Social Change and Politics in Modern Syria - with special reference to the Ba‘th Party - Prof. Yoshihiro Kimura Institute of Developing Economies, Japan This book analyzes the history of about 50 years from the birth of the modern state of Syria to 1972, from the perspective of social changes and transformations in political structure. This book was originally published in Japanese in 1983, but was reprinted here in English because the characteristics of the state revealed there are extremely important in considering the challenges facing Syria today. This translation was made by the author for those who have difficulty understanding Japanese. Therefore it was created as a PDF file and will not be published. Original version was issued from Institute of Developing Economies, Japan in 1983: as registration number ISBN 4-258-06006-2 c-3031. Preface This book is an analytical and historical follow-up to the development of the Ba‘th Party, which played an important role in the process of Syria's political history after the liberation from the Ottoman Empire and the French Mandate. The Ba‘th Party was an Arab left-wing nationalist movement that was born in the late 1930s and early 1940s, centered on Damascus, Syria, and was organized around the entire Arab people. Then, from the late 1940s to the early 1950s, it spread to neighboring countries such as Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. The Ba‘th Party then developed and took power in Iraq and Syria in 1963. In Iraq, the Ba‘th was ousted from power nine months later, but returned to power about five years later. On the other hand, in Syria, the Ba‘th has been in power since 1963. However, the Ba‘th in Syria also sometimes confronted Egyptian Nasser over Arab nationalist hegemony. In dealing with this development of the Ba‘th Party, the author's main interest was to clarify the historical significance of the Ba‘th Party as a left-wing nationalist movement. In carrying out this task, the author decided to set the following basic viewing angles. 1) What kind of historical background was the Ba‘th Party born from ? What mission did the Ba‘th Party movement set ? What was the role of the Ba‘th Party throughout the colonial era under French mandate, the era of liberation from mandate, and the formation of a nationalist state after independence? 2)To Clarify the concrete process of practicing ‘unity, freedom, socialism’ which was the basis of the party's ideology. To consider this, especially from the aspects of social movements and political movements. 3)To clarify the specific internal structure of the members who were responsible for the party movement and leadership, and the content of their social origin. To clarify the characteristics of Syria, keeping in mind the comparison with neighboring countries such as Lebanon and the Iraq. 4) What was the biggest factor that allowed the party to transform into a political movement based on the social movement when creating a new national society? Was it possible to realize the mission of freeing the people from the historically defined premodern social structure and its yoke and oppression, and forming a new free and social justice-based state? 5) Was the Syrian national consciousness formed, which is the basis of the state framework of Syria? This is a problem linked to formation of the future state image. By the way, the following four types of materials were used by the author in this work. Books, chronology, newspapers, and memoirs of party members, including party publications. As books, it includes party’s publications, (1) nidal al-ba‘th , Beirut, dar al-tali'a, 1963-65, (2) nidal hizb al-Ba‘th al-'arabi al-ishtiraki 1943-1975, Damascus, 1978, (3) al-mu'tamarat al-qamiya li-hizb al- al-Ba‘th al-ishtiraki 1947-1975, Damascus, 1978, (4) Michel Aflaq, fi sabil al-Ba‘th founders of the party). And books, (a collection of speeches by Michel Aflaq, one of the (5) Shibli al-‘Aisami, hizb al-ba‘th al-'arabi al-ishtiraki, Beirut, 1980, 4th version, 2 volumes (author was a member of the party, dealing with party history from 1943 to 1958), (6) John F. Devlin, The Ba‘th Party: A History from its Origins to 1966. Stanford, 1976, ( 7) Itamar Rabinobich, Syria under the Ba‘th 1963-1966: The Army -party Symbiosis, Jerusalem, 1972, (8) Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria, London, Croom Helm, 1979, etc. Chronology are as follows: including (1) Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain, (2) Chronology of Arab Politics 1963-66, 4 volumes, Beirut, American University Press, 1964-67, (3) Middle East Record, No. 1, Volume 2, 1961, 1967, 1968, 1969-70, Jerusalem, The newspaper was only partially available to the party newspapers al-Ba‘th and althawra. The most frequently used newspaper is the Beirut daily, al-hayat. However, this newspaper was also available only from 1962 to 1973. In the memoirs of the party members, (1) Munif al-Razzaz, al-tajriba al-murra, Beirut, 1967, (2) Sami al-Jundi, al-ba‘th , Beirut, 1969, (3) Jalal al-Sayyed, hizb al-ba‘th al-'arabi, Beirut, 1973. Table of contents Chapter 1 Background of the birth of Ba‘th Chapter 2 Appearance of the Arab Ba‘th Movement Chapter 3 Ba‘th Party Ideology and Organization Chapter 4 Attempt to Unify the Arabs (1) 1) Early stages of Ba‘th Party activity (1947-49) 2) Ba‘th Party during the military junta Chapter 5 Attempt to Unify the Arabs (2) 1) Two types of deviations 2)Development of the Ba‘th Party movement Chapter 6 United Arab Republic Era 1)The formation of the United Arab Republic and the Arab liberation movement 2)United Arab Republic administration and Ba‘th Party 3) Ba‘th Party crisis 4)What the formation of the United Arab Republic has brought about Chapter 7 Reconstruction of the Ba‘th Party 1)Rebirth of reactionary regime and military 2)Reconstruction of the Ba‘th Party 3)March 8 Revolution and the military Chapter 8 Birth of the Ba‘th Party government 1)Birth of the Ba‘th Party government 2)Two Ba‘th Party 3)Military personnel and regional Command dominance 4)Battle between Hafiz and. Jadid (August 1965-February 1966) 5)February 23, 1966 Coup Chapter 9 February 23 Ba‘th Party after the coup 1) February 1966 Government and power struggle 2) Asad’s ‘Corrective Movement’ and the Future of the Ba‘th Party Conclusion Appendix: 1) List of members of the National Command 2) List of members of the Syrian Regional Command 3) List of Syrian government/ Ba‘th Party cabinets (1963-72) 4) Directory of major members of the Syrian Ba‘th Party 5) References (only the main ones) Chapter 1 Background of the birth of Ba‘th The nationalist movement in the Arab East was greatly influenced by the British and French colonial occupation of the region and the formation of a divided state. The nationalist movement in the Arab East region during the Ottoman era was based on the opposition of Arab nationalist forces to the rule of the Ottoman Empire. This composition changed to a conflict between the British and French occupation powers and the Arab nationalist powers when the Ottoman Empire collapsed. As the Arab East region was divided and states were created, it changed further, and the struggle of the occupied Arab countries against the occupation power of each country became the basis. Along with this change in composition in the Arab nationalist movement, the goals of the Arab nationalist movement have also changed. The Arab nationalist movement aimed to establish an independent unified Arab state during the Ottoman Empire and the British and French occupation. However, as the Arab East region was divided and states created, the goal of the Arab nationalist movement has shifted from a unified Arab state to a struggle for independence at each state level. Syria was at the very core of this overall framework of the Arab nationalist movement. The French mandate in Syria began in 1920. The basic conflict in Syria during this mandate was the opposition between the direct control of French imperialism and the nationalist powers. The former was composed of occupying forces, mandates, and Syrian politicians who cooperated with them, while the latter was mainly composed of rural farmers, urban workers, handicraft workers, merchants, students, teachers, and intellectuals. And the nationalist struggle during this period was led by tribal feudal and sectarian leadership. This conflict became even more intense from 1920 to 1928(1). In particular, The 1925 revolution was so intense that it allowed Syria to establish a constitutional regime after 1928 against the occupying power. The establishment of this constitutional government changed the form of struggle. With the birth of the Constitution, the President, and the Parliament, the traditional rural- based peasant mass-centered mass struggle has been transformed into a city-based urban population-centered political struggle. This meant that a shift from an impulsive, unorganized riot to an organized and ideologically equipped political action had begun(2). Thus, in the 1930s, the political struggle in Syria came to be deployed between political organizations, the National Bloc and the Federation of National Actions, represented by nationalists, and a group of politicians who were in collusion with occupying power and sought to realize its benefits. These two political organizations have set the goal of independence. The Federation of National Actions (‘usba al-amal al-qawmi) was regarded as the political successor to the Arab independence movement, which was led by Arab patriots during the late Ottoman Empire and the First World War, with Arab nationalism as the theoretical pillar. And, if anything, the Federation of National Actions was closer to an organized party, while the National Bloc (al-kutla al-wataniya) was closer to a political bloc representing the interests of a particular class(3). The most important achievement of the nationalist movement was the conclusion of the 1936 Treaty. The treaty, which came to fruition as a result of fierce and lengthy negotiations with the occupying powers, allowed Syria to be recognized as a form of state and granted autonomy. Then, a nationalist government was established by the National Bloc. However, this nationalist autonomy was unable to counter the occupying power due to the division of political leadership and the struggle for power. Also it ignored the demands of the people and, on the other hand, ceded the Alexandretta region to Turkey. This autonomous government could not protect the country, then soon ended. As a result, various national struggles disappeared, and disillusionment with political leadership spread among the people(4). Thus, in 1939, the direct control of French occupation power was revived, and World War II broke out, marking a new stage of nationalist movement. During World War II and the following five years, it fundamentally changed Syria's socio-economic structure. In particular, the increase in food demand due to the presence of the Allied Forces brought about the prosperity of the agricultural sector such as agricultural production, agricultural product marketing and food processing, and brought about the rise and development of commercial bourgeoisies and the development of large landowners. The landowners and the newly emerging commercial bourgeoisie eventually formed an alliance, but did not take public power. The power at that time was under the direct control of the occupation forces, and they devoted themselves to economic activities and accumulated wealth, which they invested into agriculture, the consumer goods industry, and the cotton textile industry. Thus, the wealth of large landowners and the development of commercial bourgeoisie have led to great economic prosperity, especially the growth of the middle class in cities. And while the number of people receiving education has increased with the sons of the middle class, on the other hand, a group of intellectuals from the lower classes has emerged. On the other hand, the British and French occupation powers mutually confirmed the independence of Syria in 1941, and an election was held in 1943 to establish a parliament. At this time, large landowners and commercial bourgeoisies alliance fought on behalf of the National Bloc. And Shukri al-Quwatli of the National Bloc was elected president. Thus, a nationalist government was born again, but on the other hand, the people's resistance to the French occupation power became more and more intense, and they refused to join the French mandate army(5). In addition, Syrian volunteers escaped from the French mandate army. Infuriated by this, France bombarded Damascus in May 1945, but finally withdrew from Syria on April 17, 1946. Consequently Syria achieved complete independence(6). Development of nationalist movement---mainly political parties--I has already pointed out the National Bloc and the Federation of National Actions as major organizations that were active in the 1930s. However, in the 1930s, another new political organization was born at the same time. These were formed around educated and intellectuals, especially from the middle class of the city, the Syrian Communist Party and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (al-hizb al-suri al-qawmi al-ijtimai). The Syrian Communist Party actively supported negotiations on the 1936 Treaty between the National Bloc and the French occupation powers. With the Leon Blum Popular Front Cabinet in power at the time, the Syrian Communist Party enthusiastically supported the conclusion of the 1936 Treaty and its alliance with France. On the other hand, the Syrian Social and Nationalist Party was greatly influenced by the prosperity of Nazism and fascism in Germany and Italy at that time in terms of ideology, organization, and political direction. By the way, the large landowners and the commercial bourgeoisie were away from political activities and devoted themselves to economic activities to accumulate money. However, the unorganized masses, educated and intellectual groups were campaigning against the British and French occupation powers. At such a time, the Syrian Communist Party and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party changed their perspectives through World War II, avoiding intervening in the composition of the conflict between occupational power and the movement of demanding an independent state against it. Their point of view was transformed into a global conflict. The former used the Soviet Union's alliance with Western nations against Germany and Italy to cooperate with the occupying powers and was incompatible with the direction of the domestic nationalist movement. Since the latter adopted fascism as an idealism, it turned the issue in Syria into a conflict between fascism and the Allied Forces. In addition to these political organizations, new political organizations have emerged. It is a movement of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-ikhwan al-muslimin). The movement emphasized the social values and traditions that have been passed down for many years and made them the basis of political and social behavior. However, the masses were dissatisfied with these political organizations and were hungry for the emergence of another new mass-based political organization. Against this historical background, the Arab Ba‘th movement was born(7). Now, in order to examine the historical significance of the birth of the Arab Ba‘th movement, I would like to outline the political parties and political organizations behind the emergence of the Arab Ba‘th movement(8). These political parties and political organizations can be broadly divided into three groups. The first was a group that takes the Arab nationalist direction, the second was a group that tries to limit the scope of the movement regionally, and the third was a religious, Marxist-Leninist group that goes beyond the scope of Arab nationalism. It was a group that takes internationalism. The first group included (A) National Group, (B) Nationalist Movement Party, and (C) Arab Nationalist Party. (A) The National Bloc is more like a political bloc than a political party, and was formed in 1929 by the notables [big landowners who participated in the independence movement during the two wars], bourgeoisie and tribal chiefs. Its member include Ibrahim Hananu (from Aleppo), Jamil Mardam Bey (from Damascus), Muhammad Fakhir al-Jabiri (from Aleppo), Sa‘dallah al-Jabiri (from Aleppo), Shukri al-Quwatli (from Damascus), Hashim al-Atassi (from Homs), Bashir al-Hawaidi (from Raqqa, tribal chief), Hasan al-Atrash (prince of the family that ruled the Druze(9)), Shaikh Hayel al-Surur (tribe chief of the Druze). The National Bloc had no clear political ideology, no organization yet, and was merely aimed at independence and seizure of power. Although the relationship of trust between the leaders and the masses was weak, they were able to take advantage of the strong public antipathy towards colonialism and lead the masses to organize national demonstrations, especially in the late 1930s. France's failure to ratify the 1936 Treaty triggered the division of the National Bloc, and by the mid-1940s it had lost its cohesiveness. With the seizure of power in 1943 and the growing attachment to the regional Syrian state, the purpose of Arab unification became a mere complaint. The 1947 election triggered a decisive division. (B) The Federation of National Actions was established on the basis of the 1933 Lebanon Conference, with members from not only Syria but also other regions. The Federation defined Arab as "everyone who speaks Arabic in everyday life" and treated the Arab affairs as a whole, with the basic task of restoring Arab sovereignty, independence and unification of the Arabs. The founders included Amir Ahmad al-Shihabi (from Deir ezZor, born in 1905, later became a deputy), Ahmad al-Sharabati (from Damascus, born in 1909, merchant and industrialist, became a deputy since the 1940s, in 1943 became Minister), Makram al-Atassi (from Homs, lawyer, became General Secretary in 1936). As a member there were Fahmi al-Mahayri (from Damascus, born in 1902, lawyer), Abd al-Karim al-Dandashi (from Damascus, born in 1917, high school teacher, later worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Dr. Zaki al-Jabri (born in Damascus, later became Minister to Italy and Jeddah). The party was based on young intellectuals, mainly lawyers. Headquartered in Damascus, with branches in Baghdad and Palestine. It split in the late 1940s. (C) The Arab Nationalist Party was a secret organization formed by the gathering of young people and intellectuals from all over the Arab East region. Members have not been revealed, but names such as Deris al-Maqdadi, Sa‘id al-Hajj Jhabit, and Munir alRayyis (born in 1901 in Damascus, Journalist) have been seen. Some members participated in the 1941 Rashid ‘Ali al-Kailani (or al-Gaylani) coup in Iraq. A member of the party, Yunis al-Saba‘awi, was the Minister of Economy of the Rashid ‘Ali cabinet and a judge of the Baghdad Military Court. Other members also formed a group later known as the ‘Arab Nationalist.’ The Arab nationalist group had a slogan of ‘unification, liberation, retaliation.’ The second group consisted of (D) Syrian Nationalist Party and (E) Youth Party. (D) The Syrian Nationalist Party was founded by Antun Sa‘adah in Lebanon in November 1932 and was active in the late 1930s. The number of members expanded mainly in Lebanon and Syria, and in 1936, the number of military personnel in the Lebanese mountainous region alone reached 3,000. It is said that the number of members reached 50,000 in 1938. After being banned in Lebanon in 1949, its headquarters was moved to Damascus. There were Issam al-Mahayri (from Damascus, secretary general), Badi‘ Isma‘il (from Tartus), George ‘Abd al- Masih, Ibrahim Shawqi (from Hama) and others. It has a regionalist ideology and is based on the principle of Syria. The party's advocacy of ‘Syria’ was considered in geographical units, including Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine. Moreover, it did not consider language as the main distinctive mark of the nationalist movement. The party argued that Syria belonged to the Syrians, that the Syrian problem was that of the Syrian people, and that the Syrian state was a unity of the Syrian people. Also, it considered religion and nation separately. Strongly influenced by Nazism and fascism, the party insisted that the party's organization be centralized and hierarchical, while at the same time preparing a strong army. (E) The Youth Party was a political organization formed by a group of youth intellectual groups centered around Hama in central Syria. Thoughtfully, it set out an Arab progressive tendency, but its actual actions were limited to Hama. This organization throughout the 1940s, did not penetrate throughout Syria. The party mobilized farmers of Hama to counter the large local landowners. In the 1943 election, leader Akram al- Hawrani ran and was elected. The third group is (F) Syrian Communist Party and (G) Muslim Brotherhood. (F) The Syrian Communist Party was founded in 1924 and actually existed in the early 1930s. It has been openly active since about 1937-39 and spread in Syria and Lebanon in the 1940s, with Marxism-Leninism as the ideological foundation and a solid organization. On the Alexandretta issue, the party supported France with the pretext of democratic defense against fascism and gained friendship with Turkey. It also supported the Palestinian partition plan and often cooperated with the bourgeoisie reactionary regime. The center of members was a group of intellectuals, such as Khalid Bakdash (leader), Rashid al-‘Isa (lawyer), Naja‘ Qassab Hasan (lawyer). (G) Muslim Brotherhood: Started activities in the early 1930s and became apparent in the mid-30s. Initially active mainly in Aleppo in the north, then it became known throughout Syria in the mid-1940s. Major members include Mustafa al-Siba‘i (from Homs, professor of Islamic law, later became a deputy), Muhammad al-Mubarak (from Damascus, teacher of Islamic law, literature, later became a deputy), Mustafa al-Zarqa‘ (professor of Islamic law and civil law at Damascus University, later became Minister of Justice), ‘Arif alTarqji (from Damascus, doctor of law and medicine, later became a deputy). The party argued that the cause of the backwardness and corruption of society lies in the inability of Arabs and Muslims to clearly understand the purpose of religion, and that individuals, families and societies must be continuously reformed. Furthermore, it advocated the struggle against imperialism and the unification of Arabs and Muslims [the Arab, which is geographically, historically, and culturally one, must be politically unified under the guarantee of the Muslim Brotherhood, to establish a great Arab nation]. The idea of democracy and socialism was rejected because it was unacceptable due to the nature of religion and was also incompatible with Islamic interests. Now, the Arab Ba‘th movement was born against the background of the history of the practice of political struggles of various political organizations as we have seen above. The movement was not armed with established struggle theory from the beginning. With the Arab independence movement and the attempt to unify the Arabs as heritage, it started from an objective analysis of the independence struggle movement that has been unfolding in the region in Syria since the occupation of France. It goes without saying that in the process, it was closely linked to the historical heritage and socialist idealism of the world. From this analysis, the Arab Ba‘th movement extracted the concept of ‘ethnic/national’ from the Arab Independence movement and attempts at Arab unity, and the concept of ‘national mass struggle’ from attempts at independence struggle in Syria. Furthermore, extracted the concept of ‘socialism’ from the historical heritage of the world(10). Moreover, it can be said that the movement actively established its own theory of struggle by analyzing the Arab reality and has been actively pursuing the practical and ideal form of such a struggle against all forces that prevent the liberation and development and national unity of the Arab masses. The Arab Ba‘th movement has its ideological foundations from its historical heritage. But in this process the movement faced basically three different directions. These different directions were the result of the gradual historical situation that Arab society has undergone. In the context of political organizations, it was found in the Syrian Communist Party, the Syrian Nationalist Party, and the Muslim Brotherhood. The directional differences between the Arab Ba‘th movement and these political organizations can be summarized as follows(11). 1)The Communist Party of Syria advocated internationalism, which ignores the importance of the struggle for independence of the occupied nations to fight colonialism and imperialism, and makes it serve a gradual political strategy. The Arab Ba‘th movement, on the other hand, argued that the struggle for national unity of the occupied nations was just a struggle against imperialism, which benefited from colonialism and its regional division policies. The Arab Ba‘th movement considered that the realization of this Arab unity was one of the basic preconditions for the socialist construction of Arab society. According to their idea there is an organic link between the process of national unity of the Arab masses and the process of socialist construction, and they thought that the two objectives were closely linked in the same historical process. Therefore, the Arab Ba‘th movement opposed internationalism. 2)The Syrian Nationalist Party advocated regional Pan-Syrian idea and considered the establishment of ‘a large state’ covering Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine based on geographical units. On the other hand, the Arab Ba‘th movement attached great importance to language, culture and history. They considered the Arab as a person who speaks Arabic and lives or wants to live in Arab lands, and believes to be a member of the Arab community. The movement considered the existence base of this Arab community as the Arab hometown. Therefore, its geographical extent went far beyond the Syrian Nationalist Party's movement base, Greater Syria, and included the Arabian Peninsula and Maghreb countries. In other words, while the Syrian Nationalist Party advocated it as a basic regional Pan-Syrian principle, the Arab Ba‘th movement emphasized the need to develop a vibrant struggle against colonialism and imperialism, on the basis of the Arab people, who were once the historic existence that supported civilization 3)The third difference was found in the Muslim Brotherhood. They showed a conservative attitude to the challenges of Western civilization, the ideological, cultural and political attacks of Western civilization on Arab society, without any positive response. The Arab Ba‘th movement, on the other hand, seeks to counter the challenges of Western civilization by discovering new values from the great historical past and heritage of Arab society and attempting new understandings of them. In short, the Arab Ba‘th movement is trying to rethink the history of Arab Islam from the perspective of Arab nationalism. The conservative attitude of the Muslim Brotherhood is being used as a tool for domestic capitalists who were trying to hit the progressive political direction. Furthermore, it is supposed to infiltrate the roots of sectarianism and help invade colonialism. In this way, the Arab Ba‘th movement has emerged to reexamine the movement of Arab society and reconsider it in the historical context of Arab. That is, it was a movement that emerged to reorient the issues of national liberation, development, and unity within the overall framework of the Arab national liberation movement, especially in the Syrian national liberation movement(12). Notes chapter one Background of the birth of Ba‘th (1) For details during this period, see, for example, Dr. Mohi al-Din al-Safrjalabi, tarikh al-thawra al-suriya, Damascus,1961. (2) al-qiyada al-qawmiya, nidal hizb al-Ba‘th al-’ arabi al-ishtiraki 1943-1975, Damascus, 1978, (hereinafter abbreviated as nidal hizb), p. 8 (3) Ibid., p.18. (4) Regarding the political process of Syria from French occupation to withdrawal, for example, there is Najib al-Armanaji, suriya min al-ihtilal hatta al-jala‘. (5) nidal hizb, pp.16-17. (6) Ibid., pp. 17-18. (7) Ibid., pp. 14-15. (8) About political parties in Syria, see Dar al-Ruwwad (ed.), al-ahzab al-siyasiya fi suriya, Damascus, 1954. (9) Syrian denominational minorities include the Ismaili faction, the Druze faction, and the Alawite faction. Of these, the Druze and Alawites are both trying to isolate themselves from their surroundings and maintain their characteristics. Both factions have very different religious systems from Sunnis and Shiites, and they also have their own customs, each forming its own community. Until Syria became independent, they even had their own autonomy. It was not until the early 1940s that their communities were integrated into the framework of the current Syrian state. (10) nidal hizb, p. 12. (11) Ibid., pp. 12-14. (12) Ibid., p. 14. Chapter 2 Appearance of the Arab Ba‘th Movement The origin of the Arab Ba‘th can be found in the Arab nationalist activities of Michel Aflaq, a Greek Orthodox from Damascus, Salah al-Din al-Bitar, a Sunni Muslim, and Zaki al-Arusuzi, an Arab from Alexandretta. All three have a background of studying at the Sorbonne University in France and later working as faculty members in Syria. However, as for the stage of the three persons’ teaching and political activities in Syria, Aflaq and Bitar were centered on Damascus, while Arusuzi was centered on the northern part of Alexandretta and Deir ez-Zor. And the three persons rarely acted together. Arusuzi was more engaged in politics than Aflaq and Bitar. He was a member of the Federation of National Actions and was in command of the national movement as a spokesman for the Antakya branch, Alexandretta [now the Republic of Hatay, where Turkish law is enforced and Turkish currency is in circulation. Here was under the French delegation from 1921 to 1939]. In June 1937, he held an Arab conference, gathering Arabs, Armenians, Kurds, and Circassians from many cities in Alexandretta, but at the end of the year he was arrested for inciting the turmoil caused by the Arabs and Turks collision. In July 1938, an election for the Alexandretta Parliament was held in collaboration with the Turkish government and the French Mandate, with Turkish occupying a large number of seats. Alexandretta was renamed the Republic of Hatay, and the Turks were elected chairman of the Republic's parliament and head of the republic. Arusuzi was disappointed with this situation and left Alexandretta. He left the Federation of National Actions with his supporters(1). He then moved to Damascus, where he resumed his political activities. The Syrian Nationalist Party and the Arab Ba‘th movement were very similar in their purpose, but different in their composition. The former, like the latter, treated the Arab issue as a whole without dividing it, and aimed to realize the unification of the Arabs. Also, as mentioned above, the Arabs were referred to as ‘all Arabic-speaking people’, and Maghreb was also included in the Arab community. On the other hand, the difference was that the former was an organization created from above with people and intellectuals with relatively high social status at the center, while the latter was an organization created from below with students at the center. The rationale for considering the Arab Ba‘th movement as ‘a legacy of the Federation of National Actions(2) ’ and ‘the origin of the Arab Ba‘th is the Federation of National Actions(3)’ is exactly based on the ideological similarity between the Federation of National Actions and the Arab Ba‘th movement and also can be sought in connection of Arusuzi with the Federation of National Actions. The movement that seems to be the core of the Arab Ba‘th movement has already appeared since about 1939. According to Sami al-Jundi(4), in 1939, when he was still a student in Aleppo, a meeting was held in Damascus, worried about the political void at the time and advocating the need for a new movement. The meeting was attended by Michel Qauzuma, Zaki al-Arusuzi, Michel Aflaq, Salah al-Din al-Bitar, Shakir al-‘As(5), and Ilyas Qandalfat. The meeting resolved to create a new organization, but it was never held again. Separately, the Arab Nationalist Party (al-hizb al-qawmi al-‘arabi ) was established by Arusuzi in early 1939(6). This party listed three principles: 1) Arab is a nation, and 2) the need for leaders who can bring out the potential of the Arab people, and 3) 'uruba, the Arab national sentiment. Moreover, for these principles, it is necessary to go back to the past history, stop the rebellion against the ideas and customs inherited by society, and on the contrary, return to the historical origin in order to build a free and new civilized society. However, this movement was also suspended after Arusuzi was assigned to Iraq as a teacher in 1939-40(7). On November 29, 1940, the growing passion for establishing a party led to another meeting. This meeting was held in a boarding house of Abd al-Halim Qaddur(8), who was a student of the Faculty of Law at Damascus University at the time. At this meeting, after Arusuzi, who had already returned from Iraq, gave a lecture on ‘democracy, communism, and Nazism,’ the party was resolved and the Arab Ba‘th Party (hizb al-ba‘th al-‘arabi) was born(9). The party was divided into a political department and a cultural department, with Abd al-Halim Qaddur in charge of the former, Yahiya al-Suqi in charge of the latter, and Sami al-Jundi in charge of finance. The members of this party were mainly students, with the exception of Sami al-Jundi and Muhsin Shishakli, the other members being students of Aflaq and Bitar(10). The members joined the resistance movement with the people on June 8, 1941, against the British siege of Damascus. At this time, three party members were arrested, but others fled. The party's activities resumed in 1942, but when Arusuzi withdrew from political activity in 1944 when his mother died of illness, the party virtually ended. And the members of the Arusuzi group joined Ba‘th movement led by Aflaq(11). However, their personal bond with Arusuzi still continued. The representative person is his beloved disciple Wahib al-Ghanim. He praised the Ba‘th Party youth for their work when France attacked Damascus in May 1945, and with his colleagues telegraphed from Latakia to Damascus and indicated their intention to cooperate with the Ba‘th Party. The following year, Aflaq and Dr. Kamal Musharaqa toured Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Latakia, and met with young people in Latakia who were under the influence of Arusuzi. About 10 of them attended the 1947 Ba‘th Party founding convention(12). Wahib al-Ghanim was one of them, and he led a force coming out of Arusuzi faction. He also became a member of the party executive committee. Apart from this movement, Aflaq and Bitar formed the Arab Revival movement (haraka al-ihya‘ al-‘arabi, hereinafter abbreviated as the Ihya‘ movement)(13). The movement emerged after issuing a statement in 1941 and criticizing the National Bloc leader Shukri al-Quwatli. Thus, in 1941 there were two similar movements, the Arab Ba‘th Party under Arusuzi and the Ihya‘ movement under Aflaq and Bitar. The Ihya‘ movement issued a statement in February of the same year, accusing the government of its weakness over French Mandate. In May of the same year, Rashid Ali’s coup in Iraq brought the Ihya‘ movement to the stage of activity. The Ihya‘ movement distributed a statement in support of Rashid ‘Ali’s coup, but went beyond that, urging citizens to join the Iraq support movement as volunteers. With this as an opportunity, the Ihya‘ movement has come to have many meetings to clarify the idea of ‘unification’ and discuss the importance of ‘Arab unification’(14). The Arab Ba‘th Party and the Ihya‘ movement, which originally had the same spirit, emerged separately as actual forms of movement(15). It is not clear why they have emerged as two movements, based on the same spirit. It is also unclear which of Arusuzi and Aflaq first clarified the idea and meaning of Arab nationalism based on ba‘th or ihya‘. According to Muta‘ Safadi(16), ‘Aflaq is not the original (of this idea). He imitated Arusuzi's idea’. According to Sami al-Jundi, in 1941 when Arusuzi read an Arab Ba‘th -signed statement brought to him by a friend of Sami al-Jundi, he said that ‘An imperialist conspiracy has begun. This is an attempt to break the bond between us and the people by a movement that uses exactly the same name as ours.(17)’ Arusuzi added that reading this statement reveals that the method is exactly the same as ours(18). Also Jalal al-Sayyed said: ‘Arusuzi has been repeating the word Ba‘th many times since he was a teacher at Deir ez-Zor, and he plans to establish a party of this name,. ..... (omitted) ... However, these are all just a stage of thinking, and Arusuzi ... (omitted) ... didn't make a practical first step towards establishing a political party’.(19) Arusuzi went to Deir ez-Zor in 1933(20). If we compare this fact, the description of Jalal al-Sayyed, and Arusuzi's statement [‘I had planned a party named Ba‘th before joining the Federation of National Actions, but I abandoned this plan and joined the Federation of National Actions to cooperate with our Arab compatriots in Syria and other Arab regions’.(21)] (which were stated by Khalil Ahmad), it seems that the idea of Ba‘th was not Arusuzi's(22). However, given their commonalities, such as being educated in France, fighting the occupation of France, and being based on Arabism, it can be considered that their ideas influenced each other to some extent. The Ihya‘ movement led by Aflaq and Bitar then spawned the core of what is now the Ba‘th Party, with Jalal al-Sayyed (from a notable of Deir ez-Zor) and Midhat al-Bitar (doctor) joining as leaders(23). However, the word ‘party’ was added and the name Arab Ba‘th Party began to be used in the statement from 1945(24). And it wasn't until 1947 that the party officially started as a political party. The Ihya‘ movement began registering for members in 1941. The number of members was only about 25 in the first two years. Since 1943, the number of members has increased significantly due to organizational activities. In 1944, the number of high school students alone reached 45. Most of them were from rural areas. A membership card (about 7x11 cm) was issued to the members(25). As mentioned earlier, when a strike against French occupation power took place in early 1941, a statement was issued in the name of Arab Ihya‘ (al-Ihya‘ al-‘arabi). During the Rashid ‘Ali coup in May, the movement organized the ‘Iraq Support Movement’. In 1943, the name Arab Ba‘th (al-ba'th al-‘arabi) was established(26). In 1943, the slogan of ‘unification’, ‘freedom’, and ‘a single Arab nation with an eternal mission’ emerged. And since this year, party rallies have been repeated. From this, it is possible to think that 1943 was the birth of the Ba‘th Party. ‘Socialist’ was added to the name of the party after the merger with the Arab Socialist Party, led by Akram al-Hawrani, on November 13, 1952. A newsletter was published to members from April 1945(27). This newsletter has been published since 1949 as the ‘Arab Ba‘th Struggle’ (nidal al-ba‘th al-‘arabi). The first secretariat of Ba‘th Party(28) was located in the Qanawat quarter in 1945, behind the Adly Palace (now the Supreme Court) in Damascus. However, the Ba‘th Party was not legally allowed to set up an office. Despite repeated applications, it was not until the Adib al-Shishakli dictatorship collapsed in 1954 that the government approved the establishment of a Ba‘th Party office. The party newspaper ‘Arab Ba‘th’ has been applying for issuance permission since 1943. However, the government did not give consent to this. The issuance of the party newspaper was officially approved in July 1946, after the withdrawal of the French Occupation Forces was completed. Moreover, it was a condition that the name of the party was not used in the name of the party newspaper(29). The party's organization in the early 1940s was still in its infancy and extremely vulnerable. Even after the name Arab Ba‘th Party came into use in 1945, the Arab Ba‘th Secretariat was occasionally used to sign the statement's issuance officer. Furthermore, the names of Aflaq and Bitar were sometimes listed alone or jointly under the Arab Ba‘th Party and the Arab Ba‘th Secretariat. At that time, the members wanted the name ‘movement (haraka)’ rather than ‘party(hizb)’ to distinguish themselves from the existing conservative parties. Also in July 1945, the executive committee was formed as the parent body to command the Ba‘th Party. It was composed of Aflaq, Bitar, and Midhat al-Bitar. However, this was not yet officially decided at the party convention and appointed by election. The executive committee soon became four members, including Jalal al-Sayyed. The Ba‘th Party, which is based on a democratic direction and a collective system, continued the collective system of these four members until the party establishment convention in 1947. until the party establishment convention Now let's look at the political struggle of the Arab Ba‘th movement, from the 1941 Rashid ‘Ali coup to the Ba‘th Party founding convention. After the failure of the Rashid ‘Ali coup, British and free French troops occupied Syria and Lebanon in June to prevent German invasion in the Middle East. However, since then, a conflict has emerged between Britain and France over control over Lebanon and Syria. The nationalist movement sought to take advantage of the conflict between the two. Eventually, France declared to establish a republic in Syria in September, on the one hand, to crush the ‘the Fertile Crescent’ plan advocated by Nuri al-Sa‘id, backed by Britain, and on the other hand, to soften the nationalist movement. However, nationalists were infuriated as France granted the High Commissioner the right to appoint the head of state of Syria. Thus, the main question for Syria in 1942 was how to create a government that would be accepted by nationalists. During the year, the political and organizational activities of the Arab Ba‘th movement were stagnant, but ideological and political meetings continued. At the end of the year, when Aflaq and Bitar left their teaching profession and focused on political activity, the Arab Ba‘th movement began again. In 1943, the struggle between France and nationalists intensified as France banned free elections and sought to prevent the independence of Syria and Lebanon. And France eventually had to agree to hold an election in May. In June, nationalists and politicians held a meeting to review the political situation. Aflaq and Bitar attended the meeting and issued a statement after the meeting was over. In this statement, they supported Shukri alQuwatli, the leader of the National Bloc, and praised his leadership and integrity(30). Shortly after this, confusion arose within the Arab Ba‘th movement, with some questioning the attitudes of Aflaq and Bitar. And some people suspected that both attitudes might have a desire to enter the cabinet or become a member of the Diet. For this reason, Aflaq and Bitar had to issue a statement to justify the motives behind the earlier statement. In this statement, they both argued: Indeed, when nationalist forces are united to face such a political situation, we cannot be neutral or on the sidelines. With the support of the Arab Ba‘th movement, Quwatli will be forced to remove opportunistic figures and old political tools. And it will purify the traditional political movements of the past. On the contrary, support for Quwatli does not prevent the public from exerting political pressure(31). For members who have considered setting up a fierce political struggle without showing tolerance or reconciliation to the regime group, this statement in favor of Quwatli, praising him and calling for cooperation with the nationalist movement, must have been extremely shocking. If the Arab Ba‘th movement at that time had a large number of members and the trust between the leaders and the members was not strong, there must have been a division between the members. However, the movement was still in its infancy, with a small number of members and a strong personal bond between them and the leadership, so no new direction of division emerged. After that the leaders were even able to come up with the following policies regarding political activity: 1) The Arab Ba‘th movement is not just an idealistic movement that escapes from reality. Rather, it is a movement to direct and transform reality. 2) Running for Congress does not violate our ideology and does not violate the principles of our movement. On the contrary, this is rather an effective means of achieving the objectives of our movement. 3) Allow reconciliation with the opponents of the struggle. Furthermore, if absolutely necessary, it is possible to form a united front with this(32). In this way, by emphasizing understanding reality and the need for change in reality, and by insisting that it draws the movement from the level of ideological theory to the level of real life, the leaders succeeded in convincing the members. In July 1943 an election was held. Aflaq ran for this. This was the first time the Ba‘th Party participated in the election campaign. Aflaq's run was not to win a seat in parliament, but to publicize the purpose and principles of the Arab Ba‘th movement and to reach as close contact with the masses as possible(33). The election was a great opportunity for the Arab Ba‘th movement to make the public aware of its existence. Aflaq lost in this election, which was an expected result. The Arab Ba‘th movement at the time was still vulnerable and could not counter the violent attacks from government groups and reactionary groups. Since then, the Arab Ba‘th movement has been forced to articulate their ideas and principles rather than political activity. However, the confrontation between the Arab Ba‘th movement and the National Bloc, which was ruling party, continued. The movement exposed the reactionary attitude of the National Bloc. In particular, the National Bloc’s weak attitude towards French occupation power has led to bribery, corruption and favoritism. The public was angry at such a political situation, and a student-centered demonstration took place. The government reshuffled the cabinet in an attempt to mitigate the anger of these people, but it had no effect. And in the end, the government had to resort to the hard means of repression. Of these opposition movements, the Arab Ba‘th movement was the toughest. The incident in Lebanon in November 1943 was a great stimulus to the Arab Ba‘th movement. France tried to amend the Constitution, which is the basis of Lebanon's independence, and then arrested the heads of state and ministers and dissolved the parliament. In response, the Arab Ba‘th movement issued a protest statement condemning France's attack on Lebanon's independence. At the same time, the Arab Ba‘th movement warned the Syrian people and authorities that a deceptive and time-consuming attitude of France toward independence negotiations would not have any positive consequences for us(34). The Lebanese issue was also that of the Arabs as a whole, especially of Syria. Therefore, Lebanon must be supported at the national and government levels, the Arab Ba‘th movement argued. The Arab Ba‘th movement sought to embody the idea of Arab unification and raise public awareness of ethnic issues through practical activities in support of Lebanon. In 1944, there was growing interest in Palestine in the Arab Ba‘th movement. Earlier this year, Republicans and Democrats passed a resolution in the United States allowing Jews to move to Palestine. In response, Aflaq sent a letter of protest to the Permanent Mission to the United States in Syria in August, threatening that such a policy could undermine friendly relations between the United States and the Arabs(35). In 1945, the biggest challenge for the Arab Ba‘th movement (hereinafter referred to as the Ba‘th Party) was the issue of freedom. Ba‘th Party leaders were arrested for clashing with authorities on this issue. The Party also fought to protect Syria's independence against France's attacks on Damascus and other cities. In February of the same year, the Ba‘th Party issued a statement accusing the government of its weakness against the French occupation forces. In addition, it argued that the government should be represented not only by the National Bloc, but by the forces of the people, and that freedom should be guaranteed on the basis of the Constitution(36). In response to this statement, the government arrested one of the Ba‘th Party leaders, Bitar, and detained him for a week. The Ba‘th Party protested this and issued a more intense statement on March 8, and in that, criticized as follows. 1) Government corruption, hypocrisy of government officials, and dictatorship of Shukri al-Quwatli are underway, which will further strengthen the dominance and exploitation of the National Bloc. 2) Shukri al-Quwatli plans to collaborate with King Sa‘ud and King Faruq. And with the excuse of maintaining independence and republic, and even with the excuse of implementing complete unification, he is trying to reject currently feasible attempts at unification. When such a statement criticizing Quwatli was distributed, the government arrested Bitar again. He was then banished to the northeastern village of Mayadin (now Turkish territory). The Ba‘th Party held a large-scale demonstration in protest of the expulsion of Bitar. Among them, the demonstrations in Damascus were intense, calling for the overthrow of the Shukri al-Quwatli administration and demanding respect for the Constitution and protection of freedom(37). This demonstration was a huge success. The Ba‘th Party's power and organizational power have reached the stage where it can make various demands, and the people have begun to participate in support movement against the worsening political situation in response to organized forces and anti-government activities. That was a big harvest. The Ba‘th Party's attack against the government was not limited to demonstrations, but also protests by telegrams and statements. In 1945 there was another big problem. The formation of the Arab League, the clash with the Syrian Communist Party, and the invasion of France. The Arab League was formed at the end of March. The Ba‘th Party expressed its opposition to this in April the following year. According to the Ba‘th Party, the Arab League was created on the premise that the Arab people were divided into nations by Britain and France, and its foundation was fragile. In other words, the Arab League was a coalition of sovereign states formed by the division of the Arab people. The Arab League consisted of seven Arab countries, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, and disregarded Maghreb countries. The League also ignored the Palestinian issue and the illegal occupation of Alexandretta(38). These points were basically in opposition to the direction of the Ba‘th Party, which was trying to establish a unified nation by including the Arab people. The Ba‘th Party’s opposition against the establishment of Arab League was further expressed in a December statement. In this statement the Ba‘th Party stated that the Arab League is vulnerable in two respects :“1) Most of the members of the Arab League are governments linked with the United Kingdom by treaty. Therefore, this restricts the freedom of activities to carry out for the national interests of the Arab people, 2) This federation is made up of representatives of a group of government who are hindering the aspirations of the Arab people, peace and unity.(39)" The Arab League was thus a coalition formed by a group of Arab reactionaries centered on Egypt against the backdrop of Britain's Middle East policy. And this had a great impact on Nuri al-Sa‘id’s ‘the Fertile Crescent’ plan (1942) and the Ba‘th Party's idea of a unified Arab state. There was a fierce clash with the Syrian Communist Party. The Syrian Communist Party supported the Allies and cooperated with the domestic reactionary government, using the pretext of defending democracy against fascism and Nazism. This attitude of the Syrian Communist Party was unacceptable to the Ba‘th Party. Syrian Communists marched with a photo of De Gaulle and Stalin at the demonstration(40). After the May Day celebration on May 1, the Syrian Communist Party attacked a group of opponents, whose brunt was directed at Ba‘th members. This clash became a bloody disaster. In response, the Ba‘th Party issued a statement on the 11th of the same month accusing the Syrian Communist Party of being a pillar of shu‘ubiya (41)and a foreign propaganda agency(42). After World War II, France struggled to meet the demands of the Syrian nationalist movement using protracted tactics. For example, it postponed the transfer of the French Mandate army for Syria and the granting of full power to national power. In response to this attitude of France, the Ba‘th Party issued a statement on May 16 urging that it should take a resolute attitude toward France(43) and also that unproductive negotiations should be cut off, as independence should be acquired by oneself and not given by others. The Ba‘th Party also called for a demonstration when the new French national team arrived in Syria. On the other hand, the relations between the nationalist government and France have also become clear signs of conflict. On May 20, the Ba‘th Party issued yet another statement. It stated that we would only support the government in the ethnic struggle against foreign aggression(44). The Ba‘th Party began to mobilize national forces to protect Syria's freedom and independence. On May 29, when French troops attacked Damascus and other cities, Ba‘th members fought with the people. This battle was the first armed struggle for the Ba‘th Party. The Ba‘th Party movement on May 29, 1945 was centered around students, intellectuals, and freelance professionals, and its activities were mostly limited to Damascus. The period from the May 29th resistance to the first Ba‘th Party convention in April 1947 was the most fulfilling period of the Ba‘th Party's political struggle. At the domestic level, it demanded complete independence and withdrawal of the occupation forces, establishment of a constitutional system, and establishment of a democratic life including establishment of political parties and freedom to publish newspapers. At the Arab level, it criticized the Arab League and supported Palestinians in the Palestinian affairs. The political struggle of the Ba‘th Party in1946 focused on ethnic issues in the first half and freedom issues in the second half. From February to March, there were fierce demonstrations in Egypt demanding complete independence and the withdrawal of British troops(45). The Ba‘th Party seized this opportunity to issue a statement, accusing Britain of its policy as an enemy not only to Egypt but to the Arabs as a whole. On March 22, the British-Jordan Treaty was announced. In response, the Ba‘th Party has instigated mass protests and warned that Britain is trying to violate the Arab people's right to independence and unity(46). The Ba‘th Party thought that the treaty would disrupt Jordan's independence, threaten the independence of neighboring Arab countries, and make Arab unification impossible, while at the same time it would fulfill Jewish demands in Palestine. In April, the US-UK Commission on the Palestinian Issue reported allowing 100,000 Jews to move to Palestine. When the commission visited Palestine in May, the Ba‘th Party organized a strike in protest of the commission(47). In late 1946, political struggle of the Ba‘th Party shifted its focus to domestic issues. On April 17, the withdrawal of French troops achieved complete independence of Syria. The most important task for Syria after independence was to protect its Constitution and freedom. In this regard, the revision of Decree No. 50 and the Election Act was the biggest issue. Decree No. 50 gives the Minister of Interior the right to dissolve unions and political parties and to close publishers and newspapers. The Ba‘th Party sought to organize a popular demonstration by campaigning against the decree and working with other forces and politicians to create a ‘front to protect the Constitution and freedom’.(48) The movement requested to 1) create a government that respects the Constitution, 2) remove restrictions on newspapers, 3) recognize the right to rally and form political parties, and 4) hold free elections, etc.. After the fierce struggle, the Constitutional Commission of Parliament confirmed that Decree No.50 was unconstitutional and decided to abandon it. The next challenge for the Ba‘th Party to win the battle was to amend the election law. However, this amendment to the Election Act was not implemented until mid-1947. Notes chapter 2 Appearance of the Arab Ba‘th Movement (1) The Federation of National Actions was hit hard in the 1930s. The first was the death of Abd al-Razzaq al-Dandashi, one of the founders and general secretary. The next general secretary, Sabri al-Asali, was also the founder of the federation, but he registered with the National Bloc in the 1936 election and was elected a member of parliament. The final blow was the withdrawal of Arusuzi in 1938. After that, with the start of World War II, the activities of this federation were almost stopped. (2) Sami al-Jundi, al-ba‘th, Beirut, 1969. p. 20 (hereinafter abbreviated as Sami al-Jundi) (3) Philippe Ronde, La Syrie, que sais-je ?, No. 1704,1978, p. 51. (4) Sami al-Jundi, p. 21. (5) Born in Damascus. He was the president of a canning factory. He also carried out industrial projects. He later joined the People's Party. He was elected a member of the Diet from Golan in 1949. He became Minister of Economy (since June 1950) and Minister of Finance (September 1950-March 1951). (6) Sami al-Jundi, p .21. It is not clear to date whether this party was the same as the party of the same name mentioned above. Probably another organization. (7) Sami al-Jundi, p.25. (8) Born in Latakia, later became a lawyer. Was he an Alawi? (9) Sami al-Jundi, p. 26. ; Khalil al-Ahmad, Zaki al-Arusuzi, Damascus, 1978. pp. 73-76. also described the establishment of the Arab Ba‘th Party by Arusuzi. Also Salim Barakat, al-fikra al-qawmi wa asashu al-filsafiya ‘and al-Arusuzi, Damascus, 197778, p.30. stated that Arusuzi has decided to establish the Arab Ba‘th Party. (10) Sami al-Jundi, p. 31. (11) Ibid., p. 32. and Jalal al-Sayyed, hizb al-ba‘th al-arabi, Beirut, 1973, (hereafter, abbreviated as Jalal al-Sayyed), p.19. (12) Shibli al-'Aisami, hizb al-ba'th al-arabi al-ishtiraki, Beirut, 1980 (4th edition), volume 1, (hereinafter abbreviated as Shibli al-'Aisami), p.78. (13) Both ba'th and ihya' mean "revival", but while the former has an emphasis on "reviving ", in the latter there is an emphasis on "provides life or vitality", that’s "blowing". (14) Shibli al-'Aisami, p.21. (15) Ibid., p. 31. (16) Muta‘ Safadi, hizb al-ba’th, ma’sat al-mawlid, ma’sat al-nihaya, Beirut, 1964, p. 66. (17) Sami al-Jundi, pp. 30-31. (18) Ibid., p. 31. (19) Jalal al-Sayyed, p. 19. (20) Salim Barakat, op. cit., P. 22. (21) Khalil al-Ahmad, op. cit., P. 65. (22) I still can't find out if there was a description of Aflaq in this regard. Note that according to Khalil al-Ahmad, op. cit., p. 82, Arusuzi's Arab Ba‘th Party published a weekly bulletin called " Ba‘th " (23) Shibli al-'Aisami, p. 73. (24) Same as above, same page. (25) Ibid., P. 71. (26) Ibid., same page. According to Sami al-Jundi, Aflaq and his group already used this name in 1941. It is unclear if it was only once or if it was used continuously thereafter. (See Note 17) (27) Shibli al-'Aisami, p. 72. The title of the first newsletter was "Our View of the Arab League". (28) By this time, Arusuzi's Arab Ba‘th Party seems to have stopped working, while Aflaq's Ihya‘ used the name of ‘Arab Ba‘th’. Therefore, instead of this Ihya‘ movement’, I will use the name ‘Ba‘th Party’ for the time being. (29) Shibli al-'Aisami, p. 72. (30) Ibid., p. 22. (31) nidal al-ba‘th, Beirut, dar al-tali’ah, 1963, volume 1 pp. 28-30. (hereafter, abbreviated as nidal al-ba‘th) (32) Shibli al-'Aisami, p. 24. (33) Ibid., p. 25, and nidal al-ba‘th, vol 1, p. 33. (34) Shibli al-'Aisami, p. 27. (35) Ibid., P. 29. (36) Ibid., P. 30. (37) Ibid., pp. 30-31. (38) Ibid., pp. 31-32. (39) Ibid., P. 32. (40) Ibid., pp. 32-33 .; nidal hizb, p. 13. (41) shu'ubiya is an idea that opposes the Arab dominance of non-Arabs that spread throughout the early Islamic empire. The basis was that "those who believe in Islam and speak Arabic are equal regardless of ethnicity." (42) Shibli al-'Aisami, p. 33. (43) Ibid., P. 33. (44) Ibid., P. 34. (45) Ibid., P. 37. (46) Ibid., P. 37. (47) Ibid., P. 37. (48) Ibid., pp. 37-38. Chapter 3 Ba‘th Party Ideology and Organization 1. Ideology of the Ba‘th Party The Ba‘th Party was born as a historical necessity of Arab, not as a belief in the idealism born in Western Europe. It was born as a result of a full understanding of the meaning of the struggle that has unfolded in Arab society, and as a result of a full understanding of the contradictions that this struggle had behind it. Therefore, the Ba‘th Party did not have a fantasy dream of a future society. It was both scientific and realistic. The Ba‘th Party's ideas are scientific in the way they understand the reality as it is and find directions to transform it. The Ba‘th Party emerged at the height of the nationalist struggle against imperialism, but at this very historical stage Arab society basically contained two conflicts. One was the conflict between imperialist rule and ethnic awakening, and the other was the conflict between backward fetters and development. Imperialists sought to preserve the backwardness of the occupied nations in order to divide them geographically, racially, and based on religious sects. He then stationed troops for direct control. The imperialists partnered with traditional influential people, bourgeoisies, and intellectuals who could lead the people as the opposition from the occupied nations increased. The people of the occupied nations were poor and ignorant, and could not create anything like an organization, so they had to obey the traditional influential people like big landowners, bourgeoisie, and intellectuals. However, this traditional influential group has come to represent the interests of the imperialists and make eclectic reconciliations with them. The ties between the traditional influential groups and the imperialists in the occupied nations achieved the nominal independence of the occupied nations, but they could not reduce the imperialist forces or raise the standard of living of the people. The purpose of the nationalist struggle could not be achieved at all. These local traditional magnates have established and maintained a national government. However, although they had Arab hands and faces and spoke Arabic, their mentality, means, and purpose were no different from those of imperialism. The birth of the Ba‘th Party was realized in such a historical situation. This Ba‘th Party movement was essentially Arabism, an Arab nationalist movement that revived Arab national sentiment and revived a single Arab community. The nationalism advocated by the Ba‘th Party was very distinctive, unlike European nationalism. Aflaq described this in 1940 as follows: ‘Our nationalism is, above all, love. It is the same emotion that connects an individual to his family, because his homeland (watan) is a vast home and ummah (Arab community) is a big family.