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Future of International Criminal Justice in Africa

Future of International Criminal Justice in Africa

Profile image of Steven KayuniSteven Kayuni

2018, International Criminal Justice Africa 2018

The Chapter explores Africa’s international criminal justice experience. Through the prism of law as a process of decision otherwise known as policy-oriented jurisprudence, the chapter assesses the interconnectedness of international, regional and national courts as part of a global mechanism for fighting impunity. Such an assessment appraises the current fashion and practice of international criminal justice within the continent as a likely projection of future trends of legal and policy formulation, interpretation and implementation. The continent’s international criminal justice experiences have stemmed from international arena, hybrid or domestic trajectory. That notwithstanding, an analysis of relevant legal instruments and the practice of, inter alia, the African Union (AU) and some individual states point to a turbulent enterprise towards collective goals for rule of law, accountability and justice for grave crimes under international law. Flawed decision-making processes, lack of proper policy direction and sightless regionalist ideological tendencies have heavily impeded the international criminal justice progress. Despite this, and numerous jurisprudential contributions from international and hybrid criminal tribunal efforts, the chapter postulates the domestic arena as the future trajectory and grounding for international criminal justice processes on the continent. Domestic arena is likely to aid Africa’s collective efforts towards envisaged, cherished and aspirational principles that mirror probable values, consonant outcomes and responsibilities.

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HJ van der Merwe Gerhard Kemp (eds) xxii HJ van der Merwe Gerhard Kemp (eds) INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA, 2018 Copyright © Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung ISBN 978-9966-021-21-2 Year of Publication 2019 Layout & Printing by: Linotypesetters (K) Ltd. Email: info@linotype.co.ke CONTENTS List of editors and authors ............................................................................... v List of abbreviations........................................................................................ vii List of cases...................................................................................................... xi List of legal instruments................................................................................... xxiii Preface.............................................................................................................. xxix 1. Towards an international criminal law regime for the regulation of the exploitation of natural resources: Africa as pioneer Gift Joseph Kweka................................................................................. 1 Enforcing cooperation differently: Time to criminalise active noncooperation in the Rome Statute? Bernard Ntahiraja.................................................................................. 21 3. Crimes de guerre et statut de personne protégée Jacques Mbokani................................................................................... 51 4. Droits de l’homme et obligation de poursuivre les crimes de guerre: Revue critique de la decision de la commission africaine dans l’affaire Kilwa (RDC) Balingene Kahombo............................................................................... 73 The socio-political context of complementarity: The ICC and narratives of justice in Kenya Nabil M. Orina....................................................................................... 99 2. 5. 6. Drawing a balance: Establishing the parameters of victim participation in criminal proceedings in Kenya and lessons from the International Criminal Court Juliet Okoth............................................................................................ 121 7. Burundi-ICC: Trial of strength over Burundi’s duty to cooperate with respect to the situation in Burundi Aimé-Parfait Niyonkuru......................................................................... 139 8. La cour penale speciale en Republique Centrafricaine: Progres et defis Eugene Bakama Bope............................................................................ 163 9. The future of international criminal justice in Africa: An international, hybrid or domestic trajectory? Steven W. S. Kayuni............................................................................... 189 10. Le régime de complémentarité sous le protocole portant amendement du protocole portant statut de la cour africaine de justice et des droits de l’homme Nestor Nkurunziza................................................................................. 203 Bibliography.................................................................................................... 217 v List of editors and authors LIST OF EDITORS AND AUTHORS BAKAMA BOPE, Eugène – LLB, LLM (Congo Protestant University), PhD Candidate at the University of Aix-Marseille (France), Chairman of the Club des amis du droit du Congo, DRC. KAHOMBO, Balingene – Doctoral Candidate in Law, Freie Universität Berlin (Germany); Graduate of high studies in public law, public international law and international relations at the University of Kinshasa. Member of the Congolese Association for Public Policy (CAPP) and the ‘Centre de Recherches et d’Etudes sur l’Etat de Droit en Afrique’ (CREEDA). KAYUNI, Steven – Ph.D (University of Sussex), LLM (University of Sussex), Postgraduate Cert. - Social Research Methods (University of Sussex); Associate Fellow, UK Higher Education Academy; LLB (Hons) (University of Malawi), Commonwealth Scholar; International Fellow - National Attorneys General Training and Research Institute (NAGTRI – Washington, DC); Senior Deputy Chief State Advocate in the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs of the Malawi Government. KEMP, Gerhard – Professor of Criminal Law and International Criminal Law, Stellenbosch University, South Africa; Director and Executive Committee Member, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town; Advocate of the High Court of South Africa. KWEKA, Gift – LLB (University of Dar es Salaam), LLM (University of Cape Town), PhD (University of Dar es Salaam); Lecturer and Acting Dean of the Faculty of Law, Open University of Tanzania. MBOKANI, Jacques - PhD (Catholic University of Leuven), Professor at the University of Goma and Consultant with the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) in Kinshasa, DRC NIYONKURU, Aimé-Parfait - PhD (KU Leuven); Lecturer, University of Burundi; Member of the Burundian Bar Association (BBA) and Phillip Schwartz Fellow at the Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institut. List of editors and authors vi NKURUNZIZA. Nestor - PhD candidate in Law at the University of Ottawa, member of the Centre for Research and Teaching on Human Rights. Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Burundi. NTAHIRAJA, Bernard - Lecturer at the University of Burundi & Advocate at the Court of Appeal of Bujumbura OKOTH, Juliet – LLD (University of the Western Cape); Lecturer in International Criminal Law, International Law and Transnational Crimes Law, School of Law, University of Nairobi. ORINA, Nabil – PhD researcher at the City University of Hong Kong; LL.M (University of Turin, Italy); LL.B (Moi University, Kenya). VAN DER MERWE, HJ – BAcc, LLB, LLM, LLD (Stellenbosch University); Coordinator of the African Group of Experts on International Criminal Justice; Advocate of the High Court of South Africa. vii List of abbreviations LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ACJHR African Court of Justice and Human Rights APP Asia Pulp Paper APR Alliance pour la République ASP Assembly of States Parties AU African Union AUCIL African Union Commission on International Law CADHP Commission africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples CAH Crimes Against Humanity CAR Central African Republic CAJDH Cour africaine de justice et des droits de l’homme CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women CERs Communauté Économiques d’Intégration Régionale CESR Centre for Economic and Social Rights CICR Comité international de la Croix-Rouge CIJ Cour internationale de justice CIPEV or the Waki Commission Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence CMK Cour militaire du Katanga CNDD-FDD Démocratie-Forces de Défense de la DémocratieForces de Défense de la Démocratie COHRE Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions Cour africaine Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples CPI Cour pénale internationale CPS Cour pénale spéciale viii List of abbreviations CSEI Cellule spéciale d’enquêtes et d’instruction CVR Commission vérité et réconciliation DDR Désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion DRC Democratic Republic of Congo EAC East African Community EAC Extraordinary African Chambers EACJ East African Court of Justice ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EEI Équipe des experts internationaux des Nations Unies EMBL European Molecular Biology Laboratory Arbitration FAPC Forces armées du peuple congolais F/APR Front/Armée Patriotique Rwandais FAR Forces Armées Rwandaises FARDC Forces Armées de la République du Congo Gestapo Geheime Staatspolizei - Secret State Police during the time of Nazi Germany HCM Haute Cour militaire ICA International Crimes Act ICC International Criminal Court ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ICGLR International Conference of the Great Lakes Region ICJ International Court of Justice ICL International Criminal Law ICLS International Criminal Law Section ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia IJR Institute for Justice and Reconciliation IHL International Humanitarian Law ILC International Law Commission IMT International Military Tribunal IOCD International and Organised Crimes Division ix List of abbreviations IPOA Independent Policing Oversight Authority JCE Joint Criminal Enterprise KLR Kenya Law Reform KNDR Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation KPCS Kimberly Process Scheme for the Certification of Rough Diamonds Kshs Kenya Shilling Malabo Protocol Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statue on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights MINUSCA Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République centrafricaine MONUC Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo MRLK Mouvement révolutionnaire de libération du Katanga NARC National Rainbow Coalition NDR Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation on the political crisis in Kenya NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations NMT Nuremberg Military Tribunal Nuremberg Tribunal International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg ODM Orange Democratic Movement ONU Organisation des Nations Unies OTP Office of the Prosecutor PCIJ Permanent Court of International Justice PEV Post-Election Violence PNU Party of National Unity Protocole I Premier protocole additionnel aux quatre Conventions de Genève de 1949 RCA République Centrafricaine RCM Regional Certification Mechanism RDC République du Congo Rome Statute Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court x List of abbreviations RPE Rules of Procedure and Evidence RQDI Revue Québécoise de Droit International SERAC Social and Economic Rights Action Center SCC Special Criminal Court SCSL Special Court for Sierra Leone SDPI Section de droit pénal international STK Special Tribunal for Kenya TJRC Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya TNCs Transnational Corporations TPIR Tribunal Pénal International pour le Rwanda TPIY Tribunal Pénal International pour l’ex-Yougoslavie TP-Y Ex-Yougoslavie TSSL Tribunal spécial pour la Sierra Leone UA Union Africain UDC Union des démocrates congolais UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSG United Nations Secretary-General USD United States Dollar URSS Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties VJRR Vérité justice réconciliation et réparation VPA Victim Protection Act xi List of cases LIST OF CASES International Court of Justice (ICJ) Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), fond, arrêt. C.I.J. Recueil 1986 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (République de Guinée c. République démocratique du Congo), indemnisation, arrêt du 19 juin 2012, C.I.J. Recueil 2012 [Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo), compensation, Judgment 19 June 2012, ICR Reports 2012] Application de la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie‑Herzégovine c. Serbie‑et‑Monténégro), arrêt du 26 février 2007, C.I.J. Recueil 2007. [Case concerning application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzigovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment 26 February 2007, ICJ Report 2007] Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J, 19 December 2005 Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v India), Judgment of 26 November 1957 (preliminary objection), [1957] ICJ Reports 125. CIJ, Licéité de la menace ou de l’emploi d’armes nucléaires, « Avis consultatif », 8 juillet 1996 Djibouti v France, Judgment of 4 June, ICJ Report 2008. European Molecular Biology Laboratory Arbitration (EMBL v Germany), European Molecular Biology Laboratory Arbitration, Arbitration Tribunal, Award of 29 June 1990, ILR, Vol. 97 p. 114 et seq. Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) ICJ 1, 6 April 1955. List of cases xii International Criminal Cases International Criminal Court (ICC) Chad, The Prosecutor vs. Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir (Decision pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the refusal of the Republic of Chad to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) ICC‐02/05‐01/09, 13 December 2011. Corrigendum of the Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/09-19-Corr 31 March 2010. Decision on the non-compliance by the Republic of Uganda with the request to arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court and referring the matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC02/05-01/09, 11 July 2016. Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi, ICC-01/17-X-9-US-Exp, 25 October 2017, Pre Trial Chamber III, ICC-01/17-9-Red, 9 November 2017. Le Procureur c. Katanga (Décision relative à la confirmation des charges) Ch. Prél. I, ICC-01/04-01/07-717-tFRA, 30 septembre 2008. [The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Decision on the confirmation of charges) Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/04-01/07-717, 14 October 2008.] Le Procureur c. Lubanga, (Jugement rendu en application de l’article 74 du Statut), Ch. 1 Inst. I, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842-tFRA, 14 mars 2012. [The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) Trial Chamber ICC-01/04-01/06-2842. 5 April 2012.] re Le Procureur c. Ntaganda (Arrêt relatif à l’appel interjeté par Bosco Ntaganda contre la deuxième décision rendue concernant l’exception d’incompétence de la Cour soulevée par la Défense s’agissant des chefs 6 et 9) CH. Appel, ICC-01/04-02/06-1962 –tFRA, 15 juin 2017. [The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda (Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Ntaganda against the “Second decision on the Defence’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9”) Appeals Chamber ICC ICC-01/04-02/06-1962 15 June 2017.] Le Procureur c. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi et Abdullah Al-Senoussi (Arrêt relatif à l’appel interjeté par la défense de M. Al-Senoussi de la décision de la Chambre préliminaire intitulée Décision relative à la recevabilité de l’affaire à l’encontre d’Abdullah AlSenoussi décision rendue le 11 octobre 2013) ICC-01/11-01/11, 24 juillet 2014. xiii List of cases [The Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Abdullah AlSenussi against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 entitled “Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi”) Appeals Chamber ICC01/11-01/11-565, 24 July 2014.] Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali (Public decision on the application by the Government of Kenya challenging the admissibility of the case pursuant to Article 19(2) (b) of the statute) ICC-01/0902/11, 30 May 2011. Public Redacted Version of “Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi”, Pre-Trail Chamber III, ICC-01/17-X-9-US-Exp, October 25, 2017. The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda (Decision on Victim’s Participation in Trial Proceedings) Trial Chamber VI, ICC-01/04-02/06-449, Trial Chamber VI, 6 February 2015. The Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana (Decision for a Warrant of Arrest against Callixte Mbarushimana) Pre Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/04-01/10-1, 29 September 2010. The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial) Trial Chamber II, ICC 01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, 22 January 2010. The Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo (Decision on Victim Participation) Trial Chamber ICC-02/11-01/11-800, 6 March 2015. The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar Al Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court) Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-02/05-01/09-195, 9 April 2014. The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Decision on the noncompliance by the Republic of Djibouti with the request to arrest and surrender Omar Al Bashir to the Court and referring the matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the State Parties to the Rome Statute) Pre-Trial Chamber, ICC02/05-01/09-266, 11 July 2016. The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Decision on the Non-compliance of the Republic of Chad with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court Regarding the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir) Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC02/05-01/09-151, 26 March 2013. The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for a Finding of Non-Compliance Against the Republic of the Sudan) Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-02/05-01/09, 9 March 2015. List of cases xiv The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Decision pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the refusal of the Republic of Chad to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) ICC-02/05-01/09-140-tENG, 13 December 2011. The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) Pre-Trial Chamber, ICC-02/05-01/09-139-Corr, 15 December 2011. The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by Jordan with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender or Omar Al-Bashir) Pre Trial Chamber II, ICC-02/05-01/09, 11 December 2017. The Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Decision on the Admissibility of the Case against Saif Al Islam Gaddafi) Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/11-01/11-344-Red, 31 May 2013. The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on Participation of Victims, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06) Trial Chamber I, 18 January 2008), Appeals Chamber, ICC01/04-01/06-1432, 11 July 2018. The Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Decision on Prosecution’s applications for a finding of non-compliance pursuant to Article 87(7) and for an adjournment of the provisional trial date) Trial Chamber V(b), ICC-01/09-02/11 1/47, 31 March 2014. The Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by Jordan with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender or Omar Al-Bashir) ICC-02/05-01/09, 11 December 2017. The Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Second decision on Prosecution’s application for a finding of non-compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute) ICC01/09-02/11, 19 September 2016. The Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang (Decision on Victim’s Representation and Participation) Trial Chamber V, ICC-01/09-01/11, 9 October 2012. The Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang (Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute) Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/09-01/11-101, 30 May 2011. xv List of cases The Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Trial Chamber V(a), ICC-01/09-01/11, 23 January 2012. The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Decision on the confirmation of charges) PreTrial Chamber I, ICC-01/04-01/07-717 14 October 2008. The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/05-01/08, 21 March 2016. The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir (Corrigendum to the Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) ICC-02/05-01/09, 13 December 2011. The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir (Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir) ICC-02/05-01/09, 6 July 2017. The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir (Judgment in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal) ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, 6 May 2019. The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, 29 January 2007. The Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Decision on Prosecution’s application for a finding of non-compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute) ICC-01/09-02/11 1/46, 3 December 2014. The Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against Trial Chamber V (B)’s ‘Decision on Prosecution’s application for a finding of noncompliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute) ICC-01/09-02/11-1032, 19 August 2015. The Prosecutor v Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain ICC-02/05-03/09, 4 October 2013. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Prosecutor v Aleksovski, ICTY Case IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, 25 June 1999. Prosecutor v Ante Gotovina et al., ICTY Case IT-06-90-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber II, 15 April 2011. List of cases xvi Prosecutor v Blagoević and Jokić, ICTY Case IT-02-60, Judgment of the Trial Chamber I, Section A, 17 January 2005. Prosecutor v Blaskić, ICTY Case IT-95-14-A, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, Appeals Chamber, 29 July 2004. Prosecutor v Furundžija, ICTY Case IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, 10 December 1998. Prosecutor v Haradinaj et al., ICTY Case IT-04-84-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber I, 3 April 2008. Prosecutor v Kunarac et al, ICTY Case IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, 22 February 2001. Prosecutor v Tadić, ICTY Case IT-94-1-A, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, 15 July 15. TPIY (Ch. Appel), Le Procureur c. Kunarać et al., affaire n° IT-96-23 & IT-9623/1-A, 12 juin 2002. TPIY (Ch. Appel), Le Procureur c. Tadić, « Arrêt relatif à l›appel de la défense concernant l›exception préjudicielle d›incompétence », 2 octobre 1995. [Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal of Jurisdiction) 2 October 1995] International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber II, 21 May 1999. Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) TSSL (Ch. 1re Inst. I), Le Procureur c. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon et Augustine Gbao, « Judgment », affaire n° SCL-04-15-T, 2 mars 2009. [Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay et al, Case SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber I, 2 March 2009.] xvii List of cases African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (CADHP) Affaire Ayant-droits de feu Norbert Zongo, Abdoulaye Nikiema dit Ablasse, Ernest Zongo et Blaise Liboudo, et le Mouvement burkinabé des droits de l’homme et des peuples c. Burkina Faso (Réparations), Requête n°013/2011, arrêt du 05 juin 2015. [Abdoulaye Nikiema, Ernest Zongo, Blaise Ilboudo & Bukinabe Hamn and Peoples’ Rights Movement v Burkina Faso (damages), App. No. 013/2011, judgment from 5 June 2015] Affaire Lohé Issa Konaté c. Burkina Faso (Réparations), Requête n°004/2013, arrêt du 03 juin 2016. [Lohé Issa Konaté v Burkina Faso (damages), App. No. 004/2013, judgment from 03 June 2016] Affaire Révérend Christopher R. Mtikila c. République Unie de Tanzanie (Réparations), Requête n°011/2011, arrêt du 13 juin 2014. [Rev. Christopher R. Mtikila v United Republic of Tanzania, App. No. 011/2011, judgment of 13 June 2014]. Communication 274/03 et 282/03 – Interights, ASADHO et Maître O. Disu c. République Démocratique du Congo. [Communication 274/03 et 282/03 Interights, ASADHO and Maître O. Disu v Democratic Republic of the Congo] Communication 325/06 – Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture et Ligue de la Zone Afrique pour la Défense des Droits des Enfants et Elèves (pour le compte de Céline) c. République Démocratique du Congo. [Communication 325/06 - World Organization against Torture and League of Africa Zone for the Defense of the Rights of Children and Students (on behalf of Céline) v Democratic Republic of the Congo)] Communication 409/12 – Luke Munyandu Tembani et Benjamin John Freeth (représentés by Norman Tjombe) c. Zimbabwe et treize autres. [Communication 409/12 Luke Munyandu Tembani and Benjamin John Freeth (represented by Norman Tjombe) v Zimbabwe and thirteen Others]. Communication 433/12 — Albert Bialufu Ngandu c. République Démocratique du Congo. [Communication 433/12 - Albert Bialufu Ngandu v the Democratic Republic of the Congo] Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, Les Témoins de Jehovah c. Zaïre, CADHP Comm.25/89-47/90-56/91-100/93, 9ème Rapport d’activités (1995 – 1996) [Free Legal Assistance Group and Others v Zaire, Communication No. 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93, 9th activity report (1995 – 1996)]. List of cases xviii Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, CADHP Comm.393/10, 41ème Rapport d’activités (mai – novembre 2016) [Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v the Democratic Republic of the Congo, CADHP Communication No. 393/10, 41st activity report (May-November 2016)] Ministère public et parties civiles c. Adémar Ilunga et consorts, CADHP 28 June 2007, RP 010/2006. [Public Prosecutor and Civil Parties v Adémar Ilunga and others, Judgment of 28 June 2007, Military Court of Katanga, RP 010/2006] Mr. Obert Chinhamo c. Zimbabwe, CADHP Comm. 307/2005, 23ème Rapport d’activités (mai 2007 –novembre 2007). [Chinhamo v Zimbabwe, CADHP Comm. No. 307/2005, 23rd activity report (May 2007-November 2007)] Sir Dawda K. Jawara c. Gambie, CADHP Comm.147/95-149/96, 13ème Rapport d’activités (1999 – 2000). [Sir Dawda K. Jawara v Gambia, CADHP Comm. 147/95-149/96, 13rd Activity Report (1999 – 2000)] Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) et Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) c. Nigéria CADHP Comm. 155/96, 15ème Rapport d’activités (2001 – 2002). [Social and Economic Rights and Development in Africa and others v Nigeria, CADHP Communication No. 155/96, 15th activity report (2001-2002)] Soudan Human Rights Organisations et Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) c. Soudan, CADHP Comm. 229/03-296/05, 28ème Rapport d’activités (novembre 2009 – mai 2010). [Sudan Human Rights Organisations and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan, CADHP Communication No. 229/03-296/05, 28th Activity Report (November 2009 – May 2010)] Inter-American Court of Human Rights Constitutional Court v Peru, Aguirre Roca and Others v Peru, Competence, IACHR Series C no 55, [1999], 24th September 1999, Inter-American Court of Human Rights. xix List of cases National Cases Lebanon Al-Jadeed S.A.L. & Al Khayat (The Al-Jadeed Case), STL-14-05/T/CJ, Judgment, Special Tribunal for Lebanon 18 September 2015. Sierra Leone The Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa (the CDF Accused) (Appeal Judgment), SCSL-04-14-A, Special Court for Sierra Leone, 28 May 2008. The Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (the AFRC Accused), SCSL-04-16-T, Special Court for Sierra Leone, 20 June 2007. South Africa Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & others 2015 (5) SA 1 (GP). Germany Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [(German) Federal Court of Justice] 26 July 1994, Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 40, 218 (236). Cambodia Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38), Public Decision on the Appeals against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise, May 20, 2010 (Cambodia) Chambres extraordinaires au sein des tribunaux cambodgiens, Le Procureur c. Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, affaire n° 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 26 juillet 2010. Canada R v Phelan [1964] Crim LR 468. R v Reeves (1892) 13 LR (NSW) 220. Kenya Gideon Mwiti Irea v DPP & 7 Others [2015] eKLR Petition N0. 151 of 2015. List of cases xx I.P Veronica Gitahi and P.C Issa Mzee v Republic [2016] eKLR Criminal Appeal No. 23 of 2016. R v David Muchiri Mwangi [2018] eKLR. R v Eric Makau Musila [2017] eKLR Criminal Case No. 5 of 2016 High Court at Naivasha. R v Fredrick Ole Leilman and 4 others [2017] eKLR Criminal Case 57 of 2016, High Court of Kenya at Nairobi. R v James K Mutengei [2017] eKLR Criminal Revision No. 1 of 2017 High Court at Kajiado. R v Joseph Lentrix Waswa [2016] eKLR Criminal Case 34 of 2014, High Court of Kenya at Bungoma. Richard O Arondo v R [2017] Criminal Misc. Application 3 of 2017 High Court at Embu. Democratic Republic of the Congo CM/Bukavu, Ministère public et 42 Parties civiles c. Batumike et 19 autres, « Arrêt », affaire n° RP 0105/2017, 13 décembre 2017, inédit. CM/Lubumbashi, Ministère public et 102 Parties civiles c. Kyungu Mutanga Gédéon et 25 autres, affaire RPA n° 025/09, 16 décembre 2010, publié dans le Bulletin des arrêts de la Haute Cour militaire, 3e édition, 2013, pp. 267 et seq. Cour militaire (CM) de Kananga, Le Ministère public c. Nyembo Bwana Moya et consorts, « Arrêt », RP 014/017, 6 juillet 2017. CSJ, 15 septembre 2006, R. Const.038/TSR. CSJ, 22 décembre 1997, RP.032/TSR, inédit. CSJ, 27 novembre 2006, RCE. PR. 009, Requête en contestation des résultats de l’élection présidentielle du second tour du 29 octobre 2006 devant la Cour suprême de justice, quatorzième feuillet, inédit HCM, Le Ministère public et parties civiles c. Kakwavu, « Arrêt », affaire n° 004/2010, 7 novembre 2014, in Bulletin des arrêts de la Haute Cour militaire, la lutte contre les violences sexuelles, Numéro spécial, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2016, p. 69. xxi Ministère public et parties civiles c. Adémar Ilunga et consorts, arrêt du 28 juin 2007, Cour militaire du Katanga, RP 010/2006 (inédit). TMG/Bunia, Ministère public et parties civiles c. Kakado Barnaba, « Jugement », affaire n° RP N°071/09, 009/010 et 074/010, 9 juillet 2010. TMG/Goma, Ministère public et parties civiles c. Kalambay et consorts, affaire n° RP 356/2009, 24 avril 2009. Tribunal militaire de garnison (TMG) de l’Ituri, Ministère public et Parties civiles c. Masumbuko Papy et autres, « Jugement », affaire n° RP 246/13, 16 avril 2014. xxii xxiii LIST OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS International treaties and agreements Annexed to Resolution ICC-ASP/10/Res.5, Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of States Parties Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 1945 Charter of the United Nations / Charte des Nations Unies Convention Between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal Emigration, Signed at Neuilly Convention contre le genocide Conventions de Genève de 1949 et leurs deux protocoles additionnels Convention IV de La Haye de 1907 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1973 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1960 Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 41/128 of 1986; the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme List of legal instruments xxiv Décret du 6 août 1959 portant Code de procédure pénale European Molecular Biology Laboratory Arbitration General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) (1962) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 entered into force Oct. 21, 1950 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950 ICC ASP Resolution on Cooperation, ICC-ASP/12/Res.3, 27 November 2013 ICC Statute: genocide; crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression ICGLR Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, 30 November 2006 International covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 Loi organique n° 13/010 du 19 février 2013 relative à la procédure devant la Cour de cassation Nations Unies, Conseil de Sécurité, Résolution 955 du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, adoptée le 08 novembre 1995. S/RES/955 (1995) Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques de 1966 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts- ILC, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001 xxv List of legal instruments Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998 Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) of the Rome Statute Statut du TMI de Nuremberg (1945) Statute of the International Court of Justice Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1994 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 1993 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2000 The Hague Regulations 1907 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 1962 United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties UN Instruments UNSC Nations Unies, Conseil de Sécurité, Rapport du Secrétaire général sur le Rétablissement de l’état de droit et administration de la justice pendant la période de transition dans les sociétés en proie à un conflit ou sortant d’un conflit, (S/2004/616) Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the Decisions of the Assembly of the African Union on the International Criminal Court, Executive Council, Thirty-Fourth Ordinary Session, 7 - 8 February 2019, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, EX.CL/1138(XXXIV) Report of the Secretary, General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (30 March 2001) UN Doc. S/2001/331 List of legal instruments xxvi Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Doc. A/54/726, S/2000/59 Other Regulations Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907. African Union African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981 / Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 1968 African Union Protocol on Amendment to the Protocol to the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Trans boundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, 1991 Chronique de droit pénal de l’Union Africaine. L’élargissement du mandat de la Cour africaine de Justice et des droits de l’homme aux affaires de droit international pénal » (2014) Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000 Lusaka Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora, 1994 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (The Malabo Protocol) AU Assembly Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec.245 (XIII) Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.270(XIV) Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the Assembly Decisions on the International Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec.397(XVIII) Decision on the International Criminal Court, Doc. EX.CL/1068(XXXII), Assembly/ AU/Dec.672(XXX) xxvii List of legal instruments National Legislation Kenya Penal Code, Cap 63 Laws of Kenya Interpretation and General Provisions Act, Cap 2 Laws of Kenya Constitution of Kenya, 1963 Constitution of Kenya 2010 International Crimes Act 2009 Special Tribunal of Kenya Bill The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, 2009 Judicial Services Act Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission Act 2008 Victim Protection Act, 2014 Central African Republic Code pénal centrafricaine Constitution Centrafricaine du 30 mars 2016 Code judiciaire militaire De la loi sur la CPS Du Règlement de procédure et de preuve de la CPS Other Countries Constitution congolaise de la transition du 4 avril 2003 (Congo) Constitution burundaise de 2018 (Burundi) Criminal Code of California (California, USA) List of legal instruments xxviii Criminal Code (administration of justice offenses) amendment Bill 2005, Explanatory Statement 2005, (Australia) Criminal Law Act 1967 (UK) The International Criminal Court Act No. 27 of 2011 for Mauritius Penal Code (France) Penal Code (Congo) xxix PREFACE The ‘African Group of Experts on International Criminal Justice’ was formed in 2010 under the auspices of the Multinational Development Policy Dialogue of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) based in Brussels, Belgium. The group comprises of academics, researchers and legal practitioners drawn from various parts of the Sub Saharan Africa with keen interest and expertise in the field of International Criminal Law, whose primary focus is to produce a regular edited publication to serve as an Annual Compendium of International Criminal Justice on the African Continent. The group has been meeting annually since 2011 and has so far published five editions. Like the previous five editions, this publication offers our distinguished readers interesting piece of literature that addresses diverse issues of International Criminal Law as perceived and narrated by Africans as our modest contribution to the understanding and embracing of international criminal law norms and standards on the continent. This aims to provide contemporaneous, diverse and critical perspectives from within Africa regarding important developments and issues relating to the prosecution of international and transnational crimes on the continent. The publication aims to reflect the character of the modern, complementarity-centred international criminal justice system in that its focus falls not only on supranational (continental and regional) developments, but also on developments at state level within Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the publication aims to reflect both legal and extra-legal developments in order to provide a holistic understanding of the project of international criminal justice as it affects Africa and Africans as well as the challenges facing this project. I thank all the authors namely, Gift Joseph Kweka, Bernard Ntahiraja, Jacques Mbokani, Balingene Kahombo, Nabil M. Orina, Juliet Okoth, Aimé-Parfait Niyonkuru, Eugene Bakama, Steven Kayuni and Nestor Nkurunziza for their contributions which make this book worth reading. Special thanks to Beitel van der Merwe and Gerhard Kemp for supporting the authors and editing this publication. I also wish to thank Prof. Hartmut Hamann for xxx Preface assisting with the French editing as well as Cindy Salim, Selina Rohr and Edena Alfa for their help throughout the publication process. Last but not least I thank Peter Wendoh, the Project Advisor of KAS Rule of Law Program Sub Sahara Africa for coordinating the work of this group and for his tireless efforts to ensuring that the work of this group is showcased and sustained. Dr. Arne Wulff Director Rule of Law Program Sub Sahara Africa xxxi Gift Joseph Kweka THE AFRICAN GROUP OF EXPERTS ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE About the group: The group meets annually to discuss matters related to international criminal justice on the African continent. The members of the group are drawn from various parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and consist of academics and legal practitioners holding expertise in the field of international criminal law. Mission statement: The group’s primary focus is to produce a regular edited publication to serve as an annual compendium of international criminal justice on the African continent. The publication is created by Africans for a global readership and aims to provide contemporaneous, diverse and critical perspectives from within Africa regarding important developments and issues relating to the prosecution of international and transnational crimes on the continent. The publication aims to reflect the character of the modern, complementarity-centred international criminal justice system in that its focus falls not only on supranational (continental and regional) developments, but also on developments at state level within Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the publication aims to reflect both legal and extra-legal developments in order to provide a holistic understanding of the project of international criminal justice as it affects Africa and Africans as well as the challenges facing this project. Towards an international criminal law regime for the regulation of the exploitation of natural resources... xxxii 1 Gift Joseph Kweka TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW REGIME FOR THE REGULATION OF THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: AFRICA AS PIONEER Gift Joseph Kweka1 Abstract The regime of international criminal law (ICL) was formally developed after the Second World War in 1945 and arguably reached its apex in 1998 when the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) was established. ICL was developed with overarching objective of ending impunity for specific crimes associated with gross violations of human rights by punishing the perpetrators of such crimes. These crimes are primarily the so-called core international crimes, namely, crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and the crime of aggression. There has therefore been little if any focus within the ICL regime on crimes relating to the exploitation of natural resources. This notwithstanding that there has been an increasing outcry regarding illicit exploitation of natural resources, especially from within Africa; Being limited to the apportionment of individual criminal liability, the application and enforcement of international criminal justice has struggled to adapt so as to address crimes regarding the exploitation of natural resources in conflict torn countries, including the role of corporation therein. The aim of this article is, first, to explore the possibility of employing international criminal justice to combat the exploitation of natural resources by way of the already established core international crimes. Secondly, whether international criminal justice may be expanded to combat distinct or tailormade crimes that are purely related to the exploitation of natural resources; the author has employed historical assessment of the problem of illegal exploitation of natural resources in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Further, a doctrinal methodology was used to provide an analysis of the regional provisions governing illegal exploitation of natural resources in Africa. 1 Director of Coordination and Advisory Services in the Office of the Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania. Towards an international criminal law regime for the regulation of the exploitation of natural resources... VERS UN REGIME DU DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL POUR LA REGLEMENTATION DE L’EXPLOITATION DES RESSOURCES NATURELLES: L’AFRIQUE EN TANT QUE PIONNIERE Résumé Le régime du droit pénal international (DPI) a été formellement développé après la Seconde Guerre mondiale en 1945 et a sans doute atteint son apogée en 1998 lorsque la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) permanente a été créée. Le DPI été élaboré dans le but primordial de mettre fin à l’impunité pour des crimes spécifiques associés à des violations flagrantes des droits humains en punissant les auteurs de ces crimes. Il s’agit principalement des crimes dits crimes internationaux fondamentaux, à savoir les crimes contre l’humanité, les crimes de guerre, le génocide et le crime d’agression. Par conséquent, le régime du DPI ne s’est guère ou pas du tout intéressé aux crimes liés à l’exploitation des ressources naturelles. Nonobstant le tollé croissant que suscite l’exploitation illicite des ressources naturelles, en particulier en Afrique, l’application et l’exécution de la justice pénale internationale, limitée à la répartition de la responsabilité pénale individuelle, ont eu du mal à s’adapter pour faire face aux crimes liés à l’exploitation des ressources naturelles dans les pays en conflit, y compris le rôle des entreprises. Lé but de cet article est, premièrement, d’explorer la possibilité de faire recours à la justice pénale internationale pour combattre l’exploitation des ressources naturelles par le biais des principaux crimes internationaux déjà établis. Deuxièmement, la justice pénale internationale peut-elle être étendue à la lutte contre des crimes distincts ou sur mesure qui sont purement liés à l’exploitation des ressources naturelles ? L’auteur a utilisé une évaluation historique du problème de l’exploitation illégale des ressources naturelles en Afrique, en Amérique latine et en Asie. En outre, une méthodologie doctrinale a été utilisée pour analyser les dispositions régionales régissant l’exploitation illégale des ressources naturelles en Afrique. 2 3 1 Gift Joseph Kweka Introduction Natural resources denote such resources as are naturally occurring both on land and sea. These resources are traditionally under the sovereign right of a particular state2 or under the common heritage of mankind.3It is therefore expected that the exploitation of natural resources adheres to the norms and standards established by international, regional or domestic legal authorities to enhance the promotion and protection of human rights while maximizing the benefits to the countries endowed with such wealth of natural resources. Research has however shown that there is a prevalent problem of illegal exploitation of natural resources in some countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia.4 The term “illegal” and “illicit” are used interchangeably to denote exploitation of natural resources contrary to rules of international and national law.5 When considering the historical account of the problems faced by resource rich countries, it is evident that, the countries must be the drivers of any distinct legal regime or framework to criminalize the illegal exploitation of natural resources. Looking back to the 1880’s, when colonization and the scramble for, and partition of Africa reached its apex, a major driving force behind colonization was the allure of the wealth of natural resources in the colonized countries.6 It was not the beneficiaries of the colonization process that drove the agenda for self-determination, but rather the affected countries that took steps towards the realization of self-determination. This must also be true for the problem of illegal exploitation of natural resources. The most affected countries must be the primary driving force towards an international criminal law regime for the exploitation of natural resources. 2 3 4 5 6 General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) (1962)), and the subsequent 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (UN General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX) (1974). The unequal trading relations, foreign commercial control over natural resources or long term resource compromise on unfavorable terms has resulted in the watering down of the permanent sovereignty over natural resources, the right which states ought to have had upon the end of colonial domination. Higgins R, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Oxford, United Kingdom, Oxford University Press, p. 129. Solinge B, T. Paoli, Letizia (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 500 – 528. See information available at https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/natural-resourcesexploitation-in-latin- America-violates-human-rights/ (Accessed 12 December 2018). Security Council Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of DR Congo, 12 April 2001, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/democraticrepublic-congo/report-panel-experts-illegal-exploitation-natural-resources-and “In the Panel’s view, the understanding of illegality is underpinned by four elements all related to the rule of law, namely: (a) Violation of sovereignty. This posits that all activities - extraction, production, commercialization and exports - taking place …without the consent of the legitimate government are illegal. (b) Respect by actors of the existing regulatory framework in the country or territory where they operate or carry out their activities. …carrying out of an activity in violation of an existing body of regulations [is illegal]. (c) The discrepancy between widely accepted practices in trade and business and the way business is conducted in ... (d) The violation of international law including “soft” law.” Ferro M, Colonization: A Global History, Routledge, 1997. Towards an international criminal law regime for the regulation of the exploitation of natural resources... 4 One of the objectives of ICL is to contribute to peace building processes and to bring stability in post-conflict communities. But also the regime’s important role on issues of exploitation of natural resources can therefore not be ignored. As pointed out earlier, the development of international criminal justice was primarily focused on a limited category of crimes, namely, the core crimes. There has been paucity to introduce serious economic and financial crimes committed by corporations in the course of exploitation of natural resources as international crimes proper.7 However, ICL has witnessed a shift at least at African Union level. Thus, in the African context, supranational criminal liability has expanded to cover crimes such as the crime of unconstitutional change of government; piracy, terrorism, mercenary, corruption, money laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in drugs, trafficking in hazardous wastes, and illicit exploitation of natural resources.8 On top of the abovementioned lacuna, ICL is solely focused on individual criminal liability. Despite the recognition made by arguably the first international criminal tribunal - the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) - of criminal liability of legal entities9 there has thus far been no solidification of international criminal norms on this aspect. The IMT declared the leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Gestapo, the Sicherheitsdienst and the Schutzstaffel to be criminal groups and individual businesspeople that supported the Nazi and Japanese governments were held criminally liable.10 It was expected that such a legal regime would have crystallized but the instruments establishing the 1993 and 1994 ad hoc tribunals,11 Special courts12 (with the exception of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon13) and even the International Criminal Court have endowed these courts with personal jurisdiction over individuals/natural persons with a notable omission on the criminal liability of legal persons.14Although proposals were tabled during the negotiations for the establishment of the ICC to give 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Graff J, “Corporate War Criminals and the International Criminal Court: Blood and Profits in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” available at https://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/11/2graff.pdf; Report of the ICJ expert legal panel on Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability: Vol 2 Criminal Law and International Crimes, 2008, available at https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/Corporate-complicity-legalaccountability-vol2-publication-2009-eng.pdf Protocol on Amendment to the Protocol to the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights Adopted by The Twenty-Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly, held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea 27th June 2014 (herein referred to as the Malabo Protocol). Article 9 and 10 of the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 82 U.N.T.C. 280, 8 August 1945; Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 1945. Jessie Chella, “The Complicity of Multinational Corporations in International Crimes: An Examination of Principles,” PhD Thesis, pp. 200-201. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1994; Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 1993. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2000. Al-Jadeed S.A.L. & Al Khayat (The Al-Jadeed Case), STL-14-05/T/CJ, Judgment, Special Trib. for Lebanon Sept. 18, 2015. The court has affirmed its jurisdiction over legal persons. Although the case was dealing with offences against the administration of justice, the court interpreted rule 60bis “the power to hold in contempt any person” to include both natural and legal persons in line with the spirit of the statute according to rule 3A. Article 25, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998. 5 Gift Joseph Kweka the court jurisdiction over legal persons, they were rejected because of the lack of state practice on the doctrine of corporate criminal liability.15 However, state practice has been changing since the Rome Statute was adopted nearly 2 decades ago.16 This chapter explores how international criminal justice is/can be used to regulate the exploitation of natural resources. First, the background to the problem of illegal exploitation of natural resources is provided, clearly highlighting the absence of regional peculiarity to the problem, which serves as a justification for it to be included as one of international crimes. The chapter then proceeds to an examination of the body of international humanitarian law as it governs illegal exploitation of natural resources during armed conflict and the limitations in the current ICL framework. The chapter thereafter proceeds to an analysis of the crime of illicit exploitation of natural resources as advanced by the African Union (AU) as a first step towards an international criminal law regime for regulating the exploitation of natural resources. 2 An overview of the problem of natural resource exploitation As stated in the introduction, the problem of illegal exploitation of natural resources is not unique to Africa. That being said, UN reports have most frequently addressed the problem in African situations. Example, in 2001, a report from the United Nations Security Council revealed the extent of illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo.17 The report stated inter alia that: Illegal exploitation of the mineral and forest resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is taking place at an alarming rate. Two phases can be distinguished: mass-scale looting and the systematic and systemic exploitation of natural resources, mass-scale looting, during this first phase, stockpiles of minerals, coffee, wood, livestock and money that were available in territories conquered by the armies of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda were taken, and either transferred to those countries or exported to international markets by their forces and nationals… The systematic exploitation flourished because of the pre-existing structures developed during the conquest of power of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire. These pre-existing structures were improved over time and new networks for channelling extracted resources were put in place. However, the systemic exploitation used the existing systems of control established by Rwanda and Uganda. In both cases, exploitation was often carried out in violation of the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the national legislation and sometimes international law, and it led to illicit activities.18 15 16 17 18 Chella A, ‘The Complicity of Multinational Corporations in International Crimes: An Examination of Principles ‘in Kyriakakis J, International Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Corporations before International Criminal Courts: Implications for the International Criminal Justice Project, pp. 223 – 224; Kaeb C, “The Shifting Sands of Corporate Liability under International Criminal Law,” The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev., 2016, Vol. 49, pp. 377-379. Kaeb C, “The Shifting Sands of Corporate Liability under International Criminal Law,” pp. 379 – 381. Ibid. Ibid., para 4 – 6. Towards an international criminal law regime for the regulation of the exploitation of natural resources... 6 Another report issued in 2015 by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) revealed the continued prevalence of the problem of illegal exploitation of natural resources in DRC. The report has stated that; “illicit natural resources exploitation in eastern DRC is valued at over USD 1.25 billion per year (USD 722–862 million if excluding diamonds also sourced outside eastern DRC).“19 The proceeds accruing from illicit exploitation of natural resources have been used to fuel armed conflicts in different parts of Africa such as Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Angola, DRC and the Central Africa Republic, to mention just a few.20 Illegal exploitation of natural resources is also prevalent in other parts of the globe. For example, reports from different non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have shown the existence of illegal exploitation in Indonesia.21 It is documented that: In the 30 years between 1975 and 2005, Indonesia’s forest cover decreased from 130 million hectares to 91 million hectares … The main causes for deforestation in Indonesia have been logging for timber, mining, palm oil, and—less known— paper. The world’s two largest paper pulp factories, owned by APP and RAPP, are, however, found on the island of Sumatra. Both companies have been accused, mainly by NGOs, of also logging illegally.22 Latin American countries have also fallen victims to illegal exploitation of natural resources.23 Examples have been drawn from countries such as Brazil and Argentina.24 The lack of geographical limitation to the problem of illegal exploitation of natural resources calls for a holistic approach to addressing it. Over the years, the criminalization of illegal exploitation of natural resources has been left solely to national jurisdictions. There have however been challenges in addressing illegal exploitation at regional level due to the involvement of Transnational Corporations (TNCs), which operate in a multinational level and pose difficulties for ensuring accountability.25 This has resulted in the inability of individual countries to address effectively illegal exploitation of natural resources and the root cause of conflicts fuelled by illegal exploitation of 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Experts’ background report on illegal exploitation and trade in natural resources benefitting organized criminal groups and recommendations on MONUSCO’s role in fostering stability and peace in Eastern DR Congo. Final report, 15th April 2015, Available at www.unep.org. Ballentine K & Sherman J (ed.), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, International Peace Academy Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, pp. 1-3. Solinge B, Paoli T, Letizia (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 505 -507.See also Obidzinski K, ‘Illegal Logging in Indonesia: Myth and Reality, in Resosudarmo PB, (ed.) The Politics and Economics of Indonesia’s Natural Resources, ISEAS publications, 2005, pp. 193 – 205; Erman E, Coal mining in West Sumatra: Access and Actors in Post Soeharto Era,’ ‘in Resosudarmo PB, (ed.) The Politics and Economics of Indonesia’s Natural Resources, ISEAS publications, 2005, pp. 206-215. Ibid., p. 507. Bavinck M, Pellegrin L and Mostert., (eds) Conflicts over Natural Resources in the Global South: Conceptual Approaches, CRC Press, 2014. Ibid. See also Solinge B, Paoli T, Letizia (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime. Chella A, ‘The Complicity of Multinational Corporations in International Crimes: An Examination of Principles’. 7 Gift Joseph Kweka natural resources.26 There is therefore a need for the international community to consider a new approach to tackling the problem. The reach and effectiveness of the current ICL framework is limited, as indicated below. 2.1 IHL and the prohibition of illegal exploitation of natural resources during armed conflict International Humanitarian Law (IHL) regulates the conduct of parties during armed conflict either of internal or international character.27 These rules, when violated, result in the commission of war crimes which have been prosecuted under the regime of international criminal justice. The Rome Statute has lengthy provisions on war crimes as governed by article 8 of the Statute. In order to establish that the exploitation of natural resource amounts to a war crime, it must be within the prohibited conducts in the body of IHL. Therefore, the material, mental and contextual elements of liability must be present. Emphasis is placed on contextual element which is what qualifies the crime as a war crime.28 Provisions dealing directly with issues of exploitation of natural resources cover situations of occupation.29 Other prohibitions connected to the exploitation of natural reasons are those providing for the crime of pillage or those addressing plunder, looting and theft during armed conflict.30The crime of pillage denotes the prohibition on the appropriation of property during armed conflict.31 The statutes of the International 26 27 28 29 30 31 Report of the Secretary, General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict ‘(30 March 2001) UN Doc. S/2001/331, p. 61; Bucy P H, “Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does It Make Sense?” 2007, No. 44 American Criminal Law Review, p. 1437: “... the impact of the pursuit of economic interests in conflict areas has come under increasingly critical scrutiny. Corporations have been accused of complicity with human rights abuses, and corporate royalties have continued to fuel wars. It has become common knowledge that by selling diamonds and other valuable minerals, belligerents can supply themselves with small arms and light weapons, thereby prolonging and intensifying the fighting and the suffering of civilians.” Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; and Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907. Article 8 of the Rome Statute states that the court “…shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.” Article 42 of The Hague Regulations 1907 states that a “territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.” The Hague Regulations 1907 Article 47 and Article 28 which prohibit “pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault” () and further state that “[p]illage is formally forbidden”; Fourth Geneva Convention, which applies in international armed conflicts, also prohibits pillaging. Article 4(2)(g) of Additional Protocol II which applies to non-international armed conflicts also prohibits pillaging. Herik LVD& Jong DDD, “Revitalizing the Antique War Crime of Pillage: The Potential and Pitfalls of Using International Criminal Law to Address Illegal Resource Exploitation During Armed Conflict,” 15 Criminal Law Forum, 237 (2011), pp. 270-274. Towards an international criminal law regime for the regulation of the exploitation of natural resources... 8 Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),32 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),33 the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the proposed African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR)34 have provisions to that effect. Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) of the Rome Statute covers the crime of pillage for the situation of international armed conflict and in Article 8(2)(e)(v) covers the situation of noninternational armed conflict. The provisions in the establishing statute are brief, merely stating that “[p]illaging a town or place, even when taken by assault” is a crime.35 The elaboration as to what really amounts to pillaging is therefore covered under the Elements of Crimes of the establishing statutes. In order to prove that the crime of pillage has been committed, the following elements must be established: 1. The perpetrator appropriated certain property; 2. The perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of the property and to appropriate it for private or personal use; 3. The appropriation was without the consent of the owner;36 4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international/ internal armed conflict; and 5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.37 When considering the above elements for the crime of pillage, the term property denotes both personal property and any other property such as natural resources which are resources naturally occurring on land or sea. The law can therefore be employed to cover natural resources when taken within the stipulated context. This will entail situations where natural resources are appropriated with the intention of depriving the owner of the natural resources and to appropriate such resources for personal use without the consent of the owner. This can be done directly by corporations engaged in the exploitation of natural resources38 or by organized groups under the command of a leader. It is also recognized that an otherwise legitimate business of exploitation of natural resources can turn into pillage if such exploitation exceeds the agreed quantity or is done without following the regulations of a particular country.39 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 Article 3(e), Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia “plunder of public or private property” as a violation of the laws or customs of war and 2 (d) prohibits pillage as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Article 4(f), Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, provides for the prosecution of pillage as a violation of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions. Article 28D (b) (xvii), Malabo Protocol. Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) of the Rome Statute. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Case No.: ICC01/05-01/08, 21 March 2016, para 116. This can be inferred from the absence of the owner in the place where the property was taken or the existence of coercion. Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) and Article 8(2)(e)(v), International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes. Nuremberg Judgment, p. 306. Stewart JG, Corporate War Crime: Prosecuting the Pillage of Natural Resources, Open Society Institute, 9 Gift Joseph Kweka The Elements of Crime to the Rome Statute has added an additional requirement to the act of appropriation as above. Thus, appropriation must be done for private or personal use. This restriction of the definition is not supported by jurisprudence and existing norms on the crime of pillage.40The jurisprudence on the crime of pillage denotes the need to prove appropriation without consent. There is therefore no added requirement to prove that the perpetrator intended to put it to private use.41Such appropriation is however subject to exceptions contained in the Hague Regulations.42 The elements that qualifies the act of appropriation to be an actus reus for the crime of pillage is the absence of the consent of the owner of such property. In the context of this chapter, the consent referred to is that of the owner of natural resources. Deriving from the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, it is settled position that a state concerned has sovereign right over its natural resources.43 This gives a state the right to enact laws to regulate the manner in which it wishes to recognize ownership of natural resources and thereby ways of disposing them. A state can confer ownership of natural resources to a natural or legal person depending on domestic laws. Most laws fall in either of the following systems: claims,44 accession45 or concession.46 Those engaged in the exploitation of natural resources must therefore abide by the rules and regulations provided by a state. Another essential element of the crime of pillage is the need to prove a nexus between the armed conflict and the conduct of appropriation. In the wording of the ICC Elements of Crime, “the conduct must take place in the context of and was associated with an international or internal armed conflict.”47 Since pillage is a war crime, the conduct must therefore have a nexus to an armed conflict meaning that, the armed conflict must 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 2011, p. 34 para 41-43. Available at https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/pillagemanual-2nd-edition-2011.pdf Ibid, p. 20, para 16 and 17. Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, para. 160 (August 2, 2007); Prosecutor v. Brima, et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber II (SCSL June 20, 2007) at 232. Article 52, 53, 54,55 Hague Regulations, “Requisition for the needs of the army of the occupation, movable property of a nature to serve the operation of the war, munitions de-guere, usufruct by safeguarding the capital of the property.” General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) (1962)), and the subsequent 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (UN General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX) (1974). The unequal trading relations, foreign commercial control over natural resources or long term resource compromise on unfavorable terms has resulted in the watering down of the permanent sovereignty over natural resources, the right which states ought to have had upon the end of colonial domination. See also, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J, 19 December 2005, para. 244. Stewart JG, Corporate War Crime: Prosecuting the Pillage of Natural Resources, pp. 39-40. This system recognizes as lawful owner anyone who discovers a deposit of natural resources. Ibid. This system recognizes as lawful owner of natural resources the owner of land where natural resources are found. Ibid. This system recognizes the state as the owner of natural resources. The state usually establishes authorities which are responsible in the regulation of exploitation of such natural; resources example, granting of license for extraction. Article 8(2)(b)(xvi), International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes. Towards an international criminal law regime for the regulation of the exploitation of natural resources... 10 be an incentive for the perpetrator to commit the crime. This requirement will exclude ordinary crimes from being categorized as war crimes. Thus, conduct that satisfies all the elements to be regarded as the crime of pillage would be disqualified if not committed in the context of and associated with an armed conflict. In cases of natural resources, the perpetrators must therefore take advantage of the armed conflict to commit or facilitate the commission of illegal exploitation of natural resources. The law of armed conflicts has over the years maintained the distinction between inter-state and intra-state armed conflicts.48 The crime of pillage can be committed in either of the conflicts. Thus, the perpetrator must be aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict in which such appropriation is done. The prosecution of the crime of pillage before the ICTR, ICTY and SCSL was not focused on the exploitation of natural resources but rather for convictions for pillaging personal property not connected to natural resources.49 Even with the recent decision by the ICC in the case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo the charges and hence conviction has continued to focus on personal property like houses and personal belongings.50 This sharply contrast the prosecutions conducted immediately after the World War II where businessmen were prosecuted for pillaging natural resources.51 With contemporary reports denoting illegal exploitation of natural resources during armed conflict, for example in the DRC, it is imperative that the prosecution stretches the investigation to provide for charges on the crime of pillage in connection to exploitation of natural resources where individuals bear the responsibility (i.e. where they were in charge, or in control of the illegal exploitation of natural resources).52 The perpetrators may not necessarily be the direct perpetrators but those that aided or abetted such exploitation. Individuals who take advantage of existing conflicts to extract minerals and other natural resources for private use and without the consent of the state concerned cannot be left outside the ambit of accountability of international criminal justice. The only limitation of IHL as a regime for regulating the exploitation of natural resources is that it applies only in times of armed conflicts. The requirement under IHL of a nexus with an armed conflict is another important reason why a distinct crime 48 49 50 51 52 An international armed conflict will involve instances where the conflict is between two states or a third state has intervened in an internal conflict or the participants in armed conflict act on behalf another state. On the other hand, an internal armed conflict exists when an organized armed group engages in war with government forces. Prosecutor v. Brima. The perpetrators were convicted for the crime of pillage on the basis of “appropriation of goods such as “palm wine, televisions, radios and other goods, and a “gold plated wrist watch.” Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Case No.: ICC-01/05-01/08, 21 March 2016, para 44 and 45. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 October 1946 - April 1949, pp. 1344 – 1345. Keenan PJ, “Conflict Minerals and the Law of Pillage,” Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol 14, No. 2 2014, pp. 540-543. 11 Gift Joseph Kweka of exploitation of natural resources is needed. The requirement excludes all illegal exploitation of natural resources not connected or associated with an armed conflict. If accountability under the ICL regime in respect of exploitation of natural resources is limited to the IHL regime, there is a real risk of harbouring impunity in respect of similar acts perpetrated outside the context of an armed conflict unless they result in the commission of core international crimes. The office of the ICC Prosecutor has recognised the problem of illegal exploitation of natural resources by seeking to assist national jurisdictions to tackle the problem. Office of the Prosecutor Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation states that, [t]he Office will also seek to cooperate and provide assistance to States, upon request, with respect to conduct which constitutes a serious crime under national law, such as the illegal exploitation of natural resources, arms trafficking, human trafficking, terrorism, financial crimes, land grabbing or the destruction of the environment.53 While the above policy is commendable, the objective of the ICC to combat impunity and prevent recurrence of violence is not comprehensively achieved. As stated earlier, the proceeds of illicit exploitation of natural resources are often used to finance conflicts. If there is no accountability for such conduct ICL falls short of its key objective of ensuring the perpetrators of international crimes are held accountable. 2.2 Expanding the list of international crimes: The Malabo Protocol approach As stated in the introductory part of this chapter, ICL is historically limited to four core international crimes namely war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and the crime of aggression. The issue of illegal exploitation of natural resources was not included in the draft documents leading to the adoption of the Rome Statute.54However, in the contemporary world, a reassessment needs to be made in order to provide for the inclusion of illegal exploitation of natural resources as one of the core international crimes. Bassiouni has provided elements that must be taken into account when recognizing conduct as an international crime. These elements include, but are not limited to the following: such crimes must violate the fundamental values of the international community as a whole particularly posing a threat to international peace and security;55 conduct must be offensive to commonly shared values of the world community; there has to be the presence of transnational implication to the alleged conduct; and the harmful nature of the conduct to internationally protected persons.56 When considering the crime of illegal exploitation of natural resources, the assessment in part 2 of this chapter shows the grievous nature of the crime and how it has 53 54 55 56 Office of the Prosecutor Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016, p. 4, para 7. Available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf Ezekiel A, The Application of International Criminal Law to Resource Exploitation: Ituri, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 47Nat.Resources J.225 (2007). Rome Statute preamble para 3. M. Cherif Bassiouni Introduction to International Criminal Law, p. 143-146. Towards an international criminal law regime for the regulation of the exploitation of natural resources... 12 financed armed conflicts in different parts of the world.57 Further, it was evident that the illegal exploitation of natural resources is not a problem unique to Africa, as other parts of the world such as Latin America, Asia and Middle East are also affected thereby.58 The gravity of the problem and the varied communities affected in different regions of the world are features that portray illegal exploitation of natural as an issue of concern to international community not only particular states or regions. It is self-evident that illegal exploitation of natural resource is not a matter to be left to the jurisdiction of individual states. Further, it must be recognised that the illegal exploitation of natural resources is a continued threat to international peace and security, as its proceeds often fund armed groups in conflicts areas. In light of the foregoing, it is submitted that there is there are cogent reasons to elevate the crime of exploitation of natural resources to the status of a distinct “international crime”. Another feature which qualifies illegal exploitation of natural resources to be included as one of the core international crimes is the involvement of states or state corporations (a component which was also taken into account in the current core international crimes) and Transnational Corporations (TNCs). For the past decade, the international community has awakened to the need to regulate the conduct of powerful business entities in light of the burgeoning violations of human rights committed, aided or abetted by such entities.59 This has led to the development and adoption of regulatory frameworks such as the United Nations Global Compact, 2000; the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, 2003;60the Equator Principles, 2006; and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, adopted in 1976 and revised in 2011. These regulations, however, do not specifically address the problem of illegal exploitation of natural resources. Furthermore, these regulations impose only civil measures on offending parties. Therefore, if illegal exploitation of natural resources is to be effectively addressed, it is important to create an international criminal law regime that will give jurisdiction to the ICC over TNCs. 57 58 59 60 Report of the Secretary, General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict ‘(30 March 2001) UN Doc. S/2001/331, p. 61. Solinge B., T. Paoli, Letizia (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime, pp. 505 -507. Amnesty International, “Corporate Accountability,” available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/ corporate-accountability/(Accessed 19 August 2018) “Companies operating across borders are often involved in severe abuses, such as forced labour or forcibly relocating communities from their lands. Unsurprisingly, abuses are particularly stark in the extractive sector, with companies racing against each other to mine scarce and valuable resources. Panda B, “Multinational corporations and human rights violations: Call for rebuilding the laws of twenty-first century”, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 20 Issue: 4, 2013, pp.422-432. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003), rule C3. “transnational corporations and other business enterprises not engage in nor benefit from war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, forced disappearance, forced or compulsory labour, hostage-taking, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, other violations of humanitarian law and other international crimes against the human person as defined by international law, in particular human rights and humanitarian law.” 13 Gift Joseph Kweka Africa is standing out as the pioneer in its efforts to elevate the illegal exploitation of natural resources to a crime at regional level. In this regard, Africa has had to move on its own accord due the reality that the beneficiaries of illegal exploitation of natural resources have over the years been Western Countries, whose TNCs operate in the global south.61 As such, they cannot be the drivers for a more comprehensive international criminal law regime to regulate the exploitation of natural resources. The African Union Protocol on Amendment to the Protocol to the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights has therefore expanded the list of crimes to be prosecuted by the proposed court to include among others the crime of illicit exploitation of natural resources.62 It is outside the scope of the chapter to assess the content and possibility of entry into force of the Protocol, the chapter seeks to examine the new approach to the crime of illegal exploitation of natural resources. Apprehension over illicit exploitation of natural resources is not a recent development. African Countries have over the years expressed concern to this problem either through the AU or sub regional groups like the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). It is within the framework of the ICGLR that a Protocol was adopted to address the problem.63 The Protocol cited a number of international instruments touching on the issue of illegal exploitation of natural resources.64 There is no international treaty that explicitly provides for the crime of illegal exploitation of natural resources. The provision under the Protocol provides the African continent with a golden opportunity to contribute positively to the progressive development of international law, thereby moving from being receivers of international norms to creators thereof. The ICGLR Protocol defines Illegal Exploitation as “any exploration, development, acquisition, and disposition of natural resources that is contrary to law, custom, practice, or principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, as well as the provisions of this Protocol”.65 The Protocol, under article 12, provides for the criminalization of illegal exploitation of natural resources by imposing a positive obligation on member states to 61 62 63 64 65 Bavinck M, Pellegrin L and Mostert., (eds.) Conflicts over Natural Resources in the Global South: Conceptual Approaches. Article 28A(1)(13), Malabo Protocol. Preamble, para 6, ICGLR Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, 30 November 2006. Ibid, preamble para 11. “the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000; the 2 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966; the International covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966; the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981; the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 1968; the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1973; the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Trans boundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, 1991; the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992; the Lusaka Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora, 1994; the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1960 ; the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 1962; the Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 41/128 of 1986 ; the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.” Ibid, article 1. Towards an international criminal law regime for the regulation of the exploitation of natural resources... 14 provide a domestic legislative framework for the offence.66 The Protocol further urges member states to end impunity to such crimes.67 The list of acts which amount to illegal exploitation of natural resources has been provided for under article 12 of the ICGLR Protocol, which was copied verbatim under the Malabo Protocol, article 28L Bis. This has inevitably created vagueness in the criminal provisions of the Protocol, as shall be discussed more fully below. The Malabo Protocol has qualified the acts by limiting them to serious behaviour that affects the stability of a state, region or the Union.68 The criteria for categorizing such conduct as serious have not been provided for under the Protocol. It is therefore important that such qualification is made at international level. In this regard, it may be said that Africa has pioneered what can be perfected. However, the consciousness to limit such crimes to only serious crimes is in line with the spirit of ICL, which traditionally deals with crimes of concern to international community. Hence the gravity and scale of the crime must be such as to attract the attention and opprobrium of an international or regional court.69 The crime of illicit exploitation of natural resources includes: a) Concluding an agreement to exploit resources, in violation of the principle of peoples’ sovereignty over their natural resources; b) Concluding with state authorities an agreement to exploit natural resources, in violation of the legal and regulatory procedures of the State concerned; c) Concluding an agreement to exploit natural resources through corrupt practices; d) Concluding an agreement to exploit natural resources that is clearly one-sided; e) Exploiting natural resources without any agreement with the State concerned; f) Exploiting natural resources without complying with norms relating to the protection of the environment and the security of the people and the staff; and g) Violating the norms and standards established by the relevant natural resource certification mechanism.70 As can be seen from the above list, illicit exploitation of natural resources is grouped in three categories namely, those related to concluding of agreements to exploit natural resources in specified conditions, the manner in which exploitation of natural resources is done and certification mechanism. The first group contained in sub-article (a) to (d) addresses the situation prior to the actual exploitation, which would bring consequences.71 These crimes can therefore equate to initial steps taken to create an 66 67 68 69 70 71 Ibid. Ibid, article 9. The desire to ensure impunity is curbed has also been reflected in Lusaka Declaration of the ICGLR Special Summit to Fight Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in The Great Lakes Region, 15 December 2010, para 6. Article 28L Bis, Malabo Protocol. Dam D and Stewart JG, “Illicit Exploitation of Natural Resources - Art. 28L Bis of the Malabo Protocol” in Charles Jalloh & Kamari Clarke, eds., The African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2017, pp. 9-10. Article 28L Bis, Malabo Protocol. Heger M, “Trafficking in Hazardous Waste (Article 28L) and Illicit Exploitation of Natural Resources (Article 28L Bis) in Werle G., Fernandez L. and Vormbaum M., Africa and the International Criminal Court, 15 Gift Joseph Kweka environment conducive to the actual commission of the crime through the conclusion of agreements. It would be better to add a qualifying statement which will embrace both the conclusion of agreements72 and the actual commission of the acts envisioned therein. Therefore, for the purpose of expanding and or enhancing the list of crimes, actual commission should form the focus of the provisions. For example, the act of “Concluding an agreement to exploit natural resources through corrupt practices” can be qualified to add “and/or exploitation of natural resources through corrupt practices.” Further, crimes (a) and (b) have clearly been framed in a biased manner so as to exclude the liability of states or state actors, which undermines the fundamental objective of ICL. Under ICL state actors who in one way or another facilitate the commission of international crimes are held criminally liable as individuals. If one implements “concluding with state authorities an agreement to exploit natural resources, in violation of the legal and regulatory procedures of the State concerned,” only corporations or individuals that have concluded the agreements can be held liable. The state authorities on the other hand have not been captured by this provision. The second group that covers actual exploitation is limited to exploitations without an agreement with the state and those that do not comply with norms regulating the protection of the environment. By limiting the first act to only exploitation without agreement, an important aspect of exploitation is left outside its scope i.e. exploitation that does not comply with laws regulating the exploitation of natural resources. Moreover, “exploitations without an agreement with the state” gives the presumption that all states adhere to the concession system of ownership of natural resources whereby agreements between states and corporations/individuals exploiting natural resources is necessary. This provision therefore eliminates other systems of ownership of natural resources such as “accession” and “claims”, which may not necessarily require an agreement with a state. In the event one is suggesting a regime to be applicable to the international community as a whole, it is necessary that all available systems of ownership be reflected. Therefore, if taken in the manner that the crime is framed at the moment, the crime will be limited to only countries that require such agreements between states and corporations/individuals for the purpose of exploiting natural resources, something that will not be inclusive of the different systems of the world. The last group, which can be termed more novel than the rest, deals with instances where there is a violation of the norms and standards established by the relevant natural resource certification mechanism.73 It must be emphasized that, there is yet to be established international norms or rules that deal with certification mechanism. The two available mechanisms are the Kimberley Process Scheme for the Certification of Rough 72 73 International Criminal Justice Series, Volume 1, Asser Press, 2014, pp. 133-134. Dam D and Stewart JG, “Illicit Exploitation of Natural Resources - Art. 28L Bis of the Malabo Protocol” p. 13. The authors have provided examples of agreements that had violated provisions of the Protocol thereby solidifying the need to criminalize the practice of corporations entering into agreements with rebel groups. Article 28L Bis(g), Malabo Protocol. Towards an international criminal law regime for the regulation of the exploitation of natural resources... 