

The continuity of neo-colonial practices in a new context

*French use of military means to promote
national interests in Chad from 2006 until
today*

Arnhild Arntsen



Master Thesis

Department of Political Science

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

7 January 2011

The continuity of neo-colonial practices in a new context

French use of military means to promote national interests in Chad from 2006 until today.

© Arnhild Arntsen

2011

The continuity of neo-colonial practices in a new context.

French use of military means to promote national interests in Chad from 2006 until today.

Arnhild Arntsen

<http://www.duo.uio.no/>

Print: Reprosentralen, University of Oslo

IV

Abstract

In the thesis, I have studied to what extent French interests have lead France to use military force to preserve the present Chadian regime in the period 2006-2010. The analysis contains three elements; first French interests in Chad are evaluated, then the relationship between these interests and the present regime is discussed and lastly the French military policy and its significance for the survival of the Chadian regime are examined. The theory applied to conduct the study was based upon realism focusing on national interests, power and use of force.

The findings indicate that security concerns are the most important French interests in Chad and therefore considered to be central when the military policy is outlined. A change of regime is perceived as a threat to French objectives first and foremost due to absence of unity between different rebel groups; a rebellion overthrowing the present regime is feared to cause a civil war and thereby put French interests at risk. This is viewed as the main explication for continued French support to the present regime. The French military assistance provided to the Chadian regime has been of considerable significance to assure the latter's survival when confronting rebellions. However, France has attempted to limit its support to indirect means because of the political cost attached to use of force unless it is in self-defence or under a mandate issued by United Nations Security Council. The French interests in maintaining the present regime has therefore at some occasions led to a wide interpretation of legitimising principles by France to open up for a direct military support. Nevertheless, the findings indicate that France does not consider the interests in Chad as important enough to put its reputation at risk through openly intervening in a Chadian conflict without and reference possibility of legitimating it.

Final Word Count: 34657

Acknowledgements

First, I would like to thank my supervisors who provided support and guidance throughout my work on the thesis; Karin Dokken for her enthusiastic encouragement during the first part of the period and Anders Kjølberg for valuable comments in the last part of the writing process. Morten Bøås also deserves credit for his useful feedback on some of my chapters.

I am further grateful to all those who made my fieldwork in N'Djamena possible and turned it into an unforgettable experience. Some persons deserve a special mention. First and foremost, Abraham Romba who shared knowledge with me about his country and introduced me to contacts in Paris and N'Djamena. Your support was invaluable in my work and I am particularly grateful for it. Sonia Rolley and Timothée Ngakoutou also deserve a thank you for their help in supplying contacts for my fieldwork, as well as sharing their views on the subject with me. I am thankful to the Freedom of Expression foundation that provided me with a grant that enabled me to finance my stay in Chad.

Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family for support and encouragement throughout this period. A special thank you goes to Andrés López for endless encouragements as well as having read through my thesis and corrected the language. Without you, this would have been a lot harder.

All faults and errors are only mine.

Arnhild Arntsen



Figure 1 Map of Africa

(UN 2009a)



Figure 2 Map of Chad

(UN 2009b)

Table of Contents

List of acronyms.....	XVII
1 Introduction.....	1
1.1 The use of French military force in Africa.....	1
1.2 Scope and research question.....	3
1.2.1 Narrowing down the scope.....	3
1.2.2 Research question.....	5
1.3 The structure of the thesis.....	7
2 A theoretical framework.....	9
2.1 A realist foundation.....	9
2.1.1 Central realist assumptions.....	9
2.1.2 Central concepts to understand a state's foreign policy: national interest and power.....	10
2.2 The use of force to promote national interests.....	15
2.2.1 The question of legitimacy.....	16
2.2.2 The utility of force as a tool of foreign policy.....	17
3 Background.....	19
3.1 A colonial heritage – conquest and colonial rule of Chad.....	19
3.2 A continued post-colonial relationship during the Cold War.....	20
3.2.1 1960-1975: independence and continued instability.....	20
3.2.2 1975-1982: civil war and disintegration of the Chadian state.....	22
3.2.3 1982-1990: the regime of Hissèin Habré.....	24
3.3 1990-2010: the regime of Idriss Déby.....	25
4 A qualitative methodological framework.....	27
4.1 Case study as research design.....	27
4.1.1 The choice of Chad as case.....	27
4.1.2 Reasons for the choice of research design.....	28
4.1.3 Weaknesses attached to the research design.....	29
4.2 Source triangulation as research method.....	29
4.2.1 Fieldwork in N'Djamena.....	29
4.2.2 Elite interviews.....	31
4.3 Validity and reliability.....	31

5	French national interests in Chad	33
5.1	French national security: the military presence	33
5.1.1	The significance of a military presence at the center of Africa	33
5.1.2	The value of the Operation for the French defense in general terms	35
5.1.3	The importance of the strategic interests.....	36
5.2	French economic interests	37
5.2.1	The oil production in Chad.....	37
5.2.2	French economic interests in the Central African region.....	40
5.2.3	The importance of the economic interests.....	40
5.3	Prestige: France as a humanitarian actor – the case of Darfur	41
5.3.1	French support to the Chadian regime to contain the conflict in Darfur.....	42
5.3.2	France’s initiative towards a solution of the conflict	43
5.4	The significance of survival of Déby’s regime to preserve French interests	45
5.4.1	Advantages attached to Déby’s regime	45
5.4.2	Negative implications of a change of regime.....	47
5.4.3	The foundation for French military policy	47
6	French military engagement in Chad	49
6.1	The support provided during the rebellions in April 2006 and February 2008.....	49
6.1.1	The empirical context situated in the theoretical framework: expected French support.....	49
6.1.2	The rise and fall of the two rebellions.....	50
6.1.3	The French support justified through the cooperation agreement: logistical and intelligence aid	52
6.1.4	French direct intervention: how far?	56
6.1.5	The importance of an international mandate in February 2008	59
6.2	The French initiative to a multilateral presence in Chad.....	60
6.2.1	Background of the intervention and its mandate.....	61
6.2.2	The French motivation behind the efforts invested in EUFOR	62
6.2.3	Scepticism among European countries	64
6.2.4	The Chadian president’s reluctance against an international force.....	65
6.2.5	The perception of EUFOR among Chadian actors.....	66
6.2.6	The end of the mission	68
6.3	French contributions to the short term and the long term survival of Déby’s regime	69

7	Conclusion.....	72
	Literature	77
	Appendix 1 – Complete list of interviews.....	89
	Appendix 2 – The interview guide.....	91

Figures and tables

Figure 1	Map of Africa (UN 2009a).....	IX
Figure 2	Map of Chad (UN 2009b)	XI
Table 1.1	French military interventions in Chad 1960-2010	4
Table 5.1	French export to Chad 2001-2009, in million Euros.....	38
Table 5.2	Military expenditures of Chad 2004-2009	39
Table 5.3	Price of weapon orders by Chad to France 2003-2009, in current Euros	39
Table 5.4	French exportation in million Euros	40
Table 5.5	French foreign direct investment in million Euros	40

List of acronyms

B.E.T.	Bourkou-Ennedi-Tibesti
CNT	Chad National Concord (<i>Concorde nationale du Tchad</i>)
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic
FAN	Armed Forces of the North (<i>Forces Armées du Nord</i>)
FAP	People's Armed Forces (<i>Forces Armées Populaires</i>)
FROLINAT	Chad National Liberation Front (<i>Front de la Libération Nationale du Tchad</i>)
FUC	United Front for Change (<i>Front uni pour le changement</i>)
GUNT	Transitional Government of National Unity (<i>Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition</i>)
ICG	International Crisis Group
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
RFC	Rally of Forces for Change (<i>Rassemblement des forces pour le changement</i>)
RFI	<i>Radio France International</i>
SCUD	Platform for Change, Unity and Democracy (<i>Socle pour le changement, l'unité et la démocratie</i>)
UFDD	United Force for Democracy and Development (<i>Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement</i>)
UN	United Nations

1 Introduction

1.1 The use of French military force in Africa

On 2 February 2008, two rebel columns reached the capital of Chad, N'Djamena, with the objective of overthrowing the present regime led by president Idriss Déby Itno¹. After two days of combats, the rebels were defeated. The regime's victory was, according to the Chadian journalist Michaël N. Didame, made possible by the French military support provided; as such, it was another example of "the French military's interference in Chadian internal affairs to preserve French interests" (Didame 2010 [interview]).

For Chad as for the other former French colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa², the year of 2010 marks the 50th anniversary of independence. However, the degree of autonomy from France has varied during those five decades. One expression of the continued French influence on internal affairs has been the military presence in several former colonies. In some cases it has been translated into the use of force to support allies and thereby preserve French interests, like the French intervention to restore Gabonese president Léon M'Ba in February 1964, after he had been removed in a military putsch, or to overthrow the emperor Jean-Bédél Bokassa of the Central African Republic in September 1979 to the advantage of David Dacko (M'Bokolo1998:74). The aim of this thesis is to shed light on the situation today and see to what extent military means are still applied by France to obtain its foreign policy objectives in former African colonies.

During the Cold War, the use of force in former colonies was to a certain extent accepted by other states due to the logic of power politics characterising the period; "France was protecting Western interests in Africa against (mostly) communist threats" (Charbonneau 2008:282). The continued military interference was made possible by the new relationship founded between France and the colonies at the moment of decolonisation. For France, the domination on the African continent was important with regard to its overall position in world politics. Therefore the French president, Charles de Gaulle, aimed at maintaining an influence in former colonies and the military dimension was an essential element to achieve this objective. Furthermore, French military presence was also welcomed by numerous African

¹ Hereafter referred to as Déby.

² Apart from Guinea which became independent in 1958.

head of states who feared both external and internal threats (Chipman 1989:87, 117-119). In other words, French military support was provided in exchange for African regimes' protection of French interests.

Nevertheless, things were to change with the end of the Cold War and the new international context that followed. The deployment of military means by Western states could no longer be justified with reference to power politics; it should be legitimised by international norms and was only acceptable if used in self-defence or under the mandate of the United Nations (UN) Security Council³. In addition, concepts like good governance and democracy were given more importance and this reduced French possibilities to continue to support “unsavoury African regimes” to promote own interests (Chafer 2001:173). However, the influence on the French policy was not immediate. The French intervention in Rwanda⁴ in 1994 is considered as having provoked a change in the French military policy; it caused both domestic and international criticism and “de-legitimised overt military intervention as an instrument of policy” (Chafer 2002:349).⁵ It resulted in a new policy alternative aiming at a “multilateralisation” of the military policy; France did not want to intervene unilaterally in conflicts on the African continent again (Chafer 2002:349). The objective of the following analysis is to assess to what extent the actual French military policy reflects a multilateral approach or if previous unilateral characteristics are still dominating.

The purpose of the thesis is three-folded. The study of the development of the Franco-African relationship is the main motivation behind the thesis and its principal purpose. An understanding of the military dimension is considered central to a comprehension of the nature of this relationship due to the military's importance in maintaining it. The study of the use of force is expected to reflect to what extent the former Sub-Saharan colonies are still viewed by France as constituting a sphere of influence; a *pré carré*. Hence, by studying the French use of military means I aim at contributing to the comprehension of the Franco-African relationship in the present context. However, the analysis of French use of force to promote its interests in Africa is not only of value in the study of the post-colonial cooperation, which leads us to the second purpose of the thesis: the study of military force as

³ Hereafter referred to as the Security Council.

⁴ Rwanda is not a former French colony, but it was integrated into the sphere of French influence in the 1970s (Gounin 2009:44).

⁵ Different aspects of the French policy was criticised; the military support provided to the Rwandan regime before the genocide, the lack of initiative in the United Nations' Security Council and the French operation initiated to create safe havens for Rwandan refugees but which enabled several of the participants in the genocide to escape (Gounin 2009:45).

a foreign policy tool. According to Carl von Clausewitz, war is the continuation of politics by other means (Holsti 1992:230). However, as mentioned above, the use of force is in the post-Cold War-context to a larger extent than before limited by the question of legitimacy and the political cost attached to its use in non-legitimate situations. Since a state's choice of tool to achieve objectives of foreign policy is considered to reflect the effectiveness of the different available options, the thesis is also expected to shed light on to what extent the use of force is perceived as a useful political tool in the post-Cold War-context in more general terms. A third purpose is to better understand the political dynamics in the states characterised by French interference. Several of the former colonies fall into the category of fragile states and face important challenges in political and in other domains. The understanding of the French role in these states is important due to the significance of its influence. France can constitute a hindrance towards political progress if it continues to support African regimes that lack legitimacy within their populations, at the same time as France might be in a unique position to affect development in a positive way by conditioning further assistance. Hence, by studying the French use of force I also intend to discuss France's impact on the internal affairs of its former colonies. However, this will to a lesser extent than the two other purposes be focused upon in the thesis.

1.2 Scope and research question

1.2.1 Narrowing down the scope

French military interventions in Africa is a polemical subject; in the post-Cold War-context, France has to a large extent denied any interference in African states or reduced the importance of its role, while critics have claimed that French policies towards former colonies are still shaped in a neo-colonial framework⁶. Furthermore, the relationship between France and its former colonies is of heterogeneous character. The ties connecting France to the different African states vary in nature and strength. As a consequence, an in-depth study is considered as a fruitful approach to improve the insight and the comprehension of the French actions taken in the present context. Therefore, case study will be applied as research design in this thesis. This choice will be further accounted for in chapter 4 of methodology.

⁶ For critics, see for example Verschave (1998) or Granvaud (2009).

French military policy in Chad will be used as a case of study. Conflict has characterised Chad almost constantly since it became independent, although to a varying extent, and the use of force has been an important element in the political context. Until today, power has never been passed on through an election; every change in president has originated from a *coup d'Etat* or a rebellion.⁷ In addition, as visible in the table below, France has had a nearly uninterrupted military presence in Chad.

Table 1.1 French military interventions in Chad 1960-2010⁸

Name	Beginning	End
Limousin	14.04.1969	27.10.1972
Froment	24.05.1977	15.06.1977
Camomille	07.07.1977	26.07.1977
Citronnelle	03.02.1978	16.02.1978
Tacaud	27.03.1978	01.05.1980
Anabase	01.05.1980	17.05.1980
Manta	09.08.1983	07.11.1984
Silure	01.10.1984	01.12.1984
Epervier	13.02.1986	in progress
Dorca ⁹	31.07.2004	11.09.2004

(Charbonneau 2008:68-72).

French forces have partly been used whether to strengthen or weaken Chadian regimes, favouring those considered as advantageous to French interests. Therefore, according to Robert Buijtenhuijs, French preferences have been decisive with regard to the outfall of Chadian power conflicts; “to remain in power in N’Djamena without French help or against the wishes of France was difficult” (Buijtenhuijs 1998:30). The current Chadian president’s accession to power in December 1990 was part of this pattern; the rebellion which led Déby to power was supported by the French General Directorate for External Security¹⁰ (Gounin 2009:68). Due to previous use of force to promote French interests, coupled with an actual military presence and a continued Chadian conflict, the study of French military policy in Chad is considered as a fruitful approach to evaluate to what extent military means are being used by France as a tool of foreign policy.

⁷ Presidential elections have taken place in Chad but the sitting president has at every occasion been re-elected.

⁸ French forces present in Chad when the country became independent are not included in the table. The first Chadian president, Tombalbaye, asked these forces to leave in 1965 (Azevedo 1998:138).

⁹ The operation Dorca was not as other operations implemented in response to a military threat but to transport alimentation and health care to refugee camps in eastern Chad (Ministry of Defence 2004).

¹⁰ French external intelligence agency which is operating under the direction of French Ministry of Defence.

The period subject to study is from 2006 to 2010. Déby's arrival to presidency in 1990 was followed by a period of relative stability. However, a failed *coup d'Etat* in May 2004 marked the onset of deterioration in the internal conflict situation in Chad with an increased number of attacks on the Chadian territory by rebel groups. In April 2006 a rebellion reached N'Djamena and in February 2008 another one attacked the capital. On both occasions the present regime's capacity to survive was questioned. During the period studied France has expressed support to Déby and his continued presidency; one example of this could be the congratulations transmitted after the Chadian constitution was modified in 2005 so Déby could be re-elected (ICG 2008:17). Furthermore, the French military has throughout the whole period been present in Chad with the Operation Sparrowhawk¹¹, intended to protect French interests in Chad, especially French nationals, as well as to provide military assistance to the Chadian army (Ministry of Defence 2010a). Hence, the study of this period will indicate to what extent France was willing to transform its political support into use of military means to assure the survival of Déby's regime.

1.2.2 Research question

Based upon the considerations outlined above, the research question for the following analysis is;

To what extent did the promotion of French interests lead France to use military force to support Déby in the period 2006-2010?

In general, French interests are expected to be revealed in the objectives of French foreign policy. However, in the following analysis a more thorough definition of national interests will be applied to limit what is to be included in the concept. This will be discussed in chapter two. Three different dimensions of a state's potential objectives will be specified and further constitute the foundation of the following study: security, economy and reputation. French interests in Chad will be assessed in the first part of the analysis before the connection between the preservation of these interests and the survival of Déby's regime is evaluated.

By French military support, I refer to the actions taken to improve the Chadian regime's military strength and defence capabilities. However, financial support and training of the Chadian army will not be included due to the scope of the thesis and its focus upon the French

¹¹ *Opération Epervier*

use of force. I will analyse three specific events to assess the assistance: the rebellions that reached N'Djamena in April 2006 and February 2008 and the military intervention by the European Union (EU) that was deployed in 2008, European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad/CAR)¹². Through an analysis of the French policy in these situations, I seek to reveal what the support consisted of. The assistance provided during the rebellions is considered to illustrate French willingness to strengthen the Chadian regime versus an imminent threat and to what extent France was willing to intervene unilaterally to assure the regime's survival. In addition, the study of the French involvement in EUFOR will shed light on the multilateral component of French policy. The events chosen for the analysis are therefore considered as fruitful to reflect upon both unilateral and multilateral aspects of French military engagement in Chad.

The analysis of the French military policy will contain four different dimensions. First, I will discuss if France provided support or not. As a reference, I will use the content in the technical cooperation agreement from 1976. If the aid provided exceeded what is outlined in the agreement I will consider France as having actively assisted the Chadian regime. This element opens up for a debate about French interference in Chadian internal affairs. A second aspect will be if support provided to the Chadian regime reflects a French wish to keep Déby's regime in place based upon its favourable impact on French interests, or if it is rather an attempt to avoid a change of regime because a fear of an increased conflict level which can hinder the achievement of French interests. Hence, this factor will shed light on under which conditions the support can be expected to be maintained. Third, I will examine to what extent the aid provided was direct or indirect. Involvement of French forces in the battles will be considered as direct support while indirect support includes assistance that strengthens the military capacity of the regime without direct intervention. Support provided through firing against the rebels will therefore be regarded as direct while logistical aid will be characterised as indirect. This distinction is of interest since the first element reflects a willingness to deploy force to achieve aims, while the second can be considered as an attempt to avoid direct intervention through strengthening the Chadian army sufficiently for the regime to survive without further French interference. A last dimension accorded attention is if the support was open or hidden; to what extent assistance provided was acknowledged by French officials.

¹² Hereafter referred to as EUFOR.

This will enable me to reflect further upon the importance of legitimacy with regard to the political use of force.

In order to do this, I will draw upon different sources. However, a considerable part of my analysis will be founded on interviews conducted with Chadian actors during a fieldwork in N'Djamena, Chad. Thus, the Chadian perspective and how the subject is perceived by these actors will be added substantial importance in it. This choice reflects an attempt to present a more nuanced image than what would have been possible if the study had been based only on French sources. I consider the approach as fruitful to increase my comprehension of the subject and thereby improve the quality of the analysis. Chapter four will present my research method in a more detailed manner, including its weaknesses and strengths.

The analysis will be situated inside a theoretical framework shaped by realism. The choice of theory is based upon its focus on power and national interests. Through the research question I aim at analysing the French use of force to promote foreign policy objectives in Chad. Traditionally, French military actions in Africa have been explained by their influence on the position held by France in international politics. Power and national interests have consequently been important to the French policy in former colonies. Hence, the concept of realism will be central especially in the first part of the analysis, focusing upon the foundation for the French military policy. Furthermore, theory and previous research studying the use of force to promote political aims will also be included. In this part I will discuss the concepts of legitimacy and utility as analytical tools to determine to what extent military means are perceived as useful for foreign policy. These considerations will be important in the second part of the analysis where the French policy will be examined. The theory is first and foremost meant to improve the understanding of the subject and not an element for evaluation itself. A more thorough evaluation of the theory's applicability in the current case will follow in chapter two.

1.3 The structure of the thesis

Chapter two will give an overview over the theoretical framework which will be used as a backdrop for the analysis; central concepts to realism will be discussed as well as theory on the use of force to promote national interests. Then, chapter three will follow with an introduction to the internal Chadian conflict throughout its independence, as well as the

French role within it. In a fourth chapter, the methodology used will be explained as well as the methodological problems faced during the work on the thesis.¹³ The analysis will be presented in chapters five and six. Chapter five evaluates French national interests connected to the military presence in Chad and then studies to what extent they can be perceived as connected to the survival of Déby's regime. The second part of the analysis follows in chapter six and assesses French support provided to Déby's regime through the three events studied. Finally, the seventh chapter contains the conclusion of the analysis.

¹³ The chapter on methodology is situated after the chapter introducing the background since the choices of methodology are partly based upon the subject's nature.

