DOI: 10.33067/SE.2.2021.2
Natalia Sienko*
“A Europe of Homelands or Homeland Europe”
– Contemporary Limitations of the Idea of the
Federalisation of the European Union
Abstract
In this article, the author touches on the evolution of the European
integration process, trying to capture the essence of the idea of federalisation
on the way to the creation of the European Union. The theoretical narrative
within federal thoughts is complemented by contemporary limitations
both in the formal acceptance of the idea of federalisation of the European
Union and in the informal “pole organizing the imagination” as mentioned
by T. Mazowiecki. The main narrative, therefore, concerns the division of
the field of EU integration between the analysis of structural limitations of
the idea of federalisation of the European Union, including the system and
jurisdictions of nation states, as well as ideational limitations, individual
approach of the Member States to the integration process or the electoral
success of Eurosceptics.
Keywords: Federalism, Federalisation, European Union, European Integration, European Crisis, Structural Limitations, Ideational Limitations
Introduction
Initially, the road to the establishment of the European Union was
guided by the idea of a peaceful European federation, which meant the
belief that only a guarantee of equality and the formation of a united
political system with divided sovereignty would protect Europe from the
consequences of further conflicts. The expression of the above became,
* Natalia Sienko – University of Wroclaw, e-mail: natalia.sienko@uwr.edu.pl,
ORCID: 0000-0002-3111-0080.
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Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 2/2021
among others organization of the First Pan-European Congress in Vienna
in 1926. At that time, over 2,000 delegates from 24 countries discussed the
idea of uniting Europe. Moreover, the desire to establish a federal union
between the peoples of Europe was announced in the “Manifesto of the
European Resistance Movement” of July 7, 1944. Activists recognised
that cooperation based on federalisation would be the only way to achieve
lasting peace in the future. For the same reasons, the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC) was established in 1951. Member States
decided to delegate their powers in the field of economic policy to the
autonomous a “supranational” body – the High Authority, which was to
guarantee peaceful cooperation.1
There is no doubt that along with the expansion of the field of
European cooperation (from various spheres, levels of cooperation, to
participating actors), the integration process evolved, corresponding to
the present complexity and dynamics of the “diverse and contradictory
forces”. These diverse and contradictory forces, according to
J.N. Rosenau, concern the contemporary dilemma of using the potential
of “globalisation, centralisation, and integration on the one hand and
localisation, decentralisation and fragmentation on the other”.2 Based on
these processes, a lively discussion about the way of managing European
entities arose. In parallel to the original thinking about the EU in federal
terms, a conviction was developed about the need to create a unionist
European Union, functioning on the basis of intergovernmental dialogues
and compromises.
Despite the fact that the words “A Europe of homelands or homeland
Europe” were most likely never spoken by General De Gaulle; fear and
unwillingness to cede a part of sovereignty to supranational power resulted
in a greater extent of sovereign organisation of the management of the
European Union than the proponents of federalist concepts were trying
to achieve. Although the present Union, as an economic and political
union, possesses some federal features (including the vertical separation
of powers), it does not have a central government exercising control
over a semi-autonomous states, and therefore does not fully constitute
a “European federation”.
In this context, the author of the article has no ambition to prove the
correctness of 20th-century theories and models of European integration.
In addition, this paper is not an assessment of pro-European proponents
1
S. Parzymies, Czy możliwa jest europejska federacja państw narodowych?, „Civitas
Hominibus: Rocznik Filozoficzno-Społeczny”, no. 7/2012, p. 22.
2
J.N. Rosenau, Governance in a new global order, in: The global transformation reader, eds. D. Held, A.G. McGrew, Cambridge 2003, pp. 223–224.
30
N. Sienko, “A Europe of Homelands or Homeland Europe”…
of close cooperation, or Eurosceptics, who are afraid of a strong systemic
approach and excessive bureaucratisation. Apart from tracing the influence
of thoughts and the evolution of the theoretical approach to federalisation,
the author aims to analyse certain limitations both in the formal adoption
of the idea of federalisation of the European Union and in the informal
“pole organizing the imagination” mentioned by T. Mazowiecki.3
Theoretical Concepts of EU Federalisation
The evidence for the ambiguity of federalism results from the fact
that multiple attempts at theorisation within the concept concern
a broadly understood debate, views, thoughts, and values which guide
the degree of dependence between integration-disintegration of the
state, collectivism-individualism, and particularism-centralism. Other
times, efforts to capture the phenomenon concern the recognition of
federalism as a theory of decentralisation, a social model (organisation
of civil society), a political program, or a philosophical and ideological
trend.4 Studies of federalism are undertaken to take into account political
(national and international), legal, economic, cultural, and sociological
experiences, and the phenomenon itself falls within the scope of many
branches, including: normative, regulatory, analytical, comparative, etc.5
Therefore, an inhomogeneous approach also applies to the explication of
the term “federation” or “federalisation”.
