

March 8, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Buddy System

032

Please show me a proposal for a buddy system for OSD to get each person assigned to certain people in the House and Senate to develop good, continuing linkages to keep us connected.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-48

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

8

032

OSD 10892-04

March 8, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone

c c : Paul Wolfowitz
 Larry Di Rita
 LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Discuss Memo

3/13/04

Let's talk about this memo from Chris Williams.

Larry/John, please set up a meeting.

Thanks.

Attach.
 2/10/04 C. Williams memo to SecDef re: Upcoming Missile Defense Activities and Operations

DHR:dh
 030804-54

.....
 Please respond by 3/19/04

3/13/04

OSD 10893-04

LC

February 10, 2004

Copy to:
- Wynne (2/12)
- Cambone
- Ricardel
- Krieg

3/8

LARRY DI RITE
2/12

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD

FROM: Chris Williams
SUBJECT: Up-coming Missile Defense Activities and Operations

Sir, according to news reports, the Department plans to begin putting missile defense interceptor missiles in launch silos as early as June and have a rudimentary missile defense system in operation by October. First and foremost, this is truly a remarkable accomplishment – one in which you, the President, LTG Kadish, and many others can and should take enormous pride. It was barely three years ago that we were discussing how to restructure the BMD program. From decision to limited operational capability in three years! Now that is acquisition reform in earnest!

As we move into this “season of operations”, steps should be taken now to develop an overarching programmatic and political “gameplan” regarding BMD activities and operations. What do I mean by this?

- There should be a single “master schedule of events” produced and updated weekly that lays out important activities, responsible parties, and points of contact. That document should be prepared by OSD Policy (together with MDA) and shared with key DOD officials and with Condi at the NSC and, when appropriate, Andy Card and Karl Rove, and should include not only major programmatic activities but also Congressional hearing dates, major speeches planned, etc. It will be a useful tool for you to hold people accountable for delivering this capability on the schedule directed by the President.
- There needs to be a standard taxonomy adopted by all involved (DOD, State, NSC, industry, Hill supporters, etc) to describe what capabilities are being made operational, how effectively they might reasonably be expected to perform against certain threats, the national security value they provide, how they fit into the longer-term BMD and broader strategic capabilities architecture, etc. For example, at what point will you (or the President) assert that the nation possesses a limited capability to shoot down hostile missiles? Will that capability be available 24/7? Do we believe such a limited capability will help deter aggression? Who will have release authority and who will command-and-control the defensive interceptors? etc. We need factually accurate and appropriately scrubbed answers to these and other important questions well in advance of any operational deployments. And we need them soon, since testimony on the FY2005 Defense budget has already begun and since June is just a few short months away....
- Consideration should be given now to when and how to “roll out” the fact that America is no longer defenseless against in-coming ballistic missiles. Does the President wish to announce this during his nomination acceptance speech at the convention in New York? In a ceremony up in Alaska? Or does the White

House wish to “low-key” such an event? This will no doubt be a big event for many in the President’s political base, including many battle-scarred missile defense proponents on the Hill; should a high-profile event be considered?

- There will also need to be a clear strategy for dealing with our friends, allies, and adversaries. How we talk about this capability will in part help determine how other nations respond to the announcement.

In sum, we are rapidly approaching a major milestone in defense policy and operations. We need to develop a forward-looking strategy and plan for this important set of events. I would be pleased to assist you and your staff in any aspect of this undertaking you deem appropriate.

Best regards.

March 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: SOLIC Memos

020502L

I find I am not reading some of the memos Tom O'Connell sends me. I don't quite know why. Possibly I don't feel they have been staffed through you or through the Joint Staff.

I uncomfortable with an organization as important as that seeming not to report through an Under Secretary. What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-64

.....
Please respond by 3/12/04

3/12/04

OSD 10894-04

March 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Review Gompert's Ministry of Defense Paper

Iraq

Along with the Joint Staff, please review this piece from Dave Gompert, make any edit proposals you two want and then send it back to him with an okay.

Please do it within three days.

Thanks

Attach.

1/26/04 "MOD's Mission Achieved by Upholding Accepted Values"

DHR:dh
030404-11

.....
Please respond by 3/11/04

211104

OSD 10895-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25622

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Senior Military Assistant

3/3

SecDef

- Dan Gompert asked that you get this - basic principles for the Ministry of Defense
- he believes this is a start point - these principles will evolve.
- these principles will be in the CPA order establishing the Iraqi MoD
- Gompert intends to get the Governing Council to endorse.

C

MOD's mission achieved by upholding accepted values:

- **Civilian Control:** The Iraqi Armed Forces and all people working in the MOD shall be responsible to civilian authority.
- **Professionalism:** The culture and character of the Ministry will reflect professionalism, technical competence, non-interference in political affairs, merit, national allegiance, respect for individual rights, and the rule of law. The MOD shall understand and show respect for Iraqi civil society.
- **Unity:** The MOD will play its full part in reinforcing national unity, and will neither institutionalize nor be used to foster disunity.
- **Representative:** While based on merit, the MOD shall be broadly representative of the Iraqi society. No part of the MOD should be dominated by any one group.
- **Integrity:** There will be zero tolerance of corruption. Rules and regulations will be established to eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse, and avoid all employee conflicts of interest.
- **Stewardship:** The MOD shall earn the respect and confidence of the Iraqi people by accounting for resources, being effective, acting in the country's interest, abiding by laws, and telling the truth.
- **Transparency:** The Iraqi people, or their elected representatives, have the right to know about MOD's policies, organizations, financial matters, and conduct of operations. The MOD shall also be transparent in its international affairs, including active participation in international security institutions and the development of cooperative security relations.
- **Affordability:** The MOD must ensure that the scale, capabilities, and costs of defense efforts are in line with the real needs of the country and must be built and maintained within the means of the Iraqi budget.

March 8, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DL

SUBJECT: NSC Notes

I talked to Colin and Condi today. They said Paul Wolfowitz and Rich Armitage are going over all of the NSC notes with Hadley and noting what took place during the pre-9/11 part of the Administration. They reminded me that we generated a number of alerts in June and July during a threat period and put our forces on alert.

Please talk to Paul and see when they are doing that and get involved. They have the NSC notes and will run over them with us. Condi spent an enormous amount of time doing it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030304-14

.....
Please respond by 3/12/04

OSD 10896-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25625

334 NSC

2 MAR 04

SIR, your copy. JM
ET

March 8, 2004

WARM

720

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Iraqi Police

DJS
PLEASE TAKE FOR
QUICK RESPONSE. GET CSTF-9
INPUT OR CHOP. VR
8 Mar 04

The Iraqi police have to be the top priority. I don't feel that anyone is giving me the information I need. I need to know what Sanchez's people are going to do, how we are going to buy the equipment, how the budget is allocated and does it need to be reallocated.

Thanks

OK PER SMA
3/23

DHR:dh
030404-28

.....
Please respond by 3/19/04

~~DR~~

DJS

BELIEVE WE HAVE
ANSWERED THIS BY ADDING
METRICS TO OUR BRIEFING
SLIDES. PLEASE CLOSE WITH LTG CRANK.

VR/ R
3/22/04

OSD 10897-04

720

9 Mar 07 00
Scanned

✓
3/12

March 8, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Status

IRAO

What is the status of this February 3 memo you sent me?

Thanks.

Attach.
2/3/04 DSD memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
030804-5

.....
Please respond by 3/12/04

8 Mar 04

✓
3/8

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: February 3, 2004

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Bremer's Situational Awareness

Shapiro 7

Don,

Thanks for pushing back on Jerry this morning about his repeated insinuations that your "staff had misinformed you."

We do need to get as much ground truth as possible concerning facts. That was precisely the purpose of sending out the Eikenberry team. They probably know more now about the security situation than any of us, including Sanchez and Bremer. (One of their observations is that Bremer's main contact with the division commanders comes when they visit Baghdad. Apparently (I have no personal knowledge on this point), Jerry rarely visits them in the field.)

Iraq

Jerry seems to be confusing the issue of who does the training in Jordan with the issue of who's been training and managing the police who are in the field already. As you said, virtually all of the training that's been done up north has been done by the military and the equipping has been done using CERP funds. There was a slow-down in the fall because the CERP funds did dry up.

As for Baghdad, there is more CPA involvement there, mainly thanks to Bernie Kemck's successor, Steve Casteel, his Deputy, a British policeman named Doug Brand, and Jim Steele, Bremer's advisor. They have very few people working for them and even in Baghdad most of the work is still being done by U.S. military police, many of them reservists. For example, when I visited a police station in Baghdad on Sunday, there were 8 or 9 U.S. Army MPs and Civil Affairs personnel working there and no one from CPA. In Mosul, we visited a police station that Dave Petraeus has stood up. It is much better equipped and professional-looking than the still very primitive situation we encountered in Baghdad.

3 Feb 04

The bottom line for me is that the training, equipping and organizing of the police has to be done by people who put great energy into the job. It's fine if the State Department sets the training standards and provides policy guidance to the trainers, as long as that doesn't lead to still further delays. Once the police are trained and equipped, they can come under the control of the Ministry of Interior that therefore we can wait for the Ministry of Interior, if that's the decision.

8 or 04

Jerry says there is a program, it is underway and "it's working, but more slowly than we'd like." But timing on this is everything. As you know, delays jeopardize success and they put American lives at risk.

23/10
3/12

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: March 10, 2004

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*

SUBJECT: Status of February 3 Memo

Don,

This problem has been fixed by the directive you signed out to Bremer and Abizaid a week or so ago.

IRA 9

10 Mar 04

8 Mar 04

March 9, 2004

FILE

TO: **Larry** Di Rita
LTG John Craddock
Dov Zakheim
Gordon England

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Presidential Helicopter

*Sir,
This is an acquisition vice
budget matter. It has been
passed from Dr. Zakheim
to Mr. Wynn. vr/cdr N*

452 2004

The subject of the Presidential helicopter came up yesterday. I understand the Navy is the contracting officer for it.

I would like to have someone quickly brief me on it. Tell me what the facts are—whether or not the Comanche deal has affected it and who is going to make the final decision. My impression is the White House does not want to, and it should be made over here.

Please come in with a proposal. There is no rush to make the final decision. From what I have heard, it is fine if we do it very late this year. In any event, I don't want to be blindsided on it.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-29


.....
Please respond by 3/19/04

*Already discussed at
meeting - same
answer*

AC 3/19/04

C 3/9

March 8, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
 CC: Marc Thiessen
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
 SUBJECT: 9/11 Testimony

Here is the testimony. I have been over it, It needs a lot of work.

I have these thoughts:

1. I would get Marc Thiessen involved immediately.
2. I think we need a section for each of the four main questions that we have been asked. The answers can have some commentary, but basically they should be bullet points.
 - What we did January 20, 2001 to September 11, 2001.
 - What we did on 9/11.
 - What we have done 9/11 to 3/04.
 - Our recommendations.
3. I think more bullet points throughout would be good. It is more powerful and it shows a list, rather than having each thought buried.
4. We ought to think about having attachments — foreexample, my 1984 speech, the Guidelines for Going to War, and anything else that we can think of — so it gives them some stuff to chew on.

It is a good start. Thanks.

Attach.
 3/1/04 Draft testimony

DHR:dh
 030804-1

.....
 Please respond by _____

OSD 10900-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25631

000.5

8 MAR 04

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

① vic have better
② Attorney General
1 March 2004, 14:23

STATEMENT BEFORE THE 911 COMMISSION

23 March 2004

① Make T
② Better Dr. O'Connell
for each of the 4
Executive
- 11/20/01 - 9/11/01
- 9/11
- Post 9/11 to 3/04
- Recommended.

Introduction

Thank you, Chairman Kean ⁷ and Chairman Hamilton, for ⁹ inviting me here today, and thank you, and all the members, for providing me the opportunity to contribute to your Commission's important mission for our country.

You have been entrusted with an important task. The insights that you can provide are valuable to those who are charged with defending the nation against attack and, specifically, the terrorist assault of the kind we suffered on September 11, 2001. We look forward to receiving your recommendations as to how the country might arrange itself to be better prepared to disrupt such assaults and to deny our adversaries their objectives are much to be anticipated.

You have requested that I am here today to recount the actions undertaken by the Department of

Defense to prepare itself in the months prior to the attack of 911 to operate against 21st century threats, actions taken on the day of 911 and in its immediate aftermath,

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

and to offer some thoughts on the issues you ~~might as you consider~~ ^{are considering} how the nation might improve its capability to anticipate and disrupt or defeat 21st century threats.

An Era of Surprise; Intelligence's Role

^{did on a number of occasions}
~~Many of you have heard me say~~ in the past that we live in an era of surprise.

I recently reviewed the transcripts of my confirmation testimony, and I thought it

^{on the US Security Council or other Senate or Al Qaeda}
was notable that nobody asked a single question about Al Qaeda. ~~I've previously~~

^{I'm told that it} ^{in 1989}
~~reviewed~~ Vice President Cheney's confirmation testimony, as Secretary of Defense, and nobody ^{talked about} ~~mentioned~~ Kuwait or a possible invasion by Iraq.

^{by a member of the Senate}
During my confirmation hearings, I was asked what concerned me most, and

~~what might keep me awake at night.~~ 4

I answered immediately and unequivocally that it was intelligence. To be clear, my concerns about intelligence were not related to the dedication and professionalism of the men and women of the intelligence community. Rather, it was born of my conviction that intelligence — its collection, analysis, and translation into appropriate action — is exceedingly difficult in an era of surprise. —
in this 21st Century.

This era is a challenge for intelligence due to the dynamism and complexity of the world in which we live—of the growth of an international economy, the

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

volume and rate of global interactions, and the depth, breadth, and extent and ease of communications ~~only performed~~ that have been forged among public and private individuals and institutions around the world. Moreover, whereas during the Cold War, we could more easily define our intelligence priorities, today we are driven to concentrate on multiple potential adversaries—both state and non-state actors—operating around the globe and in cyber-space.

The ability of the intelligence community to monitor, analyze, report, and warn about impending events, and, specifically, to sort from that ~~wealth~~ ^{mass data} of data threats to the U.S. and its interests, is made difficult by the dynamism and complexity of our world. It is compounded by the fact that the capabilities of the intelligence community to steal the secrets of those who would do us harm, and to convey those secrets to policy-makers in confidence, continues to be compromised by leaks, unauthorized disclosures, government démarches, the easy flow of experts and expertise on technical matters, and the rapid spread of technologies and expertise useful to deny and deceive U.S. intelligence efforts.

real
~

Put in
for names for a.k.

A summary of the harm done to the United States ^{by the likes of} Ames, Hansen, Pollard, ^{Wukov} and others, suggests that ^{many} ~~some~~ features of ^{US} ~~our~~ national technical means for collecting intelligence are compromised even before

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

have been deployed.

the systems of which they are a part.) Hardly a day goes by when our newspapers

don't carry a story that reveals appropriately classified information. This activity ^{*damages*} - *indeed*

deadly ~~profits~~ profits only our adversaries.

As part of ^{*our*} ~~that~~ complicated world in ~~which we live~~, adversaries of the United States and its friends and allies have chosen terrorism as ^{*a*} ~~the~~ preferred instrument to force free nations to submit to their agendas by inflicting horror upon their innocent citizens.

Terrorism an Abiding Concern

The Herd's

The reality ~~of~~ of terrorism is not new. Back when I was Middle East envoy I ^{*Some 20 years ago,*} began to take sharp notice of it, ~~and~~ ^{*celebrated*} I noticed several distinguishing characteristics about it, ~~as I relayed~~ ^{*many*} in a talk ~~some~~ ^{*years*} ago. I said, *Quote -*

"Terrorism is growing.

"Increasingly, terrorism is not random nor the work of isolated madmen.

Rather, it is state-sponsored, by nations using it as a central element of their foreign policy.

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

“ . . . Terrorism works. A single attack by a small, weak nation, by influencing public opinion and morale, can alter the behavior of great nationsUnchecked, state-sponsored terrorism is adversely changing the balance of power in our world.

“Terrorist attacks can take place at any time, any place, using any technique. Regrettably, it is not possible to defend every potential target in every place, at all times, against every form of attack. Defense has its limits and its costs.

“Terrorism is a form of warfare, and must be treated as such. As with other forms of conflict, weakness invites aggression. Simply standing in a defensive position, absorbing blows, is not enough. Terrorism must be deterred.

“In my judgment, terrorism, even today, is dangerously underestimated.” *Orquiste*

I said those words in 1984, 20 years ago.

Changing Threat Posed by Terrorism

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

11-L-0559/OSD/25636

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

What is new today, however, is the potential for terrorists to gain access to weapons of mass destruction. My service on the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission ^{in the late 1990s} underscored for me and for many others the extent to which proliferation ^{was} ~~has~~ ^{ing} occurred. It highlighted the concomitant danger of the possibility of terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction. That nexus of terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction forms the heart of the threat that ~~the~~ ^{our country} ~~Defense Department~~ ^{must} address in the years ^{ahead} ~~to come~~.

Equipping for an Era of Surprise — Administration Efforts 20 Jan-10 Sep 2001

For the better part of a century, the nation's armed forces have been organized, trained, and equipped to fight foreign armies, navies, and air forces. We will need to maintain such a capability as a prudent deterrent. It is likely, however, that even traditionally armed adversaries ^{increasingly} will seek asymmetric capabilities that hide their weaknesses and exploit our vulnerabilities. In addition to traditional adversaries, and because of the nexus of terrorism and WMD, we will need to have ^{forces} ~~an armed force~~ able to track, engage, and defeat individual terrorists; the networks through which they operate; and, ^{if} necessary, the nation-states that harbor them. We will need to track, interdict, and, ^{if} necessary, destroy WMD and the means for their development and delivery.

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

And we will need to do it in the full knowledge that the intelligence used to support such efforts ^{and will continue to be} is imperfect.

Planning: ^{this} In the first year of ~~the~~ Administration, the senior leadership of the Department developed a strategy and plan to transform ^{our} ~~its~~ capabilities to meet emerging national security needs. In the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the final draft of which ^{had} had been completed prior to 9/11, we ~~came~~ ^{came} to the conclusion that the traditional threat-based approach to planning was no longer appropriate. We developed, instead, what we call a "capabilities-based" planning approach. Through that approach, we ^{sought} ~~seek~~ to create a portfolio of capabilities that ^{will} ~~will~~ provide the speed, agility, and precision needed to meet the 21st century threats ^{and} ~~that~~ we face.

^{Statutorily required}

As part of that defense review, we identified, as our first priority, the defense ^A of the territory and people of the United States. Many people have associated that priority with missile defense. In fact, we looked at the issue much more broadly. We sought to develop a criterion for sizing the overall force that would give us an indication of the numbers of soldiers, airmen, marines, and sailors, ~~that we needed~~ ^{for} to devote to what is now called homeland defense.

In addition to the QDR, we spent a considerable period of time refashioning the nuclear offensive deterrent in pursuit of two objectives. One was to identify the appropriate size, structure, and capabilities for the nuclear force in the new world in which we live. As a result of that effort, we concluded that we could reduce the nuclear deterrent force to 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed weapons by the year 2012. Secondly, we identified the new capabilities that needed to be incorporated into the strategic force to complement the offensive nuclear forces across a wide range of possible scenarios and to provide the kind of capabilities that might dissuade states from undertaking political, military, or technical courses of action that would threaten U.S. and allied security.

Reviews and plans are important for transforming the capabilities of the force, but it was important that we revise our deliberate and contingency planning process, as well, to reflect those capabilities and the new threats we face. When I came into office, I discovered that nearly all the major plans were more than two years old and that their assumptions had not been reviewed for three to four—and in some cases – five years. After a series of reviews of individual plans, I convened a meeting in late May 2001 to review those assumptions. As a result, direction was given and action taken to revise both our plans and the planning

U.S.

from thousands of

U.S.

in many cases the on which they were fashioned

the on which our plans had been based

the

but also started

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

process. ^{develop} As a result, we are now building plans to address the threats we face today. These are plans that would permit the President to use ^{U.S.} the force with the ^{and capabilities} kind of nuance, speed and agility needed to deter and defeat contemporary threats.

~~John~~ These changes were reflected in the Defense Planning Guidance and the Contingency Planning Guidance.

Personnel. In addition to transforming the capabilities of the armed forces and refashioning ^{US} ~~our~~ war plans, we ~~also~~ spent considerable time bringing in the people willing and able to undertake the enormous range of tasks that needed to be accomplished.

It is worth ~~nothing~~ that, despite that effort, it was not until 2 March that the Deputy Secretary ^{of Defense} ~~arrived~~. ^{MAC continued.} It was not until 10 May that the Under Secretary for Acquisition was sworn in. ^{of Defense} And it was not until July 16 that the Under Secretary ^{of Defense} for Policy, in whose area of responsibility falls many of the tasks I have just

outlined —u, took office. It was not until the first of October that the current Chairman and Vice Chairman took their positions. ^{of the Joint Chiefs of Staff} ~~Nor~~ ^{And he required to bring} has the ~~personnel~~ effort ^{People on board her if this lens failed.} ~~abated~~. In the ~~time~~ since I have been here, the President has appointed more than

30 service secretaries and chiefs, combatant commanders, and Joint Staff

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

11-L-0559/OSD/25640

7 years

directorates as he has sought to bring together the leadership needed to fight

the war on terror while transforming the force. *It has taken an average of 7 months to get them on board, and at any given time over the past 3 years we have had only 10% of the positions filled.*

Budgets. Reviews, plans, and people all are essential, but in the end, policy

is reflected in budgets. During the first year alone—between 21 January and 31

December—we were engaged in building a revised FY 2001 budget, an FY-01

supplemental, the FY-02 budget, the FY-02 supplemental, and the FY-03 budget—

five budgets in the first year alone. *Many* *or* *time and* Everyone in this town is familiar with the

effort it takes to get one budget wrapped up, so you can imagine the amount of

resources—time and effort—to take care of *for each budget* *for one* of them in one year.

Level of Effort. The review process—reviewing the strategy, planning,

budget, and personnel—consumed an enormous amount of time and effort in *the* those

first seven-and-a-half months. I held more than 250 meetings during that time, on

just the subjects I *have mentioned* listed. Over 100 of those meetings were devoted to personnel

matters? *Over* 120 meetings were devoted to strategy and policy reviews? *26* Twenty

six were focused on war plans. *60* s or more dealt with budgets. I met

with the CJCS, VCJCS, Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs and *Part time* Secretaries more than 40 times. *Spill out* Gulf policy primarily related to ONW and OSW

took over 20 meetings. I met with members of Congress – hearings or meetings –

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

over 20 times. ~~Few of them took less than 30 minutes, and most were longer than~~
~~an hour each, and some, such as the review of the war plans I conducted on May~~
~~26, lasted four to five hours. I mention that because—~~~~as you know,~~ you're all busy
people ^{you know} ~~that is a significant investment of time,~~ ~~given the kinds of schedules you~~

That investment, however, was ~~an important one,~~ and it was made with an
eye toward getting the Department ready for that era of surprise into which I ~~knew~~
^{we believe}
~~we had entered.~~
^{Correctly -}

An Eye Toward the Threat.

^{My second term as Secum. + Preside}
From the beginning, I made a point to publicly identify the nature of the
⁵ threat we would face. As far back as February of 2001, I noted that, "because of
the proliferation that is taking place (throughout the world) . . . , people look for
so-called asymmetric responses to dissuade ^(others) people from attempting to have them
not do what they would like to do in their neighborhoods, to their neighbors.
Obviously, those things [go] across the spectrum, from terrorism through cyber-
attacks to information warfare to cruise missiles to short-range ballistic missiles to
longer-range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction." ^{unquote.}

Events across the first months of the Administration underscored the many
and varied manifestations of the kind of the 21st century threats we faced. In
e _____

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

October 2000, terrorists captured a group of Americans in Ecuador, one of whom was killed January 30, 2001, and ^{thrown} dumped off the back of a truck. In the first few months after ⁱⁿ having taken office, I was delivered a report on the actions being taken to implement the recommendations from the Cole Panel. That was followed shortly thereafter by a ^{missions} long conversation with then-FBI Director Louis Freeh on the issues related to Khobar Towers and the missions that had been and could have been taken to bring those who had perpetrated the attack to justice. [check sequence]

By spring and summer ^{of 2001}, the concerns of the ~~IAI~~ ^{Intelligence Community} were becoming more insistent. Consistent with those concerns, we, in June, ^{we decided to} actually sortied some of our ^{the} Navy warships, which was just one action we undertook as we ^{Scrutinized} ~~scrutinized~~ to force protection conditions. And, I met for quite some time with the Hart-Rudman Commission to discuss ways ~~by which~~ to protect our homeland. ~~Finally,~~ In the aftermath of the incident in Ecuador and of the downing of the EP-3 in China in April, we undertook an effort to rearrange ^{the Department's} our crisis management organization and process and had not quite completed its implementation ^{by} on the 1st of September.

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

11-L-0559/2 OSD/25643

September 11, 2001

Background. On the morning of September 11, 2001, I hosted a number of Members of Congress to discuss, among other business, the budget. In the course of our conversation, I ~~mentioned something about surprise~~ ^{Defense} ~~get~~ ^{and the} ~~from Di Rita~~ ^{from Di Rita} ~~The threat posed to the United States by terrorism, and by al Qaeda especially, had been acknowledged within the U.S. Government since the mid-1990s. Al Qaeda was responsible for the attacks in Africa.~~

The previous administration had directed both its intelligence agencies and the Department of Defense to plan for and, when authorized, take action against al Qaeda [classified annex to cover MQN and Positive Plot]. I am told that the Department developed what I ~~would call~~ ^{consider} ~~concepts for employing force to support~~ ^{selective} ~~variety of actions against al Qaeda that might have been directed by the President.~~ ^{not} ~~These were in no way finished plans. In my discussions with Secretary Cohen during the transition, I do not recall those plans having a prominent role.~~ ^{being prior and on relay office} ~~basis did not~~

(Sera)

I am informed that a briefing on that subject was on my calendar in early February 2001. ~~I must say that I do not recall that specific brief as being distinguishable in any notable way from any of the other planning that I had reviewed prior to 9/11.~~

Over the course of the first seven months of the new Administration, it addressed policy initiatives on a range of subjects. With respect to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and al Qaeda, the Government worked its way through the process of developing policy ^{iel} during the course of the Spring and Summer of 2001. ^{As people came here confirmed and love on board.}

~~A review of~~ the record ~~will~~ show that the first meeting on these subjects occurred in April, leading to the penultimate draft of policy on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and al Qaeda that was circulated on 7 September 2001, for decision by principals.

^{that I said earlier} YOU will recall ~~that I told you~~ that the individual whose area of responsibility on these subjects ^{I've mentioned} ~~I've mentioned~~ that is, the Under Secretary for Policy, ^{who} was not sworn in until July. The same was true of the cognizant Assistant Secretary. So, ^{the first} ~~for a period~~ ^{and there after} of five months, the Defense Department had a skeleton team working with others throughout the Administration under the auspices of the NSC on the subject of interest to this Commission, that is, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and al Qaeda.

Paul Wolfowitz, my deputy, ^{a number of} handled these discussions for ~~me~~ ^{10/07/2001}

Associated with the effort was a classified effort to provide a relatively ^{integrated} prompt and responsive capability to strike against designated and authorized terrorist targets. That effort was a follow-on from previous activity. It required modification of equipment and creation of new command and control

arrangements. I am advised that that capability was not sufficiently mature technically, under the conditions prevailing prior to 9/11, to be deployed in an operational mode.

The Day of 9/11

Morning of 9/11. On the day of 9/11, when the plane struck the Pentagon at 0939, I had finished breakfast with the Congressional delegation and I was in my office with my CIA briefer. *It was unclear what had caused the explosion* I immediately went outside to see what had happened. I was not outside for ~~very~~ long, apparently, because I am told that there are ~~records~~ *notes* indicating that I was back in the Pentagon, with a crisis action team, by a few minutes ~~past~~ *before - after shortly after* 1000. Upon my return from the crash site and before going to what we call SecDef Cables, *went back to my office* I made a number of calls, one of which was to the President. Upon entering Cables, *I believe* [ed. note: need to consult with Di Rita/Clarke on DR's first actions upon entering room].

I then went down to the National Military Command Center. I met Gen. Myers, who had just returned from *Capitol* Hill. *discussed and I decided* We ~~agreed~~ to recommend a change in

see for next name

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

threat condition from "Echo" (?) to "Charlie," or from the lowest to the 3rd highest level. ^I We also gave instruction to notify the Russians of the change and to ^{Suggest} request that they stand down an exercise they were conducting.

(A summary was provided, of the forces we had available in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Gulf. They included the ^{the} Vinson in the Indian Ocean, the ^{Carrier USS} Enterprise and 4 SSGNs at Oman and 6 SSGNs in the Persian Gulf. The 10 SSGNs ^{had} 200 TLAMs ^{among them}. In addition, the Constellation was 4 days out of San Diego in the Pacific Ocean, and the Lincoln was in port at Everett, WA.)

^I I joined the air threat conference call, which was ~~already~~ in progress. [One of] my first conversations during the conference call was with the Vice President, who informed me that he had ~~passed along the President's authorization to shoot~~

^{it} down hostile aircraft [coming toward Washington, D.C.] ^{I later heard that the President had authorized that OIC}

My thoughts ~~immediately~~ went to the circumstances of the pilots of our ^{the U.S} military aircraft. ^{that may be called upon to exercise that role.} I went to work with the then-Vice Chairman, General Dick Myers, to work out appropriate rules of engagement. Throughout the course of the day, I returned at least once and ^{possible} maybe twice to refine those ROE, ^{and} my reason for paying such close attention to them was an experience that happened many years ago, with the Mayaguez (that stuck in my mind.)

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

at the front of the

in 1974 or 1975

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

That

had been a room where

During the incident, we had communications rigged in the Cabinet Room
the President and I the MS room in checked about
such that we could actually hear our pilots in the cockpits as they intercepted the
which they believed had all the US bombers off the Mayaguez. I remember hearing the uncertainty in the pilots' voices — these were

relatively young men, and they were charged with making some potentially grave
about wheels or not do try to stop the hunt by shooting at its rudder or
decisions on their own. I was a pilot. I remember what it felt like. I really put engine
myself into the shoes of pilots we were asking to intercept civilian airliners over
and possible how to shoot down airliners killed with our jets w of delta
American soil. They needed to have clear ROE telling them what they could and America.
could not do. They needed to have it clear in their heads.

Check this fact

So, I was terribly concerned on 911 — that these pilots have the proper
ROE with which to carry out their missions. There wasn't any ROE on the books
for this kind of situation. It has not been an order that President have had the order
to kill other Americans — Americans since Abraham Lincoln.

Adair, L. Engman

7

I spent the remainder of the morning and into the afternoon in the NMCC
and cables in preparing my thoughts for each of the conversations with the
President giving guidance on air intercepts and thinking about the way forward.

word sheet

Here again, I can best explain my thinking by analogy to past events, in this
case, the tragic bombings in Beirut in 1983, and the manner in which the response

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

was made to those bombings. The delay in responding to the embassy bombings in April, followed by the delay in response to the subsequent ^{US} ~~United States~~ Marine Corps barracks bombings, and culminating in the ineffective response months later came to mind. ^{US/then 241 Marine} ~~that~~, in such instances of attack against American interests, I thought ^{we} ~~we~~ needed to respond quickly and decisively, and aim at the true source of the problem, ^{to do so} and in a way that ^{should be} understood and supported by the American people. or else ~~we would waste our effort at best and~~ ~~more likely,~~ simply encourage future, more daring, attacks against our people.

During the course of the day of 911, the President indicated to me that he expected ^{US to provide him with} options for military responses ~~to be presented,~~ and, ^I in the intervening ^{Next} days, we began preparing those options for ^{him} in an effort that concluded with his direction to me to carry out the actions that ultimately became known as Operation Enduring Freedom, against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that harbored and supported al Qaeda.

Post-911

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

was made to those bombings. The delay in responding to the embassy bombings in April, followed by the delay in response to the subsequent United States Marine Corps barracks bombings, and culminating in the ineffective response months later came to mind. The bottom line is that, in such instances of attack against American interests, I thought we needed to respond quickly and decisively, and aim at the true source of the problem, and in a way that is understood and supported by the American people, or else we would waste our effort at best and, more likely, simply encourage future, more daring, attacks against our people.

During the course of the day of 9/11, the President indicated to me that he expected options for military responses to be presented, and, in the intervening days, we began preparing those options for him in an effort that concluded with his direction to me to carry out the actions that ultimately became known as Operation Enduring Freedom, against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that harbored and supported al Qaeda.

Post-911

~~STAFF DRAFT~~

3:23
3/29

120

EF-8768
March 8, 2004
I-04/003195

Honduras

TO: Doug Feith
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Honduras

3/29

Shouldn't we get the President to make a determination for Honduras, like he did on Colombia—that they could shoot down drug airplanes?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-7

.....
Please respond by 3/19/04

✓
3/30

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosum
3/30

OSD 10903-04

09-03-04 11:59 AM

8 March

11-L-0559/OSD/25651

MAR 11 2004
rec'd SOLIC 1030 hrs 19 Mar 04

EF- 8768
March 8, 2004
I 04/003195

Honduras

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Honduras

Shouldn't we get the President to make a termination for Honduras, like he did on Colombia—that they could shoot down drug airplanes?

Thanks.

DHR:db
030804-7

✓ 3/30

3/19/04 19 Mar 04

TO: SECDEF Please respond by 3/19/04

FM: ASD/ SO- LIC. Tom O'Connell

Sir,

USD(P) AM 31-3104
DSD _____

Under the current law (22 USC 2291-4), it would be hard to argue that narcotics air trafficking presents an extraordinary threat to Honduran national security.

We are working with the interagency to amend the law to allow the USG to address air bridge denial from a regional vice country by country basis. My staff met with ONDCP reps on 10 March. A PCC was held 12 March. We see positive movement.

As you may recall, Defense passed the lead for air bridge denial to State after the civilian shoot-down in Peru. 09-03-04 11:59 IN

We are trying to lead from the rear, not the front.

VK,
O'Connell

OSD 10903-04
8 Mar 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Bcc DSD

1200
7/15

July 14, 2004

383.6

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: MEK

Please see if we can get this MEK issue moved over to the State Department. It seems to me it is essentially in their court now, and we have only a custodial responsibility. Negroponte is the one who ought to be working the issue.

Thanks.

Attach.

AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD Cable R 1410042 JUL 04, "USEB 79: ICRC Raises New Roadblock to MEK Interviews"

DHR:dh
071404-11

.....
Please respond by 7/23/04

OSD 10904-04

14 Jul 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/25653

DA 7/14

RTTUZYUW RUEHQBAG113 1961004-UUUU--RUEKNMA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141004Z JUL 04
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0178
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHGV:MISSION GENEVA 0001

8
714

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000128

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR NEA/I

TAGS: PREL, ICRC, PGOV, PTER, PREF, UNHCR, IZ

SUBJECT: USEB 79: ICRC RAISES NEW ROADBLOCK TO MEK
INTERVIEWS

1. (SBU) THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS AN ACTION REQUEST. WE ARE SEEKING WASHINGTON CONCURRENCE, WITH CHANGES AS NECESSARY, TO OUR PROPOSED REPLY TO THE ICRC. PLEASE SEE PARAGRAPH 7.

2. (SBU) SUMMARY. DURING AN INITIAL MEETING ON JULY 12 BETWEEN THE NEWLY ARRIVED ICRC BAGHDAD HEAD OF DELEGATION CHRISTOPHE BENEY AND U.S. OFFICIALS, BENEY STATED THAT THE ICRC COULD NOT BEGIN CONDUCTING INTERVIEWS OF MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ (MEK) MEMBERS UNTIL IT RECEIVED ANSWERS TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ON THEIR LEGAL STATUS. BENEY INDICATED THAT SECURITY CONCERNS COULD ONLY BE ADDRESSED AFTER THE ADDITIONAL LEGAL ISSUES WERE RESOLVED. THE U.S. TEAM PROMISED A SPEEDY, WRITTEN RESPONSE TO THE ICRC QUESTIONS WHILE NOTING THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THE TEAM HAD HEARD OF THE ICRC REQUEST. END SUMMARY.


3. (SBU) EMBASSY POLITICAL-MILITARY COUNSELOR NEUMANN, MNF-I DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL FOR DETAINEE OPERATIONS MAJOR GENERAL MILLER, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS MAJOR GENERAL SERGEANT, EMBASSY NOTE TAKER, AND SEVERAL LAWYERS FROM GENERAL MILLERS STAFF MET JULY 12, 2004 WITH NEWLY ARRIVED ICRC BAGHDAD HEAD OF DELEGATION CHRISTOPHE BENEY TO DISCUSS MEK ISSUES. AT THE START OF THE MEETING, BENEY STATED

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

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O&D: / CCD: / CABLE CUI: FILE:
USDP: / DIA: OTHER: CPA /
USDI: / PER SEC: COMM:

March 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Goldwater-Nichols for the US Government

Attached is a memo I dictated on the idea of Goldwater-Nichols for the whole US government.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

Attach.

2/8/04 SecDef MFR re: Goldwater-Nichols for the USG (020804-64)

DHR:dh
030804-22

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

OSD 10906-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25655

020 000

2/1/04

February 8, 2004

SUBJECT: Goldwater-Nichols for the USG

The US Government as a whole is now really the way DoD was in the pre-Goldwater-Nichols days.

DoD in those days had the best Army in the world, the best Navy in the world, the best Air Force in the world, the best Marine Corps in the world.

But each one of them did what they did individually and separately.

To get where we are, each of those Services had to give up something—some authorities, some notoriety, some fame—to achieve a greater good.

The US Government is now where DoD was in the pre-Goldwater-Nichols days.

The country teams are not really country teams—they are Department of State embassies. DoD is not a competent play in a country team, nor probably are other agencies and departments.

To achieve our goals, we need to have true country teams, and we need to have leadership in those teams—not Department of State career SFOs. We need to have competent people who are the equivalent of our combatant commanders—people like Howard Baker, Bob Strauss, Mike Mansfield, Tom Foley and the like.

DHR:dh
020804-64

11-L-0559/OSD/25656

3/11 1230

11-L-0559/OSD/25657

~~INFORMATION RETENTION~~

C3/15

March 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

Lamy Di Rite
3/15

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: India and Pakistan

Do you have any proposals on this Vern Clark memo? I think he has a good point.

Let's discuss it.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/24/03 CNO memo re: India/Pakistan Trip Thoughts
12/27/03 SecDef memo to CJCS (122703-29)

DHR:dh
030804-24

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

3/11/04

✓
3/15

→ SD

Adm. Clark makes good points
I'll work with Pete Pace and
with LTG Tom Waters of DSCA
on the Pakistan "reversing from
sanctions" item. ~~etc.~~

cc IGIA

I've begun to address the India-Centcom
relationship issues - e.g. ~~INFORMATION RETENTION~~
I invite both Paccom and
Centcom representatives to my meetings with the Indians.
I'll continue to press on this, together w/ Pete Pace.
Doug Feith

OSD 10907-04

December 27, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PACOM and CENTCOM

Here is a Vern Clark e-mail on the lines between PACOM and CENTCOM that we ought to think through. Please see me on it.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/24/03 CNO e-mail re: India/Pakistan Trip Thoughts

DHR.dh
122703-29 (ts computer)

.....
Please respond by 1/23/04

U22539 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/25658

No Classification in Message Body

210/24
12/27

Craddock, John J, LTG, OSD

From: Clark, Vern (N00) [Clark.Vern@cno.navy.smil.mil]
Sent: Friday, October 24, 2003 6:16 PM
To: 'john.craddock@osd.smil.mil'; 'meyersrb@js.pentagon.smil.mil'
Cc: 'fargotb0@hq.pacom.smil.mil'; 'abizaijp@centcom.smil.mil'
Subject: India/Pakistan trip thoughts

Importance: High
Sensitivity: Personal

CS CS

John,

-- Please pass to Secretary Rumsfeld --

Mr. Secretary and Chairman,

You may recall I recently visited India and Pakistan. It was a terrific trip and very fruitful.

Two major issues for me:

- * One: the disconnect in both countries with how the UCP divides sensible relations with these two nations.
- * Our dividing lines are impacting them.
- * India wants to be engaged to the west. They have real national interests in that direction.
- * We are protective to the west because, in CENTCOM, we protect the feelings of Pakistan. (I'm not casting blame; just addressing perceptions)
- * So...India is not as engaged in the Gulf as they would like to be and they told me they sense a lack of connection with CENTCOM. They feel they have no entrance to deal in that AOR, e.g. exercises, liaisons, etc.
- * They don't see themselves as "belonging" to PACOM only.
- * It is less true for Pakistan looking east. As you know, Pak is keeping score of every move we make with India, but in naval stuff, they played in PACOM's submarine rescue event and liked it.
- * Recommendation: We need to figure out how to fuzz the lines between these kinds of boundaries.
- * Two: Recovering from sanctions.
 - o Lots of frustration. This is familiar to you I know.
 - o We need to figure out how to look proactive in a post sanctions window. We don't.
 - o Example: Pak already has the HARPOON surface-to-surface missile. During the years of sanction their HARPOON missiles became inoperable ...lack of support, parts, test equipment, etc. They are unable to obtain much needed parts and support equipment for legacy systems like this without starting over through our formal, multiagency approval process.
 - * Recommendation: When we lift sanctions, we should consider a fundamental change to our interagency approval process and issue, pre-emptively, a list of items already approved. We should not force the nation to go through the approval process again.

11

All in all a good trip. I told each of them you had given me, and each of the Chiefs, the direction to get engaged. That message was well received.


VR, Vern

No Classification in Message Body

11- L-0559/OSD/25659

March 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Meeting on Footprint

Let's make sure I have a meeting with John Warner and Pete Pace on this footprint issue on Monday or Tuesday next week.

Thanks

Attach.

Spiegel, Peter. "Senator Condemns Pentagon Move to Cut Number of US Troops Based in Europe," *London Financial Times*, March 5, 2004.

DHR:dh
030504-11

.....
Please respond by 3/10/04

File

FOR FILE

2-11-04

London Financial Times
March 5, 2004
Pg. 10

Senator Condemns Pentagon Move To Cut Number Of US Troops Based In Europe

By Peter Spiegel

Senator John Warner, the powerful chairman of the armed services committee, yesterday voiced his opposition to any significant reductions in the number of US forces based in Europe, saying such downsizing was inappropriate during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Although the Pentagon has yet to announce specific plans for troop levels in Europe, Nato diplomats have said they are expecting reductions of as much as a third, one of the biggest redeployments of American forces since the second world war.

Donald Rumsfeld, defence secretary, ordered a review of all overseas troop commitments shortly after taking office three years ago.

But speaking at a hearing on the Pentagon's budget, Mr Warner said he opposed even a study of a reduction, although he was more accepting of plans to move troops stationed in Germany into new bases in eastern Europe. There are 120,000 US troops in Europe, two-thirds of them based in Germany.

"Even the thought, at this particular point of time, with the war on terrorism, of making any significant reduction of forces concerns me greatly," Mr Warner told General Jim Jones, US commander in Europe and Nato's military chief. "This is certainly not the time for even any reassessment of that."

Gen Jones said he supported overseas troops in principle but did not address Mr Warner's concerns directly in his oral testimony. In a written statement provided to the committee, however, the general made clear his commitment to reducing troop levels in Europe and creating a series of smaller operating bases in the region.

"The United States' level of interest, commitment, and military capability resident in this theatre should no longer be measured exclusively by the number of troops permanently based in Europe," he said.

Although Mr Warner is one of the most powerful Republicans in Congress on military issues, he is unlikely to prevent the Pentagon from making the changes through legislative means.

His ability to affect defence department policymaking, however, is significant. If he decides to make the stationing of troops in Europe a personal cause, it could severely complicate Mr Rumsfeld's efforts to make US forces abroad smaller and more mobile.

At the same hearing, General John Abizaid, commander of US troops in the Gulf, rejected calls by Shia leaders in Iraq to allow them to set up local militias to protect themselves from terrorist attacks such as the bombings in Karbala and Baghdad this week.

Shia clergy have angrily criticised the US for not providing enough security. The Shias' leading political party, Sciri, has asked that its former armed movement, the Badr Corps, be allowed to operate as a

11-L-0559/OSD/25661

private militia.

11-L-0559/OSD/25662

March 8, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*

SUBJECT: Intelligence

I think I need a better screen on the intelligence material I am getting. I get the feeling I get two or three copies of everything. It is wasting a lot of time for me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-33

.....

Please respond by _____

*OB
3/7*

350.00

*69
2
3*

OSD 10909-04

March 8, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Material for Speeches

Let's think about including in a speech the things that Harry Truman did after World War II—all of the accomplishments: NATO, the UN, the World Bank, the Marshall Plan and the like.

Then let's come up with a list of things that need to be done after the end of the Cold War.

Please see me about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-31

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

OSD 10910-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25664

351.001SD

8 MAR 04

March 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tribune Foreign Correspondent

Please find out about Christine Spolar — who she is, where she works, what her beat is.

Thanks.

Attach.
Spolar, Christine. "U.S.Plans Al Qaeda Offensive," *Chicago Tribune* January 28, 2004.

DHR:dh
030504-33

.....
Please respond by 3/12/04

OB
3/24

BOC

8 M 27 04



U.S. plans Al Qaeda offensive

Publication: Chicago Tribune

Author: ~~Christina Spolar~~

Tribune Foreign Correspondent

Published January 27, 2004, 10:00 Pm Cst

WASHINGTON -- The Bush administration, deeply concerned about recent assassination attempts against Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf and a resurgence of Taliban forces in neighboring Afghanistan, is preparing a U.S. military offensive that would reach inside Pakistan with the goal of destroying Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda network, military sources said.

U.S. Central Command is assembling a team of military intelligence officers that would be posted in Pakistan ahead of the operation, according to sources familiar with details of the plan and internal military communications. The sources spoke on the condition they not be identified.

As now envisioned, the offensive would involve Special Operations forces, Army Rangers and Army ground troops, sources said. A Navy aircraft carrier would be deployed in the Arabian Sea.

Referred to in internal Pentagon messages as the "spring offensive," the operation would be driven by certain undisclosed events in Pakistan and across the region, sources said. A source familiar with details of the plan said this is "not like a contingency plan for North Korea, something that sits on a shelf. This planning is like planning for Iraq. They want this plan to be executable, now."

The Defense Department declined to comment on the planned offensive or its details. Such an operation almost certainly would demand the cooperation of Musharraf, who previously has allowed only a small number of U.S. Special Operations forces to work alongside Pakistani troops in the semi-autonomous tribal areas. A military source in Washington said last week, "We are told we're going into Pakistan with Musharraf's help."

Yet a large-scale offensive by U.S. forces within the nuclear-armed Islamic republic could be political dynamite for Musharraf.

The army general, who took power in a bloodless coup in 1999, has come under growing political pressure from Islamic parties, and his cooperation with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts is widely unpopular among average Pakistanis. Nor can Musharraf count on the loyalty of all of Pakistan's armed forces or its intelligence agency, members of which helped set up and maintain the Taliban in Afghanistan and are still suspected of ties to militant Islamic groups.

Speaking on Friday at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Musharraf again rejected the need for U.S. forces to enter Pakistan to search for bin Laden.

"That is not a possibility at all," Musharraf said. "It's a very sensitive issue." The U.S. military is

11-L-0559/OSD/25666

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operating under the belief that, despite his recent statements, Musharraf's thinking has changed, sources said. Musharraf himself said last week that bin Laden and his followers likely were hiding in the mountains along the Afghan border. He also said "we are reasonably sure that it is Al Qaeda" who was behind the two attempts on his life.

An offensive into Pakistan to pursue Al Qaeda would be in keeping with President Bush's vow to strike wherever and whenever the United States feels threatened and to pursue terrorist elements to the end.

"The best way to defend America ... is to stay on the offensive and find these killers, one by one," Bush said last week. "We're going to stay on the hunt, which requires good intelligence, good cooperation, good participation with friends and allies around the world."

Musharraf's vulnerability is of deep concern to U.S. officials. Were he to be killed, Bush administration officials say, it is unlikely that any successor would be as willing to work toward U.S. goals to eliminate Islamic extremists.

The U.S. military plan is characterized within the Pentagon as "a big effort" in the next year. Military analysts had previously judged that a bold move against Islamic extremists and Osama bin Laden, in particular, was more likely to happen in spring 2005.

~~A series of planning orders-referred to in military jargon as warning orders-for the offensive were issued in recent weeks. The deadline for key planning factors to be detailed by the U.S. military was Jan. 21.~~

Sources said the plan against Al Qaeda would be driven by events in the region rather than set deadlines and that delays could occur. But military sources said the push for this spring appeared to be triggered by the assassination attempts on Musharraf, both of which came in December, and, to some extent, the capture of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

Hussein was captured after eight months of an intense military and intelligence effort on the ground in Iraq. Pentagon and administration officials, buoyed by that success, believe a similar determined effort could work in Pakistan and lead to the capture or killing of bin Laden, said sources familiar with the planning.

Thousands of U.S. forces would be involved, as well as Pakistani troops, planners said. Some of the 10,600 U.S. troops now in Afghanistan would be shifted to the border region as part of regular troop movements; some would be deployed within Pakistan.

"Before we were constrained by the border. Musharraf did not want that. Now we are told we're going into Pakistan with Musharraf's help," said a well-placed military source.

Internal Pentagon communications indicate that the U.S. offensive would rely on several areas of operation, including Afghanistan, Pakistan and other countries in the region.

The U.S. also is weighing how and if Iran can be persuaded, through direct or indirect channels, to lend help, according to internal Pentagon communications. The U.S. is eager to avoid a repeat of the Afghan war in 2001, when some Al Qaeda fighters were believed to have escaped into Iran.

Military planners said the offensive would not require a significant increase in U.S. troops in South Asia. But Special Operations forces that had shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq in 2003 will return.

"We don't have enough forces but we can rely on proxy forces in that area," said a military source,

11-L-0559/OSD/25667

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referring to Pakistani troops. "This is designed to go after the Taliban and everybody connected with it."



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11-L-0559/OSD/25668

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~~SECRET~~

March 5, 2004

TO: Mike Wynne
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Report on Stryker Tests

Here is a report on Stryker I have not read. The cover memo says Congress is waiting for this report.

Please tell me what I am supposed to do with this.

Thanks

Attach.

2/18/04 Dir, OT&E memo to SecDef w/ "Combined Operational Test & Evaluation and Live Fire Test & Evaluation Report on the Stryker Family of Vehicles" [OSD75496-04]

DHR:dh
030504-3

.....
Please respond by _____

✓ 3/10
C 3/10

Sir,
Response attached. ADM is the acronym for Acquisition Decision Memorandum.

rr / CDR Nosenzo
3/10

11-0559-04

~~SECRET~~

← classified
UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/25669 OSD 10912-04

✓
3/10



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

INFO MEMO

March 9, 2004, 2:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DSD _____

FROM: Mr. Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

[Handwritten Signature]
MAR 10 2004

SUBJECT: Report on Stryker Tests

- Your March 5, 2004, snowflake requested information on action required regarding the subject report. No action on your part is necessary.
- The report was provided to Congress on February 19, 2004, by Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. This report supported the Stryker Milestone III full rate production decision, as required in Title 10 United States Code Sections 2399 and 2366. **(ADM attached)**
- On March 4, 2004, I approved full-rate production for seven Stryker vehicle configurations. Six vehicles were assessed as operationally effective and suitable in the test report. The Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV) was assessed as not operationally effective or suitable. I requested advice from the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB) on this finding. The JCB determined that continued production is supportable given demonstrated performance, programmed fixes, operational work-arounds, and planned follow-on testing. Based on this determination, I approved full-rate production for the Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV).

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

~~None~~ **ADM**

Prepared By: Anne Swanek, OUSD(AT&L)/DS/LW&M (b)(6)



OSD 10912-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25670



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

04 MAR 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Stryker – Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)

On February 20, 2004, I conducted a review of the Stryker program. As a result of that review, I approve Milestone III for continued production of the following Stryker vehicle configurations: Anti-tank Guided Missile (ATGM), Commander's Vehicle (CV), Fire Support Vehicle (FSV), Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV), Medical Evacuation Vehicle (MEV), and Reconnaissance Vehicle (RV).

I referred the Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV) to the Force Application (FA) Functional Capabilities Board (FCB) to determine if operational capabilities provided by the ESV support its continued production. The FA FCB and the subsequent Joint Capabilities Board of February 25, 2004, determined that the operational capabilities provided by the ESV do indeed support its continued production in light of programmed fixes, operational work-arounds, and planned follow-on testing. Therefore, I also approve Milestone III of the ESV configuration.

I direct the Army to:

- consider the recommendations identified in the Beyond Low-Rate Initial Production (BLRIP) Report and identify a path forward for corrections, funding, and testing.
- fund the Stryker Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) and Production to the levels identified in the Army Cost Position; and Operations and Maintenance in accordance with approved Operating Tempo levels in the FY06 – FY11 POM.
- submit the Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Information Support Plan (C4ISP) by April 30, 2004 for approval.

I delegate to the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) decisions on Add-on Armor and Mortar Carrier production upon successful assessment in the BLRIP and Live Fire report update. The AAE will notify me of the decisions before taking action to implement them. Regarding the Mobile Gun System (MGS) and the Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV) development, within 90 days the Army shall provide proposed changes to the MGS exit criteria, with rationale, and an update to the Technology Readiness Assessment for the NBCRV.

I direct the Army to develop an implementation plan for brigade enhancements to include Secretary of Defense approved enhancements, migration to a net-ready capability, and early application of future force (e.g., Future Combat Systems)




capabilities. The plan shall detail the incremental upgrades of all Stryker brigades and the associated scheduling and funding actions.

I request that PDASD(C3, Space, and IT Programs) oversee, with the Director, Defense Systems and USD(I) **support**, an Army-led Stryker force integration study. The **study** should **address** force interoperability among Stryker-equipped brigades and Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C3ISR) systems at the Army, joint, and coalition levels.

The Stryker **OPT** shall meet in **August 2004** to advise me on the following:

- the **Army** plan for accommodating BLRIP report recommendations;
- the **progress on the development of the NDCRV and MGS configurations and** their readiness for production;
- the implementation **plan** for brigade enhancements;
- the results of the force integration study.

Point of contact is Dr. Robert **Buhrkuhl**, Acquisition Resources and **Analysis** (OUSD(AT&L)), (b)(6)


Michael W. Wynne
(Acting)

cc:

USD(I)
D,DS
PDASD(C3, Space, and IT Programs)

March 8, 2004

China

TO: Andy Marshall
Steve Cambone

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: PRC and Russia

It seems to me that we might want to do some sort of a net assessment on the PRC and on Russia, and some competitive analysis as to where we think they are going.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-12

.....

Please respond by 4/2/04

8mar04

OSD 10913-04

March 5, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraqi Police Training

Iraq

Please have someone draft a letter from me to Colin Powell describing what the problem is here and asking if he could help speed it up.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/5/04 SMA note to SecDef re: Iraqi Police Training

OB
3/16

DHR:dh
030504-27

.....
Please respond by _____

SMA 04

OSD 10914-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25674

4:05 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: February 24, 2004
SUBJECT: Police

Do you remember who was going to do the mentoring of the police? They are now under the military but the military probably aren't the right people to do the mentoring, are they?

Thanks.



DHR/azn
0202404.05ts

Please respond by: _____

3/5

3/5

SECRET -

- Police are to be mentored by Civilian Police Advisors, who are to be recruited/provided by the State Dept.
- This program is woefully behind schedule. *OSD 09521-04*
- 1500 Advisors are required, 40 are on hand
- State is projecting 500 O/H by the end of March

11-L-0559/OSD/25675

March 8, 2004

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith
Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghan Prisons

Let's get a timeline where we can get Afghanistan to provide the prisons necessary to house the GTMO detainees who are Afghans. One would think we ought to be able to get the right kind of an arrangement.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-17

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

8 MAR 04

OSD 10915-04

March 8, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Magdalena Sub Base

OB/3/16

I have never seen the Magdalena sub base in Sardinia. We may want to stop there for refueling going to or from someplace this next trip, if there is an air base there.

Thanks.

333 SD

DHR:dh
030804-34

.....
Please respond by *3/26/04*

8 MAR 04

OSD 10916-04

March 8, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: North Korea

You ought to sit in when Volko briefs me on the North Korean nuclear situation.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030504-14



Please respond by _____

file

Korea(north)

8Mar04

OSD 10917-04

SM 22 Jul 04

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 7/21/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: FRONT OFFICE DOC ATTACHMENT:
 OSD CONTROL OSD 10917-04 DOC 3/8/2004 DOR 7/21/2004 SIGNATURE CASE:
 FROM SECDEF TO USI CAMBONE
 SUBJECT NORTH KOREA
 KEYWORDS SNOW FLAKE
 COMMENTS CAF - NO DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL.
 FN Korea(north) SEC U OCN030504-14
 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
 STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:
 AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:
 SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION
 PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 0
 SUSPENSE STATUS PACKAGE VIEW:
 FRONT OFFICE DOC

CREATED BY: reynolds

DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE COPIES
ADC *R

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ACTION REPORT

This form must be completed and forwarded to the Correspondence Control
 Division (CCD), WHS Room 3A948. Suspense Desk: (b)(6)
 Number: (b)(6) Email: suspense_desk@osd.pentagon.mil

Action Agency **USP**

Suspense Date **3/25/2004**

1. ACTION TAKEN (Check one)

- a. ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (Copy attached)
- b. REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO (Justify below)
- c. INTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT (Copy attached) EXTEND SUSPENSE TO (Justify below)
- d. REQUEST CANCELLATION (Justify below)
- e. REQUEST TRANSFER TO (Justify below /include POC Name & Phone Number)
- f. REQUEST DOWNGRADE TO (Justify below)

2. JUSTIFICATION

3. REPORTING AGENCY

a. ACTION AGENCY <input style="width: 100%;" type="text" value="USP"/>	e. APPROVING AUTHORITY (Service Secretary/Under Secretary/ASD/Military/Executive Assistant Level) Signature <input style="width: 80%;" type="text"/> Date Signed <input style="width: 15%;" type="text"/>
b. NAME OF ACTION OFFICER <input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>	

c. TELEPHONE NO. <input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>	5. ACTION TAKEN (For EXSEC/ Correspondence Control Division Use Only)												
d. DATE <input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 40%;">a. EXT</td> <td style="width: 20%;"><input type="checkbox"/> Approved</td> <td style="width: 40%;"><input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved</td> </tr> <tr> <td>b. CANX</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Approved</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved</td> </tr> <tr> <td>c. DWNGRD</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Approved</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved</td> </tr> <tr> <td>d. TRANSFER</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Approved</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved</td> </tr> </table>	a. EXT	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved	b. CANX	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved	c. DWNGRD	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved	d. TRANSFER	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
a. EXT	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved											
b. CANX	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved											
c. DWNGRD	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved											
d. TRANSFER	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved											
4. CCD CONTROL # <input style="width: 100%;" type="text" value="OSD 03700-04"/>	e. OTHER (Specify) <input style="width: 80%;" type="text"/> Signature <input style="width: 80%;" type="text"/> Date Signed <input style="width: 15%;" type="text"/>												

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SLIP

Action Agency: UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY

Action Required: APPROPRIATE ACTION

Coordinate With:

References:

Remarks:

Document Type: INCOMING

Special Instructions

Suspense Date: March/25/2004

Routing Date: March/12/2004

OSD CONTROL #: OSD 03700-04

INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION

OFFICE

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY REAR



SECRETARY GENERAL
LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

2004 MAR 12 10:13:00

SG(2004)0226

23 February 2004

Dear Secretary, dear Donald,

Looking ahead to the expanded ISAF mission beyond Kabul and Konduz, I am writing to alert you to the challenge and responsibility we share in providing the additional forces needed to support the new OPLAN currently being developed by SACEUR.

While some important progress on filling critical ISAF shortfalls was made at our recent informal meeting in Munich, particularly for Kabul airport, I must stress that those commitments relate to the current requirement only.


Over the coming weeks, SACEUR will be working closely with nations on sourcing the new ISAF combined joint statement of requirement (CJSOR). In this context I urge you to follow through the political commitment, jointly made by all Allies to enhance NATO's support for the Afghan Transitional Authority, by providing the necessary forces for ISAF's expanded mission. In the true spirit of shared responsibility and solidarity I believe that all nations can make worthwhile contributions, based upon their declared force commitments and capabilities.

As ISAF's expansion is based on the concept of additional ISAF PRTs I also take this opportunity to urge those of you who are considering the deployment of PRTs to accelerate that process. Istanbul is rapidly approaching and with each passing week it becomes increasingly difficult to meet our goal of 5 ISAF PRTs in the field by the end of June.

The Berlin Conference at the end of March and the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting immediately thereafter will be important stepping stones to mark the progress we have achieved in making good on our promises in Afghanistan. It is therefore essential that we have completed our work on the new ISAF OPLAN and the associated force generation process ahead of these meetings. I count on your support to turn political intent into concrete pledges during the next few critical weeks.

-1-

For your information, I have written to all your colleagues, including invitees, along the same lines.

Yours ever,

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense of the United States of America
Washington D.C.

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 3/12/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: INCOMING

OSD CONTROL **OSD 03700-04**
FROM NATO SCHEFFER

DOC 2/23/2004

DOR 3/12/2004

SIGNATURE CASE:

SUBJECT **LOOKING AHEAD TO THE EXPANDED ISAF MISSION BEYOND KABUL AND KONDUZ**
TO SECDEF

KEYWORDS **SCHEFFER, J**

COMMENTS

FN SEC U OCN

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:

AGENCY USP ACTION ASSIGNED **FAA** SUSPENSE 3/25/2004 DOC SUSPENSE: 3/25/2004

SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION

PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 0

PACKAGE VIEW:

SUSPENSE STATUS

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11-L-0559/OSD/25684

March 5, 2004

TO: Mike Wynne
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Adding Launchers and Interceptors

373.24

Here is an idea someone forwarded. Why not take a look at it and tell me what you think about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
MDA Forward Based Multi-mission Components

DHR:dh
030504-25

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

5 MAR 04


OSD 10910-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25685

Current Plan

- Components Configured For Unique Missions -

- Forward Based Sensors leverage the THAAD Radar Component and add unique HW/SW to execute the new sensor mission
- THAAD Fire Unit is designed specifically to engage ballistic missiles
- **Current plan fields three Forward Based Sensors and one THAAD Fire Unit**
 - Forward Based Radar(s) deployed to increase sensor for U.S. defense against
 - THAAD Fire Unit capable of rapid, world-wide, deployments defeat ballistic missiles of all



Challenges

- Single mission THAAD Fire Unit can not be used for the Forward Based Sensor
- **Single Mission Forward Based Radars are vulnerable (lack ability to defeat BMs)**
- Single Mission **Forward Based Radars provide no defense** to host nations or regional combatant
- Uniquely configured components require different CONOPS, maintenance, and


	Cost (\$M)					
	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10
Forward Radar #1	●	185	●			
Forward Radar #2		●	185	●		
Forward Radar #3			●	185	●	
THAAD Fire Unit			●	470	●	

\$1025M

Concept Under Evaluation

- Components Configured For Multi-Mission Capability -

- Evolve THAAD Radar and C2/BMC components to a multi-mission forward based configuration
- Exercise option to **field additional missiles and launchers** to complete 3 additional configured fire units
 - Provides **four multi-mission fire units versus one** mission THAAD Fire
 - Provides four multi-mission **forward radars with protection** from ballistic
 - **Provides host nation protection** for up to countries/regional combatant
 - Maximizes commonality and provides overall reduction life cycle



• Challenges

- Multi-Mission configuration for Radar and C2/BMC requires MDA Sys Eng to define and direct requirements and interfaces to avoid stove-pipe design
- MDA Sys Eng must be given authority to disrupt elements current path

Cost (\$M)

	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10
Forward Radar #1	●	185	●			
Forward Radar #2		●	185	●		
Forward Radar #3			●	185	●	
Launchers and Missiles*				●	400	●
THAAD Fire Unit			●	470	●	

* 9 Launchers and 72 Missiles for Forward Based Radars

\$1425M

Summary

MDA forward based multi-mission components:


- Maximizes BMDS flexibility and compliments BMDS with underlay capability for GMD
- Provides initial underpinning for **Global Missile Defense**
- Achieves ballistic missile protection to deployed forces, & friends
- **Offers “Regional missile defense”** for up to 4 host nations
- Maximizes BMDS support to the Combatant Command
- Allows backfitting of multi-mission Forward Based Sensor missiles and launchers to provide **three additional THA Units at less than the cost of one new fire unit**
- Maximizes commonality and provides overall reduction in costs

~~CLOSE HOLD~~
(Hand deliver)

March 2, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker
Gen. Doug Brown

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Les Brownlee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs

322

My impression is that civil affairs was put in with Special Operations because it was different and Special Ops was different, which made sense. Probably also it was because the regular Army did not want it.

It continues to be different, but it is also different from Special Ops, as well as being different from the regular Army,

My impression is that we ought to give careful thought to moving it over to the regular Army, so that the regular Army interests itself in that subject and so the transitions from combat to post-combat stabilization can be relatively seamless. Furthermore, I don't think there is anything lost by moving it out of Special Ops, and possibly something gained.

Please think about it and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030204-25

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

(Hand deliver)
~~CLOSE HOLD~~

3 MAR 04



March 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting w/Warner

When I meet with Warner next week, I want to talk to him about:

1. His position on forces in Europe and their relationship to Afghanistan and Iraq. John Craddock, you ought to make sure I know what the relationship is precisely.
2. The McCain e-mail issue, because he had breakfast with me and told me flat out not to worry, that that was only a solo McCain effort.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030504-18

.....
Please respond by _____

file

OSD 10920-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25690

100

100

March 5, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Information Warfare Board

334

Did we ever develop an information warfare board, and if so, are any of these people who I have listed here on it?

Thanks.

Attach.
5/14/01 "Information ~~Warfare~~ Board"

DHR:dh
030504-31

.....
Please respond by _____

5 MAR 04

OSD 10920-04

March 5, 2004

VIA FACSIMILE

(b)(6)


TO: Honorable Henry Kissinger

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

Thanks for the call on the number-two man in the China Foreign Office. I am not going to be able to do it, but Paul Wolfowitz is going to try to do it.

Thanks for the heads up.

Regards,



DHR:dh
030504-13

File


OSD 10928-04

5 MAR 04

11-L-0559/OSD/25692



March 4, 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Number

200

Please get back to me with that number I asked you for, the percentage—the one I guessed was something like .012.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-30



Please respond by _____

4 Mar 04

OSD 10924-04

3/12
1807

120

1

March 4, 2004

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Testimony before Budget Committee

Larry Di Rita
3/29

110.01

Yesterday the Vice President told me that Nussle says he is unhappy because I have not testified before the Budget Committee.

What is the background of that? I guess Paul does it.

I wonder if I ought to have him down for breakfast or lunch someday and talk to him.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-27

.....
Please respond by _____ *3/25* *DR 4/12* *C 3/30*

See DR
→ He might come for one-on-one. He has never come with the other Budget members when invited

Larry Di Rita
3/29

4 Mar 04

TEN
3/30

11-L-0559/OSD/25694

OSD 10927-04



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

March 12, 2004

DA
4/12

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake# 030404-27 regarding Testimony before
Budget Committee

112.01

- Your March 4th snowflake (Tab 1) noted that the Vice President commented that Congressman Nussle said he was "unhappy because I did not testify before the Budget Committee,"
- A call came to Legislative Affairs in late January requesting that you testify before the Committee sometime before the markup of the Budget Resolution. We directed the request in a Decision Memo to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz (Tab 2) because there is no precedent in this Administration for the Secretary of Defense to testify before the Budget Committee. The period between the State of the Union and the mark-up of budget resolutions is usually heavily occupied with your testimony before jurisdictional committees.
- The Deputy declined to testify and requested that Dr. Zakheim be offered to the Committee as the DoD witness. OSD(LA) complied and made the offer.
- Several weeks later, the Committee staff called back to say that the hearing was canceled. At no time did the staff indicate that the lack of testimony was a problem. Nor did I ever receive a phone call from the Chairman or Chief of Staff.
- Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz has previously handled Budget Committee testimony. According to our research, the Secretary of Defense has testified before this committee infrequently. Former Secretaries Cohen, Cheney, and Perry testified once each during the entire length of their tenure.
- We have invited Chairman Nussle for breakfast in previous years along with his Budget Committee counterparts, Senator Domenici, Senator Conrad and Congressman Spratt. Each time he has declined. We have not invited this group this year. There has been time for only three breakfasts on your schedule and we have had higher priorities.
- We should consider inviting him to breakfast later in the year.



12 MAR 04

4 MAR 04

Attachments
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/25695

0.5D 10925-04



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100
ACTION MEMO



January 23, 2004 12:30 PM

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: House and Senate Budget Committee Hearings on the Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget

DEP SEC DEF
HAS SEEN
45DC TEST RY
JAN 30 2004
PWR PW

- The House Budget Committee has invited Secretary Rumsfeld to testify at an upcoming hearing on the FY 2005 Department of Defense (DoD) Budget. It is likely that the Senate Budget Committee will also invite the Secretary. Specific hearing dates have not been set.
- While you have testified before the Budget Committees, most recently during the rollout of the FY 2004 DoD Budget, Secretary Rumsfeld has not. Given that there is no precedent for Secretary Rumsfeld testifying before these committees, I would not recommend setting one now. The Secretary will have a full schedule of hearings and meetings in February associated with the rollout of the FY 2005 DoD Budget.
- Do you have a desire to testify at these hearings? If not, I would be happy to fill in for you. After accompanying the Secretary to his round of posture hearings and conducting my own briefings for Congressional staff, I will be in a good position to address the concerns of the members of the Budget Committees.

recomm
USD(C)
1/28

RECOMMENDATION: Advise me of your desired course of action.

DepSec will testify _____ USD(C) will testify PWR 1/28/04 Other _____

COORDINATION: Tab A

Attachments: None

11-L-0559/OSD/25696

Prepared By: Mark Hoffman

(b)(6)

TSA SD	1/28
SA DSD	
SRMA DSD	
EXEC SEC	1/23

OSD 01104-04



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100



JAN 13 2004

COMPTROLLER
(Program/Budget)

January 14, 2004

~~COVER BRIEF~~

TO: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)

THRU: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY R SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(COMPTROLLER) *MM* JAN 20 2004
DEPUTY COMPTROLLER (PROGRAM/BUDGET)

FROM: DIRECTOR FOR PLANS AND SYSTEMS *R/S*

SUBJECT: House and Senate Budget Committee Hearings on the FY 2005 DoD Budget

PURPOSE: Determine the Deputy Secretary's preference regarding the DoD witness for these hearings.

DISCUSSION:

- The attached action memo informs the DepSec that the House and Senate Budget Committees have either invited or will soon invite Secretary Rumsfeld to testify at their upcoming hearings on the FY 2005 DoD Budget.
- The memo points out that there is not a precedent for Secretary Rumsfeld appearing before the Budget Committees, and you do not recommend setting one now. The Secretary will already have a full schedule of hearings and meetings in February associated with the rollout of the FY 2005 DoD Budget.
- You ask the DepSec if he would like to testify at these hearings. If not, you present him with the option of designating you as the lead DoD witness.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the attached memo.

COORDINATION: None LA (attached)

Attachments: None

Prepared by: Mark Hoffman, (b)(6) OUSD(C)P/B, P&S, 3A862/04JAN14

11-L-0559/OSD/25697

JAN 15 2004




COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100
ACTION MEMO



January 23, 2004, 12:30 PM

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: House and Senate Budget Committee Hearings on the Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget

- The House Budget Committee has invited Secretary Rumsfeld to testify at an upcoming hearing on the FY 2005 Department of Defense (DoD) Budget. It is likely that the Senate Budget Committee will also invite the Secretary. Specific hearing dates have not been set.
- While you have testified before the Budget Committees, most recently during the rollout of the FY 2004 DoD Budget, Secretary Rumsfeld has not. Given that there is no precedent for Secretary Rumsfeld testifying before these committees, I would not recommend setting one now. The Secretary will have a full schedule of hearings and meetings in February associated with the rollout of the FY 2005 DoD Budget.
- Do you have a desire to testify at these hearings? If not, I would be happy to fill in for you. After accompanying the Secretary to his round of posture hearings and conducting my own briefings for Congressional staff, I will be in a good position to address the concerns of the members of the Budget Committees.

RECOMMENDATION: Advise me of your desired course of action.

DepSec will testify _____ USD(C) will testify _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: Tab A

Attachments: None

Prepared By: Mark Hoffman (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/25698

Coordination Page

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (LA) Mr. Stanley January 13, 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/25699

3
March 3, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **7**

SUBJECT: Note from Henry Carto

381

For your information.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/9/04 Carto note to SecDef
SecDef reply

DHR:dh
030104-83

OB
3/5

.....
Please respond by _____

381

OSD 10926-04

February 7 2004
HENRY E CATTO

Dear Don,

I read the transcript of your remarks at the Wehrkunde meeting. As usual, you were absolutely first rate. One matter in particular caught my eye: your suggestion that think-tanks might explore certain facets of the Western relationship. I am Chairman of the Atlantic Council, which as you likely know is devoted to studying NATO and Atlantic unity. If we could be of any

use to the Pentagon in these matters, I hope you will let me know.

With admiration and appreciation,

Sincerely,

Henry



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Henry E. Catto
Atlantic Council of the United States
910 17th Street, NW
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Henry,

Thanks so much for your note. It was good to hear from you.

I have passed your suggestion along to Doug Feith and Paul Wolfowitz, and they will give some thought as to how that might be helpful.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/25702

Secretary Rumsfeld Availability at the Munich Conference on Security Policy

Q [Professor Karl Kaiser, visiting professor at Harvard University]: Mr. Secretary, the doctrine of preemption has been greatly criticized all over the world, but you rightly point out that under conditions of weapons of mass destructions and terrorism, our old criteria of defining the legitimacy of defense, of course, is to be reviewed. And it is an absolutely central rule of international law, I'm referring to Article 51, which makes the use of force legitimate. My question to you now is: should we not leave the redefinition of the criteria just to the accidents of the moment? Shouldn't we all sit together and redefine the criteria of when defense is legitimate under these circumstances? And secondly, where should we do it, in your opinion?

Rumsfeld: I think it's a good idea. I'll leave it to experts and diplomats to figure out where it ought to be done. My guess is it needs to be done in multiple locations. It's such a central issue that needs to be addressed, and it should be done in academia, it should be done in the think tanks, it ought to be done inside governments and it ought to be done among and between governments. It is enormously important. We did an exercise, I didn't, but some people in the United States did, I think it was Johns Hopkins on, they called it "Dark Winter," and they looked at smallpox, I believe, and put it in two or three locations in the United States and watched what happened. And the numbers immediately, very rapidly, ran into the hundreds of thousands of dead. You think what we've done for decades, when I was a child, even then we preempted. If someone got smallpox they were quarantined; they had not given that to anybody else yet, but they were stopped and they were not allowed to give it to anybody else and -- why? Because so many people could be killed by smallpox was the reason. The state stepped in and said, we are going to preemptively stop you from hurting somebody else even though you don't want to, you have no intention to, and there is not any certainty you even would -- but we're going to stop you. I think you're right, I think it's something that merits our attention, and I suspect when with discussions and debates are completed we'll find that it fits something like I suggested: the more powerful, the greater the risk and the danger, the lower the threshold for action.

March 3, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: French Forces

FRANCE

I am told by Colin Powell that the French plan to have a total of 800 people into Haiti by Friday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030304-15

.....

Please respond by _____

OSD 10927-04

3/3/04



3
March 3, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: QDR Process

310.1

I am told that this QDR process is coming at us hard. We are going to need to get me some time to make sure we get it on the right track.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030104-31

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

3 MAR 04

OSD 10928-04

March 2, 2004

310.1

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 Larry Di Rita
 LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: President's Management Agenda

Sometime in the next four to six weeks, I need a briefing on the President's Management Agenda. I would like to have someone from OMB there on the management side and people from DoD. We need someone to describe what the goals are, how they work and what our goals are for 2004.

Possibly we should have a SLRG on it.

Thanks.

Attach.
 2/2/04 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: The President's Management Agenda Q1 FY04 (OSD #02575-04)

DHR:dh
 030204-8

.....
 Please respond by 4/2/04

270104

OSD 10929-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25706

2/24 0800

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UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

February 2, 2004, 4 PM

*Sec. Briefs
w/ OMB
of DoD.
x 5000
for 2/24*

*Burman
2/24*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CC: DSD *Done 2/24*

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R) *David S. C. Chu
x P&R: A 04*

SUBJ: The President's Management Agenda Q1 FY04

- OMB has released the latest "scores" of progress toward accomplishing the President's Management Agenda. The overall Executive Branch Scorecard is at **TAB A**.
- OMB's assessment of our progress on the five crosscutting initiatives is at **TAB B**. We are "Green" in all Progress Areas. A summary of our Status follows:

Human Capital

Despite significant advances with the introduction of the National Security Personnel System, and our Workforce Restructuring Plan, Status remains "Yellow."

Competitive Sourcing

The Department exceeded OMB's goal of completing 15 percent of our agreed to 226,000 positions in FY 2003 by a factor of two. Status has advanced to "Yellow."

Financial Management

The Department-wide financial system enterprise architecture has been briefed to OMB. The score remains as rated last year: "Red" for Status.

E-Government

The Department has performed an impressive amount of work in this area. While we believe our efforts merit an elevation to "Yellow" in Status, our score remains "Red."

Budget and Performance Integration

DoD's Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System has served us for over 40 years. We believe it merits a "Green" in Status; the score remains "Yellow."

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by Mr. John G. Vonglis, Dir. Management Initiatives, P&R

HUMAN	
SUPV ASSISTANT DIR	<i>AS</i>
SR MA CRADDOCK	<i>CR</i>
MA BUDGET NEG NEG	<i>2/25</i>
(b)(6)	<i>2/23</i>

OSD 02575-04



TAB A

Executive Branch Management Scorecard

	Current Status as of December 31, 2003					Progress in Implementing the President's Management Agenda				
	Human Capital	Competitive Sourcing	Financial Perf	E-Gov	Budget/Perf Integration	Human Capital	Competitive Sourcing	Financial Perf	E-Gov	Budget/Perf Integration
AGRICULTURE	●	○	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●
COMMERCE	○	○	●	○	○	●	○	●	●	●
DEFENSE	○	○	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●
EDUCATION	○	○	● [↑]	○	●	●	●	●	●	●
ENERGY	○	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	●
EPA	●	●	●	○	○	●	●	●	●	●
HHS	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○
HOMELAND	●	○ [↑]	●	●	●	○	●	●	○	●
HUD	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	●
INTERIOR	●	○	●	●	●	○	●	○	○	○
JUSTICE	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●
LABOR	○	●	○	○	○	●	○	●	●	●
STATE	○	●	○	○	○	●	○	●	●	●
DOT	○	○	●	○ [↑]	○	●	●	●	●	●
TREASURY	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	●
VA	●	●	●	○	○	○	●	●	●	●
AID	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●
CORPS	○	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	○
GSA	○ [↑]	○	● [↓]	●	○	●	●	●	○	●
NASA	● [↑]	○ [↑]	●	○ [↑]	○ [↑]	●	●	○	●	○
NSF	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	○
OMB	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○
OPM	○	○	○	○ [↑]	○ [↑]	●	●	●	●	●
SBA	○	○ [↑]	●	○	○	●	●	○	●	●
SMITHSONIAN	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○
SSA	○	●	●	○	○	●	●	●	●	●

↑ ↓ Arrows indicate change in status since evaluation on September 30, 2003

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Executive Branch Management Scorecard

	Status as of September 30, 2001					Status as of December 31, 2002				
	Human Capital	Competitive Sourcing	Financial Perf	E-Gov	Budget/Perf Integration	Human Capital	Competitive Sourcing	Financial Perf	E-Gov	Budget/Perf Integration
AGRICULTURE	●	●	●	○	●	m	●	●	○	●
COMMERCE	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	○	○
DEFENSE	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	●	○
EDUCATION	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	●
ENERGY	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	○	●
EPA	●	●	●	○	○	●	●	○	○	○
HHS	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●
HOMELAND						4	●	●	●	●
HUD	D	m	m	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
INTERIOR	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
JUSTICE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
LABOR	○	m	●	○	●	○	●	○	○	○
STATE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
DOT	●	●	●	●	○	m	●	●	●	○
TREASURY	m	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
VA	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○
AID	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
CORPS	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
GSA	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
NASA	●	●	○	●	●	○	●	●	●	○
NSF	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●
OMB	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
OPM	○	●	●	○	●	○	●	○	○	●
SBA	●	●	○	○	○	●	●	●	○	○
SMITHSONIAN	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	○	●
SSA	○	●	○	○	●	○	●	○	○	○

Program Initiatives Scorecard



	Current Status	Progress in Implementation
Faith-Based and Community Initiative:		
• Agriculture	●	●
• Education	○	●
• HHS	○	●
• HUD	○	●
• Justice	○	●
• Labor	○	●
• AID	●	○
Privatization of Military Housing	○	●
Better R&D Investment Criteria	●	○
Elimination of Fraud and Error in Student Aid Programs and Deficiencies in Financial Management	○	●
Housing and Urban Development Management and Performance	●	●
Broadening Health Insurance Coverage Through State Initiatives	○	●
A "Right-Sized" Overseas Presence	●	●
Coordination of VA and DoD Programs and Systems	○	●

TAB B

**President's Management Agenda
Department of Defense**

Initiative	Current Status (As of December 31, 2003)	Progress in Implementing the President's Management Agenda	Comments
<p>Human Capital</p> <p>Agency Lead: Dr. David S.C. Chu</p> <p>Gail McGinn Ellen Tunstall</p> <p>Lead RMO Examiner: Janiie Price- O'Donnell</p> <p>OPM IIC Officer: Jennifer Hopkins</p>	<p align="center">Yellow</p> <p>Comprehensive human capital plan ✓ developed, etc. on 04/02 ✓ results analyzed & used on 09/03</p> <p>Organizational structures ✓ current structure analyzed and restructuring begun on 02/02 ✓ structure optimized & process in place to address future challenges on 09/03</p> <p>Succession strategies ✓ implemented on 06/02 (DLAMP) ✓ continuously updated talent pool assured by 07/04</p> <p>Performance appraisal plans link, differentiate, and provide consequences for ✓ SES & mgrs. on 06/02 60%+ of agency on 07/04</p> <p>Under representation ✓ implemented strategies to address on 06/02 reduced & established process to sustain diversity on 07/04</p> <p>Skill gaps ✓ workforce planning system implemented on 07/01 updated annually signif. reduced in mission critical gaps on 07/04</p> <p>Accountability system ✓ system developed 04/02 used to make decisions on 07/04</p> <p>Next ↑ est. by FY 2004, Q3</p>	<p align="center">Green</p> <p>Actions Taken Since September 30, 2003</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provided revised "Proud to Be" document with sufficient supporting data in the correct format • Developed Defense Business Fellowship Program • Completed development of funding strategy for marketing DoD as a "first choice" employer • Published program assistance package to promote a diverse and representative workforce • Promoted diversity in providing developmental opportunities to employees • Reported on FY 2003 diversity goals (hiring employees with disabilities) • Updated annual Workforce Planning Analysis Chart (due 12/03) • Updated Restructuring Plan (done every 6 months) <p>Planned Actions for 02 FY 2004</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide report on adequacy of resources to support FY 2006 budget ((raining and professional development) • Provide metric/calculation to use to develop civilian personnel compensation estimates under NSPS • Provide report on review of recruitment programs • Provide report on legislation and strategy for staffing mission-critical occupations • Provide analysis of data from Components on Time to Fill metric 	<p>In order to stay on track to meet Proud to Be Goals, DoD must demonstrate results with qualitative and quantitative evidence of the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Demonstrate an implemented SES and performance management system for at least 60% of the workforce which links to the agencies strategic goals, differentiates between performance levels, and provides positive and negative consequences based on performance; 2. Demonstrate the use and success of succession strategies; 3. Demonstrate a diverse workforce and the use of diversity strategies that are successful in reducing under representation in mission critical occupations and its leadership ranks; 4. Identify its mission critical occupations and skill gaps and demonstrate how it has significantly reduced the gaps; and 5. Demonstrate how its accountability system is used to make decisions and drive results. <p>DoD remains GREEN in status because:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoD implemented a Civilian FIR Strategic Plan for FY2002 to FY2008. • Each FY, Components meet to discuss the results of past objectives and determine future objectives/milestones to accomplish. • On Nov. 24, 2003, the President signed legislation to authorize a new HR system. OPM will work closely with DoD to implement new regulations. • DoD will meet with Components in January/February to determine objectives/milestones to accomplish.

**President's Management Agenda
Department of Defense**

<p>Competitive Sourcing</p> <p>DoD Leads: Dov Kakhejm Rag DuBois Mike Wynne</p> <p>Lead RMO Examiner: Bill McQuaid x53657</p> <p>Lead OFPP Analyst: Matt Blum</p>	<p align="center"> Yellow</p> <p align="center">Next ↑ est. by (12/04)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Approved competition plan ✓ "yellow" plan on <u> </u> (8/03) <u> </u> ✓ "green" plan will be submitted in FY 2005 Budget Standard competitions ✓ completed 16 standard cost comparisons during Q4 FY 2004 <u> </u> announced in accordance with "green" plan schedule <u> </u> NA <u> </u> <u> </u> in the past year completed ≥ 90% in 12 months or less <u> </u> NA <u> </u> Standard and streamlined competes ✓ at least 10 completed since January 2001. DoD has completed 270 competitions since January 2001. None under the revised Circular. Streamlined competitions completed in 90 days or less ≥ 75% during the past 2 quarters <u> </u> (date) <u> </u> <u> </u> ? 95% during the past year on <u> </u> (date) <u> </u> ✓ 10% of announced standard and streamlined competitions cancelled <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 0 in past two quarters 4-9, 2003 1 in past year 2002 of 21 announced competitions Commercial activities exempt from competition ✓ OMB approved all categories for justification on <u> </u> 12/29/2003. OMB's FAIR letter accepted DoD's inventory 	<p align="center"> Green</p>	<p><u>Actions Taken Since September 30, 2003</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> OMB's DoD Passback requested that the Business Improvement Council (BIC) 226,000 position goal be budgeted for in 05 Budgets and FYDP of the Military Services and Defense Agencies by 2009. Comptroller issued a data call to provide the data requested in the Passback. Only plans using (1) the revised A-76 Circular, (2) OMB-approved Pioneer Projects, and (3) military conversions will be accepted; Strategic Sourcing and other re-engineering projects will <u>not</u> be permitted in meeting the OMB/BIC goals. Comptroller has signed a Program Budget Decisions (PRD) to ensure that the Military Services and Defense Agencies do budget for the BIC position goal. The Comptroller will use this PBD process to correct any problems with the components' budgets by going to the Deputy Secretary. <p><u>Planned Actions for Q1 FY 2004</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Track and review execution and savings for DoD's existing, ongoing competitive sourcing program. Continue to track the development of DoD guidance on revised A-76 circular. Continue to participate closely in the PBD process for competing the BIC 226,000 position goal through the FY 2005/FYDP budget process. Audit component budgets for A-76 reviews. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Since DoD has completed competitions for 17% of the FAIR inventory, OMB maintains DoD's "Status" at Yellow. The decline in new announcements has raised questions about DoD attaining the DoD/BIC 226,000 position goal, but the PBD process is reversing that issue. The DoD Leads are ensuring that this decline in starts is replaced with significant increases in planned announcements across all components through the PBD process. OMB and DoD have agreed that the FY 2005 budget is detailing how the Military Services and Defense Agencies will meet the BIC 226,000 FTE goal in the new PBD. Now that the Military Services and Defense Agencies have aligned their plans and allocated budget and other resources necessary to implement FY 2005-9 targets to meet the BIC's 226,000 FTE goal in the PBD process, OMB has changed the rating to Green on Progress in the FY 2005 Budget. <p>To get to Green on Status, each Military Service and Defense Agency would need to have policy, infrastructure and other resources in place, and be actively announcing significant numbers of competitions under the revised A-76 circular to reach the BIC goals consistent with the approved PRD.</p>
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**President's Management Agenda
Department of Defense**

<p>Financial Performance</p> <p>Agency Lead: Dr. Dov Zakheim</p> <p>Lead RMO Examiner: Shannon Stuart</p> <p>Lead OFEM Analyst: Jean Holcombe</p>	<p align="center">●</p> <p align="center">Red</p> <p align="center">Next ↑ est. by 2007</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Audit opinion on annual statements disclaimed as of 2002 qualified clean in 2007 • Meets financial reporting deadlines As of 2003 • FFMIA compliance reported in 2007 • Accurate financial info on demand/used for day to day management does one OK other does BOTH in 2007 • No chronic or significant Anti-Deficiency Act Violations as of 2007 • Material auditor-reported internal control weaknesses as of 13 repeat new none in 2007 • No material non-compliance with laws or regulations as of 2007 • No material weaknesses in FFMIA reported in 2007 70 for Section 2 in 2002 1. for Section 4 	<p align="center">●</p> <p align="center">Green</p>	<p>Actions Taken Since Sept 30, 2003</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Progressed toward "proud to be" goals (see right) • Improved timeliness/reliability of execution reporting for major on-going operations. • The Secretary of Defense reporting that 2 of 13 material auditor-reported internal control weaknesses will be eliminated (problem disbursements, health care liability) • Made good progress on Business Management Modernization Program (BMMMP) planning and implementation. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Began business process modeling efforts ➢ Developed high level milestones, schedules for BMMMP Increment 1 ➢ Identified content for Incr. 2 & 3 ➢ Developing BMMMP performance goals ➢ Started portfolio management reviews (Logistics domain) <p>Planned Actions for Q2 FY 2004</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Report reliable execution data for major on-going overseas operations within 45 days • Assess Component plans and integrate into department-wide plan for getting a clean opinion • Complete review and analysis of Anti Deficiency Act (ADA) reporting process • Develop management guidance for environmental restoration liabilities • Define process for selecting and controlling business system investments <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Issue portfolio management instructions • Conduct portfolio management reviews for remaining domains • Continue BMMMP implementation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Develop detailed schedule and milestones for the first phase of Increment 1. ➢ Establish performance targets and establish performance measurement capability ➢ Define accounting rules/ Incr. 1 requirements 	<p>Proud to be</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting financial reporting deadlines • Components submitted detailed plans for getting to a clean audit opinion • DoD estimates that 25 FFMIA weaknesses will be resolved in FY2004. • Good progress on financial operations metrics • Working with Components to reduce ADA violations and erroneous payments • DoD and OMB management attention needed to assure continued progress BMMMP financial systems improvement effort. <p>RMMP</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoD will implement BMMMP in increments. Increment One (14 segments on critical path to clean opinion) will be complete in 2007 • DoD is taking constructive steps to meet the challenge of architecture implementation, but significant work remains. DoJ still needs to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Develop a strategy for transitioning the functions of the 2,274 legacy business systems ➢ Provide updated BMMMP business case ➢ Articulate specific plans for each functional domain and show linkages to overall BMMMP effort ➢ Fully implement new portfolio management processes to affect Component's FY2006 program/ budget build • Critical RMMP milestones occur in Q3 FY04: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Developing "master plan" with more detailed schedules and milestones for Increment 1 ➢ Completing Increment One business process modeling April 04 ➢ Conducting Increment One Analysis of Alternatives <p>Other critical future actions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Pilot for reporting mid-year status of FFMIA corrective actions (Q3 FY04)
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**President's Management Agenda
Department of Defense**

<p>E-Government</p> <p>Agency Lead:</p> <p>John Stenbit DoD CIO</p> <p>Lead HMO Examiner:</p> <p>Andrew McIlroy</p> <p>Lead IT/E-Gov Analyst:</p> <p>Dave Muzio</p>	<p align="center">●</p> <p align="center">Red</p> <p align="center">Next ↑ est. by Sept 2004</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has Modernization Blueprint that focuses IT investments (<i>DoD's Business Enterprise Architecture, BEA</i>) ✓ on May 2003 • Acceptable business cases for major systems ✓ for more than 50% in Aug 2003 (based on FY 2004 business cases) ✓ for all in Dec 2003 (based on FY 2005 business cases) • Cost/schedule/performance adherence ✓ overruns and shortfalls less than 30% in 2002 (for Major Automated Information Systems, MAIS) • Security of operational IT systems ✓ 80% of systems are certified and accredited. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ DoD currently reviews only a sample of systems. A complete review of all systems will not be completed until summer 2004 • Inspector General verifies there is a Department-wide Plan of Action and Milestone remediation process (IG report to be submitted in March 2004). <p>E-Gov participation and contributions ✓ 3 of 4 categories (achieved in May 2003 and continuing in FY 2004)</p>	<p align="center">●</p> <p align="center">Green</p>	<p><u>Actions Taken Since Sept. 30, 2003</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Submitted 162 business cases for FY 2005, with all 162 rated as acceptable, although 107 remain on the management watchlist: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ 36 for low total scores (a 3 overall) ➢ 27 for low security scores (1, 2 or 3 in security) ➢ 44 for both low total scores and low security scores (3 overall and 1, 2, or 3 in security) • Submitted additional information on low security scores and a plan of action for improving business cases with low security scores. • Conducted logistics business domain portfolio review, a first step towards full implementation of the Business Systems Modernization domain portfolio review concept. • Developed high-level milestones and schedules for the Business Management Modernization Program Increment (BMMP) One; identified content and schedules for remaining increments. • Submitted FISMA report for 2003 <p><u>Planned Actions for Q2 FY 2004</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish MOUs for FY 2004 E-Gov initiatives. • Submit revised Exhibit 300s • Inspector General to submit IG section of Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) report to OMB, which was due on October 1, 2003. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In general, DoD is meeting its Proud to He goals and milestones. Specifically it submitted improved business cases, and it is moving forward with architecture efforts, and strengthening its IT security program. • DoD will submit regular reports on the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) • The Department should demonstrate how the GIG architecture and the BMMP Architecture are integrated. • DoD is taking constructive steps to meet the challenge of architecture implementation, but significant work remains. DoD still needs to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Develop a strategy for transitioning the functions of the 2,274 legacy business systems ➢ Provide updated BMMP business case ➢ Articulate specific plans for each functional domain and show linkages to overall BMMP effort ➢ Fully implement new portfolio management processes to affect Component's FY2006 program/budget build • DoD can improve its status to Yellow if 80% of IT systems are properly secured based on a full count of all systems or the IG verifies there is a plan of action and milestones. • In addition, DoD should implement the requirement for an Earned Value Management System (BVMS) on the Development and Modernization portions of major investments.
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**President's Management Agenda
Department of Defense**

<p>Budget & Performance Integration</p> <p>DoD Leads: David Chu, Ken Krieg and Dov Zakheim</p> <p>Lead RMO Examiner: Bill McQuaid x53657</p>	<p align="center">Yellow</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Performance info used to make decisions, at least quarterly <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ some major areas (12/02) ___ all major areas Q1 2006 ___ • Strategic and annual plans <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ limited # of goals & use PART measures on FY 2005 Budget ___ AND focus on info used in senior mgmt. report 1012003 ADR • Performance appraisal plans link, differentiate, provide consequences for SES & mgrs. (date) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ ANI for ≥60% of agency FY 2005 • Cost of achieving performance goals <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ full cost reported on Q1 FY 2004 AND marginal cost reported on will strive to identify ___ • At least one efficiency measure per program <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ for ≥50% of PARTed programs on FY 2004 Budget • ___ For all programs on Q1 2006 ___ • Use of PART ratings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ to justify requests, etc. and ≤ RND for more than 2 yrs. in row FY 2004 Budget justify requests, etc., direct improvements, and < 10% RND for more than 2 yrs. in row Q1 2006 • DoD's performance/budget metrics have been incorporated into the Balanced Risk Scorecards, Annual Defense Report (ADR), and to some degree, Congressional Justifications. • RND for more than 2 yrs. in row Q1 2006 <p>DoD's performance/budget metrics have been incorporated into the Balanced Risk Scorecards, Annual Defense Report (ADR), and to some degree, Congressional Justifications.</p>	<p align="center">Green</p>	<p>Actions Taken Since September 30, 03</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoD's Comptroller is implementing a Program, Planning, and Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) system to replace the old PPBS program. PPBE formulates a two-year program and budget, and uses the off-year to focus on program performance and execution. • The Annual Defense Report (ADR) was published which reflects the Secretary's Instrument Panel metrics and the Balanced Risk Scorecards that are being devolved to the Military Services and Defense Agencies. • Comptroller proposed Operations for the next PART which will cover 30% of the budget for a total of 70% by next year. • A Comptroller-directed inter-Service-Agency working group is developing and improving performance measures by budget activity. The program and budget reviews are being combined with more emphasis on performance. <p>Planned Actions for Q2 FY 2004</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The PARTS and other performance measures will be mapped in the justification material to highlight usage. • the Operations PART will be cascaded to all DoD components early next year. • DoD and OMB will jointly evaluate the Operations PART for an additional 30% of the budget, ensuring that at least 70% of its funding is linked to program performance metrics. <p>The next ADR will report on performance metrics by March 1, 2004.</p>	<p>DoD has incorporated performance information into a published Secretary's Annual Defense Report. This ADR balances risks among the defense goals competing for DoD's limited budget resources for the first time.</p> <p>DoD's effort to develop performance metrics for use in the FY 2005 budget is much more detailed in the financial management area than anywhere else. DoD is working with OMB to define measures in many other areas including acquisition.</p> <p>OMB is working with DoD's Comptroller to review its planning and resource allocation processes to link strategically military requirements and acquisition decisions to program, performance and budget development.</p> <p>DoD is making significant improvements in linking performance and budget information in the Budget and Congressional Justifications.</p> <p>OMB has continued the Green for Progress and Yellow for Status in this Scorecard. The DoD Leads need to continue to jointly work together to fully integrate performance and budget.</p> <p>To move to Green in the FY 2006 Budget process, DoD should meet the standards and fully integrate DoD's PARTs with the ADR and Congressional Justifications. To maintain the Green on Status after that, DoD should align budget information with missions, functional accounts and activities.</p>
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March 2, 2004

IRAQ

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Dov Zakheim
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*

SUBJECT: Stress on Equipment

It seems to me that a Supplemental is to replace things that happen in a war. If there is additional stress on the equipment during a war, then that ought to be replaceable. If there is lost equipment, it ought to be replaceable. This memo from Dov Zakheim is worrisome to me.

Please come up with an appropriate approach, and then a draft memo from me to OMB to get this handled in the proper way.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/26/04 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Stress on Equipment (OSD #02925-04)

DHR:dh
030204-12

.....
Please respond by 3/19/04

2 MAR 04

2/27
1330

3/2



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2004 FEB 27 AM 9:38

February 26, 2004, 3:00 PM

COMPTROLLER

TY DJ PM
3/1

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Stress on Equipment

- You asked how we plan to deal with stress on our equipment in Iraq in the context of past and future requests for Supplemental funding.
- It is certainly true that when we use equipment at a faster rate for a sustained time, we must budget to replace the equipment earlier than anticipated. It is sometimes difficult to get Supplemental funding for this effort. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) often considers Supplemental funding to be reserved for immediate operational needs. In OMB's view, replacement of equipment, because of its longer lead time, can be budgeted for in normal appropriations requests.
- Last summer, we examined what equipment was lost in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, and allocated funding in the Supplemental to facilitate "re-setting the force," to ensure that military forces would be ready for new combat situations. In the fiscal year (FY) 2003 and FY 2004 Supplementals, \$4.3 billion was provided for reconstitution of equipment, and another \$5.2 billion was allocated for depot maintenance.
- Ken Krieg plans to take the lead on the study you suggest on stress on equipment caused by high optempo over sustained time periods. His office is developing the guidelines for the study and plans to involve the Military Departments and the Joint Staff in this effort. I will also participate and provide analysts to assist. This study will prove invaluable in helping the Department make its case for Supplemental funding to support investment needs.

RECOMMENDATION: None

Prepared By: John Roth, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	2/29
SR MA CRAWFORD	3/1
MA BOSTON ROSENBERG	3/1
EXECUTIVE MARGOTT	2/27
OSD 02925 04	

March 2, 2004

326

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Use of Reserve Components

Please take a look at the attached memo from David Chu on the use of reserve components, and let's talk about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
 2/19/04 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef [OSD#02515-04]
 2/8/04 SecDef memo to USD(P&R) [020804-55]

DHR:dh
 030104-94

.....
 Please respond by 3/19/04

2404



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

7 ✓
3/1

INFO MEMO

February 19, 2004, 4:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chiu, USD(P&R)

David S. C. Chiu 19 Feb 04

SUBJECT: Frequency of Using Reserve Components - SNOWFLAKE

- In your July 9, 2003, memo you had indicated a planning factor of not involuntarily calling up Reserve members more than one year out of every six. Our recommendation to you reflected a judgment as to what might be sustainable. As is evident, it implies approximately three years active service in a 20-year service career.
- Though there has been some discussion regarding flexibility in implementing this guidance, it has been widely reported and is generally accepted as approximately right by the Military Departments and Reserve Components.
- What really counts is what Reservists think. Reserve member expectation management is critical.
- We are undertaking an evidentiary process using survey research, empirical data, and modeling to determine the effect of activation on recruiting and retention-- some results are expected this year. In our April status of forces surveys we will ask about the frequency of call up, which will give us a better basis for judging the appropriateness of one in six.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Kohner, OASD/RA(M&P),

(b)(6)

ASSISTANT DIR JTA	
EXCISE REPORTS	2/20
EXCISE REPORTS	2/20

OSD 02515-04



February 8, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Frequency of Using Reserve Components

We need to think through and decide how often we want to use the Reserve components. Is it 1 in 50 years, as is the case with a great many of them, or is it 1 in 10 or 1 in 7?

We need to understand it and then recruit, attract and retain people based on whatever it is we think makes sense.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-35

.....
Please respond by

2/18/04

✓
3/1

OSD 02515-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25722

EF-8670

03/12

In reply refer to EF-8670 & 04/002892

March 2, 2004

TU: Ken Krieg
Andy Hoehn
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gordon England

SUBJECT: Long-Term Costs

Gordon England mentioned that DoD could end up like Bethlehem Steel because we have too many employees, too much healthcare and too much retirement, and that the weight of all of that over time will collapse us.

He also mentioned that David Chu is addressing the issue on the military side, but no one is addressing it on the civilian side.

Why don't we get Gordon England to put some structure into this problem and come up with a proposal as to how we could do the preparatory work, with an eye towards eventually ending up with a SLRG.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030104-96

✓ 3/12

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

SecDef:

I have discussed the idea with Ken Krieg. He and Gordon England will tackle the issue. I will provide support as they need it.

Andy Hoehn
Andy Hoehn

2 MAR 04

OSD 10932-04

March 2, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Realignment of Troops

320.2

Please set up a meeting for me to discuss realigning troops, probably with Feith and Hoehn.

I want to talk about some downsizing in Europe and South Korea, possibly leaving some in CENTCOM. We ought to address the Air Force, as well.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030204-26

.....
Please respond by 3/19/04

✓
3/4

SecDef -
Scheduled for Monday,
8 March, 10:45-11:30

3/4

2 MAR 04

March 1, 2004

711

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 Jim Haynes
 LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Relationship to Homeland Security Council

334 HSC

You mentioned to me you wanted to change your relationship to the Homeland Security Council.

Please describe for me what you think that relationship should be, and compare it to what it is now.

Also, how does what you think your Homeland Security Council role should be compare with your relationship to the National Security Council?

Shanks.

DIR db
030104 S

.....
Please respond by 3/19/04

That is correct
closed
C 3/4

March 04

OSD 10934-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25725

Received 0955/ WR 21 2004

Deputy EA W EA W

CJCS Decision:

Memo for my Signature

Will answer at Roundtable:

Give me verbal response OPSE

Give me e-mail response W

Give me 5x8 / slide etc. Roundtable

Send to Staff for Info 3/2

No Reply Required

Copy to: JS

CJCS HASSEEN

MAR 02 2004

March 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Funding Army's New Force Structure Plan

I find this memo from Dov Zakheim unclear, and I need a meeting on it.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/10/04 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Funding Status on the Army's New Force Structure Plan
(OSD #01977-04)

DHR:dh
030104-59

.....
Please respond by 3/12/04

3092

1 Mar 04

2/11
1200

02/11

✓
3/11



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 100
INFO MEMO

COMPTROLLER

February 10, 2004, 2:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

*MTK
vnd
ed*

SUBJECT: Funding Status on the Army's New Force Structure Plan

- You asked for the latest funding status on the Army's new force structure plan.
 - **FY 2004 Execution Plan:** As the 82ABN, 10th ID, and 31D return from deployment next month and begin the reconstitution process, the over strength in these units (i.e., the personnel that exceed their authorized end strength) will be used to stand-up three new Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). The Army will complete one full brigade and begin to stand-up two more in FY 2004. The cost estimate is approximately \$600 million.
 - We currently have over \$300 million on withhold in the Operation and Maintenance, Army appropriation that is not currently needed for purposes requested in the supplemental. Our plan is to release these funds to help finance the Army's new force structure plan.
 - During the upcoming OUSD(Comptroller)'s Midyear Execution Review, we will address the remaining shortfall of \$300 million, which will compete with other funding needs identified to date (totaling over \$2.5 billion) related directly to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (e.g., higher than expected Operating Tempo, transportation, and Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) costs).
 - **FY 2005 Funding Plan:** The cost estimate for the full stand-up of four (completing two from FY 2004 and two new BCTs in FY 2005) and partial stand-up of one BCT is approximately \$1.6 to \$2.2 billion. DoD supports including these costs in the FY 2005 supplemental request for OEF and OIF.
 - **FY 2006 Funding Plan:** The cost estimate for FY 2006 is nearly \$3 billion. The funding for FY 2006 and beyond will be addressed during the FY 2006 - 2011 Program and Budget Review.
- A talking point paper (TAB A) is also attached summarizing the funding status on the Army's new force structure plan.
- We will continue to work with the Army to address the funding issues during the upcoming FY 2004 Midyear Execution Review and the FY 2006 - 2011 Program and Budget Review.

COORDINATION: See attached. (TAB B)

Prepared By: John M. Evans, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>[Signature]</i>
SR MA CRADDOCK	<i>[Signature]</i>
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	2/11

11-L-0559/OSD/25728

OSD 01977-04

Funding Status on the Army's New Force Structure Plan

Overview:

- What follows is a coordinated strategy from USD(C), OMB, and the Department of the Army.
- As the Army returns divisions from Iraq, they will be reorganized to create new Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) within each division.
- The Army will staff these new brigades with additional personnel that exceed the current authorized level and transfers from other units.

FY 2004 Funding Plan

- The Army will complete one full BCT and begin standing up two more in FY 2004.
- The cost estimate is \$600 million.
 - The DoD has \$300 million, currently not needed for purposes requested in the supplemental, that could be used for this requirement.
 - USD(C) will address the remaining \$300 million at the midyear execution review. However, this will have to compete with other critical funding needs that have been identified (totaling over \$2.5 billion).

FY 2005 Funding Plan

- The Army will stand-up three more BCTs in FY 2005.
- The cost is approximately \$1.6 to \$2.2 billion.
- DoD supports including these costs in an FY 2005 supplemental request.

FY 2006 Funding Plan

- The cost for FY 2006 is nearly \$3 billion and will be addressed during the FY 2006 – FY 2011 Program and Budget Review.

Coordination: Army FM (MG Hartsell), OMB (Ms. Peroff)

Prepared by: John M. Evans, (b)(6)

COORDINATION PAGE

OMB	Ms. Peroff	Feb. 10,2004
Army Budget	MG Hartsell	Feb. 9,2004

TAB B



7700
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

June 24, 2004, 9:00AM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE **JUL 19 2004**
(PERSONNEL & READINESS) (signed by Dr. Chu, see attached)

SUBJECT: State Solutions for Educational Issues of Military Children - Snowflake

- I met with Senator Alexander, and we testified at his field hearing on this issue. The most common concern of military parents is the lack of a recognized state history course for graduation from the receiving school.
- The DoD has several programs in place to promote state reciprocity and legislation:
 1. DoD representatives are personally contacting each state department of education.
 2. **The DoD Promising Practices Program** identifies state & local outstanding programs that solve education issues for the military child.
 3. **The DoD Consortium of Highly-Impacted States** will meet Fall of 2004 to address educational issues of the military child in transition and deployment. Georgia House Bill 1190 Section 2 will be highlighted for replication: "The State Board of Education is authorized to provide for exemptions to the required course of study in the history of Georgia and the Georgia Constitution for transfer students, including students whose parents serve in the Armed Forces of the US."
 4. **Five DoD Regional Quality of Life Coordinators** are being sent to heavily-impacted states to work full-time with governors, legislators, State Departments of Education and school districts to address education concerns of military families.
 - Their mission is to facilitate legislation and reciprocity and improve educational opportunities and quality education for military children. They will also address other military quality of life issues.
 - Selectees are highly-skilled educational leaders familiar with the needs of the military child.

RECOMMENDATION: For information only.

Attachments: As stated

PREPARED BY: Dr. Jean Silvernail, ODUSD(MC&FP), (b)(6)





UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

June 24, 2004, 9:00AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(PERSONNEL & READINESS) *David S. C. Chu - 19 June 04*

SUBJECT: State Solutions for Educational Issues of Military Children - Snowflake

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 - Selectees are highly-skilled educational leaders familiar with the needs of the military child.

RECOMMENDATION: For information only.

Attachments: As stated

PREPARED BY: Dr. Jean Silvernail, ODUSD(MC&FP),

(b)(6)



5/12/04

May 12, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: State Reciprocity for Military

Senator Lamar Alexander and Saxby Chambliss are both eager to be helpful to try to tie military families into state reciprocity.

We should get a program going to do that, and I would like you to keep me posted on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051204-10

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

5/12/04

May 12, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: State Reciprocity for Military

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Thanks.

DHR:dh
051204-10

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

350

12 M
04

March 1, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
 Doug Feith

CC: Larry Di Rita
 LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Economic Issues in Iraq

Iraq

Attached is a letter I received from Art Laffer with some suggestions on Iraq.

Let's set up a meeting and discuss them.

Thanks.

Attach.
 2/18/04 Laffer e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
 030104-62

.....
 Please respond by 3/12/04

OB
3/2

1 MAR 04

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

✓
3/1

-----Original Message-----

From: Jax Schluenderberg [mailto:jax@laffer.com]
Sent: Wednesday, February 18, 2004 1:35 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Letter From Dr. Arthur Laffer

cc: L. D. Pita
LTG Craddock

6

February 18, 2004

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don,

Last week I was invited by a group of your finest (Marine officers) to a seminar at Camp Pendleton, which is only a few miles north of where I live. These guys are great and have been assigned to a variety of tasks involved in the transition of Iraq from an occupied, economically dependent territory to a self-governing economically independent country. They have their work cut out for them under the best of circumstances. Why I'm writing to you, however, is because I was led to believe both from written material and during the course of our conversations that these tasks are facing additional potentially insurmountable obstacles placed in their way by the Coalition Provisional Authority and other directives coming from the U.S.

Because of my experience with the domestic economy of Vietnam in the 1970-1974 period under George Schultz and my work on a post-Castro transition plan for Cuba with the Cuban American National Foundation, when it was ably led by Jorge Mas Canosa (who passed away five years ago), I thought you might be interested in my two-cents worth (which has been discounted even below two cents). Rather than criticizing what I may not have fully understood of the Bremer and CPA plans, I've limited myself to what I consider essential do's and don'ts for creating an economically viable society out of a war-ravaged former totalitarian state.

- A. Perhaps the most significant obstacle to reestablishing markets is the absence of a viable stable-valued means of payment and store of value (currency). To foster economic interchange, merchants, workers, savers and investors need a currency they can count on both over time and across space. This currency has to be stable in value over time to satisfy the needs of small savers, and to provide a basis for contracts and it has to be readily acceptable everywhere both inside and outside the region to facilitate trade and investment flows.

I can't begin to tell you how depressing it was to the local economy of Mexico in 1976 when the peso started to collapse after having been stable for years and years. Likewise, Argentina's recent abandonment of the currency peg (under de la Rúa) and the subsequent financial collapse is a tragedy of immense proportions. Our own return to dollar credulity in the late 1970s and early 1980s under Paul Volcker and Ronald Reagan was the *sine qua non* of America's renaissance. Time and again countries are forced to relearn the powerful dictum of a sound money.

Iraq does not have the ability nor does it have powerful enough political institutions to pursue, maintain and monitor its own currency *de novo*. Iraq, if it is to have its own currency at all, must have that currency immutably linked to the dollar or euro. My personal suggestion would be to use either euros or dollars as the domestic currency of

Iraq and don't even pretend to introduce a new Iraqi currency. Panama is dollarized literally, and lots of other countries are dollarized *de facto*, and the system works extremely well.

