

# A Strange Thing Happened on the Way Back from Last Year's OAS Meeting...

Y-90 Therasphere Incident Aug 24, 2017

THE UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS HOSPITAL





#### Disclaimers

- Reference to equipment, products or services in this presentation does not constitute an endorsement by The University of Kansas Hospital
- The presenter is an employee of The University of Kansas Hospital





# Objectives

- " Describe the Incident
  - . The place
  - . The players
  - . Chain of events
- " Lessons Learned
  - . Root Cause and Corrective Action
    - " Training
    - " Procedures






#### THE PLACE and PROCESS

- University of Kansas Hospital
  - ➤Interventional Radiology (IR)
    - ≥2<sup>nd</sup> Floor of Main Hospital
    - ▶6 IR suites affected
    - ➤ 3 IR suites primary Y-90 therapy





### THE PLACE and PROCESS







#### THE PLACE and PROCESS

- >Y-90 Therasphere Therapy
  - >Treatment of liver cancer (HCC)
  - > Delivered by catheter through the hepatic artery
    - ➤ High energy beta-emitter with 64 hour T1/2
    - ➤ Neutron activated from Y-89
    - ➤ Glass microspheres 20 30 microns
    - ➤ THERA High Specific Activity vs SIRSPHERE
      - >2500 Bq per sphere vs 50
    - ➤ Approximately 7 procedures a week





#### THE PEOPLE

- Interventional Radiology
  - > Two MDs (with fellows)
  - > Nurses, techs, anesthesiologists
- Radiation Safety
  - ➤ Radiation Safety Officer (RSO)
  - ➤ Health Physicist (HP)
  - Two Rad Safety Program Coordinators (RSPC)
- Radiology Staff
  - > Director
  - > Assistant Director
  - Managers





## THE PEOPLE







# THE INCIDENT Aug 24, 2017 Approximately 4:00 PM

Boarding the plane when suddenly the phone rings...





#### TIMELINE

- " Layover Dallas Ft. Worth
  - . Hospital Incident Command activated
  - . RSO (Tom Conley) receives call from VP
    - Considered bringing in a Hazmat team
    - " RSO advised against until an assessment could be done
  - . HP reestablishes contact with RSPC
  - . Received conflicting information on status and scale
    - The RUMOR MILL was in full swing
    - "Through RSPCs, able to determine actual extent and assess situation
    - Gave direction to begin clean up





- " Approximately 3:15 PM August 24, 2017
- Therasphere setup in IR procedure room 2
- " Vial pierced prior to priming the system
  - . Technologist attempted to prime the system
- " Release of ~ 40 mCi of Y-90 microspheres in liquid
- " Tech left the room to consult with physician AU
- " Contamination into the central core hallway
- " Staff spread contamination to other areas within IR.











- " Tech was surveyed and found to be contaminated
  - . Placed into a bunny suit and booties
  - Escorted to ED decon shower
- Perimeter established through physical controls and onsite security.
  - . Surveys continued to further establish non-contamination zones





### BACK ON THE PLANE!!!





### TIMELINE. Thursday 10:30 PM

- . RSO and HP onsite
- . Confirmation from RSPCs that no contamination outside of IR.
  - " Extensive surveys of hallway, stairwells, walls, floors, personnel.
- . No other personnel contaminated
  - " All personnel leaving IR surveyed
  - About 4 pair of shoes confiscated
- . Determination made by RSO and administrative staff to shut down IR until department could be adequately assessed and cleared of contamination.





