RADICALIZATION AMONG MUSLIM MINORITIES AND STATE RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BRITAIN AND RUSSIA

Utkur Yakhshiboev

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This working paper is a comparative analysis of Muslim communities in the UK and Russia. Radicalization as a process and the factors for radicalization among Muslim communities in both countries are analyzed to detect the similarities and differences. Both states' engagement in hard-line policies to tackle Islamic terrorism increases the use of undemocratic measures enhanced by the legal system of each state. Those measures are counter-productive; the social movement theory and the rational choice theory are used to emphasize that the radicalization leading to violence is a political movement intertwined with Islam.

Utkur Yakhshiboev
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I. INTRODUCTION

Islamophobia has risen in the last decades in the UK and Russia due to a threat posed by radical Islam. Muslim minorities have been targeted as a responsible community for the atrocities committed by small radical groups. In attempting to solve the problem of terrorist acts inside the country, state authorities engage in tough measures which are supported by the legal systems of each country. Unfortunately, these measures trigger dissatisfaction in the marginalized Muslim communities in both states. Ultimately, measures taken to eradicate the violence lead more people to radicalization which shows an increase in homegrown

terrorism.

Although both countries have different historical paths for minority existence, the challenges of radical Islam that they face have common roots. A Comparative analysis of these two countries shows how both countries try to manage radical Islam, 'Islamic terrorism', and to what extent the strategies they use are efficient. The following two questions will be at the core of this working paper:

■ What are the similarities and differences for radicalization of Muslims in Russia and in the UK?
■ Which state's counter-terrorism strategies are more efficient?

While facing continuous terrorist acts on its soil Russia claims that its religious minorities live in comfort, and peace. However, Galina Yemelianova, looks at the issue as 'a time bomb' waiting to explode. Muslims living under the Russian rule face discrimination and Islamophobia prevails among the ethnic Russians. This phenomenon brings the hatred towards Muslim immigrants from Central Asia.

Likewise, the whole Muslim community in the UK has been targeted after the 7/7 attacks. Little is being done to find a common ground for Muslims in the UK to feel secure, and practice their religion openly, while pre-charge detention law is increasing dissatisfaction, and perceived as discriminatory towards religious minorities.

II. APPLICABILITY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

Social movement theory approaches the terrorist phenomena from a different perspective: a movement that justifies its actions not only with irrational motives, but also with rational reasoning; a movement rising from within society that opposes societal problems such as exclusion; a movement that searches political recognition or political action, inclusion.

In Diani Mario's "The Concept of Social Movement" social movement theory is based on the idea of individuals forming networks, and focuses on the reasons for the creation of these networks as well as on the means of mobilization of previously uninvolved individuals.[1] Freeman & Johnson (1999) define a social movement as somewhere in between a political party (interest group), and an unorganized mass fad (trend without goals).[2]

Steven Buechler says that French Sociologist Alain Touraine sees contemporary social movements as evidence of a displacement of protest from the economic to the cultural realm, accompanied by the privatization of social problems which results in an anxious search for an identity (appeals to identity are purely defensive).[3]

Collin J. Beck in his article analyzing the correlation of social movements with terrorism notes that cultural perspectives (forming collective identity), study of networks (especially when relatives or family members join the movements), state

repression, or oppression justifying terrorists' actions tremendously influence to understand terrorism from a novel theoretical framework.

Terrorism is a form of contentious politics, analyzable with the basic social movement approach of mobilizing resources, political opportunity structure (originally coined by Eisenger, 1973), and framing.[4] First, for sustained collective action, movements depend on material resources, and a base of supporters: for example, Hamas, the Tamil Tigers, or Hezbollah have all organized themselves into quasi-governments in the territories they control, while still undertaking militant actions.[5] Terrorist groups that sustain action for a long period of time are thus formal organizations, and are likely constrained and enabled by the same dynamics of resources and organization as social movements.[6] Second, movements arise not only because they are able to successfully mobilize resources, but because overall political or social conditions are ripe for successful and sustained contention: for example, Al Qaeda in Iraq and other militant organizations arose not just from grievances, or the mobilization of resources, but because the American invasion demolished centralized authority, creating the opportunity for new mobilization, and a threat to establish power arrangements[7]. Third, the term framing (based on Goffman's research, 1974) is employed to describe the justifications, and appeals movements use to mobilize support:[8] for instance, Al-Qaeda

leadership engages in framing work as a primary activity, with bin Laden and Al Zawahiri issuing new statements regularly; like social movements, these statements are then diffused, and modified by media attention.[9]

III. RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY IN TERRORISM

Rational choice theory derives from math and economics. It helps to understand the motives of terrorists in terrorism studies. Lance Lindauer from the University of Pittsburgh, states that two common themes emerge when assessing terrorism within the two frameworks: Rational Choice Theory (RCT's strict method-based approach such empowers theorists to comprehend the rationality behind terrorism, and edge closer to uncovering what incentives may be offered as legitimate alternatives) is most appropriate in short run scenarios, while Grounded Theory (particularly the Glaserian school; Glaser and Strauss explain that the best way to formulate a hypothesis is to go directly to the source)[10] is more insightful with a long term focus. However, there are problems in both theories. RCT can fail in predicting (deception may be used by the terrorist organizations) terrorist acts which can lead to terrorist acts; while GT usually bases its observations, data collection for the research after the violence happens, and people are already killed. When there is little or no

access to a terrorist organization, it is hard to make assumptions which might fail eventually. For example, the organizational structure of Al Qaeda has changed considerably over the years, and its secretive nature makes it hard to analyze.[11]

Both theories have a dilemma in their core which can lead to confusion and deceit. Dr. Robert Nalbandov in his "Irrational Rationality of Terrorism" article says that while 'old' terrorism (existing prior to the end of the Cold War, such as ETA, IRA, PKK) can be explained by the rational choice, its 'new' version (appeared after the collapse of the bipolar system in early 1990s,transnational in reach and limited in their long-lasting effects) represents a substantial departure from rationality, and the more rational, or predictable, the terrorists' behavior is, the easier it would be to find their true motivators. Firstly, the concept of rationality should be understood. In this vein, as the truth may differ from person to person, rationality does too.

Rationality is a relative outcome which can be based on irrationality. Rational actors may choose irrational options that may eventually maximize their expected utility and vice versa.[12] For instance, suicide acts are usually accepted as irrational. However, to die for the common good may be a noble fit[13] or if you genuinely believe that death in jihad brings infinite reward then it makes 'new' terrorism rational.[14] As Robert Nalbandov says separate consideration should be given to the religion-based rationality; those who consider themselves true believers have the value-systems different from those who view themselves as atheists. "Even if many suicide attackers are irrational or fanatical, the leadership groups that recruit and direct them are not".[15] "Some economists argue that terrorist organizations would not want to recruit irrational members because they would be too unpredictable. They do not do so because terrorist groups pursue rational goals that would be subverted or nullified by unpredictable behavior.[16]

It is important to notice that many individuals become rationally involved in terrorism as a by-product of their personal and social conditions; social motivations for terrorism are best demonstrated in immigration neighborhoods in places like Western Europe.[17]

