

November 4, 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
CC: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Karzai Inauguration

Afghanistan

I think you ought to think about leading the U.S. delegation to Kabul for the December 7 Inauguration of Karzai. It is an enormous success for the region and the world. It's important for the Global War on Terror. It would really show the right level of interest.

I'd like to go and I think the President ought to think about including Tom Franks in the delegation, given all he has done with respect to Afghanistan.

DHR:ss  
110404-15

OSD 17680-04

4 NOV 04

~~FOUO~~

October 6, 2004

TO: Powell Moore  
David Chu

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Law Regarding Forced Retirement of Superintendents

Please get the Department working on the task of changing this law so that a superintendent at the Naval Academy can go on to another job and the same thing in other superintendent positions.

Thanks.

Attach.

Title 10 Law Chapter 603 - U.S. Naval Academy

DHR:ss  
100604-1

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

*350 Anderson*

*6 Oct 04*

~~FOUO~~



SECRET  
 UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2004 NOV -5 AM 9:37

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
 READINESS

November 4, 2004 - 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 FROM: DR. CHU, USD(P&R)  
*Av. R. Chu 4 Nov 04*  
 SUBJECT: Forced Retirement of Superintendents--SNOWFLAKE

- You asked that the Department get "working on the task of changing the law so that a superintendent at the Naval Academy can go on to another job."
- Mission Accomplished. With the signing of the F'Y-05 Authorization Bill, the law has been changed. The Bill provides for a waiver to allow continued service beyond an officer's tenure as Superintendent at any of the Service Academies.
- If the Superintendent is reassigned or retires before having completed three years in that position, the Service Secretary must report to Congress.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock

(b)(6)

*552  
 Acknowledged  
 4 Nov 04  
 6 00 PM*



~~FOUO~~

October 6, 2004

TO: Powell Moore  
David Chu

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VADM Jim Stavridis

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SUBJECT: Law Regarding Forced Retirement of Superintendents

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Thanks.

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Title 10 Law Chapter 603 - U.S. Naval Academy

DHR:ss  
100604-1

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27538

OSD 17700-04



NOV 05 2004

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
cc: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board

We've been thinking about adding Joe Califano, a former Democrat office holder, to the Defense Policy Board. Given the President's comments this morning and his desire to reach out, I wonder if it might be better to consider Tom Daschle for the position. He'd probably be a good member of the Defense Policy Board. I would be happy to make the offer, and we could do it soon if we thought it would be helpful to the effort. Probably the sooner we do it, the better. Please let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
110404-12

334

5 NOV 04

November 11, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Congressional Letters

I just looked at Powell Moore's paper on what is changing in the Congress. It seems to me that I should write to some of the people who are retiring or were defeated, people like Daschle, Nethercutt, Hollings, Schrock, etc. - people I have known and maybe some others that I didn't.

Please get a list of all of the people who are retiring or were defeated, and draft up appropriate letters where it seems likely that I should do so.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/5/04 ASD(LA) memo to SecDef re: Impact of Elections on Defense Oversight Committees [OSD 17729-04]

DHR:dh  
111104-17

.....

Please respond by 11/19/04

032  
11 Nov 04  
Snow 04

OSD 11/11



LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

2004 NOV -5 PM 2:37

INFO MEMO

November 5, 2004 11:15 AM

Paul Butler  
11/8  
PMB

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Impact of Elections on Defense Oversight Committees

- The gain of four seats in the Senate and three seats in the House for the Republican majority is expected to slightly change the ratios of majority and minority members of DoD committees of jurisdiction. The Republican term limit in both houses will have a greater impact.

1. **Senate Armed Services Committee:** None of the 25 members retired or were defeated, but the increase in the Republican majority will probably lead to a two vote margin rather than a one vote margin. No decisions have been made in this regard, but it is likely that a couple of Armed Services committee members may leave to fill vacancies on the Senate Appropriations Committee or the Senate Finance Committee. It is our understanding, for example, that Senator Evan Bayh has had a long-standing interest in the Senate Finance Committee where Democrat vacancies are likely as a result of the departure of Senators Daschle, Graham and Breaux.

2. **SASC Subcommittee Chairmen:** There will be a reshuffling of subcommittee chairmen. Senator McCain will be eligible to become a subcommittee chairman. He was previously ineligible as a result of his chairmanship of the Commerce Committee because of a Republican rule that prohibits Republicans from simultaneously serving as a full committee chairman and a subcommittee chairman. He will relinquish Commerce because of a term limit rule. McCain supposedly favors the Airland Subcommittee underscoring his interest in Air Force procurement issues. The Republican rule prohibiting a Senator from simultaneously chairing a full committee and a subcommittee may require Pat Roberts to give up the SASC Subcommittee on Emerging Threats. This would add to the subcommittee reshuffle.

|          |      |
|----------|------|
| TSA SD   | 11/8 |
| BRMA SD  |      |
| MA SD    | 11/9 |
| EXEC SEC | 11/8 |

OSD 17729-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27541

**3. House Armed Services Committee:** Two members, Congressmen Schrock of Virginia and Turner of Texas, have retired and Democrats, Baron Hill of Indiana, Charlie Stenholm of Texas and Ciro Rodriguez of Texas, were defeated. None of the subcommittee chairmen and ranking members are leaving the House.

**4. Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee:** Senator Hollings' departure, through retirement, will be the only change on this Subcommittee. He may not be replaced as a result of the change in ratios from the addition to the Republican majority.

Senator Stevens will continue to serve as Chairman of the Subcommittee thanks to an exemption from the term limit rule for appropriations subcommittee chairmen. Stevens is starting his 25th year as either Chairman or Ranking on the Defense Subcommittee. Stevens will, however, have to move from full Appropriations Committee chairmanship to Commerce Chairman, as a result of the term limit rule. Thad Cochran will replace him as full committee chairman.

**5. Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee:** Chairman Jerry Lewis is required to give up his Chairmanship as a result of term limits and he is expected to be replaced by Chairman Bill Young who must relinquish the Chair of the full committee as a result of term limits. Lewis is a candidate for full committee chairman along with Ralph Regula of Ohio and Hal Rogers of Kentucky. Congressman George Nethercutt of Washington is leaving the House of Representatives having given up his seat to run unsuccessfully for the Senate.

**6. In the Senate Leadership,** the major change will come as a result of the departure of the Majority Leader, Tom Daschle. Harry Reid of Nevada is currently the front runner to replace him. Byron Dorgan of North Dakota and Dick Durbin of Illinois are reported to be interested in the leadership and may face each other to replace Reid as Minority Whip.

(D)



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

NOV 5 11 23 07

November 5, 2004 11:15 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Impact of Elections on Defense Oversight Committees

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032

5 Nov 04

OSD 17729-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27543

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SEP 28 2004

September 27, 2004 ✓

TO: David Chu  
cc: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Joint Credit

How much longer are we going to have to wait to straighten out which billets get credit for being joint billets? We don't have joint credit for billets that deserve it, but we are currently giving joint credit for billets that don't deserve it.

I want folks to get joint credit for billets they ought to have joint credit for.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092704-26

.....  
Please respond by 10/15/04

*DR*



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

CM-2190-04

17 November 2004

2004 NOV 17 PM 5:10

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS <sup>for</sup> *VA R. B. Myers 16 Nov 04*

SUBJECT: Joint Credit

- **Question.** "How much longer are we going to have to wait to straighten out which billets get credit for being joint billets? We don't have joint credit for billets that deserve it, but we are currently giving joint credit for billets that don't deserve it. I want folks to get joint credit for billets they ought to have joint credit for." (TAB)
- **Answer.** In response to SecDef snowflake to USD (P&R), Joint Staff/J-1, in coordination with OSD, developed initiatives to obtain credit for deserving warfighters. The previous legal issues regarding proposed joint credit were resolved as follows: SecDef, in appropriate cases, could exercise his authority under 10 U.S.C. 664 (b) and waive the statutory 24- and 36-month tour lengths for full joint duty credit if the positions are on the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). For US officers to be eligible for this waiver, Joint Staff/J-1 will hold a review board of those positions that warrant joint duty credit, recommend these positions be added to the JDAL and work with OSD to expedite a JDAL board. Individuals obtaining 365 days cumulative credit in an approved JDAL position will be recommended to SecDef for full joint duty credit.
- **Analysis.** The actions listed below are planned for completion within the next 90 days.
  - CENTCOM 61: Award cumulative joint duty credit for 61 nominated Service specific positions "below" the JTF Headquarters in the USCENTCOM AOR.
  - Full Joint Duty Credit: Award full joint duty credit for deserving JTF-level positions in the USCENTCOM AOR. Following USCENTCOM's development of its key position listings, my staff will recommend their inclusion on the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL).
  - A follow-on call for positions that warrant joint duty credit, as well as a list of the officers recommended for joint duty credit, will be reviewed by a G/FO board in January 2005. The approved positions will be recommended for inclusion in the JDAL. Officers with 365 days of cumulative credit in those positions will be recommended for consideration for full joint duty credit.
  - In the spring of 2005, the JDAL will be analyzed, and positions with a modest level of jointness will be recommended for deletion. The Joint Staff will host a G/FO and SES-level board to develop recommendations.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

copy to:  
USD(P&R)

11-L-0559/OSD/27546

Prepared By: RDML Donna L. Crisp, USN; Director, J-1; (b)(6)

OSD 1773 2-04



~~TAB~~  
~~FOUO~~

September 27, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Joint Credit

How much longer are we going to **have** to wait to straighten out which billets get credit for being joint billets? We don't have joint credit for billets that deserve it, but we are currently giving joint credit for billets that don't deserve it.

I want folks to get joint credit for billets they ought to have joint credit for.

**Thanks.**

DHR:ss  
092704-26

.....  
Please respond by 10/15/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/27547

OSD 17732-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000  
 INFO MEMO



PERSONNEL AND  
 READINESS

November 5, 2004, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 FROM: David S.C. Chu, USD (P&R)

*David S.C. Chu*  
 Signature & Date

SUBJECT: Joint Credit -- SNOWFLAKE

- Together with the Joint Staff, we are executing the following action plan:
- Immediate (December 2004): Ensure deserving joint warfighters get appropriate credit now (-1000)
  - o Allow cumulative joint duty credit for 61 nominated Service-specific positions "below" the Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters in CENTCOM which would not otherwise qualify (solution is to dual-hat the incumbents in a qualifying position),
  - o Ask you to exercise your waiver authority to award full joint duty credit for deserving JTF-level positions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Horn of Africa, if the period of service does not meet the statutory minimum. General Casey and CENTCOM are completing nominations. Positions elsewhere may also deserve credit and we will pursue.
- Near-term (Summer 2005): Broaden Joint Duty Listing
  - o Add/delete positions based on actual joint content (RAND assisting Department), as confirmed by a Validation Board.
  - o Complete strategic review of joint officer management by due date (January 2006) (FY05 Authorization Act). Results of RAND's analysis and Validation Board's conclusions should be ready for your review by summer 2005.
- Long-term (January 2007): Strategic review of total work force (FY05 Authorization Act directs follow-on strategic review of senior civilians, senior noncommissioned officers, and senior Reserve leadership).

Prepared By: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)



OSD 17732-04

SEP 28 2004

~~FOUO~~

SEP 27 2004  
SECURITY  
2004 SEP -5 11 3:10

September 27, 2004 ✓

TO: David Chu  
cc: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
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Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092704-26

.....  
Please respond by 10/15/04

*MR*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17732-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27549

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

September 15, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace

858

CC: Doug Feith  
Lt. Gen Sharp  
Tina Jonas  
VADM Willard

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Funding

Please take a close look at the costs of funding ongoing and future security operations in Afghanistan. Clearly, there will be increasing pressure to reduce overall costs and to control such funding through the normal budget process.

We need to be sure that:

- Any security projects we put in place (ANA, Police, infrastructure) can be sustained by the Afghans in the long run.
- We create a force, both in size and infrastructure, which is appropriate to Afghanistan, reflecting its economy and circumstances, as opposed to creating something along American lines and standards.
- The interagency must be supportive of this process, to include fully and correctly staffing the Embassy, cooperating with us on funding, and agreeing with our approach.

Please come back to me with some thoughts on this as part of a larger Afghan Security Strategy soon.

Thanks.

DHR:ee  
091504-6

.....  
Please respond by 30 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17919-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/27550

*AFGHANISTAN*

*15 Sep 04*

~~TOUO~~

TAB

OCT 21 2004

884

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

IRAQ

I'm concerned that Prime Minister Allawi may be counting too heavily on UN participation in the upcoming elections. If the UN pulls out, I think the elections should still go forward.

I wonder what we should do about GEN Casey and Amb Negroponte beginning the process of working them on that, so it doesn't just stop if the UN gets skittish

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101904-14

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

101904-14-0000

~~TOUO~~

Tab

21 Oct 04

OSD 17924-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27551



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-2172-04  
9 November 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 11/7*


SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

- **Issue.** "I'm concerned that Prime Minister Allawi may be counting too heavily on UN participation in the upcoming elections... I wonder what we should do about GEN Casey and Amb Negroonte beginning the process of working them on that, so it doesn't just stop if the UN gets skittish." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** General Casey, Commander, Multinational Forces in Iraq (MNF-I), and Ambassador Negroonte should reinforce to Prime Minister Allawi the US commitment to sustain support for the Iraqi elections and stress that while the UN presence is important, it is not a requirement. Mr. Allawi and other key leaders of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) have been consistent and public about the importance of executing the national elections in January 2005. In coordination with the US Embassy and the IIG, MNF-I has developed detailed plans for support.
- **Discussion.** MNF-I's plans include security for distribution of materials, key officials and polling places. The Joint Staff, USCENTCOM and MNF-I are also working with the UN leadership on the ground in Baghdad and in New York to demonstrate US commitment to the elections and the security of UN personnel and facilities. The United Nations has a small number of election officials in Iraq, with plans to expand over the next several months. While important, their presence would not be the deciding factor in the success of the elections; in the end, it is Iraqi participation that will decide that outcome.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5;



11-L-0559/OSD/27552

OSD 17924-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

10/22  
15:30

72  
~~FOUO~~

October 22, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: November 14 Invitation

I can't attend this Boy Scout event on November 14. Please have someone write a letter of congratulations.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Boy Scout Invitation for Nov 14

DHR:ss  
102204-1

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

35557

22 Oct 04

15 Oct 04

OSD 17965-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27553

Boy Scouts of America Community Troop 613  
1121 University Blvd. W. #103  
Silver Spring, Maryland, 20902

October 15, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-3400

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

The Scouts, Leaders and Members of the Committee Boy Scout Troop 613 take great pleasure in announcing that:

Having completed the requirements for, and having been examined by an  
Eagle Scout Board of Review

(b)(6)

Was found worthy of the rank of Eagle Scout.

In honor of this achievement, we have scheduled an Eagle Scout Court of Honor to be held at 6 o'clock PM on November **14, 2004** at:

**The Kemp Mill Synagogue  
11910 Kemp Mill Road  
Silver Spring, Maryland.**

In the event that you are unable to attend, we would greatly appreciate a letter or certificate acknowledging his achievement. We will compile it with other acknowledgments and placed in a scrapbook commemorating this special occasion.

Thank you for taking time from your extremely busy ~~schedule to help this community~~ recognize the achievements and service of Eagle Scout (b)(6)

Sincerely,

The Members of Troop 613

National Capital Area Council, Rock Creek District

OSD 17965-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27554

3355D

1520104



As the Boy Scouts of America approaches its centennial, it seems appropriate that the distinction of the Eagle Scout award has been bestowed. Local Scout (b)(6) earned the Eagle Rank in June of 2004; the medal will be formally presented to him in November. Open to all boys of ages eleven to eighteen, Scouting stands for and upholds the ideals of leadership, citizenship, service, and collective skill. Boys have the opportunity to earn numerous awards and achieve specific ranks within the Scouts, of which Eagle is the highest. (b)(6) joined the organization in 2000, and since then has worked toward Eagle with unwavering dedication.

Internationally recognized for nearly one hundred years, the Eagle rank is the epitome of achievement in Scouting. Requiring excellence in Scouting's entire repertoire of skills, less than three percent of all Boy Scouts reach the rank. Because of its demanding requirements, maturity, focus, and dedication are crucial. While time added a certain challenge, (b)(6) considers that aspect of the journey a definite factor contributing to his motivation. He also is grateful for his expedience in the Cub Scouts, open to boys not yet old enough to become Boy Scouts. While a Cub Scout, he earned the Arrow of Light Award, its highest recognition.

Going beyond fulfilling basic requirements, (b)(6) made sure to exemplify excellence. At each level of advancement, he earned recognition for achievement far beyond that required for the Eagle rank.

He was the first in his area to receive the prestigious Etz Chaim award for religious accomplishment, and has been recently elected to Scouting's national honor society. He has also

pushed himself to earn additional awards. Knowing that setting an example helps to inspire his troop's future success, (b)(6) sets high goals. He endeavors to pass on the ideals of Scouting to all youth.

Recently graduated, (b)(6) has pursued excellence beyond Scouting. His accomplishments include becoming Valedictorian of his class as well as earning schoolwide Math and Science awards. He served as school yearbook editor, and also become a Maryland Distinguished Scholar. He has studied classical piano for ten years, and is largely involved in martial arts.

Fully believing in dedication, (b)(6) looks forward to applying himself in the years to come. Interested in attending MIT and the University of Maryland, his study plans include computer science, mathematics, engineering, and music. As far as continued involvement with the Boy Scouts of America, he hopes to continue as an adult leader within a local troop, considering the Scouting experience to be an essential part of life.

(b)(6)



BSA TROOP 613  
AND THE FAMILY OF

(b)(6)

TAKE GREAT PLEASURE IN INVITING YOU  
TO THE EAGLE SCOUT COURT OF HONOR  
TO BE HELD AT 6 O'CLOCK ON NOVEMBER 14, 2004  
AT THE KEMP MILL SYNAGOGUE  
11910 KEMP MILL ROAD  
SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND.

UNIFORM OR SEMI-FORMAL ATTIRE REQUESTED.  
RECEPTION AFTERWARDS.  
RSVP: (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27556

Mr. (b)(6)  
c/o Eagle Scout Court of Honor  
Event Coordinator  
1121 University Boulevard West  
#103  
Silver Spring, MD 20902

Dear (b)(6)

Congratulations on achieving the rank of Eagle Scout! Unfortunately, I will not be able to make it to your upcoming Court of Honor, but I do want to join your family, friends, and fellow troop members in extending best wishes on this special occasion.

This significant milestone is a result of hard work and commitment. The leadership skills you have gained will not only serve you well in the future, but also set a fine example for those who follow in your footsteps.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

*SOM*  

---

*PUB*

**Paul Butler**

11/8

11-L-0559/OSD/27557

EAGLE SCOUT COURT OF HONOR  
EVENT COORDINATOR  
1121 UNIVERSITY BOULEVARD WEST, # 103  
SILVER SPRING, MD 20902



The Hon. & Mr. Donald H. Rumsfeld  
2206 Kalorama Rd N.W.  
DC 20008

11-L-0559/OSD/27558

20008/1621





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

NOV 9 2004

Mr. (b)(6)  
c/o Eagle Scout Court of Honor  
Event Coordinator  
1121 University Boulevard West  
#103  
Silver Spring, MD 20902

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With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

OSD 17965-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27559

335513

9 NOV 04

150104

11/12  
1700

1200

~~TOOO~~

November 11, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Paul Butler

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Thank You Letters

000,1

Paul, let's get thank you letters to *these two* people, ~~Andrew~~ Athens and Andrew Manatos, thanking them for their letter.

Larry, please do a letter to John Curtis *thanking* him for the editorial he wrote. You might want to get it in the *Early Bird* or posted someplace, move it around.

Thanks.

Attach:  
11/9/04 National Coordinated Efforts of Hellzenes letter to SecDef  
11/9/04 Curtis letter to SecDef

DHR:sh  
111104-33

.....

Please respond by 11/19/04

11 NOV 04

~~TOOO~~

11 NOV 04

THE NATIONAL COORDINATED  
EFFORT OF HELLENES (CEH)

TELECOPIER TRANSMISSION

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

TO: The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

FROM: Andrew Athens & Andrew Manatos

TRANSMISSION CONSISTS OF THIS COVER PAGE AND 1  
ADDITIONAL PAGES TO FOLLOW.

IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL PAGES, OR IF THERE IS ANY PROBLEM,  
PLEASE CONTACT THE SENDER AT 202-393-7790

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

1100 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037 • (202) 393-7790 • fax (202) 628-0225  
Email: [CoordinatedEffort@Manatos.com](mailto:CoordinatedEffort@Manatos.com)



**THE NATIONAL COORDINATED EFFORT  
OF HELLENES (CEH)**

1100 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037  
(202) 993-7793, (fax) (202) 628-7223  
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**Andrew A. Athans**  
President  
National Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (NCEH)  
National Chairman  
Special Interest American Citizens (SIAC)  
World Institute  
World Council of Hellenes Abroad (WCHA)

**Paula Christopler**  
Vice Chairman  
National Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (NCEH)  
President  
International Organization Committee  
United for Egypt (UFGC)  
President  
European Association of Artists

**Andrew E. Mavreas**  
President  
National Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (NCEH)  
Executive Board Member  
UFGC and SIAC

**Pauline Papayannakou**  
Executive Director  
Special Interest of Artists

**William Mavropoulos**  
Executive Vice President  
European Association of Artists

**Christina Mavropoulou**  
President  
UFGC Executive Vice  
Executive Board Member  
SIAC

November 9, 2004

**PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL**

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000  
VIA FACSIMILE: (b)(6)

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Congratulations on your very successful efforts to help re-elect President George W. Bush.

Hellenes realized long ago that the people's ability to select their country's leaders far surpassed any other means of selection ever tried. All Americans must do what they can to help our President move our country in the right direction.

We look forward to working with you in an effort to help this Administration make the best decisions possible for America with respect to issues about which we have some special knowledge.

Sincerely,

  
Andrew A. Athans

  
Andrew E. Mavreas

*Congratulations. Not  
but for a "lightweight change"*



03/11/11



DISCOBOLOS ONLINE SERVICES

# FAX TRANSMITTAL

DATE: 4-09-07      TIME:      FROM: NIPIS

TO: DONALD H. RANSFOLD      FAX: (b)(6)

FROM: JOHN CURTIS      FAX:

RE: FYI

REASON: 3/w. cover

REMARKS: THOUGHT YOU'D LIKE THE COLUMN!

BEST, LASHOT,

Ⓢ

JOHN CURTIS  
EDITOR, ONLINE COMMENTARY

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RUMSFELD ON TARGET / 2004 J.M. Curtis

1

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JOHN M. CURTIS

(b)(6)

Realizing that the war in Iraq will not only be won in the streets, Secretary of State Donald H. Rumsfeld launched his own propaganda offensive hoping to convert skeptics in Iraq and elsewhere. Marching on Fallouja sends a loud message to doubters questioning U.S. resolve to root out insurgents. Election year politics stalled the Pentagon's efforts to capture key battlegrounds, including Sunni-controlled strongholds of Fallouja and Ramadi. Shortly after Sen. John F. Kerry conceded, U.S. forces were given the green light to retake insurgent-infested Fallouja, the presumed base of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, though U.S. officials now believe the Jordanian-born terrorist has long since moved on. But whether al-Zarqawi is killed or captured, U.S. control of Fallouja sends a loud message to insurgents hoping to derail plans for holding free elections in January.

Taking Fallouja has huge symbolic value to skeptics believing that insurgents had the upper hand. Watching terrorists scatter gives Iraqi interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi renewed credibility that his U.S.-backed government is here to stay. Playing cat-and-mouse with insurgents sent the wrong signal that Iraq was losing its war with terrorists. "Success in Fallouja will deal a blow to terrorists in the country, and should move Iraq further away from a future of violence to one of freedom and opportunity for the Iraqi people," said Rumsfeld at a Pentagon briefing. Rumsfeld reassured not only Iraqis but also growing skepticism inside the U.S. Winning reelection gives the White House some breathing room for delivering President George W. Bush's promise of democracy. Gaining the upper hand in Fallouja gives new hope to administration plans for scheduled elections.

Since Baghdad fell in April 9, 2003, the U.S. has been locked in tit-for-tat battles with insurgents, with little measurable progress. Iraqis have grown increasingly skeptical of U.S. efforts to reinforce Allawi's new government. With U.S. troops routing insurgents in Fallouja, Iraq's interim government gains a distinct propaganda advantage. Without putting up resistance, terrorists, like in Afghanistan, find themselves on the run, forced to hide in remote locations. Driving terrorists out of symbolic strongholds like Fallouja and Ramadi tells the Iraqi public Allawi's new Iraqi government is beginning to take charge. Dislodging terrorists from recognized strongholds doesn't solve the dilemma of preventing jihadists from streaming across Iraq's borders with Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Bilateral agreements and special efforts must be made to seal off Iraq's porous borders.

A-50-3

Credit Iraq's interim leader Allawi with recognizing that there can be no compromise with terrorists. Like Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Allawi finds himself one bullet away from anarchy. He knows that his only hope of survival is to use U.S. forces to push insurgents further from Baghdad, while, simultaneously, building up his own military. So far, Allawi's new military and security forces have proved disappointing, especially the recent massacre of 50 Iraqi troops suggesting infiltration. It's hard to know whether rank-and-file Iraqi support Allawi's new government or insurgents fighting to expel U.S. occupation. As Rumsfeld knows, any long-range strategy must include winning the heart-and-minds of Iraqi civilians. Only through an all-out media blitz can the U.S. hope to turn Iraqis against terrorists currently supported by Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya TV.

Driving tanks into the heart of Fallouja dealt a blow to insurgents telling the Iraqi people that they're winning the battle against U.S. occupation. Iraqis won't support U.S. efforts until they believe insurgents are losing power. No one wants to see Fallouja go the way of Samarra, where U.S. forces liberated the city but now falls prey to ongoing terrorist attacks. Putting off the assault on Fallouja in April only made matters worse. Terrorists were permitted to amass and dig in, causing bigger headaches for U.S. forces retaking key cities inside the Sunni Triangle. "It's like pulling your fist out of a bucket of water, and everyone scoops back in," said Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, concerned that Fallouja won't be Rumsfeld's "tipping point." If Fallouja joins Samarra, it won't reassure too many Iraqis that the insurgency is under control.

Rumsfeld put his finger on the pulse realizing that the U.S. must do a better job of winning the hearts-and-minds of ordinary Iraqis. Rooting out insurgents and retaking Iraqi strongholds won't work unless the U.S. confronts insurgents' formidable propaganda machine, supported in large part by Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya TV and radio. Iraqis must be convinced that there's no going back. They must repeatedly hear that insurgents are losing ground to Iraq's new government. Despite setbacks, Allawi must keep up the war-of-words against pernicious propaganda. "It may not take long to capture the city, but nothing will have been resolved. It will be a symbolic victory," said French military strategist Jean Louis Dufour, proving, if nothing else, that propaganda doesn't only come from the Middle East. Iraq must follow Rumsfeld's lead and confront the profits of doom-and-gloom.

#### About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing events in national and global news. He's editor of [OnlineColumbist.com](http://OnlineColumbist.com) and author of *Dodging The Bullet* and *Operation Christmas*.

**THE NATIONAL COORDINATED EFFORT  
OF HELLENES (CEH)**

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(202) 393-7790, [fax] (202) 628-0225  
E-mail: CoordinatedEffort@Manatos.com

SECRET  
2004 NOV 10 01 09:00

**Andrew A. Atkeson**  
Chairman  
National Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (CEH)  
National Chairman  
United Hellenic American Congress (UHAC)  
World President  
World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAB)

**Philip Christopher**  
Vice Chairman  
National Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (CEH)  
President  
International Coordination Committee -  
Justice for Cyprus (PSEKA)  
President  
Pan-Cypriot Association of America

**Andrew E. Manatos**  
President  
National Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (CEH)  
Executive Board Member  
UHAC and PSEKA

**Pantelis Papanicolaou**  
Syntagma President  
Cypriot Federation of America

**Nikos Mouyiariis**  
Executive Vice President  
Pan-Cypriot Association of America

**Charles Maragoudakis**  
President  
UHAC New York  
Executive Board Member  
PSEKA

November 9, 2004

**PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL**

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000  
VIA FACSIMILE: (b)(6)

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld;

Congratulations on your very successful efforts to help re-elect President George W. Bush.

Hellenes realized long ago that the people's ability to select their country's leaders far surpassed any other means of selection ever tried. All Americans must do what they can to help our President move our country in the right direction.

We look forward to working with you in an effort to help this Administration make ~~the~~ best decisions possible for America with respect to issues about which we have some special knowledge.

Sincerely,

  
Andrew A. Athens

  
Andrew E. Manatos

*Congratulations. Not  
bad for a "lightweight delay".  
(Amint)*

OSD 18018-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27566

**THE NATIONAL COORDINATED  
EFFORT OF HELLENES (CEH)**

TELECOPIER TRANSMISSION

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

TO: the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

FROM: Andrew Athens & Andrew Manatos

TRANSMISSION CONSISTS OF THIS COVER PAGE AND 1  
ADDITIONAL PAGES TO FOLLOW.


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11-L-0559/OSD/27567



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

NOV 24 2004

055.1

Mr. Andrew A. Athens  
Mr. Andrew E. Manatos  
The National Coordinated Effort  
of Hellenes (CEH)  
1100 New Hampshire Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20037

Dear Messrs. Athens and Manatos,

Thank you for your letter of congratulations. I do appreciate your support.

The President is indeed a superb leader, and will continue to do a wonderful job for the country.

Sincerely,

24 NOV 04

OSD 18018-04

24 NOV 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27568

**MEMO TO: Doug Feith  
Pete Pace**

**October 28, 2004 - HC 1427**

**FROM: Paul Wolfowitz**

*PW*

**SUBJECT: Post-Election Strategy for Iraq**

*Iraq*

Doug/Pete,

I agree with John Abizaid and Steve Cambone that we should get some contingency thinking going on how we would deal with the possible outcomes of an Iraqi election.

Could the two of you get back to me and the Secretary quickly with a plan of action? I would start with a very small cell that just lays out four or five possible election outcomes and then tries to enumerate the three or four major issues that we might face in each of those possible outcomes. If you prefer to start with a smaller number of outcomes and/or issues, that would be fine.

*28 Oct 04*

*25 Oct 04*

~~FOUO~~

1020  
101

October 27, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Strategy

Attached is a memo from Steve Cambone. If you agree with them, as I do, would you please act on both of these recommendations? Otherwise, please see me.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/25/04 USD (I) Memo to SecDef re: 10/23 Conversation with Gen Abaza

DHR:as  
102704-11

.....  
Please respond by 11/5/04

→ SD -  
I agree with Steve.  
I've asked  
- Ken Krieg and Jim Roche  
- Faith Pace  
to recommend a way - a lead or cad  
*FW*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27570

OSD 18024-04  
Tab A



MEMO TO: VCJCS  
Secretary of the Air Force  
Director, PA&E

October 28, 2004 -HC 10/29

1330

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*

SUBJECT: Operations Analysis of UAV Employment in Iraq

452 R

Could you please come back to me quickly with some recommendations on how we might pursue Steve Cambone's suggestion here about analyzing the use of UAVs in Iraq?

I had exactly the same reaction when we were briefed by the Air Force last week on the UAV issue. The subject needs a systems approach.

Could you get back to me quickly with some suggestions about who we might task to do this and how? Thanks.

28 Oct 04

25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27571

18024-04

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10/25/2004 5:01 PM

8.5.

MEMORANDUM **FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**FROM:** STEVE CAMBONE *SC*

**SUBJECT:** Saturday, October 23 Conversation **with** General Abizaid

General Abizaid called me on **Saturday** seeking advice on responding to Chairman Hunter's request for comments on the Intelligence Reform Bill. I advised **him against** responding. General Abizaid said he would follow that **advice**.

General Abizaid and I then spoke about strategy in **Iraq**. He said he **could use** help in two categories:

- ✓ ● development of a better approach for the employment of UAVs and other sensors, and
- ✓ ● development of a post-election strategy in Iraq.

With respect to UAV employment, General Abizaid expressed the view that **we** are making sub-optimal **use of the** assets. In **my** view, this is a classic operations research problem. Given a competing set of objectives (escorting convoys, patrolling, lines of communication, power lines and pipelines, providing surveillance for critical infrastructure, etc., in addition to supporting tactical operations), limited resources, and **an** adaptable adversary, how **does the** Commander optimize the return on the employment

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10/25/2004 5:01 PM

of those resources? **This is a task that can be assigned** to one or more of the **war colleges**, perhaps to a **Service** organization—e.g. Checkmate (USAF), the Joint **Staff**, PA&E or even an **FFRDC** such as RAND.

With respect to a Dost-election strategy, General Abizaid did not elaborate in any detail. He did, however, **ask a** telling question: having worked hard to ensure that **an** election in Iraq will be **a** success, what **tasks** will need to be accomplished **after** the election by **the** Coalition, and what strategy **should** be employed?

A post-election strategy will need to be **embraced by the** entire **USG**; however, it is my assumption that DoD will **need** to prompt discussion of the subject. Before approaching **our USG** colleagues, we might sketch a set of two or three scenarios that might emerge from the election. For example, the election might result in a **more** sectarian than secular **government** in which the Shia center holds sway. **Or, a more** secular than sectarian **government** might emerge in which **the Kurds** hold the **balance**, etc. We might then postulate what the **agenda** of these **various** governing factions **and** coalitions might be, identify what we **can** and cannot **support**, and how **we** might posture the Coalition in the **country** accordingly.

If the exercise is well constructed in the beginning, it should permit **us** to adjust **our** thinking on what we will need to do **as** events on the ground clarify themselves over coming months. The purpose is not to be predictive, but instead **to give us** the opportunity to think **through various** plausible

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10/25/2004 5:01 PM

combinations and allow us to prepare *to* respond appropriately to the results of the election.

Consistent with **my** conversation **with** General Abizaid, **this** exercise should be done here in Washington **and** offered to General Abizaid **and** General Casey for comment **and** editing.

This is **an** exercise that could be led by Doug Feith and **Pete Pace**. After the first iteration, **they** could branch out bilaterally to CIA **and** the State Department. A **second** iteration could be brought before a Deputies' Committee just prior to **Christmas**. The object **ought** not be **an** elaborate plan, but a **set** of alternate courses of action based on anticipated election outcomes **and** **US** and **Coalition** objectives in **Iraq**.

CC: CJCS

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11-L-0559/OSD/27574

## TAB B

2 November 2004

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**SUBJECT:** Operations Analysis of UAV Employment in Iraq (Your Memo, 28 Oct 04)

In response to your memo, here are some recommendations that can be pursued to analyze the use of UAVs in Iraq.

#### Draft Terms of Reference for an Operations Research Study of the Use of UAVs and RPAs in Iraq

There currently are about **400** unmanned air vehicles of various types available in-country in Iraq or nearby on any given day. These range from the long enduring Global Hawk ISR platform, to either the ISR or Killer-Scout armed Predator remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), to the ISR I-Gnat, to the Army's ISR and armed Hunter RPAs, to the Marines' Pioneer UAVs. In addition to these systems, there are numerous small, battery-powered drones, each of which is not much bigger than a bird (Desert Hawk, Raven, BatCam, etc.). These smaller drones tend to be flown below 1000 feet and may not be a serious hazard to other aircraft. The other systems are large and could be a danger to airmen whether they are flying aircraft or helicopters. Further, the Navy is experimenting with a helo-like small UAV, and the Coast Guard is experimenting with a small tilt-rotor drone. Even now, the skies over some of the cities in Iraq increasingly contain UAVs and remotely piloted aircraft, some with considerable weaponry on board.

The exploitation of the information obtained by the sensors on board the ISR drones can be done on the ground by tactical units (equipped with "Rover" lap tops which permit the direct transmission of video from vehicles like the Predator as well as from manned aircraft equipped with Litening II sensor pods). Also, AC-130 gunships are equipped to receive Predator video and work with the Predator crews in the prosecution of a target. And, in the case of Predator and Global Hawk, the control of the aircraft and the exploitation of information can be done by "reach back" to the United States.

While these systems started out as experiments, enough experience has accumulated so that commanders such as CENTCOM need to have the operations of these systems conducted in a coherent manner. This already has been discussed by General Abizaid and the Air Force Chief of Staff. Further, while "demand" for UAVs and RPAs is growing, there are not enough, nor will there ever be enough of these systems to serve every individual ground unit which desires "an eye in the sky." The intent of this study is to develop appropriate concepts of operations for the major systems, and to think through the number and types of drones which would optimize ground operations in Iraq. To do this, the study should address, inter alia, the following:

OSD 18024-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27575

Tab B

1. Categorize the **types of UAVs and RPAs** now flying in the **AOR**, both **ISR and armed**, **as well as those expected to see action in** the near future.

2. What is the specific mission of each of the growing variety of **UAVs and RPAs**?

3. What should be the concept of operations for each? Who should be permitted to task each? Who should control the acquisition and operation of each system?


4. How should **deconfliction and orchestration** of these assets be done? Who will retain control of airspace at various altitudes (e.g., it may be the case that the land forces should control all small drones which **fly** operationally below 1000 feet, while the **Forward Air Component Commander** should retain control of the employment of all others as he does for all aircraft in the theater)?

5. How should information **from** each category be exploited and **distributed**? What is the **required information/data** needed by **various** consumers of the outputs of these systems? **In** what timeline **must** information be provided? To whom? Which **Service** should take the lead on which categories of systems?

6. For those systems which are **armed**, how should they be controlled? Who **does** and who should have the authority to designate **targets** and give the order to shoot? **Who** will take the responsibility for attacks made **with** such **systems**?

7. What is the preferred distribution of various systems in support of land forces like **Army** units, **Marine** units, and Coalition units? For Special Operations units? **How many** orbits of each category per day for which missions? How best can assets be deployed so **as** to enhance serving multiple "customers?"

We **would** envision this study being conducted in **parallel** by both the Joint Staff, in conjunction with the **CENTCOM** staff, and by a think tank like **RAND** (which may be the most qualified to develop concept of operations **as well as** optimization techniques).



**JAMES** G. Roche  
Secretary of **the** Air Force

cc: Mr **Ken** Krieg (PA&E)

November 15, 2004

TO: Marvin Sambur  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Preliminary Inquiry *pk*

250

I was delighted to read this note from Joe Schmitz – not surprised, but delighted.

I know you have been through a tough time and do want you to know that I recognize that and appreciate it.

Attach.  
11/9/04 IG memo to SecDef [OSD 18035-04]

DHR:dh  
111504-14



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

15 NOV 04

9 NOV 04



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

OFFICE OF  
SECRETARY OF  
DEFENSE

@

INFO MEMO

7:00 NOV 11 2004 11:28  
November 9, 2004 5:45 p.m.

11/10  
1002  
Paul Butler

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

11/12  
pub

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Preliminary Inquiry Involving Dr. Marvin R. Sambur, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition)

- We have completed a preliminary inquiry into allegations that Dr. Sambur forwarded internal DoD email to Boeing officials in violation of Section 2635.703 of the Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), "Use of nonpublic information," which prohibits a DoD employee from using or disclosing nonpublic information "to further his own private interest or that of another."
- We concluded that the email at issue did not violate the JER and we found no basis for conducting a full investigation. In that regard, we considered credible Dr. Sambur's assertion that he forwarded email to Boeing officials as a negotiating technique designed to obtain the most favorable contract terms for the Government, rather than to further Boeing's private interests. Mr. Michael Wynne, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), corroborated this explanation.
- We initiated the preliminary inquiry following a Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) review of Dr. Sambur's actions with respect to matters involving Ms. Darleen A. Druyun, his former Deputy. The DCIS review found no information regarding Dr. Sambur that would warrant referral to the Department of Justice.
- In his interview with DCIS, Dr. Sambur denied having any knowledge of improper or illegal activities on the part of Ms. Druyun while she served as his Deputy. We obtained no evidence from any other source that would contradict his testimony on that point and found no basis for additional investigate work.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Richard T. Race, Deputy Inspector General for Investigations

(b)(6)

|          |           |
|----------|-----------|
| TSA SD   | 11/12     |
| BRMA SD  |           |
| MA SD    | SPD 11/15 |
| EXEC SEC | M 11/10   |

OSD: 18035-04

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INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

November 9, 2004 5:45 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Preliminary Inquiry Involving Dr. Marvin R. Sambur, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition)

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COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Richard T. Race, Deputy Inspector General for Investigations,

(b)(6)

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11-L-0559/OSD/27579

OSD 18035-04

~~FOUO~~

ES-1245  
04/014642

November 1, 2004

334 HSC

TO: Paul McHale  
CC: Doug Feith  
VADM Jim Stavridis

SUBJECT: Notification from Homeland Security

I want to **know** how **you fix** this system with the Homeland Security Council so I get notified at a decent time from when a meeting is going to be held and plugged in. Rachel will not be able to solve this; it will have to go to someone like Jim Stavridis and/or cables simultaneously.

We also ought to think through whose advice I would want. It would obviously be McHale, **but** also NORTHCOM, Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Myers, Pete Pace, possibly Ray **DuBois**, if it involves the National Capital area and Steve Cambone, if it involves Intel.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
110104-6

.....  
Please respond by 11/5/04

~~FOUO~~

01-11-04 15:22 0353

OSD 18057-04

11-I-0559/OSD/27580

NOV 04

1/12  
DE 200



HOMELAND  
DEFENSE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600  
INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 NOV 10 PM 2: 56

NOV 10 2004

8 NOV 2004

USD(P) *FRAN RAPUANO*  
I# 04/014642  
E5-1245

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)

*PM*

SUBJECT: Notification from Homeland Security Council

- The following corrective action has been taken regarding the attached memorandum (Notification from Homeland Security):
  - HSC Notification Process: At your direction, I contacted Ken Rapuano, Fran Townsend's deputy, immediately after the HSC. He indicated that the short notice was the result of an unanticipated POTUS decision to call an HSC PC. This decision was made during a Presidential briefing that morning (0720 – 0739). See attached Rapuano e-mail. White House notice was given to OSD Cables at 0745, six minutes after conclusion of the POTUS meeting. I emphasized to Ken that DoD must receive prompt notice, including a "warning order" if there is reason to believe that POTUS might call an HSC PC. Ken gave me a commitment that we would receive the earliest possible notice.
  - OSD Message Relay: Upon notice from the White House, it took an additional 15 minutes to relay the message to you (0745 – 0800). The time was consumed in an attempt to determine the subject matter of the PC. Such delays are unacceptable. Admiral Stavridis, whose office manages the flow of message traffic to you, has assured me that corrective action has been taken. You will now receive immediate notice from Cables.

COORDINATION: Office of the Secretary of Defense

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Paul McHale, ASD(HD), (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

ES-1245  
04/014642

November 1, 2004

TO: Paul McHale  
CC: Doug Feith  
VADM Jim Stavridis

SUBJECT: Notification from Homeland Security

I want to know how **you fix** this system with the Homeland Security Council so I get notified at a decent time from when a meeting is going to be held and plugged in. Rachel will not be able to solve this; it will have to go to someone like Jim Stavridis and/or cables simultaneously.

We also ought to think through whose advice I would want. It would obviously be McHale, but also NORTHCOM, Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Myers, Pete Pace, possibly Ray DuBois, if it involves the National Capital area and Steve Cambone, if it involves Intel.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
110104-6

.....  
Please respond by

11/5/04

~~FOUO~~

01-17-04 16:22 0353

OSD 18057-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27582

**McHale, Paul, HON, OSD-POLICY**

---

**From:** Rapuano, Kenneth (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, November 01, 2004 1:46 PM  
**To:** paul.mchale@osd.mil  
**Subject:** sat

Paul – Did not mean to be abrupt on the phone Sat morning. I do want you to know that DoD was the first call the SitRoom made to inform of the PC, and that a number of other principals, including the Judge Gonzales, C. Rice, and Josh Bolten were late or missed the call. Improvements needed all around --we all tend to overestimate our abilities to quickly notify and receive notifications. **S/F** Ken

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**The Military Assistant**

12 November 2004 - 0930 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. RICHARD LAWLESS, DASD / AP / ISA

SUBJECT: Ambassador Howard Baker Email


Sir:

The Deputy Secretary forwards the attached email with the following comments:

“Richard Lawless –  
Please get back to me quickly with a list of what we  
would like Ambassador Baker to do. PW”

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Stephen T. Ganyard  
Colonel, USMC  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:

12Nov04 0313 email by USAmbJapan

Suspense: Wednesday, 17 November 2004

copy to: Mr. Feith USD/P

**0 SD 1 80 82 - 04**



NOV 12 2004

**From the Desk of  
Paul Wolfowitz**

Richard Lawless -

Please get back to  
me quickly with a list of  
what we would like  
Ambassador Baker to do.

FW



Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  
Asian and Pacific Affairs

12 November 2004

JAPAN

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPSECDEF

Ref: Ambassador Baker's note to SecDef on his departure from Japan

Info: USDP  
ASD/ISA  
PDASD/ISA

Paul,

1. Ambassador Baker's e-mail was prompted by our ongoing meetings here in the Pentagon the past three days on U.S.-Japan strategic security cooperation and **U.S.** forces realignment in Japan/Okinawa. Baker's rep in the meeting had reported back overnight that, while strategic cooperation talks were going exceptionally well (our desire to move the Japanese into a global partnership and a more direct dialog about managing China and other interests), the discussion on the posture moves of U.S. forces in Japan would be delayed into mid-December or beyond.

(12 NOV 04)

2. A recent SecDef snowflake anticipated Ambassador Baker's note on this same issue. Our response to that snowflake, here attached, is current as of COB today.

3. I believe that my response to the SecDef snowflake answers your question, but the short version is that Ambassador Baker is very eager to do all that he can for us before he departs Tokyo PCS on 30 January. This week's results will give him a lot to work with but he will have to wait until mid-December for the real meat- specific realignment proposals. He will then have about one month left in Tokyo to push these issues for us.

Richard Lawless  15-11-04 08:29 14

12 NOV 04

P.S. AS YOU MAY BE AWARE,  
CURRENT U.S. AMBASSADOR TO AUSTRALIA, TOM SCHIEFFER,  
IS THE STRONG WH FAVORITE TO TAKE THE BAKER POSITION.  
HE ANNOUNCED HIS DEPARTURE FROM AUS EARLIER THIS

11-L-0559/OSD/27586

R 18082-04



November 12, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Colin Powell  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces Update

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is the latest Afghan Security Forces Update, for your information.

Respectfully,

Attach.  
11/8/04 Afghan Security Forces Update

DHR:ss  
111004-1


Afghanistan

1a Nov 04

OSD 18103-04

~~FOUO~~

November 10, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Colin Powell  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces Update

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is the latest Afghan Security Forces Update, for your information.

Respectfully,

Attach.  
11/8/04 Afghan Security Forces Update

DHR:ss  
111004-1

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27588

Faxed copy from plane



*Afghan Security Forces Update*  
*Executive Summary*



*8 November 2004*

on M1

11-L-0559/OSD/27589


# Afghan Security Forces

For Official Use Only

|                                      |                               |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| • <u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u> | <u>Trained &amp; Equipped</u> |
| – National Police                    | <b>30,462</b>                 |
| – Highway Police                     |                               |
| – Border Police                      |                               |
| – Customs Police                     |                               |
| – Counternarcotics Police            |                               |
| • <u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u>  | <u>Trained &amp; Equipped</u> |
| – Afghan National Army               | <b>15,084</b>                 |
| – Afghan Air Corps                   |                               |
|                                      | <hr/>                         |
|                                      | <b>45,546</b>                 |

# Trained and Equipped Afghanistan Security Forces

For Official Use Only



Data As of: 8 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27591

# Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

**For Official Use Only**

**Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Policing Units on hand over time**

| Security Force Element   | Endstate | 7-Nov-04 | 1-Feb-05 | 1-May-05 | 1-Aug-05 | 1-Jan-06 | 1-Jul-08 <sup>(1)</sup> |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------------|
| National Police          | 47,500   | 61%      |          |          |          |          |                         |
| Highway Police           | 2,500    |          |          |          | 50%      |          |                         |
| Border (2) Police        | 24,000   |          |          |          |          | 50%      |                         |
| Counter-Narcotics Police | 1,570    |          |          |          |          |          |                         |

**Notes:**

1. Projected 100% Date is 1 Jan 07 for all forces except CN Police which is a pilot program currently under review.
2. Border and Customs Police are combined following a meeting last week with MOI, INL, and the Germans.
  - A. Customs Police will receive special additional training under the border police
  - B. Customs Police will be under the MOI and not the MOF
  - C. Meeting confirmed the requirement for 24,000 Border Police

| <u>Legend</u> |                             |
|---------------|-----------------------------|
| ■             | 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT     |
| □             | 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT      |
| ■             | 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT |

Data As of: 8 Nov 04




11-L-0559/OSD/27592

# Afghan Armed Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Army Units on hand over time

| Afghanistan Security Forces Elements | Endstate | 07-Nov-04 | 01-Feb-05 | 01-May-05 | 01-Aug-05 | 01-Jan-06 | 01-Apr-07 |
|--------------------------------------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Ministry of Defense (General Staff)  | 3,000    |           | 48%       |           |           |           |           |
| Corps                                | 43,000   |           |           | 41%       | 47%       | 51%       |           |
| Air Corps                            | 3,000    |           |           |           | 40%       | 63%       |           |
| Sustaining Institutions              | 21,000   |           |           |           |           |           |           |

| Legend  |                             |
|---|-----------------------------|
|  | 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT     |
|  | 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT      |
|  | 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT |

Data As of: 8 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27593

# Coalition Contributors


For Official Use Only

## OEF & ISAF = 42 Countries

|            |      |         |       |            |     |             |     |              |               |
|------------|------|---------|-------|------------|-----|-------------|-----|--------------|---------------|
| Albania    | 22   | Denmark | 58    | Iceland    | 12  | Mongolia    | 16  | Spain        | 1,012         |
| Australia  | 4    | Egypt   | 65    | Ireland    | 7   | Netherlands | 513 | Sweden       | 87            |
| Austria    | 3    | Estonia | 15    | Italy      | 976 | New Zealand | 8   | Switzerland  | 4             |
| Azerbaijan | 22   | Finland | 80    | Jordan     | 182 | Norway      | 255 | Turkey       | 246           |
| Belgium    | 595  | France  | 1,254 | Korea      | 199 | Poland      | 119 | UK           | 592           |
| Bulgaria   | 42   | Georgia | 50    | Latvia     | 11  | Portugal    | 27  | USA          | 15,215        |
| Canada     | 1004 | Germany | 2,189 | Lithuania  | 50  | Romania     | 561 |              |               |
| Croatia    | 51   | Greece  | 108   | Luxembourg | 10  | Slovakia    | 41  |              |               |
| Czech Rep  | 32   | Hungary | 109   | Macedonia  | 20  | Slovenia    | 22  | <b>Total</b> | <b>25,888</b> |

|                                 |               |
|---------------------------------|---------------|
| <b>Afghan Forces On Hand</b>    | <b>67,892</b> |
| <b>National Police</b>          | <b>48,450</b> |
| <b>Highway</b>                  | <b>891</b>    |
| <b>Border Police</b>            | <b>3,417</b>  |
| <b>Counter Narcotics Police</b> | <b>150</b>    |
| <b>Subtotal On Hand</b>         | <b>52,908</b> |
| <b>MOD/GS</b>                   | <b>637</b>    |
| <b>Corps</b>                    | <b>13,589</b> |
| <b>Air Corps</b>                | <b>0</b>      |
| <b>Intermediate Commands</b>    | <b>858</b>    |
| <b>Subtotal On Hand</b>         | <b>15,084</b> |

|                                 |               |
|---------------------------------|---------------|
| <b>Afghan Forces Trained</b>    | <b>45,546</b> |
| <b>National Police</b>          | <b>29,121</b> |
| <b>Highway Police</b>           | <b>389</b>    |
| <b>Border Police</b>            | <b>898</b>    |
| <b>Counter Narcotics Police</b> | <b>54</b>     |
| <b>Subtotal Trained</b>         | <b>30,462</b> |
| <b>MOD/GS</b>                   | <b>637</b>    |
| <b>Corps</b>                    | <b>13,589</b> |
| <b>Air Corps</b>                | <b>0</b>      |
| <b>Intermediate Commands</b>    | <b>858</b>    |
| <b>Subtotal Trained</b>         | <b>15,084</b> |



Data As of: 8 Nov 04

■ Coalition Forces ■ US Forces ■ Afghan Forces

■ Coalition Forces ■ US Forces ■ Afghan Forces



For Official Use Only

# *Back Up*

Data As of: 8 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27595

# Afghan Security Forces M

For Official Use Only

| <b>POLICE</b>           | <b>PROPOSED</b> | <b>ON DUTY</b> | <b>TRAINED &amp; EQUIPPED</b> | <b>TRAINED &amp; EQUIPPED ON 31 JAN 05</b> |
|-------------------------|-----------------|----------------|-------------------------------|--|
| National Police         | 47,500          | 48,450         | 29,121                        | 33,621                                     |
| Highway Police          | 2,500           | 891            | 389                           | 515  |
| Border Police           | 24,000          | 3,417          | 898                           | 2,200                                      |
| Counternarcotics Police | 1,570           | 150            | 54                            | 84   |
| <b>TOTAL</b>            | <b>75,570</b>   | <b>52,908</b>  | <b>30,462</b>                 | <b>36,420</b>                              |

Data As of: 8 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27596

# Afghan Security Forces MoD Update

For Official Use Only

| ARMY                                 | AUTHORIZED    | LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY <sup>(1)</sup> | FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY <sup>(2)</sup> | 31 JAN 05 L/F CAPABILITY <sup>(3)</sup> | 100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY <sup>(4)</sup> |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|---|--|---|---|
| Ministry of Defense (General Staff)  | 3,000         | 637   | 0  | 1440/0                                  | Sep 09  |
| Corps                                | 43,000        | 13,589  | 0  | 15,480/0                                | Sep 09  |
| Air Corps                            | 3,000         | 0   | 0  | 210/0                                   | Sep 09  |
| Intermediate Commands <sup>(5)</sup> | 21,000        | 858   | 0  | 2,100/0                                 | Sep 09  |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                         | <b>70,000</b> | <b>15,084</b>                                 | <b>0</b>                                   | <b>19,230/0</b>                         | <b>Sep 09</b>                                   |

**Notes:**

- (1) Limited Operational Capability = unit is conducting combat operations, but continues to receive advanced unit training and may still require some equipment
- (2) Full Operational Capability = unit is fully manned, trained, and equipped and is capable of conducting independent operations
- (3) Data interpolated from planning figures in slide 5 and may decrease due to the delay of ETTs
- (4) Full Operational Capability planned for Sep 09 utilizing the 5 battalion training model
- (5) Intermediate Commands are: Recruiting, Logistics and Acquisition, Training and Education, Communications, and Intelligence

Data As of: 8 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27597

# Afghan Security Forces Missions

For Official Use Only

| <b>POLICE</b>                          | <b>MISSION</b>   |
|--|--|
| National Police                        | Afghan National Police (ANP) forces are responsible for security and maintaining law and order. ANP enhances security in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan   |
| Highway Police                         | Afghan Highway Police (AHP) enhance the security of Afghan highway network and increase government presence outside Kabul. Enforce criminal and traffic code violations.   |
| Border Police                          | Afghan Border Police (ABP) responsible for border protection and control. Responsible for movement of persons and goods. Control cross border traffic and counteract threats posed by organized crime and other border conflicts, including armed conflicts. |
| Customs Police                         | To assess and collect customs duties on imposed merchandise, prevent fraud and smuggling. Control carriers, persons, and articles entering and departing the country.  |
| Counter Narcotics Police               | Lead Agency for CN efforts in AF. Focuses on narcotic interdiction, interrogation, and investigations primarily in urban areas.  |
| <b>ARMY</b>                            | <b>MISSION</b>   |
| Ministry of Defense<br>(General Staff) | Defend the Nation's independent, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and establishment of law.  |
| Corps                                  |  |
| Air Corps                              |  |
| Institutional Commands                 |  |

# Afghan Security Forces Training

For Official Use Only

| POLICE  | TRAINING   | IN TRAINING  |
|---|--|--------------|
| National Police   | Basic Course is 8 weeks for illiterate;<br>4 weeks for illiterate<br>2 weeks for existing officers<br>Instructor Development Course is 4 weeks | 1702         |
| Highway Police  | Basic Course is 8 weeks<br>1 week specialized training (Change from 2 weeks in last report.)   | 0            |
| Border Police   | Basic Course is 8 weeks<br>2 weeks specialized training  | 638          |
| Customs Police  | Program not developed  | 0            |
| Counter Narcotics Police                                  | Special Course sponsored by the DEA  | 30           |
| <b>Total</b>  |  | <b>2370</b>  |
| ARMY  | TRAINING   | IN TRAINING  |
| Enlisted Basic Training                                   | Basic Training is 10 Weeks<br>Advance Individual Training is 6 to 8 weeks<br>Collective Training is 6 Weeks                                    | 2818         |
| National Military Academy –<br>Afghanistan (Begin Feb 05) | 4 Year Course  | 0            |
| Command and General Staff College                         | 12 weeks   | 0            |
| Combat Leaders Course                                     | 5 weeks  | 36           |
| NCO Course  | 6 Weeks  | 268          |
| Officers' Candidate School                                | 8 weeks  | 176          |
| <b>Total</b>  |  | <b>3,298</b> |

Data As of: 8 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27599

# *Significant Events Since Last Report*

For Official Use Only

## **Manning:**

- ANA: Ministry of Defense Level 3 fielding now complete; 21% (637) of the 3,000

## **Training:**

- ANA: Cohorts #27, #28, #29 are in training; cohort #26 graduated on 7 Nov (cohort #26 data is not incorporated in these slides)
- ANA: OMC-A will start the 5 Battalion Model on 20 Nov
- ANA: Forces are rotating for leave while still supporting counter-insurgency operations

## **Equipping:**

- ANA: The Bulgarian donation provided small arms ammunition and mortar rounds

## *Significant Events Since Last Report*

For Official Use Only

### **Building:**

- ANA: Qalat Brigade garrison contract to be awarded by 15 Dec

### **Mentoring/Employing:**

- ANA: Proposing NATO embedded training team opportunities to Coalition

### **Funding:**

- ANA: OMC-A short \$127M funding in 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter FY 05—State working AFSA/FMF Solution
- ANA: FY-05 \$65m shortfall— Plan is to cover in supplemental
- ANA: Impact of funding shortfall: delay to initial operating capability by 4 months

11/3

700 Quaker Lane, PO Box 350, Warwick, RI 02887  
Tel 401 827-2661 Fax 401 827-2674  
mtravers@metlife.com

# MetLife<sup>®</sup> Auto & Home

**Maura C. Travers**  
Assistant General Counsel and Secretary

October 22, 2004

Donald H. Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

Re: Individual Risk Surety Agreement


Dear Mr. Secretary:

Please be advised that Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company has made the decision to discontinue its involvement in the surety business. Your current agreement and any and all addenda will terminate on January 20, 2005 at 12:00 p.m. unless terminated sooner than January 20, 2005. Reasons for an earlier termination date may include your leaving the appointed position. We retain the right to terminate your agreement sooner if the company holding your benefits is merged with or acquired by another entity and/or in the event their ownership or control is changed in any manner.

It has been a pleasure serving you and we wish you continued success in your future endeavors.

If you have any questions about your agreement with Met P&C, please don't hesitate to call me directly at (401) 827-2661. You may also wish to contact Jeff Green, in the Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, at (b)(6) (b)(6) if you have any questions regarding replacement of this agreement after its termination.

Sincerely,



Maura C. Travers  
Assistant General Counsel and Secretary

cc: D. Colasanti  
J. Green





GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 NOV 12 AM 11:29

019

INFORMATION MEMO

November 7, 2004 (11:00 am)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *W. Haynes*

SUBJECT: Recusal

- This responds to your Snowflake dated November 4, 2004.
- With the expiration of your surety agreement with Metlife, you will be disqualified from taking action having a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of Sears Roebuck and Co.; Kellogg Company; and the Tribune Company. The attached memorandum (Tab A) will notify your staff of these disqualifications and direct them to refer such matters to the Deputy Secretary.
- As I indicated in my memorandum dated October 19, 2004, (Tab B), we are working with the Senate Armed Services Committee to find another provider of such sureties. If that fails, we will be proposing legislation to enable a Federal agency to provide such sureties.

Nov 04

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Jeff Green (b)(6)

Nov 04

OSD 18112-04

700 Quaker Lane, PO Box 350, Warwick, RI 02887  
Tel 401 827-2661 Fax 401 827-2674  
mtravers@metlife.com

**MetLife** Auto & Home

11/

**Maura C. Travers**  
Assistant General Counsel and Secretary

October 22, 2004

Donald H. Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

Re: Individual Risk Surety Agreement


Dear Mr. Secretary:

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It has been a pleasure serving you and we wish you continued success in your future endeavors.

If you have any questions about your agreement with Met P&C, please don't hesitate to call me directly at (401) 827-2661. You may also wish to contact Jeff Green, in the Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, at (b)(6) (b)(6) if you have any questions regarding replacement of this agreement after its termination.

Sincerely,



Maura C. Travers  
Assistant General Counsel and Secretary

cc: D. Colasanti  
J. Green

11-L-0559/QSD/27604

A



GENERAL COUNSEL

**GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

MEMORANDUM FOR THE IMMEDIATE STAFF OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Potential Conflicts of Interest for Secretary Rumsfeld

Effective this date, Secretary Rumsfeld will be deemed to have a financial interest in the following companies, which are defense contractors:

Sears Roebuck and Co.  
Kellogg Company  
Tribune Company

Please screen correspondence, memoranda, and decision papers that may have a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of these companies. Such matters should be diverted to the Deputy Secretary. Please ensure they are not forwarded to the Secretary.

If you have any questions, please contact me [REDACTED] Steve Epstein, Gail Mason, or Jeff Green of my office. They may be reached at [REDACTED]

William J. Haynes II

cc: Secretary of Defense  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

B



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFORMATION MEMO

October 19, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Surety Policies for PAS Officials

- MetLife, the only provider of sureties for retirement and deferred compensation plans for Department nominees, will terminate this product on January 20, 2005.
- To date, my standards of conduct office has not identified another issuer. MetLife was unable to find another issuer. We contacted eight companies without success, and we are currently working with Lloyds of London to identify another issuer. In conjunction with the Comptroller, my office is also working with members of the Defense Business Practice Board to identify another issuer.
- The Department may also provide a "source site" request for information on its procurement website so that any company interested in offering the surety can contact the Department.
- Because an ethics regulation prohibits solicitation of prohibited sources (i.e. an entity doing or seeking to do business with the Department), I recommend that you not contact any insurance company.
- We advised the majority and minority counsels of the SASC that the surety policy may no longer be available. The Committee agreed to permit PAS officials to disqualify themselves from participating in particular matters involving their former employers until we can secure a new surety. Current DoD PAS officials who would be disqualified are listed in Tab A.
- The SASC suggested that if we cannot find this product in the marketplace, we should propose legislation for the Government to offer the surety. My office is drafting such a proposal.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Jeff Green

(b)(6)

11-L-05575 SD/27608

| <u>Name</u>                                   | <u>Office</u>  | <u>Disqualified Company</u>                                  |
|---|--|--|
| Gordon England                                | Secretary of Navy                                    | General Dynamics,<br>Lockheed                                |
| Nelson Gibbs                                  | Ass. Sec. of AF(Installations)                       | Northrop Grumman   |
| William Haynes<br>Thomas O'Connell            | General Counsel<br>Ass. Sec. of Defense (SOLIC)      | General Dynamics<br>Raytheon                                 |
| James Roche<br>Donald Rumsfeld                | Sec. of AF<br>Secretary                              | Northrop Grumman<br>Kellogg, Sears,<br>Tribune               |
| Peter Teets<br>Paul Wolfowitz<br>Michael Wynn | Under Sec. AF (ATL)<br>Dep. Sec.<br>Deputy U/S (Acq) | Lockheed<br>Johns Hopkins U.<br>General Dynamics<br>Lockheed |
| John Young                                    | Ass. Sec of Navy<br>(Res, Dev. & Acq.)               | Sandia Corp.   |



~~TAB A~~  
~~FOUO~~

11 OCT 2004 11:29 AM

OCT 29 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: UAVs

Do you feel you have confidence that we're doing the right things on getting more UAVs into the CENTCOM AOR? If not, tell me what I could do to be helpful.

My impression is that CENTCOM is not even asking for them, and I believe they should be.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
102804-19

.....  
Please respond by 11/5/04

0 SD 18115-04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A


11-L-0559/OSD/27610



November 11, 2004

Southcom

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable Porter Goss  
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Observations from Southern Command

Attached is the farewell assessment of General Tom Hill as he departed Southern Command.

It has a number of important observations that I thought you might be interested in reading.

Respectfully,

Attach.  
11/9/04 Commander, SOUTHCOM memo to SecDef: Opportunities and Challenges in the US Southern Command Area of Responsibility

DHR:dh  
111104-11

OSD 18133-04

11 NOV 04

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER  
3511 NW 91ST AVENUE  
MIAMI, FL 33172-1217

SCCC

9 November 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1000

SUBJECT Opportunities and Challenges in the US Southern Command Area of Responsibility

1. Sir, as I relinquish command of **USSOUTHCOM**, I want to thank you for your leadership, guidance and trust over the past two years and three months. Command of such an important and diverse unit has enriched my life and deepened my appreciation for the greatness of our nation. As I depart, I'd like to highlight a few opportunities and challenges that I see in the Southern Command AOR.
2. Although I do not see a current or potential conventional military threat in the AOR, Latin America has become the most violent region in the world. I see the issues of violence and poverty as two sides of the same coin: the rampant violence impedes the economic growth necessary to pull up the 43% of the population who live below the poverty line. The poverty and hopelessness foment discontent, creating ready recruits for gangs, narco-terrorists and other illegal armed groups. The issue of gangs has the potential to be, over the next five to ten years, the greatest destabilizing force in the AOR. Gangs are currently most prevalent in Central America and Brazil, but the problem will spread if we do not address the threat quickly. The size, transnational nature and financial power of the gangs has outstripped the region's police. The fact that gangs are considered a law enforcement issue prevents the military from confronting the threat in most countries. The security forces of the AOR must change in order to combat the current array of threats. We must help our partner nations find a solution that makes sense, respects human rights and recognizes the historic mistrust of uniformed military acting in a police role. In order to do so, we must transform ourselves and readdress our current restrictions against training police. This will require DoD leadership in the interagency and within the Congress.
3. Islamic Radical Group (IRG) activity in the AOR is concentrated on fundraising and logistical support for worldwide terrorism. We do not see in our AOR operational cells of IRG terrorists staging for an attack on the United States. I take no comfort in that fact, however, since what we don't know about the IRG activity in the region greatly outweighs what we do know. We are vulnerable to an airborne threat because our outdated laws on aerial interdiction limit our actions and prevent our neighbors from taking action. We now have the technology to be able to detect and monitor an airplane that takes off from Panama, flies through all the countries of Central America and Mexico and crashes into a key target in the southern extreme of the United States and we will have done nothing about it because the current policy assumes that the worst thing that plane could be carrying is drugs. September 11<sup>th</sup> showed us the fallacy of this policy and we must fix it regionally for it to be effective. The regional approach is critical in Central America

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27612

due to the short flight time required to fly from the airspace of one country into the airspace of another. Regional airbridge denial is a sensitive **and** controversial issue across the interagency, and I believe that only you will be able to take this on effectively.

4. You can be proud of what the men and women of Southern Command do to support the Government of Colombia. The armed forces of Colombia, for the first time since the 1960s, are conducting sustained offensive operations in the old "*despeje*" region, which previously gave sanctuary to narco-terrorists. Those efforts are beginning to **bear** fruit as we are seeing greater numbers of desertions and decreased activity on the part of the illegal armed groups. We must stay the course in Colombia by continuing to provide logistical, intelligence **and** planning assistance to the Colombian military while interdicting the illicit trafficking that sustains the narco-terrorist groups. We must seek to regionalize our support, especially to Perú, Ecuador and Bolivia, whose fragile democracies must be shored up or we **risk** pushing the problem out of Colombia and into her neighbors. Again, DoD leadership is essential, both in the interagency and on the Hill.

5. In 1978, sixteen of the countries in this hemisphere had communist or totalitarian governments. Today, all of Latin America and the Caribbean, save Cuba, have made the **shift** to democracy and the militaries in the region are supporting democracies. **USSOUTHCOM** has played a key role in this maturation by close, continuous, personal interaction with the armed forces of the AOR. This engagement is necessary if we are to assist in the transformation of Latin American security forces to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century threats and it is vital to our continued understanding of the realities on the ground in the AOR. I am seeing the effects of the negative impact of ASPA sanctions on our engagement, especially in terms of IMET. Several of our key partners are already looking to Europe and China to fill the gap that ASPA is creating in Professional Military Education and exchange programs. Current limits on information sharing, security clearances and access are at cross-purposes with our professed goals of regional cooperation. The **SOUTHCOM** staff is working on ways to ameliorate the impact of these limitations. We must overcome these barriers if we are to continue to be the security partner of choice for the nations in this hemisphere.


6. Disenchantment with failed institutions **and** unfulfilled economic promises in Latin America and the Caribbean have resulted in tremendous social upheaval in the region. One manifestation of the dissatisfaction with the existing political institutions is the fact that several presidents in the AOR find themselves in the presidency as their first elected public office. As a result of the latest referendum in Venezuela, President Chávez appears to be a fixture in the **region**. From a strictly military point of view, I am concerned that President Chávez is turning his armed forces into a highly politicized praetorian guard, which will choose loyalty to **him** over loyalty to the constitution. On a larger scale, I am concerned about the exportation of his "Bolivarian Revolution" to countries in the AOR where governments can ill afford added instability. I urge the pursuit of **an** interagency consensus around a policy designed to limit the detrimental impact that Chávez is likely to have on the region.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

7. I have seen the ongoing suffering of **Haiti** first hand, both under the UN **mandate** back in **1994** and as commander of our more recent efforts there. Until the **Haitian** people are able to lift themselves from abject misery to at least dignified **poverty** and develop some semblance of working institutions, **Haiti's** problems will continue to haunt the United States. Short of a comprehensive long-term international effort to support **Haiti**, we will always be just one step away from the next migration crisis or political collapse. **DoD** has a leadership role to play in **Haiti** and must find a way to support **Haiti's** security forces.

8. The stabilization of **SOUTHCOM** Headquarters **stands** without resolution. As you are well aware, I remain convinced, **as** did my predecessors, that Miami is **the** right location for the headquarters **from a** strategic point of view. **The** recent proposal by the Governor of Florida presents us with an opportunity to **make a** sound fiscal decision **as** well. I **strongly** encourage **DoD** to consider the Governor's proposal **as** a means to resolve the command's stabilization in Miami. We should come to closure on this issue for both the strategic and fiscal reasons I mentioned **as** well as for the quality of life of our people.

9. I **thank** you again for the opportunity to have served as the Commander of United States Southern Command. I have been privileged to **work** shoulder to shoulder with great patriots and I have been blessed by having known some of the most brilliant leaders of this hemisphere. I **thank** you for your steadfast leadership in this critical phase of our country's history. I **am** enthusiastic and optimistic about **USSOUTHCOM's** role in helping the people of the Americas fully enjoy the fruits of democracy and economic opportunity.



JAMES T. **HILL**  
General, US Army  
Commander

CF:  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27614

~~FOUO~~

OCT 18 2004

Afghanistan

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Tom O'Connell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: French MOD's Suggestions

Here's a note on my meeting with the French MOD.

Please come back to me with a proposal as to how you think I ought to respond to her and what we ought to recommend. Please get back to me by Wednesday, October 20.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/15/04 MFR re: Meeting with French MOD on Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan

DHR:es  
101504-28

*10/11/1*  
*10/29*

Please respond by

*10/20/04*

Status

*DR*

*ad check*  
*10/15/04*

DRAFT  
Letter  
Attached

*v/r jin*

SIR,  
Response attached.

*v/r*  
Lt Col Lengyel

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27615

OSD 18135-04

18OCT04

~~FOUO~~

October 15, 2004

Afghanistan

SUBJECT: Meeting with the French Minister of Defense on Counter-Narcotics  
in Afghanistan

The French MOD indicated she thought that ISAF should not do the counter-narcotics tasks; they are not suited to it. Nor should OEF. OEF has other work to do.

She proposed putting together a special team, possibly the U.S., France and the U.K. with the Afghans. Some Special Forces might need to be involved. She mentioned the UN, EU, World Bank, and possibly some of Afghanistan's neighbors to the north, as others that might be involved.

She thinks it is important to act soon, to avoid having a situation where drug money elects the Afghan Parliament, and the Afghan Parliament then opposes Karzai and corrupts the government.

I told her I'd get back to her.

DHR:ss  
101404-41


~~FOUO~~

OSD 18136-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27616

156CT04

October 8.2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Reducing the Number of Exercises

Last year we cut the number of exercises and the number of people involved, because of **stress** on the force. I want to do the same thing for the period ahead.

Please get me the list of what the normal schedule would be and what you folks are proposing, so that I can make some decisions.

There's no way we can have business as usual. We have to reduce stress on the force. The only way to do it when we do some additional things is to stop doing some other things. In my view exercises are important in peacetime, but in wartime our troops are getting plenty of exercise.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100704-22

.....  
*Please respond by* 10/22/04

~~FOUO~~

TAB A

October 18, 2004

2004 OCT 18 02:55

883

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
 SUBJECT: Afghan Parliamentary Elections April '05

We may need to do something extra for the Afghan Parliamentary elections next April. We ought to have that in mind, just as we put some extra forces in for the Afghan Presidential election.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
101504-27

.....  
 Please respond by 11/19/04

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18167-04



TAB A

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 NOV 12 PM 6:04 November 1, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: GEN Doug Brown

You will recall that Doug Brown has asked for authority over \$25M for support operations. I believe we have granted him that authority, but you should get an instruction out to him, so that he understands it can only be used pursuant to a specific deployment order or execute order.

Please think that through, work it out and come back to me with a piece of paper.

Thank you.

DHR:ss  
110104-26

.....  
Please respond by 11/26/04

~~FOUO~~

0 SD 18169-04  
Tab A



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

2004 NOV 12 08:12  
CM-2184-04  
12 November 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers/12*

SUBJECT: GEN Doug Brown

- **Issue.** “You will recall that Doug Brown has asked for authority over \$25M for support operations. I believe we have granted him that authority, but you should get an instruction out to him, so that he understands it can only be used pursuant to a specific deployment order or execute order.” (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** The FY 05 National Defense Authorization Act included the authority to expend up to \$25M by US Special Operations Forces in support of ongoing military operations to combat terrorism. ASD(SOLIC), the Joint Staff and USSOCOM are developing, for your approval, the implementation procedures to exercise this authority.
- **Discussion.** The legislation explicitly requires the authority be used only for SecDef-approved military operations and requires the Secretary of Defense to establish procedures and notify the congressional defense committees prior to using this authority. ASD(SOLIC) has initiated (TAB B) the development of implementation procedures through the Joint Staff (TAB C).

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: LtGen J. T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3;

(b)(6)

OSD 18169-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27620

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 NOV 12 PM 6:06 November 1, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: GEN Doug Brown

You will recall that Doug Brown has asked for authority over \$25M for support operations. I believe we have granted him that authority, but you should get **an** instruction out to him, so that **he** understands it can only be used pursuant to a **specific** deployment order or execute order.

Please think that through, work it out and come back to me with a piece of paper.

Thank you.

DHR:ss  
110104-26

.....  
Please respond by 11/26/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18169-04  
Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/27621



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

SPECIAL OPERATIONS/  
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

1-04/013685  
OCT 14 2004

TO: DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC

*Olson  
Haxel*

SUBJECT: Section 1208, Funding Military Operations to Combat Terrorism (U)

As you **know**, the legislation has cleared the Congress and has **been** forwarded to the President for approval (Tab A).

The legislation **authorizes** the Secretary of Defense authority to expend **up** to **\$25 million by US** Special Operations Forces in support **of** ongoing military operations to combat terrorism.

The legislation **requires** Secretary of Defense to establish procedures and notify the congressional defense committees **prior to** using this authority.

Accordingly, I request **the** Joint Staff task **USSOCOM** to **develop, for** SecDef approval, **the implementation procedures** to exercise this **authority**. Draft **procedures should be** forwarded to my office and the Joint Staff NLT 18 November 2004 **for final staffing**.

Attachment: **As stated**

Prepared by: LTC Donald C. Bolduc, SOLICSO/CT (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27622

**SEC. 1208 SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS TO COMBAT TERRORISM.**

(a) **AUTHORITY.**—The Secretary of Defense may **expend up** to \$25,000,000 during any fiscal year during which this subsection is in effect to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations by United States special operations forces to combat terrorism.

(b) **PROCEDURES.**—The Secretary of Defense shall establish procedures for the exercise of the authority under subsection (a). The Secretary shall notify the congressional defense committees of those procedures before any exercise of that authority.

(c) **NOTIFICATION.**—Upon using the authority provided in subsection (a) to make funds available for support of an approved military operation, the Secretary of Defense **shall** notify the congressional defense committees expeditiously, **and** in any event in not **less** than **48** hours, of the use of such authority with respect to that operation. Such a notification need be provided only once with respect to any such operation. **Any** such notification shall be in writing.

(d) **LIMITATION ON DELEGATION.**—The authority of the Secretary of Defense to make funds available under subsection (a) for **support of a** military operation may not be delegated.

(e) **INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.**—**This** section does not constitute authority to conduct a **covert** action, as such term **is** defined in section 503(e) of the National **Security** Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.413b(e)).

(f) **ANNUAL REPORT.**—Not later than 30 days after the close of each fiscal year during which subsection (a) is in effect, the Secretary of Defense **shall** submit to **the** congressional defense committees a **report** on support provided under that subsection during that fiscal year. Each such report **shall** describe the support provided, including a statement of the recipient **of** the support and the amount obligated to provide the support.

(g) **FISCAL YEAR 2005 LIMITATION.**—**Support** may be provided under subsection (a) during fiscal year 2005 only from funds made available for operations **and** maintenance **pursuant** to title XV of this Act.

(h) **PERIOD OF AUTHORITY.**—The authority under subsection (a) is in effect during each of fiscal years **2005** through 2007.

## SOLIC EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**TO:** ASD for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

**FROM:** DASD Special Operations & Combating Terrorism, Mr. JQ Roberts

*JQ*  
10.14.04

Action Officer/Office/Phone #: LTC Don Bolduc, OASD SO/LIC SO/CT, (b)(6)

**SUBJECT:** Section 1208, Funding Military Operations to Combat Terrorism (U)

**BACKGROUND/SUMMARY OF MATERIAL:**

(U) Discussion.

- During WOT FED meetings yesterday it became clear to me that we need to develop a plan to get SecDef approved implementation guidance for 1208. Anticipating a November or December approval by the POTUS I propose we send a letter from the ASD to Director, Joint Staff requesting them to task SOCOM to develop the implementation guidance for SecDef approval.
- My concern is that there are many people looking at this (OGCILC, SOCOM leg affairs, J3 DDSO, SOLIC, SOCOM J3 CSO) but no synchronization of effort. It would be unfortunate to have a POTUS approve law that facilitates operations in the WOT and no implementation guidance. We need to move forward now, so we do not get caught on our heels with concepts from the field pending guidance approval.
- BG Phelan was briefed on the concept and agrees with this course of action.
- See attached coordination sheet

**ACTION REQUIRED:** initial Memo to DJS

| I-NUMBER:       |                                    | SUSPENSE: 14 October 04                              |   | HANDLING: Urgent                     |   |
|-----------------|------------------------------------|--|---|--------------------------------------|---|
| <b>NAME</b>     | PREPARED BY                        | CLEARED BY   | CLEARED BY                                    | CLEARED BY                           | CLEARED BY                                  |
|                 | LTC Bolduc                         | Mr. Gerlaugh   | Mr. Lellenberg                                | Mr. McCracken                        | Mr. Tim Morgan                              |
| <b>ACTIVITY</b> | Action Officer, OASD SO/LIC SO/CT  | Director, Counterterrorism Policy, OASD SO/LIC SO/CT | Director, Policy & Strategy OASD SO/LIC SO/CT | Principal Director OASD SO/LIC SO/CT | Director, Resources, SO/LIC                 |
| <b>INITIAL</b>  | <i>13 October 04</i><br><i>ABD</i> | <i>13 Oct 04</i><br><i>Gerlaugh</i>                  | <i>10/14/04</i><br><i>Lellenberg</i>          | <i>13 Oct</i><br><i>McCracken</i>    | <i>14/14/04</i><br>Cleared on 13 October 04 |



TAB C  
THE JOINT STAFF  
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:  
20318-0300

25 October 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF, US SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
COMMAND

Subject: Implementation Procedures for Section 1208, Support of Military  
Operations to Combat Terrorism (U)

1. ASD(SO/LIC) has asked USSOCOM to develop, for Secretary of Defense consideration, draft implementation procedures for Section 1208, Support of Military Operations to Combat Terrorism.<sup>1</sup> Request you forward draft procedures to the Joint Staff, J-3, Deputy Directorate for Special Operations (DDSO), NLT 16 November for final staffing.

2. The Joint Staff points of contact are Mr. Mark Dunham at DSN (b)(6) and COL Pete Dillon at DRSN (b)(6)

Approved & Secured with ApprovalT by (b)(6)

NORTON A. SCHWARTZ  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director, Joint Staff

Reference:

- 1 ASD(SO/LIC) memorandum, I-04/0 13685, 14 October 2004, "Section 1208, Funding Military Operations to Combat Terrorism (U)"

Tab C

11-L-0559/OSD/27626



TAB D

COORDINATION PAGE

| NAME          | AGENCY     | DATE            |
|---------------|------------|-----------------|
| Mr. O'Connell | ASD(SOLIC) | 8 November 2004 |
| VADM Olson    | USSOCOM    | 4 November 2004 |

~~FOUO~~

November 12, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT U.S. Air Force Tanker Scandal

Attached is a memorandum that sets out my current view as to how the tanker scandal may have occurred. I am sure there are other factors of which I am not yet aware.

It appears that the principal culprit, Darlene Druyun, will be going to go to jail for a number of years, as she should. Thus far, the Inspector General has not found wrongdoing by others in the U.S. Air Force in connection with this matter

The turbulence and long vacancies in the civilian leadership of DoD are, without question, harming the country.

Respectfully,

Attach.  
11/2/04 Druyun memo

DHR:db  
111204-1

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18175-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27628

*4527**12 Nov 04*

~~FOUO~~

November 2, 2004

**SUBJECT** Darlene Druyun and corruption in the Air Force acquisition process. The question is: "**How** could such major corruption happen, over such a **long period**, without **those serving** above and around her **seeing** her corruption and reporting it to the proper authorities?"

The following history offers a clue as to how this might have happened:

- **Druyun** served as the "civilian" **Deputy** Assistant **Secretary** of the **U.S. Air** Force for Acquisition for **ten years**.
- During the **ten** years of Druyun's service, the position of her immediate superior, the Assistant Secretary of the **Air** Force for Acquisition, was vacant for **four** of those **ten years**. **As** a result, for those **four years** Druyun was the senior civilian in the **Air** Force acquisition system and **in charge** of the day-to-day activities of all **Air** Force acquisition. In the **six years** that **there was a confirmed Assistant Secretary**, daily **oversight** of Druyun's activities **was spotty**, since there were four Assistant **Secretaries** who **moved in** and out of the **post** as her superior, for an average tenure of roughly **18 months**.
- In addition to Druyun's **post**, there is also a "military" **Deputy Assistant Secretary** of the **Air** Force for Acquisition. During Druyun's ten-year tenure, there were four "military" **Deputies** **moving** in and out of **office**. **But**, these **three-star** general officers were not involved in contracting. It is notable that, under Title **10 U.S.C.**, even **today** only a senior **civilian** can **make** major acquisition decisions. **Military officers**, no **matter** how senior, cannot do **so**. Therefore, **by virtue** of her position as the senior **Air** Force acquisition civilian, all procurement information **passed** through and **was** controlled by her.
- **To further** add to the turbulence in **Air** Force acquisition, during her **ten-year tenure**, there were five **Secretaries** or **Acting Secretaries** of the **U.S. Air** Force. And, there were four different **Under Secretaries of Defense** for Acquisition, **Technology** and Logistics to provide oversight of **Air** Force acquisition organization and processes. **The** rapid turnover reduced continuity of adult supervision.
- However, **within** twelve months of the current **Air Force Secretary** being confirmed, and within seven **months** of having an Assistant Secretary of the

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27629

~~FOUO~~

**Air Force** for Acquisition confirmed, the **Air Force** acquisition organization and processes were altered to ensure that no one person could acquire too much independent acquisition-authority. This had the effect of removing much of **the** organizational power Druyun had accumulated over time. She chose to retire shortly thereafter.

The turbulence in the civilian political appointees, both the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Assistant Secretaries of the **Air Force** for Acquisition, plus the turbulence in the "military" acquisition officials, is a formula for problems. The combination of that turbulence, coupled with the statutory requirements, and the serious delays in getting political appointees through the FBI clearances, the ethics clearances and the Senate confirmation process, all conspire to create an environment that is hospitable to corruption. And corruption is what we got.

To what extent this set of circumstances caused corruption of such magnitude will never be known with certainty. But facts are facts, and I am persuaded these facts were a nontrivial part of the problem. They need to be fixed.

~~FOUO~~



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET

2004 NOV 15 01:12:21

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: DoD Directives Review Update

- In response to your snowflake dated 26 Oct 04, the following information provides an update on progress revising or canceling DoD Directives.
- On 16 Sep 04, you issued the following snowflake to the OSD Components: "I would like to see everyone up to 100% by the end of the year. If someone thinks that is not possible, please let me know." Two responses were sent to you and one is in route:
  - USD(AT&L): "... I expect to complete the review of all but one of the 111 directives originally belonging to my office. DoDD 4100.15, "Commercial Activities Program" will not be completed because both the Senate and House versions of the FY05 Transportation/Treasury Appropriations bill prohibit the implementation of a revised OMB Circular A-76, which this directive implements for the Department. Updating it is on hold until this prohibition is resolved."
  - USD(P): "To accelerate our revision effort while sustaining policy-setting support to you, we committed with DA&M to produce one directive per month for each of my 5 components. The process began in August and we propose to complete it in June 2005."
  - USD(I): Memo to the SecDef being prepared that will indicate: USD (I) will have 32 of 56 directives in the final stages of revision by 31 Dec 04. The remaining 24 directives that will not be completed have encountered delays due to required changes in legislation, are linked to ongoing intelligence transformation initiatives, or are pending transfer to a more appropriate OSD Component or agency.
- Attached is the current Review of Directives Progress Report ending 5 Nov 04, with the data split out separately for directive revisions and cancellations, per your request.
- Progress has been slow but steady – up 10% since late July, and the volume of revisions/cancellations is increasing. Will continue to keep you advised of our progress.

cc: All Components Listed

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: Boh Storer

(b)(6)

OSD 18207-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27631

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES  
PROGRESS REPORT  
FOR WEEK ENDING  
11/05/04**

| COMPONENT      | REVISIONS  |                               | % SUBMITTED FOR<br>COORDINATION | Signed By DepSecDef |
|----------------|------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|
|                | Reported   | Submitted for<br>Coordination |                                 |                     |
| USD (AT&L)     | 48         | 36                            | 75                              | 16                  |
| USD (P)        | 44         | 12                            | 27                              | 1                   |
| USD (P&R)      | 85         | 53                            | 62                              | 23                  |
| USD(C)         | 6          | 6                             | 100                             | 0                   |
| USD (I)        | 42         | 8                             | 19                              | 0                   |
| ASD (NII)      | 10         | 8                             | 80                              | 3                   |
| ASD (PA)       | 3          | 3                             | 100                             | 1                   |
| ASD (LA)       | 3          | 1                             | 33                              | 0                   |
| DPA&E          | 1          | 1                             | 100                             | 0                   |
| DOT&E          | 1          | 1                             | 100                             | 0                   |
| DNA            | 1          | 1                             | 100                             | 0                   |
| IG, DoD        | 7          | 6                             | 86                              | 3                   |
| GC, DoD        | 16         | 11                            | 69                              | 7                   |
| DA&M           | 46*        | 9                             | 20                              | 4                   |
| WHS            | <u>7</u>   | <u>7</u>                      | 100                             | <u>5</u>            |
| <b>TOTALS:</b> | <b>320</b> | <b>163</b>                    | <b>51%</b>                      | <b>63</b>           |

| COMPONENT      | CANCELLATIONS |                               | % SUBMITTED FOR<br>COORDINATION | Signed By DepSecDef |
|----------------|---------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|
|                | Reported      | Submitted for<br>Coordination |                                 |                     |
| USD (AT&L)     | 24            | 22                            | 92                              | 10                  |
| USD (P)        | 9             | 7                             | 78                              | 0                   |
| USD (P&R)      | 11            | 6                             | 55                              | 4                   |
| USD(C)         | 1             | 1                             | 100                             | 0                   |
| USD (I)        | 6             | 4                             | 67                              | 2                   |
| ASD (NII)      | 13            | 11                            | 85                              | 9                   |
| ASD (PA)       | 0             | 0                             | NA                              | 0                   |
| ASD (LA)       | 0             | 0                             | NA                              | 0                   |
| DPA&E          | 0             | 0                             | NA                              | 0                   |
| DOT&E          | 0             | 0                             | NA                              | 0                   |
| DNA            | 0             | 0                             | NA                              | 0                   |
| IG, DoD        | 0             | 0                             | NA                              | 0                   |
| GC, DoD        | 1             | 1                             | 100                             | 1                   |
| DA&M           | 10*           | 6                             | 60                              | 1                   |
| WHS            | <u>0</u>      | <u>0</u>                      | NA                              | <u>0</u>            |
| <b>TOTALS:</b> | <b>75</b>     | <b>58</b>                     | <b>77%</b>                      | <b>27</b>           |

\*Of the 56 DA&M directives identified for revision/cancellation, 49 are charter directives requiring significant input from OSD Components.

**Total revisions/cancellations submitted: 56%**

11-L-0559/OSD/27632



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

NOV 15 2004

The Honorable H. Douglas Barclay  
U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of El Salvador  
San Salvador, El Salvador

060

Dear Ambassador Barclay:

It was a pleasure to meet you and Mrs. Barclay during our visit to El Salvador. You were most gracious hosts.

I was honored to take part in the Veterans Day Ceremony at the U.S. Embassy. It is a fine tradition that you are keeping alive.

I look forward to working with you to strengthen the defense cooperation between the U.S. and El Salvador.

I have enclosed a satellite photograph of the nighttime lights of the Korean Peninsula. If you would please give it to President Saca, I would appreciate it.

Joyce joins me in expressing our thanks.


Sincerely,

15 Nov 04

12 Nov 04

OSD 18221-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27633



Nighttime Lights, Korean Peninsula  
21 September 2003, 1201z

11-L-0559/OSD/27634



~~FOUO~~

November 12, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
CC: Peter Raymond  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Satellite Photo

I want to send Ambassador Barclay in El Salvador a copy of the Korean satellite photo and ask him to give a copy to the President of El Salvador when we send our thank you note.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111204-9

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18221-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27635

November 17, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Casualty Notification and Assistance

*704*

I don't need the meeting on the casualty notification. I have read the material. I want you to step out smartly and get it improved.

Thank you very much.

Attach.  
11/16/04 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Casualty Notification and Assistance

DHR:dh  
111704-17



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_ *—*

*16 NOV 04*

*16 NOV 04*

NOV 16 2004



From the Desk of  
Paul Wolfowitz

*Paul W.*  
11/16 1741

*Sec Def -*

*I will meet with Gen. Agos  
on this when he returns and  
then we'll get back to you.*

*Paul W.*

CORRECTED COPY

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

1232  
11/16



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFO MEMO

November 16, 2004 - 12:00 PM

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (PERSONNEL & READINESS)  
SUBJECT: Casualty Notification, Casualty Assistance--Snowflake

- Notification to the families of deceased, ill, and injured Service members generally works well. A joint body reviews the process three times annually to discuss real-world experiences, and improve performance.
- Casualty assistance to the families generally receives positive feedback from the next of kin, but services provided the injured are "stovepiped", hampering coordination. The length of the adjudication process is criticized, as is treatment by VA..
- Solutions:
  - o Establish a "case management" approach to unify the stovepipes (started in Army)
  - o Unify DOD and VA processes (will broach with VA)
  - o Track severely wounded at OSD level to monitor service performance (software identified)
  - o Streamline adjudication process
- An outside group can take a fresh look at what we do and how we do it, yielding suggestions that we have not considered internally.
- Attached is a list of possible group members who might contribute effectively to such an effort.
- We will check the implications of the Federal Advisory Commission Act with General Counsel.
- As you directed, I will organize a meeting with you to discuss purpose and process that includes General Myers and Powell Moore, immediately upon General Myers return.

Attachment: As Stated

PREPARED BY: Mark Ward, OFP, ODUS (MC&FP),

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27638

18271-04  
A282-3

Proposed List  
Casualty Notification **Working** Group

| <u>Name</u>                        | <u>Organization</u>                      | <u>Position</u> | <u>What They Bring to the Table</u>  |
|------------------------------------|--|-----------------|--|
| Ms. Marty Evans<br>RADM (USN, Ret) | American Red Cross                       | President       | Years of experience <b>as a Navy commanding officer</b> who had to deal regularly with casualty notification. Now, CEO of <b>an</b> organization with <b>a</b> traditional relationship with DoD <b>and</b> emergency notification <b>to</b> service members of ill/injured/deceased family <b>members</b> . |
| Jack Keane<br>GEN (USA, Ret)       | GSI, LLC                                 | President       | Former VCSA, with 37 years of <b>Army</b> command experience, had <b>numerous</b> experiences with casualty notification.  |
| Norb Ryan<br>VADM (USN, Ret)       | Military Officers Association of America | President       | With <b>years</b> of command experience culminating in his position <b>as</b> Chief of Naval Personnel, has both hands-on <b>and</b> policy experience with casualty notification.   |

A282-1

|   |   |                                    |  |
|---|---|------------------------------------|--|
| Lt <b>Gen</b> (USAF, Ret)                 |   | Executive Director                 | As former Deputy Chief of <b>Staff</b> for Air Force Personnel, has <b>command</b> and policy experience with casualty notification. As Executive Director of AF Aid, is involved with assisting with emergency travel for airmen who need assistance for emergency leave. |
| <b>LTG</b> Garry Parks, <b>USMC</b> (ret) | South Carolina Credit Union League & Affiliates | President/CEO                      | <b>As</b> Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, <b>was</b> responsible for Marine Corps casualty notification policy.  |
| Salvatore Frank Gallo, RADM (USN, Ret.)   | <b>Armed Services YMCA</b>                      | National <b>Executive</b> Director | YMCA provides educational, social and religious support to <b>the</b> military. He was <b>Deputy Chief of</b> Naval Personnel, Office of CNO.  |
| Bob Nardelli                              | Home Depot                                      | President & CEO                    | Broad management perspective; demonstrated concern for military and <b>militar families</b> .  |
| Ms. Candace Wheeler                       | National Military Family Association            | President                          | As President of the National Military Family Association and over 20 years as an Air Force spouse, <b>she</b> is   |

14282-5

|                           |   |  |   |
|---------------------------|---|--|---|
|                           |   |  | <b>knowledgeable from both personal and professional experience of the importance of sensitive and timely casualty notification.</b>  |
| <b>Mr. Art Wilson</b>     | <b>Disabled American Veterans</b>             | National Adjutant  | <b>As head of the DAV, he represents the official voice of America's service-connected disabled veterans - 2.1 million disabled veterans, their families and survivors.</b>     |
| Mr. Christopher Michel    | Military Advantage<br>(formerly Military.Com) | President/Founder  | Through the website he founded, his organization <b>connects</b> with over 4 million military members and their families.   |
| <b>Ms. Kathryn Turman</b> | <b>FBI</b>                                    | Program Director, <del>Office of</del> Victim Assistance | <b>Working with families of victims of crime and international terrorism for many years, she has first-hand experience in notifying and assisting surviving family members.</b> |
| <b>Mr. Jeff Bezos</b>     | <b>Amazon</b>                                 | <b>CEO</b>   | Provides technical experience/expertise   |
| Mr. Bill Plante           | CBS   | White House Correspondent                                | <b>Media perspective with added experience of spouse whose father is unaccounted for from Southeast Asia.</b>   |

A282-6

|                     |                 |                    |   |
|---------------------|-----------------|--------------------|---|
| Ms. Martha Didamo   | Gold Star Wives | National President | Head of f<br>made up<br>have lost<br>service o                          |
| Mrs. Melissa Givens | Army spouse     | OIF widow          | Recent w<br>on the HI<br>Letters H<br>hand exp<br>importan<br>supportiv |

19282-7

11-L-0559/OSD/27642



CORRECTED COPY



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

November 16, 2004 - 12:00 PM

704

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (PERSONNEL & READINESS)

*David S. C. Chu to New City*

SUBJECT: Casualty Notification, Casualty Assistance--Snowflake

- Notification to the families of deceased, ill, and injured Service members generally works well. A joint body reviews the process three times annually to discuss real-world experiences, and improve performance.
- Casualty assistance to the families generally receives positive feedback from the next of kin, but services provided the injured are "stovepiped", hampering coordination. The length of the adjudication process is criticized, as is treatment by VA.
- Solutions:
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  - o Track severely wounded at OSD level to monitor service performance (software identified)
  - o Streamline adjudication process
- **An** outside group can take a fresh look at what we do and how we do it, yielding suggestions that we have not considered internally.
- Attached is a list of possible group members who might contribute effectively to such an effort.
- We will check the implications of the Federal Advisory Commission Act with General Counsel.
- As you directed, I will organize a meeting with you to discuss purpose and process that includes General Myers and Powell Moore, immediately upon General Myers return.

Attachment: As Stated

PREPARED BY: Mark Ward, OFP, ODUS (MC&FP), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/27643

162004  
18271-04

Proposed List  
Casualty Notification Working Group

| <u>Name</u>                        | <u>Organization</u>                      | <u>Position</u> | <u>What They Bring to the Table</u>   |
|------------------------------------|--|-----------------|---|
| Ms. Marty Evans<br>RADM (USN, Ret) | American Red Cross                       | President       | Years of experience as a Navy commanding officer who had to deal regularly with casualty notification. Now, CEO of an organization with a traditional relationship with DoD and emergency notification to service members of ill/injured/deceased family members. |
| Jack Keane<br>GEN (USA, Ret)       | GSI, LLC                                 | President       | Former VCSA, with 37 years of Army command experience, had numerous experiences with casualty notification.   |
| Norb Ryan<br>VADM (USN, Ret)       | Military Officers Association of America | President       | With years of command experience culminating in his position as Chief of Naval Personnel, has both hands-on and policy experience with casualty notification.   |

|  |   |                             |  |
|--|---|-----------------------------|--|
| Mike McGinty<br>Lt Gen (USAF, Ret)         | Air Force Aid Society                           | Executive Director          | As former Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Force Personnel, has command and policy experience with casualty notification. As Executive Director of AF Aid, is involved with assisting with emergency travel for airmen who need assistance for emergency leave. |
| LTG Garry Parks, USMC<br>(ret)             | South Carolina Credit Union League & Affiliates | President/CEO               | As Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, was responsible for Marine Corps casualty notification policy.  |
| Salvatore Frank Gallo,<br>RADM (USN, Ret.) | Armed Services YMCA                             | National Executive Director | YMCA provides educational, social and religious support to the military. He was Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel, Office of CNO.  |
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| Ms. Candace Wheeler                        | National Military Family Association            | President                   | As President of the National Military Family Association and over 20 years as an Air Force spouse, she is  |

|                        |   |   |  |
|------------------------|---|---|--|
|                        |   |   | knowledgeable from both personal and professional experience of the importance of sensitive and timely casualty notification.  |
| Mr. Art Wilson         | Disabled American Veterans                    | National Adjutant                             | As head of the DAV, he represents the official voice of America's service-connected disabled veterans - 2.1 million disabled veterans, their families and survivors.     |
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| Ms. Kathryn Turman     | FBI   | Program Director, Office of Victim Assistance | Working with families of victims of crime and international terrorism for many years, she has first-hand experience in notifying and assisting surviving family members. |
| Mr. Jeff Bezos         | Amazon  | CEO   | Provides technical experience/expertise  |
| Mr. Bill Plante        | CBS   | White House Correspondent                     | Media perspective with added experience of spouse whose father is unaccounted for from Southeast Asia.   |

|                            |                    |                    |   |
|----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---|
| Ms. Martha Didamo          | Gold Star Wives    | National President | Head of the organization made up of spouses who have lost loved ones in service of the country.   |
| <b>Mrs.</b> Melissa Givens | <b>Army</b> spouse | OIF widow          | Recent widow who appeared on the HBO special, "Last Letters Home." Brings first hand experience of the importance of sensitive and supportive notification. |

720

TAB B

~~FOUO~~

~~SECRET~~  
ATTACHMENT

November 5, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci  
CC: Cathy Mainardi  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Meeting

2004 NOV 16 PM 6:28

Iceland

Please ~~stop meeting~~ to discuss costs in Iceland. ~~this memo is not going to do~~  
~~that's not how I want to do it.~~

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/29/04 Ricardel Memo to SecDef re: Iceland

DHR:ss  
110404-13

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~  
ATTACHMENT

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27648

08-11-04 16:18 0377

OSD 18345-04

Snowy /

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: December 12, 2004 -HC 12/13

CC: General Myers  
General Pace  
Ryan Henry  
Ken Krieg

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *Tw*

SUBJECT: Request for QDR Issues

WID 1

Don,

The following are my proposed Top 5 QDR issues, in more or less priority order:

1. What capabilities does the Department (and the USG) need to have for counterinsurgency warfare (as opposed to peacekeeping):
  - Focus particularly on: intelligence issues and on building capacity of indigenous security forces (including funding, training and language capabilities).
2. What is the right balance of risks between capabilities needed for the Global ~~War~~ on Terrorism and capabilities needed to manage the emerging military competition in East and ~~South~~ Asia.
3. What capabilities should should DoD have for homeland security, particularly to prevent or deal with a catastrophic attack:
  - Particular emphasis on biological terrorism.
4. Persistent surveillance is taking precision targeting to a new level.
  - What capabilities should we have in manned, unmanned and space systems for persistent surveillance;

12 Dec 04  
16 Nov 04

OSD 18372-04

~~FOUO~~

- What changes are needed in organization, decision processes, force capabilities, etc. to properly exploit this development.
5. What is the right balance of investment in tac air relative to other DoD needs.



November 16, 2004

VCJCS

TO: SLRG Principals  
Combatant Commanders

CC: Ryan Henry  
Ken Krieg  
VADM Bob Villard  
LTG Skip Sharp

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Request for QDR Issues

As we discussed in the 4 November SLRG meeting, please send me a note with your personal thoughts on the three to five top issues we should consider during the QDR. Please copy Ryan Henry,

310.1

Thanks.

DER:dh  
111604-1



Please respond by 11/19/04

16 Nov 04

~~FOUO~~

November 16, 2004

TO: SLRG Principals  
Combatant Commanders

CC: Ryan Henry  
Ken Krieg  
VADM Bob Willard  
LTG Skip Sharp

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Request for QDR Issues

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Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111604-1

.....  
Please respond by

11/19/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18372-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27652

ALR -

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND



19 NOV 2004 10:58

Reply to:  
USSTRATCOM/CC  
901 SAC BLVD STE 2A  
OFFUTT AFB, NE 68113-6000

19 Nov 04  
SM: 124-04

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Issues

Ref: a) SECDEF memorandum, 16 November, same subject.

As requested by reference (a), following issues are offered in consideration for the upcoming QDR.

1. Strategic Deterrence Posture: Establish policy and associated strategy to guide decision makers on an updated construct to achieve strategic deterrence in the context of 21<sup>st</sup> Century realities and as envisioned by the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Specifically, bolster efforts to balance the new strategic triad capabilities of strike (both nuclear and non-nuclear), defenses and a responsive infrastructure. A blended QDR/NPR will drive a consistent, department level offense-defense integration plan spanning the full spectrum of military means from influence to nuclear weapons. This approach will also allow us to assess the role of the current nuclear stockpile, establish a force-sizing construct to guide decision makers on the required size and composition of the arsenal and evaluate the need for new kinetic and non-kinetic solutions.
2. Combating WMD. Pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter the ability of rogue individuals, terrorist groups or hostile nation states to threaten the United State with the weapons of mass destruction we know today and the future technologies that are still yet to be developed.
3. Space. Evaluate current and future capabilities within the related areas of integrated space situational awareness, space protection, and space control. Develop a comprehensive strategy to deliver a sustained asymmetric advantage in this enabling mission area, and investigate the potential value and achievability of more responsive, less expensive space launch.
4. Global Missile Defense. Refine and validate plans and policy for the continued expansion of global missile defense capabilities in order to focus MDA RDT&E and procurement. Efforts should include establishing the relative priority of boost-phase intercept, space based weapons, directed energy weapons, advanced sensors and cruise missile defense.

310.1

JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT  
General, USMC  
Commander

copy to:  
Mr. Ryan Henry  
CJCS

19 Nov 04

OSD 18372-04

~~FOUO~~

November 16, 2004

TO: SLRG Principals  
 Combatant Commanders

CC: Ryan Henry  
 Ken Krieg  
 VADM Bob Willard  
 LTG Skip Sharp

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Request for QDR Issues

As we discussed in the 4 November SLRG meeting, please send me a note with your personal thoughts on the three to five top issues we should consider during the QDR. Please copy Ryan Henry.

Thanks.

DFR:ch  
111604-1

.....

Please respond by 11/19/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18372-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27654

ALL -

November 18, 2004 CLASSIFICATION  
SECRET

To: SECDEF  
Fr: SECNAV  
Subj: QDR Issues



2004 NOV 18 PM 4:37

310.1

Mr. Secretary,

You asked for my thoughts on the QDR. The last QDR was published 19 days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks; the wound to our Nation was still fresh and the strategic, enduring impact of those attacks was still to be realized. Taken in that context, I propose we address the following issues:

- Global War on Terrorism. Building on lessons learned from OEF and OIF, rethink organizational alignments, processes and investments to optimize execution of the GWOT. Fund and imbed foreign language and cultural skills, rebalance tactical strike with other needs, develop metrics for stress on equipment, shorten acquisition times, etc.
- Balancing the Force. Develop a concerted Human Capital Strategy to reduce the manpower cost of DoD. Identify options to disrupt the ever higher cost trend in moving from a conscript force to an all-volunteer force. Identify and set objectives for the implementation of NSPS and strategically manage Contractor Support Services.
- Homeland Security. Partner with Homeland Security to improve the Nation's security posture. Focus on global maritime defense awareness with the Coast Guard and international naval forces, sharing information and using common systems to develop the equivalent of a maritime NORAD.
- Future Capabilities. Move joint assessment to the front end of the process of determining what capabilities are required. Develop tools, models, and simulation that can be utilized for assessing the effectiveness of systems relative to GWOT. Establish a risk analysis approach to evaluate technology and programs in a strictly joint environment.
- Post Hostilities Operations. Assess DoD roles in supporting transition to and from hostilities including interagency relationships and identify actions required to increase effectiveness in this area.