Attempting to set up a new currency puts at risk the entire Iraqi rehabilitation effort and could, if bad enough, force the lower echelons of the Iraqi economy into barter. Barter is inefficient, inconvenient and costly, and will materially impede the type of economic progress we all hope for. The upper levels will always be able to take advantage of foreign currencies.

- B. Also of exceptional importance for a new Iraqi government is the structure of fiscal policy (taxation, spending and the issuance of debt) at the national and provincial levels.

In countries like Iraq where financial markets are years and years away from sophistication, there is a virtual certainty that budget deficits will lead to overuse of the printing press and hyperinflation. Budget deficits also can lead to excessively high tax rates and widespread disregard and flouting of the laws. Therefore, clear and concise tax policy explicitly segregated between federal and provincial prerogatives is of the essence.

Iraq is extraordinarily fortunate to be blessed with oil. As such severance taxes on oil should be a mainstay for government revenues – severance taxes are about as efficient as taxes get. If set up correctly, a good system of oil severance taxes is effectively a tax on foreigners and should do the least damage to the domestic economy of any tax system I know. We have two states that use them extensively, Alaska and Wyoming. It also makes lots of sense to collect revenues on a comprehensive flat rate basis on imports. Any type of sin tax is also a good option because the economic damage the tax does is on the disfavored products. Also property taxes should be used at the provincial level – property and real estate are about the only items that can't escape local taxes by leaving. Any additional revenue supplements should be on a flat rate, broad-based, value added like tax.

Taxes that should be avoided are income taxes (especially progressive) and small taxes where the costs of collection approach or exceed the revenue actually collected. The keys to good tax policy are:

- i.) Tax those items most that can escape the least, and conversely tax those least that can easily escape. It makes no sense to tax something that then flees the jurisdiction, goes underground or stops working. You not only don't get the revenue, but you also lose the benefits of the productive services.
- ii.) Tax those things most that you least like (sin taxes). An additional benefit of sin taxes is that they do reduce the activity being taxed.
- iii.) Tax those things least where the collection costs are highest
- iv.) Broad based low rate taxes provide people with the least incentives to evade, avoid and otherwise not report taxable income and the least number of places where they can escape taxation.
- v.) Tax people fairly. People in like circumstances should have similar tax burdens. The perception of fairness is key to voluntary compliance.
- vi.) Make sure that taxation is not arbitrary or easily subject to discretionary changes. The power to tax in the wrong hands is an ugly weapon for exploitation.

- vii.) Lastly, collect only as much as you really need. Wasteful spending will always rise to the level of revenues.

These rules should help your efforts, if meticulously adhered to. Next to a bad money I know of nothing that will bring an economy to its knees faster than an unjust, inefficient, anti-growth, excessive system of taxation. This principal is universal.

On the spending side, priorities need to be set really quickly. In my view infrastructure is the first among equals such as: security (police), judiciary, water, electricity, telecommunications, roads, airports, hospitals and government itself. In the near term at least, school programs, women's issues, social redistribution and humanitarian projects are further down on the list. Once the economy is back on its feet there will be plenty of time to redress these wrongs. At the outset, government spending should be focused almost exclusively on getting the economy back on it's feet as quickly as possible. Without production there's nothing to redistribute. Feigning a big heart is often the quickest path to disaster. Iraq needs endemic production and government can be instrumental in achieving its goal.

- C. Forgiveness of debt owed by Iraq to foreign creditors can be enormously beneficial to Iraq if and only if Iraq has the infrastructure to take advantage of the additional resources financed by additional debt. If Iraq's incentive structure and system of self governance isn't well ranged, new debt to replace old debt is money down a rat hole. You really don't want to replace old bad loans with new bad loans. No one wins. Allowing Iraq to incur additional foreign debt obligations should only occur after Iraq's economy and government have been established. You're going to make lots of mistakes and will learn a lot from those mistakes. The smaller the scale of the initial operations, the less Iraq will have to pay for lessons learned. The less costly the mistakes from which you learn, the better off Iraq will be.
- D. Regulatory policy should be simple, small and fair. Laws should be basic and enforceable with quick and decisive action for violation. Having laws on the books that are not observed or actively disobeyed undermines the moral authority of all government. Keep regulations to a minimum, keep them simple and enforce them.
- E. Trade policy should be as open and as free as possible, restricting only those products which really cause harm (drugs, weapons, etc.). For revenue purposes you may want a low rate, broad-based tax on imports. It's interesting to note that for most of our country's history, tariffs provided the lion's share of our tax revenues. Tariffs plus an oil severance tax could well be the lion's share of future Iraqi tax revenues.
- Trade is often an area where privilege and corruption take root. Here more than anywhere is where Iraq needs transparency, simplicity and fairness.
- F. A lot of attention is being placed on the need to provide an adequate number of jobs for Iraq. And while jobs per se clearly are important, increasing employment and creating jobs is often a catch phrase standing in for increasing output. In truth Iraq needs additional output far more than it needs more jobs. Now in some cases these two phrases are synonymous, but they may not be interchangeable in Iraq. Make work projects and avoiding reform for fear of losing jobs are sure fire losers. At no time and nowhere is it more important to recognize the primacy of efficiency, output and productivity than it is now in Iraq.
- G. Special industries like banking, glass factories, construction companies, etc. should be left to the marketplace. I know they are important, but so does every business person in Iraq. Those businesses will grow on their own if they are profitable.

- H. Dismantling the former government and former military can be carried too far. Under Saddam Hussein there were no alternatives and therefore there are no substitutes waiting in the wings to take over the general functions of government and security. You do need an Iraqi presence to deal with, to support, and to nurture, in order for us to get out.
- I. Be very careful of U.S. quasi-governmental lobbying groups who see visions of sugarplums with each new contract with Iraq. These people rarely focus on what's good for the Iraqi people (or Americans for that matter) and yet they can wrap their desires in the full clothe of altruistic public interest.
- J. Don't expect Iraq or Iraqis to love us right away. Even though we have done an enormous amount for them, they still feel the intense pain of Saddam's vicious dictatorship and the ensuing war and will lash out at anyone near them. In due course, if we continue to behave honorably, they will come to appreciate all that we have done for them and they will respect us for all that we have sacrificed on their behalf.
- K. Our purpose for being in Iraq has absolutely nothing to do with our desire to develop a free-enterprise, pro-growth, democratic, capitalist nation. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was a threat to our way of life and as such we eliminated that threat. Anything additional we do for the Iraqi people is truly out of the goodness of our hearts, not out of guilt. No matter what anyone may say, you were 100% correct in the actions you took. You make me very proud to be an American.

Hope these points are of some value. You have done and are doing the best job ever. I dream and hope for you continued success.

Your Buddy,

Arthur B. Laffer

cc: Steven Bucci
Catherine Mainardi
Paul D. Wofowitz

Dr. Arthur B. Laffer
Laffer Associates
5405 Morehouse Drive, Suite 340
San Diego, California 92121

(b)(6)

EF-8644

March 1, 2004

I-04/002773

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Peace Corps and Afghanistan

Please find out why the Peace Corps cannot go into Afghanistan. They say it is too dangerous. My goodness, it is no more dangerous than Washington, DC.

What do we have to do to get that changed?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030104-33

.....
Please respond by 3/19/04

3/10
3/12
See Dyl -
Attached is letter
from Feith to
Grossman/State.

D. L. [Signature]

IMaroy

Larry Di Rita
3/11



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL
AFFAIRS (MARC GROSSMAN)

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *[Signature]* 7/2/04

SUBJECT: Peace Corps in Afghanistan

The situation in Afghanistan has improved markedly over the last two years. Non-governmental organizations operate nationwide, and much of the country is secure.

One key program missing from Afghanistan is the Peace Corps. In the past, the Peace Corps played an important role in the development of Afghanistan. In addition, the Peace Corps is seen as a measure of stability by investors and many in the international community.

I think it would be a good idea to stand up a Peace Corps office in Afghanistan immediately. I would be interested in your thoughts.

Thanks.



March 1, 2004

TO: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Statistics

I need a list of the number of people killed in action in World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, so far in Afghanistan and so far in Iraq.

104

I also want the number of people killed each year, by month, in the major cities of the world: Washington, Chicago, New York, Moscow, London, and Paris. I want their populations noted on that paper, please.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030104-16

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

OB
3/5

104



March 1, 2004

0605D

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Video from Afghanistan

I need to get a copy of the videotape of my speech to the police academy in Iraq. Melissa had a camera there the whole time. I would like to see the tape.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030104-21

.....
Please respond by 3/5/04

OB
3/16

1 MAR 04

March 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Article

Someone down there in your shop might find the attached article amusing. I was a midshipman on the USS Wisconsin when Admiral Zumwalt was a lieutenant commander and navigator when the ship pulled mooring and ran aground.

SEA 1

Thanks.

Attach.

Winkler, David F. "'Wisky' Aground," *Sea History* 92, Spring 2000, pp. 17-18.

DHR:dh
030104-29

.....
Please respond by _____

1 MAR 04

“Wisky” Aground: *Inter-Service Can-Do Saves the Day!*

by David F. Winkler, PhD

One of the US Navy’s most embarrassing episodes, the grounding of USS *Missouri* (BB-63) at Hampton Roads, Virginia, on 17 January 1950, led to the relief of the commander. In the mud off the Army Officers Club at Fortress Monroe, efforts over two weeks to free the historic battlewagon drew national attention. Having to live down this incident, the Navy could have faced even greater ridicule with the grounding of *Missouri*’s sister, USS *Wisconsin* (BB-64). This happened on the morning of 22 August 1951 in the Hudson River, overlooked by midtown New York—but actions taken by members of the Navy’s sister sea services saved *Wisconsin* from infamy.

Wisconsin had been decommissioned and placed in mothballs on 1 July 1948, then recommissioned on 3 March 1951 in response to the Korean War. “Wisky,” as she was affectionately known, had picked up 800 midshipmen at Norfolk, Virginia, for a trip to Halifax, Nova Scotia. Returning from Halifax on 21 August, *Wisconsin* passed through the Verrazano Narrows to moor in the Hudson River to give the crew some liberty before returning to Virginia.

The commanding officer was Captain Thomas Burrowes, USN. Joining Burrowes for the reactivation was Commander Charles H. Becker, who served as the executive officer. The navigator, Lieutenant Commander Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., was a more recent addition to the crew, having relieved the first navigator.

Burrowes, Becker and Zumwalt had hoped to have *Wisconsin* pier-side for the New York stay. However, the only space that could accommodate the 860-foot-long warship was occupied by the liner *Queen Mary*. The Port Authority did provide an option: a buoy moor in the Hudson River. This was acceptable to Burrowes’s immediate superior, Rear Admiral Clarence E. Olsen, Commander Battleship Cruiser Division Two (ComBatCruDiv Two). RADM Olsen wanted the “middies” to have some good liberty and the proximity to Times Square and the attractions of mid-Manhattan assured increased time on the beach. He directed Burrowes to accept the Port Authority’s proposal.

LCMs and tugs team up to keep the ship’s stern from swinging into the New Jersey shore. (Photos courtesy Naval Historical Center)

Zumwalt and Burrowes, however, were not convinced that the buoys could hold the pull of the massive battleship. Zumwalt sent an advance party out, and they confirmed the buoys were properly anchored to the bottom. Still Zumwalt felt uncomfortable. Burrowes agreed, and again requested an anchorage assignment. ComBatCruDiv Two responded: “Suggest you carry out previously directed orders.”

Accordingly, with the help of eight tugboats, *Wisconsin* latched herself to two buoys, one forward, one aft, headed downstream. At 1030, Captain Burrowes assumed duties as Senior Officer Present Afloat.

Captain Francis E. Blake, USMC, commander of the Marine Detachment, returning to the battleship from a stint at legal school, reported aboard at 1040. He spoke with several more experienced deck officers during the evening meal about the possible hazards of the current moor. In the meantime, Captain Burrowes departed to overnight ashore with friends and family.

After a hectic first day, all was quiet on the battleship on the evening of the 21st. When Capt. Blake assumed the watch as in-port Officer of the Deck on the aft quarterdeck, only boiler 6 remained on line to provide auxiliary steam. As dawn broke over Manhattan on the 22nd, the Junior Officer of the Deck (JOOD) told Blake that the anchor watch had reported the port chain securing the ship to Buoy A, the upstream buoy, to be under heavy strain. Blake directed the JOOD to have the duty boatswain inspect the forward, downstream moor, and within minutes,

received a report that the wires were taut. He sent his messenger to contact the duty commander and then called the XO’s stateroom to inform Becker. While talking to Becker, Blake received a report that the stern was swinging to starboard; a glance out the porthole confirmed the bad news. The upstream mooring was dragging!

Back on the aft quarterdeck, Blake ordered LCMs (landing craft) assigned to *Wisconsin* to take position on the starboard quarter and start pushing. Meanwhile, word spread through the messdecks that the ship was adrift. Many of the middies, bleary-eyed after liberty in the big city, treated the scuttlebutt with skepticism, until the squawk boxes announced “station the special sea detail” and called all hands topside to quarters. As the crew and middies streamed out to their mustering stations, the watch was shifted to the bridge. Blake remained on the aft quarterdeck while Zumwalt and Becker assessed the situation from above. At 0656, Zumwalt informed Becker that the stern was approaching shoal water. As the stern swung thirty degrees off center, the bridge team took every action they could conceive of. *Wisconsin*’s remaining boats were called away. Passing tugs and additional LCMs from the landing ship dock Lindenwafdr responded to signals for assistance. Down below, the engineers lit off boilers 1, 2 and 5. At 0705, with the forward moor, downstream, beginning to drag, the signalman sent up the international distress signal. Becker ordered the starboard anchor dropped. That helped to hold the bow, but at 0710, Zumwalt received sounding reports indicating that the





Wisconsin's skipper, Captain Burrowes, delivers his accolade to Marine Corps Captain Blake— whose prompt action saved the ship from damage, and her officers from humiliation.

stern had come into contact with the Hudson's muddy bottom. On a positive note, the grounding eased pressure on the forward, downstream moor.

The tide was low, with high tide scheduled at 1349. These tidal conditions bode well for refloating. Unfortunately, the engineers reported a slow loss of vacuum on turbo generators 5 and 6. Lacking circulating water due to the intakes resting on the mudflats, the engineers shut down the power plants at 0715. Power was lost throughout the ship.

By this time six tugboats had joined the gaggle of LCMs on the starboard quarter in a seemingly futile attempt to move 45,000 tons of steel. But these efforts kept the battleship from moving farther toward the New Jersey shore. Over on the New York shore, *Wisconsin's* gig headed toward the 79th Street pier to pick up Captain Burrowes and the chief engineer, Lieutenant Commander G. Gardner.

At 0727 a message was dispatched to the commander of Naval Base New York to "expedite" sending additional tugs and a pilot. With the after emergency diesel generator coming to life, lights throughout the ship began to flicker. However, attempts to restart generators 5 and 6 using circulating water cut in from the firemain failed and the lights again went out at 0755 when the after emergency diesel had to be shut down due to overheating.

By this time both Burrowes and Gardner had returned. Heading down into the darkening engineering spaces, the Chief Engineer found out that the feed water supply in fireroom three was running critically low. He approved the transfer of reserve feedwater from fireroom four so that boiler 6 could continue steaming. With electrical ventilation systems shut down, the heat below became nearly unbearable as the boilermen rotated in on five-minute shifts. Four men suffered heat exhaustion,

Up above, more tugs responded to *Wisconsin's* pleas for aid. And at 0844, the Coast Guard icebreaker W-91 took position on the starboard quarter and began pushing. The icebreaker's powerful thrust proved decisive. At 0855 the sounding of the depth of water aft, which had been reading 23 feet four inches, deepened to

25 feet. *Wisconsin's* stern began to swing back into the main channel of the Hudson. A few minutes later, lights and ventilation came on as the forward emergency diesel generated power to the main switchboard. Along the New Jersey Palisades, thousands watched the drama unfold.

Still, "Wisky" faced the predicament of being latched to two buoys, and there were concerns of fouling one of the battleship's four screws in the wires. Burrowes cut loose the wires from Buoy B, aft, and the port anchor chain latched to Buoy A and raised the starboard anchor to get underway. With a pilot aboard and tugs alongside to guide the way, *Wisconsin* tested her engines. At 1057 she was under her own power, making her way down to an anchorage at Gravesend Bay near Coney Island.

Aware of the calamity of the *Missouri* grounding and the subsequent investigations and hearings, Zumwalt began drafting a chronology of events leading to the grounding. He never got to send it. As he readied the message for transmission, a message arrived from ComBatCruDivTwo. Zumwalt recalled that Olsen wrote: "Regret the report of your incident but I am delighted to note there was no command error involved."

After four days of liberty, the mighty *Wisconsin* once again raised her anchor and headed out to conduct gunnery practice and further training at Guantanamo, prior to her return to the Pacific for action off Korea. Eventually on 15 January 1952, while on the gun line off the Kosong area of Korea, Captain Burrowes recognized Marine Corps Captain Blake with a letter of commendation, crediting him with actions that were "measurably responsible for the prompt return of this vessel to safe waters."


Unlike the *Missouri* grounding, there were no courts-martial, boards, hearings—not even a standard JAGMAN investigation. RADM Olsen, by accepting immediate responsibility for his error, shielded the battleship from unnecessary scrutiny and protected the careers of her officers.

RADM Olsen was relieved as ComBatDivTwo shortly after the incident, but went on to serve the Navy for several more years with a final posting in Norway. Both Burrowes and Zumwalt attained Flag Rank. The recently deceased Zumwalt served as Chief of Naval Operations, 1970–74.


As for the cause of the grounding, the weather was blamed. Heavy summer downpours in upstate New York had flooded the Hudson's tributaries, leading to an unusually strong downstream current rushing up against *Wisconsin's* stern. The battleship's sailors clearly learned a lesson that remains valid today—that the true danger may arise from well beyond the horizon. ↓

Dr. Winkler is an historian with the Naval Historical Foundation and author of Cold War at Sea: High Seas Confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union due May 2000 from the Naval Institute Press

The lithe Eozmand powerful armament of USS Wisconsin, here off Japan in 1953, were at littk avail when failed moorings let her drift into danger.



March 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Quote

I think you ought to go in and tackle this Shinseki quote in this *New York Post* article by Ralph Peters. You should get a letter to the editor of the paper, plus write a letter to Peters and tell him he is flat wrong.

From

Thanks.

Attach.
Peters, Ralph. "Comanche: A Good Kill," *New York Post*, February 27, 2004

DHR:dh
030104-50

.....
Please respond by 3/5/04

11-0559

the weapons-system area so it can continue to produce attractive weapons systems.

That said, the officials told the security cabinet that they have now revised this coming year's expected \$2.5b. in arms sales to \$4b., which would match the record for 2002, if not surpass it.

New York Post
February 27, 2004

38. Comanche: A Good Kill

By Ralph Peters

Earlier this week, the U.S. Army scored a victory for our national security and the American taxpayer: It killed the Comanche attack-helicopter program, a \$40 billion legacy of the Cold War.

It was a tough decision. Over two decades, billions have been spent developing the Comanche. Had it gone into production, it would have been the finest attack helicopter in the world. And the Army had a deep emotional investment in the system.

The Army's chief of staff did the right thing. The funding was already in the pipeline. The Army could have grabbed the Comanche, then gone back to the Hill to beg for more money to pay for the gear our soldiers really need. Instead, the Army faced up to its budgetary - and moral - responsibilities.

Sexy though it was, the Comanche didn't offer a decisive advantage over systems already fielded. And the battlefield equation is changing. Drones handle more missions at less expense, from reconnaissance to precision strikes. And the service couldn't afford the luxury of buying the Comanche: Our soldiers have practical needs, from more personnel to a new generation of combat vehicles to replace an aging fleet.

To the Army's credit, its leadership faced the facts - not a routine practice in the Pentagon. Revelations of

military waste - real or imagined - always make headlines. But you don't see much on 24/7 when the Army declares that a weapon costs too much.

That same Army has been criticized as hidebound by civilian theorists who never ate a field ration. But the Army's deliberate approach paid solid dividends. Instead of gutting its combat power to conform to abstract theories, the Army is undertaking its most ambitious reorganization in half a century based upon battlefield experience.

Breaking down its divisions into ready-to-go-anywhere brigades, the Army's using lessons learned in Iraq and elsewhere to increase effectiveness while seeking new efficiencies. (And the Army was pretty damned good the way it was. Just ask Saddam.)

Today's chief of staff, Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, is building on the legacy of his predecessor, Gen. Eric Shinseki, who was mocked by defense "intellectuals" for predicting that the occupation of Iraq would require more than 100,000 troops.

Shinseki was also attacked for buying an innovative, cost-effective, wheeled combat vehicle, the Stryker. Disingenuously calling the Stryker a deathtrap, greedy contractors deployed their lawyers to force the Army to buy outdated junk. The Army beat them off. But self-interested critics continued to insist that the Stryker was bound to fail.

In Iraq, where it counts, the Stryker has been a noteworthy success. Even before planned upgrades, it's proven highly effective. The troops like it and trust it. And no matter what the armchair generals tell you, that's what matters.

TRADITIONALLY, only the Marine Corps and our chronically under-funded Coast Guard have been

responsible stewards of our tax dollars. Now the Army has turned a corner, demanding value and real utility, instead of gold-plating the McClellan saddle again.

The other services? A victim of its own success at dominating the seas, the Navy struggles forward in the absence of blue-water enemies. While shifting to deliver firepower deep inside enemy territory, the Navy remains a prisoner of traditions that undervalue cost-effective killing. We have the finest navy that ever sailed, but it doesn't deliver much bang for the buck.

The Navy's best friends are also its worst enemies - the senators from the shipbuilding states determined to see new hulls go down the slips, whether the Navy needs those hulls or not.

But the real problem is the Air Force. Despite endless hype about transformation, it refuses to cancel a single major program inherited from the Cold War.

The ultimate test of defense reform is the fate of the F-22 fighter. Conceived to dogfight Soviet planes that never got off the drawing board, it has no mission. No other air force is coming up to challenge us - and if they did, we already have the finest fighter aircraft in the world.

Factor in all the upstream and downstream costs, and F-22s will run at least \$180 million each. (Note to pilot: No parachute for you, pal - bring that baby home.)

The F-22 is wildly overpriced, conceptually outdated and nearly useless. And the contractors know it. As do Congress and the Air Force. So the aircraft's partisans cooked up a Rube-Goldberg redesign to give the world's most expensive air-to-air fighter a ground-attack role. No matter that carrying bombs degrades its stealth capabilities or that it can't haul much ordnance. Presto, it's the answer to all our

needs.

Using the F-22 for ground attack is like using a Maserati as a pick-up truck.

It's not a question of cutting the Air Force budget. The service needs every penny it can get - for new and affordable ground-attack aircraft, tankers, bombers and transports. But the generals in blue suits need to face reality. We can't afford the planes we need if we buy the F-22 - which is nothing more than welfare for Lockheed Martin.

Our troops must be supplied with all they need, no matter the cost. But our military leadership has a responsibility to separate needs from wishes. At a time of exploding deficits and global warfare, we can't afford extravagant buys that offer no utility.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld loves to preach "transformation." So far, that's meant starving our troops while shoveling money into contractors' pockets. The only weapons system Rumsfeld killed was the Army's Crusader howitzer - a program that deserved to die, but peanuts compared to the F-22's cost.

If Rumsfeld's serious about improving our national defense, he needs to kill the F-22 immediately.

Meanwhile, here's a well-deserved salute to the U.S. Army. It did its duty and shot the horse it loved.

Ralph Peters is the author of "Beyond Baghdad: Postmodern War and Peace."

International Herald Tribune
February 28-29, 2004

39. Europe's Debt To Rumsfeld

One year later
By Mark Leonard

LONDON--A year ago, Europe's major powers were experiencing their worst falling-out in living memory. Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair cold-shouldered each other at an emergency EU summit meeting, at the end of a week

8:30 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: DOUG FEITH
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 25, 2004

SUBJECT:

I think we've got to go to Congress and ask for changes in legislation on their decision to cancel IME^T and FM^{F?}. Seems to me the one thing they ought never to cancel except in the most egregious circumstances is the educational exchange programs.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
022504.04

Please respond by: _____ 3/8

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/
CDR Nosunzo
7/6

DR 7/8
7/6

09/3

09/3

OSD 10943-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25749



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

WJH 7/8

INFO MEMO

June 28, 2004, 4:45 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJH*

SUBJECT: International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

- You noted: "I think we've got to go to Congress and ask for changes in legislation on their decision to cancel IMET and FMF. Seems to me the one thing they ought never to cancel except in the most egregious circumstances is the educational exchange programs."
- For certain countries, the law provides that IMET and FMF funds are only available if the Secretary of State makes certain determinations related to protection of human rights. Some statutes provide for a waiver if determined and reported to Congress that waiver is in the U.S. national security interest.
- An example is the statute (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004) pertaining to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which includes "national security interest" waiver authority for Kazakhstan but not for Uzbekistan.
- Options for dealing with such provisions include (1) working with the State Department to find ways to provide assistance through certifications and/or waivers; and (2) legislative initiatives.
- DoD's work with the State Department resulted in the Secretary of State's recent certification of Kazakhstan. IMET money and FMF is now being allocated.
- DoD is continuing to work with State Department on certifying Uzbekistan, emphasizing that denying Uzbekistan IMET funds is counterproductive to fostering improvement in protection of human rights.
- DoD is exploring legislative relief options by (1) obtaining at least a waiver provision for Uzbekistan in the FY 2005 appropriations bill; and (2) making the case generally to Congress that IMET should be excluded from such provisions since IMET programs directly support the objectives that are at the root of the legislation.

091.3

28 Jun 04

25 Feb 04



3/17/04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EF-8800
04/003254ES

March 9, 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

Larry Di Rita
3/25
Sec Del

SUBJECT: Karimov

I talked to Colin today and reminded him what Karimov had done in the right direction. His comment was that they still have not done enough.

I think we better marshal our arguments and weigh in at the right time.

What is the timetable on certification?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030904-8

.....
Please respond by 3/12/04

✓
3/24

03/25
3/17/04

Sir,
Response attached.
v/r
Meg Judd

OSD/0945-04
UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10-03-04 10:24 IN

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

03/25/04

TAB

May 19, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Information

What should we do about getting that person who said he knew information about the abuses? He is in Roscoe Bartlett's Congressional district and briefed Murtha and someone else.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051904-14

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

383.6

19 May 04

Tab

OSD 10977-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25752



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1946-04
20 July 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard D. Myers, CJCS *RDMyers 7/20*

SUBJECT: Information

- **Question.** "What should we do about getting that person who said he knew information about abuses? He is in Roscoe Barlett's Congressional district and briefed Murtha and someone else." (TAB)
- **Answer.** The Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) interviewed SGT Davis and there is no action required.
- **Analysis**
 - SGT Davis is currently assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Fort Lee, Virginia. While assigned in Iraq with 372nd MP Company, his duties included escorting detainees in and out of Abu Ghraib (Oct 2003-Nov 2003).
 - SGT Davis provided a statement to Army CID dated 27 May 04 in which he claims to have witnessed certain treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib to include: 1) Naked detainees handcuffed together and to the bars of the cell being yelled at by interrogators; 2) Naked detainees being ordered to low-crawl on the floor, and; 3) PFC England taking photos of detainees.
 - SGT Davis reported what he saw to his chain of command while in Iraq. His platoon commander gave a written reprimand to a CPL involved in the events witnessed by SGT Davis. In addition, when it was brought to the attention of the Commanding Officer of Fort Lee that SGT Davis had information about possible detainee abuse, the Commanding Officer reported this to CID, resulting in CID interviewing SGT Davis. The information provided by SGT Davis is still part of a current investigation. This information was provided by CID Agent Worth of the Detainee Task Force and the agent that interviewed SGT Davis.

386

20 Jul 04

17 Aug 04

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated.

Prepared By: LtCol Richard E. Grant; USMC: OCJCS/LC; (b)(6)

OSD 10977-04

March 8, 2004
715

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Assessment Team on Iraqi Detainee Issue

It may be that we need to get an assessment team working on the detainee issue in Iraq. I am totally dissatisfied with the way it has been handled. I feel like I am just whistling into the wind.

Please come back to me with a proposal as to how we might do it.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030504-9

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

*closed per SMT
3/26/04*

OSD 10980-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25754

8
March 8, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Feedback from Capstone

Did you get any feedback from that Capstone meeting I had?

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-10

Please respond by 3/12/04

✓
3/8

SecDef —

Yes — all very positive

- appreciated the time you invested
- the Q & A was a big hit
- your responses were considered focused and candid — no ~~template~~ boilerplate or trite phrases.
- The fact you asked who all the non-uniformed folks in the room were then shared into with them — impressed all!!

OSD 10981-0A
C-3/8

11-L-0559/OSD/25755



March 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Brief on Iraqi Detainees

I want to get briefed on Iraqi detainees fast. I really am worried about it.

Thanks

DKR:dh
030404-17

.....

Please respond by 3/10/04

DR
3/9

382.4

R M ...

OSD 10982-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25756

March 7, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Prison

3886

Let's push ahead on the idea of taking Afghan detainees to Afghanistan in one of the prisons. The fact that it is in a prison that used to be a bad prison doesn't bother me a bit. We are doing the same thing in Iraq.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-16

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

1 MAR 04

OSD 10983-04



March ,2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Larry King

I saw Larry King at the White House. He says he wants me to do some kind of a show on March 14 or 19.

I don't know what that is about, but he says he has a request in. I told him I would try to do something with him. It is the anniversary of the end of the Iraq war. I probably ought to do it.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-18

.....
Please respond by 3/10/04

OB
3/7

000.7750

8.11.04

OSD 10984-04

March 8, 2004

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Paper from Rice

Please tickle a note for seven days from now that I want to get a paper from Condi Rice on war powers, a summary she is preparing for the President. I want to see it, too,

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-23

.....
Please respond by 3/11/04

031

8 M R C

OSD 10985-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25759

March 8, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Set-Aside

Please get the information as to what Tom DeLay is talking about, a set-aside of DoD spending to make sure that there is no waste, fraud or abuse.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-26

.....
Please respond by 3/19/04

OSD 10986-04

~~SECRET~~

EF-9005
I-04/004079
March 24, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

Larry Di Rita → *beck*
4/7

SUBJECT: Troops in Iraq

Please give me a list of all the countries that have troops in Iraq, and if they have announced since the Spanish election whether or not they are going to stay in. I am told that both Romania and Ukraine have said they are going to stay in.

I would like to see a complete list. We ought to compliment the people who have stood up and not caved in to terrorism.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032404-21

.....
Please respond by 4/2/04

*Sir,
Response attached.
M.
LTC swags*

*✓
4/8*

25-03-04 12:03 PM

OSD 10998-04

I R I G

24 APR 04

11-L-0559/OSD/25761

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	<i>4/7</i>
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	<i>Co 4/5</i>

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

EF-8753

8
March 8, 2004

I-04/003131

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FILE

Handwritten vertical text on the right margin.

Handwritten note: "copy to [unclear]"

Handwritten signature: "Seal"

Handwritten date: "3/29"

SUBJECT: Commitment on Security in Afghanistan

I talked to Condi and Colin about the Afghan request for a commitment on security. We are going to be thinking about it.

I want you to start thinking through the Karzai request for a security commitment of some kind, and let's talk about that and Iraq.

This is a very important aspect of the footprint, and I want it at your level for the time being.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-15

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

UCB please control

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosenzo
3/30

Handwritten vertical text on the right margin.

Response is

Returned to Policy
(La Benjamin)
3/30

OSD 77408-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25762

08-03-04 12:32 IN

OSD 11000-04

3/31
1700

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EF-9060
04/004207

29
March 24, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DM*
SUBJECT: Colombia

I want to make sure we work hard to get the caps on the number of people in Colombia up. If that is not an agreed-upon position in the government, we should make it an agreed position; if it is, we should help push it across.

I also want to try to get the air bridge straightened out in Honduras and other countries like Honduras.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/19/04 Talking points for Uribe meeting

DHR:dh
032404-31

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

3/31/04 C4/5

UCB -
FOR control -
MISSING classified
attachment

→ SD
Attached is the
raise-the-cap letter
I sent to Congress
talks.

By separate memo, I'll
report to you about Honduras.

11-L-0559/OSD/25763

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT IS UNCLASSIFIED
OSD 11001-04

✓
4/6



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-4601

MAR 31 2004

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, Section 3204 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001 (P.L. 106-246) as amended restricts funding for U.S. personnel deployed in support of Plan Colombia to 400 military personnel and 400 civilian contractors. Current SOUTHCOM requirements to support Colombia are pushing the limits of this cap. We seek relief from this restriction.

The Administration proposes to increase the cap to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors. This would improve SOUTHCOM's capabilities to help President Uribe in the fight against narcoterrorism.


Although the Administration opposes the cap and would prefer to have the restrictions lifted altogether, amending Section 3204 to support up to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors would help greatly.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that this proposal is in accordance with the President's program.

Thank you for your support of the Department's counter-narcoterrorism efforts.

With best wishes, I remain

Yours truly,



Douglas J. Feith

cc: Senator Carl Levin



11-L-0559/OSD/25764



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4002

MAR 31 2004

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, Section 3204 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001 (P.L. 106-246) as amended restricts funding for U.S. personnel deployed in support of Plan Colombia to 400 military personnel and 400 civilian contractors. Current SOUTHCOM requirements to support Colombia are pushing the limits of this cap. We seek relief from this restriction.

The Administration proposes to increase the cap to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors. This would improve SOUTHCOM's capabilities to help President Uribe in the fight against narcoterrorism.

Although the Administration opposes the cap and would prefer to have the restrictions lifted altogether, amending Section 3204 to support up to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors would help greatly.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that this proposal is in accordance with the President's program.

Thank you for your support of the Department's counter-narcoterrorism efforts.

With best wishes, I remain

Yours truly,

Douglas J. Feith

cc: Representative Ike Skelton



11-L-0559/OSD/25765



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-6015

MAR 31 2004

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, Section 3204 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001 (P.L. 106-246) as amended restricts funding for U.S. personnel deployed in support of Plan Colombia to 400 military personnel and 400 civilian contractors. Current SOUTHCOM requirements to support Colombia are pushing the limits of this cap. We seek relief from this restriction.

The Administration proposes to increase the cap to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors. This would improve SOUTHCOM's capabilities to help President Uribe in the fight against narcoterrorism.

Although the Administration opposes the cap and would prefer to have the restrictions lifted altogether, amending Section 3204 to support up to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors would help greatly.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that this proposal is in accordance with the President's program.

Thank you for your support of the Department's counter-narcoterrorism efforts.

With best wishes, I remain

Yours truly,

Douglas J. Feith

cc: Representative John P. Murtha



11-L-0559/OSD/25766



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-6025

MAR 31 2004

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, Section 3204 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001 (P.L. 106-246) as amended restricts funding for U.S. personnel deployed in support of Plan Colombia to 400 military personnel and 400 civilian contractors. Current SOUTHCOM requirements to support Colombia are pushing the limits of this cap. We seek relief from this restriction.

The Administration proposes to increase the cap to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors. This would improve SOUTHCOM's capabilities to help President Uribe in the fight against narcoterrorism.

Although the Administration opposes the cap and would prefer to have the restrictions lifted altogether, amending Section 3204 to support up to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors would help greatly.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that this proposal is in accordance with the President's program.

Thank you for your support of the Department's counter-narcoterrorism efforts.

With best wishes, I remain

Yours truly,

Douglas J. Feith

cc: Senator Daniel K. Inouye



11-L-0559/OSD/25767



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

MAR 31 2004

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
Speaker of the House
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

As you know, Section 3204 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001 (P.L. 106-246) as amended restricts funding for U.S. personnel deployed in support of Plan Colombia to 400 military personnel and 400 civilian contractors. Current SOUTHCOM requirements to support Colombia are pushing the limits of this cap. We seek relief from this restriction.

The Administration proposes to increase the cap to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors. This would improve SOUTHCOM's capabilities to help President Uribe in the fight against narcoterrorism.

Although the Administration opposes the cap and would prefer to have the restrictions lifted altogether, amending Section 3204 to support up to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors would help greatly.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that this proposal is in accordance with the President's program.

Thank you for your support of the Department's counter-narcoterrorism efforts.

With best wishes, I remain

Yours truly,

Douglas J. Feith

cc: Representative Nancy Pelosi



11-L-0559/OSD/25768



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

The Honorable Bill Frist
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

MAR 31 2004

Dear Senator Frist:

As you know, Section 3204 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001 (P.L. 106-246) as amended restricts funding for U.S. personnel deployed in support of Plan Colombia to 400 military personnel and 400 civilian contractors. Current SOUTHCOM requirements to support Colombia are pushing the limits of this cap. We seek relief from this restriction.

The Administration proposes to increase the cap to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors. This would improve SOUTHCOM's capabilities to help President Uribe in the fight against narcoterrorism.

Although the Administration opposes the cap and would prefer to have the restrictions lifted altogether, amending Section 3204 to support up to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors would help greatly.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that this proposal is in accordance with the President's program.

Thank you for your support of the Department's counter-narcoterrorism efforts.

With best wishes, I remain

Yours truly,

Douglas J. Feith

cc: Senator Tom Daschle



11-L-0559/OSD/25769

March 22, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
SUBJECT: Dollars for INC

*Advance
copy sent
3/22 1215*

Please get back to me on the question of the dollars for the INC. We have to sort that out fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032204-8

.....
Please respond by _____

MAR 29 2004 *response attached*

UCB-

Please control

Response is:

OSD 77397-04

IT-19

2004 MAR 29 11:02 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/25770

OSD 11002-04

August 3, 2004

TO: Senior OSD Staff

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Detailees

Please review the number of military detailees you have in your office. Determine if the number has crept up over the years, and if there might be some way you can reduce the number. Please report back.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/21/04 Dir, Admin & Mngmnt memo to SecDef re: OSD Military Detailees [OSD 11020-04]

DHR:dh
080304-4

.....
Please respond by 8/27/04

*O
OSD*

3 AUG 04

21 JUL 04

OSD 11020-04



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

JUL 21 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management
Ray DuBois 7/21/04

SUBJECT: Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Military Detailees

- At a senior staff meeting, you raised a concern regarding the number of military detailees to the OSD staff. You asked all of your Principal Staff Assistants to review detailees working for them and revalidate their assignments or return them to their parent units. Currently, there are **55** military detailees assigned as outlined on the attached.
- The assigned detailees are concentrated primarily in OUSD(AT&L) (15), OUSD(P) (16), OUSD(P&R) (11) and OUSD(I) (4). The OUSD(C) currently does not have any military detailees assigned. Additionally, the OGC has 7 military detailees and both ASD(NII) and WHS have 1 assigned. The assigned numbers are in rough proportion to the size of the components' permanently assigned staff.
- Military detailees are typically detailed to the OSD staff for one year or less and remain permanently assigned to their parent organization's roles. Temporary details are authorized to support unforeseen temporary requirements, workload surges, or as a short term measure where the knowledge and skills are not otherwise available from within the organization. Many are detailed to provide temporary, but specific, military expertise required for the Global War on Terrorism and some are detailed for an educational/training experience. Additionally, roughly 10 percent of existing detailees are performing a liaison function between OSD and their parent unit.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

cc:
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense

Prepared By: Carol L. Walker, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/25772

OSD 11020-04

**OSD / WHS MILITARY DETAILLEES
(as of 12 July 2004)**

<u>USD(POLIC)</u>		<u>USD(AT&L)</u>	
<u>ASD(SOL/IC)</u>		<u>DUSD(IE)</u>	
Army		Army	
0-5	1	0-6	1
0-4	3	TOTAL	1
TOTAL	4		
		Navy	
Navy		0-5	1
0-5	1	TOTAL	1
TOTAL	1	TOTAL DUSD(IE)	2
Air Force		<u>DUSD(A&T)</u>	
0-4	2	Army	
TOTAL	2	0-5	1
TOTAL ASD(SOL/IC)	7	TOTAL	1
<u>ASD(ISP)</u>		Navy	
Army		0-4	1
0-6	1	TOTAL	1
TOTAL	1		
		Air Force	
Air Force		0-5	2
0-5	1	TOTAL	2
TOTAL	1		
TOTAL ASD(ISP)	2	Marine Corps	
		0-6	1
<u>ASD(ISA)</u>		TOTAL	1
Army		TOTAL DUSD(A&T)	5
0-3	1		
TOTAL ASD(ISA)	1	<u>DDR&E</u>	
		Air Force	
<u>ASD(HD)</u>		0-5	1
Army		TOTAL DDR&E	1
0-6	2		
0-4	1	<u>ATSD(NCB)</u>	
TOTAL	3	Army	
		0-6	1
Navy		0-5	1
0-6	1	TOTAL	2
TOTAL	1		
		Navy	
Marine Corps		0-5	2
0-5	1	TOTAL	2
TOTAL	1		
		Air Force	
USCG		0-6	1
0-6	1	0-3	1
TOTAL	1	E-7	1
TOTAL ASD(HD)	6	TOTAL	3
		TOTAL ATSD(NCB)	7
GRAND TOTAL USD(P)	16		
		GRAND TOTAL USD(AT&L)	15

4:45 PM 7/14/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/25773

OSD / WHS MILITARY DETAILEES
(as of 12 July 2004)

USD(I)		ASD(NII)	
Army		Navy	
0-4	1	0-5	1
E-7	1	TOTAL ASD(NII)	1
TOTAL	2		
Navy		GC	
0-4	1	Army	
TOTAL	1	0-6	2
Air Force		0-5	1
0-4	1	TOTAL	3
TOTAL	1	Navy	
TOTAL USD(I)	4	0-6	1
		TOTAL	1
USD(P&R)		Air Force	
Air Force		0-5	1
0-6	1	0-4	1
TOTAL	1	0-3	1
		TOTAL	3
PDUSD(P&R)		TOTAL GC	7
Army		WHS	
0-6	1	Marine Corps	
TOTAL	1	0-5	1
Marine Corps		TOTAL WHS	1
0-4	1		
TOTAL	1		
Coast Guard			
0-4	1		
TOTAL	1		
TOTAL PUSD(P&R)	3		
ASD(RA)			
Army			
0-6	2		
0-5	2		
0-3	1		
TOTAL	5		
Marine Corps			
E-7	1		
TOTAL	1		
Coast Guard			
0-6	1		
TOTAL	1		
TOTAL ASD(RA)	7		
GRAND TOTAL USD(P&R)	11	TOTAL OSD/WHS DETAILEES	55



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004 SEP -2 PM 5:24
SEP 02 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ~~Raymond E. DuBois~~, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Military Detailees
Ken Durbin 7/2/04

- In the attached snowflake, you asked the senior OSD staff to review the number of military detailees in their offices, determine if the number has crept up over the years, and if they could reduce the number. My staff consolidated the senior staff responses for your information (Tab A).
- In total, there are 51 military detailees. This represents a reduction of 24% from 2003. The OUSD(Policy), OUSD(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), OUSD(Personnel and Readiness), and the DoD General Counsel account for the majority, with the remainder assigned to OUSD(Intelligence), OASD(Networks and Information Integration), Net Assessment, and Program Analysis and Evaluation.
- For the most part, they are being used in accordance with current guidance which authorizes their use to support unforeseen temporary requirements and workload surges, fill knowledge and skills gaps when not otherwise available from within the organization, and provide developmental training or act as a liaison between their parent unit and OSD. In a more limited number of instances, it appears that, based on some of the comments provided, a number do not conform to the definition of a detailee because they are supporting permanent workload requirements.
- While the reduction reflects progress in limiting military serving on the OSD staff, further scrutiny may present continuing opportunities to discipline our practices to refocus the OSD detail program to limited, temporary assignment of personnel as defined above. An important first step is the update of the applicable guidance to provide more clear-cut rules of engagement for application across the OSD staff. My staff is currently developing the updated guidance. In the interim, I will forward a memorandum to the senior staff outlining the salient program requirements.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments :
As stated

Prepared By: Carol L. Walker, (b)(6)

OSD a1020-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25775

August 3, 2004

TO: Senior OSD Staff
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Detailees

Please review the number of military detailees you have in your office. Determine if the number has crept up over the years, and if there might be some way you can reduce the number. Please report back.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/21/04 Dir, Admin & Mngmnt memo to SecDef re: OSD Military Detailees [OSD 11020-04]

DHR:dh
080304-4

.....
Please respond by 8/27/04

OSD 11020-04

**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
MILITARY DETAILEES**

<u>Component</u>	<u>Military Detailees</u>	<u>Comments</u>
USD (AT&L)	13	Detailees to OUSD(AT&L) provide expertise in chemical and biological defense, chemical demilitarization and threat reduction, nuclear weapons, executive support, business transformation, treaty compliance oversight and other areas. Detailees provide field and headquarters level experience as well as unique sets of skills not readily available within existing staff.
USD (Policy)	16	OUSD(P) reduced military detailees from 24 in 2003 to 16 in 2004. Total in 2002 was 18,2001 was 21 and 2000 was 17.
USD (C)	0	None assigned.
USD (I)	4	Two of the four expired 31 Aug 04; no plans to replace. One is a Navy intern on a rotation program, the other has key knowledge of operational CI and will be continued. USD(I) is composed of 117 permanent billets. The broad role of this organization requires occasional assignment of detailees who are experts in various fields to augment specific tasks.
USD(P&R)	9	OUSD(P&R) has 9 authorized detailees but found 2 additional military working on the staff and has expedited their return to their services. USD(P&R) believes the 9 are being used appropriately, but will continue to closely monitor this programs.
ASD(NII)	1	Navy detailee provides unique expertise required for oversight of space-based environmental monitoring programs such as National Polar-orbiting Operational Satellite System program. OASD(NII) does not have the expertise on staff otherwise to perform this oversight.
ASD(LA)	0	None assigned.
ASD(PA)	0	None assigned.
DoD GC	6	GC will continue to scrutinize on-going requirements and reduce the number as soon as possible.
Dir, PA&E	1	Current detailee is here on part of Navy Medical Corps educational program. PA&E has had three or fewer detailees serving simultaneously and PA&E does not solicit the services for military detailees.
Dir, OT&E	0	None assigned.
ATSD(IO)	0	None currently assigned and do not envision the requirement for any in the future.
ODA&M	0	None assigned to ODA&M within the last three years.
Dir Net Asmt	1	Per request of Commandant, US Coast Guard, one USCG officer is detailed to NA. Detail enhances USCG long-term planning process by participating in net assessment analyses.
Dir Force Trans	0	None assigned.

Tota

3
March 3, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Adaptive Planning Process

381

We are going to need some time on the adaptive planning process, so we get that going properly.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030104-82

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

3 MAR 04

OSD 11023-04

3

March): 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Follow Up to Assessment Teams

381

I need a method of following up on the decisions with respect to each of the recommendations of each of the assessment teams.

I need a procedure to follow up on the implementation of each of the recommendations that I approve.

Please arrange that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030104-85

.....

Please respond by 3/19/04

3 MAR 04

OSD 11025-04

March 4⁸, 2004

718

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Elections in Taiwan

Let's nail down the facts on Taiwan. What has happened after previous elections, what has the US military done in connection with those elections and the like.

Let's do it fast.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-22

.....
Please respond by 3/19/04

China (NATS)

8 Mar 04

OSD 11028-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25780

March 2, 2004

TO: David Chu
Gen. Mike Hagee

cc: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Security Guard Rotations

2004

I notice that the rotations in Afghanistan are 60 days for the Marine guard at the embassy. It is hard for me to believe that people can serve in Iraq and Afghanistan for a year in a combat role, and that it makes sense to have 60 day rotations for the security guards.

Please explain.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030204-5

.....
Please respond by 3/12/04

2 MAR 04

OSD 11029-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25781

March 2, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Review Law

IRAQ

I have to review the military section of the new basic law as soon as a copy of the English version comes in from Baghdad.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030204-15

.....
Please respond by _____

✓ 3/24

Tom / Mark —

*Policy or CPA should
have this — let's
get a copy today*

*JHX
C 3/4*

2 MAR 04

**LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ
FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (03/02/2004, 9:40pm)**

PREAMBLE

The people of Iraq, striving to reclaim their freedom, which was usurped by the previous tyrannical regime; rejecting violence and coercion in all their forms, and especially when used as instruments of governance; determined that they shall hereafter remain a free people governed under the rule of law; affirming today their respect for international law, especially having been amongst the founders of the United Nations; working to reclaim their legitimate place among nations; and endeavouring at the same time to preserve the unity of their homeland in a spirit of fraternity and solidarity; in order to draw the features of the future new Iraq, and to establish the mechanisms aiming, amongst other aims, to erase the effects of racist and sectarian policies and practices; do now establish this Law to govern themselves during the transitional period until a duly elected government operating under a permanent and legitimate constitution achieving full democracy shall come into being.

CHAPTER ONE – FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Article 1.

- (A) This Law shall be called the “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” and the phrase “this Law” wherever it appears in this legislation shall mean the “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period.”
- (B) Gender-specific language shall apply equally to male and female.
- (C) The Preamble to this Law is an integral part of this Law.

Article 2.

- (A) The term “transitional period” shall refer to the period beginning on 30 June 2004 and lasting until the formation of an elected Iraqi government pursuant to a permanent constitution as set forth in this Law, which in any case shall be no later than 31 December 2005, unless the provisions of Article 61 are applied.
- (B) The transitional period shall consist of two phases.
 - (1) The first phase shall begin with the formation of a fully sovereign Iraqi

Interim Government that takes power on 30 June 2004. This government shall be constituted in accordance with a process of extensive deliberations and consultations with cross-sections of the Iraqi people conducted by the Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority and possibly in consultation with the United Nations. This government shall exercise authority in accordance with this Law, including the basic principles and rights specified herein, and with an annex that shall be agreed upon and issued before the beginning of the transitional period and that shall be an integral part of this Law.

- (2) The second phase shall begin after the formation of the Iraqi Transitional Government, which will take place after elections for the National Assembly have been held as stipulated in this Law, provided that, if possible, these elections are not delayed beyond 31 December 2004, and, in any event, beyond 31 January 2005. This second phase shall end upon the formation of an Iraqi government pursuant to a permanent constitution. The provisions of this Law shall apply to this second phase of the transitional period.

Article 3.

- (A) This Law is the supreme law of the land and shall be binding in all parts of Iraq without exception. No amendment to this Law may be made except by a three-fourths majority of the members of the National Assembly and the unanimous approval of the Presidency Council. Likewise, no amendment may be made that could abridge in any way the rights of the Iraqi people cited in Chapter Two, extend the transitional period beyond the timeframe cited in this Law, delay the holding of elections to a new assembly, reduce the powers of the regions or governorates, or affect Islam or any other religions or sects and their rites.
- (B) Any legal provision that conflicts with this Law is null and void.
- (C) This Law shall cease to have effect upon the formation of an elected government pursuant to a permanent constitution.

Article 4.

The system of government in Iraq shall be republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic, and powers shall be shared between the federal government and the regional governments, governorates, municipalities, and local administrations. The federal system shall be based upon geographic and historical realities and the separation of powers, and not upon origin, race, ethnicity, nationality, or confession.

Article 5.

The Iraqi Armed Forces shall be subject to the civilian control of the Iraqi Transitional Government, in accordance with the contents of Chapters Three and Five of this Law.

Article 6.

The Iraqi Transitional Government shall take effective steps to end the vestiges of the oppressive acts of the previous regime arising from forced displacement, deprivation of citizenship, expropriation of financial assets and property, and dismissal from government employment for political, racial, or sectarian reasons.

Article 7.

- (A) Islam is the official religion of the State and is to be considered a source of legislation. No law that contradicts the universally agreed tenets of Islam, the principles of democracy, or the rights cited in Chapter Two of this Law may be enacted during the transitional period. This Law respects the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious rights of all individuals to freedom of religious belief and practice
- (B) Iraq is a country of many nationalities, and the Arab people in Iraq are an inseparable part of the Arab nation.

Article 8.

The flag, anthem, and emblem of the State shall be fixed by law.

Article 9.

The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official languages of Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, such as Turcoman, Syriac, or Armenian, in government educational institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private educational institutions, shall be guaranteed. The scope of the term "official language" and the means of applying the provisions of this Article shall be defined by law and shall include:

- (1) Publication of the official gazette, in the two languages;
- (2) Speech and expression in official settings, such as the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, courts, and official conferences, in either of the two languages;
- (3) Recognition and publication of official documents and correspondence in the

two languages;

- (4) Opening schools that teach in the two languages, in accordance with educational guidelines;
- (5) Use of both languages in any other settings enjoined by the principle of equality (such as bank notes, passports, and stamps);
- (6) Use of both languages in the federal institutions and agencies in the Kurdistan region.

CHAPTER TWO – FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Article 10.

As an expression of the free will and sovereignty of the Iraqi people, their representatives shall form the governmental structures of the State of Iraq. The Iraqi Transitional Government and the governments of the regions, governorates, municipalities, and local administrations shall respect the rights of the Iraqi people, including those rights cited in this Chapter.

Article 11.

- (A) Anyone who carries Iraqi nationality shall be deemed a citizen. His citizenship shall grant him all the rights and duties stipulated in this Law and shall be the basis of his relation to the homeland and the State.
- (B) No Iraqi may have his citizenship withdrawn or be exiled unless he is a naturalized citizen who, as established in a court of law, made material falsifications on the basis of which citizenship was granted in his application for citizenship.
- (C) Each Iraqi shall have the right to carry more than one citizenship. Any Iraqi whose citizenship was withdrawn because he acquired another citizenship shall be deemed an Iraqi.
- (D) Any Iraqi whose Iraqi citizenship was withdrawn for political, religious, racial, or sectarian reasons has the right to reclaim his Iraqi citizenship.
- (E) Decision Number 666 (1980) of the dissolved Revolutionary Command Council is annulled, and anyone whose citizenship was withdrawn on the basis of this decree shall be deemed an Iraqi.

- (F) The National Assembly must issue laws pertaining to citizenship and naturalization consistent with the provisions of this Law
- (G) The Courts shall examine all disputes arising from the application of the provisions relating to citizenship.

Article 12.

All Iraqis are equal in their rights without regard to gender, sect, opinion, belief, nationality, religion, or origin, and they are equal before the law. Discrimination against an Iraqi citizen on the basis of his gender, nationality, religion, or origin is prohibited. Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his life or liberty, except in accordance with legal procedures. All are equal before the courts.

Article 13.

- (A) Public and private freedoms shall be protected.
- (B) The right of free expression shall be protected.
- (C) The right of free peaceable assembly and the right to organize freely into associations and political parties, as well as the right to form and join unions freely, in accordance with the law, shall be guaranteed.
- (D) Each Iraqi has the right of free movement in all parts of Iraq and the right to travel abroad and return freely.
- (E) Each Iraqi has the right to demonstrate and strike peaceably in accordance with the law.
- (F) Each Iraqi has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religious belief and practice. Coercion in such matters shall be prohibited.
- (G) Slavery, the slave trade, forced labor, and involuntary servitude [CHECK TO ENSURE SAMIR SUMAIDY ADDITION IS IN] shall be forbidden.
- (H) Each Iraqi has the right to privacy.

Article 14.

The individual has the right to security, education, health care, and social security. The Iraqi State and its governmental units, including the regions, governorates, municipalities, and local

administrations, shall strive, within the limits of their resources and with due regard to other vital needs, to provide prosperity and employment opportunities to the people.

Article 15.

- (A) No civil law shall have retroactive effect unless the law so stipulates. There shall be neither a crime, nor punishment, except by law in effect at the time the crime is committed.
- (B) Police, investigators, or other governmental authorities may not violate the sanctity of private residences, whether these authorities belong to the federal or regional governments, governorates, municipalities, or local administrations, unless a judge or investigating magistrate has issued a search warrant in accordance with applicable law on the basis of information provided by a sworn individual who knew that bearing false witness would render him liable to punishment. Extreme exigent circumstances, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, may justify a warrantless search, but such exigencies shall be narrowly construed. In the event that a warrantless search is carried out in the absence of an extreme exigent circumstance, the evidence so seized, and any other evidence found derivatively from such search, shall be inadmissible in connection with a criminal charge, unless the court determines that the person who carried out the warrantless search believed reasonably and in good faith that the search was in accordance with the law.
- (C) No one may be unlawfully arrested or detained, and no one may be detained by reason of political or religious beliefs.
- (D) All persons shall be guaranteed the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, regardless of whether the proceeding is civil or criminal. Notice of the proceeding and its legal basis must be provided to the accused without delay.
- (E) The accused is innocent until proven guilty pursuant to law, and he likewise has the right to engage independent and competent counsel, to remain silent in response to questions addressed to him with no compulsion to testify for any reason, to participate in preparing his defense, and to summon and examine witnesses or to ask the judge to do so. At the time a person is arrested, he must be notified of these rights.
- (F) The right to a fair, speedy, and open trial shall be guaranteed.
- (G) Every person deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall have the right of recourse to a court to determine the legality of his arrest or detention without delay and to order his release if this occurred in an illegal manner.

- (H) After being found innocent of a charge, an accused may not be tried once again on the same charge.
- (I) Civilians may not be tried before a military tribunal. Special or exceptional courts may not be established.
- (J) Torture in all its forms, physical or mental, shall be prohibited under all circumstances, as shall be cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. No confession made under compulsion, torture, or threat thereof shall be relied upon or admitted into evidence for any reason in any proceeding, whether criminal or otherwise.

Article 16.

- (A) Public property is sacrosanct, and its protection is the duty of every citizen.
- (B) The right to private property shall be protected, and no one may be prevented from disposing of his property except within the limits of law. No one shall be deprived of his property except by eminent domain, in circumstances and in the manner set forth in law, and on condition that he is paid just compensation.
- (C) Each Iraqi citizen shall have the full and unfettered right to own real property in all parts of Iraq without restriction.

Article 17.

It shall not be permitted to possess, bear, buy, or sell arms except on licensure issued in accordance with the law.

Article 18.

There shall be no taxation or fee except by law.

Article 19.

No political refugee who has been granted asylum pursuant to applicable law may be surrendered or returned to the country from which he fled.

Article 20.

- (A) Every Iraqi who fulfills the conditions stipulated in the electoral law has the right to stand for election and cast his ballot secretly in free, open, fair, competitive, and periodic elections.

- (B) No Iraqi may be discriminated against for purposes of voting in elections on the basis of gender, religion, race, belief, sect, ethnic origin, language, wealth, or literacy.

Article 21.

Neither the Iraqi Transitional Government nor the governments and administrations of the regions, governorates, and municipalities, nor local administrations may interfere with the right of the Iraqi people to develop the institutions of civil society, whether in cooperation with international civil society organizations or otherwise.

Article 22.

If, in the course of his work, an official of any government office, whether in the federal government, the regional governments, the governorate and municipal administrations, or the local administrations, deprives an individual or a group of the rights guaranteed by this Law or any other Iraqi laws in force, this individual or group shall have the right to maintain a cause of action against that employee to seek compensation for the damages caused by such deprivation, to vindicate his rights, and to seek any other legal measure. If the court decides that the official had acted with a sufficient degree of good faith and in the belief that his actions were consistent with the law, then he is not required to pay compensation.

Article 23.

The enumeration of the foregoing rights must not be interpreted to mean that they are the only rights enjoyed by the Iraqi people. They enjoy all the rights that befit a free people possessed of their human dignity, including the rights stipulated in international treaties and agreements, other instruments of international law that Iraq has signed and to which it has acceded, and others that are deemed binding upon it, and in the law of nations. Non-Iraqis within Iraq shall enjoy all human rights not inconsistent with their status as non-citizens.

CHAPTER THREE – THE IRAQI TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

Article 24.

- (A) The Iraqi Transitional Government, which is also referred to in this Law as the federal government, shall consist of the National Assembly; the Presidency Council; the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister; and the judicial authority.
- (B) The three authorities, legislative, executive, and judicial, shall be separate and independent of one another.

- (C) No official or employee of the Iraqi Transitional Government shall enjoy immunity for criminal acts committed while in office.

Article 25.

The Iraqi Transitional Government shall have exclusive competence in the following matters:

- (A) Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; negotiating, signing, and ratifying international treaties and agreements; formulating foreign economic and trade policy and sovereign debt policies;
- (B) Formulating and executing national security policy, including creating and maintaining armed forces to secure, protect, and guarantee the security of the country's borders and to defend Iraq;
- (C) Formulating fiscal policy, issuing currency, regulating customs, regulating commercial policy across regional and governorate boundaries in Iraq, drawing up the national budget of the State, formulating monetary policy, and establishing and administering a central bank;
- (D) Regulating weights and measures and formulating a general policy on wages;
- (E) Managing, in consultation with the regions and governorates, the natural resources of Iraq, which belong to all the people of all the regions and governorates of Iraq; and distributing the revenues resulting from their sale through the national budgeting process in an equitable manner proportional to the distribution of population throughout the country, and with due regard for areas that were unjustly deprived of these revenues by the previous regime, for dealing with their situations in a positive way, for their needs, and for the degree of development of the different areas of the country;
- (F) Regulating Iraqi citizenship, immigration, and asylum;
- (G) Regulating telecommunications policy.

Article 26.

- (A) Except as otherwise provided in this Law, the laws in force in Iraq on 30 June 2004 shall remain in effect unless and until rescinded or amended by the Iraqi Transitional Government in accordance with this Law.

- (B) Legislation issued by the federal legislative authority shall supersede any other legislation issued by any other legislative authority in the event that they contradict each other, except as provided in Article 54(B).
- (C) The laws, regulations, orders, and directives issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority pursuant to its authority under international law shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law.

Article 27.

- (A) The Iraqi Armed Forces shall consist of the active and reserve units, and elements thereof. The purpose of these forces is the defense of Iraq.
- (B) Armed forces and militias not under the command structure of the Iraqi Transitional Government are prohibited, except as provided by federal law.
- (C) The Iraqi Armed Forces and its personnel, including military personnel working in the Ministry of Defense or any offices or organizations subordinate to it, may not stand for election to political office, campaign for candidates, or participate in other activities forbidden by Ministry of Defense regulations. This ban encompasses the activities of the personnel mentioned above acting in their personal or official capacities. Nothing in this Article shall infringe upon the right of these personnel to vote in elections.
- (D) The Iraqi Intelligence Service shall collect information, assess threats to national security, and advise the Iraqi government. This Service shall be under civilian control, shall be subject to legislative oversight, and shall operate pursuant to law and in accordance with recognized principles of human rights.
- (E) The Iraqi Transitional Government shall respect and implement Iraq's international obligations regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, non-production, and non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and associated equipment, materiel, technologies, and delivery systems for use in the development, manufacture, production, and use of such weapons.

Article 28.

- (A) Members of the National Assembly; the Presidency Council; the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister; and judges and justices of the courts may not be appointed to any other position in or out of government. Any member of the National Assembly who becomes a member of the Presidency Council or Council of Ministers shall be deemed to have resigned his membership in the National Assembly.

- (B) In no event may a member of the armed forces be a member of the National Assembly, minister, Prime Minister, or member of the Presidency Council unless the individual has resigned his commission or rank, or retired from duty at least eighteen months prior to serving.

Article 29.

Upon the assumption of full authority by the Iraqi Interim Government in accordance with Article 2(B)(1), above, the Coalition Provisional Authority shall be dissolved and the work of the Governing Council shall come to an end.

CHAPTER FOUR – THE TRANSITIONAL LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY

Article 30.

- (A) During the transitional period, the State of Iraq shall have a legislative authority known as the National Assembly. Its principal mission shall be to legislate and exercise oversight over the work of the executive authority.
- (B) Laws shall be issued in the name of the people of Iraq. Laws, regulations, and directives related to them shall be published in the official gazette and shall take effect as of the date of their publication, unless they stipulate otherwise.
- (C) The National Assembly shall be elected in accordance with an electoral law and a political parties law. The electoral law shall be designed to achieve the goal of having women constitute no less than one-quarter of the members of the National Assembly and of having fair representation for all communities in Iraq, including the Turcomans, ChaldoAssyrians, and others.
- (D) Elections for the National Assembly shall take place by 31 December 2004 if possible, and in any case no later than by 31 January 2005.

Article 31.

- (A) The National Assembly shall consist of 275 members. It shall enact a law dealing with the replacement of its members in the event of resignation, removal, or death.
- (B) A nominee to the National Assembly must fulfill the following conditions:
 - (1) He shall be an Iraqi no less than 30 years of age.

- (2) He shall not have been a member of the dissolved Ba'ath Party with the rank of Division Member or higher, unless exempted pursuant to the applicable legal rules.
- (3) If he was once a member of the dissolved Ba'ath Party with the rank of Full Member, he shall be required to sign a document renouncing the Ba'ath Party and disavowing all of his past links with it before becoming eligible to be a candidate, as well as to swear that he no longer has any dealings or connection with Ba'ath Party organizations. If it is established in court that he lied or fabricated on this score, he shall lose his seat in the National Assembly.
- (4) He shall not have been a member of the former agencies of repression and shall not have contributed to or participated in the persecution of citizens.
- (5) He shall not have enriched himself in an illegitimate manner at the expense of the homeland and public finance.
- (6) He shall not have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and shall have a good reputation.
- (7) He shall have at least a secondary school diploma, or equivalent
- (8) He shall not be a member of the armed forces at the time of his nomination.

Article 32.

- (A) The National Assembly shall draw up its own internal procedures, and it shall sit in public session unless circumstances require otherwise, consistent with its internal procedures. The first session of the Assembly shall be chaired by its oldest member.
- (B) The National Assembly shall elect, from its own members, a president and two deputy presidents of the National Assembly. The president of the National Assembly shall be the individual who receives the greatest number of votes for that office; the first deputy president the next highest; and the second deputy president the next. The president may vote on an issue, but may not participate in the debates, unless he temporarily steps out of the chair immediately prior to addressing the issue.
- (C) A bill shall not be voted upon by the National Assembly unless it has been read twice at a regular session of the Assembly, on condition that at least two days intervene between the two readings, and after the bill has been placed on the agenda of the session at least four days prior to the vote.

Article 33.

- (A) Meetings of the National Assembly shall be public, and transcripts of its meetings shall be recorded and published. The vote of every member of the National Assembly shall be recorded and made public. Decisions in the National Assembly shall be taken by simple majority unless this Law stipulates otherwise.
- (B) The National Assembly must examine bills proposed by the Council of Ministers, including budget bills.
- (C) Only the Council of Ministers shall have the right to present a proposed national budget. The National Assembly has the right to reallocate proposed spending and to reduce the total amounts in the general budget. It also has the right to propose an increase in the overall amount of expenditures to the Council of Ministers if necessary.
- (D) Members of the National Assembly shall have the right to propose bills, consistent with the internal procedures that drawn up by the Assembly.
- (E) The Iraqi Armed Forces may not be dispatched outside Iraq even for the purpose of defending against foreign aggression except with the approval of the National Assembly and upon the request of the Presidency Council.
- (F) Only the National Assembly shall have the power to ratify international treaties and agreements.
- (G) The oversight function performed by the National Assembly and its committees shall include the right of interpellation of executive officials, including members of the Presidency Council, the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister, and any less senior official of the executive authority. This shall encompass the right to investigate, request information, and issue subpoenas for persons to appear before them.

Article 34.

Each member of the National Assembly shall enjoy immunity for statements made while the Assembly is in session, and the member may not be sued before the courts for such. A member may not be placed under arrest during a session of the National Assembly, unless the member is accused of a crime and the National Assembly agrees to lift his immunity or if he is caught *in flagrante delicto*.

CHAPTER FIVE – THE TRANSITIONAL EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

Article 35.

The executive authority during the transitional period shall consist of the Presidency Council, the Council of Ministers, and its presiding Prime Minister.

Article 36.

- (A) The National Assembly shall elect a President of the State and two Deputies. They shall form the Presidency Council, the function of which will be to represent the sovereignty of Iraq and oversee the higher affairs of the country. The election of the Presidency Council shall take place on the basis of a single list and by a two-thirds majority of the members' votes. The National Assembly has the power to remove any member of the Presidency Council of the State for incompetence or lack of integrity by a three-fourths majority of its members' votes. In the event of a vacancy in the Presidency Council, the National Assembly shall, by a vote of two-thirds of its members, elect a replacement to fill the vacancy.
- (B) It is a prerequisite for a member of the Presidency Council to fulfill the same conditions as the members of the National Assembly, with the following observations:
- (1) He must be at least forty years of age.
 - (2) He must possess a good reputation, integrity, and rectitude.
 - (3) If he was a member of the dissolved Ba'ath Party, he must have left the dissolved Party at least ten years before its fall.
 - (4) He must not have participated in repressing the *intifada* of 1991 or the Anfal campaign and must not have committed a crime against the Iraqi people.
- (C) The Presidency Council shall take its decisions unanimously, and its members may not deputize others as proxies.

Article 37.

The Presidency Council may veto any legislation passed by the National Assembly, on condition that this be done within fifteen days after the Presidency Council is notified by the President of the National Assembly of the passage of such legislation. In the event of veto, the legislation shall be returned to the National Assembly, which has the right to pass the legislation again by a two-thirds majority not subject to veto within a period not to exceed thirty days.

Article 38.

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- (A) The Presidency Council shall name a Prime Minister unanimously, as well as the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister and Council of Ministers shall then seek to obtain a vote of confidence by simple majority from the National Assembly prior to commencing their work as a government. The Presidency Council must agree on a candidate for the post of Prime Minister within two weeks. In the event that it fails to do so, the responsibility of naming the Prime Minister reverts to the National Assembly. In that event, the National Assembly must confirm the nomination by a two-thirds majority. If the Prime Minister is unable to nominate his Council of Ministers within one month, the Presidency Council shall name another Prime Minister.
- (B) The qualifications for Prime Minister must be the same as for the members of the Presidency Council except that his age must not be less than 35 years upon his taking office.

Article 39.

- (A) The Council of Ministers shall, with the approval of the Presidency Council, appoint representatives to negotiate the conclusion of international treaties and agreements. The Presidency Council shall recommend passage of a law by the National Assembly to ratify such treaties and agreements.
- (B) The Presidency Council shall carry out the function of commander-in-chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces only for ceremonial and protocol purposes. It shall have no command authority. It shall have the right to be briefed, to inquire, and to advise. Operationally, national command authority on military matters shall flow from the Prime Minister to the Minister of Defense to the military chain of command of the Iraqi Armed Forces.
- (C) The Presidency Council shall, as more fully set forth in Chapter Six and Seven, below, appoint, upon recommendation of the Higher Juridical Council, the Presiding Judge and members of the Federal Supreme Court, as well as the members of the national commissions, in accordance with the conditions appearing in the relevant Articles below. [CHECK TO CONFIRM]
- (D) The Council of Ministers shall appoint the Director-General of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, as well as general officers of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Such appointments shall be subject to confirmation by the National Assembly by simple majority of those of its members present.

Article 40.

- (A) The Prime Minister and the ministers shall be responsible before the National Assembly, and this Assembly shall have the right to withdraw its confidence either in the Prime Minister or in the ministers collectively or individually. In the event that confidence in the Prime Minister is withdrawn, the entire Council of Ministers shall be dissolved, and Article 40(B), below, shall become operative.
- (B) In the event of a vote of no confidence with respect to the entire Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers shall remain in office to carry out their functions for a period not to exceed thirty days, until the Presidency Council appoints a new Prime Minister, consistent with Article 38, above.

Article 41.

The Prime Minister shall have day-to-day responsibility for the management of the government, and he may dismiss ministers with the approval of an simple majority of the National Assembly. The Presidency Council may, upon the recommendation of the Commission on Public Integrity after the exercise of due process, dismiss the Prime Minister or the ministers.

Article 42.

The Council of Ministers shall draw up rules of procedure for its work and issue the regulations and directives necessary to enforce the laws. It also has the right to propose bills to the National Assembly. Each ministry has the right, within its competence, to nominate the employees of special grades, deputy ministers, and ambassadors. After the Council of Ministers approves these nominations, they shall be submitted to the Presidency Council for ratification. All decisions of the Council of Ministers shall be taken by simple majority of those of its members present.

CHAPTER SIX – THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

Article 43.

- (A) The judiciary is independent, and it shall in no way be administered by the executive authority, including the Ministry of Justice. The judiciary shall enjoy exclusive competence to determine the innocence or guilt of an accused pursuant to law, without interference from the legislative or executive authorities.
- (B) All judges sitting in their respective courts as of 1 July 2004 will continue in office thereafter, unless removed from office pursuant to this Law.
- (C) The National Assembly shall establish an independent and adequate budget for the judiciary.

- (D) Federal courts shall adjudicate matters that arise from the application of federal laws. The establishment of these courts shall be within the exclusive competence of the federal government. The establishment of these courts in the regions shall be in consultation with the presidents of the judicial councils in the regions, and priority in appointing or transferring judges to these courts shall be given to judges resident in the region.

Article 44.

A Higher Juridical Council shall be established and assume the role of the Council of Judges. The Higher Juridical Council shall supervise the federal judiciary and shall administer its budget. This Council shall be composed of the Presiding Judge of the Federal Supreme Court, the presiding judge and deputy presiding judges of the federal Court of Cassation, the presiding judges of the federal Courts of Appeal, and the presiding judge and two deputy presiding judges of each regional court of cassation. The Presiding Judge of the Federal Supreme Court shall preside over the Higher Juridical Council. In his absence, the presiding judge of the federal Court of Cassation shall preside over the Council.

Article 45.

- (A) The federal judicial branch shall include existing courts outside the Kurdistan region, including courts of first instance; the Central Criminal Court of Iraq; Courts of Appeal; and the Court of Cassation, which shall be the court of last resort except as provided in Article 46 of this Law. Additional federal courts may be established by law. The appointment of judges for these courts shall be made by the Higher Juridical Council. This Law preserves the qualifications necessary for the appointment of judges, as defined by law.
- (B) The decisions of regional and local courts, including the courts of the Kurdistan region, shall be final, but shall be subject to review by the federal judiciary if they conflict with this Law or any federal law. Procedures for such review shall be defined by law.

Article 46.

- (A) A court called the Federal Supreme Court shall be constituted by law in Iraq.
- (B) The jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court shall be as follows:
 - (1) Original and exclusive jurisdiction in legal proceedings between the Iraqi Transitional Government and the regional governments, governorate and municipal administrations, and local administrations.

- (2) Original and exclusive jurisdiction, on the basis of a complaint from a claimant or a referral from another court, to review claims that a law, regulation, or directive issued by the federal or regional governments, the governorate or municipal administrations, or local administrations is inconsistent with this Law.
- (3) Ordinary appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court shall be defined by federal law.
- (C) Should the Federal Supreme Court rule that a challenged law, regulation, directive, or measure is inconsistent with this Law, it shall be deemed null and void.
- (D) The Federal Supreme Court shall create and publish regulations regarding the procedures required to bring claims and to permit attorneys to practice before it. It shall take its decisions by simple majority, except decisions with regard to the proceedings stipulated in Article 46(B)(1), which must be by a two-thirds majority. Decisions shall be binding. The Court shall have full powers to enforce its decisions, including the power to issue citations for contempt of court and the measures that flow from this.
- (E) The Federal Supreme Court shall consist of nine members. The Higher Juridical Council shall, in consultation with the regional judicial councils, initially nominate no less than eighteen and up to twenty-seven individuals to fill the initial vacancies in the aforementioned Court. It will follow the same procedure thereafter, nominating three members for each subsequent vacancy that occurs by reason of death, resignation, or removal. The Presidency Council shall appoint the members of this Court and name one of them as its Presiding Judge. In the event an appointment is rejected, the Higher Juridical Council shall nominate a new group of three candidates.

Article 47.

No judge or member of the Higher Juridical Council may be removed unless he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or corruption or suffers permanent incapacity. Removal shall be on the recommendation of the Higher Juridical Council, by a decision of the Council of Ministers, and with the approval of the Presidency Council. Removal shall be executed immediately after issuance of this approval. A judge who has been accused of such a crime as cited above shall be suspended from his work in the judiciary until such time as the case arising from what is cited in this Article is adjudicated. No judge may have his salary reduced or suspended for any reason during his period of service.

CHAPTER SEVEN – THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL AND NATIONAL COMMISSIONS

Article 48.

- (A) The statute establishing the Iraqi Special Tribunal issued on 10 December 2003 is confirmed. That statute exclusively defines its jurisdiction and procedures, notwithstanding the provisions of this Law.
- (B) No other court shall have jurisdiction to examine cases within the competence of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, except to the extent provided by its statute.
- (C) The judges of the Iraqi Special Tribunal shall be appointed in accordance with the provisions of its founding Statute.

Article 49.

- (A) The establishment of national commissions such as the Commission on Public Integrity, the Iraqi Property Claims Commission, and the Higher National De-Ba'athification Commission is confirmed, as is the establishment of commissions formed after this Law has gone into effect. The members of these national commissions shall continue to serve after this Law has gone into effect, taking into account the contents of Article 51, below.
- (B) The method of appointment to the aforementioned national commissions or any other commission that the National Assembly may create in the future shall be the same as that for the Presiding Judge and judges of the Federal Supreme Court, as contained in Article 46(E), above.

Article 50.

The Iraqi Transitional Government shall establish a National Commission for Human Rights for the purpose of executing the commitments relative to the rights set forth in this Law and to examine complaints pertaining to violations of human rights. The Commission shall be established in accordance with the Paris Principles issued by the United Nations on the responsibilities of national institutions. This Commission shall include an Office of the Ombudsman to inquire into complaints. This office shall have the power to investigate, on its own initiative or on the basis of a complaint submitted to it, any allegation that the conduct of the governmental authorities is arbitrary or contrary to law.

Article 51.

No member of the Iraqi Special Tribunal or of any commission established by the federal government may be employed in any other capacity in or out of government. This prohibition is

valid without limitation, whether it be within the executive, legislative, or judicial authority of the Iraqi Transitional Government. Members of the Special Tribunal may, however, suspend their employment in other agencies while they serve on the aforementioned Tribunal.

CHAPTER EIGHT – REGIONS, GOVERNORATES, AND MUNICIPALITIES

Article 52.

The design of the federal system in Iraq shall be established in such a way as to prevent the concentration of power in the federal government that allowed the continuation of decades of tyranny and oppression under the previous regime. This system shall encourage the exercise of local authority by local officials in every region and governorate, thereby creating a united Iraq in which every citizen actively participates in governmental affairs, secure in his rights and free of domination.

Article 53.

- (A) The Kurdistan Regional Government is recognized as the official government of the territories that were administered by the that government on 19 March 2003 in the governorates of Dohuk, Arbil, Sulaimaniya, Kirkuk, Diyala and Neneveh. The term “Kurdistan Regional Government” shall refer to the Kurdistan National Assembly, the Kurdistan Council of Ministers, and the regional judicial authority in the Kurdistan region.
- (B) The boundaries of the eighteen governorates shall remain without change during the transitional period.
- (C) Governorates outside the Kurdistan region, with the exception of Baghdad and Kirkuk, shall have the right to form regions from amongst themselves. The mechanisms for forming such regions may be [EITHER “PROPOSED” OR “PREPARED”] by the Iraqi Interim Government, and shall be presented and considered by the elected National Assembly for enactment into law. In addition to being approved by the National Assembly, any legislation proposing the formation of a particular region must be approved in a referendum of the people of the relevant governorates. [THIS IS OUR BEST EFFORT TO CAPTURE THE ESSENCE OF THE AGREEMENT; PLEASE REVIEW.]
- (D) This Law shall guarantee the administrative, cultural, and political rights of the Turcomans, ChaldoAssyrians, and all other citizens.

Article 54.

- (A) The Kurdistan Regional Government shall continue to perform its current functions throughout the transitional period, except with regard to those issues which fall within the exclusive competence of the federal government as specified in this Law. Financing for these functions shall come from the federal government, consistent with current practice and in accordance with Article 25(E) of this Law. The Kurdistan Regional Government shall retain regional control over police forces and internal security, and it will have the right to impose taxes and fees within the Kurdistan region.
- (B) With regard to the application of federal laws in the Kurdistan region, the Kurdistan National Assembly shall be permitted to amend the application of any such law within the Kurdistan region, but only to the extent that this relates to matters that are not within the provisions of Articles 25 and 43(D) of this Law pertaining to the exclusive competence of the federal government.

Article 55.

- (A) Each governorate shall have the right to form a Governorate Council, name a Governor, and form municipal and local councils. No member of any regional government, governor, or member of any governorate, municipal, or local council may be dismissed by the federal government or any official thereof, except upon conviction of a crime by a court of competent jurisdiction as provided by law. No regional government may dismiss a Governor or member or members of any governorate, municipal, or local council. No Governor or member of any Governorate, municipal, or local council shall be subject to the control of the federal government except to the extent that the matter relates to the competences set forth in Article 25 and 43(D), above.
- (B) Each Governor and member of each Governorate Council who holds office as of 1 July 2004, taking into account the law on local government that shall be issued, shall remain in place until such time as free, direct, and full elections, conducted pursuant to law, are held, or, unless, prior to that time, he voluntarily gives up his position, is removed upon his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude or related to corruption, or upon being stricken with permanent incapacity, or is dismissed in accordance with the law cited above. When a governor, mayor, or member of a council is dismissed, the relevant council may receive applications from any eligible resident of the governorate to fill the position. Eligibility requirements shall be the same as those set forth in Article 31 for membership in the National Assembly. The new candidate must receive a majority vote of the council to assume the vacant seat.

Article 56.

- (A) The Governorate Councils shall assist the federal government in the coordination of federal ministry operations within the governorate, including the review of annual ministry plans and budgets with regard to activities in the governorate. Governorate Councils shall be funded from the general budget of the State, and these Councils shall also have the authority to increase their revenues independently by imposing taxes and fees; to organize the operations of the Governorate administration; to initiate and implement province-level projects alone or in partnership with international, and non-governmental organizations; and to conduct other activities insofar as is consistent with federal laws.
- (B) The *Qada'* and *Nahiya* councils and other relevant councils shall assist in the performance of federal responsibilities and the delivery of public services by reviewing local ministry plans in the afore-mentioned places; ensuring that they respond properly to local needs and interests; identifying local budgetary requirements through the national budgeting procedures; and collecting and retaining local revenues, taxes, and fees; organizing the operations of the local administration; initiating and implementing local projects alone or in conjunction with international, and non-governmental organizations; and conducting other activities consistent with applicable law.
- (C) Where practicable, the federal government shall take measures to devolve additional functions to local, governorate, and regional administrations, in a methodical way. Regional units and governorate administrations, including the Kurdistan Regional Government, shall be organized on the basis of the principle of de-centralization and the devolution of authorities to municipal and local governments.

Article 57.

- (A) All authorities not exclusively reserved to the Iraqi Transitional Government may be exercised by the regional governments and governorates as soon as possible following the establishment of appropriate governmental institutions.
- (B) Elections for governorate councils throughout Iraq and for the Kurdistan National Assembly shall be held at the same time as the elections for the National Assembly, no later than 31 January 2005.

Article 58.

- (A) The Iraqi Transitional Government, and especially the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other relevant bodies, shall act expeditiously to take measures to remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime's practices in altering the demographic character of certain regions, including Kirkuk, by deporting and expelling individuals from their places of residence, forcing migration in and out of

the region, settling individuals alien to the region, depriving the inhabitants of work, and correcting nationality. To remedy this injustice, the Iraqi Transitional Government shall take the following steps:

- (1) With regard to deported and expelled residents, it shall, in accordance with the statute of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other measures within the law, within a reasonable period of time, restore the residents to their homes and property, or, where this is unfeasible, shall provide just compensation.
 - (2) With regard to the individuals newly introduced to specific regions and territories, it shall act in accordance with Article 10 of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission statute to ensure that such individuals may be resettled, may receive compensation from the state, may receive new land from the state near their residence in the governorate from which they came, or may receive compensation for the cost of moving to such areas.
 - (3) With regard to persons deprived of employment or other means of support in order to force migration out of their regions and territories, it shall promote new employment opportunities in the regions and territories.
 - (4) With regard to nationality correction, it shall repeal all relevant decrees and shall permit affected persons the right to determine their own national identity and ethnic affiliation free from coercion and duress.
- (B) The previous regime also manipulated and changed administrative boundaries for political ends. The Presidency Council of the Iraqi Transitional Government shall make recommendations to the National Assembly on remedying these unjust changes in the permanent constitution. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree unanimously on a set of recommendations, it shall unanimously appoint a neutral arbitrator to examine the issue and make recommendations. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree on an arbitrator, it shall request the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint a distinguished international person to be the arbitrator.
- (C) The permanent resolution of disputed territories, including Kirkuk, shall be deferred until after these measures are completed, a fair and transparent census has been conducted and the permanent constitution has been ratified. This resolution shall be consistent with the principle of justice, taking into account the will of the people of those territories.

CHAPTER NINE – THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

Article 59.

- (A) The permanent constitution shall contain guarantees to ensure that the Iraqi Armed Forces are never again used to terrorize or oppress the people of Iraq.
- (B) Consistent with Iraq's status as a sovereign state, and with its desire to join other nations in helping to maintain peace and security during the transitional period of ongoing terrorism, the Iraqi Armed Forces will be a principal partner in the multinational force operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003) and any subsequent relevant resolutions. This arrangement shall last until the ratification of a permanent constitution and the election of a new government pursuant to that new constitution.
- (C) Upon its assumption of authority, and consistent with Iraq's status as a sovereign state, the Iraqi Transitional Government shall have the authority to conclude binding international agreements regarding the activities of the multi-national force operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003), and any subsequent relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. Nothing in this Law shall affect rights and obligations under these agreements, or under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003), and any subsequent relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, which will govern the multi-national force's activities pending the entry into force of these agreements.

Article 60.

The National Assembly shall write a draft of the permanent constitution of Iraq. This Assembly shall carry out this responsibility in part by encouraging debate on the constitution through regular general public meetings in all parts of Iraq and through the media, and receiving proposals from the citizens of Iraq as it writes the constitution.

Article 61.

- (A) The National Assembly shall write the draft of the permanent constitution by no later than 15 August 2005.
- (B) The draft permanent constitution shall be presented to the Iraqi people for approval in a general referendum to be held no later than 15 October 2005. In the period leading up to the referendum, the draft constitution shall be published and widely distributed to encourage a public debate about it among the people.

- (C) The general referendum will be successful and the draft constitution ratified if a majority of the voters in Iraq approve and if two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates do not reject it.
- (D) If the permanent constitution is approved in the referendum, elections for a permanent government shall be held no later than 15 December 2005 and the new government shall assume office no later than 31 December 2005.
- (E) If the referendum rejects the draft permanent constitution, the National Assembly shall be dissolved. Elections for a new National Assembly shall be held no later than 15 December 2005. The new National Assembly and new Iraqi Transitional Government shall then assume office no later than 31 December 2005, and shall continue to operate under this Law, except that the final deadlines for preparing a new draft may be changed to make it possible to draft a permanent constitution within a period not to exceed one year. The new National Assembly shall be entrusted with writing another draft permanent constitution.
- (F) If necessary, the president of the National Assembly, with the agreement of a majority of the members' votes, may certify to the Presidency Council no later than 1 August 2005 that there is a need for additional time to complete the writing of the draft constitution. The Presidency Council shall then extend the deadline for writing the draft constitution for only six months. This deadline may not be extended again.
- (G) If the National Assembly does not complete writing the draft permanent constitution by 15 August 2005 and does not request extension of the deadline in Article 61(D) above, the provisions of Article 60(E), above, shall be applied.

Article 62.

This law shall remain in effect until the permanent constitution is issued and the new Iraqi government is formed in accordance with it.

EF-9191
04/004825

APR 07 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Afghan Security Responsibility

I think we ought to propose that CENTCOM take over all Afghan security and be responsible for seeing that the Germans get the police done and all of that other stuff. It just isn't happening fast enough there.

Any thoughts on this?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
033004-20

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

Policy ExecSec's Note

June 11, 2004

CAPT Marriott:

• Copy provided to SD office on 5/17/04.

• ISA is updating response based on a June 8, 2004 DSD snowflake. (See attached.)

C. L. O'Connor

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

07-04-04 18:44 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/25808

OSD 11042-04

I-04/007771
CF-9831

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Military Assistant

8 Jun 04 - 1600

MEMORANDUM FOR USD(P)

SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces

Sir,

The Deputy observed that progress toward expanding Afghan security forces has been slow. The Deputy asks:

- a. What are the causes for lagging progress?
- b. What actions should be taken now to accelerate our efforts?

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Mark R. Hagerott
Commander, USN
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUSPENSE: 14 Jun 04

cc: DJS
EA VCJCS

11-1-0559/OSD/25809

OSD 08573-04

July 23, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Crawford Options

On the subject we talked about this morning, if people couldn't get down to Crawford on Monday or Tuesday, or the President didn't want to take that much time to host everybody, you could do it by SVTC. He could discuss his issues and give instructions to the group via SVTC.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072304-13

Obowt

23501dy

OSD 11043-04

July 26, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Op-ed

Attached is an interesting op-ed by Stephen Sestanovich entitled, "How Saddam Failed the Yeltsin Test."

Respectfully,

Attach.
"How Saddam Failed the Yeltsin Test"

DHR:dh
072604-8

ITag

26501 04

How Saddam Failed the Yeltsin Test

By Stephen Sestanovich

Most anyone who's worked in government has a story — probably re-told often these days, given the Iraq debate — about facing a big decision on the basis of information that then turned out to be wrong. My favorite is from August 1998 when, with Bill Clinton just three days away from a trip to Moscow, the Central Intelligence Agency reported that President Boris Yeltsin of Russia was dead.

In 1998 the news that Mr. Yeltsin had died was, of course, no more surprising than the news, in 2003, that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. It matched what we knew of his health and habits, and the secretive handling of his earlier illnesses. Nor was anyone puzzled by the lack of an announcement. Russia's financial crash 10 days earlier had set off a political crisis, and we assumed a fierce Kremlin succession struggle was raging behind the scenes.

In the agonizing conference calls that ensued, all government agencies

Stephen Sestanovich is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a professor of international diplomacy at Columbia University. From 1997 to 2001 he was United States ambassador at large for the former Soviet Union.

played their usual parts. The C.I.A. stood by its sources but was uncomfortable making any recommendation. National Security Council officials, knowing Mr. Clinton wasn't eager for the trip, wanted to pull the plug immediately. The State Department (in this case, me) insisted we'd look pretty ridiculous canceling the meeting because Mr. Yeltsin was dead — only to discover that he wasn't.

Eventually we decided that the Russians had to let the deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, who was in Moscow for pre-summit meetings, see Mr. Yeltsin within 24 hours or the trip was off. Nothing else would convince us: no phone call, no television ap-

**Bush was right to
put the onus on Iraq
to avoid war.**

pearance, no doctor's testimony. The next day Mr. Yeltsin, hale and hearty, greeted Mr. Talbott in his office, and two days later Bill Clinton got on the plane to Moscow.

When the trip was over, I phoned the C.I.A. analyst who had relayed the false report. He was apologetic — sort of. "You have to understand," he said. "We missed the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests last spring. We're under

a lot of pressure not to miss anything else."

Some of the lessons of this episode are the same as those emerging from the Iraq debate: sensitive intelligence is often too weak to guide important decisions; if the information fits what we already believe, or what we want to do, it gets too little scrutiny.

Yet Mr. Yeltsin's "near-death experience" of 1998 carries another lesson that unfortunately hasn't been part of the current controversy. When policymakers have imperfect information about a serious problem (which is almost always), what should they do? The answer, then as now, is to shift the burden of proof to the other guy. If we had been denied that meeting with Mr. Yeltsin, it would hardly have proved that he was dead. But we would have canceled the trip all the same. Russian uncooperativeness — not our poor intelligence — would have left us no choice.

Going to war and canceling a trip are vastly different matters, but what the Bush administration did with Saddam Hussein in the run-up to war followed the same rule: it challenged him to prove that American intelligence was wrong, so that the responsibility for war was his, not ours.

Clearly, President Bush and his advisers did not expect Saddam Hussein to cooperate in this test, and might still have wanted war if he had. But even if the administration had handled other aspects of the issue differently, it would still have been neces-

sary to subject Iraq to a test. In our debate about the war, we need to acknowledge that the administration set the right test for Saddam Hussein — and that he did not pass it.

When America demanded that Iraq follow the example of countries like Ukraine and South Africa, which sought international help in dismantling their weapons of mass destruction, it set the bar extremely high, but not unreasonably so. The right test had to reflect Saddam Hussein's long record of acquiring, using and concealing such weapons. Just as important, it had to yield a clear enough result to satisfy doubters on both sides, either breaking the momentum for war or showing that it was justified.

Some may object that this approach treated Saddam Hussein as guilty until proved innocent. They're right. But the Bush administration did not invent this logic. When Saddam Hussein forced out United Nations inspectors in 1998, President Clinton responded with days of bombings — not because he knew what weapons Iraq had, but because Iraq's actions kept us from finding out.

A decision on war is almost never based simply on what we know, or think we know. Intelligence is always disputed. Instead, we respond to what the other guy does. This is how we went to war in Iraq. The next time we face such a choice, whether our intelligence has improved or not, we'll almost surely decide in the very same way. □

~~FOUO~~

BCC: GEN DICK MYERS
PAUL WOLFOWITZ
DOUG FEITH
GEN. CASEY

JUL 26 2004

TO: Ambassador John Negroponte

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Property Disputes

One of the issues still pending is the problem of the properties that Saddam Hussein took from people in the north and gave to people from the south.

Iraq

Since that happened, the properties have been sold, and the current occupants of those properties in many cases are legitimate owners, even though the people who originally owned the houses were dispossessed unfairly.

A process to solve that is critically important. It seems to me that that is a project that you might want to consider working on with the Iraqi Interim Government.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072204-6

cc:
Hon. Coun Powell

26 501 04

~~FOUO~~

RSS - SecDef CablesESO

From: Casey George GEN MNF-I CG [CaseyG@iraq.centcom.smil.mil]
Sent: Monday, July 26, 2004 10:03 PM
To: 'RSS - SecDef CablesESO'
Subject: RE: 2 pg memo for Negroonte and Casey from Rumsfeld

acknowledged

-----Original Message-----

From: RSS - SecDef CablesESO [mailto:CablesESO@osd.smil.mil]
Sent: Monday, July 26, 2004 6:45 PM
To: 1LT Kathleen Bikus (E-mail); COL James Barclay (E-mail); LTG George Casey (E-mail); MAJ Anthony Hale (E-mail); John Espinoza (E-mail); Negroonte, John (New York), ,State; Negroonte, John D (NEA/I) (Main State), ,State
Subject: 2 pg memo for Negroonte and Casey from Rumsfeld


Classification: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Please email receipt confirmation of 2-pg doc for GEN Casey and **Amb** Negroonte from SecDef.

VR/ Capt Steinfadt

(b)(6)

August 4, 2004

TO: Joe Califano
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Family Day Proclamation

006

Attached is a note I just received on the Family Day Proclamation.

Regards,

Attach.
8/4/04WH memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
080404-11


4 Aug 04

22 Jul 04

OSD 11203-04

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 4, 2004

TO: SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: HARRIET MIERS 
SUBJECT: Family Day Proclamation

This note responds to your memo of July 28th to Secretary Andrew Card. The White House will be proclaiming September 27th Family Day. The Family Day Proclamation has been issued annually for a day in September since 2001. Please let me know if *this is the* information you wished. If I may be of any further assistance to you please let me know.

Thank you-

July 28, 2004

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Family Day Proclamation

006

Andy—

Joe Califano asked me to help again this year in encouraging the President to make a Presidential Proclamation in regards to Family Day. They would like to have an opportunity to publicize it in plenty of time.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/13/04 Califano letter to POTUS

28 JUL 04

DHR:dh
072804-15

22 JUL 04

OSD 11203-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25817



The National Center on
Addiction and Substance Abuse
at Columbia University

May 13, 2004

The President
The White House
Office of Presidential Messages
and Proclamations
Washington, D.C. 20502

655 Third Avenue
New York NY 10017-6706

phone 212 841 5200
fax 212 056 8020
www.casacolumbia.org

Faxed to (b)(6) 5/13/04

Dear Mr. President:

Board of Directors

- Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Chairman and President
- tee C. Bollinger
Columbia Bush
- Kenneth I. Chenault
- Jamie Lee Curtis
- James Dilmon
- Peter R. Dolan
- Mary Fisher
- Victor F. Ganzl
- Leo-Arthur Kelmenson
- Donald R. Keough
- David A. Kessler, M.D.
- Manuel T. Pscheco, Ph.D.
- Joseph J. Plumeri II
- Shari E. Redstone
- E. John Roscnwald, Jr.
- Michael P. Schulhof
- Louis W. Sullivan, M.D.
- John J. Sweeney
- Michael A. Wiener

I am writing to request a presidential Proclamation for *Family Day: A Day to Eat Dinner With Your Children*, an initiative of The National Center On Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA) at Columbia University. Each year since its inception in 2001, you have issued a Presidential Proclamation proclaiming *Family Day*. A copy of each proclamation is attached.

Since 1996, CASA research has consistently shown that the more often children eat dinner with their families, the less likely they are to smoke, drink or use illegal drugs. *Family Day - A Day to Eat Dinner With Your Children* is a national effort to promote parental engagement as a simple, effective way to reduce substance abuse by children and teens and raise healthier children. *Family Day* emphasizes the importance of regular family activities in parent-child communications and encourages Americans to make family dinners a regular feature of their lives. In addition to your proclamation, the governors of 35 states and more than 200 cities and counties have issued *Family Day* proclamations each year. Last year your mother, former First Lady Barbara Bush, appeared in television spots to publicize *Family Day* and Jamie Lee Curtis did the same on the radio.

Directors Emeritus

- James E. Burke (1988-1997)
- Beuy Ford (1992-1998)
- Douglas A. Fraser (1992-2003)
- Barbara C. Jordan (1992-1998)
- LaSalle Loffall (1992-2001)
- Nancy Reagan (1995-2000)
- Linda J. Rice (1992-1998)
- George Rupp (1995-2002)
- Michael I. Sovern (1992-1993)
- Frank G. Wells (1992-1994)

Also attached are background information on *Family Day*, CASA, a copy of the letter from Joseph A. Califano, Jr, President of CASA, to Mr. Andy Card, and the response from Melissa Bennett. We would like the proclamation by June 15, 2004 because of our request to The Office of Scheduling for a June presidential ceremony to publicize *Family Day*.

If you need further infarmation, please Contact me at (b)(6) and kgerard@casacolumbia.org. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Kathleen Gerard
Director of Development

Enclosures



FAMILY DAY, 2003

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

Children thrive in loving families where they are taught, nurtured, and comforted. By spending time with our children and stressing the importance of making the right choices, parents and other family members help them develop into confident, successful individuals.

Families can help secure a healthy tomorrow for their children by providing guidance, staying involved, and serving as role models. I am committed to supporting strong families and strong marriages to help ensure that every child grows up in a safe, loving family. Statistics show that children from two-parent families are less likely to end up in poverty, drop out of school, become addicted to drugs, have a child out of wedlock, suffer abuse, or become a violent criminal. Because stable families should be the central goal of American welfare policy, I have proposed spending up to \$300 million a year to find the most effective programs to strengthen marriage.

Parents play a critical role in discouraging harmful behavior such as experimenting with alcohol, drug, and tobacco. Research shows that teens often listen to their parents when it comes to decisions about harmful substances and risky behaviors. Regular family activities provide opportunities for parents to communicate important messages and enhance their relationships with their children. Recent studies from the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University found that teens from families who eat dinner together were less likely to use illegal drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes, while teenagers who rarely eat dinner with their parents were more likely to engage in these unhealthy activities.

Families and all Americans can act together to educate our youth about the dangers of drugs and alcohol and help them grow into healthy, responsible, compassionate citizens. In order to ensure a brighter future for our Nation, and safe, healthy, and happy lives for our children, our children must learn that avoiding harmful substances is an ongoing responsibility. As we work to educate our next generation about making healthy choices, we renew our commitment to the American family.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim September 22, 2003, as Family Day. I call upon the people of the United States to observe this day by engaging in activities to strengthen the relationships between parents and children and help fight against substance abuse and risky behaviors.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-eighth day of August, in the year of our Lord two thousand three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twenty-eighth.

1/2
00
(b)(6)

FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

Date: July 22, 2004

To: The Honorable *Donald H. Rumsfeld*, Secretary of Defense

Fax: (b)(6)

From: Joseph A. Califano, Jr. 

Direct Phone: (b)(6)

Direct Fax: (b)(6)

#of Pages (Including this cover):

Dear Don,

Thanks so much for your help last year obtaining a Presidential Proclamation for *Family Day* in advance of the day. This year we are again having trouble getting a proclamation in a timely manner. May I ask you to please intervene again?


Family Day: A Day to Eat Dinner with Your Children will be held on September 27, 2004 and we would like to have the Proclamation as soon as possible in order to publicize it widely. The President will get much credit for this around the country and this year we have many more sponsors -- corporate, non-profit, community and government. We plan to have radio and TV spots featuring board member Jamie Lee Curtis and Barbara Bush as well as bus and subway posters, slides in movie theaters, and much local involvement.

I sent a letter to Andy Card in February asking for a Presidential Proclamation and *Family Day* ceremony. Scheduling did not permit the ceremony. Following are copies of a staff letter sent in May to the Office of Presidential Proclamations and the *Family Day* 2003 Proclamation. We have been told by the office that the request is under consideration and we will not be apprised of their decision until closer to the event.

I'm sorry to bother you with this and thanks for any and all help you can give us.

Best regards.

Sincerely,


Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

OSD 11203-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25820

(b)(6)




Account code: 150

The information contained in this telecopy message is intended only for the use of the individual of entity named above and may contain information that is privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under any applicable law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, please immediately notify us by telephone and return the original message to us at the above address via the US Postal Service. Thank You.

7/22/04
(b)(6)

FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

Date: July 22, 2004
To: The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Fax: 703.697.8339
From: Joseph A. Califano, Jr. 
Direct Phone: (b)(6)  **Direct Fax:** (b)(6) 
#of Pages (Including this cover):

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Best regards.

Sincerely,


Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

OSD 11203-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25822

(b)(6) Account code: 150

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(b)(6)

(b)(6)

May 13, 2004

The President
The White House
Office of Presidential Messages
and Proclamations
Washington, D.C. 20502

655 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10017-0708

(b)(6)

Faxed to 202.455.2895 5/13/04

www.casncolumbia.org

Dear Mr. President:

Board of Directors

- Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Chairman and President
- Lee C. Bollinger
- Columba Bush
- Kenneth I. Chagnak
- Jamie Lee Curtis
- James Dimon
- Peter R. Dolan
- Mary Fisher
- Victor F. Ganz
- Leo Arthur Kelmenson
- Donald R. Keough
- David A. Kessler, M.D.
- Manuel T. Pscheco, Ph.D.
- Joseph J. Plumeri II
- Sharp E. Redstone
- F. John Rosenwald, Jr.
- Michael P. Schulhof
- Louis W. Sullivan, M.D.
- John J. Sweeney
- Michael A. Wiener

I am writing to request a Presidential Proclamation for **Family Day: A Day to Eat Dinner With Your Children**, an initiative of The National (b)(6) at Columbia University. Each year since its inception in 2001, you have issued a Presidential Proclamation proclaiming **Family Day**. A copy of each proclamation is attached.

Since 1996, (b)(6) research has consistently shown that the more often children eat dinner with their families, the less likely they are to smoke, drink or use illegal drugs. **Family Day - A Day to Eat Dinner With Your Children** is a national effort to promote parental engagement as a simple, effective way to reduce substance abuse by children and teens and raise healthier children. **Family Day** emphasizes the importance of **regular family** activities in parent-child communications and encourages Americans to make family dinners a regular feature of their lives. In addition to your proclamation, the governors of 35 states and more than 200 cities and counties have issued **Family Day** proclamations each year. Last year your mother, former first Lady Barbara Bush, appeared in television spots to publicize **Family Day** and Jamie Lee Curtis did the same on the radio.

Directors Emeritus

- James E. Burke (1992-1997)
- Billy Ford (1992-1998)
- Douglas A. Fraser (1992-2005)
- Barbara C. Jordan (1992-1998)
- LaSalle Lefell (1992-2001)
- Nancy Reagan (1995-2000)
- Linda J. Rice (1992-1998)
- George Rupp (1993-2002)
- Michael I. Sovern (1992-1995)
- Frank C. Wells (1992-1994)

Also attached are background information on **Family Day**, (b)(6) a copy of the letter from Joseph A. Califano, Jr, President of (b)(6) to Mr. Andy Card, and the response from Melissa Bennett. We would like the proclamation by June 15, 2004 because of our request in The Office of Scheduling for a June presidential ceremony to publicize **Family Day**.

If you need further information, please contact me at (b)(6) and kgerard@casncolumbia.org. Thank you

Sincerely,

Kathleen Gerard
Director of Development

Enclosures



FAMILY DAY, 2003

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

Children thrive in loving families where they are taught, nurtured, and comforted. By spending time with our children and stressing the importance of making the right choices, parents and other family members help them develop into confident successful individuals.

Families can help secure a healthy tomorrow for their children by providing guidance, staying involved, and serving as role models. I am committed to supporting strong families and strong marriages to help ensure that every child grows up in a safe, loving family. Statistics show that children from two-parent families are less likely to end up in poverty, drop out of school, become addicted to drugs, have a child out of wedlock, suffer abuse, or become a violent criminal. Because stable families should be the central goal of American welfare policy, I have proposed spending up to \$300 million a year to fund the most effective programs to strengthen marriage.

Parents play a critical role in discouraging harmful behavior such as experimenting with alcohol, drugs, and tobacco. Research shows that teens often listen to their parents when it comes to decisions about harmful substances and risky behaviors. Regular family activities provide opportunities for parents to communicate important messages and enhance their relationships with their children. Recent studies from the (b)(6) at Columbia University found that teens from families who eat dinner together are less likely to use illegal drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes, while teenagers who rarely eat dinner with their parents were more likely to engage in these unhealthy activities.

Families and all Americans can act together to educate our youth about the dangers of drugs and alcohol and help them grow into healthy, responsible, compassionate citizens. In order to ensure a brighter future for our Nation, and safe, healthy, and happy lives for our children, our children must learn that avoiding harmful substances is an ongoing responsibility. As we work to educate our next generation about making healthy choices, we renew our commitment to the American family.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim September 22, 2003, as Family Day, I call upon the people of the United States to observe this day by engaging in activities to strengthen the relationships between parents and children and help fight against substance abuse and risky behaviors.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand, this twenty-eighth day of August, in the year of our Lord two thousand three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twenty-eighth.

~~FOUO~~

July 27, 2004
0072704-6

TO: Ray DuBois
cc: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Document/Material Retention or Destruction

At the staff meeting this morning the subject came up about our policy on retention of documents and other old materials.

Please get with the General Counsel, and come in and tell me what the current rules are and what you think they ought to be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072704-6

Please respond by 8/16/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11225-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25826



2004 AUG 19 PM 2:21

INFO MEMO

313

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director Administration and Management

Ray DuBois 8/16/04

SUBJECT: Policy on Document Retention

- In the attached July 27, 2004 snowflake you asked what our policy was on the retention of documents and other old materials, and that I brief you on the current rules and what I **think** they should be.
- The standards for records management are established by statute, and we implement these standards in coordination with the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
- In brief, official documents are used to conduct DoD business while personal documents may relate to political activities, personal or family matters, social or civic activities, or may be personal copies of official documents (not original copies).
- Official documents are organized into series based on **office of origin** and are categorized by NARA as either temporary (with destruction date) or permanent (retained forever for their historical or research value). Only 5% of official documents are categorized as permanent.
- For instance, SecDef letters, memos, and other official documentary materials (official photographs, graphics, audio and video recordings, etc) are in Series 212 (Office of the SecDef), are considered permanent, and will be preserved in the National Archives.
- SecDef permanent records are maintained under our control for **30 years** and are stored at the Washington National Records Center, Suitland, MD, prior to their transfer to the National Archives.
- The current rules are in full compliance with Federal laws and regulations, and no changes are deemed **necessary or are recommended**.

16 AUG 04

COORDINATION: OGC *D J Dell'Ob* 8/16/04

Attachment: As stated

Prepared By: Ms. Luz Ortiz, ESCD (b)(6)

OSD 11225-04

27 JUL 04

~~FOUO~~

July 27, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT Document/Material Retention or Destruction

At the staff meeting *this morning* the subject came up about our policy on retention of **documents** and **other old materials**.

Please *get* with the General Counsel, and come in and **tell me** what the **current** rules are and what you think *they* ought to be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072704-6

.....
Please respond by 8/16/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11225-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25828

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

TAB A

July 1, 2004

819

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Personnel Out of UN Missions

How long before we are going to finish **up** on getting those people out of those UN missions? I would like to be posted on where it stands and when it is finished.

UN

Thanks.

DHR:dh
(76)04-18

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

1501

Tab A

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 11237-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25829

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

USMOG-W

COL de la Pena

8 July 2004

DASD(NP)

Guy Roberts

8 July 2004

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/25830



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1954704
27 July 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 7/27*

SUBJECT: Personnel Out of UN Missions

- **Question.** "How long before we are going to finish up on getting those people out of those UN missions? I would like to be posted on where it stands and when it is finished."
(TAB A)
- **Answer.** US personnel have been withdrawn from the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The three officers and four military observers (MilObs) previously assigned to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) have returned to CONUS. After the 8 July signature of an Article 98 agreement by Eritrea, the United States has resumed its commitment to UNMEE and reassigned six officers to this mission. Five are currently in place.
- **Analysis**
 - UNMIK Personnel. Lieutenant Colonel Bilandzich, USAR, has returned to CONUS. Colonel Bagley was home on leave when the issue arose. He was reassigned temporarily to the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR) and returned to Kosovo on 7 July to out-process from UNMIK and collect his personal effects. Colonel Bagley is now in CONUS awaiting reassignment.
 - UNMEE Personnel
 - MilObs Lieutenant Commander Stewart, Major Bascom, Captain Schell and Lieutenant Dyer have departed the mission entirely. Captains Knepper and Wilson returned to CONUS on 30 June and Lieutenant Colonel Parker followed on 5 July.
 - Eritrea has signed and entered into force an Article 98 agreement securing sufficient bilateral protection from the International Criminal Court for US personnel operating in Eritrea with the UNMEE mission. An administrative and technical status of forces agreement in Ethiopia provides sufficient protection in that country. Five officers are currently in place, with one more due to arrive in country by 4 August.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

OSD 11237-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25831

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

TAB A

July 1, 2004

819

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Personnel Out of UN Missions

How long before we are going to **finish up** on getting those people out of those UN missions"? I would **like** to be posted on where it stands and when it is finished.

Thanks.

DHR:bl
070104-18

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

Tab A

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 11237-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25832

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

USMOG-W

COL de la Pena

8 July 2004

DASD(NP)

Guy Roberts

8 July 2004

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/25833

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 23, 2004

811

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Follow Up w/Karzai

What is the process to follow up on the meetings we had with Karzai concerning the US security involvement in that country post the current global war on terrorism problems?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062304-9

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 11294-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25834



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319-9000

SECRET

INFO MEMO

CM-1959-04 28 JUL 20 01 5:30
28 July 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 7/28*

SUBJECT: Follow Up w/Karzai

- **Question.** "What is the process to follow up on the meetings we had with Karzai concerning the US security involvement in that country post the current global war on terrorism problems?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** My staff is coordinating with OSD/NESA on a synopsis that outlines a way ahead for future US-Afghan bilateral military agreements. OSD/NESA will provide this brief to you when complete.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA, Director J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/25835

OSD 11294-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 23, 2004

811

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Follow Up w/Karzai

What is the process to follow up on the meetings we had with Karzai concerning the US security involvement in that country post the current global war on terrorism problems?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
082304-9

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

0 SD 11294-04

TAB B

OSD(NESA)

Mr. Kurt Amend

July 12, 2004

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/25837

TAB A

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

JUL 12 2004

813

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Pete Geren
MG Michael Maples

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Compensation Procedures

I testified in Congress that we would develop procedures to compensate those individuals who sustained abuse at Abu Ghraib. What is the status of that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070804-1

.....
Please respond by 7/16/04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

O SD 11295-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/25838



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20316-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1960-04

28 July 2004 2004 JUL 28 PM 5:41

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *FBM 7/28*

SUBJECT: Compensation Procedures

- **Question.** "I testified in Congress that we would develop procedures to compensate those individuals who sustained abuse at Abu Ghraib. What is the status of that?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** On 1 June, DOD General Counsel, the lead office for this issue, sent a memorandum to the Secretary of the Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy containing procedures for handling claims for compensation. The Joint Staff reviewed the proposal and replied on 10 June.²
- **Analysis.** It is my understanding that DOD General Counsel received final response to the 1 June memorandum on 12 July and the information will be presented for your review and approval in the near future.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

References:

- 1 DOD OGC memorandum, 1 June 2004, "Processing of Claims of Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment"
- 2 CJCS memorandum CM-1827-04, 10 June 2004, "Processing of Claims of Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment"

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

OSD 11295-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/25839

TAB A

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

JUL 12 2004

813

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Pete Geren
MG Michael Maples
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Compensation Procedures

I testified in Congress that we would develop procedures to compensate those individuals who sustained abuse at Abu Ghraib. What is the status of that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070804-1

.....
Please respond by 7/16/04

OSD 11295-04

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Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/25840

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

OGC

Ron Neubaer

13 July 2004

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/25841

Tab B

TAB A

May 25, 2004

785

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Foreign Troops in Iraq

Iraq

We have to have a major push on to get troops to:

- Protect the UN.
- Help in the elections.
- Help train Iraqi forces.
- Help replace US troops.
- Help guard borders, ports, power stations and infrastructure.

