Asian Studies Review. ISSN 1035-7823 Volume 25 Number 2 June 2001 IS PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR BOMB AN ISLAMIC BOMB? SAMINA YASMEEN University of Western Australia On 28 May 1998, Pakistan conducted six nuclear tests from which it emerged as the seventh declared nuclear state in the world. Since then, although the world refuses to acknowledge Pakistan (and India) as nuclear weapon states, references have been made to the ``Islamic nature'' of Pakistan's nuclear program, and Pakistan's nuclear bomb is occasionally identified as an ``Islamic bomb''. Such characterisations are reminiscent of comments made in the 1970s, when some Pakistani politicians and analysts described Pakistan's nuclear program as an Islamic attempt to redress the ``international balance''. However, they raise a number of questions. Can Pakistan's bomb be justifiably portrayed as an Islamic bomb at the turn of the millennium? What is the likelihood of Pakistan sharing its nuclear technology with other Islamic states? Does unanimity of views exist in the Pakistani government and non-governmental groups on the place of nuclear weapons in Pakistan's security policy? What are the prospects of other Islamic, and particularly Middle Eastern, states following Pakistan's example and acquiring nuclear capability with either the implicit or explicit intention of asserting their Islamic identity in the emerging international system? This paper argues against the possibility of Pakistan's nuclear program acquiring the status of an ``Islamic bomb''. It contends that most Middle Eastern states have publicly distanced themselves from Pakistan's nuclear program. Nor has the Pakistani government or non-governmental Islamic groups demonstrated a willingness to acknowledge the relevance of the nuclear program beyond national borders. However, there is a remote possibility that economic and political instability may alter this situation. Both governmental and non-governmental actors may opt for projecting a closer connection between Pakistan's Islamic and nuclear identities. A more likely scenario, however, remains that of Iran pursuing its own nuclear program due to developments in South Asia. This would render the idea of an Islamic bomb meaningless and underscore the continued relevance of national interests in explaining the phenomenon of horizontal nuclear proliferation. Asian Studies Association of Australia 2001. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. # 202 Samina Yasmeen PAKISTAN'S BOMB AND ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY The idea of an Islamic bomb dates back to the 1970s. In the wake of India's ``peaceful nuclear explosion'' of May 1974, a number of countries were reported to be aiming for nuclear capability. Among the list of countries intent upon pursuing the course of horizontal nuclear proliferation were Muslim states such as Libya, Iraq and Pakistan. Instead of being viewed as ``national nuclear programs'', their quest for nuclear capability was perceived through the prism of religious identity. Against the background of the newly emerging sense of solidarity among Muslim states after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and the subsequent oil crisis, their efforts were accorded a religious dimension. These countries were seen as attempting to develop an ``Islamic bomb'' that could threaten Israel and the Middle East (Weissman and Krosney 1983). As the most technologically advanced Muslim country, Pakistan was credited with the possibility of developing the first Islamic bomb (Amin 1999, 30). From the outset, the idea of a blurring of boundaries between national and religious identities as the motivating force for acquiring a nuclear capability was fallacious. It ignored the fact that, notwithstanding their declared statements of solidarity and occasional demonstration of this solidarity on a limited range of issues, Muslim countries remained divided into pro-American and pro-Soviet states. They also vied for leadership of the Muslim world, and in the process were often prepared to compromise the national interests of other co-religionist states. In the neo-realist tradition, while establishing alliances on the basis of cultural and/or religious identity, national and not religious interests motivated the Muslim states. Their search for nuclear status, therefore, was also motivated by a combination of factors. For them, nuclear weapons formed part of their quest for regional leadership and would help to maintain a regional balance of power. Nuclear programs also reflected the belief among some leaders that nuclear weapons would secure them greater prestige in an international system characterised by sharp divisions between the capitalist and socialist worlds. Despite the obvious weakness of the concept of an ``Islamic bomb'', it was interestingly adopted and projected in Pakistan in the 1970s as a valid explanation for the country's nuclear program. Pakistan's Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, was at the forefront of this religious characterisation of the national nuclear program. He argued that ``all of the other great civilisationsÐthe Christians, Jews, Hindus and CommunistsÐha[ve] the nuclear capability''. Pakistan therefore also had a right and responsibility to acquire