2 A theoretical framework

2.1 A realist foundation

2.1.1 Central realist assumptions

James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (2001:63-64) present six key assumptions that constitute the theoretical foundation for realism. First of all, states are considered as the key actors of the international system. Second, the relations between states are conflictual and international politics are mainly a struggle for power. The combination of the anarchic nature of international politics and the power struggle has two consequences: states' major preoccupation is their survival and the main tool to achieve it is their own capabilities (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr. 2001:63-64). Third, states' existence is based upon their sovereignty; they are considered as in control of the use of physical force within their territory (Dunne and Schmidt 2005:172). However, states differ with regard to the amount of capabilities they control and can therefore be ranked according to their share relative to other states. Fourth, "states are unitary actors" and domestic policy is considered as differentiated from foreign policy (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr. 2001:64). Fifth, "states are rational actors" and their decision-making process leads to policies based on national interests (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr. 2001:64). Finally, the concept of power is central to explain and predict state behaviour (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr. 2001:64).

The subject of analysis in the thesis is to what extent France uses military means to promote national interests in Chad. It follows that the central actor in the analysis will be the French state. French Africa-policy in general, including the policy with regard to Chad, has been part of the president's *domaine réservé*¹⁴ and mostly outlined by the Elysée¹⁵. This is especially the case in the military domain (Kessler 1999: 24-26). The Elysée is therefore considered to have had the final word in the shaping of the policy and therefore assured a unitary approach. After the defence agreement from 1960 was replaced with a technical cooperation agreement

¹⁴ The notion of a "*domaine réservé*" does neither have a juridical nor an administrative base, but it is employed to describe the areas in which the French president has an extensive and rather unique influence (Kessler 1999: 24, 26).

¹⁵ The name of the building where is located the French president's office as well as his administration and political advisors.

in 1976, France does not have a legal obligation to assure the defence of the Chadian state.¹⁶ Hence, based upon the realist assumptions, the presence of French military forces is expected to reflect French national interests attached to it. Furthermore, the use of those forces to support the Chadian regime in place is believed to be based upon a link between French interests and the internal context in Chad. As a consequence, eventual changes in the French support during the period are presumed to be originated from a change in French interests, in the link between the interest and the internal context or in the efficiency of military means to achieve foreign policy objectives.

By placing the analysis in a realist framework, the relationship between the French president and the Chadian president will not be included. Personal relations between French presidents and presidents in former African colonies are often presented as an important variable in analyses of French Africa policy.¹⁷ However, in the Franco-Chadian case, I argue that the exclusion of this aspect will not have important consequences for the analysis. The power in Chad has been taken by force four times, as will be described further in chapter 3. Each time French forces stationed in Chad have been accused for indirectly supporting the change of regime by supplying only limited support to the sitting president and thereby favouring the rebellion. Hence, French support to the president in place has varied and depended on his capacity to satisfy French interests. Furthermore, Chadian presidents have at times sought to distance themselves from the French influence, and the relationship between presidents in the two countries has therefore been of varying quality. Therefore, French geostrategic interests seem to a larger extent to have influenced the military policy than personal relationships and have therefore been prioritised in the following analysis. This is not to say that the latter does not play a role, however it is considered secondary to the national interests which will be outlined below.

2.1.2 Central concepts to understand a state's foreign policy: national interest and power

The importance of national interests and power is a result of the anarchic nature of the international sphere. In the absence of a world government there is no institution assuring the continued existence of states and as a result, survival becomes states' main occupation

¹⁶ An analysis of the content in the agreement from 1976 will follow in chapter 3.

¹⁷ See Médard (1998) or Verschave (1998).

(Guzzini 1998:27). The importance added to power by realists does not reflect an assumption of a direct relation between it and survival. Nevertheless, a state's chances of survival are considered to improve as its share of power increases. As a consequence, states seek to strengthen themselves and therefore international politics are characterised by a struggle for power where survival is every state's core interest (Dunne and Schmidt 2005:164). It follows that power and national interests are central in shaping a state's foreign policy; "the objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of national interests and must be supported with adequate power" (Morgenthau quoted in Donnelly 2000:45). Hence, if national interests and power constitute the main building blocks of foreign policy, an understanding of the latter necessarily rests upon a comprehension of the two former; "the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power" (Morgenthau quoted in Jervis 1994:856).

National interests

The concept of national interests has been criticised for being elusive and susceptible to interpretations and its usefulness has therefore been questioned (Morgenthau 1952:971). However, as long as national interests are considered to be the main source in the shaping of a state's foreign policy, it will necessarily be central in an analysis aiming at understanding the motivation behind a state's actions; a study of the use of force to promote French national interests inevitably rests upon a comprehension of these interests (Nincic 1999:29). The defence of any national interest depends on the existence of the state; as a consequence, the state's survival becomes its main objective. However, apart from the state's survival, Hans J. Morgenthau acknowledges that the concept of national interest may include "the whole gamut of meanings which are logically compatible with it" (Morgenthau 1952:972). What will be included in the concept is "determined by the political tradition and the total cultural context within which a nation formulates its foreign policy" (Morgenthau 1952:972).

According to Janne H. Matlary, the main security concern of contemporary Western states "is not longer existential survival of the state but the various political interests of the state" (Matlary 2009:31). To include the different aspects of French concerns in Chad, Kalevi J. Holsti's definition of national interests will structure the analysis. He argues that all contemporary states are concerned with four main interests; security, welfare, status and prestige and autonomy (Holsti 1992:83). In the analysis of French military policy in Chad, the

first three elements will be in focus. National security, is considered to reflect what Morgenthau labels as the core national interest; the preservation of the state itself. Threats towards a state's security may include menace "against the lives of citizens or their private activities, against territorial integrity, against a country's "way of life," or against the independence of the state and its institutions" (Holsti 1992:84). Hence, Holsti applies a wide definition of national security which exceeds a state's territorial integrity. The French military presence in Chad is not considered to have a major impact on the defence of the French territorial integrity *per se*. However, if it can be perceived as important with regard to the French defence on more general terms will be analysed. Furthermore, one of the French forces' official mission is to protect French nationals. Therefore, the importance of such a defence will also be assessed. This will also include French nationals in neighbouring countries due to Chad's strategic position.

The second element, a state's welfare, embraces the perception that "in addition to security, government's main tasks are to provide their citizens with social services and promote economic growth and efficiency" (Holsti 1992:97). This element is first and foremost present in liberal democracies, where state leaders' chances of being re-elected often are linked to the populations' satisfaction with the services they have provided. A state's ability to assure welfare rests upon its economic capacity to provide such services (Holsti 1992:98). Therefore, French economic interests in Chad will be analysed as well as the importance of these interests to the total French economy. As in the case of the importance of protection of French nationals, French economic interests in neighbouring countries will also be taken into account.

The latter factor which will be in focus is the importance of status and prestige; a state seeks to "generate deference, respect, and even sometimes awe among others" (Holsti 1992:107). According to Holsti, most governments are concerned with prestige: it is "an important [...] aspect of their diplomatic effectiveness" (Holsti 1992:329). In general, state leaders will try to avoid negative reactions from other states due to their policy choices. However, in cases where national interests are considered particularly important, states may be willing to "break commitments, violate rules to which they normally adhere" to defend these interests even if it causes unwanted response (Holsti 1992:328). Traditionally, military power has been an important way of promoting both status and prestige. Nevertheless, as will be discussed further below, the acceptance of the use of military force has been reduced, and therefore also

its role in contributing to status and prestige. This is also the case for French military presence in its former colonies; the Franco-African policy has been criticised for favouring French interests at the expense of development on the African continent (Chafer 2001:173-174). However, France still wants to maintain its influence (Chafer 2001:178-179). Therefore, France has sought to distance itself from such a reputation by attempting to situate military initiatives in Africa in a multilateral framework as well as associate its own military power with peace-operations and humanitarian activity. This can be considered as an attempt to limit the negative reactions and consequences for its reputation. The French engagement in the conflict in Darfur will be analysed to assess to what extent it has been motivated by an objective to improve French reputation.

Power

How to define power remains an on-going debate. Nevertheless, as for the concept of national interests, power's centrality in theories of international politics makes its exclusion impossible. Due to the scope of the thesis, there is no space for an extensive discussion on different ways of defining power. Here, what David Baldwin labels "the most common conception of power in social sciences" will be applied; "a type of causal relationship in which the power wielder affects the behaviour, attitudes, beliefs, or propensity to act of another actor" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr. 2001:72). Power in international politics therefore constitutes the ability of a state to shape another state's actions.

Morgenthau claims that states face three different strategies in their struggle for power: to preserve the *status quo*, to achieve imperialistic expansion or to gain prestige. In other words, "a political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power" (Morgenthau quoted in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr. 2001:77). As mentioned before, during the Cold War, French power in World Politics was partly based upon the French position on the African continent. A central aspect of this influence was the military relation (Gregory 2000:436-437). However, as I will come back to later, with the end of the Cold War the possibility to use military means as a tool of foreign policy had changed. At the same time, the Sub-Saharan Africa is still of considerable importance to France due to these states' role in reflecting French power and prestige (Chafer 2001:178-179). Therefore, France is susceptible to attempt to preserve its position in Africa. Hence, France can be expected to pursue a strategy of *status quo* to avoid a loss in its power. Nevertheless, the reduced

possibilities to assure influence through military means are likely to oblige France to seek other ways to promote itself as an important actor on the African continent. This reflects France's need to find another basis for prestige in former colonies. Hence, a new foundation for the French position on the African continent will assure a maintenance of France's power and thereby its influence. As mentioned above, the conflict in Darfur will be analysed to assess to what extent France has sought to present itself as a humanitarian actor through engagements in containing and solving the conflict.

Furthermore, France may still be able to take advantage of its previous military role for some time, despite changes in the context. According to Morgenthau, "the prestige of a nation might well survive for a considerable time after its actual power has declined" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr. 2001:78). This is an element of the third strategy in the power struggle: policy of prestige. The aim with this policy is for a state to gain such a reputation that the actual use of power becomes unnecessary. This can either be done through the use of diplomacy or the display of force (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr. 2001:78). In accordance with this strategy, France may attempt to preserve an image as willing to intervene in Chad to create a deterring effect among the rebels.

A central concept originating from power is that of balance of power. Balancing of power is a way to check the power of another state (Dunne and Schmidt 2005:164). The mechanism constitutes a way for states to ally with other states to improve their own position. During the Cold War, the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were central to France's power basis. However, according to Yves Gounin, the African continent has lost importance with regard to the French relative power due to the strengthening of the EU; the support of other member states plays a bigger role in promoting French views internationally than the support of its former colonies (Gounin 2009:11). Nevertheless, Bruno Charbonneau (2008) argues that it is not necessarily an opposition between the two areas of French interest. On the contrary, EU offers a new opportunity to legitimise military policies motivated by French national interests by giving them a multilateral dimension, and the African continent is an area where EU can be promoted as an international actor. The potential of Africa as a scene to present EU as a security actor is high due to the lack of American geostrategic interests on the continent (Matlary 2009:117-118). To what extent the French initiative behind EUFOR was motivated by national interests or promotion of EU will be analysed in chapter six.

Another concept related to power and national interest is “collective security”. According to Morgenthau, it describes a situation where it is in A’s state interests to support state B against attacks from state C.¹⁸ In other words; it is in a state’s interests to assure the survival of another state. This is based upon the connection between state B’s survival and the protection of state A’s interest. An intervention to protect another state is determined “by the interest which A has in the territorial integrity of B¹⁹ and by the relation of that interest to all the other interests of A as well as to the resources available for the support of all those interest” (Morgenthau 1952:979). Furthermore, state A must consider “the power which is at the disposal of aggressor C for fighting A and B as over against the power available to A and B for fighting C” as well as “the power of the likely allies of C as over against those of A and B” (Morgenthau 1952:979). Hence, a support to another state should be based upon a cost-benefit analysis where the cost of an attack on state B’s territorial integrity, or here a change of regime, exceeds the cost of the assistance necessary to maintain *status quo*. Eventual French military support to the Chadian regime is therefore considered to aim at preserving the regime and thereby French interests attached to its survival.

2.2 The use of force to promote national interests

The subject of analysis of the thesis is to what extent the use of force is chosen as a tool to promote French national interests. Political use of armed forces is defined by Blechman and Kaplan as

physical actions [...] taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behaviour of individuals in another nation without engaging in continuing contest of violence (Quoted in Blomdahl 2008:5).²⁰

According to Carl von Clausewitz, the use of force and war should be considered as the continuation of politics by other means (Holsti 1992:230). Just as any other tools of foreign policy it should be considered an instrument to promote national interests by influencing the orientation, objectives and actions of other states. When evaluating the importance of military

¹⁸ In the following analysis the main threat against the Chadian regime is considered to be the rebel movement. However, this is not considered to change the usefulness of the theory.

¹⁹ In the following analysis, the rebels are not considered to challenge the territorial integrity of the state, but the regime in place. Therefore, the French support to the regime is viewed as reflecting a French interest in avoiding a change in regime.

²⁰ In the thesis, the terms *use of force* and *use of military means* are applied interchangeably and both refer to this definition.

force as a tool of foreign policy, two aspects are central; the legitimacy²¹ and the utility of the use of force. According to Lawrence Martin, these concepts have a mutual influence on each other; “low utility will diminish acceptability and low acceptability will reduce utility by increasing political costs” (Martin 1973:14).

2.2.1 The question of legitimacy

According to realists, international institutions and norms do not play an important role in shaping a state’s foreign policy. They are only important as long as it is in a state’s interest to support them (Waltz 2000:24). Norms regulating the use of force can be considered as in a state’s interests because they make it more predictable as well as constrain other states from using force. Furthermore, for the permanent members of the Security Council the norms have added value since it, according to the norms, is the only institution which can legitimise the use of force. Hence, these norms can be considered as a source of power for France due to its membership in the Security Council and it is therefore in general perceived as in France’s interest to comply with them. However, as discussed above with regard to a state’s reputation, the norms are not considered as a total interdiction and if vital interests are at stake for a state, the norms will not be respected. Therefore, the norms are only expected to have a restricting effect as long as the cost attached to not respecting them exceeds the potential gain obtained if they are put aside.

A set of norms restraining the use of military force is considered to be part of customary international law and codified in the UN Charter. According to the Charter, the use of force is legitimate in two specific cases: if used in self-defence or if authorised by the Security Council with reference to Chapter VII of the Charter (Ruud and Ulfstein 2004:175). According to Oscar Schachter, the principle of self-defence entails four elements: to engage in self-defence, to help another state assure its self-defence, to support a part in a civil war if another state already intervened in favour of another contender or to rescue nationals in a foreign country who are in danger (Weisburd 1997:315). However, also in these cases the legitimacy may be questioned. For instance, research findings by Arthur Mark Weisburd indicate that states claiming to intervene in another state’s civil conflict to rescue nationals are often criticised for being motivated by other interests (Weisburd 1997:299). This reflects that in some situations the legitimacy of use of force may be subject for discussion.

²¹ The terms legitimacy and acceptability are applied interchangeably throughout the thesis.

The use of force in other circumstances than those described by the norms is “controversial” and likely to cause political reactions among other political actors (Egeberg and Kjølberg 2001:7). As outlined above, national interests include how a state is perceived by others, and a state will therefore seek to avoid acting in discordance with norms restricting the use of force unless vital interests are being challenged. To apply force in situations not included in those characterised as legitimate by the norms entails a risk of political reactions with a negative impact on a state’s reputation. However, the legitimacy of political use of force is not considered to be constant; it depends on the geographic area in which military means are deployed to achieve political aims as well as the period. Matlary characterises legitimacy as of “pre-eminent importance” in Western states after the Cold War (Matlary 2009:31). But the use of force is to a larger extent present as a political tool in states outside the Western sphere (Freedman 1998-99:766). In the case of Chad, this is visible through the use of force both by the state as well as rebel groups. Since it is more acceptable, the political cost attached to its use is lower. However, French use of force in Chad is expected to cause reactions among other actors. Furthermore, as mentioned above, France attempts to change its reputation on the African continent and thereby remove the image of being a gendarme. To achieve such an aim the military force used on the continent needs to be legitimated by the norms. Thus, the question of legitimacy is of significance when deciding whether military means should be used or not. To what extent the norms restrict the French military policy will be discussed in chapter six.

2.2.2 The utility of force as a tool of foreign policy

According to a rational view on state behaviour, a government should in a first step identify interests and purposes of its foreign policy and then, in a second step, find the appropriate means to achieve these objectives (Holsti 1992:83). The cases where the use of military force is included in the policy option should reflect that such means are the most efficient tool to attain the objectives of its foreign policy. The aim with political use of force is, as for other tools of foreign policy, to influence decisions made by other actors in specific directions. Hence, for the use of force to be considered the most efficient tool, it must have an impact on another state’s interests and therefore make the second state prone to take notice of the first state’s demands (Egeberg and Kjølberg 2001:8). In the case of study, the potential French influence on the Chadian regime originates from the French capacity to provide military

support to the Chadian regime and thereby increase the latter's chances of survival when confronting rebellions.

Halvor S. Egeberg and Anders Kjølberg present two criteria to measure if the use of force has been successful; to what extent the military targets have been “neutralise[d] or destroy[ed]” and if it has “influence[d] the political target” (Egeberg and Kjølberg 2001:10). Due to the French military superiority compared to the rebel movement, France is considered as able to neutralise the movement. Furthermore, the survival of the Chadian regime being at stake, the regime is believed to agree with an extensive number of French demands. Hence, in a narrow aspect focusing upon French interests in Chad, the use of force can be considered as an appropriate tool with regard to the two criteria. However, as mentioned above, the use of force risks entailing political cost which potentially can outweigh the gains. To assess the second criteria, the effect on national interests not directly connected to Chad also has to be taken into consideration. Because of the potential political cost, the degree of external engagement will depend upon to what extent the intervening power's interests are affected (Freedman 1998-99:48). If the interests at stake are perceived as vital to the state, it may consider to not respecting the norms regulating the use of force. Therefore, a French military intervention in a Chadian conflict is expected to be conditioned by vital French interests being at risk. The French military policy should be based upon a cost-benefit analysis where the eventual negative impact of a change of regime on French national interests is weighted against the political cost attached to supply the assistance needed for the Chadian regime to remain in place.

3 Background

3.1 A colonial heritage – conquest and colonial rule of Chad

The delimitation of the landlocked territory named Chad does neither result from natural geographical borders nor the habitats of ethnical groups; it was settled at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. As a consequence, the territory declared a French colony in 1900 comprised a large number of groups which differed in numerous aspects, among others: language, religion, living conditions and political organisation. A major cleavage separated the north and the south, adding to a multitude of differences between groups within each part. Northern societies to a certain extent dominated those in the south before colonisation through slave raids conducted by Sahelian sultanates in the south (Politique Africaine 1984:9-10). As will be outlined below, French intervention changed the distribution of power between the north and the south and further aggravated the north-south conflict. This cleavage, as well as the numerous disputes between different ethnic groups, constituted the foundation for the power struggle which has characterised the independent Chad until today.

The French attention to the territory today constituting Chad originated from its geographic location and the geostrategic interests attached to it. First and foremost, as observed on the map of Africa on page IX, Chad created a junction between already existing French colonial territories; Algeria, French West Africa²² and French Equatorial Africa²³. Further, Chad connected the Arabic World to the Black Africa. Hence, France considered colonising the territory in its interest despite poor economic possibilities within it (Politique Africaine 1984:9). The process of colonisation in itself varied in different parts of the territory. In the south, the opposition to the colonial power was limited since the population considered a French rule a lesser evil than the slavery raids conducted by the north. However, the northern and the eastern parts of Chad were less welcoming to the French conquest and put up considerable military resistance. As a consequence, the whole territory was not under French control before 1920 (Azevedo 1998:68-71). Under the colonial rule the French administration

²² Federation of the following French colonial territories in Western Africa: Mauritania, Senegal, French Sudan (now Mali), French Guinea (now Guinea), Ivory Coast, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Dahomey (now Benin) and Niger.

²³ Federation of the following French colonial territories in Central Africa: Chad, Gabon, Middle Congo (now Democratic Republic of Congo) and Oubangui-Chari (now Central African Republic).

used a divide and rule-technique to avoid a unified opposition and thereby strengthened already existing cleavages between the north and the south (Lemarchand 1986:31). The north-south cleavage was further reinforced by the fact that France to a larger extent was preoccupied with the fertile south, labelled by the French as “The Useful Chad”²⁴, than the arid north. Hence, the southern parts were subject to forced labour and military recruitment while the colonial power largely limited its intervention in the north to collection of taxes (Azevedo 1998:68). However, French presence in the south also led to investments in areas like education and health. Therefore, the region was more developed on the eve of independence than the north and those who had studied and could participate in the replacement of the French administration was mainly of southern origin (Politique Africaine 1984:9-10). As a consequence, the northerners feared that an independent state would be dominated by southerners and were therefore less eager to achieve independence than the southern population (Azevedo 1998: 83-85). Their fears were confirmed under the reign of François Tombalbaye, the first president in independent Chad.

3.2 A continued post-colonial relationship during the Cold War

3.2.1 1960-1975: independence and continued instability

The independent Republic of Chad came into existence in August 1960. However, the French influence continued to be strong, both through financial and military support. France even remained responsible for administrating the northern prefecture, Bourkou-Ennedi-Tibesti²⁵ (B.E.T.), due to resistance among the local population against letting any from the south into the prefecture (Burr and Collins 2008:24-25). The military cooperation was based upon a defence agreement between France and Chad, as well as the Central African Republic and Congo. Through the signature of the agreement on 15 August 1960 France committed itself to assure Chad’s defence. In return, France had the right to use the Chadian territory for military exercising as well as stationing of forces (Defence Agreement 1960).

