

siderat, utrum id, de quo demonstrat suas passiones, sit coniunctum materiae, vel abstractum a materia.' This is not the place to treat of the many interesting logical, as well as psychological, discussions which have taken place concerning precision, which is one of the subjects which the scholastics treated in a comparatively modern way, although it leads directly to the question of nominalism and realism. It may, however, be mentioned that Scotus in many places draws a certain distinction variously designated by him and his followers (its nature and application is perhaps made as clear as anywhere in the *Opus Oxon.*, III. xxii. qu. unica, 'Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo,' i. e. between the crucifixion and the resurrection), which the Thomists mostly dispute. There is some account of the matter in Chauvinus, *Lexicon* (2nd ed.), under 'Praecisio.'

Hamilton has some remarks on the use of the words *abstract* and *praescind*, which could hardly come from any other man of equal learning and power, because no other such man is liable to be utterly confused by a slight complication. The remarks are mentioned here, because they have misled some students (*Lects. on Met.*, xxxv; *Lects. on Logic*, vii).

**Precocity** [Lat. *praecox*, early, ripe]: Ger. *Frühreife, Altklugheit*; Fr. *précocité*; Ital. *precocità*. The relatively early development of a physiological or psychological function.

Wherever the time of appearance or the rate of development of a given power has been measurably determined, any marked anticipation of this period or development may properly be termed precocity. Infants may thus be precocious in their acquisition of the power to walk or to speak, and the like. There may also be a special precocity of the musical sense, of artistic capacity, of motor skill, &c. The term is most frequently used with regard to general intellectual attainments in early years. Instances of unusual precocity in the lives of men of genius are readily cited, and have led to the discussion of the general relations between precocity and genius (see Galton, *Hereditary Genius*). It is also stated that precocious children occur relatively often in families some of whose members present neurotic traits, and are themselves liable to mental disorder. Cf. GENIUS. (J.J.)

**Preconception** [Lat. *prae* + *conceptio*]: Ger. *Vorbegriff*; Fr. *préconception*; Ital. *pregiudizio*. (1) Used vaguely and popularly for anticipation with reference to a particular

idea or event which, carrying the suggestion of prejudgment or mental bias, is said to be preconceived.

(2) The term might well serve a technical use as designating the mental process of a dispositional or notional character preliminary to the determination of a concept. See CONCEPTION.

**Pre designate** [a word formed by Sir W. Hamilton by composition from Lat. *prae*, in front of, and *designatus*, marked out]: (not in use in the other languages). (1) A term applied by Hamilton to verbal propositions whose quantity, as universal or particular, is expressed (*Lects. on Logic*, xiii).

(2) By C. S. Peirce applied to relations, characters, and objects which, in compliance with the principles of the theory of probability, are in probable reasonings specified in advance of, or, at least, quite independently of, any examination of the facts. See PROBABLE INFERENCE (2).

For example, the laws of England will, in the long run, cause the majority of English sovereigns to be males. In that sense it was unlikely that the successor of William IV would be a queen. But it would be absurd to say this after knowing that there was no heir to the crown so near as the Princess Victoria; and, in like manner, to say that it was not very unlikely that Queen Victoria's successor would be a queen was true enough as long as the character of her progeny was not known, or, if known, was not taken account of, but false considering the number of her sons and grandsons. In such cases of deductive probable inference the necessity of the pre designation is too obvious to be overlooked. But in indirect statistical inferences, which are mere transformations of similar deductive consequences, and the validity of which, therefore, depends upon precisely the same conditions, the necessity of the pre designation is more often overlooked than remarked. Thus Macaulay, in his essay on the inductive philosophy, collects a number of instances of Irish whigs—which we may suppose constitute a random sample, as they ought, since they are to be used as the basis of an induction. By the exercise of ingenuity and patience, the writer succeeds in finding a character which they all possess, that of carrying middle names; whereupon he seems to think that an unobjectionable induction would be that all Irish whigs have middle names. But he has violated the rule, based on the theory of probabilities, that the

character for which the samples are to be used as inductive instances must be specified independently of the result of that examination. Upon the same principle only those consequents of a hypothesis support the truth of the hypotheses which were predicted, or, at least, in no way influenced the character of the hypothesis. But this rule does not forbid the problematic acceptance of a hypothesis, which has nothing to do with the theory of probability. (C.S.P.)