this capability (Weissman and Krosney 1983, 162±63). The country's analysts and academics espoused similar ideas. Their portrayals of a Pakistani bomb as an Islamic bomb could be attributed to two causes. First, against the background of the Islamic Summit in Lahore in 1974, the idea of Muslim unity was eagerly accepted and # Asian Studies Association of Australia 2001. Is Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb an Islamic Bomb? 203 adopted by the Pakistani public. So was the notion that each Muslim state had the right and responsibility to use all available instruments of power to protect the collective right of the Muslim Ummah to be accorded recognition in the international system. Secondly, and more importantly, the references to an Islamic bomb stemmed from a need for assistance from Middle Eastern states. After the Indian nuclear tests of 1974, Islamabad intensified its efforts to acquire nuclear capability. Coming soon after the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and the emergence of Bangladesh, this required financial assistance from the oilproducing Middle Eastern states. This need grew as US pressure intensified in 1976 to prevent Pakistan from pursuing the plutonium route. Islamabad now also needed help with finding uranium that was not under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Pakistan therefore needed to explore avenues for assistance from its Arab neighbours. It contacted countries such as Saudi Arabia and Libya that had been seeking a leadership role in the Islamic world, and reportedly offered access to its nuclear technology in return for financial assistance (Burrows and Windrem 1994, 70). Probably keen to reassure its Arab neighbours that its offers were valid, these secret moves were accompanied by claims that Pakistan's nuclear program would serve the interests of the entire Islamic community. That these reassurances worked is apparent from the fact that during the 1978±80 period, when Libya had not accepted the international safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Libya diverted some uranium from Niger to Pakistan (Weissman and Krosney 1983, 209±13).1 To some extent the identification of Pakistan's nuclear program along religious lines continued at the declared level as General Zia-ul-Haq imposed military rule in July 1977. On a few occasions during his eleven year rule (1977±88), General Zia presented Pakistan's nuclear program as part of a civilisational search for power. Speaking to an analyst, for instance, he was reported as saying: ``China, India, USSR and Israel in the Middle East, possess the atomic arms. No Muslim country has any. If Pakistan has such a weapon, it would reinforce the power of the Muslim world'' (General Zia-ul-Haq in Hassan 1986, 25). However, at the actual level, as it moved closer to acquiring nuclear capability, Pakistan began distancing itself from the idea of sharing nuclear technology with other Muslim states. In early 1988, for example, the Iranian government broached the idea of having access to Pakistan's nuclear technology. It was hinted that as a quid pro quo Islamabad could receive approximately US$5 billion annually. Despite the fact that the possibility of an agreement and consequent decline in US assistance to Pakistan was looming, General Zia-ul-Haq refused to accept such a suggestion. His rejection may have been partly prompted by a realisation that such an arrangement would incur the wrath of the international community, especially the United States. However, it was also reportedly a result of his view that the # Asian Studies Association of Australia 2001. 204 Samina Yasmeen possibility of strained Iran-Pakistan relations in future on the issue of Afghanistan necessitated complete Pakistani control over its nuclear program.2 Essentially, therefore, a clear policy was emerging in Pakistan of treating the nuclear program as an instrument of national power and not as a means of altering the international balance in favour of Islamic states. The clear distinction between the national and religious dimensions of Pakistan's nuclear program continued as Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif took turns in ruling the country through democratically held elections after General Zia-ul-Haq's death in August 1988. As in the past, the nuclear program remained under the effective control of the military. The elected leaders often had no knowledge of the direction the program took or of its exact accomplishments. However, one aspect of the nuclear equation in South Asia was clear: Pakistan and India had emerged as de facto nuclear powers and an era of undeclared nuclear deterrence between the two states had begun. It was widely assumed that neither Pakistan nor India would cross the nuclear threshold and emerge as a declared nuclear state. Against this background, both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif avoided describing Pakistan's nuclear program as an Islamic program. While alternating between acknowledging and denying that Pakistan had acquired nuclear capability, both prime ministers studiously restricted its applicability to the South Asian region. FROM AMBIGUOUS TO UNAMBIGUOUS DETERRENCE AND AN ISLAMIC BOMB? On 11 and 13 May 1998, the Indian government crossed the nuclear threshold