There ought to be a lot of reasons we can talk countries into bringing in their troops.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052504-7

.....
Please respond by 6/11/04

25 May 04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/25842

OSD 11296-04

JUL 28 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Pearl Harbor

I may have previously sent you Dr. Thomas Schelling's foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's book, *Pearl Harbor*.

461

But I just re-read it and, even though you may have read it at an earlier time, I think you will find it interesting to re-read it. I say this because of the intelligence we have been reading every day in recent months.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Thomas Schelling's foreword to *Pearl Harbor*, by Roberta Wohlstetter

DHR:dh
072704-10

cc: VICE PRESIDENT

2850104

OSD 11298-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25843

FOREWORD

It would be reassuring to believe that Pearl Harbor was just a colossal and extraordinary blunder. What is disquieting is that it was a supremely *ordinary* blunder. In fact, "blunder" is too specific; our stupendous unreadiness at Pearl Harbor was neither a Sunday-morning, nor a Hawaiian, phenomenon. It was just a dramatic failure of a remarkably well-informed government to call the next enemy move in a cold-war crisis.

If we think of the entire U.S. government and its far-flung military and diplomatic establishment, it is not true that we were caught napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. Rarely has a government been more expectant. We just expected wrong. And it was not ~~our~~ warning that was most at fault, but our strategic analysis. We were ~~so~~ busy thinking through some "obvious" Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against the choice that they actually made.

And it was an "improbable" choice; had we escaped surprise, we might still have been mildly astonished. (Had we not provided the target, though, the attack would have been called *off*.) But it ~~was~~ not all *that* improbable. If Pearl Harbor was a **long** shot for the Japanese, so ~~was~~ war with the United States; assuming the decision **on** war, the attack hardly appears reckless. There is a tendency in ~~our~~ planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not **con-**sidered seriously looks strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what **is** improbable need not be considered seriously.

Furthermore, we made the terrible mistake—one we may have come

close to repeating in the 1950's—of forgetting that **a** fine deterrent can make a superb target.

Surprise, when it happens to **a** government, is likely to be **a** complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off **so** often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it **is** the occasion—which is usually too late. (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical background to tip us off to the climax.) Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck.

The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was cumulative, widespread, and rather drearily familiar. This is why surprise, when it happens to **a** government, cannot be described just in terms of startled people. Whether at Pearl Harbor or at the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government's (or in an alliance's) failure to anticipate effectively.

Mrs. Wohlstetter's book is a unique physiology of a great national failure to anticipate. If she is at pains to show how easy it was to slip into the rut in which the Japanese found **us**, it can only remind **us** how likely it is that we are in the same kind of rut right now. The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in **a** poverty of expectations—a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely. Alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion all seem to need to focus **on** a few vivid and oversimplified dangers. The planner should think in subtler and more variegated terms and **allow** for

a wider range of contingencies. But, as Mrs. Wohlstetter shows, the "planners" who count are also responsible for alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion; they are also very busy. This is **a** genuine dilemma of government. Some of its consequences are mercilessly displayed in this superb book.

*Center for International Affairs
Harvard University*

THOMAS C. SCHELLING



Pearl Harbor

Warning and Decision

Roberta Wohlstetter

"The best book by far on the question of why we were surprised at Pearl Harbor." — Samuel Eliot Morison

Stanford University Press

11-L-0559/OSD/25846

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Stanford, California
© 1962 by the Board of Trustees of the
Leland Stanford Junior University
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Original printing 1962
Last figure below indicates year of this printing:
98 97 96 95 94 93 92

TAB A

June 29.2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Preserving Antiquities in Babylon

You will recall in the Polish MoD meeting we agreed to put together an assessment team – US, Polish, and Iraqi – to take a look at Babylon and see what we can do to get that headquarters moved and to reduce the damage on the antiquities.

Iraq

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 062904-7(ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 7/19/04

29 Jun 04 285V104

OSD 11302-04

Tab A

TAB B

COORDINATION

OSD(P)	Mr. Shawn Steen	14 July 2004
USCENTCOM	CDR Lowman	15 July 2004

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/25848



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-1961-04
28 July 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 7/28*

SUBJECT: Preserving Antiquities in Babylon

- **Issue.** Following a recent meeting with the Polish Ministry of Defense, we agreed that an assessment team be assembled to review what could be done to relocate the Polish headquarters and preserve antiquities in Babylon (TAB A).
- **Conclusion.** Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) will lead the assessment team.
- **Discussion.** The team will focus primarily on where headquarters can be relocated in order to protect Babylonian antiquities while preserving the headquarters' effectiveness. The MNF-I-led assessment team will invite participation of the Polish headquarters and the Iraqi Ministry of Culture, attempt to incorporate expertise from Middle East antiquities authorities and coordinate its findings with USCENTCOM and US Mission, Baghdad.
- The assessment team will report its findings by 22 August 2004.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: LTG W. L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

OSD 11302-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25849

TAB A

June 29, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Preserving Antiquities in Babylon

You will recall **in the Polish MoD meeting we agreed** to put together an assessment team – US, Polish, and Iraqi – to take a look at Babyion and *see* what **we** can do to get that headquarters **moved** and to reduce the damage on the antiquities.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062904-7 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

7/19/04

OSD 11302-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/25850

TAB B

COORDINATION

OSD(P)	Mr. Shawn Steen	14 July 2004
USCENTCOM	CDR Lowman	15 July 2004

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/25851

July 28, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Europe Over the Decades

Mr. President--

Attached is an illustrative list of issues that were major points of contention either between or among the United States and some countries in Europe. I send it because of the frequent references in the press that the differences between the U.S. and Europe are unusual or at an all-time high.

The fact of the matter is that what is occurring between the U.S. and Europe today is probably less contentious than has been the case in many periods over the past several decades. You may find it interesting to review this list.

Respectfully,

Attach.
Paper

DHR:dh
072804-7

Europe

28 Jul 04

OSD 11312-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25852

MAJOR STRAINS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

1950 – Truman - North Korea invades South Korea. Issue of allowing Germany to have troops for NATO use. France was alone in opposition.

1955-1956 – Eisenhower – Suez Crisis pits Britain and France against U.S. over strike on Egypt.

1957 – Eisenhower – Soviets launch Sputnik, raising fears about the Soviet Union's growing ICBM capabilities. Europe questions U.S. ability to help protect it amid expanding Soviet capabilities.

1960-1962 – Eisenhower/Kennedy - European governments (led by the British) were unhappy with U.S. refusal to share nuclear information. U.S. offers to sell Britain Skybolt air-to-ground missile technology. When Skybolt technology failed, a large argument flared between NATO countries about Americans providing Britain with Polaris missiles. The British thought they were entitled to technology, but the U.S. did not agree. Eventually, they came to a compromise and Polaris was given to Brits.

1962 – Kennedy – Cuban Missile Crisis antagonized Europeans over America's lack of consultation with them.

1966 – Johnson - de Gaulle announces France's intention to withdraw from NATO's military command structure in protest of the dominance of U.S. commanders, and threw NATO Headquarters out of France.

1969 - Nixon - Many Western European countries questioned U.S. policies in Vietnam.

1971-1975 – Nixon/Ford - The Mansfield Amendment, proposing a 50 percent reduction in the U.S. combat troops in Europe (then numbering about 300,000) was defeated in the U.S. Senate by a vote of 61-36, and was the source of friction among NATO allies and the transatlantic relationship.

1973 – Nixon - Kissinger's "Year of Europe" effort to bolster the NATO alliance included a call for increases in military spending by European nations. The Europeans would not agree to more military spending while the alliance leader was still engaged in Vietnam. More broadly, they saw the move toward a more integrated Atlantic partnership as a challenge to their own integration and identity. Opposition to it was led by France.

1977-1978 – Carter - German-led opposition to U.S. development of a neutron bomb that could destroy troops, but not property. After Carter pushed allies to accept plans to develop the weapon, he dropped the project due to domestic political concerns, angering Germany.

1979 – Carter - The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. NATO views on the Soviet threat grew further apart, as the U.S. was ready for a more confrontational policy, while Europeans were anxious to save what was left of detente.

1981 – Reagan - Reagan Administration's decision to proceed with full production of the neutron bomb led to strong debate among NATO allies.

1981-1983 – Reagan - Europeans campaign against U.S. deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe.

1982 – Reagan - The Soviets tried to take advantage of tensions in the NATO alliance by offering large contracts to Western European nations for cooperating with the construction of a large natural gas pipeline. The Reagan Administration used import controls and economic sanctions to deter European countries that might wish to help build the pipeline.

1984 – Reagan - Americans become frustrated at the failure of NATO allies in Western Europe to provide more in military forces and economic support for their own defense.

1990 – George Herbert Walker Bush - Major post-Cold War debate between European countries about strengthening Western Europe's defenses and reducing its dependence on the U.S.

1992 – George Herbert Walker Bush - The argument of whether or not NATO should extend membership to newly freed countries of Eastern and Central Europe caused sharp divides. Some member countries saw the alliance as a passive hedge against the return of a Soviet threat, while others wanted the Alliance to play a more active role in reaching out to former adversaries.

1994 – Clinton - The wars of Yugoslav dissolution create strains in the alliance. As the wars dragged on, some members saw NATO's minimalist role as increasingly unsustainable. Frictions grew, particularly between the U.S. and other Allies, over what constituted a proper course of action.

1999 – Clinton - Criticism of how the Kosovo campaign was conducted - too great a U.S. and too small a European contribution - dominated debate.

July 28, 2004

2004 – George W. Bush - Disagreements over deployment of NATO forces to train Iraqi troops. France opposed.

2004 – George W. Bush - Disagreements over providing NATO troops to oversee Afghan elections. France opposed.

Current – George W. Bush - The NATO role in combating terrorism has caused frequent differences between France (with Luxembourg and Belgium) versus the rest of the Alliance.

120
SEC STATE:
BY HAND?
BY FAX

08/7/29

OSD/ISA/NESA
I-04/009608-NES AR
ES-0196
JUL 26 2004

ACTION MEMO

Afghanistan

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *For Ryan Lenny PDASD(P)*

SUBJECT: Asia Foundation Survey on Afghanistan

- You asked about an Asia Foundation survey mentioned by President Karzai during his June 14 meeting with you.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign and send the attached note (Tab A), which commends the results of this survey to Secretary Powell and Dr. Rice.

Concur _____ Non-Concur _____ Other _____

Attachments: Letter

Prepared by: Dipali Mukhopadhyay, ISA/NESA, (b)(6)

DUSD/NESA _____

PDASD/ISA _____

26 Jul 04

OSD 11374-04

1/27
1430

June 14, 2004

EF-9871

I-04/008048

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita



7/29
Larry also
moving on
PA front

SUBJECT: Asia Foundation Survey

We ought to move around that Asia Foundation survey and make sure the world knows it.

Thanks.

DHR dh
061404-31

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

NTB SecDef

Paul Butler

7/29
L 7/27

Sir,
Response Attached.

CA 7/29
LTCOL Greg Bengel 7/27

14 Jun 04

26 Jul 04

OSD 11374-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25857

12-03-04 09:50 IN



(b)(6)

VOTER EDUCATION PLANNING SURVEY

Afghanistan 2004 National Elections

A REPORT BASED **ON** A PUBLIC OPINION POLL

Report Authors

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The Asia Foundation

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AC Nielsen India ORG-MARG

Research & Fieldwork

Afghan Media Resource Center (AMRC)



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(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/25858

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Key Findings

- The mood is positive in most of the country, with almost two-thirds of respondents saying that the country is headed in the right direction.
- Afghans identified the major problems facing their country as its weak economy, the security situation, a poor educational system, and shattered infrastructure.
- Nonetheless, a large majority is pleased with the Transitional Government and President Hamid Karzai's job performance.
- Afghans feel somewhat more secure and much freer than they did under the Taliban. However, more say they have lost than gained economically since then.
- There are regional differences in mood, and region plays as great a role as ethnicity in shaping political outlooks. In particular, interviewees the South and Northwest were more negative than respondents in other regions about the direction of the country, job ratings for the government and president, and security and freedom of political expression.
- Most Afghans interviewed view the Taliban unfavorably, with majorities unfavorable to them in every region and even among those dissatisfied with the Transitional Government.
- The UN and foreign aid workers are generally popular with Afghans. The US and American troops are also regarded favorably by the majority, but the South and Northwest again remain exceptions.
- Most Afghan citizens surveyed know of the election and registration requirements and intend to vote as they are hopeful that the election will make a difference.
- However, there is substantial doubt as to whether the election will be free and fair, with potential vote buying and cheating in the count primary among the concerns. Doubts about the fairness of elections are closely related to a lack of knowledge of the process: most voters do not know that the ballot will be secret or that there will be election monitors.
- The problems facing Afghan women are widely recognized by both men and women, chief among them are lack of power and lack of education.

- Most Afghans believe that women will need the permission of husbands or fathers to vote in the coming elections. Between one in five and one in three women may not be allowed to vote.
- Two-thirds of Afghans interviewed can offer a meaning for democracy. The principal meanings they ascribe include freedom, rights and law, elections, and women's rights.
- Political tolerance, regarding parties or between persons, is low among the Afghans interviewed.
- Radio, especially foreign radio (Azadi/Radio Free Asia, VOA, BBC) reaches a majority of Afghans and is the preferred medium for voter education. Among those who do not listen to the radio, the preferred sources are village chiefs and religious leaders.
- Only one woman in five, at most, is completely housebound.² Visiting neighbors and doing household chores were the **two** most frequent answers from women about why they leave the house.

² A "housebound" woman does not leave the house at least once a month for any of the following activities: visiting neighbors, doing household chores, visiting family and friends, visiting a health clinic, shopping, taking children to school, or taking children to a health clinic.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUL 29 2004

Afghanistan

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Asia Foundation Survey

When I met with President Karzai on June 14, 2004, he mentioned the findings of an Asia Foundation survey on Afghanistan. The results are worth reviewing (see attached).

Highlights include:

- 62% of Afghans were pleased with Karzai's performance;
- 67% expressed a positive sentiment on the presence of US military forces;
- 64% responded unfavorably toward the Jihadi leaders;
- Only 9% considered democracy and Islam to be incompatible;
- 64% were able to identify at least one characteristic of a democratic country; and
- Only 24% of those who expressed dissatisfaction with the Transitional Government responded favorably towards the Taliban.

With the exception of responses in the Northwest and the South, the results suggest a sense of cautious optimism among the Afghans.

cc: White House Communication Director's Office

29 Jul 04

26 Jul 04

OSD 11374-04



July 29, 2004

IRAQ

TO: Gen. George Casey

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Training for Protection

One of the other projects is to get people trained up to protect the Iraqi senior political leadership, so that we can take our military people off that assignment. Please include that in your periodic reporting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072904-8

.....
Please respond by 8/13/04

OSD 11377-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25862

2974104



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JUL 30 2004

Mrs. Bodman
c/o Walter Reed Army Medical Center
Office of Public Affairs
Building 1, Room C 110
6900 Georgia Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20307-5001

Dear Mrs. Bodman:

Thank you for your contribution to the rehabilitation and convalescence of our wounded servicemembers at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. What you do is important.

Keep up the great work, and thanks again.

Sincerely,

335 59

30 JUL 04

OSD 11421-04



July 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Mrs. Bodman

7/20
DR

LARRY DI RITA
7/20!

Please find out what Mrs. Bodman does out at Walter Reed. Apparently she is helping out there. It might be something we would want to get some other folks helping on.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070104-33

.....
Please respond by 7/16/04

*Sir,
options
below*

335SD

DR 7/22

✓ Do a letter to her
— No Further action

- 30 -
- END -

1 JUL 04

*Sir,
Response attached*

*YR
Lt Col Lengyel
7/20
30 JUL 04*

720

REC'D 30 JUN

file

June 29, 2004

TO: Larry Lanzillotta
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*
 SUBJECT: DoD Airline Ticket Abuse

2482

Please get back to me with a report on how you are going to fix this business on airline tickets reported in this article.

Thanks.

Attach.

Margasak, Larry. "Pentagon Wasted Millions on Airline Tickets, GAO Says," *Washington Post*, June 9, 2004, p. 8

DHR:dh
062904-11 (ts computer).doc



Please respond by 7/26/04

29 JUN 04

Sr. *8/4*
 Response attached.
 v/r,
 Lt Col Greg Lengyel
 8/4

29 JUN 04

OSD 11512-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECRET
201 112 2 11:43

INFO MEMO

COMPTROLLER

July 29, 2004 5:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: DoD Airline Ticket Abuse

- You asked that I tell you how we are going to fix the Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified deficiencies on airline tickets reported in a news article.
- What we have done to date.
 - Notified personnel, via remarks on their Leave and Earnings Statements, to return unused airline tickets to their travel offices.
 - Directed the Military Services to instruct military and civilian personnel to not claim as reimbursable expenses the tickets purchased through their organizations charge account and to return all unused tickets.
 - Approved a pilot program between the Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the Bank of America to compare electronic files of travel charge card transactions for potential fraud and misuse.
 - Requested assistance from the General Services Administration to address automatic cancellation and refund of tickets as part of the City-Pairs contract with the airlines.
 - Issued policy requiring all commercial travel offices contracts be reviewed and modified, as necessary, to ensure systematic identification of unused tickets and refund of tickets not used 30 days after the date of the last leg of scheduled travel.
 - Recovered overpayments on 99 of 123 cases the GAO identified.
- What we are currently doing: Military Services are researching 400 of the highest dollar value tickets to determine the status of the tickets, and determine possible resolution. Estimated completion date is first quarter FY 2005.
 - Researching additional 27,000 potential erroneous payments.

OSD 11512-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25866

- Fielding the Defense Travel System (DTS); full deployment scheduled by the end of FY 06. DTS will provide greater oversight and controls to prevent both unused tickets and improper reimbursements to travelers.
- The Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) has agreed to accept responsibility for travel policy and to oversee the consolidation of travel management activities.

COORDINATION: TAB A.

Prepared by: Jacqueline Jenkins, (b)(6)

RECV'D 30 JUN

June 29, 2004

TO: Larry Lanzillotta
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*
SUBJECT: DoD Airline Ticket Abuse

Please get back to me with a report on how you are going to **fix** this business on airline tickets reported in this article.

Thanks.

Attach.
Margasak, Larry. "Pentagon Wasted Millions on Airline Tickets. GAO **Says**," Washington Post, June 9, 2004, p. 8

DHR:dh
062904-11 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 7/26/04

Washington Post
June 9, 2004
Pg. 8

Pentagon Wasted Millions On Airline Tickets, GAO Says

By Larry Margasak, Associated Press

The Defense Department spent an estimated \$100 million for airline tickets that were not used over six years and failed to seek refunds even though the tickets were reimbursable, congressional investigators say.

The department compounded the problem by reimbursing employee claims for tickets the Pentagon bought, the investigators said.

To demonstrate how easy it was to have the Pentagon pay for airline travel, the investigators posed as defense employees, had the department generate a ticket and showed up at the ticket counter to pick up a boarding pass.

The General Accounting Office of Congress issued the findings in two reports on the Pentagon's lack of control over airline travel, copies of which the Associated Press obtained yesterday. A prior report, issued last November, found that the Pentagon bought 68,000 first-class or business-class airline seats for employees who should have flown coach.

"At a time when our soldiers are patrolling the streets of Iraq in unarmored Humvees, and when the Bush administration is asking for record defense spending, Secretary [Donald H.] Rumsfeld is letting hundreds of millions of dollars that could be used to protect our troops and our country go to waste," said Rep. Janice D. Schakowsky (D-Ill.), one of three lawmakers -- along with Republican Sens. Charles E. Grassley (Iowa) and Susan Collins (Maine) -- who ordered the studies.

The GAO estimated that between 1997 and 2003, the Defense Department bought at least \$100 million in tickets that were not used or used only partially by a passenger who did not complete all legs of a flight. The waste went undetected because the department relied on individuals to report the unused tickets. They did not.

The Pentagon said in a written statement that it is working to ensure it receives credit in the future for each unused ticket.

"We take this deficiency in our procedures very seriously and are moving swiftly to establish proper management controls. The long-term answer will be the automated Defense Travel System [DTS] that controls the travel order and payment process from beginning to end," the statement said. "DOD is researching the data presented in the GAO report and will continue to pursue the amounts we determine are recoupable."

The reimbursable tickets had no advanced purchase requirements, minimum or maximum stays or penalties for changes or cancellations under department agreements with the airlines.

While one GAO report focused on the unused tickets, the second investigation found potential fraud. It said the department paid travelers for tickets the department bought and reimbursed employees for tickets that had not been authorized.

A limited review of records for 2001 and 2002 identified 27,000 transactions totaling more than \$8 million in reimbursements to employees for tickets bought by the government. These figures represent only a small portion of the potential fraud, the GAO said.

It is a crime for a government employee knowingly to request reimbursement for goods and services he or she did not buy.

darick

TAB

A

Coordination:

Prin Dep Under Sec of Def (P&R)	Mr. Charles Abell	July 21, 2004
Ass Dep Under Sec of Def (AT&L)	Mr. Earl Boyanton	July 22, 2004
Director, DFAS	Mr. Zack Gaddy	July 20, 2004



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

AUG 2 2004

Mr. George Fernandes
3 Krishna Menon Marg
New Delhi 110011
India

Dear Mr. Fernandes:

It was a pleasure working with you during the past few years in your capacity as Minister of Defence. I appreciate your leadership and commitment to strengthen the bilateral defense relationship between our countries. As a result of your efforts, U.S.-India defense ties are stronger.

It was with dismay that I read press reports indicating that you had not received proper treatment at United States airports in 2002 and 2003. I regret that such incidents occurred.

Sincerely,

Warm regards

India

2 Aug 04

16 Jul 04



OSD 11552-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25873

7/21
1030
11/21

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

08/13

July 16, 2004

ES-6167
I-04/009596-ES

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Letter to Indian MoD

I think I probably ought to get a letter off to George Fernandes telling him how sorry I was that this incident occurred that is described here in the newspaper.

India

Thanks.

Attach.
"The Wand Beneath His Wings" *Washington Post*, In the Loop

DHR:dh
071604-9

.....
Please respond by _____

~~TO Secret~~
TO Secret

LF
Larry D. Feith
7/27

Exec Sec
Send back
to policy to
make changes.
Thanks
Paul Butler
Filed 2/27 7/29

16 Jun 2004

05-07-64 17:40 IN

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 11552-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25874

THE HINDU

Date:15/07/2004 URL:

<http://www.thehindu.com/2004/07/15/stories/2004071506220900.htm>

National

Not strip-searched: Fernandes

NEW DELHI, JULY 14 . As controversy raged over his "frisking" at a U.S. airport last year, the former Defence Minister, George Fernandes, today denied he underwent a "strip-search."

"Nothing like a strip-search happened there," he told reporters here referring to the book authored by a former United States Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, which says that the then Defence Minister, Mr. Fernandes, was "strip-searched" twice. Mr. Fernandes said he was asked to remove his coat, shoes and socks, which he did. "Then I was asked to spread my arms and raise them," he said, adding after that *khel khatam ho gaya* (the drama ended).

The former Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, today said he was not aware of the controversial searching of Mr. Fernandes by airport security in the United States. "I don't know about it," he told Zee News.

Asked whether he had not been informed about the incident, he said: "No." Appreciating the United States Embassy for expressing regret and apology over the "strip-searching" of Mr. Fernandes during his visit to the United States two years ago as Defence Minister, the Congress said the silence on the part of Mr. Vajpayee and his External Affairs Minister was "intriguing..."

"They (Vajpayee and his External Affairs Minister) should break their silence on the issue," the party's spokesman, Anand Sharma, told reporters here. — PTI

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Strip-search incident: Armitage apologises

July 14,200413:03 IST

Last Updated: July 14,200415:24 IST

US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage on Wednesday said he was "horrified" by the the incident of strip-searching involving former defence minister George Fernandes during an official visit to the US.

"On the way in the car here, I had the opportunity to telephone my old friend George Fernandes and told him I had heard about the problem he had. E was horrified about it and I personally apologised to him," Armitage told reporters after he met Leader of the Opposition Lal Kishenchand Advani.

Former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott in his just published book has said Fernandes was strip-searched twice at Dulles airport when he was defence minister -- once on an official visit to Washington in early 2002 and another time while enroute to Brazil in mid 2003.

The US Embassy in Delhi said Fernandes was not strip-searched but a security wand was waved over him when a key in his pocket set off the metal detector.

"Fernandes played an important role in the burgeoning US-India relationship and we consider him the cherished friend of the US," an embassy spokesman said.

Fernandes, who confirmed reports that he was searched, has said he will never visit the US again.

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Never strip-searched in US airports, says Advani

Press Trust of India
Bangalore, July 11

Former Deputy Prime Minister LK Advani on Sunday said he had never been strip-searched in US airports and he would talk to NDA convenor George Fernandes, who as Defence Minister had reportedly undergone such an exercise twice.

"I did not face it during my visits," Advani replied to questions on reports from Washington quoting former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott that Fernandes was strip-searched twice in Dulles Airport when he was Defence Minister.

The BJP leader maintained that shedding of shoes and socks was a normal security check and officials who accompanied them had to undergo that but wondered whether that can be called strip-search.

If such incidents had implications, Advani said he believed Fernandes would have brought up the subject which was not the case.

Advani also expressed the view that it would not be correct for the Indian Government to protest this (shedding of shoes and socks for security check) as all passengers are subjected to such a procedure.

But he said he would certainly talk to Fernandes to find out the facts. Though he found it strange to liken shedding of shoes and socks to strip-check.

Printed From 

Fernandes confirms strip-search, says he won't visit US again

HT Correspondent
New Delhi, July 11

George Fernandes has confirmed he was strip-searched twice at Washington's Dulles airport when he visited the US as defence minister in 2002 and 2003. He has described the experience as an "ordeal", and said he will never visit the US again.

The story of Fernandes's humiliation has appeared in former **US** deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott's book *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb*.

"I cannot forget the ordeal which I underwent in the US and have decided not to go there in future," PTI quoted Fernandes as saying in Muzaffarpur on Sunday.

According to the report, the Americans went ahead with the search despite repeated pleas by the Indian ambassador to spare the minister the embarrassment. Fernandes said he had informed PM A.B. Vajpayee about the incidents.

Meanwhile, PTI Bangalore quoted former home minister L.K. Advani as saying he had never had such an experience in the US, and would "talk" to Fernandes about it.

Printed From **HindustanTimes.com**

Fernandes strip-searched twice during visit to US: Talbott

Press Trust of India

Washington, July 19

George Fernandes was strip-searched twice in Dulles Airport in the US capital area when he was Defence Minister, once while on an official visit to Washington and another time while en route to Brazil, according to former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.

In his new book *Engaging India - Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb*, Talbott says he was told this angrily by Fernandes himself when he had visited India in February this year as part of a delegation assembled by the Asoen Institute and the Confederation of Indian Industry.

"Our group held a series of meetings with senior officials--Brajesh Mishra, Yashwant Sinha and George Fernandes--who all voiced some unease that the American government was treating Musharraf with kid gloves. But they also expressed general satisfaction with the way things were going between the US and India," writes the former Deputy Secretary of State.

Talbott says, "Fernandes, as Defence Minister, made much of how American-Indian military cooperation was thriving. India, in short, had weathered the storm of American sanctions and was now well on its way to establishing itself as a military partner.

"Just as we were saying good-bye to Fernandes, a member of our delegation innocently asked him when he would next be coming to Washington. His demeanour abruptly changed. It was as though he was glad to have an excuse to tell us how he really felt about our country.

"Ignoring an Ethiopian delegation that was already filing into his office and taking its seats, Fernandes regaled us with the story of how he had been strip-searched by officers of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service at Dulles Airport when he arrived for an official visit in early 2002, and again, in mid-2003, when he was passing through the US on his way to Brazil.

"He seemed to enjoy our stupefaction at this tale. He and other Indians who later referred to the incident clearly regarded it as more than merely a lapse of protocol or just another example of the post-9/11 excesses and indignities that air travellers had to endure for the sake of security. The Indians saw it as a symptom of a deep-rooted widespread condescension--or worse--on the part of the West toward the East."

Printed From 



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRET
AGS 110-3 PM 3:12

INFO MEMO

CM-1973-04
3 August 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers/2*

SUBJECT: Combatant Commanders'/Service Chiefs' Conference Agenda Item: Voting Issues

- **Issue.** In response to your statement; "The combatant commanders' conference is a good time to have them report back to us as to what they have done on this voting issue. Let's get that on the agenda." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** The briefing we received on 23 July, "DOD Absentee Voting Improvements Since 2000," has been added as an agenda item for the September 2004 Combatant Commanders'/Service Chiefs' Conference. Service Chiefs will provide status reports.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5;

(b)(6)

TAB
~~FOUO~~

July 23, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: RADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Agenda for CoCOM Conference

The combatant commanders' conference is a good time to have them **report back** to us as to what they have done on this voting issue. Let's **get** that on the **agenda**.

Thanks.

DHR:js
072304 11

.....
Please respond by _____

Tab

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/25881



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRET
2004 AUG -3 PM 3:19

INFO MEMO

CM-1973-04
3 August 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY/2*

SUBJECT: Combatant Commanders'/Service Chiefs' Conference Agenda Item: Voting Issues

- **Issue.** In response to your statement; "The combatant commanders' conference is a good time to have them report back to us as to what they have done on this voting issue. Let's get that on the agenda." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** The briefing we received on 23 July, "DOD Absentee Voting Improvements Since 2000," has been added as an agenda item for the September 2004 Combatant Commanders'/Service Chiefs' Conference. Service Chiefs will provide status reports.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

~~TAB~~
~~FOUO~~

July 23, 2004

TO: Gen. **Dick** Myers
CC: RADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Agenda for CoCOM Conference

The combatant commanders' conference is a good time to have them report back to us as to what they have done on this voting issue. Let's **get** that on the agenda.

Thanks.

DMR dh
072104 11

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/25883

TAB A

June 9, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Forces in Iraq and Kuwait

I would like to see a plan as to how we would begin to phase down forces from Kuwait and Iraq at the point when it is decided that it is appropriate to do so. It would be useful to begin thinking about that, so that we are ahead of the curve.

The same exercise should be undertaken with respect to Afghanistan.

I also noted that we have gone from 112,000 up to 143,000 troops in Iraq, and it seems to keep climbing. My recollection is that we were at 112,000 when General Abizaid said he wanted to go up by 19,000.

Also, I would be curious to know what skill sets are included in the increase of the 31,000 troops in Iraq.

Please get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:jh
060904-9

.....
Please respond by

6/18/04

04 JUN 10 09:21:22

Tab A

OSD 11592-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25884

TAB A

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 24, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Police Training

I need you to follow up and provide details as to what the Department of State has done on police training in Afghanistan and Iraq – from the time they had responsibility until today.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062404-9

.....
Please respond by 6/30/04

04 JUN 25 10:22

OSD 11594-04

Tab A

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/25885

August 9, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting on Corridors

2004 AUG -2 PM 4:00
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

000.915D

Please set a meeting for me with Paul Wolfowitz and Ray DuBois to discuss this paper on corridors. I will need it for the meeting.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/2/04 Dir. A&M memo to SecDef re: Corrdors [OSD11602-04] and SD memo #072204-14

DHR:dh
080904-19

.....
Please respond by 9/3/04

-UCB, from the OLD
SNOWFLAKE STACK.
Pls file.

JS
12/2

9 AUG 04

~~TOP SECRET~~

July 22, 2004

J 8/4

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld)
SUBJECT: Corridors

Please give me a list of all the corridors and what they are in honor of. Do we have one for World War I, WW II, Korea or Vietnam? Should we have one for the Global War on Terror? I know there are corridors for NATO, Eisenhower, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072204-14

.....
Please respond by _____

4/7/1

- ① Year each dedns
- ② J. 5 How Admit
- ③ Why 2 B-111
- ④ Why 2 F-117
- ⑤ Why 2 F-117
- ⑥ Why 2 F-117
- ⑦ Why 2 F-117
- ⑧ Why 2 F-117
- ⑨ Why 2 F-117
- ⑩ Why 2 F-117

Response attached.
v/R
Lt Col Greg Lengyel
8/5

~~TOP SECRET~~
⑥ H. Rumsfeld

AWM 01634-09



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
AUG 02 2004

INFO MEMO

AUG 02 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

RWB

Ray DuBois 8/2/04

SUBJECT: Corridors

- In the attached July 22 snowflake you asked for information about corridors here in the Pentagon and whether or not any were dedicated to WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam and the Global War on Terrorism.
- Also attached is an unofficial pamphlet that describes all the dedicated corridors as well as the major exhibits and displays here in the Pentagon.
- There are no corridors dedicated to a specific conflict; however, there are references, images, and memorabilia from/about them contained in various corridor displays and exhibits. **An** exhibit that featured artifacts and photographs from the Korean war was removed due to renovation and all items were returned to the Center of Military History.
- With the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) ongoing, it may be premature to dedicate one at the current time. As has been done for the other conflicts, a consideration may be to incorporate appropriate items and material related to the GWOT when our existing corridor displays and exhibits are refurbished and updated.
- As an aside, in the history of our military, there have been nine 5-star General/Flag officers – four Army (Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower and Bradley), four Navy (Leahy, King, Nimitz, and Halsey) and one Air Force (Arnold). There is a Pentagon corridor dedicated to each of the **Army** 5-stars and to the Air Force 5-star, but none to the Navy. However, in the Bradley Corridor, there is a panel that is dedicated to and lists all nine.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated





Prepared by: Brenda White, Graphics and Presentations Division,





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



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
OSD 11602-04


**Corridors/Exhibits
in the Pentagon**


Corridors	Description	Location
<p data-bbox="167 289 467 401">African Americans in Defense of Our Nation Corridor</p> 	<p data-bbox="570 289 1073 474">Dedicated to African Americans who contributed to the defense of our nation. Exhibit highlights 218 African Americans who have attained general and flag officer ranks.</p>	<p data-bbox="1105 289 1227 317">3A2-3E2</p>
<p data-bbox="167 714 500 783">Air Force Chiefs of Staff Corridor</p> 	<p data-bbox="570 714 1040 783">Contains paintings of past Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force.</p>	<p data-bbox="1105 714 1162 741">4E9</p>
<p data-bbox="167 1094 402 1121">ANZUS Corridor</p> 	<p data-bbox="570 1094 1065 1205">Commemorates the treaty enacted between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States in 1952.</p>	<p data-bbox="1105 1094 1195 1121">2A2-3</p>
<p data-bbox="167 1507 386 1535">Arnold Corridor</p> 	<p data-bbox="570 1507 1073 1724">Dedicated to General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold who was commander of the Army Air Forces in WWII and the only the air commander ever to attain the 5-star rank of general of the armies.</p>	<p data-bbox="1105 1507 1162 1535">4E8</p>


<p>Bradley Corridor</p> 	<p>Dedicated June 1972 to General Omar N. Bradley who served as Army Chief of Staff from 1948–1949 and later as first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1949–1953.</p>	<p>2E8</p>
<p>Bradley Corridor - Officers of Five-Star Rank</p> 	<p>A list of all nine Officers of Five-Star Rank is located within Bradley Corridor.</p>	<p>2E8</p>
<p>Career Civil Servants Corridor</p> 	<p>Display recognizes historic and current achievements of DoD career civilians covering the period between 1789-2004.</p>	<p>2A3–2</p>
<p>Joint Chiefs of Staff Corridor</p> 	<p>Corridor highlights the past Joint Chiefs of Staff and Vice Chairman's military history and along with their medals.</p>	<p>2A8–2E8</p>





<p>Joint Chairman's Portrait Corridor</p> 	<p>Contains paintings of past Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.</p>	<p>2E9</p>
<p>50th Anniversary of DOD Corridor</p> 	<p>Display contains factual information and images covering the first fifty years of the Department of Defense.</p>	<p>2A2-2E2</p>
<p>50th Anniversary of the Pentagon Corridor</p> 	<p>Display contains factual information, images and memorabilia covering the first fifty years of The Pentagon.</p>	<p>Corridor 3 Ramp to Concourse</p>
<p>MacArthur Corridor</p> 	<p>Dedicated to General Douglas MacArthur who was named Army Chief of Staff from 1930-1935. Served as Commanding General of the Southwest Pacific area from 1942-1945. Served as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers of Japan after the Japanese surrender in September 1945.</p>	<p>3A4-5</p>




Marshall Corridor	Dedicated April 1976 to General George C. Marshall who served as Army Chief of Staff from September 1939 – November 1945. Marshall served as Secretary of Defense from September 1950 – September 1951.	3E4.5–5
		


Marine Corps Commandants Corridor	Contains portraits of former Marine Commandants.	4A–E5
		


Military Women's Corridor	Contains historical artifacts and information covering the history of the women in the military.	In storage due to renovation and will be returned to new location, once determined.
		


NATO Corridor	Contains a historical portrayal of the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which was established in 1949. All NATO member nations are represented in the corridor.	2A9–10
		





<p>Navy Executive Corridor</p>	<p>Contains paintings of past Chiefs of Naval Operations and Navy models.</p>	<p>4E4-6</p>
		
<p>9/11 Quilts Corridor</p>	<p>Will display a variety of quilts donated in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the Pentagon.</p>	<p>1B4-E4</p>
		
<p>POW/MIA Corridor</p>	<p>Corridor is dedicated to all prisoners of war from the Vietnam Conflict.</p>	<p>4E7-8</p>
		<p>To be updated to reflect more recent conflicts – date TBD.</p>
<p>Secretaries of the Air Force Corridor</p>	<p>Contains paintings of past Secretaries of the Air Force.</p>	<p>4E8</p>
		


<p>Secretaries of Defense Corridor</p> 	<p>Portraits and brief biographies of past Secretaries of Defense while in office.</p>	<p>2A8-9</p>
<p>Secretaries of the Army Corridor</p> 	<p>Contains Army flags and portraits of former Secretaries of the Army.</p>	<p>3A5-3E5</p>
<p>Secretaries of Navy Corridor</p> 	<p>Portraits of past Secretaries of Navy.</p>	<p>In storage due to renovation and are to be relocated – date TDB.</p>


<p>Secretaries of War Corridor</p> 	<p>Portraits of Secretaries of War.</p>	<p>2A4-5</p>
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<p>soldiers and Signers of the Constitution Corridor</p> 	<p>Corridor honors 23 veterans of the Revolutionary War who were among the 40 original signers of the Constitution.</p>	<p>2A4-2E4</p>
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

<p>USO Corridor</p> 	<p>Covers the historical events of the United Service Organizations (USO) and their involvement in providing morale, welfare and recreation-type services to uniformed military personnel.</p>	<p>Corridor 2 Ramp to Concourse</p>
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Exhibits	Description	Location
<p data-bbox="180 317 488 348">Buffalo Soldier Exhibit</p> 	<p data-bbox="581 317 1029 386">Display is dedicated to the Buffalo Soldiers.</p>	<p data-bbox="1110 317 1317 499">Display is undergoing repairs and will be returned to 2A5.</p>
<p data-bbox="180 661 358 693">D-Day Ramp</p> 	<p data-bbox="581 661 1084 844">Contains 34 paintings depicting scenes from Operations Overlord during WWII. Painting were presented to Secretary of Defense William J. Perry on the 50th Anniversary of D-Day</p>	<p data-bbox="1110 661 1333 730">Concourse ramp to 3rd floor</p>
<p data-bbox="180 1043 505 1113">Hall of Heroes/Medal of Honor</p> 	<p data-bbox="581 1043 1052 1184">This hall is dedicated to the 3,440 recipients of the Medal of Honor for each of the services, our nations highest military decoration.</p>	<p data-bbox="1110 1043 1256 1113">Pentagon Concourse</p>
<p data-bbox="180 1425 548 1495">Joint Chiefs of Staff Legacy of Leadership Display</p> 	<p data-bbox="581 1425 1052 1537">Display of seven cases depicting the legacy of the leadership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1942 – 1993.</p>	<p data-bbox="1110 1425 1170 1457">2E8</p>

<p>Korean War Exhibit</p> 	<p>Contained historical artifacts and information covering the history of the Korean War.</p>	<p>Removed due to renovation and items returned to Center of Military History</p>
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<p>Kruzel Exhibit</p> 	<p>Dedicated to Joseph Kruzel in January 1996. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy who died in an accident while traveling outside Sarajevo in August 1995.</p>	<p>4D7-8</p>
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<p>Native Americans in Defense of Our Nation</p> 	<p>Display honors the American Indians and Alaskan Natives who served our nation with dignity and valor.</p>	<p>2A</p>
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Navy 9/11 Reflection Room	A prayer room honoring Navy personnel who were killed on 9/11.	1E4
		
9-11 Memorial	The memorial commemorates those killed in the terrorist attack on the morning of September 11, 2001.	1E4
		

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Raw

JUL 12 2004
1-04/007308
ES-0107

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Relationships in Asia

In the meeting with Aussies, I asked them what should we be fashioning now by way of relationships in Asia that in five years we would not be able to fashion. It is a useful question. They couldn't answer it. What do you think?

Asia

Thanks.

DHR dh
070804-8

OSD 11610-04

.....
Please respond by 7/30/04


Policy Executive Secretariat Note

August 2, 2004

Captain Marriott:

Richard Lawless provided the attached note to Mr. Feith describing his plan to address SecDef's question regarding relationships in Asia.

The attached is an interim response.

UR

June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

12 Jul 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/25900

11610-04

12-07-04 14:25 18



Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Asian and Pacific Affairs

MEMORANDUM FOR USDP

Info: ASD/ISA
PDASD/ISA


Subject: SD Snowflake: Relationships in Asia

Doug,

I've had the **AP** team consider the SD's question: "...what should we be fashioning by way of relationships in Asia that in five years we would not be able to fashion?" We are building the answer, but it is not a short one. We are at an historic moment in Asia regarding the GWOT, our global force posture movements, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, in PRC/TW relations, the rise of China, dealing with Islam, etc. As we craft this response to SD, we will generally address those treaty, bi-lateral, and multilateral relationships which will preserve/create peace and stability in Asia in order to pursue US interests. Among other things this will include movement toward democratization and fostering economic development within the region. We have some ideas.

The other principal issue we will address in this response will be managing our relationship with China, both within the region and elsewhere. "China rising" is not necessarily bad for the US and our interests, but we should play an active, not reactive role in managing China's development. We have ideas here too.

The suspense date is 30 July. We're asking for a bit more time, 13 Aug."


Richard Lawless

OSD 11610-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25901

JUL 22 4:36PM

July 2004

ASI
2 Aug 04
1252104

720
August 3, 2004

TO: Ambassador Zal Khalilzad
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to Cable

I talked to Ann Veneman about the cable you sent, and I am pushing it. I hope it helps.

Regards,

DHR:dh
080304-16

Afghanistan

3 Aug 04

OSD 11612-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25902

August 3, 2004

TO: Honorable Tom Ridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *R*

SUBJECT: Schelling Foreword

Attached is the foreword by Tom Schelling to Roberta Wohlstetter's book on Pearl Harbor.

Given the discussions currently underway, I think you will find it interesting.

Attach.

Schelling foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's **book, Pearl Harbor**]

DHR:dh
080304-5

461

3 Aug 04

OSD 11613-04

FOREWORD

It would be reassuring to believe that Pearl Harbor was just a colossal and extraordinary blunder. What is disquieting is that it was a supremely *ordinary* blunder. In fact, "blunder" is too specific; our stupendous unreadiness at Pearl Harbor was neither a Sunday-morning, nor a Hawaiian, phenomenon. It was just a dramatic failure of a remarkably well-informed government to call the next enemy move in a cold-war crisis.

If we think of the entire U.S. government and its far-flung military and diplomatic establishment, it is not true that we were caught napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. Rarely has a government been more expectant. We just expected wrong. And it was not our warning that was most at fault, but our strategic analysis. We were so busy thinking through some "obvious" Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against the choice that they actually made.

And it was an "improbable" choice; had we escaped surprise, we might still have been mildly astonished. (Had we not provided the target, though, the attack would have been called off.) But it was not all *that* improbable. If Pearl Harbor was a long shot for the Japanese, so was war with the United States; assuming the decision on war, the attack hardly appears reckless. There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what is improbable need not be considered seriously.

Furthermore, we made the terrible mistake—one we may have come

close to repeating in the 1950's—of forgetting that a fine deterrent can make a superb target.

Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it *is* the occasion—which is usually too late. (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical background to tip us off to the climax.) Finally, *as* at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck.

The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was cumulative, widespread, and rather drearily familiar. This *is* why surprise, when it happens to a government, cannot be described just in terms of startled people. Whether at Pearl Harbor or at the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government's (or in an alliance's) failure to anticipate effectively.

Mrs. Wohlstetter's book is a unique physiology of a great national failure to anticipate. If she is at pains to show how *my it was to* slip into the rut in which the Japanese found us, it can only remind us *how* likely it is that we are in the *same* kind of rut right now. The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in a poverty of expectations—a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely. Alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion all seem to need to focus on a few vivid and oversimplified dangers. The planner should think in subtler and more variegated terms and allow for

a wider range of contingencies. But, as Mrs. Wohlstetter shows, the "planners" who count are also responsible for alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion; they are also very busy. This is a genuine dilemma of government. Some of its consequences are mercilessly displayed in this superb book.

*Center for International Affairs
Harvard University*

THOMAS C. SCHELLING



Pearl Harbor

Warning and Decision

Roberta Wohlstetter

"The best book by far on the question of why we were surprised at Pearl Harbor." — Samuel Eliot Morison

Stanford University Press
Stanford, California

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Last figure below indicates year of this printing:
98 97 96 95 94 93 92

Stanford University Press

11-L-0559/OSD/25906

August 3, 2004

TO: John McLaughlin
Lt. Gen. Mike Hayden
Lt. Gen. Jim Clapper
VADM "Jake" Jacoby

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Schelling Foreword

461

Attached is the foreword by Tom Schelling to Roberta Wohlstetter's **book** on Pearl Harbor.

Given the discussions currently underway, I think you will find it interesting.

Attach.
Schelling foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's book, *Pearl Harbor*

DHR:dh
080304-7

OSD 11614-04

3 Aug 04

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If we think of the entire U.S. government and its far-flung military and diplomatic establishment, it is not true that we were caught napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. Rarely has a government been more expectant. We just expected wrong. And it was not our warning that was most at fault, but our strategic analysis. We were **so** busy thinking through some "obvious" Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against the choice that they actually made.

And it was an "improbable" choice; had we escaped surprise, we might still have been mildly astonished. (Had we not provided the target, though, the attack **would have** been called off.) But it was not all *that* improbable. If Pearl Harbor was a long shot for the Japanese, **so** was war with the United States; assuming the decision **on** war, the attack hardly appears reckless. There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency **we** have not considered seriously looks strange; what looks strange **is** thought improbable; what **is** improbable need not be considered seriously.

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*Center for International
Harvard*

THOMAS C. SCHELLING



Pearl Harbor

Warning and Decision

Roberta Wohlstetter

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Stanford University Press

11-L-0559/OSD/25910



August 3, 2004

TO: Honorable Jim Schlesinger
Honorable Harold Brown
Honorable Frank Carlucci
Honorable William Webster
Honorable Bill Vroman
ADM Bill Studer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Follow-up to Meeting

Thanks so much for coming in to visit about the 9/11 Commission recommendations. I appreciated it a great deal and I know our team found it most helpful.

Attached is the foreword by Tom Schelling to Roberta Wohlstetter's book on Pearl Harbor.

Given the discussions underway, I think you will find it interesting.

Attach.

Schelling foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's book, *Pearl Harbor*

DHR.jh
080304-8

461

3 Aug 04

OSD 11615-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25911

FOREWORD

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*Center for International Affairs
Harvard University*

THOMAS C. SCHELLING



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Stanford, California

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98 97 96 95 94 93 92

Stanford University Press

11-L-0559/OSD/25914

August 3, 2004

TO: Ms. Fran Townsend

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Schelling Foreword

Attached is the foreword by Tom Schelling to Roberta Wohlstetter's book on Pearl Harbor.

Given the discussions currently underway, I think you will find it interesting.

Attach.

Schelling foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's book, *Pearl Harbor*

DHR:dh
080304-9

OSD 11617-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25915

FOREWORD

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If we think of the entire U.S. government and its far-flung military and diplomatic establishment, it is not true that we were caught napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. Rarely has a government been **more** expectant. We just expected wrong. And it was not our warning that was most at fault, but our strategic analysis. We were so busy thinking through some "obvious" Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against the choice that they actually made.

And it was an "improbable" choice; had we escaped surprise, we might still have been mildly astonished. (Had we not provided the target, though, the attack would have **been** called off.) But it was not all *that* improbable. If Pearl Harbor was a long shot for the Japanese, so was **war** with the United States; assuming the decision on war, the attack hardly appears reckless. There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not **con-**sidered seriously looks strange; **what** looks strange is thought improbable; what is improbable need not be considered seriously.

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98 97 96 95 94 93 92

Stanford University Press

11-L-0559/OSD/25918

August 3, 2004

TO: The Honorable John Ashcroft

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Schelling Foreword

Attached is the foreword by Tom Schelling to Roberta Wohlstetter's book on Pearl Harbor.

Given the discussions currently underway, I think you will find it interesting.

Attach.

Schelling foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's book, *Pearl Harbor*

DHR:dh
080304-10

46

3 Aug 04

OSD 11618-04

FOREWORD

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August 3, 2004

TO: The Honorable Caspar Weinberger
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Schelling Foreword

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Attach.

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DHR:dh
080304-12

461

3 Aug 04

OSD 11619-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25923

FOREWORD

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Stanford University Press

11-L-0559/OSD/25926



August 3, 2004

TO: The Honorable Bob Gates
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Schelling Foreword

461

Attached is the foreword by Tom Schelling to Roberta Wohlstetter's book on Pearl Harbor.

Given the discussions currently underway, I think you will find it interesting.

Attach.

Schelling foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's book, *Pearl Harbor*

DHR:dh
080304-13

OSD 11620-04


3 AUG 04

11-L-0559/OSD/25927

720
~~LOT~~

April 19, 2004

Syria

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Syrian Border

Colin Powell raised the issue on the 600-mile Syrian border, and whether we want to work with Syria on it. I told him I wanted to talk to Abizaid about it.

Please talk to John Abizaid and find out what he proposes, and let's do it fast, so I will know before tomorrow's 7:00 a.m. phone call.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041904-6

.....
Please respond by 4/19/04

19 APR 04

OSD 11633-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25928

APR 19 2004

IRAQ

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Quotes in *Newsweek*

Newsweek says that I have said dismissively that what has been going on in Iraq was just a "flare-up."

Please see if I have ever said that publicly. I think the only place the word came up was in a classified briefing in the Senate Intel room, where I believe I said that that week we had seen some "flare-ups."

Newsweek is quoting me as being dismissive and quoting McCain. If it was only said in a classified briefing room, which I believe, I would like to know that. Also, please tell me the date of that intel meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041404-1

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

19 APR 04

OSD 11634-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25929

- APR 20 2004

0005

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Leverage of Terrorists

Attached is an interesting paper on the leverage that terrorists have. It might be useful at some point.

Thanks.

Attach.
"Wreaking Havoc" (anonymous, undated)

DHR:dh
041904-10

.....
Please respond by _____

20APR04

OSD 11635-04

Wreaking Havoc

It takes extraordinarily few people to do the kind of damage that we're witnessing in Iraq today or that other countries, including the United States, have witnessed in the past:

- It took only Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols (some might say there was a third accomplice) to kill 168 people in Oklahoma City;
- It took, I believe, less than 10 people to put a bomb in the basement of the World Trade Center in 1993 that killed 6 people and injured more than 1000. It was the largest improvised explosive device in the history of forensic science and was intended to topple one tower on top of the other – in which case it would have been far worse than September 11;
- It just took two snipers, one a teenager, to terrorize the Washington metropolitan area for the better part of a month;
- There were probably fewer than 10 people involved in the Bali bombing that killed approximately 200 people;
- It probably didn't take more than 10 people to do the bombing in Najaf that killed 150 people, including one of the most important Shia leaders in the country and which led to several weeks of reporting on alleged instability in southern Iraq;
- Of course, it took only 19 hijackers on September 11, 2001 to kill more than 3,000 people in this country;
- Perhaps most illuminating for the Iraq situation, a couple of hundred Provisional IRA terrorized the UK for a period of many years, killing an average of 300 people per year and 700 people in the peak year;
- The Baader-Meinhof Gang, I believe, was only a few dozen people at its height, and it terrorized Germany for a considerable number of years; and
- The same is true of the Red Brigades in Italy, who have actually enjoyed a recent minor comeback.

What is the point of all this?

Two things:

1. The leverage that terrorists can enjoy is simply enormous. It takes a whole society to effectively eliminate a few dozen or a few score who can do enormous damage in the meantime;
2. Most important, with respect to Iraq, it does not take a popularly based resistance to do this kind of damage. We might at some point end up facing a popularly-based resistance in Iraq, but what we are facing today is predominantly a rear-guard action by the murderers and sadists who abused Iraq for 35 years.

The frequency of suicide bombings in Baghdad and around the country certainly is not evidence of popular opposition. In fact, on the hopeful side, this terrorism might inspire more popular hostility to the terrorists and their allies.

However, to convert popular hostility into effective action, Iraqis need to be convinced that we (and they) will win. This is a crucial moment when many Iraqis are sitting on the fence, weighing the risks involved in supporting us. We need to do everything we can to encourage the many brave ones who are ready to fight for their future. Capturing Saddam has given these people a big shot in the arm. Trying him would be even better.

6/21
0900

72

In reply refer to EF-9320 & 041005404-ES

APR 20 2004

TO: Doug Feith
Jim Haynes

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

Paul Butler

6/23

SecDef

SUBJECT: Advice

What do you think about this fourth recommendation of Cerhard Caper?

Thanks.

Attach.
4/19/04 Haynes memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
041904-9

Please respond by 4/30/04

6/24
6/23

Sir,
Response attached.
w/CDR Nosenzo
6/23

3836

20 APR 04

OSD 11636-04

C4/19

April 19, 2004

For: Secretary of Defense

From: W.J. Haynes, General Counsel *W. J. Haynes*

Subject: Advice from Gerhard Casper

- I spoke with Gerhard earlier today about three topics:
- He continues to urge that we release the detainees at Guantanamo (GTMO). (He also promised to provide me comments on your proposed long-term review procedures for those that we don't release.)
- He observed that, if the Supreme Court rules that GTMO is not within the jurisdiction of U. S. courts, then "a technicality is being celebrated over substance."
- He recommended that we preserve an exit strategy for Iraq by negotiating an open-ended Status of Forces Agreement (or its equivalent), in which the U.S. states that it will remove its armed forces if ever asked by the legitimate government of Iraq.



DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
3030 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D C 20301-3030

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
As of February 7, 2006 4:00 PM

**RESPONSE TO SNOWFLAKE FOR THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ON DESALINIZATION**

Robert Ranger  

2/14 From: Mr. John J. Young, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering,

(b)(6)



- Desalination research is coordinated through the Expeditionary Unit Water Purification Program, executed by the Office of Naval Research.
- The White Paper provided by former Secretary Schultz is similar to past proposals Aqua Via has submitted to DoD, but contains less technical detail.
- The last water purification proposal Agua Via submitted was in response to a Broad Area Announcement (BAA) in January 2005. The Agua Via proposal was one of forty requested by the Office of Naval Research. 18 proposals were selected to be funded; the Agua Via proposal was not. (Tab C provides greater details)
- The Aqua Via proposal was focused largely on computer modeling. The proposal did not provide sufficient scientific and technical detail or an experimental proof-of-principle plan.
- A DDR&E technical staff expert examined the technical comments of that review and concluded that the proposal was fairly assessed. I can provide more details if you desire.
- More promising research based on artificial biological structures was recommended and is now underway.
- The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology (Dr. Slotter) has contacted Aqua Via (Ms. Pergamit) and will assist Agua Via in interfacing with DoD programs relevant to their technology interests.

Prepared by: Dr. André van Tilborg/DUSD(S&T)

(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/25935



OSD 02314-06

~~FOUO~~

1:12

January 30, 2006

To: **John Young**
CC: **Ron Sega**
Robert Rangel
FROM: **Donald Rumsfeld** *DR*
SUBJECT: **Desalinization Information from George Shultz**

Whatever happened on that desalinization activity that I sent you from George Shultz?

Thanks.

DHR:es
013006-11

.....
Please Respond By 02/16/06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/25936

OSD 02314-06

SEP. 28. 2005 12:11 PM

REUARD SHULTE

NO. 040 P. 1



VIA FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

September 28, 2005

Dear Don,

Peter Rodman and his team were out here yesterday and we had what I think was a good discussion of the issues involved in communicating with the world of Islam. Peter has a copy for you of the written material we used.

I also gave him a copy of a book on demographics that I think is very informative. I challenge you to put it in your briefcase sometime when you're going on a trip and take a little time to leaf through it. You will find it genuinely enlightening about how the future may unfold.

6x

I enclose a white paper on desalination and purification that I mentioned to you on the telephone. The essence is the invention of a nano-nuclear membrane that can be configured in a variety of ways depending on the problem. I think this is pretty exciting stuff that could have broad military and, of course, civilian use. Apparently China's interior ministry is anxious to get its hands on this out of concern for water purification.

3

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

George P. Shultz

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
U.S. Secretary of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon, Room 3E380
Washington, D.C. 20330

Enclosure

HOOPER INSTITUTION • STANFORD UNIVERSITY • STANFORD, CA 94305-5010 • PHONE: (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/25937

OSD 18601-05

WHITE PAPER

Nano-Molecular Membranes For Water Desalination and Purification

September 2005

Use and Disclosure of Data

This proposal includes data that shall not be disclosed outside the Government and shall not be duplicated, used, or disclosed - in whole or in part - for any purpose other than to evaluate this proposal. However, if a contract is awarded to this offeror as a result of - or in connection with - the submission of these data, the Government shall have the right to duplicate, use, or disclose the data to the extent provided in the resulting contract. This restriction does not limit the Government's right to use information contained in these data if they are obtained from another source without restriction. The data subject to this restriction are contained in Sheets 1-15 inclusive.

Agua Via, LLC

agua: water
via: way, path

AQUA VIA, LLC
330 Beach Road
Burlingame, California 94010
Contact Gayle Pergamit
Phone: 650/227-7777
gayle@aquavia.com

Agua Via, LLC 330 Beach Road, Burlingame, California 94010 650-227-7777 1
Use or disclosure of data contained on this sheet is subject to the restriction on the title page of this proposal.

AGUA: water

VIA: way, path

SUMMARY: Based on nanotechnology research work begun in 1997, a novel filtration technology has been developed which has the promise of broadly revolutionizing water purification, water remediation and desalination costs, purity and delivery systems. This technology was designed from its inception to deal with the challenging environmental, performance and financial considerations of this field.

Desalination and water purification based on this Smart Membrane™ technology is anticipated to:

- Deliver "full spectrum"™ filtration: filtering against the full spectrum of contaminants and delivering only pure water.
- Operate under a virtually complete range of environmental conditions and handle a virtually complete range of feedstock water
- Operate at the lowest energy thermodynamically possible for purification – 1 psi. Systems can be gravity-driven.
- Drop desalination costs by over 2/3rds by operating at the lowest energy thermodynamically possible for desalination of brackish or seawater – 1 psi plus 10 degrees of temperature change
- Present the smallest footprint theoretically possible. A Smart Membrane filtration cube measuring 188mm (8.8 inches) per side could produce 100,000 gallons of purified water per day at 1 psi
- Be completely scalable from municipal systems to individual use in the field. Individual use for full spectrum filtration could be as simple as a 27" long tube over a filter cartridge, allowing gravity to do the work.
- Drop maintenance costs and requirements by the simplest maintenance and operation modes of "filter and forget."™ No cleaning, recharging, backflushing, etc.
- Provide reliability and robustness: purification with no moving parts (except at atomic scale.)
- Introduce potential non-fouling and non-scaling ability by using biological techniques that provide non-fouling filtration in nature
- Deliver commercially-competitive performance lifetimes
- Reduce the cost of desalination to approximately that of water purification
- Replace partial water purification with complete purification at no increased cost.

"Water, like energy in the late 1970s, will probably become the most critical natural resource issue facing most parts of the world by the start of this century."

- The Financial Times of London

SMART MEMBRANE IMPACTS.

This technology is anticipated to make a significant impact on world water crisis, and issues facing the U.S. at home and abroad including hostile contamination of water supplies.

Calculations indicate that these membranes could produce 206 gallons per square foot per day (gfd) operating at <1psi, and utilizing techniques other than high pressure to accommodate the osmotic gradient during desalination. At this filtration rate, high volume, high quality water purification and desalination could be provided within a small footprint: a Smart Membrane cube measuring 165mm (8.5 inches) per side could produce 100,000 gallons of purified water per day at 1 psi. For desalination, the cube would double in size and require 1psi plus 10 degrees of temperature change.

The performance implications are:

- reduction in plant size and cost for both purification and desalination
- provide highest quality water purification at low cost
- eliminates the need for advance testing to identify contaminants.
- useful in a wide range of applications where size and energy are critical such as for peri-urban, rural or remote use off the power grid, emergency and military applications
- useful in a wide range of volume scales: from point of use solutions to small group or individual use in the field, mobile systems and municipal sizes systems in industrial, recreational, commercial, medical, agricultural, municipal, emergency and military settings
- can be packaged as low cost, reliable, low maintenance, easy to use systems which should even be applicable even in extreme rural environments.
- sufficiently low cost that it can be used for waste water remediation, elimination of endemic biologicals (e.g., Giardia), toxic solutes (e.g., arsenic) or other pollutants in rural communities worldwide.
- With the complexity built in at the atomic level, the user deals only with simple processes require minimal training and maintenance
- simple and safe technology appropriate for critical environments such as submarines, space applications

It is estimated that purification applications using membranes will be demonstrable in 18 months, and desalination applications ready in approximately three years.

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Water quality and water quantity are critical issues in the U.S., the rest of the GI plus the developing world. In natural disasters or operations in extreme environments such as military operations, these dual problems are critical.

An abundant supply of high quality fresh water is essential as the basis for individual and community health, growth and industrial productivity and economic stability. The problems of water quality and quantity were considered as one of the critical issues of the 21st century.

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Now, however, the definition of "the world water crisis" encompasses 98 countries. The global-wide scientific understanding is that we have reached the end of the era of abundant, cheap, clean groundwater. According to the World Bank, the health and economies of more than 80 countries are threatened by current water shortages. Within the next 15-20 years, that problem will extend worldwide, including the U.S.



Except for a few locales which receive their water exclusively from annual snow pack runoff or from year-round rain, most of the world's fresh water supply is stored underground in aquifers - areas of porous rock which hold water like a sponge. These reservoirs may take on the order of 100,000 to 300,000 years to fill. Higher populations, the irrigated agriculture to feed those populations, and growth of industry during the 20th and 21st centuries have meant increasing water withdrawals from aquifers. These withdrawals exceed the natural recharge provided by rainfall. The wells and pumps used to tap aquifers are drilled ever deeper to chase the falling water levels. This ongoing water debt is independent of reduction in rainfall due to climate change, or cyclical fluctuations in rainfall patterns such as those that caused the Dust Bowl.

Some examples:

- The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation predicts the exhaustion of the aquifers underlying the western and mid-western United States by 2026. These aquifers required an estimated 100,000 years of rainfall to fill.
- In India, water tables are dropping by 30 metres per year.
- The aquifer which provides Australia's fresh water is predicted for exhaustion within 10 years. It is estimated that this aquifer had taken 300,000 years to fill with water. Throughout the continent, there are burning salinas. The city of Perth (population 4M) is building a 450gallons/desalination plant to come online in Aug 2006.
- China has officially recognized that approximately 400 out of 600 cities are short of water.
- Wars driven by water shortages are predicted to escalate over the next decades. More than a dozen nations receive >50% of their fresh water from rivers that cross borders of hostile neighbors. Currently, water stress contributes to areas of conflict in the Middle East. The wars of this century are predicted to be over water shortages.

Ogallala Aquifer

Nearly five percent of the United States' fresh water is underground. At Warner in the Texas High Plains pump groundwater faster than rain replenishes it, the water tables are dropping. North America's largest aquifer, the Ogallala, is being depleted at a rate of 12 billion cubic meters (one) a year. Total depletion to date amounts to some \$25 billion, a volume equal to the annual flow of a Colorado River. The Ogallala stretches from Texas to South Dakota and waters one fifth of US irrigated land. - The BBC



Fresh water could be acquired by "desalinating" high solute wastewater, or by desalinating seawater or the brackish water which underlies most continents. However, today this process is done using reverse osmosis technology whose high energy demands produce fresh water at a price which is 8 to 10 times that of purifying fresh water (not assuming any increase in energy prices from 2004). The impact of such cost increases on industry, which uses 20% of all water, and agriculture - which uses 70+% often at artificially low prices - would be significant.

In contrast, Smart Membrane technology is anticipated to provide desalination of waste water, brackish or seawater at a cost roughly equivalent to that of current fresh water purification.


WATER QUALITY ISSUES

Worldwide, 24% of all fresh water is now polluted and in countries such as China as much of 75% of all water is contaminated. New U.S. rules will require purification of these contaminants, at the cost of billions. Water quality issues derive in part from natural contamination from substances such as boron, bacterial and viral infestations, and from man-made contaminants. For example:

- man-made pollutants, such as chemicals from manufacturing operations, or product residue such as the MBTE which contaminates the Los Angeles water supply. Contamination may be accidental or deliberate, as in terrorist threat.
- bacteria and viruses. Bacteria or viral contamination is often discovered only after illness or fatalities are traced back to the water supply. To date, the largest U.S. problem resulting in disease and death involved 400,000 people in Michigan. Some bacteria and viruses have been further spread by human activity, such as the giardia and cryptosporidium contamination from livestock waste throughout rural US communities with farming operations. According to the EPA, approximately 95% of all U.S. municipalities are small systems serving populations of less than 5,000 and lacking resources to build improved their water purity. Terrorist scenarios envision deliberate contamination.

- novel bacteria and viruses. Microbiologists are now concerned about the threat from imported species. Preparation to test for, identify and treat to eliminate a multitude of potential new threats is not present.
- arsenic, boron, other toxic minerals. Many countries, including the US, are now acquiring data which indicates that their ground water contains unacceptable levels of arsenic or boron which cause disease over the long-term. Although not at high enough levels to produce the immediate diseases and disfigurement seen in Bangladesh, the arsenic will cause cancer and other diseases over time. Within the U.S. scientific community, debate is now underway about the amount of arsenic contamination which will be accepted. Using current technology to clean water to the known safe levels is estimated to cost billions over acceptable budget levels.

Number of People at Risk From Arsenic Poisoning	
US - unknown	
Mexico - 400,000	
Chile - 457,000	
Ecuador - 6,000	
Argentina - 2,000,000	
Hungary - 20,000	
Romania - 30,000	
India - 1,000,000	
Bangladesh - 80,000,000	
Thailand - 1,000	
Vietnam - unknown	
Taiwan - 200,000	
China - 720,000	
Nepal - unknown	
Source - Jack Ng, University of Queensland, Australia	



The processes for removing large contaminants from water are well established, efficient and low cost. But as the contaminants to be removed become smaller - as in CBW agents or salts - the cost rises, achieving levels which are not financially sustainable. At present, some levels of desired cleanliness are not attainable because the technology does not exist to do sufficiently precise filtering. One

example of this lack of precision is the presence of inflammation-causing endotoxins in "ultra pure" medical water for dialysis. Another example is the filtration technology used by DodD and emergency services for hydrating a sports drink or meal package: in order to let the water through, the filter also lets through a very small toxin, urea.

Although people will pay handsomely for bottled water, general water purification is an extremely price sensitive business. Traditionally, a disease outbreak signals that a

problem exists. Municipal water systems usually have tremendous difficulty providing any improvement which increases costs.

Smart Membrane purification, providing full spectrum filtration, does not require identification of a new threat or higher cost to provide superior protection. It does not require the traditional higher energy used for filtration at the smallest end of the pollutant range. Yet it will provide water purer than that found in medical treatment centers. The definition of the desired potable water end product (water plus earth salts) means that other chemical or biological species are not allowed to pass the membrane. No testing is required to determine which chemical, biological or other species of threat is present. In this way, the highest purity water could be consistently provided in the "filter and forget" mode, and at no additional cost for the increased purity.

Agua Via products are anticipated to provide such full spectrum filtration to create good, potable water: eliminating all bacteria, viruses, parasites, cysts, amoebae, chemical and biologic warfare agents, poisons, toxins, arsenic, boron, spores of pathogens, nitrogenous waste from commercial fertilizer or excrement, heavy metals, etc. This includes the common problems of dysentery, typhoid, cholera, polio virus, or minerals such as arsenic and fluoride. Good water becomes available at low cost for all needs: drinking, sanitation, hygiene and waste water redemption. Adding Agua Via filtration to municipal systems would eliminate many contamination issues including the pervasive arsenic problem and the threat of contamination posed by terrorists.

OTHER TECHNOLOGIES PROVIDE INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS

Conventional technologies date from the 1800's (water purification) through the 1950's (reverse osmosis). Over the decades, conventional technologies have continued to make incremental gains as inventive engineers have found ways to extract bits of efficiency in creative ways. In some cases, such as multi-stage flash for desalination, take advantage of special circumstances, such as building a power plant and a water filtration plant together in order to use the abundant waste heat from the power plant. In general, however, these technologies have been out competed by membrane desalination technologies or conventional water purification techniques.

Water purification, and desalination are demanding applications in demanding environments. Experimental technologies which look good in limited performance environments in the lab commonly fail when tested in the field because of inability to deal with feedstock complexity, or other demands of the in-field environment. Adding the demanding financial requirements for water filtration or desalination can also eliminate a prospective technology or limits its use to a highly confined arena. Currently, carbon nanotubes are enjoying promotion as a water handling technology; they will have to face their limited adsorption capacity - after which small pollutants would just flow through, high manufacturing costs, lack of anti-fouling properties and attendant high maintenance costs to find any broad market acceptance.

In order to provide the necessary order of magnitude improvements to both costs and quality of filtration, truly new technology is needed that is capable of functioning in the

DEFINITION OF AN IDEAL PURIFICATION SOLUTION

- Able to clean up the full spectrum of possible contaminants with a single technology
- Lowest energy thermodynamically possible for water purification, waste water remediation and desalination. In the field, no external power source required.
- Technically simple and robust
- Greatest non-fouling and non-scaling capability ever applied to water purification or desalination.
- No ongoing maintenance requirements: eliminating chemicals, backflushing, plant downtime
- Low cost to manufacture
- Scalable from small point-of-use solutions (in the home or field) to handling large volume applications for urban water supplies.
- Long performance lifetime.
- Rapid purification of large volumes of water

SMART MEMBRANE TECHNOLOGY

The Smart Membrane core technology was designed from inception to provide ultra-specific filtration in rigorous real-world environments at the lowest energy and lowest total cost (infrastructure, maintenance, training, etc.) possible. Developing a technology capable of dealing with the highly complex set of issues involved in water purification and desalination was a key consideration in the basic design of Smart Membranes. The implication of working to the rigorous nanotechnology definition of "complete control at the atomic scale" provides unprecedented benefits in such areas as exquisite filtration specificity, high filtration performance, low energy requirements, non-fouling in the face of multiple complex feedstocks and the other criteria need to be an ideal solution to water purification and desalination needs.

Although a Smart Membrane is only a few atomic layers thick (.05-.22 nm), it consists of three distinct parts:

1. A protective top layer is designed to amplify non-fouling characteristics, amplify water ordering to further reduce energy costs, and extend the working life of the Smart Membrane. This protective layer can be custom engineered on an atom-by-atom level of design to provide a specificity previously found only in living systems. As a result, many of nature's successful anti-fouling strategies can be applied for the first time.

2. A one-atomic layer thick nanomembrane is directly under the protective top coating. This is where the work of filtration and separation is carried out. The nanomembrane is designed and built to provide only the desired end product - usually either potable water (water plus earth salts), or water that is completely salt free. This membrane eliminates anything other than the specific class of water that the customer wants. At one atomic layer thick, this membrane offers no impedance to flow.

The one-atom-thick nanomembrane is the key to the benefits which a Smart Membrane can deliver. Unlike the way conventional membranes are constructed through bulk

processes, each nanomembrane self-assembles from a collection of custom designed, pharmacologically-built pores.

Smart Membranes result from the creation of a new class of extremely selective, biomimetic Smart Pores™ which assemble into thin (0.5nanometer-22nanometer) porous nanomembranes. These porous monolayer membranes have specific structures that provide a low energy barrier to the passage of water or specific solutes, while providing a high barrier to other solutes. This technology shows highly specific molecular filtration at the atomic scale and profound transport properties such as exquisite ion selectivity characteristics.

Each pore has been designed and built with complete atomic precision in exactly the same way that a pharmaceutical is designed and built. Often the design of the pore's interior may mimic the active filtration portion in cell membrane proteins, such as aquaporin, nature's water channel. By eliminating the voluminous support structures in the natural aquaporin and building only the "business part" of the molecule, a Smart Pore can move water even faster than its natural counterpart.

Because of this tight atomic design control, a pore need not be built to merely exclude contaminants based on their size, but can also be built to eliminate classes of contaminants based on their complete chemical identity including atomic shape, electrical charge, hydrophobicity, hydrophilicity, etc. This demonstrated ability means, for example, that a complex, mixed waste stream including a wide range of 400,000 different contaminants, earth salts, urea and water can deliver just potable water (water and earth salts). The major technical achievement demonstrated here is that even though the urea (a known toxin) is smaller than the earth salts, urea is rejected based on its electronic characteristics rather than size.

The exterior of each pore has a distinct top, bottom and sides. Think of a Leggo block with a hole in the center. The hole does the filtering work, but the top, bottom and side attachment sites on the Leggo let it snap together with other Leggo blocks. The sides of the pores attach to each other to form the nanomembrane the way the sides of Leggo blocks snap together to form a plane.

On the top surface, this snap-on ability allows the precision building of the protective top layer (discussed above) which can be specifically designed to prevent bacterial fouling, scaling and other forms of fouling while also enhancing water ordering to further reduce energy demands.

On the bottom surface, the snap-on ability allows the pores in the nano-membrane to attach to a thicker, porous substrate.

3. The porous substrate. The porous substrate answers the question of how to handle a nanomembrane that is only one atomic layer thick. The porous substrate is a thin film, much like a thinner version of Saran Wrap, with a regular array of holes in it. The porous substrate is a passive, structural component. Its purpose is strictly to support the nano-membrane, allow for handling during manufacturing and contribute to the working lifespan of the membrane. The nanomembrane does the actual work of filtration; the porous substrate lets the water flow on through.

TECHNOLOGY-DERIVED BENEFITS

This basic technology enables the delivery the application-critical benefits, as exemplified in the following four key areas:

1. Ultra specificity in filtration
2. Low-maintenance strength-non-fouling, non-scaling characteristics
3. Ultra small device footprint coupled with ultra high performance
4. Ultra low Energy requirements

1. **Specificity**, Previously, the ability to create potable water by removing urea, even though the urea is smaller than the earth atom, was described. This is an unprecedented technical achievement, and a strong demonstration of exquisite control over specificity of filtration. Because pores can be built to absolute specification - different sizes, shapes, charges, etc. - this ability can be tuned to apply specific filtration to any class of problem required.

Agua Via products are anticipated to provide such full spectrum filtration to create good, potable water eliminating all bacteria, viruses, parasites, cysts, amoebae, chemical and biologic warfare agents, poisons, toxins, arsenic, Boron, spores of pathogenic, nitrogenous waste from commercial fertilizer or enrichment, heavy metals, nanobacteria, etc. This includes the common problems of dysentery, typhoid, cholera, polio virus, or materials such as arsenic and fluoride. Good water becomes available at low cost for all needs: drinking, sanitation, hygiene and waste water reclamation. Adding Agua Via filtration to municipal systems would eliminate many contamination issues including the pervasive arsenic problem and the threat of contamination posed by terrorists.

2. **Low Maintenance**. A membrane, no matter, how perfect its ability to filter, is useless if it is clogged. Scale buildup in water with notable mineral content is one such problem. Bacteria are another prime problem: they attach to surfaces and form rock hard biofilm which impairs or ends filter performance. Conventional membranes are backwashed and bleached with harsh chemicals to kill bacteria or to descale; this requires plant downtime and creates maintenance expense.

The Smart Membrane's ability to address problem through specificity at the atomic level opens unprecedented opportunities to control these problems. For example, the technology of the Smart Membrane provides multiple strategies to defend biofilm formation. Some strategies are at the level of the pores and nanomembrane, and others are employed by the protective top coating, creating a total anti-bacterial environment.

One major strategy of bacteria is to use the thread-like pill (seen here surrounding the main body of an E. coli bacterium) as grappling hooks to establish a foothold on a surface. But E. coli's pill, for example, measure 650 angstroms in diameter and are too big to snag onto any feature in a Smart Membrane. The pill are 100



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times bigger than an individual pore's exterior of 85 angstroms, and 260 times bigger than a purification pore's interior dimensions of 25 angstroms.

Both the nanomembrane and the protective layer above it appear to these bacteria as absolutely smooth, featureless surfaces. The structures of both the protective layer and the nanomembrane are too small to be used by bacteria.

Laminar flow is also known to inhibit bacteria's ability to form biofilm. The environment bacteria encounter is optimized for laminar flow; they are swept along with no ability to attach to a surface.

Other bacteria do not use pili, but colonize by laying down a slime layer. But both classes of bacteria are known to have characteristics which can be used to inhibit biofilm formation. Both classes of bacteria prefer a hydrophobic surface on which to begin colonization. Bacteria are also known to be vulnerable to a range of anti-microbial chemical and pharmaceutical agents. Therefore, among the design requirements for the protective layer is to present a bacteria-hostile, hydrophilic surface studded with anti-microbial destruct points, and optimized for laminar flow.

This ability to design with atomic precision has never been available before. It means that many strategies for preventing fouling and scaling, or strategies for precision filtration are made available for the first time. In addition, this is setup up for continual filtration over a long life span. Unlike bulky tubes, activated charcoal or deionization media which ultimately saturate, a nanomembrane simply filters: undesirable classes of contaminants cannot pass through the membrane and are dumped to waste. Desirable pure filtrate water passes through the pore and is captured.

3. Small Footprint, High Performance. Attached to their Saran-Wrap-like porous substrate, the complete Smart Membranes are only 0.5 microns thick, in contrast with conventional membranes which are 35 times thicker. Therefore, a huge amount of filtration capability fits into a very small footprint. Calculations indicate that one square foot of membrane could produce 206 gallons of purified water per day operating at <1 psi. At this filtration rate, high volume water purification could be provided within a small footprint: a Smart Membrane cube measuring 165mm (6.5 inches) per side could produce 100,000 gallons per day at 1 psi. A city of 5 Million people with a 600 gigaliter annual water need could be met with 5,000 such cubes.

4. Low Energy Requirements. Because these membranes are so thin, very little energy is required for their operations. Because these membrane structures are so thin, it is useful to think about them in quantum mechanical terms rather than classical fluid mechanical terms. Dr. William Dean of MIT has described these pores as "orifices" offering no impedance to flow, rather than as conventional "pores."

With low pressure drops across a nanomembrane 0.5 nanometers thick, high flux is produced at very low pressure differential. In fact, the impedance to flow is created by the porous substrate - although its job is to provide support, the rate limit on how fast water can be processed is how long it takes to flow through the "thick" substrate.

In the most energy efficient mode, a filtration cartridge would sit at the bottom of a tube with a 27' head of water. At 1 psi, gravity does the work to purify the water.

SMART MEMBRANES AND DESALINATION

The most expensive form of creating potable water or water completely lacking salt is desalination. Excluding any recent rise in the cost of energy, today desalination of seawater can cost over \$1,000US per acre-foot. Water with less salt in it (brackish water) costs less to clean because the lower salt content drops the amount of pressure required. Although Tampa Bay, Florida had once hoped to desalinate a mix of brackish water and seawater at a cost of only \$650US per acre-foot, the potential cost reduction was due to favorable financing terms, not technical breakthroughs. Even at Tampa Bay's target cost, this still leaves desalination open only to energy and cash rich countries of the First World and the Middle East.

The claims of dramatically lower cost desalination which used to be made by the Tampa Bay, Florida project are now being made by the Ashkelon project in Israel. These numbers, which have even been quoted by the Congressional Budget Office as reflecting the current price of desalination, are again based strictly on financing deals which have been described in the industry experts as "brilliant." According to desalination experts within the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, these systems contain no technological contribution to increased efficiency. The true cost of desalination remains unchanged. In fact, Tampa Bay failed to meet its technical performance goals by 50% and is currently undergoing re-engineering.

Energy is the largest cost component of desalination; annually, energy costs generally match capital costs. A \$400M plant can expect to generate a \$400M annual energy bill, assuming no price increases for energy. A dominant percentage of the capital costs are also derived from the energy requirement, e.g., high pressure pumps, energy recovery systems.

The final stage of purification -- in which the water and salt are separated -- accounts for 89% of the energy cost. Of that energy cost, roughly 2/3rd is due to overcoming 1) the long and 2) tortuous path of the pores in conventional membranes. Only 1/3rd is due to overcoming the osmotic gradient of the salt.

The Smart Membrane's extreme thinness and lack of tortuous paths immediately eliminates the 2/3rd energy penalty experienced by conventional membranes. Significant as this cost reduction is, the impact of moving to a low-energy/low pressure mode ripples through the overall design of any water system, accounting for an additional reduction of both the capital cost and labor costs. Concomitantly, eliminating high pressure pumps, energy recovery systems (little wasted energy to recover), certain pretreatment systems, reducing system complexity and maintenance costs may provide overall cost reductions on the order of 60 or 70% for a Smart Membrane seawater desalination system.

SMART MEMBRANE TECHNOLOGY MODIFICATION AND DESALINATION

The differences between using a Smart Membrane for desalination, as opposed to water purification are:

1. For use in desalination, a smaller pore must be used than the basic water purification pore. A water purification pore can pass up to 4 water molecules at a time. For desalination, the pore must be capable of passing only 2 water molecules at a time.

2. Further "snap on" chemistry must be used to overcome the osmotic gradient.
3. In addition to the 1 psi energy requirement, 10 degrees of temperature change would be needed.
4. This footprint would expand: the equivalent of two 6.5' cubes would now be needed to provide 100,000 gallons of desalinated water, instead of one cube.

OVERCOMING OSMOTIC GRADIENT WITH A SMART MEMBRANE SYSTEM

Conventional desalination today uses reverse osmosis with thick polymer membranes. To push the water through the membrane and leave the salt behind requires pressures ranging from 180 psi (for use with brackish water) up to 1400 psi (for use with seawater). In each case, 2/3rds of the pressure is used to overcome the tortuosity and the thickness of the membranes. The remaining 1/3rd is to overcome the osmotic gradient: with salt water on one side of a membrane and fresh water on the other side, the more concentrated salt solution "wants" to pull more fresh water onto its side until the salt content is evenly balanced between both sides. In reverse osmosis, the additional pressure is placed on the salt side to push fresh water through the membrane and away from the salt.

Because of the Smart Membrane's extreme thinness, the penalty for overcoming the tortuosity and thickness of conventional membranes is eliminated. Therefore, 2/3rds of the pressure requirement and 2/3rds of the energy cost disappear.

This leaves the remaining issue of dealing with osmotic gradient and reducing its attendant costs. Recently, a different technique has been used to eliminate the need for high pressure in dealing with an osmotic gradient: forward osmosis. The most widely known example has been the DoD's use of the technique for rehydrating food packages or sports drinks using a warfighter's urine or waste water. In this technique, a contaminated solution (urine or unsafe water) is placed on one side of the membrane. Sugar is placed on the other side of the membrane. The sugar draws the liquid in the contaminated solution across the membrane until there is an osmotic balance between the two sides. The membrane, to the best of its ability, separates water from contaminants. The user now has a sports drink or a hydrated food package.

Note that this technique produces purified water, not desalinated water (water free from a high solute content).

The disadvantages of this technique which limit its usefulness are:

- unless the desired end product is a sports drink or a hydrated food package, the user now has water contaminated by sugar or some other substance which would require purification.
- once the sugar or food packet is used up, more sugar or another sorbent must be imported to process the next batch of water. This makes the technique expensive and impractical.
- As used today with conventional membranes, urea also passes along with the water and salts into the sports drink or hydrated food package. Urea is a known toxin, and too much exposure will cause kidney failure.

However, moved to a level of atomic precision, this forward osmosis technique can be modified to overcome its disadvantages and made useful for desalination. For desalination with a Smart Membrane, a reusable, high density ("thirsty") molecular sponge can be engineered and snapped onto the base of the Smart Membrane. The sponge would soak up water from the bottom of the pores until saturation is reached. A few degrees of temperature change would be required to "wring" the sponge out and release the water into the catch chamber. The sponge is now ready to soak up another batch of water. As abundantly demonstrated in nature, many other systems commonly load and release over prolonged lifetimes. By designing and building at the atomic scale, these systems can be borrowed and modified for use elsewhere.

SUMMARY

Smart Membranes represent a new technology based on building materials which mimic the way nature performs filtration, selection, and protection against biofilm and scale formation. This technology is anticipated to out perform any known or planned competitors. The benefits include operating in an ultra-low energy mode, and producing highly pure and highly specific filtration.

Smart Membrane technology is anticipated to be applicable and superior for applications in:

- Desalination applications, including both seawater and brackish water.
- Purification applications, ranging from high purity semiconductor, other industrial and medical uses through home drinking water.
- Remediation of both waste water and polluted ground water.

Their specific technical capabilities include:

- Unique "full-spectrum" filtration of any mix of contaminants in the water feedstock
- The highest purity possible
- The lowest cost possible
- The lowest energy requirements possible
- Extreme flexibility of capacity, from municipal scale to hand held units in the field, in an extremely small footprint. A 6.5" cube is anticipated to provide 100,000 gallons of purified water per day.
- "Filter and forget" robustness under tough conditions.

Applying Smart Membranes to the problems of water purification and desalination holds the potential to positively impact the world water crisis and the many dimension which water shortage or impure water represents: health, agricultural productivity, industrial

productivity, and conflict between nations. Because the technology combines high performance with low total costs (product costs, energy, infrastructure, maintenance, training, etc.), it is anticipated to have major impact at opposite ends of the spectrum.

1. **High Performance Venues.** In addition to water users with high purity demands, such as semiconductor manufacturers or medical applications, organizations such as the US DOD services, whose needs encompass and surpass those requirements are anticipated to derive value from Smart Membrane technology. The DOD operates in the most extreme environmental and logistical conditions, and is required to deal with the fullest array of water quality and water quantity problems. In addition, their operation is usually subject to the strictest footprint, weight, component resupply, volume issues, maintenance and safety requirements. The range is exemplified by the need for desalination and purification occurring everywhere from submarines at depth to individual warfighters on the ground facing CBW contaminated water, or no liquids at all except for their own sweat and urine.

2. **Low Cost/High Volume.** Municipal systems and point of use applications both in the U.S. and internationally are anticipated to be used by those seeking highest purity fresh water at low cost, or desalinated water at low cost to cope with water shortages. At a competitive price point, the Smart Membrane technology could provide cost-effective desalination to the American mid-west as well as cost-effective water purification against the problems such as arsenic, glands, etc. Expressed interest in Smart Membranes has come from Australia, Singapore, China and India in addition to European partners. Introduction in some venues, such as the water-short Middle East, may assist in reducing tensions and increasing prosperity.

Various new paradigms of how water is delivered may well evolve, and with them new paradigms for hydro, conducting business or military operations. For example, municipal systems may become more widely distributed. Countries with substandard infrastructure may opt for home point of use systems to augment central municipal facilities. Military operations may be more flexible once the logistical burdens of water provision are lifted.

By combining high performance with low cost, Smart Membranes hold a potential solution to seemingly intractable problems involving water quality and water quantity.

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Response to Aqua Via Desalination Paper

Gayle Pergamit submitted similar white papers and a proposal to ONR BAA 05-005 Science and Technology in Water Desalination and Purification, January 2005. The BAA was part of a congressional program sponsored from Senator Domenici's office: Expeditionary Unit Water Purification Program, EUWP. Through this congressional, ONR is interested in research towards lowering the costs associated with water purification and desalination.

Working with Martin Edelstein and the company Covalent Industrial Technologies, LLC Gayle Pergamit submitted two white papers. The proposed work was primarily computer modeling (by Edelstein) to determine which sort of cyclic molecules could desalinate water. At the time, the company claimed to have developed a successful kidney dialysis membrane based on molecular computations. Two white papers were submitted to get around the cap of \$250k per year. ONR received about 300 white papers and asked for about 40 full proposals (with intent to fund about 15-20). We requested that Pergamit and Edelstein: (1) combine their two white papers into one proposal; (2) show some of the 'successful chemistry' from their kidney dialysis product; (3) and come up with a proposal that resulted in proof of concept within two years. The proposal had significantly more detail than the white papers and significantly more detail than the current white paper from Agua Via. The reviewer comments below show that at the time, it was still high risk/ high reward research and that none of the reviewers were comfortable even with the level of detail in the Covalent Industrial Technologies proposal. It was not recommended for funding.

Review comments from BAA **05-005**, Covalent Industrial Technologies, Pergamit, Edelstein

Reviewer 1:

We got this proposal two years ago. They had already developed the kidney and were looking for new markets. Now the proposal says the kidney dialysis membrane is still in development. This proposal is more cryptic. What is a "smart pore?" It sounds like the same technology proposed in #849. At any rate, this proposal will only search their molecule database and model it for the first year and in the second year make one pore. #849 was a better deal.

Reviewer 2:

The PI proposes to develop a monolayer macrocycle membrane for RO just like the artificial kidney success that they claim. The problem is that specific chemical detail is not given. The concept is great but though I believe the membranes would be frail. They

propose to use molecular modeling to develop macrocycles with 2 angstrom pores that will let only water pass. The macrocycles will assemble side by side on a substrate and be reacted to the surface so that one has a 1 molecule thick separation layer on a substrate. They say that hurdles such as ordering of the macrocycles and bonding them to the substrate have been overcome, even patented, but give very little details and don't list the patent. Still, approach is tempting, but year 1 is only modeling to select which macrocycles to make and test in year 2.

Reviewer 3:

The offeror proposes to develop an aquaporin like macrocyclic molecule which will self-assemble into a monomolecular membrane. Biological membranes use aquaporin transmembrane protein channels to separate and transport water molecules with a high selectivity and low resistance resulting in a low consumption of energy. The offeror plans to conduct a structural evaluation of their existing macromolecular library, conduct structural evaluation for chemical modification, if in the likely event no existing molecules will form a water pore, conduct molecular pore modeling, conduct pore testing, and evaluation of membrane formation and testing. This pattern follows the successful pattern used for the development of an artificial kidney membrane. The use of molecular modeling will enable rapid evaluation of macromolecules. There appears to be a high risk with the offerors proposed approach of developing a nanomolecular membrane that is only one molecule thick. This means that they must be able to form a perfect layer only one molecule thick or will have defects in the membrane, reducing rejection efficiency. This one molecular thick membrane must also be able to cover the surface of a rough support layer that will have a roughness exceeding the thickness of the membrane or they will have to fabricate a new support membrane that is extremely smooth, which is an entire project in itself. In order to overcome osmotic pressure with a thin, delicate membrane the offeror proposes to use a novel forward osmosis based on a temperature sensitive reusable polymer. No details are given on the expected driving force generated by this process or energy requirements of the recovery of water from the polymer. Without this data it is impossible to evaluate the overall system energy requirements and potential for enhancement over current state of the art.

Current White Paper from Agua Via, LLC, Pergamit

The white paper from Agua Via has the following problems:

1. Absolutely no detail is given on the chemistry of the one atom thick membrane rejection layer. It is doubtful that such a thin membrane could exclude solutes by any mechanism other than sieving. Aquaporin water channels (the molecular proteins that transport water through cell walls) in the body have an hour glass shaped pore with 20 angstroms or so length and embedded charges using both sieving and columbic repulsion to purify water.
2. Absolutely no detail is given on the rest of the membrane structure, which must be rugged enough for handling and winding into a module, have fine enough pore structure to support the atomic layer, not foul, and have no pressure drop across it. If they had such a support they could already sell it to industry.

3. Absolutely **no** detail is given on how such an atomic layer membrane is assembled to be pinhole free and adequately supported.

4. There are membrane techniques such as "direct contact membrane filtration" that can desalt water without application of pressure, just taking advantage of vapor pressure differences between cold and hot water. At a 10C temperature difference across the membrane, there is a very low flux of water from the feed to the treated water stream.

Also, for such an approach to work, thicker membranes with larger hydrophobic pores are desired.

There is **no** reason to consider this white paper any further. Work **on** this began in 1997 yet the proposer does not give any indication as to the current **state** of progress in the development of these smart membranes. Thus there is no reason to believe any of the anticipated benefits of this nonexistent technology. The lack of details is consistent with a previous proposal received by the Office of Naval Research. Additionally, Martin Edelstein, the researcher **on** the previous proposal, is not mentioned in the white paper and the qualifications of Gayle Pergamit are not given.

Paul Annistead

INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: Agua Via LLC Nano-Molecular Membranes

1. Purpose. To respond to the Agua Via Nano-Molecular Membrane Unsolicited Proposal.

2. Facts.

a. All U.S. Army tactical water purification equipment is required to purify and/or desalinate any potential source water. In general, the Army is interested in research that could lead to the reduction in costs or increased availability of water purification equipment at the tactical and individual soldier level. Current purification systems are based on membrane technology using microfiltration or ultrafiltration followed by reverse osmosis.

b. In November of 2004, individuals from the Army Tank-Automotive Research Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC) reviewed a white paper from Agua Via LLC on Nano-Molecular Membranes in support of the Office of Naval Research (ONR) Expeditionary Unit Water Purification Program (EUWP). The ONR EUWP program is currently funding two projects investigating biomimetic membranes. The white paper purposed from Agua Via LLC was not selected by ONR for award.

c. The white paper from Agua Via LLC does not provide enough information **to assess the potential** of the proposed technology. Potential technical issues not fully addressed are the ability to create defect free membranes on a large scale and the elimination of fouling (choked with a foreign substance).

d. The proposed method of desalination, which requires heating water 10 degrees, will require approximately 11 watt-hours per liter. The Affordable Desalination Collaboration, a non-profit organization of commercial and government agencies, has recently demonstrated membrane based desalination with commercial technology at 2 watt-hours per liter. Therefore, from an energy efficiency standpoint, the proposed approach does not appear attractive.

Jeff Ernat (b)(6)
Approved by Mary Miller
Office of ASA(ALT)

COORDINATION

DARPA	<i>TONY TETHER</i>	6 FEB 06
ASA(ALT)	MARY MILLER	6 FEB 06
ONR	PAUL ARMISTEAD	6 FEB 06

APR 20 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Marines Performing Protocol-type Duties

020Marines

Please have someone find out how many Marines, at any given time, are involved with Embassy guard duty and various other protocol-type things like that around the world.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041904-7

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

DR 4/21

*SecDef —
I sent a short note
into you connecting what
Ben Hayes told you —
he changed his number to
1200 Marines worldwide!*

C 4/21

020Marines



APR 20 2004

0200BMD

TO: Mike Wynne

cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone
Doug Feith
Mira Ricardel

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Program Director for Missile Defense Site

Someone tells me that the program director for the missile defense site has been reassigned back to Kadish's headquarters. Is that so?

If so, does it make sense with the deployment date so near?

It may be the exact right thing to be doing just now, but please get back to me with some thoughts on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041904-1

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

20APR04

OSD 11638-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25959

APR 23 2004

092

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: Honor Cordons

I don't think we ought to be doing honor cordons for anyone but defense ministers, prime ministers or presidents. I don't think we ought to do them for finance ministers and foreign ministers.

It is embarrassing if Paul does them for some, and I don't do them for others.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042204-5

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

23APR04

OSD 11639-04

APR 23 2004

END

TO: Gen. Mike Hagee

CC: Gordon England
Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Marine Deployments

FILE
4/27

Mike, our meeting yesterday was helpful, but I still do not have conviction on the advantage of a 7-month deployment over a 12-month deployment.

As you recall, I asked you to come back to me soon and lay out how your Marines are arranged – how many where, doing what? Additionally, I would like for you to re-address the deployment length issue – show me how that plays out over time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042004-5

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

DR 4/27

Sir,
Interim response, request
for additional time, attached.
vr/cdr Nosinger
4/27

Q3 APPROY


OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Senior Military Assistant

08/4/27

4/27

Sec Def -

- Gen Hayes wants to personally come back to you on the 7 vs 12 month deployment issue.
 - He is on travel plus a Marine Corps study on this won't be ready until after 5 May
 - I checked w/ LT GEN Schwabe, J3, to determine if he knew any reason in the deployment timeline why this should not be delayed. He did not.
 - Recommend we schedule Gen Hayes to see you on or about 10 May 
-



2004/27

26 Apr 2004

MEMORANDUM

From: Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Secretary of Defense

Sir |

Subj: SECDEF MEMO TO CMC DTD 23 APR 04; RE: MARINE DEPLOYMENTS

1. Subject memorandum requests that Gen Hagee come back to SecDef with additional information on how Marines are arranged globally and to readdress the deployment length issue and show how it plays out over time. The response is due by 30 Apr 2004.
2. Gen Hagee is currently on travel to the Pacific region and returns on 8 April. His itinerary includes visits to Australia, Singapore, and visits with Marines and families at Camp Pendleton on the return flight.
3. Additionally, the Marine Corps convened a force structure review group on 7 April and their findings are due mid-May. These findings should add greater definition to our response on both issues.
4. Due to the complexity and importance of these issues, Gen Hagee desires to personally present the response to you, Sir. Therefore, request the response date of 30 April be extended to 14 May.

Very respectfully,

W. L. NYLAND

APR 23 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ⁷

SUBJECT: Format for Read-Aheads

3/2

The current format for read aheads for press events, speeches or Congressional events could be improved. I would like to have more of the kind of information I actually need to know, and less of what I have been receiving.

Please include the following information, when applicable, in all future read-ahead:

- **Event format:** when and where the meeting is, how long it is supposed to last, whether or not there will be Q&As, whether or not there is a podium, whether I am standing or sitting, etc.
- **Audience:** background information about the organization/group, who the people are, why they are there, the total number, and whether or not spouses are included.
- **Context/Substance:** who else is speaking to them, what are the topics other people speaking to them might cover, and what topics do you think would be appropriate for me to cover.

23 Apr 04

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042104-5

.....
Please respond by _____

APR 23 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Doug Feith
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: William Levi

Attached is a background sheet on an interesting possible summer intern. He clearly doesn't have security clearances, so we would have to use him someplace where that is not required, but he looks interesting.

Please let me know if you have any interest.

Thanks.

Attach.
Background sheet on William Levi

DHR:dh
042204-1

.....
Please respond by *5/7/04* _____

230 U2

23 Apr 04

OSD 11642-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25965

(b)(6)

SECRET
2004 APR 19 11:21

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

I am a sophomore at Stanford University with a strong interest in national security and foreign policy. My grandfathers were Edward H. Levi and George A. Ranney. This summer I would very much like to serve as an intern for you or for one of your assistants.

Much of my academic study has concentrated on national security and defense. I have taken courses in international conflict and peacekeeping, technology in national security, and the politics and history of national defense. I am also co-director of the public policy forum of Stanford In Government, a non-partisan student organization that promotes discussion of national political issues.

Last summer I interned for the House Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security. This was a wonderful experience, and I learned a lot about the legislative branch while also making myself useful in anyway that I could.

It would be a great honor to serve you and to be of whatever help I am able.

I have attached a copy of my resume. I know that you are extraordinarily busy. Thank you so much for your consideration. I am most grateful.

Sincerely,

William B. Levi

(b)(6)

OSD 05776-04

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

EDUCATION

Stanford University, Class of 2006 Palo Alto, CA
o GPA: 3.99, Major: History/Political Science

REFERENCES

(b)(6) (b)(6)
o Senior Fellow, Center of International Security and Cooperation, Stanford Institute for International Studies, Stanford University.

(b)(6) (b)(6)
o President, Stanford Alumni Association

(b)(6) (b)(6)
o Counsel, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security

WORK EXPERIENCE

United States House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security.
o Congressional Intern, Majority Staff, June/July 2003, Washington, D. C. Prepared memos for Chair, members, and counsel of subcommittee
Office of Congressman Robert T Matsui
o Office Intern, August/September 2003, Washington, D. C. and Sacramento, CA. Performed constituent services, case work, data system management
Capital Nursery Company, Citrus Heights, CA 2000

VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCE

Project Read, Redwood City, CA, literacy program 2002-2003
St. HOPE Academy, Sacramento, CA, tutor/mentor 2002
Putnep Student Travel, Costa Rica Summer, 2001
Orphanage Building Project, Mexico Fall, 2000
Seeds of Learning, Nicaragua, rural housing construction Summer, 1999

ACTIVITIES

Director of Public Policy Forum, Stanford In Government 2003-2004
o Organized political panel discussions/speaking events
o Created a public policy course entitled "Current Trends in Policy Making."
Stanford Peer Academic Advisor (PAA) 2003-2004
o peer counselor and academic mentor to freshmen students
Stanford Polo Club Autumn, 2002-2003

APR 23 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Aerial Photographs

Please have someone get some overhead photographs of Iraq for me, if they are available, like the one I have of the Korean peninsula. I would like to see ones from before the war, during the war, and every couple of months since the end of the war, so we can see if there is any visible change.

DR

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042204-9

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

23 4/12/04

April 23, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Embedded Reporters

Do we have embedded reporters with folks in Fallujah today?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042304-2

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

DR
DA 4/26

4/23

Sec Def

*The I MEF in Fallujah
has embedded media with
them. I have asked
our PA folks to find out
who they work for.*

C

23 April 04

APR 27 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*
SUBJECT: Op-ed on Stress on the Force

I think we need a good op-ed on relieving stress on the force and the things I mentioned today in the meeting that I think Paul Butler made notes of. We have five or six things going on that are helping and we have to get ahead of the curve.

322

Let's get the thing done soon. Let's just set a deadline. Today is April 23. Let's have it ready next Friday, April 30.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042304-19

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

27 April

OSD 11645-04

5/5 1.00

120

EF-940Z
04/005796

APR 27 2004

~~Paul Butler~~

To SecDef

TO: Doug Feith
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Dinar

Please find out what the dinar is doing. I am told the dinar is strong. If that is true, then things may be better than we think in Iraq. Is that possible?

ICAD

How could things seem to be so difficult and have the dinar going up?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042604-17

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

DR 5/12

@5/11

Sur,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosenzo
5/11

Distro To BL Fw BR KJ
Date 28 Apr 04
Time 1015

27 Apr 04

OSD 11647-04

27-04-04 13:38 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/25971

@S/12

INFORMATION MEMO

MAY 04 2004

EF-9402
I-04/005796

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) *for [unclear] DUSD(P)*

SUBJECT: Dinar

- You asked us to find out what the dinar is doing.
- John Taylor (Treasury) told us:
 - "The dinar has been strong ever since the new currency was introduced. The new currency is popular. People want to hold it. Inflation has not been a problem. The economy has been expanding causing demand for the currency to be strong. The Central Bank is managing the currency well."

ITM

4 May 04

27 April

DUSD(NESA) *[Signature]* (B.H.L.)

OSD 11647-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25972

APR 27 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: David Merkel

There is a fellow named David Merkel referred to in this memo from Doug Feith. I am told by Congressman Chris Cox that he is very good.

We ought to see if there is some other place in the Department for him, even if Feith decides against him for the job discussed in the memo.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/2/04 Feith memo

DHR:dh
042604-15

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

230.02

27 Apr 04

OSD 11648-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25973

C4/24
D&H 4/26

② Am. to Vol

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy DJF by CTJ 4/2

SUBJECT: David Merkel

Chris Cox asked you to consider David Merkel as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Eurasia. I interviewed Merkel today.

Key conclusion: In my view, he is not as strong a candidate as Jim MacDougall.

- Merkel has relevant experience and supports President.
- Merkel is currently Deputy Assistant Secretary International Affairs, Treasury Department working on congressional issues,
- He does not have much management experience (he supervises two people at Treasury).
- He does not have substantial foreign language skills.
- He, of course, is not as knowledgeable of current policy as MacDougall, who is acting DASD-Eurasia.

APR 27 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne
CC: Bill Schneider
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Stenbit on DSB

Paul Butler
5/24

✓
334 DSB

Have we put John Stenbit on the Defense Science Board? If not, I think we ought to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042604-14

.....
Please respond by *5/14/04*

Response attached.
vr/
CDR Nosen
5/24

27 APR 04



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE
BOARD

INFO MEMO

April 28, 2003 0900

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. BILL SCHNEIDER, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

THRU: ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS)

SUBJECT: Defense Science Board Membership - Stenbit

- In response to your snowflake, we added John Stenbit to the membership of the Defense Science Board, effective 5 April 2004.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Cheryl Navarro/DSB/ (b)(6)

OSD 11649-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25976

A
Pub

5-5-04
[Signature]

334 DSB
28 April 04
27 April

APR 27 2004

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Ammunition Dumps

Apparently the Speaker is all concerned about the issue of unattended ammunition dumps in Iraq. We ought to figure out who should go see him and talk to him about it.

LEAD

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042604-12

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

27 April 04

OSD 11650-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25977

720

6/5
OBE
Per LD

T 3/1

APR 27 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meet w/Assessment Team

I have to have a meeting with the Assessment Team on their tracking on recommendations. I read the April 22 paper, and it is very worrisome. There is no green. It is all yellow and red.

TRAP

Let's set up a meeting, so they can tell me what I need to do to get going.

One of the things I want to talk to them about and I should be reminded with this memo, is to begin reducing DoD and civilian people now rather than later.

Here is the paper to tickle for the meeting.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/22/04 Assessment Team Recommendations

DHR:dh
042604-8

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

(1) for mtg Saturday

27 April 04



W. Green

Broderick

Assessment Team Recommendation

DoD Transition Support Team - Iraq

Update to the
Secretary of Defense
22 April 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/25979



Progress Notes

- The Operations Plan, with accompanying Annexes, Appendices and Milestones, was circulated for comment on 6 Apr.
 - DoS, OSD, the Joint Staff, CENTCOM, CJTF-7 and all military departments returned very helpful comments. An updated Operations Plan will be published during the week of 26 Apr.
- The DoD Assessment Teams reviewed a consolidated list of 26 recommendations stemming from their reports.
 - 12 have been completed (see Back-up slide 10)
 - 7 have been resolved and actions are ongoing (see slides 3-8)
 - ▣ 6 are working toward resolution (see slides 3-8)
 - 1 has been forwarded to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for decision (see slide 7)

■ Complete

□ Missed, or potential to miss,
due date causes moderate
risk for transition

■ Missed, or potential to miss,
due date causes high risk
for transition



Iraqi Security Forces

POC: COL Frank Hull (b)(6)

<u>Action</u>	<u>Due Date</u>	<u>Status</u>
Acquire urgently needed equipment for the Iraqi Security Forces.	1 Aug 04	<input type="checkbox"/> Army PMO reviewing and accelerating equipment procurement contracts in Baghdad. Iraqi Security Force equipment contracts will be awarded throughout April, with deliveries expected 30-90 days later.*
Strengthen Coalition efforts to stand up Iraqi Security Forces.	31 Jan 05	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Over 203,000 Iraqi Security Force (ISF) members in uniform. Current plan ensures that 68% will be fully trained by Jan 05, while 95% will have at least received training through the Transition Integration Program.**
Establish a process to certify that Iraqi units are credible and capable of performing their mission.	To be Determined	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Iraqi Security Force training and certification is being re-assessed due to lessons learned from operations during the last two weeks. A new certification plan is pending new training concept approval.

* CENTCOM is reporting requirements, equipment inventories and projected delivery dates. J8 has forwarded an inventory spreadsheet to CENTCOM to capture this critical information. CENTCOM and J8 are reviewing and reconciling a rough draft of the returned inventory spreadsheet. This information will be included as a back-up slide in next week's brief.

** During recent operations the Iraqi Police Service & Iraqi Civil Defense Corps in select locations failed to perform as expected. These forces are being reconstituted and new leadership training programs are being developed.

11-L-0559/OSD/25981



Iraqi Security Forces (cont.)

<u>Action</u>	<u>Due Date</u>	<u>Status</u>
Embed advisors in the Iraqi Security Forces.	1 Jul 04	<input type="checkbox"/> The four (4) Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) battalions that have been trained and graduated are being mentored by Coalition forces.* (2 battalions are currently deployed) <input type="checkbox"/> All 40 Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) battalions are being mentored by Coalition forces.* (23 battalions are currently deployed) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 296 of 500 authorized Iraqi Police advisors are in theater. 50 are deployed in Kirkuk, however the remainder lack sufficient personal security and communications equipment to deploy with Iraqi Police units throughout Iraq.**

* CENTCOM currently developing a program to embed advisors down to the platoon level in both the IAF and ICDC.

** All police advisors and trainers are in lock down as Coalition forces have been tasked elsewhere to meet the recent security challenges.



Acquisition

POC: COL Nick Justice (b)(6)

<u>Action</u>	<u>Due Date</u>	<u>Status</u>
Resolve post-transition Program Management Office (PMO) Alignment.	15 Apr 04	<input type="checkbox"/> Pending execution of a National Security Presidential Directive.* After the NSPD is signed, DoD and DoS will create a memorandum of agreement to address detailed operational and reporting requirements.
Develop a master plan for US Mission and other Green Zone facilities.	7 Jun 04	<input type="checkbox"/> Annex F of the Interagency Transition Operations Plan provides the overarching plan for facilities. DoS will complete a plan for US Mission facilities by 24 May. DoD will complete a detailed plan delineating the use of all other facilities in the Green Zone by 7 Jun. US Corps of Engineers has the lead.

*The National Security Presidential Directive will resolve the organizational placement of the PMO and Iraq Reconstruction Management Office after transition as well as the post-transition emergency hire authority. The National Security Council is coordinating DoD and DoS drafts and comments on the NSPD. The NSPD is expected to be approved during the week of 19 Apr 04.



Personnel

POC: Ellen Tunstall (b)(6)

<u>Action</u>	<u>Due Date</u>	<u>Status</u>
Recruit to fill vacant CPA / post-CPA staff positions on or before 30 Jun 04.	30 Jun 04	<input type="checkbox"/> There are 398 personnel filling advisor positions. CPA recommends that this number be reduced to 199 after the transition. - 111 people have agreed to remain past the transition - 14 of which are from the Coalition. These volunteers are being vetted by DoS, and recruiting continues for the remaining 88 (26 Coalition) positions. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CPA has recommended 39 support staff for the Iraq Reconstruction Office Management Office (support and oversight entity for the advisors).
Create a CPA personnel redeployment plan.	16 Apr 04	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> The Interagency Transition Planning Team is working with CPA to develop the plan. CPA is expected to have a by name, time-phased redeployment plan by 25 Apr.
Establish mechanism for DoD and DoS to maintain 5 U.S.C. Section 3161 hiring authority.	15 Apr 04	<input type="checkbox"/> Will be authorized in a National Security Presidential Directive now being coordinated by the National Security Council (as noted on slide 5.)



Finance

POC: Mary Tompkey (b)(6)

<u>Action</u>	<u>Due Date</u>	<u>Status</u>
Establish a cost-sharing plan between CPA and tenant organizations for administrative and life support costs.	1 May 04	<input type="checkbox"/> Decision memorandum setting forth the plan is in the Executive Secretary's office awaiting approval and signature.*
Balance the CPA budget.	30 May 04	<input type="checkbox"/> A series of actions, developed by the DoD Comptroller's office and Finance Assessment Team, from reviewing contract requirements to charging back logistics costs (see note above) are being planned and executed. As a result of these actions, the CPA predicts a balanced budget by the end of the fiscal year.

* In order to implement the cost-sharing plan by 1 May, the decision memorandum (OSD control number 75915) needs to be signed as soon as possible.