18 NOV 04

Copy to: Ryan Henry

16 NOV 04

OSD 18372-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27655



COMMANDER  
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

SECRET  
2004 NOV 17 01:33:50

ECCC

19 November 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington DC  
20301-1000

SUBJECT: Commander, US European Command Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)  
Issues

1. The strategic shift underway since the end of the Cold War only accelerated after 9/11. This shift provides a unique opportunity for us to look beyond the crises that currently consume most of our defense establishment to consider how best to prepare for *our* long-term security challenges. Our current national prestige and power is a unique gift of history that we can use to prevent crises and indelibly shape the future security environment. Thus, the upcoming QDR comes at an ideal time to refocus all elements of national power in support of our overarching national security interests. I would especially like to see this QDR focus on organizational, doctrinal, and training issues from a Combatant Commander standpoint.

2. In response to your specific request, I offer the following topics for consideration and study during the QDR:

a. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), along with rapidly expanding technologies, have potentially empowered small groups of extremists to pose direct threats to our nation. We must eliminate organizational seams between nations, government agencies, and within DoD to prevent a catastrophic WMD attack on the United States or one of our allies. In addition to enhancing our ability to interdict WMD materials, the QDR should also consider strategies to address the underlying causes of terrorism, recognizing the current fight against Al-Qaeda is not the "approved solution" for countering future terror threats. Even now Islamic extremism is evolving from an Al-Qaeda centrally-directed organization to a regional franchise structure that loosely supports centrally derived themes and goals.

b. Restructure the interagency process to facilitate development and implementation of integrated global and regional strategies that leverage our vast array of diplomatic, economic and military tools in support of our national security interests. The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study provides a useful starting point for energizing the discussion.

310.

19 Nov 04

16 Nov 04

ECCC

SUBJECT: Commander, US European Command Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)  
Issues

The focus should be to foster stability to ensure future security. Within EUCOM's area of responsibility, Africa, and the Caucasus region are worthy focus areas for the QDR.

c. The challenges we face in the post 9/11 environment call for a review of the capabilities needed to ensure security. High-demand low-density ~~skill~~ sets include personnel with appropriate language skills to support intelligence and security cooperation requirements. Additionally, military involvement during post-hostility stabilization and reconstruction is occurring more frequently, requiring personnel with unique skill sets not currently within core military competencies.

d. GWOT has placed a different set of demands on our Guard and Reserve forces than those experienced during the Cold War. I recommend the QDR review the roles and responsibilities mix between active and reserve forces.

e. Rotational and expeditionary forces will have a greater strategic effect in developing nations of the AOR. Clearly identified levels of presence, linked to regional security objectives and using rotational and expeditionary forces, is essential. QDR analysis to "right size" our force mix to include regional security cooperation requirements would help mitigate the tension that inevitably arises between global force managers and regional planners.

f. Establish procedures and policies to identify and resolve Unified Command Plan (UCP) seam coordination issues between both geographic and functional commands. The ability to conduct security and stability operations across UCP boundaries during preconflict phases must be established. When one considers various Global Strike options, GWOT issues like targeting, SOCOM operations, and support to OIF, there is an increase in cross boundary work done under shrinking timelines. Doctrine, operating procedures, and training need to be updated to reflect that. Additionally, we still lack an effective mechanism to integrate operations, intelligence, logistics, and command and control capabilities—any contributions the QDR can make toward common command and control standards would benefit all the Combatant Commands.


g. Recommend QDR address the issue of the structure of Unified Command headquarters to ascertain whether they are correctly sized and functionally organized to provide timely information on Interagency issues.

h. QDR should examine how to re-mission portions of our focus to generate more Tier 3 special operations-capable forces needed to prosecute expanded GWOT activities in additional regions.

ECCC

SUBJECT: Commander, US European Command Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)  
Issues

3. Thank you for the opportunity to provide inputs for consideration during the QDR. I look forward to supporting your QDR team in a healthy debate on *issues of* organization, priorities, and future challenges.

  
JAMES L. JONES  
General, U.S. Marine Corps

CC:  
PDUSD(P)



**ORIGINAL**

**INFO MEMO**

19 November 2004

FOR: **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

FROM: General M. W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps



SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Request for QDR Issues

The 2005 QDR should be a tightly focused effort that will achieve an executable DOD capability within a comprehensive national security apparatus. Specific issues to consider include:

- What are the capabilities and resources necessary to deal with the irregular, catastrophic and disruptive strategic challenges? How do we optimize the individual capability portfolios of the services in order to synergistically achieve the best strategic effect?
- How do we ensure our manpower processes best support the recruiting, training and retention that are so vital in dealing with the strategic challenges of the future? How do we improve the linkage between the joint employment of our manpower with the services' development of those manpower resources?
- What is the art of the achievable in improving our interagency efforts both at home and abroad? What are the appropriate partnerships/relationships with non-DOD entities within each of the strategic challenge areas?
- What should be the role of DOD in providing for the internal security of the homeland?
- Given the increasing interdependencies within DOD and with non-DOD agencies and departments, what is the appropriate mechanism to ensure synergy and effectiveness of our efforts?

COORDINATION: NONE.

Attachments: None

CC: CJCS

Ryan Henry

Prepared by: MajGen E. N. Gardner (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27659

**OSD 18372-04**

~~FOUO~~  
**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

SECRET

FORCE TRANSFORMATION  
OFFICE

INFO MEMO

November 19, 2004, 11:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: A. K. Cebrowski, Director, Force Transformation

*A. K. Cebrowski* 11/19

SUBJECT: Request for QDR Issues

- Rebalance the focus of Capabilities Based Planning to address the more relevant national security challenges. Shift the level of effort, both intellectually and resource wise, to the irregular, and potential catastrophic and disruptive challenges.
- Develop a strategic approach to cost. At a minimum, key elements of the strategy should include; decrease operational costs, better return on investment, broaden the base, create and preserve future options, manage divestiture, and impose cost to adversary. Compete on cost and time. Increase transaction rates (reduce cycle time), increase learning rates, create overmatching complexity at scale (modular scalable force structure).
- Develop an executable S&T strategy which is comprehensive across the Department and provides total S&T visibility. Included in the strategy must be an explicit approach to developing the intellectual talent base.
- Develop a coherent deployment, employment, sustainment strategy. Incorporate in the strategy key elements of the Mobility Capabilities Study and Sense and Respond Logistics Concept and the integration of Logistics, Operations and Intelligence.
- Develop a DoD Education and Learning Strategy to create a new national security culture and relationships to address the most critical component of our security capabilities, our people and future leaders. We can create the future by creating leaders capable of doing so.

*3/0.1*

*19 Nov 04*

*16 Nov 04*

COORDINATION: None

cc: Ryan Henry

Prepared By: T. J. Pudas,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27660

OSD 18372-04

~~FOUO~~

November 16, 2004

VADM (ret) Cebrowski

**TO:** SLRG Principals  
Combatant Commanders

**CC:** Ryan Henry  
Ken Krieg  
VADM Bob Willard  
LTG Skip Sharp

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

**SUBJECT:** Request for QDR Issues

As we discussed in the 4 November SLRG meeting, please send me a note with your personal thoughts on the three to five top issues we should consider during the QDR. Please copy Ryan Henry,

Thanks.

DR:ch  
111604-1

.....

Please respond by 11/19/04

~~FOUO~~

213-



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

November 22, 2004, 5:00 PM

COMPTROLLER

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Topics

- You asked me to provide you with the top three to five issues that should be considered during the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Here are some ideas:
- **Defense Health Program.**
  - How and where we are spending our healthcare money;
    - The budget for the unified medical program has grown from \$15 billion in FY 1993 to over \$30 billion in FY 2005 and is forecast *to* grow to \$50 billion by FY 2011.
  - Determine reasonable cost mitigation measures.
- **Force Structure.**
  - Pay and benefit structure (both military and civilian);
  - Military-civilian personnel mix;
  - Relationship between the active and reserve military components; and
  - Balance between the Services.
- **Post-conflict stability, humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.**
  - Financing the training and equipping of friendly forces; and
  - Clarify the duties and responsibilities of the Department and other federal agencies.
- **Business process.** Address business process transformation with emphasis on integrated end-to-end processes and information systems.
- **Homeland Defense.** Clarify the Department's role vis-a-vis the other federal agencies.

COORDINATION: None

Cc: Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

Prepared By: John P. Roth, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27662

OSD 18372-04

~~FOUO~~

November 16, 2004

Ms. Jonas

TO: SLRG Principals  
Combatant Commanders

CC: Ryan Henry  
Ken Krieg  
VADM Bob Willard  
LTG Skip Sharp

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Request for QDR Issues

As we discussed in the 4 November SLRG meeting, please send me a note with your personal thoughts on the three to five top issues we should consider during the QDR. Please copy Ryan Henry.

Thanks.

DIR: 111604-1

.....  
Please respond by

11/19/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18372-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27663

412



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
2000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

SECRET  
271 11/19/04

INFO MEMO

19 Nov 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ADM VERN CLARK, Chief of Naval Operations

*Vern Clark* 11/19/04

310.1

SUBJECT: QDR Issues Input

Mr. Secretary –

Thank you for the opportunity to provide input to the 2005 QDR. Concurrent with aggressively prosecuting the Global War on Terror, we must transform DoD to meet the full scope of near and long-term strategic challenges. With that in mind, I propose the QDR address the following issues:

- Enhancing Operational Availability. Develop a force-planning methodology to provide clear guidance on the capabilities, structure, and alignment needed to meet the full range of future challenges. Our focus should be on speed and agility, and we should press with this principle: if it can't get to the fight on the correct timelines for the future, we aren't buying it! Advancements in technology and operational innovation will change the way we meet COCOM requirements --- more efficiently, with greater flexibility, and more affordable.
- Balancing Our Capabilities. Focus more deeply on capabilities needed when operating in irregular, catastrophic and disruptive security environments. We must decide if the desired force is part of a "Major Combat Operations" force set or whether forces will be designed specifically for the "other" security environments. Then we create the right balance in capabilities in these areas while also maintaining superiority against traditional threats.
- Managing Risk. QDR analysis should be tasked to explicitly identify joint capability gaps and overlaps. We should specifically decide where excess capacity/overlaps are desired and required. This is hard work and the work should start in the areas where the most significant investment issues exist.
- Assuring Access. Address growing anti-access technologies and politico-military factors that will influence how quickly we can get to the fight. Future forces must reduce the footprint ashore and fully exploit international sea and air maneuver space, thereby enhancing power projection, defensive shielding, and force protection options.
- Increasing Interagency and International Efforts. Address integrating DoD into the larger inter-agency and international environments, with the goal of strengthening coordinated strategies and operations. As part of that effort, we should investigate the impact of increasing partner nation capabilities as a means to enhancing stability and counter terrorism in multiple theaters.

19 NOV 04  
16 NOV 04

copy to:  
SECNAV, PA&E, PDUSD Policy

**ORIGINAL**

NOV 23 11:36



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-6**

November 19, 2004

MEMORANDUM THRU HONORABLE RYAN HENRY  
FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
SUBJECT: Request for QDR Issues

This represents the combined reply from the CSA  
and SecArmy on the Top Issues for QDR 05.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert E. Durbin".

Robert E. Durbin  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army  
Director, Army QDRO

Enclosure

**ORIGINAL**

**OSD 18372-04**

11-L-0559/OSD/27665

~~FOUO~~

PROPOSED QDR ISSUES

1. What are the strategic requirements of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century security environment?
  - Capability, availability, and usability of forces
  - Considerations for sustained / protracted conflict (complex terrain). Intervention, deterrence
  - Impact on sustaining the all-volunteer force
  
2. What are the strategic forces for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century – the “new Triad”?
  - Inherently joint with Army, Marine Corps and SOF in major role
  - Strategically responsive and expeditionary
  - Trained and equipped for the challenges of the Security Environment
  - Constant and protected funding stream
  
3. What are the characteristics of a truly joint, interdependent and net-centric force?
  - Joint Fires, Force Projection, Sustainment, Battle Command, Air & Missile Defense
  - Deconfliction / Interoperability / Interdependence
  - Synergy / Simultaneity
  
4. What is the DoD role for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security?
  - Roles, missions, & capabilities – is it a core mission area?
  - Interagency C2
  - **AC / RC** structure and basing distribution

~~FOUO~~

#1-L-0569/OSD/27666





PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

SECRET  
204 NOV 22 2004



INFO MEMO

November 22, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*  
SUBJECT: Potential QDR Topics—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

310.1

\* I recommend three subjects as the focus of the coming Quadrennial Defense Review:

- o What should be the future size and shape of US military forces? Active versus Reserve content? Military versus civil roles?
- o How should the investment portfolio be adjusted to reflect these conclusions? What steps might promote innovation in design and competition in execution?
- o What is our future compensation strategy, both military and civilian? (We can help answer this question by building on the results of the Tenth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, which starts this year; I will work to align the schedules if you wish.)

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment: As stated

cc: Mr. Ryan Henry (PDUSDP)

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

22 NOV 04 16 NOV 04



~~FOUO~~

HOV 172004 TEA

November 16, 2004

TO: SLRG Principals  
Combatant Commanders

Dr. Chu

CC: Ryan Henry  
Ken Krieg  
VADM Bob Willard  
LTG Skip Sharp

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Request for QDR Issues

As we discussed in the 4 November SLRG meeting, please send me a note with your personal thoughts on the three to five top issues we should consider during the QDR. Please copy Ryan Henry,

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111604-1

.....  
Please respond by 11/19/04

|       |           |
|-------|-----------|
| USD   | PDUSD     |
| RA    | HA        |
| PI    | Readiness |
| MPP   | CPP       |
| PLANS | MC&FP     |
| CCO   |           |

~~FOUO~~

October 27, 2004  
I-04/014394  
ES-1182

TO: Richard Lawless  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Doug Feith  
Andy Hoehn  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Japan

JAPAN

If Howard Baker is going to leave right after the election, I believe it would be smart for us to move fast on as many of the pieces of the Japan/Okinawa puzzle as we can, and get an agreement from the Japanese, so it is behind us. What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:sa  
102704-8

.....  
Please respond by 11/5/04

OSD 18420-04

27-10-04

TAB A  
~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECURITY OF DEFENSE

NOV 01 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Qatar

Please see if you can find out some information on the attached paper. This is the first I've heard of anything like that.

Thanks.

Attach.  
TS Doc (261841Z)

DHR:as  
102804-6

.....  
Please respond by 10/5/04

*Qatar*

*10/5/04*

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 18421-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27670

720

~~FOUO~~

November 4, 2004

ES-1300  
04/014929

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT Possible Ceremony

The MOD of Portugal said we are transferring a couple of frigates to them, and he wondered if we ought to have some kind of a ceremony, somewhere. I suppose we could do it here in the U.S., if he could come over. It's probably easier than having me go over there.

Portugal

Please let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:aa  
110404-16

.....  
Please respond by 11/17/04

OSD 18425-04

4 Nov 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27671

05-11-04 P04:46

ES-1300

J-04/014929

DepSecDef

USDP *ES-4306* NOV 16 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: MIRA RICARDEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (ACTING)

NOV 15 2004

SUBJECT: Possible Ceremony

- On 28 Oct, the President signed into law legislation to transfer to Portugal two OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class frigates, the ex-SIDES and the ex-GEORGE PHILLIP.
  - Congressional notification is required prior to formally offering the frigates to Portugal. This is a 60-day process.
  - Once Navy makes the formal offer, we expect Portugal will accept.
- This will be a "cold" transfer, meaning the frigates are currently deactivated, and each will require about \$50 million in refurbishments to reactivate.
  - Portugal is aware of this and plans to do the work on one frigate in 2005 and the other in 2006. The work will be done in the US.
- Any near-term ceremony would consist of transfer of certificates, since the actual ships will not be ready until reactivation is complete.
- Once Portugal has accepted the formal offer, such a transfer of certificates could be accomplished on the margins of a NATO Ministerial) *or other visit*

*For*

DASD (EUR/NATO): *[Signature]*

Dir (EPS): \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by: COL AJ Torres, ISP/EPS  
Prepared on: 11/15/2004 07:49

(b)(6)

OSD 18425-04

16-11-2004 11:39

11-L-0559/OSD/27672

*15 M*

November 4, 2004

ES-1300  
04/014929

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT Possible Ceremony

The MOD of Portugal said we are transferring a couple of frigates to them, and he wondered if we ought to have some kind of a ceremony, somewhere. I suppose we could do it here in the U.S., if he could come over. It's probably easier than having me *go* over there.

Please let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:es  
110404-16

.....  
Please respond by 11/17/04

OSD 18425-04

November 13, 2004

TO: Mary Claire Murphy  
 (b)(6)

CC: Peter Rodman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Gift to Nicaraguan President



Please buy the David McCullough biography of Harry S Truman. I would like to send it to the President of Nicaragua with the attached note.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 Note to President Bolanos

Tell S.S. its business deductible -

333 SD

DHR:dh  
 111304-2

.....

Please respond by 12/3/04

13 Nov 04

do





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

NOV 19 2004

His Excellency  
Enrique Bolaños Geyer  
President  
Republic of Nicaragua  
Managua, Nicaragua

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you again for your warm hospitality during our visit and particularly for the family dinner at your home. Joyce and I were so appreciative of your thoughtfulness, and we particularly enjoyed having an opportunity to meet Mrs. Bolaños.

I also want to thank you for the beautiful woodcarving and the fascinating book on Nicaragua. It was kind of you to remember me with such thoughtful gifts.

During dinner, we talked of Harry Truman. Because of your interest, I thought you might enjoy reading the enclosed book, which I found most interesting.

With my very best wishes,

Sincerely,

Enclosure

OSD 1854 6-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27675


333SD

19 Nov 04

13 Nov 04  
do

# TRUMAN

DAVID McCULLOUGH



11/19

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

ACTION MEMO

NOV 12 2004

DepSecDef  
USDP *[Signature]* NOV 12 2004  
I-04/015116-STRAT

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Global Posture Open Issues Decision Briefs ~~(FOUO)~~

- After the 28 October SLRG on Global Posture you asked me to come to you with decision briefs on three remaining open issues (snowflake attached) –
  - o F-15s in the UK -- final location
  - o F-16s in Germany -- final location
  - o Japan, including Okinawa
- We are seeking to arrange for Gen Jones to brief you the week of 22 November.
  - o During that discussion I recommend that the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Gen Jumper be in attendance.
- ADM Fargo is meeting with his Component Commanders to update his proposals, and he is scheduled to be in DC the week of 6 December.
  - o Due to the importance of the Japan posture proposals, and the sensitivity of negotiations with the Japanese, he likely will have a Tank session with the Chiefs prior to briefing you.
  - o During ADM Fargo's session I recommend that the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and all four of the Service Chiefs attend.

320.2 STRATEGIC 12 NOV 04

RECOMMENDATION: If you agree I will work with VADM Stavridis to finalize the schedule, and provide the read ahead.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove \_\_\_ Other \_\_\_  
NOV 19 2004

COORDINATION: Joint Staff and CoComs.

ATTACHMENTS: As stated

Prepared by: CAPT R. M. Hendrickson, (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/27677

OSD 18555-04

2 Oct

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Military Assistant

OSD  
Process Control

Then rate to  
Policy.

Mr  
H. G. Lenzel

FN

**CHED THRU UNCLASS**  
*STRATEGIC*

---

CREATED BY: **davisr**

DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE COPIES  
ADC R  
JCS R  
USP O

October 29, 2004  
I# 04/014561  
ES-1231

TO: Ryan Henry  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Pete Pace  
Doug Feith  
Ray DuBois  
Andy Hoehn

FROM:

SUBJECT: Decisions on Global Posture

In order to synch up our decision process with the budget process, we should quickly make decisions about several of the Global Posture issues. Over the next two to three weeks, please come in with decision briefs for me on:

- 1) Japan basing, including Okinawa plan
- 2) UK Fighter squadrons - final location'
- 3) F-16 Squadrons in Germany - final location

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102904-20

.....  
Please respond by 11/22/04

Sir, <sup>Dr 11/19</sup>  
Response attached.  
✓R  
Lt Col Bengel

320.2 STRATEGIC

29 Oct 04



720  
2/14/05  
2/14/05  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 FEB -7 AM 7:11

ACTION MEMO

NETWORKS AND INFORMATION  
INTEGRATION

February 4, 2005, 5:00 PM

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lin Wells, Acting ASD(NII)/DoD CIO

SUBJECT: CIO

DEP SEC DEF  
HAS SEEN  
151 PLS  
MAR 8 2005  
14C 1315  
Xerox attached  
for files

020 NII

After we spoke in December, you asked me to prepare a reply from you to the Secretary on the CIO question. Based on our conversation in the car last week, I've revised a January 7 paper that I'd sent up, and the new version is attached for your consideration (Tab 1). In addition to our two discussions, it reflects recent talks with John Kasich, Pete Geren, Ken Krieg, Steve Cambone, and others.

Per yesterday's discussion, the memo focuses only on the CIO-ASD(NII) combination vice the four organizational options I'd originally proposed.

We have looked at the concept of a Defense Information Board, which you'd raised earlier. It is feasible, but given the difficulties of establishing a new Advisory Board under FACA rules, an Information Sub-Panel of the DSB may be a much easier way to achieve the same goals.

47E505

Next under is an amplification of some of the qualifications you might want in a CIO/ASD(NII)

Will be glad to discuss at your convenience.

RECOMMENDATION: Deputy Secretary of Defense sign correspondence at Tab 1.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated

19 Nov 04

Prepared By: LtCol Palermo (b)(6)

|          |                 |                    |
|----------|-----------------|--------------------|
| MA SD    | (SMA DSD)       | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| TSA SD   | SA DSD          | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| EXEC SEC | <i>M27</i>      |                    |
| ESR MA   | <i>TS 17E05</i> |                    |

## Qualifications for CIO/ASD(NII)

- 1) Experience in managing a very large organization (not just consultant experience)
- 2) At least some knowledge of DoD
- 3) Sufficient technical expertise to understand what is required for success in three critical areas –
  - network operations (not just the old telephone company/comms network ops),
  - network security, and
  - performance in a very large, heterogeneous environmentFailure in any one of these could undo the vision, and
- 4) An ability to implement a collaborative environment and practices (human side) across a very large constituency.



# TAB A



720  
**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

**COMMANDER**  
**U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND**  
**1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 200**  
**NORFOLK, VA 23551-2488**

205 110 2004  
**20 December 2004**

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**Subject: United States Military Contributions to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**

In response to your snowflake dated 19 November 2004, we are working closely with your staff and General Myers' to develop U.S. force contribution numbers and usability metrics that better capture the breadth of our effort, including air, land, maritime, and special operations forces and associated critical enablers (e.g., tactical and strategic airlift, aerial refueling, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). These will be provided to you by the last week of January to help you prepare for the NATO Informal Defense Ministerials starting 8 February in Nice, France.

In support of related NATO efforts, we will also provide these metrics and a proposed force contribution assessment methodology to the appropriate NATO officials.

*V/R*  
**E. P. GIAMBASTIANI**  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

copy to:  
CJCS  
USD(P)

**OSD 18661-04**

11-L-0559/OSD/27684

November 19,2004

TO: ADM Ed Giarnbastiani  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: New Metrics

I sure would like to see some new metrics on

- 1) Our contributions to NATO
- 2) The usability of our forces

I'm disturbed that we seem to be unable to lay out decent tracking metrics.

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
111904-16

.....  
*Please respond by* 12/3/04

November 19, 2004

TO: ADM Ed Giambastiani  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: New Metrics

I sure would like to see some new metrics on

- 1) Our contributions to NATO
- 2) The usability of our forces

I'm disturbed that we seem to be unable to lay out decent tracking metrics.

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
111904-16

.....

Please respond by 12/3/04


381

OSD 18661-04

12/20/04

November 19, 2004, 4:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lin Wells 

SUBJECT: Response to CIO (Kasich Group) Snowflake

I support the points Ken Krieg made to you in his memo of October 25, and have spoken with DepSecDef, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, Steve Cambone, and Mike Wynne as you asked. This memo amplifies Ken's and suggests ways ahead.

### **How do we empower the CIO for the Department?**

All principals supported the concept of a strong, information-age Chief Information Officer (CIO) for DoD, with skills and powers to help transform the Department into an information-age organization. Success will involve leadership, communications, and marketing skills. How empowered he or she will be depends on answers to the questions raised below.

**A** strong CIO can't succeed without the backing of the Secretary's "full faith and credit," but empowering the CIO requires leadership, not new authorities.

- Both Title 40 and Title 10 give the CIO significant powers regarding budget and program oversight. Despite perceptions that Title 10 perpetuates Service and agency stovepipes, all applicable authorities come together at your level and you can choose how to balance them. Adoption of an enterprise-wide, information-centric focus would be a major change, but wouldn't require new statutes.
- Thus, I agree with Ken that the first question for you to decide is whether or not you personally want to take this issue on. But, if you do take it on, you also have to be willing to follow through. This can't be done just with periodic expressions of support. Key net-centric programs are underway, but they were begun when budgets were growing. Historical patterns don't bode well for continued net-centric transformation in a time of constrained resources without a sustained commitment from the top. As Ken puts it: "In a competition between digits and widgets, the widgets usually win." Supporters of net-centric transformation may wince when their own china starts being broken.

The CIO must become the "enabler" of information age transformation, but not the "doer." He or she must communicate the value of a net-centric environment

and drive and enforce standards, such as configuration, security **and** data management.

To achieve this, governance is key. Trust must be built before people will be willing to take chances, and to get this trust the CIO must:

- o Establish consistent and clear policies.
- Bring Principal Staff Assistants (**PSAs**) and components along as partners, and empower them to succeed.
- Measure progress.
- Find a big stick to prod the Department along. Industry CIOs point to the leverage provided **by** clearly enunciated standards, coupled with an ability to report to their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) on compliance with the standards throughout their organizations.

The qualifications for the CJO will depend on what **you** want from the position

- Given the importance of your personal backing for the CIO, if you decide you're **not** willing to engage on a sustained basis, then leave the model as is. Look primarily to hire a technically oriented ASD/NII with a secondary role as an information-oriented CIO. The NII/CIO staff will do their best to leverage existing authorities to continue promoting information age transformation.
- o Four models of a stronger CJO were proposed during the discussions with principals (no effort is made to rank them here):
  1. Emphasize the CIO role and leave it with NII, but as DoD CIO/ASD(NII).
  2. Dual-hat an Under Secretary as CIO.
  3. Establish a stand-alone CIO. This led to two variants:
    - a. **A** stand-alone CIO within OSD, which might not be Senate-confirmed.
    - b. **A** completely new model, in **which** the CIO would have an internal role and also an external one, as Chairman of a DSB-like Defense Information Board, which would serve as an Information Advisory CommitteeEach of the last 3 models may have significant legal and organizational questions to be worked out.

**What is the next step for the Kasich Group?**

From a long range point of view, the most important element for the Department is to put in place a process for continuous transformation, one that will be hard to roll back and will transcend the tenure of any particular leader. The Kasich Group could provide advice on such approaches.

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How do we ensure that this effort to produce an Information Age CIO will succeed? If it doesn't, it will **be** years before someone tries again.

I recommend that:

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- The Kasich Group be engaged to help with the preparations for the second session, and also to address some of the issues raised above.
- Execution of the implementation strategy Ken recommended be deferred until the new CIO is on board, though **NIJ** will prepare interim approaches as your direction unfolds.

Hope this helps. **Will** be glad to discuss any of these issues **further**.

October 26, 2004

TO: Lin Wells

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 Gen Dick Myers  
 Gen Pete Pace  
 Mike Wynne  
 Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: CIO

Attached is a memo I sent to Ken Krieg and his response. Lin, please consult with the folks on this list and come back to me with some proposals.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 10/4/04 SecDef memo to Krieg [100404-19]  
 10/25/04 Krieg ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
102504-25

.....  
 Please respond by 11/19/04

*Lin Wells,*  
 In light of the latest E.O.s & the pending intel reform legislation, not to mention TSAT, BIG, etc., the role of a strong CEO is essential.  
 I'll support an effort toward that end.

*RC*

OCT 27 2004



October 25, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ken Krieg 

SUBJECT: CIO (Kasich Group) Snowflake

This memorandum is in response to your questions in subject snowflake. The views are mine alone. My first question – and the key insight from the roundtable discussion – is will this area be one of your key priorities in the next period of time? The clear consensus was that the effectiveness of the CIOs stemmed from the commitment of their CEOs to this area. Assuming that it will be in the top tier (a crowded level, I realize), here are some thoughts on your two questions.

**How do we empower a CIO for the Department?**

To be effective, the CIO must be perceived as a DoD vice OSD official. The CIOs worldview has to be broad (operational and business, now and in the future), his focus has to be on customers (joint war fighters and key decision-makers), and his style has to be balanced (integrating strategy vice advocating specific programs). There are three areas of empowerment – perceived authority, actual authority, and the individual's capability to use the authority.

- Perceived authority is derived from the Secretary by the level of the position, in part, and, more fully, by the time and attention you give to it. The CIO is now a dual-hat position with the Assistant Secretary for Networks and Information Integration, I would respectfully argue that the role is a little lost in the noise right now.
- Actual authorities probably could be strengthened in three areas -- by practice more than by legislation:
  1. The establishment of a DoD implementation strategy led by the CIO and agreed to by the SLRG/SEC – setting out direction, standards, and responsibilities. This should be of the 500-day variety vice the “hard-to-measure” grand strategy statements.
  2. The CIO would oversee implementation of the strategy and report regularly to you (and the SLRG/SEC) on performance and accountability.
  3. To add a little pressure to the system, you should establish dual-reporting lines for the component CIOs linking them to both the Component heads (i.e., Service Secretaries, etc.) and the DoD CIO.

11-L-0559/OSD/27691

- o The individual's capability to use that authority will come from picking the right person. This is a key hire.

Much of this is in the Department's control. To work, the CIO will have to be and be seen as a key member of the senior leadership group.

**What is the next step in the Kasich Group?**

As we work through this issue, I think we can use John and his team in the following ways:

- o As a red team to bounce development ideas off of.
- o Potentially help with the personnel search.
- Use a combination of CIOs plus their chairman for a "seminar discussion" with SLRG at kick-off for a QDR topic.
- o Lastly, you might think about bringing one or two of them on either DBB or DSB.

Hope this helps.

~~FOUO~~

October 4, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*,  
SUBJECT: CIO

What is the next step in the Kasich Group and the CIO for the Department?

And how do we empower a CIO for the Department?

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/13/04 Ken Krieg Memo to SecDef re: Snowflake **Response on CIO**

DHR:ss  
100404-19

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

*Sir,  
Response attached.  
✓  
Lt Col Langyel  
10/25*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27693

October 26, 2004

020 NII

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Mike Wynne  
Steve Cambone

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OCT 27 2004

26 Oct 04

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OSD 01970-05

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DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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OSD 01970:05

11-L-0559/OSD/27696

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Hope this helps.

December 1, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
CC: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CIO

*020 MIT*

Please read this material from Lin Wells, set an appointment, and come to me personally with your recommendation so we can discuss it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/19/04 Lin Wells memo to SecDef re: CIO

DHR:dh  
120104-10

.....  
Please respond by 12/21/04

*1 Dec 04*

*19 Nov 04*



12/1

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

November 19, 2004, 4:00 PM

2004 NOV 22 AM 8:36

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Paul Butler  
sup  
11/24

FROM: Lin Wells

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|          |            |
|----------|------------|
| TSA SD   | 11/23      |
| SRMA SD  |            |
| MA SD    | 11/24      |
| EXEC SEC | M 11/22    |
| ESR      | 2004 11/22 |

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To achieve this, governance is key. Trust must be built before people will be willing to take chances, and to get this trust the CIO must:

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SECRET  
November 19, 2004, 4:00 PM

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DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lin Wells 

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Hope this helps. Will be glad to discuss any of these issues further.

January 28, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lin Wells 

SUBJECT: CIO

After we spoke in December, you asked me to prepare a reply from you to the Secretary on the CIO question. Based on our conversation in the car yesterday, I've revised a January 7 paper that I'd sent up, and the new version is attached for your consideration (Tab 1). In addition to our two discussions, it reflects recent talks with John Kasich, Pete Geren, Ken Krieg, Steve Cambone, and others.

Per yesterday's discussion, the memo focuses only on the CIO-ASD(NII) combination vice the four organizational options I'd originally proposed.

We have looked at the concept of a Defense Information Board, which you'd raised earlier. It is feasible, but given the difficulties of establishing a new Advisory Board under FACA rules, an Information Sub-Panel of the DSB may be a much easier way to achieve the same goals.

Next under is an amplification of some of the qualifications you might want in a CIO/ASD(NII)

Will be glad to discuss at your convenience. I'm leaving for PACOM tomorrow, back on February 3<sup>rd</sup>, but my staff can make any changes to the memo while I'm gone.

020NII

28 ANOS

19 NOV 04

## Qualifications for CIO/ASD(NII)

- 1) Experience in managing a very large organization (not just consultant experience)
- 2) At least some knowledge of DoD
- 3) Sufficient technical expertise to understand what is required for success in three critical areas –
  - network operations (not just the old telephone company/comms network ops),
  - network security, and
  - performance in a very large, heterogeneous environmentFailure in any one of these could undo the vision, and
- 4) An ability to implement a collaborative environment and practices (human side) across a very large constituency.



# **TAB**

# **1**

January 28, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: CIO

You asked me to take a look at Lin Wells' memo (Tab **A**) on expanding the functions of the DoD CIO. I've done this, with recommendations below.

Both Lin's memo, and Ken Krieg's earlier note, said that you personally would have to devote significant management time if you wanted to empower the CJO to lead the Department's information age transformation. The issue is important, but a realistic **look** at your schedule regrettably causes me to doubt if you will be able to devote such time. That said, I think there is a lot that can and should be done—it really is important to have someone pull the Department's information pieces together, but the industry CJO model may not be entirely appropriate for DoD, given our size and intensity.

Lin's memo teed up various organizational options, but the first step is to decide what you want from the CIO. Lin, Pete Geren and Ken Krieg are working with John Kasich to refine the CIO role for the DoD environment. In the long run, a combined USD(I) and NII focused on information seems the best way to drive the Department's information transformation. However, since that reorganization isn't on the table now, the focus should be on leveraging the CIO function with ASD(NII). The CIO should have both the strategic vision and experience to help lead the transformation of the Department, and also sufficient technical management prowess to deliver an environment that assures acceptable performance for, say, time critical targets in a mobile tactical network.

One way to reduce the demand on your time is to ensure the CIO has enough clout to be able to ensure that your vision for information age transformation is carried out. Once you let the Department know what you expect of the CIO, this approach could let you focus your support for him or her on those occasions when it really would be needed.

11-L-0559/OSD/27708

**TAB**

**A**

November 19, 2004, 4:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lin Wells 

SUBJECT: Response to CIO (Kasich Group) Snowflake

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How do we ensure that this effort to produce an Information Age CIO will succeed? If it doesn't, it will be years before someone tries again.

I recommend that:

- **A** small DoD-only group begin addressing the above issues and prepare a short briefing to introduce the CIO issue to the SLRG, or a subset, in December.
- **A** longer SLRG session be scheduled in January in which the CEOs and CIOs from, say, two or three of the companies you saw before would spend 30-45 minutes with the SLRG to provide private sector perspectives. The CIO recruiting action would stem from this second session, though candidates could begin to be evaluated earlier against the different organizational models.
- o The Kasich Group be engaged to help with the preparations for the second session, and also to address some of the issues raised above.
- e Execution of the implementation strategy Ken recommended be deferred until the new CIO is on board, though NII will prepare interim approaches as your direction unfolds.

Hope this helps. Will be glad to discuss any of these issues further.

October 25, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ken Krieg 

SUBJECT: CIO (Kasich Group) Snowflake

This memorandum is in response to your questions in subject snowflake. The views are mine alone. My first question – and the key insight from the roundtable discussion – is will this area be one of your key priorities in the next period of time? The clear consensus was that the effectiveness of the CIOs stemmed from the commitment of their CEOs to this area. Assuming that it will be in the top tier (a crowded level, I realize), here are some thoughts on your two questions.

#### **How do we empower a CIO for the Department?**

To be effective, the CIO must be perceived as a DoD vice OSD official. The CIOs worldview has to be broad (operational and business, now and in the future), his focus has to be on customers (joint war fighters and key decision-makers), and his style has to be balanced (integrating strategy vice advocating specific programs). There are three areas of empowerment – perceived authority, actual authority, and the individual's capability to use the authority.

- Perceived authority is derived from the Secretary by the level of the position, in part, and, more fully, by the time and attention you give to it. The CIO is now a dual-hat position with the Assistant Secretary for Networks and Information Integration. I would respectfully argue that the role is a little lost in the noise right now.
- Actual authorities probably could be strengthened in three areas -- by practice more than by legislation:
  1. The establishment of a DoD implementation strategy led by the CIO and agreed to by the SLRG/SEC – setting out direction, standards, and responsibilities. This should be of the 500-day variety vice the “hard-to-measure” grand strategy statements.
  2. The CIO would oversee implementation of the strategy and report regularly to you (and the SLRG/SEC) on performance and accountability.
  3. To add a little pressure to the system, you should establish dual-reporting lines for the component CIOs linking them to both the Component heads (i.e., Service Secretaries, etc.) and the DoD CIO.

11-L-0559/OSD/27713

- o The individual's capability to use that authority will come from picking the right person. This is a key hire.

Much of this is in the Department's control. To work, the CIO will have to be and be seen as a **key** member of the senior leadership group.

**What is the next step in the Kasich Group?**

As we work through this issue, I think we can use John and his team in the following ways:

- o **As** a red team to bounce development ideas off of.
- o Potentially help with the personnel search.
- Use a combination of CIOs plus their chairman for a "seminar discussion" with SLRG at kick-off for a QDR topic.
- Lastly, you might think about bringing one or two of them on either DBB or DSB.

Hope this helps.



October 26, 2004

TO: Lin Wells

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 Gen Dick Myers  
 Gen Pete Pace  
 Mike Wynne  
 Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: CIO

Attached is a memo I sent to Ken Krieg and his response. Lin, please consult with the folks on this list and come back to me with some proposals.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 10/4/04 SecDef memo to Krieg-[100404-19]  
 10/25/04 Krieg ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
 102504-25

.....  
 Please respond by 11/19/04

*Lin Wells,*  
 In light of the latest E.O. & the pending intel reform legislation, not to mention TSAT, SIG, etc., the role of a strong CIO is essential.  
 I'll support an effort toward that end.

*RC*

OCT 27 2004

October 4, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CIO

What is the next step in the Kasich Group and the CIO for the Department?

And how do we empower a CIO for the Department?

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/13/04 Ken Krieg Memo to SecDef re: Snowflake Response on CIO

DHR:ss  
100404-19

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

*Sir,  
Response attached.  
✓h  
Lt Col Longyel  
10/25*



From the Desk of  
Paul Wolfowitz

3/3/05

Sec Def -

I think this fits well  
with yesterday's decision  
on NII.

Paul W.

020 NSI

3 Mar 05

19 Nov 04

OSD 18673-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27717



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MAR - 3 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*

SUBJECT: CIO

You asked me to take a look at Lin Wells' memo (Tab A) on expanding the functions of the DoD CIO. I've done this, with recommendations below.

Both Lin's memo, and Ken Krieg's earlier note, said that you personally would have to devote significant management time if you wanted to empower the CIO to lead the Department's information age transformation. The issue is important, but a realistic look at your schedule regrettably causes me to doubt if you will be able to devote such time. That said, I think there is a lot that can and should be done—it really is important to have someone pull the Department's information pieces together, but the industry CIO model may not be entirely appropriate for DoD, given our size and intensity.

Lin's memo teed up various organizational options, but the first step is to decide what you want from the CIO. Lin, Pete Geren and Ken Krieg are working with John Kasich to refine the CIO role for the DoD environment. In the long run, a combined USD(I) and NII focused on information seems the best way to drive the Department's information transformation. However, since that reorganization isn't on the table now, the focus should be on leveraging the CIO function with ASD(NII). The CIO should have both the strategic vision and experience to help lead the transformation of the Department, and also sufficient technical management prowess to deliver an environment that assures acceptable performance for, say, time critical targets in a mobile tactical network.

One way to reduce the demand on your time is to ensure the CIO has enough clout to be able to ensure that your vision for information age transformation is carried out. Once you let the Department know what you expect of the CIO, this approach could let you focus your support for him or her on those occasions when it really would be needed. I can provide more routine backing.

OSD 18673-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27718

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: CIO

You asked me to take a look at Lin Wells' memo (Tab A) on expanding the functions of the DoD CIO. I've done this, with recommendations below.

Both Lin's memo, and Ken Krieg's earlier note, said that you personally would have to devote significant management time if you wanted to empower the CIO to lead the Department's information age transformation. The issue is important, but a realistic look at your schedule regrettably causes me to doubt if you will be able to devote such time. That said, I think there is a lot that can and should be done—it really is important to have someone pull the Department's information pieces together, but the industry CIO model may not be entirely appropriate for DoD, given our size and intensity.

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One way to reduce the demand on your time is to ensure the CIO has enough clout to be able to ensure that your vision for information age transformation is carried out. Once you let the Department know what you expect of the CIO, this approach could let you focus your support for ~~him~~ or her on those occasions when it really would be needed. I can provide more routine backing.

NOV 22 2004

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Colin Powell  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces Update

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is the latest update on Iraqi Security Forces. I'm sending a copy along to UK's Minister of Defense Geoff Hoon, so that he can provide one to Prime Minister Blair.

Respectfully,

Attach  
11/15/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update

DHR:ss  
111804-1

*DR*

*22 Nancy*

**For Official Use Only**

# ***Iraqi Security Forces Update***

## ***15 November 2004***

***Data as of: 15 NOV 04 Version M1***

**11-L-0559/OSD/27721**

# Grand Total all Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only

|                                      |                               |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| • <u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u> | <u>Trained &amp; Equipped</u> |
| –Police                              |                               |
| –Civil Intervention                  |                               |
| –Emergency Response                  | <b>64,948</b>                 |
| –Border Enforcement                  |                               |
| –Highway Patrol                      |                               |
| –Dignitary Protection                |                               |
| • <u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u>  | <u>Trained &amp; Equipped</u> |
| –Army                                |                               |
| –National Guard                      |                               |
| –Intervention Force                  | <b>50,934</b>                 |
| –Special Operations                  |                               |
| –Air Force                           |                               |
| –Coastal Defense Force               |                               |
|                                      | <hr/>                         |
|                                      | <b>115,882</b>                |


Data as of: 15 NOV 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27722



# Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only



May 2003= 0 Iraqi Security Forces

- Iraqi Regular Army
- ▣ Iraqi National Guard
- Border Enforcement
- ▣ Army Special Ops Bde
- ▣ Iraqi Intervention Force
- Iraqi Regular Police Service
- ▣ Civil Intervention Force
- ▣ Coastal Defense & Air Force

- Does not include 74,000 in Facilities Protection Service trained by Ministry Of Interior but employed by other ministries.

\*Anticipate a drop next week. Working with Joint Headquarters to determine exact number of soldiers who have been officially dropped from the rolls as a result of recent fighting, intimidation, and due to anticipated police losses in Mosul.

# Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

**For Official Use Only**

**Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time**

| Security Force Element                    | Current Targeted End State | 15 NOV 04         | 1 FEB 05 | 1 MAY 05 | 1 AUG 05 | 1 JAN 06 | 1 MAY 06 |
|---|----------------------------|-------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Regular Iraqi Police <sup>(1)</sup>       | 135,000                    |                   |          | 46%      | 59%      | 70%      | 78%      |
| Special Police Regiments                  | 1,200                      |                   | 50%      | 86%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Public Order Battalions                   | 3,600                      |                   | 67%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Emergency Response Unit                   | 270                        |                   | 85%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Iraqi Highway Patrol <sup>(2)</sup>       | 6,300                      | UNDER DEVELOPMENT |          |          |          |          |          |
| Bur. of Dignitary Protection              | 500                        | 89%               | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Special Police Commando Battalions        | 2,019                      | 45%               | 75%      | 85%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Dept of Border Enforcement <sup>(3)</sup> | 29,360                     | 57%               | 62%      | 66%      | 73%      | 84%      | 94%      |

**Notes**

1. Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
2. On 23 October, Iraqi Highway Patrol authorizations were expanded from 1,500 to 6,300 officers. Training timelines for the expanded force are under development.
3. Border Police considered trained based on training by coalition forces; capabilities are uneven

Data as of: 15 NOV 04

| Legend       |                             |
|--------------|-----------------------------|
| ◻ (stippled) | 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT     |
| ◻ (white)    | 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT      |
| ◼ (black)    | 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT |

# Ministry of Defense Forces-Projection




**For Official Use Only**

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time\*

| Security Force Element        | Current Targeted End State | 15 NOV 04 | 1 FEB 05 | 1 MAY 05 | 1 AUG 05 | 1 JAN 06 |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Iraqi Regular Army            | 27,000                     |           | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Iraqi Intervention Force      | 6,584                      |           | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Iraqi National Guard          | 61,904                     |           | 74%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Commando Battalion            | 1,516                      | 58%       | 67%      | 82%      | 100%     | 100%     |
| Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force | 451                        |           | 40%      | 58%      | 76%      | 100%     |

\*Based on achievement of Limited Operational Capability

Data as of: 15 NOV 04

| Legend  |                             |
|---|-----------------------------|
|  | 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT     |
|  | 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT      |
|  | 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT |

11-L-0559/OSD/27725

# MNF-I and Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only

| MNF-I = 32 Countries |     |             |       |             |       |           |       |                |         |
|----------------------|-----|-------------|-------|-------------|-------|-----------|-------|----------------|---------|
| Albania              | 74  | El Salvador | 380   | Korea       | 2,956 | Norway    | 9     | Tonga          | 63      |
| Australia            | 406 | Estonia     | 48    | Latvia      | 119   | Poland    | 2,477 | Ukraine        | 1,590   |
| Armenia              | 0   | Georgia     | 161   | Lithuania   | 86    | Portugal  | 129   | United Kingdom | 7,862   |
| Azerbaijan           | 150 | Hungary     | 269   | Macedonia   | 33    | Romania   | 741   | US             | 138,472 |
| Bulgaria             | 445 | Italy       | 3,128 | Moldova     | 11    | Singapore | 0     |                |         |
| Czech Rep            | 98  | Japan       | 792   | Mongolia    | 132   | Slovakia  | 103   |                |         |
| Denmark              | 383 | Kazakhstan  | 30    | Netherlands | 1,364 | Thailand  | 0     | Total          | 162,511 |

| IRAQI FORCES ON HAND               | 174,379 |
|------------------------------------|---------|
| IRAQI POLICE SERVICE               | 87,084  |
| CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE           | 1,091   |
| EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT            | 168     |
| BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION     | 484     |
| HIGHWAY PATROL                     | 370     |
| SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS | 1,850   |
| DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT         | 15,190  |
| ARMY                               | 9,526   |
| NAT'L GUARD                        | 44,873  |
| INTERVENTION FORCE                 | 6,903   |
| SPECIAL OPS FORCES                 | 862     |
| AIR FORCE                          | 206     |
| COASTAL DEFENSE                    | 536     |

| IRAQI FORCES TRAINED AND IN TRAINING | 131,710 |
|--------------------------------------|---------|
| IRAQI POLICE SERVICE                 | 50,051  |
| CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE             | 1,091   |
| EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT              | 168     |
| BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION       | 484     |
| HIGHWAY PATROL                       | 370     |
| SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS   | 1,850   |
| DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT           | 15,190  |
| ARMY                                 | 9,526   |
| NAT'L GUARD                          | 44,873  |
| INTERVENTION FORCE                   | 6,903   |
| SPECIAL OPS FORCES                   | 862     |
| AIR FORCE                            | 206     |
| COASTAL DEFENSE                      | 536     |

## Notes

• Georgia expected to increase forces from 162 to 300 and add a 500 man battalion for UN Security

• Armenia, Singapore & Thailand pending deployment of their forces



Iraqi Forces On Hand  MNF-I

Data as of: 15 NOV 04



Trained Iraqi Forces  MNF-I

NATO Training Team = 41

11-L-0559/OSD/27726

## *NATO Training in Iraq*

**For Official Use Only**

- SHAPE OPLAN passed Military Committee under silence on 10 November. Now being forwarded to the NAC.
- Force Generation Conference 9-10 November was held to fill NTM-I Combined Joint Statement of Requirements for forces.
- NATO Training Implementation Mission-Iraq (NTIM-I) becomes NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) when Activation Order (ACTORD) is published.
- Conducted out-of-country training as follows:
  - 21 senior IZ officials attended Key Leader Training at Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger, NO (1-8 NOV).
  - Three officers attended the Combined Joint Operations Centre Course at NATO School in Oberammergau, GE (6-13 NOV).

For Official Use Only

## *Back Up*

Data as of: 15 NOV 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27728

# *Iraqi Security Forces MoI Update*

**For Official Use Only**

| COMPONENT                   | AUTHORIZED     | ON DUTY        | TRAINED & EQUIPPED | TRAINED & EQUIPPED ON 31 JAN '05 | 100% OF AUTHORIZED TRAINED & EQUIPPED |
|-----------------------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| POLICE                      | 135,000        | 87,133         | 47,342             | 52,800                           | JUL '06                               |
| CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE    | 3,720          | 1,091          | 1,091              | 3,120                            | JUL '05                               |
| EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT     | 270            | 168            | 168                | 270                              | FEB '05                               |
| BORDER ENFORCEMENT          | 29,360         | 16,237         | 14,593             | 16,107                           | AUG '06                               |
| HIGHWAY PATROL              | 6,300          | 925            | 370                | 370                              | TBD                                   |
| DIGNITARY PROTECTION        | 500            | 484            | 484                | 500                              | DEC '04                               |
| SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BNS | 2,019          | 2,019          | 900                | 2,019                            | JAN '05                               |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                | <b>177,169</b> | <b>108,057</b> | <b>64,948</b>      | <b>75,186</b>                    | <b>AUG '06</b>                        |

Data as of: 15 NOV 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27729

# Iraqi Security Forces MoD Update

**For Official Use Only**

| COMPONENT          | AUTHORIZED    | LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY <sup>(1)</sup> | FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY <sup>(2)</sup> | 31 JAN '05 L/F CAPABILITY (BATTALIONS) | 100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY     |
|--------------------|---------------|---|--|--|--------------------------------------|
| ARMY               | 27,000        | 3,887   | 620  | 10,915 / 10,915                        | JUL '05                              |
| NATIONAL GUARD     | 61,904        | 43,445  | 0  | 45,000 / 0                             | SEP '05                              |
| INTERVENTION FORCE | 6,584         | 0   | 1,816                                      | 1794 / 4,790                           | MAY '05                              |
| SPECIAL OPS        | 1,967         | 590   | 0  | 0 / 725                                | SEP '05                              |
| AIR FORCE          | 502           | 167   | 0  | TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT      | TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT    |
| COASTAL DEFENSE    | 582           | 409   | 0  | TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT   | TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT |
| <b>TOTAL</b>       | <b>98,539</b> | <b>48,498</b>                                 | <b>2,436</b>                               | <b>57,709 / 16,430</b>                 | <b>MAR '06</b>                       |

(1) Limited Operational Capability = unit is conducting combat operations, but continues to receive advanced unit training and may still require some equipment

(2) Full Operational Capability = unit is fully manned, trained, and equipped and is capable of conducting independent operations

Data as of: 15 NOV 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27730



# Iraqi Security Forces Training

**For Official Use Only**

| COMPONENT   | TRAINING   | NUMBER IN TRAINING          |
|---|--|-----------------------------|
| Iraqi Police Service  | 3 Week TIP Training<br>8 Week Academy<br>Specialized Training  | 1,053<br>2,709<br>213       |
| Civil Intervention Force  | 5 Week Specialized Training  | 0                           |
| Emergency Response Unit   | 8 Week Specialized Training  | 0                           |
| Dept of Border Enforcement  | 4 Week Academy<br>Specialized Training   | 597                         |
| Highway Patrol  | 3 Week TIP Training<br>8 Week Academy Training   | 0<br>NA (Prior Service IPS) |
| Bureau of Dignitary Protection  | 3 Week Initial Training<br>2-3 Week Advanced Training<br>Mentoring by US Contractors   | 0                           |
| Special Police Commando Battalions  | 4 Weeks Basic Training<br>1-3 Weeks Advanced Training  | 3 Police Special Force Bns  |
| Iraq Regular Army   | Cadre: 4 Weeks<br>Basic Training: 4 Weeks<br>Collective Training: 4 Weeks  | 5,019                       |
| Iraqi National Guard  | Basic Training: 3 Weeks<br>Collective Training: 4 Weeks  | 1,428                       |
| Iraqi Intervention Force  | Cadre: 4 Weeks<br>Basic/Collective Training: 8 Weeks<br>Urban Operations Training: 6 Weeks                                       | 5,087                       |
| Iraqi Special Ops Force<br>- Commando Battalion<br>- Counter Terrorist Task Force | Field Training Provided by US Special Forces (Small Unit tactics Ranger type training)<br>12 Week course on Close Quarter Combat | 72                          |
| Air Force   | Varies by specialty: 1-6 months  | 39                          |
| Coastal Defense Force   | Basic Training: 8 Weeks<br>Specialized Training at Umm Qasr  | 127                         |
| <b>TOTAL</b>  |  | <b>16,344</b>               |

Data

11-L-0559/OSD/27731

# Iraqi Security Forces Missions

**For Official Use Only**

| Unit                             | Mission   |
|----------------------------------|---|
| Police                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide law enforcement, public safety and internal security</li> </ul>  |
| Civil Intervention Force         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and insurgents.</li> </ul>  |
| Special Police Commando Bns      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a direct action, special operations, and counter insurgency capability in support of Ministry of Interior.</li> </ul>  |
| Emergency Response Unit          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.</li> </ul>  |
| Department of Border Enforcement | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Protect the integrity of Iraq's border and monitor and control the movement of persons and goods</li> </ul>  |
| Highway Patrol                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide law enforcement, public safety, and internal security, and convoy security along Iraq's Highways.</li> </ul>   |
| Bureau of Dignitary Protection   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide close protection, convoy security, and fixed-site security for Iraqi key political leaders.</li> </ul>   |
| Regular Army                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defend Iraq against external threats.</li> <li>• When directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security.</li> </ul>   |
| National Guard                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct stability operations to support the achievement of internal security, including (as required) support to Ministry of Interior elements.</li> <li>• Conduct Constabulary duties in support of internal security</li> </ul>  |
| Intervention Force               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct operations in order to defeat anti-Iraqi forces in Iraq, with primary focus on urban areas</li> <li>• Assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which the Iraqi Police Services and Iraqi National Guard can maintain law and order</li> </ul>   |
| Commando Battalion               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force. Similar in organization, training, and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion</li> </ul>   |
| Counter-Terrorist Task Force     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Direct action counter-terrorism similar in organization, mission, and training to US Special Operations Forces with counter-terrorist function</li> </ul>  |
| Air Force                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide aerial reconnaissance, and rotary and fixed wing transport for Iraqi Security Forces and authorities</li> </ul>  |
| Coastal Defense Force            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct security operations on the Iraqi coastline and over territorial waters, including gas and oil platforms out to 12 nautical miles</li> <li>• In conjunction with DBE, conduct police operations on the Iraqi coastline and out to 12 nautical miles to counter piracy, smuggling and other unlawful activities</li> </ul> |

Data as

11-L-0559/OSD/27732

## *Significant Events Since Last Report*

**For Official Use Only**

### **Manning:**

- **Completed emergency recruitment of 780 new soldiers to fill losses in the Iraqi Intervention Force's First Brigade.**
- **Began rebuilding of Mosul Police after their collapse in the face of multiple insurgent attacks.**
- **259 soldiers now part of the 1<sup>st</sup> Mechanized Battalion, with 10 MTLB armored personnel carriers.**

### **Training:**

- **2,506 Iraqi Police Service students graduated from the Basic Course**
- **1,091 Public Order Battalion officers completed their 5-week training program.**
- **125 Bureau of Dignitary Protection students graduated from courses in VIP Personnel Security Detail Operations, Motor Escort Operations, and VIP Site Security.**
- **70 Iraqi police personnel graduated from the Emergency Readiness Unit Phase I course.**

# *Significant Events Since Last Report*

**For Official Use Only**

## Equipping:

- Issued 600 weapons, 10 vehicles, 212 radios, and 350 body armor vests to Ministry of Interior forces
- Issued 4,812 sets of body armor, 287 weapons, 1990 helmets, 11,000 field jackets, 9 vehicles, 5,000 pairs of running shoes and 8,000 uniforms to Ministry of Defense forces.

## Building:

- Awarded a \$45M contract to construct all new facilities for one Iraqi National Guard Brigade.
- Awarded contract for water pipeline and pump station at Al Kasik.
- Completed master plan and statement of work to construct a brigade set of barracks and facilities at Rasheed/Ar Rustamiyah in Baghdad.
- Awarded four police station projects worth combined total of \$650,000.

## Mentoring/Employing:

- LtGen Abdul Qader commanding Iraqi forces in Fallujah with Iraqi liaison officers providing liaison to Joint Headquarters. National Joint Operations Center and Joint Headquarters Operations Center operating and tracking Iraqi Army operations.
- 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade, 1<sup>st</sup> Division (Iraqi Intervention Force); 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade (-), 5<sup>th</sup> Division (Regular Army); 36<sup>th</sup> Commando Battalion; two Shewani Special Forces battalions; and Police Emergency Response Unit; deployed for operations vicinity of Fallujah.
- Iraqi Air Force conducts reconnaissance missions in support of MND/SE locating downed power lines and leaking pipelines.
- 1<sup>st</sup> Police Commando Battalion returned from Mosul and operating in Baghdad. 2<sup>nd</sup> Police Commando Battalion returned to Baghdad from North Babil and continues operations in Samarra. 3<sup>rd</sup> Police Commando Battalion deployed to Mosul for operations.

7201

~~FOUO~~

ES-1170

04/014316-ES

October 26, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Dick Myers

SUBJECT: Elections in Iraq

Attached is a note I am sending Condi. It seems to me you ought to get a group together here, and we ought to start thinking about these things.

Thanks.

ILM

DHR:dh  
102504-26

.....  
Please respond by 11/19/04

~~FOUO~~

10-26-04 P05:48 IN

26 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27735

OSD 18718-04

~~FOUO~~

October 26, 2004

SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

The Iraqi elections in January could produce a variety of outcomes. Candidates could win who are right on the mark, somewhere in the middle, or notably unhelpful.

The NSC needs to think through appropriate strategies and objectives now to:

- Do what we can so the outcome is favorable to the President's goals.
- Strategies to deal with all of the various possible outcomes.

Let me know what we can do to help.

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27736

11/23

12/9

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

SECRET

**ACTION MEMO**

NOV 17 2004 USD(P) *[Signature]* NOV 17 2004

1-04/012998

3826

*Deputy*  
FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Policy on Detainee Body Cavity Examinations

- On October 15, 2004, you asked Policy to examine if DoD needs a policy on detainee body cavity exams,
- I have reviewed this matter and recommend that you sign the attached memorandum (Tab A) that promulgates DoD-wide policy and guidelines on the use of body cavity exams on detainees in DoD control (Tab B).

**COORDINATION:**

OGC Mr. Dell'Orto 25 October 2004  
 Joint Staff Director, Joint Staff 27 October 2004  
 Health Affairs CAPT Jack Smith 2 November 2004

Attachments:  
As Stated

Prepared by: Ross Hyams, Detainee Affairs, (b)(6)

DSD

Paul

*Ryan ① Do you really mean to require a GQFO approval when there is a reasonable belief that there is a security risk involved?*

*② See Pete Green's comment. Does my edit of bullet 3 fix the problem? Please recon. This.*

*Please see Pete Green's note at Tab C on the yellow notes.*

*OK Done*

|          |             |
|----------|-------------|
| TSA SD   | 11/23       |
| SRMA SD  | 12/10 JCL   |
| MA SD    |             |
| EXEC SEC | M 11/23 1/8 |
| ESR      | 16V11-23-04 |

*RH*

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 18742-04

17 Nov 04

15 Oct 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



**DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010



MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL  
OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
HEALTH AFFAIRS  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

SUBJECT: Policy Statement and Guidelines on Body Cavity Searches and  
Exams for Detainees Under DoD Control

Body cavity exams for detainees under DoD control shall be conducted in accordance with the attached policy guidance. Please ensure that this guidance is distributed within your organization. The Joint Staff is responsible for implementing this policy.

Attachment:  
As stated


~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27738



### **Policy Statement and Guidelines on Body Cavity Searches and Exams of Detainees in DoD Control.**

The United States has a significant and legitimate interest in performing appropriate security searches and medical exams that address the safety, health, and security concerns of DoD personnel and detainees under DoD control. However, the use of body cavity exams and searches may conflict with the customs of some detainees. Therefore, effective immediately, the following guidelines are in effect:

- Do not perform routine detainee body cavity exams or searches (to include hernia exams).
- Body cavity exams may be performed for valid medical reasons with the verbal consent of the patient. However, these exams should not be performed as part of a routine medical intake exam.
- Body cavity searches <sup>may</sup> ~~are to~~ be conducted ~~only~~ when there is a reasonable belief that the detainee is concealing an item that presents a security risk.
- To the extent possible and consistent with military necessity, a body cavity exam or search, whether conducted for medical or security reasons, should be conducted by personnel of the same gender as that of the detainee being searched.
- All body cavity exams and searches will be conducted in a manner that respects the person.
-  The first general officer in the chain of command shall be the approval authority for body cavity searches (other than those performed for valid medical reasons).
- For the purposes of this policy, a detainee is a person under the control of the Department of Defense as a result of armed conflict, including the global war on terrorism, and includes enemy combatants, enemy prisoners of war, and civilian internees.

~~FOUO~~

ES-1056  
04/013818

October 15, 2004

879

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Checking Detainees for Health

I don't see why U.S. taxpayers have to worry about whether detainees have hernias or enlarged prostates, particularly since examinations for it lead to charges of abuse.

383,6

Please find out whether that practice is still going on or if it has been discontinued.

DHR:ss  
101404-14

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

~~FOUO~~

15  
05/14

INFO MEMO

USD(P)

*copy provided  
12/31/04  
1/6*

I-04/013818

ES-1056

BEC 31 2004

FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

*Ryan Henry*

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake on Detainee Body Cavity Examinations

- You questioned whether it is necessary to require a GO/FO approval for a detainee body cavity search and if Pete Geren's edit of bullet # 3 of the policy fixed the problem (Tab A).
- We remain convinced that such approval should be required and would not jeopardize force protection.
  - o Policy convened a group of policy, legal, corrections, operational and medical experts and assessed that this policy will not impact current operations.
    - Units in Afghanistan no longer conduct routine body cavity searches.
    - Alternative non-invasive means of checking detainees for contraband are available.
- When the Secretary asked for this policy, we understood his intent to be to minimize the use of detainee body cavity searches, except for extraordinary security circumstances.
  - o As written, this draft policy ensures that detainee body cavity searches are conducted as an exception, not the norm.
  - o Approval at the GO/FO level will emphasize to lower-level commanders that this course of action is only for use in extraordinary circumstances.
- Recommend that you sign the attached memorandum that promulgates the policy attached at Tab B.

COORDINATION:

|             |                 |                  |
|-------------|-----------------|------------------|
| OGC         | Chuck Allen     | 16 December 2004 |
| Joint Staff | Col Barry Coble | 16 December 2004 |

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S  
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I

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



**DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010**

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL  
OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
HEALTH AFFAIRS  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Policy Statement and Guidelines on Body Cavity Searches and  
Exams for Detainees Under DoD Control

Body cavity exams for detainees under DoD control shall be conducted in accordance with the attached policy guidance. Please ensure that this guidance is distributed within your organization. The Joint Staff is responsible for implementing this policy.

Attachment:  
As stated

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/USD/27742

**Policy Statement and Guidelines on Body Cavity Searches and Exams  
of Detainees in DoD Control.**

The United States has a significant and legitimate interest in performing appropriate security searches and medical exams that address the safety, health, and security concerns of DoD personnel and detainees under DoD control. However, the use of body cavity exams and searches may conflict with the customs of some detainees. Therefore, effective immediately, the following guidelines are in effect:

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- Body cavity exams may be performed for valid medical reasons with the verbal consent of the patient. However, these exams should not be performed as part of a routine medical intake exam.
- Body cavity searches are to be conducted only when there is a reasonable belief that the detainee is concealing an item that presents a security risk.
- To the extent possible and consistent with military necessity, a body cavity exam or search, whether conducted for medical or security reasons, should be conducted by personnel of the same gender as that of the detainee being searched.
- All body cavity exams and searches will be conducted in a manner that respects the person.
- The first general officer in the chain of command shall be the approval authority for body cavity searches (other than those performed for valid medical reasons).
- For the purposes of this policy, a detainee is a person under the control of the Department of Defense as a result of armed conflict, including the global war on terrorism, and includes enemy combatants, enemy prisoners of war, and civilian internees.

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**The Military Assistant**

10 December 2004 - 1700

MEMORANDUM FOR USD(P)

Subject: Policy on Detainee Body Cavity Examinations


Sir,

The DSD reviewed the attached document and states the following:

“Ryan 1) Do you really mean to require GO/FO approval when there is a reasonable belief that there is a security risk involved? 2) See Pete Geren’s comment. Does my edit of bullet #3 fix the problem? Please reclear this. PW”

Please provide a copy of this tasker with your response.

Very Respectfully,



Sean E. O'Connor  
Captain, USN  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUSPENSE: 15 Dec 04  
ATTACHMENT: As Stated

OSD 18742-04

383.6

10 Dec 04

15 Dec 04

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**ACTION MEMO**

NOV 17 2004 704 NOV 22 PM 3:00 NOV 17 2004  
USD(P) *[Signature]*  
1-04/012998

*Deputy*  
FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Policy on Detainee Body Cavity Examinations

- On October 15, 2004, you asked Policy to examine if DoD needs a policy on detainee body cavity exams.
- I have reviewed this matter and recommend that you sign the attached memorandum (Tab A) that promulgates DoD-wide policy and guidelines on the use of body cavity exams on detainees in DoD control (Tab B).

**COORDINATION:**

OGC Mr. Dell'Orto 25 October 2004  
 Joint Staff Director, Joint Staff 27 October 2004  
 Health Affairs CAPT Jack Smith 2 November 2004

Attachments:  
As Stated

Prepared by: Ross Hyams, Detainee Affairs, (b)(6)

DSD

*D Paul*

*① Do you really mean to require a GPO approval when there is a reasonable belief that there is a security risk involved?*

*② See Pete Green's comment.*

*Please see Pete Green's note at Tab C on the yellow notes*

*JK*

*Dave*

*Does my edit of bullet 3 fix the problem?*

*Please reconsider this.*

*Tattom 12/9*

|          |                    |
|----------|--------------------|
| TSA SD   | 11/25              |
| SRMA SD  | 12/16 JCU 12/10/04 |
| MA SD    |                    |
| EXEC SEC | M 11/23 1/8        |
| ESR      | 18V11-23-04        |



**DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

JAN 12 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL  
OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
HEALTH AFFAIRS  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE

3834

SUBJECT: Policy Statement and Guidelines on Body Cavity Searches and  
Exams for Detainees Under DoD Control

12 JAN 05

Body cavity exams for detainees under DoD control shall be conducted in  
accordance with the attached policy guidance. Please ensure that this guidance is  
distributed within your organization. The Joint Staff is responsible for implementing this  
policy.

Attachment:  
As stated

OSD 18742-04

15 OCT 04





24

**Boykin, Jason CIV WHS/ESD**

---

**From:** Bruhn, Michael, Mr, OSD-ATL  
**Sent:** Monday, May 23, 2005 12:13 PM  
**To:** Boykin, Jason CIV WHS/ESD  
**cc:** Williams, Vanessa, Mrs, OSD-ATL  
**Subject:** RE: OSD 18755-04 (Interim Response to Bold Ideas for Acquisition)

40013

Close it as far as I'm concerned. Thx

**Michael L. Bruhn**  
**Director of Operations**  
**for the Under Secretary of Defense**  
**(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)**

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Williams, Vanessa, Mrs, OSD-ATL  
**Sent:** Monday, May 23, 2005 12:12 PM  
**To:** Boykin, Jason CIV WHS/ESD  
**cc:** Bruhn, Michael, Mr, OSD-ATL  
**Subject:** FW: OSD 18755-04 (Interim Response to Bold Ideas for Acquisition)

We have this case as closed. The attached action memo was signed by Mr. Wynne on 23 Nov 04. We have no further response from the SecDef.

<< File: osd 18755-04 Complete.pdf >>

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Bruhn, Michael, Mr, OSD-ATL  
**Sent:** Monday, May 23, 2005 9:38 AM  
**To:** Williams, Vanessa, Mrs, OSD-ATL; Barker, Elizabeth, CTR, OSD-ATL; Gamble, Michael, CTR, OSD-ATL  
**Subject:** FW: OSD 18755-04 (Interim Response to Bold Ideas for Acquisition)

Pls check, thx

**Michael L. Bruhn**  
**Director of Operations**  
**for the Under Secretary of Defense**  
**(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)**

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Boykin, Jason CIV WHS/ESD  
**Sent:** Monday, May 23, 2005 9:32 AM  
**To:** Bruhn, Michael, Mr, OSD-ATL  
**Subject:** OSD 18755-04 (Interim Response to Bold Ideas for Acquisition)

Mike,

23 Nov 05

21 Oct 04

I'm still carrying this as open. What **do** you show? It's old, can I close it?

Thanks,  
JB.

*Jason O. Boykin - ESD, WHS*

(b)(6)

ORIGINAL

HOLD  
CLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE  
NOV 23 2004 5:27 PM



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

ACTION MEMO

November 23, 2004, 12:00pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

9  
MWB

From: Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition  
Technology and Logistics)

*[Handwritten signature]*

Subject: Interim Response to Bold Ideas for Acquisition

- The purpose of this memo is to give you some early returns in response to your snowflake on Bold Ideas in Acquisition Management. The ideas are relatively easy to implement and would better align key organizations to incentivize jointness, the first step in improving acquisition. These ideas would be steps towards a bolder concept but would be useful whether or not you, and perhaps the Congress, embrace a bolder proposal. Since jointness is a Department objective, you can also achieve a major refocus by aligning resources with a policy directive.
- For aligning resources, it will be necessary to direct Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) to protect funding for joint, transformational and international programs, which AT&L will identify in each of the Services' fiscal guidance. Changes to those programs would require my approval prior to POM submission. This change would put your objectives for Joint, Transformational, and those International programs you support, at the top of the priority list. Unfortunately, as you know, joint programs are at or near the lowest priority for the Service programmers. As Secretary Roche ruefully puts it: "Joint means Navy won't pay." Transformational programs usually mean new programs and in any budget end-game, current programs beat new programs. Currently, international programs compete for the dubious distinction of being the lowest priority for the Services. Attached is a memo which gives such budgeting direction (Tab A) I recommend you sign it.
- Most of the objectives of Secretary Aldridge's Study regarding acquisition, and even an earlier study (1992) by Secretary Yockey, were to achieve jointness and to address capabilities, not individual systems. As I construct a bold proposal, driving jointness and avoiding duplicate systems, such as trucks, will be the overarching objectives -- saving slots should be secondary and should not therefore be the objective. In the interim, the following steps would be effective in promoting jointness and could be implemented this cycle:



ORIGINAL

OSD 18755-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27749

*[Handwritten notes and signatures]*

- Realign all Service research and development (R&D) commands and laboratories under the Director Defense Research and Engineering (D,DR&E). Establish Centers of Excellence with the current DoD/Service lab resources (including the universities doing basic research) in order to concentrate Science & Technology(S&T) and R&D efforts in **specific** areas. Developmental priorities would be addressed without duplicative structures. if you agree, I will **task** D,DR&E to come back to me in forty five days with a **recommendation on how they would organize these capabilities**. Examples of **organizations** that will be realigned can be found at Tab **B**.
- Realign all Logistics organizations and functions, currently resident within the Services, under the **Deputy Under** Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Material Readiness)(DUSD(L&MR)). If you agree, I will **task** the DUSD(L&MR) to come back to me in forty five days with a recommendation on how they might organize to accomplish this objective. This consolidated logistics focus would **facilitate** efficiencies, balanced workloads and **make** public private partnerships **more** productive. Examples of organizations that will be realigned can be found at Tab **C**.

COORDINATION: Tab D

**RECOMMENDATIONS :**

1. Recommend you sign the memo at **Tab A**.
2. Recommend you approve development of implementation plans for realigning R&D commands and laboratories as well as Material Management and Maintenance organizations (Tabs **B** and **C**)—with response within **45 days**.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

See Me: \_\_\_\_\_

CC: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT  
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Priority for Joint, Transformational, and International Acquisition Programs

In order to ensure appropriate emphasis is given to Joint, Transformational, and International programs, I am directing Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) to protect funding, in the budgeting process, for programs in these categories. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Technology and Logistics) USD(AT&L) will identify the program funding for each of these programs in the Services' fiscal guidance.

Changes to these programs shall require USD(AT&L) approval prior to Program Objective Memorandum submission. The process is intended to ensure the integrity of these Joint, Transformational, and International programs critical to transforming the Department of Defense and meeting the capability needs of our warfighters.



11-L-0559/OSD/27751

# Proposed RDT&E Realignment

- Office of Defense Research (Science)
  - Office of **Naval Research** (Naval Research Lab as the **Defense Research Lab**)
  - **Army Research Office**
  - **Army Research Lab**
  - **Air Force** Office of Scientific **Research**
  - **Air Force Research Lab**
  - **Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency**
- Office of **Technology** and Engineering (**Demonstrations** and **Prototypes**)
  - R&D Components of the **Naval Systems Commands and Warfare Centers (Non-ACAT I)**
  - **Marine Corps Warfighting Lab**
  - R&D Components of **Army Research, Development & Engineering (Non-ACAT I)**
  - R&D Components of the **Air Force Systems Program Offices (Non-ACAT I)**

# Proposed Logistics Realignment

- **Material Management**
  - **Army, Navy and Air Force Inventory Control Points**
  - **DLA Supply Centers**
  - **Other Materiel Mgt storage locations from the Services and Defense Agencies**
  - **Army Arsenals**
  - **Marine Corps Logistics Base**
- **Maintenance and Repair Facilities**
  - **Army and Marine Corps Maintenance Depots**
  - **Naval and Marine Corps Aviation Depots**
  - **Naval shipyards**
  - **Air Logistics Centers**
- **Distribution Centers/Depots**
  - **Defense Distribution Depots**
  - **Weapons stations and ammunitions depots**
  - **Operational (retail level) stock points**
- **Logistics Information Services**

COORDINATION

**General Counsel**

\_\_\_\_\_

November 23, 2004

-  
-



TAB

~~FOUO~~

October 21, 2004

TO: Mike Wynne

CC: Gen Dick Myers Paul Wolfowitz  
 Gen Pete Pace Jim Roche  
 Gordon England Les Brownlee  
 Jim Haynes Powell Moore  
 Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Acquisition Reform

413.51

DoD has a long way to go to ensure that our acquisition process achieves the appropriate jointness and interoperability needed in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Despite the progress with JROC and the work by AT&L and JFCOM on Command and Control, we still end up with the Marine Corps and Army procuring, driving, and training with different kinds of heavy trucks, for example. As we move forward with the QDR, **we** absolutely must transform the acquisition process. There are numerous suggestions floating around including:

- Have those in acquisition stay in their jobs longer
- A process to select the best people with the right backgrounds for key acquisition jobs
- Develop a Congressional strategy that gets the legislation needed to cut through red-tape and minimize bureaucratic roadblocks
- Consider improving joint acquisition by having more truly joint programs, and perhaps having officers from one service head up programs for other services
- Other?

21 OCT 04

Please get back to me with some bold proposals. This needs to get fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102004-18

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 18755-04

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/27755

Tab

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

SECRET

2004 NOV 22 01:05:27

CM-2195-04

22 November 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *from 11/1*

SUBJECT: Acquisition and Jointness

- **Issue.** You expressed a desire that we fix the acquisition process to achieve better jointness and interoperability (TAB). Specific examples include differences in Army and Marine Corps trucks and associated training.
- **Conclusion.** The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is evolving to manage the jointness and interoperability aspects of acquisition programs. It will be more adaptive to transformational programs (like the Army's Future Combat System) that leverage spiral development and other accelerated acquisition techniques. I will arrange for a briefing if you would like an update on the process.
- **Discussion.** When the Marine Corps was acquiring a new model truck, it first examined the suitability of the current Army variant and concluded that it was incapable of operating from the beach and soft sand during expeditionary operations. For that reason, the Corps turned its attention to another variant that was more suitable. Under the old requirements-generation process, this Marine Corps acquisition program was beneath the threshold for joint review. Under the current capabilities-based process, that would not be the case. All programs, regardless of threshold, are currently assessed for their jointness. Furthermore, JCIDS covers all aspects of joint acquisition, including training.

COORDINATION: NONE


Attachment:

As stated

copy to:

USD(AT&L)

Prepared By: VADM Robert F. Willard, USN; Director, J-8;



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27756

OSD 18755-04

TAB

~~FOUO~~

October 21, 2004

TO: Mike Wynne

CC: Gen Dick Myers Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Pete Pace Jim Roche  
Gordon England Les Brownlee  
Jim Haynes Powell Moore  
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Acquisition Reform

DoD has a long way to go to ensure that our acquisition process achieves the appropriate jointness and interoperability needed in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Despite the progress with JROC and the work by AT&L and JFCOM on Command and Control, we still end up with the Marine Corps and Army procuring, driving, and training with different kinds of heavy trucks, for example. As we move forward with the QDR, we absolutely must transform the acquisition process. There are numerous suggestions floating around including:

- Have those in acquisition stay in their jobs longer
- A process to select the best people with the right backgrounds for key acquisition jobs
- Develop a Congressional strategy that gets the legislation needed to cut through red-tape and minimize bureaucratic roadblocks
- Consider improving joint acquisition by having more truly joint programs, and perhaps having officers from one service head up programs for other services
- Other?

Please get back to me with some bold proposals. This needs to get fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102004-18

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 18755-04

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/27757

Tab

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

NOV 02 11:23

November 2, 2004

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
 CC Gen Dick Myers  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Training Matter

*Are you doing anything to fix that problem of the lack of jointness and interoperability in common training with respect to the heavy trucks -between the Marines and the Army and any other service?*

Thanks.

DR:ms  
11004-3

.....  
 Please respond by 11/12/04

~~FOUO~~

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Tab A

OSD 18826-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27758



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-2201-04

22 November 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers/22*

SUBJECT: Training Matter

- **Question.** “Are you doing anything to fix that problem of the lack of jointness and interoperability in common training with respect to the heavy trucks – between the Marines and the Army and any other service?” (TAB A)
- **Answer.** Joint Motor Transportation Training is occurring on a situational basis. Discussion of moving toward a common fleet of heavy trucks is in the initial steps of the JROC process.
- **Analysis**
  - The Army, in conjunction with the respective Services, offers motor transportation training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, to support Army, Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force requirements. Technical training for five of the six Air Force basic vehicle maintenance specialties is conducted jointly with the Navy through the Interservice Training Review Organization at Naval Air Station, Port Hueneme, California. The sixth course is collocated at the Army Technical Training Center at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland.
  - Additionally, the Army and Air Force recently entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to train Air Force personnel to perform 88M (operator) duties in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. This initiative has Air Force personnel receiving Army training on driving techniques and convoy defense operations and procedures.
  - The Joint Capability Board has tasked the Focused Logistics Functional Capability Board to investigate joint approaches for a common fleet of heavy trucks. The Joint Staff, J-4, J-7, the Services and OSD(AT&L) are participating in this effort. A roadmap should be available for review by February 2005.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Major General Jack Catton, USAF; Director, J-7; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27759

OSD 18826-04

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

NOV 02 11:23

November 2, 2004

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
C C Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Training Matter

*Are you doing anything to fix that problem of the lack of jointness and interoperability in common training with respect to the heavy trucks -between the Marines and the Army and any other service?*

Thanks.

DMR:ee  
110204-2

.....  
Please respond by 11/12/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/27760

OSD 18826-04

---

TAB B

COORDINATION

| Unit | Name                      | Date             |
|------|---------------------------|------------------|
| USA  | COL Roy Howle             | 9 November 2004  |
| USN  | CAPT Curt Goldacker       | 10 November 2004 |
| USAF | Col Shelby Ball           | 9 November 2004  |
| USMC | Col A. E. <b>Van</b> Dyke | 10 November 2004 |

7200

~~FOUO~~  
TAB A

September 30, 2004 03:11:32

370.02

TO: Ryan Henry  
Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
  
SUBJECT: Sinai Commitment

Here we are, three years later, and we still have a significant number of people committed to the Sinai force. Please get a plan to me to cut it by one-third. We should also have a plan to cut it to no more than 100 within two years.

We can do this.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
093004-13

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

30 Sep 04

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27762

OSD 18827-04





CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-2202-04 3, 11: 22  
23 November 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 11/22*

SUBJECT: Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai Commitment

- **Issue.** "Here we are, three years later, and we still have a significant number of people committed to the Sinai force. Please get a plan to me to cut it by one-third. We should also have a plan to cut it to no more than 100 within two years." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** There are several options available to reduce the DOD Sinai commitment, all of which require a significant interagency investment and the agreement of Israel, Egypt and MFO HQ Rome (TAB B).
- **Discussion.** If such prerequisites can be met, the Department of Defense can reduce its MFO commitments by over one-third by transitioning from a static observation plan – ~~manning~~ all check points (CPs) 24/7 – to an alternating observation coverage plan, manning selected CPs on an irregular basis. Additional MFO force reductions include contracting existing DOD-provided support capabilities (aviation, finance, postal, materiel management) and elimination of MFO sectors five and six (TAB C).

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General J. T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27763

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ OSD 18827-04

~~FOUO~~  
TAB A

September 30, 2004 11:32

TO: Ryan Henry  
Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Sinai Commitment

Here we are, three **years** later, and we still have a significant **number of people** committed to the **Sinai** force. Please get a plan to me to cut it by one-third. We should also **have** a plan to cut it to no **more** than 100 **within** two years.

We can do **this**.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
093004-13

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27764

OSD 18827-04

## TAB B

27 October 2004

### INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai Commitment

1. Purpose. To provide information on ways to reduce DOD MFO Sinai force level commitments.

2. Key Points

- Efforts to reduce the DOD MFO commitment will require interagency support and agreement by the 1982 MFO Protocol signatories: Israel, Egypt and MFO HQ Rome.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Meeting the SecDef force reduction timeline requires OSD(P) negotiations to be completed in sufficient time to allow the US Army time to identify, alert and mobilize the required force.
  - ~~(FOUO)~~ MFO-49 (Jan06, 395 personnel (PER); reduced from MFO-48, 687 PER):
    - Negotiations completed June 2005
    - Forces sourced / alerted July 2005
    - Forces mobilized October 2005
    - Forces deploy December 2005
  - ~~(FOUO)~~ MFO-50 (Jan07, 89 PER):
    - Negotiations completed June 2006
    - Forces sourced / alerted July 2006
    - Forces mobilized October 2006
    - Forces deploy December 2006
- ~~(FOUO)~~ There are several long-term tasks OSD(P) should pursue to support both the near-term force level reductions and the ultimate goal of withdrawing all US Sinai forces.
  - ~~(FOUO)~~ Inform signatories and MFO HQ Rome of USG intent to initiate MFO force level reductions beginning January 2006 and full US infantry battalion withdrawal by January 2007.
  - ~~(FOUO)~~ Intensify efforts to identify donor nations to backfill the US infantry battalion obligation. Identified donor nation would have to be vetted with the signatories and MFO HQ Rome.


Tab B

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27765

- ~~(FOUO)~~ Initiate talks and ultimately negotiations to close the MFO Sinai mission and transfer focus towards a Gaza observation mission.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The following actions reduce current force levels by over one-third. If executed, the estimated MFO-49 force level would be 395 PER.
  - ~~(FOUO)~~ Transition from a static observation plan to an alternating observation coverage plan in US sectors five and six.
    - ~~(FOUO)~~ US sectors five and six contain 12 fixed observation posts and check points.
    - ~~(FOUO)~~ US forces currently staff all 12 sites daily.
    - ~~(FOUO)~~ An alternating coverage plan allows the commander to develop a plan to staff selected fixed sites based on mission requirements and intelligence assessments. Rotating staffing for up to six fixed sites on an alternating basis should reduce infantry battalion requirements by two companies, or 150 PER.
    - ~~(FOUO)~~ Concurrently, inform signatories and MFO HQ Rome of USG intent to not field the infantry battalion requirement beginning January 2007 and initiate reduction in US force levels beginning January 2006. This action supports staffing requirements for a new observation plan.
  - ~~(FOUO)~~ Outsource US-provided helicopter support resident in the MFO support battalion.
    - ~~(FOUO)~~ US Army provides 10 UH-1 helicopters with crew and required support personnel, and is scheduled to replace UH-1 fleet with UH-60 aircraft in FY05, which may increase personnel requirements.
    - ~~(FOUO)~~ Contracting helicopter capability will require additional funding, estimated 2 years ago to be \$18M dollars the first year and \$13M dollars in the outyears, causing an increase in USG MFO funding levels. Increased funding levels will require a Presidential Determination finding and the identification of a funding source.
    - ~~(FOUO)~~ Contracted helicopter support will reduce US force levels by 105 PER and possibly an additional 37 PER in the MFO Support Battalion HQ structure.
  - ~~(FOUO)~~ Eliminate redundant US force structure and capabilities.

- ~~(FOUO)~~ Task Force Sinai (US element of MFO) contains two battalion headquarters for 687 PER. The infantry battalion headquarters provides command and control (C2) for the observation mission, and the support battalion headquarters provides C2 for MFO logistic operations.
  - ~~(FOUO)~~ Combining both operations under one battalion C2 node is executable, but requires an assessment by the US Army and agreement by the signatories and MFO HQ Rome.
  - ~~(FOUO)~~ Reduction of one battalion headquarters could reduce force level by 37 PER.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The following actions reduce MFO-50 force levels to 89 PER.
    - ~~(FOUO)~~ OSD(P) identifies a new donor nation to replace US infantry battalion capability in MFO sectors five and *six*.
      - ~~(FOUO)~~ Donor nation would have to be vetted and approved by the signatories and MFO HQ Rome.
      - ~~(FOUO)~~ If no donor nation is identified, recommend eliminating sectors five and *six* and moving sector four southern boundary to include the town of Taba. A boundary change would have to be negotiated with the signatories and MFO HQ Rome.
      - ~~(FOUO)~~ Eliminating US infantry battalion obligations reduces current force level by 425 PER.
    - ~~(FOUO)~~ Outsource selected US-provided MFO support battalion capabilities.
      - ~~(FOUO)~~ Replace explosive ordnance demolition, materiel management, postal, finance and selected medical capabilities with contracted services.
      - ~~(FOUO)~~ Contracted capability would increase MFO costs, requiring an additional funding source and a Presidential Determination finding.
      - ~~(FOUO)~~ Contracted logistic support should reduce US force levels by 43 personnel.



TAB C



# *Sinai Commitment and Force Reduction IPR*

**01 November 2004**

This Joint Staff briefing is classified  
**UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~**

Tab C

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27768



## *SecDef Direction*

- **Cut US Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) Sinai force by one-third**
- **Develop a plan to reduce US force levels to 100 within 2 years**

Tab C

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27769






## *Assumptions*

- MFO signatories and contributor nations do not want to decrease MFO structure or alter its mission
  
- Israel and Egypt want US military presence for security
  - Keeps United States engaged in Middle East peace process
  - United States serves as MFO backbone
  - Helps ensure other MFO participants will not back out
  - United States is honest broker
  - United States funds one-third of MFO costs
  
- US force level reduction may need to be met with an increase in US commitment in other areas
  - Must make best efforts to recruit backfill donor nations
  - Contract and fund helicopter support
  - Increasing OLIVE HARVEST support
  - Increase civilian observer unit to expand coverage





# MFO Transition Timeline



Tab C

~~FOUO~~



# One Third Reduction End State



## MFO-48 Force Structure

|                            |            |
|----------------------------|------------|
| MFO Headquarters Staff     | 27         |
| Infantry Battalion HQ      | 125        |
| Line Company               | 75         |
| Line Company               | 75         |
| Line Company               | 75         |
| Line Company               | 75         |
| Support Battalion HQ       | 37         |
| Services                   | 12         |
| Materiel Management        | 14         |
| EOD Detachment             | 5          |
| Medical Detachment         | 62         |
| <u>Aviation Detachment</u> | <u>105</u> |
| Total                      | 687        |

## MFO-49 Force Structure

|                                 |            |
|---------------------------------|------------|
| MFO Headquarters Staff          | 27         |
| Infantry Battalion HQ           | 125        |
| Line Company                    | 75         |
| Line Company                    | 75         |
| <del>Line Company</del>         | 75         |
| <del>Line Company</del>         | 75         |
| <del>Support Battalion HQ</del> | 37         |
| Services                        | 12         |
| Materiel Management             | 14         |
| EOD Detachment                  | 5          |
| Medical Detachment              | 62         |
| <del>Aviation Detachment</del>  | <u>105</u> |
| Total                           | 395        |

Tab C

~~FOUO~~



## *MFO Force 100 End State*

### **MFO-49 Force Structure**

|  |            |
|--|------------|
| <b>MFO Headquarters Staff</b>          | <b>27</b>  |
| <b>Infantry Battalion Headquarters</b> | <b>125</b> |
| <b>Line Company</b>                    | <b>75</b>  |
| <b>Line Company</b>                    | <b>75</b>  |
| <b>Services</b>                        | <b>12</b>  |
| <b>Materiel Management</b>             | <b>14</b>  |
| <b>EOD Detachment</b>                  | <b>5</b>   |
| <b>Medical Detachment</b>              | <b>62</b>  |
| <b>Total</b>                           | <b>395</b> |

### **MFO-50 Force Structure**

|   |                       |
|---|-----------------------|
| <b>MFO Headquarters Staff</b>                     | <b>27</b>             |
| <del><b>Infantry Battalion Headquarters</b></del> | <del><b>125</b></del> |
| <del><b>Line Company</b></del>                    | <del><b>75</b></del>  |
| <del><b>Line Company</b></del>                    | <del><b>75</b></del>  |
| <del><b>Services</b></del>                        | <del><b>12</b></del>  |
| <del><b>Materiel Management</b></del>             | <del><b>14</b></del>  |
| <del><b>EOD Detachment</b></del>                  | <del><b>5</b></del>   |
| <del><b>Medical Detachment</b></del>              | <del><b>62</b></del>  |
| <b>Total</b>                                      | <b>89</b>             |

Tab C

~~FOUR~~



## *MFO Force 100*

- OSD(P)
  - Inform signatories of force drawdown and propose alternatives
    - Identify donor nation backfill for US infantry battalion or eliminate some sectors
    - Outsource selected US capabilities (postal, limited medical, EOD, materiel management)
  - Obtain Presidential Determination and funding for contracts
  
- Chairman of the JCS publish PLANORD directing US Army to identify:
  - US-provided capabilities that can be contracted
  - Force structure required to support limited MFO engagement
  
- Complete: Oct 06




## *One Third Reduction*

- **OSD(P)**
  - Inform signatories of force drawdown and propose alternatives
    - Modify observation plan reducing force requirements
    - Identify donor nation backfill for US force reductions
    - Outsource selected US capabilities (aviation)
  - Obtain Presidential Determination and funding for contracts
  - Recommend MFO increase civilian observer unit personnel
- Chairman of the JCS publish PLANORD directing US Army to:
  - Identify US provided capabilities that can be contracted
  - Assist Task Force Sinai development of modified observation plan
  - Develop plan to consolidate US MFO forces into one task force
- Complete: Jan 06



# MFO Sinai Zones and Sectors



Tab C

~~FOUO~~

TAB D

**COORDINATION PAGE**

USA

COL Chappell

10 November 2004

ISA/NESA

Mr. Hulley

27 October 2004

Tab D

11-L-0559/OSD/27777

November 8, 2004  
11:38:47

TO: . Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Dick Myers  
Steve Cambone  
Ray DuBois

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Alert Status

We need to think **through** whether we **want** to lower the alert status arrangements and, therefore, costs for **those activities** that DoD is engaged in.

Please get **back** to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
110804-11



Please respond by 12/5/04

384

8 Nov 04

OSD 18858-04



~~FOUO~~

OCT 6 2004

October 6, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Individual Ready Reserve

I understand the Marines very carefully follow their Individual Ready Reserve and the rest of the services don't do as good a job.

Please find out what the Marines do, and let's fashion a program we agree with and impose it on all the services.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100604-2



Please respond by 10/29/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18875-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27779



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

November 23, 2004 – 12:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: *David S. C. Chu @ Nov 23*  
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- You recommended that we fashion a program to improve IRR management by using the Marine Corps program as a model. We are doing so.
- At the July 2004 IRR Conference we developed an aggressive IRR program based on the three pillars of the Marine Corps program: Expectation Management, Management Concepts, and IRR Use and Access.
  - Expectation Management: A deliberate DoD-wide program to educate service members, the public, and the Congress on the IRR, and members' Military Service Obligations (MSO) and responsibilities.
  - Management Concepts: Tracking of musters, member location, and readiness.
  - IRR Use and Access: The services are reviewing the Marine Corps model of linking members to an operations plan, local face-to-face muster/assessments, and tracking the currency of military experience.
- Web-based technologies will be employed. We are encouraging the Services to adopt the USMC Reserve Duty On-Line (RDOL) web-based RC usage tool. It captures volunteer and recruiting opportunities, civilian employment information, and more.
- First quarterly update on IRR improvement programs from the Services is due to me next month; I will provide you a summary.

Attachment: As stated


Prepared By: Colonel Joseph Viani, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)



OCT 6 2004

~~FOUO~~

October 6, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Individual Ready Reserve

I understand the Marines very carefully follow their Individual Ready Reserve and the rest of the services don't do as good a job.

Please find out what the Marines do, and let's fashion a program we agree with and impose it on all the services.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100604-2

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18875-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27781

11/18/04

720

Nov 17, 2004  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 NOV 23 11 06:31

TO David Chu  
CC Gen Dick Myers  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Virginia National Guard

I understand that the Virginia National Guard is not good. Every  
someone tells me they are resigning or that they are not recruiting

ere I turn,  
nd so forth.

What do we do about fixing it? Should someone talk with the Go  
need new leadership? What do you propose?

mor? Does it

Thanks.

DIR: 111704-10

.....  
Please respond by 12/17/04

~~FOUO~~

TOTAL P.01

SD 18887-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27782

322

17 NOV 04



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



2004 NOV 23 PM 6:30

INFO MEMO

November 22, 2004 – 15:00

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

*David S. C. Chu 23 Nov 04*

SUBJECT: Virginia National Guard—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- The Virginia Army National Guard achieved **only 65** percent of its FY 2004 recruiting mission, but **94.8** percent of its strength mission.
- The Virginia **Air** National Guard is performing better, achieving **98.3** percent of its FY 2004 strength mission.
- Virginia **Army** National Guard is one of **nine** that have **missed their ARNG** recruiting missions for the past four years.
  - o They are: CT, DE, HI, IL, LA, MA, MD, VA and VI.
  - o Overall, the Virginia Army National Guard missed its FY 2004 recruiting mission of 56,002 by 7,209 and its authorized strength of 350,000 by 7,081.
- We have engaged the Guard leadership to look at a **rebalancing of structure**.
  - o We will meet with LTG Blum and his Directors on **December 3** to establish the "way ahead".

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Rich Krimmer, OASD/RA(M&P)

(b)(6)

325

22 Nov 04

17 Nov 04

26



11-L-0559/OSD/27783

GSD 18887-04



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

120

~~FOUO~~

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



2004 NOV 23 PM 6:30

**ACTION MEMO**

November 22, 2004

387

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Dr. David Chu, USD (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

*David L. Chu, 23 Nov 04*

SUBJECT: MEASURING BOOTS ON GROUND (BOG)--Snowflake

- The attached paper (Tab A) addresses your snowflake (Tab B) concerning "Army deployment length to Iraq and Afghanistan."
- We have worked with the Joint Staff, Joint Forces Command and the Army (tab C) to craft a truthful and simple deployment measure.
- We believe that this measure will allow the troops and their families to form realistic expectations of deployment duration for tours in support of the Global War on Terrorism.
- If you agree we will ensure this measure is promulgated as policy in the deployment process.

22 NOV 04

RECOMMENDATION: Review and approve the attached measure of "Boots on the Ground."

Approved \_\_\_\_\_ Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: Joint Staff (Tab C)

Attachments:  
As Stated

Prepared by: Dr. Paul Mayberry, (b)(6)



27 OCT 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27784

OSD 18889-04

**DRAFT**

**“Boots on Ground (BOG)”**

SecDef Guidance:

- Truthful, simple policy
- A goal, not a promise
- Be precise; above all, be honest

Concept:

- Boots on Ground is a unit management metric based on time in theater, defined as the CENTCOM AOR in support of OIF/OEF.
- Individual expectations are set based on unit's BOG date.
- BOG is measured from the date the center of mass of the unit main body arrives in theater until the center of mass of the unit main body departs theater as reported by the service component command.

Refinements:

- Exact unit arrival date as reported by unit commanders to the service component command and validated by CENTCOM.
- Combat units report BOG at the Brigade/Regiment level.
  - All tasked subordinate units will have the same BOG date-unless a subordinate unit is moving independently of the brigade or regiment.
- Supporting or separate units will report BOG at the battalion, squadron, company, or detachment as defined by UIC/DUIC/UTC.
- Deployments are not to exceed 365 days, to include all turn-over and coordination time between rotating units.
- SecDef approval required for any BOG extension of Army units beyond 365 days.
  - For other Services, SecDef approval required for any BOG extension beyond prior approved Service rotation policy on which deployment was based.

Process Changes:

- CENTCOM will:
  - Submit all BOG extension requests through Joint Staff for SecDef approval.
  - Receive, validate, and publish BOG dates for units on SIPRNET website.
- CENTCOM Service Component Commands will:
  - Track BOG and return dates for allocated units to support sourcing decisions.
  - Ensure BOG policy is disseminated, understood, and enforced throughout their units and arbitrate all discrepancies concerning BOG for their units.
- The Joint Staff will monitor BOG policy implementation.
- If the Combatant Commander determines the requirement for a unit is no longer needed, that unit may redeploy prior to 365 days and a back fill unit will not be deployed.

**DRAFT**

1500 3 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27785

OCT 27 2004

~~FOUO~~

October 27, 2004  
OCT 27 2004 11 6:20

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Army Deployment Length Policy

Please write down a truthful, simple policy that can govern Army deployment length to Iraq and Afghanistan. It should make clear that whatever we decide upon is a goal, not a promise; and that many variables over which we exercise little control may cause perturbations.

Be precise and, above all, honest in laying it out.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102704-6

.....  
Please respond by 11/12/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18889-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27786





THE JOINT STAFF  
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:  
20318-0300

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
PERSONNEL AND READINESS


Subject: OIF/OEF Boots on the Ground/Army Deployment Length Policy

Sic,

1. Thank you for the opportunity to review the proposed OSD (P&R) draft Boots on the Ground (BOG) policy. The Joint Staff has reviewed and coordinated with J-1, OCJCS/LC, USJFCOM, USA, USAF, USMC and USN. Recommended changes and comments are enclosed.

2. The Joint Staff point of contact is Lieutenant Colonel Wallin, USAF; J-3;

(b)(6)

  
NORTON A. SCHWARTZ  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Director, Joint Staff

Enclosure

Reference:

- 1 USD(P&R) memorandum, 12 November 2004, "OIF/OEF Boots on the Ground/ Army Deployment Length Policy"

Dr Cho / Mr Abell,

This is a formal consolidated response.  
As we have discussed, we'd prefer "12 months"  
vice "305" but understand your position.

  
Norton

11-L-0559/OSD/27787

ENCLOSURE

COMMENTS ON OIF/OEF BOOTS ON THE GROUND/ARMY  
DEPLOYMENT LENGTH POLICY DRAFT

1. General Comment: All occurrences of “365 days” should be replaced with “12 months,” for the following reasons:

a. Aligns policy guidance with Department of the Army max Boots on the Ground (BOG) definition of 12 months.

b. Standardizes understanding of BOG policy within Joint Staff, combatant commands and Services.

c. Maintains current flexibility for force deployment/ redeployment planning and execution.

d. Is a more realistic, albeit less accurate, expectation for US forces deploying to the USCENTCOM AOR.

2. Page 1, “Concept” paragraph, 1st bullet. Change as follows: “Boots on Ground (BOG) is a unit management metric defined as “date main body of the unit has reported in theater as reported by the service component command based on time in theater, defined as the USCENTCOM AOR in support of OIF/OEF.””

REASON: Paragraph deals with BOG metric. Provides clarification and specificity of the BOG metric, a unit’s BOG begins as soon as the unit arrives in the USCENTCOM AOR .

3. Page 1, “Concept” paragraph, 2nd bullet. Change as follows: “Individuals; expectations are set...”

REASON: Correct punctuation.

4. Page 1, “Concept” paragraph, 3rd bullet. “BOG is measured based on time in theater, defined as the USCENTCOM AOR in support of OIF/OEF from the date the center of mass of the unit main body arrives in theater until the center of mass of the unit main body departs the theater; a unit’s BOG will not exceed 12 months.”

REASON: Paragraph deals with the BOG definition and how BOG is measured. Provides specificity and standardization on start date and end date for determining BOG, supported by US Army.

5. Page 1, “Refinements” paragraph, 2nd bullet. Change as follows: “Army combat units report BOG at the Brigade/Regiment level. USMC combat units report BOG at the Battalion/ Squadron level.”

Enclosure

REASON: USMC combat units report BOG at the battalion and squadron level. USMC battalion and squadron level units deploy for 7-months in accordance with approved Service rotation policy. Regimental headquarters and above deploy for approximately 12 months. Different deployment lengths require USMC units to report BOG at battalion and squadron level.

6. Page 1, "Refinements" paragraph, 2nd bullet, sub-bullet. Change as follows: "All tasked subordinate units will have the same BOG date unless a subordinate unit is moving independently of the brigade/regiment or battalion/squadron."

REASON: Provides guidance and clarification for determining BOG for subordinate units that are independent of their higher echelon. The deployment flow plan is normally in phases and it is unrealistic to expect all units to have the same BOG.

7. Page 1, "Refinements" paragraph, 3rd bullet. Change as follows: "Supporting or separate units will report BOG at the battalion, squadron, company, or detachment level as defined by UIC/DUIC (UTC for Air Force units)."

REASON: Clarifies that not all Services use UIC/DUIC for reporting BOG. The US Air Force uses UTCs.

8. Page 1, "Refinements" paragraph, 5th bullet. Change as follows: "SecDef approval required for any BOG extension of ~~Army~~ units beyond ~~365~~12 months.

REASON: The 12 months BOG is the maximum established BOG regardless of Service.

9. Page 1, "Refinements" paragraph, 5th bullet, sub-bullet. Change as follows: "~~For other Services, SecDef approval required for any BOG extension beyond standard Service rotation policy on which deployment was based.~~ USMC and Naval units executing GNFPP/GMFP schedule in support of the CENTCOM AOR will continue to follow the GNFPP/GMFP process unless otherwise directed in a CJCS EXORD Modification and subsequent GNFPP/GMFP change."

REASON: Service deployment rotation policy is well defined and there is a rigorous system in place to manage deployments that exceed established standards. Service standard rotation policy can and should be managed by the Services. Additionally, the SecDef is briefed on duration of non-standard Service contributions during the normal

SecDef Orders Book process. The addition of GNFPP/GMFP wording acknowledges USMC and US Navy concerns. Changes to these Service programs are briefed annually and whenever operational changes occur using the SecDef Orders Book process.

10. Page 1, "Refinements" paragraph. Add ~~sixth~~ bullet to read: "Selected individuals from a unit may exceed the 12 months BOG due to operational circumstances."

REASON: The operational situation may require that specific individuals within a unit may be required to exceed BOG in order to fill a critical skill requirement.

11. Page 2, "Process Changes:" paragraph, 1st bullet, 2nd sub-bullet. Change as follows: "Receive, validate, and publish BOG dates for all units on a SIPRNET accessible website. This website shall be accessible by all Force Providers (Joint and Service) to ensure proper planning, mobilization and training to support required rotations."

REASON: Provides guidance to ensure dissemination of critical BOG information in a timely manner to all force providers through a universal secure manner.

OCT 27 2004

~~FOUO~~

October 27, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Army Deployment Length Policy

Please write down a truthful, simple policy that can govern Army deployment length to Iraq and Afghanistan. It should make clear that whatever we decide upon is a goal, not a promise; and that many variables over which we exercise little control may cause perturbations.

Be precise and, above all, honest in laying it out.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102704-6

.....  
Please respond by 11/12/04

370

27 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18889-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27791

ES-1211  
 I-04/014540-EP  
 DepSecDef  
 USDP  
 NOV 16 2004

**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
**FROM:** MIRA RICARDEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (ACTING)

NOV 12 2004

**SUBJECT:** Thank You Letters for Afghanistan Election Assistance

Four nations deployed additional forces to ISAF primarily in support of the Afghan presidential election:

- Spain: Sent a light infantry battalion of 550, to augment long-term ISAF presence of approximately 500 troops
- Italy: Sent a light infantry battalion of 500 to augment a long-term ISAF presence of 500 troops.
- Germany: Sent approximately 70 psychological warfare troops to augment long-term ISAF presence of 2 100 troops.
- Netherlands: Sent approximately 250 troops, including 6 F-16s, to augment long-term presence of approximately 500.

At Tab A are proposed thank you letters to the MoDs of Italy, Spain, Germany, and The Netherlands for your signature.

**RECOMMENDATION:** SecDef sign suggested thank you letters at Tab A.

**APPROVE** \_\_\_\_\_

**OTHER** \_\_\_\_\_

DASD (EUR/NATO) \_\_\_\_\_ Dir (I)  
 Dir (EPS): \_\_\_\_\_

Coalition Mgt *Mary Tighe, 4 Nov 04* Dir (NATO): \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by: COL AJ Torres, ISP/EPS, (b)(6)  
 Prepared on: 11/3/2004 16:06

|          |             |
|----------|-------------|
| TSA SD   | 11/30       |
| SRMA SD  |             |
| MA SD    |             |
| EXEC SEC | M 11/30     |
| ESR      | 16011-26-09 |

OSD 18894-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27792

Afghanistan  
 12 Nov 04  
 29 Oct 04

*pub*

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Large handwritten signature]*

11/4  
1600

~~FOUO~~  
[Faint mirrored text]

October 29, 2004

I-04/014540  
ES-1211

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: [Faint]

SUBJECT: Thank you to Italians

We probably ought to send a thank you to the Italians for stepping up and providing **troops** for the Afghan election, and anyone else who helped.

DHR ss  
102904-23

.....  
Please respond by 11/5/04

Afghanistan

fcvB →  
TO Sec Def

See ed 177

29 OCT 04

L of 23

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/27793

OSD 18894-04  
20-10-04 18:04 IN



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES  
EXECUTIVE SERVICES & COMMUNICATIONS

December 1, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR CABLES DUTY OFFICER

SUBJECT: Release of Message – SECDEF Letter to Italy MOD Martino and  
Netherlands MOD Kamp

The attached package contains a message/cable to be released via the Defense Messaging System (DMS).

The text of the message and accompanying letter (as appropriate) has been reviewed and cleared for release.

Please return a copy of this memo along with a copy of the transmitted message to the Correspondence Control Division.

Thank you.