by conducting five nuclear tests. Immediately a debate ensued in Pakistan on the need for it to conduct its own tests. Those in favour of responding to the Indian moves in kind argued that the credibility of Pakistani deterrence was at stake. They also linked the Indian acquisition of nuclear capability to a ``grand Indian design'' to dominate Pakistan and secure settlement of the Kashmir dispute on terms favourable to New Delhi. India's emergence as the sixth nuclear state was also viewed as presaging an era of Indian dominance of the South Asian region with the possibility of extending this influence into neighbouring regions. Others who adopted a broader view of security opposed these views. Fearful of possible sanctions if Pakistan conducted tests, they argued that they would undermine Pakistan's economic security with ultimate implications for its military security and territorial integrity. Instead of following the Indian example, the opponents of nuclear tests within Pakistan argued in favour of securing international security guarantees and/or trading a policy of nuclear restraint for financial assistance from external sources. The debate ended when # Asian Studies Association of Australia 2001. Is Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb an Islamic Bomb? 205 the Nawaz Sharif regime conducted nuclear tests on 28 and 30 May 1998. These tests ended the era of deterrence and ushered the South Asian states into a new phase of declared nuclear capability. Pakistan's nuclear tests, like the Indian tests, attracted condemnation and criticism. The criticism primarily centred on the further weakening of the international arms control regime as a result of Pakistan's nuclear tests. Some critics, however, also revived the idea of an Islamic bomb. Instead of acknowledging that Pakistan's decision was linked to the Indian nuclear tests, they accredited the decision with a religious aspect. Some analysts argued, in line with the past statements of Pakistani leaders themselves, that Pakistan's newly acquired nuclear technology would be shared with other Muslim states.3 They also raised the spectre of an Islamic bomb to balance the Israeli nuclear capability. These comments were made despite the proliferation of academic and analytical literature in the 1990s highlighting the divisions among Muslim states on the meaning of Islam, the notion of the Islamic state, and the practical manifestation and implementation of Islamic ideas. Analysts had also emphasised differences among states with Muslim populations on the basis of their respective national interests. The continued prevalence of national interests over religious identity and solidarity had also been amply proven by the nature of relationships between various Muslim states. The Iran-Iraq war (1980±88) and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990±91) had clearly put the myth of Islamic solidarity to rest. Some non-governmental groups in other Muslim states also shared these erroneous views about the reality of Pakistan's nuclear program. Soon after Pakistan's nuclear tests of May 1998, for instance, the Mufti-e-Azam of Egypt reportedly made an appeal that ``all Muslim countries must rally round Pakistan to support its nuclear program'' (Rahman 1998). Similarly, the Imam of Al-Aqsa mosque claimed that the ``Pakistani bomb is the resurgence of the Islamic power''. Sheikh Yassin of Hamas was reported as saying that ``Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons is to be considered as an asset to the Arabs and the Muslim nations'', and Qatar's newspaper, Al-Raya, called upon Arab countries to support Pakistan's nuclear stance (Taj 1998). The governments of Muslim states, however, remained wary of identifying Pakistan's nuclear capability as an Islamic bomb. Prior to the nuclear tests, Pakistan had sought political support from its Middle Eastern neighbours against the Indian acquisition of nuclear weapons. Their response, however, was lukewarm. Apart from issuing bland statements expressing their understanding of the predicament Islamabad found itself in, most of the Gulf and Middle Eastern states avoided siding with Pakistan. Following the Pakistani government's decision to test nuclear weapons, countries such as Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates expressed a sense of pride over a fellow Muslim state's # Asian Studies Association of Australia 2001. 206 Samina Yasmeen accomplishment.4 However, with the exception of Iran, whose Foreign Minister Kharazi linked Pakistan's tests to developments in the Middle East and Israel's nuclear capability, the Arab/Middle Eastern states avoided characterising the Pakistani nuclear bomb as belonging to the Muslim community. On the contrary, they stressed the South Asian specificity of the nuclear tests. A Saudi Arabian Lieutenant General, Prince Khalid Bin Sultan, for instance, discussed the South Asian nuclear tests in terms of the balance of power between China and India, and India and Pakistan, and refrained from making any reference to the relevance of these tests for the Middle East (Sultan 1998). This reluctance, however, did not extend to drawing out any lessons from the nuclear developments on the sub-continent. On the contrary, as the international community, especially the United States, responded