11-L-0559/OSD/25985



Information Technology

POC: Brian Fila (b)(6)

<u>Action</u>	<u>Due Date</u>	<u>Status</u>
Establish a Senior Information Technology Steering Group in Iraq.	15 Apr 04	<input type="checkbox"/> A decision memorandum was circulated for comment within DoD on 1 Apr. CENTCOM / CJTF-7 registered initial non-concurrence. DoS, DoD and Joint Staff (J6) representatives met on 9 Apr to discuss how to resolve the issue.*
Stand-up an Iraq.gov internet domain to allow the Iraqi government to maintain internet services after 1 Jul.	1 Jul 04	<input type="checkbox"/> The Senior Advisor to the Science and Technology Ministry is leading the effort in coordination with the CPA Communications Support Office. A strategy document was forwarded to CPA on 7 Apr for acquisition of the domain name. Required equipment will be acquired and operated by the Ministry of Science and Technology.
Establish and fund a structure in the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to promote information flow within the Iraqi Security Forces.	1 Jul 04	<input type="checkbox"/> Baghdad continues to work requirements with analysis and budget construction to follow; initial construction on a communications infrastructure may be linked to ongoing projects to speed delivery.

* During the 9 Apr meeting, DoS and the intelligence community agreed to provide representatives to the Iraq Senior Steering Group. CPA (Baghdad) is identifying an existing forum to meet the Steering Group requirement. If identified, there will be no need for the decision memorandum. The memorandum is on hold.



Back-Up

11-L-0559/OSD/25987



Tasks Completed Prior to This Week

Action

Identify and support key Iraqi ministries

Establish a panel in Washington to ensure interagency cooperation with respect to communications issues

Achieve unity of effort in the security sector.

Specify that the Multi-National Force – Iraq priority task is the creation of capable Iraqi Security Forces.

Establish a US Deputy for Admiral Nash to oversee Iraqi Army contracting requirements.

Reorganize the CPA Baghdad personnel office.

Start daily/weekly census of CPA personnel.

Improve the operation of the Baghdad strategic communications office.

Establish a working group to identify and overcome bottlenecks in the Iraqi Reconstruction and Relief Fund process.

Resolve pre-transition Program Management Office (PMO) Alignment

Assign a Green Zone Coordinator

Name a single Chief Financial Officer in Baghdad.

720

APR 27 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
 SUBJECT: Multi-national Force Headquarters

DM

I am concerned about the Chiefs raising questions about the number of people they are getting asked for the Iraq multi-national force headquarters. It sounds like that headquarters must be hundreds, maybe 500 to 1,000 people. Does that make sense?

IRHQ

I have no visibility on the size, what its functions will be, how the Petraeus activity fits in, or what its interaction with Metz will be.

I raise the question, because if you think about it, all we talk to is Abizaid and Sanchez. We don't ever hear about Metz. I have no idea what his role is. He is obviously somewhere between Sanchez and Conway, but the question has to be asked, is the Sanchez headquarters, the multi-national force headquarters, going to be so large that it is going to subsume Metz's function?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042604-31

.....
 Please respond by 5/7/04

87 April

APR 27 2004

TO: Doug Feith
Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Al-Jazirah

Here is some more on Al-Jazirah.

Thanks.

Attach.
FBIS-FMA-04-155

DHR:dh
042604-33

.....
Please respond by _____

091.412

27
honey



FBIS

Foreign Media Analysis

Arab World: Al-Jazirah's Anti-US Tone on Iraq Overshadows Moderate Programming

The Qatari Government-financed Al-Jazirah TV in recent weeks has maintained a sharply critical tone toward the US in its reporting on Iraq. The channel portrayed US military actions in Al-Fallujah as unprovoked violations of the truce, highlighted the impact of US military operations on Iraqi civilians, implied Coalition forces used excessive force; and glorified the "resistance" against Coalition forces. The channel's reporting on Iraq is consistent with past coverage of US military operations resulting in civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Haiti. Despite the channel's consistently critical reporting on Iraq, it did provide time to the US viewpoint, covering US press conferences and speeches and inviting US officials to comment on events and participate in talk shows. The channel also offered entertainment programming that did not portray the US in an unfavorable light.

Al-Jazirah's reporting on the conflict in Al-Fallujah portrayed the situation as a popular Iraqi "resistance" against the "occupation force" without distinguishing between insurgents, foreign fighters, and unarmed civilians. The channel rarely reported insurgents as instigating attacks against Coalition forces, instead portraying US military actions as unprovoked violations of the truce.

- On 21 April, for example, Al-Jazirah's correspondent in Al-Fallujah, Abd-al-Aziz Muhammad, reported renewed fighting between US forces and "resistance men . . . people of Al-Fallujah." Muhammad said: "As the residents of the neighborhood say, the firing began when the American force with armored personnel carriers and troop carriers penetrated into the center of the neighborhood. The force was met with heavy firing from the resistance men who were surprised at the American forces firing despite the truce agreed to by the occupation forces."
- On 20 April, Al-Jazirah reported "the American occupation forces announced that eight **armed** Iraqis were killed in Al-Fallujah this evening, while the soldiers of the Marines destroyed three cars in the area, despite the truce that the occupation forces agreed to with the people of the area."
- Al-Jazirah correspondent Hamid Hadid in Al-Fallujah on 14 April reported that the "sudden US storming of the Nazzal neighborhood constitutes a **serious** threat to the cease-fire, which witnessed many violations that were represented by taking the roofs and minarets of mosques as positions for the [US] snipers, who open fire on every target they see."

Al-Jazirah's reporting on Al-Fallujah also highlighted the impact of US military operations on local civilians, implied that Coalition forces exercised excessive use of force against Iraqi

This FBIS product is based exclusively on the content and behavior of selected media and has not been coordinated with other US Government components.

11-L-0559/OSD/25991

civilians, and glorified the "resistance" by highlighting successes against Coalition forces and sometimes portraying the Iraqi dead as "martyrs."

- On 15 April, Hadid said that "an ambulance that had gone to evacuate some wounded from the Al-Shurtah [police] neighborhood was targeted by US planes which led to its destruction and the wounding of three of its members." Hadid said that US forces prevented a medical team from getting to the public hospital and preparing it for the patients: "under the pretext that it had not received orders to do so."
- Al-Jazirah on 14 April reported that overnight bombing resulted in nine killed and 11 injured in addition to damage to homes and cars. Hamid Hadid filed a video report in which he said: "Dead and injured, damage and destruction, is the result of the bombing of the citizens' homes by the American fighter planes and forces in response to the violation of the truce on the part of the people of Al-Fallujah, as they say." The report showed a resident saying the planes bombed a "residential area that didn't have any mujahidin or fighters."
- On 8 April, Al-Jazirah's Ahmad Mansur reported that the people of Al-Fallujah asked him to convey a "message" to the world that "we either live with dignity or die as martyrs and we will not surrender to the US forces, even if we remain under siege for more than a year." Mansur said: "So far, 60 martyrs have been buried in [the stadium]" and the "casualty toll of the past few days is 300 martyrs and more than 500 wounded."

Al-Fallujah Reporting Consistent With Reporting on Iraq, Other Conflicts

Al-Jazirah's reporting on events in Al-Fallujah was consistent with its reporting on events throughout Iraq, which during times of escalated violence consumed the majority of the channel's newscasts.

- On 25 April, Al-Jazirah reported: "Eyewitnesses have said that four school pupils were killed when US occupation troops opened fire indiscriminately in the vicinity of a road in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, after a roadside bomb exploded. The explosion damaged a US military vehicle." The video showed a dead child and injured children in a hospital.
- On 24 April, Al-Jazirah correspondent Yusuf al-Shuli reported that the "destruction and blood" in Al-Sadr City "were caused by US bombardment, as the citizens say, of several neighborhoods in the city." Al-Shuli added: "Some people say that this bombardment is nothing but a provocative attempt by the occupation forces against Al-Sadr City." He commented that the "bleeding is continuing in Iraq and the biggest losers are the civilians."
- On 25 April, Al-Shuli reported that the "scene in the village of Al-Nu'aymiyah, south of Al-Fallujah, was not much different from that in the city of Al-Sadr, for the destruction and blood swept the village, to which many Al-Fallujah citizens fled in quest for security. The US bombardment, however, forced them to flee the houses they sought refuge in to destinations they do not know."

1 Al-Jazirah's reporting on Iraq also mirrored the treatment the channel has given other recent conflicts involving US military actions resulting in civilian casualties or collateral damage.

- For example, a 10 December 2003 Al-Jazirah report on Afghanistan charged that "nine children paid with their lives last Saturday for an attempt by US planes to hunt a ranking Taliban minister" and the bodies of six more children who also "paid with their lives" were discovered on the same day. The video report noted similarities between US practices in Afghanistan and the Israeli practice of "targeted killings," showing Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld answering questions on the issue.
- During the channel's coverage of Haiti on 14 March, Al-Jazirah cited "eyewitnesses" in Haiti as saying that two more people have been killed "at the hands" of *American* soldiers, "one of them 18 years old," raising the number killed since the Marines arrived in the country to six. The report showed two bodies lying on a cement slab with people wailing and asserting that the two who were killed did nothing to provoke the attack.

Offering Modest Bright Spots

Despite Al-Jazirah's unfavorable news coverage and overwhelmingly critical commentary on the US in Iraq, the channel did consistently provide live coverage of US press conferences and speeches. Al-Jazirah also hosted Western personalities including current and former US Government officials on talk shows and, to a lesser extent, interviewed them during newscasts.

- On 25 April, Al-Jazirah aired repeatedly an "exclusive" two-minute recorded interview with US civil administrator Paul Bremer, in Iraq. He said the situation in Al-Fallujah is "difficult" and that "several hundred Saddam followers from the Republican Guard and the Intelligence joined some criminals and foreign terrorists and took the city hostage." Bremer added that the Coalition did not cause the problem in Al-Fallujah.
- Al-Jazirah's 23 April episode of "More Than One Opinion," moderated by Sami Haddad, discussed Bin Ladin's 16 April statement and included former British Ambassador to Iraq Sir Terrence Clark who argued against the message offered by Bin Ladin. On 26 March, the program included among its guests Stephen Cohen from the Brookings Institution.
- Al-Jazirah's live political discussion program "From Washington," which often hosts current and former US Government officials, featured former US Middle East Peace Process Coordinator Dennis Ross on its 15 April episode. On 25 March, former spokesman of the National Security Council, P. J. Crowley, and former adviser to President Carter in the National Security Council, William Quandt, appeared.

In addition, the channel sometimes presented reporting and commentary that, although not necessarily complementary of the US, did criticize terrorist activities.

- On 22 April, Al-Jazirah aired a live 12-minute report by its Baghdad correspondent Abd-al-Qadir Ayyad in which he reviewed the Iraqi press published on 22 April. During the report, Ayyad cited an article that said, "There were some 300 to 400 Arab terrorists in Al-Fallujah,

but most of them left the city after the Al-Fallujah residents insisted that they leave. Some of them refused and insisted on continuing to fight against the Americans.”

- Ayyad had with him the chief editor of Baghdad *Al-Watan* newspaper, Dr. ~~Tahar~~ Jaza, who commented on the Basra bombings, saying: “It is regrettable that we see such incidents taking place in Basra and other Iraqi cities because the result of these bombings negatively affects the civilians’ interests, security, stability, and life. Most of the Basra bombings’ victims were students.” Jaza said “there is confusion between the concept of terrorism and the concept of resistance. Nobody supports a resistance carrying out acts that harm Iraqi civilians.”
- On 15 April, Al-Jazirah aired a special talk show program discussing the Bin Ladin statement aired by the channel earlier that day. During the program, Al-Jazirah showed a three-minute video showing reactions by ordinary European citizens, including citizens of Arab origin or Muslims living in Europe. They all rejected any submission to Bin Ladin’s threats and affirmed that Muslims in European countries are being treated in a fair manner.

Al-Jazirah Offers Nonpolitical Programming

Not all of Al-Jazirah’s programming consisted of political discussion criticizing US foreign policy. The channel offered some programs that presented a mild tone toward the West, including a sports talk show, an automobile program, documentaries, a fashion program, and a cinema review program that reviewed Western movies. Al-Jazirah’s managing director also recently announced that the channel would be introducing a tourism program in an effort to “add a softer dimension” to the channel.

- Al-Jazirah’s program “Appointment in the Country of Emigration” [Maw’ad fi al-Mahjar] is a weekly program that presents the experiences of Arab personalities who emigrated to Western countries during their childhood and remained abroad to achieve prominence in the West. The channel’s 23 April episode featured a Lebanese-Arab living in Canada, Antwan Najim, who established the first “nuclear medicine laboratory” after obtaining his Doctorate in “nuclear pharmacology” in America.
- The Qatari English-language daily *The Peninsula* reported that Al-Jazirah “plans to add a softer dimension to its strident image with a slew of ‘lighter’ programs aimed at the family.” According to the article, managing director Waddah Khanfar announced the channel would soon air a travel and tourism program. The article quoted Khanfar as saying, “We don’t see our role as being restricted to bringing just the bad news and hard political developments to people. We also want to become a part of the every day lives of people. We want to create a friendly screen” (22 April).

April 27, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Missile Defense

Let's do schedule something on missile defense so I get my head around it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042704-11

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

873.24

27 4/27/04

11-L-0559/OSD/25995

OSD 11654-04

April 27, 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PAS Vacancies

Please tell me the percentage of open positions in our top Presidential appointments has been throughout the Administration. In other words, if you looked at it by month, what is the average vacancy rate of our top people - I believe there are 48 Presidential appointments. We can calculate that. My guess is that it is close to 20 to 25 percent of the top 48 Presidential appointments that have not been in place at any given time during the past 3-plus years.

230

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042704-10

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

27 April

OSD 11655-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25996

April 27, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Numbers in Headquarters

Please give me the numbers as to how many people are in Metz's headquarters,
Sanchez's headquarters and Abizaid's headquarters.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042704-12


.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

322

OSD 11656-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25997

27 Apr 04



7209

Incomplete

April 28, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Train and Equip Authorities

Put your head into this "Train and Equip" legislation memo and tell me what you think we ought to do. Please get back to me by the morning of April 30.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/12/04 ASD(LA) memo to SecDef re: Status of Train and Equip Legislation [OSD 05838-04]

DHR:dh
042804-4

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

*COMPLETE
4/30/04*

09/3

28 April 04

OSD 11657-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25998

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

2004 APR 22 AM 11:18

April 12, 2004, 2:30 PM



GENERAL COUNSEL

C 4/21
ODD 4/28

Paul Butler
4/26
TAB

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs
& William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Status of Train & Equip Legislation

- This will provide an update regarding the Department's progress in achieving legislative authority to train and equip friendly foreign forces in furtherance of the global war on terrorism.
- Over the last two years, the Department has proposed and the Congress has enacted some new train and equip authority. A brief summary of existing, available train and equip authorities is provided at TAB A.
- In addition to the authorities noted in TAB A, the Department is seeking four new train and equip authorities – two included in the Presidents Budget Request for FY05 (appropriations provisions) and two in the Department's FY 05 legislative package (authorization provisions). (TAB B). The proposed authorization provisions have not yet been approved by the Office of Management and Budget, however. They both would give us new authority -- that is not encompassed by the appropriations provisions included in the Budget Request (assistance for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, and assistance for irregular forces, groups, or individuals assisting SOF forces to combat terrorism).
- Commanders in the field continue to express dissatisfaction concerning their ability to train & equip foreign forces. While in some cases the dissatisfaction is the result of a lack of authority, in other cases it stems from the cumbersome and relatively untimely nature of our authorities (e.g., drawdown), the result of lengthy, unanticipated delays in the procurement process (e.g., acquisition of battalion sets for the Iraqi Armed Forces and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps), or simply a lack of familiarity with authorities we do have (or the process for invoking them). As set forth in detail in TAB A, the Department already possesses some authority to address many train and equip requirements. However, outside of Iraq and Afghanistan DoD's authority is severely limited – the Department of State usually is the lead agency with the requisite authority.

TSA SD	4/21/04
SA DSD	
SRMA DSD	
EXEC SEC	4/21



I-04/

TO: Donald Rumsfeld

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

PW
MAY 2004
0752-116

SUBJECT: Train and Equip Authorities

- You requested me to put my head into the “Train and Equip” legislation memo and tell you what I think we ought to do.
- DoD requested four new “Train and Equip Authorities” in FY 2005 legislative proposals—all four have gone to Congress:
 - \$500 million “train and equip” authority for Iraq, Afghanistan, and “other friendly nearby regional nations.”
 - Additional \$200 million of drawdown authority under Afghanistan Freedom Support Act for the Afghan National Army.
 - \$100 million to fund President’s Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative.
 - \$25 million to provide support to foreign forces and others facilitating military operations by US Special Operations Forces.
- What have we done:
 - In my hearings before the **SASC** on 20 April, HASC on 21 April, and the HAC-FO on 29 April, I urged Congress to support our train and equip legislative proposals **fully**.
 - At the **SASC** hearing, Sen. Lieberman responded positively: “we might ... take the lead in responding ... as rapidly as the urgent circumstances on the ground require.”
 - SOCOM and SOLIC representatives have briefed the \$25 million SOF proposal to congressional staff.
 - OSD/LA is hosting **briefings** with HASC and **SASC** staffers on 30 April.
- Chairman Kolbe of **HAC-FO** indicated somewhat greater flexibility than in the past. I will follow up with him.
- I will also **try** to enlist support from **Lewis-Murtha** and **Chairman Young** (our problems in the past have mainly been with the HAC-FO).

691.3

3 May 04

28 April 04

COORDINATION: OSD (P), ISA, SOLIC, OGC, OSD/LA

Prepared by: William E. Hopewell, OSD (Policy) (b)(6)

Policy Info Memo Template

April 28, 2004

EF-9426

I-04/005854

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Meeting w/Japanese

I need some sort of a prep for the meeting with the Japanese. I need a piece of paper as to what I should thank them for.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042804-9

[Handwritten signature]

.....
Please respond by 4/29/04

File
4/30

28 Apr 04

28-04-04 15:17 IN

What to Thank/Commend the Japanese for:

- Dispatch of Ground Self-Defense Forces (about 550) to Iraq for reconstruction and three Air Self Defense Force C-130s to Kuwait.
- Standing firm when hostage takers demanded that the Self-Defense Forces leave Iraq in return for the release of three Japanese citizens.
- Early commitment of \$5 billion for Iraqi reconstruction and close cooperation with the Coalition Provisional Authority on implementation.
- Diet approval of \$1 billion in first-year funding for fielding PAC-3 and AEGIS-based missile defense.
- Close consultations with the U.S. on how to transform each of our forces to deal with the future security environment.
- Close cooperation in handling North Korea.

Japan

28 Apr 04
28 Apr 04

April 28, 2004

CJS
5/6

TO: Jim Roche

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

STS

SUBJECT: Updating Systems and Procedures

Thanks for your note on updating systems and procedures. I am glad to see you're well on the road to getting this accomplished.

I have sent it along to Ken Krieg, who is going to coordinate this for the Department.

(Contact Sec. Roche if you need another copy. Copy has already been provided to PK: E)

Thanks so much.

DHR:dh
042804-6

.....
Please respond by _____ cc: KRISTY KOLESAR

SECRETARY

cc: DEPUTY

- WE HAVE RECEIVED ABOUT A DOZEN INPUTS SO FAR
- WE ARE CATALOGUING THE IDEAS, GROUPING THEM IN LIKE CATEGORIES AND THEN EVALUATING BY A NUMBER OF ATTRIBUTES - RISK OF NOT DOING, COMPLEXITY, EFFECT ON WARFIGHTING/MISSION, ETC.
- ~~THE~~ WE ARE LOOKING AT WHAT IS BEING DONE IN THE AREA AT THE MOMENT
- WE SHOULD HAVE THAT BACK TO YOU IN NEXT TWO WEEKS.

OSD 11650-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26003

KEN KRIEG/30

April 28, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler

Paul Butler
5/19

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Former Special Forces

230.02

→

On Wolf Blitzer on CNN at 5:40 p.m., he had on a Special Forces guy named Mancuso who has just retired. He was really impressive. I wonder if he is looking for a job.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042804-3

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

DR 5/20
5/12 C 5/19

TEN
5/19

A-

We contacted him.
He is gainfully employed
and not looking for
additional or other
opportunities right now.

28
4/20/04

OSD 11660-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26004

April 28, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: E-mail

Let's get this e-mail in the press if there is a way to do it. It is amazing.

Thanks.

make sure this is authentic

Attach.
E-mail

DHR:dh
042804-2

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

OSD 11661-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26005

DR

28 April

SECRET
FOR YOUR INFORMATION

Judd, Peter, MSG, OSD

Subject: FW: Letter from a Medic serving in Iraq

LTG C. [unclear] 4/27
Great story that
should be in the
papers.
JR 4/27
MSG Judd

>
>
> This is a letter from (b)(6) a medic in the Iowa Army National
> Guard, serving in Iraq:

> As I head off to Baghdad for the final weeks of my stay in
> Iraq, I wanted to say thanks to all of you who did not believe the
> media. They have done a very poor job of covering everything that has
> happened. I am sorry that I have not been able to visit all of you
> during my two week leave back home. And just so you can rest at night
> knowing something is happening in Iraq that is noteworthy, I thought I
> would pass this on to you. This is the list of things that has
> happened in Iraq recently: (Please share it with your friends and
> compare it to the version that your paper is producing.)

- > * Over 400,000 kids have up-to-date immunizations.
- > * School attendance is up 80% from levels before the war.
- > * Over 1,500 schools have been renovated and rid of the weapons stored
> there so education can occur.
- > * The port of Umm Qasar was renovated so grain can be off-loaded from
> ships faster.
- > * The country had its first 2 billion barrel export of oil in August.
- > * Over 4.5 million people have clean drinking water for the first time
> ever in Iraq.
- > * The country now receives 2 times the electrical power it did before the
> war.
- > * 100% of the hospitals are open and fully staffed, compared to 35% before
> the war.
- > * Elections are taking place in every major city, and city councils are in
> place.
- > * Sewer and water lines are installed in every major city.
- > * Over 60,000 police are patrolling the streets.
- > * Over 100,000 Iraqi civil defense police are securing the country.
- > * Over 80,000 Iraqi soldiers are patrolling the streets side by side with
> US soldiers.
- > * Over 400,000 people have telephones for the first time ever
- > * Students are taught field sanitation and hand washing techniques to
> prevent the spread of germs.
- > * An interim constitution has been signed.
- > * Girls are allowed to attend school.
- > * Textbooks that don't mention Saddam are in the schools for the first
> time in 30 years.

>
> Don't believe for one second that these people do not want us
> there. I have met many, many people from Iraq that want us there, and
> in a bad way. They say they will never see the freedoms we talk about
> but they hope their children will. We are doing a good job in Iraq
> and I challenge anyone, anywhere to dispute me on these facts. So if
> you happen to run into John Kerry, be sure to give him my email
> address and send him to Denison, Iowa. This soldier will set him
> straight. If you are like me and very disgusted with how this period
> of rebuilding has been portrayed, email this to a friend and let them
> know there are good things happening.

> (b)(6)
>
>
>
>

CB/11

TO SecDef

Paul Butler
5/10

April 29, 2004
EF-9456
I-04/006039

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Larry Di Rita

SUBJECT: Vote on Solidarity

Please find out if Congress did, in fact, vote financial support for Solidarity.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042904-14

.....
Please respond by 5/5/04

Poland

DA 5/12

*Sir,
Response attached.
vr / CDR Nosenzo*

29 Apr

30-94-01 16:13

OSD 11662-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26007

04/5/12

INFO MEMO

MAY 04 2004 EF-9456

1-04/006039

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *cc [handwritten signature] POMC(P)*

SUBJECT: Vote on Solidarity

- You asked if Congress voted financial support to the independent Polish trade union Solidarity.
- Solidarity received funds through several laws from Fiscal Years (FY) 1987 - 1990.
 - FY 1987: Supplemental Appropriations Act provided \$1 million in economic funds.
 - FY 1988: State/Justice/Commerce appropriations provided \$1 million.
 - FY 1989: Foreign Operations appropriations provided \$2 million.
 - \$1 million directly to Solidarity; \$1 million through AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute to promote democratic activities in Poland.
 - FY 1990, Foreign Operations appropriations provided \$1.5 million. All funds distributed through AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute.
- June 1989: Tadeusz Mazowiecki became first non-communist prime minister.
- November 1989: Congress approved the Support East European Democracies (SEED) Act, provided \$1 million for government-direct economic stabilization programs.
- December 1990: Lech Walesa elected President of Poland.

POLAND
4 May 04

COORDINATION: ISP

Prepared by: Jay Baumgartner, OSD (Policy), (b)(6)

29 APR 04

OSD 11662-04

April 29, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Andy Hoehn

cc: Gen. Dick Myers *Ray DuBois*
Paul Wolfowitz *Paul Butler*
Doug Feith
Ryan Henry

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Announcing Global Posture

We better think through how we are going to make this general announcement on the posture that Senators Warner and Levin were talking about. We certainly want to coordinate it with them from a timing standpoint.

I think it is very important that the announcement indicate how it fits with BRAC. I also think it is important that we list the principles and the criteria that I have been pushing and that Andy has been pushing.

I would like to clear the draft.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042904-12

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

320,2 STRATEGIC

29 Apr 04

OSD 11663-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26009

April 29, 2004

763

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Military Headquarters

We have to get very good visibility fast, like by Saturday, on what the military headquarters is going to look like, so we can figure out how it meshes with the US Mission that Negroponte is setting up.

I think we have had enough time to sort through it. Why don't your folks give me a briefing on Saturday to show me where you are.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042904-11

.....
Please respond by 5/1/04

*Closed.
Briefing given
on 1 May 04.*

OSD 11665-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26010

5/3
1050

120

April 29, 2004

5/6

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Dr*
SUBJECT: Cluster Bombs

5/3

Please let me know when you get the answer for that woman on cluster bombs. I need to know the answer.

477.6

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042904-8

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosunzo
5/5

5/5

29 Apr 04



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

UK

FEB 23 2006

Lord Paul Drayson
Minister for Defence Procurement
Ministry of Defence
Floor 5, Zone B, Main Building
Whitehall
London, England SW1A2HB

Paul
Dear Lord Drayson,

Thank you for the personal copy of the United Kingdom Government's Defence Industrial Strategy. It makes important statements on US policy towards technology transfer and on the UK defense acquisition process' openness to contracting with companies outside Great Britain.

As you gain insight and develop lessons learned from implementing your strategy, passing them on to Ken Krieg and his staff through the Bilateral Defense Acquisition Committee or other fora would be most appreciated.

The UK is our closest friend and ally. I share your view that we need to continue working together to meet our current and future defense requirements.

Best regards,
[Signature]

23 Feb 06

cc:
Under Secretary of Defense (policy)
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)

15 Dec 05

OSD 00120-06





DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
EXECUTIVE SERVICES DIRECTORATE

February 24, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR CABLES DUTY OFFICER

SUBJECT: Release of Message – DepSecDef Message to Lord Drayson

The attached package contains a message/cable to be released via the Defense Messaging System (DMS) .

The text of the message and accompanying letter (as appropriate) has been reviewed and cleared for release.

Please return a copy of this memorandum along with a copy of the transmitted message to the Correspondence Control Division. If further information is required, please call (b)(6) Action officer information: Seth Wilson, OUSD(AT&L)/IC/ACA, (b)(6)

Thank you.

Michael Lowery
Executive Services Directorate
Correspondence Analyst

Attachments:
As stated

OSD 00120-06

11-L-0559/OSD/26013

UNCLAS
ROUTINE

FROM DEPSECDEF WASHINGTON DC
TO: ODC LONDON UK
INFO: USDAO LONDON UK//OPNSNCO//
DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-1//

SUBJECT LETTER FROM HONORABLE GORDON ENGLAND TO LORD DRAYSON

ODC LONDON **IS** REQUESTED TO FORWARD THE FOLLOWING TEXT TO LORD DRAYSON AT **THE** EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

(BEGIN TEXT)

LORD PAUL DRAYSON
MINISTER FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
FLOOR 5, ZONE B, MAIN BUILDING
WHITEHALL
LONDON, ENGLAND SW1A2HB

DEAR LORD DRAYSON:

(PARA) THANK YOU FOR THE PERSONAL COPY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT'S DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY. IT MAKES IMPORTANT STATEMENTS ON US POLICY TOWARDS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND ON THE UK DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROCESS' OPENNESS TO CONTRACTING WITH COMPANIES OUTSIDE OF GREAT BRITAIN.

(PARA) **AS** YOU GAIN INSIGHT AND DEVELOP LESSONS LEARNED FROM IMPLEMENTING YOUR STRATEGY, PASSING THEM ON TO KEN KRIEG AND HIS STAFF THROUGH THE BILATERAL DEFENSE ACQUISITION COMMITTEE OR OTHER FOR A WOULD BE MOST APPRECIATED.

(PARA) THE UK IS OUR CLOSEST FRIEND AND ALLY. I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT WE NEED TO CONTINUE WORKING TOGETHER TO MEET OUR CURRENT AND FUTURE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS.

SINCERELY,
//GORDON ENGLAND//

CC:
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)
(END TEXT)

OSD 00120-06

11-L-0559/OSD/26014

April 29, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Quote

Some Congresswoman quoted me saying "untidy," and she said I said "a little untidy," implying that what is going on today is more than "a little untidy." I told her that I did not say "a little untidy." I thought I said "untidy," and I didn't say it in the last several weeks, I said it much earlier when things were, in fact, untidy. Please dig out that quote for me.

She also quoted the President improperly and said that he said that combat operations were over. I told her that it was "major" combat operations.

Let's get the two quotes, and we will send them to her.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042904-7


.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

350.0015D

29 Apr 04

OSD ¹¹⁶⁶⁷ ~~11666~~-04

April 29, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Pace
Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Congressman Kennedy

I want to get Congressman Pat Kennedy in sometime for a meeting with Paul Wolfowitz, Pete Pace and me to answer his questions. Please find out which Congressional resolution he voted for – whether it was the money or to go to war.

We'll just get him down maybe for lunch, so we can talk to him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042904-5

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

000-1180

29 APR 04

OSD 11669-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26016



April 29, 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PAS Tracking

210

When you fashion the numbers on the Presidential Appointment-Senate Confirmed personnel, I do want to see the percentage we have had vacant throughout the entire term.

I also want to see who was responsible for the fact that we had that substantial percentage of vacancies.

Therefore, you need to break out the period as before the President sent the nominations to the Senate and after he sent them, before the individuals were sworn in. If I could see the percentage of the responsibility for those two categories throughout the year, it would be helpful.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042904-1

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

29 Apr 04

OSD 11670-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26017

C513

April 29, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: Minow Report

Paul Butler
5/3

319.1

What is the status on the Minow report? What is happening? Nothing seems to move forward.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042904-16

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

pt 5/4

Secret -

We will be back to you shortly on a way ahead (draft statement by you and letter to Minnow are out for comment). FYI, thought you should be aware of the highlighted language in the report. Not helpful as POTUS and AG stamp for Patriot Act. This is why we are developing a strategy to distance you from the contents while properly thanking the Commission for their hard work.

29 Apr 04

Paul

Paul Butler

11-L-0559/OSD/26018

5/3 OSD 11671-04

...s beyond DARPA's control contrib-
As a research agency charged with
-developing, but not implementing, technological
tools, DARPA was unprepared to answer critics'
questions about the privacy implications of
how TIA might be used. Historically DARPA
had engaged in high-risk, high-pay-off research
for the DOD, conducted out of the limelight.
Much of its research has resulted in spectacular
advances, with benefits far beyond the defense
establishment—for example, DARPA created
ARPANet, the precursor to the Internet, as a
technological tool for linking defense research-
ers—but never before had the agency been requir-
ed to account for the potential impact on privacy
of future uses of a tool it was in the process
of developing.

This led to sustained miscommunication between
DARPA and its critics. DARPA answered questions
about privacy by repeatedly assuring the public
that it was not aggregating personally identifi-
able information on U.S. persons or using TIA to
access any such information, and that any such
activities in the future would be by *other agencies*
which would bear responsibility for complying
with the laws and regulations applicable to *them*.
Some observers found these responses evasive
especially in the light of DARPA's public rhetoric
promoting TIA. Although the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight
found no evidence that TIA was at any time
using personally identifiable information on U.S.
persons, DARPA's assurances failed to resolve
critics' concerns.

The timing of revelations about TIA also contrib-
uted to the controversy surrounding the program.
Many Americans were growing increasingly un-
easy about government actions, in the aftermath
of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, that
appeared to threaten civil liberties: the detention
of non-U.S. persons without charge or access to
counsel, monitoring of inmate telephone calls
with their attorneys, passage of the USA PATRIOT

Act with the new powers it conferred on the
government to conduct—in some cases secret—
s&&~ and seizures, physical searches of airline
passengers and their luggage, and the Attorney
General's Operation TIPS program (later-
abandoned) under which delivery, repair, and
other workers who entered people's homes would
report to the government on what they saw there.
Moreover, news of TIA was breaking during the
fall of 2002, just as Congress was debating the
Homeland Security Act, with the goal of
centralizing many of the government's surveil-
lance programs within a new Cabinet-level
department. All of this coalesced to heighten
concerns among legislators and members of the
public to the potential threat of government use
of personal data.

Another significant contributor to the contro-
versy was DARPA's failure to build protections
for privacy into TIA technologies as they were
being developed. We recognize that DARPA had
underway separate initiatives to develop privacy-
protecting technologies, but these were not part
of the TIA tools that DARPA was demonstrating
in 2002 and 2003. As the Inspector General
noted, these research projects "were not as com-
prehensive as a privacy impact assessment would
have been in scrutinizing TIA technology."⁹⁵

Informational privacy is respected and meaning-
ful policy oversight guaranteed only when they
are made a central part of the technology devel-
opment process and when the tools necessary to
ensure them are developed as an integral part
of writing software and building systems. DARPA
failed, in the words of the Inspector General's
report, "to ensure that privacy is built into the
developmental process."⁹⁶ DARPA was by no
means unique, but that failure ultimately con-
tributed to the elimination of TIA. Ironically, it
also contributed to Congress withdrawing fund-
ing for the privacy enhancing technologies that
DARPA was developing.

me
is this
for

April 29, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes LTG Sharp
 Ryan Henry Lt Gen Schwartz
 Peter Rodman MG Burgess
 Reuben Jeffery VADM Jacoby
 Bill Luti

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Sistani

IRAN

Please see the attached report about a meeting with a Sistani associate.

Thanks.

Attach.
 4/22/04 Meeting report

DHR:dh
 042804-10

.....
 Please respond by _____

29 Apr 04

OSD 11672-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26020

22 April, 2004.

██████████ is a close contact and personal friend of GA Ali Sistani. ██████████ has had access to GA Sistani for the past 15 years. ██████████ is a moderate and a respected notable in the city of Najaf/Kufa. He is not a cleric, and he is not employed by Sistani, but is an independently wealthy and a religiously inclined man who has had direct involvement in the Hawza.

The purpose of the meeting was to establish a direct relationship with CPA [██████████]. He claimed that many Baghdad visitors led them to believe that there was a solid conduit to CPA-Baghdad but that they were beginning to lose faith in this and wanted to build their own relationship at this point. He indicated grave dissatisfaction in dealing with multiple interlocutors who all claim they were sent by Amb Bremer to "solve the problem" and the episodic nature of their involvement. Some, he claimed, had even gone as far as asking for a photograph with GA Sistani [IGC member Muwaffaq Al Ruba'i] for what they interpreted as an attempt at proving they met with him and gaining increased credibility when they quoted him. He stated that Sistani understands many are speaking in his name and that he has to do something about that and is looking at making a direct office to office connection with a "real live American officer" in the CPA so there is no misunderstanding. He knows of ██████████, and sought us out.

Note: He did not indicate at any time that he had a message from Sistani. However, at the close of the meeting, ██████████ stated that he would report his meeting results directly to Sistani and requested that I meet with a closer contact of Sistani [NFI] this coming week. He stated that this person will come to CPA ██████████ to meet. He did not mention a name, nor did I ask, but he mentioned the person is a cleric and an associate of GA Sistani. I believe that final selection of this person will come out after ██████████ briefs GA Sistani.

Here is a report of the key points he made:

1. Coalition Forces were seen in some neighborhoods [Hayy Zahra] and were refreshingly received. He stated that the people that want peace welcome this action. Indicating that US Forces are welcome in their midst.
2. Any city where there is no Law and no Authority there is a problem, and thus is the case in Najaf and Kufa. The sovereign should never abandon his [people] during a crisis; neither should he yield his authority to any person that is not properly appointed. Here he is indicating the obvious, asking the US to regain control from the forces that now [occupy government offices] in Najaf. He mentioned US success in Kut, and wished for a similar outcome where the US was able to regain control and push back the militia.
3. He further commented that Najaf has fallen into the hands of the so called Jaysh Al Mahdi, a group of thieves, murderers, he goes on...that have armed themselves beyond any comprehension, taken police stations, released all the prisoners, and looted the government offices...all while the coalition forces watched. He went

on to say that anyone that worked with the CF has been targeted and many now are in jails and are being tried in so called Shari'a courts, some have been executed and still the Coalition stands by without interfering. He mentioned that [collaborators] are being systematically pursued, arrested, and detained daily and that the families have no where to go and complain—just like the old days under Saddam. Fear and Intimidation now rule the city again.

4. He stated that Sistani has done his duty [as a religious leader]; he sent a delegation asking MAS to leave the city if he intended to fight the coalition and spare the city and shrines from inherent destruction. He stated that the delegation warned MAS that the coalition will respond with might for every bullet Sadr Militia [SM] expended. He went on to explain that Sadr's inner circle was now in charge of key [military] decisions and that MAS remained removed from direct involvement, but that MAS was adamant about not backing down in the face of too much pressure—didn't look good—and that MAS was personally convinced that he could win and keep/control Najaf/Kufa.
5. He affirmed that most of the hardened MAS militants in the streets manning positions were strangers [from outside the city], and more likely from Thawra city [Sadr City] in Baghdad. He wondered how they could have traveled, unobstructed—to Najaf—and taken control so easily, and remain in control in the face of the mighty coalition that liberated Iraq. He said that people were beginning to draw dangerous conclusions from such a situation and that lest the coalition regain control that it would be hard to mobilize the citizens to help or cooperate later. They live in fear of retribution for any misconstruction made by the Sadr thugs...this is like living under Saddam only now it was 1991 all over again.
6. He stressed that Najaf is not Fallujah. He stated that Fallujah is full of former Baathists, foreign fighters from all over the Middle East to include Al Qaeda and Ansar Al Islam, former Iraqi military, former Iraqi Intelligence, and former Iraqi Special Services, many that benefited from the regime for years. Najaf is different. You do not have any military commanders, or any security apparatus, or any Sunni opposition. You have people that never benefited from the regime but were systematically oppressed and persecuted for the past 35 years. You don't have any former regime elements, or anyone fighting against an occupation—we are still thankful you liberated us, and Sistani has stated that since you announced you are leaving and given a date then you are not truly occupiers—so the dynamics are different and you can count on the people to support you to a limit if you were to go after him more aggressively. We hear the planes overhead daily and nightly, we know the troops are in the outskirts of the city, and we await a solution. It is my understanding here that he is indicating that they expect a US offensive to take back the town and remove MAS and his militia [using Kut as an example], but cautioning against prolonged fighting and collateral damage control [meaning the Shrines].
7. He described the Najaf Police as traitors that must be fired once the city is liberated. Stated that they were obedient dogs when Saddam was in power, and their paychecks were a fraction of what they are now. He displayed outright disdain for the great betrayal that they committed in giving over the city to Sadr's

criminals. He then said they would have never thought of doing that under Saddam, but it was easier now since there was no perceptible punishment by the local government/coalition, but that the outcome of not cooperating with MAS was taken more seriously.

8. Stated that Sadr was a cancer that needed to be removed or else it would get worse fast and that you would either have to amputate [give up Najaf] or be chasing the disease that was spreading ever so much faster. He urged some solution that would rid them of this future [Shi'a] Saddam. He went on to develop the Saddam analogy by showing that Sadr has surrounded himself with a circle much like Saddam's that would protect the leader as long as they were benefiting from him—currently that consisted of feeding of his spoils—like police cars and weapons, monies they plundered and influence they now enjoy along with its inherent respect. He stated that GA Sistani has declared that all government property had to be returned.

The meeting lasted two hours and was rather pleasant in tone. [REDACTED] is a friendly fellow that likes to make analogies and funny remarks. One joke he made about Sadr that is worth mentioning goes like this: A mother mosquito tells her child not to go near any people, she feared for his life, but the little mosquito didn't listen, he came home that evening and told his mother, mom, why did you ask me to stay away from the people, they really like me, when I went near them today they all started clapping for me...[he motioned with his hands how we try to kill a mosquito] he said this was Sadr, he was that naïve & stupid. We then had a catered lunch [actually cooked by the wife of one of our Iraqi staff—it was delicious] in our office followed by the usual barrage of tea and Pepsi.

Again, before we said our final good-bye's [which we did several times as usual] he mentioned that he would brief Sistani personally and re-contact our office for a future meeting with a closer associate. Direct contact with [REDACTED] is done through our [REDACTED] interlocutor [REDACTED], who has been faithfully with us for almost a year now. He has relocated his family [REDACTED] [REDACTED] after several death threats received in his home by phone and paper under the door.

April 30, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
Powell Moore

cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Missile Defense FY 2005 Budget

Here is this letter from John Kyl that is time sensitive. What do you propose?

Thanks.

Attach.
4/27/04 Kyl memo to SecDef

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INTELLIGENCE

*7/3/3
06/3/3*

DHR:dh
043004-13

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

SecDef,

I have scheduled a meeting for Monday, May 3 at 10 am to build a response.

We should have a plan and assignments complete by COB Monday, to include your role and that of Paul Wolfowitz

*SC
5/1/04*

3D Army



*3
3
3
X*

4/28
Dkt 4/30

JON KYL
Arizona

730 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
(202) 224-4521

COMMITTEES:
FINANCE
JUDICIARY

ENERGY AND NATURAL
RESOURCES

CHAIRMAN
REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0304

STATE OFFICE:
2200 EAST CAMELBACK ROAD
SUITE 120
PHOENIX, AZ 85016
(b)(6)
7315 NORTH ORACLE ROAD
SUITE 220
TUCSON, AZ 85704
(b)(6)

Well

MEMORANDUM

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
CC: Under Secretary Douglas Feith
Acting Assistant Secretary Mira Ricardel
Assistant Secretary Powell Moore
Deputy Assistant Secretary Steve Moffitt
Deputy Assistant Secretary Jeanine Esperno

FROM: Jon Kyl
DATE: April 27, 2004
SUBJECT: Missile Defense FY 2005 Budget

I believe the President's missile defense request for fiscal year 2005 is in serious danger of not being fully funded. According to today's CongressDailyAM (excerpt attached), Rep. Ellen Tauscher will likely offer an amendment to use missile defense as an offset for boosting the Army's end-strength in Iraq. I am most concerned about similar efforts in the Senate because they would be more difficult to defeat.

I understand that Senator Carl Levin will likely attempt to cut funding for interceptor deployment during the Armed Services Committee mark-up for the Defense Authorization bill. Furthermore, I am hearing that Sen. Levin may use a similar tactic to Rep. Tauscher - attempting to substitute missile defense funds for either the War on Terror or Iraq - which would, undoubtedly place Members in a politically difficult position by creating a false choice between two important priorities. I suspect some Republican Members might consider supporting such an amendment.

I alerted Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs Powell Moore to my concerns in a phone call yesterday. It is absolutely critical that the Defense Department immediately begin an intense lobbying effort, focused first on Democrat and Republican Senate Armed Services Committee Members.

As I continue to gather information on efforts to cut missile defense funding, I will be sure to pass it along to you. In the meantime, if I can be of any assistance in this or any other matter, please do not hesitate to contact me at (b)(6)

OSD 06194-04

SECRET	TOP SECRET	TOP SECRET	TOP SECRET	TOP SECRET
SECRET	TOP SECRET	TOP SECRET	TOP SECRET	TOP SECRET
SECRET	TOP SECRET	TOP SECRET	TOP SECRET	TOP SECRET

new entitlements pending.

That amendment passed on a 451-48 vote, with four Republicans voting with the Democrats to reinstate pay/go, while Democratic Sen. Zell Miller of Georgia voted 'no.' Sen. Tim Johnson, D-S.D., who was absent for that first vote, is expected to support it which means Republicans need to cajole two senators into switching their votes so Vice President Cheney can then cast a deciding vote in favor of the budget resolution.

With Commerce Chairman McCain and Sen. Lincoln Chafee, R-R.I., unwilling to negotiate, GOP leaders have turned to Governmental Affairs Chairwoman Collins and Sen. Olympia Snowe, R-Maine, as well as moderate Democrats.

Those discussions, including a one-on-one Monday evening meeting between Collins and Nickles to gauge her willingness to compromise, have not yet produced an agreement.

"We're discussing and working on it," Nickles said, walking with Collins from the meeting to the Senate floor. Collins made a similar comment.

Earlier, Snowe said she had had discussions with Nickles and GOP leaders but had made no commitments. "We've talked, that's about it," she said. *By Peter Cohn*

▲

DEFENSE

Dems Target Missile Defense Funds To Boost Troop Strength

With pressure mounting on Capitol Hill to fund more troops and equipment in Iraq, some Democratic lawmakers are eyeing the president's \$10.2 billion missile defense request as a vehicle to offset such costs.

Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Calif., said it would play into her plans to boost the Army's strength by 10,000 troops, a proposal that would cost an estimated \$1.6 billion in FY05.

"I will more likely than not offer an amendment to do that in the defense bill using national missile defense as the offset," she said. "I don't think the Pentagon should be without sacrifice for this while we're at war."

Although observers say Republican backing for such a proposal is unlikely, Tauscher's comments coincide with a report GAO issued last week criticizing the president's plan to field a missile defense capability this summer.

GAO found that the system has not been thoroughly tested and the program's prime contractors were over budget in FY03 by roughly \$380 million, according to a summary of the report.

GAO recommended that the Pentagon carry out more rigorous testing and set cost, schedule and performance baselines. Although the Defense Department agreed to establish baselines, it said formal operational testing is not required before entering production. The Bush administration has argued that growing concerns over the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, especially by a handful of potentially hostile states and terrorists, justifies the need for a missile defense capability.

The FY05 funding proposal would help field a national missile defense system with ground-based interceptors in Alaska starting sometime this summer. A total of 20 missile interceptors would be deployed in Alaska

APR 27 2004 Jk 6:28PM Cong. SEN. JON KYL
 www.congressdaily.com

and California by the end of 2005.

Because the Bush administration has made missile defense a top priority, it is unlikely Republican lawmakers would support cuts proposed far it.

But bipartisan support to increase the number of troops and provide more equipment for troops in Iraq before the November election is growing.

House Armed Services member Jim Cooper, D-Tenn., last week introduced a bill that would provide \$50 billion in FY04 supplemental funding for troops deployed in Iraq. And Armed Services Chairman Hunter said he would support an FY05 wartime supplemental of at least \$20 billion to pay for more troops and equipment in Iraq.

Tauscher introduced a bill last year to temporarily increase military end-strength by 83,700 troops, raising the total strength of the Army, Marines and Air Force by 8 percent for five years. The bill had 25 Democratic co-sponsors, including Armed Services ranking member Ike Skelton, D-Mo. *By Amy Klumper*

HOUSE PACES

N.C. Dems Are Optimistic, But Need A Challenger To Hayes

Republican Rep. Robin Hayes -- whose tie-breaking 2001 trade vote and competitive district make him a perennial Democratic target -- likely will have to wait until next week to find out who Democrats will run against him.

North Carolina's candidate filing period opened Monday, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee is still working to recruit a credible challenger against the three-term incumbent before the May 7 filing deadline.

Concord businessman Wayne Troutman, one of two Democratic prospects, said in an interview Monday his chances of entering the race are "well more than 50-50." But he said he wants to gauge his political and financial backing. To run competitively, Troutman said he would need to nearly match the \$3 million he estimated Hayes would spend on re-election.

"This is going to be an expensive race if we do it," Troutman said. "There are a few things that have to fall into place."

Troutman said attorney Chris Kouri, the 2002 Democratic nominee who held Hayes to 54 percent, was unable to get much political traction out of Hayes' tie-breaking House vote in December 2001 to give the president trade promotion authority.

However, North Carolina Democrats said the bankruptcy and liquidation last year of the Pillowtex Corp., which cost North Carolina approximately 4,800 textile jobs, could make trade a much bigger issue this year.

"It's difficult to overstate the ramifications of that vote and its effect on the district," a state Democratic Party spokesman said.

The Democrats' other prospective candidate is 27-year-old Hunter Pruette. He served as the top field staffer, or "body man," to Sen. John Edwards, D-N.C., during Edwards' presidential campaign.

A Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee spokeswoman said

April 30, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs

322

I need to have the views of the Chiefs, the Chairman, the Vice Chairman and Tom O'Connell on the subject of where the Civil Affairs people ought to be located.

I don't find this memo from the Army persuasive at all, nor do I think a study that is narrowly proposed is a good idea. I am not terribly interested in a study at all. I am interested in some argumentation, discussion, rationale, criteria, assumptions, and pros and cons.

Let's get the Chairman to get going on it, and eventually we will have a meeting.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/6/04 SecArmy memo to SecDef re: Civil Affairs (CA) Recommendation

DHR:dh
043004-12

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

043004-12

OSD 11674-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26028



UNITED STATES ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF

INFO MEMO

April 6, 2004, 2:50 PM

2
See him
DA 4/30
Myer

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THRU: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

FROM: GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army

Brownlee
Schoomaker

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs (CA) Recommendation

- In **1987**, CA was assigned to USSOCOM under U.S. Code Title **10** to designate a unified commander as the resource advocate and manager of shared characteristics of regional orientation and language skills. At the time, it seemed the best functional "fit."
- In **1993**, CA was formally designated as SOF. Prior to **1993**, CA was managed by both USSOCOM and Headquarters, Department of the **Army** (HQDA). The FY **2004-09** Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) SOF study found that, "While the focus of CA differs from that of SOF 'operators,' CA contributes best to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) by remaining within USSOCOM."
- There are proven advantages for maintaining CA within SOF. USSOCOM is uniquely suited to manage CA because of its unconventional nature and the unique skill sets CA soldiers must learn and sustain. USSOCOM is the doctrinal proponent for CA and provides the institutional training and education for all CA enlisted and officer personnel through the **JFK** Special Warfare Center and Schools at Ft. Bragg.
- CA units help commander's transition from combat to post-combat stabilization and ensure conventional commanders plan, resource, and conduct stability operations throughout the depth and width of the maneuver battlefield. Well-executed CA operations are not sequential to; they're simultaneous with combat operations.
- We have increased the role of CA in our new modularity construct. We are adding CA sections at the Unit of Action (UA) Level, and increasing CA staffing at the Unit of Employment (UE) Level. These CA forces will help **our** conventional commanders train, plan, and deploy with assigned CA experts.

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs (CA) Recommendation

- The Army is working with USSOCOM to grow the 96th CA battalion into a brigade. This will increase the number of active Army CA soldiers available on short notice. USSOCOM provides Army CA to all Combatant Commands and Services, not just Army formations.
- Recommend an independent study to conduct a thorough analysis of command relationships, organization, and staffing of CA assets to provide the requisite capability within Department of Defense before directing major changes.

COORDINATION: USASOC (LTG Philip R. Kensinger), SOCOM (LTC Kenneth Schladt), JCS J3 (LTC Stephen Dalzell), and MOSO SOD (LTC Dermis Cahill)

Prepared By: LTC Chris Hughes, (b)(6)

~~CLOSE HOLD~~
(Hand deliver)

C4/20

March 2, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker
Gen. Doug Brown

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Les Brownlee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Civil Affairs

My impression is that civil affairs was put in with Special Operations because it was different and Special Ops was different, which made sense. Probably also it was because the regular Army did not want it.

It continues to be different, but it is also different from Special Ops, as well as being different from the regular Army,

My impression is that we ought to give careful thought to moving it over to the regular Army, so that the regular Army interests itself in that subject and so the transitions from combat to post-combat stabilization can be relatively seamless. Furthermore, I don't think there is anything lost by moving it out of Special Ops, and possibly something gained.

Please think about it and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030204-25

Sir,
Response attached. ^{pt 4/30}
v/r.
DC Swope

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

(Hand deliver)
~~CLOSE HOLD~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26031

ASD 10919-04

April 30, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Update for POTUS on Footprint

We are going to want to talk to the President about the footprint and give him an update every couple of weeks, including:

- Where the Congress stands on it.
- What its relationship is to BRAC.
- The announcement we are going to make, which should be coordinated with the White House as well as with the Congress.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
043004-10

.....
Please *respond* by _____

DR
5/18

30 Apr 04

9/5/04
In reply refer to EF-9478 & 04/006073-ES

April 30, 2004

TO Sec Def

TO: Powell Moore
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

Paul Butler
5/12

SUBJECT: **Brief Committees on Posture**

Do you think we ought to brief the Foreign Relations Committee and the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on our posture statement?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
043004-9

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

out 5/12

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosenzo
5/11

320.2 Strategic

30 Apr 04

03-05-04 10:21 IN

OSD 11676-04

du 5/12

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef
USD(P) 5/5/04
I-04/006073

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Hoehn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy *Andy Hoehn* MAY 3 2004

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response: Brief to Congress on Global Posture

- We have briefed all of the relevant congressional committee staffs on more than one occasion on our global posture work, and you have met with many of the key members.
- You have not yet met with Chairmen and the Ranking Members of the
 - o Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Sen. Lugar and Sen. Biden);
 - o House International Relations Committee (Rep. Hyde and Rep. Lantos).
- You also have not met with Sen. Inouye and Sen. Stevens, although Ryan Henry and Andy Hoehn briefed them recently.
- I will work with Powell Moore to schedule these remaining meetings. For the SFRC and HIRC meetings, which I recommend you cover in a single session, you might consider inviting Secretary Powell.

3202 ST file

Cc: Powell Moore

Prepared by: Barry Pavel, Strategy (b)(6)

3M ay 04 30 Apr 04

April 30, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Wargame

353

As I mentioned, Condi and Colin both liked the idea of doing a wargame or some scenarios as to what is going to happen after July 1. Their question was at what level do we want to do this. They thought fairly high – Deputy or Deputy Under.

Let's press ahead with it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
043004-8

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

30 April 04

April 30, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Approach on Iraq

IRAQ

I would like to talk to you about a complete approach on Iraq, including borders, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
043004-7

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

OSD 11678-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26036

April 30, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
cc: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Detainees

385.6

Let's make sure we get the detainee updates for both Guantanamo and Iraq out at least a day before the next detainee meeting.

Also, please go back in and tell the NSC that the detainee meeting should be at the Deputy level, not at the Principal level.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
043004-6

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

OB
5/4

30

72(0)
April 30, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraq History Project

I just read this Collins memo on the Iraq History Project Update. The President's interest was not in museums and memorials. His interest was in what information about the atrocities and the things that went on in that country we can glean from interrogations, documentation or mass graves, so the world and the Iraqi people can have a good sense of it and put that on the scale as they are making their decisions. Three-quarters of what is on this memo seems to me to be not addressing those issues at all.

Please come back with another memo explaining if we are doing what we should be doing. If we are not, tell me and we will get someone to do it.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/27/04 DASD (Stability Operations) memo to USD(P)

DHR:dh
043004-3

.....
Please respond by

5/14/04

OB
5/4

11-L-0559/OSD/26038

OSD 11681-04

INFO MEMO

ASD SO/LIC *[Signature]*

EF-9421

I-04/05740-SO

FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Joseph J. Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations

SUBJECT: Iraq History Project Update

Joseph Collins
27 Apr 04

Museums and Memorials:

- State released a Request for Proposals for the first \$10.5 million of a \$15 million Iraq supplemental for human rights activities including museums, documentaries, and memorials on April 23, 2004.
- Ambassador Bremer announced the creation of an Iraq National Foundation of Remembrance for the purpose of commemorating and memorializing victims of the previous regime on April 25, 2004. It will be led by a seven-member Board of Directors appointed by the Administrator.

Documents:

- At a meeting on Baathist regime documents hosted by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), representatives from the Iraq Governing Council, Iraqi Ministries, non-governmental organizations, and political parties agreed to form an independent National Document Commission.
- The Document Warehouse is completed and the first 20 tons of documents have been delivered to the site.

Mass Graves

- The UK forensic team has pulled out due to security concerns. State is trying to hire the personnel as contractors in order to avoid restrictive UK security requirements.

Media:

- A film on mass graves in Iraq is about to start a tour of the US.
- Sam Chalabi, Administrator of the Iraq Special Tribunal (IST), is interviewing Sunni Arabs as potential spokesmen, and is going to begin publishing articles on the IST.
- CPA is developing a media outreach program. The first press release on judicial appointments to the IST was released the week of April 19th.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: Heather Panitz, SO/LIC Stability Operations, (b)(6)

Policy Info Memo Template

11-L-0559/OSD/26039

28-04-04 07:58 IN

TAB

June 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Headquarters

We ought to have a session with General Casey to talk to him about that headquarters, the ways it could be organized, and its enormous size.

Before he goes, we are going to want to have him carefully think through how he can slim it down and use capabilities that already exist in the Corps headquarters.

Thanks.

DR:cm
100864-20

.....
Please respond by 6/15/04

322

8 Jun 04

Tab

OSD 11682-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26040



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9000

SECRET

CM-1976-04
4 August 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC

STW 8/3

SUBJECT: MNF-I Headquarters

- **Issue.** Discussion with General Casey on size and organization of MNF-I Headquarters (TAB).
- **Conclusion.** General Casey will have had adequate time to assess MNF-I's organization and size with respect to requirements by late August, when he is tentatively scheduled to visit Washington.
- I will have my staff coordinate a session during George's next visit to Washington.

322

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J5;

(b)(6)

4 AUG 04

8 Jm 04

OSD 11682-04

ML 080504

DOCUMENT TYPE: **INFO MEMO**
OSD CONTROL **OSD 11682-04**

DOC **8/4/2004**

ATTACHMENT:
DOR **8/4/2004**

SIGNATURE CASE:

CREATED BY: **hawley**

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ES OWI

APR 5 2004

Eritrea

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Eritrea

Please get somebody to draft a memo from me to the NSC people on Eritrea, saying that we have to balance these two State Department local nationals who are in jail against the fact that we are suddenly getting cut out.

Abizaid needs to get in. He needs to work with them. It is important. The question is what is the cost-benefit ratio here? It sounds to me like we are on the wrong side of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040104-19

.....
Please respond by 4/16/04

SAPPROY

OSD 11684-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26043

APR 5 2004

W
40

TO: David Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Pay System

Please take a look at this article "Fight Now, Pay Later." It is one of the examples of how messed up our personnel system is in the Department of Defense.

Thanks.

Attach.
Carnahan, Ira. "Fight Now, Pay Later," *Forbes*, March 29, 2004, p. 50.

DHR:dh
040204-3

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

S
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H&R Blocked

The tax giant has a great brand name. Can it extend it to other financial services? BY EMILY LAMBERT

APRIL 15 LOOMS, but H&R Block Chief Executive Mark A. Ernst has more than taxes on his mind. He's eager to find out how many of this season's customers can gradually be convinced to buy H&R Block's newer offerings, including home mortgages, business consulting and brokerage services.

There's new urgency to this mission, although a strategy shift to build on the tax business has been in the works for several years. H&R Block offices lost 4% of their

taxpayer clients in 2003. Some filed taxes through H&R Block online—convenient for them but less lucrative for the tax preparer. Also, this season got off to a sluggish start, perhaps because of growing competition from rival Jackson Hewitt. Says Ernst: "This repositioning of the brand must happen." The effort is evident in increasingly pushy agents and TV spots that subtly pitch H&R Block advisers as experts in college planning, home buying—even, jokingly, nursery design. So far, results are encouraging: The average fee per office client as of Feb. 15 this year was \$135, up from \$131 last year and \$122 in 2002.

Last fiscal year the company's nontax businesses accounted for half of its \$3.8 billion in revenue, most of that from its mortgage lending, which it started offering in 1997. But other services are a tough sell. Its financial services business hemorrhaged \$128 million (pretax) last year, and the business services arm is also lagging. The unit, which operates as RSM McGladrey, lost \$14 million in 2003.

One problem has been turning number crunchers into smooth salesfolk. "Anything that's new is viewed suspiciously," sighs Ernst, 45. Now H&R Block gives its 80,000 tax advisers computer prompts with recommendations for clients, pointing them, for example, to IRAs (though it insists it wouldn't specifically push its own IRA product).

Some customers may be wary, too. The company is under fire for its "refund anticipation loans." The loans, which can carry interest rates of 129%, appeal to cash-strapped low-income customers. The fees accounted for \$109 million in revenue last year. H&R Block has settled a number of loan-related lawsuits, including one in Texas for \$50 million. The company defends the loans. But there could be more trouble: The Securities & Exchange Commission is investigating whether H&R Block properly disclosed the suits to shareholders. **F**



Beyond 1040s: Chief Mark Ernst; new "relationship" ad.

FIGHT NOW, PAY LATER

Members of the U.S. military earn an average salary and benefits of \$99,000 a year. So why is recruiting and retaining military personnel such a challenge?

With U.S. soldiers dying almost daily in Iraq, that might seem an absurd question. But it's not. The military's manpower problems precede Iraq. And while the war may scare off some potential recruits, it attracts others, who feel a patriotic call.

In fact, the Pentagon's personnel problems have a more mundane root: the way soldiers are paid. Only 43% of that \$99,000 package comes in their paychecks. The rest takes the form of benefits, with two-thirds of those benefits—mostly for pensions and health care—not received until years after soldiers leave the service, the Congressional Budget Office reports.

Not a good way to pay soldiers—or anyone else. It turns out that many prefer a bird in the hand to 200 in the bush. The evidence: In the 1990s, with the Cold War over, Congress and the Pentagon decided to encourage voluntary early departures by offering the choice of a lump-sum payment or a long-term annuity. The annuity had a present value about double that of the lump sum. Yet over half of the officers and 92% of the enlisted personnel who left took the lump sum.

Using those choices, economists John Warner of Clemson University and Saul Pleeter of the Defense Department calculate that officers discounted future benefits at an average rate of 10% to 19% a year, while enlistees discounted them at 35% to 54%, which is to say they valued such benefits hardly at all. The math is striking: A soldier with a 35% discount rate values a dollar to be received in

21 years at under a fifth of a cent. Yet to pay a soldier that \$1 in benefits in 21 years costs taxpayers 36 cents in today's dollars—200 times what the service member thinks it's worth.


So soldiers end up underpaid, and taxpayers overburdened: spending and accruals for military retirement now total \$52 billion a year, with an

additional unfunded liability of \$576 billion.

The military compensation scheme isn't just inefficient, it's also unfair. Soldiers must serve 20 years before they're eligible for retirement pay. That means the more than half of officers and 85% of enlistees who serve less than 20 years get zilch.

Fixing this screwed-up system won't be easy. The Pentagon says it's planning a review, but even a limited reform—which was passed by Congress in 1986 and wouldn't have lowered any soldier's retirement pay for another two decades—was repealed in 1999, before it ever had time to take effect.

—Ira Carmahan



April 5, 2004

334HSC

*Advance sent
copy H/S 0845*

TO: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Homeland Security Council

I want to start going to Homeland Security Council meetings regularly. I want my calendar to reflect every time they are held, just like we do Cabinet meetings and NSC meetings.

Also, let's add McHale in for two Round Table meetings per week instead of one.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040504-8

.....
Please respond by _____

*OB
9/16*

SAUGOY

OSD 11686-04

APR 5 2004

337 WH

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Ryan Henry
LTG John Craddock *

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: POTUS Footprint Brief

When should we do the POTUS brief on footprint?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040204-11

.....
Please respond by 4/9/04

SAPRO4

OSD 11687-04

APR 5 2004

334 HSC

TO: *LARRY DI RITA*
LTG John Craddock
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: HSC Meetings

I am not receiving invitations to Homeland Security Council meetings. I need to start getting invitations, and I need to be the one to decide whether or not I go. I am not even being told about the meetings at the present time, and that is not good.

Let's fix it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040204-16

.....
Please respond by 4/9/04

*Answered 8 April
Snowflake - some questions
C/4/4*

5 AUG 04

OSD 11689-04

APR 5 2004

TO: Ryan Henry
Andy Hoehn

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Global Footprint

W
D
D

In this global footprint effort, the one thing we have not done is look at the places we are planning to stay and ask ourselves if we are comfortable with the usability of our forces in those locations and with the various other legal agreements we have. Because, if we are not comfortable and if we are not able to get them to a point that is acceptable, this is the time to find that out, and move those forces as well.

So, we need to get those issues surfaced up also.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040204-17

.....
Please respond by 4/16/04

SHUGOT

OSD 11690-04

April 8, 2004

DONE

Advance copy provided

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR-*
SUBJECT: Response to Novak Op-ed

I want to see a draft of a response to the Novak column, in detail, historically by noon today and I would like to get it out tonight.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040804-10

.....
Please respond by 4/8/04


0007 SD

8 Apr 04

4/15
am

APR 14 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler
LTG John Craddock
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Testify

I am inclined not to testify again before the 9/11 Commission. Don't anyone agree to schedule me without my knowledge.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041204-3

.....

Please respond by _____

000.5

14 Apr 04

all 4/16

April 12, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DeFrank Article

You ought to go pound Tom DeFrank for the number 17 in today's *Early Bird*. It is just such nonsense. I have been pushing for them to let me know if they needed more troops, not resisting it. Anyone who knows anything about it knows that. If he paid attention, he would know it.

DeFrank

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041204-2

.....
Please respond by 4/14/04

Sec Def *4/15*
/ sicced our pit
bull on him
(Eric Ruff).
He hit him hard.

12 Apr 04

D. H. A.

all 4/16



4/15/04

APR 14 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Military Personnel Pay System

At the next Senior Staff Meeting, I want David Chu to brief on the personnel pay system and this business of getting everyone on the same system - Guard, reserve, active, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines.

240

Thanks.

Attach.
4/6/04 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Personnel Systems for Guard and Reserve [OSD 04986-04]

DHR:dh
041204-4



Please respond by _____

14 Apr 04

3/16/04

March 15, 2004

TO: David Chu
Dov Zakheim
Les Brownlee
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

cc: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Pay Systems for Guard and Reserve

v/r

I am concerned about the pay systems for Guard and Reserve that seem to be broken and causing a great deal of unhappiness and difficulty. If we are going to ask people to serve, we need to treat them right.

Please tell me what is being done to fix this problem, how much it is going to cost and when it will be finished.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031504-24

.....
Please respond by 4/2/04

31 MAR 4/12/04

*Sir,
Response attached.*

*v/r.
LTC Swope*

Chu response Attached

OSD 04986-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26054

4/12
Out



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C 20301-4000

2004 APR -7 PM 1:50

INFO MEMO

April 6, 2004, 1:00 PM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S.C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S.C. Chu to you off

SUBJECT: Personnel Systems for Guard and Reserve -- SNOWFLAKE

- Pay for active, reserve, and Guard personnel is one of the many problems caused by our ineffective legacy military personnel systems.
- The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) is developing an interim pay system (Forward Compatible Pay) that will address some of the pay problems. The Services are also putting in place manual workarounds. However, many of the pay problems are caused by the personnel systems and the lack of integration between personnel and pay.
- My office, working with the Services and other DoD offices, designed the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) that will address the problems with our current legacy military personnel and pay systems. It is a fully integrated, all-Service, all-Component personnel and pay system built on a commercial off-the-shelf base (PeopleSoft) and designed to streamline business processes and incorporate best practices. We recently developed an accelerated schedule for implementation that will bring the Army up beginning in September 2005 with full implementation in all Services by October of 2006.
- The accelerated program requires some additional near-term funding, which I will work with the Comptroller to secure.

RECOMMENDATION: INFORMATION ONLY

COORDINATIONS: NA

Prepared By: Norma St. Claire, Director, Joint Requirements and Integration Office,

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	4/9
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	4/7 Cav

OSD 04986-04



March 15, 2004

TO: David Chu
Dov Zakheim
Les Brownlee
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Pay Systems for Guard and Reserve

I am concerned about the pay systems for Guard and Reserve that seem to be broken and causing a great deal of unhappiness and difficulty. If we are going to ask people to serve, we need to treat them right.

Please tell me what is being done to fix this problem, how much it is going to cost and when it will be finished.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031504-24

.....
Please respond by 4/2/04

4/12 DR C 4/11

*Sir,
Response attached.
v/v/cdr Nosenzo
4/1*

11-L-0559/OSD/26056



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200

INFO MEMO

March 31, 2004, 8:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Pay Systems for the Guard and Reserve

- In response to your query of March 15, 2003, I fully agree that we need to ensure our Soldiers receive the best possible support, especially with respect to their pay. We have been working to resolve the systemic causes of the problems even before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. We have since intensified our efforts.
- In the near term, the Forward Compatible Pay System (FCPS) will provide a commercial, off the shelf, interim solution, beginning in March 2005. Current development cost estimates for FCPS total \$17.3 million. The ultimate solution is the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIHMRS), which is being developed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The deployment of the system will not begin until January 2006. The Army Budget Office is working with the Joint Requirements Integration Office to validate the full DIHMRS development costs.
- Until FCPS is fielded, the Army is providing training teams to finance battalions, mobilization/demobilization sites, and units in Kuwait, as well as establishing workarounds for current pay systems to correct specific, problematic input. Additionally, an information campaign to inform Soldiers and family members of the Guard and Reserve Pay Task Force (telephonic and e-mail hot line) is already proving beneficial in resolving pay issues.
- We continue to monitor progress in resolving this issue as outlined in the attached Pay Improvement Plan (Tab A).

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTC Susan Beausoleil, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/26057



Summary Action/Task List for Improving Pay Support for Mobilized Soldiers

<u>Control Number</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Primary Organization</u>	<u>Suspense</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>GAO Response</u>	<u>Memoto Congress</u>
<u>Completed Actions</u>						
2	Training team to Kuwait	DFAS	Nov-03	completed	10	1a(2)
3	35 specific training events for finance battalions and mobilization/demobilization site personnel	USARC		completed	10	1a(3)
7	US Army Reserve help lines for individuals and finance units	USARC		completed	N/A	1a(7)
8	Deploy integrated Active Component/Reserve Component input system (DMO) to all Army	DFAS		completed	N/A	1b(1)
9	Retroactive entitlement input	DFAS		completed	N/A	1b(2)
10	Leave Accrual	DFAS		completed	N/A	1b(3)
11	Revise Defense Finance & Accounting Service (DFAS) Military pay message from 19Dec 02	DFAS	Nov-03	completed	1,3,18	1c(1)
12	Publish matrix of responsibilities by action	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	completed	1,3	1c(2)
13	Publish standardized entitlement explanation flyer for distribution at mobilization sites	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	completed	13	1c(3)
15	Add warning screens on input system (DMO and JUSTIS) for tour cancellations	DFAS, ARNG		completed	4, 21	1e
18	Published guidance on processing orders for medical extensions	Army GI		completed	4	1g
20	Review grades of US Property and Fiscal Office (USPFO) military pay technicians	ARNG		completed	9	1i
25	Produce exportable DJMS-RC training package	Finance School	Mar-04	completed	10	2c
43	Joint Uniform Standard Terminal Input System (JUSTIS - ARNG input system) change to require remark on miscellaneous credit input	ARNG	Apr-04	completed	20	N/A
44	DMO change to require remark on misc. credit input	DFAS	Apr-04	completed	20	N/A
50	Establish policy for supervisory control/review of tour cancellations	DFAS/ARNG	Apr-04	completed	N/A	N/A
<u>Ongoing Actions</u>						
1	Training at US Army Reserve Pay Operations Center	USARC		ongoing	10	1a(1)
4	National Guard mobilization finance classes	ARNG		ongoing	10	1a(4)
5	Notification to US Property & Fiscal Offices of pending mobilizations	ARNG		ongoing	N/A	1a(5)
6	Notification to US Property & Fiscal Offices of recent demobilizations	ARNG		ongoing	N/A	1a(6)
14	Initiate compliance reviews of mobilization/demobilization sites	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	ongoing	1	1d
16	Defense Joint Military Pay System - Reserve Component (DJMS-RC) automated reconciliation to in-theater database for monitoring stops/starts of theater entitlements	DFAS		ongoing	3	1f(1)
17	DJMS-RC automated reconciliation to demobilization site records for stopping all pay/ curtailing tours	DFAS		ongoing	3	1f(2)
19	Publish memorandum to reserve commands on importance of using pay management report	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	ongoing	5	1h
21	Ensure pay issues for units identified by General Accounting Office are all resolved	ARNG	Oct-03	ongoing	15	1j
40	Continue to add functionality to myPay for discretionary actions	DFAS		ongoing	14	N/A
42	Add JUSTIS table of mobilized soldiers' accounts with recurring input required	ARNG	Apr-04	ongoing	19	N/A
45	Provide Defense Military Pay Offices (DMPO) and Finance Battalions (FB) with NG newsletter	DFAS		ongoing	20	N/A
51	Establish ombudsmen program for National Guard Soldiers	ARNG	Apr-04	ongoing	N/A	N/A

TAG A



Summary Action/Task List for Improving Pay Support for Mobilized Soldiers

<u>Control Number</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Primary Organization</u>	<u>Suspense</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>GAO Response</u>	<u>Memoto Congress</u>
<u>Near Term Actions (3 to 6 months)</u>						
22	Automate Hardship Duty Pay - Location (HDP-L)	DFAS	Apr-04	open	17	2a(1)
23	Develop/publish revised comprehensive procedures	USAFINCOM	Mar-04	open	1	2b(1)
24	Clarify who does what how & develop metrics/standards tailored to mobilization/demobilization	USAFINCOM	Mar-04	open	2	2b(2)
38	Evaluate support for surge staffing of USPFOs	ARNG	Apr-04	open	7, 8	N/A
41	Evaluate Standard Installation Division Personnel System - National Guard (SIDPERS-NG) - JUSTIS interface for mobilization	ARNG	Mar-04	open	16	N/A
46	Evaluate potential DIMS-RC systems change for debt threshold	DFAS	Apr-04	open	21	N/A
<u>Mid-Term Actions (6 to 36 months)</u>						
26	Internet soldiers' pay account access (myPay) for dependents (view-only)	DFAS	Aug-04	open	14	3a
27	Forward Compatible Pay system (FCP) approval from DoD/ Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP)	DFAS	Sep-04	open	17,18,20	3b(3)
28	Complete FCP Development-Dec 04	DFAS	Dec-04	open	17,18,20	3b(4)(a)
29	Start FCP deployment to the Army RC- Mar-05	DFAS	Mar-05	open	17,18,20	3b(4)(b)
30	Start FCP deployment to the Army AC-Jul 05	DFAS	Jul-05	open	17,18,20	3b(4)(c)
31	Update regulations to eliminate outdated entitlements and processes- DoDFMR	DFAS	Sep-04	open	6	3c
32	Update regulations to eliminate outdated entitlements and processes - AR 37-104-4	USAFINCOM	Sep-04	open	6	3c
33	Update regulations to eliminate outdated entitlements and processes - NGR 130-6	ARNG	Sep-04	open	6	3c
34	Evaluate placement and monitoring mechanisms for FCP/reserve pay training	Finance School	Sep-04	open	10,12	3d
39	Add pay support doc review & monthly reconciliations to precommand course	ARNG	Sep-04	open	11	N/A
49	Automate Continental US Cost of Living Allowance (CONUS COLA)	DFAS	Mar-05	open	N/A	N/A
52	Procedures for reviewing high dollar payments	DFAS	Sep-04	open	24	N/A
<u>Long Term Actions (36+ months)</u>						
35	Initial Army operational capability DIMHRS-Sep 05	OSD	Sep-05	open	22, 23	4a(4)(a)
36	Start deployment of DIMHRS to the Army-Jan 06	OSD	Jan-06	open	22, 23	4a(4)(b)
37	Complete DIMHRS implementation-Sep 07	OSD	Sep-07	open	22, 23	4a(4)(c)
47	Incorporate Army Guard pay problems in Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) development	OSD	Sep-05	open	22	N/A
48	Include full reengineering in DIMHRS	OSD	Sep-05	open	23	N/A

- APR 20 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
 Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Bids Using US Equipment

Here is a note someone sent concerning the Iraqi Army. What do you folks think?

Thanks.

Attach.
 3/25/04 Memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
 041204-9

.....
 Please respond by 4/30/04

Iraq

20 APR 04

4/12
DIA

March 25, 2004

Mr. Secretary,

I know you are incredibly busy and you haven't time to focus on the following, but I think it is important.

The Army's past request to industry to bid on equipping the Iraqi Army was cancelled. The Army through Army Material Command is re-initiating this proposal. In the initial proposal, bidders were allowed to bid foreign-made equipment. I recommend that DOD constrain industry to bidding only U.S. built equipment for the following reasons:

- It would logistically tie the Iraqi Army to the United States for the next several decades.
- It also means that we could logistically shut down the Iraqi Army at anytime of our choosing.
- We have excess equipment that can be used for equipping the new Iraqi Army.
- The upside to this is that we would need to refurbish new equipment through the Army Depot system (4-6 depots). This would be an economic advantage to the states concerned; which is a plus to the Administration in an election year.

Bottom line: I feel it is very important to have a logistical hold over the Iraqi Army.

thanx

6/14
1000

720

EF-9182
I-04/004798
APR 07 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Invite Ukraine to Istanbul

Let's push for Ukraine to be invited to Istanbul.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040604-3

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

TS 6/15

NATO 337

To SecDef
Paul Butler
6/15

Policy ExecSec's Note

June 14, 2004

CAPT Marriott,

- SYG de Hoop Scheffer sent a letter inviting President Kuchma to attend the Istanbul Summit. Although the government of Ukraine is yet to provide a formal response, Ukraine MOD Marchuk made it clear to Ian Brzezinski on June 7 that Kuchma intended to go to Istanbul.

C. L. O'Connor
Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

Det 6/16

7 Apr 04

OSD 11699-04
07-04-04 13:58 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/26062

April 5, 2004

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Reuben Jeffery
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iranian Chargé

I was amazed to hear you say you were debating whether or not to move out the Iranian chargé. I thought we had decided to do that a month ago, when I raised that with you.

DHR:dh
040504-16

.....
Please respond by 4/9/04

Iran

5 Apr 04

APR 9 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Liability Language

Russia

Let's make sure we get this liability language surfaced that came up with Ivanov.
I want to see what the problem is.

Please get it teed up for me, and maybe I can help get it solved.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040604-14

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

9 Apr 04

APR 9 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Doug Feith
Dov Zakheim
Powell Moore
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Improving Security

Iraq

The President raised the question of what we need to better develop the Iraqi security services.

We need to develop a list of things we would like to ask of Congress or OMB, which can enable us to do a better job. The Vice President raised it in the SVTC.

John Craddock, please assign someone the task of pulling that together.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040704-8

4/12 DR

*4/10
9 APR 04*

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04 SecDef -

- Ryan Henry, using Andy Hochen's shop, will pull this together
- This should get looked at by a high level group to ensure
 - focus is correct
 - list inclusive/comprehensive
- Might want to vet w/ the SLRG



April 5, 2004

TO: Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Reuben Jeffery

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iranian Chargé

Iran

I was amazed to hear you say you were debating whether or not to move out the Iranian chargé. I thought we had decided to do that a month ago, when I raised that with you.

DHR:dh
040504-16

.....
Please respond by 4/9/04

*OB
9/14*

5 Apr 04




APR 5 2004

3200a

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita
 LTG John Craddock
 Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Brief Senators Sessions and Bayh

If we haven't briefed Senator Sessions and Senator Bayh on force posture, footprint and Army end strength, we should certainly get them and do it. We could include some other folks at the same time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040204-19

.....

Please respond by 4/23/04

SAPR04

OSD 11706-04

March 30, 2004

SUBJECT: Security Transition

I have to talk to Colin Powell about security staying with CENTCOM and not going to the mission when sovereignty passes.

Our only way to make sure we get out of Iraq is if we see that CENTCOM – who has the security responsibility and is the outfit that has to organize, train, equip and undertake joint operations and work the command and control issues – has the baton.

DHR:dh
033004-18

OB
4/14

Iraq

30 Mar 04

April 8, 2004

TO: Steve Hadley

c c : Gen. Dick Myers
 Gen. Pete Pace
 Lt. Gen. Norton Schwartz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Requests of Joint Staff

If you have requests of the Joint Staff or the Vice Chairman, you should run them through John Craddock's office. Then we will know what is going on and be able to make sure that appropriate information required by the National Security Council staff gets to you.

I have asked the folks in the Joint Staff to refer such requests to my office.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 040804-4

020 SSCS

8 Apr 04

April 8, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraqi Special Tribunals

Here is a memo from Doug Feith about the Iraqi Special Tribunals. It obviously is important.

Please get into it, solve what you can solve of Doug's concerns and then come to me with a proposed way ahead.

It seems like you can probably resolve matters that are at the Feith-Hadley level.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/1/04 USD(P) info memo to SecDef re: Draft NSPD Concerning US Assistance to Iraqi Special Tribunal [OSD 04818-04]

DHR:dh
040804-5

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

Iraq

8 APR 04

OSD 11711-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26070

✓
4/8

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2004 APR -2 PM 4:18
EF-9006
04/004020

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef _____

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *DJF 4/1/04*

SUBJECT: Draft National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) Concerning United States Assistance to the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST)

- The Department of Justice (DOJ) has the USG lead in providing support to the IST, which will try the top Iraqi regime officials. DOJ has drafted an NSPD to define the responsibilities of its Regime Crimes Advisor's Office (RCAO) and the supporting roles of the CPA, DoD, State, and the intelligence community.
- At the March 23, 2004, Deputies' Committee meeting, several of us questioned whether an NSPD is necessary for this purpose, but Hadley made clear that he intends to go forward with the NSPD. I said DoD has changes to propose and, in any event, we cannot approve the NSPD until the Secretary of Defense has reviewed it.
- The DoD Office of General Counsel, USD(I), and I have made edits to the latest DOJ draft (Tab B). However, the following items remain concerns that should be addressed before the NSPD is approved (relevant language is highlighted in the NSPD draft at Tab A):
 - o The fourth full paragraph on page two delays releasing information to the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights until "the conclusion" of the DOJ mission. This information is both critical to identifying missing Iraqis and to publicizing Saddam's atrocities. This should not be delayed but should be an ongoing effort.
 - o The last full paragraph on page three directs DoD to provide "secure access to and transportation of Iraqi prisoners for interviews." After June 30, DoD should not necessarily be required to provide access to and transport of prisoners in Iraqi custody. This would be an additional task for MG Miller's mission, which is still being defined (the Joint Staff has the pen).

We've already sent them to DOJ.

SPL ASSISTANT TO FTB	8/10/04
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC HASNOTT	9/2/04

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

- This same paragraph also requires DoD to provide “access” to Iraqi documents. The final paragraph (page 4) requires the ISG to “make available . . . appropriate documents.” This may require the ISG to shift its priorities in response to DOJ requests for documents. The issue of the ISG’s priorities is being reviewed now by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and should not get foreclosed by the NSPD.
- The NSPD also places four Judge Advocates assigned to the CPA’s Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice under RCAO “operational control.” While these Judge Advocates can and should participate in the RCAO effort, operational control must remain with DoD.
- The NSPD may also raise resource concerns. A copy has been provided to the Comptroller for comment.
- DoD General Counsel recommends non-concurrence until the document is acceptable.

COORDINATION: Tab C

Attachment(s):
AS stated

Prepared by: MAJ Brad Clark, SO/LIC Special Operations Program Support, (b)(6)

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11-L-0559/OSD/26072

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DOS Draft
3/26/04

March __, 2004

NATIONAL SECURITY ~~PRESIDENTIAL~~ DIRECTIVE/NSPD-###

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE **SECRETARY OF STATE**
 THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
 THE **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**
 THE ATTORNEY **GENERAL**
 THE SECRETARY **OF COMMERCE**
 DIRECTOR, **OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET**
 THE **SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY**
 CHIEF **OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT**
 ASSISTANT TO THE **PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL**
SECURITY AFFAIRS
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT' S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD
 ADMINISTRATOR, **COALITION PROVISIONAL**
AUTHORITY

SUBJECT: United States Assistance to the Iraqi Special Tribunal

The investigation and prosecution of **members** of the **former** Iraqi regime and the **Iraqi Ba'ath Party** for genocide, crimes against humanity, **war crimes**, and **violations of certain Iraqi laws** represent key elements in the restoration of democratic **self-government** to the people of **Iraq**. The successful establishment and operation of the Iraqi Special **Tribunal (IST)** is **vital** to the **success** of our national security, foreign policy, homeland security, law enforcement and defense **strategies**, and is critical to protecting and advancing **America's** interests. The **IST** statute mandates that international advisors assist the Tribunal Investigative Judges, Prosecutors, Trial Chamber Judges, and **Appeals Chamber Judges** in the performance of their duties. The United States must take **its place** in the provision of that international assistance.

Therefore, I direct the **following**:

- All relevant Departments and Agencies of the United States Government (USG), **as set forth below**, shall provide necessary assistance to the Iraqi people to establish a fully **functioning**, independent IST that reflects internationally accepted concepts of due process and the rule of law.
- The Attorney General shall appoint a Regime Crimes Advisor (RCA) to the **XST**. The Regime **Crimes** Advisor will lead and supervise American **advisors** and

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11- L-0559/OSD/26073

1 TAB 4

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certain international advisors, collectively known as the **Regime Crimes Advisor's Office (RCAO)**, to continue the related work begun by the **GPA Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice (OHRTJ)**. Specifically, the **RCAO** will assist **IST** investigators, prosecutors and investigative judges, direct American advisors to the IST, and serve as **USG liaison** regarding **IST** investigations and prosecutions to the Iraqi Governing Council (and the successor Iraqi Government after June 30, 2004). The RCA will assist the Governing Council in establishing, **staffing, and administering the XST**. The RCAO will serve as the **lead Coalition office** to assist the **XST** in coordinating all **assistance to the IST** by foreign governments, law enforcement agencies, international and non-governmental **organizations, and other USG agencies in Iraq**. The RCAO will also serve as the **lead Coalition office supporting the IST measures to ensure the security and safety of witnesses and victims of crimes under investigation by the IST**.

hate

- The Department of Justice **will** assist the RCA to select a team **of** advisors that **will** deploy to **Iraq**. **DOJ** and RCA will assemble and **deploy squads** of investigators, under **FBI** leadership, drawn from **federal, State or local law enforcement agencies**. The RCA may deploy **these** teams or elements of them **within Iraq** in accordance with the **investigative plan**. **RCAO** may make use of any **IST-related facilities and projects** established or begun by **OHRTJ**, and coordinate **this** continued **use** after 30 June 2004 **with the appropriate Iraqi authorities**. **DOJ** will provide administrative support such as **paralegals and secretaries** to the RCAO.
- The RCA **will** supervise all **USG advisors and mentors** to the **IST**. RCAO personnel will work closely with the Iraqis supporting the **IST**, and ensure, where appropriate, that **training and technical assistance is provided**. ~~care~~
- The RCA will supervise and coordinate forensic and exhumation efforts by **USG or third-nation elements** in support of **IST investigations**. The RCA **will** also support **Iraqi forensic efforts** in support of **IST investigations**. The **RCA** may deploy personnel to locations outside Iraq.
- At the conclusion of the **RCAO's mission to support the IST**, the RCA will ensure that electronic or paper copies of all appropriate unclassified documents and information collected during its investigations are transferred to the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights to assist the Ministry's continuing efforts to identify missing persons and to preserve a historical record of the suffering of the Iraqi people under Saddam Hussein's regime.
- The CPA, in coordination **with** the Public Affairs Directorate of the National Security Council, will prepare a **strategic communications plan** directed at both **Iraqi and international audiences** concerning the activities of the **IST** and the role of the RCAO in support of the **IST**. Thereafter, all RCAO public affairs and public diplomacy activities will be closely coordinated with **CPA's Strategic Communications Office** before any public releases. In addition, all RCA public

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affairs activity will comply with any relevant rules and guidelines that the IST may enact governing pretrial and trial publicity.

- The **RCAO** shall function as a component within the CPA, and the RCA shall report to the CPA's Administrator.
 - The Attorney General may augment the **RCAO** with a Budget Officer to manage all expenditures in support of the **IST**, ~~from funds~~ appropriated for that purpose. **RCAO will have review and approval authority, within the expenditure process now employed by CPA, for all IST-related funds.**
 - The Attorney General, through the Deputy Attorney ~~General~~, may, in consultation with CPA, provide input to the **RCA** regarding **substantive legal and** investigative matters.
- Following the **transfer** of **full** governmental authority to the **transitional** Iraqi administration and the recognition of the sovereignty of that **administration**, all responsibilities of the **CPA** with respect to the **RCAO will devolve upon the** Secretary of State, acting through the Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
- The **heads** of all other United States law enforcement agencies and organizations will be **prepared to support** the RCA with personnel or resources **as** needed.
- **Using funds** appropriated to **support** the IST, the **Department of Justice will support and sustain RCAO personnel** in Iraq, to include: housing/billeting; transportation within **Iraq**; food/medical support; communications access and **linkup**; **compound security** and armed escort outside of **Baghdad**; **security for investigative** teams and forensic sites in the field; and weapons and related **weapons** training plus necessary personal protective gear. **RCAO, in consultation with the CPA, will also coordinate with** the Iraqi Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior for personal and physical security of Iraqi IST installations and facilities, judges and personnel.
- **The Secretary of Defense will assign to the RCAO from the military departments an agreed number of Judge Advocate General Corps (JAG) officers to serve as advisors to the IST, who will serve under RCAO operational control.** The Department of Defense will also **provide secure access to and transport of Iraqi prisoners for interviews; provide access to seized Iraqi documents and assistance with issues of classification and declassification; and provide departmental expertise in military history, law of war, and international law issues to include additional personnel, as appropriate.**
- The CPA and the Secretary of State will support the RCAO by assisting the Iraq Governing Council in establishing IST infrastructure and court facilities, and in

Check the date, and include of the CPA

under authority, direct control of the CPA

provide legal support as appropriate

assist RCAO in getting

allow RCAO

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the expedited identification and installation of Iraqi judges, tribunal investigators, and prosecutors to staff the IST.

- The Secretary of State will assist the RCA in recruiting and selecting, in consultation with CPA, international advisors and international investigative or forensic teams to assist the IST, and in advising the IST regarding its rules of evidence and procedure. The Secretary of State may also assist the RCAO by contacting other governments and requesting that they provide their full cooperation in collecting all evidence and contacting witnesses located within their territory that are relevant to IST investigations.
- The Director of Central Intelligence and the collected Intelligence Community: will provide historical and archival research support to the RCAO as appropriate; will serve as liaison between the RCAO and foreign government intelligence services to assist in investigations as needed; and will provide to RCAO support supplemental to the main efforts of DOD/CPA, for information security. Cleared RCAO personnel with a demonstrated need to know shall be given appropriate access to relevant captured documents and their analysis. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) within the Intelligence Community will make available to RCAO appropriate documents in ISG possession, custody or control that are relevant to RCAO and IST investigations, and ISG will coordinate with RCAO liaison to facilitate the declassification and handling of such materials.

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March __, 2004

USDP staff
D+C
USDP comments
3/31/04

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD-###

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
CHEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD
ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY

SUBJECT: United States Assistance to the Iraqi Special Tribunal

The investigation and prosecution of members of the former Iraqi regime and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and violations of certain Iraqi laws represent key elements in the establishment ~~restoration~~ of democratic self-government ~~in to the people of Iraq~~. The successful establishment **and** operation of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) is vital to the success of our national security, foreign policy, homeland security, law enforcement and defense strategies, and is critical to protecting and advancing U.S. America's interests. The IST statute provides ~~mandates~~ for the appointment of ~~%international~~ advisors to assist the Tribunal Investigative Judges, Prosecutors, Trial Chamber Judges, and Appeals Chamber Judges in the performance of their duties. The United States must take its place in the provision of that international assistance.

Therefore, I direct the following:

- All relevant Departments and Agencies of the United States Government (USG), as set forth below, shall provide necessary assistance to the Iraqi people to establish a fully functioning, independent IST that reflects internationally accepted concepts of due process and the rule of law.

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TAB B
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11-L-0559/OSD/26077

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- The Attorney General shall appoint a Regime Crimes Advisor (RCA) to the IST. The ~~RCA Regime Crimes Advisor~~ will lead and supervise ~~U.S. American~~ advisors and certain international advisors, collectively known as the Regime Crimes Advisor's Office (RCAO), to continue the related work begun by the CPA Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice (OHRTJ). Specifically, the RCAO will assist IST investigators, prosecutors and investigative judges, direct ~~U.S. American~~ advisors to the IST, and serve as USG liaison to the Iraqi Governing Council (and the successor Iraqi Government after June 30, 2004) regarding IST investigations and prosecutions ~~to the Iraqi Governing Council (and the successor Iraqi Government after June 30, 2004)~~. The RCA will assist the Governing Council in establishing, staffing, and administering the IST. The RCAO will serve as the lead Coalition office to assist the IST in coordinating all assistance to the IST by foreign governments, law enforcement agencies, international and non-governmental organizations, and other USG agencies in Iraq. The RCAO will also serve as the lead Coalition office supporting the IST measures to ensure the security and safety of witnesses and victims of crimes under investigation by the IST.
- The Department of Justice (DOJ) will assist the RCA to select a team of advisors that will deploy to Iraq. The DOJ and the RCA will assemble and deploy squads of investigators, under FBI leadership, drawn from Federal, State or local law enforcement agencies. The RCA may deploy these teams or elements of them within Iraq in accordance with the investigative plan. The RCAO may make use of any IST-related facilities and projects established or begun by OHRTJ, and coordinate this continued use after 30 June 30, 2004 with the appropriate Iraqi authorities. The DOJ will provide administrative support such as paralegals and secretaries to the RCAO.
- The RCA will supervise all USG advisors and mentors to the IQT. RCAO personnel will work closely with the Iraqis supporting the IST, and ensure, where appropriate, that training and technical assistance are provided.
- The RCA will supervise and coordinate forensic and exhumation efforts by USG or third-nation elements in support of IST investigations. The RCA will also support Iraqi forensic efforts in support of IST investigations. The RCA may deploy personnel to locations outside Iraq.
- Concurrent with its mission to ~~At the conclusion of the RCAO's mission to~~ support the IST, the RCAO will ensure that electronic or paper copies of all appropriate unclassified documents and information collected during its investigations are made available ~~transferred~~ to the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights to assist the Ministry's continuing efforts to identify missing persons and to preserve a historical record of the suffering of the Iraqi people under Saddam Hussein's regime. In the event transfer of certain documents would interfere with investigative and prosecutorial efforts, transfer will be made at the conclusion of the RCAO mission.

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- The CPA, in coordination with the Public Affairs Directorate of the National Security Council staff, will prepare a strategic communications plan directed at both Iraqi and international audiences concerning the activities of the IST and the role of the RCAO in support of the IST. Thereafter, all RCAO public affairs and public diplomacy activities will be closely coordinated with CPA's Strategic Communications Office before any public releases. In addition, all RCA public affairs activity will comply with any relevant rules and guidelines that the IST may adopt ~~enact~~ governing pretrial and trial publicity.
- The RCAO shall function as a component within the CPA, and the RCA shall report to the Administrator of the CPA, ~~the CPA's Administrator~~.
 - The Attorney General may augment the RCAO with a Budget Officer to manage all expenditures in support of the IST, from funds appropriated for that purpose. The RCAO will have review and approval authority, within the expenditure process now employed by CPA, for all IST-related funds.
 - The Attorney General, through the Deputy Attorney General, may, in consultation with CPA, provide input to the RCA regarding substantive legal and investigative matters.
- Following the transfer of full governmental authority to the transitional Iraqi administration, ~~and the recognition of the sovereignty of that administration,~~ all responsibilities of the CPA with respect to the RCAO will devolve upon the Secretary of State, acting through the Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
- The heads of all other ~~U.S. and other~~ law enforcement agencies and organizations will be prepared to support the RCA with personnel or resources as needed.
- Using funds appropriated to support the IST, the Department of Justice will support and sustain RCAO personnel in Iraq, ~~to include~~ including: housing/billeting; transportation within Iraq; food/medical support; communications access and linkup; compound security and armed escort outside of Baghdad; security for investigative teams and forensic sites in the field; and weapons and related weapons training plus necessary personal protective gear. The RCAO, in consultation with the CPA, will also coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior for personal and physical security of Iraqi IST installations and facilities, judges and personnel.
- The Secretary of Defense will assign to the RCAO from the ~~M~~ilitary Departments an agreed number of Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAG) officers to serve as advisors to the IST, ~~who will serve under RCAO operational control~~. The Department of Defense will also provide secure access to and

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11-L-0559/OSD/26079

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transport of Iraqi prisoners for interviews; provide access to seized Iraqi documents and assistance with issues of classification and declassification; and provide departmental expertise in military history, law of war, and international law issues, ~~to including e-assignment of~~ additional personnel, as appropriate.

- The Administrator of the CPA and the Secretary of State will support the RCAO by assisting the Iraq Governing Council in establishing IST infrastructure and court facilities, and in the expedited identification and installation of Iraqi judges, tribunal investigators, and prosecutors to staff the IST.
- The Secretary of State will assist the RCA in recruiting and selecting, in consultation with the Administrator of the CPA, international advisors and international investigative or forensic teams to assist the IST, and in advising the IST regarding its rules of evidence and procedure. The Secretary of State may also assist the RCAO by contacting other governments and requesting that they provide their full cooperation in collecting all evidence and contacting witnesses located within their territory that are relevant to IST investigations.
- ~~The Director of Central Intelligence and the collective elements of the ed~~ Intelligence Community, as appropriate, will; provide historical and archival research support to the RCAO as appropriate; ~~will serve~~ as liaison between the RCAO and foreign government intelligence services to assist in investigations as needed; and ~~will~~ provide to RCAO support supplemental to the main efforts of DOD/CPA, for information security. ~~Cleared-RCAO~~ personnel with requisite security clearances and a demonstrated need to know shall be given appropriate access to relevant captured documents and their analysis. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) will provide access to appropriately cleared RCAO staff or cleared RCAO approved individuals to documents in the possession of the ISG. Materials will be declassified make documents available to RCAO and declassify appropriate material in accordance with the policy guidance that has been developed between the CPA and the TSG regarding Iraq document exploitation in support of the Iraq Special Tribunal. DoJ will provide all resources required for such support.
- ~~The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) within the Intelligence Community will make available to the RCAO appropriate documents in ISG possession, custody or control that are relevant to RCAO and IST investigations, and the ISG will coordinate with an RCAO liaison to facilitate the declassification and handling of such materials.~~

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/26080

COORDINATION

Department of Defense
Office of General Counsel

Jim Haynes

March 26,2004

Under Secretary of Defense
For Intelligence

Dr. Cambone

March 29,2004

TAB C

APR 07 2004

see

TO: Steve Cambone

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Special Forces

We have a problem with CIA hiring away our Special Forces people and paying them more money. What do you propose we do about it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040304-11

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

11 APR 04

OSD 11712-04

April 5, 2004
EF-9144
I-04/004591

UZBEKISTAN

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: *SecDef*
SUBJECT: Certifying Uzbekistan

~~RTV DT...~~
4/9

If we can possibly do it, I want to make sure that Uzbekistan gets certified. I have no idea where the State Department is on that at the present time.

Please check into it, and then let's do everything we can to get it right. In my view they have made darn good progress and responded to the things I raised with them. They are not perfect, but they are moving in the right direction. As I understand it, that is the test.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040504-1

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04


*Sir.
Response attached. C4/9
✓/r. Det 4/12
LTC Swape*

SAUG04

OSD 11714-04

8:11 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: April 17, 2004

SUBJECT:

Please try to get back to me and tell me what the turkey farm or chicken farm had in Iraq and Libya so that I know what the real facts are. My mind is confused on it.

Thanks.

DHR/a7n
041704.02

Please respond by:

³⁰
4/30/04

Closed by
deskc note
4/21

IRAQ

19 APR 04

OSD 11715-04

8:11 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ↗

DATE: April 17, 2004

SUBJECT:

Please try to get back to me and tell me what the turkey farm or chicken farm had in Iraq and Libya so that I know what the real facts are. My mind is confused on it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041704.02

Please respond by: _____

4/19/04

OS
5/8

OSD 11715-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26085

~~SECRET~~

8:11 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ↗

DATE: April 17, 2004

SUBJECT:

Please try to get back to me and tell me what the turkey farm or chicken farm had in Iraq and Libya so that I know what the real facts are. My mind is confused on it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041704.02

Please respond by: _____

4/19/04

DHR 4/21

Response attached

c 4/20

11-L-0559/OSD/26086

~~SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

APR 19 2004

749

580

TO: Gen. Pete Pace

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Transport by Air

Why are we sending 90 percent of everything by air? I just got a stomach ache when I heard that. That would just be an enormous waste of money – like a billion and a half dollars.

Please check that and get back to me. People are convinced that **is** what is happening.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041304-10

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

DR 4/22

*Response attached
@ 4/20*

19APR04

OSD 11728-04

Done

April 1, 2004

452T

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meeting on Tanker E-mail

I simply have to solve this tanker issue. Let's get the e-mail meeting on fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040104-8

.....
Please respond by 4/9/04

1APRO4

OSD 11735-04

April 1, 2004

230

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Formers

Please have someone put together a list for me of all the living former Secretaries of State and Defense, National Security Advisers and CIA directors, and then give me back the attached list.

Thanks.

Attach.

1/12/04 List of former Secretaries of State and Defense and former National Security Advisers

DHR:dh
040104-2

.....
Please respond by 4/10/04

4/3 -
Attached. We have done this before and the list we are using for invites reflects earlier reviews.

D. Rita

4/2

Former Secretaries of State:

Madeleine Albright
Warren Christopher
James Baker III
Lawrence Eagleburger
George Shultz
Alexander Haig, Jr
Henry Kissinger

Former Secretaries of Defense

William Cohen
William Perry
Richard Cheney
Frank Carlucci III
Caspar Weinberger
Harold Brown
James Schlesinger
Melvin Laird
Robert McNamara

Former National Security Advisors

Samuel Berger
Tony Lake
Brent Scowcroft
Colin Powell
John Poindexter
Robert McFarlane
William Clark
Richard Allen
Zbigniew Brzezinski

Former CIA Directors

John Deutsch
Jim Woolsey
Robert Gates
William Webster
Stansfield Turner
George H.W. Bush

APR 14 2004

EF-9261

I-04/005098

Iceland

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iceland and the Sinai

How much longer are we going to be trying to get the proper arrangements in Iceland and in the Sinai?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041304-2

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

4/16/04

C 4/16

→ SD

I am working to get Jan Brzezinski to Iceland by the end of April to inform the GOI that US assets will come out this summer. Hadley so far is cooperating.

Regarding Sinai, we may be able to do a more ambitious move than earlier envisioned. I am meeting with my folks (Rodman et al.) today to review in light of this week's Sharon visit. We'll request a time to brief you soon.

Doug Feith

12:26 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/26091

OSD 11738-04

14APR04

APR 19 2004

413.51

TO: Tillie Fowler, Chairman, Defense Policy Board

c c : Gen. Dick Myers
 Bill Schneider, Chairman, Defense Science Board
 Paul Wolfowitz
 Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Information Warfare

Here is a memo from Andy Marshall about information warfare.

It would be helpful if the Policy Board got into it and proposed options for how we might go about creating such an entity as Andy suggests.

Please get back to me with some ideas.

Thanks.

Attach.
 3/29/02 Net Assessment memo to SecDef re: Creation of an Organization to Explore the Information Aspects of Warfare [U07509/03]

DHR:dh
041404-5

Please respond by 5/14/04

19 APR 04

OSD 11739-04



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

MAY 3 9 2003

MAR 29 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ANDREW MARSHALL *Am*

SUBJECT: Creation of an Organization to Explore the Information Aspects of Warfare

BACKGROUND

Central to most-of ideas about how warfare will change in the future is the notion that the information and communication technologies should lead to new operational methods and ultimately to major changes in warfare. We also already see that precision strike is now possible in ways that it was not in the more distant past, and that our ability to coordinate the actions of a wide variety of platforms or units, even if they are widely separated geographically, is now possible in a way that was never possible before. Information or superior information has always been important in warfare. Napoleon's success can be seen as due to his ability to use effectively available information and the staff that he created to support his operational command efforts. There is reason to think that information will be more central in the future than in the past. Therefore, a key competitive area in warfare is likely to be based on being better at getting and using information than one's opponent. One ought to start from a better position through superior investment, better organization for exploiting information, training, etc. As combat begins one would try to improve one's position by attacking and otherwise screwing up including deception the opponent's information acquisition and processing capabilities and defending against his efforts to similarly act upon our information gathering and processing systems. The problem is that we don't have an adequate basis for an analysis of the information aspect warfare, nor for measuring the level of superiority we have in any particular situation. We talk about information advantage, but there are few metrics. Also, our ability to model the information aspects of warfare is very poor, and hence difficult to include in any combat models that we have.

91351

29mar02



U07509 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/26093

SUGGESTION

Create a RAND of the 1950's organization and provide it with a broad but clear mission statement. Such a statement might be something like the development of the science of the information aspects of warfare. The idea would be to bring together a very bright set of people and set them to work over an extended period thinking through the role of information in warfare and developing appropriate analytic tools, metrics and significantly improving our ability to model the contribution of information to the outcomes of combat. This is likely to be a decade long effort and not too expensive, although the bureaucratic obstacles to starting such a new Federal study organization would have to be negotiated with the Congress. I don't think this requires a lot of people; the numbers initially could be quite small, on the scale of 20-25 people in the organization. In any case, the key thing is picking the management and, as in the analogy with RAND, that means finding a Frank Colbohm and people like Charlie Hitch and John Williams to establish its character and provide initial intellectual leadership. Because there are no real experts in this area you would need to think about growing future Albert Wohlstetter and Herman Kahns. So young bright people with appropriate academic backgrounds that are willing to focus on concrete problems are what you need. Ideally, if I could, I would start two of these organizations and have them compete way to see which one could provide the best analytic framework for this area, the best case studies of the role of information in warfare, etc.

FOR ⁷²⁰ SMIA
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

10:11 AM

am
c/6

TO: Steve Cambone

c c : Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ^{TR}

DATE: April 16, 2004

SUBJECT: **Attached**

FILE
}

384

Look at the attached. It shows that people have some security depending on threat level.

I would like to know what security they actually have had during the last 12 months, by month, and what they thought the threat level was.

See the attached.

Thanks.

SIR,
LTG CRADDOCK INQUIRED ABOUT THIS SNOWFLAKE SO I THOUGHT YOU MAY NEED THE INFORMATION AS WELL. ORIGINAL RESPONSE ATTACHED. LISTED ATTACHMENT INCLUDED BEHIND.

VR / CDR NOSENZO
6/14

DHR/azn
041604.01

Attach: Attachment B, Info Memo to Cambone from DUSD-CI&S Re: Protective Service Operations

Please respond by: _____ 4/23 _____

16 Apr 04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

MAY - 3 2004

384

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE *SC*

SUBJECT: Protective Service Operations

- This responds to your question (Tab B), ***"I would like to know what security they actually had during the last 12 months, by month, and what they thought the threat level was"*** concerning protective service operations conducted by each Military Department (Service).
- Each Service reported data (Tab A), by month that reflects the total number of personnel used to provide personal protection to each proteegee. Personal protection is provided by special agents (A) and when applicable are supported by drivers, administrative, and military police, which we call "support" (S).
- In the Services' report, each of the last 12 months is color-coded to show the threat level as determined by the responsible Services' field commanders.
 - Determining a threat to an individual while lacking a specific and credible threat information is subjective. The overall threat levels published by DIA, Department of Homeland Security, and COCOMs are taken into consideration, however the following are other factors field commanders consider when determining the overall threat:
 - o Terrorism (kidnapping, assassination)
 - o Criminal activities (kidnapping for ransom, assault or murder)
 - o Civil disobedience (embarrassment of activities by demonstrators)
 - o Wrong place, wrong time (natural disaster, victim of another's accident)
 - o Association and/or proximity to another threatened person (collateral effects)

3 May 04

16 Apr 04

Prepared by: Col Kevin Jacobsen, ODUS (CI&S) (b)(6)

OSD 11740-04

- When the Services reported threat level for each month, they used the following general criteria:
 - **LOW:** No significant threat to protectee or the protectee is not exposed to the general population.
 - **MEDIUM:** General information, which shows the protectee may be targeted, based on his/her position or the protectee is exposed to the environment where the terrorist or criminal threat level is assessed as medium.
 - **HIGH:** Credible and specific information that shows the protectee is targeted and/or the protectee is exposed to **an** environment where the terrorist or criminal threat level is assessed at **high** or critical.
- TAB (C) was previously provided to you and is attached for background.