**Predestination** [Lat. *praedestinatio*, a determining beforehand]: Ger. *Prädestination*; Fr. *prédestination*; Ital. *predestinazione*. The aspect of the divine foreordination which applies to moral agents as predetermining either their election to eternal life or their reprobation. See FOREORDINATION. (A.T.O.)

**Predetermination** [Lat. *prae + determinatus*, limited]: Ger. *Predetermination*; Fr. *pré-détermination*; Ital. *predeterminazione*. (1) DETERMINATION (q. v.; especially psychical, ad fin.) beforehand. (2) PREDESTINATION or FOREORDINATION (q. v.). (J.M.B.)

**Predeterminism**: DETERMINISM (q. v., various topics).

**Predicable** [Lat. *praedicabilis*, meaning in classical Lat. praiseworthy]: Ger. *Prädicabilien* (pl.); Fr. *prédictible*; Ital. *predicabile*. One of the five logical kinds of predicates of the early peripatetic school: genus, species, difference, property, accident (*γένος, εἶδος, διαφορά, ἴδιον, συμβεβηκός*), also called the *quinque voces* or *modi praedicandi*.

The indications, at present, are that the word was first used in the logical sense in translations from the Arabic. For Albertus Magnus, who did little more than report the views of Arabians, explains at considerable length the appropriateness of the term, as if it were a new one (*In praedicabilibus*, tr. ii. cap. i). It was, however, probably earlier that it was used by Lambert of Auxerre (Prantl, *Gesch. d. Logik*, iii. 28, note 114), who gives somewhat similar explanations.

Persons beginning the study of logic had better give such time as is necessary to reading the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, one of the best executed pieces of logical exposition that ever was written, superior in that respect to anything in the *Organon*, except the first book of the *Prior Analytics*. There seems to be nothing in the book which is not in Aristotle. A few sentences in the first part of the *Topics* (I. iv. 2) virtually contain the whole matter, which in the following chapter is put together

substantially as Porphyry unites it. Still, it must be admitted that the mode of colligation is here no small matter. Before Porphyry, Apuleius has stated the doctrine nearly as well, and Prantl thinks he can detect it in its matured form even in Theophrastus; but this claim is excessive. One is inclined to think that the author who expounded the doctrine with such remarkable vigour must have thought it out for himself.

The school definitions of predicable are all very bad. That of Burgersdicius is: 'Predicables are what are affirmed of many truly, properly, naturally, and immediately.' Blundeville says: 'Predicables are certayne degrees, or rather pedigrees of words that be of one affinitie, shewing which comprehend more, and which comprehend lesse.' Most of the books define universals instead of predicables, or say that predicables differ from universals only in being spoken of a subject instead of being in a subject. It is easy to see that this does not answer. A universal is 'aptum natum dici de pluribus.' Such is any general term, as *man*. But the five terms genus, species, difference, property, accident, are surely not ordinary class names. Some say they are second intentions. This is very good indeed, so far as it goes; but it is not sufficiently definite.

Kant undertook to set up his own 'predicables of the pure understanding,' which were to be derivative conceptions under the categories (*Krit. d. reinen Vernunft*, 1st ed., 82). (C.S.P.)

**Predicament** [the Eng. form of the Lat. *praedicamentum*, translating Gr. *κατηγορία*, category (Aristotle)]: Ger. *Praedicament*; Fr. *catégorie*; Ital. *categoria*. As a term of philosophy, predicament is exactly equivalent to CATEGORY (q. v.). Cf. Trendelenburg, *Beitr. z. Logik*; Baldwin, *Handb. of Psychol.*, i. chap. xiv. § 4; Peirce, *Proc. Amer. Acad. Arts and Sci.*, May, 1867. (C.S.P.)

**Predicate** [Lat. *praedicatum*, from *prae + dicare*, to make public; used in Latin since Boethius, A. D. 500, in the logical sense. It was used by Boethius to translate *κατηγορημα, κατηγορούμενον*, or τὸ δ' of a proposition. *Praedicatio*, owing to its familiarity in the sense of preaching, was a little later in becoming a term of logic]: Ger. *Prädicat*; Fr. *attribut, prédicat*; Ital. *predicato*. (1) That element of a PROPOSITION (q. v.) which is brought into relation to the SUBJECT (q. v.). Cf. also JUDGMENT, and REASONING. (J.M.B.)

(2) The view which pragmatic logic takes