However, quite apart from the diversity of definitions (resulting
undoubtedly from the multifaceted nature of definition), the concept of
the federation in the subject literature concerns in particular the aspect of
the state and its forms of organisation. The phenomenon of federalisation
in the scientific understanding means the system of exercising power
– the manner of its territorial organisation, competence, and division.
Nevertheless, it seems that the essence of the last aspect in the context
of the analysis of the political space remains the most important. In the
federal political community, the decision-making process follows the
division of powers, both constitutional and official, between the central
T. Mazowiecki, Dylemat, który organizuje debatę o Europie, Pierwsze Sympozjum
im. Ministra Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego, Uniwersytet Warszawski, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=Ix0JWVLDOAg (access 23.10.2020).
4
P.J. Borkowski, Federalizm a budowanie jedności Europy, „Studia Europejskie”,
no. 2/2006, pp. 89–91.
5
F. Lépine, A journey through the history of federalism: is multilevel governance a form
of federalism?, „Europe en formation: les cahiers du fédéralisme”, no. 363(1)/2012,
https://www.cairn.info/revue-l-europe-en-formation-2012-1-page-21.htm, DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3917/eufor.363.0021 (access 26.10.2020).
3
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Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 2/2021
government and regional authorities.6 The adoption of a federal system
does not, therefore, contradict the principle of self-determination of
nations but leads to their inherence within the territorial structures of
one state and identification with federalist unity.7
While therefore, as P. Borkowski admits, the problems of European
integration were “pressed” into the previously existing “set of political
and legal ideas”, defined as federalism and concerning the originally
mentioned construct of one state rather than a certain member
community.8 However, this did not prevent pro-European proponents
of deepened cooperation from using the experience of federal ideas in
the process of searching for an optimal method of European unification.
The first federalist movements which appeared in Europe aimed to find
a concept of the organisation of a supranational order that would save
states from dangerous antagonisms. In this context, the main questions
to be answered concerned which supranational bodies would guarantee
equality of all actors and strengthen the sense of justice (structural
shape), and to what extent European countries would be ready to give up
constitutional sovereignty for cooperation (ideational shape)?
R. Coudenhove-Kalergi was considered to be one of the first post-war
ideologists who perceived the need to build a “united Europe” or to unify
its economic development. The book “Pan-Europe”, published by an
Austrian aristocrat in 1923, was an expression of a Eurocentric political
project aimed at discrediting the idea of sovereignty and nationalism
towards supranational subsidiarity and the formation of a “European
nation”. In his opinion, only ”self-help through cohesion [integrity]”
could save Europe from another conflict and minimise the influence
of the “Russian military dictatorship” or the “American financial
dictatorship”.9 R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, inspired by the federal system
of the United States and Switzerland, founded in 1926 the Pan-European
Union – a cross-party movement, gaining adherents among some leaders
of European countries, which was reflected in the established national
committees, e.g., in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria.10 However,
P. Eberhard, Koncepcje federacyjne Milana Hodžy, „Przegląd Geograficzny”, no.
88(2)/2016, pp. 224–226.
7
Ibidem. Quoted from: F. Kinsky, Federalizm. Model europejski, Wydawnictwo
WAM, Kraków 1999, p. 141.
8
P.J. Borkowski, op.cit., p. 87.
9
R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europa, Pan-Europa Verlag, Wien 1923, p. X–XI;
W.G. Schwimmer, The European dream, Continnum, London–New York 2004, p. 23.
10
J. Kowalski, Z. Ślusarczyk, Unia Europejska – proces integracji europejskiej i zarys
problematyki instytucjonalno-prawnej, IURIS – Polskie Wydawnictwo Prawnicze,
Warszawa–Poznań 2006, p. 45.
6
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N. Sienko, “A Europe of Homelands or Homeland Europe”…
he saw the success of unification in initiating the construction of the
European Parliamentary Federation or the European Parliamentary
Union (excluding Great Britain and Russia) by introducing the United
States of Europe “with a Supreme Council and a Supreme Court, a joint
police force, equal human rights for all, a European market and a European
currency”.11 In this way, Paneuropa built as a federation consisting of the
House of Peoples, represented by one deputy per million citizens, and
a chamber consisting of 26 representatives of the federal states (the House
of States), would be finally bound by a constitution guaranteeing the
equality of all European democracies.12
It should be emphasised, therefore, that contemporary literature
on the subject underlines the utopianism of R. Coudenhove-Kalergi’s
assumptions, especially the belief in the need to abandon the national
consciousness, replace “inequalities of the unfair” with the just, or mix
races that would reflect various personalities to a greater extent than
nationalities.13 It cannot be denied, however, that this concept resulted in
the further development of federal ideas.
