


PROTECTION TRENDS SOUTH SUDAN

January - April 2017



 Rocco Nuri/UNHCR

South Sudan Protection Cluster

May 2017



PROTECTION OVERVIEW AND TRENDS

© Rooco N/UNHCR

Photo: A group of displaced women and children from Mayendit sit together in Rumbek. They were driven from their homes in September 2015 due to fighting and hunger.

INTRODUCTION

This is the tenth Protection Trends report prepared by the South Sudan Protection Cluster (PC) in close collaboration with Child Protection, SGBV and Land Mines and Explosive Remnants of War sub-clusters, and other protection actors.¹ This report provides an overview of the protection situation reported and observed in the first quarter of 2017 and includes some information obtained in April 2017 to make this report more current.² Information is gathered from partners in regional Protection Cluster meetings and PC actors' missions to field locations. A description of the main conflict displacement areas and specific sections on the threats against children, gender-based violence, and landmines and explosive remnants of war and some identified protection issues that impact on the protection of people is also included. Recommendations to improve protection in South Sudan are also provided.

OVERVIEW OF SITUATION

The initiative by the President of announcing a national dialogue in December 2016 has had mixed reactions and given the continuing conflict it raises questions on the feasibility to implement a dialogue with the ongoing conflict. Violence between government and opposition forces in South Sudan has increasingly expanded into new areas. The government has taken the offensive against an increasing number of groups and individuals that have rebelled against the changes to the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS). The process of decentralization continued with the creation of more states in Upper Nile,³ the exclusionary politics and a brutal counter-insurgency campaign that has targeted civilians has created more opposition and discontent. Militarily, the SPLA forces have gained control of more area causing more people to flee but the opposition has become more entrenched against the government. Some opposition groups are in support of the "Machar IO" and some in support of newly created belligerents. As the opposition actors fragment,

command-and-control of forces becomes even looser. With the peace process critically undermined, and no concrete efforts to reset the status quo before the July 2016 crisis, apart from statements from IGAD calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and an inclusive political process, a political solution seems less likely.

During this reporting period, the conflict has been severely affecting particularly the greater Equatoria and Upper Nile regions as well as Western Bahr el Ghazal resulting in dire humanitarian consequences, with significant displacement, serious and systematic reported human rights violations and abuses, including the killing of civilians, arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and other inhumane and degrading treatment, conflict-related sexual violence including rape and gang-rape, and looting and destruction of civilian property.⁴ Almost all villages in in Central Equatoria that have been accessed by UNMISS or humanitarians have been burned by the SPLA forces, according to the population that has fled from the area. The destruction is depicted by satellite photography.⁵ At the time of this report, there is increasing conflict reported in all the above mentioned areas and in central Jonglei the SPLA has taken control of Yuai and Waat causing the mainly Nuer population to flee in all directions. At present so far over 6,000 people are moving towards Akobo and the Ethiopian border, many stuck in locations unable to move for fear of attacks along the main route and without food and water. The Western Upper Nile is now an active conflict area as SPLA forces have reportedly taken Tonga, previously controlled by the mainly Shilluk opposition (IO) authorities. Thousands of people have been fleeing north towards through Fashoda county congregating in and around Aburoc and many people are also crossing to Sudan.⁶ The SPLA have taken over Kodok that has swelled the population in Aburoc as people are fleeing. There are an estimated 30,000 IDPs in the area without adequate food, water or shelter. Those that can afford the 3,000 SSP travel to the border are waiting for the few commercial trucks that have provided transport to Sudan. At the time of

¹ See previous reports at: www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan/protection

² To provide the most up to date report some information obtained in April is included.

³ On 14 January, Mr. Kiir issued a decree creating four additional states in greater Upper Nile and Western Equatoria and rearranging state administrative boundaries. The decree now brings the total number of states to 32 from the 28 created by a Presidential decree (Security Council Report, 16 March 2017).

⁴ Information quoted from March 2017 SG report.

⁵ UNITAR - UNOSAT identified a total of about 6,300 destroyed structures within the area of the current map (approximately 700 square kilometers). Most of the damage is concentrated in the outskirts of Yei town. The whole analysis over the Nahr Yei district covers an area of approximately 3,640 square kilometers, and the results show over 18,300 destroyed structures.

⁶ See UNHCR Sudan Flash Update 30 April. "In Sudan, Commission of Refugees (COR) estimates that 7,000 individuals have arrived in South Kordofan from South Sudan's Upper Nile State. An additional 8,000 individuals are expected within the coming days."

⁷ Description included in the PC Draft Strategy, April 2017.

⁸ <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21374&LangID=E>

⁹ Reported by Radio Tamuz. The Protection Cluster has yet to visit Raja but interviews with IDPs now in Awiel have confirmed most civilians have fled from the town. <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/raja-town-deserted-after-rebel-attack>

this report, without the means to make it to the border, many of the displaced population in Aburoc are stuck without a place to hide from a potential SPLA advance on the area.

The brunt of the conflict weighs heavily on women, girls, boys and men with forced recruitment by armed forces of boys and men coupled with abduction of women and girls into virtual slavery, to serve as wives and cooks. Gender roles have changed as women take up the role of bread winner in the family by moving in search of food, firewood and petty jobs which exposes them to exploitation, sexual violence especially rape. Though gender inequality is deeply rooted into the culture of South Sudan and early marriage has been widely practiced, the economic burden of conflict has forced parents to marry off their child daughters. Children do not attend school in order to support their parents; including girls engaging in transactional sex that exposes them to negative reproductive health consequences.⁷

In the previous Trends report a large population movement of the mainly Dinka population from the Equatoria region, mainly from Yei, to Juba and other government controlled areas from fear of being attacked was reported. Many settled around the airport in Juba and were air lifted by the Government to Malakal in February this year, just after fighting emptied nearby Wau Shilluk of its Shilluk population. From IDP monitoring and discussions with the local authorities, it is estimated that about two thousand people, the vast majority Dinka, were transported north by the Government. During this reporting period a movement of about 1,800 mainly Dinka were relocated to areas around Malakal and to the town including; Rianom, Nyonkuach, Adong and Baliet town from the IDP camps in the area south of Melut town.

Most all other ethnic groups not associated with the government SPLA or Taban Deng related forces previously part of the IO are under threat and being displaced. The UN Human Rights Commission has reported on a pattern of ethnic cleansing and population engineering. It found in Malakal that the redrawing of state boundary lines helped depopulate the town of its Shilluk and Nuer inhabitants. Civil servants had been forcibly relocated out of the town on the basis of their ethnicity.⁸ In the Western Upper Nile, including the main town of Kodok, the entire Shilluk population is under threat of being displaced while more than 20,000 have been confined without freedom of movement in the Malakal POC site for years. As mentioned above, in Central Equatoria evidence of over 18,000 structures have been burned with ongoing reports of killings and rape as thousands of Equatorian people continue to flee to Uganda with no end in sight. In Greater Bahr el Gahzal, the Fertit and Luo population continues to be displaced from their communities and within the town of Wau from fear of attack by the government authorities. Raja, previously not affected by the conflict, is now reported to be practically deserted after government and SPLA-IO forces clashed in recent weeks.⁹ In the past three months there have been at least 7 resignations from civilian and military leadership posts, protesting the Government's ethnic bias, tribalism,¹⁰ and criticizing the planned national dialogue. In one resignation letter "ethnic cleansing" was described as part of government practices.¹¹ These are allegations from insiders of the South Sudan establishment. As highlighted by the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, the underlying factors are present for the commission of mass atrocities committed mainly along ethnic identification.