# TIMELINE - Friday THE ASSESSMENT AND CLEANUP

- ″ Friday . Aug 25
- State agency (KDHE) notified
- " SURVEYS! MORE SURVEYS!
  - All Rooms and areas within IR cleared by survey and wipe test.
    - " EXCEPTION IR suite #2 (location of spill)
  - . Several contamination areas found outside of IR 2
    - " In front of sink
    - " Carpet in reading room
    - " Hallway in main corridor (multiple)



IR suite 3



### TIMELINE - Monday State Regulatory Agency

- KDHE reactionary inspection
  - . Through interviews the team confirmed the timeline
  - . Confirmed assessment of contamination
  - Determined root cause to be inadequate training
- "State cognizant of allowing us to adequately assess and begin cleanup with a focus on patient care
  - Discussed definition of abnormal occurrence and medical event.
    - Determined the incident did not meet either criteria



# TIMELINE . Monday/Tuesday IR Suite 2 DECON

" IR Suite 2 - Extensive Contamination







# TIMELINE . Monday/Tuesday IR Suite 2 DECON

- " IR Suite 2 Extensive Contamination
- " Masslin wipes
- " Dawn dish soap
- " Scrape and survey





# This is my Ludlum Model 26-1! There are many like it but this one is mine!







#### DOSE TO TECHNOLOGIST

Skin Dose equation

$$H_{T (skin)} = \frac{C_{skin} \ x \ CF_{Bela - skin} \ x \ t}{SF_{Bela}}$$

Where

 $H_{T(skin)}$  = Equivalent dose to the skin [ $\mu$ Gy].

 $C_{\text{skin}}$  = Average surface concentration of radionuclide on skin or clothing [Bq/cm<sup>2</sup>].

 $CF_{Beta-skin}$  = Conversion factor: skin beta dose rate [( $\mu$ Gy/h)/(Bq/cm<sup>2</sup>)].

SF<sub>Beta</sub> Shielding factor for beta radiation due to clothing; representative values of shielding factors are approximately 3 - 5 for light clothing and 1000 for heavy clothing.

t = Time of exposure [h]

| ncpm  | Probe area cm2 | Probe eff. | Cskin (Bq/cm2) | Cfbeta-skin [(μGy/h)/(Bq/cm2)] | Sfbeta | t (h) | Skin Dose (uGy) | Skin Dose (rad) | Assumptions              |
|-------|----------------|------------|----------------|--------------------------------|--------|-------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
|       |                |            |                |                                |        |       |                 |                 | All contamination was on |
| 90000 | 12.25          | 0.22       | 557            | 2                              | 5      | 2     | 445             | 0.045           | clothing                 |
|       |                |            |                |                                |        |       |                 |                 | Skin contamination found |
| 660   | 12.25          | 0.22       | 4              | 2                              | 5      | 2     | 3               | 0.000           | after iniital decon      |





#### ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS

Entire process reviewed including written procedures and policies.

Determination of lack of adequate training on specifics of process during set up.

Determination that Y-90 procedures were inadequate in certain areas (box set-up in particular)





# LESSONS LEARNED and CHANGES IMPLEMENTED

- . Hands-on Vendor training on box prep and setup for both types of Y-90 microspheres
- . Developed extensive and specific training for Y-90 techs, nurses, and physicians on Y-90 and radiation contamination control fundamentals.





# LESSONS LEARNED and CHANGES IMPLEMENTED

#### Procedural changes.

- " Hand and foot monitor after vial pierce
- " Only MD pierce the vial
- " Spill kits specific to RAD developed (small/large)
- " Use of updated checklist TIMEOUT sheet to be read/reviewed prior to each proc
- " Flow and accuracy of information







#### NOT DONE YETÖ

#### " DECON SHOWER WASTE WATER

. Sampled and released

#### " THERASPHERE WASTE

- . Due to manufacturing process
- . Long lived impurities
- . Disposed about 2 cubic yards through waste broker





### Wouldaye Done Differently

- Survey and decon the tech in the IR locker room
  - . Reduce further risk of contamination increase by keeping tech within IR
  - . Only send to ER decon shower if unable to decon
- " Instrumentation
  - . MCA (waste constituent analysis)
  - . Gas flow proportional counter
    - " Floor surveys





# QUESTIONS?



