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Burden of the Past. Promise of the Future.

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Brazil: The Burden of the Past; The Promise of the Future

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

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Preface to the Issue "Brazil: The Burden of the Past; The Promise of the Future"

No one who has done battle with the stalled automobile traffic of Rio or São Paolo, who has gazed with wonder at the twentieth-century glass palaces of Brasília or observed the heavily guarded skyscraper residences of the well-to-do and smelled the fetid quarters of the poor, can ever doubt that Brazil is a rich/poor society, with many of the amenities of modernity and not a few of its problems and contradictions. It is useful to know that it is the world's fifth largest country geographically, boasting the seventh or eighth largest economy, in a league that includes such other giants as Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and the United States. Such statistics are commonly quoted today and are thought to have great significance, but it may be even more useful to know that Brazil does not resemble the other so-called geographic and economic giant states of the world in any number of very important ways. Whatever differences may exist between the United States, India, Russia, and China—all geographically vast—they are scarcely less than those that make Brazil different from all of them. Indeed, even within Latin America, its own geographic enclave, Brazil's Portuguese origins distinguish it from the other

states explored and settled by Spaniards in the early modern period.

To argue this is to do more than simply emphasize Brazil's distinctiveness. It is to suggest that Brazil, five centuries after its discovery by Europeans, boasts a history with many unique features, carrying, as the title of this *Dædalus* issue suggests, the burdens of its past. Yet, as those who know Brazil best never fail to recognize, the country is shaped also by a continuing determination to be something other than what it is. It is a country of great projects, of vast ambitions. At a time when many bandy about the term "globalization"—the cliché of the moment, whose multiple meanings are scarcely ever agreed upon—Brazil, like so many other rich/poor societies, is seeking to maintain its economic viability in an international marketplace that is being rapidly transformed. More than that, it is seeking to maintain many of the distinctive features of its political and social culture, which could not be mistaken for being simply Portuguese and is scarcely more adequately rendered when described as Latin American. Brazil's federalism is not that of Germany or Switzerland; its Catholicism is not that of Italy or Spain; its racism is not that of the United States or South Africa; its intellectual life is not that of France or the United Kingdom; its transport system is not that of Russia or China.

What, then, is Brazil? Who knows it? Who cares to probe its complexities? Who has ever done so? The ample references cited in this issue tell a tale of very great importance. For those who do not read Portuguese, Brazil often remains a closed book. The question of familiarity with Brazil is particularly poignant and relevant today when so many countries, including the United States, make great pretenses to being internationally minded, purporting to know the world when they in fact do not. There is disturbing evidence to suggest that in certain of the older and more established democracies, an alarming parochialism is growing, with many preoccupied principally with themselves, concerned overwhelmingly with their economic prospects, paying less attention than is warranted to the complex and different cultural and political worlds that lie beyond their borders. Fouad Ajami may not have overstated the situation when he wrote recently: "America today faces an odd disjunc-

tion, perhaps without precedent, between its assertion of global power and its deep disinterest in the truths and details of foreign places. As our power increases, so does our parochialism."

If the United States today is not simply "the other," the giant that Latin Americans are never allowed to forget, as Octavio Paz argued in *Dædalus* almost three decades ago, it is by no means obvious that many Americans know their Latin American neighbors, even those avowedly and openly friendly. The subtle distinctions that divide the democratic world of the twenty-first century, with so many having discovered their democratic roots only very recently, are too little understood and reflected on. If there are too few who are very attentive to developments in Eastern and Central Europe, the situation may be even more acute in respect to Latin America.

The very first paragraph of this *Dædalus* issue sounds the note that needs to be kept in mind by all who read it. Leslie Bethell, one of the few non-Brazilians in this collection, writes: "A little over ten years ago, Brazil became, for the first time in its history as an independent state, a fully fledged democracy, with regular free, fair, and competitive elections for both the executive and legislative branches of government based on the principle of one person, one vote." Democracy came to Brazil very late, almost five hundred years after it had been settled by Europeans. This, clearly, was not a new society, and no one wishing to understand it can afford to be ignorant of its history. It is in no way surprising that our own study should pay so much attention to all that is new in the country, but also to Brazil's strange inheritance.

If Brazil's new democracy, its problems and prospects, is a constant theme in the issue, there is another of scarcely less importance. It is announced very early in the volume when Simon Schwartzman writes: "When it comes to social issues, Brazil has a terrible reputation. The official statistics are bad enough, and the images conveyed by the international press are arresting: children wandering and being killed in the streets or working in sweatshops; urban dwellers crowded in shantytowns; landless peasants clamoring for agrarian reform; Indians decimated by loggers, gold seekers, and ruthless landlords; dozens

killed every day in the cities by armed gangs or the police; and high income inequality, dramatized by portraits of elegant apartments in Ipanema facing the *favelas* in the hills." Schwartzman goes on to say: "None of these images is false, but their meaning and interpretation are not obvious." This study seeks to make them so. In no sense of the word can the issue be regarded as simply a "puff" for a new democracy, for one whose present political administration is in so many fundamental ways different from that of any in the past. No effort is made in these pages to underestimate the gravity of the many problems that confront contemporary Brazil, and no one seeks to predict what the country is likely to achieve in the coming decades. Early-twentieth-century prophesies of projected developments in other Latin American societies, including, to cite only two examples, Argentina and Uruguay, were sufficiently confounded by the events of the century to provide us with a lesson in the virtues of caution.

This issue seeks to describe and explain a Brazil that too few who see the country principally from abroad seem to know. The mass media, however successful they have been in describing the economic issues that have confronted Brazil in recent years, whether in curbing runaway inflation or stabilizing the *real,* have not been equally successful in rendering the political, social, religious, moral, and cultural turmoil of these years. These merit understanding, not only because Brazil is today incontestably the most powerful state in Latin America, but also because it is so inadequately known. This is what impelled the editors of *Dædalus* to launch this study in the first instance.

Adam Ulam, the historian of Russia who recently passed away, left on the World Wide Web an account of his early life in Poland, but also of his impressions on arriving in the United States immediately before the outbreak of war in 1939. Among the many arresting things that Ulam wrote, none was more important than his statement: "My first year in America showed me how a democracy with a free press can be as easily misled by oversimplification as an authoritarian society can be by censorship and tendentious government propaganda." Ulam, even as a young man, could not fail to see how little the democratic United States in 1939 understood of what was

going on in Europe. So, today, it is not always evident that those who read only the American press about Brazil are at all aware of the vast differences of opinion that exist in that country on even the most sensitive subjects, a condition by no means universal among the new democracies of the world. To listen to the arguments on race and the environment, on religion and politics, as rendered in this issue of *Dædalus,* is to understand how free the Brazilian people have become, but also why, as José Murilo de Carvalho points out, the Brazilian drama "rests on the contrast between dream and reality, aspiration and achievement," where dreams do not, today any more than in times past, always come true.

No apology is required for the difficulty of certain of the essays in this volume. Those who read it will become aware of many things: among them, that Brazilians are very conscious of the importance of foreign scholarship, and not only that part which deals with their own country, written by those known to be "expert" in matters Brazilian. It is significant that sociologists like Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton are mentioned in the extraordinarily rich essay by Peter Fry on "Politics, Nationality, and the Meanings of 'Race' in Brazil," that Carl Degler, a historian principally of the United States, like so many other Americans and Europeans before him, thought it useful to study Brazil, and to write about the country, seeking to contrast it with the United States. Eminent social scientists have long seen Brazil as a nation worthy of study, and if the social scientific literature of North America is well-known in a country whose president is a distinguished sociologist, whose wife is no less well-known as an eminent anthropologist, it is by no means true that Brazilian scholarship is equally well known here. The educational scene in Brazil merits attention, for what is happening not only in the country's primary and secondary schools, but also in its universities. Because too few North American scholars command Portuguese, and because this situation is not likely to change very soon, the emphasis is almost always on economic issues; social, cultural, and intellectual matters are scanted. Given the command of English by many of Brazil's most eminent thinkers, what is thought here, and indeed what is experienced here, will always be known there. This is not to

say, however, as this issue of *Dædalus* makes amply clear, that the American or European models are the ones that Brazil seeks to imitate. The relations between this recently created Latin American democracy and those abroad who imagine themselves more highly developed, in a position to teach the newcomer, are exceedingly complex. Whether the issue is law, justice, affirmative action, citizens' organizations, or questions of international world order, Brazil is not seeking simply to be a clone of others.

Brazil is a "new democracy," but very different from any number of others able to claim the same distinction. In its religious life, as much as in its festivities and rituals, in its treatment of the environment and of its indigenous populations, in its wish to be modern even as it seeks to have greater influence in the world, acknowledging that it has many indefinable links with countries clearly less developed, it imagines a role for itself that makes it in any number of ways *sui generis*. Even the very spare study of its press and television, as given in the versos that appear throughout this issue, suggests that Brazil is not just another Latin American society, scarcely different from the others. It is a nation little disposed to ignore the gravity of its problems, but this does not preclude its recognizing that it is not today what it was at the time of World War II, or even when the military ruled the country, that it will not be the same half a century from now.

A great debt is owed to FUNAG, Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, of the Ministry of External Relations of Brazil, led successively by Ambassadors João Clemente Baena Soares and Alvaro da Costa Franco, and to Banco Itaú S.A., who provided the financial support that allowed a small group of Brazilians and others to meet twice in Rio, to plan the issue, and to persuade authors to reserve time to write their essays. It is important that we thank also Ambassador Rubens Antônio Barbosa, Mr. Stephen Robert, and the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the MRE-BID Project, who helped support an issue that grew exceptionally long, testifying to the complexity of the questions raised, of the many issues discussed.

S.R.G.

Leslie Bethell

Politics in Brazil: From Elections without Democracy to Democracy without Citizenship

A LITTLE OVER TEN YEARS AGO, Brazil became, for the first time in its history as an independent state, a fully fledged democracy, with regular free, fair, and competitive elections for both the executive and legislative branches of government based on the principle of one person, one vote. When Francis Fukuyama first began to formulate his ideas on the late-twentieth-century triumph of liberal democracy (and free-market capitalism) worldwide—"the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government"—not only were China, the Soviet Union, and much of Eastern and Central Europe still under Communist rule, but, in the Western Hemisphere, besides the notoriously complex case of Mexico, Brazil—the fifth largest country in the world, with the fifth largest population (150 million)—was a not insignificant exception to Fukuyamian triumphalism. The painfully slow process of political liberalization and finally democratization at the end of two decades of military dictatorship—part of Samuel Huntington's so-called third wave of global democratization, which had started in southern Europe in the 1970s and spread to Latin America in the 1980s—was still by no means complete. And the Brazilian economy remained one of the most closed and state-regulated—with one of the largest public sectors—in the capitalist world. By the time Fukuyama published his book *The End of History and the Last Man* in 1992, however, not only

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had momentous events taken place in Moscow and Berlin, but with the presidential elections of November-December of 1989 Brazil could unquestionably be counted a democracy—after India and the United States the third largest democracy in the world. It was also in the late 1980s and more particularly in the early 1990s that Brazil took the first steps toward the liberalization and deregulation of its economy and the privatization of its state industries and public utilities.

Brazil's new democracy, though like all democracies flawed, has so far survived, despite fears that it might not and little in the past to justify much optimism that it would. Whether a decade of democracy and neoliberal economic reform has made Brazil significantly more prosperous and less socially and racially unequal and divided, and what the implications are for the future of democracy in Brazil if it has not, are questions I will address briefly at the end of this essay.

I

Unlike the thirteen colonies in British North America, but like colonial Spanish America, Brazil served no significant apprenticeship in representative self-government under Portuguese colonial rule. For three centuries Brazil was governed by Crown-appointed governors-general (or viceroys), captains-general (or governors), high-court judges, magistrates, and other lesser bureaucrats.[1] The first elections held in Brazil—the election of delegates to the *Côrtes* summoned to meet in Lisbon in the aftermath of the Portuguese revolution of 1820—did not take place until May-September of 1821. By that time, as a consequence of the transfer of the Portuguese court from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro in 1808 during the Napoleonic Wars—an event unique in the history of European colonialism—Brazil was already no longer strictly speaking a Portuguese colony but an equal partner in a dual monarchy. A year later, in June of 1822, there followed elections—indirect elections on a strictly limited suffrage after the extreme liberals or radicals of the period (many of them republicans) failed to secure direct popular elections—to a Constituent Assembly in Rio de Janeiro as Brazil finally moved toward full separation from Portugal.

The independence of Brazil in 1822 can be regarded as part of the so-called democratic revolution of the Atlantic world in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in the sense that liberal democratic ideas were widely proclaimed in the struggle against Portuguese colonialism and absolutism. There was, however, never any intention of establishing in Brazil, a society built on slavery, anything that, even at the time, looked remotely like liberal representative democracy based, however theoretically, on the sovereignty of the people. (Brazil's population at the time, in a vast territory of three million square miles, was between four and five million, less than a third white, more than a third slave.) Unlike the newly independent Spanish American states, Brazil did not even become a republic. Uniquely, Brazil proclaimed itself an empire, with Dom Pedro I, the son of King João VI of Portugal and heir to the Portuguese throne, becoming independent Brazil's first emperor (succeeded on his abdication in 1831 by his five-year-old son, who eventually became Dom Pedro II).[2]

Since independence Brazil has had a long history of elections that compares favorably with most countries in the world. Under the empire (1822–1889), under the First Republic (1889–1930), in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1930, in the period after World War II (1945–1964), even under military dictatorship (1964–1985), elections were regularly held in Brazil. There has in fact been only one period of more than a few years in the entire modern history of Brazil when there were no elections: the Estado Novo (1937–1945). Until ten years ago, however, Brazilian elections were not always for positions of political power, executive or legislative; they were rarely honest and usually not freely contested; and the level of participation always fell some way short of universal suffrage. Historically, elections in Brazil had more to do with public demonstrations of personal loyalties, the offer and acceptance of patronage, the reduction of social (and regional) tensions and conflict, and, above all, control of a patrimonial state and the use of public power for private interests without resort to violence than with the exercise of power by the people in choosing and bringing to account those who govern them. Before 1989 Brazil was a case study in elections without democracy.

Under the political system of the empire, Brazil had an elected Chamber of Deputies. But governments were only to a limited extent responsible to it. Power was concentrated in the hands of the hereditary emperor himself, his chosen ministers, the counselors of state he appointed (for life), the provincial presidents he also appointed, and a Senate (with senators appointed, also for life, by the emperor, though from lists of three submitted by each province). It was only when Brazil finally became a republic in 1889 that the executive (president, state governor, municipal *prefeito*) as well as the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, state assemblies, and municipal councils were all elected. Presidential, congressional, state, and municipal elections were a feature of both the First Republic and the period after World War II. During the recent military dictatorship, presidents were "elected" for a fixed term, which is unusual in military regimes, but they were indirectly elected by an Electoral College in which (until 1984 at least) the regime could count on a majority. In practice, all five military presidents were imposed by the military high command. State governors (until 1982) and mayors of state capitals and other cities of importance to "national security" were appointed by the military. Congress and state legislatures, which continued to function under the military regime (apart from one or two brief closures), though with their powers much reduced, alone continued to be directly elected—on schedule every four years.

During the empire, voting in elections was open (and oral). Fraud, intimidation, violence, and the exercise of patronage by local landowners and agents of the Crown were widespread. Elections under the First Republic—a highly decentralized federal republic—were not much less dishonest, possibly more so, controlled as they were for the most part by state governments and *coroneis* (local political bosses) representing powerful landed oligarchies, especially in the more backward states of the Northeast and North. Not until 1932 was the ballot made secret and a system of electoral supervision (*justica eleitoral*) introduced. In practice, however, the new electoral legislation was not fully implemented until after World War II—and then for less than twenty years. Under the military dictatorship, electoral rules

were frequently manipulated in the most arbitrary and blatant ways to guarantee majorities for the pro-military ruling party.

There has always been some measure of contestation between different parties, programs, and candidates in Brazilian elections. In the parliamentary elections of the empire the choice was between Liberals, Conservatives, and, finally, Republicans. During the First Republic, elections were contested but only by state parties, and in each state the Republican party was dominant. The outcome of the presidential elections was predetermined by agreements between state governors (*a política dos governadores*). No "official" candidate backed by the governors and Republican political machines of at least one (and it was usually both) of the two states with the largest electorates—São Paulo and Minas Gerais—and two or three of the largest second-rank states (Rio Grande do Sul, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, and Pernambuco) ever lost, and no "opposition" candidate ever won, a presidential election. Apart from the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), founded in 1922 and immediately declared illegal, and the fascist Integralistas, founded in 1932 and declared illegal along with all other political parties during the Estado Novo, there were no national political parties or political movements until 1945. In the postwar period more than a dozen national parties for the first time competed for office. But in May of 1947, at the beginning of the Cold War, the PCB, the only significant party of the Left, was once again declared illegal by Congress after eighteen months of *de facto* legality. The PCB, which was itself not fully committed to legal strategies and the electoral road to power, was effectively excluded from democratic politics—and remained so for the next forty years. For most of the period of military rule—between the party "reforms" of 1966 and 1979—only two parties, the pro-government ARENA (later PDS) and the opposition Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB, later PMDB), were permitted to contest elections.

In the middle decades of the nineteenth century (the golden age of the empire), the level of political participation was surprisingly high: men (not women, of course) who were twenty-five years old (twenty-one if married), Catholic, born free, and with a quite low annual income from property, trade, or em-

ployment had the right to vote in elections for the Chamber of Deputies. Richard Graham has calculated that in 1870 one million Brazilians out of a total population of a little under ten million (i.e., half of the free adult male population, including many of quite modest means, those who were illiterate, and even blacks) could vote.[3] (This is a far higher proportion of the population than in England, for example, after the Reform Act of 1832 and even after the Reform Act of 1867.) The elections, however, were indirect. The so-called *votantes* elected *eleitores* (who were required to have a higher annual income), and only *eleitores*—some twenty thousand of them in 1870—had the right to vote for *deputados*. Moreover, the turnout was generally low. This was hardly *democracia coroada,* crowned democracy, the title of historian João Camillo de Oliveira Torres's book published in 1957 on the political system of the empire.

Moreover, the level of political participation under the empire was severely reduced in 1881. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, as the coffee economy expanded and the shift from slave to free labor finally gathered momentum, making the final abolition of slavery increasingly inevitable, there was a growing fear among the dominant political class, even reform-minded liberals, that former slaves ("barbarians")—in the rural areas but more particularly in the rapidly expanding urban areas—would readily acquire the low income sufficient to secure the right to vote. Under the Saraiva Law of 1881, elections for the Chamber of Deputies were made direct and the voting age was lowered to twenty-one; the property/income qualification to vote was removed; non-Catholics, naturalized citizens (though not resident foreign immigrants), and even former slaves (freedmen) were eligible to become voters. However, undermining these apparent liberal/democratic advances, a new requirement for voter registration was introduced for the first time: namely, education as measured by a literacy test—in a country in which 80–85 percent of the population was illiterate. (In England, John Stuart Mill, the great apostle of liberal democracy, also argued against giving the vote to illiterates, but Mill at least believed in the rapid expansion of public education to reduce the level of illiteracy, not something advocated by many people in Brazil in the late

nineteenth century.) Thus, after 1881, while the number of *eleitores* increased (initially to around 150,000), the vast majority of Brazilians, even most free males, who had previously had the right to vote, albeit only as *votantes* in indirect elections, were consciously and deliberately excluded from political participation.[4] Liberalism may have been the dominant ideology in nineteenth-century Brazil, but, as in Spanish America, it was liberalism of a predominantly and increasingly conservative variety as it was forced to adjust to the realities of an authoritarian political culture, economic underdevelopment, and, most of all, a society deeply stratified (and along racial lines).

The Republic, like the empire, excluded from politics the great mass of adult Brazilians by denying the vote to illiterates (still 75 percent of the population in 1920, such was the neglect of public education during the First Republic). In the Constituent Assembly of 1891 a greater effort was made to extend the suffrage to women than to illiterates. Not surprisingly, it failed. Nevertheless, the presidential and congressional elections of the early Republic did represent a substantial advance in direct popular political participation compared with the late empire: in 1898, for example, almost half a million Brazilians voted, including sections of the emerging urban middle class and even some urban workers in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Porto Alegre, and elsewhere.[5] However, even in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the capital of the Republic, with a population of half a million in the early part of this century, José Murilo de Carvalho has calculated that only about one hundred thousand people had the right to vote, that only 25 to 35 percent of these ever registered to vote in national elections between 1890 and 1910, and that only between 7 and 13 percent (5–10 percent of the adult population) actually voted.[6] In the country as a whole, in even the most competitive presidential elections with the greatest degree of political mobilization—for example, the elections of 1910 and 1919 in which Rui Barbosa, the great liberal jurist, stood as a *civilista* opposition candidate (and lost)—less than 5 percent of the adult population voted. It was not until 1930 that more than 10 percent of the adult population voted in a presidential election.[7] What has been called oligarchical democracy (surely an oxymoron) is, as a description of the political system

of the Old Republic, as hard to swallow as is crowned democracy for the empire.

From the 1930s, wider sections of the Brazilian population were gradually incorporated into the political process. The 1932 electoral law lowered the voting age to eighteen and, more important, for the first time gave women the vote (always provided they were literate).[8] Brazil was second to Ecuador in Latin America in extending the suffrage to women—ahead of, for example, France. Women were slow to register, however; only 15 percent of those eligible to vote in the elections for a Constituent Assembly in May of 1933 did so, and only one woman, Carlota Pereira de Queiróz from São Paulo, was elected. As part of "democratization" in 1945 a new electoral law included automatic voter registration for employees, male and female, in public and private companies (many of whom were in fact illiterate)—a measure designed to extend the vote to wider sections of the urban working class while still excluding the rural population, around 60–70 percent of the total. The elections of December of 1945 were the first reasonably honest, competitive (even the Brazilian Communist Party was allowed to take part), relatively popular elections ever held in Brazil. Seven and a half million Brazilians registered to vote (more than half in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the Federal District, and around a third in the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro by means of the ex-officio registration through the workplace). This was four or five times the number who had registered to vote only fifteen years earlier and a substantial proportion (35 percent) of the adult population. A little more than six million actually voted.[9] Under the "democratic" Constitution of 1946, however, more than half the adult population of Brazil remained disenfranchised by its illiteracy. And Congress in 1950 restored individual responsibility for voter registration—on the face of it a liberal measure but in the circumstances of Brazil at the time a blow aimed at the political participation of the urban working class.

Nevertheless, as a result of the dramatic growth in the population (from 40 million in 1940 to 70 million in 1960 and 120 million in 1980), rapid urbanization (35 percent of the population was classified as urban in 1940, 45 percent in 1960, 70

percent in 1980), and, in the 1960s and 1970s, for the first time, real progress in the direction of universal basic literacy, the electorate grew steadily. It reached eighteen million in 1962, and, despite the breakdown of Brazil's postwar limited form of democracy in 1964, it grew again to over sixty million in 1982 (which means that the electorate actually grew fourfold during the military dictatorship). However, not until the return to civilian rule in 1985, in one of a series of constitutional amendments passed during the first months of the Sarney administration, were illiterates (still over thirty million of them, comprising between 20 and 25 percent of the population, with a large proportion being black) finally enfranchised. The Constitution of 1988 then extended the vote to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds: the so-called *voto facultativo.*

The municipal elections of November of 1985 and the elections for Congress and state governor a year later were the first elections in Brazil based on universal suffrage, although few *analfabetos* had time to register to vote in the first and only half registered to vote in the second.[10] Nevertheless, the 1987–1990 Congress not only had twenty-six women members, a small number but more than had been elected in the entire period from 1932–1986, but also nineteen blacks, including the first black *deputada,* Benedita da Silva (PT, Rio de Janeiro). Finally, in 1989, the first direct presidential elections in thirty years were the first in the history of the republic based upon universal suffrage. They were held symbolically on the centenary of the Republic (November 15, 1989). The electorate now numbered eighty-two million, and, since voting has been mandatory in Brazil since 1945 (under the Constitution of 1988 for those over eighteen and under seventy only), the turnout, as always, was extremely high (88 percent). Candidates of twenty-two parties from across the political spectrum, from the far Right to the far Left, contested the first round. In the second round Brazilians were offered a straight choice between the Right (Fernando Collor de Mello, Party for National Renovation, PRN) and the Left (Luis Inácio 'Lula' da Silva, Worker's Party, PT). By a narrow margin they chose Collor.[11]

Brazil's new democracy showed early signs of fragility, and from September to December of 1992 Brazilians suffered the

trauma of the impeachment (on corruption charges) of their first democratically elected president less than halfway through his term of office. In the end, however, the successful impeachment of Collor can perhaps be seen to have demonstrated more the maturity than the fragility of Brazilian democracy.[12] Twice before the end of the decade Brazilians then went to the polls—78 million (82 percent of the electorate) in 1994, 83 million (78 percent) in 1998—in remarkably free, honest, and orderly *super-eleicoes* (presidential, gubernatorial, Congressional, and state-assembly elections held on the same day). Both presidential elections were won handsomely by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a distinguished sociologist with an international reputation and a politician with impeccable democratic credentials and advanced social democratic ideas, though on each occasion, as we shall see, the candidate of a Center-Right coalition. (The defeated candidate in both elections, as in 1989, was Luis Inácio 'Lula' da Silva.) In 1998 Cardoso thus became only the second elected civilian president since 1930 to serve a full term (the other was Juscelino Kubitschek in the 1950s), the first elected by universal suffrage—and the first to be re-elected.

The international environment in the 1990s was uniquely favorable to the survival and consolidation of democracy in Latin America. In particular, the United States made support for democracy a central feature of its policy toward the region, as it had done in the past, but this time with rather better results. Furthermore, with the end of the Cold War anti-communism was no longer available as the main justification for the overthrow of democratic (or semi-democratic) governments as it had been in Brazil in 1964 (and even in 1937). Like the Left, the Right—the traditional political class (rural and urban), the more powerful economic interest groups, and the military itself—was, it seemed, now committed to peaceful democratic politics, as it had not always been in the past. The political crisis surrounding the impeachment of Collor in 1992 was the first in the history of the Republic in which the military—whose privileges and prerogatives, including the right to intervene in the political process, are explicitly recognized in the 1988 Constitution—was not an active participant. Of course, it could be argued that the Brazilian "propertied classes" (including broad

sections of the middle class) were (and still are) no more than fair-weather democrats. When the costs of overthrowing democracy and resorting to authoritarianism are high and the costs of tolerating democracy low, democracy is likely to survive. But when its interests are threatened by forces favoring a significant distribution of wealth and power, as they were, or were believed to be, in 1964, there is always a possibility that it will look to the military to overthrow democracy. We shall never know whether Brazil's new democracy would have passed its supreme test—the acceptance of victory by Lula and the PT in the presidential elections of 1989 or 1994. As Adam Przeworski once remarked, only where the Left lost the first elections following a process of democratization was democracy truly safe.

II

There can be elections without democracy, but there cannot be democracy, at least not liberal representative democracy, without elections. At the same time, there is, of course, more to democracy than elections, however honestly conducted and freely contested and whatever the level of popular participation. The democratic exercise of power *between* elections is also important, and democratic political systems vary in the degree to which they facilitate it. Brazil's democratic institutions functioned relatively well in the 1990s. At least there remained no "authoritarian enclaves," parts of the power apparatus of the former military dictatorship not accountable to democratically elected civilian governments. The military itself has so far steadfastly remained out of politics. But Brazilian democracy is not without its flaws.

Some political scientists would go so far as to claim that in Brazil, as in the rest of Latin America, the presidential system itself is a major obstacle to the proper functioning of representative democracy. It is an expression of, and it reinforces, the personalism and authoritarianism deeply rooted in the country's political culture. Moreover, however poor their performance, however weak their support in Congress, however low their standing in the country, presidents can only be removed in

advance of the next scheduled elections by extreme measures: for example, suicide (Vargas, 1954), resignation (Quadros, 1961), military coup (Goulart, 1964), or impeachment (Collor, 1992). Brazil had two opportunities to change its system of government during the process of democratization: in March of 1988, after prolonged debate on the issue, the Constituent Assembly voted 344 to 212 in favor of a presidential rather than a parliamentary system; and five years later (April of 1993), in the plebiscite required under the 1988 Constitution, 55 percent of the electorate voted for presidentialism and 25 percent for a parliamentary system of government, with 20 percent of the vote spoiled or blank. (In the same plebiscite Brazilians were also offered the opportunity to restore the monarchy: 12 percent voted in favor compared with 66 percent who supported the republic.)

Brazil's electoral system (based on proportional representation, but with large, statewide constituencies and "open" lists of candidates) and its party system have received a great deal of criticism. They are both, especially the party system, high on everyone's political reform agenda. Brazil has been described as the most severe case of party underdevelopment of any democratic country in the world.[13] Parties do not, for the most part, have deep historical roots, nor ideological/programmatic consistency (even the PT is deeply divided). Moreover, except for the PT and perhaps these days the PFL led with a firm hand by Antônio Carlos Magalhães, they are highly undisciplined: almost a third of the deputies elected in 1994 switched parties during the Congress of 1995–1998—some several times!—and those elected in 1998 would appear to be no less volatile. Finally, there are, some would argue, too many parties. Seventy-six put up candidates in nine elections between 1982 and 1996, although thirty-nine of them only once. Thirty or so parties are currently registered; eighteen have seats in Congress, although only eight have more than ten seats in the Chamber of Deputies and at least one seat in the Senate. The largest party in Congress (the PMDB after the 1994 elections, now the PFL) has only 20 percent of the seats. The PSDB, President Cardoso's party, had only 12 percent of the seats after the 1994 elections and still has less than 20 percent. What

has been called "permanent minority presidentialism"—no popularly elected president since 1950 has in fact had a majority in Congress provided by his own party—leads inevitably to party alliances, coalition government, and political bargaining in the endless search for majorities for every piece of legislation. Constitutional reform (and the 1988 Constitution is so detailed and all-embracing that almost any major reform has constitutional implications) requires the support of 60 percent of the members of both legislative houses on two separate occasions, which is extremely difficult to achieve, not least because of the high level of Congressional absenteeism in Brasília. This is all part of the game of democratic politics, no doubt, but it helps to explain why Brazilian presidents in the 1990s have increasingly resorted to the (constitutional but undemocratic) use of *medidas provisórias* in order to bypass Congress.

The most undemocratic, or, as political scientists would say, demos-constraining, feature of Brazilian democracy—and the most difficult to reform—is a federal system that rewards a great number of poor, less populated, less developed, more politically traditional and conservative (that is to say, clientalistic and corrupt) states with extreme over-representation in Congress. The problem here is not simply that, as in the United States, all twenty-seven of Brazil's states regardless of population have an equal number of seats in the Senate (three), but that representation in the lower house is not proportional to population or electorate. There is for the Chamber of Deputies currently a minimum "floor" (eight seats) and a maximum "ceiling" (seventy seats) for each state. Thus, São Paulo, with an electorate of over twenty-two million, has seventy seats (only recently raised from sixty); the former federal territory of Roraima, with an electorate of 120,000, has eight. Brazil's seven smallest states (by population, not size), which together account for only 4 percent of Brazil's population, elect 25 percent of the Senate and over 10 percent of the Chamber.[14] The system also favors the parties that are strongest in the more backward states. With only two or three percentage points more of the popular vote nationwide than the PT in 1994 and 1998, the Center-Right PFL elected three times as many senators and almost twice as many federal deputies.

An even greater cause for concern is the fragility of the rule of law in Brazil after more than a decade of democracy. Although no government in Brazilian history has been more supportive of civil and human rights than that of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, for a large proportion of the population basic civil liberties remain inadequately protected and guaranteed by the courts, and there are frequent gross violations of human rights, many of them perpetrated by the state military police.[15] Brazil is a democracy of voters, not yet a democracy of citizens.

Brazilian democracy has not so far been broadly or deeply legitimated. Public opinion polls throughout the 1990s have consistently indicated a widespread lack of trust not just in politicians, political parties, and political institutions but in democracy itself. Equally noteworthy are the large numbers of Brazilians who fail to vote in elections, even though the vote is technically mandatory, and those who vote but vote *nulo* (spoiled ballot) or *branco* (blank ballot)—practices common (and understandable) during a period of military rule but disturbing in a democracy. Abstentions rose from 11.9 percent in 1989 to 17.7 percent in 1994 and 21.5 percent in 1998. In the presidential elections of 1989, 6.4 percent of those who turned out voted *branco* and *nulo*; 18.8 percent in 1994; and 18.7 percent in 1998. In 1998 38.4 million Brazilians either abstained or voted *nulo* or *branco*—more than those who voted for Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The number voting *branco* or *nulo* in Congressional and gubernatorial elections was around 30 percent (and in some states—e.g., Maranhão, Bahia, and Pará—as high as 50 percent), and even higher in state-assembly elections. These figures are extraordinarily high by the standards of any democracy in the world.

Brazilian democracy may be imperfect and "shallow," but a democracy it is nonetheless. There may be no justification for indulging in end-of-history democratic triumphalism as far as Brazil is concerned, but there is at the same time no reason to dismiss, as some still do (especially on the Left), the establishment of democratic institutions, the extension of political rights to all Brazilians, and even the slow but steady progress that has been made in the field of civil and human rights as merely

constituting "formal" democracy. Nevertheless, those who argue that Brazilian democracy is not yet "substantive," that it neglects economic and social "rights," have a serious point. Brazil is a country with remarkably few of the regional, national, racial, ethnic, linguistic, and religious divisions, tensions, and conflicts that pose a threat to democracies, old and new, throughout most of the world. In this respect it is uniquely fortunate. But with the eighth, ninth, or tenth largest economy in the world, Brazil is sixtieth or worse in international league tables of human development and is a strong contender for the title of world champion in social inequality. Can democracy be healthy, can it properly function, can it even survive in the long run, when, as in Brazil, a third of the population (some would put it much higher) live in conditions of extreme poverty, ignorance, and ill health and are treated at best as second-class citizens?

Poverty, inequality, and social exclusion (which despite Brazil's claim to be a racial democracy have a clear racial dimension) have their roots in Portuguese colonialism (especially the system of land ownership), in slavery (both colonial and postcolonial), in (some would still argue) postcolonial economic underdevelopment and "dependency," in mass immigration to Brazil in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in rapid urbanization after 1940—but also, perhaps above all, in past failures to address the "social problem." Brazil, as Eric Hobsbawm once said, is a monument to social neglect. There was some reduction of poverty and exclusion (possibly even of inequality) as a consequence of economic growth, upward social mobility, and social policy from the 1930s to the 1970s. But the situation worsened with the economic difficulties of the 1980s (the so-called lost decade in terms of economic growth) and the (albeit necessary) structural adjustment policies and continuing lack of growth of the early 1990s. And despite the clear benefits to the poor of the 1994 Plano Real (Brazil's national economic stabilization plan), at least in its first years, and the rhetoric, and in some areas policies, of the Cardoso administrations, democratic government is perceived by many as having so far failed to promote a much-needed social transformation in Brazil. In

this respect it is in danger of being regarded as no different from the nondemocratic governments of the past.

III

Throughout modern Brazilian history every change of political regime—from the establishment of an independent empire in the early 1820s to the establishment of a modern representative democracy in the late 1980s—has demonstrated the extraordinary capacity of the Brazilian elites to defend the status quo and their own interests by controlling, co-opting, and, if necessary, repressing the forces in favor of radical social change, or, if you prefer, the extraordinary capacity of the Brazilian people for tolerating poverty, exclusion, inequality, and injustice and thus collaborating in their own subordination. Not only has there been no social revolution in Brazilian history comparable, for example, to those of Mexico, Russia, or China; there has been remarkably little popular mobilization of any kind for political and social change. On the rare occasions when popular forces were mobilized and organized to challenge the status quo, especially after 1930, whether through elections or occasionally on the streets, the Brazilian elites (always with the military) have been prepared to take the necessary measures to contain them and even to support and maintain long periods of antipopular, authoritarian government, as in 1937–1945 and 1964–1985.

Brazilian independence in 1822 was more the outcome of political and military developments in Europe and their repercussions in the New World than some kind of "general crisis"—economic, political, ideological—of the old colonial system producing a popular anticolonial political movement. As late as 1820 there was no widespread desire in Brazil for total separation from Portugal. The main aim of the leaders and supporters of Brazilian independence in 1821–1822—*fazendeiros* (plantation owners), especially in the province of Rio de Janeiro but to a lesser extent also in Bahia and Pernambuco; merchants in the principal cities; and some bureaucrats—was to achieve political and economic autonomy for Brazil without sacrificing the stability so crucial for the maintenance of its territorial unity

and existing socioeconomic structures built, above all, on African slavery. But once decided upon, independence was secured quickly and peacefully—without a long and bloody war with the colonial power or civil war (in sharp contrast to events in Spanish America), and without significant social mobilization or social upheaval. The popular forces were in any case weak—and divided by class, color, and legal status; no significant concessions had to be made to the underprivileged groups in society. The transition from colony to independent empire was characterized by political, economic, and social continuity. The existing Portuguese state apparatus never ceased to function. The economy suffered no major dislocation. Above all, as well as the existing pattern of land ownership, the institution of slavery survived—in all regions of the country and, while heavily concentrated in plantation agriculture, in all sectors of the economy and society, rural and urban.[16]

No far-reaching land reform (at least in terms of the distribution of land) has ever been effected in Brazil. But Brazil did eventually abolish slavery—although not until 1888. The greatest threat to slavery in the nineteenth century, however, had come not from opposition within Brazil (which was always weak) but, given Brazil's dependence on massive annual imports of new slaves, from outside in the form of the unrelenting and finally successful pressure from Britain to end the transatlantic slave trade. From the middle of the nineteenth century slavery began to decline, but there were still over one and a half million slaves in Brazil in 1870 (more than at independence) and over a million in 1880. The Brazilian abolitionist movement of the 1880s represented the highest level of urban middle-class (and, to a lesser extent, popular) mobilization for social change seen thus far in Brazil. But it played a relatively minor role in the final abolition of slavery, which was more the result of the cumulative effects of long-term economic and demographic change, mass flights by slaves and voluntary liberations by slaveowners, the supply of an alternative source of labor in the form of Italian immigrants, and political decisions made by the imperial government.[17]

Brazil was not only the last independent state in the Americas to abolish slavery; it was also the last to declare a republic—

one year later in 1889. It was no accident that the republic was finally proclaimed in the centenary year of the French revolution. The ideology of republicanism, especially radical republicanism, supported by progressive urban middle-class intellectuals, was profoundly French-inspired. But there was no revolution in Brazil in 1889. As Louis Couty, a French resident in Rio in the early 1880s, remarked, "Brazil has no people," that is to say, no popular forces that could be organized and mobilized for political ends.[18] The Brazilian republic came out of a military coup born of a conspiracy between a small number of army officers and representatives of the rising coffee-producing landed oligarchy of the state of São Paulo. Like the transition from colony to empire, the transition from empire to republic was marked more by fundamental social and economic continuity than by change.

The Revolution of 1930, which brought an end to the First Republic and the hegemony of the São Paulo coffee oligarchy, was in no real sense a revolution at all. Getúlio Vargas, governor of Rio Grande do Sul and the defeated candidate in the elections in March, came to power in November of 1930 as a result of an armed rebellion led by dissident members of the political elite, especially in Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Gerais but also in São Paulo, as well as by disaffected military officers; this triggered intervention by the federal army to remove President Washington Luis from office. It represented yet another shift in the balance of power between landed regional elites more than the emergence of new social forces and brought the military to the center of power, where it remained for the next sixty years.[19]

Elections in 1933 for a Constituent Assembly and the Constitution drawn up the following year were meant to inaugurate a cycle of "democratization," but the emergence in 1935 of the radical Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL) and a failed communist attempt to seize power in November of 1935 led to the imposition of a state of siege. When elections under new "democratic" rules to be held in January of 1938 threatened to produce a result unacceptable to Vargas and the military—either a restoration of the former "liberal democracy" dominated by state oligarchies and especially the coffee interests of São Paulo

or a populist president offering to improve the lot of the poor (*a política dos pobres*)—they were aborted by a military coup in November of 1937. Getúlio Vargas remained in power for another eight years.[20] The Vargas era was notable for state- and nation-building, economic development, and modernization, but also, and not least, a shift in the relations between state and society, especially the urban working class. Labor unions represented the first autonomous organizations of civil society in Brazil. Their protests and strikes during the first decades of the twentieth century had been met by severe police repression. As Brazilian industry expanded in the aftermath of the depression and especially during World War II, large sections of the working class, previously in independent, often anarchist or socialist-led *sindicatos,* were gradually drawn into a close relationship with the state, reinforced by an ideology of class collaboration, class harmony, and social peace. Much of the corporatist labor legislation of the Estado Novo remains in force today.

In 1945, at the end of World War II, the Vargas dictatorship came under considerable pressure to liberalize Brazil's political system. But the pressure was less domestic than international: Brazil was one of the United States' closest allies in the struggle for democracy against fascism. Vargas finally promised "free" elections confident that he had the means (through control of the state apparatus) and support (especially from the ranks of the organized working class) to win them. Significantly, both the pro-Vargas and anti-Vargas parties chose military figures as their candidates for the presidency. Neither had much popular appeal, certainly less than either Vargas himself or Luis Carlos Prestes, the leader of the Brazilian Communist party (PCB), who had spent the entire period of the Estado Novo in prison.

The process of "democratization" was initiated and controlled *pelo alto,* from above. But between May and October of 1945 Brazil's major cities experienced unprecedented mass political mobilization, orchestrated in part by the PCB and, more particularly, by the so-called *queremistas* (from the slogan "Queremos Getúlio": We want Getúlio). There were growing fears among those conservative sectors in Brazil newly

committed to "democracy" that popular forces were being dangerously radicalized. It took a soft intervention by the United States and another military coup (this time to remove Vargas from power) to guarantee the elections scheduled for December, which were won by General Dutra, Vargas's minister of war, representing the forces that had sustained the Estado Novo. Brazil's newly instituted "democracy" was restricted in scope and fundamentally antipopular in nature. The price of democracy was continued state control of organized labor, continued restrictions on political participation (no extension of the vote to the illiterate half of the population), and repression of the Communist Left (after the PCB had polled half a million votes—10 percent of the vote—in both the presidential and Congressional elections of December of 1945 and in the gubernatorial, state assembly, and municipal elections of January of 1947). The distribution of seats in Congress under the "democratic" Constitution of 1946 ensured that the more conservative states of the North and Northeast were overwhelmingly overrepresented at the expense of the states of the South and Southeast, especially São Paulo. Finally, and most important of all, the military retained its independent political power. It remained largely beyond civilian control, and without its support it was impossible for any elected president to remain in power.[21]

Underpinned by the rapid economic growth of the postwar period, this limited form of democracy survived several political crises, notably those surrounding the suicide in August of 1954 of Getúlio Vargas (who had been elected to the presidency in the second postwar elections in 1950) under pressure from the military to resign, and the resignation in August of 1961 of President Janio Quadros, whose many problems included his relations with the military, after only eight months in office. In the early 1960s, however, with by now a much higher level of popular participation in politics, a number of factors, principally a sharp economic downturn but also the impact of the Cuban revolution, combined to radicalize the popular forces in Brazil. Labour and the Left demanded radical social and economic change. The Right (including by now large sections of the urban middle class) was prepared to support (indeed en-

courage) a military coup if this was the only way of preventing the kind of radical change sought by the Left. Overestimating the strength of the forces for change and underestimating the strength of the existing power structure, civilian and military, and its unity and decisiveness when its interests came under threat, President João Goulart (1961–1964) attempted to create an opening to the Left. The result was his overthrow by the military on March 31, 1964, bringing to an end Brazil's postwar "experiment with democracy." There was little popular resistance.[22]

Like that of 1945, the political liberalization—and, finally, democratization—of the 1970s and 1980s was initiated and controlled from above. It was not primarily a response by the military to opposition MDB/PMDB victories in elections (in 1974 and 1982), or the unexpectedly strong emergence of civil society especially in the form of new unionism in 1978–1979 and the formation of the Workers' Party (PT), or even the extraordinary mass mobilization in favor of *diretas já* (immediate direct presidential elections) in 1984—although these all played their part. Rather, the regime sought to consolidate and advance its own institutionalization and reduce the costs of repression. It is not clear that democracy was ever the intended outcome. Only when it lost control of the presidential succession process, being no longer able to count on a majority in the electoral college, did the military throw its weight behind a deal struck between PDS dissidents (who formed the Partido da Frente Liberal, PFL) and the opposition PMDB under which the seventy-five-year-old liberal-conservative opposition politician Tancredo Neves became the "official" presidential candidate. Tancredo was duly "elected," but as is well known never took office. He was taken ill on the eve of his inauguration and died a few weeks later. The presidency went to the vice-president-elect, Jose Sarney, who was, though a civilian (and therefore the first civilian president of Brazil in more than two decades), the former president of the ruling party under the military regime.

In 1985 a transition from military to civilian rule (but not yet to democracy) was peacefully effected. It was a *transição pactuada,* a transition *sem ruptura.* The Nova República, like

the limited form of democracy established in 1945–1946, was thus compromised by its origins. It was built on the institutional foundations of the authoritarian regime it replaced.[23] Those who were anticipating simply a continuation of military rule by other means were, however, confounded. Sarney, despite some delaying tactics, presided over a genuine transition to democracy, culminating in the presidential election of 1989 based on universal suffrage.

The 1989 presidential election was not, however, as we have seen, won by the PMDB, the main opposition movement for over twenty years and by far the biggest and broadest party in Brazil, as might have been expected; nor by the PDT, the party of Leonel Brizola, the heir to Getúlio Vargas and João Goulart; nor by the PT, the new grassroots opposition party, whose leader, Lula, reached the second round; but by Fernando Collor de Mello—young, energetic, psychologically unstable, and corrupt (as we now know), a hitherto virtually unknown politician from the poor northeast state of Alagoas with no significant party behind him. He proved attractive to the dominant class, which, after the twenty-one-year military dictatorship, had no credible candidate of its own; to the poor who were susceptible to his populist appeal; to some sections of the middle class; and, to their lasting shame, to some intellectuals.[24] The 1994 election was again won by neither the PMDB, nor the PDT, nor the PT, but by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and the small Center-Left/Center PSDB, which had split from the PMDB, backed by the parties of the Center-Right/Right, especially the PFL. In 1994, even more than in 1989, the principal aim of the conservative forces in Brazil, which again, after the Collor debacle, had no candidate of their own, was to defeat Lula, who six months before the election had a considerable lead in the opinion polls and was apparently heading for victory. It was the Plano Real, of course, with its promise of a final end to runaway inflation, that guaranteed victory for Cardoso and in particular secured the support of the poorest sections of Brazilian society.[25] Above all, the 1989 and 1994 (and 1998) elections in Brazil, like most mass democratic presidential elections in the late twentieth century, were won not so much by the candidates and certainly not by their parties, but by serious money, modern campaign

organization and methods, and the influence of the media, especially television.

In each of these elections the defeated candidate Lula had to battle against deep-rooted prejudice: the majority of Brazilians (of all classes) found it hard to imagine as president a São Paulo *metalúrgico* from a poor rural northeastern background with only a modest formal education. But the PT also contributed to its own defeat: it was internally divided; many of its policies were unconvincing; its social base in the industrial working class was too narrow; it could never decide whether to bid for the support of the very poor and underprivileged or to look for alliances in the center ground (which were in any case probably unavailable). In light of Brazil's political history, political culture, and political system as described in this essay (and the defeat of the socialist Left almost everywhere in the world in this period), the growth of the PT in Brazil since its foundation in the years 1979–1982 is a remarkable story. Lula increased his vote from 17 percent in 1989 (first round) to 27 percent in 1994 and 32 percent in 1998. In every election since 1990 the PT has increased its seats in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies as well as the number of states (including the Federal District in 1995–1998 and now Rio Grande do Sul) and *municípios* (including the cities of São Paulo in 1988–1992 and Porto Alegre since 1988) it controls. The PT has undoubtedly changed the political agenda in Brazil, but it is still a long way from winning power at the national level.

IV

Since all three democratically elected Brazilian administrations in the 1990s have depended for support in Congress on the parties of the Right, Center-Right, and Center, which, except in a rhetorical sense, do not put social issues high on their agendas, since these administrations have in any case been constrained in their capacity to focus on the "social question" by the demands of macroeconomic stability, especially the need to reduce the fiscal deficit, by low economic growth, and by the realities of Brazil's position in the international economy, and since Brazil's social problems are intractable and not suscep-

tible to short-term solutions, it is not surprising that progress in this area has been slow. However, it does matter that democratic governments are seen to make a difference. And democracy does offer more possibilities for fundamental social change—and peaceful change—than other political systems. All Brazilians, even the indigent, the poor, and the illiterate and semiliterate (tens of millions of them), now have the vote. Despite all the obstacles put in their way, not least by the unreformed political system itself, they can use it effectively in their own interests—or not.

Education is perhaps the key. "We must educate our masters," famously declared Robert Lowe in the House of Commons on the passage of the Reform Act of 1867. (What he actually said was, "I believe it will be necessary that you should prevail on our future masters to learn their letters.") Almost a century later, Anísio Teixeira, one of Brazil's greatest educators, wrote, "There will only be democracy in Brazil the day the machine (*maquina*) that prepares people for democracy—the public school—is assembled in Brazil." Basic, primary education is an area in which considerable improvements have been made in recent years, although reform has too often seemed to have been driven more by the needs of the economy in the twenty-first century than by the requirements of education in citizenship, and it remains woefully inadequate. It also has to be said that few Brazilian politicians, especially those in power, think of the Brazilian people as their "masters."

Organization is also important. Civil society is now highly mobilized in Brazil, offering new forms of participation and "empowerment," but it is perhaps less *politically* combative than in the recent past. Its connections to political parties are weak. And it is still working out how to make the democratic state "useable." The political parties of the Left (old and new) that are most opposed to the status quo have for the most part failed to gain the electoral support of the poorest sections of Brazilian society, as we have seen, and have not been sufficiently prepared and ready to take power, at least at the national level. The elected Center/Center-Right Brazilian governments of the 1990s could have been more effectively pressured into engaging in more meaningful dialogue with the represen-

tatives of civil society and with leaders of opposition political parties and, without resorting to "populist economics," could have been made more responsive to the economic and social needs (rights?) of the majority of the population, more willing to give priority to compensatory, redistributive social policies.

If Brazil's still relatively new democracy fails to deliver not only economic benefits to the population as a whole but at least the beginnings of a more equitable distribution of wealth and power, it will always be fragile and will always struggle to command popular support. And there are dangers to democracy—not so much from social revolution (there is nothing in Brazilian history or political culture to suggest this as a real possibility, as we have seen, and any resort to more violent ways of demanding economic and social change outside democratic institutions would, as always, meet powerful resistance) or, at least in the immediate future, from military coup as from self-destruction. Like electorates in many other Latin American countries, the Brazilian electorate—overwhelmingly young (30 percent under thirty), poorly educated (70 percent with no more than seven years in primary school), and extremely poor (60 percent of the economically active earning under U.S. $150 per month)—could in certain circumstances be persuaded to support populist authoritarian solutions to their problems. Brazil has still to demonstrate that it can successfully combine "formal" liberal representative democracy with a significant extension of citizens' rights and a reasonable measure of social justice.

ENDNOTES

[1]On colonial government, see Leslie Bethell, ed., *Colonial Brazil* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 46, 129–135, 142, 257.

[2]On Brazilian independence, see Leslie Bethell, "The Independence of Brazil," in Leslie Bethell, ed., *Brazil: Empire and Republic, 1822–1930* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Also two essays by Emília Viotti da Costa: "The Political Emancipation of Brazil," in *From Colony to Nation: Essays on the Independence of Brazil,* ed. A. J. R. Russell-Wood (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975) and "Independence: The Building of a Nation," in Emília Viotti da Costa, *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

[3]Richard Graham, *Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 109, Table 2, and 332, note 41. On the political system of the empire, see also José Murilo de Carvalho, *A construção da ordem: a elite política imperial* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campus, 1980), and *Teatro de sombras: a política imperial* (Rio de Janeiro: IUPERJ, 1988).

[4]Graham, *Patronage and Politics,* 185–186, 200, 202.

[5]Bolivar Lamounier and Judith Muszynski, "Brasil," in *Enciclopedia electoral latinoamericana y del Caribe,* ed. Dieter Nohlen (San José, Costa Rica: Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, 1993), 99, 128. The compilation by Lamounier and Muszynski in ibid., 93–134, especially Table 2.1, "Evolución del electorado 1933–1990 [in fact 1894–1990]" (ibid., 99) and Table 2.9, "Elecciones presidenciales 1894–1989" (ibid., 125–130), contains valuable statistical information on all elections in Brazil until 1990. For elections from 1982 to 1996, Jairo Marconi Nicolau, ed., *Dados eleitorais do Brasil (1982–1996)* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Revan, 1998), is indispensable.

[6]José Murilo de Carvalho, *Os bestializados: o Rio de Janeiro e a república que nao foi* (São Paulo: Cia. das Letras, 1987), chap. 3.

[7]Lamounier and Muszynski, "Brasil," in Nohlen, ed., *Enciclopedia electoral,* 99, 128.

[8]June Hahner, *Emancipating the Female Sex: The Struggle for Women's Rights in Brazil, 1850–1940* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991), 171–173.

[9]Nohlen, ed., *Enciclopedia electoral,* 108, 113, 128.

[10]For an interesting analysis of the "black vote" in the elections of 1985 and 1986, see Elza Berquo and Luiz Felipe de Alencastro, "A emergência do voto negro," *Estudos CEBRAP* 33 (July 1992).

[11]Nohlen, ed., *Enciclopedia electoral,* 99, 130, and Nicolau, ed., *Dados eleitorais,* 23–26, 29–36.

[12]President Fernando Collor de Mello was impeached first in the Chamber of Deputies on September 29 (441 votes to 38) and then, definitively, in the Senate on December 30, 1992 (76 votes to 3), the day after he had in fact resigned.

[13]On the Brazilian party system, see in particular the work of Scott P. Mainwaring: "Brazilian Party Underdevelopment," *Political Science Quarterly* 107 (4) (1992); "Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy," in *Building Democratic Institutions: Parties and Party Systems in Latin America,* ed. Scott P. Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); and *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

[14]See Alfred Stepan, "Brazil's Decentralized Federalism: Bringing Government Closer to the Citizens?" in this issue of *Dædalus.*

[15]See Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, "Democratic Governance, Violence, and the (Un)Rule of Law," in this issue of *Dædalus.*

[16]On the independence of Brazil, see endnote 2.

[17]For an introduction to the question of the abolition of slavery in Brazil, see Leslie Bethell, "The Decline and Fall of Slavery in Nineteenth-Century Brazil," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 1 (6th series) (1991).

[18]Quoted in Carvalho, *Os bestializados,* 10.

[19]The best book on the Revolution of 1930 remains Boris Fausto, *A revolucao de 1930: História e historiografia,* 16th rev. ed. (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1997).

[20]On the background to the 1937 coup, see Aspásia Camargo et al., *O golpe silencioso: As origens da república corporativa* (Rio de Janeiro: Rio Fundo, 1989).

[21]On the "democratization" of Brazil at the end of World War II, see Leslie Bethell, "Brazil," in *Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944–1948,* ed. Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[22]On the collapse of postwar democracy in 1964, see Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, *Sessenta e quatro: Anatomia da crise* (São Paulo: Vertice, 1986), and Argelina Maria Cheibub Figueiredo, *Democracia ou reformas? Alternativas democráticas a crise política, 1961–1964* (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1993).

[23]On the process of liberalization/democratization in the 1970s and 1980s, there is a vast literature. See, in particular, Luciano Martins, "The 'Liberalization' of Authoritarian Rule in Brazil," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America,* ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Also Alfred Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[24]In the first round, Collor secured 30.5 percent of the *votos válidos* (i.e., excluding the blank and spoiled ballots), Lula 17.2 percent, and Brizola 16.5 percent. In the second round, Collor had 53 percent, Lula 47 percent.

[25]Cardoso won in the first round with 54 percent of the *votos válidos*. In 1998, he won re-election in the first round with 53 percent.

TV-Globo, depending on the assessment criterion, may be the largest private television broadcast network in the world. Its signal is picked up by 95.5 percent of the 5,507 Brazilian municipalities, scattered on a territory comprising twenty-seven states in 8.5 million square kilometers. Each evening, the *Jornal Nacional,* its main news program, one out of seven transmitted daily by that station, is watched by an average of sixty million people. This is far greater than what is achieved collectively by the three largest U.S. television broadcast chains with their news programs. With its population of 165 million, Brazil has approximately 118 million fewer inhabitants than the United States.

TV-Globo's inordinate growth may be ascribed to typical Brazilian imbalances. The average American's income is 4.5 times higher than the Brazilian's. But Brazil has at least forty-six million television sets, one for each three persons. Only 57.2 percent of its homes have drinking water; 58.9 percent have sewer facilities; and 80.3 percent have refrigerators. Nevertheless, in 1997, 86.2 percent of Brazilian residences had television sets, according to the National Survey by Residence Sample, a sampling census carried out every two years by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics.

Marcos Sá Corrêa

Simon Schwartzman

Brazil: The Social Agenda

A BAD REPUTATION

When it comes to social issues, Brazil has a terrible reputation. The official statistics are bad enough, and the images conveyed by the international press are arresting: children wandering and being killed in the streets or working in sweatshops; urban dwellers crowded in shantytowns; landless peasants clamoring for agrarian reform; Indians decimated by loggers, gold seekers, and ruthless landlords; dozens killed every day in the cities by armed gangs or the police; and high income inequality, dramatized by portraits of elegant apartments in Ipanema facing the *favelas* in the hills.

None of these images is false, but their meaning and interpretation are not obvious. The press and television portray extremes, giving no sense of the whole. Improperly used, statistics can lead to wrong interpretations, hiding important differences, contrasts, and trends. As an example, the 1995 Brazilian national household survey found about five hundred thousand children between the ages of five and nine years working, most of them without payment. The easy interpretation, which created headlines, was the existence of widespread child slavery, driving the prices of Brazilian products down and effecting the prompt and indignant reaction of well-meaning consumers in civilized countries. The reality was very different: most of these children helped their parents in family-based agricultural ac-

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tivities as part of their normal lives. At age nine, 82 percent of these children were in school, as compared with 93 percent of those who did not work. Lack of study at this early age has less to do with child labor than with general poverty and school scarcity in some rural areas. The number of children working regularly increases with age. By ten, 7 percent of children do some work, and 5 percent are out of school; by sixteen, 36 percent work, and 26 percent are out of school; by eighteen, 50 percent work, and 50 percent are out of school (data from 1997). The inference might be that the reason children do not study is that they have to work. However, the correlation is small: among eighteen-year-olds, 58 percent of those who work are out of school, compared with 40 percent of those who do not work. Child labor, in short, is mostly associated with rural poverty, and, by itself, it is not an important cause of lack of education. Abusive and exploitive child labor exists and has to be curtailed, but this is not the pattern.

In another example, the high levels of income inequality found in Brazilian statistics are due more to the existence of an extended upper middle class in the urban areas, benefiting from the large wage differentials that exist between the more and the less educated, than to the contrasts between the few very rich and the millions of poor, portrayed sometimes in the mass media (see figure 1). What is striking is not the income of the richest group (a monthly median of a little above 3,000 *reais*, or U.S. $3,000 in 1997), but the large difference between the top and the bottom, and especially the way income level multiplies as education, measured by years of schooling, grows. The conventional vision is that poverty could be reduced by taking money from the rich and giving it to the poor. The data, however, show that the rich are not so many, and that the best policy for poverty reduction is to invest in education, to provide more skills to the population and reduce the premium on higher levels of education.[1]

Brazil's bad reputation led to the idea that the country's social conditions are worsening, for reasons that vary, for different commentators, from the adoption of neoliberal and market-oriented policies by the Brazilian government to the lack of a true commitment to the values of rationalization,

Figure 1. Years of Schooling of Heads of Family and Household Income (medians by income deciles).



Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), National Household Survey (PNAD), 1998.

privatization, and international competitiveness. In reality, while some conditions have worsened in recent years, especially those related to the quality of life in large metropolitan areas, most of the basic social indicators, such as education, life expectancy, housing conditions, and sanitation, have shown steady increase and improvement. Modernization and social change are long-term trends that move forward despite short-term variations in economic trends and policies. For instance, the number of households with access to tap water in Brazil went from 52 to 85 percent between 1970 and 1991; access to standard household appliances such as refrigerators, color televisions, freezers, and telephones is increasing steadily as the prices of these items go down; infant mortality saw a dramatic drop in the 1970s, kept decreasing throughout the "lost decade" of the 1980s, and continues to decline today (see figure 2).

These examples are not given to suggest that Brazilian social problems are not serious or that they can take care of themselves. Brazil is going through a profound social transition that

Figure 2. Brazil's Infant Mortality, 1950–1997.



Source: IBGE, PNAD, 1997.

is changing the shape of the country and raising a new set of social and economic issues that were not on the agenda just a few years ago. The new agenda is a reflection not only of existing problems but also of the perspectives, values, and interests of different social groups. The question of who sets the agenda has important consequences for the issues tackled, their priority, and the likelihood of their failure or success.

THE SOCIAL TRANSITION

The most evident feature of the social transition is that Brazil is now a predominantly urban, not rural, society. Cities like Salvador, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo have always been important as seats of the colonial and later national and regional administrations and poles of attraction for immigrants, but most of Brazil's population lived outside the cities until recently. In 1940, 70 percent of the population still lived in rural areas; in 1997, only 20 percent did (see figure 3).

Rural jobs are fast disappearing. Five hundred thousand rural posts were eliminated between 1992 and 1995, while 4.7 million new jobs were created in urban areas. Between 1995 and 1997, 1.8 million jobs disappeared in the countryside, and

a similar number was created in the towns.[2] The main reason for this shift is the gradual disappearance of small, traditional rural properties and their replacement by agro-business and a new, prosperous but small rural middle class in the Southern region. The allure of city life and access to jobs and education for the young, as well as the availability of small pensions for the elderly, also explain the movement away from the hardship and uncertainties of rural poverty.

The other important transition is the dramatic drop in population growth. Between 1991 and 1996, the yearly growth rate was 1.38 percent, down from about 2.99 in the 1950–1960 period. The rates are close to 1 percent both in developed regions, such as Rio Grande do Sul and Rio de Janeiro, and in poor areas, such as Bahia and Pernambuco. This growth rate corresponds to a fecundity rate of about 2.1, below which the population starts to shrink. The Brazilian population is still young and is expected to keep growing for a few decades more, but will stabilize and start to shrink before the middle of the century. This demographic change is not a consequence of an

Figure 3. The Growth of Urban and Rural Populations in Brazil.



Source: IBGE, *Anuário Estatístico*, 1997.

intentional policy of population control, but an outcome of rural migration, the entrance of women into the labor market, and the spread of health information and services. This population trend is already having some positive effects, such as the reduction of migration flows from country to town and decreased demand for schools. Smaller families can therefore invest more in the education of their children. These facts help to explain how Brazil was able, in a few years, to achieve almost 100 percent of school enrollment for its children. In a few decades, however, as the population gets older, a new set of problems will arise, related to health, pension costs, and the social placement of the elderly.

Because of these transitions, the number of people able to change their social status in Brazil is one of the highest in the world. In 1996, 60 percent of the children of rural workers and two-thirds of the children of urban, nonqualified workers were in a better social position than their parents.[3] It is in light of these changes that the social problems in Brazil, and the agendas for their solutions, should be seen.

THE POVERTY AGENDA

Poverty eradication is now a top priority in the agendas of international institutions such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, and the Catholic Church, and it has great visibility in the mass media. In Brazil, the issue has been driven by social movements such as the Citizenship Movement against Hunger (headed by the late Herbert José de Souza, or Betinho, as he is commonly known), the Movement of the Landless (Movimento dos Sem Terra), many smaller movements and nongovernmental organizations, and the federal government itself, through the Program of Communal Solidarity (Programa da Comunidade Solidária). Together, they shattered the centuries-old tradition of accepting poverty as natural and unavoidable and placed the goal of poverty eradication at the forefront of Brazil's political and social agenda.

The poverty agenda is very different from the traditional stand of the old Left, which fought for the improvement of the

living conditions of workers through better deals in their relations with the capitalists and the establishment of compensatory social policies. In the past, industrialization, the development of science and technology, and the spread of education led to the belief that the problems of poverty, ignorance, and deprivation were about to disappear, through the expansion of private entrepreneurship, through the purposeful and rational action of governments and international organizations, or through some combination of both. Malthus's pessimism was eclipsed by the image of an "unbound Prometheus," an endless expansion of wealth and well-being driven by man's rationality and innovativeness. This image was prevalent in both capitalist and socialist countries and adopted by developing countries in the Southern Hemisphere in their drive for political independence and socioeconomic development.

The assumption that economic development alone would give everybody an adequate job, however, is now being questioned in industrialized countries and never really existed in developing and underdeveloped societies, where most of the population still remains without access to essential goods and services. The new poverty agenda is marked by the strong moral tone of its proponents and the belief in the redeeming power of political will and community mobilization. In the countryside, most of the poverty agenda is carried out by the Catholic Church and the Movement of the Landless, which denounces the immorality of land concentration and raises the flag of family agriculture.[4] In the cities, campaigns are promoted to mobilize the middle classes and to bring food and clothing to the poor. "Market capitalism" is criticized for its lack of concern for human predicaments, and government is criticized whenever social expenditures are reduced.

Indeed, Brazilians could do much more charitable work. A permanent stress on social equity and well-being is important for focusing public-policy priorities, and the growing concern of international agencies and nongovernmental organizations with issues of social deprivation is a welcome change. The poverty agenda, even when it does not lead to specific proposals and solutions, is a powerful and welcome instrument for

change. It is fair to say, however, that these efforts to mobilize society to help the poor have been less effective than expected.

The problems of poverty and social deprivation in Brazil have two very distinct faces, requiring different policies and approaches: the population of the modern, urban periphery of the large metropolitan areas and midsize towns; and the poor population in the gradually shrinking rural areas, mostly in the Northeast region. Intense poverty in Brazil has always been associated with rural populations, deprived of education or social services, working the land with very little productivity, no protection from the vagaries of rain and drought, and very high fecundity rates.[5] Brazilian rural dwellers are not descendants of old, pre-Colombian civilizations, as in Mexico and some Andean countries, nor of traditional peasant societies, as in Europe. They are, mostly, descendants of Portuguese and African or Brazilian indigenous slaves, leftovers from plantation economies and cattle-raising farms ruined by lost markets and impoverished soil, lacking the technical traditions and culture that could help them to extract more benefits from their surroundings.[6]

The combination of intense poverty, decadent local oligarchies, and depleted soil makes rural poverty very difficult to change. Since the nineteenth century, cyclical droughts have raised the specter of famine in the Brazilian Northeast, leading the federal government to pour money into the construction of water reservoirs. Most of the money, however, remains in the hands of local bosses who do little to improve the lot of the poor. Modern agriculture grew mostly in regions populated by European immigrants in the South and in large plantations in the frontier states of the West, and it is now expanding at a very fast pace in the frontier regions of the central highlands. When it comes to the Northeast (as, for instance, with new irrigation projects and the cultivation of high-quality table fruits), it is brought mostly by immigrants from the traditional small-farms economy of the South.

"Agrarian reform," the division of large rural properties into family plots, is high on the agenda of antipoverty movements in the rural areas and is dramatized by periodic episodes of forceful occupation of large farms by landless families. The govern-

ment has been responding by taking hold of little-used or contested rural properties and transferring them to the peasants; by raising taxes on unproductive land; and by devising credit instruments for rural dwellers. These policies can improve conditions for several segments of the population, but are unlikely to have a larger impact on the poverty issue. Brazil does not have a culture and tradition of small, family-based agriculture except in the Southern areas of Japanese and European immigration. Today, family-based agriculture is shrinking everywhere, or coming together in large cooperative or business networks for the production of milk, poultry, fruit, and other products for the urban markets and for export. As productivity rises, the prospects of creating more rural jobs, even in areas of modern and efficient agriculture, are not bright.

If rural poverty is not improving, it is at least getting smaller. As people move to towns, they also improve their lot, even when they remain poor and have difficulty finding jobs. According to Sônia Rocha's calculations, the proportion of those living in poverty in Brazil went down from 68 to 35 percent of the population between 1970 and 1990. Part of this change was due to economic growth, but most of it was a consequence of urban migration. In towns, people can find a cheap place to live in a shantytown or in the outskirts of the big cities, can have access to electricity and treated water, can go to a medical post to get some kind of medical care, can send their children to school, and can have a greater chance of finding a job or earnings of some kind.[7]

THE SOCIAL DEMOCRACY OR WELFARE AGENDA

This agenda can be described as the quest for public benefits and social protection for the population, in a context of economic growth and industrialization. It is very European in inspiration and is associated with issues like job stability, the reduction of working hours, medical care, retirement, and housing. It includes also the organization of workers in unions, the development and strengthening of professional associations, and the growth of the public sector as an efficient and fully professionalized administrative core.

This agenda appeared in Brazil in the 1920s and 1930s and gained importance after World War II. A complex and generous set of social benefits was created, limiting the number of hours worked and mandating yearly vacation, minimum wage, an additional salary at Christmas, maternity leave, job security, retirement benefits, pensions, health insurance, and health care.[8]

This generous social legislation, however, was limited to persons with regular jobs in urban centers. Even among them, benefits were not evenly distributed. Until the 1960s, different professional segments had separate medical and pension funds, and there was no system of social security for rural dwellers. Today, retirement benefits for civil servants and the military are still much better, and public resources for medical care go mostly to persons living in the richer urban areas.

People do not complain much about these inequities, perhaps because of the expectation that the benefits granted initially to some would be later extended to others. So industrial unions do not protest against the privileges of civil servants; students in private institutions do not complain about the free education for those in public universities; and diploma holders in new, less prestigious professional areas do not question the market privileges held by traditional professions such as law, medicine, and engineering. This assumption of increasing benefits from the social democratic agenda has enjoyed widespread support, and grew in ambition in periods of increased political participation and democracy: after 1945, and again with the Constitution of 1988, at the end of the military regime.[9]

These benefits were financed, at first, by taxes on export activities; later, in the 1960s and 1970s, by an increase in the government's ability to collect taxes; and since then by inflation. The crisis of the Brazilian welfare state is similar to the one affecting Western Europe and the United States. As benefits increased, the cost of health and education grew; as the population got older, the welfare bill skyrocketed and was not followed by equivalent increases in economic growth and productivity. Brazil spent, in 1994, about 14 percent of its gross national product (GNP) in social benefits (approximately 51.5 billion *reais*, or dollars), 65 percent of which went to social

security (two-thirds for the general population, one-third to military and civil-service retirees), 18.4 percent to education, 16.5 percent to health, 9.3 percent to education and culture, and 7.1 percent to housing.[10] Only a small part of these resources reached the bottom of society.[11]

The crisis of the social democratic agenda in Brazil is that it reached its peak when most of the population was still far from benefiting from it and when productivity was still much lower than that of the countries that were its model. The expectation that the benefits acquired by some will eventually be extended to all is becoming very difficult to sustain.

THE ECONOMIC AGENDAS: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS

Until the 1950s, Brazilians still debated whether the country should remain mostly an agricultural economy or move forcefully toward industrialization. This discussion was settled, in practice, by the "targets program" (Programa de Metas) of President Juscelino Kubitschek in the late 1950s, which started the Brazilian car industry, linked the country with paved roads, and started ambitious programs of energy production and industrial development. The key components of the early agenda of economic development were the role of national government as the main promoter of economic growth and the protection of local industry against foreign competition through high tariffs and regulations. This was not, in essence, a nationalistic agenda; the car industry, for instance, was owned by large multinational manufacturers, Volkswagen, Ford, General Motors, and later Fiat, which kept the Brazilian market for themselves, and foreign investors were well received throughout. Nevertheless, Brazilian-owned industrial and financial groups and interests also flourished and received the benefits of large public contracts and partnerships with foreign groups. This "import-substitution model" reached its climax in the 1970s, with the ambitious projects of forced industrialization led by the Ernesto Geisel government (1976–1980).[12] In the previous years, a large influx of foreign capital led to unprecedented levels of economic growth—the so-called Brazilian Miracle of the 1970s. During

these years, it was possible to argue that no specific social agenda for poverty reduction or increased social benefits was needed, since the benefits of economic growth would eventually spread out to the population as a whole.[13] In fact, economic growth led to improvements in income for all social sectors, but income inequality also increased, lending credence to the mistaken notion that economic development is based on increased exploitation of the working class.

In the 1980s, a combination of high public spending and unexpected increases in international interest rates led to mounting inflation and economic stagnation. The military started their ordered withdrawal from public life, and the civilian government that took over in 1985 did not have the nerve or the conditions to bring the country's economy under control.

The economic agenda of the 1990s is based on the quest for economic stability and international competitiveness, characterized by less reliance on the importance and relevance of a Brazilian-owned industrial sector, a reduced role of the state as entrepreneur, and a renewed appreciation of agriculture as a source of economic growth. International competitiveness requires either cheap prices or better products, or both. It also requires a sound economy, able to inspire confidence in foreign investors and predictability in economic transactions. This agenda has been tried by the Cardoso government in a very difficult situation, given the need to stop and control inflation, balance the budgets of the federal government and the states, reach an equilibrium in the balance of payments, and open the economy to the international market, all simultaneously.

At first, economic stabilization, achieved with the introduction of the *real* in 1995, was more effective in spreading social benefits and improving the living conditions of the poor than any other conceivable social policy. Inflation control is estimated to have increased the true income for those at the lower strata by about 30 percent, raising the consumption of staple products and household durable goods. Inflation remained at the level of about 1 percent a month since the introduction of the *real*, and the traditional mechanisms of salary indexing were abolished. Most price increases occurred in the services sector and were particularly damaging to middle sectors. Most

of these effects occurred immediately after stabilization in early 1995. By 1998–1999, with the economy growing slowly and unemployment on the rise, and especially after the currency devaluation of early 1999, there were signs of a worsening situation, reflected in a drop of real mean income for all social groups. Brazil entered the year 2000 with a stable and growing economy, but it is a slow growth with no direct impact on unemployment, the quality of the job market, or income inequality.

The social effects of international competition are less clear. This process did not start with the Cardoso administration, but was kept as an important part of its agenda. As the economy reorganizes and gears up for international competition, formal employment and job stability shrink while opportunities for self-employment and work in an expanding services sector increase in a new environment where educational and professional skills make all the difference in terms of opportunities and expected income. Data on unemployment, collected by the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE), showed a consistent pattern of about 5 percent of the active population in a condition of open unemployment (without work and actively looking for it), compared with figures close to 20 percent in Argentina.[14] With economic recession in 1998–1999, it rose another two or three percentage points. A closer look at the employment data shows an increasing number of self-employed and people in the so-called informal economy and a decreasing number of industrial workers. Many layoffs can be explained by the increased efficiency of firms, some by downsizing and outsourcing, and some by the relocation of industrial firms from the periphery of São Paulo, Porto Alegre, and Recife to other towns and regions (especially to the São Paulo hinterland) that are not covered by the employment statistics. So, an important part of what seems like a historical decrease in working opportunities reflects in fact an important process of economic restructuring and geographical displacement. Nevertheless, the number of people unable to find jobs or earn a living is on the rise, particularly in large metropolitan areas, among the less educated young, and for those displaced by industrial modernization.