Through the Integrated Phase Classification for Food Security (IPC)

release in February 2017, the Government of South Sudan declared that Famine began in Leer County in January, while projecting Famine from February-July for Mayendit and the prevention of Famine in Panyijiar through humanitarian assistance and noting insufficient data for a classification of Koch. This area of the White Nile basin is home to one of the most resilient livelihoods systems in East Africa. Now, some 100,000 people are experiencing starvation, destitution, and death, while up to one million more may risk death from hunger if they are not assisted. A million of children across the country are already acutely malnourished, in what the UN is calling the "worst hunger catastrophe" since civil war erupted three years ago.¹² The current situation is clearly man-made: a result of the conflict, warring parties blocking access for aid workers, and large-scale human rights violations making it impossible for farmers to access fields and people to access their livelihoods. Food security and human rights experts have identified the blatant destruction of food security infrastructure and livelihood change particularly in Leer and the Equatoria region. It underscores the actions by the SPLA and opposition forces, and the complete failure of international actors in stopping the violence.¹³

While many of the opposition forces have also committed abuses in all parts of the country, including killings, rapes, abductions and recruitment of child soldiers, according to Human Rights Watch, "crimes against civilians committed by government troops are by and large responsible for today's dire humanitarian situation. Yet, none of those who orchestrated or tolerated these abuses were ever charged by the government, and only two commanders were sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council".¹⁴ Impunity continues in all parts of South Sudan.

As the conflict continues into its fourth year, the Protection Cluster Trends reporting has continued to identify violent crimes against people causing displacement on a daily, weekly and monthly basis. The economic downward spiral facing South Sudan has intensified the violent behavior towards civilians, particularly against the most vulnerable, women and children, in an environment that lacks accountability for human rights abuses. Government security services continue to suppress independent and critical voices from the opposition, media and human rights defenders.¹⁵ In the absence of any broader political and economic reforms, and donor/international engagement to implement the terms laid out in the ARCSS, rampant insecurity and violent crime continue, further diminishing the protection environment during this reporting period. Despite some noted changes in the UNMISS FORCE protection of civilians through efforts to increase patrols and strengthening security measures particularly in and around POC sites,¹⁶ UNMISS has been denied access to practically all areas where attacks on civilians occur, and humanitarians have been targeted and killed in higher numbers than previously reported. Six aid workers and their driver were killed in South Sudan in the worst single attack on humanitarian staff in the country's three-year civil war on 27 March.¹⁷ The UN has now reported 82 aid workers killed in South Sudan since the start of the December 2013 conflict.¹⁸ With civilians targeted by their own government in increasingly more places and the opposition (IO) trying to hold areas with civilians to create defensive and support bases and attract food and other humanitarian assistance, the ability for people to find protection in South Sudan is increasingly more difficult. With great risks, people continue to flee to surrounding countries in increasing numbers.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/south-sudan-military-officials-quit-war-crimes-170219044322004.html>

¹² According to food experts brief to the Protection Cluster and UN public statements; <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56205#.WQBhZ2mGMdU>

¹³ "Famine is defined as a system-wide failure i.e. government, the humanitarian system, all political actors. Everyone has failed in some way to prevent the preventable", quote from a food security expert who asked not to be named.

¹⁴ See Human Rights Watch report, 11 April 2017, J. Pedneault, Starving Under Bullets in South Sudan and Speech of the Chair of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan to the Human Rights Council, 15 March 2017.

¹⁵ See Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, 6 March 2017, pg 10.

¹⁶ See letter from the SG addressed to the President of the Security Council (on the implementation of Cammaert Recommendations); <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/letter-dated-17-april-2017-secretary-general-addressed-president-security-council-implementation>


¹⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/mar/27/six-un-aid-workers-killed-ambush-south-sudan-unicef-partner>

¹⁸ <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-unrest-idUSKBN17L2AC>



FORCED DISPLACEMENT

IDPs as of 30 April 2017



At present (end April 2017) the estimated number of IDPs is 1.93 million and the number of refugees is now more than 1.81 million. This brings the total of conflict displaced persons to over 3.7 million. The IDP population has increased by 84,207 or 5% over the first few months of 2017 and the number of South Sudanese seeking asylum in surrounding countries has increased by 524,170, a 41% increase since 31 December 2016. With conflict spreading to more areas, with civilians and their livelihoods being targeted, as described in the previous Trends report, people are continuing to flee outside the country.

There has been a further increase of the number of people fleeing the country since the last Trends report. The average reported was over 1,200 per day into Uganda and now in the first one hundred days of 2017 there is over 2,100 on average crossing to Uganda. There is also an increase of people fleeing to Sudan and to Ethiopia. Since 1 January 2017, over 95,000 refugees have arrived in Sudan, which far exceeds the average arrival trend observed in January through March in 2014-2016 and exceeds the initial planning figure of 60,000 for all of 2017. Nearly 20,000 South Sudanese refugees are reported to have fled across the border into Sudan between 29 April and 6 May, arriving in White Nile and South Kordofan. This brings the total number of South Sudanese refugees to over 388,000 who have fled to Sudan since the start of the conflict in December 2013. In the border states of White Nile, South and West Kordofan and East Darfur, over 675 people arrived on average per day. Some people report to have been along the border for a few months and have only recently been registered in Sudan. Despite the fact that there is no conflict in this northern region of Bahr el Ghazal of South Sudan and WFP has made efforts to provide food to the area over


the past year, large numbers of persons are leaving because of lack of food.¹⁹

The number of South Sudanese refugees now in Ethiopia's southwest region of Gambella has reached over 370,000, almost matching the size of the local population. In March alone, 16,274 South Sudanese refugees arrived, three times the number registered in the previous month, February 2017.²⁰

As of the 15 April 2017, there were over 882,000 South Sudanese refugees, most from the Equatoria region, in Uganda.²¹ About 209,100 of these arrived since the beginning of 2017. Over 80 percent of refugees registered in surrounding countries are women and children.

There still remains 216,653 IDPs in the Protection of Civilian (POC) sites.²² The exact number of people departing and entering during this reporting period has been difficult to ascertain. The recording in the larger POC sites is difficult to ascertain with large numbers of people moving in and out each day. Compared to the last Trends report, less people are leaving the Juba POC sites permanently for other locations in South Sudan. For some families, Juba POC sites are a transit place before they find the resources to move onwards to Uganda. A number of people have arrived and stayed because of fear of attacks on the road to the border. From October to December last year, information obtained from focus group discussions and observations by UNHCR field staff, it was estimated that 4-5,000 people residing in the UN house left the POC sites.²³ Large numbers of people were monitored traveling down the Nile and arriving in Old and New Fangak. With the increased fighting in northern Jonglei and Upper Nile area, there has been a decrease in movement out of both Juba and Bentiu POC sites, but there still is considerable movement in and out

South Sudanese Refugees as of 15 April 2017



¹⁹ FOA has described that the dependency of the market economy and impact of attacks on the main supply roads from Uganda has severely impacted on the food security in the Northern Bahr el-Ghazal region.