16 Diamonds (KPCS) and the ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM) for tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold (designated minerals).74 Both regimes are geared towards regulating the exporting of natural resources as listed above.75The aim is to ensure that countries put checks mechanism to eliminate conflict of resources. ICGLR certification mechanism contains provisions that impose obligation on states and other actors, including but not limited to mine site inspections and export certification procedures.76 The problem with the inclusion of this subgroup as international crimes is that they contain a long list of standards that must be adhered to and as such have not been drafted with a view of formulating criminal offences. There is therefore a need for drafting more specific provision that provides for those breaches that can truly be qualified as sufficiently egregious to warrant the attention of the international community as a whole. Otherwise there is a possibility of harbouring lesser criminal offences under the umbrella of international crimes. Based on the above assessment of the three groups of conduct that qualify as illegal exploitation of natural resources under the Protocol, one must conclude that the list falls short of the scale and gravity required for an offence to attain the status of core crimes prosecuted under the international legal regime. The framing of each category must be qualified to reflect the gravity of conduct criminalized in order to attain the status of “international crimes.” This can be made in the elements of crime mimicking the ad hoc tribunals, special courts or ICC instruments. 2.3 Accountability of corporations through the doctrine of corporate criminal liability Reports have shown that corporations have also been engaging in illicit exploitation of natural resources in Africa.77 While individuals can be held accountable for committing the war crime of pillage under the current international criminal justice framework, corporations have been left altogether outside the scope of international criminal justice. It being limited to individual criminal liability,78the existing International Criminal law Regulatory framework cannot fully address the problem of illicit exploitation of natural resources, especially where corporations often bear the greatest responsibility in the commission of such crimes. 74 75 76 77 78 ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM) —Certification Manual. See also, Dam D and Stewart JG, “Illicit Exploitation of Natural Resources - Art. 28L Bis of the Malabo Protocol” p. 23. ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM) —Certification Manual, section 1, pg. 4. Ibid. African Progress Report, Equity in Extractives: Stewarding Africa’s natural resources for all, 2013, p. 55-61. See also Tsabora J, “Illicit Natural Resource Exploitation by Private Corporate Interests in Africa’s Maritime Zones during Armed Conflict,” 54 Natural Resources Journal 181, 2014, p. 182. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon in the contempt case of Al-Jadeed where the court has affirmed its jurisdiction over legal persons. Although the case was dealing with offences against the administration of justice, it was the first case before an international tribunal where a corporation was accused of committing a crime. The court interpreted rule 60bis “the power to hold in contempt any person” to include both natural and legal persons in line with the spirit of the statute according to rule 3A of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence - Special Tribunal for Lebanon, STL-BD-2009-01-Rev.9. Available at https://www.stl-tsl.org/ images/RPE/20140403_STL-BD-2009-01-Rev-6-Corr-1_EN.pdf 17 Gift Joseph Kweka To cure the lacuna that exists in international criminal justice, the Malabo Protocol has included the doctrine of corporate criminal liability in order to embrace accountability for the commission of economic related offences listed therein such as the crime of illegal exploitation of natural resources. Hence, the jurisdiction personae of the Court have been expanded to include both individual and corporate criminal liability. The Protocol provides inter alia that: 1. For the purpose of this Statute, the Court shall have jurisdiction over legal persons, with the exception of States. 2. Corporate intention to commit an offence may be established by proof that it was the policy of the corporation to do the act, which constituted the offence. 3. A policy may be attributed to a corporation where it provides the most reasonable explanation of the conduct of that corporation. 4. Corporate knowledge of the commission of an offence may be established by proof that the actual or constructive knowledge of the relevant information was possessed within the corporation. 5. Knowledge may be possessed within a corporation even though the relevant information is divided between corporate personnel. 6. The criminal responsibility of legal persons shall not exclude the criminal responsibility of natural persons who are perpetrators or accomplices in the same crimes. 79 The above provision provides for liability of legal persons, whether public or private in nature. In the reports available, evidence has been presented of the involvement of both private and public enterprises in the illegal exploitation of natural resources in countries like the DRC.80The provision therefore enables this group of perpetrators to be held accountable, something that can be replicated even before other international institutions charged with ending impunity to international crimes. The liability of these corporations does not dissolve the liability of individuals either as direct perpetrators or accomplices.81 In order to establish the mental (mensrea) and material (actus reus) elements of a crime to support corporate criminal liability, the rules relating to attribution come into play. Attribution of conduct is necessary because of the juridical nature of corporations as legal persons whose activities are executed by individuals acting on its behalf.82This is similar to rules governing state responsibility in international law. Thus, not every act of an employee can be attributed to the corporation, but only those performed by persons considered to be the “brain” of the corporation, such as managers and directors.83 Since The Protocol requires one to prove intention and knowledge of the crime then existence of corporate policy to commit a crime in the present case could be attributed to “illegal 79 80 81 82 83 Article 46 B and C, Malabo Protocol. African Progress Report, Equity in Extractives: Stewarding Africa’s natural resources for all, 2013, pp. 82-84. Article 46(C)(6), Malabo Protocol. Kaeb C, “The Shifting Sands of Corporate Liability under International Criminal Law,” p. 383. Ibid. p. 384. Towards an international criminal law regime for the regulation of the exploitation of natural resources... 18 exploitation of natural resources.”84 A policy can be attributed to the corporation where it provides the most reasonable explanation of the conduct of that corporation.85 On the other hand, corporate knowledge denotes the existence of either actual or constructive knowledge of the policy within the corporation.86 As the Protocol rightly provides, knowledge of the commission of the offence need not be possessed by all corporate personnel. Such knowledge can be divided between corporate personnel.87 Another important aspect in corporate liability is the issue of penalty. The Malabo Protocol has given the Court power to impose penalties such as pecuniary fines and forfeiture of “property, proceeds or any assets acquired unlawfully or by criminal conduct” upon conviction.88 These penalties are relevant and practical when dealing with corporate criminal liability. However, the list is not exhaustive to achieve the objective of international criminal justice which anchors among others punishment and deterrence. Therefore, other forms of punishment can be added, for example, a temporary prohibition conducting business, probation by placing the corporation under a monitoring period to confirm compliance and, in severe cases, closure of business.89 Conclusion Illegal exploitation of natural resources is not a problem that is unique to Africa. Asia, Latin America and Middle East are also affected thereby. The role played by TNCs in the illegal exploitation of natural resources is an inherent feature of the problem that brings about the need for a supranational criminal law regime to tackle the problem and bring about accountability. Is the regional framework as advanced by the AU enough to tackle the problem? This chapter has argued that it is not. This is because, on the one hand, the AU framework is limited to one geographical area and, on the other, problems related to the prosecution of multinational corporations will continue to persist. There is therefore a need for the wider international criminal law regime to consider expansion of its substantive jurisdiction to include the criminalization of the distinct crime of illegal exploitation of natural resources. As has been shown in the chapter, international criminal law has focused on core international crimes since its formal inception in 1945. The regulation of exploitation of natural resources has been covered, inadequately so, under the body of IHL, which 84 85 86 87 88 89 Article 46(c)(2), Malabo Protocol. See also Asaala EO, ‘Corporate criminal liability under the Malabo Protocol: Breaking new ground?’ in HJ van der Merwe Gerhard Kemp (eds), International Criminal Justice in Africa 2017, Strathmore University Press, 2017, p. 122. Article 46(c)(3), Malabo Protocol. Article 46(c)(4), Malabo Protocol. Article 46(c)(5), Malabo Protocol. Article 43A(2) and (5), Malabo Protocol. Kweka G.J., “The Regulation of Exploitation of Natural Resources through the Doctrine of Corporate Criminal Liability in Contemporary Africa: Regional and Domestic Legal Regime,” Paper presented at the African Society of International Law (AfSIL) sixth annual conference held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on the 27th and 28th October 2017. 19 Gift Joseph Kweka applies only in armed conflict situations. This has therefore placed the illegal exploitation of natural resources under the crime of pillage. The jurisprudence of ad hoc tribunals, the SCSL and the ICC has, however, shown that the prosecution of the crime of pillage has not fully and adequately captured the crime of illegal exploitation of natural resources, despite evidence of the commission of the crime in specific countries. There remains a need to prosecute the crime where circumstances and evidence permits. Seeing the limitation placed on the current normative framework of international criminal law on both subject matter and personal jurisdiction, the AU expanded the list of supranational crimes to include the crime of illegal exploitation of natural resources. The seriousness and gravity of the crime cannot be ignored in the contemporary world where indigenous populations are dispossessed of the benefits of their natural resources, thereby affecting a range of other human rights. What is more, the proceeds of illegal exploitation have fuelled a number of conflicts, especially in Africa. The regional criminalization of illegal exploitation of natural resources is therefore a bold and innovative step taken by Africa towards an international criminal law regime for the regulation of the exploitation of natural resources. Be that as it may, the framing of the crime in the Protocol calls for greater clarity and specificity, especially should it be included as one of the core crimes prosecuted under the ICC. The Elements of Crime if there will be any, must cure the defects attendant upon the oversimplification of the provisions presently contained in the Protocol, which is the result of copying verbatim from a document containing non-penal provisions. Another pioneering step taken by Africa towards an international criminal law regime for the Regulation of the Exploitation of Natural Resources is the inclusion of corporate criminal liability. This is key taking into account the nature of the crime in question. Without holding corporations criminally liable, international criminal law creates impunity for legal persons. The AU has attempted to cure this defect at regional level. It has become clear that countries affected by illicit exploitation of natural resources cannot afford to wait for Western countries to pioneer the inclusion of illegal exploitation of natural resources as one of the core international crimes prosecuted under the ICC regime. These regional blocks must act unanimously and lobby for the expansion of the international criminal law regime to tackle the problem. Towards an international criminal law regime for the regulation of the exploitation of natural resources... 20 21 Bernard Ntahiraja ENFORCING COOPERATION DIFFERENTLY: TIME TO CRIMINALISE ACTIVE NON-COOPERATION IN THE ROME STATUTE? Bernard Ntahiraja90 Abstract Cooperation between states and the International Criminal Court has been a topic of academic discussion and political concern since the creation of that court -actually even before -. While state’s obligation to cooperate with the Court is clearly stated in the Rome Statute, its enforcement is rather problematic. All the Statute provides for is a possible finding of non-compliance by a pretrial chamber of the Court with a possibility of referring the matter to the Assembly of States Parties [ASP] and/or the United Nations Security Council. More often than not, these political bodies do not take action. This chapter explores an additional tool to enforce cooperation. The proposal is to criminalise forms of non-cooperation that the chapter labels as active non-cooperation. Indeed, individuals – state officials - sometimes do not content themselves with ignoring court’s requests to cooperate. They take active and concrete steps to prevent the Court from performing its functions. Exploring venues for criminalisation, the chapter discusses the concepts of complicity after the fact [as a mode of liability or criminal participation] and offenses against the administration of justice. It concludes that the Rome Statute, as it stands today, does not allow prosecution of active non-cooperation with anyone of these legal tools. Drawing from comparative criminal law and from the history of international criminal law, the chapter submits that amending the Rome Statute to so allow would be a reasonable way forward. Weighing the two techniques, the chapter finds that although they are both reasonable, fairness and legal soundness make it preferable to criminalise active noncooperation as an offense against the administration of justice rather than as complicity. 90 Lecturer at the University of Burundi &Advocate at the Court of Appeal of Bujumbura Enforcing cooperation differently... FAIRE RESPECTER AUTREMENT L’OBLIGATION DE COOPERER: ERIGER EN INFRACTION LA NON-COOPERATION ACTIVE DANS LE STATUT DE ROME? Résumé La coopération entre les États et la Cour Pénale Internationale a fait l’objet de débats académiques et de préoccupations politiques depuis la création de cette juridiction - en réalité même avant -. Si l’obligation de l’Etat de coopérer avec la Cour est clairement posée dans le Statut de Rome, il reste problématique de la faire respecter. Le Statut ne prévoit qu’une éventuelle décision de la chambre préliminaire de la Cour prenant acte du défaut de coopérer, avec la possibilité de saisir l’Assemblée des États Parties [AEP] et/ou le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies. Le plus souvent, ces organes politiques n’agissent pas. Ce chapitre explore une voie supplémentaire de faire respecter l’obligation de coopérer. Il est proposé d’ériger en infraction la forme de non-coopération que le chapitre qualifie de non-coopération active. En effet, parfois, les individus agents de l’État - ne se contentent pas d’ignorer les demandes de coopération de la Cour. Ils prennent activement des mesures concrètes pour empêcher la Cour de s’acquitter de ses fonctions. En explorant les pistes possibles d’incrimination, le chapitre examine le concept de complicité a posteriori [en tant que mode de responsabilité ou de participation criminelle] et l’infraction d’atteintes à l’administration de la justice. Il conclut qu’en l’état actuel du Statut de Rome, aucune des deux techniques ne permet des poursuites pour non-coopération active. S’inspirant du droit pénal comparé et de l’histoire du droit international pénal, la présente contribution soutient qu’il serait raisonnable d’amender le Statut de Rome en vue de rendre possibles les poursuites à cet effet. Au terme d’une mise en balance des deux techniques, il est conclu qu’elles sont toutes raisonnables mais que les considérations d’équité et de solidité du raisonnement juridique rendent préférable une criminalisation s’inspirant de la technique de l’infraction d’atteinte à l’administration de la justice. 22 23 1 Bernard Ntahiraja Introduction In the Rome Statute system, the importance of ICC- state cooperation cannot be overstated. Even before the treaty entered into force, scholars as well as accountability activists were stressing the fact that having no police force, military or territory of its own, the would-be court would need to rely heavily on states parties to, among other things, arrest individuals, collect evidence and serve documents in their respective territories.91 It therefore came as no surprise that when the Statute came into being, a list of forms of cooperation that state parties are obliged to provide to the Court features prominently. The Statute addresses matters such as the identification of individuals, the taking of evidence, the questioning of persons, the service of documents, the execution of searches and seizures and the freezing of assets.92 The list is far from exhaustive.93 In the terms of the Statute itself, the Court can also request a state party to provide “any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by the law of the requested State”.94 For cooperation purposes, this catch-all phrase is a rather prudent one.95 For obvious reasons, the cooperation regime has always attracted a lot of scholarly attention. This chapter, however, intends to explore a much neglected area, namely, the enforcement of the obligation to cooperate. It is common – unfortunately - for states to refuse to comply with the obligations listed above, especially with regard to the duty to arrest and surrender suspects to the Court. They do so in two main ways, passively and actively. States can just ignore orders to cooperate from the ICC without taking any explicit decision or active move. In this paper, this attitude will be referred to as “passive noncooperation”. This is the most common form of non-cooperation. In the ICC findings so far rendered on non-compliance, states are usually criticised for ”having allowed the suspect to enter their territories without arresting him’’96 or for ” not responding to the Court and arrest the suspect.’’97 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 For details, see, inter alia, Valerie Oosterveld, Mike Perry John McManus, “The cooperation of states with the international criminal court”, Fordham International Law Journal, [Vol. 25:767, 2001, Vol. 25, Issue 3, Article 14, pp. 767-839. See, also, Human Rights Watch, “Making the International Criminal Court Work, A Handbook for Implementing the Rome Statute” Vol. 13, No. 4(G), September 2001 Article 93(1) of the Rome Statute It might be useful to read the whole chapter of the Rome Statute on cooperation (articles 86-102). Article 93(1) of the Rome Statute Commenting those provisions, some authors suggest the obligation to cooperate involves a number of areas such as “arrest and surrender; investigation and evidence gathering; privileges and immunities of Court officials; witness protection; enforcement of ICC sentences, fines, forfeiture orders; and offenses against the administration of justice. (See, for instance, Valerie Oosterveld & Mike Perry John McManu, “The cooperation of states with the international criminal court”, o. cit, p. 767-839.). See, for instance, in the case of Chad, The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir, Decision pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the refusal of the Republic of Chad to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, No. ICC‐02/05‐01/09, 13 December 2011, §2. See, for instance, in the case of Malawi, The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir, Corrigendum Enforcing cooperation differently... 24 States - state agents rather - can also be proactive and take active steps to prevent the court from starting its proceedings or to make them fail. This is the case, for instance, when the executive branch of a government, defying an enforceable order of its own court to arrest and surrender a suspect wanted by the ICC, helps him to escape arrest. This can be done in many ways, for example by a state facilitated changing of the normal and official flight route out of the country. For the purpose of this chapter, this conduct will be called “active non-cooperation.” In the case of South Africa, for instance, it is reported that Bashir’s plane flew back to Khartoum from the Waterkloof air force base on the outskirts of Pretoria on Monday, 15 June 2015. The flight had been moved to the military base late on the previous night, i.e. on Sunday, 14 June, 2015. As strange as it may sound, the idea was that the military base was a safe and even legal place for Bashir’s departure because “the defence force was not a party to the court case”.98 Explicit orders (given to members of the police or the military) not to enforce the judicial decision would fall into the same category. As of lex lata, failure to comply with a request for cooperation authorises the ICC to make a finding of non-compliance and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) and/or to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) if the situation being investigated or prosecuted was referred to the Court by the UNSC.99 What these bodies do with the referral is up to them to decide. More often than not, their political nature dictates a political outcome. In any case, from a legal perspective, only state (civil) responsibility is likely to be engaged. This chapter explores an additional venue. With regard to active non-cooperation, it submits that individual criminal responsibility (accountability) can contribute to the solution of the problem.100The paper first presents the current enforcement mechanism of the obligation to cooperate. The legal and practical shortcomings of that mechanism are highlighted. This is followed by a discussion of how criminal liability could contribute in responding to them, especially as far as African state parties are concerned. Before proceeding, however, it is necessary to consider briefly the importance of, and the debate surrounding state-ICC cooperation within the Rome Statute system. 2 State-ICC Cooperation in the Rome Statute system: An important and unfinished debate The State-ICC cooperation regime has been a subject of interest and controversy from the very beginning of the Rome Statute system. Its legal gaps have been discussed 98 99 100 to the Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09, 13 December 2011, §10 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/africa-court-rule-arrest-sudan-bashir-150615065923527.html. Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute. In keeping with today’s position of the Rome Statute on this particular point, this chapter only envisions individual - and not corporate - criminal liability. See Rome Statute, Article 25, 1: “The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.” 25 Bernard Ntahiraja at length. For instance, with regard to complementarity - hardly separable from the cooperation regime - one of the gaps scholars have identified is that, although the Rome Statute provides for the primacy of national jurisdiction, it does not require states parties, as a legal obligation, to prosecute perpetrators of Rome Statute crimes. In other words, national prosecution is not, strictly speaking, a legal obligation.101 This might sound strange. Technically speaking though, complementarity only serves as a bar in admissibility procedures, i.e., as a prerequisite for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC.102 In much simpler words, the failure to prosecute is not, by itself, a wrongful omission justifying the engagement of state responsibility. Another complementarity-related gap that scholars like Ambos and Tladi have rightly identified is that the Rome Statute does not, by its terms, establish national jurisdiction. Nor does it, strictly speaking, require states parties to establish national jurisdiction over Rome Statute crimes. According to Tladi, for instance, although the preamble to the Rome Statute declares that serious international crimes ‘must not go unpunished’ and that their ‘effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level’, this is not followed up by an obligation in the operative text of the Rome Statute.103 This position sounds particularly counterintuitive given that domestic criminalisation seems essential for effective complementarity.104 This scholarly criticism is however challenged - albeit implicitly - by individual views of some ICC judges. According to Judge Song, for instance, the ICC is a court of last resort. From that, it follows that the primary responsibility for investigation and prosecution of the Rome Statute crimes lies with the states. Importantly, Judge Song stressed that this is both a right and a responsibility of each state.105 On this question, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber sides with Judge Song. In Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi et al., the Court stated that, in addition to having the right to exercise jurisdiction over Rome Statute crimes, states are also ”under an existing duty to do so as explicitly stated in the Statute’s preambular paragraph.” 106 Indeed, with the creation of the ICC, the idea was that that Court would extend the rule of law internationally by impelling national systems to investigate and prosecute Rome Statute crimes while ensuring that where they fail, an international court is ready to act.107 Apparently, the 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 Tladi, Dire, Complementarity and cooperation in international criminal justice Assessing initiatives to fill the impunity gap, ISS Paper 277 | November 2014, p.3. Ibid. Tladi, Dire, op.cit., p.3. See Kai Ambos, Crimes against humanity and the International Criminal Court, in Leila Nadya Sadat (ed.), Forging a convention for crimes against humanity. Cambridge University Press, 2011, 295–296. Sang-Hyun Song, The International Criminal Court: A global commitment to end impunity, presentation at Istanbul Bilgi University, 22 May 2013. The situation in the Republic of Kenya: In the case of the Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, public decision on the application by the Government of Kenya challenging the admissibility of the case pursuant to Article 19(2) (b) of the statute (no. ICC-01/0902/11), 30 May 2011, para 40. (Emphasis added). Human Rights Watch, Making the International Criminal Court Work, A Handbook for Implementing the Rome Statute, Vol. 13, No. 4(G), September 2001, p.3. Enforcing cooperation differently... 26 disagreement between scholars like Ambos and Tladi on the one hand and that judicial opinion on the other is based on differing views on the legal status of the preamble in a treaty. Although not explicitly stated in their arguments, it seems that the judicial opinion above considers the preamble to be part of the treaty and therefore binding while on the other, Ambos and Tladi see it as a mere interpretive tool. Scholars have also pointed out that, with regard to cooperation, one of the biggest legal limitations is that the obligation to cooperate with the ICC under the Rome Statute is just an ordinary treaty obligation, which only binds State Parties and does not supersede other obligations to third States under other treaties. This was contrasted with the obligation to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which were established by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.108 Third parties can however be obligated to cooperate by the involvement of the UN Security Council. This is the case with Sudan under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005).109 To deal with those legal challenges, a number of initiatives are explored. They include the study by the International Law Commission (ILC) on crimes against humanity, the project of a convention on mutual legal assistance with respect to Rome Statute crimes, an initiative of Belgium, Slovenia and the Netherlands (commonly referred to as the “BSN initiative”) 110 and a civil-society initiative for a convention on crimes against humanity (referred to as the crimes against humanity initiative).111 As far as African states are concerned, the most controversial issue affecting cooperation is the supposed immunity of sitting heads of non-party states.112 This has even led the African Union to request the United Nations General Assembly to ask the question to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by way of an advisory opinion.113 This 108 109 110 111 112 113 See SC Res 827, 25 May 1993, S/RES/827 (1993) and SC Res 955, 8 November 1994, S/RES/955 (1994) on www.legal-tools.org/doc S/RES 1593(2005), 31 March, 2005, para 2, www.unscr/com/en/resolutions/1593 See the Declaration on international initiative for opening negotiations on a multilateral treaty for mutual legal assistance and extradition in domestic prosecution of atrocity crimes (crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes). See Whitney R Harris, World Law Institute Crimes against Humanity Initiative, Proposed Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity, in Leila Nadya Sadat (ed.), Forging a convention for crimes against humanity, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 359. See, e.g., Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec.245 (XIII), paras. 9,10 (July 3, 2009); Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.270(XIV) on the Second Ministerial Meeting on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec. 296 (XV), paras. 4–5 (July 27, 2010); Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the Assembly Decisions on the International Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec.397(XVIII), at 1-2 (Jan. 29-30, 2012). African Union, 30th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, 28- 29 January 2018, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Decision on the International Criminal Court, Doc. EX.CL/1068(XXXII), Assembly/AU/Dec.672(XXX). 27 Bernard Ntahiraja nevertheless remains to be done. One of the legal justifications of the move is that the ICC itself has not been particularly consistent in its reasons to support the legal position according to which heads of states do not enjoy immunity with regard to proceedings before the Court.114 This criticism has however lost much of its relevance since the Appeal judgment in the Jordan case. In this judgment, especially with regard to the question of heads of states’ immunity, the Appeals Chamber has corrected some pretrial chambers and therefore clarified the Court’s position - indeed the state of the Law as far as the Rome Statute system is concerned -. 115 It is therefore open to debate whether the sought ICJ opinion - if it is ever formally asked and delivered - will solve the problem given that it would not bind the ICC. Indeed there is no hierarchy between international judicial institutions. The search for legal certainty might therefore end up creating more fragmentation and confusion.116 As stated above, the challenge this chapter intends to deal with is the enforcement of the obligation to cooperate. It advocates criminal liability for a particular form of noncooperation conceptualised herein as ”active non-cooperation”. However, why does the Rome Statute need an additional enforcement mechanism in respect of the obligation to cooperate? Presenting the current mechanism with its shortcomings helps respond to that question. 3 The current enforcement mechanism of the obligation to cooperate and its shortcomings 3.1 The mechanism as on paper The current enforcement mechanism of the obligation to cooperate involves the Court itself in the first place and then in some cases the Assembly of State parties (ASP) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).117 The first step is a finding of non-compliance by the Court when a state party fails to comply with a request to cooperate.118 After such a finding is made, the Court may refer the matter to the ASP. Alternatively, the Court can refer the matter to the UNSC. This is the case when the Court derived its jurisdiction from a UNSC referral.119 The Rome Statute does not explicitly provide for the possibility of a simultaneous referral to both 114 115 116 117 118 119 See, for instance, Akande, D. “The immunity of heads of states of non-parties in the early years of the ICC”, AJIL UNBOUND, vol.114, pp.172-176. ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, Judgment in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, May, 6th, 2019. See, in particular, paras 1-12(Reasons, key findings). For the particular question of immunities, see paras 1-6. On the legal and practical questions raised by that move, see Nabil M. Orina, Should the ICJ render an advisory opinion on the immunity question re Articles 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute? https://www.icjafrica. com/single-post/2018/03/24/Should-the-ICJ-render-an-advisory-opinion-on-the-immunity-question-reArticles-27-98-of-the-Rome-Statute 27 & 98 of the Rome Statute?(March, 19th, 2019). Article 87, 7 of the Rome Statute Article 87, 7 of the Rome Statute Article 87, 7 of the Rome Statute Enforcing cooperation differently... 28 the UNSC and the ASP.120 In practice however, the Pre-trial Chamber has referred cases to both organs. This was the case, for instance, of the finding of non-cooperation against the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir.121 Referrals to the ASP or the UNSC are not mandatory. They are not necessary consequences of a finding of non-compliance. More than once, the Court has stated that “an automatic referral to external actors is not required as a matter of law”.122 The Court’s position is that it enjoys an unfettered discretion when deciding whether to refer a matter of non-cooperation to the ASP and/or the UNSC.123 In other words, it is up to the Court to examine all factors that may be relevant in the circumstances of the case, including whether external actors could indeed provide concrete assistance to obtain cooperation.124 In the eyes of the Court, only utilitarian considerations inspire referrals. In Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, the Court declared that: …..since the object and purpose of article 87(7) of the Statute is to foster cooperation, a referral to the Assembly of States Parties and/or the Security Council of the United Nations ‘was not intended to be the standard response to each instance of noncompliance, but only one that may be sought when the Chamber concludes that it is the most effective way of obtaining cooperation in the concrete circumstances at hand’.125 In the case of South Africa, the Court chose not to refer the case to any one of the two bodies. In the Jordan case, Pretrial chamber II took a different approach and decided to refer the case to the Assembly of State Parties and to the Security Council.126 The Appeals Chamber found later that the first judge had ‘erroneously exercised its discretion’ and reversed that part - and only that part - of the Judgment.127 If anything, those judgments reveal a growing skepticism from the Court itself on the usefulness of the current enforcement mechanism of the obligation to cooperate. From the developments above, it appears that once the finding of non-compliance has been made, the Court finds itself at a crossroads. In non-technical terms, the Court 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 Here is the very text of article 87, 7 of the Rome Statute: “Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by the Court contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers under this Statute, the Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council.” (emphasis added). See Al-Bashir ICC-02/05-01/09-195. See, in this regard, The Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, “Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against Trial Chamber V (B)’s ‘Decision on Prosecution’s application for a finding of non-compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute’”, 19 August 2015, ICC-01/09-02/11-1032, para. 49. Id, 53. Ibid. Id, para. 51 (emphasis added). ICC, Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by Jordan with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender or Omar Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, 11 December 2017, para 55. ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, Judgment in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, May, 6th, 2019, para 2. 29 Bernard Ntahiraja may decide to end the story there by not referring the matter to any of the two bodies. It can also decide otherwise and give one of these two bodies or both an opportunity to exercise their power. If it does so, the matter then falls into political hands. In their very nature - and this is a description, not a criticism - political bodies take political decisions. In other words, it does not automatically follow from the mere fact that a state party has violated its obligation to cooperate with the ICC that it will be sanctioned. Other factors are also taken into consideration. In short, when the Court has made its noncooperation finding, the choice is between doing nothing and relying on political bodies for a political outcome. 3.2. The mechanism as it works (or does not work) in real life Findings of non-compliance are common. Apart from South Africa, other African countries have been found in violation of their obligation to cooperate under the Rome Statute. They include Malawi,128 Chad,129 the Democratic Republic of Congo,130 Djibouti131 and Kenya.132 Beyond Africa, Jordan has also been found in violation of the same by both the Pretrial and Appeals Chambers.133 As mentioned above, the main difference between the two judgments is that the later reversed the former in its finding regarding the referral to the Assembly of States and the United Nations Security Council.134 Referrals to the ASP are also frequently made. Indeed, the ASP has developed a mechanism for countering non-cooperation.135 According to that mechanism, any action by the Assembly ought to be political and non-judicial in nature. Depending on the noncooperation scenario, its response can be either formal or informal. Formal responses can include convening an Emergency Bureau meeting or drafting an open letter from the President of the Assembly to the state concerned. Informal responses might include 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 ICC, Corrigendum to the Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, 13 December 2011 ICC, Decision pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the refusal of the Republic of Chad to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-140-tENG, 13 December 2011 and ICC, Decision on the Noncompliance of the Republic of Chad with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court Regarding the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09 Date: 26 March 2013 ICC, Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar Al Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, ICC-02/05-01/09, 9 April 2014. ICC, Decision on the non-compliance by the Republic of Djibouti with the request to arrest and surrender Omar Al Bashir to the Court and referring the matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the State Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC-02/05-01/09-266, 11 July 2016 | Pre-Trial Chamber II ICC, Second decision on Prosecution’s application for a finding of non-compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute, ICC-01/09-02/11, 19 September 2016 See ICC, Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by Jordan with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender or Omar Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, 11 December 2017, para 54 and ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, Judgment in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, May, 6th, 2019, para 1. ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, Judgment in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, May, 6th, 2019, para 2. Para. 3 of the ICC ASP Resolution on Cooperation, ICC-ASP/12/Res.3, 27 November 2013. Enforcing cooperation differently... 30 diplomatic action built upon the good offices of the President of the Assembly.136 These procedures are not mandatory. They rather provide useful guidance when faced with a State reluctant to cooperate with the Court.137 The mechanism is therefore obviously legally weak and highly ineffective in practice. When they are taken at all, ASP resolutions on cooperation are usually a restatement of the obvious in the form of the following declaration: “the ASP….emphasizes the importance of timely and effective cooperation and assistance from state parties and other states…..and stresses that protracted nonexecution of court requests has a negative impact on the ability to execute its mandate, in particular when it concerns the arrest and surrender of individuals subject to arrest warrants.”138 The most worrying element of the machinery, however, is the UNSC. In 2016, Eki Omorogbe rightly observed that the UNSC has repeatedly failed to respond to the ICC when it has referred African states to it for breach of Rome Statute obligations.139 The ICC itself laments the UNSC’s inaction. The Office of the Prosecutor has, on a number of occasions, expressed her “exasperation” over the Security Council’s inaction on noncompliance.140 Pre-trial chambers are of the same view. In the South African case, PreTrial Camber II even considered that a referral was not warranted as a way to obtain cooperation.141 In a very unusual decision, it made a finding of non-compliance but did not refer the matter to the ASP or the UNSC.142 To support that conclusion, the Court observed that in relation to failures to arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir only, States Parties have been referred to the UNSC in six instances. However, in more than twenty four (24) meetings following the adoption of Resolution 1593 (2005) - the resolution referring Sudan’s situation to the ICC - the Council failed to take any measure against States Parties that had failed to comply with their obligations to cooperate with the Court.143 With the Court believing that an additional referral to the UNSC would be a futile move, one can legitimately ask what is actually left of the whole enforcement mechanism of the obligation to cooperate. This renders timely and opportune reflections 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 Human Rights Law Centre, University of Nottingham, Expert Workshop on Cooperation and the International Criminal Court 18-19 September 2014, p.11. Human Rights Law Centre, University of Nottingham, Expert Workshop on Cooperation and the International Criminal Court 18-19 September 2014, p.11. Resolution ICC- ASP/ 12 /Res.3, para 3. Eki Yemisi Omorogbe, ‘The African Union and the International Criminal Court: What to do with NonParty Heads of State’ in HJ Van der Merwe & Gerhard Kemp [eds], International Criminal Justice in Africa, Strathmore University Press, 2017, p. 62. See, for instance, Bensouda tells off UN council over inaction on Darfur atrocities, The East African, Wednesday December, 14, 2016; ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, 6 July, 2017. para 138. ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, 6 July, 2017, para 138. Ibid. 31 Bernard Ntahiraja on alternative means of enforcing cooperation. This chapter argues that criminal liability is one of the options. This is not to suggest that criminalisation is the only way forward. To induce cooperation in general, incentives can also be used. The approach worked quite well at the ICTY.144 Criminalisation is however the only focus of this chapter. 4 Criminalisation of active non-cooperation: Reasonable and viable response? One needs to assess today’s state of the law to see whether the above described conduct - active non-cooperation - can criminally be dealt with within the Rome Statute framework. In the negative - and we submit this is the case - a reflection on the necessary changes to be made would be undertaken. Before that, however, a few thoughts on why criminal liability might be the way forward are necessary. 4.1. Justifying criminalisation of active non-cooperation from a theoretical perspective It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss theories of punishment in detail. Suffice it to mention that as far as justification of punishment is concerned, two major schools of thought exist: retributivism and utilitarianism.145 In some classifications, restorative justice is added on the list.146 What this means in (very) general terms is that for a criminal sanction to be justified, it needs to serve either a retributive, preventive, or reformative purpose.147 According to Moore, for instance, the function of the criminal justice system is to pursue retributive justice through punishing ’all and only those who are morally culpable in the doing of some morally wrongful action.’148 Retributivism is therefore usually associated with - almost synonymous to - legal moralism.149 Retributivist theories are retrospective and non-consequential in orientation. For them, the general justification for punishment is found in a disturbed moral balance in society; a balance that was upset by a past criminal act. Infliction of suffering proportional to the harm done and the culpability of the offender is supposed to have an inherent moral value and to redress that balance.150 Simply put, retributivism is based on the assumption that justice is about giving offenders what they deserve.151 To put it a much simpler way, retributivism posits that it is good in itself that those who have acted wrongly should suffer. When this happens, justice is done. 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 Human Rights Law Centre, University of Nottingham, Cooperation and the International Criminal Court, Report of the Expert Workshop, 18-19 September 2014, Nottingham, United Kingdom, p.12. For an in-depth reflexion on justifications of punishment in modern time, see Jan Willem de Keijser, Punishment and Purpose. From Moral Theory to Punishment in Action, Leiden University Publications, 2016, 217p. See also Materni, Mile C. “Criminal justice and the pursuit of justice” 2 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2013), pp.263-304. Ibid Ibid Moore 1997:35. Ibid. Jan Willem de Keijser, p.2. Materni, Mile C. p. 266. Enforcing cooperation differently... 32 On the other hand, utilitarian theories are forward-looking. They justify legal punishment saying that it provides beneficial effects (utility) for the future. Those effects are supposed to outweigh the suffering inflicted on offenders. The future good in the utilitarian approach is served by the reduction and prevention of crime.152 On the same line, scholars like Duff see criminal law as a technique or instrument that can be used to serve various possible ends. According to this author, “we are justified in maintaining a system of criminal law if it is an efficient technique for achieving worthwhile ends; its structure and content should then be determined by asking how it can serve those ends most efficiently.”153 This is somewhat an instrumental conception of criminal law. As far as restorative justice is concerned, it emphasises the importance of conflictresolution through the restitution of wrongs and losses by the offender.154 There are of course many hybrid theories that this chapter cannot discuss in detail.155 It should be obvious that, for the purpose of this chapter, criminalisation is advocated for mainly utilitarian reasons. Criminalisation is indeed deemed, in general terms, to deter156 state officials from taking active steps to hamper prosecution or court proceedings. However, the conduct discussed herein is also very blameworthy from a purely moral perspective. Undoubtedly, state officials who help a suspect of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity to escape arrest and prosecution ‘deserve’ punishment. Criminalising active non-cooperation would therefore seem intuitively fair and just. For instance, if, in the lege lata Rome Statute, a person corrupting a witness is punishable as an author of an ‘offense against administration of justice,’157 why would another one helping a wanted person to avoid justice enjoy legally sanctioned impunity? Intuitively, the latter type of conduct seems graver. Legal moralism and utilitarianism would therefore lead to the same conclusion. Retributivism and utilitarianism can be reconciled. As far as justification of punishment is concerned, Bronsteen identifies two separate questions. The first one is ‘Why does the state have a right to punish?’ The second one is ‘why does it choose to exercise that right?’ The first question is answered most naturally by retributive considerations, whereas the second identifies the most natural space for utilitarian values.158 In this model, retributive considerations determine who may be punished 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 Jan Willem de Keijser, p.2. Duff, 2008. Jan Willem de Keijser, p.2. Among these views is the one held by Crocker and Morris according to which retributive considerations set an upper limit of acceptable punishment and below that upper limit, punishment is justified if it also satisfies utilitarian requirements (Norval Morris, Punishment, Desert and Rehabilitation, in Equal Justice Under Law: U.S. Department of Justice Bi-centennial Lecture Series, P.60. Deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation are the three mains functions of Criminal Law from the utilitarian perspective. Rehabilitation and incapacitation rather apply to sanction though, while deterrence apply to the Legislation in and of itself. For details, see Mike C. Materni, “Criminal Punishment and the Pursuit of Justice”, 2 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2013), pp.263-304. Article 70, 1, c Bronsteen, J. “Retribution’s role”, Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 84:1129, 2009, p.1129 33 Bernard Ntahiraja and also set the upper boundary of morally permissible punishment in each instance, whereas utilitarian considerations direct how much punishment the state will choose to inflict on the offender beneath that upper boundary159 - and whether there will be actual punishment at all. In other words, once someone has relinquished the right to be free from punishment by violating the law, it becomes legitimate for society (a state or an organisation of states) to pursue its goals of maximizing welfare by imposing such punishment.160 The result is an integrated dualist account of punishment, assigning appropriate roles to retribution and utilitarianism rather than merely conjoining them or prioritizing one over the other.161 From that perspective, it seems clear that criminalisation of active non-cooperation would be a fair and just thing to do while actual prosecution would be a policy decision to take when the prosecution office deems it appropriate. 4.2 Criminal responsibility and punishment for active non-cooperation: A complement or a replacement of other enforcement mechanisms? Branches of government can take different stands on the obligation to cooperate. In the South African case, for instance, as it is widely known, an organ of the state, the Gauteng Division of the High Court of Pretoria, had ordered Bashir’s arrest.162Authorities of the executive branch took a different course of action. Undoubtedly, the conduct can legally be attributed to the State itself and entails its responsibility at least as a wrongful omission.163 However, individual agents who (actively) ordered and/or executed the maneuvers to undermine the court order can and should be held to account. As it was rightly put by a wise man in a different context, ”systems don’t make decisions, people do”.164 This supports a criminal law approach to active non-cooperation. This perspective should in no way be read as advocating a repeal of the state (civil) responsibility and its replacement by a criminal liability mechanism. The two systems can indeed coexist. While the law of criminal responsibility targets individuals as natural persons (state agents), the law of state responsibility obviously targets states. There is no contradiction in terms in maintaining both of them. They are rather complementary to each other. The Rome Statute itself never envisioned the regime it created as a 159 160 161 162 163 164 Bronsteen, 1129. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 188 (2004) (“One might easily imagine that the role of a system of criminal procedure is to impose just punishments and that direct application of the coercive power of the state is the necessary and sufficient means to this end.”). Bronsteen, 1129. Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & others 2015 (5) SA 1 (GP). Although article 1 of the draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts talks about “acts” (“Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.”), there is no doubt that omissions too can entail state responsibility. The commentary of the ILC itself states that “an internationally wrongful act of a State may consist in one or more actions or omissions or a combination of both.” (ILC, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001”, chapter I, Article 1, (1)). Representative of the Bosch Stiftung, Opening speech of a regional conference on the rule of Law in East Africa, Nairobi, 2015 (Author’s notes). Enforcing cooperation differently... 34 replacement of state responsibility, on the contrary.165 4.3. Active non-cooperation and today’s substantive criminal law in the Rome Statute In general theory, the criminalisation of assistance given to a suspect to help him/ her escape justice can take two forms. The assistance provider can first be considered as a participant to the offence.166 In the alternative, he can be considered an offender on a separate basis. In the latter case, the offense would fall into the category of offenses against the administration of justice. Where does the Rome Statute stand in this regard? 4.3. 1 Active non-cooperation and the law of criminal participation in the Rome Statute Articles 25(3) and 28 of the Rome Statute provide for a number of modes of criminal responsibility. To put it simply, they involve commission and other modes of criminal participation.167The Statute does not however define those modes, nor does it 165 166 167 Article 25, 4 of the Rome Statute states as follows: “No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under international law.” Modes of responsibility are referred to in various ways. Professor Drumbl describes them as “culpability mechanisms” and indicates that “[e]examples might include joint criminal enterprise, command responsibility, aiding and abetting; and also injecting greater elasticity into juridical understandings of ‘committing,’ ‘instigating,’ ‘ordering,’ and both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect co-perpetration’.” Drumbl, Accountability for System Criminality, supra note 3, at 378 n.23. In this chapter, we will variously be referring to them as modes/forms of responsibility, modes of liability, and forms of participation. Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute: “In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: (a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible; (b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted; (c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission; (d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: (i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime; (e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide; (f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person’s intentions……” Article 28 of the Rome Statute: In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court: (a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where: (i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and (ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or 35 Bernard Ntahiraja indicate precisely their elements. Common sense seems to suggest that the assistance provided to a suspect to help him escape arrest or prosecution cannot be labelled as commission of the suspect’s crime. The question is therefore whether it can be viewed as any of the acts of complicity listed in article 25(3) of the Statute. Answering that question (2) requires a short presentation of the law of complicity in the Rome Statute (1). 4.3.1.1 Complicity in the Rome Statute By definition and in general terms, complicity designates a form of participation that derives moral condemnation from the illegality of the principal act.168 In other words, complicity is a doctrine that attributes criminal responsibility to those who do not physically perpetrate the crime.169 As a form of secondary participation, it is derivative in nature. The responsibility of one party (the accomplice) derives from the wrongful act of another (the principal author of the offense).170 Looking at the issue from an international criminal law perspective, Schabbas suggests a rather simple definition of complicity. In this author’s view, ‘complicity, as a notion borrowed from national legal systems, shall be understood to embrace all modes of participation apart from [committing]’.171 The ICC takes the same view. It has already held that, under the Rome Statute, ‘committing’ constitutes principal liability, whereas the other forms of liability under Article 25(3)(b)-(d) constitute accessorial liability.172 Indeed, the way of thinking about criminal participation is traditionally binary. It is generally assumed that the accomplice is always the person who assisted the physical 168 169 170 171 172 her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. (b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where: (i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes; (ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of the superior; and (iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.” Graefrath, Bernhard, “Complicity in the Law of international responsibility”, Revue belge de droit international 1996/2, Éditions Bruylant, Bruxelles, p. 371. Aksenova, M., op. cit, p.13. Aksenova, M. “Returning to Complicity for Core International Crimes”, FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 17 (2014), p.2. William Schabas, 28The U.N. International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 305(emphasis added). Lubanga Confirmation Decision, paras. 320, 332 and Mbarushimana Arrest Warrant Decision, ICC-01/0401/10-1, para 30. Enforcing cooperation differently... 36 perpetrator, and that the perpetrator was whoever personally performed the requisite verb in the crime’s definition (i.e. ‘taking’ in the context of burglary).173 As Carl Erik Herlitz explains almost poetically, the problem of defining complicity is broadly analogous to defining ‘night’. If you can adequately define ‘day’, the project takes care of itself.174 For complicity too, the meaning we attach to it is inexorably bound up in our definition of perpetration.175 As far as commission is concerned, the Rome Statute distinguishes three forms: commission as an individual, commission jointly with another person and commission through another person.176 The Court has rejected a purely objective approach to distinguish between principals and accessories. Under such an approach, principals are only those who physically carry out one or more of the objective elements of the crime.177 The fact that Article 25(3) (a) of the Rome Statute recognizes commission through another person implies that physically carrying out the objective elements cannot be the distinguishing criterion between principal liability (commission) and accessorial liability.178 Instead, the recognition of commission through another person supports the notion of control over the crime as the distinguishing criterion between principal and accessorial liability. In Lubanga, the Court stated as follows: Principals to a crime are not limited to those who physically carry out the objective elements of the offence, but also include those who, in spite of being removed from the scene of the crime, control or mastermind its commission because they decide whether and how the offence will be committed.179 Indeed, following the structure of Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute, the Court has adopted a dualistic system, distinguishing between ‘committing’ under Article 25(3) (a) as a principal mode of liability and the other modes of liability under Article 25(3) (b)-(d) of the ICC Statute as forms of accessorial liability. The distinctive criterion is ‘control over the crime’. Only persons who objectively have control over the crime and subjectively are aware of this control are considered principals. It should therefore be 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 James G Stewart, “Complicity” in Markus Dubber and Tatjana Hörnle eds, Oxford Criminal Law Handbook (London: Oxford University Press, 2014) 534, p.5. Carl Erik Herlitz, Parties to a crime and the notion of a complicity object: A comparative study of the alternatives provided by the penal code, Swedish law and claus Roxin, 40-41(1992). James G Stewart, “Complicity” in Markus Dubber and Tatjana Hörnle eds, Oxford Criminal Law Handbook (London: Oxford University Press, 2014) 534, p.5. Article 25(3) (a). Commission through another person is comparable to the German concept of “perpetrator behind the perpetrator”, a form of indirect perpetration where the tool is not innocent), quoted in Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [(German) Federal Court of Justice] 26 July 1994, Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 40, 218 (236). Quoted in Seromba Appeal Judgement, supra note 52, para. 161, quoting Gacumbitsi, Appeal Judgement, supra note 50, para. 60. Lubanga, para. 328. Id. para. 333. The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 29 January 2007 para. 330. 37 Bernard Ntahiraja clear that authors of the kind of conduct we are concerned with here cannot be prosecuted as principals for the crime of the person they are protecting. Acting after the crime has already been committed, they cannot reasonably be considered to ‘control’ it. Can they however be prosecuted as accomplices? 4.3.1.2 Active non-cooperation: Prosecution complicity in the Rome Statute? based on Given the nature of the conduct above described, it should be obvious that we are here concerned with questions of a peculiar type of accessorial responsibility, i.e. accessorial responsibility after the fact rather than accessorial responsibility before the fact nor during the fact.180 An accessory after the fact is simply to be understood as the person who assists the principal in the first degree to avoid detection, apprehension or conviction after the offence has been committed.181 However, strictly speaking, the accessory after the fact is not a true accessory. He or she commits another, separate offence after the completion of the principal offence by the principal in the first degree.182 It seems that this form of participation is not explicitly provided for in the Rome Statute. Plain reading of article 25 shows that only commission and various forms of complicity during and before the fact are provided for. The question we can ask is whether this really matters, from a legal perspective. In other words, is there anything to prevent ICC judges from filling in the gap? After all, more often than not, modes of participation are not expressly provided for in the founding documents of international tribunals but courts fill in the gap.183 Indeed, for years, international criminal tribunals have been significantly creative about modes of liability. To cite but one example, from the single provision of the ICTY Statute on criminal responsibility - article 7, 1 - that court has coined the concept of “Joint Criminal Enterprise” (JCE).184 The court went even further, dividing the concept 180 181 182 183 184 For a thorough discussion, see, inter alia, Kutz, Christopher, “Causeless complicity”, Crim Law and Philos (2007) 1 289–305 Colin Scouler & Richard Button: Guide to accessorial liability in New South Wales, 2004. Ibid Stephens, Pamela, J. Collective Criminality and Individual Responsibility: The Constraints of Interpretation, Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 37, Issue 2 2014 Article 4, p.509. Art.7 (1) ICTY provides as follows: “A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.” The wording of Art. 6 (1) ICTR is virtually identical. See also, Stephens, J. Pamela: “Collective Criminality and Individual Responsibility: The Constraints of Interpretation”, Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 37, Issue 2 2014 Article 4, p. 513. See also 53. ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 7, para. 1. Enforcing cooperation differently... 38 into JCE I,185 JCE II186 and JCE III.187 The provision was obviously overreaching, as the ICTY Statute itself did not have any mention of “common plan” or “common purpose”, let alone “joint criminal enterprise.”188No reference was made to conspiracy or common plan liability, except with regard to conspiracy to commit genocide.189 The latter is however an established rule since 1948.190 In Tadić, for instance, the ICTY Appeals Chamber read Article 7 of the Statute very broadly, finding that it was meant to reach all forms of individual responsibility, direct and indirect, that are supported by the express language of the Statute and by customary international law.191 Not shying away from a teleological interpretation, the Chamber argued that the “object and purpose” of the Statute could only lead to the conclusion that “all those who have engaged in serious violations of international humanitarian law, whatever the manner in which they may have perpetrated, or participated in the perpetration of those violations, must be brought to justice.”192 The approach was severely criticised in legal scholarship.193 The JCE doctrine would be applied by the ICTR as well.194 Portions of the doctrine were also applied by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia.195 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 See Prosecutor vTadic Para 202. Also referred to as “common plan”, JCE I designs the individual criminal liability when all co-defendants act pursuant to a common plan or design and possess the same criminal intent, even if each co-perpetrator carries out a different role within the JCE. The mens rea is the shared intent of all members to commit a certain crime. See Prosecutor v Tadic´, para. 203: Also referred to as the “systemic” form of joint criminal enterprise, “JCE II exists where the participants are involved in a criminal plan that is manifested by an institutional framework, such as a concentration camp, involving an organized system of ill treatment. It is generally viewed as a variation of JCE I. Its actus reus is “the active participation in the enforcement of a system of repression, as it could be inferred from the position of authority and the specific functions held by each accused.” Its mens rea is personal knowledge of the system of ill treatment and intent to further this concerted system See Prosecutor v Tadic para. 204. Also called the “extended” form of joint criminal enterprise, JCE III ascribes individual criminal liability in situations involving a common design to commit a crime “where one of the perpetrators commits an act which, while outside the common design, was nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the effecting of that common purpose. For an overview of modes of criminal responsibility in the ICTY, see Goy, Barbara, “Individual Criminal Responsibility before the International Criminal Court, A Comparison with the Ad Hoc Tribunals” International Criminal Law Review 12 (2012) 1–70 The ICTY statute didn’t have the equivalent of article 25, 3(d) of the Rome Statute criminalising contributions to the commission or attempted commission of a crime by a group of persons “acting with a common purpose.” Article 4, 3, b of the ICTY Statute Article 3, b of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (December, 9th, 1948). Prosecutor v Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, para. 189 (Int’l Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). Prosecutor v Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, para. 190 (Int’l Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). See, for instance, Jens David Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 69 (2007) and Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 77 (2005), at 102–51. See, e.g., Prosecutor v Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda May 21, 1999). Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38), Public Decision on the Appeals against the Co-Investigative 39 Bernard Ntahiraja The ICC itself does not shy away from creativity as far as modes of liability are concerned. On commission, it has, for instance, combined the notions of ‘coperpetration’ and ‘indirect perpetration’, both provided for by article 25(3) (a) of the Statute to create a mode of liability now known as ‘joint indirect perpetration’ or ‘indirect co–perpetration.’196 On the same line, ICC Pre-Trial Chambers also seem to take the view that the ICC can adjudicate omission liability, but have not yet identified the required elements.197 As article 25(3) of the ICC Statute sets out various modes of liability without defining each of their elements, the ICTY/ICTR jurisprudence can be used in interpreting the elements of these modes of liability. On the outset, nothing seems to oppose that view, from a methodological point of view. Jurisprudence is indeed an expression of international law. However, one needs to ask how much that jurisprudence would help fill in the gaps of the Rome Statute’s letter. Moreover, caution is needed given that the ICC operates in its own [and separate] legal system. With regard to complicity, the ICTY had established that assistance may occur before, during or after the commission of the crime.198 In the Blaskić case, for instance, the Appeals Chamber stated that: ….aiding and abetting a crime can occur before, during or after the principal crime has been perpetrated, and the location where the actus reus of aiding and abetting takes place may be removed from the location of the principal crime.199 In some instances, though, the ICTY held that there was no legal basis for complicity after the fact in the court’s statute. In Gotovina et al., the trial Chamber pointed out that while [m]any domestic legal systems have adopted legislation to punish the conduct of an accessory after the fact, consisting of hindering the discovery of the offence or thwarting its investigation or prosecution, no such crime fall [sic] within the scope of articles 2-5 and 7 (1) of the Statute of the Tribunal, and the Tribunal is therefore not vested with jurisdiction over it.200 Leaving that legal debate aside though, as reiterated in other cases, ex post facto aiding and abetting could only be punished if there was a prior agreement between the principal and the person who subsequently aids and abets.201 In other words, for acts of 196 197 198 199 200 201 Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise, para. 1(May 20, 2010) (Cambodia). Katanga & Ngudjolo Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, paras 490-491. See for example, The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 29 January 2007, paras. 351-353; Bemba Confirmation Decision, supra note 11, paras. 132, 358-359. Blaskić Appeal Judgment, §48; Prosecutor v Aleksovski Trial Judgment, ICTY Case IT-95-14/1-T, 25 June 1999 (‘Aleksovski Trial Judgment’), § 62. Blaskić, Appeals Judgment, supra note 15, x 48 (emphasis added). Prosecutor v Ante Gotovina et al. (IT-06-90-T), Judgement, Trial Chamber II, 15 April 2011, Vol. 2, footnote 3554. Prosecutor v Blagoević and Jokić, ICTY Case No. IT-02-60, Trial Judgment, 17 January 2005 (‘Blagoević Trial Judgment’), § 731; See also W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, Oxford University Press, 2010, at 435. Enforcing cooperation differently... 40 assistance provided after perpetration to qualify as complicity, the principal perpetrator needs to be aware that assistance will be given and expect it. For the ICTY, absent that requirement, complicity would be seen as casting its net too wide. Nevertheless, there were trial chambers within the ICTY to consider it sufficient that the principal perpetrator committed the crime knowing that the aider and abettor were to supply assistance after its commission.202 Some commentators have therefore raised the question of whether it is in fact the encouragement or moral support effected by the agreement to provide assistance or by the willingness to assist which is made known to the principal perpetrator that constitutes aiding and abetting.203 Following that line of argument, it can legitimately be asked whether the (too many) official statements made by AU organs by which heads of states and governments take the commitment not to cooperate with the ICC do not actually amount to the “prior agreements” the ICTY referred to. When, afterwards (as in the case of South Africa), states refuse to cooperate with the ICC, passively or with the active involvement of their agents, they believe to be keeping their promises, to be implementing the “agreement”, and this is their expected behaviour, even – and especially - from political leaders who engage in criminal activity after those statements. It would be a mistake to look at those statements as only concerning ongoing proceedings and therefore past crimes. Those statements do have a posteriori effects. They can rightly be compared to imperfect insurances against prosecution for future crimes. At the very least, they sound as promises of solidarity against international prosecution. Given the very low likelihood of domestic prosecution of political leaders in power, those statements are almost synonymous to promises of impunity. It is axiomatic that promises of impunity are encouragements to crime. It matters to get right the legal characterisation of complicity. Accuracy in the legal characterisation serves the purposes of correctly locating individual criminal responsibility. In particular, it is very important to be cautious and remain in the framework of “derivative liability” and not “vicarious liability”. The latter term designs (illiberal) punishment based only on a relationship between the parties, whereas derivative liability requires an action and blameworthy choice on the part of the secondary party, apt to “make it appropriate to blame him for what the primary actor does.’’204 In the context of international criminal justice, reinforcing the principles of fairness and legality also becomes a question of attaining a higher degree of perceived legitimacy of international courts and tribunals at the domestic level.205 202 203 204 205 Haradinaj et al. Trial Judgement, para. 145, Furundžija Trial Judgement, para. 230. Goy, B. p.61. Sanford H Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 337 (1985). Aksenova, M. “Returning to Complicity for Core International Crimes”, FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 17 (2014), p.2. 41 Bernard Ntahiraja If active non-cooperation cannot be prosecuted as complicity, is it possible to look at it as a separate offense in the Rome Statute? 4.3.2 Active non-cooperation and offenses against the administration of justice in the Rome Statute In addition to the four infamous crimes,206 the ICC enjoys jurisdiction over six forms of conduct considered as offenses against the administration of justice.207 Three of them are about the presentation of evidence208while the others three touch upon conduct by court officials or interaction with them.209 None of them is about the relations between third parties and a suspect or accused person before the ICC. Helping a suspect to escape arrest or prosecution cannot therefore be prosecuted as an offense against the administration of justice. Nullum crimen sine lege, a principle reaffirmed by article 22, 1 of the Statute, stands against that possibility. State parties are required to criminalise such conduct in their domestic laws.210 Although they remain free to do more and go beyond that list - as did Canada -211 their legal obligation to criminalise is limited to the six conducts. One cannot therefore even console him/herself hoping that offenses not on the list will still be criminalised in domestic law and prosecutable before domestic courts of the state concerned. Further, even assuming that a state would have legislation covering acts of active noncooperation, it would remain uncertain that its authorities would be willing and able to actually prosecute their citizens or civil servants culpable of such acts. After all, it is that very fear that led to the creation of international criminal courts and tribunals. In the Rome Statute system, complementarity cannot work unless the conduct is a crime both domestically and in the Rome Statute itself. Furthermore, the need to criminalise such conduct is more obvious with regard to non-state parties which might however be of interest for the ICC (like Sudan). In those states, non-cooperation is usually official government policy and therefore, no internal prosecution can reasonably be expected. 206 207 208 209 210 211 The expression refers to the four crimes in the jurisdiction of the ICC: Article 5 of the ICC Statute: genocide; crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. Article 70, 1 of the Rome Statute. Article 70, 1, (a), (b) and (c): Giving false testimony when under an obligation to tell the truth, presenting false or forged evidence; and corruptly influencing a witness or obstructing (or interfering with) the attendance or testimony of a witness, retaliating against a witness or destroying, tampering with or interfering with the collection of evidence. Article 70, 1, (d), (e) and (f): : corrupting, intimidating or impeding an official of the Court, retaliating against an official of the Court; and soliciting or accepting a bribe as an official of the Court Article 70, 4. (a): “Each State Party shall extend its criminal laws penalizing offences against the integrity of its own investigative or judicial process to offences against the administration of justice referred to in this article, committed on its territory, or by one of its nationals.” Subsection 16(1) of Canadian pertinent legislation contains a general clause that criminalizes the interference with the administration of justice of the ICC. It states as follows: Every person who willfully attempts in any manner to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice of the International Criminal Court is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.” Enforcing cooperation differently... 42 Offenses against administration of justice at the ICC are a reality, as is their prosecution. The ICC has recognised that witness interference may indeed have been committed across nearly all cases that have moved to the trial phase.212 The prosecution has brought charges for witness interference in three cases: one, resulting in a conviction, relating to the prosecution of Bemba213 and two, related to the prosecution of Ruto & Sang, for which the accused remain at large.214 4.4 The way forward 4.4.1 Active non-cooperation as complicity, de lege ferenda The developments above have demonstrated that, de lege lata, active noncooperation cannot be prosecuted as complicity. The question is whether amending the Statute to make that kind of conduct punishable as complicity under that treaty would be a reasonable way forward. There are historical reasons to believe it would (1). Insights from comparative criminal law point in the same direction (2). 4.4.1.1 Modes of liability in the history of International Criminal Law (ICL) The brief history of International Criminal Law (ICL) shows that modes of liability and the mechanistic of each one of them are not settled issues. In addition to judicial creativity above referred to, treaties have established a variety of modes of criminal participation which were abandoned by subsequent instruments. The Nuremberg Military Tribunals (“NMT”) – not the International Military Tribunal (IMT) of Nuremberg - could try persons suspected of crimes in their jurisdiction as principals, accessories, members of organisations or groups connected with the commission of the crime or as connected with plans or enterprises involving the commission of the crimes or for having taken a “consenting part” in the criminal enterprise.215 With regard to crimes against peace, people could also be prosecuted only for having held a high political, civil or military position in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-belligerents or satellites or for having held high position in the financial, industrial or economic life of any such country. Article II (2) of the Law creating the 212 213 214 215 For the offence of witness interference, Open Society Justice Initiative, Witness Interference in Cases before the International Criminal Court, November, 2016. ICC, The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, ICC-01/05-01/13. The three accused are: Walter Barasa, Paul Gicheru and Philip Kipkoech Bett. See, Office of The Prosecutor: Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, regarding the unsealing of Arrest Warrants in the Kenya situation: 10 September 2015 (https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item. aspx?name=otp-stat-10-09-2015-2) The NMT were inter-Allied special tribunals created by the United States pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10 enacted by the Allied Control Council on 20 December 1945. Initiated after the IMT trial, trials by the NMT are commonly referred to as the “Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings”. 43 Bernard Ntahiraja NMT provided as follows: Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in which he acted, is deemed to have committed a crime as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article, if he was (a) a principal or (b) was an accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or abetted the same or (c) took a consenting part therein or (d) was connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission or (e) was a member of any organisation or group connected with the commission of any such crime or (f) with reference to paragraph 1 (a) if he held a high political, civil or military (including General Staff) position in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-belligerents or satellites or held high position in the financial, industrial or economic life of any such country216 Although none of these modes can be compared to accessorial liability after the fact, their mere list demonstrates that spatial or temporal closeness between the act and the culpable person was not a requirement, at all. Membership of a criminal organisation,217 the fact of holding a high position in the political or economic spheres as well as the fact of “taking a consenting part” in a criminal enterprise are clear examples of that approach. Taking a consenting part was also an omission-based mode of participation.218 It has entirely disappeared today as a mode of liability in ICL.219 As far as criminal participation is concerned, the law kept evolving both through treaties and (mainly) jurisprudence. As already mentioned, the ICTY and ICTR coined the concepts of “joint criminal enterprise” and even “complicity after the fact”.220 4.4.1.2 Active non-cooperation as complicity in national legal systems At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that, as far as the methodology is concerned, it is not strange to assert that international law can learn from domestic law. Indeed, the approach conforms to the theory of sources of international law as developed by article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.221 It cannot be disputed 216 217 218 219 220 221 Control Council Law No. 10; supra note 4, at art. II (2) (emphasis added). For details on “taking a consenting part” as a mode of participation, see Kevin Heller, Taking a Consenting Part, 39 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 247 (2017). Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol39/iss1/11 The prosecution charged six groups: Reich Cabinet, Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces, the SS, the Gestapo, and the SA (Stormtroopers). Only three of them were found by the Tribunal to be criminal organizations. the SS, the Gestapo, and the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party. Kevin Heller, Taking a Consenting Part, 249. Id, 248, 256. Prosecutor v Blagoević and Jokić, ICTY Case No. IT-02-60, Trial Judgment, 17 January 2005 (‘Blagoević Trial Judgment’), § 731; See also W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, Oxford University Press, 2010, at 435. Article 38 of the ICJ Statute provides as follows: “The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; Enforcing cooperation differently... 