Executive Services and Communications

Correspondence Analyst

Attachments:  
As stated

**OSD 18894-04**

11-L-0559/OSD/27794

Afghanistan

1 DEC 04

29 OCT 04





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

DEC 1 2004

The Honorable Antonio Martino  
Minister of Defense  
Via XX, Settembre 8  
00187 Rome  
Italy

Dear Antonio,

I want to express my deep appreciation for Italy's support to the recent election in Afghanistan. Your contributions helped ensure that this historic election occurred in a safe environment.

It is reassuring that we can count on Italy to be in the war on terrorism.

Thanks so much.

Sincerely,

Afghanistan

1 Dec 04

29 Oct 04

OSD 18894-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

DEC 1 2004

The Honorable Henk Kamp  
Minister of Defense of the Kingdom of the Netherlands  
P.O. Box 20701  
2500 ES The Hague  
The Netherlands

Dear Minister Kamp:

I want to express my deep appreciation for the support of The Netherlands to the recent election in Afghanistan. Your contributions helped ensure that this historic election occurred in a safe environment. It is reassuring that we can count on The Netherlands in the war on terrorism.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. Gates", written in a cursive style.

OSD 18894-04

UNCLASSIFIED

DTG: 101646Z NOV 04

PAGE 01 of 01

Drafter's Name : COL A. J. TORRES, DESK OFFICER  
Office Phone : EUR, (b)(6)

Releaser's Info : DONALD H. FUMSFELD, SECDEF, -7100

Action Proc : ROUTINE  
Info Proc : ROUTINE  
Specat :

From: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
To: AMEMBASSY ROME  
Info: SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
SECDEF-2 SECDEF-N  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//CHAIRS/  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//FILE/USDP ISP/USDP EUR POL//

TEXT FOLLOWS

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: LETTER TO ITALIAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE

1. REQUEST AMEMBASSY FORWARD SUBJECT LETTER TO THE HONORABLE MARTINO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

(BEGIN TEXT)

THE HONORABLE ANTONIO MARTINO  
MINISTER OF DEFENSE  
VIA XX, SETTEMBRE 8  
00187 ROME  
ITALY

DEAR ANTONIO,

(PARA) I WANT TO EXPRESS MY DEEP APPRECIATION FOR ITALY'S SUPPORT TO THE RECENT ELECTION IN AFGHANISTAN. YOUR CONTRIBUTIONS HELPED ENSURE THAT THIS HISTORIC ELECTION OCCURRED IN A SAFE ENVIRONMENT.

(PARA) IT IS REASSURING THAT WE CAN COUNT ON ITALY TO BE IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM.

(PARA) THANKS SO MUCH.

SINCERELY,  
//DONALD H. FUMSFELD//

(END TEXT)

UNCLASSIFIED

OSD 18894-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27797

UNCLASSIFIED

DTG: 101711Z NOV 04

PAGE 01 of 01

Drafter's Name : COL A. J. TORRES, DESK OFFICER  
Office/Phone : EUR, (b)(6)

Releaser's Info : DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECDEF, -7100

Action Prec : ROUTINE  
Info Prec : ROUTINE  
Specat :

From: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
To: AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
Info: SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
SECDEF-C/SECDEF-N  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//CHAIRS//  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//FILE/USDP ISP/USDP EUR POL//

TEXT FOLLOWS  
-----

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: LETTER TO THE NETHERLANDS MINISTER OF DEFENSE

1. REQUEST AMEMBASSY FORWARD SUBJECT LETTER TO THE HONORABLE KAMP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

(BEGIN TEXT)

THE HONORABLE HENK KAMP  
MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS  
P.O. BOX 20701  
2500 ES THE HAGUE  
THE NETHERLANDS

DEAR MINISTER KAMP:

(PARA) I WANT TO EXPRESS ~~M~~ DEEP APPRECIATION FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS TO THE RECENT ELECTION IN AFGHANISTAN. YOUR CONTRIBUTIONS HELPED ENSURE THAT THIS HISTORIC ELECTION OCCURRED IN A SAFE ENVIRONMENT. IT IS REASSURING THAT WE CAN COUNT ON THE NETHERLANDS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM.

SINCERELY,  
//DONALD H. RUMSFELD//

(END TEXT)

UNCLASSIFIED

OSD 18894-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27798



LtCol Kevin "Beak" Vest  
 USMC Military Assistant  
 USD Executive Secretariat

(b)(6)

MEMORANDUM

TO: ESCO

*Handwritten signature and date: 11/12/02*

SUBJ: SNOWFLAKE 102904-23 RESPONSE  
 FROM ISA.

Gentlemen, please control this package and then return to ISA for edits from SO. This package includes four letters. The letters to Spain & Germany need to be cancelled. The letters to Italy and Netherlands need to reflect the Secretary's edits. The corresponding Gencer messages attached need to reflect the appropriate edits. This package should be returned to ESCO after corrections are complete for routing back to the front office.

"BEAK" Thanks LTC VEST



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable Antonio Martino  
Minister of Defense  
Via XX, Settembre 8  
00187 Rome  
Italy

Dear Minister *Antonio* Martino:

I want to express my deep appreciation for Italy's support to the recent election in Afghanistan. Your contributions helped ensure that this historic election occurred in a safe environment. *P* It is reassuring that we can count on Italy to be ~~with~~ in the war on terrorism.

*Thanks to much.*

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/27800



**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable Henk Kamp  
Minister of Defense of the Kingdom of the Netherlands  
P.O. Box 20701  
2500 ES The Hague  
The Netherlands

Dear Minister Kamp:

I want to express my deep appreciation for the support of The Netherlands to the recent election in Afghanistan. Your contributions helped ensure that this historic election occurred in a safe environment. It is reassuring that we can count on The Netherlands to ~~be with us~~ in the war on terrorism.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/27801

~~FOUO~~

November 1, 2004

894

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Manning Requests

I just read this October 6 memo on manning at General Sanchez's headquarters. It seems to me we have a real problem. A combatant commander asks for something. The Joint Staff agrees to it. You recommend it to me. Then the Services never fulfill it.

I would like a proposed solution to this problem fast. Either there is something wrong with the request, or we ought to fill the request - but we shouldn't do what we are doing.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/6/04 CJCS memo to SecDef re: Manning at General Sanchez's Headquarters [OSD13665-04]

DHR:dh  
110104-16

.....  
Please respond by 11/12/04

322  
|  
1 Nov 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18899-04





CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

CH-2105-04 2004 OCT -7 AM 6:53  
6 October 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC *RBMY 10/6*

SUBJECT: Manning at General Sanchez's Headquarters

- Issue. "At the recent Congressional hearings on Abu Ghraib, there **were** several questions concerning the manning at General Sanchez's Headquarters. I'd like to see a lay down of **the** manning requests and how we filled *them* over the relevant period." (TAB A).
- Conclusion. Overall, manning requirements for **General Sanchez's Headquarters (CJTF-7)** fluctuated from a low of **870 personnel to a high of 1,415**. As depicted on the attached chart (**TABB**), the fill rate ranged **from a low of 65 percent to a high of 83 percent** of stated requirements. USCENTCOM managed the coordination and fill of **CJTF-7** personnel **requests** during the relevant period.
- Discussion
  - The initial **CJTF-7** organization **was** made up of the **Amy's V Corps** Headquarters and augmented by a combination of individual Service augmentees, coalition **and** interagency personnel.
  - In January 2004, the **USJFCOM J-1 met with** the Services to identify **manning** solutions for CJTF-7's Phase IV personnel requirements. **At this time the CJTF-7** Joint Manpower Document reflected **an increase from 1,036 to 1,415** personnel. Due to the **increase in requirements** validated by **USCENTCOM**, the corresponding fill level dropped to **65 percent in January 2004**. **This was** the lowest personnel fill rate for General Sanchez's headquarters.
  - Services **are** required to provide "best-qualified" individuals to fill Combatant commander requirements "in a timely **manner**," The time **required to fill** a new **manning** requirement depends on the source—an Active Component individual can be on station in **30-45 days**; a Reserve Component (RC) individual may require **as many as 180 days** to arrive on station. Currently, there are **over 200 RC** individuals serving **our** headquarters in Iraq, contributing to the "requirement to fill" time lag.

COORDINATION: **TAB C**

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: RADM Donna L. Crisp, USN; Director, J-1

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27803

OSD 13665-04

TAB A

September 10, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Gen. Abizaid  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT Manning at General Sanchez's HQ

At the recent Congressional hearings on Abu Ghraib, there were several questions concerning the manning at General Sanchez's Headquarters. I'd like to see a lay down of the manning requests and how we filled them over the relevant period.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
091004-6

.....  
Please respond by 9/15/04

11-L-0559/OSD/27804

Tab A

*OSD/3665-04*


TAB B

# CJTF-7 Manning Timeline



USCENTCOM responsible for fill  
 USJFCOM responsible for fill

**Total Manning Level**



- 1 3 May 03: CJTF-7 activated
- 2 Dec 03: CENTCOM J1 receives Phase IV JMD from CJTF-7
- 3 1 Jan 04: CJCS IA Instruction published
- 4 Dec 03 – JAN04: CENTCOM forwards multiple JMD changes to JFCOM
- 5 15 Jan 04: JFCOM informs CENTCOM that the JMD is frozen for P&SR
- 6 23 Jan 04: JFCOM, JS J1 P&SR: Services agree to source 598 of 640 (93%) IAs in CJTF-7 Phase IV IA requirements
- 7 11 Feb 04: JFCOM releases message confirming sourcing of CJTF-7 and responsibility to fill IA requirements.
- 8 15 Apr 04: P&SR for MNF-IIMNC-I. End of CJTF-7 JMD
- 9 15 May 04: MNF-IIMNC-I stand-up. CJTF-7 stands down
- 10 15 Jun 04: MNF-IIMNC-I FOC

Tab B

**TAB C -**

**COORDINATION PAGE**

| <b>NAME</b> | <b>AGENCY</b> | <b>DATE</b>       |
|-------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Col Higham  | USJFCOM       | 15 September 2004 |
| Col Jones   | USCENTCOM     | 14 September 2004 |



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-2213-04  
26 November 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 11/26*

SUBJECT: Manning Requests

- **Issue.** "I just read this October 6 memo on manning at General Sanchez's headquarters. It seems to me we have a real problem. A combatant commander asks for something. The Joint Staff agrees to it. You recommend it to me. Then the Services never fulfill it. I would like a proposed solution to **this** problem fast. Either there is something wrong with the request, or we ought to fill the request -- but we shouldn't do what we are doing." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** The current process for staffing the Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters (HQ) is not meeting the combatant commanders' requirements. The process takes too long to fill needs and is inadequate to handle the current volume of manning requests worldwide. My staff developed a solution to staffing the JTF HQ and briefed it to the Operations Deputies on 12 November. This proposed solution was approved and will be implemented before the end of November.
- **Discussion.** From 25 September to 1 October, a team led by USJFCOM with representation from the Military Departments and the Joint Staff visited Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan (CFC-A) to assess staffing. It determined CFC-A was staffed at unacceptable levels. The results were briefed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 October, during which the Joint Chiefs committed to provide 100-percent manning to CFC-A. Subsequently, you signed an execution order directing the 100-percent fill of the command by 15 December.
- My staff's proposal is similar to the method used to staff CFC-A to 100 percent. While the current process is built around concurrence between the Services and combatant commands, the proposed course will be directive and result in a total-manning solution. My staff and USJFCOM, in conjunction with the Military Departments, will determine the optimum staffing answer and will present the result to you and publish it as an order under your authority. This will speed delivery of forces and leverage USJFCOM as the Joint Force provider. Additionally, USJFCOM continues to work on the related issue of forming JTF HQs. CDRUSJFCOM is scheduled to present that effort to you on 1 December.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Rear Admiral Donna L. Crisp, USN; Director, J-1; (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ OSD 188 99-04  
DPL-0659/USD/2789

~~FOUO~~

November 1, 2004

**89J**

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Manning Requests

I just read this October 6 memo on manning at General Sanchez's headquarters. It seems to me we have a real problem. A combatant commander asks for something. The Joint Staff agrees to it. You recommend it to me. Then the Services never fulfill it.

I would like a proposed solution to this problem fast. Either there is something wrong with the request, or we ought to fill the request – but we shouldn't do what we are doing.

Thanks.

Attach  
10/6/04 CJCS memo to SecDef re: Manning at General Sanchez's Headquarters [OSD 13665-04]

DHR:dh  
110104-16

.....  
Please respond by 11/12/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18899-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

CM-2105-04 2004 OCT -7 AM 6: 53  
6 October 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC *RBM 10/6*

SUBJECT: Manning at General Sanchez's Headquarters

- Issue. "At the recent Congressional hearings on Abu Ghraib, there were several questions concerning the **manning** at General Sanchez's Headquarters. I'd like to see a lay down of the manning requests and how we filled **them** over the relevant period." (TAB A).
- Conclusion. Overall, **manning** requirements for General Sanchez's Headquarters (CJTF-7) fluctuated from a low of 870 personnel to a high of 1,415. As depicted on the attached chart (TAB B), the fill rate ranged from a low of 65 percent to a high of 83 percent of stated requirements. USCENTCOM managed the coordination and fill of CJTF-7 personnel requests during the relevant period.
- Discussion
  - The initial CJTF-7 organization was made up of the Army's V Corps Headquarters and augmented by a combination of individual Service augmentees, coalition and interagency personnel.
  - In January 2004, the USJFCOM J-1 met with the Services to identify manning solutions for CJTF-7's Phase IV personnel requirements. At this time the CJTF-7 Joint Manpower Document reflected an increase from 1,036 to 1,415 personnel. Due to the increase in requirements validated by USCENTCOM, the corresponding fill level dropped to 65 percent in January 2004. This was the lowest personnel fill rate for General Sanchez's headquarters.
  - Services are required to provide "best-qualified" individuals to fill Combatant commander requirements "in a timely manner." The time required to fill a new manning requirement depends on the source—an Active Component individual can be on station in 30-45 days; a Reserve Component (RC) individual may require as many as 180 days to arrive on station. Currently, there are over 200 RC individuals serving our headquarters in Iraq, contributing to the "requirement to fill" time lag.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: RADM Donna L. Crisp, USN; Director, J-1

(b)(6)

OSD 13665-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27809

TAB A

September 10, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Gen. Abizaid  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **P.**  
SUBJECT Manning at General Sanchez's HQ

At the recent Congressional hearings on Abu ~~Ghraib~~, there were several questions concerning the **manning** at General Sanchez's Headquarters. I'd like to see a lay down of the manning requests and how we filled them over the relevant period.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
091004-6

.....  
Please respond by 9/15/04


Tab A

OSD/3665-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27810



# CJTF-7 Manning Timeline



- 1 3 May 03: CJTF-7 activated
- 2 Dec 03: CENTCOM J1 receives Phase IV JMD from CJTF-7
- 3 1 Jan 04: CJCS IA Instruction published
- 4 Dec 03 – JAN 04: CENTCOM forwards multiple JMD changes to JFCOM
- 5 15 Jan 04: JFCOM informs CENTCOM that the JMD is frozen for P&SR
- 6 23 Jan 04: JFCOM, JS J1 P&SR: Services agree to source 598 of 640 (93%) IAs in CJTF-7 Phase IV IA requirements
- 7 11 Feb 04: JFCOM releases message confirming sourcing of CJTF-7 and responsibility to fill IA requirements.
- 8 15 Apr 04: P&SR for MNF-I/MNC-I. End of CJTF-7 JMD
- 9 15 May 04: MNF-I/MNC-I stand-up. CJTF-7 stands down
- 10 15 Jun 04: MNF-I/MNC-I FOC

Tab B

**TAB C**

**COORDINATION PAGE**

| <b>NAME</b>       | <b>AGENCY</b>    | <b>DATE</b>              |
|-------------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| <b>Col Higham</b> | <b>USJFCOM</b>   | <b>15 September 2004</b> |
| <b>Col Jones</b>  | <b>USCENTCOM</b> | <b>14 September 2004</b> |

**Tab C**

11-L-0559/OSD/27812

# UNCLASSIFIED

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

Ms. Cecconi

USJFCOM

9 November 2004

Tab B

# UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/27813

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

2008 NOV 25 AM 8:43

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RM/11/22*

SUBJECT: Manning Requests

- **Issue.** "I just read this October 6 memo on manning at General Sanchez's headquarters. It seems to me we have a real problem. A combatant commander asks for something. The Joint Staff agrees to it. You recommend it to me. Then the Services never fulfill it. I would like a proposed solution to this problem fast. Either there is something wrong with the request, or we ought to fill the request -- but we shouldn't do what we are doing." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** The current process for staffing the Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters (HQ) is not meeting the combatant commanders' requirements. The process takes too long to fill needs and is inadequate to handle the current volume of manning requests worldwide. My staff developed a solution to staffing the JTF HQ and briefed it to the Operations Deputies on 12 November. This proposed solution was approved and will be implemented before the end of November.
- **Discussion.** From 25 September to 1 October, a team led by USJFCOM with representation from the Military Departments and the Joint Staff visited Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan (CFC-A) to assess staffing. It determined CFC-A was staffed at unacceptable levels. The results were briefed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 October, during which the Joint Chiefs committed to provide 100-percent manning to CFC-A. Subsequently, you signed an execution order directing the 100-percent fill of the command by 15 December.
- My staff's proposal is similar to the method used to staff CFC-A to 100 percent. While the current process is built around concurrence between the Services and combatant commands, the proposed course will be directive and result in a total-manning solution. My staff and USJFCOM, in conjunction with the Military Departments, will determine the optimum staffing answer and will present the result to you and publish it as an order under your authority. This will speed delivery of forces and leverage USJFCOM as the Joint Force provider.

322

22 NOV 04

1 NOV 04

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Rear Admiral Donna L. Crisp, USN; Director, J-1

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 18899-04

**UNCLASSIFIED**

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

Ms. Cecconi

USJFCOM


9 November 2004

Tab B

**UNCLASSIFIED**

11-L-0559/OSD/27815

November 22, 2004  
NOV 24 11 01 22

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: COL Steve Bucci  
Cathy Mainardi  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Meeting with Freshman Senators and Congressmen

We ought to invite all the freshman senators and congressmen down to the Pentagon sometime in the next week.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
112204-2

.....  
Please respond by 11/24/04



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

NOV 23 2004 11:32  
November 23, 2004 4:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake regarding Meeting with Freshmen Senators  
and Congressmen

- You asked to meet with the new Senators and Congressmen next week. Freshman orientation has concluded and it is highly unlikely that any of the freshmen will be in town next week.
- The Deputy Secretary did meet with House Republican Freshmen on the Hill during their orientation last week. We are planning an orientation day in the Pentagon sometime in early January when all freshmen are expected to return to Washington.


Attachment:  
SECDEF Snowflake 112204-2

11-L-0559/OSD/27817

OSD 18917-04

~~FOUO~~

November 22, 2004  
NOV 24 AM 10:32

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: COL Steve Bucci  
Cathy Mainardi  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Meeting with Freshman Senators and Congressmen

We ought to invite all the freshman senators and congressmen down to the Pentagon sometime in the next week.

Thanks.

DHRss  
112204-2

.....  
Please respond by 11/24/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18917-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27818



7201

~~FOUO~~

TAB A

October 15, 2004

878

322

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Special Forces Update

I'd like a piece of paper that is clear -- without a lot of extra words, that is readable -- that explains what I've done with respect to Special Forces since I came.

I think I know, but I'd like to see some quantification of it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101504-3

.....  
Please respond by 11/1/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18958-04

Tab A

15 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27819

72



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

205 877 - 1 AM 10 11

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

ACTION MEMO

014 35

**FOR:** SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_  
**FROM:** David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R) *David S. C. Chu*  
*31 January 11*  
**SUBJECT:** Responsibility for Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)  
--SNOWFLAKE (Tab B)

You requested the redirection of absentee voting assistance responsibilities for non-DoD affiliated citizens covered under the *Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)* and Executive Order 12642 of June 8, 1988 (Tab C).

The proposed Executive Order designates the Secretary of State as the Presidential designee for *UOCAVA* and absolves you of such responsibility.

31 05

- The Department of State would assume executive branch policy and oversight responsibilities for administration of *UOCAVA* and would provide direct absentee voting assistance to overseas citizens and non-DoD Federal employees overseas.
- DoD would continue to provide direct absentee voting assistance to Uniformed Services voters, their family members, and overseas DoD employees and contractors.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That you approve the transfer of responsibilities for *UOCAVA* to the Secretary of State. A memorandum from you to the President and a draft Executive Order are at Tab A.

**COORDINATION:** DoD General Counsel reviewed the draft Executive Order. I have discussed the proposed shift in responsibility with Under Secretary of State for Management, Grant S. Green, Jr. and he is aware of our intent. *(Tab D)*

Approved \_\_\_\_\_ Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by: P. K. Brunelli, Director, FVAP, (b)(6)

30 SE. 04

**TAB**

**A**



**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Responsibility for Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)

The enclosed Executive Order designates the Secretary of State as the Presidential designee for the *Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)*.

- The Department of State would assume Executive Branch policy and oversight responsibilities for administration of *UOCAVA* and would provide direct absentee voting assistance to overseas citizens and non-DoD Federal employees overseas.
- DoD would continue to provide direct absentee voting assistance to Uniformed Services voters, their family members, and overseas DoD employees and contractors.



11-L-0559/OSD/27822

DRAFT

Executive Order \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_

**Designation of the Secretary of State as the Presidential Designee Under Title I of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act**

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including section 101(a) of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (Public Law 99-410) (“the Act”) and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. The Secretary of State is hereby designated as the “Presidential designee” under Title I of the Act.

Section 2. In order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, the Secretary of State is hereby authorized to delegate in writing any or all functions, responsibilities, powers, authority, or discretion devolving upon him in consequence of this designation to any person or persons within the Department of State.

Section 3. The Secretary of Defense shall cooperate with the Presidential Designee in carrying out the purposes of the Act and shall establish a voting assistance program in the Department of Defense for matters pertaining to absent uniformed services voters (as that term is defined in section 107 of the Act) and overseas Department of Defense civilian employee and contractor voters.

Section 4. Executive Order 12642 of June 10, 1988, is revoked.

THE WHITE HOUSE

**TAB**

**B**

~~FOUO~~

771  
NDP

September 30, 2004

TO: David Chu  
Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Absentee Ballots

Immediately following the election, please start the process of redirecting the absentee ballot responsibility (The Federal Voting Assistance Program or FVAP), for everyone except the military, to the Department of State.

DoD should handle just the military, since the military is less than half the total. People **think** of the embassies as the logical place to be helpful on this matter.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
093004-18

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27825

OSD 18960-04

TAB

C



Federal Register  
Vol. 53, No. 112  
Friday, June 10, 1988

## Presidential Documents

Title 3—

Executive Order 12642 of June 8, 1988

The President

### Designation of the Secretary of Defense as the Presidential Designee Under Title I of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including section 101(a) of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (Public Law 99-410) ("the Act"), it is hereby ordered as follows:

**Section 1.** The Secretary of Defense is hereby designated as the "Presidential designee" under Title I of the Act.

**Sec. 2.** In order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, the Secretary of Defense is hereby authorized to delegate any or all of the functions, responsibilities, powers, authority, or discretion devolving upon him in consequence of this Order to any person or persons within the Department of Defense.

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
June 8, 1988.

{FR Doc. 88-13352  
Filed 6-9-88; 12:29 pm}  
Billing code 3195-01-M

11-L-0559/OSD/27827

COORDINATION SHEET

Voting Assistance Provided to Overseas Citizens

General Counsel of the DoD *D. J. DeLoach* *cc edited*  
*Principal Deputy* *2/3/08*

10/27/04  
INDP

September 30, 2004

09:11:02

TO: David Chu  
Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Absentee Ballots

014.35

Immediately following the election, please start the process of redirecting the absentee ballot responsibility (The Federal Voting Assistance Program or FVAP), for everyone except the military, to the Department of State.

DoD should handle just the military, since the military is less than half the total. People think of the embassies as the logical place to be helpful on this matter.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
093004-18

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

305eP04

Executive Order \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_

## **Designation of the Secretary of State as the Presidential Designee Under Title I of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act**

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including section 101(a) of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (Public Law 99-410) (“the Act”) and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. The Secretary of State is hereby designated **as** the “Presidential designee” under Title I of the Act.

Section 2. In order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, the Secretary of State is hereby authorized to delegate any or all functions, responsibilities, powers, authority, or discretion devolving upon him in consequence of this designation to any person or persons within the Department of State.

Section 3. The Secretary of Defense shall cooperate with the Presidential Designee in carrying out the purposes of the Act and shall establish a voting assistance program in the Department of Defense for matters pertaining to absent uniformed services voters (as that term is defined in section 107 of the Act), their family members, and overseas Department of Defense civilian employee and contractor voters.

Section 4. Executive Order 12642 of June 10, 1988, is revoked.

THE WHITE HOUSE



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

November 23, 2004 - 5:00 PM

**FOR:** SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
**FROM:** David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R) *David S. C. Chu*  
**SUBJECT:** Responsibility for Voting Assistance Provided to Overseas Citizens  
--SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

- Executive Order 12642 (June 8, 1988) assigns DoD responsibility for the requirements of the *Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)*. A new Executive Order is needed to carry out your intent.
- The proposed Executive Order at Tab B transfers responsibilities for *UOCAVA* to the Secretary of State.
- The Department of Defense would continue to provide absentee voting assistance to absent Uniformed Services voters, their family members, overseas DoD employees and overseas DoD contractors.
- The Department of State would assume policy and oversight responsibilities for administration of *UOCAVA* and would provide absentee voting assistance to overseas citizens and other overseas Federal employees.
- DoD will determine personnel, space, and budget resources that should be transferred from the Department of Defense to the Department of State.
- We have begun the process of coordinating this action with the Department of State.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: P. K. Brunelli, Director, FVAP (b)(6)



September 30, 2004

TO: David Chu  
Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Absentee Ballots

Immediately following the election, please start the process of redirecting the absentee ballot responsibility (The Federal Voting Assistance Program or FVAP), for everyone except the military, to the Department of State.

DoD should handle just the military, since the military is less than half the total People think of the embassies as the logical place to be helpful on this matter.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
093004-18

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

Executive Order \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_

## **Designation of the Secretary of State as the Presidential Designee Under Title I of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act**

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including section 101(a) of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (Public Law 99-410) (“the Act”) and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

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Section 3. The Secretary of Defense shall cooperate with the Presidential Designee in carrying out the purposes of the Act and shall establish a voting assistance program in the Department of Defense for matters pertaining to absent uniformed services voters (as that term is defined in section 107 of the Act), their family members, and overseas Department of Defense civilian employee and contractor voters.

Section 4. Executive Order 12642 of June 10, 1988, is revoked.

THE WHITE HOUSE

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**The Military Assistant**

14 February 2005 - 1040 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. DAVID S.C. CHU, USD / P&R

SUBJECT: Responsibility for Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)


Sir:

Please see Mr. Patterson's comments to you on the attached: :

"David –  
I know the Secretary is keen on this initiative. Though you've discussed with Grant Green, is State going to agree or will this initiative snag a big non-concur? The Department may still want to press ahead, but believe State's view needs to be known.  
v/r Dave"

Thank you.

Very respectfully,

  
Sean E. O'Connor  
Captain, USN  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:  
OSD 18960-04

Suspense: Monday, 21 February 2005

014.35

14 Feb 05

30 Sep 04

M<sub>2/14</sub>



218  
1530

2/10



**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

Office of the  
Under Secretary of Defense

2005 FEB -6 AM 10:10

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_  
**FROM:** David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R) *David S. C. Chu*  
*31 January 05*  
**SUBJECT:** Responsibility for Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)  
--SNOWFLAKE (Tab B)

You requested the redirection of absentee voting assistance responsibilities for non-DoD affiliated citizens covered under the *Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)* and Executive Order 12642 of June 8, 1988 (Tab C).

The proposed Executive Order designates the Secretary of State as the Presidential designee for *UOCAVA* and absolves you of such responsibility.

- The Department of State would assume executive branch policy and oversight responsibilities for administration of *UOCAVA* and would provide direct absentee voting assistance to overseas citizens and non-DoD Federal employees overseas.
- DoD would continue to provide direct absentee voting assistance to Uniformed Services voters, their family members, and overseas DoD employees and contractors.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That you approve the transfer of responsibilities for *UOCAVA* to the Secretary of State. A memorandum from you to the President and a draft Executive Order are at Tab A.

**COORDINATION:** DoD General Counsel reviewed the draft Executive Order. I have discussed the proposed shift in responsibility with Under Secretary of State for Management, Grant S. Green, Jr. and he is aware of our intent.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_ Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by: P. K. Brunelli, Director, FVAP, (b)(6)

|          |         |     |  |
|----------|---------|-----|--|
| MA SD    | SMA DSD |     |  |
| TSA SD   | SA DSD  | 218 |  |
| EXEC SEC | 11/2/8  |     |  |
| ESR MA   | 2/18    |     |  |

COL 2/11



11-L-0559/USD/27835

OSD 18960-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Responsibility for Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)

The enclosed Executive Order designates the Secretary of State as the Presidential designee for the "Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA).

The Department of State would assume Executive Branch policy and oversight responsibilities for the administration of UOCAVA and would provide direct absentee voting assistance to overseas citizens and non-Department of Defense (DoD) Federal employees overseas.

DoD would continue to provide direct absentee voting assistance to Uniformed Service voters, their family members, and overseas DoD employees and contractors.

Enclosure:  
As stated



11-L-0559/OSD/27836

DRAFT

Executive Order \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_

**Designation of the Secretary of State as the Presidential Designee Under Title I of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act**

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including section 101(a) of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (Public Law 99-410) (“the Act”) and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

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Section 3. The Secretary of Defense shall cooperate with the Presidential Designee in carrying out the purposes of the Act and shall establish a voting assistance program in the Department of Defense for matters pertaining to absent uniformed services voters (as that term is defined in section 107 of the Act) and overseas Department of Defense civilian employee and contractor voters.

Section 4. Executive Order 12642 of June 10, 1988, is revoked.

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~FOUO~~

NDP

September 30, 2004

TO: David Chu  
Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Absentee Ballots

Immediately following the election, please start the process of redirecting the absentee ballot responsibility (The Federal Voting Assistance Program or FVAP), for everyone except the military, to the Department of State.

DoD should handle just the military, since the military is less than half the total. People **think** of the embassies as the logical place to be helpful on this matter.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
093004-18

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18960-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27838

Federal Register  
Vol. 53, No. 112  
Friday, June 10, 1988

## Presidential Documents

Title 3—

Executive Order 12642 of June 8, 1988


The President

### Designation of the Secretary of Defense as the Presidential Designee Under Title I of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act

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**Section 1.** The Secretary of Defense is hereby designated as the "Presidential designee" under Title I of the Act.

**Sec. 2.** In order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, the Secretary of Defense is hereby authorized to delegate any or all of the functions, responsibilities, powers, authority, or discretion devolving upon him in consequence of this Order to any person or persons within the Department of Defense.



THE WHITE HOUSE,  
June 8, 1988.

[FR Doc. 88-13352  
Filed 6-9-88; 12:29 pm]  
Billing code 3195-01-M

COORDINATION SHEET

Voting Assistance Provided to Overseas Citizens

General Counsel of the DoD *D. J. DeLoach* *cc edited*  
*Principal Deputy* *2/3/05*

~~FOUO~~

SECRET  
NOV 17 2004

November 17, 2004

ES-1438  
04/015597-ES

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Letter to Hungarian MoD

Someone should draft a nice letter from me to the Hungarian Minister of Defense thanking him for his efforts on this and seeing that we leave him happy. They apparently tried hard.

Thanks.

Attach.  
USADO BUDAPEST HU Cable R 170556Z NOV 04

DHR:dh  
111704-8

.....  
Please respond by 11/26/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18964-04

18-11-04 P12:15 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/27841

NOV 24 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
GEN John Abizaid  
GEN George Casey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Acting on Intel Quickly in Iraq

IRAQ

Do our tactical warfighters on the ground in Iraq feel they can act quickly on intelligence they garner in the field without excessive restrictions? I've received some indications that there is a sense that since sovereignty, our mid-grade commanders feel somewhat constrained. I hope that isn't true and I'd like your assessment. My feeling is that our commanders must be able to act quickly when they gain battlefield intelligence.

DHR:ss  
112304-2


.....  
Please respond by 12/1/04

24NOV04



November 5, 2004

11-0559/OSD/27843

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Lawsuit Information

Please give me some information on this lawsuit that is being filed against me by a GITMO detainee.

Thanks.

Attach.  
FBIS Report re: GITMO Detainee

DHR:ss  
110404-15



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

---

**A**



## *Text*

---

**Morocco: Former Guantanamo Detainee to Sue Rumsfeld Over Alleged Torture**  
*GMP20041104000229 Casablanca Assahifa in Arabic 3 Nov 04*

[Unattributed report on page one: A Moroccan lawyer sues Rumsfeld in court"]  
[FBIS Translated Text]

Mr. Mohamed Hilal, a Rabat lawyer, has told Assahifa that he is determined to take legal action against US Secretary for Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, in the United States, in coordination with American lawyers.

Mr. Hilal says that he will be asking for compensation for his client Radhouane Benchakroun for the damage caused to him by the torture he was subjected to at the hands of American troops when he was detained in Guantanamo jail.

This will be the second case of its kind. **In** fact a British lawyer **has** already lodged a similar lawsuit against the American Defense Department.

[Description of Source: Casablanca Assahifa in Arabic -Independent weekly newspaper]

***THIS REPORT MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. COPYING AND DISSEMINATION IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS.***

---

**B**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SHAFIQ RASUL  
c/o 14 Inverness Street  
London NW17 HJ  
England;

ASIFIQBAL  
c/o 14 Inverness Street  
London NW17 HJ  
England;

RHUHEL AHMED  
c/o 14 Inverness Street  
London NW17 HJ  
England; and

JAMAL AL-HARITH  
c/o 159 Princess Road  
Manchester M14 4RE  
England

C.A. No. \_\_\_\_\_

Plaintiffs

- against -

DONALD RUMSFELD  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington D.C. 20301-1000;

AIR FORCE GENERAL RICHARD MYERS  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
9999 Joint Staff Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20318-9999;

ARMY MAJOR GENERAL GEOFFREY MILLER  
Former Commander, Joint Task Force  
Guantánamo Bsy Naval Base, Cuba,  
c/o United States Army  
Army Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20310-0200;

ARMY GENERAL JAMES T. HILL  
Commander, United States Southern Command  
c/o United States Army  
Army Pentagon  
Washington, DC. 20310-0200;

ARMY MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL E. DUNLAVEY :  
Former Commander, Joint Task Force :  
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, :  
c/o United States Army :  
Army Pentagon :  
Washington] DC. 203109200; :

ARMY BRIGADIER GENERAL JAY HOOD  
Commander, Joint Task Force, GTMO  
Guantiinamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba,  
c/o United States Army  
Army Pentagon  
Washington, DC. 20310-0200;

MARINE BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL LEHNERT :  
Commander Joint Task Force-160 :  
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba :  
c/o Headquarters USMC :  
2 Navy Annex (CMC) :  
Washington, DC. 20380-1775; :

ARMY COLONEL NELSON J. CANNON  
Commander, Camp Delta  
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba,  
c/o United States Army  
Army Pentagon  
Washington, DC. 20310-0200;

ARMY COLONEL TERRY CARRICO :  
Commander Camp X-Ray, Camp Delta :  
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, :  
c/o United States Army :  
Army Pentagon :  
Washington, DC. 20310-0200; :  
:

ARMY LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM CLINE :  
Commander, Camp Delta :  
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, :  
c/o United States Army :  
Army Pentagon :

Washington, D.C. 20310-0200;

**ARMY LIEUTENANT COLONEL DIANE BEAVER** :  
**Legal Adviser to General Dunlavey** :  
**Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba** :  
**c/o United States Army** :  
**Army Pentagon** :  
**Washington, D.C. 20310-0200** :

and

**JOHN DOES 1-100, individuals involved in the illegal** :  
**Torture of Plaintiffs at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base** :

**All in their personal capacities** :

**Defendants.** :

---

**COMPLAINT**

(Violations of the Alien Tort Statute, the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the Geneva Conventions, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act)

Plaintiffs Shafiq Rasul, **Asif Iqbal**, Rhuhel Ahmed and Jamal Al-Harith, by and through their undersigned attorneys, Baach Robinson & Lewis **PLLC** and Michael Ratner at the Center for Constitutional Rights, as and for their complaint against Defendants Donald **Rumsfeld**, Air **Force** General Richard Myers, Army Major General Geoffrey Miller, Army General James **T. Hill**, Army Major General Michael **E. Dunlavey**, Army Brigadier General Jay Hood, Marine Brigadier General Michael Lehnert, Army Colonel Nelson J. Cannon, Army Colonel Terry Carrico, Army Lieutenant Colonel William Cline, Army Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver and John **Does** 1-100, hereby allege as follows:

## INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiffs are citizens and residents of the United Kingdom. They are not now and have never been members of any terrorist group. They have never taken up arms against the United States.

2. Plaintiffs Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Ruhel Ahmed were detained in Northern Afghanistan on November 28, 2001, by General Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek warlord temporarily allied with the United States as part of the Northern Alliance. Thereafter, General Dostum placed Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed in the custody of the United States military. Because Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were unarmed and not engaged in any hostile activities, neither General Dostum nor any of his troops ever could have or did observe them engaged in combat against the United States, the Northern Alliance or anyone else. On information and belief, General Dostum detained Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed and numerous other detainees who were not combatants; he handed detainees including Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed to the custody of the United States in order to obtain bounty money from the United States; and the United States took custody of Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed without any independent good faith basis for concluding that they were or had been engaged in activities hostile to the United States.

3. Plaintiff Jamal Al-Harith works as an internet web designer in Manchester, England. Intending to attend a religious retreat, Plaintiff Al-Harith arrived in Pakistan on October 2, 2001, where he was advised to leave the country because of animosity toward British citizens. Heeding the warning, he planned to return to Europe by traveling overland through Iran to Turkey by truck. While in Pakistan, the truck in which Plaintiff Al-Harith was riding was stolen at gunpoint by Afghans; he was then forced into



a jeep which crossed the border into Afghanistan. Plaintiff **Al-Harith** was then handed over to the Taliban. Plaintiff **Al-Harith** was beaten by Taliban guards and taken for interrogation. He was accused of being a British special forces military spy and held in isolation. After the US invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban released Plaintiff **Al-Harith** into the general prison population. When the Taliban government fell and the new government came to power, Plaintiff **Al-Harith** and others in the prison were told that they were free to leave and Plaintiff **Al-Harith** was offered transportation to Pakistan. Plaintiff **Al-Harith** thought it would be quicker and easier to travel to Kabul where there was a British Embassy. Officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") instructed **Al-Harith** to remain at the prison and they offered to make contact with the British Embassy to fly him home. Plaintiff **Al-Harith** also spoke directly to British Embassy officials who indicated that they were making arrangements to fly him to Kabul and out of the country. After Plaintiff **Al-Harith** had been in contact with the British Embassy in Kabul for approximately a month discussing the logistics of evacuating him, American Special Forces arrived and questioned Plaintiff. The ICRC told Plaintiff **Al-Harith** that the Americans would fly Plaintiff **Al-Harith** to Kabul; two days before he was scheduled to fly to Kabul, American soldiers told Plaintiff **Al-Harith**, "You're not going anywhere. We're taking you to Kandahar airbase."

4. All four Plaintiffs were first held in United States custody in Afghanistan and later transported to the United States Naval Base at Guantnamo Bay Naval Station, Cuba ("Guantiinamo"), where Defendants imprisoned them without charge for more than two years. During Plaintiffs' imprisonment, Defendants systematically and repeatedly tortured them in violation of the United States Constiition and domestic and international law, and deprived them of access to friends. relatives. courts and counsel.

Defendants repeatedly attempted to extract confessions from Plaintiffs without regard to the truth or plausibility of these statements through the use of the illegal methods detailed below.

5. Plaintiffs were released without charge in March 2004 and have returned to their homes in the United Kingdom where they continue to suffer the physical and psychological effects of their prolonged arbitrary detention, torture and other mistreatment as hereinafter alleged.

6. In the course of their detention by the United States, Plaintiffs were repeatedly struck with rifle butts, punched, kicked and slapped. They were "short shackled" in painful "stress positions" for many hours at a time, causing deep flesh wounds and permanent scarring. Plaintiffs were also threatened with unmuzzled dogs, forced to strip naked, subjected to repeated forced body cavity searches, intentionally subjected to extremes of heat and cold for the purpose of causing suffering, kept in filthy cages for 24 hours per day with no exercise or sanitation, denied access to necessary medical care, harassed in practicing their religion, deprived of adequate food, deprived of sleep, deprived of communication with family and friends, and deprived of information about their status.

7. Plaintiffs' detention and mistreatment were in plain violation of the United States Constitution, federal statutory law and United States treaty obligations, and customary international law. Defendants' treatment of Plaintiffs and other Guantánamo detainees violated various provisions of law including the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbidding the deprivation of liberty without due process; the Eighth Amendment forbidding cruel and unusual punishment; United States statutes prohibiting torture, assault, and other mistreatment; the Geneva Conventions; and customary

international law norms prohibiting torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

8. Plaintiffs' torture and other mistreatment was not simply the product of isolated or rogue actions by individual military personnel. Rather it was the result of deliberate and foreseeable action taken by Defendant Rumsfeld and senior officers to flout or evade the United States Constitution, federal statutory law, United States treaty obligations and long established norms of customary international law. This action was taken in a misconceived and illegal attempt to utilize torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading acts to coerce nonexistent information regarding terrorism. It was misconceived because, according to the conclusion of the US military as expressed in the Army Field Manual, torture does not yield reliable information, and because Plaintiffs—along with the vast majority of Guantnamo detainees had no information to give. It was illegal because, as Defendants well knew, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of detainees is not permitted under the United States Constitution, federal statutory law, United States treaty obligations, and customary international law.

9. On or about December 2, 2002, Defendant Rumsfeld signed a memorandum approving numerous illegal interrogation methods, including putting detainees in "stress positions" for up to four hours; forcing detainees to strip naked, intimidating detainees with dogs, interrogating them for 20 hours at a time, forcing them to wear hoods, shaving their heads and beards, keeping them in total darkness and silence, and using what was euphemistically called "mild, non-injurious physical contact." As Defendant Rumsfeld knew, these and other methods were in violation of the United States Constitution, federal statutory law, the Geneva Conventions, and

customary international ~~law~~ as reflected in, inter alia, the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT"). This memorandum of December 2, 2002, authorizing torture and other mistreatment, was originally designated by Defendant Rumsfeld to be classified for ten ~~years~~ but was released at the direction of President George W. Bush ~~after~~ the Abu Ghraib torture scandal became public.

10. After authorizing, encouraging, permitting, and requiring the acts of torture and other mistreatment inflicted upon Plaintiffs, Defendant Rumsfeld, on information and belief, subsequently commissioned a "Working Group Report" dated ~~March~~ 6, 2003, to address "Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy and Operational Considerations." This report, ~~also~~ originally ~~classified for a period of ten years by Defendant Rumsfeld, was also released after the~~ Abu Ghraib ~~torture~~ scandal became public. This report details ~~the~~ requirements of international and domestic law governing interrogations, including the Geneva Conventions; ~~the~~ CAT; customary international law; the torture statute, 18 U.S.C. §2340; assault within maritime and territorial jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. §113; maiming, 18 U.S.C. §114; murder, 18 U.S.C. §1111; manslaughter, 18 U.S.C. §1112; interstate stalking, 18 U.S.C. §2261a; ~~and~~ conspiracy 18 U.S.C. §2 and §371. The report ~~attempts to address "legal doctrines under the Federal Criminal Law that could render~~ specific conduct, ~~otherwise~~ criminal not unlawful." Working Group Report at p. 3 (emphasis in original). The memorandum is on its face an ex post facto attempt to create arguments that the facially criminal acts perpetrated by the Defendants were somehow justified. It argues first that the President as Commander-in-Chief has plenary authority to order torture, a proposition that ignores settled legal doctrine from

King John at Runnymede to Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). It next tries to apply common law doctrines of self-defense and necessity, arguing the erroneous proposition that the United States has the right to torture detained individuals because it needs to defend itself or because it is necessary that it do so. Finally, it suggests that persons inflicting torture and other mistreatment will be able to defend against criminal charges by claiming that they were following orders. The report asserts that the detainees have no Constitutional rights because the Constitution does not apply to persons held at Guantanamo. However, the report acknowledges that U.S. criminal laws do apply to **Guantánamo**, and further acknowledges that the United States is bound by the CAT to the extent that conduct barred by that Convention would also be prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. On June 22, 2004, the conclusions of this report and other memoranda attempting to justify torture were repudiated and rescinded by President Bush.

11. In April 2003, following receipt of the Working Group Report, Defendant Rumsfeld issued a new set of recommended interrogation techniques, requiring approval for four techniques. These recommendations recognized specifically that certain of the approved techniques violated the Geneva Conventions and customary international law, including the use of intimidation, removal of religious items, threats and isolation. The April 2003 report, however, officially withdrew approval for unlawful actions that had been ongoing for months, including hooding, forced nakedness, shaving, stress positions, use of dogs and "mild, non-injurious physical contact." Nevertheless, on information and belief these illegal practices continued to be employed against Plaintiffs and other detainees at Guantánamo.

12. Defendants well knew that their activities resulting in the detention, torture and other mistreatment of Plaintiffs were illegal and violated clearly established law — i.e., the Constitution, federal statutory law and treaty obligations of the United States and customary international law. Defendants' after-the-fact attempt to create an **Orwellian legal façade** makes ~~clear~~ their conscious awareness that they were acting illegally. Therefore they cannot claim immunity from civil liability.

DI AL VENUE

13. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction); and 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (Alien Tort Statute).

14. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). **The alleged acts described below are “inextricably bound up with the District of Columbia in its role as the nation’s capital.”** Mundv. Weinberger, 554 F. Supp. 811, 818 (D.D.C. 1982). Decisions and acts by Defendants ordering, facilitating, aiding and abetting, acquiescing, confirming and/or conspiring in the commission of the alleged acts reached the highest levels of the United States Government. On information and belief, approval for all alleged acts emanated under ~~color~~ of law from orders, approvals, and omissions occurring in the Pentagon, numerous government **agencies headquartered in the District of Columbia, and the offices of Defendant Rumsfeld**, several of which are in the District of Columbia. Venue for claims arising from acts of Cabinet officials, the Secretary of Defense and United States agencies lies in the District of Columbia. See id.; Smith v. Dalton, 927 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).

## PARTIES

15. Plaintiff Shafiq Rasul was born in the United Kingdom and has been at all times relevant hereto a citizen and resident of the United Kingdom. He ~~is~~ not now and has never been a terrorist or a member ~~of~~ a terrorist group. He has never taken up arms against the United States. At the time of his initial arrest and detention, he was 24 years old.

16. Plaintiff Asif Iqbal was born in the United Kingdom and has been at all times relevant hereto a citizen and resident of the United Kingdom. He is not now and has never been a terrorist or a member of a terrorist group. He has never taken up arms against the United States. At the time of his initial arrest and detention, he was 20 years old.

17. **Plaintiff Rhuhel Ahmcd was born in the United Kingdom and has been at all times relevant hereto a citizen and resident of the United Kingdom. He is not now and has never been a terrorist or a member of a terrorist group. He has never taken up arms against the United States. At the time of his initial arrest and detention, he was 19 years old.**

18. Plaintiff Jamal Al-Harith was born in the United Kingdom and has been at all times relevant hereto a citizen and resident of the United Kingdom. He is not **now** and has **never been a terrorist or a member of a terrorist group. He has never taken up** arms against the United States. At the time of his initial arrest and detention, he was 35 years old.

19. Defendant Donald Rumsfeld is the United States Secretary of Defense. On information and belief, he is a citizen of Illinois and a resident of the District of Columbia. Defendant **Rurnsfeld** is charged with maintaining the custody and control of

the Guantanamo detainees, including Plaintiffs, and with assuring that their treatment was in accordance with law. Defendant Rumsfeld ordered, authorized, condoned and has legal responsibility for the arbitrary detention, torture and other mistreatment of Plaintiffs as alleged herein. Defendant Rumsfeld is sued in his individual capacity.

20. Defendant Myers is a General in the United States Air Force and was at times relevant hereto Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On information and belief, he is a citizen and resident of Virginia. As the senior uniformed military officer in the chain of command, Defendant Myers is charged with maintaining the custody and control of the Guantánamo detainees, including Plaintiffs, and with assuring that their treatment was in accordance with law. On information and belief, Defendant Myers was informed of torture and other mistreatment of detainees at Guanthamo and Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and condoned such activities. Defendant Myers was in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia. Defendant Myers is sued in his individual capacity.

21. Defendant Miller is a Major General in the United States Army and was at times relevant hereto Commander of Joint Task Force-GTMO. On information and belief, he is a citizen and resident of Texas. At times relevant hereto, he had supervisory responsibility for Guantdnamo detainees, including Plaintiffs, and was responsible for assuring that their treatment was in accordance with law. On information and belief, Defendant Miller was in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based in the District of Columbia and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia. On information and belief, Defendant Miller implemented and condoned numerous methods of torture and other mistreatment as hereinafter described. On information and belief,



Defendant Miller was subsequently transferred to Abu Ghraib where he implemented and facilitated torture and other mistreatment of detainees there. These acts were filmed and photographed and have justly inspired widespread revulsion and condemnation around the world. Defendant Miller is sued in his individual capacity.

22. Defendant Hill is a General in the United States Army and was at times relevant hereto Commander of the United States Southern Command. On information and belief, he is a citizen and resident of Texas. On information and belief, Defendant Hill was in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based in the District of Columbia and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia. On information and belief, General Hill requested and recommended approval for several abusive interrogation techniques which were used on Guantánamo detainees, including Plaintiffs. Defendant Hill is sued in his individual capacity.

23. Defendant Dunlavey is a Major General in the United States Army and was at times relevant hereto Commander of Joint Task Forces 160/170, the successors to Joint Task Force-GTMO. On information and belief, he is a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania. At times relevant hereto, he had supervisory responsibility for Guantanamo detainees, including Plaintiffs, and for assuring that their treatment was in accordance with law. On information and belief, Defendant Dunlavey was in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based in the District of Columbia and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia. On information and belief, Major General Dunlavey implemented and condoned the torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading acts and conditions alleged herein. Defendant Dunlavey is sued in his individual capacity.

24. Defendant Hood is a Brigadier General in the United States Army and is the Commander of Joint Task Force-GTMO, which at all relevant times operated the detention facilities at Guantnamo. On information and belief, he is a citizen and resident of South Carolina. At times relevant hereto, he had supervisory responsibility for Guantanamo detainees, including Plaintiffs, and for assuring that their treatment was in accordance with law. On information and belief, Defendant Hood has been and continues to be in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based in the District of Columbia and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia. Defendant Hood is sued in his individual capacity.

25. Defendant Lehnert is a Brigadier General in the United States Marine Corps and was at times relevant hereto Commander of the Joint Task Force responsible for the construction and operation of Camp X-Ray and Camp Delta at Guantanamo. On information and belief, he is a citizen and resident of Florida. At times relevant hereto, he had supervisory responsibility for Guantánamo detainees, including Plaintiffs, and for assuring that their treatment was in accordance with law. On information and belief, Defendant Lehnert was in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based in the District of Columbia and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia. Defendant Lehnert is sued in his individual capacity.

26. Defendant Cannon is a Colonel in the United States Army and the Commander of Camp Delta at Guantanamo. On information and belief, he is a citizen and resident of Michigan. At times relevant hereto, he has and continues to have supervisory responsibility for Guantanamo detainees including Plaintiffs and for

assuring that their treatment was in accordance with law. On information and belief, Defendant Cannon has been in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based in the District of Columbia and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia. Defendant Cannon is sued in his individual capacity.

27. Defendant Carrico is a Colonel in the United States Army and was at times relevant hereto Commander of Camp X-Ray and Camp Delta at Guantnamo. On information and belief, he is a citizen and resident of Texas. At times relevant hereto, he had supervisory responsibility for Guantanamo detainees including Plaintiffs and for assuring that their treatment was in accordance with law. On information and belief, Defendant Carrico was in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based in the District of Columbia and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia. Defendant Carrico is sued in his individual capacity.

28. Defendant Beaver is a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Army and was at times relevant hereto Chief Legal Adviser to Defendant Dunlavey. On information and belief, she is a citizen and resident of Kansas. On information and belief, knowing that torture and other mistreatment were contrary to military law and regulations, she nevertheless provided an opinion purporting to justify the ongoing torture and other mistreatment of detainees at Guantnamo, including Plaintiffs. On information and belief, Defendant Beaver was in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based in the District of Columbia and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia. Defendant Beaver is sued in her individual capacity.



35. In September 2001, Plaintiff Iqbal traveled to Pakistan to join his father who had arranged a marriage for him with a young woman from his family's ancestral village. His longtime friend, Plaintiff Ahmed traveled from England in October in order to join him at his wedding as his best man. Plaintiff Rasul was at the same time in Pakistan visiting his family with the expectation of continuing his degree course in computer science degree within the month. Prior to the wedding in Pakistan, in October 2001, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed crossed the border into Afghanistan in order to offer help in the ongoing humanitarian crisis. After the bombing in Afghanistan began, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed tried to return to Pakistan but were unable to do so because the border had been closed. Plaintiffs never engaged in any terrorist activity or took up arms against the United States.

36. **Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed never engaged in combat against the forces of the United States or any other entity.** Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed never conducted any terrorist activity or conspired, intended, or planned to conduct any such activity. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed never belonged to Al Qaeda or any other terrorist organization.

#### Detention in Afghanistan

37. On November 28, 2001, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were captured **and detained by forces loyal to General Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek warlord who was aligned with the United States.**

38. No U.S. forces were present when Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were detained. Therefore, no U.S. forces could have had any information regarding Plaintiffs other than that supplied by the forces of General Dostum, who were known to be

unreliable and who were receiving a per head bounty of, on information and belief, up to \$35,000.

39. With U.S. military forces present, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed, along with 200 to 300 others, were crammed into metal containers and transported by truck to Sherbegan prison in Northern Afghanistan. General Dostum's forces fired holes into the sides of the containers with machine guns, striking the persons inside. Plaintiff Iqbal was struck in his arm, which would later become infected. Following the nearly 18-hour journey to Sherbegan prison, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were among what they estimate to have been approximately 20 survivors in the container.

40. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were held in Sherbegan by General Dostum's forces for about one month, where they were exposed to extremely cold conditions without adequate clothing, confined to tight spaces, and forced to ration food. Prison conditions were filthy. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed and other prisoners suffered from amoebic dysentery and were infested with lice.

41. In late December 2001, the ICRC visited with Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed and informed them that the British Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan had been advised of their situation and that embassy officials would soon be in contact with Plaintiffs.

42. On December 28, 2001, U.S. Special Forces arrived at Sherbegan and were informed of the identities of Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed.

43. General Dostum's troops chained Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed and marched them through the main gate of the prison, where U.S. Special Forces surrounded them at gunpoint.

44. From December 28, 2001 until their release in March 2004, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were in the exclusive physical custody and control of the United States military. In freezing temperatures, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were stripped of their clothes, searched, and photographed naked while being held by Defendant John Does, two U.S. Special Forces soldiers. American military personnel took Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed to a room for individual interrogations. Plaintiff Rasul was bound hand and foot with plastic cuffs and forced onto his knees before an American soldier in uniform. Both Plaintiffs Rasul and Iqbal were interrogated immediately and without knowledge of their interrogators' identities. Both were questioned at gunpoint. While Plaintiff Iqbal was interrogated, Defendant John Doe held a 9mm pistol physically touching his temple. At no time were Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed afforded counsel or given the opportunity to contact their families.

45. Following their interrogations, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were led outside where a Defendant John Doe immediately covered their eyes by putting sandbags over their heads and applying thick masking tape. They were placed side-by-side, barefoot in freezing temperatures, with only light clothing, for at least three to four hours. While hooded and taped, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were repeatedly threatened with beatings and death and were beaten by a number of Defendant John Does, U.S. military personnel. Plaintiff Iqbal estimates that he was punched, kicked, slapped, and struck by US military personnel with rifle butts at least 30 or 40 times.

46. Thereafter, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were placed in trucks with other detainees and transported to an airport about 45 minutes away.

47. Plaintiffs Rasul and Iqbal were led onto one plane and Plaintiff Ahmed was led onto a second plane. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed, still hooded with their

hands tied behind their backs and their legs tied in plastic cuffs, were fastened to a metal belt attached to the **floor of** each aircraft. The soldiers instructed Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed to keep their legs straight out in front **of** them as they sat. **The** position was extremely painful. When any of Plaintiffs or other detainees tried to move to relieve **the** pain, **an** unknown number of Defendant John Does struck Plaintiffs **and** others with rifle **butts**. Plaintiffs **Rasul**, Iqbal and Ahmed were flown by the U.S. military to Kandahar.

**48.** Upon arrival in Kandahar, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed, **still** covered with hoods, were led out of the planes. A rope was tightly tied around each of their right **arms**, connecting the detainees together.

**49.** Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed, who were still **without** shoes, were **forced** to walk for **nearly an hour in the freezing cold, causing them to sustain deep** cuts on their feet and rope burns on their right arms.

**50.** Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were herded **into a tent**, where **soldiers** forced them to kneel with their legs bent double and their foreheads touching the ground. With their hands and feet still tied, the position was difficult to maintain. Plaintiffs **Rasul**, Iqbal and Ahmed were **repeatedly** and violently beaten by Defendant John Does, US soldiers. Each was asked whether he was a member **of** Al Qaeda and when each responded **negatively, each was punched violently and repeatedly by** soldiers. When Plaintiffs **Rasul Iqbal** and Ahmed identified themselves as **British** nationals, Defendants John Doe soldiers insisted they were "not white" but "black" and accordingly could not be British. The soldiers continued to beat them.

**51.** Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal **and** Ahmed were "processed" by American soldiers, **and** had plastic numbered wristbands placed on their wrists. Soldiers **kicked** Plaintiff



Rasul, assigned the number 78, several times during this process. American soldiers cut off his clothes and conducted a body cavity search. He was then led through an open-air maze constructed of barbed wire. Plaintiffs Iqbal, assigned number 79, and Ahmed, assigned number 102, experienced the same inhumane treatment.

52. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed, dehydrated, exhausted, disoriented, and fearful, were summoned by number for interrogation. When called, each was shackled and led to an interrogation tent. Their hoods were removed and they were told to sit on the floor. An armed soldier stood behind them out of their line of sight. They were told that if they moved they would be shot.

53. After answering questions as to their backgrounds, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were each photographed by soldiers. They were fingerprinted and a swab from their mouth and hairs plucked from their beards were taken for DNA identification.

54. An American soldier questioned Plaintiff Iqbal a second time. Plaintiff Iqbal was falsely accused by the interrogator of being a member of Al Qaeda. Defendant John Does, US soldiers, punched and kicked Plaintiff Iqbal in the back and stomach before he was dragged to another tent.

55. Personnel believed by Plaintiffs to be British military personnel later interrogated Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed, with US soldiers present. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were falsely accused of being members of the Al Muhajeroon. During the interrogation, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were threatened by Defendant John Does, armed American soldiers, with further beatings if they did not admit to various false statements.

56. Plaintiffs Rasul and Ahmed slept in a tent with about 20 other detainees. Plaintiff Iqbal was in another tent. The tents were surrounded by barbed wire.

Detainees were not allowed to talk and were forced to sleep on the ground. American soldiers woke the detainees hourly as **part** of a systematic effort to deprive them of sleep.

57. Defendant John Does, interrogators and guards, frequently used physical violence and unmuzzled dogs to threaten and intimidate Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed and other detainees during the interrogations.

58. At or around midnight of January 12 or 13, 2002, US army personnel entered the tent of Plaintiffs Rasul and Ahmed. Both were made to lie on the ground, were shackled, and rice sacks were placed over their heads. They were led to another tent, where Defendant John Does, US soldiers, removed their clothes and forcibly shaved their beards and heads. The forced shaving was not intended for hygiene purposes, but rather was, **on information and belief, designed to distress and humiliate** Plaintiffs given their Muslim faith, which requires adult males to maintain beards.

59. Plaintiff Rasul was eventually taken outside where he could hear dogs barking nearby and soldiers shouting, "Get 'em boy." He was then given a cavity search and photographed extensively while naked before being given an orange uniform. Soldiers handcuffed Plaintiff Rasul's wrists and ankles before dressing him in black thermal gloves, dark goggles, earmuffs, and a facemask. Plaintiff Rasul was then left outside ~~for~~ hours in freezing temperatures.

60. Plaintiff Iqbal, who was in another tent, experienced similar treatment of being led from his tent to be shaved and stripped naked.

61. Plaintiffs Rasul and Iqbal were escorted onto large cargo planes. Still shackled and wearing facemasks, both were chained to the floor with no backrests. They were forced by Defendant John Does to sit in an uncomfortable position for the

entire flight to Guantanamo (of approximately eighteen to twenty hours) and were not allowed to move or given access to toilet facilities.

62. Plaintiff Ahmed remained in Kandahar for another month. American soldiers interrogated him four more times. Sleep-deprived and malnourished, Plaintiff Ahmed was also interrogated by British agents who, on information and belief were from the British intelligence agency, **MIS**, and he was falsely told that Plaintiffs Rasul and Iqbal had confessed in Cuba to allegations of membership in the Al Muhajeroon. He was told that he could return to the United Kingdom in exchange for admitting to various accusations. Distraught, fearful of further beatings and abuse, and without benefit of contact with family or counsel, Plaintiff Ahmed made various false confessions. Plaintiff Ahmed was thereafter transported to Guantanamo.

63. As noted above, Plaintiff Al-Harith was being held in custody by the Taliban in Southern Afghanistan as a suspected British spy. He was interrogated and beaten by Taliban troops. When the Taliban government fell, Plaintiff Al-Harith was in a Taliban prison. He contacted the British Embassy through the **ICRC** and by satellite phone and was assured he would be repatriated to Britain. Two days before his scheduled repatriation, US forces informed him that he was being detained and taken to Kandahar, where he was held in a prison controlled by **US** forces and interrogated and beaten by US troops. Plaintiff Al Harith was flown to Guantánamo from Kandahar on or about February 11,2002.

64. Prior to take-off, Plaintiff Al-Harith, like Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed, was hooded and shackled; mittens were placed on his hands and earphones over his ears. Chains were then placed around his legs, waist and the earphones. The chains

cut into his ears. Goggles were placed on his eyes and a medical patch that, on information and belief, contained muscle relaxant was applied.

**Captivity and Conditions at Camp X-Ray, Guantánamo**

65. Plaintiffs Rasul and Iqbal were transported to Guantanamo in mid-January 2002. Plaintiffs Ahmed and Al-Harith were transported there approximately one month later. During the trip, Defendant John Does, US soldiers, kicked and punched Plaintiff Ahmed more than twenty times. Plaintiff Al-Harith was punched, kicked and elbowed repeatedly and was threatened with more violence.

66. Upon arrival at Guantánamo, Plaintiffs were placed on a barge to get to the main camp. Defendant John Does, US Marines on the barge, repeatedly beat all the detainees, including Plaintiffs, kicking, slapping, elbowing and punching detainees in the body and head. The Marines announced repeatedly, "You are arriving at your final destination," and, "You are now property of the United States Marine Corps."

67. Plaintiffs were taken to Camp X-Ray, the prison camp for detainees. Soldiers forced all four Plaintiffs on arrival to squat outside in stress positions in the extreme heat. Plaintiffs and the other detainees had their goggles and hoods removed, but they had to remain with their eyes closed and were not allowed to speak.

68. Plaintiff Iqbal, still shackled and goggled, fell over and started shaking. Plaintiff Iqbal was then given a cavity search and transported to another area for processing, including fingerprinting, DNA sampling, photographs, and another wristband.

69. Plaintiff Rasul was forced to squat outside for six to seven hours and went through similar processing. Unmuzzled barking dogs were used to intimidate Plaintiff Rasul and others. At one point, Defendant John Doe, a soldier from a unit known as the

Extreme Reaction Force (ERF), repeatedly kicked Plaintiff **Rasul** in the back and used a riot shield to slam him against a wall.

70. After processing, Plaintiffs were placed in wire cages of about 2 meters by 2 meters. Conditions were cruel, inhuman and degrading.

71. Plaintiffs were forced to sit in their cells in total silence for extended periods. Once a week, for ~~two~~ minutes, Plaintiffs were removed from their cells and showered. They were then returned to their cells. Once a week, Plaintiffs were permitted five minutes recreation while their hands remained chained.

72. Plaintiffs were exposed to extreme heat during the day, as their cells were situated in the direct sunlight,

73. Plaintiffs were deliberately fed inadequate quantities of food, keeping them in a **perpetual state of hunger**. **Much of the food consisted of "MRE's"** (meals ready to eat), which were ten to twelve years beyond their usable date. Plaintiffs were served out of date powdered eggs and milk, stale bread from which the mold had been picked out and fruit that was black and rotten.

74. Plaintiffs and other detainees were forced to kneel each time a guard came into their cells.

75. Plaintiffs at night were exposed to powerful floodlights, a purposeful tactic to **promote sleep deprivation among the detainees**. **Plaintiffs and the other detainees** were prohibited from **putting** covers over their heads to block out the light and were prohibited from keeping their arms beneath the covers.

76. Plaintiffs were constantly threatened at **Camp X-Ray**, with guards stating on multiple occasions, "We could kill you at any time; the world doesn't know you're here; we could kill you and no one would know."

77. Plaintiff Al-Harith was taken to the medical clinic and ~~was~~ told that his **blood** pressure was too **high**. He was given, on information and belief, muscle relaxant pills and an injection of an unspecified substance.

78. ~~On~~ various occasions, Plaintiffs' efforts to pray were banned or interrupted. Plaintiffs were never given prayer mats and did not initially receive copies of the Koran. Korans were provided to them after approximately a month. On one occasion, a guard in Plaintiff Ahmed's cellblock noticed a copy **of** the Koran on the **floor** and kicked it. On another occasion, a guard threw a **copy of** the Koran in a toilet bucket. Detainees, including Plaintiffs, were also at times prevented from calling out the call to prayer, with American soldiers either silencing the person **who** was issuing the prayer call or playing loud music to drown out the call to prayer. This was part **of** a **continuing pattern of disrespect and contempt for Plaintiffs' religious beliefs and practices**.

#### **Interrogation at Camp X-Ray**

79. Plaintiffs were **extensively** interrogated at Camp X-Ray.

80. During interrogations, Plaintiffs were typically "long shackled," whereby their legs were chained using a large padlock. The shackles had sharp edges that scraped the skin, **and** all Plaintiffs experienced deep cuts on and around their ankles, **resulting in scarring and continuing chronic pain. During the interrogations, Plaintiffs** were shackled and chained to **the floor**. **Plaintiffs** were repeatedly urged by American interrogators to admit that they were fighters who went to Afghanistan for "jihad." In return, Plaintiffs were promised that if they confessed to these false assertions, they could return to the United Kingdom. Plaintiff Iqbal, who was interrogated five times by

American forces over three months at Camp X-Ray, was repeatedly encouraged and coerced to admit to having been a "fighter."

81. Plaintiff Al-Harith was interrogated approximately ten times at Camp X-Ray. He was interrogated by both British and American authorities. On one occasion, an interrogator asked Plaintiff Al-Harith to admit that he went to Pakistan to buy **drugs**, which was not **true**. On another occasion, Plaintiff Al-Harith was told that there was a new terrorism law that would permit the authorities to put his **family** out in the street if Plaintiff Al-Harith **did** not **admit** to being a drug dealer or a fighter. **On** another **occasion**, interrogators promised money, a car, a house and a job if he admitted those things. As they were **not true**, he declined to admit them.

82. Following Plaintiff Ahmed's first several interrogations at Camp X-Ray, he was isolated in a cellblock where there were only Arabic **speakers**. Plaintiff Ahmed, who does not speak Arabic, was unable to communicate with anyone other **than** interrogators and guards for approximately five months.

#### **Conditions at Camp Delta**

83. Around May 2002, Plaintiffs were transferred to Camp Delta.

84. At no time **were** Plaintiffs advised as to why they were being transferred, **for** what purpose they were detained, why they were considered "unlawful combatants," and what **medical** and **legal resources** might be available.

85. At Camp Delta, Plaintiffs were housed in mesh cages that were **subdivided** from a larger metal container. There was little to **no** privacy and the cages provided little shelter from the heat during the day or the cold at **night**. The cages quickly rusted because of the sea air. The cells contained metal slabs at waist height;

detainees could not sit on the slabs because their legs would dangle off and become numb. There was not enough room in the cells to pray.

86. Constant reconstruction work and large electric generators, which ran 24 hours a day, were used as **part** of a strategic effort to deprive Plaintiffs and others of sleep. Lights were often left on 24 hours a **day**.

87. Plaintiffs Rasul and Iqbal were in the same cellblock. Plaintiff Ahmed **was** placed in isolation for about one month. There was no explanation given as to why Plaintiff Ahmed had been placed in isolation. Following this period, he was placed in a different cell and interrogated by mostly American interrogators who repeatedly asked him the same questions for six months,

88. After **six** months at Camp Delta, Plaintiff Ahmed was moved to a cell directly **opposite** Plaintiff Rasul. Plaintiff **Iqbal** was placed in isolation for about **one** month. Again, no explanation was given for the arbitrary placement in isolation.

89. Plaintiff Ahmed was repeatedly disciplined with periods of isolation for **such** behavior as complaining about the **food** and singing.

90. Plaintiff Iqbal, after about **one** month at Camp Delta, was moved to isolation and given smaller food **portions** because it was believed he was belittling a military policeman. He was disciplined with another week of isolation when he wrote "have a nice **day**" on a **Styrofoam cup**.

91. After **his** last period of isolation, Plaintiff Iqbal was moved to a block which housed only Chinese-speaking detainees. During his time there, he was exposed to aggressive interrogation. After being there for months, Plaintiff Iqbal's mental condition deteriorated further.



92. Plaintiff Al-Harith was put into isolation for refusing to wear a wristband. Plaintiff Al-Harith was also placed in isolation for writing the letter "D" on a Styrofoam cup. The isolation block was freezing cold as cold air was blown through the block twenty-four hours a day. The isolation cell was pitch black as the **guards** claimed the lights were not working. Plaintiff Al-Harith was placed in isolation a second time around Christmas 2002 for refusing to take an unspecified injection. When he refused, the ERF was brought in and Plaintiff Al-Harith was "ERFed": he was beaten, forcibly injected and chained in a hogtied position, with his stomach on the floor and his arms and legs chained together above him. The ERF team jumped on his legs and back and kicked and punched Plaintiff Al-Harith. Plaintiff Al-Harith was then placed in isolation for approximately a month, deprived at various intervals of soap, toothpaste or a **toothbrush, blankets or toilet paper**. **He was also deprived of a Koran during this second period of isolation.**

93. On information and belief, "ERFings," i.e., the savage beatings administered by the ERF teams, were videotaped on a regular basis and should be available as evidence of the truth of the allegations contained herein.

94. The Camp Delta routine included compulsory "recreation" twice a week for fifteen minutes. Attendance was enforced by the ERF. As soon as fifteen minutes had passed, **detainees were immediately returned to** their cells. Plaintiff Rasul **noted that** one would be forced to return to his cell even if in the middle of prayers.

95. **Around** August 2002, medical corps personnel offered Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed injections of an unidentified substance. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed, like most detainees, refused. **Soon** after, Defendant John Does, the medical corps, returned with the ERF team. The ERF team members were dressed in padded

gear, thick gloves, and helmets. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were shackled and restrained with their arms and legs bent backwards while medical corps pulled up their sleeves to inject their arms with an unidentified drug that had sedative effects.

96. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed received these injections against their will on **approximately a dozen occasions. Plaintiff Al-Harith received 9 or 10** compulsory injections on six separate occasions.

97. Plaintiff Iqbal was deprived of his Koran and other possessions. His hands were shackled in front of him. When Plaintiff Iqbal looked back, a guard pushed him in the corner. There Defendant John Does punched him repeatedly in the face and kneed him in his thigh.

#### Isolation and Interrogations at Camp Delta

98. **Interrogation booths either had a miniature camera hidden in them or a** one-way **glass** window. Thus, on information and belief, some or all of the interrogations of Plaintiffs and other detainees are recorded and are available as evidence of the truth of Plaintiffs' allegations herein.

99. In December 2002, a tiered reward system was introduced at Camp Delta, whereby detainees were placed on different levels **or** tiers depending on their level of co-operation and their behavior at the camp.

100. **Interrogators and guards frequently promised to provide or threatened to** withdraw of essential items such as blankets or toothpaste – referred to as "comfort items" – in order to coerce detainees into providing information. The truthful **assertion** that Plaintiffs had no information to give did not result in the provision of "comfort items." **To the contrary**, the interrogators demanded that the Plaintiffs confess to false allegations and promised "comfort items" in exchange.

101. Isolation of detainees was frequently used as a technique to "wear down" detainees prior to interrogation. There were **two** primary ways in which prisoners would be placed in isolation: (1) for punishment, for a set period of time for a specific reason; or (2) for interrogation, with no specific time limit.

102. Between October 2002 and May 2003, Plaintiff Rasul was interrogated about five or **six** times. Most of the interrogations involved the same questions that had been asked before. In April 2003, Plaintiffs Rasul and Iqbal were given polygraph tests and were **led** to believe that they might be allowed to return home if they passed.

103. After two hours of questioning as to whether he **was** a member of Al Qaeda, Plaintiff Rasul was returned to his cell. Two weeks later, he was interrogated by a woman who may have been army personnel in civilian clothing. She informed him **that he had passed the polygraph test. Plaintiff Rasul was transferred** to a different cellblock and informed by interrogators that they had videos which proved that he and Plaintiffs Iqbal and Ahmed were members of Al Qaeda and linked to the September 11 attacks.

104. A week later, Plaintiff Rasul was transferred to an isolation block, called "November." Plaintiff Rasul asked the army sergeant why he was being moved and was informed that the order was from the interrogators. Plaintiff Rasul was placed in a **metal cell. To make the conditions of confinement continuously debilitating, the air conditioning was** turned off during the day and turned on high at night. Temperatures were near 100 degrees during the day and 40 degrees at night. The extremes of heat and cold were deliberately utilized to intimidate, discomfort and break down prisoners. For one week, Plaintiff Rasul was held in isolation without interrogation. Later, he was taken to a room and "short shackled and placed in an extremely cold room for **six** to

seven hours. Short shackling consists of chaining the ankles and wrists **closely** together to force the detainee into a contorted and painful position. He was unable to move in the shackles and was not afforded an opportunity to go to the bathroom. He was hardly able to walk and suffered severe back pains. He was taken back to his cell without explanation.

**105.** The next day Plaintiff Rasul was "**short** shackled" and chained to the floor again for interrogation by an US Army intelligence officer named Bashir, also known as Danny. He was shown photographs of three men who were supposedly Plaintiffs **Rasul, Iqbal** and Ahmed with a man purported to *be* Mohammed **Atta**. Plaintiff Rasul repeatedly and truthfully denied being the person in the photograph. Further, he repeatedly and truthfully denied any involvement **with** Al Qaeda or the September 11 **attacks**. **On five or six more occasions, Plaintiff Rasul was** interrogated in similar fashion. During these interrogations, Plaintiff Rasul was not provided with food and was not permitted to pray.

**106.** Following the first interrogation, on five or six occasions, Plaintiff **Rasul** was removed from **his** cell and brought back to the interrogation block for intervals of about four or five days at a time. He was repeatedly "short shackled," exposed to extremely loud rock or heavy metal music, and left alone in the interrogation **room** for up to 13 hours in the "**long shackle**" position.

**107.** During this period, a Marine captain and other soldiers arrived at Plaintiff Rasul's cell to transfer him to another block, where **he** would remain in isolation for another two months without "comfort items."

**108.** On one occasion, Plaintiff Rasul **was** brought to the interrogation room from isolation to be questioned by interrogators from the Criminal **Investigations** Division

(CID). These interrogators, identified as "Drew" and "Terry," informed Plaintiff Rasul that they were going to begin military tribunals.

109. After continued interrogations as to his alleged presence in a photograph with Osama Bin Laden, Plaintiff Rasul explained that he was working in England and going to college at the time the photograph was taken. Plaintiff Rasul told interrogators his place of employment at an English electronics shop and his attendance at University of Central England and implored interrogators to corroborate what he was telling them. The interrogators insisted he was lying. To Plaintiff's knowledge, no effort was made to find corroborating information which would have confirmed that Plaintiff Rasul was living in England at the time of the alleged meeting with Bin Laden in the photograph.

110. About a month after his second isolation period, Plaintiff Rasul was "long shackled" and placed in a room, where he was met by Bashir and a woman dressed in civilian clothing. Bashir informed Plaintiff Rasul that the woman had come from Washington to show him a video of an Osama Bin Laden rally in Afghanistan. After the woman showed Plaintiff Rasul a portion of the video, she asserted that it showed Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed sitting down with Bin Laden. The woman interrogator urged Plaintiff Rasul to admit that the allegation was true, but the persons in the video were not the Plaintiffs. Plaintiff Rasul continued truthfully to deny involvement. He was threatened that if he did not confess, he would be returned to isolation. Having been in isolation for five to six weeks, with the result that he was suffering from extreme mental anguish and disorientation, Plaintiff falsely confessed that he was in the video.

111. Plaintiff Rasul was then returned to isolation for another five to six weeks. During that period he had no contact with any human being except with guards and

interrogators who questioned him regarding the identity of certain individuals in photographs.

112. Plaintiff **Rasul** was then transferred to another cellblock, where both Plaintiffs Iqbal and Ahmed were being held. Here, Plaintiff Rasul was denied "comfort items" and exercise privileges.

113. Around mid-August of 2003, Plaintiff Rasul was moved within Camp Delta and placed in another cell block without explanation. After about two weeks, Plaintiff Rasul was taken to a building known as the "Brown Building" and was informed by an army intelligence interrogator named "James" that he would soon be moving to a cell next to Plaintiffs Iqbal and Ahmed.

114. Following the meeting with the army intelligence interrogator, Plaintiff **Rasul** was brought to "Kilo Block" the next day, where Plaintiffs **Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed** were reunited and able to speak *with* one another.

115. For the next two weeks, Plaintiffs **Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed** were brought in succession to be questioned by an army intelligence officer, known only as "James," as to their purported involvement in the 2000 video of Bin Laden.

116. On one occasion, Plaintiff Rasul was administered a voice stress analyzer test by "James."

117. **After his last interrogation by "James," Plaintiff Rasul was informed** that he would soon be turned over to Navy Intelligence. Before that, however, in September 2003, Plaintiff Rasul was further interrogated. He was brought into an interrogation room for eight hours. He was denied requests to pray and to have food or water. The following day, British officials questioned **Plaintiff Rasul**. Plaintiff Rasul informed an official, who gave the name "Martin," that he had been kept in isolation for three months

without cause and had severe knee pain from the lack of exercise. Later that evening, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were taken to what was, on information and belief, a CIA interrogation block.

118. Plaintiffs continued to be held in the Kilo Block and were occasionally brought in for interrogation by a navy intelligence officer who gave the name "Romeo."

119. Plaintiff Iqbal was treated in a manner similar to the other Plaintiffs.

120. Plaintiff Iqbal was interrogated on several occasions, sometimes for as long as eight hours.

121. The typical routine was to be "short shackled" and placed in an extremely cold room.

122. Plaintiff Iqbal was relegated to Level 4, the harshest level, for about two weeks, with virtually no "comfort items." Soon after, he was placed in isolation on the instruction of intelligence officers.

123. Plaintiff Iqbal's isolation cell was covered in human excrement. Plaintiff Iqbal had no soap or towels and could not clean the cell. He was unable to sit anywhere.

124. Plaintiff Iqbal was interrogated periodically to review photographs. On one occasion, he was placed in a "short shackled" position and left in a room with the air conditioning turned down to 40°. Plaintiff Iqbal was left in the "short shackle" position for about three hours. Then, Defendant John Doe, an interrogator calling himself "Mr. Smith," entered the room and teased Plaintiff Iqbal about the temperature. "Mr. Smith" told Plaintiff Iqbal that he was able to get anything Plaintiff Iqbal wanted. "Mr. Smith" then pulled out pornographic magazines and taunted him. Plaintiff Iqbal refused to talk to "Mr. Smith." "Mr. Smith" left Plaintiff Iqbal alone for another three or four hours in the

frigid room. In that one day, Plaintiff Iqbal had been "short shackled" for seven to eight hours. Upon returning to his cell, he became ill with flu and requested medication. One of the military police officers, Defendant John Doe, denied him medication, and informed him that he was acting under orders from intelligence.

125. The next day, a Marine Captain and about 15 soldiers escorted Plaintiff Iqbal to another isolation block. He was left there for several days. Prior to his interrogation, Plaintiff Iqbal was "short shackled" and then introduced to an interrogator who gave the name "James". Because the pain from the shackling became excruciating, Plaintiff Iqbal began to scream. After about three or four hours, "James" unshackled him.

126. After three days, Plaintiff Iqbal was taken to the "Brown Building," where he was "long shackled" and left in a room with strobe lighting and very loud music played repeatedly, making it impossible for him to think or sleep. After about an hour, Plaintiff Iqbal was taken back to his cell.

127. The next day, Plaintiff Iqbal was "short shackled" in the interrogation room for five or six hours before later being interrogated by "Drew," who identified himself as an agent from CID. Plaintiff Iqbal was shown photographs, but refused to look at them. He was "short shackled" for about four or five hours more. After a while, he was unable to bear the conditions and falsely confessed that he was pictured in the photographs.

128. Four days later, agents from the FBI interrogated Plaintiff Iqbal about his activities in 2000.

129. Plaintiff Iqbal remained in isolation and was questioned at one point by a military intelligence officer giving the name of "OJ." Soldiers threatened him with further beatings if he did not answer the questions.



130. Plaintiff Ahmed was interrogated on numerous occasions, particularly with respect to his knowledge of the Bin Laden video. He was interrogated every three or four days, and the typical procedure was that he was first "short shackled" and placed in a freezing room with loud music for several hours.

131. Before arriving at Guantánamo, Plaintiff Ahmed was seriously sleep-deprived and malnourished. He was the first of the Plaintiffs to admit to various false accusations by Interrogators.

132. Upon Plaintiff Ahmed's arrival at Camp Delta, he was placed in isolation for about one month. Following this period, he was placed in a different cell and interrogated by mostly American interrogators who asked him the same questions for six months.

133. Plaintiff Al-Harith also was given a lie detector test approximately one year into his detention which he was told he passed.

134. Plaintiff Al-Harith on three or four occasions witnessed Defendant John Does, military police, using an industrial strength hose to shoot strong jets of water at detainees. He was hosed down on one occasion. A guard walked along the gangway alternating the hose on each cell. Plaintiff Al-Harith was hosed down continuously for approximately one minute. The pressure of the water forced him to the back of his cell. The contents of his cell, including his bedding and Koran, were soaked.

135. Plaintiff Rasul, in the next cell, also had all the contents of his cell soaked.

136. In or around February 2004, Plaintiffs heard from military police that they would be released and sent home soon. Before leaving Camp Delta, Plaintiffs all were interrogated a final time. Plaintiffs were asked to sign statements admitting to membership in Al Qaeda and participation in terrorist activity. Plaintiffs declined.

137. In March 2004, Plaintiffs were released from Camp Delta and flown to the United Kingdom.

### Injuries

738. Plaintiffs suffered and continue to suffer from the cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment they experienced during their detention. The "short shackling" which Plaintiffs were exposed to resulted in **deep** cuts at their ankles, permanent scarring, and chronic pain. Plaintiff Rasul **has** chronic pain in **his** knees and back. Plaintiff Ahmed **also** suffers from permanent deterioration of his eyesight because of the withholding of required special lenses as "comfort items."

139. Plaintiff Al-Harith suffers from severe and chronic pain in **his** knees from repeatedly being forced onto his knees and pressed downwards by guards whenever he left his **cell**. **He also has experienced pain in his right elbow.**

140. Plaintiffs further suffer from acute psychological symptoms.

### Development and Implementation of a Plan of Torture and Other Physical and Psychological Mistreatment of Detainees

141. **The torture, threats, physical and psychological abuse** inflicted upon Plaintiffs were devised, approved, and implemented by Defendant Rumsfeld and other Defendants in the military chain of command. These techniques were intended as interrogation techniques to be used on detainees.

142. It **is** well-established that the use of force in interrogation is prohibited by domestic and international law. The United States Army strictly prohibits the use of **such** techniques and advises **its** interrogators that their use may **lead** to criminal **proaccution**. Army **Field Manual 34-52, Ch. 1, "Intelligence Interrogation," provides:**

ilit      **Against Use of Force**

The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is **prohibited by** law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the US Government... The psychological techniques and principles outlined should neither be confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques such as brainwashing, mental torture, or any other form of mental coercion to include drugs. These techniques and principles **are** intended to serve as guides in obtaining the willing cooperation of a source. The absence of threats in interrogation is intentional, **as** their enforcement and use normally constitute **violations** of **international law and may result in prosecution**. (Emphasis supplied).

143. Further, according to Field Manual 34-52, ch. 1: 'Experience indicates that the use of force **is** not necessary to gain the cooperation of **sources** for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a **poor** technique, as it yields unreliable results, may **damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say whatever he** thinks the interrogator wants to hear.'

144. Army Field Manual 27-10, 'The Law of Land Warfare,' summarizes the domestic and international legal rules applicable to the conduct of war. Field Manual 27-10 recognizes the following sources of the law of war:

The law of war is derived from two principal sources:

- a. **Lawmaking Treaties (or Conventions)**, such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions.
- b. Custom. Although **some of the law** of war has not been incorporated in any treaty or convention to which the United States is a party, this body of unwritten or customary law is **firmly** established by the custom of nations and well defined by recognized authorities on international law.

**Id.** at Ch. 1, § 1.

145. In spite of the prohibitions on the use of force, threats, and abuse in the Army Field Manual, and **is** clear acknowledgement that their use violates

international and domestic law, Defendant Rumsfeld approved techniques that were in violation of those prohibitions and thus knowingly violated the rights of Plaintiffs.

146. In a press release dated June 22, 2004, Defendant Rumsfeld admitted that beginning December 2, 2002, he personally authorized the use of interrogation techniques that are not permitted under FM 34-52. Further, in the press release, Defendant Rumsfeld admits that he personally was consulted when certain of the techniques were to be utilized.

147. The techniques practiced on Plaintiffs – including beatings, "short shackling," sleep deprivation, injections of unknown substances, subjection to cold or heat, hooding, stress positions, isolation, forced shaving, disruption of religious practices, forced nakedness, intimidation with vicious dogs and threats – were known to and approved by Defendant Rumsfeld and others in the military chain of command.

148. Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions requires that all persons in the hands of an opposing force, regardless of their legal status, be afforded certain minimum standards of treatment:

Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture:

\*\*\*\*\*

(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.

149. The Third Geneva Convention of 1949, Art. 130, bars the "willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment . . . willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health" of any prisoner of war.

150. In February 2002, the White House issued a press release, which advised:

The United States is treating and will continue to treat all of the individuals detained at Guantanamo humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner **consistent** with the principles of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949.

The President has determined that the Geneva Convention applies to the Taliban detainees, **but** not to the al-Qaeda detainees. Al-Qaeda is not a state party to the Geneva Convention; it is a foreign terrorist group. As such, its members are not entitled to POW status.

151. **On information and belief, Defendant Rumsfeld and all Defendants** were aware of **this** statement of the President. Moreover, Defendant Rumsfeld knew that **this** statement of policy was a departure from the **previous policy** of the United States that the **laws** of war, including the Geneva Conventions, were always to be honored. Defendant Rumsfeld knew that the Department of State and the uniformed services took the generally recognized position that the Geneva Conventions could not be abrogated or ignored.

152. **However, Defendant Rumsfeld and others deliberated failed to** implement the Presidential Directive in any event. Defendant Rumsfeld and other Defendants in the chain of command had no good faith basis for believing that Plaintiffs were members of or affiliated with Al Qaeda in any way. Indeed, the policy as announced was incoherent in that Defendant Rumsfeld and the other defendants had no way of knowing who was and **who** was not a member of Al Qaeda or the

Taliban and Defendants took no steps to implement any reliable fact-finding process which might ascertain who was and who was not a member of Al Qaeda or the Taliban, including in particular a "competent tribunal" as mandated by the Third Geneva Convention, Art. 5, U.S. military regulations and long standing practice of the U.S. armed forces

**153.** Defendant Rumsfeld and all Defendants were aware that torture and other mistreatment perpetrated under ~~color~~ of law violates domestic and international law at

**154.** Defendant Rumsfeld and all Defendants were aware that Plaintiffs were tortured and otherwise mistreated or knew they would be tortured and otherwise mistreated while in military custody in Afghanistan and at Guantánamo.

**155.** ~~Defendant Rumsfeld and all Defendants~~ took no steps to prevent the infliction of torture and other mistreatment to which Plaintiffs were subjected.

**156.** Defendant Rumsfeld and all Defendants authorized and encouraged the infliction of torture and other mistreatment against Plaintiffs.

**157.** Defendant Rumsfeld and ~~all~~ Defendants were aware that prolonged ~~arbitrary~~ detention violates customary international law.

**158.** Defendant Rumsfeld and all Defendants authorized and condoned the prolonged ~~arbitrary detention of~~ Plaintiffs.

**Count I**  
**ALIEN TORT STATUTE**  
**Prolonged Arbitrary Detention**

**159.** Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 158 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

160. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the allegations contained herein “unquestionably describe ‘custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698, n.15 (2004) (citation omitted) (Plaintiffs Rihel Ahmed and Asif Iqbal were also Plaintiffs in that case).

161. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were unarmed and were detained in a prison camp operated by non-U.S. forces and Plaintiff Al-Harith had been detained and mistreated by the Taliban as a suspected British spy and was trapped in a war zone when Defendants took physical custody of their persons. Plaintiffs never engaged in combat, carried arms, or participated in terrorist activity or conspired with any terrorist person or organization. Defendants could have had no good-faith reason to believe that they had done so.

162. The Plaintiffs were detained under the exclusive custody and control of Defendants for over two years without due process, access to counsel or family, or a single charge of wrongdoing being levied against them.

163. The acts described herein constitute prolonged arbitrary detention in violation of the law of nations under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1350, in that the acts violated customary international law prohibiting prolonged arbitrary detention as reflected, expressed, and defined in multilateral treaties and other international instruments, international and domestic judicial decisions, and other authorities.

164. Defendants are liable for said conduct in that Defendants participated in, set the conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered, acquiesced, confirmed, ratified, aided and abetted and/or conspired together in bringing about the prolonged arbitrary detention of Plaintiffs.

165. Defendant's unlawful conduct deprived Plaintiffs of their freedom, of contact with their families, friends and communities. As a result, Plaintiffs suffered severe psychological abuse and injuries.

166. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other relief to be determined at trial.

**Count II**  
**ALIEN TORT STATUTE**  
**Torture**

167. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 158 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

168. The acts described herein were inflicted deliberately and intentionally for purposes which included, among others, punishing the Plaintiffs or intimidating them. The alleged acts did not serve any legitimate intelligence-gathering or other government purpose. Instead, they were perpetrated to coerce, punish, and intimidate the Plaintiffs. In any event, torture is not permitted as a legitimate government function under any circumstances.

169. The acts described herein constitute torture in violation of the law of nations under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, in that the acts violated customary international law prohibiting torture as reflected, expressed, and defined in multilateral treaties and other international instruments, international and domestic judicial decisions and other authorities.

170. Defendants are liable for said conduct in that Defendants participated in, set the conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered acquiesced, confirmed, ratified and or/conspired together in bringing about the torture and other physical and psychological abuse of Plaintiffs as described above.



171. Plaintiffs suffered severe, immediate and continuing physical and psychological abuse as a result of the acts alleged herein. Plaintiffs continue to suffer profound physical and psychological trauma from the acts alleged herein.

172. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other relief to be determined at trial.

**Count III**  
**ALIEN TORT STATUTE**  
**Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment**

173. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 158 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

174. The acts described herein had the intent and the effect of grossly humiliating and debasing the Plaintiffs, forcing them to act against their will and conscience, inciting fear and anguish, and breaking their physical and moral resistance.

175. These acts included infer alia repeated severe beatings; the withholding of food, water, and necessary medical care; sleep deprivation; lack of basic hygiene; intentional exposure to extremes of heat and cold and the elements; continuous isolation for a period of months; forced injections; sexual humiliation; intimidation with unmuzzled dogs; deprivation of the rights to practice their religion and death threats.

176. The acts described herein constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of the law of nations under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, in that the acts violated customary international law prohibiting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as reflected, expressed, and defined in multilateral treaties and other international instruments, international and domestic judicial decisions and other authorities.

177. Defendants are liable for said conduct in that Defendants participated in, set the conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered acquiesced, confirmed, ratified, aided and abetted and/or conspired together in bringing about the cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of Plaintiffs as described above.

178. Plaintiffs suffered severe immediate physical and psychological abuse as a result of the acts alleged herein. Plaintiffs continue to suffer profound physical and psychological trauma from the acts alleged herein.

179. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other relief to be determined at trial.

Count IV  
VIOLATION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

180. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 158 of this Complaint as fully set forth herein.

181. As detailed herein, Plaintiffs were held arbitrarily, tortured and otherwise mistreated during their detention in violation of specific protections of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions including but not limited to Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions.

182. Violations of the Geneva Conventions are direct treaty violations as well as violations of customary international law.

183. Defendants are liable for said conduct in that Defendants participated in, set the conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered, acquiesced, confirmed, ratified, aided and abetted and/or conspired together in bringing about the prolonged arbitrary detention, torture, abuse and mistreatment of Plaintiffs as described above.

184. As a result of Defendants' violations of the Geneva Conventions, Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other relief to be determined at trial.

**Count V**  
**CLAIMS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES**  
**Violation of the Eighth Amendment**

185. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 158 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

186. Defendants' actions alleged herein against imprisoned Plaintiffs violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Over the course of an arbitrary and baseless incarceration for more than two years, Defendants inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on Plaintiffs. Despite never having been tried by any tribunal, Plaintiffs and other detainees were repeatedly denounced as guilty of terrorist acts by Defendant Rumsfeld, President Bush, Vice President Cheney and others. The acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading unusual punishment were imposed based on this arbitrary and impermissible declaration of guilt.

187. Defendants were acting under color of law of the United States at all times pertinent to the allegations set forth above.

188. The Plaintiffs suffered severe physical and mental injuries as a result of Defendants' violations of the Eighth Amendment. They have also suffered present and future economic damage.

189. The actions of Defendants are actionable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

100. Defendants are liable for said conduct in that Defendant participated in, set the conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered, acquiesced, confirmed, ratified, aided and abetted and/or conspired together in bringing about the prolonged

arbitrary detention, physical and psychological torture and abuse, and other mistreatment of Plaintiffs as described above.

191. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other relief to be determined at trial.

**Count VI**  
**CLAIMS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES**  
Violation of *the* Fifth Amendment

192. Plaintiffs ~~repeat~~ and re-allege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 158 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

193. Defendants' actions alleged herein against Plaintiffs violated the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

194. **The arbitrary and baseless detention of Plaintiffs for more than two years** constituted a clear deprivation of their liberty without due process, in direct violation of their Fifth Amendment rights.

195. The cruel, inhuman or degrading, and unusual conditions of Plaintiffs' incarceration clearly violated their substantive rights to due process. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S.239, 244(1983).

196. Defendants' refusal to permit Plaintiffs to consult with counsel or to have access to **neutral tribunals to challenge the fact and conditions of their confinement** constituted violations of Plaintiffs' procedural rights to due process.

197. The abusive conditions of Plaintiffs' incarceration served no legitimate government purpose.

198. Defendants were acting under the color of the law of the United States at all times pertinent to the allegations set forth above.

199. The Plaintiffs suffered severe physical and mental injuries as a result of Defendants' violations of the **Fifth** Amendment. They have also suffered present and future economic damage.

200. The actions of Defendants are actionable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 US . 388 (1971).

201, Defendants are liable for said conduct in that Defendants participated in, set the conditions, directly **and/or** indirectly facilitated, ordered, acquiesced, confirmed, ratified, aided and abetted **and/or** conspired together in bringing about the prolonged arbitrary detention, physical and psychological torture and abuse and other mistreatment of Plaintiffs as described above.

202. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other relief to be **dctcrmincdat trial.**

**Count VII**  
**CLAIM UNDER THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT**

203. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 158 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

204. Defendants' actions alleged herein inhibited and constrained religiously motivated conduct central to Plaintiffs' religious beliefs.

205. Defendants' actions imposed a substantial burden on Plaintiffs' abilities to exercise and express their religious beliefs.

206. Defendants regularly and systematically engaged in practices specifically aimed at disrupting Plaintiffs' religious practices. These acts included throwing a copy of the Koran in a toilet bucket, prohibiting prayer, deliberately interrupting prayers, playing loud rock music to interrupt prayers, **withholding** the Koran without reason or as

punishment, forcing prisoners to pray with exposed genital areas, withholding prayer mats and **confining** Plaintiffs under **conditions where** it was impossible or **infeasible for** them to exercise their **religious rights**.

**207.** Defendants were acting under the color of the law of the United States at all times pertinent to the allegations set forth above.


**208.** The Plaintiffs suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.A §§ 2000bb et seq.

**209.** Defendants are liable **for** said conduct in that Defendants participated **in**, set the conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered, acquiesced, confirmed, ratified, aided and **abetted** and/or conspired together in bringing about the **denial, disruption and interference** with Plaintiffs' **religious practices and beliefs as described above**.

**210.** Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other relief to be determined at trial.

WHEREFORE Plaintiffs each demand judgment against Defendants jointly and severally, including compensatory damages in the amount of \$10,000,000 each (Ten Million Dollars), punitive damages, the costs of this action, including reasonable attorneys' fees, and such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

Dated October 27, 2004



BAACH ROBINSON & LEWIS  
Eric L. Lewis D.C. Bar No. 394643  
Jeffrey D. Robinson D.C. Bar No. 376037  
Lois J. Schiffer D.C. Bar. No. 56630  
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New York, NY, 20012  
212/614-6439

Attorneys for Plaintiffs




GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600  
INFO MEMO

November 17, 2004 11:30 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II 

SUBJECT: Detainee Lawsuits

- You asked me to provide information about a lawsuit that is purportedly being filed against you by a Moroccan former GTMO detainee, Radhouane Benchakroun.
- We have found no record of a lawsuit filed against you by Mr. Benchakroun or any other Moroccan former GTMO detainee.
  - The Casablanca Assahifa newspaper reported that lawyer Mohamed Hilal intends to file a lawsuit against you on behalf of his client, Radhouane Benchakroun. (Tab A) We have found no record of a current or former GTMO detainee named Radhouane Benchakroun.
  - Five GTMO detainees were released to Moroccan authorities in August 2004, including Radhouane Chekkouri and Brahim Benchakroun. Mr. Hilal apparently represents Brahim Benchakroun.
- Several other former GTMO detainees have filed a lawsuit, *Rasul, et al. v. Rumsfeld, et al.*, against you and other DoD officials in your individual capacities. (Tab B)
  - This case was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by four former GTMO detainees who are citizens of the United Kingdom and who were released in March 2004. They allege that they were tortured during their detention at GTMO in violation of the Constitution and domestic and international law. They seek \$10M each in compensatory and punitive damages.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared By: Christine S. Ricci, Associate Deputy General Counsel (LC)

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/27898

OSD 19043-04



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**A**



*Text*

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**Morocco: Former Guantanamo Detainee to Sue Rumsfeld Over Alleged Torture**  
*GMP20041104000229 Casablanca Assahifa in Arabic 3 Nov 04*

[Unattributed report on page one: A Moroccan lawyer sues Rumsfeld in court"]  
[FBIS Translated Text]

Mr. Mohamed Hilal, a Rabat lawyer, has told Assahifa that he is determined to take legal action against US Secretary for Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, in the United States, in coordination with American lawyers.

Mr. Hilal says that he will be asking for compensation for his client Radhouane Benchakroun for the damage caused to **him** by the torture he was subjected to at the hands of American troops when he was detained in Guantanamo jail.

This will be the second case of its kind. In fact a British lawyer has already lodged a similar lawsuit against the American Defense Department.

[Description of Source: Casablanca Assahifa in Arabic -Independent weekly newspaper]

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**B**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SHAFIQ RASUL  
c/o 14 Inverness Street  
London NW1 7 HJ  
England;

ASIF IQBAL  
d o 14 Inverness Street  
London NW17 HJ  
England;

RHUHEL AHMED  
c/o 14 Inverness Street  
London NW17 HJ  
England; and

JAMAL AL-HARITH  
c/o 159 Princess Road  
Manchester M14 4RE  
England

CA No. \_\_\_\_\_

Plaintiffs

- against -

DONALD RUMSFELD  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington D.C. 20301-1000;

**AIR FORCE** GENERAL RICHARD MYERS  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
9999 Joint Staff Pentagon  
Washington, **D.C. 20318-9999;**

ARMY MAJOR GENERAL GEOFFREY MILLER  
Former Commander, Joint Task Force  
**Guantnamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba,**  
c/o United States Army  
Army Pentagon  
Washington, **D.C. 203106200;**

ARMY GENERAL JAMES T. HILL :  
Commander, United States Southern Command :  
c/o United States Army :  
Army Pentagon :  
Washington, D.C. 20310-0200; :

ARMY MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL E. DUNLAVEY :  
Former Commander, Joint Task Force :  
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, :  
c/o United States Army :  
Army Pentagon :  
Washington, DC. 20310-0200; :

ARMY BRIGADIER GENERAL JAY HOOD :  
Commander, Joint Task Force, GTMO :  
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, :  
c/o United States Army :  
Army Pentagon :  
Washington, D.C. 20310-0200; :

MARINE BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL LEHNERT :  
Commander Joint Task Force-160 :  
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba :  
c/o Headquarters USMC :  
2 Navy Annex (CMC) :  
Washington, DC. 20380-1775; :

ARMY COLONEL NELSON J. CANNON  
Commander, Camp Delta  
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba,  
c/o United States Army  
Army Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20310-0200;

ARMY COLONEL TERRY CARRICO  
Commander Camp X-Ray, Camp Delta  
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba,  
c/o United States Army  
Army Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20310-0200;

ARMY LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM CLINE  
Commander, Camp Delta  
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba,  
c/o United States Army  
Army Pentagon

Washington, DC. 20310-0200;

**ARMY LIEUTENANT COLONEL DIANE BEAVER**

**Legal** Adviser to General Dunlavey  
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba  
c/o United States Army  
Army Pentagon  
Washington, DC. 20310-0200

**and**

JOHN DOES 1-100, individuals **involved in the illegal**  
Torture of Plaintiffs at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base

**All in their personal capacities**

Defendants.

---

**COMPLAINT**

(Violations of the Alien Tort Statute, the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the Geneva Conventions, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act)

Plaintiffs Shafiq **Rasul, Asif Iqbal**, Rihel Ahmed and Jamal **Al-Harith**, by and through their undersigned attorneys, Baach Robinson & Lewis PLLC and Michael Ratner at the Center for Constitutional Rights, as and for their complaint against Defendants Donald Rumsfeld, Air Force General Richard Myers, Army Major General Geoffrey Miller, Army General James **T. Hill**, Army Major General Michael E. Dunlavey, Army Brigadier General Jay **Hood**, Marine Brigadier General Michael Lehnert, Army Colonel Nelson J. Cannon, Army Colonel Terry Carrico, Army Lieutenant Colonel William Cline, Army Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver and John Does 1-100, hereby allege as follows:

## INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiffs are citizens and residents of the United Kingdom. They are not now and have never been members of any terrorist group. They have never taken up arms against the United States.

2. Plaintiffs **Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal** and **Ruhel Ahmed** were detained in Northern Afghanistan on November 28, 2001, by General **Rashid Dostum**, an Uzbek warlord temporarily allied with the United States as part of the **Northern Alliance**. Thereafter, General Dostum placed Plaintiffs **Rasul**, **Iqbal** and **Ahmed** in the custody of the United States military. Because Plaintiffs **Rasul**, **Iqbal** and **Ahmed** were unarmed and not engaged in any hostile activities, neither General Dostum nor any of his troops ever could have or did observe them engaged in combat against the United States, the **Northern Alliance** or anyone else. On information and belief, General Dostum detained Plaintiffs **Rasul**, **Iqbal** and **Ahmed** and numerous other detainees who were not combatants; he handed detainees including Plaintiffs **Rasul**, **Iqbal** and **Ahmed** to the custody of the United States in order to obtain bounty money from the United States; and the United States took custody of Plaintiffs **Rasul**, **Iqbal** and **Ahmed** without any independent good faith basis for concluding that they were or had been engaged in activities hostile to the United States.

3. Plaintiff **Jamal Al-Harith** works as an internet web designer in **Manchester**, England. Intending to attend a religious retreat, Plaintiff **Al-Harith** arrived in Pakistan on October 2, 2001, where he was advised to leave the country because of animosity toward British citizens. Heeding the warning, he planned to return to Europe by traveling overland through Iran to Turkey by truck. While in Pakistan, the truck in which Plaintiff **Al-Harith** was riding was stolen at gunpoint by Afghans; he was then forced into

a jeep which crossed the border into Afghanistan. Plaintiff Al-Harith was then handed over to the Taliban. Plaintiff Al-Harith was beaten by Taliban guards and taken for interrogation. He was accused of being a British special forces military spy and held in isolation. After the US invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban released Plaintiff Al-Harith into the general prison population. When the Taliban government fell and the new government came to power, Plaintiff Al-Harith and others in the prison were told that they were free to leave and Plaintiff Al-Harith was offered transportation to Pakistan. Plaintiff Al-Harith thought it would be quicker and easier to travel to Kabul where there was a British Embassy. Officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") instructed Al-Harith to remain at the prison and they offered to make contact with the British Embassy to fly him home. Plaintiff Al-Harith also spoke directly to British Embassy officials who indicated that they were making arrangements to fly him to Kabul and out of the country. After Plaintiff Al-Harith had been in contact with the British Embassy in Kabul for approximately a month discussing the logistics of evacuating him, American Special Forces arrived and questioned Plaintiff. The ICRC told Plaintiff Al-Harith that the Americans would fly Plaintiff Al-Harith to Kabul; two days before he was scheduled to fly to Kabul, American soldiers told Plaintiff Al-Harith, "You're not going anywhere. We're taking you to Kandahar airbase."

4. All four Plaintiffs were first held in United States custody in Afghanistan and later transported to the United States Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay Naval Station, Cuba ("Guantanamo"), where Defendants imprisoned them without charge for more than two years. During Plaintiffs' imprisonment, Defendants systematically and repeatedly tortured them in violation of the United States Constitution and domestic and international law, and deprived them of access to friends, relatives, courts and counsel.



Defendants repeatedly attempted to extract confessions from Plaintiffs without regard to the truth or plausibility of these statements through the use of the illegal methods detailed below.

5. Plaintiffs were released without charge in March 2004 and have returned to their homes in the United Kingdom where they continue to suffer the **physical** and psychological effects of **their** prolonged arbitrary detention, torture and other mistreatment as hereinafter alleged.