COORDINATION: DUSD (CI&S); Army CID; Air Force OSI; Navy NCIS

Prepared by: Col Kevin Jacobsen, ODUSD (CI&S), (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/26097

Threat Levels:
 Low - Green
 Medium - Yellow
 High - Red

ARMY LED PROTECTION

OSD/JCS Principals have Agent Only Details

A = Agent
 S = support

Position	Mar-03	Apr-03	May-03	Juni-03	Jul-03	Aug-03	Sep-03	Oct-03	Nov-03	Dec-03	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04
Sec of Defense													
* Metro	35	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	32	30	31	31	31
Travel													
Total	75	97	102	105	81	104	109	119	70	97	59	126	63
Spt to SecDef's Fam													
Dep Sec of Def													
* Metro	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	20	19	18	17	18	19
Travel													
Total	58	60	121	81	73	59	68	63	42	49	84	60	51
CJCS													
* Metro	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Travel													
Total	28	29	74	69	62	93	48	58	47	51	60	36	66
VCJCS													
* Metro	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	7	7
Travel													
Total	22	28	38	51	32	37	17	30	32	34	37	33	42
SEC ARMY **				0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	
CSA													
Metro	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Travel													
Total	36	108	79	8	3	93	64	50	45	43	20	55	57
VCSA**								0					
Gen Franks (RET)													
Metro					3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Travel					9	4	13	38	23	37	33		34
Total					12	7	14	39	24	38	34	30	35
AMB Bremer**								9	0	7	5	0	0
SHAPE		A-9/S-3	A-9/S-3	A-9/S-3						A-9/S-3	A-9/S-3		A-9/S-3
USAREUR ***													
DEP EUCOM CDR **	A-1/S-35	A-1/S-36	A-1/S-36	A-1/S-36	A-1/S-40	A-1/S-39	A-1/S-37	A-1/S-35	A-1/S-36	A-1/S-36	A-1/S-37	A-1/S-41	A-1/S-41
NATO U.S. Rep ***							A-1/S-13						A-1/S-13
KFOR	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11
SFOR	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13
CG CFLCC													
DCG CFLCC													
V Corp													

Position	Mar-03	Apr-03	May-03	Jun-03	Jul-03	Aug-03	Sep-03	Oct-03	Nov-03	Dec-03	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04
III CORPS CDR													
CG, CFC-A													
CG, CJTF-180													
C, OMC-A													
CPA Augment ****													
JFCOM		A-0 / S-1	A-0 / S-1			A-0 / S-1							A-0 / S-2
SOUTHCOM***	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18
USARSO	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8
Total:	A-471s-322	A-471s-322	A-471s-323	A-471s-322	A-471s-326	A-471s-325	A-471s-322	A-476320	A-471s-321	A-471s-322	A-471s-325	A-471s-325	A-471s-326
* Total agent count includes all required agents ISO OSD/JCS Metro Mission on a daily basis													
** Travel Only													
*** Numbers Includes Residence Security and Travel Team													
**** Agents provide support in ITO only													

Threat Levels:

Low - Green
 Medium - Yellow
 High - Red

NAVY LED PROTECTION

A = Agent
 S = support

Position	Mar-03	Apr-03	May-03	Jun-03	Jul-03	Aug-03	Sep-03	Oct-03	Nov-03	Dec-03	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04
Washington, DC													
CNO			A-3/S-2		A-3/S-2	A-2/S-2	A-2/S-2	A-3/S-2	A-3/S-2	A-3/S-2		A-41s-2	A-41s-2
Travel Support			A-6		A-13	A-4	A-31		A-10	A-11		A-4	A-4
Total	A-21s-2	A-91s-2	A-91s-2	A-61s-2	A-16/S-2	A-61s-2	A-331s-2	A-251s-2	A-13/S-2	A-14/S-2	A-71s-2	A-81s-2	A-81s-2
SECNAV													
			A-3		A-3	A-3	A-3	A-3	A-4	A-4		A-4	A-4
Travel Support					A-4	A-13	A-4	A-5		A-25			A-14
Total	A-2	A-7	A-3	A-3	A-7	A-16	A-7	A-8	A-42	A-29	A-14	A-44	A-18
COMNAVNUKPROP													
			A-1		A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1		A-1	A-1
Travel Support									A-1	A-1			A-3
Total	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-2	A-2	A-2	A-1	A-4
CMC													
			A-2/S-2		A-2/S-2	A-2/S-2	A-2/S-2	A-2/S-2	A-3/S-2	A-3/S-2		A-3/S-2	A-3/S-2
Travel Support			A-5			A-1	A-2	A-4	A-4				A-4
Total	A-8/S-2	A-2/S-2	A-7/S-2	A-5/S-2	A-4/S-2	A-3/S-2	A-4/S-2	A-6/S-2	A-7/S-2	A-19/S-2	A-7/S-2	A-6/S-2	A-7/S-2
Asst CMC													
			A-1		A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1		A-1	A-1
Travel Support						A-3		A-2	A-1				
Total	A-3	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-4	A-1	A-3	A-2	A-1	A-3	A-1	A-1
Eurone													
COMNAVEUR	A-12	A-12	A-12	A-11	A-11	A-11	A-11	A-11	A-10	A-9	A-8	A-8	A-8
Travel Support			A-10	A-6	A-2					A-6		A-9	
Total	A-22	A-31	A-22	A-17	A-13	A-11	A-11	A-11	A-10	A-15	A-8	A-17	A-8
COMSIXTHFLT													
	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5
Travel Support	A-3	A-10	A-3	A-1	A-5						A-6	A-4	
Total	A-8	A-15	A-8	A-6	A-10	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-11	A-9	A-5
CAOC 7													
Travel Support													
Total	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-3	A-5	A-4	A-5
Bahrain													
COMUSNAVCENT													
Travel Support													
Total	A-6	A-7	A-6	A-5	A-5	A-6	A-10	A-8	A-6	A-6	A-8	A-8	A-9

Position	Mar-03	Apr-03	May-03	Jun-03	Jul-03	Aug-03	Sep-03	Oct-03	Nov-03	Dec-03	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04
Hawaii													
COMPAC			A-1		A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1		A-1	A-1
Travel Support			A-2						A-7			A-5	A-2
Total	A-1	A-9	A-3	A-16	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-8	A-1	A-1	A-6	A-3
COMPACFLT													
COMPACFLT			A-1		A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1		A-1	A-1
Travel Support					A-2							A-7	A-2
Total	A-1	A-1	A-20	A-1	A-3	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-3	A-8	A-3
Japan													
COMSEVENTHFLT													
Travel Support													
Total	A-1	A-3	A-3	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-3	A-5	A-3	A-1	A-3	A-2
Iraq													
CPA BASRAH													
CPA HILLAH													
Total				A-4	A-12	A-16	A-16	A-16	A-16	A-16	A-16	A-18	A-18

Threat Levels:

Low - Green

Medium - Yellow

High - Red

AIR FORCE LED PROTECTION

AF Principals have Agent Only Details

A = Agent

Position	Mar-03	Apr-03	May-03	Jun-03	Jul-03	Aug-03	Sep-03	Oct-03	Nov-03	Dec-03	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04
SECAF	A-14	A-10	A-6	A-4	A-9	A-10	A-1	A-11	A-3	A-9	A-6	A-4	A-14
USECAF	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-7	A-3	A-3
CSAF	A-2	A-2	A-2	A-2	A-2	A-2	A-4	A-6	A-6	A-2	A-9	A-2	A-2
VCSAF	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-3	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1
USAFE	A-9	A-9	A-14	A-9	A-9	A-9	A-9	A-9	A-9	A-11	A-9	A-9	A-9
NORTHCOM	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-8	A-6	A-12
SOCOM										A-1			
AFMC/CC													
ACC/CC													
AMC/CC													
AFSOC/CC													
AFSPC/CC													
PACAF/CC													
AETC/CC													
TRANSCOM/CC													
USCENTAF/CC													
SOUTH AF/CC													
CFACC/CC								A-3		A-4	A-12	A-5	A-7
Deputy CFACC/CC													
3rd AF/CC													
12th AF/CC													
13th AF/CC													
CPA Principals													
Chief of Defense (ChoD) Philippines													
ChoD Uzbekistan													
ChoD Colombia													
ChoD Jordan													
ChoD Japan													
ChoD Hungary													
ChoD Bulgaria													
Military of Defense (MoD) Vietnam													
NATO Ministerial Global Air Commander Conference								A-70					
Middle Eastern Air Symposium							A-35						
									A-20	A-20			
Total	A-43	A-49	A-52	A-45	A-48	A-50	A-86	A-138	A-95	A-78	A-80	A-54	A-88

Threat Levels:
 No color code
 annotated: Threat
 level is assessed by
 lead PSO agency

AIR FORCE SUPPORT TO OTHER AGENCY LED PROTECTION

A = Agent

Position	Mar-03	Apr-03	May-03	Jun-03	Jul-03	Aug-03	Sep-03	Oct-03	Nov-03	Dec-03	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04
President of the U.S	A-3	A-1		A-2				A-4	A-2			A-4	
Vice President of the U.S											A-6		A-5
Sec Def		A-1							A-7			A-2	
Deputy Sec Def				A-4					A-4	A-4	A-5	A-6	A-4
CJCS			A-2		A-3			A-3	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4
VCJCS					A-5				A-4	A-4	A-4		
CENTCOM	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1
Deputy CENTCOM						A-2							
SOUTHCOM										A-2			
J5 SOUTHCOM							A-1						
U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador						A-1			A-1				
US Naval Forces SOUTHCOM								A-1					
US Naval Forces Europe/CC						A-2							
Secretary of Energy											A-3		
Chief, US Military Training, CENTCOM											A-2		A-1
President of Latvia													A-1
US SECDEF for Policy												A-1	
USSS					A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-8	A-3	A-4
Total	A-4	A-3	A-3	A-7	A-13	A-10	A-6	A-13	A-27	A-19	A-33	A-21	A-20

Handwritten notes:
 10/17/11
 10/17/11

US Army Criminal Investigation Command

<u>Position</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u># of SA</u>	<u>Military Police SPT</u>
Sec of Defense	World Wide	Sec Rumsfeld	22	0
Dep Sec of Def	World Wide	Sec Wolfowitz	14	0
CJCS	World Wide	Gen Meyers	7	0
VCJCS	World Wide	Gen Pace	8	0
Sec Army	World Wide	Act Sec Brownlee*	0 fulltime	0
CSA	World Wide	Gen Schoomaker	2	0
VCSA	World Wide	Gen Casey	0 fulltime	0
CENTCOM (RET)	World Wide	Gen Franks (Ret)	1	0
SHAPE	World Wide	Gen Jones	10	0
USAREUR	World Wide	Gen Bell	1	8
DEP EUCOM CDR	Europe	Gen Wald	1	43***
NATO U.S.Rep	NATO	LTG Kinnan	1	15
KFOR	KFOR	TF FALCON	1**	11**
SFOR	SFOR	COMSFOR	1**	13**
CG CFLCC	CENTCOM	LTG McKiernan	1**	12**
DCG CFLCC	CENTCOM	MG Speaks	1**	10**
V Corps CDR	CENTCOM	LTG Sanchez	1**	15**
III Corps CDR	CENTCOM	LTG Metz	1**	10**
CG, CFC-A	AFGAHNISTAN	LTG Barno	1**	12**
CG, CJTF-180	AFGAHNISTAN	BG(P) Austin	1**	15**
C, OMC-A	AFGAHNISTAN	MG Wastin	1**	10**
CPA Augmentation	ITO	CPA	27	120**
Metro Team/Residence	CONUS	Principals 1-4	49	0
Travel Team	World Wide	Principals 1-7	19	0
ATOIC	Pentagon		3	0
* Will change with new SEC Army			Total PSU SA-	174
			Total MP SPT-	286

** BMM and only while deployed

*** Also performs residence and installation security and travel team

Air Force Office of Special Investigations

<u>Position</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u># of SA</u>	<u>Military Police SPT</u>
USAFE	Ramstein AFB	Gen Fogelsong	9	By Threat Level
NORTHCOM	Peterson AFB	Gen Eberheart	4	2 Auth/1 Assigned
SECAF	Andrews AFB	Hon Sec Roche	2	By Threat Level
Dep SECAF	Andrews AFB	Hon Sec Teets	1	By Threat Level
CSAF	Andrews AFB	Gen Jumper	2	By Threat Level
VSAF	Andrews AFB	Gen Moseley	1	By Threat Level
CENTCOM	Mac Dill AFB	Gen Abizaid	1	By Threat Level
AFMC/CC	Wright-Patterson	Gen Martin	1	By Threat Level
ACC/CC	Langley AFB	Gen Hornburg	1	By Threat Level
AMC/CC	Scott AFB	Gen Handy	1	By Threat Level
AFSOC/CC	Mac Dill AFB	Gen Hester	1	By Threat Level
AFSPC/CC	Peterson AFB	Gen Lord	1	By Threat Level
PACAF/CC	Hickham AFB	Gen Begert	1	By Threat Level
AETC/CC	Randolph AFB	Gen Cook	1	By Threat Level
CPA	Baghdad, Iraq		14	By Threat Level
TOTAL SA			41	

Naval Criminal Investigative Service

<u>Position</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u># of SA</u>	<u>Additional SPT</u>
SECNAV	Washington D.C.	Hon England	5	By Threat Level
CNO	Washington D.C.	ADM Clark	3	By Threat Level
Comdt Marine Corps	Washington D.C.	GEN Hagee	3	By Threat Level
NCISHQ	Washington D.C.		6	
COMUSNAVEUR	Naples, Italy	ADM Johnson	10	By Threat Level
COMSIXTHFLT	Gaeta, Italy	VADM Ulrich	3	By Threat Level
DEPCONCAOC	Larissa, Greece		3	By Threat Level
COMPAC	Hawaii	ADM Fargo	1	By Threat Level
COMPACFLT	Hawaii	ADM Doran	1	By Threat Level
COMSEVENTHFLT	Yokosuka, Japan	VADM Willard	1	By Threat Level
COMFIFTHFLT	Bahrain	VADM Nichols	1	By Threat Level
Counter Intel	CENTCOMAOR		20	USMC
Travel/CPA Support	World Wide/Iraq		44	

TOTAL SA 101

TOTAL DOD SA 315 TOTAL SPT- 286 (+)

MAJ Oliver Rose/CIOP-OP/ (b)(6)
 APPROVED BY: COL Palgutt/ (b)(6)



INTELLIGENCE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

MAY - 3 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE *SC*

SUBJECT: Protective Service Operations

- This responds to your question (Tab B), *"I would like to know what security they actually had during the last 12 months, by month, and what they thought the threat level was"* concerning protective service operations conducted by each Military Department (Service).

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INTELLIGENCE

John Craddock -
This is
standable with a
little bit of interpretation.
Bottom line: if
these individuals are to
have protective details,
the #s seem right.

SC
5/3/04

th that reflects the total number of
n to each protectee. Personal
and when applicable are supported by
which we call "support" (S).

months is color-coded to show the
e Services' field commanders.

while lacking a specific and credible
overall threat levels published by DIA,
id COCOMs are taken into
are other factors field commanders
ll threat:

nation)
; for ransom, assault or murder)
nent of activities by demonstrators)
tral disaster, victim of another's

o another threatened person (collateral



11-L-0559/OSD/26106

OSD 11740-04

Prepared by: Col Kevin Jacobsen, ODU

5-1&S), (b)(6)

April 12, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*
SUBJECT: CPA Comments

0200 CPA

Please edit this, and make it absolutely bullet-proof. Tell Carpenter we are going to move it around, so he is aware of it.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/6/04 Comments of Scott Carpenter

DHR:dh
041204-13

.....
Please respond by 4/15/04

12 APR 04

OSD 11741-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26107

D4 #12

8 Apr 04
9:00 AM

Comments of Scott Carpenter, Director, Governance Team, Coalition
Provisional Authority: April 6, 2004

- Carpenter said that without the efforts of Ahmed Chalabi, CPA would not have achieved:
 - The law on direct foreign investment.
 - The flat individual and corporate income tax.
 - The November 15 agreement.
 - The Transitional Administrative Law.
- Carpenter also said, "we go to Chalabi on a day-to-day basis to solve problems."

April 12, 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
Honorable George Tenet
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: CPA Comments

Attached are some comments by the Coalition Provisional Authority's Director of the Governance Team, which are worth considering as we prepare for the meeting ahead.

Attach.

4/6/04 Comments of Scott Carpenter

DHR:dh
041204-12

*Hold
for
JWH
to edit
attachment*

11-L-0559/OSD/26109

APR 14 2004

IRAQ

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Steele Update on Iraq

I think you may want to get this memo from Jim Steele over to Petraeus, so he is aware of it.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/19/04 Steele e-mail to DepSecDef re: Update

DHR:dh
041204-10

.....
Please respond by 4/19/04

*sent by
LTC Cavoli
for the Chairman*

14 APR 04

OSD 11742-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26110

4/12
DAD

Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD

SECDEF —

From: Caldwell, Bill, MG, OSD
Sent: Friday, March 19, 2004 9:33 PM
To: Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD
Subject: FW: Update

FROM JIM STEELE TO
DEPUTY

Sir -- thought you might want to see this email from Jim Steele to my boss.

FYI

V/r-- Bill

To be sent?

C 3/20

-----Original Message-----

From: Steele, James (SES-5) [mailto:steelej@orha.centcom.mil]
Sent: Friday, March 19, 2004 11:39 AM
To: Wolfowitz, Paul, Dr, OSD
Cc: Caldwell, Bill, MG, OSD; Sherline, Stephanie, CIV, OSD
Subject: Update

Bill, please be sure that Paul gets this.

Paul,


Here's an update on how I see the security situation and our response to the threat. I'd like to follow it up with a meeting with you either here or in DC.

- The security situation is not improving as it relates to the terrorist threat. There is improvement in law enforcement, but it remains spotty. These are my subjective assessments and may to some degree appear at odds with some of the metrics (i.e. number of Iraqi security forces, recruit and TIP graduates, equipment fill, etc.) that are being used to gauge our success. Effective Iraqi security forces, particularly the police, are the essential component in achieving our strategic objectives here. Demonstrated performance is the real measure of effectiveness.
- I consider the lack of effective leadership within the Ministry of Interior as the most significant impediment to improving the security situation. The problem begins at the top. The Interior Minister, Nouri Betran, is incompetent and dishonest. He consistently blames the US for the lack of security in that we have not provided assistance in the form of requested equipment. He and his INA party members (including Alawi) are soft on the Ba'athists and are making a concerted effort to reincorporate them into the government (including the police). I have addressed this repeatedly with Bremer, who by and large concurs with my assessment of the problem, but is unwilling to challenge the IGC by sacking one of its appointed ministers. This problem is further aggravated by the lack of an effective Senior Advisor to the MOI. The net result is the MOI, which is the key to our security objectives and withdrawal plans is marginal at best.
- General Ahmed K. Ibrahim is the latest victim of Betran's incompetence and our unwillingness to challenge him. In my opinion, Ahmed is the most competent and courageous Iraqi leader in MOI. He has been and continues to be our most loyal ally. Betran has orchestrated his removal from his post as Deputy Minister and assignment to the Foreign Ministry for subsequent transfer out of Iraq, perhaps to New York. Despite describing Ahmed in glowing terms and tell him that we need 10 more like him, Bremer has acquiesced to the reassignment as an accommodation to the IGC and Interior Minister as well as concern for Ahmed's safety. As you might expect, the enemy consider him the number one Iraqi target for assassination.

- The enhanced role of CENTCOM in training and equipping the Iraqi security forces, especially the police, is a needed change. This is not only true for the reasons listed above, but because the police have suffered from a lack of support across the board, including from both the JTF and CPA. The MSCs have been reluctant to expend their resources on the police because CPA-MOI supposedly has that responsibility. Furthermore the MSCs would much prefer to field and support ICDC for which they are responsible and have complete control. In fairness, the support from the MSCs has ranged from excellent to poor. The quality of the police in Mosul is quite good as a direct result of the efforts of the 101st Commander. The results in Baghdad are at the opposite end of the scale. I am hopeful that the change to military control will cause the MSCs to assume greater ownership of the police across the board, especially as it relates to advising and mentoring the police leadership.
- The training program for the police is largely ineffective. We transplanted the ICITAP effort in Kosovo and with little change have attempted to implement it here. The security situation alone makes it nearly unworkable, but the constraints of time and the prior conditions within the police make the plan totally inappropriate. ICITAP has had problems everywhere, including Panama where I observed them firsthand. They simply cannot deal with a program of this size. That is why they create "model precincts" that are impressive to visitors, but fail to address the need in a comprehensive way. At my insistence and Bremer's direction, the training program has been modified to address the leadership problem. Unfortunately, it remains an afterthought effort and will probably be of marginal value unless CENTCOM focuses on it. Using effective military leaders, preferably those with law enforcement experience, to act as mentors to Iraqi police leaders is probably the only way to make real improvement in the near future.
- The 8-week recruit training course is a good starting effort, but requires a 24-week follow on mentorship program to produce a qualified basic policeman. Therein lies the problem. INL is not fielding the civilian police mentors in required numbers for a host of reasons, mostly security and equipment related. Those that are fielded are likely to go to the model precincts. Given the limited number of civilian police mentors, I believe they should be linked up with police chiefs and precinct and station commanders – not as recruit mentors. The other problem with the 8-week program is that it is alien to the existing police system. The Iraqi police, like all of their neighboring police, are organized along military lines. I predict that our efforts to unwind that system will not survive beyond July. I suspect the graduates of the 8-week program will not qualify for leadership positions in the police without going back to some extended academy education program like existed prior to the war.
- The 3-week TIP program is useful, but at present does not address the key issue – leadership. I proposed that the TIP be changed to a TIP II leadership course focused on mid-level officers. Those officers are attending the current TIP and are intermixed with policemen of all ranks. Why not frontload the officers and focus on making them more effective leaders? While Bremer agreed with the concept, nothing has changed on the ground.
- The fact that we are still unable to access the supplemental funds is impossible to explain.
- On a brighter note, our efforts to create an inter-ministerial working group to address counter-terrorism looks promising. It will have the benefit of some experts like Brian Jenkins and Bruce Hoffman from Rand. The first challenge will be the Shiite religious period of Arb'een in early April.

Paul, as you may gather from this litany, I am a very concerned about what is and is not happening in the security area here. While I have high respect for Bremer, he is consumed by governance issues and relying on others to address the security problem. Please don't consider my comments as denigrating the dedicated efforts of many both in and out of uniform. I need your advice and counsel regarding my continued role here. I'm not accustomed to failure and see this mission as too important to the Nation to let it falter. I look forward to hearing from you.

APR 5 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: LTG John Craddock 
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Threat Assessment for Service Chiefs

I would like to know what the threat assessment is that causes the four Service Chiefs to have personal security. We need to review that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040104-14

.....
Please respond by 4/9/04

320.01

SAPROA

OSD 11743-04

APR 5 2004

380.01

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Personal Security Forces for Services

I would like to know what the personal security forces are in each of the Services, what they were last year, and what they are planned to be for next year.

It seems to me we are living in a world where that needs to be addressed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040104-15

.....
Please respond by 4/16/04

OSD 11744-04

SAPRO4

~~SENSITIVE~~

APR 27 2004

IRAO

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Paper on Sistani, *A*

Please clean up this piece on Sistani that you gave me and then send it to anyone who you think ought to have it from me.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/22/04 Sistani Rep Mtg

DHR:dh
042604-9

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

OB
4/28

OSD 11745-04

27 APR 04

11-L-0559/OSD/26115 UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

~~SENSITIVE~~

4/23
08 4/26

C

Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD**Subject: FW: Sistani rep meeting at CPA-SC -SENSITIVE REPORT-***(CPA South Central (Mike G's office)*

CPA-SC Senior PolAd [Fadi Petro] receives Sistani Office representative at CPA-SC HQ.

22 April, 2004.

Sayyed Maytham Faisal Mazthboub (protect) is a close contact and personal friend of GA Ali Sistani. Maytham has had access to GA Sistani for the past 15 years. Maytham is a moderate and a respected notable in the city of Najaf/Kufa. He is not a cleric, and he is not employed by Sistani, but is an independently wealthy and a religiously inclined man who has had direct involvement in the Hawza.

The purpose of the meeting was to establish a direct relationship with CPA [regional]. He claimed that many Baghdad visitors led them to believe that there was a solid conduit to CPA-Baghdad but that they were beginning to lose faith in this and wanted to build their own relationship at this point. He indicated grave dissatisfaction in dealing with multiple interlocutors who all claim they were sent by Amb Bremer to "solve the problem" and the episodic nature of their involvement. Some, he claimed, had even gone as far as asking for a photograph with GA Sistani [IGC member Muwaffaq Al Ruba'i] for what they interpreted as an attempt at proving they met with him and gaining increased credibility when they quoted him. He stated that Sistani understands many are speaking in his name and that he has to do something about that and is looking at making a direct office to office connection with a "real live American officer" in the CPA so there is no misunderstanding. He knows of Mike, Hume and I [from back when we first made our rounds with the Ayatollahs], and sought us out.

Note: He did not indicate at any time that he had a message from Sistani. However, at the close of the meeting, Maytham stated that he would report his meeting results directly to Sistani and requested that I meet with a closer contact of Sistani [NFI] this coming week. He stated that this person will come to CPA-SC to meet. He did not mention a name, nor did I ask, but he mentioned the person is a cleric and an associate of GA Sistani. I believe that final selection of this person will come out after Maytham briefs GA Sistani.

Here is a report of the key points he made:

1. Coalition Forces were seen in some neighborhoods [Hayy Zahra] and were refreshingly received. He stated that the people that want peace welcome this action. Indicating that US Forces are welcome in their midst.
2. Any city where there is no Law and no Authority there is a problem, and thus is the case in Najaf and Kufa. The sovereign should never abandon his [people] during a crisis; neither should he yield his authority to any person that is not properly appointed. Here he is indicating the obvious, asking the US to regain control from the forces that now [occupy government offices] in Najaf. He mentioned US success in Kut, and wished for a similar outcome where the US was able to regain control and push back the militia.
3. He further commented that Najaf has fallen into the hands of the so called Jaysh Al Mahdi, a group of thieves, murderers, he goes on...that have armed themselves beyond any comprehension, taken police stations, released all the prisoners, and looted the government offices...all while the

- coalition forces watched. He went on to say that anyone that worked with the CF has been targeted and many now are in jails and are being tried in so called Shari'a courts, some have been executed and still the Coalition stands by without interfering. He mentioned that [collaborators] are being systematically pursued, arrested, and detained daily and that the families have no where to go and complain—just like the old days under Saddam. Fear and Intimidation now rule the city again.
4. He stated that Sistani has done his duty [as a religious leader]; he sent a delegation asking MAS to leave the city if he intended to fight the coalition and spare the city and shrines from inherent destruction. He stated that the delegation warned MAS that the coalition will respond with might for every bullet Sadr Militia [SM] expended. He went on to explain that Sadr's inner circle was now in charge of key [military] decisions and that MAS remained removed from direct involvement, but that MAS was adamant about not backing down in the face of too much pressure—didn't look good—and that MAS was personally convinced that he could win and keep/control Najaf/Kufa.
 5. He affirmed that most of the hardened MAS militants in the streets manning positions were strangers [from outside the city], and more likely from Thawra city [Sadr City] in Baghdad. He wondered how they could have traveled, unobstructed—to Najaf—and taken control so easily, and remain in control in the face of the mighty coalition that liberated Iraq. He said that people were beginning to draw dangerous conclusions from such a situation and that lest the coalition regain control that it would be hard to mobilize the citizens to help or cooperate later. They live in fear of retribution for any misconstruction made by the Sadr thugs...this is like living under Saddam only now it was 1991 all over again.
 6. He stressed that Najaf is not Fallujah. He stated that Fallujah is full of former Baathists, foreign fighters from all over the Middle East to include Al Qaeda and Ansar Al Islam, former Iraqi military, former Iraqi Intelligence, and former Iraqi Special Services, many that benefited from the regime for years. Najaf is different. You do not have any military commanders, or any security apparatus, or any Sunni opposition. You have people that never benefited from the regime but were systematically oppressed and persecuted for the past 35 years. You don't have any former regime elements, or anyone fighting against an occupation—we are still thankful you liberated us, and Sistani has stated that since you announced you are leaving and given a date then you are not truly occupiers—so the dynamics are different and you can count on the people to support you to a limit if you were to go after him more aggressively. We hear the planes overhead daily and nightly, we know the troops are in the outskirts of the city, and we await a solution. It is my understanding here that he is indicating that they expect a US offensive to take back the town and remove MAS and his militia [using Kut as an example], but cautioning against prolonged fighting and collateral damage control [meaning the Shrines].
 7. He described the Najaf Police as traitors that must be fired once the city is liberated. Stated that they were obedient dogs when Saddam was in power, and their paychecks were a fraction of what they are now. He displayed outright disdain for the great betrayal that they committed in giving over the city to Sadr's criminals. He then said they would have never thought of doing that under Saddam, but it was easier now since there was no perceptible punishment by the local government/coalition, but that the outcome of not cooperating with MAS was taken more seriously.
 8. Stated that Sadr was a cancer that needed to be removed or else it would get worse fast and that you would either have to amputate [give up Najaf] or be chasing the disease that was spreading ever so much faster. He urged some solution that would rid them of this future [Shi'a] Saddam. He went on to develop the Saddam analogy by showing that Sadr has surrounded himself with a circle much like Saddam's that would protect the leader as long as they were benefiting from him—currently that consisted of feeding of his spoils—like police cars and weapons, monies they plundered and influence they now enjoy along with its inherent respect. He stated that GA Sistani has declared that all government property had to be returned.

The meeting lasted two hours and was rather pleasant in tone. Maytham is a friendly fellow that likes to make analogies and funny remarks. One joke he made about Sadr that is worth mentioning goes like this: A mother mosquito tells her child not to go near any people, she feared for his life, but the little mosquito didn't listen, he came home that evening and told his mother, mom, why did you ask me to stay away from the people, they really like me, when I went near them today they all started clapping for me... [he motioned with his hands how we try to kill a mosquito] he said this was Sadr, he was that naïve & stupid. We then had a catered lunch [actually cooked by the wife of one of our Iraqi staff—it was delicious] in our office followed by the usual barrage of tea and Pepsi.

Again, before we said our final good-bye's [which we did several times as usual] he mentioned that he would brief Sistani personally and re-contact our office for a future meeting with a closer associate. Direct contact with Maytham is done through our Hawza interlocutor Ala', who has been faithfully with us for almost a year now. He has relocated his family to Hilla [with relatives] after several death threats received in his home by phone and paper under the door.

Very Respectfully,

Fadi Petro

Fadi Petro
Senior Political Advisor to the Regional Director
CPA-South Central, Hilla, Iraq

(b)(6)



APR 5 2004

350.001

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Homeland Defense Domestic Intelligence Highlights

I keep getting these things, and there is no report. Why should you waste time sending them in to me if there is nothing on them? It is kind of silly and a waste of everyone's time.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/1/04 Homeland Defense Domestic Intelligence Highlights

DHR:dh
040104-17

..... *DR 4/18*
Please respond by 4/9/04

4/5

SecDef

- You are right - makes no sense.*
- We have told DIA to stop putting this in*
- We will do a better job of screening the folder for "blatant" reports before sending to you.*

DHROD

OSD 11746-04

C



APR 5 2004

337

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock
PAUL BURSEL
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Schedule Meetings on Minow Report and E-mails

I really do have to solve the Minow report, and I have to solve the e-mails on McCain. This calendar has to reflect that.

This has to be done. We have to stop it. Please give me my calendar for Friday and let me see it, and for all of next week. Set time aside today for me to go over my calendars for Friday, Saturday, Sunday and all through next Friday. I want to see it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040104-16

.....
Please respond by 4/2/04 Done
4/2/

OSD 11747-04

SAPPROY

914
1000

720

EF-9192
04/004826

APR 07 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: MOU for PRTs in Afghanistan

We need to talk about what the status is of an MOU for the PRTs in Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040604-4

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

TO: Sec Def
Paul Butler
6/18

DA 6/19
Sir,
Response attached
vr/CDR Nosow
6/18

OSD 11766-04

file

June 15, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Paul Butler
Jim Haynes
Larry Lanzillotta

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Liability Insurance

019

Please look into this subject of liability insurance for selected senior Defense Department officials, and then explain to me how we could implement it here in the Department.

As you will note, the Department of State already has such a program. It strikes me it would be a useful thing for us to do here, but we would have to figure out whether or not the Government would pay any portion, as it does at State, if it is legal, if we have authority, who we would include, and who we wouldn't include and why.

15
to
by

Please come up with a simple proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/14/04 SecState fax re: Professional Liability Insurance

DHR:dh
061504-4

Please respond by 7/16/04

DR 7/2
Sir,
Response attached.


vr
Lt Col Greg Lengyel
7/30

11-L-0559/OSD/26122 **OSD 11777-04**

2007104

~~FOUO~~

August 9, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Liability Insurance

D19

I want to sign **up** for that liability insurance.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080904-15

.....
Please respond by 8/27/04

9 AUG 04

26 JUL 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26123

OSD 11777-0f

QA 8/9

(Wish 8/4
performed
senior mil
could get
this! J

August 3, 2004
2004-08-03 15:56

To: SecDef
From: Paul Butler
Re: Liability Insurance

- Attached is a copy of Ray Dubois snowflake response outlining the terms of the liability insurance available to DoD employees. Bottom line, most employees at the GS-15 level and above are eligible and can be reimbursed up to \$150 of the yearly premium. (The premium, however, is not expensive and is in the \$290 range).
- The coverage is available for either \$500k or \$1 million and covers liability and up to \$100k in attorneys' fees. (One caveat is coverage for "pre-existing conditions." I have looked at the application form and it asks whether the applicant is aware of any pending "claims or allegations" which presumably would not be covered by a policy obtained now).
- You asked whether coverage extends beyond separation from the government. General Counsel's office has informed me that if the employee resigned or retired (as opposed to being fired), they would be covered.
- As the last paragraph of Ray's memo states, the current plan is to publicize the availability of the insurance in the next quarterly edition of Personnel HiLites, published by WHS Human Resources Directorate.

2

1

TSA SD	8/5
SRMA SD	P 8/5
MA SD	M 8/8
EXEC SEC	

OSD 11777-04


11-L-0559/OSD/26124



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO



04 8/9

2004-5 11 2 56

July 20, 2004, 10:30 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

Ray F. DuBois

SUBJECT: Professional Liability Insurance Reimbursement Program

- The attached snowflake requests information regarding a program for professional liability insurance reimbursement within DoD.
- DoD implemented this program beginning in FY 2000. Pursuant to the DoD program, qualified employees may be reimbursed up to one-half the cost incurred for professional liability insurance, not to exceed \$150.00 per year.
- The Treasury, Postal Service, and General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1997 requires agencies to reimburse qualified employees for up to one-half the cost incurred for professional liability insurance. The Act permits agencies some discretion on the specific amount to be reimbursed, provided the total yearly payment does not exceed one-half the cost of the premium. WHS operates this program for employees assigned to OSD as well as the JCS and activities receiving operational support from WHS.
- Qualified employees under the statute include law enforcement officers, supervisors, and management officials covered under the general schedule (GS) and those above the GS-15. Military personnel and non-appropriated fund supervisors and managers are not covered. Since the Program was implemented, WHS Human Resources Directorate has processed 15 claims for reimbursement. It does not have a record of claims for reimbursement sent directly to DFAS by administrative officers of other DoD organizations.
- Liability insurance obtained by employees covers legal expenses and damages awarded in the event that employees are sued for actions taken in the course of their duties.
- The Professional Liability Insurance Reimbursement Program will be publicized in the next quarterly issue of the WHS Human Resources Directorate's Personnel Hilites, a widely distributed on-line publication disseminated throughout OSD and other WHS-supported organizations.

Prepared by: David Bauer, (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

August 6, 2004

O20 A 7

TO: Gen. George Casey
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: 30-day Assessment

Your overall 30-day assessment is excellent.

Thank you so much.

DHR:dh
080604-1

.....
Please respond by _____

6 Aug 04

OSD 11819-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26126

June 17, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers *Taylor*

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D-R* *(D)*

SUBJECT: Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

210 navy (314)

What do you recommend on this eight-year four-star for the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program?

Thanks.

Attach.

6/14/04 GC memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
061704-3

.....
Please respond by 7/16/04

PW
What do you
opine?

(D)

7/1
8/8/9
17 Jun 04

14 Jun 04

SIR,
Response attached.
VR
Lt Col Greg Lengyel
8/4

DA 8/9

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: August 3, 2004

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*

SUBJECT: Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

210 Navy (384)

Don,

You asked me what I would propose concerning the personnel and assignment policies in the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. In the short term, specifically the next four years, I endorse the CJCS recommended course of action, a course of action with which the SECNAV and CNO are in agreement: maintain the four star stature of the Naval Reactors Director, but reduce the tour length to four years, renewable to eight. I've attached the CJCS's original memo at Tab A.

I believe, however, that the question you raise, as well as several associated personnel and assignment issues, should be studied. E.g.:

- Despite rising nuclear carrier numbers and declining submarine numbers, the Naval Reactors directorship continues to reside with the submarine officers. Should this change?
- Another issue is the command of nuclear aircraft carriers. By law, dating from the 1920's, an aviator qualified officer must command a carrier. Given the sensitivity of nuclear safety issues and the complexity of these ships during the series of refueling overhauls now confronting the Navy, should consideration be given to sharing command of these capital ships with nuclear trained surface or submarine officers during these overhaul periods?
- The Naval Nuclear Propulsion program tends to get first call on that segment of the Naval officer corps with engineering and scientific aptitude. Is the platform-centric organizing principal of


3 Aug 04

14 Jun 04

Naval Reactors appropriate for such a large percentage of these key members of 21st century officer corps? Is there another pool of manpower with which to operate the older technology represented by nuclear reactors (perhaps raising the retirement age of existing nuclear officers) thereby freeing up a larger percentage of the younger, technically capable officers to other needs of our nation's defense?

Reducing the term of the Naval Reactors Director to four years will require a legislative change, presumably as part of the FY'06 Authorization. With your approval, I would ask the Navy to come back with recommendations on the three questions above, as well as on the question of reducing the Director's term to four years in time to have a total package ready for the FY'06 submission.

Go ahead and task the Navy



AUG 9 2004

Prepare a tasker for SecDef signature _____

Other _____



UNCLASSIFIED

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1892-04
1 July 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 6/25*

SUBJECT: Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

- **Question.** What do you recommend on this eight-year four-star for the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program? (TAB A)
- **Answer.** I recommend the Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program remain a four-star position, however, the Department should propose to revise the tour length in FY06 NDAA. An eight-year appointment is too long. The director should be appointed to serve an initial term of four-years with the option to serve additional one- or two-year terms not to exceed a total of eight years.
- **Analysis.**
 - Retaining the Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program as a four-star position is commensurate with the level of responsibility for the safe operation of over 100 nuclear reactors.
 - Reducing the initial term from eight to four-years while retaining the option for additional one- or two-year terms will provide greater flexibility to manage the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.
 - Revising the term of the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program requires the concurrence of the Secretary of Energy as well as a change to the current law.
 - The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations concur with this proposal.

210 Navy (384)

1 Jul 04

14 Jun 04

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: VADM T. J. Keating, USN; Director, Joint Staff;

(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED
11-L-0559/OSD/26130

OSD 11872-04



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

DEK/17

INFO MEMO

June 14, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DEPSEC _____

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, (b)(6) *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Position of Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

- At your earlier direction, Dan Dell'Orto met with the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to obtain their views about the grade (O-10) and term of appointment (8 years) of this position.
- The Secretary of the Navy believes that any proposed change in either the grade level or term of appointment is sensitive.
 - The grade level is significant because of the Navy's outstanding nuclear safety record.
 - Were the grade level reduced, any subsequent safety problems likely would be attributed to that reduction.
 - An 8-year term is unduly long and permits the incumbent to outlast at least one Administration, and possibly two.
- The Chief of Naval Operations agreed that any proposed change in either grade level or term of appointment would be controversial and possibly particularly difficult in an election year because the submarine community would mobilize to oppose any change.
 - Having a 4-star officer (although it does not have to be a submariner, it historically has been) in this position provides the submarine community with an edge over both the surface and aviation community neither of which has a Navy uniformed advocate above the two-star level.
 - Interestingly, ADM Clark does not believe that either the Department of Energy or the Senate would oppose a change in this position unless the submarine community sways them.

210 Navy (384)

14 Jun 04

OSD 11872-04




- The position as currently structured is an anachronism during a period of transition from a threat- to a capabilities-based defense and a platform centric system to an information centric system.
- Consideration should be given to a Senior Executive Service person for this position, as the Executive Order contemplates, as this would remove the position from the operations role and the submarine advocacy role.
- ADM Clark was very complimentary toward ADM Skip Bowman, the incumbent, who has handled himself as well as anyone could in this position.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, (b)(6)

November 7¹⁰, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Navy Nuclear 4-Star

3


I think it is time to end the 8-year assignment for the Navy nuclear 4-star and possibly move it to a 3-star.

Please talk to Vern Clark and Gordon England, and see what we might want to propose next year by way of legislative change.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110703-8

.....
Please respond by 12/12/03

 6/17

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nozzeno
6/16

U22310 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/26133

September 27, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator Levin Request

1RAA

Carl Levin gave me the attached material last Thursday when I was testifying on the Hill.

Please get back to me by Wednesday with a proposed draft response to him.

Thanks.

- Attach.
- 9/23/04 Levin List of Documents Not Yet Received from SecDef & USDP
 - 8/05/04 Levin Letter to SecDef re: Pre-war Intel docs
 - 6/30/04 Levin Letter to USDP re: **Iraq** docs
 - 9/22/04 Levin Document Requests Update

27 SEP 04

DHR:ss
092704-17

.....
Please respond by 9/29/04

5 AUG 0

From Carl Levin
to Sec. Rumsfeld

September 23, 2004

List of documents not yet received from Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary Feith in response to Senator Levin's requests

- 1) Six items requested of Secretary Rumsfeld on August 5, 2004, to which there has been no response.
- 2) "Reviews of or contributions to" documents produced by other agencies (promised on Feb. 26, then he said on June 14 that he had not agreed to do so, and would have required permission of other agencies).*
- 3) ✓ Two binders of documents being reviewed for executive privilege (promised on May 12).
- 4) ORCON documents (unspecified number) being reviewed by the CIA for release approval (promised on May 12).
- 5) Communications from Secretary Feith's Policy office (OUSDP) personnel to other agencies and offices related to the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda from September 2001 through April 2003*
- 6) Documents related to information from detainees, or from defectors provided by or assisted by the Iraqi National Congress (the latter promised on Feb. 26, then he said there were none on June 14).
- 7) SASC received documents contained in a Feith June 29 response to SSCI, which were responsive to a previous Levin request but which Feith said on June 14 could not be found. Therefore, it appears there are likely to be similar documents and communications from other staff that should be provided.

* Items 2-7 relate to requests to USD Feith, and are summarized in Senator Levin's June 30, 2004 letter to USD Feith. That letter clarified his request to include documents from other personnel and organizations within the OUSDP, in addition to the documents from the Office of Special Plans (OSP) and the Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG). On August 16, DOD provided to SASC the October 27 answers to the SSCI's QFRs from July 10 hearing, without any reference to the June 30 letter.

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United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

August 5, 2004

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:


I am writing to request additional documents related to my inquiry into pre-war intelligence on Iraq. Four of the documents I am requesting apparently have already been provided to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission). Where relevant, I am including the page number from the 9/11 Commission report, with the reference in brackets.

- 1) September 14, 2001, Memo from Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "War on Terrorism: Strategic Concept." [p.559]
- 2) September 17, 2001, Memo from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary of Defense, "Preventing More Events." [p.559]
- 3) September 18, 2001, Memo from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary of Defense, "Were We Asleep?" [p.559]
- 4) September 20, 2001, Memo from Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith to Secretary of Defense, "Briefing Draft." [p.560]
- 5) All documents related to the DOD document identified as "Suggested Additions for CIA's 20 August Draft on Iraqi Support for Terrorism," which was provided to the Committee on January 15, 2004. This includes, but is not limited to, any cover memo; e-mails and other written communications regarding the document or the draft CIA paper; the draft CIA paper; and CIA's response to the DOD document.
- 6) All documents and communications, including e-mails, related to your request to the Intelligence Community to declassify statements about the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, which you referred to in your press conference of September 26, 2002, and in your comments to the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce on September 27, 2002, including, but not limited to, the statements themselves.

11-L-0559/OSD/26136

11879-04

I would ask that you provide the documents in response to this request by August 20, 2004. *Thank* you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Carl Levin
Ranking Member

cc: Senator John Warner

JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN

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JUDITH A. ANSLEY, STAFF DIRECTOR
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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

June 30, 2004

The Honorable Douglas J. Feith
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
2000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-2000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing in further pursuit of my request of November 25, 2003 for documents from your office related to Iraq. With your most recent letter of June 14, it appears you believe you have provided all the documents that are relevant to my request, other than documents being reviewed to determine if they are protected by executive privilege, or awaiting CIA release approval. I am concerned that you may be defining my request in a manner that limits both its scope and your response. There are some documents that you should have provided long ago, and I request that you provide them without delay, as described below.

Based on the information we already have received, it seems unlikely that there are no documents related to the subject of my inquiry. For example, you have stated on a number of occasions that new information from detainees was important in helping your office to develop its perspective on the links between Iraq and al Qaeda. Given the importance you have attached to this new information, it seems unlikely that not even one single document or record was created related to the debriefings of such detainees, whether by personnel in the Office of Special Plans (OSP) or the Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) or by anyone else in the Policy office. If, upon further review, there are any such documents, please provide them.

Your letter of June 14 states that you "did not undertake" to provide "reviews of or contributions to" documents produced by other agencies. You had never previously denied your intent to provide the requested documents, and your explanation of the necessity to obtain release permission from other agencies is neither necessarily true, nor sufficient reason to withhold such documents. Clearly, you can provide your office's reviews of other agencies' documents, as you have already done in part with the briefings on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship. You should also be able to provide any contributions or suggestions given by your office to other agencies, whether or not they contributed to subsequent documents of those agencies.

11-L-0559/OSD/26138

You have already provided one document that your office initiated to provide such input to the Intelligence Community relative to a draft CIA report concerning Iraq's support for terrorism, an example in which it appears you did not need, seek, or obtain any release permission. Please provide all such contribution documents, records and communications.

Furthermore, I would point out that the three different versions of the briefings produced by your office and provided to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and the staffs of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Office of the Vice President (OVP), respectively, on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship were, in essence, reviews of intelligence documents. As you have acknowledged, your staff met with Intelligence Community analysts after you briefed the DCI in August, 2002 in order to present your views on the intelligence. It should be a straightforward matter to provide all additional documents and records, as well as communications, related to this meeting and these briefings, including information related to why and on what basis the changes were made to the three different versions of the briefing.

Your unilateral withholding of your complete October 27, 2003 responses to the SSCI's Questions for the Record is unacceptable. Your previous actions have demonstrated that there is no reason to withhold the information. For instance, you have already provided to SASC a portion of your October 27 responses, as well as your complete responses to Senator Rockefeller's Questions for the Record from the same hearing. Also, you have provided to the SSCI all the documents provided to SASC in response to my request, and did not deny them such material as being proprietary to SASC. Why the double standard? I would also note that the Intelligence Community is providing to SASC all the documents it is providing to SSCI in response to its inquiry. The fact that I am on the SSCI is not relevant. By withholding the information from SASC, it prevents the SASC staff from reviewing the material. Please provide all the remaining material from your October 27 responses.

As to the issue of the two binders of documents being reviewed for executive privilege, your letter of June 14 states that "I did not say in my May 12 letter that the President has claimed executive privilege with respect to any of the documents you have requested." I remind you that unless the President has claimed executive privilege, documents are not protected by such privilege. Please provide the status of this review (which appears to have been under way for two months), including how many documents are being reviewed, a brief description of each document being withheld for review, and when we can expect documents to be provided or privilege asserted.

With respect to the ORCON documents mentioned in your May 12 letter that are being reviewed by the CIA, how many documents have you sent for review, and will you provide them on a rolling basis if they are approved for release on a rolling basis, rather than waiting for all of them to be reviewed?

Finally, based on the documents you have provided, it is clear that there are relevant documents that were prepared by, and communications from, individuals within your Policy office but outside of the Office of Special Plans (OSP) and Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG), including the Policy Support office. I am concerned that by asking for documents, records, and communications from the OSP and PCTEG groups, SASC would be missing a substantial amount of important and relevant information that has a bearing on our inquiry. Accordingly, I would ask that you provide all documents and communications from all persons within your Policy organization from September 2001 through April 2003, related to the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda

Please provide the requested documents no later than July 15, 2004.

Sincerely,



Carl Levin
Ranking Member

cc: Senator John Warner

September 22, 2004

^{Cu}
SEN. LEVIN DOCUMENT REQUESTS ON INTEL INVESTIGATION

- There are **2 outstanding requests from Sen. Levin** seeking documents relating to pre-war intelligence on Iraq and Policy's Office of Special Plans:
 1. **An August 5 letter to you** with 6 separate requests for documents. We expect to answer this one shortly and to provide most of the documents requested, although there are probably fewer than Levin expects.
 - a. The first 4 requests seek memos from the Deputy and Doug Feith written to you in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Although there are deliberative process privilege claims that could be made, these documents were given to the 9/11 Commission and the plan is to produce them.
 - b. The remaining 2 requests are looking for documents relating to the project on Iraq-al Qaida links and any requests you sent to CIA to declassify documents. We have some responsive documents but are still searching for others.
 2. **A June 30 letter to Doug Feith** seeking very broad categories of documents from the entire Policy organization on pre-war Iraq policy and intel. The request is still under Policy and General Counsel review. Policy has already responded to Levin as follows:
 - Policy staff has spent over 1800 person-hours searching files, reviewing documents and answering Levin's questions and document demands.
 - A team of three career DoD officials reviewed thousands of pages for any documents related to his inquiry.
 - Feith's office sent five binders full of documents, plus several hundred more pages of documents at various times, showing what Special Plans and Policy Counter-Terrorism Evaluation Group did – all of it proper. (PCTEG)
- Levin's minority inquiry duplicates the SSCI's investigation of Special Plans and PCTEG.
 - Mr. Feith testified before the full SSCI (of which Levin is a member) and answered 51 written questions for the record – nearly all on the same subjects as Levin's minority inquiry. SSCI staff also interviewed 14 Policy staff members for more than 30 hours.

JOHN WARREN, VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN

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RICHARD D. DEBOES, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

2004 AUG -9 PM 1:43

August 5, 2004

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing to request additional documents related to my inquiry into pre-war intelligence on Iraq. Four of the documents I am requesting apparently have already been provided to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission). Where relevant, I am including the page number from the 9/11 Commission report, with the reference in brackets.


- 1) September 14, 2001, Memo from Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "War on Terrorism: Strategic Concept." [p.559]
- 2) September 17, 2001, Memo from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary of Defense, "Preventing More Events." [p.559]
- 3) September 18, 2001, Memo from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary of Defense, "Were We Asleep?" [p.559]
- 4) September 20, 2001, Memo from Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith to Secretary of Defense, "Briefing Draft." [p.560]
- 5) All documents related to the DOD document identified as "Suggested Additions for CIA's 20 August Draft on Iraqi Support for Terrorism," which was provided to the Committee on January 15, 2004. This includes, but is not limited to, any cover memo; e-mails and other written communications regarding the document or the draft CIA paper; the draft CIA paper; and CIA's response to the DOD document.
- 6) All documents and communications, including e-mails, related to your request to the Intelligence Community to declassify statements about the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, which you referred to in your press conference of September 26, 2002, and in your comments to the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce on September 27, 2002, including, but not limited to, the statements themselves.

11-L-0559/OSD/26142

OSD 11879-04

I would ask that you provide the documents in response to this request by August 20, 2004. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Carl Levin". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Carl" being larger and more prominent than the last name "Levin".

Carl Levin
Ranking Member

cc: Senator John Warner

11-L-0559/OSD/26143



POLICY

[REDACTED]
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ~~TOP SECRET~~ DOCUMENT AT TAB E
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

OCT 20 2004

The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-8050

Dear Senator Levin:

I have reviewed your two October 6, 2004 letters to the Secretary of Defense. *The shorter one, dealing with document requests, does not acknowledge the substantial efforts my office and I have made in response to your minority inquiry and the voluminous documents we have provided, as summarized in an attachment to Secretary Rumsfeld's October 1, 2004 letter to you and re-attached here (Tab A).*

You included in your shorter October 6 letter a list entitled "Outstanding Information Requested from DoD." The list contains some errors. It refers to "outstanding" requests for documents that, as explained in my June 14, 2004 letter to you and Tab E of Secretary Rumsfeld's October 1, 2004 letter to you, we have not found, despite diligent efforts. Tab E of the Secretary's October 1 letter is re-attached here (at Tab B). Your list refers also to documentation that you say we did not provide about an interview with an Iraqi defector. That interview was not classified and not an intelligence de-briefing; it was a meeting between an Iraq exile and a Policy staff member doing unclassified research. I explained that interview in my June 29, 2004 letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts, a copy of which I sent to the SASC together with the relevant documents. In other words, these requests are not "outstanding."

I have **also** reviewed your longer October 6, 2004 letter to Secretary Rumsfeld, which dealt with CIA comments on our "Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq-al-Qaida Contacts (1990-2003)." We prepared the Summary in response to a request from the SSCI for intelligence community documents to which I had alluded in testimony before the SSCI. We did not write it as a paper for use within the Administration. Nor did we write it as a comprehensive analysis of the subject of Iraq-al-Qaida connections.

In July 2003, I had briefed the SSCI that in 2002 some Policy staff members believed that certain intelligence reports were not reflected adequately or at all in finished intelligence analyses on the Iraq-al-Qaida relationship. The SSCI asked me, among other

[REDACTED]
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ~~TOP SECRET~~ DOCUMENT AT TAB E



11-L-0559/OSD/26144

questions for the record, to provide those reports. As I explained in my answer to the SSCI, I attached to my answer a list of the requested documents along with the Summary, which highlighted the main points in those documents on contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida. To reiterate: The Summary responded to the SSCI's request for the reports.

The Summary was not intended to press a particular conclusion on the SSCI, which in any case had access to all the views of the intelligence community and to underlying documents. By the time the Summary was created, the matter of the Iraq-al-Qaida relationship was an historical rather than a policy issue, given that the Saddam regime had fallen months earlier.

Your letter says that (1) I did not request CIA clearance on the Summary until after you asked that a copy of it be sent to the SASC, and (2) I did not reflect CIA's modifications in our January 2004 Addendum to the Summary. Neither of those points is correct, however.

I did request CIA approval in October 2003, before submitting the Summary to the SSCI. My staff provided the Summary to the CIA on October 24, 2003 and highlighted the urgency of a response. The CIA said that it would try to provide clearance by October 27, 2003. The Summary was part of the classified annex to our answers to questions for the record that the SSCI had issued on September 26 with a due date of October 3. We wished to be responsive and were already overdue. So, though I had not yet received formal word back from the CIA, I released the answers, with the Summary, to the SSCI on October 27. From that date until receiving the CIA's December 10, 2003 letter that you mentioned, my office received no CIA comments on the Summary.

The *Weekly Standard* published an article in November 2003 that purported to quote from the Summary. DoD issued the attached November 15, 2003 press statement (Tab C) that was coordinated with other agencies. I personally discussed the initial draft press statement with Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin, and after further discussion with others, the CIA cleared the press statement, which said that "the provision of the classified annex to the Intelligence Committee was cleared by other agencies and done with the permission of the Intelligence Community."

After the *Weekly Standard* article was published, the SASC, HASC and HPSCI all requested copies of what I had sent in October 2003 to the SSCI. Before honoring those requests, my office, for the second time, requested CIA permission because the initial permission related to providing the Summary to the SSCI only, rather than to the other committees. The CIA's December 10, 2003 letter responded to this second request and

referred to some required "additions, deletions and/or source document clarifications" that were detailed in the comments attached to the letter.

You say that DoD's January 15, 2004 transmittal letter, sending the Summary and Addendum to the SASC, was wrong in stating that the Addendum contained the CIA's proposed modifications to the Summary. You mention, as examples, items #8, #9, #10 and #33, but you do not explain what you mean.

I have reviewed these and the other items in the Addendum, and the CIA's December 10, 2003 comments. I do not see any misstatement in DoD's January 15, 2004 transmittal letter (attached at Tab D without attachments), which says that the Addendum "contain[s] the substance of the CIA's proposed changes." The Addendum refers to every change the CIA requested. The CIA did not ask us to include its commentary about the requested changes; rather, it asked us to make specific modifications, and we made them. None of the CIA's requested changes altered the substance of the Summary.

For example, in item #8 the CIA asked us to delete the phrase "from a well placed source;" the Addendum does so, and replaces the deleted phrase with "from the source described in the italicized paragraph above." The CIA made no comment on this italicized paragraph, except to ask that we not refer to Senior Executive Memoranda. In item #9 the CIA asked us to replace "from the same source" with "from the same foreign government service as #8" and to replace "field comment" with "foreign government service comment;" the Addendum does that. In item #10 we replaced "according to sensitive CIA HUMINT reporting (same source as #8)" with "according to the same foreign government service report as item #8," just as the CIA asked, and we included a reference to an additional source document that the CIA asked us to add.

With respect to item #33, we cited three sources, i.e., one raw intelligence report and two products produced after that raw report. The CIA did not ask us to make any specific changes to our text, but pointed out that the earlier raw report contradicted one of our comments, which was, however, supported by the later products that we cited. As the raw report had been cited to support the main proposition of item #33 and not to support the comment in question, we replaced the reference to the raw report with a reference to a later finished product supporting the main proposition, while retaining the references to the other two sources. It bears repeating: Those other two sources, which post-dated the raw report at issue, supported the challenged comment in our Summary. So it was reasonable to conclude that the raw report was ultimately judged by the Intelligence Community to be either untrue or no longer true regarding that comment. The CIA did not express any objection to the way in which we responded regarding item #33 (nor to our responses regarding any of the other items). If the CIA's judgments on


these matters have changed since we prepared our Addendum, that would have no bearing on the adequacy of our response to its December 10, 2003 comments.

By letter of January 15, 2004, we sent the CIA the Summary¹ and a memo entitled "Response to CIA Requested Modifications to 'Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq-al-Qaida contacts (1990-2003).'" That letter and memo (both attached at Tab E, without ORCON attachments) explained how we dealt with the CIA's requests and responded to questions the CIA had raised in its December 10, 2003 letter about source documents and citations. After sending that letter and memo we received from the CIA no further comments, questions, or requested changes. Had the CIA raised any further concerns, we would have worked with it to resolve them.

Your allegations have an accusatory tone. If you had called me or asked to meet and discuss these matters, we could have cleared up the misunderstandings that underlie your allegations. The matters at issue hinge on complex textual and historical analysis. A stream of confrontational correspondence is less productive than a civil dialogue would have been.

With best wishes, I remain

Yours truly,



Douglas J. Feith

Attachments: as stated

cc (with attachments): Senator John Warner
Senator Pat Roberts
Senator John D. Rockefeller IV
Representative Peter Hoekstra
Honorable Porter Goss

August 9, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meetings on Intel Legislation

W55009

In addition to Steve Cambone, we will want to have someone in the group who is a DoD military representative from either General Myers or General Pace.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080904-6

OSD 11996-04

9 AUG 04

7204

~~FOUO~~

July 26, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
Tina Jonas

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Costs for Iceland

I would appreciate getting **hard** facts on what it costs us to stay in Iceland. Please break it down for each category of activity we are doing there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072604-14

.....
Please respond by 8/13/04

Iceland

2650104

~~FOUO~~

QSD 12088-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26149



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 100

OFFICE OF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 AUG 12 AM 9: 35

INFO MEMO

August 11, 2004, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Iceland

- In response to your request regarding the annual costs to maintain U.S. forces in Iceland, the Department spends about \$239 million annually as shown below:

(Dollars in Millions)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Total</u>
Operation & Maintenance (O&M)			
Base Operations	101	3	104
Radars	-	19	19
Total O&M	101	22	123
Military Personnel	66	39	105
Family Housing Operations	11	-	11
Total	178	61	239

- The Department maintains 2,464 military and civilian personnel (642 Air Force and 1,822 Navy personnel) at the Naval Air Station Keflavik in Iceland, along with HH-60G search and rescue helicopters, a detachment of 4 deployed P-3s (rotating every 6 months), and an Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance operation.
- The Navy P-3s are a rotational detachment from a deployed squadron, split between U.S. Southern Command and U.S. European Command. The P-3 deployment cycle maintains a rotation base of three squadrons (one deployed, two in interdeployment training cycle).
- Under the Aerospace Expeditionary Force construct, the Air Force rotates four F-15s, one KC-135, and one HC-130 and crews to Iceland every 3 months.

OSD 12088-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26150

- o The mission of Naval Air Station Keflavik is to maintain and operate facilities, and provide services and materials to support aviation activities and Navy's operating forces. Iceland also provides the primary divert airfield for the North Atlantic.
- The Air Force uses the Navy's facilities and reimburses the Navy for the support provided. The Air Force operates the radars (\$19 million) for air control and defense. The radars feed the Icelandic air traffic control system.
- o For FY 2005 and later, the Air Force has not budgeted for Iceland because it wants to remove its forces. The Air Force will continue to support Iceland until they get approval to leave. The Air Force believes that it can provide for Icelandic defense through force projection.
- Ending the Air Force presence in Iceland would save \$22 million annually (base support and radar costs) and would relieve pressure on the low density/high demand search and rescue crews and aircraft.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: John M. Evans, (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

July 26, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
Tina Jonas

FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Costs for Iceland

I would appreciate getting hard facts on what it costs us to stay in Iceland. Please break it down for each category of activity we are doing there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072604-14

.....
Please respond by 8/13/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12088-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26152



~~FOUO~~

TAB

August 2, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

830

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Muslim Forces

099

John Abizaid talked about calling it a "bridge force" of Muslim countries and trying Morocco and Tunisia. **Where do we stand on that?**

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080204-4

.....
Please respond by 8/5/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12101-04

TAB

11-L-0559/OSD/26153

099

~~FOUO~~

TAB A

July 26, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Pace

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*,

SUBJECT: NATO Working Hours

Please let me know whether or not NATO really does have a 35-hour work week that is imposed on civilian and military alike, and whether or not we ought to find a way to waive it for a military organization during wartime or permanently.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072604-34

.....
Please respond by 8/6/04

04 JUL 27 2004

OSD 12103-04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

CH-1984-704 AUG 12 PM 12:16
12 August 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, ^{F&R} CJCS *VR/R 11 AUG 04*

SUBJECT: NATO Working Hours

- **Question.** "Please let me know whether or not NATO really does have a 35-hour work week that is imposed on civilian and military alike, and whether or not we ought to find a way to waive it for a military organization during wartime or permanently. Thanks." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** NATO has set 38 hours as the normal workweek for civilian and military alike. However, depending on requirements of the unit or staff section, both categories of personnel can work extra hours (and normally do). Additional information is attached (TAB B).
- There is no real advantage to waiving the official NATO working hours. Based on current NATO personnel rules (approved by the North Atlantic Council), military and civilian working hour rules apply in peacetime as well as wartime. Personnel work the hours necessary to complete their tasking.
- **Analysis.** US military personnel assigned to the US Delegation and US Mission to NATO, as well as Joint Staff officers who have served in NATO previously, indicate that NATO working hours is not an issue that impacts staff officer availability.
- Current NATO working hour policies provide the flexibility to support operations in both wartime and peacetime. However, civilian overtime pay costs rise during wartime or when circumstances demand extended working hours. Therefore, any change to the current policies will have negligible impact on the execution of NATO operations since provisions are in place for personnel to work as required to complete tasking.

COORDINATION: TAB c

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director J-5; (b)(6)

OSD 12103-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26155

6 August 2004

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: NATO Working Hours

1. Purpose. To provide information on NATO working hours.

2. Key Points

- NATO has set 38 hours as the normal workweek for civilian and military alike. However, depending on requirements of the unit or staff section, both categories of personnel can work extra hours (and normally do).
 - For military and category A and L (executive and officer level) civilians, there is no extra compensation for working over 38 hours per week. Category B and C civilian personnel (clerks, secretaries, etc) can be made to work overtime but are paid an additional 33 percent for nights and 50 percent for weekends.
 - In addition, regardless of national working hour laws, military and civilian personnel may not work less than the mandated 38 hours when assigned to a NATO position. For example, military or civilian staff from France, a nation with a mandated 35-hour workweek, must still work the full 38 hours. It is up to the member nation to provide any extra compensation for the three-hour delta. In contrast, US civil service employees working at NATO agencies must still work a statute minimum of 40 hours weekly.
 - The only NATO employees to whom the 38-hour workweek does not apply are Local Wage Grade contract employees such as mechanics, gardeners, and cleaners. In their case, the working hour statutes of the host nation apply. National delegations and liaison offices (which do not fall under NATO personnel rules) work the hours set out by their national authorities.
- There is no real advantage to waiving the official NATO working hours. Based on current NATO personnel rules (approved by the North Atlantic Council), military and civilian working hour rules apply in peacetime as well as wartime. Personnel will work the hours necessary to complete their tasking.
 - The only difference is the extra expense of paying overtime for B and C grade civilians. If this additional expense becomes excessive, a

Tab B

suspension of overtime pay can be enacted, if necessary, by either suspending the benefits for the duration of a conflict or through a change to the normal working hours. This requires NAC approval.

- Current NATO working hour policies provide the flexibility to support operations in both wartime and peacetime. However, civilian overtime pay costs rise during wartime or when circumstances demand extended working hours. Therefore, any change to the current policies will have negligible impact on the execution of NATO operations since provisions are in place for personnel to work as required to complete tasking.

Prepared by: Walter L. Sharp, LTG, USA
Director, J-5, (b)(6)

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

Col <i>cox</i>	US Mil Del (NATO)	3 August 2004
Col Karns	USNMR SHAPE	3 August 2004

Tab C

11-L-0559/OSD/26158

Advance copy

August 16, 2004
2004 AUG 16 10 51 20

TO: Steve Cambone
Mira Ricardel
Lt. Gen. Ron Kadish

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Huntsville Trip and Missile Defense

I feel a little out of touch with missile defense. Since I am going to speak in Huntsville on Wednesday, I would appreciate it if someone would prepare some questions and appropriate responses for me, so I can refresh myself.

If it looks like it could be a problem and my head is elsewhere on intelligence reform and the like, I may have Ron Kadish (if he is going to be there) join me in responding to questions.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
081604-J1

.....
Please respond by 8/17/04

333 SD

16 Aug 04

**PROPOSED Q&A's FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD
7th Annual Space and Missile Defense Conference
Huntsville, AL
August 18, 2004**

Q1. What is the current budget for missile defense? Will the trend continue?

A1: The Fiscal Year 2005 missile defense budget is \$10.2B, an increase from the Fiscal Year 2004 missile defense budget of \$9.0B. The President is committed to the defense of this nation and its allies, and the development, deployment, and sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System is a big part of that commitment.

Q2. How are the rules of engagement being developed for the missile defense system? Has all of the necessary training been accomplished?

The U.S. Strategic Command has overall responsibility for operation of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. The Combatant Commands are responsible for planning, management, and day-to-day operation of the fielded elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. In the case of launching ground-based interceptors from Fort Greely, Alaska, that responsibility lies with Commander, Northern Command.

The Ballistic Missile Defense System will be manned by highly trained military personnel. A number of missile defense system operators completed the advanced training and certification in order to meet the strict standards required to operate and maintain the missile defense equipment. Additional operators are currently going through the training regime. This training is a cooperative effort among the Missile Defense Agency, Combatant Commanders, and the military services.

Q3. There has been lots of criticism of deploying a missile defense system without adequate testing. What is the basis for your confidence in deploying a missile defense system?

The full range of missile defense testing—from our extensive modeling and simulation and hardware-in-the-loop tests to our ground and flight testing—makes us confident that what we deploy will **work** as intended. We do not rely on intercept flight tests alone to make final assessments concerning system reliability and performance. Our flight tests are important building blocks in this process, but the significant costs of these tests combined with the practical reality that we can only conduct a few tests over any given period of time **mean** we have to rely on other kinds of tests to prove the system. System capabilities assessed for deployment will be based on test events planned for Fiscal Year 2004 as well as data collected from flight- and ground tests and simulations over the past several years.

We conduct other **kinds** of tests that provide valuable **information** about the progress we are making and the reliability of the system. Integrated ground tests, for example, are not subject to flight test restrictions and can run numerous engagement scenarios over the course of a few weeks. Our modeling and simulation activity is **an** even more powerful system verification tool. It is important to understand that in the Missile Defense **Program** we use models and simulations, **and** not flight tests, as the **primary** verification tools. This approach **is** widely used **within the Department**, especially when complex weapon systems are involved.

We will continue both ground and flight tests after our initial capability is put on alert. We still have a test bed for continuing development even though we take advantage of the test bed to provide limited defensive capability (where we have had none.)

Q4. With deployment occurring shortly, how are the fielding activities progressing? Will we be ready?

As I stated in my speech, on July 22, 2004, we emplaced the first interceptor at Fort Greely, Alaska. **Up** to five more interceptors will be emplaced at Fort Greely by the end of 2004, with up to 18 interceptors emplaced by the end of 2005 including those at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.

Preparations for communications support at Eareckson Air Station in Shemya, Alaska are on track. Over 112,000 miles of fiber optic cables connecting major communication nodes are in place, along with nine satellite communications links. We are in the process of upgrading the Early Warning Radar at Beale Air Force Base and are well underway building the sea-based X-band radar. Our brigade at Schriever Air Force Base and battalion fire control nodes at Fort Greely are connected to the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center in Colorado. The command control between combatant commanders, so essential to providing situational awareness, is progressing well and is on schedule. Upgrades to the Cobra Dane Radar are on schedule. The Chief of Naval Operations has identified the first group of Aegis ships to be upgraded with a ballistic missile defense capability, and the work to install the equipment on the first ship is underway.

Q5. You said in your speech that you're deploying a limited operational capability, what does that mean?

Fielding activities are progressing well. Construction of the silos and buildings at Fort Greely, Alaska required for the initial operational capability are complete. The first Ground-based Interceptor was installed in its silo at Fort Greely, Alaska on 22 July 2004. Assembly, shipment, and emplacement of the remaining Ground-based Interceptors are progressing according to schedule and will be available in October 2004.

We will field a system that provides some capability that we do not have today with the knowledge that we will continue to improve that system over time. Our strategy is to build on this beginning to make the BMD system increasingly more effective and reliable against current threats and hedge against changing future threats.



ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

301 O DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

ACTION MEMO

August 16, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: MICHAEL W. WYNNE, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)

AUG 18 2004

SUBJECT: Contingency Funded MILCON Projects for Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC), Site-R

- The purpose of this action memorandum is to obtain SecDef signature on letters of notification to Congress approving the two MILCON projects at RRMC/Site-R (TAB A).
WHS requests approval to proceed with two MILCON projects at Site-R using contingency funds (TAB B). The projects, a Fire Station and Upgrade to the Helipad, cost \$5,357,000.
The two projects are vital to the success of Site-R's mission and must be completed by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005.
10 USC 2804 gives SecDef authority to carry out MILCON projects not authorized by law if deferral of the project to the next Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security or national interests (TAB C). Section 2804 also requires a 21-day congressional notification and wait.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef approve projects by initialing below and sign letters to Congress at TAB A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: USD(C), OGC, and ASD(LA) (TAB D).

Attachments: As Stated

Table with 2 columns and 4 rows: TSA SD, SRMA SD, MA SD, EXEC SEC. Includes handwritten initials and dates.

Prepared by: Lt Col Steve Bradshaw, IRM, (b)(6) Aug 4, 2004 2004-2455-47c



Handwritten initials and date 8/19

Handwritten number 600.1

Handwritten number 16 AUG 04



PENTAGON RENOVATION &
CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM OFFICE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
100 BOUNDARY CHANNEL DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-3712



JUL 23 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS/
INSTALLATIONS & ENVIRONMENT

Harold G. Parker 7/28/04
THRU DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES

SUBJECT: Contingency Funded MILCON Projects for Raven Rock Mountain Complex,
Site-R

- References: (a) Memorandum (S/N), Joint Staff, DJSM-0240-04, 09 March 2004,
Subject: Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC) Site-R Master Plan
(U).
(b) Memorandum (S/N), ASD-HD, 6 Apr 2004, Subject: Raven Rock
Mountain Complex Site-R Master Plan (U).

Reference RRMC/Site-R Master Plan approved by you. As discussed during your recent visit to Site-R, this plan contained two Near Term projects for the construction of an External Fire Station and Repair and Upgrade of the Existing Helipad.

This memorandum provides the packages detailing justification for pursuing funds and authorization of these projects under 10 USC 2804, which provides the SecDef authority to carry out MilCon projects not authorized by law if deferral of the project to the next Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security or national interests. I believe these projects meet that criteria.


Since these requirements are urgent in nature, request you identify whether contingency funding of \$5,357,000.00 is available under the authorization allowed in Section 2804 of Title 10, U.S.C. I believe that deferral of these projects into the next authorization cycle would be inconsistent with national security and national interests in ensuring that RRMC Site-R is COOP ready and capable.

I have attached the DD Forms 1390 and 1391 at Tab B, and request they be forwarded with your endorsement to the SecDef for approval. We will be ready to award

11-L-0559/OSD/26164

AM 01690-04

these projects by 30 August 2004.


Michael R. Sullivan
Director

Attachment:
As stated

1. COMPONENT Defense (WHS)							FY 2004 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM			2. DATE June 2004	
3. INSTALLATION AND LOCATION Raven Rock Mountain Complex					4. COMMAND Washington Headquarters Service			5. AREA CONSTRUCTION COST INDEX 0.89			
6. PERSONNEL	(1) PERMANENT			(2) STUDENTS			(3) SUPPORTED			(4) TOTAL	
	OFFICER	ENLISTED	CIVILIAN	OFFICER	ENLISTED	CIVILIAN	OFFICER	ENLISTED	CIVILIAN		
a. AS OF											
b. END FY											
7. INVENTORY DATA (\$000)											
a. TOTAL ACREAGE											
b. INVENTORY TOTAL AS OF											
c. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY											
d. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM										\$2.17'	
e. AUTHORIZATION INCLUDED IN FOLLOWING PROGRAM											
f. PLANNED IN NEXT THREE PROGRAM YEARS											
g. REMAINING DEFICIENCY											
h. GRAND TOTAL										\$2.17'	
a. CATEGORY						b. COST (\$000)		DESIGN START		STATUS COMPLETE	
(1) CODE	(2) PROJECT TITLE		(3) SCOPE								
	Helipad Upgrade					\$2,171		31 August 2004		31 May 2005	
								Anticipated 3 Months for Design		Anticipated 6 Months for Construction	
N/A											
10. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS											
The RRMC, Site-R helipad must be able to support the CJCS OPORD 3-03 Joint Chiefs Emergency Evacuation Plans (JEEPs), it currently does not. This Design/Build construction project provides the necessary upgrades and supporting helicopter parking area to meet the JEEPs requirements as well as providing upgrade to meet the frangibility requirements of UFC3-360-01.											
11. OUTSTANDING POLLUTION AND SAFETY DEFICIENCIES											
										(\$000)	
A. Air Pollution										\$0	
B. Water Pollution										\$0	
C. Occupational Safety and Health										\$0	

1. COMPONENT	FY 2004 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION		2. DATE	REPORT CONTROL SYMBOL
3. INSTALLATION AND LOCATION Raven Rock Mountain Complex		4. PROJECT TITLE RRMC - Near Term Project - Heliport Upgrade		
5. PROGRAM ELEMENT	6. CATEGORY CODE	7. PROJECT NUMBER 3.02	8. PROJECT COST (\$000) \$2,171	

IMPACT IF NOT PROVIDED: The RRMC helipad would be unable to fully support the Joint Chiefs emergency evacuation plans (JEEPs)
 ADDITIONAL: N/A


12. Supplemental Data:

Schedule Milestones:

Contract Award..... 30 August 2004
 Design Start..... 31 August 2004
 Design Complete..... 30 December 2004
 Construction Start..... 31 October 2004
 Construction Complete..... 31 May 2005

Anticipated Schedule Duration..... 9 Months

13. Signatures:

 Date 7/28/2004

Michael R. Sullivan, Director, Pentagon Renovation and Construction Program Office

1. COMPONENT Defense (WHS)		FY 2004 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECT DATA		2. DATE 2004106124	REPORT CONTROL SYMBOL DD-A&T(A)1610																																																																		
3. INSTALLATION AND LOCATION Raven Rock Mountain Complex			4. PROJECT TITLE RRMC - Near Term Project - Heliport Upgrade																																																																				
5. PROGRAM ELEMENT		6. CATEGORY CODE	7. PROJECT NUMBER 3.02	8. PROJECT COST (\$000) \$2,171																																																																			
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10. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION

Provide improvements to the existing RRMC helipad that will allow it to continue supporting the Joint Chiefs emergency evacuation plans (JEEPs).

- The existing pad footprint will remain. The pad concrete will be replaced, repaired, cracks will be filled and the pad will be sealed. The pad will be required to meet the weight requirements for JEEPs.
- The existing asphalt apron will be replaced with concrete.
- The lighting for the heliport will be upgraded to meet the requirements of TM 5-811-5.
- A new AC power panel will be installed to provide power for the lighting and misc. equipment
- The existing RRMC helipad will be re-striped to meet the requirements of TM 5-823-4.
- The existing Air Traffic Control Observation building will be removed to allow for the construction of aircraft parking area to meet the JEEPs requirement.
- A new 33.5m² X 45.7 m² (110' X 150') concrete parking area will be installed to allow for aircraft parking.
- The existing security fencing around the existing helipad will be replaced to meet current frangibility guidelines of UFC 3-260-01
- A new asphalt entrance will be provided from the existing access road.
- A tie in to the new fire water line and fire hydrants will be installed at the site. This will allow firefighters to fight fires at the Helipad - this capability currently does not exist.

1. COMPONENT Defense (WHS)							FY 2004 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM			2. DATE June2004	
3. INSTALLATION AND LOCATION Raven Rock Mountain Complex					4. COMMAND Washington Headquarters Service			5. AREA CONSTRUCTION COST INDEX 0.89			
6. PERSONNEL		(1) PERMANENT			(2) STUDENTS			(3) SUPPORTED			(4) TOTAL
		OFFICER	ENLISTED	CIVILIAN	OFFICER	ENLISTED	CIVILIAN	OFFICER	ENLISTED	CIVILIAN	
a. AS OF											
b. ENDFY											
c. AUTHORIZATION NOT YET IN INVENTORY											
d. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED IN THIS PROGRAM											\$3,186
e. AUTHORIZATION INCLUDED IN FOLLOWING PROGRAM											
f. PLANNED IN NEXT THREE PROGRAM YEARS											
a. REMAINING DEFICIENCY											
h. GRANDTOTAL											\$3,186
a. CATEGORY					b. COST (\$000)		DESIGN START		STATUS COMPLETE		
(1) CODE	(2) PROJECT TITLE	(3) SCOPE									
	Fire Station / HazMat Response Bldg				\$3,186		31 August 2004		31 July 2005		
							Anticipated 4 Months for Design		Anticipated 7 Months for Construction		
N/A											
10. MISSION OR MAJOR FUNCTIONS											
Using the Design/Build methodology construct a Fire Station at Raven Rock Mountain complex external to the facility proper. Include a HazMat Auxiliary Building, an area for Air Traffic Control, and Presidential Weather office. Currently the Facility fire fighting and HazMat response/recovery mission are not being met. Life/Safety violations exist with Fire fighting vehicles housed within the facility and the Presidential Weather Office is inside the complex.											
11. OUTSTANDING POLLUTION AND SAFETY DEFICIENCIES											
					(\$000)						
A. Air Pollution					\$0						
B. Water Pollution					\$0						
C. Occupational Safety and Health					\$0						

1. COMPONENT Defense (WHS)	FY 2004 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTDATA		2. DATE 2004106124	REPORT CONTROL SYMBOL DD-A&T(A)1610																																																																																										
3. INSTALLATION AND LOCATION Raven Rock Mountain Complex		4. PROJECT TITLE Near Term Project (Fire Station/ Aux HazMat Response)																																																																																												
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
10. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION

New Fire Station of approximately 790m² (8,500sf.) which will include:

- A single story Truck Bay capable of accommodating 4 Fire trucks w/trailers, able to maintain a temperature no lower than 4.5 degrees C. (40 degrees F.) – 279m² (3000 SF)
- A two story office with billeting, both floors equal approximately 511m² (5,500 SF)
 - Office for Firefighter Administration and Watch Room.
 - Kitchen/Lounge that would support the (5) Billeted Firefighters.
 - Billeting for (2) helicopter pilots.
 - Small Lounge/Kitchenette for Pilots.
 - Men and Women Lavatories
 - Laundry Room
 - Storage Rooms
 - Physical Training Room (PT)
 - Necessary Communications and Equipment Rooms to support, Fire Fighters, Air Control/Observation and Presidential Weather.
 - Air Traffic Control Observation requires a glassed area of approx. 21m² (225 SF) to replace the current Helicopter Control/Observation Bldg.
 - Presidential Weather requires office and map rooms of approx. 93m² (1000 SF).

Ancillary Fire Station Building which will include:

- Approximately 186m²(2,000 square feet)
 - Capability of housing the Hazmat Response Trailer
 - Capability of housing the Special Rescue Trailer
 - Humidity Control – Minimal HVAC
 - Communications (Telephone)
 - Electrical Power

1. COMPONENT Defense (WHS)	FY 2004 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECT DATA (Continuation)	2. DATE 2004/06/24	REPORT CONTROL SYMBOL DD-A&T(A)1610
3. INSTALLATION AND LOCATION Raven Rock Mountain Complex		4. PROJECT TITLE Near Term Project (Fire Station/ Aux HazMat Response)	
5. PROGRAM ELEMENT	6. CATEGORY CODE	7. PROJECT NUMBER 3.01	8. PROJECT COST (\$000) \$3,186
11. REQUIREMENT: ADEQUATE:		SUBSTANDARD:	
<p> PROJECT: Design and construct a new Fire Station of approximately 790m² (8,500 SF) and a 186m² (2,000 SF) Ancillary HazMat Response Bldg. Included in the scope will be a single story Truck Bay capable of accommodating 4 Fire trucks w/trailers, able to maintain a temperature no lower than 4.5 degrees C, (40 degrees F), billeting for up to 5 Fire Fighters and two helicopter pilots, Air Traffic Control area, requiring a glassed area of approx. 21m² (225 SF) to replace the current Helicopter Observation Bldg. and a Presidential Weather office and map rooms of approx. 93m² (1000 SF). </p> <p> REQUIREMENT: The work required is to support the Facility's mission and to mitigate facility vulnerabilities as identified by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. </p> <p> CURRENT SITUATION: There is no existing Fire Station. All fire fighting equipment is placed in the roadways within the facility creating life/safety issues. The existing Presidential Weather facility is inside the Complex and does not meet current mission requirements. The existing air traffic control center does not meet mission parameters and violates the Guidelines for Airfield Frangibility Zones. </p> <p> IMPACT IF NOT PROVIDED: If this requirement is not authorized the facility vulnerabilities as identified by DTRA will continue and the life/safety issues will continue. </p> <p> ADDITIONAL: N/A </p>			
12. Supplemental Data: Schedule Milestones: TBD Contract Award..... 30 August 2004 Design Start..... 31 August 2004 Design Complete..... 31 December 2004 Construction Start..... 30 November 2004 Construction Complete..... 31 July 2005 Anticipated Schedule Duration..... 11 Months			
13. Signatures:  Date <u>7/27/2004</u> Michael R. Sullivan, Director Pentagon Renovation and Construction Program Office			

10 U.S.C.A. § 2804



United States Code Annotated Currentness

Title 10. Armed Forces (Refs & Annos)

Subtitle A. General Military Law (Refs & Annos)

Part IV. Service, Supply, and Procurement (Refs & Annos)

Chapter 169. Military Construction and Military Family Housing

Subchapter I. Military Construction

→ § 2804. Contingency construction

(a) Within the amount appropriated for such purpose, the Secretary of Defense may carry out a military construction project not otherwise authorized by law, or may authorize the Secretary of a military department to carry out such a project, if the Secretary of Defense determines that deferral of the project for inclusion in the next Military Construction Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security or national interest.

(b) When a decision is made to carry out a military construction project under this section, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report in writing to the appropriate committees of Congress on that decision. Each such report shall include (1) the justification for the project and the current estimate of the cost of the project, and (2) the justification for carrying out the project under this section. The project may then be carried out only after the end of the 21-day period beginning on the date the notification is received by such committees or, if earlier, the end of the 14-day period beginning on the date on which a copy of the notification is provided in an electronic medium pursuant to section 480 of this title.

CREDIT(S)

(Added Pub.L. 97-214, § 2(a), July 12, 1982, 96 Stat. 155, and amended Pub.L. 102-190, Div. B, Title XXVIII, § 2870(3), Dec. 5, 1991, 105 Stat. 1563; Pub.L. 108-136, Div. A, Title X, § 1031(a)(35), Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1600.)

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

Revision Notes and Legislative Reports

1982 Acts. House Report No. 97-612, see 1982 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 441.

1991 Acts. House Report No. 102-60, House Conference Report No. 102-311, and Statement by President, see 1991 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 918.

2003 Acts. House Conference Report No. 108-354 and Statement by President, see 2003 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1407.

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10 U.S.C.A. § 2804

Amendments

2003 Amendments. Subsec. (b). Pub.L. 108-136, § 1031(a)(35), inserted "or, if earlier, the end of the 14-day period beginning on the date on which a copy of the notification is provided in an electronic medium pursuant to section 480 of this title" before the period at the end.

1991 Amendments. Subsec. (b). Pub.L. 102-190 struck out provision permitting project to be carried out upon committee approval prior to end of 21-day period.

Effective and Applicability Provisions

1982 Acts. Section effective Oct. 1, 1982, and applicable to military construction projects, and to construction and acquisition of military family housing before, on or after such date, see § 12(a) of Pub.L. 97-214, set out as a note under § 2801 of this title.

American Digest System

Armed Services ☞ 28.

United States ☞ 79 to 91.5.

10 U.S.C.A. § 2804, 10 USCA § 2804

Current through P.L. 108-198 (Encl) approved 12-19-03

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END OF DOCUMENT

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~~FOUO~~ Cent XTRA
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MI P-XTRA
JOL
8/19
8/19

August 19, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Site-R Proposal

DR

Please look at the attached recommendation from Mike Wynne to spend \$5 million for Site-R. I can't believe it is necessary, what do you think?

You handle it anyway you want, but it worries me.

Thanks.

Attach,
8/16/04 Wynne Action Memo to SecDef re: MILCON projects. OSD 12249-04

DHR:ss
081904-2

.....
Please respond by 9/3/04 ↓

Talked w/ VAdm Stawicki.

This package was returned to Ray DeBris for his personal review to answer the Secretary's question - with input from Paul McHale who determines the capability need at Site R.

Patterson 8/19

~~FOUO~~

Handwritten initials/signature

August 19, 2004

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DHR:ss
081904-2

.....
Please respond by 9/3/04

COORDINATION

**SUBJECT: Contingency Funded MILCON Projects for
Raven Rock Mountain Complex, Site - R**

		DATE
ASD(LA)	<u>Mr. Dan Stanley</u>	<u>Aug 6, 2004</u>
OGC	<u>Mr. Daniel J. Dell-Orto, as revised</u>	<u>Aug 11, 2004</u>
USD(C)	<u>Ms. Tina W. Jonas</u>	<u>Aug 12, 2004</u>



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20510-6028

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Section 2804 of title 20, U.S.C., I am notifying you of the Department's intent to use \$5,357,000.00 of Military Construction, Defense-wide funds (contingency construction account) to support an urgent requirement at Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC)/Site-R. Two construction projects, a Fire Station with HazMat response/recovery capability and the repaid upgrade of the Helipad will be performed at the facility.

These projects are vital to the success of RRMC's mission and the Joint Chiefs Emergency Evacuation Plans. The projects must be completed by the fourth quarter FY 2005. Additional information regarding these projects is enclosed.

I have determined that deferring these projects for inclusion in the next Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security.

Additional details can be provided upon request.

Similar letters were sent to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Appropriations Committee and the Chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committees.

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Member



11-L-0559/OSD/26178



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1011 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6015

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Section 2804 of title 10, U.S.C., I am notifying you of the Department's intent to use \$5,357,000.00 of Military Construction, Defense-wide funds (contingency construction account) to support an urgent requirement at Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC)/Site-R. Two construction projects, a Fire Station with HazMat response/recovery capability and the repair/upgrade of the Helipad, will be performed at the facility.

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Similar letters were sent to the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee and the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: The Honorable David R. Obey
Ranking Member



11-L-0559/OSD/26179



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Section 2804 of title 10, U.S.C., I am notifying you of the Department's intent to use \$5,357,000.00 of Military Construction, Defense-wide funds (contingency construction account) to support an urgent requirement at Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC)/Site-R. Two construction projects, a Fire Station with HazMat response/recovery capability and the repaired upgrade of the Helipad, will be performed at the facility.

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Additional details can be provided upon request.

Similar letters were sent to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Member



11-L-0559/OSD/26180



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 205 15-6035

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Section 2804 of title 10, U.S.C., I am notifying you of the Department's intent to use \$5,357,000.00 of Military Construction, Defense-wide funds (contingency construction account) to support an urgent requirement at Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC)/Site-R. Two construction projects, a Fire Station with HazMat response/recovery capability and the repaired upgrade of the Helipad, will be performed at the facility.

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Additional details can be provided upon request.

Similar letters were sent to the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: The Honorable Robert Byrd
Ranking Member



11-L-0559/OSD/26181

~~FOUO~~ Cent. XTRA
M P-X 1 reg
502
8/19

August 19, 2004

6001

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Site-R Proposal

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DHR:ss
OS1904-2

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Please respond by 9/3/04 ↓

Talked w/ VAdm Stavridis.

This package was returned to Ray DuBois for his personal review to answer the Secretary's question - with input from Paul McHale who determines the capability need at Site R.

Patterson 8/19

19 Aug 04

16 Aug 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26182

Dist. 21 August 2004



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SEP 7 2004

600.1

The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 205 10-6028

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Section 2804 of title 10, U.S.C., I am notifying you of the Department's intent to use \$5,357,000.00 of Military Construction, Defense-wide funds (contingency construction account) to support an urgent requirement at Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC)/Site-R. Two construction projects, a Fire Station with HazMat response/recovery capability and the repaidupgrade of the Helipad, will be performed at the facility.

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Sincerely,

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Member

7 SEP 04

16 AUG 04

OSD 12249-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26183



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SEP 7 2004

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6015

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Section 2804 of title 10, U.S.C., I am notifying you of the Department's intent to use \$5,357,000.00 of Military Construction, Defense-wide funds (contingency construction account) to support an urgent requirement at Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC)/Site-R. Two construction projects, a Fire Station with HazMat response/recovery capability and the repaired upgrade of the Helipad, will be performed at the facility.

These projects are vital to the success of RRMC's mission and the Joint Chiefs Emergency Evacuation Plans. The projects must be completed by the fourth quarter FY 2005. Additional information regarding these projects is enclosed.

I have determined that deferring these projects for inclusion in the next Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security.

Additional details can be provided upon request.

Similar letters were sent to the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee and the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Paul W. Ryan".

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: The Honorable David R. Obey
Ranking Member

OSD 12249-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26184



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SEP 7 2004

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20515-6035

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Section 2804 of title 10, U.S.C., I am notifying you of the Department's intent to use \$5,357,000.00 of Military Construction, Defense-wide funds (contingency construction account) to support an urgent requirement at Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC)/Site-R. Two construction projects, a Fire Station with HazMat response/recovery capability and the repair/upgrade of the Helipad, will be performed at the facility.

These projects are vital to the success of RRMC's mission and the Joint Chiefs Emergency Evacuation Plans. The projects must be completed by the fourth quarter FY 2005. Additional information regarding these projects is enclosed.

I have determined that deferring these projects for inclusion in the next Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security.

Additional details can be provided upon request.

Similar letters were sent to the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Paul W. J. Smith", is located below the "Sincerely," text.

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: The Honorable Robert Byrd
Ranking Member

OSD 12249-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26185



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SEP 7 2004

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 205 10-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Section 2804 of title 10, U.S.C., I am notifying you of the Department's intent to use \$5,357,000.00 of Military Construction, Defense-wide funds (contingency construction account) to support an urgent requirement at Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC)/Site-R. Two construction projects, a Fire Station with HazMat response/recovery capability and the repair/upgrade of the Helipad, will be performed at the facility.

These projects are vital to the success of RRMC's mission and the Joint Chiefs Emergency Evacuation Plans. The projects must be completed by the fourth quarter FY 2005. Additional information regarding these projects is enclosed.

I have determined that deferring these projects for inclusion in the next Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security.

Additional details can be provided upon request.

Similar letters were sent to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Paul Wolfowitz".

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Member

OSD 12249-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26186



~~FOUO~~
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 203014000

SECRET

7/21/04, 11:00 AM

FORCE TRANSFORMATION
OFFICE
3A287

INFO MEMO

August 17, 2004, 9:00 AM

OSD 11020-04

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: A. K. Cebrowski, Director, Force Transformation

Handwritten signature of A. K. Cebrowski in black ink.

SUBJECT: Military Detailees

- The Office of Force Transformation currently does not have any military detailees assigned.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: T. J. Pudas, (b)(6)~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26187

OSD 12260-04

~~FOUO~~

FT
Rec'd 8/4/04

August 3, 2004

TO: Senior OSD Staff
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Detailees

Please review the number of military detailees you have in your office. Determine if the number has crept up over the years, and if there might be some way you can reduce the number. Please report back.

Thanks.

Attach.
7/21/04 Dir, Admin & Mngmnt memo to SecDef re: OSD Military Detailees [OSD 11020-04]

DHR:dh
080304-4

.....
Please respond by 8/27/04

OSD 11020-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26188



ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

08 8/3

INFO MEMO

JUL 21 2004

Paul Butler
7/27

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

Ray DuBois 7/21/04

SUBJECT: Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Military Detailees

- At a senior staff meeting, you raised a concern regarding the number of military detailees to the OSD staff. You asked all of your Principal Staff Assistants to review detailees working for them and revalidate their assignments or return them to their parent units. Currently, there are 55 military detailees assigned as outlined on the attached.
- The assigned detailees are concentrated primarily in OUSD(AT&L) (15), OUSD(P) (16), OUSD(P&R) (11) and OUSD(I) (4). The OUSD(C) currently does not have any military detailees assigned. Additionally, the OGC has 7 military detailees and both ASD(NII) and WHS have 1 assigned. The assigned numbers are in rough proportion to the size of the components' permanently assigned staff.
- Military detailees are typically detailed to the OSD staff for one year or less and remain permanently assigned to their parent organization's roles. Temporary details are authorized to support unforeseen temporary requirements, workload surges, or as a short term measure where the knowledge and skills are not otherwise available from within the organization. Many are detailed to provide temporary, but specific, military expertise required for the Global War on Terrorism and some are detailed for an educational/training experience. Additionally, roughly 10 percent of existing detailees are performing a liaison function between OSD and their parent unit.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

Handwritten signature/initials

TSA SD	7/26
SRMA SD	
MA SD	7/27
EXEC SEC	7/23

cc:
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense

Prepared By: Carol L. Walker, (b)(6)

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 8/17/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: **INCOMING** ATTACHMENT:
OSD CONTROL **OSD 12260-04** DOC **8/17/2004** DOR **8/17/2004** SIGNATURE CASE:
FROM **FTD CEBROWSKI** TO **SECDEF**
SUBJECT **MILITARY DETAILEES**
KEYWORDS
COMMENTS

FN
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS **OSD 11020-04** SEC U OCN
STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:
AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:
SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION
PAGES **1** ENCLOSURES **1** PACKAGE VIEW:
SUSPENSE STATUS **INCOMING**

CREATED BY: **gordon**

DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE COPIES
ADC RWI
DSD RWI
ES OWI

11-L-0559/OSD/26190

August 13, 2004

China

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Chinese Proverbs

John—

You seemed interested in one of the Chinese proverbs I used the other day. Here are some more I picked up on various trips to China.

Thanks.

Attach.
Chinese Proverbs

DHR:dh
081304-5 (ts computer).doc



Please respond by _____

13 AUG 04

OSD 12289-04

Chinese Quotations (Proverbs)

(Collected by Don Rumsfeld during a 1994 visit to the PRC)

"The dragonfly that barely touches the water."

"Sometimes it is necessary to kill a chicken to frighten the monkeys."

"The wind through the tower presages the coming of the storm."

"Watching the flowers on the galloping horse."

"Rain will fall, and widows will remarry."

(Mao Tse-tung's comment on receiving the report that his Defense Minister's, Lin Pio, airplane had crashed.)

"When the water recedes, the stone emerges."

(An old proverb used most recently to suggest that Quiao Shi, Chairman, Standing Committee, National People's Congress, whose name means "stone," will ultimately succeed Deng Xiaoping, but only after one or two others serve briefly.)

July 27, 1995

server(G:)/mso/winword/files/frequentlyuseddocs/chinesesayings.doc

August 15, 2004

TO: Gen. Jim Jones

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Review of NATO Air Defense Requirements

What is the timetable on having NATO review its air defense requirements?

Dick—my impression is that NATO countries are probably wasting money with their current air defense arrangements. What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081504-8(ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 8/27/04

NATO 384

15Aug04

August 19, 2004

TO: Andy Card
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Family Day, September 27, 2004

Regarding my last correspondence on Family Day, I misinformed you. Their goal is to get the proclamation now, so they can publicize the event all across the country.

006

Could you see if you could do that? I've attached the note from Joe Califano.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
081904-1

.....
Please *respond* by _____

19 Aug 04

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

Date: August 12, 2004

To: The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense

Fax: (b)(6)

From: Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Direct Phone: (b)(6)

Direct Fax: (b)(6)


#of Pages (Including this cover): 2

Dear Don,

Many thanks, but The White House missed the point (see attached memo). We know President Bush will issue another Proclamation declaring Family Day on September 27, 2004. We want the Proclamation now so that we can get the President credit for it and publicize the event all over the country. Could you, or someone in your office, make that point to Andy Card?

I know you have more important things to do. Many thanks.

Sincerely,



Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

(b)(6) Account code: 150_

The information contained in this telecopy message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity named above and may contain information that is privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under any applicable law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, please immediately notify us by telephone and return the original message to us at the above address via the US Postal Service. Thank

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 4, 2004

TO: SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: HARRIET MIERS *Harriet Miers*
SUBJECT: Family Day Proclamation

This note responds to your memo of July 28th to Secretary Andrew Card. The White House will be proclaiming September 27th Family Day. The Family Day Proclamation has been issued annually for a day in September since 2001. Please let me know if this is the information you wished. If I may be of any further assistance to you please let me know.

Thank you.

11-L-0559/OSD/26196

August 4, 2004

TO: Joe Califano
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Family Day Proclamation

Attached is a note I just received on the Family Day Proclamation.

Regards,

Attach.
8/4/04 WH memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
080404-11

OSD 11203-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26197

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 4, 2004

TO: SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD

FROM: HARRIET MIERS

SUBJECT: Family Day Proclamation



This note responds to your memo of July 28th to Secretary Andrew Card. The White House will be proclaiming September 27th Family Day. The Family Day Proclamation has been issued annually for a day in September since 2001. Please let me know if this is the information you wished. If I may be of any further assistance to you please let me know.

Thank you.

11-L-0559/OSD/26198

July 28,2004

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Family Day Proclamation

Andy —

Joe Califano asked me to help again this year in encouraging the President to make a Presidential Proclamation in regards to Family Day. They would like to have an opportunity to publicize it in plenty of time.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/13/04 Califano letter to POTUS

DHR:dh
072804-15

OSD 11203-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26199

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

May 13, 2004

The President
The White House
Office of Presidential Messages
and Proclamations
Washington, D.C. 20502

13 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10017-6706

(b)(6)

Faxed to (b)(6) 5/13/04

www.casacolumbia.org

Dear Mr. President:

Board of Directors

Ph. A. Califano, Jr.
Chairman and President

- Lee C. Bollinger
- Columba Bush
- Kenneth I. Chenault
- Jamie Lee Curtis
- James Dimon
- Peter A. Dolan
- Mary Fisher
- Victor F. Ganzl
- Luo-Arthur Kelmenson
- Donald R. Keough
- David A. Kessler, M.D.
- Manuel T. Pacheco, Ph.D.
- Joseph J. Plumeri II
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- Michael P. Schulhof
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Directors Emeritus

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- LaSalle Luffall (1992-2001)
- Nancy Reagan (1995-2000)
- Linda J. Rice (1992-1998)
- George Rupp (1993-2000)
- Michael I. Sovern (1992-1995)
- Frank C. Wells (1992-1994)

I am writing to request a Presidential Proclamation for Family Day: *A Day to Eat Dinner With Your Children*, an initiative of The (b)(6) at Columbia University. Each year since its inception in 2001, you have issued a Presidential Proclamation proclaiming *Family Day*. A copy of each proclamation is attached.

Since 1996, (b)(6) research has consistently shown that the more often children eat dinner with their families, *the less* likely they are to smoke, drink or use illegal drugs. *Family Day - A Day to Eat Dinner With Your Children* is a national effort to promote parental engagement as a simple, effective way to reduce substance abuse by children and teens and raise healthier children. *Family Day* emphasizes the importance of regular family activities in parent-child communications and encourages Americans to make family dinners a regular feature of their lives. In addition to your proclamation, the governors of 35 states and more than 200 cities and counties have issued *Family Day* proclamations each year. Last year your mother, former First Lady Barbara Bush, appeared in television spots to publicize *Family Day* and Jamie Lee Curtis did the same on the radio.

Also attached are background information on *Family Day*, (b)(6) a copy of the letter from Joseph A. Califano, Jr. President of (b)(6) to Mr. Andy Card, and the response from Melissa Bennett. We would like the proclamation by June 15, 2004 because of our request to The Office of Scheduling for a June presidential ceremony to publicize *Family Day*.

If you need further information, please contact me at (b)(6) and kgerard@casacolumbia.org. Thank you.

Sincerely,


Kathleen Gerard
Director of Development

Enclosures



FAMILY DAY, 2003

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

Children thrive in loving families where they are taught, nurtured, and comforted. By spending time with our children and stressing the importance of making the right choices, parents and other family members help them develop into confident, successful individuals.

Families can help secure a healthy tomorrow for their children by providing guidance, staying involved, and serving as role models. I am committed to supporting strong families and strong marriages to help ensure that every child grows up in a safe, loving family. Statistics show that children from two-parent families are less likely to end up in poverty, drop out of school, become addicted to drugs, have a child out of wedlock, suffer abuse, or become a violent criminal. Because stable families should be the central goal of American welfare policy, I have proposed spending up to \$300 million a year to fund the most effective programs to strengthen marriage.

Parents play a critical role in discouraging harmful behavior such as experimenting with alcohol, drugs, and tobacco. Research shows that teens often listen to their parents when it comes to decisions about harmful substances and risky behaviors. Regular family activities provide opportunities for parents to communicate important messages and enhance their relationships with their children. Recent studies from the (b)(6)

(b)(6) found that teens from families who eat dinner together were less likely to use illegal drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes, while teenagers who rarely eat dinner with their parents were more likely to engage in these unhealthy activities.

Families and all Americans can act together to educate our youth about the dangers of drug and alcohol and help them grow into healthy, responsible, compassionate citizens. In order to ensure a brighter future for our Nation, and safe, healthy, and happy lives for our children, our children must learn that avoiding harmful substances is an ongoing responsibility. As we work to educate our next generation about making healthy choices, we renew our commitment to the American family.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim September 22, 2003, as Family Day. I call upon the people of the United States to observe this day by engaging in activities to strengthen the relationships between parents and children and help fight against substance abuse and risky behaviors.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-eighth day of August, in the year of our Lord two thousand three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twenty-eighth



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

IN REPLY REFER TO.

2007 MAR 20 PM 3:20

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General W. L. Nyland, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps *WLN*

Subj: KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE (IRR)

- The Marine Corps response regarding the Secretary of Defense's inquiry on how the Services maintain contact with members of the IRR is at Tab A.
- Since 9/11, the IRR has proven to be a valuable manpower pool that the Marine Corps has utilized to meet both Joint and internal Individual Augmentation requirements. To date, we have activated a total of 3,974 IRR members in support the Global War on Terrorism. Their service has been instrumental to the successful accomplishment of the Marine Corps war fighting mission.
- The keys to this success have been twofold: first, the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS), our automated personnel and pay system that administers both Active and Reserve component personnel in one integrated system, has enabled us to efficiently and seamlessly activate and manage IRR members; and second, our perspective that the IRR is an integral part of the Marine Corps Reserve and should be utilized to the fullest extent possible during both peacetime and wartime.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared by: Maj Chris Mace

(b)(6)

Copy to: SecNav

OSD 12463-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26202

Remind them of their service obligation:

- Following the Transitional Recruiting briefs every Marine receives when departing Active Duty, "Welcome to the IRR" information is mailed to each Marine as they are joined to the IRR. Both the Transition brief and the IRR information stress the Marine's remaining service obligation and explain the requirements and/or options for reserve participation.
- The Mobilization Screening card also reminds IRR Marines of their remaining service obligation,

Etc (other efforts):

- Upcoming SNCO and Officer Promotion Board announcements with application instructions are mailed out annually to all eligible IRR Marines.
- Upcoming Professional Military Education opportunities with application instructions are mailed out annually to all IRR Marine Officers.
- Promotion warrants and congratulatory letters are mailed to all selected IRR Marines.
- The Mobilization Screening card also encourages them to visit specified Marine Corps informational websites.
- "Notification of Change in Reserve Status" letters are sent to all IRR members identified as non-participants, which explains their status, identifies remaining service obligations, and offers options for increased participation.
- All Officer promotion selects and non-selects in the IRR are called personally.
- MOBCOM maintains a Solicitation Cell that calls IRR members to find volunteers for board membership and short fuse ADSW opportunities.
- The Solicitation Cell also calls IRR members to identify their availability for activation billets which correspond with their rank, MOS, and related military or civilian experience.
- RDOL offers members the ability to search for duty opportunities while offering commands the ability to search for qualified individuals.
- The Customer Service Center (CSC) operating at MOBCOM offers assistance and guidance to all Marines, including IRR members. The CSC is available through a toll-free phone number or a web-based interactive database that provides a direct link to RDOL.
- The Reserve Counterpart Training (RCT) budget is dedicated specifically for funding IRR Marines interested in conducting periods of training with active or reserve units in their occupational field.
- The Mobilization Training Unit (MTU) program offers a viable alternative for participation to IRR Marines who cannot perform regularly scheduled drills but still desire to perform duty. MTU members participate in a non-pay status but still receive inactive points credited towards a reserve retirement. MTUs are assigned project-oriented missions, and develop flexible schedules around the needs of its members.

Marine Corps Efforts to Keep in Touch with the IRR

The Marine Corps takes a multi-faceted approach in maintaining contact with its 58,000+ IRR population and views its IRR members as a vital asset in supporting both peacetime and wartime requirements. In fact, the Marine Corps recognizes that 30% of its Selected Reserve is comprised of Prior Service Marines recruited from the IRR. The Marine Corps Mobilization Command (MOBCOM) in Kansas City is responsible for the day-to-day administration and maintenance of the IRR. We believe the effort we put into maintaining contact with IRR Marines directly increases the availability and interest of our IRR Marines. Since 11 Sep 01, 3,974 IRR Marines have been activated as Individual Augments in support of the Global War On Terrorism while countless others have volunteered for duty and transferred to the Selected Reserve.

In response to SecDef's questions - know where they are, know what their health is, know what they can do, remind them of their service obligation, etc. - the following is submitted:

Where they are:

- An annual Mobilization Screening card is mailed to every IRR Marine during the month of their membership anniversary, which requests updates to contact and personal information.
- All direct phone calls to IRR Marines are used as opportunities to obtain updates of contact and personal information.
- The Reserve Duty On-Line (RDOL) website provides IRR members a means of volunteering for activation and other duty opportunities. The registration process in RDOL captures contact information that is automatically fed into the Marine Corps Total Force System.

Know what their health is:

- The Mobilization Screening card also requests info about IRR Marines' health status.
- All direct phone calls to IRR Marines are also used as opportunities to obtain updates on their health status.
- Medical/dental records are sent to MOBCOM when a Marine transfers to the IRR.
- MOBCOM maintains these records and conducts health verification record reviews whenever an orders request is initiated on an IRR member.
- Medical status is verified during all contacts via correspondence, phone or electronically.

Know what they can do:

- The registration process in RDOL also captures Civilian Employment Information (CEI) data, self-professed language capabilities and foreign countries visited.

7/27/04

~~FOUO~~

July 26, 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Keeping in Touch w/IRR

Please let me know what you are going to do to get the Services to stay in touch with their Individual Ready Resewe **folks** - **know** where they are, **know** what their health is, **know** what they can do, remind them **that** they have an obligation, etc.

Thanks.

DTR:dh
072604-30

.....
Please respond by 8/20/04.

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26205

August 20, 2004

IRAQ

TO: Gen Casey
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Iraq Border Issue

I hope you will have something in your presentation with respect to the borders of Iraq.

I would think that using some UAVs and some curfews would enable our folks to do a better job dealing with illegal entries.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
082004-8

.....
Please respond by 8/22/04

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	
CONTRIBUTION	
DEFENSE	/
ARMY	
Navy	/
Air Force	
Marine Corps	X
Space Force	
Other	
Total	

20 AUG 04

RSS - SecDef CablesESO

From: System Administrator [postmaster@iraq.centcom.smil.mil]
Sent: Friday, August 20, 2004 5:07 PM
To: CablesESO@osd.smil.mil
Subject: Delivered: Iraq Border Issue



Iraq Border Issue

<<Iraq Border Issue>> Your message

To: COL James Barclay (barclayj@iraq.centcom.smil.mil); MAJ Anthony Hale (halea@iraq.centcom.smil.mil)
Subject: Iraq Border Issue
Sent: Sat, 21 Aug 2004 01:11:37 +0400

was delivered to the following recipient(s):

Barclay James COL MNF-I CG XO on Sat, 21 Aug 2004 01:06:44 +0400
MSEXCH:MSExchangeMTA:IRAQ:VICTEXEBIZS01
Hale Anthony MAJ MNF-I CG Aide-de-Camp on Sat, 21 Aug 2004 01:06:44 +0400
MSEXCH:MSExchangeMTA:IRAQ:VICTEXEBIZS01

August 21, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Brief

Andy—

We have an Afghanistan strategic update if there happens to be time during the day on Monday. I didn't want to have you be surprised.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
082104-19 (is computer).doc

Afghanistan

21AUG04

11-L-0559/OSD/26208

OSD 12480-04

20

August 21, 2004

3a0.2 Strategic

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Global Posture Reaction

Mr. President—

Attached is a summary of some of the immediate reactions to your announcement with respect to global posture adjustments. I thought you might like to see it.

We look forward to seeing you on Monday.

Respectfully,

Attach.

8/20/04 DASD (Strategy) memo to SecDef re: Global Posture: Reaction to POTUS Speech

DHR:dh
082104-10 (as computer).doc

OSD 12481-04

21 Aug 04

(b)(6)

08/20

INFOMEMO

AUG 20 2004

1-04/011142-STRAT

DepSecDef

USD/P

PDUSD/P

AUG 20 2004

8/20

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Hoehn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy

SUBJECT: Global Posture: Reaction to POTUS Speech(U)

Here is an update on recent reactions to the President's posture announcement on August 16. Public Affairs reports that coverage overall has been 90% positive.

- Foreign reaction, especially official statements, has been almost universally positive, while domestic reaction has been somewhat more mixed.
 - Domestic media tends to emphasize US politics, while foreign media gives more prominence to the strategic value of the review.
- In general, those who have done sufficient fact-finding (e.g. Wall Street Journal and BBC) have responded vary positively.

DOMESTIC

- Op-eds offer expected election-season political commentary, such as Ron Asmus's critical Aug 18 piece in the Washington Post.
 - But op-eds Charles Krauthammer in the Post and Marcus Corbin in Baltimore Sun were highly
- Most editorials – like the Washington Post, Boston Globe, and Detroit Free Press – offer a generally understanding, if mixed, viewpoint. Some common themes are:
 - Credit for the Administration's strategic rationale;
 - Support for long-overdue moves in Europe;
 - Concern about impact in Korea; and
 - criticism for announcing the changes at a campaign event.
- Only a few editorials have been decisively positive or negative:
 - The Wall Street Journal's good piece was the result of time we invested with their editorial Writers.
 - The New York Times' negative editorial was expected – they wrote a negative piece on US-German relations last
 - The Philadelphia Inquirer produced an oddly negative and speculative editorial, which we have responded to via a letter to the editor.

2

FOREIGN

- Foreign **official** reaction has been **positive** – testimony to our **consultation** efforts over the past 9 months.
 - Ranges from very positive (Australia, Italy) to surprisingly benign
- In foreign media, the review's strategic aspects have received significant attention, along with stories on local impact and speculation about US political motives.
- See the attached paper for samples of both official and press statements from allies and interested parties.

WAY AHEAD

- Your up-ed is being finalized.
- We will continue to respond to **negative** editorials via letters and to push out op-eds like Doug Feith's piece in the August 19 Washington Post.
- We will encourage combatant commanders to speak out,
- We will approach selected Defense Policy Board members – such as Harold Brown, James Schlesinger, and Barry Blechman – to write op-eds and take interviews.
- SASC plans a bearing on 20 September.

ATTACHMENT: As stated.

Prepared by: Mike Brown and Sean Strieland, Strategy, 614-0421

SecDEF → WE'VE ASKED DIA IF THEY CAN PROVIDE ANY INSIGHT INTO REACTIONS FROM N. KOREA, CHINA, OR FRANCE. *Jandrey*

SAMPLE OF FOREIGN REACTION

Official

- Karsten Voight, German PM Schroeder's coordinator for US relations: "This is positive...a success story."
- UK MoD: "The UK government and NATO have been consulted ... but it is too early to say what impact there will be on US deployments in the UK"
- Italy MFA: "Absolutely not [a symbol of a weaker commitment]. The Cold War is a thing of the past."
- Japan MFA: "Japan welcomes the review of the US military framework that will better suit the global security environment and further contribute to peace and stability."
- South Korea MFA: "The South Korean government has been well aware of this plan."
- Australia MoD: "It will improve the US capability to contribute to international efforts to defeat global threats."
- Russia's MoD: "I don't see anything alarming in these plans."

Note: No official commentary reported yet from China, France, Singapore, or India.

Press

- Germany: *Deutsche Welle* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine* - likely negative impacts on the German economy and local affinities for US troops, but also the need for NATO to improve its own capabilities.
- UK: *BBC* and *Financial Times* - largely favorable discussion of the strategic rationale and implications, but speculation on the fate of UK-based F-15s.
- Japan: *Japan Times* and *Asahi* - praise for the strategic rationale, and detailed reporting on specific proposals for posture in Japan.
- South Korea: *Korea Herald* - focuses exclusively on impact in Korea and ongoing Future of the Alliance talks.
- Australia: *Sydney Morning Herald* - new posture may weaken deterrence in Korea.
- Singapore: *The Straits News* - quotes from President, very little discussion of strategy or implications in Asia.
- India: *The Hindu* - cursory discussion of the rationale, with quotes from the President and critics.
- France: Minimal exposure in French press, mostly quotes from the Resident and critics.

Note: Little press commentary to date from China or Russia.



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECURITY INFORMATION

ACTION MEMO

2005 JAN 10 PM 3:39

December 23, 2004, 12:15 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM William J. Haynes II, **GENERAL COUNSEL**

WJ Haynes

SUBJECT Diplomatic Passports

014.33

- You asked (Tab A) whether providing courtesy diplomatic passports for life to former Secretaries of State should be extended to former Secretaries of Defense, in light of the nature of the world today.
- The State Department **Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM)** provides at section 1311.3-3c., "Diplomatic Passports," that:

Courtesy diplomatic passports are diplomatic passport books that are issued, for tourist purposes only, to certain former high-ranking **U.S.** Government officials, such as former Presidents, Vice Presidents, Cabinet Secretaries and Foreign Service Chiefs of Mission who were career government employees. These passports are issued **at the** Department to a very limited number of retired USG employees and their spouses. The prescribed fees are charged. (Emphasis added.)