44 that, both in the development of customary international law and the drafting of treaties, state representatives participating in the formulation of international criminal law necessarily bring to the table their own understanding of criminal law based upon their legal tradition.222 The practical impossibility of looking at the entirety of domestic legislations even of the ICC member states - needs to be mentioned. It is even doubtful whether the approach would be of any added value. Selectivity is therefore inevitable. At common law as well as in civil law tradition, complicity after the fact seems to be accepted in some domestic legislations. In the Criminal Code of California, for instance - its provisions are largely comparable to the ones of other states in the USA - harboring, concealing or aiding a principal in a felony after it has been committed, with the intent that the said principal may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment are considered acts of complicity.223 That legislation is very specific on the actus reus and mens rea of the offense. The former covers conduct of harboring, concealing or aiding a principal of felony after it has been committed. The latter is the knowledge that a felony has been committed or that the principal has been charged with such felony or convicted thereof and the intent that the principal may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment. Under English Law, for a very long time, anyone harboring a felon or assisting him to escape punishment was considered an accessory after the fact.224 The classic understanding of harboring included acts of receiving, comforting, maintaining or assisting.225 The assistance was to be for the purpose of helping the principal offender to escape justice.226 However, the common law relating to accessories after the fact was repealed by the Criminal Law Act 1967 (Eng). It was then replaced with an offence of a person (D) acting with intent to impede the apprehension or prosecution of a person (P), who has committed a “relevant offence”, where D knew or believed P to be guilty of the offence, or “of some other relevant offence” and, in so acting, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse. In the sense of the UK Law on accessorial liability after the fact, a 222 223 224 225 226 b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.” (emphasis added). Stephens, Pamela, J. Collective Criminality and Individual Responsibility: The Constraints of Interpretation, Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 37, Issue 2 2014 Article 4, p.507. “Every person who, after a felony has been committed, harbors, conceals or aids a principal in such felony, with the intent that said principal may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having knowledge that said principal has committed such felony or has been charged with such felony or convicted thereof, is an accessory to such felony.” (Article 32 Penal Code of California). Dandaviveka, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, No. LII, pp. 74-5 and introduction to the volume p. 12. M Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown (1786), vol. 1, 618. R v Reeves (1892) 13 LR (NSW) 220; R v Phelan [1964] Crim LR 468. 45 Bernard Ntahiraja “relevant offence” is an offence for which the sentence is fixed by law or one for which a person of at least eighteen (18) years of age may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least five years.227 Clearly, relevance has to do here with gravity. This change came as an effect of the abolition of the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors in 1967.228 At that time and by the same effect, two other common law offenses disappeared: misprision of a felony (concealing a felony known to have been committed) and compounding a felony (agreeing for a consideration not to prosecute or to impede the prosecution of a felony).229 This evolution of the Law in England and Wales is instructive. It clearly shows that helping wanted, indicted or condemned persons to escape arrest, judgment or punishment can be prosecuted, on equality of reasonableness, as complicity (to the principal crime) or as offences relating to the administration of justice. With the reform above described, the English legislator extended the net. The new offense would cover not only harbouring but any act designed at impeding the apprehension or prosecution of the offender. 230 In the Hindu Criminal Law, the harbourer, also called “asraya” in Hindi is considered an accomplice in murder along with the arambhakrt (he that commences or sets the ball rolling), the doshabhak (participator), the Sahaya (he that aids), the marganudesaka (he that points the way) and the anumodaka (he that supports). Each of these participants is liable to half the punishment prescribed.231 Complicity after the fact is also provided for in many Romano - Germanic legal traditions. This is the case of the penal code of the Democratic Republic of Congo with regard to crimes against the state, offenses against the peace, persons and propriety.232 The very nature of the offense suggests that causation is not required - unless it is thought of in retro. Modern French criminal law considers that the actus reus of complicity needs to happen before or during the principal actus reus.233 In other words, it does not provide for complicity after the fact. 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 Criminal Law Act 1967, Section 4, (1A). The Criminal Law Ac t ,1967 The (U.K) Law Commission, Working Paper nr. 62, Criminal Law. Offenses relating to the administration of Justice, London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1975, p.13. “Where a person has committed an arrestable offence, any other person who, knowing or believing him to be guilty of the offence or of some other arrestable offence, does without lawful authority or reasonable excuse any act with intent to impede his apprehension or prosecution shall be guilty of an offence’’ See Dandaviveka, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, No. LII, pp. 74-5 and introduction to the volume p. 12. Article 22, 4° provides as follows : « Seront considérés comme complices : ….ceux qui, connaissant la conduite criminelle des malfaiteurs exerçant des brigandages ou des violences contre la sûreté de l’Etat, la paix publique, les personnes ou les propriétés, leur auront fourni habituellement logement, lieu de retraite ou de réunion. » Article 127-1 of the (French) Penal Code. Enforcing cooperation differently... 46 In the Burundian criminal law, for a very long time, it was held that to qualify as complicity, acts of an accessory had to have been committed before or during the (criminal) actus reus of the principal offense itself. A very old - but never reversed – judicial decision considers that the person who helps a principal carry the body of a murdered victim - (to hide it to the police) is not his/her accomplice.234 The 2017 Penal Code confirmed the rather peculiar system began in the 2009 Penal Code in which certain forms of assistance given to the principal offender after the fact can be labeled acts of complicity as well as separate offenses on their own standing.235 When this kind of liability is recognised in national jurisdictions, it only applies to offenses of a relatively high gravity.236 This should not create any problem with regard to the Rome Statute crimes. The infamous “quadriumvirat” constitutes undoubtedly the most unacceptable and dangerous crimes to mankind.237 4.4.2. Active non-cooperation as a separate offense (against the administration of justice), de lege ferenda In many jurisdictions, helping a suspect, an accused or a condemned person to escape arrest, prosecution, judgment or execution of judgment is a distinct offense. For instance, Australian Criminal Law allows to punish all those who help offenders to escape punishment or realise the proceeds of their crime.238 The same goes with UK Law.239 In some jurisdictions, the offense exists only for crimes of a relatively high gravity. This is the case of Burundi where such a help is a separate criminal offense for crimes against the security of the state.240 The Rome Statute should “do” the same. Indeed, as mentioned above, if gravity is a criterion to go about, most conducts punishable under the Rome Statute as “offenses against the administration of justice” are, on balance, less grave than the conducts we are here concerned with. For instance, if corrupting a witness is punishable, why would helping a wanted person escape justice remain legally out of the scope of punishment? 4.4.3 Active non-cooperation de lege ferenda: complicity, separate offense or both? As developed above, criminalising active non-cooperation can reasonably follow two paths. They are not equally commendable, though. 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 5ème instance, Stanley ville, 16 mars 1954. Appel R-U, 26 octobre 1956. For instance, article 38, 6° of the Penal code considers harboring and concealing as acts of complicity while Article 633, 2 of the same legislation considers them as a separate offense as far as crimes against the security of state are concerned. Scouler, C.; Buton, R. Guide to accessorial liability in New South Wales, 12. Rome Statute, Preamble, Paragraph 2. Legislative Assembly for the Australian Capital Territory, Criminal Code (administration of justice offenses) amendment Bill 2005, Explanatory Statement 2005, Criminal Law Act 1967, Section 4,1A Article 633, 2 of the Penal Code: 47 Bernard Ntahiraja As far as complicity after the fact is concerned, despite the developments above, there is one reason to be skeptical about its legal soundness in modern theory of criminal law. The concern is about causation. Indeed, in today’s general theory of criminal participation, the conduct and fault of an accomplice need to be linked to the principal offense to be punishable as secondary liability. Mainstream doctrine stresses that an act of complicity, to be considered as such, must have caused the principal to act or at least exercised significant influence on the course of action he took.241 As put by Stewart, associating with the wicked is one thing, but offering a substantial causal contribution to his actions (e.g. mass killing) is altogether qualitatively different. Causation tracks this distinction.242 Causation as commonly understood does not seem to be present in the kind of conduct we are concerned with here. The only kind of causality possible is causation in retro. To retain it as a mode of a liability, the argument would be that non-cooperation is usually expected and that it encourages the commission of crimes by rendering actual accountability highly unlikely. This chapter has argued that actions taken to ‘’implement’’ AU policy expressed through commitments of non-cooperation (e.g.: assistance to escape arrest) can be read through those lenses. Active non-cooperation is however much broader. Outside that context, complicity could be seen as casting its net too wide. Nevertheless, the approach would definitely not be unreasonable. Indeed, as developed above, quite a few domestic legal systems punish or used to punish complicity after the fact without requiring causation. The actus reus of that complicity was any conduct helping a suspect/convicted person to avoid prosecution or punishment while the mens rea was the awareness of the fact that the person had committed the offense or was wanted or being prosecuted. With regard to aiding and abetting however, this approach is not followed in international criminal law. In ICTY jurisprudence, for instance, proof of cause and effect or a but-for relationship between the conduct of the aider and abettor and the commission of the crime is not required.243 With regard to the Rome Statute, there is also a view that the use of the word ‘facilitating’ in the article 25(3) (c) confirms that direct and substantial assistance is not required and that the act of assistance need not be a conditio sine qua non for the commission of the crime.244 241 242 243 244 See, James G. Stewart, “complicity”, in Markus Dubber and Tatjana Hörnle eds, Oxford Criminal Law Handbook (London: Oxford University Press, 2014), 549-552. For a challenge of this view, see Kutz, “Causeless complicity”, Crim Law and Philos (2007) 1:289–305. James G. Stewart, 550. Blaškić Appeal Judgement. para. 48. Ambos, Article 25, supra note 254, p. 760. Enforcing cooperation differently... 48 Taking this into consideration, it would definitely make more legal sense to criminalise active non-cooperation as a separate offense against the administration of justice. This would not require any causal nexus with the principal crime. Policy and legal soundness do not always point in the same direction. From a policy perspective, criminalising the conduct as complicity would be more effective. This chapter has indicated that criminalisation would be pursued as a deterrent of noncooperation activity. From that point of view, it can reasonably be argued that state officials of any country in the world would more strongly want to avoid the label of ‘accomplices’ of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity than the one of ‘suspects’ of offenses against the administration of justice. Symbolically and politically, the first label is a lot more damageable. It openly denotes a criminal conduct while non-cooperation is still largely viewed – unfortunately - as a mere political stance. For reasons indicated above though, legal soundness in modern criminal law militates in favour of the alternative approach, i.e. criminalisation of active non–cooperation as an offense against administration of justice. Sentencing would not be relevant as a criterion. Contrary to the approach taken in most domestic legal systems, in the Rome Statute system, sentencing does not depend upon the mode of liability.245 In other words, there is no specific sentence for principal or accessory liability. The Rome Statute only provides for general principles and leaves the Court with a wide discretion.246 The degree of participation is only one element in a number of relevant factors for sentencing.247 This means that the Court could retain complicity of one of the four crimes and still impose a relatively low sentence. Conclusion The purpose of this paper was to reflect on new ways to enforce the obligation to cooperate with the ICC. The focus has been put on enforcement by criminalisation of active non-cooperation. The paper began by stressing the crucial importance of cooperation and on the legal and political issues it has always raised. It was noted, however, that very little academic attention has so far been placed on the enforcement of the obligation to cooperate. The paper highlighted the weakness of the current implementation mechanism, both in theory and in practice. In theory, the fact that the power to take decisive action is in the hands of political bodies - the ASP and the UNSC - politicises the otherwise legal issue of the enforcement of the legal obligation to cooperate. In practice, the paper 245 246 247 Article 78, 1 states as follows: “In determining the sentence, the Court shall, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, take into account such factors as the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.” Article 78 of the Rome Statute. Rule 145(1)(c). 49 Bernard Ntahiraja showed that no single punitive measure has so far been taken against states refusing to cooperate with the Court. This state of affairs led to the conclusion that criminal enforcement of the obligation to cooperate might be a viable alternative. Arguing for criminalisation of active non-cooperation required demonstrating how appropriate that course of action can really be. The chapter therefore tried to demonstrate that active non-cooperation differs from passive non-cooperation in that it derives from positive decisions and actions of state agents, sometimes acting illegally under domestic law. The Bashir saga in South Africa represents an almost perfect example of this. Therefore, the conduct would more precisely be analysed as an individual criminal conduct rather than a state’s act in the normal course of public law. This is not to say that state (civil) responsibility should not also be invoked where appropriate. As stated in the chapter, the two kinds of responsibility are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary to each other. The paper demonstrated that criminal law can be used in two ways for that purpose. The first would be criminalisation of active non-cooperation as an act of complicity. The second one would be to look at active non-cooperation as an offense against the administration of justice. It was submitted that, as the Rome Statute stands today, none of these labels can be used to prosecute active non-cooperation. Drawing from the history of international criminal justice and from comparative criminal law, the chapter concluded that an amendment of the Rome Statute to make prosecution possible would be a reasonable course of action. Although complicity would also be a reasonable way forward, this chapter argued that criminalising the conduct as an offense against the administration of justice would be fairer and more legally sound a course of action. This chapter never meant to argue that criminalisation of active non-cooperation is the panacea. It humbly submitted that it is one of the reasonable tools to stimulate cooperation. The history of international relations is the one of carrots and sticks. Success depends on the ability to balance them adequately. Moreover, on the individual level, the chapter held, beyond utilitarian calculations, that active non-cooperation is a wrong that deserves a criminal law response. Enforcing cooperation differently... 50 51 Jacques B. Mbokani CRIMES DE GUERRE ET STATUT DE PERSONNE PROTÉGÉE Jacques B. Mbokani248 Résumé Le statut de « personne protégée » contre les crimes de guerre se limite-il aux personnes tombées au pouvoir de la partie adverse ou s’étend-il également aux membres d’une partie à un conflit armé qui subiraient des exactions au sein de leur propre camp dans le cadre d’un conflit armé ? La présente étude montre que la jurisprudence (nationale et internationale) considère que cette protection s’étend aussi aux combattants au sein de leur propre camp dès lors que les exactions dont ils sont victimes ont été commises dans le cadre d’un conflit armé et présentent un lien de connexité avec celui-ci. Cette étude montre toutefois que, même dans ce contexte, cette protection reste malgré tout exclue à l’égard des personnes qui participent directement aux hostilités. Pour cela, l’étude se lance dans une clarification conceptuelle du critère de la non-participation directe aux hostilités par opposition à la participation active aux hostilités et se propose de faire l’état de lieux de l’effacement progressif du critère de l’appartenance ou de l’allégeance à l’ennemi dans la détermination du statut d’une personne protégée. 248 Docteur en droit de l’Université catholique de Louvain, Professeur à l’Université de Goma et Consultant auprès de l’organisation Open society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) à Kinshasa (République démocratique du Congo). Crimes de guerre et statut de personne protégée 52 WAR CRIMES AND STATUS OF A PROTECTED PERSON Abstract Does the status of « protected persons » against war crimes apply only to those who have fallen into the hands of the adverse party (enemy) or extend also to members of a party to an armed conflict who are being mistreated within their own camp in the context of an armed conflict? This paper shows that national and international criminal tribunals extend the protection of the law of armed conflicts also to combatants within their own camp since the conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict. Nevertheless, this paper also shows that, even in such situations, this protection is still excluded for those who take a direct part in hostilities. For this purpose, the paper launches into a conceptual clarification of the criterion of taking no direct part in hostilities as opposed to taking no active part in hostilities and analyses the gradual erasure of the criterion of belonging or allegiance to the enemy in determining who is a ‘protected person’ against war crimes. Introduction L’incrimination des crimes de guerre, en particulier dans le Statut de Rome, protège-t-elle toutes les personnes dès lors que celles-ci ne prennent pas une part directe aux hostilités ? Rappelons à cet égard que les crimes de guerre sont des « violations des règles du jus in bello qui entraînent, selon le droit international, la responsabilité pénale des individus qui les commettent » . Ils visent une série d’actes individuels répréhensibles commis dans le contexte d’un conflit armé (international ou non international) et présentant un lien de connexité avec un tel conflit armé . Rappelons également qu’« un conflit armé existe chaque fois qu’il y a recours à la force armée entre États ou un conflit armé prolongé entre les autorités gouvernementales et des groupes armés organisés ou entre de tels groupes au sein d’un État » . Les crimes de guerre exigent, en plus, que l’acte individuel soit dirigé contre « une personne ou un bien protégé » par le droit des conflits armés. Cela veut dire, en d’autres termes, qu’un acte individuel peut avoir 53 Jacques B. Mbokani été commis dans le contexte d’un conflit armé et présenter un lien de connexité avec le conflit armé, mais s’il n’a pas été dirigé contre une personne ou un bien considéré comme protégé(e), il ne pourra pas être qualifié de « crime de guerre ». L’exigence du statut de personne (bien) protégé(e) dans l’incrimination de crime de guerre constitue ainsi un enjeu essentiel dans la qualification juridique de certains actes perpétrés dans le contexte d’un conflit armé et présentant un lien de connexité avec celui-ci. L’affaire Bosco Ntaganda a donné à la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) l’opportunité de se prononcer sur la question des personnes protégées. Il était en effet demandé à la Cour de se trancher la question de savoir si un combattant, en l’occurrence un enfant-soldat, victime d’exactions (viols), à l’intérieur de son propre camp, pouvait être considéré comme une « personne protégée » aux fins de la qualification de crimes de guerre. La question se posait d’abord et avant tout par rapport à la compétence matérielle de la CPI puisque cette compétence s’étend actuellement sur trois crimes, à savoir le génocide, les crimes contre l’humanité et les crimes de guerre. Ainsi, un acte, pour criminel qu’il soit, échapperait à la compétence matérielle de la CPI s’il ne peut revêtir l’une ou l’autre de ces trois qualifications. Mais, au-delà de la question de la compétence matérielle, la question posée à la Cour consistait, ensuite, à demander à celle-ci de clarifier un élément constitutif des crimes de guerre, à savoir le statut de la « personne protégée » par une telle incrimination. La réponse apportée par la Chambre d’appel de la CPI jette un regard particulier sur cette problématique . Comme on le verra, cette réponse semble surtout remettre en cause certaines opinions jurisprudentielles et doctrinales autour de cette même question, en particulier celles qui croyaient voir dans le statut de personnes protégées un des critères de distinction entre les crimes de guerre et les crimes contre l’humanité, lorsque ces derniers sont commis dans le contexte des conflits armés internationaux. Le présent article se propose de situer cet arrêt dans le débat plus global autour de la question du statut de personnes protégées par l’incrimination des crimes de guerre. L’objectif poursuivi dans cet article consiste à dégager certains enseignements de cet arrêt de la Chambre d’appel, dans l’espoir de contribuer, tant soit peu, à une clarification conceptuelle de cette condition essentielle des crimes de guerre. Pour ce faire, l’article se propose d’analyser la question du statut de « personnes protégées » au regard d’un côté, du critère de la non-participation directe aux hostilités et, de l’autre côté, de celui de l’appartenance ou de l’allégeance à l’ennemi. 1. La Non-Participation Directe Aux Hostilités La non-participation directe aux hostilités est un critère central dans la détermination des personnes protégées. Ce critère est implicitement formulé notamment à l’alinéa premier de l’article 3 commun aux quatre Conventions de Genève du 12 aout 1949 qui stipule qu’ « en cas de conflit armé ne présentant pas un caractère international et surgissant sur le territoire de l’une des Hautes Parties contractantes, chacune des Parties au conflit sera tenue d’appliquer au moins les dispositions suivantes : les personnes qui Crimes de guerre et statut de personne protégée 54 ne participent pas directement aux hostilités, y compris les membres de forces armées qui ont déposé les armes et les personnes qui ont été mises hors de combat par maladie, blessure, détention, ou pour toute autre cause, seront, en toutes circonstances, traitées avec humanité, sans aucune distinction de caractère défavorable basée sur la race, la couleur, la religion ou la croyance, le sexe, la naissance ou la fortune, ou tout autre critère analogue (…) ». La disposition ainsi invoquée appelle trois types de remarques. 1.1 La non-participation directe aux hostilités : un critère valable dans tout type de conflit armé Premièrement, contrairement à ce que l’on peut penser, la référence, dans cette disposition, aux conflits armés non internationaux n’implique pas nécessairement que ce critère de protection n’est exigé que dans ce type de conflit. En effet, l’article 3 commun exprime les principes et règles du droit humanitaire qui « reflètent les considérations élémentaires d’humanité largement reconnues comme le minimum obligatoire pour la conduite des conflits armés de toute sorte »249. Ces règles sont, en réalité, des normes coutumières d’origine conventionnelle qui remontent depuis la Convention IV de La Haye de 1907 sur les lois et coutumes de la guerre, les quatre Conventions de Genève de 1949 et leurs deux protocoles additionnels250. C’est d’ailleurs dans ce même sens que l’on peut situer le commentaire de l’article 3 commun (Convention IV) lorsqu’il pose la question suivante: « que demande-t-il, cet article, si ce n’est que le respect de quelques règles qui, bien avant que la Convention ne fût signée, étaient reconnues comme essentielles dans tous les pays civilisés et étaient déjà édictées par les lois internes de ces États ? »251. L’on se souviendra que dans son étude sur le droit international humanitaire coutumier, le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR) a énoncé la règle numéro n° 1 portant sur la « distinction entre civils et combattants » ainsi formulée : « les parties au conflit doivent en tout temps faire la distinction entre civils et combattants. Les attaques ne peuvent être dirigées que contre des combattants. Les attaques ne doivent pas être dirigées contre des civils ». Cette règle, qui constitue une des manières d’exprimer la non-participation directe aux hostilités comme critère de détermination des personnes protégées, constitue, selon le commentaire du CICR, « une norme de droit international coutumier applicable dans les conflits armés tant internationaux que non internationaux »252. Pour terminer, l’on rappellera que dans son avis consultatif relatif à l’affaire des Armes nucléaires, la Cour internationale de justice (CIJ) a déclaré que le principe de la distinction était l’un des « principes cardinaux » du droit international humanitaire et l’un des « principes intransgressibles du droit international coutumier 249 250 251 252 Arrêt Tadić (exception préjudicielle d’incompétence), § 129. Idem, §§ 87 et 117. Jean Pictet (dir.), Commentaire IV : La Convention de Genève relative à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre, Genève, CICR, 1956, p. 41. Jean-Marie Henckaerts et Louise Doswald-Beck, Droit international humanitaire coutumier, Vol. I, Règles, Traduit de l’anglais par Dominique Leveillé, Bruxelles/Genève, Bruylant/CICR, 2006, p. 4. 55 Jacques B. Mbokani »253. Ainsi, le caractère fondamental de la règle de distinction entre civils et combattants qu’exprime la non-participation directe aux hostilités comme critère de détermination de la personne protégée justifie que ce critère soit applicable dans tout type de conflit armé (internationaux et non internationaux). 1.2 La signification de la non-participation directe aux hostilités Une lecture attentive de l’article 3 commun aux quatre Conventions précitées montre que cet article vise à protéger d’une part les personnes qui ne participent pas – ou plus – directement aux hostilités. La première catégorie de personnes visées, celle des personnes qui ne participent pas directement aux hostilités, renvoie à la distinction classique entre civils et combattants. Les civils sont généralement définis par rapport combattants. Ainsi, le terme « combattant » regroupe « les personnes qui ne jouissent pas de la protection contre les attaques accordée aux personnes civiles »254. L’étude du CICR énonce d’ailleurs la règle n° 3 qui définit les combattants comme englobant « tous les membres des forces armées d’une partie au conflit (…), à l’exception du personnel sanitaire et religieux ». Tandis que le terme « civil » renvoie aux membres de la population civile telle que visée à l’article 50 du premier protocole additionnel aux quatre Conventions de Genève de 1949 (ci-après, le « Protocole I »). Aux termes de cet article 50, « (1) est considérée comme civile toute personne n’appartenant pas à l’une des catégories visées à l’article 4 A. 1), 2), 3), et 6) de la IIIème Convention et à l’article 43 du présent Protocole. En cas de doute, ladite personne sera considérée comme civile. (2) La population civile comprend toutes les personnes civiles. (3) La présence au sein de la population civile de personnes isolées ne répondant pas à la définition de personne civile ne prive pas cette population de sa qualité ». La seconde catégorie de personnes protégées, en revanche, vise plutôt les personnes qui ne participent plus aux hostilités. Il n’est plus question ici de la distinction entre civils et combattants. Il est plutôt question de la distinction au sein des membres d’une partie au conflit armé entre ceux qui continuent à prendre une part directe aux hostilités et ceux qui ont cessé de le faire et qui sont « hors de combat ». Sont ainsi considérées comme des « personnes protégées », celles qui, bien qu’étant membres des forces ou groupes armé(e) s, ont néanmoins été mises hors de combat par maladie, blessure, détention ou pour toute autre personne. L’on reviendra plus loin sur certaines questions qui se posent par rapport aux personnes qui sont hors de combat. Pour l’instant, rappelons que l’étude déjà citée du CICR a, à cet égard, énoncé une règle 47 ainsi formulée : « il est interdit d’attaquer des personnes reconnues comme étant hors de combat ». La règle précise par ailleurs qu’ « est hors de combat toute personne : a) qui est au pouvoir d’une partie adverse; b) qui est sans défense du fait qu’elle a perdu connaissance, ou du fait de naufrage, de blessures ou de maladie; ou c) qui exprime clairement son intention de se rendre; à condition qu’elle 253 254 CIJ, Licéité de la menace ou de l’emploi d’armes nucléaires, « Avis consultatif », 8 juillet 1996. Jean-Marie Henckaerts et Louise Doswald-Beck, op. cit., p. 4. Crimes de guerre et statut de personne protégée 56 s’abstienne de tout acte d’hostilité et ne tente pas de s’évader »255. Qu’il s’agisse des personnes qui ne participent pas directement aux hostilités ou de celles qui ne participent plus aux hostilités, le critère fondamental exprimé dans cette règle demeure la non-participation directe aux hostilités. Que faut-il entendre par « la non-participation directe aux hostilités » ? Puisque la « non-participation directe » est l’antithèse de la « participation », l’analyse de celle-ci permettra de clarifier le sens de celle-là. Selon le jugement Lubanga, la participation directe aux hostilités consiste dans le fait de combattre « sur la ligne de front ». Cette forme de participation se distingue de la participation indirecte aux hostilités qui englobe une « multitude de rôles d’appui aux combattants ». Parmi ces rôles, l’on peut citer celui du cuisinier, secrétaire, informaticien, garde du corps, interprète, etc. L’on peut aussi y ajouter le cas du dirigeant politique qui travaille au sein de la branche politique ou économique d’un mouvement rebelle et s’occupe par exemple des activités telles que la communication, l’éducation, l’administration, etc. Les deux formes de participation (directe et indirecte) constituent alors, au regard toujours du jugement Lubanga, la participation active aux hostilités256. Si l’on s’en tient à ce jugement, ceux qui participent indirectement aux hostilités seraient aussi des personnes protégées au regard de l’article 3(1) commun parce que leurs actes ne constituent pas une participation directe aux hostilités. Il faudra noter que la distinction énoncée dans le jugement Lubanga entre la participation directe et la participation active dans les hostilités ne fait pas l’unanimité en doctrine257. Toujours est-il que l’opinion qui semble dominer, et qui est proche du jugement Lubanga, est celle qui soutient que même au sein des forces ou groupes armés, seules les personnes qui participent effectivement directement aux hostilités pendant l’attaque ou celles qui occupent une fonction au sein du groupe armé qui les conduit à commettre de manière continue des actes qui constituent une participation directe aux hostilités peuvent être une cible légitime des attaques258. L’on retiendra ainsi, à ce stade, que celui qui pose un acte de « participation directe aux hostilités » perd la protection que lui offre le droit des conflits armés et peut devenir une cible légitime des attaques ennemies. 1.3 La détermination de l’état d’une personne hors de combat Par rapport aux personnes hors de combat, la question qui peut toutefois être posée est celle de savoir si la détermination de l’état de celui qui « hors de combat » devait être faite suivant une approche objective, consistant à se placer dans la peau d’un observateur neutre pour déterminer si la victime était objectivement « hors de combat » au moment de l’attaque, ou s’il faudrait plutôt appliquer une approche subjective consistant à se placer 255 256 257 258 Idem, p. 219. CPI (Ch. 1re Inst. I), Le Procureur c. Lubanga, « Jugement rendu en application de l’article 74 du Statut », Doc. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842-tFRA, 14 mars 2012 (ci-après, « Jugement Lubanga »), § 628. Jann K. Kleffner, « The Beneficiaries of the Rights Stemming from Common Article 3 », in Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta et Marco Sassòli (dir.), The 1949 Geneva Conventions : A Commentary, Oxford, Oxford University Press (OUP), 2015, p. 437. Marco Sassòli, « Combattants et combattants illégaux », in Vincent Chetail (dir.), Permanence et mutation du droit des conflits armés, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2013, p. 181. 57 Jacques B. Mbokani dans l’esprit de l’auteur des faits pour savoir si au moment de l’attaque par lui perpétrée il savait que la victime était hors de combat. L’étude du CICR, qui énumère un certain nombre de pratiques étatiques relatives à des situations dans lesquelles l’intention de se rendre n’est pas clairement exprimée, ne donne pas d’indications claires permettant de répondre à cette question259. Pourtant, cette question s’est posée dans une affaire jugée par les juridictions militaires congolaises. En effet, des membres des forces armées de la RDC (FARDC), l’armée congolaise, avaient attaqué des combattants d’une milice politico-ethnique dénommée « Kamwina Nsapu » qui combattaient avec des armes traditionnelles (flèches, balaies et lance-pierres) et qui portaient des amulettes et d’autres fétiches destinés soidisant à les protéger contre les balles ennemies. Après que les militaires de l’armée congolaise aient infligé de graves blessures à ces miliciens, les rendant littéralement hors de combat, ils ont dans la suite décidé de les achever en tirant plusieurs coups de feu sur eux alors que ces derniers imploraient leur pitié. Toute la scène a été filmée par l’un des militaires qui s’est empressé à divulguer la vidéo sur les réseaux sociaux soi-disant pour montrer aux autres militaires que ces miliciens n’étaient pas aussi invulnérables qu’ils le prétendaient. Poursuivis devant la Cour militaire de la ville de Kananga en RDC, pour crimes de guerre, les accusés ont avancé entre autres une argumentation à connotation mystique. Ils ont laissé entendre que le « Kamwena Nsapu c’est un phénomène, car il opère avec des bâtons et des armes mystérieuses appelées “miketa ya bajanyi”, c’est-à-dire [en tshiluba] les flèches des fantômes »260. On retrouve ce même argument un peu plus loin dans le texte de l’arrêt, lorsque la Cour rapporte que, selon la Défense, « le Kamwena Nsapu n’est pas un groupe armé organisé comme voulu par la Convention de Genève. C’est plutôt un phénomène, c’est-à-dire un groupe qui étonne par sa manière de mener ses actions. Il tue à l’aide du sable qui se transforme en flèches appelées “miketa ya bajanyi”, c’est-à-dire les flèches des fantômes »261. Ainsi, dans la tête des militaires des FARDC, même si les victimes étaient en apparence non armées, parce que non munies d’armes de guerre, cela n’impliquait pas qu’elles étaient hors de combat. Leur capacité de nuisance ne résidait pas dans le fait de porter des armes de guerre, comme les militaires des FARDC. Elle résidait plutôt dans les amulettes et autres fétiches qu’ils portaient. Ce moyen de défense ne doit pas être pris à la légère. En effet, pour mesurer son importance, il est important de garder à l’esprit que, dans le contexte congolais, la croyance dans les fétiches et autres pratiques mystiques est très répandue aussi bien au sein des militaires de l’armée régulière que dans les forces armées irrégulières (mouvements rebelles et autres groupes armés). La présence des fétiches se retrouve dans beaucoup d’affaires relatives à des crimes de droit international jugées par les 259 260 261 Jean-Marie Henckaerts et Louise Doswald-Beck, op. cit., p. 223-225. Cour militaire (CM) de Kananga, Le Ministère public c. Nyembo Bwana Moya et consorts, « Arrêt », RP 014/017, 6 juillet 2017, p. 17. Idem, p. 22. Crimes de guerre et statut de personne protégée 58 tribunaux congolais et expliquent, sans excuser, certains comportements criminels des combattants au cours des conflits armés ou encore certaines exactions de la part des militaires ou des miliciens. Par exemple, dans l’affaire Kavumu, jugée par la Cour militaire de Bukavu, les viols d’enfants âgés entre 18 mois et 10 ans étaient dictés par des croyances mystico-magiques d’invulnérabilité aux balles ennemies qui animait les membres d’un groupe armé dénommé en Kiswahili « Jeshi la Yesu », c’est-à-dire l’ « Armée de Jésus », groupe fondé et dirigé par un député provincial, le sieur Batumike. Dans ce groupe armé, le féticheur du groupe demandait aux membres de procéder au viol des jeunes filles vierges et de recueillir leur sang hyménal pour concocter une soidisant potion magique qui les rendrait, selon lui, invulnérables aux balles ennemies262. Des croyances similaires ont également été constatées dans d’autres affaires, telles que l’affaire Gédéon263, l’affaire Morgan264, l’affaire Kakado265, etc., impliquant des groupes Maï-Maï qui avaient, eux aussi, des féticheurs en leur sein pour leur préparer de prétendues potions magiques censées les rendre invulnérables aux balles ennemies ; et que ces croyances ont été à l’origine de beaucoup d’atrocités dans la commission des crimes266. Ces mêmes croyances sont également présentes dans le procès de Walikalé où les militaires des FARDC avaient sexuellement agressé les pygmées masculins dans le cadre d’une pratique appelée le « kilemba », elle aussi censée rendre invulnérable aux balles ennemies celui qui la pratiquait267. Concernant spécifiquement les miliciens Kamwena Nsapu, les détails que le rapport de l’Équipe des experts internationaux (EEI) des Nations Unies sur la situation au Kasaï a fournis quant à l’organisation interne de ce groupe autour des « tshiotas », c’est-à-dire les « feux sacrés », révèlent la place incontestable qu’occupent les fétiches dans cette milice268. Plus spécifiquement, dans le point concernant le contexte global de la crise au Kasaï, les experts des Nations Unies ont observé ce qui suit : « la croyance en la sorcellerie et dans les puissances surnaturelles reste largement répandue dans la société, y compris au sein des forces de défense et de sécurité. Les fétiches ont une place prépondérante. Un grand nombre de règles coutumières vient régir la vie de la communauté et leur transgression peut entrainer de graves conséquences »269. 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 CM/Bukavu, Ministère public et 42 Parties civiles c. Batumike et 19 autres, « Arrêt », affaire n° RP 0105/2017, 13 décembre 2017, inédit. CM/Lubumbashi, Ministère public et 102 Parties civiles c. Kyungu Mutanga Gédéon et 25 autres, affaire RPA n° 025/09, 16 décembre 2010, publié dans le Bulletin des arrêts de la Haute Cour militaire, 3e édition, 2013, pp. 267 et seq. Tribunal militaire de garnison (TMG) de l’Ituri, Ministère public et Parties civiles c. Masumbuko Papy et autres, « Jugement », affaire n° RP 246/13, 16 avril 2014. TMG/Bunia, Ministère public et parties civiles c. Kakado Barnaba, « Jugement », affaire n° RP N°071/09, 009/010 et 074/010, 9 juillet 2010 (ci-après, « Jugement Kakado »). Jacques B. Mbokani, La jurisprudence congolaise relative aux crimes de droit international : une analyse des décisions des tribunaux militaires congolais appliquant le Statut de Rome, Johannesburg et New York, OSISA, 2016, pp. 306 et suivants. TMG/Goma, Ministère public et parties civiles c. Kalambay et consorts, affaire n° RP 356/2009, 24 avril 2009. Rapport de l’Équipe d’experts internationaux sur la situation au Kasaï, Doc. ONU A/HRC/38/31, 6 juin 2018 (ci-après, le « Rapport sur le Kasaï »), §§ 31 et 32. Idem, § 20 (c’est nous qui soulignons). 59 Jacques B. Mbokani Comme on le voit, ce constat n’est pas seulement fait par rapport aux groupes armés. Les experts internationaux l’ont clairement posé aussi et surtout par rapport aux forces armées régulières. Au regard du caractère très répandu de ces croyances aussi bien dans les groupes armés que dans les rangs des FARDC, l’on pourrait comprendre que les militaires des FARDC, se trouvant en face des miliciens Kamwena Nsapu, se soient sentis en danger et qu’ils aient agi (ou réagi), pour se défendre contre une attaque jugée, selon eux, imminente. L’on pourrait également comprendre que ces militaires aient continué à avoir peur de leurs ennemis même après les avoir mortellement blessés et mis manifestement hors de combat puisqu’au regard de leur croyance, ces personnes pouvaient encore se révéler mystérieusement et les attaquer. Ces croyances étaient d’ailleurs favorisées par niveau d’étude assez bas des militaires impliqués dans l’incident de Mwanza Lomba. L’arrêt renseigne à cet égard qu’aucun des accusés n’a fait des études universitaires. Le major Bitsounda Martin, par exemple, celui qui a ordonné l’attaque contre les victimes, n’a pas terminé ses études secondaires. L’arrêt renseigne qu’il s’est limité à quatre années postprimaires (page 1re). Ce bas niveau d’études peut expliquer la vulnérabilité des accusés à des croyances comme celles qui entourent la dimension mystique des pouvoirs des miliciens Kamwena Nsapu. Par ailleurs, rien dans le parcours de ces accusés n’indique que, dans leur formation militaire, ils ont été préparés à faire face à des situations comme celle de Mwanza Lomba où des croyances parent l’ennemi d’une prétendue invincibilité. C’est d’ailleurs, et de façon paradoxale, cette prétendue invincibilité qui joue, en fin de compte, en défaveur de la victime puisqu’elle pousse son adversaire à croire que la victime est encore capable de combattre alors qu’elle est en fait hors de combat. Toujours est-il que ce type de situation pose clairement la question de savoir si l’état d’une personne hors de combat doit être analysé suivant une approche objective ou si elle doit l’être suivant une approche subjective. La Cour militaire de Kananga n’a pas explicitement répondu à cette question. L’on sait juste qu’elle n’a pas accordé du crédit à l’argument de la croyance dans les fétiches. La Cour s’est en effet contentée de déclarer que « la descente sur terrain effectuée par la Cour et la vidéo révèlent qu’il n’y avait pas un affrontement armé entre les victimes et les prévenus, mais plutôt une attaque de ces derniers contre les premières en se fondant sur les attitudes fétichistes affichées par leurs victimes, dont ils craignaient une éventuelle attaque mystérieuse »270. En fin de compte, les accusés ont quand même été condamnés pour meurtre271. Au regard de cette jurisprudence, l’on peut soutenir qu’en affirmant qu’ « il n’y avait pas d’affrontement armé entre les victimes et les prévenus », la Cour a implicitement rejeté l’approche subjective et a plutôt choisi de consacrer l’approche objective dans la détermination d’une personne hors de combat. C’est d’ailleurs 270 271 Idem, p. 20. Notons toutefois qu’il s’agissait de meurtre en tant que crime de droit commun et non en tant que crime de guerre, non pas parce que les accusés étaient excusés en raison de leur croyance, mais simplement parce que la Cour a estimé, à tort selon nous, que les exigences contextuelles des crimes de guerre (spécifiquement le caractère organisé des Kamwena Nsapu) n’étaient pas réunies (voir, Jacques B. Mbokani, La jurisprudence congolaise relative aux crimes de droit international (2016-2018), Kinshasa/Bruxelles, Club des Amis du Droit du Congo (CAD), 2018, pp. 84-85). Crimes de guerre et statut de personne protégée 60 l’approche objective qui apparaît comme la plus protectrice des victimes des conflits armés que le serait l’approche subjective. 2. L’appartenance Ou L’allégeance À L’ennemi La non-participation directe aux hostilités n’est pas toujours un critère suffisant pour déterminer le statut d’une personne protégée. Dans certains cas, il est parfois exigé en plus que la victime, pour être une personne protégée, appartienne à l’ennemi ou lui ait fait allégeance. L’analyse de ce critère appelle dans un premier temps à identifier les textes juridiques qui le prévoient pour en dégager ensuite les limites. 2.1. Les textes juridiques prévoyant l’exigence de l’appartenance/allégeance à l’ennemi Ce critère est affirmé à l’article 4 de la Convention IV de Genève relative à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre. Aux termes de cet article en effet, « sont protégées par la Convention les personnes qui, à un moment quelconque et de quelque manière que ce soit, se trouvent, en cas de conflit ou d’occupation, au pouvoir d’une Partie au conflit ou d’une Puissance occupante dont elles ne sont pas ressortissantes ». Cet article consacre ainsi sa protection aux seules personnes détenant la nationalité ennemie et ceux qui sont réfugiés et apatrides. Il ne protège donc pas tous les civils en tant que tels ni surtout les civils ou les populations civiles vis-à-vis de leur État272. Au regard du critère de la nationalité ennemie tel qu’énoncé par l’article 4 de la Convention IV, les États ne s’engagent pas vis-à-vis de leurs propres ressortissants. Comme l’écrivent Marco Sassòli et Julia Grignon, « dans l’articulation de la quatrième Convention de Genève, traité multilatéral entre États [l’exigence de la nationalité comme critère d’identification des personnes protégées] n’est que logique, puisque, les États se voient opposer des obligations spécifiques dans le traitement des personnes qui sont notamment de nationalité ennemie » ; et que « pour ce qui concerne leurs propres ressortissants et pour leurs relations internes avec eux, celles-ci ne relèvent pas – sauf en ce qui concerne la protection générale contre les effets de la guerre – du champ de la Convention »273. On pourrait craindre que l’article 4 de la Convention IV ne consacre un vide juridique ou une lacune dans la protection des civils au sein de leur propre État ou des civils étrangers ressortissants des États neutres. En réalité, cette lacune est comblée par la notion de crimes contre l’humanité. En effet, comme l’ont expliqué Georges et Rosemary 272 273 TPIY (Ch. Appel), Le Procureur c. Tadić, « Arrêt », affaire n° IT-94-1-A, 15 juillet 1999 (ci-après, « Arrêt Tadić (fond) »), § 164. Marco Sassòli et Julia Grignon, « Les limites du droit international pénal et de la justice pénale dans la mise en œuvre du droit international humanitaire », in Abdelwahab Biad et Paul Tavernier (dir.). Le droit international humanitaire face aux défis du XXIe siècle, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2012, p. 149. 61 Jacques B. Mbokani Abi-Saab, « les crimes contre l’humanité, innovation du Statut du [Tribunal militaire international de Nuremberg], ont été introduits pour remplir la lacune dans la protection du jus in bello qui ne recouvrait pas les populations civiles, apatrides ou appartenant aux belligérants, dont les combattants, commettent les exactions ; exactions qui pourront, pour la plupart d’entre elles, constituer des crimes de guerre si les populations civiles qui en ont été victimes avaient appartenu à l’ennemi »274. On retrouve cette même explication de l’origine de la notion de crimes contre l’humanité dans les écrits de Cherif Bassiouni. Ce dernier soutenait en effet ce qui suit : « une question juridique plus délicate consistait à savoir si les « crimes contre l’humanité » de l’article 6 (c) existaient par combinaison des sources du droit international, à savoir les conventions, la coutume et les principes généraux de droit. Comme les « crimes contre l’humanité » ne faisaient pas partie du droit conventionnel, les Alliés devaient éviter une interprétation rigide du principe de la légalité et éviter de mettre en place une législation ex post facto qui pourrait être contestée avec succès au procès. Par conséquent, la justification du « crime contre l’humanité » fut trouvée dans une théorie de l’extension de la compétence pour crimes de guerre. Le raisonnement suivi était que les crimes de guerre s’appliquaient à certaines personnes protégées, à savoir des civils, en temps de guerre entre États belligérants, et que les « crimes contre l’humanité » étendaient les mêmes interdictions que les « crimes de guerre » à la même catégorie des personnes protégées à l’intérieur d’un État donné, à condition qu’ils soient liés au déclenchement ou à la conduite d’une guerre d’agression ou à des crimes de guerre »275. Puisque l’article 4 de la Convention IV (1949) a été rédigé après le statut du TMI de Nuremberg (1945), l’on peut soutenir que ses rédacteurs ont consciemment exclu les exactions commises contre les combattants au sein de leur propre camp en ayant en tête qu’il était plus approprié que les victimes de tels actes soient plutôt protégées par l’incrimination des crimes contre l’humanité. Ce même critère de l’appartenance à l’ennemi est également consacré dans le Protocole I au regard de l’extension de la notion de conflit armé international aux guerres de libération nationale. Celles-ci renvoient aux « conflits armés dans lesquels les peuples luttent contre la domination coloniale et l’occupation étrangère et contre les régimes racistes dans l’exercice du droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes, consacré dans la Charte des Nations Unies et dans la Déclaration relative aux principes du droit international touchant les relations amicales et la coopération entre les états conformément à la Charte des Nations Unies »276. Le Protocole I a aussi décidé d’étendre le champ d’application des « infractions graves » à certains actes individuels commis dans le contexte des guerres de libération277. Cette double extension (conflit armé international et infractions graves) a suscité la question de savoir qui peut être considéré comme « personnes protégées » dans 274 275 276 277 Georges et Rosemary Abi-Saab, « Les crimes de guerre », op. cit., p. 151, § 39 (voy. aussi p. 155, § 56). Cherif Bassiouni, « Chapitre 58 : L’expérience des premières juridictions pénales internationales », in Hervé Ascensio et al. (dir.), op. cit., p. 740, § 24. Article 1 § 4 du premier Protocole additionnel aux quatre Conventions de Genève de 1949 (Protocole I). Voy. les paragraphes 3 et 4 de l’article 85 du Protocole I. Crimes de guerre et statut de personne protégée 62 les « infractions graves » qui seraient commises dans les guerres de libération nationale. Selon le commentaire du Protocole I, dans les guerres de libération nationale, le statut de personnes protégées s’applique, en principe, aux personnes « appartenant à l’ennemi » ou celles qui lui ont fait « allégeance »278. Il convient toutefois d’indiquer que l’article 10 du Protocole I protège « tous les blessés, malades et naufragés, à quelque Partie qu’ils appartiennent » ; et oblige les Parties au conflit à traiter ces personnes « en toutes circonstances (…) avec humanité » tout en précisant qu’ « aucune distinction fondée sur des critères autres que médicaux ne doit être faite entre eux ». Il s’ensuit que, dans les guerres de libération nationale, la protection conférée à ce type particulier de victimes de guerre peut s’étendre jusque et y compris au sein de leur propre camp279. Concernant les civils, le Protocole I ne précise pas dans quelle mesure ce critère leur est applicable. Dans l’hypothèse où les critères avancés par le commentaire du Protocole sont une extension de celui de la nationalité, l’on pourra alors imaginer qu’il soit possible de distinguer parmi les civils, ceux qui « appartiennent » à un camp et ceux qui appartiennent à l’autre camp et déterminer, sur cette base, qui peut être considéré comme une « personne protégée ». Une telle distinction parmi les civils serait sans doute très difficile en pratique. Mais, le commentaire semble la concevoir tout au moins en théorie. Ainsi, s’il peut exister, en théorie, des civils qui, dans les guerres de libération nationale, ne jouiraient pas du statut de « personnes protégées » en fonction précisément des critères énoncés par le commentaire, cette même distinction serait logiquement applicable aux combattants. À s’en tenir au commentaire, les combattants des guerres de libération nationale ne pourront prétendre au statut de « personnes protégées » que pour autant qu’ils se trouvent au pouvoir d’une partie au conflit à laquelle ils n’appartiennent pas ou à laquelle ils n’ont pas fait allégeance. En conséquence, selon toujours ce commentaire, les combattants ne peuvent prétendre à un tel statut au sein de leur propre camp dans les guerres de libération nationale. Dans ce cas, en effet, il serait plus facile de démontrer qu’ils ne remplissent pas le critère de l’appartenance ou de l’allégeance à l’ennemi. Le Protocole I reste, sur ce point, dans la même logique de l’article 4 de la Convention IV. Le critère de l’appartenance/allégeance à l’ennemi est par ailleurs consacré dans au moins deux jurisprudences internationales. La première jurisprudence est l’affaire Tadić où la Chambre d’appel du Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie (TPIY) a étendu la notion de conflit armé international aux conflits armés internes, mais internationalisés. Selon le TPIY en effet, cette situation renvoie aux conflits armés qui se déroulent sur le territoire d’un État entre les forces armées de ce dernier et un groupe armé organisé opérant sous un contrôle global d’un ou de plusieurs autres États280. En 278 279 280 Yves Sandoz, Ch. Swinarski, et Bruno Zimmermann (dir.), Commentaire des Protocoles additionnels du 8 juin 1977 aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949, Genève/Leiden, CICR et Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986, p. 55, § 117. Tilman Rodenhäuser, « Squaring the Circle? Prosecuting Sexual Violence against Child Soldiers by their ‘Own Forces’ », Journal of International Criminal Justice (JICJ), vol. 14, 2016, p. 188. Arrêt Tadić (Fond), §§ 116 et seq. 63 Jacques B. Mbokani étendant ainsi, la notion de conflit armé international, le TPIY s’est vu confronté à la question de la détermination des personnes protégées dans de tels conflits armés. Pour y répondre, le TPIY a estimé applicable le critère de l’allégeance ou de l’appartenance à l’ennemi, critère qui avait déjà été énoncé dans le commentaire du Protocole I, concernant les guerres de libération nationale. Pour expliquer son approche, le TPIY a déclaré que « dès 1949, le critère du lien juridique de nationalité n’était pas considéré comme déterminant et [que] des exceptions étaient prévues » notamment pour le cas des réfugiés et des apatrides281. Le TPIY a surtout soutenu ce qui suit : « [c]ette approche juridique, qui s’articule davantage autour des relations de fait que des liens formels, revêt encore plus d’importance dans les conflits armés internationaux contemporains. Alors que les guerres du passé opposaient principalement des États bien établis, les conflits armés interethniques modernes, comme en ex-Yougoslavie, se caractérisent par l’émergence de nouveaux États pendant le conflit et de ce fait, les allégeances peuvent tenir plus à l’appartenance ethnique qu’à la nationalité. Autrement dit, l’appartenance ethnique peut déterminer l’allégeance à une nation. Dans ces circonstances, la condition de nationalité s’avère encore moins adaptée à la détermination du statut de “personne protégée”. S’agissant de pareils conflits, non seulement le texte de la Convention et les travaux qui ont abouti à sa rédaction, mais également, et plus significativement, l’objet et le but de la Convention, suggèrent que le critère déterminant est celui de l’allégeance à une Partie au conflit et, partant, du contrôle exercé par ladite Partie sur les personnes qui se trouvent sur un territoire donné »282. Comme pour les guerres de libération nationale, cette jurisprudence suscite les mêmes interrogations sur le critère de distinction entre les civils aux fins de la détermination du statut de la « personne protégée ». Si l’on s’en tient à cette jurisprudence, le critère de l’appartenance ou de l’allégeance à l’ennemi permettrait de déterminer parmi les civils ceux qui ont le statut de « personnes protégées » et ceux qui ne l’ont pas. Mais, comme pour le cas des guerres de libération nationale, l’application concrète du critère de l’allégeance et celui de l’appartenance à l’ennemi aux populations civiles peuvent se révéler très difficiles en pratique. Toujours est-il que l’arrêt sous-entend qu’en théorie, dans les conflits armés internationalisés, il existerait des civils ou des populations civiles qui, bien que ne prenant pas une part directe aux hostilités, ne pourront pas prétendre au statut de « personnes protégées » par le droit international humanitaire. Si de telles distinctions peuvent être faites, même en théorie, à l’égard des civils, on ne voit pas comment elles le ne seraient pas parmi les combattants. Il s’ensuit donc que rien, en principe, ne permet de déduire de cette jurisprudence que les combattants seraient aussi des « personnes protégées » au sein de leur propre camp. La seconde jurisprudence est issue des Chambres extraordinaires cambodgiennes dans le procès des Khmers rouges encore en vie. Dans cette jurisprudence, il s’est avéré que même dans les conflits armés interétatiques, le statut de personnes protégées 281 282 Idem, § 165. Idem, §166. Crimes de guerre et statut de personne protégée 64 pouvait être reconnu aux personnes qui, bien qu’étant ressortissantes de leur État, étaient néanmoins géographiquement, culturellement et parfois même linguistiquement proches de l’ennemi et que, pour cette seule raison, elles étaient traitées comme des ennemis ou comme une menace à la sécurité nationale de leur propre État. Telle est en tout cas l’approche que les Chambres extraordinaires cambodgiennes ont adoptée pour ce qui concerne les mauvais traitements infligés par les membres du Kampuchéa démocratique à l’endroit des populations cambodgiennes de l’Est, lors du conflit armé ayant opposé le Cambodge au Vietnam entre 1975 et 1979283. Contrairement à ce que l’on peut penser, cette jurisprudence ne consacre pas l’idée d’une protection interne des membres des forces ou groupes armés au sein de leur propre camp. Comme dans l’arrêt Tadić, cette jurisprudence consacre elle aussi l’idée implicite de l’appartenance à l’ennemi. Cette idée est ici faite selon des critères linguistiques et culturels. La jurisprudence précitée implique a contrario que les civils qui ne remplissent pas ces critères ne peuvent pas considérés comme des personnes protégées, quand bien ils ne prendraient pas une part directe aux hostilités. Donc, ici encore, il y a implicitement l’idée d’exclusion d’une catégorie de civils de la protection du droit international humanitaire en fonction des critères de l’appartenance à l’ennemi. Cette idée exclut, elle aussi, toute possibilité de protection, par le même droit international humanitaire, des combattants khmers rouges au sein de leur propre camp. Relevons enfin que, même dans le Statut de Rome, on retrouve ce critère notamment dans les éléments du crime relatifs aux infractions graves prévues à l’article 8(2)(a) qui porte sur les crimes de guerre. Ainsi, détaillant les éléments du crime d’ « homicide intentionnel » dans la catégorie d’infractions graves aux quatre Conventions de Genève de 1949, une note de bas de page dit qu’ « en ce qui concerne la nationalité, il est entendu que l’auteur devait uniquement savoir que la victime appartenait à la partie ennemie dans le conflit ». La note précise par ailleurs cette condition « s’applique aussi à l’élément correspondant de tous les crimes visés à l’article 8 2) a) ». Cette note implique que toutes les « infractions graves » dont parle l’article 8(2)(a) du Statut de Rome ne protègent pas nécessairement tous les civils rien qu’en raison du fait qu’ils ne prennent pas une part directe aux hostilités. Selon la note, pour être protégés, les civils doivent en plus appartenir à l’ennemi. Ainsi, la note exclut implicitement que les combattants soient protégés dans leur propre camp. 2.2 Les limites au critère de l’appartenance à l’ennemi La question qu’il convient d’analyser à présent est celle de savoir si l’on peut conférer au critère de l’appartenance à l’ennemi une portée générale au même titre que le premier critère relatif à la non-participation directe aux hostilités. En d’autres termes, pour être reconnu victime de crime de guerre, doit-on nécessairement réunir ces deux critères ? Sur cette question, la Chambre d’appel de la CPI a, l’affaire Ntaganda, observé que le critère de la nationalité est applicable aux questions relevant de la Convention IV 283 Chambres extraordinaires au sein des tribunaux cambodgiens, Le Procureur c. Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, affaire n° 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 26 juillet 2010, § 426. 65 Jacques B. Mbokani portant sur la population civile et de la Convention III relatives aux prisonniers de guerre, étant entendu que ceux-ci sont, d’abord et avant tout, des membres des armées ennemies. La Chambre d’appel a, par contre, considéré que ce critère n’était pas applicable à la Convention I sur les blessés et malades en campagne et à la Convention II portant sur les blessés, malades et naufragés. Observons que l’article 12, plus ou moins commun aux deux Conventions (I et II), oblige les États à protéger respectivement les blessés et malades sur terre et les blessés, malades et naufragés sur mer « en toute circonstance (…) sans aucune distinction de caractère défavorable basé sur le sexe, la race la nationalité » et interdit toute violence à leur encontre. Cet article 12 est par ailleurs confirmé par l’article 10 du Protocole I qui proclame la même chose en faveur des malades, blessés et naufragés284. L’arrêt Ntaganda a ainsi considéré, sur la base de l’article 12 (Conventions I et II), que « ce statut protégé ne se limite pas aux personnes appartenant aux forces armées ennemies, mais inclut les membres blessés, malades ou naufragés des propres forces armées d’une partie, ce qui correspond à l’interprétation faite de la portée de cette protection depuis l’adoption de la première Convention de Genève en 1864 ». L’arrêt en a conclu que « la notion d’infraction grave aux Ire et IIème Conventions de Genève inclut les violations commises contre les blessés, les malades ou les naufragés par d’autres membres de leur propre forces armées »285. En réalité, cet arrêt corrige la note de bas de page dont on a parlé au sujet des éléments du crime relatif aux crimes de guerre tirés des infractions graves aux Conventions de Genève de 1949. En effet, alors que la note précitée avait soutenu qu’il fallait établir que les victimes appartenaient à l’ennemi, l’arrêt Ntaganda démontre plutôt que cette condition ne s’applique pas aux infractions graves prévues dans les 1re et IIème Conventions. Ainsi, on voit apparaître la première limite sur le champ d’application de la condition d’appartenance à l’ennemi. En effet, cette condition est limitée aux infractions graves prévues dans les Conventions III et IV et ne s’applique pas à celles qui sont prévues dans les Conventions I et II. Une deuxième limite à l’application de la condition de l’appartenance à l’ennemi semble résider dans l’incrimination des violations graves des lois et coutumes de guerre à l’article 8(2)(b) et à l’article 8(2)(e)(i) du Statut de Rome. En effet, les Éléments du crime relatifs à cette catégorie de crimes de guerre ne mentionnent pas une telle condition. Pourtant, parmi les actes individuels interdits figurent les « attaques délibérées contre la population civile en général ou contre des civils qui ne prennent pas directement part aux hostilités »286. Il s’ensuit que dans les conflits armés (internationaux et non internationaux) la condition de l’appartenance à l’ennemi n’est pas exigée pour qu’un civil ou une population civile soit considéré(e) comme une personne protégée contre de telles attaques. En conséquence, la protection que les civils et populations civiles n’ont 284 285 286 L’article 10 du Protocole I, article relatif à la « Protection et soin », dispose : « (1) tous les blessés, malades et naufragés, à quelque Partie qu’ils appartiennent, doivent être respectés et protégés. (2) Ils doivent en toutes circonstances être traités avec humanité et recevoir, dans toute la mesure du possible et dans les délais les plus brefs, les soins médicaux qu’exige leur état. Aucune distinction fondée sur des critères autres que médicaux ne doit être faite entre eux ». Arrêt Ntaganda, § 59 (c’est nous qui soulignons). Voir l’article 8(2)(b) et l’article 8(2)(e)(i) du même Statut de Rome. Crimes de guerre et statut de personne protégée 66 pas en vertu de l’article 4 de la Convention IV apparait à travers l’incrimination des violations graves des lois et coutumes de la guerre. La portée de la limitation de cette condition de l’appartenance à l’ennemi doit toutefois être précisée. Cette condition ne s’applique en effet pas à « la population civile en général » ou aux « civils qui ne prennent pas directement part aux hostilités ». Il s’ensuit qu’en plus de la non-participation directe aux hostilités, la qualité de « civil » ou le fait de faire partie de la « population civile » reste exigée. Cela exclut donc l’idée d’une protection générale qui serait reconnue aux « combattants » contre des exactions qu’ils subiraient au sein de leur propre camp. Comme on voit, la question de la population civile est résolue quelle que soit la nature du conflit armé et sans qu’il ne soit besoin d’appartenir à l’ennemi ou de lui avoir fait allégeance. Par ailleurs, les combattants sont protégés, y compris au sein de leur propre camp, par les Conventions I et II, en particulier, lorsqu’ils sont blessés, malades ou naufragés. Ceci étant, la question qui reste posée est celle de la protection dont jouirait un combattant, au sein de son propre camp, qui ne se trouve pas dans les situations décrites ci-haut. En d’autres termes, au cours d’un conflit armé (international ou non international), un combattant qui n’est ni malade ni blessé ni naufragé peut-il prétendre à la qualité de « personne protégée » contre des exactions qu’ils subiraient au sein de son propre camp et être considéré comme une victime de crime de guerre ? La question posée doit être distinguée de celle des cas d’abus sexuels dont seraient victimes les enfants-soldats au sein de leur propre camp. Comme l’a démontré Tilman Rodenhäuser, le fait que ces enfants perdent leur qualité de personnes protégées vis-à-vis des forces ennemies précisément parce qu’ils ont la qualité de combattants ne signifie pas nécessairement qu’ils ne bénéficient plus de la protection spéciale que leur accorde le droit international humanitaire au sein de leur propre camp287. 2.3 Les combattants : personnes protégées au sein de leur propre camp? L’interrogation qui sera abordée ici nait de certaines pratiques observées pour maintenir la discipline au sein d’une partie engagée dans un conflit armé. L’on se souvient par exemple que lors de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, Joseph Staline, président de l’exURSS, avait émis le terrible ordre n° 227 du 28 juillet 1942, ordre également connu sous son slogan « pas un pas en arrière ! ». Cet ordre imposait à chaque front de créer un à trois bataillons disciplinaires composés de condamnés lesquels se voyaient alors assigner les tâches les plus dangereuses soi-disant « pour leur donner une opportunité de laver dans le sang leurs crimes envers la Mère Patrie ». Le même ordre demandait également de former dans les limites de chaque armée 3 à 5 escouades défensives bien armées (jusqu’à 200 personnes par section), les mettre immédiatement derrière les divisions instables et requérir en cas de panique ou de retraite éparse d’éléments de la division de tirer sur les déserteurs et les lâches, et ainsi aider les honnêtes soldats de la 287 Tilman Rodenhäuser, op. cit., p. 186: « Therefore, the fact that a child may lose his or her protection against direct attack or its civilian status vis-à-vis its opponents when directly participating in hostilities or assuming a continuous combat function should not be interpreted as giving a carte blanche for ill treatment to those who recruited the child ». 67 Jacques B. Mbokani division à exécuter leur devoir pour la Mère Patrie. L’on rapporte que « durant la seule bataille de Stalingrad, 13.500 soldats soviétiques furent exécutés pour avoir fait preuve de “couardise” »288. Ces personnes-là ont été victimes, au sein de leur propre camp, des exécutions sommaires qui n’étaient pas judiciairement encadrées par des procédures devant les Cours martiales. Dans la mesure où ces personnes n’étaient ni des civils ni des blessés, malades ou naufragés peut-on dire, qu’au regard des normes actuelles, elles auraient pu prétendre à la qualité de personne protégée contre l’incrimination des crimes de guerre ? La même interrogation peut aussi être formulée concernant certaines pratiques employées pour maintenir la discipline au sein de certaines formes armées irrégulières dans les conflits armés non internationaux. Par exemple, dans le contexte du conflit armé rwandais des années 1990, opposant l’armée gouvernementale composée des forces armées rwandaises (FAR) aux membres de la rébellion armée du Front/Armée patriotique rwandais (F/APR), Pierre Péan rapporte les propos de M. Aloys Ruyenzi, un ancien membre de l’APR qui décrivait les conditions dans lesquelles l’ordre et la discipline étaient maintenus au sein de ce mouvement rebelle : « aucune faute n’était considérée comme mineure, surtout lorsqu’elle était commise par quelqu’un qui venait d’un pays francophone. La punition était d’être exécutée à la douille d’une houe usagée ou être transpercée à la baïonnette jusqu’à ce que mort s’ensuive. Ceux qui étaient suspectés d’une minime erreur, ceux qui étaient pris de fatigue à cause de la marche, ceux qui souffrirent d’une diarrhée sanguinolente à cause des mauvaises conditions de vie, étaient accusés d’être trop habitués à la vie douce. On disait: ‘Tuez ces chiens, ils ne sont pas utiles’»289. Certes, dans ce cas, il y avait des malades, notamment ceux qui souffraient d’une diarrhée sanguinolente à cause des mauvaises conditions de vie. Ces personnes peuvent donc être considérées comme des personnes protégées, y compris au sein de leur propre camp. Mais, qu’en est-il des autres ? Celles qui étaient simplement fatiguées (la fatigue n’étant pas une maladie) ou qui avaient commis des erreurs mêmes minimes ? Pouvaient-elles prétendre au statut de personnes protégées ? La Haute Cour militaire de la RDC a jugé une affaire dans laquelle une question de ce type s’est implicitement posée au sujet d’un ancien chef de guerre, Jerome Kakwavu (devenu par la suite général de brigade au sein de l’armée gouvernementale). Pour mémoire, Kakwavu avait fondé, depuis le 6 mars 2003, avec le soutien de l’armée ougandaise, un mouvement politico-militaire dont la branche politique était dénommée l’« Union des démocrates congolais (UDC) » tandis que la branche militaire se faisait appeler Forces armées du peuple congolais (FAPC). La justice militaire lui reprochait d’avoir ordonné des actes de torture et de meurtre ordonnés contre des individus présentés comme ses anciens collaborateurs et suspectés d’avoir pris part à une mutinerie (putsch manqué) contre lui en date du 23 mai 2003 vers 5 heures, laquelle mutinerie n’a pu être neutralisée que grâce à l’intervention de l’armée ougandaise. Plus spécifiquement, 288 289 Nicolas Werth, « La société et la guerre dans les espaces russe et soviétique, 1914-1946 », in Histoire, économie et société, 23e année, n° 2, 2004, p. 206. Voy. Pierre Péan, Noires Fureurs, Blancs menteurs. Rwanda 1990-1994, Ed. Mille et une nuits, 2005, p. 66. Crimes de guerre et statut de personne protégée 68 Kakwavu était poursuivi pour « atteintes à la vie et à l’intégrité corporelle, notamment le meurtre sous toutes ses formes, les mutilations, les traitements cruels et la torture », en tant que « violations graves de l’article 3 commun aux quatre Conventions de Genève du 12 aout 1949 » au regard de l’article 8(2)(c)(i) du Statut de Rome. À l’issue de son procès, l’accusé a été reconnu coupable pour crime de guerre. Pour retenir une telle qualification, la Haute Cour militaire s’est toutefois limitée à déclarer que « ce meurtre (…) a été commis dans un contexte, sous le couvert, sous le prétexte ou à la faveur d’un contexte des conflits armés ne présentant pas un caractère international qui prévalait dans les territoires sous contrôle des FAPC (…) »290. L’argumentation ainsi avancée par la Haute Cour tend toutefois à confondre d’un côté, l’exigence du lien de connexité entre un acte individuel et le conflit armé et, de l’autre côté, le statut de personne protégée. Il s’agissait pourtant des deux exigences distinctes. Le fait d’établir l’une n’entraîne pas nécessairement que l’autre est établie à telle enseigne que l’argumentation ayant présidé à la qualification de crime de guerre des actes reprochés à l’accusé se révélait finalement incomplète. En tout état de cause, l’apport de cette jurisprudence se révèle finalement très limité au débat relatif à la question de savoir si les combattants non malades ni blessés ni encore naufragés peuvent prétendre à la qualité de « personnes protégées » contre des exactions qu’ils subiraient au sein de leur propre camp. Sur cette question, l’on constate qu’il existe une grande controverse entre les auteurs. Deux écoles peuvent ainsi être dégagées dans cette controverse. Dans la première école de pensée, la règle qui demeure est que les membres des forces ou groupes armés ne sont des personnes protégées au sein de leur propre camp291. Comme l’ont dit Marco Sassòli et Julia Grignon, « les États parties s’engagent les uns envers les autres et non pas envers leurs propres ressortissants en accédant aux Conventions de Genève »292. Cette approche est soutenue par une jurisprudence du Tribunal spécial pour la Sierra Leone (TSSL) qui concernait le meurtre d’un individu considéré comme un espion au sein du groupe armé dont il était membre293. Dans cette jurisprudence, le Tribunal a estimé que les relations au sein d’une des parties au conflit pourraient, à la rigueur, relever du droit international des droits de l’homme et en tout cas pas du droit international. En soutien à cette jurisprudence du TSSL, l’on peut ranger l’argumentation de CPI dans la décision de confirmation des charges relative à l’affaire Katanga et Ngudjolo. Dans cette décision en effet, la Chambre préliminaire I de la CPI a dit que le recrutement des enfants soldats « est le seul crime de guerre (…) qui peut être commis par un auteur contre des personnes appartenant à son propre camp dans le conflit », ce qui revenait 290 291 292 293 HCM, Le Ministère public et parties civiles c. Kakwavu, « Arrêt », affaire n° 004/2010, 7 novembre 2014, in Bulletin des arrêts de la Haute Cour militaire, la lutte contre les violences sexuelles, Numéro spécial, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2016, p. 69. Peter Rowe, « The Obligation of State Under International Law to Protect Members of its Own Armed Forces during Armed Conflict or Occupation », Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol. 9, 2006, p. 23; et Marco Sassòli et Julia Grignon, « Les limites du droit international pénal … », op. cit., p. 149; Antonio Cassese et Paola Gaeta, Cassese’s International Criminal Law, 3e edition, Oxford, OUP, 2013, p. 67. Marco Sassòli et Julia Grignon, « Les limites du droit international pénal … », op. cit., p. 149. TSSL (Ch. 1re Inst. I), Le Procureur c. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon et Augustine Gbao, « Jugement », affaire n° SCL-04-15-T, 2 mars 2009, §§1451-1454. 69 Jacques B. Mbokani à confirmer implicitement l’exigence de l’appartenance à l’ennemi comme critère de personne protégée pour les autres crimes294. L’on découvre par ailleurs que dans l’arrêt Ntaganda, la CPI a cité deux autres affaires ayant abondé dans le même sens (mais, les a estimées peu convaincantes)295. Dans l’affaire Pilz en effet, la Cour de cassation néerlandaise avait jugé que le meurtre par des membres de l’armée d’occupation allemande aux Pays-Bas d’un ressortissant néerlandais qui avait rejoint cette armée ne constituait pas un crime de guerre. Par ailleurs, dans l’affaire Motosuke, concernait un membre du service de renseignement japonais accusé de crime de guerre pour avoir ordonné l’exécution d’un membre de l’armée japonaise, et dans laquelle affaire la cour martiale temporaire mise en place par les Pays-Bas à Amboina a décidé en janvier 1948 que l’acte en question ne constituait pas un crime de guerre, car cette notion se limitait aux affaires dans lesquelles les victimes étaient des ressortissants des forces alliées. Dans la seconde école de pensée, l’on constate qu’il y a aussi des auteurs qui soutiennent que le droit international humanitaire confère une protection presque à tout le monde, y compris aux membres des groupes ou forces armées (autres que les blessés, malades et naufragés) au sein de leur propre camp296. L’arrêt Ntaganda semble venir en appui à cette seconde école lorsque la CPI déclare qu’il n’était à priori pas exclu qu’un crime de guerre soit commis contre des personnes maltraitées au sein de leur propre camp. Pour rappel, l’affaire portait sur les violences sexuelles exercées contre certaines combattantes au sein de leur propre camp. Souscrivant à la conclusion initialement avancée par la Chambre de première instance, la Chambre d’appel a déclaré ce qui suit : « rien ne justifie jamais les violences sexuelles contre les personnes, que celles-ci soient ou non, au regard du droit international humanitaire, susceptibles d’être prises pour cible ou tuées. Par conséquent, en l’absence de toute règle générale excluant les membres des forces armées de la protection contre des violations commises par des membres de la même force armée, il n’y a pas lieu de présumer l’existence d’une telle règle dans le cas spécifique du viol et de l’esclavage sexuel en tant que crimes de guerre »297. Pour parvenir à cette conclusion, l’arrêt a, bien entendu, critiqué les jurisprudences citées précédemment en ne les estimant pas convaincantes tout en étant « consciente de la nature apparemment sans précédent de sa conclusion »298 et du fait que cette conclusion pourrait être perçue « comme motivée par un certain activisme judiciaire »299. Comme on peut le constater, dans cet arrêt, la Chambre d’appel va bien au-delà de la protection des enfants-soldats victimes d’exactions (violences sexuelles) au sein de 294 295 296 297 298 299 CPI (Ch. Prél. I), Le Procureur c. Katanga, « Décision relative à la confirmation des charges », Doc. ICC01/04-01/07-717-tFRA, 30 septembre 2008, § 248. Arrêt Ntaganda, §§ 62-63. Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, Oxford, OUP, 2012, pp. 246-249 (voy. “Intra-Party Protection”). Arrêt Ntaganda, §§ 64-65. Idem, § 67. Idem, § 67. Crimes de guerre et statut de personne protégée 70 leur propre camp. L’arrêt affirme en effet un principe général consistant dans le fait que le droit international humanitaire protège, en principe, les combattants, y compris au sein de leur propre camp ; et que ce n’est que de manière exceptionnelle, qu’il peut être exigé en plus, l’appartenance ou l’allégeance à l’ennemi. Conclusion L’étude du statut de personne protégée en tant qu’élément constitutif de crimes de guerre conduit à la formulation de trois constats suivants. Premièrement, ce statut repose principalement sur le critère de la non-participation directe aux hostilités. La nature du conflit armé (internationale ou non internationale) ou le statut de la victime, selon qu’elle est civile ou combattante, n’a aucune incidence sur ce critère. En effet, à partir du moment où un combattant se trouve placé hors de combat par blessures, maladies, etc., ce critère permettant d’acquérir le statut d’une personne protégée s’applique aussi à lui. L’on peut ainsi reconnaitre à ce premier critère une portée générale. Deuxièmement, à côté de ce premier critère, il existe toutefois un second critère tiré de l’appartenance ou de l’allégeance à l’ennemi. Selon ce critère en effet, pour prétendre au statut de personne protégée, il faudra, en plus de la non-participation directe aux hostilités, établir que la victime appartenait à l’ennemi ou qu’elle lui a fait allégeance. Sans ce critère supplémentaire, il aurait été plus difficile d’établir que la victime était une « personne protégée ». La jurisprudence de la CPI, dans l’affaire Ntaganda, marque toutefois une tendance consistant à réduire de façon significative le champ d’application de ce second critère. Il apparaît ainsi que ce critère ne s’applique pas (i) aux infractions graves prévues dans les Conventions I et II, mais uniquement à celles qui sont prévues dans les Conventions III et IV ; (ii) aux attaques contre les civils et les populations civiles en tant que violations graves des lois et coutumes de la guerre de telle sorte que les civils et populations civiles qui n’étaient pas protégés par le régime des infractions graves prévues dans la Convention IV se voient accordés, dans le Statut de Rome, une protection en vertu des normes interdisant les violations graves des lois et coutumes de la guerre ; et (iii) aux blessés, malades et naufragés ni aux enfants soldats victimes d’exactions au sein de leur propre camp. Sur la base de ces limitations, il est difficile de reconnaitre à ce critère une portée générale au même titre que le premier critère. Troisièmement enfin, la tendance à la restriction du champ d’application de second critère a pour conséquence d’augmenter la catégorie de personnes protégées par l’incrimination des crimes de guerre en général. Par rapport aux combattants autres que les enfants-soldats, les malades, les blessés et les naufragés qui bénéficient d’une certaine protection spéciale, cette restriction consacre une protection interne à leur égard, au sein de leur propre camp. Cette protection est importante parce que, sans la restriction de la condition de l’appartenance à l’ennemi, cette catégorie de combattants n’aurait pas été protégée à travers l’incrimination des crimes de guerre ni celle des crimes contre l’humanité. En effet, de toute évidence, il ne s’agit pas des civils ou des membres de la population civile qui seraient victimes d’une attaque systématique ou généralisée 71 Jacques B. Mbokani lancée contre eux en application ou dans la poursuite de la politique d’un État ou d’une organisation ayant pour but une telle attaque. Si par rapport aux combattants, la restriction du champ d’application du critère de l’appartenance à l’ennemi produit quelque effet utile et, à ce sujet, peut être justifié, tel n’est pas le cas concernant les civils et population civile victimes des exactions dans le contexte d’un conflit armé. Ceuxci sont en effet déjà protégés par l’incrimination des crimes contre l’humanité. L’on a d’ailleurs vu que cette incrimination a été conçue précisément pour combler les lacunes du droit international humanitaire concernant les populations civiles qui, sans appartenir à l’ennemi, sont néanmoins victimes d’exactions sur base des motifs discriminatoires. Par rapport donc aux populations civiles, la restriction du champ d’application du critère de l’appartenance à l’ennemi n’apporte pas grand-chose. Bien au contraire, elle anéantit un des critères de distinction entre les crimes de guerre et les crimes contre l’humanité lorsque ceux-ci sont commis dans le contexte d’un conflit armé. Crimes de guerre et statut de personne protégée 72 73 Balingene Kahombo DROITS DE L’HOMME ET OBLIGATION DE POURSUIVRE LES CRIMES DE GUERRE: REVUE CRITIQUE DE LA DECISION DE LA COMMISSION AFRICAINE DANS L’AFFAIRE KILWA (RDC) Résumé Balingene Kahombo L’affaire Kilwa a connu un nouveau rebondissement devant la Commission africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples (CADHP). Par sa décision du 18 juin 2016, la CADHP a condamné la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) pour plusieurs violations de la Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples (ci-après la Charte africaine). Les faits de la cause se rapportent à deux circonstances différentes mais liées. Il s’agit d’abord de l’incident qui s’est passé dans la cité de Kilwa, au sudest de la RDC, où l’armée congolaise pourchassait une milice qui avait réussi à occuper le lieu du 14 au 15 octobre 2004. A la suite de cette opération, il avait été fait état de l’exécution sommaire de nombreuses personnes, de destructions des biens privées et de cas de pillages par l’armée congolaise. La société de droit australien Anvil Mining et ses trois agents ont également été mis en cause pour leur supposée participation dans la commission de ces crimes. Ensuite, la justice militaire congolaise, à travers la Cour militaire du Katanga (CMK) saisie pour crimes de guerre, en acquitta tous les prévenus en juin 2007, avant que la Haute Cour militaire (HCM) ne déclare irrecevable le recours en appel des parties victimes en décembre 2007. L’affaire devant la CADHP résulte de la communication 393/10 introduite par trois organisations non-gouvernementales en application de l’article 55 de la Charte africaine. Cette étude démontre que bien que la décision de la CADHP soit une grande victoire des victimes contre l’impunité en RDC, la communication 393/10 aurait pu être déclarée irrecevable pour non-épuisement des voies de recours internes. Quant au fond, elle démontre que la CADHP a condamné la RDC pour certaines violations de la Charte africaine, dont des cas d’exécutions sommaires, dont l’établissement reste pour le moins très douteux. Ceci inclut les violations prétendument commises par la société Anvil Mining et ses agents, dont la RDC est rendue responsable en application l’article 1 de la Charte africaine. Il n’y avait pas non plus de violation du droit à l’appel en l’espèce du fait de la non-observation des conditions d’exercice dudit recours, dont la détermination relève de la compétence nationale de chaque Etat. En tout état de cause, quelles que soient les faiblesses juridiques de la décision de la CADHP, la RDC devrait exécuter sa condamnation de Droits de l’homme et obligation de poursuivre les crimes de guerre.... 74 bonne foi. En particulier, cette étude suggère qu’un nouveau procès pénal ait lieu devant la Cour de cassation. La société civile devrait encourager la RDC sur cette voie. 75 Balingene Kahombo HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE OBLIGATION TO PROSECUTE WAR CRIMES: CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION’S DECISION IN THE KILWA CASE (DRC) Abstract The Kilwa case has undergone a new twist before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). Through its decision dated 18th June 2016, the ACHPR condemned the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for several violations of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter referred to as the African Charter). The facts of the case relate to two different but related circumstances. First, there was the incident in the town of Kilwa, located in southeastern part of the DRC, where the Congolese army was pursuing a militia group that had successfully occupied the area from October 14 to 15, 2004. As a result of this operation, there were reports of the summary execution of many people, destruction of private property and looting by the Congolese army. A company incorporated under Australian law, Anvil Mining and its three agents were also implicated for their alleged involvement in the commission of these crimes. Thereafter, the Congolese military justice system, through the Military Court of Katanga (CMK) hearing the case for war crimes, acquitted all the accused persons in June 2007, before the High Military Court (HCM) declared inadmissible the appeal filed by the victims in December 2007. The case before the ACHPR is as a result of communication 393/10 submitted by three Non-Governmental Organisations pursuant to Article 55 of the African Charter. This study shows that although the ACHPR’s decision is a major victory for the victims of impunity in the DRC, communication 393/10 could have been declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust all the national remedies. As for the merits, it shows that the ACHPR has condemned the DRC for some violations of the African Charter, including cases of summary executions, whose establishment remains highly doubtful, to say the least. This includes alleged violations committed by Anvil Mining and its agents, for which the DRC is held responsible under Article 1 of the African Charter. Neither was there any violation of the right of appeal in the present case due to the failure to comply with the conditions for exercising the said remedy, whose determination falls within the national jurisdiction of each State. In any event, regardless of the legal weaknesses of the ACHPR’s decision, the DRC should enforce the judgment issued by ACHPR in good faith. In particular, this study suggests that a new criminal trial should take place before the Court of Cassation. Civil society organizations should put pressure on the DRC to do so. Droits de l’homme et obligation de poursuivre les crimes de guerre.... 