11 August 1986

TALKING POINTS FOR THE ADDI

MOZAMBIQUE

Orientations and Key Players

The Government
Mozambique is a one party, Marxist-Leninist, People's Republic ruled by the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) party whose President serves automatically as President of the country.
Differences exist within FRELIMO between competing factions of pragmatists and hardliners over economic policy, relations with South Africa, the US and USSR, and prosecution of the war with the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) insurgents.
The top three figures in the party and government are:
President Samora Machel Charismatic and not overly bound by Marxist ideology, he has skillfully used a consensual approach to mold a core group of party members who are personally loyal and prepared to support himeven though they represent divergent viewson controversial policies such as closer ties to the West, accomodation with South Africa, and economic liberalization.
25X1
Prime Minister Mario Machungo. Appointed last month as Mozambique's first Prime Minister, his task is to manage the war-ravaged economy to free Machel to focus on the war effort. Reports conflict as to whether he is a Marxist ideologue or a moderate.
Foreign Minister Joachim <u>Chissano</u> . A <u>leading moderate</u> , he is still a Machel loyalist and his most likely heir apparent despite his being bypassed for the prime ministership. In doing so, Machel probably chose not to increase the authority of his strongest
potential rival. 25X1
The Insurgents
RENAMO describes itself as pro-Western and in favor of democratic principles, free elections, and private enterprise. In its published program, RENAMO asserts that it seeks a government of national unity, a
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mixed economy with government responsibility for health and education, freedom of religion, the expulsion of all foreign military advisers, and full cooperation with Mozambique's neighbors.	25X1
In practice, the insurgents appear motivated mainly by their rejection of FRELIMO's Marxist ideology and their belief that Shona-speaking ethnic groups of central Mozambiquewhich form the bulk of RENAMO's ranksdo not get a fair share of government positions and public services.	Shona 25X1
RENAMO does not have a political structure to match its well developed military organization. The groups' inept political wing is scattered in exile and divided by personal and racial differences, and are resented by RENAMO's predominatly black guerrillas fighting inside Mozambique.	inept politi
In our view, if RENAMO were to come to power, it probably would establish a tribally-based military government , eliminate the trappings of Marxism, and seek close relations with South Africa and the West.	25X1
Key Figures	
Afonso Jacama. RENAMO President and commander of its incountry military wing, he is first and foremost a talented military leader who inspires personal loyalty, but lacks charismatic political skill of a Jonas Savimbi or Samora Machel. He appears determined to seek military victory and likely would continue to fight even if talks began with FRELIMO. The son of a tribal chief in central Mozambique, he received a Catholic mission education, served in the Portuguese colonial army, and was a FRELIMO guerrilla fighter prior to independence.	Jacama Vs. 25X1
Evo Fernandes. RENAMO's former secretary-general and ex-leader of its political wing, he was dismissed last month by Jacama probably to improve RENAMO's image. Fernandes, of Indian descent, was widely disliked	Fernander 25X6 25X6
External Actors	
The Government	
Zimbabwe: About 4,000 to 5,000 Zimbabwean troops carry the principal burden of guarding Mozambique's Beira transportation corridor that links Zimbabwe to the port of Beira by railway, pipeline, and road. In addition the Zimbabwean Army provides escorts for road traffic between Zimbabwe and Malawi. Their presence and periodic spearheading of government offensives are an important factor in FRELIMO's staying power.	
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S E C R E T

South Africa: Mozambique's relations with South Africa are increasingly uneasy. Maputo still discourages ANC operations from its territory, but Pretoria believes Mozambique is relaxing its vigilance. Furthermore, we believe Pretoria would not hesitate to retaliate economically against Mozambique in reaction to new Western imposed economic sanctions.	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1
The West: Mozambique's opening to the West probably has peaked, but Machel shows no sign of backing away from improved relations with the US and recently volunteered his services as an intermediary between Washington and both Angola and Zimbabwe. Western economic aid has not met Mozambique's unrealistic expectations, however, and the West has furnished only minor military aid. US support for the Angolan insurgents has created anxiety in Maputo that the US may aid RENAMO as well. The USSR: Although Mozambique and Soviet relations—strained in the aftermath of Nkomati—have warmed somewhat in the past year, Moscow displays no readiness to bail Maputo out of its military and economic morass. The USSR wants Machel to return to a more orthodox Marxist and pro-Soviet orientation and to limit his opening to the West. Although concerned, the Soviets apparently do not see the insurgency as immediately threatening the survival of the Machel regime and probably will continue assistance and advisory levels at roughly current levels so long as Maputo can control key urban areas.	25X1 25X1 25X1
Moscow's provided an estimated \$85 million in economic aid to Mozambique last year. Western countries have provided over \$300 million in economic aid so far this year, led by Italy, Sweden, Norway, France, and the Netherlands.	25X1

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The Insurgents

South Africa: Pretoria has been RENAMO's principal backer since 1980, although the Nkomati-pact led to a sharp reduction in South African aid which had consisted of small arms and ammunition, organizational and tactical direction, training, communications equipment, medical supplies and intelligence support. In the last two years, we believe RENAMO has achieved most of its military successes on its own even though South Africa probably continues to provide some small-scale covert aid.

Renamo

25X1

Other: Moral support and money comes from expatriate Portuguese

<u>businessmen in South Africa as well as from conservative individuals and groups in Western Europe, the US, and several moderate Arab states.</u>

RENAMO opened an office in Washington earlier this year, apparently trying to emulate Savimbi's success in winning official US support.

25X1