The new Chadian state was dominated by southerners; not only was the president from the south, but also the majority of the government in general, the bureaucracy and the army.

²⁴ “*Tchad utile*”

²⁵ See map of Chad on page XI.

Many southerners considered the independence as an opportunity to make up for previous injustice and suffering to which they had been subject. Hence, the south was to a larger extent favoured through the government's policies (Lemarchand 1986:32). Existing cleavages between the north and the south were therefore strengthened under Tombalbaye's rule. Coupled with the lack of a political space to express discontent, the marginalisation led to uprisings in the central and northern regions of Chad, at first rather ad hoc but later organised into rebel groups (Burr and Collins 2008:40-41).

The Chad National Liberation Front (FROLINAT)²⁶ was created on 22 June 1966 and constituted an umbrella organisation of several rebel groups. It shared two characteristics with several Chadian rebel groups to come: first, it received support from Libya and Sudan and second, it was weakened by internal divisions partly based upon ethnical conflict (Burr and Collins 2008:40-41). The external support has been based upon two components. First, several ethnic groups live on both sides of the borders separating Chad from Libya and Sudan. Therefore, rebels from these groups have often received support from their kinsmen in the neighbouring countries as well as the permission to put up a rear base. Second, the governments of Libya and Sudan have to a varying extent supported fractions of the Chadian rebellion to promote own interests, like control over the Aouzou-stripe²⁷ for Libya and spread of Islamic culture for Sudan (Azevedo 1998:144,159). Tombalbaye had asked French forces to leave B.E.T. in 1965 in an attempt to control the whole Chadian territory on his own (Azevedo 1998:138). However, the attempt failed and FROLINAT strengthened their position in B.E.T. In response to the expansion of the rebels' control, Tombalbaye turned to France for support, granted by de Gaulle in April 1969 (Buijtenhuijs 1998:23). The arrival of French forces was the first of several interventions in response to requests from Chadian presidents facing an internal or an external threat during Chad's independence.

In general, the relationship between Paris and N'Djamena varied during the presidency of Tombalbaye due to his unwillingness to comply with French demands at the same time as he continued to ask for financial and military support (Burr and Collins 2008:47-48). The resistance against Tombalbaye's rule increased both among internal and external actors. He was eventually assassinated in a *coup d'Etat* conducted by parts of the army on 13 April

²⁶ *Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad*

²⁷ The northern part of Chad has been subject for a border dispute between Libya and Chad. On previous occasions the area has been annexed by Libya (Azevedo 1998:144). The conflict was settled by the International Court of Justice in 1994 (ICJ 1994).

1975. Paris claimed it was a Chadian internal affair and denied any knowledge about it. This has been questioned for two reasons. The important French military presence in Chad and N'Djamena made it unlikely that French forces would not have detected the movements of preparation for the putsch. Further, the success of the *coup d'Etat* depended on the non-intervention by the French forces stationed in N'Djamena, which made plausible the existence of a "silent" agreement between the rebels and Paris (Mouric 1984:87-89). The same reasons made questionable French denial of awareness or implication in later *coup d'Etat*.

3.2.2 1975-1982: civil war and disintegration of the Chadian state

General Félix Malloum, also a southerner, replaced Tombalbaye as head of state. His presidency marked the beginning of a period with uninterrupted conflict. However, at first, optimism followed the change of president with hopes of a more integrated state. Several elements indicate that his governance would be more including towards the northern part of the country than Tombalbaye's; many political prisoners were freed and northerners were included in the government. Despite the positive changes in the beginning of Malloum's presidency, the enthusiasm did not last very long and the new regime was soon accused for being a re-play of the former (Azevedo 1998:100-101). The increasingly hostile attitude towards the president among Chadian actors was coupled with a worsening of the relationship between Paris and N'Djamena because of the Claustre affair²⁸. Once again, French forces in Chad were requested to leave by a Chadian president (Mouric 1984:89-91).

On 6 March 1976, an agreement on technical military cooperation was signed between France and Chad, replacing the defence agreement from 1960. The new agreement was rather limited compared to the defence agreement: it included the provision of French support with regard to formation of the Chadian army; potential transfer of military material from France to Chad and French logistical support to the Chadian army (Agreement on technical military cooperation 1976). The agreement is still the term of reference with regard to current French military activities in Chad. It is important to mention that the intellectual aid being provided by France through the actual Operation Sparrowhawk is not mentioned in the agreement from 1976. I will come back to this aspect when analysing the French support in chapter six.

²⁸ A French lady, Mrs. Claustre, among others, was taken as a hostage by Hissèin Habré's rebels in the north. The Chadian government did not appreciate that France negotiated directly with the rebels in what N'Djamena considered to be an internal affair (Mouric 1984:89-92).

However, the absence of a defence agreement committing France to contribute actively to the Chadian defence did not hinder Malloum to call on French forces in 1978 due to increased unrest in the north. The continued advance of the rebellion also led him to seek a rapprochement with one of the leaders in the rebel movement; Hissène Habré. Previously, Habré had been part of FROLINAT, but he eventually broke out and created Armed Forces of the North (FAN)²⁹. Through appointing Habré as prime minister, Malloum attempted to control the rebellion from the inside. However, Habré never intended to become a servant for president Malloum and therefore continued to challenge both him and the southern population (Azevedo 1998:103).

The internal conflict in the government led to the outbreak of the first battle of N'Djamena in February 1979 where the national army confronted FAN. Another rebel group from the north led by Goukouni Oueddei, People's Armed Forces (FAP)³⁰, joined FAN. Originally, FAP had been part of FAN, but due to disagreement with regard to which influence Libya could be given in return for support provided to the rebels, Oueddei left FAN. The conflict ended with a cease-fire followed by three peace conferences (Azevedo 1998:104-105). The question of a French involvement in a Chadian conflict was once again brought up and Paris replied by denying any intervention. However France was criticised for not stopping the FAP from entering into N'Djamena, and for not fighting Habré more firmly and thereby favouring him in an indirect way. The conferences led to the establishment of a coalition government, Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT)³¹ in April 1979. It was led by a civil servant Lol Mohammed Choua and had Habré as defence minister and Oueddei as interior minister (Mouric 1984:97-99). Malloum resigned before GUNT was put together. Choua was replaced by Oueddei in September (Azevedo 1998:106-107).

GUNT eventually collapsed due to disagreements between Habré and Oueddei. The personal conflict developed into a military one where FAN and FAP confronted each other. Labelled the second battle of N'Djamena, the combats lasted from March until December 1980 and it was the bloodiest period of the civil war (Azevedo 1998:108). FAP in the end drove Habré from N'Djamena due to Libyan support and Oueddei therefore remained president. France was mainly absent from the events, its forces withdrew from Chad in May 1980. In January 1981, Chad and Libya signed a treaty of merger that provoked considerable external

²⁹ *Forces Armées du Nord*

³⁰ *Forces Armées Populaires*

³¹ *Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition*

reactions. It eventually led to the retreat of the Libyan forces in November 1981 (Azevedo 1998:109). This opened up for the return of Habré.

3.2.3 1982-1990: the regime of Hissèin Habré

Habré retreated to Sudan after being chased from N'Djamena in 1980. There, he prepared for a new rebellion. Apart from the Sudanese support, Habré's rebellion was also backed by both the United States and France. An attack was launched on Chad in November 1981, and in June 1982 he reached the capital where he proclaimed himself president (Azevedo 1998:109). Oueddei, whose defence was substantially weakened after the Libyan troops left, fled N'Djamena before Habré's arrival (Burr and Collins 2008:186).

The new regime was recognized by France after only a few days, further underlining the French support to the presidential change (Buijtenhuijs 1984:108). Oueddei retreated to Libya where it was his turn to regroup before launching new attacks on northern parts of Chad in 1983 (Azevedo 1998:110). The important Libyan influence led France to respond to Habré's request for support. Due to French reluctance against engaging into open battle with Libyan forces, the aim of the operation was limited to containing the northern rebellion supported by Libya. The restriction materialised through the so-called "Red Line": the 15th parallel. The French forces would assure that the northern rebellion did not cross the line; however, they would not support Habré's forces in eventual attacks above the line either (Buijtenhuijs 1984:110,112). The French government eventually made an agreement with Libya about mutual withdrawal of foreign forces. Hence, in November 1984 the French forces left Chad. The Libyan president, colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi, on the other hand, kept his forces in Chad and strengthened their position before they eventually crossed the 15th parallel in February 1986. French forces then returned to Chad in 1986 to secure Habré and prevent a new pro-Libyan regime. The French operation initiated in 1986 was Operation Sparrowhawk, still on-going (Azevedo 1998:110).

Even though some stability was reinstalled, president Habré failed as his predecessors to reconcile the nation. His regime was soon to be characterised by disagreement and distrust at the same time as his treatment of political opponents worsened. Habré's increasing unpopularity in Chad coupled with his failure to transform the Chadian society towards multi-party democracy reduced Habré's good will in Paris (Azevedo 1998:111).

3.3 1990-2010: the regime of Idriss Déby

Déby, who at that time was a colonel in the Chadian army, fled to Sudan after being accused of participating in an attempted *coup d'Etat* in 1988 (Azevedo 1998:111). In the same way as for Habré, Sudan constituted a sanctuary also for Déby where he could build up a rebellion aiming at taking the power. In March 1990 he started launching attacks on the Chadian territory. While French forces slowed down these incursions at the beginning, their effort diminished and was more or less absent by November. This gave Déby the possibility to cross Chad without being affronted by French forces and enter N'Djamena which Habré had fled on December 2 (Azevedo 1998:112). The fact that the French forces did not to a greater extent try to stop the rebellion when it advanced through the country has been considered as an indirect support from Paris (Azevedo 1998:143) In addition, a few days after Déby took N'Djamena, France extended its credit to the Chadian government as well as invited the new president to Paris (Burr and Collins 2008:264).

The accession to power by Déby was welcomed by both internal and external actors and once again hopes about peace and stability returned. During his first speech to the population, Déby confirmed such an intention; “The fighters in the patriotic forces have experienced immense pleasure in having delivered the precious gift that you have been hoping for. This gift is neither gold nor silver: it is freedom!” (Déby quoted in Buijtenhuijs 1998:36). Small progress towards democratisation followed the change of regime with reinstatement of multi-party system and a new constitution, as well as removal of the secret police organised under the regime of Habré, the Document and Security Directorate (DDS). However, a new intelligence organization reappeared and it eventually became clear that Déby would rely on the same means to rule as Habré to keep power and avoid new violent resurrections (Burr and Collins 2008:273).

In May 2004, an attempted *coup d'Etat* against Déby failed. This marked the onset of a new period of conflict in Chad which lasted until May 2009. According to Gilbert Maoundonodji (2009) the three main factors behind the attempt was the power struggle among members of the Zaghawa group³², a desire to control the oil revenues and the discontentment with the lack of support provided by Déby to Darfurian rebels belonging to the Zaghawa group (Maoundonodji 2009:325-327). This period of rebel attacks seems to have come to an end;

³² The ethnic group which Déby, as well as several individuals with important positions in the Chadian regime, belong to. Members of the group live in both Chad and Sudan.

2010 has been marked by a reduction of the internal unrest. The return of stability is largely explained by the normalisation of the relationship between Chad and Sudan and therefore an end to the support provided by the Chadian and Sudanese governments to the rebel movement in the other country (Didame 2010 [interview]). Furthermore, 2010 also marked 50 years of Chadian independence from France. Déby used the celebration of Chad's independence to question the need for a continued French military presence in Chad. According to politicians in the opposition, the forces have assured the continued survival of Déby's regime (Ngothé Gatta 2010 [interview], Kebzabo 2010 [interview]). Confronted to such a background, the president's statement can be perceived as a wish to appear less dependent on French forces; the Chadian army is able to secure the Chadian territory on its own. Nevertheless, regardless of Déby's intentions behind the statement, it indicates that until now support provided by the forces to Déby has been of considerable importance to the survival of Déby's regime.

4 A qualitative methodological framework

4.1 Case study as research design

The thesis aims at shedding light on the French use of force to promote its interests in former colonies in the post-Cold War-context. The analysis conducted to answer the research questions will use case study as research design, as defined by Gerring; “an intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is to shed light on a larger class of cases” (Gerring 2007:20). Here, the class of cases consists of French military policy in former French Sub-Saharan colonies, while the case of study is France in Chad. The analysis will be conducted inside a realist framework and is therefore an interpretive case study as defined by Lijphart; realism will be applied to shed light on France’s military policy in Chad (Lijphart 1971:693).

4.1.1 The choice of Chad as case

As illustrated in the previous chapter, French support has been of considerable importance to Chadian actors attempting to remain in power or take the power. Furthermore, the French military presence in Chad has been more or less uninterrupted despite neither a permanent French military base in Chad nor a defence agreement between Chad and France.³³ In the absence of an agreement committing France to a military presence and any military support exceeding logistical and training assistance, both elements are considered to reflect objectives of French foreign policy. In addition, Chad distinguishes itself from several of the other former French colonies by the civil conflict characterising the country with varying intensity since 1965. The beginning of Déby’s presidency was marked by relative stability compared to precedent decades. However, the conflict level increased substantially from around 2004 and led to two attacks on N’Djamena. In both cases concern were raised about the survival of the regime in place. Hence, the choice of Chad as case is motivated by the importance of the military dimension in the Franco-Chadian relationship as well as the continued unrest in

³³ After 1976 when the defence agreement from 1960 was replaced by a military technical cooperation agreement.

Chad; the analysis is expected to give insights in the French willingness to use force to promote its interests in Chad.

4.1.2 Reasons for the choice of research design

The choice of case study is first and foremost based on the heterogeneous character of the empirical universe and the internal validity. The heterogeneous character of the universe is due to differences between the former Sub-Saharan colonies with regard to several factors. First, the relationship between the different African countries and France vary with regard to the existence of military agreements and the presence of French military forces. Second, the internal situation of the former colonies is diverse and therefore the potential for France to use military force to promote its interests also. Third, French interests in those countries are divergent. These factors are susceptible to influence French military policy in each former colony. The empirical universe can therefore be described as heterogeneous with regard to variables likely to influence the dependent variable, the French military policy. When studying a heterogeneous population a single case approach may be favourable since increasing the number of cases might reduce the comprehension of mechanisms through introducing so-called uncontrolled heterogeneity³⁴ (Gerring 2007:50-51). Therefore, case study is chosen as research design to get a better notion of the mechanisms in play.

Furthermore, the choice is also based on the complexity and the polemic character of the subject. French interventions in Africa have been subject to criticism since the 90s; for instance François-Xavier Verschave has accused France of continuing its neo-colonial attitude in its former colonies (Verschave 1998). Whereas the French government has rejected such claims through minimising or denying any French role, critics have exaggerated it. The sources of information available therefore risk to be biased, in both ways. As a consequence, I consider an in-depth study appropriate to answer the research question since it opens up for using several sources and thereby improve the understanding of the actual events as well as the analysis' internal validity (Gerring 2007:43).

³⁴ If units included in the study are different with regard to elements which might influence the causal relationship studied, the possibility to learn anything about the causal relation is reduced unless the heterogeneity is controlled (Gerring 2007:50).

4.1.3 Weaknesses attached to the research design

Two weaknesses are attached to case study as a research design that risk challenging the quality of the analysis. The external validity of case studies is in general low; the study of a single case gives limited possibilities to generalise eventual findings to the whole universe (Gerring 2007:43). However, the aim of the thesis is not *per se* to develop findings that can be applied to the rest of the former colonies. The main objective of the study is to obtain a better understanding of the French military policy in Chad. Afterwards, some of the conclusions drawn might be relevant for French military policy in other former colonies. However, at no point will eventual findings be considered as applicable to the rest of the cases in the empirical universe without further testing.

The other challenge is concerned with the analysis' reliability. Often case studies, as in this case, constitute the research design and qualitative methods are employed within it. The use of qualitative methods like interviewing makes it difficult for others to evaluate the accuracy of the data gathered, due to the challenges connected to a potential reconstruction of the assembling process. It is therefore important to thoroughly describe the collection of data for others to evaluate the process as independently as possible (George and Bennett 2005:106). A discussion of the actual methods used and their consequences for the reliability will follow below.

4.2 Source triangulation as research method

The method of triangulation is chosen to reduce the impact of biased sources on the analysis and thereby increase the internal validity. As mentioned above, this is considered a challenge in the analysis which is to follow. By drawing on several sources, I will hopefully be able to extract a more nuanced picture based on the converging lines which will appear when comparing the data collected from different sources (Yin 2003:97-99). The triangulation will be based on data collected both first hand; through interviews and documents, and second hand; through articles and reports published in newspapers and books.

4.2.1 Fieldwork in N'Djamena

Due to the limited number of Chadian sources available from Oslo, a fieldwork was conducted in N'Djamena during three weeks in August-September 2010. In addition to give

the opportunity to gather data through interviews, the fieldwork also provided an overall comprehension of the subject through experiencing the Chadian society and interaction with different Chadian actors. The final sample of informants was based on snowball sampling: the informants gave me advice about whom to contact to have more information. The main reason for this choice was a lack of knowledge with regard to potential informants and their contact information before going to Chad. Therefore, snowball sampling was considered the only possible option for choosing informants to interview. The choice of informants and the follow-up of potential contacts were based on their relevance to the thesis and not a passive process. Despite my dependency on the contacts to introduce me to new potential informants, I argue that I stayed in control of the process, inside of the limitations imposed by the context. When using snowball sampling it is important to assure that the initial set is biased in different directions, otherwise there is a risk of excluding certain groups or perspectives completely (Tansey 2007:770). In the end, the final sample represented three groups of actors, journalists, politicians and actors from the civil society. Because of the informants' tendency to be biased, the inclusion of informants with different positions towards the actual regime was in focus. I argue that the final sample does represent a diversity of Chadian actors with useful knowledge with regard to my thesis.

However, it was not possible to obtain an interview with any representative of the French embassy with authority to answer questions related to the military domain. A meeting was achieved with the Cooperation attaché in the institutional, economic and financial sector, Philippe Lecluze. He informed me about the economic relations between the two countries but did not have the mandate to comment on military issues. To obtain a meeting with a representative from the military section at the embassy I had to send in extensive information about the thesis as well as the questions I wanted to ask. Despite sending in the acquired information and calling several times, I did not get an appointment. The lack of French officials' view constitutes a potential threat to the reliability of the analysis. It has been compensated for by drawing on official French documents and presentations of France's perception about the events in second hand literature, both books and newspapers. Due to my awareness of this concern, I argue that it has had limited influence on the study conducted.

4.2.2 Elite interviews

The interviews conducted can be considered as elite interviews; the informants were asked to participate due to their knowledge about the subject. The aim of the interviews was first and foremost to get a perception of the Chadian perspective on the research question and thereby provide a more nuanced analysis than if only relying on French sources. Semi-structured interviews with rather open-ended questions were used to allow new elements and probes. Thereby, the informants were given an opportunity to draw the attention towards factors not necessarily considered when constructing the interview guides. Furthermore, the open-ended questions gave the informants the opportunity to articulate their views, which were in every case rather pronounced. In addition, through open-ended interviews a better impression of how the informants weighted different elements was obtained.³⁵ In general, they seemed to appreciate the possibility of fully displaying their views. However, a challenge connected to the use of this type of questions was that it opened up for informants to avoid certain points they did not want to talk about by focusing on other elements. As a consequence, probes were used to redirect them towards the original sense of the question. Since concrete questions often provoked short and limited answers, it is doubtful that a more structured interview would have avoided such problems. This challenge was connected to the polemical character of the subject and the fact that informants had a rather pronounced opinion about it. They often had their own agenda; they wanted to present their perception of the subject as the reality and were only to a limited extent open for discussions about possible critics to be made with regard to their view.

4.3 Validity and reliability

As mentioned above, the focus of the thesis is on the internal validity rather than the external. The study's internal validity is challenged by the complexity and the polemical character of the subject. Biased sources risk hindering the comprehension of the actual processes in play and thereby reduce the internal validity (Yin 2003:34). The impact of the challenge is sought counterweighted through the choice of research design and method, since they both contribute to in-depth knowledge about the subject and therefore increases the understanding of the actual mechanisms in play. I therefore argue that by focusing only on one case and drawing

³⁵For example by asking the informants in general about reasons for the continued French military presence instead of introducing the elements central to my thesis in the questions. If the informant did not mention the elements in focus I would probe to get his view with regard to that specific element.

on several sources of different nature I have limited the threat towards the internal validity caused by the nature of the subject.

The focus on in-depth knowledge and the use of certain sources may threaten the reliability of the thesis. Despite the existence of the interview guides, the interviews can hardly be repeated or reconstructed due to their informal character. Therefore, it is a problem for other researchers to evaluate the amount of errors and biases included through the data obtained through interviews. The use of a diversity of sources will improve the thesis' reliability since source triangulation will reduce the chances of systematic bias or fallacies. Furthermore, a chain of evidence has been aimed maintained to make it clear upon which empirical data arguments are based (Yin 2003: 105). The challenges towards the analysis' reliability have therefore been contained through the use of source triangulation and the maintenance of a chain of evidence.