76 Introduction En droit international aussi bien conventionnel que coutumier il existe une obligation pour les Etats de réprimer les crimes de guerre, quel que soit le type de conflit armé en cause.300 Ceci a une double signification en matiére de droits de l’homme. D’abord, cette obligation relève du devoir des Etats de respecter et de protéger les droits de l’homme en enquêtant, en poursuivant et éventuellement en jugeant, avec possibilité d’accorder des réparations justes et équitables aux victimes, les auteurs présumés des violations graves ou massives des droits humains. Ensuite, en se conformant à cette obligation, les Etats ne sont pas moins tenus d’agir en conformité avec les droits de l’homme, essentiellement pour éviter une parodie de justice, contraire aux exigences d’un procès pénal juste et équitable.301 Selon le comportement de l’Etat d’action, une affaire non-examinée ou mal jugée par ses services judiciaires peut déboucher sur un contentieux international des droits de l’homme. C’est précisément le cas dans l’affaire Kilwa.302 La Commission africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples (CADHP) a été saisie sur pied de l’article 55 de la Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples (ci-après Charte africaine) qui l’autorise à examiner des communications autres que celles émanant des Etats parties. Les faits de la cause se rapportent à deux circonstances différentes qui sont tout de même intimement liées. Il s’agit d’abord de l’incident qui s’est passé dans la cité de Kilwa, au sud-est de la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC), où l’armée congolaise pourchassait une milice qui avait réussi à occuper le lieu du 14 au 15 octobre 2004. A la suite de cette opération, il avait été fait état de l’exécution sommaire de nombreuses personnes, des destructions des biens privés et des cas de pillages massifs par l’armée congolaise. Celle-ci bénéficia par ailleurs, sur réquisition des autorités congolaises, de l’assistance logistique de la société de droit australien Anvil Mining, qui disposait d’un siège d’exploitation minière dans la contrée.303 Ensuite, il y a eu l’action de la justice militaire congolaise à travers la Cour militaire du Katanga (CMK) qui, saisie pour crimes 300 301 302 303 Article 49 (2), Convention de Genève I, 12 août 1949 ; Article 50 (2), Convention de Genève II, 12 août 1949; Article 129 (2), Convention de Genève III, 12 août 1949; Article 146 (2), Convention de Genève IV, 12 août 1949; Articles 86 et 88, Protocole additionnel I aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949, 8 juin 1977. Cherif Bassiouni M, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 271; Henckaerts JM. et Doswald-Beck L (éds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 607 (Rule 158); Kreβ C, ‘War Crimes Committed in Non-International Armed Conflicts and the Emerging System of International Criminal Justice’, 30 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, 2000, 163; Roht-Arriaza N, ‘Non Treaty Sources of the Obligation to Investigate and Prosecute’, in Roht-Arriaza N (ed.), Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice, New York/Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, 39-56. Voir Pacte international relatif aux civils et politiques (16 décembre 1966), article 14. Ministère public et parties civiles c. Adémar Ilunga et consorts, arrêt du 28 juin 2007, Cour militaire du Katanga, RP 010/2006 (inédit). Mbokani J, La jurisprudence congolaise en matière de crimes de droit international –Une analyse des décisions des juridictions militaires congolaises en application du Statut de Rome, Johannesburg, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 2016, 134. 77 Balingene Kahombo de guerre, en acquitta tous les prévenus en juin 2007, avant que la Haute Cour militaire (HCM) ne déclare irrecevable le recours en appel des parties victimes en décembre 2007. L’affaire devant la CADHP résulte de la communication 393/10 introduite par trois organisations non-gouvernementales (Institut pour les Droits de l’Homme et le Développement en Afrique, Action contre l’Impunité des Droits Humains et Rights and Accountability in Development), dont l’examen s’est soldé par la condamnation par défaut de la RDC pour plusieurs violations de la Charte africaine.304 La décision de la CADHP mérite d’être examinée pour trois raisons principales. Premièrement, elle détermine les standards de droits de l’homme qui n’ont pas été respectés dans la procédure devant les tribunaux congolais au point de lui ôter le caractère de justice équitable. Deuxièmement, elle définit l’incidence d’un tel manque de justice équitable sur la procédure devant la CADHP, obligée de remédier à la situation, dans une affaire de violations massives et graves des droits de l’homme. Troisièmement, la décision recommande à la RDC de verser ou de prendre des mesures de réparations individuelles et collectives au profit de toutes les victimes. L’objet de la présente étude consiste précisément à interroger la motivation de la décision de la CADHP et sa portée par rapport à la recherche internationale de la justice. L’hypothèse de travail est la suivante: la décision de la CADHP est une grande victoire des victimes contre l’impunité dans l’affaire Kilwa. Toutefois, sa motivation paraît peu convaincante à trois niveaux. Premièrement, la communication aurait été déclarée irrecevable pour non-épuisement des voies de recours internes. Non seulement la CADHP semble avoir sous-évalué les voies restant disponibles aux victimes en droit positif congolais, mais encore sa décision montre qu’elle aurait statué sur des faits qui n’avaient pas été commis à Kilwa et soumis à l’examen préalable de la justice congolaise. On peut bien penser que la CADHP a été influencée par une certaine inclination aux sensibilités victimologiques que sous-tend tout recours devant une instance internationale de protection des droits de l’homme, et le défaut de comparution de la RDC. Deuxièmement, s’agissant du fond, la CADHP aurait imputé à la RDC la responsabilité des violations de la Charte africaine pour des faits prétendument commis par la société Anvil Mining sans adjuger au préalable si la responsabilité ‘primaire’ de celle-ci était juridiquement établie. Troisièmement, la CADHP aurait pris pour établies des allégations contre la RDC qui seraient pour le moins invraisemblables en fait, eu égard aux éléments du dossier. Ainsi, cette étude va d’abord indiquer dans quelle mesure cette décision de la CADHP consacre la victoire des victimes contre l’impunité des crimes de masse commis à Kilwa (2), avant de soulever quelques problèmes juridiques relatifs à sa motivation (3). Par la suite, elle examinera les retombées de cette décision en RDC, notamment les perspectives de l’ouverture d’un nouveau procès pénal (4), avant d’énoncer ses principales conclusions (5). 304 Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, CADHP Comm.393/10, 41ème Rapport d’activités (mai –novembre 2016), para.154. Droits de l’homme et obligation de poursuivre les crimes de guerre.... 78 1. La consecration de la victoire des victimes contre l’impunité en RDC Il s’agit en réalité d’une double victoire contre l’impunité. D’abord, une victoire contre la RDC qui endosse toute la responsabilité dans cette affaire. Ensuite, une victoire contre Anvil Mining, dont l’implication dans l’incident de Kilwa est établie. Pourtant, jusque-là, cette société avait réussi à échapper à la justice, même à l’étranger, aussi bien en Australie, où elle a son siège social, qu’au Canada, où elle dispose d’un bureau au Québec.305 La justice de ces deux pays a successivement rejeté les actions visant à la faire condamner au payement des réparations au profit des victimes.306 A l’analyse, cette double victoire est perceptible au niveau de constatations de fait de la CADHP (2.1), de l’établissement de la responsabilité de la RDC (2.2) et de l’allocation des réparations colossales au profit des victimes (2.3). 1.1 Les constatations de fait de la CADHP En ce qui concerne l’incident de Kilwa, la CADHP a établi un certain nombre de constatations de fait pour fonder sa décision de condamnation de la RDC. Premièrement, l’incident de Kilwa a effectivement opposé les Forces Armées de la RDC (FARDC) aux insurgés dirigés par Alain Kazadi Mukalay, se réclamant du Mouvement révolutionnaire de libération du Katanga (MRLK). Au cours des opérations contre ce mouvement, les FARDC ont fait un usage disproportionné de la force par des bombardements contre les populations civiles, causant ainsi la destruction des biens civils, dont de nombreuses maisons d’habitation et de commerce, des morts par noyade des civils en fuite vers la Zambie et des disparitions forcées des victimes qui sont restées introuvables.307 Deuxièmement, les FARDC se sont livrées à l’exécution sommaire de nombreuses personnes, à des pillages systématiques de plus de 200 maisons, à l’extorsion des biens de commerce et à beaucoup d’arrestations arbitraires.308 Troisièmement, la CADHP a établi la participation de la société Anvil Mining dans ces violations des droits de l’homme à cause de son assistance aux FARDC. En l’occurrence, elle avait mis à leur disposition des véhicules et un avion de transport, des vivres et de l’argent. L’avion a servi à l’acheminement de quelques 150 soldats de la ville de Lubumbashi à Kilwa, tandis que les véhicules transportaient des civils arrêtés arbitrairement aux divers lieux de détention où ils étaient torturés ou tués, et des cadavres vers des fosses communes. Ces mêmes véhicules ont servi au transport des biens pillés ou extorqués. Il faut noter tout de suite que par ces constatations de fait, la CADHP prend radicalement le contre-pied de l’arrêt de la CMK déclarant non-établis tous les crimes 305 306 307 308 Mbokani J, La jurisprudence congolaise en matière de crimes de droit international, 134. Mbokani J, La jurisprudence congolaise en matière de crimes de droit international, 137. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, paaras.106, 137 et 138. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, paras. 7, 38,67, 105 et 138. 79 Balingene Kahombo de guerre prétendument commis à Kilwa.309 Dans cette procédure judiciaire nationale, le Colonel Ademar Ilunga, commandant des unités des FARDC au moment des faits, étaient le principal accusé. Dans le box, il y avait huit autres militaires. Trois agents d’Anvil Mining étaient également poursuivis pour complicité de crimes de guerre. Toutefois, la CMK a justifié les actes des FARDC en recourant au droit international humanitaire, singulièrement le fait que les morts déplorés étaient des combattants du MRLK tombés au combat parce que la totalité de la population restante à Kilwa avait pris part aux hostilités.310 C’est précisément ce motif qui a été écarté par la CADHP. Celle-ci souligne d’abord qu’une telle participation était invraisemblable.311 Ensuite, la CADHP a rappelé que rien ne justifiait des bombardements généralisés (usage disproportionné de la force) à Kilwa ou des exécutions extrajudiciaires des personnes –dont des femmes et des enfants – ne participant pas ou plus aux combats.312 D’ailleurs, l’arrêt de la CMK ne semble pas apparaitre comme une surprise à la CADHP parce que celle-ci est parvenue à constater d’autres faits démontrant que les victimes n’ont pas bénéficié d’un procès juste et équitable.313 De tels faits se rapportent aux menaces et harcèlements des victimes et des témoins. Il y a eu également des témoinsclés qui n’ont pas été entendus lors des audiences foraines tenues à Kilwa, à cause du refus de la CMK et des menaces de représailles. Il s’agit notamment des travailleurs de la Croix-Rouge et d’un conducteur du véhicule d’Anvil Mining. En outre, des victimes ont été interrogées en l’absence de leurs avocats, tandis que d’autres et des témoins ont été entendus en Kiswahili sans interprète alors qu’ils s’expriment dans une langue différente, le Bemba. La CADHP a finalement établi des interférences politiques dans le procès, telle que la mutation du procureur militaire qui était en charge du dossier,314 et le défaut de motivation des arrêts de la CMK et de la HCM.315 Il convient de souligner que pour établir ces constatations de fait, la CADHP s’est basée non seulement sur les allégations des victimes telles que formulées dans la communication soumise à son appréciation, mais aussi sur les rapports des Nations 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 Ministère public et parties civiles c. Adémar Ilunga et consorts (n 3). Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, paara.105. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, paara.105 Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.105 et 109. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, paras.84-86 et 124. Voir aussi Wetsh’okonda Koso M, République démocratique du Congo : La justice militaire et le respect des droits de l’homme –L’urgence du parachèvement de la réforme, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 2009, 73-74. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, paras.130 et 135. Droits de l’homme et obligation de poursuivre les crimes de guerre.... 80 Unies,316 dont celui de la mission onusienne de maintien de la paix en RDC.317 Ces constatations de fait sont du reste étayées par le Rapport du Projet Mapping concernant les violations les plus graves des droits de l’homme et du droit international humanitaire commises entre mars 1993 et juin 2003 sur le territoire de la République Démocratique du Congo qui conclut: Les décisions judiciaires dans l’affaire Kilwa illustrent, dans ce cas précis, le manque d’impartialité et d’indépendance de la justice militaire. La Cour marque clairement son parti pris en faveur des accusés, disculpant le colonel Adémar de la plupart des cas de meurtres mis à sa charge par le Ministère public, soit à titre personnel soit au titre de chef hiérarchique des auteurs desdits meurtres. Aucune référence n’est faite dans le jugement au droit international applicable en matière de crimes de guerre. Tout au long de cette affaire des interférences politiques, un manque de coopération de la part des autorités militaires et de nombreuses irrégularités ont été observés.318 Ainsi, la CADHP parvient à retenir la responsabilité de la RDC. C’est le deuxième élément de la victoire obtenue par les victimes. 1.2. L’établissement de la responsabilité de la RDC La CADHP a établi la responsabilité de la RDC pour avoir violé la Charte africaine en ses articles 1 (obligation de respecter et de protéger les droits garantis), 4 (droit à la vie et à l’intégrité physique), 5 (droit à la dignité humaine, interdiction de l’esclavage, de la traite humaine, de la torture, des peines et traitements cruels ou dégradants), 6 (droit à la liberté et à la sécurité personnelle), 7(1) (droit à un procès équitable), 14 (droit de propriété), 22 (droit au développement) et 26 (indépendance des tribunaux). Elle conclut par ailleurs à la violation du droit au logement en raison de la destruction des maisons d’habitation et du fait que les populations concernées ont été forcées à vivre en dehors de leurs domiciles.319 A cet égard, plusieurs observations s’imposent. Premièrement, toutes ces violations n’ont pas été mentionnées dans l’acte introductif d’instance.320 En l’occurrence, le moyen 316 317 318 319 320 Voir Yakin Ertürk, ‘Rapport de la rapporteuse spéciale sur la violence contre les femmes, ses causes et ses conséquences’ (27 février 2008) AHRC/7/6/Add.4, para.78 <https://daccess-ods.un.org/ TMP/5471861.95850372.html> 20 septembre 2018 ; Titinga Frédéric Pacéré, ‘Rapport de l’expert indépendant sur la situation des droits de l’homme en République démocratique du Congo’ (29 février 2008) A/HRC/7/25, paras 17-19 <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/rd-congo-rapport-delexpert-ind%C3%A9pendant-sur-la-situation-des-droits> 20 septembre 2018. Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC), ‘Rapport sur les conclusions de l’Enquête Spéciale sur les allégations d’exécutions sommaires et autres violations de droits de l’homme commises par les FARDC à Kilwa (Province de Katanga) le 15 octobre 2004’ (2004) <www.raid-uk.org/sites/default/files/monuc-final-report-fr.pdf> 20 septembre 2018. Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies aux Droits de l’Homme, ‘Rapport du Projet Mapping concernant les violations les plus graves des droits de l’homme et du droit international humanitaire commises entre mars 1993 et juin 2003 sur le territoire de la République démocratique du Congo’ (août 2010), para.869 <http://www.ohchr. org/Documents/Countries/CD/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_FR.pdf>20 septembre 2018. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.138. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, 81 Balingene Kahombo tiré de la violation de l’article 22 de la Charte africaine et les demandes y afférentes ont été introduits après la décision sur la recevabilité en mars 2014. C’est ce qu’on appelle la novelleté du moyen et des demandes additionnels. En principe, à ce stade avancé de la procédure, ceux-ci sont irrecevables. Mais, la CADHP a décidé de les recevoir à titre exceptionnel.321 Il s’agit de l’application de sa propre jurisprudence aux termes de laquelle de tels moyen et demandes ne sont admis qu’à condition qu’ils ‘se basent sur les mêmes faits, ne remettent pas en cause des questions réglées à la recevabilité, que leur auteur puisse les étayer et que la partie adverse ne puisse les contester avec succès’.322 En revanche, aucun moyen ni demande n’a été soumis à la CADHP au titre du droit au logement. Il est par conséquent surprenant que la responsabilité de la RDC ait été établie sur cette base. Certes, la CADHP ne peut se décider que sur les droits qui sont prévus par la Charte africaine. Mais, là n’est pas le problème dans cette affaire, dans la mesure où, conformément à sa jurisprudence dans l’affaire Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) et Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) c. Nigéria, elle a décidé que le droit au logement était implicitement visé par ladite Charte comme conséquence logique de trois autres droits : droit à la propriété (article 14), droit de jouir du meilleur état de santé physique et mental (article 16) et droit à la protection de la famille (article 18(1)).323 Là où le bât blesse, c’est que la CADHP a de toute évidence statué ultra petita. Deuxièmement, il apparait clairement que la responsabilité de la RDC est établie pour des violations des droits individuels aussi bien que collectifs. Entre autres droits individuels, on peut citer le droit à la liberté qui interdit notamment les cas d’arrestation arbitraire. Le droit au développement, quant à lui, figure parmi les droits collectifs réservés ‘à tous les peuples’ par la Charte africaine. Toutefois, souligne la CADHP, il peut également être exercé par les individus puisque compromettre l’aspect collectif compromettrait les libertés individuelles.324 Ainsi, pris dans son aspect culturel, le droit au développement a été violé par le fait d’enterrer les victimes des massacres dans des fosses communes aux mépris de leurs rites traditionnelles.325 Pris dans sa dimension économique, ce droit a été violé par la destruction des biens qui participaient de l’activité génératrice des revenus à Kilwa, dont des biens personnels, des infrastructures, des écoles et des centres de santé.326 Par contre, l’interdiction des traitements cruels et dégradants fait partie des droits réservés à ‘tout individu’ par l’article 5 de la Charte 321 322 323 324 325 326 para.15. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.99. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.98. Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC)et Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) c. Nigéria, CADHP Comm. 155/96, 15ème Rapport d’activités (2001 – 2002), paras.60-61. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.142. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, paras. 143-144. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.146 Droits de l’homme et obligation de poursuivre les crimes de guerre.... 82 africaine. Curieusement, la CADHP semble admettre que c’est aussi un droit collectif en l’appliquant à l’ensemble de la population de Kilwa. On peut néanmoins considérer que la population de Kilwa est prise ici dans ses composantes individuelles. C’est ce que la CADHP semble insinuer lorsqu’elle conclut à la violation de cette interdiction par le fait de causer l’exode forcé de cette population ciblée dans le cadre de la contre-attaque de l’armée contre les insurgés du MRLK. Il s’agit là de la réitération de la jurisprudence élaborée dans l’affaire COHRE c. Soudan.327 Troisièmement, il est à noter que l’imputabilité des violations de la Charte africaine à la RDC a été essentiellement opérée sur la base de la théorie de l’agent ou de l’organe au sens des articles 4 et 5 du Projet d’articles sur la responsabilité internationale de l’Etat de 2001. Cette théorie énonce une sorte de présomption de responsabilité de l’Etat pour les faits commis par ses agents ou ses organes. En l’espèce, il s’agit des membres des FARDC pour ce qui est des crimes commis à Kilwa, et du pouvoir judiciaire congolais pour ce qui est de la violation des garanties d’un procès juste et équitable. Toutefois, la RDC endosse également la responsabilité pour les violations des droits de l’homme commises par la société Anvil Mining, en application de l’article 1 de la Charte africaine. L’obligation formulée dans cette disposition est interprétée de façon constante par la CADHP comme impliquant entre autres ‘que l’Etat prenne toutes les mesures nécessaires pour garantir la protection contre les violations des droits humains par des tiers, y compris des sociétés, l’adoption de mesures pour prévenir, enquêter, punir et fournir réparation aux victimes’.328 Ceci est parfaitement en adéquation avec les Principes Directeurs relatifs aux Entreprises et aux Droits de l’Homme, énoncés par le Conseil des droits de l’homme de l’ONU en 2011.329 Ainsi, la RDC est responsable dès lors que les droits violés par Anvil Mining sont considérés comme n’ayant pas été protégés par elle qui, au surplus, dit la CADHP, n’a ni enquêté ni sanctionné les comportements de ladite société et indemnisé ses victimes.330 Il ne s’agit donc pas, en quelque sorte, d’une responsabilité pour fait d’autrui. La RDC a endossé la responsabilité pour ses propres violations de la Charte africaine. D’où sa condamnation au payement de la totalité des réparations au profit de toutes les victimes. 1.3 L’allocation des réparations colossales au profit des victimes A la différence du protocole régissant la Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et 327 328 329 330 Soudan Human Rights Organisations et Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) c. Soudan, CADHP Comm. 229/03-296/05, 28ème Rapport d’activités (novembre 2009 – mai 2010), para.164. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.101. Principes Directeurs relatifs aux Entreprises et aux Droits de l’Homme : Mise en Œuvre du Cadre de Référence “Protéger, Respecter et Réparer ” (16 juin 2011), Principe 1. Ce principe énonce : « Les États ont l’obligation de protéger lorsque des tiers, y compris des entreprises, portent atteinte aux droits de l’homme sur leur territoire et/ ou sous leur juridiction. Cela exige l’adoption de mesures appropriées pour empêcher ces atteintes, et lorsqu’elles se produisent, enquêter à leur sujet, en punir les auteurs, et les réparer par le biais de politiques, de lois, de règles et de procédures judiciaires ». Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.102. 83 Balingene Kahombo des peuples (ci-après Cour africaine),331 il n’existe pas de disposition expresse dans la Charte africaine conférant à la CADHP le pouvoir de statuer sur le droit à réparation lorsqu’elle conclut à la violation des droits garantis.332 La consécration de ce pouvoir est plutôt l’œuvre de sa propre jurisprudence en application des principes généraux de droit en la matière.333 Ainsi, rappelle la CADHP, ‘la violation des droits protégés ouvre droit à réparation, y compris une réparation monétaire’.334 Mais, il faut pour cela établir le préjudice subi et son évaluation.335 On notera que la CADHP ne cite pas le lien de causalité entre le préjudice subi et la violation du droit garanti et ne l’a pas examiné non plus lors de la discussion en droit des demandes introduites par les parties. Ce qui est moins précis que la jurisprudence constante de la Cour africaine336 et d’autres tribunaux internationaux, telle que la Cour internationale de justice (CIJ).337 Cette exigence demeure pour autant. Encore faut-il identifier, au préalable, les victimes bénéficiaires. Se penchant sur cette question, la CADHP a admis deux catégories de victimes. La première est constituée des victimes qui ont été partie à la cause soumise à son appréciation. Toutefois, la communication 393/10 avait été initialement introduite au nom et pour le compte de quelques sept victimes seulement. Par la suite, ses auteurs ont sollicité la jonction d’autres cinq victimes après la décision sur la recevabilité en mars 2014.338 Y faisant droit, la CADHP a retenu que les faits invoqués, les victimes pour lesquelles de nouvelles demandes sont introduites et les questions de droit portées par ces demandes recélaient ‘un tel degré de similitude qu’il est juste et pertinent de les joindre à la cause principale’.339 La deuxième catégorie est celle composée des autres victimes non-autrement identifiées des événements de Kilwa. L’inclusion de cette catégorie de 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 Protocole relatif à la Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peoples portant création d’un Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peoples (1998), article 27 (1) : ‘Lorsqu’elle estime qu’il y a eu violation d’un droit de l’homme ou des peuples, la Cour ordonne toutes les mesures appropriées afin de remédier à la situation, y compris le paiement d’une juste compensation ou l’octroi d’une réparation’. Evans C, The Right to Reparation in International Law for Victims of Armed Conflicts, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, 76. Evans C, The Right to Reparation in International Law, 77. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.148. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.148. Voir Affaire Lohé Issa Konaté c. Burkina Faso (Réparations), Requête n°004/2013, arrêt du 03 juin 2016, para.15 ; Affaire Ayant-droits de feu Norbert Zongo, Abdoulaye Nikiema dit Ablasse, Ernest Zongo et Blaise Liboudo, et le Mouvement burkinabé des droits de l’homme et des peuples c. Burkina Faso (Réparations), Requête n°013/2011, arrêt du 05 juin 2015, paras.20-30 ; Affaire Révérend Christopher R. Mtikila c. République Unie de Tanzanie (Réparations), Requête n°011/2011, arrêt du 13 juin 2014, paras.27-29. Voir Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (République de Guinée c. République démocratique du Congo), indemnisation, arrêt du 19 juin 2012, C.I.J. Recueil 2012, para.14 ; Application de la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie‑Herzégovine c. Serbie‑et‑Monténégro), arrêt du 26 février 2007, C.I.J. Recueil 2007, para. 462. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.70. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.97. Droits de l’homme et obligation de poursuivre les crimes de guerre.... 84 victimes peut paraitre inhabituelle à partir du moment où elles ne sont pas parties à la cause. Mais cette approche semble se justifier par le fait que la CADHP a établi, on l’a vu, la responsabilité de la RDC pour des violations des droits aussi bien individuels que collectifs. Quant à ces derniers droits, les victimes parties à la cause ont été en quelque sorte intégrées dans la catégorie des autres victimes non-autrement identifiées qui bénéficieront de la décision sur les mêmes mesures de réparations collectives. La CADHP a tiré une autre justification dans le caractère ‘d’intérêt public’ de l’affaire Kilwa en raison de l’ampleur des violations commises qui implique que de nombreuses autres personnes étaient concernées par la cause.340 Cette jurisprudence, qui devra encore être éprouvée en pratique, apparait donc comme une réponse aux situations des violations massives des droits de l’homme dans le contexte africain. La nature des mesures de réparations recommandées par la CADHP sont de deux ordres. D’abord, l’allocation des dommages-intérêts compensatoires à titre des réparations individuelles. Au total, les victimes parties à la cause s’en sortent avec un montant de 2.560.000 dollars américains. Il est à noter que la CADHP a accordé aux victimes le bénéfice intégral de leur acte introductif d’instance, sans plus ni moins, après avoir estimé que les sommes demandées par chaque victime n’étaient pas exorbitantes au regard de leur perte en vies humaines.341 Quant aux réparations collectives, la CADHP a également fait intégralement droit aux demandes des parties en recommandant à la RDC huit formes de réparations à titre de satisfaction. Il s’agit des mesures ci-après: prendre toutes les mesures diligentes à l’effet de la poursuite et de la sanction des agents de l’Etat et du personnel de la société Anvil Mining impliqués dans les violations constatées ; présenter des excuses officielles à la population de Kilwa ; diligenter une enquête indépendante afin de clarifier le sort des personnes disparues et verser des dommages-intérêts aux ayant-droits ; procéder au recensement de toutes les victimes qui n’ont pas été parties à la présente cause afin que des réparations justes et équitables leur soient accordées pour les préjudices soufferts ; prendre des mesures à l’effet de faire exhumer les corps enterrés dans les fausses communes à Nsensele et de leur donner une sépulture digne ; ériger un mémorial à Nsensele en hommage aux victimes décédées et portées disparues ; réhabiliter les infrastructures socio-économiques détruites lors des événements, notamment l’école, l’hôpital de Kilwa et les voies d’accès terrestres et lacustres dont l’état de délabrement a facilité les violations ; accorder l’assistance psycho-sociale adéquate aux victimes et autres habitants de Kilwa pour surmonter les traumatismes subséquents aux événements.342 Toutes ces mesures sont accompagnées d’un dispositif de mise en œuvre. A cet égard, la CADHP a recommandé la mise en place par la RDC d’un Comité de suivi 340 341 342 Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, paras.152-153. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.150. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.154. 85 Balingene Kahombo comprenant les représentants des victimes et des ayant-droits ainsi qu’un membre de la CADHP elle-même. Visiblement, il apparait qu’il appartiendra à la RDC de déterminer les modalités d’organisation et de fonctionnement dudit Comité conformément à son droit interne. Finalement, la RDC a été demandée de faire rapport à la CADHP sur les mesures entreprises à l’effet de la mise en œuvre de toutes les recommandations qui lui ont été adressées. 2. Les préoccupations relatives à la motivation de la Décision de la CADHP La décision de la CADHP, présente quelques faiblesses dans sa motivation. Ces faiblesses se rapportent à la recevabilité peu convaincante de la communication et à la mauvaise évaluation de certains aspects de droit touchant au fond. 2.1 La recevabilité peu convaincante de la communication Pour être examinées par la CADHP, toute communication autre qu’étatique visée à l’article 55 de la Charte africaine doit remplir les conditions fixées à l’article 56 de celleci. Dans l’affaire Kilwa, deux de ces conditions ont été particulièrement discutées. Il s’agit de l’épuisement des voies de recours internes et de la soumission de la communication dans un délai raisonnable à partir dudit épuisement. 2.1.1 L’appréciation mitigée de la question du délai raisonnable La condition de la saisine de la CADHP dans un délai raisonnable est imposée par l’article 56(6) de la Charte africaine. Sa réunion en l’espèce paraît discutable, du moins en partie. Textuellement, la Charte africaine n’en donne aucune indication expresse. Mais, en s’inspirant de la pratique d’autres instances de protection des droits de l’homme, la CADHP a déjà fixé ce délai à ‘une norme habituelle’ de six mois.343 La raison d’être de cette norme est non seulement de décourager le retard dans la saisine de la CADHP parce qu’il est nécessaire que cette instance de protection des droits de l’homme parvienne à examiner la communication lui soumise pendant que l’affaire est encore d’actualité et les éléments de fait tels que les preuves existent pour une bonne administration de la justice. Ainsi, si l’on prend pour dies a quo la date du prononcé de l’arrêt de la HCM du 21 décembre 2007 rejetant l’appel des victimes contre l’arrêt de la CMK, le délai de six mois pour saisir la CADHP était, de toute évidence, dépassée, la communication ayant été introduite près de trois ans après, soit le 9 novembre 2010. Sa recevabilité n’a tenu que grâce à l’admission de l’exception à la règle habituelle lorsque ‘des raisons valables et pertinentes’ ont justifié le retard.344 Ceux-ci sont déterminés cas par cas. Ainsi, dans l’affaire Chinhamo c. Zimbabwe, la CADHP avait considéré le délai de dix mois comme raisonnable car la victime avait dû prendre le temps de s’installer dans le pays de son 343 344 Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.59. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.64. Droits de l’homme et obligation de poursuivre les crimes de guerre.... 86 exile avant d’introduire sa communication.345 En revanche, dans l’affaire Kilwa, la CADHP s’est d’abord fondée, pour justifier le délai non-déraisonnable de sa saisine endéans près de trois ans, sur le fait que l’arrêt de la HCM n’avait pas été notifié ou signifié aux victimes.346 Elle considère, pour ainsi dire, ce défaut de signification comme un empêchement matériel susceptible de retarder sa saisine car il pouvait laisser planer le doute quant à l’issue de la procédure nationale et à la motivation de l’arrêt de la HCM.347 Toutefois, ce raisonnement n’est pas persuasif pour la simple raison que les victimes concernées ayant fait appel et comparu, l’arrêt de la HCM est censé avoir été rendu contradictoirement. Juridiquement, elles ne pouvaient pas en prétexter l’ignorance à dater du prononcé. En outre, il n’existe pas, en procédure pénale congolaise, une obligation générale pour les services judiciaires de signifier proprio motu une décision judiciaire aux parties. En ce qui concerne les actes de procédure, les jugements et arrêts des juridictions militaires, l’article 318 du Code judiciaire militaire constitue simplement une règle de compétence, attribuant le pouvoir de notification aux greffiers et huissiers ou aux agents de la force publique (armée et police). Toutefois, cette compétence doit pouvoir être exercée à la diligence de la partie ayant intérêt. En ce qui concerne la victime, trois hypothèses peuvent être distinguées. Premièrement, lorsqu’elle a gagné son procès en obtenant des réparations pour le préjudice subi, il lui appartient de faire diligence pour l’exécution du jugement. C’est ce que prévoit l’article 109 du Code de procédure pénale qui dispose : ‘l’exécution est poursuivie (…) par la partie civile, en ce qui concerne les condamnations prononcées à sa requête (…)’. Elle est pour cela obligée de lever elle-même copie dudit jugement, d’en obtenir ainsi notification, moyennant paiement à l’Etat d’un droit proportionnel fixé à 10% des dommages-intérêts alloués.348 Deuxièmement, si la victime a succombé, elle ne reste pas moins tenue, à plus forte raison, de lever copie de la décision qui lui est défavorable parce que, dans ce cas, elle a un intérêt pressant de savoir et d’étudier le raisonnement du juge afin d’évaluer la suite à donner à sa réclamation. Troisièmement, en cas de défaut, la signification est opérée par la partie la plus diligente. En pratique, c’est généralement le greffier qui y pourvoit. En tout état de cause, les victimes n’ayant pas fait défaut, le grief de la non-signification de l’arrêt de la HCM relève d’une fiction. Ensuite, pour fonder sa décision, la CADHP a retenu la ‘nécessité d’une justice équitable’,349 étant donné que la justice congolaise n’a pas respecté les règles minimales du droit à un procès équitable par des juges impartiaux si bien que ne pas recevoir la 345 346 347 348 349 Mr. Obert Chinhamo c. Zimbabwe, CADHP Comm. 307/2005, 23ème Rapport d’activités (mai 2007 – novembre 2007), para.89. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.63. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.63. Décret du 6 août 1959 portant Code de procédure pénale, article 129. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.64. 87 Balingene Kahombo communication introduite aux noms des victimes aurait équivalu à un déni de justice.350 Pourtant, précisément en pareil cas, la CADHP est appelée à remédier à la situation, d’autant plus que les éléments de la cause lui permettent d’examiner l’affaire d’une manière appropriée et équitable.351 Cette nécessité est renforcée, conclut la CADHP, par le caractère massif et grave des violations alléguées dans l’affaire Kilwa.352 Somme toute, en dépit de la pertinence de cette dernière raison, la communication était irrecevable. La raison réside dans le non-épuisement de toutes les voies de recours internes. 2.1.2. Le non-épuisement des voies de recours internes L’exigence de l’épuisement des voies de recours internes est fondée sur l’article 56 (5) de la Charte africaine. Il s’agit d’une règle de mise en œuvre du principe de subsidiarité qui conditionne, à quelques exceptions près,353 l’exercice des compétences des instances internationales de protection des droits de l’homme.354 Ce principe voudrait que celles-ci n’interviennent pas avant que l’Etat mis en cause n’ait reçu l’occasion de prendre connaissance des faits, d’y statuer et de remédier aux violations alléguées à l’aide des moyens de son propre ordre juridique, à moins qu’il ne soit démontré l’inutilité d’épuiser les recours internes quand ils ne sont pas disponibles, efficaces et satisfaisants.355 Dans l’affaire Kilwa, la question s’est doublement posée. D’abord à l’égard de trois victimes qui ont effectivement été parties aux procédures de la justice congolaise. Dans ce cas, la CADHP a conclu à l’épuisement des voies de recours internes dès le moment où la HCM, qui est la juridiction militaire suprême en RDC, a rejeté l’appel des victimes.356 Selon elle, les victimes n’avaient plus de recours à exercer car l’opposition qui est la seule voie de recours autorisée contre les arrêts de la HCM ne pouvait pas être exercée à cause du défaut de signification de la décision aux victimes.357 Ensuite, s’agissant de quatre autres victimes qui n’ont exercé aucun recours devant les juridictions congolaises, la CADHP conclut à l’inutilité de se conformer à la règle d’autant plus que 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.66. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, paras.65 et 67. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.67 C’est le cas de la Cour de justice de la CEDEAO dont l’exercice des compétences en matière des droits de l’homme n’est pas subordonné à l’épuisement des voies de recours internes. Voir Von Staden A, ‘Subsidiarity, Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies, and the Margin of Appreciation in the Human Rights Jurisprudence of African Sub-Regional Courts’ 20 (8) International Journal of Human Rights, 2016, 1119. Von Staden A, ‘Subsidiarity, Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies, and the Margin of Appreciation’, 1114. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para. 49. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, paras. 51-52. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.53. Droits de l’homme et obligation de poursuivre les crimes de guerre.... 88 ces recours devaient être de toute façon inefficaces.358 L’inefficacité signifie ici que ces recours n’offraient aucune perspective de réussite.359 La raison en est que ces victimes ont allégué des violations qui ont été commises au cours du même incident de Kilwa par les mêmes auteurs, tandis que leur recours aurait été soumis aux mêmes juridictions qui ont écarté la culpabilité de ces derniers.360 Cette motivation ne tient pas debout. On peut d’abord objecter par une mauvaise lecture de l’affaire par la CADHP sur le point du type de recours à exercer. On a déjà vu que les victimes ayant fait appel devant la HCM n’ont pas fait défaut de sorte qu’elles aient eu le droit à un quelconque recours en opposition. Ensuite, la CADHP conçoit mal la possibilité de recours contre les décisions des cours et tribunaux militaires congolais. Si on admet que l’effet de l’arrêt de la HCM rejetant l’appel des parties victimes pour vice de procédure a rendu l’arrêt de la CMK définitif à leur égard, il convient cependant d’observer qu’il leur restait le droit de se pourvoir en cassation. On oublie assez souvent ce droit parce qu’il n’est pas prévu comme tel par le Code judiciaire militaire. Ce dernier a plutôt consacré une procédure atypique d’annulation des arrêts et jugements rendus par les juridictions militaires par la HCM.361 Mais, cette procédure en annulation, qui ressemble à une cassation déguisée, a été tacitement abrogée par la Constitution du 18 février 2006 qui étend le pourvoi devant la Cour de cassation aux décisions des cours et tribunaux militaires.362 Cette extension de la cassation est confirmée par la loi organique portant organisation, fonctionnement et compétences des juridictions de l’ordre judiciaire.363 Le législateur a par ailleurs tenu de réitérer la volonté du constituant en précisant explicitement que la procédure en annulation devant la HCM est abrogée.364 Toutefois, il faut noter que le délai du pouvoir en cassation est de 40 jours francs depuis le prononcé de la décision rendue contradictoirement,365 comme c’est le cas dans l’affaire Kilwa. La confirmation du pourvoi, s’il a été introduit au greffe de la juridiction ayant rendu la décision, doit par ailleurs intervenir dans les trois mois.366 Mais, le fait que 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.57. Sir Dawda K. Jawara c. Gambie, CADHP Comm.147/95-149/96, 13ème Rapport d’activités (1999 – 2000), para.32. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, paras.55-56. Loi n°023/2002 du 18 novembre 2002 portant Code judiciaire militaire, articles 280-301. Mulenda Luetete F, ‘Procédure pénale ordinaire et militaire’, Conférence destinée aux avocats du Barreau près la Cour d’appel de la Gombe, inscrits dans le cadre du projet PARJ, Kinshasa, 2014, 31. Loi organique n°13/011-B du 11 avril 2013 portant organisation, fonctionnement et compétences des juridictions de l’ordre judiciaire, article 95. Loi organique n°13/011-B du 11 avril 2013 portant organisation, fonctionnement et compétences des juridictions de l’ordre judiciaire, article 156 (3). Loi organique n° 13/010 du 19 février 2013 relative à la procédure devant la Cour de cassation, article 45. C’est la reprise de l’ancien article 47 de l’Ordonnance-loi n°82-017 du 31 mars 1982 relative à la procédure devant la Cour suprême de justice. Bojabwa Bondio Njeko M et Yenyi Olungu V, ‘La procédure de cassation et d’annulation devant la Cour 89 Balingene Kahombo ces délais se soient épuisés sans que les victimes n’aient exercé leur droit à se pourvoir en cassation ne serait pas une raison valable pour la CADHP, si la question lui était posée, de recevoir la communication soumise à son appréciation. La raison est qu’elle n’a pas compétence de remédier à l’abstention des victimes d’exercer un droit que la Constitution et les lois congolaises leur reconnaissent dans les délais impartis. Une telle abstention pourrait s’interpréter comme une renonciation à leur droit procédural. Pourtant, au moment où la CADHP fut saisie en novembre 2010, l’exercice du pourvoi en cassation était encore possible. En droit procédural congolais, la jurisprudence a consacré, quel que soit le domaine, l’exception du relèvement de la déchéance de délai,367 si tant est que le demandeur invoque des raisons valables et pertinentes devant la juridiction compétente saisie. Parmi ces raisons, on pourrait bien avancer le caractère massif des violations commises à Kilwa et la nécessité de ne pas laisser des crimes internationaux aussi graves impunis. Enfin, l’alinéa 3 de l’article 83 du Code judiciaire militaire offre une autre possibilité en ces termes : ‘Toutefois, les recours pour violation des dispositions constitutionnelles par la Haute Cour militaire sont portés devant la Cour suprême de justice siégeant comme Cour constitutionnelle’. En réalité, le recours en inconstitutionnalité contre les arrêts de la HCM est unique en droit positif congolais et son objectif est essentiellement de garantir la protection des droits fondamentaux garantis aux citoyens contre une justice militaire que l’on soupçonne,368 à tort ou à raison, comme étant peu encline au respect des droits de l’homme.369 La HCM elle-même n’a pas été à l’abri de cette critique dans la mesure où la procédure d’appel aurait été entachée de nombreuses irrégularités, dont des interférences politiques compromettant son indépendance dans cette affaire.370 La sanction éventuelle de l’inconstitutionnalité de l’arrêt rendu par la HCM était d’autant plus adaptée en l’espèce parce que l’article 168 (2) de la Constitution congolaise prescrit : ‘Tout acte déclaré non conforme à la Constitution est nul de plein droit’. Il faut y ajouter ceci : ‘Les arrêts de la Cour constitutionnelle ne sont susceptibles d’aucun recours et sont immédiatement exécutoires. Ils sont obligatoires et s’imposent aux pouvoirs publics, à 367 368 369 370 suprême de justice’, in Parquet général de la République, Interprétation, cassation et annulation en droit congolais, Kinshasa, RDC, 2013, 87. Voir CSJ, 22 décembre 1997, RP.032/TSR, inédit ; CSJ, 27 novembre 2006, RCE. PR. 009, Requête en contestation des résultats de l’élection présidentielle du second tour du 29 octobre 2006 devant la Cour suprême de justice, quatorzième feuillet, inédit ; CSJ, 15 septembre 2006, R.Const.038/TSR, Requête en prolongation du délai de l’organisation du second tour de l’élection présidentielle, combinées avec les élections provinciales, in Wetsh’okonda Koso Senga M, Les textes constitutionnels congolais annotés, Kinshasa, Editions de la Campagne pour les Droits de l’Homme au Congo, 2010, 441. Kahombo B, ‘Les modalités d’exercice du recours individuel en inconstitutionnalité en droit positif congolais entre ambiguïté et nécessité de réforme juridiques’, 20 Recht in Afrika – Law in Africa –Droit en Afrique, 2017, 131, 134 et 146. Voir Wetsh’okonda Koso M, République Démocratique du Congo : La justice militaire et le respect des droits de l’homme –L’urgence du parachèvement de la réforme, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 2009. Association Africaine de Défense des Droits de l’Homme, Rights & Accountability in Development, Action Contre l’Impunité pour les Droits Humains et Global Witness, ‘L’appel de Kilwa – un simulacre de justice’ (5 mai 2008), pp.3-4 <https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/12266/kilwa_update_may_2008_fr.pdf> 22 septembre 2018. Droits de l’homme et obligation de poursuivre les crimes de guerre.... 90 toutes les autorités administratives et juridictionnelles, civiles et militaires ainsi qu’aux particuliers’.371 Ceci aurait logiquement conduit, en cas de succès, à la reprise du procès dans l’affaire Kilwa. Dès lors, on se rend compte que ces voies de recours qui n’ont pas été exploitées par les victimes répondaient aux préoccupations de la CADHP. En l’occurrence, la possibilité de remédier au problème de la méconnaissance des garanties d’un procès équitable par la justice militaire congolaise et l’examen des griefs formulés par les victimes par une juridiction différente. Mis à part la Cour de cassation, la Cour constitutionnelle est du reste la plus haute juridiction du système judiciaire congolais. Par conséquent, on ne pourrait pas préjuger de l’inefficacité des voies de recours non-exercées à l’effet de la recevabilité relativement aux autres victimes qui n’ont activé aucune procédure judicaire en RDC. L’ordre juridique congolais était encore bien outillé pour répondre aux allégations et réclamations de toutes les victimes. Dans tous les cas, même si ces voies de recours étaient jugées indisponibles, nonsatisfaisantes ou inefficaces, la communication ne méritait pas d’être reçue en intégralité parce qu’elle contenait des faits ne relevant pas de l’incident de Kilwa et n’ayant pas été préalablement soumis à l’appréciation des autorités nationales. Tel est le cas de la réclamation des arriérés de salaire du commandant en chef de la police à Kilwa qui, soupçonné de s’être rallié aux insurgés du MRLK, avait été arrêté, avant de décéder en détention, tandis que son indemnité n’était plus payée depuis cet incident par la RDC. Dans ces conditions, il est difficile de discerner la décision de la CADHP qui inclut ces arriérés dans le montant de la réparation accordée à la victime.372 Visiblement, cette décision semble avoir un penchant aux sensibilités victimologiques ; ce qui a conduit parfois à une mauvaise évaluation de certains éléments touchant au fond de l’affaire. 2.2 L’évaluation problématique de certains aspects touchant au fond de l’affaire Ce problème se situe particulièrement à deux niveaux, à savoir celui de l’administration de la preuve et au niveau de l’appréciation de l’atteinte au droit à l’appel. 2.2.1 L’administration douteuse de la preuve de certains faits De la lecture de la décision de la CADHP il ressort que deux défis se sont posés à celle-ci dans l’administration de la preuve des allégations faites par les victimes. Le premier défi se rapporte au défaut de comparution de la RDC et le second à la nonparticipation de la société Anvil Mining dans cette procédure. En ce qui concerne le défaut de la RDC, il a été retenu en application de la jurisprudence constante de la CADHP. Et ce n’est pas la première fois puisque la RDC est 371 372 Constitution du 18 février 2006, article 168 (1). Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.149. 91 Balingene Kahombo habituée, au regard de plusieurs autres affaires, à ne pas comparaitre devant la CADHP.373 Plus important, c’est la conséquence que l’instance régionale panafricaine devait en tirer. Rien de spécifique n’apparait pourtant à ce point relativement à la discussion du fond de la communication.374 Par rapport à la recevabilité, la CADHP a simplement indiqué qu’en pareil cas de défaillance de l’Etat défendeur, elle statuera sur ‘la base des éléments à sa possession’.375 On trouve généralement ce langage imprécis dans d’autres décisions de la CADHP. Il apparait beaucoup plus élaboré dans la décision d’octobre 1995, rendue à la suite de la communication 25/89-47/90-56/91-100/93 impliquant d’autres allégations des violations massives et graves des droits de l’homme contre la RDC, alors dénommée Zaïre.376 Cette décision spécifie : (..) la Commission africaine a établi le principe que lorsque les allégations d’abus des droits de l’homme ne sont pas contestées par le gouvernement concerné, même après multiples notifications, la Commission doit décider sur la base des faits fournis par le plaignant et traiter ces faits tels qu’ils lui sont livrés. Ce principe est conforme à la pratique des autres organes internationaux des droits de l’homme et au devoir de la Commission de protéger les droits de l›homme. Comme le gouvernement du Zaïre refuse le dialogue signifie que la Commission est malheureusement obligée de poursuivre l’examen du cas, sur la base des seuls faits et opinions émanant de la seule partie plaignante.377 Toutefois, examiner une communication sur ‘la base des éléments en sa possession’ ne devrait pas signifier prendre automatiquement pour établies les allégations du demandeur sans devoir les vérifier ou les soumettre à un examen minutieux au regard des éléments qu’il fournit au dossier. Au contraire, examiner une affaire par défaut oblige à adjuger les allégations du demandeur, si elles sont, au regard des éléments de preuve fournis au dossier et d’autres qui sont à la disposition de la Commission grâce à ses propres recherches, fondées en fait et en droit. C’est cela la pratique constante des tribunaux internationaux et de toutes les autres instances de protection des droits de l’homme, comme la Cour internationale de justice le rappelle si bien dans l’affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci.378 Il y a là une sorte de devoir de vigilance pour que le défaut ne conduise pas au prononcé d’une décision injuste. 373 374 375 376 377 378 Voir Communication 274/03 et 282/03 – Interights, ASADHO et Maître O. Disu c. République Démocratique du Congo ; Communication 325/06 – Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture et Ligue de la Zone Afrique pour la Défense des Droits des Enfants et Elèves (pour le compte de Céline) c. République Démocratique du Congo ; Communication 409/12 –Luke Munyandu Tembani et Benjamin John Freeth (représentés by Norman Tjombe) c/ Zimbabwe et treize autres ; Communication 433/12 — Albert Bialufu Ngandu c. République Démocratique du Congo. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.95. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.41. Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, Les Témoins de Jehovah c. Zaïre, CADHP Comm.25/89-47/90-56/91-100/93, 9ème Rapport d’activités (1995 – 1996), para.49. Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, Les Témoins de Jehovah c. Zaïre, para.49. Voir Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), fond, arrêt. C.I.J. Recueil 1986, paras.26-32. Droits de l’homme et obligation de poursuivre les crimes de guerre.... 92 Dans l’affaire Kilwa, la CADHP a gravement manqué à ce devoir de vérification minutieuse de certains faits allégués par les demandeurs. Elle a parfois tenu ceux-ci pour établis parce que n’ayant pas été contestés par l’Etat défendeur ;379 ce qui est quand même surprenant dès lors que l’on sait que pareille non-contestation est l’essence même d’une procédure par défaut. Pourtant, outre la prise en compte des documents émanant des Nations Unies et versés au dossier, elle devait vérifier les allégations contre la RDC, en l’absence de celle-ci, au regard des éléments factuels mentionnés dans l’arrêt de la CMK en tant qu’organe de l’Etat congolais. Ceci était d’autant plus possible que ledit arrêt semble avoir été versé au dossier puisque la CADHP s’y est elle-même référée pour écarter, on l’a vu, la motivation de droit des juges congolais pour l’acquittement des prévenus pour crimes de guerre. On peut prendre pour exemple les cas d’exécutions sommaires qui ne semblent pas toutes vérifiables et établies en fait. D’une part, les chiffres fournis par le rapport de la mission onusienne de maintien de la paix sont clairs. En effet, plus de 100 personnes auraient été tuées à Kilwa.380 Toutefois, la mission onusienne n’a pu obtenir, au cours de ses enquêtes, que ‘des informations concernant la mort de 73 personnes dont au moins 28 auraient été victimes d’exécution sommaires’.381 On peut en déduire que quelques 45 personnes auraient été tuées dans d’autres circonstances. La décision de la CADHP cite les cas de noyade après le renversement par bombardements des embarcations transportant des civils en fuite vers la Zambie. On notera que l’arrêt de la CMK mentionne une troisième circonstance, liée à la mort des combattants insurgés du MRLK sur le champ de bataille.382 Ce fait paraît être plausible puisque, comme l’atteste le rapport de la mission onusienne, le MRLK avait réussi à recruter et à intégrer au moins 100 jeunes de Kilwa dans les rangs de sa soldatesque, composée initialement de dix personnes, huit anciens policiers et 40 autres recrues venant de l’ile voisine de Nshimba.383 Les combats contre l’armée congolaise ont été par ailleurs violents dans la mesure où ils auraient duré, selon la mission onusienne, une à deux heures.384 Le rapport de la mission onusienne mentionne une quatrième circonstance, celle des civils tués par balles perdues.385 Par conséquent, mettre toutes les personnes décédées dans les cas 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 Voir Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.102. Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC), ‘Rapport sur les conclusions de l’Enquête Spéciale sur les allégations d’exécutions sommaires et autres violations de droits de l’homme commises par les FARDC à Kilwa’, para.2. Ibid. Ministère public et parties civiles c. Adémar Ilunga et consorts (n 3). Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC), ‘Rapport sur les conclusions de l’Enquête Spéciale sur les allégations d’exécutions sommaires et autres violations de droits de l’homme commises par les FARDC à Kilwa’, paras. 3 et 11. Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC), ‘Rapport sur les conclusions de l’Enquête Spéciale sur les allégations d’exécutions sommaires et autres violations de droits de l’homme commises par les FARDC à Kilwa’, para.17. Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC), ‘Rapport sur les conclusions de l’Enquête Spéciale sur les allégations d’exécutions sommaires et autres violations de droits de l’homme commises par les FARDC à Kilwa’, para.24. 93 Balingene Kahombo d’exécutions sommaires ou de mort par noyade est une constatation de fait imprécise. Cela conduit en réalité à une supposition générale, non-circonstanciée, des violations de la Charte africaine par la RDC. La vérité est que certains faits retenus par la CADHP sont même invraisemblables. Tel est le cas d’un enfant de 12 ans qui aurait été arrêté et tué en revenant de l’école.386 Ni le nom de l’école ni la date de cette exécution ne sont précisés. Mais, si l’on considère que la victime aurait été tuée le jour de la contre-attaque de l’armée, soit le 15 octobre 2004, ou au cours du ratissage qui aura duré, selon la mission onusienne, jusqu’au 16 octobre 2004,387 le doute sur la matérialité d’un tel fait devient sérieux. Et pour cause, on peut bien imaginer qu’aucune école n’a ouvert ses portes pendant les hostilités et immédiatement après à Kilwa. En outre, d’après le rapport de la mission onusienne, 90% de la population avaient déjà fui Kilwa le 14 octobre 2004, le jour même de sa capture par les insurgés du MRLK.388 Cette façon de prendre pareille allégation comme établie est préjudiciable à la manifestation de la vérité et décrédibilise la procédure et le professionnalisme de l’instruction de la CADHP. Un autre défi c’est celui de l’établissement des faits liés à l’implication de la société Anvil Mining sans la participation de celle-ci à la procédure devant la CADHP. On remarque, ici encore, que la CADHP ne s’est pas donnée la peine d’adjuger les allégations contre cette société, avant d’envisager la responsabilité de la RDC. Sa décision indique simplement sans autre précision que les violations alléguées ‘soulèvent la question de la responsabilité de la société multinationale dans les violations des droits garantis par la Charte africaine (…)’.389 Ceci est d’autant plus regrettable que c’est sur la base de l’implication d’Anvil Mining que la CADHP a demandé à la RDC de prendre des mesures à l’effet de la poursuite et de la sanction des agents de cette société. La question qui se pose est celle de savoir si le fait de mettre la logistique à la disposition de l’armée congolaise dans le cadre de sa contre-attaque à Kilwa suffit à affirmer que la société en question a participé à la commission des violations des droits de l’homme par le personnel militaire de la RDC. En acquittant les agents d’Anvil Mining de crimes de guerre pour avoir omis volontairement de retirer les véhicules mis à la disposition de l’armée pendant deux semaines,390 la réponse de la CMK a été négative. Elle a justifié sa décision par le fait que la réquisition de ladite logistique ayant été faite par l’Etat congolais par l’entremise du gouverneur de province du Katanga, 386 387 388 389 390 Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.76 Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC), ‘Rapport sur les conclusions de l’Enquête Spéciale sur les allégations d’exécutions sommaires et autres violations de droits de l’homme commises par les FARDC à Kilwa’, para.17. Ibid., para.15. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.101. Ministère public et parties civiles c. Adémar Ilunga et consorts (n 3). Droits de l’homme et obligation de poursuivre les crimes de guerre.... 94 il n’appartenait pas à la société Anvil Mining de retirer ses moyens à l’armée,391 alors même que celle-ci commettait des crimes à Kilwa. Cette motivation est d’ailleurs fondée parce qu’en droit congolais, une réquisition administrative est un ordre à exécuter, sous peine de sanction pénale,392 tandis que les biens requis échappent, de toute évidence, à la gestion de leur maitre. Un autre observateur a avancé deux raisons pouvant justifier l’acquittement des accusés. D’une part, il n’y a pas de connexité directe entre les crimes commis et la logistique fournie qui n’incluait pas des armes.393 D’autre part, l’élément moral fait défaut dans la mesure où, en octroyant une aide logistique à l’armée, la société Anvil Mining ne pouvait pas savoir que des crimes allaient être commis. Que la société ait été enthousiaste à répondre à la réquisition de l’Etat congolais pour protéger ses intérêts miniers dans la zone investie par les insurgés, ceci est immatériel à sa participation aux crimes commis par l’armée congolaise. Pour les mêmes raisons, l’implication d’Anvil Mining dans les violations de la Charte africaine pouvait être écartée Ainsi, il apparait clairement que la CADHP n’a pas tenté de scruter la motivation de la CMK comme elle l’a fait s’agissant de la motivation avancée pour l’acquittement des militaires congolais. Ce fait constitue une erreur de méthode, celle de deux poids deux mesures, dans une même procédure par défaut. 2.2.2 L’établissement discutable de la violation du droit à l’appel Une autre violation établie contre la RDC c’est celle du droit à l’appel. La reconnaissance de celui-ci à ‘toute personne’ est déduite de l’article 7(1)(a) de la Charte africaine.394 Il découle de la décision de la CADHP que ce droit peut être violé non seulement lorsqu’il est méconnu, mais encore lorsque le juge manque à l’obligation de motiver sa décision de rejet du recours en appel.395 La difficulté surgit lorsque la CADHP conclut que le droit des victimes à l’appel a été violé dans la procédure devant la HCM pour défaut de motivation. En effet, la HCM a rejeté l’appel introduit par les victimes au motif que les avocats agissant en leur nom n’avaient pas été munis de procuration spéciale. Pour la CADHP, ce moyen était non-pertinent parce que ce sont les mêmes avocats qui ont assisté les victimes devant la CMK. Elle fait par ailleurs un parallèle avec l’appel interjeté par le parquet militaire qui a été rejeté, lui aussi, au motif que le procureur militaire l’ayant fait acter possédait un grade inférieur à celui de l’accusé principal portant le grade de colonel. 391 392 393 394 395 Ministère public et parties civiles c. Adémar Ilunga et consorts (n 3). Voir Ordonnance-loi du 11 juin 1940 relative aux réquisitions, article 12 (1) ; Arrêté-loi du 20 mai 1943 portant organisation d’un régime de réquisitions. Joseph Kazadi Mpiana, ‘La position du droit international dans l’ordre juridique congolais et l’application de ses normes’, Thèse de doctorat, Sapienza Università di Roma, 2012, 498. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para. 120. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa et autres c. République Démocratique du Congo, para.127. 95 Balingene Kahombo Cette motivation fait supposer que l’arrêt d’irrecevabilité de la HCM a été porté à la connaissance de la CADHP. Toutefois, son bien-fondé demeure discutable en droit. D’abord, la CADHP semble oublier que les conditions d’exercice du droit à l’appel par un accusé relève du droit national de l’Etat concerné. C’est ce que suggère, du moins en ce qui concerne l’accusé, l’article 14 (5) du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques auquel la RDC est partie.396 Rien ne permet de penser que la partie victime puisse bénéficier d’un traitement différent. Le recours à cette disposition du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques en vue de l’interprétation de l’article 7 (1) (a) de la Charte africaine est justifié en vertu de l’article 60 de cette dernière,397 car la Charte africaine n’est pas explicite sur ce point. Ensuite, la CADHP dit que la HCM a manqué à son obligation de motivation parce que celle-ci serait frappée d’un défaut de pertinence en droit. Néanmoins, ce motif est en contradiction avec la procédure pénale congolaise. Aux termes de l’article 278 (4) du Code judiciaire militaire, l’appel contre les jugements et arrêts des juridictions militaires se fait conformément au Code de procédure pénale ordinaire. Ce dernier dispose que le droit à l’appel appartient au prévenu, à la personne déclarée civilement responsable, à la partie civile ou aux personnes auxquels des dommagesintérêts sont alloués d’office et au ministère public.398 D’après la jurisprudence constante développée par la Cour suprême de justice, l’avocat, qui ne figure pas sur cette liste, doit être muni d’une procuration spéciale de la personne qu’il assiste ou représente, lorsqu’il interjette appel, sous peine d’irrecevabilité.399 Il n’existe qu’une seule exception à ce principe exigeant la production d’une procuration spéciale. En l’occurrence, lorsqu’il s’agit d’un avocat devant la Cour de cassation qui introduit un pourvoi, aux termes de l’Ordonnance-loi relative au barreau.400 C’est visiblement ce droit que la HCM a appliqué dans l’affaire Kilwa. La comparaison avec le rejet de l’appel du parquet militaire n’a aucune pertinence à ce niveau. Au vu des éléments du dossier, il apparait que le droit à l’appel au profit des victimes n’avait pas été violé du seul fait de l’irrecevabilité de leur recours pour défaut de production de procuration spéciale par leurs avocats conseils. 396 397 398 399 400 Cet article prescrit : ‘Toute personne déclarée coupable d’une infraction a le droit de faire examiner par une juridiction supérieure la déclaration de culpabilité et la condamnation, conformément à la loi’. Cet article dispose : ‘La Commission s’inspire du droit international relatif aux droits de l’homme et des peuples, notamment des dispositions des divers instruments africains relatifs aux droits de l’homme et des peuples, des dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies, de la Charte de l’Organisation de l’Unité Africaine, de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l’Homme, des dispositions des autres instruments adoptés par les Nations Unies et par les pays africains dans le domaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples ainsi que des dispositions de divers instruments adoptés au sein d’institutions spécialisées des Nations Unies dont sont membres les parties à la présente Charte’. Décret du 6 août 1959 portant Code de procédure pénale, article 96. Cour suprême de justice, R.P.2385, 30 juin 2003. Ordonnance-loi 79-028 du 28 septembre 1979 portant organisation du barreau, du corps des défenseurs judiciaires et du corps des mandataires de l’État, article 107 : ‘Les avocats à la Cour suprême de justice représentent valablement les parties sans avoir à justifier d’une procuration’. Droits de l’homme et obligation de poursuivre les crimes de guerre.... 96 3. Les perspectives de la reprise du procès pénal Quelles que soient ces faiblesses juridiques de la décision de la CADHP, celle-ci reste valable car elle a été adoptée conformément à la Charte africaine qui lie la RDC. Il appartient désormais à celle-ci d’exécuter les recommandations qui lui ont été adressées relativement aux réparations au profit des victimes. En particulier, la question des options disponibles en vue de la reprise du procès pénal par la justice congolaise devra vite être examinée par le Comité de suivi de l’exécution de la décision de la CADHP. Adopter une attitude contraire porterait gravement atteinte au principe de l’Etat de droit qui est pourtant proclamé par la Constitution congolaise du 18 février 2006 en ces termes : ‘La République Démocratique du Congo est (…) un Etat de droit (…)‘.401 Il faut d’ores et déjà exclure la révision de ces options disponibles. Ceci repose sur le fait qu’en droit positif congolais, la révision pénale est prévue non pas pour affecter le sort d’une personne déjà acquittée, mais pour établir son innocence à la suite de la découverte ou de l’apparition des faits nouveaux ou des preuves nouvelles.402 Cette procédure est donc antinomique avec l’objet et le but de la recommandation faite à la RDC, visant plutôt à faire juger à nouveau et condamner les auteurs des violations graves des droits de l’homme commises à Kilwa. Toutefois, il reste deux autres hypothèses à explorer. La première c’est le recours en inconstitutionnalité contre l’arrêt de la HCM du 21 décembre 2007 pour violation des droits fondamentaux reconnus aux citoyens, notamment les droits à un procès équitable, conformément à l’article 83 du Code judiciaire militaire. Si ce recours prospère, la déclaration d’inconstitutionnalité aura pour effet de rendre ledit arrêt nul de plein droit. Cette nullité donnerait lieu à la reprise du procès en appel devant la HCM, obligée de refaire son travail comme si elle n’y a jamais statué. Les parties civiles en profiteraient pour régulariser la procédure. La seconde hypothèse c’est celle du pourvoi en cassation, qui serait introduit par les parties civiles. Cette procédure présente tout de même quelques inconvénients. Il faut en effet que les demandeurs en cassation parviennent à démontrer l’existence des raisons valables et pertinentes pour être relevées de la déchéance de délai de 40 jours francs à dater du prononcé de l’arrêt de la HCM ayant rendu l’arrêt de la CMK du 28 juin 2007 définitif à leur égard. Bien plus, il s’agirait d’une cassation avec renvoi,403 avec pour conséquence la prolongation des procédures devant la HCM ou une autre juridiction de renvoi désignée par la Cour de cassation, alors que cette affaire n’a que trop duré. C’est pourquoi il conviendrait de privilégier l’introduction du pourvoi par le Procureur général près la Cour de cassation sur injonction du Ministre de la justice.404 Il y a trois 401 402 403 404 Constitution du 18 février 2006, article 1 (1). Loi n°023/2002 du 18 novembre 2002 portant Code judiciaire militaire, articles 124 et 310. Loi organique n° 13/010 du 19 février 2013 relative à la procédure devant la Cour de cassation, article 37 (1)-(5). Loi organique n°13/011-B du 11 avril 2013 portant organisation, fonctionnement et compétences des 97 Balingene Kahombo raisons fondamentales en appui à cette position. D’abord, ce genre de pourvoi peut être introduit hors délai sans aucune autre justification particulière.405 Ensuite, c’est la RDC qui doit faire diligence pour exécuter les mesures de réparations au profit des victimes auxquelles elle a été condamnée. Enfin, ce genre de pourvoi est bien adapté à l’affaire, dans la mesure où il vise précisément à remédier à ‘un excès de pouvoir dans la décision entreprise ou à un mal jugé certain’.406 Il permet également l’abréviation des procédures parce que la Cour de cassation est autorisée, en pareil cas, de ne pas procéder au renvoi, mais de statuer elle-même sur le fond.407 Des problèmes juridiques complexes devront être résolus pour autant. En effet, comment la décision de la CADHP va-t-elle se concilier avec l’approche pénale devant la justice congolaise, à la fois du point de vue des constatations de fait, de l’identification des victimes et de la fixation du montant ou des mesures de réparations ? La justice congolaise est-elle tenue de se plier aux constatations de fait de la CADHP ou elle doit plutôt faire sa propre appréciation souveraine de l’affaire ? Devrait-elle simplement tenir compte des mesures de réparations demandées par la CADHP ou, au contraire, ces mesures devraient s’exécuter indépendamment de la décision à laquelle aboutirait le nouveau procès national ? Comment le juge congolais pourrait dès lors régler la question de cumul de réparations pour éviter des payements ou des versements indus ? En outre, la RDC pourrait-elle se faire rembourser par la société Anvil Mining devant la justice congolaise ou, à tout le moins, exiger sa participation à l’exécution des réparations recommandées par la CADHP ? Toutes ces questions sont d’intérêt pratique indéniable. Elles touchent à l’articulation entre le procès pénal et les droits de l’homme d’une part, et la justice nationale et la justice internationale, d’autre part. L’exécution de la décision de la CADHP offre une grande occasion pour pouvoir éclairer l’opinion. La Cour de cassation, en particulier, si elle est saisie, aura un grand rôle à jouer à cet égard. Conclusion Cette étude vient de démontrer que la décision de la CADHP est une grande victoire des victimes contre l’impunité à trois titres. D’abord, elle renverse les constatations de fait de la justice congolaise ayant acquitté toutes les personnes accusées de crimes de guerre commis à Kilwa. Ensuite, elle établit la responsabilité de la RDC non seulement pour les violations de la Charte africaine commises par les membres de ses forces armées et par son appareil judiciaire, mais aussi pour celles commises par la société Anvil Mining. Enfin, la décision de la CADHP a condamné la RDC à des réparations colossales au profit des victimes, y compris le payement des dommages-intérêts équivalents à 2.560.000 de dollars américains. 405 406 407 juridictions de l’ordre judiciaire, articles 35(5), 95 et 97(1). Loi organique n° 13/010 du 19 février 2013 relative à la procédure devant la Cour de cassation, article 36(1). Loi organique n° 13/010 du 19 février 2013 relative à la procédure devant la Cour de cassation, article 36 (4). Loi organique n° 13/010 du 19 février 2013 relative à la procédure devant la Cour de cassation, article 37 (6). Droits de l’homme et obligation de poursuivre les crimes de guerre.... 98 Néanmoins, cette étude conclut aussi que la communication 393/10 par laquelle cette affaire a été portée à la CADHP aurait pu être déclarée irrecevable pour nonépuisement des voies de recours internes, notamment le recours en inconstitutionnalité contre l’arrêt de la HCM du 21 décembre 2007 ou le pourvoi en cassation contre l’arrêt de la CMK du 28 juin 2007. Dans tous les cas, la communication ne méritait pas d’être reçue en intégralité parce qu’elle contenait des faits ne relevant pas de l’incident de Kilwa et n’ayant pas été préalablement soumis à l’appréciation des autorités nationales, telle que la réclamation des arriérés de salaire. Il a été aussi démontré qu’au fond, la CADHP a condamné la RDC pour certaines violations de la Charte africaine, en particulier des cas d’exécutions sommaires, dont la preuve de la commission reste pour le moins très douteuse. Elle a pris pour établis des faits invraisemblables rapportés par les victimes sans devoir procéder à la vérification minutieuse de leur exactitude matérielle, s’ils sont établis en fait et en droit. A ceci s’ajoute la non-vérification de l’établissement des faits commis par Anvil Mining, dont la RDC est rendue responsable en application l’article 1 de la Charte africaine pour n’avoir pas adopté les mesures nécessaires en vue de prévenir, enquêter et sanctionner les violations de ladite Charte par cette société. Qui plus est, la CADHP a fait une mauvaise appréciation de la violation du droit à l’appel. Celle-ci n’aurait pas dû être retenue en l’espèce du fait de la non-observation des conditions d’exercice dudit appel, dont la détermination relève de la compétence nationale de chaque Etat. Somme toute, il faut espérer que la RDC exécute la décision de la CADHP. Il est notamment nécessaire d’ouvrir un nouveau procès pénal devant la Cour de cassation, qui est la voie judiciaire la plus appropriée en l’espèce. Néanmoins, on constate que depuis l’adoption de la décision de la CDHP en juin 2016, la RDC n’a rien entrepris pour exécuter sa condamnation.408 Il est plus qu’urgent que la société civile se mobilise en tirant la sonnette d’alarme pour que les victimes soient rapidement rétablies dans leurs droits. 408 Voir Réseau –DESC, ‘Institute for Human Rights and Development and Others contre République démocratique du Congo, Communication 393/10’ (26 mars 2018) <https://www.escr-net.org/fr/caselaw/2018/ institute-human-rights-and-development-and-others-contre-republique-democratique-du> 9 février 2019. 99 Nabil M. Orina THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT OF COMPLEMENTARITY: THE ICC AND NARRATIVES OF JUSTICE IN KENYA Nabil M. Orina Abstract The establishment of the International Criminal Court (“the Court”) brought with it immense expectations about its overall ability to catalyse prosecution of international crimes in domestic criminal jurisdictions. The assumption was that the intervention or threatened intervention of the Court would trigger domestic action towards investigating and prosecuting international crimes. Two decades since its establishment, studies have been conducted to test this general assumption. The focus has been on how the Court has influenced these domestic jurisdictions to enact enabling laws and prosecute international crimes. These studies have formed a useful yardstick for assessing the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Court. The studies have expectedly arrived at varied results but there seems to be consensus that the Court has not lived up to the ideal expectations. However, very few attempts have been made to understand the behaviour of domestic jurisdictions when they interact with the ICC. This chapter aims to fill that gap by assessing the Court’s interaction with Situation countries in the context of the socio-political factors that underlie its possible impact. In choosing Kenya as a case study, the chapter aims to provide a comprehensive assessment of the context of the 2007-2008 Post Election Violence (“PEV”), how it shaped the various interactions with the Court and what these portend for justice. Through this analysis it is argued that the impact of the ICC is informed by unique socio-political factors prevailing in each situation. As such, the Court’s impact is, in contrast to popular belief and expectations, unpredictable. The socio-political context of complementarity.... LE CONTEXTE SOCIO-POLITIQUE DE LA COMPLEMENTARITE: LA CPI ET LES RECITS DE LA JUSTICE AU KENYA Résumé La création de la Cour pénale internationale (« la Cour «) a suscité d’immenses attentes quant à sa capacité générale à catalyser les poursuites contre les crimes internationaux dans les juridictions pénales nationales. L’hypothèse était que l’intervention ou la menace d’intervention de la Cour déclencherait une action nationale en vue d’enquêter et de poursuivre les crimes internationaux. Deux décennies après sa création, des études ont été menées pour vérifier cette hypothèse générale. L’accent a été mis sur la manière dont la Cour a influencé ces juridictions nationales à promulguer des lois habilitantes et à poursuivre les crimes internationaux. Ces études ont servi de référence utile pour évaluer l’efficacité et la légitimité de la Cour. Les études devraient avoir donné des résultats variables, mais il semble y avoir consensus sur le fait que la Cour n’a pas été à la hauteur des attentes idéales. Cependant, très peu d’efforts ont été faits pour comprendre le comportement des juridictions nationales lorsqu’elles interagissent avec la CPI. Le présent chapitre vise à combler cette lacune en évaluant l’interaction de la Cour avec les pays de la situation dans le contexte des facteurs sociopolitiques qui soustendent son impact possible. En choisissant le Kenya comme étude de cas, le chapitre vise à fournir une évaluation complète du contexte de la violence post-électorale (« VPE «) de 2007-2008, de la façon dont elle a façonné les diverses interactions avec la Cour et ce qu’elles présagent pour la justice. A travers cette analyse, il est avancé que l’impact de la CPI est influencé par des facteurs sociopolitiques uniques prévalant dans chaque situation. En tant que tel, l’impact de la Cour est imprévisible, contrairement à ce que l’on croit et ce que l’on attend d’elle. 100 101 1. Nabil M. Orina Background The 2007 presidential election in Kenya was hotly contested, pitting Mwai Kibaki (the incumbent vying on a Party of National Unity “PNU” ticket) and Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) against each other. On 30 December 2007, the electoral commission controversially announced Mwai Kibaki as the winner of the election triggering spontaneous violence in major towns in the country.409 What started as a protest against perceived electoral fraud quickly metamorphosed into large-scale violence defined along ethnic and political lines.410 This violence led to the deaths of approximately 1200 people, displacement of over 200,000 and several incidents of looting and arson.411 On 28 February 2008, a negotiated power sharing agreement was reached signalling an end to the violence.412 Upon the power sharing deal between the two major contestants in the disputed 2007 presidential poll, the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, under the mediation of the former UN Secretary General Kofi Anan, set in motion rule of law reforms ranging from electoral reform to the enactment of a new constitution.413 Among other things, the forum recommended the setting up of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, constitutional and judicial reforms and also the formation of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. The Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (“CIPEV” or “the Waki Commission”) was mandated to investigate the circumstances surrounding the PEV, to make recommendations to bring to account those responsible and, by so doing, to combat the culture of impunity.414 The Commission found that the crimes committed during the PEV were widespread and systematic in some places with evidence of planning.415 It recommended the creation of a special tribunal to investigate and prosecute these crimes, failing which a list of suspects considered to be the most responsible would be handed over to the ICC Prosecutor.416 This opened the debate on which forms of justice best suited the Kenyan situation. The key consideration, as highlighted by the Waki Commission, being that Kenya had gone through cycles of violence in previous elections 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence, Kenya (Waki Report), 346-347. Ibid. United Nations, Report from OHCHR Fact-finding Mission to Kenya, 6-28 February 2008, at 8. Reuters, ‘Text of Kenya Power-Sharing deal’ 29 February 2008. Available at <https://www.csmonitor.com/ World/Africa/2008/0229/p25s01-woaf.html> accessed 12 September 2018. See, Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, ‘Agenda Item Three: How to Resolve the Political Crisis’ Available at <https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/tjrc-pre/3> accessed 12 September 2018. The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation on the political crisis in Kenya (NDR) was set up by the two coalition partners, Party of National Unity and Orange Democratic Movement. In its Preamble, the NDR reaffirms that: “[...] the final goal of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation is to achieve sustainable peace, stability and justice in Kenya through the rule of law and respect for human rights.” Waki Report 21-22. Ibid,347. Ibid, 18, 472-473. The commission’s auto-trigger recommendation was an innovative way to address what had been seen in the past as reluctance to implement recommendations of past commissions. The socio-political context of complementarity.... 102 without redress and that there was a resultant need to establish a credible system of justice and accountability to finally put an end to impunity.417 This chapter seeks to analyse the effect of the ICC on justice narratives in Kenya through various stages starting with the recommendation of the Waki Commission for the formation of a special tribunal. The following part addresses the recommendation of the Waki Commission regarding the formation of a special tribunal which reflected an attempt to strike a balance between international mechanisms and domestic courts. This is followed with a discussion on Kenya’s path in the domestication of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”) through the International Crimes Act. This part also highlights the dilemma of conceptualising the right approach to the crimes resulting from the PEV when faced with the constitutional challenge of applying the International Crimes Act retrogressively. Next, the chapter explores the various options and difficulties with domestic investigations and prosecutions towards the PEV. The last two parts of the chapter move on to the ICC’s impact on formal and informal processes towards peace, reconciliation and reparations. The chapter concludes with a summary on the interplay of socio-political factors and Kenya’s justice discourse after the PEV. 2. Breaking away from Impunity: The Waki Commission Formula There was a general consensus after the PEV regarding the need for accountability that had been elusive in the previous cycles of political violence. Informed by a culture of impunity that had existed, the dialogue centred on finding the appropriate mechanism(s) that would respond in the best way considering the need to punish those responsible for the violence as well as address its root causes. Kenya, therefore, needed a multi-pronged approach to justice that would include criminal accountability as part of the transitional justice mechanisms. Prior to the PEV, impunity for political violence was a threat to the rule of law for a long time despite investigations by various commissions of inquiry and parliamentary committees. The scale of the PEV was in some way an awakening moment that stirred debate on ways to put an end to impunity. Significantly, Kenya had ratified the Rome Statute in 2005, thereby creating an avenue for justice in case it took no action as before. It was, however, the case that Kenya did not feel that it belonged within the ambit of States that would be subject to international criminal justice, despite having experienced similar violence in the 1992 and 1997 general elections. This was in comparison with the long running armed conflicts in some States within the Great Lakes region of Africa. Even though, in retrospect, during the debate for the constitutional amendment to allow the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Kenya (STK), a Member of Parliament saw Kenya’s ratification of the Rome Statute in 2005 as “an expression of the desire […] 417 Ibid, 442-462. 