²⁰ UNHCR spokesman statement to Anadolu Agency in Ethiopia, 6 April 2017.

²¹ At the time of the publication of this report, the first week of May 2017, the refugee numbers are only available for up to 15 April 2017. On average, over 1,500 continued to cross each day during the first two weeks of April.

²² The UNMISS figure reported is based on Biometric Registration conducted by IOM in Bor (March 2017), Malakal (February 2017), Melut (March 2017), UN House (October 2016), Wau PoC 1 and Wau AA (March 2017), and the headcounts conducted in Bentiu (March 2017). Information for the influx of over 17,000 to Wau is not included.

²³ See previous Trends Report describing restrictions on freedom of movement, pg 2.

²⁴ See Acted report, from January - February 2017, 1,635 departed the Juba POCs (about 1/3 for Jonglei) and 1,810 entered (the majority from Leer and Mayendit). Information for March and April has not been published.

of these locations.²⁴ During the first few months of 2017, UNHCR protection staff in the POC have noticed continued movements out but the number of people recorded as leaving Juba POC sites has been difficult to record. There has been consistent movement out of the Malakal POC to Sudan monitored by IOM and DRC.²⁵ The Wau POC and other IDP sites in town have had an increase of over 17,000 IDPs in April after increased conflict in surrounding areas and targeted killings in town (reported in more detail below). The population in the Melut POC has reduced to about 300 plus people as IDPs have been finding their own means to depart. Efforts to relocate the remaining have been put on hold with the increasing conflict in the areas the remaining population has requested to potentially relocate. The same is for the Bor POC as conflict in eastern Jongei has also stopped potential movement of many in the POC. These locations remain with significant humanitarian needs and protection concerns.

SIGNIFICANT FORCED DISPLACEMENT AREAS ARE DESCRIBED BELOW:

Equatoria region - The estimated number of IDPs in the region has increased with well over 450,000 (Western Equatoria 120,000, Central Equatoria 200,000 [by community assessments, it is estimated there are well over 100,000 IDPs in Juba. This includes the people in POC sites, informal settlement sites and IDPs who have settled elsewhere in the city and suburbs], Eastern Equatoria 150,000).²⁶

More people in the region have been internally displaced but a greater number flee to Uganda from the region so the IDP estimate remains about the same as previously reported in the last Trends report. All the Equatoria region except for the far Eastern part near the border with Kenya have been more or less occupied by government forces, looting and destruction of all resources and with retaliation by "IO" forces particularly and unidentified armed groups, along main roads.

As of March 2017, UNMISS estimates that 75 per cent of the **Eastern Equatoria** population is displaced. All that remains are looted shops, empty schools, miles of burned and abandoned tukuls and SPLA military occupation of most villages. The destruction is similar to what has been reported in the Yei area.²⁷ According to refugees now in Uganda attacks perpetrated mainly by the SPLA, is the overwhelming reason given for insecurity and the reasons people have fled. Government representatives and the SPLA continue to describe criminal "rebel" groups as the main cause of fear causing people to flee, similar to what was described in the last Trends report in Kajo Keji and since August previously reported about Yei.²⁸

Since the last Trends report the increase in conflict has moved further eastward. "Indigenous Equatorians", in Nimule, mainly the Madi and Acholi people, are accused of supporting the "rebels" in this area. Civilians alleged that the SPLA and unknown armed groups committed violations of looting, destruction of civilian property, rape and killing causing mass displacement.²⁹

Fighting which began on 3 April in Pajok, a border town of up to 50,000 people, caused mass displacement from the town to Uganda and the surrounding bush area, with reports of serious

human rights violations against civilians, including killings, looting and burning of property and detention. Over 6,000 people were recorded to have entered Uganda in less than 48 hours. While numbers of those crossing to Uganda have slowed to date, over 1,000 people crossing each day in this area.

UNMISS has increased its patrols to **Yei and in surrounding areas** and UNICEF and OCHA have also established a permanent presence there. However despite additional presence and monitoring, grave human rights violations have not stopped, with more reports of looting, killings, rapes and abductions of civilians by government soldiers in and outside of the town. In addition to people being subjected to physical violence, the major protection issues remain related to lack of freedom of movement, ability to plant and the widespread criminality in Yei town. Food scarcity, continued inflation and proliferation of arms are contributing factors to the further deterioration of the rule of law. The presence of the national security service that was thought to improve security in Yei as lootings, killings, rapes, break-ins of houses and offices, robberies and shooting from organized government militia forces occurs on a daily basis. There have been specific neighborhoods attacked in an organized manner. Families cannot afford to send their children to the four of forty-fives schools that remain open. Since 11 April the area to Lasu border has not been accessible by UNMISS patrol despite repeated attempts. However recently UNMISS had made it to Morobo near the border. Movement is reportedly increased from Yei to Maridi. The situation remains unpredictable, with potential further conflict in the area expected. With no economy and little food farmed or transported, Yei residents are resorting to boiling mango leaves to survive.

Humanitarian response and movements remain largely within the 3kms radius of Yei town. But during this reporting period, humanitarian partners were able to access 3 locations 20 kms from Yei town. As predicted, the situation in areas immediately outside Yei is more critical. The small number of people in these locations report of atrocities, severe lack of food and access to basic services.

In Western Equatoria; there has been less conflict reported during this reporting period, however local authorities have reported that on 10 April, an unknown armed group allegedly raided a cattle ranch in Rumbek East taking the cattle via Bahr-el-Grindi and Kokori Payams of Mvolo. Cattle owners, followed the cattle and reportedly killed seven persons. The RRC reported that this incident led to 15,968 IDPs fleeing to Mvolo Centre and 13,879 in Yeri Centre. On 27 April 2017 another cattle raiding incident occurred, displacing the few remaining people in Bahr-el-Grindi and Kokori Payams of Mvolo. UNMISS also confirmed the report of 27 April adding that incidents of cattle raiding in Bahr el Grindi, Kokori and Mapourdit areas were between Dinka Akaar and Dinka Atuot in Mvolo Amadi State. As a result, a number of people were reportedly killed and cattle stolen. The local authorities claimed that civilians from Bahr el Girindi were displaced to Mvolo while those civilians from Mapourdit moved to Yirol County, Lakes State.

According to a local organization Mundri Active Youth Association (MAYA) operating in Mundri, nearly 11,000 people

²⁴ According to DRC weekly reporting there has been an increase in departures from the POC to Sudan. In their report, 1,317 departures for the first three weeks of April 2017 were recorded, most all were to Sudan. IOM has also monitored movements of people leaving Malakal POC and other areas of the Upper Nile region indicating a regular weekly movement of a couple of hundred people.

²⁵ The numbers have remained similar to those reported in the last Trends report with only a 50,000 increase for Eastern Equatoria in the Magwi border area. Apart from an UNMISS patrol to the area no other protection assessments have been made due to lack of access for security reasons.

²⁶ See fn. 5

²⁷ See PC Update: Grave Concerns for the Lives of Civilians in Kajo-Keji: Appeal for Immediate Ceasefire in Kajo-Keji, Freedom of Movement and Protection of Civilians, Land and Property (24 February 2017) and previous Trends report on central Equatoria.

