Authority and Evidence:
Faith and the Post-Christian Master Story

Charles Scriven

> *"What do you have that you did not receive?"*
> *– 1 Corinthians 4:7 (NRSV)*

> *"Always be ready to make your defense to anyone who demands*
> *from you an accounting for the hope that is in you."*
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Abstract

When the authority of the self is idealized, as has been the case throughout the modern period, faith as response to authority outside of the self invites not only doubt but also disdain. How, it is natural to ask, can faith be truly responsible intellectually? My argument is that epistemic integrity for believers requires acknowledgment of both of the following points. First, faith is a gift. We do not think our way into faith. We receive it, and it cannot be fully justified through evidential reasoning. Second, there are nevertheless "positive analogies" between theological and scientific reasoning. These analogies involve, on the one hand, the epistemic limits of science itself; and on the other hand, believers' openness to testing, and if necessary, adjusting, of their beliefs.

"Self-authorization", declares Charles Taylor, is "an axiomatic feature of modernity."[1] But any account of Christian hope – any account of Christian *faith* – must begin with the authority, not of the self, but of a "received" (so Paul said) tradition (1 Cor 15:1–3). Thus modernity and faith come into conflict. This conflict is at once contentious and persistent, as evident, just now, in the debate occasioned by the so-called New Atheism.[2]

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[2] I allude here, of course, to the recent surge of skepticism exemplified famously by such writers as Christopher Hitchens and Richard Dawkins. Two examples of recent response from the side of belief are Eagleton 2009 and Bentley Hart 2009.

I wish here to explore this matter further, and to offer a tentative account of how Christian faith may situate itself vis-à-vis modernity, and of what defense it may have against modernity's coarser depredations of the Christian Way. With the aid of Charles Taylor, I will characterize the present religious and epistemic situation. Then, relying on Alvin Plantinga and Nancey Murphy, I will show how, though responsive to authority outside of the self, and though lacking proof or even broadly convincing evidence, religious belief may nevertheless measure up to the (humanly achievable) canons of rationality.

To begin, let us say that I hear the Christian Gospel in all its beauty and implausibility. I am stirred by its attunement to what I most desire; I am daunted by its judgment upon my self-preoccupation and its summons to radical generosity. Somehow, both because of all of this and in spite of it, I *believe*; I begin to trust the God of the Gospel, and to offer God my mind and heart, my very being. I cannot then declare, of course, that *I* am the author of, or the authority for, this new life. I cannot credit my own reasoning skills, or my own awareness or intuitions. Neither can I claim to have affirmed my "authenticity" against the compromising sway of hand-me-down beliefs. My faith has arisen precisely because others have borne witness to a Gospel I did not myself invent, and it has arisen precisely because I have responded to that witness through the influence of God, or by way, as Alvin Plantinga puts it, of "the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit."[3]

I have no basis for boasting. All that I have, I have received (1 Cor 4:7). But now this lack – this absence of self-authorization based upon my own reading of the evidence or at least my free, unencumbered expression of the self – constitutes a greater stumbling block than it did for people who lived before the Enlightenment gave rise to modernity. In what was perhaps the signature expression of Enlightenment sensibility, Immanuel Kant, in 1784, wrote: "Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage," from his inability, that is, "to make use of his understanding without direction from another." He went on: "'Have courage to use your own reason!' – that is the motto of the Enlightenment."[4]

This was a crystallization of the age's call to self-governing, or self-defining, individuality. In the context of the times it was understandable. A century and more before Kant wrote these words, the urgency of Enlightenment had come into view on blood-soaked European soil. The Thirty Years' War, religion-stoked and staggering in its brutality and senselessness, finally ended (more or less) in 1648, endowing Europe with a need and a lively desire for peace, or at least respite from war. The blood-letting had failed, however, to resolve the doctrinal discord from which it sprang. As Stephen Toulmin writes, circumstances called for a means of

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determining truth that "was independent of, and neutral between, particular religious loyalties" (Toulmin 1990, 70).

So the idea of autonomy – especially autonomy with respect to religious authority – became a defining element of modernity, and of a story that has developed by now into what I will call the Post-Christian Master Story. As modernity was dawning, other intellectual elements had also been gaining traction. One was the new natural science, with its idea, as Taylor puts it, of "exceptionless natural law," and its intimation of a universal order indifferent to human meaning (Taylor 2007, 40–41, 59–60). Another was impatience with boundaries between the religious elite and members of the laity, a resistance, that is, to the idea of "super-Christians" as opposed to "ordinary Christians." Now the thought was that everyone, not just the religious elite, can embrace self-discipline, and with that came the confidence that we can all take up a "stance of reconstruction toward ourselves" (ibid., 77, 112). We need not remain what we are, or what we have inherited.

In due course there came to be, along with all of this, a lessening of interest in "something higher which human should reverence or love or acknowledge." With the larger universe seeming "unresponsive, or indifferent, like a machine," human good, and human goals, became the focus (ibid., 245, 261). Although at first, with Deism, the machine seemed designed "for our benefit," in time that conceit began to fade. Grace came to be less and less important; among the cultured elite, reliance upon grace began to be seen as a mark of immaturity (ibid., 280, 232, 290, 364, 365).

The growing sense of the universe's unfathomable vastness, both in space and time, eventually sharpened into deep uneasiness concerning humanity's significance and role. The publication, in 1859, of Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species*, was a culminating event. It made religious faith even more fragile and, for everyone, magnified doubts about the ontic underpinnings of human aspiration (ibid., 323–327).

Charles Taylor takes pains to underscore the "malaises" that accompanied the gradual "eclipse of transcendence" in the modern period (ibid., 303–309). Modern sensibility tended to see the "terrible loss" of ultimate purpose as at the same time an opportunity for human beings to decide for themselves what goals to pursue, independently of any reference to some higher order. Many of the thoughtful, as it turned out, espoused values inherited substantially from the egalitarian legacy of biblical tradition. Others, such as Nietzsche, began to extol creativity and excellence without deference to the egalitarian spirit, and to acknowledge, without condemnation, the forces of competition and violence in human life (ibid., 362–373).

With the "benevolent over-all drift of things" less and less convincing after Darwin, World War I, an episode of astonishing mechanized slaughter, set off an upsurge of disappointment and pessimism. The poet Ezra Pound grieved over those who, as he said, died "For an old bitch gone in the teeth, / For a botched

civilization." And with Christianity to some extent implicated in all of this – as it had been since Constantine, Christianity was still linked to the state and the establishment – the war provoked still further retreat from faith (ibid., 388, 408, 409).

But even if the story of modernity involves decline for older religious forms – "the proportion of belief is smaller and that of unbelief is larger than ever before," Taylor writes (ibid., 437) – human vulnerability remains, and so, it turns out, does religious sensibility. Even as secularization has persisted, a nagging dissatisfaction with it has also persisted, and new forms of religion have emerged. Christendom, with the church as the soul of the whole society, is over, but spirituality, for all the difficulty it has faced, lives on.

Now, however, in the context of modern self-authorization, religious feeling often comes to expression under an "ethic of authenticity." Particularly after World War II, the individual has assumed, typically, that the journey to "wholeness and spiritual depth" is a matter of self-expression. "Choice" is, more than ever, "an all-trumping argument." A bewildering pluralism, not just religious but also irreligious, has emerged, and "expressive individualism" has become the "dominant" frame of mind (ibid., 507, 478, 484).

All of this (and, of course, much more) constitutes the Post-Christian Master Story: the decaying of traditional authority, the growing sense of a purposeless universe, the drift away from God, or at least away from the compliant orthodoxy of Christendom. And along the way, through all modernity's permutations, what seems to stand its ground and remain "axiomatic" is "self-authorization," or at least the *ideal* of self-authorization.

Just by telling the story of our secular age, Charles Taylor undermines this ideal: he shows (though my brief summary doesn't do this justice) that what people say is built out of inherited materials; we reflect where we've come from. Terry Eagleton, the British literary critic who has taken on the New Atheism, declares that "self-authorship" (as he calls it) is the "bourgeois fantasy par excellence." And as will become ever clearer, Eagleton is right: we cannot escape what he calls our "fundamental dependency" (Eagleton 2009, 16).

Alvin Plantinga takes for granted this fundamental dependency, particularly in matters of religious belief. We Christians do not author, or authorize, our faith. Faith is something we receive, something given to us by God. So our experience of faith runs directly afoul of the modern frame of mind, and for that reason (among others) meets with many challenges. These challenges arise because we live in the midst of difference; as Charles Taylor remarks, in a pluralist world the many forms of belief "fragilize each other" (Taylor 2007, 531). And one main challenge springs directly from the kernel of modernity; it is that Christian faith is irrational for being based on authority rather than on the use of reason and the analysis of evidence.

Plantinga has concerned himself at great length with the "rational acceptability" of Christian faith. Faith involves belief in God, as well as other challengeable core

convictions. And against the claim that these convictions lack warrant, and are thus "irrational," he offers a "model" (rooted, he says, in Aquinas and Calvin) for the epistemic integrity of Christian belief (Plantinga 2000, vii; see also chapter 6). He does not claim that his model shows the Christian perspective to be *true*. What he is confronting are *de jure*, rather than *de facto*, challenges – challenges, that is, to faith's rationality, to its conceptual and cognitive coherence – and he argues that these challenges fail.

Our "belief-producing faculties," Plantinga writes, include the capacity to become aware of God, and to acquire convictions about what God is like. The mechanism here is akin to that of acquiring knowledge by way of "perception, memory and *a priori* belief" (ibid., 175). Convictions concerning God do not take hold as a result of *inferences* taken in the face of evidence. They instead are "immediate" or "basic": they are simply *occasioned* by experience, and are compelling in just the way that my beliefs about the tree in front of me, or yesterday's tennis match, or the truths of arithmetic, are compelling (ibid., 175, 25–64).

What Plantinga now opposes, in other words, is "evidentialism." It is wrong, he says, to insist that belief in God is "rationally justifiable" only if you embrace it on the basis of arguments "from other propositions" about the world – from evidence, that is, about which you feel certain, and from which it follows that your faith is substantially "probable" (ibid., 6-9; Plantinga formerly accepted evidentialism).

This mistake turns faith into a "very large-scale scientific hypothesis" – comparable to evolution, say, or to general relativity – and thus distorts the actual experience that religious people have. To put this in the familiar terms of Christian piety, faith is properly construed as a *gift*, a gift given, as noted before, through "the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit" (ibid., 206). The testimony of the Spirit is the occasion of belief, and so belief's basis is not evidential probability but divine revelation. Crucially, this sort of belief, even in its susceptibility to "argument and defeat," resembles other kinds of belief, such as those based on perception, memory and *a priori* understanding, that human beings ordinarily accept "in the basic way" (ibid., 344).

Plantinga's point, again, is not demonstration of the truth of Christian belief: from our vantage point that is impossible. He is simply making the case that such belief can have "warrant," or epistemic integrity. Belief in God can result, that is, from the proper functioning of our "cognitive faculties" under conditions genuinely conducive to the gaining of knowledge. And what this means, he argues, is that Christian belief is secure against the charge of sheer irrationality.

Let us accept, at least for the moment, the hypothesis that faith arises from experience in a "direct," as opposed to inferential, manner. Faith *feels*, after all, as though it is a gift, not an achievement of rationality. Agreement with this hypothesis does not, however, insulate the believer from being challenged. And in the course of offering their challenges, the antagonists of faith regularly invoke "evidence" that counts against Christian conviction, and believers must regularly

respond in one way or another. Those whose love of God compels them to engage these antagonists in serious intellectual exchange must therefore confront arguments that proceed on the basis of the canons of probable reasoning.

Plantinga doubts whether reliance upon these canons can produce a compelling case for Christian faith. Faith is not, in any case, a scientific hypothesis; it does not stand or fall on its ability to "explain some body of data." Even against the "evidence" of horrendous evil, the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit provides a suitable warrant for faith. Evil may be a challenge, but it is by no means irrational to go on believing (Plantinga 2000, 477, 483).

Is there any respect, however, in which Plantinga has overstated the point? If Christian life involves the meeting of objections, and if the objectors employ evidential reasoning, how can the believers engage in the conversation without relying themselves, at least to some degree, upon evidential reasoning?

We may explore this question by considering Nancey Murphy's *Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning*. In this reflection on theological epistemology, Murphy accepts Willard Quine's picture of "a belief system as a web or net" (Murphy 1990, 7, 8). All our beliefs belong, on his account, to a highly complex network of interdependence; none is a foundation for all the rest. Even the beliefs we may think of as "basic" – beliefs not inferred from evidence but given through immediate experience – involve assumptions built into the language we use. These language-borne assumptions reflect experiences and theories about these experiences that have accumulated over generations. Thus, even what we take to know directly reflects a perspective on reality that, over time, has come into being by way of evidential reasoning.

All the while, of course, language adjusts; it adjusts in the face of new evidence or of fresh interpretations of evidence accumulated heretofore. Evidence, therefore, is always in play, even when our knowledge is direct as opposed to inferential. It continues to affect the language available to us, and so continues to affect *just how we see, just what we can take to be factual and what we cannot take to be factual*. Someone from long ago could say, "I saw the sunrise yesterday," and believe this was literally so. Today, we take the word "sunrise" to be a misleading convention. Someone from long ago could say, "John was overcome by demons." Today, we might report that John had had an epileptic seizure.

In line with all of this, Murphy embraces a "post-foundationalist" or "holistic" account of language and epistemology. There is "no clear distinction" between "basic and nonbasic beliefs" because there is no such thing as "pure, uninterpreted observation." As N. L. Hanson famously said, all facts are "theory-laden" (ibid., 194, 163; the latter page contains the quote from Hanson's essay).

The holistic account entails that even the hard sciences do not rest upon an indubitable foundation, and the history of science, with all its "paradigm shifts," underscores this point. Lacking an "unquestionable court of appeal," scientists read the world by way of a (web-like) belief system whose central elements persist even in the face of contradictory evidence. These elements persist even as

adjustments occur in the belief system's more peripheral parts. But the elements at the center of the web may themselves unravel if there is enough fraying at the system's edges. When questions accumulate, and attempted answers continue to fall short, major shifts in belief do occur.

In view of all this, Murphy turns her attention to the post-foundationalist understanding of scientific method set forth by the twentieth-century Hungarian philosopher Imre Lakatos. According to him, a scientific "research program" involves, besides the data to be studied, certain core beliefs, including the theory central to the program. It also involves auxiliary beliefs – less comprehensive theories, or theories about observation and instrumentation – that help to show how the central theory sheds light on the data, or the data sheds light on the central theory.

The best research programs advance understanding. Although any such program will meet with evidence that casts doubt upon its core elements, it makes sense to live with some anomalies. As long as a research program produces, overall, fresh insight, the theory central to the program is worth upholding. It is worth upholding despite the unmet challenges that may exist – despite, that is, the frayed edges of the program's (web-like) belief system.

Of course a research program may fail; its core beliefs, or central theory, may lose purchase on human minds, and fall out of fashion, just as Ptolemaic astronomy, with its geocentric universe, eventually fell out of fashion. In the long run, evidence that runs counter to a scientific research program will weaken it or cause it to be replaced by another research program (ibid., 59–61).

Murphy affirms this post-foundationalist, or "historicist," account of scientific method, and then expounds her sense of the "marked positive analogies between theology and science." The theological undertaking involves theories – God is our maker, Christ is alive, etc. – and it requires careful study of the relevant data. What Christians actually do and feel, and what Scripture actually says, constitutes evidence for testing whether or not claims made in the name of God are actually true. Challenges originating from outside the circle of faith require attention too. It is the work of theology to offer the appropriate judgments, and responses, and to do so in such a way to correct past mistakes and provide fresh insight. Good theology, like good science, is progressive in impact (ibid., 85–87; see also the chapter on "Data for Theology," 130–173; also remarks on belief and evidence, 190–196).

The point is not that mere argument will make a believer of a non-believer or a saint of a pretender. Nothing Murphy says counts against Plantinga's assertion that faith arises through the "internal instigation of the Holy Spirit," and thus feels like a gift. Nor does Murphy traffic in the sort of crude evidentialism that attempts to make the truth of Christian belief simply follow from certain propositions about the world. What Murphy does say, however, is that "[v]arious sorts of evidence, over the long run, do tell for or against Christian belief." And she adds, perceptively, that the various sects and denominations (and perhaps also, I may

say, the various congregations) constitute a "vast array of *experiments* in Christian life and belief." If all goes well, these experiments help produce "new and more consistent models of the Christian theory"; over the long run they provide evidence for or against the Christian Way (ibid., 196).

I conclude from all this that modernity's objection to "authority" as a basis for belief is mistaken. Faith is a gift – a gift from God, a gift from the community that helps to sustain it – and that feature of faith does not disqualify it from having epistemic integrity. After all, knowing of any kind, whether basic or inferential, reflects perspective inherited from the past.

I conclude too, however, that evidential, or probabilistic, reasoning matters importantly in Christian life and witness. As a believer, I consider it a fact that God is creator and that Christ is alive. These are core beliefs, situated at the center of my (web-like) system of beliefs. But my reading of reality may lose plausibility (even for me) if it comes, over the long run, to seem less insightful. If beliefs at the edges of my belief web – about, say, the authorship of Hebrews or the age of the earth – come under attack, I may repel the attack to my own satisfaction, or I may adjust my beliefs in a manner consistent with faith's convictional core. But if I can do neither, and if I fail as well with respect to numerous other attacks, my "web" may fray to the point where beliefs that were once at the center no longer hold for me, and I lose faith.

Related points apply concerning my witness to potential believers. Although I cannot argue someone into the faith, and although faith will always feel more like a gift than an achievement of rationality, evidence does matter. Over the long run, it matters a lot, affecting *just how the potential believer sees, just what that potential believer can, or cannot, take to be a fact*. So the "experiments" of religious life – in particular, I would imagine, the presence (or not) of love in believing communities, and the capacity (or not) of Christian peacemaking to shed redemptive light on human problems – provide reasons either for openness to the Christian Way, and to the witness of the Holy Spirit, or for refusal even to consider these things.

In so far as post-Christian sensibility insists on wholesale disparagement of authority other than the authority of self, it is self-deceived. In so far as it summons us to evidential reasoning, it commands respect – and reminds us that the intellectual love of God can be exacting as well as obligatory.

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Zusammenfassung

Wenn die Autorität des Selbst idealisiert wird, wie dies die gesamte Moderne der Fall gewesen ist, ruft der Glaube als Antwort auf Autorität außerhalb des Selbst nicht nur Zweifel, sondern auch Verachtung hervor. Wie – so die ganz natürliche Frage – kann Glaube intellektuell wahrlich verantwortlich sein? Mein Punkt ist, dass für Glaubende epistemische Integrität es erfordert, die beiden folgenden Dinge anzuerkennen: 1. Glaube ist ein Geschenk. Wir denken nicht unsere Weg in den Glauben hinein. Wir empfangen ihn, und er kann nicht völlig durch rationales Denken aufgrund von Belegen gerechtfertigt werden. 2. Dennoch existieren „positive Analogien" zwischen dem theologischen und dem (natur-)wissenschaftlichen Denken. Zu diesen Analogien gehören zum einen die epistemischen Grenzen der (Natur-)Wissenschaft und zum andern die Offenheit von Gläubigen, ihre Glaubensinhalte zu prüfen und, falls nötig, zu modifizieren.

Résumé

Quand l'autorité du moi est idéalisée, comme cela a été le cas tout au long de l'époque moderne, la foi comme réponse à l'autorité en dehors du moi n'invite pas seulement au doute mais aussi au dédain. Comment, il est naturel de se le demander, la foi peut-elle être vraiment responsable intellectuellement ? Mon argument est que l'intégrité épistémique pour les croyants demande la reconnaissance des deux points suivants. Premièrement, la foi est un don. On ne réfléchit pas à son cheminement dans la foi. On l'a reçoit et elle ne peut pas être pleinement justifiée au travers d'une évidence rationnelle. Deuxièmement, il y a néanmoins des « analogies positives » entre les raisonnements théologique et scientifique. Ces analogies incluent d'une part les limites épistémiques de la science elle-même ; et d'autre part l'ouverture des croyants à expérimenter, et si nécessaire, à ajuster, leurs croyances.

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"Self-authorization", declares Charles Taylor, is "an axiomatic feature of modernity."[1] But any account of Christian hope – any account of Christian *faith* – must begin with the authority, not of the self, but of a "received" (so Paul said) tradition (1 Cor 15:1–3). Thus modernity and faith come into conflict. This conflict is at once contentious and persistent, as evident, just now, in the debate occasioned by the so-called New Atheism.[2]

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I wish here to explore this matter further, and to offer a tentative account of how Christian faith may situate itself vis-à-vis modernity, and of what defense it may have against modernity's coarser depredations of the Christian Way. With the aid of Charles Taylor, I will characterize the present religious and epistemic situation. Then, relying on Alvin Plantinga and Nancey Murphy, I will show how, though responsive to authority outside of the self, and though lacking proof or even broadly convincing evidence, religious belief may nevertheless measure up to the (humanly achievable) canons of rationality.

To begin, let us say that I hear the Christian Gospel in all its beauty and implausibility. I am stirred by its attunement to what I most desire; I am daunted by its judgment upon my self-preoccupation and its summons to radical generosity. Somehow, both because of all of this and in spite of it, I *believe*; I begin to trust the God of the Gospel, and to offer God my mind and heart, my very being. I cannot then declare, of course, that *I* am the author of, or the authority for, this new life. I cannot credit my own reasoning skills, or my own awareness or intuitions. Neither can I claim to have affirmed my "authenticity" against the compromising sway of hand-me-down beliefs. My faith has arisen precisely because others have borne witness to a Gospel I did not myself invent, and it has arisen precisely because I have responded to that witness through the influence of God, or by way, as Alvin Plantinga puts it, of "the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit."[3]

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This was a crystallization of the age's call to self-governing, or self-defining, individuality. In the context of the times it was understandable. A century and more before Kant wrote these words, the urgency of Enlightenment had come into view on blood-soaked European soil. The Thirty Years' War, religion-stoked and staggering in its brutality and senselessness, finally ended (more or less) in 1648, endowing Europe with a need and a lively desire for peace, or at least respite from war. The blood-letting had failed, however, to resolve the doctrinal discord from which it sprang. As Stephen Toulmin writes, circumstances called for a means of

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Charles Taylor takes pains to underscore the "malaises" that accompanied the gradual "eclipse of transcendence" in the modern period (ibid., 303–309). Modern sensibility tended to see the "terrible loss" of ultimate purpose as at the same time an opportunity for human beings to decide for themselves what goals to pursue, independently of any reference to some higher order. Many of the thoughtful, as it turned out, espoused values inherited substantially from the egalitarian legacy of biblical tradition. Others, such as Nietzsche, began to extol creativity and excellence without deference to the egalitarian spirit, and to acknowledge, without condemnation, the forces of competition and violence in human life (ibid., 362–373).

With the "benevolent over-all drift of things" less and less convincing after Darwin, World War I, an episode of astonishing mechanized slaughter, set off an upsurge of disappointment and pessimism. The poet Ezra Pound grieved over those who, as he said, died "For an old bitch gone in the teeth, / For a botched

civilization." And with Christianity to some extent implicated in all of this – as it had been since Constantine, Christianity was still linked to the state and the establishment – the war provoked still further retreat from faith (ibid., 388, 408, 409).

But even if the story of modernity involves decline for older religious forms – "the proportion of belief is smaller and that of unbelief is larger than ever before," Taylor writes (ibid., 437) – human vulnerability remains, and so, it turns out, does religious sensibility. Even as secularization has persisted, a nagging dissatisfaction with it has also persisted, and new forms of religion have emerged. Christendom, with the church as the soul of the whole society, is over, but spirituality, for all the difficulty it has faced, lives on.

Now, however, in the context of modern self-authorization, religious feeling often comes to expression under an "ethic of authenticity." Particularly after World War II, the individual has assumed, typically, that the journey to "wholeness and spiritual depth" is a matter of self-expression. "Choice" is, more than ever, "an all-trumping argument." A bewildering pluralism, not just religious but also irreligious, has emerged, and "expressive individualism" has become the "dominant" frame of mind (ibid., 507, 478, 484).

All of this (and, of course, much more) constitutes the Post-Christian Master Story: the decaying of traditional authority, the growing sense of a purposeless universe, the drift away from God, or at least away from the compliant orthodoxy of Christendom. And along the way, through all modernity's permutations, what seems to stand its ground and remain "axiomatic" is "self-authorization," or at least the *ideal* of self-authorization.

Just by telling the story of our secular age, Charles Taylor undermines this ideal: he shows (though my brief summary doesn't do this justice) that what people say is built out of inherited materials; we reflect where we've come from. Terry Eagleton, the British literary critic who has taken on the New Atheism, declares that "self-authorship" (as he calls it) is the "bourgeois fantasy par excellence." And as will become ever clearer, Eagleton is right: we cannot escape what he calls our "fundamental dependency" (Eagleton 2009, 16).

Alvin Plantinga takes for granted this fundamental dependency, particularly in matters of religious belief. We Christians do not author, or authorize, our faith. Faith is something we receive, something given to us by God. So our experience of faith runs directly afoul of the modern frame of mind, and for that reason (among others) meets with many challenges. These challenges arise because we live in the midst of difference; as Charles Taylor remarks, in a pluralist world the many forms of belief "fragilize each other" (Taylor 2007, 531). And one main challenge springs directly from the kernel of modernity; it is that Christian faith is irrational for being based on authority rather than on the use of reason and the analysis of evidence.

Plantinga has concerned himself at great length with the "rational acceptability" of Christian faith. Faith involves belief in God, as well as other challengeable core

convictions. And against the claim that these convictions lack warrant, and are thus "irrational," he offers a "model" (rooted, he says, in Aquinas and Calvin) for the epistemic integrity of Christian belief (Plantinga 2000, vii; see also chapter 6). He does not claim that his model shows the Christian perspective to be *true*. What he is confronting are *de jure*, rather than *de facto*, challenges – challenges, that is, to faith's rationality, to its conceptual and cognitive coherence – and he argues that these challenges fail.

Our "belief-producing faculties," Plantinga writes, include the capacity to become aware of God, and to acquire convictions about what God is like. The mechanism here is akin to that of acquiring knowledge by way of "perception, memory and *a priori* belief" (ibid., 175). Convictions concerning God do not take hold as a result of *inferences* taken in the face of evidence. They instead are "immediate" or "basic": they are simply *occasioned* by experience, and are compelling in just the way that my beliefs about the tree in front of me, or yesterday's tennis match, or the truths of arithmetic, are compelling (ibid., 175, 25–64).

What Plantinga now opposes, in other words, is "evidentialism." It is wrong, he says, to insist that belief in God is "rationally justifiable" only if you embrace it on the basis of arguments "from other propositions" about the world – from evidence, that is, about which you feel certain, and from which it follows that your faith is substantially "probable" (ibid., 6-9; Plantinga formerly accepted evidentialism).

This mistake turns faith into a "very large-scale scientific hypothesis" – comparable to evolution, say, or to general relativity – and thus distorts the actual experience that religious people have. To put this in the familiar terms of Christian piety, faith is properly construed as a *gift*, a gift given, as noted before, through "the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit" (ibid., 206). The testimony of the Spirit is the occasion of belief, and so belief's basis is not evidential probability but divine revelation. Crucially, this sort of belief, even in its susceptibility to "argument and defeat," resembles other kinds of belief, such as those based on perception, memory and *a priori* understanding, that human beings ordinarily accept "in the basic way" (ibid., 344).

Plantinga's point, again, is not demonstration of the truth of Christian belief: from our vantage point that is impossible. He is simply making the case that such belief can have "warrant," or epistemic integrity. Belief in God can result, that is, from the proper functioning of our "cognitive faculties" under conditions genuinely conducive to the gaining of knowledge. And what this means, he argues, is that Christian belief is secure against the charge of sheer irrationality.

Let us accept, at least for the moment, the hypothesis that faith arises from experience in a "direct," as opposed to inferential, manner. Faith *feels*, after all, as though it is a gift, not an achievement of rationality. Agreement with this hypothesis does not, however, insulate the believer from being challenged. And in the course of offering their challenges, the antagonists of faith regularly invoke "evidence" that counts against Christian conviction, and believers must regularly

respond in one way or another. Those whose love of God compels them to engage these antagonists in serious intellectual exchange must therefore confront arguments that proceed on the basis of the canons of probable reasoning.

Plantinga doubts whether reliance upon these canons can produce a compelling case for Christian faith. Faith is not, in any case, a scientific hypothesis; it does not stand or fall on its ability to "explain some body of data." Even against the "evidence" of horrendous evil, the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit provides a suitable warrant for faith. Evil may be a challenge, but it is by no means irrational to go on believing (Plantinga 2000, 477, 483).

Is there any respect, however, in which Plantinga has overstated the point? If Christian life involves the meeting of objections, and if the objectors employ evidential reasoning, how can the believers engage in the conversation without relying themselves, at least to some degree, upon evidential reasoning?

We may explore this question by considering Nancey Murphy's *Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning*. In this reflection on theological epistemology, Murphy accepts Willard Quine's picture of "a belief system as a web or net" (Murphy 1990, 7, 8). All our beliefs belong, on his account, to a highly complex network of interdependence; none is a foundation for all the rest. Even the beliefs we may think of as "basic" – beliefs not inferred from evidence but given through immediate experience – involve assumptions built into the language we use. These language-borne assumptions reflect experiences and theories about these experiences that have accumulated over generations. Thus, even what we take to know directly reflects a perspective on reality that, over time, has come into being by way of evidential reasoning.

All the while, of course, language adjusts; it adjusts in the face of new evidence or of fresh interpretations of evidence accumulated heretofore. Evidence, therefore, is always in play, even when our knowledge is direct as opposed to inferential. It continues to affect the language available to us, and so continues to affect *just how we see, just what we can take to be factual and what we cannot take to be factual*. Someone from long ago could say, "I saw the sunrise yesterday," and believe this was literally so. Today, we take the word "sunrise" to be a misleading convention. Someone from long ago could say, "John was overcome by demons." Today, we might report that John had had an epileptic seizure.

In line with all of this, Murphy embraces a "post-foundationalist" or "holistic" account of language and epistemology. There is "no clear distinction" between "basic and nonbasic beliefs" because there is no such thing as "pure, uninterpreted observation." As N. L. Hanson famously said, all facts are "theory-laden" (ibid., 194, 163; the latter page contains the quote from Hanson's essay).

The holistic account entails that even the hard sciences do not rest upon an indubitable foundation, and the history of science, with all its "paradigm shifts," underscores this point. Lacking an "unquestionable court of appeal," scientists read the world by way of a (web-like) belief system whose central elements persist even in the face of contradictory evidence. These elements persist even as

adjustments occur in the belief system's more peripheral parts. But the elements at the center of the web may themselves unravel if there is enough fraying at the system's edges. When questions accumulate, and attempted answers continue to fall short, major shifts in belief do occur.

In view of all this, Murphy turns her attention to the post-foundationalist understanding of scientific method set forth by the twentieth-century Hungarian philosopher Imre Lakatos. According to him, a scientific "research program" involves, besides the data to be studied, certain core beliefs, including the theory central to the program. It also involves auxiliary beliefs – less comprehensive theories, or theories about observation and instrumentation – that help to show how the central theory sheds light on the data, or the data sheds light on the central theory.

The best research programs advance understanding. Although any such program will meet with evidence that casts doubt upon its core elements, it makes sense to live with some anomalies. As long as a research program produces, overall, fresh insight, the theory central to the program is worth upholding. It is worth upholding despite the unmet challenges that may exist – despite, that is, the frayed edges of the program's (web-like) belief system.

Of course a research program may fail; its core beliefs, or central theory, may lose purchase on human minds, and fall out of fashion, just as Ptolemaic astronomy, with its geocentric universe, eventually fell out of fashion. In the long run, evidence that runs counter to a scientific research program will weaken it or cause it to be replaced by another research program (ibid., 59–61).

Murphy affirms this post-foundationalist, or "historicist," account of scientific method, and then expounds her sense of the "marked positive analogies between theology and science." The theological undertaking involves theories – God is our maker, Christ is alive, etc. – and it requires careful study of the relevant data. What Christians actually do and feel, and what Scripture actually says, constitutes evidence for testing whether or not claims made in the name of God are actually true. Challenges originating from outside the circle of faith require attention too. It is the work of theology to offer the appropriate judgments, and responses, and to do so in such a way to correct past mistakes and provide fresh insight. Good theology, like good science, is progressive in impact (ibid., 85–87; see also the chapter on "Data for Theology," 130–173; also remarks on belief and evidence, 190–196).

The point is not that mere argument will make a believer of a non-believer or a saint of a pretender. Nothing Murphy says counts against Plantinga's assertion that faith arises through the "internal instigation of the Holy Spirit," and thus feels like a gift. Nor does Murphy traffic in the sort of crude evidentialism that attempts to make the truth of Christian belief simply follow from certain propositions about the world. What Murphy does say, however, is that "[v]arious sorts of evidence, over the long run, do tell for or against Christian belief." And she adds, perceptively, that the various sects and denominations (and perhaps also, I may

say, the various congregations) constitute a "vast array of *experiments* in Christian life and belief." If all goes well, these experiments help produce "new and more consistent models of the Christian theory"; over the long run they provide evidence for or against the Christian Way (ibid., 196).

I conclude from all this that modernity's objection to "authority" as a basis for belief is mistaken. Faith is a gift – a gift from God, a gift from the community that helps to sustain it – and that feature of faith does not disqualify it from having epistemic integrity. After all, knowing of any kind, whether basic or inferential, reflects perspective inherited from the past.

I conclude too, however, that evidential, or probabilistic, reasoning matters importantly in Christian life and witness. As a believer, I consider it a fact that God is creator and that Christ is alive. These are core beliefs, situated at the center of my (web-like) system of beliefs. But my reading of reality may lose plausibility (even for me) if it comes, over the long run, to seem less insightful. If beliefs at the edges of my belief web – about, say, the authorship of Hebrews or the age of the earth – come under attack, I may repel the attack to my own satisfaction, or I may adjust my beliefs in a manner consistent with faith's convictional core. But if I can do neither, and if I fail as well with respect to numerous other attacks, my "web" may fray to the point where beliefs that were once at the center no longer hold for me, and I lose faith.

Related points apply concerning my witness to potential believers. Although I cannot argue someone into the faith, and although faith will always feel more like a gift than an achievement of rationality, evidence does matter. Over the long run, it matters a lot, affecting *just how the potential believer sees, just what that potential believer can, or cannot, take to be a fact*. So the "experiments" of religious life – in particular, I would imagine, the presence (or not) of love in believing communities, and the capacity (or not) of Christian peacemaking to shed redemptive light on human problems – provide reasons either for openness to the Christian Way, and to the witness of the Holy Spirit, or for refusal even to consider these things.

In so far as post-Christian sensibility insists on wholesale disparagement of authority other than the authority of self, it is self-deceived. In so far as it summons us to evidential reasoning, it commands respect – and reminds us that the intellectual love of God can be exacting as well as obligatory.

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Zusammenfassung

Wenn die Autorität des Selbst idealisiert wird, wie dies die gesamte Moderne der Fall gewesen ist, ruft der Glaube als Antwort auf Autorität außerhalb des Selbst nicht nur Zweifel, sondern auch Verachtung hervor. Wie – so die ganz natürliche Frage – kann Glaube intellektuell wahrlich verantwortlich sein? Mein Punkt ist, dass für Glaubende epistemische Integrität es erfordert, die beiden folgenden Dinge anzuerkennen: 1. Glaube ist ein Geschenk. Wir denken nicht unsere Weg in den Glauben hinein. Wir empfangen ihn, und er kann nicht völlig durch rationales Denken aufgrund von Belegen gerechtfertigt werden. 2. Dennoch existieren „positive Analogien" zwischen dem theologischen und dem (natur-)wissenschaftlichen Denken. Zu diesen Analogien gehören zum einen die epistemischen Grenzen der (Natur-) Wissenschaft und zum andern die Offenheit von Gläubigen, ihre Glaubensinhalte zu prüfen und, falls nötig, zu modifizieren.

Résumé

Quand l'autorité du moi est idéalisée, comme cela a été le cas tout au long de l'époque moderne, la foi comme réponse à l'autorité en dehors du moi n'invite pas seulement au doute mais aussi au dédain. Comment, il est naturel de se le demander, la foi peut-elle être vraiment responsable intellectuellement ? Mon argument est que l'intégrité épistémique pour les croyants demande la reconnaissance des deux points suivants. Premièrement, la foi est un don. On ne réfléchit pas à son cheminement dans la foi. On l'a reçoit et elle ne peut pas être pleinement justifiée au travers d'une évidence rationnelle. Deuxièmement, il y a néanmoins des « analogies positives » entre les raisonnements théologique et scientifique. Ces analogies incluent d'une part les limites épistémiques de la science elle-même ; et d'autre part l'ouverture des croyants à expérimenter, et si nécessaire, à ajuster, leurs croyances.

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The Heresy Tertullian Overlooked:
On Prescription against the Apologist's Use of Rhetoric

Maury Jackson

Abstract

Given the emphasis on orthodoxy in early Christianity, it appears to go unnoticed that the real heresy of the patristic age was rooted in the linguistic practice of making apologies. Constraint on the use of argument, as understood from the Pauline corpus, framed crucial restrictions in forming Christian communities. The twentieth-century linguistic turn in philosophy proffers a warning to Christian philosophical societies about the need to ponder the practice of argumentation in their communities. I revisit key figures, i.e., Paul van Buren, J. L. Austin, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, who leave Christian philosophers with additional tools to dissolve the dilemma of a Christian's call to be a faithful witness and the Christian constraint on linguistic practices of argument.

This essay both acknowledges and makes use of the epistemological turn in philosophy.[1] This turn found its boldest expression in the British and American analytic tradition.[2] Its focus on epistemology de-centers the ontological questions of being;[3] it replaces these questions with more basic misgivings. These doubts relate to our questions of knowledge: "How can we know anything at all?" This paper advocates that Christians rethink their linguistic practices in light of these recent debates. In order to discern what sense can be made of various statements, there is enough linguistic work to be done when we simply analyze the way questions of meaning refer the questioner back to the community's practices. After all, any epistemological turn in philosophy entails a linguistic turn as well. In what follows, the linguistic tools that Ludwig Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, and Paul van Buren make available for language analysis offer new possibilities for rhetoric in

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[1] Much American philosophy celebrates a renaissance of pragmatic concerns. Richard Rorty is a key figure in this movement: cf. West 1999, 143–148. I also value the merits of the pragmatic turn in philosophy.

[2] A famous example is Ayer 1952.

[3] In regard to the question of the different ontological assumptions of diverse speech communities, I join with Richard Rorty's pragmatist "hope thereby to block epistemological questions like 'Can we know reality, and if so how?' and semantic successor questions like 'Can we know when we are referring to reality, and if so how?' and 'Is our language ever adequate to reality, and if so when?' [Pragmatists] think nothing useful would be lost if philosophers were to stop asking such questions." See Rorty 1997, 150.

Christian witness. A structural-canonical reading of the Christian Scripture exposes a conceptual problem. The problem relates to how argument, as a rhetorical device, has been used in Christian witness. Broadly speaking, the first half of this article exposes that conceptual problem. The second half begins by describing the linguistic tools that offer hints to a way out of the dilemma. The essay ends with an example of how sermons can model the appropriate use of argument for the witnessing Christian community. Passages from the Pauline corpus[4] advocate restraining argument usage – as a tool of Christian persuasion. In contrast Christian apologetics is a linguistic practice at least a generation removed from the discourse practice of the Evangelists.[5] It will be shown that early Christian faith calls for (among other things) delimiting the linguistic practices of the believing community.

1.   The Conceptual Problem

1.1   Defining Jerusalem and Athens through Discourse

In chapter seven of his discourse *The Prescription against Heretics*, the famous founder of Latin Christianity, Tertullian, queried: "What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem?" (see Tertullian 1995, 243–265) His query is not a genuine inquiry, but rather a rhetorical device that calls for drawing the boundaries of discourse between the two communities. Tertullian describes two communities whose people are unpersuaded by the faith convictions of the other. He names the leaders of the opposing community of heretics, i.e., the Gnostic Christians, of whom Marcion was the most famous (ibid., chapter XXX). As Tertullian sees it, these leaders do not follow the traditions handed down by the apostles. But as an apologist he has not only made a choice about belief, he has also made a choice about discourse practices. Tertullian writes: "Away with all attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and *dialectic* composition! We want no

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[4] The phrase "Pauline corpus" refers to all letters attributed to the apostle Paul, including those letters that make up the disputed writings of Paul, and are not regarded by many New Testament scholars as authentic letters. Despite this controversy, scholars recognize that the epistles, in this corpus, were addressed to a Pauline community. Gary Wills gives a succinct list of the thirteen letters attributed to Paul, cf. Wills 2006, 15–16.

[5] It is commonly accepted that the Evangelists' Gospels are compositions written earlier than the Apologies of the church Fathers. Note: I consider the so-called traditional Adventist "evangelism" as a practice that overlaps yet falls outside of the biblical Evangelists' witnessing tradition. The practice that Adventists call "evangelism," one might reasonably consider a misnomer for a linguistic practice better known as "apologetics." Whenever Adventist evangelistic practice tries to establish the veracity of the message by offering "demonstrations" of the historical fulfillment of predictive prophecy, they are really attempting to provide adequate rational justification for faith, within history, when it is only outside history that history itself can have meaning. This practice is different from the Gospel writers and is not to be equated with Matthew's typological messianic "fulfillment."

curious disputation after possessing Christ Jesus, *no inquisition* after enjoying the gospel! With our faith we desire no further belief" (ibid., chapter VII; emphasis supplied).[6] As a result his question and the subsequent judgments are ironic for several reasons. It is a subversive question. Tertullian's agenda hidden in this question is to imply that his side in the early Christian partisan conflicts has apostolic authority behind its assertions. Another dimension of irony is the way Tertullian employs the *dialectical* method throughout his treatise in order to call for an *inquisition* against the heretics. The question, however, is better framed as a question about rhetoric itself, because "far from rejecting classical culture, Tertullian sought a way to integrate it with Christianity." [7] Furthermore, it is ironic that he invokes the very passages of the Pauline corpus that (as I will argue throughout the rest of this paper) suggest that Christians cease from re-engaging these opponents (by using the very same rhetorical practices of their opponents) and get on with the life of discipleship. Again in chapter seven Tertullian writes: "The same subject-matter is discussed over and over again by the heretics and the philosophers; the same arguments are involved." New Testament passages direct disciples away from debating these matters: calling this kind of debate unfruitful. Eventually Tertullian alludes to ironic passages from the Pauline corpus that address the real heresy[8] of Christian faith. The activity of engaging in linguistic discourse not shepherded by the community of faith is a heresy of practice: unorthopraxis. The apologist Tertullian alluded to passages[9] that are relevant to the

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[6] Often Tertullian's work is given a charitable interpretation because he comes out on the winning side of the Christological battles against Marcion. My point is not to focus on the content or merits of Tertullian's arguments (against the Gnostics). I intend to make the point of whether the issue central to Christian community should be orthodoxy or orthopraxy. Heresy originally meant an act of choice. One can choose wrong beliefs and be a heretic. Another can choose wrong practices and be a heretic. Early Christianity had some groups that formed because of agreement to a set of beliefs and other groups that formed because of agreement to a set of practices. Much to their own surprise, many Christians discovered after the church councils that they were not orthodox. See Pagels 2003.

[7] See Sider 1971, 128. A number of scholars, like Sider, underscore how both the rhetorical structure of Tertullian's work and the thematic treatment of his topics demonstrate his "habit of mind." In referencing Tertullian's *Treatise on the Resurrection* 5:1, Timothy David Barnes points out that Tertullian, "…confesses himself, [that his] procedure is rhetorical, a fault which he somewhat disingenuously imputes to his adversaries." (Barnes 1971, 209) And G. W. H. Lampe says of Tertullian that "he owes a great deal in his own thought to philosophy, especially Stoicism (including his belief, set out in his *De Anima*, in the corporeality of the soul)." See Lampe 1982, 20.

[8] In regard to the "real heresy" of the Christian faith, Gunther Bornkamm devotes a section of his book to the anathema announced at the liturgy of the table. In this section he conjectures that the denial of the incarnation was reason enough to refuse Gnostics both the partaking of the flesh in the Eucharist and membership in the body of Christ; cf. Bornkamm 1969, 169–176. I use the term "heresy" playfully to designate a deviation from orthopraxy by employing the linguistic practice of apologetics.

[9] It is true that in chapter VII Tertullian references the letter to the Colossians, "see that no one beguile you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, and contrary to the Holy Ghost" (Colossians 2:8), but throughout this essay, I have in mind a different set of texts. The following New Testament passages (more relevant for the purpose of this essay) come from *The*

issue of Christian discourse; yet he misses the power these texts provide as resources for shaping speech communities. Instead of letting the dialogue process reveal the faith and practice of the community, Tertullian would rather us declare, in advance, what that faith is to be. Only then can we spend our energy policing the discourse community and enforcing orthodoxy.

This essay argues that the Christian's vocation and the witnessing community demarcate the rhetorical possibilities for argument. I use the term "argument" to designate a language function, which includes among a number of possible goals the desire to persuade. Proper arguments can take on inductive forms with the standard of probability or they can take on deductive forms with the standard of logical necessity. But a Christian called to bear a faithful witness often "makes an argument" by offering a forceful verbal confession of faith in Jesus. So in the following I do not concentrate on the term "argument" in the narrow sense of a language form comprised of a premise (or premises) that contend to support a conclusion for the sole purpose of rational justification.

As will be shown in what follows, the rhetorical purpose of argument is shaped by the community of faith. This community commits to being a certain kind of linguistic society. The religious disciplines of meditation, solitude, and quietude alarm our pious suspicions of unconstrained linguistic practice. The philosophical tradition of the Hebrew sage curbs linguistic practices. Qoheleth writes: "The more words, the more vanity, so how is one the better?" (6:11)[10] In the Pastoral Epistles, we read "avoid stupid controversies, profane chatter, and a morbid craving for disputes about words."[11] What are the boundaries for the Christian's use of argument as a rhetorical device? Can the vocation to bear witness also be a call to belong to a certain kind of linguistic community? If rhetoric is "grounded in the disciplines of grammar and logic," (Hochmuth Nichols 1967, 8) then must Christians baptize those disciplines for the purpose of faithfully witnessing the gospel? If it is to be consistent with other commitments demanded by the life of faith, then the Christian use of the rhetorical device called argument must undergo a thorough investigation.

Prescription XVI where Tertullian alludes to 1 Timothy 6:3–4 and Titus 3:10. Also, in *The Prescription XXV* Tertullian alludes to 1 Timothy 6:20.

[10] Bible texts are quoted according to the NRSV.

[11] Titus 3:10, 1 Timothy 6:20; 1 Timothy 6:4. Some interpreters view these phrases as a list for "stock language" to use against opponents in order to label them as sophist; cf. Johnson 2001, 166; 311. Trying to determine the heresy or the heretical community addressed in the Pastoral Epistles (if it is even determinable) is beyond the scope of this paper. What is important, however, is that the Pauline community is admonished to distance itself from that discourse community and its practices; cf. Pietersen 2004, 33. The "stock language" phrases appear to include, among the practices to be shunned, the intensifying, incessant argumentation or verbal warfare of the heretical community. See Collins 2002, 154–160.

1.2   The Rhetorical Dilemma in the Christian Use of Argument

Christians who place high value on biblical admonitions appear to be caught in an inherent conflict between two commitments. This conflict inheres in the use of argument. One commitment is to honor the Bible's apparent limits on the use of argument for certain rhetorical purposes. The other commitment is to bear a forceful witness: a witness that cannot escape using argumentation. Even when serving the objective of persuading nonbelievers, disciples committed to faithfully appropriating the biblical mandates will view the tool of argument with suspicion. Argument employed in early Christian literature is not always for the purpose of providing rational justification.

Warnings from notable Christian philosophers remind us of the limited nature of rational justification. Pascal warns against arguments that purport to give rational grounds for belief:

> Who then will blame Christians for not being able to give a reason for their belief… They [Christians] declare, in expounding it to the world, that it is foolishness, *stultitiam*; and then you complain that they do not prove it! If they proved it, they would not keep their word; it is in lacking proofs that they are not lacking in sense (1952, 214).

For Pascal, argument as a rhetorical device for rational persuasion involves one in impiety. More recently, the secular philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein echoes this idea when he writes: "Anyone who reads the Epistles will find it said: not only that it is not reasonable, but that it is folly. Not only is it not reasonable, but it doesn't pretend to be" (Wittgenstein 1998, 58). Early in Christian literature (in the corpus of letters attributed to Paul) this same sentiment appears. Christians are admonished to "avoid stupid controversies, genealogies, dissensions, and quarrels about the law, for they are unprofitable and worthless."[12] Furthermore, the writer cautions to "avoid the profane chatter and contradictions of what is falsely called knowledge."[13] He claims that people who do this "have a morbid craving for controversy and for disputes about words."[14]

A few Bible scholars suggest[15] that, taken as a whole, the Christian canon indicates that Paul was, in part, motivated to abandon certain rhetorical strategies in Corinth, when he failed to persuade (through argument) the Epicurean and Stoic

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[12] Titus 3:10 (also alluded to in chapter 15:5 of *Prescription Against Heretics*).

[13] 1 Timothy 6:20 (again *Prescription Against Heretics* 25:1).

[14] 1 Timothy 6:4 (again *Prescription Against Heretics* 15:4).

[15] Although a building scholarly consensus rejects the idea that Paul's rhetorical strategy in Corinth was related to a failed attempt to persuade his hearers in Athens through argument (cf. Witherington 1998, 533), this has not always been the case; see Judge 1968, 38; Lim 1987, 137–149; Hartman 1974, 109–117; Shepard 1950, 158. Furthermore, while L. L. Welborn does not go so far as to claim that Paul renounced rhetoric (a claim that I am not making either), he does believe that the terms used in 1 Corinthians 2 highlight Paul's recognition that the language of jest is speech that avoids the social constraints related to talking about crucifixion. The metaphor of theater governs Paul's rhetorical choice to play the mime or the preaching fool; cf. Welborn 2005, 3, 90–99.

philosophers of the gospel while in Athens.[16] Paul changed his rhetorical strategy in his mission to Corinth. In one of his letters to that church he writes: "When I came to you, brothers and sisters, I did not come proclaiming the mystery of God to you in lofty words or wisdom. For I decided to know *nothing* among you *except* Jesus Christ, and him crucified" (1 Corinthians 2:1f; emphasis supplied). Taken as a whole, these passages look as if certain aims for argument, as a rhetorical tool, are prohibited for Christian witness. Nevertheless, it is obvious that one of the rhetorical devices Paul employs is argument. We can infer that a blanket prohibition of argument *per se* is not the aim here. If we assume that the Pauline community was reasonable enough to want to avoid being caught in a contradiction, then we must account for the role argument plays in these letters. Better yet, we can imagine the constraints this Pauline community desired to place on argument.

As seen from Paul's rhetorical letdown in Athens, the Christian use of argument is limited in its ability to persuade nonbelievers through the force of reason. The lesson Tertullian takes from Paul's evangelistic disappointment in Athens is that a radical modularity of discourse requires the communities of Athens and Jerusalem be viewed as incommensurable. He fails to imagine how Paul's Athens experience is an invitation for disciples to re-conceptualize ways of being a discourse community. Paul seems to have taken a different lesson; namely, that unbelievers are persuaded by a demonstration of God's power, and not necessarily by a rational justification of religious claims (1 Corinthians 1:23f.).

2.   Linguistic Tools That Offer a Way Out of the Dilemma

2.1   Components of Wittgenstein's Grammatical Analysis

Ordinarily we understand arguments to carry out the goal of persuasion by making a rational justification for a claim. Today it is possible to re-conceptualize arguments as rhetorical tools that have multiple purposes. The purpose of an argument is as fluid as the role of the actors in the speech context. The changing roles of the speaker and audience involve a change in purpose for an argument. Put another way, a faith community's rhetorical goals are embedded in the form of life unique to the religious context. Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that words have multiple uses; language is fluid (Wittgenstein 1958, 304). The multiple functions of language and its fluidity are related to the community agreement. He anticipates the objections this idea would encounter; so he uses a diatribe form of writing to make his case:

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[16] Acts 17:16–34. There are interpretive approaches based on rhetorical-critical scholarship that argue Luke presents Paul's speech in Athens as the standard of discourse and that it does not represent a rhetorical failure.

So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is
false? – It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in
the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.
If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not
only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments (ibid.,
241–242).

Three components of Wittgenstein's grammatical analysis (language-games, con-
text sensitivity, and multi-functionality (Whittaker 2001, 465–480) help us to
imagine those agreed upon judgments and the various possibilities they offer for
how arguments might function in a Christian community. Let us consider these
issues as we propose one role for religious argument.

2.1.1 Rhetoric, Language-Games, and Performative Utterance

A language-game is one of the figures Wittgenstein envisions that illustrates how
grammar is embedded in a given community's form of life. Wittgenstein wrote,
"Here the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life" (Wittgenstein 1958,
23). For the purpose of illuminating possible roles for argument, the language-game
analogy helps us recognize how the word "argue" is governed by the rhetorical play
designed in the community life where the argument takes place.

J. L. Austin's taxonomy of performative language bolsters our comprehension of
this idea. His analysis has implications for how the concept of argument can be
analyzed when looking at the context of arguments. For Austin, the total speech
situation is the phenomenon to be analyzed; not just the words being uttered (Austin
1962). Non-verbal actions may condition or accompany the speech: diminishing,
enriching or enlarging meaning in the speech context. Austin classifies three sorts
of actions that are involved in sentence usage: locutionary (what is uttered), illocu-
tionary (the intention or desired aim issued when the utterance is made), and
perlocutionary (the effects this utterance has on the hearer). An example is if I say
to my wife, "I love you." This utterance is the locution. When I say "I love you," I
am not simply telling her that I love her but I am acting out my love linguistically.
This action is the illocution. If she responds by giving me a kiss, then the effect that
my utterance has on her is the perlocution. Austin believes much work remains to
be done in our analysis of expressions – primarily in the area of illocutionary acts.
He writes: "Once we realize that what we have to study is not the sentence but the
issuing of an utterance in a speech situation, there can hardly be any longer a possi-
bility of not seeing that stating is performing an act." (Ibid., 139)

To sum up his work, Austin writes: "We distinguished the locutionary act which
has a meaning; the illocutionary act which has a certain force in saying some-
thing; the perlocutionary act which is the achieving of certain effects by saying
something." (Ibid., 121) What motivates Austin to reclassify grammar analysis is

a desire to "play Old Harry with… (1) the true/false fetish, [and] (2) the value/fact fetish." (Ibid., 151) We wrongly cast many disputes into the true/false value judgment game. Some expressions are more appropriately judged "misfiring" than being false (ibid., 18).

William Alston clarifies the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. This sheds light on the subtle difference between a verbal function's utilitarian design (its illocution) and the unintended consequences of a verbal utterance (its perlocution). He writes:

> We cannot say that the illocutionary verb is always equivalent to trying to do something which might be expressed by a perlocutionary verb, as for example that "argue" is equivalent to "try to convince," or "warn" is equivalent to "try to alarm"… Further, many illocutionary acts are not cases of trying to do any perlocutionary act; for example, to promise is not to try to do anything (Austin 1962, 126).

The rhetorical task of argument in Christian community is not equivalent to the perlocutionary consequence of "convincing." So there can be multiple perlocutionary acts for a single illocutionary act – the illocutionary act of argument can produce a number of perlocutionary results: winning, persuading, reconsidering, confessing, ridiculing, etc. We can view illocutionary acts as rules for different language-games. These acts help us understand the total speech situations under which the term "argue" is used. A shift in an argument's utility shifts the rhetorical tasks designed for argument in a given language-game.

2.1.2 Rhetoric, Context Sensitivity, and Regions of Linguistic Communities

Recognizing that there is more than one way to analyze language, we may consider the constraints placed on arguments when used in the total context of different speech settings. Context sensitivity is important for this task. Wittgenstein highlights his method of context sensitivity in a passage addressing a question of whether or not there is commonality to all language-games: "Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games' " – but *look and see* whether there is anything common to all… To repeat: don't think, but look!"(Wittgenstein 1958, 66, emphasis in the original) Being sensitive to an argument's setting discloses the rhetorical task for argument embedded in that context. Consider the work of Paul van Buren. According to van Buren, there are central and peripheral regions to our language. Where a person chooses to dwell linguistically, van Buren argues, is not a matter of rationality or irrationality:

> The issue, rather, is about … how linguistically to inhabit our world. The choice about religion is the choice between residing exclusively in language's central plains, and exploring out to some of its frontiers… There is nothing naturally, historically, or logically necessary about making this decision (1972, 168).