(1)’ According to Aflaq(2), nationalism is not the product of thought created in the mind. ‘Love precedes everything. Love comes first, followed by the determination of (nationalist) meaning.(3)’[( ) is the author] Thus, while European nationalism aimed to establish a nation-state on the basis of civil society, Aflaq laid the groundwork for nationalism from the inner spiritual side, from which it aimed to regenerate Arab national sentiment and form a single Arab community. So, in what ways was the Ba‘th Party distinctive compared to the previous Arab nationalist movement ? It can be summarized in the following two points. One is the external attitude of Arabs. The Ba‘th Party has taken this from a level of temporary repulsion to the stage of equipping it with a well-thought-out view. The second is the struggle itself. The Ba‘th Party has leapt this from a temporary resistance from time to time into a continuous struggle with forces that prevent the realization of the Arab community. The foreign attitude of Arabs until the Ba‘th Party emerged was nothing more than a backlash stimulated by the challenges of imperialism. Once upon a time, many struggle movements took place and the masses participated in them, but these did not meet the expectations of the people. Thus, Arab countries have opposed the challenges of imperialism, but there was of paramount importance to these Arab countries, that is, maintaining a centuries-old traditional society. Therefore, when it was discovered that the challenge of European imperialism was not just aggression, but at the same time an attack by new civilizations, values and knowledge, it must have been reminded that these Arab nations could not confront it by tradition alone. Then, in the situation of the alliance between the imperialists and the leaders of the nationalist movement, what is the Ba‘th movement that was able to make a leap forward in this nationalist movement by taking such historical facts as a lesson ? What was it like ? The answer to this must come from the speeches and dissertations of the leaders of the Ba‘th movement in the 1940s and 1950s. Among them, “for the cause of Ba‘th (fi sabil al-ba‘th)”, which contains Aflaq's papers and speeches, is extremely important for understanding the contents of the Ba‘th movement. So, based on this, let's think about the Ba‘th movement now. The Ba‘th movement was based on two principles. One is the introduction of the Inqilab theory. The word of ‘Inqilab’ means ‘transformation’, ‘revolution’, ‘alteration’, ‘transformation’, and ‘conversion’. The second is that the leader of the struggle movement was in the working masses. Freedom from imperial rule as a historical rule of the Arab community is due to intense and ongoing struggle. However, this struggle is itself a backward shackle. Therefore, the Arabs must first be free from the backward fetters they have been imposed on. In particular, we must be free from the effects of backwardness on the mental side, which has been a major obstacle to the practice of this struggle. This is because it seems that it will take a considerable amount of time to dispel the effect of backwardness on the material side. Thus, the most basic task for Arabs is to first implement their own spiritual revolution in order to achieve a revolution and transformation of imperialism and the Arab underdeveloped society. This spiritual revolution is possible only by the consciousness that emerges from the process of practicing the struggle itself. And that cannot be achieved by mere education. Because the potential abilities are developed in the very process of this struggle, and the developed potential abilities soften and purify the rigid spirit and it follows that Arabs are released from the backward fetters(4). The Ba‘th movement is exactly this inqilab. ‘Arab Ba‘th can be summarized in the word inqilab,’(5) Aflaq said in his talk, ‘Arab Ba‘th, It's inqilab’. And he described the contents of inqilab as follows. ‘We understand inqilab as a decisive change in ummah's life.’(6) ‘Our understanding of inqilab is a true awakening that can no longer be denied and is unquestionable. That is, the Arab spiritual awakening at the decisive stage of human history. Inqilab is, in its essence, the awakening of the spirit that has long been prevented from shining and radiating to the outside world under pressure from the corrupt and decadent situation. (7)’ ‘Therefore, inqilab is a major driving force, a powerful spiritual flow, and an unavoidable struggle, before it is a political and social program, and without it, we can’t understand the resurrection of ummah. This is the inqilab we understand.’(8) So how does this concept of inqilab appear in reality ? Regarding this, Aflaq states: “Inqilab, whose practical expression is a struggle. This struggle has many broad meanings and is not limited to just political struggles. Struggle is a way of action....(omitted)…but. for the Arabs, struggle is a way of (action) and at the same time an end in itself.’(9) In short, the struggle was a way to revive the Arab spirit and to realize the Arab inqilab(10). In other words, inqilab will be realized through the struggle. Moreover, the realization of this inqilab depended on the spiritual revolution. ‘The realization of inqilab in the Arabs depends on the ability to establish a revolutionary spirit in the personalities and consciousness of the Arab Ba‘th members.’(11) Now, Aflaq expected a new generation as a means to realize this inqilab. He said the role of reviving Arab society would be played by a younger generation – students of Aflaq, Bitar, and Arusuzi - newer than Aflaq's contemporaries. Moreover, this new generation was required to have the following three properties. 1) Awareness of historical and social conditions, that is, a full understanding of the need for change for the Arab community, 2) Morality, that is, being a vanguard for the transformation of the Arab community, 3) Beliefs. It is not yet sufficient to understand the need for Arab community transformation and take responsibility for it. They must believe that their capabilities, history and all circumstances will lead to success in this transformation(12). This first principle had a great influence on the Arab nationalist movement. This is because the introduction of this inqilab theory gave the Arab nationalist movement a popular meaning and gave it a true meaning of the struggle. The struggle no longer just meant an independence struggle. In addition, the struggle itself has come to mean a flame that burns backward fetters and purifies the minds of the masses. Therefore, the struggle was no longer merely an activity to eliminate imperialists, but also an activity to revive the Arab community. The second principle underlying the Ba‘th movement is the working masses as the bearers of the struggle. By examining the current state of the Arab struggle, the Ba‘th movement confirmed that the working people are the only ones who can dismiss imperialists and carry out a revolution in backwardness. This working mass was the only force that was uncoordinated with imperialists and imperialist capital and their interests. At the same time, they carried the burden of backwardness imposed by imperialism and was incompatible with imperialism. This principle was a lesson learned from the traditional Arab nationalist struggle. From the process of imperialism invasion that has been developed so far and the trajectory of the nationalist movement against it, the following was clear. If the imperialists are forced to retreat for some reason, a hierarchy free from the mass struggle group will stand on the side of the imperialists, quelling the struggle of the masses on their behalf and gaining their own interests. This hierarchy sought to curb the mass movement if it became threatened its interest by the growing mass power, as its interests became associated with the existence of imperialists. This class, which was hungry for profits in partnership with imperialists, was the traditional ruling and exploiting class who had benefited by leaving Arab society underdeveloped. This hierarchy continued its struggle only as long as its interests were guaranteed and it could be protected from the invasion of imperialism. Moreover, when this attempt was successful, they diverged from the masses, partnered with imperialists, suppressed the mass struggle, and sought to protect their own interests. The Ba'ath Party’s ‘class’ consciousness was born from this very point. The difference in attitudes between fighting backwards and hindering development when faced with imperialism, was clearly diverged by social stratification. This was not the result of the exploitation contradiction between the owner of the means of production and the producer (i.e. the worker)(13). Aflaq understood that the differences in historical prescriptiveness between Europa and Arab societies caused differences in ‘class’ content. ‘The basic driving force of society in Western European countries, which have been established as nation-states, is the economy rather than nationalism, and social issues are the primary factor there ...(omitted) ... On the other hand, social and economic issues are of great importance to us and are the primary issues, but these are subordinate to more important and deeper issue, that is, the issue of nationalism.’(14) The Ba‘th movement understood that this attitude towards imperialism was closely related to these two hierarchical attitudes, one fighting backwards and the other fighting developmental momentum. Forces that feel that destroying the backward structure of premodern exploitation threatens their own interests, do not benefit the ethnic struggle, but rather became a burden and an obstacle to this struggle. The only force that was in harmony with its complete and inclusive liberation and its own interests was the mass force. The course of this ethnic struggle by the masses was also the step of liberating oneself from the backward-looking sword. True development is achieved only for the purpose of progress and improvement of the masses. In short, true development is only possible through mass struggle. Now, from the characteristics of the Ba‘th movement that we have seen above, the revival of the Arab community, which is the basic task of the Ba‘th movement, is the minimum condition for the existence of the Arab community, where the countries in the Arab community are integrated, the food is satisfied, and the dignity of the Arab community is restored. The minimum requirements for the existence of this Arab community were expressed as the slogans of unity, freedom and socialism. The Ba‘th movement has not newly created these objectives. The Ba‘th movement has drawn these objectives from the level of mere ideology to the dimension of reality and positioned them as everyday struggles. He clarified the interrelationship of these three objectives and viewed them as the only three aspects of the truth of the resurrection of the Arab community. Thus unification is no longer just an ideal. Moreover, it was not just a superficial agreement between governments. The divided struggles of each country were regarded as the struggle for unification of the Arabs, and the movements in each region were regarded as the movements of the masses in the Arab community. In this way, unification was a routine struggle for liberation from imperialism and liberation from exploitation and subordination, and was perceived as a mass revolution. This Arab unification, ideologically and structurally, could not be achieved under the combined administration of the traditional ruler and the bourgeoisie. Parliamentary freedom under the coalition government of traditional rulers and bourgeoisies is hypocrisy, not true freedom. Because this is the freedom of the exploitation hierarchy at the expense of the working masses. Moreover, the divided regional socialism in the Arab community cannot establish the foundation of socialism and transform it into true socialism. Also, socialism introduced by horrifying means cannot achieve socialist content, even if regulated by socialist legislations. Thus, socialism is also not an ideal that should be adopted when it comes to power. It should have been realized throughout the process that the general public routinely understands the meaning of ethnic and hierarchical struggles and participates in the struggle, recognizing its mission. In that sense, the realization of socialism has also become part of the daily struggle. No, it was both the purpose and the means of everyday struggle. Thus, the struggle of the Ba‘th movement aimed to evoke the natural talents and struggle abilities of the masses and to revive the life and spirit of these abilities(15). By the way, the idea of the Ba‘th movement that we have seen above was transformed into the Ba‘th Party at the stage of putting it into practice. The Ba‘th Party, which was born in this way, had great characteristics compared to other political parties at that time. First of all, he had an ethnic framework not only for its purpose but also for its composition. And he believed that the regionalist party could never embody the Arab mass movement, no matter how great the platform was. On the contrary, nationalist parties believed that unity could be part of their daily struggle. Second, he tried to implement ideological, structural, and policy inqilabs in order to constantly make party members revolutionary. Therefore, he did not believe in improved development and refused to compromise with the enemy of the people. And he opposed any movement, power, and force that was trying to destroy the masses. Third, he worked with the masses to unleash their abilities and revive their revolutionary abilities. Moreover, at the same time, he himself became an avant-garde and leader of the masses. The purpose of the Ba‘th Party thus established was, as is already clear, to realize the inqilab of the spirit and consciousness of the general public in its inner life, rather than the inqilab for the administration. Not surprisingly, this was a very difficult task in terms of content. The Ba‘th Party faced two types of difficulties in its emergence. One is imperialist forces, traditional ruler groups and bourgeoisies, and opportunism, which came from outside the party. The other is the fetters which has been influenced by the backwardness of society and has permeated the inside of the members. This was, so to speak, inside the party. The process of practicing the members’ spiritual revolution, which is the task of the Ba‘th Party, was extremely difficult and time-consuming. Therefore, in this process, many things happened such as frustration, opportunism, division of struggle and views into partialism, defeat in the temptation of power, and choosing a short-circuited direction over the long journey of the mass line. There was a tendency to succumb to the difficulty of the struggle. It can be said that the party's greatest enemy existed within the party. This poses a major problem in the future as a deviation or separation in the Ba‘th Party. 2. Establishment of the Ba‘th Party and its organization As the basic ideas and objectives of the Ba‘th became more concrete, there was a growing demand among the members to hold a party establishment convention. This was driven by the demand that the party's ideas and objectives should be formulated, the party’s strategy and course of action should be directed, and its internal and external and social and economic policies should be clarified. At that time, a committee was already set up to develop the basic framework of the party platform and rules and regulations, which began in early 1947. The committee consisted of seven members: Aflaq, Bitar, Wahib al-Ghanim, Abd al-Mun‘im al-Sharif, Sidqi Isma‘il, Jamal al-Atassi, and ‘Abd alBarr ‘Ayun al-Sud(16). On April 4th of the same year, the establishment convention was held at the Rashid alSaifi coffee shop on May 29th street in Damascus. Approximately 200 people from all over Syria, including Lebanese, Jordanian and Iraqi students enrolled at Damascus University in Syria, attended(17). Looking at the attendees by occupation, they were students, teachers, government employees, and freelancers. First, Jalal al-Sayyed was elected as the chair and Abd al-Rahman al-Mardini, Shakir al-Fahham, and Abd aMun‘im al-Sharif were elected as the secretariat members(18). Then, after Aflaq gave the opening remarks and Bitar issued a statement, it entered into discussions on the party platform and rules and regulations. Agenda for discussions are not clear, but a statement on the platform and resolutions adopted at the convention was published in the newspaper after the convention. The platform of the Ba‘th Party consisted of basic principles (three principles), general principles (13 articles), domestic policies (8 articles), diplomatic policies (4 articles), economic policies (12 articles), social policies (6 articles), educational policies (5 articles), and amendments to the Platform. I will not introduce all of these articles here. I just point out some of the basic characteristics of the Ba‘th Party theory from the perspective of this platform. (1) The Ba‘th Party believes in the idea of nationalism and regarded it as an eternal living reality. The Ba‘th Party emphasized the harmony and unity of nationalism and humanity. (2) The Ba‘th Party believes that the situation in which there was a divided government in the Arab homeland was artificially created and not inherent. The differences that exist between Arab compatriots are deceptive and all will be extinguished by the awakening of Arab ethnic sentiment. The Arab community is a political, economic and cultural unity. Therefore, Arabs must continue their struggle for unity. (3) The Ba‘th Party emphasized freedom and the need for freedom to achieve the Ba‘th Party's goal of a comprehensive national revival. This freedom meant liberation of Arabs from poverty, liberation from political and economic domination by foreigners, and liberation from domestic oppression. The Ba‘th Party sought to tie freedom to the interests of the masses, and rejected bourgeois democracy in connection with socialism. In short, the Ba‘th Party emphasized the importance of harmonizing individual freedom and ethnic interests. (4) The Ba‘th Party has the belief that socialism was inevitably exuded from the depths of Arab nationalism. The Ba‘th Party thought that socialism allows Arabs to realize their potential and to unleash their natural talents to ensure the constant development of material and spiritual production in the Arab community. Therefore, the Ba‘th Party did not accept Marxism-Leninist materialist views. (5) The Ba‘th Party was the first Arab movement to raise socialism along with nationalism and organically link unity, freedom and socialism. Discussions on the platform were held on a per-article basis(19). Here, I will introduce a few examples from among them. One is the debate over whether the official name of the Ba‘th should be “movement (haraka)” or “party (hizb)”. The Ba‘th Party originally issued a statement in 1941 under the name al-ihya‘ al-‘arabi, and then in 1943 it was renamed al-ba‘th al-‘arabi. The executive committee suggested that haraka is appropriate because the Ba‘th is an ethical, human and ethnic movement. However, the opinion that hizb was appropriate because it would propose clear political actions as a political party rather than a mere ideological movement, became predominant, and in consequence it was officially resolved to use hizb(20). Thus, the Arab Ba‘th movement officially started as a political party. Second, there was a discussion about socialism. The focus of this debate was the conflict on the understanding of socialism. I don't know the exact point, but it seems that the Wahib al-Ghanim group, which has a close view of Marxism, and the Aflaq, Bitar group, which has a relatively moderate view as reflected in the platform, confronted each other on this issue. The former argued that state control and a considerable degree of state intervention were required, while the latter emphasized individual freedom(21). On the other hand, Jalal al-Sayyed seems to have shown a negative attitude toward the concept of socialism itself(22). Third, there was a debate over whether national regime targeted by the Ba‘th Party should be a republic or simply a constitutional system. Ultimately, it was stipulated as a constitutional parliamentary system. This later left a big question on how to deal with the military junta. There were many resolutions other than the platform(23). Numerous resolutions have been adopted on the Arab community and the countries of the world, the Arab League, the Arab regimes, the situation of the Arab Ba‘th Party and Syria, and domestic economic policy. Let's pick up some of the main ones. 1) Maintain friendly and cooperative relations with other countries except those that plundered or occupied the Arab homeland (UK, France, Spain, Turkey, Iran, USA). 2) The Arab League allows member states to enter into treaties with foreign countries without the consent of the League, which is a serious mistake. 3) The Arab League should promptly implement Arab unification by promoting the integration of the armed forces of Arab countries and by eliminating passports and tariff barriers between Arab countries. 4) The Syrian and Lebanese governments should abandon the current isolation principle. 5) Do not ally with any existing political party in Syria. Because these parties are only temporary blocs and have no continuity. Also, they had a regionalist character and were incompatible with the Ba‘th Party. Thus, the three-day congress ended on April 7, with Aflaq as party leader(24) and Bitar, Jalal al-Sayyed, and Wahib al-Ghanim as members of the executive committee. Aflaq is a Greek Orthodox from Damascus, Bitar is a Sunni Muslim from Damascus, Jalal alSayyed is a Sunni Muslim from the northeastern Deir ez-Zor, and Wahib al-Ghanim is an Alawite from Latakia on the Mediterranean coast. Now, in order to understand the Ba‘th Party ideology more clearly, we must consider the following two points. 1) First, the relationship with Marxism-Leninism. There was a fundamental difference between the Ba‘th Party ideology of the 1940s and 1950s(25) and Marxism-Leninism. The Ba‘th Party had a nationalist character and did not take a transnational direction. Moreover, he saw nationalism as an eternal living reality and did not consider it a transitional stage. He is thinking: ‘For us Arabs, socialism is the result and derivative of Arab’s ethnic situation and needs. Socialism cannot be the number one philosophy, and the view of life as a whole. It is a primitive, a derivative subordinate to the idea of nationalism’(26) and ‘Arab nationalism is synonymous with socialism in modern times’(27) , ‘Arab nationalists are socialists’(28). In addition, the Ba‘th Party denied materialistic values and accepted ideological values. Aflaq states, ‘The mind, this is the source of everything .....(omitted) .... Mental propulsion not only controls matter and means, but also creates them at the same time’(29 Moreover, the Ba‘th Party did not accept the Marxist-Leninist class struggle. Thus, the Ba‘th Party was anti-communist. 2) Next is the relationship with religion. The Muslim Brotherhood was skeptical of Arab nationalism and criticized the Ba‘th Party for being incompatible with religion. On the other hand, Aflaq clearly explained the relationship between nationalism and religion (especially Islam) in a lecture at the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad in 1943. According to him, Islam was essentially an Arab movement, a rebirth of ‘uruba (Arab ethnic sentiment). ‘Islam is a vital force that unleashes the potential of the Arab community, revives passionate lives, flushes out traditional obstacles and traditional swords, and creates new bonds with the universe’(31). In Europe, nationalism and religion were considered separately, but the Ba‘th Party thought that they were inseparable for the Arabs. ‘For Europeans, religion comes from the outside world and is foreign to European nature and history .....(omitted). ..... Religion didn’t come down in their European language’(32). To this, ‘For Arabs, Islam is not just the ethics of faith in the next world. At the same time, it is also the Arabs’ view of space, their view of life, and more. It expresses the unification of the Arabs’ individuality’(33). It is exactly “it comes down in the language of Arab people, that is, Arabic language’.(34) Arab nationalism was inseparable from Islam. ‘Arab nationalism is a creature with a combination of organs, and if one dissects the body or separates the organs, this creature will be driven to death. Thus, the link between Arab national sentiment and Islam is characteristically different from the link with other nationalist religions’(35). According to Aflaq, all communities have the basic driving force to rock it from the depths, awaken it, and evoke lively activity(36). This fundamental driving force in Arab society was religion in the early days of Islam, but in modern times nationalism has replaced it(37). The Ba‘th Party thought, ‘This nationalist slogan can vibrate the strings of the Arabs’ hearts, penetrate deep into their hearts, and meet their inherent demands’(38). Aflaq added, ‘once (during the rise of Islam) the power of Islam represented the power of the Arabs, but (in the modern era) it was revived and emerged in the form of Arab nationalism’(39). Thus, the Ba‘th Party did not consider nationalism and religion to be conflicting and incompatible. Indeed, on the contrary, the two did not clash, although they cooperate each other. ‘(in the Arabs) there is no danger of nationalism clashing with religion, because nationalism, like religion, originates from the depths of the heart and originates from the will of God. They walk in harmony with each other, especially when religion becomes the essence of ethnicity and is in harmony with its ethnic nature’(40). The Ba‘th Party thought that nationalism and religion have equal origins and that the form of expression was different depending on the historical stage. The Ba‘th Party, which was established as a political party, made systematization of its organization one of the most important issues. The Ba‘th Party organization was extremely vulnerable when compared to its ideology. From the 1940s to the 1950s, the systematization of this organization was an important issue for the Ba‘th Party, but it was not until the mid-1950s. The organization's provisions were first adopted at the 2nd Party Congress of 1954. This has been corrected at subsequent party Congresses. Now, let's take a look at the outline based on the provisions(41) that were amended at the 6th Party Congress in 1963. Arab Nation -------------------------------------Pan-Arab or National Command Supervision of organizations throughout the Arab Regional (qutr）--------------------------------(equivalent to each country level) Reginal Command Branch (far‘)--------------------------------------- Branch Command Section (shu‘ba)----------------------------------- Section Command Division (firqa)------------------------------------ Division Command Halaqa----------------------------------------------- Circle or Cell The Ba‘th Party regarded the entire Arab world as one Arab nation (qawm). At this qaum level, a central executive committee was set up to oversee the Ba‘th Party. This was called the Pan-Arab (National) Command (al-qiyada al-qawmiya). He regarded each regime under qawm level as regional(qutri), and called the governing body of party activities at this regional level the Regional Command (al-qiyada al-qutriya). This “region” actually corresponded to a state (country). Therefore, in the organizational leadership system, the Regional leadership (Command) in Syria, the Regional leadership (Command) in Iraq, the Regional leadership (Command) in Jordan, and the Regional leadership (Command) Lebanon are controlled under the National leadership (Command) of Syria. And each of these Regional Commands at the state level had a systematic mechanism called Branch (far') - Section (shu'ba) - Division (firqa). At the administrative end is halaqa, which consisted of 3-7 members. 3-7of these halaqas gathered together to form a Division. This Division had a Division Command elected by the members, which gave instructions to the members' daily activities. Two or more of these Divisions gathered to form a Section. At this Section level, a tournament was held where the command was elected. Both Division and Section have a Command as an executive committee, but the general secretary, who is the chairman of the executive committee, was appointed by their respective superordinate organizations. In other words, the general secretary of the Division was appointed by the Section Command, and the general secretary of the Section was appointed by the Branch Command. The Branch consisted of two or more Sections. The Branch tournament consisted of the general secretary of each Section and the members elected by each Section Command. The Branch Command was elected by this convention, and the general secretary of Branch was elected by this Branch Command. On top of these organizations is the Regional Congress, the highest conference at the regional level, in reality the current state level. It was called Syrian Reginal Congress, Iraqi Regional Congress, ………, etc., with the names of each region. the Regional Congress consisted of the general secretary of each Branch, the members of each Branch Command, the members of the Section Command that existed in isolation without a Branch structure, and the representatives elected at each Branch Congress. The Congress elected a Regional Command to discuss and approve plans and policies prepared by the Command. This Regional Command is able to deal with regional issues and order the dissolution of leadership and elections for the election of new leadership at each level of its jurisdiction. At the top of these was the National Congress (al-mu'tamar al-qaumi), the Ba‘th Party General Assembly. The Congress consisted of members of each Regional Command, other representatives of each Region (minimum 5 of each Region), and representatives of the region which did not reach the Region level (1 person for each Section). The National Command will be elected at this Congress, which will include the general secretary of each Regional Command. Thus, the 2nd Party Congress of 1954 abolished the executive committee (al-hai'a al- tanfiziya), which was established in 1947, and replaced it with Regional Command and National Command. At the same time, the party leader (‘amid), who is in charge of the party as a whole, was abolished, and the general secretary of the National Command (alamin al-‘amm) was appointed in its place. Notes Chapter 3 Ba‘th Party Ideology and Organization (1) Michel Aflaq, “al-qawmiya hubbu qabla kull shai” [nationalism, it is love above all] (1940) fi sabil al-ba‘th, Beirut, 1980, (21st edition), p.111 (Hereinafter, citations from this work are in the order of the title of the relevant paper (year of publication) fi sabil al ba‘th, page.) (2) Ibid., P. 111. (3) Ibid., P. 112. (4) Munif al-Razzaz, al-tajriba al-murra, Beirut, 1967, pp. 19-20, and see, Arusuzi, 6 volumes of Complete works, 1976, pp.105-65. (5) “al-ba‘th al-arabi huwa al-inqilab” [Arab Ba‘th, it is inqilab] (1950), fi sabil al ba‘th, p.61 (6) “hawla al-inqilab” [about inqilab] (1950), fi sabil al ba‘th , p. 87. (7) “min ma’ani al-inqilab ”[meanings of inqilab] (1950), fi sabil al ba‘th, p. 80. (8) Ibid., P. 81 (9) “al ba‘th al-arabi huwa al-inqilab”, fi sabil al ba‘th, p.61-62. (10) Ibid., pp. 62-64. (11) “al-tanzim al-inqilabi” [inqilab organization] (1950), fi sabil al ba‘th, p. 68. (12) “hawla al-inqilab” (1950), fi sabil al ba‘th, p. 87. (13) Munif al-Razzaz, op.cit., pp. 21-22. (14) “ma’alim al- ishtirakiya al-arabiya ”[Characteristics of Arab Socialism] (1946), fi sabil al ba‘th, p.309. (15) Munif al-Razzaz, op.cit., pp. 23-24. (16) Shibli al-‘Aisami, p.78. (17) Ibid., p. 79 .; Also, according to Wahib al-Ghanim, there were 247 attendees. Eric Rouleau, “The Syrian Enigma: What is the Bath?” Edited by Grendziev, A Middle East Reader, New York, 1969, p. 165. (18) Shibli al-‘Aisami, p. 79. (19) The results of the discussions conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Platform were published in the “Bath” newspaper as a statement on April 13. Shibli al-‘Aisami, Appendix, pp. 102-106. (20) Jalal al-Sayyed, p. 42 .; Shibli al-‘Aisami, p. 73. (21) Shibli al-‘Aisami, pp. 53-55 .; Eric Rouleau, op. cit., p. 164. (22) According to Wahib al-Ghanim, Aflaq and Bitar (especially Bitar), opposed introducing socialist objectives into the party platform. (source) Eric Rouleau, op. cit., p. 164. (23) Published in the “Bath” newspaper as a statement on the resolutions of the First Party Congress dated April 13, 1947. (source) Shibli al-‘Aisami, Appendix, pp. 106-114. (24) At that time, he was called the party leader (‘amid), not the general secretary (alamin al-‘amm). (25) The Ba‘th Party ideology changed significantly in relation to Marxism-Leninism. (26) “ma’alim al-ishtirakiya al-arabiya ”(1946), fi sabil al ba‘th, p.307. (27) Ibid., p. 307. (28) Ibid., p. 308. (29) “al ba‘th al-arabi huwa al-inqilab”, (1950), fi sabil al ba‘th, p. 65. (30) “nazratna li-l ra'smaliya wa li-l-sira' al-tabaqi” [Our view of capitalism and class struggle] (1956), fi sabil al ba‘th, pp. 322-26.; and See. Shibli al-‘Aisami, pp.63-64. (31) “dhikra al-rasul al-arabi” [in commemoration of the Arab Prophet] (1943), fi sabil al ba‘th, p. 124. (32) Ibid., p. 131. (33) Ibid., p. 131. (34) Ibid., p. 127. (35) Ibid., p. 131. (36) “ma’alim al-ishtirakiya al-arabiya ” (1946), fi sabil al ba‘th, p.308. (37) Ibid., p. 308. (38) Ibid., P. 308. (39) “dhikra al-rasul al-arabi” (1943), fi sabil al ba‘th, pp. 130-31. (40) “al-qawmiya hubbu qabla kull shai” (1940) fi sabil al ba‘th, pp.112-13. (41) American University Press, Arab Political Documents 1963, Beirut, pp. 445-62 ; Kamel Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba‘th Socialist Party, New York, 1966, pp.139-45. Chapter 4 Attempt to Unify the Arabs (1) 1. Early stages of Ba‘th Party activity (1947-49) The organization of the party was still immature, but the members of the party spread not only in Syria but also in the surrounding Arab countries. In Syria, in Damascus, in the Mediterranean coastal areas such as Banias and Latakia, in the northeastern part centered on Deir ez-Zor, and in the fertile plains such as Aleppo and Homs located in the middle of these areas. It also spread to southern Syria, such as the Hawran region and the Jabal al-Druze Mountains. Overseas, it has spread mainly to Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, and further to Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Libya. The most important of these are Lebanon and Iraq, especially in Iraq, which later developed into power and opposed Syrian organizations. The Ba‘th Party became widespread among high school and college students in the late 1930s and 1940s. In Damascus, the birthplace of the Ba‘th Party, Tajhiz High School and the University of Syria (now Damascus University) played an important role in spreading the Ba‘th movement. Tajhiz High School was taught by Aflaq and Bitar until the end of 1942. The school was located in the Maydan quarter of Damascus. This quarter was particularly active in commerce. It was also a district where lower middle class people migrated from rural areas, especially Jabal al-Druze and Hawran regions. Most of them were Sunni Muslims, but there were also Christian families such as the Tu'ma, Zurayq, Aflaq, and Safadi families. In particular, the core of the Ba‘th Party in the Jabal al-Druze and Hawran regions was born from post-independence activities in this quarter. Mansur al-Atrash played an important role in the formation of core of the Ba‘th Party in southern Syria(1). Early members of the Ba‘th Party included students from rural areas to receive higher education as a gateway to college. After graduating from college, they became teachers, lawyers, doctors, etc. and were active in Damascus and local cities. Arusuzi has also contributed significantly to the birth of the core of Ba‘th Party. In Damascus, he made halaqa(2)composed of Alawite students from Alexandretta and Latakia. Arusuzi was a high school teacher, but the students who gathered around him were mainly students from the University of Syria. He changed his home with Latakia and Tartus, but his intentions were taken over by Wahib al-Ghanim. The officers who expelled Aflaq and Bitar in February 1966 were one of the Arusuzi-influenced groups(3). Personal ties with the party’s founders were also important. For example, Ma’mun alBitar joined the party through a personal connection with Midhat al-Bitar, one of the founders and a medical doctor. Both were close friends. Ma’mun al-Bitar was an officer but died in the 1948 Palestinian War. Bashir Sadiq (an officer) also joined the party under the influence of his neighbor Bitar(4). The penetration of the Ba‘th Party in the Latakia region, especially among the Alawites, was largely due to the contribution of Wahib al-Ghanim. He was a medical doctor and spread the Ba‘th Party ideology while continuing his unselfish patrol medical treatment. He left the party in the late 1950s after creating the core of the Ba‘th Party in Latakia region, but it is said that he was still popular among the first members of halaqa(5). In the northeastern part centered on Deir ez-Zor, Jalal al-Sayyed played an important role. He met Aflaq in 1942(6) and subsequently contributed to the creation of the Ba‘th Party. The halaqa he created eventually became the core of the party’s Deir ez-Zor region. He left the party when the Ba‘th Party merged with Akram al-Hawrani’s Arab Socialist Party at the end of 1952, but was still trusted by members of the region. Under his influence, Yusuf Zu‘ayyin(7) was one of the people who subsequently held an important position in the party. What happened in the Arab region other than Syria? In Jordan, for example. In Jordan, the British-Jordan Treaty in 1946 and its revision of two years later in 1948 was a major issue. The treaty confirmed the continued provision of convenience and base use to the British Army in exchange for aid. After that, the defeat in the Palestinian War heightened the wrath of the people(8). The Ba‘th Party ideology was accepted by the Jordanians who were staying in Damascus as students at the University of Syria. Then, in 1948, the year after the Ba‘th Party's founding convention, the core of the Ba‘th Party was created in Jordan and spread among the youth nationalist groups. In the eastern part of the Jordan River, Sulayman al-Hadidi (who became president of the Jordanian Bar Association in the late 1960s and later became Interior Minister) was central. He was the chief editor of al-yaqza (Awakening), the bulletin of these groups. On the west bank, Abdallah alRimawi and Kamal Nasir played a central role in issuing al-ba‘th. These leaders joined the Ba‘th Party in the late 1940s. As a result of such a movement, the Ba‘th Party became widespread, especially among high school students. There were also Jordanian students studying in Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad, etc. who joined the Ba‘th Party. In addition to the above three members, the early Ba‘th Party members included Bahjat Abu Gharbiya, Amin Shuqayr, Husni al Khafsh, and Ibrahim al-‘Aid(9). Then, in 1952, the first regional congress of the Ba‘th Party in Jordan was held. In Lebanon, American University in Beirut was at the core. Some of the students at this university, though the majority were Syrians and other Arabs, have spread the Ba‘th Party ideology among Lebanese students since 1947(10). Since then, this ideology has permeated among high school students in Beirut, creating a small nucleus between them. This direction extended beyond Beirut to Tripoli, Saida, Sur, Baalbek and more. In particular, ‘Abd al-Majid Rafi‘i (Abd al- Majid al-Rafei)(11) contributed greatly to the spread of the Ba‘th Party movement in Tripoli. Also there were some persons who have contributed to the penetration of the Ba‘th Party ideology into Lebanon. They have been baptized by the Ba‘th Party while attending the University of Syria in Damascus. After returning back to Lebanon they were very active in expanding the Ba‘th Party. ‘Ali Jaber, for example, is one of them, and he was already involved in the Ba‘th movement in 1945(12). In addition to the above two members, the early Lebanese Ba‘th Party members included Abd al-Wahhab Shumitli, Khalid Yashuruti, Jubran Majdalani, and ‘Ali Khalil. These Ba‘th movement groups in Lebanon had already issued a political statement in 1951, but as a party organization they were only at the shu'ba (section) stage. In 1954, a party leadership in the Lebanese region was established. However, this leadership was not established by elections. Voices calling for a party convention in the Lebanon region have been heard since 1952. However, this did not happen until 1957(13). Student groups also played a leading role in the penetration of the Ba‘th Party movement in Iraq. As in Jordan and Lebanon, Iraqi students who were impressed by the early Ba‘th Party members and their ideologies while attending universities in Damascus and Beirut in the 1940s, were very active in the expansion that has contributed to the spread of the Ba‘th Party movement after returning home. For example, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Damin and Abd al-Khaliq al-Khudayri were among the people who attended the party's founding convention during their stay in Damascus as students and contributed to the development of the Ba‘th Party in Iraq after returning home. The former was the first general secretary of the Ba‘th Party in Iraq. In addition, Sa‘dun Hammadi and Su‘ad Khalil Isma‘il were the people who joined the Ba‘th Party while studying at American University in Beirut and contributed to the spread of the Ba‘th Party after returning home. The former formed the core of the Ba‘th Party in Karbala in the late 1940s(14). However, it was Syrian students, especially those from Alexandretta, who studied at Iraqi high schools, colleges and teacher training centers that played a greater role in the spread of the Ba‘th Party movement in Iraq. They spread the Ba‘th Party ideology among Iraqi students. For example, there were Fa‘iz Isma‘il, a student at a law school, Adham Mustafa, a student at higher teacher training center, and Muhammad Jamil, a student at a commercial school. Members of the early Ba‘th Party in Iraq that emerged from this process included Fu’ad al-Rikabi, Karim Mahmud Shantaf, Hazim Jawad, Munzir al-Wandawi, and ‘Izzat Mustafa(15). Now, let's turn the story to the activities of the Ba‘th Party in Syria again. In July, three months after the party's founding convention, when elections for the new parliament took place, party leaders Aflaq and Bitar ran but did not win. Running for elections was aimed not only to disseminate the Ba‘th Party ideology, but also to promote ties between the masses and the party. Traditional political forces which won the victory in this election have sought to amend the constitution to allow the re-election of the president in order to protect their interests. On the other hand, King Abdallah of Jordan announced ‘On the Greater Syria and the Arab Unification Organization’, presenting a unified national plan that integrates Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. The Ba‘th Party issued a statement at the end of September on these political developments. He opposed the dictatorship of the government, which is being promoted against the backdrop of traditional political forces. In short, he opposed and expressed his willingness to fight a constitutional amendment that would allow the re-election of President Shukri al-Quwatli, a representative of traditional political forces. He also opposed King Abdallah's ‘the Greater Syria’ initiative. The reasons for this were that the British-Jordan Treaty shook the foundations of Jordan's independence, and that Syria wanted a republican regime, implicitly countering the Hashemites' invasion of Syria. Of course, some Syrian politicians supported the idea. However, the Syrian parliament also publicly condemned the idea at the end of September(16). In November of the same year, the Ba‘th Party held a party council (majlis al-hizb) in Homs. This was attended by representatives from Syria and Jordan. The meeting resolved to struggle for constitutional amendment and support for the Palestinian struggle(17). The constitutional amendment was railroaded on March 20, 1948, and Shukri al-Quwatli was re-elected as president on April 18. On the other hand, as a support activity for the Palestinian struggle, the Ba‘th Party recruits volunteers for the Palestinian struggle, registers their applicant names, and participated in the establishment of “the Palestine Liberation Association” to lead the armed people's struggle. When the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine was resolved on November 29, 1947, the Ba‘th Party positioned the Palestinian issue as the most important issue and emphasized the need for full-scale mobilization of volunteers and armed struggles. At the same time, he called for the severance of economic, cultural and political relations with countries that support Zionism. He also proposed that oil be used as a weapon of struggle(18). This was an action taken based on the recognition that if the state of Israel were to be established, the Ba‘th Party's basic goal of unification of the Arab world would be destroyed, and the independence of the Arab countries would be jeopardized. The Ba‘th Party has warned and urged the Arab governments, who are vulnerable to the Palestinian affairs and imperialist plots, to take a decisive step. In 1948, the Ba‘th Party established the ‘Palestinian Permanent Office’ and became more active in supporting the Palestinian struggle(19). And in mid-January, it resolved that all members of the party would participate in this activity under the direction of the party's executive committee. Then, the party denounced the government by distributing protest statements and instigating popular demonstrations, and the participation in the struggle on the battlefield was carried out extensively. As a result, some Ba‘th members died on the battlefield. Among them were Ma’mun al-Bitar from Damascus and Sulayman alKaridi from Suwayda(20). At that time, on the other hand, constitutional amendment measures by traditional political forces were being pushed forward and they were trying to suppress the opposition to this. The leader of this opposition was the Ba‘th Party. So, the government attacked the Ba‘th Party, confiscating and banning newspapers, searching office homes, and arresting members. On March 4, a threatening explosion and police attack on the office were forcibly conducted, and it resulted in the arrest of 50 party members, resulting in a fierce clash between the Ba‘th Party and the government. Constitutional amendments were enforced and President Shukri al-Quwatli was reappointed in April. The Arab side was defeated in the Palestinian war, and public dissatisfaction with the bourgeois administration exploded. At that time, the volunteers of the party members began to return from the battlefield. Against this background, the government attack by the Ba‘th party became even more intense. In response to this, the government revoked the permission to issue the Ba‘th Party newspaper in September, arrested party leader Aflaq and other key members of the party. Aflaq was detained for two weeks. For these measures criticism has also emerged within the government, and in November the deputy prime minister, interior minister, and economic minister resigned. While trust in the government has been lost and criticism of government policy has increased, the economic recession has appeared and general strikes and riots happened. With the cabinet resigning, the military intervened and declared martial law, closing schools were closed, then the turmoil finally headed for settlement. The new Khalid al-Azm cabinet was inaugurated, and in February 1949, the problems that were temporarily shelved due to the Palestinian War resumed the examination and the signing was carried out. One was to the settle financial problems with France and stabilize the Syrian currency(21). The other was the issue of the so-called TAP Line. It is the problem whether to allow the American Aramco oil company to resume the laying work of the Saudi Arabian crude oil pipe, which passes through Jordan and Syria and reaches the port of Lebanon. There was a great deal of opposition within Parliament and among the people over the signing of the financial agreement with France and TAP Line agreements with American Aramco. Oil company. In particular, the issue of arranging the TAP Line laying work with an American company was shelved as a protest against the United States, which supported Zionism on the Palestinian issue. Therefore, government measures have encountered great resistance for the following Western imperialism. In addition, student strikes also occurred, and the country was once again in turmoil. Not surprisingly, the Ba‘th Party also participated in the movement. And when the government signed the above two issues and submitted them to Congress, there was a particularly fierce resistance movement. The late 1940s were the most fulfilling period of the Ba‘th Party's basic mass movement. Now, from the party's founding convention to the past, some sort of crisis has emerged within the Party. In the late 1940s, disagreements emerged among the party's top leaders, who had been coordinating and harmonizing so far. This was united by companionship and its affinity, and did not lead to division. Differences in views among these top leaders emerged in the following ways(22): 1) Whether to allow military political intervention. There were two views on this. One is that it may be admitted only to the extent that it is in the interests of the party, and the other is that military political intervention is not desirable anyway. 2) Next, whether to allow military personnel to join the party. There were also two views on this. One is the view that this is not allowed. In this view, he thought that even if a former member of the Ba‘th party later enrolled in the military academy, he should leave the party. On the other hand, it is the view that military personnel are only a part of the people and they also have the right to participate in the resolution to revitalize the national community. Those who argued that military personnel should be excluded from the party were afraid that weapons would come into control of their idealism. Initially, the view that military personnel should be eliminated was accepted, but eventually military personnel began to join the party secretly or openly. 3) Whether the party is allowed to take hard measures against criticism from the people. There were pros and cons to this as well, but no conclusion has been reached. 4) Whether the Ba‘th Party will operate independently. There were also two views on this. One is that the alliance does not allow it, and the group did not even tolerate reconciliation with other parties, whether ideological or traditional. The other is the view that alliances and cooperation with other political parties are permitted only in special cases where the interests of the motherland are impaired without the alliance. Again, the party has shown its willingness to keep an eye on the situation without making any conclusions. Of these issues, the military and military personnel issues had a major impact on the subsequent development of the Ba‘th Party. 2. Ba‘th Party during the military junta At the end of 1948, the bourgeois administration exposed its limits before the popular attack in the fifth year of its birth. The popular government attack did not subside the following year, and a coup was finally launched on March 30 by Commander Husni alZa‘im(23). The direct motivation for this coup was the conflict between civilian politicians and the military over responsibility for the defeat of the Palestinian war. Faysal al-‘Asali, a social co-operative party, blamed the army in parliament and demanded the dismissal of some officers along with other politicians. Also, as other politicians demanded a reduction in military budgets, the criticism of politicians against the military was doubled. The officers counterattacked this, claiming that the bad situation of the army on the front was the cause of the defeat. The climax of the collision between the two was Za‘im’s coup. Behind this coup was the dissatisfaction and distrust of the people over the inefficiencies and turmoil of parliamentary politics that the bourgeois administration had dominated, the domineeringness and corruption of the Quwatli administration, and the upset of the people due to the defeat of the Palestinian war. Therefore, this coup was welcomed by many people. The Ba‘th Party also supported this. On April 4, the party’s executive committee submitted a letter to commander Za‘im, stating that he would support him. At the same time, the letter called for 1) the establishment of a credible caretaker government, 2) the cleanup of governmental institutions, 3) the guarantee of freedom, and 4) the revival of the constitutional government and the holding of elections(24). In addition, as Za‘im announced its intention to sign the TAP Line agreement, the Ba‘th Party offered to postpone ratification of the agreement. However, Za‘im has ratified the financial agreement with France, ratified the TAP Line agreement, cracked down on newspapers, and dissolved political parties, showing a tendency toward dictatorship. In response, the Ba‘th Party submitted a letter dated May 24, warning Za‘im not to step on the rut of the previous administration. In addition, he made statements on May 30th and June 9th to confront Za‘im(25). In these statements, the Ba‘th Party blamed that Za‘im did not respect the constitution, restrained freedom, disbanded political parties, and ratified a financial agreement with France and a TAP Line agreement with an American oil company. Za‘im countered this by arresting and imprisoning Ba‘th Party leaders. Za‘im gradually drowned in power and was elected president by referendum on June 25, and was promoted to marshal himself. He also appointed Hama landowner Mohsin alBarazi as prime minister, so the land reforms initially launched were ignored. Akram alHawrani, a supporter of Za‘im, left Za‘im when his political opponent, al-Barazi, was appointed prime minister and his ally, Adib al-Shishakli, has been retired. Za‘im also once defended Antun al-Sa‘adah, the leader of the Syrian Nationalist Party, who had fled to Syria after a failed rebellion in late June in Lebanon. But Za‘im handed him over to Lebanese authorities under pressure from Lebanon. Thus, members of the Syrian Nationalist Party have also taken an anti-Za‘im direction. The biggest counterattack against Za‘im came from neighboring Iraq and its sympathetic Syrian politicians and officers. Za‘im initially took a pro-Iraq policy and was interested in military and economic agreements with Iraq. However, he became increasingly cautious about the territorial ambitions of Britain's puppet Iraqi government for Syria, and eventually came closer to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In response, Iraq contacted Syrian officers and politicians to overthrow the Za‘im administration. Thus, on August 14, 1949, a coup led by Col. Sami al-Hinnawi, together with Druze officers and Syrian democratic party officers, broke the Za‘im administration. The coup was attended by Col. Bahij Kkallas, Lt. Col. ‘Alam al-Din Qawwas, and Maj. Amin Abu ‘Assaf(26). Bahij Kallas is Hawrani’s ally. ‘Alam al-Din Qawwas and Amin Abu ‘Assaf were Druze and members of the Syrian Nationalist Party. Considering these and the fact that it was Hawrani who persuaded the Druze officers to join the anti-Za‘im administration’s attempt(27), it is clear that it was Hawrani who brought together the antiZa‘im forces in this coup. Maj. Gen. Sami al-Hinnawi declared that he would return the army to the barracks and reinstate the constitutional regime, and begged Hashim al-Atassi to become prime minister. Then, the activities of various political parties except the Communist Party on the far left and the Social Cooperative Party on the far right were freed. Thus, on August 17, a nationalist government consisting of political parties was actually established. The new cabinet was mainly the People's Party, but Hawrani and Aflaq also joined(28). This was the first cabinet in which Ba‘th members entered the cabinet. The Atassi cabinet subsequently revised the election act and then held an election for the Constitutional Assembly on November 15. This election was an overwhelming victory for the People's Party. The Syrian Nationalist Party, Ba‘th Party, and Muslim Brotherhood, each gained only one seat. The People's Party, which represents the interests of Aleppo's commerce and industry and aims for economic ties with Iraq, has taken power, and the problem of integration with Iraq, which has been increasing since the coup, started to move in the direction of realization. When the People's Party submitted a proposal for integration with Iraq to Parliament, Hawrani, who opposes the integration with Iraq, and Mustafa al-Siba‘i, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, violently confronted the People's Party. The National Party (al-hizb al-watani) opposed ‘the Fertile Crescent’ plan and ‘the Greater Syria’ initiative, but suddenly began to support the integration with Iraq from the end of September. In the military, a group of officers under the influence of Hawrani played a central role in strongly opposing this direction. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have also worked to prevent the unification of Iraq and Syria, in opposition to Iraq's ambitions against the backdrop of British imperialism. Domestically, Hawrani once again called on Druze officers Maj. Amin Abu ‘Assaf and Capt. Fadlullah Abu Mansur to collude. Thus, on December 19, Hawrani's formerly known Col. Adib al-Shishakuli performed a coup and overthrew the Hinnawi administration and put an end to its integration with Iraq. Initially, Shishakili remained in the army and was in control behind the scenes. He asked Khalid al-Azm to form a cabinet, while continuing the constitutional parliament, which was born in November. Hawrani has joined the Azm cabinet as Defense Minister. The Azm cabinet came to resign on May 29, 1950, six months later, due to fierce debate over the constitution and piles of economic issues, the resignation of Hawrani and Faydi alAtassi because of disagreements between the chief of staff and congress and the cabinet. After discussions between the head of state Hashim al-Atassi and the leaders of the military, Nazim al-Qudsi (the leader of the People's Party) was asked to form a cabinet, and on June 4, 1950, the Nazim al-Qudsi cabinet was born. Brig. Gen. Fawzi Selu was sent to the cabinet as defense minister from the military. Parliament adopted a new constitution in September 1950, elected Hashim al-Atassi as president, and then transferred the constitutional parliament to a regular parliament. Thus, the People's Party-dominated parliament survived, but the relationship between the ruling People's Party and the military gradually deteriorated. In particular, the Arab Socialist Party, which was founded by Hawrani in February 1952 and gained the support of innovative and poor farmers, poses a threat to the People's Party and other conservative parties, and became a factor of psychologically disruptive to their relationship with the military. In mid-September 1951, the Arab Socialist Party sponsored a peasant convention in Aleppo. Conservative politicians called for the military to be dispatched in response to the rise of the peasant movement. However, the People's Party, which has been enthusiastic about the military's failure to respond to this request, claimed that security forces should be moved under the jurisdiction of the ministry of Interior if the military does not move, and that the defense minister should be a civilian rather than a military man. It clarified the conflict with the military. Then, on November 28, when the People's Party's Ma‘ruf al-Dawalibi organized a cabinet that also served as the minister of defense, on the following day Shishakli moved the army again, causing a second coup and expelling the People's Party from the government. After this coup, Shishakli dissolved parliament, dissolved all political parties, suppressed newspaper coverage, and banned all political activities such as students, teachers, and workers. Brig. Gen. Fawzi Selu was given full legislative and administrative authority. The new cabinet represented the interests of industrialists in general. Shishakli also formed the Arab Liberation Movement in August 1952 to gain the support of the masses. Thus, Shishakli began his path to becoming a dictator while consolidating domestic controls. Shishakli’s attitude towards the Ba‘th Party was unclear. He was neither an adversary nor an ally. However, he had a friendly relationship with a prominent Ba‘th Party figures. This was to use the Ba‘th Party and the Arab Socialist Party to fight the People's Party. By the way, Hawrani of the Arab Socialist Party was one of the best friends. However, Shishakli's dissolution of parliament in December 1951, the dissolution of political parties in April 1952, the suppression of farmers and direction to his dictatorship have made him an enemy of most political forces, including his allies Hawrani and Ba‘th members. Members of the Arab Socialist Party and the Ba‘th Party secretly worked with military personnel to disband the Arab Liberation Movement and plan to regain freedom of political activity. Shishakli sensed this move and arrested members of the Arab Socialist Party, the Ba‘th Party, and Communist Party in December 1952. Hawrani, Aflaq and Bitar were also included in this, but they then escaped from prison and fled to Lebanon(29). The army also initially supported Shishakli, but turned the back on Shishakli as he intervened deeply in politics, took a cold attitude toward the army, and dismissed officers. By 1954, these opposition groups, whether right or left, were demanding a radical change in political structure. A group of political powers, centered on traditional politicians, formed the National Front (jabha wataniya) in Homs and declared that they would fight Shishakili. Students also demonstrated and performed radical actions in cities such as Aleppo, Damascus and Homs. Local politicians actively supported the actions of these students. Thus, on February 25, 1954, the Shishakli administration was overthrown by an army uprising instigated by a large student movement. The main proponents of this coup were Capt. Mustafa Hamdun, Maj. Faisal al-Atassi, and Col. Amin Abu ‘Assaf, who represented a major group of anti-Shishakli coalition forces. Capt. Hamdun was the birth of Hama, Hawrani's best friend, and a member of the Ba‘th Party. He represented the political forces of Hawrani and the Ba‘th Party. Maj. Atassi was Hashim al-Atassi’s nephew and represented a traditional Homs group. Col. Abu ‘Assaf was from the Druze faction and represented the Druze faction that was borne the brunt of the Shishakli attack(30). Now, during the five-year military junta from March 1949 to February 1954, the Ba‘th Party encountered the following three problems. The first is the crisis within the leadership, the second is the Iraq-Syria coalition, and the third is the merger with the Arab Socialist Party. First, the Husni al-Za‘im coup had a huge impact on the Ba‘th Party. From the end of May to June 1949, the Ba‘th Party issued a statement condemning the Za‘im administration. In response, Za‘im arrested and imprisoned members of the Ba‘th Party executive committee (Aflaq, Bitar, Wahib al-Ghanim, Jalal al-Sayyed) who signed the statement. At this time, Aflaq wrote a letter from prison to Za‘im. This sown suspicion within the party and, in turn, caused discord within the party leadership. It is said that in this letter, Aflaq apologized to Za‘im and announced that he would withdraw from politics(31). However, it is not clear whether this letter was written by Aflaq, or if someone else wrote it and Aflaq was only forced to sign it, but the signature itself was Aflaq's(32). Aflaq hasn't said anything about this since then. Therefore, rumors flew, distrust spread to the party's leadership, and signs of division appeared. In particular, Bitar and Jalal alSayyed allegedly tried to drive Aflaq out of party leadership(33). Jalal al-Sayyed was influenced by the People's Party’s position and ‘the Fertile Crescent’ plan. Bitar was trying to exert personal leadership within the party(34) while joining the Jalal al-Sayyed camp. Other groups also met in Homs after the collapse of the Za‘im administration. The group nominated Wahib al-Ghanim as leader instead of Aflaq. Ghanim became famous after the 1947 elections, his speech was good, his voice was good, his passion was passionate, and he was ideal for the youth of the party(35). After this meeting, another meeting was held by Sami al-Jundi and others. The organizers invited Ghanim, but Ghanim declined because he couldn’t leave Latakia. Organizers proposed moving the party’s headquarters to Latakia and setting up a new executive committee in Damascus, but Ghanim also refused this idea. Ghanim did not break the principle that the party leader must be the party leader, the head of the party executive committee(36). These two meetings were the first to be held without the knowledge of party leaders (Aflaq, Bitar, and Jalal al-Sayyed). These signs of division within the Ba‘th Party, especially the struggle within the leadership, were the first shocks since the birth of the Ba‘th Party. The effects of this shock did not disappear immediately and were trailing until Jalal al-Sayyed left the party in 1955. The second. Iraq-Syria coalition proposal was the first and concrete proposal after the party's inauguration for the practice of the Ba‘th Party's basic goal of ‘unification of the Arabs’. Moreover, it should be noted that domestic political powers confronted each other over the pros and cons of this proposal, and the coup led to a series of changes in government. The Iraq-Syria Union Plan was proposed by Iraq. The Iraqi Istiqlal Party had agreed with Iraqi authorities at the time to achieve Iraq-Syria integration. A delegation of members of this party, Fa’iq al-Samr’'i, Saddiq Shanshal, and Salman al-Safwani(37), came to the Ba‘th Party office. They demanded the signing of consent to the documents of the Iraq-Syria Union draft. According to them, they had already obtained consent documents from the two major political parties at the time, the People's Party and the National Party, and also wanted to obtain consent from the Ba‘th Party. The Ba‘th Party discussed this issue among members of the executive committee, Aflaq, Bitar, Jalal alSayyed and Wahib al-Ghanim, but did not eventually sign this document(38). Opposition to the Iraq-Syria Union Plan was also seen outside Syria. Egypt had already frustrated Hashemites ‘the Fertile Crescent’ plan with the formation of the Arab League in 1945(39), again seeing it as Hashemites’ ambition against the backdrop of British conspiracy and opposed the plan. He clarified a policy of sparing material and mental assistance to prevent this plan. Saudi Arabia, like Egypt, strongly opposed the Iraq-Syria Union Plan. Again, this is in opposition to Hashemites' growing power. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and even France and the United States approached the Syrian army. They persuaded military leaders and politicians influential in the military to believe : the plan is a British plot, the purpose of which is to disrupt Syria's independence and incorporate it into the British framework with Iraq, thus abolishing the republic and bringing in a royal system(40). Syria was exactly the stage for the capture of imperialist forces. The Ba‘th Party's view of the plan was published on January 9, 1950. For the Ba‘th Party, whose basic task is to unify the Arabs, the Iraq-Syrian Union, which is a step toward that, was not in principle a disapproval. However, he could not agree with the plan behind the imperialist plot. Furthermore, the division within the party leadership as mentioned above was reflected in this plan, and there was a disagreement. Thus, the Ba‘th Party statement was a statement that could be read as either for or against. Iraq understood from this statement that the Ba‘th Party was against the plan(41). The Ba‘th Party regarded this plan as a plot of British imperialism. Therefore, in order to realize this plan, it must be attached the following condition(42) that the British-Iraq treaty should be amended so that this union is not a means of exploiting the people and does not subordinate the people to the control of reactionary feudal forces, the Ba‘th party answered. This condition was not feasible for Iraq. In other words, the division within the party leadership could not be unified, and the difference in opinion within the leadership was expressed as it was, so the attitude of the Ba‘th Party became extremely vague, both for and against. He then threw back the unlikely conditions for Iraq and eventually expressed his opposition to the plan. Third. The merger with the Arab Socialist Party was one of the most significant events in the history of the Ba‘th Party. The merger was a revolutionary shock to the Ba‘th Party. It vibrated the party's pillars and brought about structural changes. The ties between the party and the army have also become stronger. And the political tide of the party was transformed into another new political tide. The Arab Socialist Party had a local character that was active mainly in the rural areas of Hama. After that, college students and military academy students joined the party. The Arab Socialist Party, like the Ba‘th Party, did not ban party members from admission to the military academy or military personnel. Akram al-Hawrani, the leader of the party, was not only the most active politician in politics at the time, but also had a great deal of power in the army due to his strong ties to officers. And the Arab Socialist Party regarded the Ba‘th Party as a cultural circle rather than a political party, and a student committee. In contrast, the Ba‘th Party regarded Arab Socialist Party as a regionalist party and lacking an ethnic spirit(43). In 1951, the Ba‘th Party, which has an idealistic and ideological character, and the Arab Socialist Party, which has a realistic and practical character, began negotiations for a merger. Hawrani from the Arab Socialist Party and Aflaq, Bitar, and Jalal al-Sayyed from the Ba‘th Party attended. Hawrani aggressively insisted on the merger, with Aflaq and Bitar in favor, but Jalal al-Sayyed strongly opposed. Hawrani and Jalal al-Sayyed argued over how to achieve the party's goals. Jalal al-Sayyed was opposed to using the army to achieve the party's objectives.(44) Thus, the Ba‘th Party has submitted the following five conditions as a prerequisite for the merger. However, this condition was created by Jalal al-Sayyed. 1) The platform of the new party after the merger shall be the platform of the current Ba‘th Party, and no word-for-word correction shall be made to it. 2) The new party’s rules should be the existing order system of the Ba‘th Party. 3) The leadership will consist of four people, including Hawrani. 4) Members of the Arab Socialist Party must complete the procedures for each individual to join the Ba‘th Party. Do not allow all parties to join the party. 5) The name of the new party should be the Arab Ba‘th Party.(45) For the final condition, Aflaq and Bitar persuaded Jalal al-Sayyed to agree to add the name ‘socialism’ to it. On the other hand, the Arab Socialist Party agreed to the other conditions 1) to 4), and the merger was concluded here(46), and the Arab Ba‘th Socialist Party (hizb al-ba‘th al-‘arabi al-ishtiraki) [From now on, it will be simply referred to as the Ba‘th Party] was born. The merger is considered to be completed at the end of 1952. There is a theory that this is 1953(47), but Sami al-Jundi believes that January 26, 1952, when the two parties entered into a secret struggle against the Shishakli administration, was a de facto merger of the two parties(48). Jalal al-Sayyed also noted that three Ba‘th Party leaders (Aflaq, Bitar, and Hawrani) fled to Beirut after the merger(49), which was in early January 1953. In addition, Patrick Seale states that the merger is NovemberDecember 1952(50). The National Command states it was the end of 1952(51). From the above, it is appropriate to consider the merger to be at the end of 1952. This merger with the Arab Socialist Party also caused the Ba‘th Party to shake significantly in the future. Next, I would like to touch on the Ba‘th Party's external issues during this period. There were two problems in relation to Arab politics. The clash between the United States and Britain, and its reflection in Arab, especially Syria, and the Egyptian coup on July 23, 1952. Regarding the former, the Ba‘th, as mentioned above, has stated that it opposes separatist and isolated policies, supports unification and coalition, but opposes deceptive integration plans. He took the direction of maintaining Syria’s independence and freedom and supporting an innovative republican regime(52). The Ba‘th Party was forced to respond reluctantly to the latter Egyptian revolution on July 23. This Egyptian revolution was carried out at the height of the people's anger at the corrupt Royal system, Pre-modern social system, and foreign occupation. However, at that time the clashes of imperialist forces in the Arab region intensified, especially as a coup in Syria. It also appeared as a plan to annex Syria into other powerful regions and as a repression of innovative national movements. Moreover, from 1952 to 1954, the Ba‘th Party was in a fierce conflict with the Shishakli military regime. The Shishakli administration was trying to join forces with the Egyptian revolutionary government(53). Under these circumstances, the Ba‘th Party had to take a reluctant attitude when the substance of the Egyptian revolutionary government was not yet clarified. However, when Nasser's leadership and policies in the revolutionary government became clear and it became clear that the revolutionary government was an innovative nationalist movement in Arab, the Ba‘th Party positively evaluated it and began to take a direction of cooperation for Arab national struggle. Next is the attitude of the Ba‘th Party in international affairs. In the process of forming the framework of the East-West confrontation from the ‘Iron Curtain’ in March 1946 to the establishment of NATO in April 1949, the positive neutral position of the Ba‘th Party was revealed. The Ba‘th Party was originally hostile to Western capitalist countries. Even to the eastern socialist countries, they took a warning attitude similar to hostility, especially when the Palestinian partition plan was approved in November 1947. In the midst of the offensive of imperialism invasion, the Ba‘th Party was the first in the Arab nationalist movement to express its positive neutrality towards the East-West confrontation. It was resolved by the party's council(54) at the end of 1950, and in early 1951, it clearly called for positive neutrality. He appealed to the Arab League in the form of a warning that he ‘does not belong to either camp’ and ‘maintains true neutrality so that the Arabs do not become a military base for Western imperialists’. Notes chapter 4 Attempt to Unify the Arabs (1) (1) Muta‘ Safadi, op.cit., P. 68. (2) The word halaqa was a study session where students gathered around Aflaq and Arusuzi, but since this became the core of the Ba'ath movement, it is the name of the smallest unit at the end of the Ba'th Party organization. It seems that this word was used in. (3) Michel H. Van Dusen, "Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria", The Middle East Journal, vol. 26,1972, p.133. (4) Ibid., p. 130. (5) Ibid., p. 133. (6) Jalal al-Sayyed, p. 134. (7) Ibid., p. 135. (8) Shibli al-‘Aisami, Vol. 2, p.190. (9) Ibid., pp. 191, 192, 194. (10) Ibid., p. 228-29.; Suleiman Michel, Political parties in Lebanon, Cornell Univ. Press, 1967. p. 124. (11) Shibli al-‘Aisami, Vol.1, p. 84.; Abd al Majid al-Rafei is nationalist, medical doctor, and politician, born in Toripoli in 1927. (12) Shibli al-‘Aisami, Vol. 2, p. 228. (13) Ibid., pp. 230-32. (14) Shibli al-‘Aisami, Vol.1, pp. 86-87 .; Vol. 2, pp.200-01 .; Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, Washington, 1978, p. 10. (15) Shibli al-‘Aisami, Vol.1, p. 86 .; Vol. 2, pp.200-01 .; Majid Khadduri, ibid., p. 9. (16) Shibli al-‘Aisami, Vol.1, pp. 41-43. (17) Ibid., pp. 81-82 .; Shibli al-‘Aisami, Vol. 2, pp.257-59. The party council is not a party convention. Representatives from each region gathered and held in November 1947, April 1949, the end of 1949, the end of 1950, and July 1951, between the 1st and 2nd party conventions. It is a representative meeting from each region. It can be inferred that it was equivalent to the later meeting of the National Command. There are no sentences or rules explaining this council. (18) Shibli al-‘Aisami, Vol.1, pp. 44-45 .; nidal hizb, p. 27. (19) Shibli al-‘Aisami, Vol.1, p. 45. (20) Ibid., p. 45. (21) Edmund Asfour, Syria: Development and Monetary Policy, Harvard Univ. Press (3rd Edition), pp. 46-54. (22) Jalal al-Sayyed, pp. 51-55. (23) He had been the Chief of the Police and Public Security Bureau since 1948, but was appointed Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army on June 1, 1948, and at the same time was granted promotion to Brig. Gen. General in June 1944. (24) nidal hizb, p. 29. (25) Ibid., p. 30 .; Sami al-Jundi, pp. 53- 54. (26) The ranks of each officer at the time of the coup on August 14 are as shown here according to Patrick Seale, but in the Arabic translation of the same book by Patrick Seale, each officer has become one rank higher. For example, Hinnawi is Brig. Gen., Kallas is Brig. Gen., Qawwas is Col., and Assaf is Lt. Col.. Also, according to the Memoirs of Khalid al-Azm, Hinnawi was a Maj. Gen. and chief of staff when Shishakli launched a coup on December 19, 1949. From this, it is probable that Hinnawi was promoted to General and became chief of staff after the successful coup on August 14, as is customary in the Syrian army. (sources) Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria, London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1965, pp. 73-74 .; Khalid al-Azm, mudhakkirat Khalid al-Azm, Beirut, 1973, Vol. 2, pp. 226-27. (27) Patrick Seale, ibid., p. 74. (28) This cabinet was as follows. Hashim al-Atassi (Prime Minister), Khalid al-Azm (Minister of Finance), Rushdi al-Kikhiya (Internal Minister), Nazim al-Qudsi (Foreign Minister), Abdallah Atfah (Minister of Defense), Adil al-Azmeh (Minister of State), Faydi al -Atassi (Minister of Economy), Fathullah Asiyun (Minister of State), Najid alDin al-Jahiri (Minister of Public Works), Sami Kabara (Minister of Justice), Michel Aflaq (Minister of Education), Akram al-Hawrani (Minister of Agriculture). (source) ‘al-hayat’ newspaper (August 7th) (29) Sami al-Jundi, p. 62. (30) Patrick Seale, op.cit., p. 141. (31) nidal hizb, p. 31.; Jalal al-Sayyed, p. 62.; Sami al-Jundi, p. 54. (32) Sami al-Jundi, pp. 54-55. (33) nidal hizb, p. 35. Sami al-Jundi, p. 54. (34) Ibid., p. 36. (35) Sami al-Jundi, p. 55. This meeting seems to belong to the Arusuzi group. (36) Ibid., p. 56. (37) Jalal al-Sayyed, p. 291. (38) Aflaq was leaning towards signing, but he didn't sign in the end. Jalal al-Sayyed, pp. 69, 292. (39) In 1942-43, Iraq unveiled plans to unite Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan, but Egypt advocated that each country maintain a sovereign state and form a federation of sovereign states. As a result Iraq’s plan was shattered, then Hashemites' ambitions have been thwarted. (40) Jalal al-Sayyed, p. 70.; nidal hizb, pp. 37-38. (41) Jalal al-Sayyed, p. 73 (42) Sami al-Jundi, p. 59. (43) Jalal al-Sayyed, pp. 96-99. (44) Ibid , pp. 102, 103, 107. (45) Ibid., pp. 103-04. (46) Ibid., p. 104. (47) John F. Devlin, the Ba’th party, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1976, p. 64. (48) Sami al-Jundi, p. 62. (49) Jalal al-Sayyed, p. 105. (50) Patrick Seale, op. cit., p. 158. (51) nidal hizb, p. 37. (52) Ibid. ,p. 39. (53) Ibid., p. 40. (54) Shibli al-‘Aisami, Vol. 2., pp. 257-59 Chapter 5 Attempt to Unify the Arabs (2) Shishakli’s coup frustrated ‘the Greater Syria’ initiative and ‘the Fertile Crescent’ plan and destroyed the imperialist conspiracy behind them. The collapse of one of the imperialist plots soon led to another plot. It was the birth of the Egyptian=Saudi Arabian Axis with American and French imperialism behind it, trying to isolate Syria from the whole Arab. Shishakli was able to stay in power between 1952-53. From the end of 1953 to the beginning of 1954, a plot of American and British imperialism was planned. This was an attempt to draw Syria into the anti-communist line, the Baghdad Treaty, which included Iran, Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. While Shishakili and the Ba‘th Party faced each other, traditional feudal rulers and commercial bourgeoisies allied and faced the Shishakili administration under the command of the People's Party. The alliance failed in 1949-51 attempts to draw Syria into ‘the Fertile Crescent’ plan and the Hashemites’ ‘the Greater Syria’ initiative. They were looking to overthrow the Shishakli government in a coup, gain power, and incorporate Syria into the Baghdad Treaty. The People's Party once moved Sami al-Hinnawi in 1949 to successfully coup against Za’im, but this time things weren’t as easy as it was then. That is because the mass movement grew and became involved in the struggle. The defeat of the Palestinian War ended the rule of notables, and the era has arrived in which the people influence the situation. And the masses and progressive nationalist parties came to be at the center of the Arab liberation movement. There was a mass movement with strong leadership and a broad foundation(1). Moreover, this movement has also eroded the army(2). Reactionary and imperialist forces were no longer able to use military officers. Therefore, when they tried to coup against Shishakli in 1954 for their own benefit and for the benefit of the Baghdad Treaty, an innovative ethnic force allied with the Ba‘th forces in the army decided to suppress these reactionary forces. And this alliance of Ba‘th Party military faction and innovative nationalist forces mobilized the masses and troops to take the lead in overthrowing Shishakli(3). Thus, on February 25, 1954, the Shishakli administration finally collapsed. The overthrow of the Shishakli administration under the leadership of the Ba‘th Party had a major impact not only on Syrian nationalist and socialist forces, but also on the Arab liberation movement as a whole. Already in Egypt, a coup on July 23, 1952 created the revolutionary government of Nasser. The Nasser revolutionary government was the first Arab government to try to connect ethnic and socialist issues in practice. It sought to clarify the character of the Arab liberation movement and promote the alliance of the liberation movement in Arab countries, that is, national unity. The Ba‘th Party and the Nasser revolutionary government, although different in their methods, have come to an alliance due to the same in the struggle for liberation from imperialism and reactionaryism and the goal of national unity. From 1954 to 1958, this alliance developed into a resistance front against reactionary forces and American imperialism in Arab countries. Then there were the Algerian revolution, the battle against the three-country invasion in the Suez crisis, and the July 14 revolution in Iraq. The pinnacle of these mass movements against imperialist and reactionary struggles was the unification of Egypt and Syria in 1958 (the establishment of the United Arab Republic). This 1954-58 stage was the most violent period of the mass liberation movement in Syria against reactionary and imperialist forces such as traditional rulers and commercial bourgeoisies. It was a time when the power of the general public reached its peak. The Ba‘th Party movement with three pillars (unity, socialism and freedom) also reached the golden age at this time, because he positioned the working masses as a hotbed of a true revolution. The Ba‘th party thought that it is the Arab working masses who wait national unity, seek social justice, and hope to be free from the past suffering from dictatorship and exploitation. 1. Two types of deviations The Ba‘th Party, as an avant-garde of the mass movement during this period, developed a very fulfilling activity, in order to protect democracy and freedom from reactionary forces internally, and to protect Arab liberation from imperialist forces externally, that is, independence and freedom. However, in parallel with the development of such political movements, at the same time, an organizational crisis within the party was also in progress. In this section, the organizational issues of the Ba‘th Party and the development of the movement will be dealt with. As already mentioned in Chapter 3, the Ba‘th Party’s journey was extremely difficult. The Ba‘th Party thought that before aiming for an Inqilab (revolution) in the administration, a comprehensive Inqilab in the spirit of the masses should be implemented and that prior to the practice from above by the state, the practice in the spirit structure of the masses from below should be done. According to Ba‘th party, the issue of seizing power should be an issue after the struggle of the masses, not an issue that should be set prior to this. However, the path of this difficult and long struggle has turned to frustration. It is a deviation from the Ba‘th Party line. The first signs of this deviation were the manifestation of political and military tendencies. (1) Political tendencies have emerged since the merger with the Arab Socialist Movement, led by Hawrani, in 1952. Wherever there is a parliamentary system, parties will have to participate in political activities, participate in election campaigns, and send their representatives to parliament. Even if the party is aware that there is a contradiction in the deceptive parliamentary system, and that what contradiction exists between the claim of democracy and the government and parliamentary monopoly by traditional rulers and bourgeoisies, it’s only natural. The Ba‘th Party did not oppose the parliamentary system. The Ba‘th Party didn't think the parliamentary system was inconsistent with the Ba‘th Party’s idea of revolution, but opposed using the parliamentary system to deceive the will of the people. Also, the Ba‘th Party opposed that a handful group of traditional rulers and bourgeoisie make use of the parliamentary system to secure their own interests. The Ba‘th Party fully understood the major contradictions lurking in the parliamentary system under the monopoly of the government. If the Ba‘th Party participated in the election campaign under the bourgeoisie administration, it was not to replace the method of revolution with elections. It was one of the ways to awaken the masses and reveal the contradiction between the claims of liberty given in Congress and the reality of exploitation hidden in Congress. However, as seen in the withdrawal of Jalal al-Sayyed in August 1955, the Ba‘th Party split due to political tactics and the trap of an intergovernmental alliance. In May 1956, the Ba‘th Party established a national charter with the People's Party and the National Party and established a cooperative system. This shows that he neglects the party's principles to realize his current interests and is willing to compromise with hostile parties to get a chair in parliament and government. Thus, during the period from the merger of the Arab Ba‘th Party with the Arab Socialist Party to the unification of Egypt and Syria, the Ba‘th Party was pushing and answering between the revolutionary and political directions. The stronger the flow in one, the weaker the flow in the other. This raised concerns that the Ba‘th Party would split and return to the original Arab Ba‘th Party and the Arab Socialist Party. These two directions are a struggle between revolutionary thinking and improved thinking, the former being a group with a cautious, idealistic and ideological tendency, while the latter being hasty and realistic i.e. a political action-oriented group. The former was the Aflaq group, who considered future interests rather than current cheap ones, and believed that continued struggle could realize the basic interests of the masses. The latter was a group led by Hawrani and Abdallah al-Rimawi, who thought that it was necessary to take control immediately at any cost in order to achieve the purpose of the movement, and that it couldn’t be realized through some slow mass movements. The conflict between the two has continued since then, but it has not been enough to basically break the overall flow of the Ba‘th Party. However, this conflict has been constantly criticized by the party’s foundations and leadership. (2) The second deviation, the military tendency, was a phenomenon of military coups. The Egyptian revolution of 1952 had a great influence on this tendency. Moreover, it was no wonder that the above-mentioned political tendency (its hasty group in particular) was behind this tendency. In fact, Hawrani had a great influence on the political world at the time, and at the same time, he was able to exert a great deal of influence on military officers. Prior to the merger with the Arab Socialist Party, the Ba‘th Party believed in the mass movement and the mass party organization, and regarded them as the purpose and means of the struggle. The Ba‘th Party was thinking that the liberation of the masses cannot be done from the outside, and the mere historical events and accidental changes of government that do not prepare the mass base, would not radically change the real situation, even if it changes superficially. Therefore, the Ba‘th Party was generally opposed to military coups and juntas. However, this did not prohibit support for a military coup. And in 1949, when three coups happened, the Ba‘th Party opposed the Husni alZa'im coup, supported the Sami al-Hinnawi coup, and opposed the Adib al-Shishakli coup. The army is part of the nation and forms only one section of the nation as a whole. And the same emotions that move the spirits of the people (for example, hope and suffering) also affect the spirits of military personnel. It is not surprising that the progressive nationalist movement represented by the Ba‘th Party has resonated with military personnel. In particular, after the defeat of the Palestinian War in 1948, Arab countries were forced to strengthen their troops, putting them at the center of the Arab struggle. Under these circumstances, it was not surprising that the Ba‘th Party, especially the Ba‘th Party ideology, resonated with the Arab army during its formation. The army was not a political party and was not equipped with any special political views or idealisms. And, in the army, those who follow the ideology of the Ba‘th Party have appeared. The Ba‘th Party does not leave the troops that are part of these people, especially military groups (officers, noncommissioned officers) who believe in ‘ba‘th’, and it was also unnatural for these military groups to survive only as a personal relationship between these officers and the party's leaders. Thus , the Ba‘th Party began to organize the army. However, this also provided a great deal of direction for the future development of the Ba‘th Party. This is because the danger of a military coup or junta is inversely proportional to the mass movement, and the stronger one is, the weaker the other. In the development of the Ba‘th Party, the mass movement was prosperous in the 1940s and 1950s, but when this mass movement was suppressed and weakened by the merger with Egypt, military tendencies came to the fore. To avoid this danger, a close bond of mass organizations, including the military, was needed. Now, the success of the Nasser coup in 1952 had a great influence on the Ba‘th Party movement. It has emerged, in particular, as a question of the method of struggle. The question was whether to use a military coup as a method of struggle or to stick to the direction of the national mass movement. In other words, it was a choice of whether like Nasser, to gain power in a coup and then took a direction to revolutionize social relations, or to continue the mass movement and solidify the footsteps of the movement step by step and then gain power. The Ba‘th Party had answered this question, theoretically, before the emergence of Nasser. The Ba‘th Party opposed the military coup, saying that the consciousness and conviction of the masses that could achieve unity, freedom and socialism came from struggle and suffering(4). However, this direction changed significantly after the success of the 1952 Nasser coup. In 1952-58, the Arab nationalist revolutionary forces, especially the Ba‘th Party, set out the direction of mutual cooperation with the Egyptian revolutionary government. The Ba‘th Party and the Egyptian revolutionary government argued that they could complement each other. This was the Ba‘th Party’s theoretical view(5). However, in reality, in addition to this attitude, yet another practical attitude has emerged. Some members of the Ba‘th Party and most of the left-wing groups of the Arab nationalist movement have come to expect the army as an easy and urgent way. Then, a group emerged that deviated from the difficult struggle based on the original mass line of the Ba‘th Party and aimed at the easy direction. The Ba‘th Party has left such a hasty elements behind. Therefore, the direction of this deviation was then led by several officers throughout history in the name of the Ba‘th Party. The effects of this deviation emerged in the early 1960s when the Ba‘th Party came to power. 2. Development of the Ba‘th Party movement The Ba‘th Party’s powers in the Shishakli dictatorship were in a group of four leaders, Aflaq, Bitar, Jalal al-Sayyed and Hawrani. Organization at the Pan-Arab level was an urgent task for the Ba‘th Party at the time. In June, four months after the collapse of the Shishakli government, the first national congress was held after the establishment convention, and representatives from Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon participated in this second National Congress. At this congress the following themes became the main issues(6). 1) About the situation in Syria after the collapse of the Shishakli dictatorship, the situation in Arab after the Egyptian revolution on July 23, and the political situation such as imperialist aggression. 2) About the party rules. 3) Election of National Command The executive committee established at the 1947 founding convention was abolished and replaced by Regional Command in each region and National Command for the party as a whole. In addition, the ‘leader’ was abolished and a ‘secretary general’ was appointed. Under the National Command, three organizations were established: the Politburo, the Administrative Bureau, and the Secretariat. The National Command consisted of Aflaq as general secretary and other members of Hawrani (Syrian) , Bitar (Syrian), Fu’ad al-Rikabi (Iraqi), ‘Ali Jaber(Lebanese), Abdallah al-Rimawi (Jordanian), and Abdallah Na‘was (Jordanian)(7). At this second National Congress, Pan-Arab organization of the party was established, as a result of it, the struggle and attitude towards reactionary and imperialist plots and Zionist plots was strengthened. In that sense, the congress was the starting point for the expansion of the Ba‘th Party in the Arab region. By the way, in 1954, the Shishakli government collapsed, the constitutional government was revived, and free elections were held. This put an end to the Ba‘th Party’s ongoing struggle under the military regime. From then on, in the late 1950s, the Ba‘th Party had the immediate task of achieving the party’s basic goal of unifying the Arab people. However, this period was a time when the Syrian political affairs developed rapidly due to the large-scale conspiracy of domestic reactionary forces, imperialist forces affiliated with them, and their minions. After the second National Congress in June 1954 and the general election in September, the Ba‘th Party’s concern over Arab policy was the movement of Egypt. In Egypt, Naseer won the power struggle in the revolutionary government on July 23, and the Nasser government was born in 1954. The British-Egyptian Treaty, which the Nasser administration agreed at the end of July and signed in October, was criticized by Syria and other Arab countries. The Ba‘th Party also blamed this violently. The provision that ‘British troops will return when Arab countries or Turkey are attacked’ was seen as a link between Egypt and NATO. It was also because the United States had approved the creation of an Egyptian-led Arab collective security agreement supported by Western Europe. In short, Nasser sought the help of American imperialism in the fight against British imperialism. Syria, which refuses to have military ties with Europe, opposed such policies of the Nasser administration, both right and left. At the same time, the Muslim Brotherhood, who opposed the treaty, was expelled from Egypt and moved to Syria, where they conducted an opposition campaign. against the Nasser administration in Cairo. In response, Nasser urged the Syrian government to expel Muslim Brotherhood leaders from Syria. However, Syria’s rejection of this request put Egypt-Syria relations in crisis in late 1954. Relations between Egypt and Syria changed significantly from 1955 to early 1956. The Turkey-Iraq Agreement in January 1955 (which became the Baghdad Treaty the following February) posed a great threat to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The two countries have actively worked on Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, especially Syria, to create an anti-Baghdad treaty regime. For this reason, Saudi Arabia has actively promoted acquisitions of journalists, politicians, officers, etc. in these countries(8). The Khuri cabinet(9) of Syria resigned on February 13, 1955 due to the pressure of the people instigated by the campaign in Saudi Arabia-Egypt, and the Sabri al-‘Asali cabinet(10) was born by joint effort of the Ba‘th Party, Khalid al-Azm Bloc, and the National Party's anti-Iraqi faction. At that time, the political leaders were Sabri al-‘Asali, Khalid al-Azm, and Akram al-Hawrani. Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s invitation to the Ba‘th Party, the Communist Party, the Azm Bloc, and the National Party's anti-Iraqi factions for the Anti-Baghdad Treaty Federation, was becoming more and more powerful, but the ‘Asali cabinet has taken a cautious stance. On the other hand, pro-Iraqi reactionary forces have sought to join the Baghdad Treaty. And as the pressure of the reactionary forces increased, Syria began to compromise with the Soviet Union(11). However, at the Bandung Conference in April 1955, a Syrian delegation (led by Khalid al-Azm) confirmed political neutrality. Domestic conflicts over the Baghdad Treaty have also intensified. The Ba‘th Party has partnered with innovators to counter reactionary forces. The assassination of Col. Adnan al-Maliki, deputy Chief of Staff, by Syrian Nationalist Serg. Yunis Abdul Rahim on April 22 was at its peak. Disagreements(12) within the military with a group of officers led by Col. Maliki, the most influential leader of the independents, and officers group centered on Ghassan Jadid of the Syrian Nationalist Party were also part of the cause, but it was a plot for reactionaries to overthrow the government by using the pro-Western, fanatical Syrian Nationalist Party. The Ba‘th Party, in the position of the anti-Syrian Nationalist Party and the anti-Baghdad treaty, conducted a campaign in partnership with the Communists. The cooperation between the Ba‘th Party and the Communists on this antiBaghdad treaty laid the foundation for their subsequent joint struggle. Nationalists were also furious at the Maliki incident. And, taking advantage of the anti-Western trend, the Ba‘th Party and the Communist Party rapidly increased in power. In particular, Hawrani and Khalid Bakdash, the general secretary of the Communist Party, have come to be regarded as Syria's most capable politician. However, the Ba‘th Party was defeated in the August presidential election. The Ba‘th Party supported Khalid al-Azm in association with the Communist Party, the Azm Group, and the Nationalist anti-Iraqi Group, but Shukri al-Quwatli won. Shukri al-Quwatli was supported by Saudi Arabia and Egypt trying to incorporate Syria into the anti-Baghdad Treaty. This is because the People's Party, which was acquired by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, was finally on the side of Quwatli. Then Azm and Wahib al-Ghanim (minister from Ba‘th party) resigned as ministers, and the ‘Asali cabinet resigned. Thus, in September, the Sa‘id al-Ghazzi conservative coalition government was formed(13), centered on the People's Party, independents, and democratic blocs. Now, the Ba‘th Party’s evaluation of the Nasser administration has shown signs of change since Nasser showed a positive neutral direction at the Bandung Conference in April. This is because the Ba‘th Party’s declaration of neutrality seven years ago has now been confirmed as a policy of the Nasser administration. The Ba‘th Party’s attitude towards the Nasser administration changed decisively on September 27, when Nasser declared the purchase of weapons from Czechoslovakia. By breaking the Western monopoly on arms sales, Nasser quickly gained fame, which had been rising since the Bandung Conference, and became a national hero in the Arab world. As a result, the Ba‘th Party has changed its reputation for Nasser and, contrary to the past, has taken the direction of promoting cooperation and unity with the Nasser administration. The praise for the Nasser administration, which gained Arab trust by declaring the purchase of weapons from Czechoslovakia, spread to the Syrian people. And the Syrian people, who began to show the tide of pro-Egypt, began to demand an agreement with Egypt. Pushed by the pressure of the people, the Syrian government signed the EgyptSyria Mutual Defense Agreement on October 20. In November, the Ba‘th Party again confronted the reactionaries. Over Homs’ byelections, the Ba‘th Party formed a joint front with the Communist and the National Party’s anti-Iraqi factions and confronted conservatives of the People’s Party and Islamic Bloc, who spoke for reactionaries. The former revolutionary group recommended the neutral trade unionist Ahmad al-Hajj Yunis and defeated the latter recommended Rasim al-Akhras. By the way, the change in the attitude of the Ba‘th Party toward the Nasser administration and the direction of unification with Egypt further progressed from the end of 1955 to 1956. It’s not hard to imagine that within the Ba‘th Party leadership, there would have been a disagreement between an idealistic group like Aflaq and a pragmatic group like Hawrani. However, this disagreement was eventually adjusted towards the latter(14). The first trade union meeting was held in Damascus in March 1956, attended by trade unionists from Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Libya. The success of this first conference further boosted the momentum for Arab unification. Thus, the Ba‘th Party made clear that the unification with Egypt would be the first step toward the unification of the Arabs through June, triggered by the celebration of the withdrawal of French troops on April 16(15). The government, which has shown a favorable attitude toward French imperialism, succumbed to the resistance of the people supporting the Algerian independence struggle, and the coalition' cabinet of Sa‘id al-Ghazzi collapsed. Instead, on June 14, the National Coalition cabinet was formed by Sabri al-‘Asali(16). The Ba‘th Party entered the cabinet on the condition that it promoted dialogue on unity with Egypt. What's more, he won major posts as Foreign Minister and National Economy Minister. Thus, once the direction of the Ba‘th Party was confirmed in the new cabinet, the Ba‘th Party began more practical action towards unification. The most symbolic event was the Ba‘th Party telegram to Nasser on June 29. In this telegram, the Ba‘th Party praised Nasser for liberating Egypt from oppression, corruption and imperialism. He added that the Arab people expected Nasser to: 1) Realization of socialist and democratic ‘fairness’ in Egypt, 2) Support for the Arab struggle, 3) Unification of Egypt and Syria as the first step toward the unification of the liberated Arab as a whole(17). As a result of this positive attitude of the Ba‘th Party, on July 5, 1956, the ‘Asali cabinet declared the establishment of a ‘Ministerial Committee for the Unification of Egypt and Syria’. Prime Minister ‘Asali's declaration was approved by Parliament, and Prime Minister ‘Asali (the National Party), Ahmad Qanbar (People's Party), and Salah al-Bitar (the Ba‘th Party) were elected as members of the Syrian side. In the midst of signs that the unification of Syria and Egypt, which are the basic pillars of the Arab liberation movement, was about to be realized, conspiracies of domestic reactionary and imperialist forces were planned, and the direction of unification was to be blocked until the end of 1957. The realization of cooperation between Syria and Egypt, the emergence of Egypt’s dominance over Syria, the growing influence of the Ba‘th Party and the Communist Party within Syria, and the formation of a joint front by both parties, all of this posed a great threat to the Nuri al-Sa‘id administration in Iraq. So Nuri al-Sa‘id sought to overthrow the Syrian government and at the same time eliminate the Ba‘th Party and Communist Party forces with the support of the United States, the proponent of the Baghdad Treaty. Members of the People's Party and the Constitutional Bloc, some members of the National Party, and members of the deported Syrian Nationalist Party participated in the Iraqi plot. The plot was unraveled from summer to autumn under ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Sarraj, director of military intelligence, and was tried in a military court headed by Afif al-Bizri in December 1956. However, most of the criminals had fled the country. Among those convicted were Adib al-Shishakli (former president), Munir alAjlani (constitutional bloc, former minister of law), ‘Adnan al-Atassi (People's Party, son to former president Hashim al-Atassi), Hasan al-Atrash (Prince of the Druze Atrash family, former Minister of State), Faydi al-Atassi (People's Party, former Foreign Minister) and others. There have also been attacks by imperialist forces trying to isolate Egypt. On July 26, that year, Nasser declared the nationalization of the Suez Canal. With this as an opportunity, Israel, Britain, and France attacked Egypt from the end of October, causing the Suez crisis. Syria and other Arab nations supported Egypt and curried out general strikes to counter the imperialist invasion of Egypt. After the trial against the Iraqi plot was over, on December 31, Prime Minister ‘Asali undertook a cabinet reshuffle to expel the People's Party and Constitutional Bloc ministers involved in the plot. The new cabinet has become a national front cabinet consisting of the National Party, the Democratic Bloc, the Ba‘th Party, and independents. Azm has joined the deputy Defense Minister, with Foreign Minister Bitar and Economic Minister Khalil Kallas remaining from the Ba‘th Party(18). In 1957, the plot of American imperialism was exposed. The American imperialist attack aiming for the isolation of Syria and the overthrow of the ‘Asali National Front cabinet was further clarified by the Eisenhower Doctrine Declaration earlier this year. The Eisenhower Doctrine was to reach out to any country in the region threatened by international communism to help and protect it in order to fill the vacuum in the Middle East. The ‘Asali cabinet condemned the declaration on January 10, claiming that there was no vacuum in the Middle East and no threat of communism. It was the ‘Asali cabinet that first rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine in Arab countries. In mid-January, a fourcountry summit was held in Cairo between Egyptian President Nasser, Saudi Arabia's King Saud, Jordan's King Hussein, and Syria's President Shukri al-Quwatli, accusing Eisenhower Doctrine. However, as the Jordanian national government began to show a pro-Soviet attitude, King Saud came closer to the United States. In Saudi Arabia, Fawzi Selu, chief of staff of Adib al-Shishakli era, was staying as an adviser to the Saudi Arabian government. Also, President Quwatli often went to Egypt to treat his illness and had a close relationship with President Nasser. Also, President Nasser had already received the support of the Ba‘th Party. Against this background, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, especially Saudi Arabia, which received the intention of the United States, began to cut down Syria. This truncation manifested itself as Saudi Arabia's intervention in the military. Saudi Arabia claims that Syrian nationalist officers have opened the door to the Soviet invasion of the Arab East, and has requested demotion and reassignment of about 120 officers to President Quwatli and Chief of Staff Tawfiq Nizam al-Din. However, Defense Minister Azm and officers rejected this. Defense Minister Azm accused King Saud on June 15 and Hawrani accused Saudi Arabia’s deputy Foreign Minister on June 28, for attempting to overthrow the Syrian regime as a minion of American imperialism. Thus, tensions between Syria and Saudi Arabia were rectified by the mediation of Egyptian President Nasser and Marshal Amer. On the other hand, in Syria, the Chief of Staff was persuaded to withdraw the reassignment of officers. The domestic national front has strongly confronted reactionary forces that have joined forces with Iraq and American imperialism. In the May by-elections (replenishment of parliamentarians convicted in the Iraqi plot), the national fronts (the Ba‘th, Communist, ‘Asali factions, and Azm bloc) won in all constituencies of Damascus, Homs, and Suwayda. In June, People's Party leader Rushdi al-Kikhiya, for being insulted by Communist Party general secretary Bakdash, threatened to resign from a member of Congress together with about 40 People's Party members. However, on the contrary, due to the strong attitude of the National Front, he stopped this, and in the end, only Rushdi al-Kikhiya resigned. Meanwhile, Syria further promoted friendly relations with the Soviet Union, as if to counter the attack of American imperialism. In July, Azm’s delegation visited the Soviet Union, and in August, the Soviet Union promised economic and military assistance to Syria. A week later, on August 2, a plot of American imperialist against Syria was revealed. It was a plot to overthrow the Syrian government by using Shishakli and Ibrahim Husaini (the chief of the security police at the beginning of the Shishakli era) who had been exiled from Syria. In this plot, Lt. Col. Robert Malloy (Naval attaché), Lt. Col. Howard Stone (second secretary), and Francis Jetton (deputy consul) of the US Embassy in Syria were ordered to leave the country immediately. American imperialism has launched a menacing attack on Syria. Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy W. Henderson was dispatched to Turkey to actively start negotiations with Turkey's Prime Minister Menderes, the King of Jordan, and the President of Lebanon. In addition, Turkish troops were moved to the Syrian border(19). The Soviet Union and Egypt blamed the United States for this. At the request of Syria, Egyptian troops were dispatched to Latakia to defend Syria(20). The appeal of Arab unification had already gained great support from other groups beyond the framework of the Ba‘th Party movement due to the Baghdad Treaty and Iraq's plots. And when the plot of American imperialism was exposed in the summer and fall of 1957, many Syrian politicians and officers came to believe that the Baghdad Treaty Alliance and American imperialism were trying to overthrow Damascus’s government and establish a conservative reactionary government instead. In response to the invasion of imperialist forces that became explicit in the wake of the Baghdad Treaty, a national front was formed in Syria at the end of 1955 to counter the imperialist forces and their affiliated domestic reactionist forces. This national front was a coalition of independent nationalists, socialists, and communists. Syrian politics from 1956 to the end of 1957 was dominated by this national front. Specifically, civilians such as Khalid al-Azm, Khalid Bakdash, Akram al-Hawrani, Salah al-Bitar, Sabri al-‘Asali, and military personnel such as Amin al-Nafuri (deputy Chief of Staff), Afif al-Bizri (Chief of Staff)(21), Abd al-Hamid al-Sarraj (Director of Military Intelligence), Mustafa Hamdun (Director of Military Personnel), Abd al-Ghani Qannut, Abd al-Karim al-Nahlawi(22). Of these, the independent Azm had a pro-Soviet attitude and was intimate with the Communist Party general secretary Bakdash. Azm had a close relationship with the Amin al-Nafuri group, and Bakdash had a close relationship with Afif al-Bizri. Ba‘th members such as Hawrani and Bitar also had great power in politics. The lone wolf Sarraj was intimate with the Ba‘th Party. Hawrani's political power was enormous, with many officers around him, including Mustafa Hamdun and Abd al-Ghani Qannut. A nationalist group led by ‘Asali balanced the Azm forces with the Hawrani-Bitar Ba‘th Party forces. This national front also showed signs of division in the latter half of 1957. First, within the Ba‘th Party, there has been a growing disagreement over the alliance with the Communist Party. This has surfaced since the joint struggle in the by-elections in May. Aflaq and Bitar were opposed to fighting with the Communist Party in this by-election. But at the same time, they also didn’t want to stick to this opposition and confront Hawrani in favor of a joint struggle. Because they were afraid that the Ba‘th Party’s political influence would be diminished by splitting with the Hawrani group. At that time, Azm had a pro-Soviet attitude, partnered with the Communist Party, and had a great influence in politics. In parallel with the attacks of imperialist forces, the direction of Syria's approach to the Soviet Union was also progressing. With Azm’s visit to the Soviet Union, negotiations on economic and military cooperation with the Soviet Union, and the signing of economic cooperation between Syria and the Soviet Union in October, the national front began to divide. It is a conflict between the Ba‘th Party group supported by Egypt vs. a coalition of Azm bloc and the Communist Party. This conflict was clarified by the battle between Azm and Hawrani over the Speaker of Parliament. While Azm received the support of the Communist Party, Hawrani sought support from independents, the National Party and the long-standing hostile People's Party. Hawrani’s approach to the People's Party was suspiciously accepted. However, in the end, the alliance was realized with the understanding that this was provisional. As a result, Hawrani was able to defeat Azm. This election triggered a conflict between the Ba‘th Party and the Communist Party. The Ba‘th Party was by no means pro-Soviet and, on the contrary, was afraid of Syria’s communism. In addition, for the unified city council elections scheduled for mid-November, Hawrani rejected a joint front with the Communist Party and planned to postpone the election with the People's Party and other right-wing groups. In the end, the election was postponed indefinitely, and the division between the Ba‘th Party and the Communist Party, and eventually the division of the National Front, became decisive. In the midst of this power struggle within Syria, the issue of unification with Egypt began to develop rapidly(23). From the end of 1957 to 1958, the Egyptian and Syrian governments traveled back and forth due to this unification issue. In particular, on November 18, 1957, a joint session of the Egyptian parliamentary delegation and the Syrian parliament was held in Damascus, and both parliaments agreed to achieve the unification of Egypt and Syria as soon as possible. When Azm, the defense minister, becomes the finance minister in mid-November and the deputy prime minister in early December, the Ba‘th Party set out the direction to promote unification with Egypt due to fear of the Azm forces against the background of communist forces. Then, in early December, he clarified his support for the ‘federation’ regarding the form of unification. However, in 1958, Bitar began to support ‘integration’ at Cairo’s request and disagreed with ‘federation’ supporters such as Hawrani and Aflaq. On the other hand, the Communist Party has revealed its support for the ‘federation’ of both countries when the unification of Egypt and Syria has already become a realistic policy since the Suez crisis. However, as relations with the Ba‘th Party deteriorated at the end of 1957, it began to support a temporary ‘integration’ form in order to take the initiative on the unification of the two countries against the Ba‘th Party. However, in early January 1958, it again supported the ‘federal’ form(24). Another major force on unity was the officer group. Moreover, this group became the ultimate impetus for achieving this unification. Officers at the heart of the Syrian military were hoping that Syrian military personnel will be able to permanently escape from the conflict with civilian politicians by unifying the two countries, and expected that Nasser would encourage them to form a revolutionary council of military personnel, as in Egypt(25). Then, on January 12, 1958, a group of officers led by Chief of Staff Afif alBizri secretly headed to Cairo(26) to meet with Nasser and proposed to promptly integrate the two armed forces as a step toward unification of the two countries. The actions of these officers were independent of the civilian government. However, they had informed the Damascus government of their actions after arriving in Cairo. In response, Foreign Minister Bitar hurriedly flew to Cairo and participated in a meeting between Afif al-Bizri, the representative of the officer group, and Nasser. At this parley, Nasser has called on the Syrian government to take ‘integrate’ as the form of unification and to dissolve all Syrian parties upon unification. Bitar brought it back home to consider Nasser’s request. In Syria the Azm group has expressed opposition to this request from Nasser. The group opposed ‘integration’ and the dissolution of political parties. They wanted a ‘federation’ as a form of unity. So the Azm group, with the help of President Quwatli and Prime Minister ‘Asali, drafted a proposal for the unification of the Syrian parliament. This proposal was a ‘federal’ proposal that granted both countries significant autonomy. Bitar headed back to Cairo with the Syrian parliamentary proposal, but Nasser rejected the Syrian proposal and insisted that he would not accept any unification other than the ‘integration’ form. A group of officers who supported ‘integration’ played a major role in this situation. They forced civilian politicians to accept unification in line with Nasser’s demands. Eventually, all political parties except the Communist Party agreed, and the unification of the two countries was realized in the form of ‘integration’. The Ba‘th Party leaders have also abandoned the traditional ‘federal’ policy and agreed to ‘integration’. The Ba‘th Party’s appreciation for the Nasser administration and its coordination line which was directed by Nasser’s statement of positive neutrality in 1955 and the purchase of weapons from Eastern Europe, finally emerged in a realistic way from the end of 1957 to the beginning of 1958. The Ba‘th Party had already drafted a plan for the merger of Egypt and Syria in early 1956. Then, in June of the same year, a ministerial committee on the unification of the two countries was established. However, conspiracies against both Syria and Egypt by reactionary and imperialist forces have shelved the merger proposal. In Egypt, the nationalization of the Suez Canal triggered a three-country invasion of Egypt. In Syria, American imperialism devised a plot to isolate Syria in an attempt to incorporate Syria into the anti-communist line. And it wasn’t until the end of 1957 when Syria and Egypt won the reactionary and imperialist plots, that the merger came to fruition. There are still some questions about this Egypt-Syria merger. For example, 1) Was this plan led by the Ba‘th Party and passive by Nasser ? 