IV. RADICALIZATION AMONG MUSLIM MINORITIES IN THE UK

An emergency in domestic security of the UK began after the 7/7 London attacks. Radicalization as a threat existed even before London bombings, and actually traces back to the times when British political clout was active in different Muslim lands. Since the publication of Satanic Verses of Salman Rushdie in 1989, Muslim minorities have been portrayed and represented as individuals, groups and institutions that do not reflect the virtues of a liberal and apparently tolerant multicultural society,

however ongoing project it might be in reality; furthermore, there have been British political activity within the Muslim World in Egypt, Pakistan, Palestine for hundreds of years not including the ones that took place in 1990s.[18]

The historical context is vital, and unavoidable in multiculturalism debate, when the West, including the UK, continues its aggressively interventionist and imperial foreign policy, which undoubtedly receives backlash in a form of terrorism. Hence, diversity, multiculturalism, and equality are just unrealized ideals, particularly when there is a will to create identities such as 'British Muslim'.[19] Such identity seems to face intense fission and need time and generations to be recognized. For example, in 2011 British Prime Minister David Cameron publicly admitted that multiculturalism has failed: "Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We have failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values".[20]

The contemporary radicalization wave in the UK has its roots in 1980s and 1990s when foreign radicals such as Abu Hamza al Masri, Omar Bakri Mohammad and Abu Qataba immigrated to the UK in search of political asylum says Mitchell D. Silber, "The Al Qaeda Factor. Plots against the West".[21]

Liberal financial regulations let terrorist cells to carry out successful recruitment campaigns on British soil. Muslim majority countries from the Gulf region and the Middle East penetrated their charity organizations in the UK on religious, cultural and traditional grounds to take the responsibility to raise funds or make speeches as a form of propaganda. The main sources of the Islamic terror funding structure are charities, wealthy individuals and state funding; Saudi Arabia has been one of the biggest financers of Islamic institutions and Muslim causes in the UK and is a major source of financing for Islamic terrorist organizations says Anna Wojtowicz.[22] Additionally, a lot of terrorist organizations are involved in drug trafficking and other criminal activities that bring huge amount of money to fulfil their violent atrocities.

Over the years following the 7/7 attacks, there have been several domestic and international events that may have contributed to the growing radicalization of British Muslims: the reaction to the 1988 publication of the The Satanic Verses (Salman Rushdie affair), the 1991 Gulf War, 1992-1995 Bosnian War, conflicts in Algeria, Kashmir, and Chechnya, the 7 July 2001 northern riots (Bradford, Oldham, Burnley), British contribution in Afghanistan and Iraq, 9/11 and "the war on terror" or the Danish Jylland-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy, from 30 September 2005.[23]

In 2006, the head of MI5 has said that the security service is monitoring 1,600 terror

suspects across 200 networks in the UK.[24] However alarming it may seem, the causes are really hard to identify as they may vary from case to case.

While mentioning Oliver Roy and his three waves of Islamism, Tahir Abbas fuses all three phases to make one distinctive reason for the radicalization of Muslims in the UK:[25]

- Islamism was a response to colonialism and imperialism
- Islamism was a reaction to the aftermath of the First World War and the end of caliphate
- Islamism that is inspired by Qutb[26] and Maududi[27], but is dissimilar because of the forces of globalization eroding the powers of individual states and with new media technologies disseminating ideas at high speed.

Rik Coolsaet, a leading Belgian scholar on Muslim radicalization states that religious orthodoxy and political radicalization are very different things and respond to different mechanisms: the former starts from quest for identity in highly demanding times by developing into challenge for social cohesion like cultural ghettos while the latter starts from opposition to injustice and eventually ends up in using violence as preferred tool of political action.[28]

There is another public issue called 'self-styled segregation' that Muslims do not wish to integrate with their British 'hosts', and usually are seen as perpetrators, not always the victims of social injustice and violence.[29] However, the British assume that it is still possible to integrate Muslims into British society by decreasing the religiosity of the Muslims, by making them moderate. If so, who is to decide what 'moderate Muslim' should include? According to Carolin Goerzig and Khaled Al-Hashimi, a moderate Muslim might be a pious believer but will not adopt extreme Islamist beliefs to the extent that his or her other roles in society are in disagreement; a moderate Muslim is understood as an individual that has identity along with other multiple identities…but the British government acknowledges incompatibility of Islam with the British way of life which entails "us and them" and misrecognition[30] which eventually could lead some to radicalization. Oliver Roy says that violent radicalization has little to do with religious practice, while radical theology as Salafism, does not necessarily lead to violence.[31]

It is believed that a lot of terrorist organizations are based on one fundamental factor which is the organization's ideology and the individual's belief that violence is a legitimate tool to solve the problems. Islamic ideologies create security risks and cause tensions among communities. Radical Islam is widely considered to be in conflict with democratic principles and has largely overtaken British traditional values by imposing its own.[32] Islam is portrayed as an ideology that poses a grave threat to Britain.

After the 7/7 attacks, the police force, the judiciary and the parliament[33] all began suspecting Muslim communities which led to institutionalized discrimination of religious minorities in the UK. Half of the white British population lives in neighborhoods containing no ethnic-minority residents.[34] This political discourse on one hand perceives that Muslims are discriminated in different spheres of British life, on the other hand in Elizabeth Poole's narrative —the increasing visibility of Muslims to non-Muslims in the UK in a global mediated world, in which Muslims are homogenised, has resulted in their construction as a threat to non-Muslim and this ideological threat allows Muslims to be suppressed.[35]

Including all the foreign policy flaws as the reasons for the Muslim youth to get radicalized, there have been some of the domestic reasons causing radicalization too. The long-term domestic factors are poverty and alienation, failure of multiculturalism and integration.[36] Most young Muslims are underemployed. According to Gallup integration index only 10% of British Muslims are "integrated."[37]

Interestingly, it has been proved that deprived Muslims are not the only ones who get radicalized and are more prone to terrorism. For instance, the suspects of the 2007 London and Glasgow international airport plots were physicians, medical research scientists and an engineer.[38] The Majority of Muslims who committed terrorist attacks are reported to be from the middle class families, who were mostly married, were not isolated and had friends.[39]

Leadership of Al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations show some highly educated members who come from middle or even upper class. Rational choice theory of terrorism is usually applicable for such terrorist profiles. Terrorist may come from different social, economic and political backgrounds. MI5 reported that individuals who became suicide bombers were often highly educated.[40] Those individuals who choose to become terrorists are harder to detect because it 'shows that terrorists are normal within the general population and are hard to define'.[41]

According to Abdul Taher neither domestic, nor foreign policy reasons play an important role, as vital as personal problems in individual's life, because it all piles up from personal level which later shifts to violence. The 200-page document titled 'Radicalization of Muslims in the United Kingdom', which was produced after studying 90 terror suspects investigated by the security service, proposes four reasons why radicalization happens in British case:[42]

- Trauma, such as the death of a loved one: Ten percent of terror suspects became radicalized after a life trauma
- Migration: a third of all extremists migrated to Britain alone without relatives
- Criminal activity: two-thirds of the sample had criminal records

■ Prison: Muslim prisoners who are not religious are often radicalized in prison. The report identified 60 known Islamist extremists operating in British jails.