For van Buren, scientific language or empirically verifiable language is at the central region of our language. The frontier region is where we find those linguistic practices such as joke telling, poetry, puns, paradoxes, prayers, metaphysics, etc. (ibid., 112). Religious discourse is akin to this latter set of linguistic families. We do better analyzing the meaning of religious discourse when we are sensitive to its region. Philosophy of religion, especially, when done in a religious community, must attend to this analysis. Humans (which have a distinctively linguistic form of life) have no such thing as pure description because there is no such thing as pure fact (ibid., 58–60). In the world we inhabit, van Buren reveals that there are different ways to behave as linguistic creatures.

Christians agree to be a certain kind of linguistic society. Their sacred writings direct them to "avoid stupid controversies, profane chatter, a morbid craving for controversies and disputes about words." Christians choose to dwell in this region of language. This is their chosen way of behaving as linguistic creatures. This is their special linguistic context for understanding arguments. Religious argument, in the context of a committed believing Christian community, is on the frontier region of language and can only, by mistake, design an argumentative usage that is reduced to persuasion through rational justification. To do so is to be insensitive to the argumentative context: a context that is based on *a priori* faith.

2.1.3 Rhetoric, Multiple Functions, and Linguistic Role Play

In order to make known a boundary set for the Christian rhetorical use of argument, we considered the various acts that speech utterances are capable of performing. Furthermore, we considered the need to attend to the linguistic context of a total speech event. Finally, we must consider the multiple uses of language. As mentioned earlier, Wittgenstein characterized language as fluid. If argument serves multiple functions, then careful attention is to be given to its various rhetorical tasks in order to provide a philosophy of Christian rhetoric. Consider how the various roles played by the speaker and audience frame the specific purpose for argument in a Christian context.

A number of tasks are designed for arguments. Take for example a political debate. The argument setting is tightly scripted. The debate moderator referees the argument. The audience is screened in order to select an equal number of partisan supporters balanced by a number of undecided voters. The questions are pre-screened for the debaters. The time for responses is inflexible. The debater's illocutionary tasks are designed to (1) confirm the convictions of their supporters, (2) inform their detractors of a reasonable alternative policy option on a given topic, and (3) win. Context sensitivity requires that we observe the role played by all actors in a formal debate setting. The language-game analogy leads us to discover the goals that the two debaters aim for in this speech situation. What is the role of

the moderator? What is the role of the audience? How do the answers to these questions frame the illocutionary goals of the argument?

We might ask the same questions for a number of different contexts. When we do this, we find that there are multiple purposes and functions for arguments. Consider the same questions as they relate to argument in a courtroom, argument in a philosophical essay, argument during a sermon, or argument at a political rally. The different illocutionary goals, along with the various unintended consequences for arguments – informing, winning, persuading, ridiculing, or even confessing – are unique to the specific context where the argument takes place. An argument's purpose is at the service of its community-defining tasks.[17]

2.2   Rhetoric and Religious Argument as Expressive Demonstration

We can re-task our rhetorical expectations for arguments in Christian witness. There is a way to argue where the non-cognitive goals of a religious practice (i.e., a state of grace, peace and joy) can shepherd or oversee the cognitive goals of a rational discourse (i.e., truth and understanding). In other words, argument can be a form of expression that is religious. Argument can be expressed religiously. The particular type of argumentative expression I am thinking of is *not* for the purpose of persuasion through rational justification. The notion that religious argument of this type performs the task of persuasion through demonstration (instead of a task of persuasion through rational justification) dissolves the inherent conflict in rhetoric and Christian witness.

Now we can determine the precise nature of this rhetorical goal for Christian argument. Often there is the problem of confusing or fusing two different argumentative language-games. Imagine a sermon argument[18] that simultaneously tries to meet the rhetorical aims of the debate format and the worship format. Whereas debaters rarely confuse their rhetorical aims, preachers at times do confuse those aims. N. K. Verbin highlights what this confusion might look like, writing:

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[17] The descriptive and normative elements of the community-defining tasks are confounded by the process of community development and not by the logic of this argument. Pietersen writes, "MacDonald expresses this process well in her use of three stages of institutionalisation in the Pauline churches: 'community-building', 'community-stablishing' and 'community-protecting' institutionalisation. The Pastoral Epistles clearly reflect the latest stage in this institutionalisation process with their emphasis on the received tradition." See Pietersen 2004, 49.

[18] I have chosen the sermon as a paradigmatic case for modeling argument's rhetorical function in the Christian community. In liturgy, the ministry of the Word is where the people intentionally work on their discourse practices. Preaching often misfires when the illocutionary issuance attempts to create the perlocutionary consequence of persuasion. If there are other cases of the Christian use of argument that do not violate the admonition given in Titus and Timothy, then those cases will be symmetrical to the illocutionary warrants of the sermonic genre. It is my desire that this essay conforms to the same limits.

> In as much as deductive arguments are appropriate within mathematics and the use of a particular tone of voice is not, the latter is appropriate in aesthetics while deductive reasons are not… Priests and ministers do not ordinarily use the argument from religious experience, nor do they use the ontological, cosmological, or teleological argument for God's existence when preaching the gospel. They tell a narrative, a parable, point to certain facts, perform certain acts (Verbin 2001, 513).

A failure to recognize the different language-games that arguments play in results in a failed speech encounter.

In the sermon example, church liturgies differ somewhat but we might envision a specific middle-of-the-road Protestant worship setting. The preacher delivers (embodies) the sermon (argument) to a non-hostile group of worshipers. The liturgy is designed to prepare the audience to "receive" the message of the hour. The rhetorical tasks are many, among which are the following: to elaborately make a confession of faith, testify about a personal religious experience, and render liturgical beauty and delightfulness to the service. The shift in the socially scripted roles of the different rhetorical settings – from that of the political debate to that of the sermon – implies a shift in the illocutionary purposes for argument. This shift keeps religious arguments from becoming "stupid controversies, profane chatter, a morbid craving for controversies and disputes about words." This is due to the fact that the rhetorical goals do not include the trivial tasks of "ridiculing," "winning," nor "heretic labeling."

If we stretch the definition of argument so that it includes the perlocutionary results of persuasion (without the speaker/writer using the explicit structural features of premises and a conclusion), then we might include as arguments the polemical works of narratives, i.e., gospel narratives, hero legends, and moral tales. Biblical scholars claim the Gospel writers produced subversive polemical documents (Hayes and Holliday 1987, 101–108). The ostensibly safe telling of stories about a man from Galilee turns out to be one of the choice subtleties early Christian writers used in posing objections to Gnostic interpretations of Christian faith (Smith 1976, 58–71; 101f.). Nevertheless, we cannot forget that the illocutionary goals of the Gospels were to proclaim (not persuade); the perlocutionary effects, however, were conversion. Therefore, even the genre of the Gospels designed intentions for arguments that did not conflate the perlocutionary and illocutionary tasks.

So what then can we say about the Christian philosopher or a philosophical society of Christians? What should be their community defining tasks? How can they avoid stupid controversies and profane chatter? Can a Christian philosophical community reconcile both meeting the standards of the academic discipline of philosophy and the pre-philosophical commitment that Christians should hold to the sacred story? By agreeing to the community-defining task of building a proclamation community of Christian philosophers, a philosophical society of Christians can avoid the apologetic heresy that dominates a good portion of the

Christian philosophical effort to persuade ideological opponents. Recent criticism of the inadequate attempts to conclusively resolve the theistic disputes highlights the problem inherent in apologetics. The problem is not that people should first believe that there is a "God" and then they can join a particular discourse community. Rather, we need to discard old habits of theological thinking altogether. Paul van Buren suggests that one of those old habits is thinking that the word "God" has an object:

> The heart of the difficulty resides in the fact that the word "God" has been used as if it were the name of something-or-other… Seduced by old habits of thinking of words as labels for things, we take the religious question on that assumption and end with the denials of religion, which we have mentioned (van Buren 1972, 18).

Adventist systematic theologians will find this suggestion problematic. Yet, after all, a Christian philosophical society is not a theological society. The two societies would be in close proximity to each other in a linguistic region. And they may even overlap. Nevertheless, when choosing to become a strict "proclamation community" of Christian philosophers the community-defining tasks will differ from a community of systematic theologians. If they are to be true to the discourse rigor of philosophy, Christian philosophers need not begin with a dogmatic theological principle. But if they are to be true to their identity as Christians, then they must proclaim the sacred story of Jesus and the kingdom of "God." Van Buren's suggestion becomes viable when we take seriously his notion of different regions for dwelling linguistically.[19] If you embrace the metaphor, then ask yourself where is the linguistic region for a philosophical society of Christians?[20] Is it at the central region where scientific empiricism defines the rules? Is it at the periphery where discourse affiliates with joke telling, poetry, and that highly problematic science of metaphysics? Or is it somewhere in between? It is because this kind of question cannot be answered apart from the community-defining tasks agreed to by those philosophers who form the society that I make

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[19] A note concerning van Buren's "commitment to history" as stated in his earlier book *The Secular Meaning of the Gospel.* When read carefully, van Buren's commitment to history is qualified by the following quote, "As we have defined history, we can go this far in understanding Jesus of Nazareth" (1966, 124). For van Buren, ideas that relate Jesus of Nazareth to "God" still affix his commitment to use the term "God" non-referentially. In the discourse with Philip, in John 14, van Buren interprets Jesus' answer to the question "show us the Father" to mean that we are "to stop 'looking for the "Father",' for we shall not find him and the quest is beside the point in any case. Silence is the first and best answer to questions concerning the 'Father'… Since there is no 'Father' to be found apart from him, and since his 'Father' can only be found in him, the New Testament (and this passage specifically) gives its answer to the question about 'God' by pointing to the man Jesus" (ibid., 146–147)

[20] While atheistic Christians (who value the Sacred Story for its humanistic worth) reside in other Christian communities, e.g., Thomas J. J. Altizer and William Hamilton, Adventists have yet to show openness to its members taking this level of liberality with the Christian Story. This kind of discourse partner is policed out of the community of disciples. A policy of this kind would have little space for Thomas and Philip who themselves were skeptical members of Jesus' inner circle.

the claim that philosophical societies and theological societies "may even overlap linguistic regions." Regardless of what linguistic region they choose to reside in, if Christian philosophers are not to be seduced into discourse practices that are heretical, then they must attend to the role of argument in Christian religious discourse.

3.   Forming a Sacred Community of Free Speech and Open Inquiry

This analysis does not offer a justification for a philosophy of Christian rhetoric in principle. Maybe no such justification is desired. Each community must make its own case. Arguments have multiple functions and Christian rhetorical communities must know their unique argumentative aims. The sense, meaning, and function of words, sentences, and even more extended linguistic tools such as arguments and essays are only rightly understood within a "form of life." Their task is embedded in their context. Nevertheless, for all Christians, this context is circumscribed by "the call" to witness: to be a confessing witness to God's grace. This task is also limited by "the community" to behave as linguistic creatures who reside as pioneers on all regions of language by "avoiding stupid controversies, profane chatter, a morbid craving for disputes about words." Finally, this task must include a high regard for truth: always trusting that truth and the gospel message go hand-in-hand. Or to put it in the words of Simone Weil, "one can never wrestle enough with God if one does so out of a pure regard for the truth. Christ likes for us to prefer truth to him because, before being Christ, he is truth. If one turns aside from him to go toward the truth, one will not go far before falling into his arms" (Weil 1951, 69). This is one way to reconcile a religious form of life with the linguistic practice of argument. This is how one argues religiously. This is how a modern Christian might challenge an ancient apologetic inquisitor of heresy. And with that demonstration, we can win a world of doubters.

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Zusammenfassung

Im Hinblick auf die Betonung rechter Lehre in der frühen Christenheit scheint es unbemerkt geblieben zu sein, dass die wirkliche Häresie der patristische Periode ihre Wurzel in der linguistischen Praxis hatte, Apologien anzufertigen. Die Beschränkung der Verwendung von Argumentation, wie sich aus dem paulinischen Korpus verstehen lässt, stellte eine entscheidende Restriktion in der Entstehung christlicher Gemeinschaften dar. Der „linguistic turn" in der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts bietet christlichen Gesellschaften für Philosophie eine Warnung dar in Bezug auf die Notwendigkeit, die Praxis des Argumentierens in ihren jeweiligen Gemeinschaften zu bedenken. Ich greife Schlüsselfiguren auf – Paul van Buren, J. L. Austin und Ludwig Wittgenstein – die christliche Philosophen mit zusätzlichen Werkzeugen ausstatten, um das Dilemma aufzulösen, das darin besteht, dass ein Christ einerseits dazu aufgerufen ist, ein treuer Zeuge zu sein, und andererseits der christlichen Beschränkung linguistischer Argumentationspraktiken unterliegt.

Résumé

De par l'importance donnée à l'orthodoxie dans le christianisme primitif, il semble que passe inaperçu le fait que la véritable hérésie de l'époque patristique plongeait ses racines dans la pratique linguistique de l'apologétique. La contrainte à user d'arguments, selon la compréhension du corpus paulinien, a généré des restrictions cruciales dans la formation des communautés chrétiennes. Le tournant linguistique de la philosophie au XXᵉ siècle profère un avertissement aux sociétés philosophiques chrétiennes à propos de la nécessité de s'interroger sur la pratique de l'argumentation dans leurs communautés. Je revisite des auteurs clés comme Paul van Buren, J. L. Austin et Ludwig Wittgenstein, qui procurent aux philosophes chrétiens des outils supplémentaires pour résoudre le dilemme de l'appel chrétien à être un témoin fidèle et la contrainte chrétienne en lien avec les pratiques linguistiques de l'argumentation.

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Virtues of Prophetic Realism
in Times of a Broken Dialectic:
On Reconciling Modern Critique of Knowledge
with Common Failures in System-Building

Christian Wannenmacher

Abstract

In this article, the author first considers the ethical side of approaching truth and then ponders the appropriate framework to benefit from the lessons in system-building during the history of philosophy. According to his mind, philosophical analysis is more an instrument of critique of one's own theological reasoning and less an instrument for constructive reasoning with a missionary purpose. But in general, philosophical reasoning is only useful for analysis and orientation as long as the Holy Spirit effectively leads the way. – No one inspired by the Scriptures can expect to reverse the outcome of problems accumulated during more than two millennia of human reasoning. Not a single system that survived is perfect. Nevertheless, Adventists should be aware of these patchy and sometimes hidden accomplishments to bridge the gap between philosophy and theology and see these as a part of different attempts to sift through the evidence. In doing so and thus by improving access to critical knowledge the author expects that the Sanctuary eventually will be restored and vindicated. The paper closes with several suggestions on what Adventist philosophers need to discuss within their burgeoning society.

Zimmerfreuden
Wenn ich mittags fenstersteh / und die große Landschaft seh, /
dampft mir plötzlich Bratenrauch / in den reinen Tannenhauch.

Regst umsonst vom Erdenjoch / Flügel der Ekstase –
Ochs und Hammel steigen noch / Göttern in die Nase.
Christian Morgenstern (1871–1914)[1]

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[1] "Chamber-Joy: At noontime standing with a melting gaze / catch scenery through open window double glazed, / Suddenly the smell of roasting meat was in the air / to overpower the pure whiff of some conifer. // From earthly yoke you stir in vain / with wings of ecstasy – / Since beef and lamb will move again / into the nose of Gods to be." I tried my best to translate this piece by Bavarian poet Christian Morgenstern, who was inspired by English literary nonsense. Although a mystic influenced by Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche and Rudolf Steiner – the originator of

1. Athens *or* Jerusalem, Wisdom *and* Philosophy

The title of this symposium, "Athens and Jerusalem Revisited", suggests a historical perspective, and the conjunction 'or' can moreover indicate a strong opposition in the wake of partisans from the early Christian lay theologian Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus to the late political philosopher and German-Jewish émigré Leo Strauss.[2] Another facet of the topic has to do with the current context of the formal establishment of a *Society of Adventist Philosophers,* and thus is concerned with the relevance of the discipline for the Adventist Church at large. This aspect was alluded to in the symposium's subtitle "Adventism and the Love of Wisdom" and seems to imply a similarity between wisdom and philosophy. Therefore I discern a tension within the title and between the common main title phrase and the more special subtitle. We will have to come back to some of the implications later.

For my present purpose, I will render this phrase a little more precisely into three subsequent questions at issue, though each for themselves may sound blunt: Why philosophy? What does philosophy have to do with Adventism or the Adventist message? Why should we establish philosophy as a much more visible discipline in the Adventist educational framework now? I struggled with the first question during my initial decade of study. I struggled with the second question in the second decade, after my conversion. And now, I am struggling with the third question. However, I am hopeful that I can incorporate into my answer – especially with regard to the historical layer – some illuminative results concerning all three of the questions. But although the presentation attempts to answer the third question concerning the establishment of the discipline – while I am taking into account the question concerning philosophy as self-determination up against the Adventist denominational identity – I do not intend to work all of them through step by step because parts of my answer are as scattered across the paper as they came to awareness during different periods in my life. The main structure of the paper thus is twofold: First I consider the ethical side – our attitude or mindset – in approaching truth and then I ponder on the appropriate framework to benefit from the lessons in system-building during the history of philosophy.

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anthroposophy – he clung to the crude facts of realism. It thus boils down to the question: Are we, at the end of the day, all realists?

[2] Compare e.g. Strauss' "Preliminary Reflections" from 1967 (repr. 1983) with Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum, vii: "Worldly wisdom culminates in philosophy with its rash interpretation of God's nature and purpose. It is philosophy that supplies the heresies with their equipment. ... From philosophy come those fables and endless genealogies and fruitless questionings, those 'words that creep like as doth a canker.' To hold us back from such things, the Apostle testifies expressly in his letter to the Colossians that we should beware of philosophy ... What has Jerusalem to do with Athens, the Church with the Academy? What have heretics to do with Christians? Our instruction comes from the porch of Solomon, who had himself taught that the Lord is to be sought in simplicity of heart. Away with all attempts to produce a Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic Christianity!" (Quoted according to the translation by Greenslade 1956, 35)

2. Is There a Privileged Approach to Truth?

To oversimplify, there are apparently three modes of access to truth[3] (or what one considers to be truth): (1) immediate, i.e., "from above" through the Holy Spirit; (2) mediate or indirect through a skillful combination of human reason and divine revelation; or (3) "from below", i.e., in a fierce, logical exchange of blows of opposing arguments in a discussion involving propositions of faith and reason. These modes, at least, are suggested in quotations from Ellen White, Karol Wojtyla and the Jewish historian of philosophy, Norbert Samuelson. I will quote them in reverse order:

> Religious philosophy necessarily is polemical. ... If there was no challenge from outside ... then there would be nothing to talk about ... It is the external challenge that determines the agenda (Samuelson 1989, 288).

According to this approach every comparative study in the twilight zone between philosophy and theology tends to be apologetic. With considerable irony Heinrich Heine, who knew about the significance of philosophy, in his *Religion and Philosophy in Germany* therefore advised religionists to stay away from philosophical debates, as the following quote illustrates:

> From the instant when a religion seeks support from philosophy, its ruin is inevitable. It seeks to defend itself and sinks even deeper into destruction. Religion, like every other form of absolutism, should be above justification (Heine 1902, 110).

The second position we find championed by Karol Wojtyla, a Polish phenomenologist better known as John Paul II, who, in 1998, in his encyclical *Fides et ratio,* affirmed what the Roman Catholic Church holds to, at least since 1870:

> The Church remains profoundly convinced that faith and reason "mutually support each other"; each influences the other, as they offer to each other a purifying critique and a stimulus to pursue the search for deeper understanding. ... Philosophical thought is often the only ground for understanding and dialogue with those who do not share our faith. The current ferment in philosophy demands of believing philosophers an attentive and competent com-

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[3] When I speak of "three modes of access to truth" I do not intend to tackle what philosophers specifically call epistemology. Here I merely try to consider the ethical side of approaching truth which can be fierce, balanced or exceptionally gifted. The problem is actually how to reach a balanced middle ground knowing that the dogmatic approach is not really wanted and the approach through the spirit is not in our hands. Both – human reason and divine spirit – have had their influence on philosophical system-building and critique but now we are living in times of their broken dialectic. Nevertheless in my presentation I will abide by a dialectical approach to their relation in order to readjust their interrelation. For the purpose of a short historical introduction into the classification of systems running up to our times see Pannenberg's sketch on page 42 (including footnote 15) and for the term 'stage of broken dialectic' notice further the remarks at the end of part 5.

mitment, able to discern the expectations, the points of openness and the key issues of this historical moment.[4]

And the last mode of access to truth, which I became acquainted with at the end of the first decade of my philosophy studies, was the Adventist position. This position was insistently put forward by Ellen White in a sermon in the year 1891:

> Those who would be successful in winning souls to Christ, must carry with them the divine influence of the Holy Spirit. But how little is known concerning the operation of the Spirit of God. ... Christ has promised the gift of the Holy Spirit to his church, but how little is this promise appreciated. How seldom is its power felt in the church. ... With the reception of this gift, all other gifts would be ours; for we are to have this gift according to the plentitude of the riches of the grace of Christ, and he is ready to supply every soul according to the capacity to receive. Then let us not be satisfied with only a little of this blessing, only that amount which will keep us from the slumber of death, but let us diligently seek for the abundance of the grace of God. ... No one is prepared to educate and strengthen the church unless he has received the gift of the Holy Spirit.[5]

I am aware that Ellen White had much more to say about philosophy at large thereby touching on different strands of so-called "extra-biblical worldviews",[6] but let me repeat the central and most important phrase in the passage just quoted: "With the reception of this gift, all other gifts would be ours." And given this biblical exhortation it is quite puzzling that all three paths claim to be capable of reaching to the core of the entire spectrum of truth, and of representing or penetrating it.

For our purpose the question "Why philosophy?" should momentarily be transformed into the question "What kind of a philosophy?" Today, a type of controversial apologetics is known not only from the Catholic side. It uses a number of philosophical arguments to (a) preserve faith against the accusation of being irrational, and (b) better reach its mission-oriented purpose through the power of the superior argument. As a quite recently converted Seventh-day Adventist, I always

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[4] See paragraphs 100 and 104 of the encyclical *Fides et Ratio (*September 14, 1998) with reference to the Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith *Dei Filius*, IV (First Vatican Ecumenical Council), DS 3019.

[5] "It is not for You to Know the Times and the Seasons", Sermon at Lansing, Michigan, Sept. 5, 1891, in White 1987, 960.

[6] The proper place of the Bible in education was the underlying context for her final 19th century reflection on the impact of the natural sciences and accompanying philosophies (cf. Knight 1986 and 2008b). William Miller in his "Rules of Bible Interpretation" (cf. Damsteegt 1977, 299–300) deliberately had countered deism in 1841 without naming it explicitly. Ellen White endorsed Miller's rules in *Review and Herald* (November 25, 1884, 738), but the book *Education*, her major contribution in this field, was released not until 1903. Leading Academics of her time, such as John William Draper (1874) and Andrew Dickinson White (1896), in their major works were led by the notion of a deep conflict between science and religion instead. I owe my awareness of the historical background of Ellen White's position also to suggestions given by Denis Fortin and Gary Burdick.

felt a bit uncomfortable with dogmatic kinds of faith which, in self-sufficient trust in the achievements of reason, defends itself or, in some cases, even attacks. The sharp sword of logic is not necessarily the same as the "double-edged sword", or, perhaps even more applicable, the scalpel of the Bible (Heb 4:12).[7] There seems to be a certain distance between dogmatic arguments and the practice of faith as demanded by Jesus; for many of the common philosophical arguments probably cannot be supported sufficiently by the Bible. It seems that these apologists dared to step on a terrain that, in the end, would lead them far away from the faith that is presented in the Bible. The distance, then, is not only that of time or language, but also that of essence.

Furthermore it is my observation that an academically induced linguistic confusion is spreading even within the Seventh-day Adventist Church.[8] There are several reasons for this. To start, one should assume that there is always a close connection between language and thinking. But then there is also the element of persistence, through which the various positions, through a change of words, seemingly conform to each other progressively (*pseudo-morphosis*). Traditionally, it was the philosopher's task to assign to the various concepts a meaning that is unambiguous. Logical Positivism was the last movement in the history of philosophy to attain this goal in grand scale. But the main stream of Analytical Philosophy of our days has become much more sensitive to the history of philosophy again. Therefore the business of conceptual clarity has again become more difficult because, on one hand, scientific insight has increased in detail, and on the other hand, the task remains difficult because the persistence of great contradictions in interpretation. Under the postmodern conditions of today, all things exist quasi on equal footing with each other and many a Seventh-day Adventist despairs over the quasi-equal validity of the various answers, longing for the ultimate argument or harmony in a greater group.

Given the overall complexity, a basic assumption in the History of Ideas is that certain elements are constantly repeated, yet they are increasingly complex in combination. George Santayana holds:

> Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness. When change is absolute there remains no being to improve and no direction is set for possible improvement: and when experience is not retained, as among savages, infancy is perpetual. Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it (2011, 172).

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[7] "For the word of God *is* living and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the division of soul and spirit, and of joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart." (NKJV) – "His powerful Word is sharp as a surgeon's scalpel, cutting through everything, whether doubt or defense, laying us open to listen and obey. Nothing and no one is impervious to God's Word." (The Message)

[8] One can find a somewhat ironic illustration of this tendency in Knight 2008a, 52. Compare Zackrison 2004 touching on the mildly sarcastic comments of the early Adventists about the "Doctors of Divinity" (125).

But philosophers have to be aware that the wisdom of *Qohelet* (being existential-ist *avant la lettre*) seems to be even more radical: Repetition is likely even when we know the past. Thus, let me quote again from Ellen White's Lansing Sermon:

> It was thought that Solomon knew God. ... But although Solomon had had great light, he became lifted up in himself, and imagined that he was wise enough to keep himself, so he separated from God. ... He forgot the benefits that God had bestowed upon him; he forsook the sacred temple of the Lord, but he afterwards repented, and turned from his evil ways. But did Solomon know God when he was doing according to the ways of idolaters? – No; he had forgotten the rich experience of his youth and the prayers he had made in the temple. ... The candlestick was removed out of its place when Solomon forgot God. He lost the light of God, he lost the wisdom of God, he confounded idolatry with religion. ... Do you imagine that you can give the third angel's message to the world while you are still carnal and corrupt, while your characters are still sinful? "No man putteth a piece of new cloth unto an old garment; for that which is put in to fill it up taketh from the garment, and the rent is made worse." Unless your hearts are emptied of sin every day, unless you are sanctified through the truth, you would better not touch the message of God (White 1987, 960–961).

Notwithstanding his exemplary failure, Solomon remains the OT biblical model for wisdom.[9] But how should Adventists pay heed to what Ellen White here says, especially with regard to her application?

When we compare all the NT writings, Paul made the most frequent use of the word "wisdom" (*hokhmah*; *sophia*), i.e., the biblical concept for philosophy.[10] The presence of the word and the motif of wisdom prove that Paul was a critical interpreter who knew the contexts of the Hellenistic traditions very well. His talk on Mars Hill is the biblical starting point into a maze, if not a mess.[11] Is the Apostle Paul to blame because the subsequent discussion was leading into the de-contextualization of Jewish thought in Greek metaphysics? Does it not boil down to this: Paul could harmoniously bring together the doctrine of *tselem elohim* with the imitation of God's condescendence in Jesus Christ. The Church fathers, how-ever, were beginning to reconstruct the two doctrines about our *practical* behav-iour within the framework of Greek metaphysics. This way of deconstruction led to merely *theoretical* penetration in a systematic fashion instead. And eventually there were two highly artificial and theoretically radicalized terms resulting,

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[9] According to Daniel Krochmalnik, professor for Religious Education at Hochschule für Jüdische Studien in Heidelberg, *Qoheleth* teaches an "Anti-Genesis", and Jewish philosophers abide by the "ferment of decomposition". The list of similarities of Greek philosophy and Hebrew wisdom seems quite long: "Negative ethico-theology, demiurgic creation, philosopher king, ideal state, providence, allegoresis, and foremost, the common enemy – myth" (Krochmalnik n.d., 7, translated by C.W.).

[10] I take the identity claim here as a premise, but I do admit that showing more clearly how this claim actually works in historical and systematic terms would be an extra burden. Therefore mind the suggestion of a task list at the end of this paper.

[11] For more details of the historical complexities see the case study in section 5 of this paper.

namely Thomas Aquinas' concept of *Analogia entis* and Nicolas of Cusa's counter-concept of *coincidentia oppositorum*.[12]

Luther's case seems to be very similar to Paul's, inasmuch as Luther criticized the Thomistic use of Aristotle but appreciated Aristotle because of his logic and political ethics.[13] Of course, by recent standards, Luther's knowledge of Aristotle and Augustine was limited, though it helped him to demarcate the newly discovered biblical justification against the Scholastic doctrine of virtues and its ecclesiastical application. Thus, it should be our task to discover Paul and Luther as authentic figures in the history of philosophy. And that includes them not only in isolation but also their relationship to Plato, Aristotle and Kant (to name just the most important ones). Tracing this route we may eventually see the most important determining factor influencing the Church fathers of Western Christianity more clearly. Adventists should not refrain from understanding the influential facts in the development of Christian doctrine, and thereby in certain limits sift the sediment of human understanding in the history of ideas.

3.   How to Study Philosophy Suitable for an Adventist Context

In looking back to the fate of the Jewish, Catholic and Protestant encounter with philosophy, we have to pay heed to Fernando Canale's principled caveat. He drew the line as follows: "I am convinced that if Adventist theology opens its doors to a systematic theology whose *operative principles* are derived from any sort of human philosophy, very soon Adventism will become a subspecies of Evangelicalism, losing in the process not only its identity and uniqueness, but also the reason for its existence and mission" (Canale 2001, 130). This sharp cut, however, presupposes a reliable knowledge of philosophy and the driving forces in its history to prevent the interpreter from being lead into paradox and thereby lose his orientation. This is true not only for systematic theology, but also for church history and exegesis.[14]

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[12] This reshuffle of positions was depicted in more detail by the author under exactly the same title "Analogia entis or Coincidentia oppositorum?" (Wannenmacher 2008).

[13] Luther interpreted Aristotle according to William of Ockham appropriated by Gabriel Biel. Counter to his intentions the subsequent Lutheran orthodoxy made him fiercely dogmatic and made his biblical studies an iron cage similar to the Catholic tradition. Inter alia this served to provoke higher criticism.

[14] Nearly every proposition in the context of philosophy can turn out to be self-refuting. Therefore we have to face the crucial question of how far we can engage in given systems of philosophy to secure the starting point for the ongoing Adventist endeavor. I do not believe that Adventist insights depend on current 19th century propositions only, e.g. coming from the Scottish common sense philosophy in particular. Much more pressing is to ask how far the pattern of Adventist thought can draw upon a variety of selected building blocks common to existing systems of philosophy and whether there is a peculiar fabric to the Adventist way in bringing them together.

Let us first look briefly at a very influential European representative of mainstream Protestantism. Wolfhart Pannenberg, a Lutheran theologian with a strong leaning towards Catholicism, has suggested a model of development that reconstructs the history of philosophy in the spirit of Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel. The following five types are forms that are played through in sequence, but that also partially coexist simultaneously. Pannenberg discerned (1) radical opposition (e.g. Tertullian); (2) theological outdoing or exceeding (e.g. Augustine); (3) co-equal coordination (e.g. Thomas Aquinas); (4) principled differentiation (e.g. Immanuel Kant); and finally the famous Hegelian sublation (or "Aufhebung") through the dialectic operation of his system of logic.[15] If one only considers the great references, one will find a model that, in many ways, is similar to that of Francis A. Schaeffer. This model builds the foundation of *Escape from Reason* and *The God Who is There*, which formed a trilogy together with *He is There and He is Not Silent*.[16]

Is there anything in Adventism which could be compared to this model of chronological periods? Walter Eberhardt, a 20th century German Adventist church historian at Friedensau, published a four volume work on church history (Eberhardt 1968, 1973, 1979, 1993), in which he offers a unique Adventist perspective displaying a considerable amount of knowledge common within the framework of the History of Ideas. Daniel Heinz observed that his more or less pronounced model of decadence for the entire church history attempts to show that "Reformation" is not a singular historical event, but, instead, requires a perpetual renewal. Thus, Heinz claims that Eberhardt, in his explanation, avoids both a monopolizing of the term "Reformation" and its dissolution in a faceless ecumenical pluralism. His is a work in the best tradition of liberal Adventism. What his narrative lacks is a description on such a level that theologians trained in philosophy would accept that kind of church history as suitable.

Another church historian with a solid understanding of philosophy from an educational point of view, George Knight, recently wrote a book with the provocative title, *The Apocalyptic Vision and the Neutering of Adventism* (Knight 2008). In the face of the drifting apart styles of piety in the Adventist world, he gets straight down to the nitty-gritty. Knight makes no secret of his own experience:

> During those long years I studied philosophy for my doctorate. But by the
> time I received my degree I had concluded that philosophy was bankrupt in
> terms of answers to life's most basic questions. And that was important, since

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[15] Pannenberg 1996, 20–36. The Hegelian term *Aufhebung* covers different, even contradictory meanings like "to elevate or lift up", "to keep or preserve", "to cancel or abolish", "to transcend". According to Paul Ricœur this process finally provoked a "stage of broken dialectic" (Ricœur 1985, 643–644; cf. reprint 1986, 356–358).

[16] The series of lectures at Swanwick, UK, under the title "Escape From Reason: A Penetrating Analysis of Trends in Modern Thought" resulted in a trilogy of which the second volume now entitled "Escape from Reason" was the first volume of the trilogy to be published, and condensed his vision of the history of thought (see Schaeffer 1982, xix–xx).

> I had entered my studies hoping to find the real meaning of life that had eluded me in my Adventist experience (ibid., 8).

In forcefully bringing forward the Adventist dilemma with positivistic modernity, George Knight misses the big picture not only in studying philosophy but also in conversation with some erudite Adventist students of the bible (ibid., 52). Being incidentally a typical commonsense American he made some tough choices during his career to remain true to himself and the truth God revealed to him gradually. Despite his sometimes rather down-to-earth enunciation he nevertheless reveals himself as a liberal "in the traditional and honorable sense of the word".[17] It marks true liberals to ask more from themselves than from others. And therefore he comes in as a living role model, because he seems to be a mindful, self-conscious and courageous "in-betweener" as I understand "liberal" according to the traditional way of the word. But let me explore this a bit further by contradistinguishing two well-known figures in the Anglophone religious arena.

C. S. Lewis and Francis A. Schaeffer have also tried to avoid any faceless Christian apologetics in the tradition of enlightened philosophy of religion. Both names have a good ring to them in the Protestant world of North America. Their intellectual adventures were varied in their success and created various dangers.[18] Of C. S. Lewis it can be said that he is diligently read, and sometimes quoted, even in the Catholic world – which is still present in the corporate structures of society in Europe. Together with his wife, Josef Pieper (1904–1997), the popular German expert on Plato and Aristotle from the University of Münster (North Rhine-Westphalia), has translated a book by the "great theologian of laity".[19] He further comments, "I consider the book on pain to be not only C. S. Lewis' most important work; I much rather believe it should be hard to find in the entire philosophical-theological literature of our time any writing which is talking about issues important to people in such a comprehensive, clear, descriptive, light-hearted and at the same time serious way."[20]

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[17] McGrath 2001, 104: "Liberalism, in the traditional and honorable sense of the word, carries with it an inalienable respect for and openness to the views of others; as such, it ought to be a fundamental element of every branch of Christian theology (including neo-orthodoxy and evangelicalism, to be discussed shortly). However the term has now come to have a developed meaning, often carrying overtones of suspicion, hostility, or impatience towards traditional formulations and doctrines." With reference to John Macquarrie he observes that 'liberal' became itself a party label which then usually turns out to be extremely illiberal.

[18] C. S. Lewis is precious to different theological camps because of his self-depreciating sort of humour and his allegorical and poetic power. Some try to transform him into an icon, or try to pocket his fame, not least for a variety of Pentecostal avowals (e.g. Tony 2004). In contrast Francis Schaeffer opened the floodgates to political takeover of fundamentalism himself because of his definitive sense for questions of theological doctrine and matters of power in society (Padderatz 2007, 121).

[19] Pieper 2000, 243. Also Robert Spaemann (1927–), the predecessor in the concordat chair of Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, my retired *Doktorvater*, at Munich University, and a friend and close ally of the current Pope Benedict XVI, reads and cites C. S. Lewis (and not Francis Schaeffer) frequently.

[20] Compare the author's translation of Pieper 1985, 17 with Pieper 2003, 359–360.

The same inter-denominational appreciation was not reached by Francis A. Schaeffer. The reason for this may be that, to the very end, this fundamentalist Calvinist behaved much more belligerently than the Anglican Don of literary criticism from Oxbridge. The famous irenic and sometimes ironical insistence of C. S. Lewis' Platonism stands in a peculiar contrast to the legacy of F. A. Schaeffer. After World War II, inspired by Hans Rookmaaker, the neo-Calvinistic Dutch historian of art, Schaeffer had turned to the analysis of contemporary art-making as a means of diagnosing culture. This methodological approach in his (Argus-eyed) observation later led him to castigate ceaselessly and relentlessly the supposed "cultural relevancy" of Christendom as a form of currying favour. In all attempts toward dialogue, the hard form of Calvinism, with its unified way of thinking and its demands regarding the establishment of the rule of Jesus Christ over the entire spectrum of life, ultimately maintained the upper hand. Verbally, Schaeffer may reject any Christian chauvinism, but he nevertheless contributed significantly to the rise of this attitude among the "Bible believing" silent majority ("Moral Majority") of the United States.[21]

Due to this deplorable trend, and even in spite of it I share the concern of Christian believers who think that it is necessary to resist false doctrine, presumption, arrogance and pride, because "it is Satan's work to pervert the investigative powers of the mind."[22] The founding generation of the Adventist Church anticipated something that is called "resilience" today. Ellen White knew that the

> fact that there is no controversy or agitation among God's people, should not be regarded as conclusive evidence that they are holding fast to sound doctrine. There is reason to fear that they may not be clearly discriminating between truth and error.[23]

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[21] "In the preceding years, the well-known evangelical theologian Francis Schaeffer had been lobbying Falwell to use his mounting influence to combat the rising tide of secular humanism." (Gilgoff 2007, 82) – "Borrowing heavily from evangelical thinker Francis Schaeffer's *How Then Shall We Live?* LaHaye claims that the hearts and minds, along with the sovereignty of the American people, are under threat from a small but highly influential cabal of international elites he calls secular humanists" (Shuck 2005, 65).

[22] Ellen G. White, "The Mysteries of the Bible a Proof of its Inspiration" (1948 [1882–1889], vol. 5, 701) – "A certain pride is mingled with the consideration of Bible truth, so that men feel defeated and impatient if they cannot explain every portion of Scripture to their satisfaction. It is too humiliating to them to acknowledge that they do not understand the inspired words. They are unwilling to wait patiently until God shall see fit to reveal the truth to them." (Ibid.)

[23] Ibid., 707. "God desires man to exercise his reasoning powers; and the study of the Bible will strengthen and elevate the mind as no other study can do. It is the best mental as well as spiritual exercise for the human mind. Yet we are to beware of deifying reason, which is subject to the weakness and infirmity of humanity ... As real spiritual life declines, it has ever been the tendency to cease to advance in the knowledge of the truth. Men rest satisfied with the light already received from God's word and discourage any further investigation of the Scriptures. They become conservative and seek to avoid discussion ... When no new questions are started by investigation of the Scriptures, when no difference of opinion arises which will set men to searching the Bible for themselves

Therefore, considering it from the point of view of the gospel, Schaeffer's theology of resistance, in my opinion, represents something like a flaw of categories, which cannot be found with Ellen White. As a Methodist in the tradition of Arminianism, she knew better how to differentiate between doctrine and life, cause and effect, the power of human effort and the support of the Holy Spirit, – including in situations where resistance really was necessary. For she wrote,

> I am afraid of anything that would have a tendency to turn the mind away from the solid evidences of the truth as revealed in God's Word. I am afraid of it; I am afraid of it. We must bring our minds within the bounds of reason, lest the enemy so come in as to set everything in a disorderly way.[24]

At the same time, she warned against the misapplication of reason:

> Caviling and criticism leave the soul as devoid of the dew of grace as the hills of Gilboa were destitute of rain. Confidence cannot be placed in the judgment of those who indulge in ridicule and misrepresentation. No weight can be attached to their advice or resolutions. You must bear the divine credentials before you make decided movements to shape the working of God's cause.[25]

I think she was pleading with *us* here to walk in the spirit of Christ-like forbearance, the same Spirit who spoke through James in ways plain and perspicuous for his time. And it was James who said that one should understand that mere disputation does not edify:

> Who is wise and understanding among you? Let him show by good conduct that his works are done in the meekness of wisdom (James 3:13).[26]

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to make sure that they have the truth, there will be many now, as in ancient times, who will hold to tradition and worship they know not what." (Ibid., 703 and 706)

[24] "Warnings Against Deceptive Claims of the Spirit's Guidance", in White 1958, 43, on the occasion of an interview in St. Helena on Nov 12, 1908 by a zealous man and his wife related to their remarkable experiences dating back for about three years.

[25] "Danger in Adopting Wordly Policy in the Work of God" (1892), in White 1915, 325. The motif of aridity pervades her writings: "We need to break up the monotony of our religious labor. We are doing a work in the world, but we are not showing sufficient activity and zeal. If we were more in earnest, men would be convinced of the truth of our message. The tameness and monotony of our service for God repels many souls of a higher class, who need to see a deep, earnest, sanctified zeal. Legal religion will not answer for this age. We may perform all the outward acts of service and yet be as destitute of the quickening influence of the Holy Spirit as the hills of Gilboa were destitute of dew and rain. We all need spiritual moisture, and we need also the bright beams of the Sun of Righteousness to soften and subdue our hearts. We are always to be as firm as a rock to principle. Bible principles are to be taught and then backed up by holy practice." (White 1948 [1901], vol. 6, 417–418)

[26] James 2:17 maintains a living faith, which is ready to suffer trials and endure temptations (1:1, 12), being "swift to hear, slow to speak, slow to wrath" (1:19). We are not expected to hold our faith "with partiality" (2:1), to let our untameable tongue acting as she pleases (3:1–12), to indulge in "bitter envy and self-seeking" in our hearts, not to "boast and lie against the truth" (3:14). "Do not speak evil of one another, brethren." (4:11) "Therefore be patient, brethren, until the coming of the Lord ... Do not grumble against one another, brethren, lest you be condemned." (5:7, 9) – "But the

4.   **Towards an Adventist Notion of Prophetic Realism**

Why are these distinctions and exhortations so crucial and necessary for *Adventist* philosophers? Here we have to speak about the graduate and post-graduate degrees that the last generation of teachers inherited from different academic institutions around the globe. I do not want to put these into question as such or in special cases, but I cannot desist from shifting the general awareness to the question of what the different directions of expertise eventually do to our Adventist message if we do not heed the advice given.[27] And, therefore, I would like to quote Carsten Johnsen as a starting point for a plea in favour of something I want to call "prophetic realism", since he was one of the few Adventist thinkers of the 20th century with a strong philosophical background:[28]

> Seventh-day Adventism emerged as a particularly realistic form of Protestantism, embracing an astonishingly complete spectrum of Biblical philosophy. (Johnsen 1982, 130)
> Some readers may think that I am overdoing things with my emphasis on realism. But it would be difficult to be too emphatic on this point in this context. The Bible has other words for that realism. One designation is »the love of the truth«. So two characteristics of realism are outstanding: (1) Realism is not a built-in equipment of man's present nature. It is a miracle. (2) It comes to man as a gift of grace. It is freely offered by God. It is freely received (or refused) by man (Johnsen 1980, ch. 8, part 6).

Regardless of the many turns (they may be called transcendental, linguistic, cultural or iconic), the notion of realism (i.e. to be emphatic on reality or *Wirklichkeit*) has always been, and still is, a central subject in philosophy. Kant shifted the ontological question significantly and gave it an epistemological turn. Meanwhile philosophers used to speak of ontologies in the plural more reasonably because they assume that different sets of concepts (categories of being) can generate an object of knowledge differently. But realism had its representatives and champions in all times and areas. Today, we have a long-standing and ongoing discussion about realism in the sciences. During the Middle Ages, there was an analogous discussion about the realism of universalia. Aristotle was considered an

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wisdom that is from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, willing to yield, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality and without hypocrisy." (3:17)

[27] In this part of my argument for 'prophetic realism' I will in some footnotes repeatedly quote from the corpus of Ellen White to indicate her deliberate support of the legitimate intentions of modern critique of knowledge in her testimonies. As will be adumbrated in the conclusions of this paper, there was an intricate connection between the critique of knowledge and moral anthropology already in Kant's initial approach to his project of critical philosophy. I worked more on that inner-Kantian link in "Accountability and Real Tension: Anthropological Supposition of Man's Evil Nature in Kant's Moral Philosophy" (1992).

[28] Beside Carsten Johnsen, the poly-linguistic philologian, I know only of two other prominent Adventists who deserve to be counted as partly philosophical in mind: The Swiss theological anthropologist Jean R. Zürcher and the American bioethicist Jack W. Provonsha.

ontological realist (*universale in re*) because he assumed the perception of real objects. The idealist Plato was a universalia realist (*universale ante rem*), and nominalists like William of Ockham paved the way towards a modern empiricism and constructivism (*universale post rem*). There are many opposites to realism. First, there is the idealism or scepticism in metaphysics. Then, there are the extreme forms of subjectivism or constructivism in epistemology; in ethics, this is normally called "relativism". Immanuel Kant's transcendental idealism, in a rather intricate way, is also realistic. Within the Seventh-day Adventist Church, too, there is a discussion about realism. There are tendencies towards idealism or constructivism; whereas, on the other hand, "prophetic realism" is claimed and presented resolutely by opposing camps.[29]

However, the Adventist prophetic outlook is not only aligned with an eschatological message but should also be conceived as a distinctive model of truth. For a better understanding of what that means I want to quote the famous first two sentences from chapter 24 of the *Great Controversy*:

> The subject of the sanctuary was the key which unlocked the mystery of the disappointment of 1844. It opened to view a complete system of truth, connected and harmonious, showing that God's hand had directed the great advent movement and revealing present duty as it brought to light the position and work of His people (White 1911, 423).

In the last sentence Ellen White made clear that she wants to talk about the Prophetic activity and actuality of the End-time Church. In the subsequent chapter she then referred in symbolic terms to the procedures in the temple, i.e. to the intercourse between the High Priest and his people from the heavenly perspective of the biblical revelation, and to the importance and impact of these transactions in respect to the presentation of the Three Angels' Messages for the time being until Christ's return. What is remarkable and peculiar to this doctrine of the

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[29] See for instance Carsten Johnson's criticism: "I see my brother in the faith and colleague Jack Provonsha as a fairly typical exponent of an attitude which a large number of our learned theologians today are gradually adopting. You may feel awkwardly perplexed when you try to evaluate some of these people. On the one hand they may manifest a warm appreciation of something as radically characteristic of Seventh-day Adventism as Ellen White's writings. On the other hand they may go squarely against most essential points of the explicit realism contained in those writings." (Ibid.) The next generation of scholars, intellectuals and administrators in the Adventist church had to face even more diversity and pluralism in interpretation, not only in the pews. In this respect, the manifestation of excitement aroused by the third quarter of the 2006 Sabbath School Quarterly was unprecedented. A more level-headed scholarly commentator wrote: "For reasons which are still mysterious to me, Clifford Goldstein wants to hold to a strict historicism, rather than move to a modified historicism or a modified idealism, a position which would recognize the value of multiple applications." The late Hans LaRondelle in one of his last published papers stated a baseline in this hermeneutical debate by maintaining: "Adventist Bible scholars are becoming increasingly convinced that the traditional historicist applications of God's Word need to be re-examined and to be more critically evaluated by a contextual exegesis, guided by Christocentric hermeneutics" (LaRondelle 2010, 87).

Heavenly Sanctuary is the fact that it is both a didactical model of salvation and an eschatological activity viz. actuality of a living community alike. This central metaphor does not only lead to better understanding of salvation history but also serves the church to realize a causal, potent and operative mechanism of action in the present. But this causal connection is not a bare mechanism, it is a relationship, and due to its dynamics it is also a mystery. Both aspects – the hermeneutical and the causal notion together – were named "a complete system of truth" by Ellen White.[30] Unfortunately there are not a few Adventists who have problems with a realistic interpretation of the biblical sanctuary today. To them the traditional Adventist interpretation – or better: our customary behaviour in present dealings with it – deems to be a kind of Punch and Judy Show.[31]

The Adventist Church nowadays suffers no lack of senior scholars or intellectual high potentials. In Europe, a rapid diversification in the spectrum of employment and education is taking place. But when teenagers and young adults ask difficult questions, for which they think they can find no place in the Adventist church, they leave as a result. To create a demanding *and* nurturing atmosphere we need thinking and diligently studious members in our congregations who are able to follow doctrinal debates from an even-tempered, assured and confident vantage point without losing sight of the basics. This balanced approach needs a role model. On the occasion of Jack Provonsha's memorial service in 2004, Fritz Guy named him "a church theologian – in the highest sense of the term" and certainly not "a theologian's theologian".[32] Every clear thinking theologian stands out a bit, I think. The more one reflects the current philosophical landscape within oneself, the more the notion of God's plan of salvation will seem dramatic and battered. At the same time, one will also discover new possibilities to proclaim the message in ways that were hitherto unheard. In order to make progress in communicating the gospel as good news while at the same time also clinging to the basics, one has to be a passionate and unpretentious thinker.[33]

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[30] "Returning to the Sanctuary ... Adventism has extensively discussed the matter of time, but failed to give the same importance to the matter of place ... Following the text, ... systematic theology approaches the biblical doctrine of the investigative judgment not as literary text, but as a complex of ideas which say something about a reality" (Canale 2001, 126–127).

[31] First of all, in trying to understand what was at stake in the Ballenger debate (well received by Ludwig R. Conradi and Desmond Ford), I was inclined to think about the Heavenly Sanctuary conceived as a distant theatre and the debaters having puppets in their hands moving them from one department to another. Meanwhile I think this debate itself – or our present dealings with it – resemble the mentioned Punch and Judy Show and thus the greater audience does not know what Adventists actually are talking about, see e.g. Tanya Erzen's review under the ironic headline "Seeking Some Light on Adventism" (Erzen 2001).

[32] Guy 2004, 6. Provonsha's foci points of reflection on his bio-ethical holism were the theory of freedom, the character and essence of agape, God's presence, the change of the notion of God through Christ, research in symbolism, and the task of a prophetic minority.

[33] "It is important that in defending the doctrines which we consider fundamental articles of faith we should never allow ourselves to employ arguments that are not wholly sound. These may avail to silence an opposer, but they do not honor the truth. We should present sound arguments that will not

As a young Catholic I started my undergraduate studies in philosophy assuming that anthropology steers politics. For that reason, I wanted to get to the bottom of what Christian faith is all about, and find out whether it is still ruling society. I spent at least one semester with the Munich School of Philosophy of the Jesuits, but their introduction to the historical-critical approach was no relief. My longing for genuine faith was bound to become an extra burden among different duties and responsibilities within my studies. Later a much-admired Protestant professor of philosophy, and respected friend of Wolfhart Pannenberg, told me that Cardinal Peter Damian's idea is no longer valid. Damian (1007–1072) had taught that philosophy should serve theology like a maidservant. However, according to Hegel, philosophy asserts and successfully vindicates her autonomy, and inherits the business domain and assets of theology. This advice was combined with a Zen Buddhist metaphor to motivate my subsequent vocation as a student in the Master program: Before anyone can try to answer a *kōan* he should stand the test in cleaning up the latrine pit. I tried my best to follow his advice, but in the end our relation broke entirely because there was no mutual ground in rating Kant's doctrine of radical evil. Yet to make a long story short this was how I eventually made my own experience with some "Christian philosophy" taught in the first decade of my university studies. Thus, I concur mainly with George Knight's assessment, but I would not agree with the further suspicion that the idea of the "project of modernity" (as spelled out by Jürgen Habermas) therefore is entirely misconstrued. The critical starting point of modernity was inevitable. Its over-statement is not.[34]

With the help of God and by support of his messengers, who were able to present "Christian Faith 101" (as my entry-level course), I experienced a conversion during my Master's examinations. Notwithstanding all of the turmoil, I was then able

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only silence our opponents, but will bear the closest and most searching scrutiny. With those who have educated themselves as debaters there is great danger that they will not handle the word of God with fairness. In meeting an opponent it should be our earnest effort to present subjects in such a manner as to awaken conviction in his mind, instead of seeking merely to give confidence to the believer." (White 1948, vol. 5, 708) – "The Bible with its precious gems of truth was not written for the scholar alone. On the contrary, it was designed for the common people; and the interpretation given by the common people, when aided by the Holy Spirit, accords best with the truth as it is in Jesus." (Ibid., 331)

[34] Cf. Habermas 1997, 44–46 and 2003, 112: "Meanwhile, it is true, it had become evident from the course of history that such a project was asking too much of reason." – "Men who imagine themselves endowed with mental powers of so high an order that they can find an explanation of all the ways and works of God, are seeking to exalt human wisdom to an equality with the divine and to glorify man as God ... If it were possible for created beings to attain to a full understanding of God and His works, then, having reached this point, there would be for them no further discovery of truth, no growth in knowledge, no further development of mind or heart. God would no longer be supreme; and men, having reached the limit of knowledge and attainment, would cease to advance." (White 1948, vol. 5, 702–03)

to use the work of Immanuel Kant to find my way into the Adventist family.[35] Beyond the farewell lectures of Pannenberg in 1994, I needed good reasons, after I had found the biblical truth, to return to serious philosophical investigation, so to speak. Therefore, I had to go through the temptation not to overestimate or under-estimate the insight I had already gained.[36] In the same year – 1994 – I befriended Hans LaRondelle. In the beginning of our continued dialogue he made a statement that I have never forgotten. He emphatically said: "Philosophy and Theology do not merge. There is an angel with a flaming sword to guard the way to the tree of life." Later I learned that therewith he actually was quoting Karl Barth (LaRondelle 1971, 29, footnote 137).

To summarize my answer concerning the relevancy of philosophy in Adventism, I dare to say that it is more an instrument of critique of our own theological reasoning (the Jewish position), and less an instrument for constructive reasoning with missionary purpose (the Catholic position). But, in general, it is only useful for analysis and orientation as long as the Holy Spirit actually and effectively leads the way. And here maybe a further note of clarification is needed to distinguish the proper Adventist position about the present subject from the Papal Roman-Catholic position on the relation of the two disciplines: In order to reach a truly balanced middle ground, avoiding that human reasoning gains the lead and by the same token appreciating God's truth "from above" entering the human realm, we may think of the Messiah being fully divine *and* fully human and thus *relating to* but not being produced or limited by human reason and experience. When Adventists were thinking about inspiration and incarnation they actually were already touching on the proper relation between human reason and divine spirit. I cannot cover that discussion here but in order to perceive the boundaries of knowledge, I plead with every serious student of theology to pay due respect to Solomon and Paul as exponents of a genuine biblical approach to wisdom instead. Both had to go through trying temptations and I think both, not by accident, became role models for today. For me the rival theories that compete for particular

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[35] Both of my academic theses hitherto are making a good case for interpreting Kant's affirmation of original sin as the valid starting point to a realistic Christian anthropology. In *Accountability and Real Tension* (1992) I reconstruct the syllogism of Book one in Kant's *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.* In my dissertation "The Problem of Evil – Vital Changes in the History of an Idea" (2011) I re-contextualize Kant's insight into a framework I conceive again as 'prophetic realism'. A brief outline of my findings I try to give in the following section "A Case Study in Prophetic Realism".

[36] "Many feel that a responsibility rests upon them to explain every seeming difficulty in the Bible in order to meet the cavils of skeptics and infidels. But in trying to explain that which they but imperfectly understand, they are in danger of confusing the minds of others in reference to points that are clear and easy to be understood. This is not our work ...God would have all the bearings and positions of truth thoroughly and perseveringly searched, with prayer and fasting. Believers are not to rest in suppositions and ill-defined ideas of what constitutes truth. Their faith must be firmly founded upon the word of God so that when the testing time shall come and they are brought before councils to answer for their faith they may be able to give a reason for the hope that is in them, with meekness and fear." (White 1948, vol. 5, 705–706 and 708)

attention and that try to insinuate themselves into my belief system are reminiscent of the many wives of Solomon. The power of theories is quiet but very strong – and their influence happens generally by gravitating very slowly. Solomon told his story. Paul instead, with Pharisaic zeal, worked like a demolition expert in order to further secure the biblical foundation of the burgeoning Jesus movement.[37]

5.   A Case Study in Prophetic Realism

The following overview of the history of philosophy serves to corroborate the Adventist approach to the Biblical meta-narrative in a special way. The progression of the doctrinal development in the history of philosophy seems to fit the vision Daniel had about the Heavenly Sanctuary in chapter 8:10–14. To my mind, the appropriate interpretation of the Sanctuary is not obscure, quite the contrary![38] From the very beginning when I was confronted with biblical eschatology, I read those passages in terms of the History of Ideas. And Revelation chapter 12 was my entrance.