2) Looking at this from the side of Nasser of Egypt, is it because Nasser wanted to take the leadership of the Arab world that the Arab liberation movements of Egypt and Syria cooperated at the turning point of 1955 ? Or, 3) as T. Petran and Khalid al-Azm(27) say, Did Nasser carry out a merge with Syria with the intention of preventing Syria from becoming communist, similar to or in collaboration with the United States ? And so on. Notes Chapter 5 Attempt to Unify the Arabs (2) (1) Yoshihiro Kimura, “Social Change and Political Power in Modern Syria (1946-63)”, Ajia Keizai, 1981, Vol. 22, No.8, pp. 17-19. (2) Yoshihiro Kimura, “Relationship between the Ba’ath Party and the military”, Middle East Report, No.227, 1981, pp. 17-18. (3) Yoshihiro Kimura, “Social Change and Political Power in Modern Syria (1946-63)”, pp. 18-19. (4) “al-iman” (1943), fi sabil al-ba’th, pp.11-12. (5) nidal hizb, p. 54. (6) hizb al-ba'th al-'arabi al- ishtiraki (ed.), al-mu'tamarat al-qawmiya li-hizb al- ba'th al-'arabi al-ishtiraki 1947-1975 [the Ba'th Party (ed.), National Congresses of the Ba'th Party, 1947-1975], Damascus, 1978 [Hereafter, it is referred to as al-mu'tamarat…], pp. 13-15. (7) Shibli al-Aisami, Vol. 2, p. 266 (8) Patrick Seale, op.cit., pp. 191-200. (9) The 1954 elections saw the rise of innovators, but the innovating parties were not strong enough to control the government. Therefore, on October 29, 1954, a conservative coalition government centered on the People's Party was established by the elder Christian Faris al-Khuri. (10) Sabri al-Asali (Prime Minister, Interior Minister), Khalid al-Azm (Foreign Minister, deputy Defense Minister), Abd al-Baqi Nizam al-Din (Public Works Minister), Ra’if al-Mulqi (Minister of Education), Hamud al-Khawja (Minister of Agriculture), Fakhir al-Kiyali (Minister of National Economy), Leon Zamriya (Minister of Finance), Ma’amun al-Kuzbari (Minister of Justice), Wahib al-Ghanim (Minister of Health) (11) In September 1954, the Soviet bloc participated in the Damascus trade fair for the first time. In March 1955, Foreign Minister and Defense Minister Azm requested the Soviet Union for military assistance. (12) Shortly before this assassination, Ghassan Jadid was dismissed from the army by Maliki for the crime that he was in contact with Americans. (13) The second and third Sa‘id al-Ghazzi cabinets (September 13, 1955-September 14, 1955/ September 14, 1955-June 14, 1956). The third cabinet is as follows: Sa‘id al-Ghazzi (Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Independent), Dr. Munur al-‘Ajlani (Minister of Justice, Democratic Bloc), Hasan alAtrash (Minister of State, Democratic Bloc), ‘Abd al-Baqi Nizam al-Din (Minister of Public Works, Democratic Bloc), Rashad Barmada (Minister of Defense, People's Party), ‘Ali Bozo (Minister of Interior, People's Party), Dr. Abd al-Wahhab Hawmud (Minister of Finance, People's Party), Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad (Minister of State, Constitutional Bloc), Dr. Rizallah Antaki (Minister of Economy, People's Party), Dr. Ma’mun al-Kuzbari (Minister of Education, Independent), As‘ad Harun (Minister of State, Independent), Badri ‘Abbud (Minister of Health, Democratic Bloc), Mustafa Mairaza (Minister of Agriculture, independent). (source) Faris al-Khuri, mudhakkirati, Beirut, 1966, Vol. 3, Part 3, pp.226-27. (14) Sami al-Jundi, p. 73. (15) Sami al-Jundi, p.73.; nidal al-ba'th , Vo.4 , p.59. (16) The Third Asali cabinet (June 14, 1956-December 31, 1956). The members are as follows: Sabri al-Asali (Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, National party), Muhammad al‘Aish (Minister of State, Independent), Majddin al-Jabiri (Minister of Public Works, National Party), Abd al-Baqi Nizam al-Din (Minister of Health, Democratic Bloc), Ahmad Qanbar (Minister of Interior, People's Party), Dr. Abd al-Wahhab Hawmud (Minister of Education, People's Party), Rashad Jabri (Minister of Agriculture, People's Party), Mustafa al-Zarqa (Minister of Justice, Islamic Bloc), Salah al-Bitar (Foreign Minister, Ba‘th Party), Khalil Kallas (Minister of Economy, Ba‘th Party), Abd al-Hasib Raslan (Minister of state, Constitutional Bloc ) (source) Faris al-Khuri, op.cit, pp. 227-28. (17) Sami al-Jundi, p. 74. It is not clear who wrote this telegram. However, no one doubted that Aflaq would have written it. (18) The Fourth Asali cabinet (December 31, 1956~March 6, 1958). The configuration is as follows . Sabri al-Asali (Prime Minister, Minister of Interior, National party), Khalid al-Azm (Minister of State, Minister of Defense, Democratic Bloc), Hani al-Siba‘i (Minister of Education, Independent), Hamud al-Khawja (Minister of Agriculture, Independent), Fakhir al-Kayyali ( Minister of Public works, National Party), Dr. Ma’mun al-Kuzbari (Minister of Justice, Minister of Social Affairs, independent), Salah al-Bitar (Foreigh minister, Ba‘th Party), Khalil Kallas (Minister of Economy, Ba‘th Party), As‘ad Mahasin (Minister of Finance, Independent),Salih ‘Aqil (Minister of State, Democratic Bloc),Asad Harun ( Minister of Health, Independent or National Party). (source) Faris al-Khuri, op.cit., pp. 229-30. (19) Patrick Seale, op.cit., pp. 296-99. (20) Geoge kirk, “The Syrian Crisis of 1957,” International Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 1,1960, pp. 58 61. (21) Until 1958, the Syrian army was commanded by the Chief of Staff. The chief of staff from 1945 to 1958, were as follows: ‘Abdallah Atfeh (1945.8.1~1948.5), Husni al-Za'im (1948.5~1949.8.14), Sami Hinnawi (1949.8.14~1949.12.19), Anwar Bannoud (1949.12.20~1951.5.21), Adib al-Shishakli (1951.5.21~1953.7.15), Shawqat Shuqeir (1953.7.16~1956.7.7), Tawfiq Nizam al-Din (1956.7.7~1957.8.16), Afif al-Bizri (1957.8.16~1958.3.22). During the United Arab Republic era, the Syrian and Egyptian troops were united under Abd al-Hakim Amer (Egyptian). The First Army of the United Arab Republic (that is, the Syrian Army) stationed in Syria was commanded by Gen. Jamal Faisal (1958.3.22 ~1961.9.28). The position of ‘commander-in-chief’ higher than ‘the Chief of Staff’ has been since September 1961. (22) The influential officers at that time were divided into the following blocks. 1) Ba‘th Party officer group: ‘Abd al-Ghani Qannut, Riyad al-Maliki, Bahij Kallas, Mustafa Hamdun, etc. 2) Independent led by Amin al-Nafuri: Ahmad Abd al-Karim (Director of Military Operations), Jado Izzedin 3) 1) 2) Intermediate group: Ahmad Hunaydi, Tu‘meh al-Awdattallah 4) A lone wolf : ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Sarraj 5) Damascus Group: ‘Abd al-Karim al-Naflawi, Muhib al-Hindi, Fa‘yz al-Rifa‘i, Abd al-Ghani Dahman, Akram Dayri (23) For the formation of the United Arab Republic, there are, nidal al-ba‘th ; Muhammad Abd al-Moli, al-inhiyar al-kabir, Beirut, 1977; Patrick Seale, op.cit.; John F. Devlin, op. cit., pp.79-95., etc. (24) Patrick Seale, op. cit., pp. 318, 320. (25) Ibid., p..319 (26) This member is as follows. Afif al-Bizri (Chief of Staff), Mustafa Hamdun (Director of Military Personnel), Ahmad Abd al-Karim (Director of Military Operations), Ahmad al-Hunaydi, Tumeh al-Awdattallah, Husain Hidda, Abd al-Ghani Qannut, Muhammad al-Nisr, Yasin Farjani, Abdallah Jassuma, Jado ‘Izzedin, Mustafa Ram Hamdani, Akram Dayri, Jamal al-Sufi. Ibid., p. 320. (27) Khalid al-Azm, op.cit., Vol. 3, No. 2, Chapter 1, (especially pp.108-14). Chapter 6 United Arab Republic Era The integration of Egypt and Syria was declared on February 1, 1958. Then, on the 21st, Nasser was trusted by the president by a referendum. The following day, the 22nd, the United Arab Republic was born. The unification of Syria and Egypt achieved the basic goals of the Ba‘th Party, which had fought with the Arab masses. At the same time, this integration was a way to rescue Arab nations from their divisions and free them from backwardness and exploitation. At the same time, it also responded to the Arab masses’ desire to establish a new Arab state as the core of Arab’s inclusive integration. In addition, this integration provided a light of hope to free the working masses across the Arabs from political and economic turmoil and to lead their struggle towards development. It was intended to bring about social, economic and political changes in the Arab social structure, while at the same time regenerating the Arab personality and reviving the vitality of the Arab nation. This integration was made possible by the Ba‘th Party’s joint struggle with the Nasser revolutionary government against imperialist plots and imperialist forces. It was also made possible by a joint struggle against traditional rulers and capitalists who had long ruled the people in both countries. In Egypt, the Nasser administration was already born after the July 23, 1952 revolution, and was in a situation where it could play a major role in the liberation and development of Arabs and the construction of socialism. The unification of Syria and Egypt was an attempt to oppose divisionism, fight for unity, and organize the people towards the construction of a new society. The birth of the United Arab Republic gave Modern Arab struggle national liberation, democratic and socialist implications. It was an attempt to fulfill the Ba‘th Party’s proposition: to maintain its ethnic existence and to establish a new ethnic unity against attacks from isolationism and regionalism, in addition to direct the masses to work on the reconstruction of Arab civilization that is part of human heritage. 1. The formation of the United Arab Republic and the Arab liberation movement What was the significance of the formation of the United Arab Republic for the Arab liberation struggle? First of all, the establishment of the United Arab Republic was a sign of victory over its adversaries of Arab nationalism. It frustrated the imperialist plans to attack Syria and isolate Egypt. With the establishment of the United Arab Republic, the Arab liberation struggle was able to overcome regionalist division and isolation policies. Thus, the formation of a new Arab Union state strengthened the Arab nationalist forces, had a profound effect on the hearts of Arabs, and exploded their abilities(1). At the same time, this confirmed that the Arabs were a national community, and that their national goal, the unification of the Arabs, was a reality, not a distant and beautiful dream depicted in the painting. Moreover, the establishment of the United Arab Republic confirmed that the goals of the nationalist movement of liberation and unity were inseparable and could not exist on their own. The formation of the United Arab Republic was the core of Arab unification and made the goal of Arab unification a reality. And it marked a new stage in the direction of realizing a unified society of Arab socialism. In addition, it was able to provide a material and spiritual basis for overthrowing Zionism and to recapture the territory illegally occupied by Israel. Thus, the formation of the United Arab Republic and the adoption of neutral and non-aligned policies by the United Arab Republic have become powerful pillars for the masses who must follow the path of opposition to imperialism and the liberation front. The United Arab Republic had a positive and significant impact on the Arab struggle, inflaming the Arab masses. The United Arab Republic sought to create a new and evolving society within it as a model for a socialist society, the ultimate goal of the Arab mass struggle. Mobilizing the potential capabilities of the masses, organizing them, establishing unity and achieving ethnic challenges, which was an important task of the United Arab Republic(2). 2. United Arab Republic administration and Ba‘th Party Even before the formation of the United Arab Republic, there was a struggle between the ideological and moderate Aflaq-Bitar faction and the pragmatic and radical Hawrani faction within the Ba‘th Party. The difference between the two factions was the difference in their approach to the nationalist movement. Whereas the former aimed at a revolutionary line based on the masses, the latter emphasized a political and behavioral practical line. And the former was more nationalist than the latter. Hawrani focused on seizing his administration and considered Syria as a place for his own political activities. And both of them were thinking of restraining the other by using Nasser as an intermediary. The leaders of the Ba‘th Party in Syria expected to seize power in the Syrian region when forming the United Arab Republic(3). They accepted the conditions Nasser demanded for the formation of the United Arab Republic, the dissolution of political parties. Then, at the Regional Congress held on February 1, 1958, the dissolution of the Syrian branch of the Ba‘th Party, which was raised by the Regional Command, was approved(4). They wanted to take on an important function in the new ‘National Union (al-ittihad al-qawmi )’ to be formed in the Syrian region and exert substantial power in the policies of the United Arab Republic. This National Union is a political organization established in Egypt in 1957 in place of the ‘National Liberation Organization’, with all political parties banned after 1953. Members of the Diet were elected from this organization. After the formation of the United Arab Republic, Syria was supposed to abolish all existing political parties and establish this National Union. The Aflaq faction, which emphasizes the idealistic aspect, saw the formation of the United Arab Republic as the result of their ideological work on the Arab world. In contrast, Hawrani, who emphasizes political activity, was devoted to seizing power within the new government when the United Arab Republic was formed. Now, let's summarize the relationship between the United Arab Republic and the Ba‘th Party in terms of the power struggle between Nasser and the Ba‘th Party leaders. On March 6, ministers of the United Arab Republic government were appointed. There were 4 Vice Presidents, 8 Egyptian-Syrian central ministers, and 10 and 11 ministers from each region of Egypt and Syria, respectively. Of the government ministers, 14 were Syrians(5), four of whom were members of the Ba‘th party. There were Hawrani (vice President), Bitar (Central Government’s Minister of State for Arab Relations), Mustafa Hamdun (Syria Region, Minister of Social Affairs), Khalil Kallas (Syria Region, Minister of Commerce and Economy), all of whom are Hawrani factions except Bitar. This cabinet was remodeled on October 8, with a central cabinet and executive cabinets in Egypt and Syria. With this remodeling, seven Syrians were appointed to the Central Cabinet and 13 to the Syrian Regional Executive Cabinet. Of these, six members, Hawrani, Bitar, Khalil Kallas, Mustafa Hamdun, Abd al-Ghani Qannut, and Riyad alMaliki, were members of the Ba‘th Party, but this time also they were all Hawrani factions except Bitar. Bitar tried to get ‘Abdallah Abd al-Da’ym (of Aflaq faction) into the cabinet, but it was unsuccessful. For Nasser, Hawrani was the Ba‘th Party. And, judging from the cabinet structure of 1958(6), the Ba‘th Party could not be said to have been given an important position in the government of the United Arab Republic. On the other hand, the National Union, which was to be formed in the Syrian region by abolishing all political parties with the establishment of the United Arab Republic, was not realized by the end of 1958. Ba‘th Party leaders have become increasingly frustrated by the postponement of the formation of the National Union and the distance from the center of the United Arab Republic. The Ba‘th Party was unable to attract Nasser to its own direction. On the contrary, the dictatorship of Nasser was in progress. But Ba‘th Party leaders have yet to give up hope. In February 1959, three leaders, Aflaq, Bitar, and Hawrani, proposed the establishment of a Supreme Committee consisting of them and three Egyptians as the basic policy-making body of the United Arab Republic. However, Nasser disagreed with this proposal(7). Thus, the Ba‘th Party's rebound to the decline in political status in the United Arab Republic failed. This relationship between the Ba‘th Party and Nasser was greatly influenced directly and indirectly by the Iraqi ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim coup on July 14, 1958. On February 14, 1958, Iraq and Jordan established a Hashemite federation in opposition to the unification of Syria and Egypt. Nasser accused the coalition of trying to advance the Baghdad Treaty behind the United States as an imperialist minion. The Qasim administration, which overthrew the Hashemite federation, was naturally supposed to join the United Arab Republic. And on July 16, Nasser announced his support for the new Qasim administration. However, Qasim banished the nationalist and pro-Nasser ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif, hostile to Ba‘th members, and turned to trust in the Communists(8). So when plans were made to overthrow the Qasim administration in Iraq (Mosul Revolt in March 1959), Egyptian political leaders supporting Nasser's power helped and provided weapons(9) in order to counter Qasim and the Communists. However, this was unsuccessful. In October of the same year, Iraqi Ba‘th members, this time with the support of Syrian Ba‘th members(10), attempted to assassinate Qasim. However, this attempt also failed. On the other hand, the July 14 coup enlivened imperialist and reactionary forces as a reaction. Moreover, this trend pervaded the inside of the United Arab Republic, took root inside the National Union, and came to dominate it in partnership with opportunists. In addition, Nasser's communist suppression policy within the United Arab Republic, which began in earnest from December 1958 to the first half of 1959, greatly revived the activities of reactionaries rebel and opportunists(11). This situation transformed the National Union into a mechanism that was in the interests of imperialists and reactionaries, rather than just a mass organization. This manifested itself as a result of the National Union elections held in July 1959. In this election, the Ba‘th Party related candidate was completely defeated in the Syrian region with only one-sixth of the seats, and it was very impossible for Ba‘th Party members to control the organization of the National Union. These two results must have greatly undermined the Ba‘th members’ confidence in Nasser. Nasser's policy of abolishing all political parties and building of popular rule by the National Union, on the other hand, revived reactionaries and opportunists and suppressed the public’s passion for the Arab liberation struggle(12). In parallel with this direction of reactionaryism and opportunism, Nasser's attitude toward Arabs has also changed. In August 1959, Nasser restored diplomatic relations with Jordan, which had been cut off for more than a year since the Qasim coup. Also, the relationship with Saudi Arabia, which had deteriorated since accusing King Saud of attempting to assassinate Nasser in March 1958, was also improved with the invitation diplomacy between King Saud and Nasser at the end of August 1959 and the with the cooperation agreement for Arab Nationalism people in September. Thus, in the confrontation with Iraq's Qasim and Communism, Nasser joined forces with Jordan and Saudi Arabia’s royalism, and even became hostile to Iraqi Communist behavior and regained friendship with the United States. In response, Ba‘th members believed that the United Arab Republic should not break its positive neutral stance, even if it is hostile to Iraqi Communists. The relationship between the officers and Nasser was also unsuccessful. Since the early days of the formation of the United Arab Republic, officers have had many meetings. They contacted Ba‘th Party leaders and complained of their anxieties about the future. Ba‘th Party leaders took this calmly, but the collaboration between these officers and Ba‘th Party leaders was known to Nasser and the secret police. And in the middle of 1958, many military personnel of Hawrani faction were dismissed. Also, as one of the crackdowns on these officers, on August 18, 1958, 10 officers were ordered to relocate to Cairo. Of these, eight were members of the Ba‘th Party(13). The relationship between Ba‘th Party leaders and Nasser has deteriorated at a stretch since October 1959. With the dictatorship of Nasser, Ba‘th Party’s hopes for power have been cut off altogether. On October 21, Marshal ‘Abd al-Hakim ‘Amer, vice President and Commander-in-Chief of the Ministry of Defense, was given full authority over the Syrian region and will oversee Syria on behalf of Nasser(14). Marshal ‘Amer has established an assistant committee consisting of four ministers, Sarraj (Minister of Interior), al-Hajj Yunis (Minister of Agriculture), ‘Awdattallah (Minister of Agriculture and Forestry) and Tarabulsi (Minister of Education). Also he reorganized an administrative organization, set up a four bureaus such as the Technology Bureau and the Economic Affairs Bureau. Ba‘th Party leaders protested against such dictatorship of Nasser by resigning from the cabinet. First, on December 23, 1959, Hamdun (Minister of Agrarian Land Reform) and ‘Abd al-Ghani Qannut (Minister of Social Affairs and Labor) of the Syrian Regional Executive Cabinet, resigned. And the next day, the 24th, Hawrani and Bitar resigned. In addition, on January 3, 1960, Khalil Kallas (Minister of Economy and Commerce), resigned. This caused all Ba‘th Party ministers to resign, including Maliki (Minister of Culture) who had already been dismissed on September 15, 1959. After the resignation of Ba‘th Party ministers, on March 18, a cabinet reshuffle was carried out in the Syrian region, and three civilians(15) and four officers (16)were newly added to the cabinet. However, two officers, Amin al-Nafuri (Minister of Transport) and Ahmad ‘Abd al-Karim (Minister of Agriculture and Forestry), who had been in the cabinet as ministers of the Syrian region since the establishment of the United Arab Republic and had been in the central cabinet since the remodeling in October 1958, suddenly resigned on May 2(17). In response, Nasser appointed Interior Minister Sarraj on September 20 as chairman of the Syrian Region Executive Cabinet. Thus, a military rule system of ‘Amer = Sarraj over Syria was established. This system continued until August 16, 1961. On August 16th, Nasser established a unified cabinet for Egypt and Syria. In other words, it was decided to abolish both Egyptian and Syrian executive cabinets and to carry out direct control. This brought Nasser's dictatorship to its peak. The unified cabinet consisted of 7 vice presidents and 36 ministers(18). Sarraj, who was celebrated by the vice President with the birth of this unified cabinet, resigned as dissatisfied because he was deprived of his real power in the Syrian region. It was also a serious mistake for Nasser to remove Sarraj from Syria's Interior Minister, the State Security Officer. This had a major impact on Syria’s security system and eventually paved the way for the September 28 coup. As we have seen above, the relationship between Ba‘th Party leaders and Nasser over the power struggle was staged in the first half and the second half of the Egypt-Syria integration period. In the first half of February 1958 and the end of 1959, Ba‘th Party leaders failed to seize control in Syria and moved away from the Center of Power. On the other hand, Nasser, who succeeded in expelling Ba‘th Party leaders in the first half of the year, concentrated his power and promoted dictatorship in the second half of the year. The development of such a power struggle also reflected the very change in the political situation of Syria since its integration with Egypt. In the United Arab Republic, that is, by the political means of Nasser, the following facts have occurred in Syrian politics. First, Ba‘th members and progressive activists within the army were separated from the army and placed in civilian positions or transferred to sinecure in the Egyptian region. Second, as already mentioned, the July 14 coup in Iraq, the reconciliation between Arab reactionary forces and Nasser, and the suppression of communists by Nasser, have revived reactionaries and opportunists. They entered the National Union and came to dominate it, and then began to use this organization to attack unification supporters and progressives And third, during the National Union elections, attacks on party members, especially Ba‘th members, were extensively launched by various organizations involving these reactionary and opportunists. Fourth, the repression of Communists by Nasser has revived the activities of religious reactionaries, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. Fifth, the Ba‘th Party formally disbanded the party organization within the United Arab Republic. However, attacks were made on Ba‘th Party members remaining in the United Arab Republic and on Ba‘th Party members in other countries. Sixth, the secret police mechanism has been greatly expanded and emphasized, and the role of the people has been neglected. And because there is no public surveillance mechanism, various conspiracies have become widespread. This has stalled the unified nation itself and made it inactive(19). Thus, Nasser dismantled the mass movement and opened the door to reactionaries and opportunists. He tried to suppress the people by the National Union and the secret police organization. Nasser’s National Union, which was listed as a means of public participation in politics, was far from the ideal of a people’s organization and became in name only. This political action of Nasser was in direct conflict with the struggle for liberation from imperialism and reactionaryism by the mass movement which the Ba‘th Party and other Arab nationalist movements claim. 3. Ba‘th Party crisis In 1959, the Ba‘th Party faced a very difficult situation. In Syria, party organizations had already disbanded upon integration with Egypt. The July 14 Revolution in Iraq had deviated from the path of national liberation due to the influence of Qasim and Communists. In Jordan and Saudi Arabia, reactionaries were gradually regaining power. Under these circumstances, an opportunistic direction has emerged within the Ba‘th Party. ‘Abdallah al-Rimawi in Jordan and Fu’ad al-Rikabi in Iraq were the representatives. They wanted to build a foothold inside the party and take advantage of the party's national organizations. They wanted to make the regional organization of the Ba‘th Party independent of the National Command, limit the party's task to ‘realization of unification’ and subordinate the party to the United Arab Republic. As the party base was shaken and organizational turmoil began, Aflaq (secretary general of the Party) convened a preparatory committee to hold a party congress. Aflaq and Rimawi clashed at this preparatory committee. Rimawi has been a follower of Nasser since he was exiled to Egypt in 1957. He led the Ba‘th Party's activities in Jordan to the benefit of Nasser. At this preparatory committee, he argued that members of the National Command elected in 1954 did not have the right to direct party activities. He also argued that we can’t accept a Syrian member as a member of the National Command because the Syrian branch organization was disbanded. Iraq's Rikabi agreed on this point(20). This clash of opinions between Aflaq and Rimawi was not settled by the preparatory committee. The 3rd National Congress was held with the two in conflict. The 3rd National Congress was held in Beirut from August 27th to September 1st. In this congress, the responsibility and impact of the dissolution of party organizations in the Syrian region, the relationship between National and Regional Command, the strategy of mass action that is the basis of party activities, and the relationship with the United Arab Republic, etc. were the main issues. The congress then supported the formation of the United Arab Republic and gave consent to the dissolution of the Ba‘th Party organization within the United Arab Republic by the former leadership. It also resolved to adopt a new strategy for mass action and expand cooperation between the Ba‘th Party and the mass movement in the United Arab Republic, the Algerian Revolutionary leaders, and other Arab countries(21). The conflict between Aflaq and Rimawi was not resolved by the congress, and Rimawi, dissatisfied with the congress’s resolutions, was banished from the Ba‘th Party on September 8. The Rimawi group, with the support of Nasser, established the Arab Ba‘th Revolutionary Socialist Party in May 1960. Most of the members were Jordanians, not Syrians or Egyptians(22). Iraqi Rikabi also joined this around 1962. This party survived until early 1963. After the 3rd National Congress, the relationship of trust between Nasser and Ba‘th Party leaders was extremely weakened, and Ba‘th Party ministers resigned one after another. The National Union program as a new people's organization failed, and the secret police organization was strengthened. Opportunists and reactionaries also entered various organizations. Then there was a terrorist attack on the Ba‘th Party and critics of the government. As a result, the mass movement receded and weakened. Under these circumstances, there was an atmosphere that the Ba‘th Party's mission had to be reaffirmed and the mass movement had to be rebuilt. The 4th National Congress was held at this time. The 4th National Congress was held in Beirut in August 1960. The main items adopted at this congress are as follows(23). 1) As the basic direction of the party, too much emphasis has been placed on unification. Therefore, it is necessary to review this and take the direction of emphasizing democracy and socialism. 2) In the United Arab Republic, the masses have no freedom of people's or labor organizations, are dominated by secret police, and mass movements are banned. Also, the situation in the United Arab Republic and its ethnic/national behavior ignore the role of the people. The Ba‘th Party defends unity and criticizes the mechanisms that do harm to it. In order to protect the integration of Egypt and Syria and promote mutual relations between the two peoples, it is necessary to realize democracy and pave the way for the systematic participation of the people in it. 3) The dissolution of the Ba‘th Party organization in the United Arab Republic was based on the political situation at the time, but it is unacceptable and should be criticized from an idealistic point of view. Therefore, the resolution of the 3rd National Congress that endorsed this will be invalidated. 4) Party leaders have been too absorbed in the regional (qutri) issues. Therefore, it is necessary to raise this to the national (qawmi) level. That is, the party's political activities need to be focused on national level issues. 5) Political assassinations and coups should be criticized in the party's activities. We must reaffirm that the party's political struggles and activities should be based on mass struggles. 6) Maintain an active neutral policy. Thus, at the 4th National Congress, a resolution was passed to criticize the Nasser administration. In addition, after the establishment of the United Arab Republic, anxiety and confusion spread due to the dissolution of some party organizations and the emergence of internal division, and the party base was shaken. Therefore, in order to stabilize this party base, the party principles were reconfirmed. Upon hearing these decisions, Nasser retaliated against the Ba‘th Party. This had a negative impact on the subsequent relationship between the Ba‘th Party and Nasser. 4. What the formation of the United Arab Republic has brought about What are the consequences of the merger with Egypt on the Ba‘th Party, especially the Ba‘th Party in Syria? Upon the merger with the Nasser Revolutionary Government, groups such as Aflaq and Bitar, who emphasized revolutionary movements, regarded this as the first step towards Arab unification. On the other hand, groups such as Hawrani, who emphasized practical political action, wanted to gain power in the Syrian region. However, in reality, the formation of the United Arab Republic disbanded the Ba‘th Party, which should be the avant-garde of the mass movement. And the National Union, which was expected to replace it, has become a means of oppressing the people by Nasser. In addition, Nasser's policy of dismantling the party base has made it impossible for the Ba‘th Party to seize power over the Syrian region. These changes brought about by the formation of the United Arab Republic have shaken the foundation of the Ba‘th Party from the ground up. In short, this change is devastating hit to the two basic principles of the Ba‘th Party: the spiritual Inqilab to break away from backwardness and develop potential, and the struggle based on the working masses. In Syria, the period from the mid-1950s to the formation of the United Arab Republic was the golden age of the mass movement to protect independence, freedom and democracy against imperialist and reactionary forces. Against this background, the Ba‘th Party, as an avant-garde of the mass movement, was able to make great strides in its activities. And, in the struggle against imperialism, it was decided to partner with the Nasser Revolutionary Government, which was appointed by the avant-garde of the Arab masses. However, this alliance eventually wiped out the energy of the masses. Nasser did not rely on mass struggle in the Arab liberation movement. The National Union and the secret police organization tried to suppress the masses and extend their hegemony over Syria. As a result, Nasser and the Ba‘th Party clashed. On the other hand, at the time of the formation of the United Arab Republic, the Hawrani group had a relative advantage over the Aflaq-Bitar group within the Ba‘th Party. The Hawrani group deviated significantly from the Ba‘th Party principles of spiritual Inqilab and mass struggle. This, along with the dissolution of the Ba‘th Party organization, further encouraged Nasser's oppression of the masses. After the cooperation between the Ba‘th Party and the Nasser revolutionary government, Nasser changed its basic policy. The change in Nasser's basic policy has completely confused the Ba‘th Party. Within the Ba‘th Party, divisions and oppositions arose, and sectarianism appeared. The first sect was a group that evaluated and followed the new method of Nasser, with ‘Abdallah al-Rimawi representing this. They argued that the attempts of the Ba‘th Party and other parties were no longer justified after the formation of the United Arab Republic, then denied the legitimacy of the slogan ‘unification, freedom, socialism’. The sect believed that Nasser's leadership was a major impetus for the Arab nationalist movement, even if it was a means of power. In addition, during the process of integration of Egypt and Syria, and in the process of socialization by nationalization after the integration, imperialist and reactionary groups attacked the Arab masses, but the Arab masses have an obligation to support Nasser's policy (realization of unification and socialism). Hesitation was regarded as a perfidy against the Arab affair(24). As mentioned earlier, this sect was expelled from the Ba‘th Party between 1959 and 1960 and established another organization, the Arab Ba‘th Revolutionary Socialist Party. The second sect was the group represented by Hawrani. They regarded Nasser as a rebel. According to this sect, Nasser fulfilled their goals against imperialists and reactionaries, resulted in killing the vibrant forces of the masses. The reality of the Nasser revolution was a counter-revolution that swallowed the mass movement. Therefore, the Ba‘th Party's primary duty is to stand up to the struggle against Nasser which is more dangerous than imperialism and reactionaryism(25). The third sect was born out of a group of military personnel, especially a group of officers transferred to Egypt. Their view was closer to that of Nasser than that of the Ba‘th Party. The sect was frustrated by the long-running method of mass struggle and was fascinated by the coup that could shorten the path to power. This sect also believed that while it was possible to achieve the goals of the government and the people by seizing power, it would not be possible if we waited for the maturity of the people's forces and the people's movement. Their views were very close to Nasser in their content, but were at odds in that direction(26). This sect formed a secret society called the Military Committee (al-lajna al-‘askariya) in the summer of 1959. The founding members of the military committee were Muhammad ‘Umran (Alawites from Homs), Salah Jadid (Alawites from Latakia), Hafiz al-Asad (Alawites from Latakia), ‘Abd al-Karim al-Jundi (Ismaili from Hama), and Ahmad al-Mir (Ismaili from Hama) . After that, another officers joined this committee. For example, from Alawite faction such as Uthman Kan‘an, Sulayman Haddad, from Druze faction such as Salim Hatum, Hamad ‘Ubayd (Druze), and as Sunni groups from the Hawran region such as Musa alZu‘bi, Ahmad Swaydani, Mustafa al-Hajj ‘Ali. And also Husayn Mulhim (Sunni from Aleppo), Muhammad Rabah al-Tawil (Sunni from Latakia) have joined. Amin al-Hafiz (Sunni) also joined the group after the March 8, 1963 Revolution(27). The Ba‘th Party military committee subsequently became the center of the Ba‘th Party regime and dominated Syria’s politics. Against the emergence of such conflicts and sectarianism within the party, National Command sought to maintain an objective position and uphold the party's principles without following reactionary tendencies. He also tried to distinguish between the strengths of Nasser as a ruler and the weaknesses of trying to eliminate the masses, while at the same time distinguishing between unification and a unified government. Moreover he tried to prevent reactionaries and regionalists from trying to take advantage of the shortcomings brought about by the formation of the United Arab Republic. Notes Chapter 6 United Arab Republic Era (1) For example, three young Syrian members of the Ba‘th party participated in the Algerian Revolutionary Struggle as volunteers. Dr. Nur al-Din al-Atassi, Dr. Yusuf Zu‘ayyin, Dr. Ibrahim Makhos, all three were doctors. They played a leading role in Syrian politics in the late 1960s. (2) At such a time, incidents occurred in various parts of the Arab region. First, as a reaction to the integration of Syria and Egypt, a partnership between Jordan and Iraq was established. The United Arab Republic has also been in conflict with the Communists, who have been hostile to the alliance. The attack on Communists lasted for more than two years, but the Communists were justified by Iraq's Qasim administration and opposed the United Arab Republic and nationalist forces. (3) Sami al-Jundi, p .78. (4) Sami al-Jundi, p. 76.; However, even after that, the members of the Ba‘th party were virtually alive, and although the Regional Command was disbanded and did not exist, there was a group of party members gathered at influential leaders. On the other hand, the Ba‘th Party's National Command then moved its headquarters to Beirut. (5) The Syrian members in the cabinet established on March 6 are as follows. 1) vice President :Akram al- Hawrani and Sabri al-Asali (National Party) 2) Central bureaucrat: Salah al-Bitar 3) Syrian Regional Minister: Abd al-Hamid al-Sarraj (Minister of Interior, Ba‘th Party, military personnel), Hasan Jabbara (Minister of Planning, Independent), Mustafa Hamdun (Ba‘th Party, Minister of Social Affairs, military personnel), Shawkat al-Qanawati (Minister of Health, Independent), Abd al-Wahhab Hawmud (Minister of Justice, People's Party), Nur alDin Kuhala (Minister of Public Works, Independent), Ahmad Abd al-Karim (Minister of Home affairs, military personnel), Khalil Kallas (Minister of Commerce and Economy, Ba‘th Party), Ahmad al-Hajj Yunis (Minister of Agriculture, Independent), Fakhir al-Kayyali (Minister of Finance, National Party), Amin al-Nafuri (Ministry of Transport and Communications, military personnel). (6) The Syrian members of the reshuffled cabinet on October 8, 1958 are as follows: 1) Central Cabinet; Akram al-Hawrani (vice President, Minister of Justice), Hasan Jabbara (Minister of Finance), Fakhil al-Kayyali (Minister of State), Salah al-Bitar (Minister of Culture), Amin al-Nafuri (Minister of Transport and Communications), Bashir al-‘Azmeh (Minister of Health), Ahmad Abd al-Karim (Minister of Home Affairs) 2) Syrian Region Executive Cabinet: Nur al-Din Kahala (Chairman of the Executive Committee, Minister of Planning), Abd al-Wahhab Hawmud (Minister of Finance), Mustafa Hamdun (Minister of Agrarian Reform), Abd al-Hamid al-Sarraj (Minister of Interior), Nihad al-Qasim (Minister of Justice), Ahmad al-Hajj Yunis (Minister of Agriculture), Shawkat al-Qanawati (Minister of Health), Muhammad Ilm (Minister of Transport), Abd al-Ghani Qannut (Minister of Labor), Riyad al-Maliki (Minister of Culture) ), Amjad al-Tarabulisi (Minister of Education), Wajih Samman (Minister of Industry), Khalil Kallas (Minister of Commerce and Economy) In addition, Sabri al-‘Asali was appointed as a vice president last time, but at the Baghdad court after the Iraqi coup on July 14, it was revealed that he was involved a conspiracy to form a pro-Western government in collaboration with Iraq before the establishment of the United Arab Republic. So, on October 6, he had already resigned as vice president and was not reappointed this time. (7) John F. Devlin, op.cit., p.135. (8) Sami al-Jundi, p. 79. (9) mudhakkirat ‘Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, 1977, Vol. 2, Chapter 3, especially pp. 80-82. (10) Abd al-Hamid al-Sarraj supported this. He was the director of the military intelligence bureau at the time of the establishment of the United Arab Republic, exposed the assassination of Nasser by King Saud of Saudi Arabia on March 5, 1958, and subsequently gained the trust of Nasser as the interior minister. According to John F. Devlin, Nasser was against this plan. However, the United Arab Republic was funding the Iraqi Ba‘th Party. It is said that Egyptian pounds of 6,000 to 70,000 were paid to Iraqi Ba‘th members by the Embassy of the United Arab Republic in Baghdad in 1958 and 1959. (source) John F. Devlin, op.cit., p.159. (11) nidal hizb, pp. 56-57. (12) nidal hizb, pp. 59-60, 62-63. (13) Sami al-Jundi, p. 85. (14) Muhammad Abd al-Moli, op.cit., p. 256. Marshal Amer's appointment was directly triggered by Syrian Ba‘th members' support for the attempted assassination of Qasim by Iraqi Ba‘th members on October 7, with the significant involvement of Syrian region minister Sarraj. (15) Husni al-Sawwaf (Minister of Economy), Yusuf Muzahim (Minister of Awkaf), Jhabit al-‘Aris (Minister of Culture) (16) Akram Dayri (Minister of Social Affairs and Labour), Jado ‘Izzedin (Minister of State), Ahmad Hunaydi (Minister of Agrarian Reform), Jamal al-Sufi (Minister of Supply) (17) The reason for their resignation has not been revealed. The two were independents in the military before the formation of the United Arab Republic. (18) Of these, two Syrians, Sarraj and Nur al-Din Kahala, were vice presidents, and 13 were ministers. Five of the ministers were officers and eight were civilians. (source) Muhammad Abd al-Moli, op.cit., pp. 265-71. for more information. (19）nidal hizb, pp. 57-58, 71-72. (20) The 1954 National Command consisted of Aflaq, Hawrani, Bitar (3 Syrians), Rikabi (Iraqi), Ali Jabir (Lebanese), Abdallah al-Rimawi and Abdallah Na‘was (2 Jordanians). Among them, Ali Jabir left the National Command and Abdallah Na‘was died in the summer of 1958. (21) nidal hizb, p. 61.; al-mu‘tamarat…., pp. 16-18. (22) The leaders of this party were Bahjat Abu Gharbiya, Sulayman al-Hadidi, Shaykhun Habusi, and Hafiz Abd al-Hadi. They were all Jordanians. Y. Oron (ed.), Middle East Record, Jerusalem (hereinafter referred to as MER), Vol.1, 1960, pp. 462. 498. (23) nidal hizb, pp. 73, 87-91.; al-mu‘tamarat…., pp. 19-22. (24) Munif al-Razzaz, op.cit., p. 55 (25) Hawrani pointed out the rebellious acts that Nasser had done against the Arabs. They are:1) Nasser accepted the presence of international surveillance forces in a reconciliation with Israel in the Suez crisis, 2)Nasser opened the Gulf of Aqaba and allowed Israeli vessels to navigate, and 3) Nasser accepted American wheat aid. Ibid., pp. 55-56 (26) Ibid., p. 56. (27) Ibid., p. 87. ; Sami al-Jundi, p. 85 Chapter 7 Reconstruction of the Ba‘th Party 1. Rebirth of reactionary regime and military The conflict with the United Arab Republic, the Nasser administration, was not limited to the Ba‘th Party. Other groups were also dissatisfied with the United Arab Republic. Capitalists and businessmen were dissatisfied with socialization measures such as nationalization of banks, insurance companies and major companies and the issuance of the Land Reform Act, and the policy of subordination of the Syrian economy by the Egyptian economy. The military were indignant at being subordinated to Egyptian command. The method of Syrian rule by the dictatorship of Nasser was stumbled upon in August 1961 when ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Sarraj was dismissed from the Syrian region's security officer. The previously pent-up dissatisfaction with Nasser's dictatorial rule over Syria exploded. This opposition to the Nasser administration appeared within the military. The Syrian military was hit hard during its integration with Egypt. First, Ba‘th Party groups and independent groups (Amin al-Nafuri and Ahmad ‘Abd al-Karim) were moved away from the military. The Damascus group, led by Sarraj, Tu‘meh ‘Awdattallah, Ahmad Hunaydi and Akram Dayri, was promoted on their behalf. The upper ranks of these troops were eventually transferred to administrative positions while still in the army, and the Syrian army was weakened and subordinated to the Egyptian army. The opposition to the Nasser administration came from a group other than those embraced by these civil affairs. This included right-wing groups such as Lt. Col. Haydar al-Kuzbari, Brig. Gen. Faysal Sirri al-Husayni, and a group that showed personal opposition such as Lt. Col. ‘Abd al-Karim al-Nahlawi, Maj. Fa’yz al-Rifa‘i, Lt. Col. Muhib al-Hindi, Brig. Gen. ‘Abd al-Ghani al-Dahman. The former was associated with bourgeoisie, while the latter was a group representing the dissatisfaction of Syrian officers. These groups carried out a coup on Egyptian rule in Syria on September 28, 1961, leaving Syria from the United Arab Republic. Officers promoted by the benefit of Nasser were also banished. Syria declared an independent state and a conservative cabinet was formed with Ma’mun al-Kuzbari as prime minister(1). This administration announced as a policy, which includes restoration and guarantee of political freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the newspaper, strengthening the army, protection of the labor movement, and production planning. At the same time, cooperation with Arab countries, respect for Arab League treaties, and respect for international treaties was announced. The September 28 coup led the army to intervene in politics again. In other words, with this coup as an opportunity, the army has reappeared as a source of power in Syria. Ba‘th members did not participate in this coup. At that time, the Ba‘th Party in Syria was confused and diverged into many sects. Above all, the top of the party leadership was decisively divided. On October 2nd a statement of support for the September 28 coup was released. It was signed by 16 politicians, including Hawrani, ‘Asali, Azm, Najib alArmanazi, and Bitar(2). Hawrani and Bitar were the only members of the Ba‘th party among the signatories. Hawrani saw this statement as a precursor to the struggle against Nasser and Nasser supporters in Syria. But for Bitar, this signature was a big mistake. He deeply regrets this mistake in the 1963 trilateral unification negotiations between Egypt, Syria and Iraq. What's more, Bitar lost the December 1961 election because of this unscrupulous attitude(3). He was subsequently appointed as a member of the provisional leadership for the reconstruction of the Syrian Ba‘th Party in June 1962, but was otherwise excluded from the party leadership(4). Syria, which has left the United Arab Republic, promulgated a provisional constitution on November 12, with an urgent need to rebuild the constitutional government, proclaiming that Syria is an independent sovereign state. Then, on the following day, 13th, it was announced that an election for the Legislative Assembly would be held on December 1st. Prime Minister Kuzbari and four ministers resigned to run for this election, and the new ‘Izzat al-Nuss interim cabinet (November 22, 1961-March 27, 1962) was born on the 21st(5). By the election on December 1, 172 members were elected(6). Ma’mun al-Kuzbari(7) was elected chairman of the new parliament, Nazim al-Qudsi (People's Party) was elected president(8), and a right-wing coalition cabinet(9) was established by Ma‘ruf al-Dawalibi (People's Party). Thus, the conservative politicians were restored and the conservative government was revived. This conservative government came close to Iraq. The approach to Iraq, which had already been initiated by the Syrian-Iraq Economic Cooperation in November 1961, appeared as the Syrian-Iraq Military Agreement on January 25, 1962, and a promotion of political and military cooperation at the meeting between President Qudsi and Prime Minister Qasim of Iraq on March 14. An economic cooperation agreement was also signed with Saudi Arabia on November 17, 1961. Thus, cooperation between the Syrian government and the Arab Conservatives was also in progress. At the same time, domestically, the Land Reform Act promulgated during the United Arab Republic was amended (February 18) and the Nationalization Act was abolished (February 14). For this the Ba‘th Party and Nasserist opposed it. On March 28, 1962, Lt. Col. ‘Abd al-Karim al-Nahlawi and others(10) caused a coup, demanding the revival of the Land Reform Act and the Nationalization Act. They said that this was a disappointment to the public's expectations. Then they decided to arrest a number of politicians, dissolve the parliament, and transfer legislative and administrative powers to the military's highest command(11). The coup of Lt. Col. Nahlawi was eventually counterattacked by officers demanding unification under the command of Brig. Gen. Badr al-A‘sar of Homs. The group of Maj. Gen. ‘Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din, the commander-in-chief(13) from the Druze faction, and the Ba‘th member group demanding unification were opposed to this coup by Lt. Col. Nahlawi. The March 28, 1962 coup by Lt. Col. Nahlawi and others was a great inspiration to the Nasserist officers who had already planned another coup. Former Col. Jasim Alwan, a Nasserist officer, was joined by Muhammad ‘Umran and ‘Abd al-Karim al-Jundi of the Ba‘th Party military committee(12), and at the end of March, anti-government actions were started in Homs. On the other hand, Maj. Gen. ‘Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din(13), who was concerned about such partisan conflicts in the military, convened a military conference to avoid division of the military. The military conference was held in Homs on April 1, with representative officers from all over Syria attending. At this meeting, 1) Lt. Col. Nahlawi, the mastermind of the coup on March 28., and his group (six officers) will be expelled, 2) Revive the parliamentary system by civilians, 3) Consider reinstatement of officers who have been dismissed since September 28, 1961. etc. were resolved(14). Following this resolution, the masterminds of the coup on March 28 were expelled to Geneva on April 2. There were seven members, including Col. Nahlawi, Col. Hindi, Maj. Bassam ‘Asali, Capt. ‘Adil al-Hajj ‘Ali, Brig. Gen. Dahman, and Lt. Col. ‘Abd Rabba, plus Maj. Rifa‘i(15). Their actions were severely criticized by Nasserist and neutral officers, and their expulsion was swiftly put into action. However, the council took no concrete action on the reinstatement of officers who were dismissed in September 1961 (many of whom were Ba‘th members and unification supporters) and virtually denied reunification with Egypt. For this reason, a coup was set up, centering on Nasserist officers who were dissatisfied with this, including Ba‘th Party officers. The coup took place in Aleppo on April 2, and then spread to Deir ez-Zor, Banias and others(16). The Aleppo rebellion was commanded by Jasim ‘Alwan and Maj. Hamad ‘Ubayd of the Ba‘th Party military committee. Aleppo became the center of a coup by Nasserist officers, who raised the flag of the United Arab Republic and demanded reunification with Egypt. At Deir ez-Zor, Col. Lu’ayy al-Atassi responded. In Suwayda, Maj. Salah Jadid of the Ba‘th Party military committee was scheduled to move the army, but he did not move after all(17). In this coup, Nasserist officers and Ba‘th Party officers took a joint front, but their purposes were not the same. The former wanted to restore prestige in the army and then restore unity. The latter wanted to return to the army. These series of coups that took place in the first half of 1962 commonly set the goal of land reform, the revival of nationalization, and the revival of unification. The officer groups at that time were divided into: 1) Damascus group such as Muhib al-Hindi, Haydar al-Kuzbari, ‘Abd al-Karim alNahlawi, Fa’yz al-Rifa‘i, 2) Hawrani group such as Bahij Kallas, Mustafa Hamdun, ‘Abd al-Ghani Qannut, Riyad al-Maliki, 3) Pro-Nasser group such as Jasim ‘Alwan, Fuwwaz Muharib, Muhammad al-Sufi, ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Sarraj, Rashid Qutayni, Akram Dayri, 4) Independents such as Lu’ayy al-Atassi, Mahmud ‘Awad, Ghassan Haddad, Nur al-Din al-Hariri, Badr al-As‘ar, and 5) Amin al-Nafuri's left (and were independent), and they developed conflicts. Due to the failure of the coup on March 28, a group of Damascus officers led by Lt. Col. Nahlawi was expelled from the power struggle group. In the midst of such a conflict, eight members of the Army High Command were reelected in early April. Supreme Commander Zahr al-Din, Maj. Gen. Namiq Kamal (Chief of Staff), Brig. Gen. Akram ‘Adil (First Division Commander), Col. Badr al-Din al-As‘ar (Second Division Commander), Col. Ziyad al-Hariri (Third Division Commander), Col. Muhammad Mansur (Fourth Division Commander), Col. Sabri al-Sayyed (Chief of Military Personnel Bureau), and Col. Ahmad al-Kuzbari (Director of Officers) have become new members(18). As a result, the crisis from the end of March was settled, President Qudsi returned to work on April 13, and the Bashir al-‘Azmeh cabinet was established on April 16. The cabinet of the independent progressive Bashir al-‘Azmeh was a pro- Ba‘th Party, with two Hawrani faction and one Aflaq faction in his cabinet(19). The ‘Azmeh cabinet abolished the Land Reform Amendment Act on April 30, and restarted Nationalization in May. On June 6, he presented a proposal for a coalition with Egypt in the form of maintaining Syria's sovereignty, and requested Iraq to join it. However, the ‘Azmeh cabinet's reconciliation policy with Nasser did not work, and a propaganda attack from the Egyptian side was carried out. In addition, an attack on Syria using Nasserist was carried out. Faced with this situation, the ‘Azmeh cabinet changed its policy and abandoned cooperation with the Nasserist. Then, on July 28, he filed a complaint against the Arab League for Egypt's interference with Syrian domestic affairs and violation of Syria's sovereignty, and asked them to investigate it. The Arab League held a hearing in Shutura, Lebanon, from August 22nd to 30th. However, the Shutura hearing was eventually canceled as Egypt boycotted it during the fierce debate between Syria and Egypt. The end of the Shutura hearing put the ‘Azmeh cabinet in a corner, which was disbanded in September(20). Then, on September 17, Khalid al-Azm formed a cabinet on his behalf. This Azm cabinet was a national coalition cabinet(21) consisting of 20 representatives from each sect. The Azm cabinet has announced that it will not nationalize any further, but that what has been nationalized to date will be state-owned property, and at the same time will endeavor to unify Arab. Thus, Syrian politics since 1961 has developed conflicts between civilians and military personnel over socialist legislations and policies for unification. Moreover, against the background of such a political situation, the military has come to completely interfere with politics. 2. Reconstruction of the Ba‘th Party The withdrawal period from the United Arab Republic was also a period of great change for the Ba‘th Party. During this period, Syrian Ba‘th members were divided into the following groups(22). (1) A group based on Aflaq and the National Command. They opposed the separatist government and advocated a unified socialist government. They also believed that the Ba‘th Party had not disbanded outside of Syria. This group was later called Qawmiyun (national issue-oriented group). (2) Hawrani group. This group was thinking of conducting political activities within the scope of the separatist government. There was power until the coup on March 8, 1963. (3) A group that declared the establishment of a Ba‘th Party organization in the Syrian region in June 1962. This group was born from an organization on the outskirts of Syria which continued without dissolution during the United Arab Republic era. This group was called Qutriyun (regional issue-oriented group). The central figures of this group were Fa’yz al-Jasim (Sunni from Deir-ez-Zor), Yusuf Zu‘ayyin (Sunni from AbuKamal), Munir al-‘Abdallah (Alawite from Latakia), Ibrahim Makhos (Alawite from Latakia), etc. The group condemned the party activities of Aflaq, Bitar, and Hawrani during the time of the United Arab Republic and attacked their responsibilities for it. And they no longer expected these old leaders, and began to organize their own new Ba‘th Party. 4) An old party member who argued that when Hawrani and Bitar signed a statement of support for the separatist government, they should immediately return to the unification of the United Arab Republic. A moderate group of Nasser supporters. This group developed a socialistic unification movement centered on Sami al-Jundi and Sami Sufan. 