From the perspective of this agenda, the complex system of social protection built in Brazil in the 1930s appears insufficient, economically unbearable, and perverse. It is insufficient because most services remain limited to those who live near the places where they are provided, usually in the more developed states and regions. It is economically unbearable because the population is getting old, requiring more health care and extended retirement payments, and needs better education. It is perverse because there is a clear, positive correlation between income and benefits received—if you are middle class or higher, your chances of having free higher education, good free medical care, and early retirement with generous benefits are much better than if you are poor and live in a backward region.

This combination of moral and practical evils should be enough to convince anyone that the system of social welfare in Brazil is in need of deep reform. This is difficult to explain, however, to those who are losing benefits or imagine that they are close to getting them. At heart, the social agenda of international competitiveness is a negative one. The assumption is that the economy should be allowed to grow unhindered, and, with increased productivity and higher income, people would be able to take care of their own needs of health, education, and retirement, with as little help from governments as possible. This assumption, however, is doubtful: it is possible to conceive of a scenario in which the Brazilian state becomes very efficient and the economy very competitive, while maintaining, simultaneously, high levels of income inequality and large pockets of poverty. The poverty agenda has to be faced at once, without waiting for the benefits of international competitiveness.[15]

THE EMERGING AGENDAS

Beyond these broad agendas, there are others related to specific issues or groups, which remain, at least for the moment, in a secondary position. An incomplete list would include the themes of race, gender, and environment, which I shall address below, as well as education and urban violence.

The *ethnic or racial agenda* has not been very salient, although about half of the Brazilian population is either black or

of mixed blood, with large groups of descendants of Italians, Japanese, Germans, and other European immigrants. Most of the non–Portuguese European and Japanese immigrants came to Brazil at the turn of the century, and today the second and third generations speak Portuguese as their mother language and retain little of their original culture. We can still identify areas characterized by strong German, Italian, and Japanese groups, and the Japanese, particularly, have shown a strong tendency toward endogamy. But there are not conflicts and demands associated with linguistic and ethnic issues, and questions about the rights of or discrimination against foreigners are not part of the Brazilian social agenda.

The situation regarding the African slaves and their descendants is much more complex. The Brazilian statistical office, IBGE, asks systematically about the "color" of Brazilians in their censuses and national surveys. They find that about 10 percent of the population define themselves as "black" (*preto*), 40 percent as "brown" or "gray" (the word used in Portuguese is *pardo*), and about 50 percent as white, with a small percentage being classified either as "oriental" (mostly of Japanese origin) or indigenous. To be *preto* or *pardo* is associated, statistically, with being poorer, less educated, and less likely to hold a prestigious occupation, and the correlation between "color" and income persists even for those with similar education. This association between "color" and income suggests the existence of barriers against the social mobility of the nonwhite population, or the existence of specific cultural and value patterns associated with education and social mobility in specific groups.[16] However, the demarcation lines between different ethnic or racial groups are blurred, and it is relatively easy to "pass" from one category to another. Most of the population refuses the color classification used by the census office, particularly the terms *preto* and *pardo,* preferring to call themselves *moreno* or to use a myriad of alternative terms.[17] This means that, although the race boundaries are indistinct, there is strong awareness of racial differences.

Brazil never had apartheid institutions like South Africa or the United States and has strong legislation forbidding any kind of racial discrimination. Racial prejudice, however, seems wide-

spread, and to have dark skin can affect the self-perception and life opportunities of millions. The answer of several black organizations and intellectuals to this situation has been to embrace their racial identity and to press for an agenda of affirmative action in social policies. The main difference from the United States, however, is the lack of clear boundaries between racial groups and the refusal of most of the population to accept racial labels.[18]

The situation of the Brazilian native populations, known as "Indians" since the times of the early European exploration of the Americas, is different.[19] The estimate is that the Indian population, when the Portuguese arrived in Brazil in 1500, was about five million. The 1991 Brazilian census registered about 162 thousand persons who were still classified as Indians, while specialists estimate the actual number to be around 270 thousand. More have lost most or all of their Indian identity. Their physical traits, however, can be seen in the faces in the streets, mostly in the North and the Northeast, and native words designating places, plants, and animals are everywhere. They are not remnants of one native culture, but descendants of about two hundred very different societies, speaking 150 distinct languages and widely different in the way they related to each other and to their environment. A federal agency, FUNAI, is responsible for taking care of the Indian population—a feature of government that has seen no precedent for blacks or other underprivileged groups. This clear delimitation of some sections of the Indian population has allowed for affirmative action that has intensified recently, expressed mostly through the generous demarcation of their lands. There are several problems with this policy: it excludes assimilated Indians, it does not include effective means to protect the Indian territories from invaders and predators, it does not place limits on the predatory activities of the Indians themselves, and it often runs against the interests of the non-Indian local populations.

As with race, the *gender agenda* has not developed much, in spite of significant gender-related differences in income, occupation, and work opportunities.[20] In part, this agenda has not developed because Brazil does not have the most obvious manifestations of gender discrimination found in other societies.

Nutrition and health conditions of boys and girls are similar, showing no gender-based preferential treatment by families, and there are more girls than boys in schools at all levels; women are entering the job market in large numbers. Families with both parents working are the rule today, rather than the exception. However, women tend to get less prestigious and profitable jobs, their income is lower than men's for the same occupation,[21] and their work outside the home does not seem to have reduced their burden in the household, especially in the growing number of single-parent families. It has been difficult to translate these predicaments in a clearly defined social agenda, because they still reflect cultural traditions governing the relationships between men and women. There are a few issues of special interest for women, such as an increase in the number of kindergartens and day-care centers for children, and the right to abortion, which encounters strong resistance from the Catholic Church. The gender agenda remains, overall, limited to a few feminist movements and organizations, and it is far from entering the mainstream.

The *environment agenda* is still restricted to small groups of intellectuals and middle-class activists and to nongovernmental organizations concerned with issues such as the destruction of the Amazon forest, the extinction of animal species, and the loss of biodiversity. The problem with the environment agenda is that the collective benefits of environmental protection often conflict with the short-run interests of individuals and the budget limitations of governments and can be particularly threatening to low-income groups that deplete the resources of forests, rivers, and the soil, inhabit shantytowns near the sources of clean water in the cities, and ride in cheap, smoke-producing city buses.[22] However, environmental problems such as air pollution in large cities, the deterioration of beaches and tourist resorts, the destruction of fertile soil, the contamination of food and water, and the disposal of garbage are starting to have direct and dire consequences for the population, requiring prompt action. Electricity comes mostly from dams and waterfalls, but these sources are nearing exhaustion, and the introduction of thermal plants will bring new threats of environmental impact. In spite of the recent creation of environmental protection

agencies such as the Ministério do Meio Ambiente (Ministry of the Environment) and IBAMA (Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente), and the signature, by the Brazilian government, of Agenda 21, after hosting the world's main international conference on the environment in Rio de Janeiro, environmental issues have yet to become a priority in the country.

SOCIAL POLICIES: THE SCOPE FOR ACTION

The effect of these partially overlapping, partially conflicting agendas has been to put enormous pressure on public authorities to respond to rising and often contradictory demands, in a context of economic stringency. An incomplete list of social policy issues would include the maintenance and expansion of the existing systems of social protection and benefits in public health, retirement, education, and housing; the correction of existing distortions, delivering more benefits to the poor and removing privileges of specific groups; the improvement of the efficiency and efficacy of the civil service in the administration of its resources and in its dealings with the public; the reduction of income inequality; an increase in the number and quality of jobs and opportunities for self-employment; the provision of emergency relief to groups in extreme poverty; the development of programs to enable those in pockets of poverty in the countryside and in the urban peripheries to move away from their syndromes of poverty and social marginality; the addressing of acute problems of social conflict and unrest; and attention to the special needs and demands of minorities and less privileged groups, including the native population and blacks.

These formidable tasks are not the sole responsibility of the federal administration, but depend on the active involvement of state and local governments, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. Brazil is a federation of twenty-seven states and about five thousand municipalities, all supposed to respond to the demands and attend to the needs of their populations, particularly in education, health, urban administration, and basic services. There is a tendency, however, to look at the central government as bearing the main responsibility for the country's ills and their eventual cure. There are reasons for

this, given the tradition of political centralization. However, the large differences that exist between Brazilian states and localities are due not to preferential treatment or neglect from the central government regarding specific regions, but mostly to the ability of local populations to take care of their own needs and interests, which is related, in turn, to the quality and effectiveness of local governments and leadership.

The federal government has to bring the budget under control and cannot increase public expenditures without jeopardizing the economy. Most of the resources administered by the government are already committed to the payment of salaries, constitutional transfers to states and local governments, legal benefits, and payments of interests on the internal debt. To carry its policies, the executive needs congressional approval, which, as in the United States, often requires heavy bargaining and horse-trading. The government is also under constant pressure to deal with issues of great visibility that capture the negative attention of public opinion, nongovernmental organizations, and the press and contribute to the country's bad reputation, but are not necessarily the most important or highest-priority items on the governmental agenda.

Brasília, like Washington, is not the best place from which to run complex administrations supposed to reach poor communities thousands of miles away. The need for decentralization is clearly perceived, and it is taking place. Nevertheless, Brazilian regions and states differ widely in their ability to procure resources and use them to the benefit of the local population. The poorer the region, the more likely are its elites to live on handouts from the central government, keeping the poor in deprivation. Centralized policies are needed to compensate for regional inequity and to establish standards for services and care, but they can be used as an excuse to keep old bureaucracies in place.

Even in the best circumstances, with good government and economic growth, the daunting social problems facing Brazil in issues of health, poverty, education, employment, and living conditions will last for decades to come. Nevertheless, they can be faced, reduced, and better administered if proper policy decisions are taken and if the administrative and managerial

competencies of public authorities improve. It is useful to look, however briefly, at what is being done in some of these problem areas.

Social Security

"Previdência Social," the national system of pensions and retirement benefits, is a problem for the population because of its meager benefits, and a major headache for the government since it consumes 65 percent of the expenditures of the federal government in the social area.[23] Two-thirds of this total is for former employees in the private sector and is financed by a fixed percentage of all salaries, paid jointly by employers and employees (about sixteen million beneficiaries); one-third comes from the ordinary budget and is used to pay retirements and pensions in the public sector (about half a million persons).[24] In recent years, important advances were made in reducing corruption and increasing the speed and efficiency of processing papers and payments. New legislation was introduced to reduce the most obvious distortions and privileges, lowering the retirement benefits of civil servants and increasing their contributions.

The system remains unbalanced, however, and requires a much deeper reform. The current pay-as-you-go mechanism can only cover minimum benefits and should be replaced by a funded system based on a combination of mandatory and voluntary contributions. The transition between these systems, however, is very expensive, given the need to keep paying current benefits while saving for the future.

Health

The effort in the health sector has been to transfer the administration of health services to local communities (the so-called Sistema Unificado de Saúde, SUS), but the federal government is still responsible for two-thirds of all public health expenditures.[25] There are significant achievements in preventive medicine, through large inoculation campaigns and intensive work on grassroots programs based on community health agents and family doctors. There is no solution in sight, however, for the runaway costs of the medical and hospital bills paid by the

federal government to private health providers, or the costs of the recovery and proper maintenance of public hospitals. In the recent past, the system of payments for health services was corrupted by a combination of inflationary costs, extremely low fees, and delayed reimbursements, inducing institutions to inflate or fake the number and complexity of services provided.

Administrative mechanisms were put in place to curb these practices, and a new and highly controversial tax on financial transactions was approved by Congress as a temporary stopgap to cover the costs of the health system. The government has still to spell out a clear policy that could lead to a more equitable and viable system of public health care in the long run.

Education

Basic education is recognized as one of the most successful areas of social policy in recent years.[26] Access to basic education is almost universal, repetition and dropout rates are falling rapidly, and secondary education is expanding at very high rates. The quality of learning, however, is still low, and a complex system of student assessment at all levels was created to identify the main problems and establish priorities. Basic (fundamental and secondary) education is the responsibility of local and state governments, but the federal government has an important instrument for action: the resources of the Fundo Nacional de Educação, a tax levied on firms for educational purposes. Two-thirds of these resources remain with the states, but the federal government has about seven hundred million dollars a year to spend. In the past, most of this money was channeled through local politicians, and its destination was uncertain at best. Now, the Ministry of Education has developed a system of transferring part of these resources directly to schools, boosting their autonomy and ability to act. Recent legislation was introduced to guarantee a minimum expenditure of U.S. $300 per student per year, by states and municipalities, which leads to a common base salary for schoolteachers.[27] The success of these policies is partially explained by a growing consensus on the importance of basic education and on the main policy orientations for the sector, and by the existence of significant state- and municipal-level initiatives.

On the other hand, the Cardoso administration has been thus far unable to carry out a clear policy for higher education. Brazil has less than 10 percent of its younger population enrolled in higher education, about two million students, a figure that is expected to grow very rapidly in the forthcoming years.[28] The federal system of higher education, costing about 6.5 billion dollars a year and providing free education to less than four hundred thousand students, is clearly in need of reform. A project to grant administrative autonomy and require accountability from public universities is stalled by strong resistance from teachers' unions and student organizations. Meanwhile, the private sector is kept under bureaucratic controls and is expanding without clear directions. Several initiatives related to technical, secondary, and teacher education also exist, but none with the promise of significant impacts before long.

Unemployment

Open unemployment in Brazil's urban centers is low, but underemployment is high.[29] The outlook for the next ten to twenty years is of an increasing number of youngsters entering the job market, combined with a drive in the productive sector to increase efficiency by incorporating new technologies and downsizing. This perspective is a cause of concern, and the government has been trying to respond with a series of actions. The most important, but without immediate effects, is to increase the quality of basic and secondary education. There are also proposals to reduce the cost of labor and deregulate the labor market. Today, a firm has to spend approximately the same amount it pays for salaries in social benefits and taxes. The project is to have a menu of choices for labor contracts, including indeterminate, fixed, and short-term contracts, as well as different packages of social benefits and severance compensation, to be negotiated between independent unions and the employees. In principle, such a system should allow for better job contracts in the richest sectors of the economy and more employment while giving fewer benefits to sectors that are not employing many individuals today or are hiring illegally without paying benefits or taxes. These proposals are resisted by the trade unions and Congress, who argue that they would

just reduce the existing benefits and increase profits without generating more jobs.

Another approach is to try to increase employment through public works and through direct incentives and credit to the private sector. Although the government would not embark on a late-Keynesian policy of state-supported full employment, there are several mechanisms to stimulate job creation, through credit provided to small firms, investment in needed public work, and training programs targeted to specific sectors of the job market. In 1996, the National Development Bank (BNDES) was supposed to have invested about 11.3 billion dollars and to have combined its resources with those of the Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador (FAT) for job-creating investments in public transportation, environmental protection, tourism, and communications, which would not only generate new employment opportunities but increase the efficiency and employment capabilities of the productive system as a whole. The Ministry of Labor is also engaged in an ambitious program to provide credit for small firms in order to generate more employment and income. More than two billion dollars were invested in this program between 1995 and 1996. A similar system was devised for the rural sector.

Finally, the Cardoso administration is amplifying Brazil's system of unemployment insurance. Although still very limited in how much and for how long it pays the unemployed, it helped about 4.5 million people who lost their jobs in 1995, an estimated 60 percent of the total (the remaining 40 percent did not apply for the benefits, probably because they could find another job without much delay).

PERSPECTIVES

The old days, when governments did not care about the money they spent and people assumed that poverty and misery were facts of life, will not return. The social agenda is growing while resources are scarce, and it will never rise to the levels required by so many constituencies.

Are the current social predicaments a consequence of the recent economic policies of international competitiveness and

the reduced economic role of the public sector? A central contention of this essay is that they are not. The previous economic arrangements did not produce better social results and led to economic stagnation and financial disarray. Social conditions in Brazil have been improving in spite of slow economic growth and are better now than in the past. They are far from satisfactory, however: improvements have been too slow, and the problems of an aging population and urban decay bring new and very difficult challenges.

The new economy cannot be blamed for these social problems, but cannot be expected to solve them either. Economic development can always help, but the growing reliance on advanced technologies, the concentration of resources in large international corporations and in privileged geographical locations, the relentless pressure for lower costs in a context of intense international competition—all these elements conspire against the improvement of the income and life conditions of the poor and uneducated. Governments will remain important, making the best possible use of their tax money and regulatory powers to provide education, health, security, and environmental protection and to reduce the predatory effects of extreme market competition; society will have to learn to get organized to take care of its interests. From now on, regulatory functions are likely to prevail over the direct provision of services, and public administration will have to reinvent itself. Brazil has already had some experiences that point in the right direction. Over the course of a few years, the privatization of telecommunications gave access to telephones to millions, and new regulatory agencies have been established to oversee the work of private corporations in areas such as energy, telecommunications, and oil production and distribution. Concepts such as evaluation, assessment, certification, cost recovery, decentralization, partnership, citizens' participation, and empowerment, unknown just a few years ago, are entering the vocabulary of public administration and social movements at all levels and being gradually transformed into realities.

The introduction of new practices in the provision of public services and a larger participation of civil society in the management of its own affairs are already creating a new percep-

tion of the ways society can confront its problems, with very promising results. Old habits die hard, however; the conflicting agendas will continue to exist, and the social problems faced by the Brazilian population will not go away in a few years, even in the best of circumstances. There is always hope, however, when things are moving in the right direction, and it is possible to argue that they are.

ENDNOTES

[1]This is true not only for Brazil, but for Latin America as a whole. "The evidence does not support the notion that high inequality in Latin America is simply a matter of a few rich families owning a disproportionate share of each country. . . . Much of the region's inequality is associated with large wage differentials. . . . Large wage differentials reflect, among other factors, unequal distribution of the quantity and quality of schooling." Inter-American Development Bank, *Facing up to Inequality in Latin America: Economic and Social Progress in Latin America,* 1998–1999 report (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 1998), 1.

[2]Unless otherwise indicated, all figures are from the yearly National Household Survey (PNAD), carried out by the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE).

[3]José Pastore and Nelson do Valle Silva, *Mobilidade Social no Brasil* (São Paulo: Makron Books, 2000), 47–59.

[4]Bernardo Sorj, "A Reforma Agraria em Tempos de Democracia e Globalização," *Novos Estudos CEBRAP* 50 (March 1998): 23–40.

[5]According to Sônia Rocha, an expert on poverty issues, "poverty in the rural Northeast is still typical of traditional societies. The percentage of female household heads is low. [Most people work in agriculture], thus unemployment is irrelevant. Most . . . household heads are illiterate or have less than four years of schooling. The majority of the poor are self-employed and some—even among the household heads—work for more than fifteen hours a week without pay, which is associated [with] labor in small holdings yielding just enough for family subsistence. Access to basic public services—education, electricity, sanitation—is largely inadequate, which means that the State is absent as [a] provider." Sônia Rocha, "Sustainable Development and the Poverty Reduction Goal," paper prepared for the Brazilian Academy of Sciences Conference on Sustainable Development, unpublished, 1999.

[6]Celso Furtado was probably the first to describe this process of reversion from a modern, export-oriented plantation economy into self-contained, isolated, and inefficient rural units. Celso Furtado, "Economic Contraction and Territorial Expansion," in Celso Furtado, *The Economic Growth of Brazil* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963; first Brazilian ed., 1959), 71–77.

[7]According to Sônia Rocha's description, among the poor in the large cities "families are smaller and the number of children lower than in the Northeast. Looser family ties mean [a] higher percentage of female household heads, which is one of the main features of urban poverty in modern societies. The illiteracy rate is high, even among household heads, but much lower than in the rural Northeast. Most poor work in trade and services, that is, in the low productivity/low earnings activities in these sectors. [The] unemployment rate is high, which is typical of urban modernized areas, where formal aspects of [the] labor market are enhanced. Most household heads work as employees. Access to public services is relatively good: most children attend school and there is almost universal access to water and electricity." Rocha, "Sustainable Development and the Poverty Reduction Goal."

[8]For the beginnings of Brazil's welfare state, see Ângela Maria de Castro Gomes, *Burguesia e trabalho. Política e legislação social no Brasil, 1917–1937* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campus, 1979). For the reaction of Brazilian industrialists to welfare protection to workers, see Warren Dean, *The Industrialization of São Paulo, 1880–1945* (Austin, Tex.: The University of Texas Press, 1969). For the social-security system, see Amelia Cohn, *Previdência Social e Processo Político no Brasil* (São Paulo: Editora Moderna, 1980); for a broad overview, see Phillipe C. Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971).

[9]Authoritarian governments, however, were important in the creation and expansion of the Brazilian social democracy agenda. Thus, the Getúlio Vargas regime in the 1930s is accredited with the first legislation establishing the contours of the Brazilian welfare state, taken from Fascist Italy's *carta del lavoro*. In the 1960s and 1970s, the military government unified the social-security systems in the private sector and introduced retirement benefits to the rural population as well as the first Brazilian legislation aimed to reduce the concentration of land properties, the Estatuto da Terra.

[10]IPEA, *Dimensionamento e Acompanhamento do Gasto Social Federal—Exercicio de 1994, versão preliminar* (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA, Diretoria de Politica Social, December 1995).

[11]Estimations by the World Bank found that 21 percent of Brazil's public expenditures on health, education, and housing went to sectors in the upper quintile of income distribution, with only 15.5 percent going to the lower strata (the corresponding figures for Chile were 4 percent and 36.3 percent).

[12]Antônio Barros de Castro and Francisco Eduardo Pires de Souza, *A Economia Brasileira em Ritmo de Marcha Forçada* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1985).

[13]This was known in Brazil as the "cake theory," according to which the cake has to rise before there is enough to be shared by the party's guests. For a criticism, see Ricardo Paes de Barros and Rosane Mendonça, "O impacto do crescimento econômico e de reduções no grau de desigualdade sobre a pobreza," *Novos Estudos CEBRAP* 51 (July 1998): 107–122.

[14]Unemployment figures published by the statistical office of the state of São Paulo (the SEADE Foundation) are usually three times higher than those of IBGE, the federal statistical institute, due to conceptual and methodological differences. However, the trends for both indexes are very similar.

[15]Ricardo Paes de Barros has shown that direct investment in basic education is much more effective for the reduction of social inequality and poverty than economic growth as such. Ricardo P. Barros and Rosane Mendonça, *O impacto do crescimento econômico e de reduções no grau de desigualdade sobre a pobreza* (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA/Dipes, Texto para Discussão no. 528, November 1997).

[16]Social mobility among Japanese descendants, for instance, is much higher than among other immigrant groups or Brazilians of any "color" or race.

[17]Simon Schwartzman, "Fora de foco: diversidade e identidades étnicas no Brasil," *Novos Estudos CEBRAP* 55 (November 1999): 83–96.

[18]See Peter Fry, "Politics, Nationality, and the Meanings of 'Race' in Brazil," in this issue of *Dædalus,* for an extended discussion. See also, for an overview, Thomas E. Skidmore, *Black into White; Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974) and Carlos Hasenbalg, "Entre o mito e os fatos: racismo e relações raciais no Brasil," *Dados* 38 (2) (1995): 355–374.

[19]See Manuela Carneiro da Cunha and Mauro W. B. de Almeida, "Indigenous People, Traditional People, and Conservation in the Amazon," in this issue of *Dædalus,* for an extended discussion.

[20]Anette Goldberg-Salinas, Joana Girard Ferreira Nunes, and Emmanuelle Nunes, "Feminismo contemporâneo no Brasil: estratégias das mulheres nos movimentos e interesse dos homens no poder," *Sociedade e Estado* 12 (2) (July–December 1997): 357–380.

[21]Ricardo Paes Barros, Ana Flávia Machado, and Rosanne Silva Pinto Mendonça, *A Desigualdade da Pobreza: Estratégias Ocupacionais e Diferenciais por Gênero* (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA, Texto para Discussão no. 453, January 1997).

[22]Charles C. Mueller, "Environmental Problems Inherent to a Development Style: Degradation and Poverty in Brazil," *Environment and Urbanization* 7 (2) (October 1995): 67–84.

[23]M. A. C. Fernandes et al., *Dimensionamento e Acompanhamento do Gasto Social Federal* (Brasília: IPEA, Texto para Discussão No. 547, February 1998).

[24]Civil servants pay 12 percent of their salaries in social-security costs, but, in contrast to the National Social Security Institute (INSS) system, these resources are not linked with the ongoing expenditures, which are much higher.

[25]See, for an overview, Kurt Weyland, "Social Movements and the State: The Politics of Health Reform in Brazil," *World Development* 23 (10) (October 1995): 1699–1712. See also M. E. Lewis and A. C. Médici, "The Challenge of Health Care Reform in Brazil: Balance and Trends," *Technical Notes* RE1–97–004, ed. Inter-American Development Bank (May 1997); The World Bank, *Brazil—The Organization, Delivery and Financing of Health Care in Brazil: Agenda for the '90s* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 30 June 1994); José Luis A. C. Araújo, Jr., "Attempts to Decentralize in Recent Brazilian Health Policy: Issues and Problems, 1988–1994," *International Journal*

of Health Services 27 (1) (1997): 109–124; Amelia Cohn, “Health Policy and Economic Change in Brazil,” paper presented to the International Sociological Association (ISA), 1994; Nilson do Rosário Costa, “Inovação política, distributivismo e crise: a política de saúde nos anos 80 e 90,” *Dados* 39 (3) (1996): 479–511; and Vera Schattan Coelho, “Interesses e instituições na política de saúde,” *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais* 13 (37) (June 1998): 115–128.

[26]See Claudio de Moura Castro, “Education: Way Behind but Trying to Catch Up,” in this issue of *Dædalus,* for an extended discussion.

[27]The estimation is that, between December of 1997 and August of 1998, the average salary of teachers in the state and municipal systems increased by 13 percent, due to transfers provided by this legislation. The largest increase occurred in the Northeast, where teachers’ salaries increased by about 50 percent. Brazil Ministry of Education, *Education for All—Evaluation of the Year 2000* (Brasília: Ministério da Educação, Instituto Nacional de Estudos Pedagógicos, 2000).

[28]For an overview, see Simon Schwartzman, *O Ensino Superior no Brasil—1998* (Brasília: Ministério da Educação, Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais—INEP, Textos para Discussão 6, 1999).

[29]The interpretation of these figures of 7 or 8 percent of unemployment, however, can be deceptive. “Open unemployment” refers to persons with no source of income who are actively looking for a job. In the absence of significant unemployment compensation, those who lose their jobs have to find some other way of earning something, moving from the “unemployed” to the “underemployment” ranks.

José Murilo de Carvalho

Dreams Come Untrue

L'oubli, et je dirai même l'erreur historique, sont un facteur essentiel de la création d'une nation.
—Ernest Renan, 1882

ANOTHER AMERICA

Vicissitudes in the scramble of Spain and Portugal for a sea route to the Orient at the end of the fifteenth century caused a lag of eight years in the celebration of the Brazilian quincentenary from that of other Ibero-American countries and of America in general. The isolated celebration of the former, although necessarily more modest, has the advantage of allowing greater attention to the specificity of the country. Portuguese colonization, instead of Spanish, Dutch, or French, together with some characteristics of the new land, led to the creation of a country with peculiarities regarding the language; the relationship between Europeans and the native population; the pattern of development, based on slave labor and dependency on the external market; and the political culture.

Portugal's scarcity of human and financial resources to occupy and protect the vast empire it had conquered after Vasco da Gama's discovery of the sea route to India in 1498 forced it to adopt some measures that had important consequences. First, it closed its eyes to the intense process of miscegenation that began to take place in the Brazilian colony as soon as the first invaders arrived. Willingly or against their will, native women mixed with the newcomers, both the men of power and substance and the deserters and deported criminals left ashore.

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Miscegenation continued between the Portuguese and the African slave women, who were soon after brought to the new colony, now mostly against the latter's will. It became a basic characteristic of the future country, a matter of both shame and pride, and eventually an element of mythology.

Less lucky than the Spaniards in finding the coveted riches of gold and silver in its new colony, Portugal rented it to private entrepreneurs for the exploitation of its only marketable product, brazilwood. But the threat from other European nations, especially from the French who occupied parts of the colony, forced it to face seriously the task of colonizing the new land. The production of a more lucrative commodity, sugarcane, required plenty of capital and labor. As for labor, the enslavement of natives (numbered at approximately five million) was extensively used at the beginning. But a large number of deaths from ill treatment and diseases, and flights to the interior by the nomadic tribes, proved that a solution similar to the Spanish *encomienda* system was inapplicable. The alternative solution was to bring in slaves from Africa. The massive importation of African slaves (around four million up to the end of the traffic in 1850) was to leave a deep and lasting imprint on the colony and on the future country where slavery was abolished only in 1888.

The scarcity of manpower had another consequence. The metropolitan government had to resort to the cooperation of private initiative in the administration of the colony. First, it simply rented it; then it divided it in large plots that were given under contract to members of the aristocracy involved in the East Indies commerce. As this alternative also failed, a central government was introduced. But for the whole duration of the colonial period this government had always to seek the cooperation of the landed oligarchy. In addition, the Avis and the Bragança (since 1640) dynasties forbade the creation of universities in the new colony, in sharp contrast to the policy followed by the Spanish Hapsburgs. Wealthy Brazilians had no option but to go to the University of Coimbra in Portugal for their higher education. This restrictive policy resulted in an extremely elitist higher education, a Portuguese-oriented educated elite, and the incorporation of this elite into the metropolitan bureau-

cracy. The latter consequence led to another conspicuous difference from the Spanish counterpart: a sharp conflict between *peninsulares* and Creoles never materialized in the Portuguese colony.

The contacts between Portuguese administrators, on one side, and Brazilian oligarchies and the educated elite, on the other, were strengthened by the transference of the seat of the monarchy to Brazil in 1808 in the wake of the invasion of Portugal by Napoleonic troops under the command of General Junot. Another marked contrast to the Spanish counterpart emerged when, in good part as a consequence of the close contacts between metropolitan and colonial elites, independence was achieved with only moderate conflict and a great deal of continuity. There was continuity in the maintenance of the unity of the vast colony, in contrast to the formation of sixteen different Spanish-speaking countries by 1850. There was continuity in the preservation of a monarchical system, under a mild parliamentary form of government inspired by Benjamin Constant, in contrast to the unanimous adoption of the American model of republican presidentialism by all the Hispanic nations. There was continuity in the preservation of the social order, including slavery, this time not very differently from the Spanish counterpart.

Changes in these tendencies did take place both before and after independence. To mention only the latter period, secessionist movements developed in the 1830s, when three provinces did in fact secede temporarily. Slavery was abolished in 1888, and the monarchy was overthrown in 1889. An intense process of urbanization and industrialization, begun in the 1930s and deepened in the last thirty years, transformed a rural and agricultural society, dominated by large landowners, into a modern and industrialized country, the eighth largest economy in the world, with a population of over 160 million, 80 percent of which lives in urban areas. After twenty-one years of military rule, from 1964 to 1985, the country became a political democracy. Today, in terms of political rhetoric, it does not differ substantially from more established democracies.

Still, old social, political, and cultural characteristics do persist, among them intense ethnic and cultural miscegenation,

strong hierarchical social relations, enormous educational and economic distance between the elites and the masses, fascination of intellectuals with European and North American ideas and institutions, and social and political conservatism. This complex combination of modernity and tradition, of European and non-European cultures, of racial democracy and social inequality, of political democracy and authoritarian values, is formally a nation-state since 1822. But in substantive terms the process of building a democratic society and polity is as yet unfinished. Positive and negative factors are still at work, and the future is far from clear.

One way of looking at this process is to examine how Brazilians look at their nation and at themselves, how they have constructed their national memory, and how they look at their future. To use the well-known expression coined by Benedict Anderson, it may be useful to examine how they imagine their national community. Or, to draw on a different intellectual tradition, to look at the construction of their *imaginaire social*.[1] More than any other community, nations require for their survival the construction of a collective identity in order to counterbalance the many divisive elements they all have to face. This identity is a construction made of different ingredients, usually charged with highly emotional components. The construction of such identities requires a great deal of "forgetting" and "historical errors," as Ernest Renan warned us in his famous conference of 1882, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*[2] Forgetting and rewriting history usually involve the creation of national memories, national heroes, symbols, allegories, myths, and rituals.[3] Historical facts and figures are reinterpreted, frequently by historians themselves, in order to make possible the coexistence of contraries and the binding together of disparate elements.[4]

National myths, especially myths of origin, and national heroes are among the most powerful instruments of building national identities.[5] The polysemous nature of myths renders them able to express—in a more effective way than elaborate ideologies—national interests, aspirations, and fears. National heroes are part of the civic pantheon of all nations. They serve as images and models for the nation. In the process of con-

structing a hero it is possible to detect which kind of personality and which values are most highly regarded by the people, either as a mirror or as an aspiration. Myths and heroes help nations to develop unity of feeling and purpose, to organize the past, to make the present intelligible, and to face the future. They also help the observer to unveil what Renan called the soul of a nation. In what follows, an exercise will be made to probe into the soul of the Brazilian nation through the analysis of some of its myths and heroes.

THE EARTHLY PARADISE

The first Europeans to arrive on the shores of what was to become the Americas were struck by the beauty of the land. Columbus thought he had found the earthly paradise when he first landed in Santo Domingo. The same impression dominated those who arrived on the Atlantic coast of the continent. The inhabitants of the new land were seen with mixed feelings, but nature was unanimously praised.[6] Pero Vaz de Caminha, the clerk who accompanied the Portuguese Admiral Pedro Alvares Cabral when the first Portuguese landing took place in 1500, wrote a letter to the king praising the land and its peoples. Amerigo Vespucci, who visited the place twice, in 1501 and 1503, did not like the people very much, having witnessed and described a scene of cannibalism. But in his letter to Lorenzo de Médici, which became known as *Mundus Novus*, published in 1503, he asserted about the land: "certe si paradisus terrestris in aliqua sit terra parte, non longe ab illis regionibus distare existimo";[7] that is: "I believe that if an earthly paradise exists somewhere, it would certainly not be far from these lands."

The Edenic view of the new land was reiterated by Portuguese, Brazilians, and foreigners, until it became an important ingredient of the national *imaginaire*. It became the Brazilian Edenic myth. In the seventeenth century, the Jesuit priest Simão de Vasconcelos wrote that a comparison could be made of parts of the land with "that earthly paradise where God our Lord, as if in a garden, put our father Adam."[8] The land, he added, was surely superior to the pagan Elysian Fields. A century later, in what was at the time the first known history of Brazil written

by a Brazilian, Rocha Pitta produced the most detailed version of the myth. His long description of the marvels of the land ends with these words: "... in summary, Brazil is the discovered Earthly Paradise, where the biggest rivers originate and run; where the healthiest climate predominates; where friendly stars exercise their influence and the most tender breezes blow, rendering it fertile and peopled by countless inhabitants."[9]

At the time of independence, in 1822, Brazilians argued that the huge size, beauty, and richness of their land should convince the Portuguese that they could be, and deserved to be, independent from the old colonial power. By mid-century, literary romanticism once more invoked the myth. A famous poem called "Song of an Exile," recited to this day in elementary schools' civic celebrations, reads: "Our skies have more stars/our prairies have more flowers/our forests have more life/our life more love." This strophe was later incorporated into the lyrics of the national anthem, which is, in itself, an unabashed celebration of Brazilian nature. In 1900, as part of the celebration of the fourth centennial of what at the time was called the "discovery" of Brazil, Affonso Celso, a member of a traditional family, published a book entitled *Porque me Ufano do meu Paiz* (*Why I am Proud of my Country*). Written for schoolchildren, it became the standard example of this sort of Edenic and naive patriotism.[10]

The Edenic myth is not a creation of the intellectual and political elites for political purposes; it has resonance among the common people. Two recent public opinion surveys conducted in 1995 and 1996, one national, the other in the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro, prove the point.[11] These surveys show that about 60 percent of Brazilians are very proud of their country. The figure is lower than the one found for Americans, but Brazilians are as proud of their country as Canadians are and more proud than the Germans and the Japanese.[12] The surprise comes when the interviewees were asked about the reasons for their pride. The national survey shows that the main reason for pride, mentioned by 25 percent of the respondents, is nature. The Rio de Janeiro survey presented a similar finding of 26 percent. Even more surprising is the fact that the answers frequently repeated the same expressions used since

the letter of Caminha: a healthy and pleasant climate, big forests and rivers, beautiful skies and beaches, fertile land, and abundant animal, vegetable, and mineral resources.[13] Some respondents were bold enough to say that Brazil was the most beautiful country in the world, a god-blessed land—tantamount to saying that it is the earthly paradise. The only noticeable addition to the traditional list of natural wonders introduced by present-day Brazilians is the beauty of Brazilian women. But this is not a true novelty. The beauty of local women was not mentioned in previous Brazilian lists of national wonders, but early European observers, beginning with Caminha, did not fail to make the point.[14]

It should be remembered that these answers were given at a time when a good portion of the natural characteristics mentioned as reasons for pride had already been destroyed by the predatory actions of Portuguese and Brazilians. Most of the forests had been burned, beaches and skies had been polluted, most of the wild animals had been killed, several species had been extinguished, and parts of the land had been transformed into semi-deserts.[15] In fact, exploitation of natural resources began immediately after the arrival of the Europeans. Thousands of tons of brazilwood were shipped to Europe to be used as dye in the textile industry. It has been calculated that about eight thousand tons were exported annually during the first decades of the sixteenth century. At the very moment that brazilwood provided the name for the land, the Portuguese were devastating it with the help of the natives.[16]

It is important to add that national institutions, which in countries like the United States and England are among the most important reasons for pride, were mentioned by only 10 percent of Brazilians in the national survey and by 14 percent in the Rio de Janeiro survey.[17] The counterpart of the emphasis on nature, or maybe the reason for it, seems to be a lack of identification with the major events and institutions of the country. Pride in nature could be interpreted as an indication of the alienation of Brazilians from their own national history, as if they had nothing to do with it.

The Edenic myth is not a peculiarity of Brazil. Christianity had been looking for the location of the lost earthly paradise

since the thirteenth century.[18] This search was reinforced by the Renaissance revival of Arcadian primitivism.[19] A vivid indication of the strength of this belief is the fact that Vasco da Gama took with him letters to the legendary Prester John, the priest-king of the imagined paradisiacal kingdom of Ethiopia.[20] The Spanish and Portuguese navigators all had in mind the possibility of finding the paradise. In a letter, Columbus observed that "there are great indications of this being the terrestrial paradise."[21] The Puritan pilgrims who landed in North America were imbued with the same vision. A vast literature demonstrates the presence of the Edenic myth in the United States. As Charles Sanford puts it, "The edenic myth, it seems to me, has been the most powerful and comprehensive organizing force in American culture."[22]

But there is a very significant difference between the visions of paradise present in the Luso-Brazilian tradition and those in the Puritan tradition. As George Williams has observed, in the latter, nature was certainly present, but it was seen rather as the proper environment for the construction of a religious paradise than as paradise itself. It was initially seen as a wilderness in which the pilgrims would have the opportunity to build the new Church, the New Jerusalem, the new Eden. This new Church would be like a "garden in the protective wilderness of the New World."[23] But it would be an "enclosed garden," to be built by and for the Puritans. The very word *paradise*, of Persian origin, means exactly that: a closed royal garden. In the Luso-Brazilian tradition, paradise was of a purely natural character; it was not linked to the creation of a new religious community. It was not something to be built by human effort; it was God's gift, from which nobody would be excluded. In some way, this conception was closer to that of a pagan Renaissance paradise than to the Christian one. It more resembled the Elysian Fields than the biblical Eden. Not by chance, perhaps, Simão de Vasconcelos referred to the Elysian Fields. Religious concerns were certainly present among the Portuguese, but they had to do with the expansion of Christianity, not with its reform or with the creation of a new Church.

The implication of this difference is very significant. In the United States, many (Indians, Blacks, Catholics) were excluded

from the enclosed garden; in Brazil, all were admitted to the open garden. This difference may be said to affect recent developments in both countries. In the former, the efforts to open the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant garden introduced by affirmative action have resulted not in its opening but in the creation of many enclosed gardens in a hyphenated society of multiple ethnic groups.[24] In Brazil, the openness of the garden has been misleading throughout its history, in the sense that it has prevented the emergence of dissent. Ironically, our dissenters had to abandon the open garden and flee to the wilderness (*sertão*) to try to build alternative societies. The two best-known examples of this effort were the maroon community of Palmares in the seventeenth century, which lasted for about a hundred years, successfully resisting repeated attempts to destroy it, and the religious community of Canudos at the end of the nineteenth century, against which four military expeditions were dispatched. Both were ruthlessly suppressed, the former in 1695, the latter in 1897. Today, Brazil is still struggling with the problem of how to make its garden truly open to social minorities.[25]

A POWERFUL EMPIRE

One aspect of the Edenic myth has to do with the size of the country. Brazil is beautiful and rich but also big, huge, a continental country. This characteristic was and is frequently referred to as *grandeza*, greatness. Brazilians, it is said, suffer from a "complex of *grandeza*." Baron W. L. von Eschwege, a German engineer who lived in Brazil at the beginning of the nineteenth century, observed that Brazilians used to speak in hyperbole: "everything in Brazil must be big, nature must be different, more gigantic and more wonderful than in other countries."[26] We always want to be or to have "the biggest in the world." The Amazon is the largest river, the Amazon forest is the biggest rainforest, Iguassu Falls are the biggest and most beautiful waterfalls, Carnival is the greatest spectacle on earth, our football team is the best in the world, and so on. The complex of greatness has its political version in the belief that the country will become a powerful empire.

This belief came from Portugal and is based on the Portuguese myth of origin, the Miracle of Ourique. According to this myth, Christ appeared to Prince Afonso Henriques before the battle of Ourique in 1139, in which the Portuguese faced and defeated five Moorish kings. Along with the promise of victory, Christ is supposed to have also promised to build an empire under Afonso Henriques's descendants with the mission of spreading His name among the nations.[27] The myth of a promised empire was reinforced after 1640, when Portugal recovered its independence from Spain. Writing in that century, the Jesuit priest Antonio Vieira, born in Lisbon and raised in Brazil, the greatest preacher of the kingdom, provided some detail to the belief. In an unusual book called *History of the Future*, written as his defense before the Inquisition, he pretended to reveal to the Portuguese, who had revealed the world to itself, the secret of their future. He argued that Portugal was destined by God to preside over a Fifth Empire that would succeed the Egyptian, Assyrian, Persian, and Roman empires. In this Fifth Empire, universal and Christian, "all kingdoms will be united under one scepter, all heads will obey one supreme head, all crowns will be resumed in one diadem."[28] The myth of the promised empire was usually connected with the messianic belief in the return of King Sebastian, killed at the age of twenty-four in the battle of Al Kasr al Kebir in Morocco in 1578. According to the belief, he was to return to reestablish the kingdom or to create a new one. Three centuries later, at the end of the nineteenth century, the messianic belief in the return of King Sebastian was still alive among Brazilian peasants. Canudos was one among several examples of this survival.[29]

At the turn of the eighteenth century, as a consequence of the Napoleonic threat to invade Portugal, the idea of transferring the seat of the monarchy to Brazil began to be nurtured by some Portuguese statesmen. Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho, the main spokesman for the idea, linked the transfer to the vision of a new empire. In 1803, he spoke of creating "a powerful empire in Brazil," a project viewed with sympathy by the British.[30] When the Portuguese court did in fact move to Rio de Janeiro in 1808, as a consequence of the invasion of Portugal by the troops of Junot, the idea became a concrete possibility. At the

arrival in Brazil of Prince John, the possibility was mentioned of creating an empire that "in no distant future will take its place among the first powers of the universe."[31] Just before independence, Prince Dom Pedro addressed the Brazilians, speaking of "this vast and powerful empire." As the process of independence accelerated, Brazilian leaders, especially those connected to the late Coutinho, incorporated the idea of empire. One priest argued that it was enough for Brazil simply to increase its population to become "the greatest, the most flourishing and most powerful empire on earth."[32] Bishop Dom Marcos, one year after independence, went as far as to refer to the realization in Brazil of the Fifth Empire.[33]

Whenever there was talk of recreating the Portuguese monarchy in Brazil, the word *empire* was used instead of *kingdom*. The argument was that the size and material wealth of the country were a guarantee of its future political greatness. The belief in a future of greatness and power became part of the country's *imaginaire*. Visiting Brazil in 1838, during the tumultuous period of the Regency, U.S. Navy Captain Charles Wilkes attested: "[Brazilians] are vain of their own country and its institutions, and firmly believe that a high destiny awaits Brazil."[34] The belief in a destiny of greatness was made official ideology and an instrument of nationalistic manipulation during the military governments that ruled the country between 1964 and 1985. The "great power" ideology of the military helped to reinforce the old belief in the destiny of a mighty empire—a belief held by 57 percent of respondents to a 1996 public opinion poll. The pervasiveness and persistence of this belief gave rise to a pun on the title of a book by Stefan Zweig entitled *Brazil, Land of the Future*. It is said that Brazil is, and will always be, "the country of the future," always hoping to be something it never becomes. Even the lyrics of the national anthem speak of a greatness expected to come in the future.

As in the case of the myth of the earthly paradise, here also a comparison can be made with the United States, where the myth of a mighty empire bears the name of Manifest Destiny. According to Marc Egnal, since before independence a sector of the American elite had already in mind the goal of transforming the colony into a powerful empire. He calls this group,

which included Franklin, Jefferson, Madison, and Dickinson, the expansionists. For them, the colony could "become a self-reliant, mighty New World 'empire'"; they had "a fervent belief in America's potential for greatness."[35] In the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Franklin and others used the same word, *empire*, that we found in the Brazilian case.[36] Manifest Destiny was already present in the early days of the republic.

But again, as in the case of the Edenic myth, the complex of greatness had different content and consequences in the two countries. In Brazil, it remained a vague aspiration; it seldom referred to practical political action. Except for the concern with the consolidation of the country's southern frontiers in the nineteenth century that led to wars against its neighbors, and for the brief military governments, the utopia of greatness remained politically harmless. In the same way that the paradisiacal environment exists to be enjoyed, rather than to be constructed, the mighty empire of Brazil has been expected to materialize thanks to some miraculous intervention from outside, maybe by the action of some modern King Sebastian coming back from his mythical refuge. The winner of the first direct presidential election after the end of military regime, Color de Melo, owed his victory in part to the image of savior he successfully conveyed during the campaign. There has been nothing in Brazil similar to the Manifest Destiny that has presided over American foreign policy since the end of the nineteenth century. In the United States, the myth of Manifest Destiny, the belief in the country's mission to impose on others the model of society created according to the Edenic myth, was a powerful organizing force that helped to build a mighty empire, the only one left at the end of the millenium.

NATIONAL HEROES

Compared with most nations, Brazil has a very modest pantheon of national political heroes.[37] To be sure, many monuments and statues have been erected in honor of public figures. But one look at them will be enough to show how little they mean to administrators and the population. Most of the statues and monuments are badly kept and covered with graffiti. The

only monument I know that is well tended is a memorial built in Rio de Janeiro in honor of the Brazilian soldiers who died in Italy during World War II—but the absence of graffiti there is very simply explained by the presence of soldiers who guard the monument twenty-four hours a day. One would try in vain to find among the few visitors the civic fervor, or at least the respect, that one finds, for instance, among those who crowd inside the Washington Monument or the Panthéon in Paris.

In the popular imagination there are no undisputed founding fathers of the Brazilian nation. Attempts were made to create such figures, but without great success. This fact may be due to the achievement of independence through a process of negotiation and not of violent conflict as it happened in all other Latin American countries. Portugal accepted the independence of the former colony in exchange for an indemnity of two million British pounds. A Portuguese prince, who then became Dom Pedro I of Brazil, proclaimed the independence of the new country. Dom Pedro I has been a strong candidate for national hero, but his candidacy was always hindered by his despotic behavior after independence and by the opposition of republicans who later in the century managed to overthrow the monarchy. Opposition to independence was felt only in a few provinces, and no major war was necessary to end it. Brazil, as a consequence, for good or evil, probably for good, had no *Libertadores* such as Bolivar, San Martín, Sucre, and O'Higgins—or George Washington, for that matter.

Several regional rebellions did take place both before and after the abdication of Dom Pedro I in 1831, but they managed to produce only regional or provincial heroes, the most important one being the priest Frei Caneca. The second emperor, who ruled the country for half a century, from 1840 to 1889, became a respected figure but hardly a national hero, despite efforts in this direction. Not a martial figure, Dom Pedro II was more concerned with the regular functioning of the political system, the rule of the law, and culture and education.[38] The new republican regime, inaugurated in 1889, was proclaimed by a few military officers who paraded their troops in the streets of Rio. It had the backing of part of the elite but little popular support. The proclamation was not the sort of event out of

which heroes could be carved, nor did its protagonists possess the required qualities of heroic figures. Attempts were made to fashion heroes out of the generals involved in the proclamation, but with even less success than in the case of Dom Pedro I. The new regime, like the old, was not able to create a respectable civic pantheon.

The next national political event of some consequence took place in 1930 when the first republican regime was overthrown. Getúlio Vargas was the politician who then became president and ruled the country until 1945. He did find a way into the hearts of the people, but he did it as a fatherly figure rather than as a hero. He became popular for the introduction of comprehensive social and labor legislation, most of which is still in operation today. But in addition to being paternalistic toward the people, he was a controversial figure among the elite for having kept power as a dictator from 1937 to 1945. He was unable to unite all classes, as a national hero must do.

The only figure that approaches the status of a national hero in Brazil is Tiradentes. Recent research among elementary- and secondary-school students supports this hypothesis.[39] Tiradentes was the leader of a colonial republican rebellion against Portuguese rule that took place in 1789, inspired by the American Revolution. The only popular figure among the rebels, he was also the only one to be punished with a death sentence. The sentence was executed in 1792 with the cruel details typical of the Portuguese criminal laws of the time: he was hanged and dismembered; parts of his body were displayed publicly in the places where he had preached independence. In the second half of the nineteenth century his memory was revived by republican groups to counterbalance efforts to make Dom Pedro I the founding figure of the nation.

The efforts of the republicans eventually succeeded but for reasons that were not their own. The process of constructing Tiradentes as a national hero took surprising turns that help to illuminate national preferences regarding model figures. The initial attempt of the republicans stressed the political action of the new hero, his standing against colonial rule in favor of freedom and independence, his personal courage in assuming the sole responsibility for the rebellion, his bravery in facing the

death sentence. But during the process the aspects of his life that began to have greater appeal had to do more with the religious tendencies he revealed during his three years in jail. The prisoner, under the influence of his confessors, developed mystical tendencies. He began to think of himself as a new Christ ready to offer his life for the salvation of his people. He kissed the hand of the hangman in an indication of forgiveness just as Christ had forgiven his executors. He marched to the gallows through the streets of Rio de Janeiro in soliloquy, holding a crucifix in his arms. Inspired by these aspects, poets began to refer to him as the Christ of the crowd; painters began to represent him as Jesus Christ. The gallows were transformed into a new cross, the place of execution into a new Calvary, Rio de Janeiro into a New Jerusalem.[40] Tiradentes was transformed into a civic hero by incorporating the image of a religious martyr.

He was a hero-martyr who had never shed any blood, who was a victim of violence instead of a perpetrator of violence. It was certainly this characteristic that made him acceptable as a hero to all sectors of the population and to all political currents. Countless poems, plays, novels, Carnival songs, and films, the last one completed a year ago, contributed to consolidate his status as national hero in the last hundred years or so. He was accepted by republicans and monarchists in the nineteenth century, by the Left and the Right after 1930. Each group could stress a different facet of the image of the hero: the republican, the libertarian, or the mystic. His appeal as a civic and religious martyr prevented his image from being dismembered and made possible his transformation into the sole undisputed national hero.

There are, for sure, other national figures respected by Brazilians. The previously mentioned national public opinion poll indicates some of them. The great majority come from sports, arts, and public entertainment. Pelé, the football player, and Ayrton Senna, the race-car driver, appear at the top of the list. But they are not political heroes. Few politicians deserve more than 50 percent of the votes in the poll. One is Tancredo Neves, another "martyr," who died in 1985 on the eve of assuming the presidency as the first civilian to do so after the end of the

military dictatorship. The other is Getúlio Vargas, still another "martyr," who killed himself in 1954 while in office, offering his life as a sacrifice for the redemption of the people. The last is Juscelino Kubitschek, a former president, the only one not marked by tragedy while in office. He did, tragically, die in a car accident after leaving the presidency.[41]

The difficulty in creating national political heroes can be connected with a general dislike for politicians. Brazilians' lack of identification with their own history is matched by a lack of trust and even by open rejection of political leaders, including those elected to the highest political posts. Distrust of politicians is one of the most consistent trends seen in the results of public opinion polls. In the most recent one, completed at the end of 1998, politicians were considered the least trusted group in a list of social categories and national institutions. As many as 94 percent of the respondents said they did not trust them. The president of the republic was not trusted by 69 percent and political parties by 85 percent of the interviewees. In this same survey, politicians were considered dishonest by 91 percent of the respondents and irresponsible by 82 percent.[42]

Brazilians tend to reject military and political heroes. The most important military figure of the country, the marquis of Caxias, officially declared patron of the army, had his name made a synonym for "square." Brazilians also tend to stress, or to infuse, human dimensions that have to do with peacefulness, sacrifice, and the capacity to unite in the public figures they admire. Most of the time, these figures have excelled in other fields such as sports, arts, science, and humanitarian activity.[43] If these figures are touched by tragedy, their chances of being admired greatly increases. This is the case for Ayrton Senna, who died in a race accident, and Herbert José de Souza, known as Betinho, the closest to a charismatic figure present-day Brazil has seen, who was deeply involved in humanitarian campaigns. Betinho, a hemophiliac, died in 1998, a victim of AIDS, a disease he acquired during a blood transfusion. Aggressive, conquering, or even lawmaking figures, common among national heroes everywhere—including in the United States, to keep the comparison I have been making—do not qualify as heroes in Brazil.

SELF-IMAGE

The analysis of the three national myths, especially when a comparison is made with the United States, indicates some characteristics of the two peoples. The Brazilian paradise was to be enjoyed, the American to be built; the Brazilian mighty empire remains an aspiration, the American empire was transformed into a reality; the Brazilian hero is a martyr, the American founding fathers are nation-builders. These characteristics are reflected in the self-image Brazilians and Americans have and in the image others have of them.

From Crevecoeur in the late eighteenth century to Tocqueville in the nineteenth century to the public opinion polls of the twentieth century, some psychological traits have been consistently attributed to Americans. Foreign observers and natives alike have detected among the citizens of the United States a strong feeling of self-reliance, determination, efficacy, aggressiveness, and innovativeness.[44] Things of their own doing, such as national institutions and the qualities of their political system, not nature, make Americans proud of their country.[45]

In the Brazilian case, the positive view of nature was seldom matched by the same view of the people. The view the first Europeans had of the native population varied according to the type of initial contact: there was the "bon sauvage" and the ferocious man-eating native. The image of the "bon sauvage" was more successful in Europe than in Brazil.[46] In Brazil, the Jesuit priests were shocked by the customs and practices of the natives, particularly cannibalism. Their first superior, Manuel da Nóbrega, considered the natives "the saddest and vilest gentiles in the whole world." A positive image of the natives was introduced only in the second half of the nineteenth century, thanks to the Romantic movement in literature. The Indian was then promoted to the symbol of the country. But it was a totally idealized view with no connection to the real life of the native population, by then reduced to a tiny proportion of its original number. The view of black slaves was consistently negative. They were described as brutish and lustful at worst; as childlike at best. The population in general was not seen in a much brighter light. The author of a well-known book pub-

lished in 1618 to extol Brazilian "great things" explained the contrast between the abundance of natural riches and the scarcity of consumer products as a result of the "negligence and lack of initiative of the inhabitants."[47] Foreigners had similar views. Louis Agassiz, visiting the country with his wife Elizabeth in 1865–1866, observed that Brazil would become the happiest country on earth if some day the moral and intellectual faculties of the people matched the marvelous beauty and the immense riches of its nature. He lamented the absence among Brazilians of the energy and tenacity of the northern races.[48]

The negative view of the population was strengthened during the second half of the nineteenth century, when many Brazilian intellectuals embraced European racist theories. Racist visitors to Brazil such as the two Agassizes and the Count de Gobineau made negative if not catastrophic comments about the future of the country on account of the intense process of racial miscegenation that had taken place and was continuing. Louis Agassiz, despite his sympathy for the country, was convinced of the negative consequences of miscegenation. Gobineau was more radical; he wrote that the large mestizo Brazilian population would disappear within a short period of time. This negative view, reinforced by the would-be scientific work of Georges Vacher de Lapouge, was adopted by a substantial number of Brazilian intellectuals.[49] Few voices contradicted what was considered scientific truth. The only solution Brazilian racist authors could think of for the racial problem was the promotion of the whitening of the population.[50]

It was only in the 1930s that a radical change in this view took place, brought about in part by the work of Gilberto Freyre. Following the steps of Franz Boas, Freyre substituted culture for race and began to praise the process of miscegenation as a particular Brazilian contribution to racial relations.[51] The change received its consecration in the early 1940s thanks to a book that turned out to be the greatest praise of Brazilian racial relations ever written by a foreigner.[52] Stefan Zweig visited the country in 1936 and again in 1939 when Europe was already involved in a "suicidal war of all against all." As soon as he landed in Rio de Janeiro, he was struck by the spectacle of harmonious relations among different races: "There is no

color-bar, no segregation, no arrogant classification" of racial groups.[53] The Brazilian experiment with racial relations, which included the breeding of beautiful and healthy mestizos, was, according to him, "the most important contribution to the liquidation of a mania that brought more disruption and unhappiness than any other." For this reason, he saw the country as one of the greatest hopes for the future of civilization.[54]

The negative evaluation of miscegenation was completely reversed. The scientific myth of racial inferiority and of the evils of miscegenation gave way to a new myth of racial democracy, or to the fable of the three races, as Roberto da Matta called it.[55] The new myth was adopted by the government and became official ideology.

Nevertheless, the elimination of negative images linked to racial factors did not mean the disappearance of a negative self-image or, at least, of an image that contrasts vividly with the American self-image. Around the turn of the last century, Eduardo Prado, a noted intellectual from a prominent family, reacted against the tendency of the republican regime to imitate everything American. He admitted that the United States was a rich and progressive country, but its progress was based, according to him, on greed, aggressiveness, violence, and a materialistic conception of life. Brazilian and Latin American values, on the contrary, were of a juridical nature and based on respect for morality and on the value of life and liberty.[56] The book by Affonso Celso, *Why I am Proud of my Country,* was also a reaction against the pessimism of those influenced by racist theories. It praised nature but pointed also to the positive characteristics of the Brazilian people, above all hospitality, patience, tolerance, peacefulness, and love of order. On the negative side, he included passivity as well as lack of initiative, of determination, and of firmness. Racist thinkers considered the opposite psychological traits—determination, strong will, aggressiveness, initiative—to be typical of the superior Aryan race.[57]

After the 1930s, several among the best-known Brazilian intellectuals mentioned similar traits as part of the national character. On the positive side, they listed cordiality, compassion, peacefulness, sensibility, affectivity, tolerance, generos-

ity, and the like. On the negative: resignation, submissiveness, a desire to succeed without effort, and lack of discipline, of initiative, of love for work.[58] The same view of Brazilians as lacking in strong convictions and determination was repeated in the 1970s.[59] Recent surveys have shown that this self-image is not simply a product of the imagination or ideology of intellectuals. It is in good part shared by the population at large. It is a matter for speculation whether the reason for this coincidence is the correctness of the intuition of the former or their effectiveness in transmitting the image they have fabricated. In either case, the national survey of 1996 shows that Brazilians see themselves overwhelmingly (according to more than 70 percent of the answers) as more cheerful, more hospitable, more loving, and more religious than other people.[60] The Rio de Janeiro survey indicates that the distinctive psychological traits of Brazilians (according to more than 60 percent of the answers) are the ability to be long-suffering and hardworking, cheerfulness, and conformism. In the same survey, when the character of the people is mentioned as a reason for pride, the traits most frequently mentioned are solidarity, peacefulness, cordiality, cheerfulness, industriousness, friendliness, humanness, and hospitality. The positive characteristics of the country are thus the absence of racial discrimination and conflicts as well as hospitality, peacefulness, freedom, and democracy.[61]

The only noticeable addition to the image created by intellectuals is the view of Brazilians as hardworking instead of lazy. The nucleus of the self-image continues to include friendliness, joyfulness, solidarity, and cordiality. On the negative side, there persists the idea of conformity and of lack of initiative and aggressiveness. There is a curious combination of two apparently contradictory characteristics: being joyful and being long-suffering. The Rio de Janeiro interviewees see themselves as capable of having a good time despite the many hardships of daily life. A substantial part of popular joy is no doubt experienced in football and Carnival. A psychoanalytically oriented observer could be tempted to see a masochistic tendency in this combination. He would probably be wrong. We are more likely dealing here with a mechanism of compensation. A good indication of this is the name of a Carnival group in the northeast-

ern city of Recife: the group is called "We suffer, but we enjoy ourselves."[62]

DREAMS COME UNTRUE

The Edenic myth includes pride in the country's natural beauty and riches, a notion of paradise as a garden open to all—a gift to be enjoyed, not a goal to be achieved. The myth of the future mighty empire reveals a yearning for national greatness, for great power status, for international recognition that is not backed by the appropriate efforts to realize this dream. Brazilian national political heroes are martyrs and peace-loving figures rather than energetic nation-builders. Brazilians' self-image stresses joy, suffering, solidarity, cordiality, tolerance, and resignation rather than initiative, endurance, aggressiveness, and self-reliance.

This *imaginaire* must be contrasted with some unpleasant facts. Brazilians have destroyed a good part of the country's natural beauties, have exhausted some of its natural resources, and have almost completely destroyed the earthly paradise they were supposed to enjoy. Except for its geographic dimension, the size of its population, and football, the country excels in the international political arena mostly for its dismal statistics on poverty, literacy, and infant mortality, and for one of the worst international indexes of social inequality. Lately, the country has also become known for an increasing level of violence and police brutality, particularly in its metropolitan areas, a disappointing phenomenon for a people who see themselves as cordial and peaceful.

The drama of the country rests on this contrast between dream and reality, aspiration and achievement. Paradise is destroyed, and the peaceful empire does not materialize. Aspirations are not accompanied by the appropriate actions to bring them about. The people do not trust their leaders and institutions but do little to make the former more responsible to public needs and to change the latter, taking destiny in their own hands. All the energy and immense creativity of which they are capable is directed toward the private domain, be it to enjoy life or simply to survive. The social is disconnected from

the political. Hence a feeling of frustration, of disappointment with government and institutions, and the persistence of a vague hope that a messiah may eventually bring the solution to all problems.

In Brazil, myths do not seem to have the role of a powerful organizing force that they have in the United States. They seem rather to be an instrument of self-delusion. After five hundred years of history and on the eve of a new century, also a new millenium, Brazil remains a country of the future, a country of many dreams come untrue.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ENDNOTES

[1]Benedict Richard O'Gorman Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), and Bronislaw Baczko, *Les Imaginaires Sociaux: Memoires et Espoirs Collectifs* (Paris: Payot, 1984). The imagined aspect of national memories is also stressed in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

[2]Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation? What is a Nation?* English version by Wanda Romer Taylor (Toronto: Tapir Press, 1996), 19.

[3]The role of myths, heroes, symbols, and allegories in the formation of a national identity, as applied to the French case, is discussed in Pierre Nora, dir., *Les Lieux de Mémoire*, vol. I, *La République* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984). See also Raoul Girardet, *Mythes et Mythologies Politiques* (Paris: Seuil, 1986). For the American case, see Elise Marienstras, *Les Mythes Fondateurs de la Nation Américaine: Essai sur le Discours Idéologique aux Etats-Unis à l'Epoque de l'Indépendance (1763–1800)* (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1976). Modern-day national myths are discussed in John Girling, *Myths and Politics in Western Societies: Evaluating the Crisis of Modernity in the United States, Germany, and Great Britain* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1993).

[4]For a forceful demonstration of the presence of mythological elements in historiography, see Suzanne Citron, *Le Mythe National: l'Histoire de France en Question* (Paris: Ed. Ouvrières, 1991).

[5]On the role of political myths in general, see Girardet, *Myths et Mythologies Politiques*.

[6]For an excellent discussion of the views held by Europeans on the new land and the new peoples, see Antonello Gerbi, *The Dispute of the New World: The History of a Polemic, 1750–1900,* trans. Jeremy Moyle (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973). On the Brazilian case, the classical study is Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, *Visão do Paraíso: os Motivos Edênicos no Descobrimento e Colonizacão do Brasil,* 2d ed. (São Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1969).

[7]Quoted in Holanda, *Visão do Paraíso*, 239.

[8]Quoted in José Murilo de Carvalho, "O Motivo Edênico no Imaginário Social Brasileiro," *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais* 38 (October 1998): 63–64.

[9]Sebastião da Rocha Pitta, *História da América Portugueza desde o Anno de Mil e Quinhentos, do seu Descobrimento, até o de Mil e Setecentos e Vinte e Quatro* (Lisboa Occidental: Off. de Joseph Antônio da Silva, 1730), 3–4.

[10]Affonso Celso, *Porque me Ufano do meu Paiz* (Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, 1900).

[11]One was a national poll conducted by Vox Populi and published in *Veja* (1 January 1996): 48–57, under the title: "O Brasileiro segundo ele mesmo." The second survey was conducted in the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro by academic institutions. The results were published in CPDOC-IFGV/ISER, *Lei, Justiça e Cidadania* (Rio de Janeiro: CPDOC-IFGV/ISER, 1997).

[12]See Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 304.

[13]Data for 1959 show that only 5 percent of Americans and 10 percent of the British mentioned nature as a reason for national pride. See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), 230.

[14]Caminha noted in his letter: "One of the girls was . . . so well-shaped and round and her genitals so gracious that their sight would cause shame to our women for not having theirs as she had."

[15]At the very moment when the final version of this essay was being written, one-third of the national territory was punctuated by thousands of fires brought by the dry season. In the western part of the country, airports had been closed for lack of visibility due to the smoke produced by the fires.

[16]The history of the destruction of Brazilian forests can be found in Warren Dean, *With Broadax and Firebrand: The Destruction of the Brazilian Atlantic Forest* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). I was reminded by some critics that many other countries have also destroyed their forests and polluted their rivers. It would be silly to say that natural devastation is a Brazilian privilege. The point here is the great discrepancy in Brazil between myth and reality. Also, many countries, like England, have destroyed nature but have substituted a "cultured" nature in the form of landscape gardening. This is not a popular form of art in Brazil. Only one name comes to mind, that of Burle Marx, recently deceased.

[17]Data from 1959 for the United States and England show that political institutions were a source of pride for 85 percent of Americans and 46 percent of the British. See Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture Revisited*, 230.

[18]On this search, see E. H. P. Baudet, *Paradise on Earth: Some Thoughts on European Images of Non-European Man,* trans. Elizabeth Wentholt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

[19]On the contribution of Renaissance views to the Edenic myth, see Charles L. Sanford, *The Quest for Paradise: Europe and the American Moral Imagination* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1961), chap. 4.

[20]Baudet, *Paradise on Earth*, 18.

[21]Quoted in George H. Williams, *Wilderness and Paradise in Christian Thought* (New York: Harper, 1962), 101.

[22]Sanford, *The Quest for Paradise*, VI. On the topic, see also Williams, *Wilderness and Paradise in Christian Thought*, chap. 5.

[23]Williams, *Wilderness and Paradise in Christian Thought*, 99. An insightful comparison between the Brazilian and the U.S. cultures can be found in Clodomir Vianna Moog, *Bandeirantes and Pioneers,* trans. L. L. Barrett (New York: G. Braziller, 1964).

[24]I owe the suggestion of this idea to Helena Bomeny.

[25]Canudos was immortalized by Euclides da Cunha in *Os Sertões*, a Brazilian "founding book," translated into English as *Rebellion in the Backlands* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957). On Palmares, see Décio Freitas, *Palmares: a Guerra dos Escravos* (Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1978).

[26]Quoted in Heinrich Handelmann, *História do Brasil,* 4th ed. (Belo Horizonte: Itatiaia, 1982), vol. 2, 185.

[27]See Ana Isabel Buescu, "Un Mythe Fondateur du Royaume du Portugal: le Miracle d'Ourique," in Claude-Gilbert Dubois, dir., *L'Imaginaire de la Nation (1792–1992*) (Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 1991), 173–181.

[28]Antonio Vieira, *História do Futuro, Livro Anteprimeyro, Prolegômeno a toda a história do futuro* (Lisboa Occidental: Officina de A. P. Galram, 1718), 22–23.

[29]On the myth of King Sebastian, see Jacqueline Hermann, *No Reino do Desejado: A Construção do Sebastianismo em Portugal: Séculos VI e VII* (São Paulo: Cia. das Letras, 1998).

[30]On Coutinho and his idea of an empire in Brazil, see Maria de Lourdes Viana Lyra, *A Utopia do Poderoso Império; Portugal e Brasil: Bastidores da Política, 1798–1822* (Rio de Janeiro: Sette Letras, 1994), 117.

[31]Lyra, *A Utopia*, 118.

[32]Quoted in Carvalho, "O Motivo Edênico," 65.

[33]Lyra, *A Utopia*, 128.

[34]Charles Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition during the years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842* (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1845), 17.

[35]Marc Egnal, *A Mighty Empire: The Origins of the American Revolution* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), 6.

[36]Ibid., 333.

[37]It must be stressed that I am talking about national political heroes. Many figures could qualify as heroes who are not political or who are political but not national. Important as it is, this qualification does not of course eliminate some inevitable degree of subjectivity involved in the definition and selection of national heroes. I have used as defining criteria national acceptance across geographical and class lines as well as permanence, that is, persistence of the hero image up to the present.

[38]On the public image of Dom Pedro II, see Lilia Schwarcz, *As Barbas do Imperador* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1998).

[39]See Paulo Miceli, *O Mito do Herói Nacional* (São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 1988), 22–25.

[40]On the mythicization of Tiradentes, see José Murilo de Carvalho, *A Formação das Almas: O Imaginário da República no Brasil* (São Paulo: Cia das Letras, 1990), chap. 3.

[41]*Veja* (1 January 1996): 56.

[42]*Epoca* (24 May 1999): 14, 6.

[43]Popular characters of the national folklore, such as Pedro Malazartes, are shown as masters of cunning. In literature, there is a famous figure, Macunaíma, described by his creator, Mário de Andrade, as a "hero of our people" and called a "hero without any character." In addition to being a master of cunning, Macunaíma is lazy, irresponsible, and a liar, fighting constantly for survival. See Mário de Andrade, *Macunaíma: o Herói sem Nenhum Caráter*, 16th ed. (São Paulo: Secretaria da Cultura, Ciência e Tecnologia, 1978). On Pedro Malazartes as representative of popular culture, see Roberto da Matta, *Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes: An Interpretation of the Brazilian Dilemma* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991).

[44]See Alex Inkeles, *National Character: A Psycho-Social Perspective* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 4.

[45]Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture Revisited*, 230.

[46]The influence of the image of the Brazilian natives on European authors, including Montaigne, Shakespeare, Thomas More, and Rousseau, is discussed in Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, *O Indio Brasileiro e a Revolução Francesa* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1937).

[47]*Dialogues of the Great Things of Brazil*, attributed to Ambrósio Fernandes Brandão, trans. and annotated by Frederick Holden Hall, William F. Harrison, and Dorothy Winters Welker (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987), 22.

[48]Luiz Agassiz e Elizabeth Gary Agassiz, *Viagem ao Brasil, 1865–1866*, tradução e notas de Edgar Sussekind de Mendonça (São Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1938), 589. English edition: Professor and Mrs. Louis Agassiz, *A Journey in Brazil* (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1868).

[49]Gobineau's position can be found in Georges Readers, *O Conde de Gobineau no Brasil* (São Paulo: Conselho Estadual de Cultura, 1976), 169, 186. For

Lapouge, see Georges Vacher de Lapouge, *Les Sélections Sociales* (Paris: A. Fontemoing, 1896), 187.

[50]On Brazilian racial thought, see Thomas Skidmore, *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).

[51]See Gilberto Freyre, *The Masters and the Slaves: A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization,* trans. Samuel Putnam (New York: Knopf, 1946).

[52]Stefan Zweig, *Brazil, Land of the Future,* trans. Andrew St. James (New York: Viking Press, 1943).

[53]Ibid., 8.

[54]Ibid., 4.

[55]Roberto da Matta, *For an Anthropology of the Brazilian Tradition, or A Virtude está no Meio (*Washington, D.C.: Latin American Program, Wilson Center, 1990).

[56]Eduardo Prado, *A Illusão Americana* (Paris: A. Colin, 1895).

[57]See, for instance, Georges Vacher de Lapouge, *L'Aryen: Son Rôle Social* (Paris: Albert Fontemoing, 1899), 370–373.

[58]For a useful summary of the attempts at defining the Brazilian national character, see Dante Moreira Leite, *O Caráter Nacional Brasileiro: História de uma Ideologia,* 3d ed. (São Paulo: Pioneira, 1976), 302–303. This author considers these attempts as totally lacking in scientific validity, being no more than elitist ideologies. For a similar approach to Brazilian identity and culture, see Carlos Guilherme Mota, *Ideologia da Cultura Brasileira: Pontos de Partida para uma Revisão Histórica* (São Paulo: Editora Atica, 1977). Most prominent among the intellectuals who tried to define a national identity are Paulo Prado, *Retrato do Brasil: Ensaio sobre a Tristeza Brasileira,* 6th ed. (Rio de Janeiro: J. Olympio, 1962), Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, *Raízes do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Olympio, 1936), Fernando de Azevedo, *Brazilian Culture: An Introduction to the Study of Culture in Brazil,* trans. William Rex Crawford (New York: Macmillan, 1950), José Honório Rodrigues, *The Brazilians, their Character and Aspirations,* trans. Ralph Edward Dimmick (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967), and Darcy Ribeiro, *O Povo Brasileiro: a Formação e o sentido do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1995).

[59]See, for instance, José Fernando Carneiro, *Psicologia do Brasileiro e outros Estudos* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria AGIR, 1971), 51–53.

[60]*Veja* (1 January 1996): 52. A more recent national survey indicates that the characteristics that best describe Brazilians (according to more than 70 percent of the answers) are cheerfulness, affection, solidarity, tolerance, responsibility, ingenuity, competence, fairness, trustworthiness, and democracy. See *Epoca* (25 May 1999): 6.

[61]Carvalho, "O Motivo Edênico," 68, 72.

[62]On the role of Carnival in Brazil, the classical work is da Matta, *Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes*.