The consequences of World War II sparked an intense debate on the
relic of the “nation state” as an institution protecting the social order.
The advocates of federalism recognised that in addition to improving
living conditions, equality, and respect for human rights in post-war
Europe, the creation of a European federation would allow compensation
for the “dismantled” defence mechanisms, caused, inter alia, by
unlimited sovereignty and autocracy. Among them there are also the
“founding fathers”, also called the “fathers of European integration”,
such as A. Spinelli or J. Monnet. The first was the initiator of another
resistance movement and headed the European Federalist Movement
created in Milan in 1943. He wrote down14 the theoretical foundations
11
É. Bóka, Rethinking the role of the federalist ideas in the construction of Europe,
pp. 6–7, https://www.eva-boka.name/files/pdf/RethinkingTheRole.pdf (access
12.12.2020). Quoted from: R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Appeal to all Europeans, 28 April
1947, in: Documents on the history of European integration 4. transnational organizations
and political parties and pressure groups in the struggle for European Union, 1945–1950,
eds. W. Lipgens, W. Loth, De Gruyter, Berlin–New York 1991, pp. 123–124.
12
Nowadays the equivalent of the first can be considered the European Parliament, and the second – the Council of the European Union, or the Council of Europe
itself. B. Mucha-Leszko, A. Jarosz-Angowska, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi jako autor
koncepcji unii federalnej oraz inicjator procesów integracyjnych w Europie, „Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio H – Oeconomias”, no. 84(2)/2014, p. 71,
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/h.2014.48.2.69.
13
R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Praktischer idealismus: adel-technik-pazifismus, Paneuropa Verlag, Wien–Leipzig 1925, pp. 22–23.
14
Together with Italian intellectuals E. Rossi and E. Colorni.
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Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 2/2021
of the movement in a three-chapter, anti-fascist program document,
“The Ventonete Manifesto”. Despite the fact that, as a co-founder of
the European Defence Community (EDC) and the European Political
Community (EPC), he failed to implement these projects, he undoubtedly
contributed to the construction of the foundations of the European model
of the decision-making process and the creation of the EU legislative
body. As a result, A. Spinelli himself, who was a continuator of the idea
of adopting the constitution, forming a top-down federal movement and
a strong, supranational European government, in 1979 gained a seat in the
European Parliament.15 The other one believed that the proper, new impetus
for federalist movements would be given by a grassroots, national consent
to the existence of a political community devoid of a legitimate centre of
power. According to J. Monnet, the progress of the political integration
of Europe would be possible thanks to the federal management system,
controlled by specialists not from elections. Thus he treated pragmatism
as a premise for the gradual expansion and deepening of inter-state.16
The aforementioned effective rejection of EDC and EPC projects,
which were to reflect federalist assumptions, i.e., to emphasise the
supranational character of members by establishing a supranational
parliament and the organisation of European armed forces (which, as
A. Jaskulski emphasises, was de facto related to limiting the sovereign
right of the nation to maintain its own security guarantees); did not rule
out integration within another, supranational economic organisation – the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).17 Nevertheless, the focus
of cooperation on economic (not political or social) issues showed the
adoption of certain assumptions of functionalism, rather than building
a federal Europe. Although according to Schuman’s plan, it was supposed
to be an announcement.18
There is also no doubt that since the establishment of the European
Communities [in 1951 the above-mentioned ECSC and from 1957 the also
functioning European Economic Community (EEC) and the European
Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom)], the vision of states
regarding integration processes was often an expression of divergent
15
S. Saurugger, The European Union and federalism: possibilities and limits, in: eds.
G. Grin, F. Nicod, B. Altermatt, „Formes d’Europe. Forms of Europe, Economica”,
no. 218/2018, p. 177.
16
P.J. Borkowski, op.cit., pp. 97–98.
17
A. Jaskulski, Federalizm europejski początków integracji europejskiej i doby kryzysu
gospodarczego, „Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej”, no. 6/2012, p. 223.
18
M. Burgess, Federalism and European Union: the building of Europe, 1950–2000,
Routledge, London 2000, p. 65.