Alfred North Whitehead once remarked that the history of philosophy is only "a series of footnotes to Plato". Given the overwhelming influence of Kant's epistemological dualism in Protestant modernity, this observation is probably more than true because the Western Christian tradition of philosophy was constantly accompanied by the Acheronian dream of a life without laws. This bad dream of chaos did not only haunt Immanuel Kant and Augustine; it actually went as far back as Plato and Parmenides as well.[39]

Next to Platonism, the hermetic tradition of Egyptian wisdom transformed into something that we later were getting to know as scientific knowledge. In his book *Moses the Egyptian* Jan Assmann, the famous German Egyptologist, has presented to us a picture of Europe's scientific roots without really having chosen between Athens and Jerusalem.[40] There is some truth to it because a so-called

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[37] Compare the standard rendering "expert builder" in 1 Cor 3:10 with 2 Cor 10:4–6. For further interpretation of Paul's role model as guard of the temple and ambassador to the heathen see Wannenmacher 2009, 184–185.

[38] Eventually I hope my main argument can contribute to bridging the Adventist conflict regarding the symbolic meaning of the term 'daily'. According to the old view the passage refers to Roman paganism, and according to the new view it refers to Christ's heavenly ministry (cf. Kaiser 2011, 6–34).

[39] In his most important study Klaus Heinrich comes to the conclusion: "All propositions in logic (that is my statement) are propositions in order to de-demonize ...it is according this way a rationalized aspect, as justice or truth, of the generating and engulfing Great Goddess, who stands as the great generating and engulfing totality behind the entire ensemble" (Heinrich 1981, 54 and 41).

[40] Assmann 1997. – "The reminiscence of Egypt inter alia had shaped our self-conception by forcing the dualism between 'Athens and Jerusalem' open. It has kept alive an awareness that Athens and Jerusalem is looking back on a third world which is preceding and was molding both. In the occidental cultural memory Egypt represented a cultural deep time that bridges the antagonism of Ath-

"third force" (so named by Richard H. Popkin) in the early modern period helped to enlighten the dark Middle Ages and actually brought forth the Natural Sciences (Popkin 1992; Fried 2001). The driving energy behind or within their struggles for knowledge was what the Adventist Church calls the "Great Controversy theme", i.e. a close and direct confrontation of mutually exclusive claims in Salvation history. Thus the Natural Sciences, as we now know them, were eventually occasioned by apocalyptic thought. This alone could be an amazing fact. But given the ecological crisis, any level-headed observer moreover has to acknowledge that the application of the acquired technical skills pushed the world nearer to the predicted point of the return of Jesus Christ. And above all the ultimate apocalyptic crisis since 1844 according to prophecy would appear as deterioration in ethics.[41]

In short, the two crucial periods "Hellenism" and "Enlightenment" represent the macro-stages in the history of philosophy. Both of them deserve further inquiry on a micro-stage level. For instance, Augustinianism, as the centre pillar of the Christian tradition, was not truly internally homogeneous. During his life, Augustine tried to come to terms with Plato and Paul alike. The Canadian-Catholic philosopher Charles Taylor knows about a "hyper-Augustinian" view in theology (Taylor 1989, 246). Taylor defends Erasmus, who as a Platonist clung to the idea of liberating again the Scholastic form of philosophy. From an Adventist perspective Luther's theology was more biblical than the mix of traditions entertained by Erasmus. But in his Erasmian spirit Taylor is right to put his finger on a wrong notion of predestination. Here we face a serious problem in the theology of Augustine. Due to Hellenism and its Gnostic Heritage, which first and foremost was a shortcoming comprehension concerning the problem of evil, the question must be raised whether Greek metaphysics was the appropriate vantage ground. This problem is not only in force when approaching the Holy Scriptures, but also when doing anthropology and ethics at large.[42]

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ens and Jerusalem, Paganism and Christianity, Science and Revelation etc. as *'theologia prisca'* (primordial theology) or *'philosophia perennis'* (eternal philosophy)." (Assmann 2004.)

[41] At the very beginning of Book One of *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1792), Kant contested the notion of decline or progress in morals with regard to Horace and Seneca. But in the final passage of *The End of All Things* (1794) in contrast he drew a line between two kinds of Christianity suggesting that an illiberal and ungentle kind of Christian creed will outdo the legitimate moral one.

[42] Therefore I would reject any well-meant introduction to our topic – like the following one – purely on methodological grounds: "*Waiting for Godot* divided reality into two spheres – one was mechanistic and atheistic and secular, in which irreducible truths exist only as mathematical equations ... the other a spiritual dimension that transcended a single-tiered existence and proclaimed that irreducible truth doesn't originate in the creation but in the Creator ... The divide isn't some twentieth-century question ... Between these two centers of gravity a black fog looms. The option of a compromise, of a balance, of some Hegelian synthesis between them at the end of history doesn't (ultimately) and can't (logically) exist. There's an impassable distance between Athens and Jerusalem." (Goldstein 2003, 22) On the level of description it accepts what the author by argument ultimately wants to contest or to surmount. But that is impossible. Given these premises Goldstein

Behind these questions looms what Adolf von Harnack referred to as the "Hellenisation of Christianity",[43] and what I interpret as what the OT prophet Daniel more specifically anticipated as the taking away of the "daily" (*tamid*).[44] And because the head of the Egyptian Pharaoh loomed behind the bow of Odysseus, I support the assumption that the problem of evil resurfaces at the interface (or junction) of the two traditions of Athens and Jerusalem. Accordingly, the first stage of what I want to call a de-contextualization of Hebrew thoughts in Greek metaphysics was *nolens volens* the outcome of Paul's discourse on Mars Hill. In the aftermath, Augustine's *De civitate Dei,* together with Luther's *De servo arbitrio,* triggered the ensuing debates that were connected to the unmanageable concept of evil. Augustine shifted the focus of the problem from *Unde malum?* to *Unde malum faciamus?*[45] Because he took the biblical notion of God's foreknowledge increasingly seriously the faculty of human will was thus burdened with the doctrine of original sin, which had lasting influence for centuries with a remarkable shadow.[46]

Luther endorsed that it is necessary for a Christian to know God and his power of providence.[47] Knowing him thus means to cope with necessity, especially in Salvation history. Luther was the first who publicly and intensely accused the papacy as an organized system of religious power of being the Antichrist foreseen by Daniel and affirmed by Paul.[48] And because Luther was convinced that this insight

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[43] would be condemned to solipsism without trust in God's word, as seen in chapter 6. And additionally, I do not see how it fits the truth of the sentence quoted from C. S. Lewis, saying: "Creatures are not born with desires, unless satisfaction for those desires exists." (Ibid., 109) This is a Platonic-Augustinian premise and it doesn't fit with the Fideistic turn Goldstein arrives at eventually.

[43] "The first stage of any real influx of definitely Greek thought and Greek life is to be fixed at about the year 130. It was then that the religious philosophy of Greece began to effect an entrance, and it went straight to the centre of the new religion ... We are here concerned, however, not with the second and third stages, but only with that influx of the Greek spirit which was marked by the absorption of Greek philosophy and, particularly, of Platonism." (von Harnack 1908, 215–216) Harnack differentiated between Platonism as the centrepiece of the entire phenomenon and Gnosis (or Gnosticism) as the "acute (phase of) Hellenisation" (Ibid., 220 and 223).

[44] The reader will find a more detailed analysis of the interconnection of both debates in my doctoral dissertation ("The Problem of Evil" – Wannenmacher 2011).

[45] See Confessiones III,12 and De Libero Arbitrio I,2.4. Paul Ricœur explains the transition as follows: "The most important corollary of this negating of the substantiality of evil is that the confession of evil grounds an exclusively moral vision of evil ... For this form of nothingness, there is no need to search for a cause anywhere other than in a bad will" (Ricœur 1985, 639).

[46] "The price to pay for the coherence of this doctrine is an enormous one." (Ibid., 640)

[47] "THIS, therefore, is also essentially necessary and wholesome for Christians to know: That God foreknows nothing by contingency, but that He foresees, purposes, and does all things according to His immutable, eternal, and infallible will." (Luther, Bondage of the Will, sect. IX, cf. 1823, 26).

[48] "The reformer's growing conviction that the office of the papacy itself – not merely some evil-living or erroneous pope – was to be identified with the Antichrist because of its opposition to the preaching of the gospel was an important part of the breakthrough to a full-fledged Reformation position, though he became aware of it only gradually over the course of several years. Once he accepted it, Luther maintained this view until his death with a fierce conviction that was not above scatological invective." (McGinn 2000, 201–202)

came from God by provision he had an additional struggle in incorporating this imposition into his doctrine of God.[49] Thus he worked out a quite dark idea of a *Deus absconditus.* But Luther did not subscribe to what the Calvinists hold to as double predestination. Before and after *De servo arbitrio* he didn't stress his denial of human freedom as insistently as they did later. So we have to be prepared that Luther is not speaking in favour of the predestination of the salvation or destruction of individuals. The kind of determinism Luther proposed is supposedly not exactly the same kind of determinism which later becomes a problem for the philosophers of enlightenment.[50] It is rather the determinism of God's providence revealed through the prophetic and apocalyptic passages in Scripture.

The second stage of de-contextualization took place in the German Enlightenment with its emphasis on the conception of universalizability. Next to Thomas Aquinas' realism, we find in Kant's "Transcendental Idealism" a second classic "solution" to the conflict between the moral (viz. prophetic) and the natural worldview. The "German Socrates",[51] Immanuel Kant, held his share in the Gnostic shape of the modern debates in philosophy. In his heavy reference to a *Mundus Intelligibilis* he was still deeply in debt to Platonism. And to give a clue in the direction of anthropology, Kant was not only against the Augustinian concept of original inherited sin[52] but also de-mythologized Satan as a mere personification of inner or subjective drive-springs. Thus Kant affirmed a sharp dualism of moral motivation.[53]

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[49] Looking back to the year 1517 he remarked in 1537: "However, I came upon it quite innocently; for I never would have dreamed this twenty years prior to that day. Rather, if someone else had taught such a thing, I would have damned and burned him. But God is the cause, because he did such things miraculously." (Martin Luther, *Tischreden*. Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe Vol. 3, 438–39; quoted according to McGinn 2000, 202) – Twelve years earlier, in *De servo arbitrio,* Luther declared: "I myself have been offended more than once, even unto the deepest abyss of desperation; nay, so far, as even to wish that I had never been born a man; that is, before I was brought to know how healthful that desperation was, and how near it was unto grace." (Luther 1823 [1525], 227, sect. XCIV) Thus Bernhard Lohse explains the doctrine by Luther's special experience: "Luther's distinction [between 'Deus absconditus' and 'Deus revelatus'] indicates the abysmal experience of contestation and loneliness, certainly countervailed by divine mercy and grace" (Lohse 1995, 185; translated by C.W.).

[50] Cf. Lohse 1997, 85 with Lohse 1995, 185f. But Luther knew what is at stake: "For after all, a conscious conviction has been left deeply rooted in the heart both of the learned and the unlearned, if ever they have come to an experience of these things; and a knowledge, that our necessity, is a consequence that must follow upon the belief of the prescience and Omnipotence of God. And even natural Reason herself, who is so offended at this necessity, and who invents so many contrivances to take it out of the way, is compelled to grant it upon her own conviction from her own judgment, even though there were no Scripture at all." (1823, 228, sect. LXIV)

[51] In a poem of Johann Wilhelm Ludwig Gleim from 1769 actually Moses Mendelssohn deserved the title because of a proof of Immortality in his *Phaedon.*

[52] "But whatever may be the origin of the moral evil in man, the most unsuitable of all views that can be taken of its spread and continuance through all the members of our race and in all generations is, to represent it as coming to us by *inheritance* from our first parents" (Kant 1889, 347).

[53] "It is not difficult to find in Kant's writings on morals remarks that seem to suggest the underlying presence of an almost Manichaean view of human motivation" (Engstrom 1987, 435).

Afterwards, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel took the Kantian paradigm to the extreme. Against his version of the *Zeitgeist* dominating idea of the hidden cunning of reason (*List der Vernunft*) both Schelling and Kierkegaard tried to re-contextualize the biblical and the metaphysical realms with different perspectives and results. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling had already tried to catch up with the naturalism of his times when the younger Kierkegaard began to work through the poisoned inheritance of his melancholic, anxious, deeply pious, and fiercely intelligent father. After his *Freiheitsschrift* in 1809, – in which Schelling explained the origin of evil in God as an unleashing process of God's nature by man, – he silently drafted his "Objective Idealism" as his second philosophy, though it was not published during his lifetime. And Søren Kierkegaard's life constellation itself was somewhat prophetic since he continued to deal with the *Concept of Anxiety* from 1844 onwards and finished his work *and* his life when his father's estate was used up in 1855. To my mind, they were slightly ahead of their times. But to cleanse a Sanctuary, it takes more than some brilliant philosophers who were fighting the mighty necessities of their discipline.

Therefore, let us briefly pay attention to Ludwig Wittgenstein. As a son of a Protestant father and a Catholic mother – both having Jewish origins (Stern 2000) – young Wittgenstein at suggestion of his sister Gretl thought in the wake of Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard. After finishing his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* he dismissed his initial strategy to solve religious problems by means of analysis of language. In 1927 then he provoked the Vienna Circle logical positivists – some of them were also of Jewish origins or had such family ties – by reading poetry in their meetings.[54] In his *Tractatus* he already tried to surmount the character of language as a logical representation of reality in order to demand silence in respect to "the mystical" as ineffable and rather maintained the idea that what the mystical shows can be indicated but cannot be put into words. Instead of a philosophical delineation of the absolute (which he deemed absurd) he – in his Zen-like religious epistemology – thus insisted on the special severity in contact with the divine dimension, strongly influenced by Leo Tolstoy's *The Gospels in Brief* and William James' notion of rebirth presented in the Gifford Lectures *Varieties of Religious Experience*. Maybe Wittgenstein left a Catholic-Augustinian notion of God talk for an approach which could be seen as a more Jewish one. In his *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein finally found relief in the idea of "solving" metaphysical problems by the insight that different

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[54] "At Schlick's request, Wittgenstein agreed to meet Carnap and some other members of the Vienna Circle, but it immediately became apparent that their intellectual positions were far apart – perhaps, unbridgeably so. To begin with, Wittgenstein was unwilling to discuss technical points in philosophy with the members of the Vienna Circle, and he insisted rather on reading poetry to them, especially the poems of Rabindranath Tagore. (Given his Tolstoyan position, this insistence may not have been as willfully irrelevant as it must have appeared to his audience.) Only gradually did he gain enough confidence to engage in philosophical discussion on frank and equal terms; and even so, he found this much easier with Schlick and Waismann than with Carnap and the more fervently positivistic members of the Circle" (Janik und Toulmin 1973, 215).

spheres of reality obey different sets of rules followed in respective languages games which correspond to a way of life. Thus Wittgenstein kept hold of the view that "the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language".[55] To my mind this shows merely that it was an impossible duty for a sole genius like Wittgenstein to fuse logic and ethic without being supported and happy within a sound tradition.[56] But Wittgenstein's aphoristic style, i.e. numbered paragraphs "like well-driven nails", exhibits resemblance to *Qoheleth*. In fact they were the outcome of slowness – slow reading, intense thinking and condensed writing.[57] Wittgenstein behaved like Jeremiah towards a self-satisfied people being sure of having a temple with accustomed rituals – and Fritz Guy and Maury Jackson were right in reminding the audience of his enduring importance (Guy 2010 and Jackson 2012). But as James Barr's critical approach to linguistics in Biblical theology as contrasted with Fundamentalism in the wake of Wittgenstein had amply shown, this approach is not sufficient to do constructive work in a systematic fashion. Nevertheless it remains a necessary criticism.

In Paul Ricœur's rich *œuvre,* a lot of the considerations merge which were already mentioned. Ricœur did spend a considerable amount of his life at the University of Chicago and tried to enhance the dialogue between hermeneutical and analytical discourse in philosophy. During this time he worked out his theory of interpretation (Ricœur 1976, 1978, 1981, 1991), and the most important applications of his theory we find in *Time and Narrative* (1984–1988) and *Oneself as Another* (1992). Moreover, he collected and analyzed the symbolic forms to avert evil and saw the history of philosophy and theology for the time being consummated in the second stage of the de-contextualization, which he named "The Stage of 'Broken' Dialectic" (particularly Ricoeur 1986, 356). Paul Ricœur aimed towards a re-contextualization of both the biblical and the metaphysical realms but dared to speak out that he fell short of his own expectations.

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[55] Wittgenstein 1965, 11–12. – "It is unbearable to be unloved; it is unbearable to be half-loved; it is more unbearable to be strongly loved – there is no stillness at all then" (Brodkey 1994, 253).

[56] "The renunciation of TLP with its rigorous logics and semantics, particularly in its logico-empirical interpretation, widely was received as liberating by analytical philosophers because it seemed to make way for the discreteness of the meaning of religious discourse. It needed some time of critical examination to find out that there is still a legitimate question about the redeemability of religious claims. The turn in Wittgenstein's philosophy which was rated to be too radical in the light of his strongly self-critical words, was one of the reasons why there was such reference to Wittgenstein" (Schrödter 1979, 161).

[57] See Wittgenstein 1998, 44, 94, 146: "In philosophy the winner of the race is the one who can run most slowly. Or: the one who gets to the winning post last." (MS 121) – "Sometimes a sentence can be understood only if it is read at the right tempo. My sentences are all to be read slowly." (MS 134) – "This is how philosophers should salute each other: 'Take your time!'" (MS 138)

6.   **Conclusions**

My overview shows that the gap between Athens and Jerusalem still remains or – in terms of the history of ideas – even slightly increased. In that respect I would like to subscribe to and amend Clifford Goldstein's diagnosis (Goldstein 2003, 22). Nevertheless some brilliant philosophers partly succeeded in fighting the mighty necessities of their discipline no philosopher inspired by the Holy Scriptures can expect to reverse the outcome of problems accumulated during more than two millennia of human reasoning. But Adventists should still be aware of these patchy and sometimes hidden accomplishments to bridge the gap and see these as a part of different attempts to sift through the evidence. I hope in portraying the history of philosophy accordingly to thus improve the critical knowledge that the Sanctuary eventually will be restored and vindicated.

To summarize my approach to the question "Why should we establish philosophy as a much more visible discipline in the Adventist educational framework now?" I can refer to a very short but intricate answer given by Immanuel Kant in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,* "Innocence is indeed a glorious thing, but it is very sad that it doesn't take care of itself, and is easily led astray. For this reason, even wisdom – which consists in doing and allowing more than in knowing – needs science [Wissenschaft], not as something to learn from but as something that will ensure that wisdom's precepts get into the mind and stay there" (Bennett 2008, 13; cf. Kant, Akad. Ausgabe IV 405). That is to say, that in order to stay mindful, conscious and preserve one's identity to act accordingly one has to understand one's errors after being so educated and already having received knowledge from a great spectrum of philosophy and science. Philosophy, i.e. human wisdom, is a latecomer with intent to secure the fundamentals but in constant danger to overdo its case. Therefore man needs divine wisdom as corrective on top of that.

Because the common sense is torn and embarrassed by opposing claims, Kant was willing "to take a step into the field of *practical philosophy*", if not happy to agree to restart the speculative endeavour.[58] When Adventists begin to see a similar need after 150 years of innocence, existing within an increasingly Gnostic Modernity, they must heed the experience of the exponents of the Jewish *Haskalah* and their successors in the *Wissenschaft des Judentums*,[59] not to fall prey to the

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[58] "Practical philosophy" is a term in Kant's critical project that involves more than only ethics as a discipline. Thus Kant tried to fill the gap left by David Hume's sceptical blow against the traditional project of metaphysics, and by the same token to synthesize and secure necessary ideas like duty, freedom and God into a comprehensible "critical" philosophical discourse vis-à-vis the sciences and the witness of biblical revelation. In this way he was led to his conception of "Ethicotheology". For a more detailed introduction see Wood 1970, or a shorter one in Sturch 1975.

[59] In the shadow of the Shoah Gershom Scholem gave their methodological dilemma a sharp focus ("Mitokh Hirhurim 'al Chokhmat Jisra'el [Reflections on Modern Jewish Studies]", *Luach ha-'Aretz*, Tel Aviv 1944, 94–112) by maintaining that acquiring skills in the arts of the enemy entails

same kind of assimilation or ineffectiveness that seems to characterize many philosophers who have sought to do more than merely produce another footnote to Plato.[60] The Adventist movement after 150 years has acquired a momentum when philosophy (in the sense of human wisdom corrected by divine wisdom) becomes necessary, although it is dangerous to think that reason alone can solve the problems we are gradually becoming aware of.

Therefore let me scatter suggestions for a broad scope of subjects that pertain not only to theology but also to the field of the history of philosophy. I just wanted to present my case study as a specimen. Philosophy begins with the right questions. I am not sure that I can yet articulate carefully enough what Adventist philosophers need to discuss. Here are my suggestions:

The equation "Wisdom is the biblical concept for philosophy" means that the endeavour we know as 'philosophy' is not exclusively Greek, but that the Greek philosophers modified a standard of reflection known as 'wisdom' in the ancient scriptures. How is this claim to be corroborated in historical and systematical terms from an Adventist perspective?

In Adventism there is a venerated tradition of a debate under the catchwords "justification" and "sanctification", whereas philosophy since the Enlightenment usually does not treat the question of moral motivation in relation to the question of salvation. What impact has the splitting of these viewpoints had? Is therefore e.g. Lawrence Kohlberg's model of moral development an appropriate approach to the spiritual dimension as put forward within the Scriptures?

Which standards and whose rationality is operative in our debates about the doctrine of God and the creation/evolution puzzle?

I would like to know more about the implications of the Doctrine of the Sanctuary for the hermeneutical question at large. Which are the logically necessary prerequisites to Schleiermacher's idea of hermeneutics, taken in light of the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition? Does this set of logical conditions in any case match to the doctrine of the sanctuary? How materially should the handling of the hermeneutical question proceed?

Has Spinoza's historical struggle with immortality had any impact in relation to the Adventist position of the denial of Platonism? Do Adventists rebuke along with the idea of recollection in Platonic *anamnesis* also the maieutical element? And what are the implications for the Adventist discourse about the Bible and revelation?

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the danger of spiritualizing the basics and be sentimental about the remaining difference. Fifteen years later his judgment was more tempered and lenient (cf. Scholem 1963, 147–164).

[60] "Students won't learn to think outside the box until they know they're in a box. A big part, then, of what we do is to teach questions and that questions have histories. Like the concepts designed to address them, questions are invented, forgotten, and sometimes remembered. And for students, what could be more exciting than the idea that Western philosophy, far from being mere footnotes to Plato, is a history of inventions?" (Larrimore 2004, 52)

How are Adventists to explain the intricate relationship between Platonism (and its partial rejection in the Enlightenment) and the Gnostic shape of the secular age (drifting towards spiritualism)?

No satisfying research has been done about the relation and position of the Adventist pioneers regarding the philosophical debates of their time. Did they recognize these and – given their circumstances – could they relate to them at all?

After all, the question remains: Are investigations into the history of philosophy the only appropriate function of philosophy in Adventism? Or is there room for systematic philosophy in Adventism? When I see the struggles in our church I am not sure whether the idea of an "ideal speech situation" can serve as a model for the Adventist procedure in philosophical discourse. And to say the least: Faith is not Science. But let me pose the question in a more poignant way: Are Adventists not eventually eroding their high esteem for the prophetic worldview when they start a more systematic and constructive discourse in the field of philosophical theology?

Any proper answer to this perennial open question has to be clothed with humility. Thus I want to close with a quote of exhortation and consolation alike:

> We are not to consider that the smartness of men and women will bring success. People may have all the learning possible for a human being to comprehend, and yet they may be alone; without Christ they can do nothing. Do you walk humbly before Him? Have you a cherishing of inward sins, heartburnings against anyone? Are you seeking God with all your heart? We can bear to be separated from everything else but the Spirit of God. We want the inspiration of the cross, making us to fall helpless, and the Lord will lift us up (White 1994 [1891], 97).

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Zusammenfassung

In diesem Artikel geht es dem Autor zunächst um den ethischen Aspekt bei der Annäherung an die Wahrheit; erst dann erwägt er die Lehren, die aus den misslungenen Systembildungen gezogen werden können, um innerhalb eines angemessenen methodischen Rahmens davon zu profitieren. Seiner Meinung nach ist die philosophische Analyse mehr ein Instrument der Kritik des eigenen theologischen Denkens und weniger ein Instrument der Konstruktion von Argumenten in missionarischer Absicht. Ganz allgemein gilt, dass philosophisches Denken zur Analyse und Orientierung nur dann hilfreich ist, wenn der Heilige Geist den Vollzug wirklich anleitet. – Niemand, der sich von der Heiligen Schrift hat inspirieren lassen, wird erwarten, das Ergebnis all derjenigen Probleme umkehren zu können, die sich in der mehr als zwei Jahrtausende andauernden Geschichte der menschlichen Vernunft angehäuft haben. Kein einziges überliefertes System ist vollkommen. Dennoch sollten Adventisten sich dieser uneinheitlichen und teils verschlüsselten Errungenschaften, die Grenze des Verstehens zwischen Philosophie und Theologie zu überwinden, bewusst sein, und sie als Teil von unterschiedlichen Versuchen ansehen, das Gegebene zu mustern. Dadurch und durch einen verbesserten Zugang zu wirklich notwendigem Wissen erwartet der Autor, dass das Heiligtum letztendlich wiederhergestellt und gerechtfertigt wird. Der Beitrag schließt mit einer Reihe von Vorschlägen, die andeuten, welche Themen adventistische Philosophen innerhalb ihrer gerade entstehenden Vereinigung diskutieren sollten.

Résumé

L'auteur de l'article parle tout d'abord de l'aspect éthique relatif au fait de s'approcher de la vérité. Ensuite, il évalue le cadre approprié pour profiter des leçons concernant la formation des systèmes durant l'histoire de la philosophie, formation n'ayant pas réussi. Selon l'opinion de l'auteur, l'analyse philosophique constitue plutôt un instrument de critique pour la pensée théologique que l'on a que d'être un instrument de la construction d'arguments dans un but missionnaire. Généralement parlant, la pensée philosophique est seulement utile pour l'analyse et l'orientation quand le Saint Esprit guide réellement cette démarche. – Une personne qui se laisse inspirer par le Saint Esprit ne s'attend pas à renverser le résultat des problèmes qui se sont accumulés durant plus de deux millénaires d'histoire de la raison humaine. Aucun système qui a été proposé et qui a survécu n'est parfait. Cependant, les adventistes devraient être conscients des acquis, acquis qui ne s'avèrent pas être unifiés et qui sont parfois difficiles à déchiffrer, mais qui visent à amoindrir le fossé existant entre la philosophie et la théologie. Ils devraient les considérer comme faisant partie de différentes tentatives de prendre en considération les évidences qui existent. L'auteur est d'avis que le sanctuaire sera finalement restauré et justifié par ce biais et par l'accès à la connaissance critique. L'article se termine en proposant les sujets dont les philosophes adventistes devraient discuter dans leur association qui vient de naître.

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Analysis and Assessment of Chronological Explanations of the Fall of Samaria

Kenneth Bergland

Abstract

The dating of the fall of Samaria and the preceding decade is one of the most controversial and disputed areas of biblical chronology. The challenges relate to apparent conflicts in internal biblical synchronisms, conflicting claims in the Bible, Babylonian Chronicle and Assyrian sources as to who conquered Samaria and when it was done, the lack of information in the Assyrian sources as to the reign of Shalmaneser V, the number and date of Samarian rebellions and Assyrian campaigns against Samaria, and finally the dating of when Hoshea was deposed as king over Samaria. In this article I give a survey of seven recent chronological explanations (Edwin R. Thiele, Hayim Tadmor, Nadav Na'aman, John H. Hayes/Jeffrey K. Kuan, Bob Becking, Gershon Galil and K. Lawson Younger) given of the fall of Samaria and the events leading up to it, analysing how each commentator deals with the textual data and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the theories. In the end, by way of a summary and conclusion, I also suggest a basic outline of the most credible events and chronology leading up to for the fall of Samaria.

1.   Intention

The chronology relating to the fall of Samaria and the preceding decade is highly controversial among scholars (cf., e.g., Golding 1999, Kelle 2003, and Tetley 2002). It is difficult to make any general statements that will not be disputed by some. The intention in the following is to give a survey of recent chronological explanations given of the fall of Samaria and the events leading up to it, analyzing how each commentator deals with the textual data and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the theories. The major challenges within the textual data are the following:

(1) The apparent conflict in the biblical synchronisms, claiming that Hoshea came to power both in the 20th year of Jotham and the 12th year of Ahaz, and that the end of his reign and the fall of Samaria coincided with the 6th year of Hezekiah.

(2) The apparent conflict between the biblical material and the Babylonian Chronicle saying that Shalmaneser V was the conqueror of Samaria, and the Assyrian sources claiming it was Sargon II.

(3) The claim in the Assyrian sources that Sargon II defeated Samaria both in his accession year and in his second year.

(4) The lack of information on the reign of Shalmaneser V in the Assyrian sources.

(5) The number and date of Samarian rebellions and Assyrian campaigns against Samaria.

(6) The date of Hoshea's imprisonment; prior to or at the end of his nine year reign, before, during or after the three year siege of Samaria.

We now turn to the various explanations in order to see how they deal with the basic data and the problems inherent among them.

I will analyze and assess seven proposed explanations of the chronological data. The following sequence of authors is based on the date of their last published text that I will be dealing with. This makes it easier to follow the logical progression of their argumentation, to the extent that later authors refer to previously published material. It will also help in getting a sense of the development of opinions among scholars.

2.   Edwin R. Thiele

Edwin R. Thiele's book *The Mysterious Numbers of the Hebrew Kings* went through three revisions, with the final one being published in 1983. I will focus especially on his chapter "The Siege and Fall of Samaria".

Characteristic of Thiele's approach is what I will call his pragmatic principle of harmony. It entails the criterion for historical truth defined as a theory's ability to explain all available trustworthy data, biblical as well as extra-biblical, in a harmonious pattern. This is of course a generally accepted criterion within historiography, but in Thiele's book it takes predominance. The danger we should be aware of in such an emphasis upon harmony is the temptation to manipulate data in order to save a harmonizing reading of the data. But even if Thiele can be called a biblicist, that does not mean that he is not willing to admit errors in the biblical text. Two such cases we find in regard to the synchronisms with the kings of Judah. As this is crucial for understanding Thiele's presentation of the chronology of the fall of Samaria I will begin with them.

The first is 2 Kings 17:1 telling us that Hoshea ascended the throne in the twelfth year of Ahaz. He writes:

> When the editors of Kings were bringing that book into its final shape, they
> did not understand dual dating for Pekah; and this fact was responsible for
> the synchronisms of 2 Kings 17 and 18. In 2 Kings 17:1 the accession of

> Hoshea is placed in the twelfth year of Ahaz. That, however, is twelve years out of line with 2 Kings 15:30 (Thiele 1983, 134; cf. 38).

The second relates to 2 Kings 18:9–10 where we are told that Shalmaneser's three-year long siege began in Hezekiah's fourth year and Hoshea's seventh year.[1] Consequently, the synchronism between the two kings in 2 Kings 18:1 is also problematic (ibid., 38, 135, 199, 204). Again he sees the same editorial misunderstanding as the basis for moving both Pekah and Hoshea twelve years beyond their true chronology. The misunderstanding consisted in not seeing that Pekah was a rival regent first to Menahem and then to Pekaiah, and that they were not successive reigns (ibid., 134).

Earlier he explained how Pekah's reign should be seen as lasting from 752 to 732,[2] fitting with the twenty years assigned to his reign in 2 Kings 15:27, and how his first twelve years first overlapped with the ten years of Menahem and then with the two years of Pekaiah.[3] He finds support for the claim that the editors of Kings did not understand this dual dating of Pekah, and rather saw Menahem, Pekaiah and Pekah as having had successive, not contemporaneous, reigns in the successive order given the three, as Pekah (2 Kings 15:27–31) is placed after both Menahem (2 Kings 15:16–22) and Pekaiah (2 Kings 15:23–26). He finds further evidence for the idea of rival regency in the north in this period in Hosea 5:5 and 11:12 (12:1) among others (Thiele 1983, 130). He also argues that it is implied that Israel had fallen prior to Hezekiah due to the fact that his reign is not related to any king in Israel, i.e., except in 2 Kings 18:1, 9–10, and that Hezekiah appears to have had unrestricted freedom to send an invitation into the northern kingdom for the Pesach of his first year in 2 Chron 30:1, 6, 10, implying the absence of any king and central government there (ibid., 168–71).

In regard to the synchronism in 2 Kings 15:30 between the twentieth year of Jotham and Hoshea's accession, Thiele explains that Jotham held power until 735, but that he was not killed by his successor Ahaz (ibid., 132), and thus it could be said that Hoshea's accession in 732 was in his twentieth year. But if Ahaz, and not Jotham, was the *de facto* regent in 732 it must be admitted that it is strange

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[1] His approach is one of seeing both errors in the text and lack in our ability to comprehend. He writes: "If errors on the part of the scribes may prove to be one possible source of our difficulties with Hebrew chronology, yet another source must be recognized in ourselves, for we today may simply no longer be in a position to determine the underlying factors whereby the available data will be found to agree" (ibid., 41).

[2] All years in the following are BC, and I will therefore not repeat this throughout the paper. As the regnal year was reckoned in Israel from Nisan to Nisan, according to Thiele, I will in the following for the sake of simplicity just write the one year e.g. "732" which means "Nisan 732 to Nisan 731" (cf. Thiele 1983, 54). Thiele is among those who argue that both Judah and Israel shifted between a Nisan-Nisan and a Tishri-Tishri calendar (ibid., 43–60). He does not stick only to a Nisan-Nisan calendar as Cogan claims that he does (Cogan 1992, 1006).

[3] Ibid., 121 and 129. Even if I would not say that Thiele's attempted explanation is "far-fetched", it is a matter of fact that not even he, in his attempt to be faithful to all the biblical data, is able to harmonize both the regnal years and the synchronisms (cf. Tadmor 1979, 46).

that Hoshea's accession is synchronized with the deposed Jotham and not the reigning Ahaz. One could argue that the good king Jotham (2 Kings 15:34) was reckoned by the editors as the true king of Judah compared to the evil king Ahaz (2 Kings 16:2–3), but this is speculative chronology.

Based on 2 Kings 18:9–10 Thiele places Shalmaneser's siege of Samaria between Hoshea's seventh and ninth year, which according to his reckoning would be 725/24 to 723/22.[4] As Sargon came to power on 12 Tebeth, about the end of December, in 722, he would have ascended the Assyrian throne nine months after the fall of Samaria. Based on Olmstead and Tadmor he dismisses Sargon's claims in the Khorsabad Annals as untrue on the following basis: (1) his accession year would be in the winter – a bad time for military campaigns; (2) Samaria is not mentioned in the Eponym relating to Sargon's rule; (3) the capture of Samaria by Sargon in his accession year is mentioned only in later, not the early, texts in his life; and (4) Sargon was occupied with other issues in his accession year and first year (ibid., 165–66). The sole conqueror of Samaria to him is thus Shalmaneser, in accord with the biblical account and the Babylonian Chronicle. He sees no reason to postulate that Sargon is the one being referred to as the "king of Assyria" in 2 Kings 17:4–6, but sees the natural reading as a reference to Shalmaneser in the entire passage (ibid., 163–68). Even if Thiele does not discuss this explicitly, this would imply that it was Shalmaneser who deported the Israelites, something it is difficult to support from the Assyrian sources, but easy in regard to Sargon. He notes, but does not date, the following events in 2 Kings 17:3, 4: the time of Shalmaneser's initial campaign in 2 Kings 17:3, the time when Hoshea became a vassal and the time when Shalmaneser discovered Hoshea's treachery prior to his campaign in 725/24 (ibid., 164). Based on the coincidence between his dating Shalmaneser's siege between 725–23 and the indication in the Eponym Chronicle of campaigns by Shalmaneser during these years, he permits himself to read Samaria into the mutilated Eponym Chronicle during these years (ibid., 165–166). Thiele sees the reference to Hoshea's imprisonment in 2 Kings 17:4, which he refers to as "the death of Hoshea" without explaining the reasons for seeing his imprisonment as identical to his death, as taking place simultaneously with the fall of Samaria in 723/22.[5] Finally, he therefore sees Sargon as only having campaigned against Samaria in his second year, then quelling a rebellion of the kingless Samarians and subsequently deporting them (Thiele 1983, 167–168).

I agree with Galil that a weakness in Thiele's explanation is that the completion of the Eponym Chronicle for the years 725–23 with "Samaria" cannot be supported by internal evidence in Assyrian sources themselves (Galil 1995, 56).

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[4] Ibid., 163. Thiele argues that Samaria fell in 723, and not 722 as is commonly believed (ibid., 122).

[5] Ibid., 162. That the Assyrians did take leading rebels as prisoners of war, without executing them, is confirmed in the fragment from Sargon's Annals from the Tablet Collection, A. 16947, line 7–11 (Tadmor, 1958, 23).

Thiele also does not attempt to give an explanation of why Hoshea's imprisonment is mentioned in v. 4 before the siege in v. 5. I also agree that, as I have expanded upon above, Thiele either contradicts or has questionable explanations of the synchronisms between Hoshea and Jotham, Ahaz and Hezekiah.[6] On the other hand, Galil misunderstands Thiele when criticizing him for having placed the deportation of the people in 723 and not in 720 (Thiele 1983, 167–168). But it is true that Thiele undermines his own reading of 2 Kings 17:1–6 as only referring to Shalmaneser, when he in other places claims that Sargon was responsible for the deportation in v. 6. Even if Thiele's argument of reconstruction of the Eponym Chronicle is weak, as it lacks internal evidence in Assyrian sources, the suggestion has certain credibility. I also think that Thiele gives a solid argumentation for why Sargon's claims to having taken Samaria in his accession year should be considered as untrue, and Galil's critique is weak here. As we noted in the introduction to Thiele, his pragmatic principle of harmony makes him vulnerable to "systemic fluctuations" and "shifts which were unlikely in actual practice", as Cogan has criticized him for, altering the data in order to fit his harmonious scheme (Cogan 1992, 1006). Still, in the period we are dealing with, where he for example rejects the synchronisms in 2 Kings 17 and 18, Thiele's explanations should be given the credit that he does not dismiss data unless he can give an adequate explanation of why it deviates from what he sees as the true chronology. This is in contrast to many other commentaries that simply dismiss data when it does not fit their theory.

3.   Hayim Tadmor

In regard to Tadmor I will consult three different sources by him. The first one is his article "The Campaigns of Sargon II of Assur: A Chronological-Historical Study" from 1958. The second is his article "The Chronology of the First Temple Period: A Presentation and Evaluation of the Sources" from 1979 (Tadmor 1979), and finally his comments in *II Kings* in The Anchor Bible Series, which he co-authored together with Mordechai Cogan (Cogan and Tadmor 1988).

Tadmor sees the author, the Deuteronomist (Dtr) as he calls him, as having various and partially conflicting sources at his disposal. "The exilic redactor of the book of Kings" had available extensive chronographic works, older chronicles and king-lists. Among his sources especially the Israelite chronology did not survive intact, and he had to add details "on the basis of his own calculations or

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[6] If Thiele is correct in his claim that the "school of the prophets" formed a continuous line of editors for the Book of Kings it is strange that they should have gotten the synchronisms wrong. At this point he is thus forced to say that the synchronisms were written at a late stage when the proper synchrony was not understood. But this also weakens his position that the Book of Kings was composed and accumulated over time close to the historical events by the "school of the prophets" (Thiele, 134 and 193–204).

approximations. Because these calculated dates did not always suit the heterogeneous evidence in the sources, they gave rise to some contradictions" (Tadmor 1979, 45). He sees the editor of the Book of Kings as adjusting and altering his sources where he deemed it necessary.[7] Of importance to our study is therefore his view that the Israelite data is less reliable compared to the Judean data. The Dtr apparently tried to create clarity in the "confusion" in the "confused decade" in which he wrote. Problems in the MT are thus largely explained as based on the inconsistencies of the sources at the author's disposal.[8] The weakness with this approach is firstly to identify when the problem is with our ability to understand the text as opposed to when contradictory sources are reflected in the text. Secondly, as he does not establish identifiable characteristics of the various sources or textual borders between them, aiding us in differentiating the supposed sources, the reference to various sources easily become an arbitrary fragmentary hypothesis of the sources. Thirdly, without having identified the sources, the basis of any attempt to evaluate their relative credibility, so as to prefer one source and its data to others, remains meagre.

Tadmor/Cogan place Hoshea's nine year rule from 732/31–724/23 (Cogan and Tadmor 1988, 195 and 198). Early in Shalmaneser's reign Hoshea became his vassal and paid yearly tribute to him until he was caught in secret embassy and cessation of tribute-payments. He probably had to go to Assyria to render an explanation, and was imprisoned there. According to them, "Hoshea's arrest preceded the Assyrian campaign against Israel".[9] Based on the reference in Josephus' *Antiquities* to two campaigns against Tyre by "Selampsas", understood as Shalmaneser, and the indications in the mutilated *Eponym Chronicle* that there were campaigns in 727, 725, 724 and 723, they suggest that the two campaigns against Tyre took place respectively in 727 and 725 (Cogan and Tadmor 1988, 199). On this basis they propose that Hoshea's initial submission might be synchronized with Shalmaneser's first campaign against Tyre in 727 and Hoshea's

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[7] Cogan and Tadmor 1988, 195. Tadmor speaks both of the editor in singular and the editors in plural (cf. e.g. Tadmor 1979, 45, 47 and 51). As far as I understand him he speaks of "the editors of the chronological framework of Kings" in relation to the authors of the various sources utilized by the one exilic editor that composed the entire book.

[8] Tadmor 1979, 45. Tadmor also suggests that a practice of rounding of years by the editor and the phenomena of co-regencies (even if the editor himself assumes or ignored them for the entire period of the Israelite Monarchy) might explain some of the discrepancies in the biblical sources (Tadmor 1979, 51–53.)

[9] Ibid., 196. In his 1958 article Tadmor stated this point more cautiously: "It seems that when Samaria fell Hoshea had already been deported to Assyria" (Tadmor 1958, 37). A shift in view appears to have taken place from Tadmor's 1958 article using the word "deported" to the 1988 commentary saying that "he was called before his overlord, probably to Assyria, to explain his treasonous behavior, and there detained and jailed" (Cogan and Tadmor 1988, 196). It is not clear to me why Hoshea would have freely met the Assyrians unless it was under the pretence that he and his people were not rebelling. The variation in Tadmor's language here reflects the silence in the text in regard to the details of the arrest. I agree with Hayes and Kuan in that it is highly unlikely that Hoshea surrendered voluntarily (Hayes and Kuan 1991, 162).

secret embassy and subsequent deposition to the siege of Tyre in 725 (ibid., 198–199).

Like Thiele, Tadmor dismisses the synchrony in 18:1, 9, 10 between Hoshea and Hezekiah. But he does it for different reasons. Tadmor accepts the dating found there of Hezekiah's accession relative to the siege and fall of Samaria, but not relative to Hoshea's reign. It is the latter, the time of Hoshea's reign, that is out of joint with true chronology according to Tadmor. He finds support for this in Isa 14:28, interpreted to mean that Ahaz died in the same year as Tiglath-pileser. Hezekiah thus came to the throne in 727/26.[10] According to Tadmor Hezekiah therefore ascended the Judean throne in the sixth year of Hoshea, and not the third year as 18:1 claims. This also puts him at odds with the siege beginning, according to 18:9, in the fourth year of Hezekiah and the seventh year of Hoshea, and the fall of Samaria, according to 18:10, in the sixth year of Hezekiah and the ninth year of Hoshea (Cogan and Tadmor 1988, 216, Tadmor 1979, 57). Unlike Thiele, Tadmor also dismisses "the artificial calculation of the chronographer" in 17:6, where the author dates the fall of Samaria to Hoshea's ninth year. The author "did not know that Samaria held out for over two calendar years without a king" (Cogan and Tadmor 1988, 195, cf. 216). Tadmor therefore dates Hoshea's imprisonment to 724 (Tadmor 1979, 54). The chronology of 17:6 is thus explained as reflecting ignorance on the part of the author. This ignorance goes further. For while v. 6 sees Shalmaneser as the sole agent of the siege, capture and deportation of Samaria, the true history according to Tadmor/Cogan is that "two kings of Assyria oversaw the events referred to in v. 6; Shalmaneser V captured Samaria; Sargon II exiled Israel" (Cogan and Tadmor 1988, 197, cf. 200). Shalmaneser besieged Samaria for at least two calendar years and captured it in the winter of 722/21 before his own death (ibid., 199). Throughout the entire siege the city apparently endured without a king. Tadmor/Cogan do admit that it is rather "remarkable" (ibid., 199), and it is legitimate to ask whether it is likely. Further, having spent over two years taking the city, the Assyrian army hastily returned home upon the news of Shalmaneser's death, apparently to take care of internal affairs, and left Samaria to herself. According to Tadmor, this hasty departure of the Assyrians and the news of domestic strife within Assyria could have been the main causes of the subsequent rebellion in the west (Tadmor 1958, 37; cf. Cogan and Tadmor 1988, 199).

It was only in 720 that the Assyrians returned to the west, then with Sargon as king. Tadmor/Cogan dismiss Sargon's claim in the Khorsabad Annals that he took Samaria in his accession year, i.e. 722. This took place rather in his second year, in 720, according to them (ibid., 200; cf. Tadmor 1958, 38). This follows Tadmor's earlier article from 1958. Even though it was common among earlier scholars to accept Sargon's claim in the Khorsabad Annals that he conquered

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[10] Tadmor 1979, 58. This however puts him in contradiction with 18:13, stating that Sennacherib came against Judah in the fourteenth year of Hezekiah, the date of which according to Tadmor "is fixed beyond any doubt as the year 705 BCE" (Tadmor 1979, 58).

Samaria in his accession year, Tadmor challenged this understanding in this article (Tadmor 1979, 57–58; cf. Tadmor 1958, 33). The Babylonian Chronicle and the Ashur Charter confirm in contrast to the Khorsabad Annals, according to him, that Sargon did not conduct a military campaign in his accession year or first year of reign.[11] Sargon had to spend his accession year and first full year of reign putting down all the rebellions arising throughout the empire after he had usurped the throne (Tadmor 1958, 30–31). The Ashur Charter reflects "the first and a more reliable method developed in the early years of Sargon's reign" dating "Sargon's campaigns of 'year 2' (720) to his second *palû*" (ibid., 31). In the Khorsabad Annals, written three years before Sargon's death, an "effort was made to 'normalize' chronology and to glorify Sargon's reign by starting the account of his wars with a major victory" (ibid., 31; cf. also 32).

In the end there are some issues that Tadmor's theory does not seem to answer satisfactorily. Firstly, it is true that the order of the text in 17:1–6 leaves the impression that Hoshea was imprisoned before the siege. But if Tadmor/Cogan are right in that the chronographer was wrong both in 17:1–6 and 18:1, 9, 10 in regard to timing, how can we then trust his order of events in these passages and argue that Hoshea was imprisoned prior to the siege? Secondly, as Tadmor/Cogan themselves write that the campaign according to the Eponym Chronicle in 727 "is the last item in the reign of Tiglath-pileser and has nothing to do with Shalmaneser V or Israel's Hoshea" (Cogan and Tadmor 1988, 199), it is challenging to see, based on Josephus, how "Hoshea's first submission to Shalmaneser (v. 3) can be coordinated with the first encounter with Tyre in 727" (ibid., 199). Did Tiglath-pileser and Shalmaneser have one campaign each in 727? Is this a likely scenario? Thirdly, it is also unclear how the kingless Samarians would be strong enough to resist the Assyrian army for at least two years of siege, and how they after having been conquered a first time still had the courage and strength to raise a new rebellion. On the other hand, if the Assyrians already had Hoshea in prison, why would they be moved to attack Samaria? Fourthly, it is also strange that the Assyrian army would have left Samaria entirely to herself after just having spent two to three years in taking her (cf. Galil 1995, 57–58).

4. Nadav Na'aman

Na'aman published his article "The Historical Background to the Conquest of Samaria (720 BC)" in 1990 (Na'aman 1990). His intention is to challenge what he calls the commonly accepted "hypothesis of the two conquests of Samaria," accepted by for example Thiele and Tadmor, and suggest a new reconstruction of the events surrounding the fall of Samaria. He does this basically by discrediting

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[11] Ibid., 25. As the Assyrian custom, from Adad-nirari II to Tiglath-pileser III, was to have the king serve as eponym in his second full year of reign, it is noteworthy to find a deviation from this both with Shalmaneser V and Sargon II (Cogan, 2008, 167–172, Tadmor 1958, 28).

or reinterpreting the sources utilized by other scholars and resting heavily upon Sargon's claims to have defeated Samaria and deported her people. Still, he himself basically ends up with a moderate revision of the two-conquest theory as he also argues for two conquests, one in the accession year 727 of Shalmaneser and one in 720 in the second year of Sargon (ibid., 210–211). Na'aman should be credited for drawing in archaeological evidence in a debate that primarily hovers over textual data. Still, the way he uses this data I find inconclusive. He rests primarily on the argument of silence, i.e. the absence of archaeological evidence indicating a severe siege and destruction by the Assyrian army of Samaria (ibid., 209 and 220). Archaeology has shown several times how little can soundly be concluded according to this line of reasoning. When he writes that "the best reconstruction is one that best fits the majority of evidence and is not contradicted by any unequivocal testimony", the point is well taken, but one would have appreciated more self-awareness in that his theory is one of those dismissing and twisting most of the textual data. He seems to juggle with the evidence in order to serve his purpose of undermining the "hypothesis of the two conquests of Samaria" and suggest an original interpretation of the data.

Within the biblical material Na'aman focuses especially on 2 Kings 17:3–6. Based on the reasonable presentation of the "chain of events" and on stylistic and linguistic grounds, his denial appears to be akin to the claim made by some, that we find in vs. 3–4 and 5–6 "two parallel accounts of the same historical event … originating from different archives" (ibid., 212–213). Instead he claims that the order of the events given here is basically a correct one. That being said, he firstly dismisses the chronological data in the passage, specifically the three-year siege and capture of Samaria in the ninth year of Hoshea in vs. 5–6, claiming that it is based on a misinterpretation of the primary editor (DtrH) of his sources (ibid., 220–221 and 225). Secondly, he questions events in the account. In regard to the three-year siege he leaves it open whether this took place or not, even if his use of the archaeological absence of evidence would lead him to deny the siege alto-gether (Na'aman 1990, 209, 211, 220–221 and 223). He explains the account of the three-year siege as a "historical deduction by the Deuteronomistic Historian" (DtrH) indicating that he read into the three-year time gap, between the rebellion and imprisonment of Hoshea and the Assyrian conquest and siege, a three-year prolonged siege of Samaria (ibid., 220–221 and 225). Thirdly, he alters some of the events in the passage. To fit the claim in the Babylonian Chronicle that Shal-maneser ravaged or conquered Samaria, he supposes that 17:3 tells us of an "act of disobedience" on the part of Hoshea in 727 and a subsequent clash in the accession year of Shalmaneser, not supported by 2 Kings 17:3 and pressing the Babylonian Chronicle hard (ibid., 213). That Shalmaneser marched against Ho-shea does not necessarily mean that it ended in a clash between them (cf. Hayes and Kuan 1991, 160–161). Rather, the impression left by the verse is that under the threat of a possible military clash Hoshea submitted to Shalmaneser and paid tribute to him. And fourthly, he manipulates the identity of the agents. Despite the

natural reading of 2 Kings 17:1–6 as Shalmaneser being the "king of Assyria" referred to throughout the passage, not only does he argue that the deportation of the Israelites in v. 6b really refers to Sargon, as most commentators agree upon, but also that the attack and capture in vs. 5–6a refers to Sargon (Na'aman 1990, 217, 219 and 221).

He might be correct when saying that "eliminating the erroneous dates enables us to suggest a new reconstruction of the events leading to the fall of Samaria, and this reconstruction fits all the available data much better", but what value has such a "fit" when so much of the data has been dismissed? (Ibid., 224) In this case Na'aman seems to take Sargon's claims as his guiding rule for how to relate to the other sources. Given that this trust is out of line with the general scholarly opinion after Tadmor's 1958 article, it is strange that Na'aman nowhere argues for the reliability of Sargon's claims.

As the only event describing Shalmaneser's rule in the Babylonian Chronicle was that he destroyed Samaria, it is only by pressing the text that you can make it say that this had to be in his accession year.[12] As Shalmaneser ascended the throne in Tebeth 25, which would be in the winter, the postulate that there was a major campaign in the season the kings usually stayed at home is unlikely. Just as Na'aman is correct in that there is no internal support within the Chronicle itself to assign Shalmaneser's conquest of Samaria to his fourth or fifth year, so neither does it give a basis to assign it to his accession year as he does.[13] Finally, he offers no good explanation as to why the Assyrians would leave the Israelite throne vacant for two to three years after imprisoning Hoshea, if they had enough influence in the land to arrest and deport him (Na'aman 1990, 218).

5.   John H. Hayes and Jeffrey K. Kuan

Hayes and Kuan published their article "The Final Years of Samaria (730–720 BC)" in 1991 (Hayes and Kuan 1991). Their approach is characterized by a basic trust in the biblical account and most of the extra-biblical sources, a minute reading of the sources, together with consulting prophetic literature within the biblical corpus, especially the Hoshea. Their desire to coordinate all the details they find in the sources, however, leads them to an accumulative approach ending, for example, with a proposal of four rebellions in Samaria and four Assyrian conquests of the city in the 720s. Due to the same intent they also propose one or two native unnamed kings in Samaria between Hoshea's arrest and the fourth conquest by Sargon in 720.

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[12] Cf. critique of Na'aman on this point in ibid., 158; Younger, 1999, 465–467.

[13] Na'aman 1990, 211. For a contrast to the idea that the transversal line in the Babylonian Chronicle gives a basis for seeing Shalmaneser's conquest of Samaria as having taken place in his accession year, see Becking 1992, 24. Cf. Cogan 2008, 182 where he makes the point that nothing can be concluded on the basis of the transversal line.

Beginning with the biblical chronological information about the siege and capture of Samaria as in the seventh and ninth year of Hoshea, they try to pinpoint as exactly as possible when he ascended the throne, as this gives them the year for both the siege and the capture. For our purpose here we can just note that they see Hoshea as having received approval by Tiglath-pileser to become king in 733/32, prior to his revolt against and murder of Pekah, 732/31 as his actual seizure of power and accession year, and 731/30 as his first regnal year (ibid., 153–156).

The four rebellions in Samaria suggested by Hayes/Kuan are placed within the following periods and aligned to the following references:

(1) Nisan 728–Nisan 727: only implied according to them in 2 Kings 17:3;

(2) Nisan 726–Nisan 724: referred to in 17:4;

(3) Nisan 724–722: referred to according to them in Hos 8:4–6; 10:5 (with the fall of Samaria being between 15 Marheshvan and the death of Shalmaneser in Tebet);

(4) 722 (at Sargon's ascension)–720: referred to in Hos 10:1–8; 13:10, 11.[14]

Correspondingly, they suggest four Assyrian campaigns to quell the revolts:

(1) Tebet 727–Nisan 726: when Hoshea submitted and paid tribute without resistance as mentioned in 2 Kings 17:3[15];

(2) 725–24: ending with the arrest of Hoshea, looting of the royal sanctuary at Bethel, provincialization of Samaria and initial deportation of the people, referred to in the Babylonian Chronicle, 2 Kings 17:4b, Hos 10:13b–15, and possibly Isa 32:14 according to them[16];

(3) Marheshvan 724–722: being the three year siege referred to in 2 Kings 17:5–6 and 18:9–11 (Hayes and Kuan 1991, 168–169);

(4) 720: referred to in 2 Kings 17:24 and Sargon's sources.[17]

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[14] Hayes and Kuan 1991, 167 and 179–181. They are open as to whether there was a rebellion in 726 or not (ibid., 179). They should receive credit for drawing upon material from the prophetic literature, especially the book of Hoshea, in reconstructing the history. For another opinion see Becking 1992, 47.

[15] Hayes and Kuan 1991, 160–161. Like Tadmor and Cogan they coordinate the 727 campaign with the campaign against Tyre referred to in Josephus' *Antiquities*.

