli da Bentham e contenenti varie sue opere: i Principes généraux de législation; la Vue génerale d’un corps complet de législation; i Principes du code civil; i Principes du code pénal; la Mémoire sur la Panoptique; De la promulgation des lois; De l’influence des temps et des lieux en matière de législation3; in secondo luogo la Théorie des peines et des récompenses del 1811; in terzo luogo il Traité des preuves judiciaires del 1823 e il saggio De l’organization judiciaire et de la codification4. In Italia sono state tradotte pochissime di queste opere: l’Introduzione ai principi della morale e della legislazione a cura di Eugenio Lecaldano, nel 1998, presso la Utet, e altri saggi minori5. C’è poi una prima, antica traduzione italiana, di Barnaba Vincenzo Zambelli, Teoria delle prove giudiziarie, introvabile6, risalente addirittura 3 J. Bentham, Traités de législation civile et pénal, Bossange, Masson et Besson, Paris 1802, che nel frontespizio reca le parole «Publiés en France par Etienne Dumont, de Genève, d’après les Manuscrits confiés par l’Auter». 4 Tutte queste opere – insieme ad altre di carattere non penalistico: Tactique des Assemblées politiques deliberantes; Traité des sophisme politiques, Essai sur la situation politique de l’Espagne, Défense de l’usure, Essai sur la nomenclature des principales branches d’art et de scienze e Déontologie, ou science de la morale – sono state poi pubblicate in J. Bentham, Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Jurisconsulte anglais (1829), éd. par E. Dumont, Hauman, Bruxelles 18403. Ma si veda l’edizione inglese dei Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. by J. Bowring, Russell and Russell, New York 1962, in 11 voll. 5 Si ricordino Il libro dei sofismi, a cura di L. Formigari, Editori Riuniti, Roma 1981; Un frammento sul governo, a cura di S. Marcuzzi, Giuffrè, Milano 1990; Difesa dell’usura, a cura di N. Buccilli e M. Guidi, Liberilibri, Macerata 1996; Deontologia, a cura di S. Cremaschi, La Nuova Italia, Scandicci 2000; Panopticon, ovvero la casa d’ispezione, a cura di M. Foucault e M. Perrot, Marsilio, Venezia 2002; Teoria delle finzioni, a cura di R. Petrillo, Cronopio, Napoli 2011. Vanno inoltre segnalati: Jeremy Bentham, padre del femminismo, a cura di L. Campos Boralevi, Carucci, Roma 1980, che è un’antologia di scritti sulla condizione delle donne; Il catechismo del popolo, a cura di L. Formigari, Editori Riuniti, Roma 1982, che contiene parti del Fragment on Government e di Constitutional Code; Libertà di gusto e di opinione, a cura di G. Pellegrino, Dedalo, Bari 2007, che contiene gli scritti Reati contro se stessi del 1785, Difesa dell’usura del 1787 e Libertà di stampa e discussione pubblica del 1821. 6 J. Bentham, Teoria delle prove giudiziarie, trad. it. di B.V. Zambelli, Stamperia Mazzoleni, Bergamo 1824, 3 voll. Luigi Ferrajoli al 1824, cioè un anno dopo la prima edizione francese e un anno prima dell’edizione inglese. Dunque, quasi nulla dell’imponente produzione giuridica di Bentham e, soprattutto, delle sue opere penalistiche. Ci troviamo perciò di fronte a una grave, ingiustificabile lacuna della nostra cultura filosofico-giuridica che dobbiamo augurarci – oggi che disponiamo della nuova, rigorosa edizione delle opere di Bentham curata da Philip Schofield – che venga colmata al più presto. 2. ASPETTI COMUNI DEL PENSIERO DI BECCARIA E DI BENTHAM Ma veniamo al nostro tema, il confronto tra Beccaria e Bentham. Diciamo subito che Beccaria e Bentham sono quasi contemporanei: il primo nato il 15 marzo 1738 e morto il 28 novembre 1794 all’età di 56 anni; il secondo nato dieci anni dopo, il 15 febbraio 1748 e morto il 6 giugno 1832 all’età di 84 anni. Ma sono 25 gli anni che separano il Dei delitti e delle pene di Beccaria, del 1764, e la prima grande opera filosofico-giuridica di Bentham, Introduction to the principles of Moral and Legislation, del 1789. Ebbene, quali sono gli aspetti comuni al pensiero di questi due illuministi, e quali le differenze? Le differenze sono sicuramente più interessanti, e sembrano legate al fatto che, nonostante la non grande differenza d’età, Beccaria sembra un pensatore interamente settecentesco, mentre Bentham sembra assai più un pensatore a cavallo tra Settecento e Ottocento. Anche le convergenze, tuttavia, meritano di essere segnalate, se non altro perché riguardano la concezione illuminista, razionale e garantista del diritto penale che è opportuno ricordare in tempi come gli attuali, di crisi profonda di tutte le garanzie penali e processuali. Gli aspetti comuni sono, ovviamente, quelli connessi al diritto penale, peraltro centrale nel pensiero giuridico di entrambi. Questa centralità della questione penale, del resto, accomuna l’intera filosofia giuridica e politica dell’illuminismo, essendo il diritto penale il luogo privilegiato del rapporto tra Stato e cittadino, tra autorità e libertà, tra libertà e sicurezza – sicurezza non solo dai delitti, ma anche dagli arbitri e dagli eccessi punitivi, come scrisse Montesquieu7 – e perciò il luogo rispetto al quale soprattutto si definiscono il ruolo del diritto, i limiti ai poteri punitivi altrimenti arbitrari, i lineamenti dello stato di diritto e, conseguentemente, i principi del 7 Ch. Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des lois XII 2 (1748), Garnier-Flammarion, Paris 1979, vol. I, p. 328: «La liberté politique consiste dans la sûreté, ou du moins dans l’opinion que l’on a de sa sûreté. Cette sûreté n’est jamais plus attaquée que dans les accusations publiques ou privies». 77 Beccaria e Bentham primo liberalismo. La produzione di Bentham è incomparabilmente più ampia di quella di Beccaria. Mentre Beccaria è l’autore del solo fortunato «libriccino», il Dei delitti, Bentham ha la vastissima produzione che ho già ricordato: una produzione non solo penalistica ma anche di teoria generale del diritto, di diritto civile e di diritto pubblico. E tuttavia anche per Bentham possiamo parlare di un primato politico della questione penale, sulla cui trattazione, peraltro, si è manifestata l’enorme influenza su di lui esercitata da Beccaria e da lui stesso apertamente riconosciuta8. Segnalerò quattro aspetti comuni al pensiero di Beccaria e di Bentham: a) l’opzione per il positivismo giuridico e l’assunzione a fondamento del sistema del principio di stretta legalità, in polemica con il diritto giurisprudenziale; b) il progetto di una mitigazione e minimizzazione del diritto penale; c) l’approccio oggettivistico, cioè l’idea di un diritto penale del fatto e non dell’autore; d) la concezione del processo penale come accertamento della verità e la teoria della prova basata sui principi della logica induttiva. 2.1. A) Principio di legalità e positivismo giuridico. Cominciamo dal primo tratto comune: il principio di legalità come norma di riconoscimento esclusiva ed esaustiva del diritto vigente, l’opzione netta per il positivismo giuridico e la totale assenza, sia in Beccaria che in Bentham, di qualunque premessa giusnaturalista9. «Le sole leggi possono decretare le pene sui delitti», scrive Beccaria, «e quest’autorità non può risiedere che presso il legislatore»10, mentre «ufficio» dei giudici «è solo l’esaminare se il tal uomo abbia fatto o no un’azione contraria alle leggi» stipulate da «un codice fisso» che essi devono «osservare alla lettera»11. «Un atto proibito è ciò che si chiama delitto», dichiara a sua volta Bentham12 , e viceversa: «dichiarare con una 8 Nel primo dei tre frammenti pubblicati in C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, a cura di F. Venturi, Einaudi, Torino 1981, p. 562, Bentham chiama Beccaria «maestro mio, primo evangelista della ragione». 9 L’estraneità al diritto naturale, del tutto evidente in Bentham, è stata da ultimo ottimamente mostrata anche per Beccaria da Ph. Audegean, Beccaria lettore di Hobbes, in questo vol. (PER REDAZIONE: pp. 000-000 VD. IMPAGINATO FINALE). 10 C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene § III, a cura di G. Francioni, nell’Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di Cesare Beccaria, Mediobanca, Milano 1984, vol. I, p. 33. 11 Ivi § IV, pp. 36 e 38. E più oltre, § XLI, p. 122: «Volete prevenire i delitti? Fate che le leggi sian chiare e semplici [...]. Fate che gli uomini le temano, e temano esse sole. Il timor delle leggi è salutare, ma fatale e fecondo di delitti è quello di uomo a uomo. Gli uomini schiavi sono più voluttuosi, più libertini, più crudeli degli uomini liberi». 12 J. Bentham, Principes de législation XI, in Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, cit., t. 1, Traités de législation civile et pénale, p. 34. legge che il tale atto è proibito equivale ad erigerlo a delitto»13. Non solo. Beccaria e Bentham formulano, oltre al principio di mera legalità, in forza del quale è reato solo il comportamento previsto e punito come tale dalla legge, anche il principio di stretta legalità o tassatività, quello della massima chiarezza e determinatezza delle norme penali. «Dove le leggi siano chiare e precise», scrive Beccaria, «l’officio di un giudice non consiste in altro che di accertare un fatto»14. E Bentham: «Lo scopo delle leggi è quello di disciplinare la condotta dei cittadini. Due cose sono a tal fine necessarie: 1°) che la legge sia chiara, cioè che faccia nascere nella mente un’idea che rappresenti esattamente la volontà del legislatore; 2°) che sia concisa, perché possa imprimersi facilmente nella memoria. Chiarezza e brevità, ecco le due qualità essenziali»15. Per Bentham, non meno che per Beccaria, il principio di legalità è insomma il solo criterio di identificazione del diritto esistente e perciò dei fatti in base ad esso qualificabili come reati. Va pertanto segnalato, in proposito, un aspetto singolare della storia istituzionale inglese. L’Inghilterra è stato il solo paese del continente europeo nel quale non è avvenuta la codificazione e si è mantenuto un assetto giuridico – il sistema di common law – sostanzialmente di diritto giurisprudenziale. E questo benché siano inglesi i tre più illustri teorici del positivismo giuridico e i massimi assertori del principio di legalità, e conseguentemente della codificazione, soprattutto del diritto penale: Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham e John Austin. Bentham, in particolare, è stato il più convinto teorico della codificazione. La stessa espressione codification fu coniata da lui. Tutti i suoi libri teorico-giuridici che ho sopra ricordato sono intitolati alla legislazione o alla codificazione. Tutta la sua opera è stata informata alla critica del diritto inglese di common law, che gli appariva come una massa caotica di norme, fonte inevitabile di incertezze e di abusi e al progetto della sua riforma attraverso, appunto, la codificazione. Ebbene, questa polemica contro il diritto giurisprudenziale, questa critica radicale della tradizione giuridica caratterizza anche il pensiero di Beccaria. Basti pensare all’incipit del Dei delitti contro il corpus iuris giustinianeo, bollato come «uno scolo de’ secoli più barbari»16. 13 Id., Vue générale d’un corps complet de législation II, ivi, p. 287; ivi V, p. 291: «Fare una legge penale equivale a creare un delitto». Bentham, tuttavia, riconosce «una certa larghezza al giudice, non per aggravare la pena ma per diminuirla» (Théorie des peines et des récompenses I, XI, in Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, cit., t. II, p. 27). 14 Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene § XIV, cit., p. 59. 15 Bentham, Vue générale d’un corps complet de législation XXXII, cit., p. 339. Cfr. anche ivi, pp. 339342, il cap. XXXIII intitolato «Du style des lois». 16 C. Beccaria, A chi legge, in Dei delitti e delle pene, cit., p. 17. 78 2.2. B) Il progetto di minimizzazione del diritto penale. Il secondo tratto che accomuna Beccaria e Bentham è il progetto illuministico di umanizzazione, mitigazione, razionalizzazione e minimizzazione del diritto penale: il progetto, in breve, di quello che io ho chiamato «diritto penale minimo»17. Gli accenti di questa proposta di minimizzazione sono assai simili. Beccaria parla di pena «necessaria», «la minima delle possibili»18. Bentham, a sua volta, parla di pena «economica», consistente nel «minimo impiego possibile di sofferenze»19. «Perché una pena ottenga il suo effetto», aggiunge Beccaria, «basta che il male della pena eccede il bene che nasce dal delitto […] Tutto il più è dunque superfluo e perciò tirannico»20. D’altro canto, scrive Bentham riprendendo una tesi di Hobbes, il vantaggio del delitto non deve superare lo svantaggio della pena, altrimenti questa si trasformerebbe in una tassa 21. In questa prospettiva, scrivono sia Beccaria che Bentham, una pena può essere tanto più mite quanto più è certa e pronta. «Uno dei più gran freni dei delitti non è la crudeltà delle pene, ma l’infallibilità di esse», scrive Beccaria 22. E analogamente Bentham: «Più una pena difetta di certezza, più occorre accrescerne la severità [...] È dunque anche vero che quanto più si riesce ad aumentare la certezza della pena, tanto più se ne può ridurre la misura. È questo il vantaggio che proverrebbe da una legislazione semplice e da una buona procedura»23. Non solo. La minimizzazione del diritto penale richiede che ad esso si ricorra soltanto in caso di necessità e perciò si sopprimano le proibizioni e le punizioni inutili. «Ogni atto di autorità di uomo a uomo che non derivi dall’assoluta necessità, dice il grande Montesquieu, è tirannico», afferma Beccaria 24; «proibire una moltitudine di 17 Il diritto penale minimo, «Dei delitti e delle pene», III, 1985, 3, pp. 493524; Diritto e ragione. Teoria del garantismo penale (1989), Laterza, Roma-Bari 201811, pp. 325-332 (cap. VI: in partic. il § 24). 18 È la conclusione del Dei delitti e delle pene § XLVII, cit., p. 129: «Perché ogni pena non sia una violenza di uno o di molti contro un privato cittadino, dev’essere essenzialmente pubblica, pronta, necessaria, la minima delle possibili nelle date circostanze, proporzionata a’ delitti, dettata dalle leggi». 19 «Noi diremo di una pena che è economica allorché raggiunge l’effetto desiderato con il minimo impiego possibile di sofferenze, e che invece è dispendiosa quando produce un male maggiore di un equivalente bene o quando potrebbe ottenersi lo stesso bene a prezzo di una pena inferiore» (Bentham, Théorie des peines I iv, ed. cit., p. 11). 20 Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, XXVII, cit., p. 84. 21 Bentham, Theorie des peines I v, cit., pp. 12-13. La stessa tesi era stata sostenuta da Th. Hobbes, Leviatano XXVIII 9, con testo inglese del 1651 a fronte e testo latino del 1668, a cura di R. Santi, Bompiani, Milano 2001, p. 509. 22 Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene § XXVII, cit., p. 83. 23 J. Bentham, Principes du code pénal III ii, in Traités de législation civile et pénale, cit., p. 156. 24 Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene § II, cit., p. 29; Montesquieu, De l’E- Luigi Ferrajoli azioni indifferenti», aggiunge, «non è prevenire i delitti che non possono nascere, ma egli è un crearne dei nuovi»25. E Bentham, a sua volta, polemizza duramente contro la tendenza di molte leggi del suo tempo a punire una quantità innumerevole di violazioni futili e puerili26. Di qui, secondo entrambi, la non punibilità, perché non lesivi di terzi, del tentato suicidio27, degli atti contro natura28 e degli atti contro Dio29. 2.3. C) Un diritto penale del fatto e non dell’autore. Dal principio di stretta legalità e dal progetto di minimizzazione del diritto penale discende un terzo tratto garantista comune sia a Beccaria che a Bentham: l’approccio oggettivistico, in forza del quale si può essere puniti per i fatti commessi e previsti dalla legge come reati, e non per le proprie identità o inclinazioni criminali,o devianti o pericolose. Insisto su questo principio, che forma la base di ogni sistema penale garantista. Nella storia del pensiero penalistico possono distinguersi due grandi filoni: quello soggettivistico, che identifica come oggetto di pena i soggetti devianti e quello oggettivistico che lo identifica invece con i comportamenti deviati; in altre parole, la concezione del diritto penale come diritto dell’autore o come diritto del fatto. Il primo orientamento può farsi risalire a Kant, secondo il quale le pene devono essere commisurate alla «malignità interna» dei criminali, con conseguente confusione tra reato e peccato30. Esso si sviluppa soprattutto nella cultura penalistica tedesca: nelle dottrine correzionaliste di Franz von Liszt, che elaborò un modello di diritto penale come strumento flessibile di «risocializzazione» o «neutralizzazione» o «intimidazione» a seconda del diversi «tipi» – «adattabili», «inadattabili» o «occasionali» – di delinquenti trattati31; poi nelle concezioni sprit des lois XIX xiv, cit., p. 468: «Toute peine qui ne dérive pas de la nécessité est tyrannique. La loi n’est pas un pur acte de puissance; les choses indifférentes par leur nature ne sont pas de son ressort». 25 Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene § XLI, cit., p. 121; ivi § XXIII, p. 77: «Chi dichiara infami azioni per sé indifferenti sminuisce l’infamia delle azioni che son veramente tali». La stessa tesi era stata sostenuta da Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des lois XXIX xvi, cit., vol. II, p. 305: «les lois inutiles affoiblissent les lois nécessaires». 26 Bentham, Principes de législation XII, cit., p. 38. 27 Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene § XXXII, cit., pp. 103-108. 28 Bentham, Principes de législation XII, cit., p. 37. 29 Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene § VII, cit., pp. 45-46. 30 I. Kant, Principi metafisici della dottrina del diritto § 49 E (1797), in Scritti politici e di filosofia della storia e del diritto, tr. it. di G. Solari e G. Vidari, Utet, Torino 1965, p. 523. 31 F. von Liszt, La teoria dello scopo nel diritto penale (1905), trad. it. di A.A. Calvi, Giuffrè, Milano 1962, p. 52. In relazione a questi tre scopi, diversi e tra loro alternativi, Liszt propose una differenziazione dei 79 Beccaria e Bentham etico-legalistiche e teleologiche dell’antigiuridicità materiale e della «colpa d’autore» di Mezger e Welzel32, fino alle nefaste dottrine del tipo d’autore elaborate dai giuristi nazisti della scuola di Kiel33. Ma esiti analoghi, di tipo inevitabilmente autoritario e antigarantista, hanno anche le dottrine del «delinquente naturale» elaborate in Italia dalla Scuola positiva di Cesare Lombroso, di Enrico Ferri, di Raffaele Garofalo e di Filippo Grispigni. Ebbene, l’orientamento di Beccaria e Bentham è esattamente opposto: consiste nel rigido ancoraggio al fatto, e precisamente al comportamento dannoso, dei presupposti della pena. «L’unica e vera misura dei delitti è il danno fatto alla nazione», scrive Beccaria34. In questo, egli aggiunge, risiede la differenza tra reato e peccato, tra diritto e morale, il primo ancorato al principio di offensività quale garanzia della sua laicità, il secondo alla malvagità soggettività dell’autore: «la gravezza del peccato dipende dalla imperscrutabile malizia del cuore. Questa da esseri finiti non può senza rivelazione sapersi. Come dunque da questa si prenderà norma per punire i delitti?»35. Analogamente Bentham, che parimenti svaluta l’elemento soggettivo del reato fino a non includere la colpevolezza nella sua definizione di delitto: «si chiama delitto qualunque atto che si ritiene debba essere proibito a causa del male da esso prodotto»; quanto alla «malvagia intenzione», essa giustifica l’aggravamento della pena non tanto perché più deplorevole ma perché più pericolosa: perché è «una causa permanente di male» e perché «la condotta passata è un pronostico della condotta futura»36. «singoli strumenti punitivi», onde «adattare proprio la pena secondo il suo tipo e la sua estensione al raggiungimento di quello scopo che nel singolo caso è necessario e possibile». Questo scopo, egli aggiunse, va ricavato non già dalla «fattispecie di reato» in astratto, ma da «questo reato», ossia dall’«azione concreta» che è «inseparabile dalla persona dell’autore»: «questo ladro, questo assassino, questo testimone mendace, questo stupratore» (ivi, pp. 64 e 66). 32 E. Mezger, Die Straftat als Ganze, «Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft», 57, 1938, pp. 675-701: 675 ss; Id., Schuld und Persönlichkeit, Elvert, Marburg 1932; H. Welzel, Persönlichkeit und Schuld, «Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft», 60, 1941, pp. 428474. 33 Mi limito a ricordare P. Bockelmann, Studien zum Täterstrafrecht, De Gruyter, Berlin 1940, che concepisce la colpevolezza come «colpa per la scelta di vita» (Labensentscheidungschuld), identificandola con la possibilità che aveva l’agente di «essere diverso». 34 Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene § VII, cit., p. 44. «L’intenzione» di chi commette il delitto, aggiunge Beccaria, «dipende dalla impressione attuale degli oggetti e dalla precedente disposizione della mente» le quali «variano in tutti gli uomini e in ciascun uomo, colla velocissima successione delle idee, delle passioni e delle circostanze. Sarebbe dunque necessario formare non solo un codice particolare per ciascun cittadino, ma una nuova legge ad ogni delitto» (ivi, pp. 44-45). E più oltre, § VIII, p. 46: «Abbiamo veduto qual sia la vera misura dei delitti, cioè il danno della società». 35 Ivi § VII, p. 46. 36 Principes du code pénal I i, cit., p. 119, e I vi, pp. 123124. Ovviamente questa svalutazione dell’elemento soggettivo è insostenibile. Ma è certo che l’approccio oggettivista, pur integrato dal requisito della colpevolezza quale elemento costitutivo del reato, è l’unico orientamento garantista, essendo il solo in accordo con il principio di stretta legalità o di tassatività, con l’onere della prova a carico dell’accusa, con il diritto di difesa e con il giudizio come verificazione o falsificazione dell’accusa. Solo fatti determinati, e non anche identità personali, espresse di solito da giudizi di valore – come «pericoloso» o «deviante» o «incline a delinquere» o simili –, sono possibili oggetto di prova e di difesa. Non solo. L’approccio oggettivistico, ossia il diritto penale del fatto anziché dell’autore, è il solo in accordo con un principio ancor più importante: il principio di uguaglianza, in forza del quale si può essere punito per ciò che si è fatto e non per ciò che si è. Ho espresso questo principio con quello che ho chiamato il divieto di norme costitutive o principio di regolatività in materia penale: sono ammesse, da un diritto penale garantista, solo norme regolative di comportamenti ipotizzati come reati e non anche norme direttamente costitutive dell’identità deviante o criminale37. Che è un corollario di un principio fondamentale del liberalismo e della democrazia: il principio secondo il quale «hanno pari dignità sociale», come dice l’articolo 3, 1° comma della Costituzione italiana, tutte le differenti identità personali, incluse quelle malvagie o devianti. Solo comportamenti dannosi giustificano infatti la prevenzione giuridica ad opera del diritto penale. Al contrario, le identità personali sono per principio sottratte a qualunque forma di penalizzazione e protette dal principio di uguaglianza e dai diritti di libertà, i quali sono tutti – dalla libertà personale alla libertà di pensiero e di religione, dalla libertà di stampa alle libertà di riunione e di associazione – diritti alla affermazione, alla tutela e al rispetto della propria identità differente, anche se ritenuta perversa o deviante. 2.4. D) Il processo penale come accertamento della verità, basato su prove acquisite secondo i principi della logica induttiva. Vengo così al quarto importante tratto garantista che accomuna Beccaria e Benthm, strettamente connesso all’approccio oggettivistico appena illustrato: la natura cognitiva del giudizio e la teoria della prova basata sulla logica induttiva. Si ricordi il classico passo di Beccaria sul sillogismo perfetto38 e, più ancora, la sua 37 In Diritto e ragione VIII 36, cit., pp. 508-512. ogni delitto si deve fare dal giudice un sillogismo perfetto: la maggiore dev’essere la legge generale, la minore l’azione conforme o no alla 38 «In 80 caratterizzazione del processo penale come «processo informativo», cioè come «ricerca indifferente del fatto» dove il giudice è «un indifferente ricercatore del vero», in opposizione a quello da lui chiamato «processo offensivo», dove «il giudice diviene nemico del reo, di un uomo incatenato [...], e non cerca la verità del fatto, ma cerca nel prigioniero il delitto, e lo insidia, e crede di perdere se non vi riesce, e di far torto a quell’infallibilità che l’uomo s’arroga in tutte le cose»39. Quanto a Bentham, si deve proprio a lui il contributo epistemologico più rilevante alla teoria del processo penale: la teoria delle prove giudiziarie come procedimenti induttivi, che si inserisce nella tradizione inglese dell’empirismo e della logica induttiva, da David Hume agli allievi dello stesso Bentham, James Mill e suo figlio John Stuart Mill. Di qui una lunga serie di tesi e principi concordemente sostenuti sia da Beccaria che da Bentham e che oggi è bene ricordare ai nostri legislatori e ai nostri magistrati: in primo luogo i limiti da essi imposti alla carcerazione preventiva40; in secondo luogo la separazione tra giudice e accusa a garanzia dell’imparzialità e del carattere cognitivo del giudizio41; in terzo luogo il rifiuto legge, la conseguenza la libertà o la pena. Quando il giudice sia costretto, o voglia fare anche soli due sillogismi, si apre la porta all’incertezza. Non v’è cosa più pericolosa di quell’assioma comune che bisogna consultare lo spirito della legge. Questo è un argine rotto al torrente delle opinioni» (Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene § IV, cit., p. 36). Ovviamente nessuno oggi pensa più che l’applicazione giudiziaria della legge si riduca al sillogismo, che è solo la conclusione di un ragionamento le cui premesse, quella fattuale e quella giuridica, sono il frutto, rispettivamente, dell’argomentazione probatoria e dell’argomentazione interpretativa, entrambe in grado di motivare verità soltanto relative, probabilistiche in fatto e opinabili in diritto. E tuttavia il sillogismo (o la sussunzione), benché sia l’operazione più banale tra quelle che intervengono nell’applicazione della legge, è alla base del carattere cognitivo del giudizio. Sulla questione si veda, da ultimo, il mio Contro il creazionismo giudiziario, Mucchi, Modena 2018. 39 Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene § XVII, cit., pp. 68-69. È chiaro che questa immagine non è una raffigurazione descrittiva, ma una formula prescrittiva, che equivale a un insieme di canoni deontologici: il rifiuto della concezione del reo come nemico e della giurisdizione come lotta contro il crimine; l’onestà intellettuale che come in ogni attività di ricerca deve escludere condizionamenti esterni, nonché preconcetti e pregiudizi nell’interpretazione della legge e nella valutazione delle prove; l’indipendenza di giudizio e l’atteggiamento «terzo» o «imparziale» rispetto agli interessi delle parti in conflitto e alle diverse ricostruzioni e interpretazioni dei fatti da esse avanzate. 40 Ivi § XIX, p. 71: «la privazione della libertà essendo una pena, essa non può precedere la sentenza se non quando la necessità lo chiede»: precisamente la «custodia d’un cittadino finché sia giudicato reo [...] deve durare il minor tempo possibile e dev’essere meno dura che si possa»; e «non può essere che la necessaria o per impedire la fuga o per non occultare la prova dei delitti». Bentham, a sua volta, giustifica la custodia cautelare e l’isolamento dell’imputato fino all’interrogatorio dell’imputato, che a suo parere deve essere immediato (Traité des preuves judiciaires III xiv, in Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, cit., t. II, pp. 297298). 41 Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene § III, cit., p. 35: «Egli è dunque necessario che un terzo giudichi della verità del fatto. Ecco la necessità di un Luigi Ferrajoli delle inutili complicazioni, delle lentezze e dei vuoti formalismi della procedura42; infine il principio della pubblicità dei giudizi e l’avversione al segreto istruttorio43. 3. DIFFERENZE E DIVERGENZE NEL PENSIERO DI BECCARIA E DI BENTHAM E tuttavia, al di là di tutte queste convergenze, certamente prevalenti, non mancano le differenze e le divergenze nel pensiero di Beccaria e in quello di Bentham. Direi che queste divergenze consistono, essenzialmente, nella maggiore radicalità di Beccaria. Sia Beccaria che Bentham sono due esponenti dell’utilitarismo e due pensatori liberali: due classici sia dell’utilitarismo che del liberalismo. Tuttavia penso si possa parlare, entro il comune approccio utilitarista e liberale, di un Beccaria estremista o comunque radicale e di un Bentham moderato e conservatore. Sotto entrambi gli aspetti del loro pensiero: in primo luogo l’utilitarismo; in secondo luogo il liberalismo. magistrato, le di cui sentenze sieno inappellabili e consistano in mere assersioni o negative di fatti particolari». Solo la separazione tra giudice e accusa, d’altro canto può assicurare il modello di processo «informativo» sostenuto da Beccaria nel passo richiamato alla nota 39 e non degenerare in «processo offensivo» ove «il giudice diviene nemico del reo». Sulla separazione di ruoli e carriere tra magistrati giudicanti e magistrati requirenti, quale condizione d’imparzialità del giudizio, insiste particolarmente J. Bentham, De l’organisation judiciaire et de la codification XIX (1790), in Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, cit., t. III, p. 34. 42 Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene § XXXVIII, cit., p. 116; Bentham, Traité des preuves I ii, cit., pp. 242 ss. 43 «Pubblici siano i giudizi e pubbliche le prove del reato», scrisse Beccaria, «perché l’opinione, che è forse il solo cemento della società, imponga un freno alla forza ed alle passioni, perché il popolo dica noi non siamo schiavi e siamo difesi» (Dei delitti e delle pene § XIV, cit., p. 59). «La pubblicità è l’anima della giustizia», dichiarò a sua volta Bentham (Traité des preuves judiciaires II x, cit., p. 275), cui si devono forse le pagine più penetranti contro il segreto: non solo perché essa «è la più efficace garanzia delle testimonianze» di cui assicura, grazie al controllo del pubblico, «la veridicità», ma soprattutto perché favorisce «la probità» dei giudici agendo da «freno nell’esercizio di un potere di cui è facile abusare» (ivi, p. 276), consente la formazione di uno «spirito civico» e lo sviluppo di un’«opinione pubblica, altrimenti muta e impotente circa gli abusi» dei giudici (ivi II, p. 243), fonda «la fiducia pubblica sui loro giudizi», rafforza l’indipendenza dei magistrati accrescendone la responsabilità sociale e neutralizzandone i vincoli gerarchici e «lo spirito di corpo» (ivi X, p. 277). Per contro, aggiunse Bentham, «più i tribunali sono segreti, più sono odiosi», giacché «innocenza e segreto non vanno insieme; e chi si nasconde già appare mezzo colpevole. Perché mai questo principio, che i giudici adottano verso i delinquenti, non dovrebbe valere anche per loro? La loro condotta non presenta le stesse sembianze della criminalità? Se fossero innocenti, avrebbero forse paura di apparirlo? Se non avessero nulla da temere dagli sguardi del pubblico, perché mai si circonderebbero da una cinta di tenebre? Perché farebbero dei palazzi di giustizia delle caverne non meno segrete di quelle dei ladri? E se si fanno delle insinuazioni ingiuste, possono essi lagnarsene?». Beccaria e Bentham 3.1. Beccaria e Bentham: due utilitarismi. In primo luogo, dunque, due utilitarismi. Come è noto è di Beccaria il celebre principio utilitarista della massima felicità divisa nel maggior numero44, ripreso da Bentham – la maggior felicità possibile del maggior numero possibile di individui45 – che lo estese dal diritto penale a tutto il diritto, basando su di esso la legittimazione politica di qualunque norma giuridica46. Di qui, per entrambi, il fine utilitaristico delle pene quale mezzo di prevenzione dei delitti47. Bentham tuttavia, diversamente da Beccaria, respinge come fantastica l’ipotesi del contratto sociale, ritenendo il principio di utilità sufficiente a fondare una teoria razionale del diritto e della politica. E invece è proprio sull’ipotesi contrattualistica che si basa la maggior radicalità dell’utilitarismo di Beccaria: «Nessun uomo ha fatto il dono gratuito di parte della propria libertà in vista del bene pubblico [...] Fu dunque la necessità che costrinse gli uomini a cedere parte della propria libertà: egli è adunque certo che ciascuno non ne vuol mettere nel pubblico deposito che la minima porzion possibile, quella sola che basta a indurre gli altri a difenderlo. L’aggregato di queste minime porzioni possibili forma il diritto di punire; tutto il di più è abuso e non giustizia, è fatto, ma non già diritto»48. L’utilitarismo di Beccaria è perciò tutt’uno con il suo contrattualismo, essendo il contratto sociale concluso per le ragioni di utilità vitale che ne definiscono i contenuti ed i limiti: la difesa della 44 C. Beccaria, Introduzione, in Dei delitti e delle pene, cit., p. 23. È lo stesso Bentham che riconosce, rispettivamente nel secondo e nel terzo dei tre frammenti pubblicati da Franco Venturi nell’edizione da lui curata del Dei delitti e delle pene, cit., p. 563, che «fu dal piccolo libro di Beccaria Dei delitti e delle pene ch’io trassi, come ben ricordo, il primo accenno al principio di utilità» e che «l’idea di misurare il valore di ogni sensazione analizzandola entro quattro elementi [intensità, durata, prossimità, certezza] la presi da Beccaria». 46 J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation I 4 (1780), in The Works cit., vol. I, p. 2; Id., A Fragment on Government I 48 (1776), ivi, p. 271, dove ricorre la prima formulazione benthamiana della massima. 47 Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene § XII, cit., pp. 54-55: «Il fine delle pene non è di tormentare ed affliggere un essere sensibile, né di disfare un delitto già commesso [...] Il fine, dunque, non è altro che d’impedire il reo dal far nuovi danni ai suoi cittadini e di rimuovere gli altri dal farne uguali»; J. Bentham Principes du code pénal II i, in Traités de législation, cit., p. 133: «Lo scopo principale delle pene è quello di prevenire il ripetersi di delitti analoghi [...] Il delitto passato non riguarda che un individuo, mentre delitti analoghi possono riguardare tutti»; Id., Théorie des peines I iii, cit., p. 10: «La prevenzione generale è il fine più importante delle pene; ed è anche la loro ragione giustificativa». 48 Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene § II, cit., pp. 30-31. E più oltre, ivi § XIX, p. 71: «il peso della pena e la conseguenza del delitto dev’essere la più efficace per gli altri e la meno dura che sia possibile per chi la soffre, perché non si può chiamare legittima società quella dove non sia principio infallibile che gli uomini si siano voluti assoggettare ai minori mali possibili». 45 81 vita e della libertà, in cambio della cessione della «minima porzion possibile» della libertà naturale a tal fine necessaria; la quale non è quindi un «dono gratuito», ma ciò che «la necessità» costringe a cedere in cambio delle garanzie: della garanzia primaria del divieto come delitti delle aggressioni alla vita e alle libertà, e della garanzia secondaria dell’obbligo di applicare le pene a tali aggressioni e lesioni. Il contratto sociale si configura così, secondo Beccaria, come il patto di non aggressione nel quale le parti contraenti si impegnano a non aggredire nessuno, sicché ciascuno rinuncia alla propria libertà di aggressione in cambio della medesima rinuncia da parte di tutti gli altri. È questo l’aspetto, indubbiamente originale, del contrattualismo e dell’utilitarismo di Beccaria. In che cosa consiste infatti, per Beccaria, la cessione di libertà cui gli uomini sono stati costretti dalla «necessità»? Non certo, come secondo Rousseau, nell’«alienazione totale di ciascun associato, con tutti i suoi diritti, a tutta la comunità»49, bensì nella sola cessione da parte di ciascuno della «minima porzion possibile» di libertà, di «quella sola che basta a indurre gli altri a difenderlo» e che quindi altro non è che la libertà di aggredire – cioè di uccidere, di rubare, di recar danno ad altri – dietro la cessione della medesima libertà da parte di tutti: in breve, dietro il divieto generale ed astratto delle aggressioni, garantito dalla loro previsione come delitti e dalla loro punizione mediante pene. È in questo modo che mentre l’utilitarismo di Bentham è un utilitarismo per così dire dimezzato, ben potendo la semplice formula della massima felicità divisa per il maggior numero essere riferita alla sola utilità della maggioranza, l’utilitarismo contrattualista di Beccaria tiene conto dell’utilità di tutti, cioè della «minima porzion possibile» di libertà che ciascuno, nel patto sociale, è disposto a «mettere nel pubblico deposito». Si capisce come le due concezioni dell’utilità, applicate al diritto penale, hanno implicazioni diverse. La semplice utilità della maggioranza può giustificare anche forme di diritto penale massimo, informate alla massima sicurezza dei non devianti, non essendo in grado di porre limiti alla potestà punitiva. Al contrario l’idea beccariana della «minor porzion possibile» di afflizione penale non giustifica quel «di più» di pena rispetto alla minima afflizione possibile dei devianti che per Beccaria «è abuso e non giustizia». Se ne può dedurre un secondo scopo giustificante del diritto penale in aggiunta a quello della prevenzione dei delitti: lo scopo della prevenzione delle pene arbitrarie o inutilmente eccessive, che è non meno importante del primo dato che vale a fondare tutti 49 J.-J. Rousseau, Del contratto sociale I vi (1762), in Id., Opere, a cura di R. Mondolfo, Sansoni, Firenze 1972, p. 285. 82 i limiti al diritto penale, ossia le garanzie penali e processuali, e perciò il modello di quello che ho chiamato diritto penale minimo50. Di qui il maggior radicalismo dell’utilitarismo di Beccaria rispetto a quello di Bentham. È infatti precisamente sulla base della sua fondazione contrattualistica che Beccaria, diversamente da Bentham51, può argomentare la sua critica filosofica della pena di morte. «Nel minimo sacrificio della libertà di ciascuno», egli ripete nel famoso § XXVIII sulla pena di morte, non può esserci la vita, che certamente non può far parte della «somma di minime porzioni della privata libertà» conferite da ciascun cittadino allo Stato. E perciò si domanda: «Quale può essere il diritto che si attribuiscono gli uomini di trucidare i loro simili?», «chi è mai colui che abbia voluto lasciare ad altri uomini l’arbitrio di ucciderlo? Come mai nel minimo sacrificio della libertà di ciascuno vi può essere quello del massimo tra tutti i beni, la vita?»52. E’ insomma su questo argomento apertamente contrattualistico – se il contratto sociale e lo Stato si fondano e si legittimano sul loro ruolo di tutela della vita, è contraddittorio ammettere la pena di morte – che si basa il rifiuto beccariano della pena capitale, ammessa invece da Bentham per i delitti di alto tradimento, di assassinio e di strage53. C’è poi un’altra questione sulla quale è significativo il confronto tra Beccaria e Bentham: la questione dei pentiti. «Alcuni tribunali offrono l’impunità a quel complice di grave delitto che paleserà i suoi compagni», scrive Beccaria. «Un tale spediente ha i suoi inconvenienti e i suoi vantaggi. Gl’inconvenienti sono che la nazione autorizza il tradimento, detestabile ancora fra gli scellerati, perché sono meno fatali ad una nazione i delitti di coraggio che quegli di viltà [...] Di più, il tribunale fa vedere la propria incertezza, la debolezza della legge, che implora l’aiuto di chi l’offende»54. Di opinione 50 È il secondo scopo del diritto penale, che identificai quale fondamento di tutte le garanzie penali e processuali in Il diritto penale minimo, cit., e in Diritto e ragione, cit., cap. VI e passim. 51 Sulla pena di morte Bentham resta a lungo oscillante e incerto. In The Rationale of Punishment del 1775, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, cit., vol. I, pp. 444 ss., ammette la pena capitale in via straordinaria, «in terrorem»; in Théorie des peines II xiv, cit., pp. 67-75, elenca gli argomenti a sostegno e gli argomenti contrari, senza sostanzialmente prendere posizione. Solo in uno dei suoi ultimi scritti – On Death Punishment, in The Works cit., vol. I, pp. 525-532 – giungerà, sulla base degli argomenti utilitaristici di Beccaria, a un totale abolizionismo. 52 Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene § XXVIII, cit., p. 86. 53 Bentham, Théorie des peines II xiv, § 4, cit., pp. 72 -73. 54 Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene § XXXVII, cit., pp. 114-115. Il passo così prosegue: «I vantaggi sono il prevenire delitti importanti [...] Sembrerebbemi che una legge generale che promettesse la impunità al complice palesatore di qualunque delitto fosse preferibile ad una speciale dichiarazione in un caso particolare [...] Ma invano tormento me stesso per distruggere il rimorso che sento autorizzando le sacrosante leggi, il Luigi Ferrajoli parzialmente diversa fu invece Bentham, che muovendo da premesse puramente utilitaristiche ammise il premio ove «non si abbiano altri mezzi, giacché l’impunità di uno solo è un male minore dell’impunità di molti»; inoltre, mise in guardia «dal fissare tale premio attraverso una legge generale», che «sarebbe un invito ad ogni sorta di delitto, come se il legislatore dicesse: ‘tra molti criminali il peggiore sarà non solo impunito, ma anche ricompensato’», e propose invece che la sua elargizione «fosse lasciata alla discrezionalità del giudice» onde non sottrarre nessun criminale «alla preoccupazione della pena»55. 3.2. Beccaria e Bentham: due liberalismi. Il secondo ordine di differenze tra Beccaria e Bentham riguarda il loro liberalismo. Anche qui possiamo parlare di due liberalismi: del liberalismo di Beccaria come di un liberalismo sociale e radicale; di quello di Bentham come di un liberalismo moderato e tendenzialmente liberista. È una differenza in gran parte connessa a quella che separa il liberalismo settecentesco, quello di Beccaria e dei philosophes francesi, rivoluzionario perché ancora da realizzare contro l’antico regime assolutistico e illiberale, dal liberalismo ottocentesco, cui sostanzialmente già appartiene Bentham, che è al contrario un liberalismo conservatore dell’assetto istituzionale liberale già realizzato. Bentham fu un ammiratore entusiasta della rivoluzione francese, che sostenne e difese in quattro lettere al «Courrier de Provence», al punto che l’Assembea legislativa gli conferì la cittadinanza onoraria francese il 23 agosto 1792. Ma egli criticò radicalmente l’idea stessa di diritti fondamentali consacrata dalla Déclaration del 1789 nel pamphlet intitolato Fallacie anarchiche, nel quale attaccava la Dichiarazione come una somma di fallacie ideologiche. Cosa è mai, si chiedeva, questo documento che inizia con la falsa proclamazione che «tutti gli uomini nascono liberi ed uguali» e prosegue con l’enunciazione di una serie di principi di giustizia e di diritti naturali, se non un trattatello filosofico di diritto naturale, frutto di una «confusione di idee così grande che non è possibile associarle alcun senso»? Giacché «non esistomonumento della pubblica confidenza, la base della morale umana, al tradimento e alla dissimulazione. Qual esempio alla nazione sarebbe poi se si mancasse all’impunità promessa, e che per dotte cavillazioni si trascinasse al supplicio ad onta della fede pubblica chi ha corrisposto all’invito delle leggi!». 55 Bentham, Théorie des peines, 2^ partie, I xiv, cit., pp. 162164; anche Bentham, tuttavia, riconobbe nel cap. XII che «il campo delle ricompense rappresenta l’ultimo asilo entro il quale si è rifugiato il potere arbitrario» (ivi, p. 159). Beccaria e Bentham no», affermava, «diritti naturali prima dell’istituzione dello Stato», cioè «anteriori alle leggi, indipendenti dalle leggi, superiori alle leggi»56. Non capiva, il giuspositivista Bentham, che quella Dichiarazione non era affatto un testo di diritto naturale, ma era essa stessa una legge positiva, e che i principi di giustizia da essa proclamati non erano più, una volta in essa stipulati, principi di diritto naturale, ma principi di diritto positivo che vincolavano il sistema politico al loro rispetto e alla loro tutela; che quindi il diritto positivo, grazie a quella Dichiarazione, stava cambiando sotto i suoi occhi, dato che incorporava, sotto forma di diritti costituzionalmente stabiliti, limiti e vincoli ai pubblici poteri, non più assoluti ma limitati; che insomma stavano formalmente nascendo, con quella Dichiarazione, lo stato di diritto e il costituzionalismo moderno. E francamente, aggiungo, non è certo un modello di liberalismo il congegno disciplinare del Panopticon, cioè l’edificio carcerario di forma circolare, con le carceri disposte sulla circonferenza e il sorvegliante al centro, ideato da Bentham al fine di rendere visibile ciascun carcerato da un sorvegliante non visto57. Ma la differenza maggiore tra il liberalismo di Bentham e il liberalismo di Beccaria consiste nella valenza liberista del primo e in quella liberal-socialista del secondo. Il segno più chiaro di questa differenza è dato dal commento di Bentham alla famosa frase di Beccaria su «il diritto di proprietà (terribile, e forse non necessario diritto)»58: un giudizio che alla cultura del tempo, perfino a quella liberale e progressista, apparve tanto eccezionale e scandaloso da far scrivere a Jeremy Bentham: «È sorprendente che uno scrittore giudizio56 J. Bentham, Sophismes anarchiques I (1816), in Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, cit., t. I, pp. 506535: in particolare, pp. 511-513. 57 J. Bentham, Panopticon; or the InspectionHouse (1787), in The Works, cit., vol. IV, pp. 37172; Id., Panoptique. Établissement proposé pour garder des prisonniers avec plus de sûreté et d’économie, et pour opérer en même temps leur réformation morale, avec des moyens nouveaux de s’assurer de leur bonne conduite, et de pourvoir à leur subsistance après leur élargissement, in Traité de législation civile et pénale, cit., t. I, pp. 225242. Nel 1792 Bentham riuscì a far discutere il progetto del Panopticon in Parlamento, che lo approvò nel 1794 ma non venne messo in atto essendo sopravvenuto il divieto di Giorgio III. La critica più illustre del Panopticon è quella di M. Foucault, Sorvegliare e punire Nascita della prigione (1975), Einaudi, Torino 1966. 58 Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene § XXII, cit., p. 75. Gianni Francioni rileva ivi, in nota, che queste parole, nella terza edizione del Dei delitti, segnalano un vero mutamento di opinione di Beccaria sul diritto di proprietà: la prima edizione recava infatti le parole «terribile ma forse necessario diritto». Si è trattato peraltro di un mutamento convinto, se è vero, come ricorda Francioni, che in una lettera al fratello Alessandro del 16 settembre 1767, Pietro Verri scriveva con sarcasmo, a proposito di un progettato viaggio di Beccaria in Russia: «Ponilo a fronte d’un ministro moscovita. Con un’incombenza, per cui non ha i mezzi, e vedrai qual meschina figura sarà la sua. Egli comincerà il codice col togliere il diritto di proprietà». 83 so come Beccaria possa aver inserito, in un’opera dettata dalla più ragionevole filosofia, un dubbio sovversivo dell’ordine sociale»59. Ricordiamolo per intero questo passo del capitolo XXII sui «Furti», nel quale figurano quelle scandalose parole di Beccaria: «I furti che non hanno unito violenza dovrebbero esser puniti con pena pecuniaria. Chi cerca di arricchirsi dell’altrui, dovrebbe esser impoverito del proprio», cui segue la definizione del furto come «il delitto della miseria e della disperazione, il delitto di quella infelice parte di uomini a cui il diritto di proprietà (terribile e forse non necessario diritto) non ha lasciato che una nuda esistenza»60; e poi l’invettiva contro le leggi classiste a sostegno della proprietà, dove Beccaria, assumendo il punto di vista del delinquente, contesta «queste leggi [...] che lasciano un così grande intervallo tra me e il ricco», fatte da «uomini ricchi e potenti che non si sono mai degnati visitare le squallide capanne del povero, che non hanno mai diviso un ammuffito pane fralle innocenti grida degli affamati figliuoli e le lacrime della moglie», e dove invita perciò a rompere «questi legami fatali alla maggior parte ed utili ad alcuni pochi e indolenti tiranni» e ad attaccare «l’ingiustizia nella sua sorgente»61. È chiaro che simili parole non potevano non apparire a Bentham che sovversive dell’ordine sociale. Non a caso Ferdinando Facchinei, nelle sue dure note contro il Dei delitti, chiamò Beccaria «il Rousseau degli Italiani»62. E certamente Beccaria non avrebbe mai scritto il libretto Defence of Usury, scritto da Bentham nel 1790, nel quale questi sosteneva che non dovessero essere posti limiti legali ai tassi di interesse. Insomma Carlo Marx non avrebbe mai potuto assumere Beccaria, anziché Bentham, come fece in un celebre passo del Capitale, a simbolo e a bersaglio polemico della sua invettiva contro la mistificazione capitalistica di quello che chiamò l’«Eden dei diritti innati dell’uo59 J. Bentham, Principes du code civil I ix, in Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, cit., t. I, p. 64. 60 Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene § XXII, cit., pp. 75-76. 61 Ivi § XXVIII, pp. 91-92. E più oltre, § XLI, pp. 121-122: «La maggior parte delle leggi non sono che privilegi, cioè un tributo di tutti al comodo di alcuni pochi»; tesi già espressa a proposito delle «pene dovute ai delitti dei nobili, i privilegi dei quali formano gran parte delle leggi delle nazioni» (ivi XXI, p. 73), laddove le pene «esser debbono le medesime pel primo e per l’ultimo cittadino» (ivi, p. 74), e poi nelle invettive contro le «leggi, che hanno sempre favorito i pochi ed oltraggiato i molti» (ivi XXVII, p. 86). 62 F. Facchinei, Note ed osservazioni sul libro intitolato Dei delitti e delle pene (1765), in Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, a cura di F. Venturi, cit., p. 175: una tesi non a caso diffusa nel Settecento benché oggi smentita da numerosi studi, tra cui si ricordano G. Francioni, Beccaria filosofo utilitarista, in Cesare Beccaria tra Milano e l’Europa. Convegno di studi per il 250° anniversario della nascita, Cariplo-Laterza, Milano-RomaBari 1990, pp. 69-87: 69, e D. Ippolito, Contratto sociale e pena capitale. Beccaria vs. Rousseau, «Rivista internazionale di Filosofia del diritto», XCI, 2014, 4, pp. 589-620. 84 mo» dove «regnano soltanto Libertà, Euaglianza, Proprietà e Bentham»63. E questo perché l’identificazione liberista tra proprietà e libertà – operata da Locke, certamente accettata da Bentham e poi dall’intera filosofia politica liberale ed oggi più che mai dall’ideologia liberista – non poteva certo essere addebitata anche a Beccaria64. 63 K. Marx, Il Capitale I iv 3 (1867), trad. it. di D. Cantimori, Editori Riuniti, Roma 1970, vol. I, pp. 208-209: «La sfera della circolazione, ossia dello scambio di merci, entro i cui limiti si muovono la compera e la vendita della forza-lavoro, era in realtà un vero Eden dei diritti innati dell’uomo. Quivi regnano soltanto Libertà, Eguaglianza, Proprietà e Bentham. Libertà! Poiché compratore e venditore d’una merce, p.es. della forza-lavoro, sono determinati solo dalla loro libera volontà. Stipulano il loro contratto come libere persone, giuridicamente pari. Il contratto è il risultati finale nel quale le loro volontà si danno un’espressione giuridica comune. Eguaglianza! Poiché essi entrano in rapporto reciproco soltanto come possessori di merci, e scambiano equivalente per equivalente. Proprietà! Poiché ognuno dispone soltanto del proprio. Bentham! Poiché ognuno dei due ha a che fare solo con se stesso. L’unico potere che li mette l’uno accanto all’altro e che li mette in rapporto è quello del proprio utile, del loro vantaggio particolare, dei loro interessi privati. E appunto perché così ognuno si muove solo per sé e nessuno si muove per l’altro, tutti portano a compimento, per una armonia prestabilita delle cose, e sotto gli auspici di una provvidenza onniscaltra, solo l’opera del loro reciproco vantaggio, dell’utile comune, dell’interesse generale». Si ricordi anche, di Marx, lo sferzante giudizio su Bentham: «l’arcifilisteo Jeremy Bentham, questo oracolo del senso comune borghese del XIX secolo, arido, pedante e chiacchierone banale (leather-tongued)» (ivi I, p. 666). 64 Ho ripetutamente criticato questa confusione fin da Teoria assiomatizzata del diritto. Parte generale II 5.2, Giuffrè, Milano 1970, pp. 99-105. Mi limito a ricordare Diritto e ragione § 60, cit., pp. 950-957; Diritti fondamentali, cit., cap. I, pp. 12-18, cap. II, pp. 134-145 e cap. III, pp. 288-297; Proprietà e libertà, «Parolechiave», 30, 2003, pp. 1329; Per un costituzionalismo di diritto privato, «Rivista critica del diritto privato», 1, marzo 2004, pp. 1124; Libertà e proprietà, in G. Alpa e V. Roppo (a cura di), La vocazione civile del giurista. Saggi dedicati a Stefano Rodotà, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2013, pp. 91-104, e, soprattutto, Principia iuris, vol. I, §§ 1.6, 10.10, 11.4-11.8, pp. 132-134, 635-638, 742-772 e Principia iuris, vol. II, §§ 13.17, 14.14 e 14.20, pp. 83-85, 224-230, 254-266, e La democrazia attraverso i diritti, cit., pp. 46-48, 144-146, 151. Per una riflessione complessiva, si veda D. Ippolito, Libertà e proprietà nella teoria dei diritti di Luigi Ferrajoli, «Ragion pratica», 44, 2015, pp. 131-158. Luigi Ferrajoli Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Saggi Citation: J. Clegg (2019) «Piecemeal, incremental, ad hoc»: ‘Beccarian’ experiments in law enforcement in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 85-94. doi: 10.13128/ds-25441 Copyright: © 2019 J. Clegg. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. «Piecemeal, incremental, ad hoc»: ‘Beccarian’ experiments in law enforcement in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England Jeanne Clegg Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia Abstract. In the course of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century a series of measures were introduced into the practice of law enforcement in England which, though «piecemeal, incremental, ad hoc» were, J.M. Beattie claims, driven by a common belief in the need for more effective ways of dealing with a perceived dramatic rise in urban property crime...These included preventative measures such as improvements in street lighting and gradual recognition of the need for professional policing, measures – such as statutory rewards to informers – designed to encourage prosecutions and raise conviction rates, and state-funded transportation, which provided a punishment more appropriate to petty crime than the death penalty. Though many of these measures, diverged sharply from Beccarian principles, Beattie is right in claiming that in general terms they «anticipated some of the arguments that would be made by the reformers of the late 18th century». If this has not been noticed previously it is because scholars have focused on the history of ideas at the expense of changes in practice the resulting from thousands of individual decisions by made by ordinary people, and even by apparently powerless. Keywords. Beccaria, England, Prevention, Conviction, Judicial procedure, Punishment. WELCOMING BECCARIA. From its first appearance Cesare Beccaria’s treatise (or essay) On Crimes and Punishments aroused a degree of enthusiasm among British intellectuals which historians of ideas have not found easy to account for1. As Hugh Dunthorne puts it somewhat wryly, «the English have not often turned to foreign writers for advice about how to govern themselves»2. David Lieber1 The title of the first English translation, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, a title which includes a genre indicator suggesting an exploratory aspect not highlighted in the original; R. Loretelli, Cesare Beccaria, in Inghilterra prima di Jeremy Bentham. La specificità inglese, «Antigone», 3, 2014, p. 119. 2 H. Dunthorne, Beccaria and Britain, in D. H. Howell and K.D. Morgan (eds.), Protest and Police in Modern British Society, University of Wales Press, Cardiff 1999, pp. 73-96: 75. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 85-94 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25441 86 man has seen Beccaria as having been warmly received because he was «preaching to the converted»3, indeed flattering in his admiration of liberties and institutions – such as jury trial and rejection of judicial torture and “cruel and unusual punishments” – sanctified in Whig tradition4. As Anthony Draper noted, Beccaria’s fundamental contention that deterrence, rather than state retaliation, should be the goal of punishment had long been current in English penal theory5. On the other hand, Draper also pointed out, Beccaria’s ideas were welcomed by English jurists not because they reflected the English status quo, but because they chimed with various current dissatisfactions with the practice of punishment, dissatisfactions that were to be expressed in the late 1760s and 1770s by William Blackstone, William Eden, and Jeremy Bentham. Looking back to earlier decades, Dunthorne sees Beccaria’s proposals as having «harmonized with a debate on the reform of the country’s criminal justice system that had been proceeding intermittently for a generation or more», citing Bernard de Mandeville’s 1725 critique of public execution as ineffective as a deterrent, Samuel Johnson’s denunciation of «confusion of remissness and severity» in the penal laws in the Rambler of 20 April 1751, and Oliver Goldsmith’s insistence on the need for a «sense of distinction in the crime»6. Whether these scattered polemics add up to a «debate» is doubtful; and the decades preceding what is generally recognized as the penal reform movement produced no clear, systematic critique of the judicial system. What it did produce was a series of practical changes in methods of law enforcement which, though «piecemeal, incremental, ad hoc», were driven by a common belief in the need for more effective and less socially disruptive ways of dealing with a perceived dramatic rise in urban property crime of all kinds, from pickpocketing and shoplifting to burglary and highway robbery7. The object of my contribution is to call attention to these changes as charted by social historians of crime and justice in the period between the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660 and the middle of the eighteenth century. One of the most important of these, John Beattie, sees them as having 3 D. Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009, p. 207; quoted in A. J. Draper, Cesare Beccaria’s Influence on English Discussions of Punishment, 1764-1789, «History of European Ideas», 26, 2000, pp. 177-199. 4 Draper, Cesare Beccaria’s Influence, cit., pp. 182-183. 5 Ibidem, p. 184. 6 Dunthorne, Beccaria and Britain, cit., pp. 76-77. 7 J.M. Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, 1660-1750. Urban Crime and the Limits of Terror, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 464. Jeanne Clegg anticipated Beccaria’s emphasis on the importance of preventing crime, and some of his attitudes towards punishment – in particular that moderate punishment, adjusted to fit the crime and administered quickly and with certainty, would provide more effective deterrence than occasional displays of extreme violence on the scaffold8. Attentive not only to parliamentary legislation and decisions by central government, Beattie scrutinises also local government initiatives and court practice in metropolitan London, where the problem of urban crime was felt most strongly and where many of the measures intended to deal with it originated. In what follows I shall adopt his grouping of these measures under four heads: measures to improve the prevention of crime; to encourage detection and the prosecution of offenders; to ensure the conviction of the guilty offenders; and to make punishments more effective9. PREVENTING CRIME. «It is better to prevent crimes than to punish them» is a constant refrain in Dei Delitti e delle pene10. Ch. XI, entitled «Della Tranquillità pubblica», lists several practical measures recommended as efficacious in preventing popular disturbances, the first of which are publicly financed street lighting and the placing of guards around the city. Together with restrictions on heated religious discourse and the giving of harangues promoting adherence to the public interest, these measures constituted in Beccaria’s view one of the main branches of magisterial vigilance as understood in the French of the time as the police. How to «police the night streets» was an issue at the heart of early modern England’s efforts to “keep the peace”, namely contain immorality and disorder and thus prevent crime in urban contexts. In the pre-modern world it was generally assumed that, with few exceptions, innocent people would not be found on the city streets after dark: «that the night gave cover to the disorderly and the immoral, and to those bent on robbery or burglary or who in other ways threatened physical harm to people in the streets and in their houses»11. Until the late sixteenth century London relied for protection from such dangers on its 9 pm curfew, on the closing of the City gates, and on house8 Ibidem, p. 463. 9 Ibidem. 10 C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, Armando & Armando, Roma, 1998, cap. XLI. 11 Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, cit., p. 169. ‘Beccarian’ experiments in law enforcement in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England holders fulfilling customary preventative policing duties: acting as unpaid night watchmen, and placing candles in tin lanterns with horn sides outside their houses during moonless, winter evening hours. By the mid-seventeenth century, however, the citizens of London were proving increasingly unwilling to patrol the night streets, preferring to pay fines out of which inadequate and unregulated substitutes were employed for scanty wages. Meanwhile the curfew collapsed under pressure from a swelling population and the sprouting of shops, eating-houses and commercial places of entertainment, while for the wider thoroughfares of the city as rebuilt after the Great Fire of 1666, candles provided grossly inadequate illumination12. Both issues were addressed by fits and starts and at local level. Street lighting was to be one of several public service provisions supported by taxes but carried out by private companies, yet special in that it was thought of as a policing device in a new, more specific way and more modern way as a way of bringing the streets under surveillance and control. Effective lighting would help pedestrians to be on their guard and the night watch and constables to prevent crime and to be able to distinguish between those who had legitimate reasons to move around the city in the dead of night and those who did not13. As with other aspects of policing, the modernisation of London’s street lighting involved the replacement of customary participation by an obligation to pay for a service. From the 1660s and 70s groups of projectors were experimenting with various types of oil lamps, encouraging householders to pay them to take over the duty to place candles14. Later came tempting offers to the City Corporation, which was nearing bankruptcy, of large sums for monopoly privileges in providing a range of public services. In 1694 a first contract for oil lamps was awarded, and the following year a 21-year monopoly was sold to the Convex Light Company. At the same time an Act of the Common Council of aldermen and commoners which administered the City extended the obligation to place candles by two hours and imposed a hefty penalty on defaulters, thus virtually forcing householders into paying the Company’s fees for installing and maintaining its lamps15. There was to be no going back on these measures, which met rising expectations of urban amenities on the part of the middling sort, and responded to fears 12 Ibidem, p. 172. p. 224. 14 Ibidem, pp. 210-213. 15 Ibidem, p. 215. 13 Ibidem, 87 of gangs of street robbers and burglars, whose activities were loudly publicised in the flourishing literature of crime of the 1720s. In 1735 a committee set up by Common Council expressly to deal with lighting moved that «the better to prevent Robberies and other inconveniences» street lamps be lit from sunset to sunrise every night of the year, and petitioned parliament for powers to defray expenses. This was rapidly followed by a Lighting Act which set up a rating scheme based on values of houses, instituted all-night, year-long street lighting, regulated the types of lamps to be set, maximum distances between them, set limits on charges, and authorised wards to arrange contracts with companies as they saw fit. By the mid seventeen thirties, the City of London was probably «the best lit urban area in Europe»16. Professionalization of surveillance proceeded more erratically and less deliberately. In 1661, 1662 and again in 1663 Common Council recognised the need for «better ordering and strengthening» the night watch, but could only reiterate the obligation of all London householders to fill the customary quota of watchmen for each ward. The de facto transition to a paid night watch was not, however, conceptualised until the 1690s, when alarm over the perceived crime wave, and complaints about corruption, lax time-keeping, feeble and unsuitably-armed watchmen came to a head. In 1705 the Council passed an act which called for watchmen to be «able-bodied», thus implicitly recognising their employee status, but failed to confront the question of how they were to be paid17. It was not until 1737 that wards were authorised to levy rates to pay watchmen’s wages, which were made uniform across London. In other respects the watch and its financing was still organised locally however, so that rich, inner city wards continued to be better policed than the large, poor and crowded outskirts. Nevertheless, the 1737 Act, and similar ones passed for Westminster parishes, Beattie comments, «marked a significant moment [...] it translated the obligation to serve in person into an obligation, easily enforced, to pay in support of a service provided by waged officials»18. It was to take much longer for the gradual, de facto transformation of the ancient and customary office of constable to be officially recognised. Traditionally an unpaid, community duty to which local householders were called in rotation, the office had always been a complex one, involving what, in a classic essay, Joan Kent described as a «dual allegiance»: 16 E.S. De Beer, ‘Early History,’ 323, quoted in Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, cit., p. 223. 17 Ibidem, p. 186. 18 Ibidem, p. 197. 88 Jeanne Clegg On the one hand, the constable was the lowest officer in a hierarchy of authority that stretched from the monarchy to the village [...] On the other hand, the constable also had to represent the village’s interests to his superiors19. With the expanding scope of criminal, social and economic legislation under the Tudors and Stuarts, constables’ duties were extended enormously. By the late seventeenth century they were responsible for a vast range of tasks, from reporting newcomers, vagrants, unlicensed beggars, runaway servants, labourers refusing to work, gamblers, drunks, blasphemers, lewd persons, nightwalkers, singers of seditious ballads and people committing victimless offences and misdemeanours of many kinds20. In Europe’s fastest-growing city, the burden of crowd and traffic control grew heavier, as did – under pressure from the turn-of-the-century Reformation of Manners movement – expectations of what constables should do to enforce the vice laws21. All this the men chosen to serve their year as constable were meant to reconcile with earning a living by other means. It is no wonder that, of those who could afford it, many chose to pay the fine for avoiding their turn, or finance men poorer than themselves to stand in for them22. During the seventeenth century the practice of paying substitutes grew steadily, especially in the richer wards. By the 1720s over 100 out of 360 London constables were deputies, and by the 1750s some 90% of men elected were buying their way out of office. Many hired men served repeatedly, sometimes taking on other paid posts such as that of beadle, and/or acting as or in association with entrepreneurial thief takers. By the end of the eighteenth century amateur community representatives had in practice been completely replaced by a body of paid professionals, a transformation signalling a «seachange in thinking about policing issues»23. As we shall now see, this shift in recruiting methods was associated with a change in the nature of law enforcement: the emergence of detection as a function of professional policing. PROSECUTION PROCEDURES. Although both watchmen and constables were sometimes called upon to help search or collect evidence 19 The English Village Constable, 1580-1642: The Nature and Dilemmas of the Office, «Journal of British Studies», 20, 1981, pp. 29-49: 30-31. 