5) A group secretly formed by Ba‘th Party officers without systematically no relationship to the party's National Command and Regional Command. This group was called the Ba‘th Party military committee. Of these sects, the Hawrani faction and Qutriyun, and the Ba‘th Party military committee were in favor of a separatist government, while other Qawmiyun and socialistic unification group insisted on unity. In this way, within the Ba‘th Party at that time, there were seen a direction to pursue the responsibility of the traditional leaders for the dissolution of the party organization, and a direction to reorganize the party organization as soon as possible to reproduce the unification. There was also widespread belief that Bitar and Hawrani should be expelled from party leadership and that Bitar and Hawrani, who signed a statement in support of the separatist government, should be denounced. Therefore, confirming the party's political direction and rebuilding the party in Syria were urgent issues for the Ba‘th Party during this period. Against this background, the 5th National Congress was held in Homs on May 8, 1962. There were two major issues at the 5th National Congress. The first was to clarify the political direction of the party in order to deter the reactionaries who were regaining power at the time. The second was the reconstruction of party organizations in the Syrian region(23). On the first issue, the congress confirmed, in the first place, that the dissolution of party organizations in Syria and Egypt was erroneous. He reaffirmed that Arab unification is the only way to counter imperialism and Zionism, as well as Communism and Arab reactionaries. However, as a form of unification, a federal state(24) that maintained the functions of each region without wanting dictatorial or police state control, was proposed. This direction was, so to speak, a middle course between supporters of the separatist government and groups advocating reunification with Egypt. No one from Syria participated in this congress except Aflaq, the general secretary of the National Command. The party congress was attended by strong leftists, opposition groups, and anti-Aflaq groups, but they were resisted by Iraqi Ba‘th members(25) who supported Aflaq, and the congress was dominated by Iraqi members(26). And the resolution on the unification of the Ba‘th Party also reflected the ideas of general secretary Aflaq. The second issue was the reconstruction of the Party organization in the Syrian region. Again, Aflaq was at the center of this issue. It was decided to rebuild the Ba‘th Party organization in the Syrian region, and in accordance with this decision, a new National Command established the provisional Syrian Regional Command. Members of this provisional regional command were not limited to Syrians(27). J.F. Devlin states(28) Hamud al-Shufi, Salah al-Bitar, ‘Abd al-Karim Zuhur and others as members, but according to Razzaz(29), it is doubtful that Bitar was included in this member at the time. In parallel with this interim Regional Command, a committee was formed to lead a new party organization, consisting of Shibli al-‘Aisami (supporter of Aflaq) and al-Walid Talib, and two Iraqi party members(30). The members of the National Command elected at the 5th National congress are as follows. The general secretary Aflaq (Syrian). Others were ‘Ali Salih al-Sa‘di (Iraqi), Hamdi ‘Abd al-Majid (Iraqi)), Jubran Majdalani (Lebanese), ‘Abd al-Majid Rafi‘i (Lebanese), Khalid ‘Ali (Lebanese), ‘Ali Jabir (Lebanese), Munif al-Razzaz (Jordanian), Amin Shuqayr (Jordanian), Khalid Yashruti (Palestinian). Lebanon's representatives were joined by unification supporter, with the opposition to unification dropped out. Iraqi representatives were involved in problems within Iraq. Thus, a moderate group of supporters, centered on Aflaq, has regained power. The 5th National Congress has brought about two major achievements. One is the counterattack of Qutriyun and the Hawrani group against the new movement of the Aflaq group, and the other is the rupture between Hawrani and Aflaq. In response to the new movement centered on Aflaq and the National Command, Qutriyun tried to elect the Regional Command by holding the Syrian Regional Congress with the cooperation of Hawrani. However, the National Command led by Aflaq opposed this and negotiated with Qutriyun, taking advantage of its numerical advantage. However, the negotiations eventually failed, and Qutriyun issued a statement on June 25, claiming that they were true representatives of the Ba‘th Party(31). In parallel with this move, an attack on Aflaq by Hawrani was underway. In late June(32), Hawrani issued a statement criticizing the Ba‘th Party, centered on Aflaq and Bitar, and blaming the National Command's efforts to return to unity with Egypt. In response, Aflaq stated that the Hawrani group was no longer relevant to the party. Thus, Hawrani was banished from the Ba‘th Party, and the conflict between Aflaq and Hawrani within the party leadership came to an end. And the nine-year bond between the Ba‘th Party and Hawrani's Arab Socialist Party eventually broke down. Thus, after the 5th National Congress, Ba‘th members were divided into: a new party centered on Aflaq, Qutriyun, a group of Hawrani supporters, a socialist unification group, and a group of intellectuals who did not belong to any other group. The Ba‘th Party military committee was not a Ba‘th Party organization at the time. Of these sects, the intellectual group had a major impact on the Ba‘th Party's ideological reconstruction. The Ba‘th Party ideology had ceased its creative development since 1957. The asphyxia of the Ba‘th Party ideology was inspired by this group. This group included Jamal al-Atassi, ‘Abd al-Karim Zuhur, Yasin al-Hafiz, and Ilyas Marqus. While maintaining the Ba‘th Party's nationalist and unification direction, they attempted to transform the traditional vague and idealistic idealism of socialism into a scientific and revolutionary doctrine, by introducing Marxism. They were critical of the Nasser administration. At the same time, they did not agree with the separatist government. They emphasized their support for unity. Yasin al-Hafiz was an important member of this group. He was originally a leftist with a Communist background and criticized Qutriyun's advocacy of social reforms as still sweet. He also challenged Qutriyun's partnership with Hawrani, blaming Qutriyun's ideological weaknesses and opposition to unification. Then, in February 1963, he published a collection of papers entitled ‘On Political Thought (fi al-fikr al-siyasi) with Jamal al-Atassi, Ilyas Marqus, and ‘Abd al-Karim Zuhur. The ideology developed in this collection of papers had a major impact on the Ba‘th Party ideology, which was rebuilt in October 1963. In particular, he criticized the Ba‘th Party's theory and practice so far and proposed its ideological reconstruction. Hafez's view will have a huge impact. His view can be summarized as follows(33). Hafiz considered that the theoretical cause of the Ba‘th Party's spiritual and political collapse lay in its ideological and idealistic view of Arab socialism and the narrow petite bourgeois nature of the party's social policy. He also pointed out that of the Ba‘th Party doctrines of unity, freedom and socialism, the content of ‘freedom’ was ambiguous. According to Hafez, this ultimately upset the Ba‘th Party with ‘whether to fight in parliament’ or ‘need to allow coups and dictatorships’. Especially in developing countries like Syria, parliamentary politics by bourgeois will eventually lead to feudal reactionary rule by the wealthy, making it impossible to realize social reforms that guarantee true freedom to the masses. And coups and dictatorships, on the other hand, are shortcuts to a revolution from above, but they eventually bring control of a new class of exploiters, military bureaucrats, and cannot guarantee freedom. Therefore, Hafiz insisted that in order to guarantee freedom to the masses, a people's democratic government should be established which could limit the free behavior of reactionaries, give workers complete freedom, and exclude the army from politics. And he further states that a revolution that organizes the people's struggle is needed to establish such a government. Hafiz also proposed a ‘Arab way to reach socialism’ based on scientific methods, instead of the Arab socialism advocated by the petite bourgeois idealists centered on Aflaq. He proposed a concrete and realistic approach to Arab national unity, arguing that class struggle was needed to achieve these goals. In addition, he states that the party should seek its social foundation not from petite bourgeois or military personnel, but from intellectuals, workers, small merchants, farmers, etc. Thus, Hafez proposed the reconstruction of party ideology based on the method of scientific socialism. Hafiz's radical ideology has had a huge impact. Qutriyun welcomed Hafiz’s doctrine. This new ideology has shattered the image of the party's traditional leaders and provided a thorough measure of private property and justification for implementing widespread nationalization policies. Military groups also welcomed Hafiz's criticism of the principle of freedom. However, it was only as long as the principle of freedom did not deny Syria's parliamentary democracy. Because parliamentary democracy was dominated by bourgeoisies and reactionaries. However, views on the military, such as the view that the military should not be involved in politics, have received fierce opposition from this group of military personnel. The point of this Hafiz view is, first of all, to deny the idea of ‘Arab socialism’ and replace it with ‘Arab way to reach socialism’. In other words, socialism is essential and the way to reach it can vary from country to country. The second is to theoretically develop the Ba‘th Party's principle of freedom into the concept of people’s democracy and, as a result, show the principle that the military should be excluded from politics. These two points will have a great impact on the reconstruction of the party ideology at the 6th National Congress. By the way, the Ba‘th Party was at a turning point in its constitution at this time. The first is the emergence of the reorganization of the party organization and the revisions of party ideology. In the reorganization of the party organization, two directions have emerged: the direction of reconstruction by a group of traditional leaders based on the National Command centered on Aflaq and the direction of reconstruction by a new group. The latter emphasized the interests of the Syrian region in the opposition to these traditional leaders. As for the amendments of the Party ideology, leftist groups came to demand an amendment based on Marxism, from the dying situation of traditional idealistic ideologies. These were of great significance to the Ba‘th Party, which had developed as one of the Arab left-wing nationalist movements. The Ba‘th Party movement had a strong link between national liberation and political, economic and social liberation in the 1940s and early 1950s, with the slogans of unity, freedom and socialism showing an organic bond. However, the idea of Ba‘th became widespread, so to speak, the time of planting had passed, and in the 1960s, it entered the stage of putting it into practice. However, at this stage of practice, this organic bond relaxed and dismantled, becoming dependent on the real situation. And the slogans of unity, freedom and socialism have come to be used separately. This is exactly the time when the breakdown of this organic bond has progressed. And this appeared as two conflicting directions. The first is a nationalist group centered on Aflaq and others, in the direction that national unity is the primary priority, and that this should be prioritized over socialism both in terms of time and its importance. It was represented by Qawmiyun. The other is the direction to think that socialism should be the first priority. This direction thinks that socialism should be prioritized over national unity in terms of time and importance, and national unity will be achieved automatically once socialism is realized. This is a regionalist socialist group, such as Qutriyun and Hafiz, Jamal al-Atassi, Ilyas Marqus, who emphasize scientific socialism. Both directions destroy the original purpose of the Ba‘th Party, the former failing to achieve national unity and the latter failing to achieve socialism. Because national unity and socialism are not feasible without a people's base to engage in revolutionary struggle. With the formation of the United Arab Republic, the Ba‘th Party in Syria has been systematically dismantled, and the energy of the masses, which is its organizational foundation, has also been wiped out. Therefore, the basic principles of the Ba‘th Party, which are based on the masses and seek to practice national struggles through their spiritual Inqilab, have been broken. And the Syrian society could not get rid of the spiritual and ethical backwardness that had been imposed, and on the contrary, it was dragged by it. This situation has led to some groups deviating from the Ba‘th Party principles. The Qawmiyun and regionalist socialist groups mentioned above were just the representatives. The second of the constitutional shifts is the rise of military groups. The Ba‘th Party ideology pervaded military personnel, especially officer groups, in the 1950s. Officers who had already intervened in politics in the wake of Arab nationalism participated in political activities, so to speak, with personal ambitions or as members of military groups with clear political views. The Nationalist ideology of the Ba‘th Party was of great attraction to officers who, despite their feeling an interest in politics, were unable to formulate a particular political ideology(34). They have come to adopt this as a norm of their political conduct. And in the late 1950s, they began to participate in politics as full members and sympathizers of the Ba‘th Party or with personal ambition. Among the Ba‘th Party ideologies, the one that captured the hearts of the officers most deeply was the ‘Arab unity’. This ‘Arab unity’ ideology had the basic proposition of creating the One Arab Nation. The word ‘nation’ in this proposition was defined as avoiding ethnic discrimination and including all minorities (in Syria, Alawites, Druze, Christian factions, Shiites). This greatly facilitated the penetration of the Ba‘th Party ideology into the Syrian army. The reason is as follows: In the Syrian army, minority officers have been in high positions since the mid-1950s. But this political ideology does not make them feel discriminatory from their social origins. The ‘socialism’ slogan also had a major impact. The radical social and economic development that the Ba‘th Party has set as a means to realize socialism, was welcomed by minorities from poor rural areas. This policy could be a very effective countermeasure against the Sunnis forming the urban bourgeoisie. Minorities sought to undermine the economic foundations of bourgeoisie with this socialist policy and to level the society by lower social classes. The situation was the same for minority officers inside the army. Fascinated by the radical ideas of socialism, they eventually formed the extreme left of the party. In this way, there were many military personnel and officers baptized by the Ba‘th Party at the end of the 1950s. By the way, for the Ba‘th Party, the army was only a part of the people, it should serve the people, and it should serve the state. To that end, military personnel should also be based on the Ba‘th Party's basic principles, and by doing this the army would have become organically united with the people. However, some officers have come to deviate from this basic principle. Moreover, when the party's civilian organization was devastated, a group of these officers emerged to form an independent secret organization separate from this civilian organization. This is the Ba‘th Party military committee. They decided that in the midst of the turmoil of Syrian politics and society, the only way to stabilize it was to use a short-circuit method by coup rather than the difficult and long-term line of mass struggle. This group was the most powerful and organized group of the Ba‘th Party groups at the time. The members of this group originally consisted of 5 minority officers (three Alawite officers and two Ismaili officers). However, it expanded thereafter to a total of 15 officers, with participation of 10 new officers ( 2 Alawite officers, 2 Druze officers, and 6 Sunni officers). During the separatist era, when the mass movement showed a stagnation trend, military groups became dominant and greatly influenced Syrian politics. The same was true within the Ba‘th Party. During this period, when the Ba‘th Party as a mass movement was on the verge of dying, the Ba‘th Party military committee was steadily establishing a footing in partnership with other military groups. This relationship between civilians and military personnel within the Ba‘th Party was brought to the surface around 1962, after the civilian organization was hit hard, after which the military personnel gradually became more powerful. 3. March 8 Revolution and the military Even after the Azm administration was formed in September, the attacks on the separatist administration from the pro-Nasser group did not stop. Nasserist riots broke out in Suwayda and Daraa prefectures from January 4th to 13th, 1963. It broke out at the University of Syria in Damascus on the 14th, when pro-Nasser students clashed with neutral or anti-Nasser students(35). The turmoil in the domestic affairs caused by the clash between pro-Nasser group and anti-Nasser group has once again provided ‘Abd al-Karim al-Nahlawi with a coup opportunity. The officers of the Nahlawi group, who organized the coups of September 28, 1961 and March 28, 1962, and were subsequently exiled as military attachés to diplomatic missions abroad, were approached by the Nasser group(36). In May 1962, the ‘Azmeh cabinet tried to dismiss them from the army and put them in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the decision was postponed because their sympathizers in the military opposed it. However, when the Azm cabinet implemented this in early January 1963, the Nahlawi group responded swiftly to this decision. He planned a coup on January 13th in Damascus, Qatana, Quneitra, but it was unsuccessful. This Nahlawi’s attempted coup requested to 1) expel Hawani from politics, 2) suspend the Communist Party's activities, and 3) put Nahlawi, Muhib al-Hindi, Fa’yz al-Rifa‘i and Fakhri ‘Umar into military positions(37). This attempted coup was also endorsed by other military groups. For example, Col. Ziyad al-Hariri, who was already preparing a plan to overthrow the government, and Col. Muti‘ al-Samman, who was planning to expel his chairman, Maj. Gen. Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din, from post of the commander in chief. They were thinking of using Nahlawi for themselves. Such political instability was also reflected in the administration. Syrian politics at that time was largely divided into three groups. First, there is the <leftist group aiming for a socialist direction>, which includes AflaqBitar faction of the Ba‘th Party, 2) Hawrani supporters group, 3) Communist Party, 4) Socialistic Unification group, 5 ) Unified Arab Front, 6) a group leading to ‘Abd al-Hamid 7) Rural origin group. The second is the <right-wing group aiming for a liberal direction>, which includes 1) Islamic Bloc, 2) Chamber of Economic and Commerce Group, 3) Officers Group working for Khalid al-Azm, 4 ) A group of officers working for Nazim al-Qudsi. The third is a <centrist group> that does not belong to either the first or the second, so to speak, prioritizing personal interests. Col. Ziyad al-Hariri and his companion group(38) belong to this group. The most obvious clashes between these groups were the left-wing of Hawrani group and the right-wing of Islamic Bloc, the Chamber of Commerce and Economic group. This clash has symbolized the cabinet and has led to the resignation of the ministers of both groups one after another. On January 21, Bashir al-‘Azmeh (Deputy Prime Minister), and on the 29th, the left-wing Amin al-Nafuri (Minister of Land Reform, he was said to have been close to Hawrani at the time) and ‘Abd al-Halim Qaddur (Minister of Information, Hawrani faction) resigned. On the contrary, on the 30th, the right-wing Rashad Barmada (Minister of Education, People's Party from Aleppo) resigned, and on the 31st, Nihad Ibrahim Basha (Minister of Planning, People's Party from Aleppo, son of President Qudsi's sister), Farhan al-Jandali (Minister of Home Affairs, People's Party from Homs), Ahmad Mazhar al-‘Azmeh (Minister of Agriculture), ‘Umar ‘Awad al-Khatib (Minister of Supply, Islamic Bloc), Nabil al-Tawil (Minister of Health, Islamic Bloc) have resigned. Given the seriousness of the situation, Prime Minister Azm reconciled Hawrani and Issam al-Attar, the leader of Islamic Bloc, to confirm the direction of maintaining his national coalition. Then, on February 4, under the reunification of Azm, Hawrani, and Issam alAttar, a text of a National Agreement was created in which all political forces involved in the current administration participated. However, the ministers of Hawrani faction did not withdraw their resignation. Moreover, on February 11, even Khalil Kallas (Minister of Finance of Hawrani faction) submitted his resignation. In response, the Ministers of Islamic Brock also held their resignation. Thus, the collapse of the separatist government, supported by anti-Nasser forces, was no longer a matter of time. On February 6, a secret broadcaster in Lebanon to attack Syria's separatist government was destroyed. However, the success of the coup in Iraq on February 8 had a major impact on Syria. Those who carried out this coup were Ba‘th officers and pro-Nasser officers, and the Ba‘th Party regime after the coup was considered unification supporters This has had a major impact on Syrian politics, and power relations in the Syrian army have favored advocates of unification. Thus, military personnel prepared a coup to overthrow the separatist government. This military group consisted of three groups: Nasserist group, advocates of unification (including members of the Ba‘th Party), and independents. Of these, the number of Nasserist groups was the largest. Among the Nasserist officers, Col. Rashid Qutayni (who became Director of the Military Intelligence Bureau from March 1) and Col. Muhammad al-Sufi (who returned from studying in the Soviet Union and was a commander of the 5th Division of Homs) were main persons(39). Ba‘th Party officers were the most wellorganized and have made significant contributions to the coup operation. This Ba‘th Party officer participated independently of the Ba‘th Party. Many Ba‘th Party officers were dismissed shortly after the September 28 coup, and very few were in military service at the time(40). Ba‘th Party officers who participated in this coup were Capt. Salim Hatum (Druze), Lt. Col. ‘Uthman Kan'an (Alawite), Slayman Haddad (Alawite), Mustafa al-Hajj ‘Ali (Sunni), all were members of the Ba‘th Party military committee(41). These two groups were joined by a Centrist, Col. Ziyad al-Hariri, commander of the Southern Israeli Front(42). He was the one who was singled out by the Nasserist and Ba‘th Party officers. He was optimistic and independent, but he supported unity. Moreover, he was rumored to be the officer most likely to cause a coup at the time. In addition, he was adventurous, proud, and had a strong desire for power. He also had friendships with Col. Adnan ‘Aqil (Director of the Military Intelligence Bureau), Col. Marwan Kailani (Deputy Director of the same bureau) , and commander of the Damascus Region Brigade (a companion during the Military Academy). It was for this reason that he was selected as a third ally by the Nasserist officers group and the Ba‘th Party officers group(43). Maj. Gen. Zahr al-Din, chairman and commander-in-chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, stated(44), based on reports from his aides, that Hariri was not considered to cause a coup. The High Command of the Armed Forces, supported by the officers' committee, was planning to transfer Col. Hariri at the time. The contents of this transfer plan are as follows(45): 1) Col. Hariri will be transferred to the military attaché in Baghdad, 2) Brig. Gen. Muti‘ al-Samman, the director of security in Damascus, will be returned to military service, and 3) Col. Rashid Qutayni will be the director of military intelligence bureau, and Col. Adnan Aqil will be appointed as the deputy director of the same bureau. However, when the details of the transfer plan became known in late February, a group of right-wing officers in Damascus revealed a refusal to transfer Brig. Gen. Samman. Also, the unification supporting officers who were preparing the coup opposed Col. Hariri’s relegation. Thus, the transfer plan only carried out the appointment of Col. Rashid Qutayni as Director of Military Intelligence The finishing touch to the coup preparation was to embrace the commanders near Damascus. This was also successful, and the cooperation from Col. Nur al-Din Kanj (Druze, who leads the largest and most powerful unit in Syria at the time), Col. Mahmud ‘Awad (acquired by Hariri), Lieut. Ahmad Khattab (monitoring the Chief of Staff), and Lt. Col. ‘Uthman Salih ’Agha (Commander of the military police), etc. was confirmed. The coup was originally scheduled for March 9, but on the 5th, Col. Qutayni and Col. Sufi’s Nasserist group offered to postpone the coup uprising because of the strengthening of their troops. The Nasserist group seems to have considered their own coup(46). However, unification advocate officers and independent officers conducted a coup. In the early morning of March 8, a coup was launched without Nasserist officers. The coup was successful with little resistance from government forces. Thus, the separatist government was overthrown, and Syria returned to a progressive direction under the banner of ‘unity, freedom, and socialism’. The reactionaries reinstated by the coup on September 28 were largely dominated by political intervention of military personnel and finally banished by another group of military personnel. This final coup triggered a major shift in Syrian government from conservatives to progressives and from a civilian government to a coalition of civilians and military personnel. Notes Chapter 7 Reconstruction of the Ba‘th Party (1) The provisional cabinet of Ma’mun al-Kuzbari (1961.9.29 ~ 1961.11.20) is as follows. Ma’mun al-Kuzbari, (Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister), Leon Zamriya (Finance Minister, Supply Minister), Farhan al-Jandali (Health Minister), ‘Adnan al-Quwatli (Interior Minister), ‘Izzat al-Nuss (Minister of Education), ‘Awad Barakat (Minister of Economy, Minister of Industry), Amin Nazif (Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Land Reform), Ahmad Sultan (Minister of Justice), Na‘man al-Azhari (Minister of Planning, Minister of Rural Society), Fu’ad al-‘Adil (Minister of Social Affairs), Abd al- Rahman Hurriya (Minister of Public Works) (2) These politicians met at the house of Ahmad al-Sharabati, and representatives of political parties except the Muslim Brotherhood were present. The 16 signatories included Ahmad Qanbar, Ahmad al-Sharabati, As‘ad Harun, Akram al-Hawrani, Bashir al-‘Azmeh, Hamid al-Khawaja, Hasan Murad, Khalid al-Azm, Rashad Jabiri, Suhayl al-Khuri, Sabri al-Asali, Salah al- Bitar, Fu’ad Qudri, Muhammad al-Aysh, Najib al-Armanazi. There were also 10 people who attended this meeting but did not sign. Among them were Ba‘th party members (Khalil Kallas and Mansur al-Atrash). Aflaq was not present at this meeting. Other politicians such as Azm were skeptical about the intent of .Bitar's participation. (sources) al-ayyam newspaper, October 3, 1961, ; Khalid al-Azm, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp.201-03. (3) Ibid., pp. 201-05. (4) That is, he has not been elected as a member of the Regional Command and National Command since then. (5) Faris al-Khuri, op. cit., pp.261-62 .; al-ayyam newspaper, November 22, 1961. The cabinet consisted of 10 members, 6 of whom were reappointed. (6) The election results are as follows. 15 Ba‘th Party, 5 Ba‘th Party supporters, 33 People's Party, 21 National Party, 10 Islamic cooperative blocks, 4 ALM, 7 Bedouin tribes, 15 Rural tribes, 62 independents. (sources) MER, 1961, and al-nahar newspaper, December 5th. (7) Ma‘mun al-Kuzbari is a member of the ‘Arab Liberation Movement’. The result of votes for this new chairman's candidate was: 47 votes for Jal al-Sayyed (former member of the Ba‘th party), 7 votes for Sa‘id al-Ghazzi, and 114 votes for Ma‘mun al-Kuzbari (ALM). (8) Of the 173 members of the Diet, he won 153 member’s confidence. (9) The second Dawalibi cabinet (1961.12.22 to 1962.3.27) is as follows. "Jazierah & Euphrates Bloc" is referred to as JE bloc. Ma‘ruf al-Dawalibi (Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, People's Party), Jalal al-Sayyed (Deputy Prime Minister, Agriculture Minister, JE Bloc), Rashad Barmada (Defense Minister, Minister of Education, People's Party), Ahmad Qanbar (Interior Minister, People's Party), Muhammad al-Shawwaf (Minister of Public Works, People's Party), Abd al-Rahman al-Hunaidi (Minister of Industry, People's Party), Mustafa al-Zarqa (Minister of Justice, Minister of Wakf, Islamic Bloc), Adnan al-Quwatly (Minister of Economy, Independent), Fu’ad al-‘Adil (Minister of Culture, Independent), Mahmud al-Azm (Minister of Health, Constitutional Bloc), Na‘im al-Suyufi (Planning Minister, Islamic Bloc), Ahmad ‘Ali Kamil (Minister of Transportation, Constitutional Bloc), Suhayl al-Khuri (Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Constitutional Bloc), Bakri alQubbani (Minister of Land Reform, People's Party), Rashid Daqr (Minister of Finance, Minister of Supply, Independent), Muhammad ‘Abdin (Minister of Social Affairs, Islamic Bloc), (sources) al-hayat (December 23, 1961) ; Faris al-Khuri, op.cit., pp.262-63. (10)They were members of the September 18, 1961 coup, excluding Haydar al-Kuzbari. It included Brig. Gen. Abd al-Ghani al-Dahman, Brig. Gen. Faysal Sirri al-Husayni, Lt. Col. Muhib al-Hindi, Lt. Col. Hisham Abd Rabbo, etc. (11) al-hayat (March 29, 1962) ; And, Abd al- Karim Zaha al-Din, mudhakkirat an fatra al-infisal fi suriya (memoir of the Syrian separatist period), Beirut, 1968, pp. 190-207. (12) At that time, their names did not have the rank of the army, so the rank was unknown. (13)The Supreme Commander (the position of Commander-in-Chief) was established on September 28, 1961. The Supreme Commanders and their tenures are as follows. Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din (1961.9.29 ~ 1963.3.8), Lu‘ayy al-Atassi (1963.3.9 ~ 1963.7.27), Amin al-Hafiz (1963.7.27 ~ 1965.9.11). After September12, the Supreme Commander was merged into the Defense Minister's post. (14）Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din, op.cit., pp. 211-22. (15) At the military meeting on April 1, it was decided to expel six people. Ibid., P.215. However, according to the al-Hayat newspaper on April 4th and L'Orient le Jour on April 2nd and 3rd, there was one more person Maj. Rifa‘i, so the total exiled people were seven. (16）al-ahram newspaper, April 2-4, 1962. (17) Sami al-Jundi, pp. 89-95. (18) al-ahram newspaper, April 9, 1962. When it was founded on September 28,1961, its founding members were ten. (19) The first Bashir al-‘Azmeh cabinet (1962.4.16 ~ 6.20) is as follows. Bashir al‘Azmeh (Prime Minister), Rashad Barmada (Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Education, Minister of Agriculture), Ahmad Abd-al-Karim (Minister of Social Affairs, Minister of Land Reform), Riyad Maydani (Minister of Rural Society, Minister of Supply), Adnan al-Azhari ( Foreign Minister), Rashid Hamidan (Minister of Justice), Gerorge al-Khuri (Minister of Finance), Subhi Kahala (Minister of Transport, Minister of Planning), Abd al-Salam al-‘Ajili (Minister of Culture), Nihad al-Siba‘i (Minister of Economy), Ihsan al -Rifa‘i (Minister of Health), Abd al-Halim Qaddur (Interior Minister), Robert Ilyas (Minister of Industry, Minister of Public works), ‘Abdallah ‘Abd al-Da’ym (Minister of Information). (source) Faris al-Khuri, op.cit., pp.266-67. Abd al-Halim Qaddur and Ahmad Abd al-Karim were Hawrani faction, and Abdallah Abd al-Daym was Aflaq faction. (20) The ‘Azmeh cabinet was remodeled on June 20th, and the second ‘Azmeh cabinet (1962.6.20 ~ 1962.9.17) was born. (21) The 5th Azm cabinet (1962.9.17 ~ 1963.3.8) is as follows. Khalid al-Azm (Prime Minister), Bashir al-‘Azmeh (Deputy Prime Minister), Rashad Barmada (Minister of Education), As‘ad al-Kurani (Minister of Justice), Farhan alJandali (Minister of Agriculture and Forestry), As‘ad Muhasin (Foreign Minister), Khalil Kallas (Minister of Finance), Amin al-Nafuri ( Minister of Land Reform), George Khuri (Minister of Industry), Subhi Kahala (Minister of Transportation), Abd al-Halim Qaddur (Minister of Information), Robert Ilyas (Minister of Public Works), ‘Aziz Abd al-Karim (Interior Minister), Rafiq Jebra’il Bashur (Minister of Culture), Mazhar al-‘Azmeh (Minister of Agriculture), ‘Izzat al-Tarabulusi (Minister of Economy), Mansur al-Atrash (Minister of Social Affairs), Nihad Ibrahim Basha (Minister of Planning), ‘Umar ‘Awad al-Khatib (Minister of Supply), Nabil al-Tawil (Minister of Health). And the Minister of Defense is executed by Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din. Looking at the composition of this cabinet by political party, there were 2 People's Party, 3 Islamic Bloc, 3 Socialists (Ba‘th Party), and 11 independents. (source) Faris al-Khuri, op. cit., pp.269-70. (22) nidal hizb. pp.77-78. (23) al-mu’tamarat…… , pp. 24-26. (24) al-mu’tamarat……, pp. 24-25. ; nidal hizb, pp.78-80.. (25) ‘Ali Salih al-Sa‘di, Hamdi ‘Abd al-Majid, etc. (26) Itamar Rabinovich, Syria under the Ba‘th, 1963-66, Jerusalem,1972, pp.37-38. (27) al-mu’tamarat……, pp.26-27. (28) J.F. Devlin, op.cit., p. 333. (29) Munif al-Razzaz, op. cit., p. 109. (30) Itamar Rabinovich, op. cit. , p. 39. (31) Ibid., pp. 39-40. (32) Sami al-Jundi, p.104.; JF Devlin, op.cit., p. 201.; However, Sami al-Jundi said that the relationship between the Ba‘th Party and Hawrani was broken when a statement of the Regional Command was issued on August 14th. (33) As for Hafiz's view, See, in particular, Yasin al-Hafiz, tajriba hizb al-bath fi al-falsafa al-siyasiya, Damascus, 1963, pp.191-201; Avraham Ben-Tsur, ‘The Neo- Ba‘th Party of Syria’, “Journal of Contemporary History”, Vol.3, No. 3, 1968, pp.170-72. (34) At that time, the ideologies of the Syrian Nationalist Party and the Ba‘th Party were deeply penetrated into the army. However, after the 1955 assassination of Adnan alMaliki, the former was cracked down, the Ba‘th Party ideology became a major factor. (35) al-hayat (January 15,1963). (36) George Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East, Vol. 2, New York, 1971, p. 278. (37) al-hayat (January 15,1963). (38) ‘Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din, op. cit., p. 340. (39) Ibid., p. 423. (40) Ibid., pp. 422-23.; George Haddad, op.cit., p.294. (41) ‘Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din, op. cit., p. 423.; Itamar Rabinovich, op. cit. , p. 45. (42) Ziyad al-Hariri was promoted from Col. to Maj. Gen., Muhammad al-Sufi from Col. to Lt. Gen., and Rashid Qutayni from Col. to Maj. Gen. after the March 8 Revolution. Col. Lu'ayy al-Atassi, who was in the prison of Mezze, was promoted to Lt. Gen. They each got a key position. Lu'ayy al-Atassi became Commander-in-Chief and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, Muhammad al-Sufi became Minister of Defense, Rashid Qutayni became Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and Ziyad al-Hariri became Chief of Staff. (source) ‘Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din, op. cit., p. 446. (43) Ibid., p. 417.; George Haddad, op.cit., pp. 293-96. (44) ‘Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din, op. cit., p. 425. In particular, Maj. Gen. Namiq Kamal, a member of the Armed Forces High Command and Chief of Staff, communicated with Col. Hariri. (45) Ibid., pp. 424-29. (46) Sami al-Jundi, p. 112. Chapter 8 Birth of the Ba‘th Party government 1. Birth of the Ba‘th Party government The March 8, 1963 coup was purely military. The protagonists were independent officers and unification support officers (including Ba‘th Party officers). Ba‘th Party officers were members of the Ba‘th Party military committee and were not, in the truest sense, members of the party. Cooperation between Ba‘th Party officers and independent officers continued after the coup. In particular, it can be said that the dropout of the Nasserist officer group just before the coup made this even stronger. However, these Nasserist officers were considered part of the contributors to the coup victory. This was due to the need for the cooperation of Nasserist officers to control the army and state, and to prevent Egypt from turning to the enemy at such a delicate time. After the coup, many officers were reinstated in military service with the help of independent officers such as Col. Hariri and Col. Lu’ayy al-Atassi. Most of the officers who returned to work were members of the Ba‘th Party. For example, Lt. Col. Muhammad ‘Umran, Maj.‘Izzat Jadid, and Lieut. Salah Jadid, who were still low-ranking officers at the time(1). On the other hand, the military leaders were also replaced immediately after the coup. Lu’ayy al-Atassi replaced Lt. Gen. Zahr al-Din as the supreme commander (commanderin-chief). He was released in a coup and was promoted from Col. to Lt. Gen. Ziyad alHariri, who was promoted from Col. to Maj. Gen., replaced Maj. Gen. Namiq Kamal as Chief of Staff. Rashid Qutayni was also promoted from Col. to Maj. Gen. before becoming Deputy Commander-in-Chief. Brig. Gen. ‘Abdallah Jabrini, a supporter of Nasser and a friend of ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Sarraj, has also been appointed Director of National Security(2). The National Revolutionary Council was established as the highest decision-making body of the country centered on these members, and the Cabinet functioned as its executive body(3). The National Revolutionary Council initially seemed to try to consist only of the officers who were the protagonists of the coup, but this policy was later changed. In addition to 10 military personnel, 10 civilians will be added. The breakdown of military personnel was 4 non-affiliated groups (Lt. Gen. Atassi, Maj. Gen. Hariri, Col. Ghassan Haddad, Fahd al-Sha‘ir), 3 members of Ba‘th Party military committee (Lt. Col. Muhammad ‘Umran, Lieut. Salah Jadid, and Maj. Musa al-Zu‘bi), and 3 Nasserist officers (Lt. Gen. Sufi, Maj. Gen. Qutayni, and Lt. Col. Fawwaz Muharib)(4). Regarding civilian members, the Ba‘th Party and Socialistic Unification group, the unified Arab front, the Arab nationalist movement, and other Nasserist groups negotiated, but it is said that no conclusion was reached by the time the cabinet was established(5). On March 23, Lt. Gen. Atassi, the commander-in-chief, was elected chairman of the National Revolutionary Council by military personnel who overwhelmed civilian resistance(6). The cabinet was born on March 9th. The cabinet was a progressive unification advocate government with Bitar as prime minister, consisting of nine Ba‘th members, six Nasserist, and four independents(7). The Ba‘th members were in the majority in number, but the main posts of Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister were occupied by Nasserist. Ba‘th members were able to rule the new administration, but at the same time, on the other hand, they were well aware of their weaknesses, including their failure to win a major post in the military, weak public support, and a dilemma in their policy towards Egypt. The National Revolutionary Council sought to expel separatism and eradicate its foundation forever. And, on the contrary, he sought to establish a progressive government and achieve Arab unity supported by a strong popular base. The slogan was ‘unity, freedom, and socialism’(8). At the same time, the National Revolutionary Council has stated that the military will fight for the unity of the Arabs as part of the people, but not for the purpose of establishing a military junta(9). The March 8 coup was endorsed by Iraq and Egypt. Nasser sent a telegram to the National Revolutionary Council on the 9th, approving the Syrian government for the first time after the separatist government(10). Iraq issued a joint statement with Syria stating that further approaches between Cairo and Baghdad would strengthen friendship and solidarity between Egypt, Syria and Iraq. In response, Prime Minister Bitar announced on the 12th that he would support the formation of a federation by these three countries. In such an atmosphere, the integrated mood of the three countries has rapidly increased. Under these political circumstances, the Ba‘th Party was at a crossroads. The Ba‘th Party wanted power in Syria, but was forced to choose whether it should be absolute power or be content with Nasser’s. In this regard, the party was largely divided into two. One is Qawmiyun centered on Aflaq-Bitar. They did not want to return to full integration with Egypt and did not want to relinquish their current power in Syria. However, they also wanted Nasser's blessing to get rid of the shadows around Syria. Therefore, in the end, they had to think about integration. The other was a young group separate from these nationalist groups, who were skeptical of Nasser and its supporters of Syria. In response, most of Ba‘th members saw the rapidly evolving momentum of a unity revival as a bargain to organize the masses against reactionaries. Thus, from mid-March to mid-April, negotiations were held to form the Tripartite Federation. Of these three-country negotiations, between Syria and Egypt, the focus was on the relationship between the Ba‘th Party and Nasser supporters in Syria. Nasser called for the decentralization of power in Syria's National Revolutionary Council, cabinet, and the Armed Forces. So the question was how much the Ba‘th Party and independent groups could make concessions to this request. Negotiations between the Ba‘th Party and Nasser supporters have been slow to progress. In response, Nihad al-Qasim and Abd al-Wahhab Hawmud of the United Arab Front which was extreme Nasser supporters groups, threatened to resign as ministers. In response to this strong attitude, pro-Nasser demonstrations spread around Aleppo and Damascus from the end of March. The National Revolutionary Council has appointed Interior Minister (Brig. Gen. Amin alHafiz), the commander of martial law, for domestic security(11). Under these circumstances, the Ba‘th Party eventually conceded to a group of Nasser supporters, and on April 5, the ‘United Front’(12) consisting of the Ba‘th Party, the Arab Nationalist Movement, the United Arab Front, and the Socialistic Unification group, was formed, and the final negotiations finally started on the following 6th. As a result, a Tripartite Federation agreement between Egypt, Syria and Iraq was signed on April 17(13). However, the conflict between the Ba‘th Party and the pro-Nasser group was not fundamentally resolved, leading to a decisive clash from the end of April to May. During this period, the Ba‘th Party, supported by Maj. Gen. Hariri(14), dismissed and transferred Nasserist officers. For example, Brig. Gen. Jamil Fayyad (commander of national security), Brig. Gen. Mamduh Habbal, Lt. Col. Ma’mun Tahsin (special attendant of Nasser during the United Arab Republic era) were dismissed, and Maj. Gen. Nur al-Din Ibrahim, Brig. Gen. Anwar al-Jisri, Lt. Col. Fawwaz Muharib and Lt. Col. Mustafa alHami have been transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Industry, and the Ministry of Economy. The total number reached 47. Following this dismissal and transfer, representatives of Nasserist officers were dismissed from the military or government. Lt. Gen. Sufi, Defense Minister and member of the National Revolutionary Council, has been expelled, and Maj. Gen. Qutayni, deputy Commander-in-Chief and member of the National Revolutionary Council, has resigned from all positions. In addition, Brig. Gen. Husayn al-Qadi, the 1st Division Commander, resigned(15). In protest of these measures, five Nasserist ministers of civilian resigned on May 2. There were Nihad al-Qasim (deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice), ‘Abd al-Wahhab Hawmud (Minister of Finance), Hani al-Hindi (Minister of Planning), Jihad Dahi (Minister of Transport) and Sami Sufan (Minister of Supply)(16). Thus, the United Front has virtually collapsed, and the Ba‘th Party has become a major force in the government and the military. In response to this situation, popular-level demonstrations led by Nasserist were repeated intermittently in Damascus and Aleppo(17). Thus, the crisis of the cabinet was brought about. As a result, the cabinet was reshuffled on May 13, and the second Bitar cabinet was established(18). This cabinet consisted of the Ba‘th Party and independents. There was already a potential tension between the Ba‘th Party and Maj. Gen. Hariri, but they both maintained a cooperative relationship from the threat to the Nasserist. However, when the government and the army expelled Nasserist officers, the Ba‘th Party military committee and Maj. Gen. Hariri were in conflict. Ba‘th Party civilian Aflaq and Bitar supported Maj. Gen. Hariri to counter the Ba‘th Party military committee. Brig. Gen. Ghassan Haddad, an independent member of the General Staff, was dismissed as the director of the officer's personnel bureau during the previous cabinet reshuffle, and was appointed as a sinecure planning minister. The officer's personnel director was taken over by Lt. Col. Salah Jadid of the Ba‘th Party military committee. On the other hand, Maj. Gen. Hariri was appointed Minister of Defense for this cabinet reshuffle. However, Brig. Gen. Amin al-Hafiz, who had been appointed deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister, ordered the dismissal or transfer of 30 officers of Maj. Gen. Hariri's group on June 23. Attempts were made against this order by Maj. Gen. Hariri and his supporters like Bitar, but in the end, on July 8, Maj. Gen. Hariri was expelled from the country after being dismissed as Defense Minister and Chief of Staff. The duties of Maj. Gen. Hariri were taken over by Brig. Gen. Hafiz. As a result, Brig. Gen. Hafiz has become an influential person who also serves as deputy Prime Minister, Interior Minister, deputy Chief of Staff, Defense Minister, and deputy Commander-in-Chief(19). An organization was in place to support the expulsion of Nasserist officers and Maj. Gen. Hariri's group. The Ba‘th Party was made aware of the weaknesses of popular organizations and their foundations by pro-Nasser demonstrations. Therefore, in order to gain the support of these masses and establish the existence of the party, the National Guard (al-haras al-qawmi) was established at the end of June. The organization, led by Col. Hamad ‘Ubayd of the Ba‘th Party military committee, was initially aimed at curbing the Nasserist’s counterattack expected in the expulsion of Maj. Gen. Hariri. The final stage of the birth of the Ba‘th Party regime, the process of expelling Lt. Gen. Atassi and Nasserist groups from the political arena, was brought about by July 18 coup led by Jasim ‘Alwan. A coup was launched by Nasserist groups such as former Col. Jasim ‘Alwan and Capt. Muhammad Nabhan. This coup was planned by the unification advocate and carried out by these officers(20). However, the coup faced a barrage of attacks from government forces led by Maj. Salim Hatum and Capt. Muhammad Hamra and failed. The government set up a military court chaired by Lt. Col. Salah al-Dulli(21) and conducted trials for coup participants. The next day, Col. Hisham Shabib, 7 non-commissioned officers including, Sergeant Muhammad ‘Abdallah Yusuf and Sergeant ‘Umar Isma‘il Barghali, and 12 civilians, total 20 people were sentenced to death(22). Among the masterminds, Jasim ‘Alwan and Ra’if al-Ma‘arri were arrested a week later on July 27(23). The denunciation of the Nasserist did not end with a military trial alone. Two days later, on July 21, Maj. Gen. Hafiz issued arrest warrants for 58 Nasserist members, including Jasim ‘Alwan, Ra‘if al-Ma‘arri, as well as civilian politicians such as Sami Sufan and Ali Bozo(24). The Ba‘th Party’s crackdown on Nasserist groups infuriated Nasser. As a result, on July 22nd Nasser declared the abolition of the Tripartite Federation agreement of three countries (Egypt, Syria and Iraq) signed on April 17th. Thus, once again, the ‘Arab unity’ attempt failed. Meanwhile, domestically, Lt. Gen. Atassi expressed dissatisfaction with the treatment of coup participants and resigned as chairman of the National Revolutionary Council. However, this, on the contrary, resulted in the successful expulsion of Lt. Gen. Atassi by the Ba‘th Party. Then, on July 27, Maj. Gen. Hafiz succeeded Lt. Gen. Atassi as Commander-in-Chief and Chairman of the National Revolutionary Council. On August 5, a cabinet reshuffle was carried out to disperse the cabinet's duties concentrated on Maj. Gen. Hafiz. This led to the formation of the third Bitar cabinet (25), which consisted of half the Ba‘th Party and half independent unification advocate. However, the real power lies with the Ba‘th Party, and the entry of independent unification advocate into the cabinet was a way to gain the support of the people. What is noteworthy in this cabinet is the emergence of young Ba‘th Party fighters such as Nur al-Din al-Atassi (Interior Minister) and Ibrahim Makhos (Minister of Health). Thus, at the end of July 1963, the Ba‘th Party came to power in Syria. And the center of this Ba‘th Party administration was supported by members of the Ba‘th Party military committee. 2. Two Ba‘th Party Conflicts with other political forces were no longer a fundamental issue for the Ba‘th Party in power. Instead, conflicts of each faction within the party and within the government have emerged as the primary issue. The composition of the Ba‘th Party when it came to power at the end of July 1963 was almost the same as it was a year ago. At the time there were several groups, such as 1) Aflaq, Bitar, Shibli al-‘Aisami, Fahmi Ashuri and other groups loyal to the party rebuilt by Aflaq in June 1962, the so-called Qawmiyun, 2) Qutriyun, represented by Ibrahim Makhos, Yusuf Zu‘ayyin, Fa‘yz al-Jasim, 3) Ba‘th Party military committee, represented by Lt. Col. Muhammad ‘Umran, Lt. Col. Jadid, Maj. Gen. Hafiz, etc., 4) the Marxist group represented by Hamud al-Shufi, Yasin al-Hafiz and so on. There were also other groups of people who were banished from the party or who left the party and still had some relationship with the party. That is the Hawrani group and the socialistic unification group. Of these, Qutriyun and the Marxist group were younger generations who joined the party in the early 1950s, and their representatives were still in their mid-thirties at the time. The expansion of young party members was seen in both the military and civilian organizations. In the army, party members expanded in the process of filling vacant posts created by the expulsion of Nasserist groups and independents. At that time, the expansion of these party members was mediated by relatives, acquaintances, friends, and so on. On the other hand, civilian organizations have opened their doors wide because of their isolation and fragility. As a result, the number of party members increased. The most important person among such young party members was Hamud al-Shufi. He is from the Druze sect and became a member of the Extended Regional Leadership Headquarters, which was established on March 13, as well as a member of the National Revolutionary Council(26). He was able to get sympathizers from rebuilt party by Aflaq and the Yashin al-Hafiz group, as well as from new members after the March 8 coup(27). This radical Marxist group which gathered around Shufi was centered on the Druze faction. The most basic of the conflicts within the party was the civilian-military conflict, which manifested itself as a power struggle between Qawmiyun and the Ba‘th Party military committee. In this power struggle, Qutriyun and the Shufi group allied with the Ba‘th Party military committee. In the course of this civilian-military conflict, military personnel gradually became dominant from 1963 to 1964. This situation was evident in the Regional and National Command of the party, as well as the composition of the cabinet. By the way, from September to October 1963, the first party congress (National Congress and Syrian Regional Congress) was held after the birth of the Ba‘th Party government. At that time, it was necessary to strengthen the integration of civilian leadership and military leadership and clarify its political policy. Therefore, the 1st Regional Congress(28) was first held from September 10th to 16th, and then the 6th National Congress was held from October 5th to 23rd. The first Regional Congress was dominated by military and civilian radicals allied with it. As a result, the Aflaq faction retreated and the Shufi group emerged. In particular, Bitar, whose true intentions were questioned when he left the United Arab Republic, was not elected as a member of the Regional Command. Eight members of the Regional Command were elected at this congress, five of whom were civilians and three of whom were military personnel. The civilians were all Marxist groups, except for Nur al-Din alAtassi, who resonated with Qutriyun. They were Hamud al-Shufi, Khalid al-Hakim, Mahmud Nawfal and Ahmad Abu Salih, of which Hamud al-Shufi was elected general secretary of the Regional Command. The three military personnel were Hamad ‘Ubayd, Hafiz al-Asad, and Muhammad Rabah al-Tawil, all of whom were members of the Ba‘th Party military committee. This congress was the first time a military personnel was elected as a member of the Regional Command. On the other hand, the 6th National Congress was the first National Congress held since the Ba‘th Party administration was born in Iraq and Syria. From the ideological point of view of the party, this congress has become the most important congress since its inception. At the congress, the coalition of Syrian and Iraqi radicals and Syrian military personnel was overwhelmingly dominant. Moderates such as Aflaq and Bitar, who were party leaders before the United Arab Republic, were severely criticized. This aspect was evident in the resolutions of the congress and the composition of the National Command. The fundamentally important resolution of the 6th National Congress was the adoption of ‘some theoretical foundations’(29). This is a review and modification of the Ba‘th Party’s traditional theory. This ‘some theoretical bases’ was heavily influenced by the previously published ideological views of Marxists such as Yasin al-Hafiz in its theoretical perspective. The points of this ‘some theoretical foundations’ in a comparison between the two, can be summarized as follows: 1) As a concrete and realistic approach to Arab unification and ethnic issues, ‘some theoretical foundations’ proposed ‘Arab method to reach socialism’ as in Hafiz and others. ‘Some theoretical foundations’ took the position that socialism is in essence and how to achieve it can vary from region to region. In other words, he thought that the path of nationalism was the path that the Arabs should follow in order to reach socialism(30). 2) The second is the ‘concept of people's democracy’. ‘Some theoretical foundations’ acknowledged the need to establish a people's democracy to protect the freedom of the masses, and said that a people's struggle had to be organized to do so. It was the same as Hafiz and others who insisted on people's democracy. However, the two made a decisive difference in terms of military position. Whereas Hafiz and others argued that the army should be excluded from the political arena in people's democracy, this ‘some theoretical foundations’, on the contrary, insisted on the union of the army and civilians (party). Therefore, this ‘some theoretical foundations’ completely buried the original views of Hafiz and others and conversely, argued that the practice of people's democracy required an army. Moreover, it has even been argued that the political and ideological education of the military is important for the practice of people's democracy(31). This justified the politicization of the military and also the intervention of military personnel in state affairs and party affairs. This had a tremendous impact on the future of the Ba‘th Party. 3) In ‘some theoretical foundations’, scientific socialism was laid(32) as a premise for a realistic approach to Arab unification and ethnic issues This scientific socialism is different from petit bourgeois idealistic socialism advocated by Aflaq. That is, it is similar to Aflaq in that it associates socialism with nationalism, but it added to this the scientific(ilimi) and revolutionary (thawri) (that is, dialectical (mantiq jadali)(33) in socioeconomic analysis) character. Now, in addition to the above ‘some theoretical foundations’, the 6th National Congress made the following resolutions. First, (A) regarding the organization of the party: 1) Establish a group guidance system. 2) The foundation of the revolution and the foundation of the party should be sought from workers and farmers. 3) Make sure that most of the members of the party leadership are dedicated to party activities. Next,(B) Regarding the socialist transformation of Syrian and Iraqi societies: 1) Aiming for the socialistic transformation of societies, based on democracy. 2) To that end, create a socialistic revolutionary force consisting of workers, farmers, military and civilian revolutionary intellectuals, and petite bourgeoisies. 3) The means of production is controlled by the workers. 4) Establish a collective farm. 5) Confirm the importance of socialistic planning. 6) Guarantee freedom to popular organizations and guarantee workers the right to strike. 