[16] Ibid., 162–166. They hold that both Shalmaneser and Sargon deported Samarians (ibid., 169). Further, they criticize Na'aman on the one hand for associating the ravaging of Samaria with Shalmaneser's accession year, and on the other hand the majority of scholars who have associated it with his last year. Instead they argue that the horizontal line in the Babylonian Chronicle between line 28 and 29 indicate that the mention of Shalmaneser's ravaging of Samaria in line 28 took place sometime before his fifth and final year mentioned below in line 29 (ibid., 158–159). In my mind the arguments based on the horizontal line to date Shalmaneser's attack on Samaria remain inconclusive. The only thing we can say with certainty is that the Babylonian Chronicle claims that Shalmaneser conquered Samaria sometime during his reign. Cf. Younger 1999, 481, for a critique of them at this point.

[17] Ibid., 171–178 and 179–181. 2 Kings 17:24 does not, however, refer to a military campaign, but just a settlement of foreign people in Israel. Sargon's claims to a military campaign would thus not be recorded at all in the biblical account.

It is true that this would indicate an intensification of the Assyrian response to the rebellions, something that would be expected of an insubordinate vassal state. A strong point in their theory is that they are able to explain why Shalmaneser is attributed with both the capture and deportation of the people in 17:5–6 (ibid., 166). But my question is how likely it is that Samaria would have been able to remain basically in continuous rebellion from 728–720, raising revolts three times after the three assumed blows of the Assyrian army, a revolt that was finally quelled only with the fourth attack in 720. And how lenient is it reasonable to assume that Shalmaneser and his army would be, leaving at least twice the Israelites capable of an immediate resurrection right after a previous revolt had been put down? And is the documentation in the Assyrian sources what we would have expected given this scenario? The mutilated Eponym Chronicle does not give us free reign for our imagination, but should instead call us to caution. Hoshea's loyalty in v. 3 and the subsequent treachery and arrest of him in v. 4 does imply a certain time gap. Even if there is a logical difference between the events of v. 4 and v. 5–6, it is only with much goodwill that one can accept seeing them as representing two different campaigns.

In addition to the criticism above, firstly the postulate of a one to two year gap between the arrest of Hoshea and the siege has a very hypothetical nature, lacking satisfying evidence (ibid., 168). Secondly, by being willing to move the start of the siege down to between Marshevan 724 to Tishri 723, even Nisan 723 to Nisan 722, with the fall of Samaria sometime after 722, they very quickly come at odds with the biblical statements of a three-year siege (ibid., 168). It seems as if they become inclined to expanding the time due to all the Israelite rebellions and Assyrian attacks they try to squeeze into this relatively short period. Secondly, the extensive argumentation for the claim that there were one or two native kings after Hoshea, appointed by the rebellious people, becomes very speculative as none of the sources gives us any indication that there was a king on the throne during this time. Their hypothetical reconstruction of the Calah Inscription at this point, is too weak a basis for this claim.[18] To me their theory would have done much better if they had dropped the claim of the one or two post-hoshean kings. On the other hand, their claim that Shalmaneser himself provincialized Samaria would be rather appealing as it would explain the absence of a king in Israel up to Sargon's attack in 720.[19] Still, this asks for an explanation as to why Sargon then claims in the Calah Summary Inscription to have made Samaria into a province.[20]

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[18] Hayes and Kuan 1991, 172–178. Their suggestion that the Calah Inscription should be read as the kingless Israelites "came to an agreement" among themselves to appoint for themselves a king, appears strange as the natural reading would be that they came to an agreement with some foreigner(s) (ibid., 175).

[19] Ibid., 174. They are in my opinion correct when stating that it is not likely that the Assyrians would simply have left Samaria without a king after the arrest of Hoshea, unless they had made or intended to make it into a province.

[20] They agree with the majority of scholars that Sargon's claim to have taken Samaria in his accession year is erroneous (ibid., 170).

Thirdly, ascribing all references to "the king of Assyria" in 17:1–6 to Shalmaneser has some credibility, as mentioned already, since a natural reading of the verses leaves us with the impression that this was what the author thought. Given this it is, however, not clear why the "king of Assyria" in 17:24 should suddenly appear here to be Sargon, while it was the same king all along in 17:1–6.[21]

6.   Bob Becking

Becking published his book *The Fall of Samaria: An Historical and Archaeological Study* in 1992 (Becking 1992). He should be commended for discussing the different sources independently before comparing them and bringing them together. He closely examines Tadmor's two-conquest hypothesis, and concludes that it cannot be falsified based on the texts that have been discovered so far, and that Tadmor's basic conclusions in his 1958 article are sound even if they need to be modified at certain points. In regard to the biblical material he takes a tradition-critical approach, seeing 2 Kings 17:3–4 as reflecting annals from the northern kingdom while 2 Kings 17:5–6 and 18:9–11 reflect archives from Jerusalem (ibid., 49). He writes: "I have no other argument for this hypothesis than a conceptual one: it fits within the scheme of a double-redaction of the Deuteronomistic History." (Ibid., 49) It is really no sound argument to say that one theory fits another theory. If it is not the best explanation of the textual data, it has little to offer. Further, his explanation creates more problems than it solves, as I find his dealing with the biblical material to be the weakest point in his approach.

Beginning with the Assyrian sources, he argues in regard to the Babylonian Chronicle against those claiming that we should read ^{uru}*Šá-ba-ra-'-in* instead of ^{uru}*Šá-ma-ra-'-in*, as they deny that it refers to Shalmaneser's destruction of Samaria. Like Tadmor, Becking sees no reason for why the city referred to should not be identified as Samaria.[22] In regard to the term *ḫepû* he shows, contrary to Na'aman, that the term is used to describe military action against extensive areas but also the conquest and ruination of countries and cities (ibid., 24–25). As we have seen, Tadmor spent a lot of energy in showing that Sargon's claim in the Khorsabad Annals of having taken Samaria in his accession year was an editorial erroneous projection from events in 720 to 722, in order to leave an impression of a glorious accession year and have a military victory for each year. Becking raises the question as to whether this explanation is really necessary. He does not see that the broken …*r*]*i-na-a-a* [… should necessarily be read as ^{uru}*Sa-ma-r*]*i-na-a-a*, i.e. Samaria, as he notes thirteen other cities and villages that also end with the *-rina*. This is the only instance where Sargon supposedly dates the capture of

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[21] Ibid., 169. Interestingly, Sargon does not appear to be directly referred to in the biblical material, except in Isa 20:1.

[22] Ibid., 23. Further, in regard to the horizontal or transversal line he concludes that "an exact date cannot be concluded from this chronicle" (ibid., 24).

Samaria to his accession year. If Becking is right, then it appears to be only one date claimed by Sargon for his conquest of Samaria, namely 720 (ibid., 39–45). Even if there are other possibilities for reading the Khorsabad Annals, it is still a question if it is likely that any of the other cities known ending in *-rina* are candidates as referents in this text. The argument for the reconstruction of "Samaria" in line 11 of the Khorsabad Annals is thus analogous to the argument for reading "Samarians" in line 25 of the Calah Summary Inscription. In both cases, the absence of other likely candidates makes most scholars fall back upon the Samaria/Samarians alternative.

When Becking turns to the biblical material he primarily focuses on 2 Kings 17 and 18 and separates them into two accounts providing different scenarios: The Israelite account in 2 Kings 17:3–4 speaks of two campaigns against Samaria, the first in 727, where Hoshea again became a vassal after having revolted at Tiglath-pileser's death, but just in order to rebel again by seeking alliance with "So, the king of Egypt" and stopping to pay tribute to Assyria.[23] This time the reaction was to imprison Hoshea. But here the account stops: "The capture of Hoshea is the last detail from the annals of Israel, at least as far as they were taken over by the author of 2 Kings 17:3–4." (Ibid., 51) Of course, it is possible to imagine that someone in the north just had time to grab the annals and flee to Judah ahead of the Assyrian army, thus explaining why the fall itself was not recorded. As Becking himself does not find the biblical material to be clear as to when Hoshea was imprisoned, if Hoshea was imprisoned after or at the end of the siege, it is again strange to find no mention of the siege in the northern account. As Samaria only fell in 723 after a three year siege, according to Becking, the imagined person running to Jerusalem with the northern account under his arm would have had up to three years to write about the siege before being forced to flee! Further, the Judean account reflected, according to him, in 2 Kings 17:5–6 and 18:9–11 does not give a reason for why the Assyrians marched against Samaria. It could be understood as purely motivated by Assyrian imperial ambitions. But it would appear awkward that the first reference to Shalmaneser in this supposed Judean account would only refer to him as "the king of Assyria" in 17:5–6 without naming him.[24] Further, if 17:5–6 and 18:9–11 reflect the same source, why is Shalmaneser's name only given in the latter and not the former?[25]

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[23] He dismisses the prophetic literature as reliable historical sources, contrary to, for example, Hayes and Kuan, saying that "they cannot be considered as historical sources, although they give an insight into the 'history of mentality' relating to ruin and destruction" (ibid., 47).

[24] Here Becking gives the ad hoc argument that the editor altered the text, as the name was already given in using the northern account (ibid., 52). But if this was the case, if the editor was willing to alter his sources, why did he not write them as one integrated unit?

[25] Becking explains the duration of the siege, mentioned in the Judean account as three years, as due to "the strategic location of Samaria and by the defensive buildings constructed by Ahab and Omri" (ibid.). But as the Assyrians had possibly quickly taken Samaria two years earlier in Becking's view, it is strange why they now suddenly would need three years! Here I find Hayes/Kuan's

7. Gershon Galil

Galil wrote his article "The Last Years of the Kingdom of Israel and the Fall of Samaria" in 1995 as a critical survey of the major approaches to and a proposal of a reconstruction of the last campaign and fall of Samaria (Galil 1995).

He writes: "Some of the chronological data in the Book of Kings are accurate, while others are later additions by the author. The situation of the fall of Samaria in the last years of Hoshea is probably an invention of the author."[26] He basically moves all the immediate events relating to the fall of Samaria to the years 723–720. He sees no connection between Assyria and Israel before this point. According to him, Hoshea ascended the throne during the reign of Tiglath-pileser in 732/31 and remained loyal through Shalmaneser's reign until 723 (ibid., 59). Further he dismisses the claim that Shalmaneser campaigned against him in an early stage in his reign, making Hoshea become his vassal as mentioned in 2 Kings 17:3. The reference to treachery and rebellion in 17:4 he dates to the time around 723. The reason for his rebellion he associates with the rebellion of Tyre already taking place, with the first Assyrian campaign in 725 and the second in 724/23 when they besieged the city.[27] As Shalmaneser approached Hoshea in 723, the latter apparently came out to meet him in order to attain a compromise, but the Assyrian king arrested him and continued against Samaria. Even if Galil calls the account of the fall of Samaria in the Book of Kings an "invention", he still trusts the information of the nine regnal years for Hoshea, the synchronies given in 2 Kings 18:1, 9–10 and the three-year siege of Samaria. He thus claims that 723 – the last and ninth year of Hoshea – was in the fourth year of Hezekiah, and the fall of Samaria in 720 in his sixth year, and that the siege lasted from 722 till 720. If he is right, this would explain why the Assyrians did not replace Hoshea, as they would not be in control of Samaria during these years. The people being loyal to Hoshea would not appoint a new king for themselves either (ibid., 60). Further, he sees it as "inconceivable" that the Assyrian army left Samaria at the news of Shalmaneser's death, and claims that it was a relatively small military force anyway that would have enforced the siege of Samaria, possibly just upholding a blockade. It would have remained despite the upheavals in the rest of the empire at Sargon's ascension, until Sargon came in 720 and finally took the city and deported the people (ibid., 59–60). He accepts Tadmor's explanation that

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explanation more reasonable, that the Assyrians probably did not press the siege too hard (Hayes and Kuan 1991, 169).

[26] Ibid., 63. He sees one author as having composed the entire Book of Kings about 150 years after the fall of Samaria, thus implicitly 17:3–6 and 18:9–12 have the same author, who had reliable testimonies originating from the Book of Chronicles of the Kings of Judah, but not having any Israelite source (ibid., 53 and 62–63).

[27] The five-year siege of Tyre mentioned by Josephus he thus places between 724 and 720 (Ibid., 60).

Sargon's scribes in the Khorsabad Annals dated the fall of Samaria to his accession year for "literary-ideological reasons".

A main challenge felt by Galil is to explain 2 Kings 17:3. He writes:

> the author of Kings believed that Hoshea was not an Assyrian vassal at the beginning of his reign, but in his sources he found that Hoshea rebelled against Assyria. He resolved this inconsistency in v 3, which is merely his own interpretation, the result of his effort to clarify his sources and to explain how Hoshea could rebel against Assyria if previously he had not been its vassal. According to the author's conception, Israel became an Assyrian vassal state only during the time of Shalmaneser, not immediately upon the coronation of Hoshea. (Ibid., 63)

Here he reads more out of the verse than what is reasonable. That the author does not mention Hoshea's relation to Tiglath-pileser cannot be taken as evidence that he thought he was not a vassal before Shalmaneser. It is apparently Galil who sees no true encounters between Assyria and Hoshea referred to in Kings before 723. While v. 3 expresses the apparent solution to the author's problem, it poses a problem to Galil and he does away with it by claiming it is an artificial construction by the author. Instead of trying to understand how the order of events as described in 17:3–6 could have taken place, he attempts to present the succession of events as illogical, something they of course are not (ibid., 53). There is nothing problematic in saying that Shalmaneser marched against Hoshea and that the latter became his vassal, and that Hoshea subsequently rebelled and was met with a new Assyrian campaign where he was arrested and the city besieged, or the city besieged and Hoshea imprisoned at its fall.

Even if Galil attempts to follow the chronological information given in 2 Kings 17 and 18, he comes at odds with several events mentioned in the account. The first is, as just mentioned, the initial campaign of Shalmaneser where Hoshea became his vassal in 17:3. Secondly, he also has to push the treachery in v. 4 right down to 723, and to me this compressed history (including Hoshea's treachery, Shalmaneser's campaign and arrest of Hoshea all in one year) does not seem likely. Thirdly, his claim that Sargon took the city, and not Shalmaneser, conflicts with the explicit and natural reading of 17:3–6. To say that "the conqueror of Samaria is not identified" and that "it is similarly unclear who exiled the Israelites" is simply an unserious reading of the obvious claims of the biblical author (ibid., 53). There can be no doubt that the author claims that "the king of Assyria", who captured Samaria and deported her people, is Shalmaneser and none else. Fourthly, even if he might strictly be right in saying that "it is not stated explicitly whether he [Hoshea] was imprisoned before, during, or at the end of the siege of the city" (ibid., 53), it is similarly clear that the order of the text implies that it was before. As Na'aman discarded the chronological data of 17:3–6 but tried to follow the order of events, Galil's approach is basically opposite, where he discards the events, but tries to follow the chronological data. In regard to the extra-biblical sources, even if he is aware that they attribute the fall of Samaria

both to Shalmaneser and Sargon (ibid., 53–55), he apparently does not give that any weight in his reconstruction. It is clear that his one-conquest theory does not harmonize with the Assyrian sources either.

8. K. Lawson Younger

Younger published the article "The Deportations of the Israelites" in 1998 and "The Fall of Samaria in Light of Recent Research" in 1999 (Younger 1998; 1999). In neither of the articles does he attempt to set forth and argue a comprehensive view of the fall of Samaria. Still, we can follow his line of thinking as far as these two articles take us.[28] Even if he shows a wise care not to over-interpret the data in a historical reconstruction, his caution leaves us with many, maybe too many, unanswered questions. His concern in the 1999 article is to evaluate the various theories in light of new editions of the primary sources and recent studies (Younger 1999, 461).

He explains how Tiglath-pileser directed a series of campaigns against Israel and the surrounding areas during the years 734–732. Hoshea received Assyrian support and ascended Israel's throne in 732, and Younger refers to Tiglath-pileser claiming that he appointed him as king. At this time the Israel that the "puppet Hoshea" was given to rule, was reduced "to nothing more than the rump state of Samaria", without the coastal plains, Galilee and Transjordan including Gilead (Younger 1998, 202–204). He thus appears to contradict those who claim that the Assyrians took larger areas around Samaria in the time of Shalmaneser and Sargon, as "the rest of the kingdom was already part of the Assyrian empire." (ibid., 203; cf. Galil 1995, 62) As support of this he also mentions Isa 7 and Hos 4 referring to Israel only as "Ephraim" and Amos speaking of only "Joseph", which would include Manasseh (Younger 1998, 203).

In regard to Shalmaneser he denies that there was an encounter between Shalmaneser and Hoshea in the former's ascension year, as the approximate two months would have been too short a time to organize a military campaign, or in his first regnal year, as the Babylonian Chronicle then states that the king remained in the land (Younger 1999, 464, 467 and 478). He also denies the reconstruction of the Eponym Chronicle as referring to Samaria on the basis that it is too speculative (ibid., 464). Neither is he willing to use Josephus' reference to Menander's description of the siege of Tyre as a basis for dating a western campaign in Shalmaneser's second year: "The fragmentary nature of the eponyms and the filtered Phonecian tradition make this impossible to evaluate."(Ibid., 464) He also devotes several pages to argue that based on a study of *ḫepû* in the Babylonian Chronicle, it becomes clear, contrary to Na'aman's claim, "that the verb

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[28] Younger writes: "2 Kings 17 is a very complex passage. This is not the time or place to discuss all of its complexity." (Ibid., 215).

denotes the ruination of cities and, perhaps bombastically, of whole countries, not simply the pacification of a region".(Ibid., 465) He agrees with those claiming that it is not possible to say on the basis of the Babylonian Chronicle when during his reign that Shalmaneser "ruined Samaria", but only that he did it sometime during it (ibid., 467).

This first encounter between Shalmaneser and Hoshea took place, according to Younger, first in 724, after Hoshea had conspired against him together with the Egyptian King So. In order to harmonize the biblical material with this claim, he agrees with those who claim that 2 Kings 17:3 should not be understood sequentially as "and (then) Hoshea became vassal to him", but rather "parenthetically, as dischronologized narration: 'Now Hoshea had been vassal to him'" (ibid., 478). He then clearly comes at odds with the natural reading of the syntax of 17:3, which would then read: "King Shalmaneser marched against him (now Hoshea had been vassal to him)." If Shalmaneser marched against Hoshea in 17:3a, and then again in v. 5, but only came once, Younger has a clear challenge in regard to the biblical material. He solves this by suggesting for three different readings. All three have in common that they suggest that vs. 3–4 and vs. 5–6 are parallel accounts of the same event.[29] He does not argue which position he himself prefers, and I understand him as having pushed himself into a corner where he just needs to see vs. 3–4 and vs. 5–6 as referring to one event. Therefore at this juncture he leaves his otherwise sober line of reasoning just as long as the theories can give him the conclusion he needs at this point in his argumentation. He does not elucidate how he explains the biblical claim that Hoshea reigned nine years in 2 Kings 17:6 and 18:10, something he comes at odds with.

He sees it as possible also to postulate "some sort of deportation" under Shalmaneser, even if there is no information about this in the Assyrian sources (Younger 1998, 214; 1999, 474). He argues against Na'aman that we have other cases, especially Zincirli, Carchemish and Tarsus, which we know that the Assyrians captured without having left sufficient archaeological evidence to prove the point. He concludes: "It is unwise, therefore, to assume that whenever the Assyrians claim to have conquered a city its complete and utter destruction – a literal razing – took place."(Younger 1999, 474) Again, credit should be given for also consulting the archaeological evidence. As is common, he also sees Sargon's capture of Samaria to have been in 720 (Younger 1998, 217). He finds reconstructing line 26 in the Calah Inscription as a king either "hostile to me" or "my predecessor" both as too speculative (Younger 1999, 470–471). In regard to

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[29] In seeing vs. 3–4 and vs. 5–6 as parallels of the same event, Younger refers first to Winckler, seeing them as "two parallel accounts from two different archives", second to Brettler, who sees vs. 1–2 as the standard Dtr introduction, vs. 3–4 as reflecting one Assyrian source (*sic!*) or being an editorial note, and vs. 5–6 reflecting another Assyrian source (*sic!*), and third to Hobbs claiming that they are two verse pairs stressing different aspects, the first the effects of the Assyrian invasion relating to Hoshea and the second the effects of the invasion upon the land (ibid., 477–478).

Sargon's claim in the Khorsabad Annals that he took Samaria in his accession year, this is something Younger simply ignores.[30]

9.   Summary and Conclusion

Having evaluated the views of others, I should be willing as a summary and conclusion to at least set forth what I perceive to be the most reasonable scenario. My argumentation in regard to specific details is found above, so I will just present a quick overview here.

It seems reasonable to assume that Hoshea ascended the throne in 732/31, which would make 722 his ninth year. From the Assyrian sources there is no basis for saying that he was imprisoned prior to 722. The order of events in 17:4–5 does not allow us to be conclusive, even if I do acknowledge that it lends some support to the claim that Hoshea was imprisoned prior to the siege. When Shalmaneser came to power, it is not clear from our sources whether Hoshea rebelled or not. But when Shalmaneser turned against him he acknowledged his lordship and paid him tribute. I do not see that we can give an exact time for the first encounter between Shalmaneser and Hoshea as recorded in 2 Kings 17:3. Even if associating it as Tadmor and Cogan do with his accession year and the campaign against Tyre mentioned by Josephus is the only suggestion with some credibility, I would have wanted the evidence to be clearer than it is. I do not find any evidence for saying that this was a violent encounter, but Hoshea seems to have willingly submitted at the approach of Shalmaneser, continuing to be an Assyrian vassal as he had been since his accession. Shalmaneser's only military campaign to and siege of Samaria must therefore have begun around 725/24, something that would fit the Eponym Chronicle for these years, even if there is no internal evidence in the Assyrian sources for reconstructing the Chronicle at this point. It also seems reasonable to see the reference in the Babylonian Chronicle to a city that Shalmaneser conquered as Samaria, but the only thing we can conclude with certainty – even taking the horizontal line into consideration – is that he conquered Samaria sometime during his reign.

In regard to 2 Kings 17:1−6 there seems to be no good reason for splitting the text into various sources, and it is clear that the author saw Shalmaneser as "the king of Assyria" throughout the passage. I also sympathize with Thiele's suggestion as to why we should dismiss the synchronisms in 2 Kings 17–18, as he shows a consistent pattern in the misinterpretation of the author of the Book of Kings. The suggestion made by Hayes and Kuan that Samaria had already been turned into a province in 722, to explain why the Samarians had no king between the fall of

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[30] He sees the capture of Samaria as having been sandwiched sometime in between Sargon's first defeat of Yau-bi'di of Hamath at Qarqar, the attack on Judah and finally the attack on the Egyptian army, as "only part of a much larger military *Blitzkrieg* that subdued the west in 720 BCE" (Younger 1998, 217–218; 1999, 471–472).

Samaria in 722 and the re-conquest of it in 720, seems to have some credit to it. I find this theory at least stronger than the claims that the Assyrians left Samaria without a king even if they had just defeated and taken control over it, the suggestion that the rebel Samarians continued for two years without choosing a leader, or the speculation around one or more unmentioned king(s) replacing Hoshea. Even if it does press the time issue, we cannot rule out that Shalmaneser initiated deportation as mentioned in 2 Kings 17:6, even though it is clear that he cannot have completed it. I do have sympathy for those who draw the archaeological evidence and prophetic material into the discussion. We should seek as broad a basis as possible for our conclusions. The problem is, however, that the archaeological evidence does not seem to be conclusive. And in regard to the prophetic material, I have not had an opportunity to include this in the above analysis. Despite the attempted cautions by Becking and Younger, I still find Tadmor's arguments for dismissing Sargon's claims to have taken Samaria in his ascension year to be the most convincing. Having dealt with internal challenges to his usurpation of the throne, Sargon came in 720 to quell a subsequent rebellion, then initiating or completing the deportation of the citizens during the succeeding years.

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Zusammenfassung

Die Datierung des Falls von Samaria und des Jahrzehnts zuvor ist eine der am meisten umstrittenen Aspekte biblischer Chronologie. Dabei bestehen die Herausforderungen in offensichtlichen Spannungen in innerbiblischen Synchronismen, gegensätzliche Aussagen in der Bibel, der babylonischen Chronik und assyrischen Quellen bezüglich der Frage, wer Samaria eroberte und wann dies geschah, fehlende Information in assyrischen Quellen bezüglich der Regierung Salmanassar V., der Anzahl und Daten samaritischer Rebellionen und assyrischer Kriegszüge gegen Samaria, und schließlich in der Datierung der Absetzung Hoscheas als König Samarias. In diesem Artikel gebe ich einen Überblick über sieben Erklärungen der Chronologie aus jüngster Zeit (Edwin R. Thiele, Hayim Tadmor, Nadav Na'aman, John H. Hayes/Jeffrey K. Kuan, Bob Becking, Gershon Galil and K. Lawson Younger), die sich auf den Fall Samarias und die Ereignisse beziehen, die zu ihm führten. Der Beitrag analysiert, wie jeder dieser Kommentatoren mit den Textdaten umgeht, und wertet die Stärken und Schwächen der jeweiligen Theorien aus. Im Ergebnis schlage ich eine Skizze der am meisten nachvollziehbaren Ereignisse und eine Chronologie vor, die bis zum Fall Samarias recht.

Résumé

La datation de la chute de Samarie et de la décennie qui l'a précédée est l'un des domaines les plus controversés et discutés de la chronologie biblique. Plusieurs éléments sont en jeux parmi lesquels des conflits apparents dans des synchronismes internes à la Bible, des affirmations contradictoires dans la Bible, des chroniques babyloniennes et des sources assyriennes qui interrogent sur les auteurs et la date de la conquête de Samarie, le manque d'informations dans les sources assyriennes à propos du règne de Salmanasar V, le nombre et la date des rebellions samaritaines et des campagnes assyriennes contre la Samarie, et enfin la datation de la destitution d'Osée comme roi de Samarie. Dans cet article, je présente sept explications chronologiques récentes proposées pour dater la chute de Samarie et les événements qui l'ont précédée (Edwin R. Thiele, Hayim Tadmor, Nadav Na'aman, John H. Hayes / Jeffrey K. Kuan, Bob Becking, Gershon Galil et K. Lawson Younger), analysant comment chaque commentateur traite les données textuelles, et évaluant les forces et les faiblesses des différentes théories. Au final, pour résumer et conclure, je suggère également un schéma directeur de la chronologie et des événements les plus crédibles menant à la chute de Samarie.

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Paul and His Jewish Identity: An Overview

Luca Marulli

Abstract

Paul was a Jew from the Diaspora who never ceased to affirm his deep connection with the people, land and traditions of Israel. Even after his conversion/call, Paul was persuaded to be a godly Jew living out true Judaism. What he was and did before is in continuity with what he became after his dramatic encounter with the risen Christ. Jesus did not obliterate Paul's past; rather he helped him to bring it to the appointed (by God) completion. This paper offers an overview of how scholars understand texts such as 1 Corinthians 9:20–21, 2 Corinthians 11:22, Philippians 3:4–6, Galatians 1:13–14, and Romans 11:1 to be indicative of the fact that Paul always considered himself to be (though *in fieri*) an Israelite, a Benjaminite, a Hebrew, a Jew, a Pharisee, and a zealot for God and His plan as revealed in Christ.

Among all the New Testament writers, the apostle Paul stands out as the subject of earnest studies that seek a deeper understanding of how the theological and historical transition from Judaism to Christianity occurred. On this matter, the study of the texts that, in Paul's epistles, reflect the apostle's understanding of the relationship between continuity and discontinuity in his own religious thought as well in his "Jewish identity" is of great importance. Students of Pauline literature and of Paul's biography are confronted with Paul's way to define and redefine himself as a "Jew" converted to Christ as he used existing expressions but sometimes giving them a new or (Christianly) "updated" meaning. Texts such as 1 Corinthians 9:20–21, 2 Corinthians 11:22, Philippians 3:4–6, Galatians 1:13–14, and Romans 11:1 are unavoidable starting points for discussions about Paul's self-definition.[1]

This paper reviews some of the vocabulary Paul used in these texts to describe himself ethnically, culturally, and religiously as an Israelite, Benjaminite, Hebrew, Jew, Pharisee, and Zealot. I will limit the scope of this article to the debate on the meaning the above terms might have had for Paul's historical readers. My goal is to offer a simple overview as a basis for further discussion.[2]

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[1] All Scripture quotations, unless otherwise indicated, are taken from the *New Revised Standard Version Bible* (NRSV).

[2] In this paper I do not address issues such as Paul's understanding and critique of Judaism, or the elements that could have facilitated his conversion. The reader is referred to Stemberger 2010, 411–423; Ehrensperger and Tucker 2010; Boyarin 1994, 41–52. Another interesting aspect of Paul's biography that is beyond the scope of this article is how his conversion occurred. Hurtado 1993, 273–284, critically presents three approaches. According to Fredriksen 1986, 3–34, we cannot know

1.   An Israelite, Seed of Abraham (2 Cor 11:22; Phil 3:4–6; Rom 11:1)

According to James Dunn, "Israelite" is an ethno-religious term that emphasizes the relationship between Israel and its God. It refers to "a people who identified themselves as the chosen of God, not so much by reference to the other peoples, but primarily by reference to the covenant made with the patriarchs, children of Israel" (Dunn 1999, 187). In fact, Jesus was called "king of the Jews" by non-Jewish people (Mark 15:2, 8, 26 par. Matt 27:11, 29, 37), but "king of Israel" by Jews (Mark 15:32 par. Matt 27:42; John 12:13). As S. Zeitlin pointed out, the Rabbis (hence after 70 CE) speak of themselves as "Israel" and not as "Jews" (Zeitlin 1936, 31–32). Finally, Paul employs the term "Jews" 9 times in Romans 1–3 (where he argues that *all* people are under God's righteous wrath), but only twice in Romans 9–11 (against the 11 usages of the word "Israel"), where his people are now described "from God's perspective … Here, Israel's identity is determined by God, and not with Jewish identity determined by contrasting Jew/Gentile" (Dunn 1999, 188).

Paul's expression "son of Abraham" is linked with "Hebrews" and "Israelite" in 2 Corinthians 11:22, and with "Israelite" (again) and "Tribe of Benjamin" in Romans 11:1. If Paul, when he defines himself as an "Israelite", is somehow affirming his identity not *by contrast* (with other nations) but *by election*, he could also use or even reinterpret the expression "seed of Abraham" with the same purpose, as Esler suggests of the Pauline use of "Abraham" in Galatians 3 (Esler 2006, 23–34).

2.   Of the Tribe of Benjamin (Phil 3:4–6; Rom 11:1)

Famous characters such as Saul, the first king of Israel (1 Chron 8:33), and Mordecai (Esther 2:5) belonged to the tribe of Benjamin. Claims that the Temple was erected on Benjamitic ground appear in the rabbinic literature (SifDev 352) and also in Origen (In Genesim 42:6). Origen probably gives a reason based on Jewish tradition: since Benjamin did not bow down before Esau (Gen 33:3–7) or before Joseph (Gen 42:6), his territory was reserved for the worship of God (Gottheil et al. 1906). However, it is difficult to determine if this claim was already made in Paul's time. It has been argued that the Benjamites survived

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anything from Paul and from Acts since the memory of his conversion was reshaped by the community [apologetically] and by Paul himself [rhetorically]. According to Kim 1981, Paul alludes often to the Damascus experience in his letters, and those are reliable and accountable records. According to Segal 1990, Paul was a visionary initiated to the mystical and apocalyptic movements; in 2 Corinthians 12:1–9 Paul is allegedly talking about "an experience that transcends human ken" (35); "Paul's reference to the third heaven confirms the environment of Jewish apocalypticism and mysticism" [cf. 1 Enoch 39:3; 52:1; 71:1–5; 2 Enoch 3, 7, 8, 11; 3 Baruch 2, footnote 5, p. 313]). See Murphy-O'Connor 1996 for a more classical approach.

in Palestine after the Assyrian deportation (722 BCE) and even came back from captivity (Neh 11:7–9, 31–36), but they intermarried extensively with the tribe of Judah and therefore lost their identity (Maccoby 1986, 95–96). They were assimilated into the Judahites (or Jews), and at Paul's time it was impossible for a Jew to describe himself as a pure Benjamite (Kohler 1906). However, in 2 Maccabeans 3:4 (II BCE) Simon is described as being "of the tribe of Benjamin (ἐκ τῆς Βενιαμιν φυλῆς)". A few scholars contest the witness of 2 Maccabeans 3:4. For example, P. Spilly reads the passage thus: "But a certain Simon, of the priestly course of Bilgah" (Spilly 1985), and Maccoby argues that Βενιαμιν must be a copyist's error for Μινιαμιν, adding that in b. Berakhot 16b Jews would confess "we do not know whether we are descendant from Rachel or Leah" (Maccoby 1986, 216). However, arguing that Paul's claim of being a Benjamite is fraudulent (and casting doubt upon Hillel's alleged same origin; see BerR 33:3) assumes the unlikely combination that 2 Maccabeans 3:4 contains a scribal error (a claim that remains to be demonstrated) *and* that such a late statement as b. Berakhot 16b was already popular in the first half of the first century (a claim impossible to verify).

The fact that Paul claims a Benjaminite lineage while addressing a mixed audience consisting primarily of ethno-Christians is intriguing. He is probably reclaiming a pedigree that enables him to compete in authority with the Judaizers, without necessarily assuming that the Christians in Rome and in Philippi, and even the Diaspora Jews, were aware of their ancestors' debates in first century Palestine.

3. A Hebrew of Hebrews (2 Cor 11:22; Phil 3:4–6)

Christian thinkers during the 4th and 5th century CE reinterpreted Paul's Hebraism. For instance, Ambrosiaster understands *Hebraeus ex Hebraeis* as a "universalizing Christian faith" claim (Commentarius in Epistolam ad Philippenses, 3:5–7, cited by Jacobs 2006, 266). According to Ambrosiaster, *Hebraeus* does not come from "Eber" (Abram's ancestor, cf. Gen 10:24–25; 11:14–17), but from the word "Abraham". Ambrosiaster therefore "psychologically converted [Paul] from a Jew to an Abrahamite" (Jacobs 2006, 267). However, the word "Hebrew" in the first century CE seems to indicate a Jew from Palestine or the Diaspora able to understand Hebrew (or at least Aramaic) and closely connected (culturally and ideologically) to the land of Israel (Hengel 1991, 25). Sirach, Prol. 22, is the first time the word ἑβραϊστί appears as indicating the Hebrew language (cf. also 4 Maccabeans 12:7; 16:15). For Philo (Vita Mosis 11:31), the ἑβραῖοι from Judea are those able to translate the Old Testament into the Greek language (Hengel 1991, 117–118, footnote 146). According to Dunn, the word Hebrew in Paul's mouth "indicates willingness ... to continue to identify himself with the ancient origins

and character of his people, a studied archaism which those familiar with its use in Second temple Judaism would probably have recognized" (Dunn 1999, 186).

Paul brings up the fact that he has been circumcised (Phil 3:2), and therefore, he does not come from a family who detached itself from the language and the traditions of his ancestors and of his land. Paul is saying that he is neither a Gentile, nor a Proselyte, nor a Jew that has been Hellenized to the point of losing contact with his mother country and sacred language; on the contrary, "Hebrew of Hebrews" underlines the fact that he is able to speak Hebrew, or at least Aramaic.

4. A Jew (1 Cor 9:20–21; Gal 1:13–14)

Räisänen argues that, unlike the expression "Hebrew", the word Ἰουδαϊσμός connotes "practices" that would differentiate Jew from a Gentile (Räisänen 1987, 406). This explains why Peter's "living like a Jew" in Gal 2:14 is perceived as offensive to Gentile believers: "But when I saw that they were not acting consistently with the truth of the gospel, I said to Cephas before them all, 'If you, though a Jew (Ἰουδαῖος), live like a Gentile and not like a Jew (οὐχὶ Ἰουδαϊκῶς ζῆς), how can you compel the Gentiles to live like Jews (ἰουδαίζειν)?'".

Etymologically, the word "Jew" (יהודי, Ἰουδαῖος) stems from "Judea" (יהודה, Ἰουδαία: in 2 Kings 16:6, 25:25, many times between Jeremiah 32:12 and 52:30, and many times in Ezra, Nehemiah and Esther; the word always refers to people living in the Southern Kingdom, that is, Judea; see Dunn 1999, 179, footnote 25). However, Hanson and Oakman point out that there are five possible meanings of the word Ἰουδαῖος in the first century CE, and that it is the context that helps us to choose the preferred meaning: (1) the inhabitants of Judea proper; (2) the inhabitants of Palestine in general (Judea, Galilee, Samaria, Perea, etc.); (3) diaspora people ethnically connected to Judea; (4) all people professing allegiance to the Temple-centered religion of Judea (even if not native "Jews"); and finally, (5) the elite class of Judea as opposed to the lower and poorer strata (2002, 176).

In English, the same word Ἰουδαῖος can be translated "Judean" when indicating those who lived in Judea, and "Jew" in any other case. According to Flavius Josephus, a first-century Hellenistic "Jew", Ἰουδαῖος is an apt term to describe Diaspora people (see for instance J.W. 2:7.1). However, Josephus refers to the Israelites living in Judea as "the people that naturally belonged to Judea itself" (J.W. 2:3.1; cf. also Esler 2003, 67–68). Thus, the word Ἰουδαῖος is not merely a label put on Judeans: the term served rather to distinguish all Jews "from other peoples who had other countries of origin and other native lands; and hence the common division of humanity into the two categories 'Jews' and 'Gentiles/(other) nations'" (Dunn 1999, 179–180). Texts such as Galatians 2:15 ("We ourselves are Jews by birth and not Gentile sinners") and 3:28 ("There is no longer Jew or Greek") confirm such an understanding. Paul, by calling himself a Ἰουδαῖος,

underscores the ethnic and cultural dimensions of the word, characterized also by a specific ensemble of peculiar laws and practices. However, it must be acknowledged that Paul speaks in a negative way of the faithful practice of the Law and prescriptions as the way to earn salvation. Being "under the Law" (ὑπὸ νόμον: 1 Cor 9:20; Gal 3:23; Gal 4:4–5, 21; 5:18; Rom 6:14–15) refers to a condition that makes Jewish identity markers (strict keeping of laws and prescriptions) as necessary to soteriological purposes. To Paul, this is not sufficient for the Jews, nor required anymore for Gentiles (cf. Gal 5:18). Marcus notes that there is no exact parallel to the expression "under the Law" in Jewish texts (Marcus 2001, 72–83). He observes that Josephus (Against Apion 2:28) employs the expression "under … the law*s*" when speaking about Gentiles converted to Judaism, and that the term "yoke" appears in m. Avot 3:5 and m. Mishlei 22:4 while the expression used in Mek. R. Ish., Yitro 2 is "under the wings of the Shekinah". "Under the Law" would be then a Jewish expression relating to Exodus 19:17: "Moses brought the people out of the camp to meet God. They took their stand *at the foot of the mountain* (LXX: ὑπὸ τὸ ὄρος, "under the mountain"). In Jewish tradition (b. Shab 88a), the mountain is *suspended* over the people as a protection for the faithful, but also a terrible danger for those who reject the Laws. Perhaps this tradition was already known in Paul's time, and used to convince new converts to Judaism of the necessity of keeping the Jewish Law.

4.1   In Judaism (Gal 1:13–14)

"In Judaism" (ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ) is equivalent to practising "the religion of the Judeans who fought to resist the Hellenizing policies of the Syrians …, a religious intent on maintaining its distinctive practises and traditions under pressure to abandon them, circumcision and food laws in particular (1 Macc 1:60–63; 2 Macc 6)" (Dunn 1999, 183; cf. also 2 Macc 2:21; 8:1; 14:38; 4 Macc 4:26). According to Jewish laws, a boy began the study of the scriptures at five years of age; at ten he was initiated to the legal traditions (Pirke Aboth 5:21); at thirteen he would become a bar-mitzvah ("son of the commandment") and was considered fully responsible for his commitment and obligation to the Law. Of course, prospective "rabbis" were selected and sent to the best schools, at the feet of the best masters of the Law (Longenecker 1971, 21–22). Josephus (Life 2) states that he began his studies when he was fourteen (cf. also Against Apion 2:18), and Philo (Embassy 210) mentions his engagements with the study of the Law and its interpretation since his "earliest youth".

We must however highlight three points: (1) Josephus and Philo may be describing an ideal – perhaps for autobiographical purposes; (2) both of them came from well-to-do families who were certainly able to pay for their educational expenses, which was not the case for most illiterate and poor first century Jews; (3) it is impossible to say if what the Mishnah and the Talmud prescribed as the normal

Jewish educational *cursus* had already been implemented *before* the destruction of the Temple. Unfortunately, we do not know much about first century "practising Judaism", but we know enough to say that Second Temple Judaism was not monolithic. Galatians 1:13–14 remains a puzzling text, but a remarkable one: it is the only instance where Paul somewhat distances himself from Judaism (see also Dunn 1999, 185).

4.2   A Hellenistic Jew

Paul's insistence on affirming his "Jewish credentials" has been understood as consistent with his status of "expatriate, i.e., a Jew living in the Diaspora" (prominently in Murphy-O'Connor 1996). Paul's Hellenistic background is visible in his religious language (Col 1:15–20), in his ability to quote classical authors (1 Cor 15:33), in his ability to argue theistically (Rom 1:19–20; 2:14–15), and in his diatribe form of presentation (Rom 2:1–3:20; 9:1–11:36; Longenecker 1971, 26). Comparing Romans 7:5–7 with Philo (Abr. 147), Boyarin suggests that Paul adopted a dualistic and allegorical hermeneutical system based on "the eclectic middle-Platonism of Greek-speaking Judaism" (Boyarin 1994, 13–14). He then identifies Paul and Philo as some of the "intellectual descendants" of this school of thought, and goes on to say that "Midrash, as a hermeneutic system, seems precisely to refuse that dualism, eschewing the inner-outer, visible-invisible, body-soul dichotomies of allegorical reading" (Dunn 1999, 24). Paul's "longing for the univocal and the universal" expressed by the "in Christ" formula would have "deep roots in Greek culture" (ibid., 25).

Though Paul is doubtless a Hellenistic Jew, this does not necessarily make him a philosopher like Philo. Even the parallel between Romans 7:5–7 and Philo is questionable: some view Romans 7:1–6 as proof of Paul's rabbinic background, while others view it as a clumsy attempt to prove that Gentiles were not obliged to adopt a Jewish way of life. Regardless of that, a common and popular knowledge of some classical quotations did not necessarily require a complete *cursus* of Hellenistic studies, and the use of a secretary may also be an explanation for some rhetorical figures of style in his letters (cf. Rom 16:22).

5.   A Zealot (Phil 3:4–6; Gal 1:13–14)

5.1   Zeal and Zealot Jews in Second-Temple Judaism

The Greek noun ζῆλος is used in the LXX to describe "the intensity of God's action, whether this means good or ill for those concerned" (for example, see Deut 29:20; Zeph 1:18; Isa 63:15; Stumpff 1985, 297). The cognate verb ζηλόω means "to strive after", and the righteous man might therefore be portrayed as zealous

for God, or on God's behalf, not in mood, but in specific action (Num 25:11; 1 Kings 19:10, 14; 2 Kings 10:16; 1 Macc 2:24). Against this ideological backdrop, the accounts given in 1 Maccabeans 2:27 and 2:24, 26, 50, which refer to Jews who fought to defend their traditions against the Syrian threat, clearly depict those Jews as being zealous for the Law (Donaldson 1989, 672).

Today it is widely accepted that the "zealots" were not a political party, but rather an ideological movement rooted in the Hebrew Bible (Num 25:11, 13; 1 Kings 19:10–14; Ecclus 45:23; 48:2). Zealots "appeared across a broad spectrum of Judaism" (cf. 1QS 9:23; m. San 9:6; Philo spec. II 253), and their primary task was not to fight a foreign oppressor (cf. 2 Bar 66:1–8; Donaldson 1989, 673). Popular characters of the Old Testament were, at the time of the Maccabees, taken as exemplary figures of zeal for God's law: Phineas (Num 25) in Sir 45:23–24; 1 Maccabeans 2:26, 54 and 4 Maccabeans 18:12; Elijah (1 Kings 18–19) in Sir 48:1–2 and 1 Maccabeans 2:58; Simeon and Levi (Gen 34) in Jub 30:18; T. Levi 6:3 and Jdt 9:2–4. Donaldson rightly states that

> zeal was more than just a fervent commitment to the Torah; it denoted a willingness to use violence against any Jews (Num 25; 1 Macc 2:24; 2 Apoc Bar 66:1–8; m. Sanh. 9:6; Josephus, *Ant* 18.1.6), Gentiles (Gen 34; Jdt 9:2–4; 1 Macc 2:25), or the wicked in general (1QS 9:23; 1QH 14:4; Philo, *Spec. Laws* 2:253) who were contravening, opposing, or subverting the Torah. Further, a zealot was willing to suffer and die (1 Macc 2:50–60; 2 Macc 7:2, 11; 8:21; 4 Macc 18*; Josephus, Ant.* 18.1.6; *Ant*. 17.6.4; 17.9.3; *J.W.* 2.8.10) for the sake of the Torah, even to die at one's own hand (2 Macc 14:37–46; Josephus, *J.W.* 7.8.6–7.9.1) (1989, 672).

W. R. Farmer agrees that zeal for the Law was a common phenomenon, although with different degrees of commitment and engagement (Farmer 1956, 63).

The Zealots seem to have shared the Pharisaic understanding of the law; maybe some of the Pharisees were Zealots themselves (cf. Josephus, Ant. 18:23; Fairchild 1999, 514–532). According to Josephus (Ant. 18:4), one of the Zealots' heroes was Saddok, considered to be the ancestor of the Pharisees as well (whether Josephus in Ant 17:149–154 is talking about Pharisees is still an open debate). Perhaps the zealots believed that "as in the case of Phineas, zeal had atoning value; violent punishment of the wrongdoers would 'turn back [God's] wrath from the people of Israel' (Num 25:11)".[3] The wrongdoers could even be Israelites, and their apostate blood would provide atonement for the sins of the apostate people of Israel (Maccoby 1986, 178–179, footnote 6).

The word ζηλωτής appears at least four times in the NT (Gal 1:14; Acts 22:3; Luke 6:15; Acts 1:1). Luke 6:15 identifies Simon, one of Jesus' disciples, with the title Ζηλωτής (cf. Acts 1:13), while the parallel texts (Matt 10:4 and Mark 3:18) read ὁ κανανᾶιος. M. Borg suggests that Luke 6:15 is a translation of Mark 3:18,

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[3] Fairchild 1999, 525. Maccoby also sees "something essentially redemptive in this zealous activity (Num 25:10–13)" (1986, 178).

where *Canaanite* stems from קַנָּא, a term used to refer to personal zeal (cf. m. San 9:6) and not to the anti-Roman guerrilla (1971, 504–512). Even in the rabbinical literature, the term "zealot" does not necessarily assume a political connotation: in m. San 9:6, the term describes the personal zeal, during the Hasmodean period, that pushed some Jews to persecute fellow Jews who were not keeping the prescription of the Mosaic law (ibid., 507; cf. also Fairchild 1999, 519). Hyppolitus (Hypp.haer. 9:21–26), one of the Apostolic Fathers, also mentions the Zealots.[4] In his attempt to describe the Essenes, Hyppolitus identifies within the sect four different tendencies:

> If a member of the second party hears that someone has been speaking about God and his laws, but is not circumcised, he lies in wait for him and where he finds him alone threatens him with death if he doesn't let himself be circumcised. If he does not obey, he is not spared, but is killed. It is for this reason that they have received the name ζηλωταί. But some call them σικάριοι.

Fairchild however remarks that according to 1QM 1:13; 6:16; 4Q471 1:3–5, and 4Q448 2:7, "zealot" was used to describe a fanatic, and not an individual belonging to a specific sect. Zealous ideology also appears in Qumran 4 QMMT (4Q397–399) 7–10, but with no proof of the violence Hyppolitus reports (Fairchild 1999, 524). As a result, Hyppolitus' description seems rather confusing and may lack historical value (Borg 1971, 509–510).

Generally speaking, the zealots were not a "unified sect of Judaism with a distinctive theology and continuous leadership extending from the Maccabean period to the end of the second revolt against Rome". Economic hardship and taxation, mixed with a tradition of religious ideology rooted in the Maccabean period, provoked some cases of patriotic and religious militarism in sociologically diversified realities: "Essenes, Pharisees, and the unaffiliated masses" (Fairchild 1999, 526).

5.2   The Political Party

Anxious to gain favour in Rome's eyes, Herod instituted heavy taxation that provoked strong resentment among Galilean and Judean peasants. This "unbalanced economy caused by overcapitalized Jerusalem elite and an increasing debit burden on the peasantry" seems to be one of the major causes of the first Jewish revolt; Josephus (J.W. 2:427) highlights the destruction of the debt archives as one of the first deeds accomplished by the insurgents in 66 CE (Kloppenborg 1989, 485). Nationalistic Galileans were supportive of the Hasmonean Antigonus, and even a century after his defeat it was still possible to find some "pocket of

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[4] Among the Apostolic fathers, 1 Clement and Cyprian view zeal as a negative "evil of envy", while Chrysostom, who comments on 2 Corinthians 12:21, "finds high ethical value in imitative zélos (Stumpff 1985, 298).

resistance" (Fairchild 1999, 518). This is what Josephus experienced as he was trying to keep the tributes flowing and maintain peace in the country (J.W. 1:222). In Antiquitates 14:275, Josephus also reports that between 61 BCE and 6 CE, many Galileans who were unable or unwilling to pay taxes were deported and sold as slaves by the Romans. Josephus calls the resulting anti-Roman sentiment the "fourth philosophy": even though the "ideology was probably widely embraced ... concrete action ... [was] infrequently expressed" (Fairchild 1999, 518). Individuals may have simply refused to pay taxes (passive resistance), while some were engaged in banditry.

The words *sicarii* and *zealots* seem to be consistently employed to refer to politically connoted movements involved in active and violent opposition to Rome only around 60 CE. Josephus uses several terms to describe the various groups of rebels operating during the Roman occupation of Palestine in the first century CE, but three of them "seem to have acquired a quasi-technical sense" (Fairchild 1999, 519): λησται (brigands, robbers), σικάριοι (Sicarii), and ζηλωταί (Zealots). Josephus uses the word Zealots to describe a definite group who entered Jerusalem around 67 CE (cf. J.W. 4:161; 7:268–270). Josephus employs the term in an anti-Roman sense only when he recounts the Jewish revolt of 66–70 CE because the term was not used with this connotation before. Donaldson thus notes that "Zealot" became a technical term designating a political party only during the revolt against Rome in 66–70 CE (Fairchild 1999, 672; see also Rhoads 1992, 1045). The Zealot "political" movement of liberation very likely originated among the peasants. In 66 CE, when Rome was about to crush the Galilean resistance, many fugitives fled to Jerusalem. While traveling, they became involved in banditry initiatives to survive (earning the title λησται). After arriving in Jerusalem, many of them banded together, acquiring the technical name of Zealots. Thus, the Zealots themselves were not the cause of the revolt and of the subsequent war, but a *product* of them. The Zealots did not have a specific political agenda, as the Sicarii did. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine in reading Josephus that those groups were completely sealed off from each other (J.W. 4:138, 197–202).

Having said that, it must be added that Josephus makes considerable efforts to show that the Zealots (as a revolutionary movement) were in fact an aberration and did not belong to the true "spirit" of Judaism.[5] While his earlier writings (cf. J.W. 2:117–166) do not give to the zealot movement the name or the status of a sect, as with the Pharisees, Sadducees and Essenes, Josephus lists them along with the others in Antiquitates 18:4–25, but "clearly distinguished as being an anomaly" (Fairchild 1999, 523). The Zealots are described as "malcontents, miscreants,

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[5] Sanders 1992, 409: "Josephus wished to isolate the revolt as an aberration and to claim that only 'brigands' and the like, or holders of some strange fourth philosophy, opposed peaceful existence under the rule of Rome."

zealous for vice in its basest and most extravagant form.[6] What still puzzles scholars is why Josephus would make a clear link between the Maccabees and the Zealots. The Maccabees were considered heroes and a source of inspiration during the first century[7], so why would Josephus rewrite 1 Maccabeans 2:20–25 (where the verb ζηλόω describes Mattathias' zeal) replacing the participle ζηλῶν with the substantive ζηλωτής (Ant. 12:271: εἴ τις ζηλωτής ἐστιν τῶν πατρίων ἐθῶν, "If anyone is a Zealot for the ancestral customs")? (Fairchild 1999, 522) Maybe Josephus was implicitly criticizing the Zealot political party of his time by reminding them of the "original" zealots who, earlier in Jewish history, displayed a more noble attachment to God, the Land, and the Law.

5.3 Paul the "Zealot"

In light of the historical reconstruction above, even though Paul identifies himself as "zealous" at least two times, in Galatians 1:14 ("I advanced in Judaism beyond many among my people of the same age, for I was far more zealous [περισσοτέρως ζηλωτής] for the traditions of my ancestors"), and in Philippians 3:6 ("as to zeal [κατὰ ζῆλος], a persecutor of the church"), we should not consider Paul as a member of the Zealot political party. In both instances (and only here), Paul also mentions his persecution of the "church of God" (cf. also 1 Cor 15:9). Since the Jews thought that the transgression of the Law and apostasy could delay the coming of the Messianic Age, Paul may have viewed the Jewish Christians as a dangerous schismatic and apostate movement. In Paul's mind, the persecution of the Church was nothing else than his attempt to fulfill God's will (Longeneker 1971, 35). Because he describes himself as a "zealot" in Galatians 1:13–14, Paul seems to have shared the same zeal of Mattathias described by Josephus in Antiquitates 12:271: a passionate concern for ancestral traditions and a willingness to violently persecute infidels threatening such traditions (Fairchild 1999, 527). Paul presents himself as being a more radical Jew than many of his age since he burns of an excess of zeal, linking his "advancing" with "persecuting". Though it is debatable whether Paul was fighting the Christians because he perceived the *kerygma* about Christ as being an anti-Torah message or because the Christians were just "permissive" in their obedience of the Torah, it seems very clear that when Paul describes himself as a "zealot", he was not associating himself with any identifiable political party (cf. Donaldson 1989, 672).

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[6] Borg 1971, 506; referring to J.W. 2:651; 4:160–161; 7:270. See also the negative image given of Manahem (66 CE) in J.W. 2:442–445.

[7] The Megilloth Taanith (end of the first or beginning of the second century CE) contain a "calendar listing days commemorating the great Maccabeans victories" (Maccoby 1986, 158).

6. A Pharisee

6.1 Who Were They?

Josephus mentions the Pharisees in three of his works: Jewish War (written in 75–79 CE), Antiquities (93–94 CE), and The Life (95 CE). Murphy-O'Connor remarks that "[n]ot only are these accounts difficult to reconcile with one another, but some details are implausible, and the most extensive treatment is highly tendentious" (Murphy-O'Connor 1996, 54). The overall picture is that the Pharisees were a somewhat political group meticulous in their table-fellowship practices and quite active during the conflictual Hasmonean period. However, their political influence declined greatly under the influence of Hillel the Elder, contemporary of Herod (37–34 BCE). Things may have changed with the advent of Hillel's successor, Gamaliel I (m. Avot 1:18; m. Sota 9:15), but we can only speculate on late rabbinic literature (Murphy-O'Connor 1996, 55).

Baumgarten suggests that since παράδοσις ("tradition") refers to the Pharisees' teachings and appears in diverse sources (Josephus, Gospels and rabbinic literature), it may have been a technical term used by first century Pharisees (Baumgarten 1987, 64). Josephus sometimes employs the word "tradition" when referring to the traditions of Gentile nations (Against Apion 1:2; 1:6) or to the Pentateuch (Against Apion 1:8; cf. Acts 6:14). According to Josephus (Ant. 13:10.6), the Pharisees also observed non-written laws, later proscribed by the Sadducees, but probably in force in earlier times (cf. 1QH 4:14–15). When Queen Alexandra assumed power, those non-written laws were again enforced (Ant. 13:16.2).

A portion of the oral Laws, or oral Torah, was considered as ancient as the written Torah, as both were given to Moses on Mount Sinai (Maccoby 1986, 20). The "*paradosis* of the elders" is under attack in Mark 7 and Matthew 15:1–20, and may be a reference to this unwritten law. The plural παραδόσεων also appears in Galatians 1:14: "the traditions of my fathers" (τῶν πατρικῶν μου παραδόσεων). The "tradition-*paradosis*" guarded by the Pharisees is a field in which many legalistic battles were supposedly fought between the Pharisees themselves (Ant. 13:10.6; cf. 'Abot R. Nat., 5; Baumgarten 1987, 70), to the point that some political division occurred even between Pharisees of the first century (cf. Josephus, J.W. 2:411; 4:159; Life 190ff; Hengel 1991, 45).

Paul's "traditions of my fathers" (Gal 1:14) is echoed by Josephus' "tradition of our forefathers" (Ant. 13:10.6), and both seem to corroborate the idea that Pharisees engrafted their teachings (and teachers) to an older tradition. By the same process, they equated modern teachers with older ones (cf. Eccles 44:12).