34
N. Sienko, “A Europe of Homelands or Homeland Europe”…
tendencies. When sovereign France, under the leadership of General
De Gaulle, was to be a symbol of “European strength” built thanks to
independence from American influences, Germany saw a significant
chance for development in maintaining close ties with the USA. De Gaulle’s
policy was therefore strongly criticised by the proponents of building
federal structures, who considered the project of a loose confederation
of independent states as a manifestation of French nationalism. A plan,
published in 1961 and created by the French ambassador Ch. Fouchet,
was an expression of the formally proposed solutions which assumed the
expansion of European integration based on foreign policy, culture, and
science while maintaining individuality. Although this project was rejected
due to fear of French domination, blocking pro-American attitudes and
weakening NATO’s position (which was especially emphasised by Belgium
and the Netherlands); showed another barrier of in-depth cooperation
prospects.19
Finally, when in the 1980s it was decided to build a political union
(which was undoubtedly caused by the economic crisis); France, Denmark,
Greece, and Great Britain opposed the federal concept supported by the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany, ultimately adopting the Single
European Act (SEA) without provisions proving this form. As a result,
as requested by the United Kingdom, the Maastricht Treaty signed in
1992 also did not include the original formula “a Union with a federal
goal”.20 Further hopes were sought in the Treaty of Nice (2003), the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004) rejected by France and the
Netherlands, and the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), but the latter did not spark
federal enthusiasm also.
This does not change the fact that some federal features of the modern
European Union have been concentrated around the levels of power
between nation states, their representative bodies, and the European
Parliament and the Council of the European Union (a bicameral system),
strengthened by an executive institution - the European Commission and
a judicial institution – the Court of Justice of the Union European Union,
or EU agents such as Europol and Eurojust. The principle of the primacy
Ibidem, pp. 77–78.
It is worth noting that Great Britain refused to enter the ECSC in 1951 and
1957, but when it decided to become a member, General De Gaulle has vetoed twice.
B. Master, Teorie i koncepcje zjednoczeniowe Unii Europejskiej w założeniach programowych oraz w praktyce polskiej polityki integracyjnej, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego,
Katowice 2014, pp. 104–110; R. Grzeszczak, Federalizacja systemu Unii Europejskiej,
in: Quo vadis Europo III?, eds. E. Piontek, K. Karasiewicz, Urząd Komitetu Integracji
Europejskiej, Warszawa 2009, pp. 163–164.
19
20
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Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 2/2021
of the application of EU law over national law is also an important issue.
Also, many ideas should not be belittled, including the following: the
euro area, the Schengen Agreement, the “Ode to Joy” (recognised as the
anthem), the European flag with twelve golden stars on a blue background,
Europe Day celebrated on May 9, a passport in the colour of Burgundy
wine, or the Euroband itself on the registration plates of cars registered
in the EU. Whenever the activities of various European federationbuilding movements and all kinds of formal manifestations of federal
integration can be recalled, and the presence of European solidarity and
identity is mentioned; it should be particularly emphasised that, since
the establishment of the European Communities, there has not been
a situation in which the Member States would express their political will
and unanimously opt for a complete rejection of their autonomy towards
a “European federation”.21
Structural Limitations
One of the contemporary problems that raise many questions on the
integration project based on the federalism model is the institutional
complexity and centralisation of power towards technocratic Brussels, which
has aroused considerable opposition from many citizens of the Member
States for years. It turns out that the policy making of actors, sometimes
referred to as “unelected bureaucrats”, remains incomprehensible. Thus,
while the heads of state and government participating in the meetings of
the European Council (a political body) are elected directly or indirectly
in the Member States, similarly to the ministers of foreign affairs or other
ministries of the Council of the European Union (decision-making body); this
definition applies to the members of the European Commission. However,
it mostly affects civil servants rather than the College of Commissioners
– 28 members initially delegated thanks to Member States’ suggestions,
endorsed by the European Parliament and finally appointed by the European
Council.22 While some point to the lack of accountability of the European
Commission (whose partial responsibility is an expression of elections to
national governments and Members of the European Parliament), others
accuse some national states of wielding excessive power.
It is therefore argued that one of the arguments regarding the lack
of a solidarity policy is the unprecedented election of Donald Tusk as
R. Grzeszczak, op.cit., pp. 163–165.
Does it make sense to refer to EU officials as „unelected bureaucrats”?, https://www.
economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/07/14/does-it-make-sense-to-refer-toeu-officials-as-unelected-bureaucrats (access 25.01.2021).
21
22
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N. Sienko, “A Europe of Homelands or Homeland Europe”…
President of the European Council in 2017, despite the opposition of
the Polish government. Secondly, the proposal to reduce the number of
commissioners in the European Commission is also worrying. Supporters
of their restriction, such as French President Emmanuel Macron, admit
that the task of independent commissioners is to act in the interest of the
Community, not represent the interests of the Member States. In their
opinion, there are grounds for some countries to resign from appointing
a college member. Excessive dispersion contributes to lowering the
effectiveness of activities, and the trust and acceptance of a small college
will be (according to the supporters of federalisation) a visible sign of
supranational governance. However, among some Member States, such
as in Poland and Hungary, there was concern about the downgrading of
the role of smaller states and the temporary loss of representation in the
European Commission. In this context, Ireland also expressed concern by
opposing in 2008 the content of the Lisbon Treaty, which provided for the
possibility of reducing the composition of the College of Commissioners.