Unsurprisingly, political debate about 'British Muslims' and their association with Islam and violence created a 'bubble' in the media where Muslims and Native British are involved in an everlasting societal antagonism to blame one another. One of the surveys done by FOSIS shows that in 2005, 1 in 5 Muslim students in Britain (18%) would not report if a fellow Muslim wants to plot a terror attack and 52% did not think organizations blamed in extremism should be closed and in 2006, 12% of young Muslims in Britain (and 12% overall) believed that suicide attacks against civilians in Britain were justified.[43] In 2009, one third of Muslim students in the UK supported killing for Islam and 40% were encouraging to implement Sharia law in some parts of Britain.[44] BBC made a report informing that the estimate of those jihadists who left the UK as foreign fighters to Syria is 850 people, while almost half of them already returned to the UK.[45] Considering the small minority of Muslims living in the UK, these numbers are disturbing.

Oliver Roy and Farhad Khosrokhavar explain the dual identity theory[46] that shows that a lot of second and third Muslim generations while having two identities keep on searching for justifications because identities they have do not complement,

unfortunately contradict one another on a societal level, in our case 'British' with 'Muslim'. Hence, in contemporary Britain the second and third generations are more conservative which increases their susceptibility to radicalization. For example, in 2005, 30 students (14-17 year old) at an Islamic school in London were asked if they feel British or European to which the students unanimously answered that they feel neither, including the fact that almost all of them were born and raised in Britain.[47] The same students were asked to choose if England were to play football with Palestine or France or Spain, which football team they would support, the answers were to support Palestine, France or Spain but England. (a few months later the school was reported in British and international media as an Islamist breeding ground, British authorities began investigations).[48]

4. 1 UK's Strategy to Deal with Islamic Radicalization and Terrorism

The first generation of Muslim immigrants (primarily from Bangladesh and Pakistan) in the UK were trying to adapt to the British way of life by respecting British values. However, the second and third generations have been facing a totally different situation. Islam and Islamic way of living (Islam comes to replace other or lost identities)[49] are prevalent in the current generation's everyday life. Tahir Abbas states that the second- and third- Muslim generations who

typically have Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi origins have more connection to Islam. They question and examine the nature of Islam which usually leads to forming more religious identities.[50]

As Islam becomes an ever more important part of the Muslim community living in the UK, a sufficient degree of attention should be paid by the states to control a type of Islam that emerges. Currently, Islam in the UK is manifested in both peaceful and violent forms. Radical Islam could save those who are full of personal resentment and other forms of grievances. In this vein, counter-terrorism measures do matter to prevent violent acts.

In the UK, the counter-terrorism strategy is comprised of four steps:[51]

- Prevent terrorism by reducing the number of individuals inspired to support Islamist terrorism or become terrorists
- Pursue terrorists and those who assist them in order to disrupt potential attacks.
- Protect potential targets (buildings, for example) in the UK
- Prepare for the consequences of an attack through resilience and contingency planning.

The main terrorist act in the UK occurred in 2000, which was aimed to make temporary provisions for Northern Ireland and it allowed the search and detention for seven days.[52] During Tony Blair's government, The Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act of 2001 was introduced to amend the Terrorism Act of 2000 to make further provisions about terrorism and security:

- to provide for the freezing of assets
- to make provision about immigration and asylum
- to amend or extend the criminal law and powers for preventing crime and enforcing that law
- to make provision about the control of pathogens and toxins
- to provide for the retention of communications data.[53]

The Terrorism Act of 2005 was introduced after the 7/7 attacks, to provide for the making of 'control orders' imposing obligations on individuals suspected of being involved in terrorism-related activity.[54] This terrorism act provided the state to derogate from the Article 5 of the European convention on human rights and restrict individuals to house arrest.[55]

The Terrorism Act of 2006 appeared to have serious restrictions and brought minor tension between the authorities and Muslims. This Act authorized the holding of terrorist suspects from 14 to 28 days without charge and seven years imprisonment in case anyone encourages terrorism directly or indirectly (it is broad).[56] Counter-Terrorism Act of 2008, for example enabled the taking of fingerprints and DNA samples from

individuals subject to control orders[57] and re-engaged with the issue of detention without charge for 42 days.[58]

Since 2000, many Western nations have strengthened their anti-terror laws, giving policing and intelligence services unprecedented powers, says Tahir Abbas.[59] There has been some casualties due to such polices, for example Jean Charles Menezes was shot dead by officers in London after being mistaken for a suicide bomber, which eventually happened to have no connections with terrorists at all; however, police leaders say they will not abandon their 'shoot-to-kill' policy and warn that more innocent people could be killed in the fight against terrorism.[60]

All of these Anti-terrorism Acts were introduced to prevent the rising number of terrorist attacks in the UK. It is hard to believe that these regulations are always helpful and decreasing the number of violent acts. Prevention is not a solution and only addresses the surface while chief culprit remains untouched. For example, twenty six (52%) of those who responded to the line of questioning over the power of stop and search and the British Government's Counter-Terror Strategy (CONTEST), responded that these policies were having a negative effect on community relations, with many responses specifically mentioning that these policies were either 'racist' or alienating.[61]

Undemocratic counter-terrorism measures have tangibly impacted on the everyday movement and practices of Black and Asian minorities. It would not be stretching the truth to state that young Muslims have been talked at, talked for and talked around. They have not been talked to. [62]

The potential for British Muslims to become engaged in terrorism will likely to remain because the UK needs to move ahead, authorities need to understand that the problems of violent extremism are not about the religion of Islam, or global political ideology only, it is about social cohesion and detrimental economic conditions of the local area; for example in Bradford Muslims are trapped into economic decline and the economic performance of Birmingham has been rather favorable.[63] The Office for National Statistics reports that of those in employment, men from the Pakistani (57%), Black African (54%) and Bangladeshi (53%) ethnic groups were most likely to work in low skilled jobs.[64] The neighborhoods where Muslims reside are usually excluded from the initiatives of change and development because of structural subordination, say L. Back and J. Solomos (1992) "Black Politics and Social Change in Birmingham, UK: An Analysis of Recent Trends".[65]

This societal tension between Muslims and the Native British is a lack of trust from both sides which is reflected in inequalities of different kinds. R. Edwards, J. Franklin and J. Holland (2003) in "Families and Social Capital: Exploring the Issues" propose that bonding social capital operates as a resource for poorer ethnically homogenous communities, protecting them from market

inequalities, while providing richer and more exclusive communities the means to consolidate their advantage; bridging social capital could bring trust between communities by decreasing inequality to facilitate social mobility.[66] Tahir Abbas suggests that state support for Muslim schools can become one of the best strategies to fight discriminatory forces in the education system since the previous multiculturalist and anti-racist initiatives failed to achieve the desired effects. It can be also beneficial to de-radicalize young Muslims based on closer working relations between communities, organizations and government departments, many Muslims may even feel the need to explore precisely these concerns on their own without feeling the actual need to take up 'radical jihadi missions' of any kind.[67]

Charles Kurzman states that Western countries have seen Islam as primitive and have thought that Islamic religion is equivalent to fanaticism, Islamic political authority with despotism, Islamic military practices with terror, and Islamic tradition with backwardness for quite a long period, this is how Islam and Muslims have been portrayed in the mainstream media and Edward Said justifies it as how 'Muslims learnt to see themselves through Western eyes'. [68]

Open Society Institute reports that there is a perception that the criminal-justice system is concerned more with the political control of Muslim communities than with their safety and protection which brings about anxiety that Muslims are being spied on by the authorities that makes them very distrustful of any engagement in civil/public life.[69] Human Rights Watch informs that the powers of arrest within the different anti-Terrorism Acts experienced disproportionate treatment of British Muslims that led to race and community relations problems. This in turn decreased the willingness of British Muslims to cooperate with the authorities.[70] Amnesty International informs that UK's anti-terrorism laws violated six fundamental rights: respect for private and family life, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of movement and right to a fair trial.[71]