103 Nabil M. Orina to practice good norms and ensure that there is application of justice”,418 there was no evidence that Kenya ratified it due to its past experience with mass atrocities or in the desire that Kenya would be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. Plausibly, as argued by De Vos, Kenya ratified the Rome Statute soon after the change of regime from President Moi to President Kibaki as a show of reform,419 and perhaps as an expression of an intention to respect human rights. Despite not experiencing large scale conflicts that would be comparable to other countries in the region, there was a feeling that credible local mechanisms for the prosecution of the PEV would signal an end to impunity to electoral cycle violence that had been witnessed in 1992, 1997 and in 2007-2008. Factors that were considered by the Waki Commission in its proposal to set up a special tribunal included: the possibility that crimes against humanity had been committed during the violence,420 positions occupied by those suspected of such crimes in society421 and misgivings about the judiciary’s capability to handle such crimes.422 These findings mirror the criteria set by Bassiouni when deciding the appropriate accountability mechanisms in a post-conflict society, which include gravity of the violations, level of the accused and competence of the domestic judiciary.423 In this case, however, the need for prioritisation of local mechanisms rather than an international court resonated well with a need to have a mechanism that would address all cadres of perpetrators as opposed to the ICC that would focus on only those considered as the most responsible, hence creating a justice gap with respect to mid and low-level perpetrators.424 Also, in this debate, there was the concern for attendant sovereignty costs in case Kenya failed to establish a local tribunal. In arguing for the establishment of local mechanisms, the proponents perceived the ICC as a Court for “failed States” and that Kenya did not fit the mould.425 In order to avoid suffering the attendant reputational risks, Parliament was urged not to allow PEV cases to be taken up by the ICC.426 Comparing the PEV with the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, Liberian civil war, the genocide in the Former Yugoslavia and the conflict in Darfur, it was argued that it would not be appropriate to 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard), The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, Second Reading, 4 February 2009, 42. Christian De Vos, ‘All Roads Lead to Rome: Implementation and Domestic Politics in Kenya and Uganda’ in Christian De Vos, Sarah Kendall and Carsten Stahn (eds.,) Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (2015, Cambridge), 393. Waki Report 472. Ibid, 17. The Report notes, ‘The Commission has in possession the names of powerful individuals in politics, government, business, the police and elsewhere…’ Ibid, 469. The Report notes in this regard, ‘We find in our assessment that the chain of criminal justice system is generally weak and the weakest link is the investigative function. The weakness in the system impacts on the rule of law and therefore promotes impunity.’ M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (2012, Brill) 956. Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard), 5 February 2009, 45. Hansard, Constitutional Amendment Bill, Second Reading, 4 February 2009, 41. Ibid, 36. The socio-political context of complementarity.... 104 defer to the ICC.427 Despite the proposal to establish a domestic tribunal with international characteristics in order to assuage the fears of its independence, there was scepticism regarding the ability of local mechanisms to prosecute those in leadership positions. This was partly due to past experiences, but also due to the narrative driven by the international criminal justice project, which generally portrays domestic mechanisms as inadequate when seen through international standards.428 These misgivings were also symptomatic of deeply seated political suspicions between politicians who were on different sides of the political dispute that led to the violence. The debate further underscored the challenges faced by domestic jurisdictions in dealing with leadership crimes. For instance, with the possibility that those who occupied positions of power would be implicated in the PEV, as had been the case with the previous cycles of violence, the formation of a local tribunal was opposed for fear that it would be susceptible to manipulation, whereas an international tribunal was cast as immune from these machinations. Cyrus Jirongo, a former Member of Parliament for Lugari Constituency, expressed these fears during the debate in Parliament by arguing: …Our interest is in the leaders. Who are these people who caused pain to this country? Suppose the investigations point…at His Excellency the President, do you want to tell me that this country has the capacity to try him? Suppose the investigation points at the Prime Minister, do you want to convince the Republic of Kenya that we have the capacity to try him?429 The Waki Commission’s first proposal in its formula for dealing with PEV crimes thus faced headwinds right from the beginning. Its eventual defeat in favour of ICC intervention was characterized by deep suspicions within the political class. 3. Domestication of International Criminal Law 3.1 The International Crimes Act Kenya signed the Rome Statute on 11 August 1999 thereby showing an intention to join the treaty. However, it wasn’t until the year 2005 that Kenya ratified the treaty. The eventual ratification in 2005 can be attributed to the change in regime in the country from President Moi to President Kibaki, who came into power on a platform of reforms.430 427 428 429 430 Ibid. For some lawmakers, however, an ICC intervention was not necessarily denting Kenya’s sovereignty and was for the greater good. Citing the cases of Rwanda and Germany, Mr. Machage, former Member of Parliament for Kuria constituency argued that these two countries did not lose their sovereignty by having their nationals prosecuted through international mechanisms. (Ibid,40). Carsten Stahn, ‘Justice Civilisatrice? The ICC, post-colonial theory, and faces of ‘the local’ in Christian De Vos, Sarah Kendall and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015) 48. Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard), 29 January 2009, 48. Hansard, 16 Dec 2010, 39. See also Christian De Vos, ‘All Roads Lead to Rome: Implementation and Domestic Politics in Kenya and Uganda’ in Christian De Vos, Sarah Kendall and Carsten Stahn (eds.,) Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (2015, Cambridge), 393. 105 Nabil M. Orina Even though the NARC government represented some hope for respect for human rights and a departure from impunity, when seen in historical context, the coalition was more informed by a desire to end the KANU rule rather than any struggle for human rights that could have defined its raison d’être and perhaps help shape its prioritisation. The African National Congress struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa, for instance, shaped its approach towards human rights as argued by Gerhard Kemp.431 The ratification bound Kenya to the treaty but still required domestication in order for Kenya to exercise jurisdiction on the crimes under the Statute and to provide for cooperation with the court, as Kenya was a Dualist State before the 2010 constitutional change. Facing no immediate need for prioritisation, a draft International Crimes Bill for the domestication the Rome Statute presented to Parliament in June 2006 did not proceed beyond the first reading.432 The Rome Statute therefore remained inapplicable in the country until the events of the 2007-2008 PEV, which triggered the re-introduction into parliament of the International Crimes Bill in 2008. At this time, Kenya was desperately working to restore its reputation that had been greatly affected by the PEV. As argued during debate on the bill, there was urgency in passing the law, “to help [the] country take the right position in international standing.”433 The bill easily sailed through at the second reading in contrast to the rejection of a special tribunal law that was introduced later upon the release of the Waki Report. It is plausible that this law did not elicit strong interest from the political class because it did not present an immediate threat to those who would be potentially implicated in the PEV, as it would not apply retroactively contrary to what the special tribunal bill portended. For that reason, most of the discussion around it was centred on its perceived benefits for the future.434 The passing of this law which became the International Crimes Act (ICA) reflected how Kenya had little control over its content. There was no attempt at localisation of the crimes to fit within the peculiar conflicts that had occurred or were likely to occur in Kenya and instead the law directly imports provisions of the Rome Statute. As admitted by the then Attorney General, the law was drafted from the Commonwealth Model Law to Implement the Rome Statute and had input from the United Nations.435 The ICA adopts all the crimes as defined in the Rome Statute and also incorporates their elements.436 To a small extent, however, the ICA departs from the Rome Statute and the Model Law’s restriction of criminal liability to natural persons by recognising corporate criminal liability for international crimes. Section 2(1) of the Act defines “person” to mean, “a 431 432 433 434 435 436 Gerhard Kemp, ‘South Africa’s (Possible) Withdrawal from the ICC and the Future of the Criminalisation and Prosecution of Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes and Genocide under Domestic Law: A Submission Informed by Historical, Normative and Policy Considerations’ (2017) 16 Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 411, 422-434. De Vos, ‘All Roads Lead to Rome’ 394. Hansard, 7 May 2008, 916. Ibid, 913. Ibid, 907. Section 6(4), 7(5)(b). The socio-political context of complementarity.... 106 natural person, a company or association or body of persons corporate or unincorporated.” This demonstrated the reality of the increasing power of corporations and the recognition of their potential complicity in mass atrocity crimes.437 The extension of criminal liability to legal persons was also in tandem with the Kenyan law that recognises such liability.438 Further, the ICA adopted the optional definition in the Commonwealth Model Law that expands the definition of Crimes Against Humanity (CAH) to include, “an act defined as a crime against humanity in conventional international law or customary international law that is not otherwise dealt with in the Rome Statute or in this Act.”439 This addition recognises the potentially restrictive nature of the Rome Statute in defining crimes against humanity and allows Kenya leeway to cast a wider net and resort to customary international law (as at the time such crimes were committed) and other international treaties even if the acts are not recognised as CAH under the Rome Statute. It also creates an opportunity for the development of international criminal law. On the question of immunity, the parliamentary committee on legal affairs unsuccessfully tried to import Article 27 of the Rome Statute into the domesticating legislation as a general principle of criminal law that would be applicable in Kenya.440 This was opposed on the basis that the Kenyan Constitution as at that time recognised immunity for the head of state for criminal offences while in office.441 However the then Attorney General, Amos Wako, informed the house that the issue would be taken up in the constitutional review process that was happening.442 Indeed the 2010 Constitution removed immunity for international crimes that are applicable to Kenya pursuant to international treaties.443 Beyond the optimism that this law would address crimes committed by security forces in the context of historical and recent atrocities in the country, some disappointment was expressed on what was seen as a narrow conception of justice that would not address the root causes of “economic genocide” that was fuelling African conflicts and its effects.444 The then Member of Parliament for Garissa Town, Farah Maalim, voiced this critique: 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 For a discussion on the growing recognition of corporate criminal responsibility for international crimes see, James G. Stewart, ‘The Turn to Corporate Criminal Liability for International Crimes: Transcending the Alien Tort Statute’ (2014) 47 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics See Sections 20-23, Penal Code, Cap 63 Laws of Kenya and Section 2 Interpretation and General Provisions Act, Cap 2 Laws of Kenya. Section 6(4). Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard), 11 December 2008, 4076. Section 14 of the Constitution of Kenya, 1963 Hansard, 11 December 2008, 4076. Under Article 143(1) & (4) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 a sitting president enjoys immunity from criminal proceedings during their tenure in office but with the exceptions of crimes pursuant to a treaty to which Kenya is part of. This effectively incorporates removal of immunity for international crimes under the Rome Statute. Hansard 7 May 2008, 918 107 Nabil M. Orina I want the Attorney-General to understand that the economic genocide and wanton destruction of property that is taking us back to the days of slavery in the continent should have been included in this statute more than anything else. The permanent impoverishment of the black man, the slavery and the colonisation that we suffered is still what keeps us where we are. There has been no compensation and responsibility for what happened. The context of the statute tells me how little the black continent participated in the formulation of this statute. We need to be compensated as a continent.445 This critique reveals much more than concerns for the inadequacies of international law – and international criminal law in this case - to provide solutions for modern day conflicts. It portrays what would be perceived by the local consumer as the insincerity of the international criminal justice project in “decontextualizing” conflict to eliminate the role of the Western powers in its origins and perpetuation.446 Maalim’s concerns were not far off though, as the ICC Prosecutor’s recent policy aims to address “Rome Statute crimes that are committed by means of, or that result in, inter alia, the destruction of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources or the illegal dispossession of land,”447 a clear recognition of the wider context of conflicts. 3.2 The international crimes versus ordinary crimes debate Kenya certainly perceived its obligations under the Rome Statute as requiring an adoption of what Kevin Jon Heller calls the “hard mirror” approach to domestic adjudication of international crimes,448 which in this case would require that the definition of international crimes domestically be in tandem with their definition under the Rome Statute. Plausibly as well, owing to the long history of impunity, Kenya did not consider her criminal justice system, as it was, well suited to handle cases of that magnitude. As explained by Martha Karua, the then Minister for Justice, when introducing a bill that would have enabled the establishment of a special tribunal: this Bill is coming about because we, as a nation, are accepting that there are inherent weaknesses in our national institutions; that is the investigatory, prosecutorial and adjudication institutions and, therefore, we have not been able, up to now, to deal with the issues arising from the post-election violence.449 Seen in context, the finding by the Waki Commission that domestic institutions were ill suited to handle the PEV necessitated this proposal for the establishment of a 445 446 447 448 449 Ibid. Frédéric Mégret, ‘International Criminal Justice: A Critical Research Agenda’ in Christine Schwöbel (Ed.,) Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law (Routledge, 2014) 36 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016 at 41. Kevin Jon Heller, ‘A Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity’ (2012) 53 Harvard International Law Journal 85, 88. See also, Sosteness Matheru, The Post-Election Violence in Kenya: Domestic and International Legal Responses (TMC Asser Press, 2015) 91. Hansard, 29 January 2009, 36 The socio-political context of complementarity.... 108 tribunal with international characteristics.450 This proposal was a reflection of a desire to concretely address gross human rights violations in the country for the first time. By making this proposal, however, the Waki Commission perceived the “internationalisation” of justice as the ultimate solution to breaking the cycle of impunity. Complete with foreign judges and a structure that replicated the ICC in terms of its composition and substantive jurisdiction, the proposed tribunal was fashioned along the lines of an international criminal tribunal. This proposed law however gave room for diversification of the applicable law by importing into the tribunal existing crimes under the Penal Code to be applied on categories of defendants whose conduct wouldn’t fit within the parameters of international crimes as defined.451 However, irrespective of the domestic mechanisms agreed upon by the political elite, the prosecution of crimes against humanity as defined under the Rome Statute was going to violate the prohibition against retroactivity as the International Crimes Act 2009 was enacted after the PEV.452 To anticipate possible challenges to the proposed tribunal’s legality, the government had unsuccessfully proposed a constitutional amendment, which would anchor the proposed tribunal in the constitution and shield it from legal challenges.453 One, arguably easier route, in which this would have been cured was to prosecute the crimes arising out of the PEV as ordinary crimes since Kenya had not domesticated the crimes under the Rome Statute prior to the PEV.454 This would have satisfied the requirement under the Statute that a domestic jurisdiction investigate or prosecute based on the conduct rather than its legal characterisation.455 Proponents of the hard mirror approach have however argued that prosecution of international crimes as ordinary crimes undermines complementarity.456 The flipside of strict adherence to the hard mirror approach is the potential to lead to exclusion of conduct that is serious in nature but might not fit within the restricted definition of international crimes under the Rome Statute. Indeed, this problem became 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 Waki Report. Section 9(1)(b) Special Tribunal of Kenya Bill. Section 77 (8) of the Constitution of Kenya, 1963 (repealed). The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, 2009. In an attempt to persuade her colleagues, the then Justice Minister who was also the mover of the motion to set up the STK argued that retroactivity would not arise as the crimes committed during the PEV would be equated and prosecuted as ordinary crimes of theft, arson, rape and murder. Hansard 5 February 2009. Benson Chinedu Olugbuo, ‘Operationalising the Complementarity Principle: The Case for a Differentiated Standard in Kenya’s Post-Electoral Violence’ in Charles Chernor Jalloh and Ilias Bantekas (eds.,) The International Criminal Court and Africa (OUP, 2017) 64, 86. See also, Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdulla Al-Senussi, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case against Saif Al Islam Gaddafi, 31 May 2013, para. 85. Lisa J. LaPlante, ‘The Domestication of International Criminal Law: A Proposal for Expanding the International Criminal Court’s Sphere of Influence’ (2010) 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 635, 660 posits that the prosecution for conduct which would amount to international crimes as ordinary crimes is a vulnerable point for the complementarity mechanism prone to abuse. See also, Silvana Arbia and Giovannu Bassy, ‘Proactive Complementarity: A Registrar’s Perspective and Plans’, in Castehn Stahn and Mohamed El Zeidy (eds.), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 65 109 Nabil M. Orina apparent in the PEV, as noted in the report by the Kenya Human Rights Commission, which found that even though there was evidence of crimes against humanity, there was doubt if they would fit within “the requirement that such acts must be pursuant to either state or organisational policy as stated under article 7(2)(a) of the ICC statute.”457 These doubts were also expressed in the dissenting opinion of Judge Hans Peter Kaul, who noted that: While I accept that some of the violence appears to have been organized and planned in advance, I fail to see the existence of an ‘organization’ behind the violent acts which may have established a policy to attack the civilian population within the meaning of article 7(2)(a) of the Statute.458 Further, the difficulty with such an approach where a State has not effectively domesticated international crimes is that an opportunity would be lost to conduct domestic trials owing to the implied pressure that such a State’s systems are inadequate.459 The unsuccessful attempt by Kenya to anchor international crimes in the constitution in the aftermath of the PEV underscores the challenges the mirroring approach portends to a post-conflict society where the crimes committed are linked with the political elite. As demonstrated by the Parliamentary debates on the establishment of the STK, the essence of complementarity was understood as some compliance mechanism where states needed to directly domesticate the crimes as defined under the Rome Statute in order to be adjudged compliant. As noted by one of the contributors to the debate: …we are trying to show Kenya as a democratic nation which is prepared and ready to live with the requirements of the international criminal justice system. If you want us to be part of an emerging nation which respects the rule of law, we have to proceed with the debate on this Bill so that we can be seen to be part of the international community which recognises some of these international crimes.460 The pressure to be part of this international criminal justice system stemmed from the stigma created in the aftermath of the PEV that Kenya was a failed state and would need outside intervention to sort out its affairs. In the endeavour to redeem its image, Kenya was ready to accept any standards that appeared international without much consideration of how such a standard would fit locally. The debate for the establishment of local mechanisms was therefore heavily skewed in favour of compliance with international standards in order to eliminate this stigma. Key players behind the international criminal justice project therefore favoured 457 458 459 460 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, ‘On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of Kenya’s Post-2007 Election Violence’ August 2008, Para. 683 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenta, 31 March 2010. Para 150. See, generally, Max Du Plessis & Jolyon Ford (eds.,), Unable or Unwilling? Case Studies on Domestic Implementation of the ICC Statute in Selected African Countries <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/103560/ MONO141FULL.pdf> accessed 12 September 2018. See also, Heller, ‘A Sentenced-Based Theory of Complementarity’ 94-95. Hansard, 29 January 2009, 31, 37. The socio-political context of complementarity.... 110 an international process to a local process. In fact, civil society organizations called for ICC’s intervention as part of their presentations to the Waki Commission.461 4. Domestic Investigations and Prosecutions of PEV Crimes It has been posited that a threat to prosecution by the ICC would catalyse domestic investigations and prosecutions into international crimes.462 This assumption is predicated on the belief that States facing the possibility of an ICC intervention would want to avoid the sovereignty costs associated with such an intervention by carrying out the prosecutions themselves.463 In other instances, such States would mount investigations or prosecutions as an act of self-preservation when the ICC intervention is likely to target the political leaders who would then roll out domestic mechanisms that would forestall the ICC intervention.464 However, Kenya defied these assumptions due to divisions in the political class in the perceptions of what the choice between an ICC intervention, on the one hand, and a domestic mechanism, on the other, would portend. In order to deal with the immediate issue of the crimes committed during the PEV, Kenya sought to establish a tribunal in accordance with the recommendations of the Waki Commission. However, with a divided political establishment, Kenya struggled with conceptualising the right approach to these crimes. One group of the political class favoured a special tribunal with international characteristics viewing it as a safeguard against interference while another group objected to the formation of this tribunal and instead preferred the intervention of the ICC hoping that the ICC process would be too slow and may probably not indict anyone.465 However, an unintended alliance arose between those who opposed the formation of this tribunal to shield themselves and their political allies from possible indictment and those who opposed the formation of the tribunal on the basis of fear that it may be manipulated. Eventually, the opposition to this tribunal succeeded and the bills introduced to Parliament for its establishment were defeated. After the failed attempt to establish the proposed tribunal, the focus shifted to other domestic mechanisms for addressing crimes committed during the PEV. A divided cabinet was unable to agree on the way forward and issued a statement that the crimes would be handled through the ordinary courts as well as through the TJRC, whose mandate would be expanded.466 There was no doubt at this time that there was no will on 461 462 463 464 465 466 Njonjo Mue and Judy Gitau, ‘The justice vanguard: The role of civil society in seeking accountability for Kenya’s post-election violence’ in Christian De Vos, Sarah Kendall and Carsten Stahn (eds.,) Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (2015, Cambridge), 202 See generally, William W. Burke-White, ‘Complementarity in Practice: The International Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-level Global Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 557. Ibid. In regard to the DRC for instance, see Burke-White, ‘Complementarity in Practice’ Ibid, 569. See, Ronald Slye, The Kenyan TJRC: An Outsider’s View from the Inside (CUP, 2018) 237. Government of Kenya, ‘Cabinet Statement on the National Mechanism for Dealing with Post Election Violence’ 30 July 2009 available at <https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=1001&context=tjrc-gov> accessed 12 September 2018. 111 Nabil M. Orina the part of the political class to deal with the crimes resulting out of the PEV.467 Two years after failing to establish a special tribunal, the then Attorney General, Githu Muigai, reported to Parliament that 533 cases had been taken to court out of the 6,081 reports that had been made with the police.468 These cases covered ordinary crimes of “murder, robbery with violence, arson, malicious damage to property, assault, grievous harm, being armed in a public place, taking part in a riot, breaking, entering and theft, publishing false rumours, theft of stock and theft of farm produce.”469 However, even in these cases of ordinary crimes committed in the PEV, there were no successful prosecutions due to lack of evidence.470 Noteworthy as well, none of those cases were in relation to the six suspects that were facing crimes against humanity charges at the ICC. As it became apparent that Kenya was not going to mount investigations and prosecutions in regard to the PEV crimes, a multi-agency body, the National Council on the Administration of Justice,471 comprising of representation from the Judicial Services Commission, the police and the Directorate of Public Prosecutions proposed the establishment of an International and Organised Crimes Division (IOCD) administratively within the High Court that would be in charge of adjudication of international and organised crimes.472 This proposal, which has turned to be another smokescreen, shows the difficult political environment that Kenya finds itself in regard to the PEV crimes. 5. ICC and other Transitional Justice Mechanisms in Kenya Non-criminal transitional justice mechanisms as a complement to the formal accountability processes were largely overshadowed by the focus on the ICC and the proposed domestic tribunal. There was no doubt that such mechanisms would have advanced wider goals than the formal criminal process was promising, especially since the violence in Kenya was attributed to historical injustices that went way back to 1963 when Kenya gained independence.473 It was also apparent that the violence that happened in Kenya was as a result of many years of injustices and human rights violations that had not been addressed over time. Indeed, when seen in the context of the objects of the Rome Statute “to put an end to impunity” truth seeking, reconciliation and reparations which address deeper underlying issues that lead to conflict such as inequalities in 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 Antonina Okuta, ‘National Legislation for Prosecution of International Crimes in Kenya’ (2009) Journal of International Criminal Justice 1063, 1072. Hansard 23 November 2011, 9. Ibid. Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard), Joint Sitting of the National Assembly and the Senate, 26 March 2015, 13 (‘State of the Nation Address’). See also, Tom Maliti, ‘Prosecutor: Insufficient evidence has made prosecuting post-election violence cases difficult’ International Justice Monitor, 26 October 2012 <https://www.ijmonitor.org/2012/10/kenyan-prosecutor-insufficient-evidence-has-made-prosecuting-postelection-violence-cases-hard/> accessed 12 September 2018. Established under Section 34 of the Judicial Services Act. Kenya, The Judicial Service Commission, ‘Report on The Establishment of the International Crimes Division in The High Court of Kenya’ October 2012. (on file with author). See, generally, Waki Report. The socio-political context of complementarity.... 112 resource distribution and historical injustices, have a longer-term effect on preventing future conflicts that would lead to mass atrocity crimes. This part of the chapter focuses on two aspects of the subject that played out following the PEV. It addresses, first, the formal process of truth seeking and reconciliation through the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) that was established in the aftermath of the violence and, secondly, other informal reconciliation mechanisms and their relationship with the ICC process. 5.1. The Kenyan Truth and Reconciliation Commission In 2002, upon coming into office on a platform of change from the long-term rule under the former President Daniel Arap Moi, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) set up a task force to collect views on whether there was a need to establish a truth commission to look into the past human rights violations and economic crimes.474 The task force chaired by Makau Mutua returned a verdict that a truth commission should be established no later than June 2004.475 These recommendations were, however, ignored. In the aftermath of the violence, one of the mechanisms that were proposed by the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation was the setting up of a truth and reconciliation commission.476 Kenya set up a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission through an Act of Parliament in 2008 with a wide mandate that covered violations since independence and up to the post-election violence period. The objective of the Commission was described as follows: [T]o promote peace, justice, national unity, healing, and reconciliation among the people of Kenya byestablishing an accurate, complete and historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and economic rights inflicted on persons by the State, public institutions and holders of public office, both serving and retired, between 12th December, 1963 and 28th February 2008477. Despite being enacted into law on October 2008, there was no further action to establish the commission until almost a year later, in response to the threat of intervention by the ICC.478 Perhaps tied to the problems the TJRC would face later in regard to its credibility, it was seen as a ploy by the government to avoid accountability and justice from the beginning.479 Ronald Slye, a TJRC commissioner, notes that even though the 474 475 476 477 478 479 Kenya, Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 26 August 2003. Cyrus Ombati & David Wahito, ‘Kenya’s long road to a truth commission’ The Standard, 31 July 2009 Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission, “KNDR Documents - Agreed Statement on How to Resolve Political Crisis” (2008). II. Pre TJRC Documents. 3. <https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/tjrc-pre/3> accessed 12 September 2018. See Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission Act 2008 Ronald Slye, The Kenyan TJRC 234 International Centre for Policy and Conflict Report, ‘Concealing the Truth to Reward Impunity: A Critical Analysis of Truth Seeking in the Absence of Political Will’ 2012 (on file with author) 113 Nabil M. Orina creation of a truth commission would be seen as fostering positive complementarity, its creation was “in the context of a struggle between the Kenyan government and the ICC prosecutor over whether and how to hold accountable those most responsible for the PEV.”480 The Commission was dogged with credibility issues arising mainly out of the appointment of Bethwel Kiplagat, a man who had been mentioned adversely in regard to past atrocities, as its chairman. It further faced opposition especially from the civil society, who alleged that it could be used as a ploy to evade accountability.481 Beyond this, it was obvious that any mechanism that did not comply with ICC-style criminal accountability was now seen as a threat to justice and therefore opposed. It was no surprise therefore when civil society actors found it easier to support the ICC rather than the TJRC or both processes. It didn’t help matters that the political elite sought to amend the law establishing the truth commission in order to grant it powers to prosecute those implicated in the PEV.482 This gave credence to the initial suspicions of civil society that the commission was a ploy to evade accountability for the violations that had occurred. The failure of these mechanisms to have any impact can also be attributed to a failure by the Prosecutor to follow through with the promise to encourage domestic jurisdictions to prosecute international crimes and instead preferring a bigger role for the Court.483 There is no doubt that even though the Prosecutor had adopted a “three-pronged” approach towards complementarity which involved the prosecution of high level perpetrators by the ICC, the involvement of the special tribunal to prosecute mid and lower level perpetrators and a truth commission as a non-formal complementarity mechanism,484 he was swayed by the rejection of the TJRC process by most of the civil society groups who regularly consulted with him.485 One could also argue that these non-formal mechanisms were opposed on the basis of their perceived structural incompatibility with Rome Statute which presents very slim options for alternative justice in its complementarity regime with a bias for formalistic systems though their utility as a potential bar to admissibility 480 481 482 483 484 485 Ronald Slye, The Kenyan TJRC 242 BBC News, ‘Kenya set to get truth commission’ 24 October 2008. Mr. Harun Ndubi, a human rights activist is quoted as saying: Considering the political realities in Kenya, I will not be surprised that there will be political actors who will want to slow down on the implementation of the Waki recommendations…They are hoping that they will cover their tracks because they will have an opportunity to negotiate for amnesty…It is possible that the politicians are using this TJRC as an avenue for self interest. Government of Kenya, ‘Cabinet Statement on the National Mechanism for Dealing with Post Election Violence’ 30 July 2009 William W. Burke-White, ‘Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice’ (2008) 48(1) Harvard International Law Journal 53, 55. ICC OTP Press Release, ‘ICC Prosecutor supports three-pronged approach to justice in Kenya’ 30 September 2009<https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/icc-prosecutor-supports-three-pronged-approach-justice-kenya> accessed 12 September 2018. See Njonjo Mue and Judy Gitau, ‘The justice vanguard’ (n. 53). See also, Christine Bjork & Juanita Goebertus, ‘Complementarity in Action: The Role of Civil Society and the ICC in Rule of Law Strengthening in Kenya’ (2011) 14 Yale Human Rights & Development L.J. 205 The socio-political context of complementarity.... 114 has not been determined by the ICC.486 Kenya, however, did not seek to challenge admissibility of the cases on the basis of the existence of a TJRC. When seen in the context of the effect the ICC could have had on the TJRC process, it can be discerned that the Prosecutor’s preference for formal criminal processes as advancing positive complementarity over non-formal affected the TJRC’s legitimacy. For two institutions that had separate but potentially overlapping mandates, one would have expected that they would have established a framework for their engagement.487 Even though there were technical challenges on how it could be done due to the confidentiality clause in the TJRC Act, the law allowed recommendation of investigation and prosecution by the commission which would have benefitted the ICC.488 Even so the Prosecutor later unsuccessfully sought the TJRC’s assistance to obtain evidence when cases against four Kenyan suspects had been confirmed in 2012.489 The centralisation of criminal accountability to the exclusion of other non-formal mechanisms can be attributed to the lack of faith in previous inquiries in Kenya due to a failure to implement the recommendations of previous commissions of inquiry which had addressed some of the causes of conflicts in independent Kenya.490 At the end of the day, the TJRC was unable to provide the much-needed complimentary mechanism even though it was not going to usurp the work of the criminal process as alleged by those who were opposed to it. Its recommendations however remain unimplemented 5 years since it completed its work because of lack of political will to present the report to parliament for discussion. The suspicions may have been well founded, after all. 5.2 Reconciliation out of a Common Front against the ICC The long-term goal of the ICC is to deter violence that leads to the commission of atrocity crimes.491 Indeed it has been argued that prosecutions for human rights violations may deter future violence through their normative impact.492 While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine whether the ICC’s intervention helped to prevent political violence in Kenya, there is ample evidence of its indirect impact on fostering reconciliation. In the case of Kenya, it has been argued that the indictment of political leaders instilled on the political class the fear of punishment in the run up to 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 Nabil M. Orina, ‘Complementarity Under the Rome Statute: Is there a Place for Alternative Justice: The Case of Kenya’ Paper presented at the Moi University 8th Annual International Conference, September 2012 (on file with author). See also, Sarah M. H. Nouwen and Wouter G. Werner, ‘Monopolising Global Justice: International Criminal Law as Challenge to Human Diversity’ (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 174 Ronald Slye, The Kenyan TJRC, 231 Evelyne Asaala, ‘Exploring Transitional Justice as a Vehicle for Social and Political Transformation in Kenya’ (2010) 10 African Human Rights Law Journal, 397 Ronald Slye, The Kenyan TJRC, 282-283. Waki Report. Rome Statute, Preamble, Para. 5. Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries’ (2010) 54(4) International Studies Quarterly 115 Nabil M. Orina the 2013 and 2017 general elections and therefore prevented violence. In fact, following a peaceful election in 2013, the Court was credited with helping to prevent violence.493 The ICC charges against Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were, however, an indirect source of reconciliation especially in the communities that were worst hit by the PEV in the Rift Valley through the political alliance between Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto. This alliance that led to the formation of government by leaders representing the two communities that were associated with the PEV was borne out of a united front against the Court.494 The two were able to rally their communities to support in spite of the ICC cases that hang over them and in defiance of calls by some western countries against their election.495 Despite the political opportunism that could be seen in this alliance, it fostered some informal reconciliation between these two communities and prevented ethnic animosity during the 2013 election. This development was instrumental to the domestic understanding of justice and accountability for the PEV in three respects: 1) it challenged the international criminal justice principle of individual criminal responsibility for the violence; 2) it betrayed the disconnect between the process of international criminal justice on the one hand, and priorities for victims of mass atrocities, on the other; and 3) it invoked neo-colonial sentiments that worked to garner local and regional support. First, the focus of the Court on a few individuals that were considered as most responsible for the PEV worked to galvanise communities around these individuals, whom the communities considered were being wrongly accused for grave crimes out of what was considered a political dispute. The communities that represented the political bases for Kenyatta and Ruto (Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic communities respectively) therefore felt a responsibility to rally behind their own de facto leaders,496 who now had sufficient numbers to ascend to office as President and Deputy President of Kenya through the Jubilee Alliance. Certainly, the quest to win the elections as a united front was also incentivised by the possibility that if they won the ICC would have a difficult time prosecuting them.497 The rallying call to unite these communities therefore resonated well. 493 494 495 496 497 Daily Nation, ‘Fear of ICC ‘helped prevent’ poll violence’ 5 April 2013 As noted by the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Monitoring Project in its June 2011 Review Report: The ICC intervention in the Kenya situation has increasingly become a driver of the politics around the 2012 elections. It is seeking to re-establish accountability in Kenya’s political culture and is, therefore, causing anxiety among political elites. It has occasioned the formation and fragmentation of ethnic coalitions. <http://www.iccnow.org/documents/KNDR_June2011_Review_Report.pdf> accessed 12 September 2018. Nzau Musau, ‘Diplomats Issue Rare Warning Ahead of Kenyan Polls’ IWPR, 1 March 2013. Gabrielle Lynch, ‘Performances of Injustice: The Politics of Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Kenya’ (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 80-81. Simon Allison, ‘Kenyan election alliance between bitter enemies united by ICC charges’ The Guardian, 4 December 2012. The socio-political context of complementarity.... 116 Second, the unity of purpose between these two communities may be seen as the result of a successful counter-narrative by the political leaders on the causes of the violence and the appropriate solutions thereto. While acknowledging the atrocities committed in the 2007-2008 PEV, both Kenyatta and Ruto maintained their innocence and promised to address the plight of victims through resettlement and reconciliation of communities.498 As observed by the former Uasin Gishu County Assembly Speaker, Isaac Terer, “we have already healed as a nation and all we need is to move on. The coming together of the Kikuyus and Kalenjins in the last election is clear proof of reconciliation; what else is the ICC looking for?”499 The leading of the peace building and reconciliation efforts by Kenyatta and Ruto, both who had been indicted by the ICC at that time, underscored this contestation.500 Further, that the two leaders were able to rally their various communities – they that bore the brunt of the PEV – to emblematically reject the ICC calls into question the effectiveness of international criminal justice as distant from post-conflict settings. As a further statement of the rejection of the ICC-driven process, Kenyan Members of Parliament where President Kenyatta’s Jubilee Alliance controlled a majority passed a motion to withdraw from the Rome Statute.501 Even though Kenya has not followed through with this withdrawal, these events underscored how perceptions of justice were heavily influenced by political rhetoric. Third, Kenyatta and Ruto were able to rally support behind their anti-ICC drive through allegations of neo-colonialism by arguing that the ICC was being used by the West to target Africans.502 On the effectiveness of the neo-colonial narrative, Geoffrey Lugano notes that, “It exploited local and regional historical and political contexts, thus gaining prominence in national and regional discourses…”503 Indeed, this narrative invoked memories of colonial brutality with some drawing parallels between Kenyatta’s trial before the ICC and his father’s trial by the colonial administration in Kenya,504 and Ruto’s trial being compared with the tribulations of the Nandi resistance leader during the colonial times, Koitalel arap Samoei.505 6. Reparations for victims of the PEV in Kenya The TJRC report made comprehensive recommendations for reparations for victims of gross violations of human rights in the period of its mandate (12 December 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 Speech by President Uhuru Kenyatta at the Extraordinary Session of the African Union. Gerald Bwisa, ‘All we want is to be resettled, say IDPs’ Daily Nation, 8 October 2014. Antony Gitonga, ‘Uhuru, Ruto in bid to foster peace in Rift Valley’ The Standard, 24 July 2011. BBC News, ‘Kenya MPs vote to withdraw from ICC’ 5 September 2013. Speech by President Uhuru Kenyatta at the Extraordinary Session of the African Union, 12 October 2012. <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000095433/speech-by-president-uhuru-kenyatta-at-theextraordinary-session-of-the-african-union> accessed 12 September 2018. Geoffrey Lugano, ‘Counter-Shaming the International Criminal Court’s Intervention as Neocolonial: Lessons from Kenya’ (2017) 11 International Journal of Transitional Justice 9, 22. Tony Mochama, ‘The Kenyatta trials: Similarities between Jomo and President Uhuru’s days before courts’ The Standard, 19 October 2014. See also, Ibid, 23. Lugano 24. 117 Nabil M. Orina 1963 – 28 February 2008), which includes the PEV period.506 In these recommendations the implementation committee is required to take into account a reparations policy framework proposed by the commission which would involve victims and aimed “to contribute to a process of reconciliation and healing in Kenya.”507 This report is however pending before parliament and has not been implemented. Despite the failure to implement the TJRC report, the government continues in its efforts to resettle and compensate victims of the PEV. These reparative efforts have managed to provide a counter-narrative to the ICC and hence indirectly ensured some form of justice for these victims. Through these payments and resettlement efforts, the government exploited the justice gap created by a system that did not provide a timely remedy to the victims of the PEV. The government’s narrative that the PEV was a political dispute that affected communities was a counter-narrative to the ICC’s theory of individual criminal responsibility of those indicted. In effect, the government pushed for restorative justice as the appropriate response to the PEV rather than retribution. Indeed, as noted by the Common Legal Representative of Victims in the Prosecutor v William Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang case, some victims sought to withdraw from participating in the case in order to take part in peace processes.508 The failure of Kenyan authorities to prosecute those who bore responsibility for the atrocities – especially the mid and lower level perpetrators – necessitated the government’s efforts to provide reparations as it faced increased criticism. In President Kenyatta’s State of the Nation address to the joint sitting of the Houses of Parliament in 2015, he acknowledged that there had been challenges to prosecuting those responsible and offered a promise of restorative justice for the victims of the PEV. In his words: We must indeed recall our options are not limited to retributive justice. There also exists the promise of restorative justice. In many ways, Kenyans and humanity overall, have benefited from restorative justice, an approach that is deeply rooted in our cultural and historical realities, particularly when such conflicts have a communal and political dimension. Many thousands of Kenyans have reached out to reconcile with one another. My administration was forged from this reconciliation, and is building on the efforts of the last government to advance the resettlement, reconciliation and relief to internally displaced people. I am committed to continuing these efforts as necessary. Notwithstanding the recommendation of the TJRC report, I have instructed the Treasury to establish a Fund of 10 billion shillings over the next three years to be used for restorative justice.509 506 507 508 509 Kenya, Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission Final Report (TJRC Report), Vol. 4, 102-103. Ibid, 102. Prosecutor v William Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, ‘Common Legal Representative for Victims’ Comprehensive Report on the Withdrawal of Victims from the Turbo are by Letter dated 5 June 2013’ 5 September 2013, para. 13. Speech by Uhuru Kenyatta During the State of the Nation Address at Parliament Buildings, Nairobi, 26 March 2015. (State of the Nation Address). The socio-political context of complementarity.... 118 In establishing this fund, the Government of Kenya managed to provide, though selectively and not sufficiently, immediate relief for the victims of the PEV who had not received any form of redress through the ICC. The payments also provided important relief by having a wider scope of beneficiaries than the ICC would have provided even if the cases had been successful through reparations. In his address, President Kenyatta also offered an apology on behalf of the government to the victims of this violence and other past wrongs.510 This act of resettling and paying compensation to the victims of the violence therefore scored the goal of advancing Kenya’s obligations under international human rights law and indirectly providing a safe landing for the victims who had failed to get reparations from the ICC.511 The reparative efforts by the Kenyan government can however be criticised for their utter tokenism and for being intended to meet political ends rather than satisfying Kenya’s obligations to redress rights violations. Without implementing the recommendations of the TJRC, it is doubtful whether the government is genuinely committed to redressing the harm suffered by the PEV victims beyond using these reparations as leverage against the ICC.512 On the other hand, it came to be known that the former Prosecutor was actually considering an off-the-books deal with the Kenyatta government that would involve the payment of reparations for victims as an “honourable exit” in exchange for dropping of charges when it was obvious that the case was collapsing.513 This revelation was not only startling but it evidences a deeper challenge of the helplessness of international criminal justice when it is unable to meet the expectations of victims and lacks a framework of engagement with States on redressing rights violations. Conclusion Whereas the scepticism about the ability of domestic mechanisms to try PEV suspects was informed by a long history of impunity, as detailed in the reports of inquiries into pre/post-election ethnic clashes,514 it also portrayed a general bias towards the ability of such mechanisms to address mass atrocity crimes after a conflict. What was perceived, by some, as a chance to end impunity through locally-driven mechanisms was countered as a process of rubberstamping impunity by creating mechanisms that would 510 511 512 513 514 Ibid. ICC Trial Chamber V(a), Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, ‘Decision on the Requests regarding Reparations’ 1 July 2016 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji), Para 28. Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law, 953. He argues that a violator regime or its successor often use these remedies as a “bargaining chip rather than an affirmative duty.” Thomas Verfuss, ‘Luis Moreno Ocampo tried to provide Uhuru Kenyatta an “honourable exit” from his ICC case’ Journalists for Justice, 5 October 2017. Available at https://www.jfjustice.net/en/icc-cases/luismoreno-ocampo-tried-to-provide-uhuru-kenyatta-an-a-honourable-exita-from-his-icc-case Hansard, 4 February 2009, 39 Hansard, 5 February 2009, 42. In 1992, following ethnic clashes in some parts of the country, a Parliamentary Select Committee chaired by Kennedy Kiliku was appointed to investigate. In 1997, a judicial commission of inquiry chaired by Akilano Akiwumi was appointed to inquire into tribal clashes in Kenya. 119 Nabil M. Orina be manipulated by those in positions of power. As a result of the mistrust of the ability of domestic mechanisms to deal with the PEV, the ICC intervention option controlled the discourse on justice and accountability for the PEV in Kenya. This “monopolization” of the narrative had the attendant effect of narrowing the options for post-conflict justice in Kenya by side-lining other justice mechanisms.515 Further, this contestation on the appropriate justice mechanisms for PEV was driven by deep ethnic divides that have characterised political contests. Local justice mechanisms born out of politically motivated violence were therefore seen as susceptible to these ethnic suspicions.516 Kenya’s inability to prosecute even lower ranking perpetrators was also influenced by unwillingness to deal with the violence as requiring a formalistic approach through criminal sanctions rather than a political dispute. On the other hand, the stigma associated with the intervention of the ICC pushed the political class to take measures to redress the plight of the victims through restorative justice mechanisms, though inadequate and informal. Significantly, the ICC intervention gave rise to an alliance of convenience between key political figures who faced charges of crimes against humanity before the Court. Through this alliance, an anti-ICC counternarrative was developed that further weakened the Court’s legitimacy in the eyes of communities affected by the violence. 515 516 Sarah M. H. Nouwen and Wouter G. Werner, ‘Monopolising Global Justice’ 63. See also Carsten Stahn, ‘Justice Civilisatrice? 61. Hansard, 4 February 2009, 40. The socio-political context of complementarity.... 120 121 Juliet Okoth DRAWING A BALANCE: ESTABLISHING THE PARAMETERS OF VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN KENYA AND LESSONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT Juliet Okoth Abstract Through the enactment of the Victim Protection Act, 2014 Kenya has firmly established the right of victims to participate in criminal proceedings. The practice was largely inspired by Kenya’s membership in the Rome Statute. The scope of victim participation in a system that is traditionally adversarial is difficult to establish. The article strives to show the challenges that have arisen in the brief but robust practice involving victim participation in the criminal trials before the courts in Kenya. While drawing lessons from the International Criminal Court, the author argues that the challenge of giving greater weight to victim’s interest in criminal proceedings must be guided by the notion that the primary aim of the trial is to establish the innocence or guilt of the accused persons, underpinned by a notion of a fair trial that encompasses presumption of innocence, equality before the law and legal certainty. Drawing a balance... 122 TROUVER UN ÉQUILIBRE : ÉTABLIR LES PARAMÈTRES DE LA PARTICIPATION DES VICTIMES AUX PROCÉDURES PÉNALES AU KENYA ET LES LEÇONS TIRÉES DE LA COUR PÉNALE INTERNATIONALE Résumé Avec la promulgation de la loi sur la protection des victimes, en 2014, le Kenya a fermement établi le droit des victimes de participer à la procédure pénale. Cette pratique a été largement inspirée par l’adhésion du Kenya au Statut de Rome. Il est difficile d’établir la portée de la participation des victimes à un système qui est traditionnellement contradictoire. L’article s’efforce de montrer les défis qui ont surgi dans la pratique brève mais robuste de la participation des victimes aux procès criminels devant les tribunaux au Kenya. Tout en tirant des leçons de l’expérience de la Cour pénale internationale, l’auteur fait valoir que la difficulté de donner davantage de poids à l’intérêt des victimes dans les procédures pénales doit être guidée par l’idée que le but premier du procès est d’établir l’innocence ou la culpabilité des accusés, étayée par une notion de procès équitable qui englobe la présomption d’innocence, l’égalité devant la loi et la certitude juridique. Introduction Until recently Kenya, a common law legal system grounded in the adversarial tradition, provided a very restricted role for victim participation in criminal trials. The introduction of the Victim Protection Act, 2014 (“VPA”),517has however shifted this dimension, providing victims with a more prominent role in criminal litigation. It is now up to Kenyan courts to grapple with the scope and meaning of this expanded role for victims in criminal proceedings. The main concern for the courts seems to be the extent to which meaningful victim participation can be achieved without interfering with the rights of the accused. The need to provide the victim a more prominent role in criminal litigation was heavily influenced by Kenya being a state party to the International Criminal Court (ICC), where victims are given a formal role to present their views and concerns. 517 Act No. 17 of 2014. 123 Juliet Okoth Therefore, a consideration of some of the measures the ICC has adopted in respect to victim participation is essential to provide critical insights on how to reconcile victim participation with the rights of the accused, the role of the prosecutor and how to achieve fair and efficient justice under these new circumstances. This chapter looks into the legal framework and practice in Kenyan courts so far with respect to victim participation, highlighting its key aspects and the gaps and challenges arising there from. It then looks into the practice in the ICC with the aim of highlighting beneficial insights that would lead to a better understanding of the role of victims in criminal proceedings and to contribute to achieving meaningful victim participation in domestic courts. It should be noted that while the Rome Statute provides for protection, participation and reparations for victims, the main focus for purposes of this chapter is with respect to participation of victims in the criminal proceedings. It is imperative that victim participation in the criminal proceedings does not compromise the integrity of the criminal justice system. While the interests of victims are important, they cannot compare to the right of the accused not to be unfairly deprived of his/her liberty. Courts should consider specific interests of victims during the criminal trial to ensure that they do not impact negatively on the rights of the accused person. In addition, while striving to achieve meaningful victim participation, courts should endeavour to make victim participation the focus in areas that do not overlap with the role of the prosecutor. 1 The Legal Framework in Kenya Under the VPA a victim is defined as a natural person who suffers injury, loss or damage as a result of an offence.518 The VPA provides for rights of victims during trial which include rights to be present at the trial either in person or through a representative, to have the trial begin and conclude without unreasonable delay, to give their view in any plea bargaining, to have any dispute that can be resolved by application of law decided in a fair hearing before a competent authority, to be informed in advance and to have reasonable access to any evidence that the prosecution and defence intend to rely on, to have assistance of an interpreter if need be and to be informed in sufficient detail of the charge which the offender is facing.519 The VPA further provides that where the personal interests of a victim have been affected, the court shall, at stages of the proceedings where it deems it appropriate, allow the victim to present his/her views and concerns.520 The court is to ensure that such views and concerns are not presented in a manner that is prejudicial to the rights of the accused or inconsistent with a fair and impartial trial.521The victim may also at the time of sentencing issue a victim impact statement, which the 518 519 520 521 Section 2, VPA. Section 9(1), VPA. Section 9(2)(a), VPA. Section 9(2)(b), VPA. Drawing a balance... 124 court may consider in determining the sentence.522Such a statement includes information showing the impact the offence had on the victim’s life and concerns the victim may have in regards to their safety.523 The above framework provides for greater participation of the victim in criminal proceedings. The victim now has a formal role and a right to present his/her views during the trial of the accused. The VPA more specifically identifies areas that may be considered to be of key concern or interest to the victim during the trial, key among them being plea bargaining, access to evidence by the parties, information on the preferred charge(s) and sentencing. The new reforms ensure that victims are informed about the progress of the case and not alienated from the criminal proceedings. The victim is also allowed to express his/her views and concerns at stages of proceedings where the court deems it appropriate. What the scope of this participation entails and how the courts have ensured that such participation does not impact negatively on the rights of the accused persons is an important point to interrogate. 1.1 Determining the Appropriate Manner of Victim Participation The decisions by the courts show various interpretations regarding the appropriate level of victim participation. The courts have held that before a victim can be allowed to communicate with the court in a criminal trial, such victim must disclose their personal interest in the proceedings.524 In the case of Gideon Irea v DPP & 7 others [2015] eKLR,525 the victim was represented by 3 advocates. The court found that the complainant had a right to participate in person or through representatives and held that it was appropriate for the 3 advocates to represent the complainant.526 The court noted that their participation was restricted to safeguarding and protecting the interests of the complainant, who was also a victim in the case.527 The court also held that a victim was entitled by law to adduce additional evidence that had been left out.528 In I.P Veronica Gitahi and P.C Issa Mzee v Republic [2016] eKLR,529 the appellants contested the application by the victim’s representative to participate in an appeal where 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 Section 12(1), VPA. Section 12(4), VPA. Also Section 2, VPA providing that the statement refers to the psychological, emotional, physical, economic or social impact on the victim’s life as a result of the offence. Gideon Mwiti Irea v DPP & 7 Others Petition No. 151 of 2015. Ibid. Para 41 ibid. Para 42 ibid. Para 47-48 ibid. Criminal Appeal No. 23 of 2016. 125 Juliet Okoth the appellants were challenging the conviction for the offence of manslaughter and the subsequent sentence of seven years imprisonment. At the trial, the court had allowed the victim’s representative to address the court only on matters of law at appropriate stages of the proceedings when the court deemed it necessary, to make submissions at the stage of a case to answer and final submissions if the court considered it necessary and also allowed the victim access to the prosecution’s file. The court did not allow the victim to add any point of fact or evidence to the prosecution’s file or to question witnesses. In the appeal the victim’s representative urged the court to allow his participation seeking to address the court on the appellant’s conviction and sentence. The Court of Appeal allowed the victim’s representative to participate in the appeal and address it on the question of sentence imposed by the trial court. The court while making this decision recognised that it was in line with the Constitution and international general principles and practices, which provided for victim participation in criminal trials. It cited Article 68 of the Rome Statute, on victim participation, recognised by virtue of Articles 2(5) and 2(6) of the Constitution, which provide that international law is part of Kenya law and also cited Art 50(7) and Art 50(9) of the Constitution.530 In R v Joseph Lentrix Waswa [2016] eKLR,531 the victim’s father through his representative applied to have a more active role in the trial of the offender who had been accused of the victim’s murder. The court while giving its determination acknowledged the struggle in understanding the extent and limits of rights in the 2010 Constitution, among them being that of victims. The court noted that the 2010 Constitution and the VPA had shifted the parameters of victim participation and that the victim’s lawyer could no longer be a passive observer. The court allowed counsel for the victims to make submissions on whether there was a case to answer by the accused, final submissions should the accused be put on his defence, submissions on points of law that should arise in the course of trial and upon application at any stage of the trial to be considered by the court. In R v Fredrick Ole Leilman and 4 others [2017] eKLR,532 the accused persons through their advocate sought to bar the participation of the victims’ lawyers. They asked the court to prohibit ‘advocates watching brief’ on behalf of the victims from crossexamining witnesses in the proceedings and to expunge from the court records, all cross examination and evidence that had so far been adduced from the cross examination carried out by the victims’ advocates. The accused persons argued that such crossexamination by advocates for the victim was prejudicial to the accused, not supported by any provisions of the law and violated the principle of fair hearing. The accused persons’ advocate submitted that there was no right in the Constitution for the victim to challenge evidence, cross-examine, check and adduce evidence. In opposition, the victims’ representatives argued that such a decision would be a violation of the victims’ 530 531 532 The two sections recognise the role of victims in addressing the court in criminal proceedings and the right to protection. Criminal Case 34 of 2014, High Court of Kenya at Bungoma. Criminal Case 57 of 2016, High Court of Kenya at Nairobi. Drawing a balance... 126 right of access to justice and a limitation of their right to a fair trial, asserting that the victims had a right to actively participate in the criminal justice process and that this included the right to cross-examine witnesses. The interested party in the case, the Law Society of Kenya, urged the view that cross-examination by the victims’ advocate did not compromise the accused persons’ right to fair trial, nor hinder the prosecution’s ability to conduct a focused trial. He argued that the victim had a right to be heard which would be violated if the victim was denied the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. The prosecution, while supporting the victims’ position, argued that cross-examination was the best avenue through which the victims would bring out evidence that had been left out by the prosecution. The court, while dismissing the application, cautiously endorsed the participation of victims in the criminal trial noting that such participation subsists throughout the court process and was a non-derogable right under the Constitution.533It noted that the participation of victims in the criminal trial did not of itself compromise the fair trial guarantees of the accused, stating that it is how the same is conducted that needed to be guarded against the possibility of jeopardising the rights of the accused, and this had to be ensured by the court. The court stated that the objective of the criminal trial is not restricted to securing a conviction or otherwise but also included an interest in finding the truth.534 While making a finding that the cross-examination of witnesses by the advocates did not compromise the accused person’s right to a fair trial, nor hinder the prosecution’s ability to conduct a focused prosecution, the court held that such cross-examination should be used to bring out the evidence left out by the prosecution in the examinationin-chief and which evidence was within the statement of the witness supplied to the defence.535 The court made a distinction between those cases where the victim was the complainant and those involving an indirect victim like in the case at hand, where the primary victims were deceased. It noted that where the victim was the complainant they could call new evidence under section 13 of the VPA, but that the section did not apply in the case of indirect victims. It noted that the only evidence the indirect victims could adduce through cross-examination was evidence that the prosecution and defence had already provided and indicated they intended to rely on. It held that the accused person should not be taken by surprise or ambushed by introducing new evidence during such instances of cross-examination by the victim.536 In giving directions on participation, the court held that to save time and ensure the accused is not forced to seek leave to cross-examine further, should new evidence be introduced by cross-examination from the victim, the victim’s advocate would cross-examine the witnesses immediately after the examination-in-chief by the prosecution, which would then be followed by crossexamination by the defence counsel.537 533 534 535 536 537 ibid para 80. ibid para 76. ibid para 78. ibid para 68. ibid para 84. 127 Juliet Okoth Interestingly, the same court provided a broad definition of victims that includes those directly or indirectly affected by the offence. Therefore, apart from the families of persons against whom the offence was committed, the court accordingly recognised that professional associations to which the deceased belonged such as the Law Society of Kenya, Taxi Owners and the Bodaboda538 fraternity and the International Justice Mission (an employer of one of the victims), were also victims. The court also included special groups of victims such as the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA).539 In R v David Muchiri Mwangi [2018] eKLR the court had to deal with the question of who may be considered a victim and how many representatives should be allowed to participate in the proceedings on behalf of victims. The deceased was a lawyer. At the hearing of the application for bail the accused person’s counsel complained that there was no equality of arms between parties to the criminal proceedings because 3 counsels purported to represent 3 different victims, one the Law Society of Kenya of which the deceased had been a member, the second counsel was for the deceased’s wife and children and finally the third represented the deceased’s father and siblings, who claimed the deceased supported them. The court confirmed that all participants were indeed qualified to participate as victims endorsing the decision of the court in R v Fredrick Ole Leilman and 4 others [2017] eKLR, which asserted that the definition of victims under the VPA was broad enough to include the families of those against whom the offence was committed, including those directly and indirectly affected by the offence.540 In R v James K Mutengei [2017] eKLR,541 the court observed that the failure of the court to notify the victim of an application by an accused person to be admitted to bail and the resulting failure of the victim to participate in the said proceedings occasioned a failure of justice and warranted a review of the orders granted as result of such proceedings. In Richard O. Arondo v R [2017]542 the court also noted that the victim had a right to be heard by the court in an application for reinstatement of bond by the accused. It observed that matters in relation to bail were of concern to the victim, particularly in this case where the victims had been placed under witness protection. The court held that in proceedings involving bail/bond application the court had to ensure that the victim was availed in court to participate in such proceedings.543 Reiterating the importance of victim participation in the bail application process, the court in R v Eric Makau Musila [2017]eKLR544 reviewed its earlier order granting the accused bail by imposing more stringent terms following an application by the victims. The accused person in this case was charged with murder and had been granted a bond of Kshs. 500,000 plus two like sureties. The victims - family members of the deceased - sought 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 This refers to the association of motorcycle drivers operating as taxis. Criminal Case 57 of 2016, High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, para 40. ibid para 17. Criminal Revision No. 1 of 2017 High Court at Kajiado. Criminal Misc. Application 3 of 2017 High Court at Embu. Ibid paras 28-39. Criminal Case No. 5 of 2016 High Court at Naivasha. Drawing a balance... 128 to have the order granting bail set aside arguing that they were apprehensive of being exposed to potential harm by the accused and that the accused was a flight risk. The victims stated that their failure to oppose the initial application for bond made by the accused was because their counsel did not seek their views. The accused contested the timing of the application stating that it was being made too late when the trial was already on course and the court had already heard 12 witnesses with only one left to go. The court held that the question of bail of the accused could be revisited at any time before and during the course of trial noting that the victim should not suffer as a result of their counsel’s mistake.545 While considering that there was no evidence adduced to prove the accused was a flight risk, the court acknowledged that it was not unreasonable to anticipate that the victim family is apprehensive of being placed in harm’s way should the accused be set free. It emerged that the family was apprehensive that the accused might seek custody of his children with the deceased, who were now in the care of the deceased’s family. The court nonetheless considered that since it had already heard 12 witnesses, it would not set aside the order granting bail to the accused but instead chose to review and tailor the conditions of bail to the exigencies that had been brought up by the victims in their application.546 As a result, the court released the accused person on more stringent bail terms adding to the earlier terms a further cash bail of Kshs. 200,000, ordering the accused to report to the Director of Criminal Investigation Officer every fortnight to report his movements and not to attempt to visit the children or communicate with the family of the deceased. The above decisions show that the courts are endeavouring to give content and meaning to the right to victim participation. The interpretations confirm that the provisions on victim participation in the Constitution and the VPA are not merely symbolic but that the victim does have a significant and active role to play in criminal litigation. They recognise that the victim has a right to appear and present his/her views in the criminal proceedings. The decisions, however, disclose the courts’ challenge in defining the extent of such participation. While most interpretations generally give effect to the objectives of the constitutional and statutory provisions on victim participation, in certain instances the courts have given an interpretation that is too broad and goes beyond what was intended by the legislature. 1.2 Assessing the Participatory Role of Victims It has been confirmed that both primary victims547 (those directly affected by the crime, for example, the victim who has been raped or assaulted or family of the immediate victim) and proxy548 or indirect victims (those acting in a representative capacity for the 545 546 547 548 Ibid Paras 17-19. Ibid Paras 20-27. Also referred to as ‘True Victims’ i.e. one who can describe the nature of his or her injuries and extent of outrage. See A. S. Goldstein, ‘Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution’ 52 Miss. L. J. 515, 1982, p. 534. Ibid. 129 Juliet Okoth victim) may participate in the criminal proceedings. The interpretation by the courts in respect to proxy victims has been broad enough to include agencies, professional bodies or public interest groups.549 This interpretation goes beyond what is contemplated in the VPA, which only recognises natural victims.550 Such expansion of the rights of victims beyond what is statutorily provided, threatens the defendant’s right to fair trial. Victims are required to disclose their interests in the proceedings551, although the courts have not clearly laid out what these interests specifically maybe, it has been indirectly alluded to include a determination of the truth.552 Shockingly, the courts have allowed as many as three advocates to represent one victim553 and each different victim allowed to participate in the proceedings is permitted to have an advocate of their choice.554 While it is important that all victims are adequately represented, allowing each and every victim to be represented by their personal advocate threatens the principle of equality of arms. Pitting the defendant against several parties places a heavy burden on him/her, greatly compromising his/her rights. When it comes to evidence victims are allowed to cross-examine witnesses, testing the veracity of their evidence. It would seem that courts give no particular conditions as to the manner of questions victim representatives may ask, even allowing them to pursue confrontational lines of questioning. This questioning has been allowed immediately after the prosecution’s examination-in-chief, permitting the defence to challenge any evidence arising from both the examination-in-chief by the prosecution and crossexamination by the victim’s representative.555The requirement that the victims question witnesses immediately after examination-in-chief is however not provided for statutorily and is dependent on the court conducting the case. The court has restricted any evidence availed as a result of such cross-examination to that which was already available to the prosecution and defence, thus safeguarding the defendant’s procedural right to prior disclosure of evidence. In other words, such cross-examination should only bring out what was left out by the prosecution during examination-in-chief. This restriction is particularly applied in the case of victims who were not immediately involved during the commission of the offence in question. However, when the victim is the complainant the court has noted that they may in such cases provide new evidence.556 In this instance, the court simply applied the literal rule of interpretation affirming Section 13 of the VPA, which only allows victims who are complainants to give evidence subject to the provisions of the Evidence Act. The scope of exercising this right has not been clarified, leaving it to speculation whether victims may also call witnesses. The courts 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 R v Fredrick Ole Leilman and 4 others [2017] eKLR; R v David Muchiri Mwangi [2018] eKLR. Also see The Judiciary, Criminal Procedure Bench Book, para 128, which further clarifies that a victim is both the primary victim and family victim. Gideon Mwiti Irea v DPP & 7 Others [2015] eKLR. R v Fredrick Ole Leilman and 4 others [2017] eKLR. Ibid. R v Fredrick Ole Leilman and 4 others [2017] eKLR; R v David Muchiri Mwangi [2018] eKLR. R v Fredrick Ole Leilman and 4 others [2017] eKLR. Ibid. Drawing a balance... 130 have also recognised that once parties agree on a mode of participation during the pretrial conference, there is no need for the victims’ representatives to always seek leave before cross-examining, leaving it to the discretion of the court to decide on whether there is need to intervene and give directions on the nature of cross-examination where necessary.557 This latter directive was likely given with the intention of saving time and increasing efficiency, but such practice may compromise the rights of an accused in the instance where the presiding officer is not particularly attentive. The courts have confirmed that the input of victims is imperative in bail application and will allow victims’ views to be aired even after an initial decision on bail has been made. This indulgence has been granted even in instances where the victims failed in the first instance to give their concerns as a result of their own oversight.558 The courts have indicated that they may allow such intervention regardless of how the far the prosecution’s case has progressed.559 While it may be reasonable and fair trial demands may require that issues on bail may change depending on the accused person’s adherence to its terms, the courts’ discretion when reviewing such orders need to be exercised cautiously. Especially, when demands for such reviews emanate from them the victims. There are instances when the interests of the victims seem to control the bail application process. Thus, the court has in some occasions issued more stringent bail conditions on the application of the victim, even when no particular evidence was availed to show that the defendant had violated the terms of bail.560 This was done although the victims did not cite any special circumstances to justify their failure to participate in the initial bail proceedings. Such decisions interfere with the fair trial of the accused person and his/ her right to bail.561Victim participation should not be interpreted in absolute terms or in a manner that counteracts the constitutional protection of defendants. Victims have been allowed inter alia to make submissions regarding points of law arising during the course of a trial, to access the prosecution’s file and the defence evidence, to submit on a case to answer and make final submissions in case an accused person is put on his defence, to cross-examine witnesses, to adduce evidence and to make submissions in the course of bail applications. This is an indication of the robust role that victims are now given in criminal litigation. The practice and decision of the courts reveal that victims participate in the criminal proceedings in mostly a consultative and expressive manner, including participating in terms of receiving information.562 The decisions particularly involving application for bail/bond indicate that the input of 557 558 559 560 561 562 Ibid para 83. R v Eric Makau Musila [2017]eKLR. Ibid, the prosecution in this case was only left with one witness before closing its case. R v Eric Makau Musila [2017]eKLR. Art 49 2010 Constitution of Kenya. See Jo-Anne Wemmers, ‘Victims’ Rights and the International Criminal Court: Perceptions within the Court Regarding the Victim’s Right to Participate’ Leiden Journal of International Law, 23(2010) pp. 632-635, discussing Edward’s participatory role for victims which highlights the various roles that may be played by victims in the Criminal Justice System (Participation through Control, participation through consultation, participation through provision of information and the expressive role of participation). 131 Juliet Okoth victims is actively sought, considered and do have an impact on the court’s decision. This discloses the consultative nature of victim participation which is also displayed in the various ways the courts have allowed the victims to intervene in the course of the trial including cross-examination of witnesses. Apart from its consultative nature, one also discerns the expressive nature of victim participation in the manner in which the court obliges the victims to express their views on matters concerning application of the law and through the victim impact statements.563 Victims also participate through receiving information and notification on the procedures before the court, a clear indication that their interests in the case are recognised. While the courts have acknowledged the right of victims to participate in the dialogue during criminal litigation, the parameters of the same are not always consistent. The extent of victim participation ultimately depends on the court’s discretion. There are instances where victims have had a more substantial role which included challenging and producing evidence, while in others their role was more restricted to specifically address the court on issues of law. This inconsistency undermines the fair trial rights of the parties in the proceedings. In the circumstances, a look at the scope of victim participation in proceedings before the ICC may assist in developing a more consistent practice that facilitates meaningful victim participation without threatening the rights of the accused to a fair trial. 2 Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court Article 68(3) is the main provision on victim participation in the Rome Statute. It provides that, where the personal interests of a victim are affected, the Court will allow such victims to present their views and concerns at stages of the proceedings that the Court determines to be appropriate. Such views and concerns are to be presented in a manner that is not prejudicial, or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. The definition of a victim and mode of participation is provided in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) of the Rome Statute.564A victim is either a natural person who suffers harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction or an organization or institution whose property is damaged as a result of such crimes.565 Such property must have been dedicated to religion, education, science, art or charitable purposes and includes historic monuments, hospitals and objects of humanitarian purposes.566 A person who wishes to participate in the proceedings as a victim must submit an application to the registrar who then transmits it to the relevant chamber. A copy of the said application is also availed to the prosecution and defence, who are entitled to 563 564 565 566 Ibid p. 635 Rules 85, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, RPE. Rule 85, RPE. Rule 85(b), RPE. Drawing a balance... 132 reply to the same.567 Such application may be rejected by the Court on its own initiative or as a result of opposition from the prosecution and defence or if the court considers that the applicant is not a victim or that such participation may be inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.568 A victim is free to choose a legal representative and where there are a number of victims, the chamber may, for purposes of ensuring effectiveness of the proceedings, request the victims to choose a common legal representative or representatives.569 The legal representative is entitled to attend and participate in proceedings as directed by the court. Such participation may entail participation in hearings or may be confined to written submissions.570 Where the legal representative wishes to question a witness or the accused they shall make an application to the chamber.571 The chamber may require that the questions be written down and in such an instance the questions shall be communicated to the prosecution and, if need be, the defence, who are allowed to make observations on the same.572 The Court then gives a ruling on the request taking into account the stage of the proceedings, the rights of the accused, the interests of witnesses and the need for a fair, impartial and expeditious trial.573 Such ruling may include directions on the manner and order of the questions and the production of documents. Victims and their legal representatives are to be notified of proceedings before the Court. This includes a decision of the prosecutor not to initiate investigations or not to prosecute, a decision to hold a hearing to confirm charges, proceedings before the court of which they have been given leave to participate, dates of hearings and decisions made by court in respect of such proceedings.574 The jurisprudence of the ICC, while striving to give meaning to the above legal framework, has endeavoured to ensure effective and meaningful participation of victims in proceedings while being cautious not to allow such participation to have a negative impact on the fairness or expeditiousness of the proceedings or rights of the accused person. Only persons who are victims of the crimes charged may participate in the proceedings.575 In the case where the victim is a natural person they may be direct or indirect victims, but for a legal person the harm sustained must be direct.576 Such harm may have been suffered individually or collectively and it may have resulted in the form of physical, mental, emotional or economic loss or substantial impairment of the victim’s 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 Rule 89(1), RPE. Rule 89(2), RPE. Rule 90, RPE. Rule 91(2), RPE. Rule 91(3)(a), RPE. Ibid. Rule 91(3)(b), RPE. Rule 92, RPE. Decision on Participation of Victims, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06) Trial Chamber I, 18 January 2008, para 97; Decision on Victim’s Participation in Trial Proceedings, Bosco Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06) Trial Chamber VI 6 February 2015, para 43. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06) ibid, para 91. 133 Juliet Okoth fundamental rights.577In order to participate, it must be established that the victim’s interests relate to the evidence and issues the chamber is considering in regards to the charges against the accused person before it.578 Such participation is not determined once and for all, but rather decided on the basis of the evidence or issue under consideration at any particular point.579 A victim seeking to participate at any identified stage of the proceedings is required to set out in a written application the nature and detail of the proposed intervention and must describe the manner in which his/her personal interest is affected by the evidence or issue under consideration.580 Personal interests may mean seeking to obtain reparations, seeking determination of the truth concerning the events experienced or wishing to see the perpetrators of the crimes that caused the victims’ suffering brought to justice.581 The court has held that when seeking to establish facts which are the subject of the proceedings in respect of which the victims wish to participate, the only legitimate interest that the victims may invoke is that of contributing to the determination of the truth by helping the court establish exactly what happened.582 Thus, a victim would only participate actively if their intervention would make a contribution to the determination of the truth by providing the Court ‘with knowledge of the background to the case or by drawing its attention to relevant information of which it was not aware’.583 The ICC has allowed victims’ intervention in various ways, which include giving opening and closing statements; attending and participating in hearings; questioning witnesses, experts and the accused; the possibility of tendering evidence and challenging the admissibility of evidence; and having access to records of proceedings.584 Leave for victims to participate in the proceedings is not a carte blanche, with each trial chamber having the discretion to determine the content of such participation depending on the circumstances of the case before it. To determine the manner of victim participation in the proceedings, the trial chamber takes into account various factors, which include the nature and scope of the charges, the number of victims taking part in the proceedings and the degree of similarities in their interests, including the manner in which they are represented.585 Thus the regime governing victim participation may vary from case to case with the key aim of ensuring meaningful participation of the victims which is not prejudicial or inconsistent with the rights of the defence and requirements of a fair and impartial trial. 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06) ibid, para 92. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06) ibid, para 97; Decision on Victim Participation, Laurent Gbagbo (ICC-02/1101/11) Trial Chamber I, 6 March 2015, para 30. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06) ibid, para 101; Decision on Victim’s Representation and Participation, Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11) Trial Chamber IV, 3 October 2012, para 13. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06) ibid, para 103. Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial, Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui (ICC 01/04-01/07) Trial Chamber II, 22 January 2010, para 59. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui (ICC 01/04-01/07) ibid, para 60. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui (ICC 01/04-01/07) ibid, para 65. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui (ICC 01/04-01/07) ibid, paras 68 et seq. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui (ICC 01/04-01/07) ibid, para 54. Drawing a balance... 134 Various instances illustrate how the Court strives to balance victims’ rights for meaningful participation against the rights of the defendant and the need for a fair and impartial trial. For example, when considering a victim’s right to participate in person the Court has established that this right is not absolute and to ensure fair & expeditious conduct of proceedings and to safeguard rights of the accused, the Court finds it appropriate that victim’s views and concerns be presented through a common legal representative.586 Access to records of the proceedings has been made subject to restrictions concerning confidentiality, to ensure protective measures or security of individuals or organizations are not be adversely affected or national security is compromised.587Victims have been allowed to introduce evidence and question witnesses. The court has asserted that victims may be permitted to present evidence as part of its quest to determine the truth, which is not only within the purview of the prosecution and the defence.588To do this, the court requires that the victims make a written application stating how the evidence they intend to adduce is relevant and how it may contribute to the determination of the truth.589Should the trial chamber permit the victims to present evidence, it then has to set out the modalities for the disclosure of such evidence and decide on the measures to be taken to safeguard the fairness of the trial.590 The chamber should particularly ensure that such evidence is given to the prosecution and defence sufficiently in advance to enable them prepare effectively.591 Victims have a right to challenge the admissibility or relevance of evidence when their interests are engaged. As a result, they are allowed in appropriate circumstances to question witnesses.592 In general, such questioning ought to be neutral and must relate to points that clarify or supplement evidence already given by witnesses.593 However, there may be circumstances wherein other types of questions, for example, confrontational or leading question, may be allowed. This may be allowed, for instance, where victims wish to discredit a witness whose evidence conflicts with their views and concerns. The ICC’s victim participation regime has been lauded for allowing meaningful participation by victims and contributing to truth-finding in the various trials before the Court.594 There are still those who argue that despite the innovative provisions victims’ participation has had little impact on the decisions and has been largely symbolic.595 The practice has nonetheless been criticised for being victim-centric and involving significant 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 Decision on Participation of Victims in the trial proceedings, Abdalla Banda (ICC-02/05-03/09) Trial Chamber IV, 20 March 2014, para 20; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06) supra note 54, para 105. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06) ibid, para 108. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui (ICC 01/04-01/07) supra note 60, para 84. Ibid para 107. Ibid. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06) supra note 54, para 109. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui (ICC 01/04-01/07) supra note 60, para 78. L. Catani, ‘Victims at the International Criminal Court: Some Lessons Learned from the Lubanga Case’ 10 JICJ 905 (2012); M. Vianney-Liaud, C. Pineau, ‘Assessing Victim’s Contribution to the Determination of the Truth in the Bemba Case, 12 Eyes on the ICC 51(2016-2017). L. Moffet, ‘Meaningful and Effective? Considering Victim’s Interests Through Participation at the International Criminal Court’ Criminal Law Forum (2015)26 255-289. 135 Juliet Okoth time and resources with the potential of undercutting the defendant’s right to a fair trial.596 There is also concern that the ICC has not been consistent in its interpretation of, and approach to legal provisions regarding victim participation because victim participation is determined on a case-by-case basis, with the result in some cases victims may enjoy more rights than in others.597 3 Lessons for Kenya The challenge of victim participation rights in criminal proceedings is how to realise it without undermining the rights of the prosecution and the defence. The jurisprudence in the ICC and Kenyan courts show the difficulty of achieving victim oriented justice without replacing the core retributive goal of criminal proceedings which is prosecuting perpetrators of crimes. The case by case approach in determining scope of victim participation emanates from the language of both the Rome Statute and the VPA which give discretion to courts to determine extent of victim participation at appropriate stages. This means that discrepancy in victim participation is inevitable and courts will need to develop a practice that ensures the differences do not grossly undermine the rights of the parties in the criminal proceedings. The identification of persons who may participate in the criminal proceedings as victims is strictly scrutinised at the ICC. A victim must be someone who has suffered because of the crimes that the accused person is charged with. This is not quite an issue for the Kenyan courts, as most criminal trials do not involve mass crimes. The criteria would be more useful in the case where the courts have to adjudicate crimes in relation to the International Crimes Act where the crimes proscribed would likely involve a large number of victims like at the ICC. While Kenyan courts have determined that the definition of a victim is broad enough to include professional groups, the ICC restricts itself to the criteria in its legal framework allowing natural persons who have suffered both direct and indirect harm and only organizations that suffer direct harm as a result of the crimes before the trial chamber. Such narrow interpretation should also be adhered to by the courts in Kenya thereby restricting the definition of victims to what is strictly provided for in the VPA, namely, natural persons. Any extensive application should only apply once the statutory framework is extended to also recognise other victims apart from natural persons. At the ICC, one or two common legal representatives represent many victims with common views and concerns.598 This prevents the possibility of each and every victim 596 597 598 B. McAsey, ‘Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court and its Impact on Procedural Fairness’ 18 Austl Int’l L J 105(2011). C. Hoyle, L. Ullrich, ‘New Court, New Justice: The Evolution of ‘Justice for Victims’ at Domestic Courts and at the International Criminal Court’ 12 JICJ (2014) p. 701; Anni Pues, ‘A Victim’s Right to a Fair Trial at the International Criminal Court: Reflections on Article 68(3)’ 13 J Int’l Crim Just 951(2015); L. Moffet, ‘Meaningful and Effective? Considering Victim’s Interests Through Participation at the International Criminal Court’ Criminal Law Forum (2015)26 p. 266. For example, 229 victims participated through 2 lawyers in the Bemba case and in Lubanga 2 counsels Drawing a balance... 136 presenting their case or appointing a personal lawyer. Any arrangement to the contrary would not only affect the expediency of the trial but also, in pitting the accused person against several parties, the fairness thereof.599 Although this practice has been criticised for not sufficiently representing the views of the numerous victims600, the ICC’s use of common legal representatives for victims is a more practical way of dealing with victim participation which Kenyan courts should strive to adopt to ensure that equality of arms is maintained. The victims at domestic level (particularly where they are not the primary victims) often have similar/common interests which relate to seeing that justice is done and the truth established. Since they are few in number, one common representative would adequately represent their interests avoiding unnecessary repetition and multiplication of similar arguments. This would avoid situations where representatives appear for the parents of the deceased, his wife and children and the professional body of which the deceased was a member.601 It is also inappropriate that the courts would allow one victim to have three representatives.602This practice undermines the right of the defendant to a fair and impartial trial and breaches the principle of equality of arms. Both the ICC and Kenyan courts exercise caution when it comes to allowing victims to question witnesses and produce evidence, with the requirement of due vigilance ensuring such participation does not infringe on the rights of the accused. Nonetheless, while Kenyan courts have issued general guidelines on the same, the ICC proceedings would seem to have more specific requirements demanding that specific questions which the victim representative intends to ask be written down and given to the competent chamber in advance. The chamber may also in some circumstances forward such questions to the prosecution. The general rule at the ICC is that the questions should be neutral and essentially relate to points that clarify or supplement evidence already adduced by a witness. In Kenya, no particular guidelines are given with respect to the nature of questions, giving the victim’s representative an opportunity to ask combative questions unless otherwise directed by the court. The interpretation by some courts has been so broad as to almost give the victim an automatic right to cross-examine witnesses without any particular check.603 The practice in the ICC requiring the questions of the victim’s representative to be known in advance would ensure a more cautious approach to the participation of the victim in the local trial process, ensuring the accused person’s rights are not violated by largely unchecked questioning. Victims should for the most part be directed to ask neutral questions unless they are able to demonstrate to the court that their interests on a particular issue would be more ably pursued through confrontational or leading questions. This would also ensure that the victim’s representative is not merely duplicating the role of the prosecution. 599 600 601 602 603 were appointed one for the child soldiers and another for the victims of the attack that was subject of the charges before the trail chamber. See M. Vianney-Liaud, C. Pineau, ‘Assessing Victim’s Contribution to the Determination of the Truth in the Bemba Case, 12 Eyes on the ICC 51(2016-2017). Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06) supra note 54, para 116. Anni Pues, ‘A Victim’s Right to a Fair Trial at the International Criminal Court: Reflections on Article 68(3)’ 13 J Int’l Crim Just 951(2015) p. 963. See above R v Fredrick Ole Leilman and 4 others [2017] eKLR; R v David Muchiri Mwangi [2018] eKLR. See above Gideon Mwiti Irea v DPP & 7 Others Petition No. 151 of 2015 [2015] eKLR. R v Fredrick Ole Leilman and 4 others [2017] eKLR; R v David Muchiri Mwangi [2018] eKLR. 137 Juliet Okoth The practice in the ICC that requires victims to make a written application in advance, setting out their interests in relation to the evidence and issues being considered by the Court and the proposed mode of intervention may also be useful to the courts in Kenya. It ensures parties and the courts have a clear structure in advance on the manner and mode of intervention avoiding any surprises that may undermine the rights of parties in the trial especially the defendant. One would argue that this might make the practice before the domestic courts cumbersome and may not be necessary in a forum where there are few victims. It is also likely that such practice may hinder the possibility of spontaneous intervention and undermine the victim’s right to participation. The rationale behind such practice would be to allow the courts to set out modalities of the trial in advance and the measures necessary to safeguard the fairness of the criminal proceedings. The right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings developed for the purpose of overcoming the inherent disparity between the accused person, whose liberty is often deprived, and the prosecution.604 The guarantee to a fair trial was intended to protect the defendant against the arbitrariness of the state and the risk of abuse of such power.605 Thus any interpretations of statutory provisions that provide for victim participation in criminal proceedings would need to first and foremost adhere to the fair trial rights of the accused person and then apply the general component of fairness in legal proceedings to the other parties.606 In the circumstances, any lessons to be drawn by Kenya from the ICC should be with the understanding that achieving procedural rights for victims in criminal proceedings must be guided by the notion that the primary aim of the trial is to establish the innocence or guilt of the accused persons, while giving due regard to the notion of a fair trial that encompasses presumption of innocence, equality before the law and legal certainty.607 Conclusion Rights of victim participation in the process of adjudicating crimes are now guaranteed in the Constitution and statutory provisions of the VPA. This has brought far-reaching changes in the practice of criminal law in Kenya. Although the statutory framework sets out ways in which victims may participate in the criminal trial process, courts still have substantial power to determine the extent of such participation. The victim now has an opportunity to be more involved in critical decisions during the trial process. The victim has standing to, inter alia, participate in hearings, plea bargains, to contest bail application and contribute to sentencing. The prominent role the law provides for the victim is a confirmation of the society’s commitment to the plight of the victim. It gives victims respect and dignity. Victim participation ensures that judges 604 605 606 607 Anni Pues, ‘A Victim’s Right to a Fair Trial at the International Criminal Court: Reflections on Article 68(3)’ 13 J Int’l Crim Just 951(2015) p. 956. Ibid 957. Ibid 956. Ibid 958; 2010 Constitution of Kenya Art 50. Drawing a balance... 138 and prosecutors will no longer be inattentive to preferences of victims and will hopefully contribute to judicial officers not imposing unduly light sentences and prosecutors not using their discretion to casually dismiss or reduce charges or enter into plea bargains. The practice before the Kenyan courts shows an acknowledgement of the active and important role victims now have in criminal trials. However, a more cautious interpretation of the law with more specific rules on the extent of victim participation would ensure a more appropriate balance between the parties in the trial. The broad interpretation that has been given to victim participation in some instances, particularly with respect to the identification of victims and the seemingly boundless opportunity for victims to express their views irrespective of whether their interests are truly affected, threatens to significantly reduce the procedural protection of the accused persons. This, in effect, could compromise the integrity of the Kenyan criminal justice system. Although it is generally acknowledged that the participation of victims contributes to wider values in the criminal system such as promoting truth-finding, adding transparency to the outcome of the case and serving to enhance the overall legitimacy of the criminal justice system, courts should adhere to the statutory requirements of victim participation. Such requirements should be interpreted in a manner that ensures that both victims’ and accused’s rights in the course of the criminal proceedings are properly balanced to have a fair and impartial trial. 139 Aimé-Parfait Niyonkuru BURUNDI-ICC: TRIAL OF STRENGTH OVER BURUNDI’S DUTY TO COOPERATE WITH RESPECT TO THE SITUATION IN BURUNDI Aimé-parfait Niyonkuru608∗ Abstract Africa’s hostile posture towards the International Criminal Court (ICC) with respect to its member States’ duty to cooperate fully has become increasingly widespread. Except for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, all ICC’s findings of non-compliance with the Court’s request for cooperation involve African States, namely, the Republic of South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Malawi; the Court found that all these States Parties had failed to comply with their obligations under the 1998 Rome Statute to cooperate with the Court by refusing to arrest and surrender the then Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir. As for Burundi, its officials stated that from late 2017, Burundi will not cooperate with the Court over investigations and proceedings in relation to crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed in the country while it was a Party to the Rome Statute. After it had concluded the withdrawal process from the Rome Statute pursuant to Article 127 (1), which became effective on 27 October, 2017, Burundi declared that it will not cooperate with the ICC over proceedings resulting from the investigation into the crimes allegedly committed in Burundi from 26 April 2015 to 26 October 2017. The proceedings had been authorized by the Pre-Trial Chamber III on 25 October, 2017. Interestingly in this respect, a provision that stipulates that “No Burundian may be extradited to a foreign country” was introduced in the 2018 Burundi Constitution. This context suggests an upcoming trial of strength between Burundi and the ICC over the duty to “cooperate fully with the Court” with respect to the situation in Burundi. This chapter debates the international legality of the Burundi’s decision not to cooperate with the International Criminal Court with respect to proceedings resulting from the 608 Aimé-Parfait Niyonkuru (Ph.D in Law, KU Leuven, 2016) is a lecturer at the University of Burundi. Since October 2013, he is an accredited lawyer with the Burundian Bar Association (BBA). Between February 2017 and January 2019, he was a Phillip Schwartz Fellow at the Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institute in Freiburg, Germany. From February 2019, Dr. Niyonkuru is a postdoctoral researcher at the Université Louvain-laNeuve (Belgium). E-mail: niyoparfait2004@yahoo.fr or aime-parfait.niyonkuru@abi.uni-freiburg.de. The author sincerely thanks Prof. Dr. Andreas Mehler, Dr. Franziska Zanker and Michael Cobb for their excellent comments. ∗ Burundi-ICC... 140 investigation into the situation in Burundi. It further discusses the impact of the Burundi’s refusal to cooperate with the Court on the said proceedings. Placing the Burundi case study within the broader context of the States’ defiance of the ICC with respect to the duty to cooperate, the chapter concludes by reflecting on the impact of this defiance on the ability of the Court to fulfil its mandate to end impunity for the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. 141 Aimé-Parfait Niyonkuru BURUNDI-CPI : ÉPREUVE DE FORCE AU SUJET DE L’OBLIGATION DE COOPÉRATION CONCERNANT LA SITUATION AU BURUNDI Résumé La défiance africaine envers la Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI) en rapport avec l’obligation, à charge des États Parties au Statut de Rome de la CPI, de coopérer pleinement avec la Cour prend de plus en plus d’ampleur. A l’exception du Royaume hachémite de Jordanie, toutes les conclusions de noncoopération aux requêtes émises par la CPI concernent des pays africains, en l’occurrence la République d’Afrique du Sud, la République Démocratique du Congo, la République du Tchad et la République du Malawi. Parties tous au Statut de Rome de la CPI, la Cour a jugé que ces États avaient manqué à leurs obligations internationales en refusant de coopérer dans l’arrestation et le transfert du dorénavant ancien président soudanais Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir. En ce qui concerne le Burundi, certains de ses officiels ont fait savoir depuis la fin 2017 que le Burundi ne coopérera pas avec la CPI dans les enquêtes et les procédures en rapport avec les crimes de la compétence de cette Cour prétendument commis sur le territoire de ce pays au moment où il était Partie au Statut de Rome. A l’issue du processus de retrait du Statut de Rome conformément à l’article 127 (1), retrait devenu effectif le 27 Octobre 2017, le Burundi a déclaré qu’il ne coopérera pas avec la CPI relativement aux procédures en rapport avec les enquêtes sur les crimes prétendument commis au Burundi entre le 26 avril 2015 au 26 octobre 2017. Le commencement de ces enquêtes a été autorisé par la Chambre préliminaire III de la CPI le 25 Octobre 2017. Il est important de noter qu’une disposition introduite dans la Constitution burundaise de 2018 stipule qu’ « aucun Burundais ne peut être extradé ». Ce contexte suggère une possible épreuve de force à venir entre le Burundi et la CPI au sujet de l’obligation de « coopérer pleinement avec la Cour » en relation avec la situation au Burundi. Ce chapitre débat d’abord de la légalité internationale de la décision du Burundi de ne pas coopérer avec la CPI au sujet des procédures en relation avec les enquêtes dans le cadre de la situation au Burundi. Il discute ensuite l’effet du refus du Burundi de coopérer avec la Cour en ce qui concerne ces procédures. Plaçant le cas du Burundi dans le cadre plus large de la défiance étatique à l’égard de la CPI –en relation avec l’obligation de coopérer–, ce chapitre esquisse l’impact de cette défiance sur la capacité de la Cour à réaliser sa mission de mettre fin à l’impunité pour les crimes les plus graves qui touchent l’ensemble de la communauté internationale. Burundi-ICC... 142 Introduction Burundi signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court609 (ICC) on 13 January 1999 and ratified it on 30 August 2003.610 The ratification instrument was deposited on 21 September 2004 with the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) in his capacity as Depositary of the Rome Statute.611612 Pursuant to Article 126, paragraph 2, the Statute entered into force for Burundi on 1 December 2004. Against this background, one may note that Burundi has been a supporter of the ICC since its early days, although it did not participate in the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.613 However, this support did not survive the political and humanitarian crisis that erupted in Burundi in 2015 after the incumbent President Pierre Nkurunziza was nominated by his ruling Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD)614 party to run for a contested615 third term in office. A crisis during and following which the Office of The Prosecutor (OTP) determined that there is a reasonable basis to believe that crimes falling within the ICC’s subject-matter jurisdiction were committed.616 The opening, of a preliminary examination into the situation in Burundi since April 2015 by the ICC Prosecutor in April 2016 was followed by a crisis in the relationship between Burundi and the Court. In the wake of the opening of the investigation, the Government of Burundi adopted a legislative draft aiming to withdraw Burundi from the ICC, thus setting the stage for the legal withdrawal process. The process was sped 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 Adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9* (1998), available at http:// www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm; U.N.T.S., Vol. 2187, n° 38544. Law No. 1/011 of 30 August 2003, Official Gazette of Burundi (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi), No. 9/2003, p.629. See article 121, 122, 125-128 read together. See C.N.936. 2004.Treaties-26. Held in Rome from 15 June to 17 July 1998. National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Forces for the Defense of Democracy. See, inter alia: Filip De Maesschalck and Sergio Gemperle, ‘Pural Claims to Legitimacy: Conceptualising Legitimacy in Hybrid Political Orders’ (27 August 2015), 9; Nina Wilén, Gérard Birantamije, and David Ambrosetti, ‘The Burundian Army’s Trajectory to Professionalization and Depoliticization, and Back Again’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 12, no. 1 (2 January 2018): 120–35, https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2 017.1418173; Denis M. Tull and Claudia Simons, ‘The Institutionalisation of Power Revisited: Presidential Term Limits in Africa’, Africa Spectrum 52, no. 2 (4 August 2017): 79–102; Tim Sweijs et al., The Many Faces of Political Violence (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2017), 19. ICC (Office of the Prosecutor), Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on opening a preliminary examination into the situation in Burundi. See https://www.icc-cpi. int//pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-25-04-2016&ln=kirundi&ln=fr [last accessed on 09.04.2018]. The OTP reported that “from 26 April 2015 onwards, members of the Government, the Burundian security forces and the Imbonerakure committed at a minimum the following acts constituting crimes against humanity: murder under article 7(1)(a); imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law under article 7(1)(e); torture under article 7(1)(f); rape and other forms of sexual violence of comparable gravity under article 7(1)(g); enforced disappearance under article 7(1)(i); and persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political grounds under article 7(1)(h).” 143 Aimé-Parfait Niyonkuru up with the United Nations Human Rights Council’s decision, through resolution A/ HRC/33/24 of 30 September 2016, to create a Commission of Inquiry on Burundi with a one-year mandate, which tasks would include “a thorough investigation into human rights violations and abuses in Burundi since April 2015, including on their extent and whether they may constitute international crimes, with a view to contributing to the fight against impunity”; as well as the identification of “alleged perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses in Burundi with a view to ensuring full accountability”. The withdrawal took effect on 27 October 2017 in accordance with Article 127(1) of the Rome Statute.617 Until the day on which the Burundi’s withdrawal from the ICC took effect, there was no decision issued by the Court and made public authorizing the commencement of an investigation into crimes allegedly committed on the Burundi’s territory or by Burundians. To celebrate what senior officials in the government apparatus hailed as a great victory for Burundi618 against a Court that “has shown itself to be a political instrument and weapon used by the West to enslave”619 other States, officials called upon people to demonstrate across the country. On 28 October 2018, one day after the withdrawal became effective and in response to the call by officials, thousands of Burundians took the streets cheering the effectiveness of the withdrawal with banners stamped and chanting the slogan “bye ICC”. At the same time, human rights activists were mourning what was seen as a major blow to international justice.620 A strong turn of events that sounded as thunder in the clear sky over Bujumbura occurred on 9 November 2017. Unexpectedly, Burundi and the rest of the world alike heard that the ICC had authorized an investigation regarding the Burundi situation. Although it was made public on 7 November 2017, the decision was first issued under seal on 25 October 2017, while Burundi was still a State-Party to the Rome Statute. At the Prosecutor’s request, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber III granted, under Article 18 of the Statute as held in paragraph 19, a delay of ten working days in notifying Burundi. The announcement of the authorization by the ICC to commence an investigation into the Situation in Burundi was followed by Burundi officials’ statements strongly dismissing the ICC’s decision as illegal and fraudulent. In a tweet posted on 25 October 2017, Willy Nyamitwe, the Senior Advisor in charge of Media, Information and Communication to Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza, went so far as to say that 617 618 619 620 This provision reads as follows: “A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies a later date.” See inter alia ‘Burundian officials celebrate withdrawal from ICC’, Xinhua, October 28, 2018; ‘Burundi becomes first nation to leave international criminal court’, The Guardian, 28 October 2017. https://www. theguardian.com/law/2017/oct/28/burundi-becomes-first-nation-to-leave-international-criminal-court [last accessed 10.04.2018] The Guardian, ‘Burundi becomes first nation to leave international criminal court’, 28 October 2017. https:// www.theguardian.com/law/2017/oct/28/burundi-becomes-first-nation-to-leave-international-criminal-court [last accessed 10.04.2018] Suhr E. V., ‘Reflections on Burundi’s exit from the International Criminal Court’ Georgetown Journal of International Law available at http://www.gjil.org/2018/02/reflections-on-burundis-exit-from.html Burundi-ICC... 144 the ICC had of issued “a backdated decision”.621 The Court’s decision was issued on the basis of materials implicating several members of State institutions622 as well as members of the youth wing of the ruling CNDD-FDD party, known as the Imbonerakure,623 in the commission of alleged crimes falling within the ICC’s jurisdiction. Since the announcement of the Court’s decision, Burundi vowed to never cooperate with the Court. In the meanwhile, the ICC ruled that “subsequent to the entry into force of its withdrawal, Burundi’s obligation to cooperate with the Court in relation to [the authorized investigation] remains in effect for as long as the investigation lasts and encompasses any proceedings resulting from the investigation”.624 As one may easily notice, Burundi and the ICC have opposite views on the Burundi’s duty to cooperate with the Court in relation to the abovementioned investigation. 1 The ICC’s Investigation into the situation in the Republic of Burundi: The legal status of Burundi under the Rome Statute This section seeks to understand the status of Burundi vis-à-vis the Rome Statute of the ICC in relation to investigation into the situation in this country, whose commencement was authorized on 25 October 2017 by Pre-Trial Chamber III. Since the scope of states’ rights and obligations resulting from treaties vary depending on the status of these States with respect to each treaty, the determination of the status of Burundi with respect to the Rome Statute is interesting in order to determine whether or not under the Statute Burundi has obligation to cooperate with the ICC in relation to the investigation into the situation in Burundi of which the Court authorized the commencement; and if there is any, to determine its scope. Vis-à-vis a treaty, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)625 distinguishes three different status of States, namely that of “Contracting States”, “States Parties” and “Third Parties.” The VCLT gives the meaning of each of the three expressions. For the purposes of the said Convention, ““Contracting State” means a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty, whether or not the treaty has entered into force” (Article 2.1(f)); ““Party” means a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force (Article 2.1(g)) and ““Third State” means a State not a party to the treaty (Article 2.1(h)). The Rome Statute and the doctrine add another category, namely the category of “Withdrawing States”. 621 622 623 624 625 Gladstone and Marlise Simons, ‘We’re Not Done Yet, Hague Court Tells Burundi’s Leaders’, The New York Times, November 17, 2017. available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/09/world/africa/icc-burundinkurunziza.html [last accessed 09.04.2018]: Uwimana, D., ‘ICC authorizes investigation into Burundi’, Iwacu, November 9, 2017: available at: http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/englishnews/icc-authorizesinvestigation-into-burundi/ [last accessed on 09.04.2018]. Namely the National Intelligence Services, the Police. Literally “those who see far” in Kirundi, language common to all Burundian. Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi, ICC-01/17-X-9-US-Exp, 25 October 2017, para.26. 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, entered into force January 27, 1980. 145 Aimé-Parfait Niyonkuru Though frequently used in legal literature, the expression “withdrawing State” is not defined by those who use it. A close review of the literature that use the concept “withdrawing state” shows that authors refer to a State in the process of denouncing or withdrawing from a treaty or that concluded this process. The notification in writing626 of the State’s claim to withdraw from a treaty to the other parties is the decisive act within the withdrawal process regarding the qualification of a State as “withdrawing”627. Since the 27 October 2016, when the UNSG was notified by Burundi of its withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court628, Burundi became a withdrawing State. This finding leads to another important issue: the legal duty of Burundi as a withdrawing State from the Rome Statute and in connection with criminal proceedings resulting from the investigation into the situation in the Republic of Burundi. This issue will be discussed in the section below. 2 Legal duties of Burundi as a Withdrawing State As far as withdrawing states are concerned, distinction must be made between two different hypotheses. The first hypothesis concerns withdrawing States before the withdrawal takes effect but only after they have addressed a withdrawal written notification to UNSG in accordance to Article 127 paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute. The second hypothesis is that of withdrawing States, after the withdrawal takes effect. Depending on the period of which midnight of the 26th of October 2017 is the frontier, Burundi may fall within the first or the second hypothesis. Of the two hypotheses, the latter is more interesting with respect to the debate on the legal duties of withdrawing States. The first hypothesis does not raise difficulties as regards to the issue of legal duties of withdrawing States. With respect to these duties, the situation of the withdrawing State does not differ from that of non-withdrawing States Parties. In reality, during the withdrawal process until the withdrawal takes effect, generally upon expiry of a certain period of time set out in the treaty subject to withdrawal or not less than twelve months if the treaty does not provide for any period of time629, after the date of its receipt by the depositary or the Contracting State, the withdrawing State remains, and rightly, bound to all obligations of a State Party. This was the case for Burundi from October 27, 2016 to October 26, 2017 regarding the Rome Statute of the ICC. Until the date on which the 626 627 628 629 In the section dealing with “Instruments for declaring invalid, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty”, Article 67.1 of the VCLT specifies that “The notification provided for under article 65, paragraph 1 must be made in writing” (See note below). For the specific case of the Rome Statute of the ICC, article 127 (1) reads as follows: ““A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies a later date.” Article 65.1 of the VCLT on “procedure to be followed with respect to invalidity, termination, withdrawal from or suspension of the operation of a treaty” provides that “A party which, under the provisions of the present Convention, invokes either a defect in its consent to be bound by a treaty or a ground for impeaching the validity of a treaty, terminating it, withdrawing from it or suspending its operation, must notify the other parties of its claim”. C.N.805.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Depositary Notification) See article 56, paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, U.N.T.S, Vol. 1155,1-18232, p.331. Burundi-ICC... 146 withdrawal takes effect, exiting State’s obligations continue. Interpreting article 127(1) of the Rome Statute of ICC, the Court held that “a withdrawing State remains, for all intents and purposes, a State Party in the period between the communication of the notification of withdrawal and the end of the ensuing one-year interval.630” This finding is consistent with Article 70(1)(a) of the VCLT which provides that only “the termination of a treaty under its provisions or in accordance with the [Vienna] Convention (…) releases the parties from any obligation further to perform the treaty.” Regarding the second hypothesis, namely that of a State Party after the withdrawal takes effect, one can note that its situation is similar to that of a State that has never been party to the treaty, the Third State under Article 2.1 (h) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Today, for situations that may arise after its withdrawal has taken effect, namely after the 26 of October 2017, Burundi’s obligations vis-à-vis the ICC are that of any non-State Party to the Rome Statute. After the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber III authorized on 25 October 2017 the commencement of an investigation into crimes allegedly committed on the Burundi’s territory or by Burundians over the period starting from 1 December 2004631 up to and including 26 October 2017,632 Burundi’s officials declared that Burundi will not cooperate with the ICC over proceedings resulting from that investigation.633 Significantly, a provision of the 2018 Burundi Constitution, states that “No Burundian may be extradited to a foreign country”.634 On the contrary, the Constitution of 18 March 2005 provided for the extradition of a national “in case he is subject to criminal proceedings by an international court for genocide, war crime or other crimes against humanity”. Still, one may argue that the aforementioned provision of the 2018 Constitution does not explicitly bar the extradition of Burundians in cases where they are subject to criminal proceedings by an international court. However, both the context in which the 2018 was drafted, adopted and promulgated and the Burundian officials’ hostile discourse toward the ICC635 as well as the context of the Constitution itself,636 suggest the contrary. Both contexts suggest an upcoming 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi, para. 24. Date of entry into force of the Rome Statute of the ICC for Burundi. Date on which Burundi’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the ICC took effect. The Burundi’s Minister of Justice, Aimé-Laurentine Kanyana, has made it clear: “Burundi will never cooperate with ICC” (Uwimana, D., ‘Burundi will never cooperate with ICC, says Justice Minister’, Iwacu, Bujumbura, November 10, 2017. available at: http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/englishnews/burundi-willnever-cooperate-with-icc-says-justice-minister/ [last accessed 27 November 2017]). Article 50 in fine. See Niyonkuru, A.-P., ‘Burundi-CPI: Les non-dits et la vraie-fausse stratégie d’un retrait’, HJ van der Merwe and Gerhard Kemp(eds), International Criminal Justice in Africa, 2017, Nairobi, Strathmore University Press/KAS, 2018, p. 73-105. In a brochure endorsed by the Government of Burundi with the title «Comprendre le nouveau projet de constitution révisée: Principales innovations», the author provides a definition of extradition whose scope extends beyond the letter of Article 50 of the Burundian Constitution (See note no.). In this brochure, 147 Aimé-Parfait Niyonkuru trial of strength between Burundi and the ICC over the duty to “cooperate fully with the Court” with respect to the situation in Burundi. Even by assuming that the change in the Constitution to the extradition regime proceeds from a deliberate strategy of “guarantees of impunity”,637 we contend that this change would have no legal effect on Burundi’s obligations under the Rome Statute of the ICC, as Article 27 of the VCLT, which reflects a general customary international rule,638 provides that “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46.” Both the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and its successor the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that “it is a generally accepted principle of international law that in the relations between Powers who are Contracting Parties to a treaty, the provisions of municipal law cannot prevail over those of the treaty”.639 In the same breath, in European Molecular Biology Laboratory Arbitration (EMBL v Germany), the Arbitration Tribunal asserted that under Article 27 of the Vienna Convention, “a party to a treaty cannot invoke its internal law in order to justify the non-fulfillment of the treaty”.640 When Burundian officials vowed not to cooperate with the ICC, there then arises the question of whether such a claim does rest on a certain legal basis. We first dismiss the assumption that Burundi could publicly and proudly proclaim its disavowal of international law. Obviously, a State that is accused of breaching its international obligations or that is found to have failed to comply with its obligations under international law will have a natural inclination to argue the compliance of its actions or/and omissions with international law. As far as the duty to cooperate with the ICC is concerned, none of the States Parties and non-Parties to the Rome Statute that were 637 638 639 640 extradition is defined as “the fact of transferring a Burundian who is subject to criminal proceedings by a foreign or an international Court” (Original in French reads as follow: «L’extradition est le fait de transférer un burundais poursuivi pour un crime pour qu’il soit jugé par une juridiction étrangère ou international». The author of the brochure elaborated his explanation: “The Constitution of March 2005 authorized extradition by specifying that a Burundian may be extradited in cases he is subject to criminal proceedings by an international court for genocide, war crime or other crimes against humanity (article 50). The current [draft] forbids extradition and reaffirms accordingly the competence of Burundians courts over its (sic) Citizens” (Original in French reads as follows : « La constitution de mars 2005 autorisait l’extradition en spécifiant qu’un burundais pouvait être extradé s’il était poursuivi par une juridiction pénale internationale pour crime de génocide, crime de guerre ou autres crimes contre l’humanité (Article 50). L’actuel projet de Constitution interdit l’extradition et réaffirme par conséquent la compétence des juridictions burundaises de juger ses citoyens ». Bernard Ntahiraja, ‘L’ interdiction absolue d’extrader les nationaux dans la Constitution burundaise du 7 juin 2018 : une lecture (essentiellement) juridique’ (5 July 2018), https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/ uantwerpen/container49545/files/burundi%202018/presentations/ntahiraja%20bernard%20iob%20 burundi%20conference%202018.pdf. European Molecular Biology Laboratory Arbitration, Arbitration Tribunal, Award of 29 June 1990, ILR, Vol. 105, p. 25; Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgement of 4 June, ICJ Report 2008, p. 41, para. 124. Interpretation of the Convention Between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal Emigration, signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine on November 27th, 1919 (Question of the “Communities”), PCIJ, Series B, No.17 (1930), p.31; Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1988, p.35. European Molecular Biology Laboratory Arbitration, p.25. Burundi-ICC... 148 found by the Court to have failed to comply with their obligations under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute acknowledged the wrongfulness of its conduct. This said, whilst Burundi senior officials repeatedly warned that Burundi would refuse to cooperate with the Court, they did not provide a strong legal ground for their claim. This makes it difficult to discuss the legality of Burundi’s decision under international law. Two senior officials have been particularly vocal in arguing that Burundi will not collaborate with the ICC probe, namely, the Minister of Justice and Civic Protection, Aimée-Laurentine Kanyana and the Senior Advisor in charge of Media, Information and Communication to Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza, Ambassador Willy Nyamitwe. In an interview with Agence France Presse on 11 November 2017 in the aftermath of the publication of ICC Pre-Trial-Chamber III’s Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi, Aimée-Laurentine Kanyana declared that “Burundi rejects this decision from the very outset”,641 a decision she said “was not communicated (…) [to] Burundi before its effective departure”.642 Suggesting that the decision “was taken in violation of the Rome Statute and the principles of international law,”643 the Minister declared that Burundi “is not bound by this decision”644 and that “in any case, Burundi will never begin cooperation with the ICC for implementing [such] a decision”.645 In a tweet he posted on 25 October 2017, Willy Nyamitwe, for his part, declared that the ICC’s decision appears to be “nothing else but a backdated decision”.646 This grave and unprecedented accusation was not echoed by other state officials, as is generally the case with hostile rhetoric against the ICC that lacks minimal supporting evidence.647 As one may notice from the sample discourse above, while Burundi displays its determination to defy the ICC by refusing to cooperate with it, the discourse lacks elaborate and/or sophisticated legal argument. First, Minister Kanyana’s allegation that the ICC’s decision was taken in violation of the Rome Statute and the principles of international law lacks precision regarding the provision of the Rome Statute and the principle(s) of international law that the ICC’s purportedly decision does not comply with. Secondly, the Minister’s allegation that the ICC’s decision was not communicated 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 AFP, ‘Burundi says it will “never” collaborate with ICC probe’, Nairobi, Daily Nation, 11 November 2017. Available at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Burundi-declines-to-cooperate-with-ICC/1066-4182172i7fwcrz/index.html (Accessed on 3 October 2018). Id. Id. Id. Id. See also, mutatis mutandis, Uwimana, D., ‘Burundi will never cooperate with ICC, says Justice Minister’, Iwacu, Bujumbura, November 10, 2017. available at: http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/englishnews/burundiwill-never-cooperate-with-icc-says-justice-minister/ [last accessed 27 November 2017]. Gladstone and Marlise Simons, ‘We’re Not Done Yet, Hague Court Tells Burundi’s Leaders’, The New York Times, November 17, 2017. available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/09/world/africa/icc-burundinkurunziza.html [last accessed 09.04.2018]: Uwimana, D., ‘ICC Authorizes Investigation into Burundi’, Iwacu, November 9, 2017: available at: http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/englishnews/icc-authorizesinvestigation-into-burundi/ [last accessed on 09.04.2018]. Niyonkuru, A.-P. 149 Aimé-Parfait Niyonkuru to Burundi before its effective departure lacks legal merit. It is true that, while authorisation to investigate was issued by ICC Pre-Trail Chamber III on 25 October 2017, it was only made public on 9 November 2017, 14 days after Burundi’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute became effective. The procedure was conducted under seal, ex parte,648 and the decision issued under Article 15(4) of the Statute with the same level of classification, namely, under seal, ex parte and only available to the Prosecutor. The delayed notification was not arbitrary, since it was authorized by the Court under Article 18(1) of the Statute.649 In support of this special procedure, the Court held: In view of the continued risks facing the victims and potential witnesses [REDACTED] as well as the complete lack of international cooperation on the part of the Burundian authorities, the Chamber considers that the Prosecutor must be allowed a limited period of time for the sole purpose of preparing and implementing protective measures for victims and (potential) witnesses, if authorization to commence an investigation is granted. Accordingly, a fair balance between articles 18(1) and 68(1) of the Statute requires that, for the purposes of the particular situation in Burundi, the Prosecutor’s request for a delay of ten working days in notifying a potential decision authorizing an investigation to the States concerned be granted.650 In short, it emerges from the above analysis that the main legal argument put forward by Burundi in order to justify its announced refusal to cooperate with the ICC consists of arguing that - since it is no longer member of the Court - it has no duty to cooperate with the Court in relation to the aforementioned investigation. Such a view lacks legal merit and is inconsistent with the ICC’s decision of 25 October 2017 as well as with the state of international law concerning treaties. It is true that since its withdrawal was effective on 27 October 2017, Burundi is no longer an ICC member state and that, based on the res inter alios acta argument, it is not obliged to cooperate with the Court from that date, except in case of situations referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and pursuant Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. However, for obligations incurred or accrued while Burundi was a Party to the Rome Statute, including that the performance of which extend beyond the effective date of withdrawal, this paper contends that such obligations are not affected by the withdrawal. The duty to cooperate in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings into the situation in Burundi is nothing else but an implementation of Burundi’s past obligations under the Rome Statute. 648 649 650 See Regulation 23 bis of the Court “Filing of documents marked ex parte, under seal or confidential”, Adopted by the judges of the Court on 26 May 2004 Fifth Plenary Session, The Hague, 17- 28 May 2004, Official documents of the International Criminal Court, ICC-BD/01-01-04. “Article 18 (1) provides that: “1. When a situation has been referred to the Court pursuant to article 13 (a) and the Prosecutor has determined that there would be a reasonable basis to commence an investigation, or the Prosecutor initiates an investigation pursuant to articles 13 (c) and 15, the Prosecutor shall notify all States Parties and those States which, taking into account the information available, would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned. The Prosecutor may notify such States on a confidential basis and, where the Prosecutor believes it necessary to protect persons, prevent destruction of evidence or prevent the absconding of persons, may limit the scope of the information provided to States”. para. 15. Burundi-ICC... 3 150 Burundi’s Withdrawal from the Rome Statute does not affect the fulfillment of its past obligations under the Statute Burundi’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute took effect on 27 October 2017. In the understanding of Burundi (through the communications and utterances of its officials), the withdrawal from the Rome Statute terminated Burundi’s legal obligations under that treaty. We do not share this view, and neither is it supported by the Rome Statute’s provisions, international jurisprudence nor legal literature. An analysis of both the Rome Statute and the relevant provisions of the VCLT as well as an analysis of the legal literature lead us to argue that the Burundi’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute did not affect the country’s obligation to cooperate fully with the ICC with respect to proceedings resulting from the investigation into the situation in Burundi, since this obligation incurred before the country’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute took effect. Unlike treaties that do not contain denunciation or withdrawal clauses, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, the Rome Statute of the ICC does not preclude State Parties from withdrawing from the Statute. Article 127(1) of the Rome Statute allows States Parties to withdraw from it, by written notification addressed to the UNSG. This provision is permissive, as it does not condition exit upon either the consent of other States Parties or the review by international tribunals or treaty review bodies. However, such withdrawal does not affect obligations which have arisen prior to the date the withdrawal took effect. Article 127(2) of the Rome Statute reads as follows: A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, including any financial obligations which may have accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and which were commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective. The above provision refers to past obligations of a withdrawing State. The first sentence of the second paragraph captures the principle enshrined in Article 70(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to which past obligations survive withdrawal from the treaty regime.651 The second sentence deals with an example of this principle, namely, cooperation in connection with investigations and prosecution. 651 This provision reads as follows: “Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree, the termination of a treaty under its provisions or in accordance with the present Convention, the termination of a treaty does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination.” 151 Aimé-Parfait Niyonkuru The last part of the second sentence “nor shall it prejudice” makes it clear by the words “any matter which was already under consideration by the Court” that a State of which nationals have been put under the jurisdiction of the Court by a State referral or by a Prosecutor acting propriu motu cannot terminate such proceedings by withdrawing from the Statute. Thus, when a State finds it, or its leaders targeted by investigations or prosecution, the Rome Statute seeks to prevent the use of state withdrawal as a means of avoiding its jurisdiction. The relevance of Article 70(1)(b) of the VCLT is of such significance with respect to the interpretation of Article 127(2) of the Rome Statute that the Court itself explicitly referred to this provision in its decision of 25 October 2017.652 In this decision the Court emphasizes that before the withdrawal takes effect, “a withdrawing State remains, for all intents and purposes, a State Party”.653 The Court further drew the scope of Burundi’s duty to cooperate in the following terms: In the view of the Chamber, any obligations on the part of Burundi arising out of the Chamber’s article 15(4) decision would survive Burundi’s withdrawal. The reason is that the present decision is delivered prior to the entry into effect of Burundi’s withdrawal on 27 October 2017. Accordingly, it cannot be disputed that, if authorized, an investigation into the situation in Burundi would commence prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective. Therefore, subsequent to the entry into force of its withdrawal, Burundi’s obligation to cooperate with the Court in relation to such an investigation, if authorized, remains in effect for as long as the investigation lasts and encompasses any proceedings resulting from the investigation. Interestingly, for continued crimes whose first commission goes back to the time when Burundi was still a State Party to the Rome Statute, the Court further extended Burundi’s duty to cooperate beyond the date upon which the withdrawal took effect. On this extension, Pre-trial Chamber III held: “ (…) in the light of the continuous nature of certain crimes, the Prosecutor may also extend her investigation to crimes even if they continue after 26 October 2017”.654 This view is shared by Professor Charles C. Jalloh, who on the Kenya case remarks that “even if the ICC Prosecutor were to decide to commence additional cases before the date that the one-year withdrawal becomes effective, those proceedings would also entail a continued duty for Kenya to cooperate with the court”.655 652 653 654 655 The Court held the following: “On the whole, article 127(2) of the Statute gives effect to the principle contained in article 70(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that the termination of a treaty “[d]oes not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination” (para. 25). Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi, para. 24. Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi, para. 192. C. Jalloh, ‘Kenya Should Reconsider Proposed Withdrawal From The ICC’ (EJIL: Talk, 18 September 2013). available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/kenya-should-reconsider-proposed-withdrawal-from-the-icc/ (accessed on 4 October 2018). Burundi-ICC... 152 The ICC’s finding on the withdrawing States Parties’ obligation to cooperate with respect to past obligations is in harmony with both international jurisprudence and the dominant scholarly literature. An analysis of the international case law confirms that the withdrawal from a treaty has no effect either on pending proceedings or jurisdiction already established by a Court. Hence, on Peru’s withdrawal of its recognition of the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the InterAmerican Court on Human Rights, citing thereon the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated that “unilateral action by a State cannot divest an international court of jurisdiction it has already asserted”.656 In the case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory, the International Court of Justice held that: It is a rule of law generally accepted as well as one acted upon in the past by the Court that, once the Court has been validly seized of a dispute, unilateral action by the respondent State in terminating its declaration in whole or in part cannot divest the Court of jurisdiction.657 In this case, the Court explicitly made reference to the Nottebohm case where it was held that “An extrinsic fact (…) cannot deprive the Court of the jurisdiction already established”.658 In the legal literature, many specialists of international law are of the view that the withdrawal from the Rome Statute by a State shall have neither the effect of terminating proceedings which were commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal took effect, nor that of releasing the said State from its duty to perform any other obligation which has arisen before the date at which the withdrawal became effective and hence the date at which the Statute entered into force for that State. For Roger Clark, the purpose of Article 127(2) of the Rome Statute is to ensure that a state whose nationals have been subject to a referral to the Prosecutor by another state or by the Prosecutor acting proprio motu is not able to terminate such proceedings by withdrawing.659 In a paper where he critically comments on Kenya’s proposed withdrawal from the ICC, Professor Jalloh writes the following: First, it is true that under Article 127(1) of the Rome Statute, a State Party may, by notifying the UN Secretary-General, who is the depository of treaties, “withdraw” from the statute. So, although I hope that this does not happen, Kenya has the sovereign right to withdraw because of the consensual nature of international law. However, the withdrawal would take effect no earlier than one year after the date of receipt of the notification. More fundamentally, for our purposes, withdrawal cannot be used to undermine the ICC’s ongoing investigations and prosecutions. 656 657 658 659 Case of the Constitutional Court v Peru, Aguirre Roca and Others v Peru, Competence, IACHR Series C no 55, [1999], 24th September 1999, Inter-American Court of Human Rights [IACtHR], para.24. Judgment of 26 November 1957 (preliminary objection), Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India) [1957] ICJ Reports 125, 142. Ibid. Clark, R. S. ‘Article 127 – Withdrawal’, in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – Observers’ Notes, Article by article, Second edition, C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, München/Oxford/Baden-Baden, 2008, p. 1777-1778. 153 Aimé-Parfait Niyonkuru Thus, a withdrawing state is not “discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from” the statute during the time it was a party.660 Although it is demonstrated that with respect to the investigation and proceedings in relation with a situation in the Republic of Burundi, this country has an obligation to cooperate fully with the ICC under the Rome Statute, the risk of a non-cooperation stance may not be underestimated. This hypothesis raises the question of the impact of such a stance on the ICC’s ability to exercise its jurisdiction, both with respect to the Burundi situation and in general. 4 Impact of Burundi’s refusal to Cooperate with the ICC on ability of the Court to execute its Mandate As I shall illustrate, the effectiveness of both the judicial arm and the investigation arm of an international criminal tribunal depends heavily on state cooperation and is ultimately impeded by lack of state cooperation under the guise of state sovereignty.661 - Antonio Cassese This section suggests two main consequences of Burundi’s non-compliance with requests of the ICC for cooperation, contrary to the provisions of the Rome Statute. First, it argues that such non-compliance would render extremely difficult the exercise by the Court of its jurisdiction with respect to the situation in Burundi as referred to above and that the Court has no means at its disposal to force Burundi to cooperate with it. Second, and relatedly, the section argues that the Court’s lack of enforcement powers over its own decisions constitutes a serious threat to its viability. In this respect, the paper suggests a review of the Rome Statute to adopt robust and compelling sanctions against States that fail to comply with ICC’s requests for cooperation as the only means to ensure the State cooperation and to enable the Court to effectively execute its mandate under the Rome Statute. Obviously, a fair and effective investigation into the situation in Burundi and subsequent proceedings require a good-faith cooperation from Burundi as well as from other States Parties to the Rome Statute. The Court may also seek voluntary cooperation of States not Parties to the Statute as well as from non-state entities.662 In short, the Court must rely on the cooperation of states to effectively investigate and prosecute cases. Antonio Cassese’s argument on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) a fortiori applies to the ICC. He argues that an international criminal tribunal 660 661 662 C. Jalloh, see note 49. Antonio Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law’, 9 European Journal of International Law, (1998) 2-17, p. 12. ICC, Pre-Trail Chamber III, ICC-01/17-X-9-US-Exp, Public Redacted Version of “Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi”, October 25, 2017, para. 15. Burundi-ICC... 154 ... relies primarily on the cooperation of national authorities for the effective investigation and prosecution of persons accused of [violations of international humanitarian law]. Accordingly, all requests for assistance or orders of the ICTY, for instance, are addressed to and processed by the national system of the relevant state as the first resort Cooperation is necessary in relation to requests for assistance or orders of the ICTY for the identification and location of persons, the taking of testimony and the production of evidence, the service of documents, the arrest or detention of persons, and the surrender or transfer of the accused to the ICTY. States are obliged to cooperate with the ICTY for these purposes pursuant to Article 29 of the ICTY Statute.in relation to requests for assistance or orders of the ICTY for the identification and location of persons, the taking of testimony and the production of evidence, the service of documents, the arrest or detention of persons, and the surrender or transfer of the accused to the ICTY.663 Cassese’s remarks highlight the importance of state cooperation –particularly within the territory wherein crimes are alleged to have been committed – to the success of international criminal justice. Regarding specifically the ICC, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP), the ICC’s legislative and management body, has repeatedly “stress[ed] the importance of effective and comprehensive cooperation and assistance by States Parties, other States, and international and regional organizations, to enable the Court to fulfill its mandate as set out in the Rome Statute.664” However, as experience over the recent past has shown, there is an increase in instances of non-cooperation by both ICC States Parties and non-member states. The defiance of the ICC, mostly by AU Member States,665 likely predicts more of the same to come. This paper therefore puts forward the highly plausible hypothesis of Burundi putting its threat into action and refusing to cooperate with the ICC. Unless there is a radical change in Burundi’s position, its officials have made it clear that Burundi will not under any circumstances cooperate with the ICC.666 Burundi’s threat should be seriously considered since alleged perpetrators of crimes in question are members of its defense and security forces, its intelligence services and the Imbonerakure.667 The 663 664 665 666 667 Antonio Cassese, p. 12. “Report of the Bureau on cooperation” (ICC-ASP/15/18), Annex I, Draft resolution on cooperation, 10 November 2016; Resolution ICC-ASP/14/Res.3, “Resolution on cooperation”, Adopted at the 12th plenary meeting, on 26 November 2015, by consensus; Resolution ICC-ASP/13/Res.5, Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of States Parties, Adopted at the 13th plenary meeting, on 17 December 2014, by consensus; Resolution ICC-ASP/12/Res.3, “Resolution on cooperation”, Adopted at the 12th plenary meeting, on 27 November 2013, by consensus; Resolution ICC-ASP/10/Res.2, “Resolution on cooperation”, Adopted at the 7th plenary meeting, on 20 December 2011, by consensus; Declaration on cooperation RC/Decl.2 Adopted at the 9th plenary meeting, on 8 June 2010, by consensus at the Kampala Review Conference; Resolution ICC-ASP/7/Res.3, “Resolution on cooperation”, Adopted at the 7th plenary meeting, on 21 November 2008, by consensus. Humphrey Sipalla, ‘State Defiance, Treaty Withdrawals and the Resurgence of African Sovereign Equality Claims: Historicising the 2016 AU-ICC Collective Withdrawal Strategy’, HJ van der Merwe, Gerhard Kemp (eds), International Criminal Justice in Africa, 2016, Nairobi, Strathmore University Press/KAS, 2017, p.61-99. See above note Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation 155 Aimé-Parfait Niyonkuru ICC has already experienced uncooperative responses to its requests for cooperation and formal findings of non-compliance having been made against both States Parties and non-Parties to the Rome Statute.668 If it occurs, Burundi’s non-cooperation would simply add to the growing list of States in breach of their duty to cooperate with the Court under the Rome Statute. At a certain stage during investigation and proceedings, the Court will have to transmit to Burundi a request for cooperation. Predictably, unless there occurs a spectacular turn of events, Burundi will not comply with such a request. The recent changes in the extradition regime in the 2018 Constitution to preclude the extradition of nationals (see above) and the anti-ICC rhetoric of President Nkurunziza’s administration augur Burundi’s failure to comply with the ICC’s request for cooperation. The absence of domestic legislation to permit cooperation with the ICC is also more likely to support the assumption that Burundi will not cooperate, at least in the short term. However, from a medium to long-term perspective, since the ongoing crisis in the relationship between Burundi and the ICC has a political explanation, it is naturally also precarious. A regime change, a significant shift in political power or in political ideology is more likely to recreate a healthy relationship between Burundi and the ICC, thus allowing the country’s cooperation with the Court. At this point, the example of the Republic of The Gambia may serve as a good example. 2016 669 668 669 670 The Gambia gave notice of its withdrawal from the Rome Statute on 10 November and withdrew it on 10 February 2017670 after President Yahya Jammeh was forced in the Republic of Burundi. See also: Human Rights Council, Detailed Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi (A/HRC/39/63), 12 September 2018 (only in French), available at: https://www.ohchr. org/en/hrbodies/hrc/coiburundi/pages/coiburundi.aspx (accessed on 5 October 2018); Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi (A/HRC/36/54), 11 August 2017, available at: https:// documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/237/46/PDF/G1723746.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on 5 October 2018); Human Rights Watch, World Report 2015, Events of 2016, available at: https://www.hrw.org/ world-report/2017/country-chapters/burundi (accessed on 5 October 2018). Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by Jordan with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender or Omar Al-Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09, 11 December 2017; Decision on the non-compliance by the Republic of Uganda with the request to arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court and referring the matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute; No.: ICC-02/05-01/09, 11 July 2016; Decision on the non-compliance by the Republic of Djibouti with the request to arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court and referring the matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the State Parties to the Rome Statute, No.: ICC-02/0501/09, 11 July 2016; Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for a Finding of Non-Compliance Against the Republic of the Sudan, No. ICC-02/05-01/09, 9 March 2015; Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar Al Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, ICC-02/05-01/09-195, 9 April 2014; Decision on the Non-compliance of the Republic of Chad with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court Regarding the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, 26 March 2013; Decision pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the refusal of the Republic of Chad to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-140, 13 December 2011; Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09139, 12 December 2011. UN Depository Notification, Gambia: Withdrawal, C.N.862.2016.Treaties-XVIII.10, 10 November 2016. UN Depository Notification. Gambia: Withdrawal of Notification: C.N.62. 2017.Treaties-XVIII. Burundi-ICC... 156 out of office by the ECOWAS Standby Force for refusing to accept the result of the 2016 election. The Court harbours no illusions. Securing the State cooperation may take time. In the Case of The Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, the Court held that ... where a requested State did not immediately comply with a cooperation request, it may not amount to statutory non-compliance, if, through consultation and negotiation with the requesting entity, the requested State materially complied with the request within a reasonable timeframe. In this regard, the Chamber reiterates its view that cooperation is a continuing process and that both the requesting entity and the requested State should make genuine efforts to resolve any difficulties in order to facilitate the execution of a request.671 And by assuming that despite consultation and negotiation, Burundi fails to comply with the request of the Court for cooperation “within a reasonable timeframe” and that consequently, it is found in breach of its obligation under the Rome Statute to cooperate pursuant to article 87(7), such a finding would not, of course, affect its continued duty to perform the obligation it has breached.672 Accordingly, since in international law there is no time limit for the prosecution of [war crimes and] crimes against humanity673 and that prescription of such crimes does not apply in Burundi,674 a cooperation secured after a formal finding of non-compliance by the Court may still be useful to deal with the Court’s investigation and proceedings. However, the process of securing State cooperation cannot last forever. Otherwise, this would violate standards for fair trial and the interest of good administration of justice. In the case Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, the ICC denied the Prosecution’s request to adjourn the case until the Kenyan Government complies with the revised request for records.675 The Court considered that it was not appropriate for the proceedings to be further prolonged under the circumstances specific to the case. Only for complex cases, “an adjournment of limited duration, and for a clearly defined purpose which the Chamber considers necessary in the interests of justice” may be justified.676 On the other hand, the ICC’s investigation and prosecution of crimes in relation to the situation in Burundi, though challenging, remain possible even in the case of a Burundi’s failure to comply with the ICC’s requests for cooperation. With an effective and comprehensive cooperation and assistance by States Parties and non-party States 671 672 673 674 675 676 Decision on Prosecution’s application for a finding of non-compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute, No. ICC-01/09-02/11 1/46, 3 December 2014, para. 40 in fine. This in accordance with Article 29 of the Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001). This article provides that the State responsibility for an internationally wrongful act does not affect the continued duty of the responsible State to perform the obligation breached. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2391 (XXIII) of 26 November 1968. Entry into force: 11 November 1970, in accordance with article VIII, 754 U.N.T.S. 73. Law no.1/27 of 29 December 2017 revising the Criminal Code, Article 152. Decision on Prosecution’s application for a finding of non-compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute, No. ICC-01/09-02/11 1/46, 3 December 2014, para. 83. Decision on Prosecution’s applications for a finding of non-compliance pursuant to Article 87(7) and for an adjournment of the provisional trial date, No. ICC-01/09-02/11 1/47, 31 March 2014, para. 97. 157 Aimé-Parfait Niyonkuru alike, as well as by international and regional organizations, the Court may be able to exercise its jurisdiction though it would obviously be much less effective in discharging its mandate than it could be in a scenario wherein the court is able to rely on some cooperation from Burundi. If, as a matter of principle, ICC investigation and prosecution could not be successful without the cooperation of the territorial state, the Court would have terminated the proceedings against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir since the Court found that the Republic of Sudan has failed both to cooperate with it under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute and to consult the Court in accordance with Article 97 of the Statute and Rule 195(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.677 This suggests that notwithstanding the significance of the investigative challenges cases where the Court fails to secure the cooperation of the host State, the prosecution of crimes that fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction remains possible, provided that the cooperation other States – both ICC member and non-member states – and international and regional organizations is secured. Article 54(3)(c) of the Rome Statute empowers the Prosecutor to “[s]eek the cooperation of any State”, while under Article 89(1) The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person, (…) to any State on the territory of which that person may be found and shall request the cooperation of that State in the arrest and surrender of such a person. States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and the procedure under their national law, comply with requests for arrest and surrender. Through its Resolution ICC-ASP/14/Res.3 of 26 November 2015, the ASP stressed the importance of effective and comprehensive cooperation and assistance by States Parties, other States, and international and regional organizations, to enable the Court to fulfill its mandate as set out in the Rome Statute and that States Parties have a general obligation to cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within its jurisdiction, including with regard to the execution of arrest warrants and surrender requests, as well as other forms of cooperation set out in article 93 of the Rome Statute. Of course, without Burundi’s cooperation, the risk that the Court may encounter considerable difficulties in investigating crimes within its jurisdiction allegedly committed in Burundi or by Burundians prior to the date the withdrawal took effect is great. Not only may the Court’s investigating agents be denied access to Burundian territory (as were the members of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Burundi678), but also one may fear that victims and witnesses of those crimes could face intimidation arising from their cooperation with the ICC. While the risk of intimidation of, and interference with witnesses is significant for those located in Burundi, it is 677 678 Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for a Finding of Non-Compliance Against the Republic of the Sudan, No. ICC-02/05-01/09, 9 March 2015. The Commission was created by Human Rights Council resolution 33/24, adopted on 30 September 2016, to conduct a thorough investigation into human rights violations and abuses in Burundi since April 2015, to determine whether any of them may constitute international crimes, to identify their alleged perpetrators and to formulate recommendations for ensuring that such perpetrators “are held accountable for their acts”. By its resolution 36/19, adopted on 29 September 2017, the Council extended the Commission’s mandate without modification for one year. Burundi-ICC... 158 comparatively lower among those in exile.679 Burundian refugees and diaspora include many victims and witnesses of human rights violations, some of which amount to crimes against humanity.680 Although the Commissioners were refused access to the territory of Burundi, they however fulfilled their mandate, conducting more than 400 interviews with victims, witnesses other sources; this in addition to the 500 interviews conducted and the testimonies gathered during its initial mandate period.681 The assumption of non-cooperation raises the question of its legal consequences. Under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by the Court contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers under this Statute, the Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council. For the case under investigation, the UN Security Council did not refer the matter to the ICC. Rather, the Prosecutor used her proprio motu powers to initiate an investigation. Therefore, assuming that, either of its own accord or at the Prosecution’s request, the Court makes a finding of non-compliance pursuant to Article 87(7) and at its discretion,682 refers the matter to the ASP, the question is by what means this ICC’s “guardian angel”683 could ensure that Burundi cooperates fully with the Court. Article 112(2)(f) of the Rome Statute provides that “the Assembly shall consider pursuant to article 87, paragraphs 5 and 7, any question relating to non-cooperation.” Since its 3rd Session (in 2004/2005), the ASP has adopted several resolutions on “Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of States Parties”684 and cooperation685 as well as reports on 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 Since the start of the 2015 crisis, sources report that some 420,000 Burundians have fled to neighbouring countries (See UNHCR, ‘Burundi Situation 2017: Supplementary Appeal January- December 2017 (May 2017), Burundian refugees and asylum seekers in neighbouring countries as of 30 April 2017, May 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/59244aa77.pdf [last accessed 6 October 2017]. See note above, no. 61. Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, note No. 61 above. Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by Jordan with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender or Omar Al-Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09, 11 December 2017, para. 52; The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, “Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against Trial Chamber V(B)’s ‘Decision on Prosecution’s application for a finding of non-compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute’”, ICC-01/09-02/11-1032, 19 August 2015, para.52; See also: W.A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, Second Edition, Oxford Commentaries on International Law (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1278. C. Jalloh, see note No. 49 and 54. ICC-ASP/3/Res.3, 10 September 2004; ICC-ASP/4/Res.4, 3 December 2005; ICC-ASP/5/Res.3, 1 December 2006; ICC-ASP/6/Res.2, 14 December 2007; ICC-ASP/7/Res.3, 21 November 2008; ICC-ASP/8/Res.3, 26 November.2009; ICC-ASP/9/Res.3 10 December 2010; ICC-ASP/10/Res.5 21 December 2011; ICC-ASP/11/ Res.8, 21November 2012; ICC-ASP/12/Res.8, 27 November 2013; ICC-ASP/13/Res.5, 17 December 2014; ICC-ASP/14/Res.4, 26 November 2015; ICC-ASP/15/Res.5, 26 November 2016. ICC-ASP/8/Res.2, 26 November 2009; ICC-ASP/10/Res.2, 20 December 2011; ICC-ASP/11/Res.5, 21 November 2012; ICC-ASP/12/Res.3, 27 November 2013; ICC-ASP/13/Res.3, 17 December 2014; ICCASP/14/Res.3, 26 November 2015; ICC-ASP/15/Res.3, 26 November 2016. 159 Aimé-Parfait Niyonkuru cooperation686 and non-cooperation.687 And a Declaration on Cooperation was adopted on 21 December 2011, at its 9th plenary meeting, the ASP adopted procedures relating to non-cooperation.688 These procedures consist of a set of measures that the ASP can take in situations where States fail to comply with their obligations to cooperate with the Court. However, the truth is that the ASP lacks enforcement powers over both its own decisions and on that of the Court. The increase in cases of non-compliance with requests from the ICC for cooperation (mainly relating to arrest warrants and orders for surrender of persons) may be explained by the fact that the ASP is not empowered in the Statute with specific sanctioning powers. International lawyers have pointed out the weakness of the ICC’s cooperation regime. Hence, while Annika Jones argues that “The most severe response that the Court can take to instances of non-cooperation is a judicial finding of non-cooperation and diplomatic pressure through its legislative and management body, the ASP”,689 Göran Sluiter observes that the Statute’s silence on the measures to impose on a state in breach of its obligation to cooperate calls into question the effectiveness of the Assembly’s responses to violations of the duty to cooperate.690 Accordingly, he argues in favour of a more robust role for the ASP.691 As far as the hypothesis on a possible request by the ICC Prosecutor for a finding of non-compliance against Burundi is concerned, another legal question is likely to arise. Since Article 87(7) refers to “a State Party” failing to comply with a request to cooperate by the Court contrary to the provisions of this Statute, the question is whether this provision is applicable to Burundi which will not be longer a “State Party” to the Rome Statute when the Prosecutor will eventually file the request and when the Court will issue its decision on the said request. In our opinion, this provision should be interpreted in light of the above-discussed principle of past obligations, considering that the Prosecutor’s request should be viewed as an appendix of, or connected to pending proceedings in respect of which the ICC’s jurisdiction is already established.692 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 ICC-ASP/6/21, 19 October 2007; ICC-ASP/18/44, 15 November 2009; ICC-ASP/12/34, 7 November 2013; ICC-ASP/13/40, 5 December 2014; ICC-ASP 04/14, 14 November 2017. ICC-ASP/11/29, 1 November 2012; ICC-ASP/12/34, 7 November 2013; ICC-ASP/13/40, 5 December 2014; ICC-ASP/14/38, 18 November 2015; ICC-ASP/15/31, 8 November 2016; ICC-ASP/15/31/Add1, 9 November 2016; ICC-ASP/16/16, 26 October 2017; ICC-ASP/16/17, 22 November 2017. Annexed to Resolution ICC-ASP/10/Res.5, Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of States Parties, Adopted at the 9th plenary meeting, on 21 December 2011, by consensus. Jones, Annika (2016) ‘Non-cooperation and the efficiency of the International Criminal Court.’, Olympia Bekou and Daley Birkett (eds), Cooperation and the International Criminal Court: perspectives from theory and practice, Leiden: Brill, p.187 185-209. Nottingham studies on human rights. (4). Goran Sluiter, ‘The Surrender of War Criminals to the International Criminal Court’, 25 The Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, (2003), p. 616. Göran Sluiter, ‘Enforcing Cooperation: Did the Drafters Approach It the Wrong Way?’, 16 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2 (2018) 383–402. Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi, ICC-01/17-X-9-US-Exp, 25 October 2017. Burundi-ICC... 160 Conclusion Some international scholars have portrayed the ICC as a ‘paper tiger’ or a ‘giant without legs’ due to its ineffective enforcement mechanisms, while the cooperation regime appears as the Achilles heel of the Court’s procedural framework. This paper focused on the issue of cooperation with respect to a withdrawing State. Using Burundi as a case study and relying on the Rome Statute, the Vienna Convention and the theory of past obligations as both legal and theoretical materials, it has argued that with respect to proceedings resulting from the investigation into the crimes allegedly committed in Burundi from 26 April 2015 to 26 October 2017, the period during which Burundi was still a State Party to the Rome Statute of the ICC, Burundi’s claim that its withdrawal from the Statute on 27 October 2017 discharges it from the obligation to cooperate fully with the Court over the aforementioned proceedings or from any other obligation arising from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute lacks legal merit. Accordingly, under the Rome Statute, the Court is entitled to make requests to Burundi for cooperation, and the latter has the obligation to cooperate fully with the Court. If all efforts to secure Burundi’s cooperation should fail, the Court will probably make a finding of non-compliance against Burundi and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties. However, since the Rome Statute remains silent in regard to the repercussions of a member state that refuses to comply with the ICC’s requests for cooperation, the paper argued the ineffectiveness of the ASP’s responses to state non-compliance. The case of Sudan’s President Al Bashir is a particularly poignant illustration of this ineffectiveness. Despite warrants for arrest issued against him, he has been traversing the globe, including multiple visits to states party to the Rome Statute. Although the Court made findings of non-cooperation under article 87(7) and referred the matter to the United Nations Security Council, there is nothing to show that such referrals have resulted in an incentive for states to cooperate with the Court. To the contrary, the Court continues to face increasing challenges to secure cooperation, especially when, like in the Bashir case, the stakes are high. Regarding the impact of Burundi’s non-cooperation, the paper argued that the lack of cooperation of the territorial State will have an obvious and negative impact on the ability of the Court to conduct fair and effective investigations and/or prosecutions. Assuming that most of the suspects and individuals under warrant by the ICC will carefully avoid countries where there is a risk of being arrested and surrendered, the Court could hardly properly exercise its jurisdiction when it lacks enforcement mechanisms to ensure defendants’ appearance at trial (the Rome Statute does not provide for trials in absentia). More dramatically, by lengthening the list of countries having “successfully” defied the Court over the duty to cooperate under the Rome Statute, Burundi’s non-cooperation will show once more how ineffective the Rome Statute system is when faced with uncooperative States, both members and non-members. This paper linked this weakness to a lacuna in the Rome Statute with regards to repercussions for States in breach of their obligation to cooperate. As a result, the paper concludes that both the viability of the ICC and its ability to achieve its goal of putting an end to impunity for the perpetrators of international core crimes depends upon the strengthening the ICC’s cooperation regime. 161 Aimé-Parfait Niyonkuru At present, the ICC’s cooperation regime lacks compelling sanctions and penalties for state non-compliance. In this respect, a review of the Rome Statute to adopt persuasive and compelling sanctions in response to non-cooperation instances seems the right way to ensure effective state cooperation. This suggestion is, however, far from easily attainable. The chance of securing the two-third majority of States Parties required to adopt a necessary amendment of the Rome Statute is low. Particularly in a time when the legitimacy, the independence and the impartiality of the Court is contested. Moreover, possible sanctions like the suspension from the rights and privileges of membership and expulsion are far from being persuasive when the mere threat by State members of withdrawing from the Court places significant pressure on both the Court and its members. As for privileges membership, if they exist and perceived by the State members as such, the fact is that such alleged privileges may be of a less importance compared to expected benefits of a withdrawal. Admittedly, sanctions like trade sanctions, financial sanctions or military intervention are among the most persuasive. However, these sanctions emerge as irrelevant against a State failing to cooperate under the Rome Statute. Considering, for instance, the non-cooperation as a threat to the international peace and security under the UN justifying collective enforcement action, is an example of such persuasive sanctions. But once again, the benefit-cost of the insertion of such a sanction is such States are less likely to adopt such a norm. Comparatively, amendments of the Rome Statute to criminalize active non-cooperation in the Rome Statute –as complement or a replacement of other enforcement mechanisms may constitute credible alternatives693 693 See further Bernard Ntahiraja’s chapter in this volume. Burundi-ICC... 162 163 Eugene Bakama Bope LA COUR PENALE SPECIALE EN REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE: PROGRES ET DEFIS Eugene Bakama Bope694 Résumé Malgré la signature de plusieurs accords politiques depuis 2016, un nouveau cycle de violences communautaires ravage la République Centrafricaine depuis début 2017. De même, malgré la création en 2015 d’une Cour pénale spéciale (CPS) chargée de juger l’ensemble des crimes graves commis dans ce pays de l’Afrique centrale depuis 2003, les groupes armés poursuivent leurs exactions. Pour apaiser les tensions et tenter de restaurer son autorité dans le pays, le gouvernement centrafricain a fait le choix d’intégrer certains représentants des groupes armés dans le gouvernement. Pourtant, les conditions de sécurité ne cessent de se détériorer. Face à cette situation, certains craignent que les crimes de guerre ne soient pas jugés de manière prioritaire. D’autres restent dans la logique d’un processus de réconciliation nationale inclusif intégrant l’ensemble des acteurs (y compris les criminels). Ainsi, la CPS tout comme les autres mécanismes risquent d’être relayés au second temps. L’auteur de cette réflexion soutien que la réconciliation nationale ne doit pas entraver les poursuites judiciaires à venir contre des criminels de guerre car la paix se nourrit de la justice. 694 L’auteur est Doctorant en droit à l’Université d’Aix-Marseille en France et Président du Club des amis du droit du Congo. Il remercie Bahati Mujinya, Doctorant en droit à l’Université d’Ottawa au Canada et Chargé de projet justice du Club des amis du droit du Congo, pour la relecture de cet article. La cour penale speciale en republique centrafricaine... 164 SPECIAL CRIMINAL COURT IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES Abstract Despite signing several political agreements since 2016, a new cycle of community violence has ravaged the Central African Republic since 2017. Also, despite the establishment of the Special Criminal Court in 2015 with the mandate of dealing with grave crimes committed in the Central African Republic from 2003, armed groups continue with their human rights abuses. To deal with the tensions and attempt to restore its authority in the country, the Central African Republic government has chosen to integrate certain representatives of armed groups in the government. However, the security situation continues to deteriorate. In the face of this situation, there is fear that dealing with war crimes will not be prioritized. Some people advocate for an inclusive national reconciliation process which integrates all actors including perpetrators. The Special Criminal Court like other mechanisms risks being relegated to second level. The authors of these reflections wish that national reconciliation should not hamper judicial investigations against war criminals because peace is dependent on justice. Introduction Le 24 avril 2015, le parlement de transition adoptait la loi organique portant création de la Cour pénale spéciale (ci-après dénommée CPS) en République Centrafricaine. Cette Cour intégrée dans le système judiciaire national, est composée de juges, de procureurs ainsi que d’administrateurs internationaux et nationaux. De par cette composition, elle vient s’ajouter à une longue liste des tribunaux « internationalisés » appelés aussi des tribunaux « hybrides » ou mixtes, telles que le Tribunal spécial pour la Sierra Léone (2002), les Chambres africaines extraordinaires etc. C’est la première fois qu’un tribunal mixte fonctionnera aux côtés de la Cour pénale internationale dans un même pays. Son avènement constitue aussi un rappel qu’il existe en dehors de la CPI, d’autres formes de justice internationalisée à même de prendre à bras le corps les poursuites des crimes les plus graves. 165 Eugene Bakama Bope La CPS suscite pour les victimes des cycles de violence un espoir et une occasion importante de voire l’impunité généralisée être combattue.695 L’objectif de justice à travers la mise en place de cette juridiction se heurte notamment à la question de l’amnistie qui sous-tend les négociations de paix. Comment convaincre les chefs de guerre de transformer leurs organisations en mouvements politiques (voir le cas de la République démocratique du Congo), d’imposer un cessezle-feu et de participer au processus de désarmement et d’intégration s’ils sentent planer au-dessus de leurs têtes la menace d’une inculpation pour les crimes de guerre dont ils ont été auteurs ? Comment les faires venir à Bangui, créer une dynamique de réconciliation s’ils craignent d’être arrêtés et poursuivis ? C’est à cet égard que l’équation à multiples inconnues : guerre, justice, paix696 se révèle lancinante. Après la rédaction des instruments juridiques de la CPS tels que le Règlement de procédure et de preuve, le règlement intérieur de la Cour, le décret sur la police judiciaire, lesquels ont pris un retard d’une année, il s’avère évident qu’il n’y a plus d’obstacles pour que la Cour commence ses activités judiciaires. Son Procureur a commencé l’ouverture des enquêtes dans le deuxième semestre de l’année 2018.697 Et la session inaugurale a eu lieu le 22 octobre 2018, plus de trois ans après l’adoption initiale de la loi portant création de la loi sur la CPS. Toutefois, il (le procureur) reconnaît que la Cour doit faire face à plusieurs défis au nombre desquels se rangent la situation sécuritaire actuelle du pays qui complique le travail des enquêteurs ; le mauvais état des structures pénitentiaires surtout en province ainsi que la précarité des ressources financières pour son fonctionnement.698 Cette réflexion met l’accent sur le défi concernant, d’une part, la recherche de la paix et, d’autre part, le souci de poursuivre les auteurs de crimes graves en RCA en permettant aux victimes d’obtenir réparation des préjudices qu’elles ont subies. Il ne s’agira pas d’entrer dans le débat théorique sur la « paix contre la justice » lequel a déjà fait l’objet d’une littérature abondante .699 Mais il sera question de mettre en relief le contexte actuel en RCA, en particulier, le rôle envisagé pour la CPS et d’expliquer l’argument selon lequel « la réconciliation nationale ne devrait pas entraver les poursuites futures des criminels de guerre et de leurs complices ». Car, sans justice, il ne peut y 695 696 697 698 699 Human Rights Watch : « En quête de justice », La Cour pénale spéciale, une nouvelle opportunité pour les victimes en RCA, disponible sur le lien : https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/car0518fr_web2. pdf , publié le 17 mai 2018. Journal Le monde, « La mission impossible de la Cour pénale spéciale en Centrafrique », le 06 juillet 2017. Interviews du Procureur Muntazini sur jeune Afrique du 28 novembre 2017. Idem Jeangène Vilmer Jean-Baptiste, « Introduction », dans : Pas de paix sans justice, Le dilemme de la paix et de la justice en sortie de conflit armé, sous la direction de Jeangène Vilmer Jean-Baptiste, Paris, Presses de Sciences Pô, 2011, pp. 13-34 ; Voir aussi Vincent Chetail, « La consolidation de la paix », dans : Lexique de la consolidation de la paix, Sous la direction de Vincent Chetail, Bruylant 2009, p. 59. ; Anne-Marie La Rosa et Xavier Philippe, «  Justice transitionnelle », dans : Lexique de la consolidation de la paix, Sous la direction de Vincent Chetail, Bruylant 2009, p. 270. La cour penale speciale en republique centrafricaine... 166 avoir de réconciliation durable en Centrafrique. La réconciliation nationale passe par la justice et donc que la seconde est un moyen de réalisation de la première. 1 Contexte sécuritaire en RCA La République Centrafricaine est l’un des pays de l’Afrique centrale qui ont été déchiré par des conflits multiformes et les plus dévastateurs. La nécessité de mettre fin aux dégâts engendrés par ces conflits a dicté la mise en place d’une mission de maintien de la paix. Toutefois, la RCA est retombée dans la spirale des violences avec des groupes toujours actifs et dangereux. Des élections ont été organisées et le président Touadera a été élu en mars 2016. Ce dernier s’était fixé comme priorité de ramener la paix dans le pays. Trois ans après son élection, le pays est toujours sur le difficile chemin vers la paix, le dialogue politique engagé avec les leaders de groupes armés n’a pas encore arrêté les bruits des armes, et la réconciliation est encore un mythe, tandis qu’une Cour pénale spéciale a été crée en plein conflit. Est-ce que c’est la solution du moment? 1.1 Le difficile chemin de la pacification en RCA L’histoire de la RCA a toujours été depuis l’indépendance marquée par une succession des coups d’État jusqu’à l’élection en mars 2016 de Faustin-Archange Touadéra qui est issu d’un suffrage électoral. C’est donc un contexte des violences depuis 1960. Le contexte de la crise actuelle remonte à 2012 avec la chute de François Bozize par les rebelles de la Séléka, majoritairement musulmans qui ont mis en avant le fait que leur région a été abandonnée par l’État depuis 50 ans. Contrairement à ce qui peut apparaitre, le conflit en RCA n’est ni religieux, ni ethnique – même si quelques mosquées et lieux de cultes ont été détruit, il s’agit plutôt d’un problème de gouvernance à la tête de l’État. En s’emparant du pouvoir, les Séléka ont mené une campagne de terreur et de violence. En réponse, un autre groupe armé a vu le jour sous le nom d’Antibalaka. Ils se sont présentés comme un groupe d’auto-défense. Ils ont pris pour cibles les civils musulmans. Dans ces affrontements entre la Séléka et les anti-balaka, des civils ont été les premières victimes. Pour faire face à ce conflit, la mission de maintien de la paix de l’Union africaine et les troupes françaises ont été déployées sur le territoire centrafricain fin 2013. Mais cela n’a pas stopper la violence. De même, les Nations Unies ont mis en place en 2014, la MINUSCA (la Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République centrafricaine), une force d’environ 12.000 hommes qui n’arrivent pas à pacifier la RCA. Elles n’ont pas pu empêcher le massacre dans la localité de Pombolo en octobre 2017 et ailleurs.700 La RCA est devenue le sanctuaire des groupes armés. On en dénombre officiellement 14. Après son élection en mars 2016, le Président Touadéra s’est donné pour mission de restaurer la paix dans ce pays. Mais sur le terrain, la paix tarde à venir. Les groupes 700 RFI « Nouveau massacre dans le sud-Est de la Centrafrique », publié le 20 octobre 2017. Disponible sur le lien http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20171020-rca-nouveau-massacre-pombolo-attaque-groupes-autodefense-peuls 167 Eugene Bakama Bope armés continuent de faire la loi dans certaines provinces où l’État est absent. Human Right Watch a documenté les meurtres commis par des groupes armés contre au moins 249 civils entre mai et octobre 2017, essentiellement dans les parties du Sud du pays.701 Un programme de désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion (DDR) a été mis sur pied par le gouvernement centrafricain mais peine à donner des résultats suite au refus des groupes armés de désarmer.702 Parallèlement, plusieurs tentatives de médiation ont été menées sans succès en Centrafrique : accord de Brazzaville (juillet 2014), accord de Nairobi (avril 2015), l’initiative africaine de paix (septembre 2016-juillet 2017), accord de Sant Egidio (juin 2017), Forum de Bangui etc. Malgré ces tentatives, près de 80% du territoire reste sous la coupe de groupes armés et l’autorité étatique ne dépasse guère les faubourgs de la capitale Bangui. Quelques anciens combattants de ces groupes armés ont cependant été intégrés dans l’armée nationale. Par ailleurs, certains de leaders de ces groupes ne veulent pas désarmer. Ils veulent une amnistie générale. Ces groupes armés sont essentiellement composés de criminels de droit commun qui ont réussi à transformer leurs activités de banditisme à des groupes armés pour leurs intérêts. La plupart de ces groupes armés sont selon un membre de la société civile rattachés à certains hommes politiques en exil ou ceux qui veulent se maintenir au pouvoir. 703 Dans cette quête de paix, les autorités centrafricaines ont aussi souhaité que justice soit rendue. Elles ont décidé de mettre en place une Cour pénale spéciale pour lutter contre l’impunité qui règne en RCA. La question est cependant de savoir si le contexte actuel de la RCA caractérisé par la violence permet-il que justice soit rendue. 1.2 La Cour pénale spéciale : Est-ce la réponse du moment ? Il ne s’agit pas de répondre à la question de savoir si la justice est importante en contexte centrafricain, mais plutôt si dans ce contexte marqué par la violence, l’insécurité, rendre justice est possible. La CPS est-elle la réponse du moment, ou il y a mieux qu’elle au regard des exigences de la pacification du pays. Poser cette question c’est indubitablement s’orienter plus vers la politique que le judiciaire. On le sait, la justice ne saurait être correctement rendue en temps de guerre, notamment parce « justice institutions may be inaccessible during active hostilities 704», ce qui est à peu près le cas de la RCA. Aussi, il conviendrait que la paix précède le procès. Plus précisément, le procès, acte de justice, ne peut pas restaurer la paix, acte 701 702 703 704 Human Right Watch, « République Centrafricaine : Les civils pris pour cible dans une nouvelle flambée de violence », Communiqué de presse de HRW, 27 octobre 2017. RFI, « RCA : Début du programme DDR de réinsertion des anciens combattants » publié le 01/09/2017 Entretien avec un membre de la société civile de la RCA à Bruxelles, mars 2018. Thomas Unger, Marieke Wierda, « Pursuing justice in ongoing conflict: A discussion of current practice » in Kai Ambos, Judith Large, Marieke Wierda (eds), Building a Future on peace and justice, Berlin, Springer, 2009, p. 264. La cour penale speciale en republique centrafricaine... 168 politique.705 Cependant, il peut contribuer à consolider une paix déjà acquise .706 La justice institutionnelle devrait succéder à la paix, lui être postérieure. Cette structure temporelle permettrait au politique de faire la paix puis au juge de rendre la justice, étant entendu que le second viendrait compléter et renforcer le travail du premier. Or en RCA, il a été demandé à la CPS d’agir pendant que les hostilités et la commission des crimes sont en cours. Le procès se présente alors comme un possible catalyseur de la paix. En cas d’échec ultérieur de la paix, le tribunal risque d’être perçu comme un obstacle à la paix. Au niveau de la CPI, l’article 16 du Statut de Rome prévoit le cas où les intérêts de la justice entrent en conflit avec les intérêts de la paix. Il n’y a pas une telle disposition dans le Statut de la CPS, ni dans son règlement de procédure et de preuve. Cette omission rend compte de la difficulté qui peut découler des actions du procureur qui ne peuvent viser que les poursuites même si les intérêts de la paix dicteraient un assouplissement ou un ralentissement. Cependant, en tant que juridiction nationale, la politique de poursuite du Procureur de la CPS permet d’atténuer ou de résoudre ces questions d’intérêts de la paix. L’idée de créer une Cour pour juger les responsables des crimes graves n’était pas en soi mauvaise mais en l’absence d’infrastructures, du personnel (huissiers, avocats, auxiliaires judiciaires), et en raison du contexte sécuritaire, il était peut-être indiqué de pacifier d’abord le pays. C’est l’idée soutenue par certains diplomates africains. D’aucuns pensent que la création de cette Cour dans le contexte actuel centrafricain n’est pas la réponse à la question.707 L’expert Michel Carrié affirme que « Le pays n’est pas pacifié, il y a une insécurité grandissante, l’appareil judiciaire national a été très touché par la guerre. Comment arrêter les gens qui ont commis les crimes ou instruire si l’on ne peut pas avoir accès à des quartiers où les violences continuent. On a essayé de privilégier la justice avant les éléments de base de la justice ou l’embryon d’un État de droit. Là on risque d’avoir une pseudo justice ».708 Cette solution semble donc être selon certains experts, une réponse inadaptée à la situation en termes de chronologie. On ne peut pas faire une justice quand on n’a pas de vraies structures de justice et quand il n’y a pas de paix. Sur ce point, une approche nuancée suggérerait qu’il existe un temps pour engager des poursuites et que, dans le contexte d’un conflit violent (comme en RCA), que ça ne soit pas immédiatement après la cessation des hostilités entre les parties belligérantes.709 A ce stade, la tension dans le pays est élevée et toute initiative visant à poursuivre les individus et les dirigeants en justice est souvent considérée comme une tentative de poursuivre délibérément la « guerre par d’autres moyens ». Dans cette situation, les efforts de promouvoir la paix, 705 706 707 708 709 Anne-Laure Chaumette, « La Cour pénale internationale et le maintien de la paix », Fernandez Julian and Pacreau Xavier, Statut de Rome de la Cour pénale internationale : commentaire article par article, Editions Pedone, pp 65-75, 2012 Id. Entretien avec M. Michel Carrié, spécialiste de programme justice à l’OIF. Id. Tim Murithi, Sequencing the administration of justice to enable the pursuit of peace: Can the ICC play a role in complementing restorative justice?, IJR Policy Brief, p. 2. 169 Eugene Bakama Bope incluant la dimension justice restaurative auront priorité à l’administration de la justice punitive. Il s’agit de jeter les bases de la stabilité de la société.710 Le délai d’attente avant que la CPI engage ses propres procédures dépendra toujours du contexte national spécifique à la crise.711 Cependant, le temps de la justice et du temps de la paix dépend aussi de chaque contexte et peut avoir diverses conséquences. À titre illustratif, en République démocratique du Congo, après la guerre, on a choisi de donner d’abord la chance à la paix et d’attendre le temps de la justice. Un accord politique a été signé à Sun City en 2002, un gouvernement 1+4 (un président avec 4 vice-présidents) a été mis sur pied en 2003.712 Des anciens rebelles sont devenus ministres, généraux dans l’armée. Une amnistie a été accordée. Une sorte de prime « à la capacité de nuire » pour les victimes.713 La justice n’a pas suivi et certains de ces criminels restent impunis à ce jour. Les quelques décisions judiciaires qui ont été rendues n’ont pas concernés les « gros poissons ». L’approche centrafricaine est différente parce que la création de la CPS est une nécessité de construire la paix au travers de la justice. Le Prof Tim Murithi reconnaît lui-même qu’une « allergie aux poursuites peut empêcher que des atrocités sérieuses ne soient traitées, ce qui aurait une incidence sur la réalisation d’une paix durable à l’avenir ».714 Un juste milieu doit être trouvé. En RCA, c’est la population centrafricaine qui avait exprimé son désir de justice pendant les affrontements entre la Séléka et les anti-balaka. C’est cette demande de justice qui avait poussé le gouvernement de transition de l’époque d’initier l’idée d’une Cour pénale spéciale. Peu importe les difficultés pratiques et les défis soulevés ci-haut, les centrafricains ont souhaité que les initiatives de paix et de la justice soient concomitantes. Les consultations nationales en 2015 connues sous le nom de « Forum de Bangui » ont clairement montré l’intérêt du peuple centrafricain à l’égard de la justice pénale contre les crimes graves avec une recommandation pour l’opérationnalisation de la Cour pénale spéciale.715 Voyons à présent le rôle envisagé de cette CPS. 2. Le rôle de la CPS Pour aborder la question du rôle de cette juridiction en contexte centrafricain, il sied de revenir en arrière pour savoir le contexte de sa création de la CPS puis examiner sa base légale et son mandat, son rôle complémentarité et enfin ses atouts et défis. 2.1 Processus de création de la CPS et justification L’instabilité et l’insécurité actuelles que connaît la RCA ont pour origine, la présence de groupes armés et de milices qui luttent pour le contrôle du territoire, le pouvoir et 710 711 712 713 714 715 Id. Ibid . p. 12. Constitution congolaise de la transition du 4 avril 2003. Luzolo Bambi Lessa et Bayona Wa Bameya, Manuel de procédure pénale, Kinshasa, PUC, 2011, Tim Murithi, op. cit, p. 16. Human Rights Watch, « En quête de justice .. », op. cit. p. 8. La cour penale speciale en republique centrafricaine... 170 l’accès aux ressources naturelles. Elles résultent aussi du jeu des alliances qui se font et se défont entre les groupes et au sein de ceux-ci. 716 Ainsi, il y a eu au niveau national et international le désir de mettre un terme à l’impunité en RCA et traduire devant la justice les responsables présumés des crimes qui y ont été perpétrés. Au niveau international, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies avait décidé de mettre en place une commission internationale d’enquête pour faire la lumière sur les allégations d’atteintes aux droits de l’homme perpétrées en RCA pour toutes les parties au conflit depuis le 1er janvier 2013. Un expert indépendant sur la situation des droits de l’Homme en RCA a été nommé par le Conseil des droits de l’Homme à cet effet. Au niveau national, la présidente de la transition Catherine Samba Panza et la société civile ont déclaré à plusieurs reprises la nécessité de mettre en place une juridiction spéciale en charge des crimes les plus graves commis en RCA depuis 2012. En avril 2014, une cellule spéciale d’enquête et d’instruction (ci-après dénommée CSEI) a été mise en place par décret présidentiel avant le mémorandum d’accord conclu en août de la même année sur la création d’une Cour pénale spéciale. Cette cellule spéciale avait pour mission d’enquêter sur les violations graves des droits humains et de poursuivre les responsables de ces crimes. Un comité composé d’experts nationaux et internationaux a travaillé sur cette CPS en collaboration avec le ministre de la justice et la MINUSCA.717 Le gouvernement a adopté le 5 février 2015, un projet de loi visant à la mise en place de la dite CPS. Comme le souligne Patryk Labuda, il est difficile de reconstituer à quel moment l’idée d’un tribunal hybride pour la RCA est née. On ne sait pas si l’idée est née en RCA ou a été suggérée par des acteurs internationaux.718 La première mention de ce qui allait devenir la CPS se trouvait dans le rapport du Secrétaire général de l’ONU sur la RCA.719 Une chose est vraie, la CPS a bénéficié d’un large soutien lors de sa création. La CPS représentait pour certains une décision souveraine d’intégrer la Cour dans le système judiciaire local avec le soutien d’acteurs internationaux.720 Pour d’autres, la communauté internationale à travers la MINUSCA a joué un rôle primordial. Déjà le Conseil de sécurité avait donné des mesures temporaires d’urgences pour « maintenir l’ordre public et lutter contre l’impunité », ce qui est rare pour une mission de maintien de la paix.721 Une telle Cour a été jugée indispensable pour juger des atrocités commises en RCA, le système judiciaire national n’ayant ni les capacités, ni l’expertise et les moyens 716 717 718 719 720 721 Amnesty international, RCA : le long chemin vers la justice, L’obligation de rendre des comptes. 2017, p. 12. PGA, Mémorandum du PGA sur la création d’une Cour pénale spéciale en RCA, février 2015. Patryk I. Labuda, « The special criminal Court in the Central African Republic », in Journal of international Criminal justice, 15(2017), p. 200. Rapport du SG de l’ONU sur la RCA, S/2014/562, 1er août 2014, §55, Voir Brigitte Balipou, Special Criminal Court for the Central African Republic: Context, challenges and perspectives, Conference report of the Wayamo Foundation. 22 September 2016, p. 6. Patryk Labuda, op. cit. p. 201. 171 Eugene Bakama Bope nécessaires pour pouvoir mener à bien des enquêtes contre des criminels qui sévissent encore. La CPS aura un effet dissuasif réel parce qu’elle envoie un message fort aux auteurs de crimes graves que l’heure de l’impunité est révolue et qu’ils devront répondre de leur crimes .722 Elle est également bénéfique pour la mise en place d’un système judiciaire efficace et fonctionnel sur le long terme en RCA. Un tel organe renforcerait considérablement les structures nationales et de par son caractère mixte, elle permettrait aux acteurs judiciaires nationaux de bénéficier d’une formation de haut niveau pour ces crimes. Enfin, les victimes auront une place devant cette CPS. Cette dernière garantit que les victimes puissent faire valoir leurs droits à toutes les étapes de la procédure. 723 2. 2 Base légale et compétence de la Cour pénale spéciale 2. 2.1 Base légale de la CPS La base légale de cette institution judiciaire est à retrouver dans la loi organique n°15/003 du 03 juin 2015 portant création, organisation et fonctionnement de la Cour pénale spéciale (loi sur la CPS) adoptée par le Conseil national de transition et promulguée par la présidente de la transition. Le législateur centrafricain a décidé ainsi d’intégrer cette Cour dans le système judiciaire centrafricain.724 Ce qui fait cependant sa spécificité par rapport aux autres tribunaux mixtes, c’est le fait que son acte constitutif reste officiellement un texte de loi nationale malgré que l’ONU ait joué un rôle important voire décisif dans sa création725. La CPS a donc, une certaine dose d’internationalisation. Il est à noter aussi que la loi portant création de la CPS ne crée pas des nouvelles incriminations. Mais elle appliquera celles qui sont définies par le Code pénal centrafricain et les obligations internationales de la RCA. Puis qu’il n’y a pas de nouveauté, rien ne justifie le recours au principe de non-rétroactivité des lois pénales pour faire échec à l’application de la loi sur la CPS aux actes qui lui sont antérieurs. Dans la même logique, l’article 15 du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques de 1966, dans son paragraphe 2 précise que « rien dans le présent article ne s’oppose au jugement ou à la condamnation de tout individu en raison d’actes ou omissions qui, au moment où ils ont été commis, étaient tenus pour criminels, d’après les principes généraux de droit reconnus par l’ensemble des nations ». Et comme la RCA est de tradition moniste, « les accords ou traités régulièrement ratifiés ou approuvés ont, dès leur publication, une autorité supérieure à celle des lois, sous réserve, pour chaque Accord ou traité, de son application par l’autre partie ».726 Ainsi, les normes internationales s’appliquent à la CPS non pas parce que la législation nationale applicable comporte des lacunes ou des 722 723 724 725 726 Mémorandum du PGA sur la création de la CPS, op. cit. Art. 6 du Règlement de procédure et de preuve de la CPS. Art. 1 de la loi sur la CPS. Patryk Labuda, op. cit. p. 182. Art. 95 de la Constitution Centrafricaine du 30 mars 2016. La cour penale speciale en republique centrafricaine... 172 incohérences mais parce qu’elles font partie de l’ordonnancement juridique centrafricain. Cependant, la CPS en tant que juridiction interne centrafricaine applique aussi les règles de procédures prévues par le code de procédure pénale de la RCA.727 2.2.2 Compétence et fonctionnement de la Cour pénale spéciale 2.2.2.1 Compétence de la CPS La Cour pénale spéciale est compétente pour « enquêter, instruire et juger les violations graves des droits humains et les violations graves du droit international humanitaires commis sur le territoire de la République centrafricaine depuis le 1er janvier 2003, telles que définies par le code pénal centrafricain et en vertu des obligations internationales contractées par la RCA en matière de droit international, notamment le crime de génocide, les crimes contre l’humanité et les crimes de guerre objet des enquêtes en cours et à venir ».728 La lecture attentive de cette disposition montre que la compétence de la Cour pénale spéciale n’est pas limitée aux crimes de la CPI. Elle couvre notamment « les violations graves des droits humains » sans les définir. Est- ce à dire que le législateur centrafricain veut faire de la CPS une cour des droits humains ? Difficile de suivre ce raisonnement. Il s’agit d’une Cour pénale qui à notre avis se focalisera sur les crimes les plus graves (génocide, crimes contre l’humanité et crimes de guerre). Le législateur fait aussi référence au code pénal centrafricain et aux obligations internationales de la RCA. Comme la CPS applique aussi les dispositions nationales, il est à relever que les définitions de crimes internationaux contenues dans le code pénal centrafricain ne sont pas conformes à celles retenues par le Statut de Rome. À titre illustratif, on peut noter la définition du crime de génocide prévu à l’article 152 du Code pénal centrafricain. Cette disposition parle de l’exécution d’un « plan concerté » dans l’intention de détruire en tout ou en partie un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou un groupe déterminé à partir de tout critère arbitraire. La définition du génocide contenue dans le Statut de Rome ne contient pas cette exigence d’un « plan concerté » dans l’intention. Pour rappel, le génocide est défini comme un ensemble d’actes criminels commis dans l’intention de détruire en tout ou en partie un groupe national, racial, ethnique ou religieux en tant que tel. Cette définition, contenue dans l’article 2 de la Convention contre le génocide, est restée la même dans les statuts des deux TPI ad hoc et dans le Statut de Rome (article 6).729 Il en découle deux éléments essentiels dans la définition du génocide : l’existence d’un groupe protégé et l’intention spéciale du génocide, celle de détruire en tout ou en partie un des quatre groupes protégés en tant que tels.730 727 728 729 730 Art. 5 de la loi sur la CPS. Art. 3 de la loi sur la CPS. Jacques Mbokani, La jurisprudence congolaise en matière de crimes de droit international, Une étude de l’Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), 2016, p. 28. Idem 173 Eugene Bakama Bope S’agissant du crime contre l’humanité, la définition prévue dans le code pénal paraît identique à celle contenue dans le Statut de Rome. Mise à part quelques petites différences. C’est le cas « des actes inhumains et dégradants » qui ne font pas partie de l’article 7 du Statut de Rome mais sont prévus dans le code pénal centrafricain en son article 153. Enfin, les crimes de guerre sont considérés comme des violations graves des règles du droit des conflits armés. Dans le code pénal centrafricain, ils sont définis aux articles 154 à 157. Le législateur centrafricain n’a pas reproduit l’article 8 du Statut de Rome portant sur le crime de guerre. Cette dernière disposition (article 8) fait une classification entre, d’une part, les conflits qualifiés d’internationaux qui ne concernent que les infractions graves aux quatre Conventions de Genève et les autres violations des lois et coutumes applicables dans les conflits armés internationaux) et, d’autre part, les conflits armés non internationaux qui visent les violations graves de l’article 3 commun aux quatre Conventions de Genève et les autres violations graves des lois et coutumes applicables dans les conflits armés non internationaux. Il s’en suit que le critère central dans l’établissement d’un crime de guerre au regard du Statut de Rome réside dans la preuve de l’existence préalable d’un conflit armé, qu’il soit international ou non international.731 Deux autres éléments importants à l’existence d’un conflit armé, c’est le lien de connexité entre le conflit armé et le comportement criminel ainsi que la question des personnes ou biens protégés contre les crimes de guerre. Comme on peut le constater, les définitions des crimes internationaux dans le code pénal centrafricain de 2010 sont incomplètes. Il appartiendra aux juges de la CPS d’interpréter ces dispositions en recourant au droit international coutumier et à la jurisprudence internationale (depuis Nuremberg jusqu’à La Haye). En dépit de la prévalence du droit centrafricain dans les règles de procédure applicables devant la CPS, il est entendu que la Cour ne peut prononcer la peine de mort, même si celle-ci demeure en vigueur dans le code pénal centrafricain. En ce qui concerne, la compétence temporelle, la loi sur la CPS dispose que la Cour est compétente pour enquêter et juger les crimes commis sur le territoire de la République Centrafricaine depuis le 1er janvier 2003. Initialement, selon le projet de loi, la CPS devait être en charge de la poursuite et du jugement des crimes graves commis en RCA depuis 2012, mais lors des discussions parlementaires, la compétence ratione temporis a été reculée pour permettre de juger aussi les crimes graves commis depuis 2003, à savoir depuis l’année du coup d’État par François Bozize contre l’ancien président AngeFélix Patassé. C’est aussi pour répondre aux critiques faisant état d’un mécanisme crée uniquement contre les crimes de la Séléka. Or, une loi d’amnistie avait été votée en 2008 concernant les actes commis depuis 2003. La loi portant CPS la remet donc en question. Nous y reviendrons dans le point III.2 relatif à la CPS et l’amnistie en RCA. 731 Ibid, p. 116. La cour penale speciale en republique centrafricaine... 174 La compétence de la CPS s’étend sur l’ensemble du territoire national et aux actes de coaction et de complicité commis sur le territoire des États étrangers avec lesquels l’État centrafricain est lié par des accords d’entraide judiciaire.732 La CPS est établie pour un mandat de 5 ans renouvelable en cas de besoin733. Il faut constater que la CPS a déjà perdu une année dans la phase de son opérationnalisation, ce qui revient à dire que les 5 ans ne suffisent pas pour mener à bien les affaires aussi complexes du stade d’enquête à la phase des réparations. 2.2.2.2 Fonctionnement de la Cour pénale spéciale La Cour pénale spéciale est composée de 27 magistrats dont 14 nationaux et 13 internationaux.734 Les présidents des Chambres sont également centrafricains. C’est d’ailleurs sa composition qui lui confère le caractère d’une juridiction mixte. Elle est pleinement intégrée dans le système judiciaire centrafricain pour une durée de 5 ans renouvelable en cas de besoin. Elle fonctionne avec 3 branches principales : le parquet, le siège et le corps et unités rattachées à la Cour. Chaque branche comporte à son tour plusieurs organes. Ainsi, le parquet est composé du Procureur spécial, son adjoint et les substituts, tandis que le siège est composé du président de la Cour, son vice et les chambres d’instruction, d’accusation, d’assises et d’appel. Le corps et unités rattachés à la Cour est à son tour composé du corps spécial d’avocats, de l’unité spéciale de la police judiciaire et de l’unité de protection des victimes et témoins. Le Parquet est indépendant dans son fonctionnement mais la loi sur la CPS dispose que le Ministre de la justice centrafricain conserve le pouvoir de dénoncer au Procureur spécial des faits susceptibles de constituer les infractions de la compétence de la Cour.735 Une telle dénonciation n’entame en rien la liberté du Parquet spécial sur la suite à lui réserver.736 On peut craindre une mauvaise interprétation de cette disposition dans la pratique même si la loi n’oblige pas le Procureur à donner suite. La loi oblige cependant, le Procureur spécial à produire au ministère de la justice des rapports périodiques retraçant l’activité juridictionnelle.737 Enfin, la CPS a primauté de compétence pour instruire et juger les affaires de son domaine d’intervention. 2.3 Rôle complémentaire de la CPS ? Aujourd’hui, la répression des crimes internationaux en RCA se fait à trois niveaux : -Les juridictions nationales, la Cour pénale spéciale et la CPI. De ce point de vue, la 732 733 734 735 736 737 Art. 4 de la loi sur la CPS. Art.70 de la loi sur la CPS Voir : Organigramme de la Cour pénale spéciale, en ligne : https://www.cps-rca.cf/fr/organigramme-de-lacour-penale-speciale Art. 34 de la loi sur la CPS Idem Ibid. 175 Eugene Bakama Bope question de la complémentarité devient lancinante. L’on devra l’analyser en premier lieu sous l’angle de la relation de la CPS avec les juridictions nationales et deuxièmement en rapport avec la CPI et enfin avec la Commission vérité et réconciliation (CVR). 2.3.1 Relation entre la CPS et les juridictions nationales Conformément aux dispositions de l’art 36 de la loi organique, la Cour pénale spéciale a primauté de compétence sur les juridictions nationales pour instruire et juger les affaires relevant de sa compétence. De ce fait, lorsqu’il apparaît au Procureur spécial qu’un crime relevant de la compétence de la CPS a fait ou fait l’objet d’une enquête ou d’une procédure pénale devant une autre juridiction nationale, le Procureur spécial peut demander à cette juridiction de lui transmettre toutes les infractions relatives à cette enquête ou procédure pénale.738 Le Procureur spécial peut également demander à cette juridiction de se dessaisir en faveur de la CPS et de lui transmettre tous les éléments de l’enquête.739 En cas de refus, le Procureur ou le Procureur général près la Cour d’appel défère le litige devant le juge chargé de juger des conflits de compétence entre les juridictions de l’ordre judiciaire de la République Centrafricaine.740 Dans ce cas, le conflit qui naît oblige une intervention d’une autre juridiction dont la décision consistera à attribuer la compétence à une d’entre les deux juridictions. Cette procédure peut être rarement engagée lorsque l’on sait que les crimes pour lesquels la CPS est compétente sont bien circonscrits et que sa primauté l’emporte sur les juridictions nationales. La situation est différente lorsque la CPS est en conflit de compétence avec la CPI, dont le statut est opposable à la République Centrafricaine. 2.3.2 Relation entre la CPS et la CPI Comme le rappelle le préambule du Statut de Rome, c’est d’abord aux États parties que revient la responsabilité principale de poursuivre les auteurs des crimes internationaux. La CPI n’est censée intervenir que lorsque les États ne s’acquittent pas adéquatement de l’obligation de poursuivre les crimes qui menacent la paix et la sécurité de l’humanité. Ainsi, la CPI intervient de manière subsidiaire lorsque les États n’agissent pas ou que leur action se révèle défaillante. C’est pour cette raison que le Statut consacre la primauté des juridictions nationales sur la CPI dans la répression des crimes internationaux.741 Tel est le sens du principe de complémentarité présenté comme « pierre angulaire » du système de justice pénale internationale instauré par le Statut de Rome. Au regard de ce principe, ce ne sont pas les tribunaux nationaux à l’instar de ceux de la RCA qui sont complémentaires à la CPI, mais l’inverse. Peut-on alors considéré que l’article 17 du Statut de Rome s’applique à la CPS ? Pour y répondre, il faudrait préalablement se demander si la CPS est une juridiction nationale ? En effet, les prescrits de l’article 1er de la loi sur la CPS disposent « Il est créé au sein de l’organisation 738 739 740 741 Art 12, point a du Règlement de procédure de preuve de la CPS. Art. 13, point c. Art. 13(d). Jacques Mbokani, op. cit. p. 13. La cour penale speciale en republique centrafricaine... 176 judiciaire centrafricaine une juridiction pénale nationale dénommée Cour pénale spéciale. » On peut donc affirmer, à la lumière de cette disposition, que la CPS est une juridiction nationale même si elle a un caractère « spécial » et une composition mixte. De ce fait, l’article 17 du Statut de Rome devrait s’appliquer à la CPS. Paradoxalement, l’art 37 al.1 de la loi sur la CPS institue un malaise dans la compréhension de la nature de la CPS. Cet article dispose « Lorsqu’en application du Traité de Rome de la CPI ou des accords particuliers liant l’État centrafricain à cette juridiction internationale, il est établi que le procureur de la CPI s’est saisi d’un cas entrant concurremment dans la compétence de la Cour pénale internationale et de la Cour pénale spéciale, la seconde se dessaisit au profit de la première ». La logique que dicte le principe de la primauté de la CPS, considérée comme une juridiction nationale, vis-à-vis de la CPI est battue en brêche. Les dispositions de l’art 37, al 1 de la loi sur la CPS sont en contradiction avec l’esprit du principe de complémentarité prévu à l’article 17 du Statut de Rome et dans le préambule du Statut. Si les autres juridictions centrafricaines gardent leur primauté visà-vis de la CPI, il aurait été logique pour la CPS aussi étant donné qu’elle est considérée comme une juridiction nationale. Sinon il s’agirait comme le dit Maxime Mariage d’une « complémentarité inversée ».742 Certains ont d’ailleurs affirmé que l’art 37 est en contradiction avec les dispositions constitutionnelles qui reconnaissent la suprématie des traités internationaux y compris le Statut de Rome sur les lois ordinaires comme la loi sur la CPS.743 De ce point de vue, l’on peut soutenir que l’article 37 ne saurait prévaloir aux dispositions du statut de la CPI (notamment son article 17). Dans tous les cas, la CPS travaillerait en complémentarité avec la CPI qui enquête déjà sur la situation en RCA. Cela permettrait aux deux instances de se répartir le travail dans un pays où de nombreux crimes ont été commis. Peu importe le débat sur la primauté de la CPI sur la CPS. Cela n’empêche pas le dialogue entre les deux juridictions qui ont tout intérêt à coopérer, même si le cadre juridique de cette coopération n’est pas clairement établi. Dans la pratique, il est cependant regrettable de constater que la CPI fait l’ombre à la CPS. Un cas pour illustrer cela. Il s’agit de l’affaire Albert Yekatom, alias « Rambo », un ex-chef milicien « Anti-balaka » devenu député national en 2016, qui a été remis, le 17 novembre 2018 à la CPI par les autorités centrafricaines pour crimes contre l’humanité et crimes de guerre. Cette remise peut constituer selon nous, une entorse au principe de la complémentarité positive. Au-delà de la remise qui constitue un signal fort contre l’impunité en RCA, il y a quelques interrogations dont celle se rapportant à l’opportunité de poursuites. Pourquoi ne pas poursuivre Yekatom devant la CPS 742 743 Maxime Mariage, « La Cour pénale spéciale en RCA : un optimisme prudent devant les multiples défis », article en ligne, disponible sur le lien https://www.quidjustitiae.ca/blogue/cour-penale-speciale-enrepublique-centrafricaine-un-optimisme-prudent-devant-les-multiples Patryk Labuda, op. cit. p. 194. 177 Eugene Bakama Bope afin de réserver les ressources limitées dont dispose la CPI aux affaires beaucoup plus importantes. Autrement dit, pourquoi, la CPI s’intéresse à des affaires pour lesquelles il y a une CPS. Au lieu de s’intéresser à des affaires où on réclame son intervention. Il s’agit là d’un problème de politique de poursuite. Le principe de complémentarité positive qui a été développé par le Bureau du Procureur vise à encourager les procédures nationales pour épargner les ressources limitées de la Cour en orientant son action vers les affaires dont on réclame son intervention. 2.3.3 Relation entre la CPS et la Commission vérité et réconciliation Il s’agit, pour l’essentiel, de savoir comment seront réparties les affaires entre justice traditionnelle et justice alternative, selon quels principes et par qui. De ces réponses dépendra aussi, in fine, le sentiment de justice chez les victimes, suivant que les principaux responsables des crimes commis en Centrafrique pourront ou ne pourront pas échapper à leur juste châtiment.744 Jean-François Akandji préconise deux options à l’occasion de l’élaboration de la loi établissant la Commission Vérité justice réconciliation et réparation (VJRR). La première serait d’instituer un organe-filtre, chargé spécifiquement, en amont, de distribuer les cas et la deuxième option serait de donner la priorité à la CPS. Celle-ci pourrait renvoyer certaines affaires à la commission vérité et réconciliation.745 Par ailleurs, la CPS dispose de certains atouts et défis de la CPS. 2. 4 Les atouts de la Cour pénale spéciale 2.4.1 Les atouts de la Cour pénale spéciale Nous avons retenu quelques atouts dont dispose la CPS: Le premier, c’est la proximité avec les lieux où les crimes ont été commis. Contrairement à la CPI qui siège loin des pays où les crimes ont été commis (même si elle peut tenir des procès in situ), la CPS profite de cette proximité pour recueillir les éléments de preuve même si elle fait face aussi à l’insécurité en RCA. On se souviendra que la CPI n’a pas eu accès au territoire soudanais (absence de coopération des autorités), ce qui avait amené, le Procureur à conduire ses enquêtes en dehors du Soudan. Cette proximité des lieux des crimes permet à la CPS d’avoir une connaissance approfondie du contexte dans lequel les crimes ont été commis. Deuxième atout, c’est le soutien politique des autorités centrafricaines, de la communauté internationale et surtout du peuple centrafricain. La création de cette Cour a été souhaité par le Forum de Bangui sur la réconciliation nationale. Le fait qu’elle est intégré dans le système judiciaire centrafricain lui permet requérir la force publique. 744 745 Jean-François Akandji-KOMBE, « Paix et justice : éléments centrafricains d’une problématique incertaine de justice dans un objectif de paix », dans L’apport de l’Afrique à la justice internationale pénale, Sous la direction de Catherine Maia, Jean-François Akandji-Kombé et Jean-Baptiste Harelimana, L’Harmattan, 2018, p. 262. Id. p. 263. La cour penale speciale en republique centrafricaine... 178 Troisième atout, la garantie de coopération des autres juridictions nationales centrafricaines permet à la CPS d’être efficace dans ses actions. 2.4.2 Les défis de la Cour pénale spéciale Malgré les différents atouts dont elle dispose, la CPS devra faire face à plusieurs défis. Le Procureur de la CPS en a retenu trois746et nous y ajouterons d’autres. Pour le Procureur spécial, il y a d’abord, la persistance de l’insécurité qui complique le travail des enquêteurs. Il existe 14 groupes armés actif dans le pays qui continuent à commettre des crimes. Persistance donc, de violation des droits de l’Homme et une recrudescence de la violence malgré des progrès et des élections plus ou moins réussies.747 Ensuite, le mauvais état des structures pénitentiaires surtout en province. Où va–t-on détenir les suspects de la CPS quand on connaît l’état des prisons en RCA. Il y a un projet de réhabilitation de la prison de Bangui qui traine encore à être exécuté. Enfin, la précarité de ressources de la CPS. Cette dernière fonctionne sur base de projet conjoint entre le gouvernement centrafricain et les Nations Unies. Le financement actuel de la Cour ne lui permet de fonctionner que pendant une année. La viabilité financière à long terme de la Cour demeure en doute. Des 37 millions de dollars estimés pour son fonctionnement sur cinq ans, 32 millions de dollars n’ont toujours pas été engagés.748 Le Tribunal spécial pour la Sierra Léone avait connu ce même problème de financement à cause de sa dépendance aux contributions volontaires. Cela risque d’être le cas avec la CPS. Il existe d’autres défis auxquels la CPS devra répondre. Il s’agit notamment de : construire sa légitimité, la protection des victimes et des témoins, une stratégie pénale adéquate, la capacité à mener des arrestations (même si la procédure par contumace est prévue), le travail de sensibilisation et d’appropriation. Premièrement, la manière dont la CPS construira sa légitimité dans un contexte où l’autorité de l’État reste contestée dans une grande partie du territoire sera l’un des grands défis de cette Cour ; Deuxièmement, la Cour devra protéger l’anonymat des victimes et des témoins, au risque de mettre leur vie en péril ; Troisièmement, la stratégie de poursuite du Procureur spécial devra être efficace ; quatrièmement, la capacité de la Cour et de ses partenaires à appréhender les inculpés reste à tester ; enfin, le travail de sensibilisation dans un pays qui a connu des violences à répétition et un cycle d’impunité reste aussi un défi. Revenons un peu en détail sur le défi de coopération. 746 747 748 Voir Conférence de presse du Procureur de la CPS, Muntazini, en novembre 2017. Voir Rapport de l’expert indépendant sur la RCA. Maxime Mariage, op. cit. 179 Eugene Bakama Bope 2.4.3 La CPS et le défi de coopération 2.4.3.1 Coopération avec les autres juridictions nationales Conformément aux dispositions des articles 38 et 43 de la loi organique, les autorités compétentes sont tenues de coopérer avec les organes de la Cour à toutes les étapes de la procédure. Elles exécutent dans un délai raisonnable les demandes de coopération motivées qui leur sont adressées par la Cour. À cet effet, le Procureur spécial ou le Cabinet d’instruction concerné peut requérir des autorités compétentes la transmission de tous les actes de procédure ou de toutes les informations nécessaires à l’exercice de son/leur mandat.749 Contrairement à la CPI, la CPS de par sa proximité avec les autres juridictions nationales centrafricaines a l’avantage de requérir toutes les informations pour ses enquêtes. Elle peut requérir aussi la force publique (la gendarmerie ou la police) même si l’État centrafricain lui-même est faible et compte bien souvent sur la MINUSCA. La CPI n’a pas de police et compte sur la coopération des États pour la mise en œuvre de ses actions. Le Procureur spécial peut demander aux autorités des juridictions territorialement compétentes d’accomplir des actes de procédure en son nom selon la procédure prescrite par les dispositions du Règlement de procédure et de preuve.750 Il peut demander à une autre juridiction de se dessaisir à son profit.751 En cas de non-respect des demandes de coopération et de dessaisissement, un juge est chargé de régler le litige752. Contrairement à la CPI où en cas de non coopération des juridictions nationales, il n’y a pas de sanction dans le Statut de Rome. La procédure prévue à l’article 87 du Statut de Rome a montré ses limites à travers l’affaire le Procureur contre Al-Bashir. Les États-parties qui se sont refusés de coopérer avec la Cour en exécutant sa demande d’arrestation et de remise ont simplement vu leur situation déférer devant l’Assemblée des États-parties ou devant le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU selon le cas. Dans sa décision du 6 mai 2019, la Chambre d’appel de la CPI a souligné que la Jordanie n’a pas respecté ses obligations de coopération avec la Cour au regard de la Résolution 1593 du Conseil de sécurité (qui renvoie la situation du Soudan à la CPI). 2.4.3.2 Coopération avec la CPI La CPS et la CPI sont concurremment compétentes pour juger des crimes de génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité et des crimes de guerre commis en RCA depuis le 1er janvier 2003. Si on prend en compte la ratification du Statut de Rome par la RCA le 3 octobre 2001, cela revient à dire que pour les crimes commis avant le 1er janvier 2003 la CPS est incompétente. 749 750 751 752 Art 11 point b du Règlement de procédure et de preuve. Art. 12 point d du Règlement de procédure et de preuve. Art. 12 point c du Règlement de procédure et de preuve. Art. 13 point d du Règlement de procédure et de preuve. La cour penale speciale en republique centrafricaine... 180 Les organes de la Cour peuvent adresser des demandes d’entraide dûment motivées directement aux organes de la CPI requis pour les exécuter. De son coté, la CPI peut adresser des demandes d’entraide directement au Procureur spécial.753 On peut dire que la CPS devient l’organe de coopération avec la CPI. Dans la pratique, il y a lieu de signaler que la CPI a contribué à la formation des magistrats de la CPS et des juridictions de droit commun avec le soutien d’autres partenaires comme la MINUSCA et l’École nationale de la magistrature française an mars 2018. Il s’agit d’un travail d’appui et de formation au soutien de la CPS. Il est reconnu que le partage d’informations, d’expertises et d’expériences est fondamental. Les deux procureurs de la CPI et de la CPS ont profité de l’ouverture de la session de formation des magistrats pour signer une déclaration de coopérer entre leurs deux juridictions. Cette coopération est importante parce que la CPS représente une tentative de compléter une intervention de la CPI plutôt que de présenter une alternative à la Cour.754 2.4.3.3 Coopération avec les autres acteurs La CPS aura certainement besoin de la coopération des autres acteurs notamment les États tiers pour l’arrestation et la remise des fugitifs. La CPS pourra profiter des accords d’entraide judiciaire signer par l’État centrafricain avec les autorités des États tiers. Il semble cependant que certains groupes rebelles sont soutenus par certains pays voisins de la RCA comme le Tchad et le Soudan. Cette situation compliquera sans doute l’arrestation et la remise des fugitifs. Par ailleurs, le règlement de procédure et de preuve prévoit la procédure par contumace lorsqu’après l’ordonnance ou l’arrêt de renvoi devant la Chambre d’assises, l’accusé n’a pas été remis dans un délai raisonnable à la Cour par les autorités compétentes ou les autorités d’États tiers concernés ou l’accusé n’a pu être saisi, ou ne s’est pas présenté à la Cour.755 La CPS peut aussi compter sur le soutien et la coopération de la MINUSCA. En effet, cette dernière a été chargée de proposer à la nomination les membres internationaux de la CPS.756 Elle apporte aussi son appui logistique à la CPS etc. Cependant, un malentendu relatif à la modification de la liste des officiers chargés d’enquêter pour la CPS vers fin novembre 2017 a causé des tensions entre le gouvernement centrafricain et les bailleurs de fonds principaux USA, France, MINUSCA. Ces derniers accusant le ministre de la justice d’ingérence dans les affaires de la Cour. L’Union africaine devrait également apporter son soutien à la CPS pour maintenir la dynamique de lutte contre l’impunité sur le continent africain. L’expérience des Chambres extraordinaires du Sénégal a montré que l’Afrique est capable de poursuivre les auteurs des crimes graves sur le continent. Devant la complexité de la charge de la 753 754 755 756 Art 14, point c du Règlement de procédure et de preuve. Maxime Mariage, op. cit. Art. 172, point a du Règlement de procédure et de preuve. Art 24 de la loi sur la CPS 181 Eugene Bakama Bope CPS, elle dispose néanmoins de quelques atouts. Enfin, sur la question des immunités des officiels des États étrangers en fonction, la Cour de cassation centrafricaine avait décidé en 2007, d’exclure la possibilité de statuer sur leurs immunités. Quelle sera l’attitude de la CPS par rapport à cette question des immunités. En effet, la loi sur la CPS prévoit qu’il ne peut y avoir prescription des crimes, ni d’immunité reconnue aux personnes pouvant faire l’objet de poursuites par la Cour, quelle que soient leurs fonctions officielles (parlementaires, membres de gouvernement, haut gradé de l’armée etc.) Voyons à présent le défi de paix auquel la CPS devra faire face. 3. La Cour pénale spéciale et le défi de la paix en RCA Le dilemme de la paix et de la justice peut se résumer en deux tendances : la première qui soutient la lutte contre l’impunité et ne cesse de rappeler à chaque fois qu’il n’y a pas de paix sans justice et que la paix se nourrit de la justice tandis que la deuxième soutient que la justice peut mettre en danger le processus de paix. Cette dernière tendance est souvent appuyée par des diplomates et médiateurs. Ils mettent en avant le principe « d’abord la paix et la justice suivra ». Ces deux tendances invitent donc à se poser la question suivante : la recherche de la paix est-elle nécessairement incompatible avec celle de la justice au point de justifier le recours aux amnisties pour préserver la paix et aboutir à la réconciliation nationale ? Jean François Akandji parle de deux approches : « paix en contrepartie de l’impunité » et « paix au travers de la justice ».757 Pour répondre à cette question, il est important de clarifier les concepts de « paix » et de « justice » (1) avant d’examiner en profondeur ce que pourra être la position de la CPS face à ces questions de paix, d’amnisties et de réconciliation (2). 3. 1 Concepts de « paix » et de « justice » La notion de « paix » est généralement définie par référence aux travaux du sociologue norvégien Johan Galtung, qui a opéré un distinguo entre la paix négative et la paix dite positive. Selon cet auteur, la « paix négative » renvoie à l’absence d’une violence directe et organisée entre les groupes humains ou entre les nations tandis que la « paix positive », plus ambitieuse que la paix négative, implique une coopération et une intégration entre différents groupes afin de s’attaquer aux causes des conflits.758 L’auteur identifie trois types de violences : la violence directe, la violence culturelle et la violence structurelle. Les Nations Unies se sont inspirées de Galtung pour développer la notion de paix positive à travers le concept de « consolidation de la paix ». Cette approche a été soutenue dans l’agenda pour la paix de l’ancien Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, Boutros-Boutros Ghali. La notion de « justice » quant à elle renvoie à ce qui est idéalement juste ou conforme aux « exigences de l’équité et de la raison ».759 757 758 759 Jean-François Akandji, op cit. p. 249. Johan Galtung, War and Defense: Essays in peace research, Vol 1, Copenhagen, Christian. Ejlers, 1975, p.29, cité par Jacques Mbokani, L’amnistie et la répression des crimes de droit international au regard de l’avènement de la CPI, Thèse de droit, Université catholique de Louvain, 2015, p. 187. Gérard Cornu, Vocabulaire juridique, PUF, 2007, p. 532. La cour penale speciale en republique centrafricaine... 182 C’est aussi un concept qui comporte de dimensions multiples. L’idée de justice fait penser souvent à la justice rétributive, c’est-à-dire à l’exercice de la sanction pénale contre les responsables des abus du passé. Cependant, la justice ne résume pas seulement à la répression. Elle peut être comprise dans un sens plus large.760 La justice restaurative s’efforce quant à elle de promouvoir l’harmonie sociale par le biais d’un processus quasi-judiciaire de vérité, de reconnaissance de remords, de réparations, de pardon, de guérison et de réconciliation.761 Ainsi, si la paix et la justice sont entendues au sens large, c’est-à-dire la paix perçue dans son sens positif (construction de la paix) et la justice, dans son sens large, il n’y a pas nécessairement d’incompatibilité. Bien au contraire, une véritable relation de complémentarité peut être établie entre elles762. La justice peut donc favoriser la paix.763 Voyons à présent comment la CPS fera face à ces dilemmes. 3.2 La Cour pénale spéciale et l’amnistie en RCA Comme souligné ci-haut, la compétence temporelle de la Cour pénale spéciale couvre les crimes internationaux commis depuis le 1er janvier 2003. Or, une loi d’amnistie est intervenue en 2008 en RCA. Et l’avènement de la CPS remet en cause cette loi. Par ailleurs, d’autres acteurs participant au processus de paix en RCA ont tenté de faire revivre la question de l’amnistie. C’est le cas de l’initiative de l’Union africaine qui laisse entrevoir la possibilité d’une amnistie. Sur ce point, il y a un refus de la part des Nations unies et d’autres pays européens à admettre l’amnistie pour les crimes internationaux. De même que la société civile centrafricaine. Nous y reviendrons plus loin. Pour Labuda, bien que la légalité des amnisties soit contestée, le plus important est pour qui et sous quelles conditions est octroyée cette amnistie. Le Statut de la CPS n’interdit pas expressément les amnisties. Un examen du contexte dans lequel cette loi d’amnistie de 2008 a été adoptée s’impose (a) avant d’examiner son contenu (b). 3.2.1 Contexte de la loi d’amnistie de 2008 Le Président Ange-Félix Patassé a été renversé par un Coup d’Etat exécuté par le Général François Bozizé en 2003. De suite de ce Coup d’État la RCA a été plongé dans la violence et plusieurs exactions ont été commises. Les allégations des crimes de guerre et des crimes contre l’humanité qui ont été rapportées dans le cadre de cette rébellion ont fait l’objet d’un renvoi en 2004 à la CPI par les nouvelles autorités du pays de la situation centrafricaine. Un seul individu, Jean-Pierre Bemba (sénateur et ancien viceprésident de la RDC) a été poursuivi par la CPI. Condamné en première instance à 18 ans, ce dernier a été acquitté en 2018 par la Chambre d’appel. Cet acquittement emporte avec lui un profond questionnement quant au sort réservé aux victimes des crimes pour lesquels Bemba avait été accusés. Le système de réparation institué dans le cadre de la CPI montre sans nul doute ses limites s’agissant du droit à réparation des victimes. 760 761 762 763 Jacques Mbokani, op. cit. p. 189. Tim Murithi, Sequencing the administration of justice to enable the pursuit of peace: op. cit. p. 2. Id. Anne-Laure Chaumette, op. cit. pp 65-75, 2012. 183 Eugene Bakama Bope Malgré ce renvoi de la situation devant la CPI, l’instabilité est restée la caractéristique de la République Centrafricaine. Des groupes armés ont vu le jour et s’affrontent contre les forces étatiques. Pour tenter de calmer les esprits, les acteurs politiques centrafricains ont convenu d’adopter en 2008 une loi d’amnistie en faveur de certains acteurs politiques et plus spécialement, les partisans de l’ancien président Patassé.764 3.2.2 Une loi d’amnistie excluant les crimes internationaux La loi d’amnistie de 2008 excluait explicitement « les incriminations visées par le Statut de Rome », à savoir « le génocide, les crimes contre l’humanité, les crimes de guerre ».765 Cependant, cette loi d’amnistie qui visait à calmer les esprits n’a pas empêché la détérioration de la situation ni le renversement du président Bozizé lui-même, par la rébellion « Séléka » majoritairement composée des musulmans.766 Les allégations des crimes internationaux commis dans le cadre de ce nouveau conflit armé, opposant la Séléka aux « anti balaka », une milice composée des chrétiens, ont entrainé un deuxième renvoie de la situation de la RCA devant la CPI à partir de 1er août 2012. Parallèlement, les nouvelles autorités de la transition ont mis en place une cellule spéciale d’enquêtes et d’instruction (CSEI) ayant pour compétence d’enquêter sur les actes de génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité, des crimes de guerres et d’autres violations du droit international humanitaire perpétrés sur le territoire centrafricain depuis 1er janvier 2004 en attendant l’avènement d’une Cour pénale spéciale. Cette dernière ayant été crée en 2015, pourrait donc poursuivre les auteurs de ces crimes parce que la loi d’amnistie de 2008 ne concerne pas les crimes relevant de sa compétence. L’expérience centrafricaine d’amnistie s’inscrit jusque là dans la logique selon laquelle, la recherche d’une solution politique à une crise interne que traverse un pays ne peut justifier le recours à une amnistie s’appliquant aux crimes internationaux. Certains observateurs craignent cependant que le processus de réconciliation nationale inclusif intégrant l’ensemble des acteurs (y compris les criminels) fasse l’ombre à la justice. 3.3 La Cour pénale spéciale et le processus de réconciliation en RCA La plupart de futurs « clients » de la Cour pénale spéciale sont également des interlocuteurs essentiels dans les processus de paix en cours en RCA avec toutes les complexités que cela implique. Trois importants chefs rebelles ont d’ailleurs été nommés « conseillers spéciaux militaires » à la primature, par décret présidentiel du 24 mars 2019 (après les négociations de paix de Khartoum et d’Addis Abeba). Il s’agit d’Ali Darassa, 764 765 766 Jacques Mbokani, op. cit. p. 205. Art 2 de la loi n°08-020 du 13 octobre 2008, portant amnistie générale à l’endroit des personnalités, des militaires, des éléments et responsables civils des groupes rebelles. Jacques Mbokani, op. cit. 206. La cour penale speciale en republique centrafricaine... 184 Mahamat Alkatim, et de Bi sidi Souleymane(767). Quelle devra –être alors l’attitude de la CPS ? Poursuivre ou donner une chance à la paix ? Il n’existe pas dans la loi sur la CPS un article équivalent à l’art 16 du Statut de Rome qui permet au Conseil de sécurité de suspendre les poursuites devant la CPI pendant 12 mois. Mais on peut se baser sur la politique pénale du Procureur. Certains comme le Prof Tim Murithi estime qu’on peut se baser sur l’imprescriptibilité des crimes internationaux pour permettre à d’autres processus nationaux de jeter les bases d’une paix durable.768 Mais cela risque d’aller à l’encontre des recommandations du Forum de Bangui (a) mais pas contre la feuille de route de l’Union africaine qui semble soutenir l’amnistie pour les rebelles (b). 3.3.1 Le Forum national de Bangui de 2015 La justice et la réconciliation apparaissent aux yeux de la population centrafricaine, des observateurs nationaux et internationaux comme un instrument privilégié de sortie de crise. Les précédentes tentatives de dialogue et de réconciliation nationale en RCA ont mis l’accent sur la réconciliation entre les leaders politiques considérés par la population comme responsables et ignoré la réconciliation à la base et la dimension de la justice dans le règlement des conflits.769 De même, les notions de victimes, d’auteurs (ou de bourreaux), l’établissement des responsabilités n’ont jamais fait l’objet de traitement approfondi. Bien au contraire, les lois d’amnisties ont souvent blanchi des coupables sur le point d’être traduits en justice, éteignant opportunément ainsi l’action publique au détriment des victimes et de leur famille sans compensation de l’État qui est le seul responsable de ces amnisties sans concertation avec la population.770 Ces amnisties répétitives, y compris pour les crimes graves ont accentué le sentiment d’impunité et exacerbé la quête de vengeance au sein de la population et de toutes les communautés établies dans le pays. Il ne peut y avoir de réconciliation entre les ennemis d’hier sans une justice équitable. L’idée de justice est centrale dans les processus de réconciliation nationale, faisant suite à des crises ou conflits armés internes. Les consultations populaires à la base ont dans l’ensemble privilégié une réconciliation conditionnée par la justice et la lutte contre l’impunité. Une position prévisible compte tenu des déceptions répétitives liées à des lois d’amnisties récurrentes qui n’ont jamais rien réglé par le passé. Les 600 participants venus des quatre coins de la RCA qui ont pris part du 4 au 11 mai 2015 au Forum national de Bangui avaient fait quelques recommandations sur la thématique justice et réconciliation. La lutte contre l’impunité était l’une des recommandations principales des délégués. Le Forum de Bangui a donc recommandé la création de structures devant permettre justice et réconciliation. Une Commission vérité 767 768 769 770 http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20190327-rca-trois-importants-chefs-rebelles-nommes-conseillers-speciauxmilitaires Tim Murithi, Sequencing the administration of justice to enable the pursuit of peace.., op. cit. , p. 1.. Commission préparatoire au Forum national de Bangui, Rapport du groupe thématique 2 Justice et réconciliation, p. 12, mars 2015 Id. 185 Eugene Bakama Bope justice et réconciliation, ainsi que des comités locaux de paix et de réconciliation doivent être mis en place. Le Procureur de la CPS qui a été nommé en 2017 s’est évidemment réjouis des recommandations de ce Forum de Bangui qui place la justice comme un élément essentiel de la réconciliation. Pour sa part, la Procureur de la CPI avait lors de sa visite à Bangui en mars 2015 déjà indiqué que « la CPI ne sera pas liée par le processus de réconciliation nationale en ce qui concerne la nécessité de rendre justice aux victimes et à l’ensemble de la nation centrafricaine ». 3.3.2 La feuille de route de l’Union africaine pour la paix et la réconciliation en RCA L’Union africaine se veut désormais aux commandes des efforts diplomatiques pour la paix en RCA. À ce titre, elle a décidé de rédiger une feuille de route qui prend en compte ce qui a été fait avant y compris « les acquis » de l’accord de Sant Egidio signé à Rome en juin 2017.771 La feuille de route prend également en compte l’initiative de paix rédigée fin mai 2017 par les parlementaires centrafricains ainsi que les conclusions du Forum de Bangui de 2015. Deux documents qui écartaient de manière très claire toute idée d’amnistie pour les chefs de groupes armés. Et cette amnistie est un point crucial qui nourrissait un certain nombre de réserves voire une méfiance vis-à-vis de l’initiative africaine.772 Les autorités centrafricaines ont d’ailleurs fait savoir « qu’il n’y aura pas d’impunité », « on ne peut aller contre le forum de Bangui ou la Constitution », « la justice devra faire son travail » avait déclaré le porte parole du ministre des affaires étrangères centrafricain sur les ondes de Radio France Internationale .773 Sans d’ailleurs mentionner le mot « amnistie », la feuille de route reconnaît « que l’impunité n’a jamais constitué de solution durable aux crises récurrentes en RCA ». Reste à savoir si les autorités centrafricaines résisteront aux pressions qu’elles subissent de la part des tenants de l’amnistie au sein de l’Union africaine. Les récents pourparlers de paix de Khartoum du 24 janvier 2019 ont ramené cette question sur la table. Les groupes armés ont menacé de claquer la porte de ces pourparlers de paix si le gouvernement n’accepte pas une amnistie générale et la mise en place d’un gouvernement d’union nationale. Pendant que les organisations de défense des droits de l’homme et des victimes ne veulent pas entendre parler d’amnistie. Pour elles, la question de l’amnistie ne fait pas l’objet de débat. Pour Mark Freeman « je veux bien considérer cette position et partager l’idée que l’horreur de l’idée qu’il puisse y avoir une amnistie pour de tels actes, que faisons-nous donc dans le cadre d’une négociation en cours en RCA ? Peut-on arrêter 771 772 773 L’initiative africaine et sa feuille de route ne peuvent être objectivement confondus dans leur approche avec l’accord de Sant Egidio, en particulier sur la question de la justice. L’approche africaine se veut plus ouverte. Voir Jean- François Akandje, op. cit, p. 255. Pour Jean-François Akandje, si au départ, l’Initiative africaine a pu apparaître à certains moments de sa construction comme une énième déclinaison de la problématique « paix en contrepartie de l’impunité », tel n’est plus le cas. Elle constituerait même plutôt une passerelle vers un renouvellement de la manière de penser la paix en faisant de la justice une de ses composantes essentielles. http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180828-negociations-paix-rca-ua-union-africaine-gouvernement-veut-amnistie La cour penale speciale en republique centrafricaine... 186 la guerre ? Peut-on mettre fin aux atrocités avec cette politique de zéro amnistie ? ».774 L’expert Freeman est à l’aise avec l’idée que, dans la mesure où ce sont les atrocités qui sont le sujet, on peut accepter de pardonner celles qui ont déjà eu lieu si c’est le prix pour qu’elles s’arrêtent.775 Forcément, le gouvernement centrafricain devra faire des concessions étant donné qu’il n’est pas en position de dicter les conditions de paix. Soit le gouvernement trouve un moyen pour convaincre les groupes armés qu’il faut arrêter la guerre, soit ils vont continuer les atrocités.776 Cette question va au-delà de celle liée à la légalité des amnisties pour crimes internationaux. 3.3.3 Mécanisme de Justice transitionnelle Dans son rapport au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, la Commission internationale d’enquête sur la RCA avait insisté sur l’impératif de lutter contre l’impunité, y compris à travers des mécanismes de justice transitionnelle et traditionnelle ou avec un axe non judiciaire confié aux notables et autorités locales. Pour enrayer la culture de l’impunité, il importe de recourir à tous les mécanismes existant ou à créer. Il a été demandé à la MINUSCA d’apporter son soutien à la création de cette Commission vérité et réconciliation. Les consultations sont en cours mais le processus est trop lent. Ni le gouvernement, ni la communauté internationale n’ont élaboré de stratégie globale de justice transitionnelle pour la RCA. Ce qui soulève des questions sur le rapport de la CVR avec la CPS.777 Le règlement de procédure et de preuve a prévu une coopération avec le mécanisme de justice transitionnelle qui sera créé en RCA. Il est dit que la « Cour négocie avec le mécanisme de justice transitionnelle institué en RCA, les protocoles d’entente permettant à ces deux institutions de coopérer et fonctionner de façon complémentaire et efficace dans le respect de leur indépendance respective et des droits fondamentaux des suspects, des inculpés, des accusés et des victimes ».778 Il faut enfin, souligner que les mécanismes de justice transitionnelle ont reçu jusque là, moins d’attention de la part des acteurs nationaux et internationaux. Conclusion Devant la lenteur des enquêtes et l’absence de poursuites effectives tant devant les tribunaux centrafricains que devant la CPI, d’une part, et face à la persistance de certains dirigeant et membres des groupes armés à commettre des atrocités et à défier l’État de droit, d’autre part, un certain nombre d’experts et des membres de la société civile ont appelé les autorités centrafricaines à créer un tribunal hybride intégré dans le système 774 775 776 777 778 Interviews de Mark Freeman sur « comment négocier justice et paix ? », par Thierry Cruvellier, justiceinfo. net, le 30 octobre 2018. Id. On laisse perdurer les atrocités, on laisse les dictateurs en place, on laisse les seigneurs de guerre à l’œuvre à cause d’une position rigide sur l’amnistie, selon Mark Freeman. Entretien avec Patryk Labuda, 2 février 2019. Patryk Labuda, Negotiating peace and justice in the Central African Republic, article disponible en ligne: https://theglobalobservatory.org/2019/01/negotiating-peace-justice-central-african-republic/?fbclid=IwAR2 5JM5vU7jVPUEr8-CrLXLJJso0iYbPY9qK4lWftb-NNuLm_G6A0qXZess Art 15 du Règlement de procédure et de preuve. 187 Eugene Bakama Bope judiciaire national afin de juger les responsables des atrocités commises en RCA. La Cour pénale spéciale a finalement vu le jour grâce à la volonté des autorités centrafricaines, des Nations Unies ainsi que du peuple centrafricain à travers le Forum de Bangui. Cette juridiction dispose de quelques atouts notamment sa proximité des lieux où les crimes ont été commis, ce qui lui permettra de connaître le contexte dans lequel les crimes ont été commis, le soutien politique des autorités nationales et de la communauté internationale. Cependant, elle reste confronté à quelques défis importants comme la situation sécuritaire fragile avec 80% du territoire sous contrôle de groupes armés.779, le mauvais état des structures pénitentiaires ainsi que la question du financement de ses activités. Un autre défi, non le moindre et qui a retenu notre attention, est celui de la relation entre paix et justice. Sur ce point, il a été souligné que les amnisties répétitives y compris celles concernant des crimes graves, ont accentué le sentiment d’impunité et exacerbé la quête de vengeance au sein de la population. Ainsi, l’ignorance de la justice dans le processus du retour à une paix durable a été à la base d’autres conflits. D’un côté, les arguments en faveur de la recherche de la justice et du refus de l’impunité pour les crimes horribles sont convaincants, non seulement parce que la justice recherchée impartialement est souhaitable en soi et peut dissuader de futurs crimes, mais aussi parce que la révélation de la vérité des procès et l’acte public de responsabilité morale des crimes peut contribuer à une paix durable et à la réconciliation à long terme. D’autre part, les arguments en faveur d’une paix immédiate dans une société déchirée par la guerre en cours et de mesures incitatives pour faire cesser les combats sont également convaincants. 780 Quel compromis alors ? Il faut admettre qu’il n’y a pas de réconciliation sans justice. L’approche qui nous semble plutôt réfléchie est celle de faire avancer la justice et la recherche de la paix et la réconciliation de manière « concomitante ». Gerhard Kemp et Igor Lyubashenko partagent cette idée quand dans leur réflexions sur la justice post conflit en Ukraine, ils soutiennent en parlant de la CPI, de la réconciliation « we argue basically that one should not view the ICC and reconciliation as « either, or ». It is not about simplistic sequencing, where reconciliation, peace comes first and (?) then comes justice781 » Les deux auteurs soutiennent que la justice pénale fait partie des processus de paix et finalement de la réconciliation, parce que c’est une méthode contre « l’oubli actif ». Etablir la vérité via des procès pénaux (c’est-à-dire la justice) est souvent une 779 780 781 Propos de la Chercheuse Nathalia Dukhan dans une Tribune au journal Le Monde Afrique, disponible sur le lien : https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/08/21/en-centrafrique-les-groupes-armes-proliferentgrace-a-une-impunite-totale_5174634_3212.html Robert C. Johansen, « Peace and justice? The contribution of international judicial processes to peacebuilding » in Strategies of peace, Daniel Philpott and Gerard Powers, published to Oxford, May 2010, p. 2. Gerhard Kemp and Igor Lyubashenko, « Is it too early to speak about justice in Donbas, » in New Eastern Europe « Central Asia the forgotten region? », Bimonthly November-December, n° 6(XXIX) 2017, p. 92. La cour penale speciale en republique centrafricaine... 188 nécessité pour que les processus de paix progressent. Il est donc simpliste de dire en premier, que nous parviendrons à la paix ; alors justice (procès pénaux) sera rendue après.782 Il devrait s’agir d’une modalité plus sophistiquée et fléxible, basée également sur les circonstances uniques de la situation et les besoins sur le terrain. Ils concluent en ce sens « in the end, it is not sequencing, but rather a more flexible approach based on sequencing plus proper scaling between truth and justice which seems to be the basic formula of an effective post-war justice strategy.783 » Pour les deux auteurs, la recherche de la justice devrait faire partie intégrante de toute stratégie de consolidation de la paix dans le conflit ainsi que l’instauration de l’état de droit dans les sociétés sortant d’un conflit. Les contextes spécifiques dans lesquels toutes les stratégies de justice post-conflit sont mises en place dictent la nécessité de trouver un juste équilibre entre trois questions importantes : la vérité, la justice, et le séquençage. Il est hautement souhaitable de placer la lutte contre l’impunité et la justice au centre du processus de réconciliation nationale et de mettre en place des mécanismes efficaces de justice transitionnelle. C’est dans ces mécanismes que l’on peut rencontrer l’aspiration du peuple centrafricain. 782 Id. 783 Ibid. p. 97. 189 Steven w. S. Kayuni THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA: AN INTERNATIONAL, HYBRID OR DOMESTIC TRAJECTORY? Abstract Steven W. S. Kayuni The Chapter explores Africa’s international criminal justice experience. Through the prism of law as a process of decision otherwise known as policy-oriented jurisprudence, the chapter assesses the interconnectedness of international, regional and national courts as part of a global mechanism for fighting impunity. Such an assessment appraises the current fashion and practice of international criminal justice within the continent as a likely projection of future trends of legal and policy formulation, interpretation and implementation. The continent’s international criminal justice experiences have stemmed from international arena, hybrid or domestic trajectory. That notwithstanding, an analysis of relevant legal instruments and the practice of, inter alia, the African Union (AU) and some individual states point to a turbulent enterprise towards collective goals for rule of law, accountability and justice for grave crimes under international law. Flawed decision-making processes, lack of proper policy direction and sightless regionalist ideological tendencies have heavily impeded the international criminal justice progress. Despite this, and numerous jurisprudential contributions from international and hybrid criminal tribunal efforts, the chapter postulates the domestic arena as the future trajectory and grounding for international criminal justice processes on the continent. Domestic arena is likely to aid Africa’s collective efforts towards envisaged, cherished and aspirational principles that mirror probable values, consonant outcomes and responsibilities. The future of international criminal justice in Africa... L’AVENIR DE LA JUSTICE PÉNALE INTERNATIONALE EN AFRIQUE : EST-CE UNE TRAJECTOIRE INTERNATIONALE, HYBRIDE OU NATIONALE ? Résumé Ce chapitre explore l’expérience de l’Afrique en matière de la justice pénale internationale. A travers le prisme du droit en tant que processus de décision, autrement dit la jurisprudence orientée vers les politiques, ce chapitre évalue l’interdépendance des tribunaux internationaux, régionaux et nationaux dans le cadre d’un mécanisme mondial de lutte contre l’impunité. Dans le cadre d’une telle évaluation, la mode et la pratique actuelles de la justice pénale internationale sur le continent sont considérées comme une projection probable des tendances futures en matière de la formulation, de l’interprétation et de l’application des lois et des politiques. Les expériences du continent en matière de la justice pénale internationale sont issues de l’arène internationale, d’une trajectoire hybride ou nationale. Cela étant, une analyse des instruments juridiques pertinents et de la pratique de l’Union africaine (UA) et de certains États, entre autres, fait apparaître une entreprise tumultueuse vers la réalisation des objectifs collectifs en matière de l’Etat de droit, de la responsabilité et de la justice pour les crimes graves relevant du droit international. Les processus décisionnels imparfaits, l’absence d’orientation politique appropriée et les tendances idéologiques régionalistes invisibles ont fortement entravé les progrès de la justice pénale internationale. Malgré cela, et malgré les nombreuses contributions jurisprudentielles des tribunaux pénaux internationaux et hybrides, le chapitre postule que l’arène nationale constituera la trajectoire et le fondement futurs des processus de justice pénale internationale sur le continent. L’arène nationale est susceptible d’aider les efforts collectifs de l’Afrique vers des principes envisagés, chers et ambitieux qui reflètent les valeurs probables, les résultats consensuels et les responsabilités. 