to Pakistan's nuclear tests by imposing sanctions, the Middle Eastern states began to highlight the duplicity of the American approach. Comparisons were made between America's punitive action towards Islamabad and its silence over Israel's nuclear program. The Lebanese government, for instance, pointed out that the condemnation of the Indian and Pakistani tests ignored the reality of the Israeli threat in the Middle East (Rahman 1998). Despite drawing this comparison between the US approach to Pakistani and Israeli nuclear capability, however, the Middle Eastern states refrained from questioning the legitimacy of the international arms control regime. Instead, they have supported the agreements concluded to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This has related particularly to their concerns about the Israeli nuclear capability. Interested in neutralising this capability by promoting ideas such as the declaration of a nuclear weapons free zone, Middle Eastern states have even been prepared to criticise Pakistan's nuclear program. Similarly, Muslim states like Malaysia and Indonesia have demonstrated an unwillingness to condone Pakistan's nuclear program, for fear of its implications for the Southeast Asian region. This ``separation'' of Pakistan's nuclear status from its religious identity as an Islamic state was most obvious in the Review Conference (RevCon) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 14 April±19 May 2000. During this Conference, the Middle Eastern states emphasised that the NPT Review conference of 1995 had ``expressed concern of the parties about the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities''. They also reminded participants that, of the three Middle Eastern states identified in the previous review, United Arab Emirates and Oman had signed the NPT in 1995 and 1997 respectively. They demanded that, as the only remaining Middle Eastern state, Israel should be called upon to accede to the NPT and place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards without delay (see, for example, Working Paper submitted by Egypt, RevCon 2000). In their attempts to # Asian Studies Association of Australia 2001. Is Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb an Islamic Bomb? 207 get this demand enshrined in the final document of the RevCon, the Middle Eastern states agreed to condemn the Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests of 1998. The final document therefore ``emphasized the importance of Israel acceding to the Treaty and placing all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards''. At the same time, the document condemned the South Asian tests and stated that ``India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear weapon States''. The language used in relation to the South Asian situation ran counter to the position taken by Islamabad that it had already emerged as a nuclear weapon state and that the international community needed to engage Pakistan, and India, in constructive negotiations on the future of the NPT. Although the Middle Eastern states explained to Islamabad the reasons that they went against the Pakistani position, the fact remains that their willingness to secure a direct mention of Israel at the expense of Pakistan (and India) suggested that Pakistan's nuclear weapon is not viewed as an Islamic nuclear weapon. Instead, the Muslim states in the Middle East draw a clear distinction between the nuclear situation in their region and that in South Asia. The Pakistani government's views and policies also underscore the regional specificity of its nuclear program. The significance of this view can best be understood with reference to the debate within the Pakistani establishment on the appropriate foreign policy for their state. This debate has been characterised by a multiplicity of views on the nature of the new international system, Pakistan's relative position in this changed structure, and the appropriate foreign policy response for Islamabad. At another level, the debate has involved different views on the reliability or unreliability of the United States and the conditional or unconditional nature of Indian hostility towards Pakistan (Yasmeen 1999, 45±48). Together, these debates have found expression in three broad clusters of opinion on Pakistan's foreign policy in the contemporary international system. The first set of views, which could be identified as accommodating or moderate, acknowledges that the international system has changed from a bipolar to a unipolar one led by the United States. Irrespective of American reliability, it is argued, Pakistan needs to engage the United States in a continuing positive relationship. The ultimate objectives of this engagement are manifold: they include preventing Washington from adopting an Indo-centric policy in South Asia, if possible playing a mediatory role between India and Pakistan, or at least introducing an element of restraint in New Delhi's foreign policy vis-aÁ-vis Islamabad. Finally, a positive relationship with the United States is seen as ensuring a continued supply of the necessary financial inputs for Pakistan's struggling economy. The second set of views acknowledges the move towards unipolarity but also points to the increased manoeuvrability possible for developing states. Convinced of American unreliability and the conditional nature of Indian hostility, # Asian Studies Association of Australia 2001. 