²⁸ According to UNMISS report provided with a request not to be specifically cited.

were displaced from Kediba to Lui in Mundri East while another 6,800 moved from Kediba (Mundri East) to Mundri West town as a result of fighting between armed youth and the SPLA in March-April 2017. There are also reports of some displacement from Lakamadi to Doso and Wito areas in Mundri West as a result of SPLA actions against armed youth. Eastern Mundri has experienced conflict in several villages causing over 13,000 people displaced. In Yambio, the number of IDPs in the Remenze Catholic Church increased to 1,309 households/6,617 individuals. IDPs have expressed willingness to return subject to improvement of security situation in the surrounding villages as they claimed that the armed groups are still present and people lack confidence in SPLA provide security. The presence of South Sudan National Liberation Movement (SSNLM) and SPLA in Gangura payam of Yambio is creating fear in the local population forcing people to continue hide in the bush away from their homes.


Large scale displacement in the region continues. Humanitarians are trying to provide some assistance to identified groups of IDPs in the expanding area of displacement caused by human rights violations mainly by government forces moving into civilian communities. The last Trends report highlighted the violence and large scale displacement from Kajo-Keji town that is now practically empty. Now it is the Magwi area of Eastern Equatoria. The community of Pajok of about 50,000 has been displaced in the past month. At the

time of this report, thousands of people continue to flee from Magwi county to Uganda, many who have been hiding in the bush with continued reports of attacks on civilians.

Security situation in Lakes State region has also deteriorated. Clan, territorial and intern-communal violence triggered by revenge killings, cattle raiding, robbery and banditry have caused displacement. Towards the end of 2016 to March 2017, the security situation was relatively calm although there were some pocket areas with conflict. After the political transitions in two created "States", (Eastern and Western Lakes) conflicts began in April and May compared to the previous three months. In month of April and the start of May, 820 households (over 4,100 individuals) have been displaced in Cueibet, Yirol West and Rumbek East counties of Lakes.³⁰

In the Western Bahr el Ghazal;

During this reporting period the security situation in Wau has deteriorated with as many as 19,000 more people displaced; approximately 15,000 (in POC AA) and over 4,300 (in Cathedral and other IDP locations) from the surrounding areas and people inside Wau town who feel increasingly under risk of attacks. In March, five IDPs were killed while collecting firewood and mangos and between 5 - 13 April 2017, up to 24 civilians have been identified as shot or hacked to death following the killing of senior army officers from the



³⁰ IDP information from UNHCR and partners, Rumbek.

³¹ See New York Times news article describing this incident; https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2017/04/10/world/africa/ap-af-south-sudan-ethnic-killings.html?_r=0

5th Division when returning from the Baggari area.³¹ Besides IDPs, humanitarian workers and a UN mission member (WFP staff and a CTSAMM monitor) have been attacked and lives have been lost.

Arbitrary arrests and detention of youth, including school children targeting ethnic Fertit generally and increasingly reported, member of the Luo population.³² This has resulted in some students not going to school. Men, especially the youth, are very concerned with their safety and security where they are perceived to be targets for military personnel outside the collective center. Some male respondents highlighted forced conscription of young men from the Cathedral, during their movement outside of collective center area around evening hours by the military forces conducting security patrols.³³ Humanitarian workers, including WFP, Oxfam, UNMISS, UCDC and WDG staff have also been arbitrarily detained at the National Security Directorate and in the Grinti Barracks. SGBV incidents against the displaced population continues. The ability to report remains weak. Some survivors prefer not to report for fear of retaliation by the perpetrators (armed military personnel). Even when a perpetrator has been arrested, with links to senior officers, it often results in charges not being pursued. GBV safety audits led by IMC, indicate an increase in the stress levels among family members resulting in more domestic violence incidents, an increase of over 42% reported incidents. The capacity of local and international partners is overwhelmed resulting in a slow response on cases referred. Owing to unabated looting of property, especially in areas of Jeber Kheir and Hai Salaam, IDPs have emptied their houses and bring their property inside crowded displacement sites. The Director of the UNMISS Human Rights Division, stated during a recent visit that people are losing hope in the humanitarian actors to respond.

The government plan for relocation of IDPs from the Episcopal Church of Sudan (ECS) was a major issue during this reporting period. The authorities stated the decision is “unstoppable” to have IDPs at ECS relocated. A committee was formed to start relocation has taken place with the presence of the police and military in and outside of the ECS site forcing people to move. Not all people moved in the same direction. At the time of this report a forced relocation is ongoing with the presence of the police and military in and outside of the ECS site forcing people to move. IDPs are collecting their belonging, many walking in search of a place to shelter. It is observed that not all people moving in same direction. A group of vulnerable women stated that their family members had been killed in the Messna location where the government is forcing them to re-locate. IDPs from the ECS that have been interviewed express they do not feel comfortable moving to these areas and want to stay in the ECS.³⁴

The ICWG in Wau expects that the number of new arrivals to the town will continue and additional space will be required. The Cathedral and POC AA sites are the most congested even after the recent expansion of the site. New shelters are being created in the POC AA but there are constraints by

the government for securing additional sites. CCCM Wau is looking into other options as people arrive from Raja³⁵ and surrounding areas and from in the town with the ongoing insecurity. The local authorities are advising that humanitarians should be providing tools and seeds to plant, and not mere food distributions. Addressing the insecurity and human rights violations remains the major priority for protection in Wau and surrounding areas.

The estimated total number of IDPs in the region is now well over 100,000.³⁶ As of 30 April 2017, in all collective sites within Wau town, there are estimated to be 28,232 individuals. Nearly 61% of the IDP population are in the POC area adjacent to UNMISS (population 43,535 individuals from the last registration (of new influx), a 34% increase from the last Trends report).³⁷ POC sites are overcrowded even after the recent expansion completed in February 2017. Despite challenges in access to land for IDPs, alternative locations have to be prepared and or IDP location near the UNMISS base be expanded, as further IDPs are more than likely to arrive from within and outside of Wau town in addition to those forced to leave the ECS location.

In the Upper Nile region, on January 24th 2017, SPLA and the IO clashed on the west and east bank around Malakal and the fighting continued into the first week of February. Areas affected by the fighting were Malakal town, Ditang, Bukeny, Makal Island, Wau Shilluk, Ogod and Kom. The SPLA forces moved across to Wau Shilluk causing the entire population of Wau Shilluk, Padit and Pathow to move north to the areas of Fashoda, Orinyi, Kodok. The IDP population, directed by the IO authorities, moved as far north as Aburoc further away from the front line and river. The heavily militarized area has made it difficult for humanitarians to work. Forced recruitment was monitored and all males were prevented from moving from the area. Many women with children expressed they do not have the money to pay for their travel to the border.³⁸ The IO authorities’ influence to direct the civilian population to certain areas impacted on civilians’ decisions to seek security and international protection in Sudan.³⁹ At present, Kodok, on the west bank of the river, has been occupied by the government forces and most of the population has also fled to Aburoc. In Wau Shilluk, there also exists a small caseload of persons with special needs (PSNs) who have decided to remain in the area due to their acclaim and connection to the original Shilluk Kingdom.⁴⁰ It has also been identified that the SPLA have been providing security to these PSNs although they remain vulnerable without adequate humanitarian assistance. A recent joint mission to Tonga in the southwestern area of the Upper Nile region, a former stronghold of the IO, found the town partially destroyed and looted with 39 remaining vulnerable people.⁴¹

The majority of the population that was estimated to be over 5,000 fled east towards Malakal and north towards Aburoc. Many people are reportedly hiding in the bush. At the time of this Trends report, a large number of the Shilluk civilian population have now congregated in and around Aburoc. It is estimated there are up to 30,000 mostly women and children, exhausted

³² More ethnic Luo (from Jur River County) have joined the POC AA, including from the ECS site.