23 Dec 04

- We are informed that the Department of State changed this policy in late 2003. Under current policy, former U.S. Presidents, Vice Presidents, Secretaries of State, Career Ambassadors, and their spouses or widows/widowers **are** provided courtesy diplomatic passports for life. Such passports:
 - o do not, in and of themselves, afford the bearer any privileges and immunities;
 - o are subject to prescribed fees, just as for a "regular" or "tourist" passport;
 - o may be used only for personal travel; and,

20 Aug 04



04

5

- o still require the bearer to obtain/present a visa when presenting the “courtesy” diplomatic passport for entry to a foreign country, as do travelers on “regular” or “tourist” passports.
- Prior to November 2003, courtesy diplomatic passports also were provided to present and former U.S. Supreme Court Justices, and to all Foreign Service Officers who had **served as** Ambassadors **and** their spouses or widows/widowers.
- Due to a series of incidents involving attempted **entry** by such passport bearers into foreign countries without visas, and their requests for special privileges, State Department revised the policy and now provides diplomatic passports only to the individuals listed above (not including former Cabinet Secretaries).
- Conclusions
 - o Courtesy diplomatic passports issued to former **U.S.** Government officials do not afford to them any special protections, privileges or immunities. As a matter of current policy, State Department does not issue them to former Cabinet Secretaries (except for former Secretaries of State).
 - o Nevertheless, in light of frivolous judicial initiatives in several **countries** **in** recent years, it would seem reasonable to ask the State Department to revisit their current policy. We have **drafted** a memo (Tab B) **from** Under Secretary Feith to Under **Secretary** Grossman for this purpose. (Mr. Feith recommended extending the request to include former high-ranking agency officials and retired senior military officers, as well **as** former Cabinet Secretaries.)

RECOMMENDATION Approve USDP sending the memo at Tab B.

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

Other: _____

COORDINATION USDP

~~FOUO~~

August 20, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Diplomatic Passports



I'm told all ~~former~~ Secretaries of ~~State~~ travel on diplomatic passports for life. I think this courtesy should be extended to Secretaries of Defense.

The nature of the world today is such that this would be helpful. It's conceivable that it is reciprocal in other countries, but I'm not sure. Please tell me how you think we should handle *this*.

Thanks.

DHR:aa
082004-11

Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12492-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26216

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS (MARC GROSSMAN)

FROM Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Diplomatic Passports

Currently, only former **U.S.** Presidents, Vice Presidents, Secretaries of State, Career Ambassadors and their spouses or widows/widowers **are** provided courtesy diplomatic passports for life. The Foreign Affairs Manual, however, provides that such passports may **also** be issued to former high-ranking officials, such as Cabinet Secretaries.

Although courtesy diplomatic passports do not afford special protections, in light of recent judicial actions in some countries, such a passport might facilitate travel through foreign countries. I think you may want to consider issuing these passports to former Cabinet Secretaries and other former high-ranking agency officials, and retired senior military officers, such as Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combatant Commanders.

August 20, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Diplomatic Passports

D.R.

I'm told all former Secretaries of State travel on diplomatic passports for life. I think this courtesy should be extended to Secretaries of Defense. ¹

The nature of the world today is such that this would be helpful. It's conceivable that it is reciprocal in other countries, but I'm not sure. Please tell me how you think we should handle this.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
082004-11

.....
Please respond by _____

014.33

20 Aug 04

~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB A

August 5, 2004

TO Gen. Dick Myers

CC Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Georgia Train and Equip

833

Georgia

What kind of a proposal do we have to maintain Georgia "train and equip" efforts with some training of their folks and periodic visits?

Thanks.

DHR:ccc
08:50:19

.....
Please respond by 8/13/04

5 Aug 04

Tab A

~~TOP SECRET~~

OSD 12691-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

CH-2012-204
25 August 2004 11:06:25 File 4:49

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS ^{F32} *VRP 25A-604*

SUBJECT: Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) Sustainment

- **Question.** "What kind of a proposal do we have to maintain Georgia 'train and equip' efforts with some training of their folks and periodic visits?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** USEUCOM has developed the Georgia Capabilities Enhancement Program (GCEP) to follow up GTEP, which prepared Georgian forces for counterinsurgency operations on Georgian territory.
- **Analysis.** GCEP will be conducted using Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) focused on improving GTEP-trained units to battalion-level operations capability to include:
 - Organizing, training and equipping one NATO-Compatible Infantry Brigade (1 lth BDE) with an emphasis on creating new support units.
 - Providing uniforms and C4I equipment to GTEP battalions and staffs.
 - International Military Education and Training courses focused on US/NATO interoperability, including improvements to the English Language Training System.
 - Creating an effective UH-1H helicopter unit to NATO standards.
- I fully endorse GCEP as the right way ahead for the Georgian Armed Forces and our security cooperation focus.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

OSD 12691-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26220

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~FOUO~~

TAB A

August 5, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Georgia Train and **Equip**

833

What kind of a proposal do we have to maintain Georgia "train and equip" efforts with some training of their folks and periodic visits?

Thanks.

DRR:dr
DRR:SM-5

.....
Please respond by 8/13/04

Tah A

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12691-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26221

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

OSD (DASD-ISP Eurasia)	Mr. Harrison	10 August 2004
USEUCOM ECJ-5	COL Anderson	10 August 2004
USEUCOM ECJ-5 (RUE)	LTC Timm	10 August 2004
USEUCOM ECJ-5 (Georgia)	MAJ Sweetser	10 August 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/26222

Tab B

UNCLASSIFIED

Susp 30 Sep 1500 8/27

August 21, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to Senator McCain

Please get an answer to John McCain on the attached letter he sent to John Handy.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/20/04 McCain ltr to Gen. Handy

DHR:dh
0826044 (ts computer).doc

...../

Please respond by 9/3/04

*Jeff Lieb - #
Status?*

4527

217 201-104

SIR -- 8/25

FRYI.

v/r

JOHN MACLEAN

CHIEF OF STAFF
GENERAL AND TRANSPORTATION
CONTRACTING AND AIRCRAFT SERVICES
CONTRACTING ON MILITARY AIRCRAFT

Barbara Stratus Sauer

[Handwritten signature]

August 20, 2004

(b)(7)(C)
 (b)(7)(D)
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 (b)(7)(F)
 (b)(7)(G)
 (b)(7)(H)
 (b)(7)(I)
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 (b)(7)(T)
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 (b)(7)(W)
 (b)(7)(X)
 (b)(7)(Y)
 (b)(7)(Z)

General John W. Hardy, USAF
 Commander
 Air Mobility Command
 402 Scott Drive, Unit 3EC
 Scott Air Force Base, IL 62225-5110

Dear General Hardy:

I write regarding your statements recently reported in *U.S. News and World Report* that "I am not a missile man, but I have stuck my finger through significant pieces of wool," and "I could poke a hole into the crowded arena of the airplane." The quotes were characterized as supporting the acquisition of new air refueling tankers for the Air Force.

As you are aware, the Secretary of Defense has ordered a thorough analysis of alternatives regarding the tanker replacement program. As you also know, this was precipitated by findings of a Defense Science Board task force that, among other things, there is no evidence that corridor poses an imminent catastrophic threat to the KC-135 fleet refueling readiness and that the Air Force's maintenance regime is well poised to deal with corrosion and other aging problems. In fact, the findings indicate that the Air Force's claims of unmanageable corrosion problems and cost growth were overstated. It also found that the KC-135B can fly to 2040. These findings disproved assertions to the contrary repeatedly made by civilian Air Force leadership regarding the purportedly urgent need to lease 100 Boeing 767s. In other words, the 'dominating rationale' cited by the Air Force to Congress for having taxpayers pay billions of dollars more for leasing Boeing's KC-767A tankers than they would for buying them outright, has been conclusively shown to be without merit. The Air Force's representations on this issue remain a matter of continuing investigative concern. I discussed my concerns about such misconduct in a letter to the Secretary, dated July 28, 2004.

Aspects of that deal, ranging from the how the original Air Force proposal passed through Congress outside the normal budget process to the improper conduct of earlier procurements at the Boeing Company, have been exhaustively reviewed and fundamentally criticized by the Senate Committee on Armed Services; the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation; the Department of Justice; the Defense Department's Office of the Inspector General; the Defense Science Board; the Congressional Budget Office; the General Accounting Office; the Congressional Research Service; the Office of Management and Budget; the Defense Department's Office of Programs, Analysis and Evaluation; the Institute for Defense Analysis; the Industrial College of the Armed Forces; National Defense University and others. Notably, White House Chief of Staff Andy Card and former Defense Department Comptroller General

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04:01 002 52 80V


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11-L-0559/OSD/26224

Dov Zakheim have also weighed in with serious concerns about various aspects of the tanker program. Regrettably, your comments reflect a disturbing trend that I recently noted in my letters of March 12, 2004 and July 28, 2004 to the Secretary of Defense, whereby Air Force uniformed officers continue to publicly support an acquisition strategy that has been conclusively shown to be a folly.

I hope that you will agree that the path forward on the tanker replacement program that the Secretary of Defense ordered needs to be conducted objectively, independently, and free from political pressure. As such, it is not well-served by such commentary.

Sincerely,



John McCain

cc: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld



UNITED STATES TR

A.O. _____ SCOTT AIR I
ACTION FOR
COORD _____
DUE _____

Does This
Close Out The
McCain/HANDY/
MAYO DEPT SECDEF
has seen

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9/23

SEP 14 11:17
14 September 2004

The Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington DC 205 10-0505

Dear Senator McCain

Thank you for your letter regarding tanker recapitalization, 20 Aug 04. I was disheartened to read the *U.S. News and World Report* account of a "fight between the Air Force and the Senate" in the sentence leading into my quote regarding the health of our KC-135Es. I share your eagerness to learn the results of the KC-135 Recapitalization Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) and the OSD-led Mobility Capability Study (MCS). Rest assured I have no preference or agenda regarding an acquisition strategy or a particular tanker platform. I continue to take very seriously my responsibilities to provide robust aerial refueling capabilities to combatant commanders around the globe in support of our nation's objectives.

Sincerely

John W. Handy
JOHN W. HANDY
General, USAF
Commander

cc:
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

11-L-0559/OSD/26226

OSD 14471-04

DSD

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

241 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0203

2004 AUG 26 AM 6:32

United States Senate

(b)(6)

4480 SOUTH RURAL ROAD
SUITE B-130

TEMPE, AZ 85282

(b)(6)

2400 EAST ARIZONA
BILTMORE CIRCLE
SUITE 1180

PHOENIX, AZ 85016

(b)(6)

480 WEST PASEO RECONO
SUITE 200

TUCSON, AZ 85701

(b)(6)

TELEPHONE FOR HEARING IMPAIRED

(b)(6)

JOHN MCCAIN
ARIZONA
CHAIRMAN
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

August 20, 2004

General John W. Handy, USAF
Commander
Air Mobility Command
402 Scott Drive, Unit 3EC
Scott Air Force Base, IL 62225-53 10

Dear General Handy:

I write regarding your statements recently reported in *U.S. News and World Report* that "I am not a muscle man, but I have stuck my finger through significant pieces of metal," and "I could poke a hole into the corroded areas of the airplane." The quotes were characterized as supporting the acquisition of new air refueling tankers for the Air Force.

As you are aware, the Secretary of Defense has ordered a thorough analysis of alternatives regarding the tanker replacement program. As you also know, this was precipitated by findings of a Defense Science Board task force that, among other things, there is no evidence that corrosion poses an imminent catastrophic threat to the KC-135 fleet mission readiness and that the Air Force's maintenance regime is well poised to deal with corrosion and other aging problems. In fact, the findings indicate that the Air Force's claims of unmanageable corrosion problems and cost growth were overstated. It also found that the KC-135E can fly to 2040. These findings disproved assertions to the contrary repeatedly made by civilian Air Force leadership regarding the purportedly urgent need to lease 100 Boeing 767s. In other words, the 'dominating rationale' cited by the Air Force to Congress for having taxpayers pay billions of dollars more for leasing Boeing's KC-767A tankers than they would for buying them outright, has been conclusively shown to be without merit. The Air Force's representations on this issue remain a matter of continuing investigative concern. I discussed my concerns about such misconduct in a letter to the Secretary, dated July 28, 2004.

Aspects of that deal, ranging from the how the original Air Force proposal passed through Congress outside the normal budget process to the improper conduct of senior executives at the Boeing Company, have been exhaustively reviewed and fundamentally criticized by the Senate Committee on Armed Services; the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation; the Department of Justice; the Defense Department's Office of the Inspector General; the Defense Science Board; the Congressional Budget Office; the General Accounting Office; the Congressional Research Service; the Office of Management and Budget; the Defense Department's Office of Programs, Analysis and Evaluation; the Institute for Defense Analyses; the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University and others. Notably, White House Chief of Staff Andy Card and former Defense Department Comptroller General

OSD 12693-04

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

AUG 25 2004 10:43AM


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11-L-0559/OSD/26227

Dov Zakheim **have also weighed in with** serious concerns about **various aspects** of the **tanker** program. Regrettably, your comments reflect a **disturbing** trend that I **recently noted** in **my** letters of March **12, 2004** and July **28, 2004** to the Secretary of **Defense**, whereby **Air Force** *uniformed* officers continue to **publicly support an** acquisition strategy that has **been** conclusively shown to *be* a folly.

I hope that **you** will **agree** that **the path forward** on the tanker replacement program that the Secretary of **Defense** ordered **needs to be conducted** objectively, independently, and **free from** political **pressure**. **As** such, it is not well-served by such *commentary*.

Sincerely,




John McCain

cc: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ✓

August 25, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Transforming the USG

310.1

Attached is a short draft presentation on transforming the U.S. Government for the 21st century. This brief is obviously in an early stage.

Andy, it seems to me that these are the kinds of national security, homeland security and other issues that you folks in the White House are considering. Clearly, they don't fit neatly into the responsibilities of any single department or even into any one of the White House councils. But then, the problems we face in the world don't fit neatly into any one department or into any one of the various White House councils.

In any event, we have folks in DoD who have been thinking about some of these things. If anything here is of interest to you, the Vice President or Condi, let me know. We would be happy to try to be helpful. If you would like to talk about any of these ideas, let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/20/04 Transforming the U.S. Government for the 21st Century

DHR:dh
082104-20 (is computer).doc

25 AUG 04

Transforming the U.S. Government for the 21st Century

23 August 2004

**This briefing is classified
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~**

Draft Working Papers Not Subject to FOIA

8/20/2004

1

11-L-0559/OSD/26230

Purpose

- Public attention generated by 9/11 Commission report and Congressional hearings have focused Nation on need to improve national security
- Opportunity for Administration to:
 - Go beyond 9/11 Commission recommendations
 - Go beyond the issue of terrorism
 - Prepare for broader challenges of 21st century
- Consider whether the USG might:
 - Restructure *institutions*
 - Create or realign *authorities*
 - Take further *action*

~~FOUO~~

Restructure Institutions – Illus frative Ideas

- **Domestic intelligence** – Go beyond law enforcement approach and integrate with foreign intelligence while duly preserving civil liberties?
- **Strategic Communications** – Create entity in the USG that draws on US private sector prowess in media, IT, advertising, and entertainment?
- **NSC and HSC** – Restructure organizations?
- **US Country Teams** – Transform US Embassy Country Teams for 21st century operations?
- **UN and other international institutions** – Reorganize to prevent crises and assist member states that lack capacity for effective governance?
- **National Guard** – Organize, train and equip the National Guard for homeland defense?

8/20/2004

~~FOUO~~

3

11-L-0559/OSD/26232

~~FOUO~~

Create or Realign Authorities – Illustrative Ideas

- **Interagency “Jointness”** – Increase through “Goldwater-Nichols” for whole USG?
- **Build Local Capacity** – Help international partners build their capacity to counter enemies and replace US forces
 - Seek additional authorities for: “Train and Equip,” Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), Global Peace Operations Initiative
- **Homeland Security** – Is it time for review of how USG responsibilities and authorities are allocated to ensure right capabilities and assets address **key** problems?
- **Congress** – Streamline Congressional oversight (e.g., Joint Committees; smaller committees; merged authorization and appropriation committees) and speed nomination/confirmation process?

8/20/2004

~~FOUO~~

4

11-L-0559/OSD/26233

~~FOUO~~

Take Action – Illustrative Ideas

- **Bio-Defense** – Launch Strategic Bio-Defense Initiative?
- **Common Threat Assessments** – Implement initiative to develop common threat assessments with key allies and partners?
- **Non-Governmental Action** – Mobilize private philanthropies and utilize public-private partnerships to promote educational reform and economic development in Muslim world?
- **Civillian/Military Recruiting and Retention** – Review incentives/disincentives for public/military service?

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~~FOUO~~

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11-L-0559/OSD/26234

~~FOUO~~

Way Ahead

- Assign tasks to refine ideas and develop action plans, duties, set deadlines, develop metrics, track progress
- Recommend to Congress actions requiring new legislation
- Develop draft Executive Orders where appropriate

8/20/2004

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26235

Back-up Slide

8/20/2004


11-L-0559/OSD/26236

Additional Illustrative Ideas

- Establish standing USG planning function for building & maintaining coalitions
- Establish "National Security University" educational system for interagency
- Expand unconventional warfare, civil affairs and foreign internal defense capabilities
- Establish Deputy National Intelligence Director to serve as all-source intelligence "archivist" and Chief Information Officer for Intel Community
- Re-evaluate USG national security roles and missions (a "QDR" for USG)
- Build civilian reserve forces international stability & reconstruction operations, homeland security and intelligence
- Strengthen weak governments so that they can increase their legitimacy and authority **over** "ungoverned" territory/populations via civic action projects



August 21, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Status of Commissions

Please give me a report on where we stand on the commissions. **It seems to be** going very slowly. **What's up?**

Thanks.

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.....
Please respond by 9/3/04

D15

21 AUG 04

OSD 12765-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26238

FOUO




GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

2004 AUG 26 PM 5: 54

INFO MEMO

August 24, 2004 1902

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 

SUBJECT: Start of Military Commission Trials

- On June 29, 2004, the Appointing Authority (AA) referred charges to a Military Commission for trial in the cases of al Bahlul of Yemen, al Qosi of Sudan, and Hicks of Australia. On July 14, 2004 the Appointing Authority referred charges to a Military Commission for trial in the case of Hamdan of Yemen.
- The Presiding Officer of the Military Commission set separate initial hearing dates in each of the four cases which began this week at the U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO), as follows:
 - o U.S. v. Hamdan – Tuesday, August 24, 2004;
 - o U.S. v. Hicks – Wednesday, August 25, 2004;
 - o U.S. v. al Bahlul – Thursday, August 26, 2004;
 - o U.S. v. al Qosi – Friday, August 27, 2004.
- The initial appearance for each case will likely include:
 - o An advisement of the Accuseds' rights;
 - o A reading of the charges against each accused;
 - o An entry of the Accuseds' pleas (guilty/not guilty);
 - o Setting a schedule for future trial dates;
 - o Setting a schedule for dates that Prosecutors and Defense Counsel will be required to give notice of witness requests, discovery issues, and evidentiary issues;
 - o Setting a schedule for dates that Prosecutors and Defense Counsel will be required to file motions.
- The initial appearance for each case may also include argument of motions by Prosecutors and Defense Counsel, including:
 - o Motions Challenging the Jurisdiction of the Military Commission;
 - o Motions Challenging the Presiding Officer and Appointing Authority for Conflict of Interest;



11-L-0559/OSD/26239

FOUO

OSD 12765-04


- o Motions for Protective Orders for Classified or Protected Information.
- The initial appearances in each of the first four cases are expected to attract wide media attention.
 - o 78 media representatives will be in GTMO to watch the hearings.
 - 8 media representatives will view the hearings from inside the trial room.
 - 70 media representatives will view the hearings through closed-circuit television at another location at GTMO.
 - o 5 representatives from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) will also view the hearings from inside the trial room.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: ~~None~~ TAB 1

Prepared By: Capt. Sean Connolly (b)(6)

August 21, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: **Status** of Commissions

Please give me a report on **where** we stand on the commissions. It seems to be going **very slowly**. What's **up**?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
082104-2 (1s computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 9/3/04

OSD 12765-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26241

August 25, 2004

TO: Gen. "Hoss" Cartwright

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DRM*

SUBJECT: Crawford Briefings

Good job at the briefings down in Crawford!

I think we're off to a good start getting the President comfortable with this new capability.

We'll be back in touch with you on **tying up** some loose ends.

Regards,

DHR:dh
082504-26 (is computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

337

25 Aug 04

OSD 12796-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26242

7/27/04

~~TOUO~~

July 26, 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Keeping in Touch w/IRR

Please let me know what you are going to do to get the Services to stay in touch with their Individual Ready Reserve folks - know where they are | know what their health is, know what they can do, remind them that they have an obligation, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072604-30

.....
Please respond by 8/20/04

326

26 Jul 04

~~TOUO~~

OSD 12903-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26243

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 8/31/2004

DR 083104

DOCUMENT TYPE: **FRONT OFFICE DOC** ATTACHMENT:
OSD CONTROL **OSD 12903-04** DOC **7/26/2004** DOR **8/30/2004**
FROM **SECDEF RUMSFELD** TO **UPR**
SUBJECT **KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE IRR**
KEYWORDS **SNOW FLAKE**
COMMENTS **CAF. NO FURTHER DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL.**
FN **326** SEC U OCN072604-30

SIGNATURE: CASE:

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:
AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE
SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION
PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 0
SUSPENSE STATUS

PACKAGE VIEW:
FRONT OFFICE DOC
INFO MEMO

-- CREATED BY: **lawson** --

DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE COPIES
ADC R



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2004 AUG 20 PM 4: 51

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

August 20, 2004, 1200

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE - Keeping in Touch w/IRR

- You asked what we are going to do to get the Services to stay in touch with their IRR members and ensure that they know the members' location, health, military skills, civilian skills, and to make sure that members were aware of their obligations, requirements and opportunities.
- Currently, all Services are using, to various degrees: Exit briefings as members separate from active duty; "Welcome to the IRR" letters; annual screening mail-outs; electronic media (web-sites), telephonic contact, and letters related to promotions, physical status, military and civilian skills status, and security clearance status, as well as obligations, requirements and opportunities. Additionally, all Services update data when IRR members perform any type of duty.
 - Each Service also has some version of a "participating IRR" - a more active IRR population with whom there is regular contact.
- To locate members who fail to respond to any of the above, Services contract with various commercial sources to include credit companies and the postal service. To help in this area, we have submitted a legislative proposal that will allow the Internal Revenue Service to provide the Services with address information on those members we have not been able to locate through other means.
- To enhance contact efforts, at a recent conference on the IRR, the following initiatives were proposed and being reviewed by the Services for implementation: Institutionalized programs to inform all military members of their total service obligations; annual "virtual musters;" increased resourcing for physical musters; annual military service obligation and expectation reviews for both active and reserve members; and, a DoD-wide portal for input of required personal information.
- The most crucial effort being undertaken is the development of a DoD-wide program to educate service members, the public, and the Congress on the IRR, and the obligations, responsibilities and opportunities of IRR members. This is being developed specifically to create proper expectations.

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Kohner, OASD/RA(M&P) (b)(6)



OSD 12903-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26245

7/27/04

~~FOUO~~

July 26, 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Keeping in Touch w/IRR

Please let me know what you are going to do to get the Services to stay in touch with their Individual Ready Reserve folks – know where they are, know what their health is, know what they can do, remind them that they have an obligation, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072604-30

.....
Please respond by 8/20/04,

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12903-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26246

8/5/04

~~FOUO~~

August 4, 2004

W
e
b

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Mobilization

Please get back to me with proposed legislative changes.

Also tell me what the implications of full mobilization are. Our discussion with the **Congress** might be that we have a choice—either we go to full mobilization, or they give us additional flexibility during a national emergency.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080404-9

.....

Please respond by 8/27/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12904-04

4 Aug 04

11-L-0559/OSD/26247



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 AUG 30 PM 5:01

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD/P&R

David S. C. Chu 25 Aug 04
SUBJECT: Snowflake -- Mobilization Legislation

- You asked about proposed legislation relating to mobilization of the Guard and Reserve (TAB B).
- We support six proposals for the FY-2005 Defense Authorization Act (a more detailed description of each proposal is at TAB A):
 - Mobilize to Train — Allows reservists to be mobilized to train for their pending mobilization, be released from active duty, and then be mobilized later to deploy (House and Senate provisions).
 - Reserve Accounting and Management — Eliminates the 180-day end strength restriction and allows reservists to voluntarily serve on active duty for up to three years without counting against active duty end strength or grade ceilings (House provision).
 - Consolidated Bonuses — Allows reservists to qualify for a bonus under the same authorities and the same conditions as active duty members (House provision).
 - Foreign Language Proficiency Pay — Increases monthly pay for proficiency in a critically needed foreign language (House provision).
 - Accession and Training Requirements — Provides flexibility to reduce the minimum 8-year service obligation and 12-week basic training requirement for selected individuals accessed with unique specialty civilian skills (Senate provision).
 - Auxiliaries — Provides a structure for services to use retirees, veterans and private citizens who volunteer to support non-combat defense missions (Neither House nor Senate provision).
- Our goal is to ensure these proposals are included in the conference report.

RECOMMENDATION: None

Prepared By: Mr. Tom Bush, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)

OSD 12904-04



11-L-0559/OSD/26248

TAB

A

Legislation Related to Mobilization

House	Senate	Proposal	Description
\$522	\$521	Mobilize to Train	Allows guard and reserve members to be mobilized to train for future mobilization missions, be released from active duty, then mobilized later for a scheduled deployment.
\$404	—	Reserve Strength Accounting and Personnel Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creates a new strength accounting category for guard and reserve members serving voluntarily on active duty or full-time National Guard duty to provide operational support. • Eliminates the 180-day active duty end strength accounting threshold that has been a barrier to using reserve volunteers. • Allows reservists to remain in this category for 3 years without counting against active duty end strength and field grade or senior enlisted grade ceilings.
\$615 §617 \$618 §619	—	Consolidation of Bonus Authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Allows guard and reserve members to qualify for the active duty accession, enlistment, reenlistment, retention and conversion bonuses under the same conditions as active duty members. • Use contingent upon demonstrated need and availability of funds. • Provides greater flexibility in responding quickly and appropriately to officer and enlisted personnel shortfalls, regardless of component.
\$616	—	Foreign Language Proficiency Pay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increases monthly pay for members who maintain proficiency in a critically needed foreign language. • Converts the pay from an incentive pay, which is paid only when a reservist is in a duty status (the so-called 1/30th rule) to a bonus, which will allow reservists to be paid at the full monthly rate since it does not require reservists to be in a duty status to receive the pay.
—	§576	Service Obligation/ Basic Training Requirement	<p>Provides flexibility to reduce the minimum military service obligation and basic training requirement for select individuals accessed because of their unique specialty civilian skills (such as linguists):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Allows SecDef to specify a lesser minimum military service obligation — law currently specifies 6 to 8 years. • Allows SecMilDepts to specify a lesser required period of basic military training during war or national emergency — law currently specifies a minimum of 12 weeks.
—	—	Auxiliaries	<p>Provides structure for the services to use volunteers to perform non-combat missions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide an opportunity for military retirees, veterans and private citizens to support the military by offering their services. • Air Force could expand missions assigned to the Civil Air Patrol and improve its oversight of that organization. • Army, Navy, Marine Corps could establish auxiliaries.

TAB

B

~~FOUO~~

8/5/04

August 4, 2004

TO: David Chu

~~FROM:~~ Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Mobilization

Please get back to me with proposed legislative changes.

Also tell me what the implications of full mobilization are. Our discussion with the Congress might be that we have a choice—either we go to full mobilization, or they give us additional flexibility during a national emergency.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080404-9

.....
Please respond by 8/27/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12904-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26252

7200
~~FOUO~~

August 31, 2004

TO: Gen. Jim Jones
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Olympics



Now that the Olympics have been successfully completed, I want to thank you and the EUCOM team for your assistance on the security issues associated with the games. With the eyes of the entire world quite literally focused on Athens, your team helped to assure a secure environment for the athletes and spectators.

Regards,

DHR:ss
083104-14

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 13015-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26253

1p2
1400

77
~~FOUO~~

July 27, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Arthur Fletcher

Please figure out how to get an answer to Arthur Fletcher.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/21/04 Fletcher ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
072704-8

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13041-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26254

8/24
1630

20


~~FOUO~~

July 22, 2004

I-04/009872
EJ-0339

UN

TO: Doug Feith
SecDef
SUBJECT: Memo to SecState



Now that we have taken the action of getting our people protected who have been involved in UN missions, don't you think it is important for us to send a note to Colin Powell telling him that in the future he ought to be aware that we need to let the UN know that we will not be putting US citizens into situations where they would be at risk?

Thanks.

DHR 48
072204-8

.....
Please respond by 7/30/04

J 8/30
9/1

S/S
Response Attached.

V/R, (00B)

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13061-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26255

handcar



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

EP 1 2004

UN

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Risk of the ICC and US Participation in UN Peace Operations

State has been doing some good work in lining up additional ICC Article 98 agreements and reminding the UN that the US willingness to participate in peacekeeping operations will be affected by whether we get proper ICC-related protections. It is important that we keep pressing on this matter which grows more important as we continue to fight the global conflict we are in.

By the way, shouldn't we stop referring to the ICC as the "Rome Statute"? As I see it, one of the main problems with the treaty is that the parties arrogate to themselves the right to legislate for other countries -- that is, for countries that aren't parties to the treaty. We should stress that the ICC agreement is a treaty, not a statute.

Isn't that correct?

1 Sep 04



OSD113061-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26256

file

May 20, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: First Prison Visit

What was the date I was at the Abu Ghraib prison the first time? Was it before or after Abizaid told Myers that this was a big deal?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-4

353.6

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

~~05/31~~

SecDef —
You first visited on
6 Sep 2003 — before
Gen Abizaid told Myers that
this was a big deal.

C 5/20

20 May 04

OSD 13111-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26257

May 19, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hamre Piece

Attached is an interesting memorandum by John Hamre.

Thanks.

Attach.

Hamre, John. "Should America Just Walk Away from Iraq?" CSIS Memorandum, May 17, 2004.

DHR:dh
051904-8


.....
Please respond by _____

ILMP

19 May 04

OSD 13112-04

CSIS MEMORANDUM

To: CSIS Board of Trustees, Supporters, and Friends
From: John J. Hamre 
Date: May 17, 2004 (Number 137. Three Pages)
Re: **Should America just walk away from Iraq?**

All over Washington I am now hearing this question asked: Is Iraq a lost cause? Should we just find a way to pull out as soon as possible? I honestly believe the answer to both is no. It is clear, however, that we are less in control of the situation every day – which may indeed be our exit strategy.

Washington is still reeling from the terrible pictures from the prisons. They have become a metaphor for all that has plagued us this past year. It seems that Washington (and our Baghdad headquarters, I fear) has been cut off from what is really happening on the ground in Iraq. We have managed Iraq policy through our hopes and aspirations, not through a realistic assessment of the conditions on the ground.

It appears, though, that the Administration is now embracing a new strategic direction that is more realistically grounded on conditions in the field. After the uprising in April, senior leaders in the Administration finally realized the path they were on was not working. They correspondingly made three critical decisions:

First, they abandoned the sweeping “de-Baathification” policy that excluded past managers from participating in the building of a new Iraq.

Second, they decided to reinforce our troop levels in the region, committing to a major deployment for at least the next 18 months. There is no question that the political folks in the White House would have preferred to pull the troops out rather than to move more in, that would have been a far more popular move domestically. Instead, the President decided that his entire presidency now rests on success in Iraq.

Third, they chose to stay with the concept of “indigenization” of Iraqi security, but with a surprising twist. They agreed to let a former Saddam general take charge of the security of Fallujah. It seemed completely incongruous when it first came up. I believe it was more than just a pragmatic solution to avoid a bloody battle, which would have only served to strengthen the uprising elsewhere in Iraq. In fact, it represents a new power-sharing strategy in Iraq. We can see this even more starkly in Najaf, where the radical Shi’ite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, has holed up with his small army. Instead of launching an all out assault on them, we have sealed off the region in order to allow the most pragmatic Shia religious and political leadership the time to finally decide that they want to remove al-Sadr and his forces.

Both of these instances—turning Fallujah over to a former Saddam general and letting Shi’ite leaders disarm al-Sadr—are indeed defacto power-sharing decisions. We have

decided to let local political leaders have direct authority on the street, so long as it stays within the boundaries we find acceptable - which is why we are keeping 135,000 troops in the country indefinitely. In effect we are saying "you run things at the local level, and so long as it doesn't threaten national unity, we will leave you alone."

This still begs the question of how we create a viable national government. Here is where the tragedy of the prisoner abuse scandal will haunt us. Some 80% of Iraqi citizens now want America to leave as soon as possible. That, in combination with the fact that Ambassador Paul Bremer has publicly stated that U.S. and coalition forces would withdraw if asked to do so by a future Iraqi government, now presents a significant dilemma. No new Iraqi government will have legitimacy with its citizens unless it confronts America. If America selects the new government, it won't be legitimate. If the Iraqi people pick the government, it is likely to be anti-American. The challenge now is to create a new process to produce a legitimate government, without it being seen as America's product.

Last weekend CSIS sponsored a very high level private conference in a quiet setting outside of London. It was a productive few days that invited very frank and open discussions. The participants agreed that the primary problem we face in Iraq is to prevent it from sliding into factional strife - effectively breaking it up into three constituent parts. Based off of that premise, they outlined a path which I think makes good sense.

1. **Immediately seek a new United Nations resolution.**
2. **Recruit a "national unity" council to replace the Iraqi Governing Council.** This national unity council should explicitly include opponents of America's involvement, not just the segment of Iraqi leadership that embraces America's role.
3. **Accelerate the use of former Baathists to assume administrative functions within the government.** These Baathists should be required, however, to first pledge their support to the Iraqi national unity council.
4. **Appoint a U.S. Presidential envoy of unquestioned influence and integrity** (Jim Baker was considered a representative candidate) who could undertake a new outreach to Middle East capitals. The purpose of the outreach would be to listen to each of their perspectives, and enlist their support for the remainder of this agenda.
5. **Under the umbrella of a UN resolution, establish a Reconstruction Implementation Council patterned after the mechanism developed for Kosovo.** This takes the international legitimization effort out of the day-to-day politics of the UN and into the hands of a group that is committed to solving the problems in Iraq. Notionally the Council would include each of Iraq's regional neighbors (including Iran), along with 8-10 other countries willing to

commit a legitimate effort to helping the new government of Iraq get on its feet. This formula allows us to incorporate the regional countries, but in a forum where they can't dominate the deliberations.

6. Seek to involve the Arab League in concrete steps. Let supportive Arab capitals take the lead in developing an agenda that the Arab League could embrace for the reconstruction of Iraq.
7. Re-engage on the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Dr. Condoleezza Rice has been given the lead in this area, and she should *visibly* make it a priority during the next 3 months.

This seems to me a very pragmatic path to answer the opening question of this memo: Is the situation in Iraq lost? No, it is not lost - but the path to success now largely rests in the hands of others.

Sorry, this memo is a bit longer than usual, but I felt the topic merited a more in depth discussion. I am always grateful to hear your thoughts and comments. Please feel free to contact me with your reactions at JHamre@csis.org.

END

May 24, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Timeline

Here are some edits for this paper on what has been going on in Iraq.

Thanks.

Attach.
2004 Timeline

383.6

DHR:dh
052404-36



Please respond by _____

24 May 04

OSD 13113-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26262

May 17, 2004

(Handwritten circled 'D')

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Events in Context

Please assign someone to pull together for me what was going on between January 13 when the abuse was discovered and the day that *60 Minutes* ran it - everything that was going on in the world and what DoD was doing, what *v* were working on, so I have a good sense of that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051704-21

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

DR 5/24
Sec Def —
First Cut
C 5/24

OSD 13114-04

2004 Timeline (13 Jan - 28 Apr)

Date	Event
13 Jan 04	SPC Darby reports cases of abuse at Abu Ghraib
16 Jan 04	LTG Sanchez orders criminal investigation
18 Jan 04	Suicide bomber attacks American CPA headquarters in Baghdad
20 Jan 04	POTUS delivers State of the Union Address
23 Jan 04	Iraq Chief Weapons Inspector (David Kay) steps down
26 Jan 04	Afghanistan's constitution becomes law
28 Jan 04	30,000 more soldiers approved by SecDef
31 Jan 04	Pakistan fires top nuclear scientist for selling data to Iran and Libya
1 Feb 04	Hundreds of Muslims killed during pilgrimage
1 Feb 04	Super Bowl XXXVIII - Force Protection
2 Feb 04	POTUS calls for independent commission to study the country's intelligence-gathering operations
2 Feb 04	POTUS releases budget
3 Feb 04	Ricin found in Senate office
4 Feb 04	SecDef budget testimony
5-8 Feb 04	Wehrkunde Conference in Munich
5 Feb 04	CIA Director says intelligence could have overestimated the actual Iraqi arsenal
5 Feb 04	Protests in Haiti / Armed rebels take control of Gonaïves
5 Feb 04	U.S. Begins Fingerprinting Foreign Visitors
7 Feb 04	Bomb kills dozens in Moscow subway
10 Feb 04	SecArmy task IG to analyze internment, EPW & detention policies, practices & procedures
10-11 Feb 04	Suicide bombs kill dozens of Police and Army applicants in Iraq
11 Feb 04	POTUS proposes Seven-point plan to prevent proliferation of nuclear equipment
11 Feb 04	President Bush's National Guard records released
12 Feb 04	Iranian nuclear plans found undermines Tehran's credibility
15 Feb 04	Sudanese conflict re-intensifies
18 Feb 04	Train explosion kills hundreds in Iran
19 Feb 04	Pentagon Officials arrive at USAFA to investigate allegations of sexual assaults on female cadets
20-26 Feb 04	SecDef travel to CENTCOM AOR
23 Feb 04	Army cancels Comanche program
29 Feb 04	U.S. Marines enter Haiti
4 Mar 04	Judge convicts three in "Virginia Jihad" case
7 Mar 04	Israeli army raids refugee camps
8 Mar 04	Iraq TAL approved by Governing Council
9 Mar 04	Tenet testifies to SASC

2004 Timeline (13 Jan - 28 Apr)

12 Mar 04	MG Taguba completes investigation
12 Mar 04	South Korean President Roh impeached
18 Mar 04	SecState labels Pakistan "major non-NATO ally"
19 Mar 04	Taiwanese President Chen shot on eve of elections
20 Mar 04	Charges preferred against six U.S. soldiers
22 Mar 04	Israeli forces kill Hamas leader
22 Mar 04	US/ROK Exercise -- Foal Eagle '04
23 Mar 04	SecDef testifies to 9/11 Commission
26 Mar 04	NATO pledges ships & aircraft to help safeguard Olympics
27 Mar 04	Growing doubts on vaccine in military; some refuse, citing lack of Iraqi anthrax
28 Mar 04	Terrorism cited in Uzbekistan violence
29 Mar 04	NATO expansion - 7 new countries admitted
1 Apr 04	White House admits to withholding Clinton administration terrorism documents
3 Apr 04	Madrid bombing suspect kills himself
4 Apr 04	U.S. troops attacked in coordinated effort order by al-Sadr in several Iraqi cities
6 Apr 04	LTG McKiernan (CG, CFLCC) approves Taguba report
13 Apr 04	Pakistani scientist reports North Korea possesses nuclear weapons
14 Apr 04	Bin Laden offers truce to Europe
	Hamas Leader Killed in Gaza
18 Apr 04	New Spanish Prime Minister recalls troops in Iraq
20 Apr 04	NS Bush picks U.N. envoy as Ambassador to Iraq
21 Apr 04	Ex-Pentagon official admits job deal - civilian got Boeing offer while overseeing Air-Tanker contract
21 Apr 04	Five coordinated suicide attacks in Basra kill 68 people
22 Apr 04	Train ignites massive explosion in North Korea
27 Apr 04	China rejects wider elections for Hong Kong
28 Apr 04	60 Minutes II report on Abu Ghraib
28 Apr 04	BG Kimmitt updates public on status of investigations
28 Apr 04	North Korea nuclear estimate rises -- # of bombs to 8

May 17, 2004

(Handwritten circled 'D')

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Events in Context

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TRAD

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051704-21

Please respond by 6/4/04

DR 5/24

Sec Def -

First Cut

C 5/24

OSD 13114-04

17 May 04

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28 Apr 04	North Korea nuclear estimate rises -- # of bombs to 8

May 19, 2004

248

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Desert Storm Compensation

Please make sure someone looks into that issue of compensation being sought by American POWs who were captured during Desert Storm.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051904-12

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

DR 6/25
6/24
Sir,
Response attached.
vr
/CDR Nosenzo
6/24

19MAY04

OSD 13116-04



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

Handwritten: 04/25

June 24, 2004 12:00 PM

FOR: LTG CRADDOCK

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

Handwritten signature: Powell A. Moore

SUBJECT: Status of SECDEF Snowflakes #051704-26 and #051904-12

Handwritten: 042

- You asked for a status update
- Snowflake 051704-26 Subject: Senator Leahy
 - We checked the Correspondence and Control System and cannot find anything from Senator Leahy regarding Bagram. We are currently checking with his staff.
- Snowflake 051904-12 Subject: Desert Storm Compensation
 - This has been passed between Policy, P&R and OGC. OGC will respond with status of the litigation.

Handwritten: 24 Jun 04

Attachments:
SECDEF Snowflakes

Handwritten: 19 May 04

OSD 13116-04

May 17, 2004

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator Leahy

IRA 9

Senator Leahy said I did not ever answer his question on 6/25/03 in Bagram.
 Please find out what I answered. I want to read it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051704-26

.....
 Please respond by 5/26/04

DR 6/20

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/
CDR Nosenzo
6/24

C 6/24

19MAY04

OSD 13126-04



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

Handwritten: 6/24

June 24, 2004 12:00 PM

FOR: LTG CRADDOCK

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

Handwritten signature: Powell A. Moore

SUBJECT: Status of SECDEF Snowflakes #051704-26 and #051904-12

- You asked for a status update
- Snowflake **051704-26** Subject: Senator Leahy
 - We checked the Correspondence and Control System and cannot find anything from Senator Leahy regarding Bagram. We are currently checking with his staff.
- Snowflake **051904-12** Subject: Desert Storm Compensation
 - This has been passed between Policy, P&R and OGC. OGC will respond with status of the litigation.

Handwritten: Iraq

Attachments:
SECDEF Snowflakes ,

Handwritten: 051904-12 May 04

OSD 13126-04

6/17
1230

To Secret

pub →

Paul Butler

May 25, 2004

EF-9713
I-04/007268

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Police Training in Afghanistan and Iraq

I would like a report on what police work has been done in **Afghanistan** by whom, at what numbers, over what **period** of time, what the **State Department** has done what the Germans have done, etc.

I would like the same thing for **Iraq**. I would like to know **precisely** what the Department of State has done, **how many** instructors they have, **how many people** they have trained, were they are on schedule, are they behind **schedule**, etc.

Please get it pulled together for me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052504-13

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

[Handwritten mark]

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nasim
6/18
DB 8/2

Afghanistan

25 MAY 04

03-05-04 14:03 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/26273

OSD 13127-04

4/18/04

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef
USD(P) *for (b)(6) 4/16*
I-04/007446-SO
JUN 19 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ASD

FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC)

[Handwritten signature]

SUBJECT: Police Training in Afghanistan and Iraq (U)

Afghanistan

- You asked a number of detailed questions about police training in Afghanistan and Iraq. Here is a *summary*, followed by a detailed explanation for Afghanistan (Tabs A-B) and Iraq (Tabs C-D).
- The State Department has been slow to start police training in both countries. DoD is working with State, providing equipment and infrastructure in Afghanistan and training in Iraq.

Afghanistan

- The State Department has now picked up momentum and will meet the initial objective of training 20,000 police by July, one month behind schedule.
- The supervision of deployed police, providing adequate equipment and infrastructure, and building the managerial capacity of the Ministry of Interior are the most significant challenges.

Iraq

- Sustaining police training and mentoring programs as multi-faceted as those we have in Iraq is a complex task that will require substantially more planning and resource allocation.
- Rapidly boosting the total numbers of Iraqi security forces on duty has been relatively easy, but now the emphasis must shift to a sustained effort to boost the quality of the police force.

9 Jun 04

COORDINATION: Tab E

Attachments:
As stated.

Prepared by: Cara Abercrombie and MAJ Terry Davis, SO/LIC Stability Operations (b)(6)

OSD 13127-04

09-06-04 16:38 IN

TAB

A

Afghanistan Police

- Together with Germany, the US will likely meet the Government of Afghanistan's goal of 50,000 trained national and highway police and 12,000 border police by December 2005, provided Germany accelerates its border police training.
- In the past year, the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has trained 12,558 patrolmen. See slide at Tab B.
- INL has constructed a Central Police Training Center in Kabul and five (of seven) Regional Police Training Centers (RTCs). There are 35 US trainers in Kabul and 450 US-trained Afghan trainers in RTCs and Kabul.
- Approximately 25 German trainers train commissioned and non-commissioned officers in one- and three-year programs at the national police academy in Kabul. Since 2002, they have trained 3,700 national police, with 1,500 more in training. They have also trained 750 border police.
- INL is just beginning to address the following key challenges:
 - Ministry of Interior capacity: INL is in the process of contacting a Ministry of Interior reform package. Starting July 1, INL will embed 30 senior level police advisors within the Ministry to oversee reform and development of plans and standards.
 - Equipment and Infrastructure: INL has provided communications linking provincial police chiefs (32) to the Ministry of Interior. INL also provides equipment and supplies, and contributes to an international fund for salaries.
 - DoD is providing \$60M of Counternarcotics funds this year to CENTCOM to increase police capacity, including providing equipment and infrastructure
 - Outstanding critical needs include: police station infrastructure, weapons and weapons training, communications, specialized equipment and vehicles.
 - Germany, with US support, solicited donations for these requirements at the May 18-19 Afghan Police Reconstruction conference in Doha.
 - Mentoring/monitoring: CFC-A is deploying military Mobile Assistance Teams to help assess local police units' procedures, administrative capacity, training and deployment plans, infrastructure and equipment.
 - CFC-A will provide findings to INL with the goal of energizing INL programs.

TAB

B



Security - Police

Summary as of 24 May 04:

Lead Nations:	<u>Germany and U.S.</u>	
Jun '04 Goal:		20,000*
Current Trained:	3,600	12,558
	750 border	
Increase since 22 March	600	3600
Assessment: Currently on track to reach goal of 20,000 police by June 2004.		
* national police, border police & highway patrol combined		

US Training Goals and Status:

- US Program will build 7 Regional Training Centers (RTCs) for Police, Border Police, and Hwy Patrol in same cities as first 7 PRTs.
- Program has already completed rebuilding Kabul training facility. -Gardez, Mazar, Kandahar, Jalalabad & Konduz RTCs operational with capacity of 1,000 students each.
- Herat and Bamiyan RTCs planned Spring
- Attrition rate for trainees after graduation is than

Afghan Initiatives and Status:

- MOI developed a comprehensive reform program which includes revenue generating initiative such as traffic regulations and a fine system as well as development of a new payroll and financial management system. INL is reviewing proposals and will make selections shortly.
- MOI completed deals to purchase weapons from the Czechs, which have been delivered and is negotiating a deal to purchase vehicles from Russia. USG continues to assist with negotiations for a weapons donation from Ukraine.

German Training Goals and Status:

- Rebuild Kabul police academy and commence 3 year (officers) and 1 year (NCO) programs – construction completed, Academy training underway.
- Provide trainers for two US regional training centers – underway.
- Assist Ministry of Interior with organizational reform-planning underway, but transferred to U.S.

TAB

C

OSD Policy
6/10/04

Iraq Police

- DoD's lead role in training Iraqi police is an unusual arrangement driven by unusual circumstances. When the environment in Iraq permits, State will assume its normal lead role in training local police forces.
- The 2004 Supplemental allocated \$1.147B to train and equip Iraqi Police. The administration of that money is divided between DoD and INL.
- As of 8 June 2004, Iraq had approximately 89,000 police officers on the payroll. See chart at Tab D.
 - Select coalition Military Police have conducted Transition and Integration Program (TIP) training at fifteen sites country-wide since June 2003.
 - 21,055 police officers have graduated from one of the 3-week (TIP) programs.
 - With State Department INL funding, Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) developed the eight-week basic skills training program used at facilities in Jordan and Baghdad. To date, 5,707 recruits have received this training.
 - Jordan Academy will reach its full capacity of 3,000 students by this summer.
 - Academies in Baghdad and Mosul currently have a cumulative capacity of over 1500 and plan to expand the cumulative number to 2500 students.
 - INL is preparing to establish a training center in Baghdad to provide specialty training such as fighting organized crime, anti-terrorism, and drug enforcement.
 - INL will establish agreements with ICITAP and various U.S. law enforcement agencies to provide trainers.
 - INL will provide the field support.
 - Mentoring/monitoring: INL is planning to fund 500 U.S. Iraqi Police Advisors (IPA) in Iraq. Nearly 300 are currently in country. IPAs are responsible for supervising the field training and mentoring of Iraqi police after they receive classroom training.

TAB

D



Iraqi Security Forces Personnel & Training Summary

	Required	Off Duty		Total On Duty	In Academy Training	In TIP Training	Total On Duty & Training	
		Untrained	TIP Trained					Academy Trained
Iraqi Police Service (IPS) 1	89,369	62,236	21,055	5,707	88,998	1,883	500	91,381
Dept of Border Enforcement (DBE) 2	20,420	0	0	179	18,307	101	0	18,408

	Required	On Duty	In-Training	TOTAL
Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) 3	35,000	4,057	2,753	6,810
Defense Corps (DC) 4	40,556	33,343	1,667	35,010



Iraqi Security Forces Personnel & Training Summary (cont)

	Required	On Duty	In Training	TOTAL
Facilities Protection Service (Ministries MISC (FPS))	73,992	73,992	120	74,112
	Total Required: 259,337			Total on Duty and in Training: 225,721

- 1 New requirement from MNF-I 22 Apr based on better census data. IPS implementing new reporting procedures
- 2 OSC SITREP 29 Apr. DBE includes Border Police, Customs, Immigration, Nationality. There is no TIP training for DBE but Border Police received basic sentry training
- 3 MNF-I C3 Effects NISF Roll-up
- 4 **OSC SITREP 29 Apr. ICDC includes the 36th ICDC BN**
- 5 FPS requirements changed by Ministries. Numbers are estimated. Source OSC SITREP

**Number required and total on duty reflects best available data in
the wake of recent combat operations.
Re-assessments and updates are continuing**

TAB

E

COORDINATION

Police Training in Afghanistan and Iraq

ISA/NESA	Paul Hulley	3 June (Draft) 9 June (Final)
SO/LIC CN	DASD Marybeth Long	3 June (Draft) / 8 June (Final)
J5/ADDPM-A	COL Kevin Wilkerson	3 June (Draft) / 8 June (Final)
J5/ME	LTC John Hall	3 June (Draft) / 9 June (Final)
CPA	Matthew Gerke	3 June (Draft) / 9 June (Final)
OSD GC	Chuck Allen	3 June (Draft) / 9 June (Final)
OSD(C)	Mary Tompkey	3 June (Draft) / 9 June (Final)

720

MAY 25 2004

TO: Pete Geren

cc: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: ICRC Fix

I do think it is important that we send a high-level representative, like Tillie Fowler, to meet with the ICRC, and we ought to include someone like Eliana Davidson. But before we do, we ought to have already implemented the fix that we believe is appropriate, so we can brief them on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052104-9

..... 0000000000000000001

Please respond by _____

383.6

25 May 04

MFR

May 24, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Inform Senator Bennett

At 1510 hrs, 28 May, I informed Powell Moore that David Martin may break the Hong Suite. Powell indicated that he would call Senator Bennett (Hong is the shoplifting incident)

If the situation changes with respect to Karpinski, please make sure you inform Senator Bennett.

*15/28
383.6*

Thanks.

Attach.
5/20/04 Moore memo to SecDef, response to SecDef memo #052004-8

DHR:dh
052404.31

.....
Please respond by _____

24 May 04

HOT

May 20, 2004

TO: Powell Moore

c c : Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Bennett

Powell Moore, I would like you to report back to me within 48 hours on what you are going to do with Senator Bennett on precise steps. Specifically I am thinking about surprise visits, an officer at the prison all the time, that type of thing.

Pete Pace, you should help him get a good answer.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-8

.....
Please respond by 5/22/04

*Sir,
Response attached C 5/21
U/R. DR 5/24
LTC Swopple*

323.6

20 MAY 04
24 MAY 04

DA 5/24



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

May 20, 2004 5:45 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

Subject: Response to Senator Bennett, SECDEF Snowflake# 052004-8

- As soon as you informed me on the afternoon of May 19 that Senator Bennett had spoken with you about a floor statement he planned to make, I called him to make sure that we had a clear definition of the information he needed and to reaffirm your offer of support. He advised me that he had already made his statement right after his conversation with you.
- Moreover, he said that a primary purpose of his call to you was to be able to say in his floor statement that he had passed along his suggestions about fundamental approaches commanders should take to avoid similar situations in the future. These included surprise inspections and ensuring there is a duty officer at the prison at all times, day or night. He cited General Eisenhower's principle that "areas that are not inspected deteriorate." I have underlined these suggestions in the attached statement and have given them to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- After reviewing his speech, we advised him that he misinterpreted the meaning of a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand (GOMOR). GOMORs are originated by general officers, not necessarily directed at them. No general officer has received a GOMOR regarding this incident, as his floor speech stated. Brigadier General Karpinski received a letter of admonishment rather than a GOMOR.
- Senator Bennett and his staff have expressed appreciation for our support.

cc: General Peter Pace
The Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments:
SECDEF Snowflake
Floor Statement

383.6

20 May 04

21 May 04

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PENTAGON RESPONSE TO IRAQI PRISONER ABUSE -- (Senate - May 19, 2004)

[Page: 55741] [GPO's PDF](#)

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, last week, along with a number of my colleagues, I went up into the room on the fourth floor in the Capitol where the Defense Department, the State Department, and the CIA come to brief us on classified information. I sat in a darkened room where we saw a slide show of the photographs that had been taken of Americans inflicting abuse on Iraqi prisoners. The pictures were revolting, they were disgusting, and they left us all with a sense of outrage that this had gone on, outrage that Americans had been involved in anything such as this.

I did not look forward to the experience. Indeed, I made the initial decision not to go. Then I decided: No, if I am going to be involved in examining what is here, I have to see the evidence, as revolting as it may be.

The sense of outrage that I and my colleagues felt about this was shared by all Americans, but in one sector of American society it seems to be even greater than anyplace else. There are some in this society who might not be able to guess what that sector is. But I would say the outrage that has been the strongest has come from those who serve in the American military.

Duty, honor, country--these are the watch words of the American military, and they were violated by those who took those actions in the prison in Baghdad. They did not do their duty. They dishonored the uniforms they wore as they abused those prisoners, and they brought disgrace on the country whose Constitution they had taken an oath to uphold and defend.

The sense of outrage is nationwide, but it is particularly focused among those who have sworn to uphold duty, honor, and country and saw their fellows in uniform violate those principles.

I rise to discuss this today because today is the first court-martial coming as a result of the investigations that have been conducted into this activity. This morning in Baghdad, Army SPC Jeremy Sivits pled guilty, was convicted, and sentenced to a 1-year imprisonment, reduction in rank, and a bad conduct discharge.

Now, there are those in our society who have less faith in the military, who say: These courts-martial are a part of a coverup; this is an attempt to gloss over what has happened; one cannot trust the military to investigate themselves; and we need a whole series of investigations by outside groups.

I believe the facts are that we will find out more what happened from the courts-martial than we would find out from any degree of investigation conducted elsewhere. I offer as a demonstration of the fact that the military can be trusted to act in matters of this kind the following chronology of what has happened with respect to this incident.

We now know that the abuse of the prisoners took place in the last quarter of 2003 dates, but sometime toward the end of that year the alleged detainee abuse occurred. Joseph Darby opened an e-mail thinking he was going to see pictures that he described as the performance of a particular unit. Instead, what had been downloaded on his computer were the photographs that my colleagues and I saw in room 407 of this building.

We do not know the exact dates. On January 13, 2004, SPC Joseph Darby opened an e-mail thinking he was going to see pictures that he described as a travelogue; a history of the performance of a particular unit. Instead, what had been downloaded on his computer were the photographs that my colleagues and I saw in room 407 of this building.

Specialist Darby was absolutely stunned. What did he do? Here were his fellow soldiers engaged in activity that was clearly in violation of everything he had been taught, people he wanted to feel close with and identified with, people who, perhaps, were his friends. What would he do? He did his duty, and he provided a CD of the abuse photos to the Army Criminal Investigation Command, or the CID, on January 13, 2004. On January 14, the CID began its investigation--no attempt to cover up. No attempt to hide or turn away from the fact that there was a potential difficulty. They began the next day, and they notified people up the chain of command of what they were doing.

On January 16, just 2 days later, Brigadier General Kimmitt announced that there would be an investigation by

[Page: S5742] GPO's PDF

Central Command. It had gone up all that way, that quickly. In just 3 days they were at the top levels of Central Command.

Two days after that, BG Janis Karpinski, who was the commander at Abu Ghraib prison, was admonished and suspended from her command. She was relieved just 2 days after this reached the attention of Central Command.

Additionally, the Abu Ghraib chain of command was suspended, from the battalion commander, a lieutenant colonel, all the way down. Just 2 days after this was brought to the attention of Central Command, the entire group was relieved.

Now, on January 19, a combined joint task force requested that Central Command appoint an investigating officer, and on January 31, Major General Taguba was appointed to conduct the investigation.

On February 10, the Secretary of the Army tasks the inspector general to conduct an analysis of the internment detention policies, practices, and procedures. It goes beyond just the prison: Look at the whole Army and our procedures to see what can be done to prevent this from happening again.

On March 12, General Taguba completed his investigation and briefed the commander of joint task force 7, Lieutenant General Sanchez. Also on March 12, Lieutenant General Helmly, who was the commander of the U.S. Army Reserve Command, directed that Command's inspector general to conduct an assessment of training for Reserve personnel on the issues of detainee treatment, ethics, and leadership to see if the training had broken down in a way that would cause this to happen. All of this was going on--the military acting on its own.

On March 20, the first charges were preferred

against six accused and announced by Brigadier General Kimmitt at a press conference. This is not something that got discovered by some investigative reporter digging in behind the scenes. This was something that was announced by the military after they had done a careful examination and moved in a way to protect the rights of every individual.

At that announcement, no names or units were identified so that they would not compromise the due process of those who were being accused.

On April 15, Major General Fay, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, appointed an investigative officer to examine the circumstances with respect to the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. That is the group where the commander was relieved within 2 days of discovering that there was an allegation of a problem.

On May 1, Lieutenant General Sanchez issued a memorandum of reprimand to six general officers and one letter of admonition to a member of the 800th Military Police Brigade as recommended by Major General Taguba. This is not something that they passed off to the GIs, the sergeants, the corporals, and the privates. This is something they took care of at the general officer level. Six general officers received a memorandum of reprimand. That is a career-ending experience for a general officer.

Then on May 7, Secretary Rumsfeld announced the independent review panel headed by former Defense Secretary Jim Schlessinger, including retired Air Force General Chuck Homer, former Representative Tillie Fowler, and former Defense Secretary Harold Brown. And then, today, on May 19, the first court-martial has taken place and Specialist Sivits was found guilty and sentenced.

The lesson that comes from this list of actions is a lesson that the world should heed. The lesson for Iraqis and other nations is that this is how democracies handle their problems. This is how Americans face the difficulties that arise when there is a breakdown that occurs within our military. We do not hide it. We do not pretend it did not happen. We do not strive to find excuses. We act in the way consistent with the rule of law.

I hope everyone in the world would recognize the difference between the way we have responded to this and the way al-Qaida has responded to this. We have responded to it by exercising the rule of law and seeking those responsible. They have responded by taking an innocent American civilian, who had nothing whatever to do with any of this, and cutting off his head, live and in color on international television. That is the difference between Americans and al-Qaida when faced with a problem.

So that is the first lesson I hope the world will take from the way we are handling this. The lesson that the military should take from this is that the rules are there to be obeyed. The lesson that should go forward from Specialist Sivits' court-martial, from the six general officers who got the memorandum of reprimand and from the investigations that are still going forward is that if the rules are broken, you end up in Fort Leavenworth.

That is the lesson that should come out of this for the American military, and I believe it is being received there.

The lesson for the commanders, those who are now responsible and who have taken over to replace those who were relieved, is this. It comes from a statement by General Eisenhower, who knew something about military discipline. He said: "Areas that are not inspected deteriorate."

Let's go back to Specialist Sivits for a moment and find out from his statements relating to his court-martial what really happened. I am quoting now from the Washington Post:

Sivits told investigators that the abuse would not have happened had higher-ranking members been present. "Our command would have slammed us," he said. "They believe in doing the right thing. If they saw what was going on, there would be hell to pay."

That statement echoes testimony given by one of the initial investigators on the case. During a session similar to a grand jury proceeding, Tyler Pieron, an Army criminal investigator, said the abuses occurred, "after the chain of command had changed shifts and gone home."

* * * * *

Sivits said he did not report the abuse to his commanders because [he was told not to by a friend] "and I try to be

friends with everyone. I see now where trying to be friends with everyone can cost you."

I spoke with Secretary Rumsfeld this morning about this lesson, the lesson of command. It is fine to change the command, but we must examine what caused the problem and change the procedures. Even though the rules were there, the procedures broke down. There was not a duty officer on duty. We have been told that this abuse took place between 2 and 4 in the morning when no one was around. I raised with Secretary Rumsfeld the importance of seeing to it from now on that the new commanders of the prison make sure there is a duty officer there all night long.

Back to Eisenhower's dictum, there should be snap, surprise inspections. People in the prisons should never know when someone might drop in, unexpected and unannounced, to see what is going on. Secretary Rumsfeld concurred. I believe that is the lesson that command should receive from this experience, and I believe it is the lesson they will learn and they will follow.

As sorry as this chapter is in our proud military history and as deep as this stain has become upon America's honor, it is not the first time we have seen such chapters. It is not the first time we have endured such stains. I wish I could say it is the last time this will happen, but even in this morning's news we are hearing that there are more pictures, that it may have been more widespread than we thought. With human beings as imperfect as they are, it is inevitable that at some point in the future someone else will break the rules, violate his oath, and take actions that will cause all Americans to mourn, as we do over these actions.

Given that history, that it has happened before and perhaps will happen again, we should remember what we did as a nation when it happened before and what we are doing now. We dealt with it. We went after those who were responsible, discovered who they were, gave them their full due process, but when they were convicted, they were punished. They were dealt with. Then we made the changes that were necessary to see to it that it wouldn't happen again. Then we got past it.

We have not allowed those past chapters in our history to deter us from our destiny as a nation. We should do the same thing now. We are in the process of discovering who the guilty are. We are in the process of conducting courts-martial. Specialist Sivits is just the first. Charges have been

proffered against others and additional courts-

[Page: 557431 GPO's PDF

martial will be forthcoming. We are in the process of making the changes--not just the change of command but the change in procedures to see to it that this will not happen again.

As we have done in the past, we must get through this and not let it deter us from our overall goal of why we are in Iraq. We must not fixate on this stain on our honor to the point that we become so muscle-bound that we cannot proceed forward in our mission.

What is our mission? Speakers who have addressed this before me have made that clear. Our mission is to provide freedom and security for the people of Iraq. I believe that means freedom and security for the Middle East generally. I believe that means transforming the world in which Americans live and an increase of freedom and security for our Nation as well. These are worthy, indeed noble goals, and we must not be deterred from seeking them by preoccupation with this particular outrage.

I close with a conversation I had over the weekend. Like many of us over the weekend, I went home to Utah and I participated in Armed Forces Day. It was a poignant Armed Forces Day for a variety of reasons, because many of

the people who were there were families of those in the military who were there without their family member--that is, children, husbands, wives, mothers and fathers of Utahns who are serving in this war and who are not home with their families to enjoy the delightful spring day at Murray City Park where everyone was having a picnic and a good time. Set up in that area was a series of flags, one flag for each individual who had fallen in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Of course, the majority of flags were American flags, but I was struck by the number of British flags, Italian flags, Polish flags, Spanish flags--one I did not recognize, an Ukrainian flag, an Estonian flag. We are providing the leadership, but many countries in the world are responding to us as we launch on this mission.

On Armed Forces Day I sat next to a colonel. He was not a Utahn; he had come to participate in the activities. We visited over lunch. With the Army, he has been in Kosovo, he has been in Bosnia, he has been in Afghanistan, he has been in Iraq, and he was on his way back to Iraq.

I said to him: Colonel, tell me what it is like. You have been there, you have been on the ground. Tell me what it is like. He gave me an answer we hear a lot. Indeed, it was the first sentence out of his mouth that comes out the same as many others. He said: Well, things are not nearly as bad as the U.S. press would have you believe. Things are really going fairly well in many parts of the country. But we have problems.

We talked about some of the problems. He made this observation that I think should keep us thoughtful as we address our mission in Iraq. He said: You know, whether it is Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Iraq, the same thing is true: Those people are just like us in that all they want is to have their children be able to walk out of the door and be safe on the street, to be able to go to school without intimidation and learn what they need to learn to get a decent job and live a decent life. That is all they want in Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, or Iraq--just like us. That is what we want in America. To bring that to Iraq and give the people of Iraq that opportunity, with their wives and their children and their grandchildren, unfortunately requires force of arms.

Americans, British, Italians, Poles, Spaniards, Ukrainians, Estonians, are willing to risk their lives to bring about that goal. We must never lose sight of the importance of that mission or of the sacrifice that has gone into achieving it. We must never turn back simply because there are those who have put a stain on American honor by the way they have behaved.

I pay tribute to the Armed Forces. I pay tribute to the chain of command that is dealing with these challenges. I pay tribute to those who are willing to face the problems and not back away from them or cover them up. We must support them in their efforts. We must not smear the entire establishment because of the actions of a few.

I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennett). Without objection, it is so ordered.

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May 25, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Advisory Boards

334

Please take a look at some of these advisory boards and let me know if there are any you think we could usefully discontinue.

Thanks.

Attach. *4/29/04 DuBois INFO PAGE on DoD Advisory Boards*
~~5/14/04 ASD(ISP) memo to SecDef OSD 76611-04~~

DHR:dh
052504-20

.....
Please respond by 6/25/04

5/25/04

Information Paper on DoD Advisory Boards

- The Department currently utilizes 60 advisory boards, 34 of which were established at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. Twenty-five were created in statute by the legislative branch, and one was established by Executive Order. A listing of these boards and their missions is at Tab 1. This listing is also found at the DoD Federal Advisory Committees website: <http://faca.disa.mil> under the Advisory Committees tab.
- DoD advisory boards which have private citizens as members are subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. I. This statute not only recognizes the merits of seeking advice and assistance from experts outside the government, but it allows the executive branch to receive advice that is relevant, objective, and open to the public.
- Department advisory boards can be established on a long-term basis to address continuing issues, or they can be established on a short-term basis to address a specific issue. Long-term boards can be established for two-year periods and can be renewed for additional two-year periods thereafter.
- Under the law, advisory board meetings must be announced in advance and must be open to the public. All or part of an advisory board meeting may be closed, however, based on one or more of the provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c).
 - As an example, advisory board meetings may be closed to the public when the board will discuss classified information.
- The law also requires advisory boards to keep and make available to the public minutes of open and closed meetings, including an accurate description of and the resolution of each matter discussed by the board.
- Department advisory boards are independent entities. While they report their findings to the Department leadership, their recommendations are not subject to direction and control by the Department.
- It has been the Department of Defense's policy for the past 15 years to appoint all private sector board members as Consultants, also known as Special Government Employees. After agreeing to serve, potential members are vetted through the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (White House Liaison) and various Principal Staff Assistants who utilize the board

and/or receive their advice. Nominees are also required to fill out financial disclosure reports if the board they serve on makes recommendations that could affect the expenditure of government funds in the future. Board members may accept travel and per diem, but are rarely compensated directly for their work.

- The General Counsel of the Department of Defense notifies advisory committee members by letter to contact the Standards of Conduct Office (SOCO) for advice concerning ethics issues relating to their appointment. SOCO assures that the members' confidential financial disclosure reports are completed before their first meeting. Committee members also complete a Foreign Activities Questionnaire and execute a disqualification from participation in any particular matters involving financial interests listed on the confidential financial disclosure report. SOCO attorneys provide an ethics briefing to the Committee members. A guide for current committee members is distributed at a committee meeting and can be found at <http://www.defenselink.mil/dodnc/defenseethics> under "ethics resource library" and under "DoD guidance."
- Advice provided to the Department has been critical to current transformation efforts, keeping the Department informed on cutting edge issues from the latest best business practices to state-of-the-art science and technology developments. This advice cannot be drawn exclusively from internal government sources. We simply do not have the expertise or those with professional networks with access to the kind of information needed. This advice often has a direct impact on future military operations and the welfare of the war fighter.
- If the Department were to use survey instruments and contractual arrangements to gather the advice provided by advisory boards, the costs would be significantly higher. Most support provided to these committees is done by federal employees who manage these committees as a collateral duty to their principal duties.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES

As of 04/29/2004

Type of Committee: Statutory (Total - 25)

Presidential (Total - 1)

Discretionary/Established by Secretary of Defense (Total - 34)

Committee Name	Type	Description
<u>Advisory Council on Dependents' Education (ACDE)</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDiS), on improvements to achieve and maintain a high quality public educational program through secondary school for minor dependents in overseas areas as defined in section 1411, Public Law 95-561, as amended.
<u>Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction</u>	Statutory	Assesses the capabilities for responding to terrorist incidents in the U.S. homeland involving weapons of mass destruction. Examines response capabilities at the Federal, State, and local levels.
<u>Air University Board of Visitors</u>	Discretionary	Assists the Air University in sustaining effective programs pertaining to the educational, doctrinal, and research policies and activities of the Air University, and advises the Secretary of the Air Force, through the Commander, AU.
<u>Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support (ARMS) Executive Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Studies the ARMS Initiative and reviews the Army's plan for its implementation; makes specific findings and recommendations concerning the concept, executability, and overall soundness of the plan; assesses government and industry expectations for the ARMS Initiative; evaluates the incentives being proposed under the ARMS Initiative Implementation Plan (AIIP); reviews and makes specific recommendations on the applicability and adequacy of the loan guaranty program and planning grants; reviews and determines which existing public laws, regulations, and policies are currently available to fulfill the ARMS Initiative; and, reviews and comments on the Army's plans for Plant Reutilization, Emergency Planning, and the Disposal of Excess Plant Equipment.

<u>Armed Forces Epidemiological Board</u>	Discretionary	Serves as a continuing scientific advisory body to the Surgeons General of the military departments and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) providing them with timely scientific and professional advice and guidance in matters pertaining to operational programs, policy development and research needs for the prevention of disease and injury and promotion of health.
<u>Army Education Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary (Auth by Law)	Provides the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, and the Army's senior leadership with expert and continuous advice on Army educational programs. Advice provided relates to educational policies, school curriculums, educational philosophy and objectives, program effectiveness, facilities, staff and faculty, instructional methods, and other aspects of organization and management.
<u>Army Science Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition), the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and major Army Commanders on scientific, technological, and acquisition matters of interest to the Department of the Army.
<u>Board of Advisors to the President, Naval War College</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the President, Naval War College in educational and support areas. Reports or opinions, suggestions and recommendations of the Board will be made to the President, Naval War College. The President, Naval War College shall advise the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations of opinions and recommendations made by the members of the Board which should receive consideration by a higher authority.
<u>Board of Advisors to the Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Superintendent and the Secretary of the Navy on naval graduate education programs, assessing the effectiveness of the school in accomplishing its mission and inquires into the curricula, instruction, physical equipment, administration, state of the student body, fiscal affairs, and other matters relating to the operation of school programs.
<u>Board of Regents, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences</u>	Statutory	Provides advice and guidance to the Secretary of Defense through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs for the operation of the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences; to assure that said operation is in the best tradition of academia and in compliance with the appropriate accreditation authorities,

<u>Board of Visitors, Joint Military Intelligence College</u>	Discretionary	
<u>Board of Visitors, Marine Corps University</u>	statutory	<p style="text-align: center;">comme e policie</p> examines all aspects of the University's Professional Military Education operations; and provides such oversight and advice as s necessary to facilitate high educational standards and cost
<u>Board of Visitors, National Defense University</u>	Discretionary	students, curricula, educational methods, research, facilities, and administration of the National Defense University (NDU). Principal components of NDU are: Armed Forces Staff College, re die of D
<u>Board of Visitors, Western Hemisphere Institute for Security</u> <u>(WHINSEC)</u>	Statutory	Provides to DoD expert advice on the operations and management of the Institute. Inquires into the curriculum, instruction, physical Equipment, fiscal affairs and acaderric methods of the Institution and any other matters that it or the Secretary of Defense deems appropriate. Reviews WHINSEC curriculum and determines whether it complies with applicable U.S. laws and regulations consistent with U.S. policy goals toward the Western Hemispheres and adheres to U.S. doctrine appropriately of of th

<p><u>Chief of Engineers Environmental Advisory Board</u></p>	<p>Discretionary</p>	<p>Serves as advisor to the Chief for developing policy and procedures for Corps Programs; ascends and advises upon natural, social and cultural resource management issues associated with Corps plans, projects and programs; provides advice aimed at both identifying and resolving existing environmental issues with new or expanded Corps missions; advises on the development of workable methods for quantifying natural, social and cultural resource management costs and benefits of Corps programs and in expressing these in terms of both their tangible and intangible consequences; and, explores and advises on new directions where the Corps, acting as the national engineering agency, can continue to solve not only the engineering and economic aspects of new challenges, problems, and opportunities, but also those environmental features for which it has responsibility.</p>
<p><u>Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel Advisory Committee</u></p>	<p>Discretionary</p>	<p>Provides an avenue of communications by which a distinguished group representing scientific, academic, engineering, and political communities may advise the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) on questions related to national seapower. In pursuing its objectives, the CEP may operate in committees composed of selected Panel members to conduct detailed examinations of matters related to national seapower.</p>
<p><u>Defense Acquisition University Board of Visitors</u></p>	<p>Statutory</p>	<p>Advise the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) and the President of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) on "organization management, curricula, methods of instruction, facilities and other matters of interest" to the DAU, as directed by 10U.S.C. 1746.</p>
<p><u>Defense Advisory Board for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve</u></p>	<p>Discretionary</p>	<p>Provides advice to the Secretary of Defense about issues concerning Reservists and their civilian employers, to include recommending policies and priorities for employer support actions and programs.</p>
<p><u>Defense Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Testing</u></p>	<p>Discretionary</p>	<p>Provides the Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), with assistance and advice on matters pertaining to military personnel testing; reviews the calibration of personnel selection and classification tests to ensure the accuracy of resulting scores; reviews relevant validation studies to ensure that the tests have utility in predicting success in technical training and on the job; reviews ongoing testing research and development in support of the enlistment program; and, makes recommendations for improvements to make the testing process more responsive to the needs of the Department of Defense and the Military Services.</p>

<u>Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary
<u>Defense Business Board</u>	Discretionary	Makes recommendations to the Senior Executive Council (SEC) on effective strategies for implementation of best business practices of interest to the Department of Defense.
<u>Defense Environmental Response Task Force II</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Studies and provides an annual report to Congress on the findings and recommendations concerning environmental restoration at military installations closed or realigned.
<u>Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Board of Advisors</u>	Discretionary	the
<u>Defense Intelligence Agency Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	and technical expertise and advice on current and long-term mission of the Defense Intelligence Agency; provides a link between the scientific/technical and military operations and ration: o comb s control
<u>Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary (Auth by Law)	Secretary for Policy with independent, informed advice and opinion concerning major matters of defense policy; focus upon long-term, enduring issues central to strategic planning for the
<u>Defense Science Board</u>	Discretionary	

<u>DoD Advisory Group on Electron Devices</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Military Departments with advice and recommendations on the conduct of economical and effective research and development programs in the field of electron devices.
<u>DoD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and Preschool Children, and Children with Disabilities</u>	Statutory	Advises the Director, Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) and Director, Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools (DDESS) unmet needs within the DDESS for the education of children with disabilities, comments publicly on any proposed DDESS rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists DDESS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDEA and Director, DDESS.
<u>DoD Education Benefits Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of Defense on the actuarial status of the DoD Education Benefits Fund; furnishes advice and opinion on matters referred to it by the Secretary; reviews valuations of the Fund; and, provides periodic reports to the Secretary and President and Congress on the status of the fund as required.
<u>DoD-Government-Industry Advisory Committee on the Operation and Modernization of the National Defense Stockpile</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Established pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-1(a)), and Section 3306 of Public Law 102-484, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, advises the Secretary of Defense concerning significant issues relating to the operations of the National Defense Stockpile (NDS) and recommends ways to effect a modernization of the NDS consistent with NDS material requirements and sound business management practices.
<u>DoD Historical Advisory Committee</u>		the Secretary of Defense, Departments, and the heads of such may choose to participate, regarding the professional historical methodology, program priorities, liaison with professional groups and institutions, and adequacy of resources connected with the various historical programs and associated activities of the DoD. These include: historical, archival, museum, library, art, curatorial, and related programs
<u>DoD Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Board of Actuaries</u>	statutory	Makes all actuarial determinations necessary to sustain the DoD Medicare-Eligible retiree Health Care Fund for the accumulation of funds in order to finance, on an actuarially sound basis, liabilities of the DoD under DoD retiree health care programs for Medicare-eligible beneficiaries.

<u>DoD Retirement Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Makes all actuarial determinations necessary to sustain the Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund for the accumulation of funds in order to finance, on an actuarially sound basis, liabilities of the Department of Defense under military retirement and survivor benefit programs.
<u>DoD Wage Committee</u>	Discretionary (Auth by Law)	Makes recommendations regarding wage surveys and wage schedules for blue-collar employees to the Department of Defense Wage Fixing Authority.
<u>Inland Waterways Users Board</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of the Army on matters relating to construction and rehabilitation priorities on the commercial inland waterways and harbors of the United States.
<u>Joint Advisory Committee on Nuclear Weapons Surety</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council on nuclear weapons systems surety matters that relate to protecting against inadvertent nuclear detonation or plutonium dispersal.
<u>Missouri River -- North Dakota -- Task Force</u>	statutory	Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of North Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.
<u>Missouri River -- South Dakota -- Task Force</u>	Statutory	Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of South Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.
<u>National Security Agency Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, on matters involving Signals Intelligence production, Information Security, science, technology, business procedures and management related to the mission of the NSNCSS.
<u>National Security Education Board</u>	Statutory	Develop criteria under the National Security Education Act of 1991 for awarding scholarships, fellowships, and grants to U.S. citizens and institutions; provide for wide dissemination of information regarding the activities assisted under the Act; establish qualifications for persons desiring scholarships or fellowships, and for institutions of higher education desiring grants under the Act. The Board will report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy & Resources), who is the designated representative of the Secretary of Defense.

<u>Naval Research Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Maintains an understanding of the technological needs confronting the Navy and Marine Corps, keeping abreast of the research and development which is being carried on to address them, and offering a judgment to the Navy and Marine Corps as to whether these efforts are adequate; senior scientific advisory group to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of Naval Research
<u>Ocean Research Advisory Panel</u>	Statutory	
<u>Overseas Dependents Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities</u>	Statutory	matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDDS.
<u>Planning and Steering Committee (Navy)</u>	Discretionary	Operations Executive Board in-depth technical assessments to U.S. and Soviet ASW developments and related technologies, critically review programs which potentially impact SSBN survivability, and evaluate intelligence efforts to identify and define ASW and SSBN survivability threats.
<u>President's Information Technology Advisory Committee</u>	Presidential	
<u>Scientific Advisory Board of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology</u>	Discretionary	scientific and professional advice and guidance in matters pertaining to operational programs, policies and procedures of the AFIP central laboratory of pathology for the Department of

<u>Semiconductor Technology Council</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	public and private investment; and, to seek ways to respond to the technology challenges for semiconductors by fostering precompetitive cooperation among industry, the Federal Government, and institutions of higher education.
<u>Uniform Strategic Advisory Group (SAG)</u>	Discretionary	Provides technical and scientific advice of qualified scientists and representative views of the scientific community to the Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) during the development of the SI tifi n ord
<u>Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Scientific Advisory Board</u>	statutory	Provides recommendations to the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Council on environmental research and development activities as prescribed in statute and assume additional advisory responsibilities as directed by the Council.
<u>Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense concerning the legal and policy considerations implicated by: a) the application of pattern queries/data correlation technology to counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence missions, and b) other DoD activities related to the war on terrorism.
<u>Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC) Charter</u>	Discretionary	
<u>Uniform Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel</u>	Statutory	Reviews and comments on the development of the uniform formulary by the DoD Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee.
<u>USAF Academy Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy which the Board decides to consider.

<u>USAF Scientific Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	recent scientific information as it applies to the Air Force; reviews and evaluates long-range plans for research and development and provides advice on the adequacy of the Air Force program; recommends usually promising scientific developments for selective Air Force emphasis and new scientific discoveries of techniques for practical application to weapon or support systems; makes a variety of studies designed to improve the Air Force Research and Development Program and, serves as a pool of
<u>U.S. Army Coastal Engineering Research Board</u>	Statutory	review research and recommends priorities of projects in consonance with the needs field and the objectives of the Chief of
<u>U.S. European Command Senior Advisory Group (SAG)</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Commander, U.S. European Command with advice, guidance, and assistance toward fulfilling its mission.
<u>U.S. Joint Forces Command Transformation Advisory Group (TAG)</u>	Discretionary	command processes.
<u>U.S. Military Academy Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	ne, cal cade
<u>U.S. Naval Academy Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	discipline, al affairs, academic Naval Academy that the Board 60 days of its annual meeting, recommendation to the President of the

file

May 14, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
CC: Paul Wolfowitz

PK

SUBJECT: Records of Prior Service

One of the investigators probably ought to take a look at the records^s of the people who were charged with problems in Abu Ghraib, and see what their records looked like in Bosnia and possibly Afghanistan, since apparently some of them were there also.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051404-7

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

DA 8/4

Sir,

Response attached.

vr

*Lt Col Greg Lengyel
8/4*

313.5

14 May 04

08/03/04

August 3, 2004

→
PMB

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Pete Geren/MG Maples

SUBJECT: Answer to Your 14 May 2004 Snowflake Question:
Records of Prior Service

You said, "One of the investigators probably ought to look at the records of the people who were charged with problems at Abu Ghraib, and see what their records looked like in Bosnia and possibly Afghanistan, since apparently some of them were there also."

- Bottom line: Background checks of U.S. Army personnel so far identified in the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib did not reveal indicators of aberrant behavior.
- OUSD(I) tasked the Director of the Army Staff, Headquarters U.S. Army, to have the Army's Central Adjudication Facility (handles background investigations relevant to the granting of security clearances) review the records of all individuals that were in some way connected to the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse investigation.
- A review of U.S. Army records revealed information on three of these individuals "that might have been indicative of potential abuse behaviors." Those indicators included: violation of a restraining order, disorderly conduct, and counseling for an adjustment disorder. **None of these three soldiers, however, have so far been implicated in the Abu Ghraib abuses and there is no record of misconduct by the three while on active duty in the Army in any other theater of operations.**

313.5

3 Aug 04

14 May 04

May 14, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Interrogation Methods

Please give me a copy of the paper people are waving around showing the authorized interrogation methods. I need to see what they have, and whether it is something I have already seen.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051404-4

.....
Please respond by 5/18/04

383.6

Forwarded to Sec. Del.
by Tav 5/14
FILE (CP)

Response Attached

5/14
C

14 MAY 04

INTERROGATION RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Approved approaches for

All detainees:

- Direct
- Incentive
- Incentive Removal
- Emotional love / Hate
- Fear Up Harsh
- Fear Up Mild
- Reduced Fear
- Pride & Ego Up
- Futility
- We Know All
- Establish Your Identity
- Repetition
- File & Dossier
- Rapid Fire
- Silence

Require CG's Approval:

Requests must be submitted in writing

- Change of scenery down
- Dietary Manip (monitored by med)
- Environmental Manipulation
- Sleep Adjustment (reverse sched)
- Isolation for longer than 30 days
- Presence of Mil Working Dogs
- Sleep Management (72 hrs max)
- Sensory Deprivation (72 hrs max)
- Stress Positions (no longer than 45 min)

Safeguards:

- ~ Techniques must be annotated in questioning strategy
- ~ Approaches must always be humane and lawful
- ~ Detainees will NEVER be touched in a malicious or unwanted manner
- ~ Wounded or medically burdened detainees must be medically cleared prior to interrogation
- ~ The Geneva Conventions apply within CJTF-7

EVERYONE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING COMPLIANCE TO THE IROE.
 VIOLATIONS MUST BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY TO THE OIC.

The use of the techniques are subjects to the general safeguards as provided as well as specific guidelines implemented by the 205th MI Cdr, FM34-52, and the Commanding General, CJTF-7

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-

INFO MEMO



04/5/26

U-0429/DR

May 24, 2004

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

FROM: *L.E. Jacoby* L.E. Jacoby, Vice Admiral, USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (U) Mr. Nicholas Berg

(U) The JITF-CT queried CIA-CTC, NSA, TTIC, and FBI regarding terrorism information related to Mr. Berg.

(U) What we know. Most of what we know regarding Mr. Berg's activities results from FBI interviews and Press reporting. It appears Mr. Berg was an independent business owner looking for contract opportunities in Iraq. He does not appear to have had a direct link to terrorism, though in 2002 he may have inadvertently provided passwords for computer access to individuals with al-Qaida links.

(U) On 25 March, the U.S. military contacted the Mosul Operations Base (MOB) regarding a U.S. citizen detained at an Iraqi police station in Mosul. The U.S. person was identified as Nicholas Berg. Mr. Berg was detained by Iraqi Police on 24 March after being observed by the police in a taxicab in Mosul. The Iraqi Police deemed Mr. Berg to be suspicious (NFI), although they had no information indicating he was involved in any illegal or terrorism-related activities. Iraqi Police subsequently notified the U.S. military.

(U) Mr. Berg was interviewed by FBI agents in Mosul between 25 and 26 March, and again on 3 April. Mr. Berg told agents he entered Iraq through Jordan to establish working relationships in the "antenna tower" business and to acquire contracts for his business, Prometheus Towers. Mr. Berg stated he had previously traveled to Mosul in late 2003. During the March interview, Berg told agents he was a "politically active Jew," and believed he could inconspicuously move in Iraq because he thought he could "blend in." FBI Agents and Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) officials emphasized the dangerous Iraqi environment to Mr. Berg. Prior to Mr. Berg's CPA-assisted release on 6 April, he was offered financial assistance to safely depart Iraq. According to CPA representatives, Mr. Berg declined the assistance.

(U) In 2002, Mr. Berg was interviewed by FBI officials in Philadelphia after determining his computer account at the University of Oklahoma had been used by suspected al-Qaida member Zacarias Moussaoui. While attending the University, Mr. Berg compromised his

000.5

24 May 04
17 May 04

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OSD 13135-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26312

computer account by providing his UserID and password to an unknown individual from a nearby flight school. The flight school used some University of Oklahoma facilities and dorms but did not have computer access. Following compromise of the computer account, Mr. Berg's logon information was passed to students at the flight school on a regular basis and became widely used by numerous individuals, including Moussaoui. During the 2002 FBI interview, Mr. Berg did not recognize a photo of Moussaoui or his name. The FBI assesses Mr. Berg was not otherwise connected to Moussaoui or terrorism-related activities.

(U) What we don't know. Beyond those indicated in press, we don't know who Mr. Berg's contacts were in Iraq.

(U) The exact nature of his activities in Iraq.

(U) The circumstances of his capture – where, when and specifically by whom.


(U) What we assess. Both Press reporting and information learned from interview with FBI officials suggest he remained in Iraq for business purposes. Apparently, Mr. Berg traveled extensively in this endeavor and appeared to shun normal precautions, such as using security personnel beyond a driver.

Prepared By: DIA, J2/JITF-CT (b)(6)

MAY 8 2004

DIA? any info?
C/S/25

May 17, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Nicholas Berg

0005

Has anyone figured out who Nicholas Berg was and what he was up to? It certainly sounds strange.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051704-27

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

MAY 25 2004 response attached

DIA 5/26

19MAY04

OSD 13135-04

May 17, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
Tiger Team

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Abusing Prisoners

383.6

Attached is a note I received from Andy Marshall, which is of interest.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/12/04 Director, Net Assessment memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
051404-3

.....
Please respond by _____

1705



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

C5H
04/5/14

12 May 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Marshall *Am*

SUBJECT: Abusing Prisoners

You may be deluged with advice on this matter, but you may find the attached two items sent to me by old friends of interest. The essence of the results of experiments and experience is that normal human beings when put in the position of guarding prisoners often will mistreat them. Close supervision is required to see that it does not happen.

I will send copies to Tillie Fowler and Jim Schlesinger.

In any case, you have my best wishes and support.



11-L-0559/OSD/26316

Ferguson, Eric, CIV, Net Assessment

From: Paul Berenson (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 11:17 AM
To: Marshall, Andrew
Cc: Cheney, Richard; Warner, Senator John; Christie, Tom
Subject: Abusing Prisoners is a Natural Human Tendency of Prison Guards

Dear Andy;

The reference to the prisoner tests I requested in my e-mail below has been provided to me. It is as follows:

Eaney, C., Banks, C., & Zimbardo, P. (1973). Interpersonal dynamics in a simulated prison. *International Journal of Criminology and Penology*, 1, 69-97).

This is a famous psychological test that is known as the 'Stanford Prison Experiment' that was conducted by Prof. Philip Zimbardo and associates in 1971. Prof. Zimbardo is currently a Professor of Psychology Emeritus at Stanford, and is a former President of the American Psychological Association.

As stated below, and in the subject title, the tests demonstrate that abusing prisoners is a natural human tendency of prison guards who are normal human beings. Psychotics and sadists would behave much worse including murder, which apparently also happened in Iraq.

This can be overcome by good training, and an appropriate command environment, neither of which apparently existed in Iraq. The MPs who were assigned to prison guard duty claimed they had no special training as prison guards, and the Commanding General from MI apparently passed the word that he would like the MPs guarding the prisoners to 'soften them up' for questioning. Given these conditions, it was inevitable the prisoners would be mistreated.

I suggest you pass this information to the Secretary of Defense and the military leadership so they are aware of the cause of the problem, and can take action to ensure it doesn't happen again. None of this excuses the behavior of the enlisted personnel who abused the prisoners, but it is unfortunate they will be punished for behaving in a way that could be expected in the environment in which they were put.

I will probably be getting additional information from my e-mail network that I will pass to you if I believe it may be helpful.

I hope this is useful

Very respectfully

Paul Berenson

(b)(6)

Paul Berenson (b)(6) wrote:

Dear Colleagues:

You may find the subject statement shocking, but it is true, and apparently not widely recognized. None of the commentary or testimony on Iraqi prisoner abuse gave any indication that anyone was aware of this fact. Most important, it applies to normal, average people, not just psychotics or sadists who will behave worse than the average person. The guards behavior in Iraq is probably more common than anyone is willing to comprehend.

I first became aware of this about 40 years ago when I read a description of a famous experiment conducted by a psychology or sociology professor at a university. I would like to get a reference to this paper so that I can send it to the Secretary of Defense, et al;

11-L-0559/OSD/26317

please help me in any way you can in finding a description of this experiment. Professors of psychology or sociology are likely to know of documentation of this experiment.

The experiment was conducted by the professor randomly splitting a group of randomly selected normal male students into two groups; one group became the prisoners, and the other group became the prison guards. He then put the prisoners in makeshift cells in a prison environment, and observed what happened. Very quickly, the guards, who were otherwise

quite normal, began to abuse the prisoners in various ways. The abuse started with mild abuse, but quickly got worse. The abuse got so bad that the professor had to terminate the experiment early. I also recall that the professor was forbidden to run any more experiments like this. What this tends to show is that people given absolute power and control over other people tend to abuse them. This same phenomenon tends to happen in non-prison environments such as fraternity hazing. You can probably think of other examples.

An extreme example of this tendency is genocide. Prof. Rudy Rummel, who devoted his life to documenting and understanding government mass murder summarized his conclusion in Rummel's Power Principle: "Power kills; absolute Power kills absolutely". His work is documented in his monumental book, "Death by Government" for which he was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.

It is important that this natural tendency for human beings to abuse people under their absolute control be recognized in order to counter it. If we can find the paper describing the experiment, it should be read by all who will be prison guards so they recognize the tendency they have to abuse prisoners, and can fight the tendency.

Please help me find the paper or a description of this experiment.

Nothing I say above should be misconstrued to justify or excuse the unacceptable behavior of U.S. prison guards in Iraq.

Thanks for your help

Paul

Ponomareff, Dmitry F, CIV, Net Assessment

While a 1st Lt, Military Police Corps, 32nd Infantry Division, Wisconsin National Guard Division, when it was mobilized 1961-62 : During Survival Escape and Evasion training, following the procedure of our host unit at Fort Lewis, the 4th Infantry Division, our MPs were used to guard and harrass troops in a fake PoW cage. In their attempt to make things "realistic," our lads became a bit too zealous, and officers from other units and out MPs complained, I met with division chief of staff, and it was stopped. When the Stanford experiment results were published a decade or so later, I was not surprised.

At Fort Irwin, while I was Acting Provost Marshal in the "Exercise Bristle Cone" maneuvers - 1962 - I received a command letter from a four-star general asking for details on reports that Military Intelligence interrogators (Reservists called up from the Washington, D.C. area) had roughed up Aggressor FWS and taken away their outer clothing and sleeping bags when they put them out in our compound on a cold desert night. Our MPs had given the "PWS" their sleeping bags - fortunately.

These and other experiences, including the day-to-day leadership challenge of keeping police discretion on a tight leash, heightened my sensitivity to these issues. Many years later, when I had gained some reputation as a military historian, in full expectation that difficulties along these lines would arise in the future, I wrote two pieces on the subject:

"Preventing Atrocity in Low Intensity Conflict," MILITARY REVIEW 63:11 (November 1983).

"Thinking the Unspeakable: On Cruelty in Small Wars," SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES 1:1 (April 1990).

Reportedly they showed "The Battle of Algiers" in defense circles before the Iraq War to sensitize them to these very pitfalls. Did they use it as a training film?

11-L-0559/OSD/26319

511012004

May 17, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Economic Issues in Iraq

IRAQ

Attached is a most interesting letter from Art Laffer on the subject of Iraq. I think you will find it interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/18/04 Laffer ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
051704-31

.....
Please respond by _____

*OS
5/26*

OSD 13137-04

19MAY04

11-L-0559/OSD/26320

✓
3/1

-----Original Message-----

From: Jax Schluenderberg [mailto:jax@laffer.com]**Sent:** Wednesday, February 18, 2004 1:35 PM**To:** (b)(6)**Subject:** Letter From Dr. Arthur Laffercc: L. D. Pita
LTG Craddock

②

February 18, 2004

Donald H. Rumsfeld
 Secretary of Defense
 1000 Defense Pentagon
 Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don,

Last week I was invited by a group of your finest (Marine officers) to a seminar at Camp Pendleton, which is only a few miles north of where I live. These guys are great and have been assigned to a variety of tasks involved in the transition of Iraq from an occupied, economically dependent territory to a self-governing economically independent country. They have their work cut out for them under the best of circumstances. Why I'm writing to you, however, is because I was led to believe both from written material and during the course of our conversations that these tasks are facing additional potentially insurmountable obstacles placed in their way by the Coalition Provisional Authority and other directives coming from the U.S.

Because of my experience with the domestic economy of Vietnam in the 1970-1974 period under George Schultz and my work on a post-Castro transition plan for Cuba with the Cuban American National Foundation, when it was ably led by Jorge Mas Canosa (who passed away five years ago), I thought you might be interested in my two-cents worth (which has been discounted even below two cents). Rather than criticizing what I may not have fully understood of the Bremer and CPA plans, I've limited myself to what I consider essential do's and don'ts for creating an economically viable society out of a war-ravaged former totalitarian state.

- A. Perhaps the most significant obstacle to reestablishing markets is the absence of a viable stable-valued means of payment and store of value (currency). To foster economic interchange, merchants, workers, savers and investors need a currency they can count on both over time and across space. This currency has to be stable in value over time to satisfy the needs of small savers, and to provide a basis for contracts and it has to be readily acceptable everywhere both inside and outside the region to facilitate trade and investment flows.

I can't begin to tell you how depressing it was to the local economy of Mexico in 1976 when the peso started to collapse after having been stable for years and years. Likewise, Argentina's recent abandonment of the currency peg (under de la Rúa) and the subsequent financial collapse is a tragedy of immense proportions. Our own return to dollar credibility in the late 1970s and early 1980s under Paul Volcker and Ronald Reagan was the *sine qua non* of America's renaissance. Time and again countries are forced to relearn the powerful dictum of a sound money.

Iraq does not have the ability nor does it have powerful enough political institutions to pursue, maintain and monitor its own currency *de novo*. Iraq, if it is to have its own currency at all, must have that currency immutably linked to the dollar or euro. My personal suggestion would be to use either euros or dollars as the domestic currency of

Iraq and don't even pretend to introduce a new Iraqi currency. Panama is dollarized literally, and lots of other countries are dollarized *de facto*, and the system works extremely well.

Attempting to set up a new currency puts at risk the entire Iraqi rehabilitation effort and could, if bad enough, force the lower echelons of the Iraqi economy into barter. Barter is inefficient, inconvenient and costly, and will materially impede the type of economic progress we all hope for. The upper levels will always be able to take advantage of foreign currencies.

- B. Also of exceptional importance for a new Iraqi government is the structure of fiscal policy (taxation, spending and the issuance of debt) at the national and provincial levels.

In countries like Iraq where financial markets are years and years away from sophistication, there is a virtual certainty that budget deficits will lead to overuse of the printing press and hyperinflation. Budget deficits also can lead to excessively high tax rates and widespread disregard and flouting of the laws. Therefore, clear and concise tax policy explicitly segregated between federal and provincial prerogatives is of the essence.

Iraq is extraordinarily fortunate to be blessed with oil. As such severance taxes on oil should be a mainstay for government revenues – severance taxes are about as efficient as taxes get. If set up correctly, a good system of oil severance taxes is effectively a tax on foreigners and should do the least damage to the domestic economy of any tax system I know. We have two states that use them extensively, Alaska and Wyoming. It also makes lots of sense to collect revenues on a comprehensive flat rate basis on imports. Any type of sin tax is also a good option because the economic damage the tax does is on the disfavored products. Also property taxes should be used at the provincial level – property and real estate are about the only items that can't escape local taxes by leaving. Any additional revenue supplements should be on a flat rate, broad-based, value added like tax.

Taxes that should be avoided are income taxes (especially progressive) and small taxes where the costs of collection approach or exceed the revenue actually collected. The keys to good tax policy are:

- i.) Tax those items most that can escape the least, and conversely tax those least that can easily escape. It makes no sense to tax something that then flees the jurisdiction, goes underground or stops working. You not only don't get the revenue, but you also lose the benefits of the productive services.
- ii.) Tax those things most that you least like (sin taxes). An additional benefit of sin taxes is that they do reduce the activity being taxed.
- iii.) Tax those things least where the collection costs are highest
- iv.) Broad based low rate taxes provide people with the least incentives to evade, avoid and otherwise not report taxable income and the least number of places where they can escape taxation.
- v.) Tax people fairly. People in like circumstances should have similar tax burdens. The perception of fairness is key to voluntary compliance.
- vi.) Make sure that taxation is not arbitrary or easily subject to discretionary changes. The power to tax in the wrong hands is an ugly weapon for exploitation.

- vii.) Lastly, collect only as much as you really need. Wasteful spending will always rise to the level of revenues.

These rules should help your efforts, if meticulously adhered to. Next to a bad money I know of nothing that will bring an economy to its knees faster than an unjust, inefficient, anti-growth, excessive system of taxation. This principal is universal.

On the spending side, priorities need to be set really quickly. In my view infrastructure is the first among equals such as: security (police), judiciary, water, electricity, telecommunications, roads, airports, hospitals and government itself. In the near term at least, school programs, women's issues, social redistribution and humanitarian projects are further down on the list. Once the economy is back on its feet there will be plenty of time to redress these wrongs. At the outset, government spending should be focused almost exclusively on getting the economy back on its feet as quickly as possible. Without production there's nothing to redistribute. Feigning a big heart is often the quickest path to disaster. Iraq needs endemic production and government can be instrumental in achieving its goal.

- C. Forgiveness of debt owed by Iraq to foreign creditors can be enormously beneficial to Iraq if and only if Iraq has the infrastructure to take advantage of the additional resources financed by additional debt. If Iraq's incentive structure and system of self governance isn't well ranged, new debt to replace old debt is money down a rat hole. You really don't want to replace old bad loans with new bad loans. No one wins. Allowing Iraq to incur additional foreign debt obligations should only occur after Iraq's economy and government have been established. You're going to make lots of mistakes and will learn a lot from those mistakes. The smaller the scale of the initial operations, the less Iraq will have to pay for lessons learned. The less costly the mistakes from which you learn, the better off Iraq will be.
- D. Regulatory policy should be simple, small and fair. Laws should be basic and enforceable with quick and decisive action for violation. Having laws on the books that are not observed or actively disobeyed undermines the moral authority of all government. Keep regulations to a minimum, keep them simple and enforce them.
- E. Trade policy should be as open and as free as possible, restricting only those products which really cause harm (drugs, weapons, etc.). For revenue purposes you may want a low rate, broad-based tax on imports. It's interesting to note that for most of our country's history, tariffs provided the lion's share of our tax revenues. Tariffs plus an oil severance tax could well be the lion's share of future Iraqi tax revenues.
- Trade is often an area where privilege and corruption take root. Here more than anywhere is where Iraq needs transparency, simplicity and fairness.
- F. A lot of attention is being placed on the need to provide an adequate number of jobs for Iraq. And while jobs per se clearly are important, increasing employment and creating jobs is often a catch phrase standing in for increasing output. In truth Iraq needs additional output far more than it needs more jobs. Now in some cases these two phrases are synonymous, but they may not be interchangeable in Iraq. Make work projects and avoiding reform for fear of losing jobs are sure fire losers. At no time and nowhere is it more important to recognize the primacy of efficiency, output and productivity than it is now in Iraq.
- G. Special industries like banking, glass factories, construction companies, etc. should be left to the marketplace. I know they are important, but so does every business person in Iraq. Those businesses will grow on their own if they are profitable.

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- H. Dismantling the former government and former military can be carried too far. Under Saddam Hussein there were no alternatives and therefore there are no substitutes waiting in the wings to take over the general functions of government and security. You do need an Iraqi presence to deal with, to support, and to nurture, in order for us to get out.
- I. Be very careful of U.S. quasi-governmental lobbying groups who see visions of sugarplums with each new contract with Iraq. These people rarely focus on what's good for the Iraqi people (or Americans for that matter) and yet they can wrap their desires in the full clothe of altruistic public interest.
- J. Don't expect Iraq or Iraqis to love us right away. Even though we have done an enormous amount for them, they still feel the intense pain of Saddam's vicious dictatorship and the ensuing war and will lash out at anyone near them. In due course, if we continue to behave honorably, they will come to appreciate all that we have done for them and they will respect us for all that we have sacrificed on their behalf.
- K. Our purpose for being in Iraq has absolutely nothing to do with our desire to develop a free-enterprise, pro-growth, democratic, capitalist nation. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was a threat to our way of life and as such we terminated that threat. Anything additional we do for the Iraqi people is truly out of the goodness of our hearts, not out of guilt. No matter what anyone may say, you were 100% correct in the actions you took. You make me very proud to be an American.

Hope these points are of some value. You have done and are doing the best job ever. I dream and hope for you continued success.

Your Buddy,

Arthur B. Laffer

cc: Steven Bucci
Catherine Malnardi
Paul D. Wofowitz

Dr. Arthur B. Laffer
Laffer Associates
5405 Morehouse Drive, Suite 340
San Diego, California 92121

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MIP
8 June 04
1 (3) Info P. 11
Sub 11.2

May 19, 2004

Paul Butler
6/21 TO

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Congressman Buyer

Congressman Buyer said yesterday that he is a JAG officer and was dumped him on his fanny. I don't know what that is all about.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051904-6

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

326

6/21
9/21/04

Sir,
Responses attached.
vr/
CDR Nosenzo
6/21

OSD .13139-04

TOTAL P.01

19 May 04

08872



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

INFO MEMO

June 14, 2004 - 5:00 PM

Paul Butler
6/21 →
Aug

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: MR. POWELL MOORE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Congressman Buyer - SNOWFLAKE

- The attached information paper responds to your note of May 19, 2004, which states: "Congressman Buyer said yesterday that he is a JAG officer and we dumped him on his fanny. I don't know what that is all about."
- The information paper provides a brief background on Congressman Buyer's discussion with Army Reserve in early 2003 concerning volunteering for active duty and reiterates longstanding DoD policy concerning the limitations on active duty by serving U.S. Congressmen.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment:
As stated

326

14 Jun 04

19 May 04

INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: Background for Response to SecDef Concerning Congressman Buyer

- This information paper responds to the SecDef note of May 19, 2004, which states: “Congressman Buyer said yesterday that he is a JAG officer and we dumped him on his fanny. I don’t know what that is all about.”
- In early 2003, Congressman Steve Buyer from Indiana’s 4th District, a colonel, Judge Advocate General’s Corps officer in the Army Reserve who served the first Gulf War before his election to Congress in 1992, discussed with the Reserve volunteering for active duty. He was granted leave of absence from Congress March 20, 2003, after telling House leaders had been called to serve in
- To be mobilized under current statutory authority, a Reservist must be in the Ready Reserve.
 - 1) Members of Congress occupy a “key position” and must serve in the Standby Reserve rather than the Ready Reserve. (The Standby Reserve is a pool of trained individuals who are not required to perform training. This is the Department’s solution to the ticklish question of whether Members of Congress can constitutionally also serve in the military.)
 - 2) Members of the Standby Reserve may be transferred back to the Ready Reserve when the reason for the member’s transfer to the Standby Reserve no longer exists. They may be ordered to active duty voluntarily only if the Secretary of the Military Department concerned, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, determines that not enough qualified Ready Reservists are available in the categories required. (With over 4,000 judge advocates in the Ready Reserve, transferring Congressman Buyer from the Standby Reserve to the Ready Reserve would have been inappropriate.) Congressman Buyer’s case did not meet this test, and no such determination was made.
- Congressman Buyer was subsequently informed by _____ of the Army in a letter, that while the Army appreciated his willingness to serve, _____ would not be safe for him or those who might serve with him to have a _____ in a war zone—an important ancillary consideration in this
- The Department has used identical reasoning for the other case that has arisen, a similar request from Congressman Kirk.

August 25, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Coalition Reduction/Adjustment Plan

Copy to:
 - DJS
 - J5
 - MSD(P)
 - D-MSD(P)
 IRA9

Please find out from the Joint Staff when they are going to produce a plan to work with the coalition to lance the boil, and allow some of them to reduce some numbers and adjust what they are doing in a way that helps them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 082504-23 (to computer).doc

.....
 Please respond by 9/3/04

SIR —

- This is a joint project between Policy & Joint Staff.
- High priority project — they want to get it right.
- you will see first brief on 9/8/04.

v/r
Jim

25 Aug 04



May 20,2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tearing Down Prison

Please dig in on this issue of tearing down Abu Ghraib prison.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/18/04 Bremer memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
052004-7

..... 188888888888881
Please respond by 5/28/04

383,6

OSD 13142-04

DR May 04



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

Call 5/20

May 18, 2004

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Paul Bremer *5/18/04*
SUBJECT: Abu Ghraib Draw-Down and Demolition

This memo provides a plan for the draw-down and demolition of Abu Ghraib prison that allows the President to announce immediately that evacuation will commence by June 1 and demolition will begin no later than August 31. The plan consists of rapidly constructing 2,000 "quick-build" temporary beds in eastern Baghdad for criminal detainees, and another 2,000 "quick-build" beds for security internees at Camp Bucca near Um Qasr. Immediately thereafter, we will construct an additional 2,000 "quick-build" at both locations for total of 8,000. Finally, work will commence on a 4,000-bed permanent facility in Baghdad which will open within two years. The project will cost about \$200M. The Iraqi Governing Council has requested closure of Abu Ghraib, so we will execute this plan using money from the Iraqi Development Fund.

It is possible to begin destruction of Abu Ghraib sooner, perhaps by June 30. This would require execution of the plan described above, and temporary relocation of about 3,000 security detainees in tent facilities at Camp Bucca and relocation of 1,400 criminal detainees at detention centers in Baghdad and Mosul. But this course of action has several important disadvantages. First, it requires two mass movements instead of one, and to more distant locations, with all the considerable risks of transportation. Second, large numbers of detainees will await permanent internment in temporary camps that are substandard. Without adequate protection from the summer heat, we would expect the same thing we observed last summer -- riots, mass escape attempts, greater difficulty with accountability and control, and greater threats to our soldiers. Third, prisoners will lack access to families and to legal counsel; and trials will not be feasible from a logistical standpoint.

For all these reasons, we would expect further criticism from human rights organizations, and think we may undercut the very objectives we are trying to symbolize with our commitment to close Abu Ghraib. These risks outweigh a gain of two months, so unless instructed to the contrary, I will proceed with the first option.

CC: Dr. Rice

~~SENSITIVE~~ BUT UNCLASSIFIED

May 20, 2004

383.6

TO: Pete Geren

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Ryan Henry

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: List of Steps

We have to pull together a list of all the steps that have been taken in DoD, Central Command and Southern Command since this was reported.

We need a master list of all of what has been done to correct the situation. I listened to Sanchez's testimony. He has done a lot, so has Abizaid, so have we. We need the list.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-14

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

*Provided to SD
June 21, 2004
during Geren-Myers meeting*

OSD 13144-04

COMNAVY

CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN SINCE REPORTS OF DETAINEE ABUSE AT ABU GHRAIB EMERGED

- **SECDEF Actions**
 - MG Miller JTF GTMO assessment
 - VADM Church Detainee Ops & Interrogation Review
 - Schlesinger Panel
 - SECNAV England GTMO review panel
 - Established policy on "Investigation of Deaths of Detainees in the Custody of the Armed Forces of the United States"
 - Establishing Detainee Ombudsman
 - Named Hon. Schlesinger as ICRC Envoy

- INVESTIGATIONS/ASSESSMENTS/REVIEWS (see attached)

- CHAIN OF COMMAND
 - Streamlined chain of command at Abu Ghraib, unifying responsibility for detention operations, law enforcement, investigations, and disposition of criminal cases under a single entity to improve efficiency (under MG Geoff Miller)
 - Added general officer responsible with responsibility for all detention and interrogation operations, Deputy Commanding General – Detainee Operations, to Multinational Force – Iraq (MNF-I) staff
 - Placed Military Police under tactical control of Deputy Commanding General – Detainee Operations for detention and interrogation support mission
 - Appropriate units are task organized under MNF-I
 - All lapses of accountability, escapes and disturbances are reported to the Deputy Commanding General – Detainee Operations and Commander MNF-I
 - Units conducting internment/resettlement operations have command policies that are brief and prominently posted.

- ACCOUNTABILITY
 - Immediately initiated criminal investigation at Abu Ghraib and requested appointment of investigating officer to conduct separate admin investigation under Army Regulation 15-6
 - Seven Courts-martial ongoing – additional Courts-martial likely to result from ongoing investigations

383.6

21 Jun 04 2 May 04

OSD 13144-04

- Suspended key members of chain of command of unit responsible for detainee security at Abu Ghraib
- Over 130 criminal investigations underway in the Army, Navy and Marine Corps

- DETENTION FACILITIES:
 - Improved force protection measures to protect coalition forces and detainees
 - Prominently displayed Geneva Conventions and facility rules in English and detainee language in all camps
 - Implemented plans to upgrade facilities for soldiers and detainees
 - Improved overall facility conditions for detainees at Abu Ghraib

- DETAINEE PROCESSING:
 - Increased rate at which detainee case files were reviewed and recommended for release or continued internment to ensure only those detainees posing a threat to security were detained
 - All detainee transfers are conducted using biometric automated system
 - Segregated males, females and juveniles within detention facilities so that no contact exists

- GENERAL, DETAINEE OPERATIONS:
 - Issued orders and command policies reinforcing the law of war, including the Geneva Conventions.
 - Reissued memorandum regarding: "Proper Treatment of Iraqi People During Combat Operations"
 - Issued policy memorandum number 18, entitled "Proper Conduct During Combat Operations," which emphasized need to treat all Iraqis with dignity and respect. This policy memorandum also contained a summary for distribution down to individual soldier level providing clear guidance and mandating training on:
 - ✓ Law of war and rules of engagement
 - ✓ Treating all persons with humanity, dignity and respect
 - ✓ Using judgment and discretion in detaining civilians
 - ✓ Respecting private property
 - ✓ Treating journalists with dignity and respect
 - Improved standard operating procedures for detainee operations:
 - ✓ Published comprehensive procedures for handling and treatment of detainees in all theater detention facilities

- ✓ Detention rules of engagement/rules for use of force and principles of Geneva Convention are briefed at every shift change and guard mount
- ✓ Reviewed procedures on detention, interrogation and detention facility administration and published to lowest level

- TRAINING:

- Conduct routine training at each guard mount on daily detention tasks and standards
- Use lesson learned in serious incidents and review for future efforts
- Mobile training teams deployed to assist in training Military Police and Medical Treatment Teams; used Guantanamo Detention Facility Teams to improve individual and unit knowledge
- CPA provided training on Arab cultural awareness

- INTELLIGENCE:

- Established system for intelligence fusion that decreases information cycle time (collection, analyze, disseminate)
- Refined transfer criteria to support continued rapid exploitation of high value detainees and release of low value detainees
- Assigned Joint Intelligence Task Force – Counterterrorism personnel at primary theater interrogation facilities to expedite exchange of counterterrorism information between agencies
- Established weekly Interservice Agency Targeting Board to focus HUMINT collection and targeting efforts within the theater to provide information sharing, internee access & tasking protocols
- Re-prioritized HUMINT requirements.
- Multinational Force – Iraq (MNI) assumed responsibilities for all HUMINT collection and analysis and received additional manning

- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Report Handling:

- Working with Congress and the ICRC to establish protocols for sharing appropriate ICRC documents
- Take Red Cross findings seriously and address them
- Mandated all Red Cross reports and working papers would be addressed to Commander Multinational Force – Iraq, and designated Judge Advocate General Multinational Force – Iraq as single entry point for those reports and papers
- Changed handling process of Red Cross reports so they go via Deputy Commanding General – Detainee Operations to Commander Multinational Force – Iraq and higher authority as rapidly as possible

720

file

May 20, 2004

774

452F

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: F-15 Basing

Here is a note from Jim Jones that is a concern. It seems to me you ought to make sure the basing concepts go through the tank.