20 R.B. Shoemaker, Prosecution and Punishment. Petty Crime and the Law in London and Rural Middlesex, c. 1660-1725, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1981, p. 217. 21 Ibidem, pp. 124, 155. 22 Policing and Punishment in London, cit., p. 134. 23 Ibidem, p. 157. for use in court, the detecting, arrest and prosecution of offenders remained throughout the eighteenth century the responsibility of private citizens. It was usually victims of crimes - if anyone – who noticed a loss, suspected someone and, perhaps aided by neighbours, servants, passers-by or a patrolling watchman, grabbed him or her and “carried” – perhaps with the help of a constable fetched for the purpose – the supposed offender before a magistrate. It would then be up to the apprehender to organise witnesses and other evidence to set first before a grand jury and, if accepted by that body, a petty jury in a court of assize. Prosecution was thus an expensive and time-consuming business, and only very partially compensated after 1714, when governments began paying the costs of bringing cases in which they had an interest 24. Private citizens would in any case risk loss of earnings, damage to reputation and, with hanging the only penalty for an ever-growing number of offences, in theory responsibility for the death of a man, woman or even a child found guilty of stealing something as small as a handkerchief. The size of the “dark figure” of unprosecuted crime is impossible to calculate, but historians agree that it was probably huge25. Many victims certainly preferred to settle informally with the thief, perhaps compounding for the return of their goods, and/or resorting to traditional forms of shaming punishment, such as beating or dowsing under a water-pump. Beccaria explicitly condemned private “forgiving” of offenders (Ch. XXIX), and as a contractualist could never have condoned the survival of such informal, amateur methods of administering justice. But neither would he have approved many of the measures instituted by turnof-the-century parliaments in their efforts to encourage prosecutions. Chapter XXXXVI of the Essay denounces the offering of rewards for the capture of offenders as confessions of weakness on the part of the state, expedients which might temporarily shore up a crumbling edifice but in the long run undermine morality and virtue, trust in social relations, the happiness and peace of the whole nation. In England there had long been a tradition of offering ad hoc rewards for convicting felons and religious dissenters, but after the Glorious Revolution rewards became «a fundamental aspect of public policy»26. The 1692 Act instituting a £40 reward for convicting a highway robber was quickly followed by similar measures against counterfeiters and coiners, then 24 Ibidem, pp. 384-387. P. King, Crime, Justice and Discretion in England 1740-1820, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000, p. 11. 26 J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, 1660-1800, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1986, p. 51. 25 ‘Beccarian’ experiments in law enforcement in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England 89 shoplifters, burglars, housebreakers and horse thieves. During the robber gang scares of the early 1720s all the streets of London and Westminster, including lanes and courts, were re-categorised as highways, and an astronomical £100 temporarily added to the standard £40. Beattie finds it likely that the policy of massive rewards «had the effect they were meant to have and encouraged victims to give chase and to get others to join them in tracking down a robber or burglar»27. In the long run, however, Robert Shoemaker sees the rewards policy as having brought about «a significant transfer of responsibility from those on the streets being expected to help out of a sense of duty to giving those with information an incentive to come forward»28. A secondary effect – and again one that Beccaria could not have approved – was to stimulate the growth of thief-taking as a trade. Though not new to the English scene, thief-takers show a «marked increase» in the course of the eighteenth century. «Without their knowledge of criminal networks», Shoemaker admits, «far fewer major criminals would have been apprehended»29, but by the mid century associations with “blood money” and scandals involving “thief-making”, malicious prosecution and extortion had caused the government to abandon the massive rewards policy. Nevertheless when, in the mid 1750s, Henry and John Fielding began organising a regular, paid force of detectives, it was from among thief-catchers as well as exconstables that they recruited a body known at the time as «Fielding’s traps», but later as «Bow Street Runners». If the old appellative witnesses to the survival of past practices, the one more familiar to us reflects the transformation of private, unregulated expedients into state-regulated strategies. In this and other areas of justice administration, such as the collecting of data and development of techniques of cross examination, these extraordinarily energetic magistrates worked to coalesce «a series of single small-scale adjustments to necessity and barely perceptible shifts in attitude [...] into an articulated programme [by which they] sought to transform Londoners’ immediate response to crime from one of self-help to one of relying on the police»30. Two of a growing breed of «trading justices»31, the Fieldings were also anomalous in that the elder was legally trained and, as court justices, both were paid by the state. In 1718 William Nelson was one of many who complained about corruption and laziness among J.P.s, and but was well ahead of his time in proposing that half of those appointed be stipendiary, and be subject to strict discipline32: no such appointments were made until 1792. As with constables, and unlike the salaried officials of continental Europe, the Justices of the Peace of early modern England were «unpaid men of fortune who administered the communities in which they resided»33. Created in the fourteenth century «to hear and determine felonies and trespasses done against the peace», by late Tudor times they were responsible for many aspects of local government and trade regulation, as well as for conducting pre-trial examinations of men and women accused of felonies, taking bonds guaranteeing appearance in court and good behaviour, and committing suspects to prison to await trial. By the late seventeenth century they also exercised jurisdiction over the entire range of misdemeanours, a huge category which included certain kinds of theft, vice, regulatory and poor law offences, as well as breaking the peace34. In a period when financial and commercial affairs were demanding more time from merchants and bankers, the kinds of men who traditionally served as City aldermen and magistrates, the burdens of judicial office were also being complicated by innovations in the penal code and in the procedures intended to encourage prosecutions. With extension of the death penalty, the introduction of massive rewards and of pardons for accomplices on the one hand, and the ‘lawyerization’ of the trial bringing closer scrutiny of evidence on the other, the magisterial decision-making process was becoming ever more «complex, perhaps more difficult, or uncomfortable». The J.P.’s preliminary hearing in particular a «far more complex procedure [...] [with] a more uncertain outcome»35. These and other reasons have been offered for the «flight from office»36 which affected London’s magistracy even more adversely than it did other community officers. By the turn of the century the judicial business of London and Middlesex «was concentrated in the hands of a few very active justices»37, and by the late 1720s, in those of just two: Sir William Billers and Sir Richard Brocas. When these men died, in 1734 and 1737 respectively, a rota system was hurriedly set up. With a regular timetable involving all the aldermen who were J.P.s, an attendant attorney and clerk, and a formal, public location in the Matted Gallery of the Guildhall, the City thus gave birth to the first regular magistrates’ 27 Ibidem, and Authority of a Justice of the Peace, London, 17217. N. Landau The Justices of the Peace, 1679-1760, University of California Press, Berkeley 1984, p. 1. 34 Shoemaker, Prosecution and Punishment, cit., p. 6. 35 Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, cit., pp. 106-107. 36 Ibidem, p. 147. 37 Shoemaker, Prosecution and Punishment, cit., p. 236. p. 55. R.B. Shoemaker, The London Mob: Violence and Disorder in Eighteenth-Century England, Humbledon Continuum, London 2004, p. 36 29 Ibidem, p. 39. 30 Ibidem, p. 41. 31 . Landau, Law, Crime and English Society, 1660-1830, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, ch. 3. 28 32 Office 33 90 court, one which «did not depend entirely on the whim of a magistrate, but had a permanent life and a public character»38. Once again, necessity brought changes, changes soon to be developed by the Fieldings, who not only restructured their Bow Street offices into a space resembling a courtroom but also, by extending their functions in investigating and organising prosecutions, «created a new kind of urban magistracy»39. If in this respect judicial practice was by the third decade of the new century being rationalised, in other ways it remained almost unregulated. The J.P.s before whom plaintiffs accused their suspects enjoyed a degree of freedom in decision-making quite incompatible with Beccaria’s utopian prohibition of interpretation. In some cases decisions were taken in “Sessions”, i.e. by at least two magistrates acting together, but many – a proportion that increased in the course of the eighteenth century – were dealt with by individual justices and by most in the privacy of their own homes. In no case were their rulings subject to state regulation, and very rarely to disciplinary measures: «[n]either central government nor parliament told them what to do, supervised them or even ensured that they acted at all»40. Especially in dealing with the petty offenses which constituted the majority of those brought before them, justices could choose whether to mediate a dispute, bind over the defendant to appear at the next Sessions, or – in certain cases – issue a summary conviction on the spot and sentence the offenders to pay a fine, to be whipped, or to be committed to a house of correction41. Shoemaker’s study of the conduct of seventy-one justices active in Middlesex around the turn of the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries reveals dramatic differences in judicial behaviour [...] fundamentally different conceptions of the nature of justice and the purpose of prosecutions and punishments. Consequently, people’s expectations of the criminal justice system varied considerably depending on the identity of the justice who handled the case42. At the opposite pole in this respect to the uniform and automatic decision-making process augured by Beccaria, the English judicial system was «shot through with discretionary powers»; as we shall now see, this applies not only to the apprehending of suspects and preliminary hearings, but to «every stage of the trial and [...] administration of punishment»43. 38 Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, cit., p. 94. p. 418. 40 Landau, Introduction, The Justices of the Peace, 1679-1760, cit. 41 Shoemaker, Prosecution and Punishment, cit., p. 23. 42 Ibidem, p. 233. 43 Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, cit., p. 406. 39 Ibidem, Jeanne Clegg In one important respect J.P.s had little room for manoeuvre. Bail statutes still in force from the time of Mary Tudor stipulated that a magistrate before whom a man or woman was accused of a felony must merely record the prosecution testimony and commit the suspect to prison to await examination of the bill of indictment by a Grand Jury of seventeen, usually wealthy men of some social standing. If the bill was found “true”, the accused would then go to trial before a Petty Jury of twelve, in London for the most part artisans and shopkeepers, many with previous court experience. Despite the fact that they heard only prosecutors’ versions of events, Grand Juries threw out «significant numbers» of property charges, perhaps because they took into account a broad range of factors: not only the nature of the offence and the characters of offender and prosecutor, but also economic conditions of the time and the «general aim of preserving order and harmony»44. During the late seventeenth century London Petty Juries were «notably lenient», acquitting on average 45% of those brought before them; acquittal rates were subsequently to drop off, but still remained as high as 30%45. In addition juries exercised «massive discretionary powers», resorting in over 15% of cases to “partial verdicts”, i.e. convictions for less serious offenses than those on indictments46. Even then, those found guilty could and often were reprieved by the judge, or could have a petition of mercy presented to the monarch; in the late seventeenth century 40% of those condemned received pardons. By such means early modern jury and court practice worked to mitigate the effects of the harsh penal legislation passed during the Tudor «assault on crime», allowing large numbers of men and women found guilty to go free. As we have seen, during the second phase of the making of the “Bloody Code” several of the more innovative measures passed by parliaments between 1690 and 1713 were designed to encourage prosecutions, while others were meant to ensure higher rates of conviction. We know very little about how juries reached their verdicts. Drawn from the neighbourhood in which the crime had been committed, jurors were originally meant to rely on their prior knowledge or inform themselves of the facts of a case. By the sixteenth century, however, population growth and mobility were rendering these expectations vain, and juries were relying largely on accounts and character testimony provided in court by witnesses. But convincing evidence from victims, especially eye-witness testimony, was not always forth44 Ibidem, pp. 401-405. Policing and Punishment in London, cit., pp. 284-285. 46 Ibidem, pp. 277-286. 45 Beattie, ‘Beccarian’ experiments in law enforcement in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England coming47, a problem to which late seventeenth and early eighteenth century governments responded by extending to criminals themselves offers virtually impossible to refuse. The 1692 Act «for encourageing the apprehending of Highway Men», for example, established That if any person or persons being out of Prison shall discover Two or more person or persons [who already hath or hereafter shall commit any Robbery so as two or more of the person or persons discovered shall be convicted of such Robbery any such discoverer shall himself have and is hereby entituled to the gracious pardon of Their Majesties Their Heires and Successors for all Robberies which he or they shall [have] committed at any time or times before such discovery48. A statute of 1695 offered identical terms to «discoverers» of coiners and clippers, as did the 1699 «Shoplifting Act» to discoverers of a motley assortment of thieves. By means of this legislation, «both the authorities and private prosecutors actively sought the cooperation of accomplices as the most likely means of apprehending and convicting offenders»49, a means which and in certain cases offered the courts their only hope of a guilty verdict: The fundamental fact was that in the absence of regular police and detective forces, immunity from prosecution (along with the offer of rewards) gave the authorities their only means of securing evidence, especially against members of gangs50. According to Beccaria, in a perfect legal system pardons had no place, for mercy should be a characteristic of the legislator, while the executor should be inexorable (ch. XVLVI). Ch. XXXVII of the Essay further argues that to offer impunity to those willing to implicate confederates is particularly odious in that it authorizes treachery and cowardice of the most contagious kind, and exposes the weakness of a legal system reduced to begging help from those who offend it. In effect, and as with the rewards policy, in mid eighteenth-century England accomplice pardoning proved open to abuse, leading to false accusations by men and women in danger of their lives, and extortion of payment in exchange for 91 silence. Like other forms of evidence, such as hearsay and confession, accomplice evidence came increasingly under scrutiny in the course of the eighteenth century, especially as solicitors became more active in pre-trial hearings and barristers in court51. Yet the practice of pardoning accomplices seems to have persisted, may have become more common, and was eventually to lead to the development of the modern crown witness system52. Two other innovations, apparently favourable to defendants, were in Beattie’s view intended to encourage prosecutors and ensure higher rates of conviction. Until the end of the seventeenth century, and in order to save them from committing perjury and thus jeopardising their souls, neither defendants nor defence witnesses were required to give evidence under oath53. This changed in 1702, when a statute aimed at punishing accessories and receivers, who were increasingly suspected of giving false evidence in support of the thieves who supplied them, were required to ‘take an oath to depose the truth the whole truth, and nothing but the truth in such a manner as the witness for the Queen are by law obliged to do; and if convicted of any wilful perjury’ to suffer the consequences. The other apparent concession to defendants, in fact designed to ensure more guilty verdicts, concerns the extension to women of the possibility of pleading benefit of clergy. This device had been introduced in the Middle Ages to save men in holy orders, but during the early modern period broadened to allow any man who could read a verse from the fifty-first Psalm (popularly known as the “neck verse”) off on pain of branding. From 1623 women too became eligible for benefit of clergy in some cases, and were exempted form the literacy test. During the last decades of the seventeenth century, however, women were being increasingly held responsible for property crime, and so more frequently facing the prospect of a death sentence54. When, in 1691, benefit of clergy was allowed to women on the same footing as men, the gender imbalance was corrected, but at the same time potential prosecutors and juries were relieved of the responsibility of sending large numbers of women to the gallows. The measure may, Beattie suggests, have contributed to the conspicuous rise in prosecutions of women during the 1690s and 1700s, and very probably 47 Crimes defined as private (pocket picking, shop lifting) were by definition carried out without the victim’s knowledge; others, such as street robbery and burglary, carried fears of retaliation. 48 Ch. VIII Rot. Parl. pt. 3. no. 3. William and Mary, 1692: An Act for encourageing the apprehending of Highway Men [Ch. VIII Rot. Parl. pt. 3. nu. 3.], accessed at https://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/ vol6/pp390-391 49 Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, cit., p. 366. 50 Ibidem, p. 369. 51 Officially excluded by law until well into the 19th century, solicitors and lawyers seem to have begun appearing for the defence – often without their presence being noted in official records – from the 1730s, perhaps the 1720s. 52 J.H. Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, pp. 158-165. 53 Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, cit., p. 319. 54 Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, cit., pp. 141-143. 92 Jeanne Clegg to the fall in acquittals from one third to 14%55. As we shall now see, it was not only with respect to women that early modern governments sought to tighten the practical operation of the law by offering alternatives to the drastic forms of punishment laid down in the penal code. EFFECTIVE PUNISHMENTS. The innovation in the justice system most pertinent to Beccaria’s thinking regards the proportionality of punishment to the crime, discussed in Chapter VI of the treatise. This notion seems in have circulated in early modern England for many years before being put partially into practice in the second decade of the eighteenth century, though in a form that would not, as we shall see, have satisfied Beccaria. With only whipping, branding and the pillory available as punishments for less serious offenses, and death for most felonies, «the criminal law provided the narrowest of penal options»56. As a series of Tudor statutes excluded benefit of clergy from a long series of offences from petty treason to pickpocketing, capital punishment became the only penalty for a huge range of crimes, and under Elizabeth large numbers of those convicted, even of non-violent thefts, were sentenced to death57. During the final decades of the seventeenth century more potential victims of the gallows were saved by jury manipulation of verdicts and the exercise of judicial discretion, for example in applying the literacy test for benefit of clergy less strictly. This tendency declined in the 1590s but accelerated once more in the second quarter of the seventeenth century, when more convicted offenders were let off with a branded thumb, a whipping or, in a few cases, pardoned on condition of accepting transportation to the new American colonies58. Overall, Ian Archer argues, the criminal law was becoming «a more subtle and flexible instrument in discrimination between degrees of seriousness in crime»59. This trend, according to Beattie, «must have derived from shared views about the best way to manage capital punishment, and from a growing conviction that there was a need for alternative sanctions», and it was these assumptions, he supposes, that provided 55 Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, cit., p. 318. p. 283. 57 Ibidem, p. 278. 58 Ibidem, p. 279. 59 I. Archer, The Pursuit of Stability. Social Relations in Elizabethan England, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991, p. 248; Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, cit., p. 280. the seed-bed for the radical ideas that came to be expressed in the remarkable outburst of writing and speculation about the criminal law that followed the breakdown of authority after 1642 and accompanied the experiments in governance in the 1650s60. During these revolutionary times law reform became «an issue of urgent concern», especially among radical groups but also within the Rump Parliament, which appointed Matthew Hale to lead a committee to recommend ways of restructuring the criminal law. Leveller Gerard Winstanley was the perhaps the only critic to support total abolition of capital punishment, but many of the leading pamphleteers took the view that punishment ought to be proportional to the offence [...]. There was general agreement, for example, that minor thefts should not be punishable by hanging, and some writers would have removed capital punishment from all property crimes61. These proposals drew on various types of biblical, ethical and pragmatic argument: the Law of Moses offered no justification for killing a thief, the prospect of executing an offender discouraged prosecutors, encouraged juries to acquit and judges to pardon, and even led robbers to kill their victims in order to silence potential witnesses. With the Restoration, public speculation on such matters closed down: to all outward appearance, little was to change for the next thirty years. The courts continued to administer a criminal law that provided the narrowest of penal options and that continued to rely on the discretionary manipulation of sentences to construct a more flexible outcome62. Yet, as Beattie underlines, in this period Old Bailey acquittal rates for property offences reached very high levels (48% for women and 42% for men), while almost 30% of defendants received partial verdicts. This pattern of jury behaviour may have been in part due to conflict between City and Crown, but also expressed dissatisfaction with the punishments available to the courts, a dissatisfaction perhaps influenced by the radical debates of the 1650s. In addition, a high proportion of those sentenced to death were reprieved and then pardoned, often unconditionally: between the 1660s and the 1680s the rate of free pardoning rose from 13% to 40%63. In 56 Ibidem, 60 Policing and Punishment in London, cit., p. 280. 61 Ibidem. 62 Ibidem, 63 Ibidem, p. 282. p. 295. ‘Beccarian’ experiments in law enforcement in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England the 1690s rising prosecution rates (especially of women) and the effects of the Bloody Code led to such dire overcrowding of the notoriously unhealthy London gaols that inmates were simply set free, taking the total enjoying impunity between 1680 and 1714 to 60% of those convicted. Of the few who did go to the gallows, many were pitied and celebrated by the crowds whom public executions were meant to terrify and deter; it became a point of pride, especially among highwaymen, to put on a brave show at the gallows and “die game”. As Mandeville and others were to complain, the traditional fourhour hanging-day processions from Newgate to Tyburn were also occasions for disorder and disruption and provided excellent pick-pocketing opportunities. Dissatisfaction with the death penalty as the only punishment for property crime does not, of course, imply satisfaction with the impunity enjoyed by the convicted. The anonymous author of Hanging not punishment enough thought that even more severe punishments should be adopted for certain types of crimes, and Mandeville that hanging should take place far from public view, a proposal that was to be reiterated by Henry Fielding on the grounds that what is unseen is more terrifying than what is done in plain sight. But for nonviolent thefts, most writers – and probably most juries – took the view that more moderate punishments would be more appropriate, more productive of convictions, and hence more effective as deterrents. But what were the alternatives? Whipping was seen only appropriate for the least serious offences, and as traditionally performed in the street on half-naked convicts, usually women, was by the eighteenth century becoming in any case less acceptable to a polite and commercial people 64. During wartime the option of enlisting in the armed forces offered a solution which was evidently temporary and applied only to able-bodied men65. Restitution of two to four times the value of goods stolen had been proposed during the 1650s, but was clearly only applicable to those in a position to pay. The most popular and frequently proposed alternative to hanging involved the equivalent of slavery as recommended by Beccaria in Chapter XXVIII of his treatise: hard labour in a house of correction or workhouse, or in the colonies. Since the creation of Bridewell in the sixteenth century houses of correction had been favoured as punitive and reformative contexts for minor offenders,66 and during the late seventeenth century London magistrates made increasing use of their summary powers to commit defendants to them direct64 Ibidem, pp. 304-305. pp. 366-367. 66 Ibidem, p. 281. 65 Ibidem, 93 ly 67. But as in the case of the street watch, the financial burden of running these institutions fell on local communities, which understandably objected to having convicts dumped on them without compensation 68 . The Hard Labour Act of 1706-7 authorising judges to sentence clergied offenders to long periods of hard labour in houses of correction made «an important gesture towards filling crucial gap in the penal structure. It pushed out the boundaries of the possible and acceptable forms of punishment», but failed in practice due to lack of financial provision69. A sentence of several years’ hard labour in the American or West Indian colonies had for a time seemed to offer the solution. During the 1650s transportation had been the favoured condition for pardoning, and throughout the 1660s merchants with trans-Atlantic interests seem to have been eager to take the condemned70. Efforts were also made in parliament to allow judges to assign directly it as a punishment for certain offenses, and although these bills failed, courts found «back-door» ways of extorting convicts’ agreement to be transported71. By the 1670s, however, several colonies were establishing slave economies, and merchants became increasingly reluctant to take any but able-bodied and skilled young men; as a result, as we have seen, the gaols filled to bursting and the pardon rate rocketed. During the 1690s and 1700s war, and optimistic expectations of newly established houses of correction in London offered some respite, but with the coming of peace in 1713, the prospect of thousands of demobilised soldiers and sailors swarming the streets, and the contested accession of the first Hanoverian monarch in 1715, fears of crime and disorder once again intensified. It was this combination of factors that seems to have galvanised the new Whig ministry into seeking more lasting solutions: A century after the first convicts were sent to America, and at a point when it seemed unlikely ever to a workable element on English penal practice, the punishment of transportation to the American colonies was suddenly put on a new footing and the administration of the criminal law was entirely transformed as consequence72. The Transportation Acts of 1718 and 1720, which authorised courts to sentence those found guilty directly to transportation and provided for payment of the costs of carrying them was followed by a drop in the percent67 Ibidem, p. 309. p. 367. 69 Ibidem, pp. 335-336. 70 Ibidem, p. 290. 71 Ibidem, pp. 291-293. 72 Ibidem, p. 369. 68 Ibidem, 94 Jeanne Clegg age of men and women sentenced to death for property offences from just over 9% to 5.6%. For the thirty years that followed, until the War of Independence, transportation was to be the most common punishment assigned for property crimes, accounting for nearly 80% of sentences for such offenses. But did transportation work? And was transportation seen by its “beneficiaries” as the kind of “moderate” punishment enjoined in Dei Delitti e delle pene? For Beccaria, to commit a convict to slavery to be performed in obscurity or at a distance, whether in a prison context or in a nation other than the one offended by the crime, rendered that slavery useless (Ch. XXIX): the penalty must be performed publicly and at the scene of the crime if it was to act as an effective deterrent. In practice, moreover, the introduction of systematic transportation led to a reduction in relative but not absolute numbers of men and women executed; many of those sent to labour abroad would earlier have been acquitted, received partial verdicts or free pardons, or never have reached the courtroom at all. There were frequent mutinies on transport ships, and many risked the gallows by returning before their time was up; one suspects that the plantations did not offer the rosy opportunity to reform and make a new life pictured by Defoe in Moll Flanders and Colonel Jack. In 1790s, by which time Tasmania had taken the place of America as the destination for transports, a group of women condemned for pocket-picking repeatedly told the judge that they preferred to be hanged in England than be eaten by the savages and wild beasts rumoured to roam the antipodes; eventually, in order to avoid a mass hanging, they were discharged. Within years transportation had been discarded as the standard punishment for property crime, and penitential solutions first experimented in the late 1770s being brought in its place73. Piecemeal though these responses were, they anticipated some of the arguments that would be made by the reformers of the late 18th century. Moderate punishments would encourage victims to prosecute, and potential offenders would learn that if they committed a crime they would be caught, if caught convicted, and if convicted punished74. If scholars intent on tracing Beccaria’s importance for English judicial thinking have failed to notice the ways in which late eighteenth century reformers’ arguments were “anticipated”, it is surely because they have – understandably – focused on the history of ideas as expressed in print by men educated enough to engage in theoretical debate. But as historians who study social processes “from below” contend, we need to pay as much attention to practice as to ideas if we are to understand how change takes place, and in this respect the actions of ordinary people may be as influential as the treatises of intellectuals. The transformation of English law and English legal institutions traced by Beattie and other social historians of recent years grew largely out of thousands of individual decisions by the merchants, financiers and lawyers who initiated private members’ bills in parliament and acted as magistrates and aldermen, the shop-keepers, artisans and craftsmen who prosecuted (or decided not to prosecute), manipulated jury verdicts, served as constables or hired deputies in their place. Recent research by Tim Hitchcock and Robert Shoemaker has broadened and deepened the picture still further, investigating the agency exercised with respect to the penal system by the poor and criminal, the «apparently powerless Londoners who unintentionally helped to shape the changing character of the institutions and policies with which they were forced to engage»75. Even more «piecemeal and ad hoc» than the measures outlined above, their tactics may have determined changes even more significant. IN CONCLUSION. As we have seen, the practical changes effected in English policing and punishment between the Restoration and the mid-eighteenth century often diverged sharply from the proposals that were to be put forward by Beccaria in the 1760s and elaborated by Blackstone, Eden and Bentham. The deep reasons for these divergences need investigating more thoroughly, but the fact of their existence does not invalidate the argument that early eighteenth-century efforts to make judicial processes more effective in dealing with urban crime were ‘Beccarian’ in tendency: 74 Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, cit., p. 475. T. Hitchcock and R. B. Shoemaker, London Lives: Poverty, Crime and the Making of a Modern City, 1690-1800, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015, p. 22. 75 73 T. Hitchcock and R.B. Shoemaker, Tales from the Hanging Court, Bloomsbury Academic, London 2010, ch. 5. Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Saggi Citation: R. Loretelli (2019) The first English translation of Dei delitti e delle pene. A question of sources and modifications. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 95-106. doi: 10.13128/ds-25442 Copyright: © 2019 R. Loretelli. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. The first English translation of Dei delitti e delle pene. A question of sources and modifications* Rosamaria Loretelli Università degli Studi di Napoli “Federico II” Abstract. Unlike the first French translation, which has received adequate scholarly attention, the first English translation, printed in London in 1767 for the Whig bookseller, journalist and advocate for the freedom of the press John Almon, has as yet been neglected by research. Following on from my previous essay, which investigated the editorial and political contexts, this study focuses on the translated text, enquiring about its sources and faithfulness to the original. Indeed, a collation with one of the two Italian sixth editions (1766) and with Morellet’s version (dated 1766, but printed on 28 December 1765) revealed that this text, which was the main channel for the dissemination of Beccaria’s ideas in the English speaking world, used both the Italian original and the French version as sources. In addition and most strikingly, the collation also showed that the translation contains modifications of significant passages, which appear in neither source. They intervene surprisingly on passages whose interpretation is still debated among present day scholars. The present article interprets changes introduced in chapter II (“Of the Right to Punish”) and in chapter XXVIII (“Of the Punishment of Death”). Keywords. Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, Eighteenth-Century Translations. In a letter from London of December 16, 1766, Beccaria’s friend Alessandro Verri wrote to his brother Pietro telling him that the publisher Pietro Molini, at whose home he was staying, had recently published an Italian edition of Dei delitti e delle pene. But he added that sales had been poor and accordingly, many copies were sent to Paris where they sold out1. * I am grateful to Luigi Ferrajoli and Philippe Audegean for generously answering my queries. Honesty requires however that I relieve them from all responsibility for what I have done with their answers. 1 In the same letter, Alessandro tells his brother that Pietro Molini was brother to Giovan Claudio Molini who had recently published an Italian edition of Dei delitti e delle pene in Paris (P. e A. Verri, Viaggio a Parigi e Londra (1766-1767), a cura di G. Gaspari, Adelphi, Milano 1980, p. 148). The edition published by Giovan Claudio is the sixth edition, «Harlem, et se vend à Paris chez Molini Libraire, Quai des Augustins», 1766. Probably the edition by Pietro Molini mentioned by Alessandro is the other sixth edition, «Harlem, 1766», as recent research seems to believe, in spite of what previous scholar maintained. See R. Pasta, Tra Firenze, Napoli e l’Europa: Giuseppe Molini senior, in A.M. Rao (a cura di), Editoria e cultura a Napoli nel XVIII secolo, Liguori, Napoli 1998, pp. 251-283: 261; and L. Firpo, Le edizioni italiane del Dei delitti e delle pene, in Edizione nazio- Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 95-106 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25442 96 Evidently, the book in the original Italian had almost no market in England. But when the first English translation appeared in London in early 1767, it sold very well. Another edition was published in Dublin in the same year, and others in the years immediately following, in England, Scotland and America. This English translation was the main channel for the dissemination of Beccaria’s thinking in the Englishspeaking world. A few readers accessed Dei delitti e delle pene in Italian, of course, such as Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, who drew inspiration from Beccaria when they wrote the Declaration of Independence, having discussed the Italian text of the book with Filippo Mazzei 2. Probably Benjamin Franklin also read Dei delitti in Italian3; and Jeremy Bentham possessed the English edition, as well as a copy in Italian and one in French4. George Washington5, however, and most jurists 6, judges7, journalists, novelists and the English reading public in general accessed Beccaria’s ideas through the English translation. To the best of my knowledge, nothing has so far been written on the text of this translation or on its sources and fidelity to the original. The aim of the present article is to fill this gap. This will provide a better understanding of the function assigned to Dei delitti e delle pene by the people and the milieu who prompted its translation8, as well as of the modes of its reception nale delle opere di Cesare Beccaria [hereafter EN], vol. I. Dei delitti e delle pene, a cura di G. Francioni, Mediobanca, Milano 1984, pp. 466-473. 2 E. Tortarolo, Illuminismo e rivoluzioni. Biografia politica di Filippo Mazzei, Franco Angeli, Milano 1986, pp. 42-43. For Mazzei’s letters to Jefferson and Adams, see Filippo Mazzei: scelta di scritti e lettere, a cura di M. Marchione, Edizioni del Palazzo, Prato 1984, vol. I, p. 9. J.D. Bessler gives valuable information about the American readers of On Crimes and Punishments throughout his The Birth of American Law. An Italian Philosopher and the American Revolution, Carolina Academic Pr., Durham 2014. For the libraries of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams which contained copies of Italian editions, see p. 186. 3 M. Maestro, Benjamin Franklin and the Penal Law, «Journal of the History of Ideas», 36, 1975, pp. 551-562: 554. 4 I would like to thank Philip Schofield for this piece of information. 5 George Washington read Beccaria in the English translation (Bessler, The Birth of American Law, cit. p. 186). Others probably read André Morellet’s French translation, which was also reprinted in America. 6 In a persuasive article, which assesses the early impact of Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments on English discussions on punishment, focusing mainly on William Blackstone, William Eden and Jeremy Bentham, Anthony Draper maintains that Beccaria’s influence was particularly striking in England and had profound consequences for English approaches to punishment. A.J. Draper, Cesare Beccaria’s influence on early discussions of punishment, 1764-1789, «History of European Ideas», 26, 2000, pp. 177-199. 7 J. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England. 1660-1800, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986, pp. 223, 555-556, 558, 628-629, 632. 8 For external evidence about the milieu which promoted this translation, see R. Loretelli, The First English Translation of Cesare Beccaria’s Rosamaria Loretelli in Britain9 and of the very presence of Beccaria’s ideas in the English speaking world. The first English translation of Dei delitti e delle pene was published in February 1767. The year of publication is printed on the title-page, and the month can be established by merging information gleaned from the letters exchanged between Alessandro Verri and his brother Pietro with the entries in the April issues of «The Scots Magazine» and «The Critical Review». In a letter dated 15 January 1767, Alessandro wrote that Beccaria’s book was being translated into English and that it would shortly be published; on 8 February, Pietro replied that he had informed Beccaria, and on 26 February he asked for a copy of the book with the reviews it had received in Britain10. The reviews were enthusiastic. «The Critical Review» referred to the text as «one of the most original books which the present age hath produced», and «The Annual Register» published many extracts in a long piece by Edmund Burke, who was an MP at the time and already famous for his Enquiry into the Sublime and the Beautiful11. But a question needs to be asked: what was the exact text which they were reviewing? Was it faithful to Beccaria’s original or was it based on the French version, the language of eighteenth-century cultural mediation? And again, if it changed the original, was it to render it palatable to the English public, or to enhance some other project? Our collation has answered these questions with evidence which we will illustrate and try to interpret in the following pages. On Crimes and Punishments. Uncovering the Editorial and Political Contexts, «Diciottesimo secolo», 3, 2017, pp. 1-22. 9 For its dissemination in America, see Bessler, The Birth of American Law, cit., and, by the same, The Celebrated Marquis. An Italian Noble and the Making of the Modern World, Carolina Academic Press, Durham 2018, ch. V and VI. 10 P. e A. Verri, Viaggio a Parigi e Londra, a cura di G. Gaspari, Adelphi, Milano 1980, pp. 24, 259, and 320. 11 «The Critical Review», 23, April 23rd 1767 (p. 257); «A Catalogue of New Books» of the April issue of «The Scots Magazine», p. 210. The book is listed neither in the February issue (which excludes January as the month of publication) nor in that of March. However, the column for the new books in the March issue is completely occupied by a summary of Adam Ferguson’s An Essay on the History of Civil Society, and ends by informing readers that «The rest of the books are deferred». If we align this piece of information with Pietro Verri’s request at the end of February, we can deduce that the translation was published in February. Edmund Burke was one of the founders of the «Annual Register», to which he contributed with reviews on law and politics. P.J. Stanlis, Edmund Burke and the Natural Law, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (nj) 2009 (1958), p. 37. The first English translation of Dei delitti e delle pene SOURCES. In the 1958 introduction to Dei delitti12, Franco Venturi drew attention to the first English translation, mentioning the unknown translator’s critique of the French version and implicitly endorsing the idea that the English rendering was faithful to the original. A few years later, however, at a conference organized by him and Luigi Firpo for the 200th anniversary of the first Italian edition, Leo Radzinowicz mentioned an unspecified «French edition» as the source for the first English translation. At the same conference, H.L.A Hart underwrote Radzinowicz’s information and explicitly named the Enlightenment philosophe André Morellet as the author of the French translation13. The relation of the English with the French translation was stated again more recently by Frederick Rosen in one of the introductions to a volume of The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham.14 Whereas, in 2008, Aaron Thomas took a more cautious stance, mentioning the passage of the translator’s preface in which he criticizes Morellet’s reshuffling of Beccaria’s chapters and pointing out that «even this translator (i.e., the English translator) admitted to permitting “a paragraph or two” to stand where Morellet left them». Thomas concluded that «Fidelity to Beccaria’s original text could not therefore be automatically assumed».15 The question remained unanswered. Which of the scholars was right? Which is the true source for the English translation? The answer could emerge only from a collation with Morellet’s Traité des délits et des pei12 Venturi’s edition was based on the fifth Italian edition (March 1766), the last, as he was the first to ascertain, for which there is explicit evidence of authorial revision. See F. Venturi, Introduzione a Dei delitti e delle pene, in La letteratura italiana. Storie e testi, vol. 46/III. Illuministi italiani. Riformatori lombardi, piemontesi e toscani, a cura di F. Venturi, Ricciardi, Milano 1958 pp. 4-13. For the history of this edition, see G. Francioni, La “quinta” edizione e le testimonianze autografe, and L. Firpo, La “quinta” edizione (Livorno, marzo 1766), in EN, vol. I, cit., respectively, pp. 292-304 and 444-466. 13 L. Radzinowicz, Cesare Beccaria and the English System of Criminal Justice. A Reciprocal Relationship, and H.L.A. Hart, Beccaria and Bentham, in Atti del convegno internazionale su Cesare Beccaria promosso dall’Accademia delle scienze di Torino nel secondo centenario dell’opera “Dei delitti e delle pene” (4-6 ott. 1964), Accademia delle scienze, Torino 1966 («Memoria dell’Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche», s. IV, nr. 9), respectively, pp. 57-66, and pp. 21-29. 14 The other introduction was by H.L.A. Hart. The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. by J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996 (reprinted in 2005), note 106, p. lxvi. 15 Aaron Thomas, Preface (p. xxx), in C. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments and other writings, ed. by A. Thomas, transl. by A. Thomas and J. Parzen, Introduction by A. Burgio, University of Toronto Press, Toronto-Buffalo-London 2008. 97 nes and the Italian original at the same time. We have therefore proceeded to collate the three texts, choosing the first editions of the English and the French16 translations, and one of the two Italian sixth editions17. The title-page of the English translation reads: An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, translated from the Italian; with a Commentary attributed to Monsieur de Voltaire; translated from the French. There follows the quotation from Francis Bacon and, at the foot of the page, the name of the publisher: «London: Printed for J. Almon, opposite Burlington-House, Piccadilly, MDCCLXVII». Pages III to VIII carry the translator’s preface, and pages IX to XII, a table of contents for both the Essay and Voltaire’s Commentary. It should be noted that the French and the English translations modify Beccaria’s title, but not both in the same way. Morellet’s systematic reordering of the original text is anticipated by the term Traité18 in his title. Whereas, more in tune with Beccaria’s title, Essay sounds less assertive, reflecting a philosophical tradition which goes from Montaigne and Bacon to Locke and Hume. Moreover, the publisher John Almon was a notable figure in the Opposition, a journalist, an advocate for the freedom of the press and a friend of Lord Temple and John Wilkes19. The first pages of the English publication do not contain some of the texts present in the fifth and in the two sixth Italian editions. Those titled «A chi legge» [To the reader] and «Avviso» [Notice] are missing; also missing are De Soria’s Guidizio di celebre professore and Risposta to Facchinei.20 Indeed, if the Italian fifth and sixth editions number more than three hundred pages, the English translation has only 179 pages of the Essay 16 Traité des délits et des peines, traduit de l’Italien, D’après la troisième Edition, révue, corrigée, et augmentée par l’Auteur. Avec des Additions de l’Auteur, qui n’ont pas encore paru en Italien. Lausanne [Paris] 1766. 17 Dei delitti e delle pene, edizione sesta, di nuovo corretta ed accresciuta, Harlem 1766. This edition probably appeared in the Autumn of 1766, while the other sixth edition (Harlem, et se vend à Paris chez Molini Libraire, Quai des Augustins) was published in the August of 1766 by Giovan Claudio Molini brother to that Pietro Molini who hosted Alessandro Verri in London (see note 1 in the present article). When the English translation was published, therefore, three Italian editions with the same text were in print, the fifth and the two sixth editions. 18 For the philosophical implications of the linguistic choices of Traité and of Essay, see J. Pandolfi, Morellet traducteur de Beccaria, in A. Luzi (a cura di), Il genio delle lingue. Le traduzioni nel ’700 in area francoitaliana, Treccani, Roma 1989, pp. 291-316: 296. 19 D.D. Rogers, Bookseller as Rogue: John Almon and the Politics of Eighteenth-Century Publishing, Peter Lang, New York-Bern-Frankfurt 1986. For their connection with the translation of Dei delitti e delle pene, see my The First English Translation, cit., pp. 8-18. 20 Avviso, which introduces the fifth Italian edition, does not appear in some impressions; Giudizio, and Risposta (written by Pietro Verri, with Alessandro’s help) do not appear in Morellet. For the reasons, see Francioni Nota al testo, in EN, cit., vol. I, pp. 301-302. 98 on Crimes and Punishments, plus 79 pages of Voltaire’s Commentary. A word needs to be said about the presence of Voltaire’s text. It is important to note that this was the very first edition of Voltaire’s Commentary in a foreign language. The book had been published anonymously in France in early September 1766 and, by February 1767, it had run through six editions, plus a few pirated ones. An Italian version would appear as a separate volume a few months after the English translation, but it was only in 1769 that it would be issued in one volume with Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene21. When the English translation appeared, André Morellet’s very successful French version had already been in print for more than a year22 , since it had been published before the Italian fifth edition, although Beccaria had informed the philosophe of what he would later insert into that edition.23 In his preface, the English translator admits that he knows Morellet’s text, but criticizes his modifications («he hath not only transposed every chapter, but every paragraph in the whole book»), stating that he himself had opted for preserving «the original order». However, he adds, «in a passage or two» he «had taken the liberty to restore [passages] to the chapters to which they evidently belong and from which they must have been accidentally detached»24. Morellet had used the same justification for his own reshuffling of the original chapters, saying that he had restored «l’ordre le plus naturel», «par quelques simples transpositions de Chapitres ou de parties de Chapitres»25. However, despite his critique of Morellet, we do not need to go far in order to find evidence of the translator’s knowing the French version very well and of using it, although not slavishly. More: no effort is required to find examples of the fact that he turned sometimes to Morellet and at other times to the Italian original; indeed, every page shows that the author of the translation had both the Italian text and Morellet on his desk. Rosamaria Loretelli The very first paragraph of Beccaria’s Introduzione runs: Gli uomini lasciano per lo più in abbandono i più importanti regolamenti alla giornaliera prudenza, o alla discrezione di quelli, l’interesse dei quali è di opporsi alle più provvide Leggi, che per natura rendono universali i vantaggi, e resistono a quello sforzo, per cui tendono a condensarsi in pochi, riponendo da una parte il colmo della potenza e della felicità, e dall’altra tutta la debolezza e la miseria. Perciò se non dopo essere passati frammezzo mille errori nelle cose più essenziali alla vita e alla libertà, dopo una stanchezza di soffrire i mali, giunti all’estremo, non s’inducono a rimediare ai disordini che gli opprimono...26 This is Morellet: Parmi les hommes réunis, il s’exerce un effort continuel qui tend à placer dans une partie de la société toute la puissance et tout le bonheur, et dans l’autre toute la misère et toute la faiblesse. L’effet des bonnes lois est de s’opposer sans cesse à cet effort. Mais les hommes abandonnent ordinairement le soin de régler les choses les plus importantes à la prudence du moment ou à la discrétion de ceux-là mêmes qui sont intéressés à rejeter les meilleures institutions. Aussi n’est-ce qu’aux dernières extrémités, et lassés de souffrir, qu’ils se déterminent à remédier aux maux dont ils sont accablés. Ce n’est qu’après avoir passé par mille erreurs funestes à leur vie et à leur liberté27. This is the English translator’s rendering: [“In every human society, there is an effort continually tending to confer on one part the height of power and happiness, and to reduce the other to the extreme of weakness and misery. The intent of good laws is to oppose this effect,/A] [and to diffuse their influence, universally, and equally./B] [But men generally abandon the care of their most important concerns to the uncertain prudence, and direction of those, whose interest it is to reject the best, and wisest institutions;/C] [and it is not till they have been led into a thousand mistakes in matters, the most essential to their lives and liberties, and are weary of suffering, that they can be induced.../D]28. 21 For the publishing history of the Commentaire, see Firpo, Le edizioni italiane del Dei delitti e delle pene, in EN, cit., vol. I, pp. 487-495. 22 Published on December 28, 1765, although dated 1766. G. Francioni, Nota al testo, in EN, cit., vol. I, p. 292. 23 Morellet’s version was based on the third edition. After the publication of a pirated Italian fourth edition, Beccaria’s publisher Coltellini called fifth edition the one he was preparing. On this, see Francioni, Nota al testo, in EN, cit., vol. I, pp. 304-315. See also Pandolfi, Morellet traducteur de Beccaria, cit.; and S. Bersezio, La traduzione francese del Dei delitti e delle pene di André Morellet, in Il caso Beccaria, Il Mulino, Bologna 2016, pp. 111-137. For other French translations, see P. Audegean, L’ombre de Morellet. Les premières traductions françaises de Beccaria (1765-1822), in Cesare Beccaria. La controverse pénale XVIIIe-XXIe siècle, éd. par M. Porret et É. Salvi, P.U.R., Rennes 2015, pp. 119-132. 24 An Essay on crimes and Punishments, London 1767, p. v. 25 Ibidem, p. viii. 26 Dei delitti e delle pene, Harlem 1766, cit., pp. 9-10. I have modernised the spelling, since this aspect of Morellet’s text is not the focus of the present article. 28 What is marked with an A at the end comes from Morellet. What is marked with a B is not in Morellet, but freely translates a sentence which in the Italian original comes slightly later («rendono universali i vantaggi e resistono a quello sforzo per cui tendono a condensarsi in pochi»). C contains the incipit of the Italian text. Here, Morellet translates «leggi» with «institutions», and the English translator with «institutions», evidently imitating the French solution. D: this part and beyond follow the lesson of the Italian original. In the English translation, the Introduction ends at the ending of the Italian original, while the French translation inserted at this point passages which in the original are in chapters VIII and IX. 27 The first English translation of Dei delitti e delle pene This method is used throughout the translation, showing that its author felt free to choose either one or other of the sources within the same paragraph and sometimes even within the same sentence. This passage from the beginning of the Introduzione is only the first of a great number of such instances, but we shall avoid pointless repetition. I would like, however, to draw attention to three further examples: clauses which, as Gianni Francioni has highlighted, appear in the Italian original but not in the French version. Surprisingly enough, in two cases the English translation follows Morellet, but in the third it opts for Beccaria’s original 29. The two passages which appear neither in the French nor in the English translation are: «Le fissazioni dei limiti sono così necessarie nella politica, come nella matematica, tanto nella misura del bene pubblico, quanto nella misura delle grandezze»30 and: «Questa è la cagione, per cui le offese ne fanno nascere delle nuove, che l’odio è un sentimento, tanto più durevole dell’amore, quanto il primo prende la sua forza dalla continuazione degli atti, che indebolisce il secondo»31. In the Italian original, they are in chapters XXXIV («Dei debitori»/«Of Bankrupts») and XL («False idee di utilità»/«Of false Ideas of Utility»), respectively. In the third case, however, the passage which is missing in Morellet, is present in the English version, proving once more that the translator accessed Beccaria’s book in both languages, choosing from time to time which text to use. In the Italian original of chapter XXXIII («Contrabbandi»/«Of Smuggling») we read: «Chiunque dà pene infamanti a delitti, che non sono reputati tali dagli uomini, scema il sentimento d’infamia per quelli, che lo sono”32. In Morellet the passage does not appear, while in the English version we find: «By inflicting infamous punishments, for crimes that are not reputed so, we destroy that idea where it may be useful». If the English text does not follow Morellet here, a few paragraphs later, however, it is again dependent on his version, thus proceeding with ad hoc choices until the last page of the book. These few instances from among the many we have come across in the course of our collation point to the conclusion that, although the English translator did not accept Morellet’s ordering of the chapters, neither did he move many paragraphs (more, however, than the «one or two» he declared in the preface), he sometimes fol29 Francioni explains the reasons why Morellet omitted the three passages in in Nota al testo, in EN, cit., vol. I, p. 309. 30 Dei delitti e delle pene, Harlem 1766, cit., p. 167. 31 Ibidem, p. 187. 32 Ibidem, p. 160. 99 lowed the French translation. And, at other times however, he reverted to the Italian original. Thus, the question of the sources of the English version of Dei delitti e delle pene leads to an incontrovertible solution: the translator had the two texts in front of him and chose either one or the other to translate from, according to a criterion which seems to be purely his own. What was this criterion? More: were Beccaria’s original and Morellet’s version the English translator’s only options, or had he other strings to his bow? The collation also revealed information on these points. MODIFICATIONS AS INTERPRETATION. CHAPTER II: “OF THE RIGHT TO PUNISH”. The most apparent criterion behind the translator’s choices is a search for clarity. He tends to accept Morellet’s version where it disambiguates the Italian, sometimes just to render it easily readable, sometimes with more fundamental purposes in mind. His intention, however, does not seem to be to simplify the content; but rather, to avoid the risk of misunderstandings. The translation aims at expressing ideas as clearly and as completely as possible, resolving the ambiguities of certain passages. This practice pervades the whole translation, leading its author at times to use Morellet, at other times to revert to the Italian original, and sometimes even to make changes of his own. But there is more to be said: disambiguating a text involves interpretation, a choice between possible meanings, the reductio ad unum of polysemic ambiguity. Even when it is the outcome of superficial haste, resulting in unsatisfactory understanding, disambiguation implies a hermeneutic move. The more so in the case of this translation, which is linguistically accurate, incisive and very careful not to blur meanings. Therefore, all changes made here to the Italian original cannot be dismissed as irrelevant; rather, they should be viewed as a philosophical (and perhaps political) stance taken by whoever was involved in the translation. In actual fact, our collation has brought to light changes which all reside within a single coherent perspective, a perspective which we shall attempt to illustrate in the following pages. We shall draw attention to modifications, present in two relevant and complex passages, which point to foundational aspects of Beccaria’s thinking. In these cases, the translation shows clear signs of interpretation. One change occurs in chapter II («Diritto di punire»/«Of the Right to punish»), and another in chapter XXVIII («Della pena di morte»/«On the Punishment of Death»). 100 In chapter II Beccaria famously states that by virtue of the social contract citizens yielded the «smallest portion possible» («minima porzione possibile») of their liberty, «as much only as was sufficient to engage others to defend it»33. With a formulation which has since become standard, Luigi Ferrajoli called this parsimony principle «diritto penale minimo» (minimum penal law). 34 Further on in this chapter, Beccaria writes: L’aggregato di queste minime porzioni possibili forma il diritto di punire, tutto il di più è abuso e non giustizia; è Fatto, ma non già Diritto. Osservate, che la parola Diritto non è contraddittoria alla parola Forza; ma la prima è piuttosto una modificazione della seconda, cioè la modificazione più utile al maggior numero. E per giustizia io non intendo altro che il vincolo necessario per tenere uniti gl’interessi particolari, che senz’esso si scioglierebbero nell’antico stato di insociabilità: tutte le pene, che oltrepassano la necessità di conservare questo vincolo sono ingiuste di lor natura. Bisogna guardarsi di non attaccare a questa parola Giustizia l’idea di qualche cosa di reale, come di una forza fisica o di un Essere esistente35. This is how the 1767 English translation renders the passage: The aggregate of these, the smallest portions possible, forms the right of punishing: all that extends beyond this is abuse, not justice. Observe, that by justice I understand nothing more, than that bond, which is necessary to keep the interest of individuals united; without which, men would return to their original state of barbarity: All punishments, which exceed the necessity of preserving this bond, are in their nature unjust. We should be cautious how we associate with the word justice, an idea of any thing real, such as a physical power, or a being that actually exists36. The modification present in the English version is anything but banal and insignificant. It consists in the omission of the following sentences, which I quote from the modern translation by Aaron Thomas and Jeremy Parzen: «it is a matter of fact, not of right. Note that the word right is not in contradiction with the word force; rather, the former is a modification of the latter, that is, the modification most useful to the greatest number»37. 33 An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, cit., p. 9. L. Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione. Teoria del garantismo penale, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2011 (1989), pp. 197, 325-339. 35 Dei delitti e delle pene, Harlem 1766, cit., pp. 17-18. Italics in the Italian original. For an interpretation of this passage, see Ph. Audegean, Cesare Beccaria, filosofo europeo Carocci, Roma 2014 (2010), pp. 113 ff. 36An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, cit., p. 9. 37 I am going to use the 1767 translation for all passages where it faithfully follows Beccaria’s original. Wherever it does not, or where passages are omitted, I am using Aaron Thomas’s modern translation. For this 34 Rosamaria Loretelli At first sight, this omission may appear as the result of no more than a search for clarity and simplicity, which is one of the things it achieves. At the same time, however, it is a precise act of interpretation. If we view this omission against the background of Beccaria’s ideas concerning the relation between force and law, the hermeneutic move and the interpretative option behind this change become evident. Departing from the preceeding tradition where jus and potestas, i.e, law and force were never presented as opposed to each other, Beccaria, highly innovative also on this point, separates them. In a fundamental article which sheds light on this aspect of Beccaria’s thinking, Gianni Francioni draws attention to several passages of Dei delitti e delle pene in which «forza» (force) is repeatedly opposed to «diritto» (law, legitimated by the social contract)38. Force is opposed to law and justice, for example, in chapter XVI («Of Torture»), where the Milanese philosopher writes: «Quale è dunque quel diritto, se non quello della forza, che dia la podestà ad un Giudice di dare una pena ad un Cittadino, mentre si dubita se sia reo o innocente?»39; and in chapter XXIX («Della cattura»), where we find: Ma per qual ragione è così diverso ai tempi nostri l’esito di un innocente? Perché sembra, che nel presente sistema criminale, secondo l’opinione degli uomini, prevalga l’idea della forza e della prepotenza, a quella della giustizia; perché si gettano confusi nella stessa caverna gli accusati e i convinti; perché la prigione è piuttosto un supplicio, che una custodia del reo, e perché la forza interna tutrice delle leggi è separata dalla esterna difenditrice del Trono e della Nazione, quando unite dovrebbon essere40. In Beccaria’s thinking law and force are doubtlessly separated, as Francioni concludes after having exposed passage, see C. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings, ed. Thomas, cit., p. 12. 38 G. Francioni, “Ius” e “potestas”. Beccaria e la pena di morte, «Révue d’historie du droit de punir», II, 2016 (monographic issue on Cesare Beccaria), pp. 13-49. 