5 French national interests in Chad

The aim with the following chapter is to analyse French national interests in Chad and to assess to what extent the protection or promotion of these interests depend upon the continuation of Déby's regime. The choice of elements studied is based upon Holsti's definition of national interests, presented in chapter two.

5.1 French national security: the military presence

France's territorial integrity is not considered to be challenged by Chadian actors, nor is the French military forces stationed there viewed as assuring it. However, as outlined by Holsti, a state's security exceeds the aspect of territorial integrity. In the following part, I will discuss to what extent French military presence in Chad can be perceived as protecting other elements related to a state's security. The actual military presence takes the form of an involvement that has been running since 1986, with Operation Sparrowhawk. At the beginning, its objective was to assure the territorial integrity of Chad, exposed to a risk of Libyan invasion. The operation has been maintained despite the disappearance of the Libyan threat. It counts approximately 950 French militaries, including a ground force and an aerial force (Ministry of Defence 2010a). The actual mission of the operation is, according to the French Ministry of Defence, two-folded. First, French forces are intended to "assure the protection of French interests, especially the security of French citizens living in Chad"³⁶ (Ministry of Defence 2010a). Second, they "provide a logistic support (supplies, fuel, transport and training) to the Chadian Armed Forces and Security Forces as well as an intelligence aid" (Ministry of Defence 2010a).

5.1.1 The significance of a military presence at the center of Africa

Chad as a springboard to address French concerns in Africa

The main reason for the French colonisation of the territory which became Chad was its position in Africa; it linked together the colonised territories Algeria, French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. During the colonial period, the control over the Chadian territory therefore contributed to maintain the territorial integrity of the French colonies (Politique

³⁶ The quotations from the Ministry of Defence's homepage are my translations.

Africaine 1984:9). The military engagement was maintained after Chad became independent due to the perception of the continued importance of the territory by French officials. First, Chad was still a springboard to defend French interests in other former colonies. This role also persisted after the end of the Cold War. Chad's location in the centre of Africa enabled French forces stationed there to intervene in other former colonies, and thereby protect political and economic interests as well as French nationals in these states in case of unrest (Azevedo 1998:141, Nako 2010 [interview]). Second, France was tied to several of its former colonies through defence agreements where France committed itself to assure these states' defence.³⁷ To maintain Chad stable, it was also important to avoid the spread of unrest to neighbouring countries that could lead to requests about French interventions. According to Roland Marchal, the closure of the French military base in the Central African Republic has increased the importance of the forces in Chad even further due to the reduced French military presence in the region (Marchal 2007:187). In addition, the presence in Chad has got a new significance during the latter years due to the augmentation in the number of terrorist activities in the Sahelian belt. According to the White Paper from 2008, *Defence and National Security*, maintaining a "capacity of prevention and action"³⁸ in the Sahel is an element in the French defence strategy (Le livre blanc 2008:315). Potential development of terrorism in Sahel constitutes a threat against French interests in the region, but also the French territory since terrorist attacks could be targeting France itself. Thus, a military presence has remained of strategic value to France in the post-colonisation period due to Chad's location.

Protection of French citizens

The protection of French nationals is one of the elements included in Holsti's definition of a state's security and also one of the Operation's declared missions. It is therefore considered to be important when outlining French military policy. In 2009, 1345 French citizens were registered as living in Chad at the French consulate (Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs 2010). If the rest of the citizens from Western countries who live in Chad is included, the number increases to approximately 5000 (Nako 2010 [interview]). French forces in Chad also enable France to intervene to protecting French citizens in other states in the Central African region, like Cameroon, Congo and the Central African Republic (Nako 2010

³⁷ In 2008, France had defence agreements with the following Central African countries; Cameroon, the Central African Republic and Gabon. Niger and Congo have renounced to previous defence agreements (Le livre blanc 2008:167).

³⁸ My translation

[interview]). However, as pointed out by the politician Gali Ngothé Gatta, the evacuation of the foreigners present in Chad demands only two Transall³⁹, the rest of the military presence must therefore be explained by other purposes (Ngothé Gatta 2010 [interview]).

5.1.2 The value of the Operation for the French defense in general terms

Training possibilities

Chad is not only of strategic value to France due to its geographical location, but also because of the training possibilities offered by its size coupled with the limited population; large desert areas are used to train French military forces. Chad therefore offers important opportunities for French soldiers to acquire valuable experiences not available on the French territory (Kebzabo 2010 [interview], Didame 2010 [interview]). The training possibilities in Chad are not only important for the military operation inside Chad but also elsewhere; French soldiers were trained in Chad before they were sent to Afghanistan (Ngothé Gatta 2010 [interview]). Hence, military presence can be considered to strengthen French defence in a general way and thereby improve its capacity to protect French interests elsewhere. Furthermore, the territory's value as an exercising field is further increased by the limited number of restrictions imposed on the French forces by the Chadian president, and the exemption for French military forces to pay taxes for a large part of their activities (ICG 2006:18). Another advantage with the military presence in Chad is its flexibility due to the lack of a legal binding agreement regulating its presence. The forces stationed in Chad in the framework of the Operation Sparrowhawk are free to leave when it is considered in France's interest for them to do so, and they can also choose the amount of support they provide to the Chadian regime (Ngothé Gatta 2010 [interview], Rolley 2010:72). Therefore, the military presence in Chad offers training possibilities for the French military without imposing extensive conditions in return.

The lobbying of the French military in favour of a continued presence

As mentioned before, the military dimension has been dominating in the Franco-Chadian relationship and the French military has therefore played an important role in outlining the French military policy. Hence, in accordance with Morgenthau's claim that political tradition

³⁹ A military transport aircraft.

shapes what is considered as in a state's interest, the French army's opinion is still expected to have an influence on shaping the French official view of the Operation. In general, the French army has underlined and promoted the importance of the military presence due to ties between the French and the Chadian army as well as financial advantages attached to it. First of all, the two armies are perceived as linked through the Second World War: Chad was the first of the French overseas territories⁴⁰ that allied with the Free French Forces⁴¹.⁴² French troops were constituted in Chad and Chadian and French forces fought together; this is considered as the origin of the cooperation between the two armies (Malafosse 2008:21). In the words of Ngothé Gatta, "Chad was one of the origins of the revival of France during the Second World War"⁴³ (Ngothé Gatta 2010 [interview]). The relationship between the two armies was further strengthened through the training of important parts of today's French military elite; several of them took part in the interventions in Chad in the latter part of the 1960s to support the regime of Tombalbaye. Furthermore, Déby forged ties with several of the actual French military officials during his military studies in France (ICG 2006:17). Apart from the emotional links existing between the two armies, the French army also favours the continuation of the Operation because of its definition as an external operation and not a permanent base. The military presence is then financed by the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry and not the Ministry of Defence; it enables the French military to assure continued training as well as salaries to the military personnel stationed in Chad without being responsible for its costs (ICG 2006:18). Hence, the French military can be considered as having self-interest in the continuation of the operation and is therefore likely to enhance its importance.

5.1.3 The importance of the strategic interests

All Chadian informants presented geostrategic importance of the French military presence as the main reason behind its continuity. Its significance has augmented even further in the latter years due to reduced military presence in the region and an increased number of terrorist activities in Sahel. As a consequence, French military presence in Chad is a potential tool to defend French interests in Chad and in the Central African region, especially the protection of

⁴⁰ *Territoires d'outre-mer*

⁴¹ *Forces Françaises Libres*

⁴² The Free French Forces were French military forces led by General De Gaulle who continued to fight Germany and its allies after the official government of France had surrendered.

⁴³ All the interviews with Chadian informants were conducted in French. Hence, all the quotations from those interviews are my translations.

French citizens as well as to counter a more specific danger like Sahelian terrorism. Furthermore, Operation Sparrowhawk also constitutes an important element in the training of the French army. Hence, the French forces can both protect specific interests in the area as well as improve the French defence in general through its presence in Chad. Consequently, French military presence in Chad is considered to improve France's security.

5.2 French economic interests

According to Holsti, economy is an element of a state's interests due to its significance for a state's capacity to provide welfare. Since the political leadership of the French state is subject to election, it is considered to aim at improving the French economy and thereby ameliorate the services provided by the state to increase the support for their political parties. In the next part I will argue that the interests in Chad and the rest of the Central African region are limited in scope and thus of minor significance to the total French economy.

5.2.1 The oil production in Chad

Since the oil production started up in 2003, it has been the main economic activity in Chad. No French company has part of the consortium which extracts the oil from the onset of the production until today. As mentioned earlier, France was considered in favour of the rebellion which brought Déby to power in 1990. French "neutrality" that led to Déby's victory was based on Habré's incessant demands for economic and military assistance without favouring French interests in return. An area where France felt ignored was oil (Burr and Collins 2008:263). According to the politician Ngarlejy Yorongar, Elf Aquitaine⁴⁴ approached Déby in 1989 and offered to support a rebellion with money and weapons. In return, it demanded to be included in the oil consortium in the case of a successful *coup d'Etat* (Agir Ici – Survie 1999:24-25). Elf Aquitaine was included in 1992, after the American company Chevron withdrew from the consortium. However, in 1999 the French company decided to leave the consortium⁴⁵, due to the low potential profitability of the Chadian oil production in comparison with other countries (Maoundonodji 2009:250).⁴⁶ Despite the lack of French

⁴⁴ French oil company. In 2000 it merged with TotalFina and in 2003 it got its actual name; Total.

⁴⁵ The retreat was strongly contested amongst Chadians who perceived it as a symbol of French resistance against Chadian development. It led to anti-French manifestations in N'Djamena and a political-diplomatic crisis between Chad and France. The French ambassador was also declared *persona non grata* in Chad (Maoundonodji 2009:250).

⁴⁶ Elf Aquitaine preferred to invest in Angola instead.

companies in the oil consortium, France has economic interests attached to the oil production through the presence of French companies among the subcontractors. In all, 28 French companies were registered with subsidiaries in Chad in 2009; three in the domain of construction⁴⁷ and five in logistics and transport^{48, 49}. Companies in these domains are likely to have profited from the oil production both through the construction of the necessary infrastructure to enable the production itself but also by their implication in some of the sectors defined as priority areas by the law regulating the use of oil revenues.⁵⁰

As shown in the table below, the French export to Chad was almost the same in 2001 as in 2009. However, in between those years, it varied substantially reaching its lowest point in 2004 before increasing until 2009.

Table 5.1 French export to Chad 2001-2009, in million Euros

Year	Total export from France	Total export to Chad	Export to Chad as percentage of total
2001	335 219	106	0.03
2002	333 423	135	0.04
2003	327 653	79	0.04
2004	345 256	65	0.02
2005	360 376	76	0.02
2006	396 621	72	0.02
2007	406 484	97	0.02
2008	417 402	97	0.02
2009	345 926	105	0.03

(Ministry for the Budget, Public Accounts and State Reform (2010a) and Kwitou Ngoufang⁵¹ 2010 [e-mail]).

A more important observation drawn from the table is that the export to Chad as a percentage of total export from France has been stable. Furthermore, the percentage also shows that the export to Chad constitutes a very limited part of the total export.

⁴⁷ *DTP Terrassement (Group Bouygues), SOGEA SATOM Tchad, Etablissement fortis constructor.*

⁴⁸ *AGS Tchad, GEODIS Tchad, SDV Tchad, Société tchadienne d'affrètement et de transit, Tchad Cameroun logistique.*

⁴⁹ An overview of these companies was obtained at the French embassy in Chad.

⁵⁰ The first regulation law, from 1999, defined public health, education, infrastructure, agriculture and water as priority sectors. However, with its modification in 2006, energy, justice, security and territorial administration were also included (Law nr 001/PR/1999, Law nr 002/PR/2006).

⁵¹ Responsible for macroeconomic studies at the Regional economic service for Central Africa stationed at the French embassy in Yaoundé.

One of the sectors benefitting the most from the oil revenues has been the military sector, as shown in the table below;

Table 5.2 Military expenditures of Chad 2004-2009⁵²

Year	Million Euros
2004	40,7
2005	44,6
2006	
2007	284,3
2008	417,4
2009	313,6

(SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2009)

France has been and still is one of the weapon' exporters to Chad. Therefore, the increase in military spending is likely to have raised French income from sale of military material to Chad.

Table 5.3 Price of weapon orders by Chad to France 2003-2009, in current Euros⁵³

Year	Price of orders by Chad in million euro	Total price of all orders in million euro	Chadian orders as percentage of total orders
2003	0	4218.9	0
2004	0	3381.4	0
2005	0	4113.9	0
2006	3.1	5754.3	0.05
2007	11.2	5660.4	0.2
2008	4.1	6583.5	0.06
2009	9	8164.1	0.1

(Ministry of Defence 2008:50, 60, Ministry of Defence 2010b:61)

The value of orders of weapons by Chad to France has increased after the oil production started, with a peak in 2007. However, as shown in the last column, the Chadian part of French export of military weapons is still very small. Hence, the impact of the oil production on French economy, even in specific areas which have profited the most, remains limited.

⁵²Statistics missing for 2006.

⁵³The command is not necessarily effectuated in the same year as received.

5.2.2 French economic interests in the Central African region⁵⁴

As mentioned above, the strategic location of the Chadian territory enables French forces stationed there to intervene in other states in the region within a limited space of time. The importance of French economic interests in the Central African region as a total will therefore be analysed below.

Table 5.4 French exportation in million Euros

Year	Total	Central Africa	As percentage of total
2004	339686	2038	0,6
2008	412595	3534	0,9

(Ministry for the Budget, Public Accounts and State Reform 2010b)

Table 5.5 French foreign direct investment in million Euros

Year	Total	South and Central Africa	As percentage of total
2004	485574	1287	0,3
2008	722661	2250	0,3

(Eurostat 2010)

From the two tables above, it can be concluded that both French export to Central Africa and French foreign direct investments have increased substantially between 2004 and 2008. However, the importance of the French economy remains small.

5.2.3 The importance of the economic interests

As visible from the figures analysed above, the French economic interests in Chad and in the Central African region are limited when compared to the total French economy. As a result, they are not considered important enough to influence the French military policy. This perception is shared by the Chadian informants; “put on the balance [the French economic interests stemming from the oil production] are not important. Can they explain a military presence? I don’t think so.” (Nako 2010 [interview]). However, groups with specific interests can argue for a military policy that takes them into account. Nevertheless, it is not expected to be taken into account since the state is considered to outline its foreign policy based upon

⁵⁴ The Central African region is here considered to cover Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Niger and Nigeria. This is not the traditional definition of the Central African region but it is considered more fruitful in the current analysis. The choice of countries are based upon their proximity with Chad.

rationality and a policy promoting the interests of a few individuals rather than the state's interests is not perceived as such.

5.3 Prestige: France as a humanitarian actor – the case of Darfur

The last element of French interests that will be analysed is connected to prestige. According to Holsti, prestige is of a state's concern because it affects its power through the impact on its "diplomatic effectiveness". As mentioned above, military power has been central in maintaining the French influence in former colonies. This has further contributed to the French position in the international system; the French claim to be something more than a middle sized European state is to a large extent based upon the projection of power and prestige on the African continent (Chafer 2001:173). However, changes in the international context due to the end of the Cold War have caused France to review its military policy in Africa; previous influence cannot be maintained by the same tools as before. As a consequence, France is expected to attempt to present its military presence as contributing to African development and peace building rather than serving French interests. In the following part, I will argue that the conflict in Darfur opens up for two different opportunities for France to promote itself as a humanitarian actor: by claiming that the support to Déby's regime is an attempt to prevent the spread of the conflict in Darfur and by playing an active part in attempts to solve the conflict in Darfur.

The conflict in Darfur has its origins in a conflict for land in Darfur, enhanced by drought and subsequent migration as well as discontentment due to the marginalisation of the region by the regime in Khartoum.⁵⁵ The outset of the conflict is often dated to 2003, when insurgents of Darfurian rebel groups started to target state properties. It was encountered by the Sudanese army as well as the use of militias equipped and trained by the Sudanese army, often labelled *janjawids* (Burr and Collins 2008:292-293). The rebel movement in Darfur, especially the group Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), was partly constituted by members of the same ethnic group as the Chadian president, the Zaghawa. However, at the outset of the conflict, Déby refused to contribute to the rebel movement and chose to support the regime in Khartoum instead (Tubiana 2008:26). Nevertheless, he was not able to prevent

⁵⁵The conflict in Darfur is complex and the limited space available here will not give a complete insight into the origins of the conflict. For a better comprehension of the conflict see Daly 2007 and De Waal (eds.) 2007.

other members of the Chadian government to support the Darfurian rebels. As a consequence, the Sudanese government started providing assistance to the Chadian rebels. In response, Déby started to back the Darfurian rebels both to counter the Sudanese aid and also to reduce internal Chadian discontentment because of previous absence of support. The result was a proxy war between the two states; they both used the rebel movement in the neighbouring state to strengthen themselves in the combat against their own rebellion (Mamdani 2009:253, Marchal 2007:194, Tubiana 2008:26-27). Since fall 2003, the international community's attention was turned towards Darfur and the following year⁵⁶ accusations about genocide arose. The conflict was mainly presented as a massacre of African tribes by the Sudanese government through the intermediary of the Arab paramilitary organizations, *janjawids* (Burr and Collins 2008:293-294). According to Human Rights lawyer, Dolphin Djiraibe, the Chadian president, Déby, was presented as “the good guy” with regard to the conflict in Darfur while the Sudanese president, Omar Al-Bashir, as “the bad guy” (Djiraibe 2010 [interview]). The image presented of the conflict enabled France to justify actions in Chad with reference to it.

5.3.1 French support to the Chadian regime to contain the conflict in Darfur

France and Déby used the conflict in Darfur to present an image of the Chadian rebels as mercenaries from Sudan without a cause. In their argumentation, it logically followed that Déby was the only obstacle between the actual situation and a “Darfurization”⁵⁷ of Chad. According to Déby, the regime in Khartoum wanted to install a “puppet” regime in N’Djamena which would allow the spread of “Islamic fundamentalism across the whole Sub-Saharan Africa”⁵⁸ (Déby interviewed in Jeune Afrique 2009). Although not applying a vocabulary as strong as the Chadian president, French officials also confirmed the relation between the Chadian rebels and the Sudanese regime. The spokesperson of the Minister of Defence, Jean-François Bureau, labelled the rebellion in April 2006 as “an external aggression [...] that threatens the integrity of the Chadian sovereignty”⁵⁹ (Bureau interviewed in RFI 2006a). The discrediting of the Chadian rebellion through linking it to the Sudanese government was intended to reduce its legitimacy as a Chadian opposition; as long as there is

⁵⁶ The same year as the 10 year anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda.

⁵⁷ The exportation of the conflict in Darfur to Chad (Tubiana 2008:12).

⁵⁸ My translation

⁵⁹ My translation

no alternative to Déby's regime, supporting the latter is likely to be less criticised. Furthermore, according to Scachter's definition of self-defence, intervention in an internal conflict is acceptable if the other part in the conflict already receives support from another external actor. Thus, the focus on support provided by the Sudanese governments can also be seen as an attempt to make French assistance more acceptable.

The attention was also drawn towards potential effects of a change in a regime on eastern Chad. In a press conference during the EU-Africa summit held in December 2007, the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, justified French support provided by Operation Sparrowhawk with reference to the potential spread of the conflict in Darfur; "If we leave them on their own, then we have the Darfur to the east of the border and we make a new Darfur to the west!"⁶⁰ (Sarkozy 2007). The attempt to present Déby as the only option to avoid a spread of Darfur can be considered to have two objectives. First, by referring to the conflict in Darfur, the focus was moved from the internal situation in Chad and the unrest in Chad was presented as spill-over from Sudan. According to Djiraibe, this led international community to consider the internal Chadian problems only through Darfur and not as independent conflicts (Djiraibe 2010 [interview]). As a result, the Chadian regime has to a lesser extent been subject of criticism with regard to its internal political development. Second, French support provided to Déby could be justified as intended to avoid the spread of the conflict in Darfur rather than protecting French interests. Hence, it aimed at avoiding criticism about nationally motivated support to an undemocratic regime.

5.3.2 France's initiative towards a solution of the conflict

France did not only use the conflict in Darfur to justify its support to the Chadian regime, but it also claimed to take an active part in finding a solution to it. At the outset of the conflict, France was reluctant to participate in an intervention in Darfur, something which has been explained by the International Crisis Group (ICG) through the French economic interests attached to the Sudanese oil production (ICG 2006:19). France was in general criticised in the American press for not supporting resolutions in the Security Council proposed by the United States (Murphy 2007:326). However, after the French presidential election in 2007 and the arrival of Sarkozy as president and Bernard Kouchner as foreign minister, the conflict in Darfur became an area that was accorded substantial importance by the new government and

⁶⁰ My translation

France aimed at playing a central part in the work towards a solution of the conflict (Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs 2008).

The Chadian territory and Déby's consent of its use was presented as part of a solution. First, numerous refugees came from Darfur to Chad and were installed in refugee camps in eastern Chad.⁶¹ Second, Chad was considered as a potential launching pad in case of an international intervention into Darfur (Djiraibe 2010 [interview]). Hence, Déby was both the only obstacle to the spread of the conflict as well as part of its solution. One of the major French initiatives with regard to Darfur was the implementation of a European military force under UN-mandate in eastern Chad in 2008. With a mandate to protect civilians and UN personnel, the force had a "humanitarian" purpose. Furthermore, it situated French forces in a multilateral framework. Hence, through EUFOR French forces were presented as intervening in multilateral settings with a humanitarian objective. The force therefore had a potential to improve the reputation attached to French military operations in Africa. The conflict in Darfur constituted a possibility to legitimise French support to the Chadian regime to avoid criticism for neo-colonial actions as well as an opportunity to present French military engagement in Africa as a humanitarian presence. Both elements can be expected to have a positive impact on the French reputation.