Peter Fry

Politics, Nationality, and the Meanings of "Race" in Brazil

GIVEN THAT BRAZIL has "imported" people and ideas throughout its history and celebrated its "anthropophagous" absorption of them, it becomes particularly interesting to know why just a few outside ideas seem so indigestible. After all, however much Robert Schwarz might argue that liberal democracy was an "idea out of place" in the late nineteenth century of Machado de Assis,[1] it has nevertheless been appropriated as a central element of Brazilian nationalism together with its ancillary "racial democracy."

Indeed, it is in the name of the "imported" ideology of liberalism that so many other Brazilians now reject affirmative action, especially in its most categorical form of quotas. When some ideas from outside have been eaten and digested, they seem to lead to a kind of nausea in relation to other ideas that enter into contradiction with them. Quotas are nauseous to many not only because they appear to contradict racial democracy and liberal democracy *tout court*, but also because they seem to threaten the very idea of "anthropophagy" itself. It is as if once Brazil had eaten formalized affirmative action, other foods it held dear became increasingly unpalatable.

In a recent article on what they term "cultural imperialism," Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant argue that a "number of topics which result directly from intellectual confrontations

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related to the social specificity of American society and American universities are being imposed in what appear to be de-historicized forms on the totality of the planet."[2] Thus, "multiculturalism" and "neo-liberalism"—concepts developed in the specific context of the United States—are transformed into "natural," universal, and taken-for-granted truths, except, they note, when ridiculed as "political correctness" and "paradoxically utilized, within French intellectual circles, as an instrument of reprobation and of repression against all manner of subversive impulses [*velléités*], notably feminist or homosexual ones. . . ."[3]

Noting that the debate on "race" and "identity" has also been subject to "similar ethnocentric intrusions," they turn to Brazil to illustrate their argument.

> An historical representation, born of the fact that the American tradition arbitrarily imposed a dichotomy between Whites and Blacks on an infinitely more complex reality, can even impose itself in these countries where the principles of vision and division, codified or practical, of ethnic differences are completely different, and which, as in Brazil, were until recently held as a counter example to the "American model."[4]

This "symbolic violence" derives, they argue, from the use of American racial categories to describe Brazil and from the power of the United States to obtain the "collaboration, conscious or not, directly or indirectly out of interest, of all the 'purveyors' and importers of cultural products with or without a griffe," such as editors, directors of cultural institutions, operas, museums, galleries, magazines, and the like. They also single out the role of the great American philanthropic and research foundations in "the diffusion of the North-American racial doxa in the heart of Brazilian universities at the level of representations and practices."[5]

The irony of invoking Brazil in this context is that since the days of slavery, well before modern globalization, "race relations," real and imagined, in Brazil and the United States, have been held as contrasting models that in a sense have come to define for many the two national identities.

In this essay, I will argue that Bourdieu and Wacquant have presented an interpretative model, which only partially does justice to the facts as I see them. While it is true that many North American intellectuals consider that Brazil's ideology of "racial democracy" is, or should be, a dead letter, claiming that Brazil's only claim to specificity is the particularly insidious racism it engenders, and while it is also true that North American philanthropic organizations provide financial and intellectual support for research on "race" and for black activist groups, it is also true that many of their staff, together with a sizeable number of Brazilian academics and activists, are reluctant to abandon a commitment to the *idea* that "race" or physical appearance should not be invoked to discriminate in any way. By the same token, while many activists and intellectuals perceive "race relations" in Brazil as a contest between two categories of people—whites and people of color—others continue to celebrate the virtues of "mixture," of both genes and cultures. Still others hold a combination of these ideas and invoke them depending on the situation. That one set of ideas has become identified with Brazil and another with the United States results from metonymic associations and metaphorical contrasts that are part of the politics of nation-building and a concern for national "authenticities."

The mechanism of personifying nations and then attributing to them cultural homogeneity and purposeful projects for hegemony can obfuscate the issues that are really at stake, that are endogenous to all modern societies: namely, the conflict between the post-Boasian position that "race" is not a biological reality but rather a historical and social artifact and the persistently lingering and increasingly powerful presence of "race" as a guiding principle for the formation of meaningful social categories and groups. This mechanism, of course, also ignores the way in which distinct individuals, groups, and categories present in "subaltern" societies understand and react to the messages they receive in terms of their own cultural categories and political agendas.

As the ethnographic record shows, and in spite of Gananath Obeyesekere's counterposition, Captain Cook was killed because the people of Hawaii thought he was their God Lono.[6] I

will suggest that if Brazilian society has any specificity at all as far as these issues are concerned, it lies in the original ways in which this conflict of ideas is made manifest in public debate, and in the myriad forms in which Brazilians cope with "race" and "racism." And this specificity, again in contrast with the United States, lies in one of the few objective facts in this field so beset with subjectivism: the law. In Brazil, racial discrimination is and has been illegal since the inauguration of the republican regime in 1890.[7] In the United States, "race" was, until the civil rights movement of the 1960s, a legal construct that divided the population along "racial" lines in all spheres of social life. Since then it has continued to be as powerful as ever either to justify prejudice or to counter it. Affirmative action was relatively easy to introduce in the United States because it was built on shared premises of "racial" difference. In Brazil, it is a far more thorny issue since it runs counter to the notion of racial democracy. But, as Bourdieu and Wacquant note, the irony lies in the fact that as pressure mounts in the United States to question affirmative action and the easy dichotomy of blacks and whites, so too in Brazil pressure mounts in the opposite direction.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF MIXTURE AND RACIAL DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL

In 1859, Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau arrived in Rio de Janeiro to spend one year as French ambassador to the court of Emperor Dom Pedro II, with whom he soon established a firm friendship. Four years later, Gobineau, the author of *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines*,[8] which was later to inspire the most pernicious of twentieth-century "scientific racism," published an article about Brazil that extolled the natural wealth and beauty of the country but was less sanguine about the human beings who inhabited it. Observing the formidable mixture of "races" in Brazil and claiming that mulattos "do not reproduce themselves beyond a limited number of generations," he concluded on the basis of an analysis of available census data that the population of Brazil would have "disappeared completely, to the last man," within 270 years at the maximum

or 200 years at the minimum.[9] To avoid such a catastrophe, he advocated more valuable alliances with "European races." By so doing, "the race would become re-established, public health would improve, moral values recharged and felicitous changes would be introduced into this admirable country."[10] There is little doubt that Gobineau's distaste for mixture reflected deep concerns for the future of his native country, which, since the French Revolution, had experienced the waning of the "racial purity" and political control of an elite of supposedly German descent to which he himself claimed to belong. His efforts could well be interpreted as an attempt to universalize the reaction to the French Revolution.

Brazilian scholars imagined other outcomes for Brazil as they contemplated its multicolored population, which Gobineau and other proponents of "scientific racism" considered nonviable.[11] Nina Raymundo Rodrigues devised a complex racial classification and predicted that the population would tend toward three basic types—whites, mulattos, and blacks—that could be defined not by genealogical criteria as much as by appearance. Inspired by the Italian school of criminal anthropology, Rodrigues argued that each of these groups possessed its own moral system and went so far as to suggest that separate penal codes should be developed for each of them.[12] His ideas, however, fell on stony ground, at least where formal legislation is concerned. Since the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the inauguration of the republic in 1890, Brazilian constitutions and legislation have not discriminated on the basis of "race" or "color," even if immigration policies revealed the racial thinking of the times. By importing white people from Europe, it was hoped gradually to "whiten" the population, as the superiority and strength of white "blood" gradually eliminated African and Amerindian physical and cultural traits.[13] João Batista de Lacerda, director of the National Museum, argued in 1911 that within a hundred years the population would become not so much white as "Latin."[14] The irony of the Brazilian position in contrast to that of the United States is that whereas in the former white was supposed to subsume black, in the latter the opposite was thought to occur. To this day the "one-drop rule" may be invoked to classify any person with at least one African ances-

tor or ancestress as African-American without regard to physical appearance.

In 1933, Gilberto Freyre published *Casa Grande e Senzala*, in which he argued that "miscegenation" and the mixing of cultures was not Brazil's damnation but rather its salvation. In the preface to the first edition of the book, in the same paragraph in which he recognized his intellectual debt to Franz Boas under whom he had studied in the United States, he recalled having observed a "band of Brazilian sailors—*mulatos* and *cafuzos*" leaving ship in Brooklyn. "They gave me the impression of human caricatures. . . . Miscegenation had resulted in that. What was missing was the presence of someone who, like Roquette Pinto talking to the 'Arianists' of the 1929 Brazilian Eugenics Congress, could tell me that these individuals whom I imagined representatives of Brazil were not simply *mulatos* or *cafuzos,* but *cafuzos* and *mulatos* who were sick."[15]

Casa Grande e Senzala was Freyre's vindication of Brazilian miscegenation. Pulling together a vast array of documentation on colonial and imperial Brazil as well as his own reminiscences as the son of a Northeastern landed family, and embellishing his text with considerable poetic license, he described Brazil as a hybrid society in which Africans, Amerindians, and Europeans (especially the Portuguese) had intermingled through the interchange of genes and cultures. Freyre described a society founded on a series of what he called cultural and economic antagonisms, based on "profound traditional realities," between "sadists and masochists, the learned and the illiterate, individuals of predominantly European culture and others of principally African or Amerindian culture."[16] He argued that this duality was not entirely "prejudicial" and that a certain equilibrium existed between the "spontaneity and freshness of imagination and emotion of the great majority and . . . the contact between the elites with science, technology and with the advanced thinking of Europe."[17] But above all, the antagonisms were "harmonized" by "conditions of fraternization and social mobility specific to Brazil: miscegenation, the dispersion of inheritances, easy and frequent changes of employment and residence, the easy and frequent access of mulattos and natural children to elevated social and political positions, lyrical Portuguese Ca-

tholicism, moral tolerance, hospitality to foreigners and intercommunication between the different parts of the country."[18]

Freyre, like his predecessors, was concerned as much with describing Brazil as identifying its specificity in relation to other countries, in particular the United States. *Casa Grande e Senzala* was as much an exercise in nation-building as historical ethnography. In this regard it is not without significance that Freyre's analysis of Brazil became an important part of Boas's cross-cultural critique of "race."

> Race feeling between Whites, Negroes, and Indians in Brazil seems to be quite different from what it is among ourselves. On the coast there is a large Negro population. The admixture of Indian is also quite marked. The discrimination between these three races is very much less than it is among ourselves, and the social obstacles for race mixture or for social advancement are not marked. Similar conditions prevail on the island of Santo Domingo where Spaniards and Negroes have intermarried. Perhaps it would be too much to claim that in these cases race consciousness is nonexistent; it is certainly much less pronounced than among ourselves.[19]

As Célia Azevedo has argued, the notion that the relations between masters and slaves were more harmonious in Brazil than in the United States had grown apace throughout the nineteenth century as abolitionists in both countries "constructed little by little the image of Brazil as a society immune to racial violence."[20] Even Nina Rodrigues had adhered to this idea.

> Whether it be the influence of our Portuguese origin, and the tendency of the Iberians to cross [*sic*] with the inferior races; whether it is a special virtue of our white population, which I don't believe; or whether it might be finally one more influence of the character of the Brazilian people, indolent, apathetic, incapable of strong passions, the truth is that color prejudices, which certainly exist among us, are little defined and intolerant on the part of the white race. In any event, much less than it is said that they are in North America.[21]

But in an important way, Freyre did part company with the past, in particular with a wholly negative image of Amerindian and African cultures. Although he never completely abandoned the neo-Lamarckianism of associating culture with descent,[22]

he did emphasize the positive contribution each had lent to Brazilian society as a whole. All Brazilians, he claimed, regardless of their genealogical affiliation, were *culturally* African, Amerindian, and European. In Freyre's sociology the three "races" were *imagined* as cultural clusters that in combination allowed for the imagination of a racially and culturally hybrid Brazil. In the absence of "racial" segregation, "races" were not so much sociological realities as somehow present in various degrees of cultural and biological combination in each *individual*, where they are fused.[23]

RACIAL DEMOCRACY UNDER ATTACK

Up to the 1940s, this image of Brazil was widely accepted both in Brazil and elsewhere. Indeed, there are good reasons to suppose that the idea of "racial democracy" was consolidated by activists, writers, and intellectuals looking at Brazil from lands where racial segregation was the rule. Blacks from the United States, for example, who visited Brazil, returned full of praise. Leaders such as Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. DuBois wrote positively of the black experience in Brazil while black nationalist Henry McNeal Turner and radical journalist Cyril Biggs went so far as to advocate emigration to Brazil as a refuge from oppression in the United States.[24] In 1944, the Jewish writer Stefan Zweig found Brazil to be the least racially bigoted society he had visited.[25] In DuBois's time, then, Brazil was widely held to be a "racial democracy" where relations between people of diverse colors were fundamentally harmonious.

As the world took full stock of the horrors of Nazi racism in the years following World War II, UNESCO agreed, on the suggestion of Brazilian anthropologist Arthur Ramos, to sponsor a pilot research project in Brazil with the aim of studying "the problems of different racial and ethnic groups living in a common social environment."[26] Brazil was chosen not only because it appeared to represent a viable alternative to racial segregation and conflict but also because UNESCO had at this time shown considerable sensitivity to the specific problems of the developing world.[27]

Verena Stolcke notes that "within Brazil concern was voiced, as it turned out prophetically, that a systematic scrutiny into the nature of the country's race relations might open the Pandora's box of 'racial democracy.'"[28] The North American, French, and Brazilian anthropologists who worked on the project did indeed provide evidence of massive inequality and prejudice throughout the country. And yet, as Marcos Chor Maio has shown, the research results did not deny the importance of the myth of racial democracy.[29] What they did was to reveal the tensions between the myth and Brazilian-style racism, a tension that had already been enunciated by black and white intellectuals and activists, in particular by Abdias do Nascimento and Guerreiro Ramos.[30]

Although the UNESCO-funded researchers documented severe racial discrimination in Brazil, they continued to perceive "race relations" as distinct from those in the United States. Florestan Fernandes, for example, felt that racial discrimination and the inequality between whites and people of color were largely the result of the legacy of slavery and the difficulty Brazilian blacks had experienced in adapting to capitalism. He predicted that with their integration into the economy, inequality and discrimination would fade away.[31] Fernandes's work talks about "blacks and whites," which was the terminology used by his black activist friends and informants to classify themselves and others. Other writers, however, singled out what they saw as Brazil's specific way of classifying the population. Instead of classifying according to the simple dichotomous taxonomy used in the United States, Brazilians categorized on the basis of a complex taxonomy of terms. Furthermore, they did so on the premise not of descent but of "appearance."

The statistical documentation of racial inequality entered into a new era of sophistication with the publication in 1979 of sociologist Carlos Hasenbalg's *Discriminação e Desigualdades Raciais no Brasil*.[32] Controlling his data carefully to eliminate the effects of class, Hasenbalg was able to argue, against those who claim that discrimination is directed more toward the poor than to people of color, that "race" was significantly related to poverty. He concluded that such inequality could not be attrib-

uted to the legacy of slavery but only to persistent prejudice and discrimination against people of color, an argument that had in fact already been put forward by UNESCO project researcher Luis de Aguiar Costa Pinto.[33] Subsequent research has confirmed his findings. Demographers have established a higher infant mortality rate for nonwhites than for whites (105 as against 77 in 1980) and a lower life expectancy for nonwhites than for whites (59.4 years as against 66.1 years). In education, nonwhites complete fewer years of study than whites, even controlling for income and family background. In 1990, 11.8 percent of whites had completed 12 years of education as against 2.9 percent of nonwhites. As Hasenbalg notes, these educational differences obviously affect the subsequent careers of nonwhites and whites. The average income of blacks and mestizoes is a little less than half that of whites. Research on social mobility indicates that nonwhite members of the middle and upper classes experience less social mobility than similarly placed whites, and that they have more difficulty in transmitting their new status to their children. All these studies suggest, then, that racial discrimination has the effect of forcing nonwhites into the least privileged niches of Brazilian society.

While people of color in Brazil generally fare badly in education and in the workplace, they are most vulnerable in relation to the criminal justice system. Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro found that of 330 people killed by the police in São Paulo in 1982, no less than 128 (38.8 percent) were black.[34] Moema Teixeira notes that in 1988, 70 percent of the prison population of Rio de Janeiro was composed of "blacks" and "browns." In São Paulo, the situation is little different. Quoting a 1985–1986 survey, Teixeira notes that the percentage of "blacks" and "browns" in the prison population (52 percent) was almost twice as much as in the São Paulo population as a whole (22.5 percent).[35]

In a study of the criminal justice system of São Paulo, Sérgio Adorno found that of those arrested and accused of theft, drug trafficking, rape, and armed robbery in São Paulo in 1990, blacks lost out at each step of the system: 58 percent of blacks accused were arrested in the act of committing a crime as opposed to only 46 percent of whites. Similarly, a greater proportion of whites (27 percent) awaits trial on bail than

blacks (15.5 percent). When finally brought to trial, "the proportion of Blacks who are condemned is higher than their proportion in the racial distribution of the population of the municipality of Sao Paulo."[36]

Carlos Antonio Costa Ribeiro's findings based on crimes brought to trial by jury in the city of Rio de Janeiro from 1890 to 1930 are similar, and he concludes that "[t]he blackness of the defendant increases the probability of conviction more than any other characteristic."[37] Costa Ribeiro argues that discrimination against people of color was related during the period in question to the strength of the proponents of "criminal anthropology," of the "positive school" of thought that was established in Brazil by Nina Rodrigues. Although Rodrigues had been unsuccessful in establishing distinct penal codes for blacks, mulattos, and whites, the association of African physical traits with a propensity for crime was ritualized in the obligatory measurements of color and physiognomy in the Office for Criminal Identification of Rio de Janeiro until 1942.[38] Despite having fallen into disrepute in forensic science, these same ideas inform police practice and most of public opinion in Brazil to this day.

Adriano Maurício provides particularly poignant evidence of the entrenchment of these ideas in his remarkable study of public transport in Rio de Janeiro.[39] The young Mozambican began to notice that hardly anyone ever sat next to him on the bus that brought him from his house in the suburbs to the university in the center of town. Having read an article on Aimée Césaire's conversion to negritude on a tram in Paris where he suddenly discovered that he was looking at a rather disheveled black woman with the same disgust as the white passengers,[40] Maurício embarked on a systematic study of seating patterns on a number of bus routes and interviewed black and white passengers on their seating preferences. In his extremely delicate and careful ethnography he was able to demonstrate that the order of seating preferences of white passengers was first, white women, second, women of color, third, older men of color, and last, younger men of color. He concluded that these seating patterns were related to the common assumption that the people most likely to conduct assaults on buses are young black males. At the same time, however, he

perceived that the buses were not racially segregated as such. The patterns he observed were the result of implicit rather than explicit assumptions about the salience or nonsalience of "race" in public places.

The demonstration and recognition of the existence of racism pointed to the chasm between Brazil's ideology of "racial democracy" and sociological reality. On this point, few would disagree. Indeed, public opinion polls show quite clearly that the majority of Brazilians (not just academics and black activists) are well aware of discrimination. In 1995, a survey conducted by the São Paulo newspaper *A Folha de São Paulo* revealed that almost 90 percent of the population acknowledged the presence of racial discrimination in Brazil.[41] A survey carried out in Rio de Janeiro in 1996 showed that 68.2 percent of the inhabitants of Rio de Janeiro agree that "blacks" suffer more than "whites" from the "rigors of the law."[42] At the same time, however, both surveys revealed that most Brazilians adhere to an ideal of "racial democracy" and deny having any prejudice themselves. As many as 87 percent of respondents who classified themselves as white and 91 percent of those who defined themselves as brown claimed to have no prejudice against blacks, while 87 percent of the blacks interviewed denied having any prejudice against whites. Even more surprisingly, 64 percent of the blacks and 84 percent of the browns denied having themselves suffered from racial prejudice. It is as if Brazilians are prejudiced against racial prejudice, as a white informant told Florestan Fernandes and Roger Bastide many years ago.[43]

Whereas most agree that the myth of racial democracy coexists with prejudice and discrimination, interpretations differ. The interpretation that has fired the imagination, above all of Brazil's black activists, is that the myth does more than merely deny true racial democracy. It has the powerful function of masking discrimination and prejudice and of impeding the formation of a large-scale black protest movement. Under this interpretation, Brazilian racism becomes the more insidious because it is officially denied. Michael George Hanchard presents this argument in its most sophisticated form in his analysis of the black movement in Brazil. What he calls a "racial hege-

mony" in Brazil neutralizes racial identification among non-whites, promoting racial discrimination while simultaneously denying its existence. By the same token, the myriad color categories present in Brazil, in particular the differentiation of mulattos from blacks and whites, also has a "function."[44] As Degler would have it, the mulattos are the "escape hatch" that dissipates possible racial polarizations and animosities.[45] For these authors, what began as Brazil's glory is now its damnation.

This new version of the Brazilian nation was constructed, like that of Freyre's, on an explicit comparison with the United States. This time, however, Brazil does not represent a superior alternative, but rather an archaic and obscurantist system that must give way in time to the "reality" of clearly defined "races."

Talcott Parsons argued some years ago that racial polarization was a necessary and welcome feature of "modernity."

> Relatively sharper polarization clearly favors conflict and antagonism in the first instance. Providing, however, other conditions are fulfilled, sharp polarization seems in the longer run to be more favorable to effective inclusion than is a complex grading of the differences between components, perhaps particularly where gradations are arranged on a superiority-inferiority hierarchy. To put cases immediately in point, I take the position that the race relations problem has a better prospect of resolution in the United States than in Brazil, partly because the line between white and Negro has been so rigidly drawn in the United States and because the system has been sharply polarized.[46]

Writing much more recently, Michael Hanchard expresses a similar opinion. "Conflicts between dominant and subordinate racial groups, the politics of race, help constitute modernity and the process of modernization throughout the world. They utilize racial phenotypes to evaluate and judge persons as citizens and non-citizens. . . . This is the politics of race between whites and blacks at the end of the twentieth century, and Brazil is no exception."[47] And Angela Gilliam, a black North American social scientist, has proclaimed: "Much of the thrust of conscious Africanization in Brazil must come from the United States. American black people must start to realize that even some of the conceptualizations and solutions towards an *Afri-*

can Africa will come from our efforts. The struggle is *one*."[48] In comparison with the "normality" and "modernity" of the United States, Brazil, then, must be declared wanting: for not having polarized "races;" for defining a person's "race" by appearance rather than genealogy;[49] for not having produced a strong mass black movement; for not having been the stage for racial confrontation; and for officially subordinating the specificity of races to class inequality. The "myth of racial democracy" is interpreted as a functional element, somehow outside Brazil's "race" arrangements, which impedes Brazil from its "natural" destiny. And just as "racial democracy" was once a dominant symbol of Brazilian nationalism, it has now become demonized in certain academic and activist circles as an ideology largely responsible for Brazil's most insidious racism. As Suely Carneiro, executive coordinator of Geledês Instituto da Mulher Negra (Geledês Black Women's Institute) of São Paulo, said at a recent seminar on citizenship and diversity funded by the United States Information Service, "there exists an attempt to disqualify the advances obtained by the black movement in this fight against racism through . . . a neoracial democracy, which aims to thwart [*esvaziar*] the growing consciousness and capacity for making demands of descendants of Africans, especially the younger ones, and to impede that racial conflict might become explicit with its radical demands for social change."[50]

Bourdieu and Wacquant argue that this swing of the tide results from cultural imperialism, pointing to the influence of American funding, American activists and intellectuals, and the media in general. In a sense, they are right, for there can be no doubt about the importance of organizations such as the Ford and MacArthur Foundations, to name the two most prominent, in the funding of research and black activism. But then one must ask why it was that these ideas found such resonance among Brazilian intellectuals and black activists, unless we are to assume that they have all in one way or another been transformed, unwittingly or not, into "collaborators."

This particular interpretation of Brazil has become increasingly powerful over recent years not only because of the influence of North American scholarship and the utilization of "racial" categories, which were developed to describe North

American "races" and "race relations,"[51] but also because of the parallel growth of an articulate black movement that has been generally strongly allied to academic researchers. A case in point is Florestan Fernandes, who in his monumental *A Integração do Negro na Sociedade de Classes* utilized the terms "*negro*" and "*branco*" in accordance with the desire of his black activist informants.[52] While there is no doubt that Brazilian black activism was inspired by movements in the United States and South Africa (how could it be otherwise? I would even venture the guess that the heroic status in Brazil of Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela is greater than the Brazilian Zumbi), their very existence suggested that Brazilians should not be seen as a continuum of "colors" but rather as "blacks" and "whites." And while such a dichotomy is clearly redolent of the "American model," it had indeed always been latent in Brazil and is most clearly expressed in the term *pessoa de cor* (person of color) and in the popular adage "quem passa de branco preto é" ("He/she who is not white is black"). Perhaps, therefore, one should understand the social and historical construction of race in Brazil as lying in a tension between one taxonomy and another.

But the interpretation of the myth of racial democracy as crafty deceit has problems. First, it shows a hearty disrespect for all those (the majority of the population) who profess a belief in it. Second, it carries with it the generic defects of all functional interpretations. If one takes the "myth of racial democracy" from a more anthropological point of view, either as a charter for social action or as an ordered system of social thought that enshrines and expresses fundamental understandings about society, then it can be understood not so much as an "impediment" to racial consciousness but as the foundation of what "race" still actually means to most Brazilians. Political scientist Jessé Souza, for example, has conducted research in Brasília on the distribution of prejudice. He found that while prejudice against homosexuals, women, the poor, or people from the Northeast was common in all levels of society, if slightly less evident in higher income groups than in lower income groups, racism was the only prejudice that the vast majority of his informants from all income groups explicitly

condemned. He goes so far as to suggest that antiracism is "one of the few values that is shared without restriction by all social strata."[53]

It seems, then, that some academics tend to side with the black movement while others claim to invoke what they variously term Brazilian society or Brazilian culture. Needless to say, each lends his or her "authority" to one of two principal sides in the political battles that now rage over the racial issue. And there is nothing strange in this, since, as Marisa Peirano has pointed out, the boundary between social activism and academic life in Brazil has always been blurred.[54]

POLITICAL ACTION

During the discussions leading to the 1988 Constitution, the black movement and its academic allies armed themselves to try to bring the racial issue into sharper constitutional focus. As a consequence, the new constitution gave stronger teeth to the Afonso Arinos Law, which had been introduced in 1951 to punish racial discrimination by redefining racist practice as a crime rather than a mere misdemeanor.[55] The Afro-Brazilian Federal Deputy Carlos Alberto Caó later presented new legislation that, in accordance with the new constitution, denied bail to those accused of "crimes resulting from racial or color prejudice" and stipulated prison sentences from one to five years for those found guilty. This harsh law also states that crimes arising from racial or color prejudice cannot lapse because of the passage of time (*imprescritíveis*).[56]

The novelty of the new constitution was that it recognized the property rights of descendants of maroon (*quilombo*) communities who continue to occupy their lands.[57] For the first time, the special status of certain black communities was recognized in an affirmative sense, giving them legal rights similar to those that have long been available to Indian communities but not to other "nonethnic" rural populations. Consequently, numerous researchers and activists have started to map these communities, many of which now enjoy legal title. But this is not without a cost, for to establish their "authenticity," the communities in question are obliged to prove their status to the

technician (usually an anthropologist or historian) responsible for producing the official report (*laudo*). The process of recognition of the very existence of these communities is having, I would argue, an important effect on the way in which the race question is thought of in Brazil. The effects of the process of identification are both practical and symbolic: practical because land tenure is secured; symbolic because Brazil is confronted with a "reality" that challenges the self-image of a mixed-up society and replaces it with one in which there are "racial" authenticities. A similar effect is produced by the Africa-inspired carnival groups in Salvador and elsewhere. By imagining a multiracial and multicultural Brazil rather than a Brazil of inextricable mixture, they effectively produce it in the manner of the self-fulfilling prophecy described by Robert Merton.

The same arguments mapped out by the academics and activists have also led to changes in governmental attitudes toward "race" in Brazil. During the military dictatorship, the suggestion that there was racism in Brazil could lead to accusations of subversion. Government activity was restricted to the support of cultural events, later through the Palmares Foundation in the Ministry of Culture, which administered a minuscule and unpredictable fund for that purpose. The Fernando Henrique Cardoso government, however, which came to power in 1994, extended its concern for Afro-Brazilian issues from the Ministry of Culture to the Ministries of Labor and Justice.[58] In 1995, the government launched its National Human Rights Program, which contained a series of planned activities in the interests of the "black community." These included "the inter-ministerial working group—created by Presidential Decree on November 20, 1995—for drawing up activities and policies to recognize the value of the black population," and a "Working Group for the Elimination of Discrimination in the Workplace and in Careers" within the Ministry of Labor. All these measures can be classified as "antidiscriminatory." They are used to strengthen individual rights and freedoms as established by the federal constitution. As attempts at combating racism and racialism, they represent no marked change in policy and are in consonance with the ideals of "racial democracy."

However, the National Human Rights Program goes beyond this goal to propose interventions that aim to strengthen a bipolar definition of race in Brazil and to implement specific policies in favor of black Brazilians. For example, the program suggests bringing the Brazilian system of racial classification in line with that of the United States, "instruct[ing] the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE) [responsible for collecting official census data] to adopt the criterion of considering mulattos, browns and blacks [*os mulatos, os pardos e os pretos*] as members of the black population [*integrantes do contingente da população negra*]." In addition, the program suggests providing "support for private enterprises which undertake affirmative action [*discriminação positiva*]," developing "affirmative action to increase the access of blacks to professional courses, the university and areas of state of the art technology," and "formulating compensatory policies to promote the black community economically."

These actions are, of course, radically distinct from the deracializing strategies of combating racism. Instead of denying the significance of "race," they celebrate the recognition and formalization of "race" as a criterion for defining and targeting policy. For the first time since the abolition of slavery the Brazilian government has not only recognized the existence and iniquity of racism, but has chosen to contemplate the passing of legislation that recognizes the existence and importance of distinct "racial communities" in Brazil. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, whose academic career as a sociologist began with research on race relations as a spin-off of the UNESCO project,[59] announced in his presidential speech on Independence Day in 1995: "We wish to affirm, and truly with considerable pride, our condition as a *multi-racial society* and that we have great satisfaction in being able to enjoy the privilege of having *distinct races* [*raças distintas*] and distinct cultural traditions also. In these days, such diversity makes for the wealth of a country."[60] What could be further from the concept of distinct races than the *mixture* idealized by Freyre? And what, to give greater credence to Bourdieu and Wacquant, could be closer to the dominant ideology of "progressive" thought in the United States?

In July of 1996, soon after the president's speech, the Brazilian government sponsored a seminar in Brasília on "Affirmative Action and Multiculturalism," at which a number of Brazilian and U.S. academics discussed the issue of affirmative action in Brazil. What is interesting about this seminar is that it at once attests to the propriety of Bourdieu and Wacquant's analysis and also challenges it. While the event was surely held to promote affirmative action in Brazil, powerful cautionary arguments were also advanced in the name of "liberal democracy" or "sociological intelligence."

Political scientist Fábio Wanderley Reis argues that affirmative action runs contrary to the precepts of liberal democracy, which is based on individualism as a fundamental value. "We want," he suggests, "a society where an individual's racial characteristics are irrelevant, that is, where opportunities of all types are not related to individuals on the basis of their belonging to one or another racial group. . . . We desire a society which does not discriminate, or perceive races, which is blind to the racial characteristics of its members."[61] He recognizes that although the notion of racial democracy does not correspond to the facts of racism in Brazil, it is an "irreplaceable goal," exactly because it affirms the irrelevance of racial characteristics. As such, it is clearly important because it imagines a society that avoids the "militant affirmation of distinct racial identities."[62] He concludes with the suggestion that government should do everything in its power to redress the negative stereotypes associated with people of color through education, the media, and so on, but that it should apply affirmative action as such "socially" rather than "racially," concentrating on reducing poverty. Since color and class run together in Brazil, he argues, such a policy would respect liberal democratic values while at the same time assuaging "racial" inequality.

Anthropologist Roberto da Matta has other objections. His argument is based not so much on the importance of liberal ideals as on Brazil's distinct "sociological intelligence." For him the classificatory issue cannot be put aside as merely a "technical problem." On the contrary, it lies at the very center of the debate. Comparing the one-drop rule in the United States and the Brazilian penchant for multiple categories, da Matta con-

cludes that while the United States pursues the distinction and compartmentalization of ethnic groups in self-contained, contrasting units in a constant attempt to avoid ambiguity, the Brazilian classificatory system actually celebrates ambiguity and compromise, functioning on the basis of a finely graded hierarchy.[63] Like Reis he asks how one could possibly create the kind of binary classification that is necessitated by affirmative action (i.e., either you are eligible or you are not). He also draws attention to the consequences of affirmative action in the United States, where, he argues, the increased social mobility of many blacks has been brought about at the expense of strengthening racial prejudice and segregation. Like Reis, he suggests an educational campaign to explain the way racial discrimination works in Brazil and to exalt the idea of racial democracy.[64]

The argument in favor of affirmative action in Brazil was most clearly advanced by sociologist Antonio Sérgio Guimarães. He asserts that a "nonreified" and temporary program of affirmative action is compatible with individualism and equality of opportunity because it is a way of promoting equity and social integration.[65] His recommendation is that affirmative action be applied not to the mass of the population where "universalistic" policies should prevail, but rather to secure the formation of a multiracial elite. To do this, he suggests quotas for black university staff and student applicants, arguing that this is the only way to "'deracialize' meritocratic economic and intellectual elites."[66] Guimarães brushes aside the thorny classificatory issue by asking, rhetorically: "who would want to be black to get into the universities other than those who are blacks?"[67] (He does not ask how many people defined as blacks would prefer to enter the university merely as citizens.) To avoid fraud, he suggests that color be reintroduced into identity cards: "If being black is really such a stigma, who would want to be classified as '*negro*' who wasn't one?"

But what most clearly distinguishes Guimarães's position from that of Reis and da Matta is his defense of the celebration of "racial identities." For Guimarães this is one of the positive results of affirmative-action policies. He argues that the differences that are the cause of inequality should not disappear (that would be impossible) but should be "transformed into the oppo-

site, a source of compensation and reparation."[68] Consistent with this point of view, Guimarães has also recently argued for reintroducing the concept of "race" into analytic discourse.[69]

Guimarães's position is similar to that of Hanchard and to that of an important sector of the black movement in Brazil, in that the Brazil he imagines for the future is a society not of ambiguity and mediation but of clearly marked racial and sexual identities, which, since he believes they should be "strengthened," he assumes exist. There are those who would argue, and I am one of them, that the policy of cultural integration effected with such diligence and even violence in Brazil has been so successful that the identities that Guimarães would like to see valued have first to be constructed. And this is indeed what the ethnographic record suggests. The history of the black movement in Brazil has largely been the history of not-resoundingly-successful attempts to construct a black identity to which people of color would feel impelled to adhere.[70]

The issues at stake at the Brasília seminar on multiculturalism, as I see them, reveal serious contradictions that lie at the root of Brazilian society. On one side is a strong commitment to "liberal democracy," which, however much contradicted by the realities of patronage, corruption, nepotism, prejudice, and sheer violent power, remains an ideal to which many still aspire. On another, not so different from the first, is an appeal to "tradition," to "Brazilian sociological intelligence," which evokes the specificity of Brazilian society caught between the "ideals" of democracy and the "tradition" of hierarchy and ambiguity. And on yet another is a demand for radical change, a casting off of "tradition," the formal recognition of distinct "races" and the introduction of temporary measures to alleviate the inequalities between them. While there can be no doubt that the debate was provoked by the American experience of affirmative action (a number of North Americans were invited to recall that experience), it reveals quite clearly that the "American model" has by no means become hegemonic in Brazil. Furthermore, the issues at stake, although appearing under national banners, are really of a more general nature, for they go to the very heart of the question of humanity and its diversity in the modern world.

SOCIAL ACTION

With race issues brought to the fore in the Human Rights Program and interministerial working groups established, myriad initiatives aimed at addressing inequality and discrimination have mushroomed around the country. Most are funded by the government, international foundations, churches, or combinations of these. The range of initiatives reflects the range of opinions present in the academic debate. Some have chosen to explore options made possible by the laws against racism, bringing cases before the courts. Others concentrate on building self-esteem and a black identity, while others demand quota systems for blacks in public service and universities. Still others prefer hybrid solutions that simultaneously address issues of "racial" inequality and poverty in general by providing pre-university training courses for "blacks and the underprivileged" (*negros* e *carentes*). A few initiatives are promoted by transnational companies, a few are embedded in commercial enterprises, and a small number survive that are self-financing. There is not space here to discuss all these initiatives or to do justice to the complexity of this field. I choose just a few to illustrate the range of activities presently underway.

A number of organizations have concentrated their efforts to bring racism before the courts under the Caó law and under state and municipal legislation that has been complied by Hédio Silva, Jr., of the Center for the Study of Labor Relations and Inequalities (CEERT).[71] Notable are CEERT, the Center for the Articulation of Marginalized Populations (CEAP) in Rio de Janeiro, and Geledês, a São Paulo black women's organization.[72] Although it is extremely difficult to prove racist practice and even more difficult to bring miscreants to conviction given the extremely harsh penalties the law demands, a number of exemplary cases have been won.[73]

Traditionally, Brazilian black movements have placed the greatest emphasis on establishing a specific black identity.[74] Like academics, they felt that Brazil's complex and finely graded system of "racial" classification, as part of the "myth of racial democracy," was responsible for masking the true bipolar division of Brazilians into whites and blacks, *brancos* and *negros*.

Besides, as I argued earlier, to be able to exist at all, the movement was obliged to argue for a black identity in Brazil that would include all those who were not white. As John Burdick has so brilliantly shown, this particular affront to what da Matta called Brazilian sociological intelligence alienated many people who were sympathetic to the antiracist cause but reluctant to abandon their identities as Brazilians or as *morenos* for what appeared to them to be the exclusiveness of blackness.[75] Furthermore, it has always been difficult for black groups to establish diacritical emblems of black culture, because, under the canopy of racial democracy, many cultural touchstones, such as *feijoada* (Brazil's national dish based on black beans and pork), *samba*, and *capoeira* (a balletic martial art), that can be traced back to Africa have become symbols of Brazilian nationality.[76] Perhaps that is why the symbols of black identity were frequently taken from outside Brazil, such as reggae in Maranhão,[77] hip-hop in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, and, finally, Africa itself, especially in Bahia, where "Afro" carnival groups, in particular Ilê Aiyê, have, since the early 1980s, brought African-inspired themes to the Carnival parade and restricted their membership to people with very dark skin. Out of this experience, a musical style, Axê music and its derivatives, developed and became almost a national obsession.[78] Very recently, however, and I think related to these initiatives, a strong movement has emerged to celebrate exactly what Nogueira had noted marks "race" in Brazil, namely, appearance. The commercial success of the magazine *Raça Brasil*, which is now in its fourth year, surely lies in its emphasis on the aesthetics of blackness. Another example of celebrating a black aesthetic and trying to improve access of black Brazilians to the labor market is the Brazilian Center for Information and Documentation of the Black Artist (CIDAN), founded by actress Zézé Motta to promote black artists through a catalog that is now available on the Internet (www.cidan.org.br).

At a recent seminar on blacks and the labor market at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, psychologist Maria Aparecida Silva Bento, a longtime black activist and presently general coordinator of CEERT, affirmed that to suggest quotas for blacks is always interpreted as a "provocation," to the

extent that in her knowledge no such program exists in Brazil. Even those transnational corporations whose headquarters are in the United States and who conduct "diversity" programs in Brazil avoid any mention of quotas, concentrating their efforts on cultural events and support for poor communities. The Xerox Corporation funds the Vila Olímpica, where young athletes from the Rio shantytown of Mangueira receive training, while BankBoston has teamed up with Geledês to support promising black high-school students.

Where quotas have been proposed, opposition has been virulent. For example, a bill introduced by veteran black movement leader Abdias Nascimento, mandating a 20 percent quota for the hiring of blacks into the civil service, found no support in the Senate, where arguments similar to those of Reis were advanced to suggest the bill's unconstitutionality.[79] Likewise, a bill introduced into the Rio de Janeiro Legislative Assembly by "Green" deputy Carlos Minc by which 10 percent of places in public universities and technical colleges would be reserved for "historically discriminated ethno-racial sectors" and a further 20 percent for the "needy" (*carentes*) has met with no greater success. A group of students at the University of São Paulo who proposed a quota system for black candidates for university places and a complex system for deciding who fits into that category has also run into heavy opposition so far, even though it has led the university administration to appoint a Commission on Public Policy for the Black Population in 1999. The Commission has been charged with conducting research to discover the demand, access, and success rates of black students at the university and to propose measures to reduce whatever difficulties they identify and to increase the enrollment of black students. Conversations with members of the Commission reveal yet again the dilemma of meeting the demands for black advancement without offending the sensibilities of those who reject quotas.

While the building of a "racial" identity continues to inspire many organizations, there has been a growing emphasis on addressing the concrete issues of inequality in the workplace, in the educational system, in relation to health, and in religious organizations. As a result, black caucuses have emerged in

trade unions, preuniversity courses for young blacks and other disadvantaged people have been organized countrywide, special efforts have been made to reach black women concerning their reproductive health, and black priests and pastors have organized to fight racism within the Catholic and Protestant Evangelical churches.[80] With a reduction of an exclusive emphasis on forging identity, parts of the movement have also become more inclusive, seeking alliances beyond the small core of black activists (*militantes negros*) and recognizing that not all Brazilians favor forgoing their complex system of racial classification for the bipolar model.[81] As I have argued elsewhere, the very movement itself seems unable to ritualize its own desire.[82] On November 20, 1995, not long after Louis Farrakhan's March on Washington, various black organizations in Brazil organized a "March on Brasília" to celebrate the anniversary of the death of the maroon leader and national hero Zumbi and to protest racial discrimination. Two students who participated in the march returned with the clear sensation that they had participated in a very "Brazilian" affair. In contrast to the besuited masculine seriousness of the Washington march, the Brazilian version consisted of men *and* women of all possible colors, who *danced* their way to the center of power *dressed in the brightest garb*, rather in the manner of a carnival samba school (*escola de samba*). The students commented that it was as if Brazil had refused to accept a racial division within social and political life, even when it came to the issue of racism itself.[83]

In these ways, and by avoiding a head-on collision with the ideals of mixture and "racial democracy," the movement has been able to attract more support and achieve greater credibility. A particularly interesting example of this response to the demands for "racial" equality without total racialization is the Movimento Pré-Vestibular para Negros e Carentes (MPVNC), whose successful students are given scholarships to the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC). As its name suggests, this movement organizes courses to prepare students who are black, poor, or both for the university entrance exams (*vestibulares*). Those who pass the entrance exam to the Catholic University of Rio automatically win scholarships on the

basis of an agreement signed between the two organizations in 1994.

The name of the movement reflects the dilemmas that confront Brazilian activists who feel the need for affirmative action but who recognize that "particularistic" initiatives tend to run up against opposition from the "liberals" and from those who believe Brazil to be "different." The decision to include "*negros*" and "*carentes*" in the name of the organization represents a compromise between the two positions. There are a number of reasons for this. In the first place, the Catholic Church itself is averse to racial distinction, and a number of white Catholic teachers participate in the course.[84] Second, the organizers of the course recognize that exclusion from educational opportunity is not a monopoly of black Brazilians. But it may also be that the decision simply reflects the diplomacy of cordiality. Regardless of the reasons for the choice of name, the movement has been enormously successful, and the number of nuclei and students grows apace.

The course itself is similar to the many other *pre-vestibular* courses in Rio de Janeiro. What makes it different is that the teachers give their own time and students contribute with an almost symbolic payment of about $10 per month as compared with the commercial courses that cost up to $500 per month. It refuses all outside funding. In addition, a weekly class on civics in which the racial issue is addressed is added to the standard curriculum.

Anthropologist Yvonne Maggie suggests that the great success of the movement may lie in its ability to allow for the coexistence of various positions on the racial question within the movement itself. "Far from trying to give priority to candidates for places who are activist members of the black movement, the Movement chose a different strategy, attracting students of diverse colors and with diverse views about the race issue."[85] Thus, students who define themselves as "*negros*" study side by side with students who define themselves as "Flicts," after the hero of a children's book written by the humorist Ziraldo. (The word "Flicts" in this context indicates both all colors and none.) Finally, Maggie and her team have found that the vast majority of students and teachers, excepting

part of the leadership of the movement, are not in favor of quotas for black university applicants but rather show a strong commitment to individualism as defined by Reis. Although they work together in study groups and although the entire movement is based on generous solidarity, the belief that students ultimately enter the university on the basis of their own hard work and dedication is dominant.

Yet the Catholic University's involvement with the MPVNC has not gone without criticism among a certain sector of the student population. In November of 1997, a student newspaper, significantly called *The Individual* (*O Indivíduo*), published an article entitled "The Black Night of Consciousness." In this article, Pedro Sette Câmara launched a violent critique of the "Week of Black Consciousness" that took place to commemorate the black hero Zumbi, the leader of the Quilombo of Palmares, the best-known maroon community localized in Alagoas in the seventeenth century. He argued that it was obviously inspired by "the North American notion of political correctness" and was a clear example of cultural colonialism, and ventured the opinion that such events are themselves racist. "Nobody would like it if we had the week of white consciousness," he wrote. "Whenever you exalt a race it is racism."[86]

The following year, during elections for the students' union, one faction, "PUC Diversity," accused another, "PUC 2000," of being "prejudiced" and "segregationist." A PUC Diversity literature student was quoted as saying: "Three years ago, the entry of students from the pre-university course for blacks and the needy (*negros* e *carentes*) ended up changing the social landscape of the PUC, a school which is traditionally seen as elite. . . . This group which won the elections is prejudiced and it discriminates and segregates. Diversity of social classes is healthy." Another member of PUC Diversity claimed that one of their members who lives in the North Zone of Rio and studies on a scholarship was told that he should not be studying at the PUC because he was poor, while yet another complained that PUC 2000 had accused PUC Diversity of providing a base for "poor people, blacks and pot smokers." Walter de Sá Cavalcante, a law student and member of PUC 2000, countered the accusation: "The Students' Union is mixed [*mesclado*]. The difference

is that [PUC Diversity] cannot understand that the world has changed and that the students' movement must modernize. We are doers, while they still believe in the armed struggle." He went on to describe PUC Diversity as "the PT crowd" in an alliance with "neo-hippies."[87]

This social drama reveals yet again the contradictory premises upon which "racial politics" are built in Brazil. As Monica Grin, who is conducting research on events at the PUC, has noted, all of the actors prefer to talk about social class rather than race.[88] When they do get around to the issue of "race," each side accuses the other of being segregationist, as if neither were prepared to forgo the "mixture" that PUC 2000 identifies with Brazilian culture. Ironically, the accusation of "cultural colonialism" and "the North American notion of political correctness," normally made by the Left against the "neo-liberals," moves in the opposite direction in the debate arising from the celebration of black identity at the Catholic University. Once again, the "American model" is invoked as Brazil's nemesis.

This drama brings me back to the questions I raised earlier. PUC 2000 could be interpreted as paradoxically using American "political correctness" as an effective accusation designed to repress the positive "subversion" of PUC Diversity. But who decides what is positively subversive and what is not? Are Bourdieu and Wacquant having their cake and eating it too? Are they characterizing "political correctness" as an accusation made by conservatives against "subversives" in some situations and as the ethnocentric imposition of alien ideas in others? In the drama of the PUC, I find it difficult to understand the attitude of the rector and those who supported him (only 40 percent of the student body, according to Grin) in judging the opinions of the authors of the essay published in *The Individual* sufficiently abhorrent to discount the right to freedom of expression, which is guaranteed by the Constitution. I find it especially difficult to understand given the fact that the PUC was the target of massive repression, above all of the freedom of expression, during the years of the military regime.[89] But then, in all fairness, the debate over the "racial" issue, whether in France, Brazil, or the United States, is, as I hope I have

shown, founded on doubt and contradiction, above all because the issues at stake are so intimately intermingled with questions of national and personal identity and projects. I find it difficult not to side with those who resent attempts to interpret the "Brazilian model" or "Brazilian sociological intelligence" as fundamentally erroneous. To do otherwise would be to renege on the tenets of my discipline and succumb to pressures to capitulate to the inevitability of the "racialization" of the world. And yet, taking such a position, contrary to the dominant views of so many of my friends and colleagues, including those in the thick of the antiracist struggle in Brazil, is painful, bringing, as it does, accusations of "neo-Freyreanism," representing white privilege or even of a lack of concern for racism and "racial" inequality. For however particular and specific the "American model" may be, it has the political and epistemological advantage of simplicity and consistency. As such, the "Brazilian model," with all its ambiguity and internal contradiction, is far more difficult to grasp intellectually, let alone as a base for political action.

CONCLUSION

The events I have described persuade me that the idea of affirmative action has gone to the heart of the most potent of Brazilian nationalisms. The hybrid ideas and institutions that have begun to emerge over the issue of affirmative action, combining concerns for the inequality between people of different colors and between people of different social classes, are testimony to the potency of the desire to maintain primacy of the individual over his or her "nature," as it were; of what Brazilians call *jeitinho* over rigorous classificatory discipline.[90]

Even so, although tempers run high between the backers of diversity and the stalwarts of individualism, as is the case between PUC Diversity and PUC 2000, the debate is at least out in the open, probably far more so than in those parts of the world that have emerged from a tradition of legal racial segregation and where the mere suggestion of "integration" raises many eyebrows. Furthermore, the appropriation of "affirmative action" in the concrete case of the MPVNC is a good

example of the way "foreign" ideas are interpreted in local terms, acquiring in the process new meanings and considerable symbolic and practical efficacy. As a result, more poorer and darker people are entering Brazilian universities, but not at the expense of the values of democracy, racial or otherwise. To end on a positive note, and to return to the specificity of Brazil, I suggest that the situation at present is one that allows for multiple forms of expression and myriad forms of social action as the old ideal of racial democracy, which is still shared by most Brazilians of all colors, meets increasingly cogent demands for equity and the elimination of prejudice and discrimination.

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ENDNOTES

[1]Robert Schwarz, *Ao vencedor as batatas: forma literária e processo social nos inícios do romance brasileiro* (São Paulo: Livraria Duas Cidades, 1971).

[2]"le pouvoir d'universaliser les particularismes liés à une tradition historique singulière en les faisant méconaître comme tels." Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, "Les Ruses de la Raison Impérialiste," *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociale* 121–122 (1998): 109.

[3]Ibid., 111.

[4]Ibid., 112.

[5]Ibid., 113. In particular, they cite my own university, where, they claim, the Rockefeller Foundation, which funded a project on race and ethnicity, made it a condition of funding that the research team be recruited on the basis of the American criteria of affirmative action. And, as it so happens, the example they cite runs counter to their own argument, since the Rockefeller Foundation did not in fact impose any conditions for funding the race and ethnicity program at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, which brought to our university scholars from all over the world (including Loïc Wacquant) with

the express purpose of putting the "American model" in cross-cultural perspective. For us, and for many others, a blind "imposition" of the "American model" would bring about consequences far more pernicious than "symbolic violence." We knew, from our understanding of the effects of imperialism and colonialism *tout court*, that impositions of this type that run counter to local understandings might be at best inefficacious and at worst painful. In this case, then, at least one Brazilian university was funded by a great American foundation to put the American experience in its due place, as just one historically specific way of construing race, institutionalizing racism, and then combating it.

[6]Marshall Sahlins, *How "Natives" Think: About Captain Cook, for example* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995).

[7]This is not to deny, of course, the various attempts to bring race issues to public policy, in particular the encouragement of "white" immigration (see G. Seyferth, "A assimilação dos imigrantes como questão nacional," *Mana—Estudos de Antropologia Social* 3 [1997]) and the invocation of race as a primary concern of criminal investigation (see Olívia Gomes da Cunha, "Intenção e Gesto: Política de identificação e repressão à vadiagem no Rio," doctoral thesis, Museu Nacional, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 1998).

[8]Arthur de Gobineau, *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humains* (Pairs: Libraire de Paris, 1855).

[9]Gobineau, quoted in Georges Raeders, *O Inimigo Cordial do Brasil: O Conde de Gobineau no Brasil* (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1988), 241.

[10]Ibid., 242.

[11]Lilia Moritz Schwarcz, *O Espetáculo das Raças* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1993); Thomas Skidmore, *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993 [1974]).

[12]Raymundo Nina Rodrigues, *As Raças Humanas e a Responsabilidade Penal no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Progresso Editora, 1957 [1894]).

[13]Oliveira Viana, *Raça e Assimilação* (São Paulo: Editora Nacional, 1934).

[14]Giralda Seyferth, "A antropologia e a teoria do branqueamento da raça no Brasil: a tese de João Batista de Lacerda," *Revista do Museu Paulista* (1985): 81–98.

[15]Gilberto Freyre, *Casa Grande e Senzala* (Rio de Janeiro: Maia & Schmidt, 1933), 17–18. Marcos Chor Maio has observed that Freyre was also indebted to the Brazilian anthropologist Roquette Pinto, who in the First Brazilian Eugenics Congress argued that "the number of somatically deficient individuals in some regions of the country is quite marked. This, however, is not due to any racial factor but rather pathological causes which have nothing to do with anthropology. It is a question of educational and sanitary policy." Marcos Chor Maio, "'Estoque semita': a presença dos judeus em *Casa-Grande & Senzala*," *Luso-Brazilian Review* 36 (1999): 95–110.

[16]Freyre, *Casa Grande e Senzala*, 168.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid., 171.

[19]Franz Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1986), 65. I am grateful to Yvonne Maggie for this reference.

[20]Célia Azevedo, "O abolicionismo transatlântico e a memória do paraíso racial," *Estudos Afro-Asiáticos* 30 (1996): 152.

[21]Rodrigues, *As Raças Humanas e a Responsabilidade Penal no Brasil,* 149–150.

[22]Ricardo Benzaquen de Araújo, *Guerra e Paz: Casa-Grande & Senzala e a Obra de Gilberto Freyre nos anos 30* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora 34, 1994).

[23]I owe this interpretation to Olívia Gomes da Cunha, who, on the basis of her work in the Office of Criminal Identification in Rio de Janeiro, argues that individuals were identified and classified according to the singular combination of "racial" characteristics that their measured bodies betrayed. Olívia Gomes da Cunha,"Intenção e Gesto: Política de Identificação e Repressão à Vadiagem no Rio de Janeiro," postgraduate program in social anthropology, doctoral thesis, Museu Nacional, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 1998.

[24]Michael George Hanchard, *Orpheus and Power: The Movimento Negro of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil, 1945–1988* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[25]Leo Spitzer, *Lives in Between: Assimilation and Marginality in Austria, Brasil, West Africa, 1780–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Stefan Zweig, *Brasil, País do Futuro* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1960).

[26]Verena Stolcke, "Brasil: Uma nação vista através da vidraça da 'raça,'" *Revista de Cultura Brasileña* 1 (1997): 207–222.

[27]Marcos Chor Maio, "O Brasil no concerto das nações: a luta contra o racismo nos primórdios da Unesco," *História, Ciências, Saúde* V (1998): 375–413.

[28]Verena Stolcke, "A Nation Between Races and Class: A Transatlantic Perspective," unpublished paper presented to the Race and Ethnicity Program, Institute of Philosophy and Social Sciences, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 1996, 3.

[29]Marcos Chor Maio, "A história do Projeto Unesco: estudos raciais e ciências sociais no Brasil," Universidade de Rio de Janeiro Institute for Research (IUPERJ), 1997.

[30]Abdias do Nascimento, ed., *O Negro Revoltado* (Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1982); A. Guerreiro Ramos, "A Unesco e as relações de raça," in ibid.

[31]Florestan Fernandes, *A Integração do negro na Sociedade de Classes,* vol. 1/2, ensaios 34 (São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1978).

[32]Carlos A. Hasenbalg, *Discriminação e Desigualdades Raciais no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1979).

[33]Luis de Aguiar Costa Pinto, *O negro no Rio de Janeiro: relações de raça numa sociedade em mudança* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1953).

[34]Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, *Escritos Indignados* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1984).

[35]Moema Teixeira, "Raça e Crime: Orientação para uma Leitura Crítica do Censo Penitenciário do Rio de Janeiro," *Cadernos do ICHF* (Universidade Federal Fluminense) 64 (1994): 1–15.

[36]Sérgio Adorno, "Discriminação Racial e Justiça Criminal em São Paulo," *Novos Estudos CEBRAP* (1995): 59.

[37]Carlos Antonio Costa Ribeiro, *Cor e Criminalidade: Estudo e Análise da justiça no Rio de Janeiro (1900–1930)* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora UFRJ, 1995), 72.

[38]Cunha, "Intenção e Gesto."

[39]Adriano Maurício, "Medo de Assalto: a democraci racial em questão no ônibus público na cidade do Rio de Janeiro," masters thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 1998.

[40]Michael Lambert, "From Citizenship to Négritude: 'Making a Difference' in an Elite of Colonized Francophone West Africa," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35 (1993).

[41]Cleusa Turra and Gustavo Venturi, eds., *Racismo Cordial: A Mais completa análise sobre o preconceito de cor no Brasil* (São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1995).

[42]CPDOC-FGV/ISER, *Lei Justiça e Cidadania* (Rio de Janeiro: CPDOC-FGV/ISER, 1997).

[43]"'We Brazilians,' said a white person, 'have a prejudice against having prejudice.'" Roger Bastide and Florestan Fernandes, *Brancos e Negros em São Paulo*, 3d ed. (São Paulo: Anhembi, 1971), 148.

[44]Hanchard, *Orpheus and Power.*

[45]Carl Degler, *Neither Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986).

[46]Talcott Parsons, "The Problem of Polarization on the Axis of Color," in *Color and Race,* ed. John Hope Franklin (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 352–353.

[47]Hanchard, *Orpheus and Power*, 182–183.

[48]Angela Gilliam, "From Roxbury to Rio—and Back in a Hurry," in *African-American Reflections on Brazil's Racial Paradise,* ed. David J. Hellwig (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 180.

[49]Oracy Nogueira, "Preconceito Racial de Marca e Preconceito Racial de Origem," in *Tanto Preto quanto Branco: Estudos de Relações Raciais* (São Paulo: T. A. Queiroz, 1985), 67–94.

[50]Jamari França, "Um modelo que exclui a maioria negra," *Jornal do Brasil* (1998): 4.

[51]I have analyzed this elsewhere. See Peter Fry, "O que a Cinderela Negra tem a Dizer sobre a 'Política Racial' no Brasil," *Revista USP* 28 (1995): 122–135; Peter Fry, "Why Brazil is Different," *Times Literary Supplement,* 1995, 6–7.

[52]Yvonne Maggie has drawn attention to Florestan Fernandes's usage of a dichotomous taxonomy in consonance with his activist informants. Yvonne Maggie, "A Ilusão do Concreto: análise do sistema de classificação racial no Brasil," Professor Titular, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 1991.

[53]Jessé Souza, "Multiculturalismo, Racismo e Democracia: por que comparar Brasil e Estados Unidos," in *Multiculturalismo e Rascismo: uma comparação Brasil–Estados Unidos,* ed. Alayde Sant'Anna and Jessé Souza (Brasília: Paralelo 15, 1997), 32; Souza, "Valores e Estratificação Social no Distrito Federal," in *Brasília: A Construção do Cotidiano,* ed. Brasilmar Nunes (Brasília: Paralelo 15, 1997), 141.

[54]Marisa Peirano, *Uma Antropologia no Plural: Três Experiências Contemporâneas* (Brasília, DF: Editora UnB, 1991).

[55]Peter Eccles, "Culpados até a prova em contrário: os negros, a lei e os direitos humanos no Brasil," *Estudos Afro-Asiáticos* (1991): 146.

[56]The law is so harsh that the police are reluctant to prosecute under it. Antonio Sérgio Guimarães shows that of 275 complaints of racial crimes brought to the São Paulo Police Station between 1993 and 1997, only 58, or 21.1 percent, were classified under the Caó Law. The majority were dealt with under the laws against personal offenses. Antonio Sérgio Guimarães, *Preconceito e discriminação. Queixas de ofenses e tratamento desigual dos negros no Brasil* (Salvador: Novos Toques, 1998).

[57]Article 68 of the 1988 Constitution states: "Definitive property rights of the descendants of maroon communities (*quilombos*) who continue to occupy their lands are recognized and the State is obliged to issue the respective titles."

[58]Yvonne Maggie drew my attention to this significant shift of emphasis, having herself observed the notable emphasis on culture and identity during the events surrounding the 1988 centenary of the abolition of slavery in Brazil. She observed that the vast majority of events were of a cultural nature, while few addressed the issues of inequality. Yvonne Maggie, "Cor, hierarquia e sistema de classificação: a diferença fora do lugar," *Estudos Históricos* (1994): 149–160.

[59]Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Octávio Ianni, *Côr e Mobilidade Social em Florianópolis: Aspectos das Relações Entre Negros e Brancos Numa Comunidade do Brasil Meridional* (São Paulo: Brasiliana, 1960).

[60]My emphasis.

[61]Fábio Wanderley Reis, "Mito e valor da democracia racial," in *Multiculturalismo e Racismo*, ed. Sant'Anna and Souza, 222.

[62]Ibid., 224.

[63]Roberto da Matta, "Notas sobre o Racismo à Brasileira," in ibid., 71.

[64]Ibid., 74.

[65]Antonio Sérgio Guimarães, "A Desigualdade que anula a desigualdade, notas sobre a ação afirmativa no Brasil," in ibid., 233.

[66]Ibid., 237.

[67]Ibid., 241.

[68]Ibid.

[69]Antonio Sérgio Guimarães, "Políticas Públicas para a ascenção dos negros no Brasil: argumentando pela ação afirmativa," *Afro-Ásia* 18 (1997): 179; Guimarães, *Racismo e Anti-Racismo no Brasil* (São Paulo: Editora 34, 1999).

[70]John Burdick has argued that one of the reasons the Brazilian black movement has remained so small is its insistence on imposing a dichotomous taxonomy, which is repelled by many ordinary Brazilians of all colors. John Burdick, *Blessed Anastacia: Women, Race and Popular Christianity in Brazil* (New York and London: Routledge, 1998).

[71]Hédio Silva, Jr., *Anti-Racismo: Coletânea de Leis Brasileiras (Federais, Estaduais, Municipais)* (São Paulo: Editora Oliveira Mendes, 1988).

[72]Sérgio Adorno's research cited above was conducted in conjunction with Geledês.

[73]Olívia Cunha and Marcia Silva drew my attention to the "positive" aspects of the failure of the judicial system to bring cases of racism to court.

[74]Joaze Bernadino, in a recent master's thesis, has argued cogently that the black movement's crusade in favor of affirmative action is in effect part of a wider strategy to develop a black identity in Brazil, substituting the complex taxonomy of colors with a binary one as in the United States. Joaze Bernadino, "Ação Afirmativa no Brasil: A Construção de Uma Identidade Negra?" Mestrado, Universidade de Brasília, 1999.

[75]Burdick, *Blessed Anastacia*.

[76]Peter Fry, "Feijoada e Soul Food: Notas sobre a Manipulação de Símbolos Étnicos e Nacionais," in *Para Inglês Ver: Identidade e Cultura na Sociedade Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982), 47–53.

[77]Carlos Silva, "Da Terra das Primaveras à Ilha do Amor: Reggae, Lazer e Identidade em São Luís do Maranhão," Mestrado, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 1992.

[78]Livio Sansone and Jocelio Telesdos Santos, *Ritmos em Trânsito: Sócio-Antropologia da Música Baiana* (Salvador: Dynamis Editorial/Programa Cor da Bahia/Projeto S.A.M.B.A., 1998).

[79]Bernadino, "Ação Afirmativa no Brasil."

[80]Burdick, *Blessed Anastacia*; Caetana Damasceno, "Cantando Para Subir: Orixá no Altar, Santo no PEJI," Mestrado, Museu Nacional, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 1990.

[81]Olívia Gomes da Cunha, "Black Movements and the 'Politics of Identity' in Brazil," in *Culture of Politics/Politics of Culture: Re-visioning Latin American Social Movements,* ed. Sonia E. Alvarez, Evelina Dagnino, and Arturo Escobar (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998).

[82]Peter Fry, "Color and the Rule of Law in Brazil," in *The (Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America,* ed. Juan E. Mendez, Guillermo

O'Donnell, and Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999).

[83]José Renato Perpétuo Ponte and Denise Ferreira da Silva, personal communication. See also Denise Ferreira da Silva, "Zumbi & Simpson, Farrakan & Pelé: as encruzilhadas do discurso racial," *Estuds Afro-Asiáticos* 33 (1999): 87–98.

[84]In a recent article in the Rio de Janeiro newspaper *O Globo*, the Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro, Cardinal Eugênio Sales, published an article entitled "Miscegenation" in which he extols the virtue of "mixture" while deploring the celebration of "racial" or "ethnic" identities. Eugênio de Araujo Sales, "O papel da miscegenação," *O Globo,* 1998, 7. This can only be a thinly veiled attack on the Black Pastoral, which he has never looked upon with favor. Damasceno, "Cantando Para Subir."

[85]Yvonne Maggie, "O Pré-Vestibular para Negros e Carentes: Universalismo, particularismo e a busca de novos caminhos para diminuir a exclusão e a desigualdade," *V Congresso Luso-Afro-Brasileiro, Maputo, Moçambique, 1998*.

[86]Pedro Sette Câmara, "The Black Night of Consciousness," *O Indivíduo*, November 1997.

[87]The "PT" is the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Worker's Party), which is to the left of the Brazilian party spectrum and enjoys much support among university students.

[88]Monica Grin, "Descompassos & Dilemas Morais: Percepções sobre a Questão Racial no Brasil," *Seminário Fronteiras e Interseções, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 1998*.

[89]In an article in *O Globo*, journalist Hélio Gáspari argued along similar lines. Hélio Gáspari, "Dois abacaxis para a PUC," *O Globo,* Caderno Opinião, Quarta feira, 26 November 1997, 7.

[90]The concept of *jeitinho* refers to the ways in which rules can (and even should) be bent when they interfere with an individual's self-interest. Although often represented as a rather charming aspect of Brazilian irreverence, it is also at the root of inequality before the law and social inequality in general. Evidently the economically and politically powerful have greater recourse to *jeitinho* than the weak.

Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro

Democratic Governance, Violence, and the (Un)Rule of Law

Democratic leaders during political transitions in Brazil have held an overly optimistic view that civilian government and the strengthening of civil society would be sufficient to consolidate the rule of law. New civilian governments have underestimated the vigor of the authoritarian legacy and have proved unable to reform institutions inherited from the military regimes. In spite of democratic governance, the rule of law is far from being effectively established, and citizenship is not yet guaranteed for large sectors of the population, which live in dire conditions of poverty and social inequality. In Brazil, violence is deeply rooted in the wide gap between the elites and the general population, the longevity of slavery, racial discrimination, and profound social inequalities. But contemporary violence cannot be explained by referring exclusively to these elements; the incapacity of democratic governance to reform state institutions certainly bears a greater impact at the present juncture. More than in other South American societies—exceptions being Colombia and Peru, ravaged by insurgencies—the (un)rule of law continues to prevail for the underprivileged.

Efforts to implement specific public policies to tackle this endemic violence (expressed by extremely high rates of homicide, gross human-rights violations, torture, and summary executions) have proven futile, and impunity prevails. What are

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the main features of this complex sociopolitical reality? What is it about Brazil and its society that makes it so difficult to impose accountability?

THE LEGACY OF AUTHORITARIANISM

For more than two decades, from 1964 to 1985, Brazil was ruled by a military dictatorship. There has always existed a generalized acquiescence vis-à-vis arbitrary power, which may explain the relatively low degree of intensive repression during the military governance. When compared with contemporary dictatorships, military repression in Brazil boasts the lowest rates of disappearance, arrest, and murder. In Argentina, more than 20,000 people have been killed or have disappeared; in Chile, 3,000 have disappeared and thousands have been arrested and executed; and in Uruguay, one finds the highest incidence of imprisonment per capita in the Southern Cone. In Brazil, by contrast, there were thousands of cases of torture, and approximately 7,367 people were arrested,[1] but there were fewer than 360 political disappearances.[2]

At the beginning of the military dictatorship in 1964, very few voices dared to condemn the arbitrary detentions and torture inflicted upon political militants, supporters of the previous constitutional regime, and members of labor unions and student organizations. However, as the intensification of political repression began to affect members of the elite, complaints and protests ignited, invoking human-rights issues in cases of military abuse. In the 1970s, the emphasis was on civil-rights violations committed by the police and the parallel repressive apparatuses established by the armed forces.

In the 1980s, a dynamic network of social movements began to be organized throughout the country in urban as well as rural areas. It was then that new concepts of human rights emerged, with the creation of new political subjects. Unforeseen movements surged, such as the struggle for indigenous rights, which, in some sense, substituted for or prolonged the agrarian-reform issue. Progressively, several movements shifted to the promotion of social and economic rights among the poor sectors of the population. Several groups also began to promote

rights to housing, health, education, and a clean environment, as well as the rights of minorities, women, and children.

Thus, paradoxically, it was under the military regime that new forms of mobilization developed. It was not simply ideas that were being imported from abroad, but rather new social practices, a new discourse, voicing the demand for the consolidation of the rule of law for all the population.

However, the emergence of civil-society movements cannot be exclusively interpreted as a contribution to stability and social cohesion. An inexorable shadow of uncivil society follows the strengthening of civil society. The solidarity and "public-spirit" values of civil society revealed during the struggles for democratization are a relevant dimension of the social system, but contiguous spheres continuously challenge these positive proprieties where diverse functional interests and contradictory objectives are expressed. This situation gives rise to social relations of a completely different nature.[3] This may explain the common trend of an increase of violence after democratic transitions in such different settings as Eastern Europe, Russia, South Africa, Brazil, and other countries in South America.

Even if democratic transition and consolidation provided the basic conditions for new forms of conviviality and pacification, the return to democracy coincided with the increase in violent criminality and the spread of gangs, Mafiosi, and other criminal organizations. All classes of vigilantes in several Brazilian cities exist, in a certain way, as a continuation of the death squads and other repressive clandestine organizations and practices that prevailed during the dictatorship.

Brazil's "slow, gradual, and secure" shift to democracy took the longest of all the political transitions of the 1980s, and because of this, military leaders were able to negotiate their departure from government and a full "general, ample, and nonrestricted" amnesty for their political crimes, guaranteeing impunity. In 1985, the country returned to civil rule, and three years later a democratic constitution with a comprehensive "bill of rights" was adopted.

Despite democratic constitutionalism, however, there exists an evident legacy in state apparatuses, left by the authoritarian

regime. The authoritarian regime promoted the militarization of public security and the unification of police forces.[4] A virtual impunity for military police was also established through military courts in each state for common crimes, which continues, with a few limitations, even today. Indeed, almost fifteen years after the transition, the police continue to have the same structural organization defined during the dictatorship and preserved in the 1988 Constitution.

LAWLESS VIOLENCE AND CRIME

There is a general perception that common crimes have increased since the return to democracy. Brazil is not an isolated case in the world if we consider violence and the fear of crime. After the 1960s, statistics on crime compiled around the world all pointed to a pattern of growing criminality, especially violent crime. This tendency was witnessed both in Europe and in the United States.[5] The situation in Brazil is aggravated by extremely high rates of homicide combined with a widespread impunity unacceptable under democratic governance.[6]

This may explain why Brazilians give so much value to the maintenance of order. Indeed, in a recent survey, compiled by the Center for the Study of Violence at the University of São Paulo, ten state capitals in Brazil confirmed that perception. When asked "which is the most important—to maintain order, to increase participation, to control inflation, or to protect freedom of speech," 31 percent declared that "the maintenance of order" was the most important. It was the second choice after the necessity "to increase participation" (34 percent); 24 percent considered the "control of inflation" to be most important, while only 9 percent chose "the protection of freedom of speech" as the most important.[7]

Brazil has the eighth largest economy in the world. But when we compare the national annual homicide rate per one hundred thousand—which has grown from 13 in 1980 to around 25 in 1996[8]—with the rates of the seven economies preceding it, Brazil belongs to a totally different category. Indeed, the national annual homicide rate in 1996 in the United States was 8.22, and in 1997 for Germany it was 4.86; France, 4.11; the

United Kingdom, 2.43; Italy, 4.90; Canada, 1.99; and Spain, 2.43.[9] Among the countries of South America, Brazil ranks second (just after Colombia) in deaths resulting from homicides: homicides have grown from 11,190 in 1979 to 40,470 in 1997.[10]

We must bear in mind that Brazil is a largely urban country: in 1997, 79.6 percent of the population lived in cities.[11] A large proportion of the urban population in most of the large cities live in poor neighborhoods and shantytowns, *favelas*, in those areas that Ignacy Sachs has called "geographic and social precities." This population does not live under the minimum conditions of what could be called an "urban life." They lack adequate housing, have little access to secure jobs, and have difficulty obtaining the most basic public services. In 1997, half of the homicides (51 percent) were concentrated in 1.8 percent of the cities with a population of more than twenty thousand, and seventy-four of those cities are located in just three states: twenty-eight in Pernambuco in the Northeast region, twenty-six in São Paulo, and twenty in Rio de Janeiro.[12] If we consider the mortality rate by homicide of fifteen- to twenty-nine-year-olds, in 1995 it almost doubled the national rate (44.8 per one hundred thousand), reaching 83.1 for men and 7.1 for women.[13] In Rio de Janeiro, during 1996, firearms caused 87 percent of the homicides.

When crime statistics are broken down according to area, a correlation appears between deprived neighborhoods and the risk of victimization. In the cities of São Paulo, Salvador, and Curitiba, the violent areas, where in certain communities homicide rates have reached an epidemic level, are also the ones with the lowest socioeconomic "grades."[14] Correspondingly, the areas with the highest socioeconomic grades also enjoy the lowest rates of homicide. Therefore, members of communities with low socioeconomic indicators have a much higher risk of being murdered than those living in less deprived neighborhoods. In Rio de Janeiro, the mapping seems at first to be more complex, as *favelas,* located mostly in the hills, and wealthy neighborhoods can coexist in the same geographic area. But a closer observation confirms the correlation already observed in the case of São Paulo: there is a large disparity between the two

areas in terms of their homicide rates and socioeconomic grades. The southern zone, which is the most affluent, has the lowest rates of violence, whereas the northern zone, which is the poorest in the city, has the highest rate of murder:[15] the correlation between the rate of homicides and the quality of life is clear. These figures confirm Amartya Sen's observation of violence as an element of social deprivation.[16]

These high-risk areas are marked by several unmet needs: an absence or an insufficiency of public services (schools, cultural and sports organizations, transportation, clean water, and street illumination), a lack of commercial infrastructure, and isolation or very limited access to other neighborhoods, transforming them into enclaves.[17] In these spaces, physical violence is a concrete reality that disturbs every aspect of daily life. The frequency of homicides, thefts, robberies, and aggression in general is such that they have provoked the virtual disappearance of public spaces.[18] In those areas where most of the homicides occur and where the police presence is extremely sparse, not to say absent, the state monopoly of physical violence has been relaxed. An individual's survival may actually depend on his or her ability to display a "credible threat of violence."[19] This may also be explained by the fact that, in an environment where violence is deemed legitimate, a "loss of structure in society" often occurs. In urban Brazil, social restraints have in fact been loosened, and violence is increasingly perceived as a legitimate means of solving conflicts.[20]

But it would be misleading to consider these populations to be excluded (as in the French expression *exclusion sociale*), or even marginalized, because their immense majority is composed of lawful citizens, workers who share the same values and experience the same urban culture. They watch the same soap operas on television and have similar ambitions (often unattainable). It must be emphasized that in Brazil over 97 percent of houses in these poor urban areas have electricity, 90 percent have radios, 85 percent have television sets (which is more than the 80 percent who own refrigerators), 78 percent have access to a main water supply, and 70 percent have sewerage facilities (main connections or septic tank), even if just 25 percent have telephones.[21]

Those populations are confronted day after day by the control and terror of organized crime and the arbitrary power of the police (the only face of the state that the immense majority of the poor know). We may say that the rule of law is nonexistent in these areas. But these populations themselves are not lawless, and they attempt to remedy the terror imposed upon them by criminals who live in their communities.