6. In the course of their detention by the United States, Plaintiffs were repeatedly struck with rifle butts, punched, kicked and slapped. They were "short shackled" in painful "stress positions" for many hours at a time, causing deep flesh wounds and permanent scarring. Plaintiffs were **also** threatened with unmuzzled dogs, **forced to strip naked, subjected to repeated forced body cavity searches, intentionally** subjected to extremes of heat and cold for the purpose of causing suffering, kept in filthy cages **for** 24 hours per day with no exercise **or** sanitation, denied **access** to necessary medical care, harassed in practicing their religion, deprived of adequate food, deprived of sleep, deprived of communication with family and friends, and deprived of information **about their status.**

7. Plaintiffs' detention and mistreatment were in plain violation of the United States **Constitution, federal statutory law and United States treaty obligations, and** customary international **law.** Defendants' treatment of Plaintiffs and other Guantánamo detainees violated various provisions of law including the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbidding the deprivation of liberty without due process; the Eighth Amendment forbidding cruel and unusual punishment; United States statutes prohibiting torture, assault, and other mistreatment; the Geneva Conventions; and customary

international law norms prohibiting torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

8. Plaintiffs' torture and other mistreatment was not simply the product of isolated or rogue actions by individual military personnel. Rather it was the result of deliberate and foreseeable action taken by Defendant Rumsfeld and senior officers to flout or evade the United States Constitution, federal statutory law, United States treaty obligations and long established norms of customary international law. This action was taken in a misconceived and illegal attempt to utilize torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading acts to coerce nonexistent information regarding terrorism. It was misconceived because, according to the conclusion of the US military as expressed in the Army Field Manual, torture does not yield reliable information, and because **Plaintiffs-along** with the vast majority of **Guantánamo detainees** had no information to give. It was illegal because, as Defendants well knew, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of detainees is not permitted under the United States Constitution, federal statutory law, United States treaty obligations, and customary international law.

9. On or **about** December 2, 2002, Defendant Rumsfeld signed a memorandum approving numerous illegal interrogation methods, including putting **detainees** in "**stress positions**" **for up to four hours**; **forcing detainees** to strip naked, intimidating detainees with dogs, interrogating them for 20 hours at a time, forcing them to wear hoods, shaving their heads and beards, keeping them in total darkness and silence, and using what was euphemistically called "mild, non-injurious physical contact." As Defendant Rumsfeld knew, these and other methods were in violation of the United States Constitution, federal statutory law, the Geneva Conventions, and

customary international law as reflected in, inter alia, the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT"). This memorandum of December 2, 2002, authorizing torture and other mistreatment, was originally designated by Defendant Rumsfeld to be classified for ten years but was released at the direction of President George W. Bush **after** the Abu Ghraib torture scandal became public.

10. After authorizing, encouraging, permitting, and requiring the acts of torture and other mistreatment inflicted upon Plaintiffs, Defendant Rumsfeld, on information and belief, subsequently commissioned a "Working Group Report" dated **March 6, 2003**, to address "Detainee Interrogations in the **Global** War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy and Operational Considerations." This report, also originally **classified for a period of ten years by Defendant Rumsfeld, was also released after the Abu** Ghraib torture scandal became public. This report details the requirements of international and domestic law governing interrogations, including the Geneva Conventions; the CAT; customary international law; *the* torture statute, 18 U.S.C. §2340; assault within maritime and territorial jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. §113; maiming, 18 U.S.C. §114; murder, 18 U.S.C. §1111; manslaughter, 18 U.S.C. §1112; interstate stalking, 18 U.S.C. §2261a; and conspiracy 18 U.S.C. §2 and §371. The report **attempts to address "legal doctrines under the Federal Criminal Law that could render specific conduct, otherwise criminal not unlawful."** Working Group Report at p. 3 (emphasis **in** original). The memorandum is on **its** face an ex post facto attempt to create arguments that the facially criminal acts perpetrated by the Defendants were somehow justified. It argues first that the President as Commander-in-Chief has plenary authority to order torture, a proposition that ignores settled legal doctrine from

King John at Runnymede to Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). It next tries to apply common law doctrines of self-defense and necessity, arguing the erroneous proposition that the United States has the right to torture detained individuals because it needs to defend itself or because it is necessary that it do so. Finally, it suggests that persons inflicting torture and other mistreatment will be able to defend against criminal charges by claiming that they were following orders. The report asserts that the detainees have no Constitutional rights because the Constitution does not apply to persons held at Guantanamo. However, the report acknowledges that U.S. criminal laws do apply to Guantnamo, and further acknowledges that the United States is bound by the CAT to the extent that conduct barred by that Convention would also be prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. On June 22, 2004, the conclusions of this report and other memoranda attempting to justify torture were repudiated and rescinded by President Bush.

11. In April 2003, following receipt of the Working Group Report, Defendant Rumsfeld issued a new set of recommended interrogation techniques, requiring approval for four techniques. These recommendations recognized specifically that certain of the approved techniques violated the Geneva Conventions and customary international law, including the use of intimidation, removal of religious items, threats and isolation. The April 2003 report, however, officially withdrew approval for unlawful actions that had been ongoing for months, including hooding, forced nakedness, shaving, stress positions, use of dogs and "mild, non-injurious physical contact." Nevertheless, on information and belief these illegal practices continued to be employed against Plaintiffs and other detainees at Guantnamo.

12. Defendants well knew that their activities resulting in the detention, torture and other mistreatment of Plaintiffs were illegal and violated clearly established law — i.e., the Constitution, federal statutory law and treaty obligations of the United States and customary international law. Defendants' after-the-fact attempt to create an **Orwellian legal façade** makes clear their conscious awareness that they were acting illegally. Therefore they cannot claim **immunity** from civil liability.

### I AND VENUE

13. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction); and 28 U.S.C. §1350 (Alien Tort Statute).

14. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The alleged **acts described** below are "inextricably bound up with the District of Columbia in its **role** as the nation's capital." Mund v. Weinberger, 554 F. Supp. 811, 818 (D.D.C. 1982). Decisions and acts by Defendants ordering, facilitating, aiding and abetting, acquiescing, confirming and/or conspiring in the commission of the alleged acts reached the highest levels of the United States Government. On information and belief, approval for all alleged acts emanated under color of law from orders, approvals, and omissions occurring in the Pentagon, numerous government **agencies headquartered in the District of Columbia, and the offices of Defendant Rumsfeld**, several of which are in the District of Columbia. Venue for claims arising from acts of Cabinet officials, the Secretary of Defense and United States agencies lies in the District of Columbia. See id.; Smith v. Dalton, 927 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).

## PARTIES

15. Plaintiff Shafiq **Rasul** was born in the United Kingdom and has been at all times relevant hereto a citizen and resident of the United Kingdom. He is not now and has never been a terrorist or a member of a terrorist group. He has never taken up arms against the United States. At the **time of** his **initial** arrest and detention, he was 24 years old.

16. Plaintiff Asif Iqbal was born in the United Kingdom and has been at all times relevant hereto a citizen **and** resident of the United Kingdom. **He** is not now and has never been a terrorist or a **member of** a terrorist group. He has never taken up arms against the United States. At the time of his initial arrest and detention, he was 20 years old.

17. **Plaintiff Rhuhel Ahmmed was born in the United Kingdom and has been at** all times relevant hereto a citizen and resident **of** the United Kingdom. He is not now and has never been a terrorist or a member of a terrorist group. **He** has never taken up arms against the United States. At the time of his initial arrest and detention, he was 19 years old.

18. Plaintiff Jamal Al-Harith was born in the United Kingdom and has been at all times relevant hereto a citizen and resident **of** the United Kingdom. He is not now **and has never been a terrorist or a member of a terrorist group. He has never taken up** arms against the United States. At the time of his initial arrest and detention, he was 35 years old.

19. Defendant Donald **Rumsfeld** is the United States Secretary of Defense. **On** information and belief, he **is** a citizen of Illinois and a resident of the District **of** Columbia. Defendant Rumsfeld is charged with maintaining the custody **and** control of

the Guantnamo detainees, including Plaintiffs, and with assuring that their treatment was in accordance with law. Defendant Rumsfeld ordered, authorized, condoned and has legal responsibility for **the arbitrary** detention, torture and other mistreatment of Plaintiffs as alleged herein. Defendant Rumsfeld ~~is~~ sued in his individual capacity.

**20.** Defendant Myers is a General in **the** United States Air Force and was at times relevant hereto Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ~~On~~ information and belief, he ~~is~~ a citizen and resident of Virginia. As the senior uniformed military officer in **the** chain of command, Defendant Myers is charged with maintaining the custody and control of the Guantánamo detainees, including Plaintiffs, and with assuring that their treatment was in accordance with law. On information and belief, Defendant Myers was informed of torture and other mistreatment of detainees at Guantnamo and Abu Ghraib **prison in Iraq and condoned such activities. Defendant Myers was in regular** contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and participated in and implemented decisions taken ~~in~~ the District of Columbia. Defendant Myers is **sued** in his individual capacity.

**21.** Defendant Miller is a Major General in the United States Army and was at times relevant hereto Commander of Joint Task Force-GTMO. On information and belief, he is a citizen **and** resident of Texas. At times relevant hereto, he had supervisory responsibility for Guantnamo detainees, including Plaintiffs, and was **responsible for assuring that their treatment was in accordance with law.** On information and belief, Defendant Miller was in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based in the District of Columbia and participated **in** and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia. On information and belief, Defendant Miller implemented and condoned numerous methods of torture and other mistreatment as hereinafter described. On information and belief,

Defendant Miller was subsequently transferred to Abu **Ghraib** where he implemented and facilitated torture and other mistreatment of detainees there. These acts were filmed and photographed and have justly inspired widespread revulsion and condemnation around the world. Defendant Miller is sued in his individual capacity.

22. Defendant Hill is a General in the United States Army and was at times relevant hereto Commander of the United States Southern Command. On information and belief, he is a citizen and resident of Texas. On information and belief, Defendant Hill was in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based in the District of Columbia and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia. On information and belief, General Hill requested and recommended approval for several abusive interrogation **techniques which were used on Guantanamo detainees, including** Plaintiffs. **Defendant** Hill is sued in his individual capacity.

23. Defendant Dunlavey is a Major General in the United States Army and was at times relevant hereto Commander of Joint Task Forces 160/170, the **successors** to Joint Task Force-GTMO. On information and belief, he is a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania. At times relevant hereto, he had supervisory responsibility **for** Guantanamo detainees, including Plaintiffs, and for assuring that their treatment was in **accordance** with law. **On information and belief, Defendant Dunlavey was in regular** contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based in the District of Columbia and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia. On information and belief, Major General Dunlavey implemented and condoned the torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading acts and conditions alleged herein. Defendant Dunlavey is sued in his individual capacity.



24. Defendant Hood is a Brigadier General in the United States Army and is the Commander of Joint Task Force-GTMO, which at all relevant times operated the detention facilities at Guantnamo. On information and belief, he is a citizen and resident of South Carolina. At times relevant hereto, he had supervisory responsibility for Guantanamo detainees, including **Plaintiffs**, and for assuring that their treatment was in accordance with law. On information and belief, Defendant **Hood** has been and continues to be in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based in the District of Columbia and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia. Defendant Hood is sued in his individual capacity.

25. Defendant Lehnert is a Brigadier General in the United States Marine Corps and was at times relevant hereto **Commander of the Joint Task Force** responsible for the construction and operation of Camp X-Ray and Camp Delta at Guantanamo. On information and belief, he is a citizen and resident of Florida. At times relevant hereto, he had supervisory responsibility for Guantanamo detainees, including **Plaintiffs**, and for assuring that their treatment was in accordance with law. On information and belief, Defendant Lehnert was in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based in the District of **Columbia** and **participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia**. Defendant Lehnert is sued in his individual capacity.

26. Defendant Cannon is a Colonel in the United States Army and the Commander of Camp Delta at Guantanamo. On information and belief, he is a citizen and resident of Michigan. At times relevant hereto, he has and **continues** to have supervisory responsibility for Guantanamo detainees including **Plaintiffs** and for

assuring that their treatment was in accordance with law. On information and belief, Defendant Cannon has been in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based in the District of Columbia and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia. Defendant Cannon is sued in his individual capacity.

**27.** Defendant Carrico is a Colonel in ~~the~~ United States Army and was at times relevant hereto Commander of Camp X-Ray and Camp Delta at Guantnamo. ~~On~~ information and belief, he is a citizen and resident of Texas. At times relevant hereto, he had supervisory responsibility for Guantnamo detainees including Plaintiffs and for assuring that their treatment was in accordance with law. On information and belief, Defendant Carrico was in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based ~~in the District of Columbia and participated in~~ and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia. Defendant Carrico is sued in ~~his~~ individual capacity.

**28.** Defendant Beaver is a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Army and was at times relevant hereto Chief Legal Adviser to Defendant Dunlavey. On information and belief, she is a citizen and resident of Kansas. On information and belief, knowing that torture and other mistreatment were contrary to military law and regulations, she **nevertheless provided an opinion purporting to justify the ongoing** torture and other mistreatment of detainees at Guantánamo, including Plaintiffs. On information and belief, Defendant Beaver was in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain ~~of~~ command ~~based~~ in the District ~~of~~ Columbia and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia. Defendant Beaver is sued in her individual capacity.

29. Plaintiffs do not know the true names and capacities of other Defendants sued herein and therefore sue these defendants by **fictitious** names, John Does 1-100. Plaintiffs **will** amend this complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained. John Does 1-100 **are** the military and civilian personnel who participated in the torture and other mistreatment of Plaintiffs as hereinafter alleged.

### **FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

30. Plaintiffs are citizens and residents of the United Kingdom.

31. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed are boyhood friends and grew up streets away from each other in the working-class town **of** Tipton in **the** West Midlands **of** England.

32. **Plaintiff Shafiq Rasul attended a Catholic elementary school** before studying at the **same** high school as Plaintiffs Iqbal and Ahmed. An avid **soccer** fan, Plaintiff Rasul played for a local team before going on to study computer science at the University **of** Central England. He also worked part time at **an** electronics store.

33. Plaintiff **Asif** Iqbal attended the **same** elementary school as **Plaintiff** Rasul and the same high school as both Plaintiffs **Rasul** and Ahmed. After leaving high school, Plaintiff **Iqbal** worked at a local factory making road signs and building **bus** shelters. He **was also an active soccer player and volunteered at the local community** center.

34. Plaintiff Rhuheh Ahmed attended the same high school as Plaintiffs Iqbal and Ahmed. Like Plaintiff Iqbal, he worked at a **local** factory and worked with children and disabled people at **the local** government-funded Tipton **Muslim** Community Center.

35. In September 2001, Plaintiff Iqbal traveled to Pakistan to join his father who had arranged a marriage for him with a young woman from his family's ancestral village. His longtime friend, Plaintiff Ahmed traveled from England in October in order to join him at his wedding as his best man. Plaintiff Rasul was at the same time in Pakistan visiting his family with the expectation of continuing his degree course in computer science degree within the month. Prior to the wedding in Pakistan, in October 2001, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed crossed the border into Afghanistan in order to offer help in the ongoing humanitarian crisis. After the bombing in Afghanistan began. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed tried to return to Pakistan but were unable to do so because the border had been closed. Plaintiffs never engaged in any terrorist activity or took up arms against the United States.

36. **Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed never engaged in combat against the forces** of the United States *or* any other entity. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed never conducted any terrorist activity or conspired, intended, or planned to conduct any such activity. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed never belonged to Al Qaeda or any other terrorist organization.

#### **tention in Afghanistan**

37. On November 28, 2001, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were captured and detained by **forces loyal to General Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek warlord who was aligned with the United States.**

38. No U.S. forces were present when Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were detained. Therefore, no U.S. forces could have had any information regarding Plaintiffs other than that supplied by the forces of **General Dostum**, who were known to be

unreliable and who were receiving a per head bounty of, on information and belief, up to \$35,000.

39. With U.S. military forces present, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed, along with 200 to 300 others, were crammed into metal containers and transported by truck to Sherbegan prison in Northern Afghanistan. General Dostum's forces fired holes into the sides of the containers with machine guns, striking the persons inside. Plaintiff Iqbal was struck in his arm, which would later become infected. Following the nearly 18-hour journey to Sherbegan prison, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were among what they estimate to have been approximately 20 survivors in the container.

40. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were held in Sherbegan by General Dostum's forces for about one month, where they were exposed to extremely cold conditions without adequate clothing, confined to tight spaces, and forced to ration food. Prison conditions were filthy. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed and other prisoners suffered from amoebic dysentery and were infested with lice.

41. In late December 2001, the ICRC visited with Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed and informed them that the British Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan had been advised of their situation and that embassy officials would soon be in contact with Plaintiffs.

42. On December 28, 2001, U.S. Special Forces arrived at Sherbegan and were informed of the identities of Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed.

43. General Dostum's troops chained Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed and marched them through the main gate of the prison, where U.S. Special Forces surrounded them at gunpoint.

44. From December 28, 2001 until their release in March 2004, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were in the **exclusive** physical custody and control of the United States military. In freezing temperatures, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were stripped of their **clothes**, searched, and photographed naked while being held by Defendant John Does, two **U.S. Special Forces** soldiers. **American military personnel** took Plaintiffs **Rasul**, Iqbal and Ahmed to a room for individual interrogations. Plaintiff Rasul was bound hand and foot with plastic **cuffs** and forced onto his knees before an American soldier in uniform. Both Plaintiffs Rasul and Iqbal were interrogated immediately and without knowledge of their interrogators' identities. **Both** were questioned at gunpoint. While Plaintiff Iqbal was interrogated, Defendant John Doe held a **9mm** pistol physically touching his temple. At no time were Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed **afforded counsel or given the opportunity to contact their families**.

45. Following their interrogations, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were led outside where a Defendant John Doe immediately covered their eyes by putting sandbags over their heads and applying thick masking tape. They were placed side-by-side, barefoot in freezing temperatures, with only light clothing, **for** at least three to four hours. While hooded and taped, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were repeatedly threatened with beatings and death and were beaten by a number of Defendant John Does, **U.S. military personnel**. **Plaintiff Iqbal estimates that he was punched, kicked, slapped, and struck by US military personnel with rifle butts at least 30 or 40 times**.

46. Thereafter, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were placed in trucks with other detainees and transported to an airport about 45 minutes away.

47. Plaintiffs **Rasul** and Iqbal were led onto one plane and Plaintiff Ahmed was led onto a second plane. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed, still hooded with their

hands tied behind their backs and their legs tied in plastic cuffs, were fastened to a metal belt attached to the floor of each aircraft. The soldiers instructed Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed to keep their legs straight out in front of them as they sat. The position was extremely painful. When any of Plaintiffs or other detainees tried to move to relieve the pain, an unknown number of Defendant John Does struck Plaintiffs and others with rifle butts. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were flown by the U.S. military to Kandahar.

48. Upon arrival in Kandahar, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed, still covered with hoods, were led out of the planes. A rope was tightly tied around each of their right arms, connecting the detainees together.

49. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed, who were still without shoes, were forced to walk for nearly an hour in the freezing cold, causing them to sustain deep cuts on their feet and rope burns on their right arms.

50. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were herded into a tent, where soldiers forced them to kneel with their legs bent double and their foreheads touching the ground. With their hands and feet still tied, the position was difficult to maintain. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were repeatedly and violently beaten by Defendant John Does, US soldiers. Each was asked whether he was a member of Al Qaeda and when each responded negatively, each was punched violently and repeatedly by soldiers. When Plaintiffs Rasul Iqbal and Ahmed identified themselves as British nationals, Defendants John Doe soldiers insisted they were "not white" but "black" and accordingly could not be British. The soldiers continued to beat them.

51. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were "processed" by American soldiers, and had plastic numbered wristbands placed on their wrists. Soldiers kicked Plaintiff

Rasul, assigned the number 78, several times during this process. American soldiers cut off his clothes and conducted a body cavity search. He was then led through an open-air maze constructed of barbed wire. Plaintiffs Iqbal, assigned number 79, and Ahmed, assigned number 102, experienced the same inhumane treatment.

52. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed, dehydrated, exhausted, disoriented, and fearful, were summoned by number for interrogation. When called, each was shackled and led to an interrogation tent. Their hoods were removed and they were told to sit on the floor. An armed soldier stood behind them out of their line of sight. They were told that if they moved they would be shot.

53. After answering questions as to their backgrounds, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were each photographed by soldiers. They were fingerprinted and a swab from their mouth and hairs plucked from their beards were taken for DNA identification.

54. An American soldier questioned Plaintiff Iqbal a second time. Plaintiff Iqbal was falsely accused by the interrogator of being a member of Al Qaeda. Defendant John Does, US soldiers, punched and kicked Plaintiff Iqbal in the back and stomach before he was dragged to another tent.

55. Personnel believed by Plaintiffs to be British military personnel later interrogated Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed, with US soldiers present. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were falsely accused of being members of the Al Muhajeroon. During the interrogation, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were threatened by Defendant John Does, armed American soldiers, with further beatings if they did not admit to various false statements.

56. Plaintiffs Rasul and Ahmed slept in a tent with about 20 other detainees. Plaintiff Iqbal was in another tent. The tents were surrounded by barbed wire.



Detainees were not allowed to talk and were forced to **sleep** on the ground. American soldiers **woke** the detainees hourly as part of a systematic effort to deprive them of sleep.

57. Defendant John Does, interrogators and guards, frequently used physical violence and **unmuzzled** dogs to **threaten and** intimidate Plaintiffs **Rasul, Iqbal and** Ahmed and other detainees during the interrogations.

58. At or around midnight of January 12 or 13, 2002, US army personnel entered the **tent** of Plaintiffs Rasul and Ahmed. Both were made to lie on the ground, were shackled, and rice sacks were placed over their heads. They were led to another tent, where Defendant John Does, US soldiers, removed their clothes and forcibly shaved their beards and heads. The forced shaving was not intended for hygiene purposes, but rather was, **on information and belief, designed to distress and** humiliate Plaintiffs given their Muslim faith, which requires adult males to maintain beards.

59. Plaintiff Rasul was eventually taken outside where he could hear dogs barking nearby and soldiers shouting, "Get 'em boy." He was then given a cavity search and photographed extensively while naked before being given an orange uniform. Soldiers handcuffed Plaintiff **Rasul's** wrists and ankles before dressing him in black thermal gloves, **dark** goggles, earmuffs, and a facemask. Plaintiff Rasul was then **left** outside for **hours in freezing temperatures**.

60. Plaintiff Iqbal, who was in another tent, experienced similar treatment of being led from his tent to be shaved and stripped naked.

61. Plaintiffs Rasul and Iqbal were escorted onto large cargo planes. Still shackled and **wearing** facemasks, both were chained to the floor with no backrests. They were forced by Defendant John Does to sit in an **uncomfortable** position for the

entire flight to Guantanamo (of approximately eighteen to twenty hours) and were **not** allowed to move or given access to toilet facilities.

62. Plaintiff Ahmed remained in Kandahar for another month. American soldiers interrogated him four more times. Sleep-deprived and malnourished, Plaintiff Ahmed was also interrogated by British agents who, on information and belief were from the British intelligence agency, **MI5**, and he was falsely told that Plaintiffs Rasul and **Iqbal** had confessed in Cuba to allegations of membership in **the** Al Muhajeroon. **He** was told that he could return to the United Kingdom in exchange for admitting to various accusations. Distraught, fearful of further beatings and abuse, and without benefit of contact with family or counsel, Plaintiff Ahmed made various false confessions. Plaintiff Ahmed was thereafter transported to Guantanamo.

63. **As noted above, Plaintiff Al-Harith was being held in custody by the Taliban in Southern Afghanistan as a suspected British spy. He was interrogated and beaten by Taliban troops. When the Taliban government fell, Plaintiff Al-Harith was in a Taliban prison. He contacted the British Embassy through the ICRC and by satellite phone and was assured he would be repatriated to Britain. Two days before his scheduled repatriation, US forces informed him that he was being detained and taken to Kandahar, where he was held in a prison controlled by US forces and interrogated and beaten by US troops. Plaintiff Al Harith was flown to Guantdnamo from Kandahar on or about February 11, 2002.**

64. Prior to take-off, Plaintiff Al-Harith, like Plaintiffs Rasul, **Iqbal** and Ahmed, was hooded and shackled; mittens were placed on his hands and earphones over his ears. Chains were then placed around his legs, waist and the earphones. The chains

cut into his ears **Goggles** were placed on his eyes and a medical patch that, on information and belief, contained muscle relaxant was applied.

#### **Captivity and Conditions at Camp X-Ray, Guantánamo**

65. Plaintiffs Rasul and Iqbal were transported to **Guantánamo** in mid-January 2002. Plaintiffs Ahmed and Al-Harith were transported there approximately one month later. During the trip, Defendant John Does, **US** soldiers, kicked and punched Plaintiff Ahmed more than twenty times. Plaintiff Al-Harith was punched, kicked and elbowed repeatedly and was threatened with more violence.

66. Upon arrival at **Guantánamo**, Plaintiffs were placed on a barge to get to the main camp. Defendant John Does, **US** Marines on the barge, repeatedly **beat** all the detainees, including Plaintiffs, kicking, slapping, elbowing and punching detainees in the body and **head. The Marines announced repeatedly, "You are arriving at your final destination," and, "You are now property of the United States Marine Corps."**

67. Plaintiffs were taken to Camp X-Ray, the prison camp for detainees. Soldiers forced all four Plaintiffs on arrival to squat outside in stress positions in the extreme heat. Plaintiffs and the other detainees had their goggles and hoods removed, but they had to remain with their eyes closed and were not allowed to speak.

68. Plaintiff Iqbal, still shackled and **goggled**, fell over and started shaking. **Plaintiff Iqbal was then given a cavity search and transported to another area** for processing, including fingerprinting, DNA sampling, photographs, and another wristband.

69. Plaintiff Rasul was forced to squat outside for six to seven hours and went through similar processing. Unmuzzled barking dogs were used to intimidate Plaintiff Rasul and others. At one point, Defendant John Doe, a soldier from a unit known as the

Extreme Reaction Force (ERF), repeatedly kicked Plaintiff **Rasul** in the back and used a riot shield to slam him against a wall.

70. After processing, Plaintiffs were placed in wire cages of about 2 meters by 2 meters. Conditions were cruel, inhuman and degrading.

71. **Plaintiffs were forced to sit in** their cells in total **silence** for extended periods. Once a week, for two minutes, Plaintiffs were removed from their cells and showered. They were then returned to their cells. Once a week, Plaintiffs were permitted five minutes recreation while their hands remained chained.

72. Plaintiffs were exposed to extreme heat during the day, as their cells were situated in *the* direct sunlight.

73. Plaintiffs were deliberately fed inadequate quantities of food, keeping them in a **perpetual state** of hunger. Much **of the food consisted of "MRE's"** (meals ready to eat), which were ten to twelve years beyond their usable date. Plaintiffs were served out of date powdered eggs and milk, stale bread from which **the** mold had been **picked** out and fruit that was black and rotten.

74. Plaintiffs and other detainees were forced to kneel each time a guard came into their cells.

75. Plaintiffs at night were exposed to powerful floodlights, a purposeful tactic to **promote sleep deprivation among the detainees. Plaintiffs** and the other **detainees** were prohibited from putting covers over their heads to block out the light and were prohibited from keeping their arms beneath the covers.

76. Plaintiffs were constantly threatened at **Camp X-Ray**, with guards stating on multiple occasions, "We could kill you at any time; the world doesn't know you're here; we could kill you and no one would know."

77. Plaintiff Al-Harith was taken to the medical clinic and was told that his blood pressure was too high. He was given, on information and belief, muscle relaxant pills and an injection of an unspecified substance.

78. On various occasions, Plaintiffs' efforts to pray were banned or interrupted. Plaintiffs were never given prayer mats and did not initially receive copies of the Koran. Korans were provided to them after approximately a month. On one occasion, a guard in Plaintiff Ahmed's cellblock noticed a copy of the Koran on the floor and kicked it. On another occasion, a guard threw a copy of the Koran in a toilet bucket. Detainees, including Plaintiffs, were also at times prevented from calling out the call to prayer, with American soldiers either silencing the person who was issuing the prayer call or playing loud music to drown out the call to prayer. This was part of a continuing pattern of disrespect and contempt for Plaintiffs' religious beliefs and practices.

#### Interrogation at Camp X-Ray

79. Plaintiffs were extensively interrogated at Camp X-Ray.

80. During interrogations, Plaintiffs were typically "long shackled," whereby their legs were chained using a large padlock. The shackles had sharp edges that scraped the skin, and all Plaintiffs experienced deep cuts on and around their ankles, resulting in scarring and continuing chronic pain. During the interrogations, Plaintiffs were shackled and chained to the floor. Plaintiffs were repeatedly urged by American interrogators to admit that they were fighters who went to Afghanistan for "jihad." In return, Plaintiffs were promised that if they confessed to these false assertions, they could return to the United Kingdom. Plaintiff Iqbal, who was interrogated five times by

American forces over three months at Camp X-Ray, was repeatedly encouraged **and** coerced to admit to having been a "fighter."

81. Plaintiff **Al-Harith** was interrogated approximately ten times at Camp X-Ray. He was interrogated by both British and American authorities. On one occasion, an interrogator **asked** Plaintiff Al-Harith to admit that he went to **Pakistan** to buy drugs, which was not true. On another occasion, Plaintiff Al-Harith was told that there was a new terrorism law that would permit the authorities to put his family out **in** the street if Plaintiff Al-Harith **did** not admit to being a drug dealer or a fighter. **On** another occasion, interrogators promised money, a car, a **house** and a job if **he** admitted those things. As they were not true, he declined to **admit** them.

82. Following Plaintiff **Ahmed's** first several interrogations at Camp X-Ray, he was isolated **in a cellblock where there were only Arabic speakers**. Plaintiff **Ahmed**, who does not speak Arabic, was unable to communicate with anyone other than interrogators and guards for approximately **five** months.

#### Conditions at Camp Delta

83. Around **May 2002**, Plaintiffs were transferred to Camp Delta.

84. At no time were Plaintiffs advised as to why they were being transferred, for what purpose they were detained, why they were considered "unlawful combatants," **and what medical and legal resources might be available**.

85. At Camp Delta, Plaintiffs were housed in mesh cages that were subdivided from a larger metal container. There was little to no privacy and the cages provided little shelter from the **heat** during the day or the cold at night. The cages quickly rusted **because** of the sea air. The cells contained metal slabs at waist height;

detainees could not sit on the slabs because their legs would dangle off and become numb. There was not enough room in the cells to pray.

**86.** Constant reconstruction work and large electric generators, which ran 24 hours a day, were used as part of a strategic effort to deprive Plaintiffs and others of sleep. Lights were **often left on 24 hours a day**.

**87.** Plaintiffs Rasul and Iqbal were in the same cellblock. Plaintiff Ahmed was placed in isolation for about one month. There was no explanation given as to **why** Plaintiff Ahmed had been placed in isolation. Following this period, he was placed in a different cell and interrogated by **mostly** American interrogators who repeatedly asked him the same questions for six **months**.

**88.** After six months at Camp Delta, Plaintiff Ahmed was moved to a cell directly opposite **Plaintiff Rasul**. **Plaintiff Iqbal was placed in isolation for about one** month. Again, no explanation was given for **the** arbitrary placement in isolation.

**89.** Plaintiff Ahmed was repeatedly disciplined with periods of isolation for such behavior as complaining about the food and singing.

**90.** Plaintiff Iqbal, after about one month at Camp Delta, was moved to isolation and **given** smaller food portions because it was believed he was **belittling** a military policeman. He was disciplined with another week of isolation when he wrote **“have a nice day” on a Styrofoam cup**.

**91.** After his last period of isolation, Plaintiff Iqbal was moved to a block which housed only Chinese-speaking detainees. During his time there, he was exposed to aggressive interrogation. After being there for months, Plaintiff Iqbal's mental condition deteriorated further.

92. Plaintiff Al-Harith was put into isolation for refusing to wear a wristband. Plaintiff Al-Harith was **also** placed in isolation for writing the letter "D" on a Styrofoam cup. The isolation block was freezing cold as **cold** air was blown through the block twenty-four hours a day. The isolation cell was pitch **black** as the guards claimed the lights were **not** working. Plaintiff Al-Harith was **placed** in isolation a **second** time around Christmas 2002 **for** refusing to take an unspecified injection. When he refused, the ERF was brought in and Plaintiff Al-Harith was "ERF'ed": he was beaten, forcibly injected and chained in a hogtied position, with his stomach on **the** floor and his **arms** and legs chained together above him. The ERF team jumped on his legs and back and kicked and punched Plaintiff Al-Harith. Plaintiff Al-Harith was then placed in isolation for approximately a month, deprived at various intervals of soap, toothpaste or a toothbrush, **blankets** or **toilet paper**. **He was also deprived of a Koran** during this second period **of** isolation.

93. **On** information and belief, "ERFings," i.e., the savage beatings administered by the ERF teams, were videotaped on a regular basis and **should** be available as evidence of the truth of the allegations contained herein.

94. The Camp Delta routine included compulsory "recreation" twice a week for fifteen minutes. Attendance was enforced by the ERF. As soon as fifteen minutes had **passed, detainees were immediately returned to their cells**. Plaintiff Rasul noted that one would **be** forced to return to his cell even if in the middle of prayers.

95. Around August 2002, medical corps personnel offered Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed injections **of** an unidentified substance, Plaintiffs Rasul, **Iqbal** and Ahmed, like most detainees, refused. Soon after, Defendant John Does, the medical corps, returned with the ERF team. **The** ERF team members were dressed in padded



gear, **thick gloves**, and helmets. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were shackled and restrained with their arms and legs bent backwards while medical corps pulled up their sleeves to inject their arms with an unidentified drug that had sedative effects.

96. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed received these injections against their will on approximately a dozen **occasions**. Plaintiff Al-Harith received 9 or 10 compulsory injections on six separate occasions.

97. Plaintiff Iqbal was deprived of his Koran and other possessions. His hands were shackled in front of him. When Plaintiff Iqbal looked back, a guard pushed him in the corner. There Defendant John Does punched him repeatedly in the face and kneed him in his thigh.

#### **Isolation and Interrogations at Camp Delta**

98. Interrogation booths either had a miniature camera hidden in them or a one-way glass window. Thus, on information and belief, some or all of the interrogations of Plaintiffs and other detainees are recorded and are available as evidence of the truth of Plaintiffs' allegations herein.

99. In December 2002, a tiered reward system was introduced at Camp Delta, whereby detainees were placed on different levels or tiers depending on their level of co-operation and their behavior at the camp.

100. Interrogators and guards frequently promised to provide or threatened to withdraw of essential items such as blankets or toothpaste – referred to as "comfort items" – in order to coerce detainees into providing information. The truthful assertion that Plaintiffs had no information to give did not result in the provision of "comfort items." To the contrary, the interrogators demanded that the Plaintiffs confess to false allegations and promised "comfort items" in exchange.

101. Isolation of detainees was frequently used as a technique to "wear down" detainees prior to interrogation. There were two primary ways in which prisoners would be placed in isolation: (1) for punishment, for a set period of time for a specific reason; or (2) for interrogation, with no specific time limit.

102. Between October 2002 and May 2003, Plaintiff Rasul was interrogated about five or six times. Most of the interrogations involved the same questions that had been asked before. In April 2003, Plaintiffs Rasul and Iqbal were given polygraph tests and were led to believe that they might be allowed to return home if they passed.

103. After two hours of questioning as to whether he was a member of Al Qaeda, Plaintiff Rasul was returned to his cell. Two weeks later, he was interrogated by a woman who may have been army personnel in civilian clothing. She informed him that he had passed the polygraph test. Plaintiff Rasul was transferred to a different cellblock and informed by interrogators that they had videos which proved that he and Plaintiffs Iqbal and Ahmed were members of Al Qaeda and linked to the September 11 attacks.

104. A week later, Plaintiff Rasul was transferred to an isolation block, called "November." Plaintiff Rasul asked the army sergeant why he was being moved and was informed that the order was from the interrogators. Plaintiff Rasul was placed in a metal cell. To make the conditions of confinement continuously debilitating, the air conditioning was turned off during the day and turned on high at night. Temperatures were near 100 degrees during the day and 40 degrees at night. The extremes of heat and cold were deliberately utilized to intimidate, discomfort and break down prisoners. For one week, Plaintiff Rasul was held in isolation without interrogation. Later, he was taken to a room and "short shackled" and placed in an extremely cold room for six to

seven hours. Short shackling consists of chaining the ankles and wrists **closely** together to force the detainee into a contorted and painful position. He was unable to move in the shackles and was not afforded an opportunity to go to the bathroom. He was hardly able to walk and suffered severe back pains. He was taken back to his cell without explanation.

**105.** The next day Plaintiff Rasul was "short shackled" and chained to the floor again for interrogation by an **US** Army intelligence officer named Bashir, also known as Danny. He was shown photographs of three men who were supposedly Plaintiffs **Rasul**, Iqbal and Ahmed with a man purported to be Mohammed Atta. Plaintiff Rasul repeatedly and truthfully denied being the person in the **photograph**. Further, **he** repeatedly and truthfully denied any involvement with Al Qaeda or the September 11 attacks. **On five or six more occasions, Plaintiff Rasul was interrogated in** similar fashion. During these interrogations, Plaintiff Rasul was not provided with food and was not permitted to pray.

**106.** Following the first interrogation, on **five** or six occasions, Plaintiff Rasul was removed from his cell and brought back to the interrogation block for intervals of about four or five days at a **time**. He was repeatedly "**short** shackled," exposed to extremely loud rock or heavy metal music, and **left** alone in the interrogation room for up to 13 hours in the "**long shackle**" position.

**107.** During this period, a Marine captain and other soldiers arrived at Plaintiff Rasul's cell to transfer him to another block, where **he** would remain in isolation *for* another **two** months without "comfort items."

**108.** On one occasion, Plaintiff Rasul was brought to the interrogation room from isolation to be questioned by interrogators from the Criminal Investigations Division

(CID). These interrogators, identified as "Drew" and Terry," informed Plaintiff Rasul that they were going to begin military tribunals.

\* 109. After continued interrogations as to his alleged presence in a photograph with Osama Bin Laden, Plaintiff Rasul explained that *he* was working in England and going to college at the time the photograph was taken. Plaintiff Rasul told interrogators his place of employment at an English electronics shop and his attendance at University of Central England and implored interrogators to corroborate what he was telling them. The interrogators insisted he was lying, To Plaintiff's knowledge, no effort was made to find corroborating information which would have confirmed that Plaintiff Rasul was living in England at the time of the alleged meeting with Bin Laden in the photograph.

110. About a month after his second isolation period, Plaintiff Rasul was "long shackled" and placed in a room, where he was met by Bashir and a woman dressed in civilian clothing. Bashir informed Plaintiff Rasul that the woman had come from Washington to show him a video of an Osama Bin Laden rally in Afghanistan. After the woman showed Plaintiff Rasul a portion of the video, she asserted that it showed Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed sitting down with Sin Laden. The woman interrogator urged Plaintiff Rasul to admit that the allegation was true, but the persons in the video were not the Plaintiffs. Plaintiff Rasul continued truthfully to deny involvement. He was threatened that if he did not confess, he would be returned to isolation. Having been in isolation for five to six weeks, with the result that he was suffering from extreme mental anguish and disorientation, Plaintiff falsely confessed that he was in the video.

111. Plaintiff Rasul was then returned to isolation for another five to six weeks. During that period he had no contact with any human being except with guards and

interrogators who questioned him regarding the identity of certain individuals in photographs.

112. Plaintiff Rasul was then transferred to another cellblock, where both Plaintiffs Iqbal and Ahmed were being held. Here, Plaintiff Rasul was denied "comfort items" and exercise privileges.

113. Around mid-August of 2003, Plaintiff Rasul was moved within Camp Delta and placed in another cell block without explanation. After about **two weeks**, Plaintiff Rasul **was** taken to a building known as the "Brown Building" and was informed by an army intelligence interrogator named "**James**" that he would soon be moving to a cell next to Plaintiffs Iqbal and Ahmed.

114. **Following** the meeting with the army intelligence interrogator, Plaintiff Rasul **was brought to "Kilo Block" the next day, where Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed** were reunited and **able** to speak with one **another**,

115. For **the next two weeks**, Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed **were** brought in succession to be questioned by an army intelligence officer, known only as "**James**," **as to their** purported involvement in the 2000 **video of** Bin Laden.

116. On one occasion, Plaintiff Rasul **was** administered a voice stress analyzer test by "James."

117. **After his last interrogation by "James," Plaintiff Rasul was informed** that he would **soon** be turned over to Navy Intelligence. Before that, however, in September 2003, Plaintiff Rasul was further interrogated. He was brought into an interrogation room for **eight** hours. He was denied requests to pray and to have food or water. The following day, British officials questioned Plaintiff Rasul. Plaintiff Rasul informed an official, **who** gave the name "**Martin**," that he had been kept in isolation for three months

without cause and had severe knee pain **from** the lack **of** exercise. Later that evening, Plaintiffs **Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed** were taken to what was, on information and **belief**, a CIA interrogation **block**.

118. Plaintiffs continued to be held in the **Kilo Black** and were occasionally **brought in for** interrogation by a navy intelligence officer who gave the name "**Romeo**."

119. Plaintiff **Iqbal** was treated in a **manner** similar to the other Plaintiffs.

120. Plaintiff **Iqbal** was interrogated on several occasions, sometimes for as **long** as eight hours.

121. The typical routine was to be "short shackled" and placed **in** an extremely cold room.

122. Plaintiff **Iqbal** was relegated to Level 4, the harshest level, **for** about two **weeks**, with **virtually no** "comfort items." **Soon after, he was placed in isolation** on the instruction of intelligence *officers*.

123. Plaintiff **Iqbal's** isolation cell was covered **in human** excrement. **Plaintiff Iqbal had** no soap or towels and could not clean the cell. **He was** unable to **sit** anywhere.

124. Plaintiff **Iqbal** was interrogated periodically to review photographs. On one occasion, he was placed in a "short shackled position and **left** in a room with the air conditioning turned down to **40**". **Plaintiff Iqbal was left in the "short shackle"** position **for** about three hours. Then, Defendant **John Doe**, an interrogator calling himself "**Mr. Smith**," entered **the** room and teased Plaintiff **Iqbal about** the temperature. "**Mr. Smith**" **told** Plaintiff **Iqbal** that he was able to get anything Plaintiff **Iqbal** wanted. "**Mr. Smith**" then **pulled out** pornographic magazines and taunted him. Plaintiff **Iqbal** refused to talk to "**Mr. Smith**." "**Mr. Smith**" left Plaintiff **Iqbal** alone for another three **or** four **hours** in the

frigid room. In that one day, Plaintiff Iqbal had been "short shackled" for seven to eight hours. Upon returning to his cell, he became ill with flu and requested medication. One of the military police officers, Defendant John Doe, denied him medication, and informed him that he was acting under orders from intelligence.

125. The next day, a Marine Captain and about 15 soldiers escorted Plaintiff Iqbal to another isolation black. He was left there for several days. Prior to his interrogation, Plaintiff Iqbal was "short shackled" and then introduced to an interrogator who gave the name "James". Because the pain from the shackling became excruciating, Plaintiff Iqbal began to scream. After about three or four hours, "James" unshackled him.

126. After three days, Plaintiff Iqbal was taken to the "Brown Building," where he was "long shackled" and left in a room with strobe lighting and very loud music played repeatedly, making it impossible for him to think or sleep. After about an hour, Plaintiff Iqbal was taken back to his cell.

127. The next day, Plaintiff Iqbal was "short shackled" in the interrogation room for five or six hours before later being interrogated by "Drew," who identified himself as an agent from CID. Plaintiff Iqbal was shown photographs, but refused to look at them. He was "short shackled" for about four or five hours more. After a while, he was unable to bear the conditions and falsely confessed that he was pictured in the photographs.

128. Four days later, agents from the FBI interrogated Plaintiff Iqbal about his activities in 2000.

129. Plaintiff Iqbal remained in isolation and was questioned at one point by a military intelligence officer giving the name of "OJ." Soldiers threatened him with further beatings if he did not answer the questions.

130. Plaintiff Ahmed was interrogated on numerous occasions, particularly with respect to his knowledge of the Bin Laden video. He was interrogated every three or four days, and the typical procedure was that he was first "short shackled" and placed in a freezing room with loud music for several hours.

131. Before arriving at Guantanamo, Plaintiff Ahmed was seriously sleep-deprived and malnourished. He was the first of the Plaintiffs to admit to various false accusations by interrogators.

132. Upon Plaintiff Ahmed's arrival at Camp Delta, he was placed in isolation for about one month. Following this period, he was placed in a different cell and interrogated by mostly American interrogators who asked him the same questions for six months.

133. Plaintiff Al-Harith also was given a lie detector test approximately one year into his detention which he was told he passed.

134. Plaintiff Al-Harith on three or four occasions witnessed Defendant John Does, military police, using an industrial strength hose to shoot strong jets of water at detainees. He was hosed down on one occasion. A guard walked along the gangway alternating the hose on each cell. Plaintiff Al-Harith was hosed down continuously for approximately one minute. The pressure of the water forced him to the back of his cell. The contents of his cell, including his bedding and Koran, were soaked.

135. Plaintiff Rasul, in the next cell, also had all the contents of his cell soaked.

136. In or around February 2004, Plaintiffs heard from military police that they would be released and sent home soon. Before leaving Camp Delta, Plaintiffs all were interrogated a final time. Plaintiffs were asked to sign statements admitting to membership in Al Qaeda and participation in terrorist activity. Plaintiffs declined.



137. In March 2004, Plaintiffs were released from Camp Delta and flown to the United Kingdom.

### **Injuries**

138. Plaintiffs suffered and continue to suffer from the cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment they experienced during their detention. The "short shackling" which Plaintiffs were exposed to resulted in deep cuts at their ankles, permanent scarring, and chronic pain. Plaintiff Rasul has chronic pain in his knees and back. Plaintiff Ahmed **also** suffers from permanent deterioration of his eyesight **because** of the withholding of required special lenses as "comfort items."

139. Plaintiff Al-Harith suffers from severe and chronic pain in his knees from repeatedly being forced onto his knees and pressed downwards by guards whenever he left his cell. **He also** has experienced pain in his right elbow.

140. Plaintiffs further suffer from acute psychological symptoms.

### **Development and Implementation of a Plan of Torture and Other Physical and Psychological Abuse of Detainees**

141. The torture, threats, physical and psychological abuse inflicted upon Plaintiffs were devised, approved, and implemented by Defendant Rumsfeld and other Defendants in the military chain of command. These techniques were intended as interrogation techniques to be used on detainees.

142. It is well-established that the use of force in interrogation is prohibited by domestic and international law. The United States Army strictly prohibits the use of **such** techniques and advises its interrogators that **their** use may **lead** to criminal prosecution. Army Field Manual 34-52, Ch. 1, "Intelligence Interrogation," provides:

### Prohibition of Use of Force

The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is **prohibited by law** and is neither authorized nor condoned by the US Government... The psychological techniques and principles outlined should neither be confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques such as brainwashing, **mental** torture, or **any** other form of mental coercion to include drugs. These techniques and principles are intended to serve as guides in obtaining **the** willing cooperation of a source. The absence of threats in interrogation is intentional, **as** their enforcement and use **normally** constitute **violations of international law and may result in prosecution**. (Emphasis supplied).

143. Further, according to Field Manual 34-52, ch. 1: "Experience indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields unreliable results, may **damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say whatever he** thinks ~~the~~ interrogator wants to hear."

144. Army Field Manual 27-10, "The Law of Land Warfare," summarizes the domestic and international legal rules applicable to the conduct of war. Field Manual 27-10 recognizes the following sources of the law of war:

The **law** of war is derived from two principal sources:

- a. **Lawmaking Treaties (or Conventions)**, such as **the Hague** and Geneva Conventions.
- b. **Custom**. Although **some of the law of war has not been** incorporated in any treaty or convention to which the United States is a party, this body of unwritten or customary law **is** firmly established by the custom of nations and well defined by recognized authorities on international law.

**Id.** at Ch. 1, § 1.

145. In spite of ~~the~~ prohibitions on the use of force, threats, and abuse in the Army Field Manual, and its clear acknowledgement that their use violates

international and domestic law, Defendant Rumsfeld approved techniques that were in violation of those prohibitions and thus knowingly violated the rights of Plaintiffs.

146. In a press release dated June 22, 2004, Defendant Rumsfeld admitted that beginning December 2, 2002, he personally authorized the use of interrogation techniques that are **not** permitted under FM 34-52. Further, in the press **release**, Defendant Rumsfeld admits that he personally was consulted when certain of the techniques were to be utilized.

147. The techniques practiced on Plaintiffs – including beatings, "short shackling," **sleep** deprivation, injections of unknown substances, subjection to cold or heat, hooding, stress positions, isolation, forced shaving, disruption of religious practices, forced nakedness, intimidation with vicious dogs and threats – were **known to and approved by Defendant Rumsfeld and others in the military chain of command**.

148. Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions requires that all persons in the hands of an opposing force, regardless of their legal status, be afforded certain minimum standards of treatment:

Persons taking **no** active part in the hostilities, including members of armed **forces** who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or **any** other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or **faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar** criteria.

To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of **all** kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

\*\*\*\*\*

(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.

**149.** The Third Geneva Convention of 1949, Art. 130, bars the "willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment . . . willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health" of any prisoner of war.

**150.** In February 2002, the White House issued a press release, which advised:

The United States is treating and will continue to treat all of the individuals detained at Guantanamo humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949.

The President has determined that the Geneva Convention applies to the Taliban detainees, but not to the al-Qaeda detainees. Al-Qaeda is not a state party to the Geneva Convention; it is a foreign terrorist group. As such, its members are not entitled to POW status.

**151.** On information and belief, Defendant Rumsfeld and all Defendants were aware of this statement of the President. Moreover, Defendant Rumsfeld knew that this statement of policy was a departure from the previous policy of the United States that the laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions, were always to be honored. Defendant Rumsfeld knew that the Department of State and the uniformed services took the generally recognized position that the Geneva Conventions could not be abrogated or ignored.

**152.** However, Defendant Rumsfeld and others deliberated failed to implement the Presidential Directive in any event. Defendant Rumsfeld and other Defendants in the chain of command had no good faith basis for believing that Plaintiffs were members of or affiliated with Al Qaeda in any way. Indeed, the policy as announced was incoherent in that Defendant Rumsfeld and the other defendants had no way of knowing who was and who was not a member of Al Qaeda or the

Taliban and Defendants took no steps to implement any reliable fact-finding process **which** might ascertain who **was** and who was not a member of Al Qaeda or the Taliban, including in particular a "competent tribunal" as mandated by the Third Geneva Convention, Art. 5, U.S. military regulations and **long** standing practice of the U.S. **armed** forces

153. Defendant Rumsfeld and all Defendants were aware that torture and other mistreatment perpetrated under color of **law** violates domestic and international **law** at.

154. Defendant Rumsfeld and all Defendants were aware that Plaintiffs were tortured and **otherwise** mistreated or knew they would be tortured and **otherwise** mistreated while in military custody in Afghanistan and at **Guantánamo**.

155. **Dcfndant Rumsfeld and all Defendants took no steps** to prevent the infliction of torture and other mistreatment to which Plaintiffs were subjected.

156. Defendant Rumsfeld and **all** Defendants authorized and encouraged the infliction of torture and other mistreatment against Plaintiffs.

157. Defendant Rumsfeld and **all** Defendants were aware that prolonged arbitrary detention violates customary international **law**.

158. Defendant Rumsfeld and **all** Defendants authorized and condoned the **prolonged arbitrary detention of** Plaintiffs.

**Count I**  
**ALIEN TORT STATUTE**  
**Prolonged Arbitrary Detention**

159. Plaintiffs **repeat** and re-allege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 158 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

160. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the allegations contained herein "unquestionably describe 'custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'" Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698, n.15 (2004) (citation omitted) (Plaintiffs Rhuhel Ahmed and **Asif** Iqbal were also Plaintiffs in that case).

161. Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were unarmed and were detained in a prison camp operated by non-U.S. forces and Plaintiff **Al-Harith** had been detained and mistreated by the Taliban as a suspected British spy and was trapped in a war zone when Defendants took physical custody of their persons. Plaintiffs never engaged in combat, carried arms, or participated in terrorist activity or conspired with any **terrorist** person or organization. Defendants could have had no good-faith reason to believe that **they** had done so.

162. The Plaintiffs were detained under the exclusive custody and control of Defendants for over two years without due process, access to counsel or family, or a single charge of wrongdoing being levied against them.

163. The acts described herein constitute prolonged arbitrary detention in violation of the law of nations under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1350, in that the acts violated customary international law prohibiting prolonged arbitrary detention **as reflected**, expressed, and **defined in multilateral treaties and other international instruments**, international and domestic judicial decisions, and other authorities.

164. Defendants are liable **for** said conduct in that Defendants participated in, set the conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered, acquiesced, confirmed, ratified, aided **and** abetted and/or conspired together in bringing about the prolonged arbitrary detention of Plaintiffs.

165. Defendant's unlawful conduct deprived Plaintiffs of their freedom, of contact with their families, friends and communities. As a result, Plaintiffs suffered severe psychological abuse and injuries.

166. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other relief to be determined at trial.

**Count II**  
**ALIEN TORT STATUTE**  
**Torture**

167. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 158 of this Complaint as fully set forth herein.

168. The acts described herein were inflicted deliberately and intentionally for purposes which included, among others, punishing the Plaintiffs or intimidating them. The alleged acts did not serve any legitimate intelligence-gathering or other government purpose. Instead, they were perpetrated to coerce, punish, and intimidate the Plaintiffs. In any event, torture is not permitted as a legitimate government function under any circumstances.

169. The acts described herein constitute torture in violation of the law of nations under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, in that the acts violated customary international law prohibiting torture as reflected, expressed, and defined in multilateral treaties and other international instruments, international and domestic judicial decisions and other authorities.

170. Defendants are liable for said conduct in that Defendants participated in, set the conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered acquiesced, confirmed, ratified and or/conspired together in bringing about the torture and other physical and psychological abuse of Plaintiffs as described above.

171. Plaintiffs suffered severe, immediate and continuing physical and psychological abuse as a **result** of the acts alleged herein. Plaintiffs continue to suffer profound physical and psychological trauma from the acts alleged herein.

172. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other relief to be determined at trial.

**Count III**  
**ALIEN TORT STATUTE**  
**Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment**

173. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 158 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

174. The acts described herein had the intent and the effect of grossly humiliating and debasing the Plaintiffs, forcing **them** to act **against** their will and **conscience**, inciting fear and anguish, and breaking their physical and moral resistance.

175. These acts included inter alia repeated severe beatings; the withholding of food, water, and necessary medical care; sleep deprivation; lack of basic hygiene; intentional exposure to extremes of heat **and** cold and the elements; continuous isolation for a period of **months**; forced injections; sexual humiliation; intimidation with unmuzzled dogs; deprivation of the rights to practice their religion and death threats.

176. The acts described herein constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading **treatment in violation of the law of nation-**, under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, in that **the** acts violated customary international law prohibiting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as reflected, expressed, and defined in multilateral treaties and other international instruments, international and domestic judicial decisions and other authorities.



177. Defendants are liable for said conduct in that Defendants participated in, set the conditions, directly **and/or** indirectly facilitated, ordered acquiesced, confirmed, ratified, aided and abetted **and/or** conspired together in bringing about the **cruel**, inhuman or degrading treatment of Plaintiffs **as** described above.

178. Plaintiffs suffered severe immediate physical and psychological abuse as a **result** of the acts alleged herein. Plaintiffs continue to **suffer** profound physical and psychological trauma from the acts alleged herein.

179. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other relief to be determined at trial.

#### **Count IV VIOLATION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS**

180. **Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the** allegations **contained in paragraphs 1** through **158 of** this Complaint as **iffully** set forth herein.

181. As detailed herein, Plaintiffs were held arbitrarily, tortured and otherwise mistreated during their detention in violation of specific protections of the Third and Fourth **Geneva** Conventions including but not **limited** to Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions.

182. Violations of the Geneva Conventions are direct treaty violations as well **as violations of customary international law.**

183. Defendants are liable for said conduct in that Defendants participated in, set the conditions, directly **and/or** indirectly facilitated, ordered, acquiesced, confirmed, ratified, aided and abetted **and/or** conspired together in bringing about the prolonged arbitrary detention, torture, abuse and mistreatment of Plaintiffs as described **above.**

184. As a result of Defendants' violations of the Geneva Conventions, Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other relief to be determined at trial.

**Count V**  
**CLAIMS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES**  
**Violation of the Eighth Amendment**

185. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 158 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

186. Defendants' actions alleged herein against imprisoned Plaintiffs violated **the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Over the course of an arbitrary and baseless incarceration for more than two years, Defendants inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on Plaintiffs. Despite never having been tried by any tribunal, Plaintiffs and other detainees were repeatedly denounced as guilty of terrorist acts by Defendant Rumsfeld, President Bush, Vice President Cheney and others. The acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading unusual punishment were imposed based on this arbitrary and impermissible declaration of guilt.**

187. **Defendants were acting under color of law of the United States at all times** pertinent to the allegations set forth above.

188. The Plaintiffs suffered severe physical and mental injuries as a result of Defendants' violations of the Eighth Amendment. They have also suffered present and future economic damage.

189. The actions of Defendants are actionable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

100. **Defendants are liable for said conduct** in that **Defendants** participated in, set the conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered, acquiesced, confirmed, ratified, **aided and abetted and/or conspired** together in bringing about the prolonged

arbitrary detention, physical and psychological torture and abuse, and other mistreatment of Plaintiffs as described above.

191. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other relief to be determined at trial.

**Count VI**  
**CLAIMS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES**  
**Violation of the Fifth Amendment**

192. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 158 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

193. Defendants' actions alleged herein against Plaintiffs violated the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

194. **The arbitrary and baseless detention of Plaintiffs for more than two years** constituted a clear deprivation of their liberty without due process, in direct violation of their Fifth Amendment rights.

195. The cruel, inhuman or degrading, and unusual conditions of Plaintiffs' incarceration clearly violated their substantive **rights to due process**. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., **463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)**.

196. Defendants' refusal to permit Plaintiffs to consult **with counsel or** to have access to **neutral tribunals to challenge the fact and conditions of their confinement** constituted violations of Plaintiffs' procedural rights to due process.

197. The abusive conditions **of** Plaintiffs' incarceration served no legitimate government purpose.

198. Defendants were acting under the color of the **law** of the United States at all times pertinent to **the** allegations set forth above.

199. The Plaintiffs suffered severe physical and mental injuries as a result of Defendants' violations of the Fifth Amendment. They have also suffered present and future economic damage.

200. The actions of Defendants are actionable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S.388 (1971).

201. Defendants are liable for said conduct in that Defendants participated in, set the conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered, acquiesced, confirmed, ratified, aided and abetted and/or conspired together in bringing about the prolonged arbitrary detention, physical and psychological torture and abuse and other mistreatment of Plaintiffs as described above.

202. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other relief to be determined at trial.

**Count VII**  
**CLAIM UNDER THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT**

203. Plaintiffs repeat ~~and re-allege~~ the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 158 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

204. Defendants' actions alleged herein inhibited and constrained religiously motivated conduct central to Plaintiffs' religious beliefs.

205. Defendants' actions imposed a substantial burden on Plaintiffs' abilities to exercise and express their religious beliefs.

206. Defendants regularly and systematically engaged in practices specifically aimed at disrupting Plaintiffs' religious practices. These acts included throwing a copy of the Koran in a toilet bucket, prohibiting prayer, deliberately interrupting prayers, playing loud rock music to interrupt prayers, withholding the Koran without reason or as

punishment, forcing prisoners to pray with exposed genital areas, withholding prayer mats and confining Plaintiffs under conditions ~~where~~ it was impossible or infeasible for them to exercise their religious rights.

207. Defendants were acting under the color of the law of the United States at all times pertinent to the allegations set forth above.


208. The Plaintiffs suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.A §§ 2000bb et seq.

209. Defendants are liable for said conduct in that Defendants participated in, set the conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered, acquiesced, confirmed, ratified, aided and abetted and/or conspired together in bringing about the denial, **disruption** and interference **with Plaintiffs' religious practices and beliefs as described** above.

210. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other relief to be determined at trial.

WHEREFORE Plaintiffs each demand judgment against Defendants jointly and severally, including compensatory damages in the amount of \$10,000,000 each (Ten Million Dollars), punitive damages, the costs of this action, including reasonable attorneys' fees, and such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

Dated: October 27, 2004



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Attorneys for Plaintiffs



~~FOUO~~

November 29, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Inspirational Story

Mr. President,

Attached is an inspirational story you will enjoy reading.

Respectfully,

Attach.

11/5/04 *Washington Times*: Not Breaking His Stride

DHR:ss  
112904-30

11-L-0559/OSD/27953

OSD 19077-04

~~FOUO~~

13  
11

11/29/04

Washington Times  
November 5, 2004  
Pg. 2

## **Not Breaking His Stride**

### ***Soldier fights to return to war after losing leg***

By Estes Thompson, Associated Press

FORT BRAGG, N.C. — Pfc. George Perez still feels the sweat between his toes when he exercises. He's still plagued with cramps in his calf muscle. And sometimes, when he gets out of bed at night without thinking, he topples over. Pfc. Perez, 21, lost his leg to a roadside bomb in Iraq more than a year ago, but despite the phantom pains that haunt him, he says he is determined to prove to the Army that he is no less of a man — and no less of a soldier.

"I'm not ready to get out yet," he says. "I'm not going to let this little injury stop me from what I want to do."

Pfc. Perez is one of at least four amputees from the elite 82nd Airborne Division to re-enlist. With a new carbon-fiber prosthetic leg, Pfc. Perez intends to show a medical board that he can run an 8-minute mile, jump out of airplanes and pass all the other paratrooper tests that will allow him to go with his regiment to Afghanistan next year.

On Sept. 14, 2003, Pfc. Perez, of Carteret, N.J., and seven other members of his squad were rumbling down a road outside Fallujah when a bomb blast rocked their Humvee. Pfc. Perez recalls flying through the air and hitting the ground hard.

The blast killed one of his comrades. Pfc. Perez felt surprisingly little pain, but when he tried to get up, he couldn't. He saw that his left foot was folded backward onto his knee. His size 12 1/2 combat boot stood in the dusty road a few feet away, still laced.

A photograph of Pfc. Perez's lonely boot transmitted around the world and spread across two pages of Time magazine became a stark reminder that the war in Iraq was far from over. Doctors initially tried to save part of his foot. But an infection crept up his leg, and Pfc. Perez agreed to allow the amputation below the knee joint. "I was going to stay in no matter what," he recalls telling the surgeons. "Do whatever would get me back fastest."

Pfc. Perez was left with a rounded stump that fits into the suction cup of the black carbon-fiber prosthetic leg. When he arrived at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington for his rehabilitation, Pfc. Perez asked a pair of generals who visited his bedside whether it was possible for him to stay in the Army.

"They told me, 'It's all up to you, how much you want it,'" he says. "If I could do everything like a regular soldier, I could stay in." He wasted little time getting started. At one point, a visitor found him doing push-ups in bed. He trained himself to walk normally with his new leg, and then to run with it. Pfc. Perez has to rise at least an hour earlier than his fellow soldiers to allow swelling from the previous day's training to subside enough for his stump to fit into the prosthetic.



But it is a comfort for Pfc. Perez to know that he's not alone. At least three other paratroopers in the 82nd have lost limbs in combat during the past two years and re-enlisted. One of them, Staff Sgt. Daniel Metzdorf, lost his right leg above the knee in a Jan. 27 blast. He appealed three times before the fitness board allowed him to stay on. "I think it's a testimony to today's professional Army," says division commander Maj. Gen. Bill Caldwell. "I also think, deep down, it is a love for their other paratroopers."

In July, amputee program manager Chuck Scoville of Walter Reed told a congressional committee that amputations accounted for 2.4 percent of all wounded in action in the Iraq war — twice the rate in World Wars I and II. Pfc. Perez is one of about 160 Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans who have passed through Walter Reed's amputee patient program. The military says it does not track the number who choose to stay in the service. "It isn't something that historically we've had to deal with a whole lot," says Lt. Col. Frank Christopher, the surgeon for the 82nd Airborne.

Today, Pfc. Perez looks every bit the paratrooper — tall, in ripped-ab shape and serious-looking. His uniform is sharply creased, his maroon beret sits at a precise angle above one eye and the black leather boot on his good leg gleams with a mirror shine. The only thing that sets him apart at a glance is the white running shoe on his prosthetic leg.


Pfc. Perez has to go before another medical fitness board to determine whether he will be allowed to jump again. He also must pass the fitness test for his age — run two miles in less than 16 minutes and do at least 42 push-ups and 53 sit-ups in two-minute stretches.

For now, he must be content with a job maintaining M-16s and M-4s, machine guns and grenade launchers in his company's armory. But his dream is to attend the grueling Army Ranger school at Fort Benning, Ga., a serious challenge to even the most able-bodied soldier. "I got a lot of things to do," he said. "I want to do as much as I can, as much as they'll let me."

November 30, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Colin Powell  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces Update

Dear Mr. President,

As we discussed yesterday, I will begin sending these updates every two weeks in this shorter format.

Respectfully,

Attach:  
11/22/04 Afghan Security Forces Update

DHR:ss  
112404-9

OSD 19098-04



*Afghan Security Forces Update  
Executive Summary*

*22 November 2004*



# Afghan Security Forces

For Official Use Only




|   |  |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b><u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u></b><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– National Police</li><li>– Highway Police</li><li>– Border Police</li><li>– Criminal Investigator Police</li><li>– Counter Narcotics Police</li></ul></li><li>• <b><u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u></b><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Afghan National Army Corps</li><li>– Afghan Air Corps</li><li>– Intermediate Commands</li></ul></li></ul> | <p><b><u>Trained &amp; Equipped</u></b></p> <p><b>30,462</b></p> <p><b><u>Trained &amp; Equipped</u></b></p> <p><b>15,523</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>45,985</b></p> |
|---|--|

**Note: ANA totals dropped because of attrition**

# Trained and Equipped Afghanistan Security Forces

For Official Use Only



Data As of: 22 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27959

# Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection




For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Policing Units on hand over time

| Security Force Element   | Trained NLT Dec 05 | 22-Nov-04 | 1-Feb-05 | 1-May-05 | 1-Aug-05 | 1-Sep-05 <sup>(3)</sup> |
|--------------------------|--------------------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------------|
| National Police (1)      | 40,430             |           |          |          |          |                         |
| Highway Police           | 8,000              |           |          | 48%      |          |                         |
| Border (2) Police        | 12,000             |           |          |          | 68%      |                         |
| Counter-Narcotics Police | 1,570              |           |          |          | 67%      |                         |

**Notes:**

1. Meeting of the Interagency Police Coordination Action Group (IPCAG) on 16 Nov headed by German Ambassador Schmidt confirmed the new numbers shown for police. Highway, Counter Narcotics, Criminal Investigators and Traffic Police are all in the total figure of 50,000.
2. The meeting also directed that the Border Police number to be reduced from 24,000 to 12,000. This is in addition to the National Police total of 50,000. The total police is 62,000.
3. 100% Manned and Trained by 1 Jan 06, but equipping will lag behind.

| Legend  |                             |
|---|-----------------------------|
|  | 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT     |
|  | 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT      |
|  | 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT |

Data As of: 22 Nov 04




11-L-0559/OSD/27960

# Afghan Armed Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Army Units on hand over time

| Afghanistan Security Forces Elements | Endstate | 22-Nov-04 | 1-Feb-05 | 1-May-05 | 1-Aug-05 | 1-Jan-06 | 1-Apr-07 |
|--------------------------------------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Ministry of Defense (General Staff)  | 3,000    |           | 48%      |          |          |          |          |
| Corps                                | 43,000   |           |          | 41%      | 47%      | 51%      |          |
| Air Corps                            | 3,000    |           |          |          | 40%      | 63%      |          |
| Sustaining Institutions              | 21,000   |           |          |          |          |          |          |

| Legend  |                             |
|---|-----------------------------|
|  | 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT     |
|  | 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT      |
|  | 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT |

Data As of: 22 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27961

# Coalition Coi


For Official Use Only

## OEF & ISAF = 42 Countries

|            |      |         |       |            |     |             |     |       |
|------------|------|---------|-------|------------|-----|-------------|-----|-------|
| Albania    | 22   | Denmark | 55    | Iceland    | 14  | Mongolia    | 17  | Spain |
| Australia  | 4    | Egypt   | 65    | Ireland    | 10  | Netherlands | 472 | Swec  |
| Austria    | 3    | Estonia | 15    | Italy      | 534 | New Zealand | 8   | Switz |
| Azerbaijan | 22   | Finland | 78    | Jordan     | 174 | Norway      | 254 | Turke |
| Belgium    | 615  | France  | 1,280 | Korea      | 210 | Poland      | 119 | UK    |
| Bulgaria   | 42   | Georgia | 50    | Latvia     | 11  | Portugal    | 47  | USA   |
| Canada     | 1014 | Germany | 2,201 | Lithuania  | 49  | Romania     | 564 |       |
| Croatia    | 50   | Greece  | 149   | Luxembourg | 10  | Slovakia    | 66  |       |
| Czech Rep  | 20   | Hungary | 140   | Macedonia  | 20  | Slovenia    | 22  | Tota  |

|                                 |               |
|---------------------------------|---------------|
| <b>Afghan Forces On Hand</b>    | <b>68,431</b> |
| <b>National Police</b>          | <b>48,450</b> |
| <b>Highway</b>                  | <b>891</b>    |
| <b>Border Police</b>            | <b>3,417</b>  |
| <b>Counter Narcotics Police</b> | <b>150</b>    |
| <b>Subtotal On Hand</b>         | <b>52,908</b> |
| <b>MOD/GS</b>                   | <b>637</b>    |
| <b>Corps</b>                    | <b>14,028</b> |
| <b>Air Corps</b>                | <b>0</b>      |
| <b>Intermediate Commands</b>    | <b>858</b>    |
| <b>Subtotal On Hand</b>         | <b>15,523</b> |

|                                 |               |
|---------------------------------|---------------|
| <b>Afghan Forces On Hand</b>    | <b>45,985</b> |
| <b>National Police</b>          | <b>29,121</b> |
| <b>Highway</b>                  | <b>389</b>    |
| <b>Border Police</b>            | <b>898</b>    |
| <b>Counter Narcotics Police</b> | <b>54</b>     |
| <b>Subtotal On Hand</b>         | <b>30,462</b> |
| <b>MOD/GS</b>                   | <b>637</b>    |
| <b>Corps</b>                    | <b>14,028</b> |
| <b>Air Corps</b>                | <b>0</b>      |
| <b>Intermediate Commands</b>    | <b>858</b>    |
| <b>Subtotal On Hand</b>         | <b>15,523</b> |



Data As of: 22 Nov 04 ■ Coalition Forces ■ US Forces ■ Afghan Forces

■ Coalition Forces ■ US For

11-L-0559/OSD/27962



~~FOUO~~

November 11, 2004

I-04/015279  
ES-1373

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: MoD of Argentina

I spoke to the MoD of Argentina on November 10. He said:

- He looked forward to seeing me in South America this next week
- Argentina wanted to work on exercises with our armies.
- He has instructions to talk to me about what he thinks about the coalition in Haiti.
- He looks forward to talking about our mutual interests in the Hemisphere.

I need to know more information about what he is talking about in terms of exercises - what we've done, what he might want to do - before I meet with him there.

Thanks.

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

November 29, 2004

DHR:dh  
111104-30

..... Captain Marriott,

Please respond by 11/13/04

The talking points included in the CY 2004 Defense Ministerial of the Americas OASD/ISA trip book for SecDef's meeting with the Argentine Minister of Defense addressed the snowflake issues.

JR,  
*June Bartlett*

June Bartlett  
Deputy Director  
Policy Executive Secretariat

~~FOUO~~

12-11-04 P04:47 18

11-L-0559/OSD/27963

OSD 19143-04

Argentina

29 Nov 04

11 Nov 04

## TALKING POINTS FOR ARGENTINA

Bilateral with Mr. Jose Pampuro, Minister of Defense  
Addressed as: Mr. Minister PAMPURO [pronounced "pahm-POO-row"]  
16 November 2004, 2:00-2:30 PM

- Your troops (640 in flood-wrecked Gonaives) are performing admirably in Haiti.
  - They persevered in their security mission, even though they lost all their personal effects in the flood and were up to their waists in mud.
- I am keeping an eye on Haiti. It's bleak, and seems to be deteriorating.
  - MG Lugani [chief of the Argentine contingent + Deputy Commander of the UN force, MINUSTAH] impressed the team I sent to Haiti.
  - My team recommended we try to help MINUSTAH with information and in improving situational awareness. That sounds like a good idea.
  - I expect GEN Craddock will visit Haiti shortly. We also plan to send a NEW HORIZONS humanitarian engineering exercise in February.
  - The UN ought to hurry up and get all the forces promised in place (6,700 troops authorized, 3,100 in place). It is hard to see how the Government can govern if MINUSTAH doesn't have troops to provide basic security.
  - Reconstituting the Haitian Army is a bad idea. And integrating ex-military into the police may create more problems than it solves, unless very stringent conditions can be met. MINUSTAH's job is to provide security while the police are rebuilt.
  - There are two Haiti scenarios of especial concern to the US: 1) a humanitarian crisis, such as mass starvation or massacres, and 2) a mass migration.
- Our countries have a strong military-to-military relationship based on peacekeeping.
  - At the 2002 Santiago ministers meeting, I proposed working with Latin America to build up regional peacekeeping capabilities.
  - We are building this idea into a global approach (GPOI).
- I appreciate your personal efforts to get legislation so U.S. servicemen have immunities while on exercises in Argentina.

Argentina

29 Nov 04


11 Nov 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

- I know it's a tough sell...not to mention Article 98.
- But it would be a shame if exercises such as UNITAS fell by the wayside because of this. We want to keep working with Argentina.
- I hear MERCOSUR is discussing ideas for a new regional security arrangement.
  - The Central Americans are making strides with their arrangement, the Conference of Central American Armed Forces. SOUTHCOM is an observer, and we've been able to support that effort.
  - Where do you see this heading?
  - Might such a regional arrangement provide the political cover to seek temporary immunities for US troops in countries with no Article 98?
- A new priority for us is science and technology cooperation with the Southern Cone.
  - GEN Kern just visited the new Army Material Command science office in Buenos Aires. I have high hopes for it. This is good for both countries.
  - Our new Office of Naval Research bureau in Chile has only been up a year and is already delivering interesting results.
- What are your thoughts for the Ministerial?
  - I have heard from many of our colleagues about their concern over the nexus between terrorists, drugs, and organized crime gangs.
  - In Quito, I intend to highlight the importance of clearly *defining and coordinating* the roles of military and law enforcement.
    - I understand Colombia will have the same message
- Without clear responsibilities and good coordination, you risk leaving seams that terrorists, traffickers, and criminal gangs can exploit.

December 1, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: A Patriot

Mr. President—

You'll want to read this about Mayor Daley's son, Patrick. As you will note, he is a supporter of yours and says it right out to the press!

Respectfully,

Attach.

Sneed, Michael. "He Wants to Serve His Country," *Chicago Sun-Times*, November 30, 2004

DHR:dh  
120104-5

3355D

1 Dec 04

OSD 19216-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27966

Chicago Sun-Times  
November 30, 2004

## 'He Wants To Serve His Country'

By Michael Sneed, Sun-Times Columnist

Mayor Daley's only son, Patrick, has joined the Army during a time of war.

He reports to active duty as an enlisted soldier in the Army's regular airborne infantry.

His activation date: between Christmas and New Year's. His destination: presumably North Carolina's Ft. Bragg. His final destination? It could lead him to Iraq or Afghanistan within a year.

"He wants to serve his country," said a Sneed source, "He's a patriot. It's just that it's a pretty dangerous time to be doing so. His father is very proud but his mother, Maggie, is nervous as any mother would be. It's a pretty honorable thing to sign up in a time of war."

### **Earned MBA**

In an exclusive interview with the Sun-Times, Patrick Daley -- who recently graduated with honors from the University of Chicago's MBA program and could have pursued lucrative job offers -- told Sneed why he made the decision.

"It's been in the back of my mind for some time," said Patrick Daley, one of Mayor Daley's four children, including Nora, Elizabeth and a second son, Kevin, who died. "I left West Point during my freshman year when I was 18 years old and always remembered their motto, 'Duty, Honor and Country.' But I was so young and not really old enough to understand what it really meant. But I know now.

"I suppose when you're 18 years old -- as I was at West Point -- you're selfish and I didn't want to devote 10 years to an uncertain future. It took me a while to learn that there's also a virtue in selflessness. And I believe that virtue is to serve your country. And the values of West Point are still with me."

So what turned him around?

"I suppose you could say that one defining moment was Sept. 11 and the nightmare at the World Trade Center. I had flown into New York the night before because I had worked there for Bear Stearns. But I was frustrated, I didn't know how I could help. I didn't know what I could do, so I gave blood and volunteered at a hospital.

### **Decided in grad school**

"But it was really last fall when I decided I wanted to serve my country by joining the military. It wasn't that anything special was happening. I was still in graduate school. But it had always been in the back of my mind. And before I knew it, it was in the forefront. I graduated from the University of Chicago in June and could have gone into investment banking or private equity, but it didn't surprise anyone when I told my close friends I wanted to join the military.

"I'm 29 and on the old side to go into the military but not too old."

11-L-0559/OSD/27967

Patrick Daley's father and uncles were young men during the Vietnam War. "Although my family has a history of serving in the military reserve, I will be the first person in my family to go active."

Patrick Daley decided to enlist rather than enter service through officers training.

"In the military, doors go up and out rather than down," he said. "It's a close bet that I may make a career out of the military, and it's better to start at the bottom. But I can tell you one thing: My family wasn't surprised."

So did Patrick Daley have the biggest collection of G.I. Joes? Was he a big fan of war movies? Did he play soldier as a kid? "I suppose some of that is true, but I will tell you that I always enjoyed military history," said Patrick Daley, who graduated from Mount Carmel High School before finishing his undergraduate degree at the University of Illinois.

It's no secret among Patrick Daley's close friends that he was a big supporter of President Bush. "Well, that's true," he said. "I just hope that I can be of service."

So is he scared?

"Look. I have friends in Iraq and Afghanistan. They tell me it isn't as bad as you read in the press, that much in those countries is working and that we are making progress."

#### **Mayor supportive**

So how do his parents feel?

"Dad is very supportive and mom is doing just what mothers are supposed to do, worrying about her son."

In the end, Patrick Daley found a way to fulfill his view of public service. "There are many paths of service -- policeman, fireman, political and the military -- but it's an all-volunteer era. I've always wanted to find a way to serve . . . just like my grandfather and my father. Think of it. It's amazing. I get to serve my country."

December 1, 2004

TO: Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Broadcasting

Someone ought to take a look at the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the International Broadcasting Bureau.

My impression is that it gets money from Congress, but it is deadlocked and not functioning well. Apparently, it is a free-standing agency assigned to work on an important matter. Is anyone paying attention to it?

What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120104-13

080

1 Dec 04

file

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

August 27, 2004

Afghanistan

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Update Brief

We probably ought to update this Afghanistan Strategic Update brief. After I receive an updated version, we ought to plan to give it to the President, the PC or an NSC at some point.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/23/04 Afghanistan Strategic Update *(cover page only)*

*DR 8/30*  
*8/30*

DHR.dh  
082704-12 (is computer).doc

Please respond by 9/10/04

*SIR*

*Gen Barro  
will brief  
wed 1 sept.  
Ready after  
that to  
send over  
if you approve.*

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

*VIR  
JR*

27 AUG 04



~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

August 27, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Update Brief

We probably ought to update this Afghanistan Strategic Update brief. After I receive an updated version, we ought to plan to give it to the President, the PC or an NSC at some point.

Thanks.

Attach:  
8/23/04 Afghanistan Strategic Update *(cover page only)*

DHR.dh  
082704-12 (to computer).doc

.....  
Please respond by 9/10/04

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~


11-L-0559/OSD/27971



~~SECRET~~/REL GCTF

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# AFGHANISTAN STRATEGIC UPDATE



*23 August 2004*

~~SECRET~~/REL GCTF

1

11-L-0559/OSD/27972

~~FOUO~~ File

August 13, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Thank You Note for Mosaic

8/16  
v/r *[Signature]*

Tunisia

We received quite a large mosaic as a gift, but I don't remember who gave it to me. It was not from this recent trip, but I believe it was from someone in the US. It was not presented to me by the person directly, because it would not fit on the plane.

I would like to see the thank you letter that was prepared. If it isn't good enough, I want to dictate another one.

Thanks.

DHR.dh  
081304-2 (is computer) doc

.....  
Please respond by 8/18/04

~~FOUO~~

*DD 8/18*  
Sir,  
Thank you letter  
attached.  
v/r,  
Lt Col Greg Longyel  
*8/16*

13 AUG 04

OSD 19273-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27973

PRO



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

APR 5 2004

His Excellency Dali Jazi  
Minister of National Defense  
Republic of Tunisia

Dear Mr. Minister:

I enjoyed our recent meeting at the Pentagon and I look forward to continued cooperation between our two countries.

The beautiful mosaic arrived in perfect condition, and I do thank you for presenting me with such a memorable gift.

Thank you as well for the nice medallion and the book, Mosaics of Roman Tunisia. You were very kind to remember me with such thoughtful gifts.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. ...".

OSD 04852-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27974

August 9, 2004

W  
W  
W

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Travel

I would like you folks to limit travel for the period ahead.

We have a lot of things we need to get done and that need senior level thought and attention if we are going to get closure on them. It concerns me that so many of the four of us are gone so often.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080904-4

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

9 AUG 04

August 2, 2004

IRAQ

TO: Paul Butler  
VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Force Deployment Rules

Please set a meeting with Myers, Pace, Chu, Abell, Schoomaker and Brownlee to discuss this memo from David Chu.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/30/04 ASD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Force Deployment Rules for Operations IRAQI  
FREEDOM AND ENDURING FREEDOM

DHR:dh  
080204-1

.....  
Please respond by 8/5/04

2 AUG 04



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

ACTION MEMO

MTG



06-812

July 30, 2004, 1300

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PERSONNEL AND READINESS

*Donald C. Chan 30 July 04*

SUBJECT: Force Deployment Rules for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM

The following summarizes for the deployment rules used to source active duty and reserve forces.

Active Component Forces

- Dwell Time: a minimum 1:1 ratio of deployed time (in support of any contingency operation) to home station time. Whenever possible, forces are chosen based upon longest dwell time.
- Forces assigned to other Combatant Commanders may be used if risk is acceptable. *Don't know*
- Units will deploy at required readiness levels.
  - Units with less than required readiness ratings may be used if required training can be accomplished, or the unit can be cross-leveled with appropriate personnel and equipment. *Phrasing ahead*
- Time in theater guidelines differ for each Service.
  - Army: Units (not soldiers) will serve one-year boots on the ground (BOG). BOG is defined as when the main body of the unit (not individuals) arrives in the OIF/OEF AOR (e.g., arrival in Kuwait). The Joint Staff has defined BOG as "the window of time a unit (main body) physically arrives in theater until the window of time the unit physically departs the theater." *what ground? IIR?*
  - Marine Corps: Marine units below Regimental/Group level deploy for seven months. Regimental/Group Headquarters and above deploy for twelve months. The Marines volunteer their OIF/OEF forces as a "surge" capability if the on-ground situation requires more forces. *?*



- o Air Force: The Air Force rotates personnel in accordance with its Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) cycle. Beginning September 2004, the baseline deployment will be 120 days in a 20-month cycle. Each Airman deploys only once during a cycle, although some stressed specialties will deploy longer, and in greater frequency. Some deployment rules have been modified at the unit level to increase volunteerism or provide stability in key missions, (e.g. senior personnel rotations in the Combined Air Operations Center are for 1 year).
- o Navy: The Fleet Response Plan (FRP), calls for surge capability to meet global requirements while moving away from traditional scheduled/longer deployments. Currently, CNO deployment goals are 6 months portal to portal with 12 months in a non-deployed status.

- Alternative sourcing is considered before re-deploying active forces in violation of above criteria or service guidelines. Options include:

- o Can COCOM handle the task with forces already in country, with a gap?
- o Can the in-country force be extended without violating "boots on ground" criteria?
- o Can host nation (Iraqi/Afghani) and coalition support be used? *not sure*
- o Can the duty be outsourced and supported by a contractor? *+*
- o Can similar specialties from other Services support the requirement? *+*
- o Can other geographic Commanders' forces be used without undue risk? *+*

- Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) assets are closely managed under the Global Military Force Policy to preserve their capability to respond to emerging crises. Before an asset is tasked above levels sustainable without significant adverse effects, Joint Staff asks:

- o Can another asset be substituted or lower-priority/exercises joint experiments be cancelled?
- o Can a Prepare to Deploy Order (PTDO) minimize excessive deployments, while maintaining home-station training?
- o Can the asset support one AOR, but be quickly re-rolled into another AOR during a crisis?

Reserve Component Forces

- Activate Reserve component forces only after determining that it is both prudent and judicious to do so.
  - o Voluntary duty – no restrictions on tour duration.
  - o Involuntary duty – maximum of 24 cumulative months.
- Involuntarily recalling the Individual Ready Reserve only after considering Selected Reserve members & volunteers.

*over (ent) ...  
War zone*



- Second or subsequent involuntary recalls – previous service (length & nature) is considered and the maximum break between tours is provided (1 in 6 planning factor considered).
- Maximize Predictability – mobilization orders to be provided in a timely manner (minimum of 30 days prior to active duty report date).
- Training when mobilized – members may not be mobilized solely for the purpose of training, but training related to the mobilization mission is permitted. (Legislative relief being requested).
- Members retained on active duty only as long as absolutely necessary.
- Members taking leave prior to release from active duty are voluntarily retained to use accrued leave.

General Observations

- These rules evolved in response to changing needs since September 11, 2001. They are therefore likely to evolve further. The rules recognize that this is an all-volunteer force; equitable sharing of our burden is essential to retaining today's volunteers and attracting their future replacements.
- Upon your confirmation of these rules, we will publish the associated implementing guidance.

Decision

Schedule meeting to discuss  Proceed without further discussion

Prepared By: Paul Mayberry, (b)(6)

FOUO

file

August 2, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Guidelines for Agency Review

*J 8/4*

*040 CIA*

Have you ever heard of this set of guidelines for handling CIA review of our speeches and papers?

Thanks.

Attach.  
7-04 Guidelines for Handling External Request for Agency Review of Speeches and Papers

DHR:dh  
080204-3

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

AUG 4 2004

*DR 8/5*

*Sir -  
This is part of the normal  
process for clearing "ORCON"  
information.  
It does not represent a  
change.*  
*SK*

*240804*

## Guidelines for Handling External Requests for Agency Review of Speeches and Papers (U)

Last January, we formalized and implemented policy and procedures on how to handle requests for Agency clearance of official speeches and other draft papers. We have just completed a six-month review to adjust and validate the procedures and will soon be ready to release some updated guidance. However, the basic tenets of the guidance will remain the same, and this is a good time to issue a reminder. It is important to remember that a request is looking for Agency clearance and not personal opinion. It is imperative that we get each request into the Agency process. Each of us has a responsibility to ensure that every request is vetted properly. We have asked our customers to send requests via the DCI Operations Center; however, that has not always been the case, and some requests have been submitted directly to Agency officers. If such a request comes to you, you are responsible for getting it into the proper process—via the DCI Operations Center. If a request seems unusual or out of the ordinary, please make sure that you inform your chain of command.

If asked by senior government officials—Undersecretary and above—to review speeches or other draft papers to be placed in the public domain, the following procedures must be adhered to:

- Immediately contact the EA/DDI via the DCI Operations Center (703-482-7551) that a request has been submitted for formal review of a speech or article.
- Provide a copy of the draft to the DCI Operations Center for appropriate distribution and documentation.
- The official Agency response to the request will be prepared by the EA/DDI, in conjunction with the on-duty EA/DDO, and passed to the requester via the DCI Operations Center with a file copy to the DAC.
- The officer receiving the request should not provide the Agency response.

UNCLASSIFIED

395694ID 7-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27981

124  
~~TOOO~~ file

August 2, 2004

I-off/010 376  
ES-0326

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Drug Problem in Afghanistan

Afghanistan

Let's get a major plan going for the drug problem in Afghanistan

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080204-5

.....  
Please respond by 8/30/04

J 8/4  
↓

8/3/04 Det 8/5

→ To SecDef  
From Paul Butler  
FYI we have another  
SUTC for the Afghan briefing  
on Thursday 8/5.

→ SD  
The draft  
Afghanistan  
Strategic Review  
briefing I gave  
you addressed  
the drug problem  
and its connection  
with warlords,  
border security,  
customs collection,  
terrorism and  
other problems  
I did the briefing  
together with Pace  
and Sharp and  
Barne is developing  
it for them.  
Doug Feith

2 Aug 04

~~TOOO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27982

OSD 19280-04

~~FOUO~~ file

August 2, 2004

TO: Paul McHale  
VADM Jim Stavridis  
  
CC: Doug Feith  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
  
SUBJECT: Wiring for Homeland Security Council to OSD

311

I don't know what the problem is, but I am disconnected from the Department of Homeland Security and from the Homeland Security Council. The National Security Council knows that I am the member of the NSC, that it is my office that should get contacted, and that we decide in my office who will participate in the meetings.

But with respect to Homeland Security Council and the Department of Homeland Security, we have gotten off on a different foot. Everyone thinks it is Paul McHale who is the member of the Council, and we never even get notified or copied.

I want to end it immediately. Something is fundamentally wrong with the system. I want somebody to take the time to contact those people, talk to them, get their systems changed, and get it completely reversed, so that the principal point of contact in the Department of Defense is my office. I would like a report back no later than tomorrow when that has happened—that the rewiring has taken place for documents, phone calls, SVTC, meetings, whatever.

Thanks.

Answer below  
*VIR Jim*

DHR:dh  
080204-6

Please respond by

8/3/04

2AN904

TO: SECDEF

3 August 2004

FROM: VADM JIM STAVRIDIS

SUBJ: HOMELAND SECURITY CONNECTION

1. Sir, on the general issue of DoD connectivity to DHS and the HSC, Paul McHale and I have met and are working all our contacts to ensure full connectivity at the appropriate level – decided by YOU – in future interactions. **We have strongly emphasized that our office is the principal point of contact in DoD for all documents, phone calls, SVTC, and meetings. Both HSC and DHS have acknowledged this.** We've also emphasized the need for advance notice!
  - a. I called Dr. Hadley's office and clarified it with them.
  - b. Paul has called Fran Townsend and clarified it with her. He has also spoken with the new Deputy at Homeland Security Council, Mr. Rapuano. Everyone is very clear on the need to loop DoD in general and you in particular up front so we make conscious and correct decisions about who is participating in any given interaction.
2. On the specific issue of the call on Saturday to which you were added late, there were two problems:
  - a. HLS began the call at 1600, but did not request DoD participation until 1620. This issue of late notification will be addressed by the measures above.
  - b. We did experience some communication issues in hooking you into the call once it was clear what was going on. There were difficulties with a cell phone carried by Mr. Cirrelli. I've personally met with Cables and Communication folks to ensure there will not be any repetition.
3. I'm confident this will not be a problem in the future, and Paul and I are tracking closely to ensure it runs smoothly.

V/R Jim

11-L-0559/OSD/27984

August 3, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
VADM Jim Stavridis

CC: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Drugs in Afghanistan

I would like to have a meeting with Mary Beth Long and Doug Feith to talk about drugs in Afghanistan.

Please make a note that when I go to Afghanistan, one of the things I want to focus on is the drug situation, what we are doing and why we aren't doing more.

Thanks.

DIIR:dh  
080304-15

.....  
Please respond by 8/9/04

Afghanistan

3 Aug 04

August 4, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Article

Please get this entire article from the August 9 issue of **New York** magazine.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Mailer, Norman. **New York** magazine, August 9, 2004, p. 34-35

DHR:dh  
080404-2



Please *respond* by \_\_\_\_\_

000.750

4 AUG 04



Mary A. Marshall

(b)(6)

Telephone (b)(6)  
Facsimile

000.750

DATE: 8/3

TIME:

TO: Joyce  
FROM: Mary MARSHALL

(b)(6)

NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING THIS PAGE) 3

Subject: Woman money

I don't know if you've seen this yet but it is just a statement from an icon of the left + other fringe people.

If he were in a restaurant with you + Dan he would walk over + shake his hand.

4 AUG 01

more to take over the world with military force.

**NM** Can it be that Iraq is telling us as much?

**JBM** Let's go back to why the Republicans selected New York for the convention. Do you think they still have hopes of cashing in on the memory of 9/11?

**NH** A couple of years ago, New York may have seemed like the perfect place to go; the event had been so traumatic. And there is a large political profit in offering emotional closure to a national nightmare like the fall of the Twin Towers. Nine-eleven felled the two most opalescent pillars of the American economy. It also attacked the implicit assumption that if you worked for the corporation, you were part of a new upper class. To offer an analogy, let us suppose that in the seventeenth century, Versailles had been razed and sacked overnight by latter-day Huns. France would have been emotionally gutted. So it was with us. After all, those Twin Towers spoke of America's phallic hegemony in the world even as Versailles declared the divine right of kings.

an American male felt gelded by the event. Equally, the average American housewife was desolated by the terrifying possibility that one could work for years to build a family and lose it all in an hour. How could the Republicans not choose New York as the place to hold their convention? Given the heroic deaths of the New York firemen and police, the site will also appeal to working-class votes. The Republicans will certainly not fail to make the connection that the protesters are besmirching the memory of 9/11. But a couple of years have gone by, and we've also learned that there are a few things wrong about the picture we've had of 9/11. A new set of conspiracy theories are building. There are just too many facts that are not readily explicable.

Muir and John Buffalo at a summer rental in Maine, in 1979.



\*

---

**Rumsfeld is the only one of that coven I'd call an honorable man. Of that whole gang, he's the only one who seems real to me.**

---

There may well be room after the convention for the protest movement to look into 9/11 with some critical incisiveness. I am no longer a conspiratorialist—I spent too many years wandering around in the byways of the Warren Report. But there are elements here which are not easy to explain. I don't believe for a moment there was direct complicity. In America, we don't go in as yet for major political coups—there's too much to lose for the powers that be, and we are still a democratic society. But there may have been a sentiment in the administration—let them scream and squeal over this one—that maybe the worst thing in the world might not be that we suffer a disaster. Pearl Harbor, after all, galvanized America. Without Pearl Harbor, we might never have been able to go to war in the company of the Russians. Indeed, Roosevelt was accused of knowing about Pearl Harbor in advance and welcoming it. Well, I wouldn't go that far. I don't think the administration knew that the World Trade Center was going to be attacked. Still, some odd things did happen that day. Immensely odd. There was more than unbelievable inefficiency. I don't know that the 9/11 Commission did all they could with that. They were determined, after all, to bring in a unanimous report. That always means that the radical ends are cut off. It's like playing poker without the aces, kings, and queens, the twos, threes, and the fours.

**JBM** What happens if there's a terrorist attack between now and the election?

**NM** I don't know whether it'll benefit Kerry or Bush. That's hard to decide. Bush has been saying to America: "I've made America more secure. I've made America safer." He could be hurt badly by a large attack. On the other hand, there is a knee-jerk reflex in Americans to rally behind the president when there's a catastrophe. So, I can't pretend to know the answer.

**JBM** Starting with the WTO protest in Seattle in '99, a culture has formed around the anti-corporate, anti-globalization, anti-Bush movement. Where do you think it's going? Where should it go?

**NM** A good many people of the right, not flag conservatives but true conservatives, can feel in accord with men and women on the left concerning one deep feeling. It is that the corporations are stifling our lives. Not only economically, where corporations can claim, arguably, that they bring prosperity (and frankly, I'm certainly not schooled enough in economics to argue that point pro or con), but I can say the corporation is bad for us aesthetically speaking, culturally speaking, spiritually speaking. Just contemplate their massive empty architecture, their massive emphasis on TV commercials, which are a

PHOTOGRAPH BY O GORIO ON REINIMAGES

faces,

existential

exception, oddly enough, and by this I'll probably antagonize a good many people, is Donald Rumsfeld. Of that whole gang,

anything, but he does believe in what he says. It isn't as if he searches for the most useful response he can come up with at the moment, to wield or save his power. He's interested in his ideas first. The power is subservient to the ideas.

JBM What makes you say that?

NM Because he's real. He reacts. He doesn't weigh his words. If something makes him angry, he's angry. If something pleases him, he smiles. If he has doubts about how the situation is going, he expresses those doubts. In that sense, he's the only one of that cover I'd call an honorable man. Let me emphasize: I can disagree totally with people I consider honorable. But never have I seen an administration that has had,

en, the

products for the same real money.

JBM Well, I agree we're fighting a spiritual war against the corporation. And

make sure you have jobs and food." What they're offering is stability. What we're offering is a deeper quality of life.

NM To win this war will take at least 50 years and a profound revolution in American values. We'd have to get away from manipulation. What we've got now is a species of economic, political, and spiritual brainwashing, vastly superior to the old Soviets, who were endlessly crude in their attempts. Our governmental and corporate leaders are much more subtle. Remember years ago, when you were around 15, you were wearing a shirt that said, "Crissy on it? And I said, "Not only do you spend money to buy the shirt, but you also advertise the company that sold it to you." And you said,

"Dad, the were

empire-building. He had nothing to offer but world conquest. So, if he's reelected, what will he do if things remain bad in Iraq? You'll look back on the Patriot Act as being liberal and gentle.

JBM I will never look back on the Patriot Act as being liberal and gentle. While the protests will not have a direct, political gain—

NM You agree with me on that?

JBM Yes, I feel confident in saying that given the parameters of how we will be allowed to protest, I don't see any way it could have a direct political gain. However, I do feel that when you're out there, and see all the different types of people who have come together—particularly now with the mixture of groups that will be there—you do get a sense that the spiritual revolution may be awakening. And that's the only hope, I believe, against the total corporatization of America.

NM All right, but if we lose the election, it's going to be a very expensive spiritual education. I would be much happier if the protest movements could spread their activities over the next four years. I don't have a great deal of hope that most of the people involved are really thinking of this election so much as expressing the need to vent, to gain some self-therapy, and to express their outrage at what's been done to them, plus their need to gain power in the counterculture. There's all sorts of motives, some noble, some meretricious. But it's a poor time to exercise our most dramatic democratic privileges. What we do have over all the years to come is the confidence that we breathe a cleaner spiritual air than the greedbags who run our country, and so it is not impossible that over decades to come, much that we believe in will yet come to be. But I do not wish to end on so sweet and positive a note. It is better to remind ourselves that wisdom is ready to reach us from the most unexpected quarters. Here, I quote from a man who became wise a little too late in life:

"Naturally, the common people don't want war, but after all, it is the leaders of a country who determine the policy, and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy, or a fascist dictatorship, or a parliament, or a communist dictatorship. Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. This is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same in every country."

That was Hermann Goering speaking at the Nuremberg trials after World War II. It is one thing to be forewarned. Will we ever be forearmed? ■

August 4, 2004

TO: ADM Vern Clark  
cc: Gen. Dick Myers  
Gordon ENGLAND  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Navy's Initiatives

Attached is an op-ed by Peter Brookes. It looks to me to be an interesting laydown.

I have not sent the President anything that describes what you have been doing. Do you have a brief paper you think would be appropriate for me to send him?

Thanks.

Attach.  
Brookes, Peter. "Show of Force." *New York Post*, August 2, 2004, p. 34-35

DHR:dh  
080404-3

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*S60.1*

*4 Aug 04*

New York Post  
August 2, 2004

## Show Of Force

By Peter Brookes

Seven American aircraft-carrier strike groups are plying the world's seven seas right now in one of the biggest military exercises since the end of the Cold War.

Officially, it's the first test of the Navy's new strategy, the Fleet Response Plan (FRP). Unofficially, it puts America's potential foes on notice: The U.S. Army may be stretched pretty thin at the moment — but the U.S. Navy isn't.

It's a bold statement of U.S. power reminiscent of one President Teddy Roosevelt sent in 1907 — the two-year global circumnavigation by the Great White Fleet.

Each carrier strike group (CSG) includes one carrier with 75 aircraft, 4 combat ships, a submarine, cruise missiles and 6,500 sailors. No other nation can put to sea — anywhere on earth — such an incredible display of military might.

With China holding its yearly war games off Taiwan, Iran cracking open U.N.-sealed nuclear facilities and North Korea's continued belligerent nuclear blustering, the exercise, Summer Pulse '04, couldn't come at a more important time.

This exercise is extraordinary. Rarely does the U.S. have more than two of its 12 carriers at sea at any one time. That's because American carriers operate on a two-year cycle — six months at sea, followed by 18 months in the shipyards in overhaul and in training for its next deployment.

Under the Navy's new strategy, the smaller, more responsive CSG has replaced the vaunted, behemoth aircraft-carrier battle group (which consisted of one carrier, 10 to 15 ships and subs and 10,000 sailors) as the Navy's core carrier unit.

The Pentagon wants to be able to send six CSGs anywhere in the world in less than 30 days. Moreover, it plans to have two more CSGs ready within another 90 days to reinforce the first six carriers or relieve two of them.

(Six aircraft carriers — at a minimum — would be needed for a China-Taiwan contingency or a second Korean war.)

But there's more to it than sending 45,000 sailors to sea for the summer, giving a sea trial to the new strategy or sending a shot across the bow of potential troublemakers:

**Reassuring Friends and Allies:** One of the biggest concerns among America's partners is that U.S. military might is over-committed and unavailable if big trouble breaks out beyond Iraq or Afghanistan. Could America's involvement in the Middle East and South Asia encourage North Korea to invade South Korea or China to coerce Taiwan?

To dispel these fears, the Navy will operate with friends and allies from the Americas, Europe, Africa,

Australia and Asia during this groundbreaking exercise. In July, for instance, the USS Enterprise and USS Truman CSGs operated off the coast of Morocco with 10 other nations in a smaller exercise, Majestic Eagle '04.

**Reviving Preemption:** Some have suggested that the idea of preemption died with the revelation of the intelligence failures over 9/11 and Iraqi WMD. But word that the arrow of preemption has vanished from our quiver is *just* the thing our enemies, especially the terrorists, want to hear.

America must be able to strike first.

Of course, accurate intelligence is a must, but it makes no sense for this nation to take the first punch like we did on 9/11. Being able to muster the power of several aircraft carrier task forces at almost a moment's notice is a tremendous complication and deterrence to those who threaten us.

The aircraft carrier provides America's policymakers with 90,000 tons of cold-steel U.S. diplomacy. Without firing a single shot, the presence of 4.5 acres of floating, sovereign American territory off the coast has made more than one foreign leader think twice about acting foolishly. At the onset of international crises, American presidents often utter the worried words, "Where are the carriers?"

The Navy's forward-leaning FRP gives the commander-in-chief the opportunity to have naval forces available more rapidly than ever before. And though this great nation should always be slow to war, when the president needs a big stick, it's good to know the carriers will be there.

*Peter Brookes, a Heritage Foundation senior fellow, is a Naval Academy grad.*

72  
~~FOUO~~

file

August 4, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
cc: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Formers

*J 8/9*

*040*

I want to think about having the former directors of the NSA, NRO, DIA and NGA in to talk about intelligence.

Please get me a list of the last four or five in each of those categories, and let me look at them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080404-12

.....  
Please respond by 8/13/04

AUG 6 2004

*Six-*  
*See attached.*  
*SC*

*WJH 8/30*

*4 Aug 04*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19287-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27993

Erin,

Here is the requested information re: the last five former Directors of NSA. E-mail addresses were not currently available.

Lt Gen Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF (Ret)

(b)(6)

VADM John M. McConnell, USN (Ret)

(b)(6)

ADM William O. Studeman, USN (Ret)

(b)(6)

LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret)

(b)(6)

Lt Gen Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF (Ret)

(b)(6)



Former Directors of the NRO

The Honorable Robert J. Hermann (Dr.)

(b)(6)

The Honorable Edward C. (Pete) Aldridge, Jr.

(b)(6)

The Honorable Martin C. Faga

(b)(6)

The Honorable Jeffrey K. Harris

(b)(6)

The Honorable Keith R. Hall

(b)(6)

The Honorable Peter B. Teets (current)

**DIA FORMER DIRECTORS**

as of 9 Jun 2004

**LTG HARRY E. (ED) SOYSTER, USA**

(b)(6)

INCUMBENCY: December 1988 - September 1991

**LT GEN JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., USAF**

(b)(6)

Work: 301-227-7300 (Director, NIMA as of 13 September 2001)

(b)(6)

INCUMBENCY: 18 November 1991 - 31 August 1995

**LT GEN KENNETH A. MINIHAN, USAF**

(b)(6)

INCUMBENCY: 1 September 1995 - 15 February 1996

Home: (b)(6)

**LTG PATRICK M. HUGHES, USA**

(b)(6)

INCUMBENCY: 16 February 1999 - 27 July 1999

Home: (b)(6)

Office: (b)(6)

**VICE ADMIRAL THOMAS R. WILSON, USN**

(b)(6)

INCUMBENCY: 27 July 1999 - 19 July 2002

Home: (b)(6)

Address in Maine during Summer

(b)(6)

Home: (b)(6)

Address in Minnesota starting 1 Sept 2003

ATK Precision Systems Group

MN01-2080

5050 Lincoln Drive

Edina, Minnesota 55436-1097

(b)(6)

**NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

**DATE: DIRECTOR'S OFFICE**

5 Aug 04

Mr. Redmond, next under are the names of the two former directors of NIMA, including their addresses and phone numbers as requested:

**RADM J. J. "Jack" Dantone, USN (Ret)**

(b)(6)

**LTG James C. King, USA (Ret)**

(b)(6)

NPIC

Ms. Nancy Bone

(b)(6)

Mr. Leo Hazlowood

(b)(6)

Mr. Frank Ruocco

(b)(6)

No Phone Listed

DMA

**RADM J. C. "Jack" Dantone, USN (Ret)**

(b)(6)

**Maj. Gen. Philip W. Nuber, USAF (Ret)**

(b)(6)

**Maj. Gen. Raymond E. O'Mara, USAF (Ret)**

(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

August 5, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: Offer from Georgia

The President of Georgia mentioned the possibility of Georgian troops working with Azerbaijan and Ukraine to protect UN personnel in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080504-3

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Georgia*

*5 Aug 04*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27998

OSD 19288-04

dia  
6800

720

~~TODD~~

R&N

August 5, 2004  
I-04/010495  
ES-0351

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Andy Hoehn  
CC: Doug Feith  
Ryan Henry  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: POTUS and Global Posture Review

*ExceSec*  
*Please close*  
*out this*  
*snafu like.*  
Paul Butler  
8/11

320.2 Strategic

The White House is thinking about the possibility of the President talking a bit about the Global Posture Review. The emphasis very likely would be on two things:

1. The good things that accrue to our troops in terms of strain on families and the like.
2. The improved relationships with allies.

We may be getting asked to provide some assistance in that regard.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080504-7

8/5/04

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

→SD  
There's a trove of good material for the President in this field. Hoehn and I can help and will work with D.Rita.

5 Aug 04

~~TODD~~

Doug Feith

(b)(6)

~~POTUS~~

file

(b)(6)

SPD 08/12

August 5, 2004

I-01/010495

ES-0351

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 Andy Hoehn

CC: Doug Feith  
 Ryan Henry

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: POTUS and Global Posture Review

*J 8/12*  
*Good words*  
*From Andy*  
*Hoehn*  
*(what*

The White House is thinking about the possibility of the President talking a bit about the Global Posture Review. The emphasis very likely would be on two things:

*a*  
*superstar)*

1. The good things that accrue to our troops in terms of strain on families and the like.
2. The improved relationships with allies.