Nevertheless, the French initiative to contribute to a solution of the conflict in Darfur is perceived as limited due to the lack of measures with regard to Chadian implication in the conflict. As mentioned before, Déby has been supporting the Darfurian rebels and thereby strengthening them. In the words of the journalist Jean-Claude Nekim, the support provided by Déby has "nourished the conflict" (Nekim 2010 [interview]). Hence, a French policy only motivated by ending the conflict in Darfur would be expected to include pressure towards the Chadian regime to end support provided to the rebel movement in Darfur. However, French initiatives towards a solution of the conflict in Darfur are considered as avoiding repercussions on the Chadian regime which might damage French interests. As will be discussed when analysing the French role with regard to EUFOR, France has proposed initiatives excluding any measures with regard to the Chadian implication. Thus, France is considered to contribute as long as the initiatives do not affect the Chadian regime. The element of prestige therefore seems to be put aside in conflict with other interests.

⁶¹In 2004, 224924 Sudanese refugees were registered in Chad, while the number had increased to 270280 by 2010 (UNHCR 2004, UNHCR 2010)

5.4 The significance of survival of Déby's regime to preserve French interests

As mentioned above, the military agreement linking France and Chad only commits France to provide training of the Chadian army and logistical support: it does not indicate any French role during periods of combat, apart eventual logistical assistance. Therefore, based upon the official agreement between France and Chad, there is no responsibility for France to provide any further aid to its former colony. In the successive parts I will analyse two factors which can provoke French support to keep Déby in power despite a lack of obligation. First, the preservation of French interests can be expected to depend upon the Chadian regime's survival if another regime would not give France the same advantages. Second, a change of regime can be considered to lead to a return to a civil war that would threaten French interests both inside and outside Chad. In the first case, support would be motivated by a specific interest to keep Déby in power, while the second would reflect a willingness to provide assistance to avoid the country's return to chaos. Furthermore, such support is also expected to reflect that the importance of the interests that can be put at risk exceeds the cost of assistance provided.

5.4.1 Advantages attached to Déby's regime

The first potential French motivation to support Déby's regime is that the preservation of its interests depend directly on the regime in place in N'Djamena; a regime originating from the rebel groups would, to a certain extent, disfavour French interests. However, the Chadian informants did not share such a perception. Instead, the continuity of the Franco-Chadian relationship was considered as independent of the regime in place. As pointed out by the politician Hourmadji Moussa Doumgor, France has remained present in Chad during previous changes in regime and the French presence has been valued by successive regimes; nothing indicates that this will change now (Moussa Doumgor 2010 [interview]). Ngothé Gatta claimed that French presence was so established in Chad, that no Chadian politician considered a regime without the French presence (Ngothé Gatta 2010 [interview]). According to Nekim, such a way of thinking will not change before a new generation of Chadian politicians replaces the present one (Nekim 2010 [interview]). Based upon the impressions held by Chadian informants, France did not need to support the Chadian regime to assure the protection of French interests.

An element of insecurity was the eventual Sudanese influence on a new Chadian government. According to Déby, a regime created by the rebels would in reality be a government controlled by the Sudanese government (Ayangafac 2009:7). In the case of substantial Sudanese influence on the new regime, France might fear the expulsion of the French forces due to Sudanese pressure. However, in previous cases Sudanese support to a rebellion has not had such consequences; French forces remained in Chad after both Habré's and Déby's rebellion. It can be objected that the context in which the Sudanese support is provided has changed; French military presence in Chad can be less acceptable to the regime in Khartoum due to France's ambition to play an active role in the solution of the conflict in Darfur. Nevertheless, the extent that this has changed the Sudanese regime's capacity to influence a new Chadian regime is more questionable.

In general, French concerns in Chad increased from April 2006 to February 2008: six French members of the French charity organization Zoë's Ark had been convicted for child trafficking and EUFOR was to be deployed in Chad. In the Zoë's Ark affaire, French nationals were arrested on 25 October 2007 and accused of child trafficking. They had planned to fly 103 children out of Chad. The children were, according to the organisation, orphans from Darfur and meant to be adopted by French families. Most of the children turned out to be Chadian and not considered orphans in the villages they came from. The actions of the French members were at the outset condemned by French officials. However, Sarkozy declared in November that he would make sure they returned to France "no matter what they had done" and thereby confirmed French concerns with regard to the outcome of the judicial trial. (Rolley 2010:118). The members were condemned to eight years of hard labour, a sentence turned into prison after they were extradited to France (Rolley 2010:108-119). On 31 March 2008, Déby gave them the presidential pardon, after which they were released from prison (Gounin 2009:157). The pardon was given not even two months after the rebellion in February 2008 and, as I will come back to later in the following chapter, it can then be questioned if French support was exchanged against the prisoners' freedom.

With regard to EUFOR, France had invested extensive efforts in its realisation; its deployment can be considered to have been of substantial importance to France. Due to the link between Chadian rebels and the Sudanese government, French officials feared that a change of regime would hinder the deployment of the force. Notably, the rebellion in February 2008, just before the deployment of the force, was considered as a last attempt to

avoid it. I will come back to this aspect in the next chapter. However, an important condition imposed by the other participants of the force was the neutrality of all participating countries, France included. The deployment of EUFOR consequently augmented French concerns in Chad at the same time as it increased the cost attached to use of force.

5.4.2 Negative implications of a change of regime

A second potential reason for French support to the Chadian regime is the fear of unrest attached to a change of regime. French officials have claimed that such a change would lead to a civil war in Chad due to the “rebellion’s lack of credibility and political vision” (ICG 2008:19). The official French policy line is that “if president Déby falls, Chad will descend into chaos and drag the Central African region into the abyss” (Ayangafac 2009:9). Such a development is likely to have implications for the French interests. First, due to French military presence in Chad, France would find itself in the middle of a new internal African conflict. A new Chadian regime might condition further French military presence upon substantial military aid. France would thereby have to choose between maintaining its forces in Chad and getting involved in an internal Chadian conflict, likely to have a high political cost or withdrawal from Chad, which would have a negative impact on national interests as well as probably cause criticism for leaving Chad on its own facing chaos. In addition, a general increase in the conflict level also risks exposing French interests to greater insecurity, both French citizens and economic interests. Especially with regard to French citizens, this is likely to provoke demands for French interventions to secure and eventually evacuate them. The risk of the conflict to spread to other fragile neighbouring states also puts French interests in other Central African states at stake, as well as it potentially activates French military engagements there due to commitments through defence agreements.

5.4.3 The foundation for French military policy

Based on the analysis made of French national interests attached to the French military presence in Chad, I argue that the security dimension is the most important: the presence contributes to valuable training to the French troops, protection of French citizens in an area marked by insecurity as well as military proximity to a region considered as fostering terrorism. The conflict in Darfur is considered as an opportunity to present France as a humanitarian actor. However, due to the limited French engagement, ignoring Déby’s

involvement, I consider the importance of Darfur to be linked mainly to its potential to justify French policy in Chad. Economic interests are not considered to influence the military policy because of their minor impact on the total French economy. Regarding the security interests, it could be put at risk with a change of regime. First, because a pro-Sudanese government may ask French forces to leave and second, due to potential unrest which may follow after such a change. In both cases, the probability of the different scenarios to take place is difficult to assess, but the importance to maintain stability is considered to be France's main concern. The importance of maintaining Déby in office is considered to have increased from 2006 and 2008 because of the Zoë's Ark affaire and the planned deployment of EUFOR. However, this results from Déby being in office when negotiations concerning both the members of Zoë's Ark and EUFOR were initiated. Hence, eventual French support is expected to be motivated by avoiding an increased internal conflict level rather than maintaining Déby in office. Due to the French military's self-interest attached to a continued operation, they are likely to have exaggerated the potential risk involved in a change of regime to increase the probability of French support.

6 French military engagement in Chad

The aim of this chapter is to analyse French military policy in Chad through actions taken and the intentions behind them. Three different events will be examined: the two rebellions that reached N'Djamena in April 2006 and in February 2008, and the establishment of a European military force that was deployed in Chad in 2008.

6.1 The support provided during the rebellions in April 2006 and February 2008

6.1.1 The empirical context situated in the theoretical framework: expected French support

In both April 2006 and February 2008, rebel columns arrived to N'Djamena from eastern Chad within a few days. The rapid arrival of the rebels made the Chadian regime look weak, and in both cases concerns were expressed by French officials about its survival. As argued in the previous chapter, France had interests attached to the survival of Déby's regime. Therefore, it had to make a choice about to what extent it was willing to support Déby; a cost-benefit analysis based upon the political cost attached to potential action versus the value of the interests attached to the military presence in Chad.

Prior to the rebellion in April 2006, an attempted *coup d'Etat* against the Chadian regime took place on 14 March.⁶² The French forces were central in preventing the putsch. In the aftermath of the event, French officials assured that their forces would not be deployed to prevent a military rebellion in Chad (Le Monde 2006a). Such a statement indicates a French unwillingness to intervene directly in an internal Chadian conflict through the use of military means. According to the theory, exclusion of force as a policy option is expected to result from a lack of legitimacy, and this seems confirmed by the empirical context. The superiority of French forces indicates that they would easily defeat a rebel attack. A Sudanese intervention to strengthen the rebels was not considered likely since the assistance from the regime in Khartoum to the Chadian rebels was motivated by constraining the insurgency in

⁶² The attempt consisted of shooting down the president's plane when he returned from a meeting in Equatorial Guinea. However, the plot was revealed and French forces secured the airport before the arrival of the president (Le Monde 2006a).

Darfur and such an intervention would constitute an explicit external aggression of Chad probable to cause international reactions. The cost of such an engagement would then exceed the interests defended. Hence, compared to its possibility to neutralise the threat, a French intervention would probably be successful. As a consequence, French unwillingness against deploying force is considered to rest upon the political cost of such an action. According to such an argumentation, France is unlikely to intervene unless it is perceived as legitimated by international norms or vital French interests are at stake. The interests analysed in the previous chapter are not considered as such. Thus, France is not expected to use force apart from legitimate situations. Nevertheless, since the absence of more extensive deployment of military means seems to be caused by the political costs attached to it, intervention can be considered if they can be avoided; if the use of force can remain unknown. As a result, hidden military operations might be viewed as an efficient tool at certain occasions.

Through the presentation of data below, I argue that France provided a considerable support to Déby's regime in both April 2006 and February 2008, clearly favouring the regime's survival. In both cases, logistical and intelligence aid were central to the Chadian defence. In addition, I will show how actions claimed to have been intended to "protect French citizens", substantially strengthened Déby. Further, I claim that the increase in French interests attached to the continuation of Déby's regime prior to the rebellion in February 2008, led France to play a more active role to obtain an international mandate which would justify direct intervention if this became necessary to maintain the Chadian regime.

6.1.2 The rise and fall of the two rebellions

The rebellion in April 2006

The rebellion that reached N'Djamena in April 2006 was organised by the rebel alliance United Front for Change (FUC)⁶³. It was established in December 2005 and united eight different rebel groups.⁶⁴ The attacks leading to the battle of N'Djamena started in Moudeïna⁶⁵ where rebels from FUC confronted troops from the army on 30 March 2006. The rebel troops

⁶³ *Front Uni pour le Changement*.

⁶⁴ The alliance included, among others, the rebel group Platform for Change, Unity and Democracy (SCUD) which consisted of deserters from the Chadian regime, including the Erdimi brothers, Déby's own nephews.

⁶⁵ A locality not far from the border of Sudan in the region of Dar Sila.

then continued towards other localities in eastern Chad; on 9 April Haraze Manguerne⁶⁶ came into the rebels' control, before Koukou⁶⁷ on 10 April. When Mongo was taken on 11 April, the rebels announced their intention of attacking the capital. Forces from the national army advanced towards Mongo and battles took place on 12 April, 30 kilometres from N'Djamena, in Dourbali. Then, on 13 April, rebels attacked N'Djamena. The battle of N'Djamena started in the outskirts of the capital but some rebel troops eventually managed to advance towards the centre and confrontations took place next to the National Assembly. After several hours of fighting, the rebels retreated. (Reconstruction based on Le Monde 2006b, Le Monde 2006c and Le Figaro 2006b). On 13 April 2006, the Security Council condemned any attempts to seize power by force as well as any attacks on the Darfur refugees (SC/8690 2006).

The rebellion in February 2008

The alliance behind the attack on N'Djamena in February 2008 was constituted by three different rebel groups.⁶⁸ The rebellion started on 28 January 2008 when a column of rebels consisting of 300 vehicles left Darfur and crossed the Chadian border. The rebels' aim seemed clear; they avoided any battle with national forces in the eastern Chad by contouring the Chadian troops stationed there, and headed straight towards N'Djamena. The first battle took place on 1 January in Massaguet, situated approximately 80 km north of the capital. Déby led the Chadian troops to confront the rebel columns. However, due to betrayals inside the Chadian army, the rebels knew which radio frequency the Chadian army used to communicate on, and were therefore capable of predicting the army's moves. The first battle ended in a victory for the rebels. The national army together with the president withdrew to the capital. The following day battles started in N'Djamena and lasted for two days. In the beginning of the afternoon on 3 January, the rebels left N'Djamena and did not attempt new attacks on the capital, despite claims about only waiting for supplies to come from the east. The attack was condemned by the UN Secretary-General through an official statement on 3 February and then by the Security Council on 4 February. The Security Council then called upon Member States to "provide support, in conformity with the United Nations Charter, as requested by the Government of Chad" (S/PRST/2008/3 2008). The rebels proposed a cease-

⁶⁶ A locality close to the border of the Central African Republic in the region of Salamat.

⁶⁷ A locality close to the borders of the Central African Republic and Sudan in the region of Dar Sila.

⁶⁸ The largest group was United Force for Democracy and Development (UFDD) which was led by Mahamat Nouri. Further, the second group was Rally of Forces for Change (RFC) where Timane Erdimi was the leader. The last rebel group was UFDD-Fondamental, a splinter group of UFDD. The leader of the last group was Abdelwahid Aboud (BBC 2008a).

fire on 5 February. However, this was rejected by the Chadian government who claimed to be in control of the situation (Reconstruction based on BBC 2008a, Jeune Afrique 2008, Le Monde 2008c, Le Monde 2008d, Le Monde Diplomatique 2008).

The defeat of the rebellions

Eventually the rebels were defeated in both cases. Three main arguments were presented to explain the defeat: the internal divisions inside the rebellion, the Chadian army's material superiority, and the French support to Déby. The rebellions were in both cases constituted by alliances of several rebel groups including members from different ethnic groups. As Chadian political life in general, the rebellion was marked by ethnical conflict. Since the state's power in Chad is perceived as a way of satisfying ethnic interests, a motivation behind the rebellion is to improve the conditions of the members' ethnic group (Maoundonodji 2009:296). Thus, the ethnicity of the president is of considerable importance. As stated by Nekim while describing the rebellion in February 2008, certain rebels consider that "if it's not us who chase Déby, there is no need that it should be someone else either" (Nekim 2010 [interview]). The lack of a common political platform amongst the rebels and a bad organisation weakened them in relation to the Chadian regime (Didame 2010 [interview]). Furthermore, the army was superior to the rebellion with regard to military material. As shown in the previous chapter, the oil revenues opened up for extensive investments in the military domain. As a consequence, especially in February 2008, the superiority of the military was considerable (Topona 2010 [interview]). The latter element, the French support, will be analysed in the following part.

6.1.3 The French support justified through the cooperation agreement: logistical and intelligence aid

The content of the support

In both rebellions, French officials repeated both during and after the rebel attack on N'Djamena, that their support to the Chadian regime was limited to the content in the technical cooperation agreement: logistical and intelligence aid. As confirmed by Jean-François Bureau, the spokesperson of the French Minister of Defence, during an interview on

Radio France International (RFI); French support was technical and not operational, and the actual battles were conducted by Chadians (RFI 2006b).

An important comment to the French presentation is, as mentioned before, that the intelligence aid was not included in the agreement from 1976. In 2007, Kamougué Wadal Abdelkader, who signed the agreement in 1976 as the Chadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated in an interview with Sonia Rolley that the intelligence support “is not included in the military cooperation agreement”⁶⁹ (Rolley 2010:72). Thus, French officials’ presentation of their support reflects a comprehension of the content of the agreement that can be considered as “generous”, as labelled by Marchal (Marchal quoted in Granvaud 2009:312). This is an important point since the reference to the agreement seems to justify the assistance, even if it is provided in the context of an internal conflict. The intelligence aid indicates French willingness to provide support, exceeding its commitments, and thereby to maintain Déby in power.

The actual content of this “intelligence assistance” is vague since it is not described in the agreement. In general, the intelligence support was considered to include photos of the rebel columns as well as records of the rebels’ communications, together with their decoding during the rebellions (Jeune Afrique 2006, *Le Monde* 2008h). The lack of clarity surrounding the actual support provided was criticised by the French media. As questioned in an article in *Le Figaro* after quoting the Chief of Staff in Paris who assured the limitation of French assistance to intelligence support; “How far does this aid go?”⁷⁰ (*Le Monde* 2006d, *Le Figaro* 2006a). Articles in both *Le Monde* and *La Croix* claimed that French military officers stationed in N’Djamena participated in the planning of the defence at the presidency (*Le Monde* 2008h, *La Croix* 2008). Due to the uncertainty surrounding the actual limits of support France would justify with the cooperation agreement, it is questionable if they would include advising in the elaboration of strategy. The limited information provided with regard to the actual content can be considered in the French interest; the lack of clarity with regard to which support was provided makes it more difficult to criticise France for its policy.

⁶⁹ My translation

⁷⁰ All the quotations from French media are my translations.

According to the media, the logistical support included transportation of troops, ammunition and fuel to the battle field as well as Chadian soldiers and Darfurian rebels⁷¹ from eastern Chad to N'Djamena (Le Monde 2008d, Jeune Afrique 2006, Nekim 2010 [interview]). Both the army and the rebels ran out of ammunition and as a consequence, the provision to the army by French forces did acquire an extra importance (Ngothé Gatta 2010 [interview]). In February 2008 attention was focused upon the provision of ammunition to tanks from Libya since they were central in hindering rebels from approaching and gaining control over the presidency (La Croix 2008). Hence, the deliverance gave the Chadian army an important advantage by enabling it to continue to battle while the rebels ran out of ammunition without getting new supplies.

France was considered to provide substantial assistance in both 2006 and 2008. However, in 2008 the French support was at the outset of the rebellion perceived as reluctant by some actors. This was partly based upon the rebels' arrival close to N'Djamena before the first confrontation took place. As stated in *Le Figaro*; "the tools of surveillance and aerial transport do not seem to have been fully exploited as they could have been during the four days of the rebellion's rally in the desert." (Le Figaro 2008a). It was even questioned if France considered reducing its support to the regime to favour the rebellion (L'Observateur 2008a). According to the politician Saleh Kebzabo, France considered to leave the rebels on their own sort and to not intervene. However, the lack of a political agreement between the different rebel groups made France support Déby as before (Kebzabo 2010 [interview]). Hence, the uncertainty attached to a new regime as well as the fear of a civil war between the different rebel groups in the rebellion, caused an increase in French assistance to Déby to maintain him in office. This strengthens the observation that the French support to Déby seems to be motivated by an objective to maintain stability than a particular support for the present regime. Another way of analysing French hesitance at the outset is that France waited for promises with regard to the Zoë's Ark affaire. Ketil Fred Hansen argues that a link between the release of the French members of Zoë's Ark and the support provided is likely due to the limited space of time between the two events (Hansen 2009:190).

⁷¹ Members of the Darfurian rebel group JEM fought with the Chadian army. Their support was exchanged against military equipment and the permission to put up rear bases on Chadian territory (Marchal 2007:193).

The consequences of the support

The impact of the intelligence and logistical support on the combats is difficult to quantify. As stated by the politician Lol Mahamat Choua; “France had an important role in the defeat of the rebellion”, however, “it is hard to say” if the Chadian regime’s victory was conditioned upon it (Choua 2010 [interview]). In general, the intelligence aid was in both events considered central to the build-up of the Chadian defence. It was characterised as “an important weapon” by the Chadian newspaper *Le Temps* and its impact was compared with a direct French intervention (Le Temps 2006). The assistance was declared as “essential” to the regime’s victory by Djiraibe (Djiraibe 2010 [interview]). Also, representatives from the Chadian government and Déby himself acknowledged the role played by the information. In the aftermath of the rebellion in April 2006 the Chadian minister of human rights stated that “the destruction of the rebel column” was possible due to “the information provided by [our friends in Sparrowhawk]” (Le Figaro 2006d). The logistical support was also considered important. According to Ngothé Gatta, the rebels’ defeat partly rested upon the lack of new supplies; “you cannot continue to battle without new soldiers, new material and new ammunition” (Ngothé Gatta 2010 [interview]). Hence, the French assistance in this domain clearly favoured the Chadian army on the battle field. As mentioned above, the supply of ammunition to the Chadian army’s tanks in 2008 was of considerable significance due to the tanks’ importance in the defeat of the rebels. As summarised by *Le Monde* in an editorial; the logistical and the intelligence support “played a decisive role” with regard to the outcome of the battles (Le Monde 2006f).