7) Implement ideological education in the military to organically combine the revolutionary avant-garde of military and civilian personnel. C) Regarding the Arab struggle: Implementing the Syrian-Iraqi Union (wahda ittihadiya) as the first step in the overall unification of the Arabs. In addition, discussions were held on policies toward the Arabs and international affairs(34). There were two major characteristics of this 6th National Congress. First, the Ba‘th Party governments in Syria and Iraq resolved that a coalition government should be created. This was the Ba‘th Party's attempt to realize the Arab unity, following the formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958 and the agreement (failure) of the formation of the Tripartite Federation of Egypt, Syria and Iraq in April 1963. However, this decision did not come to fruition due to the collapse of the Ba‘th Party government in Iraq by pro-Nasser groups’ coup on November 18. The second feature is the emergence of a powerful leftist. Marxism and its analytical methods were adopted, and Aflaq's ideas were reexamined. As a result of the discussion, the left-wing ideological line was adopted. The congress abandoned the traditional Ba‘th Party belief in the validity of private property and denounced the use of private property as petit bourgeois socialism. And it said that middle-class bourgeoisies could not be responsible for building a national economy, and that only workers, farmers, and revolutionary intellectuals could create a revolution. And, as a realistic and direct goal , the emphasis has been placed on socialism, that is, the construction of a socialistic society, rather than the Arab unity, which has traditionally been the sacred slogan. Finally, 13 members of the new National Command were elected. There were 4 Syrians, 5 Iraqis, 2 Lebanese and 2 Jordanians(35). Aflaq, who was reelected as general secretary, was endorsed by the Jordanians (Munif al-Razzaz and Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar) and the Lebanese (Jubran Majdalani and Khalid- Ali). On the other hand, the other six members, including Iraqi leftist (‘Ali Salih al-Sa‘di, Hamdi ‘Abd al-Majid, Muhsin alShaykh Radi), were considered Aflaq rivals. Iraqi moderate (Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Salih Mahdi ‘Ammash) were excluded from the Aflaq rivals because they acted as an intermediary between Syrian radicals Hamud al-Shufi and Aflaq faction. Other than Aflaq, the Syrian members were Maj. Gen. Amin Hafiz and Col. Salah Jadid of the Ba‘th Party military committee, and Marxist Hamud al-Shufi, who were opponents of the Aflaq faction. What is more remarkable about the composition of National Command is that a military personnel was elected for the first time as a member of the National Command. They were Maj. Gen. Hafiz and Col. Jadid from Syria, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Salih Mahdi Ammash from Iraq. Thus, even in the National Command, the forces of civilian radicals and military personnel have become widespread. In this way, through the party congress after the establishment of the Ba‘th Party government, Syrian politics was shaken by a mix of civilian and military, moderate and radical, and Qawmiyun and Qutriyun conflicts within the Ba‘th Party. The rise of military and radical forces also appeared in the new cabinet on November 12. After the 6th National Congress in October, the conflict between Maj. Gen. Hafiz and Col. Muhammad ‘Umran became apparent. Maj. Gen. Hafiz countered Col. ‘Umran on November 11 by promoting Col. Jadid to Maj. Gen. and pushing him to the Chief of Staff(36). On the other hand, Bitar, who was disgraced at the party's Syrian Regional Congress, had already resigned from the prime minister on September 11, so Maj. Gen. Hafiz waited for the party's National Congress to end, and on November 12, organized a cabinet(37). In this cabinet, Col. ‘Umran became Deputy Prime Minister(38), but Bitar was unable to enter the cabinet, and was forced into a sinecure, the Vice-Chairman of the National Revolutionary Council. In this first Hafiz cabinet, military personnel such as Maj. Gen. Hafiz (Prime Minister), Maj. Gen. ‘Umran (Deputy Prime Minister), and Brig. Gen. ‘Abdallah Ziyad (Minister of Defense) are located in the upper ranks. In addition, allies with military personnel or radicals such as Yusuf Zu‘ayyin (Minister of Land Reform) and Nur al-Din al-Atassi (Interior Minister), Mustafa Haddad (Minister of Education), Ibrahim Makhos (Minister of Health), and Ahmad Abu Salih (Minister of Transport) entered this cabinet. By the way, the biggest challenge the Ba‘th Party in Syria had at the time was to coordinate the urban middle class and Egypt (and pro-Nasser) with the Ba‘th Party regime. The new administration sought to prevent the hearts and minds of the people from being liberated from the party because of the birth of the Ba‘th Party government and the adoption of socialistic policies by the Ba‘th. And various measures were taken for that purpose. Dialogue between Prime Minister Hafiz and merchants and industrialists in Damascus, release of former President Qudsi (who was also the leader of the People's Party), reduction of the sentence of coup participants on July 18, release of political arresters(39) such as right-wing politicians and Nasserist groups, etc. were done. However, these measures did not work. Already, government attacks by the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been underway since the 6th National Congress, have become more and more intense. Then, in December, the Muslim Brotherhood leader Issam al-Attar and the Ba‘th Party clashed. As a result, Attar went into exile in Lebanon. On the other hand, it has been in conflict with Egypt since the abolition of the Tripartite Federal Agreement on July 22nd. The overthrow of the Ba‘th Party government and the birth of the pro-Nasser government in Iraq on November 18(40) was a great shock to the Ba‘th party in Syria. Because a coalition of Syrian and Iraqi Ba‘th Party regimes was resolved at the 6th National Congress, but this has become unrealizable. And the Ba‘th Party government in Syria can no longer rely on the Iraqi government in its opposition to Egypt and has become isolated in the Arab world. Relations between Egypt and Syria were exacerbated when Syria condemned Egypt's indecisive attitude in the conflict between Syria and Israel over the use of Jordan River water. In January 1964, the Cairo Conference was convened by Nasser to discuss the use of Jordan River water. At this meeting, Maj. Gen. Hafiz, the representative of Syria, was isolated and eventually forced to make concessions to other Arab countries(41). The Shufi group, which had a large weight on Regional Command and Ba‘th Party structures at the time, expressed dissatisfaction with Maj. Gen. Hafiz's attitude and argued that it was a great opportunity to make a real revolutionary change(42). Meanwhile, Bitar criticized the then-powerful person ‘Ali Salih al-Sa‘di, radical representative of the Iraqi Ba‘th Party, for the loss of Ba‘th power in Iraq. For this reason, Bitar was decided to expel the party on January 24, 1964 by the Syrian Regional Command, which was strongly influenced by Sa‘di(43). The Aflaq faction and the Ba‘th Party military committee group, who felt the threat to the development of such a far-left group, decided to take joint steps. And they decided to convene a party congress to expel these far-left groups from the Regional and National levels of the party organization. The 1st Extraordinary Regional Congress was held from February 1st to 5th, 1964. At this congress, the Aflaq faction and the Ba‘th Party military committee succeeded in expelling the far-left Shufi group. And no one was elected from the Shufi group as a member of the new Regional Command. The new members of the Regional Command consisted of seven military personnel (all members of the Ba‘th Party military committee) and nine civilians (three of whom were Qutriyun)(44), strongly reflecting the interests of the Ba‘th Party military committee. Prior to the 6th National Congress, Qutriyun led by Yusuf Zu‘ayyin, cooperated with the military group, together with the Shufi group and, and was elected to the Regional Command under the control of Shufi in September 1963. However, this Qutriyun group was more realistic and less dogmatic than the Shufi group(45). Therefore, they could be obedient partners of the military. As soon as the extraordinary Regional Congress was over, Aflaq demanded that the National Congress be held under the authority of the general secretary of the National Command. Thus, the 7th National Congress was held from February 12th to 18th, 1964. The far-left group was banished in this congress as well as in the Extraordinary Regional Congress. In the newly elected National Command, the far left, such as Syrian Hamud alShufi, Iraqi ‘Ali Salih al-Sa‘di, Hamdi Abd al-Majid, and Muhsin al-Shaykh Radi, were banished. And on behalf of these far-left groups, Maj. Gen. ‘Umran of the Ba‘th Party military committee and Mansur al-Atrash, Shibli al-‘Aisami of the Aflaq faction from Syria, and ‘Abd al-Majid al-Rafi‘i and ‘Ali Khalil from Lebanon. ‘Ali Ghannam from Saudi Arabia were newly elected. Also, Iraqi ‘Ammash and Jordanian Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar were defeated(46). Three members (Amin al-Hafiz, Salah Jadid, Muhammad ‘Umran) were elected from the Ba‘th Party military committee, and four were military personnel, including Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr from Iraq. There were six Syrian representatives, three of whom were members of the Ba‘th Party military committee, and the remaining three were civilians of the Aflaq faction. Thus, during the six months from September 1963 to February 1964, military members of the Ba‘th Party (especially members of the Ba‘th Party military committee,) came to control the inside of the army, as well as the party(47). The 1st Extraordinary Regional Congress and the 7th National Congress have allowed far-left groups such as ‘Ali Salih al-Sa‘di, Hamud al-Shufi, and Yasin al-Hafiz to be expelled from party and Syrian politics. However, the Shufi era within the party finally ended four months later. From February to May 1964, the conflict between the Ba‘th Party and the urban middle class became clear. The nationalization of banks (May 3) and the promulgation of the New Land Reform Act (June 23(48)), which were implemented after the March 1963 Revolution, severely constrained Syrian economy. There was a sharp decline in bank credit, a stagnation in production activities such as the textile industry, and an increase in unemployment. However, the Land Reform Act, despite its radical provisions, did not necessarily come into effect because it avoided political conflicts with landowners and tribal chiefs. By 1964, the economic situation worsened further, and public dissatisfaction with the socialist policy of the Ba‘th Party increased. This dissatisfaction spread to all levels of society, centered on the middle class of the city, especially small and medium-sized commerce and industry. On February 8, in Baniyas, Ba‘th Party members, mainly Alawites, clashed with Sunni conservative students. Then, on the 22nd of the same month, a riot broke out in Homs(49), and in March, a police box was attacked in Aleppo. Furthermore, on April 5th, in Hama, a high school student arbitrarily erased the Ba‘th Party slogan written on the blackboard by a teacher (Ba‘th Party member). This incident developed into a clash between a religious group and a landowner group over the Ba‘th Party administration. The clash also showed the appearance of a sectarian conflict between the Islamic Sunni sect and the Ba‘th Party military committee which was centered on minorities such as the Alawites, Druze, and Ismailis(50). The Hafez administration has tried to remedy these rebel riots, but has failed. So, this time, it was suppressed by power. However, after that, commercial strikes continued (52)at bazaars such as Damascus and Homs(51) to support the Hama riots and oppose socialist policies. The rebel movement, peaked at the Hama riots, has brought about changes within the political system and the Ba‘th Party. On April 25, a provisional constitution was promulgated(53), which, like the 1950 Constitution, stipulates that the president is a Muslim. Islam is not mentioned in the Ba‘th Party charter, but it is mentioned in the national constitution as a compromise with Sunnis. The provisional constitution decided to expand the traditional National Revolutionary Council and give it legislative power. In addition, a Presidential Council was established to be elected from the members of this expanded national revolution council, and administrative authority was granted to this and the cabinet. The expanded members of the National Revolutionary Council will consist of traditional members plus representatives of each social group. The new Presidential Council was intended to disperse Maj. Gen. Hafiz's dictatorship. On May 13, five members of the Presidential Council were elected, chaired by Lt. Gen. Hafiz, vicechaired by Bitar, and Maj. Gen. ‘Umran, Nur al-Din al-Atassi, Mansur al-Atrash, were appointed members(54). Lt. Gen. Hafiz and Maj. Gen. ‘Umran were members of the Ba‘th Party military committee, Bitar and Atrash were members of the Aflaq faction, and Atassi was a member of the Regional Command. At that time, the Aflaq faction was favored by the elderly and the intellectuals of the big cities, while the military personnel were favored by the younger generation from small cities and rural areas. The restoration of Aflaq faction’s power in this Presidential Cuncil was a formal power balance measure to pacify urban citizens and unification supporters . Within the Ba‘th Party, the Ba‘th Party military committee and its ally group remained dominant. They had to fight the Shufi group and Qawmiyun for party leadership, but failed to collaborate with the urban middle class and Egypt (and Nasserist group) after the Hama riots. So, they had no choice but to turn the party into a moderate direction. Thus, the party launched the fourth Bitar cabinet on May 13 and attempted to strengthen the foundations for the Ba‘th Party regime(55). Qutriyun did not enter the Bitar cabinet. He tried to get non- Ba‘th Party members into the cabinet and show the breadth of support for the administration. The fourth Bitar cabinet made an attempt to renew the political environment(56). For the citizens and Nasserist, they released the instigators arrested following the Hama riots and the Nasserist prisoners. It also granted 147 politicians the reinstatement of citizenship. In addition, as a measure against unification group, it was announced that Unification supporters would be included in the expanded members of the National Revolutionary Council, and that 60% of the expanded members would be Ba‘th members and 40% would be Unification supporters. In addition, he tried to approach Nasser, but failed because he was hit by Nasser. On May 27, Shibli al-‘Aisami replaced Nur al-Din al-Atassi as the general secretary of the Regional Command. However, despite these attempts, the Bitar cabinet failed to achieve any remarkable results. As a result, Bitar resigned from the post of Prime Minister and Vice-Chairman of the Presidential Council on October 3, due to a radical push. At the same time, Mansur al-Atrash also resigned as a member of the Presidential Council. Maj. Gen. Jadid and Yusuf Zu'ayyin were appointed as members of the vacant Presidential Council. As a result, the Presidential Council became three members of the Ba‘th Party military committee (Lt. Gen. Hafiz, Maj. Gen. ‘Umran, Maj. Gen. Jadid) and two Qutriyun (Nur al-Din al-Atassi, Yusuf Zu‘ayyin). Lt. Gen. Hafiz was reappointed as chairman, and Maj. Gen. Jadid was appointed as vice-chairman. In addition, the division of duties of each committee member was clarified. So, Maj. Gen. Jadid will take responsibility for national defense and security, Maj. Gen. ‘Umran will take responsibility for economics, al-Atassi will take responsibility for labor, public affairs, supervision and censorship, and Zu'ayyin will take responsibility for agriculture(57). On the other hand, the cabinet was formed by Lt. Gen. Hafiz. This second Hafiz cabinet was entirely composed of Ba‘th Party members, but Qawmiyun was excluded(58). 3. Military personnel and Regional Command dominance The rise of military personnel within the Ba‘th Party had already begun with a coup on March 8, 1963. The Ba‘th Party itself did not participate in this coup. This coup was a military coup that included members of the Ba‘th Party military committee. Civilian organizations centered around the Ba‘th Party Aflaq have since failed to clarify their relationship with the Ba‘th Party military committee. They believed that the group of military personnel who carried out this coup would sooner or later be associated with them. They also believed that they were more powerful than these military groups because of their strong foundation in Iraq. This is the first mistake Ba‘th Party leadership made after the March 8 coup. And even after that, the party's civilians could not regulate the increasing power of military personnel, especially the Ba‘th Party military committee. This made a second mistake. In other words, it allowed military personnel to join the party's leadership, eventually bringing military control over civilian organizations. Moreover, civilians did not establish any control over military organizations. These two mistakes were the main impetus for the military's dominance over the civilian sect, and greatly influenced the subsequent course of the Ba‘th Party. The first Bitar cabinet, which was formed after the March 8 coup, attempted to stop the political interference of military personnel. But this, on the contrary, made Bitar the target of military attacks. Bitar was already very unpopular because he signed a statement in support of the separatist government, and he was also attacked by Regional Command. As a result, he was not elected as a member of the Regional Command at the first Regional Congress in September 1963, and in January 1964, the Regional Command decided to expel him from the party. Aflaq, on the other hand, was recognized as a contributor to the establishment of the party and was not directly attacked. As military personnel, especially members of the Ba‘th Party military committee, joined the party's leadership, significant changes were seen in the party's foundation. Not only did the number of military members increase, but the door was opened to the entry of civilians, and the number of party members increased five-fold in about a year(59). With the resolution of cooperation between the military and civilian organizations at the 6th National Congress, the Ba‘th Party military committee made a big leap towards the reorganization of the party. In particular, as a reorganization of the party organization, contacts were made with the Hawrani faction, the socialistic unification group, and Qutriyun. The negotiations were carried out by Maj. Gen. Hafiz, Col. ‘Umran, and Col. Jadid, members of the Ba‘th Party military committee. Of these, negotiations between the Hawrani faction and Maj. Gen. Hafiz, the socialistic unification group and Col. ‘Umran failed, but negotiations between Qutriyun and Col. Jadid succeeded(60). Qutriyun and the Ba‘th Party military committee will take this opportunity to maintain a strong alliance. The alliance between Ba‘th Party military committee and Qutriyun gradually became the core of the Ba‘th Party, alongside Aflaq's Qawmiyun, as if ‘two Ba‘th parties existed’(61). Qawmiyun of the Aflaq faction, has collaborated with the Ba‘th Party in Iraq and Jordan from the 5th National Congress in 1962 to 1963 through the National Command. In particular, it was largely dependent on Iraqi Ba‘th party members. Therefore, when the Ba‘th Party government in Iraq collapsed on November 18, 1963, Qawmiyun lost a strong support base. Moreover, their idea of recognizing the Ba‘th Party as a pan-Arab real power was greatly shaken, degrading their position as a counter to Nasser in Arab leadership. Thus, the alliance between the Ba‘th Party military committee and Qutriyun became relatively dominant. They were given the authority by the National Command to reexamine the organization in each branch and to elect the leadership(62), gradually changing the constitution of the party base. As a result, the leadership of each branch eventually became dominated by supporters of the Ba‘th Party military committee and Qutriyun. On the other hand, Qawmiyun was lethargic and completely separated from the party's foundation. He had no contact with the party's foundation, did not patrol it, and did not meet with it. Moreover, he stopped even publishing printed matter. They were devoted solely to the power struggle for the alliance between the military and Qutriyun, and refused to negotiate with their party leaders and their foundations(63). However, Qawmiyun was able to partner with the Ba‘th Party military committee. It was in the expulsion of the far-left group at the 1st Extraordinary Regional Congress and the 7th National Congress in February 1964. However, the two leaderships of Qawmiyun on the one hand and the alliance of the Ba‘th Party military committee and Qutriyun on the other were no longer able to deepen mutual understanding. Therefore, the National Command of Qawmiyun was forced to make a big choice. The choices were to strengthen relations with each other and normalize the situation to prepare for future struggles, or to clarify the differences with Regional Command and strive to abandon the military junta. However, Ba‘th Party of Qawmiyun, which had no real power, had to abandon both of them. Already, it had lost its support base in Iraq, and although the Bitar administration was established in Syria in May, it had no real power. Aflaq, the party's general secretary, was so aware of this that he stayed in Germany from late June to late November 1964, absent from Syria for about five months. .. Now, after the political tensions peaked in the Hama riots in the first half of 1964 subsided, the Shufi Group was finally expelled in June under the overwhelming power of the Regional Command. Shufi himself had already been banished from the party. This time, key members of the Shufi group, such as Yasin al-Hafiz, Khalid al-Hakim, and Ahmad Abu Salih, were banished(64). This made the dominance of the he Ba‘th Party military committee and the Regional Command centered on Qutriyun even clearer. Then, at branch chiefs’ meeting of the party (a meeting of representatives of each Branch in Syria) held from July 23 to 25, the Regional Command was confirmed as the highest political authority in Syria(65). The fate of the fourth Bitar cabinet hanged by a thread. However, Syria, hoping to improve relations with Arab countries, has postponed the removal of the Bitar cabinet until the end of the second Arab summit (September 5-11). And the Regional Command, which decided that a situation like Hama riots would no longer occur, dismissed the Bitar cabinet and expelled Qawmiyun (Bitar and Mansur al-Atrash) from the Presidential Council. Thus, in early October, both the Presidential Council and the cabinet were dominated by the alliance of the Ba‘th Party military committee and Qutriyun. As already pointed out, the Presidential Council has come to consist of three members of the Ba‘th Party military committee and two Qutriyun members. On the other hand, the second Hafiz cabinet, which replaced the Bitar cabinet, was all members of the Ba‘th Party. However, Qawmiyun's entry into the cabinet was excluded. The Hafez cabinet, which reaffirmed that it is the Ba‘th Party that actually controls Syria, set up the following political policies: 1) urgently establish a Peasant Federation(66), and 2) reorganize the traditional Workers' Federation(67), 3) Speed up the implementation of land reform, 4) Promote the direction of nationalization, etc. From this time on, the grouping of power struggles within the Ba‘th Party became clear. There were conflicts between the civilian Qawmiyun vs. the military (mainly the Ba‘th Party military committee), Maj. Gen. Jadid vs. Maj. Gen. ‘Umran of the Ba‘th Party military committee, and the pro-Nasser Maj. Gen.‘Umran vs. the anti-Nasser group. Lt. Gen. Hafiz, who also served as chairman of the Presidential Council, commander-in-chief and prime minister, went to Paris on October 26 for illness treatment(68). During this time, the duties of Lt. Gen. Hafiz, were entrusted to Maj. Gen. ‘Umran (as chairman of the Presidential Council) and Atassi (as Prime Minister). This greatly aroused Maj. Gen. ‘Umran’s ambitions. Maj. Gen. ‘Umran has been intimate with the Nasserist since about 1962. At the end of 1963 he negotiated a re-entry of the socialistic unification member to the Ba‘th Party, but failed. He also opposed Qutriyun's mass enlistment. By the end of 1963, he was in conflict with Lt. Gen. Hafiz. The conflict of Maj. Gen. ‘Umran with Lt. Gen. Hafiz was due to his dissatisfaction with the dictatorship of the Ba‘th Party military committee and Lt. Gen. Hafiz's dictatorship. Maj. Gen. ‘Umran countered Lt. Gen. Hafiz by forming sectarian bloc in the army and embracing Syrian Nasserist. After that, Maj. Gen. ‘Umran tried to revitalize the party in partnership with Qawmiyun such as Aflaq(69). When Lt. Gen. Hafiz returned from Paris on November 26, Lt. Gen. Hafiz and Maj. Gen. ‘Umran were in conflict again. Lt. Gen. Hafiz's real power had already been nominalized, and an alliance between Maj. Gen. Jadid and the Atassi faction dominated Syrian government(70). There, Lt. Gen. Hafiz worked with Maj. Gen. Jadid to counter Maj. Gen. ‘Umran. When Col. Asad was promoted to major general’s rank by Maj. Gen. Jadid, Maj. Gen. Umran's indignation against Lt. Gen. Hafiz and Maj. Gen. Jadid culminated (71). Maj. Gen. ‘Umran, Maj. Gen. Jadid, and Maj. Gen. Asad were all founding members of the Ba‘th Party military committee and were of the same Alawites(72). The confrontation between Lt. Gen. Hafiz and Maj. Gen.‘Umran manifested itself as a confrontation between the Regional Command with the Ba‘th Party military committee and Qutriyun’s alliance on the one hand and the affiliated group with Maj. Gen. ‘Umran and the National Command on the other. At the end of November, a joint meeting of National and Regional Command was held. Aflaq returned from Germany on November 23 to attend this conference. At this meeting, the Ba‘th Party military committee made a decision to dismiss Maj. Gen. ‘Umran from his party position and expel him from Syria(73). However, a meeting of National Command(74) held after this joint meeting invalidated the resolution of the Regional Command to expel ‘Umran and claimed that systematically the National Command was the supreme authority of the party. It also decided to dissolve Syria's Regional Command. However, the control of the alliance between the Ba‘th Party military committee and Qutriyun, which had already taken control of each branch in the Syrian region, was stronger than the National Command could have imagined. So, a few days later, the National Command was forced to withdraw its earlier decision regarding the dissolution of the Regional Command(75). Thus, Maj. Gen. ‘Umran was expelled as the Spanish ambassador on 14 December(76), despite strong resistance from the National Command. And Maj. Gen. ‘Umran's chair in the Presidential Council was taken over by Maj. Gen. Asad(77). The second Hafiz cabinet program, especially socialist measures, was postponed due to the December 1964 crisis. After this crisis was over, these socialist measures were implemented one after another. On December 15, the Peasant Federation was established. On the 16th, the Land Reform Act was amended to simplify land expropriation. On the same day, the nationalization of oil resources was carried out. Then, in January 1965, a large-scale nationalization was carried out. First, on January 2, 107 companies were nationalized(78), and on January 4, eight more companies were nationalized(79). And on January 7, a special military court was set up(80). It was designed to judge those who sabotage or act to prevent socialist measures against nationalization, which is scheduled to be enforced from January to March. After that, by the end of March, the electric company, metal processing company, food import company, oil refinery & distribution, cotton mill, and companies of cotton, wheat, barley, etc. were nationalized. Thus, the nationalization that started in 1963 are as follows: the nationalization of banks and insurance companies, the nationalization of industrial companies including spinning and cotton, cement, glass, sugar, etc., the state monopoly on the use of underground resources and nationalization of oil & fuel companies, nationalization of most trading companies, establishment of consumer distribution corporation, state monopoly of wheat, barley flouring and export of cotton and cotton seeds, etc.. Major parts of the economy such as domestic commerce and foreign trade as well as finance and mining and industrial production have come under the control of the state. The Nationalization Act of early 1965 was promulgated when the conflict between Qawmiyun and the Ba‘th Party military committee group was most intense. This nationalization decree best showed the difference between the two. The difference between the two was the difference in views on socialism. It should not have been distinguished by the scale of nationalization. The Ba‘th Party military committee group saw it as a socialist measure in a country. In response, Qawmiyun opposed regionalist socialism and believed that the socialist measures taken by a state were merely one step towards achieving socialism(81). Domestic resistance to these nationalization legislation has not been effective. In Damascus, strikes and store closures took place, but unlike a year ago, the Ba‘th Party's leadership was strong this time. Strike performers and demonstration agitators were sentenced to death, and closed stores were confiscated. Moreover, the Ba‘th Party was able to exert influence even on Islamic religious administration. On January 28, the legal authority of the Presidential Council over religious administration was recognized, in other words, the presidential council was granted the authority to appoint Imams and other clergy, and to dismiss them. And on January 28, all authority over the Wakf commission was transferred to the Presidential Council. Also, on February 7, the Presidential Council appointed Grand Mufti Shaykh Ahmad Kuftaru. Socialist measures, including nationalization, have also affected international relations of Syria. Relations with Western countries have deteriorated and relations with the Soviet Union have improved. For example, financial assistance for the construction of the Euphrates Dam in West Germany has been stalled by refusing oil mining rights to German oil companies. The United States also funded rebel instigators for performing espionage. It was exposed on February 17, and Walter Snowdon, the second secretary of the US embassy was ordered to leave Syria(82). At that time, the Israeli spy network was also exposed(83). The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was skeptical of the Ba‘th Party, except in 1957-58. Iraqi Communists were persecuted and murdered in early 1963, making them even more skeptical. However, since the nationalization measures in 1965, the image of the Soviet Union toward Syria has improved. And the exchange between Syria and socialist countries became active. From the process of such nationalization measures, the tendency of the Ba‘th Party military committee and Qutriyun to the left and the tendency of Qawmiyun to the right have become clear. On the other hand, civilian leftists, such as the Communist Party members, the Hawrani faction, and the anti-military leftist, have become in a corner in relations with the Soviet Union. Once upon a time, these civilian leftists were favored during the Khrushchev era. However, when Khrushchev was deposed in October 1964, the Soviet Union's policy toward Syria changed drastically and came to support the military personnel of the Ba‘th Party(84). Perhaps due to these changes in external circumstances, the attitude of civilian left-wing toward the party has changed and they have begun to plead for re-entry(85). Regional Command made a decision in April 1965 in favor of their re-entry, but the 8th National Congress held in the same month did not accept their plea. The 2nd Regional Congress was held in March 1965 with the aim of reporting on nationalization measures from January to March 1965 and counterattacking the resolution of the National Command in December 1964. This congress was held from March 17th to April 5th, and the following three points were resolved. 1) Resolutions on party organization: (a) Reduce the number of members of the regional Command to 11, of which 6 will be dedicated to party affairs and will be freed from any other duties. Each of these members shall be responsible for bureaus such as the Peasant Bureau and the Culture Bureau. (b) Hold down the ratio of new members in order to raise the level of party members. (c) With regard to the army and the party, the military organization is supervised by the military bureau of the Regional Command. The Ba‘th Party military committee will engage in original duties of the military. Members of the Ba‘th Party military committee in Regional Command will be reduced from sevenfifteenths to three-fifteenths. 2) Socio-economic policies, including nationalization measures: Prepare new policies for this as a provisional program(86) by the next extraordinary congress. 3) Regarding the resolution of the National Command in December 1964: The Regional Command elected by the Regional Congress appoints members of the Presidential Council and the prime minister. The general secretary of the Regional Command shall be the chairman of the Presidential Council. Consider the expanded National Revolutionary Council, or the National Council, as a parliament(87). This 2nd Regional Congress was dominated by members of the Ba‘th Party military committee and Qutriyun. The resolutions in 3) above, which tried to give the Regional Command an advantage over the National Command, reflected such circumstances. This was also reflected in the composition of the new members of the Regional Command. Of the 11 members, Lt. Gen. Hafiz, Maj. Gen. Jadid, and Col. ‘Ubayed were members of Ba‘th Party military committee and the remaining eight were all Qutriyun. Thus, by the end of the 2nd Regional Congress, the Regional Command, especially Ba‘th Party military committee, was in control of the Ba‘th Party. After the overwhelming victory of the Ba‘th Party military committee and Qutriyun at the 2nd Regional Congress, the 8th National Congress was held from April to May 1965. Attendees from Syria were only a quarter of the total. At this congress, it was an important task to reconcile the National Command with the Syrian Regional Command. However, Aflaq, the general secretary of the National Command, resented the attempt at the reconciliation and refused to be re-elected as the party secretary, as the reconciliation between the National Command and the Regional Command would effectively grant the real power of the Regional Command. Therefore, the congress elected Jordanian Munif al-Razzaz as the general secretary to replace Aflaq. Another important task at this congress was to clarify the relationship between the government and the party. A report was submitted on this, but the content was inadequate and a committee was set up to review it. And four people, Aflaq, Razzaz, Hafiz, and Maj. Gen. Jadid, were elected as members. This final report was approved at the congress and distributed by the National Command on 21 April. The report was basically aimed at resolving the conflict between the National Command and the Ba‘th Party military committee. The outline is as follows. 1) Recognize the authority of the National Command to supervise the Regional Command. 2) The Prime Minister, Chief of Staff, and members of the Presidential Council shall be nominated by a joint committee of National and Regional Command. 3) Establish a political bureau belonging to the Presidential Council. And this member is composed of members of the Presidential Council, general secretary and deputy general secretary of the National Command, deputy general secretary of the Regional Command, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and Chief of Staff(88). The report amended the decisions of the 2nd Regional Congress, the most notable feature of which was the institutional merger of civilians and military organizations of the party. This confirmed the existence of the Ba‘th Party military committee. However, it was stipulated that its authority should be limited to the military. In addition, the number of military personnel candidates in the Regional and National Command was clearly defined (3 in the Regional Command and 2 in the National Command)(89). The 8th National Congress reaffirmed the role of the National Command, but at the same time brought about a change of general secretary. The resignation of Aflaq, who has been the spiritual pillar of the Ba‘th Party as the founder of the Ba‘th Party and the leader of the Ba‘th Party after that, from the party secretary was a compromise with the Ba‘th Party military committee (called another Ba‘th Party). And it also meant a substantial victory of the Ba‘th Party military committee over National Command(90). The 8th National Congress was able to reconcile the power struggle between the National Command and the Ba‘th Party military committee. However, the most basic problem the party faced, the problem of removing the barrier between the party and the masses, remained unsolved. Clarifying the relationship between the party and the military has now become an essential task for military personnel who have achieved victory in the party. And a military conference was held from April to June 1965 to discuss this very issue. At that time, there were three military organizations in the Ba‘th Party. The first is the Ba‘th Party military committee. The organization was founded as a secret society in 1959 and was recognized by the Ba‘th Party as the highest authority in the party's military affairs after the March 8, 1963 coup. When the Ba‘th Party seized power, the members considered the Ba‘th Party military committee to respond to the new political situation and formed a second organization, the Military Organization (al-tanzim al-‘askari). Formed from the Ba‘th Party military committee, the military organization was organized to mimic the party's civilian organization. This military organization established 8 branches from August 1963 to February 1964 and 12 branches by 1965. Its leadership was called the Central Commission. This military organization rapidly developed its branch organization to prevent the influence of the Shufi group from spreading within the party. Tensions have gradually increased within this military organization. In particular, Dissatisfaction arose from officers who contributed to the March 8 coup but did not benefit from the promotion They were called “the Major Group (majmu'a al-ruwwad)(91)”. Blocs also progressed within the Ba‘th Party military committee, and Maj. Gen. ‘Umran was expelled in December 1964, creating extreme tensions. The third organization is the Military Bureau (al-maktab al-'askari). This organization was established as a bureau of Regional Command after the 2nd Regional Congress at the end of March 1965. This military bureau was also controlled by members of the Ba‘th Party military committee. In April 1965, a Ba‘th Party military organization held a Military Conference (also known as the Kisweh Conference because it was held in Kisweh). The meeting was held largely due to the growing opposition to the Ba‘th Party military committee within the military organization(92). This conference was the first military conference in which civilians participated(93). Therefore, it was hoped that this conference would be the first step in unifying civilians and military personnel. The following matters were resolved at this meeting. 1) Dissolve the Ba‘th Party military committee(94). 2) The military organization is tentatively commanded by Lt. Gen. Hafiz, Maj. Gen. Jadid, Maj. Gen. Asad, and Col. ‘Ubayd. 3) Establish a committee to prepare new bylaws for military organizations. Lt. Gen. Hafiz, Maj. Gen. Jadid, Maj. Gen. Asad, Col. ‘Ubayd, three members of the Regional Command, and the general secretary of the Regional Command were appointed as members of this committee. In June 1965, the 2nd Military Conference was held and the new bylaws of the military organization were adopted. The following two points were the main points of this internal rule. 1) Abolish the Ba‘th Party military committee. And the function of the Ba‘th Party military committee will be transferred to the Military Bureau of the Regional Command. The authority of this military bureau is limited to Ba‘th Party organizations in the military. 2) Establish an Officers’ Committee with the authority to relocate and promote officers. This Officers' Committee consists of military members of the Regional and National Command, members of the Military Bureau, and five other military personnel. The two military conferences, held in April and June 1965, marked a major turning point for the Ba‘th Party. That is, the Ba‘th Party military committee was dissolved, and since then the Ba‘th Party military committee no longer represents the military and the Ba‘th Party. And the organization of the Ba‘th Party in the military was to be governed by the Military Bureau of the Regional Command. In addition, the assignment, transfer, promotion, etc. of officers will be supervised by the Officers’ Committee. 4. Battle between Hafiz and. Jadid (August 1965-February 1966) With the decision to dissolve the Ba‘th Party military committee, a new crisis emerged. It was conflicts that arose between members of the former the Ba‘th Party military committee(95), replacing the previous conflict between the National Command (the Ba‘th Party, which is based on Qawmiyun) and the Ba‘th Party military committee. This is a conflict between Lt. Gen. Hafiz and Maj. Gen. Jadid. The former was chairman of the Presidential Council, Prime minister, Commander-in-Chief, member of the National Command, general secretary of the Regional Command, member of the Military Bureau, member of the Officers’ Committee. The latter was the Chief of Staff, deputy general secretary of the Regional Command, member of the Military Bureau, and members of the Officers’ Committee. The confrontation between the two was a confrontation between a person in power and a person of weight at the time, and it greatly shook the party, the government, and the military. The conflict between the two had already begun around the time of the expulsion of Maj. Gen. ‘Umran at the end of 1964. However, the conflict between the two did not become apparent because they were engaged in a joint struggle against the National Command, which is a common enemy in the power struggle. At the 8th National Congress, the National Command and the Ba‘th Party military committee compromised and there was no common enemy. Therefore, the conflict between the two came to the surface. The conflict between the two was further clarified at the military conference in April 1964. At this military conference, Lt. Gen. Hafiz blamed Maj. Gen. Jadid for the rebellion brought about by the non-commissioned officers of the army, that is, the non-commissioned officers’ request for the dissolution of the Ba‘th Party military committee. With this as an opportunity, the two began to collide completely. Lt. Gen. Hafiz established authority as a powerful person, while establishing a common personality on the other hand. However, he did not lay the organizational foundation for the party and the military. Around him, officers who opposed Maj. Gen. Jadid gathered. Maj. Gen. Jadid, on the other hand, did not have the authority and commonality of Lt. Gen. Hafiz, but he struck a discord between Lt. Gen. Hafiz and his collaborators, and tried to clarify the individualism, stubbornness, and dictatorial character of Lt. Gen. Hafiz(96). Thus, Lt. Gen. Hafiz, despite being a powerful figure at the time, was unable to mobilize much power in the military and could not lay a large foundation for the party. He had gained popularity and status in the Presidential Council and the cabinet. Maj. Gen. Jadid, on the other hand, had a great deal of power with his collaborators in major posts in the military, and at the same time, in the party also received great support from the military organization of the Regional Command. The conflict between Lt. Gen. Hafiz and Maj. Gen. Jadid was essentially a power struggle. In short, the conflict between the two was Maj. Gen. Jadid’s opposition to Lt. Gen. Hafiz’s individualism, dictatorship, and the concentration of powers by dictatorship(97). Lt. Gen. Hafiz accused Maj. Gen. Jadid of: 1) Maj. Gen. Jadid created a sectarian bloc, 2) he also brought a tribal way to state affairs and behaved arbitrarily, 3) he formed an internal party within the party and the army, using tribal solidarity and personal fellowship, etc.(98). Maj. Gen. Jadid counterattacked this as follows. Lt. Gen. Hafiz is a dictator who is trying to privatize the government and to use the people to destroy the Ba‘th Party(99). Maj. Gen. Jadid also made the following proposal to the Regional Command as an attack on Lt. Gen. Hafiz.(100) 1) Abolish the Presidential Council, 2) The Political bureau will inherit the functions of the Presidential Council, 3) The head of the state shall not serve concurrently as the Commander-in-Chief. The proposal was to undermine the very power base of Lt. Gen. Hafiz, the chairman of the Presidential Council and commander-in-chief. The conflict between the two was even more serious than the conflict between the National Command and the Ba‘th Party military committee. If this conflict continues as it is, an army clash will eventually occur and the party itself will be destroyed. Therefore, efforts to resolve this conflict continued hard. As a result, a joint meeting of the National and Regional Command was held at the end of June, and the mediation proposal submitted by Munif al-Razzaz (general secretary of the National Command) was resolved. The mediation plan was based on 1) abolishing the Commander-in-Chief and absorbing its authority into the duty of Minister of Defense, and 2) members of the Presidential Council don’t hold other government positions(101). That is, the proposal meant removing Lt. Gen. Hafiz from the Commander-in-Chief and Prime Minister, making the Prime Minister independent of the Presidential Council, and removing Maj. Gen. Jadid from the Chief of Staff or the Presidential Council(102). After the meeting, Regional Command persuaded Lt. Gen. Hafiz and Maj. Gen. Jadid to follow this resolution. However, both did not follow this decision(103). And the Regional Command that failed in this persuasion work took responsibility for it and resigned. The resignation of the Regional Command was a great opportunity for the National Command to regain power. Razzaz wanted to expel military personnel from the party and make the party civilian. He also tried to increase the number of Regional Command from 11 to 16 and add candidates for National Command to the expanded number. However, this measure was opposed by the surprising directions of Aflaq and Bitar. Aflaq argued that the conflict with the military group should be resolved by a total conflict. Bitar overestimated the party's ties with himself and argued that nine Qawmiyun (including Bitar) should be elected to the Regional Command. Thus, the National Command was divided and could not gain the advantage of the Regional Command. Under these circumstances, the 2nd Extraordinary Regional Congress was held on August 8 to reconcile the conflict between Lt. Gen. Hafiz and Maj. Gen. Jadid. First, the Regional Command, which had been vacant, was elected, and 16 members were elected. However, due to the circumstances mentioned above, Qawmiyun’s request was not accepted and all 16 were elected from the supporters of the Regional Command. Of these, nine were military personnel and seven were civilians. The resolution of the 2nd Extraordinary Regional Congress was no different from the resolution of the joint meeting at the end of June. The resolution of this extraordinary congress are as follows(104): 1) Lt. Gen. Hafiz and Maj. Gen. Jadid leave the army, 2) Lt. Gen. Hafiz retires from the Prime Minister. 3) Realize the National Council, an expanded national council, by September 1st, 4) Re-election of Lt. Gen. Hafiz as chairman of the Presidential Council, and election of Nur al-Din al-Atassi as vice-chairman. 5) Appoint Col. Hamad ‘Ubayd as Defense Minister, Col. Muhammad Shnaiwi as Chief of Staff, and Col. Fahd al-Sha‘ir as deputy Chief of Staff. However, this second extraordinary regional congress could not resolve the conflict between Lt. Gen. Hafiz and Maj. Gen. Jadid. The conflict between the two was made the first move by Maj. Gen. Jadid to solve the problem. Maj. Gen. Jadid resigned as Chief of Staff on August 21, and recommended Col. Muhammad Shnaiwi, a member Lt. Gen. Hafiz faction, to replace him. He also recommended Col. ‘Ubayed, a member of Lt. Gen. Hafiz faction, to the Defense Minister(105). On the other hand, Lt. Gen. Hafiz recommended Col. Fahd al-Sha‘ir as Chief of Staff(106). However, in the end, as Maj. Gen. Jadid intended, Col. Muhammad Shnaiwi was appointed Chief of Staff on September 7. Fahd al-Sha‘ir has been appointed deputy Chief of Staff. Both were promoted to major general at the same time. Col. ‘Ubayd was only promoted to major general and was not appointed as defense minister(107). Maj. Gen. Jadid recommended two persons of Lt. Gen.s Hafiz faction to key positions for the following reasons: The first was to have his aide, Zu‘ayyin, take office as prime minister. It was already agreed that Atassi would be appointed the Prime Minister(108), but Maj. Gen. Jadid decided to push Zu‘ayyin to this post because Atassi could succumb to the pressure of Lt. Gen. Hafiz. He also resigned as Chief of Staff with the intention of acquiring the vacant post of deputy general secretary of the Regional Command, in order to oversee the Regional Command, and take control of all government power. Second, by recommending one member of the Regional Command to the Defense Minister, and by personally recommending it, he showed good intentions and made it clear that he prioritized the interests of the party over personal motivation. He intended to attract members of the Lt. Gen. Hafiz faction in the Regional Command to his camp(109). This tactic worked great. Lt. Gen. Hafiz's entourage, who once accused Maj. Gen. Jadid of using sectarianism to pursue only his own interests and strengthening his power in the military, opposed Lt. Gen. Hafiz’s dictatorship. Then they came to support Maj. Gen. Jadid. It included Lt. Col. Mustafa Tlas, Maj. Gen. ‘Ubayd, Jamil Shayya, and Maj. Gen. Salim Hatum(110). In response, Lt. Gen. Hafiz sought to strengthen his position by Sunnis sect. However, Lt. Gen. Hafiz’s method of strengthening his position by the sect, caused the minority Alawites to run under Maj. Gen. Jadid. Thus, under Maj. Gen. Jadid, Lt. Col. Ahmad al-Mir, Col. Abd al-Karim al-Jundi of the Islamili faction, Lt. Col. ‘Izzat Jadid of the Alawite faction and Lt. Col. Ahmad Suwaydani of the Sunni faction from the Hawran region, including new supporters such as Maj.‘Ubayd and Jamil Shayya of the Druz faction, Lt. Col. Tlas of the Sunni faction, gathered. As a result, the confrontation between Lt. Gen. Hafiz and Maj. Gen. Jadid gave the appearance of Sunni vs. minority(111). External relations also influenced the conflict between the two. In August the 3rd Arab Summit was held in Casablanca. From Syria, a delegation led by Lt. Gen. Hafiz and Razzaz attended. Syria and Egypt, which had already been in conflict since the Arab Summit at the end of May, also had a conflict over the Yemen and Palestinian issues at this conference. However, Syria was pushed by many and had to make concessions. This shy attitude of the Syrian delegation stimulated anti-Nasser sentiment among the noncommissioned officers of the party branch. Maj. Gen. Jadid faction, who was supported by these non-commissioned officers, took this opportunity to launch an antiLt. Gen. Hafiz campaign(112). On the other hand, Maj. Gen. Jadid became deputy general secretary of the Regional Command at the end of August. Regional Command is already the source of all power. The Presidential Council, the cabinet, the National Command, and the Joint Session were no longer in power. Regional Command took control of politics, and at the core of which Maj. Gen. Jadid took a seat(113). The resolution of the 2nd Extraordinary Regional Congress was also being put into practice. On August 23, the National Council was expanded and a 95-member National Council was established. Representatives from the National Command, the Regional Command, the former National Revolutionary Council, the Armed Forces, the Labor Federation, the Peasant Federation, the Women's Federation, Free-lance professional persons, the Teachers' Union, the Progressivists, etc. were sent to this council(114). Of these, 16 were military personnel. In addition, there were four Communist Party members and one Nasserist(115). On September 1, Mansur al-Atrash (a member of the Ba‘th party and a member of the National Command, Aflaq faction and Druze ) was elected a chairman of the National Council, and Mazhar al-Anbari (representative of progressives) was elected a vice-chairman of the National Council. Also Ahmad al-Khatib (Ba‘th party member) and Khairi al-Shalati (progressivist representative) were elected secretary-generals(116). With the establishment of the National Council, members of the Presidential Council were also replaced. The new member is as follows. Lt. Gen. Hafiz (reappointment), Atassi (reappointment), Hassan Maryud (new appointment), Jamil Shayya (new appointment), Fa‘yz al-Jasim (new appointment). Lt. Gen. Hafiz was appointed as chairman and Atassi was appointed as vice-chairman(117). Regional Command in control have implemented plans to control party, government, and the military one after another. Maj. Gen. Shnaiwi became Chief of Staff on September 2. The commander-in-chief was abolished on September 12, and this authority was absorbed by the defense minister. These were the intentions of Maj. Gen. Jadid, who is at the center of the Regional Command. In addition, the Hafiz cabinet resigned under pressure from Regional Command, and the Yusuf Zu‘ayyin cabinet was born on September 23. This cabinet consists of Ibrahim Makhos (deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Alawite faction), Muhammad ‘Id Ashawi (Interior Minister, from Deir ez-Zor), Col. Jundi (Minister of Land Reform, Ismaili faction), Sulayman al-Khoshsh (Minster of Information & Culture), Maj. Gen. ‘Ubayd (Minister of Defense, Druze faction), etc.. It was a cabinet centered on the supporters of Maj. Gen. Jadid. After the cabinet was the governor. On October 20, six prefectural governors were removed by the Regional Command(118), not by the cabinet or the Presidential Council. As a result, all the prefectural governors, who have great power in the region, became supporters of the Regional Command(119). Regional Command also mobilized the gendarmerie on October 20 to arrest Hawrani and 18 members of his sect(120). They allegedly colluded with foreign governments to plot a rebellion against the party(121). The most important measure taken by the Regional Command was the significant transfer of Ba‘th Party officers. This was carried out by the Officers' Committee, but it was actually carried out by Maj. Gen. Jadid, who is an influential person of this committee, and Lt. Col. Ahmad Suwaydani, the director of the officer's bureau. The aim was to strengthen the attack on Lt. Gen. Hafiz. However, it was explained to the National Command that the purpose was to strengthen the Ba‘th Party in the military and to expel the Hawrani faction(122). The counterattack of the National Command against the Regional Command began at the end of October. This was done in particular through the party newspaper al-ba‘th(123). The center of the counterattack was Bitar. He re-emphasized the party's guiding principle of Arab unity, arguing that nationalism should take precedence over socialism, and that this socialism should not be confused with Marxism. At the same time, Bitar had been in contact with Maj. Gen. ‘Umran, who had been relegated to the Spanish ambassador, through Lebanese supporters of Bitar since the summer of 1965. Then, when Maj. Gen. ‘Umran returned to Syria on vacation in October, a settlement was attempted between Lt. Gen. Hafiz and Maj. Gen. ‘Umran. As a result, the two sides agreed to an alliance to counter the party's deviant group (i.e. Regional Command) centered on Maj. Gen. Jadid. Then, Qawmiyun group centered on Aflaq-Bitar, Lt. Gen. Hafiz faction, and Maj. Gen. ‘Umran, who still have an influence on the officers of the National Command group, will be united. Bitar's tough stance towards Regional Command was against the backdrop of the support of Maj. Gen. ‘Umran and Lt. Gen. Hafiz(124). There was a group within the National Command who hesitated about Bitar's hard-line stance. It included Mansur al-Atrash, Jubran Majdalani (Lebanese), ‘Ali al-Khalil (Lebanese), Razzaz (Jordanian, general secretary)(125). A meeting of National Command was held from December 8th to 20th to seek a compromise between the Aflaq-Bitar faction and these Razzaz factions. At this meeting, discussions focused on the following points. That is, the seizure of power of the military group confused the power of the Ba‘th Party and the power of the military, and brought about the current crisis(126). Maj. Gen. Asad and Makhos (supporters of Maj. Gen. Jadid), who attended the meeting, initially acted as mediators between the Aflaq-Bitar faction and Razzaz faction, but eventually Maj. Gen. Asad and Lt. Gen. Hafiz came to a head-on conflict. However, the conflict reached an agreement that ‘military personnel who became members of the Regional Command would leave the military position’ and came to a conclusion(127). Detecting the alliance between Maj. Gen. ‘Umran and Qawmiyun, Maj. Gen. Jadid arrested supporters of Maj. Gen. ‘Umran in anticipation of a confrontation with Maj. Gen. ‘Umran. This was done on December 19th by Lt. Col. Mustafa Tlas, who heads the Homs Brigade. This action arrested Col. Salah Namur and Capt. Salih Hawqan. This is the socalled Homs incident(128). With the Homs incident as an opportunity, two days later, on December 21, the National Command disbanded the Regional Command. The dissolution of the Regional Command had already been considered by Aflaq and Bitar for four months. And then, Lt. Gen. Hafiz joined this. The Homs incident was a great opportunity to do this. With the dissolution of the Regional Command, the National Command sought to keep its military and civilian powers in its hands. With the dissolution of this Regional Command, the alliance between Lt. Gen. Hafiz who seeks to reconcile with Cairo and promote friendly relations with Nasserist group (i.e. a supporter of the so-called Casablanca Charter) and his supporter Qawmiyun, on the other hand, the confrontation with the radical leftist groups such as Maj. Gen. Jadid, Maj. Gen. ‘Ubayd, Lt. Col. Tlas, and Maj. Salim Hatum, who opposed this and emphasized the Marxist direction, was tentatively settled by the former holding down the latter(129). However, Maj. Gen. Jadid took action in protest of the measures taken by the National Command. That is, on December 21, three members of the Presidential Council (Qutriyun of Atassi, Jamil Shayya, Fa’yd al-Jasim) resigned, and the Zu‘ayyin cabinet resigned(130). On the 27th of the same month, vacant members of the Presidential Council were replenished(131) and the resignation of the Zu‘ayyin cabinet was approved. After the dissolution of the Regional Command, the National Command established the party's Supreme Command (al-qiyada al-hizbiya al-ulya) as the only party leadership in Syria. It will consist of the current National Command (13 members, 6 of whom are Syrian) plus 5 new members of the Syrian Ba‘th Party. Therefore, the number of Syrians in the party's Supreme Command became 11. As is clear from its composition, the Syrian composition was dominated by the Aflaq-Bitar faction of Qawmiyun(132). The Supreme Command will oversee the officers’ committee and the military bureau. Bitar's intention was strongly reflected in the above measures. He wanted to establish a civilian advantage over military personnel and curb military political intervention. Bitar's ambitions never stopped after attacking the Regional Command. He in turn tried to organize a cabinet. However, there was opposition within the National Command to the formation of Bitar. This opposition was expressed by Maj. Gen. Asad, Makhos, Razzaz, and Majdalani. Nevertheless, on January 1, 1966, the fifth Bitar cabinet was established. The biggest problem in the Bitar cabinet was the selection of defense minister. Bitar sought to neutralize Lt. Gen. Hafiz by assigning Maj. Gen. ‘Umran to this position. Lt. Gen. Hafiz, on the other hand, had no objection to the selection, but was hungry for the commander-in-chief’s authority to be absorbed by the defense ministerial post. Therefore, he proposed to the Supreme Command to give himself the position of the supreme commander. However, it was impossible to revoke the abolition of the supreme commander's post, which was decided in September 1965. As a result of the vote, Maj. Gen. ‘Umran was appointed as the defense minister with the highest command. The Bitar cabinet consisted of 20 Ba‘th members, including veteran(133) and Bitar groups, and nonBa‘th members(135), including unification advocate(134). Of these, only two military personnel entered the cabinet(136). The attacks of the National Command centered on Aflaq-Bitar continued. This time, the popular fronts such as the Labor Federation and the Student Union were attacked. Supporters of the already disbanded Regional Command resented the attack and argued that the National Council should be convened to vote for the new cabinet's confidence. In response, the Aflaq-Bitar faction increased the number of members of the National Council from 95 to 134 to balance the power within the National Council. This expanded member included socialistic unification group such as Sami Sufan, Mustafa Hallaj, and Abu al-Nur Tayyara(137). Qawmiyun's final attack was a reorganization of the party base. They decided to convene the 9th National Congress and to hold primary elections in each branch of the Syrian region. However, it was clear that the plan was aimed at disrupting the political foundations of Qutriyun and Maj. Gen. Jadid faction(138). Reading the threat into Qawmiyun’s plan, Qutriyun prepared for a Regional Congress. Maj. Gen. Jadid faction, on the other hand, used military force to postpone the election for five days(139). A more decisive attack took place on February 21, 1966. At meeting of the National Command since the day before, it was decided that Col. Ahmad Suwaydani, the director of the officer's personnel affairs, would be transferred, and that Lt. Col. ‘Izzat Jadid and Maj. Salim Hatum, commanders near Damascus, would be dismissed. They were all supporters of Maj. Gen. Jadid. Maj. Gen. Asad strongly opposed the transfer and dismissal of these officers of Maj. Gen. Jadid faction(140). However, Qawmiyun’s attempts to change the Ba‘th Party flow- in other words, plan 1) to establish a civilian dominance over military personnel, 2) to establish hegemony of National Command over Regional Command, and 3) to reorganize party structures to achieve these- received a great deal of opposition. It was a decisive backlash. 