*Pushing*  
*this*  
*out*

We may be getting asked to provide some assistance in that regard.

Thanks.

**+**

*VR*

*Ji*

DHR:dh  
 080304-7

.....  
 Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

AUG 12 2004

SecDef :

*I provided inputs to Marc Thiessen, including your statements over the last year. A draft from Marc is attached. Steve Hadley will circulate the whole text shortly.*

*Andy Hoehn*

~~POTUS~~

To prepare for the future, we are also working with allies across the world to restructure our global force posture – the numbers, types, locations and capabilities of U.S. forces around the world. Since the end of the Cold War, our forces have essentially remained where they were stationed during the Cold War. We need to rearrange our forces, so they are positioned to deal with the less predictable dangers of the 21<sup>st</sup> century – the threats of terrorism, rogue states and weapons of mass destruction.

That is why, over the coming decade, we are going to bring home many of the heavy, legacy forces of the Cold War era, while deploying lighter, more flexible, and rapidly deployable forces across the world. We will also move our troops closer to the places where they are likely to fight, instead of the places where the wars of the last century ended. We will position them so they can surge quickly to deal with unexpected threats. And we will take advantage of 21<sup>st</sup> century military technologies to reduce the number of U.S. forces stationed at overseas bases, while deploying increased combat power in every region of the world. Today, when one high-tech ship or tank or weapon can deliver the same combat power that once required ten ships or tanks or weapons, it is no longer relevant to measure America's commitment by counting numbers of troops and equipment in a particular country or region.

These changes in our force posture will allow us to strengthen existing alliances, while giving us the opportunity to build new partnerships with countries that are eager to work with U.S. forces and increase cooperation with our military. They will also reduce the stress on our troops, and on military families. Under the plan I am announcing today, we will bring home nearly 70,000 uniformed personnel, and nearly 100,000 families and civilian employees, over the next ten years. For our service members, this will mean more time on the home front and fewer moves over a career. For military spouses it will mean fewer job changes, greater stability, and more time for their kids to spend with grandparents and school friends back home. These changes will also be better for our military communities here in the U.S., allowing us to make better use of domestic bases and training ranges. And they will save the taxpayers money, allowing us to close hundreds of unneeded foreign bases and facilities around the world.

Let me be clear: every step we are taking will increase our ability to project our Nation's military power to deal with today's and tomorrow's dangers. In so doing we will also strengthen the capabilities of our allies, and their ability to be partners in meeting the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. For over two years now we have consulted our allies abroad and Congress here at home. We have benefited from this dialogue, and have reflected many of their ideas in our plans. The changes we propose will bring better U.S. military capabilities to every part of the world, improve our ability to protect our allies, and strengthen our ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat any aggressor who threatens the peace and freedom of the world.



~~FOUO~~

file

August 5, 2004  
04/0/0325  
ES-0365

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
SUBJECT: Sinai

UN

Do we still have 682 people in the Sinai? Let's figure out a way to cut that in half.  
Please come in with a proposal. I want to get going.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/4/04 Response to SD #080404-10

DHR dh  
080504-8

.....  
Please respond by 8/27/04

8/6/04 8/10/04

→SD

I've done plans on cutting the Sinai force but it's clear we would have resistance from State and HSC staff now because of Israeli pull-back from Gaza. I'll brief you whenever you're ready.

5 Aug 04

I know there are always arguments that 'this is not a good time' but I do think it would be easier to succeed with a push in a few months.

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19290-04 Ready to discuss w/you. Doug Feith  
11-L-0559/OSD/28003 06-08-04 11:03 11

~~FOUO~~

August 4, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

SUBJECT: Sinai

Please find out how many folks we still have in the Sinai.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080404-10

.....  
Please respond by

8/10/04

8/10/11

Sir,

Provided in response to SecDef question on number of forces currently in Sinai:

According to the 4 Aug US Army Ops Summary, there are 682 US forces on the Sinai Peninsula ISO the UN MFO mission. Currently the MFO force is USA National Guard. The total force includes the MFO BN, Spt Co, and AVN Co. The MFO mission began in April 1982.

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28004



INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

CONTROL #  
09746-04

DF 8

INFO MEMO

June 29, 2004 11:30 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Clarity of DoD Policy on Delays in Reporting Detainee Data to Red Cross

- At the conclusion of your June 17, 2004, Press Briefing, during which briefing one reporter asked you if there was "an intention to hide [a certain detainee] from the Red Cross," you asked, "is there anything we want to calibrate on this detainee subject," stating, among other things: "We want to communicate accurately. . . . Our policy is clear, unambiguous and demonstrable."
- By coincidence, on the same day of your Press Briefing, I received a classified briefing in Afghanistan on the protocols governing how and when we provide information about detainees to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
- In talking with commanders and staff judge advocates who are dealing daily and routinely with the ICRC on detainee issues in Afghanistan, I learned that there is a "clear, unambiguous and demonstrable" protocol -- at least at Bagram Air Base -- to govern the transfer of data about detainees, and deception is NOT our intention -- against the ICRC or otherwise.
- In order to assist you in responding to any further press questions about reporting detainee information to the ICRC, I asked the intelligence officer and staff judge advocate at Bagram Air Base to prepare an unclassified explanation of why we under certain circumstance delay passing on detainee information to the ICRC. In summary, the primary reasons that we delay reporting detainee information to the ICRC are: (1) force protection; and (2) so as not to hinder our ability to defeat threats.
- I would respectfully submit the attachment as field input or "talking points" for any further press or congressional inquiries on the subject.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: L. Jerry Hansen, Deputy Inspector General, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/28005

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 09746-04

UNCLASSIFIED

**Question regarding Detention Operations in Afghanistan:**

I UNDERSTAND NORMAL PRACTICE IS TO ASSIGN AN INTERNMENT SERIAL NUMBER (ISN) WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD AFTER DETENTION, AND TO ALLOW ICRC TO INTERVIEW DETAINEES ONCE THE ISN IS ASSIGNED. WHY DON'T WE DO THAT IN EVERY CASE?

**Response:**

ONCE AN ISN NUMBER IS ASSIGNED TO A DETAINEE AND JCRC ACCESS FOR INTERVIEWS IS GRANTED, WE CAN EXPECT THE ICRC TO PROMPTLY NOTIFY THE FAMILY OF A DETAINEE THAT HE IS IN OUR CUSTODY. IN CERTAIN SITUATIONS, THIS CAN AFFECT FORCE PROTECTION AND HINDER **OUR** ABILITY TO DEFEAT THREATS. SPECIFICALLY:

- A terrorist cell that does not know one of its members is in custody will likely continue to operate for at least a limited period of time. If we can learn about the cell from the detainee, we have a good chance of not only stopping its mission, but exploiting or destroying the cell.
- Similarly, disclosure that a highly placed detainee has been captured could provide warnings to the enemy still at large that we possess information regarding their whereabouts. This disclosure could result in their taking measures to avoid capture.
- Notice that an individual has been taken into custody may cause the enemy to make assumptions about the sources and methods used to capture him. In response, the enemy may endanger real sources or innocent people.
- The disclosure that a specific leader or organizer is in custody could cause the enemy to assume the detainee will disclose certain information. As a result, the enemy might hide weapons, move high value targets, or anticipate our actions. This may impact the success of future coalition actions, and could endanger US Forces participating in those actions.
- If enemy forces discover a key leader is in custody, there may be an attempt to gain his release by force. This would clearly endanger the lives of our forces and potentially disrupt our mission.

AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, DELAYING ASSIGNMENT OF AN ISN AND ICRC ACCESS HAS ONLY OCCURRED ON RARE AND INFREQUENT OCCASIONS.

*Handwritten note:* I don't believe that this is an overall statement for AF operations - at best, it is anecdotal evidence - ECD 8-11-04

August 9, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Meetings on Intel Legislation

There is going to be a series of meetings on intel, fleshing out the legislation and the proposals, and teeing up issues for the President to decide. It is going to be small—CIA, DoD and NSC for the most part. You should be the DoD representative.

Dick Myers and Pete Pace will want a representative on that group also.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080904-5

.....  
Please respond by 8/20/04

350.07

9 AUG 04

August 9, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Defense/Justice Issue

150

Here is a note from Steve Herbits. Please screw your head into it and see if we can get this solved properly. Let me know what it is, and let's try not to take too long on it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/6/04 Herbits ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
080904-7

.....  
Please respond by 8/27/04

9 Aug 04



# STEPHEN E. HERBITS

(b)(6)

August 6, 2004

To: Don Rumsfeld  
From: Stephen Herbits  
Re: Defense/Justice Issue  
By Fax: (b)(6)

Dear Don,

The attached is becoming a public issue down here.

You may recall that I acted as the Chairman's liaison on the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States (Edgar M. Bronfman) in 1998 and 1999, so I am familiar with the issue in some detail.

I have learned that the issue is before advisory mediation as I write this, with Fred Fielding as the Mediator.

Both Defense and the Justice Department have a piece of this issue. Its ultimate resolution should be to do what is right, and particularly what is consistent with what the United States has been asking of other nations during the last five years. As you can imagine, the Army's instinct is not necessarily coincident.

Perhaps you and the Attorney General can get this resolved easily and in a timely manner, i.e. before public litigation scheduled for October.

Thanks.

• VERBATIM

# Give Holocaust survivors their due

Below is a letter sent by 17 senators to U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft last week regarding the case of the Hungarian "Gold Train."

We express our deep concern about the matter of the "Hungarian Gold Train," in which elderly Holocaust survivors are seeking redress for misconduct by the U.S. government

As you know, the Gold Train case is one of the most significant outstanding issues in our national effort to ensure justice for Holocaust survivors.

During World War II, the Nazis confiscated the property of Hungary's Jewish community — including precious personal property, religious artifacts, art and even gold wedding bands — and loaded it onto a train headed for Austria, which became known as the "Gold Train."

### Property was stolen

When the war ended, the train and its contents were turned over to the United States for safekeeping, with the explicit assurance the stolen property would be returned to its rightful owners. Evidence uncovered by the survivors indicates that much of the property was stolen or wrongfully used by the very people in whose care it had been placed.

For decades, our government maintained that the origin of the property was "unidentifiable" despite efforts of Hungarian Jews to demonstrate proof of ownership. Finally, in 1999, the U.S. Commission on Holocaust Assets revealed the facts and called the Gold Train an "egregious failure" of the United States to follow U.S. laws and policies concerning property restitution.

A group of elderly survivors, now totalling over 3,000, filed suit in federal court in 2001 seeking an accounting of the property and modest restitution.

Finally, in 1999, the U.S. Commission on Holocaust Assets called the Gold Train an "egregious failure" of the United States.

The survivors have now gone to U.S. federal court to seek redress, be given an accounting of what happened and modest compensation for the property that was rightfully theirs. These survivors are elderly, and many of them are in ill health.

There are reports that the judge in this case has warned that officials at the U.S. Department of Justice are "dragging their feet." Most recently, though the department has not yet replied to the substance of the allegations, it has insisted on subjecting the individual elderly survivors to the intimidating process of in-person depositions.

Now the federal judge in Miami has ordered the department to submit to mediation with the survivors. We are writing to urge you to take this opportunity, at last, to reach a fair and expeditious resolution to this case.

Any further delay by the department will mean justice denied for these elderly Holocaust survivors.

Signed:

Hillary Rodham Clinton, D-N.Y.

Christopher Dodd, D-Conn.

John Edwards, D-N.C.

Frank Lautenberg, D-N.J.

Russell Feingold, D-Wis.

Bill Nelson, D-Fla.

Marie Cantwell, D-Wash.

Charles Schumer, D-N.Y.

Debbie Stabenow, D-Mich.

Arlen Specter, R-Pa.

Trent Lott, R-Miss.

Paul Sarbanes, D-Md.

Thomas Carper, D-Del.

Jeff Bingaman, D-N.M.

Patrick Leahy, D-Vt.

Joseph Lieberman, D-Conn.

Carl Levin, D-Mich.

OSD L-0559/OSD/28010

101 SATURDAY, AUG 14, 2004

OSD L-0559/OSD/28010

# OPINION



**SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL (Ft Lauderdale) Editorial, July 23, 2004****Promptly Settle 'Gold Train' Suit**  
-----**South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board**

July 23, 2004

The U.S. government **is** trying to shirk responsibility for one of the most shameful episodes in the **nation's** history. It mustn't **get** away with it.

Late in World **War** II, the Nazis **seized** millions of dollars' **worth** of gold, jewelry, **antiques**, artwork and other valuables from Hungarian Jews and **put** the items on **a** train to Austria. The war **ended** shortly thereafter, and the train **was** turned over to **U.S.** forces, who explicitly promised to return **the** heirlooms to their rightful owners.

They **never** did, and there is substantial evidence that **U.S.** military personnel **cook** the items, which were later auctioned **off** in New **York**. That evidence came to light in 1999, **and** led to a class-action lawsuit in federal **court** in Miami by Holocaust **survivors** and their families, including **an** estimated 2,000 people in **South** Florida, seeking compensation for property lost aboard the "**Hungarian** Gold Train."

Amid accusations that the government **was** "foot **dragging**" and "**intimidating**" elderly plaintiffs, **U.S.** District Judge Patricia Seitz ordered the parties to submit to mediation, which is to begin early next month. **In** case no agreement is reached, Seitz **has** scheduled **a** September trial.

**This** case should never go to **trial**. The **U. S** Justice Department should address the issue head-on and reach **a** just settlement rather than rely on legal technicalities to avoid liability, **as** it has **done** so far. For example, it argued that the plaintiffs had filed **the** suit too late, but Seitz said the **case** could go forward because the plaintiffs "were induced or tricked by the government's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass."

**This** is not **an** image the United States should be projecting at **a** time when **U.S.** troops' responsibilities in Iraq include safeguarding Iraqis' personal property and that nation's priceless antiquities.

**The** Presidential Commission on Holocaust **Assets** called the Gold Train episode "**an** example of **an** egregious failure of the United States to follow its **own** policy regarding restitution of Holocaust victims' property." Seventeen senators, including **Sen.** Bill Nelson of Florida, **and** **a** number of **House** members, including **South** Florida Reps. Alcee Hastings, **Robert** Wexler, Peter Deutsch, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Kendrick Meek, have written to Attorney General John Ashcroft **urging** **him** to reach "a fair and expeditious resolution" of the case.

(b)(6)

**He should promptly accede to their request. The legitimate claims of Holocaust victims *are* reason enough to do so, but the United States, which preaches *the* rule of law and accountability around the world, also must show that it will not let narrow self-interest stand in the way of its own compliance with the rule of law.**

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THE TAMPA TRIBUNE Editorial, Sunday July 25, 2004

## Settling An Old Holocaust Debt

Published: Jul 25, 2004

In a few weeks a class-action lawsuit involving a very old dispute goes to court-ordered arbitration. **Hungarian** Jews and their survivors are asking for compensation from the **U.S.** government for a little of what was stolen from them at the close of World **War II.**

This is one of those rare cases when strictly following the law won't lead to justice. And a victory for the Justice Department in the Miami case will feel, to the public, like a loss.

The government has a number of arguments. The heirlooms, jewelry, art and gold were first stolen by Nazis, not American troops. After more than a half-century, it's hard to prove who owned what. Consider the wartime confusion. Consider sovereign immunity.

Consider that **Hungarian** Jews were not U.S. citizens at the time. The statute of limitations has run out. There are probably other technicalities that argue against settlement.

The case for giving this dwindling group of former refugees what they ask is simple: It's the right thing to do.

Some history: During World **War II**, the Nazis occupied Hungary and stripped the **Jews** there of valuables worth perhaps \$100 million. **Many Hungarian** Jews didn't survive the war. Yet the rule-obsessed fascists had handed out receipts for that they stole. **The** items were loaded into several dozen **boxcars** and shipped to **Austria**

That's where the invading American troops found the **gold** train as the war ended. Evidence shows U.S. officers confiscated china, **fine** furniture and paintings for their **offices**, and some of **the** items vanished.

In 1948, possibly to cover the looting, the remaining **goods** were declared unidentifiable and were auctioned in **New York**. Paperwork about the unfortunate episode was classified as national security.

Plaintiffs in the class-action suit are asking for up to \$10,000 each. Let's pay gladly and say, "Sorry it took so long."

###

# Justice for 'Gold Train' Victims

Over the past decade, this nation played a laudable role in helping to persuade European governments and companies, including recalcitrant Swiss banks, to live up to their moral duty to settle restitution claims by Holocaust survivors even when their legal liability was murky. Regrettably, the Justice Department has taken a much less high-minded approach to a three-year-old lawsuit by elderly survivors over America's mishandling of valuables the Nazis collected from Hungarian Jews and then loaded onto a train heading for Austria.

Instead of facing up to responsibility for the contents of the "Hungarian Gold Train," which the American Army took for safekeeping in 1945, the government has raised a host of technical legal defenses seeking to void the claims, or at least delay the moment of reckoning. This is particularly dismaying since essential facts aren't really in dispute.

They were documented five years ago in a report by a special presidential advisory commission

that detailed "an unexplained departure" from America's otherwise stellar record of adhering to laws and regulations calling for the preservation of victims' assets and their return to the country from which they were seized. Some of the choicest Gold Train loot was either commandeered by high-ranking officers or sold for personal use by Army personnel. Other valuables were auctioned in New York and the proceeds given to a United Nations refugee agency. Still other property was stolen from the warehouse. Two suitcases of gold dust simply vanished. Meanwhile, emphatic calls by the Hungarian government and Hungarian Jewish groups for return of the train's contents were ignored.

The opening of court-ordered mediation sessions last week provides a new opening for a fair and expeditious settlement. Attorney General John Ashcroft ought not hesitate to seize it, much as 17 Republican and Democratic senators wisely counseled him in a recent letter.

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# Venice Without


There's a very good chance that when the Venice Biennale — the oldest international exhibition of art — opens next summer, no American artists will be included. That would be a significant cultural and diplomatic default, a confession, in essence, that the United States cannot sustain a coherent cultural policy.

Last December, the already fragile system for choosing American artists for international exhibitions broke down completely. The two nonprofit partners — the Pew Charitable Trusts and the Rockefeller Foundation — pulled their funding, saying they had other priorities. The National Endowment for the Arts, which convenes the panel that vetted artist nominations, dropped out. That left the State Department, which had authorized the development of plans to broaden the selection process.

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*Paul -  
Steve Herbst asked  
me to get this editorial  
for you. He said call  
him anytime*

8/9



11-L-0559/OSD/28014



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OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

August 5, 2004

I-04/010497 2004 DEC 2 AM 9:45

ES-353

8/30 J

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers

*Sec Def*  
SUBJECT: IPAP Project

The President of Georgia said that the IPAP project in NATO is being slowed down by France and Germany.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080504-4

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*dit 8/30*  
*dit 8/30*

Sir,  
Response Attached

*V/R, COLB*

11-L-0559/OSD/28015

Upon removal of attachments  
this document becomes  
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05-03-04 15:31 11

*file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ w/ ATTACHMENT

August 15, 2004

*I-04/01/07  
ES-0483*

TO: Bill Luti  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

*J 8/30*

*[Handwritten signature]*

SUBJECT: MANPAD Issue

In the meeting with Ivanov, the subject came up about how we could get agreement on the MANPAD issue. Someone suggested telling each other whenever we sell any of them to anyone else. Why doesn't that work?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081304-10 (to computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 9/3/04

*Sir,  
Response Attached  
W/ 8/30  
W/ 10/13*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ w/ ATTACHMENT

~~FOUO~~

17-03-04 14:33

11-L-0559/OSD/28016

OSD 19305-04

August 9, 2004

38.01

TO: Paul Butler  
VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Meeting on Who Receives Security

Please set a meeting with Steve Cambone, Dick Myers, Paul Wolfowitz and me to discuss who receives security.

Thanks.

Attach.  
5/3/04 USD(I) memo to SecDef re: Security

DHR:dh  
080904-18

.....  
Please respond by 9/3/04

9 AUG 04

10:11 AM

am  
c/k

TO: Steve Cambone

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: April 16, 2004

SUBJECT: **Attached**

MitG  
G  
G

Look at the attached. It shows that people have some security depending on threat level.

I would like to know what security they actually have had during the last 12 months, by month, and what they thought the threat level was.

See the attached.

Thanks.

SIR,  
LTG CRADDOCK INQUIRED ABOUT  
THIS SNOWFLAKE SO I THOUGHT  
YOU MAY NEED THE INFORMATION  
AS WELL. ORIGINAL RESPONSE  
ATTACHED. LISTED ATTACHMENT  
INCLUDED BEHIND.

VR/CDR NOSENZO  
6/14

DHR/azn  
041604.01

*Attach: Attachment B, Info Memo to Cambone from DUSD-CI&S Re: Protective Service Operations*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

4/23



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INTELLIGENCE

John Craddock -

This is understandable with a little bit of interpretation.

Bottom line: if these individuals are to have protective details, the #s seem right.

JK  
5/3/04



Prepared by: Col Kevin Jacobsen, ODUS 5-11&5






UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

MAY - 3 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE 

SUBJECT: Protective Service Operations

- This responds to your question (Tab B), *“I would like to know what security they actually had during the last 12 months, by month, and what they thought the threat level was”* concerning protective service operations conducted by each Military Department (Service).
- Each Service reported data (Tab A), by month that reflects the total number of personnel used to provide personal protection to each protectee. Personal protection is provided by special agents (A) and when applicable are supported by drivers, administrative, and military police, which we call “support” (S).
- In the Services’ report, each of the last 12 months is color-coded to show the threat level as determined by the responsible Services’ field commanders.
  - Determining a threat to an individual while lacking a specific and credible threat information is subjective. The overall threat levels published by DIA, Department of Homeland Security, and COCOMs are taken into consideration, however the following are other factors field commanders consider when determining the overall threat:
    - Terrorism (kidnapping, assassination)
    - Criminal activities (kidnapping for ransom, assault or murder)
    - Civil disobedience (embarrassment of activities by demonstrators)
    - Wrong place, wrong time (natural disaster, victim of another’s accident)
    - Association and/or proximity to another threatened person (collateral effects)

11-L-0559/OSD/28020

Prepared by: Col Kevin Jacobsen, ODUS (I&S), 

(b)(6)

- When the Services reported threat level for each month, they used the following general criteria:
  - **LOW:** No significant threat to protectee or the protectee is not exposed to the general population.
  - **MEDIUM:** General information, which shows the protectee may be targeted, based on his/her position or the protectee is exposed to the environment where the terrorist or criminal threat level is assessed as a medium.
  - **HIGH:** Credible and specific information that shows the protectee is targeted and/or the protectee is exposed to an environment where the terrorist or criminal threat level is assessed at high or critical.
- **TAB (C)** was previously provided to you and is attached for background.

**COORDINATION:** DUSD (CI&S); **Army** CID; Air Force OSI; Navy NCIS

Threat Levels:  
 Low - Green  
 Medium - Yellow  
 High - Red

# ARMY LED PROTECTION

OSD/JCS Principals have Agent Only Details

A = Agent  
 S = support

| Position                 | Mar-03   | Apr-03   | May-03   | Jun-03   | Jul-03   | Aug-03   | Sep-03   | Oct-03   | Nov-03   | Dec-03   | Jan-04   | Feb-04   | Mar-04   |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| <b>Sec of Defense</b>    |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| * Metro                  | 35       | 34       | 34       | 34       | 34       | 34       | 34       | 34       | 32       | 30       | 31       | 31       | 31       |
| Travel                   |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Total                    | 75       | 97       | 102      | 105      | 81       | 104      | 109      | 119      | 70       | 97       | 59       | 126      | 63       |
| Spt to SecDef's Fam      |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| <b>Dep Sec of Def</b>    |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| * Metro                  | 19       | 19       | 19       | 19       | 19       | 19       | 19       | 20       | 19       | 18       | 17       | 18       | 19       |
| Travel                   |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Total                    | 58       | 60       | 121      | 81       | 73       | 59       | 68       | 63       | 42       | 49       | 84       | 60       | 51       |
| <b>CJCS</b>              |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| * Metro                  | 8        | 8        | 8        | 8        | 8        | 8        | 8        | 8        | 8        | 8        | 8        | 8        | 8        |
| Travel                   |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Total                    | 28       | 29       | 74       | 69       | 62       | 93       | 48       | 58       | 47       | 51       | 60       | 36       | 66       |
| <b>VCJCS</b>             |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| * Metro                  | 8        | 8        | 8        | 8        | 8        | 8        | 8        | 8        | 8        | 7        | 7        | 7        | 7        |
| Travel                   |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Total                    | 22       | 28       | 38       | 51       | 32       | 37       | 17       | 30       | 32       | 34       | 37       | 33       | 42       |
| <b>SEC ARMY **</b>       |          |          |          | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |          | 0        | 0        |          |
| <b>CSA</b>               |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Metro                    | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1        |
| Travel                   |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Total                    | 36       | 108      | 79       | 8        | 3        | 93       | 64       | 50       | 45       | 43       | 20       | 55       | 57       |
| <b>VCSA**</b>            |          |          |          |          |          |          |          | 0        |          |          |          |          |          |
| <b>Gen Franks (RET)</b>  |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Metro                    |          |          |          |          | 3        | 3        | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1        |
| Travel                   |          |          |          |          | 9        | 4        | 13       | 38       | 23       | 37       | 33       |          | 34       |
| Total                    |          |          |          |          | 12       | 7        | 14       | 39       | 24       | 38       | 34       | 30       | 35       |
| <b>AMB Bremer**</b>      |          |          |          |          |          |          |          | 9        | 0        | 7        | 5        | 0        | 0        |
| <b>SHAPE</b>             |          | A-9/S-3  | A-9/S-3  | A-9/S-3  |          |          |          |          |          | A-9/S-3  | A-9/S-3  |          | A-9/S-3  |
| <b>USAREUR ***</b>       |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| <b>DEP EUCOM CDR **</b>  | A-1/S-35 | A-1/S-36 | A-1/S-36 | A-1/S-36 | A-1/S-40 | A-1/S-39 | A-1/S-37 | A-1/S-35 | A-1/S-36 | A-1/S-36 | A-1/S-37 | A-1/S-41 | A-1/S-41 |
| <b>NATO U.S. Rep ***</b> |          |          |          |          |          |          | A-1/S-13 |          |          |          |          |          | A-1/S-13 |
| <b>KFOR</b>              | A-1/S-11 | A-1/S-11 | A-1/S-11 | A-1/S-11 | A-1/S-11 | A-1/S-11 | A-1/S-11 | A-1/S-11 | A-1/S-11 | A-1/S-11 | A-1/S-11 | A-1/S-11 | A-1/S-11 |
| <b>SFOR</b>              | A-1/S-13 | A-1/S-13 | A-1/S-13 | A-1/S-13 | A-1/S-13 | A-1/S-13 | A-1/S-13 | A-1/S-13 | A-1/S-13 | A-1/S-13 | A-1/S-13 | A-1/S-13 | A-1/S-13 |
| <b>CG CFLCC</b>          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| <b>DCG CFLCC</b>         |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| <b>V Corp</b>            |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |

| Position  | Mar-03     | Apr-03     | May-03     | Jun-03     | Jul-03     | Aug-03     | Sep-03     | Oct-03     | Nov-03     | Dec-03     | Jan-04     | Feb-04     | Mar-04     |
|---|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| III CORPS CDR   |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| CG, CFC-A   |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| CG, CJTF-180  |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| C, OMC-A  |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| CPA Augment ****  |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| JFCOM   |            | A-0 / S-1  | A-0 / S-1  |            |            | A-0 / S-1  |            |            |            |            |            |            | A-0 / S-2  |
| SOUTHCOM***   | A-1/S-18   | A-1/S-18   | A-1/S-18   | A-1/S-18   | A-1/S-18   | A-1/S-18   | A-1/S-18   | A-1/S-18   | A-1/S-18   | A-1/S-18   | A-1/S-18   | A-1/S-18   | A-1/S-18   |
| USARSO  | A-0/S-8    | A-0/S-8    | A-0/S-8    | A-0/S-8    | A-0/S-8    | A-0/S-8    | A-0/S-8    | A-0/S-8    | A-0/S-8    | A-0/S-8    | A-0/S-8    | A-0/S-8    | A-0/S-8    |
| <b>Total:</b>   | A-47/S-322 | A-47/S-322 | A-47/S-323 | A-47/S-322 | A-47/S-326 | A-47/S-325 | A-47/S-322 | A-47/S-320 | A-47/S-321 | A-47/S-322 | A-47/S-325 | A-47/S-325 | A-47/S-326 |
| * Total agent count includes all required agents ISO OSD/JCS Metro Mission on a daily basis |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| ** Travel Only  |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| *** Numbers Includes Residence Security and Travel Team                                     |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| **** Agents provide support in ITO only   |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
|   |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
|   |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
|   |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
|   |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
|   |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |

# NAVY LED PROTECTION

Threat Levels:  
 Low - Green  
 Medium - Yellow  
 High - Red

A = Agent  
 S = Support

| Position              | Mar-03  | Apr-03  | May-03  | Jun-03  | Jul-03   | Aug-03  | Sep-03   | Oct-03   | Nov-03   | Dec-03   | Jan-04  | Feb-04  | Mar-04  |
|-----------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|---------|---------|---------|
| <b>Washington, DC</b> |         |         |         |         |          |         |          |          |          |          |         |         |         |
| CNO                   |         |         | A-3/S-2 |         | A-3/S-2  | A-2/S-2 | A-2/S-2  | A-3/S-2  | A-3/S-2  | A-3/S-2  |         | A-4/S-2 | A-4/S-2 |
| Travel Support        |         |         | A-6     |         | A-13     | A-4     | A-31     |          | A-10     | A-11     |         | A-4     | A-4     |
| Total                 | A-2/S-2 | A-9/S-2 | A-9/S-2 | A-6/S-2 | A-16/S-2 | A-6/S-2 | A-33/S-2 | A-25/S-2 | A-13/S-2 | A-14/S-2 | A-7/S-2 | A-8/S-2 | A-8/S-2 |
| <b>SECNAV</b>         |         |         |         |         |          |         |          |          |          |          |         |         |         |
| Travel Support        |         |         | A-3     |         | A-3      | A-3     | A-3      | A-3      | A-4      | A-4      |         | A-4     | A-4     |
| Total                 | A-2     | A-7     | A-3     | A-3     | A-7      | A-16    | A-7      | A-8      | A-42     | A-29     | A-14    | A-44    | A-18    |
| <b>COMNAVNUKPROP</b>  |         |         |         |         |          |         |          |          |          |          |         |         |         |
| Travel Support        |         |         | A-1     |         | A-1      | A-1     | A-1      | A-1      | A-1      | A-1      |         | A-1     | A-1     |
| Total                 | A-1     | A-1     | A-1     | A-1     | A-1      | A-1     | A-1      | A-1      | A-2      | A-2      | A-2     | A-1     | A-4     |
| <b>CMC</b>            |         |         |         |         |          |         |          |          |          |          |         |         |         |
| Travel Support        |         |         | A-2/S-2 |         | A-2/S-2  | A-2/S-2 | A-2/S-2  | A-2/S-2  | A-3/S-2  | A-3/S-2  |         | A-3/S-2 | A-3/S-2 |
| Total                 | A-8/S-2 | A-2/S-2 | A-7/S-2 | A-5/S-2 | A-4/S-2  | A-3/S-2 | A-4/S-2  | A-6/S-2  | A-7/S-2  | A-19/S-2 | A-7/S-2 | A-6/S-2 | A-7/S-2 |
| <b>Asst CMC</b>       |         |         |         |         |          |         |          |          |          |          |         |         |         |
| Travel Support        |         |         | A-1     |         | A-1      | A-1     | A-1      | A-1      | A-1      | A-1      |         | A-1     | A-1     |
| Total                 | A-3     | A-1     | A-1     | A-1     | A-1      | A-4     | A-1      | A-3      | A-2      | A-1      | A-3     | A-1     | A-1     |
| <b>Europe</b>         |         |         |         |         |          |         |          |          |          |          |         |         |         |
| COMNAVEUR             | A-12    | A-12    | A-12    | A-11    | A-11     | A-11    | A-11     | A-11     | A-10     | A-9      | A-8     | A-8     | A-8     |
| Travel Support        |         |         | A-10    | A-6     | A-2      |         |          |          |          | A-6      |         | A-9     |         |
| Total                 | A-22    | A-31    | A-22    | A-17    | A-13     | A-11    | A-11     | A-11     | A-10     | A-15     | A-8     | A-17    | A-8     |
| <b>COMSIXTHFLT</b>    |         |         |         |         |          |         |          |          |          |          |         |         |         |
| Travel Support        | A-3     | A-10    | A-3     | A-1     | A-5      |         |          |          |          |          | A-6     | A-4     |         |
| Total                 | A-8     | A-15    | A-8     | A-6     | A-10     | A-5     | A-5      | A-5      | A-5      | A-5      | A-11    | A-9     | A-5     |
| <b>CAOC 7</b>         |         |         |         |         |          |         |          |          |          |          |         |         |         |
| Travel Support        |         |         |         |         |          |         |          |          |          |          |         |         |         |
| Total                 | A-4     | A-4     | A-4     | A-4     | A-4      | A-4     | A-4      | A-4      | A-4      | A-3      | A-5     | A-4     | A-5     |
| <b>Bahrain</b>        |         |         |         |         |          |         |          |          |          |          |         |         |         |
| COMUSNAVCENT          |         |         |         |         |          |         |          |          |          |          |         |         |         |
| Travel Support        |         |         |         |         |          |         |          |          |          |          |         |         |         |
| Total                 | A-6     | A-7     | A-6     | A-5     | A-5      | A-6     | A-10     | A-8      | A-6      | A-6      | A-8     | A-8     | A-9     |

| Position             | Mar-03 | Apr-03 | May-03 | Jun-03 | Jul-03 | Aug-03 | Sep-03 | Oct-03 | Nov-03 | Dec-03 | Jan-04 | Feb-04 | Mar-04 |
|----------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| <b>Hawaii</b>        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| <b>COMPAC</b>        |        |        | A-1    |        | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    |        | A-1    | A-1    |
| Travel Support       |        |        | A-2    |        |        |        |        |        | A-7    |        |        | A-5    | A-2    |
| Total                | A-1    | A-9    | A-3    | A-16   | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-8    | A-1    | A-1    | A-6    | A-3    |
| <b>COMPACFLT</b>     |        |        | A-1    |        | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    |        | A-1    | A-1    |
| Travel Support       |        |        |        |        | A-2    |        |        |        |        |        |        | A-7    | A-2    |
| Total                | A-1    | A-1    | A-20   | A-1    | A-3    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-3    | A-8    | A-3    |
| <b>Japan</b>         |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| <b>COMSEVENTHFLT</b> |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Travel Support       |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Total                | A-1    | A-3    | A-3    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-3    | A-5    | A-3    | A-1    | A-3    | A-2    |
| <b>Iraq</b>          |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| <b>CPA BASRAH</b>    |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| <b>CPA HILLAH</b>    |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Total                |        |        |        | A-4    | A-12   | A-16   | A-16   | A-16   | A-16   | A-16   | A-16   | A-18   | A-18   |

Inrear Levels:

Low - Green

Medium - Yellow

High - Red

AIR FORCE LED PROTECTION

AF Principals have Agent Only Details

A = Agent

| Position                            | Mar-03 | Apr-03 | May-03 | Jun-03 | Jul-03 | Aug-03 | Sep-03 | Oct-03 | Nov-03 | Dec-03 | Jan-04 | Feb-04 | Mar-04 |
|-------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| SECAF                               | A-14   | A-10   | A-6    | A-4    | A-9    | A-10   | A-1    | A-11   | A-3    | A-9    | A-6    | A-4    | A-14   |
| USECAF                              | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-7    | A-3    | A-3    |
| CSAF                                | A-2    | A-2    | A-2    | A-2    | A-2    | A-2    | A-4    | A-6    | A-6    | A-2    | A-9    | A-2    | A-2    |
| VCSAF                               | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-3    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    |
| USAFE                               | A-9    | A-9    | A-14   | A-9    | A-9    | A-9    | A-9    | A-9    | A-9    | A-11   | A-9    | A-9    | A-9    |
| NORTHCOM                            | A-4    | A-4    | A-4    | A-4    | A-4    | A-4    | A-4    | A-4    | A-4    | A-4    | A-8    | A-6    | A-12   |
| SOCOM                               |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        | A-1    |        |        |        |
| AFMC/CC                             |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| ACC/CC                              |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| AMC/CC                              |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| AFSOC/CC                            |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| AFSPC/CC                            |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| PACAF/CC                            |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| AETC/CC                             |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| TRANSCOM/CC                         |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| USCENTAF/CC                         |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| SOUTH AF/CC                         |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| CFACC/CC                            |        |        |        |        |        |        |        | A-3    |        | A-4    | A-12   | A-5    | A-7    |
| Deputy CFACC/CC                     |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| 3rd AF/CC                           |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| 12th AF/CC                          |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| 13th AF/CC                          |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| CPA Principals                      |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Chief of Defense (ChoD) Philippines |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| ChoD Uzbekistan                     |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| ChoD Colombia                       |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| ChoD Jordan                         |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| ChoD Japan                          |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| ChoD Hungary                        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| ChoD Bulgaria                       |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Military of Defense(MoD) Vietnam    |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| NATO Ministerial                    |        |        |        |        |        |        |        | A-70   |        |        |        |        |        |
| Global Air Commander Conference     |        |        |        |        |        |        | A-35   |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Middle Eastern Air Symposium        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        | A-20   | A-20   |        |        |        |
| Total                               | A-43   | A-49   | A-52   | A-45   | A-48   | A-50   | A-86   | A-138  | A-95   | A-78   | A-80   | A-54   | A-88   |



Threat Levels:  
 No color code  
 annotated: Threat  
 level is assessed by  
 lead PSO agency

## AIR FORCE SUPPORT TO OTHER AGENCY LED PROTECTION

A = Agent

| Position                             | Mar-03 | Apr-03 | May-03 | Jun-03 | Jul-03 | Aug-03 | Sep-03 | Oct-03 | Nov-03 | Dec-03 | Jan-04 | Feb-04 | Mar-04 |
|--------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| President of the U.S                 | A-3    | A-1    |        | A-2    |        |        |        | A-4    | A-2    |        |        | A-4    |        |
| Vice President of the U.S            |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        | A-6    |        | A-5    |
| Sec Def                              |        | A-1    |        |        |        |        |        |        | A-7    |        |        | A-2    |        |
| Deputy Sec Def                       |        |        |        | A-4    |        |        |        |        | A-4    | A-4    | A-5    | A-6    | A-4    |
| CJCS                                 |        |        | A-2    |        | A-3    |        |        | A-3    | A-4    | A-4    | A-4    | A-4    | A-4    |
| VCJCS                                |        |        |        |        | A-5    |        |        |        | A-4    | A-4    | A-4    |        |        |
| CENTCOM                              | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    | A-1    |
| Deputy CENTCOM                       |        |        |        |        |        | A-2    |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| SOUTHCOM                             |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        | A-2    |        |        |        |
| J5 SOUTHCOM                          |        |        |        |        |        |        | A-1    |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador           |        |        |        |        |        | A-1    |        |        | A-1    |        |        |        |        |
| US Naval Forces SOUTHCOM             |        |        |        |        |        |        |        | A-1    |        |        |        |        |        |
| US Naval Forces Europe/CC            |        |        |        |        |        | A-2    |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Secretary of Energy                  |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        | A-3    |        |        |
| Chief, US Military Training, CENTCOM |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        | A-2    |        | A-1    |
| President of Latvia                  |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        | A-1    |
| US SECDEF for Policy                 |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        | A-1    |        |
| USSS                                 |        |        |        |        | A-4    | A-4    | A-4    | A-4    | A-4    | A-4    | A-8    | A-3    | A-4    |
| Total                                | A-4    | A-3    | A-3    | A-7    | A-13   | A-10   | A-6    | A-13   | A-27   | A-19   | A-33   | A-21   | A-20   |

*Bob  
1/25/02*

**US Army Criminal Investigation Command**

| <u>Position</u>      | <u>Location</u> | <u>Name</u>       | <u># of SA</u> | <u>Military Police SPT</u> |
|----------------------|-----------------|-------------------|----------------|----------------------------|
| Sec of Defense       | World Wide      | Sec Rumsfeld      | 22             | 0                          |
| Dep Sec of Def       | World Wide      | Sec Wolfowitz     | 14             | 0                          |
| CJCS                 | World Wide      | Gen Meyers        | 7              | 0                          |
| VCJCS                | World Wide      | Gen Pace          | 8              | 0                          |
| Sec Army             | World Wide      | Act Sec Brownlee* | 0 fulltime     | 0                          |
| CSA                  | World Wide      | Gen Schoomaker    | 2              | 0                          |
| VCSA                 | World Wide      | Gen Casey         | 0 fulltime     | 0                          |
| CENTCOM (RET)        | World Wide      | Gen Franks (Ret)  | 1              | 0                          |
| SHAPE                | World Wide      | Gen Jones         | 10             | 0                          |
| USAREUR              | World Wide      | Gen Bell          | 1              | 8                          |
| DEP EUCOM CDR        | Europe          | Gen Wald          | 1              | 43***                      |
| NATO U.S. Rep        | NATO            | LTG Kinnan        | 1              | 15                         |
| KFOR                 | KFOR            | TF FALCON         | 1**            | 11**                       |
| SFOR                 | SFOR            | COMSFOR           | 1**            | 13**                       |
| CG CFLCC             | CENTCOM         | LTG McKiernan     | 1**            | 12**                       |
| DCG CFLCC            | CENTCOM         | MG Speaks         | 1**            | 10**                       |
| V Corps CDR          | CENTCOM         | LTG Sanchez       | 1**            | 15**                       |
| III Corps CDR        | CENTCOM         | LTG Metz          | 1**            | 10**                       |
| CG, CFC-A            | AFGAHNISTAN     | LTG Barno         | 1**            | 12**                       |
| CG, CJTF-180         | AFGAHNISTAN     | BG(P) Austin      | 1**            | 15**                       |
| C, OMC-A             | AFGAHNISTAN     | MG Wastin         | 1**            | 10**                       |
| CPA Augmentation     | ITO             | CPA               | 27             | 120**                      |
| Metro Team/Residence | CONUS           | Principals 1-4    | 49             | 0                          |
| Travel Team          | World Wide      | Principals 1-7    | 19             | 0                          |
| ATOIC                | Pentagon        |                   | 3              | 0                          |

\* Will change with new SEC Army      **Total PSU SA- 174    Total MP SPT- 286**

\*\* BMM and only while deployed

\*\*\* Also performs residence and installation security and travel team

**Air Force Office of Special Investigations**

| <u>Position</u> | <u>Location</u>  | <u>Name</u>   | <u># of SA</u> | <u>Military Police SPT</u> |
|-----------------|------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------------------|
| USAFE           | Ramstein AFB     | Gen Fogelsong | 9              | By Threat Level            |
| NORTHCOM        | Peterson AFB     | Gen Eberheart | 4              | 2 Auth/1 Assigned          |
| SECAF           | Andrews AFB      | Hon Sec Roche | 2              | By Threat Level            |
| Dep SECAF       | Andrews AFB      | Hon Sec Teets | 1              | By Threat Level            |
| GSAF            | Andrews AFB      | Gen Jumper    | 2              | By Threat Level            |
| VSAF            | Andrews AFB      | Gen Moseley   | 1              | By Threat Level            |
| CENTCOM         | Mac Dill AFB     | Gen Abizaid   | 1              | By Threat Level            |
| AFMC/CC         | Wright-Patterson | Gen Martin    | 1              | By Threat Level            |
| ACC/CC          | Langley AFB      | Gen Hornburg  | 1              | By Threat Level            |
| AMC/CC          | Scott AFB        | Gen Handy     | 1              | By Threat Level            |
| AFSOC/CC        | Mac Dill AFB     | Gen Hester    | 1              | By Threat Level            |
| AFSPC/CC        | Peterson AFB     | Gen Lord      | 1              | By Threat Level            |
| PACAF/CC        | Hickham AFB      | Gen Begert    | 1              | By Threat Level            |
| AETCICC         | Randolph AFB     | Gen Cook      | 1              | By Threat Level            |
| CPA             | Baghdad, Iraq    |               | 14             | By Threat Level            |
| <b>TOTAL SA</b> |                  |               | <b>41</b>      |                            |

Naval Criminal Investigative Service

| <u>Position</u>    | <u>Location</u> | <u>Name</u>  | <u># of SA</u> | <u>Additional SPT</u> |
|--------------------|-----------------|--------------|----------------|-----------------------|
| SECNAV             | Washington D.C. | Hon England  | 5              | By Threat Level       |
| CNO                | Washington D.C. | ADM Clark    | 3              | By Threat Level       |
| Cmdt Marine Corps  | Washington D.C. | GEN Hagee    | 3              | By Threat Level       |
| NCISHQ             | Washington D.C. |              | 6              |                       |
| COMUSNAVEUR        | Naples, Italy   | ADM Johnson  | 10             | By Threat Level       |
| COMSIXTHFLT        | Gaeta, Italy    | VADM Ulrich  | 3              | By Threat Level       |
| DEPCONCAOC         | Larissa, Greece |              | 3              | By Threat Level       |
| COMPAC             | Hawaii          | ADM Fargo    | 1              | By Threat Level       |
| COMPACFLT          | Hawaii          | ADM Doran    | 1              | By Threat Level       |
| COMSEVENTHFLT      | Yokosuka, Japan | VADM Willard | 1              | By Threat Level       |
| COMFIFTHFLT        | Bahrain         | VADM Nichols | 1              | By Threat Level       |
| Counter Intel      | CENTCOMAOR      |              | 20 USMC        |                       |
| Travel/CPA Support | World Wide/Iraq |              | 44             |                       |
| <b>TOTAL SA</b>    |                 |              | <b>101</b>     |                       |

**TOTAL DOD SA 315 TOTAL SPT- 286 (+)**

MAJ Oliver Rose/CIOP-OP (b)(6)  
 APPROVED BY: COL Paigutt (b)(6)

August 9, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: VOA Broadcasts to Iran

IRAN

Here is a memo from Seth Cropsey and the U.S. International Broadcasting Bureau broadcasts to Iran.

Please take a look at it and get back to me with your suggestions.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/14/04 Cropsey memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
080904-17

.....  
Please respond by 8/27/04

Cropsey

*Broadcasting Board of Governors***INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING BUREAU**

MEMORANDUM for SECDEF

FROM: Seth Cropsey, Director, U.S. International Broadcasting Bureau

SUBJ: Voice of America Broadcasts to Iran

14 July '04

This memo responds to your request of 8 June for information about VOA's Persian language television broadcasts.

**VOA Television to Iran**

VOA inaugurated a one-half hour daily primetime television news program, *News & Views*, in July 2003. The new program brought to six the number of hours that VOA broadcasts on television to Iran *per week*; (vice Iran's four 24/7 international TV broadcast operations); all VOA TV broadcasts to Iran are transmitted via satellite. The Iranian government admits that there are about three million households that can receive television signals through satellite dishes. Our research places the figure at approximately 15 percent of the adult population or nearly seven million households: satellite broadcasts are a highly effective way of reaching the Iranian people.

*News & Views* offers a mixture of international, regional, and local news geared to its audience's interests, as well as current affairs programming addressed to viewers' oft-stated thirst for information about human rights, democracy, and civil society.

**Iranian Response**

Over the previous month and in addition to its regular news stories, *News & Views* featured an interview with Justice Sandra Day O'Connor who told how her appointment by President Reagan as the first female Supreme Court justice "opened many doors to women in the U.S. and the rest of the world." Other features included an interview from London with a journalist and dissident recently released from an Iranian prison who argued that the U.S. mission in Iraq helps guarantee peace and stability in the region as it promotes democratic change. The ruling mullahs' fear of these broadcasts is clear. A panel discussion on the future of democracy that aired the first week in July featured participation by phone from Tehran of a young woman who is the spokesman for a group called "Women For Democracy." The police arrested her and her mother less than a day after the broadcast aired.

In the absence of other accurate and relevant Persian-language television news broadcasts *News & Views* established a large audience immediately. A telephone poll conducted less than two months after the program went on the air last summer determined the audience at about 13 percent of the viewing public. Since then, the program has received similar phone poll results of over 17 percent.

*News & Views* is a solid and established TV news program that receives a tremendous volume of email from its growing audience—and shares representative emails with its viewers thus establishing a dialogue among Iranians who are unhappy with their rulers and have no other means of communicating this dissatisfaction with fellow citizens. A

recent email asked 'why VOA couldn't air more emails from other listeners on the air?' The answer is that VOA doesn't have the funds to broadcast more than a daily half hour news program.

#### What Is to Be Done?

The purpose of this memo is to ask your assistance in securing the approximately \$10 million it would take to increase *News & Views* to a three-hour daily program of news and current affairs programming for a single year. The expanded show would cover in-depth such subjects as the extraordinary corruption of the ruling mullahs, their diversion of Iranian taxpayers' revenue to finance international terrorism, the lessons of east and central Europe in throwing off the communist yoke; and extensive reporting on women's issues, separation of church and state, and the different forms of democratic governance that emails from our audience make it clear they desperately want.

The precedent exists for the transfer of DoD funds to international broadcasting in the assistance DoD provided—in approximately the same amount—to build and install radio transmitters in Afghanistan following the defeat of the Taliban. This assistance was highly successful. It increased the security of our deployed forces, and of the U.S. in the same way that longer and more in-depth broadcasts to Iran would divert that country's rulers' sponsorship of terror and efforts in Iraq while it helped advance the cause of democracy in Iran.

A specific and detailed plan for increasing TV news and current affairs programming to Iran from its current level of one-half hour daily to three hours each day appears immediately below. The costs are annual.

#### TV Requirements

|                          |                    |
|--------------------------|--------------------|
| Salaries                 | \$2,386,088        |
| AP Graphics              | \$40,000           |
| Acquired Video           | \$200,000          |
| Regional News Feeds      | \$100,000          |
| Transmission and Remotes | \$500,000          |
| Overtime                 | \$100,000          |
| <b>Subtotal</b>          | <b>\$3,326,088</b> |

#### Persian Service Requirements:

|                            |                    |
|----------------------------|--------------------|
| Salaries                   | \$2,377,000        |
| Overseas stringers         | \$150,000          |
| Domestic stringers         | \$50,000           |
| Travel                     | \$200,000          |
| Telephone Toll             | \$10,000           |
| Simultaneous Translators   | \$100,000          |
| Office Supplies            | \$30,000           |
| Misc expenses              | \$20,000           |
| Other Contractual Services | \$50,000           |
| <b>Subtotal</b>            | <b>\$2,987,000</b> |

(b)(6)

|                                 |                    |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|
| IBB                             |                    |
| Satellite Transmission services | \$2,300,000        |
| Research                        | \$50,000           |
| Advertising                     | \$100,000          |
| <b>Subtotal</b>                 | <b>\$2,450,000</b> |

|                                     |                     |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------|
| <b>One Time Costs:</b>              |                     |
| Graphic Equipment                   | \$230,000           |
| Edit Suites Equipment               | \$175,000           |
| Open/Sets                           | \$100,000           |
| Avstar Licenses                     | \$45,000            |
| VJ Equipment                        | \$200,000           |
| Minicam Cameras                     | \$80,000            |
| Cairo Polycom                       | \$30,000            |
| Library Shelving                    | \$75,000            |
| Furniture/Computers                 | \$350,000           |
| <b>Subtotal</b>                     | <b>\$1,285,000</b>  |
| <b>Total Requirements for FY'04</b> | <b>\$10,048,088</b> |

**Conclusion**

Bernard Lewis observes that Ayatollah Khomeini's spoken words communicated directly to Iran by phone and by cassettes was the first electronically engineered revolution in history. U.S. international broadcasting also reaches the Iranian people directly.

Both ratings and audience response in the form of email, phone calls, and letters from Iran to the Persian language service here in Washington show that Iranians are watching VOA's broadcasts because they are meaningful to their lives. To quote again from VOA's Iranian viewers, Mohammad A's email from Tehran of 31 May sums the audience response best: "We do not have credible and trustworthy media in Iran and all the media is censored. You are now carrying a very significant responsibility and you are the hope of the Iranian youth."

We have an experienced and invigorated management structure in place; the modest plan outlined above responds both to the United States' need to address the Iranian audience, and the latter's clearly expressed desire for more programming that offers hope for a freer and democratic future. All we ask is for the means.

Broadcasting Board of Governors

INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING BUREAU



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR  
330 Independence Avenue, SW  
Room 3300  
Washington, DC 20237

Phone: (b)(6)

DATE 7-14-04 NO. OF PAGES (including cover sheet) 4

TO THE ATTENTION OF: (b)(6)

FAX NUMBER: (b)(6)

FROM: INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING BUREAU  
DIRECTOR'S OFFICE:

Seth Cropsey

COMMENTS: Sec. Rumsfeld is  
expecting this today.

**CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE**

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If you do not receive all pages, please call (b)(6)



August 9, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Reducing Troop Numbers

Please set a meeting for the Joint Staff, Policy and me to go over this paper that shows where we have troops around the world. I would like to get those numbers down.

I would like them to come in with suggestions on how to do it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/7/04 Joint Staff Paper re: US Overseas Troops

DHR:dh  
080904-21

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

320.2

9 Aug 04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

PA 8/18

To Sec Def

From Paul Butler

As per attached email from Dr. Chu, CIA personnel director does not think that CIA has been substantially hindered in its college campus recruiting. I'll dig further but I'd stay away from it in today's testimony.

040 CIA

13 Aug 04

7/13  
1245

file

~~FOUO~~

August 13, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CIA On-Campus Recruiting

Please find out how many colleges prohibit CIA from recruiting on campus and for how many years that has been the case—when it first started during the Vietnam War, etc. I may want to use it in my testimony.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081304-13 (to computer) doc

.....

Please respond by 8/16/04

040 CIA

~~FOUO~~

13 AUG 04

pb 8/18

**Butler, Paul, CIV, OSD**

**From:** Chu, David, CIV, OSD-P&R  
**Sent:** Monday, August 16, 2004 10:22 AM  
**To:** Butler, Paul, CIV, OSD  
**cc:** Wellock, Stephen M., CAPT, OSD-P&R  
**Subject:** RE: SecDef snowflake

Paul: *CIA Personnel Director*

Here's Mr. Rebal's latest bulletin: "For the last 20 years, no college campuses...denied access to CIA recruiting. During the Vietnam era, a handful...wouldn't allow recruiting on campus...but those colleges didn't preclude CIA from setting up shop in local hotels" off-campus.

Bottom line: I don't think this is an important explanation of our shortfalls, but would be glad to pursue further, especially if SECDEF has some specifics that allow a more sophisticated line of inquiry (e.g., there could have been subtle pressures whose de facto effect was to discourage young Americans from considering the Agency).

David

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Butler, Paul, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Monday, August 16, 2004 9:47 AM  
**To:** Chu, David, CIV, OSD-P&R  
**Subject:** RE: SecDef snowflake

Thanks. I think it is very important that we look into the past. The point is to draw out the fact that there are lots of reasons why HUMINT deteriorated so the historical information is very relevant. Thanks

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Chu, David, CIV, OSD-P&R  
**Sent:** Monday, August 16, 2004 8:52 AM  
**To:** Butler, Paul, CIV, OSD  
**Cc:** Wellock, Stephen M., CAPT, OSD-P&R  
**Subject:** RE: SecDef snowflake

Paul:

First check with Bob Rebal is that CIA does NOT face recruiting barriers on college campuses. He's double-checking, however. Sometimes a campus will ask CIA to adjust its schedule to avoid confrontation with other events, but that's the extent of any problem he knows about.

As he pursues his due diligence, I've asked him to see if there was indeed a problem in the past, when it occurred. etc.

Hope this helps.

David

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Butler, Paul, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Monday, August 16, 2004 8:22 AM  
**To:** Chu, David, CIV, OSD-P&R  
**Subject:** RE: SecDef snowflake

Thanks so much.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Chu, David, CIV, OSD-P&R  
**Sent:** Monday, August 16, 2004 8:17 AM  
**To:** Butler, Paul, CIV, OSD; Abell, Charles S., CIV, OSD-P&R  
**cc:** Plata, Nancy D., CIV, OSD-P&R; Wellock, Stephen M., CAPT, OSD-P&R  
**Subject:** RE: SecDef snowflake

Paul:

I'll call the **CIA** Chief Human Capital Officer, Mr. Rebalo, in a few minutes to secure.

David

P.S. to (b)(6) Please get me phone number and see if he's available at 8:45.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Butler, Paul, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Sunday, August 15, 2004 12:47 PM  
**To:** Chiu, David, CIV, OSD-P&R; Abell, Charles S., CIV, OSD-P&R  
**Subject:** SecDef snowflake

SecDef sent snowflake from the plane asking about how many colleges prohibit **CIA** from recruiting on campus and for how many years that has been the case, when did it first start (Vietnam war era), etc. Needs it tomorrow (Monday) since he may want to use in his testimony. I know we probably keep this for the military. Any ideas how I go about finding this type of data?

August 15, 2004

001.1

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Mary Claire Murphy  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Invitees to CPA Function

When we have the function for the CPA and Ambassadors from the coalition countries at our house, let's include Margaret Tutwiler, Reuben Jeffery, Larry Di Rita, and some of the other people who served in Baghdad.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081504-1 (ts computer).doc



Please respond by 9

15 AUG 04

~~FOUO~~

August 15, 2004

R U S S I A

TO: Doug Feith  
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Russian-Baltic Border Issues

In the meetings with Russian MoD Ivanov, the subject came up of some border infringements by NATO aircraft along the Baltics. When I talk to the people from the Baltics, they claim the Russians are infringing on their border.

It seems to me that we ought to encourage NATO to consider the kind of arrangements we have with the Russians, whereby there is a protocol and there are established procedures, so neighbors can live together as good neighbors, rather than fussing at each other.

Please come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
 081504-7 (ts computer).doc

.....

*Please respond by*           9/3/04          

15 AUG 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19319-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28041

~~FOUO~~

file

August 15, 2004

I-01/011040  
ES-0490

RUSSIA

TO: Bill Luti  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Nuclear Safety Visit

*J 8/30*

Who is going to follow up on the point the Russians brought up about having them do a reciprocal visit on nuclear safety with a NATO country, probably us?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081504-9 (us computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 8/27/04

*DA 8/30*

Sir,  
Response attached.

V/R  
LtCol Lengyel

15 AUG 04

~~FOUO~~





INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
POLICY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

*Handwritten initials/signature*

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

USD(C) *Handwritten signature*  
47011040 AUG 27 2004

ES-0490

*RUSSIA*

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira R. Ricardel, ASD/ISP (Acting) *MR* AUG 26 2004

SUBJECT: Response to Questions About Nuclear Safety Visit

- You asked, "who is going to follow up on the point the Russians brought up about having them do a reciprocal visit on nuclear safety with a NATO country, probably us?"
- The person responsible for this issue is Dr. Dale Klein, Assistant to the Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.
- Dr. Klein's office is now working to develop a proposal for a reciprocal NATO nuclear accident/incident response exercise, and plans to discuss this matter with officials from the UK and France.

*26 AUG 04*

*15 AUG 04*

11-L-0559/OSD/28043

OSD 19320-04

(b)(6)



COORDINATION  
On  
**SecDef Snowflake on Nuclear Safety Visit**  
18 August 2004

|                                    |                |   |
|------------------------------------|----------------|---|
| DASD (Forces Policy)               | John Rood      | <u>JR 8/19/04</u>                             |
| Principal Director (Forces Policy) | Mark Schneider | <u>MBS 8/19/04</u>                            |
| Director (NATO and Theater Strike) | David Shilling | <u>DMJ 8/19/04</u>                            |
| Deputy ATSD for Nuclear Matters    | Steve Henry    | <u>Reviewed draft; edits<br/>incorporated</u> |

124  
~~FOUO~~  
file

13759-04

August 15, 2004

TO: Bill Luti  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: More Info for Cable on Ukraine

*J* 8/15

Ukraine

For the cable on Ukraine, I talked to the MoD in the car about free and fair elections after bringing it up with Kuchma earlier.

Let's also remember that I mentioned to them the possibility of their helping with protecting the UN and training and equipping Iraqi security forces.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081504-14 (ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 8/15/04

8/15

BOTH ITEMS REFLECTED IN THE  
CABLE - ACTION COMPLETE  
*Bill Luti*

15 Aug 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28045

OSD 19321-04

August 16, 2004

333

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Checklist for papers

Please talk to GEN Craddock about how we are supposed to handle trips in terms of getting a checklist of thank you notes, taskers, outgoing cables, and a key list of action items.

There is a format for this, and apparently you did not have it. I would like you to get it and see if we can get back into the rhythm.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
081604-9

.....  
Please respond by 8/20/04

8/16 *DR*

Response  
Attached.  
V/R  
*Jim*

16 AUG 04

August 16, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Cables and Thank You Notes

In the future, I need to get the cables and thank you notes faster. Saving them until the last leg (when we're doing the SVTCs and I have to read all the material Steve Cambone has sent) just doesn't work. If they do them the same day and get them in on a 5-6 day trip like that, I can easily deal with all of them.

The day we arrived home I didn't have a chance to read the last chunk of them, and then we headed right into a very busy week. It's not a good way to do it; let's get it fixed. If that means someone has to miss going to a function (to a castle, dinner, palace, etc.), then that's what it means. ~~It~~ We have so many people along on the trips so they can trade off responsibilities.

We need to have a checklist - who is assigned which cables so they get them done on time. In the future, let's put a deadline on them.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
081604-1

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

08/18

TO: SECDEF

16 August 2004

FROM: VADM JIM STAVIUDIS

SUBJ: TRIP CHECKLIST and MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT

1. Sir, I spoke with GEN Craddock today, and he provided me a copy of the trip checklist you mentioned. The senior Policy representative on each trip is responsible to construct a detailed matrix for each trip that shows who is responsible for each product and give them hard deadlines for each of the products – cables, thank you, Presidential memo, and so forth. I will personally track this and ensure they do what is required to get the material in each day so there is not a large drop at the end of the trip.
2. I've also spoken with leadership in Policy to re-emphasize that they need to get these products into us in a timely fashion.
3. On the memo for the President, clearly the speechwriter is not the right person to draft this important document. I will ensure that henceforth an appropriate "substance person" is assigned the task, and will pay particular personal attention to its development and drafting. We'll get you a quality product in a more timely fashion on future trips.


Very respectfully,



11-L-0559/OSD/28048

August 16, 2004

IRAQ

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee's Iraq assessment

I just finished reading the conclusions of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in their pre-war assessment on Iraq.

It presents a number of conclusions critical of the intelligence community. To the extent that any of the conclusions apply to intelligence community activities involving DOD, please get involved to see that whatever deficiencies may exist are rectified and any other appropriate actions are taken.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Select Committee on Intelligence Report

DHR:ss  
081604.7

.....  
Please respond by 9/10/04

16 AUG 04



72  
INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

2004 12 01 15:30:00

**INFO MEMO**

December 1, 2004 5:30 pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Boeing Suspension Regarding the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program

- After you suggested yesterday that we should be looking not only at Department of Defense contracts that might have been tainted by Darleen A. Druyun but also by any other "criminals" associated with Ms. Druyun, the General Counsel volunteered that The Boeing Company, Incorporated, (Boeing) has also been "partially debarred" from government contracting as a result of criminal allegations. Attached, for your convenience, is a brief description of this matter, which was included with my October 8, 2003, Quarterly Update to you.
- Following is a brief summary of my Office's involvement in that matter. Even before receiving your "snowflake" of yesterday, I had already instructed my staff to share whatever information we can with the Acting Undersecretary of Defense (AT&L), who agreed yesterday to address your concerns about contracts tainted by any other "criminals" associated with Ms. Druyun.
- Since September 5, 2002, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, jointly with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Office of Inspector General, have been investigating allegations that Boeing used Lockheed Martin Corporation's proprietary documents to successfully bid on Air Force contracts for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program. On July 24, 2003, the Air Force suspended (a temporary measure short of debarment) three Boeing divisions and three former Boeing employees from government contracting. The affected Boeing divisions are the Launch Systems Division, Chicago, IL; Boeing Launch Services, Chicago, IL; and the Delta Programs Division, Huntington Beach, CA. To date, the divisions are still under suspension, and the investigation continues.
- I will respond more fully to your "snowflake" within the time you requested (1/13/05).

Attachment: As stated.

cc: Acting USD (AT&L); General Counsel

Prepared By: Charles W. Beardall, Acting Deputy Inspector General

(b)(6)

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11-L-0559/OSD/28050

OSD 19325-04





INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

INFO MEMO

October 8, 2003, 11:30 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Inspector General Quarterly Update (July - September 2003)

- Attached at Tab A is a summary of Fourth Quarter FY 2003 significant accomplishments of the Office of Inspector General.
- Over the course of the last quarter I provided 13 Info Memos in lieu of one-on-one briefings whenever there was a need to brief you on IG issues. A summary is at Tab B.
- At the request of the Vice Chairman of the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, I drafted a resolution to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the enactment of the Inspector General Act of 1978, signed into law on October 12, 1978, which has been introduced in the House (H. J. Res. 70) by Chairman Tom Davis, House Committee on Government Reform (Tab C), and in the Senate (S. J. Res. 18) by Chairwoman Susan Collins, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (Tab D).
- We held our 15th Annual Awards Luncheon on September 25, 2003. It was my privilege to honor those members of the OIG team who set the bar "very much higher" than the high standards of performance we enforce. We were also honored to have Dan Gable as our guest speaker. I have already provided your front office a video of his remarks.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Joseph E. Schmitz, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/28051

1116796-03

- ***IG Support to the Combatant Commanders:***
  - The Inspector General and his four Deputies met with the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Deputy Commander and staff to review possibilities for partnering. They requested IG support evaluating manpower allocation and acquisition plans, updating Combatant Command IG policy, and formulating a joint IG training curriculum. We return in October to scope projects and plan the way forward.
- ***Improved Financial Performance:***
  - As part of the Department's goal to achieve a favorable audit opinion on the FY2007 DoD financial statements, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) issued a memorandum to the Services and Defense Agencies to prepare comprehensive mid-range financial improvement plans which will be used as a roadmap for achieving a favorable audit opinion. The Comptroller also directed the OIG, DoD to plan for the increased internal and contract audit resources to meet the FY2007 goal. Reprogramming of about \$184M from the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to the OIG, DoD is planned for FY2004; about 96% of the total is for contract support to achieve the 2007 goal.
- ***OIG Transformation:***
  - The Office of the Chief of Staff restructured combining administration, information management, comptroller, and security into a single robust entity. The Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence transitioned two audit teams (14 auditors) to Intelligence and Thomas Gimble was named as the Assistant Inspector General for Intelligence. The Deputy Inspector General for Inspections and Policy established the Inspections and Evaluations Directorate. Initially the directorate will focus on the sexual climate at the Military Academies, human trafficking, support to Combatant Commands and Joint IG doctrine and training.
  - We promulgated four new OIG policy memoranda on the following subjects: "Leadership Assist Visits (Rev.)"; "Release of OIG Reports Containing Privacy Act Protected Information"; "Order of Inspector General Succession (Rev, 1)"; and "Robust Leadership Development and Succession Planning."
- ***Results of Major Criminal Investigations:***
  - Enaam Arnaout of Benevolence International Foundation was sentenced to 11 years for defrauding donors by concealing that donations were used to support terrorist groups.
  - Former Boeing employees were indicted for theft of trade secrets from Lockheed Martin involving Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle



~~FOUO~~

August 17, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Note from EUCOM

Please take a look at this note from EUCOM, and tell me what you think we ought to do about it.

Thanks.

**Attach**  
Note from EUCOM

DHR:ss  
081704-4

.....  
Please respond by 8/31/04

EUCOM

17 AUG 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19326-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28053

FROM: COMEUCOM

16 AUG 04

TO: SECDEF

MR. SECRETARY,

I AM IN RECEIPT OF INSTRUCTIONS TO PROCEED WITH THE TEMPORARY TRANSFER OF 87 PERSONNEL, FOR UP TO ONE YEAR, TO AUGMENT THREE CENTCOM INTELLIGENCE STAFFS. I HAVE CONDUCTED AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF SUCH A REDUCTION ON JAC MOLESWORTH AND ITS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF OUR NATIONAL AND THEATER OBJECTIVES. I HAVE REQUESTED A REVIEW OF THIS REQUIREMENT BY THE JOINT STAFF PRIOR TO EXECUTING THIS DIRECTIVE, AND I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO COMPLY WITH THE DIRECTIVE PENDING COMPLETION OF THE REQUESTED REVIEW.

I AM WRITING TO VOICE ~~M~~ INTENT TO COMPLY AS REQUESTED, BUT ALSO TO EXPRESS ~~M~~ CONCERN WITH REGARD TO THE IMPACT OF SUCH A REDUCTION ON OUR CRITICAL MISSION CAPABILITIES AT JAC MOLESWORTH. WHEN THIS REDUCTION IS IMPLEMENTED, WE WILL IMMEDIATELY HAVE TO TERMINATE ACTIVITIES FOR ONE YEAR IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

1. ALL TARGETING, TO INCLUDE BDA AND TIME SENSITIVE TARGETING
2. ALL AIR TO AIR DEFENSE ANALYSIS
3. ALL ORDER OF BATTLE MAINTENANCE
4. LONG TERM THEATER STRATEGIC ESTIMATES
5. ALL COUNTRY STUDIES IN 91 COUNTRY AOR
6. ALL EXERCISE SUPPORT

FURTHER, WE WILL REDUCE THE FOLLOWING CAPABILITIES:

1. IN DEPTH POLITICAL-MILITARY ANALYSIS OF WESTERN EUROPE
2. RUSSIAN MARITIME FOCUS
3. COLLECTION MANAGEMENT

THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THIS REDUCTION ON THIS THEATER WILL BE FELT IN KEY AREAS UPON WHICH WE HAVE COME TO DEPEND FOR GWOT AND OTHER IMPORTANT ACTIVITIES. IT WILL SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF JAC MOLESWORTH AND OUR WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY ACROSS THE BOARD, TO INCLUDE ONGOING SUPPORT TO OTHER COMBATANT COMMANDERS. THE SAME PERSONNEL IDENTIFIED FOR THIS AUGMENTATION MISSION ARE ALREADY PROVIDING SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT TO CENTCOM FOR BOTH OEF AND OIF VIA REACHBACK FOR IN DEPTH ANALYSIS AND ANALYTICAL SUPPORT FROM JAC MOLESWORTH. A SYNERGISTIC AND FOCUSED SUPPORT MISSION, LEVERAGING THE FULL CAPABILITY OF THE JAC, SHOULD BE OF GREATER BENEFIT TO THE GWOT AND TO CENTCOM THAN A DISPERSAL OF THE SAME ASSETS.

I REQUESTED RECONSIDERATION OF THIS REQUIREMENT, PRIOR TO EXECUTION, AS THERE CURRENTLY EXISTS 11 STANDING COMMANDS AND JTFs SUPPORTING OIF AND OEF, EACH HAVING AN ORGANIC INTELLIGENCE STAFF. ~~M~~ HOPE WAS THAT EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE/REDUCE COMBINE AND PERHAPS EVEN

11-L-0559/OSD/28054

ELIMINATE SOME OF THESE MULTIPLE STAFFS WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE AND ADVISABLE BEFORE IMPLEMENTING A REDUCTION OF THIS MAGNITUDE AT JAC, MOLESWORTH.

*M* RECENT VISIT TO ISRAEL HIGHLIGHTED ISRAELI CONCERN OVER THE RECENT UCP TRANSFER OF LEBANON AND SYRIA TO CENTCOM. THE IDF IS CONCERNED OVER THEIR RESULTING LACK OF ACCESS AND REPRESENTATION WITH CENTCOM ON MATTERS PERTAINING TO THESE TWO COUNTRIES. I HAVE EXPLAINED THAT THE UCP "SEAMS" BETWEEN EUCOM AND CENTCOM ARE "SOFT", VICE RIGID LINES AND THAT WE ARE QUITE ABLE AND WILLING TO BE INTERLOCUTORS WITH CENTCOM AND BACK ON MATTERS PERTAINING TO LEBANON AND SYRIA, IN EFFECT "REPRESENTING" CENTCOM FOR AND TO THEM. AS THEIR DESIRE IS TO DEVELOP GWOT INTELLIGENCE ON A BILATERAL BASIS EVEN FURTHER, THIS IS ANOTHER REASON FOR ADDRESSING THE PENDING JAC MOLESWORTH REDUCTIONS WITH CAUTION.

FINALLY, WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF ACHIEVING A BREAKTHROUGH OF SORTS WITH REGARD TO BUILDING THE FIRST NATO STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY ADJACENT TO JAC, MOLESWORTH, WITH THE INVALUABLE ASSISTANCE OF JAC AND EUCOM PERSONNEL. LACK OF ORGANIC INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN ONE OF NATO'S CLEARER WEAKNESSES FOR *MANY* YEARS. CURRENT EFFORTS TO REMEDY THIS SHORTFALL ARE TRULY TRANSFORMATIONAL FOR THE ALLIANCE, AND ARE GENERATING ENTHUSIASM. ANY SIGNIFICANT MANPOWER REDUCTION AT JAC WILL REDUCE OUR ABILITY TO BRING THIS EFFORT TO FRUITION, AT LEAST WITHIN CURRENT TIMELINES AND ESTIMATES.

I HAVE ADVISED THE CHAIRMAN, THE VICE CHAIRMAN, AND USD (I) OF *M* CONCERNS. I OFFER THESE COMMENTS IN KEEPING WITH MY RESPONSIBILITIES TO PROVIDE MY BEST MILITARY ADVICE WHEN APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY. IN MY VIEW, THIS IS SUCH A TIME.

UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED, EUCOM WILL IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENT THE DIRECTIVE WE HAVE RECEIVED.

VERY RESPECTFULLY,  
JIM

11-L-0559/OSD/28055

~~FOUO~~

file

AUG 23 2004

cc: a%

August 18, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Mike DeLong's book

*J 8/31*

Please contact Mike DeLong and be sure he clears his book for classified material.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
081804-3

.....  
Please respond by 8/20/04

AUG 21 2004

*DR 8/31*  
Sir,  
Response attached.  
YR  
Lt Col Bengyel

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19330-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28056

PA 8/31

MEMEORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Through: Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence ~~GC~~ AUG 30 2004

From: Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, CI&S ~~GC~~ 30 AUG 04

SUBJECT: LtGen Mike DeLong's Upcoming Publication

As requested, LtGen Mike DeLong was contacted reference the pending release of his book. LtGen DeLong stated the CENTCOM Security Office, specifically Mr. Dan Morris, Deputy J-2, CENTCOM and Mr. Barry Hammill, CENTCOM Deputy Judge Advocate General accomplished a security review.

Additionally, LtGen DeLong stated that when writing the book, he was mindful not to include or go into the who, what, when, why and how.

According to LtGen DeLong, the book is currently in print and expected on store shelves around 12 September 2004.

INFO MEMO

8/25/2004 5:39 PM

FOR: Ms. Haave

FROM: Buckley, M. *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: SecDef Snowflake re: LtGen DeLong's Book

- Please see Colonel Sweat's note: "Is this acceptable to DoD?"
  - o I personally called LtGen DeLong reference this subject. He stated part of his job while assigned to CENTCOM was to review like material for classified information before public dissemination.
  - o He stated he had the book reviewed by Mr. Dan Morris, Deputy J-2; CENTCOM to ensure it met all requirements and did not divulge any classified information. Mr. Morris can be reached at:
    - DSN: (b)(6)
    - Commercial: (b)(6)
- LtGen DeLong's contact information:
  - o Home: (b)(6)
  - o Cell: [Redacted]
  - o He stated I was the fifth or sixth person to call reference this subject.

Prepared by: mmb/[Redacted]

*best professional opinion  
no issues -  
conversational, no  
specificity @ TTPs & security  
JAG reviewed as well.  
Barry Hamel*



December 2, 2004

TO: Dina Powell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Powell Moore

230.02

Here's a background sheet on Powell Moore, and also some points that I have developed with respect to the job he could do as a U.S. Ambassador for this Administration. He is first rate. He is leaving. He would very much like to serve the country. I hope you will see that his name is carefully considered. You never know what might happen, but this is a person who has been carrying the mail, as has his wife, Pam, for many, many decades.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Powell Moore Bio  
Talking Points on Powell Moore

DHR:ss  
120204-1

2 Dec 04

## **POWELL A. MOORE**

Powell A. Moore is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs. He was nominated by President Bush for this position on April 23, 2001 and confirmed by the Senate on May 1, 2001.

Mr. Moore formerly served as the Chief of Staff for Senator Fred D. Thompson, Republican of Tennessee, and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. Mr. Moore held this position from September 1998 until assuming his current duties.

Active in public policy affairs in Washington for more than 37 years, Mr. Moore is a former Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs under President Reagan and served on the White House staff under Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan.

Mr. Moore began his Washington career in 1966 as Press Secretary to Senator Richard B. Russell, Democrat of Georgia, and served in this capacity until Senator Russell's death in January of 1971. He then joined the Nixon Administration, first serving as Deputy Director of Public Information for the Department of Justice and later as a member of the White House Legislative Affairs staff.

He left the White House in 1975, and for the subsequent six years, engaged in government relations and legislative affairs consulting, representing a variety of corporations and associations.

Mr. Moore returned to the White House in January 1981 on the day following Ronald Reagan's inauguration as the 40th President of the United States. As Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs during 1981, he managed the Senate component of the legislative affairs office at the White House.

In January of 1982, President Reagan nominated him to be Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, and he was confirmed by the Senate on February 4, 1982.

After leaving government in late 1983 and before returning in 1998, Mr. Moore advised and represented business interests as a consultant and as Vice President for Legislative Affairs of the Lockheed Corporation.

Mr. Moore was born in Milledgeville, Georgia, on January 5, 1938. He graduated from the University of Georgia in Athens in 1959 after attending preparatory school at Georgia Military College in Milledgeville. After graduation, he was commissioned as an Infantry officer in the United States Army where he served for three and one-half years with tours in Baumholder, Germany, and Fort Benning, Georgia.

Mr. Moore lives in Washington, D.C. with his wife Pamela. He has a daughter, Mrs. Frances M. Preston of Franklin, Tennessee; and a son, Allen Moore of Springfield, Virginia. Mr. and Mrs. Moore together have four grandsons and a granddaughter.

## Talking Points to **Support** a Recommendation Of Powell Moore to be an Ambassador

- Powell Moore's career has prepared him to serve as an Ambassador and lead an embassy team to advance the interests of the United States overseas.
- He has a longstanding history of achieving measurable results in developing and implementing strategies to deliver public policy messages.
- As a member of the President's legislative affairs and national security team for the past four years, he has a deep understanding of the President's national security and foreign policy goals
- His career in legislative affairs has provided him with solid preparation for a diplomatic post where accurate reporting and insightful analysis are essential.
- Powell Moore has an in-depth knowledge of the United States government. He has worked for Senators Richard Russell of Georgia and Fred Thompson of Tennessee, on the White House staff under Presidents Nixon, Ford and Reagan and in the Departments of Justice, State and Defense. He also understands the interests and issues of the Nation having worked closely with scores of Senators and Representatives from every region on a variety of issues including trade, manufacturing, agriculture and finance.
- As Assistant Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of Defense, he has accompanied Members of Congress to more than forty nations where he has participated in meetings with numerous international leaders.
- His introduction to U.S. ties to Europe came early in his career when he served for two years as an Infantry officer in Germany at the time of the Berlin crisis.
- His wife, Pamla Moore, would be an exceptional representative of our nation.
  - Pamla came to Washington from Atlanta in 1989 as a key member of the staff of President G.H.W. Bush's Peace Corp Director, Paul Coverdell. Her association with the late Senator Coverdell spanned more than 20 years in Republican fundraising and political activities in Georgia and in Washington.
  - As Director of the Office of Private Sector Relations for the U.S. Peace Corps, she raised more than \$12 million in private sector donations to support the Peace Corps' initiative into former Warsaw Pact countries.
  - She currently directs the National Blood Foundation, which provides support for transfusion medicine research with an endowment of more than \$4 million.
  - Pamla was an alternate delegate from the District of Columbia to the Republican National conventions in Philadelphia in 2000 and in New York in 2004.
  - On November 2, 2004, she won a non-partisan election with more than 70 percent of the vote to represent the eastern section of Georgetown on a District of Columbia Advisory Neighborhood Commission.
- Powell Moore has loyally served in the Administration of President Bush during his first term and is eager to serve the President and the Nation in a challenging assignment abroad in the second term.

December 3, 2004

311.3

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*  
SUBJECT: Thank You Note for Bill Timmons

If we have not prepared a thank you to Bill Timmons for his heads up on the calling cards for the military, please draft one.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
120304-10

.....  
Please respond by 12/9/04

*Cpt Munnott  
Another winning project  
Thanks*

*Paul*  
Paul Butler  
*2/14*

3 DEC 04

OSD 19346-04

1 Dec 04

DA 12/3

VIA FAX

Memorandum for the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

From: Bill Timmons *bill*

Date: 1 December 2004

Subject: Prepaid Telephone **Calling Cards** for **Military**

Request your personal assistance on an issue of importance to our servicemen and women and their families. In the next few weeks the FCC intends to issue an order concerning prepaid calling cards that threatens to increase rates on the military and other users of this low-cost telephone service by as much as 20%.

Ten years ago calling card service that contained promotional advertisements (called enhanced cards) was placed in service. Telephone calls using these enhanced cards are informational and outside regulated service and therefore not subject to intrastate access or universal service fees. After all these years the FCC intends to make these cards fall in a revenue category that will cause troops and other card users to contribute more so others may contribute less.

Consistent with the goals of universal service, the cards today provide low-cost calling for those who need it most - military, senior, rural, minority, and low-income users. The USO provides free pre-paid cards to service personnel as part of "Operation Phone Home program." Wal-Mart, Sam's Club, drug stores, military exchanges, and other retail outlets sell the inexpensive calling cards. Members of Congress have communicated with FCC Chairman Powell not to take money out of soldiers' pockets while they defend our country. In fact, in the closing days of this Congress through report language for the final budget legislation Congress directed the FCC "not to take any action that would directly or indirectly have the effect of raising the rates charged to military personnel or their families for telephone calls placed using prepaid phone cards." On 23 July of this year the Pentagon weighed in when Charles Abell wrote the FCC pointing out the increased costs to service personnel and families if this order were implemented. The FCC chairman put off official action until after the election but now intends to go forward.

Don, about the only avenue open seems to be White House involvement to protect the low-cost prepaid calling cards for the military. May I suggest you call Andy Card and ask him to help?

Thanks a bunch.



**William E. Timmons**  
 Chairman Emeritus

*Bill Timmons founded Timmons and Company in 1975.*

Mr. Timmons is Chairman Emeritus with responsibility for guiding corporate planning. From its formation until 1986, Mr. Timmons served as the company's president, recommending plans designed to achieve clients' goals in their relations with the federal government.


Between 1969-1974, Mr. Timmons was Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs to Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, where he was responsible for the Administrations' legislative programs and the principal advisor on Congressional relations. As a senior White House spokesman on Capitol Hill, he also coordinated strategy for department and agency legislative initiatives. Prior to his White House service, Mr. Timmons served 12 years in senior positions on Capitol Hill as Administrative Assistant to Representative Bill Brock (R-TN) and as an aide to Senator Alexander Wiley (R-WI). Bill served four years in the U.S. Air Force during the Korean War period.

He has held commissions from four Presidents and is a member of numerous professional, service, fraternal, and social organizations. Mr. Timmons has attended every Republican National Convention since 1964. He was Director of Congressional Relations for the Nixon-Agnew campaign in 1968; National Convention Manager for Richard Nixon in 1968 and 1972, for Gerald Ford in 1976, and for Ronald Reagan in 1980 and 1984; and National Political Director for Reagan-Bush in 1980. He was also Deputy Director of the Transition for President-elect Reagan in 1980, and a senior advisor to Vice President George Bush's campaign in 1988 and Senator Bob Dole's bid in 1996. In 2000, he was a senior advisor to Governor Bush for the

11-L-0559/OSD/28064



### Contact



**Bryce L. (Larry) Harlow**  
 President and Managing Director

\* Name:


**Richard J. Tarplin**  
 Chairman and Managing Director

\* Email:

Message:

**Timmons and Company, Inc.**  
 1875 Eye Street, N.W.  
 Suite 400  
 Washington, D.C. 20006  
 tel 202.331.1760  
 fax 202.822.9376

\* Required information



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**VIA FAX**Memorandum for the Honorable **Donald Rumsfeld**From: Bill Timmons *Bill*

Date: 1 December 2004

Subject: **Prepaid Telephone Calling Cards** for Military

Request your personal assistance on **an** issue of importance to **our** servicemen and women and **their** families. In the next few weeks the **FCC** intends to issue an order concerning prepaid calling cards that threatens to increase rates on the military and other users of **this** low-cost telephone service by **as much as 20%**.

Ten years **ago** calling card service that contained promotional advertisements (**called** enhanced cards) **was** placed in service. Telephone calls using these enhanced cards are **informational** and outside regulated service and **therefore** not subject to intrastate **access** or **universal** service fees. After all these years the **FCC** intends to make these cards fall in a revenue category that will cause **troops** and other card users to **contribute** more so **others** may contribute less.

Consistent with the goals of **universal service**, **the** cards today provide low-cost calling for **those** who need it **most** – military, senior, **rural**, **minority**, and low-income users. The USO provides **free** pre-paid cards to service personnel as part of "Operation Phone Home program." Wal-Mart, **Sam's Club**, **drug** stores, **military** exchanges, and other retail outlets sell the inexpensive calling cards. Members of Congress have communicated with **FCC Chairman Powell** not to take money out of **soldiers'** pockets while they defend **our** country. In fact, in the closing days of **this** Congress through **report language** for the **final** budget legislation Congress directed the FCC "not to take any action that would directly or indirectly **have** the effect of **raising** the rates charged to military personnel or their families for telephone calls placed **using** prepaid phone cards." **On 23 July** of **this** year the Pentagon weighed in when Charles Abell wrote the **FCC** pointing **out** the increased **costs** to service personnel and families if this order were implemented. The **FCC chairman** put **off** official action **until** after the election but **now** intends to go forward.

**Don**, about the **only** avenue open seems to be White House involvement to protect the low-cost prepaid calling cards for the military. May I suggest you call **Andy Card** and **ask** him to help?

Thanks a bunch.

OSD 19346-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28066





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 15 2004

311.3

Mr. Bill Timmons  
Chairman Emeritus  
**Timmons** and Company, Inc.  
1875 Eye Street, N.W.  
Suite 400  
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Bill,

Thanks for the heads up about the calling card  
**issue.** It is important, and we are looking into it.

I'll be in touch with you.

Sincerely,

15425 04

1210 89

OSD 19346-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28067

~~FOUO~~

August 31, 2004

20040831 11:13:23

092

TO: Gen Richard Myers  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*  
SUBJECT: Common Global Environment Assessment

I think we should have a common global environment assessment, and use DoD's Regional Centers and Combatant Commanders to help communicate with the rest of the world so they share our assessment. We need to show them the intelligence and our analysis. We need to get them thinking about the world the way we are thinking about it, or learn from them about what they are thinking.

Only if we have a common understanding of the global environment - the threats and capabilities we face -- will we be likely to end up singing off the same sheet of music.

Please come back to me with a proposal as to how we should proceed.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
083104-15

.....  
Please respond by 9/14

31Aug04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19347-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28068

**Policy Executive Secretariat Note**

**FEB 16 2005**


I-04/0 11748/ES-0626

Reference: 083104-15, Common Global Environment  
Assessment

Captain Marriott,

Ryan Henry briefed SecDef on October 20, 2004 on  
DoD Regional Centers. Attached is the October 20 briefing.

Respectfully request consideration that the  
October briefing answers the snowflake action.

  
June Bartlett  
Deputy Director  
Policy Executive Secretariat

11-L-0559/OSD/28069

**OSD 19347-04**

~~FOUO~~

August 31, 2004

I-04/011748  
ES-0626

TO: Gen Richard Myers  
Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Common Global Environment Assessment

I think we should have a common global environment assessment, and use DoD's Regional Centers and Combatant Commanders to help communicate with the rest of the world so they share our assessment, We need to show them the intelligence and our analysis. We need to get them thinking about the world the way we are thinking about it, or learn from them about what they are thinking.

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Thanks.

DHR:ss  
083104-15

.....  
Please respond by 9/14

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19347-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28070

# ***DoD Regional Centers – Post 9/11 Transformation***

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**SecDef Briefing  
20 October, 2004**

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**DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT:** For discussion purposes only.  
(Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA)

11-L-0559/OSD/28071



POLICY

## DoD Regional Centers **Overview**

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- Assumptions
- Background
- Evolving Vision
- Implementing the Vision
- Next Steps

### ***Bottom Line***

- To maximize our Regional Centers' contribution to national security we need to transform**
  - the way we think about Regional Centers
  - the way we **employ** them
  - how we support them

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only.  
Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA)

20-Oct-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28072



## DoD Regional Centers **Assumptions**


POLICY

- ❑ DoD's five Regional Centers for Security Studies were designed before 9/11 to address the strategic challenges we then faced.
  - And the Marshall Center has largely accomplished its original mission
- ❑ In a post-9/11 world, the Regional Centers can now do more to strengthen U.S. national security and international support by
  - ⑨ Harmonizing views on the nature of common security challenges
    - Serving as a key USG tool in countering ideological support for terrorism
  - ⑨ Educating on the role of defense in civil society (current focus)
- ❑ The value of a collaborative set of centers with a coherent message exceeds the sum of their individual contributions.
  - No one Regional Center is inherently more important than any other
- ❑ Properly fashioned, Regional Centers can be a test bed for experimentation in interagency "jointness"
  - ⑨ Focusing all elements of USG power
  - ⑨ Proving ground for low-key joint interagency initiatives
  - ⑨ Routine liaison and outreach activities with NGOs, particularly humanitarian organizations, to inform decision-making in crises
- ❑ If the Regional Centers assume a leadership role within the USG security cooperation community, investing in them can have a multiplier effect.



DoD Regional Centers

# Areas of Responsibility



**Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies**

**George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies**

**Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies**

**Africa Center for Strategic Studies**

**Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies**

★ = RC Location

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under E.O. 13526, EOIA)

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




# DoD Regional Centers Background

POLICY

| Center Name                    | Year | Service | Command  | Budget         | Participants | Participant Days | Cost per Day |
|--------------------------------|------|---------|----------|----------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|
| Marshall Center                | 1993 | Army    | EUCOM    | \$26.9M        | 2,304        | 64,566           | \$416        |
| Asia-Pacific Center            | 1995 | Navy    | PACOM    | \$13.8M        | 1,012        | 27,732           | \$498        |
| Center for Hemispheric Defense | 1997 | NDU     | SOUTHCOM | \$5.5M         | 862          | 5,953            | \$924        |
| Africa Center                  | 1999 | NDU     | EUCOM    | \$10.3M        | 905          | 2,913            | \$3,530      |
| Near East-South Asia Center    | 2000 | NDU     | CENTCOM  | \$6.8M         | 1,458        | 5,543            | \$1,227      |
| <b>Total</b>                   |      |         |          | <b>\$63.3M</b> | <b>5,940</b> | <b>106,000</b>   |              |



DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA)


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POLICY


# DoD Regional Centers Background

Regional Center budgets



- ◆ Marshall Center
- ▲ CHDS
- ◆ NESACenter
- Asia-Pacific Center
- ✱ Africa Center

Regional Center participants



investment roughly equates to impact

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA)

20-Oct-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28076



DoD Regional Centers

# ***Evolving Vision for the Centers***

|                         | <b><u>Yesterday:</u></b>   | <b><u>Today:</u></b>   | <b><u>Tomorrow:</u></b>   |
|-------------------------|--|--|---|
| <b>Objective</b>        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><input type="checkbox"/> Influence thinking in immediate post-Cold War era</li><li><input type="checkbox"/> Educate on the role of military in civil society</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><input type="checkbox"/> Inform thinking on 21<sup>st</sup> century security challenges</li><li><input type="checkbox"/> Educate on the role of defense in civil society</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><input type="checkbox"/> Become USG vanguard in:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>➤ Harmonizing threat awareness</li><li>➤ Countering ideological support for terrorism</li><li>➤ Educating on the role of defense in civil society</li></ul></li></ul> |
| <b>Target audiences</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><input type="checkbox"/> Defense</li></ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><input type="checkbox"/> Government national security</li></ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><input type="checkbox"/> Public and private national security; other “thinkers”</li></ul>   |
| <b>How they operate</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><input type="checkbox"/> “Autonomous,” not coordinated</li></ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><input type="checkbox"/> “Autonomous, but cooperative”</li></ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><input type="checkbox"/> “Cooperative and coherent;” working in an integrated fashion with SecDef agenda</li></ul>  |



*DoD Regional Centers*

# ***Moving Toward “Tomorrow”***

---

POLICY

- ❑ What is required to transition to “Tomorrow”?
  - 9 Mission
  - 9 Governance
  - 9 Metrics
  - 9 Resources



# Mission

POLICY

## Today:

- Education and outreach – forums for exchanging views
  
- Primarily concerned with regional security issues
  
- Limited target audience
  - 9 Defense elites, primarily military
  
- Few cooperative programs with government security cooperation organizations

## Tomorrow:

- “Strategic communication” – immersion and outreach activities
  - 9 Harmonize threat awareness
  - 9 Counter ideological support for terrorism
  - 9 Educate on role of defense in civil society
  
- Balanced treatment of global and regional security matters
  
- Expanded target audience
  - 9 Security elites, including government, “think tanks,” media, NGOs
  
- Broader cooperative programs
  - 9 Among Regional Centers
  - 9 Interagency “joint” experimentation centers
  - 9 Foreign government-sponsored think tanks
  - Colleges and universities



# DoD Regional Centers Governance

POLICY

## Today:

- Regional Centers independent institutions, now starting to collaborate
- Various governance models
  - Conflicting directives
  - Different practices regarding Boards of Visitors
  - Multiple and not always optimal Executive Agents
  - Fragmented, limiting legislation
    - *Hit or miss audits*
  - Few arrangements between centers and potential enabling organizations
- Directors semi-connected to SecDef
  - DoD only staffing

## Tomorrow:

- Harmonized, collaborating institutions
- Unifying governance model
  - One Directive consolidating oversight and support
  - One Board of Visitors
  - Single Executive Agent
  - Common, enabling legislation
    - *USDP-initiated audits*
  - Memoranda of agreement, e.g., between Regional Centers and Defense Security Cooperation Agency, NDU, or other institutions
- Directors more directly connected to SecDef through USD(P)
  - "Joint" interagency staffing – DoD Director, DoS Deputy, interagency staffing



# Metrics

POLICY

## Today:

- Metric formulation and data collection are ad hoc
- Existing metrics not used to guide center activities

## Tomorrow:

- Consistent metrics for measuring:
  - Effectiveness of generating attitudinal shifts of participants
    - *Entry and exit surveys*
  - Policy insights gained from exchanges and research
    - *Ability to feed the OUSD(P) policy process*
  - Quality of product
    - *Demand for product*
  - Operational effectiveness and efficiency
    - *Outside support (money, staff, facilities, etc.)*
  - DoD and interagency value added
    - *Venue of choice for security cooperation outreach activities*



DoD Regional Centers  
**Support**

POLICY

Today:

- The newer centers have smaller budgets but equal potential value
  - Newer centers responsible for strategically important regions
- Asymmetric resources
  - The largest budget is ~6x the size of the smallest
- Funding fluctuations complicate planning
- Few visits from officials
  - Minimum participation by US military
- Uneven technology applications

Tomorrow:

- Centers have equal DoD
- Roughly symmetric (within 25%)
- Stable funding with in
  - Discretionary funding is a performance
- Robust participation
  - Increased DoD and wide
- Learning technology





*DoD Regional Centers*  
***Next Steps***


POLICY

- Work with Center Directors to develop a model for post 9-11 Regional Centers
  - Generate an execution plan to transform mission and roughly equalize Centers
  - Develop roadmap for making Regional Centers interagency “jointness” labs
    - Make initial inquiries with USAID, DOS, and DOE
  - Identify Regional Centers’ post 9-11 path and support/resource needs
    - Develop integrated post 9-11 curriculum
  - Develop program for Senior OSD participation at Regional Centers
  
- Approve establishment of a single Executive Agent
  
- Approve establishment of a single Board of Visitors
  
- Follow through on requested legislation



POLICY

# DoD Regional Centers **Future Role**



**(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT:** For discussion purposes only.  
Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA)



*DoD Regional Centers*


# ***Backup***

---



# DoD Regional Centers Background

## Dollars Spent per Participant Day



\* Asia-Pacific FY96 discrepancy caused by first year start-up costs



# DoD Regional Centers Background

POLICY

## Measures of Efficiency

|                        | Population<br>Base<br>Year<br>1993 | Population<br>Base<br>Year<br>2000 | % Change<br>1993-2000 | Value<br>1993<br>(\$1000) | Value<br>2000<br>(\$1000) | % Change<br>1993-2000 |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| Marshall<br>(1993)     | 22,680                             | 64,566                             | +185%                 | \$338                     | \$416                     | + 23%                 |
| Asia-Pacific<br>(1995) | 3,290                              | 27,732                             | +743%                 | \$912                     | \$498                     | - 45%                 |
| CHDS<br>(1997)         | 2,055                              | 5,953                              | +190%                 | \$1,036                   | \$924                     | - 11%                 |
| Africa<br>(1999)       | 2,918                              | 2,913                              | -0.2%                 | \$1,668                   | \$3,530                   | + 112%                |
| NESA<br>(2000)         | 825                                | 5,543                              | +572%                 | \$1,521                   | \$1,227                   | - 19%                 |

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only.  
Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA)

20-Oct-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28087



*DoD Regional Centers*

# ***Consolidated Legislative Proposal***

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


- Reinforces unified governance model
  - Gives all Regional Centers the same authority
  
- Broadens participant base to include
  - Foreign security elites (not just defense elites)
  - Variety of **USG** participants
  - Other security “thinkers”
  
- Allows Regional Centers to accept gifts and donations
  - Increases accounting transparency by creating a gift fund
  - Permits foreign and domestic gifts and donations
  
- Authorizes Regional Centers to charge for education and training
  - Allows Foreign Military Sales (FMS), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and other security assistance funds to be used for Regional Center programs



# DoD Regional Centers USG Educational Institutions with International Participants

POLICY

- |   |  |   |   |
|---|--|---|---|
| <p><b>Regional Centers (5)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Africa Center</li> <li>• Asia-Pacific Center</li> <li>• Center for Hemispheric Defense</li> <li>• Marshall Center</li> <li>• Near East-South Asia Center</li> </ul> | <p><b>Senior DoD Institutions (11)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National Defense University</li> <li>• Naval Postgraduate School</li> <li>• Service War Colleges (3)</li> <li>• Air Force Institute of Technology</li> </ul> | <p><b>DoD Institutions (65)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Service academies</li> <li>• Education and training in warfighting, support skills, and intel</li> </ul> | <p><b>USG Programs (218)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DoS</li> <li>• DoE</li> <li>• USAID</li> <li>• 51 Other Federal Agencies</li> </ul> |
|---|--|---|---|



(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA)

20-Oct-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28089



POLICY

## ***Senior DoD Institutions with International Students***

---

- 5 Regional Centers for Security Studies
- National Defense University
- Naval Postgraduate School
- Air Force Institute of Technology
- Army War College
- Naval War College
- Air War College



~~FOUO~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

August 31, 2004

ATTACHMENT 19348-04 RUS 27

000.5

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
 Doug Feith  
 Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission Recommendation

Please read the attached on the 9/11 Commission Recommendation on paramilitary activity.

Thanks.

**Attach**  
 08/30/04 O'Connell Info Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss  
 083104-17



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

~~SENSITIVE~~

ATTACHMENT

31Aug04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19348-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~  
~~SENSITIVE~~

INFO MEMO

SIR → 0131  
Remd pass  
to GEN  
CRADDOCK.  
AUG 30 2004 VI  
Jim  
Rowell  
30 Aug 04

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC)

SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission Recommendation for Consolidated Paramilitary Activities

At a recent roundtable, you asked me to contact 9/11 Commissioner John Lehman about the above subject. You wanted to know the basis for the recommendation.

John said the Commission's time with CIA (including Director) led them to conclude:

- Agency had "haphazard" approach to paramilitary missions.
- Common thread throughout Agency approach was "unwillingness to take risk". They insisted on legal review at every step. CIA was "reluctant to pull the trigger when opportunities were presented."
- Commission thought entire Agency approach was "muddled, at best."
- Commission sees Agency/DOD mismatch – DOD has capability, CIA has authorities.
- Commission believed SECDEF's post 9-11 actions vis-a-vis SOCOM and Special Ops in general placed DoD in far superior position to conduct these operations.
- Commission was reluctant to cite Agency/national weaknesses in unclassified report.
- Mr. Lehman asked to bring Commissioner Kerrey to the Pentagon for SO/LIC overview.

7201  
~~FOUO~~

August 30, 2004

TO: Peter Rodman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: VOA Broadcasts to Iran

IRAN

Please talk to Seth Cropsey personally, for me, on this matter.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/8/04 Feith Memo on VOA; 8/26/04 Rodman Info Memo to SecDef; 10/24/03 Rodman Action Memo to SecDef (018009/03)

DHR:ss  
083004-10

.....  
Please respond by 9/17

30 AUG 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28093

OSD 19349-04

~~FOUO~~

August 9, 2004

*I-04/010681*  
*ES-0418*

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: VOA Broadcasts to Iran

Here is a memo from Seth Cropsey and the U.S. International Broadcasting Bureau broadcasts to Iran.

Please take a look at it and get back to me with your suggestions.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/14/04 Cropsey memo to SecDef

*J 8/30*

DHR dh  
080904-17

.....  
Please respond by *8/27/04*

*Sir,*  
*Response attached.*

*v/r*  
*Lt Col Lengyel*  
*8/30*

~~FOUO~~

10-03-04 15:30 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/28094

*19314-04*

*af*  
AUG 26 2004

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef                       
USD(P)                      8/27  
I-04/010681-ES  
ES-0418

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *PR* 26 AUG 2004

SUBJECT: VOA Broadcasts to Iran (SecDef Snowflake)

- You asked for my suggestions regarding International Broadcasting Bureau Director Seth Cropsey's request that DoD supply the funds for an increase in VOA's TV broadcasts to Iran.
- We supported this proposal when it was submitted to the Deputy last year (memo attached).
- As was the case then, there still does not appear to be any legal way to transfer DoD funds to VOA for this purpose.
- If the IBB goes to OMB for this funding increase, we should be prepared to support it.

DUSD (NESA) *ffl*

PDASD(ISA) *af*

USF

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

EF-7313  
11/3  
copy provided 10/29/03 LHA

SECURITY AFFAIRS

ACTION MEMO

DEP SEC DEF HAS SEEN  
PW Decision: OTHER  
NOV 6 2003  
w/ AmTS

I-03/014800

USDPA

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter Rodman, (b)(6))

24 OCT 2003

SUBJECT: Proposal to Fund IBB Farsi TV to Iran

Background:

Seth Cropsey, Director of the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), submitted a proposal to us to fund an increase in IBB TV broadcasting to Iran from one half hour per day to three hours per day, for the period of one year. (TAB A) The cost is nearly \$10 million. The amount is included in the IBB's fiscal year 2005 budget request, but the IBB would like to begin the increased broadcasts now.

- We support this proposal. As Iran increases its propaganda broadcasts into Iraq to destabilize the situation there, we should improve our ability to counter Tehran's dis- and mis-information campaigns by speaking directly to the Iranian people, who are receptive to our broadcasts.
- OGC advises that the Department of Defense cannot under any circumstances fund this program directly or transfer funds to the IBB to fund this initiative.
- The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller has evaluated this proposal, and has forwarded it to OMB to see if OMB has funding sources that can be used for this purpose.

Recommendation: That you phone Robin Cleveland to express our support for this program and to see if OMB has resources that can be used for this purpose.

Attachments: As stated

|                        |       |
|------------------------|-------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DIR I&TA | 11/3  |
| BR ISA CALDWELL        | 11/3  |
| EX-SEC MARRILLI        | 10/29 |

DEPSECDEF DECISION:  
APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER: IBB can say that it looks like a good idea to us. PDASD (ISA)

for DUSD NESA (W)

Prepared by: Robert Reilly/NESA/NGA (b)(6)

They will have to argue their own case, how

(D)

08/8/9

Broadcasting Board of Governors

INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING BUREAU



MEMORANDUM for SECDEF  
FROM: Seth Cropsey, Director, U.S. International Broadcasting Bureau  
SUBJ: Voice of America Broadcasts to Iran  
14 July '04

Handwritten initials

This memo responds to your request of 8 June for information about VOA's Persian language television broadcasts.

**VOA Television to Iran**

VOA inaugurated a one-half hour daily primetime television news program, *News & Views*, in July 2003. The new program brought to six the number of hours that VOA broadcasts on television to Iran *per week*; (vice Iran's four 24/7 international TV broadcast operations); all VOA TV broadcasts to Iran are transmitted via satellite. The Iranian government admits that there are about three million households that can receive television signals through satellite dishes. Our research places the figure at approximately 15 percent of the adult population or nearly seven million households; satellite broadcasts are a highly effective way of reaching the Iranian people.

*News & Views* offers a mixture of international, regional, and local news geared to its audience's interests, as well as current affairs programming addressed to viewers' oft-stated thirst for information about human rights, democracy, and civil society.

**Iranian Response**

Over the previous month and in addition to its regular news stories, *News & Views* featured an interview with Justice Sandra Day O'Connor who told how her appointment by President Reagan as the first female Supreme Court justice "opened many doors to women in the U.S. and the rest of the world." Other features included an interview from London with a journalist and dissident recently released from an Iranian prison who argued that the U.S. mission in Iraq helps guarantee peace and stability in the region as it promotes democratic change. The ruling mullahs' fear of these broadcasts is clear. A panel discussion on the future of democracy that aired the first week in July featured participation by phone from Tehran of a young woman who is the spokesman for a group called "Women For Democracy." The police arrested her and her mother less than a day after the broadcast aired.

In the absence of other accurate and relevant Persian-language television news broadcasts *News & Views* established a large audience immediately. A telephone poll conducted less than two months after the program went on the air last summer determined the audience at about 13 percent of the viewing public. Since then, the program has received similar phone poll results of over 17 percent.

*News & Views* is a solid and established TV news program that receives a tremendous volume of email from its growing audience—and shares representative emails with its viewers thus establishing a dialogue among Iranians who are unhappy with their rulers and have no other means of communicating this dissatisfaction with fellow citizens. A

recent email asked 'why VOA couldn't air more emails from other listeners on the air?' The answer is that VOA doesn't have the funds to broadcast more than a daily half hour news program.

#### **What Is to Be Done?**

The purpose of this memo is to ask your assistance in securing the approximately \$10 million it would take to increase *News & Views* to a three-hour daily program of news and current affairs programming for a single year. The expanded show would cover in-depth such subjects as the extraordinary corruption of the ruling mullahs, their diversion of Iranian taxpayers' revenue to finance international terrorism, the lessons of east and central Europe in throwing off the communist yoke; and extensive reporting on women's issues, separation of church and state, and the different forms of democratic governance that emails from our audience make it clear they desperately want.