Apart Ali Haggat, according to whom “Déby would have defeated the rebels without the French support, even without the intelligence information”, none of the other Chadian informants answered positively to the question if the Chadian regime could have survived without French assistance (Haggat 2010 [interview]).⁷² The Chadian president himself also confirmed the significance of the French support in the aftermath of the rebellions. In February 2008 Déby drew attention to the French support when announcing the victory; “France honoured its commitments. [...] the French support was important to us.” (L’Observateur 2008b). Nevertheless, the importance of the French support was modified through underlining that Chad would have been capable of defending themselves; Déby claimed in an interview with *Le Monde* that “Chad, with its own capacities, was capable of

⁷² This does not imply that they confirmed that the rebellion would have succeeded without the French support.

hindering the invasion” (Le Monde 2006h). This somehow contradictory way of considering the French support as important but not as indispensable was also presented by Chadian pro-governmental informants: upon the question if the regime could have won the combats without the French support, neither the minister Abderamane Djasnabaille⁷³ nor the counsellor Hourmadji Moussa Doumgor⁷⁴ responded positively (Djasnabaille 2010 [interview], Moussa Doumgor 2010 [interview]). Despite the fact that Déby rejected the allegation that his regime’s survival depended completely on the French support, he did attribute an important role to France. It should be taken into consideration that the Chadian president seems unlikely to have admitted the regime’s complete dependence upon France even if this had been the case. To strengthen the impression of his own position, the Chadian president was rather likely to undermine the role played by the French support rather than the opposite.

6.1.4 French direct intervention: how far?

The warning shot in April 2006

French officials confirmed that a warning shot had been fired towards a rebel column following orders from Paris. According to the wing commander⁷⁵ in charge of the pilots, Fabian Bajon-Arnal, it was “a very precise procedure” consisting of “a burst of 15 shells which lasted half a second and it was aimed 200 meters in front of the column” (Le Monde 2006g). The column was never in danger of being hit. Afterwards it continued towards the capital (Le Monde 2006g). The event took place 250 kilometres away from N’Djamena. Bureau claimed the warning shot was “a political signal to assure the security of [French] nationals” and “without military objectives” (RFI 2006b, Jeune Afrique 2006). Hence, the event was justified with reference to the principle of self-defence; the shot had as objective to prevent any action towards the French nationals by the rebels. However, the shot was perceived by other actors as something more than just a political message with a self-defence purpose. It became a symbol of the French implication and called “a direct engagement on Déby’s side” (N’Djamena Bi-Hebdo 2006). As concluded in the editorial of *Le Monde* on 18 April 2006 when discussing the real purpose of the shot; “The message is clear. The French

⁷³ Minister of Human Rights and the Promotion of Freedom.

⁷⁴ Counsellor for the prime minister with regard to posts and technologies for information and communication.

⁷⁵ *Lieutenant colonel*

engagement too.” (Le Monde 2006f). The rebels did also perceive the warning shot as a clear signal of a French implication in a Chado-Chadian conflict and henceforth as a demonstration of Paris’ lack of neutrality (RFI 2006b).

It is difficult to not consider the warning shot as something more than just a political message due to the alliance between France and Déby. To make its intentions known to the rebels, France would have had to specify it through other communication channels. However, if France was to enter in contact with the rebels anyway, then the whole message could have been communicated in such a way. Due to previous French military interventions in Chad, the uncertainty surrounding the warning shot seems intended; the shot opened up for speculations on further French intervention among the rebels. France may have hoped that it would have a dissuasive effect and thereby hinder further action from the rebels. Thus, France would not have to engage itself more extensively because of its reputation based upon the past. With the warning shot, France moved from actions considered as indirect to direct intervention since it included firing at the rebels. The action indicates a French willingness to use military force to preserve its interests as long as it can be justified with reference to a recognised source of legitimacy.

The protection of the airport in February 2008

Fire was opened against the rebels in February 2008 as well. A cannon-shot was fired from the airport in riposte as rebels opened fire towards it. Moreover, French forces caught in the middle of combat while evacuating foreigners, opened fire to get out of the situation. Prazuck claimed the actions were conducted in self-defence and not to be considered as taking part of the battles (Le Monde 2008e). The French base in N’Djamena is situated next to the airport. Hence, a defence of the airport was considered as a protection of own forces. However, it came to play an important role in the battle. The significance was caused by the continued use of the airport by Chadian aviation; the Chadian helicopters were central in defeating the rebellion. According to Philippe Hugon, research director at *Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques* in Paris, the French control over the airport and the Chadian helicopters’ access to it, had a “determining role” for the outcome (Hugon quoted in Le Monde 2008f). Nekim classified the protection of the airport as an “actual participation in the combats” (Nekim 2010 [interview]). The importance of the Chadian aviation was strengthened by the lack of heavy armament among the rebels (Kebzabo 2010 [interview]).

The rebellion also denounced the Chadian army's use of the airport protected by French forces. According to the spokesperson of the rebellion, Abderaman Koulamallah, the rebellion did not attack the airport because it would hinder the evacuation of foreigners. He therefore criticised France for letting the Chadian aviation use the airport (Libération 2008c).

The defence of the airport is not criticised for its role in the evacuation of the foreigners. However, the question can be raised if the permission to let the Chadian aviation use the airport did not have the opposite effect; the impression of a direct French implication could have caused anti-French sentiments amongst the Chadian population. According to Djiraibe, the population perceived the French forces as providing an unconditional support to Déby without taking into account that the Chadian population wanted a change in regime (Djiraibée2010 [interview]). Hence, through the actions officially intended to assure the protection of the French citizens, French forces actually might have put them at risk in a long term perspective. However, an important comment is that France seemed to have had not much of a choice; the French forces' mission is to protect foreigners in Chad and the airport in N'Djamena is central in attaining such objectives. At the same time it is situated on Chadian territory and it is therefore impossible to hinder the Chadian army from using it. The question of the protection of the airport can be considered ideal for France; the protection of the airport was perceived as indispensable and justified with reference to the principle of self-defence and at the same time it opened up for decisive support to the Chadian defence.

Did French forces engage further in the battles?

During the warning shot and the defence of the airport, fire was opened by French forces against rebels. This demonstration of the use of force opens up the question of how far France was willing to go in assuring the survival of Déby's regime. While French media stated that "it is visibly not an option to engage French soldiers directly against the rebels", articles in Chadian newspapers seemed to consider direct engagement as an option evaluated by France. According to *Le Temps* and *Notre Temps*, French soldiers had been present in areas of N'Djamena that have no foreigners, where battles took place (Notre Temps 2006, La Croix 2006, Le Temps 2006). This opens up to question the real purpose of the French forces; if they were present in such areas it indicates that the protection of the foreigners was not their only aim. The presence would enable them to intervene if the Chadian forces lost control, and could therefore be seen as a last option if the indirect support did not strengthen Déby's

regime sufficiently enough to defeat the rebels. Furthermore, Ngothé Gatta claimed that French forces bombed the rebels and thereby hindered new rebel columns to reach N'Djamena with supplies for the rebels already confronting the national army (Ngothé Gatta 2010 [interview]). The allegation concerning bombing of the rebels was supported and extended by the rebel groups themselves; according to the spokesperson of FUC, Laona Gong, French forces bombed rebel forces in both Adré and Moudaïna (Le Monde 2006e). In addition, according to an article in *La Croix*, French Special Forces participated in the battles taking place in N'Djamena in February 2008 (La Croix 2008). Such an assertion is supported by Ngothé Gatta. According to him, the scenario spoke for itself; in the evening of 2 February the rebels controlled the whole capital apart from the airport and the area surrounding the presidency. Then, the morning after, the Chadian forces which were left at the presidency got the upper hand in the battle against the rebels and the latter ended up by retreating. Such a sudden change in the battle was claimed to prove the deployment of French Special Forces at the presidency during the night (Ngothé Gatta 2010 [interview]). This was made possible because France asked the rebels for a ceasefire to negotiate Déby's exit. However, it was a way of buying time and France was said to have introduced Special Forces in the presidency during the ceasefire (Ngothé Gatta 2010 [interview]).

The validity of these accusations is not easy to assess; they are categorically rejected by France. However, French use of force especially through the warning shot but also with the defence of the airport indicates that French reluctance against a further engagement first and foremost rests upon the lack of legitimacy attached to an intervention. A hidden French intervention seemed therefore to have been a potential tool for France.

6.1.5 The importance of an international mandate in February 2008

In both April 2006 and February 2008 France sought a condemnation of the rebellions by the Security Council. However, in February 2008 French officials consequently presented an international mandate as a necessity before an eventual extension of the French involvement. As stated by Claude Gueant, the Cabinet Director of the French president, on 3 February; "The conflict in Chad is a civil war and the antagonists are Chadians; France can only intervene on the background of an international mandate" (BBC 2008b). France did take an initiative in UN to get such a mandate and an emergency meeting in the Security Council was asked by France and was held on 3 February. The French initiative came after the

condemnation of any seizure of power by force from the African Union. An official statement came from the Security Council on 4 February. The text did not explicitly open up for a military intervention in Chad. However, it called all member states to “provide support [...] as requested by the government of Chad” (S/PRST/2008/3 (2008)). The statement was considered by the French government as sufficient to legitimise an eventual military intervention in Chad; “If France has to do its duty – in Chad – it will” (Sarkozy quoted in *Le Monde* 2008e). Paris officially stated its will to intervene in support of the Chadian regime if such a demand was presented by the Chadian president (*Le Monde* 2008g). However, this never became a subject since the rebellions had retreated from N’Djamena before the statement was issued. French officials’ statement once again demonstrated a French willingness to use legitimate force. .

The necessity of an international condemnation of the rebellion by the Security Council before the French government would fully support Déby openly was underlined in the French press. The support from the French government was perceived as strengthened after and as a consequence of the statements of condemnation from the African Union and the Security Council (*Libération* 2008d, *Le Monde* 2008c, *Le Figaro* 2008b). In light of the considerations made above, the importance added to the international mandate in February 2008 can reflect two elements. First, the rebellion in February 2008 was viewed stronger than in 2006, and hence it was more likely that an extensive French intervention would be needed to assure the survival of Déby’s regime. Second, the stakes for France had increased in 2008 compared to in 2006. Therefore, the survival of Déby’s regime had become more important. Furthermore, EUFOR increased the political cost of using un-legitimated force even further.

6.2 The French initiative to a multilateral presence in Chad

In 2008 an international mission was implemented in Chad in an attempt to reduce the destabilizing effect of the conflict in Darfur on Chad. It consisted of a UN mission as well as a European military force; United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and EUFOR. France was behind the initiative for EUFOR and as I will argue for by analysing how the operation was perceived by different actors, the French motivation can be considered as multifaceted, including concerning a containment of the conflict in Darfur, a promotion of EU and a defence of Déby’s regime.

6.2.1 Background of the intervention and its mandate

The UN Secretary-General issued a report in 2006 on the situation in Darfur, S/2006/591, that drew attention on potential consequences of the conflict in Darfur on regional peace and stability. In response, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to report on the situation for refugees and internal displaced persons in eastern Chad, and come with suggestions concerning eventual measures which could be taken to improve it (S/RES 1706 (2006)). The original recommendations from the Secretary-General consisted of a mandate for a UN force which included both protection of civilians and UN personnel as well as facilitation of a political process in Chad (S/2006/1019 2006). However, Déby was reluctant to a military UN intervention and would only agree with a civilian intervention in a first phase. A UN mission only consisting of a police mission was rejected by the Secretary-General due to the technical assessments conducted in Chad which had concluded that such a “presence could function only in combination with a complementary military presence” (S/2007/488 2007). France then came up with a compromise consisting of a European force to accompany the UN police presence.

The mandate

The Council of the European Union expressed its readiness for establishing a 12 months’ operation in Chad and the Central African Republic at a meeting on 23 – 24 July 2007. A European force was officially accepted by the authorities from Chad and the Central African Republic on 11 September and 17 September. Thereafter, the final mandate of the European part of the intervention was voted 25 September 2007. It was outlined in the paragraph 6 of resolution 1778 from the Security Council and the main mission of the force was to constitute a military support for MINURCAT⁷⁶ (S/RES 1778 2007). EUFOR’s mandate was placed under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and the force was authorised to take all necessary means within the operations’ capabilities and its area of operation. Its purpose was:

⁷⁶ The purpose of MINURCAT was to secure civilians through the development of the Chadian police (S/RES 1778 2007)

- (i) To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons;
- (ii) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations;
- (iii) To contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel;

(S/RES 1778 2007)

The mandate was limited to a period of one year starting from the moment when the European Union declared the force as operational.

The council of the EU reconfirmed its commitment to provide a military force to the intervention in Chad and the Central African Republic through a Joint Action on 15 October 2007. The Irish lieutenant general, Patrick Nash, was appointed as Operation Commander and would lead the operation from the headquarter located at Mont Valérien, in France. The French brigadier general Jean-Philippe Ganascia was designated as the Force Commander and would lead the forces on the field (Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP 2007:art 2-4). Originally EUFOR was supposed to consist of 4200 soldiers but the number was eventually reduced to 3700. The intervention force achieved this capacity on 15 March 2008; a month and a half after the operation was initiated in the end of January (Seibert 2010:14, 22).

6.2.2 The French motivation behind the efforts invested in EUFOR

The French part in the realisation of EUFOR is unquestionable; extensive efforts were invested in it by the French diplomacy. Officially, it resulted from a wish to “play an active role in international efforts aiming at resolving [the conflict in Darfur]” (Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs 2008). As discussed in connection to prestige as a national interest, such an agenda can be explained as an aim to improve the French reputation with regard to military interventions in Africa; France wanted to present itself as a humanitarian actor through the conflict in Darfur. However, as mentioned above, the French approach was limited due to its focus upon the conflict in Darfur as origin for the unrest in eastern Chad. According to Djiraibe, the exclusion of a political mandate limited potential achievements of the force because insecurity in the east resulted from the internal conflict in Chad as well. French officials justified the removal of political mandate with the absence of open conflict in Chad

(Djiraibe 2010 [interview]). Hence, it reflected the claim that unrest in Chad was first and foremost a spill-over from the conflict in Darfur and not originating from an internal conflict. It can therefore be seen as an expression of support to Déby. As seen in the first part of this chapter, France contributed with substantial support to Déby during the rebellion in April 2006. The importance of the French assistance in the Chadian defence should make France in a position to influence Chad. Hence, if France had considered a political mandate as important, it should be able to put pressure on Déby. The absence of a mandate indicates that the protection of civilians was not the only objective behind the operation.

The force can also be considered as contributing to present EU as a military actor on the African continent through the promotion of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). EUFOR was notably the “largest, longest and most challenging military operation in Africa” conducted by EU (Seibert 2010:3). It was to a large extent perceived as a “credibility test” of the ESDP (Le Monde 2008a). However, as I will come back to, France invested considerably more in the operation than the other member states. Taking into account that the promotion of EU should be perceived as an advantage for all the member states, the French willingness to contribute to a larger extent than other EU-member indicates that France had more interests in the operation than them. Therefore, the importance of the EU does not seem to explain the French contribution fully either.

The last explanation behind the French involvement is based on EUFOR’s contribution to the overall protection of the Chadian regime. As argued above, the continuation of Déby’s regime was considered in France’s interest at the moment of the elaboration of EUFOR. The Chadian context was to an increasing extent marked by the internal conflict and intensified rebel activity. Déby’s position can therefore have been perceived as fragile. At the same time, France did not want to intervene unilaterally to assure the survival of the regime in an eventual military attack by rebels due to the political cost attached to it. Thus, other measures protecting or strengthening the regime would be in French interests since it would reduce the risk of having to intervene directly to maintain Déby in power. EUFOR was considered to play such a role, even if the mandate did not open up for direct support to Déby (Le Monde 2008b). According to the French defence minister, Hervé Morein, EUFOR would reduce the number of rebel incursions on Chadian territory (Libération 2008b). It could therefore be expected to reduce the need for French unilateral implication to assure the survival of the Chadian regime. In addition, a European force under a UN mandate was likely to receive less

criticism than a French operation. Hence, for France, EUFOR can be perceived as a way to continue to strengthen Déby's regime without the same political cost as a French engagement. Also, the economic cost of an operation would be lower for France if there were several contributors. These two elements were to cause scepticism among certain EU members with regard to the French objectives behind the operation.

6.2.3 Scepticism among European countries

The idea about an international force in Chad had been around since the beginning of 2006. France was one of the actors taking the initiative to concretise and implement the idea of an international security presence in eastern Chad, repeating the proposal several times during 2006 and 2007 (Tubiana 2008:53). The other member states of the EU were not as positive to such an intervention as France; they feared EU was being "instrumentalised for a French agenda" (Seibert 2010:10). There were two suspicions attached to the French motivation. First, due to the military relationship between France and Chad, there was a fear that the real intention behind EUFOR was to strengthen Déby's regime and not to protect the civilians. Second, there was also a worry that France sought to reduce its costs of military engagements in Africa (Seibert 2010:10). Thus, the other member states questioned if the latter dimension of the French motivation behind EUFOR was not the most important. However France eventually managed to gather enough support for the planning of the operation to start.

France originally wanted to provide less than half of the soldiers and the material needed for the operation (Le Monde 2007b). This can be seen as an attempt to reduce own costs. However, it can also be considered a way of reducing the criticism towards the operation. Due to the military relationship between France and Chad, concerns were raised about whether EUFOR could be a neutral force if including French forces (Mérand and Rakotonirina 2009:108). In the end, France had to exceed the quota it initially aimed for, due to absence of willingness among other states to provide forces. Important EU- members, like Germany and United Kingdom, were reluctant to participate. While the German refusal was based on a scepticism towards the operation, United Kingdom was withholding forces due to already extensive military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan (Seibert 2010:16, fn 67). The mission was already delayed from November 2007 until February 2008 because of lack of contributions in the areas of logistics and aviation. To avoid further delays or an eventual cancelling of the operation, the French input was increased so the resources available matched

the minimum requirement to make the mission operational. As a result, France provided 2100 of the 3700 soldiers (Libération 2008a). France was also designated as the logistical lead nation of EUFOR (Seibert 2010:17). Since each state covered the costs of their deployment and its sustainment, the cost of the operation became considerably higher for France than for the other participants. In the end, France assured 75 per cent of the costs attached to the force (Granvaud 2009:246). Hence, due to the economic cost attached to EUFOR for Chad, the legitimising effect of an intervention in a multilateral framework seems to have been of extensive importance to France.

6.2.4 The Chadian president's reluctance against an international force

Not only did the other EU-members needed to be convinced, but also Déby. At first he opposed a military international force stationed in Chad. The refusal was partly due to a fear that such a military presence in eastern Chad would limit his range of options considering the conflict in Darfur. Any force including a border-monitoring component, or the presence of international forces inside the refugee camps, was rejected because of eventual hindrance to the general support provided to the Darfurian rebels and the use of refugee camps by both rebels and the Chadian army to recruit new members (Seibert 2010:8). Furthermore, he also suspected a military force to be accompanied with an obligation to initiate an open and inclusive internal dialogue under international control (ICG 2008:32, Le Monde 2007a). Thus, both the use of the conflict in Darfur to strengthen his regime as well as his unwillingness to open up for political negotiation in Chad made Déby suspicious with regard to an international intervention. Therefore, the Chadian president continued to refuse proposals presented by the Secretary-General, the last included in the report on Chad and the Central African Republic from February 2007, S/2007/97 (ICG 2008:32).

After the last refusal, France suggested that the EU could be responsible for the military aspect of the operation through deploying a European force, while the UN assured the rest of it. The latter proposal, “an international military presence in eastern Chad composed of French and other European Union forces” was accepted by Déby during a meeting with the French foreign minister, Kouchner on 10 June 2007 (S/2007/488 2007). According to ICG, Déby accepted it because of assurances that French forces would play an important role in it. Due to the long relationship between Chad and France, the Chadian regime was more

comfortable with French forces on their territory than UN forces (ICG 2008:32). The fact that Déby approved the force indicates that he had been assured by France that his concerns would be respected. Furthermore, it also indicates that it was a gain for the Chadian president by accepting it. For some observers, the French offer was seen as unconditional support to the regime because all pressure considering a political mandate was removed (Seibert 2010:10).

6.2.5 The perception of EUFOR among Chadian actors

The rebels perceived EUFOR as direct support to the present regime and therefore declared a state of war with the force. In a press release from July 2007, rebel groups⁷⁷ stated that they:

strongly condemn[ed] French government initiatives aiming to transform the French troops in Chad into a European force under the pretext of protecting Sudanese refugees from Darfur, and Chadian displaced persons, and of guaranteeing border and national security. The intervention of these foreign forces in Chad is unacceptable to us because the undeclared aim of this Machiavellian manoeuvre is to save a failing regime at all costs... The armed opposition warns the countries of the European Union who are tempted by this military adventure, as it will have disastrous repercussions and risks leading them directly into a conflict with our armed forces. (Tubiana 2008:54)

The rebels⁷⁸ repeated their demand to European states to abstain from participating after the attack in February 2008, claiming the force's final aim was to protect Déby's regime (Tubiana 2008:54).