190 191 Steven w. S. Kayuni Introduction Africa has for a long time played witness to some of the most heinous forms of criminality and human rights violations known to humankind. From post-independence dictatorial regimes such as that of Hissène Habré, through the catastrophic ‘100 days of slaughter’ in Rwanda in 1994, atrocities in Sierra Leone and Liberia, to the ongoing massacres in Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Darfur and South Sudan, the international criminal justice enterprise has been put to the extreme test. Despite international criminal justice making substantial advancements in the efforts to ensure that all perpetrators of grave and international crimes are brought to justice, it has for a while been in a state of flux and uncertainty.784 The outright and significant resistance to the crusade against impunity in Africa has to a greater extent halted the anti-impunity norm.785 This has to a greater extent led to many criminals and violators of human rights and humanitarian law escaping legal accountability for their crimes. This chapter explores Africa’s international criminal justice experience786 from a policy-oriented perspective.787 Throughout the Chapter, law will be viewed as a decisionmaking process788 focusing on human dignity789 while conflating law and policy.790 The chapter, firstly, assesses African trends regarding interconnectedness of international, regional and national courts as part of a global mechanism for fighting impunity. Such assessment appraises the current fashion of international criminal justice operations stemming from international arena, hybrid and domestic experience. Secondly, the Chapter scrutinizes the practice of the African Union (AU) and some individual states pointing to a turbulent enterprise towards collective goals for rule of law, accountability and justice for grave crimes. It further highlights flawed decision-making processes, lack of proper policy direction and sightless regionalist ideological tendencies that have heavily impeded the progress of international criminal justice. Thirdly, and in summing up, the Chapter argues that through the process of looking at law as a process of decision-making, experiences obtaining from the African region including perspectives of the international and hybrid tribunals, a likely projection of future trends of legal 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 Carlson, K, (2018) Trying Hissène Habré on Behalf of Africa: Remaking Hybrid International Criminal Justice at the Chambres Africaines Extraordinaires in Nocholson, J (Ed.) Strengthening the Validity of Criminal Tribunals, Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, pp.342-345. Mills, K, Bloomfield, A, (2018) African Resistance to the International Criminal Court: Halting the Advance of the Anti-Impunity Norm, 44(1) Review of International Studies, pp. 101-127. It is rather impossible to touch on each and every aspect or experience of international criminal justice. As such, the chapter will only concentrate on salient examples. Wiessner, S, (2009) Law as a Means to a Public Order of Human Dignity: The Jurisprudence of Michael Reisman, 34(2) Yale Journal of International Law, p.10; Higgins, R, (1968) Policy Considerations and the International Judicial Process, 17(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp.58-84. McDougal, MS (1956) Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy Oriented Approach to Legal Study, 1 Natural Law Forum, p.53. Tipson, FS, (1973) The Lasswell-McDougal Enterprise: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, 14 Virginia Journal of International Law, p.535 Saberi, H, (2012) Love it or Hate it, but for the Right Reasons: Pragmatism and the New Haven School’s International Law of Human Dignity, 35 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review, p.59. The future of international criminal justice in Africa... 192 and policy formulation, interpretation and implementation791 point to the domestic arena as its trajectory and grounding. It is suggested herein that such domestic arena has a higher likelihood of aiding Africa’s collective efforts towards envisaged, cherished and aspirational principles that mirror probable values, human good and dignity, consonant outcomes and responsibilities. 1 International, Regional and National Courts in Africa: Current Trends and Practice of AU and African States The interconnectedness of international, regional and national courts experience within Africa as part of a global mechanism for fighting impunity has stemmed from interactive experiences of the United Nations (UN) tribunals of Rwanda,792 Sierra Leone793 through the African Union (AU) member states active involvement in the negotiation process leading to the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),794 the embattled795 relationship with the ICC, establishment of a criminal division within the African Court,796 all the way to Hissène Habré trial,797 the AU’s attempts towards amelioration of the Hissène Habré victims’ circumstances798 and attempts thereof799 or establishment of hybrid courts such as the Special Criminal Court (SCC) in Bangui, Central African Republic.800 Further to this, the international criminal justice enterprise has mirrored its standpoint in some national legislation,801 litigation in national courts802 and policy803 perspectives. It is observed that law and policy perspectives within the continent has been a mixed bag. For instance, despite the active role played by many African countries in the build up to Rome Statute, the same enthusiasm has 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 McDougal, M, S, Lasswell, H, D, (1967) Jurisprudence in Policy-Oriented Perspective, 19 University of Florida Law Review, p.486-513. UN Security Council Resolution Number 955 adopted on 8th November 1994, http://www.unictr.irmct.org The Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.rscsl.org Bassiouni, MC, (1999) Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 32 Cornell International Law Journal, 443. Murithi, T, (2013) The African Union and the International Criminal Court: An Embattled Relationship? 8 Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) Policy Brief, pp. 1-7. Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, www.au.int/en/ The Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC); Hogestol, SAE, (2016) The Habré Judgment at the Extraordinary African Chambers: A Singular Victory in the Fight Victory Against Impunity, 34(3) Nordic Journal of Human Rights, pp.147-156. Statute of the Trust Fund for Victims of Hissène Habré’s Crimes, http://www.au.int/en/ For instance, Special Court for South Sudan and considerations of a Court for Crimes in Gambia committed by Yayah Jammeh. Labuda, P.K, (2019) ‘Open for Business’: The Special Criminal Court Launches Investigations in the Central African Republic, http://www.ejiltalk.org/open-for-business-the-special-criminal-court-in-the-centralafrican-republic/ (last accessed on 6th February 2019). The International Criminal Court Act No. 27 of 2011 for Mauritius; The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 (The ICC Act). Ethiopian courts prosecutions of over 5, 000 individuals who were part of the Derg Regime, the government that ruled the country between 1974 and 1991. They were tried for genocide and crimes against humanity. Over 1000 of them were convicted. Kayange, G, M, (2013-2014) ‘AU-ICC-Malawi’ Conflict: An Analysis of Malawi’s Position and its implications, Journal of Humanities, pp.22-38; Lansky, S, R (2016) Africans Speak Out Against ICC 193 Steven w. S. Kayuni not fully translated into domestic implementation of the Statute.804 Further, since the establishment of the African Union Commission on International Law (AUCIL)805 in February 2009, there has been no grounding of international criminal justice in its framework of activities. The AUCIL Statute draws a general base of power regarding international law with a firm footing in codification and progressive development of international law in the African continent; drafting framework agreements, model regulations, formulations and analyses of emerging trends in states practice, codification and progressive development of international law; revision of existing treaties and draft new ones; conducting studies on legal matter of interest to the AU; and encouraging teaching, study, publication and dissemination of literature on international law vis-à-vis laws of the AU. National prosecutions pursuant to international criminal justice have had varied experiences ranging from one nation to another and dependent on each nation’s legal framework. For instance, there have been prominent intersections between international criminal justice and South African law and politics.806 Most African nations have either been negligent in considering international criminal law as a prominent tool to end impunity or have not had sufficient capacity to utilise it. That notwithstanding, the AU has not fully championed the cause for international criminal justice. It has been a turbulent enterprise towards collective goals of rule of law, accountability and justice for grave crimes. It has always been a choice of preferences among participants, actors and decision-makers. Such preferences on whether to support the cause of international criminal justice have been either influenced by flawed decision-making processes, lack of proper policy direction or sightless regionalist ideological tendencies. For instance, the AU has collectively decided to pursue regionalist ideology807 regarding solutions to impunity within the continent by some African leaders without due regard to established norms of international law. Further, the AU has demonized the ICC through threats and mass withdrawal actions contrary to prescriptions of international law.808 It is observed in this chapter that the standpoints of the AU seem to have no grounding in any articulated policy or perspective of the organization. According to the AU decision-makers, the ICC’s quest for international criminal justice on the continent has strayed off course 804 805 806 807 808 Withdrawal: Governments Signal Continued Support for Court, www.hrw.org. Up to now not many States parties to the Rome Statute have wholly or in part implemented the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Decision/Assembly/AU/Dec.209(XII). Ssenyonjo, M, (2018) State Withdrawal Notifications from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: South Africa, Burundi and the Gambia, 29(1) Criminal Law Forum, 63-119; Tladi, D, (2015) The Duty on South Africa to Arrest and Surrender President Al-Bashir under South African and International Law: A Perspective from International Law, 13(5) Journal of International Criminal Justice, pp.1027-1047. Oette, L, (2010) Peace and Justice, or Neither? The Repercussions of the al-Bashir Case for International Criminal Justice in Africa and Beyond, 8(2) Journal of International Criminal Justice, pp.345-364; Murungu, C, B, (2011) Towards a criminal chamber in the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 9(5) Journal of International Criminal Justice, pp.1067-1088. Vilmer, J, J, (2016) The African Union and the International Criminal Court: Counteracting the Crisis, 92(6) International Affairs, pp.1319-1342. The future of international criminal justice in Africa... 194 to the detriment of the sovereignty, security and dignity of Africans.809 Further, such standpoints have not in any way refuted the fact that flagrant violations of human rights are on the increase on the continent and little or nothing much is done to ameliorate the situation.810 It is suggested herein that to some extent criticisms levelled against the ICC’s structural processes, alleged political considerations, skewed power and patronage811 point to a Court that seems to be labouring under an ill-sorted and hazy approach. Controversy surrounds proprio motu812 processes, conclusive determinants813 for decision-making, factor processes814, alleged political justice815, discretion platitudes816 and value clarifications.817 Such opposition to the Court does not in any way disregard the quest for an end to impunity among African nations. Possibly, it is just that an international mechanism is not operating in accordance with the whims and fancies of those that originally subscribed to it. The positive aspect of such a mechanism is that it encourages domestic interventions through the principle of complementarity.818 Further, the threshold of proving criminality through domestic interventions is easier, quicker and more focused on precise elements of the offences than interventions from the international level. 2 The Future Trajectory: A Grounding in Domestic Arena Decision-making processes need to continuously make judgments about the future.819 Michael Reisman argues that lawyers too often overlook the painfully obvious fact that though the events which precipitate decisions come from the past, decisions themselves are future-oriented; the test of their quality is not whether they conform to the past, but rather whether they structure processes and value allocations in the near and distant future in preferred ways.820 Falk has argued that in seeking to make a distinction between eschatology and utopia, and predictions and conjectures based on such objective analysis as is today possible, particular attention should be given to those images of the future that are based on an explanation of the past and present.821 It is therefore not possible to know even the near future in any detailed or comprehensive sense, but it is possible 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 President Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta Statement at 26th AU Summit, Jan, 2016. President I. Déby at 26th AU Summit. Ian Brownlie, (2008) Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, OUP, p.575. Latin maxim for own action or volition; The power of the ICC prosecutor to initiate investigations and bring charges against an individual suspected of international crimes. Conclusive causes for decision-making Aspects that a decision-maker takes into account in coming up with a decision Use of judicial process for the purpose of gaining or limiting political power or influence by decision-makers Remarks or statements by decision-maker especially one with moral content Clarification of aspirations that the community has; see generally, Goldston, JA, (2010). Article 17 of the Rome Statute. Reisman, M, (1973) Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to a Decision, 14 Virginia Journal of International Law, p.33. Reisman, M, (1997) Designing and Managing the Future of the State, 8 European Journal of International Law, p.409; see generally, Arsanjani, MH, Cogan, J, Sloane, R, Wiessner, S, (Eds.) Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman, (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011). See generally, Falk, R, & Black, C, (Eds.) The Future of the International Legal Order: Trend and Patterns, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2015). 195 Steven w. S. Kayuni to identify the institutional continuities, developmental trends, systemic structures, and values, central problems, and relationships of constants and variables that have proven to be reasonably reliable. Even if a forecast does no more than suggest and evaluate a range of possibilities, it limits to this extent the uncertainties that lie ahead.822 As such, it is argued herein that the relevant practice of the AU regarding international criminal justice, points to institutional continuities, developmental trends, systematic structures and values, central problems and relationships of constants and variables. These pointers demonstrate an inclination that prioritises domestic processes, regional ideologies and strategic choices on international norms that need to be pursued and those that need to be disregarded. For instance, as earlier indicated, calls for trials of despotic regimes or leaders within the continent tend to face unanimous opposition or reluctance from the AU Assembly.823 However, there have also been those instances where the AU adopted decisions that are in tandem with international criminal justice values and goals. For instance, the prosecution of Hissène Habré received overwhelming support from the AU Assembly.824 This has been demonstrated from the initial domestic calls for trial, through calls from the international community to set up of a special court, all the way to the end of the trial.825 Further, AU has had to adopt a specific statute pertaining to processes towards the reparations of the victims.826 Closer scrutiny of the AU practice points to an AU that is more inclined to wholly supporting an international criminal justice process emanating from domestic processes than one stemming from an international arena. The Al Bashir and Uhuru Kenyatta incidents at the ICC have had no positive support from the AU Assembly.827 Further, it is suggested that the whole concept of the establishment of a regional criminal division pursuant to the Malabo Protocol at the African Court of Peoples and Human Rights, is an offshoot of the AU’s attempts to parry international influences. It must be observed that the lack of ratification instruments regarding the Malabo Protocol828 can be interpreted as another clue by African states believing more in the domestic processes than the suggested regional processes. From the ICC experience and the zeal that African nations demonstrated at the negotiating stage all the way to the adoption of the Rome Statute and the policy, strategies and experiences of the ICC, it is no longer an appealing idea for an African nation to cede power, processes and authority 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 Ibid. Ssenyonjo, M, (2013) The Rise of the African Union Opposition to the International Criminal Court’s Investigations and Prosecutions of African Leaders, 13(2) International Criminal Law Review, pp.385-428. Decision on the Hissène Habré Case Khartoum, January, 2006, Assembly/AU/Dec.103(VII). Carlson, K, B, (2018) Trying Hissène Habré ‘On Behalf of Africa’: Remaking Hybrid International Justice at the Chambres Africaines Extraordinaires, in Nicholson, J (Ed.) Strengthening the Validity of International Criminal Tribunals, (The Hague, Brill, 2018) pp.342-365. Statute of the Trust Fund for Victims of Hissène Habré’s Crimes, EX.CL/1040 (XXXI); see also AU Decision on the Establishment of the Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC), Khartoum, The Sudan, January, 2006. Weldehaimanot, S.M (2011) Arresting Al-Bashir: The African Union’s Opposition and the Legalities, 19(2) African Journal of International and Comparative Law, pp.208-235; Helfer, L.R, & Showalter, A.E, (2017) Opposing International Justice: Kenya’s Integrated Backlash Strategy Against the ICC, 17(1) International Criminal Law Review, pp. 1-46. Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the Decisions of the Assembly of the African Union on the International Criminal Court, Executive Council, Thirty-Fourth Ordinary Session, 7 - 8 February 2019, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, EX.CL/1138(XXXIV). The future of international criminal justice in Africa... 196 to an international or regional court. There is more trust in domestic processes that can be controlled, or worse still, manipulated than in regional or international processes or institutions. But what of the newly established hybrid tribunal in the Central African Republic (CAR) or the suggested South Sudan Hybrid Tribunal? It seems likely that the receiving African nation would try to negotiate terms of references and any other processes for these hybrid courts that differ from those under which earlier hybrid tribunals such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone were established. The targeted state would likely negotiate the establishment of a court more similar to its national criminal justice system. Thus these hybrid courts would mirror values more closely aligned with those of its domestic justice process than international criminal justice. Similarly, the rules of procedure and practice and policy of the court would favour domestic processes. The AU itself has little or no faith in the ICC. This has been demonstrated by the AU joining an application to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advisory opinion on the question of immunities of Heads of State and Government and other Senior Officials as it relates to the obligations of States Parties under the Rome Statute and international law.829 Further, a decision by the AU’s recent summit postulates future value allocations and structure processes that mirror Africa’s preferred international criminal justice aspirations.830 McDougal, Lasswell and Reisman have argued that the law must be regarded as a process of authoritative decision-making through which members of a community seek to clarify and secure their common interests.831 Thus it is suggested herein that within the African context, international criminal justice, in its most useful conception, must seek to clarify and add value to any conception that aspires to keep in touch with empirical reality. Such empirical reality must at all cost be an ultimate reference to decision requiring a choice among the present options while mirroring future alternatives in action and outcome.832 The recent AU decision on the ICC833 is a preferred choice predicting future alternatives in action and outcome. As Gerhard Kemp has rightly posited, the evolving system of international criminal justice consists of more than just the ICC.834 This is not to say that the ICC lacks the central footing in international criminal justice. The ICC is rather a prominent (if not the most prominent) symbol and actual manifestation of international criminal justice, but it is not the whole story.835 As argued above, even though there exist regional and sub-regional instruments for ending impunity 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 Decision on the International Criminal Court, Doc. Ex.cl/1138(xxxiv), (Assembly/AU/Res.1/XXXII), 32nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly, 10-11 February 2019, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Report of the Meeting of the Ambassadors on the ICC, January 2018 (Notes on File). See generally, McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, (1968) Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 Virginia Journal of International Law, p.188. McDougal, M, (1979) International Law and the Future, 50 Mississippi Law Journal, p.259. Supra note 45. Kemp, G, (2014) Taking Stock of International Criminal Justice in Africa – Three Inventories Considered in Beitel van der Merwe (Ed.) International Criminal Justice in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities, (Nairobi, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung), pp.7-9. Ibid. 197 Steven w. S. Kayuni for international crimes within the continent,836 the future trajectory likely lies in the domestic arena. It is further submitted that collective efforts towards an end to impunity will be highly successful where a broad mandate is given to courts. Subject-matter jurisdiction need not to be limited to core international crimes but may include serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. In addition, victims have easier access to justice in domestic fora than international ones. For instance, a justice system operating on the French inquisitorial model with investigative functions for both prosecutor and investigative judges will accord a victim a partie civile whereby victims may bring alleged crimes to the attention of either magistrate or investigative judge.837 It has to be noted that though such procedure enables victims to contribute to decisionmaking and probable outcomes as regards the investigations, it may also create problems if domestic processes are flooded with individual complaints. From any observational perspective, it is easy to note that international criminal justice in Africa today is confronted with not merely some important legal and policy formulation flaws, but that practically all of international criminal justice’s challenges within the continent have an interpretation and implementation shortfall.838 Because of these formulation, interpretation and implementation challenges, any effective and continuing solutions for these problems must be equally innovative and comprehensive. The domestic arena processes need not focus wholly on ‘most responsible’ suspects of criminality. It should however, focus on ‘degree of responsibility,’ actual role within an armed group or state institution, repeat offenders and those that played a key role. Value processes and categories for decision-making cannot be assumed to be closed. It is further suggested that domestic efforts should at all cost conform to the ICC’s complementarity principle, which gives domestic efforts the starring role as regards the investigation and prosecution of international crime. It is proposed that for such domestic processes to succeed, there is need for political will and support to the internal and external realms of criminal justice systems; continuous reviews of preliminary examinations and investigations; special attention towards women and child justice; enhanced complementarity and cooperation of the world community, and gender balance among decision-makers.839 In order for the international criminal justice project to succeed on the continent, it is suggested that the AU needs to focus its attentions on the following factors in order to influence decision:840 Firstly, it is suggested that Institutions themselves need 836 837 838 839 840 Kweka, G, J, African Regional and Sub-Regional Instruments on Ending Impunity for International Crimes: Hit or Miss?, in HJ van der Merwe & Gerhard Kemp (Eds.) International Criminal Justice in Africa, 2017, (Nairobi, Strathmore University Press), p.37. Labunda, P.L (2019) ‘Open for Business’: The Special Criminal Court Launches Investigations in the Central African Republic, http://www.ejiltalk.org (last accessed on 15 February 2019). See generally, Bellelli, R, (Eds.) International Criminal Justice: Law and Practice from the Rome Statute to its Review, (London, Routledge, 2016). This is a good governance, accountability and transparency measure by a criminal justice system so as to achieve rectitude and enlightment. Moore, JN, (1968) Prolegomenon to the jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 Virginia The future of international criminal justice in Africa... 198 to be a focus. The antiquated nation-state structures, with their disregard of physical, organizational structure, and coordination strategies. The continuing weakness of international governmental organizations has a serious impact of governance and justice delivery. The lack of development of functional national associations devoted to values or aspirations of justice other than power and wealth should not be ignored. The relative immunization of wealth associations from national authority will have a long term impact on the quality of justice within a nation. Secondly there is Security. Regardless of its definition or inclinations towards minimum order, the prevention of unauthorized coercion, or of optimum order, the maintenance of high position, potential and expectation with respect to all values by leadership in a nation must be maintained. Thus, continuing confrontations of the major adversaries, with rising expectations of violence, acquisition of contemporary instruments of destruction by adversaries and the rise and spread of private violence and terrorism must be in check by the AU. Thirdly, it is Resources or environment. This is the state sponsored spoliation, pollution, and exhaustion of resources at an accelerating rate, increasing violation of physical and engineering unities in the use of resources, the growing monopolization of sharable resources, with restraint upon scientific inquiry about resources, the promise and threat of both deliberate and accidental climate and weather modifications and the continuing diversion of important resources to destructive purposes must feature highly in the AU’s policy formulation for a domestic oriented continued fight against impunity among member states. Fourthly, it is the Population. This is the unchecked accelerating rate of increase in population growth coupled with the uneven distribution of peoples in relation to resources and increasing barriers to migration must be one of the AU’s focus and concentration in its international criminal justice agenda. Problems related to different value processes within the national social processes will require such nations to aspire for the attainment of human goods or values.841 Such values include, firstly, Power. This should be understood as the retreat of democracy and rise of totalitarianism within many different African nations. The increasing centralization, concentration, and bureaucratization of power even within nominally democratic nations. The increasing monopolization of the effective bases of power or misuse of the law within different communities. Secondly, there is Wealth. This must be contextualised as the continued prevalence of individual poverty among African nation populations. Unequal distribution of wealth 841 Law Review, p.662; Little, D, (1973) Towards Clarifying the Grounds of Value-Clarification: A Reaction to the Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence of Lasswell and McDougal, 14 Virginia Journal of International Law, p.451. Lasswell, H, McDougal, MS (1966) Jurisprudence in Policy-Oriented Perspective, 19 University of Florida Law Review, p.486; see generally, Chen, L, (2014) An Introduction to contemporary international law: a policy-oriented perspective, (Oxford, OUP). 199 Steven w. S. Kayuni both within and across community lines, inadequate regulation of national monetary units, governmental interferences with trade, arbitrary seizures and confiscations of property rights, irrational allocations of resources and unequal development and continuing cycles of depression and inflation will have a huge impact on any criminal justice system if not monitored and reconsidered. Thirdly, it is Respect. This is the widespread denials, deliberate and unreasonable limitations of individual freedom of choice about social roles, increasing individual differentiations and group hatreds upon grounds (race, sex, religion, language, nationality, age) irrelevant to individual capabilities and contributions, massive encroachments upon individual autonomy and privacy through modern technology and increasing governmental bureaucratization of its citizenry will affect the machinery and frameworks of criminal justice systems. Fourthly, it is Well-Being (Health). The continuing high mortality rate and low life expectancy in many African nations, increasing threats of famine, epidemics, and disease, indiscriminate mass killings in armed conflict and other altercations and glorification and nationalization of torture as a deliberate tool of state machinery will affect the perceptions of justice within a state. Fifthly, there is Enlightenment. This must be understood as continuing high rates of illiteracy and differential access to information in an African nation, deliberate fabrications and disseminations of misinformation or fake news, wholesale indoctrinations, propaganda and brain-washings as a state policy and the withholding and suppression of the information necessary to independently appraise national policies will have an effect on how an African national can competently implement. Sixthly, there is Skill. Any nation determined to formulate, interpret and implement international criminal justice legal and policy framework must focus on the unequal distribution of skills in modern technology and the rapid obsolescence of skills by changes in technology. Migration of highly skilled labour must be monitored and policies put in place to deescalate brain drain from such nations to those seemingly developed. Further, such nations should not restrict freedoms of skill groups to organize, function and prosper. Seventh there is Affection (Loyalties). The international criminal justice framework will advance in any African nation that is monitors and puts in place policies restricting the requisition of loyalties and promotion of state-sponsored tribal groupings and the undermining of more universal loyalties such as nation-building or unity. This must have a balancing effect on severe restrictions upon freedom of association and governmental frustration of congenial personal relations and employment of social ostracism as sanctions; Lastly, there is Rectitude. This is deliberate and state policy denials of freedom to worship and choice of secular criteria of responsibility among a nation’s population, the politicization of rectitude and restrictions upon association for religious The future of international criminal justice in Africa... 200 purposes and intolerance and persecution of religious minorities will retard progress of the international criminal justice agenda within a nation. It is suggested herein that the interdependences of all peoples in a nation and interconnectedness of these values or human goods will have a lasting impact in the fight against impunity. Little or lack of attention in decision-making to these values will only accelerate impunity in a particular nation as these values affect the core values of humankind, contemporary problems, survival and human dignity. Conclusion The first step towards a realistic and useful inquiry regarding the future of international criminal justice in Africa is to know precisely what the major goals and commitments are. A second task is historical, that of drawing upon the wisdom of the past: what Africa can learn about comparable problems from past successes and failures and where does Africa stand in approximation to its goals regarding an end to impunity. A third task is a methodological one whereby contemporary systems of justice need to thoroughly analyse the concerns of international criminal justice, its ideals and goals. The vexing question would be what factors appear to have affected past positive advancements842 of the fight against impunity within the region and are these factors likely to have comparable effects in the future. A fourth task focuses explicitly upon forecasting or the projection of future developments of international criminal justice within the continent. Within the domestic arena, what are the possible future developments among African nations criminal justice systems to accommodate the cause of international criminal justice? Further, what indices of probability can be assigned to these different possibilities? Thus, reliable forecasting would require, a perspective beyond the extrapolation of past trends, the careful evaluation of such trends in the light of knowledge and the potentialities of change.843 The final task of the inquiry is that of evaluating and inventing alternatives in action that will promote change in the direction of demanded goals.844 It is suggested that these different intellectual tasks should be performed in reliance and dependent to each other in a rational concern about the future.845 From this perspective, it is suggested that the framework of inquiry appropriate and of concern about the future of international criminal justice in Africa is a policy-oriented, problem-solving, and multi-method framework that is most appropriate for effective inquiry about the law and a projection of its future alternative outcomes. The chapter has suggested, and perhaps modestly illustrated, how a deliberately policy-oriented framework of inquiry can be used in the exploration of the potential 842 843 844 845 Such as active and successful participation of the African Group during the road to Rome i.e. ICC treaty negotiations. McDougal, MS (1966) Jurisprudence of a Free Society, 1 Georgia Law Review, p.1. McDougal, MS (1952) The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World Order, 61 Yale Law Journal, p.915. Suzuki, E, (1974) The New Haven School of International Law: An Invitation to Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence, 1 Yale Studies of World Public Order, p.1. 201 Steven w. S. Kayuni of international criminal justice processes for coping with some of the more important emerging challenges in the contemporary fight against impunity. In this chapter, major features in this framework of inquiry about the future of international criminal justice in Africa have included an observational standpoint whereby disparities between demanded values and their achievements have been considered. Further, there has been a postulation of a comprehensive set of recommended goals; a conception of law in terms not of rules only but of a continuous process of decision; the relationship and intern-connectedness of decisions to the larger effective power processes of international, regional and national courts; and, finally, the systematic employment of international criminal justice goals, the description of past trends in decision in terms of approximation to clarified goals, the analysis of conditions affecting decision, the projection of possible future developments, and the invention and evaluation of appropriate alternatives in decision, namely, domestic or national courts. The future of international criminal justice in Africa... 202 203 Nestor Nkurunziza « LE RÉGIME DE COMPLÉMENTARITÉ SOUS LE PROTOCOLE PORTANT AMENDEMENT DU PROTOCOLE PORTANT STATUT DE LA COUR AFRICAINE DE JUSTICE ET DES DROITS DE L’HOMME. » Nestor Nkurunziza846∗ Résumé En 2014 au mois de juin, l’Union Africaine a adopté le Protocole portant amendement du Protocole portant Statut de la Cour Africaine de Justice et des Droits de l’Homme (le Protocole de Malabo ou le Protocole) qui prévoit l’institution d’une Section de droit pénal international (SDPI) au sein de la Cour africaine de justice et des droits de l’homme (CAJDH). Intervenue en pleine période de tensions entre la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) d’une part, l’UA et certains de ses pays membres d’autre part, la décision a suscité des controverses quant à la question de savoir si elle était véritablement par le souci de lutter contre l’impunité des crimes les plus graves commis sur le continent. Qui plus est, le Protocole de Malabo organise un régime de complémentarité traduit l’expression d’une politique de l’UA visant à privilégier l’intervention des juridictions régionales en Afrique dans la répression des crimes commis sur les territoires des États africains. Ce qui a contribué au renforcement des points de vue qui interprètent le projet beaucoup plus dans le sens d’une barrière contre les interventions de la CPI en Afrique. Le chapitre propose une analyse qui, du point de vue de son auteur, devrait contribuer à une meilleure compréhension des fondements du régime de complémentarité prévu par le Protocole de Malabo. Il est suggéré que la solution adoptée par le Protocole peut se justifier par la nécessité de renforcer le potentiel de l’apport de la justice pénale internationale dans la réalisation d’un certain nombre d’objectifs qui lui sont communs avec la justice transitionnelle dans la plupart des contextes de son application en Afrique. L’argument est développé en deux parties. La première partie (I) identifie deux objectifs majeurs couramment assignés à la justice transitionnelle mais qui s’imposent également et constituent des défis de justice pénale internationale administrée dans les contextes de transition en Afrique. Il s’agit, en plus des fonctions traditionnelles de la justice 846 Candidat au PhD en Droit à l’Université d’Ottawa, membre du Centre de Recherche et d’Enseignement sur les Droits de la Personne. Enseignant à la Faculté droit, Université du Burundi. ∗ Le régime de complémentarité sous le protocole portant amendement ... 204 pénale, de la nécessité de promouvoir une justice réconciliatrice et de contribuer au renforcement des capacités des instances nationales dans la répression des crimes les plus graves. Dans la deuxième partie (II), l’auteur interprète d’abord la logique de complémentarité adoptée par les rédacteurs du Protocole de Malabo en proposant qu’en cas de conflits de compétences internationales, elle une solution de principe reposant sur la reconnaissance d’une primauté de juridiction en faveur d’un mécanisme judiciaire dont la situation géographique le rapprocherait du territoire du pays où les crimes ont été commis. Ensuite, l’auteur conclut qu’une approche offre de plus grands atouts aux fins de la réalisation des objectifs qui viennent d’être mentionnés. 205 Nestor Nkurunziza « THE COMPLEMENTARITY REGIME UNDER THE PROTOCOL ON AMENDMENTS TO THE PROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS. » Abstract In June 2014, the African Union adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR), (the Malabo Protocol or the Protocol). The Malabo Protocol provides for the establishment of an International Criminal Law Section (ICLS) within the ACJHR. The adoption of the Malabo Protocol amidst tensions between the International Criminal Court (ICC) on one side, the AU and some of its member States on the other side has raised doubts about the real motivations behind the project. Moreover, the adopted regime is an illustration of a policy by the AU revolving around the primacy for criminal prosecutions and trials carried out on a regional basis by African courts. This policy has further contributed to strengthening the views that the project might represent more an attempt to circumvent future ICC interventions in Africa. The proposed chapter aims to contribute to the analysis and understanding of the foundations that, from the point of view of the author, could provide better justifications for the complementarity regime under the Malabo Protocol. It is thus suggested that the adopted solution can be justified by the need to pursue the achievement of a number of common objectives between transitional justice and international criminal justice in most African contexts. The main argument of the paper is developed in two parts. The first part identifies the needs to promote a reconciliatory justice as well as building states’ institutions capacity in prosecuting gross human rights violations as one of the most important goals of justice for most African transitions. The second part suggests that geographic proximity as a primary criterion to determine which supranational judicial institution should have the priority to intervene in the absence of opportunities at the national level is the underlying rationale for the adopted complementarity regime. We then conclude that such an approach offers opportunities for strengthening international criminal justice’s potential to contribute in the realization of the identified objectives. Le régime de complémentarité sous le protocole portant amendement ... 206 Introduction En juin 2014, l’Union Africain (UA) a adopté le Protocole de Malabo qui prévoit la création d’une Section de droit pénal international (SDPI) au sein de la Cour Africaine de Justice et des Droits de l’Homme (CAJDH).847 Cette décision marquait l’étape la plus avancée d’un projet dont les origines remontent plutôt loin dans l’histoire de l’organisation panafricaine.848 Cependant, la mesure a suscité des réactions pour le moins divergentes, y compris parmi les experts, entre ceux qui y voyaient effectivement un pas de plus vers la lutte contre l’impunité des crimes les plus graves commis sur le continent, et ceux qui doutaient des motivations réelles derrière l’initiative.849 Ces controverses sont en partie dues aux tensions particulièrement élevées qui prévalaient entre l’UA et certains États africains d’une part, la CPI et des États occidentaux d’autre part touchant des questions relatives à l’administration de la justice pénale internationale au moment de l’adoption du Protocole de Malabo. Qui plus est, le contenu de certaines dispositions mêmes du Protocole a été de nature à renforcer les suspicions à l’endroit du projet. Le régime de complémentarité organisé par le Protocole a été critiqué, associé avec une politique de l’UA qui privilégie l’intervention des juridictions régionales en Afrique dans la répression des crimes commis sur les territoires de ses États membres.850. L’auteur de cette contribution est tout à fait conscient du climat politique peu favorable dans lequel les institutions judiciaires fonctionnement souvent en Afrique. Il ne rejette pas non plus l’idée que la crise qui vient d’être évoquée ait effectivement donné un coup de pouce au projet de régionalisation de la justice pénale internationale en Afrique.851 Cela dit, l’analyse développée dans le cadre de la présente contribution se situe beaucoup plus sur le plan juridique. En ce sens, l’auteur entend défendre l’approche retenue par le Protocole de Malabo en matière de complémentarité en la fondant sur les principes d’une bonne administration de la justice compte tenu des besoins sur le continent. Il propose une ligne d’analyse qui justifie la solution adoptée par le Protocole par les avantages qu’elle procure en faveur de la réalisation de certains parmi les objectifs communs entre la justice pénale internationale et la justice transitionnelle. 847 848 849 850 851 Adopté à l’occasion de la 23ème Session ordinaire de l’Assemblée de l’UA, tenue à Malabo le 27 juin 2014, https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-amendments-protocol-statute-african-court-justice-and-human-rights Pour plus de détails, voir Ademola Abass, « Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa : Rationale, Prospects and Challenges » (2013) 24 Eur. J. Intl L. 933, pp 941-942. Parmi les plus sceptiques, voir, par exemple, Chacha Bhoke Murungu, « Towards a Criminal Chamber in the African Court of Justice and Human Rights » (2011) 9:5 J Intl Criminal Justice, p 1067. Voir cependant Ademola Abass, id. Voir, par exemple, Mutoy Mubiala, « Chronique de droit pénal de l’Union Africaine. L’élargissement du mandat de la Cour africaine de Justice et des droits de l’homme aux affaires de droit international pénal » (2014) 85 :3 Rev IDP 749 L’idée que les crises ont historiquement agi comme des catalyseurs de développement du droit international a déjà fait l’objet d’étude dans la littérature. Voir, par exemple, Benjamin Authers et Hilary Charlesworth, «The Crisis and the Quotidian in International Human Rights Law. » (2013) 44 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 19, p 25. Également cité dans Matiangai V. S. Sirleaf, «Regionalism, Regime Complexes and the Crisis in International Criminal Justice» (2016) 54: 3 Colum J of Transnat’l L, p 709 207 Nestor Nkurunziza La littérature sur les origines historiques de la justice pénale internationale852 et de la justice transitionnelle853 renvoie, dans les deux cas, aux procès organisés contre les responsables nazis au lendemain de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale. En cela, la création d’une Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI) est considérée comme l’aboutissement d’un projet lancé cinquante ans plus tôt à Nuremberg.854 En dépit de ces origines communes, les travaux scientifiques qui s’intéressent aux rapports entre les deux disciplines sont rares. L’évolution historique de la justice transitionnelle expliquerait peut-être le peu d’intérêt à cet égard. Certes, la naissance de la justice transitionnelle dans les traditions libérales occidentales reste importante pour comprendre la trajectoire et les dynamiques qui l’ont marqué le long de son évolution historique.855 Toutefois, c’est plutôt l’usage quasi généralisé des mécanismes de justice transitionnelle dans les contextes de changements de régimes associés avec la troisième vague de démocratisation qui aura contribué de façon déterminante à imprimer à la justice transitionnelle le qualificatif d’un « projet global »856 qui lui est attaché aujourd’hui.857 De sa première génération858 sous forme d’une justice essentiellement rétributive selon le paradigme libéral de la justice, la justice transitionnelle a plutôt évolué vers une justice plus globale, appelée à répondre à un éventail plus large de besoins dans les sociétés qui l’appliquent. Cela étant, les développements contemporains devraient susciter un regain d’intérêt pour des questions liées aux rapports qui peuvent lier la justice pénale internationale et la justice transitionnelle en termes de convergence d’objectifs poursuivis ou qui devraient l’être. Aujourd’hui, en effet, la plus vaste majorité des cas d’application de la justice transitionnelle renvoient à des pays africains qui tentent de traiter les crimes du passé, moyennant une assistance ou une intervention internationale sous une forme ou une autre. A cette fin, les mécanismes de justice transitionnelle font actuellement partie intégrante de toute une gamme d’outils de la paix des Nations Unies relatifs à la 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 Antoine Garapon, « De Nuremberg au TPI : naissance d’une justice universelle ? » (1999), Critique internationale 5, 167 Lavinia Stan et Nadya Nedelsky, dir., Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, vol. 1, p 7; Alexander Laban Hinton, « Introduction: Toward an Anthropology of Transitional Justice », dans Alexander Laban Hinton, dir., Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities After Genocide and Mass Violence, New Jersey: Rutgers university press, 2010, p 1; Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p 29 Antoine Garapon, id., p 180 Allusion est faite ici aux pratiques néolibérales qui ont marqué les mécanismes de justice transitionnelle dans la pratique comparée. Pour une synthèse intéressante, voir Dustin Sharp, « Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition: Toward a Positive-Peace Paradigm for Transitional Justice », (2012), 35 (3), Fordham International Law Journal, p 799; également, Paige Arthur «How ‘Transitions ‘Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice» (2009), 31 (2), Human Rights Quarterly, pp 321-367 Rosemary Nagy, «Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections. », (2008), 29 (2), Third World Quarterly, pp. 275-289 Dustin Sharp, «Emancipating Transitional Justice from the Bonds of the Paradigmatic Transition. » (2014), 9 (1), International Journal of Transitional Justice, p 150 Ruti Teitel, «Transitional Justice Genealogy» (2003), 16, Harvard Human Rights Journal, pp 69-94 Le régime de complémentarité sous le protocole portant amendement ... 208 consolidation de la paix.859 Aux termes du rapport de 1992 du Secrétaire-General des Nations Unies, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, la consolidation de la paix consiste une « action menée en vue de définir et d’étayer les structures propres à raffermir la paix afin d’éviter une reprise des hostilités ».860 Et comme John-Paul Lederach le rappelle, l’aboutissement d’un processus de consolidation de la paix se matérialise par la transformation des anciens rapports interindividuels conflictuels en relations durables de paix.861 Or, du fait que la quasi-totalité des pays dans lesquels la CPI intervient se situent en Afrique, les cas d’application de la justice pénale internationale stricto sensu correspondent également à des contextes de transitions où les ambitions poursuivies à travers l’administration de la justice sont plutôt large. C’est donc à juste titre que les rapprochements entre la justice pénale internationale et la justice transitionnelle commencent à susciter un intérêt dans les milieux scientifiques. Ainsi par exemple, la Revue Québécoise de Droit International a récemment consacré un numéro spécial à ce sujet.862 A la lumière de ces considérations, le chapitre retient d’abord la promotion d’une justice réconciliatrice ainsi que la contribution dans la reconstruction des institutions étatiques qu’il analyse comme deux objectifs communs entre la justice pénale internationale et la justice transitionnelle en Afrique. Ensuite, il développe l’idée que la politique de la complémentarité adoptée dans le cadre du Protocole de Malabo contribuerait mieux à la réalisation desdits objectifs. 1. Les défis de la justice pénale internationale en Afrique Parmi les objectifs majeurs de la justice transitionnelle figurent une contribution à la reconstitution des liens sociaux brisés par le conflit ainsi que le renforcement des capacités des institutions locales dans la prévention et la lutte contre l’impunité. Un des défis de la justice pénale internationale en Afrique est qu’elle se voit imposé les missions de la justice transitionnelle qui sont étrangères à la tradition libérale de la justice pénale. 1.1 Une fonction réconciliatrice de la justice pénale internationale ? Aux termes de la résolution 955 instituant le Tribunal Pénal International pour le Rwanda (TPIR), « dans les circonstances particulières qui [régnaient] au Rwanda », les poursuites pénales permettraient non seulement de mettre fin aux crimes internationaux, « … mais contribueraient également au processus de réconciliation nationale.»863 Sur le 859 860 861 862 863 Nations Unies, Conseil de Sécurité, Rapport du Secrétaire général sur le Rétablissement de l’état de droit et administration de la justice pendant la période de transition dans les sociétés en proie à un conflit ou sortant d’un conflit, (S/2004/616) Nations Unies, « Un Agenda pour là pour la paix : diplomatie préventive, rétablissement de la paix, maintien de la paix », Rapport du Secrétaire-Général, A 47/277-S/2411, juin 1992. New York: Nations Unies, para 21 John-Paul Lederach 1997. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, à la p 29 Voir Revue Québécoise de Droit de Droit International (RQDI), Hors-Série Décembre 2017-Justice Internationale Pénale et Justice transitionnelle. Nations Unies, Conseil de Sécurité, Résolution 955 du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, adoptée le 08 209 Nestor Nkurunziza plan de la lettre, le texte de la résolution innove en assignant une fonction réconciliatrice à une juridiction de droit pénal international créée par le Conseil de sécurité. Par-là, la résolution exprime un des défis de la justice pénale internationale dans les contextes de conflits ou post-conflits en Afrique. L’idée que les procès pénaux contribueraient à la réconciliation a reçu des soutiens y compris parmi les grandes figures du droit pénal international. En ce sens, Antonio Cassese écrit ainsi : Les procès pénaux établissent les responsabilités individuelles en remplacement d’une responsabilité collective, c’est-à-dire qu’ils établissent que non pas tous les Allemands étaient impliqués dans l’Holocauste, ou les Turcs dans le génocide arménien, ou tous les Serbes, musulmans, Croates, ou Hutus, mais les auteurs individuellement […] le procès dissipe le désir de vengeance parce que lorsque la cour applique au bourreau la peine qu’il mérite, alors le cri des victimes au châtiment est entendu […] les victimes sont prêtes à se réconcilier avec leurs anciens bourreaux, parce qu’elles savent que ces derniers ont payé leurs crimes; une vérité [documentation] totale fiable sur les atrocités est établie de telle sorte que les générations futures seront informées de ce qui s’est passé864. [notre traduction] A maintes occasions, l’auteur de la présente contribution a été en contact avec une rhétorique dans ce sens au sein des milieux d’expertise sur la justice transitionnelle.865 La réalité est que les contextes de perpétration des atrocités de masse défient ces assertions qui reposent sur les postulats libéraux du procès pénal qui sont empiriquement loin d’être vérifiés.866 Le potentiel des juridictions internationales du modèle du TPIR de promouvoir une justice réconciliatrice est limité à bien d’égards. En effet, l’éloignement physique de ces juridictions des lieux où les crimes ont été commis est couramment mis en cause. La fonction réconciliatrice de la justice pénale est tributaire de l’opportunité pour les communautés touchées de pouvoir participer dans les procédures pénales. C’est en raison de l’importance de cet aspect que la Procureure auprès du TPIR, Louise Arbour, avait senti le besoin de délocaliser certaines audiences d’Arusha (Tanzanie, siège du 864 865 866 novembre 1995. S/RES/955 (1995) (« [t]rials establish individual responsibility over collective assignation of guilt, i.e., they establish that not all Germans were responsible for the Holocaust, not all Turks for the Armenian genocide, nor all Serbes, Muslims, Croats, or Hutus but individual perpetrators […] justice dissipates the call for revenge, because when the Court metes out to the perpetrator his just deserts, then victims’ calls for retribution are met […] victims are prepared to be reconciled with their erstwhile tormentors, because they know that the latter have now paid for their crimes; a fully reliable record is established of atrocities so that the future generations can remember and be made fully cognisant of what happened ». Voir Antonio Cassese, « Reflection on International Criminal Law » (1998) 61 :1 Mod L Rev 1, p 6 [italiques dans l’original]. Allusion est notamment faite aux conférences et séminaires auxquels l’auteur a participé en tant que membre de la société civile au Burundi. Dans le cas du Rwanda, voir par ex Mark Drumbl, « Sclerosis : Retributive Justice and the Rwandan Genocide » (2000) 2:3 Punishment and Society, p 287 Le régime de complémentarité sous le protocole portant amendement ... 210 TPIR) à Kigali la capitale du Rwanda.867 Cette opportunité est considérée comme un des atouts que représentait la situation géographique du TPIR comparé avec le Tribunal Pénal International pour l’ex-Yougoslavie (TP-Y).868 Cela étant, les limites des procès pénaux internationaux sous l’angle du sujet qui nous occupe ne sont pas que pratiques. Elles sont aussi et surtout d’ordre idéologique.869 1.2 Le renforcement des capacités locales : un objectif majeur pour la justice pénale internationale en Afrique Les politiques internationales relatives aux modalités de mise en place des mécanismes judiciaires destinés à répondre aux crimes commis dans les sociétés en situation de conflit ou post-conflit ont évolué le long des différentes interventions des Nations Unies. Actuellement, les juridictions mixtes ou hybrides sont préférées par rapport aux tribunaux purement internationaux. Un des facteurs déterminants dans cette orientation réside dans le potentiel plus élevé de contribuer au renforcement des capacités locales que représente cette dernière modalité d’application de la justice pénale internationale. C’est précisément dans ce sens que le Secrétaire General des Nations Unies justifiait l’abandon d’une proposition initiale d’un tribunal pénal international pour le Timor oriental en faveur d’un mécanisme judiciaire plutôt mixte « qui contribuerait mieux au renforcement des structures judiciaires nationales avec l’assistance de l’ONU ».870 Dans la même optique de raisonnement et en dehors des tribunaux spécifiquement mis en place pour traiter des situations post-conflituelles, des commentateurs trouvent un apport de la CPI à la lutte contre l’impunité dans de tels contextes non pas nécessairement à travers l’aboutissement des poursuites qu’elle y entreprendrait, mais par l’effet « catalyseur » de réformes législatives ou institutionnelles desdites interventions dans les pays concernés. Une série de réformes qui ont été menées par les autorités nationales kenyanes et libyennes sont citées à titre d’illustration.871 Bien plus, et les décideurs impliqués dans le fonctionnement de la CPI sont généralement d’accord de placer le renforcement des capacités des États en matière de prévention et de lutte contre les crimes relevant de la compétence de la cour au 867 868 869 870 871 Voir Payam Akhavan «Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities? » (2001) 95 Am. J. Intl L. 7, à la p 25 Wiliam Burke-White, par exemple, déplore l’invisibilité du TP-Y aux yeux de nombreuses victimes des violences sexuelles dans le cadre du procès Kunarac. Voir Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (I.C.T.Y. Feb. 22, 2001). Cité dans William W Burke-White, « Regionalization of International Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration » (2003) 38:4 Tex Intl LJ 729, p 735 Voir Mark Drumbl commentant les procès pénaux au Rwanda et devant le TP-Y, en particulier l’affaire Tadic. Supra, note 20, p 294 Voir Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/54/726, S/2000/59. Pour une analyse plus détaillée, voir Suzannah Linton, « Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice » (2001) 12 Criminal Law Forum 185, aux pages 202 et Ss. Pour une analyse critique plus détaillée, voir Carey Shenkman, «Catalyzing National Judicial Capacity: The ICC’s First Crimes Against Humanity Outside Armed Conflict» (2012) 87 New York University Law Review 1210, pp 1235-1239 211 Nestor Nkurunziza centre d’une politique de « complémentarité positive ». Le rapport final du Bureau de l’Assemblée des États parties au Statut de Rome, tenue à Kampala en 2010, est on ne peut plus clair en ce sens : […] la complémentarité positive fait référence à toutes formes d’activités par lesquelles les capacités des instances judiciaires nationales sont renforcées et cellesci sont capables de mener à bien les poursuites et la répression des crimes prévus sous le régime du Statut de Rome […]872 Les points de vue divergent plutôt au sujet de la question d’assigner à la CPI une fonction d’assistance directe sous forme de renforcement des capacités des instances judiciaires locales. Alors que les représentants des Etats africains présents à la conférence de Kampala avaient formulé une requête dans ce sens, le bureau de l’Assemblée des États Parties a finalement rejeté la demande en estimant que ce genre d’initiatives relèverait des mécanismes de coopération bilatérale entre États.873. Encore une fois, les obstacles à cet égard peuvent être d’ordre pratique mais ils sont également idéologiques. 2. Régimes de complémentarité comparés sous le Statut de Rome et le Protocole de Malabo Les questions relatives à la coopération entre les instances étatiques et les juridictions supranationales dans la répression des crimes internationaux sont au cœur d’une bonne administration de la justice pénale internationale. Les implications d’un sujet aussi politiquement sensible sur le fonctionnement de la CPI avaient également été anticipées dès les premières années suivant l’entrée en vigueur du Statut de Rome.874 La gestion des conflits de compétence et des problèmes de coopération entre la Cour et les instances étatiques est restée au centre de son fonctionnement, culminant par la crise qu’elle a connu au cours des dernières années sur le continent africain.875 Le Protocole de Malabo introduit donc de nouveaux éléments aux débats. Parmi autant d’innovations du texte figure l’éventualité de deux niveaux de compétence supplémentaires à l’échelle supra-nationale: sous-régional dans le cadre des Communautés Économiques d’Intégration Régionale (CERs) et continental au sein des structures de l’UA, envisageable du moins à l’égard de États africains. Par conséquent, le Protocole prévoit d’une part des dispositions relatives à la complémentarité entre les juridictions étatiques et le mécanisme judiciaire au sein du système de l’UA. D’autre part, il introduit également des dispositions destinées à régler les conflits de compétence 872 873 874 875 ICC, Assembly of States Parties, « Report of the Bureau on Stocktaking: Complementarity. Taking Stock of the Principle of Complementarity: Bridging the Impunity Gap », ICC-ASP/8/51 (2010), en ligne: ICC <www. https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/complementarity/Documents/ICC-ASP-8-51-ENG.pdf> au para 16. Ibid. Voir, en général, Jon Holmes, « Complementarity : National Courts versus the ICC » dans Antonio Cassese et al. (dir. ), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002), p 674 Pour une analyse synthétique et critique intéressante, voir Kevin Jon Heller, « Radical Complementarity » (2016) 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1-38. Le régime de complémentarité sous le protocole portant amendement ... 212 entre des juridictions supra-nationales que laisse entrevoir la nouvelle architecture du système d’application du droit pénal international sous l’empire du Protocole. Pour une large part, la présente contribution reconnait les mérites de la solution adoptée à cet effet. 2.1 Le principe de la primauté des juridictions étatiques et ses fondements La règle de la primauté des poursuites nationales sur les poursuites supra-nationales est commune au Statut de Rome et au Protocole de Malabo. Sous l’empire du Statut de Rome, le principe est posé par l’article 1 du Statut qui dispose que « la CPI est complémentaire des juridictions pénales nationales. »876 Les fondements du principe de la subsidiarité des instances internationales aux juridictions nationales se justifient aisément. Tout d’abord, il permet de préserver la souveraineté et l’intérêt que les États ont normalement à avoir l’opportunité de pouvoir réprimer les crimes qui relèvent de leur compétence. Ensuite, la même règle se justifie par des considérations d’une bonne administration de la justice pénale internationale. Les autorités nationales sont par hypothèse mieux placées pour accéder aux éléments de preuve plus facilement, et peuvent organiser et conduire les procès à des coûts de loin plus raisonnables, etc. Le Bureau du Procureur de la CPI revient régulièrement sur ces conspirations à travers ses documents de politique. Ainsi, le document publié en septembre 2003 explique qu’en plus de traduire la volonté des États parties de se ménager la primauté dans l’administration de la justice pénale, le régime de la complémentarité sous le Statut de Rome se fonde sur des considérations d’« efficacité » et d’« effectivité » de la justice pénale internationale.877 Enfin, en particulier dans les contextes de transitions qui constituent la majorité des situations d’intervention de la CPI, la justice pénale internationale répond mieux aux besoins des communautés touchées par les crimes si elle est administrée localement.878 Sur le plan technique, l’article 17 paragraphe premier du Statut de Rome développe les modalités d’application du principe de la subsidiarité des poursuites internationales. Cette disposition énumère quatre situations dont chacune d’elles doit amener la CPI à déclarer l’irrecevabilité d’une affaire, mais elle prévoit en même temps des exceptions au principe. La première des quatre hypothèses nous intéresse ici. Elle est posée à l’article 17, 1 (a) qui dispose qu’une affaire est jugée irrecevable par la Cour lorsqu’ « [elle] fait l’objet d’une enquête ou de poursuites de la part d’un État ayant compétence en l’espèce, à moins que cet État n’ait pas la volonté ou soit dans l’incapacité de mener véritablement à bien l’enquête ou les poursuites ».879 876 877 878 879 Voir Statut de Rome de la Cour pénale internationale, 17 juillet 1998, A/CONF.183/9, 2187 RTNU 3854 (entré en vigueur : 1er juillet 2002) [Statut de Rome] Voir ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, «Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor» ( September 2003), para 2, https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b2560aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf Voir dans ce sens Neil Kritz, «Progress and Humility: The Ongoing Search for Post-Conflict Justice », dans M. Cherif Bassiouni (dir.), Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2002 Id. 213 Nestor Nkurunziza En application des dispositions précitées, lorsqu’un État compétent et la CPI (le Bureau du Procureur) se disputent la conduite des poursuites dans une « même affaire », l’État l’emporte en principe. Dans la pratique, lorsque la représentation de l’État soulève une exception d’irrecevabilité au motif que l’affaire poursuivie par la CPI « fait l’objet d’une enquête ou de poursuites » auprès des instances nationales d’un État compétent, la CPI (Chambre préliminaire) règle la question en procédant par deux étapes. En premier lieu, les juges appliquent un certain nombre de critères que la Cour a eu à développer pour vérifier si les poursuites nationales visent effectivement la même affaire que celle poursuivie par le Bureau du Procureur de la CPI.880 Dans l’affirmative, la Cour passe alors à l’étape suivante qui consiste à se prononcer successivement sur le « manque de volonté » et, ensuite au sujet de la « (in) capacité de mener véritablement à bien l’enquête ou les poursuites » aux fins de traduire le suspect devant la justice. Sous l’angle du premier volet c’est-à-dire celui du « manque de volonté », le paragraphe 2 de l’article 17 prévoit que les juges de la CPI pourront se prononcer dans ce sens s’ils estiment que l’enquête ou les poursuites engagées au niveau national visent plutôt à soustraire la personne poursuivie de la justice.881 Une telle intention pourrait se déduire des agissements ou des circonstances comme « un retard injustifié » ou le manque d’ « indépendance ou impartialité » dans la conduite des procédures nationales.882 L’incapacité de poursuivre, quant à elle, doit découler « de l’effondrement de la totalité ou d’une partie substantielle (de l’appareil judiciaire de l’État concerné) ou de l’indisponibilité de celui-ci »883. Une littérature abondante s’est penchée sur l’élaboration d’une série de théories sur la signification et la portée que les juges de la CPI devraient donner aux expressions « manque de volonté et/ ou incapacité » de mener véritablement à bien des poursuites » employées dans la rédaction du Statut de Rome.884 La Cour a également eu l’occasion de préciser sa ligne d’interprétation dans le cadre des débats sur la recevabilité des affaires visant des situations au Kenya puis en Libye.885 880 881 882 883 884 885 Pour une analyse critique intéressante, voir Kevin Jon Heller, « Radical Complementarity » (2016) 14:3 J Intl Criminal Justice 63 Statut de Rome, article 17, 2 (a) Id., article 17, 2 (b) Id., article 17, 3. Pour une analyse plus détaillée, voir Jon Holmes, supra, note 28, pp 677-678 Pour une synthèse des courants doctrinaux en présence ainsi qu’une analyse particulièrement convaincante, voir Kevin Jon Heller, « A Sentence-Based Theory to Complementarity », (2012) 53: 1 Harvard International Law Journal 85-133 Voir ICC, Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute, Ruto, Kosgey, and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 30 mai 2011; CPI, Le Procureur c. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi et Abdullah Al-Senoussi, Arrêt relatif à l’appel interjeté par la défense de M. Al-Senoussi de la décision de la Chambre préliminaire intitulée « Décision relative à la recevabilité de l’affaire à l’encontre d’Abdullah Al-Senoussi » décision rendue le 11 octobre 2013. (Cas n° ICC-01/11-01/11), 24 juillet 2014. Pour une réflexion critique, voir Kevin Jon Heller, supra note 34; également Frédéric Megrét et Marika Giles Samson, « Holding the Line on Complementarity in Libya: The Case for Tolerating Flawed Domestic Trials », (2013) 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice (JICJ) 571-589 Le régime de complémentarité sous le protocole portant amendement ... 214 Quant aux rédacteurs du Protocole de Malabo, ils ont préféré les termes « réticence ou incapacité à réellement mener des poursuites » en lieu et place des expressions « manque de volonté ou incapacité de mener véritablement à bien des poursuites » contenues dans le Statut de Rome. Il est encore tôt de spéculer sur les implications pratiques de ces différences de formulation dans les deux textes. Toujours est-il que le choix des termes n’a probablement pas été le fait du hasard. Chacune des expressions en cause ont fait l’objet d’intenses débats dans le cadre de la rédaction du processus de rédaction du Statut de Rome886 tandis qu’une littérature critique décèle justement dans les termes « manque de volonté et/ou incapacité » une certaine connotation impérialiste. 887 Pour le reste, le Protocole de Malabo retient la solution du Statut de Rome s’agissant de la complémentarité de la SDPI aux instances étatiques. Le deuxième paragraphe de l’article 46 H du Protocole de Malabo est en effet presque l’équivalent du premier paragraphe de l’article 17 du Statut de Rome précité. A bien d’égards, les juges de la SDPI auraient donc un intérêt à s’inspirer de la jurisprudence déjà développée par la CPI. 2.2 Les avantages du principe de la primauté de la juridiction internationale physiquement la plus proche des lieux des crimes sous le Protocole de Malabo Une des innovations majeures du Protocole de Malabo se situe sans doute dans le cadre des dispositions qui règlent la complémentarité entre le mécanisme judiciaire que le Protocole crée au niveau continental au sein des structures de l’UA d’une part, les juridictions sous régionales existantes au sein des CERs ou qui seraient ultérieurement mises en place dans le cadre dédites communautés d’autre part. En effet, selon le premier paragraphe de l’article 46 H du Protocole, « la juridiction de la Cour est complémentaire à celle des juridictions nationales et éventuellement à celle des Communautés économiques régionales quand cela est expressément prévu par lesdites communautés.»888 (C’est nous qui soulignons). Il découle du prescrit de cette disposition qu’à défaut de poursuites nationales, le Protocole de Malabo pose le principe de la priorité d’intervention d’une juridiction sous-régionale par rapport au mécanisme judiciaire continental. Quel est donc le bienfondé de la solution ainsi adoptée ? Un critère qui permettrait d’établir les fondements de cette approche reposerait sur la prise en compte de la plus grande proximité 886 887 888 Dans le cadre de la rédaction du Statut de Rome l’expression anglaise « genuinely prosecute » traduite par « mener véritablement à bien des poursuites » dans la version française a été préférée à « effectively prosecute » considérée comme trop subjective par certaines délégations. Voir Jon Holmes, supra, note 28. Quoique largement acceptée, l’expression « genuily prosecute » n’a pas non plus fait l’unanimité. Voir Paolo Benvenuti, «Complementarity of the International Criminal Court to National Criminal Jurisdiction», dans Flavia Lattanzi and William Schabas, dir., Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, vol I (Il Sirente 1999), à la p 42 Voir Ntina Tzouvala, «Symposium on TWAIL Perspectives on ICL, IHL, and Intervention: TWAIL and the “Unwilling or Unable” Doctrine, Continuities, and Ruptures», (2016) 109 AJIL Unbound 266. Supra note 1 215 Nestor Nkurunziza géographique des lieux des crimes de la juridiction supra-nationale. L’auteur a suggéré ailleurs que cette approche s’inscrit dans la logique d’une politique de complémentarité positive en matière d’administration de la justice pénale internationale.889 Par ailleurs, Ademola Abas a soulevé un certain nombre de défis plutôt d’ordre pratique à la mise en application de cette même disposition.890 Quoique ces défis puissent être réels, ils ne sont ni insurmontables ni n’enlèvent son bien-fondé à la solution de principe posée par le Protocole de Malabo.891 A bien d’égards, l’approche représente également un atout pour la justice pénale internationale aux fins de contribuer également à la réalisation des objectifs majeurs de la justice transitionnelle qui ont été identifiés dans la section précédente. Tout d’abord, le critère posé contribue, par hypothèse, à limiter les effets de la déconnection physique des sphères d’administration de la justice pénale internationale avec les communautés touchées sur son apport dans la réalisation des objectifs globaux de la justice transitionnelle. Ensuite et surtout, les modalités de création des juridictions sous-régionales de même que leurs modes d’organisation et de fonctionnement offrent des opportunités incomparables. Déjà sans anticipation de la crise que traverse la justice internationale, William Burke White avait plaidé en faveur d’une exploration des pistes régionalistes de la justice pénale internationale compte tenu des avantages uniques que cette option offrirait dans le renforcement des capacités locales des États impliqués. En ce sens, cet auteur suggérait que « les juridictions régionales comprendraient des procureurs, des juges et du personnel en provenance [des pays] de la région, formant du coup ceux qui retourneront probablement travailler au sein des systèmes judiciaires nationaux » [trad.]892 Les propositions que William Burke White formulait ainsi dans le cadre de ce qu’il présentait lui-même comme « une exploration préliminaire » des pistes régionalistes de la justice pénale internationale ne sont pas que théoriques. L’organisation et le fonctionnement de l’actuelle Cour de Justice de la Communauté Est-Africaine (EACJ), par exemple, illustre ces différents aspects. La Cour est l’organe judiciaire de la Communauté Est-Africaine (EAC) et a son siège actuel à Arusha en Tanzanie893. Elle comprend une section de première instance et une section d’appel894. La section 889 890 891 892 893 894 Nestor Nkurunziza, « Les dimensions et les dynamiques régionales et internationales de la justice transitionnelle au Burundi: proposition de création d’un organe de droit pénal international au sein de la Communauté EstAfricaine (EAC) » (2017), Hors-série décembre 2017, Revue Québécoise de Droit International (RQDI), pp 196 et Ss Supra note 2, pp 944-45 Pour une analyse plus détaillée, voir Nestor Nkurunziza, id. “Regional courts would presumably draw on prosecutors, judges, and staff from the region, thereby providing training and experience for those likely to return to domestic judicial systems.” Supra note 19, p 735 Traité instituant la Communauté de l’Afrique de l’Est, 30 novembre 1999, 2145 RTNU 255 (entrée en vigueur : 7 juillet 2000), art 9 [Traité de l’EAC]. Ibid, art 23(2). Le régime de complémentarité sous le protocole portant amendement ... 216 de première instance compte dix juges, tandis que celle d’appel est composée de cinq juges895. Les juges sont désignés par le Sommet des chefs d’États et de gouvernements des États membres de l’EAC à partir d’une liste de nominations préalables soumises par les États896 qui disposent par ailleurs d’un droit d’égale représentativité au sein de chacune des deux chambres de l’EACJ897. Le rôle de ce genre de juridictions dans le renforcement des capacités des Etats pourrait aller au-delà même de leur apport indirect à travers l’acquisition des compétences par les nationaux qui y occupent des postes. Les juges régionaux pourraient intervenir dans la formation des praticiens locaux fournissant ainsi une assistance directe aux instances étatiques dans le sens où les dirigeants africains le voulaient de la CPI.898Les traités négociés sur une base régionale offrent plus de marges de manœuvre aux Etats impliqués pour aménager la prise en compte des besoins propres à la région des Etats membres impliqués et rien n’empêcherait l’adoption des dispositions dans ce sens.899 Des règles de procédures pénales plus ouvertes à une participation des victimes voire communautaires pourraient s’envisager.900 Conclusion Au cours des dernières années, l’UA a accéléré son projet historique visant à mettre en place une juridiction de droit pénal international au sein des structures actuelles de l’organisation. L’adoption du Protocole de Malabo, le 27 juin 2014, représentait l’étape la plus avancée dans le processus. Alors intervenue au moment où la CPI traversait une crise sans précédent sur le continent, la décision a été plutôt été accueilli avec des suspicions certains lesquels ont été confortés par un régime de complémentarité organisé par le Protocole qui apparemment s’inscrit en droite ligne avec une politique de l’UA visant à privilégier le rôle des juridictions régionales africaines dans la répressions des crimes internationaux commis sur le continent. Dans le cadre de la présente contribution l’auteur a suggéré que la solution adoptée par le Protocole consisterait, en principe, à reconnaitre une priorité d’intervention à la juridiction supra-nationale géographiquement la plus proche des lieux de commissions. Il a conclu qu’une telle approche se justifie par le potentiel plus élevé que cette option d’application de la justice pénale internationale offre en faveur de la réalisation des objectifs globaux de la justice dans les contextes de transitions en Afrique. 895 896 897 898 899 900 Ibid, art 24(2). Ibid, art 24(1). Ibid, arts 24(1) (a) et (b), 24 (2). Supra note 25 Voir dans le meme sens William Burke White, « [p]articularly if regional courts were given a specific mandate of engaging with and training national courts, they could offer a powerful tool for post-conflict reconstruction ». Supra note 21, p 735 Voir dans ce sens Kai Ambos «Expanding the Focus of the “African Criminal Court», (2012), dans Yvonne McDermott, Niamh Hayes et William A. 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Available at https:// www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/pillage-manual-2ndedition-2011.pdf. Bibliography 236 The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation - Coalition for the ICC, available at: <http://www.iccnow.org/documents/KNDR_June2011_Review_Report.pdf> (accessed 12 September 2018). Titinga Frédéric Pacéré, ‘Rapport de l’expert indépendant sur la situation des droits de l’homme en République démocratique du Congo’ (29 février 2008) A/HRC/7/25, paras 17-19 <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/rd-congorapport-de-lexpert-ind%C3%A9pendant-sur-la-situation-des-droits> (accessed on 20 September 2018). Tom Maliti, ‘Prosecutor: Insufficient evidence has made prosecuting post-election violence cases difficult’ International Justice Monitor, 26 October 2012 <https://www.ijmonitor.org/2012/10/kenyan-prosecutor-insufficient-evidencehas-made-prosecuting-post-election-violence-cases-hard/>(accessed on 12.09.2018). Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission, “KNDR Documents - Agreed Statement on How to Resolve Political Crisis” (2008). II. Pre TJRC Documents. 3. <https:// digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/tjrc-pre/3>(accessed on 12.09.2018). Uwimana, D., ‘Burundi will never cooperate with ICC, says Justice Minister’, Iwacu, Bujumbura, November 10, 2017. available at: http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/ englishnews/burundi-will-never-cooperate-with-icc-says-justice-minister/ [last accessed 27 November 2017]. Uwimana, D., ‘ICC authorizes investigation into Burundi’, Iwacu, November 9, 2017: available at: http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/englishnews/icc-authorizesinvestigation-into-burundi/ [last accessed on 09.04.2018]. Yakin Ertürk, ‘Rapport de la rapporteuse spéciale sur la violence contre les femmes, ses causes et ses conséquences’ (27 février 2008) AHRC/7/6/Add.4, para.78 <https://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/5471861.95850372.html> (accessed on 20 September 2018). Institutional Authors Commission préparatoire au Forum national de Bangui, Rapport du groupe thématique 2 Justice et réconciliation, mars 2015. Human Rights Watch, « République Centrafricaine : Les civils pris pour cible dans une nouvelle flambée de violence », Communiqué de presse de HRW, 27 October 2017. 237 Bibliography Jacques Mbokani, La jurisprudence congolaise en matière de crimes de droit international, Une étude de l’Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), 2016. Murithi T, The African Union and the International Criminal Court: An Embattled Relationship? 8 Institute for Justice and Reconciliation Policy Brief, 2013. Nations Unies, « Un Agenda pour la paix : diplomatie préventive, rétablissement de la paix, maintien de la paix », Rapport du Secrétaire-Général, A 47/277-S/2411, June 1992. New York. Nations Unies, Conseil de Sécurité, Rapport du Secrétaire général sur le Rétablissement de l’état de droit et administration de la justice pendant la période de transition dans les sociétés en proie à un conflit ou sortant d’un conflit, (S/2004/616). Tim Murithi, Sequencing the administration of justice to enable the pursuit of peace: Can the ICC play a role in complementing restorative justice?, IJR Policy Brief. Tim Sweijs et al., The Many Faces of Political Violence (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2017). Conference Papers Filip De Maesschalck and Sergio Gemperle, ‘Plural Claims to Legitimacy: Conceptualising Legitimacy in Hybrid Political Orders’ (27 August 2015). Kweka GJ, ‘The Regulation of Exploitation of Natural Resources through the Doctrine of Corporate Criminal Liability in Contemporary Africa: Regional and Domestic Legal Regime’, Paper presented at the African Society of International Law (AfSIL) sixth annual conference held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, October 2017. Nabil M. Orina, ‘Complementarity Under the Rome Statute: Is there a Place for Alternative Justice: The Case of Kenya’ Paper presented at the Moi University 8th Annual International Conference, September 2012. Reports Amnesty International, République Centrafricaine : le long chemin vers la justice, L’obligation de rendre des comptes, Amnesty International Ltd, 2017. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1988. Bibliography 238 Cour Internationale de Justice (CIJ), Licéité de la menace ou de l’emploi d’armes nucléaires, <Avis consultatif >, 8 July 1996. Human Rights Law Centre, University of Nottingham, Cooperation and the International Criminal Court, Report of the Expert Workshop, Nottingham, United Kingdom, September 2014. Human Rights Watch, Making the International Criminal Court Work, A Handbook for Implementing the Rome Statute, Vol. 13, No. 4(G), September 2001. International Centre for Policy and Conflict Report, ‘Concealing the Truth to Reward Impunity: A Critical Analysis of Truth Seeking in the Absence of Political Will’ 2012. Kim H and Sikkink K, ‘Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries’ 54(4) International Studies Quarterly, 2010. Parliamentarians for Global Action, Mémorandum du PGA sur la création d’une Cour pénale spéciale en RCA, février 2015. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Doc. A/54/726, S/2000/59, 31 January 2000. Working papers Kutz C, ‘Causeless complicity’, Crim Law and Philos, March 2007. Orina NM, ‘Should the ICJ render an advisory opinion on the immunity question re Articles 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute?’, ICJ Africa, March 2018. Revue Québécoise de Droit de Droit International (RQDI), Hors-Série Décembre-Justice Internationale Pénale et Justice transitionnelle, 2017. Scouler C, Button R: ‘Guide to accessorial liability in New South Wales’, March 2004. The (U.K) Law Commission, Working Paper nr. 62, Criminal Law, London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1975. Tladi D, ‘Complementarity and cooperation in international criminal justice Assessing initiatives to fill the impunity gap’, ISS Paper 277, November 2014. 239 Bibliography Speeches Bosch Stiftung, Opening speech of a regional conference on the rule of Law in East Africa, Nairobi, 2015 (Author’s notes). Sang-Hyun Song, The International Criminal Court: A global commitment to end impunity, presentation at Istanbul Bilgi University, 22 May 2013. Newspaper Articles BBC News, ‘Kenya set to get truth commission’ 24 October 2008. Daily Nation, ‘Fear of ICC ‘helped prevent’ poll violence’ 5 April 2013. IWPR, Musau N, ‘Diplomats Issue Rare Warning Ahead of Kenyan Polls’, 1 March 2013. The Guardian, Allison S., ‘Kenyan election alliance between bitter enemies united by ICC charges’, 4 December 2012. The Standard, Ombati C & Wahito D, ‘Kenya’s long road to a truth commission’, 31 July 2009. Bibliography 240 xxii The International Criminal Justice in Africa series is a collection of papers by members of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung’s African Group of Experts on International Criminal Justice. The group’s members are mostly academics and legal practitioners from sub-Saharan Africa with expertise in the field of international criminal law. The book offers a uniquely African perspective on the issues, challenges and prospects facing the project of international criminal law in Africa. It is essential reading for students and scholars interested in the subject. This sixth edition offers a capita selecta of topics relevant to international criminal justice in Africa. The following topics are covered in the book: • Towards an International Criminal Law Regime for the Regulation of the Exploitation of Natural Resources: Africa as Pioneer • Enforcing Cooperation Differently: Time to Criminalise Active Non-Cooperation in the Rome Statute? • Crimes de guerre et Statut de Personne Protégée • Droits de l’homme et Obligation de Poursuivre les Crimes de guerre : Revue Critique del Decision de la Commission Africaine dans l’affaire Kilwa (RDC) • The Socio-Political Context of Complementarity: The ICC and Narratives of Justice in Kenya • Drawing a Balance: Establishing the Parameters of Victim Participation in Criminal Proceedings in Kenya and Lessons from the International Criminal Court • Burundi-ICC: Trial of Strength over Burundi’s Duty to Cooperate with Respect to the situation in Burundi • La Cour Penale Speciale en Republique Centrafricaine : Progres et Defis • The Future of International Criminal Justice in Africa: An International, Hybrid or Domestic Trajectory? • Le Régime de Complémentarité sous le Protocole Portant Amendement du Protocole Portant Statut de la Cour Africaine de Justice et des droits de l’homme

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