S. Brighton in "British Muslims, Multiculturalism and UK Foreign Policy: Integration and Cohesion in and Beyond the State" says that after the 7/7 attacks, the Home Office founded seven working groups on issues such as: Muslim youth; education; women's issues; regional, local and community projects; the training of imams and the role of mosques; community security and police relations and, finally, tackling extremism and radicalization.[72] This approach is impressive, however the authorities should pay attention to the foreign policy and be alert of mass media demagogy which may exacerbate the current radicalization process of Muslims. Tariq Ali blames George W. Bush and Tony Blair that their international politics assisted to radicalize the majority of Muslims in the UK,

however these radicalization factors are officially denied.[73]

Katy Sian, Ian Law and S. Sayyid analysed four papers: the Sun, Daily Mail, The Guardian and The Independent and their data collection results indicated that 70 percent of all the news items gathered were hostile; 15 percent were inclusive; and 15 percent neutral. When examining the strength of minority news actors' voices, they found that 80 percent of the items represented no voice, 10 percent represented a medium voice, 5 percent a weak voice and 5 percent represented a strong voice.[74] Unfortunately, media distortion and foreign interventions make counter-terrorism efforts counter-productive.

4.2 Radicalization Among Russia's Muslims

Islamic radicalization is not a new phenomenon among Russian Muslims. It has a long history since the Russian Empire began its conquests and invasions. In different centuries motives and factors behind the radicalization was different by nature. In contemporary Russia such factors or motivations may overlap throughout the historical timeline. Russia can benefit from its historical experience and needs to reorganize its approach towards the Muslim minorities as Islamic threat seems to shape global character. Russia is experiencing the beginning of an Islamist jihad in its Muslim republics: Dagestan, Kabardina-Balkaria

(KBR), Karachaevo-Cherkessiya (KCHR) and Adygeya which could soon spread to Tatarstan and Boshkortostan and beyond.[75]

Gordon M. Hahn states that present Muslim dilemma is shaped by economic, demographic, and military factors. Moscow's Muslim challenge has already produced a Muslim revolutionary movement- the emerging Islamist movement and the Chechen-led Islamist terrorist network- which is already demonstrating a capacity that could ultimately threaten the integrity of the Russian state.[76] Dmitry Gorenburg states that 'corruption' and 'poverty' contributes to the popularity of radical Islam, especially when clans control the main part of the wealth in the areas with the 'repression of anyone who tries to change the situation through political or legal channels'. Akhmet Yarlykapov while agreeing on the points above, additionally stresses that at present, the social structure of radical Muslims has changed significantly, they are now not poor and uneducated people or deprived of work and other social benefits, these young people, organized in these jamaats (Arabic word jamaa means society or community) seek to resolve a broad range of problems that are present in the region, for example these feelings of disillusionment usually get intensified by the sense of being 'second rate' while compared to the non-Muslim majority of Russia as a whole.[77]

Some recent research shows that poverty is not one of the factors as to why Russia's Muslims join terrorist organizations and,

primarily, radical Islam is said to be penetrated by the foreign influence which is an official position of the Kremlin. Gordon M. Hahn rejects both of the reasons as they lack credibility, instead he mentions that Russia's poorest regions are most often those heavily populated by Muslims and high levels of joblessness among the youth, especially in the North Caucasus where it reaches nearly 50% and in some villages 90%. This type of socio-economic situation is creating an army of young males with no outlet for their energies and it is no surprise if some of these idle energies are sooner or later expended in armies of Allah.[78]

Giada Tardivo, a research assistant in International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, encompasses the whole nature of the problem as deep-rooted in Russian society because historical and cultural factors represent one of the underlying causes of the relatively high levels of radicalization of Russia's Muslim community these days. In the Russian Empire, and particularly during the Soviet Era, Russian Muslims were subject to often-brutal treatment by the state, and propensities to violence are common not only in the Northern Caucasus, but also in the Russian society as a whole.[79]

Russia is facing a demographic challenge where Muslim families have higher fertility rates than Russian families. In addition, the situation in the Ural, Volga, and Western Siberian regions is changing in part because both internal and external migrations are on the rise, with migrants coming from the North Caucasus, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia which means that the Muslim space in Russia is continuously expanding.[80] George F. Kennan expert Denis Sokolov highlights that dislocation of Muslims was not only economic in nature, but also political (interethnic conflicts in the Northern Caucasus).

Pro-Kremlin analyst Roman Silantyev says that radical Islamists comprise up to 5 percent of all Muslims in Russia, or 700,000 out of 14 million and there are more radicals in such areas of Russia as Saratov oblast as the Far East than in Chechnya (Pravoslavie.ru, September 9, 2014).[81] The current number can indicate the level of danger to set the counter-terrorism strategies towards the maximum risk situations. Sociologist Andrey Ignatyev criticizes and opposes Orthodox activist Roman Silantyev who has written alarmist tracts about the threat Muslims in Russia supposedly represent to Russia's future.[82]

Entire districts of the Ural region and especially Tatarstan have reportedly come under the control of the Salafists (Rusrep.ru, October 31, 2013) and a similar trend is also notable in Astrakhan where, according to some sources, there are up to 1,000 Russian Salafists (Riss.ru, January 26, 2014).[83]

According to Ashley Kirk about 2000 foreign fighters joined ISIS from Russia.[84] It is even reported that Russian is the second most spoken language after the Arabic among ISIS foreign fighters.[85] Denis Sokolov claims that a large number of these fighters

are Muslims originating from the Northern Caucasus, the region that has been rent by war, terror, and brutal state crackdowns for over two decades and Russian state policies over the past two decades have done much to build today's pipeline of radicalized extremists.[86] Russian President Vladimir Putin's North Caucasus policy has, if anything, hastened the spread of Islamic radicalism in the region says Dmitry Gorenburg.[87]

For example, Youth who studied Islam in the Middle East and practice their religion peacefully, but in ways different from local traditions, are treated with suspicion and sometimes arrested and beaten. And these actions mainly serve to further radicalize pious Muslims, some of whom then turn to violence.[88] Since 2003 social activists who speak out against corruption and land rights abuses and advocate the right to practice Islam according to one's beliefs have frequently found themselves on lists of "untrustworthy" citizens. Some have found themselves on criminal "wanted" lists and under investigation for alleged violations of the same criminal code articles as radical Islamist fighters. Being on one of these lists means detentions, interrogations involving torture, and abductions by law enforcement officers, including abductions for ransom.[89]

Russian politicians and the academic community came to divide Islam into "traditional" (religious tradition that intertwines with ethnic culture and adherence to "one's own" centuries-old theological and legal school of thought 'mazhab') and "nontraditional" (encompasses the forms of Islamic views that began entering Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union) branches.[90] Volga-Ural Muslims follow Hanafi School[91] while the North Caucasus follows different strains of Sufism (such as tariqatism, Naqshbandia[92] strain for example). Non-traditional may include all the other forms such as Wahhabism, Salafism etc. which are predominantly common among North Caucasian youth who distrusted local Muslim leaders because of their lack of Islamic education and possible ties with Russian security services.[93]

Seemingly, there is another problem concerning economic migrants coming from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Most of the migrants settle and start practicing their religion which usually exacerbates pre-existing Muslims' situation. As Alexei Malashenko, one of Russia's leading experts on political Islam notes the 'great majority of Russians judge Islam by the actions of religious extremists; by conflicts with the involvement of Muslims; by radical statements by Muslim politicians and spiritual leaders; and by an influx of immigrants'.[94] Such an environment triggers Islamophobia while Islamophobia creates the ground for Muslims to consolidate their positions in the regions they settle.