Please come back to me with the views of the Chiefs and your views as to how we ought to proceed.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/18/04 EUCOM memo to SecDef re: F-15 Basing Proposals, Based on 27 April Discussions

DHR:dh
052004-17

.....

Please respond by 6/11/04

20MAY04

OSD 13147-04

rec'd 5/18/04

5-18-04

DDA S/20

To: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: F-15 BASING PROPOSALS, BASED ON 27 APRIL DISCUSSIONS.
MR SECRETARY,

AS I WAS NOT PRESENT AT THE 27 APRIL MEETING WITH GENERALS PACE, JUMPER, AND HANDY, I WOULD APPRECIATE AN OPPORTUNITY TO OFFER SOME THOUGHTS WITH REGARD TO THE F-15S AND THE BASING PROPOSALS WHICH WERE DISCUSSED.

BY WAY OF PREPARATION FOR DISCUSSION, THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS SOME OF MY THOUGHTS CONCERNING THIS ISSUE:

1. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

A. REDUCED CAPABILITY IN THEATER CLOSEST TO WESTERN EDGE OF "GREATER MIDDLE EAST".....MEANS GREATER REPOSE TIMES AND SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER SUPPORT PACKAGES FOR CONUS BASED DEPLOYMENTS.

B. IMPACT OF DIMINISHED ABILITY TO LEAD NATO'S AIR FORCES.

C. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES WITH REGARD TO U.K., ESPECIALLY IF ANNOUNCED NOW.

D. DISPROPORTIONAL RELIANCE ON CONUS BASED FORCES TO SUPPORT U.S. MISSIONS IN 91 COUNTRY THEATER

2. NATO/EUCOM TRANSFORMATION:

A. IMPACT ON NATO AIR POLICING/AIR DEFENSE THROUGH REDUCED USAF ASSETS IN THEATER.

B. REDUCED CAPABILITY TO SOURCE U.S. AIR FORCE ROTATIONS/CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NATO RESPONSE FORCE.

C. ALLIES WILL CONCLUDE THAT SUCH A REDUCTION IS NOT TRANSFORMATION, BUT IS A FORCE CUT.

D. POSSIBLY UNBALANCES EUCOM JOINT BASING PROPOSAL PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED.

3. THEATER RESPONSE FORCES:

A. GUARANTEED ACCESS FROM U.K. BASES, THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN WHERE WE BASE OUR FORCES.

B. F-15 PAYLOAD IS TWICE THAT OF THE F-16, SOLE DELIVERY PLATFORM OF SOME OF OUR BEST STANDOFF WEAPONS.

C. EXCESSIVE RELIANCE ON CONUS BASED AIR FORCES, WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE/PROVIDED.

4. FORWARD PRESENCE:

A. MAINTAINING MIX OF FIGHTERS FORWARD SUPPORTS SECDEF STRATEGIC GUIDANCE AND RECENT 10-30-30 TO EACH SERVICE.

B. REDUCES BY A FACTOR OF TWO STRATEGIC LIFT REQUIREMENTS (TON-MILE/TANKER/ TIME REQUIREMENT), AND DEPLOYMENT TIME LINES.

C. REMOVES DELIVERY SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS LEFT IN EUROPE

D. COMBAT UTILIZATION DATA FOR EUCOM BASED SQUADRONS SUPPORTS CURRENT EUCOM FOOTPRINT PROPOSALS

E. NEXT 12 MONTHS, F-15S ALONE TO TAKE PART IN 17 MISSIONS IN THEATER.

5. US/UK SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP:

A. HISTORICAL IN NATURE. UK WILL BE HIT BY NAVEUR DEPARTURE AS WELL. POLITICALLY, A BAD TIME FOR MR. BLAIR.

11-L-0559/OSD/26336

B. OFFSET PROPOSED (MOVING OUR 24/7 HQ FROM GERMANY) DISADVANTAGES US BY MISALIGNING AND SEPARATING OUR OWN HQ. LIKELY WILL NOT BE CONVINCING TO UK THAT IT REPLACES 3 SQUADRONS. WILL BE EXPENSIVE.

6. SUMMARY:

A. CONCERNED WITH EMERGING PATTERN SIGNALING U.S. CHANGE IN VALUE OF FORWARD BASING AND FORWARD PRESENCE.

B. NEED TO THINK ABOUT HOW WE WILL LEAD, AND WHAT IT IS WE WILL LEAD WITH IN THE FUTURE. VACUUMS WILL BE FILLED, MOST LIKELY BY E-U. POSSIBLE FUTURE QUESTIONING OF U.S. LEADERSHIP IN BILLETTS TRADITIONALLY "RESERVED" FOR US.

C. F-16 BASING IN TURKEY NOT YET RESOLVED. HOPE TO DO SO AT APPROPRIATE TIME. MANY US/TU ISSUES ON TABLE AT PRESENT.

D. FROM BOTH THEATER AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, RECOMMEND NO REMOVAL (OR ANNOUNCEMENT OF INTENT TO REMOVE) OF F-15'S AT THIS TIME

E. APPRECIATE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT VIEWS IN PERSON AT YOUR CONVENIENCE.

*Very respectfully,
Jim*

SJS 04-03602

21 May 2004

DISTRIBUTION J-1, J-8,
OCJCS/LC

SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF DIRECTIVE

on

/SP-774/ F-15 BASING

1. The attached is referred to J-5 for CJCS REPLY in collaboration/coordination with J-8, OCJCS/LC, and the Services.
2. The suspense for this action is 9 June 2004, unless an extension is coordinated with the Secretary, Joint Staff.

Joint Secretariat

11-L-0559/OSD/26338

file

May 20, 2004

775

383.6

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Security Arrangements

Between June 1 and June 30 we have to get a new negotiating team in to negotiate how the security arrangements are going to work. It should probably be led by DoD.

We need to decide how we are going to work with Iraq on Iraqi detainees, what we are going to do with the Iraqi Police, and the like.

Maybe we could have Gen. Casey head up the group and start working with Negroponte. Maybe one of the outcomes would be to set up a Consultative Group fashioned to work out issues going forward between CENTCOM, the new US Mission and the new Iraqi government.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-31

.....
Please respond by 5/28/0

20MAY04

OSD 13152-04

Dillard, Frances W, CIV, JCS SJS

From: Nosenzo, Thomas E, CDR, OSD [Thomas.Nosenzo@osd.smil.mil]
Sent: Thursday, June 17, 2004 7:35 AM
To: Dillard, Frances W, CIV, JCS SJS
Subject: RE: SF-803 PRESS IN CENTCOM

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Fran,

I do not close out snowflakes until the Secretary returns them to me

SF-803: Closing this action at the joint staff assumes the Chairman concurs with Mr. Di Rita's memo. If that is the case the Chairman should pass the information at roundtable or by some other means.

SF-661 and SF-680: 25 June extension approved.

SF-775: closed - Feith is here, Wolfowitz let the delegation.

r/
CDR Nosenzo

-----Original Message-----

From: Dillard, Frances W, CIV, JCS SJS
[mailto:frances.dillard@jcs.pentagon.smil.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, June 16, 2004 10:07 AM
To: Nosenzo, Thomas E, CDR, OSD
Cc: Koles, Robert E, Lt Col, JCS SJS; Leonard, Kevin A, COL, JCS SJ
Subject: SF-803 PRESS IN CENTCOM

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Sir,

Just checking to make sure SF-803 was closed out with Mr Di Rita's memo to SecDef, 15 June 2004. The Joint Staff action has been closed.

I am attaching a copy of the tasker for SF-803 and of Mr Di Rita's memo.

Respectfully,

Fran Dillard
Chief, Assignment and Control Branch
Joint Staff Actions Division

(b)(6)

<<SF-803 Tasker.pdf>> <<Di Rita memo.pdf>>

SJS 04-03601

21 May 2004

DISTRIBUTION J-1, J-5,
OCJCS/LC

SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF DIRECTIVE

on

/SF-775/ SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

1. The attached is referred to 5-5 for CJCS REPLY in collaboration/coordination with OCJCS/LC.
2. The suspense for this action is 28 May 2004, unless an extension is coordinated with the Secretary, Joint Staff.

Joint Secretariat

11-L-0559/OSD/26341

May 20, 2004

775

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Security Arrangements

Between June 1 and June 30 we have to get a new negotiating team in to negotiate how the security arrangements are going to work. It should probably be led by DoD.

We need to decide how we are going to work with Iraq on Iraqi detainees, what we are going to do with the Iraqi Police, and the like.

Maybe we could have Gen. Casey head up the group and start working with Negroponte. Maybe one of the outcomes would be to set up a Consultative Group fashioned to work out issues going forward between CENTCOM, the new US Mission and the new Iraqi government.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004:31

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

11-L-0559/OSD/26342

May 20, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

cc: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Envoy for Global Defense Posture

I did not have a chance to use the information on the envoy for global defense posture with the President.

It probably should be prepared as a memo from Paul to the interagency and do it at that level.

Thanks.

Attach.
 Global Defense Posture: Update and Next Steps

DHR:dh
052004-39

.....
 Please respond by 6/4/04

320.2 Strategic

20 May 04

OSD 13153-04

NT Done

Global Defense Posture: Update and Next Steps

- ❑ **DoD and interagency** analysis and recommendations are nearly complete...it is time to move into the **next phase ..implementation**, including ongoing consultations and negotiations
- ❑ **Broad outreach effort** with Allies and Congress to date...all accept our rationale...we'll continue at more detailed level as we go public
- ❑ Two key thoughts...
 - First is a **keynote speech**, linked to our Hill and Allied outreach plans...we could use military academy graduations as a setting
 - SecDef speaks at West Point, 29 May
 - President speaks at Air Force Academy, 2 June
 - Second, it may be time for a Presidentially-appointed **special envoy** for posture negotiations
 - Show our **seriousness of purpose**
 - Critical for getting **flexible legal arrangements** for access and usability by our forward forces

Potential Candidates – Special Envoy for Global Posture

~~Jim Ellis, Commander, United States Strategic Command~~

~~John Keane, former Vice Chief of Staff, US Army~~

~~William Schneider, resident fellow of American Enterprise Institute; Chairman, Defense Science Board; former Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance~~

~~Chris Williams, Partner, Johnson and Associates; Defense Policy Board member~~

Dov Zakheim, (soon to be) Partner, Booz Allen Hamilton

Attributes:

- Good negotiator, detail-oriented
- Solid understanding of strategic rationale behind posture proposals
- Positive international stature/reputation
- Acceptable to State and White House
- Responsive to SecDef
- Protective of DoD equities
- Integrity, no perception of conflict of interest
- Willing to travel

SPECIAL ENVOY FOR GLOBAL POSTURE NEGOTIATIONS

Talking Points:

- I recommend a Presidentially-Appointed Special Envoy to conduct negotiations for the global defense posture review.
- Our allies have been receptive to our consultations on this subject
- As we transition into the next phase, we would benefit from having a Special Envoy to convey the significance of the negotiations both for the USG and the host country.
- The envoy will need not just diplomatic stature, but a **firm** grounding in the strategic rationale for the review and an ability to protect DoD equities.

For background only:

The presumptive negotiator from State, Ambassador Barbara Bodine, has not represented well DoD's concerns in several recent negotiations.

Global Posture: potential special envoys and attributes

Jim Ellis, Commander, United States Strategic Command

Tillie Fowler, Partner, Holland & Knight; Chair, Defense Policy Board; former member of Congress

John Keane, former Vice Chief of Staff, US Army

William Schneider, resident fellow of American Enterprise Institute; Chairman, Defense Science Board; former Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance

Chris Williams, Partner, Johnson and Associates; Defense Policy Board member

Dov Zakheim, (soon to be) Partner, Booz Allen Hamilton

Attributes:

- Good negotiator, detail-oriented
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- Positive international stature/reputation
- Acceptable to State and White House
- Responsive to SecDef
- Protective of DoD equities
- Integrity, no perception of conflict of interest
- Willing to travel

May 12, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Fingerprints

What is the status of this item I have circled on detainee fingerprint s?

Thanks.

Attach.

5/6/04 HSC Deputies Committee Meeting Summary of Conclusions

DHR:dh
051204-2 (ts computer)

.....
Please respond by _____

*OB
5/26*

OSD 13155-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26348

383.6

12 May 04

C5/11

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

HSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

For Your Information

DATE: May 6, 2004-
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 PM - 4:00 PM

The Homeland Security Council (HSC) Deputies Committee (DC) met to discuss four topics: enhancing rail security of toxic-by-inhalation hazards; fingerprint sharing; the success of continuity of operations (COOP) and Continuity of Government (COG) programs; and Presidential Emergency Action Directives (PEAD).

The following was agreed to by the attendees:

1. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Transportation (DOT) should begin to implement the seven-step plan for enhancing the security of TIH shipments by rail presented to the deputies. Specifically, DHS and DOT, as appropriate, will:
 - a. Begin implementing short term recommendations (within Actions 1, 2, 3, and 4) immediately, existing authorities permitting; and
 - b. Establish a regulatory working group that will, in close coordination with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and other appropriate agencies, evaluate and recommend options for any rulemaking necessary to implement the actions contained in Actions 3, 5, 6, and 7.
2. The Department of Defense (DOD) will provide all fingerprints of known or suspected terrorists in its possession to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as soon as possible after the Secretary of Defense and the DOD General Counsel approve the transfer. Estimated completion of the transfer is within 90 days. DOD will continue to provide such fingerprints to the FBI as they are collected from known or suspected terrorists in the future. In addition, DOD will seek to implement policies such that: (a) fingerprints compatible with FBI standards are collected from all detainees before they are released from detention; and (b) DOD deploys electronic systems to the field that can collect fingerprints compatible with FBI standards. The Department of Justice (DOJ) will provide technical and other assistance to DOD to implement these policies.
3. The major findings and recommendations of the end-to-end review of COOP/COG will form the basis for a final report and phased implementation plan that will be presented to the Enduring Constitutional Government Coordinating Committee (ECGCC) by June 15, 2004.
4. Deputies will advise their own Department and Agency general counsels to work with HSC's Office of General Counsel and the White House Counsel's Office to:

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26349

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

- a. Update those Presidential Emergency Action Documents (PEAs) assigned by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to their respective Department or Agency; and
- b. Compile or update individual Department and Agency compilations of Secretarial emergency authorities.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26350

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 11, 2004 .

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. KARL HOFMANN

Executive Secretary
Department of State

MS. HARRIET MIERI

Assistant to the President
& Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy

MR. PAUL CURRY

Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MS. MARY KRUGER

Director, Office of Homeland Security
Environmental Protection Agency

CAPT WILLIAM MARRIOTT, USN

Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOEL KAPLAN

Deputy Director
Office of Management & Budget

MR. JAMES MCATAMNEY

Counsel for National Security Affairs
Department of Justice

MR. GREG SCHULTI

Executive Secretary
National Security Council

MR. FRED SCHWIEN

Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

MR. DAVID LEITCH

Deputy Assistant to the President
& Deputy Counsel

MS. ANN AGNEW

Executive Secretary
Department of Health & Human Services

MR. PHILLIP SWAGEL

Chief of Staff
Council of Economic Advisors

MR. MICHAEL DANNENHAUER

Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Transportation

MS. SHANA DALE

Chief of Staff & General Counsel
Office of Science & Technology Policy

MR. KENNETH HILL

Executive Secretary
Department of Homeland Security

MR. V. PHILLIP LAGO

Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. JOSEPH HAGIN

Assistant to the President
& Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

COL EDWARD SNEAD, USA

Secretary, Joint Staff

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26351

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

MS. MARY INCONTRO
Counsel to the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

MR. JOHN BRENNAN
Director
Terrorist Threat Integration Center

President
Affair

SUBJECT: Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee Meeting Summary of Conclusions.

Please find attached the Summary of Conclusions from the Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee on Thursday, May 6, 2004.



Laura L. Flippin
Special Assistant to the President
& Executive Secretary
Homeland Security Council

ATTACHMENT
TAB A - Summary of Conclusions

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

May 12, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Fingerprints

What is the status of this item I have circled on detainee fingerprints?

Thanks.

Attach.

5/6/04 HSC Deputies Committee Meeting Summary of Conclusions

DHR:dh
051204-2 (computer)

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/26353

205/11

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

HSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

For Your Information

DATE: May 6, 2004-
 LOCATION: White House Situation Room
 TIME: 2:30 PM - 4:00 PM

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The following was agreed to by the attendees:

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3. The major findings and recommendations of the end-to-end review of COOP/COG will form the basis for a final report and phased implementation plan that will be presented to the Enduring Constitutional Government Coordinating Committee (ECGCC) by June 15, 2004.
4. Deputies will advise their own Department and Agency general counsels to work with HSC's Office of General Counsel and the White House Counsel's Office to:

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26354

C311

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

HSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

For Your Information

DATE: May 6, 2004.
 LOCATION: white House Situation Room
 TIME: 2:30 PM - 4:00 PM

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3. The major findings and recommendations of the end-to-end review of COOP/COG will form the basis for a final report and phased implementation plan that will be presented to the Enduring Constitutional Government Coordinating Committee (ECGCC) by June 15, 2004.
4. Deputies will advise their own Department and Agency general counsels to work with HSC's Office of General Counsel and the White House Counsel's Office to:

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26355

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

MS. MARY INCONTRO
Counsel to the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

MS. KRISTEN SILVERBERG
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Domestic Policy

MR. JOHN BRENNAN
Director
Terrorist Threat Integration Center

MS. CAROL KUNTZ
Assistant to the Vice President
for Homeland Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee Meeting Summary of
Conclusions.

Please find attached the Summary of Conclusions from the Homeland Security Council Deputies
Committee on Thursday, May 6, 2004.



Laura L. Flippin
Special Assistant to the President
& Executive Secretary
Homeland Security Council

ATTACHMENT

TAB A - Summary of Conclusions

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26356

72

file

May 10, 2004

770

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Approval for Compensation

Please make sure that the people down below know that we have to approve at
OSD-level the compensation system for the abuses to the Iraqi detainees.

Thanks.

383.6

DHR:dh
051004-12

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

OSD 13157-04

10 May 04

SJS 04-03325

11 May 2004

DISTRIBUTION J-2, J-3, J-5, OCJCS/LC

SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF DIRECTIVE

on

/SF-770/ APPROVAL FOR COMPENSATION

1. The attached is referred to J-5 for CJCS REPLY in collaboration/coordination with J-2, J-3, and OCJCS/LC.
2. The suspense for this action is 14 May 2004, unless an extension is coordinated with the Secretary, Joint Staff.

Joint Secretariat

11-L-0559/OSD/26358

May 10, 2004

TO: Jim Roche

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Increase in Air Force

I am concerned about the continued rise in the number of forces in the Air Force. I don't understand why it is so high. I can understand the increases in the Army and the Marines, but I am having trouble understanding the increases in the Air Force.

Please explain and indicate if, in fact, it is a potential problem, what the plan is to deal with it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051004-6

.....
Please respond by 5/21/04

DR 5/21
C5/20

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosenzo
5/20/04

320.2

10 May 04



OSD 13160-04



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

211 5/24

MAY 19 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Increase in Air Force

Since we discussed this subject in January, we've taken several actions to return to endstrength by the end of FY05, the original goal. Providing numerous opportunities for leaving the active force and limiting accessions this year and next to our most needed skills should get us there.

With the implementation of two periods of Stop Loss for OEF and OIF, we disrupted the normal departure patterns of our people. The aggregate impact of a strong commitment to the GWOT, success in obtaining long sought improvements in the compensation package, including pay raises, pay table reform, BAH improvements, and a variety of special pays and bonuses for hard-to-fill skills, combined with an uncertain economy, caused our people to stay at unprecedented rates that initially were masked by the Stop Loss which was in place until July 2003. In short, we are experiencing great demand to enter the Air Force; at the same time, retention is very high. This "good news" is causing us an endstrength problem. At present, we are 20,000 over endstrength.

320 2

Recognizing this by November 2003, we began reduction measures with opportunities for service in the Air Reserve Component (ARC), rollbacks in dates of separation and active duty service commitments, inter-service transfers, ROTC-to-ARC commissions, and bonus commitment waivers. These efforts only yielded about 2,500 additional departures, so we significantly increased the population eligible for each of the measures and added an aggressive retraining program of individuals in overage skills. This is already moving some people to critical skills and to the ARC, the Army or civilian life. This alone could yield about 9,800 in FY04 and FY05.

19 May 04

Simultaneously, we have restricted recruiting for the rest of FY04 and through FY05 only to maintain or correct skill balances across our force. This translates to reductions of approximately 2,000 recruits in FY04 and 11,000 in FY05. The combination of all of these actions should bring us down to authorized endstrength by the end of FY05.


From a force stability standpoint, reducing accessions by a third in one year is very significant, but also creates some opportunities. We can correct skill imbalances, transform training programs, eliminate ARC training backlogs, and return to authorized endstrength without breaking faith with our current force. While some will believe this warrants reducing our recruiting and training budgets, that would be counterproductive for this brief training pause. We appreciate your support in that regard.

10 May 04

OSD 13160-04

We will track the effects of these actions along a ballistic trajectory, with increases likely for a few months. Nevertheless, we intend to be at authorized levels by the end of FY05. I'll keep you apprised as we go forward. John Jumper and I will be monitoring this on a monthly basis.

James G. Roche
Secretary of the Air Force

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "James G. Roche". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "J" and "R".



May 4, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Next Briefing on Hill

The next time there is going to be an op-intel briefing up there, I think we ought to have the Department of State do it, since what they are doing is now quite important.

Also, we ought to think about having the CIA do one at some point, and get the burden spread away from Defense toward all the other departments and agencies that are doing things.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050404-7

.....
Please respond by 5/21/04

352 09

OSD 13163-04

4 May 04

May 3, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*
SUBJECT: Captain Morel

There is a Captain Morel who was killed recently, within the last month or so, and I met his father at Bethesda last weekend.

Please see if you can get me his father's address. Then give me this letter back, and I will dictate a note to his father.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/16/04 Letter to family of Captain Morel

DHR:dh
050304-20

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

add 5/20
Response Attached
@ 5/18

293

3 May 04

Judd, Peter, MSG, OSD

From: BYoung@Bethesda.med.navy.mil
Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 2004 4:42 PM
To: Peter.Judd@osd.pentagon.mil
Subject: RE: Issue

Peter.

Here is the information you asked for:

(b)(6)

Regards,
Brian

-----Original Message-----

From: Judd, Peter, MSG, OSD [mailto:Peter.Judd@osd.pentagon.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 2004 12:32 PM
To: 'BYoung (byoung@bethesda.med.navy.mil)
Subject: Issue

Brian,

When the SecDef was there visiting he met the father of a (b)(6). Would you happen to have a mailing address for the father? The SecDef wants to write him a letter.

Regards,
Peter W. Judd
MSG, USA
Enlisted Military Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense

16 Apr 7 2004

To The Fam of Captain (b)(6)

We have never met and I didn't know your son but I was moved to write to you after reading several articles in the Commercial Appeal following his death.

First, I must confess to you that I have experienced many conflicting feelings about the US presence in Iraq, so upon reading about your son my first thought was how sad and how senseless. But throughout the days since news of his passing was first reported, I have often thought of him — and I can't explain why.

Except that, over these days I have come to see that what your son was doing and why he died surpasses any single war or conflict. He died, defending or if you will — promoting and protecting the fundamental principle of this great Nation FREEDOM. That concept is so much bigger than any political party, agenda or election. That alone makes him a true American patriot and hero — at least to me! And I am profoundly moved.


From everything I have read and heard about Brent he was a good, noble and fine man. While I can't begin to comprehend your loss; I appreciate his (and your) sacrifice. I am humbled by his courage and commitment. Over the weeks and months to come, may God continue to bless you with love and the comfort of his grace and the love and

11-L-0559/OSD/26365

support of family and friends. Please know that through God your son has truly impacted my life and, I think, changed me ~~to~~ for the better! My deepest sympathy - you are in my thoughts and prayers.

Many Blessings,
A grateful American

May 3, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Metrics for Iraq Weekly Update

Here are some good metrics that Lamar Alexander sent along.

Why don't you see the extent to which they have been incorporated into our Iraq Weekly Update, and, if they have not, consider incorporating them.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/22/03 Senator Alexander ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
050304-25

.....
Please respond by 5/21/04

OSD 13173-0

11-L-0559/OSD/26367

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 OCT 23 AM 10:01

✓
10/23

October 22, 2003

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1300 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Don,


Thank you very much for your letter of the 16th and the copy of the one pager you are working on to explain the administration's plan to win the peace.

The one-pager is moving in the right direction. Fully developed, it should persuade Americans of our goal, our plans and our progress toward the goal.

Since you asked, here are my suggestions:

1. Set a clear overall goal: Operation Iraqi Democracy.
2. Set a timetable for accomplishing the goal and withdrawing most American forces: for example, January 1, 2005 or 2006.
3. Establish a set of measurable objectives which, taken together, add up to a plan to meet the goal. These should specify pre-war levels, post-war levels, today's levels, today's goal, and the goal for January 1, 2005 (or 2006). I've appended a list of suggested measurable objectives that are easy to understand.
4. Report publicly on the objectives once a week.
5. In every speech you, the President, Vice-President, Secretary Powell, Dr. Rice and other key officials make, refer briefly to that week's progress report: "As our weekly progress report on our plan to build democracy in Iraq showed, electricity before the war was at 3300 megawatts, our goal for January 1, 2005(or 2006) is 6000 megawatts, we are at 4217 megawatts today which is 1217 more than before the war, and right on schedule for our goal; on crude oil production, etc.

Sincerely,



U17594 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/26368

Suggested objectives (should be measurable and simply presented):

- ✓ Electricity (megawatts produced, % of Iraqis w/ power)
- ✓ Schools (# of schools open, % of boys & girls attending)
- ✓ Health care (# of hospitals operating, % receiving services)
- ✓ Governance (timetable to a constitutional democracy)
- ✓ Crude oil production (barrels produced, shipped)
- ✓ Police (# in training, # serving)
- ✓ Militia (# in training, # serving)
- ✓ Water (gallons of water available, # of Iraqis w/ fresh water access)
- ✓ Prisons (# of prisons, # of beds for prisoners, # of prisoners)
- ✓ Iraq Troops (# in training, # serving)
- ✓ Troops from other countries (# of troops, # of countries)
- ✓ US Troops (overall #, reserve, and active duty)
- ✓ Food (# of malnourished Iraqis, amount of food available)
- ✓ Unemployment (# and/or %)
- ✓ TV/Radio (# of stations, # of Iraqis receiving)
- ✓ Etc.

August 27, 2004

O: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore
Paul McHale
Jim Haynes

ROM: Donald Rumsfeld *P.R.*

UBJECT: DoD Responsibilities Paper

lease take a **look** at the attached **paper**. It is a problem **that** concerns me, and I don't know the answers. **If** you have thoughts or suggestions on it, **let me know**.

My thought is to send it to the Vice President, **Andy Card, Condi Rice and Fran** Townsend to get them **thinking about** these issues.

Let me know what you think soon.

Thanks

Rich.
Department of Defense Responsibilities

1R.doc
2604-2 (D-computer)406

.....
Please respond by 9/1/04

844

384

27 Aug 04

OSD 13248-04

~~TOP SECRET~~

August 27, 2004

SUBJECT: U.S. Department of Defense responsibilities for homeland security, prior to September 11, 2001, on 9-11, and today

Homeland Security Assignments and Responsibilities:

DOD never has had, and does not have today, primary U.S. Government responsibility:

- To stop terrorists from coming across our borders.
- To stop terrorists from coming through U.S. ports.
- To stop terrorists from hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United States.
- To seek out or arrest terrorists inside the United States.

Responsibility for those functions rests with the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice and the FBI, the Department of State, CIA and various other U.S. agencies.

Not only does DOD not have primary responsibility for any of those functions, DoD is expressly limited by federal law, including the Posse Comitatus Act, from participating in most U.S. law enforcement activities.

DOD's role has been, and is today, restricted to the following:

- Defend the U.S. homeland against foreign threats and attacks from outside the U.S. (NORTHCOM/NORAD/PACOM)
- Protect U.S. DoD military forces and facilities located within the United States.
- Support designated lead federal agencies, as specifically directed by the President, to include:
 - "Render safe" a nuclear weapon located inside the United States.
 - Provide support for designated "National Special Security Events," such as the G-8 Summit, Democratic and Republican Convention, the Super Bowl, etc., and
 - Serve as a sector-specific agency for the U.S. defense industrial base in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7

~~TOP SECRET~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26371

~~TOP SECRET~~

August 27, 2004

Comment:

I am deeply concerned that the September 11th Commission, the press, Members of the U.S. Congress, and many Americans are not aware of the very limited role of the U.S. Armed Forces in dealing with terrorist attacks inside the USA, by law and Executive Order.

However, notwithstanding DoD's limited role and the general misunderstanding about our role, it is clear that, in the event of a chemical, biological or nuclear attack on the U.S. from within the U.S., the following would occur, as it did on September 11, 2001:

- 1) The first calls for help will be to DoD to immediately take charge, but technically not in the lead role, only in a supporting role; specifically, DoD will be asked to undertake the very responsibilities DoD has not been assigned or funded to do, and therefore has not organized, trained or equipped to do, and
- 2) When the dust settles, blame will be placed on DoD for:
 - Not preventing the attack, even though that is the legal responsibility of others and is not DoD's assignment;
 - Not instantaneously responding to mitigate the attack after it occurs, even though DoD is not authorized, funded or permitted by law to organize, train, equip or deploy to do so.

This unusual situation raises some questions:

Does the current USG arrangement and allocation of responsibilities still make sense?

If not, what might be done to better organize, allocate and rearrange responsibilities among USG agencies?

In either case, what might be done to better inform the Members of Congress, the press, and the American people of the decided upon allocation of responsibilities, so the current confusion as to roles and responsibilities can be reduced?

~~FOUO~~

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: September 1, 2004 - FGH HC 9/2
0700

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*

SUBJECT: Redrafted Memo on USG Responsibilities for Homeland Security

384

Don,

I met with the recipients of the attached snowflake and we produced the redraft you requested.

I'm available to discuss it further if you wish.

15 Sep 04

27 Aug 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26373 OSD 13218-04

~~TOP SECRET~~
DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

SUBJECT: USG Responsibilities for Homeland Security

Situation Today:

Since September 11, 2001, the Administration has made substantial progress to protect America from terrorist attacks. Among other measures, we have established:

- The Department of Homeland Security.
- A National Bio-Defense Strategy and stockpiles of biological vaccines.
- United States Northern Command.
- The Terrorist Threat Integration Center.

As a result of these and other initiatives, America is safer today than it was prior to the 9/11 attacks, although we must continue to improve America's homeland security.

Homeland Security Roles and Responsibilities:

However, in the event of another major terrorist attack, we will certainly ask ourselves what else we might have done to prevent it or mitigate its consequences. One issue that concerns me is that roles and responsibilities for homeland security are still not as clearly defined as they might be. Now that we have almost two years of experience with the Department of Homeland Security and the new USG organization for homeland

DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

~~TOP SECRET~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26374

security, it may be an appropriate time to evaluate the assignment of roles and responsibilities for homeland security. We also need to consider how we can better educate the American people about those roles and responsibilities. It is important for the American people to have realistic expectations about the role the U.S. Armed Forces might play in dealing with terrorist attacks inside the United States, as defined both by law and executive policy. I am reminded of the polls taken in the 1990s which showed that Americans believed erroneously that we have a capability to shoot down a ballistic missile targeting the U.S. There is a great deal the U.S. military can do in the event of a terrorist attack, but there are limits on that capability and—as a matter of law and policy—there may be things we should not do.

Across the USG, there have been several major homeland security exercises over the past several years. We could use their results to evaluate where gaps may exist in the USG homeland security concept and determine if changes are warranted with respect to statutes, authorities, policies, missions, resources and training, etc. Evaluations, moreover, could help to identify any legal considerations that might limit the military from providing support to any Lead Federal Agency and that could impede effective command and control.

Homeland security roles and responsibilities are spread among the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, State, the FBI, the CIA and various other U.S. agencies:

- To stop terrorists from coming across our borders.
- To stop terrorists from coming through U.S. ports.
- To stop terrorists from hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United States.

~~FOUO~~
DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

- To seek out or arrest terrorists inside the United States.

DOD does not have primary responsibility for any of those functions. Its traditional role has been largely restricted to the following:

- Defend the U.S. homeland against foreign threats **and** attacks from outside the U.S. (NORTHCOM/NORAD/PACOM).
- Protect U.S. DoD military forces and facilities located within the United States.
- Support designated lead federal agencies, as specifically directed by the President, to include:
 - "Render safe" a nuclear weapon located inside the United States.
 - Provide support for designated "National Special Security Events," such as the G-8 Summit, Democratic and Republican Conventions, the Super Bowl, etc., and
 - Serve as a sector-specific agency for the U.S. defense industrial base in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7.

Comment:

In the event of a catastrophic nuclear or biological attack on the territory of the United States, the **following** would likely occur, **as** it did on September 11, 2001:

- 1) The first calls for help will be to DoD to immediately take action, but

DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26376

technically not in the lead role, only in a supporting role. Specifically, DoD may be asked to undertake the very responsibilities DoD has not been assigned or funded to do, and therefore may not have organized, trained or equipped to do, and

- 2) When the dust settles, the American people may well ask why DoD did not:
- Prevent the attack, even though that is the legal responsibility of others and it is not DoD's assignment;
 - Instantaneously respond to mitigate the attack after it occurs.

Recommendation:

Given this situation, the Administration may wish to undertake a quick review to provide recommendations for the following types of questions:

- What might be done to better organize, allocate and rearrange responsibilities among USG agencies to ensure that the right capabilities and assets will address key problems?
- Should we further organize, train and equip the National Guard and the reserves for homeland defense?
- Has DoD allocated sufficient force structure to homeland defense, particularly to prevent or mitigate the consequences of a catastrophic attack?
- What might be done to better inform the Members of Congress, the press, and

DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

the American people of the decided upon allocation of responsibilities, so the current confusion as to roles and responsibilities can be reduced?

UNCLASSIFIED



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CH-2026-014 SEP - 2 PM 3:53
2 September 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY/1*

SUBJECT: DOD Responsibilities Paper

- **Issue.** "Please take a look at the attached paper. It is a problem that concerns me, and I don't know the answers. If you have thoughts or suggestions on it, let me know. My thought is to send to the Vice President, Andy Card, Condi Rice and Fran Townsend to get them thinking about these issues. Let me know what you think." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** I agree with your concerns that there are misconceptions regarding the military's roles and responsibilities in the event of another catastrophic domestic event.
- **Discussion.**
 - We should first ensure that all of DOD has the same understanding regarding military roles, missions, and responsibilities in Homeland Security. A discussion involving your staff and mine would be useful to consolidate views.
 - We have conducted several HLS exercises over the past few years. We can use their results to evaluate where gaps exist in the USG concept for protecting its horders and citizens. Some gaps exist in WMD response, maritime defense and security, and counter-tenorism.
 - An assessment of these gaps in USG capability would tell us if any DOD changes are warranted with respect to statute, authorities, policy, mission, resources and training, etc. Evaluations will identify any legal considerations that limit the military in providing support to any Lead Federal Agency (LFA) and which may impact Command and Control requirements.
 - I agree a note to key members of the interagency, mentioning this review process, may get them thinking about their respective roles and responsibilities.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: LTG W. L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

OSD 13218-04

UNCLASSIFIED
11-L-0559/OSD/26379

August 27, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore
Paul McHale
Jim Haynes

844

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: DoD Responsibilities Paper

Please take a look at the attached paper. It is a problem that **concerns me**, and I don't know the answers. **If you have thoughts or suggestions on it, let me know.**

My thought is to send it to the Vice President, Andy Card, Condi Rice and Fran Townsend to get them thinking about these issues.

Let me know what you think soon.

Thanks

Attach.
Department of Defense Responsibilities

DFR:ph
082604-2 (is computer) doc

.....
Please respond by 9/1/04

OSD 13218-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26380

~~FOUO~~

August 27, 2004

SUBJECT: U.S. Department of Defense responsibilities for homeland security, prior to September 11, 2001, on 9-11, and today

Homeland Security Assignments and Responsibilities:

DOD never has had, and does not have today, primary U.S. Government responsibility:

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 - Provide support for designated "National Special Security Events," such as the G-8 Summit, Democratic and Republican Conventions, the Super Bowl, etc., and
 - Serve as a sector-specific agency for the U.S. defense industrial base in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7.

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26381

August 27, 2004

Comment:

I am deeply concerned that the September 11th Commission, the press, Members of the U.S. Congress, and many Americans are **not** aware of the very limited role of the U.S. Armed Forces in dealing with terrorist attacks inside the USA, by law and Executive Order.

However, notwithstanding DoD's limited role and the general misunderstanding about our role, it is clear that, in the event of a chemical, biological or nuclear attack on the U.S. from within the U.S., the following would occur, as it did on September 11, 2001:

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This unusual situation raises some questions:

Does the current USG arrangement and allocation of responsibilities still make sense*?

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In either case, what might be done to better inform the Members of Congress, the press, and the American people of the decided upon allocation of responsibilities, so the current confusion as to roles and responsibilities can be reduced?

May 3, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*
SUBJECT: Comparison to Vietnam

FYI.

Attach.
Undated: "Vietnam? No Comparison"

DHR:dh
050304-28



Please respond by _____

TRAC

3 May 04

OSD 13219-04

Vietnam? No Comparison.

- It's difficult to recall of an instance in which guerillas alone have ever won a war. They can:
 - Harass.
 - Ambush.
 - Mine roads.
 - Occasionally shoot down a helicopter.
 - Occasionally mass for an attack (like in Ramadi last week).

- But these things don't win wars, *unless they break the will of the stronger power*. Guerillas stand a better chance of winning when they:
 - Have a coherent political strategy;
 - Can serve as an auxiliary to a conventional force;
 - Enjoy the benefit of an external sanctuary;
 - Have the support of a sympathetic population;
 - Supplied by a major client state.

- Has Iraq become, as some have claimed, "George Bush's Vietnam?" Hardly. Iraq is not like Vietnam:
 - There is no conventional North Vietnamese Army to distract us from organizing to fight a guerilla war.
 - There is no coherent anti-coalition strategy like Hanoi's "armed struggle" and "political struggle."
 - There is no external sanctuary of the scope enjoyed by Hanoi.

- There is no overwhelming sympathy from the population.
- There is no major client state supplying the guerillas.
- With time and perseverance, an army can always defeat guerillas acting alone especially if that army:
 - Organizes for counter-guerilla operations;
 - Develops good intelligence and acts on it quickly;
 - Isolates the guerilla strongholds (prevent them from entering or leaving);
 - Systematically identifies, captures, or kills trapped guerillas;
 - Gains and keeps the support of the local population;
 - Secures the borders.

We are doing these things in Iraq today and we will win. Iraq is not like Vietnam.

May 3, 2004

TO: Les Brownlee
 David Chu
 Pete Schoomaker

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Stop-Loss Implications

Please keep me posted on the potential implications of stop-loss.

Thanks.

Attach.
 4/12/04 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
 050304-29

.....
 Please respond by 5/21/04

320.2

31504

OSD 13220-04

April 12, 2004

**THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)**

C4/12
DU 5/3

VOTE FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Sir:

Attached is an update on the stop loss issue, which I understand arose again this weekend. I urge that we focus our argument for the policy on the benefit to unit readiness and cohesion.



David S. C. Chu

Attachment

11-L-0559/OSD/26387

TALKING POINTS
(April 12, 2004)

SUBJECT: Stop Loss Update

- To maintain cohesion among deploying units during periods of train-up, in-theater service, and redeployment, a program called "Stop Loss" is employed. It presently affects about 21,000 from the Active Components and 24,000 from the Reserves. Only Army presently is using Stop Loss.
- Stop-loss restrictions bar voluntary separations or retirements for Soldiers in designated units throughout their deployment, and up to 90 days after their unit returns to its home station. In addition, a stop-movement policy suspends the normal rotation of soldiers into and out of affected units.
 - Most deployed soldiers are not affected because they have service obligations that extend beyond their deployments.
- The use of Stop Loss is driven by concerns over unit performance, and the recognized requirement to maintain unit cohesion down to the squad and crew level, which contributes to the safety and the effectiveness of units.
- Stop Loss plans are reviewed quarterly. Presently, the Army must employ Stop Loss, in light of its substantial numbers participating in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The other Services have for now suspended employment of Stop Loss.
 - Navy and the Marine Corps terminated use of the program in May 2003. About 2,600 Sailors were affected by the program during FY 2003, as were 3,400 Active and 5,600 Reserve Marines.
 - Air Force discontinued use of the program in June 2003. About 8,500 Airmen in the Active and Reserve Component were affected by Stop Loss during FY 2003.

Prepared by: W. J. Carr, OUSD(PR), (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/26388

May 3, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Embed Forces

My personal view is we ought to keep US forces embedded in the Iraqi forces, so we have a first-hand view of how well they are doing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050304-11

.....
Please respond by _____

JMP

3 May 04

OSD 13221-04

5/13
1162

120

del
4/20/04
0630

May 3, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Speech by Laura Bush

Paul Butler
5/18

Please get me a copy of Laura Bush's speech to the Congressional wives recently. Apparently it listed a lot of things that can be done for service people's families. I think it would be a good thing if David Chu did a press briefing on that sometime.

Please let me see the speech.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050304-7

350.001

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

Sir,
Speech attached.
ur/CDR Nosenzo
5/19
C5119 DR 5/24

OSD 13222-04

3 May 04

11-L-0559/OSD/26390

Remarks by First Lady Laura Bush at the Congressional Club First Lady's Luncheon Washington Hilton

AS DELIVERED

MRS. BUSH: Thank you, Mary for your warm welcome. I always look forward to this lunch and to spending time with each of you. Special thanks to Lea Ann and to Cecile for organizing this beautiful lunch. Congressman Tauzin and Cecile are in our thoughts and prayers. Lynne Cheney and other cabinet member wives thank you for being here today. President Bush and I appreciate your and your husband's dedication to our country. And we appreciate the dedication of every member of the United States military, the National Guard and Reserve, and America's veterans like Joe Bartlett who is here today. I'm happy to hear that Janet Flower's son, P.F.C. Andrew Flowers is doing well. His eagerness to return to his unit in Iraq is evidence of his commitment and courage.

The President and I are inspired by the dedication of our men and women in uniform. We visit with soldiers at bases all over the world -- and perhaps one of our most moving visits was at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. One of the remarkable men we met at Walter Reed was Staff Sergeant Michael



McNaughton. He stepped on a land mine near Kabul while serving with the Louisiana National Guard. His right leg had to be removed above the knee and he was fitted with a prosthetic leg. Michael had been a great runner and he and the President exchanged stories about their favorite past time.

President Bush encouraged Michael to get well so that someday they could take a run together. Sergeant McNaughton held the President to his promise, and last week they ran together around the South Lawn at the White House. Sergeant McNaughton is still

working for the National Guard where he enlisted after September 11th because he said he "needed to do something."

The men and women of the United States military answer this call every day as they defend freedom around the world. Over the last year, the world has witnessed the skill and resolve of our military from Korea to Kosovo to the Middle East. We've seen their courage and their decency to the people of Afghanistan and Iraq. Our military men and women have helped to free fifty million people from the oppression of two brutal regimes. They are supplying villages with their first taste of clean water, delivering medicine and supplies to hospitals and schools. Our troops and their coalition partners have refurbished over a thousand schools so millions of children can study and learn again.

Our soldiers' compassion is not simply part of their mission -- it's part of their character. We will never forget their commitment to our country, nor will we forget the men and women who have fallen in service to America. All of those who serve in our military deserve our utmost respect -- and so do those who serve behind the front lines -- their families and children. As I've traveled to military bases, I've become aware of the special challenges that face military families. Like many families and like some of you, President Bush and I have moved a lot -- five times -- and we've lived in six different homes. Moving, packing and hoping our children will be happy in a new home is something many of us can relate to. And so is change. For us and for military families, change means moving and starting over; but it also means new friends, and new challenges. A military families' determination to make a home wherever they are matches their loved ones devotion to duty. Separation and transition are part of a military child's life, and they accept their duty with brave hearts.

There are more than one million military children around the world, and 800 thousand children go to public and Department of Defense schools in your neighborhoods. A military child may move as many as six to nine times from kindergarten to high school. By her senior year, a child will have attended six elementary and middle schools and

two or more high schools -- often in different states. This constant change has a huge impact -- both academically and socially -- on children. Many school districts are not prepared to help military children transition from one school to another.

There is no systematic process that ensures that records, grades, and accomplishments transfer with a military child. And this is a problem for many children, not just military children, in our highly-mobile society. Many students lose their class rank after transferring, and many fall behind in class requirements because their new school will not grant credits for their previous coursework. Many children who were athletes at their old school miss the opportunity to play sports because they miss tryouts.

Some students, like Renee, deal with the challenge of not graduating. Renee lives with her sister and her sister's husband, a soldier. As a senior, she recently moved to her fourth new high school. Renee's new school has more graduation requirements. She must pass a test and have a year of computer science. Her new school requested that Renee's previous school grant her a reciprocal diploma. But the school refused. Renee is receiving special help and support from her new school, but she may not graduate on time. This is a common problem for many military children and their families. But it doesn't have to be this way.

When an Air Force officer was asked what he needed in Iraq, he said, "Please don't send cookies, care packages, or socks. Just help take care of our children." Our country has always supported its military -- in times of war there were community efforts to roll bandages and knit socks. We have a great capacity to care for the home front. Now is the time for a new Victory garden. In this garden, we can tend to the needs of military children. You can host a PTA group and talk about how your school can help ease transition for military children and families. You can volunteer at military bases and installations in your home states and read to children or host local events at libraries. Establish a parenting support program for military spouses in your neighborhood and help with home repairs and baby sitting.

The USA Freedom Corps started a program called "On the Homefront" to provide Americans with opportunities to support our troops and their families. More than a thousand volunteers from Rebuilding Together have repaired homes for military families while their spouses are deployed. With her two sons in Iraq, Marlyss Murray couldn't do all of the home improvements she needed. An army of volunteers in Tulsa helped Marlyss put a new roof and a fresh coat of paint on her home.

Volunteers from the Salvation Army in Cleveland, Ohio are collecting diapers and blankets to throw a group baby shower for military wives. And members of the VFW started a community-wide Adopt-A-Unit program to support military units in Iraq and Afghanistan.

We can show our appreciation for our troops and their families by getting involved in our communities. The members of the United States military pledge their lives to protect ours, and we can support them by supporting their loved ones. The Military Child Education Coalition is working to do just that. The coalition's founder, Dr. Mary Keller, works with schools and families to help military children with transition. While working as an Assistant Superintendent in Texas, Dr. Keller had more than 16 thousand students from neighboring Fort Hood in her school. She noticed that many of the military children who had transferred could not keep up. She gathered educators, military experts, and parents at her kitchen table and formed a coalition to help these students. She began as a volunteer and soon moved to working full time as Executive Director of the Coalition. Some of the funds from today's luncheon will benefit the Coalition. Dr. Keller can provide you with more information on how you can help military children -- children like Kiara who deserve not only a great education, but our support.

A sixth grade student in Louisiana, Kiara wrote a poem titled "I Serve Too." It reads, "I'm a military child, I stay strong when my dad goes away. If there is a war and my dad is detached, I will help him fight back. With my braveness and courage I can stay strong, my family's support helps me carry on. Whenever we move, I start over again, I have to go to a new school, and make new friends. Even though people think I'm a military brat,

I just don't quite see it like that. My daddy helps defend our country, so we can live in peace and harmony. So all the military children help their mothers and fathers because we serve too, we're their sons and daughters."

With your help, we can fulfill our duty on the home front -- and the hopes of every military parent who prays "help take care of our children." Thank you for this lovely lunch and for your generous contribution to the Military Child Education Coalition.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

July 1, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore
Jim Haynes

File:
Sent as 'A' Doc
TN 7/12

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Actions to Respond to Senator McCain

1. Please draft a letter to Senators McCain and Warner, addressing the e-mails and what our approach is going to be.
 - Include references and attachments listing the things we have done: actions we have taken, studies we have initiated, and corrective steps taken. Include a list of what he has requested and all we have given him - the number of documents, the number of pages, etc.
2. I need a copy of the ICAF report and a briefing - I have not seen it. I assume it is okay to send it to McCain.
3. We need an attachment that answers the allegation that the briefing from Tinker was "doctored." I am uncomfortable letting that thought sit there. If it wasn't, we should say so. If it was, we should do something about it.

032

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063004-9

.....
Please respond by

*Call m
to Dell'orto
1115...*

1 Jul 04

OSD 13223704

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

MEMO FOR: SECDEF

8 JUL 04

FROM: LTGCRADDOCK

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO SEN MCCAIN

YOU ASKED THAT I FOLLOW-UP WITH DAN DELL'ORTO ON THE ATTACHED SNOWFLAKE.

DAN REPORTS THAT AT A MEETING THIS MORNING ON THE HILL WITH SASC AND SEN MCCAIN STAFFERS ABOUT THE WAY AHEAD FOR THE EMAILS, THE MCCAIN STAFFERS HAVE NOW CHANGED THEIR REQUEST. THE FORMER REQUEST AT ISSUE - EMAILS FROM A FEW INDIVIDUALS (WYNNE, ROCHE, ETC.) FOR A FINITE PERIOD HAS NOW BEEN EXPANDED TO ALL EMAILS ON THE LEASING SUBJECT GENERATED BY APPROXIMATELY 26 PERSONS IN THE DEPARTMENT.

DAN SAYS THIS HAS TURNED ALL UPSIDE DOWN. HE WILL BE MEETING WITH LARRY DI RITA, POWELL MOORE, DAVE PATTERSON (DEPUTY'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT) LATER TODAY TO SORT OUT WHERE WE NOW ARE AND WHAT WE NOW THINK WE MAY HAVE BEEN ASKED FOR. AFTER THAT MEETING, HE WILL PROVIDE YOU A WRITTEN UPDATE OF HIS ASSESSMENT OF THIS NEW SITUATION.

ON THE ICAF REPORT - I HAVE LOOKED AT THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - YOU WOULD NOT BE FULFILLED. AFTER LARRY, PAUL AND I LOOKED AT IT, WE ALL AGREED YOU NEED TO BE BRIEFED ON THE FINDINGS. THAT IS SCHEDULED FOR FRIDAY, 17 JULY.

DAN IS STILL WORKING ON THE RESPONSE TO THE ALLEGATION THAT THE TINKER BRIEF WAS DOCTORED.

11-L-0559/OSD/26397

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~HOT~~ 7/12
074

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **D**
SUBJECT: Statistics

C 7/12
LTG C
PB

Ask some research office fast to get me separate information for both the Mexican and Canadian borders:

1. The number of border patrols the US has. ✓
2. How many kilometers the border is.
3. How many border patrol per 100kilometers of border.

384

Then get the separate numbers for both the United States and New York City:

1. Number of police officers.
2. Total population.
3. How many police officers per 100,000 population.

I would like it fast.

Thanks.

RESPONSE ATTACHED

DHR:dh
070204-4

C 7/12

S. Gandy

.....
Please respond by _____

File Forwarded as
B Doc

TN 7/12
OSD 132 24-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26398

July 2, 2004
4:20 PM

FOR: SecDef
FROM: Mr. Paul Butler
SUBJECT: Answer to Your July 2, 2004 Snowflake Requesting Border Patrol & Police Statistics

Border Patrol Information

(Note: the size of an actual border patrol varies based on the situation; data compiled below reflects individual border patrol officers)

- Number of border patrol officers the US has:
 - Along the US-Mexican border: 9,838 (total border length is 3,141 km)
 - Along the US-Canadian border: 983 (total border length is 6,416 km)
- Number of border patrol officers per 100 km of border:
 - Along the US-Mexican border: 313 officers/100 km of border (or 3/1 km)
 - Along the US-Canadian border: 15 officers/100 km of border (or .15/1 km)

Police Information

- Number of police officers serving in:
 - The United States overall (federal, state, local): App. 870,000 (total US population is app. 285 million)
 - New York City: App. 38,000 (total New York City population is app. 8 million)
- Number of police officers per 100,000 population:
 - The United States overall: 305
 - New York City: 475

Source of Data: US Department of Homeland Security, July 2, 2004

Attach:
July 2, 2004 Snowflake, subj: Statistics

OSD 13224-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26399

34
29
8

720
~~CLOSE HOLD~~

May 17, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Najaf and Karbala

Please take a look at this memo from Schlesinger. If you think it is useful, see if you can sterilize it send it to whoever you think ought to have it, in a way that it won't hurt anybody.

DRM

Thanks.

Attach.
4/22/04 Schlesinger e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
051704-34

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

11-L-0559/OSD/26400

OSD 13226-04

17 May 04

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

LTG Craddock

04/22/04
11

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

This message is sent to Secretary Rumsfeld from James Schlesinger:

Don:

I'm not there. Can't vouch for this information.

But I thought it essential to pass it along.

Handwritten notes and signature:
none
w/ K lead?
[Signature]

CLOSE HOLD: THIS REPORT CONTAINS SENSITIVE INFORMATION. PLS HANDLE ACCORDINGLY.

The following is some information and analysis based on discussions with Tribal Sheikhs, local leaders and members of the Hawza in Najaf and Karabala regions;

1- Sadrites [militiamen] are openly engaged in anti-Sistani rhetoric in the streets, tearing his picture and cursing his name.

Sadr sees himself as the Iraqi Marja'iyah [i.e., the source of emulation/religious authority] first and foremost, and above any foreigners claiming this right [note: Sistani, Fayyad, Ghurayffi are all foreign—non-Iraqi]. All Sadr [ref the father] students claim Marja'iyah status and feel they are by default the true sources of religious authority, while the rest [Sistani, Fayyad, etc.] follow a sort of hierarchy. [Note: the Moslems do not have a church, anyone can issue a fatwa and there is no hierarchy, however the clerics do yield to one leader from among their peers in their immediate location, i.e. Sistani in Najaf or Iraq...but that status does not extend to Bahrain or Lebanon for example].

Already Sadr has killed the only other Iraqi Grand Ayatollah [Quoi] who posed a threat to his advancement, and after that he then surrounded Sistani's home and threatened him with death. That may happen again as Sadr feels his leadership position is vulnerable as he was isolated from the traditional Marja'iyah by the Coalition Forces (CF) presence on the outskirts of Kufa. The CF pull-back has not done much to quell that situation; in fact it has exacerbated the tension.

Indeed, the Hawza did not side much with the CF, but they did not side with Sadr either and announced they do not support any such activity by his forces which resounds through his mind right now. The CF withdrawal has put those who didn't support Sadr in a precarious situation. In the words of the delegation, they are scared, they realize they are dealing with a dangerous kid and do not trust him to be wise when he is feeling vindictive.

2- Indeed, anti-Sadrites [but not necessarily pro-coalition anymore] were hoping for a strong CF stand against Sadr.

While not expecting a CF military attack necessarily, they did NOT want to see CF pull back, which really troubles them. Sadr to them is the new Shi'a Saddam, and they fear him outright, and are afraid they will have to obey him if we do not fix this situation—and they are looking for US leadership. One suggestion was an attempt to isolate Najaf from Kufa and deal with two different but smaller

11-L-0559/OSD/26401

4/22/2004

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problems, (nfi -- just relaying their view at this point.

3- Next step—they may start looking for a local solution, and if they start that, intricate warfare patterns will become evident moving towards a civil war pitting tribal and religious groups against one another which could become the norm rather than an all-out intifadah against the occupation. If Sadr is not diffused before we hand over sovereignty, then we will definitely see this after 30 June.

4- Moqtada Al Sadr is already searching for a governor for Najaf and for a Police Chief, He occupies all the key government sites, has checkpoints at all the main roads [using police Motorola's to call in spot reports], has control over the Shi'a Shrines and their funds, his government is slowly but surely manifesting itself.

5- The Hawza has declared, behind closed doors, that Sadr is not a Moslem, and urged that we get this message.

Their explanation:

There are 5 tenets in the Shi'a religion that are inviolable. These are

1. Belief in God,
2. Belief in the Prophet Mohammad,
3. Belief in Justice,
4. Belief in the resurrection, and
5. Belief in the Imams [mainly Ali, but all 11 and the coming of the 12th and last Imam].

If you betray any of these 5 principles then you are not a Moslem.

Here is what MAS has done to deserve such condemnation...his troops are chanting [note: all chants are pre-approved] very controversial slogans that portray him above Imam Ali and the Prophet Mohammad. Here is a translation of the slogans: 1. **Please excuse us Ali, Sadr is the Imam** [min rukhsitaq ya Ali, Muqtada huwa al Wali] and 2. **Please excuse us Batool** [aka the Prophet's daughter and wife of Ali-Fatirna AL Zahra] **Muqtada is the Prophet** [min rukhsitek ya Batool, Muqtada huwa al Rasool], in Arabic they rhyme.

For this, Sadr is now considered a MURTAD, which means a REJECT— meaning from the religion of Islam. Sadr taking the place of the two holiest men in Shi'a Islam [the Prophet and 1st Imam], making himself larger than the 12th Imam who hasn't appeared yet, and larger than the Prophet of Islam altogether, is blasphemy and he is being condemned for it, secretly so far out of fear of him, but it will get out and spread .

They affirmed the people of Najaf and Kufa are on our side and against MAS/SM. Sadr must be taken down, brought to Justice, and or killed in the process, but he cannot remain in Kufa/Najaf to control/terrorize the Shrine cities unopposed. This goes for his entire team. (Sadr has ordered 400 cleric turbans, 200 white, 200 black, distributing them out to key associates for cover and protection.)

FINAL COMMENT:

Our strategy of negotiating with Sadr after he has committed still more outrages, murdered Coalition soldiers, seized two cities, desecrated two sacred Shi'ite shrines, and defied both Iraqi law and the Coalition's authority is unwise, ineffective, against our own interests, and morally unjustifiable. Is this why we fought the war?

11-L-0559/OSD/26402

With every passing day our credibility is falling as our local friends and other incountry sources are advising. We need to give the people of Karbala', Kufa, and Najaf the justice and protection they deserve by using military force to put an end to Sadr's rebellion as soon as possible. If Sadr and his forces escape from this situation to fight another day, we will have sown the seeds of disaster and guaranteed that Iraq's future will be anything but democratic.

These points re Najaf apply equally to Karbala. Sadr will not go away peacefully; moreover, we have to be seen to be driving him from the field, or else we will have lost all credibility -- especially when the real struggle comes, with the Badr taking the lead, in the months following the dissolution of CPA.

The people of Karbala want to see Sadr humiliated, but they cannot do so by themselves as they have no weapons or leadership.

Moreover, it was painfully obvious at a recent meeting that the Abd al-Mahdi al-Karbalawi (al-Sistani) representative clearly did not want this stalemate to end. He wanted no armed confrontations to occur within the "holy city of Karbala" and opposed a citizen's demonstration against Sadr, **meaning that it suits the Iranian agenda perfectly to have our indeciveness prolonged as long as possible.** SCIRI/Badr/Abd al-Mahdi/Iranians all know Sadr and his Militia cannot threaten their control of Karhala, but Sadr's Militia is very useful in telegraphing to everyone here just who it is that can be relied upon to provide long-term security for the city -- SCIRI/Badr.

While we are losing time with negotiations that can only lead to a smoke and mirrors solution to the Sadr problem, the Governor, at the initiative of a local Sheikh (Muslim al-Taa'i of the Husayn al-Sadr marj'a in al-Kazimiyya), has obtained permission from the Ministry of Awqaf (religious endowments) in Baghdad to turn the al-Mukhayyam Mosque (MAS headquarters in downtown Karbala) into a health clinic. While this is not a carte blanche to launch a missile into the al-Mukhayyam, it clearly shows that local civic leaders are doing all they can to pave the way for the removal of MAS influence from their city. After order is restored and the Ministry of Awqaf order can be implemented, this will be a tremendous humiliation for MAS as it will leave him with no base in this city. It remains to be seen, though, whether sufficient calm will be restored to allow the local government to seize the al-Mukhayyam and convert it into a center that serves the people of Karbala rather than one which threatens them.

In the meantime, Sadr's Militia continues to disturb our sleep almost nightly with scattered mortar attacks near or on our base camp. Just enough harrassment to let us and everyone else know they are still there and defying us. How much more of this are we going to put up with? When are we going to start playing "No-more-Mr.-Nice-Guy"? How about a few U.S. forces to take the initiative and start attacking the SM checkpoints in the northeastern suburbs of Karbala?

When SM militiamen start taking casualties, they will start to melt away. There aren't more than 300 of them, if even that many, in the whole city, according to informed U.S. military sources on the ground here. It is a mistake to have our forces simply surround Najaf while negotiations are going on and leave tidying up Karhala for another day. Every day of delay is subtracting from our ability to influence what is going on in this province. Soon we will have no credibility at all.

11-L-0559/OSD/26403

4/22/2004

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CLOSE HOLD~~

May 17, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Karbala Report

Here is another memo from Jim Schlesinger. If you think it is useful, see if you can sterilize it send it to whoever you think is appropriate.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/22/04 Schlesinger e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
051704-36

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

DR

17 May 04

11-L-0559/OSD/26404

OSD 13227-04

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

Nestel, Arlene, CIV, OSD

cc: LTC Craddock only

CLOSE HOLD: THIS REPORT CONTAINS SENSITIVE INFORMATION. PLS HANDLE ACCORDINGLY.

This report comes from US personnel in Kerbala who have been shelled virtually every night by mortar fire in Karbala. This has gone on now for more than three weeks. They are recommending Coalition Forces become proactive in striking back at those who are trying to kill them every night, and if nothing else, at least allow US Special Forces to take out the positions which they know that Sadr's Militiamen are holding. Reportedly the US military are willing to take the fight to the enemy, but their requests for permission to do so are being turned down in Baghdad.

They also are seeking guidance on the overall plan to bring the crisis with Sadr to a close. Although negotiations are going on in Najaf and Falluja, Sadr's Militia (SM) in Karbala is operating as an independent force and is slowly occupying more and more real estate. The Tribal Democracy Center, taken over by the SM two days ago, is only two blocks away from the entrance to the US compound in which the governorate buildings and our Women's Rights Center (WRC) are located. If SM takes the WRC or one of the other high-rises near the city center, they will be able to direct their fire directly, and at close range, at the all-too-symbolic center of governance for this province. If they take the downtown area, they will release the dangerous criminals being held in the local jail and turn them against us in attacks on our base camp. At present, the SM's attention is drawn primarily to taking the city center, but our base camp will become their next principal target after the governance center falls. The mortars which have so far been missing us will then start to fall in our camp, and there will inevitably be casualties.

Moreover, we will not be able to hold meetings downtown with the Governor and Provincial Council, and as civil servants will not be able to come to work, the local government will come to a standstill. Indeed, if the center of governance falls, the Governor and PC will have become entirely superfluous and all of our work in reforming the local government will have been in vain. You will then have to face the prospect of negotiating directly with some MAS-appointed government, which will only deal with us in bad faith, I assure you. These people will not go away until we drive them out. They see our current posture as cowardice and their nightly mortar attacks are demonstrations of their contempt for us. We must use our legitimate force to control this situation, and use it quickly.

The province's civic leaders also need us to provide a word of hope and guidance, but we have none to offer. Without our leadership and some reason to hold out hope, their morale will finally collapse, and we will face the same problem in Karbala -- JAM occupying the rabbit-warren of old city streets and lanes near the shrines -- that we already have in Najaf.

Karbala can be saved if we act in time.

I know that this is a difficult time to be asking for your personal attention to the problems of Karbala, which seems relatively quiet compared to all else that is being reported from around the country. The situation is actually quite serious, however, especially given the special symbolic significance of this city.

This matter undoubtedly is receiving your utmost attention, but we and other governance teams in Iraq would appreciate some guidance on what to expect in the near future. What is our game plan?

11-L-0559/OSD/26405

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We are now on Day 19 of the Mahdi Army siege in Karbala, with no end in sight and a complete absence of direction as to how this will all play out. I have not been in the State Department that long, but I spent twenty years of battles trying tough litigation cases and I learned a few things along the way that I believe in good faith apply here. (1) negotiating with people whose word cannot be trusted is a useless exercise and an affirmative demonstration of lack of resolve; (2) the failure to decide on a plan is to decide; (3) the failure to act is an affirmative act of omission.

(1) From all reporting we receive from Najaf and from what we know of the criminal, brutal acts of the Mahdi Army here in Karbala, negotiating with Sadr and/or his Mahdi Army lieutenants is nothing but a useless exercise. We will get no where with the word of thugs and only demonstrate to all in Karbala our lack of resolve to actually support our mission here by attempting to engage in civilized discussion with terrorists and murderers.

(2) Throughout this crisis, we have had no direction or guidance from Baghdad as to the way out. The failure of Baghdad to provide us with decisive guidance that we can pass on has eroded the confidence of the Karbala civic leaders and citizenry in us (CPA) and our CF. By failing to decide and/or advise us on what the plan is, we have not only failed the province of Karbala, we are failing ourselves as we are held virtual hostages in our Camp Juliet. We have been subject to water and food rationing as well as nightly mortar and RPG attacks that cause us to run at break-neck speed to our bunkers for safety. We dare not to venture out of Camp Juliet for fear of facing what has now become an almost virtual certainty that we will be ambushed if we don't hit a IED first. As the days pass, the odds are stacking up against us that one of those nightly mortars is going to find its way to a CPA human target. We need and deserve to know what decisions have been made for Karbala. If they haven't been made, then who do we need to impress that some course of action needs to be planned for Karbala? The failure to decide is costing us dearly with credibility and I just don't want it to cost us a life as well.

(3) What is most incredulous to me is that our CF are either unwilling or unable to engage the Mahdi Army directly. Our special forces are repeatedly attacked, yet they are denied the green light to attack known Mahdi Army strongholds in Karbala. Our IBCT advises it will only engage the Mahdi Army in Karbala if our nascent provincial council will give it permission. The failure of CF to affirmatively address the Mahdi Army siege has resulted in the Mahdi Army taking control of a significant portion of the city (including our almost-ready-to-be-opened Tribal Democracy Center) and poised to take over other strategic locations which will allow the domino-effect of taking control of the governorate building and police station. I am not a military strategist, but it is apparent to me that the failure to timely and directly engage the Mahdi Army in Karbala has allowed them to fortify their positions, pinpoint weak but strategically important positions to seize and has bolstered their confidence that they will not be touched in their efforts to take over this province. CPA and CF are being attacked daily and nightly, yet we see no firm resolve to respond. Maybe it is lack of a good night's sleep for too many days, or maybe it is the very real and present danger we are in here in Karbala, but I am beginning to feel unprotected and unsupported in our mission's efforts.

John, I am but one voice, but I'm looking for answers. Pass this up your chain of command or not, but please know I always appreciate that you encourage my most candid assessment.

11-L-0559/OSD/26406

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

4/23/2004

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

May 17, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meeting with Sistani Representative

Here is another memo from Jim Schlesinger. If you think it is useful, see if you can sterilize it send it to whoever you think is appropriate.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/22/04 Schlesinger e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
051704-35

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

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17 May 04

11-L-0559/OSD/26407

OSD 13228-04

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~~CLOSE HOLD~~

all 5/17

From Dr. Schiringer

cc: LTG Craddock only

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

CLOSE HOLD: THIS REPORT CONTAINS SENSITIVE INFORMATION. PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY.

Meeting with Sistani Office representative

22 April, 2004.

Sayyed Maytham Faisal Mazthboub (protect) is a close contact and personal friend of GA Ali Sistani. Maytham has had access to GA Sistani for the past 15 years. Maytham is a moderate and a respected notable in the city of Najaf/Kufa. He is not a cleric, and he is not employed by Sistani, but is an independently wealthy and a religiously inclined man who has had direct involvement in the Hawza.

The purpose of the meeting was to establish a direct relationship with US personnel in the southern region. He claimed many Baghdad visitors led them to believe they were a solid conduit to CPA-Baghdad but Sistani and his interlocutors were beginning to lose faith in this and wanted to build their own relationship at this point. He indicated grave dissatisfaction in dealing with multiple envoys who all claimed they were sent by Amb Bremer to "solve the problem" and the episodic nature of their involvement. Some had even gone as far as asking for a photo with GA Sistani [IGC member Muwaffaq Al Ruba'i for one] for what they interpreted as an attempt to prove they met with him and gain increased credibility when they quoted him.

He stated Sistani understands many are speaking in his name and knows he has to do something about that ; thus he is looking to make a direct office-to-office connection with a military office in CPA south so there is no misunderstanding. He knows of us from back when we first made our rounds with the Ayatollahs, and sought us out.

Note: He did not indicate at any time that he had a message from Sistani. However, at the close of the meeting, Maytham stated that he would report his meeting results directly to Sistani and requested a meeting for a closer contact of Sistani [NFI] with us this coming week at our locale. He did mention the person will be a cleric and an associate of GA Sistani, once one to be determined after Maytham briefs GA Sistani.

Here are key points Maythem made:

1) Coalition Forces were seen in some neighborhoods [Hayy Zahra] and were refreshingly received. People who want peace welcome this action, indicating US Forces are welcome in their midst.

In any city where there is no law and no authority there is a problem, as is the case in Najaf and Kufa. The sovereign should never abandon his [people] during a crisis, nor should he yield his authority to any person not properly appointed. [Here he is indicating the obvious, that the US regain control from the forces now occupying government offices in Najaf.] He mentioned US success in Kut, and wished for a similar outcome where the US was able to regain control and push back the militia.

2) Najaf has fallen into the hands of the so called Jaysh Al Mahdi (Sadr's Militia), a group of thieves, murderers who have armed themselves beyond any comprehension, taken police stations, released all the prisoners, and looted the government offices... all while the coalition forces watched. Anyone who worked with the CF has been targeted and many now are in jails and are being tried in so called Shan'a courts, some have been executed and still the Coalition stands by without interfering. "Collaborators" are being systematically pursued, arrested, and detained daily and their the families have no where to go and complain—just like the old days under Saddam. Fear and Intimidation now rule the city again.

3) Sistani has done his duty [as a religious leader]; he sent a delegation asking Sadr to leave the city if he intended to fight the coalition and spare the city and shrines from inherent destruction. He stated that the delegation warned Sadr the coalition would respond with might for every bullet the Sadr Militia [SM] expended. Sadr's inner circle is now in charge of key [military] decisions and Sadr remains removed from direct involvement, but remains adamant about not backing down in the face of too much pressure—which in his view

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17 May 04

11-L-0559/OSD/26408

4/23/2004

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~~NO LOG HOLD~~

doesn't look good—in that Sadr is personally convinced he could win and keep/control Najaf/Kufa.

4) Most of the hardened MAS militants in the streets manning positions are in fact strangers [from outside the city], and more likely from Thawra city [Sadr City] in Baghdad. It is unclear how they could have traveled unobstructed to Najaf, and taken control so easily, and remain in control in the face of the mighty coalition that liberated Iraq. He said that people were beginning to draw dangerous conclusions from such a situation, and unless the coalition regain control, it would be hard to mobilize the citizens to help or cooperate later. They live in fear of retribution for any misconstruction made by the Sadr thugs...this is like living under Saddam only now it was 1991 all over again.

5) Najaf is not Fallujah. Fallujah is full of former Baathists, foreign fighters from all over the Middle East to include Al Qaeda and Ansar Al Islam, former Iraqi military, former Iraqi Intelligence, and former Iraqi Special Services, many that benefited from the regime for years. Najaf is different in that it does not have any military commanders, security apparatus, or Sunni opposition, but instead people who never benefited from the regime but were systematically oppressed and persecuted for the past 35 years. There are no former regime elements or anyone fighting against an occupation—but people still thankful US liberated us. Sistani has stated that since US announced its departure on a given date then US not truly occupiers—so the dynamics are different.

6) The people in Najaf can be counted on to support you to a limit if US were to go after Sadr more aggressively. Hearing planes overhead day and night, knowing US troops are in the outskirts of the city, Najaf awaits a solution (ie, they expect a US offensive to take back the town and remove Sadr and his militia [ala Kut]). He cautioned against prolonged fighting and collateral damage [meaning the Shrines].

7) The Najaf Police are traitors who must be fired once the city is liberated. They were obedient dogs when Saddam was in power, and their paychecks were a fraction of what they are now. He displayed outright disdain for the great betrayal they committed in giving over the city to Sadr's criminals. They would have never thought of doing that under Saddam, but it was easier now since there was no perceptible punishment by the local government/coalition, but that the outcome of not cooperating with Sadr was taken more seriously.

8) Sadr is a cancer that needs to be removed or else it will get worse fast and then require either amputation [give up Najaf] or chasing after a disease that is spreading fast. Some solution that would rid them of this future [Shi'a] Saddam is needed ASAP. Re the Saddam analogy, Sadr has surrounded himself with a circle much like Saddam's to protect him as the leader so long as they are benefiting from him—currently that consists of sharing his spoils—like police cars and weapons, monies they plundered and influence they now enjoy along with its inherent respect. GA Sistani has declared all government property must returned.

The meeting lasted two hours and was rather pleasant in tone. Maytham is a friendly fellow that likes to make analogies and funny remarks. One joke he told about Sadr worth mentioning goes like this:

A mother mosquito tells her child not to go near any people as she feared for his life, but the little mosquito didn't listen. He came home that evening and told his mother, mom, why did you ask me to stay away from the people, they really like me, when I went near them today they all started clapping for me...[he motioned with his hands how we try to kill a mosquito] he said this was Sadr, he was that naive & stupid.

In departing he again mentioned he would brief Sistani personally and re-contact our office for a future meeting with a closer associate.

11-L-0559/OSD/26409

4/23/2004

~~NO LOG HOLD~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

July 1, 2004



TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Instruction

J 9/2

I look forward to receiving an additional instruction from me concerning the slave trade with young women.

Thanks.

Attach.
1/30/04 DSD memo: "Combating Trafficking in Persons in the Department of Defense"
[U19895/03]

DHR:dh
070104-13

.....
Please respond by 7/16/04

Sir,
Response Attached
YR, COLB
9/2

380.01

150104

OSD 13237-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26410



**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant**

20 October 2004 - 2000 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. DANIEL J. DELL'ORTO, PDGC

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial (SNOWFLAKE)

Sir:

Please note that the Deputy's decision with comments:

"Other: Don't send the letter, unless she raises the issue again. It would only be irritating at this stage."

Thank you.

Very respectfully,

Sean E. O'Connor
Captain, USN
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:
OSD 13274-04

250

18 OCT 04

19 AUG 04

OSD 13274-04

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600



DEP SEC DEF
HAS SEEN
OTHER - PU
OCT 20 2004
w/ CMTS

ACTION MEMO

October 18, 2004, 11:33 AM

Paul Butler

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial (SNOWFLAKE)

- You asked whether someone should clarify to Major General Kathryn Frost the distinctions between the political activity rules that apply to military personnel and those that apply to civilian employees.
- On July 16, 2004, the Acting Secretary of the Army denied MG Frost's request for waiver from certain political activity restrictions. She then forwarded the request to the Secretary of Defense, on whose behalf the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) denied it on August 17, 2004.
- Because MG Frost has not had further communications with the Office of the Secretary, taking additional steps on this matter would be unnecessary. As a courtesy, however, it would not be inappropriate for me to send her the letter at TAB A. It discusses the legal basis on which her request was denied. It also reiterates the limited activities related to her husband's campaign in which she may participate.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve TAB A by initialing below.

Approved _____ Disapproved _____ Other Don't send the

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment: As stated.

Prepared by: Alcides Ortiz, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

TSA SD	10/14
SA DSD	
SRMA DSD	21 10/20
EXEC SEC	M 10/19

letter, unless she raises the issue again. It would only be irritating at this stage.

PRS/PRD ITEMS

DATE RECEIVED IN OSD: 10/19/04
 SUSPENSE DATE: 9/13/04
 RECEIVED IN C&D: 10/19/04
 DAYS LATE: 36





**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600**

Major General Kathryn G. Frost
Headquarters, Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

Dear General Frost:

On July 16, 2004, the Acting Secretary of the Army denied your request for waiver from certain political activity restrictions. You then forwarded the request to the Secretary of Defense, on whose behalf the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) denied it on August 17, 2004.

As support for your argument that the Department of Defense (DoD) had relaxed the restrictions, you made reference in the request to section 734.307 of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations. I discuss below the reasons for which this section is inapplicable. I also reiterate the limited activities related to your husband's campaign in which you may participate.

Section 734.307 provides that a civilian employee covered by subpart C of the regulations may appear with the employee's spouse in a political advertisement or a broadcast and urge others to vote for the employee's spouse. Members of the armed services, however, are subject to DoD Directive 1344.10, not to the OPM regulations. Still, some of the civilian rules are persuasive in determining whether a service member may participate in political activities — specifically the rules in subpart D of the regulations, which apply to members of the Senior Executive Service (SES), employees of the National Security Agency (NSA), and other similarly situated employees.

This is the case because the rules in subpart D of the regulations are analogous to the rules in DoD Directive 1344.10, just as the duties of service members are analogous to those of NSA employees and the duties of senior commanders to those of SES officials. Subpart D employees, for example, may not participate in political campaigning and neither may military personnel. In contrast, employees covered by subparts B and C of the regulations are subject to less restrictive rules. For example, not only may they participate in a political campaign, but they may even manage one. Section 734.307 applies to employees covered by subpart C and thus fails to be persuasive.



11-L-0559/OSD/26413

Conversely, section 734.405 is persuasive because it applies to subpart D employees. This section provides that an employee may attend a political function with the employee's spouse, stand in the receiving line, and sit at the head of the table during a political dinner honoring the spouse. It also states that the employee may appear in photographs of the candidate's family that might be used in a political advertisement, broadcast, or campaign literature. In the same manner, an active-duty major general and senior commander may participate in these limited activities when out of uniform. The officer and the subpart D employee alike, however, are prohibited from taking an active role in the political campaign of the officer's spouse, speaking on behalf of or representing the spouse at political events, hosting an event honoring the spouse, or participating in media interviews.

The OPM regulations therefore fail to support your request for waiver. They instead confirm the Under Secretary's denial.

Please contact me if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Daniel J. Dell'Orto
Principal Deputy General Counsel



APR 29 2004

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial. Department of Defense Directive
 1344.10/Army Regulation 600-20

MEMORANDUM THRU: Army Chief of Staff

THRU: Secretary of the Army

FOR: Secretary of Defense

1. I respectfully request reconsideration of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of Army. 12 Apr 04, denial of my request for waiver ~~burn~~ certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 4.1.2.3 and Enclosure 3 of Department of Defense Directive 1341.10, and paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), Army Regulation 600-20. I requested this waiver by letter dated 26 Feb 04, so I may participate in the campaign for my husband, Congressman Marlin Frost.

2. Specifically, I would like to be able to accompany my husband in door-to-door campaigning; represent him at events when he cannot be present; speak on his behalf to organizations; and participate in media interviews.

3. I believe the prohibitions concerning political activity were developed primarily to avoid command influence in the political process or to preclude the perception of an organizational or military endorsement of any candidate or party. It is doubtful those who crafted the language even contemplated the situation where a military member would be married to a politician. My request for a waiver in 2000 was denied. However, a recent decision by the Department of Defense (DoD) indicates a relaxation of restrictions. Likewise, in accordance with 5 C.F.R. 731.307, civilian federal employees are permitted to participate in a spouse's political campaign. Examples of authorized participation include attending a fundraiser, standing in the receiving line, sitting at the head of the table, and urging others to vote for his or her spouse.

} Note to
 Du/David

4. In order to comply with regulatory requirements and departmental policy, I have been forced into the role of silent spouse when I accompany my husband to various events that are critical to the success of his campaign. The spouses of today's political candidates, whether male or female, are expected to take a much more active role than in the past. As a result of my enforced silence even when appearing in public, my husband's supporters may question my loyalty, and his opponents may take advantage of the fact that I must remain silent in the face of criticism against him.

5. I will not wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation to interfere with my duties as the Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or Department of Defense endorsement; solicit or receive campaign contributions; use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates; or campaign on behalf of anyone but my husband.

6. The reason given for denying my original waiver request was that "HQDA policy follows the DoD policy." However, DoDD 1344.10 has vested authority in the Secretary of the Army to consider waiver requests based on individual situations. If my request continues to be denied, I ask that the specific reasons for such denial be provided to me.

KATHRYN G. FROST
 Major General, U.S. Army
 Commander

Attachments:

- 1. DAPE-HR-L Ltr, 12 Apr 04
- 2. AAFES Commander Ltr. 26 Feb 04

cf: Army Deputy Chief of Staff

~~FOUO~~

August 19, 2004

000.1

TO: Dan Dell'Orto

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial

Here is a request that I have not reviewed carefully.

Please get into it and get with the Deputy Secretary to figure out the proper course of action.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/5/04 AAFES memo to SecDef[OSD 11853-04]

DHR:dh
081904-5

.....
Please respond by 8/27/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26416

OSD 13274-04

1920604

5

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Senior Military Assistant

9 September 2004 - 2027 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. DAN DELL'ORTO
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial (SNOWFLAKE)


Sir:

The Deputy's comments to you on the attached read:

" Dan -
I agree that Paragraph 2 of her April 29 letter goes much further,
but paragraph 3 implies that she thinks she is more restricted
than civilian employees. Should someone clarify that for her?
PW"

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Frank G. Hornick
Brigadier General, USA
Senior Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachments:

OSD 13274-04

Suspense: Monday, 13 September 2004

250

9 SEP 04

19 AUG 04

09 SEP 2004



From the Desk of
Paul Wolfowitz

Don -
I agree that #2
of her April 29 letter
goes much further.
But #3 implies that
she thinks she is more
restricted than civilian
employees.
Should someone clarify
that for her?

PW



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
 1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

OFFICE OF THE
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 774 510 - 3 11 11: 57

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 9/9

INFO MEMO

September 2, 2004, 10:00 A.M.

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial (SNOWFLAKE)


- You asked for information about the regulation concerning the participation of civilian employees in a spouse's political campaign. You also asked whether some limited waiver allowing Major General Kathryn G. Frost to stand in a receiving line, for example, was appropriate.
- Under the Hatch Act, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has issued regulations in 5 C.F.R. §§ 734.307 and 734.405 that address the issue specifically. One section appears in the subpart with the least restrictions. The other appears in the subpart that applies to members of the Senior Executive Service (SES), employees of the National Security Agency (NSA), etc., who are subject to more restrictive rules.
 - Under the subpart with less restrictions, section 734.307 provides that employees who are a candidate's spouse are subject to the same rules as other employees covered by this subpart. For example, they may attend a spouse's fundraiser, "stand in the receiving line," and "sit at the head table." They also may appear with the spouse in a political advertisement or broadcast and urge others to vote for the spouse.
 - Under the subpart with more restrictions, section 734.405 provides that employees may attend a political function with the spouse. For example, they "may stand in the receiving line and sit at the head of the table during a political dinner honoring the spouse." The section also states that they may appear in photographs of the candidate's family that might appear in a political advertisement, broadcast, or campaign literature.
- Members of the armed services are not subject to the Hatch Act, but the applicable rules (published in DoD Directive 1344.10) are analogous to the more restrictive rules in it. (Under one rule, service members—like NSA employees—may not participate in political campaigns.) The directive does not address the specific

SA SD	AX
SA DSD	Volkman 9/8
SRMA DSD	N 9/7
EXEC SEC	M 9/3



OSD 13274-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26419

issue at hand, but it requires the use of rules of reason and common sense when determining whether an activity should be prohibited. For this reason, service members have not been prohibited from attending political functions, standing in the receiving line, or sitting at the head table with the spouse (as long as they are out of uniform). Nor have they been prohibited from appearing in photographs of the candidate's family that might appear in a political advertisement, broadcast, or campaign literature. 

- In her request, however, MG Frost does not seek a waiver to engage in such activities. Rather, she wishes to take an active role in her husband's campaign, representing him at events that he cannot attend and speaking on his behalf. Because such activities are not allowed by the directive (or by the analogous Hatch Act provision) and waivers have not been granted previously, the Acting Secretary of the Army and the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) denied the request. If MG Frost wishes instead to stand with her husband in a receiving line, for example, she does not require a waiver. ✓

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: Alcides Ortiz, (b)(6)

Military Assistant Note

To: Mr. Alcides Ortiz
From: CDR T. L. Copenhaver
Date: 9/1/2004
Re: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial 2 (SNOWFLAKE)

Sir,

Attached is a waiver request by MajGen Frost from certain prohibitions against political activities. While reviewing the package, the DEPSECDEF had some additional questions he would like answered. Please respond to DEPSECDEF's concerns and prepare a memo for Mr. Dell'Orto to send to the Deputy.

Response is due by COB on 2 September 2004. Please note that Mr. Dell'Orto's response is due to DEPSECDEF on 3 September 2004.


v. ~~Tom Copenhaver~~
r. Tom Copenhaver

CC: Mr Dell'Orto, Col Reed

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Senior Military Assistant

1 Sep 04-0700

MEMORANDUM FOR: GC, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial

Gentleman,

The DSD reviewed the attached package and wrote the following questions referencing the 29 Apr 04 letter, paragraph 3: "What is ~~the~~^{she} referring to here? Is some limited waiver for spouses to at least stand in receiving lines, etc. appropriate?

Specially 5 C.F.R. 734.302 and a DOD decision to relax restrictions.

Thank You.

Very respectfully,



Frank G. Henick
Brigadier General, USA
Senior Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense: ~~9 Aug 04~~ *3 Sep 04*

~~SECRET~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26422

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

August 19, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *RA*
SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial

Here is a request that I have not reviewed carefully.

Please get into it and get with the Deputy Secretary to figure out the proper course of action.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/5/04 AAFES memo to SecDef [OSD 11853-04]

DHR:dh
081904-5

.....
Please respond by 8/27/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26424

OSD 13274-04



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
 Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
 Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

OFFICE OF THE



204 AUG -9
 AUG 05 2004

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial, Department of Defense Directive
 1344.10/Army Regulation 600-20

MEMORANDUM THRU: Deputy Secretary of Defense

FOR: Secretary of Defense

1. Request for a waiver from certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 4.1.2.3 and Enclosure 3 of Department of Defense Directive 1344.10, and paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), Army Regulation 600-20. I am requesting this waiver so that I may participate in the campaign of my husband, Congressman Martin Frost. This request follows two earlier requests to department of the Army that have been denied. //

2. I requested a waiver by letter dated 26 Feb 04. It was denied by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, by letter dated 12 Apr 04. I requested reconsideration by letter dated 29 Apr 04 and asked that, if my request was denied, I be given the specific reasons. The 16 Jul 04 denial states that granting this waiver "would undermine a sound policy that helps preserve the integrity of the Army by keeping it politically neutral."

3. I respectfully submit to you that the political neutrality of the Department of the Army will not be adversely impacted should you grant my request for waiver. When the restrictive language of DODD 1344.10 and AR 600-20 was drafted, it was unlikely that anyone anticipated that a service member would be married to a Member of Congress. The current Administration has emphasized that strong marriages are central to a strong America. Therefore, I would plead that the ability of anyone to fully participate in the life of his/her spouse is central to a strong marriage - recreation, avocation, or career. To restrict me, as a result of my military service, is to communicate that marriage within the military is less relevant than that of the private sector. My husband's constituents and potential voters do not now, nor would they in the future, presume my advocacy for my husband or my participation on his behalf to be anything other than my support for or belief in the man I love. No one would view action on my part either as violating Army neutrality in an election or as a service endorsement of any candidate - rather the expected support of the wife. //

4. Specifically, I will not wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation to interfere with my duties as Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or Department of Defense endorsement; solicit or receive campaign contributions; use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates, or campaign on behalf of anyone but my husband. //

5. I do not believe that allowing me to participate in my husband's campaign under these conditions would cause a reasonable person to perceive that the integrity of the Army or the Department of Defense has been compromised. For this reason, and the reasons outlined in my previous letters, I respectfully ask that you expeditiously approve my request.

KATHRYN G. FROST
 Major General, U.S. Army
 Commander

Attachments:

1. DA Ltr, 16 July 04
2. AAFES Commander Ltr 29 Apr 04
3. DAPE-HR-L Ltr, 12 Apr 04
4. AAFES Commander Ltr, 26 Feb 04

cf: Acting Secretary of the Army

OSD 11853-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26425

TAB

1



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

JUL 16 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Kathryn G. Frost, Commander, Headquarters,
AAFES, P. O. Box 660202, Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of waiver denial, DOD Directive 1344.10/AR 600-20

Your request for reconsideration of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1's denial of your request to be allowed to campaign for your husband, Congressman Martin Frost, is denied.

This denial is based on a careful review of DODD 1344.10, paragraph 4.1.2.3 (Enclosure 1) and AR 600-20, paragraph 5-3A(2)(c) (Enclosure 2), which prohibit members of the Army on active duty from participating in political campaigns. Granting the requested exception would undermine a sound policy that helps preserve the integrity of the Army by keeping it politically neutral.

As an additional matter, I recommend that you request your spouse's political campaign to delete all references to your duty position on its internet website to remove even the appearance that as an Army officer you are participating in a political campaign.

My point of contact for this action is Chaplain (LTC) Rick D. Mathis, Chief, Army Command Policy Branch, (b)(6)


R. L. Brownlee

Acting Secretary of the Army

Encl

TAB

2



APR 29 2004

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial. Department of Defense Directive
1344.10/Army Regulation 600-20

MEMORANDUM THRU: Army Chief of Staff

THRU: Secretary of the Army

FOR: Secretary of Defense

1. I respectfully request reconsideration of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of Army, 12 Apr 04, denial of my request for waiver from certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 4.1.2.3 and Enclosure 3 of Department of Defense Directive 1344.10, and paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), Army Regulation 600-20. I requested this waiver by letter dated 26 Feb 04, so I may participate in the campaign for my husband, Congressman Martin Frost.

2. Specifically, I would like to be able to accompany my husband in door-to-door campaigning; represent him at events when he cannot be present; speak on his behalf to organizations; and participate in media interviews.

3. I believe the prohibitions concerning political activity were developed primarily to avoid command influence in the political process or to preclude the perception of an organizational or military endorsement of any candidate or party. It is doubtful those who crafted the language even contemplated the situation where a military member would be married to a politician. My request for a waiver in 2000 was denied. However, a recent decision by the Department of Defense (DoD) indicates a relaxation of restrictions. Likewise, in accordance with 5 C.F.R. 734.307 civilian federal employees are permitted to participate in a spouse's political campaign. Examples of authorized participation include attending a fundraiser, standing in the receiving line, sitting at the head of the table, and urging others to vote for his or her spouse.

4. In order to comply with regulatory requirements and departmental policy, I have been forced into the role of silent spouse when I accompany my husband to various events that are critical to the success of his campaign. The spouses of today's political candidates, whether male or female, are expected to take a much more active role than in the past. As a result of my enforced silence even when appearing in public, my husband's supporters may question my loyalty, and his opponents may take advantage of the fact that I must remain silent in the face of criticism, against him.

5. I will not wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation to interfere with my duties as the Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or Department of Defense endorsement; solicit or receive campaign contributions; use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates; or campaign on behalf of anyone but my husband.

6. The reason given for denying my original waiver request was that "HQDA policy follows the DoD policy." However, DoDD 1344.10 has vested authority in the Secretary of the Army to consider waiver requests based on individual situations. If my request continues to be denied, I ask that the specific reasons for such denial be provided to me.

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re

KATHRYN G. FROST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

Attachments:
1. DAPE-HR-L Ltr, 12 Apr 04
2. AAFES Commander Ltr, 26 Feb 04

cc: Army Deputy Chief of Staff

TAB

3



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF G-1
300 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0300



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

1 2 APR 2004

DAPE-HR-L

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Kathryn G. Frost, Commander, Headquarters
AAFES, P.O. Box 660202, Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

SUBJECT: Request for Waiver, AR 600-20

1. Your 26 Feb 04 request for a waiver under AR 600-20, to campaign for your husband, Congressman Martin Frost, is denied.
2. This denial is based on a careful review of AR 600-20, paragraph 5-3a(2)(c) and DODD 1344.10, paragraph 4.1.2.3. DOD policy prohibits members of the Armed Forces on active duty from participating in campaigns. In this regard, HQDA policy follows the DOD policy.
3. My responsible officer for this action is the Chief, Army Command Policy Branch, CH (LTC) Rick D. Mathis, (b)(6)

F. L. HAGENBECK
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1

TAB

4



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202



FEB 26 2004

SUBJECT: Request for Waiver, AR 600-20

Lieutenant General F. L. Hagenbeck
Department of the **Army**
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Pentagon 2E736
Washington, DC 20310

1. I respectfully request a waiver from certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), AR 600-20. I am requesting **this waiver** in order to campaign for my husband, Congressman Martin Frost.

2. In **today's** multi-media political campaign, spouses of candidates are expected to take an **active role** in the campaign. I would like to be able to accompany my husband in door-to-door campaigning; represent him at events when he cannot be present; speak on his behalf to organizations; host **events** at my home for him, and participate in media interviews.

3. I believe **that** the prohibitions concerning political **activity** were developed primarily to avoid command influence in the political process or to preclude the perception of organizational or military endorsement of **my** candidate or party. **It is** doubtful those **who** crafted the language ever contemplated the situation where a military member would be married to a politician. My previous request for a waiver in 2000 was denied. However, a recent decision by the Department of Defense (DoD) indicates a relaxation of restrictions.

4. I have of course refrained from these activities since our marriage, in compliance with regulatory requirements and departmental policy. **As** a result, my husband's supporters have questioned **my** loyalty, and his opponents have taken advantage of the fact that I had to remain silent in the face of criticism against him.

5. I will not wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow **my** participation to interfere with **my** duties as the Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (**AXFES**); engage in conduct which would imply Army or DoD; solicit or receive campaign contributions from a member of the Armed Forces, or from a civilian employee of the United States, or use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates.

KATHRYN G. FROST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

11-L-0559/OSD/26433

TAB B



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

1745
8/25
D/O

INFO MEMO

August 20, 2004, 4:00 P.M.

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial (SNOWFLAKE)

- On February 26, 2004, Major General Kathryn Frost requested a waiver from certain political activity prohibitions. (Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 provides that service members on active duty may not engage in campaigning.) In the request, at TAB 1, she expressed her wish to take an active role in her husband's campaign for reelection to the U.S. House of Representatives.
- The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army denied the request on April 12, 2004 and the Acting Secretary of the Army affirmed such determination on July 16, 2004. See TABS 2 and 3.
- On August 5, 2004, MG Frost forwarded to the Secretary of Defense a request for reconsideration, at TAB 4. The Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (USD(P&R)) coordinated this action with my office and denied the request on August 17, 2004. See TAB 5.
- The determination by USD(P&R) constitutes final resolution of the matter. Any further action is therefore unnecessary.

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: Alcides Ortiz, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/26435

Ballman 8/25



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202



FEB 26 2004

SUBJECT: Request for Waiver, XR 600-20

Lieutenant General F. L. Hagenbeck
Department of the Army
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Pentagon 2E736
Washington, DC 20310

1. I respectfully request a waiver from certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), AR 600-20. I am requesting this waiver in order to campaign for my husband, Congressman Martin Frost.

2. In today's multi-media political campaign, spouses of candidates are expected to take an active role in the campaign. I would like to be able to accompany my husband in door-to-door campaigning; represent him at events when he cannot be present; speak on his behalf to organizations; host events at my home for him, and participate in media interviews.

3. I believe that the prohibitions concerning political activity were developed primarily to avoid command influence in the political process or to preclude the perception of an organizational or military endorsement of any candidate or party. It is doubtful those who crafted the language ever contemplated the situation where a military member would be married to a politician. My previous request for a waiver in 2000 was denied. However, a recent decision by the Department of Defense (DoD) indicates a relaxation of restrictions.

4. I have of course refrained from these activities since our marriage, in compliance with regulatory requirements and departmental policy. As a result, my husband's supporters have questioned my loyalty, and his opponents have taken advantage of the fact that I had to remain silent in the face of criticism against him.

5. I will not wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation to interfere with my duties as the Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or DoD; solicit or receive campaign contributions from a member of the Armed Forces or from a civilian employee of the United States, or use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates.

KATHRYN G FROST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

11-L-0559/OSD/26436



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF G-1
300 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0300



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

12 APR 2004

DAPE-HR-L

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Kathryn G. Frost, Commander, Headquarters
AAFES, P.O. Box 660202, Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

SUBJECT: Request for Waiver, **AR 600-20**

1. Your **26 Feb 04** request for a waiver under **AR 600-20**, to campaign for your husband, Congressman Martin Frost, is denied.
2. This denial is based on a careful review of **AR 600-20**, paragraph **5-3a(2)(c)** and **DODD 1344.10**, paragraph 4.1.2.3. DOD policy prohibits members of the Armed Forces on active duty from participating in campaigns. In this regard, HQDA policy follows the DOD policy.
3. My responsible officer for this action is the Chief, Army Command Policy Branch, CH (LTC) Rick D. Mathis, (b)(6)

F. L. HAGENBECK
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

JUL 16 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Kathryn G. Frost, Commander, Headquarters,
AAFES, P. O. Box 660202, Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of waiver denial, DOD Directive 1344.10/AR 600-20

Your request for reconsideration of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1's denial of your request to be allowed to campaign for your husband, Congressman Martin Frost, is denied.

This denial is based on a careful review of DODD 1344.10, paragraph 4.1.2.3 (Enclosure 1) and AR 600-20, paragraph 5-3A(2)(c) (Enclosure 2), which prohibit members of the Army on active duty from participating in political campaigns. Granting the requested exception would undermine a sound policy that helps preserve the integrity of the Army by keeping it politically neutral.

As an additional matter, I recommend that you request your spouse's political campaign to delete all references to your duty position on its internet website to remove even the appearance that as an Army officer you are participating in a political campaign.


My point of contact for this action is Chaplain (LTC) Rick D. Mathis, Chief, Army Command Policy Branch, (b)(6)

R. L. Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army

Encl



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
 Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
 Dallas, Texas 75256-0202

OFFICE OF THE
 207 MIB-9
 AUG 05 2004


SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial, Department of Defense Directive
 1344.10/Army Regulation 600-20

MEMORANDUM THRU: Deputy Secretary of Defense

FOR: Secretary of Defense


1. Request for a waiver from certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 4.1.2.3 and Enclosure 3 of Department of Defense Directive 1344.10, and paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), Army Regulation 600-20. I am requesting this waiver so that I may participate in the campaign of my husband, Congressman Martin Frost. This request follows two earlier requests to department of the Army that have been denied.

2. I requested a waiver by letter dated 26 Feb 04. It was denied by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, by letter dated 12 Apr 04. I requested reconsideration by letter dated 29 Apr 04 and asked that, if my request was denied, I be given the specific reasons. The 16 Jul 04 denial states that granting this waiver "would undermine a sound policy that helps preserve the integrity of the Army by keeping it politically neutral."

3. I respectfully submit to you that the political neutrality of the Department of the Army will not be adversely impacted should you grant my request for waiver. When the restrictive language of DODD 1344.10 and AR 600-20 was drafted, it was unlikely that anyone anticipated that a service member would be married to a Member of Congress. The current Administration has emphasized that strong marriages are central to a strong America. Therefore, I would plead that the ability of anyone to fully participate in the life of his/her spouse is central to a strong marriage - recreation, avocation, or career. To restrict me, as a result of my military service, is to communicate that marriage within the military is less relevant than that of the private sector. My husband's constituents and potential voters do not now, nor would they in the future, presume my advocacy for my husband or my participation on his behalf to be anything other than my support for or belief in the man I love. No one would view action on my part either as violating Army neutrality in an election or as a service endorsement of any candidate--rather the expected support of the wife.

4. Specifically, I will **not** wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation to interfere with my duties as Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or Department of Defense endorsement; solicit or receive campaign contributions; use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates, or campaign on behalf of anyone but my husband.

5. I do not believe that allowing me to participate in my husband's campaign under these conditions would cause a reasonable person to perceive that the integrity of the Army or the Department of Defense has been compromised. For this reason, and the reasons outlined in my previous letters, I respectfully ask that you expeditiously approve my request.



KATHRYN G. FROST
 Major General, U.S. Army
 Commander

Attachments:

1. DA Ltr, 16 July 04
2. AAFES Commander Ltr 29 Apr 04
3. DAPE-HR-L Ltr, 12 Apr 04
4. AAFES Commander Ltr, 26 Feb 04

cf: Acting Secretary of the Army

OSD 11853-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26439



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



AUG 17 2004

Major General Kathryn G. Frost
Headquarters, Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202


Dear General Frost:

I regret that I must deny your request for a waiver from certain prohibitions contained in Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 and Army Regulation 600-20.

As the Supreme Court has ruled, "keeping official military activities . . . wholly free of entanglement with partisan political campaigns of any kind . . . is wholly consistent with the American constitutional tradition of a politically neutral military establishment under civilian control." *Greer v. Spock*, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976); *see also* 42 U.S.C. § 1972. To maintain this neutrality, Department of Defense officials and active-duty members of the Armed Forces must avoid even the appearance of political partiality.

The participation of an active-duty Major General and senior commander in political campaigning would violate this standard.

Sincerely,



David S. C. Chu

cc:
Acting Secretary of the Army



11-L-0559/OSD/26440



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004-09-02 10:11:57

INFO MEMO

September 2, 2004, 10:00 A.M.

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel
SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial (SNOWFLAKE)

- o You asked for information about the regulation concerning the participation of civilian employees in a spouse's political campaign. You also asked whether some limited waiver allowing Major General Kathryn G. Frost to stand in a receiving line, for example, was appropriate.
- o Under the Hatch Act, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has issued regulations in 5 C.F.R. §§ 734.307 and 734.405 that address the issue specifically. One section appears in the subpart with the least restrictions. The other appears in the subpart that applies to members of the Senior Executive Service (SES), employees of the National Security Agency (NSA), etc., who are subject to more restrictive rules.
 - o Under the subpart with less restrictions, section 734.307 provides that employees who are a candidate's spouse are subject to the same rules as other employees covered by this subpart. For example, they may attend a spouse's fundraiser, "stand in the receiving line," and "sit at the head table." They also may appear with the spouse in a political advertisement or broadcast and urge others to vote for the spouse.
 - o Under the subpart with more restrictions, section 734.405 provides that employees may attend a political function with the spouse. For example, they "may stand in the receiving line and sit at the head of the table during a political dinner honoring the spouse." The section also states that they may appear in photographs of the candidate's family that might appear in a political advertisement, broadcast, or campaign literature.
- o Members of the armed services are not subject to the Hatch Act, but the applicable rules (published in DoD Directive 1344.10) are analogous to the more restrictive rules in it. (Under one rule, service members—like NSA employees—may not participate in political campaigns.) The directive does not address the specific



issue at hand, but it requires the use of rules of reason and common sense when determining whether an activity should be prohibited. For this reason, service members have not been prohibited from attending political functions, standing in the receiving line, or sitting at the head table with the spouse (as long as they are out of uniform). Nor have they been prohibited from appearing in photographs of the candidate's family that might appear in a political advertisement, broadcast, or campaign literature.

- In her request, however, MG Frost does not seek a waiver to engage in such activities. Rather, she wishes to take an active role in her husband's campaign, representing him at events that he cannot attend and speaking on his behalf. Because such activities are not allowed by the directive (or by the analogous Hatch Act provision) and waivers have not been granted previously, the Acting Secretary of the Army and the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) denied the request. If MG Frost wishes instead to stand with her husband in a receiving line, for example, she does not require a waiver.

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: Alcides Ortiz (b)(6)

Military Assistant Note

To: Mr. Alcides Ortiz
From: CDR T. L. Copenhaver
Date: 9/1/2004
Re: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial 2 (SNOWFLAKE)

Sir,

Attached is a waiver request by MajGen Frost from certain prohibitions against political activities. While reviewing the package, the DEPSECDEF had some additional questions he would like answered. Please respond to DEPSECDEF's concerns and prepare a memo for Mr. Dell'Orto to send to the Deputy.

Response is due by COB on 2 September 2004. Please note that Mr. Dell'Orto's response is due to DEPSECDEF on 3 September 2004.


v/r, Tom Copenhaver

CC: Mr Dell'Orto, Col Reed

11-L-0559/OSD/26443

~~SECRET~~

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Senior Military Assistant**

1 Sep 04-0700

MEMORANDUM FOR: GC, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial

Gentleman,

The DSD reviewed the attached package and wrote the following questions referencing the 29 Apr 04 letter, paragraph 3: "What is ~~the~~ referring to here? Is some limited waiver for spouses to at least stand in receiving lines, etc. appropriate?"

Specially SCFA. 734.307 and a 300 decision to relax restrictions.

Thank You.

Very respectfully,



Frank G. Helmick
Brigadier General, USA
Senior Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense: ~~9 Aug 04~~ *3 Sep 04*

~~SECRET~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26444

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

August 19, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial

Here is a request that I have not reviewed carefully.

Please get into it and get with the Deputy Secretary to figure out the proper course of action.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/5/04 AAFES memo to SecDef [OSD 11 853-04]

DHR:dh
081904-5

.....
Please respond by 8/27/04


~~FOUO~~

OSD 13274-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26446



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202



SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial, Department of Defense Directive 1344.10/Army Regulation 600-20

MEMORANDUM THRU: Deputy Secretary of Defense

FOR: Secretary of Defense

1. Request for a waiver from certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 4.1.2.3 and Enclosure 3 of Department of Defense Directive 1344.10, and paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), Army Regulation 600-20. I am requesting this waiver so that I may participate in the campaign of my husband, Congressman Martin Frost. This request follows two earlier requests to department of the Army that have been denied.
2. I requested a waiver by letter dated 26 Feb 04. It was denied by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, by letter dated 12 Apr 04. I requested reconsideration by letter dated 29 Apr 04 and asked that, if my request was denied, I be given the specific reasons. The 16 Jul 04 denial states that granting this waiver "would undermine a sound policy that helps preserve the integrity of the Army by keeping it politically neutral."
3. I respectfully submit to you that the political neutrality of the Department of the Army will not be adversely impacted should you grant my request for waiver. When the restrictive language of DODD 1344.10 and AR 600-20 was drafted, it was unlikely that anyone anticipated that a service member would be married to a Member of Congress. The current Administration has emphasized that strong marriages are central to a strong America. Therefore, I would plead that the ability of anyone to fully participate in the life of his/her spouse is central to a strong marriage - recreation, avocation, or career. To restrict me, as a result of my military service, is to communicate that marriage within the military is less relevant than that of the private sector. My husband's constituents and potential voters do not now, nor would they in the future, presume my advocacy for my husband or my participation on his behalf to be anything other than my support for or belief in the man I love. No one would view action on my part either as violating Army neutrality in an election or as a service endorsement of any candidate--rather the expected support of the wife.
4. Specifically, I will not wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation to interfere with my duties as Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or Department of Defense endorsement; solicit or receive campaign contributions; use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates, or campaign on behalf of anyone but my husband.
5. I do not believe that allowing me to participate in my husband's campaign under these conditions would cause a reasonable person to perceive that the integrity of the Army or the Department of Defense has been compromised. For this reason, and the reasons outlined in my previous letters, I respectfully ask that you expeditiously approve my request.

KATHRYN G. FROST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

Attachments:

1. DA Ltr, 16 July 04
2. AAFES Commander Ltr 29 Apr 04
3. DAPE-HR-L Ltr, 12 Apr 04
4. AAFES Commander Ltr, 26 Feb 04

cf: Acting Secretary of the Army

OSD 11853-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26447

TAB

1



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

JUL 16 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Kathryn G. Frost, Commander, Headquarters,
AAFES, P. O. Box 660202, Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of waiver denial, DOD Directive 1344.10/AR 600-20

Your request for reconsideration of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1's denial of your request to be allowed to campaign for your husband, Congressman Martin Frost, is denied.

This denial is based on a careful review of DODD 1344.10, paragraph 4.1.2.3 (Enclosure 1) and AR 600-20, paragraph 5-3A(2)(c) (Enclosure 2), which prohibit members of the Army on active duty from participating in political campaigns. Granting the requested exception would undermine a sound policy that helps preserve the integrity of the Army by keeping it politically neutral.

As an additional matter, I recommend that you request your spouse's political campaign to delete all references to your duty position on its internet website to remove even the appearance that as an Army officer you are participating in a political campaign.

My point of contact for this action is Chaplain (LTC) Rick D. Mathis, Chief, Army Command Policy Branch, (b)(6)

R. L. Brownlee

Acting Secretary of the Army

Encl

TAB

2



APR 29 2004

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial. Department of Defense Directive
1344.10/Army Regulation 600-20

MEMORANDUM THRU: Army Chief of Staff

THRU: Secretary of the Army

FOR: Secretary of Defense

1. I respectfully request reconsideration of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of Army, 12 Apr 04, denial of my request for waiver **born** certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 4.1.2.3 and Enclosure 3 of Department of Defense Directive 1344.10, and paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), Army Regulation 600-20. I requested this waiver by letter **dated** 26 Feb 04, so I may participate in the campaign for my husband, Congressman Martin Frost.
2. Specifically, I would like **to** be able to accompany my husband in door-to-door campaigning; represent him at events when he cannot **be** present; speak on his behalf to organizations; **and** participate in media interviews.
3. I believe the prohibitions concerning political activity were developed primarily to avoid command influence in the political process or to preclude the perception of an **organizational** or military endorsement of any candidate or party. It is doubtful **those** who crafted the language even **contemplated** the situation where a military member would **be married to** a politician. My request for a waiver in 2000 **was** denied. However, a recent decision by **the** Department of Defense (DoD) indicates a relaxation of restrictions. Likewise, in accordance with 5 C.F.R. 731.307, civilian federal employees are permitted **to** participate in a **spouse's** political campaign. Examples of authorized participation include attending a fundraiser, standing in the receiving line, sitting at the head of the table, and urging others **to** vote for **his** or her spouse.
4. In order to comply with regulatory requirements **and** departmental policy, I have been forced into the role of silent **spouse** when I accompany my husband **to various** events **that** are critical **to** the success of **his** campaign. The **spouses** of today's political candidates, whether male or female, are **expected to** take a much more active role **than** in the past. As a result of my enforced silence even when **appearing** in public, my husband's supporters may question my loyalty, and his opponents may take advantage of **the** fact **that** I must remain silent in the face of criticism against him.
5. I will not wear my **uniform** or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation **to** interfere with my duties **as** the Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or Department of Defense endorsement; solicit or receive campaign contributions; use my official authority or position **to influence** my subordinates; or campaign **on behalf** of anyone **but** my husband.
6. The reason given for denying my original waiver request was **that** "HQDA policy follows the DoD policy." However, DoDD 1341.10 has vested authority in the Secretary of the Army to consider waiver requests **based on** individual situations. If my request continues to be denied, I ask **that** the **specific** reasons for such denial **be** provided **to** me.

KATHRYN G. FROST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

Attachments:

1. DAPE-HR-L Ltr, 12 Apr 04
2. AAFES Commander Ltr, 26 Feb 04

cc: Army Deputy Chief of Staff

11-L-0559/OSD/26451

TAB

3



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF G-1
300 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0300



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

12 APR 2004

DAPE-HR-L

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Kathryn G. Frost, Commander, Headquarters
AAFES, P.O. Box 660202, Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

SUBJECT: Request for Waiver, AR 600-20

1. Your 26 Feb 04 request for a waiver under AR 600-20, to campaign for your husband, Congressman Martin Frost, is denied.
2. This denial is based on a careful review of AR 600-20, paragraph 5-3a(2)(c) and DODD 1344.10, paragraph 4.1.2.3. DOD policy prohibits members of the Armed Forces on active duty from participating in campaigns. In this regard, HQDA policy follows the DOD policy.
3. My responsible officer for this action is the Chief, Army Command Policy Branch, CH (LTC) Rick D. Mathis, (b)(6)


F. L. HAGENBECK
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1

TAB

4



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202



FEB 26 2004

SUBJECT: Request for Waiver, AR 600-20

Lieutenant General F. L. Hagenbeck
Department of the Army
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Pentagon 2E736
Washington, DC 20310

1. I respectfully request a waiver from cemin prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), AR 600-20. I am requesting this waiver in order to campaign for my husband, Congressman Martin Frost.