6.2 Where Were They?

Murphy-O'Connor makes considerable efforts to show that the Pharisees were active only in Jerusalem during the first century (Murphy-O'Connor 1996, 55–60). This would "prove" that Paul, by claiming to be a Pharisee, had to go to Jerusalem to be trained in pharisaic studies. His argument is developed thus: (1) according to Josephus and the Gospel of John, the Pharisees were found only in Jerusalem; (2) Mark places them also in Galilee, but it seems that this is the effect of his redactional work (2:16→2:13; 3:6→3:7; 7:1→6:53; 8:11→8:13); (3) in Matthew and in Luke the Pharisees are Jesus' enemies *par excellence*, therefore it is natural (and redactional) to find them almost everywhere Jesus goes; (4) in Luke 13:31 they know Herod's intention, therefore they were from Jerusalem. Murphy-O'Connor also disallows the possibility that at least two of the three letters found in t. San 2:6 (also in t. San 1:2 and b. San 11b) were addressed to Pharisees living in Galilee. This is because the Pharisees did not need to be reminded about paying their tithes, and they would not go into non-urbanized areas where it would be too hard to observe their scrupulous laws of purity. However, Murphy-O'Connor seems to speculate on the Pharisee's first century habits and sees them acting as they are portrayed in the rabbinic literature. O'Connor also rejects the idea of Pharisees living in the Diaspora. He claims that if Paul claimed to be a Pharisee, he must have joined a group in Jerusalem, maybe around 15 CE. He then concludes that in Galatians 1:14 Paul is claiming to belong to a minority of scholars.

Hengel supports Murphy-O'Connor's view, as he states that we cannot know anything about a so-called diaspora Pharisaism, and that the Pharisees were only in Jerusalem (Hengel 1991, 27–34). He quotes m. AZ 4:7; t. AZ 6:7; b. AZ 54b; and b. Ket 88a as mentioning *rabbinic* (i.e., non-Pharisaic) schools in the Diaspora, but only after 70 and 132–135 CE. Having said that, one must recognize that "virtually no documents have survived that come from the Pharisees themselves" (Baumgarten 1987, 63). Baumgarten might have gone too far in stating that Josephus, although claiming to be a Pharisee, "shows little indication of Pharisaic belief or practice in his life or writings" (ibid., 63). But what do we really know about the Pharisees of the first century? We know them from Josephus, the Gospels, Qumran and the rabbinical writings, but all these sources are biased for one reason or another. Paul's claim that he studied in Jerusalem cannot be proved or disproved by an independent source, and does not need to be. The same can be said of Diaspora Pharisees; if they were active outside Palestine, they probably were not as portrayed in the second century and later literature.

6.3   Was Paul a Pharisee?

Paul calls himself a Pharisee only once, in Philippians 3:5 ("…in regard to the law, a Pharisee [κατὰ νόμον Φαρισαῖος]"). It has been argued that Paul would be able to reproduce the "exegetical forms of the earlier teachers" (Longenecker 1971, 25), however (and unfortunately) there is nothing coming directly from the "earlier teachers". In the same stream, W. D. Davies depicts Paul as a "Rabbi become Christian" (Davies 1955, 1–16). If this is so, his being also a ζηλωτής must be very informative about Rabbi-Pharisees in the first century!

Other scholars think that Paul was no Pharisee (Maccoby 1986, 61, and Montefiore 1914, 90–93; according to the latter, Paul was a Jew from the Diaspora, not well acquainted with Jerusalemite Pharisaism). Paul's claim of being a Pharisee can be explained by his intention to exploit the typical Jesus/Pharisees antithesis developed by the canonical Gospels and already adopted by communities (such as the Philippians) who were ignorant of the Palestinian religious panorama and variety. According to Maccoby, Paul was not a Pharisee because (Maccoby 1986, 62–94):

(1) The Pauline expression ἐν Χριστῷ does not have any parallel in Jewish literature.

(2) Χριστός as a divine title is not compatible with the Jewish theology.

(3) Κύριος, used to define Jesus, is a blasphemy for Jews, since the term in the LXX translated the YHWH of the Hebrew Bible.

(4) Paul does not use a Pharisaic style or hermeneutic: Romans 5:10, 5:17, and 11:15 are not examples of the pharisaic hermeneutical "tools" such as the *qal wa-homer* ("light and heavy", or the *a fortiori* argument).

(5) Galatians 3:13 is not a pharisaic *midrash*: the Pharisees did not consider dying on a cross or being hanged as a curse, since many Pharisees died on a cross under the Roman occupation. The curse was on the people if they did not remove the corpse before night. Moreover, the condemned expiated his guilt by his own death (Deut 21:23; t. San 9:5).

(6) Romans 7:1–7 is a clumsy attempt to imitate, without success, the pharisaic construct known as legal analogy: "[w]hat Paul is saying … is that death dissolves legal ties. Therefore the death of Jesus and the symbolic death of members of the church by identifying themselves with Jesus' sacrifice all contribute to a loosening of ties with the Old Covenant" (Maccoby 1986, 70).

(7) Paul needed to know Hebrew to be a Pharisee. Such knowledge was quiet rare in Paul's time (this explains the large production and use of the targumim). Paul quotes the LXX, not the Hebrew Bible, building his theology on that translation (cf. 1 Cor 11:55 as quoting Hosea 13:14 LXX, not MT).

(8) Paul is not necessarily acquainted with Pharisaic traditions: the legend of the "moving well or rock" in 1 Corinthians 10:4 is also known by Pseudo-Philo 12c–13a, and thus already known in Greek in the first century.

(9) Although Paul does not critique the Torah, he assumes that its just requests are impossible for a man to accomplish (Rom 7:14–8:1). According to him, the Torah was given to reveal the intrinsic weakness of man. Pharisees would instead think that fulfilling the Law was within the range of human accomplishment (Deut 30:11–14).

(10) Paul would have had a "divided self", a "moral struggle" common in the Gnostic *sarx-pneuma* dualism, but totally absent in the Pharisaic sect.

(11) Paul was concerned about the salvation of the Gentiles, while the Pharisees had already resolved the question by producing the *Noahide Laws*: Maccoby sees in Jubilees 7:20–39 (2nd century BCE) an allusion to a certain "code for Gentiles", but this is not the Noahide Laws.

Maccoby inevitably concludes that Paul reveals himself not only as a non-Pharisee, but even as a non-Jew in Galatians 3:13–14: "Christ redeemed *us* ... in order that in Christ Jesus the blessing of Abraham might come to the Gentiles, so that *we* might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith" (Maccoby 1986, 95).

Maccoby's lengthy discussion on this topic is less impressive and convincing than it first appears. His arguments are mostly built on shaky ground: for instance, Maccoby's assumption that Romans 7:14–8:1 refers to the post-conversion inner-man conflict is not certain. On the contrary, recently scholars have convincingly argued that Paul is referring to the pre-conversion experience, and that the Law has a prominent place in his theology, that is, the Law is "confirmed", but in its proper role (cf. Rom 3:31).[8] The truth is that we know very little of Pharisaism of the Second Temple Period. Sanders concludes his voluminous book by saying that Pharisaism before 70 CE *might* have had a "covenantal nomism" character (Sanders 1992, 426–428). Jacob Neusner, at the end of his three-volume study on Pharisaic traditions during the Second Temple Period, also says:

> So, in all, we have from the rabbis a very sketchy account of the life of Pharisaism during less than the last century of its existence before 70 … almost entirely the internal record of the life of the party and its laws … the laws being mainly rules of how and what people might eat with one another (Neusner 1971, 319).

Therefore, one must be very careful in reconstructing first-century Pharisees' theology and practises. Even Richard Longenecker, who attempts to counter Maccoby's arguments by correlating Paul's pessimism in keeping the Law with some Jewish literature (e.g., m. Avot 2:1; m. Mak 3:14; b Shabb 70b; t. Shevu 3:6; 4 Macc 5:20,21; 1QS 1:14; 4 Ezra 7:116–126),[9] suffers the criticism that most of the quoted works are in fact late rabbinic literature.

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[8] See for instance Longenecker 2005, 88–93. Against Maccoby's view of a clumsy usage of rabbinical hermeneutical tools by Paul, see Kister 2007, 391–424.

[9] 4 Ezra is not reliable, according to Sanders 1977, 428, for knowledge about second Temple Judaism.

Instead of *acting* as if we know a lot about first century Pharisees' thought, we simply confess that we possess almost no documentation coming directly from them that would permit us to speculate about their theology and hermeneutics. Although some of Maccoby's arguments have some ground, he is more successful in depicting Paul as being unlike Pharisees *as we know them from descriptions recorded after 135 CE*. In light of later rabbinical literature, Maccoby imagines first-century relationships between the service at the Temple and Pharisees in the following terms: "they did not consider these ceremonies [sacrifices] as central to their religious life, which focused rather on the acquisition of knowledge about how people should live together in society" (Maccoby 1986, 24). However, this view has no foundation at all and it seems too much like Pharisaism after 70 CE. The truth is that it is hard to fully understand what Paul meant by saying that he was κατὰ νόμον Φαρισαῖος (Phil 3:50). Surely he was not claiming to belong to some renowned elite of rabbinic scholars as we know them from the Talmud.

Recent developments in Pauline studies point to a linguistic and cultural difference between the Western and Eastern Diaspora. Paul, coming from Tarsus, belonged to the Hellenistic Western Diaspora and therefore spoke mostly Greek. He was more acquainted with Greek literature (e.g., LXX, Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha eventually rejected by the Sages of the East who clung to, and eventually produced, Hebrew and Aramaic literature such as the Targumim, the Mishna and the Talmud) and Hellenistic culture, though he also knew some of the rabbinic law and lore (Mendels and Edrei 2010; Mendels and Edrei 2007, 91–137; Mendels and Edrei 2008, 163–187). The hiatus between the two Diasporas seems to explain why Paul preferred travelling and preaching west of Israel:

> The only population he [Paul] thought might accept his teachings were the Jews of the Greek-speaking diaspora who did not have the Oral Law. Paul and the apostles and subsequently the Church Fathers all taught in the west. Paul's big advantage, and subsequently that of the Church Fathers, was that they, unlike the sages of the eastern diaspora, taught in Greek. Paul's ability to enter the public sphere of the Jewish community via the synagogue was possible because there Jews were spiritually cut off from the center in the Land of Israel and from Babylonia – places where the Oral Law, with its intricate legal traditions, bound and governed the Jewish community (Mendels 2011, 54).

As a Jew from the Western Diaspora who had been also trained in Palestine (Acts 22:3), Paul had a solid Hellenistic background and also access to the Hebrew/Aramaic cultural milieu. However, Paul apparently preferred to speak in Greek and to Greek-speaking people. Once again, this is not what one might expect from a Pharisee as described in later (Hebrew) rabbinical literature.[10]

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[10] Actually, later Pharisees/Rabbis refrained from writing and eventually translating the Oral Law in Greek because they feared that "others" (Christians?) would read it and claim "I am Israel". The Oral Law, in its oral form, and later in its Hebrew written form, had to be the "secret" between God and Israel; cf. Midrash Tanhuma, ki Tissa 34, quoted in Mendels 2011, 54.

7. Conclusion

Krister Stendahl long ago proposed replacing the word *conversion* with *call* or *vocation*, when referring to Paul's religious experience.[11] He noted that the formulation of Galatians 1:13–16 is very close to Isaiah 49:1–6 LXX and Jeremiah 1:5 LXX (cf. also Ez 2:1–3 LXX). In other words, Paul is equating his experience to that of an ancient prophet of Israel: he has been called by God himself from his mother's womb to pursue a precise mandate, and the Lord appointed him to go to the Gentiles (Rom 3:30). According to Philippians 3:6 ("as for legalistic righteousness, faultless"), Paul is not frustrated towards the Law as Luther was.[12] It is therefore logical to suppose that in Philippians 3:13ff Paul is talking about his successes – instead of his frustrations – as being "a loss". Moreover, although Paul considered the persecution of the church as a sin, he also seems to say that he has paid off his debt (1 Cor 15:9–11). If we may assume that Paul was a Diaspora Jew, it seems he overemphasizes his deep and strong connection with his people, land, and traditions.

Though he is not talking about the political party as established in 68–70 CE, his claim of being a "zealot" points to a connection between his zeal and his persecution of the Christians. This is because his zeal for the Law was lived out along with the absence of any reluctance to use violence as a means to fulfill God's will. Paul "never speaks of his previous life in Judaism as one hideous mistake, nor as a bondage" (Longenecker 1971, 29–30). More strikingly, *after* his conversion/call, Paul was persuaded to be a rightful and godly Jew living out what was actually *true* Judaism (Boyarin 1994, 2; see also Hurtado 1993, 284): he never gave up his zeal for God, nor deprecated his being a Benjaminite or a Pharisee. In Boyarin's words, Paul "represents the interface between 'Jew' as a self-identical essence and 'Jew' as a construction constantly being remade" (Boyarin 1994, 2). As such, the apostle of the Gentiles was still living out the zeal described in the Old Testament and extracanonical passages that were inspiring his actions before his conversion/call. Paul confirms this with his own words in 2 Corinthians 11:2: "for I am jealous (ζηλῶ) for you with a jealousy of God (θεοῦ ζήλῳ), for I betrothed you to one husband to present you as an unsullied virgin to Christ" (cf. also 1 Cor 10:22).[13] Just as God is working with zeal to keep the Christians in Corinth (as He did with Israel) from idolatry, so Paul seeks, with the same holy zeal, to keep them pure (Stumpff 1985, 298).

Paul's persecution of the church contradicted his "being separated/appointed from his mother's womb" (cf. Gal 1:15). Paul himself explains this contradiction in 1 Corinthians 15:8–10 by defining himself as an ἔκτρωμα, that is, an untimely

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[11] Stendahl 1980, 7–23.

[12] Cf. also 1 Corinthians 4:4: "I am not aware of anything against myself, but I am not thereby acquitted. It is the Lord who judges me".

[13] Translation is mine.

birth.[14] Within this context, Paul considers himself "the least" and "not enough" compared to the other apostles (v. 9); nevertheless, he also affirms that, "by the grace of God, I am what I am" (v. 10). In other words, Paul, as an ἔκτρωμα, is someone who was "born" a little late compared to his fellow apostles. This birth is not to be understood in terms of "Paul's Judaism as embryonic of the true religion", but rather as "Paul's appointment as an apostle and his initial opposition to that appointment through his persecution of the church" (Nickelsburg 1986, 204; cf. also Gal 1:15).

Paul considered himself more as a "delayed childbirth" than a "new creation" with regards to his religious and cultural identity. What he was and did before, in fact, is somewhat continuous with what he became after his encounter with the risen Christ. Though his encounter with Christ was obviously a dramatic experience in his life, the newness of Jesus did not obliterate Paul's past: it actually helped him to bring it to the God-appointed completion. Therefore, Paul estimated himself (albeit *in fieri*) an Israelite, a Benjaminite, a Hebrew, a Jew, a Pharisee, and a zealot for God and His plan as revealed in Christ.

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[14] Ektrôma could either mean an abortion, an abortive birth, or an untimely birth (Thayer 1981, s.v. ἔκτρωμα,; cf. Louw and Nida 1988, s.v. ἔκτρωμα. The context of 1 Corinthians 15:8–10 makes clear that Paul acknowledges his own apostolic call as atypical, just as an untimely birth is atypical compared to a timely one. Nevertheless the "child" seems to be born anyway "by the grace of God", since in v. 10–11 he affirms the legitimacy of his apostolate.

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Résumé

Paul était un Juif de la Diaspora qui n'a jamais cessé d'affirmer son lien profond avec le peuple, le territoire et le traditions d'Israël. Même après sa conversion/vocation, il était persuadé être un bon Juif qui vivait en accord avec le vrai judaïsme. Ce qu'il avait fait et été avant sa dramatique rencontre avec le Ressuscité est en solution de continuité avec ce qu'il est devenu après. Jésus n'a pas effacé le passé de Paul, il a plutôt amené ce passé à son accomplissement selon le plan de Dieu. Cet article donne une vue d'ensemble de la manière dont des textes tels que 1 Cor 9:20–21, 2 Cor 11:22, Phil 3:4–6, Gal 1:13–14, et Rom 11:1 sont compris comme des indicateurs que Paul s'est toujours considéré (même si en devenir) Israélite, Hébreux, Benjaminite, Juif, Pharisien et zélote pour Dieu et pour son plan tel qu'il a été révélé en Christ.

Zusammenfassung

Paulus war ein Jude aus der Diaspora, der niemals aufhörte, seine tiefe Verbindung mit dem Volk, dem Land und den Traditionen Israels zu betonen. Auch nach seiner Bekehrung bzw. Berufung war Paulus davon überzeugt, dass er als frommer Jude das wahre Judentum auslebe. Was er zuvor war und tat steht in Kontinuität mit dem, was er nach seiner dramatischen Begegnung mit dem auferstandenen Christus wurde. Jesus merzte die Vergangenheit des Paulus nicht aus, sondern half ihm, diese zur (von Gott) bestimmten Vollendung zu bringen. Dieser Artikel bietet eine Übersicht darüber, wie die Texte z.B. in 1. Korinther 9,20–21, 2. Korinther 11,22, Philipper 3,4–6, Galater 1,13–14 und Römer 11,1 als Hinweise darauf zu verstehen sind, dass Paulus sich stets (wenngleich *in fieri*) als Israelit, Benjaminit, Hebräer, Jude, Pharisäer und Zelot für Gott und seinen in Christus offenbarten Plan verstand.

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Grundzüge des Zelotismus bei Josephus und im Neuen Testament

René Gehring

Zusammenfassung

In diesem Artikel werden zunächst die Gruppenbezeichnungen sowie die inhaltlichen Hinweise zum Zelotentum innerhalb der Schriften des Flavius Josephus untersucht. Die hieraus gewonnenen Grundmuster dieser gewalt-sam-revolutionären Strömung werden dann auf latente, grundsätzlich nur schwach erkennbare Andeutungen innerhalb der neutestamentlichen Schrif-ten angewandt und eine entsprechende zelotische „Atmosphäre" der jeweili-gen Situation hervorgehoben. Abschließend geht es darum, Schnittmengen und Gegensätze zwischen den zelotischen Anklängen und der neutestament-lich-christlichen Geisteshaltung herauszustellen.

Die Literatur über „die Zeloten" ist im vergangenen Jahrhundert nahezu unüber-schaubar geworden. Markant sind hierbei die nach wie vor ungelösten Fragen zu grundlegenden Charakteristika der Sekte, besonders auch die Diskussionen über deren eigentlichen Namen und zur Abgrenzung der Gruppe. Was speziell mög-liche Verbindungen zum Neuen Testament betrifft, so liegen hierzu erst wenige Untersuchungen vor.

Als Hauptquelle der Informationen zu dieser Strömung im Judentum des 1. Jh. n. Chr. muss Flavius Josephus gelten, der das zelotische Wirken noch aus eigener Anschauung, speziell durch sein Amt als Heeresführer im Jüdischen Krieg, kannte.[1] Auffällig ist hierbei seine Zurückhaltung hinsichtlich einer klaren Ab-grenzung des Zelotentums zum einfachen jüdischen Volk und den anderen Parteien. Während er sie zwar als eigenständige „Philosophie" bezeichnet, gibt er ihnen doch keinen konkreten Namen (er nennt sie lediglich „Eiferer", „Mörder" oder „Räuber").[2] Seine weiteren Beschreibungen lassen immer wieder den Ver-dacht aufkommen, dass es sich um eine unterschwellig auch in den übrigen Parteien sowie dem einfachen Volk aufkeimende, aggressiv-nationalistische Geisteshaltung handelt.

Das Neue Testament weiß hierzu nicht viel zu berichten. Manche Forscher sind gar der Überzeugung, dass es in der Zeit bis zum Ende des 1. Jh. n. Chr. fast keine

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[1] Weitere (außerjüdische) althistorische Quellen über die Zeloten sind: Hipp. Ref. 9:26; Tac. hist. 5:10–13; Suet. Vesp. 6; Tit. 3f.; Cass. Dio 66:1:4–7.

[2] Die in diesem Artikel mit doppelten Anführungszeichen gekennzeichneten Begriffe kommen wörtlich in der jeweiligen Quelle vor; die mit einfachen Anführungszeichen markierten dienen der Hervorhebung durch den Verfasser.

Erkenntnisse zum Zelotentum gab. Der vorliegende Artikel beabsichtigt, nach einer einführenden Übersicht über die wenigen konkreten Angaben des Josephus zu den Zeloten in den Jahren vor dem Krieg, gerade dieser Frage nachzugehen und zu untersuchen, inwieweit das Zelotentum zumindest subtil in den Berichten des Neuen Testaments über das Leben Jesu anklingt. Da es sich allgemein um eine vergleichsweise ruhige Phase noch Jahrzehnte vor dem ersten Aufflackern des Jüdischen Krieges (66–70 n. Chr.) handelt, sind verständlicherweise nur recht unkonkrete Anspielungen zu erkennen, die hier nun hervorgehoben werden sollen.

1. Josephus' knappe Charakterisierung des Zelotentums

Josephus bezeichnet die zelotischen Umtriebe als „vierte Philosophie" (τετάρτην φιλοσοφίαν) der Juden, gegründet durch den Galiläer Judas und seinen *phari-säischen* Kollegen Sadduk (vgl. Bell. 2:118; Ant. 18:3–10). Sie steht in engem Zusammenhang mit der Gesamtdarstellung der drei ‚offiziellen' jüdischen Richtungen und wird von Josephus als ‚illegitime' Richtung bewertet, die den Juden all das Leid des Krieges brachte.[3] Diese wird von vielen Forschern mit den späteren „Zeloten" (ζηλωταί), „Sikariern" (σικάριοι) oder „Räubern" (λησταί) in Verbindung gebracht, die vermutlich eine breite, nur lose organisierte Front gegen die römische Besatzungsmacht bildeten – als solche aber namentlich erst zu Beginn des Jüdischen Krieges in Erscheinung treten.[4]

Die Gruppenbezeichnungen. Es ist zu beachten, dass der Begriff „Zeloten" kein Name im eigentlichen Sinne ist. Das griechische Wort ζηλωτής bzw. ζηλωταί bedeutet schlicht „Eiferer" und wird entsprechend auch unabhängig von einer

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[3] Interessant ist hierbei, dass Josephus grundsätzlich für alle Schulen die gleichen Begriffe verwendet, ohne eine inhaltliche Differenzierung vorzunehmen (vgl. auch Baumbach 1989, 174). Auf diese Weise wird prinzipiell auch die „vierte" Schule zunächst auf eine Stufe mit den anderen drei gestellt, obwohl die näheren Beschreibungen schließlich eine deutliche Abgrenzung (Essener, Pharisäer und Sadduzäer contra Judas und Sadduk) erkennen lassen. Allerdings fällt auch auf, dass der griechische Text der ausführlichsten Passage in Ant. 18 entgegen der gängigen Übersetzungen zumindest in der konkreten Bezeichnung als τετάρτην φιλοσοφίαν bzw. τετάρτη τῶν φιλοσοφιῶν (Ant. 18:9.23) lediglich von einer „vierten Philosophie" spricht und dieser Richtung nicht das Prädikat „Schule", „Partei" oder „Sekte" zuerkennt. (Dagegen verwendet zumindest Bell. 2:118 den Terminus αἵρεσις.)

[4] Erstmals sicher zu identifizieren in Bell. 4:161f. (so nach Horsley 1986 a, 162). Ausführlichere Untersuchungen der zelotischen Bewegung innerhalb des Jüdischen Krieges der Jahre 66–70 n. Chr. finden sich repräsentativ in folgenden Werken: Hengel 1961/1976 (=2011) und 1974; Driver 1965; Farmer 1957; Horsley 1979 a, 1979 b, 1985, 1986 a, 1986 b; Baumbach 1965; Smith 1971; Kingdon 1972; Wegenast 1916; Schürer 1973–1987, Bd. 2, 598–606; Stern 1977; Rhoads 1976; Donaldson 1990; Deines 2004, 628–630; Roth 1959; einen Beitrag zur Person des Judas aus Galiläa und seiner Schule liefert auch Black 1974, 45–54; speziell zu den jüdischen „Banditen" und deren Identität im Rahmen der zelotischen Freiheitsbewegung auch Horsley 1981.

Parteizuordnung gebraucht.[5] Allerdings bezieht Josephus den Plural ζηλωταί meist auf eben jene Gruppe, zumindest im Kontext des Jüdischen Krieges.[6] Überhaupt tritt die Gruppe der Zeloten erst im Rahmen des Krieges auf, was indes nicht notwendigerweise gegen ihre (zumindest unorganisierte, latente) vorherige Existenz sprechen muss, vielmehr entwickelte sich dieser militante Widerstand in den Jahrzehnten zuvor.[7]

Bei dem Begriff „Sikarier" (σικάριοι) ist es etwas leichter. Dieser bedeutet „Mörder / Attentäter" und wird abgeleitet von dem Namen für den kurzen, krummen Dolch (lat. sicae), den die Anhänger dieser zelotischen Richtung bei sich trugen, um als Meuchelmörder ihre Opfer zu beseitigen. Diese Bezeichnung wird von Josephus ausschließlich im Zusammenhang mit der jüdischen Mörderschar des Jüdischen Krieges verwendet, daher auch stets im Plural, nie im Singular (σικάριος).[8]

Die λησταί („Beutemacher / Räuber")[9] werden zum Teil als eigenständige Gruppierung betrachtet (zumindest im Umfeld des Krieges), gelten anderen aber auch als eine frühe Bezeichnung der späteren Zeloten und damit als mit diesen identisch;[10] oder als zumindest teilweise kongruent mit den Zeloten (so z.B. Fairchild 1999, 21; Shimon 1971, 163).

Inwieweit die drei Gruppen sich überschneiden oder gar synonyme Bezeichnungen für ein und dieselbe Gruppe tragen, ist unklar. Die beiden Gruppen der Zeloten und Sikarier gelten meist als nicht deckungsgleich, obwohl es weite Überschneidungen gab und die Sikarier sicherlich auch der „vierten Philosophie" entstammten.[11] Manche Forscher wollen gar allein (oder zumindest primär) die Sikarier als mit der „vierten Philosophie" des Josephus identisch verstehen.[12] Zumindest σικάριοι und λησταί bildeten wohl eigenständige Gruppen innerhalb dieser aufständischen Bewegung.[13]

Insgesamt erscheint es am sichersten, unter den „Zeloten" schlicht eine breite radikal-nationalistische Front zu erkennen, die in sich nicht geschlossen und auch

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[5] Vgl. z.B. Ant. 12:271; Bell. 5:103.314; 6:59; Vita 11; C.Ap. 1:162; Zeitlin 1962, 395, übersetzt: „devoted / fanatic / emulative / zealous", vgl. auch LSJ s.v. ζηλωτής.

[6] Vgl. z.B. Bell. 4:196.199.291.305.310.326.340.355.387f.; 5:250 etc.

[7] Gegen Horsley 1981, 409; 1985, pass.; für eine frühe Entwicklung der Zeloten (aus der vierten Sekte heraus) z.B. Hengel 1976, 91f.; Neusner 1975, 19; Brandon 1971, 453; Deines 2000, 741f.; 2004, 627; Donaldson 1990, 19; Weiß 1996, 479; Brandon 1967, 31–40.52; Shimon 1971, 158f.; Zeitlin 1988, 134; Heiligenthal 2005, 32; Daniel 1966, 89.

[8] Vgl. z. B. Ant. 20:1.186.208; Bell. 2:254; 4:400; 7:254.262.311.

[9] Siehe LSJ und Rengstorf 1942, 262f.

[10] So Rengstorf 1942, 263–267; ähnlich Fairchild 1999, 21; Shimon 1971, 163.

[11] Vgl. Horsley 1979b, 442; 1985, 335; 1986b, 3; Smith 1971, 18; Zeitlin 1962, 395f.; Rengstorf 1942, 259f.; Hengel 1976, 47–54; ähnlich Parente 1984–85, 197: „a faction of the Zealots, those termed *sicarii*." Siehe zur Begrifflichkeit auch Zeitlin 1962, 395f.; Hengel 1976, 25–78: Hier sind auch die sog. „Galiläer" (Γαλιλαῖοι) inkludiert.

[12] So beispielsweise Horsley 1985, 340–347 (5-mal): „Fourth Philosophy/Sicarii"; so auch in Horsley 1986a, 190; Zeitlin 1962, 395f.; Kingdon 1972, 80; Roth 1962, 63 / fn. 1; Parente 1984–85, 197.

[13] Besonders betont von Smith 1971, 19; Zeitlin 1962, 397; Horsley 1986a, 190.

nicht straff organisiert, sondern die vielfach sogar von starken inneren Konflikten (organisatorisch wie auch ideologisch-moralisch) gekennzeichnet war. Die einzelnen Gruppen mit ihren Sonderbezeichnungen befinden sich demnach innerhalb dieser übergeordneten ‚Bewegung', ohne dass eine genaue Abgrenzung möglich oder auch nur nötig wäre.[14] In diesem Artikel wird der Begriff „Zeloten" daher entsprechend seiner eigentlichen Breite als allgemeine Bezeichnung für alle nationalistischen „Eiferer" (eben ζηλωταί) verwendet, unabhängig von den Verzweigungen bzw. Aufspaltungen, die sich in den Jahren von 6 bis 66 n. Chr. ergeben haben und schließlich zu den unterschiedlichen (konkreten Gruppen-)Bezeichnungen (ζηλωταί, σικάριοι, λησταί, evtl. auch Γαλιλαῖοι) führten.[15]

Die inhaltlichen Hinweise. Die historisch-chronologische Einordnung des Kontextes der frühesten Passagen des Josephus über den Beginn des (ersten) zelotischen Aufstands (Bell. 2:117f. und Ant. 18:1–10.23–25) führt uns in das Jahr 6 n. Chr.[16] Josephus berichtet über diese Zeit:

> Während seiner [des Coponius] Amtsführung verleitete ein gewisser Galiläer Judas seine Landsleute zum Abfall, indem er sie als Feiglinge beschimpfte (κακίζων), wenn sie noch fernerhin Abgaben an die Römer entrichteten und außer Gott auch sterbliche Menschen als ihre Gebieter (δεσπότας) anerkannten. Er war der Schriftgelehrte (bzw. geistige Leiter / Anführer) einer eigenständigen Sekte, die mit den anderen nichts gemein hat (ἦν δ' οὗτος σοφιστὴς ἰδίας αἱρέσεως οὐδὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις προσεοικώς) (Bell. 2:118).

Nach dieser knappen Einführung folgt die lobende und ausführlich-vergleichende Gesamtdarstellung der drei ‚wahren' jüdischen Philosophenschulen (Essener, Pharisäer, Sadduzäer), womit dem Leser doch sehr eindringlich vor Augen geführt werden soll, dass diese neue Philosophie keine Existenzberechtigung hat und sicher auch nicht als authentisch jüdisch angesehen werden kann. Als Kern der Lehre des Judas nennt Josephus das Verwerfen der Anerkennung der römischen Oberherrschaft, was ihn und seine Anhänger schließlich in einen offenen

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[14] Zur Frage nach Einheit und Vielfalt innerhalb der jüdischen Freiheitsbewegung der Jahre 6 bis 74 n. Chr. siehe besonders Hengel 1974, 175–196; Rengstorf 1942, 264; Horsley 1979 a, 1979 b, 1986 a; Smith 1971.

[15] So verfahren auch z. B. Heiligenthal 2005, 32; Baumbach 1973, 273; ähnlich Shimon 1971, 163. Außerdem gibt Kingdon (1972, 80) zu bedenken: „It is further possible that these revivalists [i. e., the rebels of A.D. 6] were chary about publishing such titles as zealots, when Varus had so recently crucified 2,000 rebellious Jews. For these Josephus habitually uses the terms brigands (λησταί) and the kindred Roman term *sicarii*". Diese Annahme erscheint durchaus sinnvoll und legt entsprechend eine viel engere Verbindung der einzelnen Gruppen nahe – alle von ähnlichen Motiven getragen (dem vorbildlichen Gotteseifer), obgleich in verschiedener Ausprägung. Als konkreter Ausgangspunkt dieser Strömungen ist demnach der josephischen Angabe folgend das Jahr 6 n. Chr. anzusetzen (siehe Bell. 2:117f.). Man muss insgesamt von einer eher lockeren Organisation ausgehen, nicht von einer abgegrenzten, fest gegründeten „Schule" (so auch Kingdon 1972, 80f.).

[16] Im Jahre 7 n. Chr. erfolgte die im Text erwähnte Volkszählung unter Quirinius, die den Aufstand des Judas zur Folge hatte. Damit liegt eine früheste Einordnung in das Jahr 6 n. Chr. (also kurz vor der Erhebung) nahe.

Aufstand führt.[17] Die nächste Stelle in den *Antiquitates* gibt hierüber noch genaueren Aufschluss. Der vergleichende Bericht zu den Essenern, Pharisäern und Sadduzäern wird in diesem Kapitel geradezu von der Schule des Judas umrahmt und stellt damit deutlich die apologetische Absicht des Josephus heraus, der die drei legitimen Schulen gegen die rebellische zu verteidigen sucht.

Unter Quirinius als Statthalter Syriens und Coponius als römisch-ritterlichem Präfekten Judäas erfolgten eine Vermögensschätzung und der Verkauf der Güter des vorigen Regenten (Herodes Archelaus). „Die Juden wollten zwar anfangs von der Schätzung nichts wissen, gaben jedoch allmählich auf Zureden (πείσαντος) des Hohenpriesters … ihren Widerstand auf und ließen nach seiner Weisung die Schätzung ihres Vermögens ruhig geschehen" (Ant. 18:3). Die Situation scheint damit schon entschärft, und das jüdische Volk hätte sich einen besseren Ruf vor der römischen Obrigkeit erwerben können, doch

> der Gaulaniter Judas dagegen, der aus der Stadt Gamala gebürtig war, reizte (ἠπείγετο) in Gemeinschaft mit dem Pharisäer Sadduk das Volk durch die Vorstellung zum Aufruhr (ἐπὶ ἀποστάσει), die Schätzung bringe nichts anderes als offenbare Knechtschaft (δουλείαν) mit sich, und so forderten sie das gesamte Volk auf, seine Freiheit zu schützen (τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐπ' ἀντιλήψει παρακαλοῦντες τὸ ἔθνος).[18]

Um welche Freiheit es sich genau (oder primär) handelt, lässt Josephus offen; jedenfalls ist der spätere Kampf vorrangig politisch, gegen die römische Ober-herrschaft gerichtet – jedoch mit religiöser Motivation und ausgehend von sozialen Missständen. Vermutlich hat Baumbach recht, wenn er dahinter eine vollkommene Neuordnung der Verhältnisse Judäas in sozialer, politischer und

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[17] Man beachte die knappe Erwähnung und Charakterisierung der Lehre des Judas in Bell. 2:433: „Manaïm, ein Sohn jenes streitbaren Schriftgelehrten Judas aus Galiläa, der einst unter Quirinius es den Juden zum Vorwurf gemacht hatte, dass sie außer Gott auch noch die Römer als Herren anerkannten." Hier scheint es so, als bestehe sie nur aus der theologisch begründeten Auflehnung gegen die Besatzungsmacht der Römer. Und auch die deutliche Aussage „eine eigene Sekte, die mit den anderen nichts gemein hat" scheint dies zu stützen. Verwunderlich ist in diesem Zusammenhang nur, dass Josephus später (die Stelle wird noch zu besprechen sein) die Lehre des Judas und Sadduk als „in allen Stücken mit den Pharisäern übereinstimmend" beschreibt! Anscheinend ist das wegen der rebellischen (Zusatz-)Elemente hier gänzlich unpassend und für Josephus nicht einmal eine Erwähnung wert. Damit bezieht sich dieses „nichts gemein haben" offensichtlich nicht auf die Lehre an sich, sondern auf die Gesinnung, die aufrührerisch und damit nicht genuin jüdisch ist. Hier ist wieder sehr deutlich die apologetische Absicht zugunsten eines friedliebenden und philosophischen Judentums zu erkennen.

[18] Ant. 18:4. Bisher ist es leider noch nicht gelungen, den hier genannten „Pharisäer Sadduk" (Σάδδωκον Φαρισαῖον) „mit einer historischen Persönlichkeit jener Zeit zu identifizieren" (Baumbach 1997, 26; vgl. Hengel 1976, 340). Gleiches gilt für den in jener Zeit sehr häufig begegnenden Namen Judas, der damals der am vierthäufigsten verwendete Name war (so Mason 2008, 81; vgl. Parente 1984–85, 185). Dass im Kampf die „Freiheit" (ἐλευθερία) im Mittelpunkt stand, mag auch aus dem entsprechenden hebräischen Begriff (חֵרוּת) hervorgehen, der auf die Münzen der Kriegszeit geprägt war (vgl. Parente 1984–85, 194; Schürer 1901–1909, 1:766f.; Meshorer 1967, 153, 178–215).

auch religiöser Hinsicht annimmt (Baumbach 1967, 18). Mit dem Versprechen von „Glück …, Ehre und Herrlichkeit" (τὸ εὔδαιμον … τιμήν καὶ κλέος) (Ant. 18:5) verführen sie schließlich das Volk und betonen dabei:

> Gott werde aber nur dann bereit sein, ihnen zu helfen, wenn sie ihre Entschlüsse tatkräftig ins Werk setzten und das besonders, je wichtiger diese ihre Entschlüsse seien und je unverdrossener sie dieselben ausführten (τὸ θεῖον οὐκ ἄλλως ἢ ἐπὶ συμπράξει τῶν βουλευμάτων εἰς τὸ κατορθοῦν συμπροθυμεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἂν μεγάλων ἐρασταὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ καθιστάμενοι μὴ ἐξαφίωνται πόνου τοῦ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς). Derartige Reden wurden mit Beifall aufgenommen, und so dehnte sich das tollkühne Unternehmen bald ins Ungeheuerliche aus; kein Leid gab es, welches nicht durch diese Männer über das Volk gebracht worden wäre (καὶ ἡδονῇ γὰρ τὴν ἀκρόασιν ὧν λέγοιεν ἐδέχοντο οἱ ἄνθρωποι προύκοπτεν ἐπὶ μέγα ἡ ἐπιβολὴ τοῦ τολμήματος κακόν τε οὐκ ἔστιν οὗ μὴ φύεντος ἐκ τῶνδε τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ περαιτέρω τοῦ εἰπεῖν ἀνεπλήσθη τὸ ἔθνος) (Ant. 18:5f.).

Interessant erscheint hier das enge Zusammenwirken zwischen menschlicher Initiative und göttlicher Vollendung: τὸ θεῖον οὐκ ἄλλως ἢ ἐπὶ συμπράξει τῶν βουλευμάτων εἰς τὸ κατορθοῦν.[19] Die Nähe zum pharisäischen Prädestinationsverständnis ist deutlich erkennbar und unterstreicht damit Josephus' spätere Charakterisierung dieser Schule als „in allen Stücken mit den Pharisäern übereinstimmend".[20]

Die Folge war großes Unglück für das gesamte Volk, das sich zudem bei den Römern einmal mehr in Verruf brachte. Josephus stellt sich hierbei wieder deutlich auf die Seite der Römer, indem er sagt, „ihre *Freunde*, die ihnen hätten beistehen können, hatten sie verloren" (ἀποστέρησιν *φίλων* οἳ καὶ ἐπελαφρύνοιεν τὸν πόνον) (Ant. 18:7; Hervorhebung hinzugefügt). Außerdem wurden „viele der edelsten Männer (ἀνδρῶν τῶν πρώτων) ermordet, angeblich um der Freiheit willen, in Wahrheit aber nur aus Beutegier (οἰκείων κερδῶν ἐλπίσιν)". Die Motive dieser zelotischen „Räuber" (λῃστηρίων) werden hier nicht auf den Wunsch nach vermeintlicher „Freiheit" (von den Römern) bzw. genauer „dem allgemeinen Wohlergehen" (τοῦ ὀρθουμένου τῶν κοινῶν) zurückgeführt, sondern es treten deutlich egoistische, gänzlich ‚unphilosophische' Absichten in den

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[19] Vgl. zu diesem Verständnis der göttlichen σύμπραξις auch Parente 1984–85, 195; Hengel 1976, 128. Parente 1984–85, 205, sieht gerade in diesem Aspekt des Zusammenwirkens bzw. Kooperierens mit Gott eines der entscheidenden Merkmale, die die jüdische Eschatologie des 1. Jh. n. Chr. auszeichnete, „essentially in finding a way to ‚force God's hand', to assure God's intervention; and that the different currents within Judaism differed in their views of how to bring this about". Das wäre durchaus möglich, muss aber dennoch als unsicher gelten, bedenkt man die ebenfalls existente, nahezu atheistische Haltung, die beispielsweise den Sadduzäern nachgesagt wird (vgl. Bell. 2:164f.) – oder auch Josephus' eigene Haltung, der die Prophezeiungen des AT großteils als unveränderlich und damit klar (zumindest weitgehend unabhängig vom menschlichen Einflussbereich) determinierend versteht (siehe beispielsweise Ant. 10:276 und Bell. 6:313 zur fest determinierten Vorhersage des Propheten Daniel).

[20] Ant. 18:23; siehe zum Prädestinationsverständnis der Pharisäer Ant. 13:172; Bell. 2:162f.

Vordergrund: „die Hoffnung auf eigenen Profit" (οἰκείων κερδῶν ἐλπίσιν) und Mordlust (vgl. Ant. 18:7). „Um das Elend voll zu machen, entstand dann auch noch Hungersnot, die zu allen möglichen Freveln die Wege ebnet, sodass ganze Städte verwüstet wurden" (λιμός τε εἰς ὑστάτην ἀνακείμενος ἀναισχυντίαν καὶ πόλεων ἁλώσεις καὶ κατασκαφαί) (Ant. 18:8).

> So führte die Neuerung und Veränderung der väterlichen Einrichtungen zum großen Verderben (οὕτως ἄρα ἡ τῶν πατρίων καίνισις καὶ μεταβολὴ μεγάλας ἔχει ῥοπὰς τοῦ ἀπολουμένου) jener, die sich hierzu zusammentaten; Judas und Sadduk nämlich, die eine vierte Philosophenschule gegründet und bereits zahlreiche Anhänger um sich gesammelt hatten, brachten nicht nur augenblicklich den Staat in grenzenlose Verwirrung, sondern säten auch für die Zukunft durch Lehren, die bis dahin kein Mensch je gehört hatte, all das Unheil, das gar bald anfing, Wurzel zu treiben (τὸ παρὸν θορύβων τὴν πολιτείαν ἐνέπλησαν καὶ τῶν αὖθις κακῶν κατειληφότων ῥίζας ἐφυτεύσαντο τῷ ἀσυνήθει πρότερον φιλοσοφίας τοιᾶσδε) … besonders … die Jugend … war [es], die, durch jene Lehren fanatisiert, unserem Staate den Untergang bereitete (τῷ κατ' αὐτῶν σπουδασθέντι τοῖς νεωτέροις ὁ φθόρος τοῖς πράγμασι συνέτυχε).[21]

Über die genaue Lehre der beiden Anführer wird hier noch nicht viel gesagt. Es zeigte sich aber schon, dass zumindest Sadduk ein Pharisäer ist, der sicherlich nicht im Sinne seiner Schule handelt, als er zu diesem Aufstand aufruft und schließlich auch eine eigene Sekte gründet. Die Folgen dieser „Lehre, die bis dahin kein Mensch je gehört hatte" (τῷ ἀσυνήθει πρότερον φιλοσοφίας) sind nichts als „Unheil" (κακῶν).[22] Dass diese Lehre zuvor noch niemand gehört hatte, lässt auf kein hohes Alter schließen, sondern auf eine jüngere Erfindung der beiden Führer, die damit nicht gemäß des althergebrachten Judentums wirken und auch keine Autorität in Lehrfragen beanspruchen durften. Josephus stellt sie hiermit letztlich als ‚illegale' Schule dar, die keinesfalls als legitime Schule des Judentums anzusehen ist.[23]

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[21] Ant. 18:9f. Wörtlich heißt es in § 9: Ἰούδας καὶ Σάδδωκος τετάρτην φιλοσοφίαν ἐπείσακτον ἡμῖν; ἐπείσακτος bedeutet „brought in besides: brought in from abroad, imported, alien, foreign" (LSJ; vgl. Parente 1984–85, 192f.) und unterstreicht damit einmal mehr Josephus' apologetische Absichten. Diese Richtung gilt ihm als ‚unjüdisch' und kann wohl nur daher gefährlich werden. Judäas Untergang ist damit letztlich nicht von den Juden selbst verschuldet, sondern „von außen importiert".

[22] Mit dem Hinweis, dass von dieser „Lehre, die bis dahin kein Mensch je gehört hatte", will Josephus offenbar aufzeigen, dass es den Juden von jeher fremd war, sich gegen die Steuerzahlungen und die Anerkennung einer fremden Oberherrschaft aufzulehnen. Ganz korrekt ist das natürlich nicht, entspricht aber seinem Ziel, die „vierte Philosophie" als gänzlich unjüdisch darzustellen und somit auszugrenzen. Das Verderben kam damit eigentlich nicht aus dem traditionellen Judentum, sondern aus (unjüdischen) revolutionären Neuerungen von letztlich unberechenbaren, übereifrigen Jugendlichen.

[23] So auch Saldarini 1988, 109: „Josephus presents the three traditional philosophies for his gentile readers as a respectable and permanent part of Judaism, but he discredits the fourth philosophy, which led to the war, here and all through his book."

Es ist das Streben nach „Erneuerung und Veränderung der väterlichen Einrichtungen" (τῶν πατρίων καίνισις καὶ μεταβολή) mittels jener neuen Lehren, was schließlich den Untergang im Jüdischen Krieg herbeiführt. Die Jugend bereitete, „durch jene Lehren fanatisiert, unserem Staate den Untergang" (τῷ κατ᾽ αὐτῶν σπουδασθέντι τοῖς νεωτέροις ὁ φθόρος τοῖς πράγμασι συνέτυχε) und zeigte damit zugleich die lange Wirkungsdauer dieser Extremisten-Schule,[24] die nach Josephus solche un- bzw. sogar antijüdischen Lehren vertrat. Er verteidigt darum im Folgenden nun umso mehr die traditionellen Schulen, die es „schon seit der Väter Zeit" (ἐκ τοῦ πάνυ ἀρχαίου τῶν πατρίων) (Ant. 18:11) bei den Juden gab und kommt am Ende seiner positiven Ausführungen über alle drei dieser *offiziellen*, genuin *jüdischen* Sekten wieder auf die Rebellen zurück, wobei er nun auch Aspekte der eigentlichen Lehre nennt:

> Außer diesen drei Schulen nun gründete der Galiläer Judas eine vierte, deren Anhänger in allen Stücken mit den Pharisäern übereinstimmen (τὰ μὲν λοιπὰ πάντα γνώμῃ τῶν Φαρισαίων ὁμολογούσῃ), dabei aber mit großer Zähigkeit an der Freiheit hängen und Gott allein als ihren Herrn und König anerkennen (αὐτοῖς μόνον ἡγεμόνα καὶ δεσπότην τὸν θεὸν ὑπειληφόσιν). Sie unterziehen sich auch jeder möglichen Todesart und machen sich selbst nichts aus dem Morde ihrer Verwandten und Freunde, wenn sie nur keinen Menschen als Herrn anzuerkennen brauchen.[25]

Während Josephus in Bell. 2:118 noch deutlich erklärt, dass diese vierte Schule „mit den anderen nichts gemein hat", nennt er hier ganz unvermittelt eine sehr enge Verbindung zu den Pharisäern, deren Lehren sie (wohl auch inklusive der Zusatzgebote) „in allen Stücken" vertreten: τὰ μὲν λοιπὰ πάντα γνώμῃ τῶν

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[24] Vgl. zur rebellischen Jugend als Frucht dieser Lehren auch Bell. 2:225.346; die Wirkungsdauer: mindestens von 6 n. Chr. (Judas und Sadduk erheben sich gegen die Vermögensschätzung) bis 66 n. Chr. (Ausbruch des Krieges aufgrund ihrer extremistischen Polemik).

[25] Ant. 18:23. Es sei darauf hingewiesen, dass das hier von Josephus verwendete Verb ὑπειληφόσιν („akzeptieren / annehmen / unterstützen"; LSJ s.v. ὑπολαμβάνω) „in Greek … is generally used to imply a wrongly-held belief" (Parente 1984–85, 193), woraus folgen kann: „It was not, then, the struggle against the Romans, but the ,love of liberty' which constituted the ,innovation' leading to the destruction of their people." Tatsächlich waren die Juden Jahrhunderte der Fremdherrschaft gewohnt – dieses ,Joch' nun abzuschütteln, kann daher in der Tat als ,Neuerung / neue (und verderbliche) Erfindung' betrachtet werden. Fairchild 1999, 25, weist außerdem darauf hin, dass die hier gegebene pharisäische ,Verwandtschaft' sicherlich zu umfassenderen, gemeinsamen zelotischen Aktivitäten im Jüdischen Krieg führte, die von Josephus zum Schutz der Pharisäer verschleiert wurden. Diese Verteidigung des Pharisäismus wird auch dadurch deutlich, dass er im früher geschriebenen *Bellum* den pharisäischen Mitbegründer Sadduk sowie die weite ideologische Übereinstimmung mit den Pharisäern auslässt, sie in den deutlich später verfassten *Antiquitates* aber durchaus nennt – die Zeiten hatten sich geändert und eine detailliertere, treuere Wiedergabe des Geschehens war nun nicht mehr so verfänglich für die mächtige (inzwischen rabbinische) Schicht des Judentums (vgl. auch Dunn 1988, 269). Ähnlich auch Brandon 1967, 37f., allerdings eher bezogen auf Josephus' Nationalstolz und pharisäische Identität, die ihn im *Bellum* noch schweigen ließen.

Φαρισαίων.[26] Diese veränderte Sichtweise dürfte der deutlich stärkeren apologetischen Ausrichtung des *Bellum* geschuldet sein, während in den *Antiquitates* durch den größeren zeitlichen Abstand zum Krieg inzwischen wohl auch solche Details deutlicher hervorgehoben werden konnten, ohne damit gleich die ‚legitimen‘, althergebrachten, genuin jüdischen „Philosophien" in Mitleidenschaft zu ziehen (ähnlich auch Schwartz 1983, 169).

Während man einerseits durchaus davon ausgehen kann, dass es sich beim Zelotismus um eine „Radikalisierung des pharisäischen Parteiprogramms" (so z.B. Weiß 1996, 479; vgl. Heiligenthal 2005, 32) handelt, ist der anscheinend einzige Zusatz und damit genuine Unterschied zu den offiziellen Pharisäern die ‚Lehre‘ der jüdischen Unabhängigkeit von jeglicher Obrigkeit außer Gott; daher auch das Verweigern der Steuerzahlungen, mit denen sie die Herrschaft der heidnischen Römer anerkennen würden.[27] Damit machen sie es natürlich jeder noch so guten, fairen Regierung unmöglich, sie als loyale Elemente in die Staatsführung einzubeziehen und ihnen den gleichen Schutz zu gewähren, wie dies bei den anderen Sekten der Fall war. Die direkte Konfrontation war damit unausweichlich.[28] Doch sogar dieser ‚abgefallenen‘ Schule, die den Juden ‚jedes

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[26] Weiß 1996, 479, erkennt ganz richtig: Es „liegt die Schlußfolgerung nahe, das theokratische Programm der Zeloten sei als eine Radikalisierung des pharisäischen Parteiprogramms zu verstehen: Heiligung des Alltags durch die Thora nunmehr auch – was besonders die Reinheitsgebote betrifft – im politischen Raum, konkret also gegen die Verunreinigung des Heiligen Landes und der Heiligen Stadt durch die römische Fremdherrschaft." In ähnliche Richtung weist auch Hipp. ref. 9:26, obgleich fälschlicherweise auf eine Abspaltung der Essener bezogen.

[27] Zu den Tributzahlungen als ‚Stein des Anstoßes‘ vgl. auch: Bell. 2:368.372.383.405; 5:405f. Wie Parente 1984–85, 193f., richtig anmerkt, könnte darüber hinaus der eigentliche Kern des Aufstands vielmehr in der Volkszählung gelegen haben: κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς ἐν δεινῷ φέροντες τὴν ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀπογραφαῖς (Ant. 18:3). Der Unmut über die ἀπογραφή ("*a writing off: a register, list … a register of persons liable to taxation*, Lat. census"; LSJ) ist besonders innerhalb des Judentums verständlich, bedenkt man die Verheißungen Gottes an Abraham, dass seine Nachkommen unzählbar sein würden (siehe 1. Mose 13,16; 15,5; 16,10; 22,17; 26,4; 28,14; 32,13), was, neben anderem, den besonderen Stolz der Israeliten ausmachte. Außerdem verdeutlichen 2. Samuel 24 bzw. 1. Chronik 21, dass Gottes deutliches Missfallen auf einer Zählung seines Volkes liegen würde. Dass dieses Denken auch im 1. Jh. v. (und gewiss auch n.) Chr. noch aktuell war, verdeutlicht der Zensus, von dem in 3. Makkabäer 2,28 die Rede ist (dort: λαογραφία), einer Zählung aller Juden in Ägypten, die von Augustus im Jahre 20 v.Chr. angeordnet wurde und unter Todesandrohung durchgesetzt werden sollte. Wie 3. Makkabäer 4,17 stolz berichtet, wurde dem König letztlich gemeldet, dass die Menge der Juden zu groß sei, als dass sie gezählt werden könnte: μηκέτι ἰσχύειν τὴν τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἀπογραφὴν ποιεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀμέτρητον αὐτῶν πληθύν – womit Gottes Verheißungen an Abraham erfüllt wären. Siehe allgemein zum Zensus auch Hengel 1976, 132–145.

[28] Es ist also letztlich eine Abspaltung der *Pharisäer*, die den Krieg heraufbeschwört. Andererseits sind es wieder andere (Mainstream-) Pharisäer, die sich gegen die Rebellen stellen (vgl. Bell. 2:411; Vita 21). Daraus folgt, dass es innerhalb dieser Partei unterschiedliche Strömungen bzw. Geisteshaltungen und theologische Überzeugungen gab, die sogar bis zu einer Spaltung führen konnten. Man denke hierbei auch an Eleazar (unter König Hyrkanus; 134–104 v.Chr.; siehe Ant. 13:288–300; b. Kidduschin 66a), der offensichtlich nicht im Sinne der Gesamtheit bzw. Mehrheit der Partei handelte. Ähnliches, nur in positiver Weise, trifft auch auf Pollio und Sameas zu (vgl. Ant. 14:171–176; 15:2– 4.370).

erdenkliche Leid' brachte, kann Josephus noch etwas Gutes, Tugendhaftes abgewinnen: „ihre *Hartnäckigkeit* [ist] indes allgemein durch Augenschein bekannt …; viel eher müsste ich fürchten, dass mir nicht genug Worte zu Gebote stehen, um solchen *Heldenmut* und solche *Standhaftigkeit* zu schildern" (Ant. 18:24; Hervorhebungen hinzugefügt). Von „Hartnäckigkeit" (ἀμετάλλακτον), „Heldenmut und Standhaftigkeit" (καταφρονήματος δεχομένου τὴν ταλαιπωρίαν τῆς ἀλγηδών) ist hier die Rede, was durchaus positive Assoziationen hervorruft. Doch schließt er mit den Worten: „Diese *Tollkühnheit* (ἀνοίᾳ: „Unvernunft / Dummheit / rasende Wut") (siehe LSJ s.v. ἀνοία.) war es, die das Volk in Aufruhr brachte, als der Landpfleger Gessius Florus durch den Missbrauch (ὑβρίζειν) seiner Amtsgewalt dasselbe so zur Verzweiflung (ἀπονοήσαντος) trieb, dass es von den Römern abfiel" (Ant. 18:25). Diese Aussage bezieht sich nun schon auf die Zeit des Prokurators Gessius Florus (64–66 n. Chr.), dessen Politik an dieser Stelle von Josephus deutlich – natürlich zusammen mit der aufrührerischen Lehre der sehr auf Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit bedachten Sekte des Judas und Sadduk – als Ursache für den Kriegsausbruch im Jahre 66 n. Chr. genannt wird.[29] Während Josephus seine Schulpassagen einerseits durchweg positiv zeichnet, um die philosophisch-theologische Tiefe und Vielfalt des Judentums eindrucksvoll zu belegen, nutzt er dies andererseits zur Diffamierung der späteren Rebellen, die sich aufgrund ihres religiös-politischen Extremismus ausgrenzen und als Einzige den Vorwurf der Misanthropie verdienen, der in der Antike häufig gegen die Juden im Allgemeinen erhoben wurde.[30]

Nicht nur den allgemein schlechten Ruf der Juden, sondern besonders die Kriegsschuld will Josephus durch die Art seiner Darstellung offenbar auf jene Aufrührer abwälzen. Da er gleichzeitig die Pharisäer am ehesten als ‚Nachkriegslösung' präsentiert, musste diese aufwieglerische, nationalistische Abspaltung der Pharisäer als eine eigene φιλοσοφία bzw. αἵρεσις bezeichnet und entsprechend abgehandelt werden. Diesem Konzept folgt Josephus auch inmitten seiner Berichte zum Kriegsgeschehen, indem er hier zwar diese „vierte" (zelotische) Philosophie erwähnt und schuldig spricht, bewusst aber Judas nur als „streitbaren Gelehrten" (σοφιστὴς δεινότατος) bezeichnet und den Pharisäer Sadduk sogar ganz weglässt. Er gibt hier keine Hinweise auf eine grundsätzlich ideologische Übereinstimmung mit den Pharisäern, die schlicht um die genannten nationalistisch-aufrührerischen Lehren erweitert wurde:

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[29] Josephus führt die unsägliche und provokante Politik des Gessius Florus natürlich noch detailliert aus; siehe Bell. 2:271–332. Siehe zu den Ursachen des Krieges aus josephischer Sicht auch besonders Bilde 1979, pass.; vgl. auch Schürer 1973–87, 1:455–470; Schaper 1999, 425f.