The precedent exists for the transfer of DoD funds to international broadcasting in the assistance DoD provided—in approximately the same amount—to build and install radio transmitters in Afghanistan following the defeat of the Taliban. This assistance was highly successful. It increased the security of our deployed forces, and of the U.S. in the same way that longer and more in-depth broadcasts to Iran would divert that country's rulers' sponsorship of terror and efforts in Iraq while it helped advance the cause of democracy in Iran.

A specific and detailed plan for increasing TV news and current affairs programming to Iran from its current level of one-half hour daily to three hours each day appears immediately below. The costs are annual.

#### **TV Requirements**

|                          |                    |
|--------------------------|--------------------|
| Salaries                 | \$2,386,088        |
| AP Graphics              | \$40,000           |
| Acquired Video           | \$200,000          |
| Regional News Feeds      | \$100,000          |
| Transmission and Remotes | \$500,000          |
| Overtime                 | \$100,000          |
| <b>Subtotal</b>          | <b>\$3,326,088</b> |

#### **Persian Service Requirements:**

|                            |                    |
|----------------------------|--------------------|
| Salaries                   | \$2,377,000        |
| Overseas stringers         | \$150,000          |
| Domestic stringers         | \$50,000           |
| Travel                     | \$200,000          |
| Telephone Toll             | \$10,000           |
| Simultaneous Translators   | \$100,000          |
| Office Supplies            | \$30,000           |
| Misc expenses              | \$20,000           |
| Other Contractual Services | \$50,000           |
| <b>Subtotal</b>            | <b>\$2,987,000</b> |



|                                     |                     |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------|
| <b>IBB</b>                          |                     |
| Satellite Transmission services     | \$2,300,000         |
| Research                            | \$50,000            |
| Advertising                         | \$100,000           |
| <b>Subtotal</b>                     | <b>\$2,450,000</b>  |
| <br>                                |                     |
| <b>One Time Costs:</b>              |                     |
| Graphic Equipment                   | \$230,000           |
| Edit Suites Equipment               | \$175,000           |
| Open/Sets                           | \$100,000           |
| Avstar Licenses                     | \$45,000            |
| VJ Equipment                        | \$200,000           |
| Minicam Cameras                     | \$80,000            |
| Cairo Polycom                       | \$30,000            |
| Library Shelving                    | \$75,000            |
| Furniture/Computers                 | \$350,000           |
| <b>Subtotal</b>                     | <b>\$1,285,000</b>  |
| <b>Total Requirements for FY'04</b> | <b>\$10,048,088</b> |

**Conclusion**

Bernard Lewis observes that Ayatollah Khomeini's spoken words communicated directly to Iran by phone and by cassettes was the first electronically engineered revolution in history. U.S. international broadcasting also reaches the Iranian people directly.

Both ratings and audience response in the form of email, phone calls, and letters from Iran to the Persian language service here in Washington show that Iranians are watching VOA's broadcasts because they are meaningful to their lives. To quote again from VOA's Iranian viewers, Mohammad A's email from Tehran of 31 May sums the audience response best: "We do not have credible and trustworthy media in Iran and all the media is censored. You are now carrying a very significant responsibility and you are the hope of the Iranian youth."

We have an experienced and invigorated management structure in place; the modest plan outlined above responds both to the United States' need to address the Iranian audience, and the latter's clearly expressed desire for more programming that offers hope for a freer and democratic future. All we ask is for the means.

August 30, 2004

320.2 Strategic

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Matt Latimer  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Force Posture Testimony

The testimony I will present in mid-Sept to the SASC on Force Posture is terribly important. I would like to get the first half by this Friday.

Please get an outline from Dr. Cambone to get started. We need to discuss transformation in the broadest sense and then bring it down to force posture because the force posture arrangements are a direct result of our ability to use greater flexibility and agility.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
083004-5

.....  
Please respond by 9/3

30 AUG 04

August 30, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Geren Paper

Please take a look at the attached, from Pete Geren, and see me on it tomorrow.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Abu Ghraib paper by Pete Geren

DHR:ss  
083004-6

.....  
Please respond by 9/1

**“Mr. Chairman, I know you join me today in saying to the world, judge us by our actions, watch how Americans, watch how a democracy deals with the wrongdoing and with scandal and the pain of acknowledging and correcting our own mistakes and our own weaknesses.”**

-- Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld  
May 7, 2004 before the Senate Armed Services Committee

Lost in the public conversation about the recently released reports on Abu Ghraib is a powerful and important message for the world and for Americans – for Baby Boomers who cut their political teeth on Watergate and Generation X’ers who did so on Whitewater.

It is an important message for Americans who have grown to expect accountability for public officials to be a game of semantic dodge ball, who have watched people they wanted to trust hide behind clever spin, hair-splitting, high fences and legal technicalities.

These reports came forward in a world of low expectations. Many, if not most, expected a whitewash from the Rumsfeld-appointed Schlesinger Panel and a team of Generals investigating Generals. It is understandable that Americans, with their civic morality numbed by Whitewater, Watergate and various other “Gates”, expected no more than whitewash from the people they have placed in positions of trust.

On May 7, 2004 in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Secretary of Defense invited the world’s scrutiny of our handling of this grave affair. He said:

“Mr. Chairman, I know you join me today in saying to the world, judge us by our actions, watch how Americans, watch how a democracy deals with the wrongdoing and with scandal and the pain of acknowledging and correcting our own mistakes and our own weaknesses.”

He offered this view of American values:

“We value human life. We believe in individual freedom and in the rule of law. For those beliefs, we send men and women of the armed forces abroad to protect that right for our own people and to give others who aren’t Americans the hope of a future of freedom.

Part of that mission, part of what we believe in, is making sure that when wrongdoings or scandal do occur, that they're not covered up, but they're exposed, they're investigated, and the guilty are brought to justice."

The events of the last week proved the Secretary true to his words. They proved that this Administration will follow the facts where they lead, put the full story before the American people, and stand accountable.

Let me add further, this was done in a Presidential election year, in a close election, two months before election day, a period during which even the most virtuous could be tempted to stray from their convictions.

Over one-hundred and seventy years ago, an adopted son of Texas, Sam Houston, lived by the creed, "Hew to the line and let the chips fall where they may." Today, President Bush, another adopted son of Texas, has demonstrated that his Administration will live by those words.

Abu Ghraib is a painful chapter in American history. It was, as Secretary Rumsfeld described it, a "body blow" to our country. As terrible as the cost has been, the crimes of Abu Ghraib would have been compounded had the world seen politics as usual, had America done anything but what this Administration has done.

On May 7, with calls for his resignation echoing in the Senate Armed Services Committee chamber, Secretary Rumsfeld announced the standard for this Administration's review of Abu Ghraib:

"And there's no question but that the investigations have to go forward... And it does not matter one whit where the responsibility falls. It falls where it does."

Sam Houston could not have said it better nor meant it more. The events of the last week bear witness to that fact. Let the world take note and watch how this democracy deals with wrongdoing and scandal.



August 27, 2004

383.6

TO: Pete Geren  
 Gen. Maples

c c : Ryan Henry

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld @-

SUBJECT: Wrapping Up

It seems to me we are at a point where we ought to begin wrapping up the prison abuse issues.

Specifically, why don't we make a list of all the problems that have been found in the various investigations and reports, and then list what we have done or are doing to correct each one.

The fact is that, as we get into new circumstances, things have to be reviewed and adjusted. Problems occur and, as they occur, we will fix them. In each case, show whose responsibility the problem was and who has been assigned the task of fixing it. In almost every case, it will be the Army. The Army has to fix the training, fix the military intelligence, etc.

Please come up with a format and talk to me about this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082704-5 (ts computer).doc



Please respond by 9/10/04

2M AUG 04

11-L-0559/OSD/28104

OSD 19353-04

720

file

August 21, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
cc: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Response to Senator McCain

452T

Please get an answer to John McCain on the attached letter he sent to John Handy.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/20/04 McCain ltr to Gen. Handy

DHR dh  
082604-4 (is computer) doc

.....  
Please respond by 9/3/04

*Closed.  
Gen Handy replied  
directly to Sen McCain  
See attachment*

3700904

11-L-0559/OSD/28105

OSD 19355-04

SIR --- 8/25  
FYI.  
VIR

JOHN MCCAIN  
ARIZONA  
CHAIRMAN  
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,  
AND TRANSPORTATION  
AND ON ARMED SERVICES  
AND ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

United States Senate

August 20, 2004

General John W. Handy, USAF  
Commander  
Air Mobility Command  
402 Scott Drive, Unit 3EC  
Scott Air Force Base, IL 62225-5310

561 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0561  
(202) 534-3236  
4400 SOUTH RURAL ROAD  
SUITE 3-135  
TUSCALOOSA, AL 35602  
(205) 967-6338  
3400 EAST ARIZONA  
BIRMINGHAM OFFICE  
SUITE 1150  
PRICHARD, AL 36071  
(205) 963-0610  
450 WEST PARKER ROAD  
SUITE 100  
TUCKER, AL 35711  
(205) 870-6334  
TELEPHONE FOR HEARING IMPAIRED  
(202) 524-7132  
(202) 523-0170

Dear General Handy:

I write regarding your statements recently reported in *U.S. News and World Report* that "I am not a muscle man, but I have stuck my finger through significant pieces of metal," and "I could poke a hole into the corroded areas of the airplane." The quotes were characterized as supporting the acquisition of new air refueling tankers for the Air Force.

As you are aware, the Secretary of Defense has ordered a thorough analysis of alternatives regarding the tanker replacement program. As you also know, this was precipitated by findings of a Defense Science Board task force that, among other things, there is no evidence that corrosion poses an imminent catastrophic threat to the KC-135 fleet mission readiness and that the Air Force's maintenance regime is well poised to deal with corrosion and other aging problems. In fact, the findings indicate that the Air Force's claims of unmanageable corrosion problems and cost growth were overstated. It also found that the KC-135E can fly to 2040. These findings disproved assertions to the contrary repeatedly made by civilian Air Force leadership regarding the purportedly urgent need to lease 100 Boeing 767s. In other words, the 'dominating rationale' cited by the Air Force to Congress for having taxpayers pay billions of dollars more for leasing Boeing's KC-767A tankers than they would for buying them outright, has been conclusively shown to be without merit. The Air Force's representations on this issue remain a matter of continuing investigative concern. I discussed my concerns about such misconduct in a letter to the Secretary, dated July 28, 2004.

Aspects of that deal, ranging from the how the original Air Force proposal passed through Congress outside the normal budget process to the improper conduct of senior executives at the Boeing Company, have been exhaustively reviewed and fundamentally criticized by the Senate Committee on Armed Services; the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation; the Department of Justice; the Defense Department's Office of the Inspector General; the Defense Science Board; the Congressional Budget Office; the General Accounting Office; the Congressional Research Service; the Office of Management and Budget; the Defense Department's Office of Programs, Analysis and Evaluation; the Institute for Defense Analyses; the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University and others. Notably, White House Chief of Staff Andy Card and former Defense Department Comptroller General

2004 08 20 10:43 AM

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER



Gov Zakheim have also weighed in with serious concerns about various aspects of the tanker program. Regrettably, your comments reflect a disturbing trend that I recently noted in my letters of March 12, 2004 and July 28, 2004 to the Secretary of Defense, whereby Air Force *uniformed* officers continue to publicly support an acquisition strategy that has been conclusively shown to be a folly.

I hope that you will agree that the path forward on the tanker replacement program that the Secretary of Defense ordered needs to be conducted objectively, independently, and free from political pressure. As such, it is not well-served by such commentary.

Sincerely,

*John McCain*  
John McCain

cc: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

NOV 08 10 43 AM '04

NOV 08 10 43 AM '04

3

OSD Copy

9/23



UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

508 SCOTT DR  
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE IL 62225-8367

A.O. \_\_\_\_\_  
ACTION For R  
COORD \_\_\_\_\_  
DUE \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET

2004 SEP 23 11:17

14 September 2004

The Honorable John McCain  
United States Senate  
Washington DC 205 10-0505

Dear Senator McCain

Thank you for your letter regarding tanker recapitalization, 20 Aug 04. I was disheartened to read the *U.S News and World Report* account of a "fight between the Air Force and the Senate" in the sentence leading into my quote regarding the health of our KC-135Es. I share your eagerness to learn the results of the KC-135 Recapitalization Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) and the OSD-led Mobility Capability Study (MCS). Rest assured I have no preference or agenda regarding an acquisition strategy or a particular tanker platform. I continue to take very seriously my responsibilities to provide robust aerial refueling capabilities to combatant commanders around the globe in support of our nation's objectives.

Sincerely

*John W. Handy*  
JOHN W. HANDY

Commander

cc:

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

OSD 14471-04

11-L-0558/OSD/28108

D&D



August 25, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DFI Fund Response

*IRAO*

Please draft a response to these three Senators' letter on the CPA and DFI, and let me see your proposed draft from you to them before it goes.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/19/04 Senators Wyden, Harkin, and Dorgan ltr to SecDef [OSD #12458-04]

DHR:dh  
082504-28 (ts computer).doc



*Please respond by*           9/3/04          

*25Aug04*

OSD 19357-04



23 AUG 2004

**From the Desk of  
Paul Wolfowitz**

8/23

*Sec Def -*

*This could be a big  
issue -*

*I will call you about  
it.*

*Paul W.*

11-L-0559/OSD/28110

United States Senate  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

August 19, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Department of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301

2004  
2004 AUG 20 PM 2:34  
OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:


We are writing about recent press reports that indicate \$8.8 billion in Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) money cannot be accounted for. The reports indicate that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was in charge of the money throughout the period in question, allocated the money to Iraqi ministries earlier this year, prior to the termination of the CPA. The CPA apparently transferred this staggering sum of money with no written rules or guidelines for ensuring adequate managerial, financial or contractual controls over the funds.

Among the disturbing findings are that the payrolls of the ministries, under CPA control, were reportedly padded with thousands of ghost employees. In one example, the report indicates that the CPA paid for 74,000 guards even though the actual number of guards couldn't be validated. In another example, 8,206 guards were listed on a payroll, but only 603 real individuals could be counted. Such enormous discrepancies raise very serious questions about potential fraud, waste, and abuse.

The reports raise anew very serious questions about the quality of the CPA's oversight and accountability in the reconstruction of Iraq. Iraq is now a sovereign nation, but it is clear that the United States will continue to play a major role in the country's reconstruction. It is therefore imperative that the U.S. government exercise careful control and oversight over expenditures of taxpayer dollars. Continued failures to account for funds, such as the \$8.8 billion of concern here, or Halliburton's repeated failure to fully account for \$4.2 billion for logistical support in Iraq and Kuwait, and the refusal, so far, of the Pentagon to take corrective action are a disservice to the American taxpayer, the Iraqi people and to our men and women in uniform.

We are requesting a full, written account of the \$8.8 billion transferred earlier this year from the CPA to the Iraqi ministries, including the amount each ministry received and the way in which the ministry spent the money, as well as a date certain for when the Pentagon will finally install adequate managerial, financial and contractual controls over taxpayer dollars and DFI expenditures in Iraq. We look forward to hearing from your office in the next two weeks.

Sincerely,

  
Ron Wyden

  
Tom Harkin

  
Byron Dorgan

OSD 12458-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28111

72

RA 9/28



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

SECRET  
SEP 27 2004 9:05

INFO MEMO

September 10, 2004 2:25 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW* SEP 27 2004

SUBJECT: CIO for DoD

- You asked me to pull together a small group to address issues raised by Ken Krieg in his Aug. 13, 2004 memo to you regarding the roles and authority of CIOs.
- Such a group is being assembled and will meet on Oct. 1<sup>st</sup> in your conference room. The agenda and attendee list are attached. We are working with your schedule and hope you will be able to attend the last session.
- As Ken noted, the Department has a CIO. John Stenbit occupied that position when he was here, and Lin Wells is acting in that capacity now.
- The question remains, how do we move the Department to use this person/role effectively? Ken pointed out, "In leading private sector companies, the CIO is one of the key business leaders. The position is the strategic leader on information inside the enterprise and has significant authority in partnership with the senior sector leaders (equivalents of service secretaries, service chiefs, etc.)".
- Independently, Art Cebrowski has proposed a change to the charter for the ASD(NII)/CIO to enhance his role; a revised charter along these lines is being staffed.
- In addition, various net-centric transformational initiatives are coming to fruition. Information-based approaches are proving their operational worth in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

COORDINATION: Ken Krieg *JK*

Attachments: As stated

0200000

1055004

25 AUG 04

OSD 19370-04

**DRAFT**

**Agenda**  
**Department of Defense Meeting with Industry Chief Information Officers**  
**October 1, 2004**  
**The Pentagon, Room 3E921**

- 0800 – 0820**            **Arrival**
- 0820 – 0830**            **Welcome & Introductions**
- *Mr. Pete Geren, Special Assistant  
Office of the Secretary of Defense*
  - *Mr. John Kasich  
Managing Director, Lehman Brothers  
Former Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Budget Committee*
- 0830 – 0845**            **Meeting Goals and Expectations**
- *Mr. Ken Krieg  
Director, Program Analysis & Evaluation  
Office of the Secretary of Defense*
  - *Mr. Mark Kvanme  
Partner  
Sequoia Capital*
- 0845 – 0930**            **DoD Briefing - VADM (Ret) ~~At~~ Cebrowski**
- *DoD CIO Perspective ~~Lin Wells, Acting DoD CIO/ASD(NII)~~*
  - *Why IT is Crucial to the Warfighter and DoD Key Challenges  
Mr. John Garstka  
Assistant Director for Concept and Operations for Force Transformation  
Office of the Secretary of Defense*
  - *Netcentric Operations Experience – Global War on Terrorism  
Senior Military – BG Cone preferred*
- 0930 – 0945**            **Break**

## DRAFT

0945 – 1145

### **Moderated Discussion: Role of CIO in a Netcentric Enterprise**

*Mr. Ken Krieg*

### **Industry CIO Organization Structure, Challenges, and Perspectives**

1000 – 1010 *Mr. Robert B. Carter, Executive Vice President,  
Chief Information Officer, Federal Express*

1010 – 1020 *Mr. Brad Boston, Senior vice President and  
Chief Information Officer, Cisco Systems*

1020 – 1030 *Ms. Carol Kline, Chief Information Officer,  
America Online*

1030 – 1040 *Mr. Robert DeRodes, Executive Vice President and  
Chief Information Officer, Home Depot, Inc.*

1040 – 1050 *TBD*

*Chief Information Officer – Johnson & Johnson*

1050–1100 *Large Transition Company Representative  
(i.e. Automotive, GE, or CitiGroup, etc.)*

1145 – 1200

**Break**

1200 – 1300

**Working Lunch**

- *Round Table Discussions and Recommended Actions*

1300 – 1315

**Break**

1315 – 1400

**Discussion with Department of Defense Leadership-Ken Krieg**

- *Secretary of Defense*
- *Deputy Secretary of Defense*
- *Service Secretaries*
- *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*
- *DoD CIOs/Private Sector CIOs*



**DRAFT**

**Department of Defense Meeting with Industry Chief Information Officers**  
*Updated as of: September 10, 2004*

**Attendee List (Defense)**

|     | <b>Name</b>               | <b>Title/Organization</b>  |
|-----|---------------------------|--|
| 1.  | Boutelle LTG, Steven      | Chief Information Officer, Department of Army                                    |
| 2.  | Cebrowski VADM (Ret), Art | Director, Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense     |
| 3.  | Geren, Pete               | Special Assistant, Office of the Secretary of Defense                            |
| 4.  | Gilligan, John            | Chief Information Officer, Department of the Air Force                           |
| 5.  | Guthrie, Priscilla        | Deputy, Chief Information Officer, Department of Defense                         |
| 6.  | Krieg, Ken                | Director, Program Analysis & Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense      |
| 7.  | Lentz, Robert             | Director, Information Assurance, Department of Defense, Chief Information Office |
| 8.  | Myers, Margaret           | Principal Director, Chief Information Officer, Department of Defense             |
| 9.  | Shea LtGen, Robert        | J-6, Joint Chiefs of Staff   |
| 10. | Wells II, Linton          | Acting, Chief Information Officer, Department of Defense                         |
| 11. | Wennergren, Dave          | Chief Information Officer, Department of the Navy                                |

**Attendee List (Industry)**

|     | <b>Name</b>     | <b>Title/Organization</b>  |
|-----|-----------------|--|
| 12. | Banahan, Tom    | Managing Director, Lehman Brothers                                   |
| 13. | Boston, Brad    | Senior Vice President and Chief Information Officer, Cisco Systems   |
| 14. | Carter, Robert  | Executive Vice President, Chief Information Officer, Federal Express |
| 15. | DeRodes, Robert | Executive Vice President and Chief Information Officer, Home Depot   |
| 16. | Kline, Carol    | Chief Information Officer, America Online                            |
| 17. | James, Wilber   | Partner, Rockport Capital  |
| 18. | Kasich, John    | Managing Director, Lehman Brothers                                   |
| 19. | Kvamme, Mark    | Partner, Sequoia Capital   |
| 20. | Schlein, Ted    | General Partner, Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers                    |
| 21. | TBD             | Chief Information Officer, Johnson & Johnson                         |
| 22. | TBD             | Chief Information Officer, Large Transition Company                  |

**DRAFT**

**Other Attendees**

|     | <b>Name</b>        | <b>Title/Organization</b>  |
|-----|--------------------|--|
| 23. | Bollinger, Terry   | Contractor, Defense Venture Catalyst Initiative Support  |
| 24. | Cocca, Vivian      | Information Assurance Transformation Leader, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Networks and Information Integration          |
| 25. | Dingman, Michael   | Contractor, Defense Venture Catalyst Initiative Support  |
| 26. | Garstka, John      | Assistant Director for Concept and Operations for Force Transformation Office of the Secretary of Defense                  |
| 27. | Goldman, Harriet   | Contractor, Defense Venture Catalyst Initiative Support  |
| 28. | Holland, Charles   | Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science & Technology   |
| 29. | King, Steve        | Associate Director for Information Assurance and Defense Venture Catalyst Initiative                                       |
| 30. | McVaney, Ed        | Defense Business Board*  |
| 31. | Sega, Ronald       | Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary for Acquisition Technology & Logistics |
| 32. | van Tilborg, Andre | Director, Information Systems, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Science & Technology                                     |

*\*Request from Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)*

**Wrap up with Additional Senior Invitees**

Secretary of Defense  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Service Secretaries  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

# **BACKGROUND**



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

1355  
a/10  
Dy 20

NETWORKS AND  
INFORMATION  
INTEGRATION  
(ACI/IS)

Sept 10, 2004

Dep Sec Def,

This responds to your request of  
Aug 30 for a memo you could send  
to Sec Def about CIO issues. We're  
making good progress, and I think  
the meeting on Oct 1 will be valuable

Jim



UNCLASSIFIED

Revised

9/10  
BACK  
1855  
9/10

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
The Military Assistant


30 August 2004 - 1030 Hours

20 9/23  
2/21

SUBJECT: CIO

Sir,  
The DSD has asked that you please prepare a response that DSD can send to SecDef.  
Also, please coordinate the response with Mr. Ken Krieg. Please see attached document.

Very respectfully,



Stephen T. Ganyard  
Colonel, USMC  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense: 8 September 2004

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/28119

August 13, 2004

*AK/SL*

Memorandum for: Secretary of Defense  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

From: Ken Krieger *KK*

Cc: Pete Geren

Subject: Snowflake Response on CIO

Several months ago you asked me to think about whether we should have a CIO in the Department. The easy answer is yes.

By responsibility and title you have one in the Assistant Secretary for Network and Information Integration - who is dual-hatted as CIO. Lin Wells serves in that capacity on an acting basis until either Fran Harvey or an alternate is confirmed by the Senate.

The harder answer is that there is still a wide gap in the standard view of the role of the CIO between that in the private sector and the government. In leading private sector companies, the CIO is one of the key business leaders. The position is the strategic leader on information inside the enterprise and has significant authority in partnership with the senior sector leaders (equivalents of service secretaries, service chiefs etc.) to create a joint, enterprise approach to information. In DoD's case, converting to an approach like this will require significant changes in the roles and behaviors of Services, Agencies, and OSD alike.

Interestingly, Pete Geren informed me that the Kasich Group has identified this as a significant issue of interest. Pete is arranging a seminar on October 1 in the Pentagon with John Kasich and a number of leading private sector CIOs to think about the question of how DoD might adapt the role given the breadth and complexity of our enterprise.

It might be useful to get a number of the senior leaders of the Department in this seminar. If you are interested, I will work with Pete to keep you informed.

COPY

427  
36



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPT OF DEF 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
HAS BEEN APPROVED - PW  
JUL 1 2004

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

ACTION MEMO

TRANSFORMATION OFFICE

Butler

June 24, 2004, 10:30 AM

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: A. K. Cebrowski, Director, Office of Force Transformation

*AKC* 6/24

SUBJECT: Transformation and ASD(NII)/DoD CIO Charter

Since the stand-up of **ASD(NII)/DoD CIO** a little over a year ago, the organization's charter **has** been in **staffing**. The Department **is** missing a significant transformational opportunity if the charter **goes** forward in its present form. I suggest the Department leverage the NII charter development to adopt an enterprise-wide approach to information **management**, in lieu of the fragmented, piecemeal processes we now have.

The key issue is if we are to have a CIO, how do **we** do it right.

Defense Transformation hinges on the successful development of a net-centric capable force and the recognition that information and communications technology (ICT) **and** information **activities** are our **great source of power**, yet we **seem** to be poorly organized for it. **This** is a governance issue which requires us to craft new organizational relationships to exploit **this** new source of power **effectively**. Specifically, the broad relationship between **owners** of the processes that **ICT** supports **and the DoD CIO** must be crafted for success using demonstrated effective commercial business models.

Unlike successful firms, DoD lacks an enterprise-wide approach to the management of its **ICT** resources. Services' authorities, fragmented ICT oversight by **various** acquisition executives and bureaucratic legacies **all** impede the development of an integrated approach to information management. This **was** one of the concerns and recommendations I presented in my Strategic Transformation Appraisal to the **SLRG**. During my briefings to the individual Service Secretaries **and** Service Chiefs it continually surfaced **as an** issue of frustration.

To serve you and the Secretary best, the DoD CIO should perform four roles, as is done in successful **firms**, with authorities appropriate **to** each:

- Principal staff assistant and advisor on <sup>(IT)</sup> ~~IT~~ and information management, networks, and related areas
- Enterprise-level strategist **from** the <sup>man</sup> **ICT** perspective
- **ICT** architect for the DoD enterprise
- DoD-wide **IT** executive

|              |         |
|--------------|---------|
| TSA SO       | 6/28    |
| SA DSD       |         |
| SRMA DSD     | 4/27    |
| 0:385 563-04 | 11/9/05 |

Implementing these roles will involve technical, organizational, cultural and operational change. There is no good time for this fight, but there is a significant chance for success under you and the Secretary. I'm prepared to work with Lin Wells and others. I have discussed this with Fran Harvey.

I'm asking your concurrence to begin this approach, since there will be significant resistance from some quarters.

Pursue the approach FW Non Concur \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_  
1 JUL 2004



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COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by: A. K. Cebrowski, Director, Force Transformation

(b)(6)

file

*summary*

1400  
8/22

August 25, 2004

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2004-08-25 09:05

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CIO for DoD

Please put together a small group to address this question that Ken Krieg discusses in the attached memo, and get back to me with a report by October 1.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/13/04 Krieg memo to SecDef/DepSecDef re: memo #042704-6

DHR:dh  
042504-20 (to computer).doc

.....  
Please respond by 10/1/04

*DL 9/28*

Sir,  
Response attached.  
v/R,  
Lt Col Lengyel

020000

25 Aug 04

OSD 19370-04

(b)(6)

August 25, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

CC: **Larry** Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*

SUBJECT: Information Needed Today

2504

Please get me that piece of **paper** I had that **shows** how **many** courts martial there **are** per year (there were four categories) at any given time.

**Also, get me:**

- the total number of active, guard, reserve and civilian employees in the Department **of** Defense, separately
- the total number of prisons under the jurisdiction of DoD **and** overseas, separately
- **who** (what organizations) in DoD is responsible for managing the people in the **prisons**
- who is responsible for training the people **who** work in the prisons—MPs and MI
- who is responsible for training the military intelligence people
- the total number of people involved with prisons—the guards, the military police, **and** also the interrogation **people**
- the total number of detainees that have existed from the time I came in (on a chart)—what the total number was at the **peak** and what it is now.

I need all the **answers** to these questions before tomorrow morning.

Thanks.

DFIR: dh  
082504-6 (ts computer) doc

.....  
**Please respond by** 8/26/04

25AUG04

0 SD 19380-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28125

August 25, 2004

SECRET

7000-10-2 011 2:10

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Transforming the USG

Attached is a short draft presentation on transforming the U.S. Government for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This brief is obviously in an early stage.

Andy, it seems to me that these are the kinds of national security, homeland security and other issues that you folks in the White House are considering. Clearly, they don't fit neatly into the responsibilities of any single department or even into any one of the White House councils. But then, the problems we face in the world don't fit neatly into any one department or into any one of the various White House councils.

In any event, we have folks in DoD who have been thinking about some of these things. If anything here is of interest to you, the Vice President or Condi, let me know. We would be happy to try to be helpful. If you would like to talk about any of these ideas, let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/20/04 Transforming the U.S. Government for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

DIIR:dh  
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11-L-0559/OSD/28126

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25 AUG 04

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# ***Transforming the U.S. Government for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century***

**23 August 2004**

**This briefing is classified  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~**

**Draft Working Papers Not Subject to FOIA**

8/20/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/28127

# ***Purpose***

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- Public attention generated by 9/11 Commission report and Congressional hearings have focused Nation on need to improve national security
- Opportunity for Administration to:
  - Go beyond 9/11 Commission recommendations
  - Go beyond the issue of terrorism
  - Prepare for broader challenges of 21<sup>st</sup> century
- Consider whether the USG might:
  - Restructure ***institutions***
  - Create or realign ***authorities***
  - Take further ***action***

~~FOUO~~

## ***Restructure Institutions – Illustrative Ideas***

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- **Domestic intelligence** – Go beyond law enforcement approach and integrate with foreign intelligence while duly preserving civil liberties?
- **Strategic Communications** – Create entity in the USG that draws on US private sector prowess in media, IT, advertising, and entertainment?
- **NSC and HSC** – Restructure organizations?
- **US Country Teams** – Transform US Embassy Country Teams for 21<sup>st</sup> century operations?
- **UN and other international institutions** – Reorganize to prevent crises and assist member states that lack capacity for effective governance?
- **National Guard** – Organize, train and equip the National Guard for homeland defense?

~~FOUO~~

## ***Create or Realign Authorities – Illustrative Ideas***

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- **Interagency “Jointness”** – Increase through “Goldwater-Nichols” for whole USG?
- **Build Local Capacity** – Help international partners build their capacity to counter enemies and replace US forces
  - Seek additional authorities for: “Train and Equip,” Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), Global Peace Operations Initiative
- **Homeland Security** – Is it time for review of how USG responsibilities and authorities are allocated to ensure right capabilities and assets address key problems?
- **Congress** – Streamline Congressional oversight (e.g., Joint Committees; smaller committees; merged authorization and appropriation committees) and speed nomination/confirmation process?



~~FOUO~~

## ***Take Action – Illustrative Ideas***

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- **Bio-Defense** – Launch Strategic Bio-Defense Initiative?
- **Common Threat Assessments** – Implement initiative to develop common threat assessments with key allies and partners?
- **Non-Governmental Action** – Mobilize private philanthropies and utilize public-private partnerships to promote educational reform and economic development in Muslim world?
- **Civilian/Military Recruiting and Retention** – Review incentives/disincentives for public/military service?

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

## ***Way Ahead***

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- Assign tasks to refine ideas and develop action plans (assign duties, set deadlines, develop metrics, track progress)
- Recommend to Congress actions requiring new legislation
- Develop draft Executive Orders where appropriate

~~FOUO~~



# **Back-up Slides**

11-L-0559/OSD/28133

~~FOUO~~

# ***Additional Illustrative Ideas***

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- Establish standing USG planning function for building & maintaining coalitions
- Establish “National Security University” educational system for interagency
- Expand unconventional warfare, civil affairs and foreign internal defense capabilities
- Establish Deputy National Intelligence Director to serve as all-source intelligence “archivist” and Chief Information Officer for Intel Community
- Re-evaluate USG national roles and missions (a USG)
- Build civilian reserve for international stability, reconstruction operations, security and intelligence
- Strengthen weak governments that they can increase legitimacy and authority in “ungoverned” territory via civic action projects

8/20/2004

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28134

August 21, 2004

2004-08-21 12:23

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: **PA** on Global Posture

320.2

Attached is Andy Hoehn's memo on the global force posture summary. Your folks ought to get a full court press on it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/20/04 DASD (Strategy) memo to SecDef re: Global Posture: Reaction to **POTUS** Speech

DHR:dh  
082104-11 (ts computer).doc



Please respond by 8/27/04

21 AUG 04

0 SD 19382 -04

0481

INFO MEMO

I-04/011142-STRAT

DepSecDef

AUG 20 2004

USD/P

PDUSD/P

*[Signature]*  
AUG 20 2004

*J 8/20*

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Hoehn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy *Andy H.*

SUBJECT: Global Posture: Reaction to **POTUS** Speech (U)

Here is an update on recent reactions to the President's posture announcement on August 16. Public Affairs reports that coverage overall has been 90% positive.

- Foreign reaction, especially official statements, has been almost universally positive, while domestic reaction has been somewhat more mixed.
  - o Domestic media tends to emphasize US politics, while foreign media gives more prominence to the strategic value of the review.
- In general, those who have done sufficient fact-finding (e.g. Wall Street Journal and BBC) have responded very positively.

**DOMESTIC**

- Op-eds offer expected election-season political commentary, such as Ron Asmus's critical Aug 18 piece in the Washington Post.
  - o But op-eds Charles Krauthammer in the Post and Marcus Corbin in the Baltimore Sun were highly supportive.
- Most editorials – like the Washington Post, Boston Globe, and Detroit Free Press – offer a generally understanding, if mixed, viewpoint. Some common themes are:
  - o Credit for the Administration's strategic rationale;
  - o Support for long-overdue moves in Europe;
  - o Concern about impact in Korea; and
  - o Criticism for announcing the changes at a campaign event.
- Only a few editorials have been decisively positive or negative:
  - o The Wall Street Journal's good piece was the result of time **we** invested with their editorial writers.
  - o The New York Times' negative editorial was expected – they wrote a similarly negative piece on US-German relations last **May**.
  - o The Philadelphia Inquirer produced an oddly negative and speculative editorial, which we have responded to via a letter to the editor.

## FOREIGN

- Foreign official reaction has been positive – testimony to our consultation efforts over the past 9 months.
  - Ranges from very positive (Australia, Italy) to surprisingly benign (Russia).
- In foreign media, the review's strategic aspects have received significant attention, along with **stones** on local impact and speculation about US political motives.
- See the attached paper for samples of both official and press statements from allies and interested parties.

## WAY AHEAD

- Your op-ed is being finalized.
- We will continue to respond to negative editorials via letters and to **push** out op-eds like Doug Feith's **piece** in the August 19 Washington Post.
- We will encourage combatant commanders to speak out.
- We will approach selected Defense Policy Board members – such as Harold Brown, James Schlesinger, and Barry Blechman – to write op-eds and take interviews.
- SASC plans a hearing on 20 September.

ATTACHMENT: As stated.

Prepared by: Mike Brown and Sean Sinclair, Strategy, (b)(6)

See DEF → WE'VE ASKED DIA IF THEY CAN PROVIDE ANY INSIGHT INTO REACTIONS FROM N. KOREA, CHINA, OR FRANCE. *J. [Signature]*

## SAMPLE OF FOREIGN REACTION

### Official

- Karsten Voigt, German PM Schroeder's coordinator for US relations: "This is positive... a success story."
- UK MoD: "The UK government and NATO have been consulted ... but it is too early to say what impact there will be on US deployments in the UK"
- Italy MFA: "Absolutely not [a symbol of a weaker commitment]. The Cold War is a thing of the past."
- Japan MFA: "Japan welcomes the review of the US military framework that will better suit the global security environment and further contribute to peace and stability."
- South Korea MFA: "The South Korean government has been well aware of this plan."
- Australia MoD: "It will improve the US capability to contribute to international efforts to defeat global threats."
- Russia's MoD: "I don't see anything alarming in these plans."

*Note: No official commentary reported yet from China, France, Singapore, or India.*

### Press

- Germany: *Deutsche Welle* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine* – likely negative impacts on the German economy and local affinities for US troops, but also the need for NATO to improve its own capabilities.
- UK: *BBC* and *Financial Times* – largely favorable discussion of the strategic rationale and implications, but speculation on the fate of UK-based F-15s.
- Japan: *Japan Times* and *Asahi* – praise for the strategic rationale, and detailed reporting on specific proposals for posture in Japan.
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- Australia: *Sydney Morning Herald* – new posture may weaken deterrence in Korea.
- Singapore: *The Straits News* – quotes from President, very little discussion of strategy or implications in Asia.
- India: *The Hindu* – cursory discussion of the rationale, with quotes from the President and critics.
- France: Minimal exposure in French press, mostly quotes from the President and critics.

*Note: Little press commentary to date from China or Russia.*





SECRET  
2004 08 21 PM 2:30

August 21, 2004

TO: Matt Latimer  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Operation OVERLORD

*Germany*

Here are some interesting thoughts about Operation OVERLORD you might want to take a look at.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/18/04 Historian memo "OVERLORD What Ifs"

DJR dh  
082104-16 (ts computer).doc



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*21 Aug 04*

OSD 19384-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28139



HISTORICAL OFFICE

**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1777 NORTH KENT STREET  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209-2165

August 18, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR: R. F. DUBOIS

SUBJECT: OVERLORD What Ifs

In response to your E-Mail, "what went wrong with Operation Overlord", herewith some of the more obvious observations.

Operation OVERLORD was an operational plan for the first 90 days (D + 90) of a campaign to defeat the Germans in Northwest Europe in 1944. Retrospective analyses of the campaign have identified what are considered errors in planning and execution.

Planning:

1. Concentration on knowledge of coastal area landing sites to relative neglect of inland areas.
2. Insufficient attention to problem of bocage or hedgerow areas which became major obstacles to operations.

Execution:

1. Inadequate intelligence on German unit disposition. Presence of German 32<sup>nd</sup> Division at Omaha Beach not previously detected; made Omaha landing a bloodbath for U.S. forces on 6 June.
2. Landing at wrong places – U.S. 4<sup>th</sup> Division landed one kilometer south of where it was supposed to on Utah Beach. This caused delays in advance inland.
3. Failure to take Caen as early as planned. Caen was a key objective, the gateway to Paris. Instead of a few days it took the better part of two months to capture it.
4. Hedgerow fighting. These obstacles held up advances for weeks. U.S. forces not properly prepared in advance to cope with them.



11-L-0559/OSD/28140

5. Failure to close the Falaise – Argentan gap in August. British and American forces missed the opportunity to bag more than a dozen German divisions by leaving open a 25-mile gap in the planned encirclement. Most of the Germans escaped. Success of this maneuver might have shortened the war by months, since it is unlikely that the Germans could have stopped what probably would have been a much more rapid Allied advance to the German border.

*Alfred Goldberg*

Alfred Goldberg  
OSD Historian

SECRET  
201 001 -2 01 2:33

August 21, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Global Posture Reaction

Mr. President—

Attached is a summary of some of the immediate reactions to your announcement with respect to global posture adjustments. I thought you might like to see it.

We look forward to seeing you on Monday.

Respectfully,

Attach.  
8/20/04 DASD (Strategy) memo to SecDef re: Global Posture: Reaction to POTUS Speech

DHR:dh  
082104-10(ts computer).doc

320.2 STRATEGIC

214 200

OSD 19385-04

048/21

INFO MEMO

1-04/011142-STRAT

DepSecDef

AUG 20 2004

USD/P

PDUSD/P

*[Handwritten signature]*

AUG 20 2004

*J 8/20*

*Andy H.*

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Hoehn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy

SUBJECT: Global Posture: Reaction to POTUS Speech (U)

Here is an update on recent reactions to the President's posture announcement on August 16. Public Affairs reports that coverage overall has been 90% positive.

- Foreign reaction, especially official statements, has been almost universally positive, while domestic reaction has been somewhat more mixed.
  - Domestic media tends to emphasize US politics, while foreign media gives more prominence to the strategic value of the review.
- In general, those who have done sufficient fact-finding (e.g. Wall Street Journal and BBC) have responded very positively.

**DOMESTIC**

- Op-eds offer expected election-season political commentary, such as Ron Asmus's critical Aug 18 piece in the Washington Post.
  - But op-eds Charles Krauthammer in the Post and Marcus Corbin in the Baltimore Sun were highly supportive.
- Most editorials – like the Washington Post, Boston Globe, and Detroit Free Press – offer a generally understanding, if mixed, viewpoint. Some common themes are:
  - Credit for the Administration's strategic rationale;
  - Support for long-overdue moves in Europe;
  - Concern about impact in Korea; and
  - Criticism for announcing the changes at a campaign event.
- Only a few editorials have been decisively positive or negative:
  - The Wall Street Journal's good piece was the result of time we invested with their editorial writers.
  - The New York Times' negative editorial was expected – they wrote a similarly negative piece on US-German relations last May.
  - The Philadelphia Inquirer produced an oddly negative and speculative editorial, which we have responded to via a letter to the editor.

## FOREIGN

- Foreign official reaction has been positive – testimony to our consultation efforts over the past 9 months.
  - Ranges from very positive (Australia, Italy) to surprisingly benign (Russia).
- In foreign media, the review's strategic aspects have received significant attention, along with stories on local impact and speculation about US political motives.
- See the attached paper for samples of both official and press statements from allies and interested parties.

## WAY AHEAD

- Your op-ed is being finalized.
- We will continue to respond to negative editorials via letters and to push out op-eds like Doug Feith's piece in the August 19 Washington Post.
- We will encourage combatant commanders to speak out.
- We will approach selected Defense Policy Board members – such as Harold Brown, James Schlesinger, and Barry Blechman – to write op-eds and take interviews.
- SASC plans a hearing on 20 September.

ATTACHMENT: As stated.

Prepared by: Mike Brown and Sean Smeland, Strategy, (b)(6)

*SecDEF → WE'VE ASKED DIA IF THEY CAN PROVIDE ANY INSIGHT INTO REACTIONS FROM N. KOREA, CHINA, OR FRANCE. Jambury*

## SAMPLE OF FOREIGN REACTION

### Official

- Karsten Voight, German PM Schroeder's coordinator for US relations: "This is positive... a success story,"
- UK MoD: "The UK government and NATO have been consulted ... but it is too early to say what impact there will be on US deployments in the UK"
- Italy MFA: "Absolutely not [a symbol of a weaker commitment]. The Cold War is a thing of the past."
- Japan MFA: "Japan welcomes the review of the US military framework that will better suit the global security environment and further contribute to peace and stability."
- South Korea MFA: "The South Korean government has been well aware of this plan."
- Australia MoD: "It will improve the US capability to contribute to international efforts to defeat global threats."
- Russia's MoD: "I don't see anything alarming in these plans."

*Note: No official commentary reported yet from China, France, Singapore, or India.*

### Press

- Germany: *Deutsche Welle* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine* – likely negative impacts on the German economy and local affinities for US troops, but also the need for NATO to improve its own capabilities.
- UK: *BBC* and *Financial Times* – largely favorable discussion of the strategic rationale and implications, but speculation on the fate of UK-based F-15s.
- Japan: *Japan Times* and *Asahi* – praise for the strategic rationale, and detailed reporting on specific proposals for posture in Japan.
- South Korea: *Korea Herald* – focuses exclusively on impact in Korea and ongoing Future of the Alliance talks.
- Australia: *Sydney Morning Herald* – new posture may weaken deterrence in Korea.
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- France: Minimal exposure in French press, mostly quotes from the President and critics.

*Note: Little press commentary to date from China or Russia.*

120

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

102904-16 03 03 26  
October 29, 2004

890

35009

TO: Gen Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tracking Ideas

I think we need to put more discipline into the task of tracking individual human beings. We need to get a Manhattan Project going that integrates a variety of intelligence disciplines and military capabilities.

Please see me with some ideas.

Thanks.

DHR:sa  
102904-16

.....  
Please respond by 11/30/04

290204

0 SD 19409-04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/28146



~~TOP SECRET~~

December 2, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
  
cc: ADM Giambastiani  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
  
SUBJECT: Joint Task Force HQ Brief

322

I was impressed with Ed Giambastiani's concept for the JTF HQ. Clearly a lot of good work by his staff and the Joint Staff as well went into it.

I do want to see you carefully think through whether it ought to be an active cadre of folks instead of reserves. I cannot see any reason whatsoever to use reserves. Once you think that through, I'd like to see an implementing document that I can sign in the next two weeks. We need to move out on this.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
120204-10

.....  
Please respond by 12/16/04

Thanks.

2 Dec 04

~~TOP SECRET~~

OSD 19415-04

December 3, 2004

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Prepaid Calling Cards for Military

Attached is a note from my friend, Bill Timmons, raising a matter of importance and concern on telephone credit cards for the military. It is self-explanatory.

The solution lies totally outside the Department of Defense, as I read it. I would very much appreciate your interest in this.

Thank you, sir.

**Attach.**  
12/1/04 Memo to SecDef from Bill Timmons

DHR:ss  
120304-3

3113

3 Dec 04

VIA FAX

Memorandum for the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

From: Bill Timmons *Bill*

Date: 1 December 2004

Subject: Prepaid Telephone Calling Cards for Military

---

Request your personal assistance on an issue of importance to our servicemen and women and their families. In the next few weeks the FCC intends to issue an order concerning prepaid calling cards that threatens to increase rates on the military and other users of this low-cost telephone service by as much as 20%.

Ten years ago calling card service that contained promotional advertisements (*called* enhanced cards) was placed in service. Telephone calls using these enhanced cards are informational and outside regulated service and therefore not subject to intrastate access or universal service fees. After all these years the FCC intends to make these cards fall in a revenue category that will cause troops and other card users to contribute more so others may contribute less.

Consistent with the goals of universal service, the cards today provide low-cost calling for those who need it most - military, senior, rural, minority, and low-income users. The USO provides free pre-paid cards to service personnel as part of "Operation Phone Home program." Wal-Mart, Sam's Club, drug stores, military exchanges, and other retail outlets sell the inexpensive calling cards. Members of Congress have communicated with FCC Chairman Powell not to take money out of soldiers' pockets while they defend our country. In fact, in the closing days of this Congress through report language for the final budget legislation Congress directed the FCC "not to take any action that would directly or indirectly have the effect of raising the rates charged to military personnel or their families for telephone calls placed using prepaid phone cards." On 23 July of this year the Pentagon weighed in when Charles Abell wrote the FCC pointing out the increased costs to service personnel and families if this order were implemented. The FCC chairman put off official action until after the election but now intends to go forward.

Don, about the only avenue open seems to be White House involvement to protect the low-cost prepaid calling cards for the military. May I suggest you call Andy Card and ask him to help?

Thanks a bunch.



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

2004 055 -3 PW 5:41

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *12/3/04*

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Command Sergeant Major (CSM) James R. Jordan's Retention  
Beyond Retention Control Point (RCP)

- This information memorandum is in response to your inquiry concerning the November 28, 2004, Fayetteville Observer article regarding CSM Jordan.
- CSM Jordan is the Brigade CSM for the 35<sup>th</sup> Signal Brigade (Airborne), XVIII<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The above-mentioned article reported that CSM Jordan had requested to extend beyond his mandatory retirement date in order to deploy with his unit to Iraq, but did not clearly report the status of his request.
- The Army Human Resources Command approved CSM Jordan's request on September 13, 2004. His request was approved as an exception to policy in accordance with Army Regulation 601-280, paragraph 3-10. The approved 14-month exception, thru August 2006, will allow CSM Jordan to deploy with his unit and then retire upon completion of redeployment processing.
- This was a good news / personal interest story.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: LTC David R. Alexander III

(b)(6)

Fayetteville (NC) Observer  
November 28, 2004

## Senior NCO Jordan Decides To Stay With His Team

By Henry Cuningham, Military editor

Command Sgt. Maj. James R. Jordan asked to stay in the Army for a year beyond his mandatory retirement date so he could complete a deployment to Iraq with the 35th Signal Brigade.

"We are currently at war," Jordan said. "We are doing things, and it requires leaders to do certain things. That's what I am, a leader."

Like his younger brother, retired basketball star Michael Jordan, James Jordan loves his job, believes in helping his team, expects maximum effort from those around him, and will leave on his own terms.

The sergeant major stands 5-foot-7. His brother is about 6-foot-6. At Fort Bragg, the older brother has kept a low profile and avoided calling attention to his family connection.

Command Sgt. Maj. Jordan and about 500 soldiers of the brigade are scheduled to depart today for a year in Iraq.

Under normal conditions, the 47-year-old Jordan, who entered basic training in June 1975 and had three assignments in Korea, would start winding down his Army career in the spring as he approached the 30-year mark.

His colonel promised to support whatever decision he made, but Jordan had no intention of getting on an airplane April 29, flying home and leaving his brigade.

"That's not the way you want to end a 30-year career," Jordan said.

"People ask, 'Why?'" said Col. Bryan Ellis, the brigade commander. "The answer is, he is completely selfless. We all want to see it go well."

### No-nonsense

Jordan is a no-nonsense noncommissioned officer with a shaved head and a wry sense of humor. In his job, he advises the commander as the senior enlisted soldier in the brigade of 2,450. Many of them are young specialists and sergeants facing back-to-back extended tours overseas.

"If you don't believe in selfless service, you are not going to make it in this business," Jordan said.

It's not your age that counts, it's your mind, said Jordan, the oldest person in the brigade. He went to airborne school, where most soldiers are in their teens or early 20s, as a 36-year-old first sergeant. At 47, he will run eight miles for physical training and expects soldiers to be alongside him, not lagging behind.

Three years of Junior ROTC at New Hanover High School in Wilmington helped convince Jordan that the Army was for him.

"I figured I wanted to be a soldier, plus I was the oldest of five kids," he said. "I wanted to get out of the house and do something myself."

In the early 1990s, he, as a sergeant first class, was the noncommissioned officer in charge of the team fielding the Mobile Subscriber Equipment, the Army's cell phone system.

"You would ask senior people for the answers to questions," said Ellis, the brigade commander. "They would always say, 'Talk to Sgt. 1st Class Jordan.' He was the one that had the answers about anything - the training, the fielding, the maintenance."

As Jordan sees it, his job is to help get the brigade to Iraq and back and resume the hectic work of providing communications for the 18th Airborne *Corps* around the world.

"The brigade has got to be prepared to do the mission when we return," Jordan said. "Quite a few critical people are preparing to get out of the Army when they return."

### **Preparing for danger**

In recent months, he has been focused on preparing his soldiers for the dangers of Iraq.

"One of the things we found out is you've got quite a few soldiers who are technically smart," Jordan said. "They can make a computer do everything you want it to do."

But the computer-savvy soldiers also must know what to do on a Fort Bragg firing range or when a convoy is ambushed in Iraq.

"Your technical skills ain't going to help you be able to put steel where it needs to be," he said. "'Technical' ain't got nothing to do with it out there. You've got to be 'tactical' - just as qualified as the infantry."

And don't tell the command sergeant major that a soldier can't pass the marksmanship test.

"That's the wrong answer," he said. "You'll stay at that till you get it done. If you don't get it done today, you're going back tomorrow. Then tomorrow you get a little bit of love because I'll be standing over top of you, making sure you get it right."

That's what a sergeant major is for, he said.

A noncommissioned officer can't be effective sitting in an office or standing back with hands on hips, he said.

"Some of my family really don't even know what I do," he said. "They know I'm in the Army. That's about it. My immediate family and my wife, my kids, not extremely happy, but they are on the team. They say, 'Daddy, do what you've got to do.'"

Jordan said his mother told him he has "been in it forever."

"I've been doing this by myself for so long, being my own person, being my own soldier," he said. "I'm going to continue doing it the same way until the day I feel like I need to hang it up, not when they feel like I need to hang it up."

November 30, 2004

10:50:41

TO: Fran Harvey  
CC: GEN Pete Schoomaker  
Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Extension

I take it there is a way for Chief Master Sergeant Jordan to stay in the service for an extra year, as he has requested. Please advise.

Thanks.

DHRdh  
113004-1

.....  
*Please respond by* 12/9/04

November 30, 2004

2004 11 30 15:01

TO: Fran Harvey  
CC: GEN Pete Schoomaker  
Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Extension

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Thanks.

DHRdh  
113004-1

.....  
*Please respond by* 12/9/04



~~FOUO~~

Handwritten: 9/7/04

September 7, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: E-mail from Ron Arons

Please take care of the attached e-mail regarding an idea to disarm Al-Sadr's people.

Thanks.

Attach.  
08/18/04 E-mail from Ron Arons to SecDef re: HIDA technology

DHR:as  
090704-10

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Vertical handwritten note: Iraq 7 Sep 04 26 Aug 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28155

OSD 19580-04

(b)(6)

*ASST*

From: Ron Arons (b)(6)  
Sent: Thursday, August 26, 2004 11:10 AM  
To: Donald Rumsfeld  
Subject: A couple of Ideas

11-059-3 1113 23

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Maybe I'm missing something but.....

Why can't we use HyperSound technology, already in the Defense Department's hands, to disarm Al-Sadr's people guarding the mosque? I direct you to the following article: <http://www.raven1.net/hssweapon.htm>

Why can't we throw a couple of smoke or stink bombs at Al-Sadr's people guarding the mosque.

Just some thoughts

Ron Arons  
Princeton '78

*1*  
*Suz -*  
*I've emailed him back looking for his email address*  
*Address I'll let you know when I see it*

ATTACH.

NY TIMES MAGAZINE ARTICLE RE: HIDA (09/23/03)

## ATC HyperSonic Sound as a Weapon

-----  
By Marshall SELLER New York Times March 23, 2003  
5035 words, Late Edition - Final , Section 6 , Page 34 , Column 3

Original link:

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/23/magazine/23SOUND.html>

For the moment, though, HSS is unfinished business. As night must follow day, there are Defense Department applications. Norris and A.T.C. have been busy honing something called High Intensity Directed Acoustics (HIDA, in house jargon). It is directional sound -- an offshoot of HSS -- but one that never, ever transmits Handel or waterfall sounds. Although the technology thus far has been routinely referred to as a "nonlethal weapon," the Pentagon now prefers to stress the friendlier-sounding "hailing intruders" function.

In reality, HIDA is both warning and weapon. If used from a battleship, it can ward off stray crafts at 500 yards with a pinpointed verbal warning. Should the offending vessel continue to within 200 yards, the stern warnings are replaced by 120-decibel sounds that are as physically disabling as shrapnel. Certain noises, projected at the right pitch, can incapacitate even a stone-deaf terrorist; the bones in your head are brutalized by a tone's full effect whether you're clutching the sides of your skull in agony or not.

"Besides," Norris says, laughing darkly, "grabbing your ears is as good as a pair of handcuffs."

Wimily holding a big black plate, Norris stands with me in an A.T.C. sound chamber. Since he's poised behind the weapon, he will hear no sound once it's powered up: not a peep. "HIDA can instantaneously cause loss of equilibrium, vomiting, migraines -- really, we can pretty much pick our ailment," he says brightly. "We've delivered a couple dozen units so far, but will have a lot more out by June. They're talking millions!"

(Last month, A.T.C. cut a five-year, multimillion-dollar licensing agreement with General Dynamics, one of the giants of the military-industrial complex.)

Norris prods his assistant to locate the baby noise on a laptop, then aims the device at me. At first, the noise is dreadful -- just primally wrong -- but not unbearable. I repeatedly tell Norris to crank it up (trying to approximate battle-strength volume, without the nausea), until the noise isn't so much a noise as an assault on my nervous system. I nearly fall down and, for some reason, my eyes hurt. When I bravely ask how high they'd turned the dial, Norris laughs uproariously. "That was nothing!" he bellows.

"That was about 1 percent of what an enemy would get. One percent!" Two hours later, I can still feel the ache in the back of my head.

-----  
11-L-0559/OSD/28157

9/1/2004



ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ACTION MEMO

300.8

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

*Ray DuBois 12/7/04*

SUBJECT: Services/Non-OSD Directives Review

- In your attached snowflake of November 17, 2004, you requested information on what the Services and non-OSD elements of DoD are doing to update their directives. You asked for an analysis of their directive systems, and for a memo prompting a comprehensive review of their directives.
- Defense Agency/Activity directives promulgate their DoD-wide policy through the WHS-administered directives systems. Their parent USDs and ASDs oversee the content.
- The Services have their own procedures for publication of directives, regulations, and instructions, which vary widely. WHS reviewed the Services' policy level publications and identified the following sample data reflecting publications in selected functional areas that are older than January 1999:
  - o Air Force: 14 of 21 Directives in the Manpower/Organization series (66%).
  - o Army: 28 of 29 Regulations in the Organization/Functions series (97%).
  - o Navy: 18 of 22 Instructions in the Operations/Readiness series (82%).
  - o Marine Corps: 92 of 126 Orders in the General Admin/Mgmt series (73%)
- All four services have actions ongoing to modernize their publications programs in various stages of development.
- The Joint Staff is actively managing its Directives Program, with only 27 out of 267 publications (10%) older than five years. Updates to many of these older publications are awaiting release of updated DoD issuances.
- The memorandum to the Service Secretaries is attached at Tab A, with courtesy copy provided to the CJCS.

7 DEC 04

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum at Tab A

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment: As stated

Prepared By: Mr. John C. Krysa, WHS/ESCD, (b)(6)

OSD 19721-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28158

17 NOV 04



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS**

**SUBJECT:** Review of Service Directives

In recent years, we have adopted significant changes in DoD and Service policies, programs, missions, organizations, and responsibilities. World events, current and emerging threats, and evolving technologies have all helped drive these changes. It is imperative that we codify in our policy level directives, regulations, and instructions the decisions we make to guide our departments through these changing times.

At my direction, OSD Components conducted a comprehensive review of DoD Directives to ensure that they are current with today's defense posture. Of 653 DoD Directives, 259 were certified as current, 317 required revision, and 77 will be cancelled. A sample review of your directives, regulations, and instructions indicates your Service requires a similar review. In selected functional areas, the majority of your policy level issuances are older than five years.

Therefore, I request that you conduct a thorough review of your publications to ensure that they are current with Service guidance and consistent with their counterpart DoD Directives. As DoD Directives are revised or cancelled, these changes will be posted on the following web site: <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/>. I direct your attention to this web site because revisions and cancellations of DoD Directives may guide your prioritization of effort.

Please provide me an assessment of your policy level publications by February 1, 2005 to include your plan of action.

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



11-L-0559/USD/28159

1/4  
2/13

HOLD



ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ACTION MEMO

2004 03 - 7 11 5:19

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Paul Butler  
2/13 PUB

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

Ray DuBois 12/7/04

SUBJECT: Services/Non-OSD Directives Review

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- The memorandum to the Service Secretaries is attached at Tab A, with courtesy copy provided to the CJCS.

Terrell

following sample data reflecting publications in selected functional areas that are older than January 1999: 2-02

AD Since QDR-1/2003

24/11

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum at Tab A

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment: As stated

|          |        |         |  |
|----------|--------|---------|--|
| MA SD    | SM-DSD | 3/23/04 |  |
| TSA SD   | SA DSD | 12/10   |  |
| EXEC SEC | M12/9  |         |  |
|          | 6/12/8 | 7/12/8  |  |

Prepared By: Mr. John C. Krysa, WHS/ESCD, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/28160

OSD 19721-04



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

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2

Therefore, I request that you conduct a thorough review of your publications to ensure that they are current with Service guidance and consistent with their counterpart DoD Directives. As DoD Directives are revised or cancelled, these changes will be posted on the following web site: <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/>. I direct your attention to this web site because revisions and cancellations of DoD Directives may guide your prioritization of effort.

Please provide me an assessment of your policy level publications by February 1, 2005 to include your plan of action.

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



11-L-0559/USD/28161





~~FOUO w/CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

NOV 11 2004  
November 11, 2004  
I-04/015082  
ES-1376

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Iceland

Please take a look at this Reykjavik cable and tell me what you think we ought to do.

Thanks.

Attach:  
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK Cable O 090748Z NOV 04: "Iceland: How to Get Started"

DJR:sk  
111104-9

.....

Please respond by 12/3/04

ICELAND

~~FOUO w/CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

2-11-04 P04:46 IN

OSD 19751-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28163

11 Nov 04

~~FOUO~~

November 29, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

According to Abizaid, with respect to the drug strategy for Afghanistan, it appears not to be synchronized -- no one's in charge. Department of State has to develop a strategy. Other countries in the region want to get involved -- Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, along with Afghanistan. Why don't you see what you can do about that.

Thanks.

DHR:gg  
112904-23

.....  
Please respond by 12/23/04

AFGHANISTAN

29 Nov 04

OSD 19788-04

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-05597 OSD/28164

FOUO

~~SECRET~~

October 29, 2004  
I-04/014576  
ES-1235

301 OCT 14 11 08 13

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Chinese MOD Invitation

China

In my meeting with the Chinese CHOD yesterday, he reiterated the Chinese MOD's invitation for me to come to China.

DHR:as  
102904-8

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

29OCT04

11-L-0559/OSD/28165

OSD 19845-04

Upon removal of attachments  
this document becomes

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~  
~~SECRET~~

29-10-04 18:05 IN

TAB A  
~~FOUO~~

October 29, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs

What is taking so long in deciding where Civil Affairs ought to be located? If they don't agree I want it kicked up to me and I will figure it out. Let's get it moving.

Thanks.

DHR:sa  
102904-23

.....  
Please respond by 11/5/04

322

29 OCT 04 9 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 19857-04

~~OSD 13900-04~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28166



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

774 500 10 AM 6:33

CM-2228-04

9 December 2004

322

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBW 12/7*

SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs (SF-888)

- **Answer.** The following is an interim response to your question (TAB A). My staff has requested USSOCOM schedule an OpsDeps Tank session during December to review three concepts for the assignment of Civil Affairs (CA) forces under either USSOCOM or the Army.
- **Analysis.** On 26 August, an Army CA Tiger Team briefed the Army Vice Chief of Staff on three concepts for the assignment of CA units (TAB B). On 8 November, USSOCOM recommended CA forces supporting USSOCOM be assigned to USSOCOM, others should be assigned to the Army. The Army, however, recommends all CA forces be assigned to USSOCOM. The purpose of the OpsDeps Tank is to develop a recommended course of action for your decision.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: LtGen James T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3;

(b)(6)

9 Dec 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 19857-04

TAB B



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CH-2043-04  
13 September 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *19/10*

SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs (CA)

- **Question.** "When are we going to get closure on where **the Civil Affairs** functions ought to be located? What is **the** pacing item there? Is it getting on my schedule?" (**TABA**)
- **Answer.** The **Army** has completed its study of the issue. **VCSA** was briefed on **26 Aug** and approved a recommendation that all **CA** and **PSYOP** Units remain assigned to **US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)**.
- **Analysis.** **TAB B** summarizes **Army staff briefing** to the **VCSA**. **TAB C** is a **VCSA** memorandum giving the **USASOC** Commander his recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the scheduling of a meeting with you, USD(P), CSA, **CMC**, **CDRUSSOCOM** and me to review the **Army** recommendation.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: **TAB D**

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3;

(b)(6)

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/28168

*OSA 13900-04*

APR 27 2004

755

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs

When *are we going to get* closure on where the Civil Affairs functions ought to be located? What is the *pacng item* there? Is it *getting on my* schedule?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
042304-14

.....  
Please respond by 5/9/04

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/28169

30 August 2004

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: **Army "Tiger Team"** Briefing to Vice Chief of Staff

1. **Purpose.** To summarize latest **Army** briefing on Civil Affairs (CA) issues.
2. **Key Points.** On 26 **August**, the CA/PSYOP Tiger Team (**CAPOTT**) briefed the Vice Chief of Staff, **Army** (VCSA) on **options** for the assignment of **CA units**.
  - The CAPOTT presented the following findings:
    - **CA (and PSYOP)** forces can best **support** operations by remaining under US **Army** Special Operations **Command (USASOC)** . Reassigning **CA** to **Army** Forces Command **would** not increase **Army** interest in these activities, improve the **transition** to post-combat stabilization operations, nor **support** the **Army** Campaign Plan.
    - Addressing **CA and PSYOP** challenges requires partnership between US **Army** Forces Command and **USASOC**.
    - Operations **would** benefit from creation of a full-time strategic-level **Civil Military Operations (CMO) planning/coordination capability**.
    - The **Army** **should** consider elevating CMO to a doctrinal "battlefield operating system."
    - **USASOC** **must** redesign the current **CA and PSYOP** force structure for **modularity** and **use Total Army Analysis** to review AC/RC mix.
    - **Extending the** Reserve Component **CA** branch to the Active Component and creating a **PSYOP** branch **would** promote the management, professionalism and availability of those officers.
  - VCSA approved the findings and gave the following guidance:
    - Continue to work the force structure for **CA and PSYOP**.
    - Determine **how** to integrate **CA, PSYOP and supported units** per the **Army Campaign Plan**. This should **include** Combat **Training** Centers.
    - Return in 90 days to brief the implementation plan.

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/28170





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE WCE CHIEF OF STAFF  
201 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0201

26 AUG 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY  
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (AIRBORNE), FORT BRAGG, NC 28310**

**SUBJECT: Results of G-3 Directed Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations  
Tiger Team (CAPOTT)**

1. As per our meeting and your request for assistance on 29 April 2004, I convened a Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT) to analyze your Civil Affairs and PSYOP "Way Ahead" concept. The Team **also** analyzed **two** additional concepts for points of comparison. The team consisted of members of the **Army** Staff, selected Army major commands, and selected outside agencies. It ensured all doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities issues were reviewed and considered.
2. The Tiger Team determined civil affairs and psychological operations forces **could** best support the Army by remaining under the Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The Army's Force Generation Model's emphasis on modularity will assure that this capability is realized as CA and PSYOP staff planners will be assigned down to the BCT UA level. The Tiger Team recommends that USASOC should redesign the current CA and PSYOP force structures for modularity and **relook the AC/RC** mix.
3. During the conduct of the Tiger Team review and assessment the following three concepts were developed:
  - a. **Concept 1** – USACAPOC, with all currently **assigned** forces, remains assigned to USASOC and transforms to support modularity.
  - b. **Concept 2** – **HQ USACAPOC** with all **CA** and PSYOP Forces reassigned to **JFCOM**.
  - c. **Concept 3** – **SOF** supporting forces assigned to USASOC and conventional forces assigned to FORSCOM.
4. Recommendation: The CAPOTT endorses **Concept 1** by utilizing the comparison criteria of Training/Readiness, Modularity, Flexibility, and Predictability. Recommend USASOC begin coordination with **FORSCOM** to support transformation and support modularity IAW Concept 1.

Tab B



11-L-0559/OSD/28171

**SUBJECT: Results of G-3 Directed Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT)**

5. Although this constitutes the closure of this Tiger Team, the members are available to assist in any capacity. We need to continue to build on the momentum gained thus far. Furthermore, USASOC's pursuit of branches for CA and PSYOP will help to increase professionalism, management, and availability of the officers in those branches.

6. The POC for this action is COL Jose Olivero, HQDA, G-3, MOSO-SOD, DSN (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)



**RICHARD A. CODY**  
General, United States Army  
Vice Chief of Staff

Tab B

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

| Unit       | Name           | Date             |
|------------|----------------|------------------|
| USA        | MG Robinson    | 23 November 2004 |
| USMC       | COL Van Dyke   | 23 November 2004 |
| OSD(SOLIC) | COL Romano     | 3 November 2004  |
| USSOCOM    | Col Buckmelter | 2 November 2004  |
| USJFCOM    | COL Milburn    | 23 November 2004 |

December 9, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
CC: Dina Powell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Jim Denny - Proposed Candidate for the President's Commission on Tax Reform

012

Attached is a background sheet of James M. Denny. He is world-class - a brilliant lawyer and financial expert.

As you will see from his background sheet, he has broad experience. He is a solid Republican. He would be a superb member of the President's Commission on Tax Reform.

Please let me know if I can provide any additional information.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Jim Denny Background Sheet  
Denny political contributions

DHR:dh  
120504-18

9/22/04

OSD 19861-04

November, 2004

James M. **Denny** is a retired Vice Chairman of Sears, Roebuck and Co. He joined Sears in 1986 as Vice President-Finance, became Chief Financial Officer in 1988, Vice Chairman in 1992 and retired in 1995 upon completion of the program to unbundle the financial services/retail conglomerate through a series of spin-offs and sales of its financial services businesses. Earlier positions include Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Office with G.D. Searle and Co., Chairman of Pearl Health Services, Inc., a publicly held Searle-affiliated company, and Treasurer of the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company. He began his career as a lawyer, practicing in New York and Paris with the firm of Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer and Wood.

Denny is a director of ChoicePoint, Inc., GATX Corporation, and Gilead Sciences, Inc., where he also serves as Chairman, and several private companies. Previous board memberships include Allstate Corporation, Astra AB, General Binding Corporation, General Instrument Corporation, The Principal Financial Group, and Sears, Roebuck and Co. Since his retirement from Sears, he has been engaged in investment related activities including serving on the advisory Board of Evanston Capital Management and as an advisor to William Blair Capital Partners, LLC. from 1995 to 2000 and as a trustee of the Searle Family Trusts.

Denny is a director and a past Chairman of Northwestern Memorial Healthcare Corporation and is current Chairman of Northwestern Memorial Foundation. He is a member of the Board of Directors of Georgetown University and the Board of Trustees of DePaul University. He also serves as a member of the boards of the Catholic Extension Society and the

November, 2004

Catholic Theological Union, a member of The Bernardin Center National Advisory Board, and as a Vice **Chair** of the Finance Council of the Archdiocese of Chicago. **He** received the Princeton Club **of** Chicago's Community service award in 1999, **an** honorary degree from Catholic Theological Union in **2003**, and was the American Ireland Fund 2002 Chicago Dinner Honoree.

Denny attended Princeton University from 1950 to 1954 **and**, following completion of military service in Korea, graduated **from** the University **of** Minnesota **in** 1957 and the Georgetown University law Center in 1960 where **he** was **an** editor / officer of the **law** review.

Denny **was** born in Minneapolis, Minnesota. He is married **to** the former Catherine Florance. They have six children **and** nine grandchildren.

**James M. & Catherine M. Denny**  
**1999 through 2004 Political Contributions**

| <u>Date</u>   | <u>Name</u>                               | <u>Paid Amount</u>  |
|---|---|---------------------|
| 05/28/1999  | Porter for Congress                       | 500.00              |
| 05/28/1999  | Governor George W. Bush Presidential Exp. | 1,000.00            |
| 12/17/1999  | Empower America Supporter                 | 1,000.00            |
| 05/04/2000  | Abraham Senate 2000                       | 1,000.00            |
| 06/09/2000  | Mark Kirk for Congress                    | 1,000.00            |
| 06/09/2000  | McCollum for U.S. Senate                  | 2,000.00            |
| 06/09/2000  | McCollum for U.S. Senate                  | 2,000.00            |
| 09/22/2000  | Mark Kirk for Congress                    | 1,000.00            |
| 10/20/2000  | Illinois Victory 2000                     | 5,000.00            |
| 11/16/2001  | Bill Simon for Governor                   | 250.00              |
| 11/16/2001  | Citizens For Corinne Wood                 | 1,000.00            |
| 10/03/2002  | Illinois Republican Party                 | 5,000.00            |
| 04/08/2003  | Illinois Republican Party                 | 25,000.00           |
| 06/23/2003  | Andy McKenna for Senate                   | 2,000.00            |
| 09/09/2003  | Bush - Cheney '04                         | 2,000.00            |
| 09/09/2003  | Bush - Cheney '04                         | 2,000.00            |
| 05/11/2004  | Illinois Republican Party                 | 10,000.00           |
| 07/26/2004  | RNC Presidential Trust                    | 5,000.00            |
| 09/21/2004  | CITIZENS FOR KARMEIER                     | 1,000.00            |
| 10/07/2004  | Martinez for U.S. Senate                  | 1,000.00            |
| Total Political Contributions                               |   | <u>68,750.00</u>    |
| TOTAL   |   | <u>\$ 68,750.00</u> |
| <b>Additional Family Contributions to Bush - Cheney '04</b> |   |                     |
| 09/09/2003  | Andrew Bowyer                             | 2,000.00            |
| 09/09/2003  | Catherine Denny Bowyer                    | 2,000.00            |
| 09/09/2003  | James M. Denny Jr.                        | 2,000.00            |
| 09/09/2003  | Katherine Denny                           | 2,000.00            |
| 09/09/2003  | Mathew Denny                              | 2,000.00            |
| 09/09/2003  | Catherine Q. Denny                        | 2,000.00            |
| 09/09/2003  | Norton O'Meara                            | 2,000.00            |
| 09/09/2003  | Sarah Denny O'Meara                       | 2,000.00            |
|   |   | <u>\$ 16,000.00</u> |
| <b>Consolidated Denny Family Contributions</b>              |   | <b>\$ 84,750.00</b> |

December 10, 2004

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
GEN George Casey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DRM*

SUBJECT: Militia Theory

*IRAO*

Attached is an e-mail I received on militias. What do you think of it?

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/16/04 Pickard e-mail to SD re: Militia Theory

DHR:dh  
120904-49

.....  
Please respond by 1/6/05

*10 Dec 04*



(b)(6) CIV, OSD

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 17, 2004 4:02 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Militia theory

From DR's email

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ronn S. Pickard (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 16, 2004 11:51 PM  
**To:** Donald Rumsfeld  
**Subject:** MILITIA THEORY

Don,

The Department of Defense has no militia theory.

Fundamentally, the term "militia" refers to a citizenry voluntarily mobilized for the common defense.

The strategy of terrorism is ultimately simple. A community is criminally attacked. The folks in the community naturally organize to defend themselves. Terrorist allies within the government block the government from passing proper laws to enable the community to defend itself lawfully and openly. Terrorist allies within the community attacked promote the formation of illegal militias and, thus, control the linkage between illegal militia units. The illegal militia units are then run up against each other and the government. Totalitarianism results. A well regulated militia would make such shenanigans impossible.

Things immediately became unglued in Iraq after Allawi stated that there would be "no militia laws". How could the people of Iraq possibly support a government that seeks to disarm and disorganize them in the face of such violence? Without a lawful self-defense how much easier could it be for terrorists to dominated communities?

The Kurdish militia had repelled Saddam Hussein and his agents when they were in power with a minimum of support from the United States. The Allawi government with U.S. support has sought to stand down the Kurdish militia and replace them with government paid police. The result as with the situation in Mosul was predictable. The militia has to be properly regulated not eliminated.

There is a world of difference between a well regulated militia, a poorly regulated militia, an unregulated militia, and an illegal militia. The Department of Defense has no analysis of the difference.

The principles of a well regulated militia are universal, although unknown to the D.O.D.

1. The basic militia unit must be neighborhood based so that the members are first defending their own families and neighbors. This makes the militia unit naturally conservative and responsible. It would be extremely difficult for a neighborhood based militia unit under proper regulations to sustain illegal activities because everyone in the neighborhood would know what they were doing. It would be too easy for authorities to investigate reports of misbehavior and provide remedial discipline.
2. The members of the basic militia unit elect their own sergeant. This makes the militia unit a bulwork of democracy and assures community support for the unit.
3. The militia sergeants must swear into "the regular uniformed officer corps" -- in municipalities this means the local police station. Sergeants serve, in effect as reserve police officers. They are always subject to the martial laws. No law commands individual militia members to mobilize unless the order comes from a governor or the president. However, the social conditions of the basic militia unit effectively require members to mobilize at the call of their sergeants unless there are exceptional political conditions afoot.

11/17/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/28179

Once mobilized, militia members are under the martial laws.

Our Constitution gives it to the Congress to write the militia code for the nation and leaves it to the states to implement that code. The President becomes commander-in-chief of the militia if he declares a state of emergency.

The Congress never wrote the appropriate militia code. The lack of a national militia code resulted in the militias of the individual states becoming independent only state organs -- which was the necessary precondition if not the ultimate cause of the Civil War.

It would be easy to implement a good Standard Militia Code in Iraq. Provide the form for neighborhoods to form units and elect sergeants. Assign local police officers to the units and ex-military personnel to drill them. This would put an immediate end to the insurgency because it would give the citizenry the mechanism to lawfully root it out and also prevent the only course to power the insurgency depends upon.

If even the weak PLA issued a Standard Militia Code, the Palestinian people would immediately and openly establish neighborhood militia units. These units would put a prompt end to the petty crime in the neighborhoods that is the necessary precursor to the gangs and larger illegal militia organizations. Once the Palestinian neighborhood militias were up and properly regulated, they would quickly put an end to any intimidation by the existing illegal militias such as that of Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyr's Brigade. What seems so difficult from a centralized political perspective is essentially simple on the neighborhood level.

The political opposition to well regulated militias is simply motivated. If folks in a neighborhood had a well regulated militia unit, they would use different but similar neighborhood based organization to address other political concerns. The well regulated militia entrenches the principles of freedom, democracy, and good government.

This is evident in urban American. Good neighborhood watches use the natural principles of a well regulated militia. Where the good neighborhood watch exists, the community is safe. Governing urban Democratic Parties actively and systematically oppose those who independently select their neighborhood leadership for any purpose. We have the common phenomenon of Democratic politicians pulling back their opposition to a neighborhood's self-organizing when crime surges and then pouncing back in after the crime is reduced. The meetings are flooded out with public employees, etc., when the crisis is solved. In minority areas where the Democrats' hold is especially strong, gangs can simply take over. Although the American neighborhood watch rarely displays arms, they are present in the background.

The well regulated militia simply formalizes the rights and procedures that are natural and appropriate. The well regulated militia, of course, also instructs and disciplines the use of arms.

The problems with militias around the world are predictable when we look at how the individual principles of the well regulated militia are manifest or absent. In Iraq, even urban militias are tied to family and tribes rather than being neighborhood based. Local unit leaders are appointed not elected. The regular uniformed officer corps plays no role. It would be easy to replace these structures with a well regulated militia structure.

The well regulated militia requires that the regular uniformed officer corps is under local civil authority except for states of emergency.

It should be expected that members of a well regulated militia in their individual capacity as citizens would form civic associations and have political impacts. It would be best for such associations to follow the principles of American non-profit organizations.

It is also proper that militias have communications and joint operational infrastructures by which they can operate if their regular uniformed officers are absent. Those communications and joint operational infrastructures should develop under the law and the supervision of the regular uniformed officer corps. For instance, in case of strife, a police department headquarters could be compromised or officers might need to be sent to particular hotspots. The neighborhood militia should still be able to mobilize and communicate. When regular officers return, their authority should be immediately recognized.

It is common in America for citizens to take action to apprehend a suspect, and for those citizens to immediately follow the orders of police officers when they arrive on the scene. The principles involved are natural.

Under our Constitution, our Congress should enact legislation that gives our citizens the specific right and regulations to form neighborhood militia units, elect sergeants, and be assigned officers. If we had a Standard Militia Code, the neighborhoods across the America would form militia units virtually overnight. Street crime and neighborhood gangs would vanish in a few short weeks. This is not a pipe dream. It is based on practical experience. I served as chair of an ad hoc community neighborhood watch in a high crime minority area in Los Angeles. At one point we dissolved what had become the heaviest drug trafficking intersection in Los Angeles in two weeks without arrests -- then the politicians swept in.

My concern is with applying the natural principles of a well regulated militia without written regulations and formal structures. Although this immediately pacifies neighborhoods, the corruption of these structures looms.

We should take advantage of the crises in this country and abroad to enact the full regulatory structures that would govern appropriately long after the crises are past. Parties will always seek to dominate and exploit any neighborhood structures (let alone militia) for other political purposes. Only by good regulations can militia be properly governed and sustained.

Presently, the D.O.D. position is against any militia because it has no theory of regulation let alone the regulations themselves.

Citizens have the natural right to mobilize for the common defense. It is essential that this be properly regulated. The alternative is untenable.

At the time our Constitution was written the wisdom of the following words of the Second Article of the Bill of Rights was self-evident:

"A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

Your D.O.D. has analysts who would be willing to work on the development of militia theory and a Standard Militia Code. Would you care for names?

It would be easy to have the assistance in doing this from police departments across America. The people would support, the Congress would pass, and the President would sign such a code.

Sincerely yours,  
Ronn S. Pickard

(b)(6)



SECRET  
REF ID: A10116

OCT 15 2004  
I-04/013802  
ES-1049

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Post-Election Plan

I need a report on how the U.S. Government is going to hold the Coalition together after the Iraq election, and keep the troops we need in there. We must get ahead of the curve.

I need to be persuaded that you and the Department of State are doing what we need to do to see that that happens.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101404-5

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

-04 16:56 11  
O SD 19871-04

~~FOUO~~

October 19, 2004  
I-04/013970  
ES-1093

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Coalition Members

I want a report as to what countries we're working with to help them pare down their coalition forces slightly, so they don't pull out completely.

We can afford to have some smaller countries take 50 or 100 people out and still manage the problem. But losing them completely would be harmful.

Thanks.

DHR:js  
101904-4

.....  
Please respond by 11/5/04

OSD 19872-04

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/28183

19-10-04 18:46 IN



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

DATE: 10/26/04 11:26

COMPTROLLER

December 9, 2004, 5:00 PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report on Defense Department's Failure to Track Personnel Spending

110.01

- You asked me to look into an Early Bird article referencing a GAO report regarding oversight of Military Personnel appropriations. (TAB A)
- The GAO report cited in the article criticized the Department for insufficient oversight of the use of Military Personnel appropriations.
- We do have proper controls in place to ensure that we properly use funds appropriated for Military Personnel. In addition, we agree with the GAO report that the Department would benefit from increasing oversight and having greater visibility into the execution of the Military Personnel appropriation.
- We have drafted explicit guidance that requires reviews that will provide greater visibility and will monitor compliance through our financial metrics program. This guidance is under review by other agencies prior to its incorporation in the Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation.
- It may be appropriate in some cases to make changes to current accounting systems to gain this visibility. I have asked the Military Departments to do a cost benefit analysis of making changes to current systems. If the analysis shows that these changes would provide increased visibility and improved internal controls, and that they are cost effective, we will pursue them through our financial system improvement effort.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: Terri McKay (b)(6)

9 Dec 04

**TAB**

**A**

December 1, 2004

TO: Tina Jonas  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: GAO Report

What is this item about in today's *Early Bird* referencing a GAO report that says DoD is not providing proper oversight to ensure that military personnel appropriations are directed to cover pay, benefits and expenses?

Thanks.

Attach.  
McGlinchey, David. "Defense Department Not Tracking Personnel Spending, Report Says," *GovExec.com*, November 30, 2004.

DHR:dh  
120104-17

.....  
Please respond by 12/9/04



GovExec.com  
November 30, 2004

## Defense Department Not Tracking Personnel Spending, Report Says

By David McGlinchey

The Defense Department is not providing sufficient oversight to ensure that military personnel appropriations actually are directed to cover pay, benefits and expenses, according to a new Government Accountability Office report.

**As** a result of the report, the Office of the Secretary of Defense **has** ordered a study on the cost and time needed to modify the relevant financial systems to comply with regulations.

GAO released **similar** findings to lawmakers in **2003**, and the fiscal **2004** conference report on defense appropriations called on the Pentagon to "strengthen the **annual** review process" and "provide transparency of disbursements at the same level **as** the budget submission."

In the report released **this** week, however, GAO announced that the Pentagon is not following congressional direction on oversight.

"**The military** services are not matching obligations to disbursements at the individual disbursement transaction level in all the years that disbursements can occur **as** required by the Financial Management Regulation," the report (GAO-05-87R) said. "Additionally, the services are not reporting the obligation balances at the budget submission level **as** directed by congressional conferees."

In their report, GAO noted that military personnel appropriations, also **known as MILPERS**, make up a significant amount of the Defense Department's budget. In fiscal **2003**, MILPERS accounted for more than \$109 billion. That figure also includes allowances, housing, travel and reserve training. GAO investigators said the insufficient budget review is stopping lawmakers from making informed decisions on funding.

"**This has** made it difficult, if not impossible, for decision-makers to oversee how the services actually use MILPERS funds," the GAO report said.

The investigators took the Office of the Secretary of Defense to task for failing to implement the reforms from the top.

"OSD **has** not provided the services with explicit instructions in the Financial Management Regulation requiring them to review MILPERS obligations," the report said. "Moreover, OSD has not effectively monitored the services' compliance with the Financial Management Regulation's requirement to review obligation balances. Unless the services strengthen their year-end reviews and certification processes, the actual **use** of MILPERS funds will continue to be masked, and the baseline for future budget requests may be inaccurate."

GAO did note that the Army **has** made some progress in developing prior year financial reports with great detail. In a Nov. 23 directive, top Defense officials ordered the Air Force, Navy and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to complete a feasibility study on recording and reporting detailed

11-L-0559/OSD/28187

disbursements for prior years' spending. That study is scheduled to be completed by Jan. 31, 2005.

11-L-0559/OSD/28188

72\*

~~FOUO~~

ES-1644  
04/016678

December 9, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board

Please send me the complete list of Defense Policy Board members. I want to make some changes.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120904-33

.....  
Please respond by 12/10/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19898-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28189 -1 -2

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

POLICY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT NOTE

December 10, 2004  
I-04/016678  
ES-1644

To: CAPT Marriott, Executive Secretary

Subject: Defense Policy Board - Snowflake #120904-33

In response to the SecDef's note, attached is the current list of Defense Policy **Board** members.

  
William G. Mock  
Director, PES

cc: PDUSSDP  
USSDP/SA

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OSD 19898-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28190

~~FOUO~~

ES-1644  
04/016678

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Please send me the complete list of Defense Policy Board members. I want to make some changes.

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DHR:dh  
120904-33

.....  
Please respond by 12/10/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19898-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28191

**Defense Policy Board  
as of October 2004**

**Members:**

|                          |   |
|--------------------------|---|
| Dr. Kenneth Adelman      | Senior Counselor, Edelman Public Relations                          |
| Honorable Richard Allen  | Senior Counselor, APCO Worldwide                                    |
| Dr. Martin Anderson      | Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution                                   |
| Dr. Gary Becker          | Professor, University of Chicago                                    |
| Dr. Barry Blechman       | President & Chairman, DFI International                             |
| Dr. Harold Brown         | Counselor, CSIS<br>Partner, Warburg Pincus & Co                     |
| Ms. Victoria Clarke      | Comcast   |
| Dr. Eliot Cohen          | Professor, Johns Hopkins University                                 |
| Ms. Devon Cross          | President, Donors' Forum on International Affairs                   |
| Gen(Ret) Ronald Fogleman | Chairman and CEO, Durango Aerospace, Inc                            |
| Amb Thomas Foley         | Partner, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP                      |
| Hon Tillie Fowler        | Partner, Holland & Knight LLP                                       |
| Hon Newt Gingrich        | CEO, The Gingrich Group   |
| GEN (Ret) Charles Horner | Consultant and Author   |
| Dr. Fred Ikle            | Chairman of the Board, Telos Corporation and<br>CMC Energy Services |
| ADM (Ret) David Jeremiah | President Technology Strategies & Alliances                         |
| GEN (Ret) John Keane     | URS Corporation   |
| Dr. Henry Kissinger      | Chairman, Kissinger Associates, Inc                                 |
| VP Dan Quayle            | Investment Banker, International Consultant                         |

Dr. James Schlesinger

Senior Advisor, Lehman Brothers

Dr. Kiron Skinner

Assistant Professor, Carnegie Mellon  
University and Research Fellow, Hoover  
Institution

Dr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Guest Scholar, Brookings Institution

Dr. Ruth Wedgwood

Professor of International Law and Diplomacy  
and Director of International Law and  
Organization, Johns Hopkins

Mr. Christopher Williams

Partner, Johnston and Associates

Honorable Pete Wilson

Former Governor, California

Mr. R. James Woolsey

Partner, Shea & Gardner

December 10, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Colin Powell  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces Update

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is the latest update on Iraqi Security Forces. I'm sending a copy along to UK's Minister of Defense Geoff Hoon, so that he can provide one to Prime Minister Blair.

Respectfully,

Attach.  
12/06/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update

DHR:ss  
121004-4

*Handwritten initials*

*Handwritten initials*

OSD 19907-04



**For Official Use Only**

# ***Iraqi Security Forces Update***

## ***6 December 2004***

**Date as of: 06 DEC 04    Version M1**

**11-L-0559/OSD/28195**

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# *Grand Total all Iraqi Secu*

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
|  |  |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b><u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u></b><br/>(Police, Civil Intervention,<br/>Emergency Response,<br/>Border Enforcement,<br/>Highway Patrol, Dignitary<br/>Protection)</li></ul> | <b><u>Trained &amp; Equip</u></b><br><br><b>69,310</b> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b><u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u></b><br/>(Army, National Guard,<br/>Intervention Force, Special<br/>Operations, Air Force,<br/>Coastal Defense Force)</li></ul>                | <b><u>Trained &amp; Equip</u></b><br><br><b>46,930</b> |
|  | <hr/> <b>116,240</b>                                   |

Data as of: 06 DEC 04

11-L-0559/OSD/28196

# Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

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- Does not include approximately 74,000 in Facilities Protection Service trained by Ministry Of Interior but employed by other ministries.

Data as of: 06 DEC 04

11-L-0559/OSD/28197

# Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

**For Official Use Only**

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time

| Security Force Element                    | Current Targeted End State | 06 DEC 04 | 1 FEB 05          | 1 MAY 05 | 1 AUG 05 | 1 JAN 06 | 1 MAY 06 |
|---|----------------------------|-----------|-------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Regular Iraqi Police <sup>(1)</sup>       | 135,000                    |           |                   | 46%      | 59%      | 70%      | 78%      |
| Special Police Regiments                  | 1,200                      |           | 50%               | 86%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Public Order Battalions                   | 3,600                      |           | 100%              | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Emergency Response Unit                   | 270                        | 54%       | 85%               | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Iraqi Highway Patrol <sup>(2)</sup>       | 6,300                      |           | UNDER DEVELOPMENT |          |          |          |          |
| Bur. of Dignitary Protection              | 500                        | 97%       | 100%              | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Special Police Commando Battalions        | 2,019                      | 45%       | 78%               | 85%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Dept of Border Enforcement <sup>(3)</sup> | 29,360                     | 46%       | 54%               | 66%      | 74%      | 84%      | 94%      |

**Notes**

1. Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
2. On 23 October, Iraqi Highway Patrol authorizations were expanded from 1,500 to 6,300 officers. Training timelines for the expanded force are under development.
3. Border Police considered trained based on training by coalition forces; capabilities are uneven

Data as of: 06 DEC 04

| <b>Legend</b> |                             |
|---------------|-----------------------------|
|               | 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT     |
|               | 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT      |
|               | 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT |

# Ministry of Defense Forces-Projection




**For Official Use Only**

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time\*

| Security Force Element        | Current Targeted End State | 06 DEC 04 | 1 FEB 05 | 1 MAY 05 | 1 AUG 05 | 1 JAN 06 |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Iraqi Regular Army            | 27,000                     |           | 88%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Iraqi Intervention Force      | 6,584                      |           | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Iraqi National Guard          | 61,904                     |           | 74%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Commando Battalion            | 1,516                      | 58%       | 67%      | 82%      | 100%     | 100%     |
| Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force | 451                        |           | 40%      | 58%      | 76%      | 100%     |

\*Based on achievement of Limited Operational Capability

Data as of: 06 DEC 04

| Legend  |                             |
|---|-----------------------------|
|  | 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT     |
|  | 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT      |
|  | 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT |

11-L-0559/OSD/28199

# MNF-I and Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only

| MNF-I = 32 Countries |          |             |       |             |       |           |       |                |         |
|----------------------|----------|-------------|-------|-------------|-------|-----------|-------|----------------|---------|
| Albania              | 73       | El Salvador | 381   | Korea       | 3,109 | Norway    | 9     | Tonga          | 44      |
| Australia            | 389      | Estonia     | 58    | Latvia      | 120   | Poland    | 2,488 | Ukraine        | 1,587   |
| <b>Armenia</b>       | <b>0</b> | Georgia     | 300   | Lithuania   | 101   | Portugal  | 135   | United Kingdom | 9,207   |
| Azerbaijan           | 151      | Hungary     | 272   | Macedonia   | 33    | Romania   | 744   | US             | 139,397 |
| Bulgaria             | 320      | Italy       | 3,109 | Moldova     | 11    | Singapore | 33    |                |         |
| Czech Rep            | 98       | Japan       | 792   | Mongolia    | 132   | Slovakia  | 103   |                |         |
| Denmark              | 392      | Kazakhstan  | 30    | Netherlands | 1,622 | Thailand  | 0     | Total          | 165,213 |

| IRAQI FORCES ON HAND               | 180,838 |
|------------------------------------|---------|
| IRAQI POLICE SERVICE               | 92,727  |
| CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE           | 3,277   |
| EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT            | 245     |
| BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION     | 576     |
| HIGHWAY PATROL                     | 521     |
| SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS | 3,906   |
| DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT         | 16,109  |
| ARMY                               | 11,718  |
| NAT'L GUARD                        | 41,850  |
| INTERVENTION FORCE                 | 6,424   |
| SPECIAL OPS FORCES                 | 674     |
| AIR FORCE                          | 206     |
| COASTAL DEFENSE                    | 611     |



Iraqi Forces On Hand
  MNF-I

Data as of: 06 DEC 04

| IRAQI FORCES TRAINED AND IN TRAINING | 135,051 |
|--------------------------------------|---------|
| IRAQI POLICE SERVICE                 | 55,075  |
| CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE             | 2,641   |
| EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT              | 245     |
| BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION       | 576     |
| HIGHWAY PATROL                       | 141     |
| SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS   | 2,830   |
| DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT           | 15,518  |
| ARMY                                 | 10,340  |
| NAT'L GUARD                          | 42,128  |
| INTERVENTION FORCE                   | 4,063   |
| SPECIAL OPS FORCES                   | 674     |
| AIR FORCE                            | 206     |
| COASTAL DEFENSE                      | 611     |



Trained Iraqi Forces
  MNF-I

## Notes

•Armenia & Thailand pending deployment of their forces

## Other Forces

Facilities Protection Service

73,992

NATO Training Team = 59

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# ***Back Up***

***Data as of: 06 DEC 04***

**11-L-0559/OSD/28201**

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# Iraqi Security Forces MoI Update

**For Official Use Only**

| COMPONENT                   | AUTHORIZED     | ON DUTY        | TRAINED & EQUIPPED | TRAINED & EQUIPPED ON 31 JAN '05 | 100% OF AUTHORIZED TRAINED & EQUIPPED |
|-----------------------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| POLICE                      | 135,000        | 92,727         | 50,798*            | 52,800                           | JUL '06                               |
| CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE    | 3,720          | 3,277          | 1,091              | 3,121                            | JUL '05                               |
| EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT     | 270            | 245            | 147                | 270                              | FEB '05                               |
| BORDER ENFORCEMENT          | 29,360         | 18,590         | 14,999             | 16,107                           | AUG '06                               |
| HIGHWAY PATROL              | 6,300          | 521            | 141**              | 141                              | TBD                                   |
| DIGNITARY PROTECTION        | 500            | 576            | 484                | 500                              | DEC '04                               |
| SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BNS | 4,450          | 3,900          | 1,650              | 4,450                            | JAN '05                               |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                | <b>179,600</b> | <b>119,355</b> | <b>69,310</b>      | <b>77,389</b>                    | <b>AUG '06</b>                        |

\*Increase in police from last report due to inclusion of updated training data (from last two month's graduations) on the 3-week Transition Integration Program. Trained police include 34,801 from the three-week TIP training, and 15,997 8-week academy graduates.

\*\* Drop from last week due to losses from intimidation of Iraqi Highway Patrol in the Anbar Province.

Data as of: 06 DEC 04

11-L-0559/OSD/28202



# Iraqi Security Forces MoD Update\*

**For Official Use Only**

| COMPONENT          | AUTHORIZED    | OPERATIONAL*                       | 31 JAN '05                        | 100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY     |
|--------------------|---------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| REGULAR ARMY       | 27,000        | 3,428**<br>4 BNS                   | 13 BNS                            | JUL '05                              |
| NATIONAL GUARD     | 61,904        | 40,115***<br>39 BNS                | 45 BNS                            | SEP '05                              |
| INTERVENTION FORCE | 6,584         | 2,062<br>3 BNS                     | 9 BNS                             | MAY '05                              |
| SPECIAL OPS        | 1,967         | 674<br>2 BNS (-)                   | 2 BNS(-)                          | SEP '05                              |
| AIR FORCE          | 502           | 167<br>1 SQDN (-)                  | TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT | TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT    |
| COASTAL DEFENSE    | 582           | 484<br>2 SQDNS                     | 2 SQDNS                           | TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT |
| <b>TOTAL</b>       | <b>98,539</b> | <b>46,930</b><br>48 BNS<br>3 SQDNS | <b>69 BNS</b><br><b>3 SQDNS</b>   | <b>MAR '06</b>                       |

- \* Operational: unit is conducting security operations.
- \*\* Includes trained Army personnel above battalion level, as well as in operational battalions.
- \*\*\* Drop from last report reflects losses due to intimidation in Anbar Province.
- \*\*\*\* Drop of five battalions due to moving the training location of three battalions from a base that suffered construction delays caused by AIF attacks to another training base, and due to delay in starting two battalions' training because unexploded ordnance caused delay in making training space available at Numiniyah. Two battalions will complete training by 6 Feb, and the last three by 27 Feb.

Data as of: 06 DEC 04

# Iraqi Security Forces Training

**For Official Use Only**

| COMPONENT   | TRAINING   | NUMBER IN TRAINING          |
|---|--|-----------------------------|
| Iraqi Police Service  | 3 Week TIP Training<br>8 Week Academy<br>Specialized Training  | 371<br>4,277<br>177         |
| Civil Intervention Force  | 5 Week Specialized Training  | 1,550                       |
| Emergency Response Unit   | 8 Week Specialized Training  | 98                          |
| Dept of Border Enforcement  | 4 Week Academy<br>Specialized Training   | 519                         |
| Highway Patrol  | 3 Week TIP Training<br>8 Week Academy Training   | 0<br>NA (Prior Service IPS) |
| Bureau of Dignitary Protection  | 3 Week Initial Training<br>2-3 Week Advanced Training<br>Mentoring by US Contractors   | 92                          |
| Special Police Commandos  | Specialized Training (Tadji Base)  | 1,180                       |
| Iraq Regular Army   | Cadre: 4 Weeks<br>Basic Training: 8 weeks<br>Collective Training: 4 Weeks  | 6,912                       |
| Iraqi National Guard  | Basic Training: 3 Weeks<br>Collective Training: 4 Weeks  | 2,013                       |
| Iraqi Intervention Force  | Cadre: 4 Weeks<br>Basic/Collective Training: 8 Weeks<br>Urban Operations Training: 5 weeks                                       | 2,001                       |
| Iraqi Special Ops Force<br>- Commando Battalion<br>- Counter Terrorist Task Force | Field Training Provided by US Special Forces (Small Unit tactics Ranger type training)<br>12 Week course on Close Quarter Combat |                             |
| Air Force   | Varies by specialty: 1-6 months  | 39                          |
| Coastal Defense Force   | Basic Training: 8 Weeks followed by specialized Training at Umm Qasr (In Progress)   | 130                         |
| <b>TOTAL</b>  |  | <b>19,359</b>               |

Data as of: 06 DEC 04

# Iraqi Security Forces Missions

**For Official Use Only**

| Unit                             | Mission   |
|----------------------------------|---|
| Police                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide law enforcement, public safety and internal security</li> </ul>  |
| Civil Intervention Force         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and insurgents.</li> </ul>  |
| Special Police Commando Bns      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a direct action, special operations, and counter insurgency capability in support of Ministry of Interior.</li> </ul>  |
| Emergency Response Unit          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.</li> </ul>  |
| Department of Border Enforcement | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Protect the integrity of Iraq's border and monitor and control the movement of persons and goods</li> </ul>  |
| Highway Patrol                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide law enforcement, public safety, and internal security, and convoy security along Iraq's Highways.</li> </ul>   |
| Bureau of Dignitary Protection   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide close protection, convoy security, and fixed-site security for Iraqi key political leaders.</li> </ul>   |
| Regular Army                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defend Iraq against external threats.</li> <li>• When directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security.</li> </ul>   |
| National Guard                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct stability operations to support the achievement of internal security, including (as required) support to Ministry of Interior elements.</li> <li>• Conduct Constabulary duties in support of internal security</li> </ul>  |
| Intervention Force               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct operations in order to defeat anti-Iraqi forces in Iraq, with primary focus on urban areas</li> <li>• Assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which the Iraqi Police Services and Iraqi National Guard can maintain law and order</li> </ul>   |
| Commando Battalion               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force. Similar in organization, training, and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion</li> </ul>   |
| Counter-Terrorist Task Force     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Direct action counter-terrorism similar in organization, mission, and training to US Special Operations Forces with counter-terrorist function</li> </ul>  |
| Air Force                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide aerial reconnaissance, and rotary and fixed wing transport for Iraqi Security Forces and authorities</li> </ul>  |
| Coastal Defense Force            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct security operations on the Iraqi coastline and over territorial waters, including gas and oil platforms out to 12 nautical miles</li> <li>• In conjunction with DBE, conduct police operations on the Iraqi coastline and out to 12 nautical miles to counter piracy, smuggling and other unlawful activities</li> </ul> |

Data as of: 06 DEC 04

# *Significant Events Since Last*

**For Official Use Only**

## **Manning:**

- 1000 recruits report to training for the Regular Army.
- 128 soldiers reported to the 1<sup>st</sup> Transportation Regiment after completing training with the Iraqi Training Battalion
- 500 recruits are starting the Border Enforcement Course in Jordan

## **Training:**

- 2,486 begin eight week training course at Jordan Training Facility
- 743 Public Order Battalion personnel, and 807 Police Mechanized (formerly called Special Police Regiment) started their 5-week training program
- 760 direct recruited soldiers completed training with the 1<sup>st</sup> Division assigned throughout the Division

## **Equipping:**

- Issued 2,442 weapons, 6,900 body armor vests, 1 million rounds of ammunition and 6,220 sets of uniforms to Ministry of Interior Forces
- Issued 2,000 sets of uniforms, 122 vehicles and 1.02 million rounds of ammunition to Ministry of Defense Forces.

*Data as of: 06 DEC 04*

11-L-0559/OSD/28206

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# *Significant Events Since Last Report*

**For Official Use Only**

## Building:

- **\$775M worth of construction work continues; Some slippage due to security situation in Sunni areas.**
- **Assessment of damage to police infrastructure is ongoing; submitted bids for work on five previously assessed stations valued at \$1.5 million, and began construction at eight others valued at \$2.5 million.**

## Mentoring/Employing:

- **7th Battalion , 3 Brigade (Iraqi Intervention Force) is conducting local security operations and force protection mission in Samarra.**
- **Both 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigades (Iraqi Intervention Force) are conducting operations in vic Fallujah.**
- **Four battalions in the An Bar province have become ineffective due to intimidation and losses; new timeline reflects adjusted estimate to equip and base new battalions based on estimated contracted delivery dates for equipment; infrastructure timeline pending.**
- **1<sup>st</sup> Special Police Commando Battalion has elements operating in Mosul, 2<sup>nd</sup> Special Police Commando Battalion has elements operating in , North Babil, Baghdad and Sammara and 3<sup>rd</sup> Special Police Commando Battalions is operating in Baghdad.**

DEC 16 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Incentive Pay for SOF

*322*

Please have a meeting between Doug Brown and David Chu regarding this memo. Then come to me with a proposal as to what you think we ought to do for incentive pay for Special Operations Forces.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/10/04 USD (P&R) memo to SD re: Incentives to Increase Retention of Special Operations Forces

DHR:dh  
121504-16

.....  
Please respond by 1/13/05

*16 Dec 04*

*10 Dec 04*



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



301 FEB 13 2005

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

December 10, 2004, 11:57 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: David S.C. Chu, HSD (P&R)

*David S.C. Chu, 10 Dec 04*

SUBJECT: Incentives to Increase Retention of Special Operations Forces (SOF)

- We worked closely with the SOCOM staff and Services to develop an optimal compensation package that focuses on retention of highly trained/experienced SOF special operators.
- The Services recognize the need to increase targeted retention incentives for special operators. However, Services viewed SOCOM's initial proposed set of incentive pays as excessive. Instead, the Services agreed that favorable retention results could be attained with a more conservative incentive package.
- A balance of special duty pay, retention bonuses, and assignment pay will comprise the following retention incentive package, effective January 1, 2005.
  - o Special Duty Assignment Pay: \$375/mo for SOF enlisted in MFP-11 billets
  - o Selective Reenlistment Bonus: Services determine use based on retention needs
  - o Critical Skills Retention Bonus: Creative contracts maximize retention potential

|            |           |          |          |          |          |         |
|------------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|---------|
| [REDACTED] | \$150,000 | \$75,000 | \$50,000 | \$30,000 | \$18,000 | \$8,000 |
|------------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|---------|

\* 1 year contract option for members who have completed 24 years of service only.

- o Assignment Incentive Pay: \$750/mo for enlisted with 25 or more years of service
- We will closely monitor SOF retention to ensure timely adjustments in compensation are implemented.

COORDINATIONS: NA

Prepared By: Lt Col Melissa Applegate, ODUSD(MPP)/Compensation, (b)(6)

OSD 19962-04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

TO Tom O'Connell  
From Paul Butler

Not sure if you'd see  
this but thought you would  
be interested.



Paul Butler

12/14

322

14 Dec 04

10 Dec 04

OSD 19962-04





~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

NOV 04 2004

*TLA*

NOV 03 2004  
11:26

TO: David Chu

CC: Mike Wynne

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: SMART Program for Math and Science Education

As you work on the idea of increasing the number of young Americans who study math and science subjects, please ensure that any incentive program you create includes an associated obligation. For example, if we are going to pay for some years of education in math or science, we should expect a commitment on their part to serve in the Department using the education the taxpayers have paid for. Please don't move forward on a plan that doesn't include a return on the taxpayers' investment.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110304-3

.....  
 Please respond by 12/5/04

|       |           |
|-------|-----------|
| USD   | PDUSD     |
| RA    | HA        |
| PI    | Readiness |
| MPP   | CPP       |
| PLANS | MC&FP     |
| CCO   |           |
|       |           |

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28212

OSD 19965-04



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

GROUP OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

DEC 13 AM 9:26

December 8, 2004 - 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD(P&R)  
*David S. C. Chu* *Chu 9 Dec 04*

SUBJECT: SMART Program for Math and Science – Snowflake (attached)

- You asked that the SMART Program include an associated obligation for payment of a student's education.
- We've done just that. The Program has a payback component, both for service and funding. Scholars and Fellows will be required to sign a written service agreement to serve in the Department of Defense for a time equal to their scholarship/fellowship, and refund the government if they do not honor their obligation.
- The financial obligation may be waived by you, or in a case of bankruptcy.
- The conditions of a service agreement requirement are currently in law and are being applied in other training and scholarship programs for employees seeking to obtain an academic degree.