208 Samina Yasmeen those subscribing to this set of views argue for an independent foreign policy, which does not necessarily take into account American regional and global interests. The third set of views focuses on Pakistan's identity as an Islamic state. Some division of opinion notwithstanding, it ascribes unreliability to the United States and unconditional hostility to Indian decision-makers. For those subscribing to this set of views, therefore, capitalising on Pakistan's Islamic identity by building close links with Muslim countries and supporting ``Islamic causes'' remains the country's best option. This multiplicity of views has sometimes resulted in conflicting trends in Pakistan's foreign policy on regional issues, including its relations with Iran. The nuclear program, however, has remained remarkably insulated from variations in the relative power of the three groups during the 1990s. This has been especially evident since Pakistan's nuclear tests in May 1998. From the outset, Islamabad has been adamant that its nuclear program is South Asia specific and cannot be viewed in civilisational terms. The decision to test the nuclear weapons, therefore, was clearly related to the Indian nuclear tests of 11 and 13 May 1998. Also, soon after the nuclear tests the Iranian Foreign Minister, Kharazi, visited Islamabad and described Pakistan's nuclear program in terms of Islamic identity. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reacted to the remarks by pointing out that ``bombs do not have religious identities, only national identities''.5 He repeated these ideas in an interview with India Today by stating that ``the [nuclear] device has no religion''. He then asked a question: ``Do bombs have religion? Or caste, creed and colour? We have never spoken of a `Hindu bomb''' (Muslim, 12 June 1998). These statements were accompanied by a refusal to describe Pakistan's nuclear program as part of the Islamic world's struggle to alter the international balance of power in its favour. Nor was it portrayed as balancing Israel's nuclear capability. In an interview with the dailies Al-Itehad and Emirates News, for example, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was asked how he assessed the ``distinguished standing'' Pakistan had acquired by testing nuclear weapons. He replied: ``We are not claiming any standing or status at this point in time. Our decision to exercise the nuclear option was related solely to Pakistan's requirements for national defence and was taken in our supreme national interest''. He was then reminded that ``Israel is a non-declared nuclear force'' and asked how ``Israel could be contained at the Arab, Islamic and international levels?'' The Pakistani Prime Minister refrained from giving any hint that the Pakistani bomb could be used in the Middle East. Instead, he limited his comments to reaffirming his support for the peace process, saying: ``Pakistan has always supported its Palestinian and Arab brothers in their efforts to obtain just peace. We fully support the need for the resumption and continuation of the Middle East peace process'' (The Nation, 8 June 1998).6 The regional specificity of Pakistan's nuclear program has become clearer as the broad contours of its nuclear policy/doctrine have unfolded over the last two # Asian Studies Association of Australia 2001. Is Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb an Islamic Bomb? 209 and a half years. Against the background of the broad clusters of opinion on foreign/strategic policy, differences have existed within the Pakistani establishment over the need for a reactive or pro-active nuclear policy, minimum or dynamic deterrence, an appropriate targeting policy, the appropriateness of a no-first use policy, participation in the international arms control regime, and the relevance of declared nuclear status to securing an acceptable resolution of the Kashmir dispute. In the final analysis, however, moderate views have dominated Pakistan's evolving nuclear policy. This was the case during Nawaz Sharif's regime and is true even for the military regime that assumed power in October 1999. While unable or unwilling to completely de-link Pakistan's nuclear policy from that of India, the two regimes have favoured a policy of minimum nuclear deterrence (Shahbaz 2000; News, 26 March 2000). Islamabad interprets this notion in terms of sufficiency. In effect, this means that Pakistan could acquire a sufficient number of nuclear weapons and missiles to deter a potential aggressor from posing a threat to its security. The notion of sufficiency further encompasses a counter-value rather than a counter-force targeting policy. This in turn stems from the fact that Pakistan is in the early stages of weaponisation and has not been technologically advanced enough to develop a counter-force targeting capability. However, this inability has not deterred Pakistan from its avowed non-adherence to the concept of no-first use of nuclear weapons. Islamabad has frequently asserted that, given its lack of geographical depth, it is not averse to the idea of ultimately using nuclear weapons to protect its territorial