³³ See DRC Post Displacement Rapid Protection Assessment Wau city, Wau State April 2017.

³⁴ DRC and UNHCR protection assessments.

³⁵ The RRC provided information that as many as 17,000 people have been displaced from Raja; so far not confirmed.

³⁶ This includes Wau town, surrounding villages, Raja and Awiel.

³⁷ The last Trends report used January statistics of 41,000 plus individuals in Collective Sites and 80,000 in total in the region. With the expansion of POC AA many people moved. The discrepancies indicate the difficulties of maintaining reliable registrations as populations have moved from relocations to new collective sites and with increased security concerns over the past two reporting periods.

³⁸ According to DRC, NP and UNHCR assessments.

³⁹ See UNHCR/DRC joint mission report to Aburoc, 1 March 2017.

⁴⁰ Information provided by DRC.

⁴¹ See report on protection and rapid needs assessment to Tonga – Saturday 28 April, 2017 and OHCHR High Commissioner statement on Aburoc, 12 May 2017.

and vulnerable, many living in the open without adequate shelter, lack of sanitation and in need of food and water in an area covering a few square kilometers. If the government forces move towards their settlements from Kodok, the only option for them to seek safety will be to flee to Sudan about 45 km away. Without transport to a safer location, food and water, the population, especially the most vulnerable persons, are at serious risk of being abused, raped and killed.⁴²

Malakal POC site - During the first few months of 2017 population movement out of the POC site has continued. This is a change from the movement in December 2016 when individuals who had left the POC site began returning. Camp Management reported as of 13 April 2017, 2424 individuals consisting primarily of women and children have left the POC site with the intention of moving to Sudan.⁴³ UNHCR/DRC and partners are conducting further intention surveys to establish triggers for movement in and out of the POC site. There has been consistent movement from February to the present time out of the Malakal POC to Renk and Sudan monitored by IOM and DRC.⁴⁴ Through UNHCR and partner's interaction with persons of concern via community structured meetings and focus group discussions, various reasons have described why people are leaving the POC at this time. While insecurity has been a general reason cited, it is typically related to personal safety in which SGBV and threat to life continues to exist outside of the POC site. A number of IDPs expressed their desire to move to Sudan to reunite with family members who are able to provide financial assistance, better living conditions, access to employment/education, and a prospect of having a future. The political atmosphere is perceived as no longer conducive for peace, with the increase of conflict in the area and the taking over of Wau Shilluk by the SPLA, this means the Shilluk community no longer have access to their land. This has instilled a sense of hopelessness for the future of the community. The traditional and community roles/structures that have broken down or no longer respected, negative coping mechanism through abuse of drugs and alcohol and aggressive behavior have further eroded the will of the population that has been residing in the POC site for over three years. Mental health issues directly related to living in such an environment is still a serious concern.⁴⁵ Although service providers are on the ground while mental health and psychosocial (MHPSS) referral mechanisms need strengthening, the root cause of the problem persists - living in a place without freedom of movement and no access to livelihoods. Movement out of the POC is largely undertaken by women and children. Due to security threats the men are choosing to remain in the POC site which creates an increasing protection concern in terms of livelihood access for men. Male youth are also remaining behind because of their fear to move outside and be at risk of arrest, torture and being killed.⁴⁶ These young men consume drugs and alcohol which typically leads to violent behavior.

Malakal town has become increasingly populated with the arrival of government facilitated IDP movement. The authorities claim these individuals are originally from Malakal. From monitoring and discussions with newly arrived persons it is obvious that they do not have land or a property in Malakal.

They are being hosted communally in a compound identified by the government. Protection, WASH and health concerns have been identified. Many older persons have been assigned to travel with several children (up to 8 children per an older care provider). Street children and provision of care by single mothers, older persons, in addition to deplorable living conditions further exacerbates the difficult living conditions of the people. UNHCR and partners have initiated response to identified Persons with Specific Needs (PSNs). Child protection actors (UNICEF & INTERSOS) have included children into PSS activities and school programs. Protection actors have advocated for mobility equipment for PSNs in Malakal town. With such a vulnerable population and without allocation of land and adequate housing to the arriving population, they are unable to initiate livelihood activities to provide for themselves. They are highly dependent on food distribution and other humanitarian interventions such as WASH facilities and health care.

In Melut, there have been movements from the Khoradar to Baliaet, Anakdiar, Riangnhom and Adong and a total of 3,600 individuals (362 HH) have been monitored leaving these areas. The intention for the population movement for people without registration cards is to access arable land for farming. Most of this movement took place in April. It has since stopped due to the onset of the rains which will inhibit the movement of persons of concern to their respective areas of origin. DRC and UNHCR continue to monitor these movements as it is likely that they will start again in the dry season.

In Nasir County, following the fighting between government and SPLA-IO forces the first week of January 2017 over 30,000 people were displaced and many still in villages near the border with Ethiopia near Malual cattle camp, Maker, Buri Abiye, Jikmir, Makak. Smaller number of IDPs are staying along the Gilo River near the border with Ethiopia. The current IDP population in the area is estimated at 35,000 by protection partners working in the area. Some people are crossing to Ethiopia through Buri Abeyi checkpoint border. The main reason for the population fleeing from Nasir County at this time is due to hunger and food insecurity. The average number of people crossing to Ethiopia in this area is approximately 150 – 250 individuals. This includes people from Jonglei State and Nasir County.

Jonglei⁴⁷ – Since the last Trends report there has been a significant deterioration of the protection situation. In February, clashes between the SPLA and SPLA/IO in Yuai (Uror) caused a large displacement of the population to Duk, Mowtot and Lankien. Intense fighting between government and opposition forces in the newly established state of Bieh (north western Jonglei), started on 13 April 2017 and continuing to date intermittently, there are reports of large scale civilian displacement from IDPs reaching Akobo. According to these IDPs, fighting commenced when government forces advanced from Yuai town eastwards affecting a large number of communities, including Pulchuol, Pieri, Mowtot, Waat, Kalkuiny and Walgak. The population in Akobo fears that government forces are currently mobilising in Waat to take over Akobo and establish total control of Bieh State and the subsequent installation of government-appointed officials in

⁴² See OCHA ICWG and PC assessments from mission to Aburoc, 29 April 2017.

⁴³ The information collected by camp management does not capture push/pull factors in specific but rather covering general reasons for movement.

⁴⁴ See fn 24.

⁴⁵ In previous Trends report nine attempted suicides were reported over the course of less than a year. One attempted suicide was reported in the past three months.

⁴⁶ UNHCR and partner information obtained from interviews with the population in the POC site.

⁴⁷ Information obtained in this section was largely obtained by the Protection Cluster focal persons, Bor field office, April 2017.