Galina Yemelianova asserts that the pro-government mass media have played a central role in reinforcing anti-Islamist sentiments among the public and promoting

Islamophobia in Russian society.[95] A substantial demographic increase of Muslims may have contributed to the rising Islamophobia too. Krasnodar Krai has 20 percent Muslims while Astrakhan Oblast accounts for 30 percent and Rostov Oblast over 10 percent.[96]

Demographic 'Islamization' or 'Muslimization' of Russia will impact both Russia's domestic situation and its foreign policy options in the medium and long-term; by around 2050 Muslims will represent between one third (according to the most conservative estimates) or one half (according to the most 'alarmist' assessment) of the Russian population.[97] Yuri Krupnov, a scholar at the Institute for Demography, Migration and Regional Development who participated in writing Russia's demographic doctrine and is known for his nationalist views has advocated the notion of "national preservation" (sberezhenie natsii), which became popular in the mid-2000s in discussions around the need to "preserve" the "ethnic gene pool" (genofond) of Russians against migrants and this view was widely adopted by politicians such as Dmitry Rogozin.[98] In a globalized world a concept of identity is vague especially when people are in a position to reject or accept certain identities be it religious, ethnic or some other type of belongingness.

Some researchers conclude that violence, or susceptibility to terrorism is less successful among Central Asian Muslim immigrants because most of them come to earn money and do not participate in jihad for example: Muslim migrants themselves are under constant pressure not only by the Russian militia but also by Russian nationalists. (It is known that in the last two years attacks on and even killings of immigrants from Central Asia have become a routine, and their number has grown so much that the federal authorities have been compelled to pay attention to this, reports MICROCON Policy working paper 9.[99]

The first Chechen War (1994-1996) has never been accepted as a religious conflict, but it had the features of religious tension. The main point behind the war was independence but it was nourished with radical Islam from different Muslim majority countries. This phenomenon was the repetition of Afghan jihad. The resistance movement for independence shifted to Islamic Jihad, namely terrorism. Herewith, the nature of the conflict is important to stress because it is exactly when compromise to or from the Jihadists' side is unacceptable and intolerable. Jihad (holy war) or any other trend of Islamic fundamentalism, be it Wahhabism or Salafism (both of them give priority to jihad, understood as an armed struggle by the faithful against the enemies of Islam)[100] does not accept a defeat during warfare. The Jihadists were ready to go further in their violence by challenging Russian rule. Violence brought even more violence. Russia's war with radical Islam had devastating results for both sides. The Kremlin fought a war against radical Islam,

not considering periodical terrorist attacks that were happening after the fall of the Soviet Union. It seemed that there were only two ways for Jihadists during the first Chechen War, either they could win and build their empire on oppressing people, or they had to be defeated by the means of violence that they used.

Akhmet Yarlykapov says that the youth jamaats were transformed into a base for separatist movements and they were instrumental in shifting the ideology of the North Caucasus from ethnic separatism, such as the war for Chechen independence, to a religious separatist movement, with radicals declaring the formation of a North Caucasian emirate as part of a global Islamic State.[101] Furthermore, Yarlykapov shows the seriousness of these jamaats as they are international in composition because it has representatives from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and the countries of the Middle East; official Russian statements typically describe these foreigners as mercenaries, as many of them arrive for ideological reason to participate in jihad against non-Muslims, namely Jews and Crusaders.[102]

Gordon M. Hahn says that 'jihadization' in Chechnya produced a level of terror unknown in Russia since the Stalin era. He also states that the North Caucasus's jihad is likely to continue …because Russia's emerging jihad is now undergoing an ominous expansion of the Islamist terrorist network deeper into the North Caucasus and perhaps elsewhere in Russia.[103]

War in Chechnya triggered a wave of instabilities across the neighboring regions. Dagestan became another hub for Islamic radicalism. Islamist 'guerrilla warfare' and 'Sharia campaign' mobilized the part of the population that had little to gain from the failed socio-economic atmosphere in the country. The isolation, unpopularity and corruption of clan-based elites could lead to the emergence of a macro-regional, socio-political and economic crisis which is likely to bring the radicalism fast.[104]

The North Caucasian Republics, namely, Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia and Buddhist Kalmykia are largely rural areas where a significant percentage of the population resides in mountainous regions and economic development and law enforcement are usually absent.[105] According to reported statistics, unemployment can reach 90% in these mountainous regions which can feed any type of violence be it crime or terrorism.[106]

Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR) includes KBR itself, Adygeya and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya (KChR) where Muslims constitute the majority.[107] For example, the Karachay-Balkar nationalist agenda in Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia have been increasingly Islamicized and in Adygea the major conflict has developed along ethno-religious lines: the Orthodox Russian and Cossack majority against the Muslim Adygeas and the weakness of Sufism among the Muslim population has accounted for the predominantly Wahhabi form of Islam

there.[108]

Tatarstan unlike the North Caucasus has been experiencing its Islamic revival on Nationalism. Gordon M. Hahn states that the North Caucasus's radical Islamists have the presence in Tatarstan and in other Tatar communities and Islam is being used as a strong political tool. Azat Khurmatullin in his "Islam Entwined with Nationalism" explains that Islam in Tatarstan is undergoing an important stage in its revival, with its role in the Tatar public, political and spiritual life becoming ever more evident and despite this array of quasi- radical groups, the overall situation in Tatarstan remains stable, and there is little evidence of a radical threat except at the political margins.[109]

Akhmet Yarlykapov in his "Radicalization of North Caucasian Muslims" mentions that in Russia, differing constellations of individuals, organizations, groupings and mosques have been responsible for the spread of radicalism and specifically in the Northern Caucasus, the basic structure of radicalism is the jamaat.[110] The youth jamaat played a role in radicalization of many young generations as the Islam they inspired was derived from different Middle East and Gulf countries. The activities and form of organization of youth jamaats have been patterned after the forms and experience of Muslim organizations in the Middle East which represents a totally different Islam from traditional ones in Russia.[111]

Generally, by the electoral period in 2007-8, there was evidence of greater national stability and a reduction of major internal threats to state security, linked to the improved economic situation and the popular support for Putin's policies.[112] Undoubtedly, some of the strategies used to fight terrorism seemed to give positive results, however the point is to see if this containment period is long-lasting or short-term. Sometimes it is quite natural for the resistance movements to step back due to financial reasons which may delude the situation with a short period of peace.

Some of the scholars state that radical Islam has more of an audience among Muslims of Russia and in order to deal with it there has to be a charismatic leader who will unite Muslims in Russia around peaceful Islam. However, charismatic leadership may lead to more radicalization too. Osama bin Laden was also a charismatic leader, and his attractiveness has recruited and still does recruit great number of people from all over the world.