[30] Ähnlich auch Mason 2000, 209. Zu den negativen Meinungen über die Juden und deren Religion siehe beispielsweise Tac. hist. 5:2–5.8; Iuv. 6:542–547; 14:96–106; Aug. civ. 6:11; Rut. Nam. 1:381–398; Diod. 40:3; Ios. C.Ap. 2:80; eine gute Zusammenstellung verschiedener Meinungen findet sich bei Noethlichs 1996, 44–69. Zu einem umfassenden Überblick der antiken Äußerungen über die Juden vgl. Stern 1998, pass.

> Unterdessen machte sich ein gewisser Manaïm, ein Sohn jenes streitbaren Schriftgelehrten (σοφιστὴς δεινότατος) Judas aus Galiläa, der einst unter Quirinius es den Juden zum Vorwurf gemacht hatte, dass sie außer Gott auch noch die Römer als Herren anerkennten, mit einigen seiner Vertrauten nach Masada auf … bewaffnete außer seinen Landsleuten auch noch fremde Räuber und kehrte mit dieser Rotte als seiner Leibwache wie ein König nach Jerusalem zurück, wo er sich an die Spitze der Empörer stellte und die Leitung der Belagerung übernahm.[31]

Hier ist es sogar der direkte Nachfahre des ersten Empörers, der nun „wie ein König" (οἷα δὴ βασιλεύς) als Anführer der nationalistischen Revolutionäre auftritt und den Kampf gegen die eigenen Landsleute und schließlich die Römer beginnt. Als eine geordnete Einheit von Empörern mit innerem Zusammenhalt, klar formuliertem philosophisch-politischem Programm und entsprechender Ordnung zum Kampf gegen Juden wie Römer kann man die Zeloten nicht bezeichnen. Wie die ausführlichen Darstellungen des Josephus bestätigen, handelt es sich um verschiedene kleinere Haufen aufrührerischer, beute- und mordgieriger Extremisten, die sich – gemäß ihrer wichtigsten Grundüberzeugung – keiner Obrigkeit unterordnen wollen. Die kleineren Bündnisse und Zusammenschlüsse unter einer gemeinsamen Führung, von denen berichtet wird, sind reine Zweckbündnisse zum strategischen Angriff auf die gemeinsamen politischen Feinde.[32]

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[31] Bell. 2:433f.; auch in Bell. 2:118 wird bereits jede Zuordnung weggelassen und Sadduk nicht einmal erwähnt. Wie oben bereits genannt, kann man dem entnehmen, dass Josephus bei der Niederschrift des *Bellum* noch stärker bemüht war, die Pharisäer in ein glänzenderes Licht zu rücken und daher jede direkte Verbindung zu den Zeloten zu verschweigen. In den *Antiquitates*, die er Jahre später verfasste, als sich die Lage in Judäa bereits wieder stabilisiert hatte, war es ihm scheinbar möglich, offener über die pharisäische Identität der Zeloten zu sprechen, dabei aber immer noch die notwendige Abgrenzung zu ziehen (vgl. auch Dunn 1988, 269). Außerdem scheint die genannte Stelle subtil auf eine Art ‚Rebellen-Dynastie' hinzuweisen, die sich von den Anfängen bis hin zum Untergang im jüdischen Krieg halten konnte: „Further, the famous Eleazar son of Ya'ir, rebel leader of Masada (d. 73 CE), is portrayed by Josephus as both 'a relative of Menachem' ([Bell.] 2.447) and 'a descendant of Judas' (7.253). Ant. 20.102 adds that two of Judas' sons, named Simon and Jacob, were executed for rebellious activity by Ti. Iulius Alexander when he was prefect of Judea (46−48 CE). It is a further question whether this Judas is to be identified with the one who led rebel activities around Sepphoris in Galilee after Herod's death in 4 BCE (2.56), who is described as the son of a Galilean rebel named Ezekias killed in 47 BCE by the young Herod (1.204) … If that Judas became active again in Judea on Archelaus' removal in 6 CE as ‚Judas the Galilean', then we would have a rebel dynasty lasting well over a century" (Mason 2008, 81; vgl. Hengel 1976, 299; Brandon 1967, 132f.; Kingdon 1972, 80; Kennard 1945/46, pass.; Schürer 1901–1909, Bd. 1, 486f.; Schürer 1973–87, Bd. 1, 332, 381f., 414; Deines 2004, 627; dagegen: Horsley 1985, pass., besonders 341f.). Parente 1984–85, 189–191, macht deutlich, dass eine Übereinstimmung beider Personen zwar möglich ist – und auch der fehlende Rückverweis des Josephus schlicht an einer unterschiedlichen Quelle liegen könnte –, dass es aber insgesamt nicht Josephus' Art ist, keine näheren Hinweise zu geben, wenn er sich auf Personen bezieht, die schon einmal von ihm genannt wurden; auch er ist daher gegen eine übereinstimmende Identifikation beider Personen.

[32] Man beachte hierzu die detaillierten Berichte zum grausamen Kriegsgeschehen und deren Vorgeschichte z.B. in Bell. 4:121–6:434.

Es muss auch deutlich festgehalten werden, dass man nicht davon ausgehen kann, dass diese nationalistische Strömung bereits im Jahre 6 n. Chr. und den folgenden Jahrzehnten als eine eigenständige Partei wahrgenommen wurde. So wie es Josephus hier beschreibt, sind Judas und Sadduk zwar die geistigen Väter dieses zelotischen Erbes, das aber erst kurze Zeit vor und dann besonders während des Jüdischen Krieges in seinem ganzen Ausmaß offenbar wird. Auch in seinen beiden großen Werken (Ant. und Bell.) kommt Josephus namentlich erst in direktem Zusammenhang mit dem Krieg auf die Zeloten (ζηλωταί) bzw. auch Sikarier (σικάριοι) oder „Räuber" (λησταί) im Sinne einer gewissen ideologisch-nationalistisch-strategischen ‚Front' zu sprechen, wobei die Frage nach dem genauen Grad bzw. überhaupt der Existenz eines engeren Zusammenhalts dieser ‚Bewegung' bis heute ungeklärt ist – und aufgrund der sehr dürftigen Hinweise in den Quellen auch kaum lösbar sein wird.

Anhand der ausführlichen Berichte im *Bellum* stellt Josephus die weitreichenden Folgen dieses zelotischen Aufstands dar, der schließlich in der Zerstörung des Jerusalemer Tempels im Krieg gegen die Römer endet. Ein erneutes Aufleben des jüdisch-nationalistischen Gedankenguts ist erst in dem Aufstand unter Bar Kochbar (132–135 n. Chr.) erneut vergleichsweise deutlich erkennbar. Als knappe Zusammenfassung kann somit gesagt werden, dass es sich bei dem Zelotentum grundsätzlich um eine religiöse national-extremistische Idee handelt, deren Wurzeln im Pharisäismus der herodianischen Ära liegen.

2. Hinweise auf das Zelotentum im Neuen Testament

Das Neue Testament spricht prinzipiell nicht konkret vom Zelotentum. Allerdings gibt es einen knappen Hinweis auf den zelotischen Aufstand des Jahres 6 n. Chr. innerhalb des Gerichtsverfahrens gegen die Apostel (siehe Apg 5,34–40). In diesem Zusammenhang erinnert Gamaliel an den Galiläer Judas, der auch von Josephus genannt wird:

> Nach diesem stand Judas der Galiläer auf, in den Tagen der Einschreibung, und machte eine Menge Volk abtrünnig und brachte sie hinter sich; auch der kam um, und alle, die ihm Gehör gaben, wurden zerstreut. Und jetzt sage ich euch: Steht ab von diesen Menschen [den Christen] und laßt sie! Denn wenn dieser Rat oder dieses Werk aus Menschen ist, so wird es zugrunde gehen.[33]

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[33] Apg 5,37f.; vgl. Ios. Bell. 2:117f.; Ant. 18:1–10.23–25. Siehe zu dem Aufstand des Theudas auch Ios. Ant. 20:97–99. Die Verführung des Theudas wird von Josephus auf eine viel spätere Zeit datiert (44/45 n. Chr.), als es in der Rede des Gamaliel der Fall ist (vor 6 n. Chr.). Tatsächlich scheint es so, dass sich Josephus geirrt hat, da die Rede des Gamaliel an sich schon vor dieser Zeit stattgefunden haben muss (so auch der Ausgabe von Clementz 2005, 979). Vgl. auch Schürer 1973–87, 1:566; Hengel 1976, 235f.

Der zelotische Aufstand war den Pharisäern zur Zeit Jesu offenbar noch gut bekannt. Außerdem vergleicht einer ihrer angesehensten Vertreter die gerade neu aufkeimende christliche αἵρεσις (vgl. Apg 24,5.14; 28,22) mit dieser vorigen Strömung und beurteilt das damalige Zelotentum als „menschliches Werk" (ἐξ ἀνθρώπων), das keinesfalls „aus Gott" (ἐκ θεοῦ) war (Apg 5,38f.). Trotz dieses Vergleichs wird im Nachsatz deutlich, dass er das Christentum nicht vorschnell mit dem Zelotentum oder einer Variante hiervon gleichsetzen will, da er zumindest die Möglichkeit einräumt, dass es Gottes Werk sein könnte.[34] Das Zelotentum scheint für Gamaliel bereits der Vergangenheit anzugehören, da er die Anhänger des Judas als „zerstreut" (διεσκορπίσθησαν) bezeichnet und deren menschliches Werk indirekt als „zugrunde" gegangen (καταλύω). Dennoch finden wir auch in den Berichten der Evangelien zumindest noch einige Andeutungen auf zelotische Elemente bzw. entsprechendes Gedankengut.

So wird in Lukas 13,1–3 Jesus von „den Galiläern" berichtet (περὶ τῶν Γαλιλαίων), deren Blut Pilatus mit den Opfern mischte. Die Jünger fragen nach der besonderen Schuld dieser Galiläer, die offensichtlich von der römischen Streitmacht überwältigt und getötet wurden. Da die Römer hier derart hart durchgreifen, wohingegen andere Aktionen wie die Tempelreinigung Jesu ohne Folgen blieben, muss man von einem für Rom deutlich erkennbaren politischen Motiv ausgehen, das Pilatus bzw. die Soldaten unter seinem Befehl zum Eingreifen zwang. Beachtet man nun, dass der Ausdruck „die Galiläer" (οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι) unter Berufung auf „Judas den Galiläer" (Ἰούδας ὁ Γαλιλαῖος) als Gründer der zelotischen Bewegung öfters als Synonym für die Zeloten gebraucht wurde,[35] so könnte man hier zumindest ein leichtes Aufflackern des Zelotismus und eine indirekte Konfrontation Jesu mit dieser rebellischen Richtung sehen. Nimmt man dies als gegeben, ist Jesu Urteil zumindest kein außergewöhnliches; er sieht die Galiläer als ebenso schuldig bzw. sündhaft an wie den Rest der Juden auch – denen er übrigens das gleiche Ende (im Aufstand und Krieg gegen Rom?) vorhersagt: „Meint ihr, dass diese Galiläer vor allen Galiläern Sünder waren, weil sie dies erlitten haben? Nein, sage ich euch, sondern wenn ihr nicht Buße tut, werdet ihr alle ebenso umkommen" (Lk 13,2f.).

Des Weiteren wäre ein Jünger Jesu zu nennen, der von den Schreibern „Simon, der Zelot" (Σίμων ὁ ζηλωτής) genannt wird.[36] An anderer Stelle erscheint auch

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[34] Siehe Apg 5,39: „Wenn es [d.i. das christliche „Werk"; V. 38] aber aus Gott ist, so werdet ihr sie nicht zugrunde richten können; damit ihr nicht gar als solche befunden werdet, die gegen Gott streiten. Und sie gaben ihm Gehör."

[35] Vgl. Black 1974, 52f.; Hengel 1976, 57–61. Beispiele für den späteren Gebrauch der Bezeichnung „Galiläer" für die Zeloten siehe Iust. M. Dial. 80; Hegesippus in Eus. HE 4:22:7.

[36] So in Lk 6,15 (Σίμωνα τὸν καλούμενον ζηλωτήν) und Apg 1,13 (Σίμων ὁ ζηλωτής). Brandon 1967, 355 (vgl. Brandon 1971, 453), weist diesbezüglich zu Recht darauf hin, dass die Sonderbezeichnung dieses Jüngers Jesu – „Simon, der Zelot" – bereits aufgrund der Hervorhebung der (möglichen) Parteibezeichnung auf die Differenz zwischen dem Kreis Jesu und den seit etwa 6

die Beschreibung Σίμωνα τὸν Καναναῖον, was das aramäische Äquivalent (קַנְאָן) zu ζηλωτής darstellt und ebenfalls „Schwärmer / Eiferer / Nationalist" bedeutet.[37] Möglicherweise muss man annehmen, dass Simon zumindest ein ehemaliges Glied dieser nationalistischen αἵρεσις war (so auch Wegenast 1916, 2493; Heiligenthal 2005, 33). Möglicherweise sah er in Jesus einen neuen Führer der jüdischen Freiheitsbewegung, wie man es evtl. auch besonders bei Petrus, Judas, Jakobus und Johannes erkennen kann, die einem ähnlichen (gewaltsamen) Eifer für die Sache ihres Meisters offen gegenüberstanden und ein nun beginnendes, irdisch-messianisches Reich erwarteten.[38] So sagen auch die sogenannten „Emmaus-Jünger" kurz nach der Kreuzigung ganz offen: „Wir aber hofften, dass er der sei, der Israel erlösen solle" (Lk 24,21). Dieses λυτροῦσθαι τὸν Ἰσραήλ ist hier gewiss eher als politische Befreiung zu verstehen, da die von der Sünde erlösende Befreiung durch das Opfer Jesu ja offensichtlich noch nicht erkannt und verstanden wurde (siehe hierzu Lk 24,25–27).

Das genannte Attribut ὁ ζηλωτής muss aber nicht allein auf eine (frühere?) Zugehörigkeit zu den Zeloten deuten. Wie oben bereits erwähnt, wird dieser Begriff, der übersetzt ja schlicht „Eiferer" heißt, vielmehr meist in eben diesem Sinne gebraucht und nicht als Zuweisung zu einer jüdischen Sekte. So erscheint auch bei Josephus erst unmittelbar vor dem Jüdischen Krieg dieser Ausdruck als feste Zuweisung zur „vierten Schule".[39] Offenbar war dieser Eifer grundsätzlich etwas Begehrenswertes, Geachtetes, da er so häufig Erwähnung findet und auch den angesehensten Aposteln zugeschrieben wird.[40] Andererseits wird in den Evangelien klar herausgestellt, dass ein zu starker Eifer, der möglicherweise gar in Gewalt ausarten könnte, die christlichen Ziele gefährdet und nicht dem Wesen der neuen, christlichen Richtung entspricht: „Hingabe an den Willen Gottes heißt bei Jesus eben nicht Gewalttat gegen Gegner und Übertreter des Gesetzes. ‚Liebet

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n. Chr. weitgehend bekannten zelotischen Strömungen deutet. Wäre Jesu Gruppe als zelotisch zu identifizieren gewesen, wäre dieser Beiname zwecklos und hinfällig.

[37] Vgl. BDAG / GING / FRI / LN / THA s.v. Καναναῖος; Wegenast 1916, 2493.

[38] So in Mt 26,35: die Jünger wollen mit Jesus in den Tod gehen; Lk 9,54: die „Donnersöhne" (υἱοὶ βροντῆς; Mk 3,17) wollen wie Elia (vgl. 2 Kön 1) tödliches Feuer fallen lassen; Lk 22,36–38: die Jünger denken an einen gewaltsamen Kampf für Jesus; V. 49–52: mit Gewalt gegen die Festnahme Jesu; Mt 21,1–9.14–16; Joh 12,12–19: die Jünger erwarten die Aufrichtung des irdischen Messiasreiches; Mt 26,14–16; 27,3–5: Judas will die Sache beschleunigen und Jesus zum Handeln herausfordern, er scheitert. Auch Stumpff 1935, 888, erkennt zumindest in den Berichten über Johannes zelotisches Gedankengut und entsprechende Handlungsweisen; dass er die anderen (bereits oben genannten) Personen unerwähnt lässt, ist verwunderlich.

[39] Bei Josephus erscheinen die Zeloten mit dieser Bezeichnung etwa ab dem Bericht über die Maßnahmen des Hohenpriesters Ananus gegen diese extremistische Sekte, was nur kurz vor Ausbruch des Jüdischen Krieges liegt (vgl. Bell. 2:651; 4:160–7:268). Wie bereits erwähnt, sind die Zeloten als Gruppe erstmals sicher in Bell. 4:161f. zu identifizieren (vgl. Horsley 1986a, 162).

[40] So z. B. Jakobus und Johannes (die „Donnersöhne" des Zebedäus in Mk 3,17) oder Petrus (vgl. Mt 26,51f.). Man beachte auch die Würdigung des religiösen Eifers der Juden durch Paulus in Röm 10,2; oder das Lob, dass alle Judenchristen „Eiferer für das Gesetz" seien (πάντες ζηλωταὶ τοῦ νόμου ὑπάρχουσιν; Apg 21,20). Siehe auch Wegenast 1916, 2494.

eure Feinde' (Mt 5,39ff.) heißt Gottes Gebot."[41] An der Hingabe und Selbstaufgabe bis hin zum Tode für ‚Gottes Sache' kann indes kein Zweifel bestehen – aber eben gewaltlos, friedfertig und auf ein *himmlisches* βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ bzw. τῶν οὐρανῶν bedacht.[42]

Dennoch kommt es zu möglichen Verwechslungen mit zelotischen Ambitionen, sofern man das Vorgehen gegen Jesus „wie gegen einen Räuber" (ὡς ἐπὶ λῃστὴν ἐξήλθατε)[43] mit der den Zeloten nahestehenden Gruppe der λῃσταί verbinden will. So wird Jesus auch neben den als λῃστής bezeichneten „Aufrührer" und „Mörder" Barabbas gestellt und das Volk aufgefordert, zwischen diesen beiden zu entscheiden (vgl. Mt 27,15–26; Mk 15,7–15; Lk 23,18f.). Außerdem wird er zwischen zwei λῃσταί hingerichtet (durch Kreuzigung, die Todesart, die politischen Revolutionären galt). Diese Hinweise müssen insgesamt als starke Indizien für die unterschwellige Anklage gegen ihn als Anführer einer neuen, eifernden (zelotischen) Sekte gelten, deren geistige Herkunft und Auswirkungen man entsprechend der Aussage des Gamaliel noch nicht abzuschätzen weiß.[44] Wie der Sanhedrin kurz vor der Tötung Jesu jedenfalls zugibt, befürchtet man ein (sicherlich blutiges) Eingreifen der Römer aufgrund der großen Beliebtheit Jesu und dem Wunsch des Volkes, diesen zum König zu machen – was nichts anderes als einen Abfall von der römischen Jurisdiktion und damit einen offenen Aufstand bedeutet hätte.[45] Das Volk ist offenbar bereits stark von dem zelotisch-nationa-

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[41] Wegenast 1916, 2494; siehe hierzu auch Mt 26,51f. und Joh 18,36; vgl. Stumpff 1935, 888f.

[42] Mir ist bewusst, dass sich „Gottesreich" und „Himmelreich" nur mittelbar auf das transzendente Reich Jesu beziehen und auch eine (vorherrschend) immanente Komponente aufweisen. Zur jedenfalls unbedingt gewaltlosen ‚Etablierung' dieses Reiches siehe Joh 18,36. Zum (gewaltlosen, friedvollen) Eifer für Gottes Reich: Mt 5,5.9f., 39.44; 10,34–39; 26,51f.; Lk 6,35; Joh 12,25; 15,13; 18,36; Röm 12,1. Auch Newell 1972, 236f., verstehen die aggressive, extremistisch-gewalttätige Vorgehensweise der Zeloten als Anklagepunkt Jesu – nicht so sehr ihr Eifer für Israel an sich: „The violence of their methods is what seems to be under attack."

[43] Siehe Mt 26,55; Mk 14,48; Lk 22,52 (Hervorhebung im Zitat hinzugefügt); zum Begriff λῃσταί als zelotische Gruppe vgl. z.B. Ios. Bell. 4:196.199.291.305.310.326.340.355.387f.; 5:250; Hengel 1976, 25–47; besonders auch Rengstorf 1942, 263f., der die λῃσταί des Josephus als „ständige Bezeichnung der Zeloten" versteht (ibid., 263).

[44] Zu Gamaliels Aussage siehe oben (Apg 5,38f.). Zur unterschwelligen Anklage Jesu als zelotischer Anführer bzw. „König" siehe auch Rengstorf 1942, 267; Baumbach 1971, 36; Cullmann 1970, 47, 50 („Jesus ist von Pilatus als politischer Rebell, als Zelot, verurteilt worden … die Inschrift, der ‚Titulus' über dem Kreuz, nannte als Verbrechen den zelotischen Versuch, in Israel, einem doch von den Römern verwalteten Lande, nach der Königsherrschaft gestrebt zu haben."). Interessanterweise wird Jesus auch noch zu Origenes' Zeiten (185–253/4 n.Chr.) von Celsus als λῃστής bezeichnet (siehe Orig. c. Celsum 3:59), was auf eine lange Wirkungsgeschichte der Charakterisierung Jesu als zelotischer „Räuber" deutet.

[45] Vgl. Joh 6,15; 11,48. „Der Prophet" (ὁ προφήτης), auf den sich die begeisterte Volksmenge in Joh 6,14 bezieht, muss als Erfüllung der Ankündigung des Mose in Dtn 18,15 verstanden werden: „Einen Propheten wie mich wird dir der HERR, dein Gott, aus deiner Mitte, aus deinen Brüdern, erstehen lassen. Auf ihn sollt ihr hören." Ein Prophet wie Mose könnte entsprechend große Autorität als Führer seines Volkes erwarten; die Absicht des Volkes, Jesus zum König zu salben, ist daher gut

listischen Unabhängigkeitsstreben durchdrungen und geht die damit verbundene Gefahr anscheinend bereitwillig ein. Jesus distanziert sich jedoch deutlich von solchen Ansprüchen, indem er sich zurückzieht und die Lage damit entschärft.[46]

Nicht nur durch seine Lehren distanzierte sich Jesus von nationalistischen Absichten, auch durch sein Verhalten stellte er einen deutlichen Gegensatz zu den Zeloten her. So ist er nicht nur bei Zöllnern zu Besuch und isst mit ihnen, sondern nimmt mit Matthäus sogar einen dieser jüdisch-römischen Kollaborateure in seinen engsten Schülerkreis auf (vgl. Mt 9,9f.; 11,19; 21,31; Lk 19,1–10). Zudem antwortet er römisch-loyal, und damit entgegen einer Grundüberzeugung des Zelotentums, auf die Frage nach der Rechtmäßigkeit, Steuern an die Römer zu zahlen.[47] Interessanterweise sind es hier wieder die Pharisäer, die diese Frage mit der Absicht stellen, „ihn in seiner Rede zu fangen" (αὐτὸν παγιδεύσωσιν ἐν λόγῳ) (Mt 22,15). Nur durch die geschickte Begründung der Antwort kann Jesus sowohl der Anklage entgehen, ein Nationalist zu sein, als auch dem Vorwurf, seine jüdischen Wurzeln zugunsten des Friedens und der Loyalität gegenüber den Römern zu verleugnen.[48] Letzteres hätte gewiss Jesu Beliebtheit und Einfluss im Volk geschmälert, Ersteres hätte ihn als (zelotischen) Angeklagten vor den römischen Richterstuhl geführt. Seine Antwort („Wessen Bild und Aufschrift ist das? … So gebt dem Kaiser, was des Kaisers ist, und Gott, was Gottes ist"; Mt 22,20f.) zeigt, dass die römische Herrschaft für ihn kein Widerspruch zum Reich Gottes darstellte. Man kann möglicherweise auch in einigen seiner Gleichnisse eine unterschwellige Kritik am Zelotentum erkennen, besonders dort, wo er negativ von λῃσταί spricht.[49]

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verständlich. Unabhängig von dieser religiösen Sicht wäre dies aber dennoch ein klarer Abfall von den Römern, die allein dazu berechtigt sind, neue Könige einzusetzen.

[46] Siehe Joh 6,15. Auch die am nächsten Tag folgende, in gewisser Weise provokante Rede Jesu (V. 26–65), war gewiss nicht zufällig gewählt. Wie es heißt, werden hier die meisten der Anhänger zerstreut (V. 66) – und damit die Gefahr des Aufstands gebannt. Zudem zeigen sich nun die treuen Anhänger als Gegensatz zur breiten Masse, die Jesus möglicherweise tatsächlich nur aus politischen Gründen folgte.

[47] Siehe Mt 22,15–22; Mk 12,13–17; Lk 20,20–26. Zur Interpretation der Steuerfrage als Angriff bzgl. des Zelotentums auch Cullmann 1970, 64f.; Heiligenthal 2005, 33; Deines 2004, 627; ähnlich (implizit) Wiefel 1998, 379; Rasp 1924, 41.

[48] Die Hohenpriester hingegen, als Vertreter des pharisäisch-sadduzäischen Sanhedrins, scheuen sich nicht, dezidiert zu bekunden: „Wir haben keinen König außer dem Kaiser" (οὐκ ἔχομεν βασιλέα εἰ μὴ Καίσαρα; Joh 19,15). Da sie dies, zumindest dem knappen Bericht des Johannes zufolge, ohne Einschränkung aussagen, verleugnen sie damit ihren eigentlichen jüdischen König, Jahwe. Sie wiederholen damit den Abfall des alten Israel von der Theokratie (vgl. 1Sam. 8,7) und lösen sich zugleich von der göttlichen Herrschaft. Dass dies gerade vonseiten der Hohenpriester derart deutlich ausgesagt wird, muss für einen überzeugten (insbesondere nationalistischen) Juden umso verwerflicher gewesen sein und könnte zu einer Vertiefung der Kluft zwischen loyal-pazifistischen Pharisäern und national-zelotischen Eiferern innerhalb der übergeordneten Pharisäer-Partei geführt haben.

[49] Hier sind das Gleichnis vom barmherzigen Samariter (Lk 10,25–37) sowie die Bildrede vom guten Hirten (Joh 10,1–16) zu nennen (siehe hierzu auch Rengstorf 1942, 266).

Trotz dieser deutlichen Ablehnung jeglicher zelotischer Bestrebungen wird ihm letztlich vor Pilatus gerade das zur Last gelegt, was er so deutlich abwies, nämlich dass er „unsere [jüdische] Nation verführt und sie davon abhält, dem Kaiser Steuern zu geben, indem er sagt, dass er selbst Christus, ein König, sei" (Lk 23,2). Die Unrechtmäßigkeit dieser (zelotischen) Anklage ist offensichtlich. Als einzige ‚zelotische' Tat Jesu könnte man die Tempelreinigung bezeichnen, die indes aber keinen derartigen Aufruhr auslöste, dass die bei der nahegelegenen Burg Antonia stationierten römischen Truppen eingeschritten wären.[50]

Zusätzlich ist die beiden Parteien (d.i. der christlichen und der zelotischen) gemeinsame eschatologische Naherwartung nicht nur in ihren konkreten Ausformungen unterschiedlich (himmlisches *vs.* irdisches Reich), sondern speziell auch in dem vorgesehenen Weg, diese religiösen Ziele zu erreichen (Friedfertigkeit *vs.* Gewaltbereitschaft).[51] Ein Gegensatz hinsichtlich des Erreichens bzw. der Durchsetzung eschatologischer Erwartungen wäre die christliche ‚Passivität' im Warten auf Gottes Handeln (in der Etablierung des geistlichen Gottesreiches bzw. der Wiederkunft Jesu) lediglich dadurch unterstützt, dass die Welt (auf Basis der freien Willensentscheidung) missioniert wird (vgl. Mt 24,14; 28,19f.), im Gegensatz zum zelotischen Eifer, der die eigenen Erwartungen durch gewaltsamen Einsatz zu erzwingen sucht.

3. Schlussfolgerungen

Bei Josephus erscheint der religiös-nationalistische Eifer der Zeloten aufgespalten in verschiedene Gruppierungen, die erst unmittelbar vor dem Jüdischen Krieg deutlicher sichtbare Konturen erhalten. Dass die hier zugrunde liegende Geisteshaltung jedoch schon Jahrzehnte früher, spätestens um 6 n.Chr., sichtbar wurde, wird auch von diesem jüdisch-römischen Historiker bestätigt und knapp charakterisiert. Anhand dieser Angaben ist es möglich, zumindest latente Vorkommnisse jener revolutionären Auswüchse auch in den zurückhaltenden Berichten des Neuen Testaments zu erkennen.

Während der religiöse Eifer auch aus neutestamentlicher Sicht nicht von vornherein als grundsätzlich negativ beurteilt wird und sich ein (ehemaliges) Mitglied der Zeloten vermutlich sogar unter den zwölf engsten Vertrauten Jesu befand, ist das gewaltsame Zelotentum mit dem neutestamentlichen Christentum unvereinbar, da es konträr zu den christlichen Geboten sowie dem friedlichen Vorbild Jesu steht. Die ‚fünfte' jüdische αἵρεσις (die christliche) ist damit, neben den Essenern, die einzige, die die politische Ebene als Instrument religiöser Zwecke ausschließt und

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[50] Vgl. Mt 21,12; Mk 11,15f.; Joh 2,14–17; Wegenast 1916, 2493f. Zumindest bei Johannes wird berichtet: „Seine Jünger aber dachten daran, dass geschrieben steht: ‚Der Eifer [ζῆλος] um dein Haus wird mich fressen'" (Joh 2,17).

[51] Vgl. hierzu auch Wegenast 1916, 2494; Hengel 1976, 273ff.

allein durch religiöse Überzeugungen die Menschen positiv zu verändern sucht.[52] Der Obrigkeit untertan zu sein, gilt als christliche Pflicht; der religiöse Eifer zeigt sich in Liebestaten, nicht in politischen Aktionen (vgl. Mt 5,44; Lk 6,35; Jak 1,27; 2 Petr 1,7; Röm 13,1–7.10; Gal 5,14). Es ist richtig, dass es „einige Berührungspunkte zwischen Jesus, dem Urchristentum und den Zeloten [gibt], aufs Ganze gesehen schließen sich aber Zelotismus und Christentum aus".[53] Man kann eine gewisse Wirkung des zelotischen Gedankenguts auf Worte und Taten Jesu nicht leugnen (vgl. Wood 1956, 266) – allerdings rührt dies von der damals gegenwärtigen Mentalität, die dieser revolutionär-nationalistischen Ideologie zum Teil sehr offen gegenüberstand und von Jesus daher mehrfach deutlich zurückgewiesen werden musste. Eine sympathische Haltung Jesu zum Zelotismus ist nicht erkennbar, obgleich der *friedfertige* „Eifer" durchaus als positive Qualität seiner Nachfolger galt.

Trotz dieses großen Unterschiedes zwischen der christlich-pazifistischen Überzeugung, die in Jesu Leben offenbar wird, und der gewaltsam-revolutionären Geisteshaltung der Zeloten, wird auch Paulus später (von einem römischen Obersten) für einen Anführer der Σικάριοι gehalten – was auf die Anklage jüdischer Männer hin geschieht, die mitten in Jerusalem einen Aufruhr gegen ihn initiieren (siehe Apg 21,27–38). Es hat insgesamt den Anschein, als würden die übrigen Parteien des damaligen Judentums das junge Christentum subtil als den Zeloten nahestehend charakterisieren, wobei das Volk gleichzeitig gegen deren angebliche Gesetzlosigkeit aufgehetzt wird – beides um deren immer stärker werdenden Einfluss zu unterminieren (so in Apg 21,27–30). Dass diese Polemik als Ausdruck einer stark empfundenen Konkurrenzhaltung der nicht-christlichen Juden, insbesondere der geistlichen Führer des Volkes, gewertet werden muss, ist zumindest naheliegend.[54]

Die Divergenz hinsichtlich des gewaltsamen nationalen Eifers zwischen den frühen Christen und den etablierten, religiös-politisch einflussreichen Sekten der Pharisäer und Sadduzäer stellt einen der großen Unterschiede in der religiösen Landschaft am Vorabend des verheerenden Jüdischen Krieges dar und ist Ausdruck einer konträren messianischen und eschatologischen Erwartung, daneben auch eines andersartigen Verständnisses der alttestamentlichen Gebote und des Zwecks der Theokratie. Zugleich sichert gerade diese unpolitische Einstellung den Christen das eigenständige Überleben trotz des Jüdischen Krieges und späterer Verfolgungen, die sich entsprechend vorrangig auf den religiösen Charakter der neuen Sekte konzentrieren. Während die Christen ohne politische Ambitionen ihre Kirche theologisch immer deutlicher festigen, müssen Pharisäer und Sadduzäer in der rabbinischen Bewegung wieder miteinander kooperieren, um letztlich das Überleben der jüdischen Kultur zu

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[52] Dies dann allerdings bis in die höchsten politischen Ämter: Apg 24,24f.; 25,12; 27,24. Zum essenischen Einfluss auf die hohe Politik Judäas siehe Gehring 2010, pass.

[53] Wegenast 1916, 2494; vgl. Black 1974, 54; Parente 1984–85, 196; Rengstorf 1942, 267.

[54] Man denke besonders an Joh 11,48: „Wenn wir ihn [d.i. Jesus] so lassen, werden alle an ihn glauben, und die Römer werden kommen und unsere Stadt wie auch unsere Nation wegnehmen."

sichern, die durch das zelotische Aufbäumen im Krieg der Jahre 66–70 n. Chr. kurz vor dem Untergang stand.

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Abstract

This article first examines the group terms used and the references containing details on zealots in the writings of Flavius Josephus. The basic patterns of this violent revolutionary movement developed from these materials are then applied to latent and generally but dimly recognizable hints in the New Testament writings, and a corresponding zealot "atmosphere" of the respective situation is highlighted. The conclusion emphasizes overlaps and contrasting features of the zealot allusions and the Christian attitude as found in the New Testament.

Résumé

Cet article étudie tout d'abord les termes utilisés et les références contenant des détails relatifs aux zélotes dans les écrits de Flavius Josèphe. Les caractéristiques fondamentales de ce mouvement violent déduites de ces matériaux seront ensuite appliquées à des remarques latentes et, en général, difficilement repérables dans le Nouveau Testament. Une ambiance correspondante, ambiance concernant les zélotes de la situation respective, est soulignée. La conclusion met l'accent sur les correspondances de et les caractéristiques en opposition à des allusions relatives aux zélotes et l'attitude chrétienne trouvées dans le Nouveau Testament.

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Ellen G. White's *Life of Christ*: An Episode in the History of Early Adventist Translation Work

Denis Kaiser

Abstract

In the late 1880s and early 1890s a book on the life of Jesus Christ was published in various foreign languages in Europe and North America. Ellen G. White was given as the author of the book. It generally was known under the English working title *The Life of Christ*, although an English counterpart to these foreign language editions has never been published. The circumstance of those editions raises the question of their textual basis, background, and significance. The following article shows that the *Life of Christ* is an adapted version of *Spirit of Prophecy*, vols. 2 and 3, which also influenced the chronology and content of the later *Desire of Ages*. Published in Danish-Norwegian, Swedish, German, French, and Finnish, the *Life of Christ* had a major impact on evangelistic work and on the principles followed in the preparation of Ellen White's books in later years.

Throughout her life Seventh-day Adventist leader, writer, and prophetic voice Ellen G. White (1827–1915) was moved in her writing and speaking ministry by a passion for Jesus Christ and Scripture (Burt 2010; Kaiser and Moon forthcoming). This passion is reflected in her many sermons, articles, manuscripts, and letters that speak of her love for Jesus as a personal Savior, Lord, and Friend. Her books also manifest a continual amplification and enlargement of the life of Christ theme: *Spiritual Gifts*, vol. 1 (White 1858); *Spirit of Prophecy*, vols. 2 and 3 (White 1877; White 1878); *Thoughts from the Mount of Blessing* (White 1896); *The Desire of Ages* (White 1898); and *Christ's Object Lessons* (White 1900). In his extensive research on the literary sources and the development of ideas in the *Desire of Ages* Fred Veltman briefly mentioned various foreign language editions of a book on the life of Jesus Christ, authored by Ellen White and published during the late 1880s and early 1890s in Europe and North America (Veltman 1988, 119–123). These editions were generally called *The Life of Christ*[1] although a published English counterpart never existed. Since Ellen White was not conversant in any language other than English and the text of those editions differs somewhat from any of her other books published in English, these *Life of*

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[1] The title *Life of Christ* was used in contemporary correspondence, advertisements, and mission reports which is why it is subsequently used for simplification although there never existed a published English edition of the book.

Christ editions represent a rather obscure chapter in Adventist literary history. This article looks at the literary relationships, the background, and the significance of these editions, specifically for the evangelistic work of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, the editorial process in translating and publishing Ellen White's books, and the conceptions of divine inspiration.[2]

1.   Literary Relationships of the *Life of Christ*

As can be seen below there are striking literary relationships not only between *Spirit of Prophecy*, vols. 2 and 3, and the *Life of Christ* but also between the latter and the literary masterpiece *Desire of Ages*. The explanation of these relationships is preceded by a chart containing a comparison of the chapters of the three works.[3]

	The Spirit of Prophecy, vols. 2 and 3			The Life of Christ			The Desire of Ages	
	Chs.	Titles	Page	Chs.	Titles	Page	Chs.	Titles	Page
Vol. 2				1.	Plan of Redemption	9	1.	God With Us	19
							2.	The Chosen People	27
							3.	The Fulness of Time	31
	1.	The First Advent of Christ	9						
				2.	The Birth of Jesus Christ	14	4.	Unto You a Saviour	43
							5.	The Dedication	50
							6.	We Have Seen His Star	59
	2.	The Life of Christ	30						
				3.	Childhood of Jesus Christ	30	7.	As a Child	68
							8.	The Passover Visit	75
							9.	Days of Conflict	84
	3.	Life and Mission of John	41						
				4.	John the Baptist	43	10.	The Voice in the Wilderness	97
				5.	The Baptism of Christ	57	11.	The Baptism	109
	4.	The Mission of Christ	58						
				6.	The Temptation in the Wilderness	65	12.	The Temptation	114
							13.	The Victory	124
							14.	We Have Found the Messiah	132
				7.	John Bears Witness to Christ	78			
				8.	John's Character	84			
	5.	The Death of John	74	9.	John's Death	90			
	6.	Temptation of Christ	85						
	7.	The Marriage at Cana	98	10.	The Wedding of Cana	100	15.	At the Marriage Feast	144
	8.	Cleansing the Temple	115	11.	Jesus Cleanses the Temple	116	16.	In His Temple	154
	9.	Nicodemus Comes to Christ	124	12.	Nicodemus Comes to Christ	124	17.	Nicodemus	167
							18.	He Must Increase	178
	10.	The Woman of Samaria	140	13.	The Samarian Woman	139	19.	At Jacob's Well	183
	11.	The Centurion's Son	151	14.	The Centurion's Son	149			
							20.	Except Ye See Signs and Wonders	196
	12.	Jesus at Bethesda	156	15.	Jesus at Bethesda	154	21.	Bethesda and the Sanhedrin	201
							22.	Imprisonment and Death of John	214
							23.	The Kingdom of God Is at Hand	231
							24.	Is Not This the Carpenter's Son?	236
							25.	The Call by the Sea	244
	13.	Jesus at Capernaum	173	16.	Jesus in Capernaum	170	26.	At Capernaum	252
	14.	Choosing the Disciples	182	17.	Jesus Chooses the Disciples	179			

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[2] A concise article on "The Life of Christ" will appear in the forthcoming *Ellen G. White Encyclopedia* (Kaiser, forthcoming).

[3] The page numbers of the *Life of Christ* in this chart stem from the Swedish *Kristi lefnad* of 1885.

	The Spirit of Prophecy, vols. 2 and 3			The Life of Christ			The Desire of Ages	
	Chs.	Titles	Page	Chs.	Titles	Page	Chs.	Titles	Page
Vol. 2				18.	The Leper's Healing	189	27.	Thou Canst Make Me Clean	262
				19.	The Paralytic	195			
							28.	Levi-Matthew	272
	15.	The Sabbath	193	20.	The Sabbath	204	29.	The Sabbath	281
							30.	He Ordained Twelve	290
	16.	Sermon on the Mount	200	21.	Jesus' Sermon on the Mount	210	31.	The Sermon on the Mount	298
	17.	The Leper Healed	225						
	18.	Parable of the Sower	232	22.	The Parable of the Sower	234			
	19.	Other Parables	242	23.	Other Parables	243			
							32.	The Centurion	315
							33.	Who Are My Brethren?	321
							34.	The Invitation	328
				24.	Jesus Calms the Storm	259	35.	Peace, Be Still	333
							36.	The Touch of Faith	342
				25.	The Men from the Grave	264	37.	The First Evangelists	349
							38.	Come Rest Awhile	359
	20.	The Loaves and Fishes	258	26.	Loaves and Fishes	271	39.	Give Ye Them to Eat	364
	21.	Walking on the Water	267	27.	Jesus Walks on Water	279	40.	A Night on the Lake	377
							41.	The Crisis in Galilee	383
	22.	Christ in the Synagogue	274	28.	Christ in the Synagogue	284	42.	Tradition	395
	23.	The Paralytic	292						
							43.	Barriers Broken Down	399
	24.	Woman of Canaan	301	29.	The Canaanite Woman	300	44.	The True Sign	404
	25.	Christ Stills the Tempest	305						
	26.	Men from the Tombs	311						
	27.	Jairus' Daughter	318	30.	Jairus' Daughter	304			
							45.	The Foreshadowing of the Cross	410
	28.	The Transfiguration	324	31.	Christ's Transfiguration	310	46.	He Was Transfigured	419
							47.	Ministry	426
							48.	Who Is the Greatest?	432
	29.	Feast of Tabernacles	337	32.	Feast of Tabernacles	325	49.	At the Feast of Tabernacles	447
	30.	Go and Sin no More	349	33.	Go and Sin no More	336	50.	Among Snares	455
							51.	The Light of Life	463
							52.	The Divine Shepherd	476
							53.	The Last Journey From Galilee	485
							54.	The Good Samaritan	497
							55.	Not With Outward Show	506
							56.	Blessing the Children	511
							57.	One Thing Thou Lackest	518
	31.	Resurrection of Lazarus	358	34.	Resurrection of Lazarus	345	58.	Lazarus, Come Forth	524
							59.	Priestly Plottings	537
							60.	The Law of the New Kingdom	547
							61.	Zacchaeus	552
	32.	Mary's Offering	372	35.	Mary's Offering	358	62.	The Feast at Simon's House	557
	33.	Riding into Jerusalem	382	36.	Jesus Rides into Jerusalem	368	63.	Thy King Cometh	569
Vol. 3	1.	Weeping over Jerusalem	9	37.	Jesus weeps over Jerusalem	380	64.	A Doomed People	580
	2.	Cleansing the Temple	20	38.	Jesus Cleanses the Temple	391	65.	The Temple Cleansed	589
	3.	Jesus and the Pharisees	36	39.	Jesus and the Pharisees	406	66.	Controversy	601
	4.	Denouncing the Pharisees	56	40.	Jesus denounces the Pharisees	424	67.	Woes on the Pharisees	610
	5.	In the Outer Court	74	41.	In the Outer Court	440	68.	In the Outer Court	621
	6.	The Passover Supper	81	42.	The Passover Supper	447	69.	On the Mount of Olives	627
							70.	The Least of These My Brethren	637
							71.	A Servant of Servants	642
							72.	In Remembrance of Me	652
							73.	Let Not Your Heart Be Troubled	662
	7.	In the Garden	94	43.	In the Herb Garden	459	74.	Gethsemane	685
	8.	In the Judgment Hall	107	44.	Jesus in the Judgment Hall	471	75.	Before Annas and the Court of Caiaphas	698
							76.	Judas	716
	9.	Condemnation of Jesus	127	45.	Jesus' Death Warrant	490	77.	In Pilate's Judgment Hall	723
	10.	Calvary	148	46.	Golgotha	510	78.	Calvary	741
	11.	At the Sepulcher	173	47.	At the Grave	533	79.	It is Finished	758
	12.	The Conflict Ended	183	48.	The Battle Ended	542	80.	In Joseph's Tomb	769
	13.	The Resurrection	191	49.	The Resurrection	550	81.	The Lord Is Risen	779
	14.	The Women at the Tomb	198	50.	The Women at the Tomb	556	82.	Why Weepest Thou?	788
	15.	Jesus at Emmaus	206	51.	Jesus at Emmaus	564	83.	The Walk to Emmaus	795
	16.	In the Upper Chamber	216	52.	The Disciples in the Hall	573	84.	Peace Be Unto You	802
	17.	Jesus at Galilee	223	53.	Jesus at Galilee	579	85.	By the Sea Once More	809
	18.	Meeting of the Brethren	234	54.	The Brother's Meeting	590	86.	Go Teach All Nations	818
	19.	Ascension of Christ	249	55.	Christ's Ascension	604	87.	To My Father, and Your Father	829

1.1   The Relationship to *Spirit of Prophecy*, Volumes 2 and 3

The charts above show that the material used in the *Spirit of Prophecy* volumes appears in almost the same chronological order in the *Life of Christ*. A comparison of the 55 chapters of the initial *Life of Christ* with the 52 chapters on Jesus' life in vols. 2 and 3 of the *Spirit of Prophecy* series reveals striking similarities between those books. The chapters from vol. 3 appear in the exact same order in the *Life of Christ*, whereas the order of the chapters from vol. 2 was rearranged and slightly adapted. Thus the first four chapters from vol. 2 were replaced by eight chapters in the *Life of Christ* that contain new material. The first four chapters in vol. 2 were entitled: (1) "The First Advent of Christ," (2) "The Life of Christ," (3) "Life and Mission of John," and (4) "The Mission of Christ." These chapters were replaced in the *Life of Christ* by one rearranged old chapter and seven new chapters on the following topics: (1) "The Plan of Redemption," (2) "Jesus Christ's Birth," (3) "Childhood of Jesus Christ," (4) "John the Baptist," (5) "Christ's Baptism," (6) "The Temptation in the Wilderness" (rearranged), (7) "John Bears Witness to Christ," and (8) "John's Character." Further on in the book, five chapters were moved to different places: chapter 6 on the temptation of Christ was placed right after the new chapter 5; chapter 17 on the healing of the leper and chapter 23 on the paralytic were placed right after the old chapter 14; and chapters 25 on the stilling of the tempest by Christ and 26 on the men from the tombs were placed right after the old chapter 19.

The textual basis of the *Life of Christ* was basically vols. 2 and 3 of the *Spirit of Prophecy*, also published under the alternative series title *The Great Controversy*. William C. White explained the literary basis as follows: "While this edition [the *Life of Christ*] is largely a translation of G[rea]t Con[troversy], vols. 2&3, the text has received some additions, and a special preparation for translation into the European languages." He left no doubt that his mother was involved in the preparation of the textual basis for the translation: "In the production of the book, no pains have been spared by the author, the translators, or the publishers, to make the book just what it ought to be, that it may go freely among the people, and do the most possible good."[4]

Those remarks are supported by two interesting copies of the *Spirit of Prophecy*, vol. 2, which are found in the vault of the Ellen G. White Estate at Silver Spring, Maryland. Both copies contain introductory notes that are quite insightful. Thus the first copy was "marked for the German Life of Christ," and was intended to be the "Manuscript for [the] Translator." It was supposed to be returned to "M. A. Davis," referring to Marian A. Davis, Ellen White's long-time literary assistant. The second copy was designed for the "French Life of Christ," and was sent on "May 13, 1884" to "G. I. Butler," then president of the General Conference of

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[4] W. C. White, letter to H. P. Holser, September 5, 1887; cf. W. C. White, letter to L. C. Chadwick, July 10, 1888; W. C. White, letter to A. O. Tait, July 10, 1888. All letters referred to are from the Ellen G. White Estate, Silver Spring.

Seventh-day Adventists (EGWE 689). Even more significant is the fact that these two copies contain a number of notes, markings, and insertions for the translators (for more details, see Kaiser 2008, 44–50). The existence of these adapted *Spirit of Prophecy* copies is indicative of the fact that there was no single published English work used as the master copy for the *Life of Christ*.

1.2 The Relationship to the *Desire of Ages*

While the text of the *Desire of Ages* obviously constitutes a significant improvement over the text of the *Life of Christ*, the chronology of the events is quite similar. A comparison of the 55 chapters of *Life of Christ* with the topics treated in the 87 chapters of the *Desire of Ages* revealed that the 55 chapters of the *Life of Christ* were used in the same chronological order in the *Desire of Ages* with a few exceptions. Four chapters were moved to a different place;[5] chapters 22 and 23 were either left out, or their content was used in other chapters. Further, the *Desire of Ages* contains 32 additional chapters that contain new material or material that was previously part of already existing chapters.

A close examination of the chapter on the birth and ministry of John the Baptist led Fred Veltman to the discovery

> that selections which later appear in Patriarch and Prophets but are not part of the S[pirit of] P[rophecy] text show up also in the French work [of the Life of Christ]. There are other sentences which appear to be, upon translation into English, closer to the D[esire of] A[ges] text than to the S[pirit of] P[rophecy] text. We also found sentences in the French edition [of the Life of Christ] which we were not able to find elsewhere in Ellen White's writings. Perhaps these materials originated from the writings Ellen White was preparing at the time and while translated for the European editions were not preserved for the English text of either Patriarchs and Prophets or the D[esire of] A[ges] (Veltman 1988, 122).

Veltman further states that Ellen White's later works on Christ's life follow "the order and arrangement of the narrative presentation" (Veltman 1988, 122). That confirms Marian Davis' statement that "in the suggestions made as to detail and arrangement, I have followed, as nearly as seemed feasible, the French L[ife of] C[hrist]."[6] Although the plan to prepare an English edition of the *Life of Christ* was eventually aborted, it is reasonable to conclude that the *Life of Christ* constitutes a distinct stage in the history of the text of *The Desire of Ages* and could be called a missing link as well (Veltman 1988, 123).

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[5] Chapter 7 on John's witness about Christ was moved between the chapters on Nicodemus and the events at Jacob's well; chapter 9 on John's death was moved between the chapters on Bethesda and the kingdom of God being at hand; chapter 17 on Jesus calling his disciples was moved right before the chapter on the events at Capernaum; and chapter 30 on Jairus' daughter was moved between the chapters on the stilling of the storm and the first evangelists.

[6] Marian Davis, letter to James Edson White, December 22, 1895.

2.   The Story of the Various *Life of Christ* Editions

It was during the 1883 Session of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists that the resolution was passed that "Sr. White's 'Life of Christ' shall be published in the Danish-Norwegian language. … This and other books shall also be published in the French, German, and Swedish languages." (Butler and Oyen 1883, 733) Subsequent correspondence shows that the basis for the translation was vols. 2 and 3 of the *Spirit of Prophecy*.[7] In order to realize this resolution, it was recommended that A. B. Oyen should move to Norway to translate the book into the Danish-Norwegian language with the help and criticism of J. G. Matteson. Further, W. C. White was asked to "arrange his business to go at some time to Europe in order to take advanced steps in establishing publishing interests in Europe" (ibid.). Between September 1885 and August 1887, W. C. White, his mother Ellen G. White, and the rest of her staff established their headquarters in Basel, Switzerland (Delafield 1975). It was during those years that the *Life of Christ* was prepared and published in various languages.

2.1   Published Editions

Danish-Norwegian Edition. Although Oyen did not plan to leave for Norway until the end of the following March (1884), he had already begun to translate the book before he left. Since he regarded many sentences as rather "wordy" and not concise enough, he asked W. C. White for the permission to shorten some of the statements.[8] When Matteson received and proofread the first couple of pages, he arrived at the conclusion that Oyen was not competent to translate the *Life of Christ* or anything of importance.[9] Hurt by Matteson's behavior and criticism, Oyen wanted to stay in America, discard the project, and leave the translation entirely to Matteson.[10] Yet the denominational leaders were able to convince him to change his mind and go to Norway. His mood and attitude towards the project improved, and he wanted to prepare himself as well as possible to accomplish that translation work. He considered the manuscript of the *Life of Christ* to be a decided improvement over the *Spirit of Prophecy* text. Oyen was especially pleased with the new first chapter "The Plan of Redemption." The message of the book had been made clearer and more interesting by subdividing the subsequent

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[7] J. G. Matteson, letter to G. I. Butler, January 16, 1884; W. C. White, letter to H. P. Holser, September 5, 1887; W. C. White, letter to L. C. Chadwick, July 10, 1888; W. C. White, letter to A. O. Tait, July 10, 1888.

[8] A. B. Oyen, letter to W. C. White, February 8, 1884.

[9] J. G. Matteson, letter to G. I. Butler, January 16, 1884; A. B. Oyen, letter to W. C. White, February 8, 1884.

[10] A. B. Oyen, letter to G. I. Butler, February 14, 1884; A. B. Oyen, letter to W. C. White, March 20, 1884.

chapters and by the introduction of "new matter."[11] He suggested the insertion of the statement "Specifically prepared by the author for translation into Danish-Norwegian" on the title page of the book, a suggestion that was also accepted in an adapted form in the Swedish edition (White 1885, 1; White 1886a, 1).[12] The translation was actually done by Matteson, who dictated to a shorthand writer, getting "along quite rapidly" this way.[13] While the book was published in one volume in North America, it was bound in two volumes in Norway to "facilitate the sale."[14] The Danish-Norwegian edition, which was entitled *Jesu Kristi liv*, was published at Battle Creek (Michigan), Chicago (Illinois), and Kristiana (Norway) between 1885 and 1895 (White 1885; White 1888a; White 1895).

Swedish Edition. It took a little bit longer to get the book translated and published in Swedish. However, by the latter part of 1886 it was also issued in that language.[15] While the books were initially printed at the Review and Herald publishing house in Battle Creek, it was considered more efficient by the people in Sweden to have printing plates in Europe too so that they could print as often and as many copies as necessary, without waiting for several months for books to arrive from America.[16] Thus, from 1886 until 1893, *Kristi lefnad* was printed at the publishing houses in Battle Creek and Stockholm (White 1886; White 1893a). The circulation of the book was attended with much success and good results, as W. C. White reported.[17]

German Edition. In early 1886, the book was almost entirely translated into German.[18] However, the publishing date had to be postponed several times due to various disagreements about the best and most accurate translation.[19] Although initially the project looked quite promising, it was not certain anymore if it could be completed before W. C. White would leave Europe again.[20] The determination "to have it as good as possible" made the German translation unusually expensive and time-consuming.[21] However, there were other reasons for the delay apart from the translation and shortage of money. In November 1886, the work was practically at a standstill, for Marian Davis' time was taken up entirely with

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[11] A. B. Oyen, letter to W. C. White, March 20, 1884.
[12] A. B. Oyen, letter to W. C. White, March 21, 1884.
[13] A. B. Oyen, letter to W. C. White, June 19, 1884.
[14] W. C. White, letter to British Mission Board, May 18, 1888.
[15] W. C. White, letter to A. R. Henry, June 23, 1886.
[16] W. C. White, letter to C. H. Jones, February 19, 1886; W. C. White, letter to A. B. Oyen, April 5, 1886; W. C. White, letter to A. R. Henry, June 23, 1886; W. C. White, letter to E. Eldridge, August 1, 1886; W. C. White, letter to A. R. Henry, Sept. 6, 1886.
[17] W. C. White, letter to H. P. Holser, September 5, 1887.
[18] W. C. White, letter to C. H. Jones, February 14, 1886; W. C. White, letter to C. H. Jones, March 8, 1886.
[19] W. C. White, letter to C. H. Jones, May 13, 1886.
[20] W. C. White, letter to G. I. Butler, January 26, 1887.
[21] W. C. White, letter to L. C. Chadwick, December 1887.

articles that Ellen White was sending from her journeys.[22] Yet by the end of July 1887 it was finally printed with the title *Das Leben Jesu Christi,* although it was not ready for the market until September (Conradi 1887a, 253–254; Holser 1888, 237).[23] The book was well received and very popular among ordinary people in Germany (Conradi, 1887b, 286). W. C. White advertised *Das Leben Jesu Christi*, printed in Basel, at the General Conference Session in November 1887, urging church administrators to employ good agents and train them well to work among the German population in their areas. Several weeks afterwards the German edition was also printed by the Pacific Press at Oakland in California (Abtheilung 1888).[24] The German edition was published at Basel (Switzerland), Hamburg (Germany), Oakland (California), and Battle Creek (Michigan) from 1887 until at least 1893 (White 1887a; White 1888b; White 1891a; White 1893b).