integrity. While keeping open its options for a ``first use policy'', Islamabad has also demonstrated a willingness to participate in the international arms control regime. It is prepared to participate in the regime provided its newly acquired status as a nuclear state is not compromised.7 Since its nuclear tests, therefore, various Pakistani leaders and officials have insisted that, irrespective of recognition by the international community, Pakistan is a nuclear state (News, 7 February 2000). They argue that Pakistan could not be expected to be a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear state. The Nawaz Sharif government expressed this view categorically (Dawn, 25 February 1999) and it is being reiterated by the military regime. However, criticism of the NPT has not prevented Islamabad from seriously considering the possibility of signing the CTBT. Soon after its nuclear tests, Islamabad began giving hints of its willingness to sign the CTBT. On 23 September 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif declared his government's willingness to ``adhere to the CTBT'' before the Conference of State Parties to the Treaty met in September 1999 (News, 24 September 1998). The government also secured the support of the parliament for its policy on the Treaty. This approach to the CTBT has not been shelved by the new regime, which has mentioned the need to develop a consensus on the # Asian Studies Association of Australia 2001. 210 Samina Yasmeen issue but clearly supports the idea of Pakistan's participation in a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests (Selections from Regional Press 15 April 2000, 30).8 That this nuclear policy is targeted against India and does not extend to the Middle East is obvious from the manner in which Islamabad has approached the issue of reducing the dangers emanating from its nuclear status. Clearly identifying India as the sole reason for its decision to become a nuclear weapon state, the Pakistani government has suggested a Strategic Restraint Regime for Islamabad and New Delhi. It argued during the Nawaz Sharif regime that New Delhi and Islamabad needed to undertake nuclear restraint and stabilisation measures, such as the prevention of a nuclear and ballistic missile race, risk reduction mechanisms, non-induction of anti-ballistic and sea-launched ballistic missile systems, and the avoidance of nuclear conflict. Linking Pakistan's nuclear program with its perceived inferiority in conventional terms, Islamabad also proposed the mutual and balanced reduction of forces and armaments. Equally importantly, it acknowledged the significance of confidence-building measures as a means of improving the security environment in the region (Pakistan-India Dialogue 1998). These ideas were incorporated in the Lahore Declaration signed during Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Lahore in February 1999. The Kargil crisis in mid-1999 cast doubts over the feasibility of such a regime. Soon after the military takeover in Pakistan, however, the military regime reiterated its commitment to the need for restraint. In his first speech after the coup, for instance, while discussing ``the new nuclear environment in South Asia'', General Musharraf expressed his belief ``that both Pakistan and India have to exercise utmost restraint and responsibility'' (Shaikh 1999). Pakistan's policy on international arms control also supports the argument that its nuclear policy is South Asia-centred and not related to its Islamic identity. The debate on the CTBT, for instance, has focused on the question of linking or de-linking it from the Indian approach to the Treaty. More importantly, Islamabad's policy on negotiating and concluding the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) demonstrates that its nuclear program is guided by its concern about the Indian nuclear program and not that of Israel. It is unwilling to participate in drafting a Treaty that does not address the issue of unequal stockpiles of fissile materials, due to its fear that it could be relegated to a permanent position of inferiority vis-aÁ-vis India. If these concerns could be allayed, Pakistan would be willing to participate in a future ban on the production of fissile materials (Shahbaz 2000; Lodhi 1999). It could be argued that, its declared policies notwithstanding, Islamabad may be prepared to share its nuclear technology. The Pakistani government's approach to the question of controlling the export of nuclear technology, however, illustrates the weakness of such an argument. Soon after the nuclear tests, Pakistan started negotiations with the US government on preventing the # Asian Studies Association of Australia 2001. Is Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb an Islamic Bomb? 211 unauthorised transfer of nuclear technology. During these negotiations, Islamabad has frequently asserted its ``impeccable record'' on preventing the export of nuclear technology. At the same time, it has voiced the opinion that as the target of sanctions for its nuclear program, Pakistan cannot be expected to participate in controlling the spread of nuclear technology. These assertions have co-existed, though, with a willingness to put in place arrangements that would make any unauthorised transfer of nuclear