4.3 Russia's Strategy to Fight Islamic Radicalization and Terrorism

Throughout the historical timeline, Russia has treated its Muslim minorities differently. These Muslims having the same faith have different ethnic roots, and according to that they have distinctive Islam in each Muslim minority region. Tatar-Bashkir Muslims have too much in common with Central Asian

Muslims. These are Turkic tribes dispersed all around Central Asia. Even linguistically all the languages spoken in these areas are very close to one another. Theoretically, these languages can be different dialects of the Old Turkic language. As an example, a very prominent moderator of the 20th century among Turkic Muslims Gaspirinskii stood for the implementation of common *Turki* language to all Tukic peoples living in the territory of Russian Empire.[113]

Islam in Central Asia and Tatarstan and Bashkirtostan is Turkic Islam or Islam of the Turkic World. This particular Islam had close ties with Turkish and Persian Islam (cultural similarities are meant here, not sectarian Shia and Sunny divisions) because of historical reasons. When Muslims of Caucasus and Central Asia were isolated under the Russian rule, Islam in these regions had to survive oppression. Oppression faded out the religiosity in some communities (during the Soviet Union's Godless and classless state policies) while revived it strongly in other communities. Generally, more or less peaceful and, specifically, 'Russian Islam' emerged in the Turkic world. However, the Northern Caucasian minorities were always problematic from the time they had been colonized by the Russian empire until the present. Their Islam is more militarized resembling the Islam in Afghanistan. That is how Islam emerges and consolidates itself among the peoples living in mountainous regions. Their norms and conditions in everyday life get intertwined in all senses

with Islam.

Russia's responsibility and ability to adapt itself to a changing world can be seen in the evolution of laws and regulations or in attitude towards the Muslim minorities over time. There have been several state policies aimed at integrating Muslims into Russian society for the last two decades. Any word which is going to be used in here, be it integration or assimilation, possibly has a different contextual meaning compared to integration or assimilation of Muslims in the UK. In the UK Muslims are immigrants or have immigrant backgrounds with the exception of those white British who convert to Islam. These Muslims in the territorial sovereignty of Russian Federation are not settlers; they have been living in their own lands for centuries.

Ekatirina Braginskaia in her comparison between State approaches to Muslim integration says that Tatar Muslims represent the most culturally assimilated Muslim community due to long Christianization and Sovietization policies while the North Caucasus and Volga region Muslims have striking differences from Tatars.[114] According to her, Putin's administration has been preoccupied with forging Russia's unique, synthesized identity by creating a stronger sense of national belonging to position Russia as a strong multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural country which may promote multinational unity and spiritual revival through which it may protect the peaceful coexistence of different peoples

and confessions, as the idea behind a spiritual revival is an attractive fusion of religious and secular values. [115]

Current counter-terrorism strategies of Russia on federal and local level take a rigid position in respect to 'Islamic dissidents'. The Russian government adopted the Federal Law "On Combating Terrorism" in 1998, which became the main legal pillar of Russian anti-terrorist efforts which attempted to define terrorist activity omitting political motivation as one of the defining characteristics of the crime.[116] Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Ministry of Interior (MVD) became the main responsible units to respond terrorism. In 2006, another law on combatting terrorism legalized the use of armed forces against terrorism be it inside or outside of the country, and the 2006 counterterrorism law allows for suspension of certain individual liberties and media freedoms in the zone of counterterrorist operations, and authorizes counterterrorism units to carry out searches and demolition of suspicious airplanes and ships.[117] For instance, an exceptionally repressive policy has led to radicalization of the Kabardino-Balkarian jamaat and from the middle of 2004, militarized extremist cells began to step up their activities in the Northern Caucasus, including in the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic.[118]

The societal structure in the North Caucasus reminds typical Muslim communities where people may take dissidents' side due to different reasons, be it grievances or sympathy towards resistant fighters. Such incidents frequently target whole communities which lead to a failure in dialogue between the authorities and the communities. Some representatives of Muslim communities usually ask for a change of the repressive approach into a more 'balanced approach', as repressive approach may deal with the problem by force for a short-term, however is most likely to fail in a long-term solution of the issue.[119]

On the international level, Putin and some other responsible politicians portray that Russia is a part of an Islamic World and the justification for this stance will be Russia's claims and solid statements in different international geopolitical events. For example, in 2003 Putin during his speech in Malaysia confirmed that Russia considers itself to be a 'Muslim Power' which in recognition of this joined the Organization of Islamic Conference with observer status. Russian foreign policy happens to shift from a West oriented approach towards a pro-Islamic direction: opposition to invasion in Iraq and Libya and a huge support to Iran and Hamas in Palestine.[120]

Aleksei Malashenko and Akhmed Yarlykapov admit that the struggle against extremism serves the Russian authorities as a pretext for tightening the screws for imposing harsher control on mass media and for persecution of the opposition which in itself brings violations of basic human rights in terms of privacy and freedom of fundamental rights. Russia struggles to overcome

terrorism by increasing its influence as long as it is not in a position to build a proper infrastructure which may better the lives of those deprived peoples living in rural mountainous areas. Very often these communities become the victims of corrupted politicians, who have been replaced by other responsible politicians, but such 'cosmetic measures' are not sufficient according to Akhmed Yarlykapov.[121]

Dennis Sokolov emphasizes that Russian state claims that it is fighting international terrorism when in reality it is engaging in something totally different.[122] According to him there are three myths that Russian authorities pretend to fight the international terrorism:[123]

- Russian security agencies in the North Caucasus exclusively combat terrorists.
- Fundamentalist Islamists from abroad are the principle factor behind the radicalization of Muslims in the North Caucasus and elsewhere in Russia.
- All Muslims who have left Russia and other post-Soviet countries are extremists and terrorists who support ISIS ideology and are ready to fight for it.

The first myth shows how Russia's war on the region's Islamic awakening demonstrates that the issue is mainly about maintaining political control and not about solving the problems that piled up in the socioeconomic life of the region for quite a long period of time which is driving some people to alienation and ultimately frustration.

In the second myth, too much attention is given to the influence of foreign indoctrination of Muslims in Russia, which is said to cause damage and instabilities to peaceful existence of Muslims in Russia. This reason is often portrayed as the main challenge to traditional Islam (which is controlled by the Russian authorities), perhaps to change public perception by not questioning the vital reasons behind radicalization. Sokolov also criticizes the adoption of a law in Dagestan on September 22, 1999, "On the Prohibition of Wahhabi and Other Extremist Activities in the Territory of Dagestan," which opened the way to the persecution of groups of citizens on ideological and religious grounds and a lot of legal experts assert that the law is contrary to the Russian constitution.[124] He argues that such laws and regulations entail 'a regime of terror' that may increase the degree of radicalization. Additionally, the current situation in the Northern Caucasus is built by the early 2000s, the post-Soviet elites in the North Caucasus eliminated much of their competition for authority through charges of extremism and terrorism against their political rivals which led to a system of three pillars: (1) regional authorities, (2) the administration of the Russian president, and (3) the FSB (inheritor to KGB) and other special services, which forced out those who resisted.[125]

In the third myth, many Muslims are surprised to find their names on the lists of wanted Islamic State fighters while spending a vacation in Turkey or studying at Al-Azhar University in Egypt or some Islamic activists are warned not to come back and are threatened with arrest.[126] Intentional or unintentional pressure seems to trigger and attract more dissatisfaction from the Muslim minorities. Such pressure and hesitation based prosecutions are typical to the authorities where the majority of key positions are occupied by people who grew up and gained their education in the USSR. Unfortunately, such counter-terrorism measures are short-lived because they are based on fear and irrationality. Terrorists are portrayed as freedom fighters against the true oppressor or aggressor in such situations.