A wide variety of criminals is active in the urban areas where the poor live. These criminals may act individually or in groups; they may be either regular citizens or state agents. It should be noted that the difference between the two categories—*justiceiro* (vigilante) and *matador* (gunman)—is not always evident. It is common knowledge that civil or military police, both on and off duty, participate in private death squads. During the military dictatorship, death squads were formed with the support of authorities to kidnap or kill political dissidents in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. After the dictatorship, most of these groups were dismantled, but their practices survived in different forms. Death squads involving the police continued to be active in several states, for example, in Acre, Espiríto Santo, and along the border with Paraguay in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul. In this last case, it is the special border division of the state police that is suspected of taking part in criminal actions.[22]

In the 1990s, cocaine use has dramatically increased in the main metropolis in the east of the country, as well as in the principal cities located in the transit routes of drug trafficking between Bolivia, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. Contemporary Brazil offers an important market for the cocaine produced in Bolivia, in addition to the large markets in the United States and Europe:[23] Brazil is already the second largest consumer of cocaine in the world.[24] If one considers the logistics of drug running, it becomes apparent that the conditions found in the great hydrographic basins in South America offer an ideal natural system for the circulation of cocaine. Drug traffickers can rely upon vast river, road, and air networks, which act as a reliable liaison between the Pacific Coast and the Atlantic Ocean.[25] The growing strength and infiltration of these criminal organizations into state institutions such as the police, the

judiciary, and the federal, state, and municipal legislatures reveal the weaknesses of the democratic state.

Gross human-rights violations under democratic rule are much more visible when they occur in urban areas thanks in part to media exposure. But police brutality and massacres are also frequently committed in rural areas. Several rural conflict areas have become territories for the confrontation between rural workers, activists, state military police, and landowners' private militias. During the 1990s, the landless poor, led by the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Movement of Landless Workers), intensified land occupations aimed to pressure the government to accelerate land reform, which resulted in increasing violence directed at the leaders and participants in this movement.

The incapacity of democratic governance to create and reform institutions to build a state able to protect the rights of the citizens certainly has an impact on the violence and criminality described above and must be taken into consideration to understand contemporary Brazil.

A USABLE STATE?

The role performed by state institutions in the existing context of violence continues to be extremely precarious, to say the least. "Unfortunately, it is a chronically violent country. The police are not efficient, it does not fight crime, and it is violent. The justice system is very slow," was the candid statement recently given by José Gregori, secretary of state for human rights.[26] Police and other institutions of the criminal justice system tend to act as border guards protecting the elites from the poor. Police violence, such as torture, remains unpunished, as it is largely directed toward these "dangerous classes" and rarely affects the lives of the well-to-do. Throughout the country, impunity is virtually assured for those who commit offenses against victims considered "undesirable" or "subhuman."

Thus, despite the vigor of the resistance to the dictatorship and the inventive capacity of civil-society organizations (CSOs) formed in the 1970s, a coercive state apparatus to protect the rights of all is not yet available to the general population. The

state—the main defender of rights, the *defensor pacis*, the main guarantor of pacification—is simply not perceived as accessible to all citizens.[27] In terms of the protection of rights and public security, there is not a usable state available—the basic requirement of a consolidated democracy. Fifteen years after the dictatorship, many surveys indicate that people still think it dangerous to go a police precinct, even to make a simple complaint. A recent study in Rio de Janeiro indicated that just 20 percent of people robbed went to the police. Of these, just 13 percent effectively registered complaints, and in as few as 5 percent of those cases, the police have had some success in their investigations.[28]

The police tend to see the rule of law as an obstacle rather than as an effective guarantee of public security. They believe that their role is to protect society from "marginal elements" by any means available, even if those means are illegal.[29] Illegal detention by the civilian (judiciary) police continues to be a common practice. The return to a democratic constitutional system in 1985 was an outstanding advancement that enabled civil society and the offices of federal and state public prosecutors to fight the arbitrary practices of state institutions. However, arbitrary practices have not yet been fully eradicated.

One of the main obstacles to changing the police system is that state governments, despite the regionally determined differences in security issues they face, are not allowed by the federal Constitution to define a police structure more adequate for their respective needs. The states cannot unify the military police (in charge of patrol) and the civilian police (in charge of the investigation), or extinguish them, or modify the role of either. This aspect makes it difficult (if not impossible) to curb the authority of the police and gives them a large degree of autonomy.[30] During the last fifteen years, several government proposals were presented to the National Congress to change the police structure inherited from the military regime. Among them were the separation of the military police from the armed forces, the extinction of the military police, the transfer of the activities of patrol from the military police to the civilian police, and the autonomy granted to the states to organize their police forces and to eliminate the military status of the military police.

Not a single one of these changes to the Constitution was voted. On the contrary, in 1998, under pressure from the armed forces and the "lobby" of the military police, the Congress approved Constitutional Amendment 18, which defined the military police as the "armed forces [*militares*] of the states," reinforcing their military status and making reform of the public-security system seem even more distant.[31]

Police do not receive sufficient training, they are underpaid, and most do not respect the rule of law. Torture is used in the majority of police inquiries throughout Brazil. Torture became a crime in 1997, but these horrendous practices are protected by the absence of effective systems of accountability. Accusations of torture are rarely investigated, and when they are, those responsible often go unpunished. In 1998, there were several high-profile cases in which the police extracted confessions from defendants who were later shown to be innocent.[32]

Besides torture, summary execution of suspected and accused criminals has become a common practice in several states. It is justified as a way to control ordinary crime in poor neighborhoods, and the victims come from the most vulnerable groups in society—the poor, the homeless, and those of African descent. This picture becomes even more complex in light of the acquiescence by the majority of the population to these practices. Such killings receive broad support from elites as well as the poor—who are the first targets of these abuses and crimes.

Since the 1970s, the regular killing of young, poor, and nonwhite suspects by the military police has been common in Brazil's main state capitals like Rio Janeiro and São Paulo. In São Paulo, for example, from 1990 through 1998, 6,218 civilians were killed by the military and civilian police—an average of 691 a year and 58 a month. The number of civilians killed by the police reached its peak in 1992, when 1,458 civilians were killed by the military and civilian police. In 1997, the civil and military police killed 1,008 civilians, and in 1998, the number dropped to 546. In Rio de Janeiro, 595 civilians were killed by the police from January through October of 1998, an average of 59 killings a month.[33]

Some cities have showed some recent improvement: Rio de Janeiro police killed fewer civilians in 1999 under a new state

administration. In São Paulo, figures released by the state secretariat of public security showed that the police killed 317 civilians in the first seven months of 1999, suggesting that by year's end, the number would rise for the third consecutive year. Despite measures taken by civilian authorities in São Paulo in recent years to control police abuse, police killings, after experiencing a sensible reduction, are again on the rise.[34]

The 1988 democratic Constitution did not reform the system established under the military dictatorship in which crimes committed by the military police were tried in military police courts. These courts are composed of military officials and base their sentences on shoddy criminal investigations. They often give impunity for acts like police killings and other violent crimes. In 1996, the competence to examine and try homicides perpetrated by the military police was transferred to civilian courts and popular juries. This transfer occurred following the legislative initiative that President Fernando Henrique Cardoso proposed in the context of the Human Rights National Program. This judicial reform, law 9299/96, being of a procedural nature, was retroactive for all cases not yet closed. Civilian courts are now examining cases involving the military police. Among such cases are the Eldorado dos Carajás massacre, which left nineteen landless peasants dead in the state of Pará in April of 1996. That incident, described in reports provided by an independent coroner, mandated by Nelson Jobim, then minister of justice, demonstrated that the police had hacked several of the landless to death with their own farm tools and shot others at point-blank range.[35]

Despite that important change, judicial authorities continue to fail to successfully prosecute recent violations despite overwhelming evidence. Seven years after the Carandiru massacre, the defendants have not yet been brought to trial. Despite the transfer of the Eldorado dos Carajás case to the state capital to assure independent jurors, a Belém jury of seven acquitted three of the defendants of all charges on August 19.[36] Efforts to prosecute the military police officers responsible for extreme police brutality in the Favela Naval neighborhood in Diadema, São Paulo, in early March of 1997 also suffered setbacks. A film made by an amateur cameraman and broadcast through-

out Brazil and the world showed police officers extorting, beating, torturing, and shooting persons randomly stopped at a roadblock. In one instance, after beating and humiliating the occupants of one car, Otávio Lourenço Gambra shot at the departing vehicle, killing Mário José Josino. The Justice Tribunal of São Paulo, the state's highest appellate court, overturned Gambra's murder conviction in June.

Access to justice in Brazil, especially for the poor, has always been extremely precarious. Historically, the judiciary has not been perceived as a body that protects the rights of the underprivileged classes, but rather as an institution responsible for the criminalization and repression of these classes. There is an extremely unfavorable perception of the legal system, which is reflected in the low frequency with which the population resorts to the judiciary.[37] The operation of the judiciary is marked by legacies from the authoritarian past: these are perhaps more present in the judiciary than in any other state institution. The criminal justice system is also characterized by strong racial discrimination. Nonwhites confront greater obstacles in accessing justice and have more difficulties in having their rights protected. As a result, they are more likely to be punished and they tend to receive more rigorous penal treatment.[38]

In 1990, there were only 5,164 judges in Brazil. The ratio between the number of judges and the size of the population is the lowest in those states where impunity is most flagrant: in the state of Alagoas, there is one judge for 44,000 people; in Pernambuco, one judge for 40,228 people; in Maranhão, one judge for 39,383 people; in Bahia, one judge for 38,774 people.[39] The Brazilian national average is one judge for every 29,452 inhabitants; the deficiency becomes more apparent when this ratio is compared to those in developed countries. In Germany, there is one judge for every 3,448 inhabitants; in France, one for every 7,142 inhabitants; and in Italy, one for every 7,692 inhabitants. In this respect, Brazil follows the typical pattern of developing countries, which allocate a greater proportion of human resources to the police, ultimately to the detriment of the judiciary: in 1986, 2 percent of its criminal justice personnel were judges, while 80 percent were police. In developed countries, in the same year, 8 percent were judges and 76 percent

were police.[40] A clear indicator of the lack of judges in Brazil is the fact that in every state there is a large percentage of judgeships that are not being filled: the national average of empty positions is 26 percent, and it is as high as 50 percent in some states.[41]

Another aspect of the crisis of the judiciary is the large discrepancy between the volume of cases that are brought to trial and the number that are resolved in court. In 1990, 4,209,623 prosecutions were brought before magistrate judges throughout Brazil; only 2,434,542 were resolved in the same period. This extremely low level reflects the output of the judiciary in recent years. Furthermore, since the number of prosecutions tends to increase and the speed for resolving cases remains constant, this discrepancy continues to grow.[42] Due to the accumulation of prosecutions, many judgments are not carried out within the procedural time limit and the charges are therefore dropped. Consequently, impunity is widespread. Some judges who are corrupt and controlled by local interests intentionally allow some charges to lapse.[43] In many states in the North and the Northeast, there is often a judge but no prosecutor, or vice-versa.

Many judges and prosecutors in rural conflict areas have received death threats and live under the protection of the federal police. The criminal justice system has failed to investigate and prosecute the numerous cases of rural violence against peasants. This is partly explained by the repetition of rural massacres—to the point that they are now perceived as a common phenomenon—and the lack of effective measures for investigation of most of these crimes. According to the Pastoral Land Commission (Comissão Pastoral da Terra, CPT), of the 1,730 killings of peasants, rural workers, trade-union leaders, religious workers, and lawyers committed between 1964 and 1992, only 30 had been brought to trial by 1992, and of those only 18 resulted in convictions. The lack of effectiveness witnessed in the police and the judiciary exists in penal institutions as well. Detention conditions continued to violate international norms as severe overcrowding, abysmal sanitary facilities, and lack of legal and medical assistance provoked riots in police lockups, jails, and penitentiaries throughout 1999. Food, health

conditions, and medical assistance are poor for the 170,208 prison inmates held in Brazilian prisons, which have a capacity of only 74,000. Commonly, the management of these establishments is arbitrary and oppressive, and the internal administration is often left to the inmates themselves. It is difficult to imagine the impact of these circumstances on the hundreds of thousands of inmates concentrated in very limited spaces.[44] In the pens—police lockups initially used for short-term detention but transformed into long-term facilities in the city of São Paulo—there are more than 9,000 prisoners living in sub-humane conditions. Prisoners' riots, hostage-taking, and hunger strikes are a routine occurrence in every state as prisoners demand that minimally humane conditions of incarceration be provided or that they be transferred from police lockups to penitentiaries.

Every year there are dozens of deaths in prisons resulting from prison official and police violence. The inmates live under the constant threat of being beaten or tortured by prison guards and police, common methods used to control the prison population. Criminal suspects and prisoners are the forgotten victims of gross human-rights violations in Brazil.[45] Torture is also common in police precincts. The inmates are subjected to oppression from the guards and sexual violence from other inmates. In consequence, riots and mutinies are frequent. The reaction of the police to these outbreaks has, in general, been the use of "massacres to restore order."

Conditions of detention for juveniles also remained well below international standards as well as below the minimum guarantees established in Brazil's progressive Children's and Adolescents' Statute (Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente, ECA). A series of riots in detention facilities for adolescents in São Paulo demonstrated the state government's inability to maintain security in the facilities or guarantee minimum standards of decent accommodations for the youths held there. In September of 1999, some 500 detainees escaped from the Imigrantes center during two days of rioting. At the time of the riots, the center held more than 1,300 juveniles in a space designed for fewer than 400. In the midst of the September rioting, footage from television camera crews showed guards

at these detention centers using batons to beat juveniles who had already been subdued and stripped to their underwear.[46]

CIVILIAN GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Despite the inability of the Brazilian state to implement guarantees of the rule of law for the majority of citizens, the return to democratic governance brought important changes, making the national landscape today very different from what it was fifteen years ago. The present democratic regime functions in a country where three-fifths of the population is enfranchised, 80 percent are urbanized, and more than half of the workers are in the service sector. There was an impressive 12 percent growth of the electorate between 1994 and 1998, mostly in the areas of the North and Central-West. In 1998, there were more than 106 million voters, corresponding to 65 percent of the total population, making Brazil one of the world's largest electorates. But the states of the federation in which more voters are concentrated continue to be those located on the seacoast of the Southeast region: six of these states—São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Rio Grande do Sul, and Paraná—have more than 60 percent of the voters.

Several changes were made concerning relevant civil and political rights. The democratization process contributed to guarantee most political rights such as fair and clean elections, freedom of parties and candidates to campaign (although there have been a few cases of political assassination), and alternation in power. Another important element was the growing attention that several federal administrations—those of José Sarney, Fernando Collor, and Itamar Franco—gave to the ratification of human-rights treaties and conventions during the 1980s and the 1990s. The federal Congress voted recognition of the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, and President Cardoso, on December 9, 1998, in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, announced this important decision. The Brazilian state has now ratified all the core instruments of international human-rights law. The official recognition of those international norms has contributed to strengthen and empower

groups "struggling domestically—both legally and politically, and in creating both material incentives and normative pressures for the internationalization of such norms into domestic legal and political systems."[47]

This official recognition of the human-rights international machinery will be an important element in prosecuting the perpetrators of gross human-rights violations, increasing the "power to embarrass" governments by CSOs, which is extremely effective in making governments comply with human-rights requirements. CSOs have learned that when they are unable to get the attention of their government, they can bypass the state apparatus and call on international allies to apply pressure on the government from the exterior. After most of the core human-rights treaties were ratified by the Brazilian government in the 1990s, these organizations began to turn to international institutions—like the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights—responsible for aiding in the implementation of such treaties. These institutions express concern to the national government and apply pressure by shaming it on the international stage.[48] The federal government in the 1990s has begun to play a decisive role in promoting and protecting human rights with the objective of putting an end to persistent illegal and violent practices.[49]

During the political transition in the 1980s, social movements—like labor unions and associations of the liberal professions, for instance, the Society for the Advancement of Science (SBPC), the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB), the Brazilian Press Association (ABI), and the new human-rights association—were able to reshape the face of politics by helping to dismantle authoritarian regimes. In the new democratic setting, CSOs have rapidly developed as they moved beyond their role in the resistance against dictatorship, being able to establish new connections between the autonomous spheres of society and political institutions.[50] The new constitutional system opened up space for new movements and organizations defending the rights of women, blacks, Indians, rural workers, and groups with differing sexual orientation. The contemporary Brazilian population and civil society is much more active, better informed, and more participatory than ever. A major develop-

ment of this has been that CSOs were able to accumulate a large number of experiences, build greater knowledge, and create better networks. One outstanding example is the Rede de Informação do Terceiro Setor (RITS, Third Sector Information Network).

CSOs have also begun to function as "early warning systems," acting as censors that hear public opinion and concerns and attempt to introduce different viewpoints into the political process. They are able to provoke political exposure and transparency, contributing to the control of political power and of powerful social groups, forcing them to act in accordance with the law. In all these ways, CSOs are capable of contributing to the amplification and democratization of the political process.[51]

The National Movements on Human Rights, the National Movement of Street-Kids, and the national conferences on human rights promoted by the Human Rights Commission of the House of Representatives (Câmara de Deputados) were able in the 1990s to establish themselves as monitors of state compliance with international standards ratified by Brazil, proposing changes in state institutions and challenging the genuine interest of those institutions in defending human rights. Human Rights Watch/Americas, with a dozen Latin-American CSOs and the Center for the Study of Violence at the University of São Paulo, supported the creation of CEJIL, the Center for Justice and International Law, a corporate law office in Washington, which prepares the complaints on human-rights violations for the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the Inter-American Human Rights Court.

HOW TO EXIT FROM ENDEMIC VIOLENCE?

How do we exit this world of violence, gross human-rights violations, and impunity? What are the possible perspectives? We have learned that in a federal system the "political will" of the executive is not sufficient to bring about change. The federal government is convinced of the need to improve human-rights records, not only to improve the Brazilian image—as some wish to suggest—but as a requirement to establish good governance and efficiency within the state apparatus. Nonethe-

less, a certain tolerance for violence continues in government organizations and in society in general—a tendency that contributes to the resistance to human-rights policies.

It has been acknowledged that the Cardoso government has broken new ground by adopting a National Human Rights Program in 1996, prepared with the participation of CSOs.[52] Since then, annual National Human Rights Awards were established, the National Secretariat for Human Rights was established in 1997, and in 1998 it became a state secretariat. Important pieces of legislation have been introduced and approved, racial inequality was officially addressed, and the struggle against forced labor and child labor was intensified. There have been undeniable changes and advances in government policies to protect and promote human rights in the framework of a National Human Rights Program. Numerous partnerships were built with the National Movement on Human Rights, CSOs, human rights NGOs, research centers, and universities through the National Secretariat for Human Rights. These are all major advances in the history of the protection of human rights in Brazil.

An increasingly mobilized civil society contributed to the realization of these recent positive changes. Even if the numbers of Brazilians who participate in these civil CSOs are very limited relative to the population, it is important to note that violence and crime are being denounced by new associations and organizations that are enthusiastic about small progresses and not discouraged by numerous setbacks. Examples of this trend are the many human-rights groups, the campaign against hunger, the partnerships between government and civil society launched by the Comunidade Solidária, the Viva Rio mobilization against violence in Rio de Janeiro, and the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra.

We must not underestimate the changes in the 1988 Constitution that increased the powers of federal prosecutors, who became the defenders of indigenous peoples' rights. On occasion, they were even able to act against the Federal Union on their behalf. There exists today, in each state of the Federation, a citizenship federal prosecutor for the promotion and protection of human rights. In June of 1999, a project to reform the

judiciary was elaborated in the House of Representatives, and at the same time a Commission of Investigation was established to look into cases of corruption, nepotism, and misallocation of funds in both houses.

State governments have also contributed important innovations to this movement. In the state capitals of São Paulo, Fortaleza, Belo Horizonte, and Rio, the police are now subject to the control of an ombudsman *(Ouvidoria)*. The ombudsman has a precise mandate. Independent and respected officials who receive and process complaints of police violence fill the office. In 1998, the ombudsman of São Paulo was able to show that police violence had been underreported by roughly 30 percent throughout the decade.[53] As a result of this observation, the governor of São Paulo declared that police killings are to be regularly published in the official government newspaper *(Diário Official)*.

There are structural obstacles that the Brazilian government will have to overcome. The first step is clearly the implementation of institutional reforms. The judicial court system, perhaps the most evident in its inadequacy, must be rethought and its ideology revised. The promotion of human rights, especially among the poor, has never received the necessary attention and consideration of Brazilian judges. It is rare that these judges have even basic knowledge of international human-rights obligations, despite the fact that the 1988 Constitution recognizes these obligations as domestic legislation. Ideally, associations of conscientious judges will become a state norm, modeled after the Judges for Democracy, which was formed to promote within their profession the values of democratic constitutionalism, human rights, and social responsibility.

As in any process of reform, the establishment of the rule of law and civil society in Brazil is multidimensional and requires more than institutional restructuring alone. Changes must simultaneously be made to the penal code and the penal process. It is crucial, for example, to remove from the code the provisions that delay legal procedures and that are occasionally used to escape punishment by those who have the means to hire a lawyer. Brazil must not be characterized by the simple enforcement of criminal law, precisely because one of the cardinal

features of any criminal law is its discriminatory nature. Indeed, the vast majority of those who are punished or imprisoned in Latin American society are the powerless and the underprivileged, exactly those who should be protected by the rule of law in a democracy.[54]

Does the possibility of remedying this urgent situation of endemic violence, high rates of criminality, and homicide exist for Brazil in the near future? It is difficult to imagine that in a country of such continental proportions, the multiplicity of problems being confronted can be solved in all of the diverse geographic regions. There are many positive practices being implemented by a number of different state governments in areas such as public security and citizenship. However, for these attempts to be fully effective and achieve true reform, the federal government must play an active role, as many of the necessary changes to institutions such as the police and the judiciary depend upon constitutional amendments. To build a sound support for these changes, some political reforms are fundamental—like controls on economic power during elections, the limitation of parliamentary privileges (which now give immunity from criminal prosecution), the reduction of overrepresentation of the less populated states, and the confrontation of corruption and infiltration of organized crime in the state apparatus.

Democratic states have failed to promote accountability, that magic word that does not exist in Spanish or Portuguese. In consequence, CSOs need to increase pressure on states so that they can build accountability through serious investigations, prosecution, and punishment of criminal offenders, be they civilians, civil servants, or government agents, without interference of party politics.

In accordance with what I have said thus far, one of the basic strategies for CSOs should be to strengthen local social controls on the public policies of the state. Besides monitoring gross human-rights violations, it is crucial to monitor the performance of state institutions. One of the main problems in Brazil, as a result of corruption, inefficiency, and lack of accountability, is that social investment often does not reach the most underprivileged. The decentralization of state power has opened

new possibilities to better define the appropriate mechanism for local social control.

In any case, the first and most basic issue in the next decade for government and civil society is to cope with lawless violence. Rights are systematically violated under democratic rule, as they have been consistently throughout the Republican period since 1889. It is a trademark of Brazilian political history: abusive practices against citizens (nowadays against the youth in particular), entrenched in the political system. Torture under police investigation and abominable prison conditions persist without dramatic changes.

Thus, reinforcing the rule of law continues to be extremely relevant for effective democratic governance. For everyone to understand that human rights are the rights of all, and not only of the elite, it is essential that CSOs be able to mobilize, organize, and fight for the realization of social, economic, and cultural rights without the threat of being tortured or murdered. Constitutional guarantees and basic democratic principles, such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association, are the foundation of an active civil society. CSOs challenge the power of the state, but it is only within a democratic state that a democratic civil society can thrive, as it is only a democratic civil society that can effectively preserve a democratic state.[55]

Thus, Brazilian society arrives at the turn of the century obliged to cope with rampant crime and violent death. The obstacles are immense; the impediments sometimes seem insurmountable. What is needed is not just the implementation of rights but the institutionalization of public policies capable of preventing the practice of gross human-rights violations. Even if in Brazil the past never seems to die, democratic constitutionalism may open new perspectives in the next century to guarantee finally the control of the elites by the nonelites, a primordial and essential requirement for an effective democracy.

ENDNOTES

[1]See Arquidiocese de São Paulo, *Brasil Nunca Mais* (Petropolis: Vozes, 1985), 85–88.

[2]Nilmário Miranda and Carlos Tibúrcio, *dos filhos deste solo (Mortos e desaparecidos políticos durante a ditadura militar: a responsabilidade do Estado)* (São Paulo: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo/Boitempo Editorial, 1999), 15–16. The government's special commission on political disappearances, at the Ministry of Justice, established by the law 9140/95, recognized that the Brazilian state was responsible for the disappearance of 148 people until May of 1998 (besides the 136 already recognized in the annex of that law). The commission continued its work in 1999.

[3]Jeffrey Alexander, "Aspectos não—civis da sociedade. Espaço, tempo e funcäo," *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais* 33 (12) (February 1997): 175–176.

[4]Sérgio Adorno, "Insegurança versus direitos humanos: o governo FHC (1995–1998) entre a lei e a ordem," *Tempo Social* 11 (2) (October 1999).

[5]Sérgio Adorno, "O Gerenciamento Público da Violência Urban: a justiça em Ação," in Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro et al., *São Paulo sem medo* (São Paulo: Garamond, 1998), 227–246.

[6]See, for instance, Robert Sampson: "Once crime reaches a certain level, a lot of gang violence we see is reciprocal. . . . Acts of violence lead to further acts of violence. You get defensive gun ownership. You get retaliation. There is a nonlinear phenomenon. With a gang shooting, you have a particular act, then a counter response." In Malcolm Gladwell, "The Tipping Point," *The New Yorker*, 3 June 1996, 32–38.

[7]Of course, this perception may be influenced by an increasing exposure to violence, notably through the media. But despite that, it is extremely revealing of insecurity and disorder as unsolved problems. See Nancy Cardia, coordenação, *Attitudes, Normas Culturais e Valores em relação à violência em 10 capitais em capitais brasileiras* (Brasília: Ministério da Justiça, Secretaria de Estado dos Direitos Humanos, 1999), passim.

[8]Even if the crimes of homicide may be affected by the underregistration that characterizes all the information on crime, the data on mortality, reasonably systematized under the same criteria throughout the country, offer a situation extremely close to reality. See Ministério da Saúde, Fundação Nacional de Saúde, Departamento de Informática do Sistema Único de Saúde, Coordenação de Informações de Saude, Sistema de Informações de Saude, SIM, IBGE in IBGE, Departamento de População e Indicadores Sociais, *Síntese de Indicadores Sociais 1998* (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1999), 49.

[9]For data about France and other European countries, see France, Ministère de l'Intérieur, *État de la Criminalité et la Délinquance en France et dans l'Union Européenne* (Paris, 1997); for the United States, see U.S. Department of Justice, *Uniform Crime Reports* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996).

[10]"Arquitetura da Violência," *Folha de S. Paulo,* 17 October 1999, sec. 3, 3.

[11]IBGE, *Síntese de Indicadores Sociais 1998,* 19.

[12]In the state of São Paulo (54.7 homicides per one hundred thousand) and in Rio de Janeiro (53.7 homicides per one hundred thousand) there are approxi-

mately seven hundred homicides a month, or twenty-three a day, or one an hour. Sistema Único de Saúde, "Arquitetura da Violência," sec. 3, 3.

[13]In 1995, the most populated and/or affluent regions had the highest mortality rates by homicide per 100,000: North, 28.5; Northeast, 28.8; Southeast, 63.70; South, 23; Center-West, 38.2. But if we consider each state individually, this tendency is no longer true. Some of the Brazilian states with the highest rates are those that are more populated, such as Rio de Janeiro, 114.7; and São Paulo, 68.8. The smallest rates belong to Minas Gerais, 11.9; Santa Catarina, 12.3; and Rio Grande do Norte, 14.7. But Pernambuco, 65.9, is not the most populated nor the most affluent and yet it has the third highest rate after Rio and São Paulo. IBGE, *Síntese de Indicadores Sociais 1998,* 47–48.

[14]See MJ (Ministério da Justiça), CEDEC (Centro de Estudos da Cultura Contemporânea), *Mapa de Risco da Violência Cidade de São Paulo* (São Paulo: CEDEC, 1997), 4.

[15]Ibid., 7–11.

[16]Amartya Sen, "The Economics of Life and Death," *Scientific American* (May 1993): 46.

[17]See Albert Levy, "L'espace public peut être incivil," *Le Monde* (16 janvier 1998): 15.

[18]See Loic J. D. Wacquant, "Banlieues françaises et ghetto noir américain: de l'amalgame à la comparaison," *French Politics and Society* 10 (4) (1992): 81–97.

[19]For a discussion on the state monopoly of physical violence see Norbert Elias, "Violence and Civilization: The State Monopoly of Physical Violence and its Infringement," in John Keane, *Civil Society and the State* (London: Verso, 1988), 177–198. The expression "credible threat of violence" is from Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, *Homicide* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter Press, 1988), passim.

[20]Robert Wright, "The Biology of Violence," *The New Yorker*, 15 March 1995, 73.

[21]"Survey Brazil," *The Economist* (27 March 1999): 14.

[22]Human Rights Watch, "Brazil," *World Report 1999* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998), 103–109.

[23]I owe this information to Christian Geffray.

[24]*Veja* 32 (9) (8 dezembro 1999).

[25]Lia Osorio Machado, "Movimento de Dinheiro e Tráfico de Drogas na Amazonia," in Maurides de Melo Ribeiro and Sergio Dario Seibel, *Drogas, Hegemonia do Cinismo* (São Paulo: Fundação Memorial da América Latina, 1997).

[26]"Survey Brazil," 14.

[27]The 1996 Latin American *Barometer* survey showed that, when asked how much confidence they have in the police, 21 percent of Brazilians answered "some," 35 percent answered "a little," and 39 percent declared to have "no confidence at all." With respect to confidence in the judiciary, the results are

astonishingly similar: 28 percent answered "some," 35 percent "little," and 39 percent "none." *Latin Barometer,* June 1996, 35.

[28]Leandro Carneiro, "Para medir a violência," in Dulce Pandolfi et al., *Cidadania, Justiça e Violência* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1999), 175.

[29]Paul Chevigny, *The Edge of the Knife* (New York: The New Press, 1995), passim.

[30]I am relying on Paulo Mesquita Neto, "Pesquisa e prática policial no Brasil," versão revisada do texto preparado para apresentação no seminário "Agenda de Colaboração Sociedade/Polícia," mimeo, 11 June 1999, 18.

[31]Ibid., 19–20.

[32]Human Rights Watch, "Brazil," *World Report 1999.*

[33]Mesquita Neto, "Pesquisa e Prática Policial no Brasil," 8.

[34]Summary of the cases from Human Rights Watch, "Brazil," *World Report 1999.*

[35]See Claudio Júlio Tognolli, "O Dedo de Badan Palhares," *Caros Amigos* (5) (September 1999): 17–19.

[36]The trial for the remaining 152 defendants is pending a decision of the Ceara's State Justice Court on an appeal by the Public Ministry asking for the verdict to be annulled.

[37]See Maria Teresa Sadek and Rogério Bastos Arantes, "A crise do judiciário e a visão dos juízes," *Revista da USP* 21 (Março-Abril-Maio 1994): 39.

[38]Sergio Adorno, "Racial Discrimination and Criminal Justice in São Paulo," in Rebecca Reichmann, *Race in Contemporary Brazil* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 123–138.

[39]Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, "Democracia, derechos humanos y desarollo economico y social obstáculos y resistencias. El caso de Brasil," paper, Santiago de Chile, Centro de Derechos Humanbos de las Nacionales Unidas, Seminario Latino Americano de Expertos, 1991.

[40]"The Cost of Criminal Justice," *Trends: UNCJIN (United Nations Criminal Justice Information Network) Crime and Justice Letter,* special issue, November 1991.

[41]Sadek and Arantes, "A crise do judiciário e a visão dos juízes."

[42]Ibid.

[43]U.S. Government, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994,* report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate and the Committee on Foreign Relations, House of Representatives by the Department of State (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995).

[44]The ratio of prison inmates per one hundred thousand inhabitants increased in 1995 from 95.47 to 108.36 in 1997. The Penitentiary Census, Ministry of Justice, March 1998, indicated that there is one prisoner for 923 Brazilians. In the state of São Paulo, that rate is double the national rate: 198.66, or one

prisoner for 503 people. In the period from 1950 to 1997 the population of the state of São Paulo increased 39 percent and the number of prisoners rose by 239 percent.

[45]International, *Aqui ninguém dorme sossegado* (São Paulo, Porto Alegre: Seção Brasileira da Anistia Internacional, 1999), 1–2.

[46]"Relatório da Visita da Commissão Teotônio Vilela a Febem Imigrantes," mimeo, São Paulo, October 1999; and summary of cases from "Brazil," *Human Rights Watch 2000* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999).

[47]Andrew Hurrell, "Power, Principles and Prudence: Protecting Human Rights in a Deeply Divided World," in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Human Rights in Global Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 283.

[48]This is called the "boomerang pattern" by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikking, *Activists Beyond Borders* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 13.

[49]Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro and Paulo Mesquita Neto, *Texts from Brazil,* special ed. (Fifty Years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) (Brasilia: Ministry of External Relations, May/August 1998), year II-n.6, passim.

[50]Juan Carlos Portantiero, "La Sociedad Civil en América Latina: Entre Autonomia y Centralización," in Peter Hengstenberg, Karl Kohut, and Gunther Maihold, *Sociedad Civil en America Latina: representación de interesses y gobernabilidad* (Caracas: Nueva Sociedade, 1999), 37–38.

[51]The expression "early warning system" is from Dick Messner, "Organizaciones No-Gubernamentales; nuevas esperanzas o actores sobreestimados? Processos de Búsqueda en América Latina y experiencias de los países industrializados," in Hengstenberg, Kohut, and Maihold, *Sociedad Civil en America Latina,* 442–444.

[52]"Survey Brazil," 14.

[53]Human Rights Watch, "Brazil," *World Report 1999;* "Brazil," *Human Rights Watch 2000.*

[54]See Jean Paul Brodeur, "Comments on Chevigny" and Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, "The Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America," in Juan Méndez, Guillermo O'Donnell, and Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, *The (Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), 1–18, 71–86.

[55]Messner, "Organizaciones No-Gubernamentales," 448–449.

Even at the end of the 1990s, when investments made in the first stages of privatization had considerably increased telephone lines and telephone sets, the ratio between public telephones and inhabitants in Brazil was about 14.5 to 100. Public telephones are scanty: 3.5 sets for 100 people. On the other hand, 90.3 percent of all residences have access to radio. In the Amazon region, radio frequently replaces telephone for interpersonal communication. Prospectors disappearing in the woods for long solitary journeys seldom carry compasses; they cannot, however, do without the portable radio, able to transmit, in the middle of the jungle, news from home, or notice that a mono-motor is on its way to throw food along their trail. Radio is a powerful political device in Brazil. However, in contrast to television, it avoids arousing suspicion of political manipulation because its control is spread out among 2,986 commercial broadcasting companies. Sharing a relatively modest slice of the advertising market—4 percent, in contrast to 12 percent in the United States—they are not thought to be big businesses. The radio stations with the largest audiences reach only 4.3 percent of the public.

With television, the situation is very different. Its presence inside Brazilian homes, estimated at 86.2 percent, embraces all social classes, as does the radio. The 263 broadcasting stations and 3,747 retransmission stations lead 80 percent of all Brazilians to watch television every day. Six large private networks share some 97 percent of the audience. The others are principally state broadcasting stations. Their educational programs cannot begin to match the popular attractiveness of the commercial channels. Until 1995, seven out of ten sets were tuned in seven days a week to *TV-Globo,* which exports its products to other Portuguese-speaking countries. In April of 1999, when it broadcast the last chapters of *Torre de Babel,* 75.5 percent of all television sets in Portugal were plugged into this soap opera by *TV-Globo.*

Marcos Sá Corrêa

Alfred Stepan

Brazil's Decentralized Federalism: Bringing Government Closer to the Citizens?

INTRODUCTION

A NEW "WASHINGTON CONSENSUS" has been emerging, which says that increased decentralization is not only good for the economy but good for the politics of democratizing countries also. Why? Because it brings government closer to the people.

Brazil's 1988 Constitution mandated significantly expanded decentralization. In January of 1995, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a world-famous social scientist and architect of the Real Plan that would reduce inflation from four digits to one digit in two years, was inaugurated as president after a sweeping first-round victory. In January of 1999, Cardoso, again elected in the first round, began his second term. However, the extreme difficulties that the Cardoso administration has encountered in carrying out his reform agenda raises some serious questions about the wisdom of the Washington Consensus.

Are there, for example, some types of decentralization, such as are found embedded in Brazil's 1988 federal Constitution, that worsen the quality of democratic politics rather than improve it? This is the question I explore in this essay. But first, let us go back to the origins of democracy. How do contemporary federal systems relate, or not relate, to these origins? One of the earliest ideas of a democracy was that all the citizens of the polis, collectively deliberating together at one forum, were

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the *demos*. As the number of citizens grew, this direct participation of the demos in law-making had to give way to the election of representatives. For the analytic purposes of the argument to be explored in this essay, I will assume that the more a single deliberative body is responsible for law-making in the polis, and the more that body approximates the principle of one-citizen one-vote, the less the demos is constrained.

Of course, all modern democracies, correctly, are to some extent "demos-constraining." In order to prevent the people or demos from passing majoritarian laws that could violate the rights of minorities, for example, almost all modern democracies have a constitution that protects the fundamental rights of individual citizens and a supreme court with the constitutional prerogative to declare laws passed by the legislature null and void if, in that court's judgment, the laws violate the constitution.[1]

There are further constitutional constraints on the citizens that modern democracies have found acceptable. Societies that are multinational in population, and very large (in territory and/or population), have normally opted for a federal system. Unitary systems have "open agendas"—that is, there is no area where the highest legislative body cannot make laws. Federal systems, by definition, must to some extent have "closed agendas"—that is, there are some areas where the central federal legislature cannot make laws because these law-making areas fall within the constitutionally guaranteed and exclusive legislative competence of the subunits that make up the federation.[2] By universal modern practice, as well, all modern federal democracies have an Upper Chamber to represent the people of the territorial subunits, as in the U.S. Senate. To the extent that the Upper Chamber participates to any significant extent in law-making, this has the potential to further constrain the demos. All democratic federal systems are thus more demos-constraining than democratic unitary systems. This is widely understood.

What is less widely understood is the immense variation that exists within democratic federal systems. One can in fact construct a continuum that runs from the least to the most demos-

constraining federal systems. When we construct such a continuum, two things become clear. First, U.S. federalism, which is often depicted historically, politically, and analytically as the standard model of democratic federalism, is, empirically, an outlier, situated at the demos-constraining end of the continuum.[3] Second, Brazilian federalism, while often seen as being patterned on U.S. federalism, is actually vastly more demos-constraining than even U.S. federalism.

Many of the difficulties faced by the reform government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–) might be better understood if we could get greater intellectual purchase on Brazil's unique demos-constraining federalism. This essay will therefore address three broad aspects of it. First, I provide the evidence showing that Brazil has by far the most demos-constraining democratic federal system in the world. Second, I discuss briefly some of the historical factors involved in the emergence of such a constraining system of federation. And third, I explore how the Cardoso administration has attempted to make the political system less demos-constraining, less center-disabling, and more demos-enabling.

MODERN DEMOCRATIC FEDERATIONS: HOW DEMOS-CONSTRAINING ARE THEY?

The evidence upon which I base my assertion that Brazil has the world's most demos-constraining democratic federal system involves seven key factors. The first two factors involve the Upper Chamber, which I will occasionally call the "Territorial Chamber" because it represents the principle of territorial representation. I will at times refer to the Lower Chamber as the "Demos Chamber," because it represents in principle the one-citizen one-vote ideal.[4]

The Overrepresentation of States in the Upper Chamber

My attention to this factor may strike some readers as strange, because they may assume that the U.S. model, in which every subunit in a federation, however large or small, gets the same number of seats in the federal Upper Chamber, is the norm and

therefore easily justified. Actually, the equal representation of the different states in the federation produces a system of massive over- and underrepresentation. California's population, for example, is sixty-six times greater than that of Wyoming, yet both states get two U.S. senators, making one vote in Wyoming worth the same in producing a U.S. senator as sixty-six votes in California. Brazil's system of representation to the Upper or Territorial House is even more extreme. There, one vote in the sparsely populated state of Roraima has 144 times the weight in producing a Brazilian senator as does a vote cast in the densely populated state of São Paulo.

There is nothing intrinsic to democratic federal systems that leads to such malapportionment; Austria, Belgium, and India, for example, all use formulas for the representation to the Upper Chamber that approximate the principle of proportional representation. If we use the Gini index of inequality to measure the principle of representation to the Upper or Territorial Chamber, based on a scale of 0 (perfect equality of representation) to 1 (absolute inequality—one state has all the seats), we find that Austria has a score of 0.05, Germany 0.32, and Brazil 0.52, making Brazil among the most unequal of all the federal systems.[5]

The Policy Scope of the Upper or Territorial Chamber

The inequality built into representation in Brazil's federal system of government also involves the policy scope of the Territorial Chamber. On grounds of democratic theory and practice, is there any *prima facie* reason to think that the frequently malapportioned Territorial Chamber should be given the same policy scope as the more proportional Demos Chamber? Or should its power be limited to those issues that relate directly to the relations between the center and the territorial subunits or states? Democratic federal systems vary greatly as to how they answer these questions, but, in general, Territorial Chambers have less legislative power than the Demos Chamber; this is the case in Germany, for example, while in Austria, Spain, Belgium, and India the Territorial Chambers have even less power.

Brazil in theory follows the U.S. constitutional formula of relative power symmetry between the two chambers, but in fact

Brazil's Upper or Territorial Chamber, equivalent to the U.S. Senate (and also called the Senate), has more unilateral power to kill a bill passed by the Demos Chamber than in any other federal democracy.[6] Though senators seldom find they have to exercise this prerogative (because their power is anticipated), the Senate has many other exclusive competencies that are routinely exercised. Senators directly appoint two-thirds of the judges that review federal expenditures. They have the right to deny or confirm the other third. The Senate has exclusive competence to authorize international borrowing by the states. This means that even if the Central Bank says it is strongly opposed to a state contracting an international loan, the Senate can overrule the Central Bank and authorize the loan. The Senate has exclusive competence to approve the central administration's foreign borrowing levels. In fact, in Brazil, there is no policy area that is beyond the policy-making competence of the Senate. Indeed, there are twelve policy areas that are the exclusive law-making prerogative of the Senate.

In comparative terms, then, the Brazilian Senate is one of the most malapportioned territorial chambers in the democratic world. It also has the most disproportionate power vis-à-vis the chamber of the demos of any Upper Chamber in the democratic world. The consequences of this are, as we shall see, that a small group of senators have the power to put into the Brazilian Constitution many things that specially favor their states and to block any efforts at constitutional reform that might challenge or change their constitutional prerogatives.

Deviation from Proportionality in the Lower Chamber

In keeping with the demos principle of one-person one-vote in the Lower Chamber of federal systems, in the United States there is a national census every ten years in order to adjust the number of seats per state and redraw voting districts to reflect changes in population. In Brazil, however, the demos principle of one-person one-vote in the Lower Chamber is heavily diluted by the territorial principle. A unique "floor and ceiling" decision rule determines that no state, no matter how small in terms of population, can have fewer than eight representatives in the Lower Chamber, and that no state, no matter how large the

population, can have more than seventy. This decision rule introduces yet another constraint on democracy, this time in the Lower Chamber. For example, the one-person one-vote rule would have given the states of Acre, Amapá, and Roraima 1 federal deputy each in 1994 and the large state of São Paulo 114, whereas the Brazilian system actually produced 8 deputies for each of the three sparsely populated states while the citizens of the huge state of São Paulo were represented by only 70.[7]

The Amount of Powers Constitutionally Devolved to Federal Subunits

The U.S. Constitution and federal laws are explicit on the right of the Center to retain important powers that relate to the single market of the entire country. For example, the U.S. Constitution forbids any state to impose duties or taxes on imports or exports without congressional approval and prevents the states from entering into any treaty or alliance with other countries or extending their own bills of credit.

Here, once again, Brazil's federal constitution operates in a different direction, since it gives the individual states enormous scope to influence macroeconomic policies, thereby reducing the power of the democratically elected federal government to manage the economy for all the citizens.[8] Virtually every state in Brazil by the early 1990s had, for example, at least one substantially autonomous state bank. Neither the Lower Chamber nor the Central Bank had authoritative control over the subunits' international borrowing activities. In effect, the states *de facto* had the right to print their own money (by the mechanism of issuing huge bond offerings). An extraordinary number of spending rules, involving such things as the exact details of special tax schemes for regional (state-level) development projects, or regulations requiring fixed percentages of federal taxes to be handed over to the states and municipalities, or the amount of federal money that must be spent on irrigation in the North and Northeast, are furthermore specified in the 1988 Constitution as such, making them policy areas that lie beyond the scope of ordinary majority legislation. They are constitutionally embedded and thus require exceptional majorities to change.

Party-Systems as Potential Demos-Enabling Forces

As I have said, all democratic federal systems are inherently more demos-constraining than democratic unitary systems. However, programmatic and disciplined political parties can play an important role in representing and empowering the citizens of the demos. The United States has a relatively loose two-party system in which the parties, by European standards, are neither very programmatic nor very disciplined.[9] The Brazilian party system is much looser in terms of polity-wide cohesion than that in the United States and therefore is not in itself a compensating factor that can help overcome the demos-constraining factors I have mentioned so far, especially the power of groups of individual senators to block reforms. The party system existing in Brazil when Fernando Henrique Cardoso became president did not produce predictable, disciplined, and therefore relatively inexpensive (in terms of side-payments) majorities at the Center.[10]

Enduring programmatic party coalitions are made even more difficult due to the constant movement from party to party of many legislators. In the federal Lower Chamber during the 1991–1994 session, for example, 51.7 percent of the total deputies changed parties at least once, 18.1 percent to programmatically noncontiguous parties.[11] On the Pedersen Index of electoral volatility, which measures the net change in the vote or the seat shares of all parties from one election to another, Brazil's score from 1982–1994 was 33.0 percent. The United States from 1944–1994 was 4.0 percent. In this period, the only federal system in the world with a higher volatility than Brazil was semidemocratic Russia, with a volatility score of 54 percent for 1993–1995.[12]

The Control of Constitutionality and the Demos

Brazil has a unique combination of legal procedures concerning constitutional review that makes it easier for judges, at any level, to challenge the constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature than in any other federal democracy in the world. For example, in Switzerland there is no judicial review. In Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Austria there is a centralized

system of constitutional review in which only a single body, the constitutional court, can declare a law passed by the federal legislature unconstitutional.

The United States and Brazil have defused systems of constitutional review; that is, judges, at all major levels of the judicial system, can challenge the constitutionality of laws passed by the federal legislature. However, the United States has four principles of judicial review that tend to limit the defused system's challenge to the right of the federal legislature to pass laws that are considered binding. First, the Supreme Court in the United States has the right to control its own docket. It has the *writ of certiori* (the right not to review a case). Second, if the Supreme Court decides to review the constitutionality of a law and declares that the law is constitutional, the law is *erga omnes* (against everyone). Third, the Supreme Court's decision is *stare decisis* (a binding precedent) in all analogous cases, for all judges. Fourth, there is a norm, the so-called political question doctrine, that means that inherently political issues, which could in theory be constitutionally settled by carefully crafted laws, should if at all possible be left to legislative and not judicial determination.

None of these four principles is in effect in Brazil. The cumulative result is extremely demos-constraining. Even if the legislature passes a law, and the Supreme Court reviews a challenge and issues a judgment that the law is constitutional, the absence of the *erga omnes* and *stare decicis* principles means that the decision is only binding in the specific case under litigation. The next day, hundreds of plaintiffs, in virtually identical circumstances, can start constitutional challenges to prevent the same taxation law or the same agrarian reform expropriation law that was just declared constitutional from affecting them. Often, within a week, scores of lower court judges have issued injunctions preventing the law from going into effect against the plaintiffs in their court as long as litigation is in process.[13] With no *writ of certiori,* most of the cases go all the way back to the Supreme Court. With no "political doctrine" norm, normal politics becomes "justicialized." In the judgment of one of Brazil's closest observers of this process, "the judicial system,

especially the judiciary, has become a powerful resource for vetoing majority decisions made in the political sphere."[14]

The combined result is a Brazilian Supreme Court that is overwhelmed and whose decisions have little weight. While the U.S. Supreme Court decided on only 87 cases in 1996–1997, the Brazilian Supreme Court had to decide on 37,555 cases in 1997, and almost none of their decisions were generically binding. Thus, even when the legislature passes a law, Brazil's lower courts can continually create obstacles to the law's implementation, and the Supreme Court can almost never sanction a law as the law of the land.[15]

Monopoly of the Legitimate Use of Force by the Government

Most political scientists accept some version of Max Weber's definition of an independent state—namely, that the state is the entity that is able to effectively make a claim to the monopoly over the legitimate use of force in the country. Historically, however, a great deal of this control over force has always been devolved in Brazil to the individual states. Though the Brazilian Constitution of 1891 was relatively silent about state militias and who controlled them, the exporting states, especially São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul, benefited from their right to tax exports to finance virtual state armies. São Paulo, for example, tripled its revenues in the first year of the federation and quadrupled its military expenditures in three years. In the 1920s, São Paulo flaunted a military police force that normally outnumbered the federal army garrisoned in the state by a factor of ten, an air force that outnumbered that of the entire federal air force, and a French military mission.[16]

The new Brazilian Constitution of 1988, in Article 125, gives states the right to their own military police forces. Crimes committed by the force fall within the jurisdiction of that state's military court system. Thus, when Fernando Henrique Cardoso became president of Brazil, crimes against human rights, even murders, committed by state military police forces could only be investigated by military police prosecutors and tried in military courts from the same state where the alleged crime occurred. Many egregious violations of human rights, including

virtual massacres, were committed with *de facto* impunity because federal law enforcement officers or judges were powerless to intervene.

THE ORIGINS OF BRAZIL'S DEMOS-CONSTRAINING FEDERAL SYSTEM

The dominant theoretical model for explaining the origins of federations is William H. Riker's.[17] Riker believed that *all* enduring federations come into being via the same path, when a variety of political communities, each with a great deal of sovereignty, believe that they could increase their security, and possibly the size and power of their markets, if they entered into a voluntary bargain in which they pooled as much of their sovereignty, but no more than is necessary, to achieve these goals. We might call this a "coming together" federal system. Riker added a second argument to his first: namely, that the interests of the individuals (he often calls them "tastes") in the federation are more important than federal institutions (which he calls "congealed tastes") in determining policies. According to Riker, if the majority of individuals in a polity want to change their institutions, then these institutions will, in not too much time, become uncongealed, because they will reflect the new tastes of the majority of individuals. Both of these arguments are misleading and make it particularly difficult to understand Brazil.

The path to federalism in the United States in 1787 approximated the Rikerian path, and it is the example he had most in mind when he proposed his theory of federalism. With some differences, Switzerland in 1848 and Australia in 1901 also approximated this path.

But there are in fact many more paths to federalism than the bargaining path Riker described, paths that can generate different outcomes in federal institutions.[18] Brazil's path to federalism is normally seen as following the U.S. path; however, there are some important differences we should note. First, there was no "coming together" of previously sovereign political communities. The previous political community was a unitary state, the Brazilian empire under an emperor. Second,

there was no "bargain" between the future members to create the federation. The military, encouraged by some economic and political leaders mainly from São Paulo, executed a coup, set up a military-led provisional government, and declared Brazil a federal republic. Third, it probably strains language to say the members joined the federation "voluntarily." The Proclamation of the Republic explicitly stated that one of the extraordinary powers of the provisional government was to "defend the integrity of the country." Fourth, unlike the U.S. experience, one powerful state and its ally was able to gain great control over the constitution-making and state-building processes. Let us explore this fourth point.

During the constitution-making period in 1890–1891, the military began to divide somewhat, and one economically powerful and politically cohesive state, São Paulo, together with its powerful ally, the state of Minas Gerais, was able to control much of the constitutional agenda. As Brazil's leading export state and a state that wanted to subsidize immigration, São Paulo wanted, and got, a constitution that allowed states to tax exports and to negotiate, with Senate approval, international agreements.[19] It also wanted, and got, a constitution that did not say too much about the supremacy of federal law over state law and was not too explicit about the control of state militias.

The bargain that the state of São Paulo, the emerging hegemonic power, together with its allies, offered the other subunits was that all members of the federation would receive the same extreme rights of self-management (but without the financial and military resources to protect these rights). In addition, each subunit would get the same amount of seats as the hegemonic subunit in the territorial chamber of the weak center. The outcome was a federal system with very strong prerogatives for the member states.[20] In the beginning, it was a system dominated by a few powerful states. The president of the first constituent assembly of the federal republic in 1891 was from São Paulo. The first three popularly elected presidents of the new federal republic were from São Paulo. The ministers of finance and justice who put in place a reinforcing network of structures were from São Paulo. Significantly, the first minister of justice in the new federation, the Paulista Campo Salles,

"dissolved the commission appointed to draw up a civil code because he considered this a function of the state rather than the federal government."[21] Ironically, this federal constitutional legacy of strong states' rights, together with authoritarian interludes, eventually was not only demos-constraining, but São Paulo–constraining. This brings us to the question of the unusually strong "stickiness" of federal institutions.

Let us examine Riker's second major argument, that institutions are only the congealed "tastes" of individuals and thus ultimately melt before the new demands of the majority. The entire point of this essay, of course, is that the key political feature of federations is that they can create decision rules whereby minorities can block majorities. From a theoretical perspective, the hardest rules to change are those that give some specific benefits to a minority whose vote is required to change the rules. Changing the rules of a demos-constraining federation is one example.

The situation in the Brazilian federation has been further complicated by two additional factors. First, each of the three major Constitutions of 1891, 1946, and 1988 was put together in a democratizing atmosphere following a long period of centralized and nondemocratic rule; the spirit of the times in all three cases led to reinforcing states' rights as a democratic demand. Second, participation in the constituent assemblies of 1946 and 1988 was largely based on seat-allocation rules crafted by the immediately preceding authoritarian regime for its own purposes. These two apparently contradictory factors fused to make Brazil's Constitutions of 1946 and (especially) 1988 extremely demos-constraining.[22]

The Brazilian military regime that came to power in 1964 did not allow a direct election for president until 1989. However, unlike the military regimes of the period in Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, the Brazilian military regime allowed the Congress to stay open except for brief periods. To maintain control of the political system, *via an elected Congress,* the military regime intensified the demos-constraining features of the federation. In 1978 the military regime created the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, and, in 1982, another, Rondônia, out of rela-

tively underpopulated and underdeveloped areas in the North and Center-West. Federal subsidies and a strong military presence made these states much more predictably pro-government than those in the more developed South, where civil society organizations, trade unions, and opposition parties were becoming increasingly strong. In the South, the military also managed to eliminate an opposition state by fusing the states of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro into a single state called Rio de Janeiro.

As a result of the creation of small states in the North, twelve new federal deputy and six new federal senator posts were created. Owing to the fusion by the military of two states in the South, the developed states eventually lost three senators. The military also altered the formula for new federal representation to the lower and more democratic chamber, causing a further underrepresentation of the population from the larger states.[23]

Representation at the constituent assembly of 1986–1988 to a great extent followed these new military-crafted *faits accomplis*. Thus, the states of the North, Northeast, and Center-West, which together only represented about 40 percent of the population—the demos, if you will—had 52 percent of the votes at the constituent assembly.[24]

In this context, there was absolutely no effort in the constituent assembly to alter the decision rule that every state, no matter how small or large, would receive three senators. Likewise, no prerogatives were taken away from the Territorial Chamber, and some were added. There was also little discussion by members of the Lower Chamber (the possible one-citizen, one-vote chamber) about the elimination, or at least diminution, of the decision rule giving a minimum of eight deputies to each state.

With their 52 percent of seats in the constituent assembly, the states from the North, Northeast, and Center-West voted, almost as a block, to admit three new thinly populated states from their region: Tocantins, Roraima, and Amapá. In the federal elections of 1990 this block of states, with 43 percent of the population of Brazil, controlled 74 percent of the seats in the federal Senate.[25]

The other major effect of Brazil's constitutions being drafted after long periods of authoritarian governments is that the constitution makers, in their desire not to have another nondemocratic authoritarian government, engaged in a political process that unwittingly intensified the demos-constraining features of the constitution. In the euphoric democratization period of 1987–1988, all groups of the new civil society (as well as many of the old interest groups) went into great constitutional detail about the rights and entitlements of citizens and groups. The basic human rights provisions of the 1988 Constitution were considered by many citizens, correctly, to be the culminating achievement of the democratization movement.

However, many aspects of public life that are not basic human rights but politically captured entitlements, or entitlements granted by authoritarian regimes for their own purposes, such as decisions about the exact percentage of public money to be allocated to the states and municipalities, the very generous pension rules for senior government officials, the specific requirements for state ownership, and the detailed articles about where the central government should create irrigation projects, were also constitutionally embedded. From the viewpoint of democratic theory and practice, everything that is constitutionally embedded is removed from normal democratic majority-voting procedures. Exceptional majorities are required to change these procedures. This means that minorities that want to maintain the status quo are given enhanced leverage. The blocking power of constitutionally entrenched minorities has been one of the elements that has most impeded the reform agenda of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

If we stay with our concept of the demos, in a presidential system with free and universal suffrage a key representative of the demos could be the directly elected president. In Brazil during the military regime, direct elections for the president that were scheduled to be held in 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1985 were canceled. However, direct elections for governors (last held in 1965) were held again in 1982. The opposition captured governorships in many key states such as São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro in that year. These directly

elected governors provided the platforms (and the police protection) for the major opposition rallies of civil society. In 1984 they spearheaded the massive and popular Diretas Já demonstrations in support of the direct elections amendment. Governors of states thus had great moral and political weight in the constituent assembly.

In contrast, once again, the interests of the Center were not strongly represented in the constituent assembly, mainly because there had been no directly elected president since 1960. Making matters worse, José Sarney, a traditional politician from the northeastern state of Maranhão, became the "accidental president" upon the sudden death of the much more popular—and historically legitimate—figure of Tancredo Neves, from Minas Gerais.

In this context, both new (and old) civil and political societies, for their own reasons, effectively championed the idea that the more power was devolved to the states and municipalities, the more democratic Brazil would be. In reality, of course, the decentralized constitution, which transferred a significant amount of Brazil's total federal tax revenues from the Center to the states and municipalities, served many of the governor's political, financial, and tax interests extremely well.

MAKING BRAZIL'S FEDERALISM LESS DEMOS-CONSTRAINING

Here I am concerned with what the democratically elected president in Brazil's federal system can do to garner more power at the Center and make it less constraining on the democratic needs of its citizens. There is a school of thought inside and outside of Brazil that argues that, no matter what the rights of the states or the Senate, ultimately the president can effect the policies he wants. This school of thought is based on the fact that President Fernando Henrique Cardoso is seldom blocked from implementing new measures, because 1) he uses presidential decree powers (the *medida provisória*, or provisional measures), and 2) most of the non-decree legislation he formally proposed to Congress actually passed. I do not challenge any of the data in the meticulous and valuable study by

Angelina Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi that pioneered this thesis.[26] However, three observations are in order.

First, decree powers do not cover constitutional amendments. Some of the most critical measures that involved constitutional reform, such as social security reforms and administrative reforms, were passed, but in "watered down" forms, and were still being "revised" or subjected to hundreds of constitutional challenges in late 1999.

Second, the fact that President Cardoso, who would like to consolidate the institutions of democracy in Brazil, has had to pass so much legislation that was widely supported in the country and was crucial for the efficacy of government via decrees has been an unfortunate way to advance the democratic values of liberty, equality, and efficacy. Under a less able and democratically committed president, the demos-constraining element of Brazilian federalism might contribute to what Guillermo O'Donnell calls "delegative democracy" of the sort found in Fujimori's Peru.[27]

My third point revolves around a question: how does one measure things that do not happen because they have no chance of passing? Political leaders only have so much political capital and resources; they also know how to count. If a powerful minority win-set opposes many of their preferred policy-proposals, they will be parsimonious in the measures they will attempt to get by this formidable blocking win-set. From this perspective, which is more important: the fact that most of the measures that the president has proposed to the Congress actually passed, or the fact that many of the measures that the president would like to have passed in the first five years of his presidency were never put forward at all, because he believed that they would never pass? Based on my study of the policy proposals written before the Cardoso administration assumed office, on interviews with various cabinet ministers at the beginning of the Cardoso administration about their plans, and on the fact that many of these plans never came to Congress, I believe that the second interpretation is the more politically significant.

I have argued, contra Riker, that federal institutions do not simply represent the congealed tastes of the majority. If this

were so, a president like Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who has been elected twice and who has in the past had approval ratings of over 60 percent, would not have been so repeatedly constrained by win-sets of minorities.

However, it may be that the high point of Brazil's demos-constraining federalism has passed, as a consequence of actions the Cardoso administration has been able to take. Here I assess the changes in relation to each of the seven demos-constraining factors with which I began this essay.

Powers Constitutionally Devolved to States

The most significant changes in these areas have been in the *de facto*, more than the *de jure*, prerogatives of the states to make policies, especially the capacities of the states to carry out policies that impede the federal government's ability to implement a reasonable macroeconomic policy. Cardoso became president largely because of his success in reducing Brazil's annualized inflation rate of over 2000 percent. The Real Plan began officially on July 1, 1994, and by mid-1996 the inflation rate was down to less than 10 percent a year. One of the consequences of this dramatic reduction in the inflation rate was that state banks could not pass off their huge debts on unsound loans via inflationary measures. Virtually all the state banks were facing bankruptcy by 1995; indeed, two of the largest and most abused state banks, São Paulo's Banespa and Rio de Janeiro's Banerj, saw intervention by the Central Bank on December 30, 1994, two days before Fernando Henrique Cardoso assumed office. One of the main reasons for the existence of many unsound loans in the state banks was that the most politically powerful regulator and the most politically powerful borrower had normally been the same person—the state governor.[28]

In the midst of this impending bankruptcy crisis of the state banks, the federal government became the liquidator of last resort. The state banks have now virtually lost their capacity to issue bonds as *de facto* money. But the cost of achieving control over Brazil's money supply has been great for the Center. As of the end of 1999, the Cardoso government had spent at least 50 billion dollars to prepare state banks for privatization or liqui-

dation.[29] In an effort to make the states' debt crises more manageable, the federal minister of finance and the Central Bank helped restructure state debts (many to private banks) in such a way as to stretch out debt repayments over thirty years, at an interest rate of 6 percent, with a repayment schedule to the federal government. However, opposition governors, when they took office in January of 1999, complained that they could not meet even these generous terms. Indeed, the declaration by the governor of Minas Gerais, Itamar Franco, of a moratorium on his state's payments to the federal government greatly contributed to the financial crisis of January of 1999.

The Center has thus acquired important, but continually contested, new leverage vis-à-vis the states through its role as the stabilizer of state accounts. Nevertheless, the Senate will remain a major potential veto player in areas concerning state finances because of continuing Senate prerogatives in this area and the politically close connection between senators and governors.[30]

Monopoly of Legitimate Use of Force

Many reformers inside and outside the Cardoso administration would like to curtail the relative autonomy of the militarized state police forces that often commit human rights abuses and kill citizens with impunity. For example, during a peaceful march in Pará toward the state capital in April of 1996, nineteen members of the Movement of Landless Rural Workers (MST) were slaughtered at Eldorado dos Carajás by the gunfire of the military state police force of Pará. Four years later, no one has been convicted. Why? Partly because during the military regime each state's military police forces were put under the legal authority of state military courts. Owing to reforms championed by the Cardoso administration, the trial eventually went to a civilian jury, but most of the evidence collected (and not collected) was under the initial authority of the Pará military state police. The judge, in a controversial 1999 decision in the state capital of Pará, acquitted the three top officials involved in the massacre.

Many reformers now want to fuse the civil police and the military police and in essence put them under civilian control

and civilian courts. There is also some discussion of giving some of their functions to an expanded federal police force, along French lines. But all these reforms would require constitutional changes, because the prerogatives of the state military police forces are constitutionally embedded. In 1996, after the Pará massacre, President Cardoso proposed strong legislation that would have begun serious reform of the state military police forces. The Chamber of Deputies passed the president's proposals. However, the Senate, under great pressure from governors, who in turn were under great pressure from their state military police force lobbies, gutted the bill.

Two reforms survived the Senate veto. First, particularly egregious crimes involving loss of life can now be judged in civilian courts. Second, massive violations against human rights became a federal crime that can be tried in federal courts.[31] The former minister of justice, Nelson Jobim, whose bill was defeated in the Senate, believes that, given Senate resistance to major reforms of the state military police, "we do not have the political conditions to take them out of the hands of the states."[32]

The Court System and the Constitutionality of Laws

Five years into the Cardoso administration, Brazil continues with its mixed system of constitutional review, which has strong demos-constraining effects. However, there is growing pressure to introduce the principle of "binding precedent."

Malapportionment and Broad Policy Scope in the Federal Territorial Chamber

One of the key initiatives of the Cardoso government in his second administration was to have been political reform. Senator Machado, with encouragement from the Cardoso administration, prepared a major report about proposed political reforms. It is significant that in the entire report there was not one word about decreasing the malapportionment of the Senate or reducing its prerogatives.[33] Unfortunately, given the theoretical and political arguments advanced previously in this essay, such political untouchability is precisely what one should have expected.

Decreasing Malapportionment in the Demos Chamber

There is a proposal being discussed to decrease malapportionment somewhat in the Lower House by lowering the "floor" from eight to four and raising the "ceiling" from seventy to ninety. This would still give Brazil a substantially more malapportioned Demos Chamber than Austria, the United States, West Germany, or India, but would, if passed, be an improvement. However, in August of 1999, the College of Party Leaders of the Lower Chamber (most of whom would lose some seats if such a bill were passed) voted to "pigeon-hole" the proposal until further notice.

Incentives for Fewer and More Disciplined Parties

Despite Brazil's incentives for party proliferation and loose party discipline, the Brazilian federal legislature of 1994–1998 had somewhat fewer parties than in 1990–1994. Also, party switching by federal deputies declined somewhat and party discipline increased somewhat in this period. However, the original Machado Commission proposals to introduce measures to constrain party proliferation have also, in essence, been shelved until at least 2003.

CONCLUSION: MAKING DECENTRALIZATION WORK

This brief assessment of Brazil should be read as a cautionary note about decentralizing reforms in new democracies. Before rushing to espouse decentralization and federalism for their own sakes, we should be aware that decentralization raises not one but two possibilities. The first possibility is that decentralization will indeed bring government closer to the people who are the users of the government's services. The second possibility is that decentralization will devolve even more power and resources to local elites. If poverty alleviation is the central objective in the country, does it make more sense to devolve federal money to poor states permanently, or for the Demos Chamber to design temporary programs that directly help the life chances of poor people? This distinction becomes all the more salient if there is evidence that the poorer states have

particularly unequal income distribution and/or particularly oligarchic local elites.

In this regard, Cardoso's experiments in crafting new forms of political participation are particularly interesting, especially in the area of primary education, considered by many social commentators to be the most important key to improving citizens' income and quality of life.

The Cardoso government's experiments in primary education are probably the administration's greatest success in decentralization. A number of practices are at work in new programs of primary education that bear special analysis. First, there is a conscious effort on the part of the central government to be partners, with some oversight role, in the decentralization process. The central government becomes a partner by giving extra federal budget allocations to the experiment. However, federal money is only released after new participatory structures actually involving the users (in this case parents of children in the local school) have been set up. The extra federal money goes directly to the account of the committee that has been elected by the users. The decision on how best to spend this extra money is made at a public meeting, often involving teachers, local officials, older students, and parents. At another public meeting sometime later, the committee explains, and often shows, how the agreed-upon expenditures were made. This set of new structures and practices involved in the decentralization initiative entails three fundamental aspects of democracy. The election of the users committee involves *participation*. Decision-making at public meetings helps ensure that these commitments have *transparency*. This means that at the follow-up meetings the elected committee must have *accountability*.

Much of the overrepresentation of the states of the Northeast, North, and Center-West in the Brazilian federal legislature has traditionally been justified on the grounds that they are poorer than the underrepresented states of the South and Southeast. But there is evidence that many of the states that are overrepresented in the federal legislature are precisely those states with particularly unequal income distribution and strong traditions of local oligarchic control. The Cardoso government's

primary school reform is a nice response to this seemingly intractable problem. The basic premise of the reform is that the federal government will allocate resources to ensure that any child who attends a primary school in Brazil, regardless of whether the child lives in a rich or poor state or comes from a rich or poor family, will go to a school that spends a fixed minimum sum, per child enrolled, on teachers. Most of the school districts in the Northeast are below this national standard. Virtually all the school districts in the South and Southeast are above this standard. Thus, the policy designed to improve poor citizens' life chances does just that. But the policy also has the indirect effect of transferring resources to poorer regions without that money being spent by local elites in ways that would concentrate, rather than deconcentrate, power, resources, and income.

Decentralized federal systems in democracies are more "congealed," and further away from the control of the majority of the citizens, than most proponents of the new Washington Consensus imagine or would like. Precisely because of this, both Brazil's unexpectedly intransigent, constitutionally embedded obstacles and the country's under-observed successes in decentralized primary education deserve increasing attention.

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ENDNOTES

[1]In some countries the court with these prerogatives is called the Constitutional Court.

[2]See Robert A. Dahl, "Federalism and the Democratic Process," in Dahl, *Democracy, Identity and Equality* (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1986), 114–126. Citation from ibid., 114.

[3]For evidence of this assertion, see Alfred Stepan, "Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model," *Journal of Democracy* 10 (October 1999): 19–34.

[4]In fact, virtually no Lower House is perfectly proportioned.

[5]I present comparative data on this and other indicators for all the democratic federal systems in the world in Alfred Stepan, "Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, (Multi)Nationalism and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism," in Stepan, *Arguing Comparative Politics* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming, Summer 2000). This is part of a longer book-length work in progress with Juan J. Linz, *Federalism, Democracy and Nation*.

[6]If the Brazilian Senate does not amend a bill but turns it down entirely, the bill is dead for that legislative session.

[7]For an excellent analysis of the historical evolution of malapportionment in Brazil's lower federal house, see Jairo Marconi Nicolau, "As Distorções na Representação dos Estados na Câmara dos Deputados Brasileira," *Dados* 40 (3) (1997): 441–464.

[8]Article 9 in the 1891 Constitution of Brazil gave the states the exclusive right to tax exports. Articles 48 and 65 gave the states the right to negotiate international treaties as long as the federal Territorial Chamber approved. The more authoritarian constitutions created in Vargas's Estado Novo (1937–1945), and during military rule (1964–1985), gave the states less power in macroeconomic areas.

[9]Nelson Polsby calls the U.S. party system 100 state parties flying two national flags.

[10]On the Laakso/Taagepera Index measuring party fragmentation, or more exactly the weighted number of parties in the legislature, Brazil in 1992 had 8.5 parties in the Lower Chamber, higher than any democratic federal system in the world. The mid-1980s scores on the same index for the other important democratic federal systems in the world were 1.9 for the United States, 2.0 for Canada, 2.4 for Austria, 2.5 for Australia, 3.2 for West Germany, 3.7 for Spain, and 5.4 for Switzerland. India was 2.1 in the early 1980s, but is much higher now.

[11]See Table 5.3 in Scott P. Mainwaring, *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 144.

[12]Table 2.1, ibid., 29.

[13]In Brazil this is called the *indústria de liminares* (the industry of injunctions).

[14]Rogério Bastos Arantes, "The Judiciary, Democracy and Economic Policy in Brazil," paper prepared for the World Congress of the International Political Science Association, 17–21 August 1997, Seoul, Korea.

[15]The above discussion is partly based on my interviews with two Brazilian Supreme Court Justices, Minister Moreira Alves and Minister Nelson Jobim, in their chambers in Brasília in December of 1998. Rogério Bastos Arantes puts the Brazilian treatment of the judicial control of the constitutionality of laws in comparative perspective in his *Judiciario Política no Brasil* (São Paulo: Editora Sumaré, 1997), 21–64.

[16]See Joseph Love, *São Paulo in the Brazilian Federation: 1889–1937* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), Appendix C, and Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 17–18.

[17]His two most general and cited works on federalism are William H. Riker, *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964) and Riker, "Federalism," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 5 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 93–172.

[18]One such path is what we might call a "holding together" federalism. A previously unified state may decide that the only way to hold its multicultural, multilingual, and perhaps multinational population together democratically is to constitutionally devolve power to a federation while retaining significant power at the Center. Federal constitution-making in India in 1949, Spain in 1978, and Belgium in 1993 approximated this path. The United Kingdom is a possible candidate for such a path to federalism in the future.

[19]São Paulo did not necessarily consider secession and independence indispensable. It expected to be able to control the weak federal Center and did not in any case want to upset the federal military needlessly.

[20]As early as 1870 the motto of some Republicans was "Centralization= Dismemberment, Federalism=Unity." While São Paulo's revenues tripled in the first two years of the federation, the Center's revenues decreased by 30 percent.

[21]Emilia Viotti da Costa, *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), 226.

[22]Getúlio Vargas ruled without elections in his Estado Novo of 1937–1945, but after Brazil's participation against Germany in World War II, he prepared for upcoming elections by raising the "floor" to seven in small states because his political agents, who were forming the new PSD party, controlled most of these states. For a painstaking analysis of the manipulation of over- and underrepresentation by Vargas and his allies, see Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza, *Estado e Partidos Políticos no Brasil (1930 a 1964)* (São Paulo: Editora Alpha-Omega, 1976), 124–136.

[23]For the military regime's manipulation of the electoral system (manipulation that often backfired), see David Fleischer, "Manipulações casuísticas do sistema eleitoral durante o período militar, ou como usualmente o feitiço se voltava contra o feiticeiro," in Glaúcio Soares and Maria Celina D'Arújo, eds., *21 Años de Regime Militar: Balanços e Perspectivas* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1994), 154–197.