French Edition. The translation of the book into French occurred simultaneously with the translation into German. As with the German translation, the completion of the French was repeatedly within eyeshot but it had to be postponed several times.[25] W. C. White reported that precious months had been lost in the French project

> until some who ought to have had the burden of pushing the work forward almost forgot that there was such a book being published. At one time Bro. Whitney proposed to throw away all we had done and begin anew. This would have delayed us another year, and how pleased the Devil would have been, if he had succeeded in cheating us out of another year.[26]

The book was not available until October 1, 1887.[27] Afterwards it was published initially under the title *La vie de Christ* and later with the title *La vie de Jésus-Christ notre Seigneur* in Basel (Switzerland), Oakland (California), and Battle Creek (Michigan) between 1887 and 1891 (White 1887b; White 1888c; White 1891b).

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[22] W. C. White, letter to E. G. White, November 14, 1886.

[23] W. C. White, letter to C. H. Jones, July 29, 1887; W. C. White, letter to M. K. White, August 1, 1887; W. C. White, letter to C. H. Jones, August 11, 1887; W. C. White, letter to E. G. White, August 11, 1887.

[24] W. C. White, letter to H. P. Holser, September 5, 1887; W. C. White, letter to L. C. Chadwick, December 1887.

[25] W. C. White, letter to E. G. White, October 19, 1886; W. C. White, letter to C. H. Jones, November 10, 1886; W. C. White, letter to S. N. Haskell, March 18, 1887; W. C. White, letter to C. H. Jones, March 23, 1887; W. C. White, letter to T. Valentine, March 24, 1887; W. C. White, letter to A. R. Henry, April 1, 1887; W. C. White, letter to C. H. Jones, April 4, 1887; W. C. White, letter to unknown, April 15, 1887; W. C. White, letter to R. H. Coggshall, May 13, 1887; W. C. White, letter to C. H. Jones, May 18, 1887; W. C. White, letter to C. H. Jones, July 21, 1887; W. C. White, letter to G. I. Butler, July 28, 1887.

[26] W. C. White, letter to the Central European Mission Board of S. D. Adventists, May 15, 1888.

[27] W. C. White, letter to E. G. White, August 11, 1887.

Finnish Edition. The Seventh-day Adventist faith had entered Finland for the first time in 1891, and by 1897 the church had grown to 68 members (Land 2009, 100; "Finland (1897–1900)"). Thus it is surprising that such a small group of people was able to accomplish the translation and publishing of this 635-page book. *Kristuksen Elämä* was published in Helsinki (Finland) in 1897 (White 1897), the year before the *Desire of Ages* appeared in English.

2.2   Proposed Editions

English Edition. In 1886, W. C. White was so satisfied with the sale of the *Life of Christ* in Scandinavia that he desired the book to "be published in English soon."[28] He recognized the need of the book "to be revised and enlarged, and an English edition of this put out."[29] While he wished that his mother would be able to prepare that edition before their return to America,[30] she wanted to make "important additions" which deferred its publication for an indefinite period of time.[31] Convinced of the importance of the Christ-centered content and perspective of the book, W. C. White considered either reprinting the two *Spirit of Prophecy* volumes as one book or hastily revising the *Life of Christ* and making plates for the publishing houses in England, the United States, and perhaps even Australia. He added, however, that she "greatly desired to add something when the book was printed again, and this is why we have not printed it in English."[32]

Dutch Edition. By the end of 1887 it was suggested that the *Life of Christ* be translated into the Dutch language. W. C. White favored the idea of having G. Velthuysen translate the book.[33] After Velthuysen was employed by the Central European Mission Board at Basel, Switzerland, he began translating the book from the English copy, comparing it with the German and the French editions.[34] For an unknown reason, Velthuysen was relieved of that task shortly afterwards, and M. J. van der Schuur[35] was considered as a possible translator but these considerations were soon given up. Now it was discussed if the translation should be done by J. Kolvoord from the English and be critically examined by Van der

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[28] W. C. White, letter to E. Eldridge, August 1, 1886.
[29] W. C. White, letter to C. H. Jones, November 10, 1886.
[30] W. C. White, letter to G. I. Butler, January 26, 1887.
[31] W. C. White, letter to F. E. Belden, March 1, 1888.
[32] W. C. White, letter to the British Mission Board, May 18, 1888.
[33] W. C. White, letter to B. L. Whitney, L. R. Conradi, and E. J. Waggoner, December 13, 1887; W. C. White, letter to F. E. Belden, February 3, 1888; W. C. White, letter to G. I. Butler, February 14, 1888; W. C. White, letter to F. E. Belden, March 1, 1888; W. C. White, letter to E. W. Whitney, March 6, 1888.
[34] W. C. White, letter to Central European Mission Board, May 15, 1888; W. C. White, letter to L. R. Conradi, May 16, 1888.
[35] M. J. van der Schuur was asked to come from the Netherlands to the United States. See W. C. White, letter to the Central European Mission Board, August 8, 1888.

Schuur.[36] That was the procedure recommended by W. C. White, whereas the publishing house apparently argued for "a translation from the German by a man who could not read the English."[37] Kolvoord felt that many passages in the book would be considered objectionable by the readers since they would not understand "the author's special gift," or they would not regard it as "sufficient authority for statements not susceptible of Scripture proof."[38] Since the book committee decided to wait for the revision until the end of the year 1888, the translation came to a standstill.[39] Yet, even after the revision had been accomplished, the Dutch people were unwilling to continue working on the book, as the following statement by W. C. White shows.

> There is but little prospect that we shall have the Life of Christ very soon in the Dutch language. Our Holland Brethren find so many points to criticize, and their criticism finds so little favour with us, that they have no heart to go forward with the work, and it must wait. I hope the time will come when they will like taking hold of the work, and bring it out, for I am sure it would meet with favour, in South Africa, if not in Holland.[40]

Spanish Edition. In 1891 the European book committee recommended revising the *Life of Christ* so that it could be published as a subscription book in Spanish for South America. Henry Holser, the chairman of that committee, envisioned the book "as a pioneer book among the Spanish speaking people." Yet John N. Nelson confronted Holser's dream with reality when he informed him that the book was not even ready in English.[41] Hence the plans for a Spanish edition had to be postponed.

3.   The Significance of the *Life of Christ*

The *Life of Christ* in its various foreign language editions had an impact in Europe, North America, and even Australia in several ways. Since its envisioned audience was not so much the membership of the denomination but rather non-members, special care was taken to present it in the best way possible. Thus illustrations were sought that would attract the interest of the readers. The text of the book was

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[36] W. C. White, letter to G. I. Butler, July 2, 1888; W. C. White, letter to the Managers of the Review and Herald, July 4, 1888.

[37] W. C. White, letter to the Managers of the Review and Herald, July 4, 1888; W. C. White, letter to E. W. Whitney, July 10, 1888; W. C. White, letter to the Central European Mission Board, August 8, 1888.

[38] "Book Committee Proceedings: Third Session, Fall of 1888," Minneapolis, MN, October 25 – November 17, 1888, 10.

[39] W. C. White, letter to H. P. Holser, December 18, 1888.

[40] W. C. White, letter to J. H. Waggoner, April 2, 1889.

[41] "Meeting of the European Aux. Book-Committee," July 24, 1891, 1, 2; "Book Committee Proceedings of the Fall 1891," n.d., 21.

repeatedly improved, omitting phrases that were questioned and criticized by its readers, yet without changing the basic content and meaning of the text. The *Life of Christ*, intended as a work that would open the way for later doctrinal works, was a great evangelistic success. However, beyond being an evangelistic door opener, it also influenced the preparation of Ellen G. White's masterpiece *The Desire of Ages*.

3.1   Contextualized Illustrations

When the *Life of Christ* was published in the different countries, W. C. White invested much time and effort in finding fine illustrations that would make the book really appealing to the readers.[42] He also ensured that the European editions contained different illustrations than the American editions because people on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean were attracted in different ways.[43] When some illustrations proved to be rather "coarse," they were replaced by better ones in subsequent editions.[44] In a letter to Henry Holser, W. C. White emphasized that good pictures were sometimes the crucial factor in securing the sale.[45]

3.2   Continuing Editorial Work

Besides finding the best illustrations to make the book attractive, Ellen White and her staff were also interested in providing a text that would be received favorably by the readers. Thus they were willing to change the wording in subsequent editions to make it more acceptable. For example, much energy and money had been invested to secure a good German translation but it was exposed to adverse and bitter criticism from the newspapers, which meant the reception of future publications might be hindered.[46] Hence, over the following years, several committees were formed to examine the *Life of Christ* in its different languages, and to make recommendations to Ellen White for making it more "suitable for publication as a pioneer work in English" as well as in other languages.[47] Those

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[42] W. C. White, letter to C. H. Jones, February 14, 1886; W. C. White, letter to J. E. White, February 18, 1886; W. C. White, letter to M. C. Wilcox, February 24, 1886; W. C. White, letter to J. G. Matteson, March 17, 1886; W. C. White, letter to O. A. Olsen, March 29, 1886; W. C. White, letter to A. R. Henry, April 14, 1886; W. C. White, letter to O. M. Dunham, April 15, 1886; W. C. White, letter to A. B. Oyen, May 7, 1886. See also W. C. White's letter books between 1886 and 1887.

[43] W. C. White, letter to C. H. Jones, November 10, 1886.

[44] W. C. White, letter to H. P. Holser, September 5, 1887; W. C. White, letter to F. E. Belden, December 21, 1887; W. C. White, letter to S. Curtis, December 1887; W. C. White, letter to F. E. Belden, February 5, 1888; "Book Committee Proceedings: Spring Session of 1888, held at Battle Creek, Mich.," March 29 – April 10, 1888, 9.

[45] W. C. White, letter to H. P. Holser, September 5, 1887.

[46] W. C. White, letter to H. P. Holser, December 18, 1887.

[47] W. C. White, letter to L. R. Conradi, May 16, 1888; "Book Committee Proceedings: Third Session, Fall of 1888," 14; W. C. White, letter to E. W. Whitney, December 13, 1888; W. C. White,

committees consisted of such people as W. C. White, Ludwig Richard Conradi, Dores E. Robinson, Frank E. Belden, A. Swedberg, J. Kolvoord, E. P. Auger, M. A. Davis, Mary Stewart, T. Valentiner, and J. Edson White.[48]

The suggestions that were made in these committees may be summarized in two categories: First, some corrections—the most serious ones—dealt with matters that were "partly or wholly errors of the translators or publishers."[49] Second, "some passages not susceptible of direct Scripture proof," were criticized "by those not familiar with the special gift of the author."[50] Some recommended replacing such statements "with something less suggestional to the reader, who is not acquainted with the author and the nature of her work," whereas others regarded such a procedure as a "proposition to eradicate all evidences of special enlightenment."[51] It was decided to revise the *Life of Christ* with a special focus on such passages.[52]

The changes were apparently only made in the manuscripts of the German and French texts but not in the Swedish and Danish-Norwegian editions, for W. C. White insisted that the Review and Herald, in translating the *Life of Christ* into Dutch, should not merely use the "manuscript from which it was translated into Danish and Swedish" but also pay attention to the revisions made at Basel.[53] Although the book had been revised by the summer of 1890, objectionable passages had again been found in the French edition, which called for renewed editorial work.[54] While most of the recommendations for changes were made by the committees, there was at least one individual who made changes single-handedly.[55] Both these revisions and the additions that Ellen White made to the English manuscript in subsequent years led to the publication of the *Desire of Ages* in 1898 (Olson 1979; Veltman 1988).

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letter to H. P. Holser, December 18, 1888; W. C. White, letter to Central European Publishing Board and Board of Managers, April 2, 1889; Book Committe Proceedings from Spring 1891, 10.

[48] "Book Committee Proceedings: Fourth Session, Spring of 1889," 17.

[49] "Book Committee Proceedings: Fourth Session, Spring of 1889," 23; W. C. White, letter to Central European Publishing Board and Board of Managers, April 2, 1889.

[50] Book Committee Proceedings from Spring 1891, 10; W. C. White, letter to H. P. Holser, December 18, 1888.

[51] W. C. White, letter to J. H. Waggoner, April 2, 1889.

[52] "Book Committee Proceedings October 25 - November 17, 1888," 14; W. C. White, letter to E. W. Whitney, December 13, 1888; W. C. White, letter to H. P. Holser, December 18, 1888.

[53] W. C. White, letter to E. W. Whitney, July 10, 1888.

[54] "Proceedings of the S. D. A. Book Committee: Fifth Session, Summer of 1890," 7½; Book Committee Proceedings from Spring 1891, 10.

[55] L. R. Conradi, letter to W. C. White, January 4, 1915. While the first edition of the German *Life of Christ* still showed Judas as being present at the institution of the Lord's Supper revealing Christ's forbearance with Judas, later editions omitted this aspect and left the impression that Judas had already left before. It was supposedly Conradi who was responsible for this change and its implementation in the other foreign-language editions. See W. C. White, letter to L. R. Conradi, February 26, 1915.

3.3   The Impact on the Evangelistic Work

The *Life of Christ* was frequently mentioned in the *Review and Herald* between 1886 and 1888 in connection with references to the evangelistic work among the Scandinavians[56], the French, and the Germans both in Europe (Olsen 1886, 748; *Herold* 1887, 352; *Herold* 1888a, 384; *Herold* 1888b, 64; Conradi 1887a, 253, 254; Whitney 1888, 91; Conradi 1888a, 365, 366; Conradi 1888b, 123) and North America (Wilson 1886, 748; W. B. White 1887, 126; Wilson 1887, 380; Underwood 1888, 140; Paquette 1888, 156; Hutchins 1888, 157). Speaking about the sale of the *Life of Christ* in Iowa, one literature evangelist commented, "We have now just about canvassed the whole State for that good book" (Wilson 1887, 380). W. C. White considered the *Life of Christ* as "the most salable of all our books,"[57] which was designed to prepare the way for the sale of doctrinal works.[58] The book was advertised as far as Australia, as can be seen a dozen times in the Australian *Bible Echo and Signs of the Times* in 1890. The advertisement stated that the book is "issued only in French, German, Swedish, and Danish," the English *Life of Christ* being "supplied in two volumes known as The Great Controversy, vols. II and III" ("The Life of Christ" 1890, 383). The publishing houses in Europe and the United States published the book in its various languages throughout the late 1880s and the early 1890s, thus supporting Ellen White's Christocentric emphasis.

Ellen G. White showed her personal interest in the distribution of the book when, while in Denmark and Norway, she talked to people and gave them copies of the Danish-Norwegian *Life of Christ*.[59] The education of evangelistic workers in Germany and Switzerland was so close to her heart that she gave the royalties from the *Life of Christ* to the advancement of that cause.[60] It was her common practice to devote the proceeds from her translated books to the mission work.[61]

3.4   The Impact on the *Desire of Ages*

Although no revised edition of the book was published in English, the German edition and especially the French edition of the *Life of Christ* did influence the

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[56] Oftentimes they were merely called "Scandinavians," without distinguishing between Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish origins.

[57] W. C. White, letter to A. R. Henry, June 23, 1886.

[58] "Book Committee Proceedings: Third Session, Fall of 1888," 14; W. C. White, letter to E. W. Whitney, December 13, 1888.

[59] Ellen G. White, Diary June 9-22, 1887 (Manuscript 34, 1887).

[60] W. C. White, letter to L. C. Chadwick, December 1887; W. C. White, letter to the Central European Mission Board, August 8, 1888; W. C. White, letter to George I. Butler, August 10, 1888; W. C. White, letter to S. C. Stickney, August 11, 1889.

[61] W. C. White, letter to George I. Butler, November 6, 1886; W. C. White, letter to A. R. Henry, December 22, 1886.

preparation of the *Desire of Ages*. Ellen White's "bookmaker," Marian Davis, stated later that the German and French *Life of Christ* was "arranged and prepared with the counsel of sister [sic] White, W. C. W[hite], M[ary] K. W[hite], and sister [sic] E. J. Burnham." The decisions made at that time guided her "in the preparation of the new book," i.e. the *Desire of Ages*. One of those guiding decisions was to avoid statements for which the Bible gives no evidence, since the readers would not be conscious of the prophetic gift of the author; this statement calls to mind the discussions already mentioned above in the book committees in 1888 and 1891. She further stated that "In the suggestions made as to detail and arrangement, I have followed, as nearly as seemed feasible, the French L[ife of] C[hrist]."[62] In counseling James Edson White in his preparation of *Christ Our Savior*, Davis pointed to the French *Life of Christ* for principles and guidelines in regard to chronology and content.[63] Then she remarked:

> The above arrangement is that which we shall probably follow in the new book, and it is very undesirable to have different books disagree, especially now when they have such wide circulation.[64]

Accordingly the chronology of events followed in the *Life of Christ* formed the primary basis for the chronology found in the *Desire of Ages*. Further, the principles proposed by the book committees in regard to "unnecessary statements" and statements "not susceptible of direct Scripture proof" were followed in the preparation of the *Desire of Ages*. In fact, Ellen White was already revising the English manuscript that provided the basis for the *Life of Christ* and adding new material to it even before the German edition was published. These efforts led directly to the later publication of the *Desire of Ages*.

4.   Conclusion

The *Life of Christ*, as it was published in Danish-Norwegian, Swedish, German, French, and Finnish, was one of the most successful Seventh-day Adventist evangelistic books prior to the *Desire of Ages*, and continued to be such in those languages until the latter work was eventually translated. While the broad textual basis of those translations was *Spirit of Prophecy*, vols. 2 and 3, the *Life of Christ* represents a more advanced stage of that text. There was never any published English edition of the book, but Ellen White herself and her staff were active in preparing the textual basis for the translations. After the publication of the foreign

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[62] Marian Davis, letter to James Edson White, December 22, 1895; cf. "Book Committee Proceedings: Third Session, Fall of 1888," 10; Book Committee Proceedings from Spring 1891, 10.
[63] Marian Davis, letter to James Edson White, December 22, 1895. The latter part of the letter gives several suggestions for changes to the book *Christ Our Savior*. Although the book lists Ellen G. White as the author, the book was, in fact, prepared by her son James Edson.
[64] Ibid.

language editions of the *Life of Christ*, additional revisions were made to them, including corrections to errors in translation, elimination of references to special knowledge, and addition of new material. Ellen White obviously welcomed help from others to find a wording that would make the divine message as attractive for the readers as possible, without changing the message itself. This supports previous findings that her own concept of inspiration cannot be defined in terms of mechanical or verbal inspiration but rather in terms of an inspiration of the person (Olson 1979; Veltman 1988; Kaiser 2010, 10–13, 22–24, 31–32; etc.). It remains for future studies to identify the sources of the new material added to the original text of *Spirit of Prophecy*, vols. 2 and 3 (Kaiser 2008, 44–50), to compare the various language editions of the *Life of Christ*, and to detect revisions within each of those languages. The translation into other languages (Dutch, Spanish, and English) had to wait until these revisions were accomplished. The result of that revision work was finally published as *The Desire of Ages*. The *Life of Christ* was thus a distinct stage in the preparation of the *Desire of Ages*, and a missing link between *Spirit of Prophecy*, vols. 2 and 3, and the *Desire of Ages*. It is quite apparent that Ellen White, W. C. White, and her staff were highly interested in bringing Jesus Christ, humanity's personal savior and friend, to the attention of people all around the world so that they might enter into a saving relationship with him and be prepared to receive further biblical truths. Thus this study contributes to a better understanding not only of early Adventist editorial and translation work but also of the evangelistic efforts of Adventism's publishing ministry in Europe and North America and of Ellen White's conception of her inspiration.

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Abstract

In den späten 1880er und frühen 1890er Jahren wurde in Europa und Nordamerika ein Buch über das Leben Jesu Christi in verschiedenen Fremdsprachen veröffentlicht. Es wurde im Allgemeinen unter dem englischen Arbeitstitel *The Life of Christ* geführt, obwohl es nie ein veröffentlichtes Gegenstück dieser fremdsprachigen Ausgaben gab. Die Existenz dieser Ausgaben wirft Fragen zu ihrer Textgrundlage, ihrem Hintergrund und ihrer Bedeutung auf. Der vorliegende Artikel zeigt, dass *The Life of Christ* eine bearbeitete Fassung des 2. und 3. Bandes von *Spirit of Prophecy* ist, die auch die Chronologie der Ereignisse und den Inhalt des späteren Buches *The Desire of Ages* beeinflusste. *The Life of Christ* wurde in Dänisch-Norwegisch, Schwedisch, Deutsch, Französisch und Finnisch herausgegeben und hatte einen großen Einfluss auf evangelistische Arbeit und auf die Prinzipien, die in späteren Jahren bei der Erstellung von Ellen Whites Büchern befolgt wurden.

Résumé

A la fin des années 1880 et au début des années 1890 un livre sur la vie de Jésus fut publié en différentes langues en Europe et en Amérique du Nord. Ellen G. White était considérée comme étant l'auteur de ce livre. Il était connu sous le titre de travail en anglais *The Life of Christ* (*La vie de Jésus*) et pourtant une édition anglaise en contrepartie à ces éditions en langues étrangères n'a jamais été publiée. L'occasion de ces éditions souleva la question de leur fondement textuel, de leur origine et de leur importance. L'article qui suit montre que le livre *Life of Christ* (*La vie de Jésus*) est une version adaptée du livre *Spirit of Prophecy*, vols. 2 et 3 qui a également influencé la chronologie et le contenu du tardif *Desire of Ages* (*Jésus-Christ*). Publié en danois, norvégien, suédois, allemand, français et finnois, le livre *Life of Christ* (*La vie de Jésus*) eut un impact majeur sur l'œuvre d'évangélisation et sur la suite de l'élaboration des livres d'Ellen White dans les années tardives.

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Ambivalenz im Adventismus

Roland Fischer

Zusammenfassung

Der Adventismus scheint sich in vielen Bereichen ambivalent zu verhalten: Er vermeidet eindeutige Aussagen und Stellungnahmen, bezieht manchmal keine Position und ist auch in seinen Beziehungen zur Gesellschaft und zu anderen Kirchen uneindeutig. Diese Ambivalenz ist systemimmanent, teilweise unvermeidbar und dient dem Selbsterhalt des Systems. Deshalb ist diese Ambivalenz zu bejahen und konstruktiv zu nutzen. Gleichzeitig scheint es angeraten, in bestimmten Bereichen ambivalentes Verhalten zu vermeiden, Stellung zu beziehen und Profil zu zeigen, um die Identität des Adventismus zu wahren und den Mitgliedern Sicherheit zu bieten.

Im deutschen bzw. mitteleuropäischen Adventismus fällt auf, dass es interne Spannungen und Auseinandersetzungen gibt (siehe z. B. Wilhelm 2010), ja dass der Adventismus in einer Krise[1] zu stecken scheint. Gegensätzliche theologische Positionen, kulturelle Unterschiede und Differenzen im Frömmigkeitsstil werden als zugespitzt erlebt und als Polarisation wahrgenommen. Wie geht die Freikirche der Siebenten-Tags-Adventisten (STA) damit um? Hat der Adventismus die Kraft und die Möglichkeiten, Lösungen zu entwickeln? Hat er aber auch die Absicht, Entscheidungen zu treffen? Kann und will er Position beziehen und dadurch Spannungen vermindern und Auseinandersetzungen entscheiden?

Oder ist diese Krise ein weiterer Ausdruck dessen, dass der Adventismus gar keine Position beziehen will, also eine Unentschiedenheit aufrechterhält? Auch in der geschichtlichen Entwicklung der STA war und ist sie immer wieder wahrnehmbar: eine Ambivalenz, eine (un-)bewusste Unentschiedenheit. Die Fragestellung zu diesem Artikel lautet: Ist im Adventismus eine systemimmanente Ambivalenz vorfindbar? Und wenn ja, welchem Zwecke dient sie und wie ist damit umzugehen?

1.   Grundlagen

Unter Ambivalenz ist eine Dichotomie von Sichtweisen zu verstehen, die gegensätzliche Reaktionen bedingen und letztlich die Fähigkeit zu einer Entscheidung im weitesten Sinne hemmen. Nach Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme führt das

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[1] Gremien, Seminare und Artikel zum Thema „Adventistische Identität" sind ein Ausdruck dessen; siehe z.B. Paulsen 2010.

Problem der „doppelten Kontingenz zwangsläufig zur Bildung von sozialen Systemen" (vgl. Reese-Schäfer 1999, 77). Das Problem der doppelten Kontingenz, das heißt des völlig beliebigen Verhaltens von *Ego* und *Alter,* wird zunächst durch Kommunikation reduziert. Indem sich *Ego* und *Alter*, zwei psychische Systeme, in bestimmter Weise verhalten, entscheiden sie sich für eine Handlungsoption und damit gegen alle anderen. Wenn durch diese Selektion Verstehen entsteht, wurde Kontingenz erfolgreich reduziert. Durch diese Kommunikationsprozesse entstehen einfache soziale Systeme, schließlich bilden sich organisierte soziale Systeme. Das Kontingenzproblem wird durch diese Systembildungen weiter reduziert, aber nicht gelöst. Die doppelte Kontingenz wirkt als „Dauerproblem" weiter (ibid.).

In welchem Verhältnis steht nun die Ambivalenz zum Kontingenzproblem? Insofern Kontingenz „Unsicherheit und Handlungsoffenheit … [also] zugleich Unverfügbares und Verfügbares bezeichnet" (Makropoulos 1990, 407), enthält sie implizite Ambivalenz. In einer (bewussten oder unbewussten) Wahrnehmung dieser Ambivalenz könnten *Ego* und *Alter* nun beabsichtigen, sich nicht eindeutig, sondern mehrdeutig zu verhalten und dadurch ihre Handlungsoptionen zu vergrößern. Sie versuchen also, sich für das eine *und* für (und nicht gegen!) das andere zu entscheiden und verhalten sich damit ambivalent. Ambivalenz wäre demnach der Versuch einer Antwort auf das Problem der Kontingenz, würde sie jedoch gleichzeitig aufrechterhalten und damit zur Komplexität beitragen.[2] Bevor am Ende wieder auf diesen systemtheoretischen Ansatz zurückgegriffen wird, sollen nun exemplarisch einige Wahrnehmungen und Beobachtungen aus verschiedenen Subsystemen des Adventismus aufgezeigt werden, die den Befund der Ambivalenz belegen.

2.   Beobachtungen und Darstellungen der Ambivalenz im Adventismus

Oberdorfer und Waldmann gehen davon aus, „dass sich alle Religionen durch eine grundsätzliche *Ambivalenz* auszeichnen" (Oberdorfer und Waldmann 2008, 11; Hervorhebung im Original). Sie beziehen das auf die Frage nach der Gewalt, dass Religionen „sowohl Frieden befördern als auch Gewalt hervorrufen können". Die Frage allerdings, „wann und unter welchen Bedingungen die eine oder die

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[2] Ein einfaches Beispiel soll das illustrieren: Bei einer Begegnung von *Ego* und *Alter* sagt *Ego* „Guten Tag" und wählt damit eine Begrüßungsformel aus den (fast) unbegrenzten Möglichkeiten der Kommunikation aus. *Alter* antwortet mit „Auf Wiedersehen" und entscheidet sich damit für eine Abschiedsformel und gegen alle anderen Möglichkeiten. Das Kontingenzproblem wurde hier nicht wirkungsvoll reduziert, ein Verstehen findet kaum satt. *Ego* könnte nun versuchen wollen, durch ambivalentes Verhalten die Handlungsoptionen zu vergrößern, also „Guten Tag und Auf Wiedersehen" sagen. Wenn *Alter* darauf mit „Auf Wiedersehen" antwortet, war dieser Versuch erfolgreich. Viel wahrscheinlicher ist jedoch, dass *Alter* dieses ambivalente Verhalten nicht als Kontingenzreduktion wahrnimmt und damit auch seinerseits keinen Beitrag zum Verstehen leisten kann (z.B. auch mit „Guten Tag und Auf Wiedersehen" antwortet).

andere Seite jener Ambivalenz aktiviert wird" (ibid.), kann nicht von vornherein aus den Dokumenten der Religion, also dogmatisch, festgelegt werden, sondern ist im Einzelfall zu untersuchen. Deshalb folgen nun zu unserer Fragestellung einige Beobachtungen und Darstellungen aus der Literatur und der Wahrnehmung des Autors.

2.1 Verhältnis zur Gesellschaft

In der religionssoziologischen Dichotomie von Kirche und Sekte nach Troeltsch und Weber werden sechs Merkmale genannt, an denen die Entwicklung einer religiösen Institution von einer Sekte zur Kirche identifiziert werden kann. Dies sind Universalität, Mitgliedschaft, Herrschaft, Verhältnis zur Welt, Kirchenzucht und Organisationsform (Kehrer 1988, 158 – 162). Wo sind in diesem Schema die STA religionssoziologisch einzuordnen? Sind sie eine Sekte oder eine Kirche? Nach Meinung von Theologiestudierenden und Gemeindegliedern bei einer nicht repräsentativen Befragung befinden sich die STA „irgendwo dazwischen". Sind sie im Übergang von einer Sekte zur (Frei-) Kirche oder halten sie sich in diesem ambivalenten Zustand auf? Bei einigen dieser sechs Faktoren mögen die Merkmale je einer Sekte bzw. einer Kirche stärker ausgeprägt sein. Besonders augenfällig ist jedoch das Verhältnis der STA zur Gesellschaft, also die Beziehung zwischen System und Umwelt.

Bull und Lockhart (2007) beschreiben in einer Untersuchung des amerikanischen Adventismus das Verhältnis zwischen den STA und der Gesellschaft folgendermaßen: Die STA im 19. Jahrhundert haben den amerikanischen Traum, also das Streben nach Glück, Erfolg und der Errichtung eines irdischen Friedensreiches, abgelehnt und sich von der amerikanischen Gesellschaft zurückgezogen. Das war, aufgrund der Deutung apokalyptischer Prophezeiungen der Bibel, vor allem theologisch motiviert:

„In der Apokalyptik des frühen Adventismus wurde die Gemeinde in Opposition zur amerikanischen Nation eingeordnet. Im 19. Jahrhundert glaubten viele Amerikaner, dass durch ihr Land das Millennium auf Erden Wirklichkeit würde. Adventisten kamen zu der Überzeugung, dass es kein irdisches Millennium gibt und dass Amerika zu einem Helfer des Antichristen werde, bevor es bei der Wiederkunft Christi zerstört wird" (Bull und Lockhart 2007, 244; Übersetzung R. F.). Dabei haben sich die STA, so Bull und Lockhart, selbst als eine Alternative zur Gesellschaft verstanden und letztlich die Institutionen und Funktionen der amerikanischen Gesellschaft wiederholt: „Adventisten imitieren mehr als dass sie partizipieren. Sie sind nicht in die amerikanische Gesellschaft integriert worden, sondern sie fungieren als ein separater Organismus innerhalb eines größeren Körpers" (ibid., 248; Übersetzung R. F.).

In ihrem Subsystem zur amerikanischen Gesellschaft haben die STA vor allem Gesundheits- und Bildungsinstitutionen aufgebaut. Das führte dazu, dass Mit-

glieder der STA, die zunächst vor allem aus weniger privilegierten Gruppen der Bevölkerung kamen, sozial aufstiegen und schließlich wieder in die amerikanische Gesellschaft integriert wurden. Bull und Lockhart nennen das die *revolving door*, die Drehtür: Die erste Generation von STA (*aspirers,* Bewerber) war bestrebt, sich von der Gesellschaft zu trennen. Die zweite Generation ist aufgrund der adventistischen Institutionen sozial aufgestiegen. Diese *sustainers* (Bewahrer) waren im adventistischen Milieu völlig sozialisiert. Die dritte Generation (*transformers,* Verwandler) nahm Kontakt mit der Gesellschaft auf und versuchte, den Adventismus mit den Grundlagen der amerikanischen Gesellschaft zu versöhnen.

Das Verhältnis der STA zur amerikanischen Gesellschaft bleibt jedoch ambivalent. Es findet kein völliger Rückzug von der Gesellschaft statt, wie das in den Anfängen der STA der Fall war und wie das auch heute noch auf andere religiöse Gemeinschaften, wie zum Beispiel auf die amischen Mennoniten*,* zutrifft. Auch die Werte der Gesellschaft wie Glück, Wohlergehen und Erfolgsstreben und deren Verwirklichung durch entsprechende Institutionen werden nicht abgelehnt. Gleichzeitig jedoch wird das amerikanische System mit Skepsis betrachtet, die Ziele der Nation theologisch entlarvt und bewertet und das Leben in den adventistischen Institutionen als das bessere dargestellt.

„Für alle Adventisten sind die Kirche und deren Institutionen jedoch das Zuhause und Amerika ist zu einem gewissen Grad ein fremdes Land. Dessen Institutionen sind vertraut; vertraut durch die Ähnlichkeit mit ihren adventistischen Entsprechungen, aber nicht durch einen direkten Kontakt" (ibid., 252). Der Grund für dieses ambivalente Verhalten und Verhältnis liegt laut Bull und Lockhart letztlich im Überleben und Wachstum der Kirche: „Die Uneindeutigkeit in dem Verhältnis des Adventismus zu Amerika ist die Quelle der Identität und des weltweiten Erfolgs" (ibid., xiii).

2.2   Verhältnis zu anderen Kirchen

Das Verhältnis der STA zu anderen christlichen Kirchen und Gemeinschaften kann, ähnlich wie die Beziehung zur Gesellschaft im Allgemeinen, auch als ambivalent eingeschätzt werden. In ihren Anfängen haben sich die STA scharf von anderen Kirchen abgegrenzt, diese als abgefallen bezeichnet und sich selbst als den auserwählten Rest der Gemeinde Gottes gesehen (Pöhler 2000, 78, 105–107). Im Laufe der Zeit fanden Dialoge und Annäherungen statt, verbunden mit einer durchaus positiven Wertschätzung der aufrichtigen Christen in den anderen Kirchen. Viele bilaterale Gespräche, ein Beobachterstatus im „Ökumenischen Rat der Kirchen" (ÖRK) und eine Gastmitgliedschaft beispielsweise in der „Arbeitsgemeinschaft christlicher Kirchen" (ACK) in Deutschland sind Ausdruck dessen. Neben dieser reservierten Öffnung und Kontaktaufnahme bleibt aber das ekklesiologische Selbstverständnis der STA erhalten, wonach sie die „Übrigen" sind, die von Verbindungen mit anderen Kirchen Abstand nehmen müssen.

Höschele (2009) hat in einer Untersuchung die Nähe und die Qualität der Beziehungen zwischen den STA und anderen Kirchen dargestellt: Wenn wir bei der Nähe von Beziehungen zwischen nah, halb nah und fern und bei der Qualität von Beziehungen zwischen positiv, ambivalent und negativ unterscheiden, dann sind die sechs Muster einerseits etwas verteilt; andererseits fehlen die eindeutig negativen Beziehungsmuster und ebenso weitgehend die nah-positiven. Ein klares Übergewicht haben die ausgeglichenen und ambivalenten bis positiven Anteile:

1. Opposition – ambivalent nah bis halb nah
2. Proklamation – ambivalent nah bis halb nah
3. Wertschätzung – positiv halb nah
4. Kooperation – positiv halb nah
5. Dialog – ambivalent bis positiv halb nah
6. Gastfreundschaft – positiv halb nah bis nah

Bei dieser Kategorisierung fällt auf, dass in den Bereichen, die eine Beziehung zu den anderen Menschen beschreiben, die Qualität eher positiv ist. Die Mitglieder anderer Kirchen werden als Mitchristen gesehen, zu denen die STA ein grundsätzlich geschwisterliches Verhältnis einnehmen. Insofern aber eher die Kirchen als Organisation betroffen sind, kommt wieder die systemische Skepsis zum Ausdruck, wie sie auch im Verhältnis zur Gesellschaft vorhanden ist. Hinzu tritt die negative theologische Bewertung, die sich interessanterweise auf die Kirchen *und* die USA bezieht (Pöhler 2000, 78). So sollen STA durchaus freundschaftliche Beziehungen zu anderen Christen, auch den Geistlichen anderer Kirchen unterhalten, gleichzeitig aber keinerlei organisatorische Verbindungen eingehen. Informelle Kontakte zu ökumenischen Einrichtungen werden begrüßt, aber eine Vollmitgliedschaft wird kategorisch abgelehnt („Siebenten-Tags-Adventisten und die Bemühungen um die Einheit der Christen" 1992; Lobitz 2011, 5).

2.3   Struktur der STA

Im Laufe ihrer Entwicklung von einer regional begrenzten religiösen Bewegung zu einer weltweiten Kirche haben die STA eine komplexe Struktur und Organisationsform entwickelt (Knight 2004, 24–33). Zum Selbstverständnis der STA gehört, dass die Kirche von unten nach oben aufgebaut ist und die Ortsgemeinde die Basis bildet. Die Gemeindeordnung (GO) spricht daher immer wieder von der „repräsentativen" Form, bei der die Entscheidungskompetenz bei der Gemeinde liegt: „die Autorität der Kirche beruht auf ihren Gliedern" (GO 2006, 54). Jedoch wird diese Autorität immer weiter nach oben delegiert – in Ausschüsse und Gremien.

> Die Vollversammlung der Generalkonferenz ist die höchste Instanz in der Organisation unserer weltweiten Gemeinschaft; in der Zeit zwischen den Vollversammlungen ist es der Exekutivausschuss der Generalkonferenz …
> alle nachgeordneten Organisationen und Institutionen in der ganzen Welt [anerkennen] die Generalkonferenz als höchste Autorität unter Gott innerhalb der Gemeinschaft der Siebenten-Tags-Adventisten (GO 2006, 56).

Die Repräsentanz der Glieder, also der Gemeindebasis, ist auf den unteren Verwaltungsebenen (Vereinigung, Union) noch einigermaßen vorhanden. Auf der Ebene der Generalkonferenz und ihrer Divisionen ist sie nur noch rudimentär gegeben. Je höher also die Ebene, desto weniger Demokratie findet statt. Auf den höheren Ebenen liegt die Autorität in der Verwaltungsstruktur und den kirchlichen Institutionen. „Das System entwickelte sich so, dass den Institutionen eine Stimme gegeben wurde, anstatt dass Mitglieder das Sagen haben" (Bull und Lockhart 2007, 120; Übersetzung R. F.). Diese Veränderungen sind zum einen deshalb eingetreten, weil die Kirche schnell expandiert ist und deshalb die Anzahl der zu repräsentierenden Gemeindeglieder immer größer wurde. Die Ausbildung eines Klerus mit entsprechenden theologischen und leitenden Kompetenzen bringt es mit sich, dass die (hauptamtlichen) Amtsträger die Ausschüsse dominieren. Überdies findet nicht nur eine Repräsentanz von unten nach oben statt, sondern auch von oben nach unten, indem Vertreter der übergeordneten Dienststelle immer auch Mitglieder in den untergeordneten Gremien sind (z. B. Unionsvertreter im Vereinigungsausschuss).

Die Kirchenorganisation der STA ist also ambivalent: Sie ist nicht demokratisch-kongregationalistisch, sodass die Autorität bei der Ortsgemeinde und/oder deren charismatischen Führern liegt und bestenfalls nach oben delegiert wird. Sie ist auch nicht streng hierarchisch, wo die Autoritätsausübung (nur) von oben nach unten verläuft. Befindet sie sich nun im Übergang von der Sekte zur Kirche, wobei sich die Hierarchisierung durchsetzen wird? Oder versucht man, das Postulat der repräsentativen Demokratie aufrechtzuerhalten und leistet damit einer ambivalenten Struktur Vorschub?

2.4 Theologie: Schöpfung vs. Vollendung

Die christliche Theologie, sofern sie sich um ein Verständnis vom Wesen und der Offenbarung Gottes, der Heilsgeschichte und anderer „Mysterien" (1 Tim 2,16) bemüht, kommt ohne Spannungen, Widersprüche und Paradoxien nicht aus. Ambivalent scheinende Aussagen können also in der Natur der Sache liegen und unvermeidbar sein. Andererseits ist es möglich und auch nötig, Stellung zu beziehen und sich für bestimmte (und gegen andere) theologische Konzepte zu entscheiden. Die folgenden beiden Beispiele deuten auf gewisse ambivalente theologische Strukturen hin.

Die STA werden gewöhnlich als apokalyptische Glaubensgemeinschaft klassifiziert und in der Tat hat die Eschatologie ihre Entstehungsgeschichte dominiert. Die Erwartung der Parusie war konstitutiv für die STA, und nach wie vor ist die Hoffnung auf das kommende Reich Gottes prägend für Glauben und Leben. Gleichzeitig legen die STA starken Wert auf die Beachtung des Sabbats als dem Ruhetag und Tag des Herrn. Der Sabbat wird mit der Schöpfung begründet (Gen 2,2.3; Ex 20,8–11), und umgekehrt wird der Glaube an eine Sechs-Tage-

Schöpfung aufrechterhalten, weil sonst der Sabbat seine biblisch-historische Begründung verlöre (Lobitz 2011, 5). Zwischen diesen beiden Glaubensaussagen sieht Jacques Doukhan eine Ambivalenz. Er nennt dies „Spannung" und definiert: Spannung ist das „Ziehen zwischen zwei Kräften"; es handelt sich um „zwei fundamentale Wahrheiten, die in entgegengesetzte Richtungen ziehen" (Doukhan 2006, 15). Diese Spannung zeige sich schon am Namen „Siebenten-Tags-Adventisten".

Die erste Spannung besteht in den zwei entgegengesetzten Ereignissen der Geschichte: Schöpfung und Wiederkunft. Beim ersten liegt der Bezug zur Vergangenheit, zum Anfang der Menschheit und der Heilsgeschichte. Beim zweiten geht es um die Erwartung der Zukunft und der Vollendung, um den Abschluss der Heilsgeschichte. Entsprechend besteht die zweite Spannung laut Doukhan in den gegensätzlichen Lebensordnungen: die diesseitige Schöpfung Gottes vs. das zukünftige Reich Gottes. Die Parusie Jesu Christi bringt den Abschluss des Erlösungswerkes und damit die endgültige Befreiung von Sünde, Tod und Teufel. Erst die Auferstehung verleiht den verstorbenen Gläubigen die Unsterblichkeit. Das abschließende Gericht Gottes schafft Gerechtigkeit und rehabilitiert die Gläubigen. Das kommende Reich Gottes stellt die schöpfungsgemäßen Lebensordnungen wieder her. Deshalb ist der Fokus der STA auf die Zukunft und die Transzendenz gerichtet. Sie sehen ihre Mission und Existenzberechtigung darin, Menschen auf die Wiederkunft Christi vorzubereiten, indem sie die sogenannte Drei-Engels-Botschaft (siehe Offb 14,6–12) verkündigen. So kann der STA-Weltkirchenpräsident Ted Wilson sagen: „Ich glaube, dass dies Gottes Gemeinde der Übrigen ist mit einer einzigartigen Botschaft und einer einzigartigen Gelegenheit – die Botschaft der drei Engel aus Offenbarung 14 mitzuteilen" (Satelmajer und Hucks 2011, 6).

Diese Erwartung und Verkündigung der unmittelbar bevorstehenden Parusie führte die ersten Adventgläubigen dazu, sich dieser Welt und vielen Lebensvollzügen zu entsagen (Mueller 1977, 113–114).

Gleichzeitig bejahen STA mit dem Sabbat die gute Schöpfung Gottes. Sie genießen die (materiellen und immateriellen) Schöpfungsgaben, schätzen die Schönheit und Heiligkeit des Lebens und fühlen sich dem Schöpfungsauftrag verpflichtet (Gen 1,28; 2,15). Daraus erklärt sich der engagierte und massive Einsatz für die Menschen und diese Welt durch Erziehung und Bildung, durch Gesundheitseinrichtungen und durch soziale und karitative Institutionen (z. B. über die adventistische Entwicklungshilfeorganisation ADRA). STA leben also in der Immanenz und verwirklichen darin ihren Glauben.

Somit besteht eine Spannung zwischen diesen beiden Lebensordnungen, die dadurch noch gesteigert wahrgenommen wird, dass STA in dieser Welt etabliert und engagiert sind, während sie seit 150 Jahren die nahe Wiederkunft Jesu verkündigen: „Einhundertfünfzig Jahre verursachen eine ganze Menge an Skepsis und Unwohlsein mit dem Predigen dieser Botschaft" (Satelmajer und Hucks 2011, 7).

2.5 Theologie: Anthropologie

Nach adventistischer Anthropologie wurde der Mensch als Mann und Frau nach dem Ebenbild Gottes geschaffen. Das erhebt ihn über alle anderen Kreaturen und rückt ihn in die Nähe seines Schöpfers. Der Mensch als eine Einheit von Leib, Seele und Geist spiegelt in seiner Ganzheit einschließlich seiner Körperlichkeit das Wesen Gottes wider. Vor allem aber sind die spirituellen und ethisch-moralischen Dimensionen des Menschseins durch die Gottesebenbildlichkeit dargestellt. Der Mensch besitzt geistiges und geistliches Potenzial, das ihm die Fähigkeit gibt, Gut und Böse zu unterscheiden und sittliche Entscheidungen zu treffen. Durch den Sündenfall hat er seine bedingte Unsterblichkeit verloren und eine innewohnende Neigung zum Bösen erworben. Dadurch wurde das Ebenbild Gottes im Menschen getrübt, entstellt, aber nicht völlig zerstört (Cairus 2000).

Hier zeigt sich ein Problembereich der adventistischen (wie ja auch der allgemein christlichen) Anthropologie: Der Mensch steht in der Spannung zwischen seiner Gottesebenbildlichkeit und seiner sündhaften Verderbtheit. Er ist nicht mehr ganz gut, er ist aber auch nicht völlig schlecht – er ist ambivalent. Dieses Dilemma hat Auswirkungen auf die christliche Lebensführung: Kann der Mensch als Ebenbild Gottes aufrecht durchs Leben gehen oder muss er sich eingedenk seiner Sünden immer zerknirscht und bußfertig zeigen? Soll er sich immer wieder ermahnen und zur Besserung auffordern (lassen) oder kann er darauf vertrauen, recht handeln und ethische Entscheidungen treffen zu können? Dies wirkt sich schließlich auch auf Konzepte von Erziehung und Bildung aus: Wie steht es um den freien Willen und die moralischen Fähigkeiten, die im Erziehungs- und Bildungsprozess einsetzbar sein könnten? Heißt Erziehung, heißt Bildung: Entfaltung des unbegrenzten Potenzials im Menschen in der Hinwendung zur ursprünglichen Vollkommenheit oder besteht sie im Kampf gegen die Sünde und in der Bändigung der sündigen Leidenschaften, um dem Gericht Gottes zu entgehen? In der Literatur zum adventistischen Erziehungsverständnis werden beide Konzepte unterstützt, und die Lebenspraxis in Familie und Gemeinde folgt bis heute ebenso beiden.[3]

3. Ergebnisse und Erklärungen

Dieser kleine Überblick über einige Glaubens- und Lebensbereiche hat gezeigt, dass der Adventismus sich durchaus (bewusst oder unbewusst) ambivalent verhält. Die möglichen Gründe hierfür – oben bereits angedeutet – sollen kurz ausgeführt werden. Eine Erkenntnis aus der Systemtheorie besagt, „dass die Ambivalenz des Kontingenten selbst nicht aufzulösen ist" (Makropoulos 1990, 421). Der Adventismus scheint dies verstanden zu haben. Er weiß, dass „Handlungsmög-

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[3] Siehe dazu ausführlicher: Fischer 2008, Kap. I: *Education* in der Adventgemeinde. Ergänzend dazu auch Steininger 1993.

lichkeiten … ohne Unsicherheiten nicht zu haben" sind (ibid.). Allerdings bevorzugt er anscheinend, zumindest in manchen Bereichen, die Unsicherheit, die Unentschiedenheit und lässt damit Handlungsoptionen außer Acht. Dadurch wirkt der Adventismus ambivalent und praktiziert damit eine Überlebensstrategie. An einigen der oben genannten Bereiche soll dies aufgezeigt werden.

3.1 Kirche und Umwelt

In seiner Beziehung zur Umwelt isoliert sich der Adventismus nicht völlig, er grenzt sich aber deutlich ab und vermeidet eine totale Öffnung. Das gewährleistet das Überleben einer relativ kleinen Glaubensgemeinschaft unter Beibehaltung ihrer Identität. Diese Art von Begrenzung nennt Noack „Membran":

> Ein System muss begrenzt sein, um eine unverwechselbare Identität zu besitzen. Allerdings darf sich das System nicht durch eine Panzerung von der Umwelt abgrenzen, weil es sich sonst isolieren würde; Traditionsbildung und Stagnation wären die Folge. Die Membran hingegen ist nach innen und außen durchlässig (Noack 2003, 76).

Religionsgemeinschaften, die sich in der einen oder anderen Weise eindeutig verhalten haben, verloren ihre Identität oder sind in der Bedeutungslosigkeit verschwunden. Als Beispiele hierfür nennt Knight (2004, 124–125) die vereinigte Methodistenkirche beziehungsweise die amischen Mennoniten. Der Adventismus jedoch nimmt an Einfluss und Größe zu (ibid., 65–94), und zwar durch Mission, wie Noack (2003, 83) den „wechselseitigen Austausch zwischen Gemeinde und Umwelt" nennt. Gleichzeitig versuchen die STA, eine Beeinflussung durch die Gesellschaft abzuwehren und durch die Aufrechterhaltung von Werten, Normen und Regeln Identität zu wahren. Ähnlich ist auch die Beziehung der STA zu anderen Kirchen und Glaubensgemeinschaften zu bewerten.

3.2 Struktur

Die STA sind im Laufe ihrer Geschichte zu einer Organisation mit sehr komplexen Strukturen geworden (Knight 2004, 55–62). Die Ambivalenz, als Weltkirche keinen Kongregationalismus zuzulassen und gleichzeitig mit einem demokratischen Verständnis auch keine straffe Hierarchie zu wollen, steigert die Komplexität des Systems. Je höher nun die Eigenkomplexität eines Systems, desto besser sind seine Überlebenschancen. Die ambivalenten Strukturen könnten also auch eine Überlebensstrategie sein: In einer streng hierarchisch geführten (Frei-)Kirche würde die Motivation und das Engagement der Laien unterdrückt und damit das Wachstum gefährdet. In einer kongregationalistisch strukturierten Kirche läge der Fokus zu sehr auf der Ortsgemeinde und damit ginge die Solidarität und auch die Identität als Weltkirche verloren.

3.3 Theologie

Theologie bestimmt den Sinn eines sozialen Systems (Noack 2003, 80–81), identifiziert es als religiöses System und unterscheidet es auch von anderen religiösen Systemen. Somit trägt Theologie wesentlich zur Identität einer Glaubensgemeinschaft bei. Außerdem legt die Theologie die Werte, Normen und Regeln einer Kirche fest und definiert dadurch Mitgliedschaft. Wer der Theologie und den daraus folgenden Verhaltensforderungen zustimmt, tritt in die Kirche ein; wer das nicht (mehr) tut, verliert die Zugehörigkeit, tritt aus oder wird ausgeschlossen. Inklusion und Exklusion werden also wesentlich durch Theologie geregelt (ibid., 89).

Indem nun der Adventismus in bestimmten theologischen Feldern ambivalent wirkt oder an uneindeutigen Aussagen festhält, vergrößert er die Zahl der potenziellen Mitglieder. So könnten sich beispielsweise Menschen, die sehr auf das zukünftige Reich Gottes ausgerichtet sind und das Leben und das Engagement in dieser Welt gering schätzen, genauso angezogen fühlen wie solche, die ganz im Diesseits leben und sich sozial engagieren wollen. Der Adventismus spricht – um das zweite obige Beispiel aufzugreifen – genauso Menschen an, die ein eher negatives Menschenbild haben und sich gerne moralisch instruieren lassen, wie Menschen sich eingeladen fühlen können, die einem positiven Menschenbild anhaften und ihr Potenzial entfalten möchten.

Auch hier fördert die Ambivalenz das Überleben, indem sie zum Wachstum und zur Vielfalt der STA beiträgt. Es tritt eine Wechselbeziehung in Kraft, denn mit zunehmender Komplexität eines Systems werden auch die identifizierenden Maßstäbe vielfältiger, die Grenzen bleiben nicht mehr so scharf erhalten. Ambivalenz und Pluralität stehen also in einem wechselseitigen Verhältnis: Je größer und vielfältiger eine Kirche wird, desto mehr wird sie ambivalentes Verhalten zeigen. Gleichzeitig fördert die Ambivalenz die Pluralität und Komplexität dieser religiösen Gemeinschaft.

4. Desiderate

Diese kurze Untersuchung hat ergeben, dass Ambivalenz im Adventismus vorfindbar ist, dass sie systemimmanent ist, ja dass sie letztlich unvermeidbar ist. Sie dient dem Überleben, dem Wachstum und der Balance des Systems. Deshalb ist es zum einen wichtig, dass der Adventismus dieses ambivalente Verhalten bewusst wahrnimmt, es bejaht und als zu sich gehörend akzeptiert. Die STA können sich die Vorzüge dieser Realität vor Augen führen und sie konstruktiv für das System nutzen. Sie ist Ausdruck der Größe und Vielfalt der Kirche und fördert sie gleichzeitig.

Zum andern ist der adventistischen Kirchenleitung zu raten, an sorgfältig ausgewählten Punkten Ambivalenz zu vermeiden, Handlungsoptionen zu nutzen und

Entschiedenheit zu zeigen. Das ist vor allem dann nötig, wenn Mitglieder verunsichert sind, Profil verloren geht und damit die Identität gefährdet ist. In den gegenwärtigen Auseinandersetzungen, wie sie einleitend angedeutet wurden, ist also Weisheit vonnöten, um einerseits eine bewusste Unentschiedenheit und Handlungsvielfalt zu fördern und andererseits deutlich Position zu beziehen und damit an Profil zu gewinnen.

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Abstract

Adventism appears to act in an ambivalent manner in many areas: it avoids unequivocal statements and clear positions, does not take a stance at all in some cases and is ambiguous in its relationship to society and other churches as well. This ambivalence is inherent in the system, partly unavoidable, and serves the self-preservation of the system. Therefore this ambivalence is to be affirmed and to be utilized constructively. At the same time it appears advisable to avoid ambivalent behaviour, to take a clear stand, and to show profile to safeguard Adventist identity and offer security to members.

Résumé

L'adventisme semble agir de manière ambivalente dans bien des domaines; il évite les déclarations sans équivoque et les positions claires, ne prend parfois pas position et est ambigu dans ses relations avec la société ainsi qu'avec d'autres Eglises. Cette ambivalence, en partie inévitable, est inhérente au système et sert l'auto-préservation du système. C'est pourquoi cette ambivalence doit être affirmée et employée de manière constructive. Il serait pourtant sage, dans des situations bien précises, d'éviter une attitude ambivalente, de prendre clairement position et de montrer une attitude propre à préserver l'identité adventiste et à offrir la sécurité aux membres.

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Coping
Ein Modell für den Umgang mit Sterben und Tod

Gerhard Menn

Zusammenfassung

Menschen gehen unterschiedlich mit ihren Krankheiten und ihrem Sterben um. Die Vielfalt menschlicher Bewältigung wird mit gängigen Zugangswegen über Phasenmodelle nicht befriedigend erklärt. Hilfreich erscheint das aus der Stressforschung stammende Copingmodell, um Menschen zu verstehen. Dieses Verstehensmodell kann die Seelsorgearbeit unterstützen, sodass der sterbende Mensch seinen eigenen Zugang zu seinem Leben und seinem Tod findet. Dies führt letztlich zu einer intensiven Kommunikation zwischen dem Patienten und dem Seelsorger.