The second Chechen War (1999-2009) ended while Dmitriy Medvedov was a president. Putin and Medvedov both have had a 'hardline policy' in fighting terrorism by supporting prevention of terrorism and relying on intelligence with five 'pillars' of counter-terrorism approaches:[127]

- strengthening of law enforcement agencies;
- use of preventive strikes;
- assistance to those citizens willing to "reintegrate" in the society after a period of membership in radical groups;
- the development of socio-economic spheres;

- the consolidation of common moral and spiritual foundations.

In 2014 Putin approved a policy for countering terrorism in Russia until 2025 which focuses in particular on intelligence gathering (especially social networks), interethnic relations, and illegal migration. Putin's strategy involves a combination of the efforts of the state, society and public organizations. One of the most important aims is to establish a climate of public non-acceptance, and strengthen civil immunity against the spread of extremist and radical ideas.

It is important to understand that Russia's strategy to fight terrorism emerged during two Chechen wars. Strict measures were aimed at bringing peace and eliminate the terrorist cells in Chechnya, but it was not planned to touch Muslims living in Volga-Ural areas as their Islam was distinctively different. Hence, it has encompassed all the Muslims as jihadist networks were active to reach different corners of Russia. Russia demonstrated the violation of all norms during the Chechen Wars. Later, the Russian state admitted that repressive measures to prevent terrorism have failed and the focus has now been put on actions aimed at diverting the recruitment of terrorists; in 2006 Putin created a commission to improve the socio-economic situation in the Southern Federal District through job creation, and educational reform, but it was only after Medvedev put an end to the antiterrorist operations in Chechnya in 2009 that this soft

approach to fighting terror was further developed and implemented.[128] One of the most useful counter-terrorism strategies was to tackle the problem with a few mentions of security considerations by targeting only terrorists instead of the whole population.[129]

Putin's aggressive, hardline stance on terrorism which includes collecting DNA data, using racial categories for high-risk police registries, surveilling mosques, and conducting raids cannot be accepted as effective policy.[130] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reported no "terrorist attacks" within the Russian Federation in 2015 but in the North Caucasus, authorities detained more than 770 suspected terrorists and killed 156, and prevented 30 out of 84 "terrorism crimes," according to FSB Head Alexander Bortnikov.[131] Interestingly, Gordon M. Hahn presents another argument saying that a drop in the number of terrorist attacks in Russia may be connected to the ongoing decrease of funding and internal structure crisis of the global jihad campaign.[132]

The 2006 "Yarovaya Law" empowered FSB with more inspection of data; the law also introduces criminal liability for failure to report a crime that someone has been planning, is perpetrating, or has perpetrated; under the new law, children as young as 14 can face up to a year in prison for such a "failure" and for other reasons related to extremism, terrorism and participation in massive riots (all of which can be virtually anything in Russia, since the law is vague).[133]

Professor A. Campana in "Beyond Norms" indicates that currently, Russia's counterterrorism framework includes three approaches: terrorism as a result of internal troubles; counter-terrorism as a "positive process"; and Islam not being stigmatized. In addition, she asserts that there may appear some hindrances on the way to implement the new counter-terrorism regulation:[134]

- The first one is the lack of coherence between the definition of the threats and the identification of the causes leading to violence.
- The second one is an incomplete attempt to de-securitizing the counter-terrorism discourses, which paradoxically leads to the re-securitization of socio-economic, religious, and interethnic issues.
- The third one is the use of old discourses (paternalism, strong interventionism) to persuade public opinion.
- The last one is the stress on strategic silences.

Some of the counter-terrorism approaches taken by Putin and Medvedev encounter intellectual criticism. For example Gordon M. Hahn states that despite Putin's efforts to recentralize power, Russia remains a weak state, is becoming a failing state, and risks becoming a failed one; a confluence of several immediate causes – the ongoing

Chechen War, the growing influence of radicals tied to the international Islamist revolutionary network, and Russian President Vladimir Putin's de-democratizing anti-federalist counter revolution – and numerous other background and structural causes are leading to a radical re-islamization of some of Russia's Muslims and the formation of a geographically expanding, ethnically diverse, and flexibly organized terrorist Islamist network across Russia.[135]

Gordon M. Hahn assesses the threat of militant Islam in Russia as the result of Putin's policies, because brutal prosecution of the festering low-intensity war in Chechnya has led to the Chechens' radicalization under the influence of foreign, jihadist terrorist ideologies and movements funded, inspired, and perhaps still coordinated by Al Qaeda.[136] Furthermore, he admits that Russian authorities have had some successes in decreasing the number of terrorist attacks which were happening quite frequently in the last decades, because more and more terrorists are being arrested or killed by Russian state. Galina Yemelianova partially agrees that ultimate success in Chechnya has been reached as a result of the strengthening of the authoritarian rule of President Ramzan Kadyrov, backed by the Kremlin.[137] John Russel says that Chechnya today is still ranked at the bottom of the scale for civil liberties, and that is the consequence of the Putin-Kadyrov deal which essentially remains a private understanding between two powerful individuals: one in Moscow and the

other in Chechnya; he also accentuates that Ramzan has managed to achieve what no Chechen leader before him has managed: the effective end of Russian control of the country which may yet turn out to be a short-term fix.[138]

Besides all these negative and positive approaches during Putin's rule, Roland Dannreuther and Luke March say that recentralization of power and the creation of a power 'vertical', has actually contributed to processes of de-radicalization and the absence of radicalization is also due to the more proactive engagement of the state with its Muslim communities through initiatives such as imam training, the building of mosques, the publication of scholarly materials on Islam and the provision of more professional and academically rigorous Islamic education.[139]

V. CONCLUSIONS

During the investigations carried out after the terrorist attacks or during the counter-terrorism campaign, both Russia and the UK have violated human rights of their Muslim minorities. Harsh regulations targeting Muslim minorities were the status quo to gain political control over the situation. Both states in desire to do so relied on severe undemocratic measures. Russia succeeded with harsh measures to somehow decrease the level of threat, although it required wiping out the City of Grozny. The UK hasn't had an emergency where it had to

engage in warfare.

Obviously, Russia had a longer history of engagement with Muslims or has been present in the affairs of Muslims in its territory. Russia's Muslims may have the historical confidence to act differently, because it is their historical territories where they have been residing for centuries. British Muslims are comparatively younger settlers from this perspective; it may take them several more generations to gain such confidence.

There have been a lot of unjust persecutions with the help of fabricated facts from the state authorities. Under the banner of 'war on terror' Russia justifies its authoritative and imperial nature while the UK seems to fall into this category too. Russia has made an attempt to narrow down the persecutions towards the suspected terrorists only, while in the UK the same approach needed some time as mass media indoctrination was able to transform people's attitudes. In Putin's Russia, media was particularly cautious when it touched Muslim radicalization and terrorism, as much of it now state controlled.[140]

The overall atmosphere in the UK remains tensed as British authorities have been reacting on emotion. Anthony Glees, professor of security and intelligence at Buckingham University, said: "The UK has more highly-developed anti-terror laws than almost any other country in the free world; we have tried to make extremism something that is just not worth the risk, but despite all this we are clearly still generating jihadists."[141]

Russian authorities claim that they have their own traditional Islam which is set and can develop within the Russian norms and conditions. Any other type of Islam coming from different parts of the world is perceived as violent. Anyone rejecting traditional Islam is seen as a radical and subject to pre-charge detention or some other type of investigation.