⁴⁸ In the previous Trends report, 3,700 households (20,000 individuals) were reported to have been registered as refugees at the time, while people moving from Akobo to Tierguol, Ethiopia continued to be reported.

areas considered to be opposition strongholds. Akobo being a refuge point for many IDPs, any takeover of the area will likely displace thousands and force them to seek asylum across the border in Ethiopia.⁴⁸

Following the clashes in Yuai and the surrounding areas in mid-February, some 11,204 individuals (1,314 HHs) were reported to have arrived from Uror to Akobo and some 1,536 individuals to Lankien. The number of displaced persons in Duk is still being assessed but unverified reports by the local RRC indicate that some 39,711 IDPs from Uror are now in Duk (Padiet, Payuel/Poktap&Panyang/Pajut). Following the clashes south of Malakal also in early February, some 5,000 IDPs were reported to be displaced from Atar/Kaldak/Khorfulus/Koethok to Diel in Pigi. The recent fighting in Greater Fangak has also led to displacement of people affected by the fighting in the areas of Bei, Nyalual, Kuerkier, Kuer Nyang, and Thokchak.

People fleeing these areas report of shelling and shooting by government forces and subsequent cross-fire with opposition forces, causing deaths of civilians, including women and children. Scenes of chaos have been described as people fled in all directions during attacks, resulting further in cases of missing family members, including children and vulnerable persons as well as the destruction of properties and looting during the fighting.

Unverified estimates are that up to 100,000 civilians have been displaced and many are reportedly trapped with fear of further attacks by government forces from one side and alleged harassment and looting by armed elements of civilians who are trying to reach safety, including Ulang and Akobo. In addition to insecurity, the absence of drinking water on the 2-3 day walk from the Waat area to Akobo and lack of money to hire vehicles for the journey are reportedly preventing civilians from reaching safety.

The increase of insecurity in the region is also a result of the frequent armed attacks by Murle tribesmen on villages and on people fleeing fighting, particularly in areas between Uror and Akobo. The attackers have mainly traditionally targeted cattle, but they are also after personal belongings of IDPs fleeing from fighting, abducting children and also attack and kill, including women and children. This has been one of the major causes of population displacement recently.

Revenge attacks by Dinka youth mobilized from Jonglei against Murle in Boma State have also increased. In March, there was a report of the displacement of Murles from Pibor to Akobo due to the attacks by the Dinka youths, initially reported to be some 400 households (2,000 individuals). Fighting between Dinka Youth from Jonglei and Murle from Boma State is ongoing in Gumuruk and Vertet areas of Boma and will likely continue.⁴⁹ Reportedly this has led to displacements in the area but figures are yet to be established given its remoteness and limited access by humanitarians.

Another noted population movement are people moving between Juba POC and the Greater Fangak. While the number was reported to be high in the previous Trends report (Between mid-November and December 2016, some 5,000-

6,000 individuals were reported to have arrived from Leer in Unity and Juba POCs to Old Fangak). In January and February, the number has significantly dropped, presumably due to the fear of insecurity from the renewed fighting between SPLA and SPLA/IO. However in March, the movements from both sides (observed at the Bor dock site) started to increase again to 485 per month from Juba to Greater Fangak and to 444 from Greater Fangak to Juba and Uganda. The reasons of the movements were mentioned to be family reunification, economic hardship and lack of access to service.

The State RRC continues to report new arrivals of "IDPs from Yei" arriving in Bor. In March 2017, the RRC shared a list of some 836 households (5,160 individuals) with humanitarians that needs further assessment/confirmation. The list was reviewed by the protection partners and revised by reducing a few duplicate HHs. The final figure stood at 797 HHs. This is a small decrease of the number reported in the previous Trends report. The figure from the RRC at the end of December 2016 was 900 households (5,335 individuals) of IDPs arriving from Yei/Juba. While it is claimed by the RRC that more Yei IDPs are arriving on daily basis, humanitarian actors have not been able to verify this assertion.

According to Protection Cluster members, the deterioration of protection could be attributed to a number of factors including increased road accessibility during the dry season, the renewed confidence of the government to capture the IO areas without a political solution, more people with access to weapons and the lack of rule of law. With the long term economic hardship, an increase of armed robberies, ambushes, and other criminal activities across the Jonglei region was recorded up to February and then slightly decreased in March 2017.⁵⁰

Bor POC – At present there are 1,975 IDPs in the POC site. Similar to last reporting period, 1,392 individuals (543 HHs) are registered to return or relocate when the security improves. Despite the increasing conflict in the region, some people continue to request humanitarian support to move at this time, particularly requesting money for transport.⁵¹ The increased security developments have had an impact on population movement to and from the POC, which has been receiving new arrivals from areas affected by fighting as well as other locations including Juba and even from outside of the country. Spontaneous departure of IDPs have also been monitored from the POC to areas of origin and to seek asylum outside the country. During the reporting period, 141 IDPs spontaneously left the POC while 171 were registered as newly-arriving IDPs. This in and out movement has remained relatively the same to previous reporting periods. The main reasons for people arriving to the POC include family reunification, insecurity due to fighting as well as lack of means of survival in terms of food and services forcing them to seek protection and assistance in the POC.⁵²

Unity⁵³ – During the reporting period, relative to the last Trends report, there has been less conflict in the region. The Bentiu POC population figures have fluctuated. In January, 2017, the total population/individuals in the POC was 120,011 (21,221 households) while In the middle of March, the population reduced to approximately 117,654 IDPs. There

⁴⁹ Youth in the region seem more concerned with obtaining cattle by raiding than a peace process and agreements made between tribal leaders.

⁵⁰ UNHCR Security Incidents Summary through March 2017, Jonglei Information obtained in this section was largely obtained by the Protection Cluster focal persons, Bor field office, April 2017

⁵¹ According to UNHCR Protection Desk reports in the POC site.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Information obtained in this section was largely obtained by the Protection Cluster focal person, Bentiu field office, April 2017.

⁵⁴ INGO Nonviolent Peace Force is providing protection monitoring in famine affected areas in Koch, Leer and Mayendit.

has been a steady increase noticed when the famine was declared in February and after fighting in Mayendit.⁵⁴ As of 31 March 2017, the population in the Bentiu POC was 121,225 (individuals) according to IOM headcount. From November 2016 to date, 5,500 new arrivals (unregistered) came to POC location stating reasons of lack of food, physical security, forced recruitment by IO 2 and other armed groups and family reunification.

In the month of March, 2017 when the fighting erupted in Mayendit, the movement of IDPs has been increased in the state. People fled to the safest place for their physical safety and reached to Bentiu, Rubkona towns and POC Bentiu as well. Currently, 354 households/3,156 individuals are residing at collective centres in Bentiu and Rubkona towns.

REACH has also identified 352 households (approximately 1,760 individuals) who arrived in Nyal Town during that period from Mayendit County due to fighting. A much larger number (2,000-5,000 individuals) is believed to have arrived in nearby Mayom Payam from the same location.

Forced recruitment has been noticed in Nhialdiu, Leer, and Mayendit & Southern Koch Counties and is noted as a push factor for male IDPs to relocate to the POC Bentiu, Rubkona and Bentiu towns. One humanitarian partner (CHADO) has reported that 4 of the organization's school teachers have been forcefully recruited into armed groups in Guit County. Consequently, the school has been closed denying education for over 538 children. IDPs living in the POC are also affected.