According to the Eurosceptics, this means that, contrary to assurances,
the European Commission does not remain a completely independent
body.23
The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty initiated the arduous
process of introducing new restrictions. Overregulation remains apparent
in many meticulous and seemingly insignificant aspects – from the legal
framework of the electricity market and the limits of its consumption
in toasters, to the debate about considering carrots as a fruit or snail as
a fish, to analysing the correct curvature of bananas when the regulation
of September 16, 1994, stated that bananas may have “slight defects in
shape” and “slight skin defects”.24 Formality, inefficiency and lack of
transparency of procedures, and repeatedly raising issues considered
absurd, also resulted in criticism of countries that are among the most
competitive in the EU, such as Germany and, until recently, Great Britain,
promoting a free-market economy.25
The financial crisis in the euro area also showed a significant weakness
and structural limitations of the EU [especially within the monetary
J. Chmiel, Polskę czeka szantaż ze strony UE? Polska może nie mieć swojego komisarza w Unii Europejskiej!, https://www.stefczyk.info/2019/04/30/polske-czeka-szantazze-strony-ue-polska-moze-nie-miec-swojego-komisarza-w-unii-europejskiej/ (access
25.01.2021).
24
Commission Regulation (EC) no. 2257/94 of 16 September 1994 laying down
quality standards for bananas, OJ L 245, Brussels 20.09.1994.
25
Ping Chan S., Germany pleads with UK to remain in EU to fight red tape, https://
www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11718554/Germany-pleas-with-UK-to-remain-in-EU-to-fight-red-tape.html (access 1.02.2021).
23
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policy of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)]. Despite the fact
that the currency integration chosen by countries with different levels
of competitiveness was to contribute to the elimination of structural
inequalities, it resulted in an increase in imbalance and sensitivity to
“asymmetric shocks”. In the indebted European public sector, it did not
protect against the effects of global paralysis. Interestingly, another cause
of the instability of the euro area is the adoption of a federal monetary
system, which is not commensurate with the neutralisation of this type of
recession by fiscal integration (fiscal federalism) and the high mobility on
the labour market observed in federal countries.26
In particular, the lack of financial discipline and flexibility of the
European market, as well as, according to A. Visvizi, the insufficient
capacity to make authoritative political decisions, limited the introduction
of mechanisms that effectively maintain the stability of the economic and
monetary union. As a result, the EU leadership, in agreement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank
(ECB), was forced to neutralise the consequences of the Greek ruling party’s
decisions (excessive spending or concealing the state of the economy)
of the multi-annual aid program, granting loans worth over EUR 300
billion since 2010 and buying Greek, as well as Irish, Italian, Spanish,
and Portuguese bonds in 2010–2012. Due to the lack of a cohesion policy,
designed at the central level of the monetary union and conducted in
the event of an economic downturn, the most stable euro area countries,
such as Austria and Germany, were among the creditworthy countries.
Both countries, previously criticised for suspending the program due to
concerns over the transfer of their taxpayers’ money, were subsequently
accused of taking advantage of the economic crisis and earning interest
on loans.27
There is no doubt, therefore, that the natural consequence of the
weakness of the institutional system, in which mechanisms imposing freemarket reforms were not implemented, was, as admitted by T.G. Rosse
“a growing tendency to differentiate political power between member states
A. Visvizi, The eurozone crisis in perspective: causes and implications, in: The eurozone crisis: implications for Central and Eastern Europe, eds. A. Visvizi, T. Stępniewski,
„Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe”, no. 10(5)/2012, pp. 13–16; Unia
Europejska i strefa euro. Doświadczenia i wyzwania ekonomiczne, techniczne, inżynieryjne,
eds. M. Gwóźdź-Lasoń, S. Miklaszewicz, K. Pujer, Exante, Wrocław 2017, pp.
46–48; T.G. Rosse, Systemowe uwarunkowania kryzysu strefy euro, Instytut Studiów
Politycznych PAN, Warszawa 2010, p. 347, http://www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl/
Content/35518/015.pdf (access 2.02.2021).
27
Ibidem; Austriacy zarobili na nieszczęściu Grecji, https://wgospodarce.pl/
informacje/53049-austriacy-zarobili-na-nieszczesciu-grecji (access 5.02.2021).