39 Dei delitti e delle pene, Harlem 1766, cit., p. 69. «What right, then, but that of power, can authorize the punishment of a citizen, so long as there remains any doubt of his guilt?» (An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, cit., p. 57). It is worth checking this passage in Morellet: «Quel autre droit que celui de la force peut autoriser un Juge à infliger une peine à un citoyen, lorsq’on doute encore s’il est innocent ou coupable?». 40 Dei delitti e delle pene, Harlem 1766, cit., p. 136. «But why is the fate of an innocent person so different in this age? It is, because the present system of penal laws presents to our minds an idea of power rather than of justice. It is, because the accused and convicted are thrown indiscriminately into the same prison of the accused; and because the interior power, which defends the laws, and the exterior, which defends the throne and kingdom are separate, when they should be united» (An Essay on Crimes and Punishment, cit., p. 119). 101 The first English translation of Dei delitti e delle pene more of such evidence41. If we now revert to the passage quoted above from chapter II and examine it in light of what has just been said, we can – credibly, I believe – hypothesize the reason why the English translator might have decided to modify it. It is that the part he omitted carries an ambiguity precisely in the area of the relation between force and law. The sentence «la parola diritto non è contraddittoria alla parola forza, ma la prima è piuttosto una modificazione della seconda, cioè la modificazione più utile al maggior numero» is ambiguous. It could mean that force guarantees the compliance with the law42; but it could also signify that there is a connection between force and the origin of law, legitimising law by recourse to the concept of the utility of the greatest number. An option which would be in contradiction with the other occurrences where law and force are radically and unambiguously separated. By eliminating this passage, the English version avoided all risks of such contradiction, thus bringing the paragraph into harmony with one of the ideas which are right at the heart of Beccaria’s project. Before concluding on this passage, mention must be made of the fact that the omission to which we drew attention is not to be found in Morellet, whose translation in this case is faithful to the original. The omission is the English translator’s initiative and reveals, it would seem, his philosophical awareness and deep understanding of Beccaria’s work. MODIFICATIONS AS INTERPRETATION. CHAPTER XXVIII: “OF THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH”. If we now turn to chapter XXVIII, «Della pena di morte» (Of the Punishment of Death), we also discover consistent changes. This time, however, most of them are also in Morellet. Most, but not all: another proof of the fact that the English translator’s interpretative strategy did not stem from slavish fidelity to Morellet, but from a project of his own. This chapter, which is the longest in the book, begins with a paragraph which discusses whether or not the death penalty is founded on a right to punish deriving from the social contract. The conclusion reached is 41 Francioni, “Ius” e “potestas”, cit., p. 31, note 44. In the National Edition, Francioni interprets this passage in light of the many others which, in Dei delitti, unambiguously separate force from law: «L’affermazione può essere fraintesa, se non collegata ad altri passi del Dei delitti, che mostrano come per Beccaria forza e diritto non si identifichino [...]. La forza dunque non origina né legittima il diritto ma ne garantisce l’osservanza ai fini dell’utilità, se non di tutti, del “maggior numero”» (EN, p. 32, note 1). 42 that it has no such foundation. The second and third paragraphs continue: Non è dunque la pena di morte un Diritto, mentre ho dimostrato che tale, essere non può; ma è una guerra della Nazione con un Cittadino, perché giudica necessaria, o utile la distruzione del suo Essere: Ma se dimostrerò non essere la morte né utile, né necessaria, avrò vinto la causa dell’umanità. La morte di un Cittadino non può credersi necessaria, che per due motivi. Il primo, quando anche privo di libertà egli abbia ancora tali relazioni, e tal potenza, che interessi la sicurezza della Nazione; quando la sua esistenza possa produrre una rivoluzione pericolosa nella forma di governo stabilita. La morte di qualche Cittadino divien dunque necessaria quando la Nazione ricupera, o perde la sua libertà, o nel tempo dell’Anarchia, quando i disordini stessi tengon luogo di leggi; ma durante il tranquillo regno delle leggi in una forma di governo, per la quale i voti della Nazione siano riuniti, ben munita al di fuori, e al di dentro dalla forza, e dall’opinione forse più efficace della forza medesima, dove il comando non è che presso il vero Sovrano, dove le ricchezze comprano piaceri, e non autorità, io non veggo necessità alcuna di distruggere un Cittadino, se non quando la di lui morte fosse il vero e unico freno per distogliere gli altri dal commettere delitti, secondo motivo, per cui può credersi giusta, e necessaria la pena di morte43. Rounding off the argument developed in the first paragraph, the second paragraph (the first of the two quoted above) repeats conclusively that no right authorizes the death penalty. Under the social contract, the death penalty is always illegitimate. It is a war moved by a nation against one of its citizens, whose destruction the nation deems either necessary or useful. The paragraph closes with a sentence which states the aim of the rest of the chapter, which is to prove that the death penalty is in fact neither necessary nor useful. The third paragraph assigns centre stage to necessity. Only in two cases («due motivi»), says the Italian original, the death of a citizen may be considered necessary. The first case is when a citizen «retains such connections and such power that he endangers the security of the nation even when deprived of his liberty, that is, when his very existence can provoke a dangerous revolution in the established form of government. The death of such a citizen, then, becomes necessary when a nation is recovering or losing its liberty; or in time of anarchy, when disorder itself takes the place of laws», but not during the normal functioning of a State («regno tranquillo della legislazione»). This is the modern faithful translation of the paragraph44. As we shall see, the 1767 version is different. 43 Dei delitti e delle pene VI, Harlem 1766, cit., pp. 118-120. On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings, cit., p. 52. 44 Beccaria, 102 The hermeneutic difficulty provided by this ‘first case’ can be summarized by the following question: does it describe a situation in which the social contract, although at risk, may be considered still existing; or is the situation one of such anarchy that the social contract is no longer binding, since individuals have reverted to the state of nature? The point at issue is a possible exception under the rule of law to Beccaria’s rejection of the death penalty. Opinions diverge amongst present-day scholars. According to some, here Beccaria is making a distinction between a ‘normal’ and an ‘exceptional’ state of things, both of them within the social contract. Although with arguments differently nuanced, these scholars maintain that, according to Beccaria, an exceptional state of things would impose a suspension of the rules, and in such a case the Milanese philosopher would not be against the death penalty45. Of a different opinion is Gianni Francioni, who upholds that within the social contract Beccaria conceives of no exceptions to a total abolition of the death penalty. The situation contemplated here is, in Francioni’s opinion, of «a revolutionary disruption of the social contract, of a dissolution of society which has moved individuals back into the ‘state of war’». Therefore, it would not be a situation bordering to a reversion to bellum omnium, but a real bellum omnium. In sum, according to Francioni, Beccaria admits of no intermediate positions between the state of nature and the rule of law. The social contract cannot be “suspended”; it is either in existence and binding, or it does not exist any longer, and society has reverted to the state of nature. For Beccaria, therefore, the death penalty is always illegitimate46. 45 Audegean, Cesare Beccaria, filosofo europeo, chapter «Giustizia e utilità», in particular p. 123; C. Beccaria, Des délits et des peines. Suivi de Avis au sujet de la peine de mort, Préface, traduction et notes de Ph. Audegean, Note de L. Ferrajoli, Payot et Rivage, Paris, 2014, note on pp. 130-121; D. Ippolito, Contratto sociale e pena capitale: Beccaria vs Rousseau, «Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto», 4, 2014, pp. 607 ff.; N. Campagna, Sonnenfels, Beccaria et la peine de mort, in Ph. Audegean and L. Delia (eds.), Le moment Beccaria. Naissance du droit pénal (1764-1810), Liverpool University Press, Liverpool 2018 («Oxford University Studies in the Enlightenment»), pp. 195 and 203-204. Francioni mentions K. Ladd, Penser la peine dans la souveraineté et dans l’époque: Situation de l’argumentation abolitionniste dans Des délits et des peines de Cesare Beccaria, in L. Delia et G. Radica (eds.), Penser la peine à l’âge des Lumières, «Lumières», 20, 2012, pp. 101-120: 108 ff.; and P. Costa, Lo ius vitae ac necis alla prova: Cesare Beccaria e la tradizione contrattualistica, «Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno»,. 44, 2015, 2, pp. 817-895. 46 G. Francioni, Beccaria filosofo utilitarista, in Cesare Beccaria fra Milano e l’Europa, Atti del convegno di studi per il 250° anniversario della nascita promosso dal Comune di Milano, Cariplo-Laterza, Milano-Roma-Bari, 1990, pp. 69-87 (A slightly modified French translation appeared under the title of Beccaria, philosophe utilitariste, in Le bonheur du plus grand nombre. Beccaria et les Lumières, sous la direction de Ph. Audegean, et al., ENS Éditions, Lyon 2017). See also Fran- Rosamaria Loretelli I have briefly summarized the two current most relevant lines of interpretation, not in order to enter a debate which lies outside both the aim of this article and my field of competence, but to indicate the hermeneutic difficulty of this passage and the questions at stake. This, in order to highlight the fact that the verbal formulation of this passage contains an ambiguity which, as we shall see, the English translator seemed to be aware of. As he also seemed to be aware of the philosophical implications of this ambiguity. Interestingly, he introduced changes which framed a text unambiguously consonant with one of the two interpretative options exposed above – most precisely with Francioni’s. So much for the moment about the first case («primo motivo»). The second case («secondo motivo») – also mentioned in the third paragraph of the Italian original – hypothesizes a justification of the death penalty in a situation in which the State is functioning normally and the social contract is binding. This case refers to a possible deterrent role of the death penalty. The question Beccaria implicitly asks here is: would the death penalty be justified if it served to dissuade citizens from committing crimes? And the answer, to which the rest of the chapter is devoted, is an unwavering no. On historical and psychological grounds, Beccaria proves that the death penalty has no deterrent capacity. This conclusion is crystal clear. However, the sentence «secondo motivo, per cui può credersi giusta, e necessaria la pena di morte» contains a term which looks problematic. The use of the word «giusta» (applied to the two cases) risks destroying retrospectively the clarity of the argument developed in the first paragraph of the chapter, as it seems to imply that if proved necessary, the death penalty becomes «giusta», i.e., rightful, legitimate. But the first paragraph had stated that the death penalty is never «giusta», never founded on a right to punish deriving from the social contract, and is therefore always illegitimate. Does Beccaria use that word inadvertently, or is it a deliberate choice? Is it a «terminological imprecision»47, or a precise option? What is certain is that the presence in this sentence of the word «giusta» – legitimate – blurs the interpretation and ushers in controversial questions. To sum up: as framed in the original Italian text, the first of the two cases – the two «motivi», possible exceptions to a total abolition of the death penalty – presents an ambiguity which requires strong hermeneutic moves. As to the sentence mentioning the second case, although it provides a hypothesis which will be unambiguously rejected in the rest of the chapter, it nonetheless hosts cionj, «Ius» e «potestas», cit., p. 43. 47 Francioni, «Ius» e «potestas», cit., note 33, p. 19. 103 The first English translation of Dei delitti e delle pene a problematic word. It is, as I said, the term «giusta» – legitimate – applied on grounds of necessity to both cases. Again, an effort of interpretation is called for, which is all the more necessary here as the ambiguity bears on fundamental aspects of Beccaria’s thinking. With this in mind, let us now read the 1767 English translation: But the punishment of death is not authorised by any right; for I have demonstrated that no such right exists. It is therefore a war of a whole nation against a citizen, whose destruction they consider as necessary, or useful to the general good. But if I can further demonstrate, that it is neither necessary nor useful, I shall have gained the cause of humanity. The death of a citizen cannot be necessary, but in one case. When, though deprived of his liberty, he has such power and connections as may endanger the security of the nation; when his existence may produce a dangerous revolution in the established form of government. But, even in this case, it can only be necessary, when a nation is on the verge of recovering or losing its liberty; or in times of absolute anarchy, when the disorders themselves hold the place of laws. But in a reign of tranquility [...] there can be no necessity for taking away the life of a subject48. A number of modifications attract our attention, some of them highly significant if viewed in light of present-day debate and of the interpretative options illustrated above. The sentence «But the punishment of death is not authorised by any right; for I have demonstrated that no such right exists», for instance, is not an exact translation of: «Non è dunque la pena di morte un Diritto, mentre ho dimostrato che tale, essere non può», and sounds slightly more assertive, admitting of no exception that might intervene even in the future. This change, however, could be attributed simply to the unavoidable differences entailed by all translations. On the contrary, the addition of «to the general good» already reveals a precise interpretative perspective, soon to be endorsed by other occurrences. The words: «even in this case, it can only be necessary» correspond only partly to «La morte di qualche Cittadino diviene dunque necessaria quando la nazione ricupera o perde». «Can only» restricts the field of application to a particular case only, whereas «diviene dunque necessaria» states a necessity but does not point to its limits. Pride of place in an abolitionist perspective must be given, however, to the translation of the words «o nel tempo dell’anarchia», which become «or in times of absolute anarchy». No reason of translation technique whatsoever required the insertion here of the word «absolute», evidently derived from a hermeneutic option. The sen- tence can now only be interpreted as denying all possibility of inflicting the death penalty within the social contract, not even under special circumstances. The translator seems to have tried to remove the ambiguity of the ‘first case’ by taking a stride in the abolitionist direction. «Absolute anarchy» definitely indicates a condition of total dissolution of the social contract, with a reversion to the state of nature. It conveys, more directly, the idea that, both in a normal and in an exceptional state of things, under the social contract the death penalty is always illegitimate and should never be inflicted. Another change also strikes the reader. It is the translator’s omission of the clause «unless his death were the only real way to deter others from committing crimes. And this is the second reason for believing that the death penalty could be just and necessary49 («se non quando [...] necessaria la pena di morte»). Commenting above on the Italian original of this passage, we have not ignored the ambiguity introduced by the presence of the word «giusta». Eliminating the sentence with the explicit mention of a second case as well as the word «giusta» (legitimate), the ambiguity concerning a possible clash of paradigms disappears altogether. This does not mean that the content of the second case has been erased, since the confutation on historical and psychological grounds of the dissuasive capacity of the death penalty is amply provided for by the rest of the chapter. Again, the English translation significantly sweeps away all ambiguity, taking a precise stance in the same direction as the other modifications. The meaning becomes unequivocal: «in a reign of tranquility», when the social contract is functioning, under no circumstance whatsoever – not even when such contract is at risk of dissolution – can the death penalty be considered legitimate, necessary or useful. It is worth noting, incidentally, that if the second “motivo” has disappeared also in Morellet, the case of other modifications is different. Take, for example the corresponding French passage50: La peine de mort n’est donc autorisée par aucun droit. Elle ne peut être qu’une guerre de la nation contre un Citoyen dont on regarde la desctruction comme utile et nécessaire à la conservation de la Société. Si donc je démontre que, dans l’etat ordinaire de la Société, la mort d’un Citoyen n’est ni utile, ni nécessaire, j’aurais gagné la cause de l’Humanité. Je dis dans l’état ordinaire; car la mort d’un Citoyen peut être nécessaire en un cas; et c’est lorsque, privé de sa liberté, il a encore des relations et une puissance qui peuvent troubler la tranquillité de la nation; quand 49 On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings, cit., p. 52. In chapter XXVIII of the Italian original and the English translation; in chapter XVI of the French translation, pp. 98-99. 50 48 An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, cit., pp. 103-104. 104 Rosamaria Loretelli son existence peut produire une révolution dans la forme du gouvernement établi. Ce cas ne peut avoir lieu que lorsqu’une nation perd ou recouvre sa liberté, ou dans les temps d’Anarchie, [...] Mais pendant le règne tranquille de la Législation [...] il ne peut y avoir aucune nécessité d’ôter la vie à un Citoyen. The French and the English translations are similar, but not identical. Morellet also removes the sentence which mentions a second case and contains the word “giusta”; and he also uses the expression «ce cas ne peut avoir lieu que» which is conceptually similar to «but, even in this case, it can only» and is different from «divien dunque necessaria quando». However, he does not add the word «absolute» to «anarchy», and exhibits other differences which reveal a conceptual distancing of the two translations. We can thus conclude that the English translator did not only choose at times the French and at other times the Italian texts as his sources, but also inserted modifications of his own to be found in neither text. Therefore, he was not guided simply by a search for clarity but also by a philosophical vocation and a strategy, which were purely his own and which prompted him to dissolve the ambiguity of the original Beccarian text in a coherently radical abolitionist direction. also for minor offenses such as poaching, forgery, stealing objects of little value from shops and houses, acts of theft difficult to prevent because these forms of property were so widely exposed to risk. Hence, the only way to protect property and deter crime was the threat of a terrifying punishment. Of course, these ideas were not shared by everybody in Britain, and debate had started before Beccaria, to continue for years also fuelled by his book 52. However, it was only in 1808 that Samuel Romilly succeeded in securing the repeal of the statutes which imposed the death penalty for small thefts committed without violence. In 1820, bills to abolish capital punishment for wounding cattle and destroying trees were passed by the House of Commons but not by the House of Lords. And only in 1832 was the punishment of death abolished for stealing a horse or a sheep53. In the light of this situation, the omission of the sentence mentioning a second «motive» in chapter XXVIII, could also be explained as an attempt to remove a linguistic ambiguity which might open up a space, albeit not intended by Beccaria, for a hypothetical future justification of the death penalty on grounds of deterrence. On this subject, the English translations exhibits another discrepancy with the Italian original. At the end of chapter XLVI, titled «Of Pardons», the translation has the following passage: A BRIEF NOTE ON DETERRENCE IN BRITISH EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PENAL PRACTICE. Deterrence was a sore point of eighteenth-century British criminal law and practice. As deterrence was a core principle in Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene, it was also the primary justification for the application of punishment in Britain. However, the two conceptions were miles apart. If Beccaria suggested deterrence through certainty of punishment, celerity, equality and penal parsimony, the British penal system mostly conceived it as expressed by William Paley in The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. Along with Beccaria, Paley thought that the «proper end of human punishment is, not the satisfaction of justice [Paley’s terminology for revenge of the State], but the prevention of crimes»51. Differently from Beccaria, however, his conclusions were that, since punishment could not be certain, it must be exemplary. Thus, punishment should not be proportionate to the severity of the crime, but to the ease with which it was committed. This justified the application of the death penalty not only for murder, but 51 W. Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Printed for R. Faulder, London 1785, p. 1. A small crime is sometimes pardoned, if the person offended chuses [sic] to forgive the offender. This may be an act of good nature and humanity, but it is contrary to the good of the public. For, although a private citizen may dispense with satisfaction for the injury he has received, he cannot remove the necessity of example. The right of punishing belongs not to any individual in particular, but to society in general, or the sovereign. He may renounce his own portion of this right, but cannot give up that of others54. More coherently with its subject, in the Italian original this passage is located in chapter XXIX («Della cattura»/«Of Imprisonment»)55. By moving it to a more 52 Draper, Cesare Beccaria’s influence on early discussions of punishment, 1764-1789, cit., p. 183. 53 Maestro, Cesare Beccaria and the Origins of Penal Reform, Temple University Press, Philadelphia 1973, pp. 136-137. For a broad perspective, see L. Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750, vol. I. The Movement for Reform (1750-1833), Stevens, London 1948. 54 An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, cit., p. 177. 55 Dei delitti e delle pene, Harlem 1766, cit., VI, p. 139 (cap. XXIX. «Della cattura»): «Alcuni liberano dalla pena di un piccolo delitto quando la parte offesa lo perdoni, atto conforme alla beneficienza ed all’umanità, ma contrario al bene pubblico, quasi che un Cittadino privato potesse egualmente togliere colla sua remissione la necessità dell’esempio, come può condonare il rifacimento dell’offesa. Il diritto di far punire non è di The first English translation of Dei delitti e delle pene visible position, just before the conclusions (XLVII, «Conclusion»), the translator evidently wanted to call attention to it. This passage, in fact, refers to what was a common practice in Britain, and questions it on theoretical grounds. For reasons of convenience – since the offended party had to face all the expenses for capture and prosecution – and for reasons of empathy with the people who, out of necessity, stole goods of little value and nonetheless risked death on the scaffold, the victims of thefts often did not prosecute the offenders56. This was one of the reasons that condemned the British penal system to great uncertainty. Certainty of punishment is what this translation highlights here in accordance with Beccaria’s tenet and in opposition to the English practice of random prosecution and discretionary sentencing. Certain but mild punishments, as recalled in the concluding chapter, which the English translator transposes with great care and precision to the last sentence, evidenced in italics as in the Italian original: That a punishment may not be an act of violence, of one, or of many against a private member of society, it should be publish [public] immediate and necessary; the least possible in the case given; proportioned to the crime, and determined by the laws. CONCLUSIONS. The results of the collation of the first English translation of Dei delitti e delle pene with the Italian original and the French version brings me to conclusions along two lines. One specifically relates to the actual text that introduced Beccaria in the English-speaking world. The other faces the more general question of what information may be gleaned from the peculiar unfaithfulness of eighteenth-century translations. un solo, ma di tutti i Cittadini, o del Sovrano. E gli non può che rinunziare alla sua porzione di diritto, ma non annullare quella degli altri». The French version has this passage in chapter XX. «Que la punition doit être certaine et inévitable. Les graces»: «Quequefois on s’asbtient de punir un léger délit, lorsque l’offensé le pardonne; acte de bienfaisance, mais contraïre au bien public. Un particulier peut bien ne pas exiger la reparation du dommage qu’on lui a fait, mais le pardon qu’il accorde ne peut détruire la nécessité de l’example. Le droit de punir n’appartient à aucun Citoyen en particulier, mais à tous et au Souverain. L’offensé peut renoncer à sa portion de ce droit, mais non pas ôter aux autres la leur» (p. 132). It should be remembered that the chapter «Delle grazie» appeared in the fifth edition for the first time, and for this reason it was not in Morellet’s version, which was based on the third edition, albeit with some additions sent by the author to the translator before the fifth edition was in print. See page 000 here above (PER REDAZIONE: p. 000). 56 J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England. 1660-1800, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986, pp. 35-73 (ch. II. «Prosecution»). 105 As to the text, the collation enabled me to define once and for all the question of the sources for the 1767 English translation. There were no doubt two sources. One source was an Italian 1766 edition (either the sixth edition harlem, et se vend a paris, Chez Molini Libraire, Quai des Augustins; or, the sixth edition harlem, 1766), and the other was the French version. The collation also revealed that the English translation contains relevant, albeit not especially frequent, differences in form and content, which appear in neither source. In these cases, the original Italian text was consistently and coherently modified. Examining an excerpt from chapter II («Of the Right to punish»), I found that the translation eliminated an ambiguity which ran the risk of being interpreted as acknowledging a connection between law and force, and of placing the origin of law in the utility of the ‘greatest number’ (which, differently from «common utility», might counteract penal parsimony, consenting penal excess). I also examined passages from chapter XXVIII («Of the Punishment of Death»), realizing that the changes introduced aimed at rendering the text unequivocally and thoroughly abolitionist. Interestingly and unexpectedly, these modifications involve questions focused also by present-day debate over the interpretation of these passages of the Italian text. Translations are first of all interpretations. One can therefore deduce that such relevant changes represent, as it were, a kind of taking sides in the eighteenth-century Beccarian controversy, and that they can thus provide clues for the understanding of the project this translation was involved in and the task it intended to fulfil. It is worth noting that this translation certainly had a wide audience from the start, considering the fact that many editions were published in Britain and in the overseas colonies in the first few years after its initial appearance. Moreover, its first publisher John Almon was politically involved and would soon publish books and a periodical for the American revolutionaries. Much remains to be investigated, but I am convinced that the information provided here may well offer a useful lead for further discoveries. A knowledge of how the text which disseminated Beccaria’s ideas in the Englishspeaking world was actually framed may help to clarify aspects of its reception, with the reasons for its rejections and acceptances. Which text, for instance, triggered the Pennsylvania experiment? Was it Beccaria’s original, the French translation or the English translation? As we have seen, they are different in crucial points, and the question therefore is anything but pointless. So much for the conclusions focusing directly on Beccaria’s text. The second line of considerations pertains to a more general perspective. As is well known, 106 an important dimension of eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism fed on translations. In many cases, the French language functioned as a «clearing-house» for books written in other languages, which were translated first into French and subsequently into other European languages. This was probably the most common procedure. But, as we have seen in the case of On Crimes and Punishments, not the only one; other procedures were followed as well. Were there many such hybrid cases? Since, in the eighteenth century, translations were a highly effective channel for the dissemination of texts, promoting the circulation of ideas and of the new languages of politics, law, philosophy, economy, science and medicine; and since they were notoriously unfaithful to the original and more target-oriented that in later times, one should expect interesting information to be gleaned through close examinations of translations. What has surfaced in our enquiry could be taken as an example. I am firmly of the view that highly relevant but otherwise elusive details remain to be brought to light by probing the folds of the changes which eighteenth-century translations made to texts. As a corollary to the intentio auctoris, the intentions which underpinned the work of eighteenth-century translators are a crucial fact which cannot be ignored if we are to achieve a proper understanding of the eighteenth-century transmission of texts into foreign cultural environments. Rosamaria Loretelli Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Saggi Citation: J.D. Bessler (2019) The Marquis Beccaria: An Italian penal reformer’s meteoric rise in the British Isles in the transatlantic Republic of Letters. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 107-120. doi: 10.13128/ds-25443 Copyright: © 2019 J.D. Bessler. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index. php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. The Marquis Beccaria: An Italian penal reformer’s meteoric rise in the British Isles in the transatlantic Republic of Letters John D. Bessler University of Baltimore School of Law Abstract. This article traces the reception of Cesare Beccaria’s book, Dei delitti e delle pene (1764), in Britain and in colonial and early America. That book, first translated into English as An Essay on Crimes and Punishments (1767), catalyzed penal reform and the anti-gallows movement on both sides of the Atlantic. As the first Enlightenment text to make a comprehensive case against capital punishment, On Crimes and Punishments became a bestseller, appearing in multiple English-language editions and attracting much public attention. Widely read by an array of British and American lawmakers and other civic-minded penal reformers, On Crimes and Punishments was printed in a number of European and American cities, including London, Glasgow, Dublin, Edinburgh, Philadelphia, Charleston, South Carolina, and New York. Beccaria’s book influenced a large number of prominent figures (from William Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, and Samuel Romilly in England to John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and William Bradford in America), and it led to the end of the Ancien Régime. Keywords. Cesare Beccaria, Enlightenment, Dei delitti e delle pene, On Crimes and Punishments, Penal Reform. I. INTRODUCTION. Through his influential essay on the criminal law, Cesare Beccaria had a major impact on Western civilization and legal systems around the globe1. His landscape-changing book, first published anonymously as Dei delitti e delle pene (1764)2, and translated into English as An Essay on Crimes and 1 J.D. Bessler, The Celebrated Marquis: An Italian Noble and the Making of the Modern World, Carolina Academic Press, Durham (nc) 2018; Id., The Economist and the Enlightenment: How Cesare Beccaria Changed Western Civilization, Eur. J.L. & Econ. (Sept. 23, 2016), <http://link.springer. com/article/10.1007/s10657-016-9546-z> (03/2019). 2 The first Italian edition of Cesare Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene (1764) contains no information as to authorship or place of printing. Another Italian edition of Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene, published in 1765 and labeled the «Terza Edizione» (third edition), also does not mention Beccaria’s name on the title page. That edition, described as being printed «In Lausanna» Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 107-120 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25443 108 Punishments (1767), helped catalyze the abolition of torture and made punishments less severe 3. As the first Enlightenment text to make a comprehensive case against capital punishment, it also led to the curtailment of death sentences and executions in Europe and the Americas4. Beccaria himself has been described as one of the founders of the field of criminology5. As a foundational text, one that argued for proportion between crimes and punishments and against arbitrariness and tyranny, Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments shaped constitutions and penal codes worldwide6. Through his book, one frequently reprinted and translated into several languages7, Cesare Beccaria became a (a false imprint, since the book was printed in Marco Coltellini’s printing office in Livorno in March 1765), contains the now-famous frontispiece depicting an idealized figure, Justice, rejecting three severed heads being presented by a sword-wielding executioner. In the engraving by Giovanni Lapi, prepared upon Beccaria’s instructions, Justice is instead focused on a pile of tools and shackles representing the punishment of hard labor and imprisonment. C. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, transl. by G.R. Newman & P. Marongiu, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (nj) 20095, p. lx; C. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings, ed. by A. Thomas, transl. by A. Thomas & J. Parzen, University of Toronto Press, Toronto 2008, p. 166 note 36; J.D. Bessler, The American Death Penalty: A Short (But Long) History, in R.M. Bohm and G. Lee (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Capital Punishment, Routledge, New York 2017, ch. 1. Because of the Inquisition, Beccaria’s book «was published anonymously at first for fear of serious religious and government reprisals» with Dei delitti e delle pene in fact placed on the Catholic Church’s Index of Forbidden Books in 1766. J. Hostettler, Cesare Beccaria: The Genius of ‘On Crimes and Punishments’, Waterside Press, Hampshire (uk) 2011, p. 21. 3 J.D. Bessler, The Birth of American Law: An Italian Philosopher and the American Revolution, Carolina Academic Press, Durham (nc) 2014. An encyclopedia notes that «[t]he last recorded instance of the use of torture in England was in the reign of Charles I. (1640) to compel a confession of treason». D.C. Gilman, H.T. Peck and F.M. Colby (eds.), The New International Encyclopædia, Dodd, Mead & Co., New York 1911, vol. 19, p. 372. Torture was abolished considerably later in continental Europe. Prussia abolished torture in 1754, but other locales (Saxony, 1770; Poland and Austria-Bohemia, 1776; France, 1780; Tuscany, 1786; Austrian Netherlands, 1787; Sicily, 1789) abolished it only after the publication of Dei delitti e delle pene. J.H. Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof, in W.F. Schulz (ed.), The Phenomenon of Torture: Readings and Commentary, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2007, pp. 19-26: 25. 4 J.H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Sanction of Imprisonment for Serious Crime, «The Journal of Legal Studies», 5, 1976, pp. 35-60: 35 («The movement for the abolition of capital punishment is rightly associated with the writers of the Enlightenment, especially Beccaria, whose enormously influential tract appeared in 1764»). 5 J.F. Anderson, Criminological Theories: Understanding Crime in America, Jones & Bartlett Learning, Burlington (ma) 20152, p. 68. 6 See, e.g., Bessler, The Birth of American Law, cit.; Id., The Celebrated Marquis, cit. 7 Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene was continually printed and reprinted in the years after its initial publication. For example, in 1766, a sixth edition («Edizione Sesta») of Beccaria’s book was published in Italian and bears the false imprint «Harlem». It was listed to be sold («Et se vend») «a paris, Chez Molini Libraire, Quai des Augustins». Dei delitti e delle pene («Edizione Sesta: Di nuovo corretta ed accresciuta», 1766). John D. Bessler global celebrity whose name became synonymous with the Italian Enlightenment, or Illuminismo8. First translated into English by an unknown translator 9, Dei delitti e delle pene, through its early Italian editions10 and its French, English and other translations11, materially transformed continental European as well as AngloAmerican law12. 8 B. Cassin (ed.), Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon, Princeton University Press, Princeton (nj) 2004, p. 521. 9 R. Loretelli, The First English Translation of Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments: Uncovering the Editorial and Political Contexts, «Diciottesimo Secolo», II, 2017, pp. 1-22. DOI 10.13128/ds-20618. 10 Information on the early Italian editions of Dei delitti e delle pene can be found in the introduction and notes to a modern translation of Dei delitti e delle pene. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings, ed. Thomas, cit., pp. xxviii, xxx, 166 note 36. See also C. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings, ed. by R. Bellamy, transl. by R. Davies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003, p. xlvii («A new scholarly Edizione Nazionale of Beccaria’s complete works, under the general editorial control of the late Luigi Firpo, began to appear in 1984. The first volume was Dei delitti e delle pene, ed. Gianni Francioni, Milan, Mediobanca, 1984»). 11 The first French translation of Cesare Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene was prepared by French philosophe André Morellet. It appeared at the end of December 1765, with Morellet writing a letter to Beccaria on January 3, 1766 about the new translation, titled Traité des délits et des peines. B.E. Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural Order, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (ma) 2011, pp. 54-55; see also C. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, transl. by G.R. Newman & P. Marongiu, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (nj) 20095, pp. lx-lxi («In 1765 Beccaria sent via d’Alembert a copy of the third edition to French Abbè André Morellet, who produced a French translation, which appeared in Paris on December 28, 1765 [with the false notation of à Lausanne], introducing a number of substantial changes, altering its internal structure and the position of chapters and paragraphs, leaving only four paragraphs [III, IV, V, and XIX] in their original position»). «By 1767, when the book was first translated into English, it already had been through several French and Italian editions». J.R. Lilly, F.T. Cullen and R.A. Ball, Criminological Theory: Context and Consequences, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks (ca) 20074, p. 16. 12 See generally J.D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, «Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy», 4, 2009, 2, pp. 195-328: 195; Id., The Italian Enlightenment and the American Revolution: Cesare Beccaria’s Forgotten Influence on American Law, «Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice» 37, 2016, 1, pp. 1-184, Article 1. For a discussion of Beccaria’s impact on America’s founders, see Id., Cruel and Unusual: The American Death Penalty and the Founders’ Eighth Amendment, Northeastern University Press, Boston 2012, pp. 31-65; Id., Beccaria in America: How the Italian Enlightenment Shaped American Law, in An den Wurzeln des modernen Strafrechts: Die juristische Aufklärung Cesare Beccarias und die Strafgewalt, Lorenzo Picotti (hrsg.), Lit Verlag GmbH & Co., Zürich 2017, pp. 107-121; K. Preyer, Cesare Beccaria and the Founding Fathers, in Blackstone in America: Selected Essays of Kathryn Preyer, ed. by M.S. Bilder, M. Marcus and R.K. Newmyer, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009, p. 241; see also J.D. Bessler, The Anomaly of Executions: The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the 21st Century, «British Journal of American Legal Studies», 2, 2013, pp. 297-451: 324 («Blackstone’s Commentaries, which also communicated Cesare Beccaria’s ideas to a much wider audience, were highly influential in the American colonies and early America»). An Italian penal reformer’s meteoric rise in the British Isles in the transatlantic Republic of Letters This article will trace the early reception of Beccaria’s work in Britain and America, charting its early impact and focusing on the key figures who promoted its dissemination. As I will show, Beccaria’s work had enormous success in Anglophone countries, was hailed as an important, innovative contribution to legal thinking and rapidly became a bestseller. I will trace, in particular, the initial reception of On Crimes and Punishments in the British Isles amidst the ongoing, transatlantic book trade and the Enlightenment’s vigorous, cross-cultural exchange of ideas. While the influence of Beccaria’s book on English discourse on punishment has been traced by other scholars13, this article provides a comprehensive view of its early influence. The article specifically highlights how On Crimes and Punishments – advertised and sold throughout the British Isles – quickly transformed the legal landscape by influencing thinkers such as Bentham and Blackstone, even if it took many years for Beccaria’s ideas to bear fruit in terms of concrete penal reform14. Britain’s infamous «Bloody Code» – the set of laws that, at one time, made more than 200 crimes punishable by death – had long dominated English life15. But Beccaria’s book, on which Voltaire wrote a famous commentary which 13 E.g., H. Dunthorne, Beccaria and Britain, in Crime, Protest and Police in Modern British Society: Essays in Memory of David J. V. Jones, ed. by D.W. Howell and K.O. Morgan, University of Wales Press, Cardiff 1999; A.J. Draper, Cesare Beccaria’s Influence on English Discussions of Punishments, 1764-1789, «History of European Ideas», 26, 2000, pp. 177-199: 177. 14 See, e.g., C. Phillipson, Three Criminal Law Reformers: Beccaria, Bentham, Romilly, J.M. Dent and Sons, London 1923; see also D. Hirschel, W. Wakefield and S. Sasse, Criminal Justice in England and the United States, Jones and Bartlett Publishers, Sudbury (ma) 20082, p. 230 (taking note of the reform efforts in England of John Howard, William Eden, Samuel Romilly and Jeremy Bentham). This article focuses on the impact of Beccaria’s ideas in the British Isles in the earliest years after the publication of the first English-language translation of Dei delitti e delle pene appeared in London in 1767. 15 J.D. Bessler, The American Enlightenment: Eliminating Capital Punishment in the United States, in Capital Punishment: A Hazard to a Sustainable Criminal Justice System?, ed. by L. Scherdin, Ashgate, Aldershot 2014, p. 97; see also F. McLynn, Crime and Punishment in Eighteenth-century England, Routledge, London 2002, p. xi («The Bloody Code is the name traditionally given to the English system of criminal law during the period 1688-1815. In these years a huge number of felonies punishable by death was added to the statute book»); J. Walliss, The Bloody Code in England and Wales, 1760-1830, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham (ch), 2018, p. 2 («Between 1688 and 1820, the number of capital crimes in England and Wales increased exponentially from fifty to over 220»). In actuality, «the likelihood of whether a capitally convicted felon was executed was often determined by the county in which they were tried and convicted» (ibidem, p. 80). «[T]he Bloody Code», scholar John Walliss observes, «was significantly less brutal in practice» than a reading of statute books might suggest. «While those convicted of murder more often than not expiated for their crime on the gallows», Walliss explains, «the majority of those convicted of lesser offences were often pardoned, receiving instead a sentence of transportation or even imprisonment» (ibidem, pp. 1-2). 109 was regularly reprinted with it16, helped to transform the debate in Britain, leading a number of lawmakers and legal commentators, including Basil Montagu17 and Sir Samuel Romilly18, to question the efficacy and morality of severe punishments19. It took many years – indeed decades – for the British to curtail death sentences20, but today, the United Kingdom no longer uses capital punishment21. The earliest English-language editions of Beccaria’s book were printed in London in 1767 by John Almon, and in 1769, 1770, and 1775 by Francis Newbery; in Glasgow in 1770 for Robert Urie; in Dublin in 1767 and 1777 for John Exshaw; in Edinburgh in 1778 by Bell & Murray for William Gordon and William Creech, and, in another 1778 edition, by Alexander Donaldson (to be sold at his shops in Edinburgh and London). Across the Atlantic, American editions of On Crimes and Pun16 Bessler, Cruel and Unusual, cit., p. 48. Montagu, of Lincoln’s Inn, cited, quoted and excerpted Beccaria’s work repeatedly in his own two-volume book, a compilation of writers who had addressed the subject of capital punishment. B. Montagu, The Opinions of Different Authors upon the Punishment of Death, Longman, Hurst, Rees, and Orme, London 1809, vol. 1, pp. 9, 18-26, 152, 208, 228, 288, 293, 295; ibidem, vol. 2, pp. 33, 35-36, 39, 109, 173. 18 In his first speech on criminal law reform, made in 1808, Sir Samuel Romilly forthrightly acknowledged his intellectual debt to Beccaria. Bessler, The Birth of American Law, cit., pp. 184, 220-221. 19 For a contextualization of the death penalty debate in Great Britain and the United States in the pre- and post-On Crimes and Punishments era, see The Death Penalty: Debates in Britain and the US, 1725-1868, ed. by J.E. Crimmins, Thoemmes Continuum, Bristol 2004, 7 vols.; J.D. Bessler, The Death Penalty in Decline: From Colonial America to the Present, «Criminal Law Bulletin», 245, 2014, 50, pp. 245-262. 20 J.F. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014, vol. 3, pp. 183-84 («In 1837 [...] the punishment of death for forgery was abolished in all the cases of forgery which had been declared to be capital by the act of 1830 [...] except only the case of forging the Great Seal and other public seals. This offence continued to be high treason punishable with death down to 1861, when it became a felony punishable with penal servitude for life as a maximum»); V.A.C. Gatrell, The Hanging Tree: Execution and the English People 1770-1868, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1994, p. 589 (noting that the last man publicly hanged in England was Michael Barrett, an Irishman, who was executed outside Newgate on May 27, 1868); compare P. King, Punishing the Criminal Corpse, 1700-1840: Aggravated Forms of the Death Penalty in England, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2017, p. 148 («By 1808, the year in which Romilly launched his parliamentary attack on the Bloody Code, ten months would pass by without a single hanging in London, and crime-scene hangings had reached their lowest levels for nearly 100 years»). 21 See B.P. Block & J. Hostettler, Hanging in the Balance: A History of the Abolition of Capital Punishment in Britain, Waterside Press, Hampshire (uk) 1997, p. ix (noting that capital punishment was formally abolished in the United Kingdom in 1969); see also P. Hodgkinson & W.A. Schabas (eds.), Capital Punishment: Strategies for Abolition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004, p. 106 (noting that the death penalty was suspended in England and Wales in 1965); N. Twitchell, The Politics of the Rope: The Campaign to Abolish Capital Punishment in Britain 19551969, Arena Books, Bury St. Edmunds 2012 (describing the abolitionist campaign). 17 Basil 110 ishments were printed and offered for sale in 1777 in Charleston, South Carolina, by David Bruce, and in 1778 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, by Robert Bell22. «Cesare Beccaria’s seminal On Crimes and Punishments (1764)», Michael Widener of Yale Law Library and Mark Weiner of Rutgers Law School write, «lay the foundation for modern penology and criminal justice». An Italian edition of Dei delitti e delle pene, they point out, was printed in London in 1774 for the Società dei Filosofi23. The English-speaking publishers of Beccaria’s book were prominent figures. Francis Newbery (1743-1780) was educated at Oxford and Cambridge, and was a respected London bookseller who operated out of Paternoster Row and, after the death of his father in 1767, at St. Paul’s Churchyard 24. Robert Urie (1711-1771) was a printer and bookseller in Glasgow from 1744 to 1771, and he published Francis Hutcheson’s Reflections upon Laughter and translations of the works of Rousseau, Voltaire and D’Alembert, among others25. John Exshaw was an Irish bookseller, printer and publisher operating out of Dublin26, while Bell & Murray was a partnership between John Murray (1737-1793), a London bookseller, and John Bell (1735-1806), an Edinburgh bookseller27. 22 This information was obtained through a search of the WorldCat database and from a dictionary of English, Scottish and Irish printers and booksellers. The Bibliographical Society at the Oxford University Press, A Dictionary of the Printers and Booksellers Who Were at Work in England, Scotland and Ireland from 1726 to 1775, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1932. William Creech (1745-1815) was a bookseller and publisher in Edinburgh. He was educated at Edinburgh University and, as a young man, had spent time in London, Paris and Holland and had toured continental Europe. He became the original publisher of the works of Adam Ferguson and other famous writers (ibidem, pp. 296-297). William Gordon, who died in 1794, was a bookseller in Edinburgh who had been sued for selling pirated editions of various works (ibidem, p. 312); «GORDON, William bookseller Edinburg». National Library of Scotland, <https://www.nls.uk/media/63385/sbti-a-m.pdf> (04/2019). 23 M. Widener & M.S. Weiner, Law’s Picture Books: The Yale Law Library Collection, Talbot Publishing, Clark (nj) 2017, pp. 1, 9, 122. As Widener and Weiner write of that Italian edition – and of its famous frontispiece – published in London: «The frontispiece image [...] was engraved on Beccaria’s detailed instructions, and it was frequently reproduced and copied by eighteenth-century publishers. Lady Justice recoils from an executioner’s offering of three decapitated heads and instead gazes approvingly at various instruments of labor, measurement, and detention» (ibidem, p. 122). 24 A Dictionary of the Printers and Booksellers Who Were at Work in England, Scotland and Ireland from 1726 to 1775, pp. 178-179. 25 Ibidem, p. 362; R.J. Jones, Tobias Smollett in the Enlightenment: Travels Through France, Italy, and Scotland, Bucknell University Press, Lewisburg 2011, p. 6. 26 A Dictionary of the Printers and Booksellers Who Were at Work in England, Scotland and Ireland from 1726 to 1775, p. 383; M. Pollard, A Dictionary of Members of the Dublin Book Trade 1550-1800 Based on the Records of the Guild of St Luke the Evangelist, Bibliographical Society, London 2000, p. 190. 27 R.B. Sher, The Enlightenment and the Book: Scottish Authors and Their John D. Bessler Alexander Donaldson (1727-1794), the bookseller in Edinburgh and London, «became known for selling cheap reprints of books which were in his opinion out of copyright»28. The early American publishers of Beccaria’s treatise were equally prominent. While David Bruce (1731-1783), a Scotsman, had settled in Charleston, South Carolina, in 1759, and had formed a lucrative partnership with Robert Wells29, Robert Bell – the Scottish-born printer who had emigrated to Philadelphia – had, during the early 1770s in Philadelphia, published and sold through subscriptions William Blackstone’s four-volume Commentaries on the Laws of England30. Before his death in 1784, Bell – perhaps most famously – published the original edition of Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, the political pamphlet that helped spur the American Revolution and America’s quest for independence from Great Britain31. «With rare exceptions, such as octavo editions Publishers in Eighteenth-Century Britain, Ireland and America, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2006, pp. 274, 325, 381-82, 388, 453, 703, 762; Bessler, The Birth of American Law, cit., p. 88. 28 Sher, The Enlightenment and the Book, cit., p. 703; A Dictionary of the Printers and Booksellers Who Were at Work in England, Scotland and Ireland from 1726 to 1775, pp. 77-78. 29 G.C. Rogers, Jr. and D.R. Chesnutt (eds.), The Papers of Henry Laurens, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia 1979, vol. 7, p. 3; South Carolina Imprints, 1731-1800: A Descriptive Bibliography, ABCClio Information Services, Santa Barbara, CA 1985, p. xxxi. On July 31, 1777, a notice in a South Carolina publication announced that «An Edition of Beccaria on Crimes and Punishments is published here by Mr. Bruce» (ibidem, p. 117). That edition of On Crimes and Punishments also contained the commentary attributed to Voltaire (ibidem). 30 E.C. Surrency, A History of American Law Publishing, Oceana Publications, New York 1990, p. 23. Robert Bell was described as a «witty, energetic, skeptical, and imaginative man» and fourteen hundred copies of Blackstone’s Commentaries were ordered in advance from Robert Bell’s print shop (ibidem, pp. 23-24). Robert Bell, who had been born in Glasgow, had moved to Dublin in 1759 after serving as an apprentice to Robert Taylor, a bookbinder in Berwick-upon-Tweed who is known to have been a «famous piratical printer». Bell himself was «a passionate defender of his right to reprint whatever he pleased, not only copyrighted English books but also books his colleagues in Dublin had already printed or reprinted». «In 1767», one source notes of the same year Bell emigrated from Dublin to Philadelphia, «he reprinted a pamphlet by another notorious pirate, the Scot Alexander Donaldson» and was «apparently driven out of town by Irish booksellers whom he had “printed upon”». J.N. Green, English Books and Printing in the Age of Franklin, in A History of the Book in America: The Colonial Book in the Atlantic World, ed. by H. Amory and D.D. Hall, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 2009, vol. 1, p. 284. 31 Sher, The Enlightenment and the Book, cit., pp. 512, 528. It was Dr. Benjamin Rush – a disciple of Beccaria – who suggested the title of Paine’s famous political pamphlet, the original proposed title being «Plain Truth». E.A. Duyckinck and G.L. Duyckinck, Cyclopædia of American Literature, Ch. Scribner, New York 1856, vol. 1, p. 198. David Bruce, the South Carolina printer, also reprinted Thomas Paine’s Common Sense. G.C. Rogers, Jr. and D.R. Chesnutt (eds.), The Papers of Henry Laurens, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia 1979, vol. 7, p. 3. An Italian penal reformer’s meteoric rise in the British Isles in the transatlantic Republic of Letters of Beccaria’s Essay on Crimes and Punishments and Miscellanies by M. de Voltaire», Richard Sher writes in The Enlightenment and the Book of America’s Revolutionary War period, «Bell limited his Enlightenment publications during the early years of the war to smaller works»32. All these editions and translations, as well as all the people who read, and then quoted from, On Crimes and Punishments, made Beccaria’s ideas ubiquitous in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. While Beccaria was regularly hailed as a «genius» or as «benevolent», «celebrated», «enlightened», «humane», «illustrious» or «learned»33, Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene – as the Encyclopedia of Italian Literary Studies puts it – «is widely considered the most important work» of the Italian Enlightenment 34. As Piers Beirne writes in Inventing Criminology: «The first copies of Dei delitti were printed in Livorno and circulated anonymously in the summer of 1764. Beccaria’s short treatise of 104 pages was an instant and dazzling success». In addition to the English-language editions of Dei delitti e delle pene printed from 1767 to 1778 that are listed above35, the following additional editions of An Essay on Crimes and Punishments were published in these locations (listed by year) by these publishers before 1800: London (1782) by printers and booksellers Charles Dilly and John Debrett (successor to Mr. Almon); London (1785) by E. Newbery; London (1786) for John Murray; Edinburgh (1788) by James Donaldson; and Philadelphia (1793) by William Young36. All the translations and editions of Beccaria’s book – ones that continued to be produced into the nineteenth century37 – made it the equivalent of a modern-day best32 Sher, The Enlightenment and the Book, cit., p. 530. Robert Bell’s 1778 edition of On Crimes and Punishments contained the commentary attributed to Voltaire. His reprinting of Voltaire’s Miscellanies was also printed in Philadelphia in 1778. E.T. Bannet, Transatlantic Stories and the History of Reading, 1720-1810: Migrant Fictions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011, p. 259; H.C. Jacobs, Gegen Folter und Todesstrafe, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 164. 33 Bessler, The Celebrated Marquis, pp. 9, 15, 23, 101, 126, 134, 171, 178, 180, 183, 201, 211, 217, 233-236, 246, 259, 269, 272, 284, 286-287, 290, 299, 302-304, 310, 315-316, 321-323. 34 G. Marrone (ed.), Encyclopedia of Italian Literary Studies, Routledge, New York 2007, vol. 1, p. 145. 35 See supra text accompanying note 22. 36 Bessler, The Birth of American Law, cit., pp. 75, 77, 80, 88, 91-92, 396. This information on editions of Beccaria’s book was also obtained through a WorldCat database search. 37 A WorldCat database search reveals the following editions (listing by location of publication and date) of An Essay on Crimes and Punishments that were published in the first two decades of the nineteenth century: London, 1801 (printed by E. Hodson for J. Bone); London, 1804 (printed for H.D. Symonds); Edinburgh, 1807 (Bell & Bradfute); Boston, 1809 (published by Farrand, Mallory and Co.); Philadelphia, 1809 (published by William P. Farrand and Co.); New York, 1809 (Ste- 111 seller. «By 1800», scholar Piers Beirne points out, «there had been no less than twenty-three Italian editions, fourteen French editions, and eleven English editions (three printed in the United States)»38. In 1786, William Bradford – one of James Madison’s closest college friends, later the Attorney General of the United States but then serving as Pennsylvania’s attorney general – tellingly wrote about Beccaria to Luigi Castiglioni, a botanist from Milan who visited North America from 1785 to 1787 and who had befriended Benjamin Franklin39. In presenting Castiglioni with a new American edition of On Crimes and Punishments in the wake of the Revolutionary War (1775-1783), Bradford had this to say in 1786 about Beccaria’s much-celebrated book: «Long before the recent Revolution, this book was common among lettered persons of Pennsylvania, who admired its principles without daring to hope that they could be adopted in legislation, since we copied the laws of England, to whose laws we were subject»40. In A History of Political Economy (1888), John Kells Ingram – a fellow of Trinity College, Dublin – emphasized that Beccaria «holds a foremost place» among those «in closest harmony with the general movement which was impelling the Western nations towards a new social order». In particular, Ingram wrote that Beccaria became «best known by his celebrated treatise Dei delitti e delle pene, by which Voltaire said he had made himphen Gould); Philadelphia, 1819 (published by Philip H. Nicklin). 38 P. Beirne, Inventing Criminology: Essays on the Rise of ‘Homo Criminalis’, State University of New York Press, Albany 1993, p. 13. In December 1793, Robert Southey, in a letter written from Bath to Horace Walpole Bedford, listed Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene among his «pocket companions», calling Beccaria «the philosopher of humanity». Southey added in that letter: «Beccaria pleases me much. I had long been self-convinced that the punishment of death was as improper as it was inhuman. Godwin carries this idea farther». Southey had borrowed the first volume of William Godwin’s An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793) from the Bristol Library Society between November 25 and 28, 1793 and the second volume between December 9 and 18, 1793. Robert Southey to Horace Walpole Bedford, 12[-15] December 1793, available at <https://www.rc.umd.edu/editions/southey_letters/Part_One/HTML/ letterEEd.26.72.html#back6> (03/2019). In An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, Godwin had quoted Dei delitti e delle pene in Italian and referred to «[t]he humane and benevolent Beccaria» (W. Godwin, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, and Its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness, G.G.J. & J. Robinson, London 1793, vol. 2, p. 716 and note *). Another prominent writer, the English poet and politician Lord Byron, himself owned a copy of Beccaria’s book, admired Beccaria’s bust in the Biblioteca Ambrosiana on a 1816 visit to Milan, and noted in a 1816 letter to his publisher, John Murray, that Beccaria had «published such admirable things against the punishment of death» (A.A. Schmidt, Byron and the Rhetoric of Italian Nationalism, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2010, p. 18). 39 Luigi Castiglioni’s Viaggio: Travels in the United States of North America, 1785-1787, ed. and transl. by A. Pace, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse (ny) 1983. 40 Bessler, The Celebrated Marquis, cit., p. 243. 112 self a benefactor of all Europe, and which, we are told, has been translated into twenty-two languages»41. After the initial publication of Dei delitti e delle pene, Voltaire had called Beccaria «a brother» and «a beneficent genius whose excellent book has educated Europe». In a subsequent letter to Voltaire, sent in 1777, Prussia’s powerful monarch, Frederick II, similarly wrote: «Beccaria has left nothing to glean after him; we need only to follow what he has so wisely indicated»42. II. VOLTAIRE’S COMMENTARY AND EARLY ENGLISHLANGUAGE EDITIONS OF BECCARIA’S BOOK. Voltaire was reading Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene in Italian by the autumn of 1765, and after another Frenchman, the abbé André Morellet, translated Beccaria’s book into French later that year, his fellow philosophe, Voltaire, decided to write a commentary on it43. While editions of André Morellet’s Italian-to-French translation, published in 1766 by Evert van Harrevelt as Traité des délits et des peines, appeared in Amsterdam, other early French editions – also printed in 1766 – appeared with false designations as being published in «Lausanne» and «Philadelphie» 44 . Voltaire fin41 J.K. Ingram, A History of Political Economy, Adam & Charles Black, Edinburgh 1888, p. 73. 42 Bessler, The Birth of American Law, cit., pp. 61, 146. 43 I. Davidson, Voltaire: A Life, Pegasus Books, New York 2012, ch. 27. Morellet had toured Italy in the 1750s, with 1766 being the publication date of Morellet’s French translation of Dei delitti e delle pene. Francis Lieber (ed.), Encyclopedædia Americana: A Popular Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, Literature, History, Politics and Biography, Lea & Blanchard, Philadelphia 1844, vol. 9, pp. 39-40. 44 Traité des delits et des peines, traduit de L’Italien, D’après la troisieme Edition, revue, corrigée & augmentée par l’Auteur, E. van Harrevelt, Amsterdam 1766 (with the following rectangular stamp on the title page «Koninklijke Bibliotheek te ’s Hage»); Traité des délits et des peines, traduit de l’Italien, D’après la troisieme Edition, revue, corrigée & augmentée par l’Auteur (1766) (not listing «Amsterdam» on the title page but containing the same rectangular stamp, «Koninklijke Bibliotheek te ’s Hage»); Traité des délits et des peines, traduit de l’Italien, D’après la troisieme Edition revue, corrigée & augmentée par l’Auteur («Philadelphie» 1766); see also M. Foucault, The Punitive Society: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1972-1973, ed. by B.E. Harcourt, transl. by G. Burchell, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2015, p. 41 note 28; L. De Michelis, Letters from London: A “Bridge” between Italy and Europe, in The Centre and the Margins in Eighteenth-Century British and Italian Cultures, ed. by F. O’Gorman and L. Guerra, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne (uk) 2013, p. 49 note 3 («Morellet’s translation [...] was published in Paris at the end of December 1765 with the false imprint of Lausanne, 1766»); E.R. James, A List of Legal Treatises Printed in the British Colonies and the American States Before 1801, The Lawbook Exchange, Union (nj) 2002, p. 180 (taking note of «A Philadelphie» marking on an early French translation of Beccaria’s treatise but noting: «It is doubtful whether this is an American print. Types and ornaments seem to point to a European origin»). Evert van Harrevelt (1729-1783) was a printer in Amsterdam. L.P. Sloos, Warfare and John D. Bessler ished his own commentary on Beccaria’s book by September 1766, and he had published it anonymously as Commentaire sur le livre Des délits et des peines, par un avocat de province. As Ian Davidson writes in Voltaire: A Life: «Voltaire’s authorship was quickly known, and his Commentaire gave substantial new impetus to the international renown of Beccaria. Later in the eighteenth century, in Italy, France, England and Germany, the two books were often published together in the same volume»45. This was, to modern eyes, a time of extreme brutality and grotesque executions, both in the British Isles and in continental Europe. In London, Tyburn’s scaffold – once known as the «triple tree» – was still in use, with oxen- or horse-drawn carts pulling the condemned to the place of execution46. Across the English Channel, in an especially horrific death, Robert-François Damiens had only recently, in 1757, been horrifically tortured and drawn and quartered for attempting to assassinate King Louis XV47. In February 1766, a French aristocrat, Jean François Lefèvre, chevalier de La Barre, of Abbeville, had also, much to Voltaire’s chagrin, been found guilty of blasphemy and sacrilege and then been condemned to have his tongue torn out, to be beheaded, and to have his body burned on a pyre. A copy of Voltaire’s Dictionnaire philosophique portatif had been found in La Barre’s room by the chief investigating magistrate, the mayor of Abbeville, and that book was also ordered to be burned in the same pyre. After La Barre’s sentence was confirmed by the parlement of Paris in June 1766, La Barre was tortured for an hour – the Age of Printing Catalogue of Early Printed Books from Before 1801 in Dutch Military Collections with Analytical Bibliographic Descriptions of 10,000 Works, Brill, Leiden 2009, pp. 330, 333; K. van Strien, Isabelle de Charrière (Belle de Zuylen) Early Writings: New Material from Dutch Archives, Éditions Peeters, Louvain 2005, pp. 18-19, 105, 331. Morellet, who later translated Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia, took considerable liberties in translating Beccaria’s text, reordering it and changing it significantly. Morellet’s translation of Beccaria’s book was nonetheless celebrated by prominent French philosophes. D. Gish and D. Klinghard, Thomas Jefferson and the Science of Republican Government: A Political Biography of Notes on the State of Virginia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2017, p. 255. 