ATTACHMENT: As stated

Prepared by: Janice Thigpen, ODUSD(CPP), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/28213

OSD 19965-04

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

NOV 04 2004

*TLA*

November 3, 2004  
11:26 AM

TO: David Chu

CC: Mike Wynne

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: SMART Program for Math and Science Education

As you work on the idea of increasing the number of young Americans who study math and science subjects, please ensure that any incentive program you create includes an associated obligation. For example, if we are going to pay for some years of education in math or science, we should expect a commitment on their part to serve in the Department using the education the taxpayers have paid for. Please don't move forward on a plan that doesn't include a return on the taxpayers' investment.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110304-3

.....  
 Please respond by 12/5/04

|       |           |
|-------|-----------|
| USD   | PDUSD     |
| RA    | HA        |
| PI    | Readiness |
| MPP   | CPP       |
| PLANS | MC&FP     |
| CCO   |           |

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28214

OSD 19965-04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

11/4

To Mike Wynne -  
From Paul Butler

Mike -

Snowflake came out on  
this topic which I'm sure  
you will see shortly. Probably  
better to do a quick snowflake  
response and attach this. Just  
consolidates to one doc and  
we can close out the snowflake.

Regents  
Paul

Paul Butler

1/4



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS

Nov 3, 2004

Sec. Rumsfeld.

Wanted to assure you  
that there is a Service Req.  
for Defense Education.

Jerry & didn't have  
specifiers - wanted to be sure.

This satisfies a desire  
to get a pool of 'Clearable'  
Grads in Science and Tech.  
The trends have been  
bad for 10-15 years in  
critical areas.

Best  
Mike Wynne

**“(e) SERVICE AGREEMENT FOR RECIPIENTS OF ASSISTANCE.—“(1) To receive financial assistance under this section—**

**“(A) in the case of an employee of the Department of Defense, the employee shall be required to enter into a written agreement to continue in the employment of the department for the period of obligated service determined under paragraph (2) of this subsection; and**

**“(B) in the case of a person not an employee of the Department of Defense, the person shall be required to enter into a written agreement to accept employment in the Department of Defense for the period of obligated service determined under paragraph (2) of this subsection.**

**“(2) For the purposes of this section, the period of obligated service for a recipient of a scholarship or fellowship shall be determined by the Secretary of Defense. Generally, the period of obligated service may not be less than the total period for which the recipient was provided financial assistance. The period of obligated service is in addition to any other period for which the recipient is obligated to serve in the civil service of the United States.**

**“(3) An agreement entered into under this subsection shall include any terms and conditions that the Secretary of Defense determines necessary to protect the interests of the United States or otherwise appropriate for carrying out this section.”**

**“(f) REFUND FOR PERIOD OF UNSERVED OBLIGATED SERVICE.—“(1) A person who is not an employee under this program, but who receives financial assistance under this section and who voluntarily fails to complete the educational program for which financial assistance has been provided, or fails to maintain satisfactory academic progress as determined in accordance with regulations issued by the Secretary, shall refund to the United States an appropriate amount, as determined by the Secretary;**

**“(2) A person who is an employee under this program who—**

**“(A) voluntarily fails to complete the educational program for which financial assistance has been provided, or fails to maintain satisfactory academic progress as determined in accordance with**

11/3/2004

regulations issued by the Secretary; or

“(B) before completion of the period of obligated service required—

“(i) voluntarily terminates his or her employment, or

“(ii) is removed from his or her employment on the basis of misconduct, shall

refund to the United States an appropriate amount, as determined by the Secretary of Defense.

“(3) **An** obligation to reimburse the United States imposed under paragraph (1) is for all purposes a debt owed to the United States.

“(4) **The Secretary of Defense may waive, in whole or in part, a refund required under paragraph** (1) of this subsection if the Secretary determines that recovery would be against equity and good conscience or would be contrary to the best interests of the United States.

“(5) **A** discharge in bankruptcy under title 11, United States Code, that is entered less than five years after the termination of **an** agreement under this section does not discharge the person signing such **agreement from a debt arising under such agreement or under this subsection.**”



NOV 30 2004

November 30, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Changing Force Structure in Guard

Please report back to me after you have had that December 3 meeting with Blum on how to change force structure in the National Guard.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/17/04 SecDef memo #111704-10, USD (P&R) memo to SecDef#OSD 18887-04

DIR:dh  
113004-11

.....  
Please respond by 12/9/04

11/18/04

November 17, 2004

SECRET

2004 NOV 23 PM 6:31

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Virginia National Guard

I understand that the Virginia National Guard is not good. Everywhere I turn, someone tells me they are resigning or that they are not recruiting and so forth.

What do we do about fixing it? Should someone talk with the Governor? Does it need new leadership? What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:wh  
111704-10

.....

Please respond by 12/17/04

*DR 11/20*

~~FOUO~~

TOTAL P.01

OSD 18887-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28220

11/29



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

NOV 23 PM 6:31



SD 117

INFO MEMO

November 22, 2004 - 15:00

Paul Butler  
11/29

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chy, USD(P&R)

*David S. C. Chy 28 Nov 04*

SUBJECT: Virginia National Guard — SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- The Virginia Army National Guard achieved only 65 percent of its FY 2004 recruiting mission, but 94.8 percent of its strength mission.
- The Virginia Air National Guard is performing better, achieving 98.3 percent of its FY 2004 strength mission.
- Virginia Army National Guard is one of nine that have missed their ARNG recruiting missions for the past four years.
  - o They are: CT, DE, HI, IL, LA, MA, MD, VA and VI.
  - o Overall, the Virginia Army National Guard missed its FY 2004 recruiting mission of 56,002 by 7,209 and its authorized strength of 350,000 by 7,081.
- We have engaged the Guard leadership to look at a rebalancing of structure.
  - o We will meet with LTG Blum and his Directors on December 3 to establish the "way ahead".

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Rich Krimmer, OASD/RA(M&P),

(b)(6)

|          |          |
|----------|----------|
| TSA SD   | 11/29    |
| SPMA SD  |          |
| MA SD    | 2 11/29  |
| EXEC SEC | M 11/24  |
| ESR      | ES 11/24 |



11-L-0559/OSD/28221

OSD 18887-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

December 10, 2004 – 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

SUBJECT: *David S. C. Chu 10 Dec 04*  
Guard Realignment—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- Initial meeting with LTG Blum on December 1<sup>st</sup>; more work is needed before we can provide you with a plan.
- General Blum has already alerted the state adjutants general (in writing) that future force structure will flow to states with sustained recruiting and retention success, at the expense of states that fall short.
- This is an opportunity to rebalance the Guard, building units of the type we now need, shedding those less necessary.
- We will lay out a plan that plots by state how strength should move, and the numbers and types of new units that should be established. I anticipate forwarding this to you by the end of next week.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment:  
As stated

cc: General Myers



0 SD 19971-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28222

11/29



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2004 NOV 23 PM 6:31



SA 117

INFO MEMO

November 22, 2004 - 15:00

Pub  
Paul Butler  
11/29

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)  
SUBJECT: Virginia National Guard — SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- The Virginia Army National Guard achieved only 65 percent of its FY 2004 recruiting mission, but 94.8 percent of its strength mission.
- The Virginia Air National Guard is performing better, achieving 98.3 percent of its FY 2004 strength mission.
- Virginia Army National Guard is one of nine that have missed their ARNG recruiting missions for the past four years.
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  - o Overall, the Virginia Army National Guard missed its FY 2004 recruiting mission of 56,002 by 7,209 and its authorized strength of 350,000 by 7,081.
- We have engaged the Guard leadership to look at a rebalancing of structure.
  - o We will meet with LTG Blum and his Directors on December 3 to establish the "way ahead".

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Rich Krimmer, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)

|          |           |
|----------|-----------|
| TSA SD   | 11/29     |
| SPMA SD  |           |
| MA SD    | X 11/29   |
| EXEC SEC | M 11/24   |
| ESR      | ESR 11/29 |



11-L-0559/OSD/28223

OSD 18887-04

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

November 17, 2004

ES-1436  
04/015594-ES

CENTRAL AMERIC

TO: Peter Rodman

CC: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Central American Cooperative Security

Should we think about encouraging and helping the Central American countries form a cooperative security organization that is more robust than the entity they currently have? It wouldn't be a Central American NATO, but it could be better organized, trained and equipped than it currently is.

Why don't you think about it and let me know what you come up with.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111704-5

.....

Please respond by 12/3/04

17 Nov 04

~~FOUO~~

November 17, 2004

ES-1436  
04/015594-ES

TO: Peter Rodman  
CC: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Central American Cooperative Security

Should we think about encouraging and helping the Central American countries form a cooperative security organization that is more robust than the entity they currently have? It wouldn't be a Central American NATO, but it could be better organized, trained and equipped than it currently is.

Why don't you think about it and let me know what you come up with.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111704-5

.....

Please respond by 12/3/04

10 Dec 04  
Knowlton Response  
Handcarry to OSD  
CCD  
Policy  
ES

→ Sec Def  
we have begun  
consultations with State  
and NSC staff on  
this idea.  
Purz

~~FOUO~~


OSD 19980-04

18-11-04 P12:15 N

DEC 14 2004

TO: Commanding Officer, USS John F Kennedy

c c : Gordon England  
ADM Vern Clark

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Return of JFK to Homeport

Welcome home from an exceptional combat cruise. You did a superb job during our Ministers of Defense meeting afloat, and the excellence you showed in that event clearly was reflected throughout the cruise.

Well done!

DHR:ss  
121304-30

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

5601

14 Dec 04

OSD 20042-04



720  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~FOUO~~

ES-1372

04/015276-ES

November 11, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
VADM Jim Stavridis

SUBJECT: Phone Calls to MoDs

We need a project to have me systemtically call MoDs. I should probably do one or two per week -NATO allies, countries helping in Afghanistan and Iraq, countries doing something for Haiti or Liberia, countries we are trying to get to do something, countries who have experienced casualties, etc.

If I did one or two per week, it seems to me we could work through the list every six months. It would be a very good thing to do and would make a difference.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111104-4

.....  
Please respond by 12/3/04

~~FOUO~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12-11-04 P04:46 IM

Upon removal of attachments  
this document becomes

~~FOUO~~

~~W. H. H. H.~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/28227

OSD 20061-04

092

11 Nov 04

June 30, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Comptroller 6/25/04 Weekly Report

Please get on these issues raised in Lairy Lanzillotta's attached letter.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/25/04 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Weekly Report 06/25/04 [OSD 09611-04]

DHR:dh  
063004-2

.....  
Please respond by 7/19/04

020 USC

30 Jun 05



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 15 2004

332.1

Mr. William B. Magrath

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Magrath,

Thank you for your recent letter regarding your brother, Private First Class John Magrath, and his Medal of Honor **flag**.

You raised an important question, and I have passed it along to the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, Mr. David Chu. He will be in touch with you.

I do appreciate your brother's service to our nation.

Sincerely,

15 DEC 04

22 NOV 04

OSD 20087-04

Mr. William B. Magrath

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Magrath,

*Thank* you for your recent letter regarding your brother, Private First Class John Magrath, and his Medal of Honor flag.

You raised an important question, and I have passed it along to the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, Mr. David Chu. He will be in touch with you.

I do appreciate your brother's service to our nation.

Sincerely,

5710072A M




Paul Butler  
12/14

9.11 -  
CSO tasked this to UPR David Chu.  
This will serve as an internal  
response

Phx  
CSO 12/14

November 22, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Letter from Bill McGrath

Please **look** into this letter from Bill McGrath regarding the Congressional Medal of Honor flag and follow **up** with him.

Let me know what was done.

Thanks.

Attach  
11/8/04 Letter from Bill McGrath

DHR:ss  
112204-4

.....  
Please respond by 12/10/04

CSC  
NGBD INTERIM from  
SD TRS TASK FULL  
RESPONSE

332.1

22 NOV 04

OSD 20087-04

William B. Magrath

(b)(6)

Nov. 8, 2002

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld:

I have been told by the "Congressional Medal Of Honor Society" that Congress approved, and President Bush signed a Bill approving a " Medal Of Honor" flag.

My brother PFC John Magrath was killed in action in Italy in 1945 and awarded the "Medal Of Honor" posthumously. The only one in the 10th Mountain division so honored.

I would like to fly a MOH flag in his memory, but the "Congressional Medal Of Honor Society" told me this past week that only recipients of the "Medal Of Honor" from July of 2002 can have one.

Is John less deserving of having one because he gave his life for his Country in 1945? The least his Country can do for him is to let him have a MOH Flag fly in his honor.

I understand that the Department of Defense is responsible for distributing the flags.

We have John's MOH displayed in our home here in Martingham. We would be honored if you could spare the time to visit us, and read his citation.

Awaiting your comments, I am,

Respectfully yours,

*Bill*  
Bill Magrath



OSD 20087-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28232



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

February 17, 2005, 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R) *David S. C. Chu 28/2/05*  
(Signature and date)

SUBJECT: Letter from Bill Magrath

- This responds to your note, "Please look into this letter from Bill Magrath regarding the Congressional Medal of Honor Flag and follow up with **him**. Let me know what was done" (Tab A).
- Our staff responded directly to **Mr. Magrath** on December 22, 2004 (Tab B).
  - The flag is a new entitlement and authorized for only those individuals who receive the Medal of Honor after October 23, 2002. The statutory sections, initiated by Congress, do not allow issuance of flag to those who received the Medal of Honor prior to this date.
- We will seek, in coordination with the Services, a change in legislation to also authorize the presentation of a flag to current living Medal of Honor award recipients and those living primary next of kin of deceased Medal of Honor award recipients.


COORDINATION: Tab C.

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Tim Donohue, ODUSD (MPP) OEPM (b)(6)

~~TOUO~~

November 22, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Letter from Bill McGrath

Please look into this letter from Bill McGrath regarding the Congressional Medal of Honor flag and follow up with him.

Let me know what was done.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/8/04 Letter from Bill McGrath

DHR:ss  
112204-4

ESR - LTC FONZEL  
PER ISSUES - PLS  
SEE WHERE THIS IS  
M 1/11

.....  
Please respond by 12/10/04

Spec Sec  
Could you check on  
this and see what was  
done.  
Thanks

Paul Butler



~~TOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28234

OSD 20087-04



**William B. Magrath**

(b)(6)

Nov. 8, 2002

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld:

I have been told by the "Congressional Medal Of Honor Society" that Congress approved, and President Bush signed a Bill approving a "Medal Of Honor" flag.

My brother PFC John Magrath was killed in action in Italy in 1945 and awarded the "Medal Of Honor" posthumously. The only one in the 10th Mountain division so honored.

I would like to fly a MOH flag in his memory, but the "congressional Medal Of Honor Society" told me this past week that only recipients of the "Medal Of Honor" from July of 2002 can have one.

Is John less deserving of having one because he gave his life for his Country in 1945? The least his Country can do for him is to let him have a MOH flag fly in his honor.

I understand that the Department of Defense is responsible for distributing the flags.

We have John's MOH displayed in our home here in Martingham. We would be honored if you could spare the time to visit us, and read his citation.

Awaiting your comments, I am,

Respectfully yours,

*Bill*  
Bill Magrath



11-L-0559/OSD/28235

OSD 20087-04

**CORRESPONDENCE TASKER**

**Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED

**Date:** 1/27/2005

**Control Number:** 0117959

**Route To:** USDADMIN/CCO

**External Reference:** OSD 20087-04

**Controlling Organization:** ADMIN/CCO

**Document Date:** 11/8/2004

**Original Suspense Date:** 12/28/2004

**Document Originator:** MCGRATH, W

**Current Suspense Date:** 12/28/2004

**Create Date:** 12/14/2004

**Signature Level:**

**Subject:** WOULD LIKE TO FLY A CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR FLAG HONORING HIS BROTHER WHO DIED IN ITALY 1945

**Action:** Reply Direct

**ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS:**

**COORDINATIONS**

**Signature:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Date/Time:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Printed Name:** \_\_\_\_\_

11-L-0559/OSD/28236



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



22 DEC 2004

William B. Magrath

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Magrath:

Thank you for your recent letter to the Secretary of Defense regarding the Medal of Honor flag. Since my office is responsible for the Department's military awards policy, I was asked to respond.

The Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003, section 903, required the Secretary of Defense to design and designate a flag as the Medal of Honor Flag. Pursuant to **this** law and codified in title 10, United States Code, the Medal of Honor Flag **shall** be presented each person to whom a medal of honor is awarded after the date of the enactment of the law, which was October 23, 2002.

It is clearly not our intent to slight those, including your belated brother, who have given unselfishly in service to their Nation and no doubt added immeasurably to the defense of **our** nation. However, **under** the provisions of **this** law, the Department does not have the authority to grant the flag to prior recipients of the Medal of Honor or their next of kin. While the requirement may seem stringent, the past and current awards system provides for suitable recognition of individual members' acts of valor and the sacrifices made by all Service men and women.

I hope **this** information is helpful. I appreciate your personal interest in **this** matter and concern for the recognition of those who have faithfully served the United States of America.

Sincerely,

Terry L. Miatz  
Acting Deputy Director, Policy  
Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management  
(Military Personnel Policy)

11-L-05597-SD/28237

OSD 20087-04

**Donohue, Tim S., Lt. Col., OSD-PB**

---

**Subject:** FW: Snowflake: MOH Flag Request

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Hall, Nikki, LTC, DoD OGC  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 19, 2005 1:10 PM  
**To:** Donohue, Tim S., Lt. Col., OSD-P&R  
**Subject:** RE: Snowflake: MOH Flag Request

Tim -

The statutes are pretty clear. The specific language is "after October 23, 2002..." To award a Congressional Medal of Honor flag to anyone who was awarded the MOH prior to October 23, 2002 will take a change in the legislation authorizing the presentation. This may be a situation where a change would be beneficial to pursue.

Cheers

Nikki

Lieutenant Colonel Nikki A. Hall  
Associate Deputy General Counsel  
(Personnel & Health Policy)

Phone: (b)(6)

**CAUTION: This message may contain information protected by the attorney-client, work product, deliberative process, or other privilege. Do not disseminate without the prior approval of the Office of the DoD General Counsel.**

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Donohue, Tim S., Lt. Col., OSD-P&R  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 19, 2005 11:27  
**To:** Hall, Nikki, LTC, DoD OGC  
**cc:** Mintz, Terry L. CIV, OSD-P&R; Earle, Sheila M. CIV OSD-P&R  
**Subject:** Snowflake: MOH Flag Request

Nikki,

**Ref past discussions, we're beginning to see some inquiries on MOH flag eligibility and we're hamstrung by the 23 Oct 02 and future forward date. Do we have any leeway with policy to alter award of flag -- for all past MOH recipients, all living members only?**

**Specifically, here's most recent inquiry and our reply. We now have a SecDef snowflake, "Pls look into this letter from Bill McGrath regarding the Congressional Medal of Honor flag and follow up with him. Let me know what was done." DR. Appreciate your assist**

**Thanks, Tim**

**<< File: MoH Flag Request - Magrath.doc >>**

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Sprance, William, Mr, DoD OGC  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 17, 2004 12:59 PM  
**To:** Donohue, Tim S., Lt. Col., OSD-P&R  
**Subject:** RE: MOH Flag

Tim,

Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 3755 (Army), 6257 (Navy) and 8755 (Air Force), as well as 14 U.S.C. 505 (Coast Guard), the Medal of Honor flag is authorized for those individuals who receive the MOH after October 23, 2002. The statutory sections do not authorize those who received the MOH before October 23, 2002, to receive the flag.

R/  
Bill

11-L-0559/OSD/28238

William R. Sprance  
Associate Deputy General Counsel  
(Personnel and Health Policy)  
Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel

(b)(6)

This message may contain information protected by the attorneywork product, attorney-client, deliberative process or other privilege. Do not disseminate without the approval of the Office of the General Counsel

-----Original Message-----

From: Donohue, Tim S. Lt. Col., OSD-P&R  
Sent: Monday, August 16, 2004 10:51 AM  
To: Sprance, William, Mr, DoD OGC  
Cc: Link, Ryan A, CPT, OSD-P&R; Loo, Bradford G, CTV, OSD-P&R  
Subject: FW: MOH Flag

Bill,

We're working on creating a Medal of Honor Flag and a question has come up on which MOH recipients are entitled to receive the flag. The attached P.L. **107-248** at bottom, contains a reference for each Service -- Sec **3755** covers Army is below. Here's our questions:

1- Are all past MOH recipients, prior to legislation enactment (23 Oct **2002**), entitled to receive the MOH flag?

2 - Or does President give flag to just those MOH recipients after enactment of this legislation (23 October **2002**)?

Appreciate your interpretation/advice on who gets -- as it will affect policy development and flag distribution.

Thanks, Tim

<< OLE Object: Picture (Device Independent Bitmap) >>

3/4  
1130



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

775 112 - 2 PM 4: 48

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFO MEMO

February 17, 2005, 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R) David S. Chu 2/17/05  
(Signature and date)


SUBJECT: Letter from Bill Magrath

- This responds to your note, "Please look into this letter from Bill Magrath regarding the Congressional Medal of Honor Flag and follow up with him. Let me know what was done" (Tab A).
- Our staff responded directly to Mr. Magrath on December 22, 2004 (Tab B).
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- We will seek, in coordination with the Services, a change in legislation to also authorize the presentation of a flag to current living Medal of Honor award recipients and those living primary next of kin of deceased Medal of Honor award recipients.

COORDINATION: Tab C.

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Tim Donohue, ODUSD (MPP) OEPM, (b)(6)


  
Paul Butler  
3/4

|          |         |     |  |
|----------|---------|-----|--|
| MA SD    | SMA DSD |     |  |
| TSA SD   | SA DSD  | 3/4 |  |
| EXEC SEC | M 3/4   |     |  |
| ESR MA   | 7 3/3   |     |  |



~~FOUO~~

November 22, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Letter from Bill McGrath

Please **look** into this letter from Bill McGrath regarding the Congressional Medal of Honor flag and follow **up** with **him**.

Let me know what was done.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/8/04 Letter from Bill McGrath

DHR:sa  
112204-4

ESIL - LTC FENZEL  
PER ISSUES - PLS  
SBS WNBRS THIS IS

m  
1/11

.....  
Please respond by 12/10/04

Exec Sec  
Could you check on  
this and see what was  
done.  
Thanks

Paul Butler  


~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28241

OSD 20087-04

**William B. Magrath**

(b)(6)

Nov. 8, 2002

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld:

I have been told by the 'Congressional Medal Of Honor Society' that Congress approved, and President Bush signed a Bill approving a "Medal Of Honor" flag.

My brother PFC John Magrath was killed in action in Italy in 1945 and awarded the "Medal Of Honor" *posthumously*. The only one in the 10th Mountain division so honored.

I would like to fly a MOH flag in h i memory, but the "Congressional Medal Of Honor Society" told me this past week that only recipients of the "Medal Of Honor" from July of 2002 can have one.

Is John less deserving of having one because he gave his life for his Country in 1945? The least his *Country* can do for him is to let him have a MOH Flag fly in his honor.

I understand that *the* Department of Defense is responsible for distributing the flags.

We have John's MOH displayed in our home here in Martingham. We would be honored if you could spare the time to visit us, and read his citation.

Awaiting your comments, I am,

Respectfully yours,

*Bill*  
Bill Magrath



11-L-0559/OSD/28242

OSD 20087-04



**CORRESPONDENCETASKER**

**Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED

**Date:** 1/27/2005

**Control Number:** 0117959

**Route To:** USDADMIN/CCO

**External Reference:** OSD 20087-04

**Controlling Organization:** ADMIN/CCO

**Document Date:** 11/8/2004

**Original Suspense Date:** 12/28/2004

**Document Originator:** MCGRATH, W

**Current Suspense Date:** 12/28/2004

**Create Date:** 12/14/2004

**Signature Level:**

**Subject:** WOULD LIKE TO FLY A CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR **FLAG** HONORING HIS BROTHER WHO DIED IN ITALY 1945

**Action:** Reply Direct

**ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS:**

**COORDINATIONS**

**Signature:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Date/Time:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Printed**

**Name:** \_\_\_\_\_ 11-L-0559/OSD/28243



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



22 DEC 2004

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

William B. Magrath

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Magrath:

Thank you for your recent letter to the Secretary of Defense regarding the Medal of Honor flag. Since my office is responsible for the Department's military awards policy, I was asked to respond.

The Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year **2003**, section **903**, required the Secretary of Defense to design and designate a flag as the Medal of Honor Flag. Pursuant to this law and codified in title 10, United States Code, the Medal of Honor Flag shall be presented each person to whom a medal of honor is awarded after the ~~date~~ of the enactment of the law, which was October **23, 2002**.

It is clearly not our intent to slight those, including your belated brother, who have given unselfishly in service to their Nation and no doubt added immeasurably to the defense of our nation. However, under the provisions of this law, the Department does not have the authority to grant the flag to prior recipients of the Medal of Honor or their next of kin. While the requirement may seem stringent, the past and current awards system provides for suitable recognition of individual members' acts of valor and the sacrifices made by all Service men and women.

I hope this information is helpful. I appreciate your personal interest in this matter and concern for the recognition of those who have faithfully served the United States of America.

Sincerely,

Terry J. Mintz, Director, Policy  
Acting Deputy Director  
Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management  
(Military Personnel Policy)

OSD 20087-04

11-L-055 OSD/28244

**SUBJECT:** Medal of Honor Flag

Office of General Counsel

Lt Col Nikki Hall, 19 January 2005



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



22 DEC 2004

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

332.1

William B. Magrath

(b)(6)



Dear Mr. Magrath:

Thank **you** for **your** recent letter to the Secretary of Defense regarding the **Medal of Honor** flag. Since my office is responsible for the Department's **military** awards policy, I **was asked** to respond.

The Department of Defense Appropriations **Act for Fiscal Year 2003, section 903**, required the Secretary of Defense to design and designate a **flag** as the Medal of Honor **Flag**. Pursuant to this law and codified in **title 10, United States Code**, the **Medal of Honor Flag** shall be presented each person to whom a **medal** of honor is awarded after the date of the enactment of the **law**, which was **October 23, 2002**.

It is clearly not **our** intent to slight those, including **your** belated **brother**, who have given unselfishly **in** service to their Nation and **no doubt** added immeasurably to the **defense** of our **nation**. However, under **the** provisions of **this** law, the Department **does** not have the **authority** to grant the flag to prior recipients of the **Medal of Honor** or their next of kin. **While the** requirement **may** seem **stringent**, the past and current awards **system** provides for suitable **recognition** of **individual members'** acts of valor and the **sacrifices made by** all Service men and women.

I hope **this information** is helpful. I appreciate **your** personal interest in this matter and concern for **the recognition** of those who have faithfully served **the United States of America**.

Sincerely,

Terry L. Mintz  
Acting Deputy Director, Policy  
Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management  
(Military Personnel Policy)


(8 Nov 04)

9/11/04  
OSD 20087-04  
R 20087-04

~~TOP SECRET~~

December 14, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Iceland

Condi,

I'm ready to go and start the process on Iceland, along the lines of the memo I gave you. I need a yes or no. It is \$281 million/year, and we just had our budget reduced by \$10 billion.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
121404-4

Iceland

~~TOP SECRET~~

OSD 20124-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28247

14 DEC 2004

~~FOUO~~

November 19, 2004

I-04/015675

ES-1454

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Japanese

Please coordinate with me on dates when we do the Japanese 2+2.

Thanks.

DHR ss  
111904-22

.....  
Please respond by 12/3/04

19-11-04 17:37 IN

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20130-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28248



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

2004 07 15 10 16 00

December 14, 2004, 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Marine from Romania

- You asked what the legal basis was for the quick withdrawal of the Marine Security Guard (MSG) detachment commander from Romania, whether his removal was pursuant to the SOFA, and whether this action was unusual.
- MSG personnel are accredited members of the Administrative and Technical (A&T) staff of the Embassy.
  - This status – pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations -- gives them immunity from host nation criminal jurisdiction, and from civil jurisdiction for acts relating to official duties (the same immunity that foreign embassy staff personnel have in the U.S.).
  - As part of the Embassy **staff**, he was not covered by NATO/Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
- The decision to remove the Marine from Romania was made at the Embassy in Bucharest (by the Ambassador, in consultation with the Deputy Chief of Mission and the Regional Security Officer).
  - His removal was consistent with government practice in similar situations involving embassy staff, and was not done pursuant to the SOFA.
- The Vienna Convention does not explicitly provide for removal of Embassy staff from a host country, but removal is consistent with the immunity afforded to them.
- This purpose of providing immunity is not to benefit individuals, but to have consistent rules for how countries should treat diplomatic personnel stationed in their territory. A country may waive a person's **immunity**. We are not aware, however, of any past **U.S.** waiver of the immunity of an MSG member.



11-L-0559/OSD/28249

OSD 20142-04



~~FOUO~~

November 17, 2004

ES-1435  
01/015592-ES

TO: Peter Rodman  
Roger Pardo-Maurer

CC: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Options for Haiti

Steve Herbits gave me a paper on Haiti, which I then gave to either Peter Rodman or Roger Pardo-Maurer. I forget who I gave it to.

I would like it **back**, but I would like to know from whomever I gave it to what their opinion is about it, and whether or not there **is** anything we could do about it or whether Millennium Challenge would fit.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111704-11

.....  
Please respond by 12/3/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20178-04  
18-11-04 P12:14 OUT

11-I-0559/OSD/28250

HAITI

17 NOV 2004





INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



DEC 14 2004  
USDP *[Signature]*  
DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_  
ES-1435

INFO MEMO

1-04-016494-WH

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *[Signature]* DEC 2004

FROM: Roger Pardo-Maurer, DASD- Western Hemisphere Affairs

SUBJECT: HAITI PROPOSAL EVALUATION (U)

Haiti

You asked for views on the attached proposal to help Haiti.

Our analysis is immediately under, with a summary. These impressions are based on informal discussions with people at State, AID, and various Haiti experts.

8 Dec 04  
17 Nov 04

Attachment

OSD 20178-04

## Evaluation of Proposal

“An Initiative for the Revitalization Of Haiti: an Interdisciplinary Project”

### Summary:

The project carries a big price tag, and there is plenty of competition for donor funds.

- On the plus side, it addresses the full spectrum of Haitian governance problems which are a high priority to international donors, and identifies credible experts to be recruited for execution.
- The project would be more competitive if it had a narrower focus (e.g. on a region, or on the connection between security, investment, and the Diaspora).
- A clearer statement of the mission, value-added, and benchmarks for success would also be helpful.
- The interdisciplinary approach which is the basis of the proposal is an appropriate analytical tool, but in terms of implementation there is a risk of overstretch.
- A more narrowly tailored interdisciplinary approach (e.g. public health + economic opportunity, education + sanitation) might be more successful.

### Discussion:

**1. Relevance.** There is increasing urgency in the international community on the need to help the Interim Government of Haiti overcome crippling personnel and policy weaknesses. These weaknesses are jeopardizing every aspect of the country's governance and of international programs to support Haiti, and may derail the disbursement of approximately \$1.2 Billion pledged to support Haiti. This proposal, “*An Initiative for the Revitalization of Haiti*”, addresses the full spectrum of Haitian governance problems, including problems which are of critical interest to international donors, and identifies credible experts to be recruited for execution.

The proposal needs to be considered in the context of existing efforts to improve conditions in Haiti. The US. and the international community draw on over four

hundred Haiti-focused NGOs, dozens of international donors, dedicated academic programs at various colleges and universities, and international institutional support from the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), and others.

There is little to specifically distinguish this proposal from scores of other projects, both completed and proposed, intended to provide expert advice on Haiti. New proposals, especially of this magnitude (\$4 M budget), are far more likely to find sponsors if they have a clear comparative advantage by offering clear value-added and definite benchmarks for success.

**2. Timeliness.** This proposal was evidently developed in early 2004 to respond to conditions prevailing under the Aristide regime, and would have to be updated in light of Haiti's current circumstances: including the rebellion, the fall of the Aristide government, the UN intervention forces (MIFH and MINUSTAH), the formation of Haiti's Interim Government, and the continuing lack of legitimate governance in the countryside. While many of Haiti's problems are endemic, and transcend regime change, any successful proposal must respond to current political and economic realities.

**3. Value-Added and Benchmarks.** The proposal's likelihood of finding a sponsor would probably increase if it had a narrower focus. As examples (drawn from the proposal itself) one could suggest an initiative narrowly centered on:

- *a region*
- *land-titling*
- *integrity in government*
- *the Diaspora*

The interdisciplinary approach which is the basis of the proposal is an appropriate analytical tool, but in terms of implementation runs a risk of overstretch.

A more narrowly tailored interdisciplinary approach might be successful, e.g.:

- *public health + economic opportunity*
- *education + sanitation*
- *security + investment + the Diaspora.*

A clearer statement of the mission, value-added, and benchmarks for success would also be helpful. The proposal should be narrowed to address specific, measurable, programmatic goals. Instead of describing broad challenges to sustainable development — all of which are generally known — a successful

proposal must identify achievable outcomes and the unique qualifications of the project performers to pursue those objectives. *“Featurestell, but benefits sell”*.

Also, this proposal would likely be more competitive if it provided a more compelling methodology for dealing with the myriad practical challenges to a functioning, democratic Haiti. The “Plan Process” (p. 7) and “Task Force Projects” (p. 9) are a start; they need more detail. As outlined, they are menus from which the details of the project and associated methodologies would be determined *after* funding is secured.

**4. Sponsorship/Funding.** The obvious source of funding for this proposal would be the Millennium Challenge account, which is intended to reward poor countries for attempting good governance. Unfortunately, this is not an option since Haiti does not yet qualify for such funding. The qualification process is a function of measurable steps a country is taking to improve governance. Haiti has yet to get on that treadmill. This in fact, suggests the usefulness of an initiative to advise Haiti on what it needs to do to qualify for Millennium Challenge funding.

Nor in its current form would the project qualify for PEPFAR funding, since it does not focus on delivery of medical services, or other support services. A more narrowly crafted proposal might qualify for such funding.

The goal of the initiative, *“to develop a plan that is comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and of sufficient scale to be implemented for the purpose of revitalizing Haiti,”* is laudable, but far too broad and diffuse either to produce deliverables for identifiable sectors in Haiti or sponsors in the donor community. For the same reason, various experts agreed that without substantial revisions it is unlikely to qualify for U.S. government funding as an unsolicited offer.

**An Initiative for the Revitalization of Haiti**  
**An Interdisciplinary Project**  
(Draft: January 2, 2004)

**Contents**

**Vision**

**Description of the Current Situation**

**Short History of Helping Haiti**

**Goal of the Initiative**

**Potential Project Sponsors/Co-Sponsors**

**Guiding Principles**

**Plan Process**

**Task Force Projects**

**Potential Participants**

**Collateral Benefits**

**Timeline**

**Budget**

**Appendix**

**References**

**S. Herbits**

## Vision

Haiti is a country of vibrant, enthusiastic, optimistic, artistic people.

It is also a nation of profound economic poverty and societal deprivation.

Haiti is a democracy, according to its constitution, but most of its people are only free to subsist.

The world's market democracies, which now encompass hundreds of millions of people possessed of trillions of dollars in wealth, should be able to prompt the creation of one more market democracy – a liberal democracy in Fareed Zakaria's words – in a place that occupies roughly half a Caribbean island and 8 million people.

The incentives, if needed, begin with the humanitarian instinct – the comfortable millions will not abide children in slavery a few hundred miles from their shores. There is also the economic incentive – three centuries of growth around the world have surely taught the lesson that bringing humans into true productivity is the best wealth production engine available to serve all mankind.

What is needed is a compelling strategy – a scheme to achieve what governments cannot order and dollars cannot purchase – to bring about a modern Haiti.

Such a strategy can direct the many interests in preventing Haiti from continuing on its current course because those interests touch every element of the country's life. The achievement should take less than a decade.

The market economy in the new Haiti will not only end the humanitarian horror, best personified by children in slavery, but will create a source of productive manpower for the 21st century that the West will sorely need. While Haiti may be the toughest case today, the lessons of a successful new model of international action will have an impact on comparable challenges in the rest of the world.

## Description of the current situation in Haiti

Haiti's political system is frozen.

Large numbers of citizens, protesting the 2002 election have promised not to participate in another election as called for by the Organization of American States unless there are sufficient safeguards to protect them and its accuracy. President Aristede is accused of supporting violence in response to the protesters and promises to remain in office until his term expires in 2006. The stability of the government is in question.

There is both a governmental and an informal system of thuggery that keeps large segments of the population in fear and danger and diminishes the opportunity for democracy.

Corruption is pervasive. Transparency International rates it the 3<sup>rd</sup> worst in the world, outdone only by Bangladesh and Nigeria. (12)

The health and well-being of Haitians is calamitous – equal to the worst in the world.

Unemployment may be as high as 70% (6)(12)

More than half the population is illiterate (12)

Wages are the equivalent to \$1 a day (6), \$375 per year.

Life expectancy is the shortest in the Western Hemisphere; 45 for males; 49 for females

Infant Mortality is 81 per 1000 births; 125 per thousand for those under 5 years old.

Estimated AIDS cases at 300,000 (6) are the world's highest outside sub-Saharan Africa (12)

There are an estimated 300,000 child slaves in Haiti (3)

Infrastructure and finances are not positioned to help cure Haiti's ills.

Potable water is available to less than half the population

Electricity is available to six percent of the population. (13)

Haitian debt is estimated at \$1.1 billion, approximately 40% of GNP.

The United States retains economic sanctions because of the political situation.

Haiti may be responsible for at least 15% of the \$60 billion in cocaine reaching the US.

## **History of US and International Efforts to Help Haiti**

Haiti is the world's oldest black republic and the second oldest republic in the Western Hemisphere after the United States.

Since obtaining its independence from the French in 1807, Haiti has undergone continuing political upheaval through to today. The United States military intervened in 1915 and stayed until 1934. Following the dictatorship of the Duvalier family in 1991, a series of provisional governments ruled until a military take-over later that year. The United Nations Security Council authorized a multilateral force. The US-led force entered in September, 1994 and restored civilian government. OAS-led efforts have not overcome the claims of election fraud accompanied by growing violence that exist today. The crises continues to grow. (For a more detailed description, please see Appendix C)

Of note, US AID is widely distrusted in Haiti, with claims that the United States has consistently "pulled rug out from underneath" reconstruction efforts. Specific review of the history of US economic and humanitarian aid, as well as military and political intervention is warranted.

For the purposes of this study, it is valuable to note that President Aristede's first Administration (early 90s) created a series of task forces to study Haiti's problems and make recommendations.

Enormous pressures on Haiti continue: enormous power of US interests and international financial institutions, entrenched prerogatives of the elite and its corruption of the political class, and the rapidly rising expectations of the people and their champions among the intellectuals and NGOs." (6)

For perspective, Haiti's problems are less than 250 years old. As the United States, they need not be entrenched, not endemic. We know how to create economic opportunity and find the people who want it.

### **Goal of The Haiti Initiative**

The goal of this Initiative is to develop a plan that is comprehensive, interdisciplinary and of sufficient scale to be implemented for the purpose of revitalizing Haiti. The plan seeks to incorporate the collaborative efforts of international and multinational organizations, Western Hemisphere governments, and their private sectors, both for-profit and not-for-profit.

### **Potential Project Sponsors/Co-Sponsors**

University of Miami (President Donna Shalala; UofM medical program in Haiti)  
Florida International University, Miami (President  
(Just signed partnership with Rand for Latin American Studies) (2)  
American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.  
Freedom House  
Director, Net Assessments, DoD  
Florida Atlantic University (Boca Raton)



## Guiding Principles

The moment in history has arrived when it is time to generate a sustained effort to prompt a new Haiti. The principles of the strategy to be written are informed by an understanding of the opportunity presented by that moment. Consider:

There are no Cold War distractions or competitions. Cuba is nearby and yet irrelevant.

The world's economies are rebounding and the long-term need for human resources in the West is about to mushroom.

The importance of democracy to the world is in sharp relief. Ultimately all the world's people must be free in fact as well as in name. But it is particularly important that our country's first sphere of influence achieve that goal – now.

And now is just when the role of freedom and the rule of law in true, liberal democracy is gaining greater appreciation. Again, freedom will arrive in many places in the world after, in Secretary Rumsfeld's words, "a hard slog." It should be simpler in Haiti

In a brilliantly succinct history of liberal democratic developments since Constantine left Rome in A.D. 324 to create a new capital at the mouth of the Black Sea, Fareed Zakaria catalogues in his 2003 book, *The Future of Freedom*, the necessary elements for success in this venture. First and foremost, the book demonstrates that there must be competing centers of power in the society.

Haiti has a culture that has been burdened by the absence of this competition.

Colonialism was one obstacle to developing a civil society, but so was the military. And even in the years when the Haitian people were nominally free of authoritarians, political instability and unrest produced 32 governments in 70 years. Yet, there are in this island nation a vibrant people proud of a history that has repelled colonial powers, rebelled against slavery, and formed the hemisphere's second independent nation. Akin to the earliest day of European civil societies, there is a strong church, a creative culture and an optimistic outlook.

Today, we believe, a concerted strategy can be developed to introduce a variety of civil institutions among Haitians that can balance each other, competing and cooperating in the development of a free people, a democratic state and a liberal society.

A set of ideas can change a country long before it changes its structure or governance. While this has not happened often in the history of the world, it has happened: See Revolutions, America.

The philosophical underpinning of a strategic plan for Haiti is to achieve long-term freedom, security, prosperity and health by creating mechanisms of opportunity rather than shorter-term treatment of victims and to do so in a comprehensive manner in order to achieve scale of effectiveness.

As Zakaria continues, history teaches that building economic strength with its concomitant benefits to extending liberty provides a much greater likelihood that democracy

itself will succeed. A guiding principle of this plan will be to strengthen the economy of Haiti as the underpinning of its future.

Maximizing private sector participation and minimizing government micromanagement, the model would seek to transform the poor into citizens with access to and ownership of capital, collateralizing opportunities and economic prospects.

Enormous mechanisms of communications, even to and among the poorest, provide an opportunity to empower the bulk of the citizens to help shape their future.

## Plan Process

### Phase 1. Preparation/Development of the Plan outline (3 months)

Phase one of the Planning Process develops a set of Project Descriptions designed to set in motion each of the projects. Development of each project descriptions would include an overview of the relevant conditions in Haiti and some thoughts about solution topics to be considered. The collection of these Project Descriptions will serve only as a starting point, but no limitation for each Project Task Force.

During this period, members of each Task Force would be recruited.

### Phase 2. Task Force Projects (8 months)

Each Task Force will be chaired by an individual selected by the Project Director with the Advice of the Co-Chairs.

Other members of the task force will be recruited as described in the Section on Project Participants.

Each Task Force would be expected to:

- a. conduct a close analysis of the challenges facing Haiti relevant to the work of that Task Force.
- b. an inventory of current efforts addressing each issue
- c. draw up a range of recommendations for addressing those challenges
- d. evaluate those recommendations
- e. cost-out those recommendations
- f. produce a report and set of recommendations, with costs and priorities, for the larger project.

### Phase 3. Plan Integration (3 months)

The combination of the Task Force Reports would be melded into a larger Strategic Plan, including the following:

- a. a set of priorities
- b. proposed roles for those implementing the Plan
- c. a timetable for implementation
- d. costs associated with each Project
- e. resources available for funding each Project.

Phase 4. Government reviews (4 months)

Upon completion of the draft Strategic Plan, it would be circulated for comment among a number of government experts covering a broad selection of country and multilateral agencies for further evaluation.

Phase 5. Plan completion (2 months)

The final draft of the plan would be prepared during this period.

Potential project leaders/institutions and sponsors for its implementation would be identified.

A Communication Plan will be developed.

Phase 6. Communication Plan (4 months)

A plan to communicate the results of the completed project to various audiences would be implemented with the goal of recruiting commitments for implementation.

- a. Project Implementers, e.g. corporations, government agencies, not-for-profits, etc.
- b. Publication: informing the media
- c. Presenting at Congressional Hearings, especially if US Government funds are sought

## Task Force Projects

Specific projects are identified below. Additional projects may be added.

A Task Force will be assigned to each. Over the eight months, each Task Force will develop a specific plan of action in its designated area, and include delineation of those steps required to implement the plan. The plan for each project must be delineated with sufficient precision to provide evaluators with enough information to assess its potential for being implemented and the identification of resources available for such implementation. In each instance, various sectors will be included where they have a role, e.g. governments, including multilateral organizations (OAS, IMF, World Bank, Inter American Development Bank, UN Agencies), the for-profit sector, and the not-for-profit sector.

### 1. Private Ownership

- a. Explore the 1815 Property Law and its consequences for individual property ownership
- b. Examine the progress of the Hernando DeSoto private property project in Haiti. (*The Mystery of Capital*, New York: Basic Books, 2000)
- c. If applicable, describe steps necessary to implement.
- d. Study related capital needs

### 2. Commerce

- a. Review and update laws and regulations of commerce, including its judicial system, to bring them into line with other OECD nations.
- b. Review and update currency policies
- c. Review and update for foreign investment.
- d. Develop an export promotion program.
- e. Review banking structure, particularly related to new private ownership

### 3. Infrastructure

- a. Enhance internal commerce by assuring adequate roadways throughout the nation.
- b. Enhance healthcare by assuring potable water to and proper sanitation for all citizens (11). Study rainfall patterns and questions of storage.
- c. Assure power generation throughout most of the country. Study alternative energy sources, including solar, wind, storage, transmission for long-term.
- d. Inventory Housing needs and prepare a plan for adequate housing. Pre-fab (10)

### 4. Agriculture

- a. Understand what is possible given the range of topography, from desert to mountains, from forest to beach
- b. Consider possibilities given resources, water, education, arable land, consumer behavior, export opportunities
- c. Understand the constraints and opportunities with Haiti's tradition of private ownership of small plots of land.
- d. Study current crises in loss of arable land and deforestation.

## 5. Education

- a. Develop practical education programs for work-skills
- b. For K-12, develop a plan for implementation of a country-wide, all-student voucher system.
- c. For higher education, develop a plan for creating partnerships with universities in other countries, whose exchange programs of students and faculty will benefit both institutions.
- d. Develop a “virtual” curriculum for students at all levels to both supplement and supplant other education. RADIO, TV, on-line (See India model) (7)
- e. Develop citizenship and “values” elements of curricula, including freedom, prosperity, safety, and individual responsibility.
- f. Develop a system of exchange for K9-12 Diaspora students to return to Haiti to gain a sense of their own history and to contribute a broader perspective for students in Haiti.
- g. Consider plans to prevent brain drain of those most accomplished.

## 6. Health

- a. Explore a new national model based on creative work now underway for restructuring the US healthcare system. Its fundamental ingredients include minimizing paperwork and administration, preventive education and care, adequate system of distribution for pharmaceutical and medical supplies.
- b. Develop a specific plan for attaching the HIV/AIDS crises, referencing the recent experiences in Africa
- c. Consider resources such as: Project Medishare, U of M. ([projectmedishare.org](http://projectmedishare.org)); Haitian Health Foundation, (Jeremie, Haiti) ([haitianhealthfoundation.org](http://haitianhealthfoundation.org)); Jefferson College of Health Professions (sister city between Cardenas, Cuba and Philadelphia)

## 7. Security

- a. Screen and retrain a single national police force.
- b. Create a Special Crime Unit to investigate and prosecute instances of physical abuse by government employees or groups associated with the government or political parties
- c. Embargo private weapons importation
- d. Install an effective border police
- e. Examine program of the International Red Cross in non-lethal crime fighting tactics training. (8)
- f. Explore resources such as: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Washington, D.C.; Inter American Court of Human Rights (OAS), Costa Rica; OAS Special Representative, David Lee; UN. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (Afghan); Bureau of International Advocates (BAI) (group of Haitian and international attorneys; assisting the judiciary with human rights cases. Brian Concannon (6)

## 8. Democracy

- a. Review the recent history of political institutions and the political process.
- a. Make recommendations to rebuild the operation of and confidence in the political process, utilizing outside supervision where necessary.
- c. Establish a program of teaching democracy

## 9. Integrity in Government/Corruption

- a. The fight against corruption is a necessary element in building an effective economy. Daniel Kaufmann (head of World Bank's anti-corruption drive) claims that research shows that "if a poor country with a high level of corruption manages to reduce corruption to a median level, it will enjoy a 400% improvement in its per capita income." (1)
- b. Consider recent efforts:
  - World Bank (Daniel Kaufmann), Integrity Pacts
  - UN General Assembly's Convention Against Corruption  
(12/9- 11, 2003. Mexico City signing)
  - OECD Convention
  - OAS Convention
  - Council of Europe Convention
  - African Union Convention
- c. Create a Special Investigative Unit and pair it with a special team from the OAS with subpoena power to strengthen the integrity of government officials.
- d. Create a judicial watch and a system to remove judges.
- e. explore expertise: Transparency International (US/Germany)

## 11. The Arts

- a. Examine the hypothesis that Haiti is among the highest producers of visual and performing art per capita in the Hemisphere.
- b. Examine possibilities of export
- c. Explore the US import of Haitian art teachers for our public schools

## 12. Foreign Sanctions

- a. Study the impact of the current sanctions to the health and welfare of Haiti versus its achievement in its goals of political change.

## **Plan P: Participants**

The Plan is designed to capitalize on a broad range of expertise. Starting with a small core -- a director, strategic advisors, administrator, writer, and clerical support -- the project would search out and arrange for small teams to focus on specific projects. The Core would be full or part-time; the experts would be part-time and would be paid stipends for their contributions.

### 1. Project Management

The Project would be directed by Stephen Herbits.  
Bill Roesing will be a consulting strategist.  
Bio's attached.

### 2. Co-Chairs

Three leading Haitian or Haitian-Americans will Chair the project.

Their responsibilities will be to assure that a broad spectrum of views is considered, to facilitate the attraction of expert participants, and to contribute as policy experts.

### 3. The role of Haiti and its citizens

Central to the project, of course, will be those members of the leadership community in Haiti who wish to participate. It is intended that each specific task force have at least one knowledgeable participant from Haiti.

### 4. The role of the Haitian Diaspora

The wealth of experience and knowledge among Haitians living in the United States provides another pool for project members.

### 5. The role of academics

Also participating will be experts from academia and think-tanks.

### 6. The role of international and regional governments

Each international and regional organization that may have an interest or possible future role in implementation will be asked to participate as advisors to the project.

### 7. The role of the business community

Individual companies, trade associations and business organizations will be invited to support this project. They may perceive specific business opportunities in a strong Haitian economy or simply believe in the benefit of developing a strategic model for broad-scale national improvement. They will be invited to join as contributors to the planning process itself with a concomitant opportunity to participate in the project work.



## 8. The role of the not-for-profit community

The not-for-profit community has much to offer any nation, any time. They bring skills, knowledge, personnel and support mechanisms for a wide variety of projects. Their participation in the project development would add value. It is important from the beginning, however, to understand that the strategic model being developed in this plan does not provide for institutionalizing a central role for not-for-profits over the long term.

While there will always be a need for charitable activities; the plan would hope to capitalize on their contributions primarily for transitional purposes, with a draw-down as the economic benefits of the plan begin to become widespread.

### Candidate Participants

Eric Behrmann (Kim Green)

M. Bubishi (KG)

Yolly Roberson (Fla. State Rep.) (KG)

Aldy Castor, MD. (KG)

President Human Resource Development Foundation (HRDF.org)

Vice President, Haitian-American Republican Caucus (?)

Mark Rogers (KG)

Director of Development, FAUACA.org

Patrick Prosper (KG)

Ambassador at large for war crimes

Dr. Rudy Moise (KG)

University of Miami

Owns Radio Carnivale

Dr. Laurence Pierre (KG)

Center for Haitian Studies

John Rendon, The Rendon Group (PR) (KG)

Terry Rey

FIU, Professor, Haitian Studies Class

Gepsie M. Metellus, ED

Sant La-Haitian Neighborhood Center

Marleine Bastien

Haitian American Women Foundation

Tom Reeves, former director of the Caribbean Focus Program, professor of history at Roxbury Community College, Boston. Founding Member of the New England Observer delegations to Haiti on democracy.

Jim Obestar (D. Minn. Former?) Peace Corps in Haiti. (NG)

## II: I Benefits of the Initiative

1. Were there to be a demonstrable improvement in its condition, other nations may be encouraged to take steps to address their own poverty.
2. Haiti has a substantial expatriate community in the United States that can provide an important resource of advice, counsel, and perhaps relationships for future growth.
3. The pervasiveness of poverty in a world that also contains incredible wealth begs for working models that address institutionalized or intractable poverty. It is the compassionate thing to do, because it will ultimately improve the population's economic well-being. It is important for everyone's security, because it will diminish opportunities for radicalism and improve governance.
4. As Haiti is neither white nor non-white Hispanic, a successful model may have application throughout black inner cities in the US and across Africa.
5. Given its presence in the Caribbean, there may be regional entities – such as the Organization of American States – that will take the lead, rather than the United States Government, increasing chances that other regional organizations throughout the world can apply similar efforts.
6. Haiti is of a size that enhances the opportunity to take risks. Most laws are both national and local simultaneously.
7. Haiti's location is an invitation to substantial expert advice from around the Caribbean as well as the United States.
8. A successful plan will reduce illegal emigration efforts and thereby reduce one of the largest illegal immigrant-seeking populations challenging the United States, thus reducing pressure on the US government's inconsistent policy towards Haitians and Cubans.

The USG ties illegal Haitian immigration to terrorism. "If we are going to start to win that aspect of the war on terrorism we call the "war for minds," we should begin at home, with our own behavior, our own justice, our own Justice Department. I fear we are creating the motivation for terrorists; not educating the world of the incompatibility of terrorism and civilization. (4)

9. Modern nation building: a necessary in the 21<sup>st</sup> century war on terrorism, including the reduction or elimination of ungovernable areas as hosts for terrorist bases and training.
10. US Annual Assessment of the cooperation of major drug producing and transiting countries (2003) says that Haiti had "failed demonstrably" to meet international obligations to fight drugs. (5) It is estimated that 15% of the \$60 billion worth of cocaine reaching the US is handled by Haitian traffickers and that Aristide himself earns from the process. (12)
11. A successful effort will be a model for close-by Jamaica and Cuba.

**Plan 1 Summary**

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| 1. Phase 1 – Preparation/Development of the Plan outline | 3 months  |
| 2. Phase 2 – Task Force Projects                         | 8 months  |
| 3. Phase 3 – Plan Integration                            | 3 months  |
| 4. Phase 4 – Government Reviews                          | 4 months  |
| 5. Phase 5 - Plan Completion                             | 2 months  |
| 6. Phase 6 - Plan Communication                          | 4 months  |
| Total time   | 24 months |

**Plan Budget (24 Months)**

Cash

|  |             |
|--|-------------|
| Director:  | \$600,000   |
| Strategic Advisor  | 480,000     |
| Strategic Advisor  | 360,000     |
| Administrator:   | 120,000     |
| Writer:  | 50,000      |
| Clerical:  | 44,000      |
| Participant Stipends   |             |
| Co-Chairs (3) \$2kx21  | 126,000     |
| Task Force Chairs (12) \$6x21                                    | 852,000     |
| Task Force Members (12x5) \$5x8                                  | 48,000      |
| Travel   | 360,000     |
| Other overhead, payroll taxes, etc.<br>(phone, copier, supplies) | 480,000     |
| Media Advisor (three months)                                     | 90,000      |
| Total Project  | \$3,610,000 |

In-Kind

(To be provided by one of the sponsors)

Office suite, including two private offices, a clerical space, and conference room seating up to 12, parking  
Access to faculty; stipends to be paid by the project.

### **Appendix 1: A view towards economic sanctions**

- a. Study of the recent history of the role of sanctions towards Haiti by the United States, other governments and international organizations.
- b. Analyze their effectiveness
- c. Study other possible approaches
  1. flooding the nation with currency
    - a. flooding the country with communications, e.g. satellite dishes and radios and programming; cell phones; web access; aid packed with messages.
    - b. ruthless humiliation of leaders – at the UN and its organizations, in public, in communications above, use cell phone information collection; increase investment in intelligence
  4. Embargoing items that support the dictatorship, e.g. weapons importation.
  5. Encourage and support exile participation in their native country.

### **Appendix 2: A new model of foreign AID.**

- a. governmental
- b. best-practices shared
- c. bureaucracy versus evaluation
- d. band-aids or cures

### **Appendix 3: A Short History of US and International Efforts to Help Haiti**

Haiti is the world's oldest black republic and the second oldest republic in the Western Hemisphere after the United States.

“The native Arawak Amerindians - who inhabited the island of Hispaniola when it was discovered by Columbus in 1492 - were virtually annihilated by Spanish settlers within 25 years. In the early 17th century, the French established a presence on Hispaniola, and in 1697, Spain ceded to the French the western third of the island - Haiti. The French colony, based on forestry and sugar-related industries, became one of the wealthiest in the Caribbean, but only through the heavy importation of African slaves and considerable environmental degradation. In the late 18th century, Haiti's nearly half million slaves revolted under Toussaint L'OWERTURE and after a prolonged struggle, became the first black republic to declare its independence in 1804.” (13)

From 1822 to 1844, Haiti occupied the entire Island until the Dominican Republic was formed. The following is an edited version of the US State Department Background Note on Haiti (14): “With 22 changes of government from 1843 to 1915, Haiti experienced numerous periods of intense political and economic disorder, prompting the United States military intervention of 1915. Following a 19-year occupation, U.S. military forces were withdrawn in 1934, and Haiti regained sovereign rule.

“From 1986--when the 29-year dictatorship of the Duvalier family ended--until 1991, Haiti was ruled by a series of provisional governments. In March 1987, a constitution was ratified that provides for an elected, bicameral parliament; an elected president that serves as head of state; and a prime minister, cabinet, ministers, and supreme court appointed by the

president with parliament's consent. The Haitian Constitution also provides for political decentralization through the election of mayors and administrative bodies responsible for local government.

"In December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a charismatic Roman Catholic priest, won 67% of the vote in a presidential election that international observers deemed largely free and fair. Aristide took office on February 7, 1991, but was overthrown that September in a violent coup led by dissatisfied elements of the army and supported by many of the country's economic elite. Following the coup, Aristide began a 3-year exile in the U.S. Several thousand Haitians may have been killed during the de facto military rule. The coup contributed to a large-scale exodus of Haitians by boat. The U.S. Coast Guard rescued a total of 41,342 Haitians at sea during 1991 and 1992, more than the number of rescued boat people from the previous 10 years combined.

"From October 1991 to September 1994 an unconstitutional military de facto regime governed Haiti. Various OAS and UN initiatives to end the political crisis through the peaceful restoration of the constitutionally elected government, including the Governor's Island Agreement of July 1993, failed. The military and de facto authorities couldn't agree on a return to constitutional government, even though the economy was collapsing and the country's infrastructure was deteriorating from neglect.

"On July 31, 1994, the UN Security Council authorized member states to use all necessary means to restore Haiti's constitutionally elected government to power.

"In the weeks that followed, the United States took the lead in forming a multinational force (MNF) to carry out the UN's mandate by means of a military intervention. In mid-September, with U.S. troops prepared to enter Haiti by force, President Clinton dispatched a negotiating team led by former President Jimmy Carter to persuade the de facto authorities to step aside and allow for the return of constitutional rule. With intervening troops already airborne, Gen. Raoul Cedras and other top leaders agreed to accept the intervention of the MNF. On September 19, 1994, the first contingents of what became a 21,000-member international force touched down in Haiti to oversee the end of military rule and the restoration of the constitutional government. By early October, the three de facto leaders--Cedras, Gen. Philippe Biamby, and Police Chief Lt. Col. Michel Francois--and their families had departed Haiti. President Aristide and other elected officials in exile returned on October 15.

"Under the watchful eyes of international peacekeepers, restored Haitian authorities organized nationwide local and parliamentary elections in June 1995. A pro-Aristide, multi-party coalition called the Lavalas Political Organization (OPL) swept into power at all levels. With his term ending in February 1996 and barred by the constitution from succeeding himself, President Aristide agreed to step aside and support a presidential election in December 1995. Rene Preval, a prominent Aristide political ally, who had been Aristide's Prime Minister in 1991, took 88% of the vote, and was sworn in to a 5-year term on February 7, 1996, during what was Haiti's first-ever transition between two democratically elected presidents.

"In late 1996, former President Aristide broke from the OPL and created a new political party, the Lavalas Family (FL). Elections in April 1997 indicated victories for FL candidates in most races, but were plagued with allegations of fraud and not certified by most international observers. Partisan resulted in almost total governmental gridlock until early January 1999, when President Preval dismissed legislators whose terms had expired--the entire Chamber of Deputies

and all but nine members of the Senate--and converted local elected officials into state employees. The President and Prime Minister then ruled by decree. Following several delays, the first round of new elections took place on May 21, 2000. The election drew the participation of a multitude of candidates from a wide array of political parties and a voter turnout of more than 60%. Controversy mired the good start. Nonetheless, on August 28, 2000, Haiti's new Parliament, including the contested Senators accorded victory under the flawed vote count, was convened.

"Through a number of diplomatic missions by the OAS, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the United States, the international community had sought to delay Parliament's seating until the electoral problems could be rectified. When these efforts were rebuffed, Haiti's main bilateral donors announced the end of "business as usual." They moved to re-channel their assistance away from the government and announced they would not support or send observers to the November elections. Concurrently, most opposition parties regrouped in an alliance that became the Democratic Convergence. The Convergence asserted that the May elections were so fraudulent that they should be annulled and held again. Elections for President and nine Senators took place on November 26, 2000. All major opposition parties boycotted these elections in which voter participation was estimated at 5%. Jean-Bertrand Aristide emerged as the easy victor of these controversial elections, and the candidates of his FL party swept all contested Senate seats. He was inaugurated on February 7, 2001.

"It did not, however, put an end to the political stalemate. OAS-mediated negotiations began in April 2001 to find a resolution, focusing on the on possible makeup of a new electoral council, a timetable for new elections, security for political parties, and other confidence-building measures. These negotiations made some progress, but were suspended in mid-July without a final agreement. On July 28, 2001, unknown gunmen attacked police facilities in Port-au-Prince and the provinces. A subsequent government crackdown on opposition party members and former soldiers further increased tensions between Lavalas and Convergence. On December 17, 2001, unidentified gunmen attacked the National Palace in Port-au-Prince. Following the assault, pro-government groups attacked the offices and homes of several opposition leaders. One opposition member was killed. Negotiations between FL and Democratic Convergence, already on hold following the July violence, were suspended indefinitely.

"In January 2002, the OAS Permanent Council adopted Resolution 806 on Haiti that called for government action to address the political stalemate, growing violence, and deterioration in respect for human rights. It also authorized OAS establishment of a Special Mission in Haiti to support implementation of steps called for in Resolution 806. The OAS Special Mission began operations in March 2002, working with the government on plans to strengthen Haiti's democratic institutions in security, justice, human rights, and governance. Nevertheless, the climate of security deteriorated and a rapidly weakening economy created risks of a humanitarian disaster. The OAS Permanent Council adopted Resolution 822, September 4, 2002, which set a new course for resolving the crisis by: committing the Haitian government to a series of steps leading to an improved climate of security for free and fair elections in 2003; supporting Haiti's resumption of normal relations with the International Financial Institutions; and strengthening the mandate of the OAS to monitor as well as support GOH efforts to comply with OAS resolutions. It also conferred new mandates related to conduct of elections and disarmament.

"Protest strikes and attacks on opposition demonstrations by government-supported gangs between November 2002 and February 2003 hardened attitudes on both sides. The

opposition issued a public call for Aristide's removal and announced plans for a transitional government. In March, 2003, a high-level joint delegation of the OAS and Caribbean Community (CAFUCOM) presented specific demands to President Aristide to restore public security and create confidence necessary to move toward elections: select new leadership for the Haitian National Police in consultation with the OAS; arrest Amiot Metayer, a notorious gang leader; and disarm the security forces used by government politicians to intimidate opponents. Since then, a new police chief, appointed June 9 in consultation with the OAS, resigned and fled the country June 23 after being ordered to give up his authority over budget and personnel; government-paid thugs violently disrupted a civil society public ceremony July 12 in Cite Soleil; police attacked civil society marches in Cap Haitien August 30 and September 14 and prevented an opposition march scheduled for October 5. Amiot Metayer was murdered September 21 (it is widely believed the government ordered the murder to prevent release of compromising information). The government announced August 13 that it was re-activating a defunct CEP in what many have interpreted as a move toward holding elections outside the framework of OAS Resolution 822 . The OAS and other foreign observers, including the U.S., have denounced these steps. To re-invigorate the process envisioned in Resolution 822, the OAS designated a Special Envoy for Dialogue in Haiti, Terence Todman, a retired U.S. Career Ambassador. Todman, a native of the U.S. Virgin Islands, undertook three negotiating missions to Haiti in September-October 2003. The political stalemate and violence continues." (14)

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~~FOUO~~

November 17, 2004

ES-1435  
04/015592-ES

TO: Peter Rodman  
Roger Pardo-Maurer

CC: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Options for Haiti

Steve Herbits gave me a paper on Haiti, which I then gave to either Peter Rodman or Roger Pardo-Maurer. I forget who I gave it to.

I would like it back, but I would like to know from whomever I gave it to what their opinion is about it, **and** whether or not there is anything we could do about it or whether Millennium Challenge would fit.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111704-11

.....  
Please respond by 12/3/04

~~FOUO~~

10-11-04 P12:14 OUT

11-I-0559/O5D/28275

12/14  
11:30

120

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE / 10/29

2004 DEC 15 PM 4:16

October 29, 2004

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: MP Training

J-3 - action  
P.S.

230

Please dig into this subject David Chu comments on regarding MPs. I guess I want to be persuaded.

Thanks.

Attach  
9/27/04 SecDef Memo to USD (P&R) re: Training of MPs  
10/22/04 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef re: Potential Further Consolidation of Military Police Training

353

DHR:js  
(02904-1)

.....  
Please respond by 11/12/04

10/29 → TO SecDef

Paul Butler  
12/20

S.R.  
Response attached  
12/21

V/R, Col B  
12/20

(29 Oct 04)

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 20182-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28276



THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE VICE CHAIRMAN  
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
201 82 12 11 0 16

CH-2236-04  
14 December 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, VCJCS *VR/Pace 14 Dec 04*

SUBJECT: Military Police (MP) Training

- **Answer.** In response to your question (TAB A), based on today's missions and force structure, I concur in Dr. Chu's reply that the Services already benefit from joint training of MPs and pursuing further "jointness" in current MP training would likely not yield major benefits. However, we should explore standardization of MP skills across services. To ensure we are maximizing our common skills and training opportunities, we will establish a Joint Integrated Process Team to completely analyze the issue.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Major General Jack J. Catton, Jr., USAF; Director, J-7;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/28277

OSD 201 82 -04

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

10/29  
10/29 13 16:16

October 29, 2004

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: MP Training

J-3 - action  
PR.  
230

Please dig into this subject David Chu comments on regarding MPs. I guess I want to be persuaded.

Thanks.

Attach

- 9/27/04 SecDef Memo to USD (P&R) re: Training of MPs
- 10/22/04 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef re: Potential Further Consolidation of Military Police Training

DHR:ss  
102904-11

.....  
Please respond by 11/12/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/28278

OSD 20182-04



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

October 22, 2004 - 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*pub* ↑

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

*David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Potential Further Consolidation of Military Police Training—  
SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- \* We have already achieved substantial "jointness" in MP training
- Army and Marine Corps train together at Fort Leonard Wood
- Air Force and Navy train together at Lackland Air Force Base
- Guard and Reserve train with their respective service at these joint locations
- Skill sets for Army/Marine Corps differ substantially from Air Force/Navy, since principal responsibility of Air Force and Navy personnel is protection of "places." Curriculum overlap is only about 20 percent.
- ? • Unless it is decided to change the mission of Air Force and Navy personnel, further consolidation would not yield any important benefits (and might engender some unnecessary complications).

*meje*

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

|          |                |
|----------|----------------|
| TSA SD   | <i>10/27</i>   |
| SRMA SD  |                |
| MA SD    | <i>10/27</i>   |
| EXEC SEC | <i>M 10/28</i> |



OSD 16867-04

Tab A

10/15/04  
SEP 28 2004

~~FOUO~~

September 27, 2004

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld )N  
SUBJECT: Training of MPs

Should **we** have a **program** to get **all** Military Police **joint and** trained all at the same place with the **same** rules? (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Guard, Reserve?)

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092704-25

.....  
Please respond by 10/15/04

JB See Def

Paul Butler

10/27

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/28280

TAB B  
COORDINATION PAGE

| Unit | Name                 | Date             |
|------|----------------------|------------------|
| USA  | COL John Chappell    | 4 November 2004  |
| USN  | CAPT Curt Goldacker  | 18 November 2004 |
| USAF | Col Shelby Ball      | 18 November 2004 |
| USMC | Col Anthony Van Dyke | 10 November 2004 |

December 15, 2004

TO: GEN Leon LaPorte

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Progress

The progress in South Korea is impressive. Congratulations!

DHR:dh  
121504-2

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Korea

15 Dec 04





72  
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

001 512 10 11 11: 56

## INFORMATION PAPER

16 December 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General M. W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps *WMA for*

SUBJECT Response to Komatsu Snowflake

- Komatsu Armored vehicle
  - The Marine Corps has procured no armored vehicles from Komatsu Defense LTD.
  - However, the Komatsu armored vehicle (at Tab A) was considered twice as a candidate for procurement, once for a Convoy Escort Vehicle and the second time for a Hardened Engineer Vehicle. In both instances the vehicle was identified as a "developmental item" and therefore not considered a viable candidate for urgent requirements that targeted fielding time lines of six months or less.
  - Of note, a third opportunity to evaluate the Komatsu is on going; a Request for Information was released for a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle requirement last Friday, 10 Dec. All vendor responses, domestic and foreign, are due NLT 15 Jan 05. Komatsu, along with other foreign vendors, will be made aware of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle RFI.
  - We will continue to investigate foreign products, like the Komatsu vehicle, that can be rapidly procured to support OIF requirements.
- Organizing, Training, and Equipping the Forces
  - I MEF deployed to Iraq in March 2004 for OIF II. This force was well prepared for operations – 100% of its vehicles had armor protection and each Marine had the best personnel protective equipment available.
  - Attached is an earlier memo from Assistant Secretary Young (Tab B) that highlights the successful efforts to equip Marine forces.

Tabs: as stated

Prepared by: Mr. Steven J. Manchester, Director, International Programs,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/28283

OSD 20220-04

## TAB (A) – Komatsu Armored Vehicle Photos



**December 14, 2004**

**TO: Secretary Rumsfeld / General Myers**

**FROM: - John Young**



**SUBJECT: MARINE CORPS VEHICLE ARMOR**

BEFORE the Marine Corps I MEF force crossed the line of departure into Iraq in March, 2004, the Marine Corps had armor for 100% of it's 3000+ vehicles. The armor, a quick fix application of 3/16" steel, was installed on 90% of the HMMWV's and MTRV's. The Marine Corps also had 37 up-armored HMMWV's. The Marine Corps acquisition and logistics system assembled over 1,800 sets of the interim 3/16" armor kits within six weeks of receiving the execute order to provide armor for the MEF prior to it rolling across the line of departure. Similarly, all Marine Corps helicopters were equipped with Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) countermeasures for deployment. Finally, every Marine in Iraq has, and has always had, personal protection gear (Outer Tactical Vests, Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) plates, ear plugs, and safety glasses).

The Department next identified additional reprogramming funds and upgraded all vehicle armor kits to Marine depot built 3/8" rolled homogeneous armor (RHA) by September, 2004. We used an effort called Operation Respond, supplemented by the Marine Corps' Urgent Universal Needs Statement process, to identify the urgent needs of the Marines as well as to force the naval enterprise to identify funds. In excess of \$520 million was reprogrammed to meet over 120 requirements for deployed Marines. These initiatives included additional armor kits, IED jamming devices, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) robots, dogs for IED detection, gunner's shields, unmanned air and ground vehicles, ballistic goggles, body armor extensions for extremity protection, communications gear, and language translation equipment. Through dedicated leadership and Operation Respond, the naval acquisition team equipped the Marines with every needed, available solution.

**cc: Secretary England**

11-L-0559/OSD/28285

ACTION MEMO

DepSecDef

USDP ~~SECRET~~

I-04/014171-ISP

ES-1171

DEC 15 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira Ricardel, ASD/ISP (Acting) *John Rood for* DEC 1 2004

SUBJECT: Discussing Operation of Initial Missile Defense System

- You asked Policy to draft a declaratory policy to describe the operation of our initial missile defense capabilities once the current "shakedown period" has been completed.
- Attached at Tab A is a draft declaratory policy which has been coordinated with the Missile Defense Agency, General Counsel, the Joint Staff, NORTHCOM, PACOM, and STRATCOM.
  - o Steve Cambone also offered a number of comments, each of which we incorporated.
  - o The draft declaratory policy is intended to put our missile defense efforts into context, to deter potential adversaries, and to make clear that the U.S. is working with friends and allies.
- You specifically asked us to consider how best to address the possibility of a missile attack under the guise of a pre-announced space launch.
  - o The draft declaratory policy addresses this and other potential circumstances through use of a formulation that is clear, simple, and broad in its coverage:
 

"The missile defense system is available to engage launches that we determine are on a trajectory that threatens the United States or its deployed forces. Such events include deliberate, unauthorized, or accidental launches."
- In crafting this formulation, we attempted to avoid phrases that could be viewed as overly muscular or mischaracterized as a means of forcibly controlling access to space.
- We expect it will be necessary to update this declaratory policy as we develop greater capabilities, and reach agreements on the circumstances under which other nations would receive protection and their respective contribution.

373.24

1 Dec 04

RECOMMENDATION: Review and approve draft declaratory policy attached at Tab A. Attachment: a/s

Prepared by: John Rood, DASD Forces Policy (b)(6) 30 November 2004

~~SECRET~~ DECISION:

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~  
DRAFT

## Missile Defense Declaratory Policy

### Introduction

- Today, many nations, including some of the world's least responsible states, possess ballistic missiles of increasing range and complexity.
- To address the growing threat of ballistic missile attack, President Bush directed the development and fielding of an initial set of missile defense capabilities that would begin operating in 2004.

### Description of Today's Capability

- The U.S. has begun operating a set of missile defense capabilities.
- The system's capability will be improved continually through additional testing and the insertion of additional or new capabilities as they become available and are needed to meet mission objectives.
- The U.S. will continue a robust research, development, testing, and evaluation program while conducting operations of the missile defense system.
  - Through these continuous efforts and the fielding of additional capabilities, the performance of the initial system and its ability to defend against more complex threats will continue to improve.

### Purpose of the System

- The purpose of the missile defense system is to deter and defend against a deliberate missile attack, as well as to counter unauthorized or accidental missile launches.
- The Department of Defense is developing and deploying missile defenses capable of protecting not only the United States, but also our friends and allies, and is pursuing cooperative relationships with a number of countries.
- As the President stated on June 17, 2002, "[b]ecause these threats endanger our allies and friends around the world, it is essential that we work together to defend against them. . ."
- The participation of friends and allies will, over time, extend to them the benefits of missile defense.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~  
DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/28287

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~  
DRAFT

### Use of the System

- The missile defense system is available to engage launches that we determine are on a trajectory that threatens the United States or its deployed forces. Such events include deliberate, unauthorized, or accidental launches.
- U.S. missile defenses will be integrated with offensive capabilities to improve the ability to defeat and defend against potential attacks, deter and dissuade potential foes, and assure the American people and allies.
  - Regardless of whether a missile attack is successfully intercepted, the United States will consider the full range of its response options in light of the circumstances surrounding such an event.
- To ensure that peaceful launches are not construed as hostile acts, the United States encourages the public announcement of upcoming launches, as many countries do so today.

### Conclusion

- We are fielding an initial missile defense system that will continue to evolve and become increasingly more capable over time.
- We intend to continue to pursue the most promising technologies and basing modes to strengthen this system.
- The message to potential adversaries is clear: We are determined to make the pursuit of ballistic missiles designed to threaten or deter the United States, its deployed forces, or friends and allies an increasingly costly and ineffective proposition.

December 21, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Missile Defense Declaratory Policy

Please make sure this declaratory policy is staffed out to Policy, Di Rita and Cambone.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/1/04ASD(ISP) memo to SecDef re: Missile Defense Declaratory Policy

DHR:dh  
122104-15

.....  
Please respond by 1/13/05

373.24  
21 Dec 04  
1 Dec 04

12/17  
1030

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

**ACTION MEMO** OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef

2004 DEC 16 09:13:03

USDP (L) 1500  
I-04/014171-ISP  
DEC 15 2004

ES-1171

Paul Butte  
12/20  
Pro

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira Ric el, ASD/ISP (Acting) *Road for* DEC 1 2004

SUBJECT: Discussing Operation of Initial Missile Defense System

- You asked Policy to draft a declaratory policy to describe the operation of our initial missile defense capabilities once the current "shakedown period" has been completed.
- Attached at Tab A is a draft declaratory policy which has been coordinated with the Missile Defense Agency, General Counsel, the Joint Staff, NORTHCOM, PACOM, and STRATCOM.
  - o Steve Cambone also offered a number of comments, each of which we incorporated.
  - o The draft declaratory policy is intended to put our missile defense efforts into context, to deter potential adversaries, and to make clear that the U.S. is working with friends and allies.
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- We expect it will be necessary to update this declaratory policy as we develop greater capabilities, and reach agreements on the circumstances under which other nations would receive protection and their respective contribution.

RECOMMENDATION: Review and approve draft declaratory policy attached at Tab A.  
Attachment: a/s

Prepared by: John Rood, DASD Forces Policy, (b)(6) November 2004

**SECDEF DECISION:**  
APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_

|          |          |       |       |
|----------|----------|-------|-------|
| MA SD    | SMA OSD  | SPD   | 12/20 |
| SA SD    | SA DSD   | 10/20 |       |
| EXEC SEC | 11/17/17 |       |       |
| ESR MA   | 12/16    | 12-16 | -04   |

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28290 01-12-04 USDP 20228-04



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

DRAFT

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- The participation of friends and allies will, over time, extend to them the benefits of missile defense.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/28291

## Use of the System

- The missile defense system is available to engage launches that we determine are on a trajectory that threatens the United States or its deployed forces. Such events include deliberate, unauthorized, or accidental launches.
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~~FOUO~~  
TAB A

November 8, 2004: 51

898

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: War Phases

381

We need to see that war plans have a zero, as well as a four phase. What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:as  
110804-12

.....  
Please respond by 12/5/04

8 Nov 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 16 2004

Mr. Michel Richard  
Citronelle  
3000 M Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20007

Dear Mr. Richard,

I understand that you participated in the USO "Holiday for the Troops" Dinner on December 13<sup>th</sup>.

Thank you for your role in this special event. It was a fitting recognition of our fine U.S. forces. I do appreciate all the work that must have gone into that evening.

Sincerely,

335 SD

16 Dec 04

3 Dec 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 16 2004

Mr. Bob Kinkead  
Kinkead's  
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Kinkead,

Thank you for the work you put into last week's USO  
"Holiday for the Troops" Dinner.


You used your talents to make an important contribution  
to our service members, and I do appreciate it.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld".

0SD 20232-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28295



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 16 2004

Mr. Darren Jolley  
Fat **Punk's** Restaurant  
9103 Andrew Drive  
Manassas, VA 20111-8248

Dear Mr. Jolley,

Thanks for your efforts in the USO "Holiday for the Troops" Dinner. I hear that the troops thoroughly enjoyed the evening.

This event was a great morale builder, and I do appreciate your role in honoring these fine men and women.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. ...".

OSD 20232-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28296



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 16 2004

Mr. Christopher Clime  
Ceiba  
701 14<sup>th</sup> Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20005

Dear Mr. Clime,

I understand that the "Holiday for the Troops" Dinner was a great success.

Thank you for using your talents to brighten the season for these fine men and women. I do appreciate it.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert M. Gates".



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 16 2004

Mr. Todd Gray  
Equinox  
818 Connecticut Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Gray,

Thank you for your role in the USO "Holiday for the Troops" Dinner last week.

I understand that the evening was a great success, and I appreciate the work that you put into this event.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. ...". The signature is written in a cursive style and is located below the word "Sincerely,".

OSD 20232-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28298



~~FOUO~~

December 3, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 9  
SUBJECT: Note to Chefs

Someone ought to draft a nice note from me to the chefs of each of the restaurants listed on the attached invitation, thanking them for helping out the troops.

Thanks.

**Attach.**

12/13/04 Invitation to USO Holiday for the Troops Dinner

DHR:ss  
120304-7

335 SD

.....  
Please respond by 12/15/04

3 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20232-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28299

We would like to cordially invite you and a guest to join the service members from Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda for the

# "HOLIDAY FOR THE TROOPS" DINNER

Chefs from:

~~Ceiba~~

~~Citronette~~

~~Equinox~~

~~Fat Punk's~~

~~Kirkhead's~~

Marcel's

Melrose

Poste <sup>Madame</sup> Brasserie

Rocklands BBQ

Tosca

Will be cooking a very special dinner on

**MONDAY DECEMBER 13TH**

**6:00-9:00 PM**

Mologne House Dining Room

Walter Reed Army Medical Center

Please RSVP to Lisa Marie at (b)(6)



of Metropolitan Washington

(b)(6)



# *Fax*

*To: Honorable Donald Rumsfeld and guest*

*Fax Number* (b)(6)

*From: Elaine Rogers ; President, USO of Metropolitan Washington*

*Number of Pages including Cover Page: 2*

*Message: We are pleased to invite you to celebrate the holiday season with our wounded service members. Please RSVP no later than December 8, 2004. Thank you!*

# *HAPPY HOLIDAYS*

11-L-0559/OSD/28301

~~FOUO~~

December 9, 2004

I-04/016688

ES-1646

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Indian Air Show

An issue has come up as to what kind of aircraft and what participation the US should have at the Indian air show. We have to do it very fast.

Are you familiar with the issue? If not, please get your head into it.

Thanks.

DHR:m  
120904-13

.....

Please respond by 12/16/04

Sir,  
Response attached.  
v/r  
Lt Col Lengyel

DEC 17 2004

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20305-04

10-12-04 09:33 13

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEC 22 2004

TO: Ray DuBois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Don Haider

Attached is a letter from an excellent person, Don Haider, who is a possibility for the Base Closing Commission.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/3/04 Letter from Do Haider to SecDef

DHR:ss  
122104-6

.....  
Please respond by 11/20/05

323.3

22 Dec 04

3 Dec 04

~~TOP SECRET~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28303      OSD 20355-04



J.L. Kellogg School of Management  
Center for Nonprofit Management  
Donald P. Jacobs Center  
2001 Sheridan Road  
Evanston, Illinois 60208-2001

(b)(6)

[www.kellogg.northwestern.edu](http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu)



NORTHWESTERN  
UNIVERSITY

December 3, 2004

Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense  
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Enjoyed seeing you at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in August where, once again, you were headed to Afghanistan. I do hope you have the energy and support to see us through this a while longer. We need you.

I enjoyed my brief tenure on your DOD Financial Management Reform Study Team with Stephen Friedman so much that I am compelled to volunteer for more. If you have an opening on the Base Closing Commission and you would be so inclined to recommend me, I'll do whatever lifting is required at this end for support. I not only have the passion for this but also, I hope, the credentials.

Best to you, Joyce and family for the holidays. Stay the course.

Sincerely,

Don Haider  
Professor of Management

**OSD 20355-04**

11-L-0559/OSD/28304



J.L. Kellogg School of Management  
Center for Nonprofit Management  
Donald P. Jacobs Center  
2001 Sheridan Road  
Evanston, Illinois 60208-2001

(b)(6)

www.kellogg.northwestern.edu



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UNIVERSITY

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Best to you, Joyce and family for the holidays. Stay the course.

Sincerely,

Don Haider  
Professor of Management

OSD 20355-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28305



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 21 2004

323.3

Mr. Don Haider  
Professor of Management  
J.L. Kellogg School of Management  
Northwestern University  
2001 Sheridan Road  
Evanston, IL 60208-2001

Dear Don,

Thanks so much for your note. I appreciate it and will feed that into the process.

Best to you and your family for Christmas and the New Year.

Warm regards,

21 Dec 04

OSD 20355-04

3 Dec 04

11-L-0559/OSD/28306



September 7, 2004

701 572 01 01 7 10

TO: Andy Marshall  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Alternative Futures

I was just re-reading your February 24, 2004 memo (attached). Have you gone ahead and attempted to flesh out several alternative futures? If so, I'd like to see them.

Thanks.

Attach.  
02/24/04 Memo from Andy Marshall to SecDef re: Assumptions for Next Two or Three Years

DHR ss  
090704-14

.....  
Please respond by 9/10

*351*

*7 Sep 04*

9/17



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

DIRECTOR OF  
NET ASSESSMENT

R

24 February 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Andy Marshall *Acum*

SUBJECT: Assumptions for Next Two or Three Years

Here are my thoughts:

1. Major geo-political structure of the world will be as it is now. A possible Economic/ banking crisis in China could affect its relative position some. Therefore, the main uncertainties that should be taken account of in DoD planning concern:

- How the situations in Iraq, Afghanistan, N. Korea play out over the next few years.
- The fate of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines: where governments could change or internal unrest increase. Some changes could be very favorable and others create major problems.
- Large casualty terror events in the U.S., Western Europe.
- Constant high rate of scientific and technological advance leading to some surprises.

2. An effort to flesh out three to four alternative futures could be mounted. A team of people is needed to cover the wide range of knowledge necessary for intelligent speculation.

3

U 11- *smaller class*  
I-04/012253.  
ES-0729

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
Military Assistant

14 Sep 04 - 0930


MEMORANDUM FOR USD(P)

SUBJECT: Iraqi calls to *Coalition* Countries

Sir,

Request proposed "Way Ahead" for DSD to respond to the attached SD snowflake.

Very respectfully,



Sean E. O'Connor  
Captain, USN  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUSPENSE 23 Sep 04

cc: DJS

*11/13/04*  
*14/1/04*  
*13/1/04*

14-09-04 12:16 IN

11 sep 20075  
scanned

SECRET  
September 13, 2004

2004 SEP 21 11:10:02

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Iraqi calls to Coalition Countries

We need to find opportunities for the Iraqis to call all the Coalition countries and set up a process whereby we can help them do it. They need to connect and say thank you - it is important.

Thanks..

DHR:as  
091304-1

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

11/11/04

13 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

I-04/016419  
ES-1598

December 6, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Ireland Result

This is inexcusable that this woman caused \$1.5 million in damage but doesn't have to pay for it. I think we ought to look for some alternative places to stop instead of Ireland.

Thanks.

Attach.  
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN Cable O 031613Z DEC 04

DHR:dh  
120504-13

.....  
Please respond by 12/16/04

~~FOUO~~

05-12-04 19:00 12  
OSD 20464-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28311

720  
~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
December 20, 2004

2004 DEC 21 PM 5:10

SUBJECT: Exchange Program

There's an exchange program Ted Stevens is involved in with Jim Billington. It is for young people who are interested in politics. We might want to think about inviting them to the Pentagon sometime and I could talk to them.

DHR:ss  
122004-32

000,1

20 DEC 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 204 99-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28312

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

OFFICE OF  
SECRETARY

2004 DEC 01 PM 5:10

000,1

To Powell Moore  
From Paul Butler

Powell -

Could you please see  
if you can find out what  
Secret is referring to here

Thanks

Paul

04

OSD 20499-04

20 DEC 04

11-L-0559/OSD/28313

DEC 21 2004

TO: Dina Powell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Joe Rothenberg

*040 NASA*

Dina,

I don't know this fellow, Rothenberg, but here's a note from Pete Conrad's widow. Pete Conrad was a friend of mine from college and an astronaut, and his wife, Nancy, wrote with this recommendation.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/17/04 Nancy Conrad Letter to SecDef

DHR:ss  
122004-48

*21 Dec 04*

OSD 20501-04



DB 12/20

17 December 2004

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

The purpose of this note is to request your assistance. Let me begin by saying I believed in and admired NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe, and am saddened by his resignation.

There are several names being discussed for his replacement. Among those being discussed is former Associate NASA Administrator for Space Flight Joe Rothenberg. Joe is an old friend of Pete's, and is currently serving as President of our company Universal Spacenetwork. I know Pete discussed this company with you and it gives me great pleasure to tell you the company is alive and well and thriving. I know Pete would want me to do everything possible to bring as much to bear on Joe's appointment as possible. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to briefly state why we (Pete and I) endorse the appointment of Joe Rothenberg.

Joe has the right depth and breadth of NASA experience to deal with the Agencies current challenges. He has the skills and capability to ensure that NASA pursues an appropriately balanced scientific, exploration and aeronautics NASA program that is fiscally responsible, consistent with the President's vision and gains support from a broad constituency. He is a consensus builder and has the respect of the Congress as well as the NASA family and would make an outstanding Administrator.

I appreciate your help in bringing Joe Rothenberg to the attention of the proper parties.

Again thank you for your gracious help with Pete's book and have a wonderful holiday season.

Best regards,

Nancy Conrad

**Joseph H Rothenberg**  
**President**  
**Universal Space Network**  
**1501 Quail Street, suite 102**  
**Newport Beach, CA 92660**

(b)(6)

Joseph H. Rothenberg's 40-year career spans 21 years in industry and 19 years with NASA. Rothenberg is currently the President and a member of the Board of Directors of Universal Space Network (USN). He was elected to the Board of Directors in 2002 and named President of USN in February 2003. USN is a commercial space operations company that owns and operates global satellite tracking stations for commercial and Government customers. In addition, Rothenberg is an Independent Consultant providing management consulting services to NASA, Universities and Aerospace firms.

Joseph H. Rothenberg retired from NASA in 2001 as the Associate Administrator for Space Flight, a position he held from January 1998. In this position he was responsible for establishing the policies and direction of NASA's space flight and operations programs including the Space Shuttle and International Space Station, space communications, expendable launch services and human exploration of space. In addition, he was responsible for the operation and oversight of NASA's Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, Stennis Space Center and Marshall Spaceflight Center. Under his tenure the International Space Station began orbital assembly and Human operations, a new Space Shuttle upgrade program was initiated, and a Space Exploration Plan and Technology initiative was put in place. He in partnership with the Associate Administrator for Space Science co-directed the development of a NASA Vision and Strategy for NASA's robotic and Human exploration of space in the 21<sup>st</sup> century which put in place a conceptual foundation for the 2004 Presidential initiative.

Prior to his assignment as Associate Administrator for Space Flight he was Director of the Goddard Space Flight Center. Rothenberg returned to NASA in April of 1995 as Deputy Director of the Goddard Space Flight Center and was appointed the Director in July of 1995. He was responsible for the space systems development, operations and the scientific research program execution for NASA's Earth orbiting science missions. During his tenure at Goddard he developed a new Strategic Plan for the Center and led the restructure of the Center to transform Goddard from an internally focused organization to a customer focused one. Under his leadership significant changes in organization structure, engineering, procurement and management practices which streamlined the way Goddard carried out it's mission were implemented. He directed a number of new mission technology initiatives including the next generation of Earth Science Satellites, and the Next Generation Space Telescope. In addition he established a large number of new outreach activities which leverage NASA's programs to help increase the math and science literacy of America's students.

Prior to joining Goddard in April 1995, Rothenberg served as Executive Vice President of Computer Technology Associates, Inc., Space Systems Division, McLean, Virginia, and a position he held from February or 1994 to April of 1995. In his short tenure at CTA he successfully led the effort to both acquire business and restructure CTA Space Systems to transform it from a low-technology satellite builder into a high-technology satellite developer.

From 1990 to 1994, he was Associate Director of Flight Projects for the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) at Goddard. In this position, he was responsible for directing all aspects of the HST Project. He is widely recognized in the Aerospace and Space Science community for leading the development and execution of the highly successful first HST on-orbit servicing mission which corrected the telescope's flawed optics.

In 1983, Rothenberg joined NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center as Operations Manager for the HST. He led the NASA team responsible for integrating the ground systems and developing the orbital operations of the HST. In April 1987, he was appointed Chief of the Mission Operations Division under the Mission Operations and Data Systems Directorate at Goddard. In September 1989, he was appointed Deputy Director of Mission Operations and Data Systems at Goddard followed by the 1990 appointment as Associate Director for Flight Projects for the HST. In these positions, he was responsible for the development and operations of the ground and space operational systems from NASA's Scientific Satellites.

From 1981 until 1983, Rothenberg was with Computer Technology Associates where he managed all of the ground system test and operations systems engineering projects. These projects included HST, Solar Maximum Repair Mission, and Space Tracking and Data System Architecture projects.

Rothenberg was with Grumman Aerospace from 1964 until 1981 where he held a variety of project engineering and management positions for hardware development, systems engineering, test and operations for spacecraft, aircraft and submersible research vehicles.

Rothenberg holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering Science and a Master of Science degree in Engineering Management from C. W. Post College of the Long Island University. In addition, in 1997 he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate in Engineering from Stevens Institute of Technology and in 1999 an Honorary Doctorate of Science from the C.W Post College. He is a member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and past president of the Long Island Section of the Instrument Society of America. He was recipient of the NASA Exceptional Service Medal in 1990, in 1994 and 2000 he received NASA Distinguished Service Medals, and, in 1996 and 2001 he received the NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal, in 1994 and 2000 he received Senior Executive Service Presidential Rank Meritorious Executive Awards. In 1997, he received the Presidential Rank Distinguished Executive Award. Rothenberg has also received the National Aviation Association Collier Trophy, the AIAA Goddard Astronautics Award, the National Space Club's Nelson P. Jackson Award, and was inducted into the Smithsonian's Aviation Week and Space Technology Hall of Fame.

DEC 22 2004

TO: Ambassador Zal Khalilzad  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Art Laffer

Afghanistan

Art Laffer was in the other day, and he has certainly offered to be of assistance with economic advice in Afghanistan if you think that would be helpful. He is a brilliant economist who was, of course, the author of *The Laffer Curve*. His contact points are attached.

Let me know if he can be helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Contact information

DHR:dh  
122104-12

OSD 20509-04

2004

DEC 22 2004

TO: Ambassador John Negroponte

CC: Honorable Colin Powell  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Art Laffer

IRAQ

Art Laffer was in the other day, and he is willing to assist in any way possible with economic advice in Iraq. His contact points are attached. He is a brilliant economist and, of course, the well-known author of *The Laffer Curve*.

Let me know if he can be helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Contact information

DHR:dh  
122104-10

22 Dec 04

Dr. Art Laffer      POC: Ian McDonough (b)(6)

DEC 22 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DeA [signature]*  
SUBJECT: NID

040

I think that Larry Silberman would be world-class as NID. I don't know if he would do it, but he would be terrific. I believe Studeman is under consideration and is a good man, but Silberman has a background that is broader and deeper.

DHR:ss  
122104-5

020204

OSD 20511-04

720

file

ATTACHMENT

September 13, 2004

091304-01 01 0 30

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Update on the Jenkins Case

If I am meeting with the President this week, I will need an update on the Jenkins Case.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Jenkins Case with President, 09/07/04

DHR:ss  
091304-19

.....  
Please respond by 9/14/04

*DR* 9/13

*SIR —*  
*You are not meeting w/ POTUS this week, but we'll include for next one-on-one. Attached is the latest.*

ATTACHMENT

*v/r Jim*

OSD 20530-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28322



9/13

**INFO MEMO**

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

USD(P) \_\_\_\_\_

I-04/012004-AP

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

SUBJECT: Update on SGT Jenkins

- This responds to your September 13 request for an update.
- SGT Jenkins voluntarily surrendered to military control at Camp Zama, Japan on September 11, accompanied by his family and his assigned military defense counsel.
- In-processing is going smoothly.
  - No significant health issues have been noted during initial in-processing.
  - Jenkins and family have been provided temporary lodging on base.
  - Military intelligence officials are available to conduct debriefings.
- Disposition of the charges against SGT Jenkins.
  - Charges against Jenkins for desertion, soliciting other service members to desert, aiding the enemy, and encouraging disloyalty will be referred to trial by court-martial this week. The trial date is unlikely to be before mid-October or early November.
  - Jenkins likely will attempt to negotiate a pre-trial agreement with the court-martial convening authority through his assigned counsel, or choose to contest the charges and stand trial.
- Media interest in SGT Jenkins remains intense, primarily as a human interest story.
  - The public affairs line remains:
    - SGT Jenkins faces serious charges;

11-L-0559/OSD/28323

OSD 13985-04

- Charges against him will be processed under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
- SGT Jenkins will be afforded all the benefits, rights, and privileges to which he is entitled.

COORDINATION: OGC (pending)

PDASD/ISA \_\_\_\_\_

DUSD/AP \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by: Suzanne Basalla, OSD/ISA-AP (b)(6)

December 21, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace

cc: GEN John Abizaid  
GEN George Casey  
Fran Harvey  
GEN Pete Schoomaker

451

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: Armored Vehicles

I would like a report at least three times a week, in writing, setting out what is being done to see that we don't have U.S. Military personnel driving around in Iraq, outside of protected compounds, with vehicles that are not properly armored and protected. The reports should state what the current situation is, what is being done to get to our goal, progress against the goal, and what help is needed to assure the urgency needed.

We know that our troops are vulnerable in much of the country. That being the case, they need appropriate protection. If at any time, in any place, enough armored vehicles are not available, for whatever reason, it is the responsibility of the Commanders to change their tactics, techniques and procedures to fit the armored vehicles available.

If it looks as if they will need more armored vehicles than are available at a given time, they should anticipate that to the extent possible and consider a variety of options, including:

- 1) Putting together a large team of people -- from Iraq or elsewhere -- to bolt armor plate on every vehicle they will need to take outside a protected compound area.

21 Dec 04

- 2) Mounting a massive "Berlin Airlift"-type effort and move a much greater amount of material by air.
- 3) Hiring many more contractors to convoy in materials that may be needed, etc.
- 4) Reducing the number of locations that need to be supplied until the armored vehicles needed are available.
- 5) If nothing else works or if there is a gap, then sharply changing tactics so that fewer vehicles are needed for that period of time.

I am very uncomfortable with the pace at which this is going. We know that vehicles are vulnerable and we know they are less vulnerable with armor. We have known it for some time. It is the task of commanders to adjust tactics, techniques, and procedures to fit the circumstance they find. It is the job of the Services to meet the Commanders' needs as they arise, as promptly as possible. And it is our job to see that we all do our jobs.

I look forward to receiving the reports. I expect the efforts to be significant and executed urgently. I need a date certain – soon – when no U.S. Forces will be traveling in Iraq, outside of protected compounds, in vehicles without appropriate armor.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
122004-16

.....  
Please respond by 12/30/04

December 21, 2004

TO: ADM Tom Fargo  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Philippine Relief Operations

Your folks have done some good work moving hundreds of thousands of pounds of relief supplies to the Philippines after the tropical storm and associated flooding.

Please pass along my thanks to your team for a job well done.

DHR:dh  
122104-20

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Philippines*

*21 Dec 04*

OSD 20617-04



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2004 DEC 23 AM 10:41



ACTION MEMO

December 20, 2004, 12:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: *fa* David S. C. Chu Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

*Charles Mill 12-22-04*  
(Signature and date)

SUBJECT: Managing Air Force Strength, and Supplemental Funding

- Wanted to offer perspective regarding your October 7 snowflake (Tab A). I believe that a requirement for AF to effect accelerated drawdown would provoke intolerable risk in enlisted accessions (falling from 22K to 12K against a normal 34K intake).
- We are continuing to work with AF to define a range of imaginative programs to balance its force, including needed legislative authority (NDAA'06) to permit shaping of more senior cohorts (years of service 14 plus) approaching retirement.
- Those aberrantly large senior cohorts are a legacy of the way AF executed its early-nineties defense reductions – a strategy that also depressed accessions in favor of careerists -- something we want to avoid in the management of this drawdown.
- I believe that the Department should look for ways to assist the Air Force with financing its end strength in FY 05, to permit a soft yet sure landing at end-FY 05, without further truncating recruiting and generating another legacy of imbalances for the AF of the future.

320.2

20 DEC 04

RECOMMENDATION: Allow me, Tina Jonas, and the Air Force to work on funding to avoid the intolerable risk of shrinking enlisted accessions from 34K to 12K.

Attachment  
As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Bill Carr Acting DUSD (Military Personnel Policy),

(b)(6)

SECDEF DECISION:

APPROVED *JK* DEC. 30 2004

DISAPPROVED \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

|          |         |       |       |
|----------|---------|-------|-------|
| MA SD    | SMA DSD | 12/29 |       |
| TSA SD   | SA DSD  | 12/28 |       |
| EXEC SEC |         | 12/27 | 12/30 |
| ESR MA   |         | 12/27 |       |

7 Dec 04



OSD 20653-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28328

10/27  
10/27  
10/27/09

~~FOUO~~

October 7, 2004

TO: Jim Roche  
Gen John Jumper

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: USAF End Strength

Please give me a monthly update on your efforts to reduce excess end strength, showing me how you are doing relative to the goals you have set for the months ahead.

It would be helpful for me to see the progress on a regular basis.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100704-12

.....  
Please respond by MONTHLY

Paul Butler TO Sec Def  
12/28  
PUB

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28329

~~FOUO~~

10/8/04

October 7, 2004

TO: Jim Roche  
 Gen John Jumper

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
 David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: USAF End Strength

320.2

Please give me a monthly update on your efforts to reduce excess end strength, showing me how you are doing relative to the goals you have set for the months ahead.

It would be helpful for me to see the progress on a regular basis.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100704-12

.....

Please respond by MONTHLY

7 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28330





~~FOUO~~

December 20, 2004

TO: ~~VADM Jim Stavridis~~ LARRY DIRITA  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: List of SOM'd Items

The list you gave me as to what we SOM did not include everything. Please get back to be with a complete list of everything we are SOMing, so I can decide whether or not I want to do that.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
122004-26

*4/13*

.....  
 Please respond by 12/22/04

*Exec Sec* <sup>12/22</sup>  
~~Capt. Harriott~~  
 Can you assist? This <sup>DONE</sup>  
 Capt. Romley <sub>M</sub>

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20658-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28331

*to DHR 04*



TAB A  
~~FOUO~~

December 13, 2004 7:00:10

**TO:** Gen Dick Myers  
**CC:** Fran Harvey  
Gordon England  
GEN Pete Schoomaker  
Gen Mike Hagee  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT:** Komatsu

Attached is an article on Komatsu. It apparently has small armored vehicles.  
Please look into it and **get** me an answer fast.

I have obviously been laboring under the delusion that the Services were  
responsible for organizing, training and equipping the forces.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Brown, Peter. "Need Armor Fast?" *Washington Times*

DHR:dh  
121304-13

.....  
Please respond by 12/16/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

2004 12 23 11 08 10  
CH-2248-04  
23 December 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*RFM 12/23*

SUBJECT: Komatsu (SF 914)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), the Army (TAB B) and Marine Corps (TAB C) have examined several foreign armored vehicles, to include the Komatsu light armored combat vehicle, for use in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM.
- **Analysis.** During the review, the Komatsu vehicle was evaluated as a source for rapid procurement. The Army and Marine Corps concluded that the vehicle was in its initial stages of production and there was insufficient data to make an informed procurement decision. Foreign products will continue to be assessed--including the Komatsu--for rapid procurement in support of USCENTCOM requirements.

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:

As stated

*This is a good issue to put in our J-4's in-basket. VZ Dick*


Prepared By: Lt Gen Duncan J. McNabb, USAF; Director, J-4;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/28333

OSD 20709-04

December 13, 2004 7:05:10

TO: Gen **Dick** Myers  
CC: Fran **Harvey**  
Gordon England  
**GEN** Pete Schoomaker  
Gen **Mike Hagee**  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Komatsu

**Attached** is an article on Komatsu. It apparently **has small armored vehicles**.  
**Please** look into it and **get** me an answer fast.

I have obviously been laboring under the delusion that the Services were responsible **for** organizing, training and **equipping** the forces.

**Thanks.**

Attach.  
Brown, Peter. "Need Armor Fast?" *Washington Times*

DHR:dh  
121304-13

.....  
*Please respond by* 12/16/04



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON DC 20310

INFO MEMO

December 22, 2004, 1:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter J. Schoomaker, General, Chief of Staff rmy

*Gen Richard Alody 22/12/04*

THRU: Richard B. Myers, General, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Peter Brown Article, "Need Armor Fast?"

- The Army considers all known foreign and domestic sources in satisfying materiel solutions for needed capabilities. To date, we have not found a better alternative than the M1114 Up-Armored HMMWV (UAH) and Armored Security Vehicle (ASV) for the Convoy Protection Platform (CPP) and other selected roles.
- The following vehicles have been/are being considered by the Army for their related mission essential roles:
  - Casspir, RG-31, and Meerkat; South Africa. Procured for current operations.
  - Cougar and Buffalo; Canada. Procured for current operations.
  - Cobra; Turkey. Evaluated, but not used.
  - VBL; France. Evaluated, but not used.
  - Dingo, Mungo and Husky; Germany. Husky procured for current operations. Information requested on Dingo and Mungo manufacturers.
- Limited information is available on the JGSDF (Japanese Ground Self Defense Force) Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) produced by Komatsu Ltd. The JGSDF LAV is in the early stages of production and its characteristics are unknown. The Army will continue to pursue contacting Komatsu to properly assess the vehicle's capabilities.
- PM Tactical Vehicles published an armor sources sought in the FedBizOps on October 1, 2003.
- Since October 2003, the Army has tested 207 different armor solutions from 40 vendors. The Army evaluated and is producing 12 add-on-armor (AoA) kits for our Light, Medium, and Heavy truck fleet. The 12 kits are in production at six depots and

11-L-0559/OSD/28335

SUBJECT: Peter Brown Article, "Need Armor Fast?"

five corporate locations. As of December 15, 2004 we have produced 13,845 kits. In addition, the Army projected production of 8,105 UAH vehicles by April 2005 with the current production rate of 450 per month. The recent modification to accelerate production to 550 per month provides additional UAH vehicles beginning in March.

- In addition to armoring solutions, the Army continues to modify tactics, techniques, and procedures to preclude Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks.
- Additional information regarding the other vehicles procured and those evaluated but not procured is provided as follows:
  - Casspir, RG-31, and Meerkat; South Africa. One Casspir and one RG-31 have been purchased and are being evaluated by the Army's Rapid Equipping Force (REF). PM Close Combat Systems (PM CCS) is purchasing 148 RG-31s as a medium mine protected vehicle. There are 2 in Iraq, 5 in Afghanistan and 141 systems yet to be produced. PM CCS is purchasing 39 Meerkat vehicles as the Interim Vehicle Mounted Mine Detector (IVMMD). There are 6 in Iraq, 3 in Afghanistan and 30 systems yet to be produced.
  - Cougar and Buffalo; Canada. The USMC purchased 16 Cougars. The PM CCS is purchasing 46 of the Buffalo as the Ground Standoff Mine Detection System (GSTAMIDS Block 0). There are 11 in Iraq, 3 in Afghanistan and 32 systems yet to be produced.
  - Cobra; Turkey. The Cobra was formally evaluated for Special Operations. The vehicle did not meet payload and survivability requirements and was not purchased.
  - VBL; France. The Army evaluated the VBL. The VBL was similar to the HMMWV. The VBL was evaluated but due to human factor issues was not considered for additional analysis.
- Dingo, and Mungo; Germany. The Army has contacted the Dingo and Mungo producers and requested information on these products. Textron, under license from KWI, is going to produce a Dingo2 that they would like the U.S. Army to consider. However, Textron does not yet have the production line up and running. The Mungo is a light armored airborne vehicle that would require additional armor protection for US Army application.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: LTC Jeffrey Voigt, (b)(6)

CF: Secretary of the Army



TAB C

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

INFORMATION PAPER

16 December 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General M. W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps *WHA for*

SUBJECT: Response to Komatsu Snowflake

- Komatsu Armored vehicle
  - The Marine Corps **has** procured no armored vehicles from Komatsu Defense LTD.
  - However, the Komatsu armored vehicle (at Tab A) was considered twice as a candidate for procurement, once for a Convoy Escort Vehicle and the second time for a Hardened Engineer Vehicle. In both instances the vehicle was identified as a “developmental item” and therefore not considered a viable candidate for urgent requirements that targeted fielding time lines of six months or less.
  - Of note, a third opportunity to evaluate the Komatsu is on going; a Request for Information was released for a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle requirement last Friday, 10 Dec. All vendor responses, domestic and foreign, are due NLT 15 Jan 05. Komatsu, along with other foreign vendors, will be made aware of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle RFI.
  - We will continue to investigate foreign products, like the Komatsu vehicle, that can be rapidly procured to support OIF requirements.
- Organizing, Training, and Equipping the Forces
  - 1 MEF deployed to Iraq in March 2004 for OIF II. This force was well prepared for operations - 100% of its vehicles had armor protection and each Marine had the best personnel protective equipment available.
  - Attached is an earlier memo from Assistant Secretary Young (Tab B) that highlights the successful efforts to equip Marine forces.