Unlawful arrests have been on the increase for IDPs living in the Bentiu POC. When males go out of POC to town for

their daily business, but on the way back are screened and taken by SPLA/SPLA IO 2 and accused of having "a military background".

Despite of the challenges, movement of IDPs from the POC Bentiu and Bentiu and Rubkona towns has continued. Over 2350 IDPs (from the POC) returned voluntarily to Koch, Mayom, Rier, Guit, Bieh and nearby villages as they found that security situation is conducive for them to go back to their original villages. Family reunification was another factor related to their return as they left behind their elderly and disabled members (unattended) in the community. One positive factor has been UNMISS confidence building patrols that has impacted on the perception of IDPs that security the environment is conducive for them to return.

As the rainy season is approaching, many IDPs have planned to go back to their villages to cultivate to improve their food situation. Protection actors met with 242 households who intended to go back to Koch, Mayom and Nhialdiu for cultivation. However, it is reported that some armed elements in Thargana stopped the people forcefully from cultivating as they suspect them to be supporting the rebels.

Displacement Trends Mar2014 - Apr2017 (in million) *



* The refugee data is up to 15 April 2017.

FAMILY TRACING AND REUNIFICATION (FTR)

At the end of March 2017, separated children comprised 60.5% of the total caseload of unaccompanied and separated children (UASC), followed by missing and unaccompanied children, at 25.0% and 14.5%. Funding gaps, necessitating a move away from FTR services to all UASC, to provide FTR services to only unaccompanied children and the most vulnerable among separated children. More sufficient funding would allow Child Protection partners to include separated and missing children in the FTR programs.

284 children have been reunified with their families during the first quarter of 2017 compared to 501 children reunified during the same period in 2016. Cumulatively there are 4,901 reunifications so far. This represents 42.1% of all children registered in the data base. The reunification for this reporting period represents 5.8% of total reunification.

State caseloads continue to reflect a number of differentials relating to partner's presence, on-going conflict, concentration of populations, accessibility and the availability of funding. The overwhelming majority of the total FTR caseload is concentrated across Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei, States. However the trends in Wau area and Kajo keji within Western Bar-El-Ghazal and Western Equatoria continue to increase due to the recent conflict in the two regions respectively. Partners have been empowered and deployed in the two regions

to provide FTR intervention with support from FTR lead.

Inaccessibility issues in Southern Unity and Northern Jonglei continue to impact on the FTR response. This has left over 1000 children without adequate monitoring support and tracing progress curtailed. This is expected to continue in 2017.

Beyond contextual issues that contribute to spikes and falls in data, trends from 2016 speak to the significant impact of the changed funding landscape, accessibility to areas controlled by SPLM-IO, increased incidences of conflict and displacements, absence of partners in particular areas and turnover of staffs and capacity of Family Tracing and Reunification partners to operate and reach children in South Sudan with critical services.

Separated Children




Missing Children



Unaccompanied Children




Unaccompanied, Missing and Separated Children by Gender as of March 2017



Family Tracing and Reunification (cumulative)

Mar2014 - Mar2017



Source: Family Tracing and Reunification database.



GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS

Attacks on & military use of schools



3,983 affected children

Recruitment and use of children



314 affected children

Killing



34 affected children

Injuring



22 affected children

Abduction



20 affected children

Sexual violence




12 affected children

During the reporting period, 252 incidents of grave violations affecting an estimated 4,385 children were documented through the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM). The UN verified 201 incidents affecting 2,005 children. Forty-five per cent of all documented incidents were of denial of humanitarian access, and 27 per cent were incidents of recruitment and use. Over half of all incidents, 52 per cent, were documented in the Upper Nile region followed by the Equatorias region, where 31 per cent of all incidents were documented. The increase in documented incidents in the Upper Nile region from the previous quarter is due to fighting in the region that erupted in late January and the ongoing recruitment and use of children in Unity.

Incidents of killing and maiming of children


were documented in Upper Nile during offensives carried out in late January and early February. Children were also killed or maimed in 12 incidents involving unexploded remnants of war, including when they have been left behind in schools that were used by armed forces or armed groups.

Recruitment and use of children continued to be documented throughout South Sudan, particularly in the Upper Nile region. Children, humanitarian workers, and teachers were reported to have been forcibly conscripted, and children, some as young as 11 years, were also observed by the UN carrying weapons, wearing military uniforms, and being used as escorts to elements of armed forces and armed groups. The UN also documented incidents of children deprived of their liberty



Source: Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism.

Registered Incidents:
January - March 2017




for their alleged association with armed forces and armed groups.

The UN documented three incidents of attacks on schools and six incidents of military use of schools. Four schools previously used by armed forces or armed groups were also vacated. The total number of schools that have been verified as being used for military purposes stood at 39 at the end of March. Additionally, four health clinics were attacked during the reporting period. During the attacks, drugs, immunization kits, and cold-chain refrigerators were looted from the facilities.

Denial of humanitarian access continues to be the most documented violation. During the reporting period humanitarian workers were abducted, humanitarian compounds were looted and vandalized, and in one incident humanitarian workers were killed in an ambush. Most incidents of denial of humanitarian access were documented in Central Equatoria and Jonglei, where humanitarian compounds were found looted

and vandalized after conflict erupted and civilian populations were displaced in both regions.


Incidents of Grave Child Rights Violations (cumulative)
Mar2014 - Mar2017






GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

GBV Reported Cases:
Case Context
January - March 2017



GBV Reported Cases:
Age of the Survivor
January - March 2017



The continuous country wide fighting has exposed the community to multiple displacements with no access to basic services such as medicine, shelter, water and food. This has increased the risk for gender-based violence especially when women and children move long distances in search of food, water and shelter materials.

From January to March 2017, according to the GBV IMS, the reported cases of GBV was 560 cases a slight drop from last quarter's reported cases at 575 cases. 97% of cases happened to female survivors and 19% of survivors were children. Physical assault continues to be the highest percentage of cases reported at 50% of total cases. Although gender inequality is deeply rooted in the culture and social norms in South Sudan, the conflict has uprooted the community from their original dwellings and denied men and women access to their means of livelihoods.

The conflict has further seen a change of gender roles between men and women where women have become bread winners although men still retained their patriarchal tendencies. The redundancy of men coupled with frustrations of failing to meet their social obligations to protect and fend for their families explains why there is anarchy in families resulting into high cases of inter partner violence. As bread winners, women are forced to risk their lives and move out of the protected camps in such for food and firewood. A total of 84 cases of rape were reported this quarter. With the declaration of famine in southern Unity, it should be noted that famine is a contributing factor to GBV especially sexual violence as it forces women to move in the wilderness in search for food or young girls exchanging sex for food and in some cases women and girls turn to do petty jobs in insecure centres which increases their

risk to sexual violence. The displacements in Wau in Western Bahrel-Ghazal, in Kajo-Keji in Central Equatoria, in Aburoc in Upper Nile in Akobo, Pibor in Jonglei and in Pajok in Eastern Equatoria has increased the burden and risk to sexual violence on women and girls. Other GBV cases that were reported this quarter included emotional violence at 16%, denial of economic resources at 10%, forced marriage at 6% and sexual Abuse at 4%. Incidences of forced marriage increased this quarter from 21 cases last quarter to 33 cases this quarter. Cumulatively since 2015 to date, a total of 283 girls were reported to have been forcefully married off. (83 in 2015, 168 in 2016 and 33 in the first quarter of 2017. The financial hardship in the country has forced some families to marry off their daughters with the hope of receiving a dowry or to reduce on the number of mouths to be fed in a family. The cattle raids that has been rampant in Western Bahrel-Ghazal and Jonglei has also seen girls abducted and end up as wives of their captives. There has also been a myth on the issue of protection of girls by marrying them off without considering the reproductive health consequences that they face.