45 Davidson, Voltaire, cit., ch. 27; L. Silverman, Tortured Subjects: Pain, Truth, and the Body in Early Modern France, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2001, pp. 167, 230 note 53. 46 A. McKenzie, Tyburn’s Martyrs: Execution in England, 1675-1775, Hambledon Continuum, London 2007, p. 10; see also S. Wade, Jane Austen’s Aunt Behind Bars: Writers and Their Criminal Relatives and Associates, 1700-1900, Thames River Press, London 2013, p. 16: «Until 1760, a “triple tree” was used at Tyburn: a wooden frame with three sides, so that several people could be hanged at once; this was replaced by a portable gallows in that year»; ibidem: «Hangings at Tyburn (close to Marble Arch) ended in 1783 and from December of that year executions took place at Newgate». 47 Bessler, The Birth of American Law, cit., pp. 46, 95, 103, 305. An Italian penal reformer’s meteoric rise in the British Isles in the transatlantic Republic of Letters and then executed – on July 1, 1766, again drawing Voltaire’s ire48. In England and France, public executions were then routine49. When La Barre was taken to the place of execution, the authorities dispensed with tearing out his tongue, but he was forced to wear a placard that read «Impie, blasphémateur, et sacrilège abominable et exécrable», translated in two English-language sources as «Impious, sacrilegious and hateful blasphemer». As ordered, La Barre was beheaded before his body was burned on a pyre along with the copy of Voltaire’s book 50. An incensed Voltaire – writing under the pseudonym «Mr. Cass ** Avocat au Conseil du Roi» – thereafter wrote a 24-page pamphlet entitled Relation de la Mort du Chavalier de La Barre (Account of the Death of the chevalier de La Barre), a 1766 pamphlet that made explicit reference to the by then much-celebrated marquis, Cesare Beccaria. As Ian Davidson explains of Voltaire’s pamphlet: «Voltaire concealed his authorship, ostensibly representing it as if it were a memorandum from Maître Pierre Cassen, a well-known real-life Paris lawyer and a relative of Damilaville, addressed to the Marchese Cesare Beccaría, the celebrated Milanese author of Dei Delitti e delle Pene and pioneer of penal reform»51. The first English-language editions of An Essay on Crimes and Punishments were printed in London and Dublin in 1767 after La Barre’s execution. The first edition printed in England was published in February 1767 by John Almon, a Whig journalist who worked as a 48 Davidson, Voltaire, cit., ch. 28. P. Friedland, Seeing Justice Done: The Age of Spectacular Capital Punishment in France, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012; P. Linebaugh, The London Hanged: Crime and Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century, Verso, London 20032; H. Johnston, Crime in England 1815-1880: Experiencing the Criminal Justice System, Routledge, London 2015, p. 64; see also D. Garland, Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 108 (noting that England did not abolish public executions until 1868 and that France did not do so until 1939). 50 Dictionnaire Universel, Historique, Critique et Bibliographique, Paris 1810, vol. 5, p. 564; Nouvelle Encyclopédie Théologique (1863), vol. 10, p. 581; Davidson, Voltaire, cit., ch. 28; B. Mesler and H.J. Cleaves II, A Brief History of Creation: Science and the Search for the Origin of Life, W.W. Norton & Co., New York 2015, ch. 4. 51 I. Davidson, Voltaire in Exile: The Last Years, 1753-78, Grove Press, New York 2004, p. 172. Etienne Noël Damilaville, Davidson notes, «was one of Voltaire’s closest and most loyal friends» and had discreetly distributed copies of Voltaire’s Dictionnaire Philosophique to Voltaire’s friends and trusted associates (ibidem, p. 140). Voltaire extensively used pseudonyms to conceal his identity, particularly for his most controversial works. As one scholar notes: «No writer of the century relished pseudonyms as much as Voltaire did, and altogether they number many hundreds» (N. Cronk, Voltaire and Authorship, in The Cambridge Companion to Voltaire, ed. by N. Cronk, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009, pp. 39-40). 49 113 printer and bookseller in London. Almon strongly sympathized with American revolutionaries, and he was a close friend of the English radical John Wilkes, a rabble-rousing, liberty-loving British journalist and politician. Wilkes had faced charges of seditious libel in 1763, then took refuge in France shortly before being declared an outlaw. While exiled in Paris, Wilkes met and dined with Cesare Beccaria and his traveling companion, Alessandro Verri, while the two were visiting Paris in late 1766 at the invitation of the French Encyclopédistes52. In mid-January 1767, the Milanese aristocrat Alessandro Verri – then in London, and having just been in Paris in late 1766 with Beccaria himself – had written to his older brother, Pietro Verri: «Beccaria’s book is being translated into English for the first time» and «it will see the light in a few days»53. In April 1767, The Critical Review – a publication printed in London «for A. Hamilton, in FalconCourt, Fleet-Street», ran a lengthy review of Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments, giving it a burst of initial publicity. The review of the book published by Almon began: «The publication of this book in our language cannot fail of being very agreeable to those who have not read the original, as there are few people who do not wish to obtain some knowledge of a performance which hath been so frequently mentioned, and so universally read in every other part of Europe». «The author», the review continued, «is now generally known to be the marquis Beccaria of Milan, who, we are informed, resides at present at Paris, having, since the publication of this book, been obliged to leave Italy for fear of consequences». «Indeed, in point of expression», the review wrote of Beccaria and his much-lauded book, «he seems to have been studiously careful not to give offence; but he censures the established laws of his country with so much freedom, and breathes such a spirit of liberty, that his apprehensions were probably not without foundation»54. 52 I.R. Christie, John Wilkes: British Journalist and Politician, in Encyclopædia Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Wilkes> (03/2019); Loretelli, The First English Translation of Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments, cit., pp. 1, 17. 53 Ibidem, pp. 7 and note 22, 8-11; see also ibidem, p. 8: «The first reviews of the English text appeared in April 1767, confirming what Verris’ letters suggest, namely that the translation was published in February»); ibidem, p. 8 note 27 (noting that the English translation «is mentioned in the column “A Catalogue of New Books” of the April issue of The Scots Magazine»). From 1775 to 1784, Almon – through The Remembrancer – published a monthly report of news from America (ibidem, p. 12). 54 The Critical Review: Or, Annals of Literature, A. Hamilton, London 1767 (produced «By a Society of Gentlemen»), pp. 251-252. By the beginning of 1767, Cesare Beccaria was actually no longer in Paris. Beccaria had traveled from Milan to Paris in October 1766, leaving Milan in early October and arriving in the City of Light on October 18, 114 The seven-page review of Beccaria’s Essay on Crimes and Punishments and Voltaire’s accompanying Commentary gave the English-language edition printed by John Almon significant public exposure. In particular, the review highlighted Beccaria’s view that laws should be crafted to serve «the greatest happiness of the greatest number», as well as Beccaria’s concern about «the cruelty of punishments, and the irregularity of proceedings in criminal cases». After taking note of Beccaria’s ideas, the review then turned to existing English laws, with the reviewer writing: «Part of the evils complained of in these general reflections have indeed been remedied in this country; but part of them still continue. Possibly the time may come when our penal laws may undergo a thorough reformation». The review went on to highlight various excerpts from chapters of Beccaria’s book, including the ones on torture and «On the proportion between crimes and punishments». After quoting one passage about freedom, the reviewer in The Critical Review observed, «What Englishman can read this passage, and not feel his heart warm towards a man, who, notwithstanding the principles in which he was born and educated, is capable of uttering such sentiments of liberty?». The review, after excerpting a number of important passages, concluded with these complimentary words: «These few extracts, we presume, will be sufficient to give the reader an idea of the entertainment he may expect in the perusal of this performance, which we recommend as being one of the most original books which the present age hath produced». «As to the translation», the review observed, «we have compared it with the Italian, and find it not only just, but, in many places, superior to the original in point of perspicuity». «This testimony», the review continued as it came to an end, «we think due to the translator, especially as it is so seldom in our power to speak thus favourably of translations from foreign books»55. 1766. However, Beccaria only stayed in Paris for a few weeks, and he had arrived back in Milan on December 12, 1766. M.T. Maestro, Cesare Beccaria and the Origins of Penal Reform, Temple University Press, Philadelphia 1973, pp. 52, 59; P. Groenewegen, Eighteenth-century Economics: Turgot, Beccaria and Smith and Their Contemporaries, Routledge, London 2002, p. 41 note 13; D. Williams (ed.), The Enlightenment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999, p. 440. 55 The Critical Review: Or, Annals of Literature, A. Hamilton, London 1767 (produced «By a Society of Gentlemen”), pp. 252-255, 257. The review of Voltaire’s commentary began with these words: «We shall pass over the remainder of this essay in order to give our readers a few extracts from the commentary attributed to M. de Voltaire. We cannot proceed, however, without first expressing our approbation of the word attributed in the title, which is a proof of honesty highly commendable, and rarely practiced. There are few translators who would not so far have availed themselves of common report, as to omit the word attributed, especially as common report is the only authority we have for many of Mr. Voltaire’s pieces, and more particularly, as this John D. Bessler The first English-language edition of Beccaria’s book – the one printed by John Almon – was advertised for sale in 1767 in The London Magazine for «4s. 6d». (four shillings and 6 pence). And additional extracts from On Crimes and Punishments were printed in that magazine that same year. On June 6, 1767, one letter writer – using the pseudonym «Philanthropos» – sent a letter «To the Author of the London Magazine» that began as follows: Since you gave a place in your valuable collection, once and again, to some thoughts of mine on Capital Punishments, I have had the pleasure of meeting with a similarity of sentiments in some considerable writers on the same subject. Particularly Dr. Delany, in one of his sermons; and more lately in a treatise entitled Essay on Crimes and Punishments; which the Critical Reviewers recommend as being one of the most original books which the present age has produced: and which hath led them to say; «possibly the time may come when our penal laws may undergo a thorough reformation». This time ’tis hoped, it not very distant. To hasten it, such publications have a manifest tendency. And possibly a few extracts from the treatise mentioned may contribute to it56. In the November 1767 issue of The London Magazine, that same letter writer wrote again «To the Author of the London Magazine». «I thank you for inserting in your very useful collection those extracts from the Essay on Crimes and Punishments, which I lately sent you», that letter began. The letter writer then gave excerpts of «Dr. Delany’s sentiments” from «his seventh sermon» – the one referenced in the prior letter to the publisher signed «Philanthropos». Near the end of that letter, the letter writer – after quoting from Dr. Delany’s sermon57, which called sending men to the galcommentary bears very strong marks of the style and manner of that author: as for example, in his chapter On the punishment of hereticks» (ibidem, p. 255). 56 The London Magazine, Or, Gentleman’s Monthly Intelligencer, London 1767, vol. 36, pp. 205, 289-90, 306-308, 575. The letter writer then proceeded to extract multiple excerpts from On Crimes and Punishments. Ibidem, pp. 307-308. Signing the letter, «Your humble servant, Philanthropos», the letter writer made this concluding observation in the letter to the publisher of The London Magazine: «The above detached, curtailed passages could have been enlarged, had I not feared their length would exclude them. If you think fit, and can allow sufficient room, you may make such additions as will be acceptable to your readers; many of whom will not peruse the essay from whence they are taken: though probably some of them (and those not the least respectable) may be induced to it by these extracts» (ibidem, p. 308). The London Magazine was published monthly by Richard Baldwin of «Paternoster-Row» in the City of London (ibidem, Preface). 57 The sermon of Dr. Patrick Delany, an Irish dean, was published in London in 1766. P. Delany, Eighteen Discourses and Dissertations upon Various Very Important and Interesting Subjects, J. Johnston, London 1766, p. 155. In Sermon VII of that collection, said to be «Preached in An Italian penal reformer’s meteoric rise in the British Isles in the transatlantic Republic of Letters lows for stealing sheep a form of «cruelty and iniquity» akin to «Draco’s laws» – wrote: «I will conclude with a few lines of the celebrated Rousseau. “The frequency of executions (says he) is always a sign of the indolence of government. There is no malefactor who might not be made good for something: nor ought any person to be put to death, even by way of example, except such as could not be preserved without endangering the community”»58. In 1767, while Dei delitti e delle pene was stirring up controversy in Britain, France and elsewhere59, John Exshaw – the Dublin printer – also published Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments (denoted as «The Fifth Edition»60) accompanied with the commentary explicitly attributed to Voltaire. That edition also reprinted the «Preface of the Translator, to the First Edition»61. Meanwhile, On Crimes and Punishments continued to be regularly advertised for sale, as it would be for decades to come, with the Marquis Beccaria’s name growing in prominence62. As more and more peothe College of Dublin», Dr. Delany preached on «Thou shalt not steal», though he lamented that «the laws of our land, in the case of theft, are the most unrighteous and unequitable that can be imagined». «Here», he said, «the stealing of a cow, or a sheep, is death by the law! now, what can be more unrighteous, or absurd, than that the life of a man should be estimated by that of a cow or a sheep?» (ibidem, pp. 155, 160-161). 58 The London Magazine, Or, Gentleman’s Monthly Intelligencer, London 1767, vol. 36, pp. 575-77 (quoting «Treatise on the Social Compact», p. 54). The letter writer, seeking to impact the public debate over executions, went on to tell the publisher of The London Magazine: «Nor will you, sir, be sorry that you have had a hand in awakening the public attention to it. May it not be hoped, that some good effect will in time be produced thereby? Nay, are not executions now less frequent than formerly? At the last Lent-assize held for the county where I live, six criminals were condemned to dye for divers thefts and robberies, but were all———all reprieved. A noble instance of wise clemency, unparallelled perhaps in our history! – May we not hope that the minds of our honourable legislators will be possessed with such sentiments?» (ibidem, p. 577). 59 Réfutation Du Traité des Délits et Peines (1767) («Par M. Muyart de Vouglans, Avocat au Parlement»). The French writer Pierre François Muyart de Vouglans wrote «a much-cited attack» on Beccaria’s book, with Muyart de Vouglans defending the use of judicial torture. M. Farrell, The Prohibition of Torture in Exceptional Circumstances, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013, p. 211; B.E. Harcourt, Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments: A Mirror on the History of the Foundations of Modern Criminal Law, in Foundational Texts in Modern Criminal Law, ed. by M.D. Dubber, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014, p. 41; J.Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide between America and Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003, p. 163. 60 A fifth Italian edition of Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene had been published in April 1766. Loretelli, The First English Translation of Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments, cit., pp. 16, 19; Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings, ed. Thomas, cit., p. 171. 61 Cesare Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, with a Commentary, Attributed to Mons. De Voltaire, John Exshaw, Dublin 1767. 62 A Sentimental Dialogue between Two Souls, in the Palpable Bodies of an English Lady of Quality and an Irish Gentleman (1768) (by «Tristram 115 ple read Beccaria’s book, the debates over penal laws – and what some felt to be «obsolete and useless statutes» – only intensified63. In 1769, «The Second Edition» of An Essay on Crimes and Punishments had been «Printed for F. Newbery, at the Corner of St. Paul’s Churchyard»64 . That edition again reprinted the translator’s preface, which read in part: «The author is the Marquis Beccaria, of Milan. Upon considering the nature of the religion and government under which he lives, the reasons for concealing his name are obvious, the whole was read, at different times, in a society of learned men in that city, and was published at their desire»65. Around that time, Beccaria’s pioneering work as an economic thinker – due in part to his appointment in Milan as a new professor of political economy – also came to light in the British Isles66. In 1769, an Englishlanguage translation of Beccaria’s inaugural lecture in political economy, at Milan’s Palatine School, was printed in London67. Published as A Discourse on Public Economy and Commerce68, that lecture had been translated by Sylvester Douglas (1743-1823), a recent graduShandy»), pp. i-ii (containing this advertisement under the heading «This day are published”: «An Essay on Crimes and Punishments. Translated from the Italian of the Marquis Beccaria. In one volume, octavo. Price 4s. 6d»). 63 «Debates of a Political Club» The London Magazine: Or, Gentleman’s Monthly Intelligencer, R. Baldwin, London 1772 (Aug. 1772 ed.), vol. 41, p. 351. 64 An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, Translated from the Italian; with a Commentary Attributed to Mons. De Voltaire, Translated from the French, F. Newbery, London 17692. 65 Ibidem, pp. iv-v. In Milan, Beccaria was a member of the Academy of Fists, of which brothers Pietro and Alessandro Verri were also members. Both of the Verri brothers played a role in helping Beccaria write and edit his book, Dei delitti e delle pene; Bessler, The Celebrated Marquis, cit., pp. 50-52, 63, 92, 130. «The Fourth Edition» of An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, showing the demand for Beccaria’s book, was «Printed for F. Newbery, at the Corner of St. Paul’s Church-Yard» in 1775. An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, Translated from the Italian; with a Commentary Attributed to Mons. De Voltaire, Translated from the French, F. Newbery, London 17754. 66 Bessler, The Celebrated Marquis, cit., pp. 178-179. See «National Edition of the Works of Cesare Beccaria» Mediobanca, https://www.mediobanca.com/en/media-relations/edizione-nazionale-cesare-beccaria.html. See also L. De Michelis, “Una rete immensa lega tutte le verità”: Cesare Beccaria’s Lectures on Public Economy and Sylvester Douglas’s Translation of His “Discourse on Public Œconomy and Commerce”, in L. De Michelis, L. Guerra and F. O’Gorman (eds.), Entangled Histories: Politics and Culture in 18th-Century Anglo-Italian Encounters, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle 2019 (forthcoming). 67 S. Copley and K. Sutherland (eds.), Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations: New Interdisciplinary Essays, Manchester University Press, Manchester 1995, p. xii; Catalogue of the Library of the Patent Office, The Commissioners of Patents’ Sale Department, London 1881, vol. 1, p. 78; J. Raven, London Booksellers and American Customers: Transatlantic Literary Community and the Charleston Library Society, 1748-1811, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia 2002, p. 434 note 244. 68 C. Beccaria, A Discourse on Public Œconomy and Commerce, J. Dodsley and J. Murray, London 1769. 116 ate of the University of Aberdeen in Scotland who had visited Milan before Beccaria gave his lecture and began teaching classes in his native city. In a short preface to the English-language translation, Douglas emphasized that «the following discourse» was by «the celebrated author of the “Treatise on Crimes and Punishments” at the opening of a new professorship instituted last winter at Milan, for teaching this science». Noting Beccaria’s growing reputation but modest demeanor, Douglas stressed: «The genius of the author almost insures the merit of his lectures. Though his modesty had long been a bar to that encouragement which his talents deserve, yet it is known that he was invited to Petersburg by the most flattering offers, to assist in digesting the code of laws lately published by the Czarina»69. While Russian Empress Catherine II had invited Beccaria to come to St. Petersburg to help her reform Russian law, Beccaria declined the invitation. He instead accepted the teaching position in Milan, a chair conferred upon him by Austria’s Habsburg ruler, Maria Theresa70. Because of Beccaria’s quickly spreading fame from On Crimes and Punishments, The Critical Review decided to review A Discourse on Public Economy and Commerce, even though the review found Beccaria’s discourse on economics less compelling than his prior work. Noting that the pamphlet reprinting his inaugural lecture was being offered for sale for «1s. 6d». (1 shilling, 6 pence), The Critical Review emphasized in the opening two sentences of its review: «The observations of this writer are plausible, and in some parts masterly, but, we are afraid, impracticable. To think of reducing political 69 J.R. McCulloch, The Literature of Political Economy: A Classified Catalogue of Select Publications in the Different Departments of that Science, with Historical, Critical, and Biographical Notices, Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, London 1845, p. 27; Bessler, The Celebrated Marquis, cit., p. 178. Catherine II issued Instructions for the reformation of Russian law in 1767 after consulting the works of Montesquieu, Beccaria and other Enlightenment thinkers, from whom she liberally borrowed. «Within four years of its appearance (1767)», one source notes, «it was published in twenty-four foreign versions». Th. Riha (ed.), Readings in Russian Civilization: Imperial Russian, 1700-1917, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 19692, vol. II, p. 252. Catherine II, also known as Catherine the Great, wrote her Nakaz (Instructions) to guide the activities of a commission set up for drafting a new code; those instructions, setting forth general principles, were later translated into English and published in London. A.N. Medushevsky, Russian Constitutionalism: Historical and Contemporary Development, Routledge, London 2006, pp. 73-74; The Grand Instructions to the Commissioners Appointed to Frame a New Code of Laws for the Russian Empire Composed by Her Imperial Majesty Catherine II, Empress of all the Russias, transl. by M. Tatischeff, T. Jefferys, London 1768. «Of its 655 clauses» one source notes, 108 were «derived wholly or in large measure» from Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments. Bruno Aguilera-Barchet, A History of Western Public Law: Between Nation and State, Springer, Cham (ch) 2015, p. 275 note 49. 70 Bessler, The Celebrated Marquis, cit., pp. 9, 171-173, 177, 259. John D. Bessler œconomy and commerce to a system, as he does, is a mere chimera». «Nothing ought to give greater pleasure to an Englishman than to hear foreigners talk and write in this manner», the review nonetheless professed, noting that «[i]t is certain, that England has arrived at the present amazing pitch of greatness chiefly by trusting to experience and mechanical habits». «These», the review observed, «we are so far from thinking to be blind directors, that we believe them to be the eyes of a trading people, and the polar stars by which politics, so far as they relate to public œconomy and commerce, ought to be directed»71. III. THE DISCIPLES: WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, JEREMY BENTHAM, ET AL. Sir William Blackstone was an early admirer of On Crimes and Punishments. When the fourth volume of his Commentaries of the Laws of England was published in 1769, Blackstone lamented: «It is a melancholy truth, that among the variety of actions which men are daily liable to commit, no less than a hundred and sixty have been declared by act of parliament to be felonies without benefit of clergy; or, in other words, to be worthy of instant death»72. It was in that same volume, Book Four, covering «Of Public Wrongs», that Blackstone praised Beccaria as «an ingenious writer, who seems to have well studied the springs of human action, that crimes are more effectually prevented by the certainty, than by the severity, of punishment». Blackstone agreed with Beccaria that «preventive justice is upon every principle, of reason, of humanity, and of sound policy, preferable in all respects to punishing justice». Blackstone specifically cited Beccaria for the proposition «as punishments are chiefly intended for the prevention of future crimes, it is but reasonable that among crimes of different natures those should be most severely punished, which are the most destructive of the public safety and happiness». Blackstone spoke pejoratively of both «cruel punishments» and «severe punishments» and, then, citing Beccaria with respect to an «ingeniously proposed» idea, observed: 71 The Critical Review: Or, Annals of Literature, A. Hamilton, London 1769 («By A Society of Gentlemen»), vol. 28, pp. 69-70. I have discussed Cesare Beccaria’s ideas on crimes and punishments and economics in two prior books. See Bessler, The Birth of American Law, cit.; and Id., The Celebrated Marquis, cit. 72 D.J. Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law: An Essay on Blackstone’s Commentaries Showing How Blackstone, Employing Eighteenth-Century Ideas of Science, Religion, History, Aesthetics, and Philosophy, Made of the Law at Once a Conservative and a Mysterious Science, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1996, p. 150. An Italian penal reformer’s meteoric rise in the British Isles in the transatlantic Republic of Letters It is moreover absurd and impolitic to apply the same punishment to crimes of different malignity. A multitude of sanguinary laws (besides the doubt that may be entertained concerning the right of making them) do likewise prove a manifest defect either in the wisdom of the legislative, or the strength of the executive power. It is a kind of quackery in government, and argues a want of solid skill, to apply the same universal remedy, the ultimum supplicium [ultimate punishment], to every case of difficulty. It is, it must be owned, much easier to extirpate than to amend mankind: yet that magistrate must be esteemed both a weak and a cruel surgeon, who cuts off every limb, which through ignorance or indolence he will not attempt to cure. It has been therefore ingeniously proposed, that in every state a scale of crimes should be formed, with a corresponding scale of punishment, descending from the greatest to the least: but, if that be too romantic an idea, yet at least a wise legislator will mark the principal divisions, and not assign penalties of the first degree to offences of an inferior rank73. Blackstone’s Commentaries went through multiple editions, further highlighting Beccaria’s reform-minded ideas on the criminal law to members of the legal profession and to lawmakers and the general public more broadly. The fifth edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries, for example, was published by Oxford’s Clarendon Press in 1773, with each edition of that popular treatise giving further public exposure to Beccaria’s ideas as the Italian thinker’s name appeared multiple times in it74. Likewise, the seventh edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries appeared in 1775, also getting printed in Oxford75. Few, if any, legal texts, in fact, can be matched – at least from an historical perspective – in terms of the influence that was exerted on the law than Blackstone’s Commentaries. In «250 Years of Blackstone’s Commentaries: An Exhibition», the exhibition’s curators – Wilfrid Prest at the University of Adelaide and Michael Widener at the Yale Law School’s Lillian Goldman Law Library – emphasized in 2015 of the true scope of influence of Blackstone’s Commentaries: «In her massive Bibliographical Catalog of William Blackstone, published for the Yale Law Library by William S. Hein & Co. to coincide with the 250th anniversary of the Commentaries, the late Ann Laeuchli lists the details of 55 English and Irish and no fewer than 139 American editions produced between the 1760s and the first decade of the 73 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book IV. Of Public Wrongs, ed. by R. Paley, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016, p. 11. 74 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Clarendon Press, Oxford 17735, vol. 4, pp. 3, 16 note v, 17 and note x, 40 note h, 155 note c, 156 note f, 326, 357 note e, and 397 note o. 75 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Clarendon Press, Oxford 17737. 117 present century». «This», they write, «is to say nothing of abridgements, extracts, translations, and adaptations of the Commentaries»76. In 1776, Jeremy Bentham – an early reader of Beccaria and, also, an early commentator on Blackstone – anonymously published A Fragment on Government, a response to Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England77. That essay got some attention, and both Bentham and Beccaria ended up corresponding with French philosophes and influencing a number of English and other penal reformers78. In his Fragment on Government, Bentham called Beccaria the «single Censor» among «the multitude of Expositors» on «the Jurisprudence of every nation». Though the French jurist, Montesquieu, of course could not go unmentioned in his essay, Bentham, in his Fragment on Government, gushed of his Italian idol: «When Beccaria came, he was received by the intelligent as an Angel from heaven would be by the faithful. He may be styled the father of Censorial Jurisprudence. Montesquieu’s was a work of the mixed kind. Before Montesquieu all was unmixed barbarism»79. After reading Beccaria’s book, Bentham wrote in praise of his Italian intellectual muse: «Oh, my master, first evangelist of Reason, you who have made so many useful excursions into the path of utility, what is there left for us to do»80? References to Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments can be found in multiple early English sources, some of which – like Beccaria’s own book – went through multiple editions. For example, in Principles of Penal Law, William Eden – also known as Baron Auck76 250 Years of Blackstone’s Commentaries: An Exhibition (curated by Wilfrid Prest and Michael Widener), available at <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=amlaw> (03/2019), p. vii. In introducing the exhibition, Kevin M. Marmion, the president of William S. Hein & Co., had this to say: «Blackstone’s Commentaries is one of the most important treatises ever written in the English language, by perhaps the foremost figure in Anglo-American law» (ibidem). «Blackstone» one modern source notes, «made use of influential international texts of his own generation, some of which, such as Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws and Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments, we now regard as seminal» (W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book IV. Of Public Wrongs, ed. by R. Paley, cit., p. ix). It was, at least in part, through Blackstone’s Commentaries and the publicity that treatise provided to Beccaria’s ideas that Cesare Beccaria became such a well-known figure in Anglo-American law. 77 J. Bentham, A Fragment on Government; Being an Examination of What is Delivered, on the Subject of Government in General, in the Introduction to Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries; with a Preface in Which Is Given a Critique of the Work at Large, J. Sheppard et al., Dublin 1776. 78 J. Bentham, A Fragment on Government (1776), ed. by F.C. Montague, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1891, pp. 1-3, 5-8. 79 Ibidem, pp. 31-32, 105 note 2. 80 C.J. Larson and G.R. Garrett, Crime, Justice, and Society, AltaMira Press, Lanham (md) 19962, p. 178. 118 land – cited the work of the Marquis Beccaria multiple times in his own popular book81. Beccaria’s On Crime and Punishments was also cited in Political Disquisitions: Or, An Enquiry into Public Errors, Defects and Abuses, a book published in London in 1774. In that source, chapter three – entitled «The Colonies, though so valuable to Britain, have been greatly oppressed by the Mother Country» – quoted the following passage from Beccaria’s treatise: «“Every act of authority of one man” [or body of men] “over another, for which there is not an absolute necessity, is tyrannical”»82. William Dodd, in his sermon, The Frequency of Capital Punishments Inconsistent with Justice, Sound Policy, and Religion, also cited «the Marquis de Beccaria’s Essay on crimes and punishments» along with the commandment, «Thou Shalt not Kill»83. That sermon, written by Dodd, the Chaplain to the King, was reportedly «intended to have been preached in the Chapel Royal at St. James’s, but was omitted on account of the absence of the Court during the author’s month of waiting»84. The sermon, originally printed in London in 1772, was later reprinted in Dublin in 1777. In it, Dodd had this to say: «There are, no doubt, some crimes so atrocious in their nature, so immediately injurious to society, that they must and ought to be capitally punished. But, allowing this, the question still recurs, and seems not easy to be resolved: nor can those laws well be justified, which, in a variety of instances, exact the extremest penalty for offense by no means extreme in their nature». As Dodd’s sermon continued: To those who are acquainted with the nature of our constitution, the mildness of our government, the temper of our people, and particularly the humane and benevolent spirit which characterizes the present times; to such, it may well 81 W. Eden, Principles of Penal Law, B. White & T. Cadell, London 1775 (3d ed.), pp. 163, 288 note o, 322-333 note b, 323; see also ibidem, pp. 288, 311 note h (citing «the French Commentary on the M. Beccaria»). 82 Political Disquisitions: Or, An Enquiry into Public Errors, Defects and Abuses, E. and Ch. Dilly, London 1774, vol. 2, p. 291 note a. Beccaria’s name also appears in many books and pamphlets printed in America both before and after the issuance of the Declaration of Independence. Bessler, The Birth of American Law, cit.; Id., The Celebrated Marquis, cit.; see also J.D. Bessler, The Baron and the Marquis: Liberty, Tyranny, and the Enlightenment Maxim that Can Remake American Criminal Justice, Carolina Academic Press, Durham (nc) 2019 (describing the influence of the writings of Montesquieu and Beccaria in the United States); The Patriots of North-America: A Sketch, New York 1775, p. 26 (a line of poetry reads, «Thy Beccaria peaceful dwells»). 83 This sermon was originally published in 1772. W. Dodd, The Frequency of Capital Punishments Inconsistent with Justice, Sound Policy, and Religion: Being the Substance of a Sermon, W. Faden, B. Law and C. Dilly, London 1772, pp. 3, 11 note *; see also The Monthly Review; Or, Literary Journal, R. Griffiths, London 1772, vol. 46, p. 548 (taking note of William Dodd’s published sermon). 84 This is noted in an «ADVERTISEMENT» following the title page that accompanied the printed sermon. John D. Bessler seem strange, if not wholly incredible, that the evil just referred to should be found amongst us, and that of all nations upon earth, the laws of England perhaps should be the most sanguinary: there being in them, as I am credibly informed, above one hundred and fifty capital cases; and, in full proof thereof, almost continual executions85! William Dodd’s sermon argued for the preservation of life whenever possible. As Dodd wrote at some length: In a nation like ours, crowded with business, and extensive in dominion, the life of the subject, of the common people especially, (those nerves and sinews of a state) is peculiarly valuable: and consequently, every method to promote and increase population must be desirable and important. But what can be more contrary to this end than the cutting off continually, numbers of these subjects, and that, for the most part, at a very early period of life, when the ends of government might be better answered by saving them, and those lives be rendered useful to the community? For, it is evident to the slightest observation, that the only ends at which government can be supposed to aim, in the execution of criminals, are not answered by the frequency of our executions. Correction and example are the only proper objects of punishment. It is plain that the former can never be attained by the death of the sufferer; and for the latter, we are every day fully assured, that public executions are not of the least avail. The common people flock to them, as to a spectacle, in which they are gratified! and we constantly hear of crimes, not less flagitious than those for which the criminal is to die, perpetrated even at the very place and moment of his punishment. And if neither example nor reformation is effected by the death of these offenders; if the state is in no respect benefited, but on the contrary injured, by the diminution of its members; If all the good ends of punishment may be attained, and better attained, by subjecting such offenders to perpetual servitude and labour; does not the voice of humanity, of christian charity and benevolence, unite with that of sound Policy, to implore from the throne of princes this salutary amendment of the laws86? Invoking the by then well-known work of Cesare Beccaria, William Dodd – calling Beccaria «the illustrious Italian» – then emphasized in his sermon: An able and illustrious foreigner, whose work breathes the true spirit of humanity and freedom, hath urged a vari85 W. Dodd, The Frequency of Capital Punishments Inconsistent with Justice, Sound Policy, and Religion: A Sermon, W. Hallhead, Dublin 1777, pp. 11, 13-14, 19 note *. In Dodd’s sermon, he quoted this passage from Blackstone’s Commentaries: «It is a melancholy truth, that among the variety of actions which men are daily liable to commit, no less than 160 have been declared by acts of parliament to be felonies without benefit of clergy, or, in other words, to be worthy of instant death» (ibidem, p. 14 note *). 86 Ibidem, pp. 15-17. An Italian penal reformer’s meteoric rise in the British Isles in the transatlantic Republic of Letters ety of arguments on the Topick, well known, I persuade myself, to this audience, and therefore the less necessary to be insisted on at present. He seems to have proved beyond dispute what I have suggested before, “That the punishment of death can never be just, in cases of that nature to which we refer.” Nor are his arguments less conclusive, to shew the superior advantages arising from condemning offenders to servitude and labour. “It is not the intenseness of the pain (he has justly remarked) which has the greatest effect on the mind, but its continuance: For our sensibility is more easily and more powerfully affected by weak but repeated impressions, than by a violent but momentary impulse.” The death of a criminal is a terrible but momentary impulse, and therefore a less efficacious method of deterring others, than the continual example of a man deprived of his liberty, and condemned as a beast of burden to repair by his labours the injury he has done to society87. Demonstrating that he, like everyone else in the British Isles, was living in the Age of Beccaria, Dodd’s sermon tellingly ended with an extended excerpt – and plea – from On Crimes and Punishments. Calling the frequent use of executions «a Barbarism» in «a christian country», Dodd passionately quoted Beccaria’s call for the recognition of a more reasoned criminal justice system and the abolition of capital punishment. As Dodd wrote, quoting Beccaria: [T]o conclude in the words of the illustrious Italian before mentioned – “If these truths should haply force their way to the thrones of princes, Be it known to them, that they come attended with the secret wishes of all mankind. And tell the sovereign, who deigns them a gracious reception, that his fame shall out-shine the glory of conquerors; and that equitable posterity will exalt his peaceful trophies above those of a Titus, an Antoninus or a Trajan”88. Unfortunately for Dodd, he himself was executed in the same year that his sermon was reprinted; he had been convicted of forgery and, despite strenuous efforts by many people to secure his pardon, Dodd was put to death at Tyburn on Friday, June 27, 177789. At his sentencing, William Dodd had been ordered «to be hanged by the neck» until he was dead90. 119 IV. CONCLUSION. In Britain, Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments materially influenced the debate surrounding the administration of the criminal law. It took many years for Beccaria’s rational and humane approach to persuade members of Parliament to dismantle Britain’s «Bloody Code», but Beccaria’s influence was felt almost immediately. By March 1779, a London journal, The Literary Fly, specifically identified Beccaria – along with Montesquieu, Voltaire and Blackstone – as part of an eighteenth-century «enlightened» quartet who had «echoed to each other»91. The identification of these four figures as «the first ornaments of the age» – one from Italy, two from France, and one from England – demonstrates how the Enlightenment, and its quill pen-, printing press-, and transatlantic book trade-driven Republic of Letters, was not centered in any one country or place92. In fact, Montesquieu, Voltaire and Blackstone all, themselves, have important Beccaria-related connections. It was Montesquieu who, through his popular books, Persian Letters and The Spirit of the Laws, inspired Beccaria’s literary endeavors in the first place; it was Voltaire who wrote the famous commentary on Dei delitti e delle pene that helped publicize it and who called Beccaria a brother who had educated Europe; and it was Blackstone who, through his famous Commentaries, had helped to spread Beccaria’s fame far and wide, not only throughout the British Isles, but in distant America where those Commentaries were widely read by colonists and early Americans93. Cesare Beccaria’s meteoric rise in the British Isles from the 1760s onward was thus no accident; it was a product of Beccaria’s clear thinking and accessible style and the enlightened times in which intellectuals such as Beccaria lived. Associate Professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law, Adjunct Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center, and Of Counsel at Berens & Miller, P.A. in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The author extends a special thank you to Professor Ryan Greenwood, the Curator of Rare Books and Special Collections 87 Ibidem, pp. 17-18, 22. Ibidem, pp. 21-23. At the end of his sermon, William Dodd included «extracts translated from the Empress of Russia’s celebrated Code of Laws, as it cannot fail to be agreeable to the Reader to know the sentiments of so great and able a Legislator on the subject of this Discourse: and indeed it is highly pleasing to observe not only the justice, but the humanity, which runs through this admirable Code» (ibidem, pp. 24-30). 89 J. Villette, A Genuine Account of the Behaviour and Dying Words of William Dodd, LL.D., «Printed for the Author», London 17772, pp. 4, 15. 90 An Account of the Life and Writings of William Dodd, LL.D., M. Hingeston and J. Williams, London 1777, p. 73. When imposing a death 88 sentence, an English judge would regularly pronounce: «[Y]ou are to go from hence to the place from whence you came, and thence to the place of execution, where you are to be hanged by the neck till you are dead, and God have mercy upon your soul» (M. Grosley, A Tour to London: or, New Observations on England, and Its Inhabitants, transl. by Th. Nugent, Lockyer Davis, London 1977, vol. 2, p. 142. 91 W. Prest, William Blackstone: Law and Letters in the Eighteenth Century, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008, p. 308. 92 The Literary Fly, Mar. 6, 1779, No. VIII, p. 1. 93 Bessler, The Celebrated Marquis, cit., pp. 10, 12-13, 45, 55, 75, 113, 183, 300; Id., The Birth of American Law, cit., p. 61. 120 at the University of Minnesota Law School. The author was a visiting scholar at the Human Rights Center at the University of Minnesota Law School during the spring 2018 semester, and Professor Greenwood provided exceptional assistance in helping the author trace Cesare Beccaria’s influence on the law. John D. Bessler Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Saggi Mille choses de sa part. Hume, Ramsay and Beccaria* Citation: E. Mazza (2019) Mille choses de sa part. Hume, Ramsay and Beccaria. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 121-129. doi: 10.13128/ds-25444 Copyright: © 2019 E. Mazza. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. Emilio Mazza IULM-Libera università di lingue e comunicazione, Milano Abstract. At the end of 1765 Morellet wrote to Hume: «I send you 3 copies of my translation of the book de’ delitti». A few days afterwards he informed Beccaria that Hume «desires me to tell you one thousand things for him». To justify his translation Morellet appeals to Hume’s authority: he «read the original and the translation with great care» and «approved of my freedom in translating it». In his works and letters Hume never mentions Beccaria: what about the «one thousand things» that he is supposed to have told Morellet about Dei delitti? Were they close to those that Ramsay mentioned to Diderot? What did Hume think about the theory of original contract and the abolishment of capital punishment? Keywords. David Hume, Cesare Beccaria, Allan Ramsay, Capital Punishment, Original Contract. GOOD THINGS: MORELLET, BECCARIA AND HUME. «I send you 3 copies of my translation of the book de’ delitti»1, Morellet writes to Hume at the end of December 1765. A few days later he announces to Beccaria: «without having the honour of being known to you, I think myself entitled to send you a copy of my translation of your work»2 . It is a «universal success»3. The new order, he claims, is fitted to the French genius 4. D’Alembert appreciates it so much. Diderot, Helvétius, Buffon, Hume and d’Holbach send their congratulations5. Hume «desires me» – Morellet declares – «to tell you one thousand things for him»6 . Milles choses de sa part. The great authorities approve of Morellet’s freedom in translating Beccaria’s Delitti. And Hume, who «read the origi* I am grateful to Giuseppe Cospito, Gianni Francioni, Marina Leoni, Alberto Mingardi, Gianluca Mori, Laura Nicolì, Emanuele Ronchetti, Luigi Turco for their useful comments. All the translations from Beccaria and Ramsay and Diderot are my own 1 A. Morellet to D. Hume, 31 December 1765, Edinburgh, NLS MSS 23153 n. 40. A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 3 January 1766, in Lettres d’André Morellet, ed. by D. Medlin, J.-C. David, and P. Leclerc, The Voltaire Foundation, Oxford 1991, p. 36. 3 Ibidem, p. 39. 4 Ibidem, pp. 41-42; cfr. ibidem, pp. 36, 39. 5 Ibidem, p. 39. 6 Ibidem. 2 Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 121-129 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25444 122 nal and the translation with great care»7, agrees with them. The works of d’Alembert, Diderot, Helvétius, Buffon, and Hume – Beccaria replies (following Morellet’s order of names8) – are the object of his «continuous reading»9; even though it was Montesquieu who produced his philosophical «conversion», and Helvétius who later accomplished it10. «The profound metaphysics of Hume» – Beccaria goes on – «the truth and novelty of his views astonished me and enlightened my understanding. Not so long ago I read the 18 volumes of his history with infinite pleasure»11. In September 1766 Beccaria asks Morellet to send Hume a copy of his new edition to show how «sensible» he is of Hume’s attention to his work, and how «encouraged» he is by the «good» things Hume told Morellet about it and Morellet «faithfully» reported to him12. What about these good things? Hume probably reads Beccaria in autumn 1765. Four years before Hume’s philosophical and historical work was almost achieved; afterwards he does not feel the need to add any explicit reference to Beccaria (or any other French philosophe among those mentioned above); not even in the 1774 essay «Of the Origin of Government»13. 7 Ibidem, p. 42. Like Ramsay, Hume probably read Beccaria’s 1765 third edition. There is no trace of it in the Hume library sold in 1840, which contains another edition given to Hume by Morellet: [C. Beccaria] Dei delitti e delle pene, Harlem [Livorno] 17665 (cfr. D.F. Norton, M.J. Norton, The David Hume Library, Edinburgh Bibliographical Society, Edinburgh 1996, p. 115). Morellet received some copies of this edition in July 1766 (A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 17-28 July 1766, in Lettres d’André Morellet, cit., p. 60) and, satisfying Beccaria’s desire (ibidem, p. 73, note 1), sent a copy to Hume in September (A. Morellet to D. Hume, 8 September 1766, ibidem, pp. 71-72). 8 A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 3 January 1766, in Lettres d’André Morellet, cit., p. 39 («compliments de Mr. Diderot, de M. Helvetius, de M. De Buffon [...] M. Diderot [...] M. De Buffon [...] M. Hume [...] M. Le Baron d’Holbac [sic]»); C. Beccaria to A. Morellet, 26 January 1766, in C. Beccaria, Carteggio, ed. by C. Capra, R. Pasta and F. Pino Pongolini, in Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di Cesare Beccaria, 16 vols., ed. by L. Firpo and G. Francioni, Mediobanca, Milano 1984, vol. IV, pp. 222-223 («Alembert, Diderot, Helvetius, Buffon, Hume [...] monsieur Helvétius [...] monsieur de Buffon [...] monsieur Diderot [...] monsieur Hume [...] monsieur Dalembert»), 226 («il signor Helvetius, Diderot, ed il signor di Buffon ed Hume e di Holbac [...] signor d’Alembert»). Beccaria merely thanks d’Holbach, without adding any (positive) remarks on his philosophy. 9 C. Beccaria to A. Morellet, 26 January 1766, in Beccaria, Carteggio, cit., 222. 10 Ibidem. 11 Ibidem, p. 223. 12 A. Morellet to D. Hume, 8 September 1766, Lettres d’André Morellet, cit., pp. 71-72. 13 Beccaria is never mentioned in the most recent companions to Hume: The Oxford Handbook of Hume, ed. by P. Russell, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016; The Continuum Companion to Hume, ed. by A. Bailey and D. O’Brien, The Continuum International Publishing, London 2012; The Cambridge Companion to Hume, by D.F. Norton and J. Emilio Mazza DIFFERENT KINDS OF CEMENT: BECCARIA AND HUME. Reading carefully Dei delitti (if indeed he did it), Hume could have enjoyed Beccaria’s assertion, and his Lockean use of the cement image: «it is demonstrated that the union of the ideas is the cement which forms the entire fabric of human understanding»14 . Hume called himself «inventor» for the use he makes of the principles of association: these principles «are really to us the cement of the universe, and all the operations of the mind must, in a great measure, depend on them»15. Yet, it is unlikely that Beccaria, who couldn’t read English (despite Morellet’s exhortations16), knew the Abstract of the Treatise. We all know that Beccaria read Hume. We all repeat what he declares. Since Morellet told him that Hume enjoyed his work (and Morellet’s translation), how could Beccaria declare something different17? Why do we not Taylor, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 20092; A Companion to Hume, ed. by E. Radcliffe, Blackwell, Oxford 2008. He is not even mentioned in E.C. Mossner, The Life of David Hume, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1980; A. Sabl, Hume’s Politics. Coordination and Crisis in the “History of England”, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2012; J.A. Harris, Hume. An Intellectual Biography, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015. There are a few exceptions. Burton, for example, underlines the utilitarian connection between Hume and Beccaria (J.H. Burton, Life and Correspondence of David Hume, 2 vols., W. Tait, Edinburgh 1846, vol. I, p. 121; cfr. J.A. Harris, Liberty, necessity and moral responsibility, in The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy, ed. by A. Garrett, Routledge, London 2014, pp. 320-337: 335; J.E. Crimmins, Utility and religion, ibidem, pp. 465-499: 481-485, 494), and Berry maintains that Beccaria’s view on luxury «bear the hallmarks of his knowledge» of Hume’s History (C. Berry, David Hume, Bloomsbury, London 2009, p. 124; cfr. L.L. Bongie, David Hume. Prophet of the Counter-revolution, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis 20002, p. 13). 14 C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, [M. Coltellini], Lausanna [Livorno] 17653, § XVIII, p. 55 (cfr. C. Beccaria, Des délits et des peines / Dei delitti e delle pene, ed. by P. Audegean and G. Francioni, ENS, Lyon 2009, § XIX, p. 206; hereafter BAF). For the Lockean flavour of the cement image, cfr. J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. by P.H. Nidditch, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1985, II, XI, § 13, p. 161; II, XXIII, § 26, p. 310; II, XXXIII, § 11, p. 398. 15 D. Hume, An Abstract of a Book lately Published; Entituled, «A Treatise of Human Nature», in A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge, rev. by P.H. Nidditch, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1978, pp. 640662: 662. 16 A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 17-28 July 1766, in Lettres d’André Morellet, p. 60. 17 Audegean at first appositely remarks on the influence of the context on Beccaria’s acknowledgments in the letter to Morellet, and then reverts to the common opinion: «it is likely that these readings had the importance and the impact that Beccaria ascribed them» (P. Audegean, Introduction, BAF, p. 25); with regard to Hume’s influence on Beccaria, he consequently makes the common reference: G. Imbruglia, Riformismo e illuminismo. Il Dei delitti e delle pene tra Napoli e l’Europa, in Cesare Beccaria. La pratica dei lumi, ed. by V. Ferrone and G. Francioni, Olschki, Firenze 2000, pp. 99-126 (cfr. Audegean, La philosophie de Beccaria. Savoir punir, savoir écrire, savoir produire, Vrin, Paris 2010, cit., p. Mille choses de sa part. Hume, Ramsay and Beccaria* precisely indicate the passages where Hume’s French translations exert an influence on Beccaria’s writings? A METAPHYSICAL INEFFECTUAL TREATISE: RAMSAY AND BECCARIA. «Diderot had transmitted me a letter from M. Ramsay [...] which contains some general critical reflections on your work»18, Morellet writes to Beccaria in July 1766. In October 1765, chez d’Holbach, Diderot had informed Ramsay about Dei delitti19. At the end of January 1766 Ramsay sends Diderot his ref lections20, and Diderot, considering them «too serious to be neglected»21, translates them into French and gives them to Morellet 22, who sends these «false discouraging maxims»23 to Beccaria. One year after, Alessandro Verri informs Pietro that Diderot gave Beccaria some short «objections» as «very powerful», but Beccaria did not take the trouble to answer them24. In March Morellet is still remembering Ramsay’s reflections to Beccaria: «I recommend you [...] the letter from Ramsay that I gave you»25. Allan Ramsay is the first painter to the King of England. «It is said that he paints badly, but he reasons well»26 , Diderot remarks. In 1765 Ramsay is already 23, note 1). 18 A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 17-28 July 1766, in Lettres d’André Morellet, cit., p. 60. 19 Ramsay owns that he was informed about Beccaria’s work in Paris (chez d’Holbach) by Diderot and Suard (D. Diderot, Correspondance V (Janvier 1765 – Février 1766), ed. by G. Roth, Les éditions de Minuit, Paris 1959, p. 246). Ramsay possibly arrives in Paris at the beginning of September 1765, since Diderot dined with him (chez van Loo) on the 2nd (ibidem, p. 113), and with him, Hume and Walpole (chez d’Holbach) on the 6th. Ramsay leaves Paris on the 15th of October 1765 (ibidem, p. 137). 20 Ibidem, p. 245 and note 3. 21 J.-A. Naigeon, Avertissement de l’Éditeur, in Œuvres de Denis Diderot, ed. by J.-A. Naigeon, Desray et Deterville, Paris 1798, vol. IX, pp. 449450: 449. 22 At the beginning of June 1766 Morellet possibly received Diderot’s translation of Ramsay’s «general critical reflections» (A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 17-28 July 1766, Lettres d’André Morellet, cit., p. 60). In 1765 Diderot and Morellet «talked a lot» about Beccaria’s work, and Morellet has written his own «observations» and «reflections» resulting from these «conversations» (A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 3 janvier 1766, ibidem, p. 39; A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 17-28 July 1766, ibidem, p. 60). 23 A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 17-28 July 1766, ibidem, p. 60. 24 A. Verri to P. Verri, 15 January 1767, in Viaggio a Parigi e Londra (1766-1767). Carteggio di Pietro e Alessandro Verri, ed. by G. Gaspari, Adelphi, Milano 1980, p. 247; cfr. E. Mazza, Hume’s «Meek» Philosophy among the Milanese, in Impressions of Hume, ed. by P.J.K. Kail and M. Frasca-Spada, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, pp. 213-243. 25 A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 14-15 March 1767, Lettres d’André Morellet, cit., p. 88. 26 D. Diderot to S. Volland, 8 September 1765, Correspondance V, cit., p. 113. Diderot, who first met Ramsay chez the painter Louis-Michel van 123 known as a political writer: the Gazette littéraire, edited by Suard, calls him a follower of Harrington’s Oceana who is well acquainted with Hume’s History 27. In 1762, Voltaire’s history of Jean Calas had called him a «philosopher»28, because, Diderot adds, he «opened the eyes to English Justice» and saved some gentlemen from capital punishment29. Ramsay’s reflections (a «light reading»30 of the Italian original) concern the Introduction and the first two chapters of Beccaria’s work. It is a double attack: against the theory of social contract in general, and against Dei delitti in particular. Ramsay is sceptic concerning Beccaria’s ingenious observations and their possible useful consequences; yet he is assertive concerning their philosophical weakness: their foundations are «too uncertain […] to support a useful and solid edifice»31. A few months before Grimm had written: Beccaria’s edifice lacks «solid» foundations32. Loo at the beginning of September (is van Loo one of those who say that Ramsay «paints badly»?), depicted him as the author mentioned by Voltaire in his «papers on the Calas» (ibidem). 27 Review of the «Essai sur la Constitution d’Angleterre», «Supplément à la Gazette Littéraire de l’Europe», 28 April 1765, no. 10, art. VII, pp. 285295: 295; cfr. ibidem, art. VI, pp. 243-253: 245; Review of the «Essai sur la Constitution d’Angleterre», «Journal des Sçavants», March 1765, pp. 251-254: 252 (cfr. Review of «An Essay on the Constitution of England», «The Monthly Review», XXXII, 1765, pp. 59-66: 59); Review of the «Essai sur la Constitution d’Angleterre», «Gazette Littéraire de l’Europe», June 1765, no. 6, pp. 311-327: 311. 28 Voltaire, Histoire d’Elisabeth Canning et de Jean Calas, [Paris] 1762, p. 5. 29 D. Diderot to S. Volland, 8 September 1765, Correspondance V, cit., p. 113. 30 [A. Ramsay] «Il y a environ un mois...», end of January 1766, in Diderot, Correspondance V, cit., letter 374, pp. 245-254: 246 (hereafter RR). Ramsay’s reflections are contained in a letter to Diderot: the original was in English, and Diderot translated it into French (Naigeon, Avertissement de l’Éditeur, cit., p. 449; A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 17-28 July 1766, Lettres d’André Morellet, cit., p. 60). Grimm first made public Diderot’s translation in the Correspondance littéraire on the 15th of July 1766 (U. Kölving, J. Carriat, Inventaire de la «Correspondance littéraire» de Grimm et Meister, 3 vols., The Voltaire Foundation, Oxford 1984, vol. I, p. 184 n. 66:207), together with a «Notice sur Ramsay» (ibidem, n. 66:206). In January 1782 Meister included it again in the Correspondance (ibidem, vol. II, p. 32 n. 82:001). Diderot’s translation was published by Naigeon in 1798, cfr. [A. Ramsay] «Lettre de M. De Ramsay, peintre du roi d’Angleterre A M. Diderot», in Œuvres de Denis Diderot, cit., pp. 451-466. 31 RR, p. 246 (cfr. RR, p. 248). On Ramsay and Beccaria, cfr. F. Hörcher, Beccaria, Voltaire, and the Scots on Capital Punishment: A Comparative View of the Legal Enlightenment, in Scotland and France in the Enlightenment, ed. by D. Dawson and P. Morère, Associated University Press, London 2010, pp. 305-330: 308, 314-316; A. Smart, Alan Ramsay. Painter, Essayist and Man of the Enlightenment, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1992, pp. 201-202. 32 [M. Grimm] «M. l’abbé Morellet...», 1 December 1765, in Correspondance Littéraire, Philosophique et Critique par Grimm, Diderot, Meister Etc., par M. Tourneux, Garnier, Paris 1878, vol. VI, pp. 422-429: 427 (Kölving, Carriat, Inventaire, cit., vol. I, p. 169 n. 65:359); cfr. [M. Grimm] «Un petit livret, intitulé Dei Delitti...», 1 August 1765, in Correspondance Littéraire, cit., pp. 329-337 (Kölving, Carriat, Inventaire, cit., vol. I, p. 162, n. 65:234). 124 The first attack is in two phases. First, the «metaphysical idea» of a social contract «has no source in any real transaction»33 (again, Ramsay agrees with Grimm34, and Ferguson will follow them35). Secondly, Beccaria’s method is far from being experimental, therefore his system is full of «ambiguities» and «contradictions»36. Beccaria must acknowledge that force is «a tie of this voluntary contract»: without its «menace» we shall be «incessantly» inclined to take back our smallest portion of liberty37. Beccaria concedes that we are «constrained by necessity» to consent to such contracts; yet he does not say whether they were voluntary, and whether men had been brought into them by need or necessity38. Finally, if by social contract Beccaria means a tacit «mutual obligation» between the powerful and the weak (protection and service)39, such a contract had always existed and will always exist (even between the Mogol and his subjects), but it is a «poor basis» for an edifice of civil liberty40. Here begins the second attack. Again, it is in two phases. First, if moral politics must be founded on our indelible sentiments, as Beccaria asserts, we should first consider our universal «desire of superiority and command»41 (in 1774 Hume will call it «Love of dominion», which, he says, is «so strong»42): those who «actually» possess power must necessarily use «all the means they can» to protect their authority and safety43. They must «prevent and punish» every plot, with a degree of «severity proportioned to the danger»44. Therefore, in governments of a certain nature (like Turkey), those who propose «to suppress tortures [...] (upon the lightest suspicion) and the most cruel executions (upon the smallest proof), will tend to deprive the governments of the best means of security»45. The laws and their severities did flow everywhere from the particular «circumstances», «necessities» and «dangers» of the particular societies46. 33 RR, p. 246. [Grimm] «M. l’abbé Morellet...», Correspondance Littéraire, Philosophique et Critique par Grimm, Diderot, Meister Etc., cit., p. 427. 35 A. Ferguson, Principles of Moral and Political Science, 2 vols., A. Strahan and T. Cadell, London / W. Creech, Edinburgh 1792, vol. II, pp. 220221. 36 RR, p. 247. 37 Ibidem. 38 Ibidem. 39 Ibidem, pp. 247-248. 40 Ibidem, p. 248. 41 Ibidem. The expression recalls Machiavelli’s «ambition and desire of command» (N. Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago-London 1996, p. 28). 42 D. Hume, Of the Origin of Government, in Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, 2 vols., T. Cadell, London 1777, vol. I, pp. 35-39: 37. 43 RR, p. 248 (emphasis added). 44 RR, p. 249. 45 Ibidem. 46 RR, pp. 249-250. 34 Emilio Mazza Secondly, Ramsay sets up a dialogue between Beccaria and his adversaries. Beccaria complains that men commonly abandon the «most important» regulations into the hands of «those whose interest is to oppose the most wise laws», that is, Ramsay translates, the «rich and powerful» men47; but these interested men are the «only» persons «naturally» apt to exert this prerogative48. Force always commands over weakness49 (again, Grimm says almost the same50). Beccaria complains that laws commonly arise from a «fortuitous and temporary necessity»; but, «without necessity, there would have been no law at all»51. Beccaria complains that only a «few happy nations» did speed the intermediary stages by «good laws», instead of waiting for the «slow motion of human vicissitudes»52; but, as history shows (a Machiavellian retort 53), these happy nations «never» existed, and the same good laws are the outcome of human vicissitudes54 . Laws are commonly written «with the sword» to the advantage of those who establish them55. Beccaria may well obtain the praise of the inexperienced, insignificant and ignored partisans of reason56; but his particular reform asks for a universal revolution, which can happen only in a very violent way (an obvious calamity)57. Dei delitti, Ramsay concludes, is a «speculative» work, which does not consider the «actual» interests and safety of the masters58. It shows the wit and «humanity»59 of the author (a traditional, and sometimes slightly ironical, remark) 60, but will 47 RR, p. 250. Ramsay quotes the original Italian («gli uomini […] piu provvide leggi»; Beccaria, Dei Delitti, cit., «Introduzione», p. 5; BAF, p. 142) and either he – or Diderot – adds a French translation with an omission («alla giornaliera prudenza»; RR, pp. 250-251). 48 RR, p. 251. 