26
38
N. Sienko, “A Europe of Homelands or Homeland Europe”…
and strive to maximise national interests within existing institutions”.28
It is not surprising that it is the national decision-makers who pursue
fiscal policy and transfer aid from national budgets that coordinate the
stability of the euro system, on terms that they themselves accept. In view
of the above, the circumstances surrounding the crisis, including the
strengthening of Germany’s position as the EU leader, gave rise in 2015
to Greek demands for German reparations for the effects of World War
II and sustained further opposition from Member States (downplaying
their disapproval of the enlargement of the euro area) against excessive
redistribution of taxes to the EU fund. Thus, the perspective of the
political will to harmonise legislative and institutional solutions at the
national and supranational level was still receding.29
Further limitations in the process of EU integration concerned the
gradual expansion of the Schengen Area and the different perceptions
of the Member States about institutional cooperation in the field of
preventing and combating crime, migration issues, asylum policy, and
judicial cooperation. Removing controls at the EU’s internal borders
required harmonised measures to build the security of the European
organisation. Although in 2002 it was decided to set up a European Arrest
Warrant (EAW), and following the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004, an
EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (EU-CTC) was appointed; Europol
as a fully-fledged police agency designated to fight cross-border organised
crime and terrorism was established in 2010 after almost 30 years of
debate on its shape. In the process of its formation, countries wondered
whether the transfer of classified information to other Member States
would harm the image of a state fighting organised crime, and what
police powers could be transferred to the agency. First and foremost, the
lengthy process of formation was a consequence of concerns about the
authorisation of Europol officers to conduct investigations without the
consent of the Member States. Therefore, there is no possibility of using
coercive measures on behalf of the agency, and transnational cooperation
concerns in particular the exchange of operational information, expertise
or strategic data.30 Similarly, Eurojust – established to fight transnational
crime and meeting Europol’s competences in the field of operational
and strategic cooperation in the field of the judiciary, has no practical
T.G. Rosse, op.cit., p. 343.
Ibidem, pp. 346–347; A. Visvizi, Niebezpieczne związki, czyli Niemcy i Grecja
w dobie kryzysu, „Biuletyn Niemiecki”, no. 58/2015, pp. 2-8.
30
More on this: N. Sienko, Europejski Urząd Policji – działania operacyjne na rzecz
przeciwdziałania nielegalnej migracji i handlu ludźmi, „Rynek – Społeczeństwo – Kultura”, no. 26/2017, pp. 53–56.
28
29
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instruments that would entitle EU citizens to be prosecuted before the
competent courts of the Member States, if they do not demonstrate such
will.31
However, while common foundations have been established in
the field of data transfer, a pressing problem in 2015 due to the record
number of third-country nationals arriving in Europe turned out to be
a lively discussion about the EU’s limited resources to fight the crossborder activity of people who illegally transport immigrants and the very
effects of migration. In September of that year, German border controls
were strengthened, and the German government was followed by, among
others, Austrian, Hungarian, and Slovak authorities. The construction of
a wall separating Bulgaria from Turkey was also started. Thus, it turned out
that Frontex, established in 2004 (the European Border and Coast Guard
Agency since 2016), is unable to seal the EU’s external borders. Despite
the fact that Poland, Germany, Austria, and France supported the need to
increase the capacity of the agency to provide technical and operational
support to the Member States allowing border control, the rulers did not
reach an agreement on the announced obligation to accept the number of
immigrants imposed by the European Commission. Germany and France
envisaged the support of Greece and Italy, which are on the first transit
line on the Eastern and Central Mediterranean routes. Poland, Hungary,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Austria, concerned about the lack of
institutional opportunities and financial resources, refused to introduce
an immigration reform.32
Fear of being unable to solve the problem of illegal immigration
resulted in mutual migratory pressures, emphasising the importance
of national security policies rather than the European solidarity of EU
members. Accordingly, as J. Estevens notes: “(…) all Member States tend
to impose their own protection standards on EU asylum policies at EU
level, but some (...) influence EU policies more effectively than others,
and therefore there are Member States to have a greater impact on the
legislative outcomes of migration and asylum in the EU”.33
As in the case of difficulties with the development of an appropriate
system and ruling powers of national states, a coordinated response to
31
Council Decision no 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime, O.J. L 63/1, 6.3.2002, Brussels 28.02.2002.
32
Where do EU countries stand on migration?, https://www.dw.com/en/where-do-eucountries-stand-on-migration/a-44356857 (access 17.02.2021).
33
J. Estevens, Migration crisis in the EU: developing a framework for analysis of national security and defence strategies, „Comparative Migration Studies”, no. 1/2018, p. 7,
DOI: https://doi.org/ 10.1186/s40878-018-0093-3.
40
N. Sienko, “A Europe of Homelands or Homeland Europe”…
economic problems or a crisis hitting the European migration and
asylum policy; the importance of individual security of the Member
States, translated above the EU subsidiarity and solidarity, is evidenced
by the recent reports on the introduction of the export ban, blocking the
shipments of protective materials, medical equipment and other personal
protective equipment used to fight the COVID-19 pandemic,34 as well as
independent negotiations with producers vaccines and the purchase of
additional doses outside the EU vaccination strategy, coordinated by the
European Commission.35 It seems, therefore, that it is the difference in
the matter of counteracting the effects of the coronavirus, including the
lack of consent to the establishment and spending of the EU aid fund,
that will affect the further debate on the legitimacy of the functioning of
the EU in its present shape.
