





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






See authorized categories of collection on slides 15-16.

AG-approved guidelines and procedures can expand on EO 12333 Part 2.3 listing of categories of information that the IC may collect.





Domestic Intelligence Collection


•Truman through Nixon Administrations – provided vague intelligence collection guidance that led to:

- Mail openings
- Break-ins
- Medical experiments
- Smear campaigns

•These violations prompted Congressional investigations









Govt Response: Mid 70s – 1981


- System of Executive Branch rules established
 - EO 11905 under President Ford.
 - Established an Intelligence Oversight Board to receive reports regarding "activities that raise questions of legality or propriety"
 - Later replaced by EO 12036 under President Carter
 - then EO 12333 under President Reagan

E.O. 11905, and 12036: "The measures employed to acquire [intelligence] information ... must be conducted in a manner that preserves and respects established concepts of privacy and civil liberties."

- Offices of General Counsel and intelligence oversight functions enhanced
- Intelligence Oversight Board established in EO 11905 to receive reports regarding "activities that raise questions of legality or propriety"
- Congressional Oversight Committees established
 - Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)
 - House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)
- Statutory framework for electronic surveillance for national security
- Legislation passed
 - The Privacy Act
 - FISA







Part 1 of EO 12333 sets the tone of the IC and details the following:


- Goals of the IC
- Role and duties of the National Security Council (NSC), Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and the Heads of IC elements
- IC elements and their authorities regarding intelligence activities


Note that the heads of *all* Executive Branch agencies have duties and responsibilities to support the DNI's intelligence mission (see Part 1.5)


Part 2 details the purposes and techniques for collection of intelligence by the various IC elements. (e.g., the need for AG approval to surveil or monitor w/in the US or against a USP abroad; prohibition on undisclosed participation in organizations in the US unless the organization is composed primarily of non-USPs and is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power).

Part 3 of EO 12333 provides definitions of essential terms and concepts:

- USP
- Intelligence (i.e., National Intelligence, Intelligence Related to National Security, National Intelligence Activities, and Foreign Intelligence)
- Intelligence Activities
- Intelligence Community










USP examples:

- Person born in the U.S. or naturalized as a citizen
- Person with dual citizenship
- Green card holder
- Not for profit group or social club substantially composed of USPs
- US legal corporation
- US legally established subsidiary of a foreign (non-government) corporation Non-USP examples:
- Foreign citizen
- Visa holder
- Foreign corporation even if doing business in US
- Or foreign government directed/controlled
- Foreign legal US subsidiary (incorporated/legally formed under foreign law)


Presumption: a person encountered in the US, its territories and possessions is presumed to be a USP unless there is evidence to the contrary




"Responsibility to Provide" is in tension with the "need to protect." While driving intelligence -- through mission imperatives and sound intelligence tradecraft to serve its customers -- the IC must balance the risk of providing information with the need to protect sources and methods. (ICPM 2007-200-2)


Additionally ICD 501 establishes that IC elements shall treat information collected and analysis produced as national assets and, as such, shall act as stewards of information who have a predominant "responsibility to provide."

Note that responsibility to provide must be "consistent with applicable law and presidential guidance," so – for example – a particular minimization provision governing dissemination in FISA cases might preclude providing intelligence n/w/s the mandate.





Note again that dissemination of USP information could be trumped by a FISA minimization provision that is more restrictive.




"Elements of the Intelligence Community are authorized to collect, retain, or disseminate information concerning United States persons only **in accordance with procedures** established by the head of the Intelligence Community element concerned or by the head of a department containing such element and **approved by the Attorney General** consistent with the authorities provided by Part 1 of this order, after consultation with the Director."

EO 12333, 2.3


AG Guidelines, e.g.:


- Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons
- Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations




Note that the standards for disseminations inside/outside the IC may not be consistent with a FISA minimization provision for a particular agency or a particular agency's AG guidelines dissemination provision.

Note also: E.O. 12333 prescribes a more restrictive approach for SIGINT (may only be disseminated or made available to IC elements in accordance with procedures established by the DNI in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and approved by the AG)








Please note that this list is not exhaustive.



US Constitution: Establishes powers and duties of the three Branches of government and sets out individual rights vis a vis the government

Laws: Authorize and fund activities of the Federal Government (among other things)




Fourth Amendment requires Court approval for use of electronic surveillance, nonconsensual physical searches, etc. for intelligence purposes within the US or against a USP abroad.




Recall that FISA was outgrowth of Church/Pike hearings on politically-motivated surveillance

Distinguish FISA surveillance from Title III wiretaps --- purpose is foreign intelligence versus criminal investigatory purpose

By distinction, the targeting of non USPs outside the US is authorized under the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA) – requires the AG and DNI to approve certifications, which the FISC in turn must approve. Statement of probable cause not required, as in the other FISA activities. Lower expectation of privacy by non-nationals outside of the US.








FISA Amendments 2007 and 2008


- Made provisions for modernization and minimization
 - Modernization addressed changes in technology
 - Allows collection against non-USP targets located outside of the U.S. through interception of communications that transit the U.S.
 - Minimization Procedures to protect USP information
 - Requires a FISC court approval for intrusive intelligence collection on USP overseas
 - Requires a *FISA* caveat for all products that use intelligence derived from *FISA* collection (with the exception of 704/705b collection and Business Records)




FISA caveat typically provides notice that AG approval must be obtained before using FISA derived information in a "criminal proceeding" (that the term has a broad meaning to include for example deportation hearings); agency SMPs vary


Note: there is no caveat required for information obtained under FISA 704/705b and Business Records.


Note: certain SMP procedures also apply to information about non-USPs





Because the Privacy Act is a "withholding" statute (it protects against release of information about an individual without his/her consent), it uses the term "share" or "disclose" instead of "disseminate" as used in the IC.















Note re sensitive PII: for example, a bank account number combined with a name is more sensitive than a place of birth combined with a name, because disclosure of this bank account/name information could result in identity theft, fraud, misappropriation of personal assets. The bank account and name combination might therefore be considered "sensitive PII."









Notes re E-Government Act (section 208):

Mandates Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for non-national security-systems (NSS) as defined by statute


•PIA is an assessment of the risks to privacy and civil liberties arising from an electronic business process involving PII, and an evaluation of the sufficiency of privacy and civil liberties safeguards and measures applied.

• (PIA considers: type of information; why

collected; how used/shared/secured; whether Privacy Act applies; whether collected/used with subjects' consent; risks to privacy/civil liberties; if/how risks are mitigated by policy or technical fixes.)

Establishes criteria for evaluating the privacy implications of IT systems projects, and new electronic collections of PII:

•Notwithstanding the exemption for NSS, many elements formally or informally consider the privacy implications for all information systems and electronic collections that use or collect PII



- Each organization's procedures are **unique** one size does **not** fit all
- But underlying principles are applicable to all