technology impossible. The Pakistani government also established a Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) in February 2000. Apart from developing a strategic and nuclear policy, the NCA has been entrusted with the task of nuclear export control. It could, therefore, be safely argued that the Pakistani government does not see its nuclear program in civilisational but national terms, and has a strong preference for not sharing its nuclear knowhow or technology with other Islamic states. PUBLIC ATTITUDES The Pakistani public approaches the nuclear issue in a slightly different manner. As the nuclear program has been the preserve of the military, ordinary citizens have remained largely ignorant of the pros and cons of Pakistan's nuclear policy. The question of Pakistan acquiring nuclear capability was initially addressed purely in terms of the country's izzat [honour] and its right to link this acquisition to India's nuclear policy. Following the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998, however, the scope of discussions on nuclear matters has widened, with various sections voicing their opinions on how Pakistan could or should handle its nuclear capability. Mirroring the idea expressed by some Middle Eastern non-governmental actors, a few groups in Pakistan have also placed the country's nuclear capability in a broader perspective. They argue that, while initially motivated by its concerns to balance the Indian capability, the Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 have provided the country with the ``bonus'' of ``dual deterrence''. Pakistan's nuclear program, it is argued, could be used to balance the Israeli nuclear capability as well as meeting the challenge from New Delhi. Writing soon after the nuclear tests, for instance, former Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg argued that Pakistan's Islamic bomb, which is India-specific, had acquired new strategic dimensions and would serve as an effective dual deterrent. ``Pakistan nourishes no jingoistic designs,'' he argued. ``The idea is only to provide the requisite deterrence to our Muslim countries who are under strategic bondage of Israel, for too long. . . . Pakistan's nuclear capability serves to maintain the correct level of deterrence against India, as well as provide a meaningful deterrent against Israel. This enhanced capability provides new geo-strategic options to # Asian Studies Association of Australia 2001. 212 Samina Yasmeen Pakistan and opportunities, demanding a much more aggressive and dynamic foreign policy to strengthen the security of Pakistan and the entire region from the Middle East, to the Gulf, West Asia and South Asia''. The ability to play this role, he maintained, required ``understanding and support from friendly countries, [for Pakistan] to play the role of an equaliser and balancer of power in the region'' (Beg 1998).9 The majority of the Pakistani public, however, has not endorsed the notion of ``dual deterrent capability''. The tests have induced a sense of pride among the general public that Pakistan is technologically capable of ``matching'' the most developed nations such as the United States and Russia. This new sense of identity as a ``significant state'' has also acquired some religious dimensions. Increasingly, a nuclear Pakistan is seen as strengthening an Islamic Pakistan. This new notion of Pakistani identity, however, has predominantly excluded the idea of sharing nuclear technology with other Islamic states. The Jamaat-I-Islami is a classic example of this exclusionary approach to Pakistan's nuclear capability. As the most organised religious party, it has gradually developed and espoused its position on Pakistan's nuclear policy. While stridently opposing Pakistan's accession to the CTBT and the NPT, its leaders have avoided discussing the nuclear issue in terms of the rights and obligations of a state that possesses an ``Islamic bomb''. Nor have they argued that the bomb would shift the international balance of power in favour of the Muslim Ummah. On the contrary, they have repeatedly raised the question of Indian accession to the arms control agreements and have linked Pakistan's participation in these agreements to the need to resolve the Kashmir issue (Muslim, 26 July 1998; Ahmed 1998; Dawn, 25 December 1999; Dawn, 28 February 2000). One could, therefore, argue that while a disjunction between the governmental and non-governmental views on Pakistan's nuclear policy does exist, it does not necessarily extend to differences on the degree to which Pakistan's nuclear bomb is Islamic. POSSIBILITIES FOR CHANGE The reluctance among both governmental and non-governmental sectors in Pakistan to share their nuclear technology with other Islamic states cannot be treated as fixed. On the contrary, technological advancement may strengthen the argument of those subscribing to the idea of ``dual deterrence''. It may also bolster the position of ``Islamists'' in Pakistani governmental circles. This is most likely to occur if Pakistan successfully tests Ghauri III. These tests would bring Tel Aviv within range of the missile. Coupled with Pakistan's nuclear capability, this would embolden those arguing that Islamabad needs to use its nuclear weapon # Asian Studies Association of Australia 