Ideational Limitations
Life in the age of globalisation, that is “the gradual expansion on
a global scale of the social impact of the division of labour and market
exchange, connections and interactions between human communities in
all spheres of life”, sparked the aforementioned debate on the relic of the
“state”. Therefore, one cannot disagree with the fact that some state competences have been shifted to supranational actors (international organisations, such as the EU) and the groups below its level (e.g. specialised in
maintaining public security and order) or the instruments next to it (e.g.
mass media).36 The fact is that it is the state, which is the main actor in
international relations, that faces a number of challenges. It is undeniable
that “the creation of a European federation would mean the collective
suicide of nation states”.37
This process concerns, inter alia, Germany, Poland, Slovakia or Romania.
K. Kaźmierczak, Niemcy wstrzymały maseczki zakupione przez Włochów z Chin, https://
kresy.pl/wydarzenia/regiony/europa-zachodnia/niemcy-wstrzymaly-maseczki-zakupione-przez-wlochow-z-chin/ (access 20.02.2021).
35
Szczepienia przeciwko COVID-19 w Europie. Węgry i Niemcy wyłamały się z mechanizmu wspólnych zakupów, https://pulsmedycyny.pl/szczepienia-przeciwko-covid19-w-europie-wegry-i-niemcy-wylamaly-sie-z-mechanizmu-wspolnych-zakupow1107808 (access 20.02.2021).
36
J. Ruszkowski, Państwo poza państwem. Wstępna konceptualizacja procesu przesuwania władzy państwa na otoczenie pozapaństwowe, in: Państwo w czasach zmiany, eds.
M. Pietraś, I. Hofman, S. Michałowski, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2018,
pp. 90–91.
37
J. Zielonka, Kontrrewolucja. Liberalna Europa w odwrocie, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2018, p. 229.
34
41
Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 2/2021
One of the reasons why states do not build a European federation
is therefore nationalism, which is a construct of nations’ past, their
historically conditioned aspirations for sovereignty, and is now understood
as a special promotion of solidarity within the internal borders of EU
members. This attitude, emerging from growing concerns about the loss
of control over the implementation of state interests, the contemporary
sense of economic injustice, or resulting from the threat to the cohesion
of social groups, could be the reason for the lack of will to federalise the
EU structures.
Also, the current failure to apply the reallocation system proposed by
the EU bodies is due to the fear of the inability to tackle illegal immigration
transnationally. The lack of trust contributed to the subjective rhetoric
of the citizens of countries in which the necessity to enter into new
types of social interactions caused considerable concern about internal
security. On the one hand, the migration crisis contributed to the spread
of Islamophobia and racism in social media. The record migratory flows
were seen as a threat to the stability and development of the state and gave
rise to the formation of anti-immigrant groups, and resulted in physical
manifestations of hatred. On the other hand, however, there have been
accusations of leftism and idealisation of life in the “multi-culti” space by
groups emphasising supra-state and supra-ethnic solidarity.38
However, taking into consideration recent events, the expression of
the divided Union has also completed the picture of emerging “extremist
narratives inside right-wing political parties”.39 Among the Eurosceptics
who criticised some of the Community ideas were, inter alia, Law and
Justice in Poland, Fidesz with the Christian Democratic People’s Party in
Hungary, and the Sweden Democrats rejecting the adoption of the euro
in Sweden.40 Moreover, it seems that the results of the elections to the
European Parliament in 2014 and 2019 showed the regression of liberal
democracy with the simultaneous flourishing of counter-revolutionary
groups, which include contemporary right-wing populist groups
opposing Europeanisation. Radical changes, according to J. Zielonka,
result from the liberal distortion of freedom, equality, social justice, from
“betraying” by the “liberal oligarchy” the original ideas at the expense
of the ideology of power and depriving the electorate of any influence
on politics. Nowadays, an alternative to pro-European groups in the
European Parliament turned out to be groups using the “policy of fear”,
38
N. Sienko, Czeska debata wokół kryzysu migracyjnego w przekazie i dyskursie medialnym, „Kultura – historia – globalizacja”, no. 25/2019, p. 163–167.