5. February 23, 1966 Coup Qawmiyun's power in the party was destroyed by a coup of Maj. Gen. Jadid faction on February 23. The coup was directly triggered by the dismissal plan of 30 officers(141) by the National Command and the reconciliation work(142) with Egypt. At that time, within the National Command there were conflicts between various groups(143)such as (Lt. Gen. Hafiz vs. Maj. Gen. Asad),(Lt. Gen. Hafiz and Maj. Gen. Asad vs. Maj. Gen. ‘Umran),(majority in the National Command vs. Qutriyun representatives like Maj. Gen. Asad and Makhos in the National Command),(majority in the National Command vs. Lt. Gen. Hafiz),(Bitar faction vs. Razzaz faction), etc.. Therefore, the National Command was not in a position to confront the coup of Maj. Gen. Jadid faction. The same was true within the military, where he was confused over his loyalty to the National Command, Lt. Gen. Hafiz, Maj. Gen. Jadid, Maj. Gen. ‘Umran, and Maj. Hatum. So he was unable to take action. Only Lt. Gen. Hafiz’s guards countered the February 23 coup. The protagonists of the coup were Col. Ahmad Suwaydani (Sunni faction, then 34 years old), Air Force Commander Maj. Gen. Asad (Alawite faction, then 35 years old, who was between Maj. Gen.’Umran and Maj. Gen. Jadid, but finally on the side of Maj. Gen. Jadid), Commando leader Maj. Hatum (Druze), Maj. Rabah al-Tawil (Sunni, who tended to be Marxist), and Capt. Khalid Aslan (commander of the Sa‘iqa Army). A total of more than 16 officers participated(144). In particular, the participation of the Air Force, led by Maj. Gen. Asad, made the coup's victory decisive. In this coup, Razzaz, Maj. Gen. ‘Umran, Masur al-Atrash, Bitar, Shibli al-‘Aisami were arrested(145). Immediately after the coup, a provisional Regional Command consisting of 14 people was appointed(146), and the issued communiqués and resolutions one after another(147). As a result, the provisional constitution promulgated on May 25, 1964 was first abolished, and the National Council was dissolved. Next, Maj. Gen. Asad was appointed Minister of Defense. In addition, Col. Suwaydani was promoted to major general and appointed Chief of Staff. On February 25, the party's interim Regional Command also became the supreme authority of the state, with the right to appoint and dismiss the president and the prime minister(148). Until the Constitution was enacted, the president and the cabinet were given legislative and administrative powers(149). Nur al-Din al-Atassi has been appointed President and Yusuf Zu‘yyin has been appointed Prime Minister(150). On February 27, it was announced that an extraordinary party congress in the Syrian region would be held on March 10. And on March 1, a new cabinet was established. This cabinet was the second Zu‘ayyin cabinet, and in addition to the Ba‘th Party left, independents, unification advocate, the Communist Party, etc. entered the cabinet(151). However, the main players of this cabinet were Qutriyun, such as Yusuf Zu‘ayyin (from Abu Kamal), Makhos (from Latakia), Jamil Shayya (from Jabal al-Druze), Mustafa Haddad (from Idlib), Col. Jundi (from Salamiya), Muhammad ‘Id Ashawi (from Deir ezZor), and Mashhur Zaytun (from the Hawran region). Regarding military personnel, four persons including Maj. Gen. Asad, the Minister of Defense, entered(152). The final stage of the coup was the expulsion of officers of Lt. Gen. Hafiz faction. In particular, the main officers were banished as military attachés in diplomatic missions abroad. For example: Lt. Col. ‘Abduh al-Dayri, commander of the 10th Division of Latakia, was appointed military attaché with the Embassy of Syria in Moscow; Lt. Col. Husayn Mulhim, Commander of the Military Police, was appointed a military attaché in Madrid; Lt. Col. Mustafa ‘Umran, commander of the 70th Division, was appointed a military attaché in Paris; Lt. Col. ‘Ali Mustafa, Chief of Staff of the 70th Division, was appointed a military attaché in London, Lt. Col. Ahmad Khaddur, commander of the Central Army, was appointed a military attaché in Beijing; Lt. Col. Jamal Jabir was appointed a military attaché in Madrid; Maj. Ahmad Saqr was appointed a military attaché in Prague; Capt. Sulayman Haddad was appointed a military attaché in Athens; and Capt. Khalid Arslan was appointed a Roman military attaché(153). The government, which was born in the coup on February 23, was based on countrybased nationalism rather than ethnic nationalism as a political direction. It also had a socialist character against the reactionary government and opposed bourgeois democracy. These trends were reflected in domestic and foreign policies. The implementation of land reform(154) was further promoted, while the convention of the Syrian Labor Federation(155) was held. President Atassi also blames the United States, Great Britain, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, etc. (March 8 and April 1), while calling for the unification of socialist-based Arab countries. He regarded Algeria, Egypt, and Yemen as progressive governments and showed his idea that Syria can ally with these countries (April 1st). Regarding relations with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union initially showed a cautious attitude, but after the visit of Prime Minister Zu‘ayyin to Moscow on April 18, the Soviet Union recognized Syria as a revolutionary and progressive nation, and the relationship of both countries was strengthened. As a result, the Soviet Union's economic and military assistance has come to be promoted. Notes Chapter 8 Birth of the Ba‘th Party government (1) al-hayat newspaper (hereinafter referred to as al-hayat), (March 9, 1963). Itamar Rabinovich also mentions Abd al-Karim al-Jundi, Hafiz al-Asad, but they are not included in the Edict of the Revolutionary Council according to al-hayat. In addition, I.Rabinovlch had Salah Jadid as a Lt. Col. at that time, but he is a lieutenant in al-hayat. By the way, the source is not specified in this part of I. Rabinovlch (ibid., p. 50). (2) Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din, op.cit.,p.446.; and National Revolutionary Council Communiqué No. 3. al-hayat (March 9, 1963). (3) al-hayat (March 9, 1963) (4) Sami al-Jundi, pp. 118-19 ; Itamar Rabinovich, op. cit., p. 52. (5) Itamar Rabinovich, op.ct., p.53. ; Civilian members are unknown, but by analogy with the Chronology of Arab Politics, 1963-1966, Beirut, American University Press, 19641967, Michel Aflaq, Abd al-Karim Zuhur, Khalid al-Hakim, Shibli al-‘Aisami etc. were included. (6) Sami al-Jundi, p. 118. Shibli al-‘Aisami recommended Bitar. However, based on the statement by Lt. Gen. Atassi that "the officer has decided to make the chairman a military officer," Lt. Gen. Atassi was unanimously recommended as chairman. (7) See appendix. (8) Declaration of the National Revolutionary Council on March 8th. Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol.14, No.4, April 1963, pp. 108-09 .; and al-hayat (March 9, 1963). (9) Statement of the National Revolutionary Council. al-hayat (March 9, 1963). (10) Telegram from Nasser to the National Revolutionary Council dated March 9. al-hayat (March 10, 1963). (11) al-hayat (April 4, 1963). (12) al-hayat (April 6, 1963). (13) “Record of the unification negotiations between Egypt, Syria and Iraq in 1963” (muhadir muhadathat al-wahda baina misr, suriya, al-iraq, 1963), Lebanon, dar almasira, 1973, 2 Vols. (14) Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din, op. cit., p. 469. (15) al-hayat (May 4, 1963); Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din, op. cit., pp. 470-71. (16) Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Sufi had already resigned. al-hayat (May 4, 1963) (17) al-hayat (May 9, 11, 1963) (18) See Appendix (19) al-hayat (July 11,13, 1963); Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din, op. cit., p. 470 ; Sami al-Jundi, pp. 129-30. Also, Amin al- Hafiz was appointed as Maj. Gen. by the National Revolutionary Council on July 9. (20) Sami al-Jundi, p. 130. (21) This military court consisted of four members, including three members such as Maj. Salim Hatum, Capt. Rabah al-Tawil, Capt. Muhammad Hamra. (22) Civilians were Ahmad Yasin, Muhammad Abu ‘Isa, Lutfi Qadiriya. and others. Most of them were executed the next day. (source) Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din, op. cit., pp. 470-71. (23) In addition, a military trial against three masterminds, including Capt. Muhammad Nabhan, was held on September 9, and all three were sentenced to death. (24) Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din, op. cit., p. 491. (25) See Appendix (26) Appointed as a member to fill the vacant seats in the post caused by the resignation of Nasserist group and Unification advocate. Sami al-Jundi, p. 129. (27) Shufi was a former teacher. He was only 30 years old in late 1963. One of his sympathizers, Ahmad Abu Salih, a Sunni lawyer from Aleppo, was just 30 years old at the time. Their group later became known as the Shufi group. (28) The party congress in the Syrian region was already held in March 1954 and July 1957, but it is considered separately because the party organization was dissolved due to the establishment of the United Arab Republic. Therefore, the congress held after reestablishment of the party has been counted since September 1963. (29) This was discussed and adopted based on a proposal prepared by the party's ideology committee. However, this proposal was already heavily influenced by the political views of Yasin al-Hafiz and others that had already been announced. This was compiled as a booklet under the following titles. Here, the one published in 1974 is used. "ba‘d al-muntalaqat al-nazariya li-l-hizb al-ba‘th al-‘arabi al-ishtiraki" [some theoretical basis of the Arab Ba‘th Socialist Party (adopted at the 6th National Congress in 1963) ], Beirut, dar al-tali‘a, 1974, 88p. (Hereafter, abbreviated as ba‘d al-muntalaqat -----) (30) ba‘d al-muntalaqat ----, pp. 30-31. (31) ba‘d al-muntalaqat ----, pp. 45-46,67-68. (32) ba‘d al-muntalaqat ----, pp. 20-22. (33) ba‘d al-muntalaqat ----, p. 22. (34) ba‘d al-muntalaqat -----pp. 28-32.; Arab Political Documents 1963, Beirut, American University Press, pp.438-44. (35) See Appendix (36) Maj. Gen. Hafiz, Col. Jadid, and Col. ‘Umran were all members of the Ba‘th Party military committee. Col. Jadid was already the director of the officer's personnel affairs on May 13. The chair of the Chief of Staff this time was a battle between Col. ‘Umran and Col. Jadid (both Alawites). (37) See Appendix. First Hafiz Cabinet (1963.11.12 ~ 1964.5.3) (38) Col. ‘Umran was promoted to Maj. Gen. at the same time. (39) In particular, in the amnesty of December 10, Nazim al-Qudsi, Haydar al-Kuzbari, Khalid al-Azm, Bashir al-Azmeh, Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din, Jihad Dahi, Abd alWahhab Hawmud , Nihad al-Qasim, Muhammad Jarrah, etc. were included. (40) Within Iraq's Ba‘th Party, there was a conflict between moderates who were dissatisfied with the outcome of the 6th National Congress and radicals who supported it. The former included Talib Shabib, Hazim Jawad, Hardan al-Tikriti, Taher Yahya, and the latter included Iraqi representatives of the National Command such as ‘Ali Salih al-Sa‘di, Muhsin al-Shaikh Radi, Hamdi Abd al-Majid. An extraordinary Iraqi regional congress was held on November 11 to resolve the conflict between the two, but right-wing soldiers invaded the meeting place, arrested five radical members and expelled them to Spain. In response, the National Command flew from Damascus to Baghdad to rebuild the Iraqi Ba‘th Party. During this time a coup was carried out by pro-Nasser Abdul Salam Aref (November 18), and the Ba‘th Party government was overthrown. (41) It was resolved to build a dam at the source of the Jordan River situated in the border area between Lebanon and Syria. At this conference, Nasser proposed Arab joint action on Israel's plan for water use of the Jordan River. Nasser was planning to ceasefire with the Arab reactionary government by this. This shift in Nasser's policy toward the Arabs was intended to gain spiritual and political support from Arab countries. (sources) Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, London, 1971 (3rd edition), pp. 96-102; Itamar Rabinovich, op. cit., pp. 101-03. (42) Itamar Rabinovich, op. cit., p. 102. (43) Kamel Abu Jaber, op. cit., p. 87. (44) See Appendix. (45) Itamar Rabinovich, op. cit., p. 105. (46) See Appendix.; Avraham Ben-Tsur, op. cit., p. 177. (47) In the military, as mentioned above, the commander-in-chief, the chief of staff, the director of officers' personnel affairs, etc. were seized by the Ba‘th Party military committee. In addition, military personnel of Ba‘th Party occupied a quarter of the National Command. (48) Abolished all amendments to the Land Reform Act of 1958 promulgated during the separatist administration, and further lowered the upper limit of land ownership. (49) al-hayat (February 25, 26, 1964) (50) al-hayat (April 26, 1964) (51) According to al-hayat (April 26, 1964), the rebel riot in Homs on April 21 was a conspiracy between the Iraqi Aref administration and the Egyptian embassy in Lebanon. It was a plot to overthrow the Syrian government (Ba‘th Party administration). (52) al-hayat (April 29, 1964) (53) On March 8, 1963, the promulgation of a new constitution had already been declared. (54) Everyone except Bitar was a member of the party's Regional or National Command. Some say the Presidential Council will be established on May 4th or April 2nd, but it has been officially announced that it exists after May 7th. Therefore, the date of establishment is May 7. The Presidential Council survived until the coup on February 23, 1966, with some replacements in October 1964 and August 1965. al-hayat (May 14, 1964). The same newspaper also reported that Amin al-Hafiz was promoted to lieutenant general on April 20, 1964. (55) al-hayat (May 14, 1964) ; See Appendix. (56) al-hayat (May 15, 1964) (57) al-hayat (October 4, 1964) (58) See Appendix. (59) Munif Razzaz, op. cit., p. 110. (60) Ibid., pp. 110-11. (61) Ibid., pp. 95-108. (62) Ibid., pp. 111. (63) Ibid., pp. 113-14. (64) Itamar Rabinovich, op. cit., p. 128. (65) Ibid., p. 131. (66) Attempts to organize a Peasant Federation began at the end of 1963. Regional Command attempted to form a regional farmers' union based on beneficiary farmers in land reform, but failed. So, this time, with the help of government officials, Regional Command tried to form a peasant federation at the local, prefectural, and national levels. A decree was promulgated on December 14, 1964 to establish a peasant federation, but it did not actually work, and the first Peasant Convention was finally held on September 20, 1965. (67) The Ba‘th Party's influence on trade unions can be traced back to the mid-1950s. At that time, the Ba‘th Party aimed to counter Communists and right-wing organizers. Since 1958, the Ba‘th Party aimed to attack the Nasserist among the workers. The members of the Ba‘th party in the union were leftists and were strongly influenced by Shufi. In the summer of 1964, the Shufi group was expelled from the union by the Regional Command. (68) al-hayat (December 9,10, 1964). (69) Munif al-Razzaz, op.cit., p. 116. (70) al-hayat (December 9, 1964). (71) al-hayat (December 9, 1964). (72) The transition of the real powers of Maj. Gen. ‘Umran and Maj. Gen. Jadid is detailed in al-hayat (December 19, 1964). (73) al-hayat (December 9, 1964). (74) Shibli al-‘Aisami, Mansur al-Atrash from Syria, Munif al-Razzaz from Jordan, Jubran Majdalani, Ali al-Khalil from Lebanon, and Ali Ghannam from Saudi Arabia attend. (75) Munif al-Razzaz, op.cit., pp. 116-17. (76) al-hayat (December 19, 1964). (77) Thus, the members of the Presidential Council became 3 members of the Ba‘th Party military committee [Lt. Gen. Hafiz (Chairman), Maj. Gen. Jadid (vice Chairman), Maj. Gen. Asad] and 2 members of Qutriyun [Nur al-Din al-Atassi and Yusuf Zu‘ayyin]. (78) There were 22 companies that were completely nationalized, 24 companies that were 90% nationalized, and 61 companies that were 65% nationalized. (79) 90% nationalization was carried out by companies such as vegetable oils, soaps and chemicals. (80) Lt. Col. Salah al-Din al-Dulli was appointed as the presiding judge. (81) Munif al-Razzaz, op. cit., pp. 104-08. (82) This spy network included Farhan al-Atassi and Abd al-Mu‘in al-Hakimi (former Col.). Both were sentenced to death on February 20. It is not clear about the other former officers. (83) On January 23, 1965, Israeli espionage led by Eli Cohen was exposed and about 40 Syrians involved in it were arrested. (84) Avraham Ben-Tsur, op.cit., p. 178. (85) Ibid., p. 178. (86) This provisional program was adopted at a joint meeting of National and Regional Command on 22 July. Arab Political Document, 1965, pp. 286-90. (87) Munif al-Razzaz, op. cit., p. 112. ; Itamar Rabinovich, op. cit., pp. 145-63. (88) Munif al-Razzaz, op. cit., pp. 120-21. (89) Ibid., p. 120. (90) Ibid., p. 120. (91) Maj. Salim Hatum (Druze), Maj. Salah al-Dulli, Maj. Muhammad Rabah al-Tawil, Maj. Khalid Aslan. al-hayat (August 17, 1965). However, Maj. Salah al-Dulli was a Lt. Col. at this point. (92) One of them is the intimidation of Maj. Gen. Jadid by Maj. Salim Hatum. Maj. Hatum threatened Maj. Gen. Jadid with a pistol and demanded that he resign as Chief of Staff. Maj. Gen. Jadid submitted his resignation in response to this request, but Lt. Gen. Hafiz did not accept the resignation. (source) Munif al-Razzaz, op. cit., p. 132. (93)These civilians were Munif al-Razzaz, Shibli al-‘Aisami, Muhammad al-Zu‘bi. Ibid., p. 132. (94) This was a strong request from each branch. (95) The military council disbanded the organization, but its entity members were still alive. (96) Munif al-Razzaz, op. cit., pp. 138-39. (97) Some blame the removal of Lt. Col. Ahmad Suwaydani, Maj. Gen. Jadid faction, from the Director of Information, but this may not be essential. (98) Munif al-Razzaz, op. cit., pp. 140. (99) Ibid., pp. 137, 140. (100) Ibid., p. 137. (101) Ibid., p. 141. (102) This intermediary proposal aimed to undermine the authority of Lt. Gen. Hafiz and eliminate Lt. Gen. Hafiz and Maj. Gen. Jadid from the military. In other words, the intention was to expel or civilize military personnel within the party and make the party civilian. (103) Maj. Gen. Jadid had no intention of becoming a member of the Presidential Council. However, he was not willing to resign as Chief of Staff. On the other hand, Lt. Gen. Hafiz was not willing to resign as Commander-in-Chief as long as Maj. Gen. Jadid was Chief of Staff. (sources) Munif al-Razzaz, op. cit., pp. 142 .; al-hayat (August 7, 1965). (104) al-hayat (August 17, 1965).; Chronology of Arab Politics, 1965, p. 299. ; Itamar Rabinovich, op.cit., p. 166. (105) al-hayat (August 22, 1965). (106) al-hayat (August 17, 1965). (107) al-hayat (September 7, 1965). Maj. Gen. ‘Ubayd will become Defense Minister in the First Zu'ayyin Cabinet (1965.9.22 ~ 12.31). (108) al-hayat (August 22, 1965). (109) Munif al-Razzaz, op. cit., p. 150. (110) Ibid., pp. 150-51. (111) Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria, London, Croom Helm, 1979, p. 59. (112) Munif al-Razzaz, op.cit., pp. 152-53. (113) Ibid., p. 155. (114) See al-hayat (August 24, 1965) for details such as the names of all members. (115) Communist Party members are Ahmad Hamdun, Su‘ad al-‘Abdallah, Najah Su‘ada, Farnan Bali. The Nasserist is Sharif al-Nablsi. Al-hayat paper also named Jamail Shayya as a Communist member, but he was a member of the Ba‘th party at the time. al-hayat (August 24, 1965) (116) al-hayat (September 2, 1965). (117) al-hayat (September 3, 1965). Also, according to al-hayat (August 22, 1965), at the August 21 agreement Ibrahim Makhos was nominated instead of Fa’yz al-Jasim. (118) al-hayat (September 24, October 21, 1965). (119) Munif al-Razzaz, op.cit., p. 156. (120) Hawrani, Mustafa Hamdun (former Minister), Khalil Kallas (former Minister), Abd al-Fattah al-Zalt and others were arrested. However, Hawrani went to Paris on December 18th to treat his illness. al-hayat (October 21, 1965). (121) The foreign power is the Soviet Union. al-hayat (October 21, 1965). (122) Munif al-Razzaz, op. cit., p. 156. (123) al-ba‘th newspaper, October 28, 1965. al-ba‘th newspaper was the representative newspaper of the National Command. (124) Munif al-Razzaz, op. cit., p. 164. (125) Ibid., p. 164. (126) Ibid., p. 162. ; al-hayat (December 22, 1965). (127) Munif al-Razzaz, op. cit., pp. 162-63. (128) Ibid., pp. 165-67. ; al-hayat (December 29, 1965). (129) The al-hayat paper reported this as the White Revolution. al-hayat (December 22, 1965). (130) al-hayat (December 22, 1965). (131) There are 3 members of Shibli al-‘Aisami, Abd al-Fattah al-Bushi, Ahmad al-Khatib. Shibli al-‘Aisami became vice chairman. Lt. Gen. Hafiz, chairman and Hassan Maryu continued to be members. (source) al-hayat (December 29, 1965). (132) The 11 members are as follows. Aflaq, Lt. Gen. Hafiz, Atrash, Shibli al-‘Aisami, Maj. Gen. Asad, Makhos, Bitar, Ilyas Farah, Zayd Haydar, Slayman al-‘Ali, Abd alQader al-Nayyal. al-hayat (December 25, 1965). Also, the member of the current National Command is reported as 14 people in the al-hayat newspaper, but in almu’tamarat ---- there are 13 people. However, neither has announced the names of all the members. (133) Bitar. Shakir Mustafa, Ahmad Badr al-Din, Kamal Shahada, Abdallah Abd alDa’ym. al-hayat (January 4, 1966). (134) Muhammad al-Fadil, Muhammad Arab Sa‘id. al-hayat (January 4, 1966). They were admitted in consideration of their policy toward Egypt. (135) Independents such as Mamduh Jabir, Muwaffaq al-Shurbaji, Jean Siyyaj, Abd alWahhab Khayyata. al-hayat (January 4, 1966). (136) Maj. Gen. Mamduh Jabir and Maj. Gen. Muhammad ‘Umran. al-hayat (January 4, 1966). (137) al-hayat (February 15, 1966). (138) Munif al-Razzaz, op. cit., p. 196. (139) al-hayat (February 22, 1966). (140) Munif al-Razzaz, op. cit., pp. 194-95. (141) Thirty officers were planned to be dismissed and deported. Among these 30 officers are Maj. Gen. Jadid, Maj. Hatum, Col. Ahmad Suwaydani, Col. Abd al-Karim alJundi, Lt. Col. Mustafa Tlas, Maj. Gen. ‘Ubayd, Lt. Col. ‘Izzat Jadid, and Maj. Muhammad Rabah al-Tawil. All are officers of Maj. Gen. Jadid faction. al-hayat (February 26, 1966). (142) On February 17, Maj. Gen. ‘Umran secretly flew to Cairo and was working with Nasser, including a "ceasefire." al-hayat (February 26, 1966). (143) Munif al-Razzaz, op. cit., pp. 185． (144) Others included Maj. Yusuf Arafa, Maj. Gen. ‘Ubayd, Lt. Col. Tlas, Maj. Ibrahim al-Ali, and Maj. Muhammad Hamza. There were also Col. Jundi and Col. Ahmad alMir. al-hayat (February 24, 1966). (145) Coup performers announced communiqués one after another through Damascus broadcast. The arrest of Razzaz et al. was announced in No. 3 of these communiqués. al-hayat (February 24, 1966). With them, Jubran Majdalani was also arrested. alhayat (February 25, 1966). (146) It consisted of 6 military personnel and 8 civilians. Military personnel were Maj. Gen. Jadid, Maj. Hatum, Maj. Rabah al-Tawil, Col. Jundi, Lt. Col. Tlas, and Maj. Gen. ‘Ubayd. All others were Qutriyun. See appendix. (147) The first resolution of February 24, 1966. al-hayat (February 26, 1966). (148) Articles 8, 9 of the second resolution of February 25, 1966. al-hayat (February 26, 1966) (149) al-hayat (March 3, 1966). (150) al-hayat (February 26, 1966). (151) From the Communist Party, Dr. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Akta‘ (Minister of Health), Samih Atiyya (Minister of Transport), Dr. Ahmad Murad (Minister of Economy), and from the Unification advocate, ‘Abd al-Salam Haydar (Minister of Justice), and from Independent, Salih Mahamid (Minister of Rural Affairs), Col. Mamduh Jabir (Minister of Public Works), Muwaffaq al-Shurbaji (Minister of Finance), Ghalib Abdun (Minister of Waqf), Dr. As‘ad Taqla (Minister of Industry), Dr. Abdallah Wathiq al-Shahid (Minister of Education) have joined the cabinet. (source) al-hayat (March 2, 3, 1966). (152) There are four members: Maj. Gen. Asad, Maj. Gen. Mamduh Jabir, Col. Abd alKarim al-Jundi, and Col. Rabah al-Tawil. al-hayat (March 3, 1966). (153) al-hayat (March 4, 1966). (154) On March 2, announced to create 80 hectares of production units in Ghouta near Damascus. On March 8, land will be distributed to 44 families in three villages in Ghouta. Land distribution of 11,260 hectares of non-irrigated land and 1,104 hectares of irrigated land was implemented in five prefectures. On April 7, non-irrigated and irrigated land was distributed to 436 families. On April 25, 11 large landowners (straddling 7 prefectures) confiscated land that exceeded the limit. (sources) Chronology of Arab Politics ; al-hayat (March 4, 1966). (155) Held on March 14th, a new executive office was elected on the 15th. Khalid alJundi was elected as chairman, Muhammad Khalil Shawish as vice-chairman, and Mahmud Fa‘ri as general secretary. [Chronology of Arab Politics] In addition, a seven-member executive committee was formed, including Ahmad alTarzi (second general secretary), Husayn Rizk, and Fayyed Mustafa. Khalid al-Jundi organized a worker army that imitated the Hongqi army of China. ["Le Bath et l'armée en Irak et e n Syrie," Maghreb-Machrek, 1967, January-March, pp.66-72.] Chapter 9 Ba‘th Party after the coup on February 23 1. February 23, 1966 Government and power struggle (February 23, 1966-November 13, 1970) 1). The character of the February 23 administration The February 23, 1966 coup marked a major turning point in Ba‘th Party history. The Ba‘th Party came to power in 1963. After that, until 1966, civilians and military personnel coexisted within the Ba‘th Party. This Ba‘th Party regime was established by military personnel and given ideology by civilians. The Ba‘th Party, a civilian-led party that had already lost its foundation as a mass-based party during the United Arab Republic, could not reestablish its foundation as a mass-based party. From the perspective of party leadership, the period from 1963 to 1966 was a period of continued coexistence and opposition between the Ba‘th Party, a civilian organization rebuilt by the Aflaq-Bitar faction, and the Ba‘th Party military committee. It was a time when there were two Ba‘th Party’s. The existence of two Ba‘th Parties, the Ba‘th Party centered on the Aflaq-Bitar faction and the Ba‘th Party military committee, was against the background of the constitutional transformation of the Ba‘th Party itself. The Ba‘th Party once existed as a united body identified by specific leaders such as Aflaq, Bitar, and Hawrani. However, after 1963, the Ba‘th Party changed from an organization centered on such personal ties to an institutionalized depersonalized organization. The era of the United Arab Republic and the ensuing separatist era was a major turning point for the party's constitutional changes. At this very time, a new group was born, such as the Ba‘th Party military committee and Qutriyun, which had a different constitution from the traditional members. What's more, this new group has since gradually grown into a major force within the party. And those who oppose such a constitutional shift of the party, or who cannot keep pace with it, had to take either direction of maintaining the traditional party or creating a different organization. The party's constitutional shift was, of course, accompanied by a change in ideology. The group centered around Aflaq-Bitar saw that the unification of the Arabs was the first priority, and that it was regarded as a balance between nationalism and socialism. However, the Ba‘th Party military committee and Qutriyun formally agreed on the basic idea of maintaining pan-Arabism and unifying Arabs, but in reality they emphasized unilateralism (home country priority) and socialist directions. There was a clear difference between the two in terms of what they considered the foundation or scope of the Ba‘th Party administration. The former was called Qawmiyun because it was not limited to Syria but aimed at a pan-Arab ethnic direction. In contrast, the latter was, in fact, content to dominate Syria. By the way, the establishment of the Ba‘th Party administration was not brought about by the Aflaq-Bitar faction (Qawmiyun), but by the new ruling elite, the Ba‘th Party military committee and Qutriyun. This new ruling elite was dominated by people from depopulated areas, and also from minorities. The traditional bourgeois-dominated elite came from the upper classes of the city and was predominantly Sunni Muslim. This new ruling elite sought to appeal to the lower middle class. However, the image that they were depopulated and from minorities was incompatible with the urban character and was not accepted by the urban middle class, especially Sunni merchants(1). Thus, it was through the mediation of the army that minorities became an important part of Syrian political arena. The Ba‘th Party military committee was born in 1959 and played a major role in establishing the Ba‘th Party administration in 1963, but the members of this military committee were mainly from minorities. The establishment of the Ba‘th Party administration was made possible by the ability of this Ba‘th Party military committee group to control the army, and at the same time, by the lack of political power to counter them. During the time between the establishment of power in 1963 and the coup on February 23, 1966, within Ba‘th Party, Qawmiyun and the Ba‘th Party military committee (and its alliance Qutriyun) fought for leadership. On the other hand, externally at the same time, the Ba‘th Party government has fought with the Nasser government over Arab leadership. The purge of Qawmiyun in the February 23 coup and the victory of the Ba‘th Party military committee group(2) and the Qutriyun alliance were crucial to the history of the Ba‘th Party. Originally, the basic task of the Ba‘th Party was to fight imperialism and reactionaries based on the progressive forces of the Arab masses. Moreover, two factors were important there. One was that the the Ba‘th Party was made up of the masses. And he had the principle of realizing the hopes of the masses for the masses, based on the power of the masses. Second, the Ba‘th Party aimed for a nationalist perspective and foundation. However, these elements were destroyed from inside and outside the Ba‘th Party. External attacks on the Ba‘th Party took place in Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt, but for the Syrian Ba‘th Party, the attacks from Egypt's Nasser were extremely serious. The attacks made by Nasser during the time of the United Arab Republic have brought about a major setback not only for the Ba‘th Party in Syria, but also for the Arab progressive movement. However, this did not end the mission of the Syrian Ba‘th Party. And the Ba‘th Party was rebuilt. However, its popular foundation has collapsed significantly. There, a Ba‘th Party group with a different constitution than before, was born. The group prioritized the interests of the Syrian region and emphasized socialism, rather than the nationalist perspective. And on February 23, 1966, they succeeded in expelling a group that prioritized a nationalist perspective through the army. In this sense, the February 23 coup ended the Ba‘th Party’s mission as a nationalist leftist. The Ba‘th Party, which has already been greatly upset since the time of the United Arab Republic, has finally ended its original role, the avant-garde role of the Arab nationalist movement, in the process of power struggle for about three and a half years after taking power. After that, the Ba‘th Party functioned as a place for government struggle within the new ruling elite. The power struggle within this new ruling elite was especially developed within the military, that is, within the former members of the Ba‘th Party military committee. In this chapter, the development of the Ba‘th Party will be traced from the perspective of a power struggle within this new ruling elite. The members of the Ba‘th Party military committee consisted of 15 members, including 5 original members(3) and 10 expanded members(4). The first division of the Ba‘th Party military committee was the expulsion of Maj. Gen. ‘Umran in December 1964. Maj. Gen. ‘Umran was an original member of the Ba‘th Party military committee and was an Alawite. He was banished by a coalition of Lt. Gen. Hafiz (Sunni) and Maj. Gen. Jadid (Alawites), who were in power at the time(5). After the expulsion of Maj. Gen. ‘Umran, Lt. Gen. Hafiz sought to strengthen his position, centered on Sunnis, in order to counter Maj. Gen. Jadid of the Alawites. For example, he supplied weapons to the Hawrani civilian supporters through the Sunni Maj. ‘Abd al-Ghani Barru to embrace the powerful Hawrani faction in Hama. In addition, he got Badr Jum‘ah, the chief of the security bureau of Aleppo, on his side. This measure to strengthen the status of Lt. Gen. Hafiz with the Sunnis as a lever resulted in the gathering of the Alawites under Maj. Gen. Jadid. In late 1965, more officers disliked Lt. Gen. Hafiz’s dictatorship and pledged allegiance to Maj. Gen. Jadid. This included Druze and Ismaili minority groups(6) in addition to the Alawites. Also, in the Sunni Muslims, there were officers(7) who supported Maj. Gen. Jadid. Thus, the conflict between the two became a Sunni vs. minority aspect. The conflict between Lt. Gen. Hafiz and Maj. Gen. Jadid also became a conflict between the party’s National Command and Regional Command. Lt. Gen. Hafiz took Qawmiyun of the Aflaq-Bitar faction on his side and got back with Maj. Gen. ‘Umran. Maj. Gen. Jadid resigned as Chief of Staff since August 1965 and became deputy general secretary of the Regional Command with the support of the military and Qutriyun(8). The confrontation between the two ended up being the victory of Maj. Gen. Jadid in a coup on February 23, 1966(9). 2) Power struggle after the February 23 coup In the coup on February 23, the Regional Command, which became the highest authority of the state, held the second extraordinary Regional Congress from March 10 to 27. The congress first confirmed national unity, socialism, and people's democracy as party policies. After that, 16 members of the new Command were elected(10). Maj. Hatum, Maj. Gen. ‘Ubayd (former Defense Minister), and Lt. Col. Tlas have been removed from the new Regional Command. At that time, inside the army were Maj. Gen. Jadid bloc, Maj. Hatum bloc, and Defense Minister Maj. Gen. Asad bloc(11). Maj. Hatum and Maj. Gen. ‘Ubayd(12) were not elected as members of the new Regional Command because of the conflict between Maj. Gen. Jadid and Maj. Hatum(13). This new Regional Command and the second Zu‘ayyin cabinet (March 1, 1966-October 15, 1966), which was established on March 1, were organized around the radicals. And these radical policies have been gradually put into practice. The entry of Communist Party members in the Zu‘ayyin cabinet was the forerunner. Furthermore, with the return of Khalid Bakdash(14), the general secretary of the Syrian Communist Party, and the visit of Prime Minister Zu‘ayyin to the Soviet Union, the activities of the Communist Party have begun to resume. Then, the policy of the Communist Party's activities was discussed, and an attempt was made to return the Communist Party officers to military positions.(15) Demonstrations by students(16) and the Muslim Brotherhood took place from mid-April to late April, in opposition to the new administration’s policies, especially the compromise between the Ba‘th Party and the Communist Party. Also, at the end of April, officers persuaded by Lt. Gen. Hafiz’s supporters attempted to overthrow the new government. In the center of this move there were Maj. Gen. ‘Ubayd, Col. Salah al-Dulli, Col. ‘Uthman Kan‘an. However, the plan was discovered in advance and they were arrested(17). The party was also purged by a new Regional Command. On May 30, 22 members of Aleppo were expelled from the party. This included former minister Jamil Thabit, union activist Subhi al-Qarnafl, and lawyer Bahjat Shihab(18). Under these circumstances, opposition to the new government appeared. There were officers group supporting the National Command who were expelled in the February 23 coup and Druze officers group who were not re-elected as a member of the new Regional Command in March while contributing to the February 23 coup. The former helped the jailbreak of Bitar, Shibli al-‘Aisami with the help of Maj. Hatum bloc(19) and they successfully escaped to Beirut on August 29,. However, about 50 officers were arrested in this case. In parallel, Maj. Hatum of the Druze faction prepared a coup with the aim of expulsion of Maj. Gen. Jadid and the reinstatement of Lt. Gen. Hafiz(20). A coup by a coalition of the two was also planned, which was exposed in early September(21). The Druze repulsion culminated on September 7-8. The party's Suwayda Branch (mainly the Druze faction here) submitted a memorandum to Maj. Gen. Jadid as the opinions of the majority of the Branch. The following opinions were expressed in this memorandum. 1) Qawmiyun's expulsion from the party is allowed, but 2) the opinions of the subordinate organizations should be taken into consideration. 3) If you want to expel a Druze officer who participated in the February 23 coup, we will not obey the Regional Command(22). The party's top executives have taken action to respond, sending general secretary Atassi, deputy general secretary Maj. Gen. Jadid, and Jamil Shayya, the only Druze faction in the Regional Command, to Suwayda. Lt. Col. Hatum(23) took this opportunity to capture Atassi and deputy general secretary Jadid and presented the following request. 1) Reverting the officers of Lt. Col. Hatum bloc who were transferred or arrested after February 23, 2) Allowing the Shufi group to re-enter the party, 3) Re-election of the Regional Command elected in March with at least 5 members of the Shufi group, etc. However, the requests of Lt. Col. Hatum and Lt. Col. Talal Abu ‘Asali to regain the Druze power were rejected by Defense Minister Maj. Gen. Asad and Prime Minister Zu‘ayyin. Thus, the coup failed(24), and the Druze officers who participated in it fled to Jordan to avoid a military conflict(25). The remaining Druze officers in Syria were no longer able to participate in the struggle for government. Now, after the arrestation of many people such as Qawmiyun’s supporters and the Druze faction in favor of Lt. Col. Hatum, the government felt that it needed to be strengthened in collaboration with progressive forces in order to achieve socialist policies. This was confirmed at the 3rd Regional Congress held on September 20th. The 3rd Regional Congress summarized the political crisis that occurred after the February 23 coup and then elected a new leadership. Of the 16 members of the new Regional Command, up to 13 were reelected. The members who have left the leadership this time are Jamil Shayya of the Druze sect, Muhammad al-Zu‘bi and Kamil Husayn from the Hawran region. The new members were ‘Abd al- Hamid al-Miqdad (Governor of Suwayda), Druze Hadithi Murad and Muhammad Sa‘id Talib(26). There were five military personnel(27). In this Regional Command, the solidarity between the Alawites and those from Deir ez-Zor became stronger. Alawites, group such as Maj. Gen. Jadid and Maj. Gen. Asad, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Makhos and those who came from Deir ez-Zor such as Prime Minister Zu‘ayyin, Interior Minister ‘Id Ashawi, and former Presidential Council member Fa'yz al-Jasim, dominated the center of Syria The 9th National Congress was held(28) before and after the 3rd Regional Congress. The national congress also summarized the political and party crises that occurred after the February 23 coup. The congress confirmed the need to strengthen the party base and reaffirmed the basic idea of national unity. In addition, the issues of the new leadership were clarified in order to dispel the backward social relations. Furthermore, he confirmed solidarity with the progressive forces of the Third World and strengthening of friendship and cooperation with socialist countries. A new leadership was also elected. Jamil Shayya, Kamil Husayn, and Muhammad al-Zu‘bi, who were defeated in the previous re-election of the Regional Command, ran for the election of this new National Command(29). Of these, Kamil Husayn and Muhammad al-Zu‘bi won, but the Druze Jamil Shayya lost. The new National Command was dominated by the Syrian representative at seventhirteenths(30). The 3rd Regional Congress envisioned a new cabinet that emphasized progressive forces. Specifically, the entry of Nasserist and Unification advocate into the cabinet has come to be considered. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Makhos was promoting friendship between Damascus and Cairo, and the concept of a coalition cabinet of Ba‘thNasserist was embodied. On the other hand, Nihad al-Qasim, Sami al-Sufan, ‘Abd alWahhab Hawmud, Hani al-Hindi have expressed their intention to enter the cabinet(31). Such a move has greatly stimulated the Communist Party and has led to a conflict between the Nasserist, Unification advocate and the Communist Party(32). However, these conflicts were eventually compromised by a coalition of Ba‘th Party, Nasserist, Unification advocate, and Communist Party members, and on October 16th the third Zu‘ayyin cabinet (October 16, 1966- September 28, 1967) was born. The composition of each party was 11 Ba‘th Party, 2 Nasserist, 1 Arab Socialist Union, 2 Communist Party, 6 independents (1 pro- Ba‘th Party, 5 leftists), and 1 other (partisan is not clear)(33). The radical direction of the Syrian government also manifested itself in its foreign policy. On October 31, the statement of the 9th National Congress was released. The statement abandoned the leaders of former National Command such as Aflaq, Bitar, and Razzaz, and accused these groups of being the spokesman for bourgeoisie in partnership with reactionary and colonialism. Since this statement, the Syrian and Cairo administrations have come close to each other rapidly. A joint defense pact was signed on November 4, and it was announced on November 12 that a joint committee for political and military cooperation would be established between the two countries. And on December 5, diplomatic relations between the two countries recovered for the first time in five years. Thus, the rivalry between the Ba‘th Party and Nasser, which has continued since September 1961, has finally come to an end. On the other hand, from the end of 1966 to 1967, the expulsion of Qawmiyun’s supporters and the Druze faction was even more thorough. On November 28, the party's Regional Command removed 62 officers related to the former National Command, from the party and the armed forces. In addition, on the same day, 27 officers who were involved in the coup on September 8 and subsequently fled to Jordan were also removed. In March 1967, among the above officers, the property of 55 officers, including Maj. Gen. Fahd al-Sha‘ir (former Chief of Staff), Col. ‘Uthman Kan‘an (former Commander of the Security Bureau), and Col. Salah al-Dulli (chief of former Special Military Court(34)), was confiscated(35). In March of the same year, Qawmiyun’s property was also confiscated. This included Bitar, Sahib al-Jabiri, Shibli al-‘Aisami, Ahmad Rustum, and Talib al-Walid. In addition, on December 17, 1966, a special military court chaired by Lt. Col. Tlas(36) was set up to try the conspirators(37) against the administration of February 23. In March 1967, the court also tried 59 participants on the coup of September 8 and five members including Maj. Gen. Fahd al-Sha‘ir, Lt. Col. Hatum, and Lt. Col. Talal Abu ‘Asali were sentenced to death(38). During the time the Qawmiyun and the Druze factions were banished, another new conflict had already been created. It is a conflict between Maj. Gen. Jadid and Maj. Gen. Asad, Alawite officers. From late 1966 to early 1967, Ba‘th Party officers and civilians gradually gathered around them. Maj. Gen. Jadid was an influential person at the time as deputy general secretary of the Regional Command. He was endorsed by President Atassi, Prime Minister Zu‘ayyin, and the majority of members of the Regional Command. In the army, it was supported by Maj. Gen. Suwaydani (Chief of Staff), Col. Jundi (Director of Information), and Lt. Col. ‘Izzat Jadid (commander of the 70th Division). The second influential person in the administration was Maj. Gen. Asad, who concurrently served as Defense Minister and Air Force Commander. His supporters were Lt. Col. Mustafa Tlas (commander of the Central region of Hama, Homs). From 1967 to the middle of 1968, threats to the administration were expelled one after another. The first was Khalid al-Jundi. He was the cousin of Col. ‘Abd al-Karim al-Jundi (Director of Information) and the chairman of the Syrian Confederation of Labor. He was also the commander of the worker militia (al-kata’ib al-‘ummaliya)(39) attached to the Syrian Confederation of Labor. The Jundi family belonged to the Ismaili faction, but Maj. Gen. Asad is said to have had a bad deal with the Jundi family(40). The worker militia, led by Khalid al-Jundi, was an irregular soldier and was outside the control of Maj. Gen. Asad, Defense Minister. The presence and actions of this worker militia stimulated Maj. Gen. Asad. Therefore, in April of the same year, Maj. Gen. Asad supervised the worker militia under the command of the Minister of Defense, with the consent of Maj. Gen. Jadid. The worker militia has since been renamed to become the People's Defense Force. In parallel, Maj. Gen. Asad also pressured the expulsion of Khalid al-Jundi from the Confederation of Labor(41). This forced Khalid al-Jundi to resign as chairman at the Confederation of Labor Convention held at the end of July(42). In parallel with the expulsion of Khalid al-Jundi, the expulsion of the power of people from the Hawran region was carried out. The power of the Hawran factions was worried that the Alawites were establishing dictatorial control over the party and the army after the expulsion of the Druze factions. The representative persons were Maj. Gen. Ahmad Suwaydani (the Chief of Staff, Sunni), Muhammad al-Zu‘bi (Information Minister, Sunni) and Mashhur Zaytun (Supply Minister, Christian). In March, tensions increased between Muhammad al-Zu‘bi (who was also a member of the National Command) and Maj. Gen. Asad. At that time, three ministers from the Hawran region, Zu‘bi (Minister of Information), Zaytun (Minister of Supply), and Salih Mahamid (Minister of Rural Affairs, Sunni) threatened with resignation. This behavior of the Hawran faction further evolved into a conflict between Sunnis and Alawites from August to September. Zu‘bi and Mustafa Rustum (Sunni, member of the Regional Command) attacked at a party congress in August that the Alawites were making an organization within the army(43). At the congress, supporters of Information Minister Zu‘bi also called for a restructuring of the party foundation based on criticisms of the current regime. This was a Sunni group such as Talib Hilal (Governor of Hama), As‘ad Saqr (Governor of Deir ez-Zor), Abd al-Ghani al-Sa‘dani (Governor of Aleppo)(44). They argued that the party should strengthen the party’s foundation, by reconciling with the Arab Socialist Union, the Socialistic Unification group, the Arab Nationalist movement, and other factions such as the Hawrani faction(45). These forces from the Hawran region retreated after the 3rd Extraordinary Regional Congress from August to September 1967, the 9th Extraordinary National Congress in September, and the cabinet reshuffle on September 29. Zu‘bi did not run for National Command elections. In the cabinet reshuffle (4th Zu‘ayyin cabinet), Zu‘bi (Information Minister), Mahamid (Rural Affairs Minister), and Zaytun (Supply Minister), all left the cabinet. Sunni Mustafa Rustum has also resigned from Regional Command. In 1967, in parallel with the attacks on these Ismaili factions and those from the Hawran region, measures were attempted to expand the party's foundation at the same time. As one of them, attempts were made to control popular organizations such as the Student Union, the Syrian Confederation of Labor, the Peasant Federation, and the Syrian Women’s Union(46). And the party’s Regional Command oversaw these popular organizations by three secretariats. The People’s Organization Bureau, which deals with matters related to the entire People’s Organization, the Workers’ Bureau, which supervises the Confederation of Labor, and the Farmers’ Bureau, which supervises the Peasant Federation. These secretariats were emphasized in the party organization and were commanded by members of the Regional Command. The People’s Organization Bureau was commanded by Hadithi Murad, the Workers’ Bureau was commanded by ‘Abd alHamid Miqdad, and the Farmers’ Bureau by Muhammad Sa‘id Talib. It also included irregular soldiers such as the National Guard, the Worker Militia, Peasant army, and People’s Defense Force into the regular army. In this measure the People’s Defense Force played an important role. The People’s Defense Force, organized at the end of 1966 and reorganized in early 1967, was in control of all irregular army organizations under the command of the Defense Minister by mid-1967. The People’s Defense Force was incorporated into the regular army by a presidential directive on October 28, and Muhammad Rabah al-Tawil, a member of the Regional Command, was appointed as its commander(47). Now, at the 3rd Extraordinary Regional Congress and the 9th Extraordinary National Congress, the main theme was to strengthen the struggle against the invasion of imperialism and Zionism after the Six-Day War in June. It was confirmed that the Arab and Third World progressive forces must be united in order to strengthen this struggle(48). In addition, the National Congress resolved not to participate in the 4th Arab Summit in Khartoum(49). In addition, after resolving to increase the number of members of the National Command from 13 to 17, a new member was elected(50). After the party congress, the cabinet was reshuffled and the fourth Zu‘ayyin cabinet (September 29, 1967-October 29, 1968) was born. The cabinet replaced those from the Hawran region and those who resigned in protest of the government’s response to the Arab-Israeli war. As a result, a radical coalition cabinet consisting of 11 Ba‘th Party members, 5 Nasserist, 2 Communist Party members, 3 independents, and 1 other member (parties are not clear) was established(51). The Arab-Israeli war had a great influence on the Syrian government struggle. The traditional conflict between Maj. Gen. Jadid faction and Maj. Gen. Asad faction has intensified over postwar political policy. Moreover, this confrontation has taken on the character of a civilian-military confrontation. The civilian group was led by Maj. Gen. Jadid, which was associated with Zu‘ayyin (Prime Minister) and Makhos (Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister). This group made the socialist transformation of Syrian society a basic task, and insisted on economic development and modernization based on it. Moreover, he argued that this policy of socialist transformation would ultimately strengthen the state both economically and militarily. He also clarified that it is impossible to cooperate politically or in military operation with reactionary and pro-Western governments such as Lebanon, Jordan, even in the war against Israel. Therefore, the group increased its economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries(52). On the other hand, the military personnel, led by Maj. Gen. Asad, the Minister of Defense, prioritized the military struggle against Israel, and for that purpose, strengthening national defense was set as a top priority. He argued that the Arab cause should be the first priority and that for the military struggle against Israel, we should cooperate with Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, etc. to avoid the isolation of Syria in the Arab world. The confrontation between the two factions was deepened through the 4th Regional Congress and the 10th National Congress from September to October 1968. Then gradually, it developed into a personal conflict between Maj. Gen. Jadid (in the background of the party's civilian organization) and Maj. Gen. Asad (in the background of the military), the two major Alawite political bosses. In 1968, another power struggle continued. The main focus in the first half of the year was the dismissal of Maj. Gen. Suwaydani (Sunni) from the Hawran region and the expulsion of the Ismaili Jundi family. Maj. Gen. Suwaydani, who escaped the expulsion of people from the Hawran region in 1967, became Chief of Staff after a coup on February 23, 1966, and was trusted by Sunni officers in the military. However, after the coup on September 8, 1966, many Sunni officers were dismissed, and the forces of those from Hawran region centered on Muhammad al-Zu‘bi were expelled in 1967, so the power of Maj. Gen. Suwaydani became retreated. Then, on February 15, 1968, he was dismissed from the Chief of Staff and relegated to the Director of the People's Organization Bureau of the Regional Command. As the new Chief of Staff, Mustafa Tlas, the Central Army Commander (Sunni, Lt. Gen. Asad faction) has been appointed(53). At the same time, the post of Under Secretary of Defense was newly established. Maj. Gen. Tlas, Maj. Gen. Louis Dakar(54), and Maj. Gen. ‘Awad Bagh(55) were appointed to that post(56). Maj. Gen. Suwaydani then fled to Lebanon(57) after being involved in an attempted rebel coup in Aleppo in August. Thus, people from the Hawran region no longer functioned as a force group in the Syrian power struggle. This also means that all Sunni members of the former Ba‘th Party military committee who had power in the party and the army, were expelled. The expulsion of the Ismaili Jundi family continued from February 1968. Khalid alJundi, who had been already resigned as chairman of the Syrian Confederation of Labor in July 1967, was arrested in December of the same year. Following this, in February 1968, ‘Ali al-Jundi (deputy Secretary of Information), and Muhammad al-Jundi (Director of Public Relations of the Party), were dismissed. Also, Sami al-Jundi, who was one of the leading figures since the founding of the party, served as Minister of Culture in 1963, founded the Socialistic Unification movement, and became the French ambassador after 1966, , was dismissed the ambassador on July 9 and arrested(58). The final expulsion of the other Ismaili factions took place between late 1968 and early 1969. Of the original members of the former Ba‘th Party military committee, Maj. Gen. ‘Umran has already been expelled, and with the exception of Maj. Gen. Jadid and Lt. Gen. Asad, two of the Ismaili factions, Col. Ahmad al-Mir and Col. ‘Abd al-Karim al-Jundi remained. Col. Ahmad al-Mir, who was the commander of the Israeli front during the SixDay War in 1967, was dismissed in October 1968 and banished as the Spanish ambassador. The last fighting spirit of the Ismaili faction was Col. ‘Abd al-Karim al-Jundi. He was a supporter of Maj. Gen. Jadid, a director of intelligence bureau and a member of Regional Command, but was forced to commit suicide on March 2, 1969 by the pressure of Lt. Gen. Asad(59). In parallel with the expulsion of the Ismaili faction, the conflict between Maj. Gen. Jadid and Lt. Gen. Asad of the Alawites has intensified. The first opportunity was the establishment of the Ba‘th Party government in Iraq in July 1968. This was achieved by a moderate group that was once affiliated with Qawmiyun, who was exiled from Syria. Syrian military personnel, led by Lt. Gen. Asad, said that the formation of the Ba‘th Party government in Iraq was a great opportunity to restore friendship and that it should be used to strengthen the struggle against Israel. This group insisted on the approach to Iraq. On the contrary, civilian Prime Minister Zu‘ayyin opposed this, saying that Iraq's Ba‘th Party leaders are foreign elements of the party and that no approach to the Baghdad administration is possible. The conflict between civilians and military personnel surfaced at the 4th Regional and 10th National Congresses held at the same time from September to October 1968(60). The radical left-wing civilians were divided into a far-left group of Prime Minister Zu‘ayyin and deputy Prime Minister Makhos and Maj. Gen. Jadid. This was due to a personal conflict between Prime Minister Zu‘ayyin and Maj. Gen. Jadid. The clash between civilians and military personnel surfaced at a Regional Congress when Lt. Gen. Asad (Minister of Defense) of the military sect who takes a nationalist line denounced the farleft tendency of civilians. In particular, the ties between Prime Minister Zu‘ayyin and the Communist Party were raised. However, the clash between the two factions did not lead to a head-on collision, and a compromise was reached. In other words, they agreed that the government’s policy is to continue the civilian line as before, but the prime minister will be relieved (to replace Zu‘ayyin with Atassi, the party secretary, as the new prime minister)(61). The members of the new command elected by the 4th Regional Congress were the same as before. Thirteen of the 16 were reelected and only three were replaced. In particular, there was no change in the main members(62). The following three people were replaced. Maj. Gen. Suwaydani, Fa’yz al-Jasim(63) (Zu‘ayyin faction), and Mustafa Rustum(64) disappeared and on their behalf Maj. Gen. Tlas. (Lt. Gen. Asad faction), Hamud al-Qubbani (Zu‘ayyin faction), and ‘Adil Na‘isa (Maj. Gen. Jadid faction and general secretary of the Latakia Branch) were elected. On the other hand, the National Congress also elected the new Command. The number of Syrian representatives in the National Command decreased by one to six(65). Ahmad al-Mir and Mustafa Rustum fell and Fawzi Rida was elected. The other five were still re-elected. Atassi was re-elected as general secretary and Maj. Gen. Jadid was re-elected as deputy general secretary in both the Regional and National Commands. The balance between Maj. Gen. Jadid faction and Lt. Gen. Asad faction in the cabinet reshuffle on October 29 was not significantly disrupted. The biggest change is the expulsion of Zu‘ayyin and Makhos. Atassi, the general secretary, was appointed as prime minister. With the exception of Prime Minister Atassi, five new members have joined the cabinet. There were three members of Ba‘th Party such as Hadithi Murad (Front Rural Minister, Druze), Naji al-Darawisha (Planning Minister, Christian), As‘ad Saqr (Information Minister, Christian?), and two members of the Communist Party such as Ibrahim Hamzawi (Minister of Justice, Sunni) and Wasil Faysal (Minister of Transport, Sunni). Wasil Faysal was a replacement for former Transport Minister Samih ‘Atiyya (Communist Party member). The cabinet consisted of 13 Ba‘th Party members, 4 leftists, 3 Nasserist, 2 Communist Party members, and 1 Arab Socialist Party. It was a radical coalition government, which is almost the same as the previous 4th Zu‘ayyin cabinet. Lt. Gen. Asad established prestige with the expulsion of Zu‘ayyin and Makhos, but Maj. Gen. Jadid faction was also able to take control of the main post such as Minister of Foreign Affairs ‘Id Ashawi (former Interior Minister) and Minister of Interior Rabah al-Tawil (former People's Defense Force Commander). Among the new ministers, As‘ad Saqr (Information Minister) and Hadithi Murad (Frontier Rural Minister and People's Defense Force Commander) were close to Maj. Gen. Jadid. Thus, at the September-October 1968 two-party congress, the conflict between civilian and military personnel in the power struggle was only clarified, and no direction could be found to radically cure this conflict. At the same time, the party congress also fully confirmed the power of the military personnel led by Lt. Gen. Asad. The Ba‘th Party also continued to strengthen its party base in 1968 by overseeing the people's organizations. And the government established three new popular organizations. It was the Revolutionary Youth Union(66), the Union of hand-craft subordinate to the Ministry of Economy, the Union of Small Income earners under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Supply. These unions were organized in a pyramid shape: terminal regional unions, prefectural unions at the prefectural level, and general union at the national level. The party tried to expand the people’s base by controlling these organizations. The power struggle within the Ba‘th Party was to be polarized at the end of 1968 as the result of the expulsion of Sunni, Druze, People from Hawran, and Ismaili factions, by Maj. Gen. Jadid and Lt. Gen. Asad of the Alawites, and their the supporters. The confrontation between Maj. Gen. Jadid and Lt. Gen. Asad was finally won by Lt. Gen. Asad after two clashes from February to March 1969 and October to November 1970. Although the party congress between September and October 1968 established a truce between the two, the truce was soon broken and the two clashed again in early 1969. This new conflict was brought about by two causes. The first is that the civilian factions of the party, led by Maj. Gen. Jadid, attacked Iraq violently and indirectly attacked Lt. Gen. Asad, who was planning a military approach to Iraq. The attack on Iraq by Maj. Gen. Jadid faction was an attack on the Ba‘th Party's moderate government by the Ba‘th Party radical government. In Syria, moderate Qawmiyun was banished and radicals were in power. On the other hand, in Iraq, moderates led by Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr were in control. And Qawmiyun, who was banished from Syria, became affiliated with the Ba‘th Party Iraqi government in Baghdad. Under these circumstances, moderate Iraqi groups attacked radicals who are intimate with Maj. Gen. Jadid faction(67). In response, Maj. Gen. Jadid faction severely criticized Iraq's moderate government. However, this also ultimately attacked Lt. Gen. Asad’s stance to intensify his military struggle against Israel in association with the moderate Iraqi government. Syrian radicals also attacked Lt. Gen. Amin al-Hafiz, a Syrian under the auspices of the moderate Iraqi regime. The second is the transfer of officers and commanders after October 1968. Lt. Gen. Asad exercised his power in the army to separate military personnel from the party and ban military personnel from contacting members of the party(68). He also transferred Maj. Gen. Jadid faction(70), including the dismissal of Lt. Col. ‘Izzat Jadid, commander of the 70th Division, and the relegation of officers of the Na‘isa family(69). The tensions between the two factions caused by these causes exploded in the wake of the Israeli Air Force air raid on February 24, 1969. On the same day, the Israeli Air Force bombed the al-hama Camp northwest of Damascus, leading to an aerial battle between Syrian and Israeli aircraft. The awkwardness of the Syrian Air Force in this aerial battle was attacked by Maj. Gen. Jadid faction. Pamphlets criticizing the Air Force were distributed at the party's Latakia Branch, which threatened the prestige of Lt. Gen. Asad, Defense Minister and Air Force Commander. Maj. Gen. Jadid faction took this opportunity to further expel Lt. Gen. Asad faction from the Latakia Branch. However, Lt. Gen. Asad arrested Maj. Gen. Jadid faction of the Latakia Branch(71) and replaced them with members of Lt. Gen. Asad. He also came to imprison Governor Latakia on February 27(72). Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Jadid sent high-ranking party officials to local cities on February 24 to distribute weapons to civilian supporters(73). ‘Adil Na‘isa (a member of the Regional Command and general secretary of the Latakia Branch) was dispatched to Latakia, Muhammad Sa‘id Talib (a member of the Regional Command) was dispatched to Homs, and Mahammad ‘Id Ashawi (a member of the Regional Command and Foreign Minister) was dispatched to Aleppo, and Fawzi Rida ( a member of the National Command) was dispatched to Deir ez-Zor(74). Interior Minister Rabah al-Tawil has also replaced Maj. Muhammad ‘Abd al-Karim ( a relative of Lt. Gen. Asad and commander of the Damascus gendarmerie), and appointed a new Maj. Yusuf Tamtuh of the Zu‘ayyin faction(75). In response to these attacks by Maj. Gen. Jadid faction, Lt. Gen. Asad immediately launched a counterattack. On February 25, he transferred Col. Sulayman al-‘Ali from the Homs Military Academy to Suwayda, Col.