[24]See the well-documented and richly detailed study by Ana Luiza Backes, *Democracia e Sobre-Representação de Regiões: O Papel do Senado,* dissertação de Mestrado en Ciência Política, Universidade de Brasília, 1998, 8.

[25]Ibid., 128.

[26]For an impressive argumentation and documentation of this position, see Angelina Cheibub Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi, "Medidas Provisórias: Abdicação ou Delegação?" *Novos Estudos* 47 (1997): 127–154.

[27]See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 5 (1) (1994): 55–69.

[28]For the extraordinary financial and political prerogatives of governors in this period, see the pioneering book by Fernando Luiz Abrúcio, *Os Barões da Federação: Os Governadores e a Redemocratização Brasileira* (São Paulo: Editora Hucitec, Departamento de Ciência Política, USP, 1998).

[29]For an extremely detailed analysis and documentation of the costs for the Center of "bailing in" the state banks, see Harry M. Makler, "Bank Transformation and Privatization in Brazil: Financial Federalism and Some Lessons about Bank Privatization," *Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance* 40 (1) (April 2000).

[30]In a private conversation, David Fleischer (professor of political science at the University of Brasília) estimated that roughly 40 percent of Brazilian federal senators have been governors (many more than once) and that many of the senators aspire to be governors. Almost no U.S. senators were once governors and aspire to return as governors.

[31]Interviews with José Alfonso da Silva, director of public security, state of São Paulo, and Nelson Jobim, former minister of justice, 11 December 1998, Brasília.

[32]Nelson Jobim, ibid.

[33]See Senador Sérgio Machado, *Relatório Final da Comissão Temporária Interna Encarregada de Estudar a Reforma Político Partidária* (Brasília: Federal Senate, 11 November 1998).

Despite their differences, televisions, magazines, and newspapers have one thing in common. They all concentrate their journalistic efforts on a small segment of Brazil. The Brazilian media tend to look for the news in three cities—Brasília, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. Confined within these strict geographical limits, the media usually ignore all peripheral affairs, unless they achieve a proportion clearly arousing national curiosity. Every year at the drought season, for example, it is possible to watch the country literally on fire in thousands of burning areas. It is a predictable scare, repeated with a kind of cosmic regularity. Brazilian peasants have preserved for centuries the habit of preparing the land for cultivation by burning the vegetation left from the previous harvest. This spares them the work and various expenses incurred if modern agricultural techniques are used. Inevitably, the fire spreads through whole regions and invades forest reserves. The fires are captured by satellites, turning on the alarm at the National Spatial Research Institute in São Paulo. On the ground, the fires are largely invisible. Thus, in the past twenty-five years, an expanse of forest comparable to the whole territory of France was devastated in the Amazon, without receiving first-hand, on-the-spot descriptions.

Marcos Sá Corrêa

Elisa P. Reis

Modernization, Citizenship, and Stratification: Historical Processes and Recent Changes in Brazil

INTRODUCTION

THE 1930 REVOLUTION was a turning point in the process of political incorporation in Brazil. The model of citizenship that was adopted imparted peculiar characteristics to the public sphere. The prominence of social over political and civil rights made room for a pattern of interaction between authority and solidarity that some have described as *state corporatism*: segmented demands along functional lines, and paternalistic control from the state.[1]

Nationalism provided the ideological justification for a holistic view of society. In this picture the potential wealth of the nation would become the effective wealth of all social groups. It was illegitimate to speak for specific interests in the public sphere. All sectors of society were part and parcel of the national body, regulated and protected by the state. This pattern of interest representation made room for populism, better described as a political style that tied the masses to the state without mediation.

Other important components of the Brazilian model were statism (the belief that the state steers development and is also an economic actor) and its concomitant element, developmentalism (the belief that planning and adequate political will would assure continuous prosperity). This ideological set (stat-

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ism, developmentalism, and nationalism) compounded a powerful modernization ideology in Brazilian life from the 1930s to the end of the 1970s.

CITIZENSHIP: THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL EXPLANATIONS

Since T. H. Marshall's famous lecture of 1949 we have become used to thinking of the relationships between stratification and citizenship as ambiguous, yet critical to understanding modern social structures.[2] In Marshall's formulation the common status of citizenship confers upon all, rich and poor, proprietors and nonproprietors, haves and have-nots, a peculiar equality. Through the status of citizenship, economic differentiation-cum-stratification on the one side and formal equality vis-à-vis the state on the other became central tenets of modern democracies. Citizens are equal in relation to public authority and yet different in the market.

Some have seen in Marshall's arguments a defense of a strategy for harmonious incorporation as opposed to the revolutionary method behind working-class initiatives.[3] With few exceptions, analysts tend to see the expansion of citizenship as a uniform process, subject only to variations of timing and rhythm.[4] It is true that Marshall himself was very much aware of the British bias in his view of citizenship expansion. He states that what he had accomplished was a description of the evolution of citizenship in England.[5] But increasingly readers took his arguments as general and abstract—in short, as a theoretical elaboration about the evolution of citizenship as such, because Marshall himself left the door open to such an interpretation.

Elsewhere I have discussed two alternative models of citizenship with definite consequences for the consolidation of a political community, based upon Louis Dumont's suggestion that there are two alternative ways to conceive of the modern nation: as a collection of individuals or as an "organic" collective individual.[6] I argued that the former is typical of liberal-democratic orders, while the latter is the ideological representation associated with authoritarian projects of modernization. Furthermore, my analysis suggested that for most of its history

the modern Brazilian nation-state amalgamated authority and solidarity, giving priority to the organic representation over the liberal-individualistic conception of the nation.

Vargas, the modernizing dictator who ruled Brazil from 1930 to 1945, made it clear that authority was of paramount importance to a healthy nation. It was the moral duty of authority to ensure the harmonious integration of all parts of the national body. Equating individualism and egoism, he and the many populist leaders who followed him condemned any defense of specific interests in favor of the national interest.

Thanks to the abovementioned ideological choice of organic statism, the consolidation of social citizenship helped pave the way to modernity while accommodating a hierarchical tradition whose roots were slavery and the patrimonial legacy inherited from the Portuguese colonizers. This does not mean that the colonial inheritance is an explanation for the way Brazilians shaped their nation and defined citizenship. Concrete choices made by concrete actors explain how traditions were recreated or changed.[7] Historically, individuals everywhere made choices that bent their projects of nation- and state-building expansion closer to liberal or to authoritarian conceptions of citizenship.

MODERNIZATION AND STRATIFICATION IN BRAZIL

There is little doubt that every national process of modernization is a particular combination of tradition and modernity.[8] Societies use the past to legitimate the present and to project a future. Yet the degree of continuity between past and present varies significantly, depending largely on the political choices made along the way. Brazil has been characterized as a country of notable continuity. Thus, for example, unlike her sister nations in Latin America, the geographical unity prevailing under the colonizers persisted. Moreover, national independence did not involve serious military confrontations. Furthermore, the monarchy was preserved and the heir to the Portuguese crown was the founder of the Brazilian empire. Also notable is the pacific and gradual substitution of free labor for slave labor, in sharp contrast to the traumatic end of slavery in the United States.

However, continuity did not mean stagnation. What calls attention in the Brazilian process of modernization is that it has been tightly controlled from above.[9] One feels tempted to explain that feature as the consequence of some omniscient political strategy. In practice we know that the picture is quite different: while the weight of politics does account for much of the success of controlled modernization, politics itself has always been shaped by contingency rather than by some ideological fiat. In any case, political resources have been highly instrumental in preserving elite power and sustaining extreme wealth concentration, despite progress in the expansion of citizenship.

In the modern processes of nation- and state-building, continuity was remarkable. Even the 1930 Revolution, consensually interpreted as a watershed, is perceived by the analysts as a preemptive movement.[10] Fractions of the ruling oligarchy staged a coup, and Vargas, the leader of the movement, became the populist dictator who for fifteen years ruled the country conducting policies that dramatically changed the economy and the political arena. The modernization project then inaugurated took advantage of political processes initiated long before, under the oligarchic republic lasting from 1889 to 1930. Particularly important in that sense was the gradual concentration of political power at the federal level, as well as the politicization of the economy promoted by the coffee barons of the period.

Modernization in Brazil was closer to the process observed in late nineteenth-century Germany than to what took place in pioneering Britain.[11] The relationships between state-building and nation-building in Brazil (as in Germany) were such that the state took the leading role in promoting both nation-building and industrial growth. The public championed the political incorporation of the urban masses through a citizenship model that accorded priority to social over civil and political rights. Moreover, the definition of social rights was closely tied to the urban labor market.[12] To be entitled to welfare benefits one needed to have a formal job contract. Health assistance, sickness and maternity leaves, pension funds, retirement benefits, and all other existing forms of social protection were regulated along with work rights defined by job categories.

To tie social rights to workers' rights was not an authoritarian particularity. Historically, it was the political mobilization of workers in liberal regimes that made possible the securing of the first social rights. The difference in authoritarian contexts, however, lies in the fact that without a firmly established tradition of civil and political rights, social citizenship becomes the fragile daughter of the benevolent authority. Not that workers in these societies were passive, but they failed to institutionalize autonomous political power.

The Vargas regime imprinted on Brazilian society new political, economic, and social characteristics. That is why the armed coup of 1930 deserves to be called a "revolution." Even taking into account that many characteristics of the state-building process predated Vargas and made it possible to implant a modernization process from above, there is no doubt that from the 1930s on, a state-led process of modernization was set in motion that had a lasting impact on the country's social structure. We see that the political market expanded with the inclusion of the urban masses into politics and that the state managed to increase its autonomy while industrialization proceeded apace.

The regime inaugurated by the 1930 Revolution lasted until 1945, when the liberalizing winds of the immediate postwar era overthrew dictators in some places. Vargas, however, returned to power in 1950 through constitutional means, and stayed on as president until 1954, when under strong political pressures he killed himself. Vargas, in these crucial years, pushed further the modernization project he had started earlier through dictatorial means.

To a considerable extent, the model set in motion in the 1930s was not replaced under the constitutional governments that ruled from 1945 to 1964. State-led growth remained a central pillar of economic development; governmental planning grew in importance.[13] Furthermore, the model of social citizenship remained intact while populism, the political style that knitted together personalistic ties between various elites and the masses, flourished with new vigor and nuance.[14] Persistent economic growth made it possible to absorb the rural masses entering the urban world into the labor market, as well as into the political

market where populist leaders sought to make their mark. Closely tied to the state, labor unions were part and parcel of the hierarchical corporatist arrangement that regulated citizenship.

Through the years tensions within this model mounted. Populism itself was a contradictory mechanism: it kept the masses under elite control, but once incorporated into the political arena the worker-citizen was able to demand further concessions and gradually to achieve autonomy. As populist leaders relied on the political market to enforce the loyalty of the rank and file, the latter learned to bargain for greater benefits. In the competitive period lasting from 1945 to 1964, elite disputes provided worker organizations with the opportunity to improve their bargaining power.

The very success of the processes of modernization and citizenship expansion also contributed to make the persistence of the adopted model problematic. To the extent that they proceeded successfully, these processes threatened to weaken one of the crucial elements of the model, namely, the exclusion of the lower rural classes from citizenship. The incipient political mobilization of the countryside was one of the key factors triggering the armed coup of 1964, which inaugurated a period of twenty-one years of military dictatorship.

The army did not act to restore order to the ruling oligarchies. Instead, they kept power for themselves and implemented their own project of national modernization. That project was innovative enough to once again justify a "coup" as a "revolution" in Brazilian history. However, despite the big changes introduced, it is also reasonable to say that the military's political project had some striking continuities with the previous model. While suppressing the populist component and imposing open political repression, the army leaders deepened the presence of the state as an economic agent. Nationalism acquired new strength, now redefined to embody a growth project based upon an economic alliance between state firms, multinational corporations, and domestic capital.[15]

As for the enforced model of citizenship, the new political order set in motion important changes aiming to correct dys-

functions of the corporatist model. Thus, efforts were made to generalize access to social rights: first the unification of the welfare system, and later its partial extension to rural laborers.[16] While aiming at modernizing and rationalizing the administration of welfare, the changes introduced by the military government were largely completing the task of political incorporation initiated by Vargas. As before, it was the continuous growth of the labor market that supported the enforcement of social rights, the backbone of the ongoing citizenship model.[17]

At the close of the military regime, the country's political demands were much larger. The supply of "citizenship goods" remained very limited, and although demands for its expansion were still repressed, the formal inclusion of large segments of the population as legitimate consumers of social rights put a heavy strain on the system. Moreover, the exhaustion of economic growth in the 1980s shrank job creation and the tax base, thus limiting state capacity to enforce social rights.

The economic growth model that had been quite successful for decades was reaching its limits. From 1940 to 1980 the average yearly economic growth rate was an impressive 7 percent. This was instrumental in implementing social citizenship and shaping patterns of interaction between classes. Brazil still had a large mass of poor people and great inequality. But while growth persisted, no zero-sum games legitimated disputes between groups and classes. A peculiar view of universality seems to have prevailed, based upon an evolutionary view, according to which all would be gradually contemplated, as suggested by Schwartzman in this issue.[18] The continuous flow of migrants from agricultural to urban jobs brought them immediate gain, and this helped to fuel optimism about the chances of upward mobility for everybody. Brazil continued to be perceived as the country of open opportunities, the land of the future.

Gradually, though, unforeseen predicaments were disclosed. The last two decades have been a period of recurring economic crisis, forcing Brazil to confront hard choices. It has also been a period of significant political change and institutional reform. It is perhaps too early to risk any conclusion as to what have

been the net results of these crises and changes. But it is certainly the right time to reflect upon such things, to formulate the questions to which answers will have to be pursued.

CITIZENSHIP AND STRATIFICATION IN THE POST-POPULIST ERA

When President Cardoso, upon his inauguration in January of 1995, announced “the Vargas era is over,” he was epitomizing what has been said above: that the modernization model set in motion more than fifty years earlier had reached its limits and had to be replaced. The social structure had changed so much that the old model of political incorporation had become obsolete. Despite several shortcomings, the three abovementioned tenets of modernization—nationalism, statism, and developmentalism—had been quite successful in past decades. Now, however, they proved to be inadequate to meet new societal challenges.

In fact, as any other project, modernization from above had had positive and negative consequences, had been profoundly redefined through the decades, but could no longer be reinvented. Its economic, political, and ideological bases were exhausted. The import-substitution model, based upon economic protectionism, could no longer answer to the pragmatic needs of domestic production. And the nationalistic values that justified it could no longer be sustained in the globalized world thirsty for free markets.

Urbanization had transferred the mass of the population from the countryside, thereby putting strong pressure upon public services and goods.[19] Moreover, the conventional expectation that urban employment would eventually catch up with urbanization proved wrong. Job expansion in the industrial sector has been particularly reduced in the last two decades. The service sector kept some dynamism, but here too labor demand lagged behind supply.

In recent periods the job market has no longer been able to absorb the expanding labor force. Thus, for example, between 1989 and 1996, an expansion of 16.5 percent in the active economic population corresponded to an 11.4 percent growth

in the total number of job positions.[20] This proportion has pushed unemployment rates much beyond the country's historical record. To aggravate the situation, the growing informality of labor arrangements in the service sector weakened the tax basis of the already precarious welfare system.[21] Under these circumstances, the minority who had secure formal jobs and access to social rights became, *de facto,* a privileged caste.

At the political level, the democratizing wave brought new demands and new forms of participation and fueled competition, putting further stress on established power monopolies. Ideological disputes took place between traditional representations of society and the emerging representations tuned to neoliberal arguments. Such disputes were often difficult to decipher, because in the political praxis these competing worldviews were not always sharply differentiated. Perhaps because no radical political rupture took place, there was no urge to establish big contrasts or explicit conflicts.

The Constitutional Assembly that drafted the new Constitution in the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule expressed the ambiguity of the various interests at play.[22] The new Constitution, enacted in 1988, accommodated organic-communitarian and liberal-individualistic principles, often at odds with one another. There have been constitutional revisions, most of them efforts to make the Constitution more coherent with a neo-liberal system. Further reforms of the Constitution remain on the government's agenda.

Pressure from inside and outside made clear that the pattern of citizenship had to be drastically altered. Pressures for change are multiple and at times contradictory. To incorporate those who lack social rights, to restore public finances, to assure governability, and to increase legitimization are goals of current politics. However, while there is reasonable consensus about the need for changes, there is not only divergence as to what these changes should be, but also great uncertainty about what is the new reality that they should consider. While statistical information about Brazilian society is better today, interpretations of it are not clear-cut.

What does the Brazilian social structure look like today? If we think of the extreme inequalities that characterize the coun-

try, we could talk of a caste-like society: a vast number of socially excluded individuals who have no access to public services and goods at the bottom, and a tiny minority who concentrates wealth at the top. In between lie the large middle strata, old and new, holding a wide range of values and expectations. It is particularly within that group that we observe intense social mobility.

The available statistics provide a snapshot of the country's social stratification: in 1990, close to 12 percent of the Brazilian population, or about 16.5 million people, lived under miserable conditions.[23] In 1997 the proportion had risen to 15 percent, while the total number of those living below the poverty line constituted 24 percent of the population. That is to say, of the 54 million Brazilians who are poor, 24 million live under truly wretched conditions.[24] On the other extreme we have the top 10 percent of the population, roughly 16 million people, who make up the country's upper strata, concentrating about 48 percent of the total income.[25] In between remains a large group that encompasses very disparate social categories.

The lack of minimal citizenship rights in a large proportion of the population, as indicated above, points to a very serious problem of social exclusion. In this category are persons deprived of health services, with severe malnutrition problems, without access to education, to secure jobs, to proper (or any) housing—in short, people to whom citizenship goods are denied. This group includes individuals who could potentially be incorporated into the rest of society as long as the means are available, and people who, no matter what the law says, are *de facto* unable to exert rights or fulfill obligations: some have been permanently impaired physically and/or mentally by poverty, some are too old to be socialized, some are already socialized in marginal communities, which compete with the state. Therefore, even the relatively more homogenous sector of "non-citizens" comprises many differences that have to be taken into account by any sound social policy strategy.

In the middle sector there are signs of conflict. Relevant in that context are the disputes involving those who stick fiercely to their status as citizens and those who are still striving to get

effective legal rights. These disputes have remained more potential than effective, however, partly because political representation has not been firmly institutionalized, and parties have appealed to disparate interests depending on the contingencies of each electoral game. Also, the old ideology affirming the harmonious defense of the country's general will still has some currency in the political arena.

Within the upper social echelons there have also been important changes in interests, political strategies, and ideological preferences, although these too are hard to accommodate in a clear and coherent picture. There is little systematic information available, but we can infer changes from current economic data. Evidence indicates that while much of the old elitism survives in Brazil, new elite groups have arrived to break down the previously existing relative consensus. There are signs that new groups have been able to benefit from the changes in the economic model, chief among them the privatization of state firms and the opening up of Brazil to the international market. At the same time, old established economic elite groups experience significant losses due to these same changes. In other words, there are winners and losers in the changed economic game, with immediate impact on the stratification structure. The crucial question is whether competition among old and new elite groups will lend new dynamism to the social structure, or if new exclusionary arrangements will be made. Elitism is so ingrained in Brazilian politics and ideology that often even classic pluralist mechanisms and processes act to reinforce power monopolies.

An illustration of the resilience of elitism can be found in recent analyses of data on social mobility: specialists have indicated that while the Brazilian social structure shows signs of greater openness and fluidity, most of the movements between social strata are limited to the middle positions, while the weight of social inheritance remains high on the bottom and top social positions.[26] The deep economic changes of the last decades have not much altered the shape of the stratification structure. As figure 1 indicates, there has been remarkable stability in the distribution of wealth.

Figure 1. Distribution of earned income to the top 10 percent, the median 50 percent, and the bottom 40 percent of wage earners.



Source: R. Paes de Barros and R. Mendonca, "Uma Caracterizacao das Condicoes de Pobreza e de Desigualdade no Brasil," IPEA, Rio de Janeiro, September 1999.

THE VIEW FROM THE TOP

It is one thing to investigate the social structure by using statistical data, quite another to examine how individuals experience that social structure. Although much less explored, the latter may be equally revealing, suggesting possible explanations for both persisting patterns of social inequality and policies aiming to counteract poverty and reduce inequality.[27] In my own research I have been investigating how those who have leading positions in society understand poverty and inequality in Brazil.[28] Starting from the idea that those who, through their control of strategic resources, may change or preserve the status quo are key elements in deciphering the social structure, I examined the perceptions of different elite sectors about social stratification, poverty, and inequality.

Focusing on the elite view is often taken as a sign that an analyst views those on the bottom stratum of society as a passive lot shaped by the will of the ones on the top. Such a prejudiced assumption explains why researchers have chosen to focus on the culture of poverty and the strategies of survival among the poor rather than on how those who control strategic resources perceive, act, and react toward those at the bottom. In fact, however, policy action and inaction to affect social stratification strongly reflect the cognitive and normative views of those in command of different sources of power.

The interviews I have conducted with Brazilian elite representatives in recent years indicate great sensibility to the problems of poverty and inequality. There is wide awareness that Brazil competes with a few much poorer Third World countries for the embarrassing distinction of being the most unequal society on earth.[29] Different elite sectors agree that social problems are among the most serious in the country. Thus, for example, in the survey conducted in 1993–1994, social problems appeared among the most salient to the elite.[30]

As the tables below indicate, social issues were high on the agenda when we asked what were the major obstacles to democracy, what were the most important problems facing the country, and what should be the major goals of the country. Table 1 shows that lack of proper education and high levels of poverty and inequality were the two obstacles to democracy considered most relevant among elite people, comprising 47.5 percent of the answers.

The pattern of answers changes little when the issue is *not* obstacles to democracy but national problems in general. Table 2 shows again that apart from inflation (an issue that was then very alive in people's minds), social problems top the list of concerns. Together, problems involving the supply of health services and education, the existing levels of poverty, and the pattern of income distribution amount to 38.5 percent of the total answers.

Looking at the distinct sectors of the sample, we observe that the relevance of each issue varies significantly to each group. We can see that health and education problems are particularly relevant among the business elite, and less prominent to union

Table 1. Main Obstacles to Democracy in Brazil (percent).

Obstacle	Total Sample
Low Educational Level of the Population	24.1
High Levels of Poverty and Social Inequality	23.4
Lack of Party Tradition	15.8
Corporatism of Groups and Sectors of Society	10.4
Incompetence of Power Incumbents	6.0
Lack of Popular Political Organization	5.4
Selfishness of the Elites	4.7
Political Clientelism	3.8
Too Much Power in the Hands of the Executive	3.2
High Inflation Rates	1.3
Impoverishment of the Middle Class	1.3
Prolonged Economic Recession	0.6
Threat of Military Intervention	0.0
Total	100.0 (n=316)

Source: Elite Survey, 1993–1994.

Table 2. Brazil's Most Important Problems (percent).

Problem	Total Sample	1	2	3	4
Inflation	17.5	22.6	14.0	25.3	8.8
Education/Health	15.9	13.2	23.3	16.8	8.8
Poverty	14.3	15.1	11.6	8.4	23.8
Governability	11.5	11.3	11.6	17.9	3.8
Income Distribution	8.3	3.8	11.6	5.3	11.3
Other Political Issues	8.3	3.8	7.0	13.7	6.3
Other Economic Issues	5.4	1.9	6.0	3.2	8.9
Corruption	4.8	9.4	3.5	1.1	7.5
Recession/Unemployment	4.1	9.4	2.3	2.1	5.0
Behavior of the Elites	3.5	---	1.2	5.3	6.3
Foreign Dependence	3.2	3.8	2.3	---	7.5
Moral Crisis	2.2	3.8	3.5	1.1	1.3
Other Social Issues	1.0	1.9	1.2	---	1.3
Total	100.0 (n=314)	100.2 (n=53)	99.1 (n=86)	100.2 (n=95)	100.6 (n=80)

(1) Deputies and Senators; (2) Top Public Officials; (3) Businessmen; (4) Labor Union Leaders

Source: Elite Survey, 1993–1994.

leaders. In turn, poverty is particularly relevant for the workers' elite. Top public officials (technocrats and bureaucrats) constitute the group most concerned with the existing income distribution.

When the question is what should be, from a normative perspective, the major national objectives, the salience of social issues remains high, as shown in table 3. Education is the single most important objective if we look at the total sample. Taking into account the various sectors surveyed, education is relevant particularly for the business elite, followed by the public officials. More recent studies on elite perceptions further clarified this preference for educational policies as a means to counteract poverty and inequality. In turn, explicit antipoverty and redistribution policies are less popular among the business elite.

Not surprisingly, the first preference of business leaders is for a smaller state. That objective is also quite popular within the political elite. However, that does not mean that these elite

Table 3. Main National Goal in the Medium Run (percent).

Goal	Total Sample	1	2	3	4
Increase Educational Levels	23.0	14.8	24.7	29.8	18.5
Reduce Size of State	18.2	22.2	13.5	33.0	3.7
Eliminate Poverty and Reduce Inequality	17.6	25.9	19.1	9.6	19.8
Increase Popular Participation in Political Decisions	16.4	5.6	14.6	5.3	38.3
Preserve Democratic Regime	11.3	20.4	7.9	8.5	12.3
Guarantee Economic Growth	9.7	7.3	14.6	10.6	4.9
Integrate the Economic into the International Market	2.2	1.9	2.2	3.2	1.2
Keep the Order	0.9	1.9	2.2	---	---
Further Integrate the Country into Mercosur	0.3	---	1.1	---	---
Protect the Environment	0.3	---	---	---	1.2
Total	99.9 (n=318)	100.0 (n=54)	99.9 (n=89)	100.0 (n=94)	99.9 (n=81)

(1) Deputies and Senators; (2) Top Public Officials; (3) Businessmen; (4) Labor Union Leaders

Source: Elite Survey, 1993–1994.

sectors favor civil society's initiatives to counteract poverty. There are indications that the various elite sectors attribute to the state the direct responsibility to tackle social problems and blame public power for social policy failures, as indicated in table 4.

Surprisingly, even when these elite groups are government workers or elected Congressional representatives, they do not portray themselves as personally involved in the state. What the survey results suggest is that the state is still perceived as an actor of itself, an actor above society. However, where market issues are involved, elite sectors make a strong defense of the liberal state and view privatization very positively.[31]

The data also show that poverty and inequality are viewed by the elite as severe problems mainly because of the threats

Table 4. Main Causes of Poverty (percent).

Cause	Total Sample	1	2	3	4
State Does Not Fulfill its Social Functions	26.0	25.5	25.0	32.2	20.7
Lack of Political Will to Fight Poverty	19.6	23.5	18.2	20.0	18.3
Elites Lack Social Sensitivity	13.5	11.8	23.9	10.0	7.3
Insufficient Economic Development	13.2	9.8	17.0	18.9	4.9
The Protracted Recession	9.0	7.8	3.4	15.6	8.5
The Fatal Logic of the Capitalism System	8.7	7.8	4.5	---	23.2
Monopolization of Opportunities	7.7	9.8	6.8	3.3	12.2
The Need for Income Concentration for Economic Development	1.3	3.9	---	---	2.4
Lack of Effort on the Part of the Poor	1.0	---	1.1	---	2.4
Total	100.2 (n=311)	99.9 (n=51)	99.9 (n=88)	100.0 (n=90)	99.9 (n=82)

(1) Deputies and Senators; (2) Top Public Officials; (3) Businessmen; (4) Labor Union Leaders

Source: Elite Survey, 1993–1994.

they pose to property and private safety. Other conventionally perceived negative externalities of poverty—epidemic contagion, migration, and rebellion—do not affect the Brazilian elite. Asked about the negative consequences of poverty and inequality, their views strongly focus on individual, not collective, violence.

In short, the survey suggests that the elite very much fear those at the bottom of the social stratification. The poor are perceived as dangerous, but not because they may disrupt the political status quo. What the elite fear is individual violence, threats to their physical integrity and private property, and urban degradation.[32]

Another noticeable aspect of the elite political culture is the strong preference for universal social policies to counteract poverty and inequality. The survey data also show a strong elite consensus against affirmative action and taxing wealth. While recognizing that there is negative discrimination against blacks and women, the elite is not prepared to compensate for it with positive discrimination. Even education seems to be favored as the most effective solution to overcome poverty and inequality largely because it is perceived as a universal solution, free to all.

The above findings have been largely confirmed by in-depth interviews I conducted in 1999 with elite members from the Northeast and the Center-South of Brazil. While the information provided by those interviewed cannot be generalized, the insights they give throw light onto the statistical information provided by the survey. It now becomes clear that education is seen as the privileged means to equal opportunity, that the costs of it should be covered by the state, and that the taxpayer should not contribute more.

The idea that the negative consequences of poverty for the nonpoor involve concerns about individual property and physical integrity rather than more collective problems is also more explicit in the in-depth interviews. Like the European elite who favored collective solutions to poverty, the Brazilian elite confers upon the state the responsibility to implement such solutions. However, the big difference between national elites in Brazil and those in Europe lies in the fact that in Europe the

state is seen as their instrument, whereas in Brazil elite members of society perceive the state as an actor of itself, useful to them but also independent and therefore able somehow to provide resources of its own to implement social policies.

The above is partly explained by a long tradition of state-building that favored state corporatism. Nevertheless, analysts should not ignore the conditions and choices that actualize that tradition at different historical moments. In that sense, it is important to take into account, for example, that the inflationary culture that Brazilians lived with for so long played a role in reinforcing the irresponsibility of the elite. For over four decades, the government's issuing of new money to finance its activities, neglecting sound fiscal measures, stimulated financial irresponsibility and fostered the illusion of cost-free solutions.[33]

The information provided by the qualitative interviews helps to generate hypotheses to be explored in the future. With that purpose I venture some conclusions about changes perceptible along regional lines within the elite. I suggest that the old industrial and commercial elites in the Center-South are the elite sectors that resent the new parameters of the economic policy. Some of them have trouble coping with market liberalization, miss the nationalism that ideologically justified the previous development model, and resent competition from their colleagues in other Brazilian areas or sectors that explore with success the new competitive opportunities.

The industrial elite in the Northeast is much more sympathetic to the new economic model. They tend to see themselves as a national bourgeoisie that finally managed to advance a regional project thanks to the opening of the market. That picture is particularly sharp in the state of Ceará, where a modernizing entrepreneurial group is hegemonic in politics. In Bahia, the other Northeastern state covered in my present research, we find a different pattern where traditionalism and modernism are much more fused socially and politically. While the regional economy is benefiting from the new economic model, power competition is weak and old monopolies preserve traditional patron-client networks.

The differences noted above clearly reflect the immediate economic interests of regional elites. The picture is much less sharp when the political and cultural dimensions are taken into account. One observes, for example, that with regard to cognitive and normative views about poverty and inequality, no clear-cut regional lines can be drawn. The preference for state initiative characterizes both the Center-South and the Northeast. They also coincide in the priority accorded to education and in the negative view of affirmative action.

The majority of the elite in these two regions regards nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with some suspicion. However, among the minority directly involved with such organizations or with philanthropic initiatives, it is possible to see different regional trends: while both regions show innovative signs of voluntary action, the major initiatives in the Northeast tend to have a strong charismatic or religious dimension; projects of the same kind in the Center-South share the space with several secular initiatives organized by civil society.

Leaving aside the regional dimension, can we identify distinguishing features of particular elite sectors? Both the survey and the interviews include union leaders as the elite representatives of the working classes. The survey indicates that union leaders do not differ sharply from other sectors in many aspects, such as the priority given to education, the lack of support for positive discrimination, and even the reluctance to tax wealth. It is only in regard to the few questions directly related to their role definition that they differ from other elite sectors. The interviews go in the same direction, but show more clearly the points of convergence with other sectors.

The tendency to converge is even stronger between the other three elite categories investigated in the survey. Elected politicians, bureaucrats, and entrepreneurs share important political values and attitudes, differing only in questions related to their functional definition. The same holds true for the qualitative data. Although the interviews include a larger number of categories, the evidence is similar.

An exception should be made here for politicians in ideological parties on the Left and for portions of the Catholic leadership. A significant part of the intellectual elite also warrants

exception to the elite value consensus, but they overlap to a large extent with both ideological politicians and religious leaders. These are the elite sectors that are more critical of the status quo. They are people who see themselves as critical interpreters of the nation, who are against privatization, who have nationalistic aspirations, and who are suspicious of globalization. They support civil society, social movements, and citizenship. They criticize the faulting state, old political parties, neoliberal policies, and the Washington consensus. Perhaps because they keep a critical view, but at the same time stick to the old tenets that inspired Brazilian modernization, this countervailing elite is in a defensive position that hinders its political initiatives.

A NEW HEGEMONIC IDEOLOGY? A NEW CITIZENSHIP MODEL?

In my comments about the past, I emphasized that an ideological compound involving nationalism, statism, and developmentalism informed Brazilian life for a long period. As a hegemonic ideology, this set of beliefs and values fostered solidarity among Brazilians from different social strata and somehow justified existing inequalities. Certainly there were interest divergences and power disputes, but at a basic level some minimal notion of a national community rooted a collective identity.

As already stressed, the anticipation of national development, of a prosperous future, contributed to justify the high inequality levels that traditionally characterize social distribution in Brazil. No matter that the model of citizenship enforced allowed for hierarchical differentiation, or that many were not included in the political community. The prevailing ideology stated that continuous development, equivalent to progress and modernization, would eventually encompass everybody.

The vanishing of national developmentalism is the cultural component that corresponds to the structural changes the country has been experiencing. It suggests that old *habits of the heart* (after Alexis de Tocqueville) that used to answer for social solidarity are losing ground. Growing rates of violence and criminality are an indication of decreasing social solidarity.[34] There are also indications to the contrary, such as the

expansion of voluntary associations and philanthropic initiatives.[35] The point is that these very counter-examples suggest the possible emergence of a new consent ideology—that is to say, of new values and beliefs providing for social solidarity and political compliance.[36] Thus, for example, the flourishing of voluntary associations is a departure from the previous era when social and political participation were regulated in accordance with the corporatist model. In turn, the new emerging forms of participation take place independently of state control and openly challenge the old pattern of citizenship.

However, as already suggested, there is no guarantee that the new forms of participation will overcome the deep-seated elitism that characterizes Brazilian society. Those empowered through new mechanisms of participation may be those already entitled to citizenship, and therefore the absolute gap between the haves and the have-nots may increase. Even though the composition of the elite changes, exclusion of those at the bottom of the social structure may persist. Indeed, the combination of high unemployment and neoliberal beliefs informing policies make this a likely outcome.

Other trends, though, make the devising of alternative outcomes possible. To begin with, there seems to be much more concern about civil rights, which were undervalued in the past when social rights were supposed to compensate for other rights. There has also been progress in political participation: since 1986, the ban on illiterates has been lifted, the minimum voting age has been reduced to sixteen years, and elections have been much less hampered by both public and private intimidation. Moreover, even though party representation remains problematic, here too we observe some progress. Increased competition between parties and between candidates has contributed to weaken patron-client networks and other forms of personal influence.

The progressive changes taking place in the realm of civic and political rights and duties suggest that a new pattern of citizenship may emerge. These changes may perhaps contribute to stifle social inclusion. Does it mean that the old citizenship path that Marshall described will finally take root in Brazil? Perhaps in a distant future an observer with a macrohistorical

inclination will say so. But we, the observers and actors of the present, will be long dead. For us what counts is the fact that when other actors made their choices in the past they discarded alternatives to citizenship that would have shaped different stratification patterns. It also counts that the choices we make now will affect the new pattern of the citizenship emerging from the structural, institutional, and ideological changes of the present.

ENDNOTES

[1]Philippe Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971); Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society, Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); James Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1978).

[2]T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950).

[3]Ralph Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (London: Routledge, 1959); Anthony Giddens, "T. H. Marshall, the State and Democracy," in *Citizenship Today,* ed. Martin Bulmer and Anthony M. Rees (London: UCL Press, 1996).

[4]One of the exceptions is Michael Mann, who reacts against what he considers to be Marshall's Anglophile and evolutionary model. Against a single trajectory view, Mann proposes a typology of the progression of citizenship in advanced industrial countries that distinguishes between five forms of expansion. Michael Mann, "Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship," *Sociology* 21 (3) (1987): 339–354.

[5]Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays.* See also T. H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (New York: Doubleday, 1964).

[6]Louis Dumont, "Religion, Politics and Society in the Individualistic Universe," *Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* (London: The Institute, 1970). Elisa P. Reis, "O Estado Nacional Como Ideologia: o Caso Brasileiro," *Estudos Historicos* I (2) (1988): 187–203; reprinted in Elisa P. Reis, *Processos e Escolhas* (Rio de Janeiro: ContraCapa, 1998).

[7]Analyses of Brazilian ideological processes have usually centered their attention on the cultural legacy of colonization. See, for example, Sergio Buarque de Holanda, *Raizes do Brasil,* 8th ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Jose Olympio Editora, 1975); Richard Morse, *O Espelho de Prospero* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1988). Important as these analyses are, they do not explain why and how such a tradition has perpetuated itself, thus relying on some sort of a residual explanation.

[8]Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* IX (April 1967): 292–346.

[9]Luiz J. Werneck Vianna, *Liberalismo e Sindicato* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1976); Otavio G. Velho, *Capitalismo Autoritario e Campesinato* (São Paulo: Difel, 1976); Simon Schwartzman, *Bases do Autoritarismo Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campus, 1982); Elisa P. Reis, "The Agrarian Roots of Authoritarian Modernization in Brazil," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., 1979.

[10]Illustrative here is the often-quoted sentence attributed to one of the leading politicians of the period: "Let's make the revolution before the people take the initiative." On the 1930 Revolution, see Boris Fausto, *A Revolucao de 1930* (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1970).

[11]Reis, "The Agrarian Roots of Authoritarian Modernization in Brazil"; and Reis, "Elites Agrarias, State-Building e Autoritarismo," *Dados* 25 (3) (1982): 331–348.

[12]Wanderley G. dos Santos, *Cidadania e Justica: a Politica Social na Ordem Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campus, 1979); Vianna, *Liberalismo e Sindicato*.

[13]Celso Lafer, *O Sistema Politico Brasileiro* (São Paulo: Editora Perspectiva, 1975); Alberto Venancio Filho, *A Intervencao do Estado no Dominio Economico* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1968).

[14]See Francisco Weffort, *O Populismo na Politica Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1978); and Octavio Ianni, *O Colapso do Populismo no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilizacao Brasileira, 1968).

[15]Peter Evans, *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Tom Trebat, *Brazil's State-Owned Enterprises: ACase Study of the State as Entrepreneur* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Carlos E. Martins, ed., *Estado e Capitalismo no Brasil* (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1977).

[16]On the political incorporation of the countryside, see Elisa P. Reis, "Mudanca e Continuidade na Politica Rural Brasileira," *Dados* 31 (2) (1988): 203–218.

[17]That does not mean that the welfare system was very progressive, or very effective. It only indicates that the state could afford to carry out the model because the number of contributors was continuously expanding as long as economic growth rates were positive.

[18]Simon Schwartzman, "Brazil: The Social Agenda," in this issue of *Dædalus*.

[19]Rapid urban growth had actually started much earlier, but high fertility rates in the countryside postponed the decline of the rural population.

[20]Pedro L. Barros Silva, Marcio Pochmann, and José Abrahão, "Açaõ dos Atores na Superação da Exclusão Social no Brasil: Experiências Atuais; Série Exclusión Social Mercosur," Documento De Trabajo 116, Equipo Tecnico Multidisciplinario, OIT/Fundacion Ford, November 1999, esp. 37–38.

[21]Ibid., 39–40. The authors estimate that in the 1990s, 80 percent of new job positions in Brazil were in the informal sector.

[22]Amaury de Souza and Bolivar Lamounier, “A Feitura da Nova Constituição: Um Reexame da Cultura Politica Brasileira,” *Planejamento e Politicas Publicas* I (2) (1981): 17–37.

[23]IBGE, *Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios* (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1990).

[24]Ricardo Paes de Barros and Rosane Mendonca, “Uma Caracterização das Condicoes de Pobreza e de Desigualdade no Brasil,” IPEA, Rio de Janeiro, September 1999.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Nelson do Valle Silva, “Vinte e Tres Anos de Mobilidade Social no Brasil,” *Teoria e Sociedade* (October 1998): 181–211.

[27]Abram de Swaan, *In Care of the State: Health Care, Education and Welfare in Europe and the USA in the Modern Era* (London: Polity Press, 1988); Stein Ringen, *The Possibility of Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); Sidney Verba and Gary Orren, *Equality in America: The View from the Top* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1985); Sidney Verba et al., *Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden and the United States* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987).

[28]My study is part of an ongoing international comparative project on “Elite Perceptions of Poverty.” A summary of the project appears in the Comparative Research Programme on Poverty (CROP) online Newsletter, October 1999, at <http://www.crop.org>.

[29]For international comparisons of inequality, see Barros and Mendonca, “Uma Caracterizacao das Condicoes de Pobreza e de Desigualdade no Brasil.” The authors clearly indicate that, compared to other very unequal societies, Brazil cannot be considered poor.

[30]The survey was a collaborative project developed by a group of specialists on the political culture of the Brazilian elite. See Maria Regina S. Lima et al., “Elites Estrategicas e Consolidacao Democratica,” IUPERJ, Rio de Janeiro, 1994.

[31]The exceptions to that view correspond to particular regional sectors, as I discuss later on.

[32]Elisa P. Reis, “Elite Perceptions of Poverty: Brazil,” *IDS Bulletin* 30 (2) (1999): 127–136.

[33]As inflation and compensatory indexation became institutionalized, regressive distribution systematically punished those at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The more access one had to the financial market, the more one benefited from protective mechanisms against inflation.

[34]Elisa P. Reis, “Banfield’s Amoral Familism Revisited: Implications of High Inequality Structures for Civil Society,” in *Real Civil Societies,* ed. Jeffrey Alexander (London: Sage Publications, 1998), 21–39.

[35]Renato Boschi, *A Arte da Associação, Política de Base e Democracia no Brasil* (São Paulo: Editora Vertice, 1987); Ana M. Doimo, *Voz e Vez do Popular* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Dumara, 1995).

[36]Richard Wilson, *Compliance Ideologies, Rethinking Political Culture* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

Luciano Martins

Muddling Through Changing References: From Late Nation-Building to the Crisis of the Nation-State

THIS ESSAY EXAMINES a long-standing relationship between intellectuals and politics in Brazil and discusses how recent changes in the national and international environments have reversed political references and values concerning what used to be called in Brazil a "national project of development"—changing, by the same token, that pattern of relationship. The brief historical remarks are intended to underline the significance of these changes.

I am aware that these are complex subjects, difficult to address in a short essay.[1] For this reason I will have to pass over some otherwise needed qualifications and make use of some categories (such as "intellectuals" and "politics") at a relatively high level of abstraction, i.e., ignoring the different dimensions and cleavages that exist in their internal spheres. Accordingly, by "intellectuals" I mean the intelligentsia and by "politics" the arena in which national policy-making takes place.

THE BRAZILIAN INTELLIGENTSIA

The notion of intelligentsia is controversial.[2] In spite of its difficulty, this notion is useful to designate a particular type of intellectual who perceives an obligation to intervene in political affairs as part of his or her deontology, either as a moral

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guardian of universal and humanitarian values wherever they are threatened or as the political conscience of a nation. Following a less heroic view, such as Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan's classic one, members of the intelligentsia can also be considered as the producers of "political myths," which cannot be confounded with "utopias."[3] It is in this latter role that the intellectuals who constitute a Brazilian intelligentsia will be considered in this essay.

An intelligentsia took form in Brazil in the 1920s. It began to ask what Brazil "really was," as well as to search for the country's roots in order to think about its future. In short, Brazil began to be perceived not only in the light of (and by contrast with) the European or North American paradigms, but as having its own identity, which had to be preserved, and having huge potentialities, which had to be developed in order for the country to become a modern nation.

This led to a sort of intellectual "rediscovery" of Brazil. This was the main task undertaken by the leading artists and intellectuals of the 1920s and early 1930s through the appreciation of distinctive Brazilian cultural traits (racial mixture, language, popular music and art, etc.), which before were ignored if not seen as discomforting; and also through the study of Brazilian history under a new light: the search for the causes of what would later be called "underdevelopment." The modernist movement born in the exhibition *Semana de Arte Moderna* (1922) and the seminal studies of Sergio Buarque de Holanda and Caio Prado, Jr., in the early 1930s are the best examples of this attitude.

What is known in Brazilian historiography as the Revolução de 30, which inaugurated the Vargas era, brought to power a new breed of political, military, and bureaucratic elite sensitive to these new ideas. It gave itself the task of reorganizing the mosaic of local oligarchies of agrarian origin into a modern nation based on industrialization in a sort of "late" modern-nation-building process.

It is curious to note that the introduction of Marxism into (or its influence on) the cultural framework of Brazilian intellectuals, from the mid-1920s onwards, had a contradictory effect. On the one hand, and because it was introduced by the Com-

munist Party in its already bastardized Stalinist form, it has transformed into a "doctrine" the idea of the inevitable reproduction of the historic sequential stages of capitalism, hence jeopardizing the initial and more creative search for the originality of Brazilian historical evolution. (The ridiculous effort to demonstrate the existence of "feudalism" in Brazil and, later, of a "democratic bourgeois revolution" are good examples of this.) But, on the other hand, it has reinforced the notion of historical change and the idea that it was up to intellectuals to form the "vanguard" that would help to bring it about, hence strengthening the ethos that intervention in politics was a historic task and indeed a moral obligation.[4]

This ethos, of course, had a previous origin inherited from the educated elites of the Brazilian traditional dominant classes, which consider political affairs their natural domain. The differences between individual social origins or political values become irrelevant, therefore, from the viewpoint of the intellectuals' perceived moral obligation to intervene in politics.

During the late 1940s and early 1950s those intellectuals who favored change took the lead and developed a more or less articulated *corpus* of ideas concerning Brazil's envisaged development. This was subsequently systematized under the influence of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), which had the Argentinean economist Raul Prebish as its leading thinker.

Thus, and following ECLA's ideas, historical differences between the previous capitalist development that gave birth to the ("central") industrialized countries and the one taking place in the developing countries (which formed the "periphery" of advanced capitalism) acquired a more systematic treatment and engendered conceptual references and political values that the intelligentsia transformed into policy orientations. In fact, during the 1950s, such ideas inspired the policies of development carried out under the Vargas and Kubitschek administrations.

In retrospect, I would say that the impulse (or rather the perceived "right") to intervene in politics was fully exercised by the Brazilian intelligentsia: during authoritarian regimes in defense of human and civil rights, at their peril and often involving

brave personal sacrifice; during the periods when free discussion was possible in defense of a "national project" for Brazil.[5]

This latter kind of intervention in public affairs was possible because the intelligentsia then had strong convictions concerning a set of social values that the intellectuals were prepared to convert into a national project; also because under the prevailing national and international conditions of the time the undertaking of such a development project was perceived as possible. Both situations have changed. My point is that this certitude no longer exists or, if it does, no longer finds the conditions to influence the political arena—changing the relationship between intellectuals and politics. In the next section I will discuss the reasons for this.

To anticipate an argument: because they are now muddling through changing references and because the political arena's configuration has changed, Brazilian intellectuals no longer constitute an intelligentsia as defined previously, since two of the conditions for it (an articulated set of propositions and the capacity to intervene in politics) seem no longer to exist. There is no reason to think, however, that this situation cannot be reversed in the future. It should be noted *en passant* that, ironically, this occurs when Brazil has as its president one of its most brilliant and outstanding intellectuals.

THE DEMISE OF THE "NATIONAL PROJECT" OF DEVELOPMENT

This section has a double aim: first, to systematize the argument over the economic, political, and international causes of the demise of a certain pattern of development in Brazil; second, to discuss in light of the newly created conditions the present difficulties of both Brazilian intellectuals and political actors in conceiving and implementing an alternative pattern of development.

Situating the Problem

Political strategic choices and economic planning in Latin America have usually been associated with what were called projects of development. These presumed a more or less articulated cluster of social values, political choices, and economic orientations

that would give birth to public policies and entrepreneurial decisions aimed to promote the economic development associated with a certain image of the country's future. It was in this realm that intellectuals habitually made their contributions or interventions. The way these strategies were implemented and have interacted with the national and international environments has fostered patterns of growth generally known as models of development.

Since the 1930s, and notably during the 1950s, the debate on development projects in Brazil has been an integral part of intellectual and political life. Thanks to the public policies and entrepreneurial decisions that this debate induced, some Latin American countries successfully pursued the course of industrialization, following the path of import substitution under strong state intervention. Brazil is the best example of what became known as *nacional desenvolvimentismo*: it has succeeded in diversifying its economic structure and attaining a sustained average yearly economic growth of 7 percent for more than three decades.

From the late 1970s onward this model of development has gone into deep crisis for both internal and external reasons. But the discussion of the nature of this crisis was overshadowed by pressing problems, such as the oil shocks, external debt, and persistently huge rates of inflation. In fact, the structural nature of the crisis was not fully perceived, and, therefore, the search for alternative patterns of development was almost absent from the intellectual agenda during the 1980s.

Since then, certain Latin American countries have sunk into a state of social indecision about how to deal with these cumulative problems; hence their manifest perplexity concerning their own futures. Brazil is a good example of this. One of the indicators of such a state is the proliferation of contradictory trial-and-error governmental economic policies and stabilization plans in Brazil up to the mid-1990s, almost always divorced from any alternative development strategies.[6]

To be sure, a new discourse on alternative paths of development (rightly or wrongly labeled as "neoliberal") has emerged in Brazil and elsewhere in the 1990s, and a new brand of policy orientations was adopted rather abruptly. Some of these have

been very successful in the short run (such as the Real Plan) in curbing inflation and stopping the dramatic erosion of salaries caused by it. Others, directed toward a new conception of development involving the redefinition of the state's role in the economy, reforms of the state apparatus and social security system, extensive privatization, etc., were viewed with mixed feelings or even faced with open opposition by society. However, these policies and reforms, even when successfully enacted, have not (or not yet) turned into a "project" able to build up consistent social support and bring forth a new and coherent conception of Brazil's future.

This is due in part to the fact that these new economic development policies were carried out without a debate on the real causes of the demise of the late model and, therefore, on the possible alternatives to it. In fact, the debate on the crisis of and alternatives to *nacional desenvolvimentismo* has been fragmented and impoverished. These questions were treated either as intramural by the technocratic establishment or as a sort of *deus ex machina* by the critics of neoliberalism—as if an ideological by-product could by itself explain the changing course underway. Hence, it could be useful to try to reset the debate by placing the *problématique* involved in a broader context. This context, in my view, has as its dominant factor the crisis of the nation-state.

It seems clear that the nation-state either as a historical phenomenon or as a conceptual framework is under stress, caused by both transnational processes and centrifugal internal trends. The implosion of nations in an uproar of ethnic, religious, or other centrifugal movements is the most extreme example of this. No less important are the diversified interests brought forth (and the constraints imposed by) the globalization of production and the economic interdependence of "sovereign" government policy-making. More subtle and less studied seems to be the impact of the nation-state's crisis on the capability to produce national political myths and, hence, on the fostering of national projects of development in countries that traditionally had in the concept of the nation-state a consensual political reference for building up their own future.

An initial proposition is that in order to be formulated and acquire political plausibility a development project has to meet at least two conditions: first, it has to refer to or be derived from certain social values; second, its proposed goals and the predominant local class interests have to be reasonably compatible. The feasibility of a development project (meaning its capability to generate strategies able to be implemented) will also depend, of course, on its suitability to the structural potentialities of the country and on its compatibility with the international economic and political environment.

A subsidiary proposition is that the different development projects formulated in Brazil from the 1930s up to the 1980s had as a reference the idea of what I would call late nation-building. Derived from the concept of the nation-state, this depended on the capability of the political system (under democratic and authoritarian regimes) to aggregate interests and to mobilize national political support on its behalf.

Brazil's Previous National Project of Development

As previously stated, Brazil's strategic thinking and public policies aimed at overcoming underdevelopment have traditionally been directed toward the building of a modern national state. Whether underdevelopment was perceived as a consequence of "economic delay" (as in the 1930s), or of "incomplete industrialization" (as in the 1950s) or even as an obstacle to the building up of a "national power" (as in the military jargon of the 1970s), the underlying reference was the idea of the nation-state.

The different faces assumed by nationalism, in either its authoritarian or its populist version, were the ideological expression of this fact. To be sure, the idea of *nation* has always prevailed in Brazil over the notion of *citizenship,* as the tolerance of social inequality and authoritarian practices shows.[7]

Different political and ideological currents have evolved from the nation-state conceptual matrix and competed with each other for control of the intellectual and political arenas. But, as stated before, is was *nacional desenvolvimentismo* that prevailed culturally until about the late 1970s as the core of

Brazil's project of development. In spite of the ideological cleavages and frequent tensions between ideology and actual policies, *desenvolvimentistas* shared in Brazil (in deed if not in word) a common view concerning three constituent elements of this project.

These elements were: (a) the building up of a "national capitalism," notwithstanding the dissenting views on how autarkic it should be and what role foreign investment should play in it; (b) the need to industrialize the country by means of import substitution, despite the dissenting views concerning how extensive protectionism to "infant industries" should be; and (c) the assignment to the state of a basic role in the promotion of economic development, no matter how conflicting the discourses on the nature or extension of this role might be.

Two other factors must also be considered. On the one hand, there existed a competent bureaucracy in the upper echelons of the state apparatus that was moved by a "spirit of mission" to foster national development. On the other, populist practices and nationalist ideologies (when not authoritarian regimes) managed to make capital accumulation and social tensions compatible in the name of a national grand design.[8]

The basic consensus among intellectual and political elites concerning national goals, competent bureaucracy, and political mobilization capability has certainly contributed to make the aggregation of interests by the political system possible, despite its intermittent instability. In fact, it is worth noting that in spite of all the political turbulence Brazil passed through from the 1930s onward, the political system's ability to formulate and implement development policies was not substantially affected until the late 1970s—i.e., under both democratic and authoritarian regimes.

If, on the other hand, we consider the international environment, the nation-state was also the central actor of international relations, and developing countries could easily evaluate their chances of overcoming constraints or mobilizing international support through traditional diplomacy among governments. All of these internal and international factors and circumstances have changed since the late 1970s. However, perception of the dimensions and implications of these changes has

been somehow obscured in Brazil: internally by the initial apparent economic success experienced during the authoritarian regime and the silence imposed on intellectual criticism by it; in the international environment because the emergence of the new economic realities was overshadowed by the political priorities and disciplines imposed by the Cold War on national governments.

The demise of authoritarian governments and the end of the Cold War have brought to light the changes already in progress (as the internationalization of production shows); at the same time, the implosion of the Soviet system and the discrediting of the ideologies nurtured by its previous achievements have accelerated the rhythm of the changing references and paved the way for free worldwide capitalist expansion and the growing influence of supranational ideologies. As a consequence, all societies are still passing through agonizing processes of adaptation to these new trends. In short, there is a general crisis of the traditional political and economic references, and Brazil's political elite seems to be particularly unarmed to deal with it.

It is my main contention that the nation-state's crisis as a consensual reference and as a political reality is central to the problems discussed. There are at least two reasons to justify this proposition. First, the transnationalizing processes of capital, information, and patterns of behavior, along with the globalization of production and financial markets, make obsolete any attempt to build up a "national capitalism" within the traditional boundaries and cultural framework of the nation-state. At the same time, these transnationalizing processes have given birth to new international actors and political arenas (transnational corporations, multilateral agencies, international interest associations, etc.) that tend to collide with the traditional concepts of nation-state sovereignty and monopoly of politics.

Second, nationalism, an ideological by-product of the nation-state, seems no longer able to perform its internal traditional function of inspiring a symbolic social cohesion. This is due to the eruption now of very diversified and often irreconcilable social demands under the form of corporatist, ethnic, or other subnational interests. The plethora of constituencies, single-

issue movements, nongovernmental organizations, and the like is a good example of the existing interest diversification and the new patterns of political action. It is worth noting that this late formation of a civil society in Brazil occurs as if dissociated from the idea of *nation,* reversing the previous pattern that subordinated the civil society to the nation's design. In short, the nation-state and its traditional institutions are threatened by both transnational and subnational processes. As a consequence of the transnationalization of the economy and the fragmentation of internal demands, the articulation and aggregation of interests by political actors, as well as the production of consensual references and political myths by intellectuals, have became much more difficult.

CONCLUSION

In summary, my central hypothesis is that the present difficulty of Brazilian elites to propose credible alternative projects to the previous model of economic development is probably linked to four mutually related factors.

The first is the disruptive consequence of the crisis of the nation-state upon intellectual elites and dominant classes, insofar as there is no longer any consensus on where national interests lie.

Second, the political system has had difficulty aggregating growing particularistic and corporate interests in the vacuum created by the obsolescence of the traditionally amalgamating functions of populist/nationalist ideologies and political parties.

Third, there are new international economic realities and constraints created by the emergence of regional blocs and dealings with multilateral organizations (such as the World Trade Organization) or international agencies (such as the International Monetary Fund) that any country's development strategies have in one way or another to comply with.

Fourth, prevailing ideologies substitute government planning for the "market" as the motor of economic growth—i.e., they substitute the political actors' will for anonymous forces. Defining national interests, fostering nationalist ideologies, denouncing international constraints, and influencing government plan-

ning were the domains of the intelligentsia. The loss of their capacity to intervene in politics is, therefore, not surprising. Of course, one could argue that if an alternative project of development to the previous one seems no longer possible, it does not mean that the present Brazilian ruling elites do not have a new set of political values and policies to create a basis for a new model of development. This may be true if one considers, for instance, that the present redefinition of the role of the state, the internationalization of the economy, the belief in the market's efficiency, and the attainment of economic stability at any cost are part of the creation of this basis for a different model of development.

However, what type of development will emerge from this new course, how it will cope with the accumulated social problems Brazil has to face, what kind of international insertion it will bring about, and which social and political structures will be brought forth by it are not clear at all. In other words: what type of society is Brazil supposed to be moving toward? This was precisely the question that the intelligentsia could once answer by envisaging a project for the country's future. If they seem no longer able to produce political myths it is because the intelligentsia are muddling through changing references or no longer have the instruments to intervene in politics—or both.

ENDNOTES

[1]Some of the ideas developed in this essay were previously presented in a conference organized by the *Forum Nacional*. Cf. "Projeto de desenvolvimento, sistema político e a crise do Estado Nação," in J. P. Reis Velloso, org., *Desenvolvimento, Tecnologia e Governabilidade* (Rio de Janeiro: Nobel Editora, 1994), 107–120.

[2]Unless referred to the concrete historical phenomenon that took place in Russia and Poland in the nineteenth century. This problem has been analyzed in Luciano Martins, *La Genèse d'une intelligentsia. Les intellectuels et le politique au Brésil—1920–1940* (Paris: E.H.S.S., 1986).

[3]Cf. Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society; A Framework for Political Inquiry* (London: Routledge, 1952).

[4]It is curious to note that the original concept of "vanguard" (meaning the vanguard of the proletariat) was also interpreted as giving intellectuals a sort of self-attributed mandate to speak in the name of classes (and not only the pro-

letariat) that were viewed by them as not yet fully constituted or not aware of their supposed historical role. This was particularly true in the case of the intellectuals who during the 1950s conceived of themselves as representing an emergent "national bourgeoisie."

[5]A good example of this is Celso Furtado, *Um Projeto para o Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Saga, 1968).

[6]Between 1983 and 1993, Brazil changed currency four times (cruzeiro novo, cruzado, cruzado novo, cruzeiro), had nine ministers of finance, and experienced eleven stabilization and economic plans without succeeding in curbing inflation or resuming sustained economic growth.

[7]In fact, the formation of a civil society with its own institutions of interest representation is a very recent phenomenon in Brazil, and it was in its absence that the intelligentsia succeeded to have a voice.

[8]During the 1950s, President Kubitschek's slogan, "fifty years in five," to describe what his development policies would attain, and the very construction of the monumental Brasília were good examples of this.

Celso Lafer

Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future

"Brazil has always been conscious of its size and has been governed by a prophetic sentiment with regard to its future."

—Joaquim Nabuco, 1908[1]

TODAY'S INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM is characterized by an intense interaction between two conflicting forces: the struggle for the preservation of national identities and the overwhelming impact of globalization.

José Ortega y Gasset observed that perspective is one of the components of reality. It does not deform it, but rather organizes it.[2] Ortega's general epistemological evaluation is extremely appropriate for analyzing foreign policy, which is clearly an expression of a country's view of the world and its functioning, or, in other words, of its capacity to preserve and enhance its national identity while at the same time fully participating in and taking advantage of global trends and events.

This perspective can have, as in the case of Brazil, a measure of continuity, which can be explained on the basis of how certain persistent factors impact the way the country interacts in the international arena. From among them, we can highlight the South American geographical factor; the relationship with many different neighbors; the use of a single language; the remoteness since independence, in 1822, from points of tension at the core of the international scene; the question of world stratification; and the challenge of development.

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These persistent factors help to explain important traits of Brazil's international identity—that is, the set of circumstances and predicates that differentiate the country's vision and interests as an actor in the world system from those of others.

In the following pages, I will try to point out some of the traits of Brazilian identity and to explain how they shaped the country's foreign policy in the past, how they affect it at present, and how they will most likely influence it in the years to come.

THE RELEVANCE OF HISTORICAL ORIGINS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF BRAZILIAN INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY

At the outset of the new millennium, Brazil has a unique identity in the international system. It is, because of its size, a continental country, such as the United States, Russia, China, and India, which were described by George F. Kennan as "monster countries." This designation takes into account not only geographic and demographic data, but also economic and political data and the magnitude of the problems and challenges encountered by these countries.[3] Indeed, given the size of its territory (8,547,000 square kilometers—the world's fifth largest country); its population (160 million inhabitants); and its GDP of over U.S. $700 billion (the world's seventh largest economy at the end of 1998), Brazil is naturally involved in the shaping of the international order.

Brazil is, of course, very different from China and India, which have cultural heritages that go back thousands of years, as well as from Russia, which lies midway between Asia and Europe and has a relevant and centuries-old presence in the culture and politics of Europe and the United States. Furthermore, located in South America, Brazil is not in the front line of international tensions. If its continental scale is one of the elements of Brazilian international identity, and if national territory and its definition constitute an important aspect of any state's foreign policy, the question that naturally follows is: how did Brazil attain such a continental scale?

Brazil has its origins in Portuguese overseas expansion, one of the constituent elements that ushered in the modern age. Portuguese exploration and its consequences transformed the

country from a small independent Iberian kingdom to an empire. Camões's *Lusíadas,* the only great epic poem of the modern age, drawing from the great navigations that shaped Brazil, expresses the identity and purposes of Portugal: to spread faith and empire, and to promote trade, including that of *pau-brasil,* so designated by that author, which constituted the new country's first export-oriented economic activity. These were done while holding in one hand the sword (representing conquest) and in the other the pen (representing culture).[4]

Having been simultaneously a poet, navigator, and warrior, Camões incorporated knowledge acquired from accomplished experience into the *Lusíadas*. The poet's knowledge was such that, in line with Portuguese tradition, it gave him, as suggested by Gilberto Freyre, an anthropological point of view that made him aware of differences in culture, flora, and fauna, as well as making him susceptible to the attraction of non-European women.[5] Miscegenation, which was to constitute one essential trait of the Brazilian people, is in part the result, on a collective scale, of the existence of such an attraction, just as Portuguese open-mindedness was essential for the occupation of the territory that was to become Brazil.

In effect, as Sérgio Buarque de Hollanda has shown, in order to tread the paths—the invitation to movement and the search for riches—that inspired the São Paulo *bandeirantes* to lead the process that widened the Portuguese presence in South America, it was necessary to deal with the geographic reality of a then unknown and mostly tropical continent. Colonization was achieved by continuously adapting to the environment and displaying the necessary flexibility to incorporate "primitive" indigenous standards. Lifestyles brought over from Europe were established only later, and gradually.[6]

During the period when Brazil was a colony, as well as afterwards, diplomats complemented the work of navigators and *bandeirantes* in the establishment of national boundaries.[7] From 1580 to 1640, during the reign of Felipe II, Felipe III, and Felipe IV of Spain, territorial expansion was politically facilitated by the union of the two Iberian powers in a dual monarchy—the Felipean era for Brazil—during which time there were no diplomatic differences to instigate difficulties between Por-

tuguese and Spanish possessions. It is worth mentioning the Portuguese-Dutch negotiations that took place between 1641 and 1699. By means of such negotiations, Portugal reestablished diplomatically the monolithic character of its dominion in South America, which for a quarter of a century had been broken by the Dutch presence in Pernambuco. This foreign-policy development had great importance for preserving what was to become the future of Brazilian territorial unity.[8]

The Treaty of Madrid, signed in 1750 by the Portuguese and Spanish Crowns, established for the first time the boundaries of Portuguese and Spanish possessions in America. This treaty corresponded to the renunciation of imaginary lines of demarcation—a point made in 1894 by Baron Rio Branco when discussing the question of boundaries related to a territorial dispute between Brazil and Argentina, which was successfully submitted to the arbitration of U.S. President Grover Cleveland. It stipulated that "boundaries should be determined by the most notable and best known rivers and mountains, *and that each of the Contracting Parties should remain in the possession of what it held at that date,* excepting those mutual cessions that might be made."[9] In enshrining the principle of *uti possidetis* as the title for acquisition of territory in South America, Luso-Brazilian diplomacy legitimized and allowed for the legalization, at the international level, of the occupation of the territory that is now Brazil. This Portuguese heritage provided a continuous link with the past that Brazilian diplomacy would successfully explore.

Territory is one of the components of the nation-state at the international level; government is another. The creation of a sovereign government in Brazil after independence in 1822, in what was the first wave of decolonization, allowed for a continuity that differentiates Brazil from all other countries in the Americas. Indeed, the fracture that expresses the wider political and economic process of disaggregation of the colonial system occurs while retaining important elements of continuity with regard to Portugal, thus making Brazil's entry into the concert of nations unique. In 1808, the Portuguese court responded, with British support, to the expansionism of Napoleonic troops in the Iberian peninsula by transplanting itself to

Brazil, a contingency plan that was not new in Portugal. The presence, up to 1821, of Dom João in Brazil transformed the colony into the metropolis. In 1815, by suggestion of the Congress of Vienna, which Portugal attended, Brazil was elevated to the category of a united kingdom alongside Portugal and Algarve. In 1822, Dom Pedro, the son of Dom João VI, who was now king of Portugal, proclaimed Brazilian independence. Dom Pedro, who was the heir to the Portuguese throne, had stayed behind in Brazil as regent. Recognition of the new empire was obtained, with British support, with the Treaty of 1825, celebrated between father and son.[10]

The constitutional monarchy, which extended until 1889, managed to keep Brazil united within its vast territory, as had been one of the aims of its builders. Monarchy was the basis for the specificity of Brazilian international identity in the nineteenth century within the Americas: an empire amidst republics; a great Portuguese-speaking territorial mass that remained united while the Hispanic world fragmented and, in the northern hemisphere, the United States expanded its territory. That is why, in the nineteenth century, in view of our position in South America, to be Brazilian meant not to be Hispanic. In this respect, Brazil recreates, on a continental scale, the sociologic and linguistic uniqueness that have historically characterized Portugal in the Iberian peninsula and in Europe. The perception that to be Brazilian also means to be Latin American comes later, during the Republic, as pointed out by Euclides da Cunha.[11] Only when the U.S. Manifest Destiny doctrine increasingly asserted itself internationally did prominent diplomats and thinkers emphasize what we had in common with "nuestra America."[12]

Territory and government only have meaning in a nation-state as an expression of their people. José Bonifácio—the "Patriarch of Independence"—coined the original metaphor: the Brazilian people, he wrote, should result from a new alloy that would amalgamate, in a solid and political body, the heterogeneous metals represented by whites, Indians, people of mixed race, freed blacks, and slaves, all of whom were part of the Brazilian population at the beginning of the nineteenth century. As an enlightened reformist, he saw the legislator as a wise and prudent sculptor who makes statues out of pieces of

rock. That is why he proposed the integration of the Indian, the abolition of slavery and of slave traffic, and land-tenure reform.[13]

As we enter the twenty-first century we are far from having resolved the question of social exclusion, which had been part and parcel of José Bonifácio's political project. This is partly the result of the fact that the maritime slave traffic from Africa to Brazil was discontinued only in 1850. Similarly, the abolition of slavery, which had been proposed by José Bonifácio in his 1823 plan to the General Constitutional Assembly, was achieved only in 1888. As Great Britain dedicated itself through naval power to repressing the traffic, in what constituted a sort of nineteenth-century precedent for "humanitarian intervention," it collided with the Brazilian empire, creating difficulties in the bilateral relations of the two countries.[14] But while social exclusion remains a pending and recurrent problem in the Brazilian agenda, the racial amalgam conceived by José Bonifácio in his project for Brazil did, in fact, occur.

As Darcy Ribeiro observed, Brazil is a confluence of various racial matrices and distinct cultural traditions that, in South America and under the Portuguese, gave rise to a new people. This new people is not quite a transplanted people that reconstructs Europe in other lands, nor is it like the witness-people of Mexico and of the Andean highlands—the heirs of the great pre-Columbian civilizations—who today live in a dual culture, facing the problem of integration to Western culture. This new people is unique, with its own characteristics, yet it is unequivocally tied to the Portuguese matrix, in view of the single language uniting the vast national territory.[15]

The new people expresses itself through the Brazilian culture that was "Europeanized" in the decisive moments that led to the creation of a Brazilian literature in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As Antonio Candido points out, such literature corresponds to an interactive system between the authors, the public, and the works themselves to become a national process of mutual references.[16] This process was consolidated in time and permeated society through codes of language, beliefs, and behavior. Portuguese Western heritage was enriched and modulated by the historical non-European elements

of Brazil: the Indians and the Africans. As a result of the migratory flows of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, other Europeans (for example, Italians, Spaniards, Germans, and Slavs) as well as non-Europeans (Arabs and Japanese) were aggregated into this cultural and demographic matrix. This resulted in a linguistically and culturally homogeneous country in this pluralism of its continental scope, despite the persistent dilemma of social exclusion. That is why, to borrow an expression from José Gulherme Merquior, Brazil is "Another West"—a poorer, more enigmatic, more problematic West, but no less the West.[17]

These aspects of the Brazilian condition are projected outside the country and constitute elements of the Brazilian international identity. The new people that resulted from the first wave of decolonization brought affinities that led Brazil to sustain the liquidation of colonialism. This was done at the United Nations beginning in 1953, occurred with more precision in 1960, and proceeded with unequivocal assertiveness in 1962 and 1963. In 1961, Brazilian Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos stated to the UN General Assembly that "the liberation movement of the old colonial peoples will not turn back. Brazil, an ex-colony, is constructing a new civilization, in a mostly tropical territory, with people from all races. Its destiny therefore conferred upon it a firmly anti-colonialist and anti-racist conduct."[18] In 1963, Foreign Minister Araújo Castro, in his "Three D's" speech at the United Nations (decolonization, development, and disarmament) added economic arguments in making the case for the eradication of the historical and sociological archaism represented by colonialism.[19]

The economic dimension of anticolonialism mentioned by Araújo Castro is an integral part of the concept of a Third World. As we know, this concept acquired more density with decolonization as well as political consistency when the North-South cleavage expanded in spite of U.S.–Soviet Union bipolarity, which by then already showed the breaches imposed on it by an increasingly complex world. In the Third World, however, it should be pointed out that Brazil expressed the uniqueness of its position through the "Another West" component of its identity. That is why Brazil was and is part of the Group of

77 (G-77), which expresses the impact of poverty in the economies of the Third World, yet always remained, even at the height of "Third Worldism," an observer of the nonaligned movement.[20]

The continental dimension of Brazilian international identity started to be built in the nineteenth century as Brazil emerged in the concert of nations. In that century, Brazil found itself distant from international tensions and could dedicate itself to what Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa calls the search for the "consolidation of national space."[21] This search was the first guiding line for Brazilian foreign policy. The basic goal was effective occupation of territory and its defense, especially of the River Plate Basin where the Paraguay War took place. This period culminated in the political figure of Rio Branco, whose work and effort determined the definitive configuration of the country's borders.[22]

The establishment of borders is always a key problem for the foreign policy of any nation. Russia, China, and India, which, like Brazil, are continent-sized, are still bedeviled by border problems and because of this have waged war or had war waged against them throughout their history. The United States has only two neighbors—Canada and Mexico—and, in implementing its Manifest Destiny in the nineteenth century, changed its borders at the expense of its southern neighbor. Brazil has ten neighbors—it is one of the countries of the world with the greatest number of neighbors—and it was Rio Branco who peacefully drew the Brazilian map, first as representative and Brazilian counsel in international arbitrations, then, from 1902 to 1912, as minister of external relations.[23]

The stature of Rio Branco's diplomatic achievement is undeniable. As Rubens Ricúpero asserts, it is difficult to find, in the history of international relations, a negotiating performance and an exclusively peaceful pattern similar to the Brazilian one in the establishment of national borders.[24] Rio Branco, himself a baron but a paragon of republican Brazil, was the last great representative of the work of the leading statesmen and diplomats of the Brazilian empire. He provided, through his exceptional knowledge of Brazilian history and geography, a link of continuity and at the same time an expression of the potential

for change, which is important for understanding Brazilian international identity.

Not only did Rio Branco bequeath to Brazil a peacefully obtained map of continental proportions, he was also the great institution-builder of Itamaraty, the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations. He inspired the style of diplomatic behavior that, in my view, characterizes Brazil. Such a style is one of constructive moderation and expresses itself, in the words of Gelson Fonseca Jr., as the capacity to "de-dramatize the foreign policy agenda, that is, to reduce conflicts, crises and difficulties to their diplomatic bedrock."[25] Such constructive moderation is influenced by a Grotian assessment of international reality—that is, by a concentration on the value of diplomacy and law in international intercourse as appropriate ways to deal with conflict, foster cooperation, and reduce the impetus of power politics.[26]

BRAZIL IN SOUTH AMERICA: ITS IMPORTANCE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY

While evaluating the results of his efforts in consolidating the size of Brazil, Rio Branco commented that the next phase of his work would be that of "contributing to union and friendship among the South American countries." Rio Branco's program was deeply coherent. Ortega y Gasset's well-known formulation is "I am I and my circumstances." With this he intends to show that there is no isolated self, that every person is related to his specific circumstances. The location of Brazil in South America as a given is one of the basic circumstances of its international identity, of its collective "self." That is why Brazil's relationships with its neighbors are not an option but a necessity of its geographical circumstances.[27] Thus, once the country was disentangled from the issue of borders, a constant goal for Brazilian foreign policy became to work for union and friendship among South American nations. Alongside motivations of Kantian "perpetual peace" that might sustain such a goal, it is worth mentioning that a peaceful climate in South America is an important condition for "development of national space,"

the predominant orientation of post–Rio Branco Brazilian foreign policy.