In the UK, targeted minorities experienced more radicalization by the thrust of state authorities, while in Russia limitations to understand the radical versions of Islam led some people to radicalization.

The UK seemed to have more problems with mutual trust that adversely affected social cohesion between the majority and minority while Russia has not been an exception either. Both states initiated different programs to engage in Muslim communities to gain mutual trust and build up new relations in order to understand what is really going on in Muslim majority neighborhoods or regions. This approach as was mentioned above has been put into practice to gain control over the situation. Certainly, the cooperation teemed with hostility due to already existing social tensions.

Efforts to reduce home-grown terrorism are significantly dependent on the foreign policies of the states too. Mutual understanding and cooperation are difficult-to-impossible to build when states engage in de-radicalization on one hand and in

interventionist invasions on the other. It is impossible to hide such policies in the 21st century. The UK under Tony Blair and his party could not mourn its imperial ghosts, nor embrace a democratic and truly multicultural future[142] by engaging in War on Terror. Russia is in a more privileged position in foreign policy as it condemned the invasions and different military activities in Muslim lands however has closely participated in Syrian conflict recently.

A terrorist act in St. Petersburg metro which left 11 dead and 51 injured and the assassination of the Russian Ambassador to Ankara, Andrey Karlov can be added to the line of backlashes received.[143] Recent terrorist attacks aimed against Russian state and its involvement in Syrian conflict show that success achieved by the Russian authorities through smashing the terrorists undermines effective counter-terrorism measures. Julia Ioffe in her report to The Atlantic says that Russia got used to its terrorist attacks because there have been too much of it that has stopped being terrifying over time.[144]

Both states have tried to improve the social and economic situation of their Muslim minorities as socio-economic deprivation: poverty, unemployment, small economic investments are the main factors for radicalization. Reducing socio-economic inequalities and building cohesion to eliminate violent extremism are closely related.[145]Russia's main problem with Muslims comes from the North Caucasus,

while other regions seem to be peaceful; Akhmet Yarlykapov says that given the depth of the crisis in the Northern Caucasus, cosmetic measures as demonstrative actions against the corrupt officials, the development of tourism and other economic projects are clearly insufficient.[146] The UK hasn't had such a deep crisis in comparison to Russia, the British case is still on a manageable level, which does not require military action as it required in the Russian case.

The international community criticized Russia for using force in its territory towards its citizens; however, was there any other choice to deal with the terrorism which turned into cruel warfare? Had Russia approached the Chechnya problem with less brutality, tried political outreach or offered greater autonomy, the opposition to its rule might have turned out to be vigorous but still manageable says Fareed Zakaria.[147] Unfortunately, as Mariya Y. Omelicheva says Russia's counterterrorism policy can be explained from the position of Russia's imperial tradition, measures adopted by the Tsarist and Soviet regimes.[148]

As Russia was expected to have more efficient counter-terrorism strategies based on fact that it has been engaged in Muslims' political and socioeconomic lives for a long period, it has failed to understand the core values of the new emerging world, where demographics of a country will speak louder. Throughout its imperial history, Russian elites haven't had a proper policy towards Muslims. It was a master-slave relation

which continues until now. The imposition force is the reason for North Caucasus to submit and cooperate. Russian counter-terrorism laws are aimed to cut off the roots of terrorism in general, it does not aim at decreasing it in the first place. Such an approach draws a line between 'us and them', but at least Russia has its traditional Islam, while it violently suppresses non-traditional types of Islam by considering it hazardous.

The UK as one of the representatives of the free world and a promoter, and defender of democratic principles, and human values seems to have a better situation for its Muslim minorities. Comparatively, British Muslims have enjoyed more freedom to practice their religion and traditions in the pre 7/7 period. However, Radical Islam as an ideology and religion in general targets the whole population of Muslims, and the minorities are under suspicion. Russia does not accept Islam as a dangerous religion it overtly claims that Muslims can be violent due to religious misinterpretations. On the contrary, The UK views Islam as dangerous and violent while it says Muslims can be peaceful or violent. All these attempts to make Islam a religion of peace failed greatly. The antagonism

between the native majority and the Muslim minority in the UK seems to continue as counter-terrorism laws of Britain do not support mutual understanding; it marginalizes one group from another.

To conclude, in both cases the laws and actions still reflect the imperial mindset of the countries. In this particular comparison it would be useless to argue that there is a universal or one size fits all solution to this problem. The reason is that both sides rely on coercion without realizing that it only increases the dissatisfaction among the Muslims. By saying that every citizen is equal, the majority stresses their superiority by marginalizing Muslims in case a Muslim terrorist commits a terrorist act.

All these, be it minor or major reasons contribute to radicalization among Muslim communities. As a social movement, terrorism will be still on the top of security agenda because more and more perpetrators will be committing violence by taking rational choices. Hopefully, all these violations of human freedom and loss of human lives due to terrorist atrocities will make both sides to listen to each other.

Notes

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[10] Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, "The Discovery of Grounded Theory" (*Transaction Publishers*, 1967), 6.

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[14] Bryan Caplan, "Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model", *128 Public Choice* (2006), 91-107, at <http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/bcaplan/pdfs/terrorism.pdf>

[15] Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism", 97(3) *American Political Science Review*, (2003), 343-361, at <http://www.columbia.edu/itc/journalism/stille/Politics%20Fall%202007/readings%20weeks%206-7/Strategic%20Logic%20of%20Suicide%20Missions.pdf>

[16] Caplan, ibid., 98.

[17] Lance Lindauer, "Rational Choice Theory, Grounded Theory, and Their Applicability to Terrorism", 9(2) *The Heinz Journal*, 1-12, at <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9fdf/66491f28cf87f4f674fc3b093ff166d071f6.pdf?_ga=1.215214802.436799361.1488986939>

[18] Tahir Abbas, *Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics. The British Experience* (London: Routledge, 2011), 22.

[19] Most of the UK's Muslims hail from Pakistani and Bangladeshi backgrounds. The Somali Muslim community - 100,000-strong, according to the 2011 census - forms Britain's largest refugee population. The Turkish Muslim community numbers some 66,500, two-thirds of which is made up of Cypriots. Nigerian Muslims are believed to make up about 10% of the total Nigerian population in the UK, although precise figures are hard to come by. That's about 16,000 people. See Jawad Iqbal "The Diverse Origins of Britain's Muslims", BBC News, 2016 at <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33715473>

[20] Soeren Kern, "The Failure of British Multiculturalism", Gatestone Institute International Policy Council, at <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/1869/british-multiculturalism-failure>

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[23] Ibid., 47.

[24] MI5 monitoring 1,600 radicals, Politics.co.uk (10 November 2006), available at <http://www.politics.co.uk/news/2006/11/10/mi5-monitoring-1-600-radicals>

[25] Abbas, ibid., 133.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Utkur Yakshiboev

MA in European Studies, University of Flensburg

Contact: yaxshiboyev.utkur@mail.ru