The current context with civilians in POCs, collective sites and deep field areas or in Institutions like schools has forced GBV partners to modify their approaches to include static responses as well as mobile responses with temporal shelters and work with community members for continuity of service provision. Although GBV programmes have been expanded in Central and Western Equatoria, access still remains a big challenge. Partners in Kajo-keji now access the IDPs from North Western Uganda in Moyo district which is not sustainable. Most health facilities are closed and looted like Kajo-Keji hospital leaving the partner to work in a few primary

GBV Reported Cases:
Types of Incidents
January - March 2017

Physical assault

 278

Emotional abuse

 87

Rape

 84

Denial of resources

 58

Forced marriage


 33

Sexual violence

 20

health care units that are accessible to the IDPs although it is quite challenging. The IDPs in the POCs also faced numerous challenges within the POCs with over 90 houses burnt down in Bentiu POC and the families now displaced in a school. This further exacerbate the already difficult conditions of the women exposing them to incidences of abuse. Shortage of water was also reported in some of the POCs and other collective sites in Kajo-keji in Eastern Equatoria and Aburoc in Upper Nile. The fact that families are forced to hide in the field or bush is very challenging. GBV programme response has also been curtailed by funding gaps for most of the GBV partners. This has hampered continuity of services for the affected community.

Number of GBV Reported Cases (cumulative)
Mar2015 - Mar2017




*The GBVIMS was rolled out in South Sudan in 2014. It currently includes 15 member organizations. GBVIMS data that is shared is only from reported cases in areas where the data-gathering organizations are providing services, and is in no way representative of the total incidence or prevalence of GBV in South Sudan. These statistical trends are generated exclusively by GBV service providers who use the GBVIMS for data collection in the implementation of GBV response activities in a limited number of locations across South Sudan and with the consent of survivors.



LANDMINES AND UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO)

©UNMAS

Types of Hazards as of March 2017




The explosive legacy of conflict in South Sudan has contaminated vast swathes of land with mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). In addition to threatening the safety of people in their vicinity, explosive hazards inhibit freedom of movement and preclude the delivery of humanitarian aid. Over 90 million square kilometers of land is known to be contaminated by landmines and UXO in South Sudan, however the full extent is still unfolding. This quarter, 394 previously unknown hazards were recorded in the Mine Action database.


period for Mine Action teams owing to dry climatic conditions. However the scale of operations continues to be limited by access incursions, evidenced by the fact that in Q1 of 2015 and 2016 an average of 941 hazardous areas were cleared (with more than 50 teams deployed), compared to 402 hazardous areas in 2017. After a girl aged 13 lost her right leg in a mine accident in Mangar Ayou Village in Aweil, Northern Bahr el Ghazal in February 2017, an investigation revealed that the area was heavily contaminated by landmines laid in an attempt to obstruct Sudanese Armed Forces during the Civil War. These deadly weapons have remained undetected for several years as the resident community was displaced by the historical conflict and has only recently returned, clearance operations are now underway. Mine Action deployed

Responding to security improvements in specific locations, the number of Mine Action teams deployed increased from 19 to 35. This resulted in greater clearance outputs as compared to the previous quarter. The period under review is typically the most productive

MRE* Audiences: January - March 2017



Known Hazardous Areas as of March 2017



Source: Information Management System of Mine Action (IMSMA).
 * MRE: Mine Risk Education, UXO: Unexploded Ordnance.

Devices Destroyed as of March 2017

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)

 **911,290**

Anti Personnel mine

 **31,291**

Anti Tank mine


 **5,739**

two teams in support of partners in the areas hit by famine. One team deployed to survey hazardous routes near Koch and the second team operated in Leer. Additional Mine Action staff were allocated to participate in the Inter-cluster Response Missions. Funding is being sourced through UNMISS to increase the number of technical survey teams so that Mine Action can map the current proliferation of hazards and share this information with humanitarian partners.

The first quarter of the year typically sees a spike in the number of accidents reported in relation to landmines and UXO. A number of factors contribute to this including population movement. Accordingly in February and March, four incidents were recorded which killed six people and injured 12. The vast majority of the victims were children, 11 boys and five girls who, out of curiosity were tampering with hazardous objects such as grenades or explosive hazards which they have found. Mine Action partners have been

working to target children in Risk Education (RE) sessions (64% of the total audience), working closely with schools and using new ways to engage young people. In March an event was held in Juba where nine schools, having received RE, performed related songs. A winner was selected to record their song with popular music artists, the Jay Family (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7rucbiEneVc>) and the song has been broadcast through several media channels to raise awareness. In Juba, children in the Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites were found with explosive items, hoping to exchange them for food. Mine Action partners delivered specific RE for children in conjunction with the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED), a non-governmental organisation, responsible for coordination of humanitarian services within the PoC site. UNMAS, an integral part of UNMISS, will be extending explosive hazard detection and entry point control at PoC sites with additional Explosive Detection Dog teams in the forthcoming months.

Hazardous Areas - Oct2013 - Mar2017





RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE PROTECTION OF IDPS

1. As repeatedly stated in previous and current Protection Updates, Security Council Resolutions, and the most recent Secretary General Statement, South Sudan's Transitional Government of National Unity bears the primary responsibility to protect its civilian population from human rights violations, including targeted killings, torture, and gender-based violence, abductions of women and children and destruction and looting of property. These acts have destroyed livelihoods, contributed to famine, caused displacement and left millions of people homeless. Efforts must be made for the government to stop the conflict and take steps to hold actors accountable for human rights violations.
2. In order to effectively assist people in the continuing emergency, humanitarian actors must be able to work freely, neutrally, impartially and independently. Assistance should be needs-based conducted in line with existing humanitarian principles and guidelines based on a protection assessment of the population of concern. For an emergency operational plan to have impact, International stakeholders must emphasize the imperative that UNMISS can patrol in all areas according to its mandate and humanitarian access must be ensured by the Transitional Government and all parties to the conflict.
3. Humanitarian actors are overwhelmed, but donors, as a priority, must continue to support the UN and NGO actors dealing with Gender Based Violence (both prevention and response), Child Rights Violations and in providing basic lifesaving services. Monitoring and reporting on the overall protection situation is essential to inform all stakeholders.
4. With the wide spread conflict, increased attacks on communities, targeting of individuals, destruction of infrastructure and livelihoods, people have increasing difficulty to find protection in practically all areas of South Sudan. Until there is a sustainable political solution, families will continue to flee the country in fear of persecution to surrounding countries where their children can be safe and can access services, including education. Efforts to keep the international refugee protection regime in place must be a priority for the Emergency Response in the region.