49 Ibidem. 50 [Grimm] «M. l’abbé Morellet...», Correspondance Littéraire, Philosophique et Critique par Grimm, Diderot, Meister Etc., cit., p. 428. 51 RR, p. 251; Ramsay refers to the «Introduzione» («le leggi [...] nate da una fortuita e passeggiera necessità» (Beccaria, Dei Delitti, cit., «Introduzione», p. 6; BAF, p. 142). 52 RR, p. 251; Ramsay quotes the original Italian («Felici sono [...] buone leggi»; Beccaria, Dei Delitti, cit., «Introduzione», p. 6; BAF, p. 142) and either he – or Diderot – adds a French translation. 53 Beccaria maintains: «Let’s open the Histories, and we shall see that the Laws...» (Beccaria, Dei Delitti, cit., «Introduzione», p. 6 [emphasis added]; BAF, p. 142); and Ramsay replies: «if these philosophers would open the history and see to what are due the best institutions» (RR, p. 253 [emphasis added]), «if he [Beccaria] would take the pains to examine carefully the history and the archives of the nations...» (RR, p. 251). Possibly recalling Hume’s works, Ramsay frequently appeals to «history and observation» (RR, p. 246) against Beccaria. 54 RR, p. 251. 55 RR, pp. 251-252. 56 RR, p. 252. 57 Ibidem. 58 Ibidem. 59 RR, pp. 246, 252. 60 Cfr. [Grimm] «Un petit livret, intitulé Dei Delitti...», Correspondance 125 Mille choses de sa part. Hume, Ramsay and Beccaria* never have «any actual and present influence on human affairs»61. «OF CRIMES» REFORMED (BY RAMSAY). Those who want to reform the laws should enquire into «the actual and real origin of different governments and their different laws»62 and survey «only one single society at a time»63 – this is Ramsay’s prescription. If they discover some «unnecessarily severe» laws, they should modestly address themselves to the masters and show them that the same «circumstances», which originally required these laws, may be satisfied by means «more mild for the subjects and at least equally safe for the masters»64. The reformers should always consider the security of «those who alone have the power to sanction the laws»65. In 1771 Diderot seems to have Ramsay’s reflections on the table. Punishments, he writes, can only refer to the «security of the masters»66, which is the supreme law, and they must be different in different nations: in Constantinople one illicit assembly is enough to strangle a Sultan, in London it takes twenty years of illicit assemblies to overthrow a minister (this is Ramsay’s example)67. Ramsay recalls Grimm, and Diderot recalls Ramsay. Are their observations the outcome of their common discussions in 1765? The work of the humane Beccaria is not «so important», nor his ideas «so true»68 as they are claimed to be. Littéraire, Philosophique et Critique par Grimm, Diderot, Meister Etc., cit., p. 344; [Grimm] «M. l’abbé Morellet...», ibidem, pp. 427, 429; [Voltaire] Commentaire sur le Livre Des délits et des peines, Par un Avocat de Province, [Paris] 1766, IX, p. 51; XII, p. 63; D. Diderot, Recherches sur le style, in Encyclopédie Méthodique. Philosophie ancienne et moderne, 3 vols., ed. by J. A. Naigeon, Panckoucke, Paris 1792, t. II, pp. 223a-224b: 223b; P. Verri to A. Verri, 15 gennaio 1767, Viaggio a Parigi e Londra (1766-1767), cit., p. 247. 61 RR, p. 252. 62 RR, p. 246. 63 RR, p. 250. 64 Ibidem. 65 Ibidem. 66 Diderot, Recherches sur le style, cit., p. 223b. 67 Ibidem (cfr. RR, p. 239). Ramsay refers to «Robert Walpole», Diderot to a London «minister»: in both cases the term of comparison is the Sultan of Constantinople. 68 Diderot, Recherches sur le style, cit., p. 223b. It is certainly difficult, as Venturi observes, «to say to what extent Diderot [...] might have been influenced by this letter from Allan Ramsay» (F. Venturi, Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1971, p. 110); and it is equally difficult to say to what extent this letter from Ramsay was influenced by Grimm’s Correspondance littéraire, and Diderot’s and Suard’s observations, since Diderot and Suard were those who first introduced Ramsay to Dei delitti (RR, p. 246). THE HUMEAN RAMSAY AS A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHER. In 1754 Ramsay and Hume founded the Edinburgh Select Society, where they discuss the questions «Whether Capital punishment be the most proper method for restraining theft?»69, and «Whether severe or moderate punishments have the greatest effect in preventing the commission of Crimes?»70. In 1753 Ramsay had published An Essay on Ridicule and Elizabeth Canning 71, which was celebrated by Voltaire72. In 1755 he publishes a dialogue On taste73, which recalls Hume’s A Dialogue and is silently discussed in Hume’s Of the Standard of Taste 74. As a Humean writer, Ramsay intends to show the «usefulness and necessity of experimental reasoning in philological and moral enquiries»75 (Hume’s Treatise is An Attempt to introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects), and recalls that philosophy is «nothing but common sense and experience methodised»76 (according to Hume «philosophical Decisions are nothing but the Reflections of common Life, methodiz’d and corrected»77). In 1765 Ramsay publishes the Essay on the constitution of England; in 1766 he writes the Thoughts on the Origin and Nature of Government, which were to be published three years later (Hume probably possessed all of them)78. Before his arrival in Paris the Gazette 69 NLS, Select Society Adv. Mss. 23.1.1, pp. 43, 67. The question, named as a subject of debate in January and November 1755, is declared «Debated» (ibidem, p. 191). 70 NLS, Select Society Adv. Mss. 23.1.1, pp. 150, 167. The question, named as a subject of debate in January 1760 and June 1761, is declared «Debated» (ibidem, p. 250), possibly in July 1761. 71 [A. Ramsay] A Letter to the Right Honourable the Earl of – Concerning the Affair of Elizabeth Canning. By a Clergyman, T. Seddon, London 1753. 72 Voltaire, Histoire d’Elisabeth Canning et de Jean Calas, [Paris] 1762. 73 [A. Ramsay] The Investigator. Number CCCXXII, A. Millar, London, 1755. Ramsay’s performance is retitled in 1762: The Investigator. Containing the following Tracts. I. On Ridicule. II. On Elizabeth Canning. III. On Naturalization. IV. On Taste, London 1762; A Dialogue on Taste, London 17622. 74 Cfr. E. Mazza, Fluctuations: manners and Religion in Hume’s “Of the Standard of Taste”, in The Humean Mind, ed. by A. Coventry and A. Sager, Routledge, London 2019, pp. 272-284 75 [A. Ramsay] Advertisement to An Essay on Ridicule, A. Millar, London 1753, p. i. 76 [A. Ramsay] The Investigator. Number CCCXXII, cit., p. 28. 77 D. Hume, Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding, A. Millar, London 1748, p. 251. 78 [A. Ramsay] An Essay on the Constitution of England, T. Becket and P.A. De Hondt, London 1765; An Essay on the Constitution of England, T. Becket and P.A. de Hondt, London 17662; [A. Ramsay] Thoughts on the Origin and Nature of Government. Occasioned by The late Disputes between Great Britain and her American Colonies. Written in the Year 1766, T. Becket and P.A. de Hondt, London 1769. Hume probably owned a «unique» collection of all Ramsay’s essays (cfr. Norton, Norton, The David Hume Library, cit., pp. 34-35, 45, 124). 126 Littéraire announces: he is a «skilful painter, already known for some ingenious writings»79. Both the Essay on the constitution and the Thoughts on the origin of government show some connection with the reflections on Beccaria. Especially the Thoughts, which attack those who believe in «a voluntary social contract, by which each man gives up, as it were into a common stock, a small portion of this natural liberty»80. The reflections had attacked those who believe that «each man, by contributing to this imaginary repository, puts in it only the smallest possible portion of his own liberty»81. The Essay makes repeated appeals to «experience» and the «real» motives of men, like their «hopes of superiority»82. The political philosopher must have an «attentive eye» to the «constituents» of government and their interests83. The Thoughts repeat these appeals, and proceed to attack the «idle dreams of metaphysicians, uncountenanced by fact and experience», who maintain that «all the rights of government are derived from a voluntary social contract»84. «Unfortunately», Ramsay writes, «no such voluntary contract was ever known to be entered into»85 (does Bentham, who is acquainted with Hume86, know Ramsay?87). The rights of government are built upon the «weakness and necessities of 79 Review of the «Essai sur la Constitution d’Angleterre», «Supplément à la Gazette Littéraire de l’Europe», 28 April 1765, n. 10, cit., p. 295. 80 [Ramsay] Thoughts on the Origin, cit., p. 9 (emphasis added). 81 RR, p. 247 (emphasis added; cfr. Beccaria, Dei delitti, cit., § I, p. 8; § II, p. 10; BAF, pp. 146, 148). This could be Ramsay’s only textual reference to the chapter «The death penalty» («laws are nothing but a sum of the smallest portions of each man’s own freedom»; Beccaria, Dei delitti, cit., § 27, p. 73; BAF, p. 228); yet, it is more likely that Ramsay is still referring to the chapters «The origin of punishment» («the sum of all these portions of freedom sacrificed to the good of everyone forms the sovereignity [...] everyone is always trying to take out of the repository his own portion»; Beccaria, Dei delitti, cit., § 1, p. 8; BAF, p. 146) and «The right to punish» («none want to put in the public repository more than the smallest possible portion of his freedom [...] the aggregate of these smallest possible portions forms the right to punish»; Beccaria, Dei delitti, cit., § 2, p. 10; BAF, p. 148). 82 [Ramsay] An Essay on the Constitution of England, 17662, cit., sect. II, p. 15. 83 Ibidem, sect. I, p. 6. 84 [Ramsay] Thoughts on the Origin, cit., p. 9. 85 Ibidem. 86 According to Bentham the notion of original contract «had been effectually demolished by Mr Hume» (J. Bentham, A Fragment on Government, ed. by J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001, p. 51). 87 «In this society we will say no contract has as yet been entered into» (Bentham, A Fragment on Government, cit., p. 50). In 1770 Ramsay’s pupil, the engraver and portrait painter David Martin, «offered to paint Bentham, who refused [...], as he could not afford to pay the import duty into England» (J. Bowring, Memoirs of Bentham, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, W. Tait, Edinburgh 1842, 66b). Emilio Mazza mankind»88. If a contract exists, it is a «reciprocal obligation of protection and service»89 («if you are powerful I will be obedient»90). Any act of power must tend to the «support or safety of government»91. Any project, which does not proceed upon this, will be «for ever abortive, or fatal to the projector»92. In Elizabeth Canning Ramsay allowed: «in the present state of ignorance, credulity, and irregular method of enquiry, I should be extremely fearful of my life and character, if I were accused of a capital offence; and should, by no means, think my innocence a sufficient protection»93. A battle in favour of a legal trial does not necessarily mean a battle against capital punishment. SUICIDE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: HUME IN PARIS. Self-murderers, the Persian Letters deplore, «are put to death a second time»94. Any punishment for suicide, Beccaria agrees, is «useless and unjust»95. Suicide, Hume proclaims, is no «transgression of our duty either to God, our neighbour, or ourselves»96. According to Montesquieu, «the English kill themselves» even in the very midst of happiness97. A travelling Englishman, Diderot adds, «is often a man who gets out of his country in order to kill himself somewhere else»98. One of them, he goes on, has just thrown himself into the Seine. It is September 1765. «They fished him out alive and brought him to the Grand Châtelet»99. The English Ambassador «had to interpose his authority to prevent them from putting him to death»100. As the Secretary to the English Embassy, Hume makes the French understand that there is no AngloFrench treatise that «forbids an Englishman from drowning himself in the Seine under pain of death»101. And then he amusingly concludes: «if my compatriot had unfortunately been jailed, he would have risked 88 [Ramsay] Thoughts on the Origin, cit., p. 10. p. 11; cfr. ibidem, p. 14. 90 Ibidem, p. 25. 91 Ibidem, p. 21; cfr. ibidem, p. 25. 92 Ibidem, p. 11. 93 [A. Ramsay] The Affair of Elizabeth Canning, cit., 1753, p. 55. 94 Montesquieu, Lettres Persanes, 2 vols., P. Marteau, Cologne 1731, vol. 2, letter LXIV, p. 9. 95 Beccaria, Dei Delitti, cit., § XXXI, p. 101 (BAF, p. 260). 96 [D. Hume] Essay I [Of Suicide], in Two Essays, London 1777, p. 5. 97 [Montesquieu] De l’Esprit des Loix, 2 vols., Barillot, Geneve 1748, vol. I, XIV, XI, p. 377. 98 D. Diderot a S. Volland, 6 octobre 1765, Correspondance V, cit., p. 132. 99 Ibidem. 100 Ibidem. 101 Ibidem. 89 Ibidem, 127 Mille choses de sa part. Hume, Ramsay and Beccaria* disgracefully losing his life for having or not having drowned himself. If the English are quite mad, you will allow that the French are quite ridiculous»102. Marischal Keith congratulates Hume for so «many good works» in his ministerial functions and for saving «a poor fellow from the gallows who chose rather to drown than starve»103. The author of Suicide is closer to that of Dei delitti in practice than in theory104. TYRANNICIDE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: HARMFUL THEREFORE BLAMEWORTHY. Tyrannicide was so «approv’d of by ancient Maxims»105, Hume remarks in 1748; yet «instead of keeping Tyrants and Userpers in Awe, made them ten times more fierce and unrelenting»106. Now it is «universally condemn’d as a base and treacherous Method of bringing to Justice these Disturbers of Society»107. Its useless or harmful consequences make it blameworthy. In 1751 Hume recalls the question. «History and Experience [...] [have] convinc’d us, that this Practice encreases the Jealousy and Cruelty of Princes»108: if its «great Inconveniencies» could have «prov’d clearly» to the ancients, we could have «reform’d their sentiments» concerning tyrannicide109. Can the same argument be used against capital punishment? Hume’s History applies it against the attempt to extirpate a widespread heretical opinion «by capital punishments». Besides its «extreme barbarity», this attempt «proves commonly ineffectual to the purpose intended»110: it «serves only to make men more obstinate in their persuasion»111. Yet, someone else argues, unlike soft persecution, which does «serve only to irritate the 102 Ibidem. Keith to D. Hume, Postdam, 10th September 1765, NLS MS 23155, n. 112, ff. 85-88: f. 85. 104 In 1757 Hume ironically declares that he will proceed directly «to recommend Suicide & Adultery» (D. Hume to J. Edmonstoune of Newton, 29 September 1757, in New Letters of David Hume, ed. by R. Klibansky and E.C. Mossner, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1954, p. 43). Yet he never declares that he will proceed to recommend the abolition of capital punishment. With regard to this question he doesnt’t wish to be a «disturber of the public peace among philosophers» (P. Bayle, Arcesilas, in Dictionnaire historique et critique, 4 vols., P. Brunel et al., Amsterdam-Leyde 17405, vol. I, Rem E, p. 285b; cfr. ibidem, p. 285). 105 D. Hume, Of Passive Obedience, in Essays, Moral and Political, A. Millar, London / A. Kincaid, Edinburgh 17483, pp. 308-312: 310. 106 Ibidem. 107 Ibidem. 108 D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, A. Millar, London 1751, pp. 29-30. 109 D. Hume, A Dialogue, ibidem, pp. 223-253: 240. 110 D. Hume, The History of England under the House of Tudor, 2 vols., A. Millar, London 1759, vol. I, p. 375. 111 Ibidem. sects, without disabling them from resistance», hard persecution is useful: «the stake, the wheel, and the gibbet, must soon terminate in the extirpation or banishment of all the heretics, [...] and in the entire silence and submission of the rest»112. And Hume bitterly acknowledges: since the latter argument was «more agreeable to the cruel bigotry» of the Queen, it was «better received»113. HUME AND THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT: A PHILOSOPHICAL SIN. «Of the Original Contract» anticipates some of Ramsay’s reflections114. The essay is «a short, but compleat Refutation of the political Systems of Sydney, Locke, and the Whigs, which [...] are plainly [...] repugnant to Reason & the Practice of all Nations» (even though «all the half Philosophers of the Nation have implicitely embrac’d for near a Century»115). These «so refin’d»116 systems, which «suppose that there is a Kind of original Contract»117, can only be either «seditious» or «delirious»118. Hume appeals to «History or Experience»119. The notion of an original contract could have a meaning only if referred to government in its «earliest infancy»120: savage people «voluntarily [...] abandon’d their native Liberty» for the advantages of peace and order121. If this «be meant by original Contract, it cannot be denied that all Government is, at first, founded on a Contract»122 (Ramsay follows the same line of argument: «if by his social contract our Italian means [...] we are ready to acknowledge that...»123). Yet, philosophers assert that «even at present», in its «full Maturity», government «rests on no other Foundation»124. If they look outside in the world, they will find «every where» sovereigns, who «claim their Subjects as their Property», and subjects, 103 G. 112 Ibidem, p. 377. 113 Ibidem. 114 On Hume’s criticism of the notion of original contract, cfr. A Treatise of Human Nature, cit., pp. 541-542, 547-549. 115 D. Hume to Lord Elibank, 8 January 1748 O.S., in E.C. Mossner, New Hume Letters to Lord Elibank, 1748-1776, «Texas Studies in Literature and Language», 4, 1962, pp. 431-460: 437. 116 D. Hume, Of the Original Contract, in Essays, Moral and Political, cit., pp. 289-307: 293. 117 Ibidem, p. 289. 118 Ibidem, p. 294. 119 Ibidem, p. 295; cfr. ibidem, pp. 293, 296, 304; supra, note 54. 120 Hume, Of the Original Contract, cit., p. 292; cfr. ibidem, pp. 291-292, 294. 121 Ibidem, p. 291. 122 Ibidem, pp. 291-292. 123 RR, pp. 247-248. 124 Hume, Of the Original Contract, cit., p. 292. 128 Emilio Mazza who «acknowledge this Right» in them125. There is nothing discoverable «but Force and Violence»: no «voluntary Association»126. The necessity of human affairs will never admit of this consent. Historical governments have been «originally» founded «either on Usurpation, or Conquest, or both without any [...] fair Consent, or voluntary Subjection»127: «Force, by dissolving the ancient Governments, is the Origin of almost all the new ones, that ever were establish’d in the World»128. In 1758 Hume adds a footnote: «New discoveries are not to be expected in these matters»129. In the «Idea of a perfect Commonwealth» Hume maintains that «all plans of government, which suppose great reformation in the manners of mankind, are plainly imaginary. Of this nature, are the republic of Plato, and the Utopia of Thomas More»130. According to Ramsay «all speculative work, such as that dei Delitti e delle Pene, belong to the category of utopias, of platonic republics and other ideal politics»131. Perhaps Hume would have called Dei delitti an imaginary reformation; certainly he thought that «political projectors» are very «pernicious», where they have power, and very «ridiculous», where they want it132. dro Verri, he never went outside London to see the new «English way of being hanged»136, as Alessandro calls it. In 1752 Hume observes that at the end of the Roman commonwealth the laws were «absurdly contriv’d»137: «all capital punishments were abolish’d» and, however dangerous any citizen might be, he was regularly punished by «banishment»138 (Hume seems to follow Sallust139 and criticise Montesquieu140). It became «necessary» to make use of private vengeance and it wasn’t easy «to set bounds to» it141. «One extreme produces another»142, he concludes: «in the same manner as excessive severity in the laws is apt to beget great relaxation in their execution; so their excessive lenity naturally engenders cruelty and barbarity»143. This is one of those Political Discourses, translated into French144, which are quoted by Beccaria in 1762145, but never mentioned in Dei delitti. In 1755, while the Select Society is discussing the question, Hume observes that «Punishment, without any proper purpose, is inconsistent with our ideas of goodness and justice»: «according to our conception, it should bear some proportion to the offence»146. A certain lenity may be natural to us: nothing can «steel the breast of judges and juries against the sentiments of humanity but reflections on necessity and public interest»147. As Hume HUME AND (CAPITAL) PUNISHMENT. 136 The young Hume knew the train of ideas of a prisoner going to the scaffold: «the action of the executioner; the separation of the head and body; bleeding, convulsive motions, and death»133. He knew that people commonly feel a «kindness» for him. He accounted for this in the Treatise134, possibly drawing from a bookish experience (Hobbes and Malebranche)135. Unlike Alessan- 125 Ibidem, 126 Ibidem, p. 293. p. 295. 127 Ibidem. 128 Ibidem, p. 298. D. Hume, Of the Original Contract, in Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, A. Millar, London / A. Kincaid and A. Donaldson, Edinburgh 1758, pp. 252-262: 262, note g. Even Boullainvilliers, Hume adds, knew that «time alone bestowed right and authority on what was commonly at first founded on force and violence» (ibidem). 130 D. Hume, Of the Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, in Political Discourses, R. Fleming for A. Kincaid and A. Donaldson, Edinburgh 1752, pp. 281-304: 283. 131 RR, p. 252. 132 Hume, Of the Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, cit., p. 281. The sentence was deleted after the 1770 edition. 133 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, cit., p. 406. 134 Ibidem, p. 388. 135 T. Hobbes, Human Nature, in The Elements of Law Natural and Politic, ed. by J.A.C. Gaskin, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1994, p. 53; N. Malebranche, De la Recherche de la vérité, ed. by G. Rodis-Lewis, 3 vols., Vrin, Paris 19913, vol. I, pp. 238-239. 129 A. Verri to P. Verri, 15 January 1767, in Viaggio a Parigi e Londra, cit., p. 251 (cfr. ibidem, p. 255). The «spectacle», Alessandro writes, does not excite «horror» nor offend «humanity» (ibidem, p. 251; cfr. ibidem, p. 255). The criminals are calm on their chariot pulled by a horse, their face is covered by a cap, and the executioner does not torment them (ibidem, p. 255): around them people enjoy themselves playing with snowballs (ibidem, pp. 251-254). It is like a «feast» (ibidem, pp. 252, 255). 137 D. Hume, Of the Populousness of antient Nations, in Political Discourses, cit., pp. 155-261: 202. 138 Ibidem. 139 Sallust, The War with Catiline, in Sallust, W. Heinemann, LOEB, London 1921, pp. 94-95; cfr. ibidem, pp. 98-99; Livy Books VIII and IX, 13 vols., W. Heinemann, LOEB, London 1926, vol. IV, pp. 388-389; Livy Books I and II, 13 vols., W. Heinemann, LOEB, London 1967, vol. I, pp. 104-105. 140 On the «moderation» and «mildness» of punishments with the Romans and the «Porcian law», cfr. [Montesquieu] De l’Esprit des Loix, cit., vol. I, VI, XV, p. 141. 141 Hume, Of the Populousness of antient Nations, cit., p. 202. 142 Ibidem, p. 203. 143 Ibidem. 144 Cfr. Discours Politiques de Mr. David Hume, [transl. by E. de Mauvillon], J. Schreuder & P. Mortier le Jeune, Amsterdam 1754, pp. 238-239. 145 C. Beccaria, Del disordine e de’ rimedi delle monete nello stato di Milano nel 1762, in Scritti Economici, ed. by G. Gaspari, Mediobanca, Milano 2014, II, I, p. 38. 146 [D. Hume] Essay II [Of the immortality of the Soul], in Two Essays, cit., pp. 25-41: 32. 147 Ibidem, p. 34. «This lenity» – Hume observes – «suits our natural ideas of right even towards the greatest of all criminals, and even though it prevents so inconsiderable a sufferance. Nay, even the most bigotted priest would naturally without reflection approve of it, provid- Mille choses de sa part. Hume, Ramsay and Beccaria* puts it in the moral Enquiry, what matters is the «Benefit of Society»148. How many heads lying on the block and severed from their bodies, how many stretched out slender necks, illegal trials, and unjust sentences; and how many executions we meet with in Hume’s History, which Beccaria read with «infinite pleasure»149! But only a few remarks on those capital punishments which were ineffectual to the purpose, and no general reasoning on their illegitimacy or inhumanity. On the contrary, we find some remarks on them as necessary acts of severity. The execution of Sidney, Hume writes, is «one of the greatest blemishes» of the age150. The court and the ministry were «inexcusable»151. The evidence was «not legal» and the jury «very blameable», and this is a «great reproach on the administration»152 . But Sidney was «undoubtedly guilty», he was always «a most inflexible and most inveterate enemy to the royal family», and even «abused the King’s clemency»153. That the King should pardon such a man «might be an act of heroic generosity, but can never be regarded as a necessary and indispensible duty»154. This is History. And perhaps these are some of those thousand things that Hume could have said about Beccaria, and his philosophical Crimes. In short, Morellet, who is connected with Hume, tells Beccaria that Hume desires him to tell Beccaria «one thousand things». Being the unfaithful and criticized translator of Dei delitti, Morellet adds that Hume carefully read the original and the French translation and approved of Morellet’s use of translator’s licence. Beccaria thanks Morellet for Hume’s congratulations and celebrates Hume as a profound philosopher and a historian. Morellet tells Hume that he «faithfully» reported to Beccaria the fact that Hume paid attention to his work and said «good» things about it: Beccaria told him to tell Hume that he is «sensible» of this attention and «encouraged» by these things. Yet, Hume apparently never wrote to Beccaria, and certainly never ed the crime was not heresy or infidelity; for as these crimes hurt himself in his temporal interest and advantages, perhaps he may not be altogether so indulgent to them» (ibidem, pp. 34-35). 148 «When any Man, even in political Society, renders himself, by his Crimes, obnoxious to the Public, he is punish’d by the Laws in his Goods and Person; that is, the ordinary Rules of Justice are, with Regard to him, suspended for a Moment, and it becomes equitable to inflict on him, for the Benefit of Society, what, otherwise, he could not suffer without Wrong or Injury» (Hume, Enquiry, cit., p. 40). 149 C. Beccaria a A. Morellet, 26 gennaio 1766, Carteggio, cit., p. 223. 150 D. Hume, The History of Great Britain, A. Millar, London 1757, vol. II, p. 363. 151 Ibidem, p. 362. 152 Ibidem, p. 363. 153 Ibidem. 154 Ibidem. 129 wrote anything about Dei delitti in his published works. On the other hand, Hume’s friend Ramsay wrote a criticism of Dei delitti, which is partly founded on Hume’s criticism of the contract theory and has something in common with Grimm’s and Diderot’s perplexity over Beccaria’s work. It is likely that Hume could agree, at least in part, with Ramsay’s reflections. It is certain that he could not accept any proposal for the abolition of capital punishment which was founded on a social contract, and it is equally certain that in the History he takes it as a matter of fact. Even if we could maintain that Hume had at his disposal some argumentative resources for a critique of the death penalty, it is a fact that he never used them, at least in his public writings nor – as far as I know – in his private correspondence. In 1766 d’Alembert informs him about the execution of La Barre («such an absurd and atrocious arrest [...] an abomination»)155, and twenty days afterwards Hume writes to the Marquise de Barbentane concerning «the atrocious punishment of the Chevalier de la Barre by the Parliament of Paris, on account of some youthful levities»156. Hume has no doubts: these «very strange stories [...] excite horror in every one, and give me a sensible concern»157. As a lover of France, he is «pleased to hear, that the indignation was as general in Paris as it is in all foreign countries»; as a philosophical historian he finds it «strange» that «such cruelty should be found among a people so celebrated for humanity, and so much bigotry amid so much knowledge and philosophy»158. Yet, even in this case, Hume does not appeal to Beccaria’s Delitti nor say a single word against capital punishment. 155 J.-B. Le Rond d’Alembert to D. Hume, 4 August 1766, in Letters of Eminent Persons Addressed to David Hume, ed. by J.H. Burton, W. Blackwood, Edinburgh and London 1849, pp. 196-197. 156 D. Hume to the Marquise de Barbentane, 29 August 1766, in The Letters of David Hume, 2 vols., ed. by J.Y.T. Greig, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1932, vol. II, p. 85. 157 Ibidem. 158 Ibidem. Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Saggi Crime, punishment, and law in eighteenthcentury British encyclopedias Citation: E. Lonati (2019) Crime, punishment, and law in eighteenth-century British encyclopedias. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 131-142. doi: 10.13128/ ds-25445 Copyright: © 2019 E. Lonati. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. Elisabetta Lonati Università degli Studi di Milano Abstract. In the second half of 18th-century Europe, the notions – and the administration – of law and justice underwent dramatic and fundamental epistemological changes. Crime and punishment were gradually reconceptualised and redefined. The general aim of the present study is to provide an overview of selected contents included in 18th-century British dictionaries of arts and sciences: a survey on the words connected to crime and punishment, and the function of reference works in the dissemination of traditional vs. innovative contents. The detailed aim is at least twofold: to analyse the notions and terms of crime, punishment, corporal punishment as judicial torture, and their relationship with law and justice, and to verify the inclusion of Beccaria’s work and his ideas in encyclopedic entries after 1767. Keywords. Crime, Punishment, Law, Torture, 18th-Century Encyclopedias. 1. INTRODUCTION. In the second half of the eighteenth-century, the notions of law and justice, as well as their administration, underwent dramatic and fundamental epistemological changes. On the basis of these epistemological changes, the notions of crime and punishment were gradually reconceptualised and redefined. These theoretical and practical changes involved, among others, a shift «from the vengeance of the sovereign to the defence of society» and «the disappearance of the tortured, dismembered, amputated body»1. It was a long process which undermined customary practices, and favoured «the development of the rule of law as against the rule of King and Queen»2; the idea of punishment as a way to prevent the proliferation of evil in the future 3; «a complete separation of crime from ideas of sin» and «deterrence [as] the 1 M. Foucault, Discipline & Punish. The Birth of the Prison, Engl. transl. by A. Sheridan, Vintage Books Edition, New York 1995, pp. 8 and 90 (first edition Surveiller et Punir: Naissance de la Prison, Gallimard, Paris 1975). 2 D. Friedman, Torture and the Common Law, «European Human Rights Law Review», 2, 2006, pp. 180-199: 190. 3 P. Audegean, Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments: the Meaning and Genesis of a Jurispolitical Pamphlet, «History of European Ideas», 43, 2017, 8, pp. 884-897: 886. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 131-142 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25445 132 primary theoretical justification for the application of punishment»4; «punishments and the means adopted for inflicting them [...] consistent with proportionality»5. The notion of proportionality and its interaction with other emerging principles, namely social contract, equality, utilitarian analysis and retributive elements, the right to punish, amount of punishment, and the economic issues included in the notion of crime 6, transform the background for crime and punishment to enact. The debate on «health, education and social policy [...] as crimeprevention tools»7, «the idea of a Code and the idea of ‘Codification’» of crimes, punishments, and criminal laws8, the emergence of humanitarian issues, religious toleration, educational reform, and modern police forces9, highlight a more constructive and benign outlook on life. All these progressive ideas and perspectives were clearly and effectively introduced and discussed in Beccaria’s Essay on Crime and Punishments10, and represent the issues of a complex, laborious, and strenuous «epistemological conflict»11. It is from this conflict that the new attitudes concerning the conceptualisation and the administration of justice across nations emerge. The gradual abolition of bodily pain and judicial torture, and the introduction of alternative penalties to death definitely become an essential and constitutive background in establishing human rights12. It was – and still is – a long process of adaptation and modification of the traditional punitive outlook: 4 A.J. Draper, Cesare Beccaria’s Influence on English Discussions of Punishment, 1764-1789, «History of European Ideas», 26, 2000, 3-4, pp. 177199: 181 and 183. 5 K.P. Haggard, On Crime, Punishment, and Reform of the Criminal Justice System, «Athene Noctua: Undergraduate Philosophy Journal», 1, 2013, pp. 1-7: 4. 6 B.E. Harcourt, Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments: A Mirror on the History of the Foundations of Modern Criminal Law, «Chicago Case – Sandor Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper», 2nd s., 648, 2013, pp. 1-22, passim [also «Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper» No. 433]. 7 L. Ferrajoli, Two Hundred and Fifty Years since the Publication of On Crimes and Punishments: The Currency of Cesare Beccaria’s Though, «Punishment & Society», 16, 2014, 5, pp. 501-519: 505. 8 A. Cadoppi, Cesare Beccaria, John Bessler and the Birth of Modern Criminal Law, «University of Baltimora Journal of International Law», 3, 2015, 2, pp. 1-29: 11. 9 P.M. Warthon, The Humanitarian Movement in European History, «Il Politico», 48, 1983, 4, pp. 693-726: 698-699. 10 C. Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, Translated from the Italian; with a Commentary, attributed to Mons. De Voltaire..., London 1767 (hereafter: Essay). For a thorough treatment of the first English translation of Beccaria’s Essay, cfr. R. Loretelli, The First English Tanslation of Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments. Uncovering the Editorial and Political contexts, «Diciottesimo Secolo», 2, 2017, pp. 1-22. The original Italian version, titled Dei delitti e delle pene, was published anonymously in 1764. 11 Audegean, Meaning and Genesis, cit., p. 894. 12 For this specific topic, cfr. Warthon, Humanitarian Movement, cit. Elisabetta Lonati The state of the criminal law in Europe in the early 18th century was appalling. Laws everywhere in Europe were confused, cruel and inconsistent and their administration was often corrupt. [...] The convicted were condemned in large numbers not merely to death itself but to agonising death, by burning, breaking on the wheel and other terrible tortures. [...] The use of torture to extract confessions was defended by the Spanish inquisitors, but also by the English scholar and Lord Chancellor Francis Bacon and in 1686 by Sir Robert Wiseman13. and In England, there had been attempts as far back as the Magna Carta to limit the king’s power of arbitrary arrest and unjust trials and punishments and torture was not permitted by customary Common Law, although special measures of legislation had introduced it14. In this context, the general aim of the present study is to provide an overview of selected contents made available to the educated and curious reader in eighteenth-century British dictionaries of arts and sciences: a survey on the words connected to crime and punishment, and the function of reference works in the dissemination of traditional vs. innovative contents15. The detailed aim is at least twofold: to analyse the notions and terms (lexical items) of crime, punishment, corporal punishment as judicial torture, and their relationship with law and justice, and to verify the inclusion of Beccaria’s work and the dissemination of ideas in encyclopedic entries after 1767. Before starting with the investigation of the key words and entries above mentioned, it is worth introducing the lexicographic nature of universal dictionaries of arts and sciences and their socio-cultural function, though in general terms. 1.1. Lexicographic and textual features. Universal dictionaries of arts and sciences, or ‘lexicographic encyclopedias’, had been a typical emerging phenomenon since the opening of the century, the first of this kind was John Harris’s Lexicon Technicum (1704)16, followed by the well-known Cyclopædia (1728), 13 Ibidem, p. 701. p. 703. 15 The close textual analysis of encyclopedic entries on a selected number of topics, also including traditional and up-to-date measures of legislation in the administration of justice, will be carried out later on in this paper, precisely in sections 2 and 3. 16 J. Harris, Lexicon Technicum, or, an Universal English Dictionary of Arts and Sciences explaining not only the Terms of Arts, but the Arts themselves, London 1704. 14 Ibidem, Crime, punishment, and law in eighteenth-century British encyclopedias compiled by Ephraim Chambers17. These pioneering examples, and those which came later on in the century, can be considered as the realisation of the Baconian programme for the advancement of natural knowledge [...] with their coverage of the sciences and the practical arts and crafts, were called ‘scientific dictionaries’, in spite of the fact that they also included subjects such as law, music, and heraldry18. Organised in alphabetical order, they include many topics, or subjects, and they share a kind of double nature: as dictionaries they start from words to unfold the general meaning of the thing or idea to be represented; as encyclopedias, their primary aim is to display present and past realities, entities, processes, notions and ideas. The general aim is both to display the many subjects in their complex relations with other disciplines (cross-references), and to unfold each of them in detail (individual entries): because the dictionaries of arts and sciences aspired to cover a range of subjects, the decision to use alphabetical order implied a radical break with respected assumptions concerning proper relations between subjects19 [...] alphabetical order authorises all reading strategies; in this respect it could be considered an emblem of the Enlightenment. [...] The alphabet thus gave scientific dictionaries the flexibility to absorb the new findings of the Scientific Revolution without having to assess the implications for traditional doctrines in long treatises20. Generally interested in including and recording developing and expanding disciplines (medicine, botany, geography, natural history, ‘scientific’ discoveries), they also include more traditional topics (heraldry, house17 E. Chambers, Cyclopædia: or, an Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences; containing the Definitions of the Terms, and Accounts of the Things signify’d thereby, in the several Arts, both Liberal and Mechanical, and the several Sciences, Human and Divine..., Printed for James and John Knapton, etc., London 1728; E. Chambers, Cyclopædia: or, an Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences; containing an Explication of the Terms, and an Account of the Things signified thereby, in the Several Arts, Both Liberal and Mechanical; and the several Sciences, Human and Divine... The fifth Edition in Two Volumes, London 1741-1743 (hereafter: CCy and 5thCCy, respectively). 18 R. Yeo, Encyclopædic Visions. Scientific Dictionaries and Enlightenment Culture, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001, p. xiv. 19 In the case of Chambers’s Cyclopaedia, a detailed Tree of Knowledge is included in the long Preface. The function of the Tree is to unfold knowledge as a hierarchical whole, in which single branches are represented in further detail, and connected to each other. Another strategy largely used by Chambers is the cross-reference technique, in a way that many headwords-topics are related to each other, to recreate the wholepart and part-whole relationship, and to stimulate a kind of ‘systematic reading’. 20 Yeo, Encyclopædic Visions, cit., p. 25. 133 hold, religion or ecclesiastical matters, law, music). The entries may vary in length, some of them only consist of the lexical meaning of the headword, some just include one or more cross-references, others expand for pages (in-folio pages). The entries may include descriptive, narrative, informative, instructive passages, encompassing the history of the discipline and the present state of the art (e.g. finance, trade and commerce, customs, laws and statutes, etc.), up-to-date discoveries (e.g. geography, botany, physics and chemistry, etc.), anecdotes and case studies (e.g. medicine, pharmacy, natural sciences, etc.), quotations taken from scholars of the past and contemporary men of science. The dissemination of knowledge in English within the restricted circles of an educated elite, mainly belonging to the upper and the middle classes, was directly connected to «the rise of the vernacular as a form of scholarly communication»21. This does not mean that Latin was abandoned, but that its role and usage were redefined as the highest form of disciplinary and specialised communication among the men of science, as a restricted professional tool. Latin was definitely given a precise role, as distinct from the outstanding possibilities of vernacular to communicate both between experts, and between experts and the lay readership. It was a period in which the intention of disseminating knowledge for the benefit and the utility of mankind was rapidly expanding, also supported and stimulated by the expansion of the book market 22 , for those who could afford the expense. The opportunity of collecting many different disciplines and topics under key headwords in a few volumes represented then a crucial turning point in the reading practice. 1.2. Sources. The sources for the present study are the most relevant universal dictionaries of arts and sciences compiled and published in eighteenth-century Britain. One is Ephraim Chambers’s Cyclopædia23, issued in the first half of the century, long before Beccaria’s Dei Delitti e Delle Pene (1764)24 was published in Italian. Two of the three reference works selected for this analysis were instead issued in the second half of the century, after the 21 Ibidem, p. 157. M. Fissel, The Marketplace of Print, in M.S.R. Jenner & P. Wallis (eds.), Medicine and the Market in England and its Colonies, c. 14501850, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke and New York 2007, pp. 108-132. 23 Cfr. CCy and 5thCCy, note 17. 24 For reference to the English version, cfr. note 10. 22 134 English version of Beccaria’s book was translated and made known to the public in 176725: the Encyclopædia Britannica (1768-1771)26, and Abraham Rees’s Cyclopædia (1778-1788)27. Besides the socio-historical, socio-cultural, and pragmatic relevance of these encyclopedias as representatives of a momentous period in European history, this selection is also strictly motivated by chronological reasons, 1767 being the date ante quem reference works might include traditional ideas and practices in the administration of justice, and the date post quem new perspectives, attitudes, and practices might be gradually assimilated and accepted in society, and be included in the entries. Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language28 (1755 and 1777) will also be of help in the attempt to define the meanings and senses of some words under scrutiny, to clarify their contextual meaning and to avoid anachronistic interpretations. Elisabetta Lonati tions are highlighted. Law belongs to «Ethics, or Natural Religion», directly connected to «Relations [...] to our Happiness»29. A more detailed contextualisation of law, is displayed further on in the Preface: Chambers organises the main topics, among which law, into separate sections, headed and numbered. These sections function as lexical sets, or list of the most representative headwords concerning the general topic, in this case law («LAW, or the rules...»). The lexemes are further clustered under thematic, and more specific, headings (e.g. «1° Persons [...] 2° Estates or Things [...] 3° Wrongs or Injuries», etc.). In this section, Law is lexically represented as follows: 15LAW, or the rules and Measures of Society; publish’d in Act, Statute, Charter, Rescript, Constitution, Decretal, Senatus-consultum, Pragmatic Sanction, &c. Recorded, in Institute, Code, [...] Kinds, Civil, Canon, [...] Respecting, 1° Persons, as the King; his Prerogatives, [...] Officers and Magistrates [...] Corporations [...] 2° Estates or Things; either Real [...] Or Personal [...]. 3° Wrongs or Injuries; either Criminal, and to Persons, as Treason, Parricide, Murder, Felony, Assault, Rape, Assassin, Adultery, Fornication, Defloration, Polygamy, Heresy, &c. Prosecuted by Indictment, Accusation, Actions of Conspiracy, and upon the Case, Habeas Corpus, &c. Punish’d, with Hanging, Crucifixion, Wheel, Furca, Scala, Pillory, Transportation, Divorce, Scaphism, &c. Or Civil, and to Things; [...]. Suit or Course of Proceedings whereby Redress is procured; including, 1°, Process [...] 2°, Pleading [...] 3°, Issue [...] 4°, Trial; whence Proof, Evidence, Presumption, Oath, Duel, Champion, Purgation, Ordeal, &c. Paine fort & duret, Rack, Torture, &c. 5°, Judgment; whence Arrest, &c. 6°, Execution, whence Scire facias, Reprieve, &c. (CCy, Preface, iv, topic 15)30. 1.3. Background notions and methodological issues. The analysis starts from CCy and, in particular, from its paratext. The preface, which introduces and presents the many disciplines treated in the work, includes a typical Tree of knowledge, displaying its many branches as subdivisions of a hierarchical order in which connec25 Cfr. Loretelli, First English Translation, cit. Encyclopædia Britannica; or, a Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, compiled upon a new plan. In which the different Sciences and Arts are digested into distinct Treatises or Systems; and the various Technical Terms, &c. are explained as they occur in the order of the Alphabet..., Printed for A. Bell and C. Macfarquhar, Edinburgh (1768-)1771 (hereafter: EB). 27 Cyclopædia: or, an universal dictionary of arts and sciences ... by E. Chambers, F.R.S. With the supplement, and modern improvements, incorporated in one alphabet. By Abraham Rees, D.D. In four volumes, London 1778-88 (hereafter RCy). In this context, and for reasons of space, time, and aims of the work, it is not possible to expand the description of single encyclopedias, and discuss them in detail. For an in-depth reading, the following works are worth citing: G. Abbattista, La ‘folie de la raison par alphabet’. Le origini settecentesche dell’Enciclopedia Britannica (1768-1801), «Studi settecenteschi», 16, 1996 (L’enciclopedismo in Italia nel XVIII secolo, a cura di G. Abbattista), pp. 397-434; L.E. Bradshaw, Ephraim Chambers’ Cyclopædia, in F.A. Kafker (ed.), Notable Encyclopedias of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Nine Predecessors of the Encyclopédie, The Voltaire Foundation, Oxford 1981, pp. 123-140; F.A. Kafker, William Smellie’s Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, in F.A. Kafker (ed.), Notable Encyclopedias of the Late Eighteenth Century: Eleven Successors of the Encyclopédie, The Voltaire Foundation, Oxford 1994, pp. 145-182; S. Werner Stephen, Abraham Rees’s eighteenth-century Cyclopædia, ivi, pp. 183-199; R. Yeo, Reading Encyclopedias: Science and the Organization of Knowledge in British Dictionaries of Arts and Sciences, 1730-1850, «Isis», 82, 1991, 1, pp. 24-49; Id., Ephraim Chambers’s Cyclopædia (1728) and the Tradition of Commonplaces, «Journal of the History of Ideas», 57, 1996, 1, pp. 157-175. 28 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, 2 vols., London 1755 (first edition, hereafter 1st1755), and 1777 (fourth edition, hereafter 4th1777). 26 This concise passage of about half an in-folio column already includes all the key words which embody the complex and general network of any legal system: regulating rights and social interaction according to «the rules and Measures of Society», prosecuting «Wrong and Injuries», sanctioning criminal behaviour, and punishing it «with Hanging, Crucifixion, Wheel, Furca, Scala, Pillory, Transportation, [...] Ordeal, &c. Paine fort & duret31, Rack, Torture [...] Execution». The law punishes 29 CCy, Preface, p. ii. For the nature of the analysis and for practical reasons, the references to the headwords-entries will immediately follow the lexicographic extracts under scrutiny, in the sequence ‘encyclopedia/title, s.v. HEADWORD’, between brackets. 31 This expression is recorded with different spellings throughout the paper, according to the sources under scrutiny. The Oxford English Dictionary, 20053, s.v. PAIN, at <http://www. oed.com.pros.lib.unimi.it/> (03/2019) makes the word derive from Anglo-Norman peine, paine, etc., the spelling <paine> is regional and 30 Crime, punishment, and law in eighteenth-century British encyclopedias ‘the body’ of the accused to reestablish, «Redress is procured», an ideal order. Judicial torture, though formally banished in England32, comes into play. Law is also discussed in individual entries in each work: in CCy, 5thCCy and RCy, the entry covers about three and half an in-folio columns; in EB, Law is a treatise included in the alphabetical lemmata and essentially discussing the «PRINCIPLES of the LAW of SCOTLAND» (EB, s.v. LAW, pp. 882-960), besides a very concise opening paragraph which defines the word law in general. For reasons of space, and according to the focus of this study, only the most general notions of law are introduced here, as a background to more specific headwords and topics. Law is defined as «a Command or Precept coming from some superior Authority, to which an inferior is obliged to obey» (CCy and 5thCCy, s.v. LAW), «a command or precept, constituting a rule of action, coming from some superior authority, which an inferior is obliged to obey» (RCy, s.v. LAW); and as «The command of the sovereign power, containing a common rule of life for the subjects» (EB, s.v. LAW). Law is then a regulating principle established by a «supreme power» (EB, s.v. LAW), or by «some Person, or Power» (CCy, 5thCCy, and RCy, s.v. LAW), but also «a rule of action» (RCy, s.v. LAW) determining practical, human behavior in social interaction. Law is also subdivided into two branches. On the one hand, it highlights and embodies the «rule of life» (EB, s.v. LAW), it is the distributive function: «Distributive is that Branch by which every Man has his Right; or that which constitutes the Rules and Measures of Things» (CCy; 5thCCy and RCy with minor morphosyntactic changes, s.v. LAW). On the other hand, law punishes the offender, or the convict: it is the «Vindicative [...] Branch by which the Punishments to be inflicted on those who violate the Laws are determined» archaic, whereas <pain> is the usual one at the time. PAIN refers to «1. a. Punishment; penalty; suffering or loss inflicted for a crime or offence; (sometimes) spec. a fine, a tax. Also in extended use» and «†c. Law. pain fort and dure: = peine forte et dure at peine n. 1. Obsolete». The spelling <peine fort et dure> is also attested in English, s.v. PEINE, it is defined as follows: «1. Law. Pain, punishment. Originally and chiefly in peine forte et dure: a form of torture used on a prisoner who refused to plead, in which the prisoner’s body was pressed with heavy weights until submission or death. Cf. penance n. 2. Now hist. Peine forte et dure was abolished by the Felony and Piracy Act 1772, in which refusal to plead to a charge was made equivalent to pleading guilty. For an Anglicized version of the phrase see pain n.1 1c.». The etymology goes back to «Middle French peine (French peine) pain n.1, apparently via Law French in phrase peine forte et dure (lit. ‘severe and hard punishment’), although this is apparently first attested later (1560). Compare Anglo-Norman prison forte et dure (1275 in the first statute of Westminster (3 Edw. 1, c. 12), and post-classical Latin pena fortis et dura...», s.v. PEINE. Cfr. also notes 44 and 45 for the ‘refusal to plead’. 32 Warthon, Humanitarian Movement, cit., pp. 701-703 and 718-719. 135 (CCy, 5thCCy, and RCy, s.v. LAW). However, laws change in time according to new ideas and needs, since «the supreme power of one age cannot [...] be fettered by any enactment of a former age, otherwise it would cease to be supreme. Hence the law last in date derogates from prior laws» (EB, s.v. LAW). Two considerations are necessary here: the first regards the inclusion of a more practical and socialbound outlook s.v. LAW in RCy and EB, «constituting a rule of action» and «common rule of life» respectively. These expressions suggest very pragmatic issues in everyday life, besides the more abstract concept of law. It seems relevant to highlight the fact that these encyclopedias were both published in the second half of the century. The latter concerns the notion of ‘change in law’, and the fact that the supreme power is not fixed once and for all: to be supreme, it has to be legitimised and updated according to new needs and innovative ideas, «otherwise it would cease to be supreme» (EB, s.v. LAW). Law more clearly emerges as an agreement in progress within a community. Hence, the interpretation and the representation of justice, crime, punishment, and penalties would change as well, according to a restatement of social values and aims. A further step in the analysis considers both suggestions which emerged from prefatory materials, and the close reading of individual entries: as noted above, the key words are crime, punishment, and torture and their relationship with law and justice. Further suggestions for the debate are also introduced by internal and external referencing: on the one hand, cross-reference is a dynamic and effective tool to organise discourse and connect the entries with one another; on the other hand, external reference usually cites, and sometimes quotes – relevant sources on related topics. What follows represents only a few of these connections, as they emerge from dictionaries of arts and sciences; the focus is on penal law: Law civil & penal: a. Right, justice, judgment b. Free/dom, liberty, happiness c. Society, government, policy/ty, politics d. Crime, punishment/s, penalty/ies, question, torture e. Stocks, pillory, burning in the hand, whipping, cucking stool [or ducking stool]33, hanging, beheading, quarter- 33 The Oxford English Dictionary, 19892, <http://www.oed.com.pros. lib.unimi.it/> (03/2019), defines a cucking-stool as «An instrument of punishment formerly in use for scolds, disorderly women, fraudulent tradespeople, etc., consisting of a chair (sometimes in the form of a close-stool), in which the offender was fastened and exposed to the jeers of the bystanders, or conveyed to a pond or river and ducked», s.v. CUCKING-STOOL. 136 Elisabetta Lonati ing, burning, transportation, pain(e) fort et dure, gallows, gibbet, rack, etc. Law is at the centre of a complex network, in which every single word opens on to supplementary notions, events, contexts and situations34 . Some of the words included in the two lexical sets d. and e. above will be discussed in sections 2. and 3 below. The analysis will follow a narrowing process, based on the sense relation of hyponymy, from general notions to specific practices. 2. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT. This section presents and discusses two of the key words under scrutiny, and delineates the general features and the two major components of penal law: crime and punishment. In CCy, 5thCCy and RCy, crime is said to be a Breach, or Transgression of a Law; or an Action contrary to the Tenor [RCy: purport] of a Law, either Natural or Divine, Civil, or Ecclesiastick; to which a Penalty is annex’d. See Law. [5thCCy: See law, transgression; no cross references in RCy] The Romans distinguished [...]. With us, Crimes are distinguish’d into Capital, as Treasons, Murders, Robberies, &c. and Common, as Perjuries, &c. [...] (CCy; 5thCCy and RCy with minor spelling and lexical changes, s.v. CRIME). The three entries definitely overlap (about twenty infolio lines each), except for the concluding sentence. CCy introduces further semantic matter for the interpretation of the word, alongside the etymology. This was a systematic component in eighteenth-century dictionaries, and dictionaries of arts and sciences, particularly in the first half of the century, as a basic tool to start or support the discussion, as in this context: «The Term Crime includes in it the Idea of a Determination, and a Design form’d to do an Injury. It is deriv’d from the Latin Crimen, of the Greek κρινω, judico», (CCy, s.v. CRIME). 5thCCy omits the sentence on etymology, but adds further cross-references to «Quasi Crime. Crimen Falsi», a fraudulent behaviour including perjury. RCy omits etymology, and replaces it with relevant up-to-date information: «There is an excellent book on the subject of crimes and punishments, published by the marquis de Beccaria. Crime, quasi. See Quasi crime. Crimen falsi. See Falsi», (RCy, s.v. CRIME). It is not clear whether Abraham Rees directly knew, read, and used Beccaria’s Essay, but he might have been acquainted with Blackstone’s Commentaries (17651769)35. Blackstone quotes Beccaria more than once in his fourth volume, and Rees himself cites Blackstone in his entries (cfr. punishment, torture, transportation). RCy also includes the headword «CRIMINAL law», which testifies, both at a lexical and lexicographic levels, to the intense and current debate about the relationship between crime and law: «CRIMINAL law, is that which discusses the nature of crimes, and inflicts suitable penalties; or, as it is more usually denominated in England, the doctrine of the Pleas of the Crown», (RCy, s.v. CRIMINAL law). Criminal law does not only distinguish the nature of crimes, but also establishes «penalties» according to the extent of the offence, «suitable». It seems that the notion of proportionality is suggested here. Moreover, though the notion of punishment and penalty partially and significantly overlap, the word penalty does not directly entail punishment and/or vengeance. In this respect, Johnson’s definitions, and the inclusion of Locke’s perspective by way of example, are particularly revealing36. To conclude the discussion on the term crime, and expand the notion of crime as crime-to-society, EB puts forward the following opening paragraphs, in the section «Tit. 26. Of Crimes» (p. 953-960): The word crime, in its most general sense, includes every breach, either of the law of God, or of our country: in a more restricted meaning, it signifies such transgressions of law as are punishable by courts of justice. [...] 6. Those crimes that are, in their consequences, most hurt- 34 It is worth quoting here the complex definition of law included in Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language, in the first (1755) and fourth (1777) editions respectively: «1. A rule of action. Dryden. 2. A decree, edict, statute, or custom, publickly established. Davies. 3. Judicial process. Shakespeare. 4. Conformity to law; any thing lawful. Shakespeare. 5. An established and constant mode or process. Shakespeare» (1st1755, s.v. LAW) and «1. A rule of action. 2. A decree, edict, statute, or custom, publickly established as a rule of justice. 3. A decree authoritatively annexing rewards or punishments to certain actions. 4. Judicial process. 5. A distinct edict or rule. 6. Conformity to law; any thing lawful. [...]. 12. Jurisprudence; the study of law: as, a doctor of law...» (4th1777, s.v. LAW). The expansion of the concept, by the addition of further senses in the 4th1777 edition, testifies to the central role law has in this period, and also reflects a parallel attitude and practice in EB and RCy, as mentioned above. 35 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1765-69, voll. 1-4. 36 Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language: «PU’NISHMENT [...] Any infliction imposed in vengeance of a crime», (1st1755, s.v. PUNISHMENT); «PU’NISHMENT [...] Any infliction or pain imposed in vengeance of a crime», (4th1777, s.v. PUNISHMENT); «PE’NALTY, PENA’LITY [...] 1. Punishment; censure; judicial infliction. Brown. [...]», (1st1755, s.v. PENALTY); «PE’NALTY [...] 1. Punishment; censure; judicial infliction. [...] (1.) Political power is a right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for preserving property, and employing the force of the community in the execution of laws. Locke...», (4th1777, s.v. PENALTY). 137 Crime, punishment, and law in eighteenth-century British encyclopedias ful to society, are punished capitally, or by death; others escape with a lesser punishment, sometimes fixed by statute, and sometimes arbitrary, i.e. left to the discretion of the judge, who may exercise his jurisdiction, either by fine, imprisonment, or a corporal punishment. Where the punishment is left, by law, to the discretion of the judge, he can in no case extend it to death... (EB, s.v. LAW). Two fundamental principles emerge from the passage. On the one hand, crimes are perceived as a breach or transgression towards an entire community, «most hurtful to society»: the concept was not explicit in CCy’s, 5thCCy’s and in RCy’s definitions. On the other hand, «the discretion of the judge» is limited in the determination of a punishment: the relationship is not direct, or personal, but mediated «by law». It is worth remembering that EB essentially discusses the «Principles of the Law of Scotland»37. This section of the study closes with the notion of punishment, strictly connected with crime, and mostly overlapping with penalty, the equivalent used as primary semantic reference in all the dictionaries of arts and sciences38: PUNISHMENT, a Penalty impos’d upon the Commission of some Crime [5thCCy and RCy: or offence against the laws]. See Crime. ’Tis essential to the Nature of a Law, that it import or decree a Punishment to the Transgressors thereof. See Law. The Forms and Manners of Punishment are various in various Countries, and Ages, and for various Crimes; as Treason, Felony, Adultery, Parricide, &c. See Adultery, &c. [...] 37 The first section of the treatise Law, «Title I. General Observations», introduces the Law of Scotland as a mixed system, mostly based on written law, rather than common law. It is worth mentioning some defining passages: «I. The municipal law of Scotland, as of most other countries, consists partly of statutory or written law, which has the express authority of the legislative power; partly of customary or unwritten law, which derives force from its presumed or tacit consent. 2. Under our statutory or written law is comprehended, (I.) Our acts of parliament: [...] 3. The remains of our ancient written law were published by Sir John Skene clerk-register, in the beginning of the last century, by licence of parliament. [...] 4. Our written law comprehends, (2) [...] ordinances for regulating the forms of proceeding before the court of session in the administration of justice, made by the judges, who have a delegated power from the legislature for that purpose. Some of these acts dip upon matter of right, which declare what the judges apprehend to be the law of Scotland, and what they are to observe afterwards as a rule of judgment. 5. The civil or Roman and canon laws, though they are not perhaps to be deemed proper parts of our written law, have undoubtedly had the greatest influence in Scotland. The powers exercised by our sovereigns and judges have been justified upon no other ground, than that they were conformable to the civil or canon laws...», EB, vol. 2, p. 883. 38 Cfr. Johnson’s definitions, s.v. PUNISHMENT and PENALTY, supra, note 36. Among us, the principal Civil Punishments, are Fines, Imprisonments, the Stocks, Pillory, Burning in the Hand, Whipping, Cucking-Stool, Hanging, Behading, Quartering, Burning, Transportation, &c. See Fine, Pillory, Cuckingstool, Gallows, Gibbet, &c. [...] The Military Punishments, are, being Shot, Running the Gantelope39, Riding the wooden Horse, Bilboes, &c. [...] (CCy; 5thCCy and RCy with minor spelling and lexical change, s.v. PUNISHMENT). and, «PUNISHMENT, in law, the penalty which a person incurs on the breach or transgression of any law», (EB, s.v. PUNISHMENT). The combination punishment-penalty-crime-transgression-law, or the lexical set defining the area of meaning, is strengthened in any definition. EB is extremely concise, the entry simply includes the lexical meaning; whereas CCy, 5thCCy and RCy expand their contents to encompass very specific examples of punishment. These are mainly corporal punishments inflicting pain, and were probably still in use, according to the present tense are of the expression «Civil Punishments, are». The list of punishments provides evidence for further analysis and comment. In particular, the discussion on the notion of judicial torture, and specific corporal procedures. 3. TORTURE AND PAIN. This section concentrates on the effects of the relationship between crime and punishment already introduced, exemplified, and discussed in previous entries. In particular, the analysis focusses here on both the response, or ‘action’, of the authority to a personal or public offence, and the physical pain systematically employed to extort a confession. According to CCy, 5thCCy and RCy, torture is: a grievous Pain inflicted on a Criminal, or Person accused; to make him confess the Truth. See Question. The Forms of Torture are different in different Countries. In some they use Water, in others Iron, in some the Wheel or Rack, in some the Boot, Thumbkins, &c. See Rack. [5thCCy and RCy also add Boot, &c.] [...] In England the Use of all Torture is abolished, both in Civil and Criminal Matters; and even in Cases of High Treason; tho’ something like it still obtains, where the Criminal 39 The expression running the gantelope, or running the gauntelet refers to a military punishment «in which the culprit had to run stripped to the waist between two rows of men who struck at him with a stick or a knotted cord. rare except in †to pass the gantlope, to run the gantlope», s.v. GANTELOPE, Oxford English Dictionary, 19892. The words gantelope and the corrupted variant gauntelet derive from Old Norse, and mean ‘run through a lane’. 138 refuses to plead40. See Paine fort & dure. [RCy omits the closing sentence: “tho’ ... Paine fort & dure”] (CCy, 5thCCy and RCy, s.v. TORTURE). The three encyclopedias regularly display their similarities: most of 5thCCy and RCy entries match CCy. Torture is an appalling and heinous pain inflicted on a person accused, not condemned. It is a preventative treatment: the cross-reference “Question” is more than a relevant suggestion, and will be discussed below. The general definition of torture is immediately followed by exemplification: to make the «Criminal, or Person accused» confess, different strategies are used according to different countries and customs. Besides being officially abolished in England, sometimes torture, or «something like it», may be used: it is the case of «Paine fort & dure», actually leading to death. However, it is worth noting that the clause dealing with it (cfr. extract above) is completely omitted in RCy, in the second half of the century, whereas it is still included in 5thCCy. This may suggest that this practice was not in use in England in the 1770s, when RCy started to be compiled. The three works also include a quotation from La Bruyère (1645-1696), taken from his Caractères (originally published in 1688)41, and dealing with torturequestion: The Torture, says M. Bruyere, is a sure Expedient to destroy an innocent Person of a weak Complexion, and to save a Criminal of a robust one. – It was a noble Saying of an Ancient, They who can, and They who cannot bear the Torture, will equally lie. [5thCCy: They who can bear the torture will lie, and they who cannot bear it. RCy: They who can bear the torture will lye, and also they who cannot bear it] (CCy, 5thCCy and RCy, s.v. TORTURE). Question was a term used in France to refer to a standardised procedure in providing judicial evidence: 40 Cfr. infra, notes 44 and 45 for the ‘refusal to plead’. The following French version is drawn from La Bruyère, Les Caractères de Théophraste et de la Bruyere, avec des notes par M. Coste, Nouvelle Edition, t. II, Paris 1769, p. 208: «La question est une invention merveilleuse & tout-à-fait sûre, pour perdre un innocent qui a la complexion foible, & sauver un coupable qui est né robuste» (ch. XIV. «Des quelques usages»). The first edition of Les Caractères was published in anonymity in 1688. According to E.R. Clark, Le siècle des Lumières face à la torture, «Man and Nature», 6, 1987, pp. 173-180: 177-178: «La formule célèbre de La Bruyère [...] deviendra un lieu commun au siècle suivant et sera reprise par Voltaire, Beccaria et Jaucourt, autour de l’article ‘Question’ de l’Encyclopédie, parmi bien d’autres. Même Beccaria en 1765 ne trouvera pas d’autres principes pour renforcer son apologie de la justice humaine, qui a pourtant fini par ébranler l’immobilisme institutionnel, là où d’autres avaient échoué». 