The time of the attack on N'Djamena in February 2008 was considered as provoked by the implementation of the force; it was a last attempt to avoid the deployment of the troops (De Waal 2008). This indicates that the rebels perceived the force as a strengthening of the regime which would make it harder to succeed in overthrowing Déby. However, it also points to a potential link between the survival of Déby's regime and the deployment of EUFOR. This impression was confirmed by some of the informants. For pro-governmental informants the implementation of the force was conditioned upon this survival because of the close connection between the rebels and the Sudanese government. According to the informants, the Sudanese government was against the force because of its potential implications for the crisis in Darfur as well as reduced possibilities to destabilise the Chadian regime. Furthermore, Khartoum was considered to fear an international military presence in the

⁷⁷ Chad National Concord/Convention (CNT), RFC, UFDD and UFDD-Fundamental.

⁷⁸ RFC, UFDD and UFDD-Fundamental.

eastern Chad because it would increase the probability of an intervention into Darfur (Moussa Doumgor 2010 [interview] and Haggar 2010 [interview]). Kebzabo also considered EUFOR to depend upon Déby's victory, but not for the same reasons; "Without Déby, EUFOR would not have been deployed. It was a French-Chadian affair." (Kebzabo 2010 [interview]). If the force was a protection to the actual regime, the mission's *raison d'être* would disappear with a change of regime.

Not all the informants were as clear on the necessity of the survival of Déby's regime for EUFOR to be deployed. According to Maoundonodji, representatives of the rebellion had stated in an interview that they would not have a problem with the European force if they were in power (Maoundonodji 2010 [interview]). This is not necessarily contradictory to the declaration of war preciously made: the rebels had objections against EUFOR first and foremost because it was perceived as a protection of the regime in place. However, if the rebels were in favour of a regime, in other words, if a regime change took place before the deployment; they would not necessarily be against the force. Hence, to what extent the deployment depended upon the survival of Déby's regime in February 2008 is hard to assess. As summarised by Djiraibe when asked about the link between the two events; "it's hard to predict, the situation is complex" (Djiraibe 2010 [interview]).

The Chadian president asked UN for an international force to police its eastern borders after the rebel attack in 2006 (Tubiana 2006:16). The timing of the request indicates that Déby considered that such a force would prevent new rebellions on the Chadian territory. The Chadian foreign minister, Ahmat Allam-Mi, stated during a press conference after the events in February 2008 that "EUFOR will be able to discourage rebels coming from Sudan and to discourage Sudan itself from attacking Chad" (Ahmat Allam-Mi, quoted in Tubiana 2008:17). EUFOR was therefore clearly perceived as a force with a dissuasive effect on new attacks by the Chadian regime, despite its mandate being limited to the protection of civilians and humanitarian work, and not include assuring the integrity of the Chadian territory. Not only was the force expected to reduce the number of attacks, but it was also considered to relieve the Chadian army from some responsibilities; "[EUFOR will] free us of the weight of being responsible for the security of 300 000 Sudanese refugees and 170 000 Chadian internally displaced people. It is a significant burden that mobilises many of our forces." (Déby quoted in Tubiana 2008:17). Hence, several Chadian forces would be available to fight eventual incursions by the rebels.

From their statements, it is clear that Chadian actors, both pro-governmental and in opposition, perceived the operation as a support to the regime in place. The fact that representatives for the government shared such an opinion indicates that the force had been presented in such a way by French officials to get Déby's acceptance. As commented before, Déby's approval indicates that he had something to win by doing so.

6.2.6 The end of the mission

EUFOR was from the outset intended as a bridge-operation to be implemented while a UN-force was put together to replace it. Responsibilities were eventually handed over to a UN force on 15 March 2009. The new force, MINURCAT 2, continued with the same mandate as the EUFOR force (S/RES/1861 2009). According to EU, the EUFOR was a success story characterised by "impartiality, neutrality and independence" (European Union @ United Nations 2009). Déby was not as satisfied with the force. He questioned the purpose of EUFOR due to its neutrality and lack of intervention when rebels attacked eastern parts of Chad (ICG 2008:34). This further strengthens the argument that the force was viewed by Déby as an assistance to consolidate his regime. The actual effect of the deployment of EUFOR has been questioned and is difficult to assess. According to Seibert, EUFOR did contribute to "the establishment of a safe and secure environment", but it did not have a long term impact on the security situation in eastern Chad (Seibert 2010:41).⁷⁹ ICG claimed that the European force was an expression of French foreign policy objectives and had contributed to strengthen Déby's regime (Granvaud 2009:254). EUFOR promoted the same aim as the French foreign policy; however, the economic and political cost for France was reduced compared to a unilateral engagement.

MINURCATs mandate was renewed for a year and in 2010, Déby seemed reluctant to prolong it. After negotiations with UN representatives, Déby agreed to extend the mandate until May 2010 and the UN forces were to start gradually withdrawing on 27 May 2010. By the end of December 2010 the whole mission is supposed to have left Chad. During 2010, the Chadian government takes over all the responsibilities included in the UN-mandate (UN 2010). The ending of the mandate was according to ICG motivated by the weak impact of the force on the security situation in the east as well as the expected reduction in the internal conflict level following the normalisation of the relationship with Sudan (ICG 2010:9).

⁷⁹ For a more extensive analysis of EUFOR see Mérand and Rakotonirina 2009 or Seibert 2010.

However, humanitarian organizations claim that the Chadian army does not have the competence required for taking over the mission. The main problem is not the material capacities but rather the previous implication of the national army in the instability itself, and the army is therefore not considered to have the capacity of protecting civilians (ICG 2010:9).

Compared to the important role played by France in realising the mission, its absence in the negotiations to convince the Chadian president to prolong the mandate was striking. This has led to speculations about a French' willingness to see an end to the mission (ICG 2010:10). According to Nekim, this absence can be explained by the achievement of the French motivation behind EUFOR; “Déby was maintained in power” (Nekim 2010 [interview]). During the deployment of EUFOR, the Chadian government invested in the army and therefore increased their capacity of resisting an eventual rebel attack. Hence, the intervention can be said to have succeeded in promoting EU as well as maintaining Déby in power. However, with regard to the first dimension of the French motivation, bringing stability to eastern Chad, the record is more uncertain. The lack of French resistance to the ending of the UN-mission despite the ambiguity attached to the consequences for eastern Chad can be taken as support for the argument that the situation there was neither the only motivation behind the French initiative, nor the most important. This is in accordance with the analysis of the conflict of Darfur as a potential way to improve French reputation; the importance of Darfur to French interests lies first and foremost in its legitimating effect on policies intended to support Déby.

6.3 French contributions to the short term and the long term survival of Déby’s regime

Through all three situations analysed in this chapter France is considered to have provided assistance to the present Chadian regime with the aim of strengthening it and thereby increase its chances of survival. The support provided during the rebellions sought to assure the survival against an imminent threat: a military takeover by the rebels. In both cases the support provided exceeded the content of the technical cooperation agreement due to the intelligence aid provided as well as the direct actions taken which benefitted Déby’s defence. Hence, the French actions in April 2006 and February 2008 clearly indicated that France was in favour of the survival of the present regime and that it was willing to back its will with military support. EUFOR can also be perceived as a contribution to consolidate the regime in

a long term perspective: by reducing the number of rebel incursions on the Chadian territory Déby would have the time to reinforce his defence through building up the army as well as invest in military equipment instead of defeating successive attacks. Therefore, independently from the nature of the support, if it was direct or indirect, the French assistance changed the equilibrium in the combats between the Chadian regime and the rebellion by favouring the regime and thereby the conflict's outcome. Hence, the French support provided, especially during the rebellions, constituted interference in Chadian internal affairs.

To evaluate to what extent the support was provided because France wanted to maintain Déby's regime or to avoid a change, is difficult. The risk of a civil war attached to a change in regime based upon the lack of a unified rebel coalition can be considered as constantly present. Hereafter, concerns with regard to the consequences of such a change are viewed as strengthening the assistance to Déby's regime without necessarily expressing a support for that particular regime. In February 2008 certain observers claimed that France was in dialogue with the rebels before deciding to continue to support Déby. If that is true, such a negotiation would strengthen the argument that the assistance provided to Déby is first and foremost motivated by avoiding a change in regime because of the lack of a clear alternative would lead to conflict. However, new French concerns attached to Zoë's Ark affaire and the deployment of EUFOR indicate that the present regime should have increased in value; Déby had accepted the European force and the negotiation with regard to the French members of Zoë's Ark was already initiated. Nevertheless, it is not so much the qualities attached to the present regime which makes it favourable than it being the regime in place; it is likely that the French preference for the status quo is related to the uncertainty connected to a change in regime, and the consequences for French interests instead of Déby's regime in itself. Thus, the French support can be expected to be maintained as long as France does not consider another alternative regime as credible.

As argued above, France provided both direct and indirect support to Déby in the rebellions. The indirect assistance did mainly consist of logistical and intelligence assistance and constituted the foundation for the Chadian defence. Even if the French official version of no involvement of French soldiers in the combats is accepted, the indirect aid was central; the intelligence support was the base for the construction of the Chadian strategy of defence while the logistical assistance contributed to the framework which enabled the Chadian forces to continue the battle. This support did not include a direct intervention in terms of French

soldiers on in the battle; however it did considerably change the power equilibrium in the combats by providing an important advantage to the Chadian regime compared to the rebels. Further, this element can be perceived as reflecting French' will to support the regime but excluding the use of force. Nevertheless, France did also resort to military force and thereby indicating that the use of force is still considered a fruitful tool to promote national interests. The cases where French officials acknowledged to have used military means were justified through reference to the principle of self-defence. Hence, the lack of political use of force is perceived as reflecting absence of legitimacy rather than a general unwillingness to use force; France avoided using military means to promote its own interests because of the political cost attached if it cannot be justified with reference to a mandate from the Security Council or the principle of self-defence. The importance added to an international mandate in February 2008 reflects the increased French concerns attached to the continuation of the regime, at the same time as the conditions for the deployment of EUFOR had heightened the cost of using force without a recognised justification. The indirect support provided through EUFOR can be considered as an attempt to avoid the necessity to use force in the future to maintain Déby in power. Thus, the French indirect assistance indicates a willingness to keep the present regime, at the same as France is reluctant to use military means to assure such an objective unless it can be legitimised.

This indicates that the French refusal to use force is attached to its political cost. Hence, it can be considered an option as long as it remains unknown, which leads to a discussion about the possibility that France provided hidden assistance to the regime. Due to the categorical rejection from French officials about such support, coupled with the lack of material proving it, an evaluation of this possibility is based upon contradictory statements. Therefore, to what extent it did happen or not will remain an unanswered question. However, situated in the context outlined by the considerations made above, such support seems possible. Through direct intervention, claimed to be part of the protection of the French citizens, France indicated a will of using force to promote its own interests. This is especially valid in the case of the warning shot where the link between the action and the justification seems too weak for the protection of the French citizens to be the only element motivating the shot. For that reason, in such a framework the deployment of French Special Forces to further support Déby's regime is not unimaginable.

7 Conclusion

In this thesis, I have studied the French use of military means to promote national interests in Chad during the last five years. To answer the research question I first analysed French interests in Chad and in particular those attached to the French military presence in the country. Then I evaluated to what extent the protection of these interests was connected to the survival of the present Chadian regime. In the last part of the analysis I examined the French military policy in Chad during this period. To do so, I used a theoretical framework based upon central concepts of realism that also included more applied theoretical approaches to the use of force as a tool to promote national interests.

Based on the outlined theory, I chose to focus on three dimensions when examining French interests in Chad: security, economy and prestige. In accordance with the comprehension of the security challenges facing the contemporary states, my approach to the concept of a state's security was rather wide, so it exceeded the definition of the core interests as a state's territorial integrity. My main finding from the analysis of the interests is that the security dimension appears to be the most important aspect for France and hence believed to be dominant when the military policy is outlined. There are three main concerns which emanate from the French military presence in Chad: the first interest is the training possibilities offered by the Chadian territory for French forces. The exercise is considered important to strengthen the French military and thereby prepare it for international engagements related to French security, like the engagement in Afghanistan. Furthermore, a military presence in Chad is of interest, due to new concerns about terrorism in the Sahel belt. The French forces in Chad enable France to maintain a capacity of intervention with regard to a threat that risks challenging French interests in the Sahelian belt as well as on the French territory itself. Last, the military forces are essential in the protection of French nationals residing in Chad as well as neighbouring countries prone to unrest.

These interests are perceived as more important than the concerns with regard to economy and prestige. Economic interests are considered too limited in scope compared to the total French economy to have any major impact on the military policy. Regarding prestige, the conflict in Darfur is believed to be viewed by France as having a potential role in improving its reputation with regard to involvement on the African continent. However, the analysis of France and its initiatives concerning the conflict reveals that the conflict is first and foremost

of importance because it can justify French support to Déby's regime as essential to contain the conflict. Based upon the analysis, France does not seem willing to initiate or support measures which might weaken the Chadian regime. This is likely to result from the connections between French interests and the survival of the present regime. Hence, in accordance with realist predictions, the interests in the security domain are added more importance than those attached to prestige and status. However, it also indicates the perception of former colonies as a sphere where French interests can be promoted without taking into consideration the implication in the domestic affairs of another state.

As a consequence of the analysis of interests, the focus when evaluating the connection between French interests in Chad and the survival of Déby's regime has been upon French security concerns attached to its military presence. From the analysis it seems that the French support to Déby was motivated by two elements of insecurity attached to an eventual change of regime. First, the extent that a new regime would allow a continued military presence with the same conditions was uncertain due to the rebels' dependence upon the regime in Khartoum. The Sudanese influence on a regime originating from a rebellion, might have been expected by France to be stronger than in previous cases due to the conflict in Darfur. Second, a change of regime might have led to the outbreak of a new civil war or increased internal unrest because of the divisions in the rebel movement. This could have put the Operation Sparrowhawk at risk because of the increased costs attached to it or just threatened some of the concerns it is intended to address. According to the analysis, the latter element is considered to have constituted a bigger peril than the first. However, they both favour the support for the regime in place and thereby the maintenance of *status quo*. Due to the French military's self-interest, attached to the ongoing Operation, the military is likely to have emphasised the risk attached to a change of regime with regard to French interests. Thus, the French support provided to Déby is believed to result from a perception that French interests are better preserved if Déby remains president.

The main finding from the assessment of the French military policy is two-folded. First, France deliberately strengthened Déby's regime through indirect support. As viewed in chapter 6, the indirect support provided through the rebellions was of considerable significance to the Chadian defence. It improved the regime's capacity to defeat the imminent threat of an overthrow by rebels. EUFOR can also be seen as partially intended by France to strengthen Déby through reducing the number of rebel attacks. However, the extent EUFOR

fulfilled such a role is more uncertain. The assistance can be considered to have had two aims: Its main objective was to favour the maintenance of Déby's regime. However, it can also be viewed as an attempt to avoid the necessity of intervening more directly. The Chadian regime was considerably strengthened through indirect support and thereby its capacity to defeat the rebels increased. In so, the need for a French direct intervention to maintain the regime in power was reduced. Since the victory over the rebels is believed to have been achieved faster if French forces had engaged in the battles, the French insistence on limiting its support to indirect means indicates a French reluctance to use force.

However, the unwillingness to use military means did not translate into a total abstention from it; in both rebellions French forces fired at Chadian rebels under the justification of self-defence due to the purpose of protecting French nationals. This leads us to the second main finding of the study: French reluctance to use force to support Déby seems to be based upon its political cost. Through indirect support, France indicated a wish to maintain Déby's regime in power. Furthermore, the French military superiority compared to the rebellions' armament made it likely that French use of military means would achieve such an aim rapidly. In addition, the warning shot and the defence of the airport, as well as the expressed willingness to intervene directly after the Security Council issued its statement in 2008, indicate a French disposition to use force as long as it can be justified and legitimate. The French comprehension of the legitimacy behind the warning shot and the interpretation of the mandate from the Security Council also show that France had a generous comprehension of which situations could be considered to legitimate the case of military means. Hereafter, the absence of a more extensive use of force seems to originate from the political cost attached to the use of such means and not a French unwillingness to deploy such tools *per se*. Based upon these observations, the accusation that France deployed Special Forces cannot be ruled out as long as France considered it possible to keep such an intervention secret. Nevertheless, the French use of force to support Déby seems to have remained limited due to the potential political cost of such an intervention.

The analysis therefore indicates a French military policy in Chad that aimed at preserving the present regime due to its significance for the preservation of French interests in Chad. However, the tools available to maintain the regime were limited; France did not appear to consider open direct intervention in the internal conflict without such an act being legitimised. Furthermore, France seemed to attempt to make its support to Déby more acceptable through

justifying its necessity with reference to the conflict in Darfur as well as taking the initiative for a multilateral intervention. Nevertheless, the French motivation behind its military presence in Chad seems to remain unchanged, independently if the presence is a unilateral or a multilateral engagement. The aim behind the French policy, to avoid the overthrow of an allied regime in a former colony to preserve French interests, can be seen as in continuation with the policy during the Cold War. However, the post-Cold War-context has imposed significant constraints on the range of policy-options that are considered as available to achieve such an objective. In the case of Chad, the French policy objective seemed to have remained mainly unchanged from the Cold War-period, but the applicability of tools of foreign policy including the use of force has changed.

The thesis has studied the military dimension of the cooperation between France and Chad. Hence, a more complete comprehension of to what extent the colonial heritage also has continued to mark other dimensions of this relationship requires further studies. In addition, since the findings indicate that the idea of a French sphere of influence in Chad to a certain extent persists among French policy-makers, further studies to shed light on the character of the relationship between France and other former Sub-Saharan colonies would be valuable to complete the insights acquired from this study.

The observations made above with regard to French use of force to promote national interests in Chad are also interesting for the political use of military means more generally. The study of French military policy in Chad shows that the concept of legitimacy is an efficient tool to restrict a state's range of options with regard to acceptable ways of achieving the objectives of foreign policy. However, the analysis shows that the restriction imposed by the norms can be contoured in two different ways. First, due to concerns about negative impact on its reputation, a state may consider to use undercover operations, if possible, to promote national interests without causing criticism and negative reactions. Nevertheless, the potential size and scope of such intervention are likely to remain limited since the chances of awareness of such actions are expected to increase at the same time as its dimensions. Second, the norms regulating the use of force and especially mandates from the Security Council are prone to be used to validate interventions first and foremost motivated by national interests if these can be justified by reference to other more acceptable concerns, like containing the conflict in Darfur. As visible on the French justification of the warning shot and the understanding of the content of the mandate from the Security Council, the comprehension of when the use of

force is deemed acceptable is subject to interpretations. Hence, the norms risk to be used as a tool to legitimise actions despite motivations originating from national interests. The importance added to these norms indicates that it can be considered as rational for France to support them due to its permanent membership in the Security Council and the following right of veto with regard to issuing mandates opening up for legitimate use of force.

Furthermore, the analysis also indicates that through its military support France has had a substantial impact on Chadian internal affairs. To say whether the French assistance decided the outcome of the confrontation between the Chadian rebels and the Chadian regime is not easy. However, France at least facilitated the regime's victory to a considerable extent. The French implication in Chad is by some observers criticised for promoting French interests without addressing its impact on Chadian internal affairs. Hence, France can be considered as potentially hindering a political solution to the power conflict still characterising Chad. A more thorough understanding of the implication of the French interference on the Chadian development demands further studies.

Literature

Agir Ici – Survie (1999). *Projet pétrolier Tchad-Cameroun. Dés pipés sur le pipe-line*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Agreement on technical military cooperation (1976). Military cooperation agreement between France and Chad, signed 6 March. <http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/30/17/00058811.pdf> [Consulted 24.11.2010]

Ayangafac, Chrysantus (2009). *Resolving the Chadian Political Epilepsy: An Assessment of Intervention Efforts*. ISS: Situation Report.

Azevedo, Mario J. (1998). *Roots of Violence. A History of War in Chad*. Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach Publishers.

BBC (2005). "Analysis: NATO's role in Darfur". <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4498409.stm>> [Consulted 22.11.2010]

BBC (2008a). "Q&A: Chad rebellion", 4 February. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7225023.stm>> [Consulted 03.11.2010]

BBC (2008b). "France faces tough choices over Chad", article by Hugh Schofield 4 April. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7227290.stm>> [Consulted 04.11.2010]

Blomdahl, Mikael (2008). *The Political Use of Force. Beyond National Security Considerations as a Source of American Foreign Policy*. Doctoral thesis. Stockholm: Department of Political Science, Stockholm University.

Buijtenhuijs, Robert (1984). "L'art de ménager la chèvre et le chou. La politique tchadienne de François Mitterand", *Politique Africaine* 16:102-117.

Buijtenhuijs, Robert (1998). "Chad in the age of the warlords" in David Birmingham and Phyllis M. Martin (eds.). *History of Central Africa. The contemporary years since 1960*. London, New York: Longman.

Burr, Millard J. and Robert O. Collins (2008). *Darfur: the long road to disaster*. Princeton, New Jersey: Markus Wiener Publisher.

Chafer, Tony (2001). "French African Policy in Historical Perspective", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 19(2):165-182.

Chafer, Tony (2002). "Franco-African Relations: No longer so exceptional?", *African Affairs* 101:343-363.

Charbonneau, Bruno (2008). "Dreams of Empire: France, Europe, and the New Interventionism in Africa", *Modern & Contemporary France*, 16:279-295.

Chipman, John (1989). *French Power in Africa*. Oxford : Basic Blackwell.

Choua, Lol Mahamat (2010). *Interview with politician*. 31 September.

Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP (2007). *Council Joint Action on the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic*. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/l_279/l_27920071023en00210024.pdf> [Consulted 09.12.2010]

Daly, Martin William (2007). *Darfur's sorrow. A History of Destruction and Genocide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

De Waal, Alex eds. (2007). *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University.