2001. Is Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb an Islamic Bomb? 213 to secure a favourable deal for Muslims in the Middle East. Such an argument, however, is most likely to gain support if there is a further deterioration in Pakistan's economic performance. Pakistan's economy has been verging on bankruptcy for some time, a result of the failure of successive Pakistani regimes to address significant economic issues including agricultural reforms, taxation, industrialisation and increasing exports. Nearly 4,000 industrial units are lying idle. Foreign Direct Investment has declined from US$601.3 million in 1997±98 to US$376 million in 1998±99. Meanwhile, Pakistan's debt burden has increased to US$38 billion (Dawn, 28 May 2000; The Nation, 8 November 1999; The Nation, 14 November 1999; Ahmed 1999). The situation could be remedied by a combination of concerted domestic effort and foreign assistance. However, the reluctance of the international community to provide assistance to a military regime could mean that the downward trend will not be arrested. This would increase the level of unemployment in a country where already 25±35 per cent of the 140 million people are living below the poverty line (The Nation, 8 November 1999). Given that nearly 44 per cent of Pakistan's population is under 15 years of age (Federal Bureau of Statistics 1998, 168) and given the presence of Islamic groups, restricted access to employment opportunities could provide fertile ground for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism among the general population. This could also strengthen Islamist groups within the government who may support the notion of an independent nuclear policy and may not be averse to the idea of a government-sanctioned transfer of nuclear technology for economic reasons. This is partly attributable to the already present resentment among some decision-makers that Pakistan is expected to participate in preventing the spread of nuclear technology while itself being the target of sanctions. A more likely and indirect result of the Pakistani bomb, however, is that Iran might acquire nuclear capability. Different assessments of how committed and close Teheran is to acquiring nuclear capability abound. There is, nevertheless, consensus that Iran has not given up its arms acquisition policy. If anything, after the South Asian tests, it chose to demonstrate its ballistic missile capability by launching the intermediate range ballistic missile Shehab III in July 1998. Given that Iran's relations with Islamabad have shown signs of strain over Afghanistan, and given the continued Iranian drive for a regional role, it could be argued that Teheran may further intensify its search for nuclear weapons status. Some Pakistani scientists who sympathise with the Shiite clergy may aid it in this search. However, even if it does eventuate, the resulting Iranian bomb will be distinct from the Pakistani nuclear bomb. This, in itself, should discredit the notion of an Islamic bomb and reinforce the argument that the world is more likely to witness continued horizontal nuclear proliferation in the form of national, and not Islamic, bombs! # Asian Studies Association of Australia 2001. 214 Samina Yasmeen NOTES 1 According to some sources, Pakistan received approximately 150 tons of uranium via Libya. Interview with a senior retired Pakistani official, December 2000. 3 Senator Daniel Moynihan, the former US ambassador to India, repeatedly mentioned the danger arising from the possibility of Pakistan's bombs finding their way into the Middle East. Quoted in Najam 1998. 4 For example, the UAE President Shaikh al-Nahyan said that the Arab world was proud of Pakistan for becoming a nuclear power ``which it considers as its own strength''. The bulk of the statement, though, focused on bilateral relations between Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates. See News, 11 September 1998. 5 Interview with a senior Pakistani official, December 2000. 6 Emphasis added. 7 See, for instance, Intervention in the Conference on Disarmament by H.E. Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, Geneva, 9 March 2000. He referred to the nuclear arms race as a ``reality'' that ``would not be reversed but could be contained''. For similar ideas expressed by the Foreign Minister, Abdul Sattar, see `Sattar says no rollback of nuclear programme'. Dawn, 7 February 2000. 8 Briefing given by Pakistani officials after President Clinton's visit to Islamabad. Pakistan-India Dialogue: Proposed Framework for Agenda Item (a): Peace and Security including CBMs, Proposal by Pakistan, 16 October 1998. 9 Another analyst stated that: ``Pakistan has found itself in the ranks of the world powers, and now must think how this role is to be used . . . Policy makers must now think about their responsibilities towards the entire Middle Eastern Muslim world, towards the smaller SAARC countries, towards the Central Asian republics and even possibly in the Indian Ocean littoral . . . Pakistan is not now in a position to provide any kind of security umbrella to anyone; it is hard'' (Niazi 1998). See also Rahman 1998. 2 REFERENCES Ahmed, Sultan. 1999. National, not sectoral interests. Dawn, 11 November. Ahmed, Khurshid. 1998. 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