During the 1930s, Brazilian efforts in search of conciliatory solutions—whether in the question of Letícia, which resulted in armed conflict between Colombia and Peru, or in the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia—were in line with Rio Branco's program.[28] In the 1990s, Brazil's role as one of the guarantors of the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Protocol to help creatively resolve the territorial dispute between Peru and Ecuador is part of the same program. The solution that was found—and that brought to term the 1942 Protocol—was one of the great diplomatic accomplishments of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in his first term of office and of his Foreign Minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia, both of whom were personally involved in all phases of the negotiation.[29]

Rio Branco's conception of a foreign policy to bring union and friendship to South American nations finds, according to Rubens Ricúpero, its context within an axis of relative equality among partners.[30] As part of such an axis, it is representative of a classic concept of diplomatic action: countries should make the best politics out of their geography. This directive was recently furthered in order to favor and stimulate the development of national space. In effect, in a world that simultaneously regionalizes and globalizes, it is convenient to make not just the best politics but also the best economy out of a geography, as, for example, the Europeans have been doing since the 1950s with their integration process. That is the reason for a line of action set on transforming the Brazilian borders from classic borders of separation into modern borders of cooperation.[31]

The following provide some examples of foreign-policy landmarks aimed at fostering the opportunities for economic cooperation: the 1960 ALALC (Latin American Free Trade Association), superseded in 1980 by ALADI (Latin American Development and Integration Association);[32] the 1969 Plate Basin Treaty; the 1973 Treaty with Paraguay that led to the construction of the Itaipu hydroelectric plant; the 1979 Tripartite agreement between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay on the Itaipu and Corpus hydroelectric plants' compatibility;[33] the 1978 Treaty of Amazonian Cooperation;[34] and the inauguration, in the first

semester of 1999, of the Bolivia-Brazil gas pipeline, bringing about a positive conclusion to a number of initiatives that had been going back and forth since the 1930s.[35]

But the paradigm of this process of transformation of the role of borders in South America is Mercosur—a trading bloc established by the Treaty of Asunción in 1991. It was the result of an effective and strategic restructuring of the Brazil-Argentina relationship, which had alternated between periods of close convergence and of distancing and suspicion. The previous, preparatory phase for Mercosur occurred in the 1980s after the military regimes had drawn to a close. Such a phase was marked by initiatives taken by Presidents Sarney and Alfonsín, who, based on the existing precedents of convergence, brought the two countries to a new level of understanding. The 1988 Treaty on Integration, Cooperation, and Development reflected this new level and, at a time of great economic difficulties for Latin America, represented an attempt at stimulating development by simultaneously focusing on the broader political context. This context contemplated issues such as the consolidation of democratic values, respect for human rights, and the reduction of tensions, including confidence-building measures in the military-strategic area, particularly in the nuclear field.

The shape acquired by Mercosur in the 1990s is the accomplishment of Presidents Fernando Collor, Itamar Franco, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso on the Brazilian side and President Carlos Menem on the Argentinean side. In 1995 new advances were generated by the implementation of a customs union. It not only incorporated Paraguay and Uruguay into the integration process, but also created an associative link with Bolivia and Chile. Mercosur expresses a vision of open regionalism; it attempts to render the internal and external modernization agendas compatible with each other—a necessity for both Brazil and Argentina in the 1990s, given the exhaustion of the import-substitution model for the state and the economy. It also represents a democratic reference for its constituent states, and, notwithstanding the difficulties it has been facing—inevitable as they are in any economic integration process—Mercosur remains a symbol of a new South American presence in the post–Cold War world.[36]

The Brazilian-Argentinean understanding lies at the heart of Mercosur, just as the understanding between Germany and France stood as the cornerstone for the construction of the European Community. The Brazilian-Argentinean understanding also possesses an international security dimension in the nuclear field that transcends South America. In effect, the nuclear confidence-building measures implemented in the 1980s gave way in the 1990s to the establishment of a formal mechanism of mutual inspections; opened nuclear installations to international supervision; and allowed for the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which bans nuclear weapons in Latin America, to come fully into effect. With Brazilian adhesion in 1998 to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the international non-proliferation regime increased its scope, since Argentina and Brazil were no longer considered "threshold states."[37]

In short, given its geography, its historical experience, and the line of continuity of its diplomatic activity, Brazil is at ease with the South American component of its international identity. Its immediate vicinity, in contrast to that of China, India, or Russia, is propitious, in a Grotian sense, to what President Fernando Henrique Cardoso calls the organization of the South American space.[38] At the turn of the millennium, the shadow of concern over the organization of this area lies in an aspect of international security that was modified in the post–Cold War world. Indeed, if the threats of military confrontation that could affect us directly have diminished, the diffuse risks of anomic violence have increased.[39] In South America, these risks stem from the weakness in the state power of some of our neighbors to deal appropriately with centrifugal forces that can bring certain particularities up to higher levels, including organized crime, illegal drugs, and guerrilla activity.

BRAZIL IN THE ASYMMETRICAL AXIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The construction, during the twentieth century, of the South American component of the Brazilian international identity was achieved by means of a foreign policy developed along the axis of relations between relatively equal states. Even though

South America may have been very far from the center of the international political and economic system, such an axis of relatively equal relations evidently was and continues to be influenced by another axis, which Rubens Ricúpero calls the axis of asymmetrical relations. This axis corresponds to the interaction of both Brazil and the other South American states with those countries from which we are all separated by an "appreciable political and economic power differential."[40]

In the beginning of the twentieth century, the very "unwritten alliance" with the United States established by Rio Branco took this into account. Indeed, from the Brazilian perspective, such an alliance had two objectives: with respect to the asymmetrical axis, to release Brazil from the preponderance of its previous economic and political relationships with the European powers; with respect to the symmetrical axis, simply to preserve it as such, thus seeking to avoid its contamination by the former's asymmetry. For Rio Branco, such contamination was always an underlying risk.[41]

Both Rio Branco and Joaquim Nabuco—Brazil's first ambassador to the United States—took care in preserving a margin of autonomy when developing the Brazilian approach to Pan-Americanism. Throughout the twentieth century, such a concern would mark Brazilian identity in multilateralism and the asymmetrical axis. One example of this concern is the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. In the Brazilian view, this should not be taken as a unilateral declaration by the United States, but rather as part of the International Law of the Americas, applicable through cooperative and joint action on the part of the main American republics.[42]

After the consolidation of national space was formally achieved, Brazil could begin to express its uneasiness with the European concert's logic of unquestioned conferral of governance over world order to the great powers. Here lies the significance of Ruy Barbosa's diplomatic action as Brazilian delegate at the second Peace Conference in the Hague in 1907. As the representative of Republican Brazil inaugurating the country's presence in international fora, Ruy Barbosa, with Rio Branco's support and invoking the legal equality of states, called for a role in the elaboration and the application of the

norms that were to apply to the great international problems of the time, thereby disputing the logic of the great powers.[43]

The same reasoning governed Brazil's participation in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. The characterization of the great powers as nations that have "general interests" as vast as the inter-state system itself seemed illogical to Pandiá Calógeras, the Brazilian delegate to the conference. It was illogical given that the new inspiring principle of the League of Nations, based on Wilson's Fourteen Points, called into question the old logic of the European concert by affirming the equality of nations with regard to the law. The implementation of the conference regiment, which proposed a distinction between great powers with general interests and powers with limited interests (all others), would deny this concept. As Calógeras pointed out in a cable to Itamaraty and in his diary entries, the consequences of this, from the Brazilian perspective, would be to ascribe to the great nations the role of courts from which to judge the interests of the smaller ones.[44]

This evaluation led the Brazilian delegation to take the initiative to act in coordination with other nations of "limited interests," undertaking *démarches* that resulted in the great powers accepting the presence of smaller ones in the various commissions of the conference. The success of such *démarches* allowed the Brazilian delegation to the Peace Conference, headed by future president Epitácio Pessoa, to deal not only with specific Brazilian interests (back dues for coffee sales and the legalization of the property of merchant vessels) but also with "general interests" inherent to the establishment of the new post–World War I international order. Subsequently, Brazil also dealt with "general interests" as a temporary member of the Council of the League of Nations, in which category it remained until 1926. In that year, Brazil withdrew from the League, given that it had not obtained, after Germany's accession, the status of permanent member of the Council, a diplomatic objective that had been established by President Arthur Bernardes.[45]

The assertion that Brazil has "general interests"—that is, a vision of the world and its functioning—and that such a vision is important to safeguard and to put forward the country's specific interests, as made explicit in the post–World War I

period, would become a constant trait of the Brazilian international identity during the twentieth century. The *locus standi* for this assertion resides in the diplomatic competence with which Brazil has made its presence felt in international life as a medium-sized power of continental dimensions and regional relevance.

It is not easy to define what constitutes a medium-sized power.[46] Giovanni Botero, in his 1589 book on the "reason of state," points out that such powers would have the characteristics of not being as weak and thus not as subject to violence as the small powers and simultaneously not being so great as to provoke envy as do the great powers. Moreover, Botero observes that since those in the middle participate in extremes, they have, in principle, the sensibility to exercise the Aristotelian virtue of searching for the balanced middle ground.[47] The Aristotelian middle ground corresponds to one form of justice[48] and can, for that reason, depending on the diplomatic situation, become an argument for legitimacy, capable of attaining a generalizing scope and therefore of being of interest to the other participants in international life.[49]

Brazil has shown the capacity to articulate such consensual solutions. The *locus standi* for exercising this role—that of working for the "possibility of harmony"—stems from the fact that Brazil is not a scary "monster country." In the words of former minister of external relations Saraiva Guerreiro, it does not have "an excess of power, neither an excess of cultural, economic, or political attraction." That is why it needs to construct its international presence on the basis of confidence, which expresses itself through coherence. If the limitation of its means makes it a medium power in the international system, its concurrent condition as a medium power of continental proportions naturally confers upon it a role in the shaping of the world order. It is this conjunction of factors that gives Brazil "soft-power" credibility, to use Joseph Nye's terms—a necessity if it is to display the Aristotelian virtue of middle-ground justice.[50]

This role of mediation within multilateral diplomacy is not a given. It is a challenge posed by each diplomatic situation. Success or failure depends upon the greater or lesser intensity, at one particular moment, of existing tensions and controver-

sies at the international level. It also depends on the talent of delegates who need to explore possibilities in international fora so as to generate power through joint action, as Hannah Arendt would say.[51]

The soft-power role of Brazilian international identity has existed under the various and variable possibilities offered by internal and international circumstances. Such a component has also been relevant in more recent times. In the field of the environment, this occurred during the Rio Conference of 1992 as the heuristic components of sustainable development were worked out so as to give new conceptual legitimacy to the question of development from the global issue perspective. In the economic sphere, it was highlighted at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round that led to the creation of the World Trade Organization. In the field of values, the soft-power role helped lead the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights to a successful conclusion. That conference gave international recognition not only to the universality, indivisibility, interdependence, and interrelationship of various human rights (civil and political rights; social and economic rights; collective rights) but also to the legitimate international interest in their promotion and protection.[52]

THE SEARCH FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL SPACE

During the twentieth century, internal analyses and reflections on Brazilian national identity spurred the idea that the development of national space should become the characterizing note of Brazilian foreign policy. A stronger note, however, was given by the discussion of the contrast between the potential and the reality of a country of continental proportions such as Brazil. In this context, it is worth examining the role of nationalism in shaping Brazil's international identity. In line with one of the interpretations of Brazilian history, nationalism in Brazil is oriented toward the internal integration of its great national space. It is therefore not, like others, an expansionist nationalism, and it is thus compatible with a Grotian vision and style of diplomatic behavior.

Nationalism is usually a term that allows for multiple meanings. In the case of Brazil, and to summarize a multifaceted discussion, I believe we can say, as Antonio Cândido does, that if there is a naive and patriotic vein in extolling Brazil's potential as a new country full of future promise, there is also a more profound view that realistically evaluates the country's deficiencies. This evaluation is rooted in the social-science "classics" of the 1930s and in their successors of subsequent years that attempted to interpret Brazil. Using different methodological approaches and from distinct political orientations, such important academics focused on explaining what were the "faults" in the country's formation. In this sense, the 1930 Revolution—which corresponds to a political, economic, and cultural watershed in twentieth-century Brazilian history—would signify a generalized change of perspective. It led to a critical evaluation of Brazilian nationalism as it brought into being the notion of Brazil as an underdeveloped country.[53]

The consequence of this was the perception that nation-building in the twentieth century would require a project to correct, through systematic action, the original "faults" in the country's formation, including social exclusion. Therein lies the strength of the idea of a nationalism that seeks to integrate national space through development. The latter would result from a goal-oriented nationalism. As Hélio Jaguaribe, in his important analytical reflection on the significance of nationalism in Brazil, said: "nationalism is not imposed by our peculiarities, neither is it a simple expression of national characteristics. It is, on the contrary, a means for achieving an end: development."[54]

From the 1930s on, these reflections clearly oriented Brazilian foreign policy and diplomatic action by means of two principal guiding lines. One was to obtain and cultivate space for the exercise of autonomy—that is, in the words of then-minister of external relations Horácio Lafer in 1959, the zeal "to preserve the freedom to interpret the country's reality and to find Brazilian solutions to Brazilian problems."[55] The second was to identify which external resources could be mobilized in different international situations in order to respond to the internal imperative represented by the challenge of development.

The effort to translate internal necessities into external possibilities, thus increasing the country's control over its destiny and following the logic of a nationalism of ends, finds its inaugural and significant paradigm during the various phases of the first Getúlio Vargas government (1930–1945). In this period, which begins under the impact of the 1929 crisis that interrupted the flow of capital and caused a collapse in the price of coffee, then the country's main export product, the first problem was to obtain hard currency for financing international trade and for meeting Brazilian financial obligations. In light of such imperatives, the Vargas government explored the breaches that existed in the international system by maintaining pragmatic equidistance from the great powers and by using the country's potential strategic importance in order to obtain external resources to cover internal needs.

As Gerson Moura shows, the start of the war turned pragmatic equidistance into an actual alignment with the United States. Such an alignment was imposed by the weight and importance of the United States in the inter-American context, of which Getúlio Vargas was keenly aware. That explains the care with which he cultivated his relationship with Roosevelt. This alignment was, nonetheless, negotiated in light of the diplomatic logic represented by a nationalism of ends, drawing upon what the country could offer for the war effort—that is, essential raw materials and military bases in the Northeast that were important for the war in Africa. Such a negotiation finds expression at two complementary levels: the economic and the military-strategic.[56]

At the economic level, the objective of the Vargas government was to promote the country's development through a controlled participation in the world economy—a plan compatible with what was occurring in the rest of the world. The attainment of this objective is illustrated by the financing that was, after protracted discussions, obtained from the United States for the establishment of the steel industry in Brazil. This is how Getúlio Vargas referred to this diplomatic success in his diary entry of May 31, 1940: "just before retiring, I received a coded cable from our Ambassador in Washington which informed that the American government [was] ready to finance

our steel program. It was a happy news which filled me with satisfaction. It is a new sort of life for Brazil: wealth and power."[57]

At the military-strategic level, the objective was to reequip the Armed Forces and to obtain the support of the United States for Brazil's decision to participate effectively in the war through the dispatch of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force to the European theater of operations. This decision gave Brazil—in contrast, for example, with Perón's Argentina—the *locus standi* and the trustworthiness of a country that was truly aligned with the victors who subsequently built the new world order. The rigid bipolarity of the Cold War and the priority given by America to the reconstruction of Europe (by way of the Marshall Plan) left, during the Dutra government, few rewards for the Brazilian *locus standi* as an aligned country and for a diplomatic logic marked by a nationalism for achieving ends.

The existence of fissures in the international system (Suez; the Hungarian Revolution; Bandung) opened spaces for Brazilian foreign policy to implement a nationalism of ends in a more outspoken manner, all the while conducting its diplomacy in Grotian style. The Pan-American Operation can be seen in this context as the great initiative through which the presidential diplomacy of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–1961) succeeded in articulating the internal imperative of development within the inter-American system.

This imperative was universalized through the independent foreign policy pursued by Presidents Quadros (1961) and Goulart (1961–1964). The internal and external factors that precipitated the military regime in 1964 initially reduced the scope for "autonomy from a distance" brought about by the independent foreign policy. Nonetheless, the profound forces of the nationalism of ends, as a strong component of Brazilian national identity, once again came to light in view of the internal situation and of the functioning of the internal system, which gave new meanings to the North-South polarity in international life (OPEC). The clearest expression of this can be found in the responsible pragmatism of President Geisel (1974–1978) and of his minister of external relations, Azeredo da Silveira.[58]

In summary, while the international system that prevailed was that of defined East-West, North-South polarities, and

while import substitution based on the country's continental dimension was economically successful, Brazilian foreign policy worked on the basis of the logic of a nationalism for achieving ends—seeking autonomy from a distance. This operated in a constructive and flexible manner, focused on exploring areas of opportunity offered by the competitiveness of bipolarity. The objective, as formulated by San Tiago Dantas, was to find emancipation through development.[59]

THE CHALLENGE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The fall of the Berlin Wall was an inaugural event: it marks, along with the downfall of the Soviet Union, the end of the "short twentieth century." The collapse of the Wall and its reverberations during the 1990s no doubt correspond to a shift in the functioning and configuration of the international system after World War II. Indeed, international life ceased to be structured around the defined polarities of East/West, North/South relations. It became characterized by undefined polarities, subject to the "deep forces" of two different types of logic that operate in dialectical contradiction yet also in mutual complementarity: the logic of globalization (of finance, economy, information, values); and the logic of fragmentation (of identities, state secession, fundamentalism, social exclusion).

The interaction between one logic that integrates world space and another that disintegrates and questions the first has much to do with what President Fernando Henrique Cardoso denominates an "asymmetrical globalization."[60] Such a concept highlights the perception of discontinuities in the international system, which reveal the existence of an unequivocal shortfall in the governance of global spaces.[61]

How do monster countries, including Brazil, position themselves with regard to these new realities? Having won the Cold War in peace, the United States is today the only world superpower; it is relatively at ease in this world of discontinuities and has been exploring the opportunities offered by the current international system in order to assert unilaterally its own globalism. China, for its part, was one of the great beneficiaries, at the military-strategic level, of the end of the Cold War,

and managed to achieve exceptional development by competently administering the interplay between what is "internal" and "external" in a globalized world of undefined polarities. For India, this new world modified the country's military-strategic situation and how it fit into its regional setting. Such a modification explains India's affirmation as a nuclear power outside the purview of the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) as well as its cautious approach toward the logic of globalization, whose imbalances can release, within the country, centrifugal forces that up to now have been managed by its own democratic system. As the successor to the Soviet Union after its Cold War defeat, Russia continues to wield an impressive nuclear capability but finds itself in the midst of great economic and political difficulties and searches for a new international identity. In short, the abovementioned monster countries continue to be scary, albeit in new configurations and for different reasons.

How is Brazil doing in the face of such new realities? It is important to mention that Brazilian society has changed significantly since 1930 as a result of a set of public policies, including foreign policy, inspired by a nationalism for achieving ends. Brazil urbanized, industrialized, democratized, diversified its exports, broadened its diplomatic relations—although it did not, nevertheless, correct one of the "faults" of its original formation: the problem of social exclusion.

At the internal level, the decade of the 1980s saw a politically successful transition from the military regime to democracy. Economically, Brazil witnessed, amongst the external debt crisis and inflation, the exhaustion of the import-substitution model. Such exhaustion became even less equivocal in view of the changes that took place at the international level after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Under the impact of diminishing costs for transport and communications, globalization, through technological innovation, led to the dilution of the economic and financial significance of borders, fraying the difference between the "internal" and the "external." In a world of undefined polarities, such fraying put in question the efficiency and dynamism of the process of internalizing productive chains by means of the controlled insertion of the country into the world

economy. Indeed, globalization not only accelerated financial flows, but also precipitated the expansion of productive chains, which are now organized on a worldwide level. It made outsourcing a routine corporate procedure and turned foreign trade and the production of goods and services into two sides of the same coin.[62] For this reason, it became inoperative to promote development through a state-controlled relative distancing from the world economy, relying on the country's continental scale and on the operation of the previous logic of nationalism for achieving ends. The world that Brazil used to administer as an "externality" became internalized, thus putting an end to the effectiveness of the repertory of solutions that shaped the country in the twentieth century.

President Fernando Collor (1990–1992) perceived the magnitude of these future changes. He had what in classical Greece was termed *eustochia*—sharpness of gaze. He thus sought, with clumsy vigor, to reorder the country's internal and external agendas, in a process that was jeopardized by the serious internal problems that led to his impeachment. His succession by Vice President Itamar Franco (1992–1994), properly following constitutional procedures and therefore attesting to the maturity of democratic institutions, provided the country with an early pause to digest the scope of the change. In his first term of office (1995–1998), President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, making use of what the Greeks called *anchinoia*—agility and swiftness of intelligence—brought a new and more consistent rationality to the process of agenda reordering.[63] In his second term, which started in 1999, he has before him the challenge of effectively transforming the new agenda into one through which, in the context of an "asymmetrical globalization," the country can strengthen its control over its own destiny as well as resolve, with social-democratic sensibility, the persistent problem of social exclusion.

What does this challenge mean from the point of view of foreign policy, conceived as a public policy focused on the development of national space? I believe, along with Gelson Fonseca Jr., that if the country was previously able to construct, with reasonable success, its possible degree of autonomy through a relative distancing from the world, then at the turn

of the millennium this autonomy, necessary for development, can only be achieved through active participation in the elaboration of norms and codes of conduct for the governance of world order.[64] In other words, the country's "specific interests" are more than ever linked to its "general interests" in the workings and dynamics of the world order. It is for this reason that the ongoing opus of continuous change that characterizes Brazilian diplomacy requires that the line of foreign policy inaugurated at the Hague in 1907 be deepened in multilateral fora.

Brazil is a country of continental scale, a fact relevant to its participation in the making of world order and its ability to articulate consensus between great and small. During the 1990s it dealt constructively with "global issues" through participation, not distancing. Those issues have been reinserted in new terms in the international post–Cold War agenda. Let us from among them highlight the environment, human rights, and nuclear nonproliferation, with the observation that on the level of values such constructive treatment is compatible with the Western component of Brazil's international identity; it is congruent with the view that characterizes its diplomatic conduct; and it is viable in light of how Brazil fits into the world.

Given the interplay of variably shaped alliances allowed for in a world of undefined polarities, multilateral fora constitute, for Brazil, the best chessboards for the country to exercise its competence in the defense of national interests. It is here that Brazil's potential can best be put to use and can excel. In the political and economic fields, such potential can help elaborate norms and codes of conduct for the governance of globalized space. This is where Brazil's greatest challenge lies.

In effect, in the development of national space and the alleviation of poverty, the real challenge for Brazil lies in the negotiations of the financial agenda and the agenda for international trade. Globalization shortened spaces and accelerated time, and such acceleration of time affects Brazil in a nonuniform manner. Time is not only the abstract measurement offered by calendars and watches. It is also a concrete social process. The acceleration of time, spurred by globalization, affects social processes in distinct manners, and we can discern

different chronological spans for what I could call financial, media, economic, political, and diplomatic time.

Financial time is the online time of financial flows, whose volatility has been provoking successive crises in emerging markets that have directly or indirectly affected us. That is why negotiations on a "new financial architecture" are so relevant for Brazil.

Media time is also online time. It brings to and into Brazil the immediate repercussion of events and the weight they have on collective perception. Consequently, it creates an environment of excessive concentration on the present moment, to the detriment of paying necessary attention to its future implications. The focus on events and the lack of focus on processes imposed by the workings of the media pose a constant challenge for the construction of the soft power of Brazil's international credibility. That is why, for example, presidential diplomacy and summit meetings are important, as they constitute expressions of open diplomacy, creating *events* that can be used to inform internal and international public opinion about the significance of the *processes* that are underway in the country.[65]

Economic time is the one that applies to production and investment cycles. It is slower than financial or media time, and, in the case of Brazil, it is affected by systemic conditions of competitiveness. This requires reforms in, for example, the fiscal and social security areas. Such reforms advance at the pace of political time, which in Brazil as well as in the rest of the world is distinct from financial, media, or economic time. It is, in principle, in a democratic regime, a slower time, subject to the territoriality of political institutions, to electoral cycles, to party interests, and, in the case of Brazil, to the problem of the complex balance between the states of the federation in a country characterized by the pluralism imposed by its continental scale.

The challenge of synchronizing political time with financial and economic times has a dimension that passes through diplomatic time, which in the case of multilateral negotiations is a slower time. It is in this time, which is predominantly that of the WTO, that Brazil as a small global trader needs to widen its access to markets. It also needs to obtain space, which is

narrowing, for the conduct of its own public policies. Indeed, in a country such as Brazil, development will not automatically come about from the virtuous combination of fiscal, monetary, and exchange-rate policies, although in them lie the macroeconomic conditions for its sustainability. Development requires an ample array of public policies that, in a manner congruent and compatible with a macroeconomic equilibrium that sustains currency stability, would reduce inequality and further the development of national space, ascertaining that within it economic agents enjoy fair conditions for engaging in the sort of competition that will enable them to face the challenges of globalization.[66]

The challenge facing Brazilian foreign policy at the outset of the twenty-first century is that of searching for the right conditions in order to sing the tune of specificity in harmony with the world. It is not an easy challenge, given the magnitude of the country's internal problems; the difficulties in synchronizing concurrent times so as to implement public policies; and the general cacophony that characterizes the world today, given the discontinuities that prevail in the functioning of the international system. The history of the making of Brazilian identity and of Brazil's place in the world, as analyzed in this essay, nevertheless provides a significant foundation for successfully taking on such a challenge.

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José Sergio Leite Lopes

Class, Ethnicity, and Color in the Making of Brazilian Football

INTRODUCTION

THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE 1998 WORLD CUP in France made it possible to envision the strength of Brazilian football as a symbol for the diffusion of world football. The fact that Brazil had won the 1994 World Cup was important, of course. But the value of this victory, obtained for the first time in a final match decided by penalties, is connected to the remarkable victories of 1958, 1962, and 1970 that created Brazil's fame in world football. Because of this glorious past, built between the late 1950s and the early 1970s, excellence in football—the most popular sport in the world—became internationally regarded as a distinctive Brazilian national quality. The 1994 world title indicated that Brazil's excellence was not something of the past, before the great recent transformations connected to the professionalization of this sport, and showed that Brazilian football still had links with that past for which it had become so famous.

In fact, football from the 1980s on distinguishes itself from the past because of the intensification of phenomena that were already present. Many of these factors are related to the live transmission by television of matches and championships from all over the world. Competitions have come, in consequence, to

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involve larger values, leading to greater commercial interests in the sport. The number of different professionals connected to football (medical staff, trainers, physiotherapists, show business and marketing experts, sports media, security staff, service workers, and so forth) has also grown tremendously. Paradoxically there is also a growth of voluntary activities, such as temporary services for specific championships (as during the World Cup) or permanent organizations like the *torcidas organizadas*. These new fans' associations appeal to a supporter very different from the kind of spectators that went to the stadiums before the 1970s. On the other hand, the international circulation of players has greatly accelerated, leading to a concentration in Europe: among the principal players on the Brazilian team during the 1998 Cup, five were playing for Italian teams, two for Spanish teams, two for Japanese teams, and two for Brazilian teams. The situation was similar in the other important teams at the tournament. There has been a transition from national to multinational professionalism. In the latest World Cups even the transportation of great numbers of Brazilian fans was supported by large state-owned or multinational companies, which paid the fares for their employees or clients as a reward for productivity or sales.



Brazilian football, with its outstanding presence in the history of world football, becomes thus a strategic product to be displayed in the World Cup's marketing strategies. The companies that promoted the Cup or were related to it sought endorsements from Ronaldo, a Brazilian player of poor background from the suburbs of Rio who became an international star after a very early start in the Brazilian national team. By doing so, they focused on Brazilian football as a model for helping poor youngsters—who might thereby not only rid themselves of the dangers of poverty, but also become idols worldwide. Marketing thus aestheticizes poverty, while the large multinational companies express their concern about it—a very paradoxical concern, since it comes from the same enormously wealthy, powerful, and profitable companies that blindly create unemployment and exclude large sectors of the population by means of their internal microeconomic policies and their public demands for liberal macroeconomic policies.



In spite of this business dimension, the World Cup still awakens and liberates strong emotions. On the one hand, the apparent paralysis of the Brazilian team in the final match was occasioned by the players' tension—especially Ronaldo's—which was perhaps related to the indirect presence of the companies that supported them. On the other hand, the French team was able to arouse the enthusiasm of local multitudes—which in the beginning of the Cup seemed quite cold—because it became a symbol of the success and the legitimate integration of the sons of long-stigmatized proletarian immigrants. This same sport-related energy that liberates strong emotions was also one of the foundations for the fame and success of Brazilian football. It was likewise a symbol of the integration of dominated social groups, even while the domination was reproduced and intensified in other critical fields such as the economical and political.[1]

This essay will focus on the formative period of Brazilian football, when no one would have imagined such success. Such a starting point helps to counteract the now-prevailing notion that takes for granted expertise and success in this sport as an inherent national gift. On the other hand, it will show that football is a domain where social conflicts and national dilemmas are clearly brought out.

One way of understanding the peculiarities of the rapid dissemination of football in Brazil is to analyze how early and to what degree blacks and *mestizos* entered the upper echelons of the sport. Football's spread among the Brazilian population was related to the sport's appropriation by the various classes and social groups, but this was not independent of skin color or ethnicity.

In this essay I seek to analyze the social contradictions between the consequences of football's predominantly aristocratic beginnings in Brazil and its appropriation by social groups from below, leading progressively to the transition from amateur to professional football. This transition fostered a huge growth of entry and success by players from the working classes in general, and blacks and mulattos in particular. Yet in the sport's universe there persisted racist beliefs and practices, taking new forms and gaining strength after the defeats Brazil suffered in the 1950 and 1954 World Cups. Only after the 1958 victory in

the World Cup (held in Sweden) could the local (Brazilian) public sphere evaluate the success in terms of the historical making of a specific style, reversing an internalized sense of inferiority into a positive self-assessment of Brazilian football.

THE FOOTBALL OF THE BRAZILIAN ELITES

Following the early growth of football's popularity in Great Britain—which centered on the dispute for the British Cup and the acceptance of professional play within national borders—the sport spread internationally through the previously established network of contacts between local elites and English elites and their institutions.[2] This was no less true in Brazil: the first football games on record in Brazil were played by English sailors (material witnesses to the degree of the sport's popularization in its country of origin) and sporadically among employees of English firms. Yet the games played as the outcome of the *missionary* effort by the local British colony, and later by the young elite Brazilians—former students in England, Switzerland, or Germany—upon their return to Brazil were those which depended on the founding of permanent teams in preexisting clubs or a *de novo* founding of football clubs. Although some football initiatives sprang up inside companies, business leaders and company managers soon met in clubs in order to socialize more freely. Thus, many of the major football clubs ended up reproducing (both on the field and in the stands) the social selection practiced by elite families from Rio and São Paulo. The clubs turned into places for urban socializing; by providing participation in or attendance at physical and sporting activities, they prolonged the receptions and soirées bringing together the dominant families from early twentieth-century *sobrados* (town mansions) in those two cities. In addition to cricket (played by the British), until the 1920s the clubs were organized around men's rowing. The rowing contests in Rio attracted the city's population to the beaches and shoreline along Guanabara Bay and were the main source of attraction for the city's budding sports press. Those who practiced rowing felt that football was not a very masculine sport, with what they viewed as chasing and "prancing" around the field. Still,

the Fluminense Football Club gradually became the game's benchmark for the "Carioca elites," attracting an elegant public to its stadium—men in suits, ties, and hats, and smartly dressed young girls and women, showing by their clothing that they belonged to Rio's finest families. A little hatband with the team's colors, imported from England and used by the men, was a discrete detail indicating the club's coded, select membership.[3] The cry from the stands when the team entered the field—"*Hip, hip, hurrah!*"—and the team's solemn sideline bow to the fans (especially to the young ladies), were also signs of refinement, imported details from the world metropolises. Such gestures showed the social status of both players and fans, also manifested by the players' frequent visits to the stands during halftime and after the game, when they met up with their own families and those of their peers.

Players also frequented dances at the club; playing football regularly was one of several characteristics of an elite lifestyle. Several football clubs were made up of university students, and access to law, medicine, and to a lesser extent engineering was a form of social reconversion (via schooling) for the declining Brazilian rural aristocracy, or an expanded reproduction of the new scholarized urban elites. Thus, while the original Fluminense team was made up of young businessmen, top employees of factories and major stores, and *rentiers*—the sons of moneyed parents, educated in Europe—from 1910 on it was forced to primarily recruit university students, who were younger, had more time for the game, and were competing with Fluminense on successful rival teams.

Because it was the national capital, Rio de Janeiro soon became the center of Brazilian football, serving as a model for the sport's diffusion around the whole country. The clubs from Rio had a following in many other cities, reproducing the same rivalries. However, football developed first in São Paulo, which was the center of the coffee economy and was just becoming an industrial center as well, with important local elites. Some sectors of Rio's and São Paulo's population had the power to disseminate norms, novelties, and forms of behavior to the rest of the country. São Paulo and the country's capital always had a strong rivalry, which would lead to a serious political crisis

in the 1930s. Football became an instrument for the sublimation of this rivalry.

The first football league in Brazil was organized in São Paulo in 1901, and the first championship of football clubs in the country was held there, while in Rio the local league was organized only in 1905 and the first championship only in 1906. Thus, the original football players from Rio de Janeiro's and São Paulo's elite society in the early twentieth century were *university football majors* as compared to the *primary* players of the working classes, according to a school metaphor used by Mário Filho.[4] Although the equipment needed to play the game was not comparatively sophisticated or exclusive, at that time the leather ball had to be imported from England, as did the football shoes. The grass-covered field was also an attribute of players with higher financial means. Yet the popular substitutes for imitating this leisurely practice were not at all expensive: stocking balls served the purpose for the sandlot games hotly disputed by barefoot players, with goalposts easily improvised from any variety of possible materials. Children and teenagers from the working classes could watch the football matches between the big elite teams (in the neighborhoods frequented by the elites) by either working as ballboys or watching from the cheapest, ground-level places in the stadium, an area used as a ploy to recruit cheering sections for decisive matches.

In São Paulo, the matches between teams of the first division were held at the Velódromo, a former stadium for bicycle races turned into a football stadium in the early years of the century. In this city the popularization of football was facilitated by the many empty, flat areas on the floodplains, where matches and championships between teams of the poor sectors of town could be held. Besides, as more and more factories and companies began promoting football as a form of leisure and integration between their employees and workers, in both São Paulo and Rio there were greater opportunities for the poor population to see matches in the suburbs and popular neighborhoods.

FACTORY FOOTBALL AND COMPANY TOWNS

The year 1904 witnessed the founding, in the Rio suburb of Bangú, of the Bangú Athletic Club by English managers, over-

seers, mechanics, and employees at the Companhia Progresso Industrial textile factory.[5] There, contrary to other Rio clubs in which the English founders were capable of attracting other Englishmen to make up the full complement of a football team, Bangú's geographical isolation from the city proper meant that the English had to include Brazilian supervisors, overlookers, administrative employees, even shop-floor workers—as well as those of other nationalities. Thus, Bangú's first several lineups included one or two Brazilians among five Englishmen, three Italians, and two Portuguese. The number of Brazilians and factory workers increased over time: the workers stayed at the factory longer, and learning football was a continuous process for them, while managers and overseers tended to return to their native countries or change jobs, and their replacements were not always good at the sport. As the number of workers increased on the team, so did the number of black and mulatto players. In the Bangú stadium there was no distinction between the *gerais* (literally "general [area]," the ground-level area with no seating) and the stands or reserved seating; the community of workers, their families, and other people from the neighborhood made up the team's working-class supporters, the numbers of which grew tremendously when Bangú was incorporated into the Rio de Janeiro football league, the first division in the Carioca championship. The Bangú team was soon more famous than the factory itself and ended up serving as a positive marketing image for the latter.

Bangú inaugurated the figure of the worker-player, a worker less known for his work inside the factory than for his performance as a football player on the factory team. This justified certain relative privileges in the company: time off from the factory for training and games; assignment to light work, for example in the "cloth room" (for quality inspection and recording of each worker's production of fabric). While football was originally introduced by the English for their own delight and socializing, the company soon realized that the sport fit in well with activities and the use of time in a company town. So, too, Bangú was aware of the then-current practice of other European companies of promoting football as a stimulus to workers, increasing the workers' sense of belonging to the company community.[6]

The board of directors at the Bangú factory were quick to discover what would soon lead to one of the watersheds for the spread of football among the various social classes in Brazil, as it already had in other countries in Europe and South America; football could be adopted as a pedagogical and disciplinary technique for "total institutions," a technique invented by elite English boarding schools but applicable to shaping working-class youth in various types of institutions.[7] Thus, not only schools (catering to the elite in a country with little schooling among the general population), but above all companies, helped make possible direct access to football among the working classes.

Several factories (especially in the textile industry) started promoting football among their workers and administrative employees, founding teams in great numbers all over Brazil in the first three decades of the twentieth century and soon taking the Bangú factory and team as their point of reference. Prime examples of such factories were in the so-called company towns where football fit in well with other recreational activities aimed at maintaining discipline.[8] Thus, in 1908 the English managers of the América Fabril company founded the Sport Club Pau Grande in the rural village of Pau Grande, some 90 kilometers from Rio de Janeiro. Forty years later this factory boasted an outstanding team in the championships between textile factory teams in the Petrópolis region, routinely beating visiting company teams from Rio. The Pau Grande team even outstripped factory teams sponsored by the same company in Rio. And one of the players on this team, Garrincha, was already playing the same basic style that fans would come to love ten years later, when he would be a member of Brazil's 1958 world championship team.[9]

In addition to Bangú, another textile factory club participating in Rio's first-division championship was Andaraí, located in the northern-zone neighborhood by the same name. The dominant force in an isolated company town, the Bangú factory formed its team from the little leagues and juniors teams like Esperança, where famous players like Domingos da Guia started their careers. Outstanding young players from these teams could hope to be hired as worker-players in the factory and

guaranteed a stable job, even beyond the age at which they could play competitive football. In addition, both Bangú and Andaraí allowed players from the working classes—poor whites, mulattos, and blacks—to measure their strength and skills against those of players from the major elite clubs that had introduced football to Brazil, an opportunity denied to the welter of small teams springing up in the main working-class suburban towns, both inside companies and at the initiative of small groups of neighbors. Yet while Bangú was feared when it played on its own field, backed by the home fans, it was no real competitor for the city title: greater available time and resources, together with deeper knowledge of the tactics and training spreading directly from Europe or via Argentina and Uruguay, gave the elite amateurs from the big clubs the upper hand when compared to the limited resources available to the worker-players who (albeit on light work schedules) had to subordinate football to factory production needs.

SOCIAL TENSION AND CRISIS IN AMATEUR FOOTBALL

The elite clubs' hegemony, as expressed by successive victories in the Rio de Janeiro city championship, was only broken in 1923 when Vasco da Gama, a team built on support from the burgeoning colony of Portuguese immigrants, vied for the title for the first time and won. The Vasco team, champions in the second division in 1922, had a secret: it had recruited the best players from the working-class suburbs, whether they were white, black, or mulatto, and kept them in a regimen of semiconfinement, financed by the club, where the athletes focused exclusively on football.[10] Vasco's success was a sign of football's growing popularity. The sport was now played in all the working-class neighborhoods and enjoyed enormous popularity, allowing for two seemingly contradictory processes—the intensification of its bourgeois and its proletarian bases of support—simultaneously, much as they had occurred in England. In fact, unlike the aristocratic clubs dominating the first-division championship, the Clube de Regatas Vasco da Gama had no athletes from the same social extraction as its members. In the aristocratic clubs, athletes and member fans socialized

during halftime and after the matches—just as they did in daily life, whether at dance parties in the club itself, as family members, family friends, acquaintances, or suitors. The Portuguese club, on the other hand, apparently had no athletes from the same social origins as its members. The Portuguese way of life, immersed in work and tending family businesses, was quite different from that of the sons of the Brazilian aristocracy. Their upbringing, modeled after elite European schooling, encompassed a long formal education and playing sports, both of which constituted not only a transition period separating one from work and intensive business management but also an educational process preparing one to exercise top-level economic and political domination.

The bourgeois and petit bourgeois sons of the Portuguese colony, with their hands-on approach to family business, played an improvised, haphazard kind of football in neighborhoods that included working-class youth. The only possibility for Vasco da Gama to compete was to "proletarianize" its team by the unrestricted recruitment of the best players from the working-class suburbs, while simultaneously making it bourgeois so as to secure the finances needed to support these players (who had no resources of their own for continuous leisure activity) in a semi-confinement situation where they were fed, housed, and encouraged to train at least as much as the athletes from the major clubs. Vasco's 1923 championship team consisted of white, black, and mulatto players who had already been part of a de facto scratch team in the suburbs, with a taxi driver at the goal and several former factory workers from Bangú, Andaraí, and other minor league teams.

Vasco's victory in the 1923 Carioca championship fueled the defensive stance taken by Brazilian amateur football toward the rise of subordinate social groups in quality football; Dunning has pointed out a similar process that had already occurred in England.[11] From moral qualities associated with the essence of modern football, which in turn was seen as an important part of the way of life characterizing and distinguishing social groups classifying themselves as select, the precepts and practices of amateur play now turned to excluding the "outsiders."[12]

The big clubs were quick in reacting; they set up a new football league that Vasco was not invited to join, allegedly because it had no stadium of its own. The Portuguese colony, in turn, organized itself and funded construction of the city's largest stadium (until the construction of Maracanã in 1950), with a capacity of fifty thousand, inaugurated in 1927. Fluminense's stadium could hold no more than twenty thousand spectators. Yet the unusually large blueprint of Vasco's stadium was not based only on a logic of honor in response to the discrimination the club had suffered. The team played top-quality football; its supporters grew in the wake of mobilization by the Portuguese colony; opposition from other teams' supporters increased; and all the while the fans flocked to see the matches—so much so that the big clubs relented (for economic reasons), allowing Vasco to join the first division even before its stadium was completed.

Yet other measures were taken. The Rio local state team competing for the national championship had not a single player from Vasco's championship team.[13] The new league set up a commission to investigate players' means of survival, to determine the extent to which they were actually playing as amateurs. The very substance and procedures of this investigation expressed a number of class distinctions and prejudices. In fact, in addition to keeping the team in semiconfinement—paying for food, lodging, uniforms, and training equipment—Vasco had a policy of paying them the so-called *bicho,* a bonus based on one's performance in the match, in addition to a "travel allowance" for train fare.[14] Such coverage of athletes' expenses—which assumed, or rather acknowledged, that they had no resources of their own—appeared to be at odds with the prevailing notion of players' social status, at least as expected by the managers and athletes who had introduced football into Brazil. The latter, by contrast, purchased their own sports gear, financed their own free time, and covered their own expenses when the team went to play outside of Rio or outside of Brazil: when the teams traveled to São Paulo, Montevideo, or Buenos Aires, the players never failed to take their dinner jackets along for the hotels and receptions.

Aware of the new league's investigation into the means of support for athletes, Vasco's bourgeois members offered to give the players make-believe jobs, generally in their stores, where they would have many more perks than the worker-players in the factories. Meanwhile, the proletarian worker-players were welcomed by proponents of amateur play—as if the moral shaping provided by the factory, and the fact that a worker-player simultaneously worked and kept up his athletic performance (and thus lacked the time to compete on equal footing with other athletes in the big clubs), were reason enough to regard him as a worthy competitor. So, too, accepting the worker-players offered the additional merit of not totally excluding the poor from amateur sport at a time when scrutiny was falling on the amateur legitimacy of poor recruits to the game. Even so, some occupations and professions—stevedores, soldiers, and those who habitually received tips (waiters, taxi drivers, and barbers)—were arbitrarily prohibited in written league rules from playing in the first division.[15]

Another step by the new league was to require that players know how to read and write properly. When they entered the field, players had to be able to sign their names on the scorepad and to quickly fill in an "enrollment form" with several items. This implicit test of schooling is characteristic of the indirect, euphemistic exercise of class and color prejudice in Brazil. Entering a game under the eagle eye of league representatives, athletes had to fill in a questionnaire with the following required information: full name, both parents' names, nationality, place of birth, date of birth, and place of study and work.[16] Vasco da Gama and São Cristóvão, another club recruiting players from the suburbs, had their athletes attend specially organized crash literacy courses and remedial primary-school tutoring. Their players from working-class origins, who were almost invariably illiterate or functionally illiterate, managed to scrape by this apparently neutral writing trap, albeit with great difficulty.

Just like this use of writing skills indirectly to block access to first-division football by working-class players, the most famous cases of racial prejudice were also indirect and jocose. Such was the case for the myth behind the origin of the term

"*pó de arroz*" ("rice powder") for members and fans of the Fluminense Futebol Clube, the oldest football club in Brazil and the one with the most aristocratic origins. The mulatto player Carlos Alberto, son of a photographer (who took university graduation portraits), was playing on the second team for the América Futebol Clube, where he was friendly with a number of university student players. In 1916 he was called up to the Fluminense starting team. Before entering the field, when the players posed along the sidelines to greet the select public in the stands, Alberto was reported to have been seen in the dressing-room spreading rice powder on his face to lighten his complexion. In a game against América, the group of supporters from his former home team standing in the cheapest area of the stadium refused to forgive their former star athlete and shouted out, "*pó de arroz!*" Alberto paid no heed to their heckling but the stigma of pretentiousness and whitening endured—quite appropriately not only for the team's players but for the aristocratic club as a whole. This episode, supposed to have occurred in the second decade of the twentieth century, was further publicized and immortalized in the chronicles by sports writer Mário Filho in the 1930s to stimulate rivalry between supporters and attract bigger crowds to budding professional football. Thus when Flamengo was becoming the city's most popular club in the late 1930s, the Fluminense fans counterattacked by heckling the Flamengo supporters with "*pó de carvão*" ("coal dust").[17] Originally intended as insults, both cheering sections ended up assimilating the nicknames as self-designating; they have survived to this day.[18]

This episode, with its mythical overtones, denotes not only how mulattos and blacks internalized their inferior social situation (as Carlos Alberto was reported to have done), but also the jocose effect and conciliatory outcome through which much of the ambiguity in racial stereotypes and prejudices in Brazil is expressed.[19] Of the examples cited by Mário Filho, the only case of overt racial prejudice committed against a player involved an athlete nicknamed Manteiga. In 1923 the managers of the América team, motivated by the same spirit of competition that had led Vasco to base its team on players recruited from the working classes, set out on a more timid recruiting

search in the docks area of Rio. They recruited a successful local player, a sailor playing right wing and nicknamed Manteiga (or "Butter," because of his slick passes). They proposed that he leave the Brazilian navy and take a job at a business owned by one of the club's board members. But Manteiga was black: as he prepared to enter the field for his first game, other players from the team walked out of the dressing room in a blatant display of prejudice. Next, nine players from the club's first and second teams resigned in protest against the inclusion of this new player. These dissidents were later absorbed by Fluminense. The board members of the club kept Manteiga on despite the crisis, but he felt extremely uncomfortable; his presence made for a greater disturbance in the club's facilities than it had on the playing field itself. During a tour by América to Salvador (Manteiga's hometown, and where there is a higher concentration of blacks than in Rio), he stayed behind, abandoning the team.[20]

One can thus easily understand the big clubs' reaction to Vasco da Gama's successful entry in 1923, with a team made up of poor whites, *mestizos,* and blacks. Having excluded Vasco from the club league in 1924 and 1925, Fluminense and Flamengo won these two titles respectively, and proper order appeared to have returned to the league: even though "little" São Cristóvão won in 1926 and Vasco (back in the league) took the title in 1929, the 1927, 1928, 1930, 1931, and 1932 titles went to the traditional clubs. Yet the crisis in amateur football, which was already appearing as "yellow amateurism," fueled the faction of players, sportswriters, and even board members of clubs in favor of adopting professional sport.

The events related to the entry of Vasco da Gama into Rio's championship of 1923 and its victory using amateuristic methods with a team formed by players from the working class from the suburbs of the north part of town—some of them black or mulatto—are exemplary of what also happened in other Brazilian states. Some years before, similar events occurred in São Paulo. But things only settled down in the 1930s with the institution of professional football. In São Paulo the reactions from the elite clubs were not caused specifically by the admittance of blacks and mulattos, predominant in the working

classes in Rio, as players, but by the additional admittance of immigrant workers, such as Italians and Spaniards. In 1910 one more club, called Corinthians Paulista, appeared in São Paulo, its name an homage to the Corinthians, an amateur team of university students from Oxford and Cambridge that had been in Rio that year at the invitation of the Fluminense and had also played in São Paulo. This appropriation of one of English football's most aristocratic names by a working-class club playing in the floodplain areas of São Paulo is interesting and revealing, and it is ironic that this team was to become the most popular one in São Paulo. Palestra Itália and Corinthians Paulista, both of which had more popular origins than the elite clubs that had created the football league, were admitted to the first division of the city's league after some of the elite clubs had left. The departure of the founding clubs reaffirms their exclusive amateuristic and elitist character, as they preferred to quit football or play out of competition than face the pressure from below exerted by athletes from the lower classes who wanted to participate. Interestingly, once they formally expressed a desire to affiliate with the local league after the retreat of elite clubs, both teams had to wait four years before the final acceptance of a committee judging the "moral values" of newly associating clubs.[21]

The entry of these two new clubs into São Paulo's first division was somewhat less dramatic than the entry of Vasco da Gama into the premier league in Rio. This is perhaps related to the better position in São Paulo of Italian, Spanish, and Syrian immigrants as compared to the slave descendants. Even though many of these immigrants were workers, their communities also had representation in the higher and middle classes, and in general were more broadly accepted by local elites. Palestra Itália, for example, had connections with the higher strata of Italian immigrants. Many Italian immigrant workers, however, were connected to Corinthians, a club with a more universalistic affiliation, which attracted immigrants who had no prospect of associating themselves with an exclusive team like the Palestra Itália. Corinthians became the team of the Spanish, the Syrians, the blacks, and even of the poorer Italians. Palestra Itália, even though it was at first despised by the elite

clubs and press, represented the upward mobility of the Italian community—in such a way that in the 1940s it resisted the admittance of black players, allying itself with the traditional elite clubs. It was not until World War II, when Brazil declared war against Italy, that Palestra Itália changed its name to Palmeiras and finally admitted a black player, forced by the circumstances to move toward Brazilian nationalization.

BLACK PLAYERS AND THE EMERGENCE OF BRAZILIAN PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL

The internal crisis in Brazilian amateur football finally became unbearable due to the outside pressure exerted by the international game. With the beginning of the World Cup, Brazilian players who felt "enslaved" by the traps of amateurism found a way out in the 1930s, as European clubs, particularly the Italians, raised the demand for South American players. Soon after the first World Cup, won by Uruguay, and in light of preparations for the second World Cup, to be held in Italy, Mussolini began to promote Italian football by promising to build a stadium for the winning team in the Italian Cup. Competition for talent among teams ended up sparking a race for the best players from South America—which in the context of Mussolini's Italy meant the best players of Italian ancestry in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil (especially São Paulo). Argentina's football was most threatened by this recruiting: the solution for the Buenos Aires teams was to adopt professionalism, and the Montevideo teams followed soon after.[22] Under these circumstances, professional football would be coming soon to São Paulo and Rio. In both of these cities there were cases of white players who were not *oriundi* (i.e., of Italian ancestry) who adopted Italian names, altering their identification papers with the acquiescence of clubs from Italy. Facing the loss of such players to the European professional teams, factions favoring implementation of professional football gained momentum in Brazil.

White players were exported to Europe, while black players, blocked from playing for the most significant importing country, Mussolini's Italy, and with little stimulus to remain for long

in countries where blacks were the exception, became virtually nonexportable.[23] Such was the case of the black player Fausto, a center-half, who was highlighted by international sports coverage during the 1930 World Cup tournament. Rising in the ranks from the Bangú company-town club, recruited into what became Vasco's 1929 championship team, highly rated for his performance in the 1930 World Cup, Fausto, who wanted to live full-time on playing football, had difficulty putting up with the false amateurism in the big Brazilian clubs. During a tour with Vasco to Spain in 1931, Barcelona made Fausto an offer and he stayed behind there. Yet his experience with professional football abroad led him to break off his contract, an episode that he would repeat in Switzerland. When professional football finally came to Brazil, he returned to Vasco in 1933.

The same occurred with Vasco's black goalkeeper, Jaguaré. Recruited by Barcelona along with Fausto, he came back in 1932, even before professional football began in Brazil, offering to play again for his old team. So it was also with Domingos da Guia and Leônidas da Silva, the two of whom had led a victory by the Brazilian national team in 1932, beating the world-champion Uruguayans on their home field in Montevideo. Both players stayed abroad for only a short while. Domingos was hired by Nacional of Montevideo and Leônidas by Peñarol: the former was successful in Uruguay (and later in Argentina) while the latter was not. Both rejoined Brazilian football in 1934, after professional play had begun.

Meanwhile, many white Brazilian players who had gone to Italy ended up integrating into that society, encouraged by the Italian colony in São Paulo, who considered a triumphant return to Italy an ideal to be achieved by Brazilian-born descendents of Italians. Blacks, in turn, appeared to be "condemned" to "local" success, to be great local players—indeed, to be Brazil's greatest players. Significantly, in this sense they became identified as the great initiators of Brazilian national football. Football could not have the same meaning for white and black Brazilians. Between them there was a difference separating "good professionals," prone to exercising their talents on the international football scale, and talented players who—through their athletic success—were seeking ethnic eman-

cipation and were condemned to succeed exclusively within their own homeland. Professional football became a means of emancipation for black athletes—a necessary condition, as it turns out, for establishing football as a "national" sport. Such an undertaking was not just a business strategy (involving money); it established an identity between players and the public, united in their adherence to a common project of social emancipation through sport.[24]

This identity between players and the public was tested soon after the move to professionalism. When Flamengo hired players like Fausto, Domingos da Guia, and Leônidas da Silva, the team—which until then had followed an amateur policy—became the most popular one in the city. By heavily recruiting working-class players (as Vasco da Gama had begun doing twelve years earlier), Flamengo had the advantage of being identified as the prime example of a universally "mixed-race" Brazilian club, in contrast to the nucleus of Portuguese-colony board members and supporters from the equally popular rival club. Flamengo's football club headquarters and field were also moved, in 1935, from a traditionally elite neighborhood to one characterized at that time by its proximity to factories, company compounds, and a shantytown (all of which have now disappeared, giving way to a middle-class neighborhood). Domingos's and Leônidas's tremendous popularity, which had increased with their participation in the national team competing for the World Cup in 1938, was transferred to and assimilated by Flamengo.[25] Meanwhile, Fluminense, which had begun decisively supporting the implementation of professionalism in 1932, aimed at a policy of separating the athlete-as-professional-employee from its exclusive club membership, expanded its practice of recruiting white players from São Paulo and the interior of Brazil as a whole. Symptomatically, Bangú was able to free its worker-players from their factory jobs and hire a coach who had worked for the big clubs. In 1933, it became the city's first championship team under professionalism.

The 1930s were thus marked by progress in a process of democratization within football, both for the professional definition of players, coaches, and trainers and for the incorporation of a broader, mass public.[26] This process continued into the

1940s: even when Leônidas and Domingos left Flamengo, the team's popularity continued to grow as it won three straight city titles, in 1942, 1943, and 1944.[27] The popularity of some charismatic players who had moved to São Paulo (e.g., Leônidas and Domingos) was transferred to the team as a whole (where mulattos and blacks were the majority) and to the team's shirt, consolidating its image of universalist mixture.[28] Little by little the young mulatto Zizinho occupied the place left by Leônidas. Yet even when he was transferred to Bangú in 1950, the team pulled together without any charismatic players and again won three straight city titles in 1952, 1953, and 1954. Still, in the late 1940s the dominant team was Vasco da Gama; its players were the core of the national team competing in the 1950 World Cup, bringing this club great popularity, splitting between Vasco and Flamengo the loyalties of Rio's lower classes.

Eventually, this process of popularization of formerly elite clubs that used players from working-class backgrounds reached other clubs in Rio, São Paulo, and other cities. In Porto Alegre, it was seen in the development of the great rivalry between two clubs, Grêmio and Internacional. Grêmio Portoalegrense was founded in 1903 for the practice of football by German associations that promoted gymnastics. It was thus a club of the German community in Porto Alegre, and included sectors of the local business elites. Like the Palestra Itália in São Paulo that began with players of the Italian community, Grêmio also was based at first on players from the German community in Porto Alegre. In contrast with Germania in São Paulo, Grêmio was supported by the large German community that existed in Rio Grande do Sul. But Grêmio did not expect to represent the German community, and was also open to other sectors of the local elites. Internacional, founded in 1909, soon tried to become a rival to Grêmio, but the latter team was dominant until the 1940s. With professionalization, Internacional recruited the best players from the working classes, including blacks and mulattos, while Grêmio sustained its traditional policy, excluding black players.

Without any real chances of being accepted by the main clubs in town, or so they believed, blacks in Porto Alegre decided in the early 1920s to create a separate championship and league

in the poor sector of the city, known as the "league of the black legs."[29] It was a successful idea. While Grêmio kept its traditionally exclusive policy, Internacional later incorporated the great black and mulatto players from the second division and dominated the state's championship until the 1950s.

One of the symbols of this glorious period for Internacional is the black right-wing player Tesourinha, who began playing in the poor black sectors of Porto Alegre in second-division teams and in the 1940s was incorporated by Internacional. In 1949 he was included in the Brazilian team for the South American championship, but could not participate in the 1950 World Cup because of a contusion. In the early 1950s he was traded to Vasco da Gama. In 1952 Grêmio brought him back to Porto Alegre from Vasco da Gama, but the president of the club had a hard time overcoming the resistance of the club's council, which defended the tradition of not admitting black players. Grêmio's president wanted to end the club's exclusivist tradition precisely through the admittance of the former idol of the rival team who was also a player of the Brazilian national team, qualities that gave him legitimacy. By now Tesourinha was already older and more injured than ten years previously, and people used to say that Tesourinha had given his football to Internacional and was lending his color to Grêmio. From then on, Grêmio adopted a policy more adapted to professionalism, selecting the best players independently of their origins and skin color, and trying to attract as many fans as possible. It collected money among its associates for the construction of a large stadium, as Internacional had done in the 1940s. With time it was able to shed its elite character and become a club with a faithful and passionate following, like its rival and many other popular clubs in Brazil.[30]

This late acceptance of professionalism by elite clubs also happened in other states. Thus, São Paulo Futebol Clube was created during the period of professionalism in the 1930s by members of clubs that had desisted playing football because of the end of amateurism—such as Paulistano. But by the early 1940s it was engaged in professional competition and had admitted Leônidas da Silva into the team. The admittance of this great black player from Flamengo, an idol from the World

Cup of 1938, opened the way for other players from poor and black sectors of the population, and for the growth of the number of fans. The Corinthians, which had from early times been associated with São Paulo's poor sectors and with the acceptance of black players and fans, answered São Paulo's action by admitting Domingos da Guia in 1944. This was another player from the 1938 Cup who, together with Leônidas, had helped make Flamengo a popular club during the turn to professionalism in the 1930s. Like Grêmio with Tesourinha, the elite clubs in Rio, such as Fluminense and Botafogo, ended up improving their professional policies—for example, by the acceptance of the black player Didi in 1951 by Fluminense and in 1956 by Botafogo.

THE RESURGENCE OF RACIST STEREOTYPES AFTER THE 1950 WORLD CUP DEFEAT

While such progress in the democratization of football did in fact occur, ambiguous, dissimulated stereotypes and prejudices present in Brazilian society as a whole were also active in sports. Thus, the flow of young, poor, black athletes meant that the greater or lesser faults and threats hovering over the players' careers—lack of discipline, drinking, and taking bribes—were attributed preferentially to blacks, albeit sometimes unconsciously.[31] There was also an ambiguous split between the adoption and idolatry of black athletes by the home fans and the stigmatizing of black athletes from other teams—an expression of the kind of "cordial racism" permeating Brazilian society and oriented by one's own personal relations.

According to this logic, Brazil's defeat by Uruguay in the final game of the 1950 World Cup, held in Brazil, sparked a barrage of accusations against several black ballplayers on Brazil's defense, targeted as the scapegoats for the tragedy. These racial stigma and "common-sense" stereotypes were backed by the pretense of erudite evolutionist and social-Darwinist explanations propounded by physical anthropologists and essayists from various professional backgrounds, which found wide acceptance among Brazilian elites.[32] One result of the confrontation between such evolutionist racial theories—

proposing a hierarchy in the various human "races" and belittling racial mixture—and the reality of widespread Brazilian miscegenation was the prediction of a gradual "whitening" of the Brazilian population based on policies to encourage European immigration, and prognoses that the trend in Brazil would be away from miscegenation and toward the predominance of the white "race."

According to such theories, the less "civilized" black and *mestizo* Brazilians were purportedly prone to greater emotional instability relating to achievements and decisions. Although such theories admitted the existence of bodily qualities and skills in blacks and mulattos such as those associated with music and dance, in sports such skills were allegedly linked to a countertrait of instability and indecisiveness. The result of the 1950 World Cup final thus appeared adequate to illustrate this erudite supposition, and a number of sports directors subscribed to it: the best team in the championship, displaying great beauty and skill in its football technique, succumbed by a score of 2–1 in its own stadium, the biggest in the world with the largest public ever seen, to a technically inferior yet determined and "whiter" team.

Again, when Brazil was eliminated from the 1954 World Cup in Switzerland by the Hungarian team, with the 4–2 defeat ending in a free-for-all, the head of the Brazilian delegation published a report on the team's tour, turning to such theories and justifying Brazil's defeat on the basis of the alleged emotional instability resulting from Brazilian miscegenation.[33]

REVERSAL OF STIGMAS AND NEW EXCELLENCE: THE 1958 WORLD CUP AND THE FIRST "MULTIRACIAL" CHAMPIONSHIP TEAM

The Brazilian national team's victory in the 1958 World Cup in Sweden, tying the English in the second game and beating the Austrians, Russians, Welsh, French, and Swedes, belied the erudite theories and racist stereotypes concerning the alleged weaknesses of *mestizo* Brazilian football. Contradicting the assertion that "only by chance or contingency might we become world football champions and establish hegemony in this

sport," virtually the same team won again in the 1962 World Cup in Chile, beating the Mexicans, Spanish, English, Chileans, and Czechoslovakians. It was the first *mestizo* team (blacks, whites, and mulattos) to win a World Cup, at a time when the skin color of European players was universally white.

Indeed, after the defeat in 1950, suffered by the Brazilian population as a national tragedy, and the experience in 1954, the 1958 team had a more seasoned group of managers, the teamwork of a "technical commission" in charge of organizing the entire tour, and above all a group of extraordinary players, combining the experience of left-back Nilton Santos and midfielder Didi with the youth and unnerving style of others like Pelé and Garrincha. These latter three players helped turn physical disadvantages and stigma like skin color into embodiments of excellence in football. Didi was a craftsman of sagacity and elegance, making long-distance, curved passes, and taking foul-shots with his famous "*folha seca*" or "dry leaf" kick (where the ball took an elliptical, semi-boomerang flight, tricking the goalkeeper); he was chosen by the press as the 1958 World Cup's most valuable player. Pelé was the teenage prodigy at seventeen, son of a former football player, aware of the virtues of asceticism to avoid the pitfalls of a professional football career and heir to the synthesis of qualities in his father's generation, which had included Leônidas. Garrincha was the prime example of transforming bodily and social stigmata into physical and athletic capital. Born and raised in a textile-factory company town in the rural village of Pau Grande, some 90 kilometers from Rio, and living there until the eve of the 1962 World Cup, Garrincha embodied the *habitus* of a factory worker deriving the utmost pleasure from the marginal activities of a company town—hunting, fishing, playing as a worker-player for the factory team, dribbling around the work routine, and transferring this hedonistic pleasure to the professional football context. With his crooked legs and total detachment from all things professional in his career (and thus from the nervousness characterizing decisive games), the *mestizo* Garrincha, bearer of the marks and stigma of the Brazilian lower classes, was an extreme case of turning such disadvan-

tages into an unusual, unnerving style, with his dribble down the right wing, fatal to the opponents' defense.[34]

The 1958 World Cup may be used as a yardstick to compare Brazilian football with what was going on in Argentine football, since it brought Argentina's national team back into international competition after a period of isolation in South America. Football had spread among the Argentine working classes ever since the 1920s, and the country's all-star team beat the Uruguayans in the 1921 and 1927 South American Cups; but Argentina lost when competing for world football hegemony against Uruguay in the 1928 Olympics and the 1930 World Cup. Such defeats fueled the Argentine supporters' image of their football as "generous," more concerned with art than winning, unlike Uruguayan football. This image was reinforced when Argentina exported a large number of players to Italy in the 1930s, lending a new, more imaginative style to the tough football style then current in Italy, helping Italy to win the world championships in 1934 and 1938. It was further underscored later in the 1950s when Argentine players gave strength to the main Spanish teams, considered the best in Europe. (The most notorious case in point was a player named Di Stéfano, who played both for Real Madrid and the Spanish national team.) The Argentines thus kept their high self-esteem in football, even though they did not win in the 1920s and 1930s, and later remained outside of the World Cup for several years. Argentina's return to the World Cup in 1958 was a blow to this self-esteem; the 6–1 defeat by Czechoslovakia caused a sense of national frustration comparable to that experienced by Brazil in the 1950 World Cup.[35]

Meanwhile, Brazil—which took Argentine football as its model from the 1920s into the 1950s, and which failed to achieve outstanding international results until then[36]—did not suffer the same loss of players to Italian and Spanish football. Brazil's great black and mulatto players, as we have already seen, were "condemned," so to speak, to exercise their talents in their own country; one or another player would spend short periods abroad, generally in Argentina or Uruguay. These players succeeded in making a major contribution to the creation of a national style of football in their own country, beginning in the 1930s. On the

other hand, although football had spread throughout Brazil from the 1930s on, and although the public wanted to see exhibition, style, and "art football," there was still a strong belief in the inferiority of Brazilian football as compared to that of Europe (especially England) and Argentina. Factors contributing to this were the stereotypes and erudite racist theories considered natural by the majority of the population and even internalized by blacks and *mestizos* themselves. The latter, in turn, appropriated a certain *functional democratization* in Brazilian society through football, silently constructing their "ethnic" and social liberation through the sport. Brazil's World Cup title in 1958—which had been so close in 1950 in Maracanã—thus in a sense came as a surprise to the country. It took Brazil's international vindication in Sweden to reinforce a positive self-assessment of Brazilian football, reversing the people's sense of inferiority.

RECENT TRENDS AND FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Even when Brazil won in 1958 and 1962—temporarily reversing racist stereotypes, taking previously stigmatizing bodily attributes and turning them into an internationally acknowledged "Brazilian style"—after the defeat in 1966 many football analysts and coaches considered this style outdated as compared to the new European "power football" *(futebol-força)*.[37] There was also (even after the famous victory in the 1970 World Cup in Mexico) recurrent discussion in the period between the 1974 and 1994 World Cups concerning the offensive type of "art football" *(futebol-arte)* and the defensive "pragmatic football" *(futebol de resultados)*; among coaches and managers only a minority trusted in a reappropriation (for the current context of football) of the "Brazilian style" consolidated in the 1958, 1962, and 1970 World Cups.

After the 1970s, Brazilian players—including *mesitzos* and blacks—were coveted by European clubs and frequently moved abroad, participating in a more "globalized" European football. Players of color from Portuguese, French, Dutch, Belgian, and English colonies and former colonies began to circulate through European clubs, especially around Italy and Spain. In

the 1970s, Brazilian players, including Pelé, played soccer in the United States; but in the 1980s Japan became the major importer.[38] There was an enormous increase in the wage figures paid by clubs and intermediaries to transfer players. It is worth noting, however, that this high living standard is the privilege of a tiny minority of players acting in the big clubs; the average monthly wage of professional players (in all divisions, not only the first-division clubs) in Brazil is not higher than one or two times the minimum wage (that is, from 80 to 160 dollars per month; the minimum wage was 70 dollars in March of 2000, and in April, a presidential decree raised it to 82 dollars). Unlike the great players of the 1950s and 1960s, who ascended to a relatively modest middle-class standard of living, today's players from the working or lower-middle classes encounter a consumer hedonism that they exploit through their high salaries.[39] Career-management problems are no less complicated than they used to be, given the rapid leap in the athletes' living standard and harassment by the media and fans.[40]

Unlike the tenuous supporters' groups of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, made up predominantly of adult male factory and office workers, supporters' organizations in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s have consisted primarily of young people. While the traditional "carnivalization" of the stands is still present, through the adaptation of old *sambas* or songs from the *escolas de samba* clubs, more recently cheering sections have concentrated on the music and body language of funk, which has spread all over the slums and working-class suburbs in Rio and São Paulo.[41]

Beginning in the 1970s one notes a trend toward relatively greater participation by players from higher social origins and a certain sense of regret over the demise of the sandlot football fields of yesteryear. But in the 1990s one observes considerable effort and initiative in promoting football among the working classes in Brazil's large cities. While previously there had been a spontaneous process of functional democratization through football by which the working classes could achieve real participation and success, there then began an educational process aimed at creating the conditions for team loyalty and discipline among children and youth in these same social classes.[43] The

latter, besides no longer having the same access to sandlot or factory football fields, have now often found themselves in neighborhoods where unemployment, a deteriorating school system, and misdemeanors and felonies have become the prospects for a generation of youth no longer incorporated in great numbers as manual or factory labor by the productive system. Even so, in smaller towns in various parts of the country and in the poor suburbs where opportunities still appear for working-class youth to practice football, they continue to appear and renew the regular and the national teams of juniors.

Mestizo football in Brazil thus survives, with its traditions of success and more or less silent conflicts relating to access by and the continued presence of working-class (and thus mulatto and black) ballplayers in an area of activity highly prized in Brazilian national identity—even when the legitimized hierarchy of professions ascribes priority to the more dominant activities in economic, political, and intellectual life. With the vast majority of spectators and ballplayers originating in the working classes, they still take interest in an activity joining the various classes together in a common language—even though living conditions for the lower classes are aggravated by the persistent lack of social sensitivity in the majority of the country's political and economic elite, combining the traditional old kind of masters-and-slaves domination with modern, exclusive neoliberalism. By using a unique body language and inventing an original style for a quasi-universal sport, Brazil's working classes have succeeded in making a silent contribution to their relative social ascent while furnishing an important domain for Brazilian national identity, wherein they have contributed to reverse the elite's racist stereotypes—and an ethnocentrism internalized by society as a whole.

ENDNOTES

[1]For more information on the new trends of football professionalization appearing through the analysis of the 1998 World Cup, see Jean Pierre Faguer and José Sergio Leite Lopes, "Le football mondialisé comment il va. . . ," *Le Monde*, 22 July 1998, 10; and José Sergio Leite Lopes and Jean Pierre Faguer, "Considerações em torno das transformações do profissionalismo a partir da observação da copa de 1998," *Estudos Históricos* (23) (1999): 175–191.

[2]See James Walvin, *The People's Game: A Social History of British Football* (London: Allen Lane, 1975), chap. 5; Alfred Wahl, *La balle au pied; histoire du football* (Paris: Découvertes Gallimard, 1990); Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning, *Sport et Civilization; La Violence Maîtrisée* (Paris, Fayard, 1994); Mário Filho, *O Negro no Futebol Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1964); Anatol Rosenfeld, *Negro, Macumba e Futebol* (São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1993); and Tony Mason, *Passion of the People? Football in South America* (London: Verso, 1995), chaps. 1, 2.

[3]See Filho, *O Negro no Futebol Brasileiro,* chap. 1.

[4]See ibid., chap. 2. The school metaphor Filho uses refers to the contrast between the university education of the elite introducers of football to Brazil and the primary-school education (if such) of the illiterate or poorly scholarized working classes of the country, who were beginning to be fond of football.

[5]The name Bangú supposedly came from the term *bangüê*, a type of rural mill where sugar was made (see Márcio de Oliveira, "Bangú: de fábrica-fazenda e cidade-fábrica a mais uma fábrica na cidade," masters dissertation on geography, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, 1991). The name indicates the homology between the isolated "company towns" and labor conditions in the Brazilian sugar mills.

[6]See Rosenfeld, *Negro, Macumba e Futebol,* 82.

[7]See Pierre Bourdieu, "Comment Peut-On Être Sportif?" in Bourdieu, *Questions de Sociologie* (Paris: Minuit, 1980).

[8]See José Sergio Leite Lopes, *O "vapor do diabo": o trabalho dos operários do açúcar* (The "devil's steam": the labor of sugar workers) (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1976), chap. 4, and Leite Lopes, *A tecelagem dos conflitos de classe na cidade das chaminés* (The weaving of class conflict in "chimney city") (São Paulo/Brasília: Marco Zero/Editora da UnB, 1988), chaps. 4–7, for a description of these activities in the context of the sugar mills and textile company towns in Brazil's *Nordeste.*

[9]See José Sergio Leite Lopes and Sylvain Maresca, "La disparition de la joie du peuple; notes sur la mort d'un joueur de football," *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* (79) (1989): 27–35.

[10]See Filho, *O Negro no Futebol Brasileiro,* chap. 2.

[11]Eric Dunning, "La Dynamique du Sport Moderne," in *Sport et Civilisation; La Violence Maîtrisée,* ed. Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning (Paris: Fayard, 1994), 81–307.

[12]See Tony Mason, "Football," in Mason, ed., *Sport in Britain: A Social History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 147–148, for the less well-known persistence of amateur football in England and its conflicts with professional football from the end of the last century until the 1970s.

[13]It is worthwhile to remark that, in contrast to most European countries, there was no national championship of clubs in Brazil before the 1970s.

[14]While the term *bicho*—the bonus paid to a player, varying according to his performance—referred to the amount of money paid, the origin of the phrase lay

in a clandestine lottery known as *jogo do bicho* (literally, the "animal game," which still exists in Brazil), in which each number is associated with an animal. The language of the "animal game" was thus appropriate as a metaphorical, coded reference to the semiclandestine payment of bonuses to amateur athletes. For a sociological analysis of this game see Roberto da Matta and Elena Soárez, *Águias, Burros e Borboletas; um estudo antropológico do jogo do bicho* (Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 1999).

[15]The reference to professions associated with tips appears to be an indirect warning against semiclandestine bonuses (the *bicho*) for amateur athletes.

[16]See Waldenyr Caldas, *O Pontapé Inicial; Memória do Futebol Brasileiro (1894–1933)* (São Paulo: Ibrasa, 1990), 84.

[17]See Nelson Rodrigues and Mário Filho, *Fla-Flu; e as multidões despertaram*, org. Oscar Maron Filho and Renato Ferreira (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Europa, 1987), 57–62.