De Waal, Alex (2008). "Making Sense of Chad", *Pambuzka News* 342 <http://www.pambazuka.org/en/issue/342#cat_1> [Consulted 02.11.2010]

Didame, Michaël N.(2010). *Interview with journalist*. 19 August.

Djasnabaille, Abderamane (2010). *Interview with the Minister of Human Rights and Promotion of Freedoms*. 30 September.

Djiraibe, Déphine (2010). *Interview with Human Rights lawyer*. 4 September.

Donnelly, Jack (2000). *Realism and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dougherty, James E. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr (2001). *Contending theories of international relations. A comprehensive survey*. New York: Longman.

Dunne, Tim and Brian C. Schmidt (2001). "Realism" in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.). *The globalization of world politics. An introduction to international relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Egeberg, Halvor S. and Anders Kjølberg (2001). *The growing gap between force and power*. FFI rapport 2001/01363. Oslo: FFI.

Eurostat (2010). *EU direct investment positions, breakdown by country and economic activity*. <<http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do>> [Consulted 23.11.2010]

European Union @ United Nations (2009). EU Presidency welcomes successful handover from EUFOR Chad/CAR to MINURCAT. 17 March. <http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_8581_fr.htm> [Consulted 30.10.2010]

Flint, Julie (2007). "Darfur's armed movements" in Alex De Waal (eds.). *War in Darfur and the search for peace*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University.

France24 (2010). "Niger Kidnappings: gangs and terrorism in the Sahel" <<http://www.france24.com/en/20100920-niger-kidnappings-gangs-and-terrorism-in-the-sahel>> [Consulted 22.11.2010]

Freedman, Lawrence (1998-99). "The Changing Forms of Military Conflict", *Survival* 40(4):39-56.

George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Gerring, John (2007). *Case Study Research. Principles and Practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gounin, Yves (2009). *La France en Afrique. Le combat des anciens et des modernes*. Brüssel: Group de Boeck.

Granvaud, Raphaël (2009). *Que Fait l'armée française en Afrique?* Dossiers noirs 23. Marseille: Agone

Gregory, Shaun (2000). "The French Military in Africa: Past and Present", *African Affairs* 99:435-448.

Guzzini, Stefano (1998). *Realism in international relations and international political economy. The continuing story of a death foretold*. London, New York: Routledge.

Haggar, Ali (2010). *Interview with economist*. 20 August.

Hansen, Ketil Fred (2009). "Fra Françafrique til Euroafrique? Endringer i fransk afrikapolitikk de siste 15 årene", *Internasjonal politikk* 2:174-196.

Holsti, Kavli J. (1992). *International Politics. A Framework for Analysis*. New Jersey : Prentice-Hall.

ICG (2006). *Tchad: Vers le retour de la guerre*. Rapport Afrique 111.

ICG (2008). *Chad: A New Conflict Resolution Framework*. Africa Report 144.

ICG (2010). *Tchad: au-delà de l'apaisement*. Rapport Afrique 162.

ICJ (1994). *Case concerning the territorial dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad)*. <<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/83/6899.pdf>> [Consulted 03.01.2011]

Jervis, Robert (1994). "Hans Morgenthau, Realism, and the Scientific Study of International Politics", *Social research* 61(4):853-876.

Jeune Afrique (2006). "Jusqu'à quand?", article by François Soudan 16-22 April.

Jeune Afrique (2008). "La bataille de N'Djamena", article by Christopher Boisbouvier 10 – 16 February.

Jeune Afrique (2009). Idriss Déby Itno: "Je ne suis ni un tueur ni un dictateur", interview by C. Yérin Seck 15 July.

Kezabo, Saleh (2010). *Interview with politician*. 5 September.

Kessler, Marie-Christine (1999). *La politique étrangère de la France. Acteurs et processus*. Paris : Presses de Sciences Po.

Kwitou Ngofang, Hermann (2010). *Relations économiques entre le Tchad et la France*, <e-mail to Arnhild Arntsen, 27.08.2010>

L'Observateur (2008a). "Ombres et interrogations", article by Dieudonné Gata Nder 14 February.

L'Observateur (2008b). "Pourquoi les rebelles ont-ils échoué?", article by Samory Ngaradoumbé 14 February.

La Croix (2006). "Dossier : Violences au Tchad. FRANCE. Embarrassé, Paris soutient néanmoins le président tchadien. Idriss Déby a maintes fois appuyé les stratégies françaises en Afrique.", article by Laurent Ersu 14 April.

La Croix (2008). "La France a permis à Idriss Déby de sauver son régime", article by Laurent Ersu 8 February.

La Croix (2010). "La question du jour; La présence militaire de la France au Tchad est-elle utile?", article by Laurent Ersu 13 August.

Law nr 001/PR/1999 (1999). *The Petroleum Revenue Management Law*. <<http://www.cefod.org/spip.php?article1097>> [Consulted 26.11.2010]

Law nr 002/PR/2006 (2006). *Amendement to the Petroleum Revenue Management Law*. <<http://www.cefod.org/spip.php?article1065>> [Consulted 26.11.2010]

Le Figaro (2006a). "Paris soutien le président Idriss Déby", article by Patrick Saint-Exupery 13 April.

Le Figaro (2006b). "Chronologie: l'offensive des rebelles". 14 April.

Le Figaro (2006c). ""Soutien sans participation" de l'armée française", article by Arnaud La Grange 14 April

Le Figaro (2006d). "L'armée française a aidé le pouvoir tchadien", article by Patrick Saint-Exupery 18 April.

Le Figaro (2008a). "Le déploiement de la force européenne à la frontière du Darfour est suspendu", article by Arnaud La Grange, 4 February.

Le Figaro (2008b). "Paris a volé au secours de a victoire d'Idriss Déby", article by Alain Barluet 6 February.

Le Figaro (2010). "Le Tchad remet en cause la présence militaire française", article by Aelle Thedrel 12 August.

Le livre blanc (2008). "Défense et Sécurité Nationale". Paris: La documentation française.

Le Monde (2006a). "Paris ne défendrait pas le régime tchadien en cas de coup d'Etat", article by Philippe Bernard and Laurent Zecchini 1 April.

Le Monde (2006b). "Au Chad, l'offensive de la rébellion vise le pouvoir de N'Djamena et inquiète Paris", article by Laurent Zecchini 13 April.

Le Monde (2006c). "Les rebelles tchadiens ont lancé leur offensive sur N'Djamena", article by Laurent Zecchini 14 April.

Le Monde (2006d). "La France indécise devant le nouveau conflit tchadien" 14 April.

Le Monde (2006e). "L'armée tchadienne repousse l'offensive rebelle menée contre N'Djamena", article by Philippe Bernard 15 April.

Le Monde (2006f). "Le piège tchadien". 18 April.

Le Monde (2006g). "Au Tchad, des officiers français évoquent leur mission et le "tir de semence" contre les rebelles", article by Philippe Bernard 19 April.

Le Monde (2006h). "A l'agression armée, nous répondons en organisant la démocratie dans les délais prévus", article by Philippe Bernard 20 April.

Le Monde (2007a). "Idriss Déby accepte le déploiement d'une force européenne au Tchad", article by Jean-Pierre Tuquoi 21 July.

Le Monde (2007b). "Paris peine à obtenir des soldats d'autres pays de l'Union", article by Laurent Zecchini 25 September.

Le Monde (2008a). "L'Union européenne lance l'opération Eufor au Tchad et en Centrafrique", article by Laurent Zecchini 30 January.

Le Monde (2008b). "La France renforce son dispositif militaire au Tchad". 1 February.

Le Monde (2008c), "La France obtient le soutien de l'ONU pour le Tchad", article by Philippe Bernard, Philippe Bolopion and Natalie Nougayrède 6 February.

Le Monde (2008d). "A N'Djamena, les combats se sont arrêtés mais l'incertitude persiste", article by Jean-Philippe Rémy 7 February.

Le Monde (2008e), "Après le cessez-le-feu, la France accentue son soutien à Idriss Déby", article by Philippe Bernard 7 February.

Le Monde (2008f). "La France a apporté une aide militaire indirecte mais décisive au régime de Déby", 7 February.

Le Monde (2008g), "Tchad: Paris avait décidé de ne pas intervenir", article by Philippe Bernard and Natalie Nougayrède 8 February.

Le Monde (2008h). "Paris à l'épreuve du guépier tchadien", article by Jean-Philippe Rémy 2 March.

Le Monde (2010). "La France prête à envisager une contrepartie pour maintenir sa présence militaire au Tchad", article 11 August.

Le Monde Diplomatique (2008). "Tentatives de coup d'Etat, rébellions transfrontalières, ingérences étrangères; Comment le conflit au Darfour déstabilise le Tchad", article by Gérard Prunier 1 March.

Le Temps (2006). "Chirac, un fauteur de troubles", article by Michaël N. Didame 19 – 25 April.

Lemarchand, René (1986). "Chad: The Misadventures of the North-South Dialectic", *African Studies Review* 29(3):27-41.

Libération (2008a). "La France donne un coup de pouce pour mettre l'Eufor sur les rails", article by Christophe Ayad 11 January.

Libération (2008b). "Idriss Déby menacé par les rebelles", article by Thomas Hofnung 2 February.

Libération (2008c). "N'Djamena secoué par l'arme lourde", article by Sonia Rolley 4 February.

Libération (2008d). "Paris soutient Déby, mais pas trop", article by Thomas Hofnung, 5 February.

Lijphart, Arend (1971). "Comparative politics and the comparative method", *American Political Science Review* 65(3):682-693.

Luckham, Robin (1982). "Le militarisme français en Afrique", *Politique Africaine* 5:95-110.

Malafosse, Antoine (2008). "Tchad, une continuité de conflits", *Etudes* 409:19-29.

Mamdani, Mahmood (2009). *Saviours and Survivors. Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror*. London: Verso.

Maoundonodji, Gilbert (2009). *Les enjeux géopolitiques et géostratégiques de l'exploitation du pétrol au Tchad*. Doctoral thesis. Louvain: Department of Political and Social Sciences, Catholic University of Louvain.

Maoundonodji, Gilbert (2010). *Interview*. 1 September.

Marchal, Roland (2007). "The unseen regional implications of the crisis in Darfur" in Alex De Waal (eds.), *War in Darfur and the search for peace*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University.

Martin, Lawrence (1973). "The utility of Military Force." *Adelphi Papers* 13(102):14-21.

Matlary, Janne H. (2009). *European Union Security Dynamics. In the New National Interest*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Médard, Jean-François (1997). "France-Africa: within the family" in Donatella Della Porta and Yves Mény (eds.), *Democracy and Corruption in Europe*. London: Pinter.

Mérand, Frédéric and Haingo Mireille Rakotonirina (2009). "La force européenne au Tchad et en Centrafrique: le baptême du feu", *Politique Africaine* 114:105-125.

Ministry for the Budget, Public Accounts and State Reform (2010a). *Apperçue du commerce extérieur de la France*. <<http://lekiosque.finances.gouv.fr/APPCHIFFRE/Etudes/tableaux/aperçu.pdf>> [Consulted 20.10.2010]

Ministry for the Budget, Public Accounts and State Reform (2010b). *Exportations de la France: structure par zone et principaux pays*. <http://lekiosque.finances.gouv.fr/APPCHIFFRE/Etudes/cadre_etude.asp> [Consulted 23.11.2010]

Ministry of Defence (2004). *Tchad, opération Dorca*. <<http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/tchad/actualites/11-09-04-tchad-operation-dorca>> [Consulted 16.11.2010]

Ministry of Defence (2008). *Rapport au parlement: Les exportations d'armement de la France en 2007*. <[http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/international/rapport-d-exportations-d-armement-2009/\(language\)/fre-FR](http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/international/rapport-d-exportations-d-armement-2009/(language)/fre-FR)> [Consulted 04.11.2010]

Ministry of Defence (2010a). *Les éléments français au Tchad (EFT)*, <<http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/tchad/dossier/les-elements-francais-au-tchad-ef>> [Consulted 30.10.2010]

Ministry of Defence (2010b). *Rapport au parlement: Les exportations d'armement de la France en 2009*. <[http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/international/rapport-d-exportations-d-armement-2009/\(language\)/fre-FR](http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/international/rapport-d-exportations-d-armement-2009/(language)/fre-FR)> [Consulted 04.11.2010]

Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (2008). *France and Darfur*. <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/france-priorities_1/conflicts-andcrisis_1959/darfur_3538/france-and-darfur_6011/france-and-darfur_10672.html>. [Consulted 29.10.2010]

Morgenthau, Hans J. (1952). "Another "Great Debate": The National Interest of the United States", *The American Political Science Review* 46(4):961-988.

Mouric, N. (1984). "La politique tchadienne de la France sous Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Vers la prise en compte de la rébellion", *Politique Africaine* 16:86-101.

Moussa Doumgor, Hourmdji (2010). Interview with technical advisor for positions and technology in sectors of information and communication. 23 August.

Murphy, Deborah (2007). "Narrating Darfur: Darfur in the U.S. Press, March-September 2004" in Alex De Waal (eds.). *War in Darfur and the search for peace*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University.

N'Djamena Bi-Hebdo (2006). "Comment et pourquoi le FUCD a échoué", article by Madjiasra Nako Special 13 April.

Nako, Madjiasra (2010). *Interview with journalist*. 23 August.

Nekim, Jean-Claude (2010). *Interview with journalist*. 24 August.

Ngothé Gatta, Gali (2010). *Interview with politician*. 20 August.

Nincic, Miroslav (1999). "The National Interest and Its Interpretation", *The Review of Politics* 61(1):29-55.

Notre Temps (2006). "La France doit rendre compte", article by Nadjikimo Benoudjita 18-24 April

Politique Africaine (1984). "Le problème tchadien: rappel historique", article 16:9-14.

RFI (2006a). "Idriss Déby affirme contrôler la situation, les rebelles démentent", 13 April. <http://www.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/076/article_43024.asp> [Consulted 05.12.2010]

RFI (2006b). "Situation "volatile" selon la France", 13 April. <http://www.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/076/article_43040.asp> [Consulted 04.11.2010]

RFI (2010a). "Senegal "takes back" French military bases", 5 April. <<http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20100405-senegal-takes-back-french-military-bases>> [Consulted 24.11.2010]

RFI (2010b). "Idriss Déby critique la présence militaire français au Tchad", 12 August. <<http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20100812-idriss-Déby-critique-presence-militaire-francaise-tchad>> [Consulted 04.11.2010]

Rolley, Sonia (2010). *Retour du Tchad. Carnet d'une correspondante*. Paris: Solin, Actes Sud.

S/2006/1019 (2006). *Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic pursuant to paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of Security Council resolution 1706 (2006)*. <<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/682/07/PDF/N0668207.pdf?OpenElement>> [Consulted 04.11.2010]

S/2007/488 (2007). *Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic*. <<http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/448/21/PDF/N0744821.pdf?OpenElement>> [Consulted 04.11.2010]

S/PRST/2008/3 (2008). *La situation au Tchad, en République centrafricaine et dans la sous-région. Declaration of the president of the Security Council*. <<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/227/10/PDF/N0822710.pdf?OpenElement>> [Consulted 03.11.2010]

S/RES 1706 (2006). *Reports of the Secretary-General on Sudan*. <<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/484/64/PDF/N0648464.pdf?OpenElement>> [Consulted 03.11.2010]

S/RES 1861 (2009). *La situation au Tchad, en République centrafricaine et dans la sous-région* <[http://www.un.org/french/documents/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1861\(2009\)](http://www.un.org/french/documents/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1861(2009))> [Consulted 26.11.2010]

Sarkozy, Nicholas (2007). *Press conference during the second European Union-Africa summit in Lisbon 8-9 December 2007*. <http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-actualites/conferences-de-presse/2007/conference-de-presse-lors-du-deuxieme-sommet.5890.html?search=Sommet&xtmc=conference_de_presse_lors_du_deuxieme_sommet_ue_afrique&xcr=1> [Consulted 23.11.2010]

SC/8690 (2006). *On Chad, Darfur. Declaration of the president of the Security Council, 13 April*. <<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/sc8690.doc.htm>> [Consulted 03.11.2010]

Seibert, Björn H (2010). *Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA and the European Union's common security and defence policy*. Strategic Studies Institute: SSI Monograph. <<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1026>> [Consulted 11.11.2010].

SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2010). <<http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>> [Consulted 19.10.2010]

Tansey, Oisín (2007). “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability Sampling”, *PS: Political Science and Politics* 40(4):765-772.

Topona, Eric (2010). *Interview with journalist*. 23 August.

Tubiana, Jérôme (2008). *The Chad-Sudan Proxy War and the "Darfurization" of Chad: Myths and Reality*. HSBA Working Paper 12. Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies. Small Arms Survey.

UN (2009a). *AFRICA, Map No. 4045 Rev.5, April 2009*. <<http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/africa.pdf>> [Consulted 03.01.2011]

UN (2009b). *CHAD, Map No. 3788 Rev. 8, March 2009* <<http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/chad.pdf>> [Consulted 03.01.2011]

UN (2010). *MINUCAT Background*. <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurcat/background.shtml>> [Consulted 30.10.2010]

UNHCR (2004). *2004 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook Country Data Sheet – Chad*. <<http://www.unhcr.org/44e5c75111.html>> [Consulted 03.01.2011]

UNCHR (2010). *2010 UNHCR country operations profile – Chad*. <<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e45c226>> [Consulted 03.01.2011]

Verschave, François-Xavier (1998). *La Françafrique : le plus long scandale de la République*. Paris : Stock.

Weisburd, A. Mark (1997). *Use of force. The practice of states since World War II*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (2000). “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, *International Security* 25(1):5-41.

Yin, Robert K. (2003). *Case Study Research. Design and Methods*. California: Sage Publications.

Appendix 1 – Complete list of interviews

- Ali Kaya, Abba (2010). Interview with correspondent for *Agence France-Presse*, N'Djamena, 19 August.
- Didame, Michaël N. (2010). Interview with journalist in *Le Temps*, N'Djamena, 19 August.
- Djiraibe, Dolphin K. (2010). Interview with Human Rights lawyer and national coordinator of the Monitoring committee to call for peace and national reconciliation, N'Djamena, 4 September.
- Djasnabaille, Abderamane (2010). Interview with Minister of Human Rights and Promotion of Freedoms, N'Djamena, 30 August.
- Haggar, Ali A. (2010). Interview with economist and former secretary-general of the presidency of Chad, N'Djamena, 20 August.
- Kebzabo, Saleh (2010). Interview with politician and president of the political party National Union for Democracy and Renewal, N'Djamena, 5 September.
- Mahamat Choua, Lol (2010). Interview with politician and president of the political party Rally for Democracy and Progress, N'Djamena, 31 August.
- Maoundonodji, Gilbert (2010). Interview with coordinator for *Groupe de Recherches Alternatives et de Monitoring du Projet Pétrole du Tchad-Cameroun* (GRAMP/TC), N'Djamena, 1 September.
- Moussa Doumgor, Hourmadji (2010). Interview with technical advisor for positions and technology in the sectors of information and communication, N'Djamena, 23 August.
- Nako, Madjiasra (2010). Interview with correspondent for *Radio France Internationale*, N'Djamena, 23 August.
- Nekim, Jean-Claude (2010). Interview with journalist in *N'Djamena Bi-Hebdo*, N'Djamena, 24 August.

- Ngothé Gatta, Gali (2010). Interview with politician and president of the political party Union of Democratic Forces/Republican party, N'Djamena, 20 August.
- Topona, Eric (2010). Interview with journalist in *Radio Nationale Tchadienne*, N'Djamena, 23 August.

Appendix 2 – The interview guide

- What do you consider as the main reasons behind French forces' continued presence in Chad since 1986?
- On 11 August 2010 president Déby opened up for a withdrawal of the French forces stationed in Chad. Do you think this announce reflects a change in the relations between Chad and France?
- The Chadian regime defeated the rebellions that reached N'Djamena in April 2006 and February 2008. Which elements were central behind the regime's victory?
- A successful rebellion would most likely have resulted in a new regime. Do you think that a change of president in Chad would have had an impact on the conflict in Darfur?
- To what extent does the Franco-Chadian relationship depend upon the Chadian regime in place?
- In 2003 Chad started to produce oil, which led to increased income for the Chadian state. Has the petrol production and the revenues originating from it had an influence on the internal conflict level in Chad?
- The Chadian regime has been able to invest in the military sector due to the oil revenues. Can the investment made be said to have reduced the probability for a new military rebellion?
- The Darfurian region, a region with ties to eastern Chad, has been characterised by conflict for several years. Which influence has the conflict in Darfur had on the internal Chadian conflict?
- The Chadian president accused the rebels in the attacks on N'Djamena in April 2006 and February 2008 for being Sudanese mercenaries. To what extent is Déby's regime a counterweight to an aggravation and an expansion of the conflict in Darfur?

- In 2007 the United Nation's Security Council issued a mandate for an international intervention in eastern Chad. Which role did France play in the planning and the deployment of this international force?
- France used its diplomatic weight in the European Union and the United Nations to realise such an international intervention. What do you consider as the motivation behind this initiative?
- In February 2008, just before the European forces were to be deployed, a rebellion attacked N'Djamena. To what extent did the deployment of these forces depend on the outcome of the combats in the capital?
- France used both economical and political resources to implement the international intervention. The mission's achievements have been subject for discussion at the same time as MINURCAT's mandate is expiring. Does this reflect that the French policy has been a defeat?