2. In today's multi-media political campaign, spouses of candidates are expected to take an active role in the campaign. I would like to be able to accompany my husband in door-to-door campaigning; represent him at events when he cannot be present; speak on his behalf to organizations; host events at my home for him, and participate in media interviews.

3. I believe that the prohibitions concerning political activity were developed primarily to avoid command influence in the political process or to preclude the perception of an organizational or military endorsement of any candidate or party. It is doubtful those who crafted the language ever contemplated the situation where a military member would be married to a politician. My previous request for a waiver in 2000 was denied. However, a recent decision by the Department of Defense (DoD) indicates a relaxation of restrictions.

4. I have of course refrained from these activities since our marriage, in compliance with regulatory requirements and department policy. As a result, my husband's supporters have questioned my loyalty, and his opponents have taken advantage of the fact that I had to remain silent in the face of criticism against

5. I will not wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation to interfere with my duties as the Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AXFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or DoD; solicit or receive campaign contributions from a member of the Armed Forces, or from a civilian employee of the United States, or use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates.

KATHRYN G. FROST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

11-L-0559/OSD/26455

TAB B



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

1745
9/25
DJK

INFO MEMO

August 20, 2004, 4:00 P.M.

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial (SNOWFLAKE)

- o On February 26, 2004, Major General Kathryn Frost requested a waiver from certain political activity prohibitions. (Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 provides that service members on active duty may not engage in campaigning.) In the request, at TAB 1, she expressed her wish to take an active role in her husband's campaign for reelection to the U.S. House of Representatives.
- o The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army denied the request on April 12, 2004 and the Acting Secretary of the Army affirmed such determination on July 16, 2004. See TABS 2 and 3.
- o On August 5, 2004, MG Frost forwarded to the Secretary of Defense a request for reconsideration, at TAB 4. The Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (USD(P&R)) coordinated this action with my office and denied the request on August 17, 2004. See TAB 5.
- The determination by USD(P&R) constitutes final resolution of the matter. Any further action is therefore unnecessary.

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: Alcides Ortiz, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/26457

Ballman 8/25



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202



FEB 26 2004

SUBJECT: Request for Waiver, AR 600-20

Lieutenant General *F. L. Hagenbeck
Department of the Army
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Pentagon 2E736
Washington, DC 20310

1. I respectfully request a waiver from certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), AR 600-20. I am requesting this waiver in order to campaign for my husband, Congressman Martin Frost.

2. In today's multi-media political campaign, spouses of candidates are expected to take an active role in the campaign. I would like to be able to accompany my husband in door-to-door campaigning; represent him at events when he cannot be present; speak on his behalf to organizations; host events at my home for him, and participate in media interviews.

3. I believe that the prohibitions concerning political activity were developed primarily to avoid command influence in the political process or to preclude the perception of an organizational or military endorsement of any candidate or party. It is doubtful those who crafted the language ever contemplated the situation where a military member would be married to a politician. My previous request for a waiver in 2000 was denied. However, a recent decision by the Department of Defense (DoD) indicates a relaxation of restrictions.

4. I have of course refrained from these activities since our marriage, in compliance with regulatory requirements and departmental policy. As a result, my husband's supporters have questioned my loyalty, and his opponents have taken advantage of the fact that I had to remain silent in the face of criticism against him.

5. I will not wear my uniform or use government property or facilities while campaigning; allow my participation to interfere with my duties as the Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (XXFES); engage in conduct which would imply Army or DoD; solicit or receive campaign contributions from a member of the Armed Forces, or from a civilian employee of the United States, or use my official authority or position to influence my subordinates.

KATHRYN G. FROST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander

11-L-0559/OSD/26458



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF G-1
300 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0300



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF


12 APR 2004

DAPE-HR-L

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Kathryn G. Frost, Commander, Headquarters
AAFES, P.O. Box 660202, Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

SUBJECT: Request for Waiver, **AR 600-20**

1. Your 26 Feb 04 request for a waiver under **AR 600-20**, to campaign for your husband, Congressman Martin Frost, is denied.
2. This denial is based on a careful review of **AR 600-20**, paragraph 5-3a(2)(c) and DODD 1344.10, paragraph 4.1.2.3. DOD policy prohibits members of the Armed Forces on active duty from participating in campaigns. In this regard, HQDA policy follows the DOD policy.
3. My responsible officer for this action is the Chief, Army Command Policy Branch, CH (LTC) Rick D. Mathis, (b)(6)


F. L. HAGENBECK
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

JUL 16 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Kathryn G. Frost, Commander, Headquarters,
AAFES, P.O. Box 660202, Dallas, Texas 75266-0202

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of waiver denial, DOD Directive 1344.10/AR 600-20

Your request for reconsideration of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1's denial of your request to **be** allowed to campaign for your husband, Congressman Martin Frost, is denied.

This denial is based on a careful review of DODD 1344.10, paragraph 4.1.2.3 (Enclosure 1) and AR 600-20, paragraph 5-3A(2)(c) (Enclosure 2), which prohibit members of the Army on active duty from participating in political campaigns. Granting the requested exception would undermine a sound policy that helps preserve the integrity of the Army by keeping it politically neutral.

As an additional matter, I recommend that you request your spouse's political campaign to delete all references to your duty position on its internet website to remove even the appearance that as an Army officer you are participating in a political campaign.


My point of contact for this action is Chaplain (LTC) Rick D. Mathis, Chief, Army Command Policy Branch, (b)(6)

R. L. Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army

Encl



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY & AIR FORCE
 Headquarters Army & Air Force Exchange Service
 Dallas, Texas 75266-0202



SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Waiver Denial, Department of Defense Directive
 1344.10/Army Regulation 600-20

MEMORANDUM THRU: Deputy Secretary of Defense
 FOR: Secretary of Defense

1. Request for a waiver from certain prohibitions against political activities contained in paragraph 4.1.2.3 and Enclosure 3 of Department of Defense Directive 1344.10, and paragraph 5-3a(2)(c), Army Regulation 600-20. I am requesting this waiver so that I may participate in the campaign of my husband, Congressman Martin Frost. This request follows two earlier requests to department of the Army that have been denied.
2. I requested a waiver by letter dated 26 Feb 04. It was denied by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, by letter dated 12 Apr 04. I requested reconsideration by letter dated 29 Apr 04 and asked that, if my request was denied, I be given the specific reasons. The 16 Jul 04 denial states that granting this waiver "would undermine a sound policy that helps preserve the integrity of the Army by keeping it politically neutral."
3. I respectfully submit to you that the political neutrality of the Department of the Army will not be adversely impacted should you grant my request for waiver. When the restrictive language of DODD 1344.10 and AR 600-20 was drafted, it was unlikely that anyone anticipated that a service member would be married to a Member of Congress. The current Administration has emphasized that strong marriages are central to a strong America. Therefore, I would plead that the ability of anyone to fully participate in the life of his/her spouse is central to a strong marriage – recreation, avocation, or career. To restrict me, as a result of my military service, is to communicate that marriage within the military is less relevant than that of the private sector. My husband's constituents and potential voters do not now, nor would they in the future, presume my advocacy for my husband or my participation on his behalf to be anything other than my support for or belief in the man I love. No one would view action on my part either as violating Army neutrality in an election or as a service endorsement of any candidate—rather the expected support of the wife.
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5. I do not believe that allowing me to participate in my husband's campaign under these conditions would cause a reasonable person to perceive that the integrity of the Army or the Department of Defense has been compromised. For this reason, and the reasons outlined in my previous letters, I respectfully ask that you expeditiously approve my request.

KATHRYN G. FROST
 Major General, U.S. Army
 Commander

- Attachments:
1. DA Ltr, 16 July 04
 2. AAFES Commander Ltr 29 Apr 04
 3. DAPE-HR-Ltr, 12 Apr 04
 4. AAFES Commander Ltr, 26 Feb 04

cf: Acting Secretary of the Army

OSD 11853-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26461



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



AUG 17 2004

Major General Kathryn G. Frost
Headquarters, Army & Air Force Exchange Service
Dallas, Texas 75266-0202


Dear General Frost:

I regret that I must deny your request for a waiver from certain prohibitions contained in Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 and Army Regulation 600-20.

As the Supreme Court has ruled, "keeping official military activities . . . wholly free of entanglement with partisan political campaigns of any kind . . . is wholly consistent with the American constitutional tradition of a politically neutral military establishment under civilian control." *Greer v. Spock*, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976); *see also* 42 U.S.C. § 1972. To maintain this neutrality, Department of Defense officials and active-duty members of the Armed Forces must avoid even the appearance of political partiality.

The participation of an active-duty Major General and senior commander in political campaigning would violate this standard.

Sincerely,



David S. C. Chu

cc:
Acting Secretary of the Army



11-L-0559/OSD/26462

7241
~~FOUO~~

September 7, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from Archbishop George

How do you think I should answer the attached letter from Francis Cardinal George?

Thanks.

Attach.
08/19/04 Letter to SecDef from Francis Cardinal George

DHR:ss
090704-35

.....
Please respond by 9/17/04

33530

750044

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26463

13281-04

ARCHDIOCESE OF CHICAGO

Office of the Archbishop



Post Office Box 1979
Chicago, Illinois 60690-1979

August 19, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1400 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld,

It was good to hear from you at the Commercial Club luncheon on August 6, and I thank you for your clarity and courtesy in responding so graciously to my question about the future of the Christian communities in Iraq. As I mentioned, the Archbishop of Baghdad, here three weeks ago, and others in Iraq have said exactly what you said about the improvement in the lives of ordinary Iraqis because of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by the United States and its coalition partners.

The question of the Christian minority in Iraq is complicated, as you know, by the history of the treatment of Christian and Jewish minorities in officially Muslim lands. The state of dhimmitude imposed by Sharia is not really compatible with contemporary standards of freedom, both personal and religious, yet it seems Iraq cannot become simply a Western style constitutional democracy. Is there conceptual room for a culturally and even in some sense officially Muslim state which would not impose Sharia? My contacts with Muslim political scientists here leave me puzzled, which is why I put the question to you. I hope that someone, in the midst of the immediate turmoil, is working toward such an order. The alternative is the flight of most of the Christians in Baghdad, a phenomenon already occurring.

Thank you for your dedicated service to our country. You and your family, as well as your work, are daily in my prayers.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Francis Cardinal George".

Francis Cardinal George, OMI
Archbishop of Chicago

OSD 13281-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26464



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SEP 27 2004

Archbishop Francis Cardinal George
Archdiocese of Chicago
Post Office **Box** 1979
Chicago, IL 60690-1979

Dear Archbishop George:

Thank you for your letter and kind words. I enjoyed the opportunity to speak at the Commercial Club Luncheon.

You raised an important question in your letter. My impression is that the Interim Iraqi Government is committed to establishing a system that respects all of the ethnic and religious diversity in that country.

It is a tough road ahead, but I believe the Iraqis are up to the task.

With best wishes,

OSD 13281-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26465

335811

27 Sept 04

19 Aug 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Archbishop Francis Cardinal George
Archdiocese of Chicago
Post Office Box 1979
Chicago, IL 60690-1979

Dear Archbishop George:

Thank you for your letter and kind words. I enjoyed the opportunity to speak at the Commercial Club Luncheon.

You raised an important question in your letter. My impression is that the interim Iraqi government is committed to establishing a system that respects all of the ethnic and religious diversity in that country.

It is a tough road ahead, but I believe the Iraqis are up to the task.

With best wishes.

CSC
FX PG786
M

11-L-0559/OSD/26466

Archbishop Francis Cardinal George
Archdiocese of Chicago
Post Office **Box** 1979
Chicago, IL 60690-1979

Dear Archbishop George:

Thank you for your letter and kind words. I enjoyed the opportunity to speak at the Commercial Club Luncheon.

You raised an important question in your letter. My impression is that the interim Iraqi government is committed to establishing a system that respects all of the ethnic and religious diversity in that country.

It is a tough road ahead, but I believe the Iraqis are up to the task.

With best wishes,

*Prep for
Secret
Signature*

Archbishop Francis Cardinal George
Archdiocese of Chicago
Post Office Box 1979
Chicago, IL 60690-1979

Dear Archbishop George:

Thank you for your letter and kind words. I am pleased ~~that you~~ enjoyed the Commercial Club Luncheon.

opportunity to speak at
I appreciate your thoughts regarding Christian and Jewish minorities in Iraq. You raise some important questions that I will pass along to the appropriate folks.

With best wishes,

You raised an important question in your letter. My impression is that the interim Iraqi government is committed to establishing a system that respects all of the ethnic and religious diversity in that country. It is a tough road ahead, but I believe the Iraqis are Prime Minister Allawi's team up to the task.

Prep for SecDef Signature



Paul Butler

9/14

ARCHDIOCESE OF CHICAGO

Office of the Archbishop



2004 SEP 17 Post Office Box 1979
Chicago, Illinois 60690-1979

August 19, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1400 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld,

It was good to hear from you at the Commercial Club luncheon on August 6, and I thank you for your clarity and courtesy in responding so graciously to my question about the future of the Christian communities in Iraq. As I mentioned, the Archbishop of Baghdad, here three weeks ago, and others in Iraq have said exactly what you said about the improvement in the lives of ordinary Iraqis because of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by the United States and its coalition partners.

The question of the Christian minority in Iraq is complicated, as you know, by the history of the treatment of Christian and Jewish minorities in officially Muslim lands. The state of dhimmitude imposed by Sharia is not really compatible with contemporary standards of freedom, both personal and religious, yet it seems Iraq cannot become simply a Western style constitutional democracy. Is there conceptual room for a culturally and even in some sense officially Muslim state which would not impose Sharia? My contacts with Muslim political scientists here leave me puzzled, which is why I put the question to you. I hope that someone, in the midst of the immediate turmoil, is working toward such an order. The alternative is the flight of most of the Christians in Baghdad, a phenomenon already occurring.

Thank you for your dedicated service to our country. You and your family, as well as your work, are daily in my prayers.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Francis Cardinal George".

Francis Cardinal George, OMI
Archbishop of Chicago

OSD 13281-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26469

September 2, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleeza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Strategic Plan on Afghanistan

Why don't we get the Department of State, which is the lead agency on Afghanistan, to present a strategic plan on Afghanistan. I'm concerned about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090204.3

AFGHANISTAN

OSD 13293-04

R. V. Spill

25 May 2004
Scanned
1:05 PM
Call
6/11

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 24, 2004

SUBJECT: **Detainees**

383.6

Colin Powell said that Prime Minister Howard of Australia has got problems with two detainees. He hears they were mistreated in Baghram.

Please get somebody looking into it.

29 May 04

Thanks.

*Sec Def -
I've asked VCIS for an investigation of the Hicks and Habib cases, to be completed by 6/18.*

DHR/azn
050804.05

*Please respond by: 6/5. I have informed Secretary Powell and the Australian Ambassador.
Paul W.*

24 MAY 04

OSD 13371-04

120

25 May 2004

1:07 PM

Scanned

Handwritten initials and scribbles

383.6

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **Q**

DATE: May 24, 2004

SUBJECT: **Detainees**

Colin Powell said that Beg has an issue. He is the UK detainee. Please look into it and get to Paul Wolfowitz, and have Paul get back to me and to Secretary Powell.

29 May 04

Thanks.

SecDef -
I've replied to Nigel
Steinwald in the PM's office
and informed Armitage.
6/5/04

DHR/azn
050804.06

Please respond by: _____

See attached letter.

PW

24 May 04

OSD 13372-04

JUN 21 2004

RUSSIA

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Warning

I read in the newspapers that President Putin says that he warned the US Iraq was planning terrorist attacks. Please check to see what he said and when pre-war.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061804-9

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

JUL 1 2004 *7/2*
response attached
vr/CDR Noseny
7/2

File - forwarded
as 'A' Doc
TN/7/12

21 Jun 04

OSD 13373-04

1618-
10000

120

Uncl.

NESSA

May 18, 2004

J-04/006916

EF-9633

IRAP

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: What Did Not Happen

Did someone in your shop ever pull together a list of all the things we planned for that did not happen?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051804-6

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

Paul Butler

Sec Def

Paul B →
6/14

Exec Sec
Close this
Out - Uncl. Sec
version sent to
Sec Def
Paul
Sir,
Response attached. Paul Butler
7/23
vr/ ~~OR~~ Nosenza
6/14

OSD 13374-04

received 4/2/04
13-33-04 13374-04

18 MAY 04

11-L-0559/OSD/26474

September 7, 2004

TO: Ray Dubois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Updated Status of DoD Directives

2004 SEP 11 11 24 AM
SECDEF

I would like an update on the status of DoD Directives through September 1, so I can see what kind of progress we are making.

Thanks.

Attach.
.06/21/03 DoD Directives Memo from SecDef to Ray Dubois

DHR:ss
090704-31

.....
Please respond by 9/24/04



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET
2004 SEP 17 11 07 13

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond E. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: DoD Directives Review Status *Kay DuBois 9/9/04*

In response to your attached September 7 snowflake requesting the status of the DoD Directives review, the chart at Tab A shows our status as of September 3.

- At the outset of the Directives review effort, 654 directives were reviewed for currency, and a total of 396 were identified for revision or cancellation (327 for revision and 69 for cancellation).
 - To date, 193 have been submitted for formal coordination, and 70 (revisions and cancellations) have been signed by the DepSec.
 - Many of the remaining 133 Directives are under internal review within their own components.
 - As the attached status chart indicates, two components (Policy and Intelligence) are lagging behind the others in completing their submissions for formal coordination. My staff is working with these components to help expedite the work they have in progress.
 - On July 12, I forwarded you the report at Tab B reflecting our progress. During a meeting on September 7, you noted this report and a question about its accuracy was raised. We reviewed the data and determined that the July 12 report was indeed accurate.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Harold Neeley, ESCD, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/26476



OSD 13471-04

~~FOUO~~

September 7, 2004

TO: Ray Dubois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Updated Status of DoD Directives

I would like an update on the status of DoD Directives through September 1, so I can see what kind of progress we are making.

Thanks.

Attach.
06/21/03 DoD Directives Memo from SecDef to Ray Dubois

DHR:ss
090704-31

.....
Please respond by 9/24/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26477

OSD 13471-04

TAB A

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
9/03/04**

COMPONEKT	TOTAL NUMBER	CERTIFIED CURRENT	TO BE REVISED OR CANCELED	SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION*	% OF TOTAL SUBMITTED	DEPSECDEF SIGNED
USD(AT&L)	111	37	74	54	(73%)	21
USD(P)	66	11	55	7	(13%)	0
USD(C)	15	8	7	6	(86%)	0
USD(P&R)	192	98	94	58	(62%)	23
USD(I)	55	8	47	10	(22%)	2
ASD(LA)	3	0	3	0	(0%)	0
ASD(NII)	40	17	23	16	(70%)	7
ASD(PA)	14	11	3	3	(100%)	1
GC, DoD	36	19	17	9	(56%)	5
DOT&E	3	2	1	1	(100%)	0
IG, DoD	14	7	7	6	(86%)	3
DA&M	87	31	56	15	(27%)**	3
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	(100%)	0
DNA	1	0	1	0	(0%)	0
WHS	15	8	7	7	(100%)	5
TOTALS:	654	258	396	193	(49%)	70

* Of the 193 submitted for coordination, 49 have been recommended for cancellation.

** Of the 56 DA&M Directives identified for revision or cancellation, 49 are charter Directives. While DA&M is the agent for updating, coordinating, and maintaining these Directives, processing updates is a participatory endeavor and cannot be completed without full and timely input from the concerned PSAs and Component Heads.

TAB
B

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
7/9/04**

COMPONENT	TOTAL NUMBER	CERTIFIED CURRENT	TO BE REVISED OR CANCELED	SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION*	% OF TOTAL SUBMITTED	SIGNED
USD(AT&L)	108	37	71	50	(70%)	15
USD(P)	66	11	55	6	(11%)	0
USD(C)	15	9	6	5	(83%)	0
USD(P&R)	192	103	89	49	(55%)	18
USD(I)	58	8	50	11	(22%)	2
ASD(LA)	3	0	3	0	(0%)	0
ASD(NII)	40	17	23	16	(70%)	6
ASD(PA)	14	11	3	3	(100%)	0
GC, DoD	36	19	17	9	(56%)	4
DOT&E	3	2	1	1	(100%)	0
IG, DoD	14	7	7	6	(86%)	3
DA&M	87	31	56	14	(25%)**	3
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	(100%)	0
DNA	1	1	1	0	(0%)	0
WHS	15	8	7	7	(100%)	1
TOTALS:	654	264	390	178	(46%)	54

* Of the 178 submitted for coordination, 49 have been recommended for cancellation.

** Of the 56 DA&M Directives identified for revision or cancellation, 49 are charter Directives. While DA&M is the agent for updating, coordinating, and maintaining these Directives, processing updates is a participatory endeavor and cannot be completed without full and timely input from the concerned PSAs and Component Heads.

4/4
1200



08/9/04



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010



ACTION MEMO

September 7, 2004, 10:00 AM

Paul Butler

PWB
9/14

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT: Processing of Claims by Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment

383.6

- In response to your previous comment about reviewing any claims arising from Abu Ghraib allegations, Jim Haynes and Pete Geren sent you a draft memo (Tab B) that would have directed the Army (responsible for claims in Iraq) to submit any such claims packages to you.
- Your note of August 25 (Tab C) instead suggests delegating such review responsibility. Thus, I recommend proceeding with a process similar to the one set out in Jim Haynes' memo, with such claims being forwarded to the Secretary of the Army, who would review and act on the cases or, in his discretion, forward to me cases that raise particularly sensitive issues.
 - An example might be a claim not payable under any claims statute, in which case the Secretary of the Army could consider alternative authorities (e.g., emergency and extraordinary expense (EEE) authority) and either use such an authority to provide compensation himself or forward the claim to me with a recommendation.
- The attached memorandum for your signature (Tab A) directs the Secretary of the Army to take action to ensure completed reports of the foreign claims commission, or investigations under other applicable claims statutes, are forwarded to him for appropriate action.
- Army reports that nine detainee-related claims have been submitted, and five allege abuse/mistreatment at Abu Gharib prison. Six claims allege that death occurred as a result of abuse/mistreatment during detention. (Tab D)

75 SEP 04

RECOMMENDATION: Sign memorandum at Tab A.

Attachments: As stated.

COORDINATION: General Counsel

TSA SD	4/13
SA DSD	
SRMA DSD	
EXEC SEC	M 9/9

25A 4904



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301



August 13, 2004

PUB → FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: Pete Geren *Peter Geren*
SUBJECT: Compensation for Abuse of Iraqi Detainees

Attached is an Action Memo from Jim Haynes proposing a way ahead for processing claims of abuse by Iraqi Detainees.

The proposal has been approved by CJCS, ASA and OGC. The only dissent came from Mr. Di Rita. He questioned whether you should, "really be the one to review all claims. Doesn't feel right to me."

Mr. Haynes explained to Mr. Di Rita that he believed the memo reflected your guidance and moved it forward for your consideration without change.

The memo and the coordinating documents are attached for your consideration.

TSA SD	8/16
SRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	11 8/16



OSD 10688-04



(Regener) @ Col Copeland's request. 8/13. JTB)

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

ORIGINAL
ACTION MEMO

SECRETARY
2004 JUL 13 PM 5:55

July 13, 2004, 2:00 PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Processing of **Claims** by Iraqi **Detainees** Based on Allegations of **Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment**

- We understand ~~that~~, because of the sensitivity of allegations of **personal injury/abuse and mistreatment** by Iraqi detainees, particularly at Abu Ghraib prison, **you** will review all claims based on **such** allegations.
- **The U.S. Army has** claims responsibility in Iraq. **The attached memorandum for your signature at Tab A directs the Secretary of the Army to forward to you, via my office, the completed report of the foreign claims commission, or investigation under other applicable claims statutes.**
- **These reports will contain a thorough analysis of:**
 - whether the claim is cognizable under the Foreign **Claims Act** or other claims **statutes**;
 - whether the claimant is a proper claimant under the Foreign **Claims Act** or other claims **statutes**; and
 - a recommendation regarding an appropriate amount of compensation, if **any**.
- If it is concluded that **the claim is not payable under the Foreign Claims Act or any other claims statute**, we will identify alternative authorities **under** which the claim could be paid, if you determine **that payment is otherwise appropriate.**

RECOMMENDATION: **Sign** the memorandum at Tab A.

COORDINATION: Tab B

Attachments: **As** stated.



OSD 10688-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26484



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

A

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY


SUBJECT Processing of Claims by Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment

The U.S. Army has claims responsibility in Iraq. Because of the sensitivity of allegations of personal injury/abuse and mistreatment of Iraqi detainees, particularly at Abu Ghraib prison, I will review all claims based on such allegations.

Prior to my review, such claims will be investigated by a foreign claims commission under the Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. 2734, or investigated under other applicable claims statutes. The report of investigation will include a thorough analysis of whether the claim is cognizable under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes, whether the claimant is a proper claimant under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes, and recommendation regarding an appropriate amount of compensation, if any.

The report of the foreign claims Commission, or investigation under other applicable claims statutes, will be forwarded to me, via the Secretary of the Army and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense. If it is concluded that the claim is not payable under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes, the Secretary of the Army will identify alternative authorities under which the claim could be paid and a recommendation whether such payment is appropriate.

Copy to:
C CS
C DR, USCENCOM USD (P)
D OD General Counsel





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20315-0200

B

JUN 1 8 2004

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Brownlee".

R. L. Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army

Printed on Recycled Paper

11-L-0559/OSD/26486



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9000

CK-1827-04
10 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Subject: Processing of **Claims** of Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment

1. Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft memorandums to the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army.¹

2. I recommend one correction to the ACTION MEMO to the Secretary of Defense:

~~Second bullet, second sub-bullet.~~ Change as follows: "whether the claimant ~~is~~ **is** a proper claimant under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes; and"

REASON: Clarity.

3. No other changes required.


RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Reference:

1. OGC memorandum, 1 June 2004, "Processing of **Claims** by Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of Personal Injury/Abuse and **Mistreatment**"

2	GENERAL COUNSEL
1	DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL
3	IA
	7/2004

Hab

From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:


Sub:

Laurer
CJCS
attach

We ne
the ab
becau

So, do you think we could get a SOLIC, PDUSDP, or USDP coordination on this today? I'm hoping you'll find that it is an and somewhere and that the right people have already looked at it.

Thank chuck

PD approval 

approve _____

disapprove _____

other _____

7/9/11



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1800 DEFENSE PENNACON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1800

JUN 01 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY


FROM: Daniel J. Dall'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: Processing of Claims by Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of
Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment

Because of the unique sensitivity of allegations of personal injury/abuse and mistreatment of Iraqi detainees, particularly at Abu Ghairib prison, the Secretary of Defense has indicated his intent to review all claims based on such allegations.

The Department of the Army has claims responsibility in Iraq. We have prepared a memorandum for signatures by the Secretary of Defense that directs the Secretary of the Army to forward to the Secretary of Defense, via the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, the completed reports of foreign claims commissions or investigations under other applicable claims statutes. These reports will contain a thorough analysis of: (1) whether the claim is cognizable under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes; (2) whether the claimant is a proper claimant under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes; and (3) a recommendation regarding an appropriate amount of compensation, if any. If it is concluded that the claim is not payable under the Foreign Claims Act or any other claims statute, the reports forwarded by the Secretary of the Army will identify alternative authority under which the claim could be paid, should the Secretary of Defense determine that payment is otherwise appropriate.

Please provide your comments and coordination by the close of business June 5, 2004 on the proposed action memo and memorandum to be signed by the Secretary of Defense. TAB A. My point of contact for this matter is Ron Neubauer (b)(6); rneubauer@dodsec.osd.mil.


Daniel J. Dall'Orto
Principal Deputy

Attachments:
As stated



11-L-05559/OSD/26489



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1800 DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1800

DRAFT

May 17, 2004, 5:00 PM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

ACTION MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Processing of Claims by Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment

We understand that, because of the unique sensitivity of allegations of personal injury/abuse and mistreatment by Iraqi detainees, particularly at Abu Ghairb prison, you will review all claims filed based on such allegations.

- The U.S. Army has single service claims responsibility in Iraq. The attached memorandum for your signature directs the Secretary of the Army to forward to you, via my office, the completed report of the foreign claims commission, or investigation under other applicable claims statutes. Tab A. These reports will contain a thorough analysis of:
 - whether the claim is cognizable under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes;
 - whether the claimant is a proper claimant under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes; and
 - a recommendation regarding an appropriate amount of compensation, if any.
- If it is concluded that the claim is not payable under the Foreign Claims Act or any other claims statute, my office will identify alternative authority under which the claim could be paid, if you determine that payment is otherwise appropriate.

Recommendation: Sign memorandum at Tab A.

Attachment: As stated

Coordination:
Secretary of the Army
CJCS
USD (P)



11-L-0559/OSD/26490



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Processing of Claims by Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment

The U.S. Army has claims responsibility in Iraq. Because of the unique sensitivity of allegations of personal injury/abuse and mistreatment of Iraqi detainees, particularly at Abu Ghraib prison, I will review all claims based on such allegations. Prior to my review, such claims will be investigated by a foreign claims commission under the Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. 2734, or investigated under other applicable claims statutes. The report of investigation will include a thorough analysis of whether the claim is cognizable under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes, whether the claimant is a proper claimant under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes, and a recommendation regarding an appropriate amount of compensation, if any. The report of the foreign claims commission, or investigation under other applicable claims statutes, will be forwarded to me, via the Secretary of the Army and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense. If it is concluded that the claim is not payable under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes, the Secretary of the Army will identify alternative authorities under which the claim could be paid.

Copy to:

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
USCIB/TCOM
USD (P)
DOD General Counsel

5

TOTAL P. 04

11-L-05559/OSD/26491



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319-6000

CH-1827-04
10 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Subject: Processing of Claims of Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment

1. Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft memorandums to the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army.¹

2. I recommend one correction to the ACTION MEMO to the Secretary of Defense:

~~Second bullet, second sub-bullet.~~ Change as follows: "whether the claimant ~~is~~ a proper claimant under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes; and"

REASON: Clarity.

3. No other changes required.


RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Reference:

- 1 OGC memorandum, 1 June 2004, "Processing of Claims by Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment"

2	GENERAL COUNSEL
1	DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL
3	IR
	Figca

UNCLASSIFIED

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant**

30 August 2004 - 1625 Hours


MEMORANDUM FOR: OGC

SUBJECT: Processing Iraqi Detainee Claims

Sir,

Please draft a proposal to SD from DSD ref the attached document.

Very respectfully,



Stephen T. Ganyard
Colonel, USMC
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense: 21Sep04

Attachment: As Stated

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/26493

INFORMATION PAPER

JACS-TCF
2 Sep 2004

SUBJECT: Detainee Claims and Investigations

1. **Purpose.** To provide a summary of specific claims for personal injury stemming from allegations of mistreatment at US military detention facilities in Iraq.

2. Claims.

a. The US Army Claims Service has three open claims pending investigation alleging personal injury as a result of detention at US military detention facilities. These investigations are almost complete.

(1) Hassan, Alaa Ahmed. Colonel (Iraqi Navy or Marines) Hassan alleges US forces captured him on 21 March 2003 while aboard his tugboat in the northern Persian Gulf and took him to a US Navy ship. While on US Navy ship, COL Hassan alleges that he was flexicuffed, shoved by two US sailors, and slipped on the deck of the ship, where he injured his foot. He alleges he received no medical treatment other than having his foot wrapped in a bandage, and that his foot has never properly healed. However, in another interview, COL Hassan alleged that he broke his leg while in Camp Bucca, a US detention facility in Am Qser. He alleges elbow injury from his hands flexicuffed behind his back overnight. COL Hassan alleges damages of \$20,000 and medical and travel costs to a foreign country for surgery on his elbow. Prior coordination with the US Navy resulted in no information of his detention. Investigation is completed and is pending recommendation for denial as he is not a proper claimant. Processed under the Foreign Claims Act.

(2) Shaltout, Hassam. Mr. Shaltout is a Canadian citizen who is a resident alien in Los Angeles, California, who was in Iraq with a peace organization. Mr. Shaltout also claims to be an employee of Gamin Europe, and to have sold products for that company prior to entering Iraq. US Marines detained him in Baghdad on 9 April 2003, and sent him to Camp Bucca. Mr. Hassan claims that he was beaten and tortured at the camp, and that his property, including \$19,000 in cash in his hotel room, which he was not allowed to secure while detained, was stolen from him. Mr. Shaltout alleges \$350,000 in personal injury (depression, PTSD, hearing loss in left ear, and aggravation of previously existing glaucoma and of a preexisting hernia) and property loss. Claimant and military police interviewed. Interviewed apprehending Marines and treating physician. Processed under the Military Claims Act. Investigation completed, pending drafting of recommendation.

(3) Saleh, Haidar Muhsin. Mr. Saleh is a Swedish citizen, who alleges that US military personnel detained and imprisoned him in el-Najaf, el-Dewaniya, and

Abu Ghraib, Iraq; tortured; and stole \$79,000 cash and a Mercedes Benz automobile worth \$3,000. He alleges \$100,000 in personal injury (insomnia; depression; PTSD; injury to left leg, right hand, and head) and property damage. Mr. Saleh submitted an amended claim on 8 Jun 2004, and now alleges \$3.5 million in personal injury. Investigation completed and pending drafting of recommendation. Processed under the Foreign Claims Act.

b. The US Army Claims Service received three claims on 7 Jul 04 alleging wrongful death as a result of detention at US military detention facilities. The Service will process under the Foreign Claims Act. On 16 July 2004, this Service requested CID reports, if any, of these named individuals.

(1) Aziz, Abdul Hasan Khashan (claimant). The claimant alleges that his son, Mawafiq Abdul Hassan Khashan, was arrested by US forces in May 2003 and detained at Abu Ghraib prison. In August 2003, the claimant was notified to pick up his son's body at the Al Shua'a police station. Identification of the body is in question. The claimant alleges \$7,000.00 in damages.

(2) Shamy, Abus Farhan (claimant). The claimant alleges that his son, Mosa Abas, died as a result of a bullet wound sustained while detained at Abu Ghraib prison. The claimant alleges \$5,000.00 in damages.

(3) Abdul-Kalil, I'ham (Mrs.) (claimant). The claimant alleges that her husband, Asa'ad Abdulkarim Abduljali, was detained on 4 Jan 04 at the Asad Air Base (or aboard the Al Asad) and was tortured and killed on 9 Jan 04. The deceased had seven (7) minor children. The claimant alleges \$50,000.00 in damages.

c. The US Army Claims Service received three claims in Aug 04 alleging wrongful death as a result of detention at a US military detention facility. This Service will process the claim under the Foreign Claims Act.

(1) Shalan, Najia (Mrs.) (claimant). The claimant alleges that her husband, Loay Ibrahim, died on 19 Apr 04 as a result of his detention at Abu Ghraib. The claimant alleges \$3500.00 in damages.

(2) Menem, Ashraf Muhamed Abdul (claimant). The claimant alleges that his father, Dr. Mohammed Abdul Menem Mehmud, died on 31 Jan 04 as a result of his torture at Abu Ghraib prison. The claimant alleges \$10,000.00 in damages.

(3) Khamees, Shamsa Salman (claimant). The claimant alleges that her husband, Jassim Anoon Ayaash, died on 16 Aug 03 while in the custody of coalition forces. The claimant alleges \$50,000.00 in damages.

d. The US Army Claims Service has received notice of one potentially compensable event (PCE) in Iraq, yet there has not been a claim filed.

(1) Oday, Kareem (deceased). Name of family member is unknown at this time. US forces detained on 10 Sep 03, 4 months later, it was reported to the family that he died. No further information is available at this time and this Service is attempting to confirm actual receipt of a claim.

LTC Charlotte Herring/JACS-TCF/DSN (b)(6)
Charlotte.herring@claims.army.mil

21 AUG. 0846
Scanned

August 25, 2004

W
83.6

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Processing Iraqi Detainee Claims

I just looked at these memos from Haynes and Geren. There is no way in the world I am going to decide all these things. I either have to delegate it to you, or we have to delegate it to the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army or somebody.

Please come back with your best proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/13/04 Geren memo (OSD #10688-04)
7/13/04 Haynes (GC) memo to SecDef re: Processing of Claims by Iraqi Detainees

DHR:dh
082504-21 (is computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 9/24/04

25AUG04

OSD 13474-04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Military Assistant

✓ Sec Def
Signed.

TO C&D
PLEASE DISTR

P
1/11 9/15



GENERAL COUNSEL
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

9/7/07

DEP SEC DEF

Per your request, I
recommend you sign the attached.

[Handwritten signature]

OSD 13474-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

SEP 15 2004

383.6

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Processing of Claims by Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment

The U.S. Army has claims responsibility in Iraq. Because of the sensitivity of allegations of personal injury/abuse and mistreatment by Iraqi detainees, particularly at Abu Ghraib prison, I ask that the Secretary of the Army review all claims based on such allegations and act on them in his discretion.

Prior to this review, such claims will be investigated by a foreign claims commission under the Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. 2734, or investigated under other applicable claims statutes. The report of investigation will include a thorough analysis of whether the claim is cognizable under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes, whether the claimant is a proper claimant under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes, and a recommendation regarding an appropriate amount of compensation, if any.

The report of the foreign claims commission, or investigation under other applicable claims statutes, should be forwarded to the Secretary of the Army. If it is concluded that the claim is not payable under the Foreign Claims Act or other claims statutes, the Secretary of the Army will identify alternative authorities under which compensation could be provided and either take such action in appropriate cases or forward the claim to the Deputy Secretary of Defense via the General Counsel of the Department of Defense with a recommendation whether such payment is appropriate.

155 Sep 04

copy to:
CJCS
CDR, USCENTCOM
USD (P)
DoD General Counsel

25 Aug 04

OSD 13474-04



September 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Abizaid
CC: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Using Kuwait to Relieve Pressure in Iraq

As we discussed at the SVTC this morning, I'd be interested in your assessment of how we could use Kuwait as a basing site to reduce the number of forces actually operating in Iraq and use the U.S. to reach back as well. This may be useful as we look ahead to allied roles.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090804-6

.....
Please respond by 9/24/04

KUWAIT

8 Sep 04

8/17
1000

720
~~FOUO~~

August 17, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Nancy Droege Letter

600

Let's answer this nice letter from Nancy Droege, tell her it was good to hear from her and we appreciate her support. See if we can get her a tour of the Pentagon and suggest she get a tour of the Capitol by writing her Congressman.

Thanks.

Attach
Letter from Nancy Droege

17 AUG 04

DHR:ss
081704-8

.....
Please respond by 8/20/04

CSC
LETTER PLEASE
5 in 9/1

4 AUG 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13547-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26502

(b)(6)

Dear Donald,

I have been waiting until it would be a good time to write to you. I had hoped that these times were better in the world. I can just imagine the stress of your job. I'm also proud that you are the Secretary of Defense. I don't know what all you would have done. I pray that George Bush will get elected again.

009

We met in Little Rock a number of years ago, I was then President of the Republican Women Club.

I grew up in Little Rock and I remember my folks campaigning for you when you first ran for Congress.

We corresponded for a few years when you were in Chicago.

Then I was excited when you became

4 AUG 90

OSD 13547-04

Secy. of Defense. What an honor and privilege
to serve under President Bush.

My son and I are going to
Washington D.C. the week of August 30th.
I would also like to see you.

If at all possible could you get
see press for the White House and the
oval office? If there are any other places
that we need press we would love to
see as much as possible.

Thank you for all your help.

Sincerely

(b)(6)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

600

SEP 9 2004

(b)(6)

Dear Ms. Droege:

Thank you so much for your thoughtful letter and kind words. I appreciate them a great deal.

Unfortunately, postal security delays prevented me from getting your letter until just recently. However, the next time you plan a trip to Washington, please call my Front Office at (b)(6) to arrange a Pentagon tour. For a tour of the Capitol, you might contact your Congressional Representative.

10-556

I hope your visit to D.C. was pleasurable.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

100

OSD 13547-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26505

CSC GO SMOOEN

5/11/97

(b)(6)

Dear Ms. (b)(6)

Thank you so much for your thoughtful letter and kind words. I appreciate them a great deal.

Unfortunately, postal security delays prevented me from getting your letter until just recently. However, the next time you plan a trip to Washington, please call my Front Office at (b)(6) to arrange a Pentagon tour. For a tour of the Capitol, you might contact your Congressional Representative.

I hope your visit to D.C. was pleasurable.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Sam

11-L-0559/OSD/26506



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

SEP 02 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Bird Flu

- You inquired as to potential implications for DoD regarding Bird Flu. (TAB A)
- Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Thompson delivered a memo to the President discussing the threat of Avian Influenza (Bird Flu) on August 26, 2004. This memo outlined steps the United States Government is taking to prepare for the potential that this strain of influenza (H5N1) could cause an influenza pandemic. The Department of Defense has been an active participant in the interagency planning process over the past six months.
- Important recent developments include:
 - Bird Flu is now considered endemic in Southeast Asia. Poultry flocks continue to turn up with the virus at unprecedented levels such that no expert in the field expects that it will go away on its own. A recent report from China indicates the H5N1 virus has now been found in pigs as well.
 - Scientists at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and at the World Health Organization (WHO) are very concerned this virus will develop the ability to be transmitted human to human, raising the potential for a worldwide influenza pandemic.
- Secretary Thompson's memo summarized the work done to date and the way forward.
 - HHS has released their Pandemic Influenza Response Plan. DoD has participated with HHS in the development of this plan, and contributed on aspects of the plan that affect us.

OSD 13556-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26507

- Expanded surveillance efforts are already underway to ensure the earliest possible detection of the emergence of an H5N1 strain that can cause a pandemic. DoD participates in this effort through its overseas labs and the DoD Global Emerging Infections System (GEIS).
- The National Institutes of Health has launched an initiative to develop and test potential vaccine candidates against the H5N1 strain and has taken actions to ensure the most rapid and effective production of vaccine should a pandemic occur. DoD has been working with them to ensure we will have access to an effective vaccine as quickly as possible to protect our forces worldwide.
- HHS has purchased 1.3 million treatment courses of the antiviral drug oseltamivir (Tamiflu), which is the only suitable antiviral drug against this particular form of influenza. The strategic national stockpile should have 2.3 million doses by December 2004. DoD is procuring a stockpile of Tamiflu and will position it forward in the Pacific theater and CENTCOM to be used for our forward deployed forces, if needed. DoD will also participate in a September 13, 2004 conference with HHS and the Department of Veterans Affairs to establish a common operational strategy for the deployment and use of antivirals during a pandemic outbreak.
- HHS and the White House have prepared documents to add a pandemic strain of influenza to the President's executive order for quarantine authority.
- HHS has contracted with an independent body to perform an interim assessment of the nation's pandemic preparedness. My staff is also finalizing DoD guidelines for pandemic influenza preparedness to ensure synchronization with the national plan.
- We will continue to participate in the interagency planning process to ensure that DoD will be maximally prepared in the event of an influenza pandemic. I will keep you informed.

COORDINATION: TAB B

cc:

USD (P)

USD (P&R)

CJCS

VCJCS

Prepared by: COL Steve Phillips, FHP&R, (b)(6) PCDOCS#69842/R69941

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

28 August 2004 - 1005 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR ASD(HA)


SUBJECT: Bird Flu

Sir,

Please prepare a DSD draft response to SD, reference the attached SD Snowflake.

Thank you

Very Respectfully



Stephen T. Garyard
Colonel, USMC
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

ATTACHMENT: As Stated

SUSPENSE: 01Sep04


11-L-0559/OSD/26509

69842

Cap XTPT

1800
8/27

August 27, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Bird Flu

Please find out what the President was talking about with respect to the Senate-Secretary Thompson memo on bird flu and see if there are any implications for DoD.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
082704-1 (is computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 9/3/04

11-L-0559/OSD/26510

Bird Flu Snowflake

COORDINATION

DASD (FHP&R)

Ms. Ellen P. Embrey

Concur 9/1/04

Cos (HA)

COL Thorn Kurlmel

Concur, 9/1/04

USD (P&R)

Dr. David S. C. Chu

David S. C. Chu

9 Sep 04

Bird Flu- Update

COORDINATION

DASD (FHP&R)

Ms. Ellen P. Embrey

EP 9/1/04

Cos (HA)

COL Thorn Kurinel

PDASD (HA)

Mr. Ron Richards

USD (P&R)

Dr. **David S.C.** Chu



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

SEP 02 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

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710
25 Sep 04
27 Aug 04

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COORDINATION: TAB B

cc:
 USD (P)
 USD (P&R)
 CJCS
 VCJCS

Prepared by: COL Steve Phillips, FHP&R, (b)(6) PCDOCS#69842/R6994 1

Bird Flu Snowflake

COORDINATION

DASD (FHP&R)

Ms. Ellen P. Embrey

Concur **9/1/04**


Cos (HA)

COL Thom Kurlmel

Concur, 9/1/04

USD (P&R)

Dr. David S. C. Chu



9 Sep 04

Bird Flu- Update

COORDINATION

DASD (FHP&R)

Ms. Ellen P. Embrey

ene 9/1/04

Cos (HA)

COL Thom Kurinel

PDASD (HA)

Mr. Ron Richards


USD (P&R)

Dr. David S.C. Chu

Cal XTRA

1800
8/27

August 21, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Bird Flu

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Thanks.

DHR:dh
082704-1 (ts computer) .doc

.....
Please respond by 9/3/04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENTOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920
INFO MEMO

2004 FEB 1 10 31 19

September 10, 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Marshall *Acmm*

SUBJECT: Alternative Futures

I did not attempt to flesh out the short sketches of alternative futures in my 24 February note. Ideally a team of people should do that, but since you are interested I will next week send you what I and a couple of people in my office can do.

Attachments:

TAB A. 10/07/04 Memo from SecDef to Mr. Marshall re: Alternative Futures and
02/24/04 Memo from Mr. Marshall re: Assumptions for Next Two or Three Years.

Prepared by: MSgt Riche,

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26518



OSD 13644-04

September 7, 2004

TO: Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Alternative Futures

I was just re-reading your February 24, 2004 memo (attached). Have you gone ahead and attempted to flesh out several alternative futures? If so, I'd like to see them.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/24/04 Memo from Andy Marshall to SecDef re: Assumptions for Next **Two** or Three Years

DHR:ss
090704-14

.....
Please *respond* by 9/10



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

04 911

R-1

24 February 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Andy Marshall *Acum*

SUBJECT: Assumptions for Next Two or Three Years

Here are my thoughts:

1. Major geo-political structure of the world will be as it is now. A possible Economic/ banking crisis in China could affect its relative position some. Therefore, the main uncertainties that should be taken account of in DoD planning concern:

- How the situations in Iraq, Afghanistan, N. Korea play out over the next few years.
- The fate of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines; where governments could change or internal unrest increase. Some changes could be very favorable and others create major problems.
- Large casualty terror events in the U.S., Western Europe.
- Constant high rate of scientific and technological advance leading to some surprises.

2. An effort to flesh out three to four alternative futures could be mounted. A team of people is needed to cover the wide range of knowledge necessary for intelligent speculation.

?





DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920
INFO MEMO

SEP 10 2004

381

September 10, 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: Andy Marshall *Army*
SUBJECT: Alternative Futures

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Attachments:

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- 02/24/04 Memo from Mr. Marshall re: Assumptions for Next Two or Three Years.

10 SEP 04

Prepared by: MSgt Riche,

(b)(6)

7 SEP 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26521



OSD 13644-04

September 10, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
 CC: Gen. Abizaid
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Manning at General Sanchez's HQ

At the recent Congressional hearings on Abu Ghraib, there were several questions concerning the manning at General Sanchez's Headquarters. I'd like to see a lay down of the manning requests and how we filled them over the relevant period.

Iraq

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091004-6

.....
 Please respond by 9/15/04

10 Sep 04

OSD 13665-04

9/13 1400

~~FOUO~~

August 15, 2004

I-04/01016
ES-0461

Ukraine

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Link Ukraine to NATO

I want to find ways to better link Ukraine to NATO.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081504-15 (to computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 9/10/04

15 Aug 04

OSD 13759-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26523

17-08-04 14:32

August 17, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from George Peugeot

Please read this letter from George Peugeot and tell me what you think we ought to do with it.

Thanks.

Attach
Letter from George Peugeot

DHR:ss
081704-5

.....
Please respond by 9/3/04

TO: SecDef
From Paul Butler

We are in the process of drafting a response back from you thanking Mr. Peugeot for his letter and stating that we have forwarded to Homeland Defense for consideration and they will be in touch. I've spoken to Pete Verga (Paul McHale's deputy) and he is going to study the proposal and get back to Mr. Peugeot about his ideas. I also sent a copy to Lin Wells to look at.

W
C
C
C

CSC

GO SMOOZE

W/ DEAR GEORGE

Mr. George L. Peugeot
President
S.P.A. Industries, Inc.
305 Crestwood Village
Northfield, IL 60093-3403

Dear Mr. Peugeot:

Thank you for your letter regarding the development of a national intelligence system.

You addressed some important issues. I have forwarded the information on to Homeland Defense for consideration. Someone from that end will be in touch with you.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Mg/10 → Check with Cathy and DeLonne. Unclear if he is an FBI name basis with Mr. Peugeot. Although Peugeot addresses him as Secretary Rumsfeld, there is personal info in the letter. Thanks
Paul
Paul Butler
9/10

S.P.A. INDUSTRIES, INC.
305 CRESTWOOD VILLAGE
NORTHFIELD, ILLINOIS 60093-3403

Paul R. Dons copy

G.L. PEUGEOT
PRESIDENT

(b)(6)

August 4, 2004

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

Pete and Carolyn Reperning send their regards. **Walt McNerney does too except his stroke has taken away his speech. However, his cognitive powers are almost at 100%.**

I am consulting on my coming book with two outstanding geniuses. Phil Hogan and associate. Both are working 24-7 for America. I have finished the book and it is headed to the publisher. **Paul Wolfowitz has a very rough draft. Condoleezza Rice will get one.**

Phil's brother, Paul Hogan, a Michigan State Police trooper at the time, wrote you a speeding ticket sometime in 1979. You were north bound on I-196 just north of South Haven Michigan. You were headed for a vacation at Saugatuck with your family. Paul still remembers how courteous you were. I guess it is a small world.

Phil Hogan has a strong past in information technology. While with the Michigan State Police he developed their Uniform Crime Reporting system that integrated reports from over 500 local police agencies. This application not only met the FBI requirements for the national Uniform Crime Reporting, but it also created a data repository that could be used for crime analysis and pattern detection across multiple police agencies.

He also developed a Major Case Investigation system that was recognized by the Department of Justice. He then went into the private sector working for EMC in the development and implementation of Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Security applications for industry.

Recently he served as an instructor for the roll-out of Homeland Securities' Airport Security Screener effort in 2002. He is currently working on the Department of Defense roll-out of the CHCS II Military Medical Treatment Facility medical system.

Phil's past experience came to light as he worked editing my manuscript. I asked him if his system would be used to provide a large scale national intelligence service and if so why he had not offered it. He told me it could. However, in the past the necessary national integration of law enforcement, etc, information had not been possible for the same reason pointed out in the 9/17 Commission report. I asked him to take a look at the new Department of Homeland Security to see if it offers anything.

He got back to me a couple of days later saying that the new DHS Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection unit would be appropriate. He also identified a Dr. Ruth A David, who is on the Homeland Security Advisory Council, as bring a possible point of

contact through which the applicability of Phil's system could be explored. As past Technical Advisor to the Director of the CIA and current CEO of Analytic Services, Inc. (ANSER) it would appear that she would have the background and interest in this area.

I feel such a meeting with him is a must.

My guys, veterans, are still 100% behind you and so is Phil. The current emphasis on developing a single point national intelligence system is obvious and valid. Whatever structure the new Intelligence Czar appears in—the fact remains that he will need valid “intelligence” to work with. Something beyond a large scale collection of “reports”.

Offering a functional Anti-Terrorist Intelligence System along with the Missile Defense System would give President Bush some powerful campaign ammunition and delight the voters by providing solutions instead of the hollow “promises” the other fellow is hawking.

Phil can be reached at (b)(6)

Sincerely yours,


George Pedgeot

Chicago-Denver-PalmBeach-Cincinnati-Holland
Since 1975

11-L-0559/OSD/26527



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SEP 13 2004

Mr. George L. Peugeot
President
S.P.A. Industries, Inc.
305 Crestwood Village
Northfield, IL 60093-3403

Dear George:

Thank you for your letter regarding the development of a national intelligence system.

You addressed some important issues. I have forwarded the information on to Homeland Defense for consideration. Someone from that end will be in touch with you.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. ...". The signature is written in a cursive style and is located below the "Sincerely," text.

OSD 13798-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26528
<-
et*

11-L-0559/OSD/26528

September 14, 2004

TO: Ryan Henry
 Mira Ricardel
 John Rood

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
 Gen. Pete Pace
 Gen. Cartwright

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Revision 5 to STRATCOM Plan

STRATCOM

While I have approved ongoing work on Revision 5 to the STRATCOM Plan, I noted several provisos:

- Policy, working with STRATCOM and appropriate outside expertise, needs to ensure we have the political-military context for the scenarios in which we would use the options provided for in the revisions.
- We also need to consider how to bundle or package the options in sensible ways so that decision-makers can use them under pressure and quickly.
- Throughout the process, we must consider the reliability (or unreliability) of our intelligence and capture the effect of that factor.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091404-1

.....
 Please respond by 10/1/04

14 SEP 04

OSD 13867-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 14 PM 4:13

CM-2043-04
13 September 2004

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 9/10*

SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs (CA)

- **Question.** "When are we going to get closure on where the Civil Affairs functions ought to be located? What is the pacing item there? Is it getting on my schedule?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** The **Army** has completed its study of the issue. VCSA was briefed on 26 Aug and approved a recommendation that all CA and PSYOP units remain assigned to US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC).
- **Analysis.** TAB B summarizes **Army** staff briefing to the VCSA. TAB C is a VCSA memorandum giving the USASOC Commander his recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the scheduling of a meeting with you, USD(P), CSA, CMC, CDRUSSOCOM and me to review the Army recommendation.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

322

13SEP04

27 APR 04

OSD 13900-04

APR 27 2004

755

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs

When are we going to get closure on where the Civil Affairs functions ought to be located? What is the pacing item there? Is it getting on my schedule?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042304-14

.....
Please respond by 5/9/04

OSD 13900-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26531

30 August 2004

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Army "Tiger Team" Briefing to Vice Chief of Staff

1. Purpose. To summarize latest Army briefing on Civil Affairs (CA) issues.
2. Key Points. On 26 August, the CA/PSYOP Tiger Team (CAPOTT) briefed the Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) on options for the assignment of CA units.

- The CAPOTT presented the following findings:
 - CA (and PSYOP) forces can best support operations by remaining under US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). Reassigning CA to **Army** Forces Command would not increase Army interest in these activities, improve the transition to post-combat stabilization operations, nor support the Army Campaign Plan.
 - Addressing CA and PSYOP challenges requires partnership between US Army Forces Command and USASOC.
 - Operations would benefit **from** creation of a full-time strategic-level Civil Military Operations (CMO) planning/coordination capability.
 - The Army should consider elevating CMO to a doctrinal "battlefield operating system."
 - USASOC must redesign the current CA **and** PSYOP force structure for modularity and use Total Army Analysis to review AC/RC *mix*.
 - Extending the Reserve Component CA **branch** to *the* Active Component and creating a PSYOP branch would promote the management, professionalism and availability of those officers.
- VCSA approved the findings and gave the following guidance:
 - Continue to work the force structure for CA and PSYOP.
 - Determine how to integrate CA, PSYOP and supported units per the Army Campaign Plan. **This** should include Combat Training Centers.
 - Return in 90 days to brief the implementation plan.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
201 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0201

86 AUG 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (AIRBORNE), FORT BRAGG, NC 28310**

SUBJECT: Results of **G-3** Directed *Civil Affairs* (CA) and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT)

1. **As** per our meeting and your request for assistance on **29 April 2004**, I convened a **Civil Affairs** and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT) to analyze your Civil Affairs and PSYOP "Way Ahead" concept. The Team **also** analyzed **two** additional concepts for points of comparison. The team consisted of members of **the Army Staff**, selected Army major commands, and selected outside agencies. **It** ensured **all** doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities **issues were** reviewed and **considered**.

2. The Tiger Team determined civil affairs and psychological operations forces could best support the Army **by** remaining under the Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The Army's Force Generation Model's emphasis on modularity **will** assure that this capability **is** realized **as CA** and **PSYOP** staff planners will **be** assigned down to the BCT UA level. **The Tiger Team** recommends that **USASOC should** redesign the current CA and PSYOP *force* structures for modularity and **relook** the AC/RC mix.

3. During the conduct of the Tiger Team review and assessment the *following* three concepts were developed:

a. **Concept 1 - USACAPOC**, with all currently assigned forces, remains assigned to USASOC and transforms to **support modularity**.

b. **Concept 2** - HQ USACAPOC with all **CA** and PSYOP Forces reassigned to JFCOM.

c. **Concept 3** - SOF supporting forces assigned to USASOC and conventional forces assigned to FORSCOM.

4. Recommendation: The CAPOTT endorses **Concept 1** by utilizing the comparison criteria of Training/Readiness, Modularity, Flexibility, and Predictability. Recommend USASOC begin coordination with FORSCOM to **support** transformation and support modularity IAW Concept 1.

11-L-0559/OSD/26533




Printed on Recycled Paper

SUBJECT: Results of **G-3** Directed Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (**CAPOTT**)

5. Although this constitutes the closure of this Tiger Team, the **members** are available to assist in **any** capacity. We need to continue to **build** on the momentum gained **thus far**. Furthermore, **USASOC's** pursuit of branches for **CA** and **PSYOP** will **help** to increase professionalism, management, and availability of the **officers** in those branches.

6. The POC for this action is COL **Jose** Olivero, HQDA, **G-3, MOSO-SOD, DSN** (b)(6)
(b)(6) Comm: (b)(6)


RICHARD A. CODY
General, United States Army
Vice Chief of Staff

TAB D

COORDINATION PAGE

COL Milburn	USJFCOM	29 July 2004
COL Bennett	USSOCOM	28 July 2004
COL Wright	Army	5 August 2004
COL Van Dyke	USMC	10 August 2004

APR 27 2004

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755

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs

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Thanks.

DHR:dh
(42304-14)

.....
Please respond by 5/9/04

|

27 APR 04

OSD 13900-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26536

30 August 2004

INFORMATION PAPER

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1. Purpose. To summarize latest Army briefing on Civil Affairs (CA) issues.
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 - USASOC must redesign the current CA and PSYOP force structure for modularity and use Total Army Analysis to review AC/RC mix.
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 - VCSA approved the findings and gave the following guidance:
 - Continue to work the force structure for CA and PSYOP.
 - Determine how to integrate CA, PSYOP and supported units per the Army Campaign Plan. This should include Combat Training Centers.
 - Return in 90 days to brief the implementation plan.

11-L-0559/OSD/26537



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
201 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0201

26 AUG 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (AIRBORNE), FORT BRAGG, NC 28310

SUBJECT: Results of G-3 Directed Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations
Tiger Team (CAPOTT)

1. As per our meeting and your request for assistance on 29 April 2004, I convened a Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT) to analyze your Civil Affairs and PSYOP "Way Ahead" concept. The Team also analyzed two additional concepts for points of comparison. The team consisted of members of the Army Staff, selected Army major commands, and selected outside agencies. It ensured all doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities issues were reviewed and considered.
2. The Tiger Team determined civil affairs and psychological operations forces could best support the Army by remaining under the Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The Army's Force Generation Model's emphasis on modularity will assure that this capability is realized as CA and PSYOP staff planners will be assigned down to the BCT UA level. The Tiger Team recommends that USASOC should redesign the current CA and PSYOP force structures for modularity and relook the AC/RC mix.
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 - a. **Concept 1** - USACAPOC, with all currently assigned forces, remains assigned to USASOC and transforms to support modularity.
 - b. **Concept 2** - HQ USACAPOC with all CA and PSYOP Forces reassigned to JFCOM.
 - c. **Concept 3** - SOF supporting forces assigned to USASOC and conventional forces assigned to FORSCOM.
4. Recommendation: The CAPOTT endorses **Concept 1** by utilizing the comparison criteria of Training/Readiness, Modularity, Flexibility, and Predictability. Recommend USASOC begin coordination with FORSCOM to support transformation and support modularity IAW Concept 1.

11- L-0559/OSD/26538




Recycled Paper

SUBJECT: Results of G-3 Directed Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT)

5. **Although** this constitutes the **closure** of this Tiger Team, the **members** are available to assist in any capacity. We need to continue to build on the momentum gained thus far. Furthermore, **USASOC's** pursuit of branches for **CA** and **PSYOP** will help to increase professionalism, management, and **availability of the** officers in those branches.

6. The POC for this action is COL Jose Olivero, HQDA, G-3, **MOSO-SOD**, DSN (b)(6)
(b)(6) Comm: (b)(6)


RICHARD A. CODY
General, United States Army
Vice Chief of Staff

TAB D

COORDINATION PAGE

COL Milburn	USJFCOM	29 July 2004
COL Bennett	USSOCOM	28 July 2004
COL Wright	Army	5 August 2004
COL Van Dyke	USMC	10 August 2004

12 Jul 04

104 00000 03 0000

TO: David Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 6, 2004
SUBJECT: John Hamre Proposal

326

Where do we stand on Hamre's proposal? I think it is a good idea.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604E.02ts

Attach: Hamre's Developing Strategy re: Rising Demand for Entitlement benefits for Reservists 3/12/04

6 JUN 04

11-L-0559/OSD/26541

OSD 13916-04


C311

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(1)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

From: John J. Hamre



Date: March 12, 2004

Subject: Developing a strategy concerning the rising demand for entitlement benefits for reservists

First, let me thank you for the time you gave us yesterday to go through the "Beyond Goldwater Nichols" study. It is just the half-way mark in our work, but we felt this was the crucial foundation for what follows. You have brought the department to a remarkable position where change is possible. It is now feasible to take the next step that until now was not possible — genuine integration of key staff functions.

Phase 2 of the study will examine new combat missions, UCP changes, and the acquisition process, as well as continuing our work on the interagency process. In a separate but closely related effort, we'll be looking at the role of the Guard/Reserve components. It is this last item that I want to raise with you in this memo.

We have already started work on the Guard/Reserve issues. I have been startled, however, to see the momentum in Congress for a sweeping enlargement of pay and benefits for reservists due to the strains of current deployments. There is legitimate worry here, but a blind expansion of benefits will undermine the reserves as it will practically price them into the same cost structure of active-duty personnel. If that is the case, the general purpose of the reserves is significantly diminished.

D

I have met with staff directors on the Senate side, but they frankly don't have a plan to deal with the steamroller that is heading their way.

My sense is that everyone needs a firebreak to separate the passions of the current problems from a rational assessment of the role, structure and management of Guard/Reserve forces for the future. The traditional method of building a firebreak is to create a commission in order to buy time. This won't be enough this year. You need some commission-like process to get a dispassionate look at the role/structure/management issues, but you also have to create an escape valve for the political pressures of this year.

As I mentioned yesterday, I would propose that you request a 2-year authority to establish an "exceptional relief" process for active duty and reserve personnel who have suffered extraordinary hardship as a result of recent deployments. The authority would allow you to empanel a 5 (pick a number) person review board that would hear hardship cases. This board would have the authority to grant no-interest loans to military personnel. The board's decisions would be final, though Congress would retain the authority to pass private relief legislation (a very rare event).

7

This gives members of Congress something to act on without locking the Department into a long-term entitlement, or giving benefits to 100% of the population to solve a problem that plagues only 1% of the community.

— Ideally this initiative would come from the Joint Chiefs as a relief measure for the total force, allowing you to work with members of congress to guide it towards being the dominant policy path to head off the steamroller of benefits enlargement. I know that we spoke yesterday about the idea possibly originating on the Hill. I am happy to help here, as well, but I honestly feel that it has gotten so far down the road that it will take the collective authority of the Chiefs to get attention to it.

The purpose of creating a firebreak is to create a new mindset about a problem. That is why you do need to accompany this with some kind of a commission.

I am prepared to build a commission to look at the Guard/Reserve issues. You can use us if you want, or create something yourself. If you want CSIS to do something here, I am happy to talk. One way or the other we will press ahead to examine the Guard/Reserve issues at the staff expert level.

We have examined the plans that the reserve components have launched under your direction already, and there are some exciting new ideas in the works.

Please let me know how I can help. And, thank you again for the chance to brief you yesterday.

END

11-L-0559/OSD/26543



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

September 13, 2004 - 9:00 AM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD(P&R)
David S. C. Chu, 14 Sep 04

SUBJECT: John Hamre Proposal - SNOWFLAKE

- You asked where we stand on John Hamre's proposal (attached).
- We have met with John and his staff to discuss the roles and missions of the Reserve components and how we might shape future compensation and benefits.
- The Small Business Administration already has a program that provides some of the relief John proposes. The first loan under this new program was granted just months after the September 11th attacks, and to date the SBA has granted 186 loans totaling \$16,144,400.
- While we were not successful in getting John's proposal considered this year (it requires legislation), the Senate authorization bill includes a provision that would establish a 13-member commission to assess the roles and missions of the National Guard and Reserve, and compensation and benefits provided to reservists. It would take up this idea.
- In the meantime, the President has proposed expanding educational benefits for mobilized Reservists, and you have approved added compensation and incentives for those who serve more than one year in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additional bonus authority for the Reserves, sponsored by the Administration is in the House Authorization Bill, and the conference must also adjudicate the vast difference between the Senate position on Reserve health benefits and that of the House (which follows the Administration's recommendations).
- The DoD Advisory Committee on Military Compensation is scheduled to begin work in October to review the long-term appropriateness of our pay and benefits structure. It is a good place to assess the net effect of all these changes, and will be able to consider the results of research we're now conducting on actual income loss by Reservists.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Tom Bush, OASD(RA) (b)(6)

OSD 13916-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26544



12 July 04

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: John Hamre Proposal

Where do we stand on Hamre's proposal? I think it is a good idea.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604E.02ts

Attach: Hamre's Developing Strategy re: Rising Demand for Entitlement benefits for Reservists 3/12/04

C 311

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(7)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: John J. Hamre *John J. Hamre*

Date: March 12, 2004

Subject: Developing a strategy concerning the rising demand for entitlement benefits for reservists

First, let me thank you for the time you gave us yesterday to go through the "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols" study. It is just the half-way mark in our work, but we felt this was the crucial foundation for what follows. You have brought the department to a remarkable position where change is possible. It is now feasible to take the next step that until now was not possible — genuine integration of key staff functions.

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We have examined the plans that the reserve components have launched under your direction already, and there are some exciting new ideas in the works.

Please let me know how I can help. And, thank you again for the chance to brief you yesterday.

END



September 13, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Wrap-up Paper on Detainee Issue

SEP 13 11:04 AM '04
OSD 13918-04

383.6

I need the wrap-up paper on the detainee issue. I would like to see a draft soon. I want to know who is responsible for producing it. Please set a tentative schedule when this document will be finished and a plan as to what we are going to do with it.

Please get a draft to me no later than Wednesday, Sept. 15.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091304-32

.....
Please respond by 4/15/04

13 Sep 04



72
~~FOUO~~

September 13, 2004

TO: Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Friday, Sept 17 Lunch

2004 SEP 15 11:26
SECURITY INFORMATION

OSD

On Friday, let's have McLaughlin in for lunch, rather than Jerry Johnson. And, Porter Goss has been confirmed, include him.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091304-31

.....

Please respond by _____

13 SEP 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26549

OSD 13927-04

77
~~FOUO~~

September 13, 2004

TO: Suzanne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Photograph for George Tenet

2004 SEP 15 11:16:28
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY

OSD

I want to give George Tenet a photo when he comes in - it is in the bottom drawer of my credenza.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091304.27

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13928-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26550

OSD

77
~~FOUO~~

September 13, 2004

TO: Suzanne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Lunch on Friday

Please tell me who Jerry Johnson is - the person I am having lunch with on Friday. Please tell me what it is about.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091304-28

SEP 13 11 19 26

SECURITY

091304-000

.....
Please respond by _____

He is our new
White House Fellow.
Paul Butler wanted you
to have some time
with him.
Not lunch - fire
Just coffee
DeLorme

~~FOUO~~


OSD 13931-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26551

091304-000

7200
~~FOUO~~

September 13, 2004

TO: Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Lunch with Tenet

I would like to have George Tenet in for lunch sometime.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091304-30

SEP 13 2004
10 51 AM
DHR

000.71810

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13932-04

13 26 04

11-L-0559/OSD/26552

September 13, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Background for SASC Hearing

SEP 15 10 20
032

032

Please pull together the following information for this year:

- The total number of people in DoD who are involved in responding to Congress and preparing materials for Congress.
- The number of Congressional inquiries we have responded to.
- The number reports we have submitted to Congress.
- The number of hearings the members of DoD (military and civilian) have testified before.
- The number of different different people in DoD that have testified.
- The number of briefings that have been held for Congressional Members and staff.
- Anything else along these lines you can think of.

I am going to need this information when I am on the Hill next week.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091304-21

.....
Please respond by _____

13 SEP 04

OSD 13933-04



September 13, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
VADM Jim Stavridis
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: NASCAR Race

SEP 13 11 26 AM '04

SECDEF (11)

253.8

The staff should have asked me if I had ever been to a stock car race. All the press said I had never been to one and, as you now know, I went to several back in the late 1940s.

DHR:ss
091304-16

.....
Please respond by _____

13 SEP 2004

OSD 13934-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26554

September 13, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Continuity of Personnel

2004 SEP 15 11 10 AM

SECDEF (133)

2004

I am convinced that people should serve longer in their posts. A logical corollary to that is that careers will be longer for successful people.

Please have your folks to think this through and get back to me, before Oct. 1, with some options as to how this might be accomplished.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091304-18

.....
Please respond by _____

133
2004

OSD 13940-04

September 13, 2004

383.6

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Release of Detainee Treatment Paper

Do you think this DoD Detainee Treatment Paper could be put on the DoD website, sent to Members of Congress and given to the press *corps*?

Thanks.

Attach.
9/08/04 DoD Detainee Treatment Paper

DHR:ss
091304-20

.....
Please respond by 9/21/04

13 Sep 04

Detainee Treatment: Forward Momentum of DoD Implementation



8 September 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/26557



Moving Forward on Abu Ghraib and Detainee Operations

- The Department of Defense has aggressively investigated issues associated with detainee abuse and is committed to addressing shortcomings and improving detainee operations.
- We began the process of assessing detainee operations and implementing change before the abuses at Abu Ghraib were reported. Changes and improvements have been implemented when appropriate, without waiting for the results of investigations.
- As we continue to improve operations, the Department now has, or will soon have, insight and recommendations gained from 11 major investigations and assessments
 - Many of the proposed fixes are already completed or underway
 - We continue to consolidate and address the conclusions from the various assessments

The Department is taking a top-to-bottom approach

- Improvements are occurring simultaneously in OSD, the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and the Combatant Commands

Improvements are already underway across the spectrum of Policy, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities

2

Detainee Operations: Forward Momentum of DoD Implem.

OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED

Department of the Army Inspector General Assessment

GIMO

Afghanistan

IRAQ

C
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Army Reserve Assessment of Reserve Training with Focus on MI and MP

11-L-0559/OSD/26559




OSD Actions

- Established Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA) office
- Established a Joint Detainee Coordinating Committee on Detainee Affairs chaired by DASD-DA
- Issued policy “Handling of Reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross”
- Issued policy “Procedures for Investigations into the Death of Detainees in the Custody of the Armed Forces of the U.S.”
- Initiated a department-wide review of detainee-related policy directives

OSD is organized to integrate fixes with USG and DoD policy, and to streamline the flow of information throughout the Department

4



Joint Staff Actions

- Created Joint Staff Detainee Affairs Division to address worldwide detainee operations
- Drafted Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques & Procedures on Detainee Operations by the Air, Land, & Sea Applications Center
- Expediting publication of Joint Doctrine for Detainee Operations (Joint Publication 3-63)
- Including Joint Interrogation Operations in “Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations” (Joint Publication 2-01)
- Added Detainee Operations to “Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States.” (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01C)

**Joint Doctrine for detainee operations and interrogations
is already being developed**



U.S. Army Actions

- Initiated Army assessments of detainee operations in summer of 2003 at the request of the Combatant Commanders
- Reviewed findings & recommendations from 3 Army assessments, two investigations, and 2 DoD reviews
 - Completed more than 950 interviews, compiling more than 10,000 pages
 - Gained combat experience of more than 300,000 soldiers
- Revising Army regulations on detainee operations
- Developing clearer lines of responsibility between Military Police and Military Intelligence

The Army is improving its practices based on lessons learned

6



U.S. Army Actions

- Established Provost Marshal General in September 2003
 - Army executive agent for detainee operations
- Developed detainee operations integration plan -- prioritized plan addressing policy, doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities
- Synchronized Army with joint policy and doctrine
- Established Detainee Operations Oversight Council
- Providing training and augmentation for detainee operations
 - Sending corrections specialists, lawyers, interrogators, medical personnel
- Making technical assistance visits
- Improving detention facilities

Army is adapting to support the warfighter

7



Navy/Marine Corps Actions

Navy:

- DepSecDef established the Administrative Review Process
 - Gordon England (SECNAV) appointed Designated Civilian Official
 - Established Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants
- DepSecDef established the Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Marine Corps:

- Coordinating with Army on enemy detention and interment operations , regarding doctrine development, training, and other pertinent issues.
- Deployed corrections specialists to Iraq and GTMO to provide oversight, training, inspection, and operational support for all detainee
- Continues to provide pre-deployment training (in conjunction with the Army) on detainee operations and the Geneva Conventions.

Navy and Marine Corps are contributing to improved processes.



Central Command Actions

- Assigned general officer to be responsible for all detention and interrogation operations, Deputy Commanding General – Detainee Operations, to Multinational Force – Iraq
- Require all lapses of accountability, escapes and disturbances to be reported to the Deputy Commanding General – Detainee Operations and Commander Multinational Force – Iraq
- Protecting coalition forces and detainees through improved force protection
- Upgrading facilities for soldiers and detainees
- Issued interrogation policies reiterating application of Geneva Conventions and requiring all interrogations be conducted in lawfully and humanely

**CENTCOM has reorganized for improved management;
its facilities are safer for U.S. personnel and detainees**

9



Central Command Actions

- Accelerated review process for detainee case files for release or continued internment decisions
- Using biometric automated tool set for all detainee transfers to improve accountability
- Mandated and conducted training down to the individual level on CENTCOM policy “Proper Conduct During Combat Operations”. This policy memorandum provides guidance and requires training on:
 - following the law of war and rules of engagement
 - treating all persons with humanity, dignity and respect
 - using judgment and discretion in detaining civilians
 - respecting private property

**CENTCOM has improved detainee accountability and processing;
its policy is distributed widely and is enforced.**

10



Southern Command Actions

- Reviewing compliance with Standard Operating Procedures on a periodic basis
 - Secretary of the Navy Inspector General team inspection (May 04) – no deficiencies noted
 - Established Joint Task Force Internal Standarduation Team
 - Dedicated a Field Grade officer to ensure all Standard Operating Procedures are followed
 - Inspecting 4 specific areas weekly, 15 other areas inspected monthly
- Hosting American Corrections Association visit with Detention Operations Group to compare procedures in use at U.S. detention facilities
- Video Recording all Forced Cell Extractions
 - Reviewing every tape for compliance with proper procedure
 - Keeping historical archives of all videos.
- Reviewing Standard Operating Procedures and processes to ensure adequate leader supervision
 - Require Commander Joint Detainee Operations Group (Colonel) approval for detainee movement and body searches
 - Require Commander Joint Task Force (General Officer) approval for segregation over 30 days

**SOUTHCOM is verifying compliance with
Standard Operating Procedures.**

11



Improvements across all components and across the breadth of recommendations

Examples :

Policy

- ICRC Reporting
- Autopsies

Doctrine

- Joint Detainee Ops
- Army MI/MP relationship
- Army Detainee Ops

Organization

- DASD-DA
- Joint Detainee Coord Cmte
- JS – Detainee Ops Div

Training

- Army MP/MI
- Marine Corps Correction
Specialists

Leadership

- Deputy Cdr for Detention
Ops -Iraq

Personnel

- MI/MP Force Structure
Reviews

Facilities

- Improvements in detention
facilities



Holding Personnel Accountable

- General Officer suspended from command
- Investigated over 250 allegations of abuse
 - Army referrals to date: 45 Courts-Martial, numerous Article 15s and General Officer Letters of Reprimand (GOMOR)
 - Administratively separated 13 Soldiers from Army
 - Closed 120 of 225 cases.
 - 12 Marines have been Court-Martialed
 - A number of other Courts-Martial are pending
 - Article 32 investigation of 4 U.S. Navy members of Special Warfare Command
 - Information provided to Department of Justice for investigation of contractors
 - Numerous unit-level Article 15 Non-Judicial Punishment actions underway for Army and Marine Corps (not normally reported outside command channels).



Summary

Improvements are already underway across the spectrum of Policy, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities

OSD is organized to integrate fixes with USG and DoD policy, and to streamline the flow of information throughout the Department

Joint Doctrine for detainee operations and interrogations is already being developed

The Army is improving its practices based on lessons learned

The Army is adapting to support the warfighter

Navy and Marine Corps are contributing to improved processes

CENTCOM has reorganized for improved management; its facilities are safer for Soldiers and detainees

CENTCOM has improved detainee accountability and processing; its policy is distributed widely and enforced

SOUTHCOM is verifying compliance with Standard Operating Procedures

September 13, 2004

TO: Ryan Henry
Ken Krieg
Lt. Gen. Sharp
VADM Willard

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: QDR

SEP 15 11 26 AM '04

SEP 15 11 26 AM '04

310.1

As we move forward toward the QDR, we should ensure that we look at several key issues. In particular, we should examine how we can create longer tour lengths so people learn their jobs. Equally important, we must focus on creating Standing Joint Task Forces and headquarters. Additionally, this QDR should look at DoD roles in homeland security, intelligence, counter-terrorism and tracking individuals, force sizing constructs, space investment, medical benefits, and global force posture. This is not an all-inclusive list, but should be helpful as we start this process.

Also, think through how we can take advantage of the good thinking available at the Defense Science Board, Defense Policy Board, and Defense Business Board.

The SLRG process should be valuable as we move forward on this QDR. Please come back to me soon with a lay-down of the dates and sessions for the process.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091304-22

.....
Please respond by _____

1304081

September 13, 2004

TO: *Mary Claire*
Andy Hoehn
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: October Carrier Visit

SEP 13 11 00 AM '04
SECDEF
1103

Please get Mary Claire thinking about the upcoming October aircraft carrier visit and develop a program that includes:

- How we want to handle these folks.
- Who greets them upon arrival at the airport.
- How we treat them on the carrier.
- A timeline for the day (since they will not be overnighing, I gather they would fly out early and have lunch aboard the carrier).

Next, I would wash this list I have approved with the appropriate people and see if you can get any ideas of any mistakes we have made (people that should be on the list and are not, or vice versa).

Thanks.

Attach.
9/13/04 Memo from Andy Hoehn to SecDef re: Proposed Invitees for Oct. Carrier Visit

DHR:ss
091304-26



Please respond by _____

9/13/04

September 2, 2004

TO: Dr. Chu
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: History of the Combat Zone Tax Exclusion

Please give me the history of this benefit, with a particular emphasis on how it works in Congress as between the Ways and Means Committees and the Armed Services Committees. I'd also be interested in thinking through how we might creatively leverage similar arrangements as we continue to find good incentives for the force.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090204-7

.....
Please respond by 9/10

*Tom - DID I
already ask you
about this?
Henry*

SEP 15 11:53 AM '04
090204-7

FOUO

OSD 13958-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26573



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SEC 100-10

2004 NOV 15 11 30



INFO MEMO

November 3, 2004, 9:11 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S.C. Chu, ~~USD~~ (P&R)

SUBJECT: History of the ~~the~~ Combat Zone Tax Exclusion — SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- Prior to the Korean conflict, income tax benefits for members of the Armed Forces were part of individual revenue acts passed to finance war efforts, and the exclusion was not dependent on combat zone designation.
- Beginning with the Korean conflict, the law excluded military compensation earned in a combat zone.
 - o The Internal Revenue Code exclusion is generally triggered by the President establishing a combat zone by Executive Order, not by Congressional action.
 - o Presidents have designated five combat zones: Korea, Vietnam, Arabian Peninsula, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Korea and Vietnam have been terminated.
 - o Treasury regulations allow the Secretary, or his delegate, to extend combat zone tax benefits to members serving outside of but in “direct support” of the combat zone.
- Congress acted only twice to extend combat zone tax benefits to members by establishing in law Qualified Hazardous Duty Areas: the Former Yugoslavia (1995) and Kosovo (1999).
 - o Both of these bills originated in the House Ways and Means Committee.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: LTC Janet Fenton, USA, (b)(6)

OSD 13958-04



~~FOUO~~

September 2, 2004

TO: Dr. Chu
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: History of the Combat Zone Tax Exclusion

Please give me the history of this benefit, with a particular emphasis on how it works in Congress as between the Ways and Means Committees and the Armed Services Committees. I'd also be interested in thinking through how we might creatively leverage similar arrangements as we continue to find good incentives for the force.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090204-7

.....
Please respond by

9/10

U.S. Get Answer

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15958-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26575

September 15, 2004

TO: David Chu

c c : Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
VADM Staser Holcomb

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tour Lengths

Please send me the data we discussed on the tour lengths for our senior people as soon as you can.

Also, I want to see some specific suggestions for how we can lengthen tours at all levels in our military quickly. What are the mechanisms by which we will actually put this idea in place?

At a minimum, it seems to me that this idea should be embedded in the QDR and all upcoming guidance to the Services.

I am sure there are policy documents, instructions, and other mechanisms – such as operational “fleet up” concepts for Commanders – that can quickly move us in the direction of having people stay in a job long enough to really learn what they are doing and maximize their contributions.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091504-2

.....
Please respond by 10/1/04

OSD 13987-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26576



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SEP 15 2004

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. (b)(6)

Thank you so much for your role in my visit to the Chevy Rock & Roll 400 NASCAR NEXTEL Cup Series race. It was a pleasure to be involved in the day's excitement.

I do appreciate your efforts. You helped make the trip a success.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. ...".

OSD 13989-04

September 13, 2004

333SD

TO: Paul Butler
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Thank You Notes for NASCAR Event

Who is handling the thank you notes for the NASCAR Event? It was terrific and there are about five or six people we should thank. One of them is (b)(6) - he was just terrific. Who is he? (b)(6) was another person who was helpful (their cards are attached).

Please get the draft thank you notes to me soon, so I can take a look at them.

Thanks.

Attach.
Business Cards for (b)(6)

DHR:ss
091304-12

.....
Please respond by _____

THE AMES COMPANY
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE

HERBERT F. AMES
(b)(6)

P.O. BOX 710
FLORENCE, SC 29503



Douglas S. Fritz
President

(b)(6)

Email: dfritz@rir.com
600 E. Laburnum Avenue / Richmond, Virginia 23222

13 Sep 04

OSD 13989-04

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 15 AM 07:15 August 15, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

~~837~~
837

SUBJECT Caspian Sea Security Initiative

Because of the seam between CENTCOM and EUCOM and the Caspian Sea our Caspian Sea security initiative is getting uneven attention, much more from EUCOM than CENTCOM, given CENTCOM's busy agenda.

What do you propose we do about it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081504-17 (18 computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 9/10/04

OSD 14001-04

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

240

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

July 2, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letters

Let's make sure I write letters to Keith Kellogg, General Kicklighter, Reuben Jeffery and some of these people who are leaving.

*C.M. (Mick)
LTC US Army Ret.
copy*

*↳ for the
Interagency Transition Planning Team*

20122

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070204 1

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04 8/30

8/30

~~*Please
Rec Sec. Check
D. Butler*~~

*Please Draft letter to
each thanking them for
their work in Iraq. Int.
D. Butler*

850.84

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 14019-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26580



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SEP 16 2004

Mr. Reuben Jeffery, III
National Security Council
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20504

Dear Reuben:

Thank you for your contributions as the
Representative and Executive Director for the Coalition
Provisional Authority.

You and your team did important work in helping
guide the transition to a free Iraq. I do appreciate your
leadership and commend you for a job well done.

Sincerely,

201.22

16 Sep 04

250104

OSD 14013-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26581



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SEP 16 2004

Lieutenant General Claude M. Kicklighter, USA

(b)(6)

Dear Mick:

I thank you for committing your time and energy as the Director of the Interagency Transition Planning Team. You did a fine job.

You and your team made important contributions in the efforts to establish a free Iraq. Your work continues to be crucial in achieving this goal.

I do appreciate your leadership on this issue.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Thank to much

201.22

16 Sep 04

250104

OSD 14013-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26582

Lieutenant General Claude M. Kicklighter, USA

(b)(6)

Dear Mick:

I thank you for committing your time and energy as the Director of the Interagency Transition Planning Team. You did a fine job.

You and your team made important contributions in the efforts to establish a free Iraq. Your work continues to be crucial in achieving this goal.

I do appreciate your leadership on this issue.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

*Prep for Sec Sec
Signature*

Paul Britt

9/14

Mr. Reuben Jeffery, III
National Security Council
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20504

Dear Reuben:

Thank you for your contributions as the
Representative and Executive Director for the Coalition
Provisional Authority.

You and your team did important work in helping
guide the transition to a free Iraq. I do appreciate your
leadership and commend you for a job well done.

Sincerely,

FYI ...
Needs to be couriered.
- ESE 9/8

11-L-0559/OSD/26584

Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg

(b)(6)

Dear General Kellogg:

You did a fine job during your time as the Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer of the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Thank you for your important contributions. You and your team laid the foundation for a free Iraq, and I commend your dedication and commitment to this goal.

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/26585



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 18 2004

Lieutenant General Joseph K. Kellogg, Jr., U.S. Army

(b)(6)

Dear Keith,

Your note meant a great deal to me. Know that I appreciate your support as well as your outstanding service to our country.

Warm regards,

33
SD

18 May 04
11 May 04

OSD 07317-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26586



11 MAY 2004

Mr. Secretary

Sir
You hang in there! You are
doing great and you have a super
Team. I would not have you to
begin if I did not believe in you.
Do not let them gain you down.

JN

Keith
Kellogg
LTJG(A), USA

335 SG

11 May 04

OSD 07317-04

Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD

From: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD
Sent: Tuesday, September 07, 2004 2:24 PM
To: Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD
Subject: RE: names and titles
Importance: High

Carrie Sue,

1. We don't have anything official for a mailing address for Reuben Jeffery. He now works over at the White House. The Sit Room (b)(6) may be able to point you in the right direction. He signed his memos to SecDef as "Reuben Jeffery 11" → *look it up NCS: Natl Sec Council*

However, according to <http://www.theultimates.com/white/>, his address is (b)(6)
(b)(6)

2. Keith Kellogg (address from May 2004 SecDef note, cy attached)

Lieutenant General Joseph K. Kellogg, Jr., U.S. Army

(b)(6)

(FYI: his address is (b)(6) according to <http://www.theultimates.com/white/>)

3. General Kicklighter

Lieutenant General Claude M. Kicklighter, U.S. Army

"Mick"

Still working this one - may be able to get confirmation on his mailing address from someone in the building; will let you know what we find out;

however according to <http://www.theultimates.com/white/>, his address is (b)(6)
(b)(6)

v/r,

John

-----Original Message-----

From: Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD
Sent: Tuesday, September 07, 2004 11:29 AM
To: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD
Subject: names and titles

Dear John -

I have a question for you -- do you have the full names, titles, and addresses of Keith Kellogg, Gen. Kicklighter, and Reuben Jeffrey? I have to do ltrs to them and need that info. If you have it, that would

Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD

From: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD
Sent: Wednesday, September 08, 2004 10:39 AM
To: Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD
Subject: RE: names and titles
Importance: High

Carrie Sue,

Good morning.

1. Jeffery: Representative and Executive Director for the Coalition Provisional Authority
2. Kellogg: Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer, Coalition Provisional Authority
3. Kicklighter: Director, Interagency Transition Planning Team

v/r,

John

-----Original Message-----

From: Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD
Sent: Wednesday, September 08, 2004 8:00 AM
To: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD
Subject: RE: names and titles

Dear John - can you please also tell me what they did here -- i know that Gen Kicklighter was the Director of the Interagency Planning Team, for example...
Thanks -- CSC

-----Original Message-----

From: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD
Sent: Tuesday, September 07, 2004 2:24 PM
To: Casey, Carrie, CTR, OSD
Subject: RE: names and titles
Importance: High

Carrie Sue,

1. We don't have anything official for a mailing address for Reuben Jeffery. He now works over at the White House. The Sit Room (b)(6) may be able to point you in the right direction. He signed his memos to SecDef as "Reuben Jeffery III"

However, according to <http://www.theultimate.s.com/white/>, his address is (b)(6)
(b)(6)

2. Keith Kellogg (address from May 2004 SecDef note, cy attached)

Lieutenant General Joseph K. Kellogg, Jr., U.S. Army
(b)(6)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SEP 16 2004

Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg

(b)(6)

20122

Dear General Kellogg:

You did a fine job during your time as the Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer of the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Thank you for your important contributions. You and your team laid the foundation for a free Iraq, and I commend your dedication and commitment to this goal.

Sincerely,

16 Sep 04

250104

OSD 14013-04

04/10/15

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~


ACTION MEMO

DepSecDef _____
1-04/012468-ES
ES-0772
USDP (P) 213 12/13/04

300.8

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


From: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy



Subject: DoD Directives

- You directed that Policy update 100% of its assigned DoD Directives by the end of this year and, if that is not possible, to respond to you.
- I met with Director Administration and Management's (DA&M) staff on 15 July to devise a work plan to manage Policy's directives workload that was compatible with ensuring policy-setting support to you.
 - o Of Policy's 66 assigned directives, 11 were current, 53 needed to be revised and 2 to cancel. Of the 53 directives to revise, 5 were in DoD coordination at the time.
 - o To accelerate our revision effort while sustaining policy-setting support to you, we committed with DA&M to produce one directive per month for each of my 5 components.
 - o The process began in August and we propose to complete it in June 2005.
- Status now is 7 revisions in DoD coordination and 1 signed into effect.

Recommendation: That we continue with our work plan to produce 5 revisions a month to complete effort in June 2005.

Approved:  Other: _____
OCT 15 2004

13 OCT 04

OSD 14072-04

16 SEP 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

12:30
0930

~~TOP SECRET~~

USP

September 16, 2004

ES-0772

04/012468-ES

TO: Distribution

SUBJECT: DoD Directives

Attached is a summary of progress -- or lack thereof -- being made on the updating of DoD Directives. The information is self-explanatory.

I would like to see **everyone** up to 100% by the end of this year. If someone thinks that is not possible, please let me know.

Thanks.

ATTN: 9/16 DURING MEETING TO ADDRESS (R) DoD BUSINESS REVIEW STATUS REPORT

DHR:er
091604-3

.....

Please respond by 9/30/04

ST PB Sec Det

10/15

Policy response for addressing it's directives is at last page

Paul Butler

12/4

ORIGINAL

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

SEP 17 2004 11:03 AM '04

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR *SECRETARY OF DEFENSE*

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director Administration and Management

SUBJECT: DoD Directives Review status Report

Paul Butler
9/10
RFB

Kay Burson 9/9/04

In response to your attached September 7 *snowflake* requesting the status of the DoD Directives review, the chart at Tab A shows our status as of September 3.

- At the outset of the Directives review effort, 654 directives were reviewed for currency, and a total of 396 were identified for revision or cancellation (327 for revision and 69 for cancellation).
- To date, 193 have been submitted for formal coordination, and 70 (revisions and cancellations) have been signed by the DepSec.
- Many of the remaining 133 Directives are under internal review within their own components.
- As the attached status chart indicates, two components (Policy and Intelligence) are lagging behind the others in completing their submissions for formal coordination. My staff is working with these components to help expedite the work they have in progress.
- On July 12, I forwarded you the report at Tab B reflecting our progress. During a meeting on September 7, you noted this report and a question about its accuracy was raised. We reviewed the data and determined that the July 12 report was indeed accurate.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

TSA SD	9/10
SRMA SD	
MA SD	R 9/13
EXEC SEC	M 9/10

Prepared by: Harold Neeley, ESCD, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/26593

13471-04

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
7/9/04**

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>TOTAL NUMBER</u>	<u>CERTIFIED CURRENT</u>	<u>TO BE REVISED OR CANCELED</u>	<u>SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION*</u>	<u>% OF TOTAL SUBMITTED</u>	<u>SIGNED</u>
USD(AT&L)	108	37	71	50	(70%)	15
USD(P)	-66	11	55	6	(11%)	0
USD(C)	15	9	6	5	(83%)	0
USD(P&R)	192	103	39	49	(55%)	18
USD(I)	58	8	50	11	(22%)	2
ASD(LA)	3	0	3	0	(0%)	0
ASD(NII)	40	17	23	16	(70%)	6
ASD(PA)	14	11	3	3	(100%)	0
GC, DoD	36	19	17	9	(56%)	4
DOT&E	3	2	1	1	(100%)	0
IG, DoD	14	7	7	6	(86%)	3
DA&M	87	31	56	14	(25%)**	3
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	(100%)	0
DNA	1	0	1	0	(0%)	0
WHS	15	8	7	7	(100%)	1
TOTALS	654	264	390	17%	(46%)	54

* Of the 178 submitted for coordination, 49 have been recommended for cancellation.

** Of the 56 DA&M Directives identified for revision or cancellation, 49 are charter Directives. While DA&M is the agent for updating, coordinating, and maintaining these Directives, processing updates is a participatory endeavor and cannot be completed without full and timely input from the concerned PSAs and Component Heads.

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEKENDING
9/03/04**

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>TOTAL NUMBER</u>	<u>CERTIFIED CURRENT</u>	<u>TO BE REVISED OR CANCELED</u>	<u>SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION*</u>	<u>% OF TOTAL SUBMITTED</u>	<u>DEPSEC'D SIGNED</u>
USD(AT&L)	111	37	74	54	(73%)	21
USD(P)	66	11	55	7	(13%)	0
USD(C)	15	8	7	6	(86%)	0
USD(P&R)	192	98	94	58	(62%)	23
USD(I)	55	8	47	10	(22%)	2
ASD(LA)	3	0	3	0	(0%)	0
ASD(NII)	40	17	23	16	(70%)	7
ASD(PA)	14	11	3	3	(100%)	1
GC, DoD	36	19	17	9	(56%)	5
DOT&E	3	2	1	1	(100%)	0
IG, DoD	14	7	7	6	(84%)	3
DA&M	87	31	56	15	(27%)**	3
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	(100%)	0
DNA	1	0	1	0	(0%)	0
WHS	15	8	7	7	(100%)	5
TOTALS:	654	258	3%	193	(49%)	70

* Of the 193 submitted for coordination, 49 have been recommended for cancellation.

** Of the 56 DA&M Directives identified for revision or cancellation, 49 are charter Directives. While DA&M is the agent for updating, coordinating, and maintaining these Directives, processing updates is a participatory endeavor and cannot be completed without full and timely input from the concerned PSAs. Component Heads.

September 16, 2004

TO: Distribution

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: DoD Directives

300.8

Attached is a summary of progress -- or lack thereof -- being made on the updating of DoD Directives. The information is self-explanatory.

I would like to see everyone up to 100% by the end of this year. If someone thinks that is not possible, please let me know.

Thanks.

ATTACH
9/10 DUBOIS MEMO TO SECDEF re: DOD DIRECTIVE REVIEW STATUS REPORT
DHR:ss
091604-5

.....
Please respond by 9/30/04

16SEP04

9/10
1300

ORIGINAL



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SEP 10 11 07 16

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond E. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: DoD Directives Review Status Report

Paul Butler
9/10
RWB

Ray DuBois 9/9/04

In response to your attached September 7 snowflake requesting the status of the DoD Directives review, the chart at Tab A shows our status as of September 3.

- o At the outset of the Directives review effort, 654 directives were reviewed for currency, and a total of 396 were identified for revision or cancellation (327 for revision and 69 for cancellation).
- o To date, 193 have been submitted for formal coordination, and 70 (revisions and cancellations) have been signed by the DepSec.
- o Many of the remaining 133 Directives are under internal review within their own components.
- o As the attached status chart indicates, two components (Policy and Intelligence) are lagging behind the others in completing their submissions for formal coordination. My staff is working with these components to help expedite the work they have in progress.
- o On July 12, I forwarded you the report at Tab B reflecting our progress. During a meeting on September 7, you noted this report and a question about its accuracy was raised. We reviewed the data and determined that the July 12 report was indeed accurate.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

TSA SD	9/10
SRMA SD	
MA SD	R 9/13
EXEC SEC	M 9/10

Prepared by: Harold Neeley, ESCD, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/26597

OSD 13471-04



**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
9/03/04**

COMPONENT	TOTAL NUMBER	CERTIFIED CURRENT	TO BE REVISED OR CANCELED	SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION*	% OF TOTAL SUBMITTED	DEPSECDEF SIGNED
USD(AT&L)	111	37	74	54	(73%)	21
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USD(C)	15	8	7	6	(86%)	0
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GC, DoD	36	19	17	9	(56%)	5
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WHS	15	8	7	7	(100%)	5
TOTALS:	654	258	396	193	(49%)	70

* Of the 193 submitted for coordination, 49 have been recommended for cancellation.

** Of the 56 DA&M Directives identified for revision or cancellation, 49 are charter Directives. While DA&M is the agent for updating, coordinating, and maintaining these Directives, processing updates is a participatory endeavor and cannot be completed without full and timely input from the concerned PSAs and Component Heads.

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
7/9/04**

COMPONENT	TOTAL NUMBER	CERTIFIED CURRENT	TO BE REVISED OR CANCELED	SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION*	% OF TOTAL SUBMITTED	SIGNED
USD(AT&L)	108	37	71	50	(70%)	15
USD(P)	66	11	55	6	(11%)	0
USD(C)	15	9	6	5	(83%)	0
USD(P&R)	192	103	89	49	(55%)	18
USD(I)	58	8	50	11	(22%)	2
ASD(LA)	3	0	3	0	(0%)	0
ASD(NII)	40	17	23	16	(70%)	6
ASD(PA)	14	11	3	3	(100%)	0
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DOT&E	3	2	1	1	(100%)	0
IG, DoD	14	7	7	6	(86%)	3
DA&M	87	31	56	14	(25%)**	3
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	(100%)	0
DNA	1	0	1	0	(0%)	0
WHS	15	8	7	7	(100%)	1
TOTALS:	654	264	390	178	(46%)	54

* Of the 178 submitted for coordination, 49 have been recommended for cancellation.

** Of the 56 DA&M Directives identified for revision or cancellation, 49 are charter Directives. While DA&M is the agent for updating, coordinating, and maintaining these Directives, processing updates is a participatory endeavor and cannot be completed without full and timely input from the concerned PSAs and Component Heads.



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SECRETARY'S OFFICE
2004 OCT -5 PM 12:12

UNCLASSIFIED

**RESPONSE TO SNOWFLAKE FOR THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

As of October 7, 2004, 11:45

_____ DEPSEC

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

- In the attached snowflake, you asked me to let you know if we were not going to complete our review of ow DoD Directives (DoDD).
- Barring any coordination delay from other components, I expect to complete the review of all but one of the 111 directives originally belonging to my office.
- DoDD 4100.15, "Commercial Activities Program" will not be completed because both the Senate and House versions of the FY05 Transportation/Treasury Appropriations bill prohibit the implementation of a revised OMB Circular A-76, which this directive implements for the Department. Updating it is on hold until this prohibition is resolved.

Attachment:
As Stated

Prepared by: Julie K. Bigler/Director for Administration/ (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

0 SD 14072 - 04


11-L-0559/OSD/26600



~~FOUO~~

USA

September 16, 2004

TO: Distribution
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: DoD Directives

Attached is a summary of progress -- or lack thereof -- being made on the updating of DoD Directives. The information is self-explanatory.

I would like *to see everyone up to 100% by the end of this year*. If someone thinks that is not possible, please let me know.

Thanks.

ATTN:AM
A/IN DUBOIS MEMO TO SHELTON re: DoD DISCIPLE REVIEW STATUS REPORT
DHR:aa
091604-5

.....
Please respond by 9/30/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 14072-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26601

ORIGINAL



**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950**

SEP 10 2004 10:17:16

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Paul Butler
#10
Feb

FROM: Raymond E. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: DoD Directives Review Status Report *Ray DuBois 9/9/04*

In response to your attached September 7 snowflake requesting the status of the DoD Directives review, the chart at Tab A shows our status as of September 3.

- At the outset of the Directives review effort, 654 directives were reviewed for currency, and a total of 396 were identified for revision or cancellation (327 for revision and 69 for cancellation).
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- As the attached status chart indicates, two components (Policy and Intelligence) are lagging behind the others in completing their submissions for formal coordination. My staff is working with these components to help expedite the work they have in progress.
- On July 12, I forwarded you the report at Tab B reflecting our progress. During a meeting on September 7, you noted this report and a question about its accuracy was raised. We reviewed the data and determined that the July 12 report was indeed accurate.

COORDINATION; NONE

Attachments:
As stated

TSA SD	9/10
SRMA SD	
MA SD	R 9/13
EXEC SEC	M 9/10

Prepared by: Harold Neeley, ESCD, (b)(6)

OSD 13471-04



**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
9/03/04**

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DA&M	87	31	56	15	(27%)**	3
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	(100%)	0
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WHS	15	8	7	7	(100%)	5
TOTALS:	654	258	396	193	(49%)	70

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**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
7/9/04**

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TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 6, 2004
SUBJECT: Electronic Health Records

Here's some material on health transformation that Gingrich is working on. Is there anybody that can be helpful here at DoD? Do you have your head into those issues?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604D 02ts

Attach: Gingrich email 3.20.04 Re: Tricare

Please respond by: _____

~~6/23~~ 8/19/04

OSD 14122-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26605



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1200

SECRET
2004 SEP 17 PM 5:10

HEALTH AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

SEP 16 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Electronic Health Records

- You requested information regarding electronic health records. (TAB B)
- To answer your question, our heads are very much into the issues raised by Gingrich. I meet periodically with him and his staff to exchange ideas on electronic health records and health information technology. We have provided him demonstrations on the military electronic health record, as well as a number of other advanced technologies in use today within the Department of Defense.
- I admit to some bias, but based on my experience in the private sector, the Military Health System is pursuing information technology and its application to all phases of our business far more aggressively **than** the vast majority of private sector health organizations and companies. (See TAB A)

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Connie Gladding, IMT&R/IPI&EL, (b)(6) PCDOCS 69124,
69345,69892

11-L-0559/OSD/26606

OSD 14122-04

INFORMATION PAPER

DoD Health Transformation through Information Technology

The DoD is a leader in the use of health information technologies to improve health care access, quality, population health management and force health protection.

I have met with Mr. Gingrich on a periodic basis to exchange ideas on the electronic health record and health information technologies in general. My staff has shown Mr. Gingrich and his staff the military electronic health record and a number of advanced technologies in use today within DoD. Health information technologies are being used to facilitate DoD's health and business transformation include:

- Composite Health Care System – Provides an electronic health record at all military treatment facilities that includes laboratory, pharmacy and radiology computerized physician order entry and results retrieval, registration, appointing and scheduling, and documentation of the patient encounter capabilities.
- TRICARE Online – Provides health care benefits information, health and wellness information, a secure personal health journal and online appointing capabilities at over 300 military treatment facilities.
- Telehealth - Provides interactive consultations in radiology, mental health, dermatology, pathology and dental care between remote locations and medical referral centers.
- Military Health System Data Repository – A centralized data warehouse containing patient encounter information from military treatment facilities and private sector providers, financial data, demographics and other data. It is used in our strategic planning, performance monitoring, population health management and business management.
- Pharmacy Data Transaction System – A centralized data repository of all prescriptions processed for DoD beneficiaries, whether obtained in military treatment facilities, 50,000 retail pharmacies across the U.S., or through our mail order system. The system processes over 411,000 prescription transactions per day. It gives DoD amazing capability to know what is happening with all pharmaceutical services (over \$5B per year), and helps prevent tens of thousands of adverse drug reactions every year for our beneficiaries.
- Joint Medical Asset Repository – A web-based system that provides comprehensive information on the location, movement, status and quantity of medical equipment, supplies, pharmaceuticals and units of blood in the Military Health System.

- Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support – This system combines business process re-engineering with leading edge technologies to provide state-of-the-art capabilities supporting DoD medical logistics, electronic commerce and commercial best practices.
- Computer/Electronic Accommodations Program – Provides assistive technology and accommodations for DoD and other Federal employees with disabilities. It is available to employees, patients and family members, Pentagon survivors and wounded soldiers with visual, hearing, dexterity and cognitive disabilities.

Key to transforming health care is an enterprise architecture; data, security, communication and interoperable standards; and implementation of a robust computing and communication infrastructure. The Military Health System enterprise architecture is aligned with the DoD Business Enterprise Architecture and Federal Health Architecture. DoD is a leader in the Consolidated Health Informatics initiative to develop and adopt common health standards for all Federal agencies.

I fully support the President's Management Agenda on health care reform. DoD assisted the Department of Health and Human Services (Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology) in developing national strategies for transforming health care through the use of technologies such as the electronic health record. DoD, in response to a Presidential Executive Order, recommended approaches for providing affordable health information technologies to rural and medically underserved communities. DoD will continue to collaborate and share technology products, outcomes, benefits and lessons learned with HHS, other Federal agencies, and the private sector.

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: **Electronic Health Records**

Here's some material on health transformation that Gingrich is working on. Is there anybody that can be helpful here at DoD? Do you have your head into those issues?

Thanks.

DHR:azn
060604D.0121s

Attach: Gingrich email 3.20.04 Re: Tricare

Please respond by: _____

23 8/19/04

OSD 14122-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26609

Look out for Chu

1480 1 01 *Chu*

Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Saturday, March 20, 2004 10:34 AM
To: (b)(6) Larry.O'Rita@osd.pentagon.mil.
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil;
david.chu@osd.mil; william.winkenwerder@ha.osd.mil
Cc: john.jumper@pentagon.af.mil; peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; damicorj@js.pentagon.mil
Subject: electronic health records and tricare-the aarp example-newt

for secdef,depsecdef
from newt 3/ 20/04

transforming tricare for greater member satisfaction and better health and lower cost (the trifecta of health transformation)

everything being described for an electronic health record below could apply even more to the military and military retirees and we could have an electronic health record up and running for the members to use as well as their doctors and hospitals by September one of this year

aarp is very excited about rolling out an electronic health record by January for the 2.2 million 65 year olds who will be getting the new Medicare benchmark physical exams in 2005.

building further on friday's lunch conversation

so we can explain why an electronic health record would be truly empowering for the new medicare benchmark physical:

it would be really helpful if aarp might have or develop the following data:

the new 65 year olds are different from their parents (remember your magazine cover with the model-60 is 30,a little much,I think it is 45 and I am 60)

1. how many more years will the average 65 in 2005 probably live and how long will the longest probably live
2. how many of the 2.2 million will probably reach 80 and how many will probably reach 90 and the same for 100 (this lets us know that in 2020,2030,and 2040 we will have this many people still using their electronic health records compared to the

3/20 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/26610

frequency of paper records being lost, copied, fedexed etc.)

3. how often will this generation of 65 year olds travel each year, how many will go out of state, how many will go out of country

this explains why accessing your records from anywhere on the net is so important

how many will actually move out of state to live somewhere else than where they are now

how many have children or grandchildren who live out of state

this kind of data would enable us to build an overwhelming case for starting in January with an electronic health record as a matter of convenience and safety for the health of "the new 65 year olds"

if you put all this together it might make a great article for the magazine along with a story about what England is actually doing (I met last night with the people from IDX who are partnering in two of the five English electronic health record regions and they were very very encouraging). you could also tie it into explaining your website development at aarp

thanks for helping with this
newt

3/20/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/26611



The Center for Health Transformation Vision Statement

*The Center for Health Transformation is dedicated to creating a 21st Century Intelligent Health System in which knowledge **saves** lives and **saves** money for every American.*

Years 2004-2030



Years 1903-2003

This explosion of knowledge is moved from laboratory to market by a venture capital-licensing-royalty system of unprecedented power and ability. The potential for production is being radically expanded by the rise of China and India as the lowest cost producers on the planet.

Zones of Transformation

This scale of change will require America to undergo profound transformations if we want our children and grandchildren to live in the **most** productive economy in the world creating the **highest** value-added jobs and the greatest wealth, especially for retirees.

We will have to transform:

1. National security
2. Math and science education
3. Health and healthcare
4. From bureaucratic public administration to entrepreneurial public management
5. Tax code
6. Litigation system

For more on this go to www.healthtransformation.net/.

It will be the natural pattern for the system to revert to the traditional behavior unless leadership consistently reorients it to the new **transformational** model and sets **metrics** of achievement which only a transformation could achieve.

When faced with change on this **scale**, leadership **has** to learn not to say "No, because." but practice saying "**Yes, if.**"

In health we not only have to transform for the future but we have to transform to catch up with the last thirty years. Look for example at ATM's, self-service **gas** stations with credit cards. Travelocity, e-tickets and cell phones.

Four Key Drivers of Health Transformation will be:

- Patient safety and patient outcomes
- Information and communication technology
- A system and culture of quality
- Individual knowledge, responsibility and power to choose

The Center for Health Transformation's 2004 Key Strategies for Transforming Health

1. Create information-rich health savings accounts to both incentivize and empower the individual.
2. Create secure electronic health records with expert systems to maximize minimize errors, reduce inefficiencies and improve
3. Develop a new system of health
4. Create a **buyers'** market for pharmaceuticals by building a transparent system for individuals, doctors, and pharmacists of price and efficacy information about prescription drugs and medically appropriate over-the-counter drugs. The system would have an open formulary with **an** "after-pay" rather than a co-pay (a "Travelocity" for drug purchasing).
5. Create a system and culture of rapid adoption of solutions that result in better outcomes at lower cost for both the public and private sector.
6. Establish **an** intellectually credible, accurate system for capturing the *cost and benefits* of better solutions, better technologies and better outcomes in order to create a technically correct model of return on investment for solutions resulting in better outcomes at lower cost.
7. Develop a real-time continuous research database and discover-develop-deliver ability (turning cancer into a chronic disease by 2015 and eliminating preventable complications from diabetes by 2015).
8. Knit together these electronic systems into a virtual public health **network** for health protection against natural outbreaks and a bioshield against deliberate biological attack.
9. By implementing the first eight strategies, turn health and healthcare from a problem into an opportunity, making it the leading creator of high-value jobs and foreign exchange **earning** in American society (including **as** a first step the creation of an undersecretary of commerce for health).

For more information on transforming health and healthcare in America visit our web site at www.healthtransformation.net

CORRESPONDENCE TASKER

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Date: 8/12/2004

Control Number: 0115824

Route To: ASD HA

External Reference:

Controlling Organization: ADMIN/CCO

Document Date: 6/6/2004

Original Suspense Date: 8/19/2004

Document Originator: SECDEF/ RUMSFELD

Current Suspense Date: 8/19/2004

Create Date: 8/12/2004

Signature Level: USD

Subject: SNOWFLAKE-- ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS

Action: Prepare for Signature

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS

8/12

S: 18 AUG to HA
TO: IMT&R and TMA
COOR w/ C+PP and
FH P/TR.

cor Please prepare memo
to SECDEF thru P+R
on the subject in
the memo. Included
both IT and other
Clinical innovations
MHS is working
on.

Thanks.
Call me for color
commentary.

cof S

Signature: _____

Date/Time: _____

Printed Name: _____

Electronic Health Record Snowflake

COORDINATION

USD (P&R)

DR. CHU

David L. Chu 17 Sep 11

11-L-0559/OSD/26615

Electronic Health Record Snowflake

COORDINATION

MHS CIO	Concurred, 8/25/04
DASD (FHP&R)	Concurred, 8/30/04
DASD (C&PP)	Concurred, 9/1/04
Dir, Program Integration, TMA	Concurred, 8/26/04
Chief of Staff, TMA	Concurred, 9/8/04
Deputy Dir, TMA	Concurred, 9/9/04
Chief of Staff (HA)	<u>concurr'd, 9/13/04</u>
APDASD (HA)	<u>N/A</u>