[18]In spite of Filho's personal militancy in football, the classical essay "Blacks in Brazilian Football" remains an important source, to be appropriated contextually and critically. On this subject see Leonardo Pereira, "Footballmania; uma história social do futebol no Rio de Janeiro (1902–1938)," Ph.D. thesis, department of history, University of Campinas, 1998; Antonio J. Soares, "História e invenção das tradições no campo de futebol," *Estudos Históricos* (23) (1999): 119–146; Ronaldo Helal and Cesar Gordon Jr., "Sociologia, história e romance na construção da identidade nacional," *Estudos Históricos* (23) (1999): 147–166; and Maurício Murad, "Considerações possíveis de uma resposta necessária," *Estudos Históricos* (24) (1999).

[19]See Giralda Seyferth, "A invenção da raça e o poder discricionário dos estereótipos," *Anuário Antropológico 93* (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Tempo Brasileiro, 1995), 175–204, and also the essay by Peter Fry, "Politics, Nationality, and the Meanings of 'Race' in Brazil," in this issue of *Dædalus*.

[20]Filho, *O Negro no Futebol Brasileiro,* 54–55.

[21]See, for more details, Plínio J. L. de C. Negreiros, "Resistência e Rendição: a gênese do Sport Club Corinthians Paulista e o futebol oficial em São Paulo, 1910–1916," masters dissertation, department of history, Catholic University of São Paulo, 1992, and José Renato de Campos de Araújo, "Imigração e Futebol: o caso Palestra Itália," masters dissertation, department of sociology, Institute of Philosophy and Social Sciences, University of Campinas, 1996.

[22]Football had reached Argentina and Uruguay early. Argentina was one of the first countries outside England to witness the sport—from 1865, when a group of Englishmen living in Argentina founded the Buenos Aires Football Club. Uruguay was already a two-time Olympic football champion when the government proposed to host the first World Cup in 1930 (which Uruguay won). Argentina was runner-up in the 1928 Olympics in Amsterdam and runner-up in the 1930 World Cup. The establishment of the South American Football Confederation in 1916 was second only to the founding of the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) in 1904. See the entry on "Futebol" in *Enciclopédia Mirador*, vol. 10, 5036–5038, and Eduardo Archetti, "Argentina and the World Cup: In Search of National Identity," in

Host and Champions: Soccer Cultures, National Identities and the USA World Cup, ed. John Sugden and Alan Tomlinson (Aldershot: Arena, 1994), 37–63.

[23]We find here on a Brazilian national scale a kind of reproduction of the closed world experienced by these players' ancestors and contemporaries on the large sugar or coffee plantation operations or in the company towns of the large factories. See Rosilene Alvim, "Constituição da Família e Trabalho Industrial," Ph.D. thesis, Museu Nacional, Rio de Janeiro, 1985; Rosilene Alvim and José Sergio Leite Lopes, "Familles Ouvrières, Familles d'Ouvrières," *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* (84) (September 1990): 78–84; and Leite Lopes, *A tecelagem dos conflitos de classe,* for an analysis of the confined situation in the company towns; and Afrânio Garcia Jr., *Libres et Assujettis* (Paris: Ed. da la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1989), chap. 1, and Leite Lopes, *O "vapor do diabo,"* for an analysis of the closed world of the sugar mills in Brazil.

[24]See José Sergio Leite Lopes, "A vitória do futebol que incorporou a pelada; a invenção do jornalismo esportivo e a entrada dos negros no futebol brasileiro," *Revista USP* (22) (June-July-August 1994): 64–83, and José Sergio Leite Lopes and Jean Pierre Faguer, "L'invention du style brésilien; sport, journalisme et politique au Brésil," *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* (103) (June 1994): 27–35.

[25]Flamengo has the country's most devoted and largest group of supporters. It is said (by the means of public opinion polls) to be supported by 25 to 30 million people in Brazil, followed by Corinthians (in São Paulo) and Vasco.

[26]All this was happening in parallel with a process of regulated, controlled citizenship, brought about by initiatives of the central state (which was consolidating itself at the same time). These took a variety of forms. Urban labor relations became regulated. The policy of incorporating large urban masses was parallel to the large internal migration from the country toward the great industrializing cities. See Wanderley Guilherme Santos, *Cidadania e Justiça* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campus, 1979), and José Sergio Leite Lopes, "Lectures savantes d'un syndicalisme paradoxal; la formation de la classe ouvrière brésilienne et le syndicat 'officiel,'" *Genèses* (3) (1991): 73–96.

[27]Leônidas's and Domingos's transfer to São Paulo contributed to the "nationalization" of the Carioca football style.

[28]Identification of this club with blacks and the poor began when Flamengo's fans found that their jibes toward Fluminense supporters—"rice powder!"—were returned with "coal dust!" referring to heavy manual labor and the color black. This process has continued to this day, using symbols like the *favela*, or hillside shantytown; when Flamengo suffers a goal, the opposing fans goad the sad fans with "*Ela, ela, ela, silêncio na favela!*" translated loosely as "Tum, tum, tum, silence in the slums!"

[29]This episode, rather rare in Brazil, could be compared with the black leagues that existed in North American sports (such as baseball's Negro League).

[30]See Arlei Damo, "Para o que der e vier: o pertencimento clubístico no futebol brasileiro a partir do Grêmio Foot-Ball Porto Alegrense e seus torcedores,"

Patrícia Birman and Márcia Pereira Leite

Whatever Happened to What Used to be the Largest Catholic Country in the World?

ORIGINALLY CALLED the "Land of the Holy Cross," the Portuguese colony of Brazil came into being at the beginning of the sixteenth century under the aegis of the crown and the cross. Catholicism remained the official religion of the country until the last decade of the nineteenth century when the last emperor, Dom Pedro II, was sent into exile and a republican constitution was promulgated.

Even so, the Roman Catholic Church maintained its ascendancy over the hearts and minds of both the rulers and the ruled. As late as the 1990s Brazil was recognized as the largest Catholic country in the world. We do not know whether it remains such today. Doubts abound as we now witness the rapid proliferation of alternative religious movements (led by a burgeoning number of Pentecostal churches and sects), which has led the Catholic Church to adopt measures intended to recapture lost ground. To begin to interpret this dramatic transformation, it is necessary to understand what it has traditionally meant to be Catholic in Brazil and to set this against the contemporary cultural, economic, and political context.

The Catholicism that was practiced in Brazil after its "discovery" became progressively distant from its European origins. During the sixteenth century the European Catholic Church was engaged in the Counter-Reformation. In Brazil, however,

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the Catholicism that developed paid less attention to the dissemination of Christian values. Instead, it adapted to the beliefs and practices of the local population, composed of Amerindians, African slaves, Portuguese heretics, and exiled criminals, who inhabited what many contemporary observers, principally Jesuits, denominated the "Tropics of Sin."[1] This population resisted the Jesuit missionaries, corrupted the parish priests, and refused to be intimidated by the Inquisition. The result was that one of the permanent characteristics of the colonial church in Brazil was its inability to bring about effective and exclusive conversion to its doctrine. In spite of enjoying the status of the official state religion, the Catholic Church was unable to eradicate non-Christian values and practices. This has led some historians to argue that Catholicism was a kind of superficial "varnish," giving the impression that the country was largely Catholic but in effect merely concealing all manner of religious belief and practice.[2]

The Catholic Church secured its religious preeminence over the colony partly because of its official status but also because, rather than carrying out the religious and moral reforms that the Jesuits had propounded, it preferred (or was obliged) to accommodate itself with local belief and practice.[3] The kind of Catholicism that grew up could be considered a sort of popular religion in which formal dogma lived side by side with strong devotion to the saints and belief in magic and witchcraft. It also maintained a close relationship to the possession cults that were practiced mainly—but not exclusively—by slaves and freedmen. In this way, the Eurocentric hierarchy of the church sought to maintain its place in the local structures of power by turning something of a blind eye to the non-Christian practices of the landowners and the people in general. Thus, as Gilberto Freyre has argued, the church remained subordinate for a long time to the representatives of the Portuguese crown and the dominant order in the slave domain, in particular the sugarcane plantations.[4] From the point of view of most participants, the Catholic God seemed to be quite at ease with the innumerable saints and other myriad supernatural beings who were attributed with the power to intervene in their lives. The relative

unimportance of theological rigor was the basis of an ethical order in which good and evil were not clearly defined. Saints and demons lived cheek by jowl and the only matter of importance was the capacity of these spirits to resolve day-to-day problems.

This religious mixture, this flux of beliefs and practices, represents a form of religious tolerance under the mantle of Catholicism—a valued characteristic of national identity. As such, it has been seen as yet another instance of the myth of Brazilian cordiality that values relations of proximity between those who are different and of unequal status: masters and slaves, whites and blacks, Catholics and the followers of cults of African origin.[5] The "Brazilian people" would be receptive and tolerant. They would avoid political clashes and exclusive affirmations of identity and would practice a religious syncretism unchallenged by the Catholic Church. Just as this myth has allowed Brazilians to avoid resolving racial antagonism, which is manifest in racist practices and profound social inequality, so it has allowed for a relatively conflict-free religious syncretism.

PENTECOSTALISMS, INTOLERANCE, AND VIOLENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION

As we move into the twenty-first century and as Brazil enters upon celebrations commemorating its "discovery" five hundred years ago, the religious status quo is under serious threat from various spiritual alternatives, such as forms of Oriental mysticism spreading apace among the urban middle classes. But by far the most significant threat to Catholic hegemony is the multitude of Pentecostal churches mushrooming throughout the land. In contrast with the Catholic Church, which has always mirrored the social and political hierarchy of Brazil, the new Pentecostal churches spring from the bottom up: the pastors and their converts belong to the poorer segments of the population, speak the same language, and share the same basic values.

The new Pentecostal churches refuse to accept the status of a minority and syncretic religion under the protection of a wide

and powerful Catholic identity, as the possession cults did in the past. By the same token, they reject the values of cordiality and tolerance, since these supposed virtues are considered to conceal an unsuspected connivance with the devil. For this reason, the preferred religious practice among this cult to a single God is the unending battle against all other spiritual beings. Exorcism is their most powerful weapon. The Pentecostal groups demand the exclusive dedication of their members. They also demand a new form of religious pluralism. Rather than a peaceful coexistence of various religious groupings under the overall authority of the Church of Rome, they appeal for the equal rights of all religions before the state, with access to the same social and political privileges that had hitherto been the monopoly of the Catholic Church.

Contemporary Brazilian society both reaffirms and doubts the myth of cordiality. The myth continues to govern Brazilians' self-image, but it does not correspond to concrete social experience. This new religious intolerance, this battle against spiritual beings identified with the devil and his works, has become identified with a more secular battle against social evil and, in particular, the various forms of urban violence. Can one remain virtuous, living pacifically with the emanations of the devil and thus leaving the way clear for the tribulations of the daily round? Unemployment, violence, and poverty now seem to demand a less conciliatory religious strategy. From the point of view of the Pentecostals, these afflictions are manifestations of the devil in the world. The preachings of moral revival and the reenchantment of the world seem to appeal to growing numbers of people. It would appear that the religious language of Pentecostalism has become the most pervasive instrument for explaining and dealing with the afflictions of day-to-day life.[6]

THE SECULARIZATION OF CATHOLICISM AND THE THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION

To be able to understand the growth of Pentecostalism and the challenge to Catholic preeminence, it is necessary to take into

account changes in the theology and politics of the Catholic Church that began in the 1950s but were intensified during the 1960s and 1970s after the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965). During these years, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in Brazil attempted once again to bring Brazilian popular religion in line with Catholicism in Europe. The Second Vatican Council aimed to "modernize" the church on the basis of a sociological diagnosis of the religious situation in the world, which pointed to a growing secularization of society and the state. It was considered necessary to renew the traditional Catholicism of Latin America, which seemed doomed to decline in the context of wider secularizing tendencies.[7] Accordingly, during the 1950s the church encouraged the members of the Catholic University Youth Movement (JUC) and the Catholic Workers' Youth Movement (JOC) to develop an ambitious popular education project. In place of the traditional Catholicism of miracles and devotions, the people were to be given more "earthly" tools to change their social condition.[8] By these means, it was hoped that religion would cease to be dominated by attempts to intervene in the realm of the supernatural and would become a more conventional instrument of social change.

With the Second Vatican Council, which encouraged a stronger social commitment on the part of Latin American bishops and priests, the Brazilian church became increasingly and more radically engaged in the political struggle against social injustice and in favor of human rights under the banner of the "theology of liberation."[9] After the meeting of Latin American bishops in Medellin in 1968, the lay movements within the church against social inequality became even stronger and began to promote nonreligious organizations, such as trade unions, residents' associations, and the like. The ideal of the liberating church was to have people organized into participatory communities called "ecclesiastic base communities" (CEBs). It was hoped that by participating in such communities, guided by what were called pastoral agents, the "people" (*povo*) would develop a new kind of church. Religious participation would take the form of the discussion of social problems, which would thus be perceived as having both religious and political import.

Each parish was charged with generating the largest possible number of CEBs. In this way, the new church would be formed, organized among the *povo*, and linked into the overall religious hierarchy through parish structures.

It was during the 1970s, when Brazil was ruled by a military dictatorship, that the theology of liberation began to bear fruit in the form of innumerable CEBs. At the same time, important members of the church began to join political resistance movements—thus exposing themselves to political repression. From that time onward, more and more Catholics joined the social and political battle against the regime. The National Conference of Bishops, created during the 1950s, systematically went about defending civil liberties in general, and those of threatened individuals in particular. Bishops and priests occupied the front line of protest against torture, the assassination of political activists, the death penalty, and arbitrary arrests.[10] The church was just about the only public voice that could be heard and the only institution that, although threatened, was not directly attacked by the military. It became transformed into a sanctuary for resistance to military rule. When the military government succeeded in eliminating left-wing and guerrilla groupings in the 1970s, the Catholic Church was the only institution in a position to negotiate with the state in defense of citizens' rights.

The public activities of the church in defense of human rights did not impede work with local communities on the part of priests and lay people inspired by the theology of liberation. By the mid-1980s, between sixty and eighty thousand CEBs had been formed,[11] and there were many Catholic and non-Catholic intellectuals who believed that the base communities were bringing about a revolution in Brazil—a revolution from the bottom up. It was thought that a new form of political action had been born, more autonomous, more conscious, and more closely related to trade unions and local protest movements. Surely this political action was inspired by the institution of the church, but it was thought to be less beholden to traditional power structures and political parties.[12] It was hoped that it would bring about a change in the political and religious consciousness of

the people, workers, Indians, Blacks, and women, and in so doing would bring about the transformation of Brazil.

TRANSFORMING SOCIETY OR CHANGING LIFE ITSELF

Although the revolutionary idea of transforming the country through rational political intervention, which seemed so close to success at the beginning of the 1980s, has not been totally abandoned, it has certainly been postponed until the new millennium. During the 1990s, priests and bishops who were most closely identified with the theology of liberation began to suffer from growing criticism from the Vatican, while, at the same time, more conservative tendencies began to gain prominence within the Brazilian church. Meanwhile, in society at large, the heroic days of the battle against the dictatorship had passed. Concomitantly, the base movements began to lose momentum while new social movements supported by international nongovernmental organizations gained ground.[13] And finally—and this is the bitter irony of history—the very *povo* who were supposed to have been the architects of their own liberation began to abandon the Catholic Church in favor of the new Pentecostal churches.[14]

The question we must ask is just how these *povo*—that is, the poor in general, who were the principal target of the theology of liberation—have experienced and understood these changes. How and why have the middle classes looked to religion to find meaning for their lives? To try to answer these questions we will look more closely at the political and religious life of the inhabitants of one of the principal urban centers of the country—namely, Rio de Janeiro.

The inhabitants of Rio de Janeiro, like most other people in Brazil, do not often talk about religion in abstract terms. Rather, religious interpretations arise to provide meaning for concrete day-to-day problems. But when we enter into the sphere of daily life, we meet religious actors we have not yet mentioned. They are the men and women who occupy what are often thought of as "lesser" spaces of sociability—such as neighborhood networks, prayer groups, or neighborhood associations

that operate far from party structures and state institutions. In these regions of social life, we find nonpracticing Catholics, members of the new Pentecostal churches, participants in possession cults, "charismatic" Catholics, and members of alternative "Oriental" religions. These people, most of them anonymously, are bringing about widespread political and religious transformations through the daily choices they make. Every now and again, particular aspects of this quotidian religiosity gain the kind of public visibility that allows us to understand the wider social movement in which these individuals participate.

What to Do about Evil in the World?

When faced with the immense problems of a great metropolis, or those that occur on an even wider scale, people often choose an evil to which they attribute blame. During the 1990s the people of Rio de Janeiro came to see violence and the drug business in the shantytowns (*favelas*) as the quintessential evil.[15]

Discussions about urban violence and the drug business soon took on religious connotations, producing a series of projects and aspirations within specific religious groupings. By looking at the field of social violence, then, we can begin to understand why certain religious interpretations lost meaning and credibility—and, therefore, followers—while others, in particular those offered by the Pentecostal churches, became more plausible and attracted increasing numbers of adepts.

The most important of these churches, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (IURD), was founded in 1976 by Bishop Edir Macedo. Within a short period of time, Macedo had built up a religious empire complete with television and radio channels and temples in all the Brazilian states, as well as in other countries in Latin America, Europe, and Africa. In Brazil it now poses a serious threat to the previously solid preeminence of the Catholic Church.

Bishop Macedo designed his proselytizing strategy on the basis of a relentless attack against evil, which, by an unhappy coincidence, prefers to inhabit the poorer territories of the cities.[16] Evil emanates above all from the devils that hide behind the Catholic saints and African divinities that populate the possession cults. The IURD, therefore, grew most rapidly in

just these areas of the city by attacking Catholicism and, even more so, members of the spirit-possession cults who could be saved from damnation through the exorcism of their possessing spirits.

The Catholic Church and the Brazilian elite in general have attacked Macedo's empire on a number of grounds. The bishop himself was accused of dodging taxes, laundering money, and exploiting popular credulity by offering miracles, above all prosperity, in exchange for cash gifts to the church. The problem with these accusations is that they do not come to terms with the undoubted success that the IURD has in attracting its members. They are not able to understand the strong utopian content of the church's preachings. Pastors claim that each person will be blessed with the miraculous repayment of his or her donations, and that this is clear evidence of the commitment Jesus has to each of the faithful. The members of the church dream of prosperity and the ousting of the evils that beset them in the family, with their loved ones, and in the workplace.[17] Furthermore, the critics of the IURD do not seem to be aware that their attacks on the movement, far from impeding its growth, actually strengthen it.[18] Such critiques from the outside merely consolidate the belief within that the IURD is a holy citadel persecuted by the devil and his emissaries.

Fighting Against the Spirits of Evil

The possession cults do not define good and evil in absolute terms. The spirits are worshipped to win their support for the living; they are valued for their power to resolve specific problems rather than for any moral virtue they may possess. It is assumed, for example, that this is how members of the drug business obtain supernatural protection against the police and members of rival organizations. Pentecostals accuse the leaders of the possession cults of complicity with the drug traffickers and therefore find them largely responsible for the violence that arises from conflicts between rival drug gangs and from police blitzes. In these situations all *favela* dwellers are exposed to the danger of death or disability. As a consequence, members of these cults, who are believed to "work with devils disguised as divinities" and "to work evil when professing to do good," are

treated with increasing mistrust. Exorcisms are a daily occurrence in the Pentecostal churches. “Depart, devil, in the name of the Lord Jesus,” and “leave the life of this person” are phrases repeated at each street corner by the members of the IURD. The exorcism of the malignant spirits believed to be the prime cause of the evil of the drug business and its associated violence has become one of the most significant methods of dealing with evil in the *favelas* and the most popular ritual activity. Exorcism involves first inducing possession by the evil spirit, who is encouraged to announce his or her malignant intentions before being expelled forever in the name of the Holy Spirit. Through exorcism, the individual concerned believes that he or she has been “cleansed” of all that might hurt.

The open hostility between the Universal Church and the possession cults is destroying the ancient alliance between these cults and breaking with traditional forms of religious intervention. The occult face of Catholicism, which turned a benevolently blind eye to the possession cults, is losing ground, together with its more public face, associated with the base communities. The Catholic Church is perceived, at best, as being quite helpless to deal with the causes of urban violence and, at worst, as conniving with them. In fact, the church is seen as refusing to utilize its divine and saintly powers. Instead, it continues in favor of developing a more rational discourse directed toward awakening the civic consciousness of citizens and the state. But these efforts of the Catholic Church to draw attention to the causes of violence and to denounce police brutality, for example, seem inadequate to those who are the victims of violence that continues unabated.[19] The refusal of the Catholic Church to bring its supernatural powers to bear on urban violence has the effect of strengthening the exorcising furor of the Pentecostals.

The act of exorcism is believed to have immediate effects. Proffering the performative words “depart, devil, in the name of Jesus the Lord,” the pastor expels the evil spirits with the power of Christ, which is recognized by both the Catholic saints and the divinities of African origin. Just as the pastors confront the spirits with the confidence of the superior power

of Jesus Christ, so they also seek out the drug traffickers themselves in their hillside fastnesses. They are spiritually so strong that they command the respect even of the representatives of evil, the drug organizations, without running the risk of becoming themselves contaminated. These new religious figures have become recognized as possessing much more power than the Catholic priests, and as being radically dissociated from the malignant forces of the cults of possession. They are able to interrupt the flow of violence utilizing two weapons: the rituals of exorcism and the word of God. They bring the Bible and prayer to combat revolvers and machine guns: the fire of the Holy Spirit against the fire of weapons.

The warring spirit of the Universal Church is in marked contrast to the strategy of more traditional Pentecostalism in Brazil. The first missionaries of the Assembly of God arrived at the beginning of the twentieth century and became the largest Pentecostal denomination until the rise of the IURD. The Assembly of God preached the construction of a Christian world set apart from the evils of Catholicism, mundane politics, and moral permissiveness.[20] By withdrawing from the world, the Assembly of God never represented a serious threat to the Catholic status quo. The IURD, however, as we have seen, instead of excluding itself from evil, went on the attack to exclude evil from the world. This strategy has proved so satisfactory that the Assembly of God and other smaller churches are themselves turning to exorcism to root out the causes of evil in the world.[21]

A Civic and Religious Alternative

The wealthier citizens of Rio de Janeiro do not look upon the drug business in the same way the inhabitants of the *favelas* and the poorer suburbs do. Rio's privileged classes feel besieged by the "dangerous classes"—who are in a state of war provoked by the drug traffickers—and fear the expansion of urban violence to the areas of the city where they themselves live. These elites, whose more rationalist ethos denies the efficacy of exorcism as a way of dealing with the evils of the drug wars, are nevertheless attracted by religious initiatives to moralize public space.

And so we return to our previous discussion of the former leaders of the Catholic youth movements who were responsible for popular education projects in the 1970s. Many of these leaders were exiled or went into exile during the years of military rule, returning to Brazil in the mid-1980s. One of these was Herbert de Souza (Betinho), who became an important symbol of the campaign for a general amnesty as a precondition for the return of democracy and one of the principal opinionmakers in Rio de Janeiro. In 1993 he organized a national campaign to fight hunger called "Citizens' Action against Misery and for Life," which appealed to the moral sense of the more affluent to provide gifts of food and clothing that would be sent to the poorest regions of the country. The basic idea was to eliminate poverty and foster civic participation through the practice of charity. Thirty million poor spent a "Christmas without Hunger." But this campaign also had an important symbolic function in the sense that it encouraged citizens to believe in the efficacy of ideas and the transformative power of the responsible actions of each individual.

The strength of conviction and concrete action entered into the civic and political ethos of the city, producing what some have called a "civic religion," which soon engendered debate on the evils associated with the drug business and its concomitant violence.[22] The Catholic bishops interpreted the violence as a consequence of social inequality.[23] They therefore preached in favor of human rights and structural reforms (such as land reform, for example) that would reduce the enormous gap between rich and poor. But this solution seemed ineffective to many. With the continued growth of violence, and a sense of insecurity and fear in the city, the wealthy denizens of the middle-class areas supported the municipal and state governments in their attempts to exterminate the "bandits" by staging military invasions of the *favelas* and peripheral areas of the city. The inevitable death of innocent victims was seen as a "necessary evil" of the all-out war against the drug business.

An alternative to the extremes of vague structural reform and all-out war came from a nongovernmental organization, Viva Rio (Live Rio), led by Rubem César Fernandes, an anthropologist and former exile who had been brought up in a Pres-

byterian family, and Caio Fábio, a young Presbyterian pastor. The pastor was the leading spokesman for the "progressive" wing of the Evangelical churches,[24] while the anthropologist was well related to various nongovernmental organizations in Rio de Janeiro. These two leaders within a Protestant tradition aimed to abandon the generic and abstract goals of structural reform and replace them with a civic and religious movement that could intervene directly in city affairs. Under the banner of peace and fraternity, they organized a veritable crusade to mobilize a sense of responsibility among the citizenry. At the same time, it was felt necessary to offer education and work opportunities to the poor youth of the *favelas* in order to be able to lure them away from the drug business and to incorporate them into society.

Caio Fábio lent the movement a sense of urgency. He climbed up into the *favelas* to convert drug traffickers to the gospel, organized a project to provide professional skills to children and adolescents, and sought out business people, artists, and intellectuals to get involved in the civic cause of bringing goodness and peace to Rio de Janeiro. In a gesture of great media efficacy he managed to convert the most important protagonists of the drug war: the governor in his palace and the most dangerous drug traffickers locked up in the city jails. In close contact with both sides, the pastor soon became the principal mediator between the besieged suburbs of the wealthy and the fortresses of the drug barons. Since the gospel knows no boundaries, Caio Fábio was able to transform it into the ideal instrument to promote peace in the city.

In 1995 Viva Rio organized a demonstration against violence in which all churches—except for the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God—participated. The majority of the participants came from the wealthier areas of the city. Nongovernmental organizations, alternative religions, Catholic and Protestant youth groups, artists, teachers, members of the liberal professions, business people, intellectuals, and housewives joined the march against violence, as well as a small but significant number of people from the *favelas* and representatives of their residents' associations. The ideal of solidarity between the opposed "two cities" had begun to emerge as a possibility.

The campaign was successful to the extent that it convinced some that there was an alternative to all-out war against the "bandits." The idea took root that moral conviction in action constituted the most effective strategy of civic participation. Thanks to this movement, disbelief in the efficacy of politicians gave way to a growing belief in the transformative power of religion. The evangelical preaching of this Presbyterian pastor gained credibility in its capacity to give religious significance to the public world, which had until then been monopolized by Catholic bishops. The Catholic Church had been up to then the only one to have political voice in the public world. Caio Fábio and his church thus entered into competition with the Catholic Church and the Pentecostals of the Universal Church. Segments of the middle class, which had previously been somewhat impervious to Protestantism, are today more likely to be receptive to the evangelical preaching of innumerable churches.[25]

WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE LARGEST CATHOLIC COUNTRY IN THE WORLD?

We have seen how two segments of the population of Rio de Janeiro, the poor and the middle class, came to lend new meaning to religion. In both cases, the importance of Protestantism grew, either in its Pentecostal or more traditional forms. Even so, our initial question about the religious destiny of Brazil cannot be satisfactorily answered.

The Catholic Church has reacted to the changes we have described, and bit by bit it has changed its proselytizing strategy. A strong charismatic movement that allows for the expression of emotion and sentiment in ways similar to the Pentecostals has arisen within the Catholic Church. It is popular particularly among the young and enjoys the active support of the more conservative church hierarchy, even of the Vatican itself. At the same time, cults in honor of God, Jesus, and the Holy Spirit, not to mention the emotional and mystical traditional cults to the Virgin, are receiving support. These cults are designed to bring Catholics back to the true source of charisma. This form of Catholicism seems more in tune with the new times. It makes use of such concepts as "spirituality" and

"energy," which attract so many middle-class people to the alternative cults. The Catholic Church makes a special effort to attract young people, promoting encounters during which the sharing of faith and *joie de vivre* are the principal attraction. Following the example of the Universal Church, Catholics are filling football stadiums with hymns of praise, led by young priests who are committed to renewal. A new category of priests is growing apace: the "singing padres," who, filled with charisma, direct shows, lead bands of musicians, and dance their way through television programs in order to bolster the participation of young people praising Jesus Christ and the Virgin.[26] Mystical meetings and boisterous shows now take the place of the somber discussion groups of the base communities and their political concerns.

At this moment, therefore, it is becoming clear that the conversion of the poor of Rio de Janeiro to Pentecostalism does not necessarily adhere to orthodox procedures. At first, it was thought that conversion meant also a commitment to the Protestant ethic with its moral rigor and sense of individual responsibility. It was felt, also, that the growth of Pentecostalism signaled the demise of "tradition"—that is, the magico-religious practices associated with an enchanted world. From the events we have described, however, we have seen that changes in these two directions have been relative. Religion in what was the largest Catholic country in the world, even as it changes, maintains continuity with the values and the ethos associated with Catholicism and the possession cults. We may therefore speak of a "syncretic Pentecostalism," which reinvented magic and possession in its own way.[27] The losses suffered by the Catholic Church have apparently led to the opening of a field of experimentation, which is leading to the birth of new religious projects. Ideals of fraternity inspire new groups, the long-term significance of whose participatory ethic and new forms of religious civism are difficult to predict.

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ENDNOTES

[1]As Ronald Vainfas observed, there is an "insoluble contradiction within the program for Catholic reform in Brazil: the colonization process provided the Church with the opportunity to expand abroad, at the same time in which, operating on the basis of slavery and cultural miscegenation, it negated the Christianization of the masses so successful in Europe." Ronaldo Vainfas, *Trópico dos pecados: Moral, sexualidade e Inquisição no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campus, 1989), 36. According to the same Brazilian historian, Jesuit reports on colonization did not spare "criticism of the first colonizers who as soon as they disembarked tried to cohabit with the female Indians of the land, and not satisfied with this already monstrous sin, many of them joined with several women at one time, ready to imitate the style of the chiefs and the principals of the heathen." Their complaints were also directed to "the secular clergy who . . . accused of similar sins and of collusion with the cohabitation of the lay people . . . said it was 'lawful to sin with the Negro women as they were slaves.'" Ibid., 28–29.

[2]The Brazilian historian Laura de Mello e Souza, for example, analyzes the Portuguese Catholic legacy, emphasizing how extensively it was related to the practices of magic and witchcraft, which were in fact intensely combated by the Inquisition. See Laura de Mello e Souza, *O Diabo e a Terra de Santa Cruz: Feitiçaria e religiosidade popular no Brasil colonial* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1986).

[3]Which is not to say that Catholicism has not undergone reform. See, for example, the "Romanization" process of popular Catholicism once the republic was proclaimed, studied by Pedro de Oliveira, *Religião e dominação de classe: gênese, estrutura e função do catolicismo romanizado no Brasil* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1985); and Ralph della Cava, *Miracle at Joaseiro* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970).

[4]Gilberto Freyre, known worldwide for *The Masters and Slaves* (*Casa Grande e senzala*) (Rio de Janeiro: Maia and Schmidt, 1933), suggested an interpretation of Brazilian society grounded in the slavery system and the manner in which Portuguese domination was established in Brazil. The power of the sugar-plantation owner and the slave master was based on a strong social, cultural, and religious miscegenation. The commerce between the *casa grande* of the great rural masters and *senzala* was intense, affectionate, and established a "syncretic" cultural order in which there was a mutual influence between slaves and masters, without the former evidently losing control over the latter. Thus, a model of domination was established on the basis of close relations such as sexual exchanges, day-to-day life, and religious practices. The Catholicism resulting from this was unconcerned by the pagan universe and committed to the practices prevalent in the popular classes. The plantations were a production unit for the manufacture of sugar, the major product exported by Brazil at the time, and formed the basis of economic and social power of the large landowners of colonial Brazil until the empire.

[5]A recent analysis made by the anthropologist John Burdick in *Blessed Anastacia: Women, Race and Popular Christianity in Brazil* (New York and London: Routledge, 1998) explores the racial and religious meanings of cer-

tain myths surrounding a popular black saint and former slave, called "Slave Anastacia." It attempts to show how much these contemporary myths can differ from the model of racial relations based on affection and familial connections between masters and slaves, as defended by Freyre (*The Masters and Slaves*). For the debate on national identity and ethnicity, also see Peter Fry, "Feijoada e soul-food: notas sobre a manipulação de símbolos étnicos e nacionais," in Fry, *Para inglês ver: identidade e política na cultura brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1983).

[6]For a discussion of the impact of Pentecostalism on national identity and culture, see Pierre Sanchis, "O repto pentecostal à cultura brasileira," in Paul Freston et al., *Nem anjos nem demônios: interpretações sociológicas do pentecostalismo* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1994).

[7]We have summarized here the arguments developed by Carlos Alberto Steil, "A Igreja dos Pobres: da secularização à mística," *Religião e Sociedade* 19 (2) (1999), with regard to the role played by the Catholic Church during this period.

[8]According to Carlos Steil, as of the 1950s and the advent of the theology of liberation, the Catholic Church based its work on the basis of the belief that social utopia was one and the same thing as Christian salvation. Ibid., 63.

[9]In the 1960s the social policy of the church in Latin America and in Brazil had as its guidelines the document of the Second Vatican Council, followed by the encyclical *Populorum Progressio* (1966), directed toward Latin America, and finally the orientation emanating from Medellin, Colombia, at the Second Conference of Latin American Bishops, held in 1968. In 1979, in Puebla, the Latin American Church "reaffirm[ed] the basic principles of a church committed to the oppressed." Ilse Scherer-Warren, "Redescobrindo a nossa dignidade: uma avaliação da utopia da libertação na América Latina," *Religião e Sociedade* 15 (2–3) (1990): 168.

[10]Several priests were imprisoned and persecuted throughout the 1970s. See Charles Antoine Arquivo, "Igreja e Estado no Brasil, 1971–1974," *Religião e Sociedade* 6 (1980).

[11]Cf. Pedro de Oliveira, "Ceb: unidade estruturante de Igreja," in Clodovis Boff et al., *As comunidades de base em questão* (São Paulo: Paulinas, 1997), 131. See also Ivo Lesbaupin, "As comunidades de base e a transformação social," in Lesbaupin et al., *As comunidades de base em questão* (São Paulo: Paulinas, 1997).

[12]Refer to Willen Assies, "Theory, Practice and 'External Actors' in the Making of New Urban Social Movements in Brazil," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 18 (2) (1999), for an in-depth study of the significance of these movements and the autonomy they intended to have in contrast to traditional policy.

[13]These NGOs are extremely varied in their objectives and in the roles they play, which range from actions of a political nature to campaigns, projects, and philanthropic activities. They introduced new themes into political and associative life, such as ecology, the rights of women, children, and adolescents, alternative religiosities, new ways of relating to the state, philanthropy, etc.

For an analysis of this field, see Leilah Landim, "'Experiência militante': histórias das assim chamadas ONGs," in Landim, org., *Ações em sociedade. Militância, caridade, assistência etc.* (Rio de Janeiro: NAU Editora, 1998).

[14]"Supposing that the evangelicals were 15 percent of the population of the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro, that 70 percent of them converted to the church, and that of these 28 percent converted in the past three years, one can estimate that between 1993 and 1994 roughly three hundred thousand became evangelicals in this region, or an average of one hundred thousand per year. The majority (65 percent) come from Catholicism, 16 percent from Umbanda or Candomblé, and 6 percent from Kardecist Spiritism. The Baptists are more successful in converting Catholics, while the Universal [Church of the Kingdom of God] is more successful in converting umbandistas." Rubem César Fernandes, "Os evangélicos em casa, na igreja e na política," *Religião e Sociedade* 17 (1–2) (1994): 6.

[15]As of the mid-1980s, the drug traffic in the city of Rio de Janeiro changed radically, transforming itself into an economic enterprise of great scope with international connections and a circulation of arms, money, and drugs on a grand scale. For the most part, the drugs began to be distributed on a greater scale in the slums and in the periphery of the city, involving in a critical way the lives of all who lived in these areas and changing their relationship with the rest of the city. For an analysis of violence and drug trafficking in the peripheral areas of Rio de Janeiro, see Alba Zaluar, *O condomínio do diabo* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Revan, 1994).

[16]From the identification of the drug traffic headquartered in the slums as the great evil that cursed the city, the slums progressively began to represent "pockets of marginality," where it was assumed that all *favela* dwellers were somehow involved with the drug traffickers because they grew up with and shared social and kinship networks with them. In addition, the traffickers developed other strategies of integration by setting up networks of reciprocity using godfather-type exchanges and offering services to the "community." These strategies do not exclude the use of violence to ward off any threat to their power. As a result, the dividing lines between contact, negotiation, and complicity are tenuous in the areas dominated by drug traffic. For this reason, the role of religious groups in *favelas* has grown largely in response to the demand for the positive moral identities that they provide.

[17]As was stated in Patrícia Birman and David Lehmann, "Religion and the Media in a Battle for Ideological Hegemony: The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God and TV Globo in Brazil," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 18 (2) (1999): 162, "The response of the enlightened intelligentsia, the political class, and the Catholic hierarchy has been to portray the rewards of faith advertised by the Universal Church as merely a matter of consumption, ignoring that the prosperity proclaimed by the Universal Church encompasses sex, status, money, marriage, the health of one's children, freedom from the scourges of drugs, violence, unemployment—in short a point-by-point inversion of the ills of Brazilian society. Negating the utopian dimension of its message, they accuse the Church of *estelionato*—of obtaining money by fraudulent means. Just as political dissent is often dismissed and cheapened by those who, fearing loss of property or status, brand it a criminal activity, so here is a religious

discourse criminalized, or at least cheapened." For the history of the Universal Church, see also Paul Freston, "Brother Votes for Brother: The New Politics of Pentecostalism in Brazil," in David Stoll and Virginia Garrard-Burnett, eds., *Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993).

[18]Cf. Clara C. J. Mafra, "Na posse da palavra: religião, conversão e liberdade pessoal em dois contextos nacionais," Tese de doutoramento em Antropologia Social, Museu Nacional, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, mimeo, 1999.

[19]According to the data from the survey "Lei, Justiça and Cidadania" conducted in the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro, it is reasonable to suppose that the black and *pardo* (brown) population has gradually been moving toward the Pentecostal churches. In 1996, 56 percent of the members of the Evangelical churches belonged to these categories, while 76 percent of the followers of *candomblé* and *umbanda* were black or *pardo*. José Murilo de Carvalho et al., *Lei, justiça e cidadania. Cor, religião e acesso à informação e serviços públicos* (Rio de Janeiro: CPDOC-FGV/ISER, 1998), 16.

[20]On Pentecostal values and political participation, see Regina Novaes, *Os escolhidos de Deus: pentecostais, trabalhadores e cidadania* (Rio de Janeiro: ISER; São Paulo: Editora Marco Zero, 1985).

[21]For a short history of Pentecostalism in Brazil, see Paul Freston, "Breve história do pentecostalismo brasileiro," in Freston et al., *Nem anjos nem demônios: interpretações sociológicas do pentecostalismo* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1994).

[22]Cf. Robert Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," in Bellah, *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1970). Several campaigns and actions endeavored to make a type of "civil religion" flourish by investing symbolically in religious, civic, and moral virtues and in the commitment of the citizens to the fate of the city.

[23]We refer to the significant increase in the number of homicides of youths between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four, of assaults and kidnapping, as well as the wars between the drug-traffic gangs, deaths by "stray bullets" as a result of them, and police confrontation with the traffickers. For the configuration of a "culture of fear" and the perceptions of evil in the city, see Márcia Pereira Leite, "Entre o individualismo e a solidariedade. Dilemas da política e da cidadania," XXII Encontro Anual da ANPOCS, GT Rituais e Violência na Política, Caxambu, mimeo, 1999; and Luiz Eduardo Soares et al., *Violência e política no Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Relume Dumará/ISER, 1996).

[24]This pastor constructed his religious trajectory as a representative of the camp of the "ethical Evangelicals" in opposition to the Universal Church and its greatest leader, Edir Macedo. Cf. Paul Freston, "As Igrejas Protestantes nas eleições gerais brasileiras," *Religião e Sociedade* 17 (1–2) (1996).

[25]In the last gubernatorial election in Rio de Janeiro, the winning candidate and his running mate were both publicly known as evangelical Christians. To many electors, this gave them considerable moral credibility.

[26]In October of 1999, the Catholic Church held the largest Catholic show in its recent history. It gathered a crowd of 170,000 in the Maracanã football sta-

dium of Rio de Janeiro for a show called "In the name of the Father." A number of singing priests participated. The Cardinal of Rio de Janeiro attributed its success to the many years of collaboration with Charismatic Renewal. One of the priests attending emphasized the devotional aspect of the event: "Violence does not stop with the end of the arms. We must disarm our hearts. And only Christ can do this." Cf. *O Globo*, 2d ed., 13 October 1999.

[27]See Patrícia Birman, "Médiation feminine et identités pentécotistes," *Problèmes d'Amérique Latine* 24 (1997).

Claudio de Moura Castro

Education: Way Behind but Trying to Catch Up

EDUCATION IN BRAZIL is a source of embarrassment and perplexity: embarrassment because the system is deficient; perplexity because it is difficult to understand how a country with such a weak education system has done so well in matters of growth. Between 1930 and 1993, the economy of Brazil grew (in absolute terms, not per capita) faster than that of either Japan or Korea, the countries usually given as examples of economic progress.

In terms of economic growth, Brazil is a late bloomer, even in Latin America. During the nineteenth century, it was poorer than Peru, and growth was, at best, quite slow.[1] In 1913, Argentina's per capita income was 4.5 times higher. Only after World War I did economic growth increase and, over time, progressively accelerate. In fact, growth after World War II was astonishingly high—among the highest in the world and definitely at record-breaking levels, averaging 7.4 percent between 1950 and 1980. After 1980, growth began to oscillate. Political accidents and a sequence of economic crises in the world put a stop to the exhilarating growth. The import substitution model, based on large enterprises (public and private), reached its limit, and, perhaps more importantly, it became apparent that little more could be achieved with the very narrow supply of well-educated workers. This posed an even more

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serious constraint on growth. The average schooling levels of the formal sector workforce were around fifth grade. Small and mid-sized enterprises, which, by default, should have become engines of growth, shared a supply of well-educated workers too meager to satisfy the demand.

Despite some impressive achievements after the middle of the century, the education system lagged behind when compared both to the fast economic growth that ensued and to other Latin American countries much poorer than Brazil (e.g., Peru). And the weakest link continued to be primary education. While a significant transformation of education in Brazil had started to take hold by the mid-1990s, the system remains far from adequate, even with the fast pace of change observed in many sectors.

THE TRADITIONAL IMBALANCE: A BIG HEAD ON WOBBLY FEET

Brazilian education has had an imbalanced development. In contrast to the educational pyramid of most countries—even in Latin America—the top grew more than the bottom. In other words, higher education was developed before basic schools were minimally competent to handle students. Both quantity- and quality-wise, basic education remains deficient.

Compared to neighboring Argentina, Brazilian education has a "big head on wobbly feet." Basic education in Argentina traditionally has been solid and universal, while in Brazil it always had limited coverage. But higher education in Argentina is no longer remarkable,[2] while a significant number of Brazilian universities are now of high quality. By contrast, Argentina has a small number of weak masters and doctorate programs, compared to the vastly superior and larger system of graduate education programs in Brazil.

The Illiterates and the Barely Literates

Brazil has long been known for the high illiteracy rate of its population—a source of great shame and embarrassment for the elites. However, over the last thirty years, school enrollment has expanded steadily. Initial bottlenecks at the first

grade have been mostly overcome. Over 95 percent of the school-age cohort enter school, do so at the right age, and remain in school for an average of nine years. Outside of the rural and poor Northeast, this number reaches 98 percent.

These figures suggest that illiteracy is a problem of the older generations and rural pockets in the Northeast. An estimated 17 percent of the Brazilian population is illiterate.[3] Of these, the overwhelming majority is old, not school-age youth. Thus, illiteracy more closely reflects situations of the past, when schools did not exist, rather than any fault in the present-day network of schools. Indeed, illiteracy increases with age. According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), whereas more than 31 percent of people age sixty and above are illiterate, illiteracy plagues only 4 percent of the population aged fifteen to twenty-four years.[4]

Two implications arise from this conclusion. First, the unconvincing experience with adult literacy campaigns (in the case of Brazil, the ill-fated MOBRAL, a literacy campaign promoted by the military government with much fanfare but showing disappointing results) suggests that it would make little sense to engage in another massive effort along these lines. Second, the present illiterates are probably not a major handicap to the country, as they are mostly very old or live in the countryside or work in simple manual jobs where literacy is not critical for productivity. This is not to say that smaller and well-focused literacy programs do not make sense or are not cost-effective. But, fortunately, ineffective large-scale programs have been dropped from the government's agenda. The new programs, like those of Comunidade Solidária (managed by the first lady), are much smaller and well focused.

The real problem today is not classical illiteracy—the inability to sign one's name and write a simple message—but the insufficient level of knowledge those considered literate have. By the standards commonly used in industrialized countries to define functional literacy, a large share of Brazilians who went to school would be considered illiterate. The few international student achievement evaluations have shown this much. This is indeed the number-one problem in Brazilian education.

Primary Education: The Number-One Disaster

Once Brazil managed to enroll a majority of children in primary school (less than a decade ago), the next problem became what happened inside the school. The instruction in these institutions was watered down by the explosion in enrollment—expanding at about 3 percent per year. Both the populace and the political class were seemingly indifferent. Neither had a serious commitment to develop basic education, seeing schools as little more than a source of political spoils (e.g., appointments of teachers and principals).

In the past, the difficulties were quantitative and qualitative. Now they are mostly qualitative. The number-one bottleneck—which in earlier times was insufficient initial enrollment—has become the slow rate of progress throughout all grades of primary school resulting from repetition that starts as early as the initial grades.[5] The surprising news is the perseverance of students who are forced to repeat but, nevertheless, stay in school. Repetition rates at the primary level average 18.4 percent.[6] It is even higher for first grade: 51 percent of all students advance to the next grade while 44 percent repeat it.[7] At present, students tend to drop out after nine years of schooling, which would be enough to finish primary school—if it were not for repetition. As a result of repetition and eventual dropping out, only 62 percent finish primary school and require, on the average, 11.2 years to do so.[8] Of those enrolled, an estimated 63 percent are overage, a figure that reaches as high as 78 percent in the North and 80 percent in the Northeast.[9] These results compare unfavorably with those of Peru and Paraguay, countries much poorer than Brazil, where repetition is 15.2 percent and 8.1 percent respectively; survival rates for the primary level in Paraguay exceed 71 percent.[10]

Many reasons explain Brazil's poor performance in primary education. The fast growth in enrollment drained the meager resources allocated to basic education. This led to a large proportion of unqualified teachers, frequent strikes, a lack of teaching materials, a short school day (two to four hours per day), and a short school year (180 days). Consider also that Brazil has a highly decentralized education system, with each

state having its own tax basis and independent school system. In addition, a significant share of students attend schools operated by any of 6,000 municipalities. Thus, when education is not a priority in the richer regions, in those that are very poor the situation is much worse, since, under the federal structure, the administrative reach of the central government is quite limited.

In the mid-1990s, unbeknownst to most observers, things started to change. The Fernando Henrique Cardoso period has witnessed an energetic effort by the Ministry of Education to reform education. In retrospect, however, it can be observed that primary education statistics began to change before the inauguration of the new federal government. Whatever social ferment allowed this mammoth system to change, it seems to have started working a few years before the fresh impetus of the new central government.

It happened slowly and locally, gaining speed along the way. First, a few municipalities began reforming their systems of education. Then a few states (especially Paraná and Minas Gerais) took reform seriously and created new styles and new formulae to improve basic education. Perhaps the most critical engine of change has been the modernization of the economy, which generated a powerful demand for better-educated workers. Let us not forget that labor productivity increased about 50 percent in the last five years, and this meant greater demand for better-educated workers in the dynamic sectors of the economy. While modern firms hire less and less, they have abruptly increased the education requirements of those who remain in their labor force. They need better-trained workers, and the higher complexity of the training, in turn, requires higher levels of formal schooling.

It seems that this one reason—a greater demand for better educated workers—stands above the others. The Brazilian labor force has an average of less than five years of schooling. Yet most modern sector firms will no longer hire someone with less than a primary education, and without a high-school diploma the hopes of getting a good job are dim. Less than ten years ago, Brazilian Fiat (the number-two carmaker in the country) would not hire high-school graduates for the shop

floor of its factories. Today, it will not hire any workers without this level of education. Pressured by enterprises that realize they need better educated workers, over two million young Brazilian adults are enrolled in programs leading to diplomas legally equivalent to formal degrees in primary and secondary education. Noteworthy is a high-quality television program (Telecurso 2000) that is shown to more than two hundred thousand workers sitting in classrooms in factories.[11]

As mentioned before, the changes did not start at the federal government but rather at some forward-looking municipalities, followed by states such as Paraná and Minas Gerais that introduced serious and imaginative reforms. What the Ministry of Education did was to take the best ideas from the states, augment them with other policies, and energize the entire country with them. But this came after significant local changes started taking place. In fact, it may well be that the very success of the Ministry of Education in promoting reform is due to the fact that society had matured and was ready for the changes. It is interesting to notice that a powerful and dedicated minister of education such as General Ruben Ludwig was incapable of getting Brazilian education moving in the early 1980s, despite his best intentions, access to funds, and a strong staff. Under the military regime, he also had a level of political power that Paulo Renato de Souza, the current incumbent, could never dream of possessing. After a long succession of politically appointed ministers, ministers with more prestige and intellectual stature begin to appear in the middle of the Collor mandate (e.g., José Goldenberg, an eminent physicist and former rector of the prestigious University of São Paulo).

But the fact of the matter is that primary education has only taken off over the last few years. The best news in Brazilian education is that the most impressive changes are taking place inside primary schools. Graduation rates are growing very fast: 12 percent per year in the last five years. Achievement tests indicate that the quality has not deteriorated in the process. In fact, lower rates of repetition reflect the simple fact that students are learning more. Therefore, the number-one problem is met by the number-one solution.

Perhaps the most deep-reaching program is FUNDEF, a federal program (coupled to the requisite legislation) subsidizing education in poor schools. Those states or municipalities that are truly spending the constitutionally mandated proportion of their budgets for education but cannot reach the defined threshold of costs per student (315 *reais*) will receive funds from the federal government necessary to close the gap. Those municipalities that do not spend the mandated proportion will have the difference between what they should spend and what they already spend taken away and used to subsidize other communities. There are good reasons to believe that the impact on equity of this program is far more than any other initiative of the federal government. A recent evaluation of FUNDEF indicates that it has reshuffled 13.3 billion *reais* (out of a total of 18.3 billion spent in basic education) and generated a net increase of 2 billion in educational expenditures. Municipal schools increased their expenditures by 22.7 percent, and 2,159 municipalities benefited from such gains (these municipalities are responsible for 66.4 percent of municipal enrollment). Two-thirds of the gains went to the North and Northeast, the poorest regions in the country. In Northeastern municipalities, real growth in expenditures reached 89 percent (47 percent in the North). The injection of fresh money into the poorest municipalities led to an increase of 6 percent in total primary enrollment, jumping from 30.5 to 32.4 million students. For the same reason, the mean salary of teachers increased 12.9 percent between 1997 and 1998 (the increase in the Northeast reached 49.6 percent). FUNDEF generated 153,000 new jobs, mostly teaching positions. Overall, in a country where government expenditures tend to be regressive, FUNDEF stands as a powerful counterexample.

A path-breaking development has been the creation of achievement tests. Brazil had a long tradition of tests at the transition points between primary, intermediate, and high school. These tests were subsequently abandoned when growth in enrollment accelerated. But during the 1980s, strong ideological objections, the general state of disrepair of the schools, and pressures from teacher unions created a climate in which testing became *lèse-majesté*.

In the early 1990s, INEP (Instituto Nacional de Estudos Pedagógicos, the official education research and statistics branch of the Ministry of Education) started to apply tests (the SAEB tests) to a national sample of students at the primary level (and expanded to include the secondary level and private education in 1995). Minas Gerais took a more daring step. In 1992 it challenged the ideological taboo on testing and created a comprehensive system to test each and every school in the state. Progressively, its yearly tests were given greater publicity, being distributed to the school principals and then to parents.

It is worth mentioning other aspects of the Minas Gerais reform, since it has become the blueprint for other states. Beginning in 1992, more decision-making authority was given to individual schools, the central bureaucracy was thinned, and money was transferred directly to the principals via Parent-Teacher Associations. Spoils politics was driven out of the schools with the introduction of a test used to choose principals, followed by a vote of parents and teachers to select one of the three candidates who placed best on the test. Boards of parents were created and given considerable power to influence the management of schools. From a mediocre position vis-à-vis other Brazilian states in 1992 (at tenth place), Minas Gerais today scores higher in the SAEB test than any other Brazilian state.

Another interesting mechanism adopted by some states and municipalities is the acceleration program. These initiatives take repeaters away from the regular classes and offer them a special program with better books, more structure, more pedagogical support to teachers, and greater concern for positive rewards and the self-image of the students. These programs have been properly evaluated and indicate that at a cost per student 50 percent higher than that for regular students, accelerated students gain, on the average, two years for every year they participate in the program. There is an impressive growth in enrollment in these types of programs but, at the moment, the total count of participants is still below one hundred thousand.

What do we make of Brazil's educational transformation? Quite clearly, changes are now easier to see. About three years ago I used the term "silent revolution" to describe the situation,

and the leading weekly magazine (*Veja*) took up the expression. Today, it would be inappropriate to use the same term. The revolution is no longer invisible, even though many left-wing educators still deny it. The most salient feature of the present process is that the variable that moves the fastest—the proportion of the cohort finishing primary education—happens to be the one in which Brazilian performance has been the most dramatic sore spot.

A very interesting and understudied aspect of this process is the role of interest groups, and in particular, teachers' unions. These left-leaning groups acquired great strength in the 1980s and early 1990s and dominated the discussion arenas. In fact, they created a virtual monopoly in forums and conferences, creating an environment openly hostile to other lines of thought (the so-called ideological patrols). In fact, the judgment of this author is that the presence of interest groups has been a deleterious presence in the education scene, always complaining that education is a tool to reproduce social stratification and diverting the discussion away from practical policies to improve schools.[12]

As their positions became increasingly radical and antagonistic to the establishment, this broad group started losing its ability to engage in dialogue and criticize the government in productive modes. They lost (or never had) the mastery of the technical tools to discuss complex issues in areas such as testing and student flows. Today, this disjointed but still noisy group has lost much of its power and has become unable to influence practical policies.

Secondary Education: Forgotten until Now

Secondary education was very narrow as a result of the lack of graduating students at the primary level. In 1994 it enrolled only 52 percent of the cohort, while Argentina enrolled 67 percent, Uruguay 81 percent, and Peru, despite being much poorer, 74 percent.[13] But as a result of the explosion in the number of students graduating at the end of eighth grade, secondary education is beginning to change. Enrollment at this level practically doubled in about five years, and growth is expected to continue unabated.[14]

Reform is taking place along three distinct lines. The first, and most pervasive in its impact, is the new federal law on Diretrizes e Bases of Education (Guidelines and Ground Rules for Brazilian Education). The second focuses on changes in the curricula and structure of secondary schools. The third affects the technical schools—a smaller part of the system—taking the occupational content away from academic secondary programs.

After more than a decade in the making, the National Congress finally approved a new version of the guidelines with the minister personally pushing to replace an earlier version that had been radically altered by hundreds of amendments introduced by the (left-wing) Labor Party. To a significant extent, the approved law approaches the original and much more modern-minded version, initially presented by Senator Darcy Ribeiro, an unconventional and creative left-wing anthropologist. The new law markedly decreases mandated government controls, promotes innovation, such as distance education, and allows for much greater flexibility at all levels. All in all, it is a step ahead, instead of the several steps backward that would have resulted from the amended version, which was almost approved. While this law deals with the entire educational system, it significantly affects the secondary level, where critical transformations were required.

Following the lead of primary education, which was reformed in the mid-1990s, the new system moves away from spelling out detailed curricula and, instead, focuses on "curricular parameters" that are much broader, more flexible, and based on competencies rather than on a chapter-by-chapter description of disciplines. In a country chronically plagued by over-detailed and centralizing legislation, this is a welcome change. The new programs leave 25 percent of the total credit hours to be used by individual schools in courses of their own choice (it is to be hoped that State Councils of Education will not take away this freedom by creating their own complementary legislation). The new approach includes all the right messages, such as contextualization, curricular integration, and flexibility. It is, however, silent on some critical issues, e.g., whether schools have to offer several alternative menus of disciplines or can choose a fixed set, and whether students can make their own

curricula or have to follow the schools' choices. But silence is better than wrong solutions.

The problems of secondary education are broad. After a period of stagnation, the vastly enlarging population of children graduating from primary school is putting great pressure on expansion. In fact, the system always absorbed a very high fraction of the age cohort graduating from primary education (a 65.1 percent transition rate,[15] or a 105 percent transition rate if nontraditional students—e.g., those with equivalency degrees—are taken into consideration),[16] and now that pressure for high school diplomas is higher, it is not likely that transition will be reduced. On the whole, secondary enrollment has increased dramatically, growing an estimated 85 percent between 1991 and 1998.[17] During this same period, the country saw enrollment increase from about 3.7 million to more than 7 million students.[18] Such increases certainly reflect improvement in levels of education over the past decade. Of a total of 9.6 million youths between the ages of fifteen and seventeen, more than 77 percent currently are a part of the educational system, versus 59.2 percent in 1985.[19]

The market signals have been very clear: no secondary diploma means no good jobs. The population deciphered the signals and decided to stay longer in school, repetition or not. The result is that by the time many students arrive at the secondary level they are young adults, over eighteen years of age. Since the students have to work, secondary schools became predominantly evening schools (enrolling 55 percent of the secondary-school population in 1998).[20] Nevertheless, in the past few years there seems to have been a reversal of the trend, as graduates become younger and are less likely to work. But evening schools have not yet been converted into day schools, generating a situation in which 60 percent are in evening schools, and of those, 43 percent do not work (compared to 77 percent of secondary day-school students who do not work).

Such growth rates, likely to increase, put a great strain on budgets and on the already narrow supply of teachers (particularly in mathematics and science). Laboratories and educational projects, which always were underutilized or unavailable, will be under even greater rationing. The chronically

weak quality of public education runs the risk of being further eroded. The chances that secondary education will be further watered down by having more students than fresh resources are greater than the chances that a lack of resources will block quantitative growth. This puts more pressure on middle-class parents to enroll their children in the better and more expensive private schools and further penalizes the poorer families who have to put up with deteriorating public schools. The silver lining is that improvement in primary education means that the time required to finish it shrinks as a result of less repetition. This, in itself, liberates resources that can be used to expand the secondary level.

Secondary-level technical schools were created several decades ago. These are the typical technical schools of French inspiration, essentially different from the American tradition of comprehensive high schools offering a loose set of optional vocational and shop disciplines. The typical secondary-technical school offers the regular academic secondary curriculum and, in addition, a well-structured set of occupation-preparatory disciplines that are clearly defined and often regulated by law.

The overall number of technical schools is not very impressive—about three hundred (state and federal) with approximately 37 percent of secondary students enrolled.[21] However, their importance is crucial in a country that is heavily industrialized and fighting to remain competitive. The (Federal) Ministry of Education operates more than 130 of these schools, all expensive and well equipped.[22] In fact, these are practically the only federal schools beyond its network of universities. In addition, the state of São Paulo also has about one hundred schools of this nature, not as expensive as the federal but costing at least double what its general secondary schools cost.

However, until the mid-1990s all these programs suffered from a structural dilemma. In a country in which so few finish secondary school, those who did inevitably saw themselves as natural candidates for higher education.[23] Under these circumstances, all efforts to invest in high-quality technical schools came to nothing, as graduates occupied the workshops and laboratories and then moved on to higher education. The rich

students crowded out the entrance of those who might have been truly interested in the occupations but could not compete on the test to enter these technical schools (they have over ten candidates for each vacancy).

As a result of a 1995 decree, the structure of these schools changed drastically. The decree postulated that technical schools would no longer offer academic secondary-level programs (integrated into the technical package). What this meant was that the job-training disciplines were to be separated from the official secondary curriculum, splitting technical courses into two separate programs. The occupational training disciplines became a stand-alone offer, as did the academic. In other words, instead of one integrated program, it was as if two separate schools were being created. Some technical schools might require a high school diploma as a prerequisite, becoming, *ipso facto*, a post-secondary program. Other schools may prefer to allow students to enroll while taking the last two years of high school elsewhere.

Higher Education

By any standards, Brazil has been a latecomer to higher education. A few professional schools (for law, civil engineering, and medicine) were created at the beginning of last century, but subsequent growth was slow. While other Latin American countries have had universities since the sixteenth century, the first real Brazilian university was the University of São Paulo, created in the 1930s, with the strong support of eminent French and German scholars. The University of Brazil, created in the early 1920s (mostly because the government wanted to give an *honoris causa* doctorate to the visiting King of Belgium), amounted to no more than a combination of existing professional schools under one rector. But after these pioneering efforts, progress stalled.

However, the prosperity of the 1960s and the major developmental role then imparted to universities led to an explosive growth in public universities. Between 1960 and 1973 enrollment went from 53,094 to 300,079.[24] The federal government led this expansion by opening at least one university in each

Brazilian state. By 1980 there were thirty-four federal universities.

Without any doubt, this expansion completely changed the picture of Brazilian higher education. Compared to other countries in Latin America, Brazil acquired a respectable set of universities, probably better equipped than those of any other country. At the same time that physical facilities were expanding, a vigorous program to award graduate degrees to the faculty was launched in the early 1960s.

These universities were created with the ambition that they would become centers of teaching, research, and extension. These policies are today the object of much controversy. Should every department in every university do research? Should every teacher do research? It makes sense to promote a policy of encouraging research wherever the preconditions are present. In the older universities, better endowed with human resources, research would be widespread. In younger institutions, small groups here and there would engage in research. In fact, this is exactly what happened. About ten top universities have considerable segments of the faculty doing research; the majority have an island of research here or there; and the weaker have close to nothing. This puts Brazil ahead of all other Latin American countries in terms of total research potential, effort, and performance.

In the last twenty years, student politics have been replaced by the more organized unionization of teachers, with concomitant pressure to reduce competition and prevent the enforcement of rigid criteria for teaching and research. This politicization, coupled with the rules of tenured civil service for all teachers, has further reduced the governance of these institutions. Brazilian public spending on higher education, as a proportion of the GNP, is the highest in the world. Whereas the country spends 4.7 percent of its GDP on education (compared to an average of 3.7 percent in the rest of the region), 25.5 percent, or more than U.S. $9 million in 1995, was spent on higher education—which, in turn, enrolled merely 1.9 percent of all students.

Compared to almost any other Latin American country, Brazilian higher education fares well, but it costs as much as ten

times more per student. The federal universities cost on the average U.S. $7,000 per student, almost the same as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) average (U.S. $8,134) and far exceeding other countries' costs (e.g., U.S. $2,441 in Uruguay; U.S. $3,770 in Spain; U.S. $6,020 in France).[25] The main reason public universities are expensive is that almost three-quarters (73 percent) of their faculty members are hired on a full-time basis but receive light teaching loads. There are also programs with more teachers than students (e.g., in some areas of music). Ultimately, it is a simple line of reasoning: there are too many full-time teachers and administrators and not enough students. A higher-education student costs more than twenty times as much as a primary student.

With such great expense for the public universities and private students paying full costs, equity issues cannot be avoided. All public education is tuition-free—by constitutional mandate—and all students, therefore, have access to mediocre public primary schools. But to pass the entrance examinations of the expensive public universities, the rich who attend high-quality private schools are at a clear advantage.

Private higher education has mushroomed in the last twenty years, offering all levels of quality: from programs that compare to the best public institutions to others that are outright dishonest. Some are unbelievably profitable; others merely break even. But they have some common traits. One is the lack of variety in career planning, due to restrictive and unenlightened public policies that force private institutions to mimic the public universities. The increasing diversity of Europe and North America is not matched by Brazilian institutions, either private or public. They still are forced to pretend that they do research and are pressured to hire those with masters and doctorate degrees, even in professional areas.

In the mid-1990s, public enrollment remained stagnant (only in the last few years has it again expanded), and the further expansion of private education was held at bay by the Ministry of Education and its normative branch, the Federal Council of Education (since 1995, the National Council of Education). Even now, there is a backlog of about two thousand requests to

open courses, a very conflictive issue in the council. The members representing the public system resent and fear the invasion of private education, while the representatives of the well-established private system fear competition from new private schools. Also militating in favor of a more conservative expansion are the professional associations (lawyers and medical doctors in particular) claiming to protect quality, although it is not easy to dismiss the hypothesis that they want less competition. In fact, all groups claim that they are protecting quality. This may very well be true, yet it is also true that they have vested interests in slowing down the creation of new schools.

Along with all the other changes taking place at the lower levels, the higher education scene is beginning to change. From the private end, pressure for expansion remains strong, and a more favorable attitude from the minister of education himself led to the creation of approximately three hundred thousand new vacancies in the private sector since 1980.[26] Clearly, competition within the private sector is becoming fierce in the Southeastern capitals. The education sector is already the leading advertiser in the Rio de Janeiro newspapers. The new education law is far more liberal than the previous one concerning one- and two-year postsecondary courses, and some of the most aggressive schools are moving in fast to offer the equivalent of American associate degrees.

Quite clearly, public universities are under great tension, and the seeds of change are already germinating. Charging tuition remains taboo, but those opposing it are increasingly weaker, at the same time that public opinion is shifting in favor of cost recovery. The minister has publicly declared that this is not his priority and remains a policy to be considered only in the future. Other changes, however, are being implemented. The dogma of research for all is being challenged and softened. A bonus for classroom activities and for excellency in teaching has been created, as a response to a long strike of public university teachers.

However, the most courageous and revolutionary step was the creation of *provão,* an examination given during the last semester before graduation. The grades in this test do not affect the entitlement to a diploma. Instead, they are used to compute

an average score for each course of study in each higher-education institution. These results are plotted on a normal curve and transformed into letter grades (i.e., A, B, C, D). The grades of each institution are published in all of the newspapers. Already, thirteen major disciplines have had their courses graded and disseminated yearly. Reaction to *provão* was initially very strong, but progressively it is being perceived by all sides as a useful and powerful instrument. Private courses receiving low grades immediately panic and try to improve performance in the next round. It is interesting to notice that the private schools lose two to one among the top 12 percent of programs. But below that level, they offer an education of comparable quality (without burdening the public budgets). In fact, the difference between the means of the raw scores in public and private institutions is very small, probably not statistically significant. In any case, it is a little bit higher for the public in some careers and higher for the private in others. All in all, one can safely say that the average quality of the public is not higher than that of the private. This is a very dramatic result, considering that the private institutions have costs per student about one-third of the publics and receive hardly any subsidies.

Higher education remains the area in which public policy has been most timid and controversial. Overall, the public universities cost too much, deliver too little, and displease just about everybody, inside and outside. Teachers complain about low salaries—and they are right when we consider that the remuneration is below market for those who indeed deliver the contractual forty hours per week. However, it is not so low in light of the fact that few faculty actually devote forty hours to their official duties, many merely teaching four to six hours a week and doing little beyond this. One key reason for high costs and low salaries is a student/teacher ratio of 9:1, one of the lowest in the world (about half of that of the United States).

Public universities operate under a perverse set of incentives, since improving productivity or quality brings no prizes. Teachers are hired according to the results of competitive examinations but, on a day-to-day basis, get no rewards for being better teachers or researchers and no penalties for missing classes or

being careless. University administrators have no freedom to reassign resources. The minister is aware of these problems and tried to tackle them by giving greater autonomy to universities. But to do that required changing the Constitution, a major surgery that failed to materialize due to political difficulties (other constitutional changes were more urgent). Several years were lost in the process, and now a new attempt is being made to obtain this autonomy by other legal instruments. The Left has always been against autonomy (it was seen as the first step to privatization), but it has lost much of its previous power.

All public universities are equally expensive—in fact, the variance in costs per student among them is quite modest. But they are highly differentiated in their performance. The costs of most institutions are out of line with their output (mediocre teaching and no research or extension). But this is not the case with a group of about ten universities concentrated in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul. They cost about the same per student and produce just about all of the research in Brazil.[27] These institutions are staffed by a significant proportion of research-oriented faculty and successfully bid for research funds from public agencies. To bypass the civil-service regulations, they operate several foundations that aggressively sell training, consulting services, and research and development. For instance, the foundations of Unicamp generate additional revenues amounting to nearly half of its public budget.

Another controversial area is the increasing participation of states in funding higher education. The state of São Paulo has the oldest and most distinguished set of universities (the University of São Paulo and Unicamp are second to none). Paraná, another rich state, also has well-performing universities (particularly in Londrina). But poorer states such as Bahia, Ceará, and Maranhão are creating schools that are second-rate and expensive. To the extent that these initiatives decentralize education and relieve the burden of federal funds, they are a welcome development. However, the downside is that some states are spending generously on higher education of doubtful quality, at the same time that their primary and secondary

levels remain underfunded, perform poorly, and fail to enroll the corresponding age cohort.

Whatever qualitative changes may occur, the higher education system is poised for a major jump in enrollment as the larger cohorts of secondary school approach graduation. Public universities under-enroll and have a poor public image. Hence, they feel politically threatened and are taking their own initiatives to increase enrollment, requesting only minor increases in costs from the public coffers. The private institutions are aggressive and relentlessly try to offer more vacancies—recently, market saturation in large cities led them to create branches in smaller centers. A new development is the entry of major entrepreneurs into the higher-education field. Investment bankers and large contractors are moving in with ample funds and ambitious goals. The only constraints to growth are the hurdles, both reasonable and unreasonable, imposed by the National Education Council, which has the role of issuing permits for the creation of new higher education institutions. Unfortunately, the government's skills in dealing with private programs still leave much to be desired.

Graduate Education and Science and Technology

Graduate schools are the crown jewels of Brazilian education—perhaps not such a great merit, considering the lackluster achievements of the other levels. Be that as it may, in the early 1960s, the only graduate programs were those of French inspiration offered at the oldest universities. In practice, they were no more than the preparation and presentation of a thesis to a formal committee. Except for some early and outstanding efforts at the University of São Paulo, there was little if any empirical research, and the whole effort did not amount to much.

In the late 1950s, the Brazilian government, as well as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, started a vigorous and well-managed system of sending students to the United States for graduate studies. Those who were already teaching in public universities were given preference. This became, from the 1960s on, a massive effort, mobilizing many thousands of students who went to leading U.S. schools—and later to Europe—to get

their masters and doctorate degrees. By 1970, the first crops of students finished their degrees.

Independent public agencies (such as FINEP, FAPESP, and CNPq, but also including CAPES),[28] working outside the constraining environment of the Ministry of Education, promoted and funded the creation of graduate schools at a fast pace. Money was plentiful, and so were the incentives to send faculty abroad and to create graduate programs. Indeed, between 1973 and 1984, the number of graduate programs increased from about two hundred to over one thousand.[29]

Graduate schools have an exemplary system of evaluation, under which all programs are peer reviewed every two years and receive a grade that becomes public record and affects the ability of the program to obtain research money and fellowships for its students. This incentive system is as competent as any other anywhere in the world. Thanks to the transparency in performance and the availability of funding based on merit and academic productivity, it is possible to have an exemplary set of graduate schools inside a public university that lacks governance and is plagued by all sorts of inefficiencies.

However, the graduate level is the only level of education in which major changes have not been observed over the last five years. Indeed, graduate schools have not kept up with the pace of change of the other levels, where changes have been more significant or even momentous. A number of unresolved problems linger for years.

Universities were instructed to create masters programs as a warming-up process before engaging in doctoral programs. However, even those 671 departments offering doctoral programs did not cancel their masters' programs.[30] This causes an unduly long duration for graduate studies, since students have to take the masters courses first and then enroll in the doctorate program. This is a double waste, since departments are overburdened with teaching and students must allocate close to ten years to get a masters and then a doctorate degree. Considering the early age of retirement of federal university professors, their productive life as researchers at these institutions can be very short.

In addition, would-be professional programs have become very "academic" in the worst sense of the word. The amount one has published gets higher marks in the evaluation process of engineering and business schools than experience in the field. Academic training for the teachers of professional disciplines takes precedence over a history of relevant professional work.

With regard to science and technology, Brazil has gone a long way toward industrialization from being a country that half a century ago imported shoes, butter, combs, hand tools, and toothpicks. In fact, it has become one of the countries that least depends on imports of manufactured goods. Its number-one exporter is Embraer, with its latest crop of commuter planes. Yearly export revenues from the automotive sector are more than U.S. $4 billion. Machinery and electric equipment add over another U.S. $4 billion (a little less than 10 percent of total exports). The number-one agricultural export, soy beans, is the result of sophisticated biotechnology; before this development, the Brazilian highlands were not suited to agriculture.

With the massive creation of graduate programs at public universities, starting in the late 1960s, Brazil became a serious producer of research. Despite economic and political turbulence, the growth in published research has been continuous and considerable since the 1960s. Taking the papers listed in the *Current Contents* database as a neutral source of information, Brazilian publications have grown from 1,438 to 2,760 between 1981 and 1995. In fact, together with Spain, Brazil has one of the highest growth rates in scientific output. It is vastly more productive than all other Latin American countries.

Graduate schools have been a very positive factor in generating a well-educated and sophisticated elite. But producing technology has been far more difficult than publishing scholarly papers. Nevertheless, some tangible results of technology can be seen. In agriculture, they are pervasive and impressive. But there are serious disagreements regarding the ultimate usefulness of scientific research and the volume of technological progress generated by schools, independent research institutions, and industry.

Education and Training Outside of Schools

Perhaps to compensate for its underperforming educational system, Brazil has seen the development of all forms of adult education. Given the long time it takes the average student to finish primary education, a lot of what is considered youth education in other countries has become adult education in Brazil, since students are quite old when they reach higher levels of education. Universities and technical schools offer thousands of short training courses in all possible subjects, ranging from merger legislation to Total Quality systems, soccer playing and coaching, philosophy, and photography. Improvised programs offer secretarial and computer courses. Any major city will have thousands of such programs. Franchises compete for students who want to develop English language skills or take cramming courses for university examinations. Most of these programs are offered by private enterprises, but there is much offered by public institutions working under the banner of their aggressive foundations.

Television has become a major medium for education. The Globo Network has a program to prepare students for primary and secondary equivalency examinations. Public and private television channels offer a wide variety of courses and support for regular students. Correspondence schools enroll millions of students. And, of course, the Internet is beginning to offer courses of all varieties.

While the statistics are lacking to document these efforts, it is quite clear that the overall effort is enormous. Brazil is a land of second-chance education.

CONCLUSION

Education in Brazil once displayed a horrible record. Major changes have been taking place during the last five years at almost all levels, but most importantly at the primary level, where the number-one bottleneck—retention and eventual dropping out—is being removed. In other words, the most critical problem is the area in which the most spectacular progress has been recorded. But there are changes and improvements through-

out. All relevant statistics have shown improvement, and none show deterioration. But Brazil is still far from having a halfway decent education system. There is much change, there is ebullience, but it is unclear whether the pace of change is sufficient to cope with the increasing needs of society for a better-educated labor force.