‘Ali Zuyut (a relative of Maj. Gen. Jadid) from the Chief of Staff of the Fifth Armored Brigade to the Officer Academy, and Maj. Gharib Waqqaf from the Commander of the Artillery Corps of the 70th Armored Brigade to the Israeli Front(76). After transferring Maj. Gen. Jadid's officers, he convened a meeting of Top Class officers and renewed the members of the Military Commission. The new Military Commission consisted of Lt. Gen. Asad (Chairman), Maj. Gen. Tlas (vice Chairman), Maj. Gen. ‘Awad Bagh (deputy Secretary of Defense), Brig. Gen. Abd alGhani Ibrahim, and Brig. Gen. Sabah al-Atassi(77). On February 26, at the command of Lt. Gen. Asad, Col. Rifa‘at al-Asad (younger brother of Lt. Gen. Asad) occupied the Damascus broadcast station. In addition, Capt.‘Ali Duba (commander of the military intelligence bureau of Latakia province) arrested members of the Latakia Branch leadership and confiscated the weapons distributed to civilian members by Maj. Gen. Jadid. He then sent ‘Adil Na‘isa back to Damascus. Similarly, in Aleppo, Lt. Col. Muhammad Kan‘an (the director of military intelligence in Aleppo) confiscated the weapons distributed to civilian members and sent ‘Id Ashawi back to Damascus. Similar measures were taken in Homs and Deir ez-Zor, and Sa‘id Talib and Fawzi Rida were repatriated to Damascus(78). On the 26th, at the direction of Lt. Gen. Asad, Maj. ‘Abd al-Karim regained the post of the previously dismissed commander of the Damascus gendarmerie(79). The following day, the 27th, a squad of gendarmerie occupied al-ba‘th, the party's bulletin, and al-thawra, the semi-governmental newspaper(80). On March 1, a meeting of the party's Regional Command was held on the clash between Maj. Gen. Jadid and Lt. Gen. Asad. At the second meeting held on the same day, Lt. Gen. Asad gave the Regional Command an ultimatum of six items. This is to 1) stop the Soviet Union's interference with Syria’s internal affairs, 2) create a system for the struggle against Israel, and strengthen the Eastern Joint Command Headquarters, 3) strengthen relations with Iraq, and 4). Strengthening and expanding military cooperation with Arab countries, 5) Allowing Lt. Gen. Amin al-Hafiz to return to Syria, 6) Expanding support for Fedayeen(81) (those who are willing to sacrifice themselves for their homeland and nation, here refers to Fedayeen whose goal is to establish a Palestinian nation-state). There was a heated debate about this. As a result, Maj. Gen. Jadid and President Atassi agreed to cooperate with Lt. Gen. Asad, but Col. Jundi, Director of Information, refused to surrender this condition(82). The following day, March 2, Col. Jundi committed suicide(83). He was driven to death by the opposition. His death ended the forces of the Ismaili faction and all non-Alawite factions disappeared from the stage of the power struggle. Civilians have called for Arab mediation to avoid this crisis. From March 2nd to 5th, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Makhos (a member of the party's Regional and National Command) visited Algeria and Egypt to meet with Boumediene and Nasser(84). During this time, there have been moves in Syria to support Maj. Gen. Jadid and President Atassi. A popular organization under the command of the Regional Command launched an anti-Lt. Gen. Asad campaign. The Peasant Federation, the Confederation of Labor, the Women's Union, the Teachers and Staff Union, the Syrian Student Union, and the Revolutionary Youth Union jointly distributed pamphlets and criticized military political intervention(85). The crisis between the two factions brought about by Lt. Gen. Asad’s coup was finally settled by the efforts of Makhos and the mediation of Algeria and Egypt(86) to hold a party convention on March 20, 1969. On March 13, Atassi announced that he would resign from his post as president, prime minister, party secretary(87). This caused a sense of crisis again for a time, but it did not lead to a collision. However, Maj. Gen. Jadid has taken steps to postpone the party convention on March 20 due to the disadvantage(88). This scheme eventually failed, and the party convention was held as scheduled from March 20th. The 4th Extraordinary Regional Congress on March 20 was held in the military auditorium, and the surrounding area was guarded by the military(89). This was the first time the military had intervened in a party convention. Against this background, the superiority of Lt. Gen. Asad was established at the congress. However, the conflict between the two factions was not resolved, and the duality of power between the militarybased Lt. Gen. Asad and the party's civilian organization-based Maj. Gen. Jadid continued. The party congress also elected a new leadership. Atassi and Maj. Gen. Jadid were reelected as general secretary and deputy general secretary, respectively. Of the 16 members, 13 were reelected and 3 were replaced. Of the three replacements, two were Lt. Gen. Asad’s strong demands for expulsion. One is Foreign Minister ‘Id Ashawi (from Deir ezZor) and the other is ‘Adil Na‘isa (the secretary general of Latakia Branch). Another replacement is Col. Jundi, who committed suicide on March 2. Ahmad al-Shaykh Qasim (the secretary general of the party’s Raqqa Branch), was newly elected to replace ‘Id Ashawi, and Anis Kanjo (the deputy general secretary of the party’s Damascus Branch, Maj. Gen. Jadid faction) was elected to replace Col. Jundi. Also, in place of ‘Adil Na‘isa, a former member Mustafa Rustum (Maj. Gen. Jadid faction) who resigned in September 1967, was re-elected. After the party congress was over, a joint meeting was held between the Regional and National Command. Then, based on the resolution of the congress, it was decided to establish a new political bureau (maktab siyasi). This political bureau is systematically positioned in the order of the National Command, the joint meeting of the National Command and the Regional Command, the Political Bureau, and the Regional Command. And the main function of the bureau was to put into practice the matters decided at the joint meeting of the National Command and the Regional Command. The political bureau was actually set up on April 17, with nine members elected. Of these, six were elected from the Regional Command(90) and three from the National Command(91), but Maj. Gen. Jadid himself and none of his strong supporters were elected. On May 1, a provisional constitution was promulgated based on a resolution of the party congress. The provisional constitution stipulates the establishment of the People's Assembly (majlis al-sha‘b) as the supreme body of state authority. In addition, on May 29, Atassi organized a second cabinet (May 29, 1969~November 16, 1970), following the decision of the political bureau. The new cabinet consisted of 15 members of the Ba‘th party (13 members last time) and 9 members of the left wing other than the members of the Ba‘th party (10 members last time). There was almost no change in the composition ratio between the Ba‘th party members and the leftists other than the Ba‘th party members(92). This indicates that this cabinet reshuffle was the result of a power struggle within the Ba‘th Party. Five members of the Ba‘th party(93) have left the cabinet, and seven new members have joined the cabinet. All five who left the cabinet were Maj. Gen. Jadid faction, but of the seven new members, Maj. Gen. Jadid faction was only three(94). Of the other four, Mustafa al-Sayyed (Foreign Minister) was neutral, but the remaining three, Abd al-Halim Khaddam (Minister of Economy), Mahmud al-Ayyubi (Minister of Education), and Dr. Dawud al-Riddawi (Minister of Health) were not yet clear at that time which faction it belonged to. However, these three later gained major positions under Lt. Gen. Asad's administration. This second Atassi cabinet was similar to the first Atassi cabinet in October 1968 in terms of balance of power, although there were some personnel changes, and there was no sudden change. However, while the representatives of Qutriyun such as Zu‘ayyin and Makhos were banished last time, this time, Fa’yz al-Jasim and ‘Id Ashawi from Deir ez-Zor were banished. It was characteristic that the forces from Deir ez-Zor, together with the previous Zu‘ayyin, were expelled from the stage of the government struggle. The second and final clash between Maj. Gen. Jadid and Lt. Gen. Asad was triggered by the Jordanian Civil War in September 1970. The opinion within the Regional Command was divided on the clash between the regular army of King Hussein and the Palestinian command in Jordan. Maj. Gen. Jadid and civilians argued that the civil war should be intervened in support of the Palestinian command. On the other hand, Lt. Gen. Asad opposed such military intervention. This opposition was not surprising for Lt. Gen. Asad, who was planning an Eastern Joint Command Headquarters, including Iraq and Jordan, as well as Saudi Arabia. However, in the end, Syria intervened in the civil war, which failed. As a result, the two factions fought violently over the responsibility for this failure. At such a time, Nasser died of illness (September 28). The death of Nasser stimulated Lt. Gen. Asad and made him decide to end his duality of power. Thus, military pressure has increased. Under these circumstances, civilian Atassi resigned as president (Head of the State) and prime minister (October 17)(95), and Zu‘ayyin, Makhos, and ‘Id Ashawi were imprisoned at home by the military(96). The military also transferred the officers of Maj. Gen. Jadid faction. This event drastically increased the internal crisis of the party. Then, a party congress was convened to coordinate the two factions. The 10th Extraordinary National Congress was held on October 30, 1970. However, the party congress was unable to coordinate the clash between the two factions. At the congress, Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Asad and Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Tlas were completely isolated. Eventually, it was resolved that Lt. Gen. Asad and Maj. Gen. Tlas should be dismissed from the military(97). The counterattack against this resolution by Lt. Gen. Asad was swift. On November 13, Lt. Gen. Asad mobilized troops to occupy party offices and the secretariat of popular organizations and arrested opposition leaders. And he came to full control of Syria. Lt. Gen. Asad appointed new members of party's Interim Regional Command after the coup on November 13, 1970. Initially there were 14 members, but later it became 18. Ahmad al-Khatib was appointed the general secretary of the Interim Regional Command and Head of the State, and Abdallah al-Ahmar was appointed deputy general secretary of the Interim Regional Command. In addition, all members of the Interim Regional Command are new members except Lt. Gen. Asad and Maj. Gen. Tlas. Of the original 14 members, there were only four military personnel: Lt. Gen. Asad, Maj. Gen. Tlas, Col. Naji Jamil, and Col. Abd al-Rahman al-Khalifawi(98). Lt. Gen. Asad remained the Prime Minister, Defense Minister and Air Force Commander. And on November 19, Ahmad al-Khatib was tentatively appointed President (Head of the State). On November 21, a new cabinet was inaugurated. The new cabinet consisted of 14 members of the Ba‘th Party and 12 members of the non- Ba‘th Party, for a total of 26 members. Other than the Ba‘th Party, two from the Communist Party(99), three from the Arab Socialist Union(100), three from the Socialistic Unification of the Nasserist group(101), one from the Arab Democratic Socialist Party of Hawrani faction(102), and three independent leftists. In other words, it was a coalition government of the Ba‘th Party and the left-wing minor party. Thus, the expulsion of Sunnis, the expulsion of minorities, and the conflicts and power struggles that had developed within the Alawites, ultimately led to the victory of Lt. Gen. Asad. The power struggle was centered around members of the Ba‘th Party military committee, which was formed around minorities. After the Ba‘th Party came to power, political power groups centered around these members were born. And these political groups have developed power struggles on the stage of parties, governments, and the military. The most basic Merkmal in this power struggle were religion/sects, regional ties, and blood relations, the conflict between civilians and military personnel. And, in the end of this power struggle, the minority Alawites and military personnel remained. 2. ‘Correction Movement’ by Lt. Gen. Asad The new party leadership, formed by the November 13 coup, announced the party’s new policy on November 16. In domestic affairs, he has revealed that he will abolish the dictatorship by the extreme left group and its ideological terrorism that have continued since February 23, 1966, and correct the direction of the Ba‘th Party. And he set out to establish democracy based on a new party base. In foreign policy, he clarified that they will work with the progressive forces of each country to fight the attacks of imperialism and Zionism. He reaffirmed the direction of strengthening solidarity with the progressive governments of Arab countries and the innovative forces of the Third World. The November 16 communiqué criticized party leaders who had been dominated by authoritarian and tactical thinking until 1966, and evaluated that a coup on February 23, 1966 expelled such leaders. However, this communiqué, in addition, criticized that the February 23 administration’s leadership, like its predecessor, was increasingly violated by authoritarian and tactical thinking, oppressing the masses in an undemocratic way, and resulted in deepening the gap between the party and the masses(103). In light of these summaries, Lt. Gen. Asad declared to correct the party’s trajectory. He clarified that he further will dispel this authoritarian and tactical orientation and reorganizes parties, governments, and people’s organizations on the principles of democracy. For this reason, the party’s movement after this is called the ‘correction movement (al-haraka altashihiya)’ from November 16th. The communiqué on November 16 specifically set out the following action items(104). Domestic policies include: 1) to mobilize all progressive people's forces to participate in the struggle, 2) to establish a parliament for the people within 3 months which will be composed of representatives of parties, people’s organizations, craft unions, trade unions, and other progressive organizations., 3) to develop socialist transformation in order to lay the material foundation of socialist Arab society, 4) to promulgate domestic administrative law, etc.. As for foreign policy: it clarified that it would strengthen relations with the Arab progressive government and the reformists of the Third World, while at the same time developing relations with the socialist sphere, especially the Soviet Union. Thus, Lt. Gen. Asad abolished the dictatorship of party leaders and revealed a resurgence of parliamentary democracy. At the same time, he clarified that he would correct the isolationist position that the far-left government had taken, restore the Arab unification as the primary goal, and promote cooperation and unification with the Arab countries. This was a huge shift in party and Syrian politics. This correction movement set by Lt. Gen. Asad was further confirmed at the 5th Regional Congress (May 1971) and the 11th National Congress (August 1971) after that Lt. Gen. Asad became president (March 14, 1971) and the new Abd al-Rahman Khalifawi cabinet (April 3, 1971~March 22, 1972) was born. The 5th Regional Congress was held from May 8th to May 13th, 1971. The main theme of the congress was to analyze the party’s crisis brought about by the far-left group of the administration on February 23 and to find a solution. And first, there was a debate about the fact that the former leaders were influenced by authoritarian and tactical thinking and deviated from the party’s ideas. First, they were criticized for sacrificing democracy within the party and forcing a strict centralization. In contrast, the congress acknowledges that the principles of central democracy are correct, then resolved that central democracy, if applied correctly, can create a proper relationship between the leadership and its foundations. Second, discussions were held on people’s democracy and the relationship between the party and the masses. Former leaders did not take a democratic way to implement the party’s program. Also, they did not establish a proper relationship between the party and the masses. They also neglected to provide a legal basis for the establishment of a people’s organization. These have further deepened the separation between the party and the masses. Moreover, their authoritarian and strategic thinking destroyed the democratic principles of the people's organizations and deprived them of their freedom of activity and struggle. Based on these summaries, the congress recognized the importance of promptly promulgating and applying national administrative law, preparing the legal basis of organizations, and the importance of popular organizations, and resolved to guarantee freedom in this. Third, discussions were held on the formation of the National Progress Front (al-jabha al-wataniya al-taqaddumiya). Then it was resolved to establish a national progress front in which legally-based organizations and fronts could participate to strengthen the struggle(105) The 11th National Congress was held from August 23rd to 29th. This was the first National Congress after the correction movement and confirmed the need for ideological and organizational unity at the party's national level. He also confirmed the need for progressive national solidarity to form a united front at the regional and national (panArab) levels. And, for example, regarding the Arab struggle, the congress passed the following resolution. The invasion of imperialism and Zionism in the Arab-Israeli war (Six Day war) of 1967 forced the Arab Revolution into a major setback. This reaffirmed the Arab countries that the Palestinian issue is the axis of the Arab struggle. Therefore, strengthening the strategy of socialist and unification struggle and liberating the occupied territories of Israel must be set as the basic goal of Arab policy. Finally, a new National Command was elected, and Syrian President Asad was elected the general secretary. The members consisted of 5 Syrians (excluding the general secretary), 1 Lebanese, 1 Jordanian, 6 Iraqis, and 3 Palestinians(106). Representatives from Iraq and Palestine have increased, while representatives from Jordan and Lebanon have decreased. Also, no one was elected from Yemen. This indicates that the constitution of the National Command has changed under the Asad administration. Now, the Asad administration has put into practice the above issues one after another in the correction movement since 1970. Among them, the main ones are as follows. 1) Careful consideration was given to the people’s organizations in order to gain the support of the masses and expand and strengthen the party’s foundation. Then, the party leadership and the leadership of the people’s organization held discussions to guide the activities of the people’s organization in line with the new policy. 2) On February 16, 1971, a People’s Assembly(107)consisting of 173 members was established and entrusted the drafting of a permanent constitution(108). On March 14, 1973, the Permanent Constitution was promulgated, and based on this, on May 25, a general election(109) that had not been held since December 1961 was held for the first time in 11 and a half years. 3) The president was elected by referendum, and Asad became president on March 14, 1971. 4) On August 12, 1971, the Domestic Administrative Law was promulgated, and based on this, the unified prefectural assembly election was held on March 3, 1972. 5) On March 7, 1972, under the direction of the Ba‘th Party, with participation of the Communist Party, the Arab Socialist Union, the Socialistic Unification group, and the Arab Socialist Movement, the National Progression Front was formed. On this National Progress Front, a central leadership consisting of 18 people and a local leadership in each prefecture were set up. The central leadership consisted of 10 representatives from the Ba‘th Party and 2 representatives from each other party. 6) As for the Arab policy, on September 1, 1971, the Federation of Arab Republics was formed with Egypt and Libya. This was the fourth attempt(110) at the Ba‘th Party’s basic goal of unifying the Arabs. However, this Federation of Arab Republics soon became a mere corpse. On the other hand, in April 1972, a trilateral summit meeting was held with the Presidents of Iraq and Egypt. These were the intentions to avoid the isolation of Syria and seek solidarity with the progressive governments of Arab countries. President Asad also wiped out the forces of opposition in parallel with the process of establishing government. For example, in early 1971, Lt. Col. ‘Izzat Jadid, a confidant of Maj. Gen. Jadid, was dismissed(111). In June of the same year, a number of civilians who supported Maj. Gen. Jadid were arrested for sabotaging the government(112). On March 14, 1972, Maj. Gen. ‘Umran, who had been exiled to Lebanon since 1967, was assassinated there. Also, in December 1972, civilians and military personnel who were supporters of Maj. Gen. Jadid were arrested for conspiracy against the government. Most of them were Alawites(113). The foundation of the Asad administration, which had been solidified in this way, was supported by the following officers. A) First, in Sunnis and Christians: There were Sunni officers such as Maj. Gen. Tlas (Chief of Staff from February 1968 to March 1972, Defense Minister from March 1972), Maj. Gen. Naji Jamil (from Deir ez-Zor, Air Force Commander from November 1970 to March 1978, Under Secretary of Defense), and Maj. Gen. Abd al-Rahman Khalifawi (Prime Minister, three-time cabinet from April 1971 to March 1978), and Christian officer Yusuf Shakkur, who was the Chief of Staff from March 1972 to August 1974. However, the main supporters of the Asad administration remained Alawite officers. B) At its core were relatives, especially the younger brothers of Rifa‘at al-Asad and Jamil al-Asad. The former was the captain of the Presidential Guard (saraya al-difa‘), and a member of the Regional Command since 1975 and the latter was the captain of the Special Forces of the Presidential Guard. Then Adnan Makhluf, a brother-in-law, served the deputy captain of the Presidential Guard for several years until 1979. C) Officers belonging to the same tribe of the Alawites(114). There were Brig. Gen. General Muhammad al-Khawli (Presidential Adviser, Director of Air Force Intelligence, Chairman of the Presidential Intelligence Committee), Brig. Gen. ‘Ali Duba (Director of Military Intelligence), Brig. Gen. ‘Ali Aslan (deputy Chief of Staff, Director of Military Operations and Training) , Maj. Gen. ‘Ali Salih (Air Force Defense Corps Captain, Missile Squad Captain)(115). D) Also there were officers who came from another tribe of the same Alawites. For example, Yunis Yunis (commander of the 9th Division), Muhammad Tawfiq al-Jahani, (commander of the 1st Division from 1971 to 1978), ‘Ali ‘Umran (commander of one of the Special Army), ‘Ali Haydar (commander of the Defense Reserve, composed of command and parachute members), Ibrahim Hasan (Air Force Chief of Staff), Ali Ja‘ja‘ (commander of the 3rd Division), and Maj. Gen. ‘Abd al-Ghani Ibrahim (a member of Regional Command from May 1971 to December 1979)(116). Among the above officers, Rifa‘at al-Asad, ‘Ali Haydar, Muhammad Tawfiq al-Jahani, ‘Ali Duba, and ‘Ali Salih were members of the military committee overseeing the transfer of officers in 1975. The Asad administration, which was based on the Alawites of minorities, moreover their own tribe, were, of course, attacked by the Sunnis of the majority. This was especially manifested in the assassination of Alawite influential people by the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, the following cases can be mentioned. 1) Muhammad Fadil (President of Damascus University) was assassinated on February 22, 1977. 2) Brig. Gen. ‘Abd al-Karim Razzuq (Missile Captain) was assassinated on June 19, 1977. 3) ‘Ali ‘Ubayd al-‘Ali (Aleppo University Professor) was assassinated on November 1, 1977. 4) Ibrahim Nu‘amah (a dentist and vice president of the Syrian-Soviet Friendship Association) was assassinated on March 18, 1978. 5) Also Lt. Col. Ahmad Khalil (director of Police Department, the Ministry of Interior) was assassinated on August 1, 1978. As for party congresses, from 1972 to the end of 1982, three Regional Congresses and two National Congresses have been held. First, on May 30, 1974, the 5th Extraordinary Regional Congress was held. The congress was held to ratify the Armed Forces Separation Agreement (concluded on May 28) on the War of Attrition against Israel on the Golan Heights from March to May 1974(117). Next, on April 5, 1975, the 6th Regional Congress was held. The congress was an unprecedented scale with 590 participants(118). The main matters resolved at this congress are as follows; 1) to continue the struggle against Israel until all Israeli occupied territories in the Arab region are released and the ethnic rights of Palestinian Arabs are restored. 2) to strengthen Syria's military combat capabilities. 3) The Iran-Iraq Agreement of March 6, 1975 is a collusion between the right-wing Iraqi government and imperialism(119). The number of members of the Regional Command has been expanded to 21 since the 5th Regional Congress in May 1971. At the 6th Congress in 1975, seven of them were replaced. Col. Rifa‘at al-Asad, Mahmud Hadid (Chairman of the People's Assembly), Ahmad al-Hasan (Director of the Party Youth Bureau), Zuheir Musharaqa (former Governor of Hama), Yusuf al-As‘ad (secretary general of the Party Hama Branch) , Ahmad Diyab (Director of the Ministry of Education), and Nabih Hassun (member of the party Idlib Branch leadership) were newly elected. At the same time, seven people including Mahmud al-Ayyubi (Prime Minister), Ahmad al-Khatib (President of the Federation of Arab Republics), and Maj. Gen. Naji Jamil (Air Force Commander, Under Secretary of Defense) were defeated(120). In addition, the 7th Regional Congress was held from December 22, 1979 to January 5, 1980. 771 people participated in this congress, of which 256 were observers. Political corruption and security were the main themes of this congress. A censorship and audit committee was set up to check for abuse of rights. In addition, a new central committee (al-lajna al-markaziya) consisting of 75 members was established(121) as a means of strengthening the bond between the party and the masses. In the new leadership elections, seven of the 21 were reelected and 14 were replaced. Among the losers, there were Muhammad ‘Ali al-Halabi (Prime Minister), ‘Mahmud Hadid (Chairman of the People's Assembly), Fahmi al-Yusufi (deputy Prime Minister), ‘Abd al-Rahman Khalifawi (former Prime Minister), Muhammad Haydar (former Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform Minister), Muhammad Bajbuj (former deputy secretary general of the Party). However, five influential people: President Asad, Rifa‘at al-Asad, ‘Abdallah al-Ahmar (deputy secretary general of Regional and National Command), Maj. Gen. Mustafa Tlas (Defense Minister), and ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam ( deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister),were re-elected(122). On the other hand, the 12th National Congress was held at the end of July 1975. The congress was the first to be held after the fourth Arab Israeli War on October 6, 1973, and a resolution on politics and organization was adopted. The resolution on politics summed up the fourth Arab Israeli War and reaffirmed its continued struggle to achieve Arab unity. The congress also resolved to use political means to politically and economically isolate Zionism in order to free all areas occupied by Israel during the 1967 Arab Israeli War. In addition, it resolved to provide all kinds of support for the return of Palestinian Arabs and the realization of self-determination(123). The election of a new leadership was carried out and 17 new members were elected. 14 people were re-elected and 3 people were replaced. Of the 17 members, eight are Syrians, including general secretary Asad. Other Syrian members were ‘Abdallah Ahmar, Mahmud al-Ayyubi, Muhammad Jabir Bajbuj, George Saddiqni, ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Muhammad Haydar, and new member, Maj. Gen. Naji Jamil(124). In addition, the 13th National Congress was held from August 10th to 25th, 1980. The congress confirmed the need to strengthen solidarity with the world’s national liberation movements and socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union. In addition, 20 members of the new National Command (17 members of the former Command) were elected. Of these, 9 were reelected and 11 became new members. Looking at the Syrian members, there were two members who were defeated in the re-election of the Regional Command in January of the same year and were elected to the National Command this time. They were Muhammad Jabir Bajbuj and Muhammad Haydar(125). Notes Chapter 9 Ba‘th Party after the coup on February 23 (1) See Chapter 8. Especially about the 1964 Hama Riot. (2) The organization of the Ba‘th Party military committee was disbanded in 1965, but its members remained. (3) They were Muhammad ‘Uthman (Alawites), Salah Jadid (Alawites), Hafiz al-Asad (Alawites), ‘Abd al-Karim al-Jundi (Ismaili), Ahmad al-Mir (Ismaili). (4) ‘Uthman Kan‘an (Alawites ), Sulayman Haddad (Alawites), Salim Hatum (Druze), Hamad ‘Ubayd (Druze), Musa al-Zu‘bi (Sunni from Hawran region), Mustafa al-Hajj ‘Ali (Sunni from Hawran region), Ahmad Suwaydani (Sunni from Hawran region), Amin al-Hafiz (Sunni), Husayn Mulhim (Sunni), Muhammad Rabah al-Tawil (Sunni from Latakia region, ). (5) al-hayat ( December 9, 19, 1964). (6) During this period, the representatives who changed from Lt. Gen. Hafiz to Maj. Gen. Jadid were Maj. Hatum and Col. ‘Ubayd (later Maj. Gen.) of the Druze faction, and Jamil Shayya, a civilian of the Druze faction. Col. Jundi and Lt. Col. Ahmad al-Mir of the Ismaili faction have long supported Maj. Gen. Jadid. (7) Col. Suwaydani (later to become Maj. Gen. and Chief of Staff) and Lt. Col. Mustafa Tlas (later to become Maj. Gen. Asad's supporters) are representatives. (8) al-hayat (December 22, 1965, February 5, 1966). (9) al-hayat (February 24, 1966). (10) al-hayat (March 29, 1966). See appendix for members. (11) Maj. Gen. Suwaydani, Chief of Staff, has joined Maj. Gen. Jadid’s bloc. Maj. Hatum bloc was in charge of 99% of the Druze officers. al-hayat (March 16, 1966). (12) Maj. Gen. ‘Ubayd was appointed as a military attaché to the Embassy in Athens, but refused to do so. al-hayat (March 29, 1966). (13) al-hayat (March 29, 1966). (14) In 1958, he returned back to Syria on April 13, 1966, eight years after he was expelled from Syria when the United Arab Republic was established. (15) al-hayat (April 20, 23, 1966). (16) The student leader was Mustafa Stambuli. (17) al-hayat (May 1, 1966). (18) al-hayat (May 31, 1966). (19) The representative who provided the assistance was Lt. Col. Talal Abu ‘Asali. alhayat (September 6, 1966). (20) al-hayat (September 1, 1966). (21) al-hayat (September 7, 1966). (22) Nikolaos Van Dam, op. cit., p. 73. (23) Hatum has been the title of Maj. until September 6th in al-hayat paper, but has been the title of Lt. Col. since September 7th. In other books, civilians and military personnel are written in the same line and no title is given to military personnel, so details are unknown. Follow the same paper here. (24) It is said that the coup of Lt. Col. Hatum was supported by the Hamud al-Shufi group, Khalid al-Hakim, Nabil Shweri, Mahmud Nawfal, and the group supporting ‘Ali Salih al-Sa‘di. Maj. Gen. Asad was also on the side of Lt. Col. Hatum, but eventually abandoned him. Maj. Gen. Asad’s attitude change is said to be the main cause of the failure of this coup. (source) al-hayat (September 13, 1966). (25) In addition to Lt. Col. Hatum and Lt. Col. Abu ‘Asali, there were Lieut. Munir Sallum, Lieut. Walid Sharif, Second Lieut. Muhammad Hasan Haddad, Second Lieut. Isma‘il ‘Isa, Second Lieut. Harabi Tadrus, and Second Lieut. Muhammad Husayn al-Jaish. (source) al-hayat (September 13, 1966). (26) al-hayat (September 25, 1966). (27) See appendix. (28) According to al-mu’tamarat ----, it was held from September 25th to 29th, but at alhayat and L'Orient reported that the congress ended on October 5th. (29) al-hayat (October 1,1966). (30) There are seven Syrian national teams: Atassi, Maj. Gen. Jadid, Zu‘ayyin, Makhos, Kamil Husayn, Muhammad al-Zu‘bi, and Mustafa Rustum. (31) al-hayat (September 29,1966). (32) al-hayat (September 30,1966). (33) See appendix. (34) A special military court set up to judge a coup by Nasserist group on July 18, 1963. (35) al-hayat (March 30, April 29, 1967). (36) In addition, Maj. Ra’if Alwani, Maj. Rafiq Halawa, and Lieut. ‘Ali Nadaf were members of the committee. (37) Military personnel such as Maj. Gen. ‘Ubayd and Lieut. Ghassan Rasmi Hamawi, and civilians such as former minister Shukri Abu Salih were indicted. (38) al-hayat (April 2, 1967). Lt. Col. Hatum then returned to Syria during the Six-Day War in June 1967, when he was arrested by the government and executed on June 26. (39) In 1966, it was likened to the former Chinese "Red Army", so it was called "al-haras al-ahmar". (40) MER,1967, pp. 489-490. (41) Khalid al-Jundi was advertised as committing corruption and affairs on the job. al-hayat (April 2, 1967). (42) al-hayat (August 3, 1967). The tournament was held from July 31st to August 2nd. Sami Mansur al-Shadida was elected as the new chair. (43）al-hayat (September 26, 1967). (44) al-hayat (September 26, 1967) (45) al-hayat (September 29, 1967). (46) MER,1967, pp. 489, 493-94. (47) Ibid., p. 493. (48) al-mu’tamarat ----, pp. 49-52. ; al-hayat (September 17, 1967). The 3rd Extraordinary Regional Congress and the 9th Extraordinary National Congress were held jointly or individually. It is said that 116 people participated in the Regional Congress. Other articles concerning the congress in the newspapers are censored. Therefore, it is unclear if there have been any changes to the members of the Regional Command. However, looking at the members of the Regional Command selected for the 3rd Regional Congress (September 1966) and the members of the Regional Command selected for the 4th Regional Congress (October 1968), only 3 out of 16 members changed. Therefore, it is safe to assume that at the 3rd Extraordinary Regional Congress in 1967, the members of the Regional Command had little or no change. See appendix. (49) al-hayat (September 19, 1967). (50) The general secretary was Nur al-Din al-Atassi, and the others were 6 Syrians, 2 Lebanese, 3 Jordanians, 4 Iraqis, and 1 Yemeni. The Syrians are Maj. Gen. Jadid, Zu‘ayyin, Makhos, Rustum, Ahmad al-Mir, and Muslih Salim (the latter three are estimated). (51) al-hayat (September 29, 1967). (52) In late May, there was momentum to establish a "the East Joint Command Headquarters to Israel" between Syria, Jordan and Iraq. And in mid-September, the military leaders of four countries, including Saudi Arabia, are meeting in Amman. (53) Mustafa Tlas was a Sunni commander of the Central Army, overseeing Homs and Hama. In March 1967, he chaired a special military court for the "September 8 Coup Trial." Upon his appointment as Chief of Staff, he was promoted to major general. (54) Greek Orthodox. One of the leading pilots in the Syrian Air Force. He became Deputy Chief of Staff in 1967 after serving as a military adviser to the President. (55) Circassian from Quneitra. He served as an operational officer on the Six-Day War against Israel. (56) al-hayat (February 16, 1968). (57) It is also said that it is unknown whether he was really involved in this coup. al-hayat (August 14,15, 1968). Maj. Gen. Suwaydani was later captured by the government on his way from Baghdad to Cairo in July 1969 when he landed at Damascus Airport. (58) Sami al-Jundi was later released and left in Beirut in early 1969. (59) al-hayat (March 3, 1969). (60) It is presumed that these congresses, like the 3rd Extraordinary Regional Congress and the 9th Extraordinary National Congress from August to September 1967, were jointly or individually held. Because the general secretary and deputy general secretary of the National and Regional Command are the same person, and the main members of both Commands are members of both, and these Commands run the congress completely individually during the same period. This is because it is hard to think that it was done. Even if the operations were carried out separately, it seems that the contents of the proceedings were quite common. No proceedings for the 4th Regional Congress were announced. (61) MER,1968, p.716. (62) See appendix. (63) Sunni faction from Deir ez-Zor. (64) a supporter of Maj. Gen. Suwaydani. (65) al-mu’tamarat ----, p. 57. (66) Established on May 4.. It signed an agreement with the Soviet Union of Communist Youth [Komsomol] for delegations and information exchange. (67) represented by the killing of Abd al-Karim Nasrat. (68) Nikolaos Van Dam, op.cit., p. 85. (69) ‘Adil Na‘isa, a member of the Regional Command and general secretary of the party's Latakia Branch, has been removed from important posts. Col. ‘Ali Na‘isa was transferred from the headquarters of the missile brigade in Qutayfah (near Damascus) to the headquarters of Deir ez-Zor. Maj. Yusuf Na‘isa was transferred to the Israeli front from the headquarters of the artillery battalion in Qatana (near Damascus). (70) Maj. Kasir Mahmud, a relative of Maj. Gen. Jadid, was transferred from the Qutayfah Artillery Battalion Command to the Officer Academy and then to the Ministry of Industry in January 1970. Maj. Ibrahim al-‘Ali was transferred from the commander of the People's Defense Force to work at the Officer Academy. al-hayat (March 8, 1969). (71) ‘Adil Na‘isa, general secretary of the Latakia Branch, was a supporter of Maj. Gen. Jadid. He was arrested in Tartus and immediately expelled outside Latakia prefecture. (source) Nikolaos Van Dam, op.cit., p. 87. (72) Ibid., p. 86. (73) At that time, Maj. Gen. Jadid had incorporated the party and the party-controlled people's organization into his camp to counter Lt. Gen. Asad's military. (74) al-hayat (March 8, 1969). (75) al-hayat (March 8, 1969). (76) al-hayat (March 8, 1969). (77) In addition, Brig. Gen. General Mamduh ‘Abbada, Brig. Gen. General Mufid alHawwash, Col. Naji Jamil (commander of the Air Force Intelligence Department, later commander of the Air Force), Lt. Col. Mahmud ‘Azzam, Col. ‘Ali Husayn, Lt. Col. Ghanim Husayn, and Lt. Col. Jalal al-Jahani were members. al-hayat (March 8, 1969). (78) al-hayat (March 8, 1969). (79) al-hayat (March 8, 1969). (80) al-hayat (March 8, 1969). (81) al-hayat (March 3, 1969). (82) al-hayat (March 3, 1969). (83) al-hayat (March 3, 1969). (84) al-hayat (March 6, 1969). (85) al-hayat (March 5, 1969). Arab student organizations have conducted similar campaigns. (86) From Algeria, Minister Abd al-Karim Mahmud came on behalf of President Boumédienne, and from Egypt, Hasan Sabri al-Khuli on behalf of Nasser came to coordinate the two factions. (87) The reason for this is said to be as follows. Lt. Gen. Asad invades Iraqi troops into Syria behind President Atassi and he secretly signed an agreement to establish a joint headquarters between Syria and Iraq. (source) al-hayat (March 16, 1969). At the same time, it is said that Lt. Gen. Asad requested the dissolution of the National and Regional Command, and Maj. Gen. Jadid requested the transfer of about 40 officers, including Lt. Gen. Asad. Atassi rejected both requests and resigned from all his positions. (source) al-hayat (March 18, 1969). (88) al-hayat (March 18, 1969). (89) al-hayat (March 21,25, 1969). (90) Thery were Atassi, Lt. Gen. Asad, Maj. Gen. Tlas, Rabah al-Tawil, Habib Haddad, Hadithi Murad. (91) They were Malik Amin (Lebanese), Mahmud al-Mu‘ayta (Jordanian), Muhammad ‘Ammar al-Rawi (Iraqi). (92) Among them, three socialistic unification group, Sami Sufan (Minister of Public Works), Fa’yz Isma‘il (Minister of Rural Affairs, previously added to the Nasserist), and Hisham Hallaj (Minister of State) were introduced to the cabinet. (93) They were Fa’yz al-Jasim, As‘ad Saqr, Hadithi Murad, ‘Id Ashawi, Sulayman alKhoshsh. (94) They were Marwan Habash, Muhammad Sa‘id Talib, Hamad al-Qabbani. (95) In particular, the conflict between Col. Rifa‘at al-Asad (younger brother of Lt. Gen. Asad) and Atassi was fierce. And the gendarmerie's surveillance of Atassi was extremely strict. al-hayat (November 16, 1970). (96) al-hayat (November 18, 20, 22 , 1970). (97) Nikolaos Van Dam, op.cit., p. 88.; MER,1969-1970, pp. 1128, 1152-54.; Decisions such as removing Lt. Gen. Asad and Maj. Gen. Tlas from military service are of a nature that should be made under the authority of Regional Congress rather than National Congress. (98) al-hayat (November 17,19, 1970).; And see appendix (99) They were Yusuf Faysal and ‘Umar al-Siba‘i (100) Thy were Fawzi al-Kayyali, Adib al-Nahawi, Mahmud Qanbaz. (101) They were Mustafa Hallaj, Sami Sufan, Fa’yz Isma‘il. (102) It was ‘Abd al-Ghani Qannut. (103) nidal hizb, pp. 115-18. (104) nidal hizb, pp. 119-21. (105) nidal hizb, pp. 125-27. (106) There are 17 members in total. Syria's representatives were President Asad, Mahmud al-Ayyubi (vice President), ‘Abdallah Ahmar (deputy secretary general of Regional Command), ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam (deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister), George Saddiqni, Muhammad Haydar (a member of the Regional Command). al-hayat (August 30, 1971). (107) Ahmad al-Khatib was appointed as chair (February 22). (108) On March 26, 1972, the Constitutional Committee was established, chaired by Fahmi al-Yusufi. (109) The term of office of members of the Diet was four years, and the fixed number was 186. After that, general elections were held in August 1977 and August 1981. (110) Three attempts were made before this. There were 1) Merger with Egypt in 1958, 2) attempt to unify Egypt and Iraq on April 17, 1963 (destroyed by Egypt on July 22, 1963), 3) merger with Iraq in October 1963 (This merger plan was not realized, because one month later the Ba‘th party administration in Iraq was overthrown). So this is the fourth attempt. (111) al-hayat (January 5, 1971) (112) al-hayat (June 11,15, 1971) (113) L’ Orient (December 14, 1972) (114) President Asad is from the al-Matawirah tribe. (115) Hanna Batatu, “Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria’s Ruling Military Group and the Causes for its Dominance,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1981 Summer, pp. 331-32. (116) Yunis Yunis and ‘Ali Haydar are from the al-Haddadin tribe, Tawfiq al-Jahani from the al-Kalbiyyah tribe, and Ali ‘Umran from the al-Khayyatin tribe. Ibid., p. 332. (117) The 5th Extraordinary Regional Congress was held from May 30th to June 13th, 1974. (source) nidal hizb, pp. 156-58. (118) Previously, it did not exceed 200 people. (119) nidal hizb, pp. 159-65. (120) al-hayat (April 15, 1975) (121) al-Tishrin newspaper (January 6, 1980) (122) al-Tishrin newspaper (January 6, 1980) (123) nidal hizb, pp. 172-74, 176-77. (124) L'Orient (August 3, 1975) (125) Maghreb-Machrek, No. 90, 1980, pp. 97-99.; and See Appendix. Conclusion Syria was granted an independent state from the French Mandate (colonial rule) and tried to form and develop its own nation. Here, I will briefly summarize some points below, regarding ‘how the Ba‘th movement was involved in this new nation-building’ and of ‘what the Ba‘th Party has played in the modern development of Syrian society’, from the perspective of political sociology. 1. Historical background of the birth of the Ba‘th Party During the rule of the Ottoman Empire, Syria was only one region of the territory of the Empire, and the concept of ‘country’ did not exist. At the end of this Ottoman rule, a nationalist movement aimed at liberation and secession from the Ottoman Empire took place. This movement was an ethnic nationalism based on the national idea of Arab, and centered on the formation of Arab identity. It did not depict the formation of a concrete political unity with a clear awareness of geographical scope and establishment of sovereignty. At the heart of this movement were people (thinkers, intellectuals, commercial bourgeoisies, etc. from traditional ruler class and notables) who were not clearly envisioned ‘people’ (like Syrian people) as the basis for forming a sovereign state. See: Yoshihiro Kimura (Emeritus Professor of Tohoku University), A Study on the Formation of National Identity in the Arab East, (in English translation by author, 2021) [First publication (in Japanese) February 1987, ISBN4-258-04354-0 C-3033] 2. In the process of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the implementation of French mandate (colonial rule), ‘the country’ in the geographical sense was established, and autonomy and sovereignty were given and a de facto state was born. In reality, ‘this country’ was based on the administrative divisions of the Arab East region during the Ottoman Empire, and was integrated into a country, and the rulers were inherited by the traditional ruling class of the pre-modern Ottoman Society. From the point of the social and political composition, at that time Syria was a country in which social communities with a stronger combination of ethnic, religious, local elements, were integrated. In Syrian region there were Sunni-dominated societies centered on the central cities of Aleppo and Damascus, and there were also social groups (communities) composed of minorities in the mountainous and rural areas. France used this geographical and social structure to implement divide and rule. As a result the State of Aleppo (in 1920), the State of Damascus (in 1920), the Alawite State (in 1920), and Autonomous state of Jabal Druze(in 1921),were established. After that, Aleppo and Damascus states were integrated to form the State of Syria (1924~30). The political union was subsequently renamed the Syrian Republic (1930~1958) in 1930, and was annexed by Alawite and Jabal Druze in 1936. Syrian peoples were controlled under the rule of being divided into small nations (cultural, social, and geographical unity) that considered natural and organic unions such as ethnic, sectarian, and local consciousness. It made Syrian Peoples impossible to unite and resist colonial rule. During this period, Syria was dominated by the traditional ruling class from the Ottoman era in collaboration with French mandate government. They were mainly large landowners from a pre-modern society, commercial bourgeoisie, intellectuals from notables. They founded the National Bloc in 1929 and negotiated independence with French mandate. As a result, political control was transferred and the Syrian Republic was born. But this negotiation was done mainly between colonial bureaucrats and feudal rulers (centered in Aleppo and Damascus in central Syria), regardless of the will of the people. The National Bloc continue to maintain its political power, but after the withdrawal of the French occupation forces and the liberation of Syria in 1946, it split into the National Party centered on Damascus and the People's Party centered on Aleppo in 1947. 3. The Ba‘th movement centered on Syria began to sprout from the latter half of French mandate (colonial rule). The main challenge there is to continue the struggle against the rule of imperialism and their associated reactionary forces, and to participate in the formation of a new society and the construction of a modern state based on it, freed from the pre-modern social system in the country. There the slogan of the Ba‘th movement was ‘Arab unity, freedom, and socialism.’ ‘Arab unity’ inherited the ethnic nationalism from the Ottoman era, and considered that the Arabs would fight against imperialism as a whole. He also continued a struggle against the Zionist movement and participated in the Palestinian War. ‘Freedom’ was intended to free the masses from the domination and oppression of the pre-modern social system and its mental structure. ‘Socialism’ was a guideline for the masses freed from the pre-modern social system to form a new nation. Although this ideology is based on Western ideas, but in actual practice, it was emphasized to dispel pre-modern social systems and realize social justice. 4．The Ba‘th movement was a movement that combined ‘nationalism’ and ‘socialism’. The attempts tried by Ba‘th Party to unify the Arabs ranged from the formation of the integration to federation. The attempt was done 4 times from the formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958 to the federation with Egypt and Libya in 1971. However, the slogan ‘Arab unity’ was faced with the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and the fact that the Arab side was defeated in the 6-day war in 1967, raising doubts about the ‘Arab’ framework and its contents, and the Arab countries became suspicious. The focus of Arab states has turned from the Pan-Arab struggle to countrybased nationalism. Domestically, socialist policies were implemented, and wedges were driven into the foundations of pre-modern social and political forces. The states in the present Arab East region became independent as a new sovereign state from the territory of the former Ottoman Empire. It is not realistic for these independent sovereign states to establish an Arab ‘unification nation’. ‘Arab Unity’ of the Ba‘th Party, can only be interpreted as the Arabs' solidarity (acting, fighting) against external threats to the Arab region. 5. Freed from French colonial rule, Syria entered an era of the construction of a new nation-state during the rise of nationalism after World War II. Especially during the military junta from 1949 to 1954 and after, policies focusing on economic development (fostering national capital) and the spread of education aimed at modern industrial state were carried out. As a result the mobilization of society was promoted. New social groups such as lawyers, engineers, doctors, teachers, students, military personnel, workers and farmers have emerged, changing the existing traditional social order. During this period, the Ba‘th Party supported by innovative ideas, gained a foothold. The new nation-building idea of the Ba‘th movement permeated among the lower middle class adolescents who gathered in high schools and those who were financially poor, barely received primary education, and used the free system of higher education like teacher training centers and military education in the 1940s. The new idea of the Ba‘th movement became popular among college students. At the same time, it permeated among students from Iraq and Jordan who studied at universities in Lebanon and Syria (now Damascus University). In Syria, it penetrated deeply to the civilians and military personnel of the Sunni, Alawite, Ismaili, and Druze in remote areas such as Latakia, Tartus on the Mediterranean coast, Deir ez-Zor bordering Iraq, and the Hawran region in the south. The growth of such social groups has formed a progressive force against conservatives such as the National Party and the People’s Party on the political stage. The Ba‘th Party, equipped with secular, socialist and nationalist ideologies, has made a leap forward and came to oppose the traditional forces of the Sunni majority centered on big cities. 6．The expansion of the Ba‘th Party, which promotes progressive ideology, has also enabled the realization of Arab unification. Egyptian President Nasser gained power in a military coup in 1952, gaining fame as a leader in Arab nationalism at the time. There, the Ba‘th Party, a progressive political party in Syria, and the progressive government of Nasser, which implements socialist policies, worked together to form the United Arab Republic (UAR)in 1958. This Arab unification attempt took the form of ‘integration’ rather than ‘federation’, with Nasser’s hard -line claim. Syrian political parties, including the Ba‘th Party, were dissolved, a unified central cabinet and Syrian and Egyptian cabinets were formed, and the political activities of the people were unified into the National Union’. This political system has gradually changed and the UAR has become dominated by the central government only, progressed to the dictatorship of Nasser, which subordinates the Syrian region, and Syria's sovereignty has been endangered. As a result of it, a disagreement arose over the ruling system within the United Arab Republic, and Syria withdrew from the republic in 1961. It was a big blow to the Ba‘th Party that the dictatorship of Nasser made the masses less willing to fight, during the UAR. Nasser did not emphasize (or ignore) differences in social structure between Egypt and Syria. In Egyptian society, Sunni Muslims were the majority and political society had almost homogeneous character, while in Syrian society, there were several social communities in which some elements like ethnic, sectarian, and local consciousness. are firmly connected, and political society had heterogeneous character. Therefore, it was not feasible to annex Syria with military force alone. In Syria, the departure from the UAR was supported by traditional conservative and nationalist groups, and the traditional groups were temporarily reinstated on the political arena. However, the social situation that had already been greatly transformed and polarized, was not suitable for the political and social foundations of traditional ruling groups. In particular, it was hit back by emerging social forces. 7. In March 1963, the Ba‘th Party seized control of politics through a coup centered on military officers. However, there was an urgent need to rebuild the party's ideology and organization from the blows of the UAR era. First, the party split into moderates and radicals over the extent to which socialist policies were implemented. Moderates emphasized nationalist directions such as Arab unification, and radicals emphasized socialist directions based on unilateralism. The Qawmiyun group gathered in the former, and the Qutriyun and military personnel groups gathered in the latter. The latter controlled the former, and it adopted a completely new political framework that was completely different from the conventional one. Then the land reform, nationalization of companies, and the organization of workers, craftsmen, and the people were thoroughly implemented. These disrupted the political and social foundations of traditional political forces and expelled them from the political arena soon. At the same time, a battle for leadership arose within the latter group. This battle for leadership was developed based on the social origin of ‘ethnicity, religion-sects, and local consciousness’. More specifically, exclusion struggle from the government took place based on the local- regional consciousness (group) like ‘Latakia, Tartus, Deir ez-Zor, Hawran’ and the religious-sect and family (tribal) consciousness (group) like ‘Ismaili, Druze, Alawite’, and eventually some Alawite tribes survived. Power struggles within the Ba‘th Party, on the one hand, appeared as civilian-military conflicts, conflicts within the military, and on the other hand, Sunni majority expulsion between political groups, minority exiles, and tribal conflicts. Such a power struggle has made the divergence between the party and the masses decisive. Party leaders have been largely liberated from the masses that underlie them as they struggle over power in the party, government, and the military. The Ba‘th Party, which was originally mass-based and should have been positioned as the avant-garde of their ethnic, political, economic and social liberation movements, has already died of its own life in this sense and has come to be used as a mere means of government struggle. In November 1970, the new leadership declared that he would correct the party's trajectory in order to wipe out previous authoritarian and tactical thinking and reorganize parties, governments, and people's organizations on the principles of democracy. 8. About the relationship between the Ba‘th Party and the military The Ba‘th Party’s social movement was able to expand its power in the field of politics and finally seize power, not simply because of its new nation-building idea and the efforts of the civilians who were responsible for it. It needed ‘power’ to actually carry out this idea on the political stage. It was the power of a group of military personnel. Military junta and subsequent parliamentary politics in the late 1940s and 1950s, focused on secular policy, fostering modern industries and promoting education. These political and social measures greatly contributed to the mobilization of society and changes in the social system. The Ba‘th Party’s idea pervaded military personnel and the army. In particular, the Homs Military Academy, founded in 1933, was a great catalyst for the growth of military groups as a social force. The military was also a great place for local minorities to deepen exchanges and friendships without discrimination. And, in particular, military personnel from the economically poor rural area gradually began to resonate with the Ba‘th Party’s ideas. Then they have appeared on the political arena in the late 1950s and early 1960s. On the other hand, at that time, a movement was underway to free farmers from the oppression of feudal landowners in the Hama region of the inland area of Syria. Its leader was Akram Hawrani who established the Arab Socialist Party. The Ba‘th Party merged with the Arab Socialist Party in 1952. This merge gave a great impact on the subsequent course of the Ba‘th Party. Hawrani had many acquaintances with military personnel, and as a result, had a great stimulus for the expansion of military personnel within the Ba‘th Party. Thus, a group of military personnel awakened to the consciousness of participating in and contributing to the creation of a new nation was an essential element of the movement to transform the pre-modern social system. 9. Characteristics of Arab society A social group (community) in the Arab area is a very strong, natural and organic community in which the following three elements are tightly connected, such as 1) a blood-relations linked to the family-clan-tribe-nation, 2) a religious-sectarian and ethnic community, and 3) birthplace and hometown consciousness. Members of the group have belonged to this community since they were born. Therefore, here, this sense of belonging to the social group (community) has priority over the sense of belonging and loyalty to the sovereign state that exists above the social groups. In the Arab society, it is not common that individuals freely participate in new social groups and organizations, independent of the natural and organic bonds that they belong to by nature. 10. Some comments When Syria was granted a state, traditional ruling class ruled political institutions as social leaders. In the process of modernizing society after independence, new social groups have emerged. The Ba‘th Party’s efforts, which has focused on fostering the youth who will be responsible for the future nation, have paid off, and the party has grown significantly. This has brought about changes in the pre-modern social system. Changes have also taken place in the political arena, and in the 1950s the Ba‘th Party became a driving force for innovative political forces, able to compete with conservatives centered on traditional ruling forces. Then, in the 1960s, it banished from the political stage the People’s Party and the National Party, which are the centers of traditional social forces. Furthermore, in the latter half of the 1960s, party’s radical civilians and military groups worked together to further promote socialist policies, disrupting the old social system and creating a new society. It is highly worthy of evaluation that the Ba‘th Party have played an important role as a leader in the process of the drastic transformation that formed a dynamic society based on the modern industrial society from the pre-modern fixed agricultural society. Ba‘th Party members and their leaders, in the process of the party’s birth and development, have a common political purpose of breaking down the pre-modern social system, with their social origins behind them, have been working together in solidarity. So, the social and political structure that the traditional ruling class ruled, was destroyed by the Ba‘th Party movement to build a truly unified nation on the basis of progressive ideology. However, in the case of the Arab East, although the structure as state could be modernized, it was difficult to form the true nation in a sociological sense that is the basis of it, because of the geographical and political and social conditions that have been formed historically. Several social groups (or communities) were unable to create one ‘Syrian people’ who participated equally beyond their own groups, in other words, joint consciousness as a citizen belonging to the same country. Unless a sense of belonging and loyalty to state sovereignty can be formed above the sense of belonging to each social community, true national unity cannot be achieved. The problem facing Syria today will be to form a political identity, preferably a political identity based on social mobilization.