1.   Sterben und Tod in der gegenwärtigen Diskussion

Der Tod macht zwar alle Menschen gleich, doch was bedeutet es für einen Menschen, um seinen eigenen Tod, sein bevorstehendes Vergehen und Nicht-mehr-Sein zu wissen bzw. es zu ahnen? Wie gehen Menschen mit ihrem Sterben und bevorstehendem Tod um? Was geht in ihnen vor, wie handeln und reagieren sie? Wie erleben, wie bewältigen Menschen Sterben und Tod?
Sterben und Tod konfrontieren Menschen mit der größten existenziellen Bedrohung; aber unsere Gesellschaft realisiert dies nicht und geht eher verdeckt damit um. Der Tod ist der Feind, der das Sein eines Menschen auslöscht, das Sterben ist der Weg dorthin. Menschen bewältigen Bedrohungen ambivalent. Das zeigen die emotionalen Äußerungen, die es wahrzunehmen gilt, um Betroffene besser verstehen und begleiten zu können.

1.1   Ambivalente Einstellungen

Die Gesellschaft zeigt ein pluriformes Bild im Umgang mit Sterben und Tod. Die Medien befassen sich in Schlagzeilen mit Morden, Suiziden, dramatischen Unglücksfällen. Filme und Nachrichten setzen in Extremsituationen Sterbende und Tote in Szene. Krankheit und Tod prominenter Persönlichkeiten, außergewöhnliche Sterbefälle oder Katastrophen werden aufreißerisch verarbeitet, sodass das zuschauende Publikum zum Mitleiden und Mittrauern animiert wird.

Wiederum werden Sterben und Tod in unserer Gesellschaft nicht mehr unmittelbar an- und ausgesprochen, oft ist dann im Nachklang von „unerwartet" und „unverhofft" die Rede – man könnte ergänzen „unvorbereitet". Das Sterben wird auch nicht mehr direkt erlebt, gestorben wird zumeist im Krankenhaus, im Altenheim – der Tod wird aus dem Bewusstsein der Gesellschaft herausgetrennt. Der aufgebahrte Tote, von dem die Familie, die Nachbarschaft, Freunde und Verwandte Abschied nehmen, gehört längst der Vergangenheit an. Beerdigungen führen nicht mehr in die Mitte des Dorfes, sondern in ausgegrenzte und begrünte Zonen. Tote dürfen das Leben nicht stören. Sie werden in die Ferne an den Stadtrand überführt und in parkähnlichen Anlagen immer öfter anonym beerdigt und zunehmend auch ohne Trauerfeiern beigesetzt.

Andererseits interessiert sich ein Teil der Öffentlichkeit stark für diese Thematik. Eine Fülle von Publikationen flutet in und durch unsere Gesellschaft. Entscheidenden Einfluss auf das öffentliche Bewusstsein hatte Elisabeth Kübler-Ross mit ihren Büchern Ende der 1960er Jahre in den USA. Es entstand eine Bewegung kreuz und quer durch alle sozialen Schichten, Wissenschaften und Parawissenschaften. Ihnen ging es darum, den Tod und das Sterben zu enttabuisieren oder „zu besiegen" (Engelke 1980, 16) und dem Menschen beim Verstehen der Todes- und der Sterbeproblematik behilflich zu sein. Darüber hinaus entstand aus bedrückenden Mängeln in Pflegeheimen und Krankenhäusern im Umgang mit Sterbenden die Hospizbewegung.

Die zunehmend besseren diagnostischen und therapeutischen Möglichkeiten der modernen Medizin zögern den Tod bei progredienten und unheilbaren Krankheiten hinaus. Seuchen, Epidemien oder der Hungertod treten in den modernen Industrienationen immer seltener auf, und eine Pflege, die dem Leben gegenüber und seiner Verlängerung eine hohe Wertschätzung beimisst, führt zu einem langen Sterben, womit die Konfrontation mit dem Tod hinausgeschoben, verzögert und Institutionen überlassen wird. Dennoch: „Auch wenn wir den Tod verdrängen oder verleugnen, er ist da und unser Fühlen, Denken und Handeln wird von ihm beeinflusst" (Ochsmann 1993, 115).

Einerseits will der Mensch leben und führt einen enormen Überlebenskampf, andererseits wird er immer wieder mit seinem und dem Tod anderer konfrontiert:

> Dies geschieht insbesondere immer dann, wenn wir im Alltag mit dem Themenbereich von Sterben, Tod und Trauer konfrontiert werden. – Und dann prallen diese beiden Kräfte mit enormer Gewalt aufeinander … Der Aufeinanderprall dieser gegensätzlichen Impulse erzeugt in uns eine abgrundtiefe Angst – eine Angst, die bisweilen so groß ist, dass sie sich nur bewältigen lässt, indem wir sie tief in unserem Inneren vergraben (Student 2004, 37).

Ängste werden den Tod oder eine Krankheit nicht aufhalten, hingegen halten sie das Leben eines Menschen auf und hindern ihn, sich zu entfalten.

Es darf und kann nicht das Ziel einer Sterbe- oder Trauerbegleitung sein, angstfrei oder „todesmutig" zu werden, wohl aber kann der Begleiter lernen, mit Angst vor dem Tod umzugehen. Vor der Zuwendung zur Angst anderer steht deshalb zuallererst die Begegnung mit den eigenen Ängsten, um diese kennenzulernen und sie ins eigene Leben zu integrieren. Deshalb ist eine sorgfältige Vorbereitung auf die Sterbebegleitung unerlässlich, um sich selbst zu erkennen, aber auch um zu verstehen, wie Menschen mit der körperlichen, geistigen, geistlichen und sozialen Lebensbedrohung – die mit dem Tod eintritt – umgehen können.

1.2   Sterben in phasenartigen Verläufen

Die Psychiaterin Elisabeth Kübler-Ross (1926–2004) formulierte als Erste zahlreiche Gesetzmäßigkeiten, die halfen, den vielschichtigen Sterbeprozess in Worte zu fassen, und den Menschen, die Sterbende begleiten – vor allem Pflegepersonal in Krankenhäusern und Heimen –, ein Hilfsmittel in die Hand gab, das ihnen das Verständnis für sterbende Menschen erleichterte. Dies tat sie in einer einfachen und allseits verständlichen Sprache, sodass auch medizinisch interessierte Laien sich sicher fühlen durften, wenn sie Sterbende begleiteten.

Elisabeth Kübler-Ross schaffte es, das öffentliche und wissenschaftliche Interesse auf die Situation und die Bedürfnisse Sterbender zu lenken und das Thema Sterben aus einer Tabuzone herauszuholen. In diesem Zusammenhang sind ihre Verdienste unbestritten und hoch zu würdigen. Kübler-Ross betont, dass der Mensch alle diese Phasen durchschreitet (Kübler-Ross 1992, 94). Die von ihr dargestellten Erlebnis- und Verhaltensweisen wirken unterschiedlich lange, „lösen einander ab, existieren aber auch nebeneinander" (ibid.).

Daraus entstand das Phasenmodell; es sollte eine Hilfe im Umgang mit Sterbenden sein, doch birgt es die Gefahr in sich, dass in der Suche nach Orientierung dieses Modell allzu unkritisch übernommen wird. Dies kann dazu führen, dass „der individuelle Sterbeprozess eines Menschen in ein Schema gepresst [wird], das … den Kranken aber der Individualität seines Sterbens beraubt" (Wittkowski 1978, 51). Der Sterbende wird also womöglich danach beurteilt, ob er das Ziel, das heißt die letzte Phase des Sterbens, die Annahme, erreicht oder nicht. Hier muss man zum Phasenmodell die Frage stellen, ob es den Sterbenden nicht einengt, „durch ein zu absolvierendes Sterbecurriculum" (Breuer 1989, 47) gehen zu müssen, und es ihn in dieser letzten Lebensphase unnötig pädagogisiert.

Ein weiterer Kritikpunkt richtet sich auf den Ablauf der Phasen. Elisabeth Kübler-Ross beschreibt in ihren Berichten keinen Fall, an dem sie von der Eröffnung der Diagnose bis zum Tod alle Phasen darstellen konnte. Die Beschreibungen der einzelnen Phasen fanden an verschiedenen Patienten statt, bei denen die Identifizierung der Phasen nicht eindeutig war. Die Phasen lassen den Helfer relativ hilflos erscheinen, denn er kann nicht wirklich etwas zur Veränderung der Situation beitragen, da der Sterbende selbst von einer Phase zur anderen gelangen

muss. Die Diagnosestellung der Phase suggeriert Handlungsfähigkeit und Kompetenz. Sie hilft, sich vom Betroffenen distanzieren und ihn objektivieren zu können, das heißt, der Begleitende muss ihn nicht mehr als Subjekt sehen. Und so ist die Frage zu stellen, ob die Eingruppierung in die verschiedenen Phasen nicht auch Projektionen des Behandlungsteams oder der Begleiter sein können.

Die Phasenmodelle geben darüber hinaus trotz ihrer umfassenden Ansprüche keine Auskunft, warum Menschen so unterschiedlich mit der Bedrohung durch den Tod umgehen oder warum gleiche Ausgangssituationen sich verschieden auswirken. Im Gegenteil: Sie vereinheitlichen das Sterben und lassen individuelle Ansätze außer Acht. Um Menschen umfassend verstehen zu lernen und sie folglich individuell begleiten zu können, bedarf es weiterer Verstehensmöglichkeiten und Alternativen zu Elisabeth Kübler-Ross. Eine Antwort bietet dazu die Coping-forschung.

2.   Das transaktionale Stresskonzept: Coping

„Denn unser keiner lebt sich selber, und keiner stirbt sich selber", formuliert der Apostel Paulus in Römer 14,7 und beschreibt damit, dass der Mensch nicht nur in einer Interaktion zu seiner Umwelt steht, sondern in einer Transaktion. Die vielen Eindrücke und Prozesse, die den Menschen bedrängen oder bedrücken, seien sie medizinischer Herkunft, auf das Familienleben oder das Berufsleben bezogen, dringen auf den Kranken ein, müssen bewältigt werden und stellen ihn unter Stress. Darauf reagiert er. Stress gestaltet sich dadurch zu einem wesentlichen Erlebnis bei sterbenden Menschen. Bei diesem Stress-Bewältigungsverhalten ist Coping einsetzbar.

2.1   Das Stresskonzept

Wesentliche Ansätze für das Coping kamen aus der Stressforschung. Populär wurde der Begriff des Stresses ab den 30er Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts durch den ungarisch-kanadischen Endokrinologen und Mediziner Hans Selye (vgl. Selye 1981 und 1985). Für ihn ist Stress Bestandteil des Lebens eines Menschen. Als „Allgemeines Adaptionssyndrom" (A.A.S.) oder „Biologisches Stresssyndrom" wurde sein Konzept bekannt. Dieses A.A.S. differenzierte er in drei Stadien: Alarmreaktion, Widerstandsstadium und Erschöpfungsstadium. Stress verursacht aber mehr als biochemische oder physiologische Reaktionen.

Die psychologische Stressforschung weist zwei Äste auf. Der eine ist in der Psychoanalyse (Vasconcellos 1984, 36) und Tiefenpsychologie verankert. Der zweite Ast entspringt der kognitiven Psychologie, zu deren Hauptvertretern Richard S. Lazarus gehört. Er bezieht sich hauptsächlich auf die Beziehung zwischen der Umwelt und der Person. Eine Situation wird subjektiv wahrge-

nommen und bewertet, das heißt, die Person ist an diesem Geschehen aktiv beteiligt. Ihre Wahrnehmung und Bewertung sind von bisherigen Lernprozessen abhängig.

Beispielsweise kann der Anblick eines Polizisten Angst, Wut, Ärger oder Freude hervorrufen, je nachdem, ob jemand zum Beispiel bei einem Einbruch ertappt wurde oder ob er in einem Polizisten einen Freund und Helfer sieht. Ebenso kann dieselbe Musik für den einen Krach und für den anderen Wohlklang bedeuten. Gleiche Reize können unterschiedliche Stresszustände hervorrufen und unterschiedliche Reize ähnliche Stresszustände auslösen.

Die Stressreaktion hängt zudem von der subjektiven Interpretation des Stresszustandes ab. Gleiches gilt für die Folgen. Schätzt zum Beispiel ein Krebskranker seine Situation mit seiner Erkrankung als behandelbar und heilbar ein, hat er die Möglichkeit, seine Anstrengungen mit Unterstützung des behandelnden Teams so weit zu steigern, dass dieses Ziel unter Umständen erreicht werden kann, besonders dann, wenn die Beziehung zum Behandlungsteam und der Umgang positiv bewertet werden.

Faktoren, die die Person, ihre Umwelt oder ihre Aufgaben betreffen, können subjektiv zu Stressoren werden, wenn sie erhöhte Anpassungsnotwendigkeiten oder erhöhte Anpassungsschwierigkeiten signalisieren bzw. wenn sie in hochvalenten Situationen Bewältigungsungewissheit oder in hochproblematischen Situationen Bedeutungsungewissheit erzeugen. Krankheit, Sterben und Tod als Stressoren stellen Menschen vor höchste Anpassungs- und Bewältigungsschwierigkeiten und Ungewissheiten. Dies führt unweigerlich zu intrapsychischen Spannungen.

Die Reaktion des Körpers auf einen Stressor ist davon abhängig, ob Stress als bedrohlich erlebt wird. Krankheit definiert die Stressforschung als Anpassungsgeschehen (Nitsch 1981, 137). Stress führt allerdings nicht unbedingt zu Krankheit. Therapie, Rehabilitation oder Prävention senden auch Stressoren[1] aus, auf die der Mensch reagiert, die aber eine positive und heilende Wirkung haben können. Stress ist also ein umfassendes Geschehen, auf das der Mensch mit seinen biologischen, psychischen und sozialen Möglichkeiten antwortet.

2.2 Coping

Der amerikanische Psychologe Richard S. Lazarus und seine Arbeitsgruppe formulierten das Copingmodell. Sie wollten damit zeigen, dass es in einer

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[1] Krankheitsbegünstigende Umweltfaktoren oder Stressoren sind Einflüsse, die beängstigen, frustrieren, fürchten lassen, Ohnmacht- und Unfähigkeitsgefühle vermitteln, wie der Tod eines Angehörigen, das eigene bevorstehende Sterben oder die Kündigung des Arbeitsplatzes. Antistressoren bieten dem Organismus die Möglichkeit zur Gegenregulation und wirken dem Stressor entgegen, um mit einem neuen Reiz, der so gesehen ein Stressor gegen den Stressor ist, einen Impuls zur Gegenregulation zu geben.

Situation zwar auch um objektive, physikalische Zusammenhänge und Eigen-schaften geht, doch schienen ihm die subjektiven Bewertungen und das verfüg-bare Bewältigungsrepertoire einer Person bedeutsamer zu sein. Er achtete auf die Beziehung zwischen einer Person und ihrer Umwelt. Stress ist für Lazarus „eine besondere Art der Beziehung zwischen einer Person ... und der jeweiligen Um-welt" (Lazarus und Launier 1981, 213).

Lazarus und Launier gehen in ihrer Theorie von der Stressforschung aus und erweitern sie „zunehmend zu einer allgemeinen Emotionstheorie ..., in deren Mittelpunkt subjektive Bewertungsprozesse (‚appraisal') und Bewältigungs-prozesse (‚coping') stehen" (Rüger, Blomert und Förster 1990, 18). Sie legen in dem Modell Interaktionen und Transaktionen zugrunde. Interaktionen gehen von unabhängigen Person- und Umweltvariablen aus, die sich einander anpassen. Der Ansatz für die Transaktion stellt heraus, dass nicht nur die Situation auf eine Person wirkt, sondern diese auch ihrerseits eine Situation verändern kann, zum Beispiel durch ihr Bewältigungsverhalten. Das Interesse der Transaktionen richtet sich auf den Prozess des wechselseitigen Austauschs zwischen Person und Situa-tion. So rückt das Interesse zur Persönlichkeit des Betroffenen, die intraindivi-duellen und langfristigen Veränderungen des verschmolzenen Systems Person–Umwelt in den Fokus.

Der Mensch beurteilt und bewertet ständig die Situation, die sich verändert; er analysiert und sucht „das Wohlbefinden" (Lazarus und Launier 1981, 233)[2] für sein Leben. Permanent ablaufende Beurteilungen sind für die adaptive und damit verändernde Auseinandersetzung mit der Umgebung nötig. Diese Einschätzungen oder Bewertungen sind maßgeblich dafür verantwortlich, ob eine Person eine Situation als belastend erlebt oder nicht.

Kognitive Vorgänge ordnen Ereignisse individuell und persönlich ein. Sie messen ihnen eine Bedeutung zu, die sich auf das Wohlbefinden (primäre Bewertung) oder auf die zur Verfügung stehenden Bewältigungsressourcen (sekundäre Bewertung) ausrichten. Kognitive Bewertungsprozesse könnten auch als Informa-tionsverarbeitung bezeichnet werden und Auskunft darüber geben, wie eine Person ihre Umwelt bewertet.

Primäre Bewertung (primary appraisal): Die betroffene Person bewertet die stattfindende Transaktion in der primären Bewertung nach der Bedeutung für das Wohlbefinden und der Realisierung ihrer Zielsetzung als irrelevant, günstig/positiv oder stressend/belastend.

Sekundäre Bewertung (secondary appraisal): Sekundäre Bewertung bedeutet nicht, dass diese weniger wichtig ist als die primäre oder dass sie zeitverzögert abläuft. Hier werden die Bewältigungsfähigkeiten und das Wohlbefinden be-wertet. Die sekundäre Bewertung untersucht und analysiert vorhandene und

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[2] Wohlbefinden ist wohl der zentrale Begriff für das Ziel aller Copinganstrengungen. Mit Wohlbefinden ist der Zustand inneren Gleichgewichts gemeint. Diesen Zustand, der möglicherweise verloren gegangen ist oder bedroht erscheint, gilt es wiederherzustellen. Im Folgenden wird statt eines *Zustands inneren Gleichgewichts* von Wohlbefinden gesprochen.

effektive Bewältigungsmöglichkeiten. Sie sucht nach adäquaten und verfügbaren Copingressourcen und stellt fest, ob sich eine Person bedroht fühlt. In Stresssituationen oder bei Gefahr werden Vergleichsinformationen herangezogen. Bewusst, gezielt oder unbewusst und automatisch werden Entscheidungen für ein bestimmtes Bewältigungsverhalten getroffen.

Primäre und sekundäre Bewertungen sind voneinander abhängig. Die Kenntnis, wie eine Gefahr zu überwinden ist, kann eine Herausforderung darstellen, um diese zu bewältigen und zu relativieren. Die Bewertung, in einer Gefahr zu stehen, führt dazu, nach Informationen zu suchen, um die Lage einschätzen zu können, und zu überlegen, was getan werden muss.

Neubewertung (reappraisal): Primäre und sekundäre Bewertungen stehen in enger Verbindung miteinander. Durch Rückkopplungen reagiert der Mensch durch Revisionen der beiden Bewertungen auf veränderte Situationen und auf den Erfolg bisheriger Bewältigungsbemühungen, die zum Beispiel durch das Bewältigungsverhalten, zusätzliche Informationen oder kognitive Reflexionen entstanden sind. Dies führt zu Neubewertungen (siehe Abb. 1).

Getroffene Entscheidungen werden überprüft, „können aber auch im Sinne einer defensiven Neubewertung zur Reduktion von Belastungen eingesetzt werden" (Beutel 1988, 39). Dies kann durch Leugnung, Distanzierung (z. B. Intellektualisierung) und anderes zu einer selbsttäuschenden Neubewertung führen, sodass einst bedrohliche Ereignisse nicht mehr beängstigend oder sogar wünschenswert erscheinen können. Die nötigen Informationen, die zu einer Neubewertung führen, kommen aus der Umwelt und von eigenen Reaktionen und Reflexionen. Das transaktionale Stresskonzept hilft, menschliche Reaktionen zu verstehen, und führt dazu, das Verhalten einer Person zu akzeptieren, um Alternativen zu erproben beziehungsweise anzubieten.

Die *Klassifikationen von Bewältigungsprozessen*: Lazarus und Launier (1981, 218) klassifizieren die Bewältigungsprozesse (1) in Änderung der gestörten Transaktion, also in Aktion (instrumentell), und (2) in Regulierung der Emotion, also Linderung, Dämpfung und Selbstberuhigung (Palliation). Einmal soll die Situation ohne großen Aufwand verbessert und die Ausgangssituation unter Vermeidung zerstörender Konsequenzen wiederhergestellt werden. Zum anderen wird ein Zustand inneren Gleichgewichts realisiert, indem die psychischen und erlebnismäßigen Komponenten durch die im Stress erzeugten Emotionen so verändert werden, dass Wohlbefinden und soziales Miteinander unbeeinträchtigt bleiben. Beide Funktionen sind teilweise unvereinbar, können Fehlanpassungen hervorrufen oder sich ergänzen. Der Mensch hat die Möglichkeit, sich selbst oder die Umwelt zu verändern.

Die beiden Bewältigungsfunktionen *Änderung der gestörten Transaktion* und *Regulierung der Emotion* werden durch sechs Bewältigungsformen (coping modes) ausgedrückt, um Stresssituationen bzw. Transaktionen zu bewältigen: Informationssuche, direkte Aktion, Aktionshemmung, intrapsychische Bewältigungsformen, Hinwendung zu anderen und Hinwendung zum Glauben.

Das transaktionale Stresskonzept

Primäre Bewertung

Irrelevant Günstig/Positiv Bedrohlich/Stressend

Sekundäre Bewertung

Analyse

Welche Bewältigungsmöglichkeiten
vorhanden? Welche Bewältigungsmöglichkeiten
am effektivsten?

Rückkopplungen

Veränderte Situationen

Neubewertung

Primäre Bewertung

Abb. 1: Das transaktionale Stresskonzept

Jede dieser Bewältigungsformen erfüllt „sowohl problemlösende wie emotions-regulierende Funktionen ..., jede [Bewältigungsform kann] sowohl auf augen-blickliche oder vergangene Ereignisse (Schädigung/Verlust) wie auf künftige Ereignisse (Bedrohung/Herausforderung) gerichtet" sein (ibid.). Menschliches Verhalten ist ein Prozess, der unter wandelnden Bedingungen abläuft. Die Bewältigung einer Situation hängt davon ab, wie ein Mensch diese subjektiv und kognitiv einordnet. Das Ausmaß der Stressreaktion wird von objektiven Merk-malen einer Situation, der subjektiven Einschätzung deren Gefährlichkeit durch den Betroffenen und der zur Verfügung stehenden Bewältigungsmöglichkeiten bestimmt.

Über diese Bewältigungsformen wird versucht, ohne großen Aufwand psychi-sches Gleichgewicht sowie soziales Miteinander zu erhalten oder wieder herzu-stellen. Dabei sind in den Gesprächen mit Betroffenen etwa 60 verschiedene Bewältigungsmodi festgestellt worden, wobei davon auszugehen ist, dass es noch wesentlich mehr gibt (Menn 2007, 228 ff.). Dies zeigt zudem, dass eine Klassi-fizierung in fünf oder mehr Phasen menschliches Verhalten nur ungenügend darstellt, geschweige denn umfassend wahrnehmen kann. Die Wahl der Bewälti-gungsform ist von sozialen Strukturen und der Persönlichkeit des Betreffenden abhängig. Jede Person wählt je nach Einschätzung der Situation die für sie sinnvollen Bewältigungsformen aus. Coping ist folglich ein dynamischer Prozess.

2.3   Theoretische Ansätze von Stress und Coping bei Sterben und Tod

Das Copingmodell kann dem Begleiter helfen zu erkennen, auf welche Art und Weise Menschen bewältigen. Dem vom Tode bedrohten Menschen ist aufge-geben, selbst seine Fragen und Probleme zu bewältigen. Beispielsweise wird eine Persönlichkeit, deren Grundstruktur ängstlich ist und deren Lebensmuster eher aus Verneinung, Vermeidung und Rückzug besteht, auch in der Konfrontation mit dem Tod zunächst so, wie sie es gewohnt war, reagieren (Poss 1984, 392–395). Die Form der Bewältigung spiegelt die Art und Weise eines Menschen wider, „wie dieser die negativen Schaltpunkte seines Lebens bewältigt hat" (Shneidman 1992, 237). Das Copingmodell führt dazu, den Todkranken mit all seinen Be-wältigungsfähigkeiten zu akzeptieren. Ein Mechanismus wie Leugnung darf darum nicht negativ bewertet, sondern als zur Persönlichkeit gehörend akzeptiert werden.

Für den verlässlichen Begleiter bedeutet dies, da zu sein, kommunikationsbereit zu sein, auszuhalten und zu teilen.[3] So gibt es nicht *die eine* Form von Bewältigung, genauso wie es auch nicht *die eine* Form des Sterbens gibt. Jeder Mensch stirbt seinen eigenen, ganz persönlichen Tod und neigt dazu, „so zu

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[3] Dazu gehören auch, Reaktionen wie Stoizismus, Wut, Schuldgefühle, Entsetzen, Duckmäuserei, Furcht, Angst, Aufgeben, Heldentum, Abhängigkeit, Überdruss, Kontrollbedürfnis, Kampf um Autonomie und Würde sowie Verleugnung auszuhalten und mitzuerleben.

sterben, wie er gelebt hat, besonders wie er früher in Zeiten von Bedrohung, Stress, Versagen, Herausforderung, Schock und Verlust reagiert hat … Das bedeutet, dass man so stirbt, wie man in den schlimmen Stunden seines Lebens gelebt hat" (ibid., 244–245).

Das Copingmodell kann für den Seelsorger eine Hilfe sein, dem von Sterben und Tod bedrohten Menschen beizustehen, ihn zu akzeptieren und darin zu unterstützen, seine belastende Gegenwart wahrzunehmen und trotz bevorstehender Verluste den Rest des eigenen Lebens selbst zu gestalten. Es zeigt einen Zusammenhang zwischen Stressoren und innerer Auseinandersetzung, akzeptiert negative Gefühle und ordnet sie in die individuelle Auseinandersetzung ein, ohne den Betroffenen in eine andere Gefühlslage drängen zu wollen.

2.4   Beschreibung des Bewältigungsverhaltens der Gesprächspartner

Wie Menschen bewältigen, wurde in 104 Gesprächen mit insgesamt 22 Dialogpartnern untersucht. Die Menschen, mit denen gesprochen wurde, zeigten sehr beeindruckend, wie individuell sie sich verhielten und die Umgebung ihre Bewältigung beeinflusste, was das transaktionale Stresskonzept anschaulich und nachvollziehbar erklärt (Menn 2007, 98 ff.).

Die Bewältigung der belastenden Situation hängt von der eigenen subjektiven, persönlichen Einschätzung (z.B. Lebenserfahrung in Krisen, Weltanschauung, intellektuelle Faktoren, Bildung), der Erkrankung (z.B. Art und Stadium, Prognose, Schmerzen, Veränderung der Integrität), des sozialen und des örtlichen Umfelds (z.B. Atmosphäre, Aufklärung durch Ärzte, belastende Behandlung, therapeutisches und pflegerisches Personal, soziale Beziehungen und Kontakte) ab (Menn 2007, 286, 301 ff.).

3.   Die Begleitung unter der Perspektive des Coping

Das Copingmodell zeigt, dass sich ein Mensch an eine neue Situation anpasst, wenn sie ihn belastet. In dieser Transaktion verändert sie ihn, wobei er seinerseits die Situation beeinflusst. Das heißt, ein Mensch passt sich einer Situation an oder stellt sich auf seine Erkrankung und alle neuen Umstände ein. Gleichzeitig wirken diese auf ihn und beeinflussen ihn wie zum Beispiel das Wetter, das Essen, das Wohnumfeld, Ärzte mit ihren guten oder schlechten Nachrichten, Pflegepersonal, das Wärme oder Distanz vermittelt, Angehörige, die sich einfühlsam nähern oder mit der Situation überfordert sind, Seelsorger, die zuhören oder verändern wollen. Sterbebegleitung, die das Copingmodell kennt, wird zu einem Prozess, der sich fortlaufend verändert und dem sterbenden und kranken Menschen hilft, seine Situation wahrzunehmen und selbst gestalten zu können. Denn Coping wird „als

stabilisierender Faktor verstanden, der Individuen dabei hilft, während Lebensphasen voller Stress ihre psychosoziale Anpassung aufrechtzuerhalten" (Morgenthaler 2002, 290).

3.1 Die Dimension des Begleitens im Umgang mit Sterbenden

Begleiten ist eine Grunddimension im Umgang mit Sterbenden.[4] Menschen, die die Absicht haben, zu begleiten, sollen die Kranken nicht allein lassen. Seelsorge hat in der Begleitung eine besondere Bedeutung, denn sie tritt mit einem kranken und sterbenden Menschen in eine Beziehung von Seele zu Seele, was einen theologischen und spirituellen Hintergrund hat und über medizinische Betreuung hinausgeht. Hier nimmt der Begleiter oder Seelsorger sich und seinen Partner, das heißt den kranken bzw. sterbenden Menschen, wahr. So sind beide in Bewegung, verändern und entwickeln sich. Um diese Entwicklungen wahrzunehmen, beobachtet der Seelsorger oder Begleiter sich selbst und sein Gegenüber und wird gewahr, was sich zwischen ihnen beiden ereignet. Im Rahmen der Begleitung kommt der umfassenden Wahrnehmung eine herausragende Bedeutung zu, zu der alles Sichtbare und Unsichtbare gehört, was sich in der gegenwärtigen Situation ereignet bzw. bewegt. Der Fokus richtet sich auf den Menschen, der begleitet wird.

Ein Seelsorger, der das Copingmodell kennt, wird auf Entwicklungen während der Erkrankung achten. Die große Aufgabe der Begleitung besteht darin, einen Menschen trotz seiner Widerstände anzunehmen und zuverlässig bei ihm zu bleiben. Hier wird das Copingmodell zu einer sinnvollen Hilfe, da es den Begleiter schult, den Kranken oder Sterbenden umfassend wahrzunehmen und sich von Vorstellungen und Modellen zu lösen, da nur das Gegenüber im Zentrum steht.

Begleitung schließt nicht nur den Kranken und Sterbenden ein, sondern sieht auch das Umfeld und die Angehörigen. Seelsorge kann die Kommunikation zum Sterbenden unterstützen und vermitteln. Begleitung beobachtet und wertschätzt nicht nur, sondern sucht Worte zwischen den Betroffenen und deren Angehörigen zu finden, damit sich diese verstehen. Hierzu gehört es auch, Lebensbilanz zu ziehen, damit Menschen sehen, wie sie einst mit Schwierigkeiten umgingen und ihnen dies nun die Kraft gibt, sich der gegenwärtigen Belastung zu stellen.

Im Prozess der Bewältigung ist Seelsorge zunächst *eine* Stimme in der Begleitung. Sie hat kein Monopol, kann aber die vielen anderen Stimmen zum Gleichklang bringen, wenn sie den Menschen wahrnimmt und wertschätzt, sodass

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[4] Eine Fülle von Publikationen beschäftigt sich damit, wie Sterbende begleitet werden können. Immer wieder erscheinen neue Ratgeber, die Begleitung in allen möglichen und nicht möglichen Nuancen schildern. Auf den Begriff des Begleitens selbst soll hier nicht eingegangen, sondern auf Paul Sporken (1992, 11–41) verwiesen werden.

dieser im Augenblick der Begleitung die gewachsene Beziehung erleben will. Seelsorge kann Perspektive anbieten, wenn sie in der Beziehung zum Partner präsent ist. In diesem Sinn ist der Seelsorger nicht Beobachter, Zuschauer, Missionar oder Funktionär, sondern Begleiter, der durch seine Präsenz mit der Fülle der seelsorgerlichen Angebote mitgeht.

3.2   Die Dimension von Deutung und Antwort in der Begleitung

Kranke und sterbende Menschen bewältigen ihre Situation mit Hilfe von Anpassungs- und Abwehrstrategien. In den Transaktionen setzen sie sich mit sich und dem Begleiter auseinander. Dabei deuten sie selbst ihre Situation, wenn sie beispielsweise feststellen, dass sich ihr gesundheitlicher Zustand verändert, oder mutmaßen, dass sie sterben werden, oder auf Fragen nach ihrem Befinden die Gelegenheit nutzen, die ihnen angeboten wird, um über ihr körperliches, psychisches, soziales oder geistliches Empfinden zu sprechen. Die Antworten zeigten, dass sie selbstverantwortlich mit ihrem Leben umgehen, sich schützen, nicht alles preisgeben und sich selbst stützen, wenn sie über Vordergründiges oder Hintergründiges sprechen.

Bevor es darum geht, einen Zustand, Aussagen oder sich selbst zu deuten, gilt es, den Weg des Schwerkranken wahrzunehmen, zu bestätigen, zu hören, zu sehen und zu empfinden, was dieser sagt oder noch nicht sagt, wie er folglich die Gegenwart bewältigt. Insofern akzeptiert der Seelsorger, der nach dem Copingmodell handelt, dessen Selbsteinschätzung und interpretiert sie nicht. Es geht nicht darum, den anderen zu konfrontieren; dies geschieht bereits durch die Person und das Erscheinen des Seelsorgers. Vielmehr sollte dieser der Belastung standhalten, nichts zu bagatellisieren und auch nicht zu versuchen, dem Gesprächsthema und Gesprächspartner auszuweichen.

Im gegenwärtigen gesellschaftlichen Umgang mit schwer kranken und sterbenden Menschen klärt der Seelsorger oder Begleiter den Menschen, den der Tod betrifft, über dessen gesundheitlichen Zustand nicht auf, denn das ist in unserer westlich geprägten Gesellschaft in der Regel die Angelegenheit des Arztes, der die Diagnose und den medizinischen Verlauf einer Erkrankung kennt. Dies heißt nicht, dass der Seelsorger der sogenannten *objektiven* Wahrheit ausweicht; er wendet sich vielmehr der subjektiven Wahrheit des Kranken und Sterbenden zu, um ihm Räume zu eröffnen, in denen er sich seinen Lebensinhalten, die ihn bedrohen, in Bildern, Geschichten und Symbolen nähern kann. Diese Wahrheit muss keineswegs dieselbe sein, die der Arzt in objektiven Befunden diagnostiziert. Die Symbole[5] und Bilder des Glaubens bieten den Raum, der Leben und Tod mit

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[5] Über Symbole, deren Sprache und Bedeutung gibt es eine große Anzahl von Literatur. An dieser Stelle sei auf Verena Kast (1999), Elisabeth Kübler-Ross (1990) und Hans-Christoph Piper (1990) verwiesen, um nur einige zu nennen, die sich mit Symbolik in der Sprache beschäftigen, denn Sprache ist der wohl wichtigste Träger der menschlichen Kommunikation. Wir teilen uns über sie

Vergleichen öffnen kann. Wenn der Seelsorger Symbolen und Gefühlen Worte gibt und sich dazu auch des reichen Schatzes der Texte der Bibel bedient, stürzt er den Schwerkranken nicht schutzlos in die Wahrheit seines Todes, sondern begleitet den Kranken in das Mysterium seines Lebens, das sich dem Sterbenden Stück für Stück lüftet. Der Tod oder eine Erkrankung, die den Menschen bedrohen, nötigen ihn, einen neuen Lebensweg einzuschlagen, wobei der Seelsorger Vertrauen aufbaut und durch den Glauben einen Himmel anbietet, der sich dem Sterbenden und nicht ihm selber öffnet. Als Beispiel sei hier erwähnt die Zigarette, die ein Gesprächspartner sich am Schluss des letzten Gesprächs anzündete und dieses damit beendete, denn er hatte alles gesagt, was für ihn zu sagen war, oder eine Krebskranke, die kurz vor ihrem Tod zur Tochter über- siedeln und ihre Kleidung packen wollte, wobei sie sich auf ihre Reise zu ihr und in den Tod vorbereitete, oder ein anderer Patient, der vom Baum abgefallene reife Pflaumen sorgsam vom Boden aufhob. Sie waren für ihn wertvoll, so wie er auch sich selbst als wertvoll ansah, als sein Leben am Boden lag und durch den Krebs zu verfaulen drohte. – Diese alltäglichen Beobachtungen, Handlungen und Geschehnisse werden zu Symbolen des Kranken bzw. Sterbenden, mit denen er dem Begleiter das Leben deutet, was unbewusst geschieht.

Die Todkranken interpretieren ihr Leben, wenn sie zurückblicken, und sehen, dass sie wertvolle Menschen sind, sie sehen, wie sie Konflikte und Belastungen bewältigten. Seelsorge kann die Lebensbilanz unterstützen und aufwerten, sie muss den Schwerkranken nicht mit den Traumata seiner Lebensgeschichte konfrontieren, kann jedoch vermitteln, dass Menschen Gnade in den Augen Gottes finden, und ihnen helfen, ihre unterschiedlichen Lebensgeschichten in ihr jetziges Leben hineinzunehmen und die dunklen Stunden des Lebens mit diesem *so* zu verknüpfen, dass sie dazugehören.

Seelsorge bietet Bilder an oder greift sie auf; damit schenkt sie Menschen zusätzliche Räume, in denen ihre Lebenserfahrung Platz hat, sodass sie diese mit der gegenwärtigen Belastung vertiefen und neu bewerten können. Die Deutung obliegt als Aufgabe dem Kranken oder Sterbenden selbst, der seine Symbole und Bilder nutzt, um mit dem Seelsorger zu kommunizieren; es ist nicht des Seel- sorgers Aufgabe. Vielmehr antwortet er in der Transaktion dem Kranken und Sterbenden in der Situation und kann ihm dabei helfen, eigene Bilder zu finden, wenn er seinerseits Glaubensbilder anbietet, die im Copingmodell lediglich als sogenannte „Impulse" fungieren, die der Todkranke aufnimmt, um seine Situation neu zu bewerten.

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mit und geben Auskunft. Piper (ibid., 158) beschreibt Symbole, die Sterbende in ihrer Sprache nutzen, um sich auszudrücken und ihre Situation zu beschreiben, um ihre Krankheit und ihren Tod zu bewältigen.

3.3 Die Dimension des Sorgens in der Begleitung

Sorgen im Rahmen der Begleitung von schwer kranken und sterbenden Menschen bedeutet auch, zu akzeptieren, dass diese für sich selbst sorgen. Das Coping-modell betont die Ressourcen, die dazu dienen, die Situation zu bewältigen, das heißt ein seelisches Gleichgewicht aufzubauen und sein Leben zu stabilisieren. In der Sterbebegleitung rückt damit das Leben anstelle des Todes in den Mittel-punkt.

Wenn nur die Selbstsorge des Todkranken betont wird, unterwirft der Begleiter sich dem starren Copingmodell, sodass sich keine seelsorgerliche Beziehung entwickeln kann. Coping als wissenschaftliches Modell kennt die Sorge für den Menschen nicht, wohl aber die Seelsorge, die davon beeinflusst ist. In der Trans-aktion zwischen dem Seelsorger und dem Patienten ist für beide Raum, sich kennenzulernen, sich gegenseitig zu beeinflussen und füreinander zu sorgen.

In den Gesprächen, deren Protokolle in meine Dissertation eingeflossen sind (Menn 2007), versuchte ich, meine jeweiligen Partner zu stützen, bei ihnen zu sein und ihnen beizustehen. Dies wiederum ist die Stärke des Copings, wenn es den Schwerkranken wahrnimmt, was nur möglich ist, wenn der Begleiter um-fassend anwesend ist. Ich versuchte, die Menschen zu verstehen und ihnen Raum zu geben, sich zu äußern und ihre Belastungen auszudrücken. Dies bedeutet zunächst, sich zurückzuhalten, was jedoch in der Betreuung von schwer kranken und sterbenden Menschen äußerst schwerfällt, denn deren Alltag war bislang davon geprägt, dass etwas „getan wurde".[6] Dennoch kommt der Dimension des Sorgens eine große Bedeutung zu, wenn sich bei den Angehörigen oder dem Kranken selbst Hilflosigkeit breitmacht, je mehr der Krankheitsprozess fortschreitet, der mit dem körperlichen Verfall einhergeht. Dann kann der Seel-sorger dem Sterbenden versichern, dass er ihn nicht allein lässt, sondern er zuverlässig bei ihm bleiben wird. Deshalb kann er den Tod zulassen, genauso wie er zulässt, dass der Sterbende seine eigenen Entscheidungen trifft, und diesem Räume eröffnet, er selbst sein zu dürfen. Auf diese Weise wird Leben ermöglicht, was darüber hinaus bedeutet, dass ein Seelsorger kompetent sein und sich auch im sozialen Management soweit auskennen muss, dass er bei der Organisation der Versorgung des Kranken oder Sterbenden behilflich sein kann.[7] Sorgen bedeutet

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[6] Der Krankenhausalltag ist vom Machbaren geprägt, seien es Untersuchungen, Applikationen von Medikamenten, von pflegerischen Tätigkeiten des Personals, wie Waschen oder Lagern, aber auch von deren Hilf- und Machtlosigkeit. Ähnliches lässt sich auch für die ambulante Versorgung zu Hause sagen. Ein Begleiter, der nur da und bereit ist, findet sich im Alltag nicht oft, es sei denn, gut geschulte Hospizmitarbeiter oder Seelsorger begleiten. Ansonsten verlassen Begleiter aus dem sozialen Umfeld nach meinen Beobachtungen Sterbende aus einem Gefühl der Hilflosigkeit und Ohnmacht heraus, je mehr sich ihr Zustand verschlechtert. Besucher lassen sich erst bei der Beerdigung wieder sehen.

[7] Es ist nicht die Aufgabe eines Seelsorgers, zu pflegen oder hauswirtschaftliche Verrichtungen zu tätigen; dies kann angebracht sein, doch sollte ein Seelsorger vermitteln und delegieren können und

somit, sich an diesem zu orientieren, ihn nicht aufzubrechen oder zu drängen, sondern einen Weg zu suchen, auf dem es ihm nach dessen eigenen Vorstellungen wohl ergeht.

Die Aufgabe des Seelsorgers in der Begleitung von schwer kranken und sterbenden Menschen besteht darin, auf deren körperliche, soziale, personale, geistige und geistliche Bedürfnisse zu achten, ihnen beizustehen, sodass sie sich verstanden fühlen, wenn sie sich verbal und nonverbal äußern, dass sie sich getragen und geborgen wissen und Raum bekommen, um zurückzusehen, dass sie in ihrem Leben etwas zurücklassen, auf das sie stolz sein können, was sie stärkt oder belastet. Hier kann der Seelsorger mit der Beichte oder dem Segen entlasten.

In der Sorge um den schwer kranken und sterbenden Menschen kommt dem Trost eine herausragende Bedeutung zu, denn hier entfaltet sich christliche Seelsorge. Trost verweist dabei nicht auf einen fernen unklaren und unerreichbaren Punkt. Ebenso sind sogenannte Trostworte fehl am Platze, die allgemein gehalten sind und eher die Hilflosigkeit des Begleiters ausdrücken. Solcher missverstandener Trost schafft eher Distanz. Trost entwickelt sich, wenn der Seelsorger dem Todkranken nahe ist und zwischen beiden eine persönliche, nahe Beziehung entsteht, in der aus dem Glauben des Sterbenden eine persönliche Hoffnung erwächst. Texte und Bilder können trösten und Kraft geben, sich auf den Tod vorzubereiten. Die Aufgabe der Seelsorge ist es, Liebe zu geben, sodass der Kranke oder Sterbende seinen Glauben und seine Hoffnung ausleben kann. Dieser allein bestimmt selbst, inwieweit er christliche Formen und Angebote in Form von Gebeten, Liedern, Texten, Beichte, Krankensalbung oder Abendmahl annimmt. Diese besiegeln nicht den Tod oder das Sterben, sondern bieten an, auf dem Weg, der möglicherweise der letzte sein kann, zu helfen, zu stärken, auf den baldigen Tod vorzubereiten und den Sterbenden der Liebe Gottes zu vergewissern.

In den Gesprächen mit den Kranken wurde immer wieder das Zuhause thematisiert (Menn 2007, 259 ff.). Alle Patienten äußerten den Wunsch, in irgendeiner Weise nach Hause kommen zu wollen. Wo dies nicht gelang, versuchten sie, sich in der Klinik, im Heim oder im Hospiz zumindest eine Art von Zuhause einzurichten, indem sie sich Gegenstände an ihr Bett oder in dessen Nähe bringen ließen. Zu Hause war für alle *der* Ort, an dem sie sich geborgen fühlten, Liebe bekamen oder zumindest erhofften, Liebe zu empfangen, wo sie unbeschwert sein und träumen konnten, Gemeinschaft erleben und verstanden werden wollten. Das Zuhause ist der Ort, an dem es warm ist, das heißt emotionale Wärme zu spüren ist, wo gespielt, gegessen, geredet und Gemeinschaft erlebt wird. Es wurde von allen, solange sie nicht dort waren, idealisiert, und wenn sie zu Hause waren, wollten sie nicht wieder fort und wenn möglich, auch dort sterben, auch wenn die Versorgung nicht so professionell und umfangreich war wie in einer Klinik oder einem Heim.

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wissen, was zu tun ist. Dies gilt vornehmlich für den ambulanten Bereich. Im stationären Bereich sollte der Seelsorger in das Betreuungsteam integriert sein.

Der Seelsorger kann dem Sterbenden nahe kommen und ihn begleiten, wenn er hilft, ein Zuhause einzurichten, das spirituelle Züge trägt, denn damit verbindet dieser einen Raum, in dem er Ruhe und Frieden finden und seinen Glauben frei ausleben kann. Zu Hause fühlen sich Menschen wohl und sicher. Diese Gefühle kann der Seelsorger vermitteln, der dem Sterbenden einfühlsam eine irdische Heimat einräumt und Platz für eine himmlische lässt.

Sich wie zu Hause fühlen, umfasst auch, bei der Ordnung des Nachlasses vor dem Tod zu helfen, um den Sterbenden zu ermutigen, mit seiner Familie zu reden, Ungeklärtes und Unerledigtes zu bereinigen, um sein Haus zu bestellen. Die Sorge um das Zuhause verlangt vom seelsorgerlichen Begleiter, dass er den Menschen in seiner Individualität, mit dessen Kultur und Weltanschauung akzeptiert und sich selbst als Gast in dessen Nähe sieht, der einen dritten beziehungsweise fremden Mensch in seinen persönlichsten Raum einlässt.

4.   Schluss

Sterbebegleitung gehört zu den ureigensten Aufträgen des Christentums. Dieser Auftrag wird durch Coping unterstützt und transparent, denn das Copingmodell hilft dem Seelsorger, den kranken und sterbenden Menschen zu verstehen. Obwohl es ein säkulares Modell ist, ermöglicht es nicht nur, den christlichen Glauben entfalten zu können, sondern es bietet sich an, bewusst in der Seelsorge eingesetzt zu werden, um die Schätze der Seelsorge und des christlichen Glaubens einzubringen. Sei es die Hoffnung, die der christliche Glaube mit sich bringt, sei es der Auftrag, einfach nur da zu sein. Gerade die Schätze der christlichen Zeichenhandlungen, wie Abendmahl, Krankensalbung, Segenshandlungen, finden im Copingmodell einen Widerhall und Raum, wo sie angebracht sind und vom Sterbenden gewünscht werden.

Das transaktionale Stresskonzept hat eine hohe Bedeutung für die Seelsorgearbeit. Es kann ein tieferes Verständnis für menschliche Handlungen vermitteln und in Bezug auf die Begleitung eines mit seinem Tod konfrontierten Menschen möglicherweise individuelle Antworten darauf geben, wie und warum eine Person mit der Bedrohung, der Schädigung oder Herausforderung des Sterbens und des Todes fertig wird und eine andere Person nicht. Es sensibilisiert wie kein anderes Modell in der Begleitung Sterbender den Seelsorger für den kranken und sterbenden Menschen und dessen einzigartiger Situation, was bedeutet, sich von Konzepten, Modellen, Seelsorgetheorien und Theologien zu befreien, um einem Menschen *wirklich* begegnen zu können. Unter diesem Aspekt wird Seelsorge im Angesicht des Todes zu einer Lebensbegleitung, die den sterbenden und kranken Menschen wertschätzt, stärkt, eine Perspektive durch die Kraft des Glaubens anbietet und das gesamte Lebensumfeld nicht aus den Augen lässt. Der Mensch steht allein vor seinem Tod und muss mit diesem allein umgehen, doch Seelsorge, die den Menschen sieht, lässt nicht allein.

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Abstract

People have different and individual ways of coping with seriously illnesses and death. This variety cannot always be sufficiently explained by the current use of phasing models. In this context the "Coping Model" by Richard S. Lazarus and his stress research group seems to be helpful in understanding dying humans. This comprehension model can be supportive of pastoral counselling to a person's individuality and to support him in his own way of approach to life and death. This way leads to an intensive dialogue between patient and pastor who can have the courage and the confidence in letting the person find his own way of coping.

Résumé

Les gens réagissent différemment face à la maladie et à la mort. Cette diversité de comportements humains ne peut pas toujours être expliquée de manière satisfaisante par l'emploi des modèles évoquant la succession de différentes phases. Dans cette perspective, le « modèle du coping », proposé par Richard S. Lazarus et son groupe de recherche sur le stress, semble être utile dans l'accompagnement de fin de vie. Ce modèle de compréhension peut être un soutien à la cure d'âme et peut aider la personne en fin de vie à trouver son propre cheminement face à la vie et à la mort. Ce processus du coping induit un dialogue intense entre le patient et le pasteur qui peut avoir le courage et la confiance de laisser la personne trouver sa propre façon de gérer ce cheminement.

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Rezension: *Die Entstehung des Sabbats*

Alexandra Grund: *Die Entstehung des Sabbats: Seine Bedeutung für Israels Zeitkonzept und Erinnerungskultur.* Forschungen zum Alten Testament 75. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011. XII, 370 Seiten.

Der von Alexandra Grund vorgelegte Band *Die Entstehung des Sabbats* ist 2011 in der Reihe „Forschungen zum Alten Testament" bei Mohr Siebeck erschienen und gibt im Wesentlichen ihre 2007 bei der Evangelisch-Theologischen Fakultät der Universität Tübingen eingereichte und 2008 angenommene Habilitationsschrift wieder. Alexandra Grund ist gegenwärtig Professorin für Altes Testament an der Philipps-Universität Marburg.

Wie der Untertitel „Israels Zeitkonzept und Erinnerungskultur" vermittelt, liegt der Schwerpunkt dieser religions- und theologiegeschichtlich orientierten Untersuchung darin, die Bedeutung des Sabbats ins Verhältnis zu Israels Zeitverständnis zu setzen. Die Autorin hinterfragt die von Gerhard von Rad aufgestellte und vielfach aufgegriffene Position, dass sich Israels chronologisch orientiertes Konzept der Heilsgeschichte grundlegend vom naturzyklischen Denken der altorientalischen Kulturen unterscheidet. Sie nimmt damit die Kritik Jan Assmanns auf, der unter Hinweis auf den wöchentlich wiederkehrenden Sabbat eine rein lineare Zeitauffassung Israels in Frage stellt. Dabei stellt Grund fest, dass einerseits die frühen Hochkulturen lineare und zyklische Vorstellungen miteinander kombiniert haben. Andererseits finden sich selbst in der israelitischen Prophetie mit ihrem prägnanten Geschichtsbewusstsein Verweise auf den Kreislauf innerhalb der Schöpfung (z.B. Jer 8,7).

Grunds Werk ist in drei Hauptteile untergliedert; der erste behandelt den Sabbat in vorexilischer Zeit, der zweite den Sabbat im Dekalog und der dritte das Sabbat- und Zeitkonzept der priesterlichen Komposition. In diesen Teilen werden die relevanten Textpassagen einzeln kommentarähnlich ausgelegt, wobei sowohl synchrone als auch diachrone Aspekte Berücksichtigung finden.

Im ersten Hauptteil wird aufgezeigt, dass die Mondfeste Hinweis auf ein zyklisches Bewusstsein in Israel geben. Die Verfasserin stellt fest: „Die Orientierung an den Mondphasen war also – durchaus gemäß der in 1. Mose 1,14–16 notierten Bedeutung von Mond (und Sonne) für die Bestimmung der Feste – in Israel seit frühester Zeit und bis in die Gegenwart sehr viel ausgeprägter, als man lange Zeit angenommen hat" (129f.). Auf der Grundlage von 2. Könige 4,22f., Hosea 2,13, Jesaja 1,13f., Amos 8,4–7 u.a. zeigt Alexandra Grund auf, dass im alten Israel zwei Mondtage begangen wurden: der Neumond und der Sabbat. Dass der Sabbat dem Neumond gegenübersteht – Grund spricht von einem „polaren Wortpaar" (77) – deutet darauf hin, dass wir es hier mit einem Vollmondsabbat zu tun haben.

Feiern am ersten und fünfzehnten Tag des Mondmonats sind auch aus Israels Umwelt bekannt. Berührungen zum mesopotamischen *sab/pattu* lassen sich feststellen. An dieser Stelle bestätigt Grund die Aussage von Gerhard Hasel, der

betont, dass *sab/pattu* gar kein Tag des Ruhens sei (132). Für Grund ist das nur logisch, da der Vollmondsabbat nicht mit dem späteren Ruhetag im Sieben-Tage-Rhythmus identisch ist. Vielmehr handelt es sich um zwei unterschiedliche Institutionen, bei denen lediglich der Begriff übernommen wurde. Sie kann sich daher auch nicht der verbreiteten These anschließen, dass der Wochensabbat ursprünglich ein Vollmondtag gewesen sei (306).

Die ersten Belege für die spätere Sabbattheologie sieht Grund in 2. Mose 23,12 und 2. Mose 34,21. Hier wird die Zeit durch einen fortwährenden Rhythmus von sieben Tagen strukturiert. Aus traditionsgeschichtlicher Perspektive ist dieser Rhythmus nur ansatzweise erklärbar und muss als „eigenständige Entwicklung" (43) angesehen werden. Einzigartig ist auch die Begründung des Sabbats als eines sozialen Gebotes, in dem die Gottheit die Entlastung von Untergebenen dadurch garantiert, dass sie sie am siebten Tag der Verfügungsgewalt anderer entzieht. Zu solch einer Institution, so Grund, „gibt es in der gesamten Umwelt bislang keine greifbar Parallele" (148).

Im zweiten Hauptteil behandelt Grund die Sabbatgebote aus den Dekalogen in den Büchern Exodus und Deuteronomium. Sie vergleicht dabei synchron die Kompositionen beider Fassungen und diachron die literargeschichtliche Entstehung. Auch wenn das Sabbatgebot keine kultdramatischen Anweisungen enthält, so dient es in beiden Versionen eindeutig „der Vergegenwärtigung fundierender Vergangenheit" (185). Gerade im Deuteronomium wird der Sabbat zu einem „kleinen, wöchentlichen Pessachfest" (181). So gesehen wird die Bedeutung des Sabbats in der Erinnerungskultur Israels deutlich.

Im dritten Hauptteil werden Texte aus der „priesterlichen Komposition" besprochen. Auf 1. Mose 1 geht die Autorin ausführlich ein. Des Weiteren werden der Sabbat in der Wüste (Ex 16), Schöpfung und Heiligtumsbau sowie der Sabbat in Beziehung zum Heiligtum und zum Festkalender behandelt. Schließlich geht Grund der Frage nach, wie das priesterliche Zeitverständnis zu charakterisieren sei. Obwohl die priesterliche Erzählung durchaus an typische Aspekte eines mythischen Zeitverständnisses (302) erinnert, könne beim wöchentlichen Sabbat nicht von einer „Wiederholung der Urzeit gesprochen werden, sondern von einer Imitatio Dei, von einem die Zeit der Weltschöpfung in sieben Tagen *darstellenden Handeln*" (304; Hervorhebung im Original). Die letzten Seiten des Buches weisen in einem Ausblick auf die Beziehung von Sabbat und Sonntag hin. Grund betont sowohl die Wertschätzung des Sabbats „als Gedächtnis von Schöpfung und Exodus in Verbundenheit zu Israels Sabbatfeier" (319) als auch den Sonntag als Herrentag zur Feier der Auferstehung.

Das Besondere an der Arbeit von Prof. Grund liegt in der Verknüpfung der Thematik des Sabbats mit Israels Zeitkonzept. Sie geht über eine Untersuchung zur Entstehung des Sabbats hinaus und stellt kulturanthropologische Fragestellungen zur Fest- und Erinnerungskultur in den Fokus ihrer Betrachtung. Das Werk führt den Leser zugleich umfassend in den Stand der Forschung zum Thema Sabbat ein.

Aus der Perspektive einer adventistischen Theologie ist dieses Werk mit Sicherheit eine Herausforderung – sowohl hermeneutisch als auch dogmatisch. Selbst wenn man mit den Schlussfolgerungen nicht übereinstimmen mag, kann das Werk als Anstoß dienen, sich mit den Entwicklungen im theologischen Diskurs zur Sabbatthematik auseinanderzusetzen. Schließlich ist Niels-Erik Andreasens Artikel über „Recent Studies of the Old Testament Sabbath" (ZAW 1974) gar nicht mehr so „recent". Eine aktuelle Auseinandersetzung mit dem Stand der Forschung in der Gegenwart ist der adventistischen Theologie zu wünschen.

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