41 Elisabetta Lonati l’accusé est appliqué à la question, [...] le terme ‘question’ est le seul admis, faisant oublier les abus trop visibles dans des expressions telle ‘supplices’, ‘tourments’ et, bien entendu, ‘torture’. [...] L’accusé [...] devait tout avouer devant le spectacle affreux qui l’attendait42. The term is also included in CCy, 5thCCy and RCy with a general meaning of inquiry in logic and law, but question with specific reference to torture is only included in RCy, as a sub-headword closing the entry: «Question is also sometimes used for Torture», (RCy, s.v. QUESTION). The quotation from La Bruyère closes the entry TORTURE in CCy and 5thCCy. On the contrary, RCy further expands its contents, and provides noticeable external reference in the closing paragraph: The marquis Beccaria (chap. 16) with exquisite raillery proposes this problem: the force of the muscles and the sensibility of the nerves of an innocent person being given, it is required to find the degree of pain necessary to make him confess himself guilty of a given crime (RCy, s.v. TORTURE). This is the second time that Rees includes Beccaria’s work and thought in his RCy43, in this case also commenting – and positively supporting – Beccaria’s approach, «exquisite raillery». It is clear that Rees is well aware of the debate of the age, and of his effort to update very complex and disconcerting topics. As regards EB, the entry TORTURE is listed in alphabetical order and is very concise, limited to the lexical definition: «TORTURE, a grievous pain inflicted on a criminal, or person accused, to make him confess the truth», (EB, s.v. TORTURE). It overlaps with the general definition in CCy, 5thCCy and RCy, and does not add new information. At this point of the discussion, it is worth introducing some encyclopedic passages which deal strictly with very specific judicial treatments, that is to say kinds of torture and punishment, according to the definitions and cross-references provided by the compilers. The key words are rack, pain fort & dure, beheading, and transportation in the four works under scrutiny. The aim is primarily to examine how reference works encompass 42 Clark, Le siècle des Lumières face à la Torture, cit., p. 174. quotation refers to Beccaria’s words on torture: «The result of torture, then, is a matter of calculation, and depends on the constitution, which differs in every individual, and is in proportion to his strength and sensibility; so that to discover truth by this method is a problem, which may be better solved by a mathematician than a judge, and may be thus stated. The force of the muscles, and the sensibility of the nerves of an innocent person being given, it is required to find the degree of pain necessary to make him confess himself guilty of a given crime». The extract was drawn from Beccaria’s Essay, ch. 16, p. 64; cfr. note 10. 43 The Crime, punishment, and law in eighteenth-century British encyclopedias this matter, and how they verbalise these dreadful experiences. The first entry refers to rack, which is defined as an Engine furnished with Cords [5thCCy: chords], &c. for extorting Confession from Delinquents [RCy: criminals]. See TORTURE. The Duke of Exeter, Constable of the Tower under Henry VI with the Duke of Suffolk, and others, having a design to introduce the Civil Law into England; for a Beginning, the Rack, or Brake allowed in many Cases by the Civil Law, was first brought to the Tower, where it is still preserv’d. In those Days the Rack was call’d the Duke of Exeter’s Daughter. (CCy, 5thCCy and RCy, s.v. RACK). In CCy and 5thCCy, the entry finishes at this point. The definition, followed by historical reference, confirms the rack as a practice to make the accused person confess: it is an extortion, referring back to torture. EB proposes a similar definition, only focussed on the lexical meaning, and very concise: «RACK, an engine of torture, furnished with pullies and cords, &c. for extorting confession from criminals». Nothing new, and nothing else is added. On the contrary, an interesting addition is provided by RCy, after «the Duke of Exeter’s Daughter». The rack appears to be a practice of the past, but definitely abandoned at the time of writing: RACK, an engine of torture furnished with cords, &c. for extorting confession from criminals. The duke of Exeter [...]. It was occasionally used as an engine of state, not of law, more than once in the reign of queen Elizabeth. But when, upon the assassination of Villiers, duke of Buckingham, by Felton, it was proposed in the privy council to put the assassin to the rack, in order to discover his accomplices, the judges, being consulted, declared unanimously, to their own honour, and the honour of the English law, that no such proceeding was allowable by the laws of England... (RCy, s.v. RACK). The past tense «was occasionally used [...] it was proposed [...] declared unanimously [...] no such proceeding was allowable», alongside the exemplification by historical reference, would confirm the rack as not in use. Torture was actually not allowed for the Common Law, but it was sometimes used as a political tool until Felton’s case (1628), and formally abolished in England in 1640. A similar case is that of PAIN fort & dure (about twenty in-folio lines), CCy and 5thCCy completely overlap. The opening paragraph in the present tense (refuses, stands) is followed by a quotation, describing in detail the «prescribed» procedure. It is worth highlighting here the deontic strength of the verb shall: PAIN fort & dure, in Law, an especial Punishment for one, 139 who being arraigned of Felony, refuses to put himself upon the ordinary Trail of God and his Country44, and thereby stands mute by the interpretation of the Law. See Mute. This is vulgarly called Pressing to Death. The Process whereof is thus prescribed: “He shall be sent back to the Prison, whence he came, and be laid in some low dark House; where he shall lie naked on the Earth, without any Litter, Rushes, or other Cloathing, and without any Raiment about him, but only something to cover his PrivyMembers; and he shall lie upon his Back with his Head covered, and his Feet; and one Arm shall be drawn to one Quarter of the House, with a Cord, and the other Arm to another Quarter, and his Legs in the same Manner: Let there be laid upon his Body, Iron, or Stone, as much as he may bear, or more; and the next Day following, he shall have three Morsels of Barley-Bread without Drink; and the second Day he shall have Drink three Times, as much at each Time as he can drink, of the Water next unto the Prison, except it be running Water; without any Bread: and this shall be his Diet, till he dies”. (CCy and 5thCCy with minor spelling changes, s.v. PAIN fort & dure). Pain fort & dure is not a systematic preventative punishment, but «an especial» one to be applied occasionally. It is described as a step-by-step process, a ritual, a ceremony leading to death: «shall be sent back [...] be laid in some low dark House [...] shall lie naked [...] he shall lie upon his Back [...] one Arm shall be drawn [...] he shall have three Morsels [...] He shall have Drink [...] this shall be his Diet, till he dies». No comments are added at the end of the quotation. The almost biblical language is self-evident: the description anticipates the act of torture, inflicted by an external, distant, irrefutable authority. Similarly, RCy introduces the topic with the general definition, immediately followed by the same quotation included in CCy and 5thCCy. However, things are different here, the original present tense is replaced by the past participle and past tense (inflicted, refused, stood), also reinforced by the adverb formerly: PAINE fort & dure, in Law, an especial punishment, formerly inflicted on one, who, being arraigned of felony, refused to put himself [...] and thereby stood mute [...]. (RCy, s.v. PAINE fort & dure) 44 This passage refers to the necessary practice for the accused to plead, in order to undergo the ordinary judicial process. Only in this case, a legal verdict was possible. If the accused was found guilty for crimes of felony and treason, the penalty would be forfeiture of property, and hence the potential destitution of his family. By ‘standing silent’, «stands mute» (cfr. quotation above), the accused refused to plead, and to be judged. For this reason, the «ordinary Trail of [...] his Country» could not regularly operate, hence neither verdict, nor forfeiture of property, were issued. Cfr. note 45 on the ‘refusal to plead’: some revealing passages of the entries MUTE and FORFEITURE are transcribed, and briefly discussed. 140 [This is vulgarly called... till he dies, cfr. CCy and 5thCCy]. The entry closes with an external reference to the Acts of Parliament for the abolition of this practice, which is «now discontinued», that is to say suspended or come to an end: «This species of punishment is now discontinued by 12 Geo. III. Cap. 20. See Mute», (RCy, s.v. PAINE fort & dure)45. Two further examples are provided below, before concluding this concise, though meaningful, review of corporal punishments in British encyclopedias: in this case, the extracts describe «a capital punishment», beheading, and «an Alleviation or Commutation of Punishment», transportation, after the judicial sentence is pronounced. They are not preventative treatments. Beheading is not included in CCy and 5thCCy, whereas RCy (twenty in-folio lines) and EB define it as «a capital punishment, wherein the head is severed from the body by the stroke of an ax, sword, or other cutting instrument», (RCy, s.v. BEHEADING); and «a capital punishment, inflicted by cutting off the head with an ax, sword, &c.», (EB, s.v. BEHEADING). 45 This reference goes back to the Felony & Piracy Act 1772, by George III, 1738-1820, King 1760-1820. As regards the the entry MUTE, it refers to the attitude of «a person that stands dumb or speechless, when he ought to answer or plead», (RCy, s.v. MUTE), cfr. also the entry TORTURE in CCy, 5thCCy and RCy. The opening definition of mute is followed by a thorough explanation which also confirms the abolition of PEINE fort & dure by an Act of Parliament: «But in appeals or indictment for other felonies, or petit treason, it was the custom till of late not to consider him as convicted, so as to pass judgment for the felony; but for his obstinacy he was to receive the terrible sentence of penance, or PAINE fort & dure. Before this was pronounced, the prisoner was allowed not only trina admonitio, but also a convenient respite for a few hours, and the sentence was distinctly read to him, that he might know his danger; and, after all, if he continued obstinate, and his offence was clergyable, he was allowed the benefit of his clergy, even though he is too stubborn to pray it. But in this respect the law is now altered; for by 12 Geo. III. cap. 20. standing mute in felony or piracy is made a conviction. To advise a prisoner to stand mute is an high misprision, a contempt of the king’s court, and punishable by fine and imprisonment», (RCy, s.v. MUTE). It is also worth quoting here some relevant passages of the entry FORFEITURE (cfr. also note 44 above), which «originally signified a transgression or offence against some penal law. [...] But with us, it is now more frequently used for the effect of such transgression, or the losing some right, privilege, estate, honour, office, or effects, in consequence thereof, than for the transgression itself [...]. The true reason of any forfeiture for crimes, says judge Blackstone, is this: that all property is derived from society, being one of those civil rights which are conferred upon individuals, in exchange for that degree of natural freedom, which every man must sacrifice when he enters into social communities: if, therefore, a member of any national community violates the fundamental contract of his association [...] he forfeits his right to such privileges as he claims by that contract; and the state may very justly resume that portion of property, or any part of it, which the laws have before assigned him. [...] in many cases a perpetual, in others only a temporary, loss of the offender’s immoveables or landed property [...] Blackst. Com. vol. i. p. 299», (RCy, s.v. FORFEITURE). Cfr. also note 31 on PAIN(E)/PEIN(E) fort et dure. Elisabetta Lonati Besides the opening definition, both works add extra information as historical background and present practice across nations. As is usual, RCy expands the entry including many details, whereas EB is more selective and just sums up the key points: Beheading was a military punishment among the Romans, known by the name decollatio. Among them the head was laid on a cippus or block, placed in a pit dug for the purpose; in the army without the vallum; in the city, without the walls, at a place near the porta decumana. Preparatory to the stroke, the criminal was tied to a stake, and whipped with rods. In the early ages the blow was given with an ax; but in after-times with a sword, which was thought the more reputable manner of dying. The execution was but clumsily performed in the first times; but afterwards they grew more expert, and took the head off clean, with one circular stroke. In England and France, beheading is the punishment of nobles; being reputed not to derogate from nobility, as hanging does. In Scotland they do not behead with an ax, as in England; nor with a sword, as in Holland and France; but with an edged instrument called the MAIDEN. (RCy, s.v. BEHEADING). and Among the Romans, beheading was a military punishment, performed at first with an ax, but afterwards with a sword, as done at present in Holland and France. In England the ax is preferred; and in Scotland they use, for this purpose, a machine called a maiden. (EB, s.v. BEHEADING). There are two relevant aspects here to be highlighted. On the one hand, the fact that this punishment is included in RCy and EB, issued in the second half of the century, would testify to the involvement in the lively debate on judicial procedures of the time. On the other hand, the expansion in EB seems to be a kind of summarised version of the expansion in RCy. However, since RCy (1778-1788) was published later than EB (1768-1771), they might have used, and collected materials from, the same source. These differences also reflect an alternative, if not divergent, approach in compiling the two works: RCy aims at comprehensive, analytical entries, whereas EB aims at very practical conciseness. This is clear from the accurate and commented description on ‘beheading variants’ provided by RCy, and the essential outlook on tools and procedures in EB, without commentary. The last extract regards transportation as an alternative punishment, which replaces capital execution in certain circumstances. The headword is included in all the encyclopedias: the general definition and the opening Crime, punishment, and law in eighteenth-century British encyclopedias section (about twenty-five in-folio lines in CCy, 5thCCy, and RCy) refer to commerce and navigation, except for the EB, in which transportation only refers to other fields of knowledge than law. In CCy, 5thCCy, and RCy, transportation as punishment is a sub-headword, and is said to be [RCy: in Law,] a kind of Punishment; or, more properly, an Alleviation or Commutation of Punishment, for Criminals convicted of Felony, who, for the first Offence, unless it be an extraordinary one, are ordinarily Transported to the Plantations, there to bear hard Labour for a Term of Years [RCy: transported to some foreign country for a term of years or for life;], within which if they return, they are executed without further Trial [RCy: than ascertaining their identity]. See FELONY, PUNISHMENT, &c. (CCy, 5thCCy with minor spelling variants, RCy with minor spelling and lexical variants, s.v. TRANSPORTATION). If in CCy and 5thCCy the entry is limited to these few lines, consisting of a gloss, «kind of Punishment», and a lexical definition, «an Alleviation or Commutation of Punishment», followed by a concise expansion, «for Criminals [...] further Trail», RCy proves to be, once again, analytical, innovative and up-to-date. Transportation is a long and informative sub-entry of about fifty infolio lines, describing in detail the many acts and statutes which regulate the new practice: Transportation, in Law, is also a kind of punishment, or, more properly, an alleviation or commutation of punishment, for criminals convicted of felony; [...] trial than ascertaining their identity. This is made felony without benefit of clergy by statutes 4 Geo. I. cap. II. 6 Geo. I. cap. 23 16 Geo. II. cap. 15 and Geo III. Cap. 15. As is also the assisting transports to escape from such as are conveying them to the port of transportation. Exile and transportation are punishments at present unknown to the common law; and whenever the latter is now inflicted, it is either by the choice of the criminal himself, to escape a capital punishment, or else by the express direction of some modern act of parliament. Accordingly, it was enacted by the statutes 4 Geo. I. cap. II. and 6 Geo. I. cap. 23. that when any persons shall be convicted of any larceny or felony, who by the law shall be intitled to the benefit of CLERGY, and liable only to the penalties of burning in the hand or whipping, the court in their discretion, instead of such burning in the hand or whipping, may direct such offenders to be transported to America (or, by statute 19 Geo. III. Cap. 74. to any other parts beyond the seas) for seven years. And by the subsequent statutes 16 Geo. II. cap. 15. and 8 Geo. III. Cap. 15. many wise provisions are made for the more speedy and effectual execution of the laws relating to transportation, and the conviction of such as transgress them. But now, by the statute 19 Geo. 141 III. Cap. 74. all offenders liable of transportation may, in lieu thereof, at the discretion of the judges, be employed, if males (except in the case of petty larceny) in hard labour for the benefit of some public navigation; or, whether males or females, may, in all cases, be confined to hard labour in certain penitentiary houses, to be erected by virtue of the said act, for the several terms therein specified, but in no case exceeding seven years; with a power of subsequent mitigation, and even of reward, in case of their good behavior: but if they escape and are retaken, for the first time an addition of three years is made to the term of their confinement; and a second escape is felony without benefit of clergy. Transportation is said to have been first inflicted as a punishment by 39 Eliz. Cap. 4. Blackst. Com. Vol. iv. P. 370, &c. Burn’s ed. (RCy, s.v. TRANSPORTATION). On the one hand, punishments may undergo some modification in the judicial process, «mitigation», and law itself is adjusted to newly emerged perspectives on the punishment system, maybe at the dawn of a rehabilitation process, «reward, in case of their good behavior». In this context, «hard labour for the benefit of some public navigation», or «hard labour in certain penitentiary houses» are alternative strategies to transportation, and ultimately to harsher corporal punishments. The convict is thus made partly responsible for his or her destiny: «but if they escape and are retaken, for the first time an addition of three years is made to the term of their confinement; and a second escape is felony without benefit of clergy». On the other hand, Rees’s technique in compiling his dictionary is revealing of his epistemological outlook. Besides the preceding tradition, his main sources are CCy and 5thCCy, the attention to contemporary context is well marked, as well as the ability to include real data. His approach is dynamic, as dynamic is the period he lives in. Once more, Blackstone is included as a source, a very precise and reliable citation at the end of the entry46. 46 According to Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 4, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1769, pp. 370-371, «Some punishments consist in exile or banishment, by abjuration of the realm, or transportation to the American colonies: others in loss of liberty, by perpetual or temporary imprisonment. Some extend to confiscation, by forfeiture of lands, or moveables, or both, or of the profits of lands for life: others induce a disability, of holding offices and employments, being heirs, executors, and the like. [...] Disgusting as this catalogue may seem, it will afford pleasure to an English reader, and do honour to the English law, to compare it with that shocking apparatus of death and torment, to be met with in the criminal codes of almost every other nation in Europe. And it is moreover one of the glories of our English law, that the nature, though not always the quantity of degree, of punishment is ascertained for every offence...». 142 Elisabetta Lonati 4. CONCLUDING REMARKS. The study has focussed on the notions of crime and punishment, with a view on corporal punishment and judicial torture, and their relationship with law and justice in the Eighteenth century. The analysis, carried out on a selected number of entries – law, crime, punishment, torture, rack, pain fort & dure, beheading, and transportation – included in British dictionaries of arts and sciences, has highlighted the persistence and the perpetuation of appalling traditional practices in the administration of justice, alongside the emergence of humanitarian approaches in the second half of the century. The lexicographic examples testify to some fundamental differences between CCy (1728) and 5thCCy (174143) on the one hand, and RCy (1778-88) and EB (176871) on the other. All of them include records and plain descriptions of brutal corporal punishments and, even though some minor lexical changes are already introduced in the 5thCCy, a watershed is evident at mid-century, particularly in RCy. EB usually provides only the lexical definition, which, besides being a lexicographic choice, also involves the omission of dreadful details. RCy considerably modifies some of the entries drawn from CCy and 5thCCy, by omitting (cfr. crime, torture) and modifying (cfr. crime, punishment, torture) certain passages, adding material (cfr. crime, punishment, torture, rack, beheading, transportation), and updating contents (cfr. torture, rack, pain/e fort & dure, transportation). Updating is the most relevant feature in RCy, since Rees includes fundamental external reference to current issues and works on the administration of justice. The entries refer to acts of parliament (cfr. peine fort & dure, transportation), and to contemporary jurists, economists, and philosophers lively debating and writing on crime, punishment and judicial reform: Beccaria (cfr. crime and torture), and Balckstone (cfr. transportation). The use of past tense instead of present tense in a few entries (rack, peine for & dure) is further indication, suggesting that some corporal punishments were definitely dismissed, at least by law, if not by practice. The selection of key terms, though limited, and their close investigation provides evidence of a dramatic epistemological change throughout the century. The dictionaries of arts and sciences, besides recording traditional topics and issues, also testify to in-depth socio-historical transformations. They cannot overlap with reality, but, certainly, they help mirror socio-cultural habits, conflicts and innovations. Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Saggi Citation: B. Witucki (2019) Oliver Goldsmith’s The Vicar of Wakefield and Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 143-150. doi: 10.13128/ds-25446 Copyright: © 2019 B. Witucki. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Oliver Goldsmith’s The Vicar of Wakefield and Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments Barbara Witucki Utica College, USA Abstract. This paper posits the influence of Cesare Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene on the development of characters and episodes in Oliver Goldsmith’s The Vicar of Wakefield using the close analogies between the two texts, particularly the later chapters of the novel, the time lapse between the sale to the publisher and the eventual publication of the novel that allowed for revisions and additions to the text, and the spread of Beccaria’s ideas in England prior to the English translation of his work. Keywords. Prison Reform, Death Penalty, Social Contract, John Rice. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. INTRODUCTION. Two almost contemporaneous authors, Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) and Oliver Goldsmith (1728-1774), both published works in the 1760s which treated the then popular issue of penal reform. Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene (1764)1 «provided a model [...] of how the criminal justice system could be rationally and critically examined»2 , and it «took intellectual circles in Europe by storm»3: The publication of the original Italian text and the first translation, into French4, preceded the publication of Goldsmith’s novel, The Vicar of Wakefield, in March, 17665. Prior to undertaking writ1 All future references will be to the English title and translation: On Crimes and Punishments, translated from the Italian in the Author’s original order with Notes and Introduction by David Young, Hackett, Indianapolis 1986. All references are to The Vicar of Wakefield, in The Collected Works of Oliver Goldsmith, ed. by A. Friedman, The Clarendon Press, Oxford 1966, vol. IV. 2 H. Dunthorne, Beccaria and Britain, in D.H. Howell and K.O. Morgan (eds.), Crime, Protest, and Police in Modern British Society, University of Wales, Cardiff 1999, pp. 73-96: 85. 3 J. Bender, Prison Reform and the Sentence of Narration in “The Vicar of Wakefield”, in F. Nussbuam and L. Brown (eds.), The New Eighteenth Century: Theory, Politics, English Literature, Methuen, New York and London 1987, pp. 168-188: 170. 4 Traité des délits et des peines transl. by Abbé Morellet, 1766. See R. Loretelli, The First English Translation of Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments. Uncovering the Editorial and Political Contexts «Diciottesimo Secolo», II, 2017, pp. 1-22: 3, DOI ˂10.13128/ds-20618˃ (03/2019). 5 For background on the writing and reception of On Crimes and Punishments, see M. Maestro, Cesare Beccaria and the Origins of Penal Reform, Temple University Press, Philadelphia 1973, in particular chs. 1 and 2, and T. Rawling Bridgwater, Cesare Bonesana, Marquis di Beccaria. The Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 143-150 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25446 144 ing a novel, presumably around 1760 6, Goldsmith had spent a number of years writing for periodicals7. Thus, it is not surprising that when he turned to writing a novel, he incorporated ideas and subjects current in the popular press into the plot8. The plot itself works out the convoluted love affairs of two sisters. Perhaps responding to mention of Beccaria in the popular press, which further ignited the already prevalent interest in penal reform, as well as to the influence Beccaria’s work, even in Italian, had in England9, Goldsmith included his own version of prison reform in Chapters 26 and 27. Unlike Beccaria, however, Goldsmith not only examines the problems in the abstract, but he also implements methods of reform through Dr. Primrose, the Vicar of Wakefield. Having been imprisoned for debt, Primrose, the father of the sisters involved in the love affairs, sets out to reform the prisoners and the prison10. The two chapters dealing with Primrose’s prison reform as well as Chapter 19, a debate on political systems, became the most popular and most excerpted sections of the novel and were frequently reprinted in the popular press11. Therefore, both Beccaria and Goldsmith addressed the issues of crimes and punishments in works that were widely disseminated, read, and discussed. Though they differ in genre and approach, they make strikingly similar points. Great Jurists of the World, «Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation», 8, 1907, 2, pp. 219-228. 6 The Collected Works of Oliver Goldsmith, cit., vol. IV, pp. 1-8, and R. Quintana, Oliver Goldsmith. A Georgian Study, Macmillan, New York 1967, p. 101. 7 S. Bäckman, This Singular Tale. A Study of The Vicar of Wakefield and Its Literary Background, Berlingska Boktrycketiet, Lund 1971, p. 141; R.M. Wardle, Oliver Goldsmith, University of Kansas, Lawrence 1957, pp. 75-38, and A. Dobson, Oliver Goldsmith: A Memoir, Dodd, Mead, & Co., New York 1899, pp. 64-123. See also, R.C. Taylor, Goldsmith as Journalist, Associated University Presses, Cranbury (nj), London, and Mississauga (cdn) 1993. 8 In particular, see M. Golden, Goldsmith, “The Vicar of Wakefield”, and the Periodicals, «The Journal of English and Germanic Philology», 76, 1977, 4, pp. 525-536: 535. See Bäckman, This Singer of Tales, cit., pp. 25-28, for Goldsmith’s opinions on contemporary novels expressed in part by his reviews in the periodicals. 9 Loretelli, The First English Translation, cit., pp. 4-7, and A.J. Draper, Cesare Beccaria’s Influence on English Discussions of Punishment, 17641789, «History of European Ideas», 26, 2000, pp. 177-199: in particular, p. 182. 10 Bender, Prison Reform, cit., notes the publication of Beccaria’s work in 1764 and its French translation of 1766, just prior to the publication of The Vicar of Wakefield as one reason for the popularity of the novel. See in particular p. 177. 11 In particular, see Golden, Goldsmith, cit., pp. 525-536. Golden gives a breakdown of excerpts taken from the novel and reprinted in periodicals, pp. 525-526. He concludes, «The Vicar of Wakefield itself was the hit of the spring 1766 in the periodicals, substantially excerpted both with and without acknowledgment» (p. 525). See also M. Golden, Contemporary Reprints of Goldsmith’s Writings, «Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900», 19, 1979, 3 (Restoration and Eighteenth Century), pp. 475-491, ˂http://www.jstor.org˃ (03/2019). Barbara Witucki This paper focusses on Primrose’s experiences in prison, the conclusions he draws from these experiences on the current nature of punishment and imprisonment, and his remedies to reform them. Once imprisoned, Primrose, the narrator, functions as both a victim of the current penal system and a legislator working to reform this system12 . Though English as well as French roots have been established for Goldsmith’s ideas13, many of Primrose’s experiences and the reforms he institutes in the prison echo Beccaria’s work. Despite a lack of any record of the two meeting, or even of Goldsmith having read Beccaria’s work, similarities and echoes between On Crimes and Punishments and The Vicar of Wakefield suggest more than an accidental overlap of the two. Indeed, they suggest that Goldsmith was familiar with Beccaria’s theories if only as the result of the «easy dissemination of social and political theories» throughout eighteenth-century Europe14 . These similarities and echoes will be discussed first, followed by a brief investigation of the probability of direct or indirect influence of Beccaria on Goldsmith’s The Vicar of Wakefield. I. Both Beccaria and Goldsmith detail systemic flaws in the current penal system and suggest reforms, albeit with different motivation and in a different way. Beccaria says that he feels compelled to fight against «the cruelty of punishment and the irregularity of criminal procedure», while Goldsmith uses the character, Dr. Primrose, who is driven by compassion and a sense of duty, to make his points. In his «Introduction» to On Crimes and Punishments, Beccaria notes that even though the present conditions should have merited the notice of others, «very few people [...] have examined and fought 12 Bender, Prison Reform, cit., p. 182 describes Dr. Primrose, the Vicar, as «a character who is at once the apparent narrator [and] the chief actor». Quintana, Oliver Goldsmith, cit., p. 110, describes the Vicar in the second half of the novel, which is the focus here, as «a straight-faced narrator who is himself completely involved in the action». M. Harkin, Goldsmith on Authorship in “The Vicar of Wakefield”, «Eighteenth-Century Fiction», 14, 2002, 3-4, pp. 336-337, DOI ˂https://doi.org/10.1353/ ecf.2002.0034˃ (03/2019), suggests Goldsmith’s view of authors «as social reformers» and desiring «legislative and social power» as a force driving the development of Primrose’s character. 13 Bender, Prison Reform, cit., notes a commonality in French sources between Beccaria and Goldsmith, pp. 170-171. For Beccaria’s French sources see: Bridgwater, Cesare Bonesana, cit., pp. 219-222; A. Lytton Sells, Les Sources Françaises de Goldsmith, Slatkin Reprints, Geneva 1977 (1924); and M. Maestro, Voltaire and Beccaria as Reformers of Criminal Law, Columbia University Press, New York 1942, ˂https://www.babel. hathitrust.org˃ (03/2019). 14 Draper, Cesare Beccaria’s Influence, cit., p. 182. Oliver Goldsmith’s The Vicar of Wakefield and Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments against the cruelty of punishment and the irregularity of criminal procedure». He adds that «indivisible truth has compelled [him] to follow the shining footsteps of this great man [the immortal President de Montesquieu]»15. He feels that he is addressing an issue which has – inexplicably – been virtually ignored. One of Beccaria’s objectives was to clarify the purpose of punishment which, he says, should be deterrence through the fear of the inevitability of punishment16. Goldsmith, while also working to uncover abuses, has both a different impetus and approach to his work. Through Primrose, he describes the experience of imprisonment and voices the motivation for reform: duty and the hope of «reclaiming» the humanity of the prisoners. Once Primrose himself experiences the character and the environment of the prisoners, he reflects, «It even appeared a duty incumbent upon me to attempt to reclaim them [the prisoners]»17, and continues, «I [...] actually conceived some hopes of making a reformation here; for it had ever been my opinion, that no man was past the hour of amendment»18. Through Primrose, Goldsmith not only offers specific plans for reformation, but he also implements these plans and shows the hypothetical outcome. Like Beccaria, he considers the intent of punishment not as torture or affliction. Rather than a deterrence from crime, however, Goldsmith focuses on reformation. He considers that prisons themselves should be reformed into «places of penitence and solitude» as a means to reform the prisoners19. Beccaria speaks as an abstract theoretician while Goldsmith, through Primrose, speaks as an agent who offers practical plans because of his own firsthand experience. Despite these initial differences, however, the two works make remarkably similar points. Perhaps the most striking similarity is found in their arguments against the death penalty. Beccaria argues, How could this minimal sacrifice of the liberty of each individual ever include the sacrifice of the greatest good of all, life itself? And even if such were the case, how could this be reconciled with the principle that a man does not have the right to take his own life? And, not have this right himself, how could he transfer it to another person or to society as a whole20? 15 Author’s Introduction, pp. 5-6. XII, p. 23. 17 Ch. XXVI, p. 144. 18 Ibidem, p. 146. 19 Ch. XXVII, p. 149. Bender, Prison Reform, cit., p. 171, notes the similarity of Goldsmith’s ideas here to «Fielding’s plan for a Middlesex County House in A Proposal for Making an Effectual Provision for the Poor (1753)». He also suggests that Primrose «establishes a proto-penitentiary within his old-style jail» (p. 179). 20 Ch. XXVIII, p. 48. 16 Ch. 145 Primrose, echoes the argument that man does not have the right to take his own life, and that he cannot therefore give that right to another, when he says, Natural law gives me no right to take away his life, as by that the horse he steals is as much his property as it is mine. If then I have any right, it must be from a compact made between us, that he who deprives the other of his horse shall die. But this is a false compact; because no man has a right to barter his own life, no more than to take it away as it is not his own21. In addition to this similarity in the conclusion and language of Goldsmith with the most oft cited point of Beccaria’s treatise, the argument against the death penalty, are many equally significant similarities between the two works. For example, to use the terminology of Beccaria, as an «insolvent debtor», Primrose must be taken into custody. Nevertheless, he is also an «innocent bankrupt» in so far as his inability to pay his debts resulted from no fault of his own. Beccaria says, «The good faith of contract and the security of commerce oblige the legislator to take custody of the persons of insolvent debtors on behalf of their creditors. I believe it is important, however, to distinguish the fraudulent from the innocent bankrupt»22 . Beccaria characterizes «the innocent bankrupt [as] the person who has proved before his judges after a rigorous examination that he has been stripped of his substance, either by the malice or misfortune of others or by vicissitudes that human prudence cannot avoid»23. Goldsmith’s Primrose is clearly the debtor of Squire William (Mr. Thornhill), his landlord, since he is unable to pay his annual rent, but the loss of almost all of his possessions through a fire has also left him bankrupt. In this instance, it is not Primrose’s words, but the narrative of events that echo Beccaria. Prior to the fire, Primrose went in search of his abducted daughter, Olivia. While away, he became ill and incurred the consequent expenses of housing himself until he recovered enough to travel again. After he found Olivia, they returned home only to find the family house and corn burning. Although the family is saved, their possessions are lost. Thus, Primrose and his family are left in Beccaria’s state of «the innocent bankrupt». The following day, Squire William comes to Primrose with an offer of friendship. As the Vicar’s landlord, Squire William is also his creditor. It is, however, Squire William who abducted Olivia and, when he tired of her, had tried to turn her to prostitution. His offer of friend21 Ch. XXVII, p. 150. This is noted by Dunthorne, Beccaria and Britain, cit., p. 80. 22 Ch. XXXIV, pp. 64-65. 23 Ibidem, p. 65. 146 Barbara Witucki In this instance, the greed of the powerful is Squire William’s greed for the inheritance he will gain by marrying an heiress27. His fear of Primrose or Olivia somehow wreaking havoc on that possibility leads him to the imprisonment of Primrose. Although Primrose seems to personify Beccaria’s «innocent bankrupt», he also gives substance to Beccaria’s claim that «the good faith of contracts and the security of commerce oblige the legislator to take custody of the persons of insolvent debtors on behalf of their creditors»28. Squire William justifies his imprisonment of Primrose with the words, «If he has contracted debts and is unwilling or even unable to pay them, it is their [the attorney’s and the steward’s] business to proceed in this manner [imprisoning the debtor], and I see no hardship or injustice in pursuing the most legal means of redress». He then dares Primrose to contradict his claim of being owed monies, and Primrose is forced to remain silent since he «could not contradict [Squire William]»29. Sir William Thornhill, his uncle, to whom Squire William makes this justification, agrees that the actions were «equitable», but he adds that his nephew’s «conduct might have been more generous in not suffering this gentleman [Primrose] to be oppressed by subordinate tyranny»30. With the use of the words «oppressed» and «tyranny», Goldsmith suggests the innocence of Primrose. This innocence is proven through a mock trial under the aegis of Sir William with witnesses who unmask the reality of Squire William’s actions. Ultimately, Sir William concludes, «All his guilt is now too plain, and I find his present prosecution was dictated by tyranny, cowardice and revenge»31. Included in this declamation is the substance of Beccaria’s comments on the present abuses that threaten the social contract and necessitate the investigation of the penal code and punishments: «the unbridled course of ill-directed power» and «the barbarous and useless tortures multiplied with prodigal and useless severity for crimes that are either unproven or chimerical»32. In addition, the contrast between the tyranny of Squire William and the justice, compassion, and generosity of Sir William in the prison scenes serves to solidify the different characteristics of the two suggested from the beginning of the novel. As portrayed, they illustrate Beccaria’s political idleness and political usefulness respectively: «Political Indolence [is] that sort that contributes to society neither with work nor with wealth...»; in contrast, a person «is not indolent in the political sense if he enjoys the fruits of the vices or virtues of his own ancestors and if he offers bread and livelihood to industrious poverty in exchange for his immediate pleasures»33. From his first introduction as a «young gentleman who enjoys a large fortune» to the rumors suggesting that he is the sort who plots «intrigues» against beautiful young women34 , Squire William is politically indolent. On the other hand, Sir William uses his inherited wealth to alleviate the distress or misery of others, unwittingly as a young man so that his own 24 Ch. 29 Ch. ship and reconciliation consists in a demand that Primrose agree that Olivia’s «excursion» with Squire William had nothing «criminal in it»24. Further, Primrose must agree to marry her to someone else in the near future and not to interfere with Squire William’s incipient marriage to an heiress. Primrose’s refusal and his contempt lead Squire William to note that his steward will be coming soon for the rent and that he himself has no money he can spare at the moment to help the Primroses25. As presented by Goldsmith, the bankruptcy of Primrose seems to be the product of what Beccaria calls «malice» and «the vicissitudes that human prudence cannot avoid». The expenses incurred by Primrose followed by the «threatening» visit of Squire William seem to comprise acts of malice on the part of the Squire. Primrose’s loss of his home and all of his possessions through a fire at the very moment he is returning home is either an unavoidable «vicissitude» or an act of «malice». By imprisoning Primrose in these circumstances, Squire William deprives him of the means to make restitution of the monies owed since he no longer has the ability to work. To circumstances such as these, Beccaria poses the question: Upon what barbarous pretext can he be thrown into prison where, deprived of his one poor remaining possession, bare liberty, he experiences the agonies of the guilty and, with the desperation of downtrodden honesty, he perhaps repents of the innocence that permitted him to live peacefully under the tutelage of the laws he broke through no fault of his own? Such laws are dictated by the powerful out of greed and endured by the weak for the sake of that hope which usually shines in human hearts26. XXIV, p. 137. pp. 137-138. 26 Ch. XXXIV, p. 65. 27 Squire William admits, «It was her [the heiress’s] fortune, not her person, that induced me to wish for this match» (ch. XXXI, p. 176). 28 Ch. XXXIV, p. 64. 25 Ibidem, XXXI, p. 171. p. 171. 31 Ibidem, p. 173. 32 See Beccaria’s Introduction, pp. 5-6. 33 Ch. XXIV, p. 42. 34 Ch. III, pp. 27 and 29, and ch. XVIII, p. 109. 30 Ibidem, Oliver Goldsmith’s The Vicar of Wakefield and Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments fortune is temporarily depleted, but, after learning from his errors, with prudence and discrimination. Therefore, through the mechanics of both the plot and the characters, Goldsmith enacts the reality of Beccaria’s abstractions. The prison scenes included in The Vicar of Wakefield provide another example of Goldsmith’s bringing the philosophical abstractions of Beccaria to life. Beccaria gives a stark idea of penal conditions through the use of freighted terms to express the conditions of prisons: «the squalor and horrors of a prison»35, «the squalid condition of a prisoner»36, the «squalor and hunger» of prison37. He notes that «the accused and the convicted are thrown into the same cell indiscriminately»38. Primrose experiences these «squalid» conditions for himself39. As he is led into the prison, Primrose finds that it «consisted of one large apartment, strongly grated, and paved with stone, common to both felons and debtors at certain hours in the four and twenty»40, and notes the «execrations, lewdness, and brutality that invaded [him] from every side» 41. He describes the prisoners’ time as «divided between famine and excess, tumultuous riot and bitter repining»42. Given the conditions he finds in the prison, including the mixing of those convicted with those merely accused of crimes of every sort and awaiting their trial, Primrose concludes that the «present prisons, which find or make men guilty, [...] enclose wretches for the commission of one crime, and return them, if returned alive, fitted for the perpetration of thousands»43. He might have added Beccaria’s observation that because the accused and the convicted are held together, the accused, though not yet convicted, is undergoing punishment through his imprisonment. Nonetheless, the imprisonment of Primrose does not result in his «experiencing the agonies of the guilty» or «the desperation of downtrodden honesty» as suggested by Beccaria. Instead, after a close consideration of his new environment, he uses his observations as motivation to reform it. When his family objects to his planned 35 Author’s Introduction, p. 5. XIX, p. 36. 37 Ch. XXXIX, p. 54. 38 Ibidem, p. 54. 39 Neither Beccaria’s generalized «squalor» nor Primrose’s description of his surroundings seems to aspire to any true representation of the conditions in prisons at that time. See, for example, O. Sherwin, Crime and Punishment in England of the Eighteenth Century, «The American Journal of Economics and Sociology», 5, 1946, 2, pp. 169-199, <http://www. jstor.org> (03/2019). 40 Ch. XXV, p. 141. He goes on to note that the prisoners have separate cells to sleep in at night. 41 Ch. XXVI, p. 144. 42 Ch. XXVII, p. 149. 43 Ibidem, p. 149. 36 Ch. 147 reforms, Primrose responds to their objections by stressing the humanity of the prisoners and the equality of all men and says, «The heart that is buried in a dungeon is as precious as that seated upon a throne»44. Here, too, he echoes Beccaria’s claim about the necessity of equality in the face of the law, so that punishments «should be the same for the first citizen as for the least. In order to be legitimate, every distinction, whether it be in honor or wealth, presupposes an anterior equality founded upon the law, which considers all subjects as equally dependent upon itself»45. In undertaking his reforms, Primrose seems to embody the legislator as described by Beccaria: «Let the lawgiver be gentle, indulgent, and humane. Let the legislator be a wise architect who raises his building on the foundation of self-love, and let the general interest be the result of the interests of every person»46. In his actions among the prisoners, Primrose shows himself to be «gentle, indulgent, and humane». He recognizes Mr. Jenkinson, one of the first prisoners with whom he converses, as the man who not only swindled his middle son, Moses, at the neighboring fair, but Primrose himself. He further discovers that Mr. Jenkinson also swindled his neighbour, Farmer Flamborough, on an annual basis. In fact, it is Flamborough who is prepared to bear witness against Jenkinson at his trial. On learning this, despite the harm done to him previously by Jenkinson, Primrose sends his son Moses to try and persuade Flamborough to suppress his evidence. Finally, despite the «goal tricks» the prisoners perpetuate against him, Primrose «took no notice of all [...] [they] could do»47. Primrose’s reformation includes trying to make their situation in prison «more comfortable» by moderating the prisoners’ behavior and regularizing their activities. First, he systematized their idle pastime into a form of paid employment, and then he «instituted fines for the punishment of immorality, and rewards for peculiar industry»48. As a result of these actions, Primrose concludes: «In less than a fortnight I had formed them into something social and humane, and had the pleasure of regarding myself as a legislator, who had brought men from their native ferocity into friendship and obedience» 49. In these actions, Primrose mimics his actions at the start of the novel. After the Primrose family migrated from Wakefield to a rural habitation, Primrose orders their daily life. Primrose discusses how he «regulated» each day’s activities and calls his fam44 Ibidem, pp. 148. XXI, p. 39. 46 Ch. XLVI, pp. 80-81. 47 Ch. XXVII, p. 148. 48 Ibidem, p. 149. 49 Ibidem, p. 149. 45 Ch. 148 ily, «The little republic to which I gave laws»50. So, from the outset of the novel, Primrose describes himself as a legislator. Goldsmith’s use of the term, «a republic», to describe the Primrose family brings to mind Beccaria’s chapter, «The Spirit of the Family», in which he distinguishes between «the spirit of the family» and «the spirit of the republic». In the latter, as Beccaria says, «the good of the majority» is the goal51. Therefore, Primrose is a wise legislator who considers the interest of each the interest of the whole. At the outset of the novel, before the loss of his fortune, Primrose appears to personify Beccaria’s claim that the «luxury and easy living» of the past few centuries has resulted in «the sweetest virtues –humanity, benevolence, tolerance of human errors»52. In his initial prosperity, Primrose depends on his own fortune to live and practices humanity and benevolence by giving his livelihood «to the orphans and widows of the clergy»53. Even as his family journeys into the country to their new and much reduced life, Primrose shows his customary benevolence when he offers to pay the bill of a stranger who has given his own money away in an act of charity and, consequently, is left unable to pay his expenses at the inn. This stranger tells the Primroses about their future abode and mentions Sir William Thornhill about whom Primrose cries, «a man whose virtues, generosity, and singularities are so universally known [...] one of the most generous, yet whimsical, men in the kingdom; a man of consummate benevolence»54. Primrose identifies his own characteristics in Sir William: generous, humane, and benevolent. Not surprisingly, both also serve in the role of legislator: Primrose as previously described in his reformation of prison life and the prisoners, and Sir William in the prison when he takes over the role of legislator from Primrose and imposes order on the chaos of claims and counter claims, and distributes just punishment 55. Thus, both Primrose and Sir William function as the legislator, or Beccaria’s «good architect», who lays down simple and clear boundaries for behavior, rewards good behavior, and establishes punishment specific to different types of deleterious behavior. Goldsmith seems to be following Beccaria’s precepts: «Do you want to prevent crimes? See 50 Ch. IV, p. 33. XXVI, p. 44. 52 Ch. V, p. 13. 53 Ch. II, pp. 21-22. 54 Ch. III, pp. 28-29. 55 Harkin, Goldsmith on Authorship, cit., pp. 342-343, notes the shift of legislator from Primrose to Sir William in her larger argument that Goldsmith, in The Vicar of Wakefield, investigates the changing role of the author in the eighteenth century, a topic he had addressed in earlier writings. 51 Ch. Barbara Witucki to it that the laws are clear and simple»56, and, «Another way of preventing crimes is to reward virtue»57. Sir William, in bringing justice at the end by unmasking Squire William’s infamous plots and treacherous actions, and decreeing punishment in a gentle and yet effective way, as Primrose before him, acts so that «the general interest [is] the result of the interests of every person». II. Despite what seem to be clear parallels between the theory of Beccaria and the characters and events that Goldsmith develops in The Vicar of Wakefield, there is no proof of a direct relationship between the two authors. Nonetheless, there is enough opacity in Goldsmith’s life and in his composition of The Vicar of Wakefield to suggest the likely influence of Beccaria’s ideas on the novel. As noted before, it is commonly agreed that Goldsmith was working on The Vicar of Wakefield in the early 1760s, and that the manuscript of the novel was sold in 1762. In the often cited story, when Goldsmith was in despair over obtaining funds to pay his rent and faced the threat of prison, he told Samuel Johnson that he had a completed novel at hand. To mitigate Goldsmith’s problems, Johnson sold the manuscript of the novel58. The novel, however, was not published until 1766. During this gap, Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene was published in Italy in 1764. A French translation followed in December 176559, though the first English translation did not appear until 176760. Two questions, then, emerge: whether or not Goldsmith continued to work on the novel in the gap between its sale and its publication, and whether or not it is reasonable to surmise that Goldsmith was influenced by Beccaria either directly, or indirectly. The lack of reliable detail about the sale of the manuscript in 1762 and its state at that time leave room for speculation though, perhaps, not a definitive answer61. 56 Ch. XLI, p. 75. XLIV, p. 79. 58 Dobson, Oliver Goldsmith: A Memoir, cit., pp. 132-141, summarizes this anecdote from Boswell’s Life of Johnson as well as other variants of the same story, and describes the mechanics of the «selling» of the novel, ˂https://babel.hathitrust.org˃ (03/2019). More recently, Quintana, Oliver Goldsmith, cit., p. 101. See also The Collected Works of Oliver Goldsmith, cit., vol. IV, pp. 1-8. 59 Although the title page bears the date of 1766. 60 For the first English translation, see Loretelli, The First English Translation, cit., pp. 1-22. 61 Quintana, Oliver Goldsmith, cit., p. 102, summarizes the conundrum: «One further question remains, and unfortunately it must go unanswered. Was The Vicar complete when sold in manuscript, or was it fin57 Ch. Oliver Goldsmith’s The Vicar of Wakefield and Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments On the basis of parallels between current events in the 1760s and details included in The Vicar of Wakefield, scholars have long surmised that Goldsmith was «tinkering» with it in the years prior to its publication62. As early as 1899, Dobson noted a correlation between contemporary events and fads, and details in the novel. He used this correlation to establish that Goldsmith was still completing or further developing the novel in 1762, and that he continued to refine the content at least until 1764. As evidence he gave two examples of current detail included in the novel: a «reference in Chap. xix to The Auditor, which began its career in June of that year [1762]» and «the mention in chap. ix of the musical glasses then in vogue»63. Dobson also noted the inclusion of the poem, «Edwin and Angelina», the composition of which he limits to sometime between 1764 and its private printing for the Countess of Northumberland in 176564. All of these details point to Goldsmith’s continual revision of his manuscript. More recently, Morris Golden has cited «striking» similarities between passages on politics and penal law in The Vicar of Wakefield and those found in Goldsmith’s History of England, in a Series of Letters from a Nobleman to his Son for which he received payment 11 October 1763. He suggests that the latter work is the source for the material in the novel65, in which case, Goldsmith could still be revising in 1763. In a subsequent study 66, Golden notes other details in the novel based on popular topics and events that postdate its 1762 sale. These suggest even more strongly that ished, or revised, or in any way added to later on prior to publication?». Wardle, Oliver Goldsmith, cit., p. 142, notes early reviews which suggest that «additions were intended which were never made». Dobson, Oliver Goldsmith: A Memoir, cit., pp. 133 and 141, suggests that the manuscript was not fully completed at the time of sale. However, an earlier biographer, James Prior, The Life of Oliver Goldsmith, M.B. from a Variety of Original Sources, E.L. Clarey & A. Hart, Philadelphia 1837, p. 307, ˂https://babel.hathitrust.org˃ (03/2019), includes the following, «It [The Vicar of Wakefield] may have been delayed likewise with the expectation of undergoing careful revision, and altering objectionable circumstances in the story; a task which however the author declined, alleging it is said, – and the argument must be considered powerful in the estimate of an author militant, – that whatever time or labour should be expended on the alterations, no increase would be made to the purchase money. That he corrected the language afterwards appears by the variations between the first and subsequent editions». More recently, Golden, Goldsmith, cit., p. 528, notes, «The charges of carelessness in plotting and inconsistency of observation, both usually attributed to haste and changes of plan, have continued to our day». 62 The term, «tinker», is taken from Golden, Goldsmith, cit., p. 527. 63 Dobson, Oliver Goldsmith: A Memoir, cit., pp. 140-141. 64 Ibidem, p. 141. Golden, Goldsmith, cit., p. 531, expands on Dobson’s observation by calling attention to Goldsmith’s own opinions previously expressed in his periodical writings. 65 M. Golden, Image Frequency and the Split in “The Vicar of Wakefield”, «Bulletin of the New York Public Library» LXIII, 1959, pp. 473-477: 474, ft. 5, ˂https://babel.hathitrust.org˃ (03/2019). 66 Golden, Goldsmith, cit. 149 Goldsmith continued to adjust the manuscript after its sale. Golden, too, notes the mention of musical glasses in the novel and further clarifies the duration of the discussion of performances on musical glasses by the popular press to the following: April 1762, August 1763, and February 1764. Likewise, Golden notes the inclusion of a poem on the use of green spectacles in «James’s Magazine» for June 176467. He also develops the suggestion made by Friedman «that Goldsmith probably intended at first to use the Vicar’s theological pamphleteering as the cause of his removal to Wakefield but for some undetermined reason changed his mind» by citing the «notorious» case of a broker, John Rice, who «absconded» to the continent only to be captured and returned to England and the available monies were repaid to the clients. The case was treated in the periodical press as late as March 176368. Based on the press coverage of the case, Golden suggests it as the impetus for Goldsmith overriding the significance of Primrose’s pamphleteering as a cause for the Primrose family being forced to retreat to Wakefield in order to include the loss of Primrose’s fortune at the hands of a «merchant in town [...] who has gone off to avoid a statute of bankruptcy»69. As Goldsmith resolves the various subplots at the end of the novel, Primrose receives news that the merchant «was arrested in Antwerp» with financial means so that his creditors, including Primrose found their «lost» money returned to them70. Golden uses the story of John Rice, publicized as it was in the press throughout 1762-1763, as another example of current events and popular topics suggesting that Goldsmith was fiddling with the details of his narrative to include references to events in the years following the sale of the manuscript. In addition to details such as those just mentioned, Goldsmith also includes topics of immediate concern that appeared in the periodicals such as: the release of harmless prisoners (1762), the religious needs of convicts (1763), the humane treatment of prisoners (1765), and objections to imprisonment for debt (1765). Here, subjects developed in Chapters 26 and 27 of The Vicar of Wakefield appear in the popular press in the months and years after the sale of the manuscript, and suggest an ongoing process of revision as Goldsmith reacts to timely events and issues71. 67 Ibidem, p. 530. Golden mentions Friedman’s comment on the inclusion of musical glasses as proof of composition of the novel in 17601761, but extends that date significantly in light of the more inclusive detail he gives about the mention of musical glasses in the press. 68 Ibidem, p. 529. Golden cites Friedman’s comments from The Collected Works of Oliver Goldsmith, cit., vol. IV, p. 8. 69 Ch. II, p. 24. 70 Ch. XXXII, p. 182. 71 Golden, Goldsmith, cit., p. 535, concludes, «In The Vicar of Wakefield, Goldsmith was subjecting the traditional romance plot to the imagina- 150 If, as suggested above, Goldsmith was tinkering with The Vicar of Wakefield in the years prior to its publication, the question of Beccaria’s influence, direct or indirect, remains. The swift and easy transmission of ideas from the continent to England in the eighteenth century has been frequently noted72, so it is not implausible to suggest a knowledge of Beccaria’s ideas in England prior to the appearance of the text in English. The first English review of the original Italian edition of Beccaria’s book appeared in «The Monthly Review» 32, 1765, slightly before the publication of The Vicar of Wakefield73. More important than this, perhaps, is the indirect influence of Beccaria on Goldsmith through the works of William Blackstone. Though Blackstone makes specific references to Beccaria only in volume four of his four-volume, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-1769), his work as a whole seems to be influenced by Beccaria74 . Blackstone based his work on the lectures he gave as the Vinerian Professor of Law at Oxford from 1758-1766. His student, Robert Chambers, was a friend of Samuel Johnson, who, in turn, was Goldsmith’s friend. Among other common interests, Goldsmith and Johnson shared an interest in law. Through this chain of friendships, Goldsmith could well have known about and been discussing Beccaria’s ideas prior to the publication of The Vicar of Wakefield75. Though Bender suggests that such knowledge «would have come too late to affect [Goldsmith’s] revision of the novel»76, given the analogies between Beccaria’s observations and theories and the way in which Goldsmith develops events and characters in the novel, it seems reasonable to posit at least an indirect influence of Beccaria. The widespread belief that Goldsmith was revising, adding to, or at least tinkering with the novel in the years between 1762 and 1766 supports the possibility of his incorporating ideas from Beccaria’s work. Finally, while the general interests Goldsmith shares with friends and associates suggest one way in which Beccaria’s ideas may have been transtive daily world of magazines and newspapers». 72 See for example, Dunthorne, Beccaria and Britain, cit., pp. 73-74. See also L. Radzinowicz, Cesare Beccaria and the English System of Criminal Justice. A Reciprocal Relationship, in Atti del Convegno Internazionale su Cesare Beccaria Promosso dall’Academia delle Scienze di Torino nel secondo centenario dell’opera «Dei delitti e delle pene», Accademia delle Scienze, Torino 1966, pp. 57-66: 57. For a discussion of the Italian Molini family of publishers with branches in Florence, Paris, and London as an example of the ways in which ideas not only could be but were disseminated internationally, see Loretelli, The First English Translation, cit., pp. 5-8. 73 Dunthorne, Beccaria and Britain, cit., p. 93, ft. 30. See p. 91, ft. 12, for a complete list of reviews. 74 Bender, Prison Reform, cit., pp. 171-172, and Draper, Cesare Beccaria’s Influence, cit., pp. 182 and 184-185. 75 Bender, Prison Reform, cit., pp. 171-172. 76 Ibidem, p. 172. Barbara Witucki mitted to him, the details of events and ideas presented in the popular press after the sale of the novel yet before its publication that are incorporated into the novel suggest another. Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Saggi Citation: A. Carrera (2019) Tra filosofia e diritto. Il pensiero critico-riformista di Manasseh Dawes, studioso di Beccaria. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 151-157. doi: 10.13128/ds-25447 Copyright: © 2019 A. Carrera. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. Tra filosofia e diritto. Il pensiero critico-riformista di Manasseh Dawes, studioso di Beccaria Alberto Carrera Università di Brescia Abstract. Considered as one of the staunchest supporters of the need to reform the eighteenth-century British penal system, the jurist Manasseh Dawes combines legal reflection with moral criticism. This union emerges from the reading of his works and in particular in a treatise published in 1782, entitled An Essay on Crimes and Punishments. In this work Dawes takes up and analyzes several aspects of Beccaria’s thought, paying special attention to the causes of criminal conduct in parallel with the theory of human freedom. Through other important English intellectuals such as Blackstone, Eden and Dagge, Dawes draws from Beccaria his critical and reformist approach to the study of criminal law. Keywords. Death Penalty, Murder, Mercy, Human Freedom, Suicide. Sulla base di un progressivo ma deciso distacco tra contrattualismo sociale e giustizia, l’illuminismo di area inglese1 si caratterizza per la profonda rifles1 In prospettiva storico-giuridica risulta tutt’ora fondamentale lo studio di G. Tarello, Storia della cultura giuridica moderna. Assolutismo e codificazione del diritto, Il Mulino, Bologna 1976 con particolare attenzione alle pp. 393-414. Dello stesso autore si richiama Le poco luminose origini dell’illuminismo penale dell’area inglese, «Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica», 5, 1975, pp. 173200. Si veda inoltre E. Dezza, Breve storia del processo penale inglese, Giappichelli, Torino 2009. Per un’ampia ricostruzione del quadro storico dell’Europa settecentesca risultano fondamentali A. Padoa Schioppa, Storia del diritto in Europa. Dal medioevo all’età contemporanea, Il Mulino, Bologna 2007, e A. Cavanna, Storia del diritto moderno in Europa. Le fonti e il pensiero giuridico, Giuffrè, Milano 2005, 2 voll. Ricco approfondimento e puntuale disamina degli elementi caratterizzanti l’illuminismo giuridico sono forniti da F. Venturi, Settecento riformatore, Einaudi, Torino 1969-1990, 5 voll.; F. Valsecchi, L’Italia nel Settecento dal 1714 al 1788, A. Mondadori, Milano 1971; R. Ajello, Arcana juris: diritto e politica nel Settecento italiano, Jovene, Napoli 1976, e G. D’Amelio, Illuminismo e scienza del diritto in Italia, Giuffrè, Milano 1965. Recentemente si pone lo studio di B. Sordi, La progettazione della modernità: l’Illuminismo giuridico, in Il contributo italiano alla storia del pensiero. Diritto, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, Roma 2012, pp. 199 e ss. Con riferimento specifico all’illuminismo giuridico penale si segnala D. Ippolito (a cura di), La libertà attraverso il diritto: illuminismo giuridico e questione penale, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli 2014. Circa il collegamento tra Illuminismo e diritto penale si rinvia aL. Berlinguer e F. Colao (a cura di), Illuminismo e dottrine penali, Giuffrè, Milano 1990. Con riguardo all’illuminismo penale di area anglosassone, nel parallelismo concettuale tra giustizia e razionalità, si veda lo studio di A. MacIntyre, Dall’Illuminismo scozzese all’età contemporanea, Anabasi, Milano 1995. Di fondamentale importanza inoltre la densa monografia, di taglio filosofico-politico, di E. Lecaldano, L’illuminismo inglese, Loescher, Torino 1985. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 151-157 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25447 152 sione circa i temi della retribuzione penale, della organizzazione ed amministrazione della repressione criminale (con particolare riferimento alla amministrazione carceraria) e dei diversi rapporti tra azione delittuosa e povertà (in parallelo agli articolati fenomeni della urbanizzazione e della organizzazione economica del lavoro). Nella prima metà del Settecento nella dottrina giuridica inglese emerge con forza un approccio utilitaristico nei confronti della problematica penale. In tale prospettiva vengono proposti ed affrontati temi direttamente legati al multiforme contesto socio-economico inglese. La figura del soggetto povero2 diviene il fulcro d’analisi. Questo determina il rafforzamento di una tendenza – di carattere dominante in area inglese – a porre e analizzare sotto un unico profilo la legislazione criminale e la legislazione sullo stato di povertà creando pertanto un rapporto simbiotico tra politica criminale e politica sociale3. Espressione di tale inclinazione è il movimento riformista4, che influenza profondamente la cultura giuridica illuminista britannica, nella quale si innesta la complessa e laboriosa recezione dell’opera e del pensiero di Cesare Beccaria. In questo contesto si delineano e si contrappongono due diverse configurazioni ed accezioni di utilitarismo penalistico, non prive tuttavia di punti di contatto o di tentativi di sintesi: da una parte, l’utilitarismo penalistico beccariano5 che concepisce il formalismo legale come 2 Centrale nella ricostruzione concettuale del soggetto povero all’interno della cultura giuridica inglese lo studio di F. Baroncelli, Tra Locke e Smith. Alcune immagini del rapporto col “povero”, «Studi settecenteschi», 1, 1981, pp. 135-171. Per una ricostruzione storica del fenomeno pauperistico si vedano alcuni importanti studi congiunti di F. Baroncelli e G. Assereto: Sulla povertà: idee, leggi, progetti nell’Europa moderna, Herodote, Genova-Ivrea 1983, e Pauperismo e religione nell’età moderna, «Società e storia», 7, 1980, pp. 169-201. Fondamentale B. Geremek, La pietà e la forca. Storia della miseria e della carità in Europa, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1986. 3 Interessanti spunti sono forniti da M.A. Cattaneo, Illuminismo e legislazione, Edizioni di Comunità, Milano 1966. 4 Si vedano i risalenti, ma ancora oggi basilari, studi di L. Radzinowicz, A history of English criminal law and its administration from 1750, vol. I. The movement for Reform, Stevens and Sons Limited, London 1948, in particolare pp. 345-347; Id., Cesare Beccaria and the English System of Criminal Justice: A Reciprocal Relationship, in Atti del convegno internazionale su Cesare Beccaria promosso dall’Accademia delle Scienze di Torino nel secondo centenario dell’opera “Dei delitti e delle pene” (Torino, 4-6 ottobre, 1964), Accademia delle Scienze, Torino 1966, pp. 57-66. Nella stessa direzione si pongono gli studi di M.T. Maestro, Cesare Beccaria and the Origins of Penal Reform, Temple University Press, Philadelphia 1973, e Id.,Voltaire and Beccaria as reformers of criminal law, Octagon books, New York 1972. Si vedano più recentemente C. Blamires, Beccaria et l’Angleterre, in M. Porret (a cura di), Beccaria et la culture juridique des Lumières, Droz, Genève 1997, pp. 69-81, e A.J. Draper, Cesare Beccaria’s influence on English Discussion of punishement. 1764-1789, «History of European Ideas», 26, 2000, pp. 177-199. 5 In relazione al pensiero di impostazione utilitarista di Beccaria si veda in prospettiva storico-giuridica G.P. Massetto, Economia e pena nell’o- Alberto Carrera elemento di supporto della prevenzione penale; dall’altro, l’utilitarismo penalistico, riconducibile ad Henry Fielding6, che si focalizza su temi della difesa sociale in cui le istituzioni legali divengono aspetto collaterale e sussidiario. Tale duplicità di letture ed interpretazioni troverà poi una elaborazione di sintesi solo verso la conclusione del secolo XVIII con la riflessione di Jeremy Bentham7. L’opera di Beccaria diviene oggetto di un lento e complesso processo di analisi, di studio ed al contempo di influenza all’interno dell’articolato e a tratti frastagliato panorama della penalistica inglese della seconda metà del Settecento. In questo quadro si pone l’eclettica figura dell’intellettuale anglosassone Manasseh Dawes. Fine studioso ed attento osservatore della realtà socio-politica coeva, pensatore acuto, pacato ma al contempo pungente e a tratti tagliente, Manasseh Dawes si pera di Beccaria, in Id., Saggi di storia del diritto penale lombardo, secc. 16.-18, LED, Milano 1994, pp. 495- 542. Dello stesso autore si segnala Pietro e Alessandro Verri in aiuto di Cesare Beccaria: la risposta alle Note del Facchinei, in C. Capra (a cura di), Pietro Verri e il suo tempo: Milano, 9- 11 ottobre 1997, Cisalpino, Bologna 1999, vol. 1, pp. 289-351. Si consulti altresì G. Francioni, Beccaria filosofo utilitarista, in S. Romagnoli e G.D. Pisapia (a cura di), Cesare Beccaria tra Milano e l’Europa, Atti del Convegno di studi per il 250° anniversario della nascita, Cariplo, Milano e Laterza, Roma-Bari 1990, pp. 69-87. Interessanti spunti sono inoltre forniti da D.B. Young, Cesare Beccaria: utilitarian or retributivist?, «Journal of Criminal Justice», 11, 1983, pp. 317-326. Risalente ma basilare per comprendere il connubio tra morale e politica nel pensiero utilitaristico di Beccaria lo studio di G. Zarone, Etica e politica nell’utilitarismo di Cesare Beccaria, Istituto per gli studi storici, Napoli 1971. 6 Circa la figura di Fielding si vedano Tarello, Storia della cultura giuridica, cit., pp. 406-413, e M. Ripoli, L’oculata benevolenza di Henry Fielding, «Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica», 17, 1987, pp. 649-679. Con riferimento al quadro inglese si veda anche S.L. Darwall, Hume e l’invenzione dell’utilitarismo, «Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica», 24, 1994, pp. 285-314. 7 Per un approfondimento del significato e del contenuto dell’utilitarismo giuridico nella riflessione di Bentham si veda G. Pellegrino, La volontà del sovrano. Epistemologia, semantica e definizione di “legge” nell’utilitarismo giuridico di Jeremy Bentham, «Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica», 32, 2002, pp. 3-24. Più risalente ma foriero di spunti di riflessioni lo studio di L. Campos Boralevi, Bentham e l’utilitarismo come scienza sociale, «Il Pensiero Politico. Rivista di Storia delle Idee Politiche e Sociali», 12, 1979, pp. 361-371. Si veda anche F. Rosen, Bentham utilitarista?, «Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica», 23, 1993, pp. 325-338. In generale sul tema e concetto di utilitarismo, muovendo da una prospettiva giuridica, si consulti, oltre alla voce enciclopedica di F. Zanuso, Utilitarismo, in Enciclopedia del diritto, 45, 1992, pp. 1167-1185, il denso studio di D. Ippolito, La filosofia penal de las Luces entre utilitarismo y retribucionismo, «Jueces para la democracia», 74, 2012, pp. 83-112. Utili spunti di riflessione provengono inoltre da M. Cranston, Bentham and the Oppressed, «Il Pensiero Politico. Rivista di Storia delle Idee Politiche e Sociali», 18, 1985, pp. 347-351. Sul rapporto e parallelismo tra Bentham e Beccaria si rinvia al recente studio di M. Barberis, Beccaria, Bentham e il creazionismo giuridico, «Rivista Internazionale di filosofia del diritto», 91, 2014, pp. 559-574; più datato ma ancora fondamentale lo studio di H. Hart, Beccaria and Bentham’s Theory of Punishment, «Memorie della Reale Accademia delle Scienze di Torino», 4a s., 9, 1966, pp. 19-29. Il pensiero critico-riformista di Manasseh Dawes, studioso di Beccaria colloca nel filone critico-riformista della penalistica britannica accanto a William Eden e Henry Dagge. Personaggio ad oggi poco studiato dalla storiografia italiana, Dawes è stato barrister presso Inner Temple dove pare non abbia esercitato per molto tempo, prediligendo invece una vita più appartata ed incentrata alla meditazione, alla riflessione ed allo studio. Muore nel 1829. Alle scarne informazioni biografiche si contrappone tuttavia la sua copiosa produzione bibliografica su temi centrali della cultura politico-giuridica e filosofica del tempo: il libero arbitrio8, doctrine of libels9, l’idea di libertà intellettuale e di tolleranza10, beni immobili11 e proprietà terriera12 . La sua opera maggiore, su cui si focalizza l’attenzione del presente scritto, è An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, with a view of, and Commentary upon Beccaria, Rousseau, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Fielding and Blackstone pubblicata in Londra nel 178213. Si tratta di uno scritto nel quale, attraverso una prospettiva di analisi critica ed una marcata venatura riformista, Dawes analizza ed approfondisce i concetti di delitto e pena, ponendo a tal fine particolare rilevanza all’opera di Beccaria. Accanto ad essa, in parallelo o in contrapposizione, l’Autore studia gli scritti di altri maestri del pensiero giuridico europeo, tra i quali i pilastri dell’illuminismo (Rousseau, Montesquieu, Voltaire) e di due importanti esponenti della cultura giuridica britannica: Henry Fielding e William Blackstone. Nella riflessione di Dawes14 l’opera di Beccaria costituisce un costante punto di confronto sia per la ricostru8 M. Dawes, Philosophical Considerations, or Inquiry into the Merits of the Controversy between Dr. Priestley and Dr. Price, on Matter and Spirit, and Philosophical Necessity with an Introductory Essay on the Subject at Large, London, Printed for T. Cadell, 1780. 9 Id., England’s alarm! On the Prevailing Doctrine of Libels, Printed for J. Stockdale, London 1785; e Deformity of the Doctrine of Libels, Printed for J. Stockdale, London 1785. Cfr. al riguardo alcuni richiami in L. Williams Levy, Legacy of suppression: freedom of speech and press in early American history, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1960; Id., Judgments: essays on American constitutional history, Quadrangle Books, Chicago 1972. 10 M. Dawes, An Essay on Intellectual Liberty, Printed for T. Cadell, London 1780. In questo saggio Dawes critica aspramente la posizione di Jeremy Bentham (espressa in A Fragment on Government) e difende invece il pensiero di William Blackstone. 11 Id., An Introduction to the Knowledge of the Law on Real Estates, Butterworth, London 1814. 12 Id., Epitome of Landed Property, with a description of the several assurances by deed and will, Printed for J. Butterworth and son, London 1818. 13 M. Dawes, An Essay on crimes and punishments, with a view of, and commentary upon Beccaria, Rousseau, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Fielding and Blackstone, Printed for C. Dilly, in the poultry; and J. Debrett (successor to Mr. Almon) Piccadilly, London 1782. 14 Per un inquadramento ed approfondimento della figura e del pensiero di Manasseh Dawes si veda il recente studio di D.Y. Rabin, Identity, crime, and legal responsabily in Eighteenth-Century England, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2004, in particolare pp. 57-60. Interessanti spunti 153 zione sistematica degli istituti giuridici presi in esame sia per l’elaborazione di osservazioni de jure condendo. Il saggio di Dawes è determinante per comprendere e appurare la recezione e la diffusione del Dei delitti e delle pene nel tessuto intellettuale inglese. Come ben sottolineato da Thomas Andrew Green nel suo studio circa il sistema giudiziario penale inglese15, a differenza dei pionieristici lavori di Eden e Dagge, relativi alla riforma penale in Inghilterra e caratterizzati da una influenza diretta del pensiero di Beccaria, Dawes, che scrive circa un decennio dopo rispetto a loro e nelle cui pagine è profondo l’influsso di Blackstone e degli scritti filosofici di Joseph Priestley16, propone ed aggiunge una importante e davvero significativa lettura giuridico- morale ai temi cardine del pensiero beccariano. Infatti Dawes sostiene con forza argomentativa la necessità di una riforma del diritto penale inglese e del relativo sistema sanzionatorio. In tale prospettiva e con una accentuata venatura filosofico- morale di impostazione materialistico- deterministica di matrice lockiana, egli pone particolare attenzione allo studio delle cause del comportamento criminale. Riprendendo il pensiero del filosofo britannico Joseph Priestley, recupera e elabora la dottrina del nesso tra fenomeni psichici e fenomeni fisici. Si tratta di un aspetto focale e centrale da cui trae vigore la spinta critica rivolta agli stessi giuristi (lawyers) incapaci, a suo dire, di comprendere i principi base del comportamento umano ed i principali concetti relativi alle pene ed alle punizioni. La critica di Dawes è ferrea. Accusa i giuristi di parlare di «necessity of punishments» mentre non conoscono – se non solo parzialmente – le cause di quelle stesse azioni per le quali vorrebbero siano inflitte le pene. Lungo questa linea prosegue sostenendo anche in P. King, Punishing the Criminal Corpse, 1700-1840. Aggravated Forms of the Death Penalty in England, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2017, in particolare pp. 125 e ss.; si veda inoltre A. Page, John Jebb and the Enlightenment Origins of British Radicalism, Greenwood Publishers, Westport (ct) 2003, in particolare pp. 229-230. 15 T.A. Green, Verdict according to conscience. Perspectives on the English criminal trial jury 1200-1800, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1985, in particolare pp. 301-303. Green sottolinea come «Dawes associated himself with the critique of the administration of criminal law that Blackstone, Eden, and Dagge set forth and that derived, ultimately, from the reception of Beccaria’s work. And like the English writers who preceded him, Dawes argued that, pending reform either of human nature or of the law of sanctions, mercy – whatever its contributory costs – was appropriate» (p. 302). 16 Per inquadrare la figura di Priestley si segnala P. Taranto, La «conséquence» de Joseph Priestley et la métaphysique du matérialisme, «Dix-huitième siècle: revue annuelle de la Societé Française d’Etude du Dix-Huitième Siècle», 46, 2014, pp. 439-457. Si veda inoltre O. Colomer i Carles, Joseph Priestley, «Quadern de les idees, les arts i les lletres», 180, 2011, pp. 11-14. Per un quadro più ampio si rinvia a A. Santucci, Filosofia e cultura nel Settecento britannico, vol. 2. Hume e Hutcheson, Reid e la scuola del senso comune, Il Mulino, Bologna 2000. 154 che in realtà i criminali non offendono tanto per scelta quanto invece per miseria, mancanza, pochezza «of sentiment»17. Al riguardo richiama e riprende la complessa teoria che si articola intorno ai «principles of philosophicalnecessity» contestandone la tensione – o quanto meno la tendenza – verso il fatalismo o la predestinazione, i quali, a suo giudizio, porterebbero a negare il concetto stesso di volontarietà della azione umana (dunque alla negazione di una libera volontà dell’uomo nella determinazione delle proprie azioni)18. Emergono pertanto due aspetti fondamentali nella riflessione di Dawes: da una parte, una interiorità psicologica – ancor prima che morale – del soggetto che pone in essere un’azione, quale atto della propria libera volontà; dall’altra, una libertà di volontà che viene plasmata e modellata da elementi esterni alla singola individualità soggettiva ma connotanti le dinamiche sociali. Sotto il primo profilo, si può dunque comprendere come il senso, la percezione, la misura della mancanza (intesa quale sofferenza, miseria, infelicità) stimoli un senso di necessità tale da spingere a compiere una determinata azione i cui effetti sono pertanto previsti dalla mente dell’uomo, quale essere libero e razionale in grado di valutare ogni atto della propria volizione. Sussiste dunque un rapporto causa-effetto: ogni azione segue – o meglio consegue – a determinate cause e conduce a specifiche conseguenze. È un rapporto prestabilito, predeterminato e soprattutto prevedibile dalla mente di ogni singolo uomo (emerge la dimensione psicologica). In questo passaggio si pone il secondo profilo, poc’anzi accennato, ossia l’affioramento di una volontà libera, ma in realtà modellabile; o meglio – come afferma lo stesso Dawes – l’opportunità, la necessità, il dovere della società di formare e al contempo plasmare la mente dei singoli individui in modo tale che questi 17 Dawes, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, cit., pp. 2-3. Osserva Dana Y. Rabin come «Dawes identified the offender’s scarcity of sentiment and unrestrained passions as the sources of crime. Only the admission of sensibility into the legal process could correct this imbalance. [...] Dawes spoke of the opposition between strict laws and compassion». Ed ancora «In order to understand the full dimensions of crime, Dawes embraced the affinity of sensibility and justice. [...] Dawes did not deny or discourage the effects of compassion on a jury. Instead he saw it as the beginning of a process of dispensing mercy. [...] Dawes urged legal reforms that would incorporate this perspective on human psychology and behaviour», (Identity, cit., pp. 57-59). 18 Al riguardo Dawes sostiene che «all actions are effects of some cause in the mind; and man being free, he has a self-determining power governed by consideration and judgment, which precede his volition, and direct it; all actions necessarily follow their causes, or volitions; and as they cannot be otherwise than they are, when committed, it ought to be, and is the duty of society to form the minds of individuals, so that they may detest what is constituted bad by law» (M. Dawes, Of Crimes and Punishments in General, Book I, Chap. II, in An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, cit., p. 40). Alberto Carrera giungano a negare – o comunque quantomeno a detestare – tutto ciò che è vietato e proibito dalla legge, ciò che è contrario alla legge. La teoria della necessità (quale base per il compimento di una azione in relazione al rapporto causa-effetto) e la teoria della libertà umana si congiungono nello strutturare il concetto di volontarietà dell’azione. Sul punto pare evidente l’influenza non solo di Joseph Priestley circa il determinismo riformista, ma anche del filosofo e teologo calvinista statunitense Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758), autore di un’importante opera di chiara influenza lockiana intitolata The freedom of the Will (Boston 1754)19. Su tali premesse filosofico- concettuali poggia il programma riformista di Dawes, che coinvolge primariamente l’istruzione e l’educazione morale, per giungere poi – quasi come diretta conseguenza – ad una riforma del sistema e del diritto penale. In tale prospettiva, si oppone al mantenimento dell’istituto giuridico della grazia in quanto esso costituirebbe – a suo dire – una grave violazione del principio di eguaglianza ed una fondata minaccia al principio di legalità. Sulla scorta quindi di una ripresa critica del pensiero di Beccaria, Dawes segue in realtà da vicino il percorso già segnato da Blackstone, Eden e Dagge, senza tuttavia giungere,a differenza dei suoi predecessori, all’individuazione e indicazione dell’istituzione più idonea a realizzare quel piano di riforma o più correttamente di cambiamento che non è solo giuridico ma anche – e forse soprattutto – morale. I profondi influssi del pensiero di Priestley e di Edwards, l’attento richiamo ai grandi maestri del pensiero giuridico europeo moderno testimoniano la complessità della riflessione di Dawes, che per taluni aspetti pare assumere un approccio ed una forma mentis più da filosofo che da giurista. Richiama, commenta e confronta le opere di numerosi autori; in tal modo emerge la sua posizione personale al tema trattato. In questa dinamica argomentativa ed operativa, il capolavoro di Beccaria costituisce dunque uno degli elementi strutturali del pensiero di Dawes.Sono numerosi,significativi e non sempre di facile o immediata lettura i punti ed i passaggi in cui l’eclettico intellettuale britannico riprende, con approccio critico-riformista, l’opera del giurista milanese, in particolare in tema di pena di morte20 nella parte del trattato dedicata allo 19 J. Edwards, A Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of that Freedom of Will, which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, Vertue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame, Printed and sold by S. Kneeland, in Queen-Street, Boston 1754. Cfr. W.J. Danaher, The Trinitarian Ethics of Jonathan Edwards, Westminster John Knox Press, Louisville, London 2004. 20 Per un ampio quadro ricostruttivo circa la riflessione illuminista sulla pena di morte cfr. E. Dezza, Il problema della pena di morte, in Il con- Il pensiero critico-riformista di Manasseh Dawes, studioso di Beccaria 155 studio del concetto di morte quale pena (punizione) per il caso di omicidio21. Analizzando il pensiero di Beccaria, Dawes introduce il tema chiedendo al lettore se la condanna a morte, benché inflitta nei confronti di un assassino, non configuri di per sé un omicidio. Nonostante possa essere volta a prevenire o impedire un nuovo crimine e quindi finalizzata a preservare e tutelare la vita dei consociati, la condanna alla pena di morte priverebbe lo Stato di due suoi membri22. La morte dell’uccisore, quale risultato della applicazione della pena capitale irrogata nell’ipotesi di delitto di omicidio, non recherebbe infatti alcun tipo di vantaggio all’ucciso, tantomeno alla sua famiglia e neppure alcun indennizzo alla società, la quale, per di più, con la condanna a morte dell’omicida, si priverebbe di due suoi elementi. Dawes evidenzia come secondo la posizione di Beccaria la pena capitale comporterebbe inoltre il rischio di commettere errori giudiziari irreparabili ed avrebbe anche una minore forza dissuasiva rispetto ad una pena ai lavori forzati, la quale può essere prolungata per tutta la vita del condannato, rispetto alla esecuzione capitale in cui la sofferenza del condannato si consuma in brevi istanti. La condanna di un uomo a morte si rivelerebbe dunque transitoria, breve, istantanea, allontanandosi dalla finalità deterrente e preventiva. Ad un primo sguardo Dawes pare riprodurre ed accogliere le argomentazioni elaborate da Beccaria. In realtà la recezione è molto più articolata e diversificata. Tale complessità emerge nel momento in cui l’intellettuale britannico si interroga su quale possa essere l’eventuale fondamento giuridico della pena di morte, intesa come esercizio del diritto di uccidere. Il singolo individuo detiene tale diritto? Può conferirlo o cederlo ad un soggetto terzo? Può disporne giuridicamente? Sulla base di una osmosi tra individuo e società, la pena di morte (e conseguentemente il diritto ad infliggere la pena capitale) si congiunge alla delicata questione della legittimità del diritto ad uccidere se stessi, e quindi al diritto a suicidarsi. La dimensione individuale trasla sul piano sociale. Anche in questo punto Dawes riprende Beccaria: la pena di morte non risulta in alcun modo autorizzata o legittimata da alcun diritto; essa costituisce un suicidio da parte della stessa società. Dal momento che il singolo individuo non ha diritto di uccidersi23, questi non può in alcun modo trasferire ad altri (né alla collettività e tanto meno al sovrano) ciò che lui stesso non possiede. Il diritto ad uccidersi non rappresenta un social right. L’intellettuale britannico si pone una ulteriore domanda: se a livello sociale e politico non si individua una base legittimante il diritto ad uccidersi, è possibile trovare un’altra fonte di questo diritto? Nel suo incedere argomentativo, Dawes volge allora lo sguardo verso la sfera religiosa. Ed è in questo passaggio così delicato che si realizza una significativa divergenza concettuale rispetto al pensiero di Beccaria. Una divergenza che diventa ben presto rottura. Se, da un lato, infatti, il giurista lombardo separa e tiene distinte la sfera giuridica da quella religiosa, superando il concetto di delitto inteso come peccato, dall’altro, l’intellettuale britannico pare ricongiungere le due sfere individuando e riconoscendo nella religione l’elemento legittimante l’imposizione della morte quale punizione per il crimine di omicidio. La condanna a morte si configura dunque come pena per la commissione di un peccato di massima gravità. La necessità del conferimento del relativo potere e consenso verrebbe sostituita dal precetto della legge divina. Di conseguenza, benché non possa conferire né socialmente né politicamente ad altri quel potere (in quanto ne è soggettivamente privo), il singolo ne risulterebbe comunque sottomesso e subordinato dal punto di vista religioso. Si realizza una commistione – che a tratti si tramuta in sovrapposizione – tra sfera religiosa e sfera giuridica24: evidentemente un passo indietro rispetto alla posizione assunta da Beccaria. tributo italiano alla storia del pensiero. Diritto, cit., pp. 223 e ss.; si veda inoltre E. Tavilla, Guerra contro il crimine. Pena di morte e abolizionismo nella cultura giuridica italiana, in A. Sciumè (a cura di), Il diritto come forza. La forza del diritto. Le fonti in azione nel diritto europeo tra medioevo ed età contemporanea, G. Giappichelli Editore, Torino 2012, pp. 151-185. Nella medesima direzione si pone il denso studio di D. Ippolito, Beccaria, la pena di morte e la tentazione dell’abolizionismo, «L’Acropoli», 6, 2007, pp. 701-715. 21 Interessanti spunti sono offerti da I. Mereu, La morte come pena. Saggio sulla violenza legale, Donzelli, Torino 2007. 22 Dawes afferma «Is it not murder (asks the humane, the tender Beccaria) that, in order to prevent murder, death is inflicted on a murderer? If he had asked this question by a robber, he must have been answered in the affirmative, because death is not warranted for inferior crimes, except, as he says, by the iron sceptre that rules the universe. In the case of murder the state loses two members for the sake of a third and fourth member» (Book I, Chap. III, in An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, cit., p. 63). 23 Circa il tema del suicidio nella sua triplice connotazione di diritto, crimine e malattia, nel quadro del diritto comune europeo, sussistono importanti studi. Con specifico riguardo ai riflessi sul diritto successorio e di famiglia si segnala il contributo di G.P. Massetto, Il suicidio nella dottrina dell’età di mezzo, «Acta Histriae», 12, 2004, 1, pp. 139-176: contributi dal convegno internazionale Crimini senza vittime. La vittima nello scenario del processo penale (Capodistria, 23-25 ottobre 2003). Un attento affresco della dottrina giuridica di diritto comune circa il tema del suicidio è offerto da G. Masi, Il suicidio nel diritto comune, «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico», 63, 1952, pp. 497-535. Con riferimento all’età moderna si vedano le ricerche condotte da P. Bernardini, Le rive fatali di Keos. Montaigne o il cauto inizio del moderno trattato morale del suicidio, «Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica», 31, 2001, pp. 335-352, e Id., Dal suicidio come crimine al suicidio come malattia. Appunti sulla questione suicidologica nell’etica e nella giurisprudenza europea tra Sei e Settecento, «Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica», 24, 1994, pp. 81-102. 24 Dawes afferma infatti che «Beccaria says, that the punishment of death is not authorized by any right, and that as a man has no right to 156 Il parallelismo concettuale tra pena di morte e suicidio, all’interno del più ampio quadro del diritto ad uccidere e congiunto al diritto alla propria difesa e conservazione, spinge Dawes, riprendendo sul punto Rousseau, a sostenere e rimarcare come l’omicidio richieda sotto ogni punto di vista la punizione della morte. La condanna alla pena di morte, quale reazione ad un atto di omicidio, consente di raggiungere un duplice obiettivo: da una parte, incutere terrore negli altri (effetto deterrente), dall’altra, eliminare l’assassino. La morte diventa quindi punizione caritatevole in grado anche di prevenire i futuri tormenti dell’assassino 25. La legittimità giuridica della pena di morte nei confronti di un assassino non radica dunque nella dimensione sociale o politica bensì nella sfera religiosa ed etica. Da tali brevi ma significativi spunti si può notare come la riflessione di Dawes ruoti intorno ad una concezione utilitaristica del diritto penale. La pena deve infatti mirare alla difesa della società mediante la prevenzione e la repressione del comportamento criminoso che reca danno alla comunità. La pena si configura come strumento finalizzato ad evitare che il malfattore ponga in essere ulteriori comportamenti di carattere criminoso ed al contempo a distogliere chi volesse imitarne le gesta attraverso il timore della sanzione. Si pone a questo punto il concetto di proporzionalità tra pena e reato, allo scopo anche di evitare una eccessiva ed indiscriminata severità della pena che potrebbe kill himself, (meaning only no social right) he cannot transfer to others what he has not in himself. In this he may be civilly right, but considering that revelation goes further, and absolutely points out death as a punishment of murder, his own consent gives way to the divine law, and that though socially he cannot give to others a power to inflict it, he religiously must submit to it; notwithstanding what Beccaria says, (apparently but not really to the contrary) in denying that as suicide is forbidden, no man can even for murder authorize another to do that by him, he must not socially or politically do by himself» (Book I, Chap. III, in An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, cit., p. 64). 25 Sul punto Dawes propone un interessante parallelismo tra il pensiero di Beccaria e la riflessione di Rousseau sostenendo che «Rousseau has very properly explained the apparent error of Beccaria in this particular. Every man, says he, has an undoubted right to hazard his life for its preservation, and that he who would preserve his life at the expence of others, ought to risque it for their safety when it is necessary, as it is to prevent our falling by the hands of assassins, that we consent to die, on becoming such ourselves. Murder therefore calls for the punishment of death in every view of it, not only as a terror to others, but to destroy the murderer. It is impossible, however useful he may be made to the state, that his life can compensate for the loss of a member, the human heart detesting the act of murder, he would be a living object of horror to himself and others. Death therefore is a charitable punishment, and prevents at once all future torments of the murderer» (Book I, Chap. III, in An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, cit., pp. 64-65). Per un approfondimento del rapporto tra Beccaria e Rousseau sulla pena di morte si rinvia allo studio di D. Ippolito, Contratto sociale e pena capitale. Beccaria vs. Rousseau, «Rivista Internazionale di filosofia del diritto», 91, 2014, pp. 589-620. Alberto Carrera produrre un effetto di segno contrario26. Le pene non dovrebbero pertanto essere ingiustificatamente aspre, bensì dovranno essere applicate prontamente e senza eccezioni. Le leggi troppo crudeli, afferma Dawes nel capitolo dedicato al potere legislativo, devono essere modificate per evitare il rischio di anarchia o impunità 27. Si individua pertanto un importante punto di contatto tra Beccaria e la riflessione di Dawes e, più estensivamente, con la cultura giuridica penalistica inglese tardo settecentesca. Il concetto di pene miti ma certe, nel quadro del principio sopra richiamato di proporzionalità tra pena e gravità della condotta criminosa,entra infatti in contatto con l’opposto principio, all’epoca dominante, della mitigazione della crudezza e della severità delle pene dovute al largo ricorso all’istituto della grazia concessa dal sovrano, fonte e causa, secondo Dawes, di instabilità dell’assetto legale dello Stato. Emerge dunque una prospettiva riformista nella quale la legge assume un ruolo centrale. L’attenzione si posta quindi sul tema del potere legislativo e sulla legge penale: solo la legge deve specificare per quali comportamenti la pena debba essere inflitta, in contrapposizione quindi all’ampia discrezionalità lasciata al giudice. Ne consegue un notevole rafforzamento della funzione del legislatore penale e – più in generale – del potere legislativo28. Le leggi penali dovranno essere chiare e concise, dovranno inoltre essere applicate senza lasciare alcuno spazio alla discrezionalità interpretativa. Dawes richiama e riprende ancora Beccaria in merito ad un duplice ma congiunto aspetto: da un lato, la classificazione dei reati in base alla loro gravità 29 determinata 26 Basilare lo studio di F. Rosen, Crime, punishment and liberty: Montesquieu, Beccaria, Bentham, «History of political thought», 20, 1999, 1, pp. 173-185. 27 Nel pensiero di Dawes il concetto di severità presenta due estremi di segno opposto: punizione ed impunità. Richiamando la riflessione beccariana, spiega: «the one takes place of the other, because it fails in its purpose, and by becoming hideous, creates contempt for it; until set at defiance, impunity is preferred to it. Thus Beccaria says, if the laws be too cruel, they must be altered, or anarchy and impunity will succeed» (Book I, Chap. III, in An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, cit., p. 75). 28 Riferendosi ai «legislators» e al loro ruolo, Dawes afferma che «Human fallibility should be ever before their eyes, and they should rather study to improve the virtues of mankind, than shed their blood for human offences: but instead hereof, they prescribe penalties for those actions which the refinements of civil society produce; or, as Beccaria says, they punish by the laws the crimes which the laws have occasioned; and as such actions prove inconvenient or injurious, they attempt to punish them with more violence than is exerted by the hand that commits them» (The Subject of criminal Actions, and their punishments examined, Book I, Chap. VII, in An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, cit., p. 121). 29 Richiamando nuovamente Beccaria, Dawes afferma «... which brought this able writer in another place to propose a scale of punishments corresponding with a scale of crimes, that there might be a distinction in guilt, and not that inferior offences should have the fame penalties annexed to them as those in the highest degree. Every injury being constituted cri- Il pensiero critico-riformista di Manasseh Dawes, studioso di Beccaria in relazione al grado di pericolosità dell’atto criminoso nei confronti della società (vengono collocati al vertice quei reati che mettono a repentaglio la stabilità o addirittura l’esistenza stessa della società); dall’altro, l’enumerazione delle sanzioni in ordine di asprezza crescente30. Da questi rapidi cenni e veloci spunti tratti dall’analisi dell’opera di Manasseh Dawes si può desumere la complessità del laborioso e graduale processo di recezione dell’opera di Beccaria31 all’interno della dottrina giuridica inglese nella seconda metà del Settecento. Si tratta di una lenta e graduale metabolizzazione, in cui emergono elementi sia di contatto che di divergenza. Si delinea dunque una recezione critica e creativa, al contempo connotata da forti resistenze e da prese di distanza rispetto al modello beccariano. Tensioni opposte che caratterizzano la dinamica riformista del sistema penale britannico agli albori dell’età contemporanea. Il trattato dell’intellettuale britannico è una chiara testimonianza di questi aspetti. Attraverso una prospettiva criticoriformista, Dawes unisce, mischiandoli e spesso sovrapponendoli, elementi di filosofia morale e di teoria del diritto che ne fanno una significativa personalità scientifica nel quadro culturale inglese a cavaliere tra XVIII e XIX secolo. minal, and punishable, there certainly is no bounds of punishment but in the wisdom and prudence of legislators, which may as well invent new penalties for new injuries, as continue the old, when they grow enormous, frequent, and dangerous, which they may possibly do in the degree, as human invention may point out public conveniences» (ibidem). 30 L’intellettuale inglese cita ancora Beccaria: «If the hand of a legislator and an assassin are directed (as Beccaria says) by the same spirit of ferocity, it is evident that until the rigour of the one shall abate, and point to reformation, it may be expected that the other will infest our peace, and perhaps repeat his crimes, according to the rashness with which they are punished; and nothing but the mildness of the former can remove the barbarism of the latter» (ivi, p. 123). 31 Con taglio critico dalle sfumature ironiche, Dawes richiama Beccaria anche in un ulteriore passaggio del suo saggio, laddove tratta di Cause of Vice and the Effect of a capital punishment. Nel corso della descrizione ed analisi del pensiero di Fielding, Dawes afferma infatti «Mr. Fielding thought it possible to remove vice, or lessen the practice of it, by a vigorous exertion of the laws against what he supposed produced it; but he found himself mistaken. In a chapter on the difficulties attending prosecutions, he has suggested fix reasons for them; one only of which being applicable to the purpose of this essay, it will be proper to remark: it is, that the tender hearted cannot take away the life of a man. Had Beccaria read this passage before he had written his tender hearted essay, what would have been his transports! At all events he felt it, and enlarged on the humane idea of it, to the compass we find in his ingenious disquisitions on crimes and punishments» (Of the Cause of Vice, and the Effect of Capital Punishment, Book I, Chap. XI, in An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, cit., p. 143). È rinvenibile infine un ultimo cenno a Beccaria nella parte dedicata all’idea di onore. Dawes argomenta infatti che «While men act under the influence of honor, they withdraw themselves from the laws, which, as Beccaria observes, are insufficient for their protection» (Of the Idea of Honour, Ambition, and Pride, as productive of moral and criminal Offences, Book II, Chap. VII, in An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, cit., p. 221). 157 Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Note e discussioni Dove va la ricerca modernistica in Italia? Riflessioni a margine di Padova giovani SISEM 2019 Citation: M. Galtarossa (2019) Dove va la ricerca modernistica in Italia? Riflessioni a margine di Padova giovani SISEM 2019. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 159-164. doi: 10.13128/ ds-25448 Copyright: © 2019 M. Galtarossa. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index. php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. Si è svolto a Padova fra il 20 e il 22 febbraio 2019 tra l’Accademia galileiana, in assemblea plenaria il primo giorno, e le aule del Dipartimento Dissgea dell’Università di Padova, per sessioni parallele, gli altri due giorni, la V edizione del seminario giovani e giovane studiose della Società italiana per lo Studio della Storia moderna. Alcune cifre possono contribuire a restituire, in prima approssimazione, la fisionomia sociologica dell’avvenimento. Più di 70 giovani partecipanti, accompagnati da una decina di professori membri del direttivo. I relatori erano in maggioranza studiosi (47), anche se questo rapporto di genere è meno evidente fra i coordinatori (12) rispetto alle coordinatrici (9), distribuiti in circa 20 panel, con mezz’ora di tempo a disposizione per ciascuno gruppo per la presentazione e le singole comunicazioni. Nella varietà di questi panel individuiamo dei fili conduttori. Nell’era della globalizzazione e della Public history si ragiona ancora per comunità, città, regioni, Repubbliche ed Imperi, ma anche sulla storia della disciplina e delle fonti iconografiche. Mentre l’appartenenza alla Sisem, come soci, è limitata a circa 20 relatori, situazione plausibile del resto per dei giovani dottoranti non strutturati e segnale comunque significativo d’apertura della Società aver scelto di ammetterli tutti senza iscrizione, si può affermare che rimane il dottorato di ricerca lo strumento principe in Italia per l’avvio a seri e rigorosi studi storici. Di prima battuta due curiosità fra la distanza dell’oggetto di ricerca e il luogo di affiliazione dei giovani: si studia il controllo sociale dei forestieri a Venezia nel Settecento all’Università di Genova oppure la peste fra la Calabria e la Sicilia, sempre a metà del secolo dei “lumi”, all’Università di Roma 3. La formula adottata dell’incontro scientifico di presentazione delle prime ricerche potrebbe apparire consolidata. In realtà quest’ultimo seminario appare tarato sulla precedente esperienza di Bologna del 2017: quindi niente discussment con la decisione della Sisem di accettare tutte le proposte, al fine di favorire la massima partecipazione democratica dei giovani. Scelta che ha permesso di cogliere da una buona visuale la panoramica dello stato di salute della giovane modernistica italiana. Dopo i saluti istituzionali di Egidio Ivetic, che ha organizzato il seminario assieme a Walter Panciera, del direttore del Dipartimento Gianluigi Baldo, il presidente Sisem Luigi Mascilli Migliorini ha lucidamente chiarito il significato di Padova 2019. In effetti ci si interroga e si cerca di comprendere le domande, presenti e future, dei giovani che fanno e vogliono insegnare storia. La generazione precedente usciva dalla fine della seconda guerra mondiale, visse la nascita dell’Europa, con la rivoluzione dei consumi, mentre i giovani di oggi, spinti nella globalizzazione, si Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 159-164 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25448 160 trovano a dover affrontare le nuove richieste di cittadinanza. La robusta tradizione civile del paese ci impone, ha continuato Migliorini, di leggere la domanda pubblica per una cittadinanza globale e di fornire delle ricerche per questa “coscienza assettata”. Nel pomeriggio di mercoledì 20 si sono aperti i lavori. Monarchie borboniche: spazi distanti e controllo del territorio era un panel costituito in realtà da due diverse sezioni (Spazi distanti, coordinatrice Viviana Mellone, relatori Arturo Gallia, Antonio D’Onofrio e Controllo del territorio, coord. Stefano Boero, Rita Profeta, Michele Fasanella, Álvaro Paris). Il problema che ci si pone è quello della sovranità, cioè come si fa concretamente a costruirla su spazi distanti e distaccati come lo Stato dei presidi (1557-1801) e le isole ponentine nel Settecento (Arturo Gallia). L’indagine sulle strategie di gestione di spazi altamente strategici risente della fortuna dei royal studies che si proiettano sull’Ottocento, in questo caso specifico sulla lunga durata della monarchia borbonica. La connects history permette di affrontare questa funzione strategica del governo nel tempo considerando il sistema economico, i trattati di estradizione dei criminali, l’arruolamento dei nativi, insomma l’autonomia dello Stato dei Presidi, giunto dall’eredità imperiale spagnola cinquecentesca ma rimasto sostanzialmente avulso dal Regno di Napoli (Antonio D’Onofrio). Sfide e soluzioni che sono lette in maniera sperimentale attraverso contesti nettamente diversi dal punto geografico e temporale. Diverse sono infatti le vicende del Vicereame del Rio della Plata (1817-1819) istituito da Carlo III (1776-1777) per il progetto francese di monarchia costituzionale che si intendeva allora approntare (Viviana Mellone). Si passa dallo Stato di origine divina allo Stato quindi legittimato attraverso una carta costituzionale. Territorio strategico di ampie dimensioni statali, ben visibili geograficamente, esso era allora al centro di una serie di contese internazionali fra Spagna e Francia (1810-1816). La sezione dedicata al Controllo del territorio affronta i nuovi problemi che la neonata monarchia di Carlo di Borbone (1734) si trovò a dover gestire nel Regno di Napoli. Dopo la famosa peste di Marsiglia del 1720 quella di Messina e Reggio Calabria (1743-1745), una delle ultimi grandi peste del Mediterraneo, ripropone la fecondità di questo approccio di storia sociale alla spaventosa malattia (Rita Tolomei). Accertata tardivamente, dopo due mesi, dalla Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute pubblica del Regno. L’istituzione centrale adottò il modello sanitario veneziano (richiesta di medici, istituzione di quarantene e di cordoni sanitari). L’isolamento di Messina pose problemi di approvvigionamento alimentare alla città, con percorsi terrestri alternativi nei trasporti per Palermo, ma soprattutto linee di cordoni Massimo Galtarossa che attraversavano la Calabria e la Sicilia, separazioni ad opera di presidi militarizzati che a loro volta causarono ulteriori conflitti e negoziazioni fra le comunità. Un altro tema è relativo all’Abbruzzo Ulteriore nel clima dell’avanzata degli austriaci (1744). Il confronto fra il re di Napoli Carlo III e l’episcopato locale si coglie attraverso le diocesi di frontiera, simpatizzanti per l’invasore, e per mezzo dei carteggi, come quello dell’ex-gesuita Francesco Saverio Cenci con il cardinale Passionei (Stefano Boero). Forze centripete nell’esercizio pieno della sovranità che comprenderanno grandi famiglie della nobiltà romana con cui il Regno di Napoli scoprì i limiti del controllo del territorio in specifiche aree. Per il principato di Melfi tratto caratterizzante fu la surrogazione del potere ai Doria-Pampijli per mezzo di amministratori esterni, in particolare emerse la figura dell’erario, nell’esercizio di riscossione fra le comunità locali (legnatico e pascolatico). Carica reclutata fra i professionisti romani prima e poi fra i patriziati cittadini. Quando nel 1799 l’amministrazione su quel territorio inizia ad essere scardinata dall’ondata rivoluzionaria i Doria, questa famiglia feudale romana, riuscirono ad aumentare lo stesso il fatturato aziendale affidando all’inizio del nuovo secolo le controversie con il potere centrale a un mediatore come l’avvocato Domenico Mastellone (Michele Fasanella). Infine passiamo a Stati come la Spagna, Francia e città come Napoli (1799-1830), e in particolare per quest’ultima capitale – dopo gli studi di Anna Maria Rao – si avverte la perdita, da parte dello Stato, nell’esercizio di controllo della violenza da parte della polizia. La sollevazione popolare ci restituisce uno spaccato della società napoletana mentre la sbirraglia è accusata di tiepidezza nei confronti della repressione dei giacobini. Il problema che ci si pone è quindi quello delle vie europee della ripresa della sorveglianza delle strade, di ricomposizione delle fratture interne alla monarchia, attraverso la cooptazione di forze locali (Francia, 1815; Spagna, 1823). A Napoli i capi dei realisti vengono integrati fra la nuova milizia urbana al termine di un processo di negoziazione (Álvaro Paris). Imaginetur causam praesentis examinis? Il disciplinamento socio-morale nel settentrione italiano d’età moderna (XVI-XVIII secolo), (coord. Luca Al Sabbagh, Marco Bolzonella, Tommaso Scaramella, Domizia Weber) richiama fin dal titolo la fase iniziale dei processi inquisitoriali locali che rispetto alla nascita dell’istituzione poliziesca (1542) si estesero nel tardo Cinque e Seicento all’ampia sfera di irregolarità anche di natura morale. Dalla Modena nel ducato estense della prima metà del Cinquecento, con i casi di stregoneria contaminati da miti celtici (Domizia Weber), si passa all’ambiente di Rovigo e alla Fratta di Lucrezia Gonzaga, quindi tra il Riflessioni a margine di Padova giovani SISEM 2019 palazzo Roncale e le accademie polesane. L’Archivio della curia vescovile consente di cogliere la connotazione famigliare, del resto comune alle famiglie Thiene, Pellizzari, di Vicenza, dell’eterodossia. Nuclei famigliari, quindi, rispetto alla connotazione individuale, tipica nell’adesione all’eresia, fra i patrizi veneziani (Marco Bolzonella). Proseguendo con il caso reggiano, nonostante le perdite documentarie, esso permette di ricostruire quantitativamente, dopo lo sradicamento delle forme di eresia manifesta, il forte interesse per materie di nuova competenza dell’Inquisizione come i sortilegi, la blasfemia, gli ebrei e la sessualità. La panoramica è ampia: l’esilio del soldato Giacomo Neri per bestemmia, gioco, maltrattamenti alla moglie e ubriachezza (1709), l’ebreo Emanuele Mocato (anche se la comunità ebraica era protetta dagli Estensi), l’oste Pietro Zoli per poligamia. Particolarmente significativo il dato per la Sollecitatio ad turpia, cioè i reati sessuali commessi nei confessionali, con i picchi degli anni 1734 e 1784. I processi venivano condotti dal vescovo con l’assistenza del vicario dell’Inquisizione e malgrado i molti casi, che vedono coinvolte monache o diverse donne, si giunge a poche condanne (Luca Al Sabbagh). Significativo infine il processo condotto dalla magistratura dei Savi all’Eresia a Venezia nel 1707 contro il monaco camaldolese Silvano d’Este del monastero di San Clemente. L’accusa di sodomia apre uno squarcio sulla morale cattolica nei confronti del reato, il suo rapporto con l’eresia, la giustificazione dottrinale della molestia da parte dell’accusato. Insomma una finestra sulla sessualità e le opinioni dottrinali della popolazione maschile nei monasteri veneziani del primo Settecento (Tommaso Scaramella). Il convegno ha proseguito i lavori giovedì 21 nelle aule del Dipartimento Dissgea. Ne La città e il sacro: religione potere e credenze nella Sicilia d’età moderna (coord. Giuseppe Campagna, Antonino Teramo, Silvia d’Agata, Claudia Stella Geremia) è lo scenario urbano, anche dal punto di vista dei luoghi di culto mariani, che diventa il luogo di raffigurazione di un’identità urbana segnata dal rapporto con il sacro su differenti piani (devozionale, associativo, pastorale e famigliare) da parte dei ceti sociali. Il culto per la promozione di San Placido e della Madonna della Lettera si inseriscono nelle strategie dei palermitani volte ad assicurarsi il ruolo di capitale della Sicilia. Le élites urbane si impegneranno in investimenti nell’edilizia religiosa. Credenze popolari, come quella della donne de fora, troveranno una collocazione nella toponomastica cittadina. Lo storico e le immagini. Il contributo delle fonti iconografiche per la ricerca storica, (coord. Marcello Dinacci, Gaia Bruno, Gabriella Desideri, Francesco Buscemi) pone il problema metodologico dell’apporto dell’elemento visivo nel lavoro 161 degli storici. Un impulso interdisciplinare che attraverso le indagini seriali della storia della mentalità di Michel Vovelle, passa per i Visual Studies, con le immagini come prodotto culturale in un dato contesto sociale. La feconda prospettiva adottata confronta scene di genere ed inventari di beni a Napoli nel Settecento. Dalla storia della cultura materiale si passa a quella diplomatica con il dipinto Il convegno diplomatico di Francesco Guardi (1753), coevo al negoziato per il trattato commerciale fra il Regno di Napoli e la Repubblica delle Provincie Unite. Ritornando a Napoli il rapporto complesso fra immagini e avvenimenti può essere esplorato attraverso una serie di acquerelli dedicati alla capitale partenopea alla fine del 1798. Infine al rapporto fra mass media e storia è dedicata l’analisi del dipinto Il giuramento della Pallacorda ai prodromi della Rivoluzione francese. Trasmissione culturale e istituzioni educative nell’Europa dell’età moderna, (coord. Daniela Buccomino, Alessia Castagnino, Fabio D’Angelo, Giacomo Alberto Donati) indaga gli influssi, le iterazioni e le tensioni nella circolazione delle idee e pratiche culturali fra centri italiani ed europei secondo un approccio multidisciplinare. Daniela Buccomino affronta l’evoluzione del rapporto fra l’Università di Pavia e le sue Accademie, in particolare quelle degli Affidati e Intenti, spesso composte di docenti universitari, durante l’età spagnola. Giacomo Donati si sofferma sulla formazione teologica e giuridica, e questa è una novità, nell’ordine domenicano attraverso le biografie di due frati predicatori Umberto Locati e Pietro Maria Passerini vissuti fra Cinque e Seicento. Alessia Castagnino indaga la circolazione del sapere medico scozzese e francese. Le traduzioni di docenti come Federico Rossi ed Angelo Nannoni a Siena costituiranno delle figure di mediazione culturale nella trasmissione e adattamento di teorie e linguaggi scientifici europei di pubblica utilità rivolti per un pubblico indifferenziato. Fabio D’Angelo si sofferma sulle accademie minerarie di regia istituzione, in particolare di Freiberg e di Schemnitz in Sassonia, punto di riferimento per un’adeguata preparazione mineralogica, o più propriamente delle scienze della terra, dei quadri scientifici europei, anche piemontesi, e di creazione e diffusione del sapere scientifico. Medici physici, chirurghi e “caritatanti”. Teorie e pratiche della cura del corpo e dell’anima tra XVI e XVII secolo, (coord. Stefano Tomassetti, Francesco Baldanzi, Alessandra Quaranta) risente di un trentennio di studi di storia della medicina diventata campo di ricerca della storia sociale. Fra i temi in esame emergono gli intrecci dell’attività terapeutica dei medici fisici influenzati da concezioni astrologiche, libri di “secreti” e dottrine religiose, nonché dalla porosità del contatto con una prati- 162 ca considerata tradizionalmente meno autorevole come quella chirurgica (Alessandra Quaranta). L’istituzione ospedaliera di Santa Maria Nuova di Firenze è ricostruita per il secolo XVII nella cura quotidiana ed assistenza agli ammalati nonché nel conforto religioso dei chierici, evidenziando la funzione dell’istituzione assistenziale dell’Ospedale fra sperimentazione e formazione medica post-laurea (Francesco Baldanzi). Il rapporto fra cura del corpo e medicina dell’anima è ripreso per l’Ospedale papale del Santo Spirito di Roma attraverso l’operato di novizi oratoriani e laici devoti, detti “caritatanti” (Stefano Tomassetti). Diplomazia nella prima età moderna: approcci plurali e nuove storiografie (coord. Giovanni Contel, relatori Daniele Argenio, Nazareno Galiè) è una rassegna che risente dell’influenza della New Diplomatic history. Le sfaccettature della comunicazione, come alternativa al conf litto, riguardano gli ambasciatori come rappresentanti dei principi e degli Stati. L’analisi privilegia il gruppo diplomatico inteso sia come familia che partecipa dei privilegi e delle immunità diplomatiche dell’ambasciatore e del ruolo dello stesso come mediatore culturale attraverso la pratica del dono, dello scambio di beni di consumo e di lusso, per facilitare le entrature a corte nonché delle esperienze di viaggio. Tra diplomazia e mediazione culturale: una storia di personaggi e istituzione ponte tra dimensione locale e globale (XV-XVII sec.), (coord. Alessandro Tripepi, Federica Fiorini, Davide Trentacoste), assume il Rinascimento italiano come significativo periodo storico. Il panel recepisce le indicazioni provenienti da filoni di ricerca anglosassoni come la connected, global o entangled History. Nello specifico le connessioni di quel periodo sono indagate attraverso la mobilità per ragioni diplomatiche, intese in un’ampia accezione: i cardinali spagnoli alla fine ’400 e la cultura profetica, il gioco diplomatico dell’ambasciata persiana del 1601 a Firenze e il contributo dei mercanti toscani. L’esame della diplomazia gesuitica in Giappone nel corso della celebre delegazione giapponese in Europa (1585) completano la proposta. Un modello di penetrazione e connessione che è forse il primo esempio della diffusione su scala globale dell’attività della Compagnia prima dell’esperienza del Paraguay nel Settecento. Circolazione di informazioni e pratiche di governo nella Monarquía Hispánica (secoli XVI-XVII), (coord. Flavia Tudini, Matteo Lazzari, Sonia Isidori, Valeria Patti) pone le comunicazioni fra il centro della monarchia spagnola e i viceregni del Perù e della Nuova Spagna come oggetto di studio. Presupposto del buen gobierno della Corona erano dettagliate e regolari informazioni dalle colonie americane fornite da un’ampia platea di agenti (di governo, religiosi, mercanti e fra la popo- Massimo Galtarossa lazione locale). Matteo Lazzari si sofferma su una presunta cospirazione di schiavi africani a Città del Messico, segnalata dal viceré Antonio de Mendoza nella prima metà del Cinquecento. Valeria Patti si sposta nella seconda metà del Seicento con la notizia della morte di re Filippo IV. Particolare attenzione viene riservata alle notizie provenienti dal viceregno del Perù a fine ’500. Da una parte Flavia Tudini racconta del governo pastorale dell’arcivescovo di Lima Turibio di Mogrovejo e dall’altra Sonia Isidori indaga i contatti con la Spagna dei padri gesuiti presenti nella provincia di Quito. Non solo Cantimori e Chabod. La Storia moderna nell’università italiana dopo la Riforma Gentile, (coord. Beatrice Donati, Michele Cilenti, Martina Regis, Elisa D’Annibale) dopo gli anni 1924 ci fornisce la mappatura della cattedre di Storia moderna nel Regno d’Italia, con particolare attenzione a Palermo, Roma e Perugia (sono ricordati come docenti Francesco Ercole, Alberto Maria Ghisalberti e Giuseppe Maranini). Infami, streghe, terroristi, accattoni. Retoriche della paura in età moderna, (coord. Fabiana Ambrosi, Marco Albertoni, Carolina Antonucci, Ida Xoxa) è dedicato a quello spettro che si aggira nell’Europa che è la paura politica con le sue ripercussioni sull’ordine pubblico. Processi di stigmatizzazione, esclusione all’interno della società, se non di vera e propria criminalizzazione, hanno riguardato un largo palcoscenico di figure marginali (le streghe con la loro invasione dello spazio del sacro e del medico guaritore, i poveri “ladri in potenza” con le leggi contro di essi volte al lavoro obbligatorio) su cui si riversavano i timori del corpo sociale. Il lessico di queste emozioni è giunto fino a noi, prima con le “colonne infami” di manzoniana memoria e poi rispolverando la dicitura “terrorista” durante il periodo termidoriano della Rivoluzione francese. Figure al margine schiavi, zingari e rinnegati nel Mediterraneo della prima Età moderna, (coord. Maria Gloria Tumminelli, Michele Bosco, Francesco Caprioli) tenta di intrecciare i Mediterranean Studies, rinnovati dalle ricerche sull’emigrazione di fronte all’avanzata turca, con il filone di studi sulla marginalità per sfatare archetipi culturali negativi in modo tale da rendere complessa la storicizzazione dell’alterità. I temi in esame sono diversi: la schiavitù cristianità nel Maghreb ottomano e le trattative caritatevoli di riscatto (redenzione dei captivi) in Sicilia, il fenomeno dei rinnegati come neoconvertiti alla fede islamica. Analizzare la condizione di esclusione come occasione di riscatto, e a sua volta fattore di inclusione in un altro gruppo sociale, appare di estremo interesse come nel caso delle reti dei rinnegati algerini. Il panel inizia dalla mobilità degli zingari, inizialmente considerati come pellegrini, nel Regno di Riflessioni a margine di Padova giovani SISEM 2019 Napoli e Ducato di Milano che appare influenzata dalla legislazione sui forestieri, regolata da specifiche grida, (bandi) di espulsione, che per Milano si intensificano fra il 1660 e il 1713, per la presenza dei cingani come soldati disertori (Maria Gloria Tumminelli). Meritevole d’attenzione è l’intervento di Francesco Caprioli sul passaggio sociale dei neoconvertiti all’Islam (mawla, processo di islamizzazione) fra Algeri ed Istanbul a fine ‘500 che sotto un patrone (Intisad) possono acquistare diritti e ruoli sociali all’interno della nuova famiglia mussulmana. Migrazioni e minoranze. Mobilità e integrazioni delle alterità nella prima Età moderna (coord. Benedetto Ligorio, Vincenzo Tedesco, Marco Cesareo, Alessandro Abbate), in realtà comprende un intervento di fine Seicento. Prendendo in considerazione la diaspora sefardita nel bacino Mediterraneo sono seguiti i flussi che dalla Spagna, con il fenomeno dell’espulsione dei moriscos, e dal Sud Italia si dirigono verso Ragusa e Venezia, dove sorgerà all’inizio del Cinquecento il primo ghetto della storia (Benedetto Ligorio). Talvolta gli ebrei convertiti ritornavano al giudaismo per cui erano indagati dall’Inquisizione. A Siena i comportamenti difformi o le dottrine eterodosse degli studenti tedeschi, maestri di scuola e artigiani sono ricostruiti attraverso i processi del Sant’Uffizio (Vincenzo Tedesco). In questo panel compaiono quindi minoranze etniche, per motivi di Studio e religiose ma pure gli esuli della fallita rivolta antispagnola (1674-1678) di Messina che costituirono un’emigrazione qualificata. Sempre nella Sicilia di fine secolo gli attriti con l’operato del viceré portarono a dei flussi in uscita di dissidenti regnicoli mentre nuovi quadri militari ed amministrativi giunsero dall’estero. In Tra libero commercio e tutela del pubblico. Le reti mercantili ed informative delle istituzioni pubbliche d’ancien régime (XVI-XVIII), (coord. Francesca Ferrando, Giulia Bonazza, Sofia Gullino, Andrea Zappia), i relatori si rifanno all’approccio della social network analysis avvalendosi di fonti contabili e della corrispondenza istituzionale. Gli interventi, attraverso reti commerciali ed informative, intendono analizzare le relazioni economiche fra enti pubblici ed operatori privati prendendo in considerazione un campione di magistrature annonarie ed assistenziali (Ufficio dei poveri, dell’Abbondanza e magistrato per il riscatto degli schiavi di Genova nonché la casa dei Catecumeni di Roma). La mobilità in età rivoluzionaria e napoleonica: controllo sociale, identificazione personale e reti politiche, (coord. Carlo Bazzani, Paolo Conte, Domenico Maione, Stefano Poggi) si pone sulla scia di un filone storiografico fecondo e produttivo (oltre a Gilles Bertrand per la Francia, si pensi alla collana del “Centro sulle polizie informali” di Livio Antonielli, nonché l’opera di Mar- 163 co Meriggi) ma importanti risultano i lavori di Marina Formica, Anna Maria Rao e Chiara Lucrezio Monticelli per il Settecento. Da una parte quindi procedure di identificazione e sistemi di controllo e dall’altra l’intensa migrazione politica dei fuoriusciti italiani verso la Francia. Alcune centinaia di esuli (circa 400) – è riportato il caso del conservatore del Louvre il romano Ennio Quirino Visconti nel 1815 – decideranno di stanziarsi definitivamente in Francia dopo la stagione napoleonica (Paolo Conte). Esempi di fattive collaborazioni in terra straniera che ribaltano il valore e significato dell’esilio e semmai, al limite, esso è rivissuto con dolore al momento del ritorno in patria. In questi termini scriverà il napoletano Giosué Sangiovanni, seppure per lui il viaggio in patria fosse arricchito dalle nuove conoscenze maturate all’estero. Se per la Repubblica di Venezia (1789-1797) si può parlare delle modalità di schedatura e controllo dei forestieri, ad esempio nell’esame dei dati delle liste settimanali nelle città della terraferma (Carlo Bazzani) nella Repubblica Cisalpina interverrà un processo di successiva autonomizzazione amministrativa (passaporto per gli stranieri, carte di sicurezza e certificati di residenza per i cittadini) dopo l’influenza delle pratiche francesi (Stefano Poggi). Il caso della questione dello straniero nella Repubblica romana (1798-1799) è interessante per il dibattito politico sui limiti della libertà del cittadino, cioè in che misura il rilascio dei passaporti poteva rappresentare una garanzia della stessa o piuttosto un limite amministrativo alla libertà individuale (Domenico Maione). “Esemplari femine e gentildonne sotto la protezione dei Padri”: fondatrici e fondazioni semireligiose femminili nell’Italia post – tridentina, (coord. Francesca Guiducci, Fabio Arlati, Domenico Uccellini) analizza i percorsi alternativi ed autonomi di congregazioni di devote italiane in risposta al progetto di claustrazione di queste ampie e diversificate realtà femminili (istituti laicali, orsoline e terziarie) avviato dopo il concilio di Trento con la bolla Circa Pastoralis di Pio V. Contrariamente alla vulgata della dicotomia tra dominio maschile e soggezione femminile, le soluzioni adottate nella creazione di originali modelli di vita religiosi alternativi ai monasteri sfruttarono l’appoggio di gruppi religiosi maschili e il potere delle benefattrici. Stato guerra e fiscalità in Toscana tra XVI e XVIII secolo. Indagini preliminari per una verifica della categoria di fiscal – military state negli Stati italiani dell’età moderna, (coordinatore Guido Cioni, Alessandro Lo Barto, Jacopo Pessina) passa dalla Repubblica di Lucca nel Cinquecento all’esperienza del Granducato di Toscana nel Settecento. La guerra è un tema storico ormai con una lunga tradizione di studi di storia sociale. Maggiore interesse ha quindi il filo- 164 ne storiografico sulla capacità degli antichi Stati italiani di mobilitare maggiori risorse dal proprio territorio per rispondere alle esigenze finanziarie necessarie per affrontare i conflitti internazionali. Particolare attenzione viene dedicata all’evoluzione degli apparati amministrativi in un periodo di aspri scontri militari. Le attività delle comunità marittime tra contesti pacifici e contesti turbolenti: identità fluide e sistemi di autoprotezione (XVII-XIX secolo), (coordinatore Leonardo Scavino, Alessio Boschiazzo, Tamara Decia) indaga il destino dei piccoli Stati, comunità di pescatori e piccole comunità litorali stretti fra il rischio del mare e l’opportunità di guadagno nei periodi di pace. Significativa la straordinaria capacità delle genti ligure di interpretare la congiuntura nei periodi di conflitto e dirottare le rotte e le forme d’investimento. Il panel considera il feudo imperiale del Marchesato di Finale, la cui crisi è letta attraverso le carte della compagnia assistenziale di Sant’Erasmo. Per fronteggiare la situazione Finale è trasformato in porto corsaro cambiando le rotte commerciali verso la Maremma nella seconda metà del Seicento (Tamara Decia). Le turbolenze del periodo rivoluzionario e napoleonico permetteranno dei margini di manovra all’attività della pesca del corallo nel Maghreb pure alla comunità di pescatori di Torre del Greco (Alessio Boschiazzo). Infine la piccola comunità di Camogli, a 30 km da Genova, fra fine Settecento ed inizi del Novecento dimostrerà insospettabili capacità di adattamento degli attori marittimi passando dalle commesse con Algeri al commercio granario nel Mar Nero (Odessa, 1861-1864) fino ai viaggi oceanici trasportando guano fra il Perù e l’Asia (1865-1866) (Leonardo Scavino). In Carriere plurilocalizzate al servizio dei sovrani. La Monarchia Ispanica e le sue élites, (coord. Valeria Cocozza, Davide Balestra, Yasmina Rocio Ben Yessef Garfia, Benoit Marechaux) si presentano i risultati di un’indagine sui percorsi di ascesa sociale di individui, anche ecclesiastici, e di gruppi famigliari, valorizzando la documentazione conservata in archivi italiani e spagnoli e avvalendosi del metodo prosopografico e della network analysis inserendosi, inoltre, nel solco della ricca tradizione storiografica spagnola (Casalilla, 2009). I benefici di queste carriere vengono a comprendere anche le linee collaterali ma soprattutto stabiliscono nuove relazioni clientelari nell’articolazione della monarchia spagnola e del suo dominio in Italia. In Violenza e amministrazione della giustizia nella Repubblica di Venezia (XVI-XVIII): riletture e nuovi ambiti di ricerca, (coord. Andrew Vidali, Umberto Cecchinato, Marco Romio, Marija Andrić) si tenta di leggere il profilo del patriziato veneziano fra la sconfitta di Agnadello (1509) e la riforma del Consiglio dei X (1582) attraverso categorie quali il conflitto, la fai- Massimo Galtarossa da e la vendetta (Andrew Vidali). I conflitti delle comunità di terraferma vengono studiati attraverso il prisma del ballo e delle feste avvalendosi di fonti processuali e normative. Spostandoci fino al XVII secolo nello Stato da Mar le pratiche di pacificazione fra Venezia e l’Impero ottomano sono analizzate lungo il nuovo confine montenegrino le cui tensioni frontaliere erano acuite dalla presenza della zona strategica delle bocche del Cattaro (Marco Romio). I processi di una magistratura con competenze commerciali come i V Savi alla mercanzia consentono infine di esplorare la parabola della presenza turca a Venezia nel secondo Settecento (Marija Andrić). Per concludere può essere utile compiere alcune riflessioni generali in termini di vuoti e pieni, cioè quello che cambia nell’universo delle proposte dei panel, anche avvalendosi come termine di confronto dell’esperienza del seminario giovani Sisem di Verona del 2012. Alcune tematiche che forse in futuro potranno essere riprese sono: il lavoro corporato, l’ambiente catastrofico e il paesaggio rurale, l’Italia delle corti e l’Europa. Può essere inoltre utile chiedersi qual’è la situazione della Storia moderna praticata dai giovani in città sedi universitarie come Udine, o regioni come la Sardegna, che pur erano presenti con dei panel al seminario scaligero. Spunti per proseguire il discorso sull’interdisciplinarietà non mancano perché si può citare il rapporto fra storia e teatro a Napoli presentato nel 2012. A dire il vero occorre infine, come afferma Mascilli Migliorini, saper ascoltare perché se la Public history in prima impressione sembra assente dagli abstracts degli interventi appare chiaro che una relazione come la geografia della colonne “infami”, presenti nei comuni italiani, si inserisce bene in questo indirizzo storiografico. Massimo Galtarossa Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Recensioni Citation: F. Abbri (2019) Corinna Guerra, Lavoisier e Parthenope. Contributo ad una storia della chimica del Regno di Napoli. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 165-167. doi: 10.13128/ ds-25449 Copyright: © 2019 F. Abbri. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. Corinna Guerra, Lavoisier e Parthenope. Contributo ad una storia della chimica del Regno di Napoli, Prefazione di Renata De Lorenzo, Introduzione di Maurizio Torrini, Società Napoletana di Storia Patria, Napoli 2017, (Società Napoletana di Storia Patria. Biblioteca Storica Meridionale. Saggi 3), v + 391 pp. La diffusione della chimica antiflogistica di Lavoisier nei vari contesti politici europei rappresenta da tempo un argomento di innegabile importanza nelle ricostruzioni delle percezioni storiche e del destino della rivoluzione chimica tra la fine del Settecento e gli inizi dell’Ottocento. Il rilievo storiografico e epistemologico dell’affermazione della chimica di Lavoisier è legato a molteplici fattori: studio dei modelli di mutamento paradigmatico nella scienza, illustrazione delle diverse modalità di resistenza e accettazione di una teoria nuova, i legami tra una scienza come la chimica, di innegabile impatto sociale e tecnologico, e le vicende politiche del tardo Settecento. Giova ricordare che nel corso dell’Ottocento e del primo Novecento, grazie al radicamento istituzionale di chimici professionisti, sostenitori di idee specifiche di scienza nazionale in contrapposizione al cosmopolitismo settecentesco, molte discussioni hanno fatto ricorso alla figura di Lavoisier e alla visione ideologica della chimica moderna come “scienza francese”. Nelle controversie sul significato e sulla reale portata rivoluzionaria dell’opera di Lavoisier – continuisti e discontinuisti si sono a lungo fronteggiati nella ricerca di una definizione storicamente convincente della chimica nell’età dei Lumi – il ricorso ad episodi rintracciabili in specifici contesti culturali e linguistici è stato utile per afferrare l’impatto effettivo della coterie antiflogistica e per cercare di mettere in crisi l’immagine tradizionale della rivoluzione chimica come affaire anglo-francese. Lo sguardo dello storico della chimica del Settecento si è progressivamente allargato verso zone considerate un tempo periferiche e la stessa contrapposizione di centro e periferia – che pure possiede una qualche utilità metodologica per ricostruire il destino di una scienza ‘anomala’ come la chimica – è diventata assai problematica. Lo sviluppo di una moderna storiografia della scienza nei paesi iberici, nell’Europa dell’est, in Italia ha favorito l’attenzione verso zone linguistiche e culturali un tempo ignorate o trascurate. È innegabile che lo studio della penetrazione delle idee di Lavoisier in Spagna, ad esempio, sia utile per comprendere vicende interne alla scienza spagnola ma anche per definire il significato complessivo della rivoluzione chimica. In anni ormai lontani ho dedicato ricerche e studi alla diffusione della teoria di Lavoisier in Europa cercando di offrire un quadro un po’ più mosso, rispetto a quello tradizionale, della realtà scientifica europea nel quale si verificarono accese discussioni sulle proposte lavoisieriane. Com’è noto, ogni contesto politico offre motivi di riflessione sulle dinamiche di ricezione di una teoria scientifica innovativa: resistenze, adesioni più o meno entusiasti- Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 165-167 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25449 166 che, atteggiamenti di indifferenza o improntati a qualche forma di strumentalismo utilitaristico sono rintracciabili nell’Europa di tardo Settecento e ad esempio i vari stati tedeschi compongono un panorama di grande vivacità, anche alla luce del formidabile destino che la chimica era destinata ad avere nella Germania dell’Ottocento. In quegli anni ho rivolto l’attenzione agli antichi Stati italiani seguendo un progetto su Lavoisier e l’Italia che mi apparve subito assai complesso data la necessità, prima di poter delineare un quadro generale, di indagare i vari contesti regionali a partire da ricerche su fonti inedite e primarie. Divenni subito consapevole che una storia della chimica italiana nell’età dei Lumi era tutta da scrivere. Colleghi di storia della cultura scientifica continuavano a lavorare su contesti specifici – si pensi agli studi di Virgilio Giormani e di Angelo Bassani sulla chimica in Veneto – mentre le mie ricerche volevano essere solo sondaggi, case studies relativi a ambiti regionali con un inevitabile privilegiamento anche per ragioni pratiche, ossia l’accesso alle fonti, della chimica in Toscana. Alcuni scavi sulla cultura meridionale e in particolare sull’edizione napoletana del Traité élémentaire de chimie di Lavoisier (1789; edizione napoletana 1791), mi avevano fatto comprendere che il Regno di Napoli meritava una studio dettagliato in grado di delineare un quadro assai ricco di interazioni tra potere, istituzioni scientifiche, ricerche naturalistiche e indagini chimiche. Ricerche successive sul destino di Linneo in Italia mi avevano fatto approdare di nuovo a Napoli come centro fondamentale di diffusione delle teorie linneane. La tarda fondazione a Napoli di una Accademia reale delle scienze (1779) non doveva dunque trarre in inganno rispetto alla vivacità di un contesto come quello napoletano sul quale le vicende storiche dei riformatori e quelle della filosofia avevano da tempo fornito indicazioni di indubbio rilievo. Nel 2002 Raffaella Seligardi pubblicò la sua monografia su Lavoisier in Italia ma l’autrice riconosceva esplicitamente che la sua ricostruzione si muoveva nell’area geografica del Nord Italia, tra Torino e Bologna e che il meridione costituiva ancora un contesto non indagato. Il volume di Corinna Guerra scaturito dal dottorato barese di storia della scienza che qui si segnala giunge a colmare una vera e propria lacuna perché ci consegna la prima documentata ricostruzione dello stato della chimica nel Regno di Napoli e del destino della teoria di Lavoisier in questo contesto. Nella sua Introduzione al volume Maurizio Torrini sottolinea giustamente la novità del saggio di Corinna Guerra che fornisce un quadro in grado di mostrare che la scienza napoletana, le scienze del Mezzogiorno sembrano reggere per tutto il Settecento il confronto con la cultura europea. Lavoisier a Napoli non è solo un capitolo della storia italiana della Ferdinando Abbri chimica e della diffusione in Italia delle teorie francesi ma serve a mostrare gli sforzi di uno specifico contesto storico-culturale per mantenersi in sintonia con gli sviluppi della migliore scienza europea. È subito da dire che Guerra ha fatto largamente ricorso a fonti inedite, trascurate o ignote conservate in archivi e biblioteche italiane e questa attenzione alle fonti primarie, unita ad una solida consapevolezza storiografica – testimoniata dai Prolegomeni ad ogni futura storia della chimica che si presenterà come italiana che aprono il volume – le hanno consentito di delineare una storia della chimica nel Meridione d’Italia attenta a grandi temi ma anche ad aspetti all’apparenza marginali che consentono però di mettere a fuoco le varie tonalità del dibattito scientifico meridionale. Conviene ricordare che i fenomeni vulcanici, i Campi Flegrei erano da tempo oggetto di attenzione da parte dei naturalisti locali ma anche dei viaggiatori naturalisti europei e la scoperta dell’attività chimica dell’aria, quindi dei diversi tipi di aria o gas, aveva rafforzato l’immagine del territorio napoletano come grande laboratorio chimico all’aperto. Il primo capitolo del volume è dedicato alla impresa di Gaetano Maria La Pira e Luigi Parisi che nel gennaio del 1791 pubblicarono a Napoli la prima traduzione in italiano del Traité di Lavoisier per uso del Real Corpo degli Artiglieri, ossia per l’istruzione degli allievi presso la Reale Accademia Militare detta la Nunziatella. In questo capitolo vengono messe in luce le motivazioni della traduzione, i suoi caratteri e i rapporti con la più fortunata e posteriore traduzione del farmacista veneziano Vincenzo Dandolo, ma vengono anche chiariti i legami tra istruzione chimica ed esercito. Siamo abituati a collocare lo sviluppo della chimica in relazione all’esercito nel Piemonte settecentesco ma Corinna Guerra dimostra che una attitudine di politica scientifica del tutto simile è rintracciabile a Napoli grazie anche alla nuova chimica. Il governo napoletano inviò all’estero giovani ufficiali per l’istruzione mineralogica che ritornarono a Napoli con le nuove proposte scientifiche. Viaggi di istruzione e ricerca vennero condotti in molte zone dell’Europa – è probabile che il modello fosse quello dei naturalisti svedesi del Bergkollegium di Stoccolma – furono garantiti a sei giovani naturalisti, i più famosi dei quali sono Andrea Savaresi e Matteo Tondi, che contribuirono alla affermazione della “nuova chimica”. I due capitoli successivi del volume sono infatti dedicati proprio a Savaresi e a Tondi, mentre i restanti capitoli hanno per oggetto figure di primo piano della chimica meridionale come Nicola Andria, ‘il tormentato’, o Saverio Macrì, ‘l’indeciso’. Il quinto capitolo su Giuseppe Vairo, ovvero ‘l’Introduttore’, assume una particolare importanza dato il ruolo che Vairo ha svolto nell’istituire l’in- Corinna Guerra, Lavoisier e Parthenope. Contributo ad una storia della chimica del Regno di Napoli segnamento e la pratica chimica. Per molto tempo Vairo è stato solo un nome mentre ora abbiamo un quadro preciso delle sue attività di chimico, ossia di colui che mostrò, pur tra difficoltà e limiti, l’importanza sociale e culturale della chimica. In Appendice, da pagina 276 a pagina 314 Guerra pubblica opere latine di Vairo con traduzione italiana a fronte. La rivoluzione in chimica, espressione usata dallo stesso Lavoisier, assunse un impatto ancora maggiore a ragione delle vicende politiche del tempo: la nuova teoria e la nuova nomenclatura furono percepite in alcuni contesti come espressioni di giacobinismo scientifico. Corinna Guerra conclude opportunamente il volume con un capitolo dedicato a due citoyens chimistes, ossia Carlo Lauberg e Annibale Giordano, e proprio nell’Accademia di chimica di Lauberg, presso la sua abitazione, «scienza chimica e rivoluzione si fusero a Napoli» (p. 234). Il saggio di Corinna Guerra – che è corredato da importanti Appendici documentarie – ricostruisce molti aspetti sulla chimica nel Meridione d’Italia che varrebbe la pena di ricordare, ma qui è sufficiente concludere che siamo in presenza di un contributo originale su un contesto scientifico di innegabile rilievo storico e sul quale, nella prospettiva della storia delle idee e delle pratiche chimiche, prima della comparsa di questo volume le conoscenze erano poche e talora imprecise. Ferdinando Abbri 167 Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Recensioni Citation: G. Piaia (2019) Antonio Conti, Dialoghi filosofici. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 169-170. doi: 10.13128/ ds-25450 Copyright: © 2019 G. Piaia. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. Antonio Conti, Dialoghi filosofici, Edizione critica e commento a cura di Romana Bassi e Renzo Rabboni, Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, Venezia, 2018, lviii + 247 pp. L’attenzione sull’abate padovano Antonio Conti (1677-1749), figura emblematica della République des lettres del primo Settecento, assiduo viaggiatore che ebbe rapporti con i maggiori intellettuali del suo tempo, fu richiamata mezzo secolo fa da Nicola Badaloni con la monografia Antonio Conti. Un abate libero pensatore fra Newton e Voltaire (Milano 1968), cui seguì nel 1972 la pubblicazione degli Scritti filosofici del Conti, a cura dello stesso Badaloni. Nel 2009 apparve a Padova la raccolta di studi Antonio Conti. Uno scienziato nella République des lettres, a cura di Guido Baldassarri, Silvia Contarini e Francesca Fedi, che conteneva anche un contributo di Renzo Rabboni dal titolo Per l’edizione dei Dialoghi filosofici. Quello che era solo un progetto si è ora realizzato grazie all’impegno dello stesso Rabboni (che oltre ad aver curato l’edizione critica ha steso una «Introduzione» sulla genesi e l’elaborazione dell’opera [pp. ix-xxxvi], nonché la «Tavola delle sigle e delle abbreviazioni» [pp. xxxvii-xxxix] e l’accuratissima «Nota al testo» [pp. xlilviii]) e di Romana Bassi, studiosa del pensiero filosofico-scientifico del SeiSettecento, cui si deve l’ampio e puntuale «Commento» (pp. 159-235). Conversazione fra la Marchesa di Nefelo Filosofessa Francese e Nonnio Attico Associato all’Istituto di Bologna: così suona il sottotitolo di questi Dialoghi filosofici, che ci sono pervenuti tramite il ms. Manin 1306 della Biblioteca Civica «Vincenzo Joppi» di Udine. Il testo è incompleto, perché comprende solo quattro dei previsti sette dialoghi: la morte improvvisa per apoplessia impedì infatti all’autore di portare a compimento l’opera, di cui però, a detta sua, egli aveva già iniziato una prima stesura in lingua francese già negli anni venti. Ciò fa supporre a Rabboni che, «almeno a livello di concezione», l’abate Conti si possa considerare un «antesignano, nella nostra letteratura, del genere della divulgazione filosofico-scientifica e, insieme, della civile conversazione» (p. xi), con riferimento, ovviamente, alla celebre opera Il Newtonianismo per le Dame di Francesco Algarotti, apparsa in prima edizione nel 1737. Al riguardo va sottolineata la decisa presa di posizione del Conti in senso “femminista” verso quest’opera dell’Algarotti e verso i celeberrimi Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes (1686) del Fontenelle. A queste opere egli rimprovera d’essersi limitate a una passiva divulgazione: troppo poco rispetto alle capacità intellettuali del gentil sesso, una volta ch’esso sia fornito di un’istruzione pari a quella riservata al sesso maschile V’è di più in fatto di femminismo: nell’ultimo dei sette dialoghi programmati l’abate Conti si proponeva (seriamente o ironicamente?) di «provare che le donne furono l’arbitre e le signore di tutta la terra» (p. 26). Ma veniamo alla struttura e al contenuto dei Dialoghi filosofici, che si aprono con la dedica (pp. 3-5) all’allora duca di Savoia Vittorio Amedeo Maria (il futuro Vittorio Amedeo III, re di Sardegna), in cui il Conti, sulla scia di Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 169-170 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25450 170 un Orazio riletto in chiave illuministica, dichiara il suo intento di fare «ridere da filosofo» per contrastare il «ridicolo risibile» dei sistemi di pensiero frutto dei «pregiudici» e della «strane fantasie de’ filosofi» (p. 3; vedi anche p. 24, ove la «derisione […] accompagnata da facezie non mordaci» è indicata come «il miglior rimedio contra l’entusiasmo»). La posizione filosofica dell’autore, che già traspare da queste parole, è illustrata nell’ampio avviso «Ai lettori» (pp. 7-26), ispirato a un aperto scetticismo nei riguardi della metafisica. Dopo aver ripercorso brevemente «l’origine e il progresso della filosofia sperimentale» a partire da Bacone e Galileo fino a Newton, il Conti distingue infatti, con tono deciso, tre tipi di filosofia. Anzitutto la «sperimentale», che unisce l’osservazione e l’esperimento alla matematica e che, «considerata in se stessa, non è soggetta né a contese né a littiggi, manifesta i veri segreti della natura, perfeziona l’arti e le scienze utili alla società, che vuol dire ai comodi e alle delizie della vita» (p. 13). Ma non sempre è possibile cogliere mediante l’esperienza e la dimostrazione «la ragion sufficiente de’ fenomeni», per cui è giocoforza ricorrere a supposizioni e procedere per tentativi e successive correzioni, e qui si delineano altri due modi di far filosofia: vi è la filosofia «congetturale», che ha pur sempre i fatti come oggetto , ma «oscuri» e poco certi, e che fu praticata da Newton; e vi è la filosofia «ipotetica» che degenera alfine in «romancesca» (un’eco dell’esprit romanesque denunciato da Voltaire) perché fondata su «ipotesi arbitrarie» e alla quale cedette lo stesso Newton quando fece sua la visione dello spazio di Henry More, contravvenendo al suo principio «Hypotheses non fingo» (pp. 14-16). In quest’ultima rientrano i moderni sistemi metafisici da Descartes fino a Leibniz. Infatti Descartes «non si contentò d’avere tanto promossa l’Analisi geometrica e la Filosofia conghietturale, ma s’abbandonò alla vivacità della propria immaginazione, e diede ne’ sogni e nella follie de’ poeti» (pp. 19-20). È muovendo da questa posizione teorica, maturata dopo aver messo da parte la giovanile adesione al pensiero leibniziano, che il Conti progetta sette «conversazioni» che hanno come tema principale la «stravagante» e «assurda» tesi (trattata in particolare da Christiaan Huygens nel Cosmotheoros [1698]) che i corpi celesti siano abitati. Ma questi dialoghi offrono anche lo spunto per una fitta serie di riferimenti alle più svariate teorie filosofiche e scientifiche del tempo, nonché agli strumenti scientifici di cui allora si disponeva, compresa la costruzione di automi. Quattro sono i protagonisti dei dialoghi, ambientati in terra di Francia: anzitutto due “filosofesse”, fanatiche seguaci rispettivamente di Descartes e di Leibniz. La prima è la marchesa di Nefelo (dal greco “nuvola”, perché «la sua testa è affatto nuvolosa o piena di fantasmi disordinati come le nubi»), l’altra è la contessa di Filolero, cioè amante di frivo- Gregorio Piaia lezze, come, per l’appunto, le monadi leibniziane (p. 25). Vi è poi il precettore delle due dame, Arcilerone (= «maestro di fandonie»), che propina alle allieve una fantasiosa mistura di filosofia antica e moderna, occidentale e orientale, da Ermete Trismegisto e Zoroastro fino a Newton, e che sembra una caricatura di Leibniz nonché di Fontenelle; e v’è infine un «Associato all’Istituto di Bologna», di nome Nonnio Attico, che funge da portavoce dell’autore. Quanto allo stile adottato dal Conti, nell’«Introduzione» si rileva come esso non ceda alla ricerca dell’ornato e non tema (a differenza dell’Algarotti) di risultare troppo tecnico o scientifico. Significativo, al riguardo, è il richiamo a una lettera inviata nel giugno 1716 dal Conti al Muratori, in cui si prende posizione contro le frasi troppo lunghe e ampollose e contro l’uso di parole «antiche e rancide», per richiamarsi invece al modello offerto dalle «lettere di Pico, di Ficino, di Sperone, del Tasso, e d’altri autori italiani de’ buoni secoli tanto lontani dalle smorfie, e dalle gonfiezze dello stile ultimamente introdotte» (p. xxxvi). Nel Conti la critica alle esagerazioni barocche non esclude però il ricorso ‒ per altro assai frequente nella sua produzione letteraria ‒ a sogni e visioni metaforiche per far meglio comprendere ai lettori i termini esatti del dibattito scientifico. Si veda, ad esempio, il «Sogno dell’autore» posto all’inizio della «Conversazione terza»: in un verde prato, che è attraversato da ruscelli confluenti in un lago e che si chiude con un verde anfiteatro, ecco comparire Malebranche e Leibniz che illustrano il movimento del Sole e della Luna lanciando su un drappo steso a terra «certe piccole palle d’avorio e di creta»; poi Descartes e Malebranche, che meditano sui grandi e piccoli vortici prodotti dalle pietre lanciate nel lago. Infine ecco Newton e Leibniz che, saliti nell’anfiteatro su due «banchi simili a quelli che nella piazzetta di San Marco [a Venezia] s’erigono nel carnevale», si fronteggiano opponendo la filosofia sperimentale alla metafisica: «Montò il Newtono su un banco, e tratta fuori di saccoccia una palla dorata ed un’altra di piombo, dicea: “La prima palla rappresenta il sole e l’altra Saturno: osservate come nel vuoto si traggono senza miracolo; non bisogna ascoltar la metafisica non più verace dell’astrologia”. Dal banco opposto rispondea con grand’urlo il Leibnizio: “Signori, non badate all’inglese: egli vi vuol far credere ciò che immagina; nulla v’è in natura senza ragion sufficiente, e non altro che la metafisica o la scienza delle cose astratte può dimostrarlo”. Mormoravano fra loro in termini bicornuti alcuni uomini gravi in veste lunga e cogli occhiali sul naso» (pp. 89-90). Per l’abate Conti letteratura e scienza devono dunque interagire, in vista di un obiettivo comune che bene esprime la temperie illuministica: il progresso delle «arti e scienze utili alla società». Gregorio Piaia Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Recensioni Andrea Addobbati, Facchinerie. Immigrati bergamaschi, valtellinesi e svizzeri nel porto di Livorno (1602-1847), Edizioni ETS, Pisa 2018, 199 pp. Citation: L. Piccinno (2019) Andrea Addobbati, Facchinerie. Immigrati bergamaschi, valtellinesi e svizzeri nel porto di Livorno (1602-1847). Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 171-173. doi: 10.13128/ds-25451 Copyright: © 2019 L. Piccinno. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. L’immigrazione, le dinamiche e le problematiche che caratterizzano l’integrazione dei lavoratori stranieri nel tessuto economico e sociale del paese di accoglienza sono temi di grandi attualità e, di conseguenza, oggetto di numerosi dibattiti all’interno dei quali la componente storica di tale fenomeno viene frequentemente menzionata. Non di rado, infatti, le attuali fragilità del mondo globalizzato di fronte al fenomeno migratorio vengono messe a confronto con vicende ormai lontane nel tempo, quali l’emigrazione ottocentesca verso le Americhe, o quella più tardiva verso il Nord Italia o il Nord Europa. Con riferimento al contesto italiano, fin dal Medioevo l’area alpina fornisce forza lavoro alle economie urbane di pianura e, in special modo, alle città portuali, dove viene generalmente impiegata nel trasporto delle merci in ambito doganale: infatti, è questo il caso dei camalli del porto di Genova, dei bastagi dei fondaci veneziani, così come dei facchini addetti alla dogana di Pisa. Sono le avanguardie di un movimento migratorio che si intensificherà nel corso dell’età moderna, secondo dinamiche e con ripercussioni sotto il profilo sia economico che sociale meritevoli di un’analisi approfondita. A partire dagli ultimi decenni del XVI secolo, questi gruppi di lavoratori forestieri, già attivi presso gli snodi doganali e quindi in aree strategicamente rilevanti, vedono estendersi il loro ambito operativo alle neo costituite aree sottoposte a regime di portofranco. Essi operano in tali spazi grazie alla concessione di un privilegio esclusivo da parte delle autorità competenti, le quali intendono ridurre il rischio di frodi nel pagamento dei dazi e di altre pratiche collusive affidandosi a manodopera straniera piuttosto che alle maestranze locali, ritenute più facilmente corruttibili. Generalmente, a fronte della concessione del suddetto privilegio, i facchini forestieri costituiscono una compagnia privilegiata, che prende il nome di Caravana o Carovana, la quale rappresenta il soggetto giuridico con il quale si devono rapportare le autorità in occasione del rinnovo dei contratti di ingaggio, i mercanti destinatari dei carichi, e, più in generale, tutti coloro che a vario titolo hanno interessi di natura economia nel commercio marittimo. Obiettivo primario del lavoro di Addobbati è quello di focalizzare l’attenzione su un caso fino ad oggi poco studiato, rappresentato dall’immigrazione di maestranze provenienti dalle vallate alpine che vengono impiegate come facchini nel porto di Livorno fra il 1602 e il 1847. L’analisi di questo fenomeno viene affrontata dall’autore secondo un’ottica innovativa, ovvero incrociando il punto di vista degli emigranti con quello delle comunità che li accolgono, tenendo altresì nella dovuta considerazione il peso delle relazioni sociali che si instaurano tra le due componenti e l’importanza che esse assumono nel guidare le scelte di politica economica delle autorità locali. Sotto il profilo delle fonti utilizzate, il lavoro si basa sullo studio sia della Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 171-173 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25451 172 documentazione conservata presso gli archivi toscani, in merito alla quale l’autore sottolinea la ricchezza delle informazioni in essa contenute ma anche l’immagine “distorta” che ne deriva, trattandosi prevalentemente di atti amministrativi, sia del materiale inedito reperito attraverso una meticolosa e complessa ricerca presso gli archivi delle comunità montane di provenienza delle maestranze in oggetto. “È stato come sbirciare dietro le quinte del teatro dei pupi” (p. 9) afferma Addobbati, ma solo attraverso questo tipo di indagine è stato possibile riconsiderare tutta la vicenda secondo una prospettiva nuova, apportando quindi i dovuti correttivi a quanto fino ad oggi sostenuto dalla storiografia tradizionale. Era necessario infatti indagare quali fossero stati i presupposti che avevano dato origine al fenomeno migratorio in oggetto e quali le conseguenze sulle rispettive comunità di provenienza, non accontentandosi quindi di prendere per buona la tradizionale e sbrigativa spiegazione della ricerca di occasioni di impiego che la terra nativa non era in grado di offrire. La retribuzione del facchino non costituiva infatti la base per la sussistenza del suo nucleo familiare, ma una fonte integrativa di reddito che aumentava la sua capacità di spesa e conferiva stabilità all’intera comunità di provenienza. L’economia montana era infatti certamente povera, ma comunque in grado di garantire la sussistenza dei propri abitanti: emigrare verso le città portuali era quindi frutto di una scelta ben precisa al fine di migliorare la propria condizione economica e non una necessità. Il volume, suddiviso in quattro capitoli, si apre con un inquadramento generale del contesto territoriale nel quale si inserisce l’attività dei circa 50 facchini provenienti da Urgnano nella Bassa Bergamasca e da Albaredo San Marco in Valtellina , che, già attivi in epoca tardomedievale presso la Dogana di Pisa, a partire dal 1565 cominciano ad essere impiegati per le operazioni di carico e scarico nel nuovo porto di Livorno. Essi si inseriscono quindi nel tessuto sociale di una città cosmopolita, che, per una precisa politica demografica, attira forza lavoro dai quattro angoli della terra e nella quale la convivenza fra culture e religioni differenti è all’insegna della reciproca tolleranza. L’elemento peculiare che caratterizza l’attività di questo gruppo di lavoratori risulta determinato dai privilegi che vengono loro concessi dalle autorità locali e dalle conseguenti frizioni che ne derivano con le maestranze locali, i cosiddetti “monelli”. Inoltre, la neo costituita compagnia, o meglio “Carovana” livornese, nata nel 1602 per distaccamento di un gruppo di facchini dalla già esistente compagnia della Dogana di Pisa, è fin da subito al centro di un aspro conflitto con le maestranze rimaste ad operare proprio presso la sede di Pisa, fino a quel momento centro direzionale dei Luisa Piccinno traffici marittimi dell’area toscana. I facchini rimasti a Pisa si sentivano infatti defraudati dai probabili futuri proventi derivanti dallo sviluppo dei traffici facenti capo allo scalo di Livorno, a fronte di una progressiva perdita di importanza (evidenziata dalla crisi sia sotto il profilo demografico che commerciale) della città della torre pendente. Come sapientemente sottolineato dall’autore, le questioni più rilevanti che emergono in un contesto di forte conflittualità sono tre. Innanzi tutto, l’accanita rivalità con i facchini di Pisa è segno inequivocabile di come fosse all’epoca appetibile l’impiego presso la dogana livornese, a sua volta oggetto di lotte intestine tra bergamaschi e valtellinesi per la spartizione dei posti disponibili. Secondariamente, la spartizione di tale privilegio fra queste due comunità montane risiede probabilmente nell’intento di far sì che esse si controllassero a vicenda, al fine di limitare per l’erario il rischio di concussioni e frodi. Infine, questa divisione interna è presumibilmente causa di un’altra particolarità che caratterizza la compagnia livornese, specialmente se paragonata ad esempio alla omologa “Caravana” bergamasca operante nel porto di Genova. A differenza di quest’ultima, infatti, che, oltre ad essere interamente composta da maestranze provenienti dalla Val Brembana, vede la sua attività strettamente regolamentata da norme scritte di antica emanazione (il primo Statuto risale addirittura al 1340), la compagnia livornese sembra avere operato nell’intero corso della sua storia in assenza di un vero e proprio Statuto. Non a caso, quando intorno alla metà dell’Ottocento si innesca una dura battaglia legale per abolire i privilegi assegnati alla compagnia, uno degli argomenti utilizzati per colpirla è dato proprio dalla mancanza di un corpus di leggi scritte tale da darle dignità di associazione formalmente costituita, rendendola piuttosto simile ad un semplice gruppo di persone “tenute insieme da un privilegio”. Il problema è ancora più rilevante sotto il profilo della trasmissibilità ed ereditarietà del posto di lavoro, anche perché il privilegio loro concesso nel 1602 non li aveva in realtà vincolati come singoli individui ma in quanto parte di un «corpo politico, allora costituito e nel quale erano ricompresi i loro ‘eredi e successori in perpetuo’» (p. 31). L’analisi prosegue con un focus su quello che viene definito il “modello alpino dell’emigrazione” e sulle dinamiche che caratterizzano i rapporti tra i lavoratori emigrati e le comunità di provenienza, senza tralasciare di affrontare un tema sul quale ancora non si riesce a fare completamente luce in base alle fonti disponibili, ovvero gli avvicendamenti e la trasmissibilità per via ereditaria o compravendita del posto di lavoro (cap. 2). Infine, l’ultima parte del volume (cap. 3, intitolato La Compagnia e le Carovane, e cap. 4 su L’assalto alla pri- Andrea Addobbati, Facchinerie. Immigrati bergamaschi, valtellinesi e svizzeri nel porto di Livorno (1602-1847) vativa dei “Bergamaschi”) ripercorre i mutamenti intervenuti nell’andamento del traffico facente capo allo scalo livornese in seguito all’occupazione francese alla fine del XVIII secolo e la conseguente crisi del lavoro portuale, che contribuisce ad acuire le lotte tra maestranze locali e facchini della Compagnia, il cui privilegio viene messo fortemente in discussione e comincia progressivamente ad erodersi. La situazione non muta negli anni della Restaurazione, anche sotto la spinta di nuovi movimenti di stampo liberista e antistatalista, per i quali l’abolizione della privativa era al centro di una battaglia ideologica. L’epilogo della vicenda arriva nell’ottobre del 1847, quando i nuovi regolamenti emanati in materia di facchinaggio sanciscono il tanto atteso passaggio di consegne tra facchini “bergamaschi” e facchini livornesi, atto che decreta la fine dell’esistenza della Compagnia. In questo lavoro l’autore è riuscito ad affrontare in maniera innovativa un tema complesso, coniugando l’analisi degli eventi storici che caratterizzano questa vicenda con considerazioni più prettamente antropologiche e sociali legate alle caratteristiche intrinseche della classe lavoratrice dei facchini, sottolineando altresì i tratti distintivi dei forestieri provenienti dalle vallate alpine rispetto alle maestranze locali. Egli segnala inoltre tutta una serie di quesiti che ancora restano in attesa di una risposta e sottolinea possibili futuri percorsi di ricerca su tale tematica., tra cui il vasto e complesso tema del percorso di maturazione politica e culturale seguito dal mondo del facchinaggio nel periodo intercorso tra la fine dell’Ancien Régime e l’Ottocento post rivoluzionario. Luisa Piccinno 173 Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Recensioni Citation: E. Alfano (2019) Carlo Borghero, Interpretazioni, categorie, finzioni: narrare la storia della filosofia. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4: 175-178. doi: 10.13128/ds-25452 Copyright: © 2019 E. Alfano. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. Carlo Borghero, Interpretazioni, categorie, finzioni: narrare la storia della filosofia, Le Lettere, Firenze 2017 (Giornale critico della filosofia italiana. Quaderni, 35), XXXVII + 534 pp. Le Lettres philosophiques (1734) di Voltaire possono essere annoverate tra le prime narrazioni che furono scritte sulla storia della filosofia moderna. Come ricorda Carlo Borghero in questo volume che narra, invece, la storia della storiografia della filosofia moderna, Voltaire individuò l’origine della nuova filosofia nel pensiero britannico. Gli elementi della filosofia moderna risiedono dunque a suo modo di vedere nella «Physique expérimentales» di Bacone, nell’osservazione «méthodique» e «géomètre» dell’uomo di Locke e, infine, nella scienza filosofica ma altresì filosofia scientifica di Newton. È a Bacone, non a Descartes, che di fatto Voltaire attribuì il merito di aver rovesciato per primo la filosofia e il linguaggio della Scolastica – riconosciuto universalmente come il criterio critico e antitetico fondamentale del pensiero e della cultura moderna. Talché, stando a Voltaire, sembra che le fonti alle quali attingono i Philosophes du Siècle, ossia gli attori di questa modernità, siano state scelte tra le opere in cui venivano confutate le dottrine cartesiane. In effetti, se da un canto Locke dimostrò l’inesistenza delle idee innate e si oppose al dualismo delle sostanze criticando la contrapposizione tra pensiero e materia; dal canto suo, con le sue importanti scoperte sull’attrazione e la gravità, Newton smantellò l’‘inverosimile’ fisica dei tourbillons ipotizzata da Descartes. Ciò nondimeno, fa notare l’autore, l’intento di Voltaire fu quello di «rivendicare il ruolo storico di Descartes». Lungi dal demolirne la figura, il padre del Candide considerò il pensatore del dubbio iperbolico un «philosophe, combattente intrepido per i diritti della verità e della ragione, nemico della filosofia bugiarda della Scuola come dei pregiudizi e delle superstizioni del volgo» (p. 160). Tale interpretazione volteriana veicolò «un’immagine filosofica» del Descartes ‘scopritore’ di nuove terre che è stata ripresa dalla filosofia della storia di Hegel. Come ricorda Borghero, il filosofo tedesco celebrò in Descartes il ‘Colombo’ della soggettività. Nella Fenomenologia dello spirito (1807), nella misura in cui fungono da motore di un ‘ingranaggio’ dialettico, com’è noto, Descartes e l’Illuminismo rivestono una funzione storica. Difatti, è la soggettività giunta all’autoconsapevolezza (processo avviato appunto dai Lumi) e liberata dall’empirismo ad essere teleologicamente approdata all’idealismo. Oggi risultano ormai del tutto superati sia lo schema filobritannico volteriano, che venne ripreso dagli studi storiografici del primo Novecento, sia l’interpretazione hegeliana del Settecento ‘cartesiano’, che si diffuse nell’idealismo sino a Croce e al binomio Adorno-Horkheimer. Borghero dimostra in che misura questa interpretazione considerò la cultura ‘intellettualistica’ dell’Illuminismo come una sorta di «stimolo negativo» funzionale soltanto ad un superamento dialettico di ordine storico-filosofico, ma altresì politico- Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 175-178 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25452 176 sociale. Dopo aver dato origine a potenti ed influenti tradizioni storiografiche, entrambi questi modelli o filoni interpretativi devono essere riposti, per usare un’espressione di Carlo Borghero, nell’‘armadio’ accanto agli altri «abiti storiografici passati irrimediabilmente di moda». Come evidenzia il leitmotiv che percorre il volume, la pluralità e l’interdisciplinarietà della discussione storiografica più recente (messa in luce attraverso le numerose e ricche indicazioni bibliografiche dell’autore) tende a mettere in discussione la «compattezza» dell’Illuminismo metodologico, anti-metafisico, dedito alla razionalità e al progresso. D’altro canto, sono in aumento i modernisti che dagli ultimi decenni si adoperano ad attenuare le vecchie fratture tra Seicento e Settecento, tra il secolo dell’erudizione e dei grandi sistemi e quello, invece, della scienza e della sistematicità. Ad esempio, l’autore ricorda il ruolo svolto dalla storiografia filosofica italiana del secondo Novecento. In particolare, menziona l’importante tentativo di Tullio Gregory di penetrare la realtà storica del libertinage érudit. Le sue ricerche sulle biblioteche dei libertini e la circolazione delle opere clandestine hanno dimostrato la stretta connessione fra il naturalismo rinascimentale e il materialismo settecentesco. È proprio sulla scia di questo nuovo orizzonte di ricerca che un convegno internazionale organizzato congiuntamente da CNRS e l’Université Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV), tenutosi presso la Sorbonne dal 14 al 16 giugno del 2001, propose come tema d’indagine la seguente questione continuista: «Un siècle de deux cents ans? XVIIe et XVIIIe siècle: continuité et discontinuité». La categoria stessa dell’Illuminismo è, dunque, sempre più incline a «disintegrarsi», talché Borghero preferisce parlare piuttosto di una storia delle filosofie del Settecento. Del resto, notiamo en passant che questa sua scelta storiografica risulta essere in linea con la stagione delle Lumières, contenente nella sua stessa denominazione francese l’accezione del plurale. Per tornare a Descartes, il suo caso è «esemplare», secondo Carlo Borghero, circa gli «usi storicamente documentabili delle immagini filosofiche di epoche e di autori». (p. XV dell’Introduzione) In effetti, ciò che l’autore intende narrare in questo volume, mediante «una buona dose di scetticismo metodologico» e un felice invito a tornare «alla filologia dei testi», è una vera e propria genealogia delle interpretazioni, categorie e finzioni storiografiche della filosofia moderna. Ma prima di spendere qualche parola sul dibattito squisitamente storiografico che Borghero risolleva in questo volume, a proposito del rapporto tra filosofia e storia, filologia ed ermeneutica e, infine, storia della filosofia e filosofia della storia, consideriamo la composizione del testo. I vari «racconti» sulle storie della filosofia e sulle filosofie del- Eleonora Alfano la storia relative all’età moderna che Carlo Borghero ha elaborato nel corso di anni di ricerca e di didattica (fra gli anni 2000 e 2017), presentati in occasione di convegni e/o editi in diverse riviste o monografie specialistiche, vengono raccolti e trovano una complessiva rivisitazione in questo volume. Il libro si sviluppa in quattro parti principali. Intitolata Eredità libertine, età classica, crisi della coscienza europea, nella prima parte (3-151 pp.) il filosofo romano conduce un’analisi genealogica delle principali categorie storiografiche dell’età moderna (quali razionalismo, cartesianesimo, età classica, libertinismo, crisi della coscienza europea, illuminismo radicale) e di alcune delle loro interpretazioni (quelle, in particolare, di Benedetto Croce, Eugenio Garin, del neoilluminismo e di Tullio Gregory). Sullo sfondo delle riflessioni di Borghero vi è la problematica circa l’esistenza di ‘continuità’ e ‘discontinuità’ nella storia del pensiero europeo tra Cinquecento e Settecento. La seconda parte (155-328 pp.) s’intitola Illuminismi vecchi e nuovi e verte sui seguenti schemi interpretativi dell’Illuminismo. Tra quelli ‘vecchi’, ritroviamo l’interpretazione di Voltaire, le letture Ottocentesche dell’idealismo e della Restaurazione e, infine, le discussioni sorte nel Novecento attorno al concetto di dialettica dell’illuminismo. Mentre tra quelli ‘nuovi’, emerge soprattutto la categoria istituita da M. C. Jacob e J. Israel di illuminismo radicale. Nei due capitoli intermedi della seconda parte dedicati al «processo ai Lumi» – di cui il primo, Il processo ai Lumi dal 1789 al 1848 (207-275 pp.), è inedito – Borghero ricostruisce il complesso e variegato quadro storiografico dell’anti-Illuminismo, anzi, degli ‘anti-illuminismi’. In essi, l’autore porta alla ribalta diverse immagini coniate nel corso degli ultimi due secoli da pensatori critici (come i pensatori romantici, i filosofi idealisti, i promotori della Restaurazione, ecc.) del movimento dei Lumi. Fulcro chiaramente non di «descrizioni neutre» bensì di «strumenti di una battaglia ideologica», tali categorie, pur avendo dato origine a fuorvianti «miraggi» o «fantasmi» storiografici rimasti in auge fino alla metà del secolo scorso, oggi meritano comunque di essere approfondite e ricontestualizzate, secondo l’autore, alla stessa stregua di documenti storici. In Storia della filosofia e bandiere nazionali, ossia la terza parte (331-437 pp.), Borghero mette a fuoco la peculiare e controversa impostazione metodologica dei seguenti ‘militanti’ della filosofia, talora accusati di aver compiuto delle forzature storiografiche. Nel secondo capitolo della terza parte (369-410 pp.) che riguarda la nascita della storia professionale della filosofia in Francia, l’autore si sofferma sulla riforma filosofica attuata da Victor Cousin e sulla natura del suo «lascito». La metodologia storiografica della filosofia eclettica, ‘interessata’ a studiare il passato Carlo Borghero, Interpretazioni, categorie, finzioni: narrare la storia della filosofia per scovarvi delle risposte risolutive alle problematiche del presente, «presuppone a priori una filosofia della storia». In effetti, è Cousin stesso a dichiarare nel discorso di apertura del corso universitario Du vrai, du beau et du bien, pronunciato il 4 dicembre 1817: «Bisogna sapere già qual è la verità, per riconoscerla da qualche parte e distinguerla dall’errore che vi è mescolato […]. Così la filosofia è insieme l’oggetto supremo e la fiaccola della storia della filosofia» (p. 389). L’intrinseca saldatura tra filosofia e politica, l’identità tra filosofia e storia della filosofia nonché la concezione di quest’ultima, da un lato, meramente strumentale e subordinata rispetto alla filosofia speculativa e, dall’altro lato, marcatamente ideologica, raffigurano «i lati ‘impuri’» della filosofia ‘professionalizzata’ di Cousin. Non meno importante è il capitolo seguente, Immagini filosofiche dell’Illuminismo e storia patria (411-437 pp.), in cui Borghero ripercorre le diverse rivalutazioni della filosofia del Settecento apparse sulla scena storiografica italiana a partire dal secondo dopoguerra. Un’altra rivalutazione emblematica è senz’altro rappresentata dal movimento peculiarmente italiano del neoilluminismo. L’immagine filosofica dei Lumi propugnata dai suoi promotori, tutta volta al progresso e alla razionalità, era strettamente congiunta con un programma politico di riforma laica della società e della cultura italiana. La quarta ed ultima parte (441-510 pp.), intitolata Teorie e pratiche della storia della filosofia in Italia e fuori d’Italia, è incentrata in particolar modo sulla figura di Eugenio Garin, uno tra i maggiori storici della filosofia nell’Italia del secondo dopoguerra. Il suo saggio sulla metodologia della storiografia filosofica, La filosofia come sapere storico (1959), va reinserito nel contesto di una discussione italiana risalente a Gentile e a Croce. Al dibattito gentiliano-crociano, cui si oppose Gramsci, rammenta Borghero, si aggiunsero altri studiosi italiani come Viano, Paci, Preti e Dal Pra. Nell’Italia degli anni Cinquanta, alcuni storici della filosofia avvertirono la necessità di riformare l’uso delle categorie storiografiche tipiche dell’hegelianismo (specialmente quelle di unità, precorrimento e superamento) segnando una svolta nel dibattito storiografico italiano. Con il rifiuto anti-idealistico dei «sistemi prefissati», da un lato, e il richiamo critico-filologico a cogliere i pensatori nella loro «concretezza storica», dall’altro, Garin dimostra di aver recepito la lezione dei Quaderni gramsciani sull’identificazione di filosofia e storia. Il «mestiere» dello storico della filosofia nella concezione gariniana consiste, di fatto, in una prassi, «un’opera di ricostruzione, fatta sui documenti nei quali si è depositata la riflessione filosofica» (p. 448), fa notare Borghero. «Narrare» la storia della filosofia significa dunque cogliere le vicende specifiche, concrete, la genesi e i nessi reali delle idee e dei modi del 177 «filosofare». Lo storico della filosofia non deve quindi ricercare a priori una philosophia perennis, neppure deve tentare di individuare i cosiddetti grandi problemi della filosofia, in sé ed immutabili, nell’intento di ritrovarli in un secondo momento negli autori o nelle correnti di pensiero che sono oggetto del suo studio. Per Garin, la filosofia è inevitabilmente un sapere storico nella misura in cui le idee vengono sempre considerate il frutto di un’attività umana presa in un senso globale e, pertanto, storicamente determinata. È proprio in questo clima, in cui si tentò di attuare un distacco storiografico dall’idealismo, che emerse in Italia, ben vent’anni prima, la prefigurazione di due orientamenti metodologici: quello di una «storia storica della filosofia» (come sarà praticata da Henri Gouhier) e quello di una «storia filosofica della filosofia» (come verrà espressa da Martial Gueroult). Si desume dai saggi conclusivi di questo volume che l’approccio storiografico alla filosofia di Garin produsse una sorta di ‘rivoluzione copernicana’. Seppure in maniera diametralmente opposta rispetto al criticismo kantiano, lo storico della filosofia rovesciò, secondo Borghero, «i termini tradizionali del rapporto tra filosofia e storia della filosofia» (p. 458). È infatti «l’oggetto dell’indagine», ovvero l’oggetto storico preso nella sua «irriducibile complessità», a dettare le metodologie, le competenze e gli strumenti di volta in volta richiesti allo storico della filosofia, e non una rappresentazione ideologicamente orientata della filosofia. Alla luce di queste considerazioni sulla tradizione storiografica italiana, Borghero non manca di sottolineare l’«assenza ingombrante» di Eugenio Garin nel dibattito internazionale sui diversi orientamenti metodologici della storia della filosofia. Attraverso le sue ricerche sull’età moderna, l’autore stesso dimostra di aderire a questo indirizzo metodologico. Ed è infatti la ricezione di un tale criticismo storico ad aver indotto Borghero a «coltivare il sospetto» nei confronti delle interpretazioni, categorie e finzioni storiografiche. Pertanto, nel solco della tradizione gariniana, l’autore ha deciso di narrare la storia delle categorie storiografiche filosofiche, ricostruendone la genesi e i mutamenti. È difatti sua «convinzione» che il ruolo dello storico della filosofia consista «nel misurare lo scarto tra i testi e le interpretazioni e che la storiografia contribuisca alla comprensione filosofica dei testi» (p. XI dell’Introduzione). Con la pubblicazione di questa ricca raccolta di 15 saggi (che corrispondono ai 15 capitoli di questo volume), l’autore raggiunge, a nostro modo di vedere, l’obiettivo stabilito, fornendo allo studioso e allo storico della filosofia una mirabile dimostrazione, sia teorica che pratica, della fondatezza del suo approccio criticofilologico alla storia della filosofia. Per la ricchezza dei materiali esaminati, nonché la pluralità delle prospettive 178 Eleonora Alfano adoperate, l’insieme degli esiti ottenuti dalle ricerche sui vari aspetti delle filosofie sei-settecentesche e sulla storia della storiografia filosofica di Carlo Borghero – del quale vorrei ricordare: La certezza e la storia. Cartesianesimo, pirronismo e conoscenza storica (Angeli 1983) e Les Cartésiens face à Newton. Philosophie, science et religion dans la première moitié du XVIIIe siècle (Brepols 2011) – permettono difatti al lettore di toccare con mano tanto l’indeterminatezza, quanto la potenza di alcune immagini filosofiche relative all’età moderna. Eleonora Alfano Firenze University Press http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds Diciot tesimo Secolo Recensioni Citation: V. Lepore (2019) Philosophie et libre pensée = Philosophy and free thought. XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, Textes réunis par Lorenzo Bianchi, Nicole Gengoux et Gianni Paganini. Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 179-182. doi: 10.13128/ds-25453 Copyright: © 2019 V. Lepore. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.net/index.php/ds) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. Philosophie et libre pensée = Philosophy and free thought. XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, Textes réunis par Lorenzo Bianchi, Nicole Gengoux et Gianni Paganini, Honoré Champion, Paris,2 017 (Libre pensée et littérature clandestine, 66), 580 pp. Il volume, composto da trenta saggi, nasce da un doppio colloquio – il primo svoltosi all’ENS di Lione nel 2012, il secondo all’Università L’Orientale di Napoli nel 2013 – come indagine sulle influenze reciproche fra gli esponenti del libero pensiero del Sei e Settecento e i grandi autori coevi. L’apparente polarità fra i grandi filosofi, da una parte, e una schiera residuale e oppositiva di autori minori, dall’altra, evoca un pregiudizio storiografico di fondo che l’intera raccolta intende scardinare. La présentation lo chiarisce; e già a partire dal titolo è evidente lo sforzo di contestualizzare il termine e il sintagma philosophie e libre pensée, nonché di giustificare l’operazione di avvicinamento e compenetrazione dei concetti che essi designano. Libre pensée sussume qui una popolazione eterogenea di liberi pensatori, o libertini, che sono tuttavia assimilabili considerando la comune rivendicazione della libertas philosophandi e l’analogo atteggiamento contro le correnti di pensiero dominanti e a favore di quelle reiette e minoritarie. La sfida del volume è accordare a tali pensatori la «dignité philosophique» (p. 9), da misurare nelle spinte impresse ad alcune conquiste cruciali della filosofia moderna. In contrordine, quindi, a quella tradizione storiografica, in parte già analizzata da Pierre-François Moreau, che li degrada ad autori minori in quanto non responsabili di nessuna concezione strutturata né di opere sistematiche. Ma quando nasce questo pregiudizio? La marginalizzazione dei liberi pensatori – risponde Jean-Pierre Cavaillé (Qu’est-ce qu’un «philosophe libertin» au XVIIe siècle?, pp. 23-37) – risale a una «disjonction […] d’ordre disciplinaire» (p. 25) che a fine XIX secolo li collocò nel campo della storia letteraria, nettamente separato da quello della storia della filosofia. A sua volta, tale disgiunzione risentiva della letteratura antilibertina del Seicento. Gli apologeti ritrassero infatti i libertini come quanto vi fosse di più lontano dalla filosofia come la intendevano loro, ovvero come prisca theologia e ancilla theologiae, e, soprattutto, come postura intellettuale implicante uno stile di vita virtuoso. A partire da questa genesi polemica, Cavaillé ripercorre le variazioni di significato che, da La Mothe Le Vayer a Bayle e da Mersenne a Jakob Thomasius, attraversò il termine ‘libertino’ prima di designare una pratica della filosofia libera, «un usage de la raison [...] non contrainte par la foi et affranchi des autorités», ma non per questo moralmente abietto (p. 32). Quanto al sintagma ‘libero pensiero’, Ann Thomson (Second thoughts on free thought, pp. 511-524) ne ricostruisce lo slittamento semantico subìto nel transfert dall’Inghilterra, dove in Shaftesbury e Anthony Collins esso denotava il diritto al libero esame della religione, alla Francia, dove a libre pensée fu attribuita la cifra irreligiosa. Proprio in ragione Diciottesimo Secolo Vol. 4 (2019): 179-182 ISSN 2531-4165 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/ds-25453 180 di quell’attitudine al reimpiego di contenuti altrui che costò loro lo stigma di compilatori, i libertini agirono in qualche modo come mediatori fra istanze filosofiche del passato e gli autori loro coevi e posteriori. Per comprendere l’originalità del loro apporto, anzitutto occorrerà pertanto riandare alle loro fonti di riferimento, come proposto da Winfried Schröder (Alogos pistis. Early modern free-thinkers and the heritage of the late antique critics of Christianity, pp. 39-50) e, poco prima della sua prematura scomparsa, Germana Ernst (Effigies miranda viri mirabilis. La rencontre entre Campanella et Naudé: entre attraction et déception, pp. 51-65). Il primo, seguendo la tradizione, tuttora da approfondire e giunta ai lumi in particolare attraverso Bodin e Reimarus, di alcuni argomenti di Celso, Porfirio e Giuliano l’Apostata contro la concezione cristiana della fede come atto di volontà cieco. La seconda, arricchendo il frequentato tema dei rapporti fra Naudé e Campanella di un ulteriore tassello: quello della rielaborazione, da parte del bibliotecario di Mazzarino, della teoria del filosofo calabrese sulla «forza magica» delle parole nella direzione di una politica utilitaristica. Su Naudé come interprete libertino di fonti anteriori interviene peraltro anche Anna Lisa Schino (Les libertins et la médecine. Peut-on échapper à la mort ou la retarder? Les réflexions de Gabriel Naudé dans la Quaestio de fato, pp. 67-90), concentrandosi sulla resa antiprovvidenzialistica e antifatalistica della fisiologia aristotelica e della medicina galenica nella Quaestio iatrophilologica de fato et fatali vitae termino del 1639. Un approccio analogo guida le studiose alle prese col Theophrastus redivivus, una delle opere più rappresentative delle finalità sovversive della pratica di scrittura libertina del rimpasto di dottrine preesistenti. Delle citazioni rintracciate da Nicole Gengoux (Le Theophrastus redivivus et le libertinage: une hypothèse à partir des Dialogues faits à l’imitation des Anciens de François de La Mothe Le Vayer, pp. 157-179) e Cecilia Muratori (Food for “ free thought”: diet and libertinism in Theophrastus redivivus and its sources, pp. 181-198) è difatti evidente la radicalizzazione in senso materialistico e ateistico guadagnata nella nuova sede testuale. Da un lato, dai Dialogues faits à l’imitation des Anciens di La Mothe Le Vayer al Theophrastus, la Gengoux riscontra lo scarto nella rifondazione, da parte dell’Anonimo libertino, dell’«art de vivre» sul diritto a gratificare un istintuale amore di sé. Dall’altro, la Muratori sottolinea lo smantellamento, nel Theophrastus, della compensazione teleologica nell’ordine della quale, nell’Atheismus triumphatus, Campanella risarciva l’uomo della perdita della sua centralità nella Creazione con l’idea che la natura fosse regolamentata da Dio al fine del benessere universale. Valentina Lepore Lo sforzo di avvicinamento e compenetrazione fra filosofia e libero pensiero prosegue con il rilevamento di una contiguità di temi e strategie argomentative fra i testi di alcuni protagonisti del pensiero moderno e le opere di altrettanti autori libertini. Uno dei casi meno prevedibili – e che è quindi tanto più funzionale allo scopo della raccolta – è quello studiato da Claudio Buccolini (Mersenne et les libertins. Du libertinage à l’athéisme mathématisant, pp. 91-120). La prova decisiva della permeabilità al libero pensiero è, in altre parole, che nemmeno l’apologeta Mersenne se ne poté sottrarre. Tant’è vero che, dopo avere a più riprese condannato la dimostrazione more geometrico come prerogativa degli atei, in alcuni interventi dal 1639 al 1645 egli ne suggerì l’applicazione alle verità metafisiche e morali come arma più efficace proprio contro l’ateismo. Altrettanto difficile da sospettare, sebbene meno stringente, è la concordanza che Hélène Bah Ostrowiecki (Pascal et le Theophrastus redivivus: la philosophie et l’autorité, pp. 199-212) individua fra Pascal e l’autore del Theophrastus sulla «dépendance inévitable» dell’esercizio filosofico dal principio di autorità (p. 211). D’altra parte, al progetto di Pascal di convertire i libertini si dedica Antony McKenna (La cohérence de l’argument apologétique que Pascal adresse au libertin, pp. 213-244), soffermandosi in particolare sul riutilizzo in chiave apologetica del pirronismo di Gassendi riferito alle Sacre Scritture. Meno inattesa, fosse anche soltanto per i suoi noti contatti con l’Académie putéane, è la traccia della libre pensée in Hobbes. Se ne occupano Gianni Paganini (Hobbes, les «semences naturelles» de la religion et le discours libertin, pp. 245-264) e Anne Staquet (Comparaison entre Hobbes et Montaigne sur les conceptions religieuses, pp. 265-278), colmando quella che il primo aveva segnalato come una lacuna storiografica. Il terreno d’indagine di entrambi è il Leviathan. Paganini vi rileva un’«indéniable […] influence des milieux libertins» specialmente nelle due tesi dei moventi psicologici della fede e della funzione politica delle religioni (p. 262). La Staquet vi rilegge le concezioni della «croyance […] rapportée à obéissance» (p. 269) e della morale fondata sul piacere alla luce della mediazione libertina degli Essais di Montaigne. Su Descartes e Bayle il problema dei rapporti con il libero pensiero è stato, al contrario di quanto attestato per Hobbes, molto discusso, ma senza raggiungere una soluzione univoca. Il volume ne tiene conto. Se Denis Kambouchner (Descartes et les libertins: peut-on parler d’une incroyance cartésienne?, pp. 121-135) ridimensiona l’ascendente dei libertini su Descartes considerando che egli non sottopose mai ad esame critico il proprio credo, nel Discours de la méthode Emanuela Scribano (Les animaux et les horloges. Descartes contre les «esprits faibles», Philosophie et libre pensée / Philosophy and free thought: XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles pp. 137-156) rinviene invece l’ipotesi eterodossa di una biologia evoluzionistica. Quanto a Bayle, Hubert Bost (Bayle ou la rétorsion du libertinage, pp. 279-299) ne analizza le repliche all’accusa di libertinismo contro chiunque, egli stesso compreso, non difendesse razionalmente i misteri della fede, mentre Jean-Michel Gros (Bayle et les libertins, pp. 301-318) ne sottolinea la lontananza dalla tesi libertina della religione come «lien de communauté» imprescindibile (p. 316). Un altro autore del quale è stato esaminato il rapporto «ambivalente» con la tradizione libertina è Montesquieu (p. 476). Malgrado la presa di posizione contro ateismo e libertini a partire dalle Lettres persanes, Lorenzo Bianchi (Montesquieu et les libertins, pp. 473-489) rileva infatti nell’interesse del barone di La Brède per la religione come dispositivo sociale l’influsso di Fréret e Fontenelle. Quest’ultimo è inteso come figura di passaggio tra libertinismo e lumi anche da Maria Susana Seguin (Fontenelle, au tournant des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, pp. 347-361), che gli riconosce soprattutto l’apertura al pubblico dei dibattiti filosofici più controversi. A rendere complicata la ricognizione delle influenze del libero pensiero è, ad ogni modo, il suo carattere di movimento composito e dai tratti sfuggenti, del quale sono conseguentemente difficili da individuare non solo le propaggini ma anche le premesse e il nucleo identitario di base. Lo dimostrano Oreste Trabucco (Aristotélisme et libertinisme: le cas de Fortunio Liceti, pp. 319-332) e Bertram Eugene Schwarzbach (Répéter une assertion n’est pas la démontrer (Richard Popkin sur les origines des Lumières), pp. 363-384). Entrambi si occupano di sfatare due tesi storiografiche a lungo sostenute benché quanto meno da ridimensionare. Il primo affronta la «vulgate», risalente a Giorgio Spini, secondo la quale il libertinismo francese debba all’aristotelismo padovano la cifra eterodossa – ed invece gli dovrebbe quella erudita. Il secondo, quella di Richard H. Popkin sull’atteggiamento iconoclastico dei lumi quale eredità degli argomenti anticristiani dei cripto-giudei ad Amsterdam nel Cinque e Seicento. Né bisogna dimenticare che la messa a fuoco di idee e autori qualificati con il termine ‘libertino’ risente anzitutto della natura indeterminata di quest’ultimo. Grazie all’esempio delle Lettere apologetiche di De Benedictis, Pierre Girard (Libertins et libertas philosophandi à Naples à l’âge classique, pp. 417-439) prova, anzi, che tale nebulosità di significato rispondesse solitamente alla volontà di ottimizzarne la plasticità come categoria di accusa piuttosto che di elencare con essa delle qualità definitorie. Contro queste insidie, è di aiuto la storia della storiografia filosofica. Sulla costruzione di una storiografia antilibertina si segnalano i contributi di Mogens Lærke (Pigros semper festinare. Leibniz, les libertins 181 et la raison paresseuse, pp. 333-345) e Wolfgang Rother (Epicureanism, scepticism and atheism in Jacob Brucker’s philosophical historiography, pp. 385-401). Il primo ricostruisce la sfavorevole profilatura del libertino da parte di Leibniz come empio caratterizzato da «raison paresseuse» e «légèreté d’esprit» (p. 339). Il secondo rimarca le intenzioni apologetiche della condanna di Jacob Brucker nei confronti dell’ateismo di «Latitudinarii, Freydencker, Esprits forts» quale deriva di uno scetticismo antireligioso che estendeva il dubbio alle verità rivelate. Di segno opposto, invece, il caso affrontato da John Christian Laursen (Christian Thomasius as lawyer for the atheists: defending the author of The history of the Sevarambians, pp. 403-416): benché credente, Christian Thomasius rappresentò e difese i capisaldi del libero pensiero a costo di contraddire i dogmi religiosi. Non mancò, infine, chi, anche a partire da una prospettiva confessionale, cercò realmente di comprendere il corpo polimorfo delle idee del libero pensiero. A questo titolo, sono importanti le Lettere sugli atei di Lorenzo Magalotti, che Maurizio Torrini (Le Lettere sugli atei di Magalotti. Apologia o libertinismo?, pp. 441-454) presenta come uno dei primi tentativi cattolici di dialogo con i libertini; e l’attività storiografica del pietista luterano Gottfried Arnold, del quale Roberto Osculati (Gottfried Arnold e la «cosiddetta cristianità» del XVII secolo, pp. 455-472) enfatizza la tesi secondo cui la piaga della cristianità del Seicento fosse l’«ateismo pratico ed ecclesiastico molto più pericoloso d[el] presunto ateismo teorico» che i chierici imputavano a chiunque non accettasse il loro potere (p. 466). Gli ultimi interventi s’interrogano sul perdurare, o sullo scomparire, di alcune risonanze del libertinismo dal tardo Settecento al secondo Novecento. Laursen ricerca le ragioni dell’ininfluenza della pionieristica campagna di Carl Friedrich Bahrdt (From libertine idea to widely accepted: the human right to sexual satisfaction. A research program for the study of the idea from Carl Friedrich Bahrdt to the present, pp. 491-510) per il diritto alla soddisfazione sessuale; James Vigus (The “owlet atheism” in the 1790s: an essay on Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Henry Crabb Robinson, pp. 525-540) soppesa il ruolo dell’«anxiety about atheism» nella conversione di Samuel Taylor Coleridge e Henry Crabb Robinson al trascendentalismo kantiano (p. 526); e Paolo Quintili (Kundera et Diderot. Échos des Lumières et du libertinisme dans le romain contemporain, pp. 541-553) si sofferma sulla rivisitazione di Kundera di Jacques le fataliste. Merita infine una menzione a sé il contributo di Pierre-François Moreau (Kant. La croyance et l’incroyance, pp. 555-568) sulla seconda prefazione della Kritik der reinen Vernunft, nella quale Kant accomuna i libertini ai metafisici dogmatici come fautori 182 Valentina Lepore della miscredenza, e dimostra per di più di combattere i primi su un piano strettamente filosofico e non apologetico. L’ultimo caso di studio conferma ancora una volta la porosità dei confini fra filosofia e libero pensiero, e in modo tanto più persuasivo – un discorso in qualche modo simile lo si è fatto su Mersenne – perché la si documenta nella percezione di un autore al quale, essendo avverso ai libertini, non può essere attribuito nessun interesse di rappresentazione edulcorata o nobilitante degli stessi. In conclusione, non solo la raccolta raggiunge gli obiettivi enunciati nella présentation, ma la ricchezza dei risultati che offre agisce come stimolo a proseguire lungo la pista di ricerca indicata. Valentina Lepore D i c i ot t e s i m o Secolo SISSD Rivista della Società Italiana di Studi sul Secolo XVIII The criminal question in the public sphere. Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments and Eighteenth-Century Britain: A Two-Way Perspective Edited by Rosamaria Loretelli, Riccardo Capoferro and John Dunkley The first English translation of Dei delitti e delle pene. A question of sources and modifications Rosamaria Loretelli 95 The Marquis Beccaria: An Italian penal reformer’s meteoric rise in the British Isles in the transatlantic Republic of Letters John D. Bessler 107 Mille choses de sa part. Hume, Ramsay and Beccaria Emilio Mazza 121 British Culture in Cesare Beccaria and in his Circle Crime, punishment, and law in eighteenth-century British encyclopedias Elisabetta Lonati 131 Beccaria e l’Inghilterra Gianni Francioni 11 Oliver Goldsmith’s The Vicar of Wakefield and Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments Barbara Witucki 143 19 Tra filosofia e diritto. Il pensiero critico-riformista di Manasseh Dawes, studioso di Beccaria Alberto Carrera 151 SAGGI Introduction Rosamaria Loretelli and John Dunkley Beccaria e Bacon: una fonte inglese alle origini del Dei delitti? Marialuisa Parise Droit naturel et droit à la vie. Beccaria lecteur de Hobbes Philippe Audegean Anglo-Italian interdisciplinary networks 17651767. Frisi, Beccaria, the Verris and the Fellows of the Royal Society Manuela D’Amore A member of the Accademia dei Pugni translates Frances Brooke’s. The History of Lady Julia Mandeville. From Giambattista Biﬃ’s manuscripts Lia Guerra 3 33 NOTE E DISCUSSIONI Dove va la ricerca modernistica in Italia? Riflessioni a margine di Padova giovani SISEM 2019 Massimo Galtarossa RECENSIONI 57 Corinna Guerra, Lavoisier e Parthenope. Contributo ad una storia della chimica del Regno di Napoli Ferdinando Abbri 165 Antonio Conti, Dialoghi filosofici Gregorio Piaia 169 Andrea Addobbati, Facchinerie. Immigrati bergamaschi, valtellinesi e svizzeri nel porto di Livorno (1602-1847) Luisa Piccinno 171 175 179 On Crimes and Punishments in EighteenthCentury Britain «The first steps rightly directed in the track of legislation»: Jeremy Bentham on Cesare Beccaria’s Essay on Crimes and Punishments Philip Schofield 65 Beccaria e Bentham Luigi Ferrajoli 75 Carlo Borghero, Interpretazioni, categorie, finzioni: narrare la storia della filosofia Eleonora Alfano 85 Lorenzo Bianchi, Nicole Gengoux et Gianni Paganini (éds.), Philosophie et libre pensée / Philosophy and free thought: XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles Valentina Lepore «Piecemeal, incremental, ad hoc»: ‘Beccarian’ experiments in law enforcement in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England Jeanne Clegg € 70,00 159 47

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The criminal question in the public sphere. Cesare Beccaria and Eighteenth-Century England - Diciottesimo Secolo Rivista della Società Italiana di Studi sul Secolo XVIII.

The criminal question in the public sphere. Cesare Beccaria and Eighteenth-Century England - Diciottesimo Secolo Rivista della Società Italiana di Studi sul Secolo XVIII.

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