ENDNOTES

[1]For further information, see Paulo Roberto Almeida, *O estado das relações internacionais do Brasil no contexto econômico Mundial* (São Paulo: Editora Unimarco, 1999). Chapter One is based on historical data arranged and compiled by Angus Maddison, notably in his *Monitoring the World Economy*, 1820–1992 (Paris: Development Center of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1995).

[2]Higher education in Argentina was at one time excellent; Argentina once produced three Nobel laureates in the sciences.

[3]UNESCO, statistics <http://www.unesco.org> (1999).

[4]Ibid.

[5]For many years, repetition rates were about 50 percent. As a result of an energetic effort in most states, the national average has gone down to 22.6 percent and is falling even faster in those states that took primary education reform more seriously.

[6]UNESCO, statistics <http://www.unesco.org> (1999).

[7]UNESCO/International Bureau of Education, *World Education Data, 1998* (Geneva: UNESCO/IBE, May 1998).

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ibid.

[10]UNESCO, statistics <http://www.unesco.org> (1999).

[11]Telecurso 2000 was created by the Globo TV Network and funded by the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP).

[12]The Left systematically opposed any form of merit pay and promoted "isonomia" (paying all federal university professors the same, regardless of geography, supply and demand, and discipline). The Left opposed the evaluation of students and (even more) of teachers, the autonomy of universities, and cost recovery. It focused its efforts on across-the-board pay increases. It also opposed private education and public subsidies to support it. It tended to favor extreme versions of constructivism that expected teachers to create their own teaching materials that allowed students to learn by experimentation.

[13]UNESCO, *Statistical Yearbook* (Paris: UNESCO, 1995; 1997).

[14]This, of course, exposes structural weaknesses, particularly the lack of teachers for science and mathematics.

[15]This figure relates to the regular academic progression.

[16]This strange result—more students entering secondary school than finishing primary school—is due to the massive return of older students to secondary school and the parallel path of *supletivo* (the equivalent of a GED in the United States) graduating large numbers of students.

[17]INEP (Instituto Nacional de Estudos Pedagógicos), correspondence with the author, 1999.

[18]Ibid.

[19]UNESCO/IBE, *World Education Data.*

[20]INEP, correspondence with the author.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Costs per student are around U.S. $3,000, usually three to five times more than the equivalent purely academic secondary school.

[23]In fact, at one point, more than three-fourths of those graduating from secondary school were absorbed by higher education (this is much higher than the U.S. rate of about two-thirds). Such figures merely reflect the distortion in the education pyramid, which showed the secondary level almost as thin as higher education (but not much thinner than the last year of primary school).

[24]INEP, correspondence with the author.

[25]Data for 1995. OECD, *Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators, 1998* (Paris: OECD, 1999).

[26]INEP, correspondence with the author.

[27]The three state universities in São Paulo, USP (Universidade de São Paulo), Unicamp (Universidade Estadual de Campinas), and UNESP (Universidade Estadual Paulista), produce almost half of the Brazilian scientific publications.

[28]FINEP (Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos) is a public enterprise funding science and technology projects; FAPESP (Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo) is the São Paulo Foundation to Support Research, CNPq (Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa) is the National Research Council, and CAPES (Fundação Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nivel Superior) is the Agency for Graduate Education.

[29]INEP, correspondence with the author.

[30]Ibid.

Manuela Carneiro da Cunha and
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Indigenous People, Traditional People, and Conservation in the Amazon

In a stunning reversal of ideological fortune, traditional people in the Amazon, who until recently were deemed, at best, candidates for, if not hindrances to, "development," have been promoted to the forefront of modernity. This change has occurred primarily through the association made between traditional people and conservation. At the same time, indigenous peoples, formerly despised or hunted down by their neighbors, have become role models to dispossessed people in the Amazon.

We felt compelled to write this essay partly in response to two major current misunderstandings. The first one questions the foundations of traditional peoples' commitment to conservation. Is such commitment a kind of forgery? Is it, more blandly phrased, a case of a Western projection of ecological concerns onto an ad hoc constructed "ecologically noble savage"? The second misunderstanding, clearly linked to the former, asserts that "foreign" nongovernmental organizations and ideologies were responsible for the connection made between conservation of biological diversity and traditional people of the Amazon. This misunderstanding makes for strange bedfellows. Progressive first-world activists and scholars and third-world military leaders and communists alike share in that belief.

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WHO ARE TRADITIONAL PEOPLE?

The use of the term "traditional people" is intentionally encompassing. Yet this should not be mistaken for conceptual fuzziness. To define traditional people by their following of a stable age-old tradition would run counter to anthropological knowledge. To define them as populations having a low impact on the environment and then to go on to assert their ecological soundness would be tautological. To define them as people outside the market sphere would make them very hard to find. True, categories in academic and legal texts are most often described through the properties or characteristics of their elements. But categories can also be described "in extension"—that is, by listing their constituent elements. It is our contention that "traditional people," for the time being, are best defined by extension—that is, by enumerating their current "members" or the current acceptable candidates for such "membership." This approach is in consonance with our emphasis on the creation and appropriation of categories. More importantly, it also points to how subjects form themselves through new practices.

This is hardly novel. Terms such as "Indian," "indigenous," "tribal," "native," "aboriginal," and "mixed blood" are all products of the metropolis, generated by encounter. And yet, artificial and generic as they were at the time of their creation, these labels have progressively come to be "inhabited" by flesh-and-blood people. This has sometimes been the outcome of the elevation of these terms to a legal or administrative status. What is remarkable, however, is that as often as not, the forced inhabitants of them were able to seize these highly prejudiced categories and turn them into banners for mobilization. Deportation to a foreign concept leads to squatting in it and patrolling its boundaries. This is very often the point at which what was previously defined "in extension" is analytically redefined on the basis of a set of characteristics.

To this day, the expression "traditional people" is at the initial stage of existence. It is a sparsely inhabited class, and yet it has some members as well as obvious candidates for membership. It already enjoys an administrative life: a "national center of traditional people" is a division of Ibama, the Brazilian

official environmental administration. It originally congregated rubber-tappers and Brazil-nut collectors from the Amazon. It has since expanded to cover other people, such as, for example, clam gatherers from southeast Brazil. What all these people have in common is a good environmental record based on low-impact techniques and a stake in retaining or regaining control of the territory they exploit. But more fundamentally, they are ready for a trade-off: in return for control of the territory, they commit themselves to providing environmental services.[1]

HOW (SMALL) PEOPLE MAKE HISTORY

Indigenous people in the Amazon have come a long way in the last twenty years. In the 1970s, a state governor unashamedly referred to them as obstacles to progress. Right-wing politicians and many in the military put them under suspicion, finding the international concern with their fate based on nothing more than greed. It was then commonplace to deplore their impending doom. Some attributed their fate to the inexorable March of Development and Progress, while many leftist intellectuals ascribed it to the no less inexorable March of History. The stampede of all these fiercely marching brigades left no room for survival and obscured the violence, the corruption, and the governmental policies that were the true agents of indigenous peoples' afflictions.

Indigenous issues became a prominent national concern in the late 1970s.[2] In the Constitution of 1934, and in every subsequent Brazilian constitution promulgated until the 1970s (in 1937, 1946, 1967, and 1969), indigenous land and its riches were collectively ascribed to the exclusive usufruct of each ethnic group. Dominion of the land is vested in the federal government, who cannot divert it for any other purpose. Indigenous land cannot be sold or alienated in any manner. On the other hand, in the Civil Code of 1916, indigenous people were classified together with people over sixteen and under twenty-one years of age as "relatively capable." This was an awkward last-minute patch, since the Civil Code was not meant to deal with indigenous issues. "Relatively capable people," because they are easy to deceive, are granted special protection in their

business dealings. Although the concept of tutelage over indigenous peoples sounds derogatory and anachronistic, to say the least, in practice it has provided them with very effective judiciary leverage. Any deal made to their disadvantage and without judicial assistance can be challenged and nullified in court. Moreover, since there was no other case in Brazilian law of a collective land title, indigenous peoples' legal status as wards was commonly understood as the basis for the exceptional status of indigenous land titles. In reality, prior occupation (that is, historical antiquity) is the real foundation of indigenous land rights.

In 1978, a cabinet secretary developed a proposal to emancipate so-called acculturated Indians that would grant them individual land titles, which could then be put on the market. In other words, indigenous land could be sold. The effects of such a measure are well known not only from the United States in the nineteenth century but also from precedents in Brazilian history. Beginning from regulations put in place in 1850 and 1854, it amounted to a three-decade-long liquidation of indigenous titles over land coveted by settlers.[3]

Military rule, in 1978, still thwarted all political demonstrations. Indigenous issues, however, were not deemed political. Repressed dissatisfaction, to the surprise of everyone involved, seems to have found a channel in such issues. The ban on any kind of political protest could well be the reason why the so-called Indian emancipation project, an issue that seemed remote to most urban Brazilians, channeled such a wide range of protest. The emancipation project was duly dropped, although it has since resurfaced under different guises. But the anti-emancipation campaign was to be the start of a decade of intense mobilization around indigenous struggles. The first pan-Brazilian indigenous organization was founded,[4] as well as a significant number of advocacy nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), joined on a voluntary basis mostly by anthropologists and lawyers. A branch of the powerful Brazilian Catholic Bishops Council, the Indigenous Missionary Council (CIMI), was strengthened to include not only missionaries but very active lawyers as well. The Brazilian Anthropological Association, which at the time numbered around six hundred

members, was also to become quite active on the issue of indigenous rights. The major foundations that supported such work were ICCO, a Dutch organization of Protestant churches, the Ford Foundation, based in Rio de Janeiro, and, to a lesser extent, some German NGOs and British Oxfam. Many legal cases were fought, most of them successfully. There were campaigns for the demarcation and effective protection of indigenous lands.

Although the results of such campaigns were uneven, they had very important outcomes. For one, they helped to clarify the major threats faced by indigenous people. They also built some unexpected coalitions on very solid ground: namely, on the trust that resulted from shared studies, goals, or campaigns. We will stress only two examples.

The first example is the alliance between anthropologists and federal prosecutors, built around the need of the government to defend itself from mostly fraudulent claims for indemnification by alleged landowners in indigenous territories. Having lost case after case in court, and dissatisfied with the assistance it received from the official indigenous affairs agency, Fundação Nacional do Indio (FUNAI), the federal prosecutor's office called on the Brazilian Anthropological Association to help establish facts in court. The positive results cemented an enduring relationship of mutual trust that was to bear fruit in the 1988 Constitution.

The other example is the support of a ban on mineral prospecting in indigenous lands by the Brazilian association of professional geologists, whose agenda was to maintain Brazilian mineral reserves against a very powerful lobby of multinational mining corporations. This support was also built over a joint project launched by Centro Ecumênico de Documentação Indígena (CEDI) to map the overlap of indigenous land and areas requested for mineral prospecting. A radar survey of the Amazon had been conducted in the mid-1970s, raising big expectations in mineral riches and causing a scramble for research and extraction concessions. Since ownership of the soil and the subsoil do not coincide under Brazilian law—subsoil resources being federal property—there was a bitter battle

about whether mineral research and extraction could be launched under indigenous land.

By 1987, when a democratically elected Constitutional Assembly started debating a new Constitution, an effective coalition of indigenous leaders, anthropologists, lawyers, and geologists had consolidated. Legal shortcomings impairing indigenous rights had become quite clear, and the aims for indigenous rights in the new Constitution were well defined. With the partial exception of CIMI, which ultimately pursued its own broader Latin American policy, the coalition's agenda for the Constitution was unanimous.

Not surprisingly, the most controversial issues revolved around rights by non-Indians to build hydroelectric dams and to have access to the subsoil of indigenous land. Private corporations' stakes were particularly high in regard to minerals. As a preliminary draft constitution was reviewed, in which access to indigenous subsoil was barred, a press campaign of surprising dimensions was orchestrated against indigenous rights. A few days before the rapporteur was to submit a new draft, five major newspapers in five different state capitals gave weeklong full-front-page space to stories of an alleged conspiracy: in order to keep tin prices high, tin-mining companies were conspiring to prevent Amazonian tin from reaching the market by barring cassiterite extraction in indigenous land. Another line of accusations was directed at CIMI, which had insisted on the use of the term "nations" for indigenous societies. This term, ironically an archaic one found in historical documents up until the late nineteenth century when the word "tribe" replaced it, was used to raise alarm. Nations, in contemporary jargon, might entail a claim to autonomy. The signing of a petition by Austrians on behalf of indigenous rights was used as evidence of foreign conspiracy lurking behind indigenous rights. Those and other similarly creative conspiracy charges, and the publishing of forged documents, kept the momentum high until the new constitutional draft came to light. Not surprisingly, in this version, indigenous rights had been drastically cut. The step-by-step recovery, in the final constitutional text, of most of these rights was an extraordinary tour de force. A massive indigenous and particularly Kayapo presence, the negotiating

skills of the late Senator Severo Gomes, and the efficacy of a large group of NGOs are to be praised for it.

Eventually, indigenous rights were included in a whole separate chapter in the 1988 Constitution. The definition of Indian land in Article 231 explicitly included not only dwelling spaces and cultivated areas, but also land required for the *preservation of environmental resources necessary to indigenous peoples' well-being as well as land necessary to their physical and cultural reproduction, according to their usage, customs, and traditions*.

Indigenous land rights were declared "originary," a legal term that implies precedence and limits the state's role to recognizing rather than granting rights. This phrasing had the virtue of linking land rights to their historical foundations (rather than to a cultural stage or an awkward status as wards). Indigenous groups' and associations' legal status, in particular their capacity for suing on their own behalf, was recognized, independently of their guardian's opinions, and an obligation to assist them before the courts was vested in federal prosecutors. All of this resulted in the securing of basic instruments for upholding their rights.[5] In the process, the visibility and success of indigenous claims on land were enhanced, with the unexpected and paradoxical result that some other dispossessed sectors of society, such as rubber-tappers, began to emulate them.

RUBBER-TAPPERS AS ENVIRONMENTALISTS

By the mid-1980s, rubber-tappers took the lead in establishing a link between their struggle and ecological concerns. By late 1988, in the state of Acre, a coalition for the preservation of the Amazonian rain forest was active under the name "Forest Peoples Alliance," covering both rubber-tappers and indigenous groups. The Altamira rally, led by the Kayapo against the projected Xingu Dam, had itself explicit environmental concerns. By the end of the 1980s, the connection was a matter of course. As against the Yellowstone model that evicted indigenous tribes in order to create a pristine North-American environment, here the vindication was that local communities, who

had conserved and relied on their environment, should not become victims of ecological projects. Rather, in order for the environment to be conserved, they should be in charge of both the management and the control of the resources they depended on. What was novel was the agency that was imparted to local communities. The explicit connection between indigenous people and conservation gained an international dimension in early 1992 with the creation of the International Alliance of the Indigenous-Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests, of which COICA (Confederation of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin) was one of the founding members. The Convention for Biological Diversity and Agenda 21, approved during the Rio Summit in June of 1992, explicitly acknowledged the major role to be played by indigenous and local communities.

INDIGENOUS LAND AND CONSERVATION AREAS

Brazil's indigenous population is estimated at 310,000 people, 280,000 of whom live in indigenous areas. While this is a small population, there is a great wealth of diversity among it. There are 206 indigenous societies, 160 of which are in the Amazon, and 195 different languages, most of which can be subsumed under four major linguistic units. In addition, an estimated 50 indigenous groups still have no contact with the outside world.

The Amazon remained, with the short exception of the rubber boom that lasted from the 1870s to the 1910s, relatively aloof from European occupation. As a result, most of the indigenous groups that have survived and most of the land that they have been able to retain are in the Amazon. This history accounts for the large Indian areas in the Amazon, where nearly 99 percent of Brazilian Indian land is located.

As a whole, the extension of Indian land is striking. Indians have constitutional rights to a little less than 12 percent of Brazilian territory, distributed in 574 different areas, and 20 percent of the Brazilian Amazon. Conservation areas in the Amazon where human presence is permitted give Indians as much as an additional 8.4 percent of that region.

In the 1980s, the size of Brazilian indigenous land seemed astounding: too much land for too few Indians. That perspec-

tive is changing: the cover story of *Veja*, a major Brazilian weekly journal, on June 30, 1999, was about the 3,600 Xingu Indians who were "preserving an ecological paradise" the size of Belgium. The point was that very few Indians could take sound care of a large territory. That conservation might best be undertaken by people who have lived and sustained themselves in the areas is also the premise for the creation of extractive reserves.

Not all conservation areas, of course, can be managed by their preexistent human population. But it has also become clear that a sound and viable ecological policy in Brazil has to involve local communities. Moreover, to evict people from conservation areas without offering them alternative means of subsistence is a sure path to disaster.

JUST HOW CONSERVATION-ORIENTED ARE TRADITIONAL PEOPLE?

Opponents of traditional peoples' involvement in conservation argue two things: that not all traditional societies are conservation-oriented, and that even those that are may not be once they enter the market sphere.

For a long time there has been, among anthropologists, conservationists, policymakers, and traditional peoples themselves, what anthropologist Paul Bohannan in another context has called a "working misunderstanding." It revolved around what one could call the essentialization (something that anthropologists nowadays seem fond of detecting) of traditional peoples' relationship to the environment. A cluster of ideas representing indigenous groups as naturally conservation-oriented resulted in what has been labeled "the myth of the ecologically noble savage."[6] Of course, there is no such thing as a *natural* conservationist, but even if one translates "natural" into "cultural," the issue remains: can traditional peoples be described as "cultural conservationists"?

Environmentalism can refer both to a set of practices and to an ideology. There are, therefore, three different situations that tend to be blurred by using a single term to cover them all. First is the case in which the ideology is present without the actual practices—a case of lip-service to conservation. Second is the

case in which sustainable practices and cosmology are both present. Many Amazonian indigenous societies uphold a sort of Lavoisierian or zero-sum ideology in which all things, including life and souls, are recycled. Theirs is an ideology of limited exploitation of natural resources in which human beings are the sustainers of the equilibrium of the universe, nature and supernature included. Values, taboos on food and hunting, and institutional or supernatural sanctions provide the instruments for them to act according to this ideology. Such societies could easily fit into the category of cultural conservationists. The Peruvian Yagua example comes immediately to mind.[7]

Third is the case in which cultural practices are present without the ideology. In this scenario, one thinks of people who, although lacking an explicit conservation-oriented ideology, follow cultural rules for using natural resources that, given the population density and the territory, are sustainable. It is worth observing that in order to conserve resources, a society does not have to avoid waste entirely. It has just to keep it within limits. If a society approves of killing a whole group of monkeys, females and offspring included, and if such massacre, however distasteful, has no consequence as far as resources are concerned, then this society is not infringing on conservation practices. All one can ask is whether such habits are compatible with sustainable use, not whether they are morally right. We might object to sport hunting in our society, yet it is a fact that North American hunters' associations, such as the Wildlife Federation, have had a strong concern with and positive effect on conservation. Similarly, indigenous groups might conserve and manage their environment with ingenuity and knowledge,[8] particularly when soil is poor, yet this is not necessarily performed under a conservationist ideology. The management of a more bountiful environment might be much less commendable, but low population density still makes it sustainable.

Indigenous groups and even some migrant groups such as rubber-tappers have indeed preserved and possibly enhanced biodiversity in neotropical forests. Amazonian forests, as botanists put it, are oligarchic, with "subaltern" species being oppressed by dominant ones. These societies seem to have acted as revolutionaries: just by making small clearings in the forest,

they allow oppressed species a new chance to outrun their competitors.[9]

The second argument suggests that, although traditional societies might have exploited their environment in a sustainable manner, frontier populations, which come into contact with such societies, will induce a short-sighted strategy for utilizing resources. There will be a lack of adequate institutions and little information about alternative opportunities. Anomie will morally dissolve groups as young entrepreneurs clash with old customs and reciprocity values.

So, the argument goes, although "traditional culture" might once have fostered conservation, the induced needs and link with the market economy inevitably lead to changes in culture and the overexploitation of natural resources. In fact, it certainly does lead to changes, but not necessarily to overexploitation. For what the balanced pre-contact situation also implies is that, given some structural conditions, traditional peoples might play a central role in conservation.

What this argument fails to recognize is that the situation has changed, and the validity of old paradigms has changed along with it. Traditional peoples are neither outside the central economy nor any longer simply in the periphery of the world system. Traditional peoples and their organizations are no longer dealing solely with frontiersmen. They have become partners with such central institutions as the United Nations, the World Bank, and powerful first-world NGOs.

Nor is the market in which traditional people now move the market of old. Until recently indigenous societies could only get cash from first-generation commodities (raw materials such as rubber, nuts, minerals, and the like). They have skipped the so-called second generation of value-added industrial production. Now they are starting to participate in the information economy of third-generation commodities derived from indigenous and local knowledge.[10] And they have even entered the emerging fourth-generation market of "existence values," such as biodiversity and natural landscapes, whose existence some people deem to be valuable in themselves. In 1994, buyers of one acre of Amazonian land, through an NGO called Nature Conser-

vancy, paid not for using or even seeing that acre, but rather for its preservation.

HOW DOES CONSERVATION ACQUIRE LOCAL MEANING? A CASE STUDY

The major bottleneck in involving local communities in conservation plans and putting them in control stems from the effort to give these plans local meaning. Agendas have to merge, benefits have to reach the communities, training and techniques have to be provided.

On January 15, 1990, the Juruá Extractive Reserve in the Brazilian Amazon was officially founded. It was the first of its kind: that is, "a conservation area managed by its traditional population." The Juruá Extractive Reserve, with its 500,000 hectares, was largely the result of the work of a coalition of people and organizations at different levels, including grassroots union members, the national rubber-tapper's council (based in the capital of the state of Acre), academics, the Brazilian Development Bank, federal prosecutors, and Brazilian and foreign NGOs. It was also the outcome of unexpected events and contingent links and considerations.[11]

Extractive Reserves enjoyed rapid success in Brazil and also internationally, where the idea actually caught on and was articulated with community-based sustainable programs.[12] The term "reserve" first came on the scene in October of 1985, at the first national rubber-tappers assembly in Brasília, organized by anthropologist Mary Alegretti. A delegation of rubber-tappers from the state of Rondonia made the remark that no one was (in principle) allowed to interfere with indigenous reserves. Why could rubber-tappers' areas not be protected by law in a similar way? Why could they not have "reserves"? "Reserve," at that point, had no specific meaning other than referring to a protected area.

The term acquired a more concrete meaning in late 1986. At a meeting of rubber-tapper leaders, an anthropologist explained the statute of indigenous land. Indigenous land, as mentioned previously, is specially protected and is the only case in which collective rights over land are acknowledged under Brazilian

law. At that point, the term "reserve" began to sound interesting to some socialist rubber-tapper leaders, who might have seen it as a collectivization of sorts. After a closed-door deliberation from which the anthropologists were excluded, this inner cabinet chose to claim collective possession of the land.

In the 1980s rubber-tapper leaders were convinced of the importance of their contribution to the economy. This could well be the legacy of the World War II American and Brazilian effort to resuscitate, for strategic reasons, natural rubber production in the Amazon. At that time, following a massive propaganda campaign and offered the alternative of being sent to the battlefields in Italy, a new wave of immigrants was taken to Acre, under the resounding name of "rubber soldiers."

By late 1986 the alliance between rubber-tappers and environmentalists was launched, and one year later, Chico Mendes made it operative.[13] At that point no one except perhaps one anthropologist, Mary Alegretti, was thinking of defining the reserves as conservation areas. Rather, following in the tradition of the union members, agrarian reform was the motto. Rubber-tappers defined themselves as landless peasants of the forest.

In October of 1989, the left-wing Workers Party lost the presidential elections by a slim margin. Given the political basis of the newly elected president, hope for agrarian reform faded. There was a window of opportunity, however, to have reserves declared as conservation areas. Legal technicalities such as not having to previously indemnify the landowners (as would have been the case in an agrarian reform) made it expedient to define the reserves as conservation areas. Landowners, in this case, would have to seek indemnification in the courts, but this was not a prerequisite. After the Juruá Extractive Reserve was created as a conservation area in January of 1990, three other projects were rapidly presented. After a long interview with some members of the Rubber-Tappers Council and their advisors, the military gave its authorization to proceed and the projects were approved before the deadline of March 15, when the new president was to take office.

To rely on a conservationist alliance was thus a strategy. To constitute the reserves as conservation areas was a tactical

choice. To say that this was strategic does not mean that it was a deception, a scam, a forgery, either in substance or in project. The project itself is still being translated into local meaningful terms. As for substance, rubber-tappers had indeed been conserving biodiversity. In the upper Juruá, as mentioned above, rubber had been exploited for over 120 years, and yet the area was shown to be uniquely diverse with 549 bird species, 103 kinds of amphibians, and 1,536 butterfly species.[14]

What is true, however, is that rubber-tappers, like Monsieur Jourdain, had been conserving biological diversity unknowingly. Most thought they were producing rubber, not diversity. Rubber was tangible, individualized, distinctive, since it could be of varying quality and was concretely linked to its producer, who signed his name on his product before it was sold to the estate store and sent drifting downriver to the market. Despite price oscillations, it had a relatively permanent value. When inflation was raging all over the country, and people's wages, at the end of the month, were worth less than half of what they had been at the beginning of the very same month, rubber-tappers could still measure the worth of their labor in a steady currency. They charged a daily wage equal to the market value of 10 kilograms of rubber. As compared to the rest of the country, this was expensive labor. It did not imply that every rubber-tapper would produce 10 kilograms of rubber every day. An average rubber-tapper exploits two trails of rubber trees, each one being tapped two times a week and then only for a maximum of eight months. He would be expected to work on rubber about four times a week, the rest of his time mostly used for hunting in the wet season and fishing in the dry season. Moreover, 10 kilograms of rubber a day is not likely to be obtained everywhere in the area. It is a standard set in very productive areas. As a daily wage, therefore, this standard stood for a man's dignity and independence, what he *could* achieve in a day if only he wanted to, the monetary dimension of which is what economists call opportunity cost.

An average rubber-tapper household relies on rubber extraction for cash, swidden agriculture for basic foodstuffs, and some sheep and possibly a few cows for hoarding, while meat and fish come directly from the forest and the river. Wild palm

fruits and honey are gathered in season, and many more items from the forest are used for house and canoe building, medicine, fish poisons, and the like.

It is well known that rubber in the Amazon cannot prosper in plantations because of a leaf disease. Trees can only remain healthy when dispersed in the forest. A rubber trail will consist of about 120 rubber trees, of the Hevea genus. A household will rely on an average of two such trails, and the total area will cover something like 300 hectares (741 acres) or 3 square kilometers (1.15 square miles). This is the minimum area needed. As an average, households used up 500 hectares (1,235 acres) or 5 square kilometers (1.9 square miles). This accounts for the very low population density in a rubber estate—1 to 1.2 persons per square kilometer—which seems optimal for conservation.

As could be expected, conservation varied according to local situations and agendas. In the eastern part of Acre, rubber estates had been sold in the 1970s, mainly to southern corporations or private investors. This was done with governmental incentives for the area to be turned into cattle ranches. Some of the investors actually started cutting down the forest for pastures or simply to expel rubber-tappers and consolidate their legal titles. Rubber-tappers, in this predicament, started defending their livelihood. They would form human barriers to stop wage laborers from cutting down the trees. This form of nonviolent resistance drew the attention of the media and of ecologists.

In the western part of Acre, the old system of rubber estates still prevailed. Corporations had also bought land there, but they were speculating and waiting for roads. The lack of any road made the region unattractive to new ventures, except for some attempts at extracting mahogany. Meanwhile, the new landowners let the traditional system continue. Local bosses (sometimes the previous landowners themselves) would lease the estates and sublease them according to the century-old system. A pyramid of stores would be set at each river and tributary mouth, provisioned with goods available on credit. Storekeepers tried to control all the rubber production along the rivers and prevent the rubber from being smuggled before

debts were paid off. The rubber-tappers of the Juruá, in contrast to those of the more "modern" area to the east, were considered "*cativos,*" a word that means "captives"; in a more archaic sense that resonates to this day, it also means "slaves." The rubber-tappers in the east, abandoned by their bosses and landowners, were, in contrast, *libertos*: freed, manumitted. Although there is much literature on debt slavery in the Amazon, it is quite doubtful whether the system really qualified as slavery, at least as known in Brazil until 1888. In the absence of any effective control over people spread out in the forest, monopoly over their product was achieved through the system of credit for goods that operated at the stores found at the mouth of each river. In fact, debt was the rule of the whole system, from the merchants in Belem who took advances from their clients in Liverpool to the very last tributary upriver. As one writer put it, one's worth could be measured by the extent of one's debts.

Landowners in Acre had a very flimsy legal basis for claiming their estates. In fact, if there was any legal title at all, it would most likely cover but a fraction of the total estate. An annual fee of 30 kilograms of rubber per trail was paid by the rubber-tapper to the estate owner as a rent, or, rather, a tithe. This fee amounted to about 10 percent of the annual production (which was estimated at 600 kilograms over two trails). Again, it had a symbolic rather than an economic significance: it sanctioned the recognition of rubber-tappers as tenants rather than proprietors of the forest and reinforced the bosses' dubious claims over the land. The rubber-tappers of the Juruá River had no cattle ranchers to fight. What they did have was what they thought of as a degrading state of serfdom. Manumission was their primary agenda. The first efforts toward this end, long predating the extractive reserve project, were several attempts at disrupting payment of the annual 30 kilograms of rubber. The message was clearly understood: to this day, refusing to pay the annual rent amounts to open defiance of the rubber-estate system. It directly challenges landowners' claims.[15]

When rumors of the extractive reserve were circulating, rebellion against rent started again. Then, in a spectacular move, a cooperative store was founded, with a grant from the Federal

Development Bank. This store challenged landowners' monopoly over trade. Overcoming conflicts, arrests, and threats from local authorities, several boats triumphantly entered what was to become the reserve, loaded with blue jeans, watches, radios, and motors for canoes, among other things, in an apotheosis of cargo.[16] The cooperative went bankrupt in little more than a year (among other reasons because no one truly understood money and inflation), but the significance of these two initiatives was not lost. At that point the Upper Juruá Extractive Reserve was founded by the federal government and put under the jurisdiction of Ibama. It was grounded on expert advice and reports by biologists and anthropologists on the biological importance of the area, its high incidence of endemisms, and the serfdom in which rubber-tappers were kept.

In contrast to the struggle for preserving trees in the Xapuri region, there was nothing at first that could be called ecological mobilization in the Juruá. After these heroic times and the initial exhilaration of freedom, a set of institutions started to take root in the area. A large research project, funded by the MacArthur Foundation, was launched, involving a great number of local people, anthropologists, biologists, geologists, and many others. This project had political aims: it set out to prove, through a successful example, that under adequate conditions, so-called traditional people *would* manage a conservation area. Adequate conditions, in our view, include clear legal rights, a good quality of life, democratic institution-building, and access to scientific and technological resources. A number of different goals were achieved, many of which were directed at shaping a conservationist set of ideas in the reserve. Conversely, there was an effort to persuade the public, environmentalists, and the government of the viability of putting traditional people in charge of conservation areas. Evidence of the high biological diversity of the area was collected by the biologists. Reliable and simple methods for the rubber-tappers to monitor degradation as well as quality of life were devised. A land-use code for the area was discussed and adopted in an assembly of the association of rubber-tappers. A project for zoning the area based on local exploitation patterns and ecological significance was set up. "Democratic" institution-building and administra-

tive training took place. Studies of patterns of settlement, mobility, and conflict resolution were undertaken. There was a census, and a registry of land (actually rubber-trail) rights. A study of local knowledge and practices related to the use of the forest and its resources was prepared. Research was carried out on new or enhanced old products with more added value. And links were strengthened with Ibama, encouraging them to delegate some responsibilities to the association and a body of local "environmental overseers or inspectors." Ibama also channeled G-7 funds to the reserve.

The impact of these policies on all aspects of life in the upper Juruá was quite remarkable but not surprisingly very different from what had been expected. For one thing, the Juruá people developed their own version of conservation. While their adult children tended to enter the political dispute on the side of the board of the Association, a group mostly comprised of mature men became part of a body of "environmental inspectors." The policing they undertook was closely modeled on the old *mateiro*, or woodsmen, role. *Mateiros* were specialized workers in the rubber estates of old, who opened up new trails and imposed sanctions if rubber trees were overexploited or damaged. The "environmental inspectors" received a measure of power, but were not allowed to take sanctions. They could merely counsel the culprits and report infractions to the official bureau in Brasília or in Cruzeiro do Sul, which was three days downriver. They pointed out that if given no real power, they would not engage in any confrontations with their neighbors. They nevertheless went at their job with self-righteousness. The major infractions were related to hunting. Until 1998 when a new bill was passed, hunting was strictly forbidden under Brazilian law. Imprisonment without bail was the sentence for hunting, whereas primary culprits of murder could be released on bail. This strict law was translated in local terms not as a conservation policy but primarily as a matter of equity. In the officially approved land-use code, after much deliberation, two practices related to hunting were banned: hunting for the market (and indeed there was a market for game meat in a nearby village, adjacent to the reserve) and using dogs. There are two kinds of dogs in the area: native dogs and the valued *Paulista* dogs (the word refers

to someone from São Paulo). It is uncertain whether these dogs, which entered the region through trade with another river valley (the Tarauacá), were indeed from São Paulo or whether their species name was a reference to their superior predatory abilities. In any case, they are excellent hunting dogs, who will not lose a prey once they have tracked it. The problem, according to the Juruá reasoning, was that these dogs would frighten the game into deserting the area—not only their owner's area, but also a much larger one—thus diminishing hunting returns for neighbors who had no Paulista dogs. So Paulista dogs were forbidden in the reserve according to the land-use code. The ban on dogs became the touchstone of local conservationism. Not to have dogs became the external sign of adherence to the reserve project.

An important dissonance stems from the very notion, introduced with the reserve, of producing and maintaining biodiversity. With respect to the forest, the old rules were restraint, limited exploitation, social sharing, magical precautions, and pacts with the keepers or mothers of what we could call wild realms. Agriculture, on the other hand, has no mother. People are thought to control the whole process, notwithstanding the well-known fact that results are uncertain. There is thus a radical separation between what is extracted from nature and what is controlled by men and women, a sharp disjunction between the domestic and the wild. This can be sensed, for instance, in the fact that there is no category corresponding to what we call "plants." The word "plant" (*planta*) does exist, but it refers only to what we would call cultivated plants. This meaning appears to be self-evident to people who derive the noun from the verb "to plant." "Plants" are necessarily "planted." Since wild species by definition are not, how could one ever call them "plants"?

Another clue in the same direction can be drawn from the distinction between *brabo* and *manso*. In its regional usage, *brabo* could be rendered approximately as "wild, savage, or uncivilized" as opposed to domesticated. It can also more generally refer to the contrast between creatures who flee men and those who are unafraid of him. In the more restricted sense of "uncivilized," the word *brabo* is applied to those unfamiliar

with work and survival in the forest. During World War II, so-called rubber soldiers were somewhat surprisingly called "wild" *brabos*. They were commonly left in the forest with basic food-stuff and instructions, sometimes under the guidance of more experienced rubber-tappers, to be "domesticated."

The opposition between the wild and the domesticated is a pervasive and radical one. As one rubber-tapper put it, "There is both a wild (*brabo*) and a domesticated (*mansa*) variety of everything in this world: the tapir and the cow; the deer and the sheep or goat; the squirrel and the rat; the nambu bird and the chicken. The same is true even for people: there are tame (*manso*) people and there are wild (*brabo*) people, namely the Indians."[17]

Producing biodiversity, producing nature, is therefore an oxymoron, a contradiction in (local) terms. Yet this is precisely what the G-7 funds are rewarding. How is one to handle this in terms of policy? A straight economic response would be to pay rubber-tappers directly for what the market is actually interested in: namely, biodiversity. Yet this runs counter to local perception. Biodiversity is a by-product of a form of life, the equivalent of what economists call an externality. Externalities are products that result from other processes and are not taken into account by the market. They carry no price tags. Biodiversity and environmental services (or disservice) are presently beginning to be taken into account; their costs or benefits are starting to be internalized, and so they should be. This is the consequence, by the way, of an expanded notion of the total system. If environmental services were to be directly paid for in the reserve, it could mean inverting figure and ground: what was a by-product, an unintended consequence of a way of life, would become the product itself.

On the other hand, Ibama has concentrated on enhancing the value of so-called sustainable products from the forest and expects the reserve to be economically viable on those grounds. But Ibama does not include conservation services in its accounting.[18] The conundrum might be solved by a judicious mixture of enhanced rubber products that would provide cash to individuals and households in conjunction with a fund that would globally reward the maintenance of biological diversity by provid-

ing general benefits (such as education, health, and transportation services) and financing environmentally friendly initiatives. This is already taking place. Conservation was initially a political weapon in a fight for freedom and entitlement to land rights. Presently, conservation money is being used for motors, for boats, for schools, for health facilities. Conservation is becoming embedded within local projects and expanding its relevance.

TRADITIONAL PEOPLE REVISITED

We started by defining the category in terms of the elements that constitute it and suggested that an analytical definition would emerge. From what we have described, a step in that direction would be to state that traditional people are groups that have created or are struggling to create (through practical and symbolic means) a public identity that includes several if not all of the following characteristics: use of low-environmental-impact techniques; equitable forms of social organization; institutions with legitimate enforcing power; local leadership; and, lastly, cultural traits, selectively reaffirmed and enhanced.

Thus, while it is tautological to say that "traditional people" have a low impact on the environment, it is nontautological to say that a definite group, such as clam collectors in Santa Catarina, have become "traditional people," for this is a process of self-constitution. Internally, it requires conservation rules and legitimate leadership and institutions. Externally, it requires making alliances with nongovernmental organizations and academics as well as with governmental institutions.

It should be clear by now that the category "traditional people" is occupied by political subjects who are ready to give it substance: that is, to enter into a covenant. They commit themselves to a number of practices in return for other benefits, foremost of which are land rights. In this perspective, even the most culturally conservationist human societies are nonetheless always in some sense neotraditional or neoconservationist.

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ENDNOTES

[1]Although, as we will endeavor to show, traditional people have taken indigenous people as role models, the category of "traditional people" in Brazil does not encompass indigenous people. This separation rests on a fundamental legal distinction: namely, that indigenous land rights are not predicated on conservation, even when indigenous land stands out as an island of environmental soundness within otherwise devastated landscapes. To stress the Brazilian specificity that sets indigenous people apart from "traditional people," the former will not be subsumed under the latter, and we will be using, when necessary, the longer and cumbersome expression "indigenous and traditional people."

[2]The only previously comparable national mobilization around indigenous rights took place in the first decade of the twentieth century, resulting in the creation in 1910 of the SPI (Indian Protection Service). Colonial examples are less clear, although seventeenth-century Jesuit struggles against Indian slavery could, with some anachronism, possibly be included among large-scale movements. The creation of the Xingu National Park, in 1961, although attracting great urban support, was an isolated experiment, to the extent that some would later contend that it had become a mere showcase. Ordinarily, massacres, evictions, and other kinds of violence were not treated as national issues, but rather as unfortunate types of local level violence. The structural conditions under which such violence could occur were not perceived.

[3]Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, *1993 Legislação Indigenista no seculo XIX* (São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo e Comissão Pro-Indio, 1993).

[4]This was UNI (Union of Indigenous Nations), which was to play a significant role in the 1980s despite or maybe because of its urban origins. It was to be followed in the late 1980s and the 1990s by active indigenous organizations either ethnically or regionally grounded.

[5]Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, "L'état brésilien, les Indiens, la Nouvelle Constitution," in Marie Lapointe, ed., *L'État et les Autochtones en Amérique Latine/au Canada* (Symposiums du Congrès annuel. Association Canadienne des études latino-américaines et Caraibéennes, Université Laval, 1989), 133–145; republished in *Ethnies* 11–12 (1990).

[6]Kent Redford and Allyn M. Stearman, "The Ecologically Noble Savage," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* 15 (1) (1991): 46–48; Kent H. Redford and Allyn M.

Stearman, "Forest Dwelling Native Amazonians and the Conservation of Biodiversity: Interests in Common or in Collision?" *Conservation Biology* 7 (2) (1993): 248–255.

[7]Jean-Pierre Chaumeil, *Voir, Savoir, Pouvoir: Le chamanisme chez les Yagua du Nord-Est Peruvien* (Paris: Editions de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1983).

[8]William Balée, "The Culture of Amazonian Forests," *Advances in Economic Botany* 7 (1989): 1–21; William Balée and Alfred Gely, "Managed Forests Succession in Amazonia: The Ka'apor Case," *Advances in Economic Botany* 7 (1989): 129–158; Anthony B. Anderson, "Forest Management Strategies by Rural Inhabitants in the Amazon Estuary," in Arturo Gomez-Pompa, T. C. Whitmore, and Malcolm Hadley, eds., *Rain Forest Regeneration and Management* (Paris: UNESCO, 1991), 351–360; Kent H. Redford and Christine Padoch, eds., *Conservation of Neotropical Forests: Working from Traditional Resource Use* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), chap. 5, 83–107.

[9]William Balée (*Footprints of the Forest* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 119–123) provides a detailed review on the evidence of Amazonian societies enhancing environmental resources, be it rivers, soils, wildlife, or plant diversity.

[10]Andrew B. Cunningham, "Indigenous Knowledge and Biodiversity: Global Commons or Regional Heritage?" *Cultural Survival Quarterly* (Summer 1991): 1–4; Gurdial Singh Nijar, *In Defence of Local Community Knowledge and Biodiversity* (Penang: Third World Network Paper, 1996); Stephen Brush, "Indigenous Knowledge of Biological Resources and Intellectual Property Rights: The Role of Anthropology," *American Anthropologist* 95 (3) (1993): 653–686; Manuela Carneiro da Cunha with Marilyn Strathern, Philippe Descola, C. A. Afonso, and Penelope Harvey, "Exploitable Knowledge Belongs to the Creators of It: A Debate," *Social Anthropology* 6 (1) (1998): 109–126; Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, "Populações Tradicionais e a Convenção da Diversidade Biológica," *Estudos Avançados* (1999); also published in French: "Populations traditionnelles et Convention sur la Diversité Biologique: l'exemple du Brésil," *Journal d'Agriculture Traditionnelle et de Botanique Appliquée* (1999).

[11]Mauro Almeida, "The Struggles of Rubber Tappers," unpublished manuscript.

[12]Eleven other such units had been created by 1997, totaling 2.5 million hectares, and two others at least are in the process of being created. The largest extractive reserve is Chico Mendes's with close to 1 million hectares. Mary H. Allegretti, "Extractive Reserves: An Alternative for Reconciling Development and Environmental Conservation in Amazonia," in Anthony B. Anderson, ed., *Alternatives to Deforestation: Steps Toward Sustainable Use of the Amazon Rain Forest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 252–264; Stephan Schwartzman, "Extractive Reserves: The Rubber Tappers' Strategy for Sustainable Use of the Amazon Rainforest," in John Browder, ed., *Fragile Lands of Latin America: Strategies for Sustainable Development* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 151–163.

[13]Chico Mendes, *Fight for the Forest: Chico Mendes in His Own Words* (London: Latin American Bureau, 1989; 2d ed. 1992); Susanna Hecht and Alexander Cockburn, *The Fate of the Forest: Developers, Destroyers and Defenders of the Amazon* (London: Verso, 1989); Alex Shoumatoff, *Murder in the Forest: The Chico Mendes Story* (London: Fourth Estate, 1991).

[14]Keith Brown Jr. and André V. Freitas, "Diversidade biológica no Alto Juruá: avaliação, causas e manutenção," in Manuela Carneiro da Cunha and Mauro Almeida, eds., *Enciclopédia da Floresta: O alto Juruá* (São Paulo: Ed. Cia das Letras, forthcoming).

[15]Mauro W. B. Almeida, "Rubber Tappers of the Upper Juruá River, Acre: The Making of a Forest Peasantry," Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1993.

[16]This is a reference to the literature on the cargo cult in Melanesia.

[17]Antonio Pereira da Silva, "seu Lico," personal communication.

[18]Nor did Ibama, until recently, relying on the old naturalized idea of forest people being conservationists, by their very essence, reserve funds for administration costs, providing for the local government of the reserve.

Albert Fishlow

Brazil and Economic Realities

INTRODUCTION

THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY until 1980 enjoyed one of the highest rates of growth in the twentieth-century world, despite the unorthodox economic policies favored during this time. This phenomenon was not merely the product of a commitment to import substitution in the decades after World War II. Quite the contrary. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Brazil had committed itself to high rates of protection in order to establish and sustain its domestic production of textiles. At the same time, it sought to ensure high prices for its coffee exports by buying up the excess supply and storing it, a pioneering intervention in the market. Finally, Brazil never accepted price stability as a condition of economic policy: only for a very brief interval was there a commitment to a gold standard, and that was only while rising prices for exports prevailed. World War I ended that experiment.

In the 1930s, in the midst of the world depression, Brazil achieved substantial industrial growth. It did so by committing to import substitution—before the term had even evolved—in the midst of a decline in export earnings and an inability to service its outstanding debt. By the time Raul Prebisch emerged as secretary general of the Economic Commission on Latin America, with his call for similar continentwide policies, Brazil

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had already established the viability of the strategy, at least for very large countries. And so its growth in the 1950s continued at an impressive rate, albeit with increasing problems that finally emerged at the end of the decade.

Import substitution had built on the attractiveness of the domestic production of manufactures. No longer would the unfavorable terms of trade that hindered the primary sector be cause for concern. Commercial policy had the purpose not of assuring equilibrium in the balance of payments but of altering relative prices in favor of a domestic supply of industrial products. Additionally, of course, this change would tax the agricultural sector, thereby providing resources to underwrite expansion of the necessary investment.

More than a theory of growth, import substitution was also a short-term theory of macroeconomic adjustment. Structuralism opposed the use of monetary and fiscal policies as mechanisms to limit inflation unnecessarily. Controls of various sorts on prices of key commodities, especially from the primary sector; differential limits on imports; subsidies and direct assistance to sectors undergoing expansion; and an expanded role for public intervention were all intended to replace conventional policies.

The model could not endure—even in a country as large as Brazil. It provoked new distortions and failed adequately to provide mechanisms to adjust fully to them. Those distortions turned out in the end to prevent the economy from advancing.

Three have special significance. First, there was the ever increasing aggregate disequilibrium of the balance of payments. Second, there was the growing sectoral imbalance that characterized the economy. And finally, there was the growing rate of inflation that became progressively more troublesome.

The greatest paradox of the import-substitution strategy—devised to escape from the limit of foreign exchange—is its tendency to increase the vulnerability of a lack of external purchasing power. It does so for a variety of reasons.

First, the overvaluation of exchange rates produces a negative effect on future exports. At the beginning it was possible to tax the agricultural sector because supply was inelastic in the short run, but afterwards producers adjusted to lesser profit-

ability through lesser production. That, of course, soon meant stagnation of exports since primary products were virtually the only ones. In part, import substitution was as successful as it was in the 1950s because it came into operation after the Korean War had elevated the prices of raw materials. That translated into large profits, which could be taxed without an immediate effect on the quantity of exports. In the case of Brazil, moreover, since it was coffee that provided the vast bulk of revenues, supply response could only occur over the longer run, because once trees had been planted, the marginal cost of production was limited.

Second, import substitution produced an increased dependence on imports at exactly the same time it discouraged new exports. With increased domestic production of former imports, reliance on the intermediate and capital goods brought from abroad became ever greater. An interruption in their supply inevitably translated into negative effects on domestic production. Since the really easy phase of import substitution was finished by the mid-decade—after all, Brazil had begun the process even before the Great Depression—the need for complementary inputs grew rapidly as production increased.

This problem was resolved by increased reliance on foreign investment. Imported capital compensated for stagnant export receipts. Additionally, it moved the economy rapidly into the production of consumer durables, and finally even automobiles, enabling the diversification to continue longer than was possible in smaller-scale economies. The importance of foreign participation was an unexpected consequence of a strategy that was supposed to yield greater independence from international markets. Later, in the 1960s, the rise of dependency theory made much of this new reality. At the end of the 1950s, the need of large investment prior to demand helped to keep the Brazilian economy running at full speed longer than most in the region.

This external difficulty was matched by an increasing internal problem of sectoral imbalance. The exclusive emphasis upon industry had several consequences. First, the production of foodstuffs did not keep pace with the expansion of the urban population. Agricultural prices, even those of products for the

domestic market, were held down to ensure an improvement in real incomes as cities grew larger. Second, the industrial sector could not absorb the rising urban population as the general population increased and internal migration swelled. In counterpart to the high-productivity jobs in the new manufacturing sectors and the need for improved efficiency in the older ones, a new sector of temporary and part-time workers emerged. Many of these jobs were created in an expanded governmental sector. And a third imbalance was the substitution of physical objectives for profit maximization. It is no accident that planning first became popular in the 1950s, and new techniques like input-output analysis emerged. Cost minimization was a secondary matter; gross production was the only statistic that appeared to count. Kubitschek's regime saw the emergence of the Programa de Metas: physical output targets were set for the new activities. The establishment of Brasília as the new capital was one direct consequence.

Finally, there was the important fiscal imbalance that resulted from implementation of the strategy of import substitution. When real resources that had come from the agricultural sector began to disappear, the state was called upon to provide the subsidies necessary for the expanding industrial activities. One of its major sources was protection, from both tariff and nontariff sources. Broader access to public revenues was not easy to secure. At the same time, expenses were rapidly increasing to meet the new needs of an emerging urban industrial society. Larger personnel expenses were needed to ensure continuing employment opportunities within the governmental sector. The fiscal deficit reflected the growing disparity between burgeoning commitments and the resources available to meet them.

There were limited ways to finance the imbalance: increased issue of money, increased sale of internal securities, and external finance exhaust the possibilities. An external source was largely unavailable in the 1950s, but new public funds became the heart of the Alliance of Progress in the next decade. Expanded debt was utilized, but not yet substantially. So it was an increased supply of money that represented the largest part of finance. The consequence was increased inflation. At the begin-

ning, such inflation secured a real transfer of resources to the government through the mechanism of forced savings. But as price increases regularly occurred, everyone sought self-protection. This led to higher and higher rates of price increase with an actual reduction in the real resources transferred to the government. In the last analysis, without the capacity to tax or to restrain consumption, the state could only play its role as the supplier of resources by accelerating inflation.

All of these disequilibria interacted at the end of the 1950s. The Kubitschek regime confronted this event primarily by postponing its resolution. The turbulent early 1960s, with the appearance and disappearance of the Quadros government, the rise and fall of Goulart, and finally the military coup in 1964, almost inevitably followed. Even the establishment of the Alliance for Progress in 1961, when American foreign aid first became available in large quantities, could not alter the rhythm of rising prices and falling production, particularly given the increasing radicalism of the Brazilian internal response and the consequent greater U.S. caution in providing assistance.

The military government came to power and devolved management of the economy to two leading private economists: Roberto Campos and Octavio Bulhoes. Their task was to correct the previous distortions. They, and their successors, succeeded handsomely. What widely came to be called the "Brazilian Miracle" followed.

The differentiating characteristics of that special period of rapid growth—in which expansion of the gross domestic product was close to 10 percent annually between 1968 and 1973—were: 1) a new commitment to domestic production of consumer durables, especially automobiles; 2) the considerable availability of external capital to finance expanded imports of investment goods; 3) rising prices of exports that led to expansion of the capacity to import; and 4) a continuation of substantial government outlays for road construction and other public infrastructures.

In other words, the Brazilian Miracle was really not very different from the preceding period of import substitution. There was no emphasis upon an expansion of exports as was the case among the soon-to-be Asian tigers. There was no commitment

to zero inflation, although the rate of price increase fell to the 20 percent level. There was no stress upon agricultural development to remedy productivity deficiencies that had emerged over the previous years. Above all, there was little use of the expanded resources available to the government to alter the educational system in favor of a marked expansion of primary and secondary training. And despite the extraordinary growth, income distribution received little attention. Deterioration had occurred during the 1960s, helped by wage controls after the government takeover in 1964. So the miracle meant little to the bottom part of the income hierarchy except for the opportunities it provided for employment. That is not trivial, but neither was it sufficient to compensate for one of the greatest inequalities registered in the developing world.

The miracle came to an end with the oil crisis in 1973. Prices quadrupled in October subsequent to the Yom Kippur War between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Brazil was a major importer. But its adjustment to the radically different environment was only partial. Instead of altered domestic prices and increased exports, Brazil opted for continuing imports, paid by much-increased foreign debt. Having already become part of the new capital market during the miracle years, Brazil did not find it difficult to accumulate larger debt in 1974 and thereafter. Debt was the easy way out—a way that made great sense if the change in price were temporary. In the early years, moreover, while real interest rates remained quite low, and even negative, such a policy had great advantages. But real interest rates rose at the end of the decade. Brazil had to pay more, not merely for new borrowing, but on the entire stock of debt to private banks as well, since charges were indexed against Euromarket interest rates every six months.

Brazil's economic performance continued to excel during the post–1973 years, amounting to something like 6 percent annual growth under the stimulus of renewed import substitution. Rising domestic inflation and a stop-and-go policy to try to restrain it became more costly at the end. A new president, still military, came to office in 1978. Soon thereafter, the second rise in external prices occurred as a consequence of the Iran–Iraq War, sending oil prices up to more than $40 a barrel. Brazil

sought to borrow, but now interest rates had shifted to highly positive values. In 1981, for the first time in many years, a decline in output was required. The next year was worse: it saw the end of bank lending with the Mexican failure in August. Brazil was forced to go to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance at the end of the year. What had begun as a nagging debt problem ended as a debt crisis.

From 1982 until the Real Plan of 1994, Brazil underwent periods of radically increased inflation. A number of attempts evolved to deal imaginatively and inventively with the problem. But in the end, sustained growth disappeared. It was replaced by positive expansion at first, when a new effort at stabilization was adopted, then, ultimately, decline when that effort turned out to be inadequate. Income per capita did not increase, a result much worse than at any earlier point in the century. About five efforts were made to control rising prices, all with the same unfortunate result of failure. The 1980s were a lost decade, not only in Brazil, but also in much of the rest of Latin America.

An important political gain was realized in the midst of this extraordinary economic difficulty. The Brazilian military retreated in 1984, defeated by the magnitude of the crisis and their inability to resolve it. A similar transition occurred elsewhere in the region as well; by the end of the decade, civilian leadership was established universally, and has remained. Tragically, the newly elected Brazilian president, Tancredo Neves, never served, having become ill prior to his inauguration. His vice-president, Jose Sarney, replaced him. A new constitution was adopted in 1988, and civilian rule—extending to the point of impeachment of an elected president—became firmly implanted. Yet congressional politics lagged significantly behind the economic changes that ultimately emerged. Political parties continued to be numerous and variable; weighted voting increased the power of the Northeast and North; and elections for congressional representation at a statewide level limited the degree of local responsibility.

Still, the Real Plan, introduced in 1994 when Fernando Henrique Cardoso was finance minister, produced an enormous and continuing difference in Brazil. That is where this

economic analysis really begins. All that came before has changed fundamentally. Brazil has been seeking to follow a competitive, capitalist model for the first time. Domestic macroeconomic policy has been altered to assure price stability. External policy has reduced tariff protection to perhaps the lowest levels of the century, opening the economy to rising imports as well as large foreign investment. Privatization has been substituted for state ownership and management of telecommunications, electric energy, rail and highway transportation, and other essential activities such as steel manufacturing and oil exploration.

This new model is now at risk. The devaluation that occurred in January of 1999 has changed matters substantially. President Cardoso has become highly unpopular. Rigorous fiscal policy is being pursued to produce continuing budgetary surpluses, something never realized earlier. Real interest rates are quite high, but are declining quickly. Unemployment has risen as governmental expenditure has been curtailed. Can Brazilian capitalism manage to work before it is too late?

DOMESTIC INNOVATIONS

The Real Plan was a final stage in a reform process directed against inflation that began with the Cruzado Plan in 1985. That effort had produced an initial success. Unfortunately, its life was short. Indeed, it was the excess aggregate demand generated at the very beginning that was very much responsible for its subsequent failure less than a year later. Thereafter came other efforts in the Sarney government, as well as the dramatic new program installed by President Collor at the time of his inauguration. All worked initially but soon proved inadequate.

The Real Plan was another matter. Not accidentally, its intellectual leaders built on the initial Cruzado Plan efforts. But this time, they were older and wiser. As a consequence, the new effort started only after there was a budgetary commitment to a federal surplus, thereby draining off government demand when the private sector was stimulated. In addition, monetary expansion was controlled. Interest rates remained high, and the Central Bank restricted credit. Another difference was the re-

liance upon market adjustment of wages and prices rather than a period of initial governmental setting and control. This was possible because preparation for the Real Plan occurred over a longer interval, when public-sector prices, still very important at this time prior to privatization, were adjusted in relative terms. And finally, as a means of using greater market competition to limit price increases, imports were openly encouraged. Tariff protection had already been reduced under the Collor administration, and this route of increasing aggregate supply to match boisterous domestic demand was relied upon from the very beginning.

After an initial rapid growth and overvaluation of the fixed *real,* economic policy managed to introduce continuing variations in the exchange rate that sought to eliminate this important source of disequilibrium. Interest rates remained high, and that made possible a continuing supply of external capital to compensate for a negative balance on current account. High interest rates also checked domestic demand. Macroeconomic policy began to be applied in earnest. There was continuous growth, but also restraint. Expansion from 1993–1995 was 5 percent, slowing to 3 percent from 1996–1997.

This was hardly a spectacular result. But following on the troubled 1980s, it was an indication that the new policies were working. Brazil had successfully managed the first international crisis, the Mexican "tequila" collapse of late 1994. It had come when conversion to the *real* was in its early stages, and so the problem was less pronounced. The major consequence was the postponement of a regular policy of depreciation until April of 1995. But the effects of the Thai collapse in July of 1997, and of the subsequent difficulties of Indonesia and Korea, were felt strongly in October. In response to a speculative attack on the *real*, Brazilian interest rates were sharply increased to 40 percent, and there was a governmental commitment to a new and continuing effort to eliminate the fiscal deficit that had developed from 1995 on.

The beginning of the election season—President Cardoso's term expired on January 1, 1999—was hardly the right moment for aggressive efforts to restrain the public accounts, especially since Cardoso had succeeded in obtaining an amendment that

permitted him to run for reelection. Although some effort at curtailing expenditures was made, and growth trickled to a halt as the international climate improved, domestic interest rates started to come down in the first half of 1998. But the fiscal deficit remained and naturally turned even worse with the need to pay higher rates on government debt.

Politically, Cardoso retained strong support because of the success of the *real*. Inflation had disappeared in Brazil. His major opponent again was Lula, the head of the Labor Party, in his third consecutive try for the presidency. Ciro Gomes, a leader from the president's own party and former finance minister, also ran, largely on the basis of his criticism of economic policy: it was too orthodox and, after the initial gains in income distribution associated with curbing inflation, too supportive of established interests.

The Russian disaster came toward the end of the campaign—an actual default on outstanding government securities held internationally. The ruble evaporated, moving quickly from six to the dollar to twenty-four. And that shortly translated into not merely a return to high interest rates, but this time, after Cardoso's successful reelection in the first round, the necessary entry of the IMF to provide significant external assistance to the Brazilian government. This was a preventive move for the IMF and allied lenders: Brazil received a loan of more than $41 billion *before* its reserves had disappeared the way they had in previous international crises. This was an innovation. Brazil had become the line in the sand, marking a new decisive point in a sequence of economic disasters.

Despite this support, the macroeconomic structure put into place in 1994 could not be preserved. While Congress largely went along with the new IMF program of cutting expenditures and raising revenues, it failed to pass a needed change in the social-security program in December. Banks were already refusing to sustain their previous quantity of loans, and reserves began to flow out rapidly. This was shortly followed by Governor, and former President, Itamar Franco's refusal to honor the state of Minas Gerais's external debt in early January of 1999. A mini-devaluation was attempted—as in Mexico in

1994—but badly failed, exactly as it had on the earlier occasion. The *real* rapidly moved from 1.21 to the dollar to over 2.

Estimates followed of a major decline in the growth rate. Some guessed at a negative rate of some 5 or 6 percent in 1999. Inflation rates of 25 percent and higher were predicted. Exchange rates were placed at over three to the dollar. None of these extremes has come to pass. Interestingly, these adverse views foresaw a return to the past, ignoring the reality that Brazil's economy had changed dramatically.

One of those central changes had occurred in the domestic response to devaluation. Instead of provoking a proportional increase in all prices, as had been Brazil's response previously, this time devaluation caused a much restrained rate of domestic inflation. The reason is obvious: the ratio of imports to total product is on the order of 5 percent. In the midst of slowed domestic growth, and with changed perceptions of inflation, the price rise in 1999 was on the order of 9 percent at the retail level but a higher 20 percent at the wholesale level.

A second area of divergence has been the relatively constant real gross domestic product in 1999. There has not been growth, but neither has there been the significant drop in income foreseen earlier. Why? The simple answer is that the economy of Brazil had fallen significantly in the second half of 1998, thereby provoking a marginal decline for the year as a whole. That downturn continued in the first half of 1999; but in the second half, contrasted with the declines a year earlier, the economy started to climb. That revival is much assisted by the Central Bank's ability to bring real interest rates significantly down since February of 1999. Moreover, the bank has moved to generalize the decline—previously focused upon prices paid for public debt—to private-sector finance. It still has a long way to go, but a substantial stimulus to new investment and growth can be foreseen.

Domestic macroeconomic policy was thus substantially converted in 1999. Previously, the anchor of price stability was provided by limited devaluation of the exchange rate. That has disappeared. In its place has come inflation targeting, which is really not much more than a new term for effective monetary and fiscal policy. These are the elements essential for the task.

A quasi-fixed exchange rate can serve to provide creditworthiness to an anti-inflationary policy in the short term. But in the ultimate instance, continuing control of inflation requires either the automatic discipline of a currency board—which has its own limits—or internal and adjustable domestic instruments. Brazil has now opted definitively for the latter—as have Mexico, Peru, Chile, and Colombia.

That inevitably means new and serious attention to a major source of the Brazilian fiscal problem: the social-security expenses of the governmental sector. This deficit, plus the lesser, but growing, shortfall in the private sector, already accounts for some 5 percent of total Brazilian product. What makes the problem worse is the extent of the differential benefit: public retirees receive their highest salary as an initial retirement payment, subject to a high maximum limit. Such civil servants contribute only a fraction of what they receive. Private workers receive a retirement salary that is equivalent to their average monthly salary since 1994, up to a monthly limit of about $600.

A September 1999 Supreme Court decision has made matters much worse. It negated expected gains from contributions to be paid by civil-service retirees as well as active workers. But it has led to a new and concerted effort, in which state governors have prominently joined—because they are equally impacted—to re-pass the measures as constitutional amendments. Currently, income of the system is only 18 percent of expenditures.

But note that the problem of the private sector gets progressively worse. There is no surplus from past contributions available to meet current deficits, while the 1988 Constitution doubled the retirement benefit for rural workers without a corresponding contribution. With the change in age distribution, as well as the rise of the informal sector, the ratio of contributions to payments eventually falls despite Supreme Court approval of some modifications.

There is no simple solution to this problem. Movement to a fully funded system from the current pay-as-you-go framework is extraordinarily expensive. This is hardly a moment—when emphasis is upon reducing debt after devaluation—for a monumental debt increase. Yet the need to pay larger taxes on wages generates resentment from both employers and employees. Just

as in the United States, this issue will continue to hinder domestic fiscal policy in the near future. Stabilization is an ongoing domestic problem rather than one that is resolved definitively.

THE EXTERNAL ECONOMY

Like other Latin American economies, Brazil initially guessed wrong in presuming that the world would return to the high rates of protection and reduced trade that characterized the Great Depression. Instead a long period began in which international trade has grown at a rate double that of the national product. Over this interval, Brazil's share of world commerce has almost continuously declined; its share of exports in total product—5 percent—is one of the lowest. Contrast this result with the performance of the Asian economies.

Only in the 1990s did Brazil begin to reduce its high levels of tariff and nontariff protection. Today, it is on the order of 15 percent. While increased imports played an important role in the success of the Real Plan, exports have not kept pace. In the last three years, they have not expanded. Price declines in commodities are partially responsible, but are not the full story. Nor is it the case that initial overvaluation owing to the *real* can fully be blamed: with a declining degree of overvaluation, manufactured exports did not respond, although they are now increasing. A widening current account deficit has resulted, mounting to almost 5 percent of the product.

A major requirement for successful future Brazilian economic performance is an expanded role in world trade. That element is recognized in the recent Brazilian Multiyear Plan of Investment, but much too casually. There it is stated that exports will double by 2002 to $100 billion. This rate of expansion, of almost 25 percent a year, is not realistic. It makes it much too easy to forget about the goal altogether.

What Brazil requires instead is a serious commitment to regular and continuing export expansion. The recent devaluation provides a more-than-adequate basis from which to begin. Brazil, after a decline of some 30 percent in the real rate of exchange, is now a source of much cheaper products. In a world that is seeing a European and Japanese recovery and

only a modest decline in the economy of the United States, Brazil must increase not only its agricultural products but its exports of manufactures as well. The significant foreign investment Brazil has been receiving should be directed not merely to import substitution, but to cultivation of wider world markets.

This is not an easy task. Lack of continuity in exports means broken relationships with important importers. At the same time, Asian exporters are beginning another period of major growth. This is occurring in multiple areas: Korean computers, appliances, and cars as well as Chinese textiles, plastic products, and other consumer goods. Brazil suffers from its intermediate position vis-à-vis its competitors, but not irremediably. This has too often been the excuse in the past. Mexico, under somewhat similar conditions, has been able to expand its exports at a high rate in recent years. To be sure, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has operated to permit that rapid growth of the market. But the foreign investment that is now substantially entering the country should have the global foreign market, and not merely Mercosur, in mind.

That regional trading pact, founded in the 1990s, has grown at a faster rate than exports to the world. Brazil has benefited from the preferred market for its industrial products, particularly before the overvaluation resulting from successful stabilization. With major Brazilian devaluation, the situation has sharply altered, to Argentina's resulting distress. The consequence has been a sharply reduced growth in Mercosur, with Argentina resorting to nontariff protection to benefit industrial sectors as distinct as shoes and textiles on the one hand and steel products on the other.

At the same time, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), established in December of 1994 among thirty-four nations—excluding only Cuba—has produced little forward movement. The reason is obvious. The United States has been without "fast track" authorization since the approval of the Uruguay Round of the World Trade Organization in the same year. As a consequence, not even Chile, an obvious addition to NAFTA, has been able to enter. Free trade from Alaska to Patagonia remains an ever dimmer dream.

Brazil has been a major player in all these negotiations, but not an enthusiastic one. To some degree, because the notion of free trade has come late, it still has not fully adapted to the new reality. All of the calculations suggest that Brazil, along with Mexico, would be the major beneficiary of such an arrangement. But domestic industry, as well as some of the service sector, has been reluctant to accept the reality of greater competition. Because successful regional integration requires an active Brazilian presence, Brazil and the United States have been nominated to co-chair the final phase of the FTAA discussion before 2005, when agreement is to be reached.

Such reluctance is part of the older style of Brazilian hemispheric diplomacy. Especially with the recent devaluation, the terms of the relationship have been substantially altered. Brazil is now more than competitive. It should seize upon these changed circumstances to push its export sector much more aggressively. While something is to be gained from negotiating a South American Free Trade Agreement in the interim, in order to gain the advantage of reducing the scope of national differences, the real prize is the substantial and growing U.S. market.

Brazil requires a continuing participation in the modern global marketplace. But it also requires a capacity to generate domestic savings. Foreign investment historically has been a medium that has compensated for inadequate internal accumulation. This is inappropriate for the future. It opens the economy to an excessive current account deficit that cannot be sustained. It justifies, and partially causes, lower rates of export growth through overvaluation of the exchange rate. It retains an excessively high domestic interest rate that serves to attract foreign funds. Much of the discussion about high interest rates in Brazil ignores this reality: higher domestic savings are necessary to bring the rate down. This lesson emerges clearly from the Asian experience.

PRIVATIZATION

Another dimension of difference in Brazil this decade is the new commitment to a private presence in its economy larger than it has been since the 1950s, and probably even earlier. The pro-

gram of selling off large public sectors such as steel, mining, energy, transportation, telecommunications, and the like first took shape in 1990, with the initial Collor attempt at stabilization. But it has grown considerably since the first Cardoso election in 1994.

A good part of the revenue to limit the deficit in earlier years, and to move to a surplus recently, comes from the $60 billion realized from selling public enterprises. There was no alternative. Controlling inflation placed new responsibilities on the public sector. It was much more difficult to contain spending than to find a source of revenues to counteract it. The easier task was to sell off public enterprises. But these revenues are a one-time gain. Sale of a public firm generates a given amount, partially reduced by the inevitable need to retire debt. Thereafter, gains have to be derived from the rise in productivity as numbers of employees fall, as well as from the tax revenues that are newly available. It is striking that a co-author of *Dependencia,*[1] Fernando Henrique Cardoso, should have been president when this massive transformation took place.

Privatization has not occurred with tranquility. Extensive court actions have slowed, but not prevented, intended sales. Organized opposition by labor groups has also occurred, but has had minor support for a simple reason—employees of these formerly public firms are among the highest paid in Brazil. In the case of the privatization of Telebras, the release of taped phone calls sought to indict members of the administration for seeking to enlist greater competition in the final sale. And, finally, political resistance has tended to mount as water-powered electric facilities, still public in the United States, have joined the list of properties to be transferred.

Yet one factor should be emphasized. Brazil, because it started the privatization process later than other Latin American countries, had a number of advantages. It was able to receive higher prices for its properties after the success achieved in other places. It was able to negotiate sales more advantageously by comparing the results of the variety of previous privatizations. It could seize upon the technological progress made in cell phones to organize its transfer of telecommunications more effectively. And finally, it can structure its regulation of the

new private operations more efficiently, building upon previous experience.

This last point should be emphasized. Brazil is starting fresh in organizing its regulatory activities. Three central agencies, responsible for petroleum, telecommunications, and power, have been established. They have important responsibilities, less so in the present, when terms of the sale have specified initial operating rules, than in the future, when new pricing and service terms will be determined. These are novel experiences for Brazil. Historical ownership placed regulation in a second category of importance. Already one has seen cases of competition between state and federal authorities in terms of regulatory authority. The ability to ensure that new and substantial investment is undertaken and that consumer interests are protected is important to the success of the new adventure that has been launched.

Privatization, as impressive a change as it is, is only part of the transformation. Also important is the new structure evolving within the private sector. There are other factors as well, such as a reduction in governmental supervision, which had become virtually omnipresent in a previous period. Thus, annual wage changes are no longer fixed. There is greater openness: family enterprises that had long controlled a variety of industrial and service activities are being consolidated, often with the novel entry of foreign participation. And the devolution of federal responsibilities to state and local government is another factor. The case of education is illustrative.

All of these modifications are occurring simultaneously. The recent privatization experience is necessarily highlighted because of its financial significance and centrality to budgetary stability. But the other institutional changes are likely to prove more significant in the end. Their permanence will determine the extent to which capitalism proves a positive and innovative change in Brazilian society. It is easy to be critical in this initial phase, as Celso Furtado and the political Left have been. It is equally facile to be self-congratulatory, as some elements of the political Right have more quietly chosen to be. To make of the current market transformation a basis for a broad socially

beneficial development is the real task, not only in Brazil but in the rest of Latin America.

CONCLUSION

Brazil's economy is thus at a critical turning point, but not in the way that daily and weekly commentary in the financial press suggests. The issue is not simply the current exchange rate or the statistics of international trade or the stock prices of the new private successors to Telebras or the rate of inflation. These do matter, because they substantially influence macroeconomic policy and thus current performance. But the underlying issue goes much deeper: it is the restructuring of Brazil for the twenty-first century.

In that process, one must come to grips with the substantial inequality of income distribution. Brazil, along with South Africa, stands at the global extreme. It has been there for many decades. There are no simple policies that will produce immediate results. Indeed, it is precisely the need for continuous and longer-term investments but the simultaneous pressure of short-term demands for improvement that has led to the lack of progress. Rules for high minimum wages, insistence upon much higher rates of taxes, direct guarantees of income for the poor—all of these make relatively little difference in comparison to a commitment to free, effective, and global access to education and health services. The latter takes a generation to prove effective, but it can and has.

Currently, Brazil spends a considerable amount on education. But much of the resources go to finance free state universities of high quality with competitive entry. That offers substantial incentive for private investment in elementary and secondary education and benefits the rich relative to the poor. This pattern is reinforced by a high rate of year repetition at public elementary school that, again, early differentiates to the disadvantage of the poor. Efforts at reform are being made. For virtually the first time, Brazil has had a minister of education of high quality and continuous service for several years. But the reality is a need for more fundamental change and continuity beyond the term of a single president.

Beyond that requirement, the role of regular economic growth stands as a major additional force in Brazil's restructuring. Rising productivity enables noninflationary wage gains that raise income. Expansion creates new employment opportunities to replace those that are lost due to improved efficiency. In particular, to cope with the poverty that afflicts something like a third of the present labor force, there is no substitute. Even with a constant distribution, continuous increase in the average income—something that ceased two decades ago in Brazil—reduces the relative number who are poor.

That is the reality confronting Brazil today. Yet rejection of the gains thus far achieved is a real possibility. The falling popularity of President Cardoso translates into a lesser ability to pass legislation in the Congress and a diminished capacity to carry the transformation begun through to completion. It is easy to criticize the International Monetary Fund and errors in macroeconomic policy. It is easy to blame the novelty of foreign competition for smaller sales and profits. It is easy to argue that the jewels of public wealth are being sold for an inadequate pittance. It is much more difficult to implement the regular doses of intelligent public policy to move Brazil into the next century. This, finally, seems to be the time.

ENDNOTE

[1]Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependencia y desarrollo en America Latina; ensayode interpretacion sociologica,* 3d ed. (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1971).

The fourth largest weekly newsmagazine on the planet is also Brazilian—*Veja,* launched in 1968 by *Editora Abril.* Its readership is surpassed only by the three largest U.S. publications of its kind—*Time, Newsweek,* and *U.S. News & World Report.* With 1.2 million copies sold each week, *Veja* exceeds the circulation of the principal European magazines, who claim to have a market that reaches a richer and more educated public than is possible in Brazil. At the end of the 1990s, *Veja* defended itself against a new weekly magazine, *Época,* published by *Editora Globo* to compete with *Veja.* Published first in 1998, *Época* achieved, in its first year of life, a circulation of nearly 900,000 copies a week, a level of readership comparable to *Der Spiegel,* the major German weekly publication, founded in 1947.

Brazilian newspapers are not equally popular. *Folha de S. Paulo,* with 560,000 copies sold on Sundays, and *O Globo,* with 501,000 copies, do not together equal the Sunday edition of the Argentine daily newspaper *El Clarín,* although Brazil's population is four and a half times larger than Argentina's.

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