39
J. Estevens, op.cit., pp. 8–11.
40
N. Sienko, Czeska debata…, op.cit., pp. 169.
42
N. Sienko, “A Europe of Homelands or Homeland Europe”…
opposing technocracy or weakening the position of nation states, such as
the Marine Le Pen’s National Front, V. Orban’s Fidesz, and M. Salvini’s
League.41
Centrifugal tensions in the EU do not remain visible only within the
Eurosceptic rhetoric, but concern systemic changes made on January
31, 2020 by the United Kingdom, deciding to leave the EU structures in
line with the 2016 referendum. As F. O’Toole admits: “England seems
to be stumbling towards a national independence it has scarcely even
discussed, let alone prepared for. It is on the brink of one of history’s
strangest nationalist revolutions”, and also adds that “the inexorable logic
of Brexit is the logic of English nationalism: the birth of a new nation
state bounded by the Channel and the Tweed”.42 The motive for Great
Britain’s withdrawal from the EU is therefore the pursuit of independence
in the face of barriers imposed by participation in the EU community.
The concept of “Global Britain” (building relationships “with old friends
and new allies”), the need for implementation of which was emphasised
by T. May, is to be an expression of openness to the world and building
bold trade ties.43
The wave of comments about the next act of leaving – “Czexit”,
“Swexit”, “Nexit”, “Italexit” resulted in uncertainty about the future
of the EU. Therefore, the question arose whether “being” a European
results only from living in the geographical area of Europe, recognising
the European identity as a political construct, or does it mean actually
adopting a certain model of group identification? When in Great Britain
T. May mentioned that the British were leaving the EU in the national
interest but would not renounce their European heritage,44 the leader of
the Swedish Democrats J. Åkesson, calling the EU structures “the main
force of corruption”, announced the construction of a Swedish national
space, free from membership. G. Wilders, the leader of the Dutch Party for
Freedom, also spoke about the EU as an identity-interfering “expansionist
monster”.45 However, if the further implementation of “separation”
J. Zielonka, op.cit., pp. 15–19.
F. O’Toole, Brexit is being driven by English nationalism. And it will end in self-rule,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/18/england-eu-referendumbrexit (access 27.02.2021).
43
Theresa May’s Brexit speech at London’s Lancaster House, 17.01.2017, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=o0rRnTFJszU (access 27.02.2021).
44
Ibidem.
45
Referendum w sprawie członkostwa w UE, https://skandynawiainfo.pl/referendum-w-sprawie-czlonkostwa-w-ue/; Dlaczego UE się sypie? Holandia i Nexit, https://
pl.sputniknews.com/opinie/201608223745558-ue-eurosceptyzm-holandia-nexit/ (access 27.02.2021).
41
42
43
Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 2/2021
initiatives seems to remain distant, it suggests considerable dissatisfaction
of the Member States with the results of European integration and the
particular need to consolidate and protect state security.
Conclusions
It does not seem possible to talk of the near future of “the state of Europe”,
a “homeland Europe” – a federation of EU nation states. Although the
times of war in Europe are but a memory, the construction of an integral
political area, apart from structural issues, faces a number of constraints.
Some limitations include various models of economic and cultural policy,
separate historical experiences, political divisions and representations,
indicators of poverty, the level of economic emigration, and problems in
shaping national awareness into being constructed ideas of the nation.
Consequently, the conditions under which the European Communities
were established and the EU evolved depended on the motives of action,
capabilities, ambitions of the Member States and different perceptions of
transnational integration.
It is also difficult to imagine the situation mentioned by S. Fabbrini,
who recognises that an EU federation could be established within the
countries belonging to the euro area, institutionally separating from
those which strive to maintain unwavering national sovereignty. From
the beginning of the establishment of the European Communities, this
form of cooperation has not been used by the Member States. If it were
so, it is impossible not to agree with J. Zielonka that Germany, France, or
Belgium would create a small federal state. Thus, the formal promotion
of the concept of a “two-speed Europe” could be economically and
politically diversified and, culturally, the EU should strengthen the sense
of marginalisation and lead to the replacement of the organisation with
many other initiatives or strengthening of integration within the existing
ones, such as The Visegrad Group, the Three Seas Initiative, the Central
European Initiative, the Slavkov Declaration.46
However, it seems that both the concept of “upward” and “downward”
integration towards disintegration remain unprofitable for the Member
States. The future of the Union will depend on how far it is possible
to move “aside” – from the centralisation of the Union’s power to the
S. Fabbrini, Which European Union? Europe after the euro crisis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015, pp. XVII–XVIII; M. Graczyk, Pomysł na Europę pilnie
poszukiwany – wywiad z prof. Janem Zielonką, https://www.euractiv.pl/section/instytucje-ue/interview/pomysl-na-europe-pilnie-poszukiwany-wywiad-z-prof-janemzielonka/ (access 27.02.2021).
46
44
N. Sienko, “A Europe of Homelands or Homeland Europe”…
political activity of cities, non-governmental organisations and citizens,
participating in shaping and developing political, social and economic
initiatives.47
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