Tabs: as stated

Prepared by: Mr. Steven J. Manchester, Director, International Programs, (b)(6)

Tab C

11-L-0559/OSD/28337

**TAB (A) – Komatsu Armored Vehicle Photos**



Japan has gone to Iraq with a new armored vehicle called, the "Light Armored Combat Vehicle." The 4.5 ton vehicle has been in development until recently. The vehicle is 13.8 feet long and normally carries four troops. It can mount a 12.7mm machine-gun or an automatic 40mm grenade launcher.

Tab C



December 14, 2004

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld / General Myers

FROM: - John Young



SUBJECT: MARINE CORPS VEHICLE ARMOR

BEFORE the Marine Corps I MEF force crossed the line of departure into Iraq in March, 2004, the Marine Corps had armor for 100% of its 3000+ vehicles. The armor, a quick application of 3/16" steel, was installed on 90% of the HMMWV's and MTVR's. The Marine Corps also had 37 up-armored HMMWV's. The Marine Corps acquisition and logistics system assembled over 1,800 sets of the interim 3/16" armor kits within six weeks of receiving the execute order to provide armor for the MEF prior to it rolling across the line of departure. Similarly, all Marine Corps helicopters were equipped with Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) countermeasures for deployment. Finally, every Marine in Iraq has, and has always had, personal protection gear (Outer Tactical Vests, Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) plates, ear plugs, and safety glasses).

The Department next identified additional reprogramming funds and upgraded all vehicle armor kits to Marine depot built 3/8" rolled homogeneous armor (RHA) by September, 2004. We used an effort called Operation Respond, supplemented by the Marine Corps' Urgent Universal Needs Statement process, to identify the urgent needs of the Marines as well as to force the naval enterprise to identify funds. In excess of \$520 million was reprogrammed to meet over 120 requirements for deployed Marines. These initiatives included additional armor kits, IED jamming devices, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) robots, dogs for IED detection, gunner's shields, unmanned air and ground vehicles, ballistic goggles, body armor extensions for extremity protection, communications gear, and language translation equipment. Through dedicated leadership and Operation Respond, the naval acquisition team equipped the Marines with every needed, available solution.

cc: Secretary England

Tab C

TAB (8)

11-L-0559/OSD/28339

TAB D

COORDINATION PAGE

| Name                            | Agency  | Date             |
|---------------------------------|---------|------------------|
| The Honorable Francis J. Harvey | SECARMY | 16 December 2004 |
| General Schoomaker              | CSA     | 16 December 2004 |
| General Hagee                   | CMC     | 16 December 2004 |

~~FOUO~~

SECRET

December 9, 2004 11:54 AM

I-04/016724  
ES-11660

**TO:** Doug Feith  
**CC:** Powell Moore  
**FROM:**  
**SUBJECT:** Congressional ~~Letter~~

Please see if you can find out why Lantos and Shays sent this letter on Jordan to me instead of to Colin Powell.

Thanks.

**Attach:**  
12/3/04 Lantos and Shays ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
120904-24

.....  
Please respond by 12/16/04

~~FOUO~~

A  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2004 DEC 27 PM 5:07

INFO MEMO

I-04/016724  
ES-1660  
DepSecDef  
USDP For RODMAN  
DEC 27 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *PR* 22 DEC 2004

SUBJECT: Letter on Jordan from Congressmen Lantos and Shays

- You asked us why Congressmen Lantos and Shays sent you a letter about additional funding for Jordan border security, instead of sending it to SecState Powell.
- Based on our discussions with Lantos' office and (previous discussions) with the Jordanian Embassy we understand that the letter was sent to you because the Jordanians believe that the most likely source of additional U.S. funding for the integrated border security program they seek (known as C4ISR) is the FY04 \$25B Iraq Supplemental.
- A similar letter may eventually be sent to SecState Powell.
- We have been told by <sup>OSD</sup> ExecSec that a response to Congressmen Lantos and Shays is being drafted by ASD Wells' office (Networks and Information Integration).

Prepared by: David Schenker, Levant Director (b)(6)

DUSD (NES) *[Signature]*

PDASD (ISA) *[Signature]* DEC 22 2004

~~FOUO~~

December 9, 2004 5:40

I-04/016724  
ES-1660

**TO:** Doug Feith  
**CC:** Powell Moore  
**FROM:**  
**SUBJECT:** Congressional Letter

Please see if you can find out why Lantos and Shays sent this letter on Jordan to me instead of to Colin Powell.

Thanks.

**Attach.**  
12/3/04 Lantos and Shays ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
120904-24

.....  
Please respond by 12/16/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28343 OSD 207 86-04

2001  
12/14/04

**Congress of the United States**  
Washington, DC 20515

December 3, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
The Pentagon 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

As you know, Jordan is making outstanding contributions to the war on terrorism. Thanks to these efforts and to its programs of political, economic, and educational reform - Jordan is emerging as a Middle Eastern model in fighting terror root-and- We, the undersigned, are particularly impressed with Jordan's initiatives to prevent terrorism on both its Iraqi and Israeli borders.

Accordingly, we are deeply disturbed by reports that there has been an increase in arms-smuggling and terrorist infiltration on Jordan's other borders this year and, moreover, that Jordan lacks adequate means to deal with this problem as effectively as possible. Needless to say, terrorist infiltrators into Jordan from these borders pose a serious threat to U.S. interests, whether transiting on their way to Israel or seeking to attack Jordan itself. It would hardly be surprising that Jordan's very achievements in the war on terrorism would make the kingdom a desirable target for destabilization by extremists. The incident last April in which Jordanian security forces interdicted Syria-origin, Zarqawi-affiliated terrorists plotting to attack multiple sites in Jordan, including the U.S. Embassy, is only the best-known example of this problem.

As strong supporters of both Jordan and the war against terrorism, we would like to urge that the United States Government, and you personally, do whatever is possible to assist Jordan in combating this growing scourge. In particular, we suggest that the U.S. help to secure Jordan's borders by supporting a comprehensive security approach, including increased support for an ongoing project to establish the technology-based, integrated border security system known as C4ISR.

|                            |        |          |        |        |        |
|----------------------------|--------|----------|--------|--------|--------|
| SECRET CABLES DISTRIBUTION |        |          |        |        |        |
| SECRET                     | DISSEM | REF ASST | DISSEM | SECRET | SECRET |
| SECRET                     | SECRET | SECRET   | SECRET | SECRET | SECRET |

(b)(6)

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
December 3, 2004  
Page Two

As you prepare to meet King Abdullah next week, we want you to know that you have our encouragement and support to exercise your authority to expend such sums as necessary and appropriate, consistent with U.S. interests, in order to accomplish this goal expeditiously.

Thank you for consideration. We would welcome the opportunity to work with you on this issue.

Sincerely,

  
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, MC

  
TOM LANTOS, MC

7401  
~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
December 8, 2004  
04/016556  
ES-1614

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Trainers for NATO in Iraq

ITC 9

I saw the Secretary General of NATO. He said he wants 10 to 15 trainers for Iraq and have the US supply them. Would you please take a look into it and get back to me?

Thanks.

DHR:db  
120804-8

.....  
Please respond by 12/21/04

SD SNOWFLAKE  
RESPONSE FROM  
POLICY  
Ln ECB - What is  
# ?  
OSD 20788-04 *thx Tim*

8 Dec 04

03-12-04 A OSB9 20788-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28346



720  
TAB

~~FOUO~~

DEC 20 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
CC: Fran Harvey  
Gordon England  
Jim Roche  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT Troops and Equipment

I'd like to have you recommend a team we could put together to continuously monitor whether the troops in the field have the equipment they need;

It's the responsibility of the Services to organize, train and equip the troops. They need to see that it is done well.

When the President asked the Combatant Commanders if they had everything they needed and were prepared, they all answered that they had everything they needed and were prepared.

If the circumstances on the ground change and they need additional things, they need to say so, the Services need to respond, and you and I need to be told.

Please let me know what you feel we should do to see that that happens.

Thank you.

DHR:es  
121304-29

.....  
Please respond by 12/22/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab

OSD 20815-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28347



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

OK  
7.14

INFO MEMO

December 23, 2004, 7:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Francis J. Harvey

SUBJECT: Troops and Equipment, 20 December 2004

- Over the course of the Global War on Terrorism, the Army has developed a number of complementary organizations and associated processes to rapidly address the warfighter's critical operational needs. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) aggressively solicits from deployed/deploying commanders their operational requirements. Field commanders submit these requirements to HQDA and their entire chain-of-command utilizing Operational Needs Statements (ONS).
- On a weekly basis, the Army Requirements and Resourcing Board (AR2B), composed of Army Staff 3-star principals validates and prioritizes requirements from the field; immediately develops resourcing strategies; and monitors execution. The AR2B has processed 2,598 ONS since October 2002. The peacetime average is less than 12 a year.
- The AR2B also provides the Army's connectivity to the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, as this body works to address immediate warfighter needs.
- The Army G-3/5/7 chairs a weekly Secret Video-Teleconference, which brings together HQDA 3-star principals with the leadership of every Army Major Command and Central Command (CENTCOM). This senior leader forum clarifies theater warfighting issues and identifies emerging operational requirements.
- Complementing this effort, HQDA has established liaison teams with deployed/deploying Army Divisions to provide continuous communication with the Army Staff. These teams are responsible to insure the Army addresses unit requirements in a timely and effective manner.
- Over the past several years, the Army has proceeded with a series of initiatives to meet the field's requirements:
  - o The Rapid Equipping Force (REF) has the broad charter of rapidly increasing the mission capability of the warfighter while reducing the risk to Soldiers and others. One half of the REF is forward in theater, with teams dispatched to every division in Iraq. They take their operational guidance from the Army G-3/5/7 and report directly to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

SUBJECT: Troops and Equipment, 20 December 2004

- o In October 2003, the Army G-3 established an Army Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Task Force to lead the Army's effort against the IED threat. This Task Force formed the basis for the Joint IED Defeat Task Force. It is heavily engaged in theater and is already providing significant solutions for Joint and Coalition forces.
- o The Army established a Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) program to develop an integrated solution to this problem and distribute it to the force by the 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter of fiscal year 2005. This solution will be integrated across existing Army, as well as Air Force and Marine, command and control systems.
- o The Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) leverages current programs and commercial off-the-shelf technology to provide the Soldier with increased capabilities. The Army has prioritized the RFI equipment list directly from Soldier feedback. Since June 2004, all brigade combat teams and nearly 85% of other units are being fielded RFI equipment at home station 70-80 days prior to deployment.
- a The recently formed Armoring Task Force, led by the Army G-8, has the mission of identifying and anticipating armoring requirements, and then determining ways to accelerate production/installation of armor solutions, to include expanding the supplier base.
- In the last several months, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed a team of HQDA 3-star principals, led by the Army G-3/5/7, to visit all divisions (Active and Reserve) as they prepare to deploy. The purpose of these visits is to ensure the Army Staff shares a common operating picture of what equipment, personnel, and command and control systems these units will receive prior to deployment, and what they will receive once they arrive into theater. Capability gaps identified are addressed immediately with the AR2B process.

**RECOMMENDATION** Since the Army Requirements and Resourcing Board (AR2B) is the Army's synchronizing body for these multiple efforts that continuously monitor what the Soldier in the field needs, I recommend this board should be the Army element in any joint team that is formed.

COORDINATION: NONE.

Prepared By: LTC Aidis Zunde, (b)(6)

CF: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-2250-04  
27 December 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS ~

27 Dec 04 ~ ~ ~ ~

SUBJECT: Troops and Equipment (SF 917)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB), and consistent with your 22 December meeting with Lt Gen McNabb, the Director for Logistics/DJ-4 is forming a Fusion Cell/Engine Room to integrate the efforts of my staff, combatant commanders, Services and Defense agencies to rapidly support urgent warfighting needs.
- **Analysis.** The new cell will achieve mission success by:
  - Integrating all efforts to resource and protect deployed troops.
  - Reporting critical wartime requirements from identification through final resolution.
  - Ensuring a sense of urgency across all production and industrial base capabilities, technology initiatives, acquisition avenues, transportation assets and concepts of operation.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Duncan J. McNabb, USAF; Director, J-4;

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28350

OSD 20815-04

-TAB

~~FOUO~~

DEC 20 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers

CC: Fran Harvey  
Gordon England  
Jim Roche

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Troops and ~~Equipment~~

I'd like to have you recommend a team we could put together **to continuously** monitor whether the troops in the field **have** the equipment they need.

It's **the** responsibility of the Services **to organize, train** and equip the troops. They need to see **that it is** done well.

When **the** President asked the Combatant Commanders if they had **everything** they needed **and were** prepared, they **all** answered **that** they had everything **they** needed and were **prepared**.

If **the** circumstances on the **ground** change **and they** need additional **things**, they need to **say so**, the Services need to respond, **and you** and I need to be told.

Please let **me know what** you feel we should do to see **that that happens**.

Thank you.

DHR:bj  
121304-29

.....  
Please respond by 12/22/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/28351

OSD 20815-04

.3li  
0230

~~FOUO~~

February 28, 2005

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Response to the Gavriels

Please have someone draft an appropriate post-Iraqi election letter to the Gavriels, if we have not already done so.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/12/04 Gavriel ltr to SecDef [OSD 20826-04]

DHR:dh  
022805-10

.....  
Please respond by 3/10/05

293

28 Feb 05

12 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28352

OSD 20826-04

(b)(6)

ADK  
2/28

December 12, 2004

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Parents want to watch their children grow, mature, and create their own legacy. Losing them along the way is almost an alien thought.

In Dimitri, both his Mom and I were blessed to watch a smart, restive boy grow into a man of substance, a disciplined goal-setter, a loving son, a brother, a friend, an accomplished athlete, an occasional prankster, a lover of life and challenges, a poet, a dreamer, an intellectual, an idealist, a leader, a true patriot and now an American hero.

Dimitri was accomplished. From an honor student and stellar athlete in high school, to an Ivy League and Division I wrestler, to the best in Wall Street, and finally *Semper Fidelis*, the honor of the Marines and service to our country, volunteered unselfishly in the midst of two wars, he forged his legacy.

As a first generation American, he wanted to give back to his country for the blessings he and his family received. He became a marine's marine and wanted to validate his courage, honor, and valor. He was affected by the September 11 attack, having lived it in New York City as it was unfolding, losing fraternity brothers in the towers as they collapsed. Great honor was bestowed upon him by our country and all who knew him for he proudly served us all and made the ultimate sacrifice. He was awarded two Purple Hearts. He is now forever in the Marines family and in our hearts; he will be missed.

In this, the darkest time of our lives, we are ever grateful for your overwhelming support, thoughts, and kindness. Your letter provides solace to us for he has touched your heart.

Please, keep Dimitri and all who have sacrificed for our country in your prayers. As parents of a fallen soldier, we look forward to see a Democratic Iraq become a reality, a noble cause worthy of their sacrifice. As he never questioned the war but strongly felt the calling of his country in that mission, we can only hope that it will become "mission accomplished so that his and so many other souls sacrificed may rest in peace.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

OSD 20826-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28353

R



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

November 29, 2004

Mr. and Mrs. (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

Dear Mr. and Mrs. (b)(6)

I am very sorry to learn of the loss of your son. There is nothing anyone can do or say to ease your pain, but please know that you are in my thoughts during this difficult time.

Lance Corporal Dimitrios Gavriel made lasting contributions to the cause of freedom. He served his nation with honor. His devotion and integrity will not be forgotten.

I extend my heartfelt condolences.

With deepest sympathy,

OSD 19169-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28354





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JAN 28 2005

3355D

Mr. and Mrs. (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

Dear Mr. & Mrs. (b)(6)

Senator Kennedy was kind enough to send me a copy of the letter you wrote him about your son, Lance Corporal Dimitri Gavriel. It is clear from your words that he was a remarkable young man who lived his life with integrity and honor, whether on Wall Street or on the battlefield.

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His efforts came at a most important moment in our history, reminding us that America is free because so many are willing to serve. I count Lance Corporal Gavriel among the noble ranks of those who fought to preserve and protect that freedom, and join a grateful nation in saluting him.

05

Please know that I continue to keep you and your family in my thoughts and prayers.

Sincerely,

this  
ltr  
ANSWER  
SAMPLE

4 Jan 05

OSD 01091-05

Mr. and Mrs. (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

Dear Mr. & Mrs. (b)(6)

I know that this is a most difficult time for you and your family, and it was so thoughtful of you to send me a letter.

As I said in my earlier correspondence, your son was an honorable man who was dedicated to the cause of freedom. Lance Corporal Dimitri Gavriel played an important part in helping make it possible for Iraqis to vote in their first free elections in over three decades. Now, their nation is on the road to building a democracy. Your son's service has historic meaning, for with the spread of democracy comes the promise of a safer world. His sacrifice was not made in vain.

Please know that I continue to keep you and your family in my prayers.

With my very best wishes,

Sincerely,

*Prep for Sealed Signature*

Paul B...  
3/11

\* [unclear]  
[unclear] Kennedy [unclear]  
[unclear] from them to [unclear]  
[unclear] Kennedy [unclear]

CSO 3/11



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JAN 28 2005

335 SA

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Ted:

I received your note forwarding (b)(6)  
(b)(6) letter about their son, Lance Corporal Dimitri Gavriel.  
Lance Corporal Gavriel was an outstanding young man and  
dedicated Marine – truly one of America's finest.

Thank you for sharing it with me.

Sincerely,

28

05

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OSD 01091-05

11-L-0559/OSD/28357

(b)(6)

December 12, 2004

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Parents want to watch their children grow, mature, and create their own legacy. Losing them along the way is almost an alien thought.

In Dimitri, both his Mom and I were blessed to watch a smart, restive boy grow into a man of substance, a disciplined goal-setter, a loving son, a brother, a friend, an accomplished athlete, an occasional prankster, a lover of life and challenges, a poet, a dreamer, an intellectual, an idealist, a leader, a true patriot and now an American hero.

Dimitri was accomplished. From an honor student and stellar athlete in high school, to an Ivy League and Division I wrestling, to the best in Wall Street, and finally *Semper Fidelis*, the honor of the Marines and service to our country, volunteered unselfishly in the midst of two wars, he forged his legacy.

As a first generation American, he wanted to give back to his country for the blessings he and his family received. He became a marine's marine and wanted to validate his courage, honor, and valor. He was affected by the September 11 attack, having lived it in New York City as it was unfolding, losing fraternity brothers in the towers as they collapsed. Great honor was bestowed upon him by our country and all who knew him for he proudly served us all and made the ultimate sacrifice. He was awarded two Purple Hearts. He is now forever in the Marines family and in our hearts; he will be missed.

In this, the darkest time of our lives, we are ever grateful for your overwhelming support, thoughts, and kindness. Your letter provides solace to us for he has touched your heart.

Please, keep Dimitri and all who have sacrificed for our country in your prayers. As parents of a fallen soldier, we look forward to see a Democratic Iraq become a reality, a noble cause worthy of their sacrifice. As he never questioned the war but strongly felt the calling of his country in that mission, we can only hope that it will become "mission accomplished" so that his and so many other souls sacrificed may rest in peace.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/28358

OSD 20826-04

~~FOUO~~

DEC 28 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: Richard McCormick

I received this letter from Richard McCormick at CSIS. He is clearly interested in doing something in the Administration - I wouldn't know where, but he seems to feel that you know him.

I'll leave it in your hands.

Thank you.

Attach.  
10/04 McCormick Letter to SecDef

DHR:ms  
122704-8

*230,02*

*28 Dec 04*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20863-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28359



Center for Strategic & International Studies  
Washington, DC

RB 12/28



The Hon-Donald Rumsfeld


Oct, 2004

Dear Don:

Remembering our trip to China together four years ago, I thought you might be interested in the results of a trip that Herman organized in August involving Newt Gingrich and myself.

I later went to Japan and Taiwan and presented this report at **CSIS**.

With every good **wish**;

Sincerely:  
  
Richard McCormack

P.S. Thank you also for your past efforts to involve me in the Administration. Don, this will never happen unless it is handled directly at the level of the Vice President. At the lower levels, there are simply too many people protective of the status quo.



Center for Strategic & International Studies  
Washington, DC

Presentation to CSIS Sept. 28, 2004.

Richard McCormack\*

UNCERTAINTIES IN CHINA'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE  
BROADER PROBLEM OF GLOBAL IMBALANCES.

SUMMARY

**China's** problems and vulnerabilities cannot be understood unless viewed in a broader economic and political context.

Unsustainable economic imbalances, including those involving **China**, are gradually increasing the dangers to the long-term health of the world economy. Other economic and **political** problems, including rising **oil** prices and America's 700 billion dollar **annual** trade deficit, add to these uncertainties. Wise statesmanship and some important policy changes are needed.

-----  
KEY ISSUES INVOLVING CHINA

Earlier **this** spring, there was a lot of discussion in **Washington** about whether China would experience a hard or **soft** landing of its overheated economy. **So** to take a deeper look at this question, I visited **China** in August, with **former** speaker Newt Gingrich, to talk with central **bankers**, members of the Central Committee, **key** officials and investors.

**This** was my 8<sup>th</sup> **trip** to China since 1983. To **see** the continual improvement in ordinary peoples' lives **since** those early years is a heartening confirmation of **many** hopes **and** the result of much hard work, both in **Washington** and much more importantly in **China** itself. The large number of **hungry** and ill-dressed children that you earlier saw in every city in China is now largely a thing of the past. *All* involved need to make sure it stays that way.

After visiting China in early **August**, I traveled to Japan and **Taiwan** to meet with other senior people from the public and private sectors to learn how **China's** prospects looked **from** the perspective of these neighboring locations.

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<http://www.csis.org/>

11-L-0559/OSD/28361

The bottom line **from** these consultations suggested that China would, in fact, engineer a **soft** landing, with growth falling from its present **9-13** per cent rate, depending on whose numbers **you** believe, to somewhere near **7%** in 2005.

But many of these experts reported an **unusually** large number of downside possibilities that could result in a Chinese economic crash landing. I'm going to list some of these wild cards in the deck for your own evaluation.

There are obvious **strains** in global oil markets. A spike in oil prices would cause serious problems for China. **China has** only **15** days of reserve oil supplies, **as** opposed to 90 days' reserve in the **U.S.** strategic stockpile. Any spike in global oil prices **that was sustained** for any length of time would obviously savage global equity markets, including those in the **U.S.**, China's **principal** export market. For an economy so massively driven by foreign trade, the economic health of **China's** overseas markets will have a critical impact on China's economy.

There are serious tensions in China between the experts in the **central bank** and **finance ministry** and many of the **regional** political leaders over the pace and direction of the cooling off process. Leaders in the central and western parts of China, where living standards **are** only about 1/10 **those** of the richer coastal province, resent the pressure **from** Beijing to cancel or delay their own investment and growth plans **as** part of the **national** campaign to prevent overheating and over capacity problems **from** spiraling out of control. The result of this tension **has** been a delay in the **full** implementation of Beijing's overall economic program to address the overheating problem.

**China** doesn't have the financial instruments of more advanced economies, such **as** deep bond and other financial markets, to fine-tune economic growth. They have to depend upon reserve requirements in banks and credit allocation by category and by geographical area. They **also** have to rely on compliance by unruly and sometimes corrupt regional leaders to carry out **the** edicts from the Center. But forbidden steel factories and golf courses are still emerging in China, according to Morgan Stanley's Andy Xie, which **add** up to more credit and monetary creation than China's Central **Bank** would like, generating more overheating **and** excess capacity problems.

Statistics in **China** are not always reliable, **although** they are better than they were ten years ago, thanks to help from the IMF and **other** experts mobilized by the Central **Bank**. The problem comes not just from bad news that the government considers a crime to report in the **media**, but more pervasively, **from** the distortions that flow **from** reporting **from** the provinces and are collected at the center. Naturally, provincial authorities wishing to **keep** their **jobs**, like to report to Beijing that edicts **and** goals are being fully complied with. **This**, however, is often not true. When you add up the individual inaccuracies and fudging, to produce a national statistic on growth, or even monetary creation, you can get major distortions in your statistical base.



There are 150,000 State owned enterprises in **China**. If you think Enron's **books** were not always models of probity, can you imagine the disparities between the published statistics on **these** companies, and the actual economic health of many of them? **Can you also** imagine what collective distortions appear when you multiply the fudging in **the** reports of individual companies by 150,000? **This** is particularly true of profit and loss statements, asset estimates, company debt and contingent liabilities, pension problems, etc. according to many close observers of the scene. **This has** important implications for **China's** banks, which for decades have **been** providing loans to these state **owned** enterprises to keep them afloat. These bad loans continue to accumulate inside the Chinese banking **system**. It is not clear that the published statistics dealing with **this** problem are totally candid, nor that the problems involving **China's** overall banking system are going to be improved a year or two from now, notwithstanding Chinese efforts to purge some of the bad loans from certain categories of banks.

### IMPORTANT CURRENCY ISSUES

The Chinese currency **has** been pegged to the dollar at a **fixed** rate **since 1995**. **This** currency peg is favorable to China **as** an export platform, and linked **as** it is to currency regimes elsewhere in Asia, helps undermine the whole purpose of the floating exchange rate system, which was to permit an orderly, **gradual** and automatic adjustment between surplus and deficit countries on trade accounts. By **contrast**, **China's** present **highly** competitive currency **situation** and its impact on other currencies is intensifying the global imbalances and creating **an** ultimately unsustainable situation. In the case of **China**, a dollar-linked currency, combined with the inexpensive labor, **has** resulted in a massive annual increase in exports and foreign and domestic investment. Investment **and** exports **at** this rate are seen by the Chinese **as** critical to **sustain China's** over all economic growth and stability. Additional export-linked investment also increases the **already** existing dependence of this huge **national** economy on foreign trade **as** the primary driver of China's growth.

What are the problems with this arrangement?

Because of the central role of **China** **as** the hub **and** assembly point for much of the East **Asian** economy, neighboring countries like Thailand are forced to intervene massively in the **currency** markets to maintain their own de facto dollar **pegs**. In Thailand's case, this is generating excess monetary creation, **and** growing inflation. Thailand is not an isolated example.

Many of the countries of East Asia are thus being pushed into a de facto currency bloc, regardless of the local economic circumstances in each of the different countries. **Price** competition in **China's** inter and **intra** regional trade is incredibly fierce, **and** profit margins very narrow. **Those** countries now part of the growing hub and spokes economic system built around China **are** forced to toe the currency line imposed by **China's** standard to keep their products competitive. Even Japan is not immune from **this** pressure and will be more **so** in the **future** **as** **China** produces more **and** more high technology products for the global market. China will **also** inevitably gradually increase

its share of value added with the products now assembled from regional imports for export market destinations.

The bottom line here is that any currency adjustments in Asia will have to begin with one involving China. Until that happens, mounting pressures may continue to build at a different rate in different parts of this China centered system. The great value of a floating exchange rate is that it allows pressures to be released at a gradual pace. Otherwise you have a pressure cooker with the safety valve stuck, and this is a dangerous utensil, as history has repeatedly demonstrated.

Distortions and monetary policy problems from the current dollar peg also impact China directly. Last year over a 12 month period, intervention by the Bank of China to sustain the dollar peg in the face of market pressures exceeded 200 billion dollars. This eventually drew the wrath of the U.S. Treasury, which became uncomfortable with the vulnerabilities of direct Central Bank intervention on this scale. The Japanese Central Bank adopted similar tactics on a similar scale. In China, however, this massive Central Bank activity, which was not sterilized by contractions elsewhere, had the result of generating excessive monetary creation, with M2 exceeding 25% for a period of time. This was a sure recipe for overheating and potential future inflation. The Central Bank eventually found other market related means to sustain the dollar peg, namely encouraging local insurance companies and others with surplus cash or credit to invest abroad, or purchase such assets as commodities to soak up excess dollars.

This favorable exchange rate has helped allow China to expand her exports by 46%, year on year from June of 2004. This massive compound annual increase in exports has continued at an ever-expanding pace for years. This explosive increase in exports contributes to both economic and political problems for China's main export destination country, namely the U.S. If President Bush loses this presidential election, disaffected, unemployed, and worried manufacturing workers and their families in places like Ohio and Pennsylvania will be an important reason for his defeat. If present relative currency and competitiveness conditions continue, these economic and political pressures are unlikely to ease in the years ahead. That means future problems in Congressional and Presidential elections, and steady increases in the political pressure on Washington to deal with this situation.

There are safeguard provisions in China's WTO access agreement which could allow countries like the U.S. to limit the future pace of export expansion in some situations. Even the articles of the IMF have a balance of payments provision allowing countries with dangerous payments problems to take special measures to correct the situation.

China's overall trade is of course in balance. The problem is that neither China's nor the Asian regional trade nor the rest of the world's trade with America is balanced. This comes partly from the Chinese currency linkage to the dollar that prevents China's competitors and component suppliers from allowing their own currencies to float.

## SOARING AMERICAN TRADE DEFICITS

The U.S. current account deficit is now approaching 700 billion dollars per year, nearly 6 % of ~~our~~ GNP( See attachment). That means the **U.S. must** attract each and every day two billion dollars in loans and investments to fill the gap in its current accounts. Concern over how much longer a current account deficit of **this** magnitude is sustainable is rapidly rising around the world. **What** will happen to **China's** growth and highly leveraged new export oriented factories if a future Secretary of Treasury repeats what Secretary Baker did in 1985 when he deemed the then 90 billion dollar **U.S. current** accounts problem dangerous for the long term economic and political health of the **united** states.

Long term, massive, current accounts deficits create long term debt to foreigners that must be **serviced**, ultimately by exports of goods and services. President Reagan and Secretary Baker moved vigorously to implement a program to address this problem. They began by **talking** down the dollar and gradually added a number of important but controversial macro and micro economic measures **aimed** strengthening U.S. competitiveness and its current 'accounts' position. These measures and others, for a time, brought U.S. current accounts into balance. There were **also** unintended consequences **from part** of this major **shift** in policies, which included a linkage between **G-7** monetary policies and relative currency rates that may have contributed to the 1987 stock market crash. During the decade that followed, a **far** worse long term deterioration resumed. After more than a decade of neglecting this problem, America's net debt now **amounts to trillions** of dollars. New trade agreements provided little help, notwithstanding all the speeches to the contrary.

Looking at this problem, officials from the Treasury Department **and those from the** White House Trade Office sometimes privately point to each other **as being** mainly responsible for America's out of control trade deficits. The one side cites inappropriate macro economic and currency policies. The other points to weakly enforced and poorly crafted trade deals. Many neutral observers believe that America needs both macro and micro economic remedial measures.

At least, on currency ratios, the **status quo** seems very unlikely to continue much longer. Should a future dollar crisis develop, **China** is unlikely to be allowed to retain its current dollar **peg**, forcing **the** full brunt of the adjustment onto the **Euro** and **other** currencies which freely float.

If existing relative competitive conditions continue, including currency ratios and inadequate enforcement of WTO rules, additional investment decisions relocating **U.S. manufacturing** plants and crating new export facilities in **China** and elsewhere will undoubtedly occur. **This** means even more pressure on **U.S.** current accounts and more long term debt. When any eventual **dollar** crisis does come, perhaps triggered by loss of faith in future macro economic policies, or by a sudden economic shock of some **kind**, the adjustment difficulties for all involved could be very great indeed.

## FACING THE PROBLEMS

No one should underestimate for a moment the complications and difficulties that could accompany an effort by officials to deal with global economic imbalances, including possibly some highly negative unintended consequences. At the very least, adjustment pain and transitional impact on financial markets could be highly unsettling. It is, however, unlikely to be any less painful if we wait until the U.S. accumulates another trillion or two dollars of net debt through continuation of the *status quo*. It just means that the U.S. will have a deeper hole to dig out of, and more newly constructed export facilities abroad will have to find other markets, or close. Additional production facilities to serve an unsustainable export market also makes more likely a final burst of deflation in products with excess capacity. These and other adjustment problems that could flow from an effort to deal with global imbalances and excess debt building up in the United States, may not fully unfold, but officials need to be mindful that they easily could.

If policy measures addressing the U.S. relative competitive situation are implemented, there will undoubtedly be a new burst of investment in manufacturing in the U.S. itself. After the Baker reforms, for example, more and more foreign auto makers built cars and car parts in America, rather than importing them. The same presumably would happen again.

Other longer-term U.S. deficiencies may also need to be addressed if the longer term problems are to be corrected. For example, after the shock of Sputnik in the Eisenhower and Kennedy years, the United States undertook a number of measures to make its young people more competitive in science and technology, including revamping the entire educational system. The influence of this effort was felt in one degree or another in nearly every school in America. The intellectual capital which grew from those early government funded and encouraged efforts not only put a man on the moon in ten years, but America's entire economy profited from the technological breakthroughs and spin offs that resulted. This historical experience should not be altogether forgotten as we address our current problems.

If we mobilize ourselves again to become more competitive internationally, and devote additional hundreds of billions of dollars in public and private funds to education, research and development, and science and technology, we will need to intensify our efforts to capitalize commercially on this national effort. Part of this must involve more effective curbing of out of control theft of intellectual property in many parts of the world where potential markets exist, including China. No matter how much money you spend on research, and how innovative your scientists, if the product of your money and work is simply stolen and marketed by others, gradually the incentive for this activity will be drained away.

The preferred solution to the problem of global economic imbalances by some academic economists is an explosion of new economic growth world-wide. In theory, this new growth could absorb additional production and imports from the U.S. and elsewhere.

Looking, however, at the all the political and economic obstacles likely to delay **this** wonderful day, causes others to conclude that a new dollar Crisis is far more likely to come long before the rest of the world restructures itself to permit new growth on **the** scale needed. Moreover, today economic growth in many parts of the world is largely export driven, and largely at the expense of long term **U.S.** trade deficits and debt. More of this kind of **growth** will only make America's long-term adjustment difficulties even greater.

Increasing oil prices will also serve to push any automatic adjustment in global markets even farther **into** the future. More and more countries will be seeking **additional** export markets to cover their increased oil import costs. They will be looking **first** and foremost at the **U.S.** market to accomplish **this**.

As one reflects upon China's economy, it is important also to remember that while **China's** nominal per capita income is \$1000, the internal purchasing power parity of **this** \$1000 is five times **as** great, namely equal to \$5000 per person. **This** disparity is **caused** by many factors, including uneven conditions in the vast Chinese economy, the low price of services and wages, and some administered prices. Some of **this** results in distorted market pricing signals. China **imports** less and **exports** more than otherwise would be **the** case. By internal purchasing power calculations, China is already the world's second largest economy.

#### ENFORCING **THE** WTO AGREEMENTS: THE **PLEASURES** AND **PERILS**

There are other neuralgic elements involving China and her **trading** partners that are likely to put **additional** political pressure on China's current economic **situation**. Secretary of Treasury **Snow** told 500 members of the **Economic** Club of New **York** two weeks ago that **China** had passed the required laws to enter the **WTO**, but was not enforcing many of them, including the intellectual property related items. Enforcement problems worsen the farther you travel in China **from** Beijing. In some provincial cities, Beijing's writ on WTO related matters barely exists. **You** can therefore expect increasing pressure from the WTO on China in the **years** ahead to carry out obligations. Failure to succeed in **this** effort could fatally discredit the WTO itself, and send global trade officials **back** to the drawing boards for other solutions. The other problem is that there are **thousands** of individual violations, ranging **from** Zippo lighter's trademark piracy to far **more** complex issues. The entire WTO and the tiny Chinese legal structure assigned to handle such cases could be consumed for decades without **making** much of a dent in **this** massive **pattern** of violations

There are also political problems for the Chinese Government in carrying out **some** of their WTO commitments. Some of these WTO obligations, for example, provisions allowing **much** greater future access of cheap foreign agricultural imports to China, will generate more pressure on the **rural** economy in China, **as** happened with Mexico's corn farmers after NAFTA. **This** is likely to accelerate an already serious demographic **shift** in China of surplus people moving **from** the farms to the cities looking for **jobs**.

Providing jobs for tens of millions of displaced former agricultural workers **has** been and will continue to be one of the regime's main preoccupations. Political stability in China hinges in part **upon** their success. But there may be both economic and political **limits** abroad to the degree to which these tens of **millions** of new workers can be deployed in ever more export producing industries. **This** constitutes a serious policy dilemma for **China** and her trading partners.

Coping with **regional** political opposition to other unpopular or inconvenient WTO commitments **will** also not be easy for Beijing.

#### **OTHER POTENTIAL TIME BOMBS**

The Communist Party has lost a great deal of its **local** reputation in recent years in part because **of** corruption problems. In some **ways**, **the** current Chinese system combines the worst evils of both socialism and capitalism: namely, the inherent corruption problems of a vast bureaucratic establishment, plus exploitation of workers in some places on a scale that **has** not been seen **since** the darkest days of the industrial revolution in England. **This** too is potentially explosive.

The overheated Chinese economy **has** also generated shortages of energy, water, port and transportation facilities and environmental systems that already act **as** a brake on future growth. Supply has to catch up with demand. **This** will take time and investment.

Finally, China's leaders have painted themselves into a political corner, whereby if **the** Taiwanese ever declare full independence, Chinese leaders may have to go to war to avoid massive loss of face, and even their positions. Chinese leaders expressed to Gingrich and myself their great concern ~~that~~ Taiwan's president would move toward independence later this year.

Any conflict between Taiwan and China would be massively destabilizing to the economies of **both** places, **and** a meltdown of China's already **strained** financial system could **easily** be one consequence. Since much of the production is concentrated in China and Taiwan, shortage **of** computer chips **could** also impose real dislocations in the broader global economy, should any conflict over Taiwan get out of hand. There are already discussions in the **U.S.** about the need for more diversification of sources of supply of critical industrial and defense components, because of potential instabilities across the **Straits** of Taiwan. The **just** in time procurement policies of many companies, make **this** potential disruption even more **worrisome** to many thoughtful policy makers in Washington.

Based on **what** I heard from my subsequent visit **to** Taiwan, I doubt **that** present Taiwanese leaders will, **in fact**, go **far** enough in the year or two ahead with their independence aspirations to provoke Beijing into a military response. Today, however, Taiwan is a democracy and **85%** of the people are native Taiwanese, **as** opposed to **only** **15%** **from** the mainland. Many will not willingly allow absorption of Taiwan by China.

**Still**, Taiwanese investors have placed perhaps as much as \$140 billion **dollars** of investment in China. It is **potentially** hostage to Beijing's good will.

Aware of these and other vulnerabilities, Taiwan is no longer the confident little island of ten years **ago**. There is a lot of nervousness **among** investors, those facing competition from China, and the ordinary native Taiwanese who like their present liberty. These conflicting economic and political pressures will have to work their way out in **Taiwan's** robust new democracy. No one can really predict how this tension will eventually end. Much depends upon Hong Kong's subsequent experience with the one **state** two systems situation, and the conclusions that **the** people of Taiwan draw **from** it.

### THE UNPREDICTABLE FUTURE

A few weeks before he died, former President Nixon assembled a couple dozen of **Washington's** foreign policy experts at Jackson Place near the White House, to hear his views on Russia. He had **just** completed a trip there. He spoke for more than **an** hour without notes, which was his custom. Later during the question period, he was **asked** about his medium and long-term assessment of the direction **China** would take. He paused for **a** few seconds, and then said: "I **am** generally hopeful about long term trends in **China**, but I have only visited China seven or eight times, and I don't consider myself an expert on China." **This** was **Nixon's** way of **telling** us that there were huge complexities in China that made predicting the future difficult.


I **can** only agree with the former President's assessment

China's economy seems likely to continue its upward long term trend, producing higher living **standards** for the people of the country in the decades **ahead**. Presumably also the Taiwan/China issue **will** ultimately find a peaceful solution, since neither party **has an** interest in economic chaos.

There are, however, a lot of downside local, regional, and global risks at play just now, some political, some economic. Governments are notoriously slow in dealing **with** even obviously dangerous financial problems. **This** is partly because any major change in **the status** quo inevitably inflicts pain on powerful domestic constituencies. For that reason, any major change usually requires sufficient deterioration to generate a crisis of some kind to provide policy makers with the needed political **cover**.

Current global imbalances, including **U.S.** fiscal policies, and **the** regional ones involving **China**, pose trends that seem unsustainable to more and more informed people. Before they are corrected, however, we may see **once** again the truth of **that** old Wall Street saying: "The bigger the **boom**, the bigger the bust"

---



**A Widening Imbalance**  
The US current account deficit has grown by 50% since 2000, reaching 664 billion dollars annually.

664 billion dollars annually



The New York Times

FINANCIAL TIMES WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 13 2004





Center for Strategic & International Studies  
Washington, DC

Ambassador Richard McCormack

**Former** Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Richard McCormack, **is** currently senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, one of Washington's leading policy research institutes.

**Within** the past year, Mr. McCormack has carried out projects in Russia, China, Iran, Argentina, Brazil, West Africa, Japan, Israel, Jordan, and Western Europe. These visits involved meetings with Presidents, Central Bank Governors, and other leading financial and political figures from the public and private sectors. **Some of** the confidential reports from missions of this kind were reviewed at the highest levels of the American Government. He **has** also served as an advisor to the IMF's Managing Director.

During the Administration of President George H.W. Bush, Mr. McCormack served as Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. He was also President Bush's principal "sherpa" coordinator for the President's involvement in the G-7 economic summits, receiving high praise from the former President for his contributions. He was awarded the State Department's highest award, the Distinguished Service Award, from Secretary of State James A. Baker.

In President Reagan's administrations, Mr. McCormack served as United States Ambassador to the Organization of American States, and received the Superior Honor Award for outstanding sustained performance. Prior to that, he was Assistant Secretary of State for Economics and Business.

Earlier in his career, Mr. McCormack was an advisor to a Senator on the Foreign Relations Committee, deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and senior staff on the President's Council on Executive Organization at the White House, with lead responsibilities for developing plans for the Council on International Economic Policy at the White House under President Nixon.

He received his PM, Magna cum Laude, from the University of Fribourg, Switzerland in 1966, and his BA from Georgetown University in 1963. In 1992, as guest scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington D.C. he delivered a paper in Jerusalem on potential micro economic reforms in the Israeli economy, and wrote a widely quoted paper on the Japanese financial crisis.

In 1975-77 he was a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Until recently, he was Counselor at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and a member of the State Department's advisory commission on Africa. He is a member of the Economic Club of New York.

Mr. McCormack is married to (b)(6) a policy analyst for the Environmental Protection Agency. They live with their three children in (b)(6)



## Remarks by Vice Chairman Roger W. Ferguson, Jr.

At the Conference on Trade and the Future of American Workers, Washington, D.C.  
October 7, 2004

### Free Trade: What Do Economists Really Know?

#### Arguments against Free Trade

If the benefits conferred by international trade are reasonably straightforward, **how** can we explain the apparent ambivalence toward trade picked **up** by recent surveys? Clearly, many people view the benefits of free trade as being outweighed by its perceived costs.

One **concern** about **free** trade may be that it **has** given rise to large trade and **current account** deficits, thereby **adding** to the nation's debt and putting future prosperity at **risk**. Now at more **than 5 percent of GDP**, the current account deficit is in record territory, it is growing, and it cannot be sustained indefinitely. We cannot foresee when the deficit will stop **growing** and return to more-sustainable levels, **through** what mechanisms this adjustment will occur, or whether this adjustment will be **smooth** or disruptive for financial markets and the economy more generally. No matter how a correction of the **external** imbalance

proceeds, however, it will involve a **range** of adjustments to investment, **saving**, and asset **prices**, both for the U.S. economy and for our trading partners. Research suggests that past corrections of large external imbalances in industrial countries generally have occurred without crisis.<sup>12</sup> Whether or not **this** will remain the case, I **am** confident that protectionism is not the appropriate response to **our** growing current account deficit. The amount of current account adjustment that would be gained **from** a given tightening of import **controls** is questionable. Yet, it is **certain** that such actions would impose **costs** on the economy that would persist long after concerns about the deficit dissipated.

Don: This statement is absolutely untrue. The effort the U.S. made to deal with our 90 billion dollar payments deficit in 1985/86 led to the mLouvre Agreement, and various Japanese polash, measures which directly contributed to the 1987 crash and the later disastrous Japanese bubble. McCormack

P.S. our current account problem today is 8 times the size of the 1985 problem that had Baker and Reagan so concerned about the longer term economic and political implications.

**US Current account balance**

% of GDP




1988 90 95 2000 05 09  
Source: Roubini and Selzer - Stern School of Business 2004

FINANCIAL TIMES WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 13 2004

**A Widening Imbalance**  
The nation's current account deficit has broadened to a record high of 664 billion dollars annually

664 billion dollars annually



The New York Times

~~FOUO~~

November 12, 2004  
I-04/015285/16  
ES-1378

TO: Peter Rodman  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: El Salvador and Nicaragua

What can we do for El Salvador and Nicaragua in terms of helping them with their forces?

Thanks.

DHR:sh  
111204-7

.....

Please respond by 12/3/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20864-04

~~FOUO~~

DEC 29 2004

TO: Lt Gen Duncan McNabb

CC: Gen Dick Myers *Gen John Abizaid*  
*Gen George Casey*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Steel to Iraq

There has to be a way to push steel into the country faster. Please talk to Gen Casey about the briefing he gave me in the car and the importance of doing that.

Thanks.

DHR:m  
122704-26

.....  
 Please respond by 1/21/05

*TMP*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20907-04

*29 Dec 04*

11-L-0559/OSD/28375

~~FOUO~~

OCT 15 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Notes from Kicklighter

Here are the notes Kicklighter gave me in his out-call. You should be sure someone is following up on this.

Thanks.

Attach  
10/7/04 Kicklighter Notes: Iraq Transition Follow-Up Issues

DHR:m  
101404-25

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*ICAP*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20910-04

*15 Oct 04*

## IRAQ TRAF OW ISSUES

Notes from LTG(R) Kickliehter

### Integration of MNF-I and U.S. Mission

- MNF-I / U.S. Embassy cooperation and integration is strong, effective and a model for future operations.
- MNF-I has just completed an organizational reevaluation and is moving the main **headquarters** to co-locate with the U.S. Embassy in the Palace.
- The new MNF-I Campaign Plan is guiding the U.S. team.
- "Strongest, most integrated DoD/State team that I have ever witnessed."

### Regional Embassy Offices & State Embedded Teams

- **IRMO** plans to establish Reconstruction teams in Baghdad and ten (10) field locations: at the 4 REOs and 6 SETs.
- The Tikrit SET is the model to follow:
- **Recommend IRMO be given responsibility for integration and oversight of USG Regional Operations.**

### IRMO & PCO Structure Changes

- The State Department decided to **assign** Program Management for reconstruction to IRMO; to accomplish **this**, PCO's Strategic Analysis Office is being transferred to **IRMO**.
- **Doth PCO & IRMO are** heavily committed. Any additional resources required for **IRMO** will have to come from other sources.
- **MNF-I** is providing personnel to **IRMO** to strengthen its capability. MNF-I's Director of Engineers has been embedded within **IRMO** as the Deputy for Strategic Operations with responsibility for oversight of Regional Operations.
- Commander, USACE Gulf Region Division (GRD), is now the Deputy for Construction at **PCO**.
- **When** PCO phases down in the future, the GRD will take the lead in reconstruction. PCO is developing a phase-down plan.

### Stem to streamline the acquisition process

- Acquisition process is slow, cumbersome and not based on the speed required in a combat zone.
  - **PCO** is required to use peacetime contracting rules in a wartime environment.
- While in Iraq, received three suggestions for improvement (since then the Acquisition **Community** in Iraq has expanded the list to twenty):
  - Raise the Simplified Acquisition Threshold from \$500,000 to \$1M. Action underway.
  - Reduce the response times for federal acquisition activities **as** required under Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), Action underway.
  - Streamline the Export License approval process for the transfer of critical military equipment to the **Traqi** Security Forces. Action underway.
  - DoD & State have established a joint team to oversee the 20 improvement recommendations.

#### Strategic Communications

- Inadequate staffing levels are hindering the effectiveness of the strategic communications effort and straining team integration.
  - MNF-I staffing level: approximately **50%** of newly approved JMD.
  - State Public Affairs Office (PAO) staffing level: approximately **42%**.
- **Staffing problems are hindering the USG's** ability to assist the Interim Iraqi Government in developing its strategic communication capability.
- **Recommend State's PAO & MNF-I's Stratcom co-locate and integrate staff, as appropriate.**

#### U.S. Mission

- **Recommend placement of U.S. Advisors within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to include one with the experience and background to be Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Minister of Defense.**

#### Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I)

- MNSTC-I is working hard to improve Iraqi leader selection and training for the Iraqi Security Forces, National Guard and local Police forces.
- Staffing level is currently at **47%** of approved JMD with a level of **75%** expected by late Nov. **04**.

#### Reconstruction Operations Center

- A Reconstruction Operations Center (ROC) has been established to focus on logistics operations.
- Logistics operations are rapidly approaching full capacity.
  - Warehouse capacity is strained.
  - The process for tracking material movement, which currently includes truck transport, needs to expand to railroad, air and sea.
  - The reallocation of \$1.8B from equipment and construction material to Iraqi Security Force expansion will increase demands on logistics capacity.
  - To manage the resulting logistics surge, there is a requirement of \$70M for operations and 7-8 additional logistics management personnel.
- Accountability of equipment and supplies must be maintained.
  - **Recommend MNF-I's Deputy Chief of Staff for Sustainment partner with PCO and be given oversight responsibility for this huge logistical effort.**
  - A small logistics command may be required to coordinate this mission.





OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1000

CLASSIFIED  
SECRET  
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DEFENSE SUPPORT OFFICE-IRAQ

29 December 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: Director, Defense Support Office - Iraq *ghb*  
SUBJECT: Follow-up on Kicklighter Recommendations

Listed are recommendations that LTG Kicklighter presented to you upon his departure. His principal recommendations with brief status updates are as follows:

**Recommendation:** *Give IRMO responsibility for integration and oversight for Regional Embassy Operations (REO) in Iraq.*

- IRMO now has responsibility for REO integrative task.
- IRMO established a 'Deputy for Operations' to provide integration and oversight over regional programs and is staffing twelve provincial coordination offices. Whether these organizations have real horsepower remains to be seen.

*IRMO*

**Recommendation:** *Integrate MNF-I Strategic Communications and Embassy PAO.*

- Embassy and MNF -I Public Affairs Operations have co-located personnel and assets. MNF-I StratComm remains a separate office within MNF-I, but MNF-I and State PAO do hold daily coordination meetings.

**Recommendation:** *Increase the number of U.S. advisors within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, including one as Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Minister of Defense.*

- Remains an open issue: Only 9 of 22 IRMO MoD advisory positions are currently filled. US provides only two advisors. While willing to convert the position of Minister's Personal Secretary from British to US position, State Department appears to want the Senior Advisor position to remain a UK slot.
- DSO-Iraq suggests considering the merit of a more traditional construct after January elections where DoD assumes from State the responsibility for operating the MoD advisory function and staffing it with DoD personnel and contractors.

*29 Dec 04*

**Recommendation:** *Assign responsibility for reconstruction logistics to ensure accountability of equipment and supplies.*

- Remains an open issue: Accountability, integration and sustainability for logistics operations require attention.
- Assistant SecArmy and DSO-Iraq are attempting to define specific requirements for improvements. Formal meeting of all relevant players, including MNF-I and PCO, will be held January 5, 2005 at Logistics Management Institute (LMI).

*15 Oct 04*

COORDINATION: NONE  
Attachments: As Stated

OSD 20910-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28379

~~FOUO~~

OCT 15 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Notes from Kicklighter

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Thanks.

Attach:  
10/7/04 Kicklighter Notes: Iraq Transition Follow-Up Issues

DHR:m  
101404-25

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28380

## IRAQ TRANSITION FOLLOW-UP ISSUES

Notes from LTG(R) Kicklighter

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**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
The Military Assistant**

~~4~~ January 2005 - 11 15 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HOWARD BURRIS, DIRECTOR, DSO-IRAQ

SUBJECT: Follow-up on Kicklighter Recommendations


**Sir:**

Please see Mr. Patterson's note to you on the attached:

"Howard - Please take a look at this and provide  
a memo to the SD/DSD on how these recommendations  
will be handled. Thanks, Dave"

*Thank you.*

Very respectfully,



Sean E. O'Connor  
Captain, USN  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:  
OSD 20910-04

Suspense: Monday, ~~14~~ January 2005

1240

4 JAN 05

15 OCT 04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

To Dave Patterson 1/3  
From Paul Butler

Take a look at this and  
see what we need to do. I'm  
sure SecDef will want the  
Deputy to get in to it first

Thanks  
Paul

DSD-Iraq. (Howard Basis) Paul Butler  
Howard — Please take a look at this  
and provide a memo to the SD (DSD)  
on how these recommendations will be  
handled. Thanks.  
Dave

J. David Patterson  
The Special Assistant to  
The Deputy Secretary of Defense



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1000

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

113

2004 DEC 29 AM 11:35

DEFENSE SUPPORT OFFICE-IRAQ

29 December 2004

TO: *[Signature]* SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: Director, Defense Support Office - Iraq *[Signature]*  
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COORDINATION: NONE  
Attachments: As Stated


11-L-0559/OSD/28385

|          |                    |                    |
|----------|--------------------|--------------------|
| MA SD    | SMA DSD            |                    |
| TSA SD   | SA DSD             | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| EXEC SEC | <i>[Signature]</i> |                    |
| ESR MA   | <i>[Signature]</i> | 12-29-04           |

OSD 20910-04

~~FOUO~~

OCT 15 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Notes from Kicklighter

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Attach:  
10/7/04 Kicklighter Notes: Iraq Transition Follow-Up Issues

DHR:m  
101404-23

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28386



## IRAQ TRANSITION FOLLOW-UP ISSUES

Notes from LTG(R) Kicklighter

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- **The State Department** decided to assign Program Management for reconstruction to **IRMO**; to accomplish this, PCO's Strategic Analysis Office is being transferred to **IRMO.**
- **Both PCO & IRMO are** heavily committed. **Any** additional resources required for **IRMO** will have to come from other sources.
- MNF-I is providing personnel to **IRMO** to strengthen its capability. MNF-I's Director of Engineers **has** been embedded within **IRMO** as the Deputy for Strategic Operations with responsibility for oversight of Regional Operations.
- Commander, USACE Gulf Region Division (GRD), is now the Deputy for Construction at **PCO.**
- When PCO phases down **in the future**, the GRD will take the lead in reconstruction. **PCO** is developing a phase-down plan.

### Steps to streamline the acquisition process

- Acquisition process is slow, cumbersome and not based on the speed required in a combat zone.
  - **PCO** is required to use peacetime contracting rules in a wartime environment.
- While in **Iraq**, received three suggestions for improvement (since then the Acquisition **Community** in Iraq **has** expanded the list to twenty):
  - Raise the Simplified Acquisition Threshold from \$500,000 to \$1M. Action underway.
  - Reduce the response times for federal acquisition activities **as** required under Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). Action underway.
  - Streamline the Export License approval process for the transfer of critical military equipment to the Iraqi Security Forces. Action underway.
  - DoD & State have established a joint team to oversee the **20** improvement recommendations.

#### Strategic Communications

- Inadequate **staffing** levels are hindering the effectiveness of the strategic **communications effort** and straining team integration.
  - MNF-I staffing level: approximately **50%** of newly approved JMD.
  - State Public Affairs Office (PAO) staffing level: approximately **42%**.
- **Staffing problems are hindering the USG's ability to assist the Interim Iraqi Government** in developing its strategic communication capability.
- **Recommend State's PAO & MNF-I's Stratcom co-locate and integrate staff, as appropriate.**

#### U.S. Mission

- **Recommend placement of U.S. Advisors within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to include one with the experience and background to be Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Minister of Defense.**

#### Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I)

- **MNSTC-I** is working hard to improve Iraqi leader selection and training for **the Iraqi Security Forces, National Guard and local Police forces.**
- Staffing level is currently at 47% of approved **JMD** with a level of **75%** expected by late Nov. **04.**

#### Reconstruction Operations Center

- A Reconstruction Operations Center (ROC) has been established to focus on logistics operations.
- Logistics operations are rapidly approaching full capacity.
  - Warehouse capacity is strained.
  - The process for tracking material movement, which currently includes **truck transport**, needs to expand to railroad, air and **sea.**
  - The reallocation of **\$1.8B** from equipment and construction material to Iraqi Security Force expansion will increase demands on logistics capacity.
  - To manage the resulting logistics surge, there is a requirement of \$70M for operations **and** 7-8 additional logistics management personnel.
- Accountability of equipment and supplies must be maintained.
  - **Recommend MNF-I's Deputy Chief of Staff for Sustainment partner with PCO and be given oversight responsibility for this huge logistical effort.**
  - A small logistics command may be required to coordinate **this** mission.

720  
~~FOUO~~

ES-1694  
04/016920

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
December 14, 2004

2004 DEC 29 PM 12:12

TO: Mira Ricardel

SUBJECT: Letter to Buckovski

Shouldn't we write Buckovski of Macedonia a letter congratulating him?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
121404-7

.....  
Please respond by 12/22/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20914-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28389

15-12-04 A10:56 IN

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**Policy Executive Secretariat Note**

2004 DEC 29 PM 12:12


December 28, 2004

Reference: 121404-7, Letter to Buckovski

Captain Marriott,

Please find attached a congratulatory letter to Prime Minister Buckovski that Policy/Mira Ricardel submitted separately.

SecDef signed the letter on December 22.

  
June Bartlett  
Deputy Director  
Policy Executive Secretariat

OSD 20914-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28390

~~FOUO~~

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: September 1, 2004 - FGH HC 9/2

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*

0700

SUBJECT: Redrafted Memo on USG Responsibilities for Homeland Security

384

Don.

I met with the recipients of the attached snowflake and we produced the redraft you requested.

I'm available to discuss it further if you wish.

1Sep04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20954-05

~~FOUO~~  
DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

SUBJECT: USG Responsibilities for Homeland Security

Situation Today:

Since September 11, 2001, the Administration has made substantial progress to protect America from terrorist attacks. Among other measures, we have established:

- The Department of Homeland Security.
- A National Bio-Defense Strategy and stockpiles of biological vaccines.
- United States Northern Command.
- The Terrorist Threat Integration Center.

**As** a result of these and other initiatives, America is safer today **than** it was prior to the 9/11 attacks, although we must continue to improve America's homeland security.

Homeland Security Roles and Responsibilities:

However, in the event of another major terrorist attack, we will certainly ask ourselves what else we might have done to prevent it or mitigate its consequences. One issue that concerns me is that roles and responsibilities for homeland security are still not as clearly defined **as** they might be. Now that we have almost **two** years of experience with the Department of Homeland Security and the new USG organization for homeland

DRAFT WORKING PAPERS  
~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/28392

security, it may be an appropriate time to evaluate the assignment of roles and responsibilities for homeland security. We also need to consider how we can better educate the American people about those roles and responsibilities. It is important for the American people to have realistic expectations about the role the U.S. Armed Forces might play in dealing with terrorist attacks inside the United States, as defined both by law and executive policy. I am reminded of the polls taken in the 1990s which showed that Americans believed erroneously that we have a capability to shoot down a ballistic missile targeting the U.S. There is a great deal the U.S. military can do in the event of a terrorist attack, but there are limits on that capability and—as a matter of law and policy—there may be things we should not do.

Across the USG, there have been several major homeland security exercises over the past several years. We could use their results to evaluate where gaps may exist in the USG homeland security concept and determine if changes are warranted with respect to statutes, authorities, policies, missions, resources and training, etc. Evaluations, moreover, could help to identify any legal considerations that might limit the military from providing support to any Lead Federal Agency and that could impede effective command and control.

Homeland security roles and responsibilities are spread among the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, State, the FBI, the CIA and various other U.S. agencies:

- To stop terrorists from coming across our borders.
- To stop terrorists from coming through U.S. ports.
- To stop terrorists from hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United States.

- To seek out or arrest terrorists inside the United States.

DOD does not have primary responsibility for any of those functions. Its traditional role has been largely restricted to the following:

- Defend the U.S. homeland against foreign threats and attacks from outside the U.S. (NORTHCOM/NORAD/PACOM).
- Protect U.S. DoD military forces and facilities located within the United States.
- Support designated lead federal agencies, as specifically directed by the President, to include:
  - "Render safe" a nuclear weapon located inside the United States.
  - Provide support for designated "National Special Security Events," such as the G-8 Summit, Democratic and Republican Conventions, the Super Bowl, etc., and
  - Serve as a sector-specific agency for the U.S. defense industrial base in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7.

Comment:

In the event of a catastrophic nuclear or biological attack on the territory of the United States, the following would likely occur, as it did on September 11, 2001:

- 1) The first calls for help will be to DoD to immediately take action, but



technically not in the lead role, only in a supporting role. Specifically, DoD may be asked to undertake the very responsibilities DoD has not been assigned or funded to do, and therefore may not have organized, trained or equipped to do, and

- 2) When the dust settles, the American people may well ask why DoD did not:
- Prevent the attack, even though that is the legal responsibility of others and it is not DoD's assignment;
  - Instantaneously respond to mitigate the attack after it occurs.

Recommendation:

Given this situation, the Administration may wish to undertake a quick review to provide recommendations for the following types of questions:

- What might be done to better organize, allocate and rearrange responsibilities among USG agencies to ensure that the right capabilities and assets will address key problems?
- Should we further organize, train and equip the National Guard and the reserves for homeland defense?
- Has DoD allocated sufficient force structure to homeland defense, particularly to prevent or mitigate the consequences of a catastrophic attack?
- What might be done to better inform the Members of Congress, the press, and

DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

the American people of the decided upon allocation of responsibilities, so the current confusion as to roles and responsibilities can be **reduced**?

# TAB A

~~FOUO~~

December 29, 2004  
7:17

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Principi *DR*

Just to close the loop, I received a call from Tony Principi saying he really didn't think he should have lunch with me and talk, because he's decided to go outside.

DHR:es  
122904-2(b)

002.71 59

29 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20958-04

11-L-0559/OSD/28398

~~FOUO~~

SECRET December 29, 2004

2004 DEC 30 AM 6:40

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Vehicle Armor

Mr. President,

I listened to your statement after our NSC meeting this morning. You were asked about armor. You responded as indicated on the top of this attached page. I checked with our folks, and have attached more current information. I now have the military committed to not having U.S. Servicemen driving any vehicles in Iraq that do not have the appropriate armor after February 15, except for those vehicles that are used solely within protected military compounds.

451

I'm pushing them to accelerate the February 15 date to January 30.

The way we are doing it is:

- 1) To get more steel and more people in Iraq to bolt the protective armor on the vehicles;
- 2) changing tactics, techniques and procedures, so fewer vehicles have to be out;
- 3) reducing the number of locations that materials have to be dispersed to, and/or hiring more contact drivers.

The long and the short of it is, by February 15, 2005, or sooner, the goal is to not have any U.S. military vehicles in Iraq, outside of a protected military compound, unless they have appropriate armor. I'll keep you posted.

Respectfully,

Attach.  
Information Paper on Vehicle Armor

DHR:ss  
122904-15 (a)

~~FOUO~~

29 Dec 04

OSD 20959-04

The statement made by the President at the press conference is factually correct...but the amendment below offers a more complete view.

**THE PRESIDENT:** Well, I have looked at the statistics on that, and we have stepped up the production of armored Humvees significantly. The other issue is the rearmament of existing - of vehicles that are now in theater, vehicles that require a different armament structure than that which they initially were manufactured with. And I am told that those vehicles will be armed up by mid-summer of 2005. And what I know is, is that the Defense Department is working expeditiously with private contractors and with our military to get these vehicles armed up.

#### A MORE COMPLETE STATEMENT

**THE PRESIDENT:** Well, I have looked at the statistics on that, and SINCE MAY OF 2003 we have stepped up the production of armored Humvees significantly. The other issue is the rearmament of existing - of vehicles that are now in theater, vehicles that require a different armament structure than that which they initially were manufactured with. And I am told that those vehicles WILL HAVE FACTORY BUILT, INTEGRATED ARMOR AND BALLISTIC GLASS be armed up by mid-summer of 2005. IN THE INTERIM, BY 15 FEB 05 OR SOONER, WE WILL ARMOR - WITH BOTH FACTORY BUILT AND LOCALLY INSTALLED ARMOR PLATE - ALL VEHICLES WHICH OPERATE OUTSIDE A PROTECTED COMPOUND. And what I know is, is that the Defense Department is working expeditiously with private contractors and with our military to get these vehicles armed up.

~~SECRET~~  
~~ATTACHMENT~~

September 7, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Defense Science Board Summer Project

If you have not seen the Defense Science Board Summer Project, I think you should. (See page 33 of their briefing papers.)

I think we should ask **DIA** to come back to us with a proposal as to how they are going to make better use of open source information.

Thanks.

Attach.  
08/31/04 Defense Science Board Summer Project (page 33)

DHR:ss  
090704-22

.....  
Please respond by 9/17

334 DSB

7 SEP 04

~~SECRET~~  
~~ATTACHMENT~~



## Transition to and from Hostilities

### III.C. Knowledge, Understanding, and Intelligence for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century



Unclassified

#### *Recommendations: Open Source*

- USD(I) designate DIA as Executive Agent for oversight, planning and (most) direct execution
  - Separately budget so that it does not compete with “core business” of the Executive Agent
  - Fund for the central procurement resolution of intellectual property rights
  - Consider “industrial funding” model for open-source-analytic and other value-added products; Executive Agent would qualify the vendors
- Fund demonstrations of linking and e-business paradigms on Intelink TS and S
- Change the lanes in the road so that every single source agency produces two-source integrated product ...e.g., SIGINT and open source, or geo-spatial and open source
- Design the enterprise-wide data architecture to support and exploit linkages provided by open source

Unclassified

Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

33

11-L-0559/OSD/28402



September 7, 2004

TO: Matt Latimer  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Thoughts on Iraq Papers

Here are some papers I have worked on. Please sort through them and, after talking with Larry and Tony, come back to me with a recommendation as to what I should do with them, if anything.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/10/04 ASD(ISA) Memo to SecDef re: Thoughts on Iraq,  
06/09/04 Suggested Insert from Dr. Wolfowitz  
06/21/04 memo from SecDef to Rodman re: Edits on Thoughts on Iraq.

DHR:ss  
090704-43

.....  
Please respond by 9/17/04

*Iraq*

*75 Sep 04*

September 10, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Briefing Paper for POTUS

We need to see that the President has a briefing paper before he meets with Prime Minister Koizumi showing what we are doing in Japan, and why the deterrent will not be weakened.

*Japan*

Please read the attached.

Thanks.

Attach.  
FBIS Report Re: Koizumi to discuss USFJ Realignment on 9/21

DHR:ss  
091004-2

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*10 SEP 04*



FBIS

Text

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**Japan: Koizumi Expected To Discuss USFJ Realignment With Bush in NY on 21 Sep**

JPP20040909000004 Tokyo Nikkei Telecom 21 WWW-Text in English 2056 GMT 08 Sep 04

[Unattributed report: "Koizumi, Bush To Discuss US Base Issue in New York on 21 September"; English version of report attributed to Tokyo Nihon Keizai Shimbun in Japanese 9 Sep 04 Morning Edition]

[FBIS Transcribed Text]

TOKYO (Nikkei) -- Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is expected to discuss the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan when he meets with U.S. President George W. Bush in New York on Sept. 21.

Koizumi is scheduled to travel to New York to attend the annual U.N. General Assembly following visits to Brazil and Mexico.

Specifically, Japan will seek to have local interests reflected in these plans through such measures as reducing the burden borne by communities hosting U.S. military installations. In addition, Koizumi will ask that U.S. military forces in Japan maintain their deterrence capabilities.

In bilateral director-general-level discussions with foreign affairs and defense officials at the end of August, Japan expressed its intention to present as early as this year a policy response to the planned U.S. military realignment.

The meeting between Koizumi and Bush is expected to establish a foundation for discussions before the bilateral military realignment talks begin in earnest.

On the expansion of the U.N. Security Council, Koizumi will explain Japan's bid to seek entry into the group without changing the country's war-renouncing Constitution. Koizumi hopes to win Bush's support on the matter.

[Description of Source: Tokyo Nikkei Telecom 21 Text-WWW in English -- on-line database service owned by Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc., containing flash news, the main Tokyo newspapers, business, technical, and regional newspapers, weekly magazines, plus various business-oriented databases]

11-L-0559/OSD/28405

file

September 16, 2004

TO: Les Brownlee  
Lt. Gen. Lovelace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: General Officer Memos of Reprimand

At the detainee brief, you said there were 13 GO Memos of Reprimand.

I would like more detail on the implications of the memos -- how many will be in service jackets and how those that are not in service jackets will affect the individual's careers.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
091604-1A

.....  
Please respond by 9/23/04

*Sir,*  
*Response attached.*

*v/r*  
*Lt Col Lensye*  
*9/23*

*383.6*

*16 SEP 04*

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Senior Military Assistant

9/23

011 9/24

SIR \_\_\_\_\_

My Army sources,  
including Col Bucci,  
tell me these are  
essentially all career  
terminal.

V/R  
Jim



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200

*204 9/24*

INFO MEMO

September 22, 2004, 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R.L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

*- Brownlee*

SUBJECT: General Officer Memos of Reprimand

- You were informed that Headquarters, Department of the Army, has received reports of 13 administrative reprimands imposed in connection with incidents of detainee abuse. Since that time, we have received reports of two additional administrative reprimands imposed for incidents of detainee abuse. Of these 15 reprimands, seven were imposed by general officers and eight were imposed by other officers. All of these reprimands were filed in local unit files, and may be considered by the recipient's commander when making assignments, promotions, or selections for schooling.
- We have also received reports of two additional reprimands for related misconduct that were imposed by a general officer as nonjudicial punishment under the provisions of Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice. Both of these actions will be filed in the Official Military Personnel Files (OMPF) of the recipients, which are maintained by the Department of the Army.
- In addition, six Soldiers have been reprimanded by a general officer for dereliction of supervisory duties and similar neglects in connection with the administration of the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. All of these reprimands were filed in the OMPF of the recipients.

*383.6*

*22 Sep 04*

*165 Sep 04*

COORDINATION: NONE

PREPARED BY: COL William Barto, (b)(6)

September 16, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DRM*  
SUBJECT: Note from Newt Gingrich

Here are some interesting e-mails from Newt Gingrich. I would appreciate it if you would talk to him sometime and explain what you are doing. He is interested and knowledgeable. I think it would be helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.  
E-mails from Gingrich (6/4, 6/21, 7/9/04)

DHR:ss  
091604-11

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*320.2*

*16 Sep 04*

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

LD's response to  
Newt's ad (below)

cc Craddock  
Butler

**From:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Sunday, June 20, 2004 5:31 PM  
**To:** 'Thirdwave2@aol.com'; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD; (b)(6) Patterson, Jack D, CIV, OSD  
**Cc:** peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@OSD.mil; Thornhill, Paula, Col, JCS SJS  
**Subject:** RE: the army is too small-newt

could it be that the army is the right size, but too much of it is in the reserves?

that's a much more transformational matter than simply adding bodies.

for years, for all the right reasons at the time (maybe) we have been putting what has become critical capability into the reserves.

it's time to change that.

put another way, adding two new divisions and not fixing the imbalance will not solve the problem.

i'm not stubborn on the point, but you shouldn't be, either. your comments suggest that you have not had the chance to consider the matter as carefully as you might.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com [mailto:Thirdwave2@aol.com]  
**Sent:** Friday, June 04, 2004 8:27 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;  
 John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil  
**Cc:** peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@OSD.mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil  
**Subject:** the army is too small-newt

for secdef, depsecdef  
from newt 6/04/04

it is untenable to argue the Army is the right size

it is a direct contradiction of the Secretary's warning at West Point that we are in the early stages of a long war

it is impossible for average Americans to believe that the Army is the right size but we have to rely on reservists and guardsmen on a continuing basis and we now have to extend service involuntarily

I do not care what the studies and higher ups are telling you as an Army brat who went through the Eisenhower reductions in forces in the late 1950s as a child this combination of events is going to weaken the Army



finally, it is impossible to explain to the American people why the Army is the right size when their neighbors are called up and service is involuntarily extended

I cannot defend the current size and when asked I am going to say the Army should be larger

Kerry will win this debate

this is a repetition of the 1960 Nixon mistake of defending America's strength against Kennedy's charge of a missile gap--the country decided Kennedy was right even though he was wrong

for the first time in decades Republicans are now on the weakness side of a defense issue and giving the Democrats an easy way to be on the pro-defense side of more strength.

You should call for a significant increase in Army end strength and a significant increase in the Army budget to cover that cost without eating into the rest of the Army's program

if this is a long war then let's start acting like its a real war and budget accordingly

to repeat: I personally cannot defend the smaller Army position and I would support a substantial increase in both Army strength and the Army budget

this is both a national security and a political issue and the administration is wrong on both

cc: Butler  
LTG Craddock

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com  
**Sent:** Monday, June 21, 2004 8:02 PM  
**To:** larry.dirita@osd.pentagon.mil; (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@osd.mil;  
(b)(6) Jack.Patterson@osd.mil  
**Cc:** peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@OSD.mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil  
**Subject:** Re: the army is too small-newt

there is a theoretical army in which total manpower including reserves and national guard, mobilization depots, division overhead, etc all can be converted to a lean fighting army

we are in a war

we are making decisions about troops in Korea and troops in Germany which may effect our long term influence in those regions forever

we have an army which is very strained and in which we do not have enough area specialists with language skills, we do not have enough civil affairs units, we do not have enough information officers with even a minimum level of information strategy skills

in a societal war against an embedded opponent the army will end up being the primary carrier of the war

it is too small

you are being told it is adequate only because we have imposed a budget cap on it

if you asked the combatant commanders and the army to assess a long war strategy and the current tempo they would need a much bigger system

this is not about divisions it is about rotatable units, sustaining the force, developing adequate specialties

in peacetime we can wait until we reform the guard, reserve and overhead

in a war we would insist on adequate troops and then try to reform

which are we in?

newt

LD's response to  
Newt's email

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

**From:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA

**Sent:** Tuesday, June 22, 2004 7:09 AM

**To:** 'Thirdwave2@aol.com'; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD; (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: the army is too small-newt

Because we are in a war we can do things we knew we needed to for a long time but always found a reason not to.

This is not an argument against more end strength, although I am not persuaded that's the right answer and I only have to listen to the chief of staff of the army on that one.

But if we did get an increase in end strength, we would lose some of the impetus to do the very things that we are doing because we never had an impetus until now.

Restructuring in Europe and Korea are good things, and long overdue.

Restructuring the active and reserve balance is overdue, although we probably did not know that until now.

Getting our civil service system redesigned to make it more flexible and less dependent upon activity duty military is a good thing, although we never would have achieved that legislative initiative without the pressure on end strength.

I don't know if we need more end strength or not. If after we have done all these other things, we find we still do, then we should ask for it. But even accepting your argument that simply being in a war demands a larger army, it is not clear to me how we would use it if we had it and I know that if we had it a lot of these other things might not happen.

If your concern is our footprint in Europe and Korea, then we just have a basic difference of views on whether it makes sense for us to continue maintain all those divisions so committed. That is a quite different consideration, it seems to me.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com [mailto:Thirdwave2@aol.com]

**Sent:** Monday, June 21, 2004 8:02 PM

**To:** larry.dirita@osd.pentagon.mil; (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@osd.mil;

(b)(6) Jack.Patterson@osd.mil

**Cc:** peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@OSD.mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil

**Subject:** Re: the army is too small-newt

there is a theoretical army in which total manpower including reserves and national guard, mobilization depots, division overhead, etc all can be converted to a lean fighting army

we are in a war

we are making decisions about troops in Korea and troops in Germany which may effect our long term influence in those regions forever

6/22/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/28413

we have an army which is very strained and in which we do not have enough area specialists with language skills, we do not have enough civil affairs units, we do not have enough information officers with even a minimum level of information strategy skills

in a societal war against an embedded opponent the army will end up being the primary carrier of the war

it is too small

you are being told it is adequate only because we have imposed a budget cap on it

if you asked the combatant commanders and the army to assess a long war strategy and the current tempo they would need a much bigger system

this is not about divisions it is about rotatable units, sustaining the force, developing adequate specialties

in peacetime we can wait until we reform the guard, reserve and overhead

in a war we would insist on adequate troops and then try to reform

which are we in?  
newt

Call

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com  
Sent: Friday, July 09, 2004 7:58 AM  
To: (b)(6) Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;  
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil  
Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil  
Subject: the army is too small and it is starting to make us lookg **silly**

from newt 7/9/04  
army size

the contortions we are going through with the Army are going to **be** politically very expensive this **fall**

it is impossible to **be** doing all the different things the army is doing to hold itself together and argue that it is not too **small**

involuntarily retaining people, involuntarily calling people back, reaching out to recruit from the other services

everything indicates **we** are in a system that is too small and that is wearing down'

it is like watching a company starting to kite checks to cover cash flow problems

there may be **good** management answers but politically the country is not going to believe the army is big enough

the **sooner we** decide to **expand** the army the **less** it will **cost us** this **fall** in the debates

September 17, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: "Stress on the Force" Memo - Update

I would like to see an update to our "Stress on the Force" Memo very soon. My sense is that we have made some good progress and I am looking forward to hearing the specifics.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
091704-1

.....  
Please respond by 9/24/04

*322.2*

*17 Sep 04*

7200  
~~FOUO~~ file

September 20, 2004  
ES-0826  
04/012625-ES

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Pakistan

What more can we do for Pakistan on getting money for those madrasahs?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092004-31

.....

Please respond by 10/15/04

9/23/04

DA 9/28

SSD

Paul Butler  
9/23

I'm working this on two levels.  
I'll continue pushing Hadley and Grossman on how best to use current ESF and other accounts for Pak education.

The greater issue is that we (the USG) need billions more from Congress to fight the War on Terrorism on the ideological front. I am working with Tina Jonas and Powell Moore on a plan to brief Congress systematically on our GWOT Strategy and make case for a different approach to funds and authorities. You discussed this with us last Friday at the three-hour session.  
Doug Feith

Pakistan

20 SEP 04

~~FOUO~~

September 23, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Satellite Photo of Iraq

Please get me a copy of a satellite photograph of Iraq before the war and a photo today. I would like to see an image taken at night, so we can see the difference in electricity generation from then to now.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092304-2

.....  
Please respond by 10/7/04

Sir,

The first photo is the average lights during a 1 1/2 month period before the war. The second is a one month average after the war, The third is a one night image that shows the night after the attack on the oil line that closed down the Bayji Power plant. It shows how quickly the majority of power was restored.

VIR, COL B

*060*

*23 Sep 04*



file

September 24, 2004

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: List of SASC and HASC Subcommittees

Please give me a copy of the subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. I want to look at how they are organized. And maybe privately suggest some different organizations at some point to Duncan Hunter and John Warner.

032

I have a feeling they are organized for the way we used to look at the Department of Defense, instead of the way we ought to be looking at it. Maybe that would help.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092404-3

.....  
Please respond by 9/24/04

*Tom*  
*AW 9/27*

24 Sep 04

DA 9/27



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

September 24, 2004 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Inquiry

032

- Attached is the information you requested regarding SASC and HASC subcommittees.

2 Attachments:

1. SASC Full Committee and Subcommittees
2. HASC Full Committee and Subcommittees

24 Sep 04

24 Sep 04

11-L-0559/OSD/28420

OSD 20983-04

## SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

### FULL COMMITTEE

**Jurisdiction:** Defense and defense policy generally; aeronautical and space activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems or military operations; the common defense; the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, military research and development; national security aspects of nuclear energy; naval petroleum reserves, except those in Alaska; pay, promotion, retirement, and other benefits and privileges of members of the Armed Forces, including overseas education of civilian and military dependents; selective service system; and strategic and critical materials necessary for the common defense; comprehensive study and review of matters relating to the common defense policy of the United States. The chairman and ranking minority member are non-voting members ex officio of all subcommittees of which they are not regular members

#### Republicans (13)

---

John W. Warner, Va. - *chairman*  
John McCain, Ariz.  
James M. Inhofe, Okla.  
Pat Roberts, Kan.  
Wayne Allard, Colo.  
Jeff Sessions, Ala.  
Susan Collins, Maine  
John Ensign, Nev.  
Jim Talent, Mo.  
Saxby Chambliss, Ga.  
Lindsey Graham, S.C.  
Elizabeth Dole, N.C.  
John Cornyn, Texas

#### Democrats (12)

---

Carl Levin, Mich. - *ranking member*  
Edward M. Kennedy, Mass.  
Robert C. Byrd, W.Va.  
Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn.  
Jack Reed, R.I.  
Daniel K. Akaka, Hawaii  
Bill Nelson, Fla.  
Ben Nelson, Neb.  
Mark Dayton, Minn.  
Evan Bayh, Ind.  
Hillary Rodham Clinton, N.Y.  
Mark Pryor, Ark.

**Republican Staff Director:** Judith A. Ansley

**Democratic Staff Director:** Rick DeBobes

## SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIRLAND

**Jurisdiction:** All Army and Air Force acquisition programs (except strategic weapons and lift programs, special operations and information technology accounts); all Navy and Marine Corps aviation programs, National Guard and Army and Air Force reserve modernization, and ammunition programs.

### Republicans (7)

---

Jeff Sessions, Ala. - *chairman*  
John McCain, Ariz.  
James M. Inhofe, Okla.  
Pat Roberts, Kan.  
Jim Talent, Mo.  
Saxby Chambliss, Ga.  
Elizabeth Dole, N.C.

### Democrats (6)

---

Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn. - *ranking member*  
Daniel K. Akaka, Hawaii  
Mark Dayton, Minn.  
Evan Bayh, Ind.  
Hillary Rodham Clinton, N.Y.  
Mark Pryor, Ark.

## SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

**Jurisdiction:** Policies and programs to counter emerging threats such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, illegal drugs, and other asymmetric threats, information warfare programs; technology base programs, special operations programs; emerging operational concepts; Foreign Military Sales (FMS); technology export policies; Nunn-Lugar issues; DOE non-proliferation programs; doctrine and R&D supporting non-traditional military operations, including peacekeeping and low-intensity conflict; budget accounts for technology base RDT&E for DOD and DOE counterterrorism and chemical and biological warfare defense; DOD funding for the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program; DOE funding for non-proliferation programs; DOD command and agencies including Defense Advance Research Project Agency (DARPA); Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); Defense Security Cooperation Agency (SSCA); SOCOM

### Republicans (9)

---

Pat Roberts, Kan. - *chairman*  
Wayne Allard, Colo.  
Susan Collins, Maine  
John Ensign, Nev.  
Jim Talent, Mo.  
Saxby Chambliss, Ga.  
Lindsey Graham, S.C.  
Elizabeth Dole, N.C.  
John Cornyn, Texas

### Democrats (8)

---

Jack Reed, R.I. - *ranking member*  
Edward M. Kennedy, Mass.  
Robert C. Byrd, W.Va.  
Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn.  
Daniel K. Akaka, Hawaii  
Bill Nelson, Fla.  
Evan Bayh, Ind.  
Hillary Rodham Clinton, N.Y.

## SUBCOMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL

**Jurisdiction:** Policies and end strengths for military and civilian personnel; military health care; compensation; force structure; Morale, Welfare and Recreation; Professional Military Education; military nominations; DODDS/Section 6 schools, Civil-military programs; POW/MIA issues; family housing policy; Armed Forces Retirement Home; budget accounts for military personnel; military retirement; Defense Health Care; AAFES

### Republicans (4)

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Saxby Chambliss, Ga. - *chairman*  
Susan Collins, Maine  
Elizabeth Dole, N.C.  
John Cornyn, Texas

### Democrats (3)

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Ben Nelson, Neb. - *ranking member*  
Edward M. Kennedy, Mass.  
Mark Pryor, Ark.

## SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

**Jurisdiction:** Military readiness, training, logistics and maintenance issues and programs, all military construction, installations and family housing issues, including the base closure process.

### Republicans (9)

---

John Ensign, Nev. - *chairman*  
John McCain, Ariz.  
James M. Inhofe, Okla.  
Pat Roberts, Kan.  
Wayne Allard, Colo.  
Jeff Sessions, Ala.  
Jim Talent, Mo.  
Saxby Chambliss, Ga.  
John Cornyn, Texas

### Democrats (8)

---

Daniel K. Akaka, Hawaii - *ranking member*  
Robert C. Byrd, W.Va.  
Bill Nelson, Fla.  
Ben Nelson, Neb.  
Mark Dayton, Minn.  
Evan Bayh, Ind.  
Hillary Rodham Clinton, N.Y.  
Mark Pryor, Ark.

## SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER

**Jurisdiction:** Naval and U.S. Marine Corps programs less tactical aviation; strategic lift programs; U.S. Coast Guard; maritime issues; TRANSCOM; budget accounts for USN; USMC procurement and RDT&E less tactical aviation; Army and Air Force strategic lift programs; National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF).

### Republicans (4)

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Jim Talent, Mo. - *chairman*  
John McCain, Ariz.  
Susan Collins, Maine  
Lindsey Graham, S.C.

### Democrats (3)

---

Edward M. Kennedy, Mass. - *ranking member*  
Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn.  
Jack Reed, R.

## SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

**Jurisdiction:** All strategic forces (except deep strike systems), space programs, ballistic missile defense and Department of Energy national security programs (except non-proliferation programs).

### Republicans (6)

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Wayne Allard, Colo. - *chairman*  
James M. Inhofe, Okla.  
Jeff Sessions, Ala.  
John Ensign, Nev.  
Lindsey Graham, S.C.  
John Cornyn, Texas

### Democrats (5)

---

Bill Nelson, Fla. - *ranking member*  
Robert C. Byrd, W.Va.  
Jack Reed, R.I.  
Ben Nelson, Neb.  
Mark Dayton, Minn.

# HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

## FULL COMMITTEE

**Jurisdiction:** Ammunition depots; Army, Navy, and Air Force reservations and establishments; conservation, development, and use of naval petroleum and oil shale reserves; Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; Merchant Marine Academy, and State Maritime Academies; military applications of nuclear energy; tactical intelligence and DoD intelligence related activities; national security aspects of merchant marine, including financial assistance for the construction and operation of vessels, the maintenance of the U.S. shipbuilding and ship repair industrial base, cargo preference and merchant marine officers and seamen as these matters relate to the national security; all benefits and privileges of members of the armed forces; scientific research and development in support of the armed services; selective service; size and composition of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force; soldiers' and sailors' homes.

### **Republicans (33)**

Duncan Hunter, Calif. - *chairman*  
Curt Weldon, Pa.  
Joel Hefley, Colo.  
James Saxton, N.J.  
John M. McHugh, N.Y.  
Terry Everett, Ala.  
Roscoe G. Bartlett, Md.  
Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, Calif.  
William M. "Mac" Thornberry, Texas  
John Hostettler, Ind.  
Walter B. Jones, N.C.  
Jim Ryun, Kan.  
Jim Gibbons, Nev.  
Robin Hayes, N.C.  
Heather A. Wilson, N.M.  
Ken Calvert, Calif.  
Rob Simmons, Conn.  
Jo Ann Davis, Va.  
Ed Schrock, Va.  
Todd Akin, Mo.  
J. Randy Forbes, Va.  
Jeff Miller, Fla.  
Joe Wilson, S.C.  
Frank A. LoBiondo, N.J.  
Tom Cole, Okla.  
Jeb Bradley, N.H.  
Rob Bishop, Utah  
Michael R. Turner, Ohio  
John Kline, Minn.  
Candice S. Miller, Mich.  
Phil Gingrey, Ga.  
Mike D. Rogers, Ala.  
Trent Franks, Ariz.

### **Democrats (28)**

Ike Skelton, Mo. - *ranking member*  
John M. Spratt Jr., S.C.  
Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas  
Lane Evans, Ill.  
Gene Taylor, Miss.  
Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii  
Martin T. Meehan, Mass.  
Silvestre Reyes, Texas  
Vic Snyder, Ark.  
Jim Turner, Texas  
Adam Smith, Wash.  
Loretta Sanchez, Calif.  
Mike McIntyre, N.C.  
Ciro D. Rodriguez, Texas  
Ellen O. Tauscher, Calif.  
Robert A. Brady, Pa.  
Baron P. Hill, Ind.  
John B. Larson, Conn.  
Susan A. Davis, Calif.  
Jim Langevin, R.I.  
Steve Israel, N.Y.  
Rick Larsen, Wash.  
Jim Cooper, Tenn.  
Jim Marshall, Ga.  
Kendrick B. Meek, Fla.  
Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam  
Tim Ryan, Ohio  
Charles W. Stenholm, Texas

**Republican Staff Director:** Robert S. Rangel

**Democratic Counsel:** Jim Schweiter

## SUBCOMMITTEE ON PROJECTION FORCES

**Jurisdiction:** Navy and Marine Corps programs (except strategic weapons and space programs, special operations and information technology accounts), deep strike bombers and related systems, strategic lift programs and naval reserve equipment.

### Republicans (9)

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Roscoe G. Bartlett, Md. - *chairman*  
Rob Simmons, Conn.  
Jo ~~Ann~~ Davis, Va.  
Ed Schrock, Va.  
James Saxton, N.J.  
John Hostettler, Ind.  
Ken Calvert, Calif.  
Jeb Bradley, N.H.  
John Kline, Minn.

### Democrats (7)

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Gene Taylor, Miss. - *ranking member*  
Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii  
Ellen O. Tauscher, Calif.  
Jim Langevin, R.I.  
Steve Israel, N.Y.  
Jim Marshall, Ga.  
Charles W. Stenholm, Texas

## SUBCOMMITTEE ON TOTAL FORCE

**Jurisdiction:** Military personnel policy, reserve component integration and employment issues, military health care, military education and POW/MIA issues. In addition, the subcommittee will be responsible for Morale, Welfare and Recreation issues and programs.

### Republicans (8)

---

John M. McHugh, N.Y. - *chairman*  
Tom Cole, Okla.  
Candice S. Miller, Mich.  
Phil Gingrey, Ga.  
H. James Saxton, N.J.  
Jim Ryun, Kan.  
Ed Schrock, Va.  
Robin Hayes, N.C.

### Democrats (6)

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Vic Snyder, Ark. - *ranking member*  
Martin T. Meehan, Mass.  
Loretta Sanchez, Calif.  
Ellen O. Tauscher, Calif.  
Jim Cooper, Tenn.  
Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam



## SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

**Jurisdiction:** Military readiness, training, logistics and maintenance issues and programs, all military construction, installations and family housing issues, including the base closure process.

### Republicans (16)

---

Joel Hefley, Colo. - *chairman*  
Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, Calif.  
John Hostettler, Ind.  
Walter B. Jones, N.C.  
Jim Ryun, Kan.  
Robin Hayes, N.C.  
Heather A. Wilson, N.M.  
Ken Calvert, Calif.  
J. Randy Forbes, Va.  
Jeff Miller, Fla.  
Tom Cole, Okla.  
Rob Bishop, Utah  
Candice S. Miller, Mich.  
Mike D. Rogers, Ala.  
Trent Franks, Ariz.  
John M. McHugh, N.Y.

### Democrats (14)

---

Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas - *ranking member*  
Lane Evans, Ill.  
Gene Taylor, Miss.  
Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii  
Silvestre Reyes, Texas  
Vic Snyder, Ark.  
Ciro D. Rodriguez, Texas  
Robert A. Brady, Pa.  
Baron P. Hill, Ind.  
John B. Larson, Conn.  
Susan A. Davis, Calif.  
Rick Larsen, Wash.  
Jim Marshall, Ga.  
Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam

## SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

**Jurisdiction:** All strategic forces (except deep strike systems), space programs, ballistic missile defense and Department of Energy national security programs (except non-proliferation programs).

### Republicans (8)

---

Terry Everett, Ala. - *chairman*  
William M. "Mac" Thornberry, Texas  
Curt Weldon, Pa.  
Heather A. Wilson, N.M.  
Rob Bishop, Utah  
Michael R. Turner, Ohio  
Mike D. Rogers, Ala.  
Trent Franks, Ariz.

### Democrats (6)

---

Silvestre Reyes, Texas - *ranking member*  
John M. Spratt Jr., S.C.  
Loretta Sanchez, Calif.  
Ellen O. Tauscher, Calif.  
Kendrick B. Meek, Fla.  
Tim Ryan, Ohio

## SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES

**Jurisdiction:** All Army and Air Force acquisition programs (except strategic weapons and lift programs, special operations and information technology accounts); all Navy and Marine Corps aviation programs, National Guard and Army and Air Force reserve modernization, and ammunition programs.

### Republicans (16)

---

Curt Weldon, Pa. - *chairman*  
Jim Gibbons, Nev.  
Todd Akin, Mo.  
Jeb Bradley, N.H.  
Michael R. Turner, Ohio  
Phil Gingrey, Ga.  
Terry Everett, Ala.  
Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, Calif.  
Walter B. Jones, N.C.  
Jim Ryun, Kan.  
Rob Simmons, Conn.  
Ed Schrock, Va.  
J. Randy Forbes, Va.  
Joel Hefley, Colo.  
Joe Wilson, S.C.  
Frank A. LoBiondo, N.J.

### Democrats (14)

---

Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii - *ranking member*  
Ike Skelton, Mo.  
John M. Spratt Jr., S.C.  
Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas  
Lane Evans, Ill.  
Jim Turner, Texas  
Adam Smith, Wash.  
Mike McIntyre, N.C.  
Robert A. Brady, Pa.  
John B. Larson, Conn.  
Steve Israel, N.Y.  
Jim Cooper, Tenn.  
Kendrick B. Meek, Fla.  
Charles W. Stenholm, Texas

## SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

**Jurisdiction:** Defense Department counterproliferation and counter terrorism programs and initiatives; Special Operations Forces, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, information technology policy and programs, force protection policy and oversight, and related intelligence support.

### Republicans (12)

---

H. James Saxton, N.J. - *chairman*  
Joe Wilson, S.C.  
Frank A. LoBiondo, N.J.  
John Kline, Minn.  
Jeff Miller, Fla.  
Roscoe G. Bartlett, Md.  
William M. "Mac" Thornberry, Texas  
Jim Gibbons, Nev.  
Robin Hayes, N.C.  
Jo Ann Davis, Va.  
Todd Akin, Mo.  
Joel Hefley, Colo.

### Democrats (10)

---

Martin T. Meehan, Mass. - *ranking member*  
Jim Turner, Texas  
Adam Smith, Wash.  
Mike McIntyre, N.C.  
Ciro D. Rodriguez, Texas  
Baron P. Hill, Ind.  
Susan A. Davis, Calif.  
Jim Langevin, R.I.  
Rick Larsen, Wash.  
Jim Cooper, Tenn.

September 27, 2004

TO: Matt Latimer  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: P.M. Blair Statement

*UK*

Here are some interesting words by Tony Blair that are worth keeping -- he says it well.

Thanks.

Attach. 7/15/04 Statement on Butler Report

DHR:ss  
092704-11

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*27 Sep 04*



10 DOWNING STREET

Print this page

## Statement on Butler Report

Prime Minister Tony Blair has given his response to the Butler Review in the House of Commons.

- **Download the Butler Report on the Directgov website**

Read the Prime Minister's statement in full below.

[check against delivery]

Lord Butler's Report is comprehensive, thorough; and I thank the members of his Committee and their staff for all their hard work in compiling it. We accept fully the Report's conclusions.

The Report provides an invaluable analysis of the general threat in respect of WMD; of the potential acquisition of WMD by terrorists; and though it devotes much of its analysis to Iraq, it also goes into detail on the WMD threat posed by Iran, Libya, North Korea and A Q Khan. Some of the intelligence disclosed is made available for the first time and gives some insight into the reasons for the judgements I and other Ministers have been making. I hope the House will understand if I deal with it in some detail.

The hallmark of the Report is its balanced judgements.

The Report specifically supports the conclusions of Lord Hutton's inquiry about the good faith of the intelligence services and the Government in compiling the September 2002 dossier.

But it also makes specific findings that the dossier and the intelligence behind it should have been better presented, had more caveats attached to it, and been better validated.

It reports doubts which have recently arisen on the 45 minute intelligence and says in any event it should have been included in the dossier in different terms; but it expressly supports the intelligence on Iraq's attempts to procure uranium from Niger in respect of Iraq's nuclear ambitions.

The Report finds that there is little - if any - significant evidence of stockpiles of readily deployable weapons.

But it also concludes that Saddam Hussein did indeed have:

- a. "the strategic intention of resuming the pursuit of prohibited weapons programmes, including if possible its nuclear weapons programme, when United Nations inspection regimes were relaxed and sanctions were eroded or lifted.
- b. In support of that goal, was carrying out illicit research and development, and procurement, activities, to seek to sustain its indigenous capabilities.
- c. Was developing ballistic missiles with a range longer than permitted under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions;"

Throughout the last 18 months, throughout the rage and ferment of the debate over Iraq, there have been two questions.

One is an issue of good faith, of integrity.

This is now the fourth exhaustive inquiry that has dealt with this issue. This report, like the Hutton inquiry, like the report of the ISC before it and of the FAC before that, has found the same thing.

11-L-0559/OSD/28430

BLAIR:

No-one lied. No-one made up the intelligence. No-one inserted things into the dossier against the advice of the intelligence services.

Everyone genuinely tried to do their best in good faith for the country in circumstances of acute difficulty. That issue of good faith should now be at an end.

But there is another issue. We expected, I expected to find actual usable, chemical or biological weapons shortly after we entered Iraq. We even made significant contingency plans in respect of their use against our troops. UN Resolution 1441 in November 2002 was passed unanimously by the whole Security Council, including Syria, on the basis Iraq was a WMD threat. Lord Butler says in his report:

"We believe that it would be a rash person who asserted at this stage that evidence of Iraqi possession of stocks of biological or chemical agents, or even of banned missiles, does not exist or will never be found."

But I have to accept: as the months have passed, it seems increasingly clear that at the time of invasion Saddam did not have stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons ready to deploy.

The second issue is therefore this: even if we acted in perfectly good faith, is it now the case that in the absence of stockpiles of weapons ready to deploy, the threat was misconceived and therefore the war was unjustified?

I have searched my conscience, not in a spirit of obstinacy; but in genuine reconsideration in the light of what we now know, in answer to that question. And my answer would be: that the evidence of Saddam's WMD was indeed less certain, less well-founded than was stated at the time. But I cannot go from there to the opposite extreme. On any basis he retained complete strategic intent on WMD and significant capability; the only reason he ever let the inspectors back into Iraq was that he had 180,000 US and British troops on his doorstep; he had no intention of ever co-operating fully with the inspectors; and he was going to start up again the moment the troops and the inspectors departed; or the sanctions eroded. And I say further: that had we backed down in respect of Saddam, we would never have taken the stand we needed to take on WMD, never have got the progress for example on Libya, that we achieved; and we would have left Saddam in charge of Iraq, with every malign intent and capability still in place and every dictator with the same intent everywhere immeasurably emboldened.

As I shall say later: for any mistakes, made, as the Report finds, in good faith I of course take full responsibility, but I cannot honestly say I believe getting rid of Saddam was a mistake at all. Iraq, the region, the wider world is a better and safer place without Saddam.

The Report begins by an assessment of intelligence and its use in respect of countries other than Iraq. It points out that in respect of Libya, the intelligence has largely turned out to be accurate especially in respect of its nuclear weapons programmes; and those are now being dismantled. In respect of Iran, the Report says Iran is now engaged with the IAEA, though there remain 'clearly outstanding issues about Iran's activities'.

About North Korea, the Report concludes that it 'is now thought to be developing missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons as far away as continental US and Europe'.

The Report goes on at para 99: 'North Korea is a particular cause for concern because of its willingness to sell ballistic missiles to anyone prepared to pay in hard currency'.

The Report also discloses the extent of the network of A Q Khan, the Pakistani former nuclear scientist. This network is now shut down largely through US and UK intelligence work, through Pakistani cooperation and through the dialogue with Libya.

The Report then reveals for the first time the development of the intelligence in respect of the new global terrorism we face. In the early years, for example, in the JIC assessment of October 1994, the view was that the likelihood of terrorists acquiring or using chemical, biological or nuclear weapons was, whilst theoretically possible, highly unlikely.

However, as the name and activities of Usama Bin Laden became better known, the JIC started to change its earlier assessment. In November 1998, it said:

[UBL] has a long-standing interest in the potential terrorist use of CBR materials, and recent intelligence

11-L-0559/OSD/28431

suggest his ideas about using toxic materials are maturing and being developed in more detail. ... There is also secret reporting that he may have obtained some CB material - and that he is interested in nuclear materials.

And in June 1999:

Most of UBL's planned attacks would use conventional terrorist weapons. But he continues to seek chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material and to develop a capability for its terrorist use.

By mid-July 1999 this view hardened still further:

There have been important developments in [Islamist extremist] terrorism. It has become clear that Usama Bin Laden has been seeking CBRN materials ... . The significance of his possession of CB materials is that, in contrast to other terrorists interested in CB, he wishes to target US, British and other interests worldwide.

A series of further assessments to the same effect issued in January 2000, again in August 2000, and in January 2001.

To anyone who wants to know why I have become increasingly focused on the link between terrorism and WMD, I recommend reading this part of the Report and the intelligence assessments received.

It was against this background of what one witness to Lord Butler called the 'creeping tide of proliferation' that the events of September 11th 2001 should be considered. As the Report says, following September 11th, the calculus of the threat changed:

I said in this House on the 14th September 2001:

"We know, that the terrorists would, if they could, go further and use chemical or biological or even nuclear weapons of mass destruction. We have been warned by the events of 11 September. We should act on the warning."

I took the view then and stand by it now that no Prime Minister faced with this evidence could responsibly afford to ignore it. After September 11th, it was time to take an active as opposed to reactive position on the whole question of WMD. We had to close down the capability of the rogue states - usually highly repressive and unstable - to develop such weapons; and the commercial networks such as those of A Q Khan helping them.

Again my clear view was that the country where we had to take a stand was Iraq. Why?

Iraq was the one country to have used WMD recently. It had developed WMD capability and concealed it. Action by UN inspectors and the IAEA had by the mid to late 1990s reduced this threat significantly; but as the Butler Report shows at paras 180-182, by the time the inspectors were effectively blocked in Iraq (at the end of 1998) the JIC assessments were that some CW stocks remained hidden and that Iraq remained capable of a break-out chemical weapons capability within months; a biological weapons capability, also with probable stockpiles; and could have had ballistic missiles capability in breach of UN Resolutions within a year.

This was the reason for military action, taken without a UN Resolution, in December 1998.

Subsequent to that, the Report shows that we continued to receive the JIC assessments on Iraq's WMD capability. For example, in respect of chemical and biological weapons it said in April 2000:

Our picture is limited.

It is likely that Iraq is continuing to develop its offensive chemical warfare (CW) and biological warfare (BW) capabilities.

In May 2001, the JIC assessed, in respect of nuclear weapons:

Our knowledge of developments in Iraq's WMD and ballistic missile programmes since Desert Fox air operations in December 1998 is patchy. But intelligence gives grounds for concern and suggests that Iraq is becoming bolder in conducting activities prohibited by UNSCR 687.

There is evidence of increased activity at Iraq's only remaining nuclear facility and a growing number of

11-L-0559/OSD/28432

reports on possible nuclear related procurement.

In February 2002, the JIC said:

Iraq ... if it has not already done so, could produce significant quantities of BW agent within days. ...

The Report specifically endorses the March 2002 advice to Ministers which states that though containment had been partially successful and intelligence was patchy, Iraq continues to develop WMD:

Iraq has up to 20 650km range missiles left over from the Gulf War. These are capable of hitting Israel and the Gulf states. Design work for other ballistic missiles over the UN limit of 150km continues. Iraq continues with its BW and CW programmes and, if it has not already done so, could produce significant quantities of BW agents within days and CW agent within weeks of a decision to do so. We believe it could deliver CBW by a variety of means, including in ballistic missile warheads. There are also some indications of a continuing nuclear programme.

The point I would make is simply this. The dossier of September 2002 did not reach any startling or radical conclusion. It said, in effect, what had been said for several years based not just on intelligence but on frequent UN and international reports. It was the same conclusion that led us to military action in 1998; to maintain sanctions; to demand the return of UN inspectors.

We published the dossier in response to the enormous Parliamentary and press clamour. It was not, as has been described, the case for war. But it was the case for enforcing the UN will.

In retrospect it has achieved a fame it never achieved at the time. As the Report states at para 310:

It is fair to say at the outset that the dossier attracted more attention after the war than it had done before it. When first published, it was regarded as cautious, and even dull. Some of the attention that it eventually received was the product of controversy over the Government's further dossier of February 2003. Some of it arose over subsequent allegations that the intelligence in the September dossier had knowingly been embellished, and hence over the good faith of the Government. Lord Hutton dismissed those allegations. We should record that we, too, have seen no evidence that would support any such allegations.

The Report at para 333 states that in general the statements in the dossier reflected fairly the judgements of past JIC assessments.

The Report, however, goes on to say that with hindsight making public that the authorship of the dossier was by the JIC was a mistake. It meant that more weight was put on the intelligence than it could bear; and put the JIC and its Chairman in a difficult position.

It recommends in future a clear delineation between Government and JIC, perhaps by issuing two separate documents. I think this is wise, though I doubt it would have made much difference to the reception of the intelligence at the time.

The Report also enlarges on the criticisms of the ISC in respect of the greater use of caveats about intelligence both in the dossier and in my foreword and we accept that entirely.

The Report also states that significant parts of the intelligence have now been found by SIS to be in doubt.

The Chief of SIS, Sir Richard Dearlove has told me that SIS accepts all the conclusions and recommendations of Lord Butler's report which concern the Service. SIS will fully address the recommendations which Lord Butler has made about their procedures and about the need for the Service properly to resource them. The Service has played, and will continue to play, a vital role in countering worldwide the tide of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, its successes are evident in Lord Butler's report.

I accept the Report's conclusions in full. Any mistakes made should not be laid at the door of our intelligence and security community. They do a tremendous job for our country.

I accept full personal responsibility for the way the issue was presented and therefore for any errors made.

11-L-0559/OSD/28433

As the Report indicates, there is no doubt that at the time it was genuinely believed by everyone that Saddam had both strategic intent in respect of WMD and actual weapons.

I make this further point. On the sparse, generalised and highly fragmented intelligence about Al Qaida prior to September 11th, it is now widely said policy-makers should have foreseen the attacks that materialised on September 11th 2001 in New York . I only ask: had we ignored the specific intelligence about the threat from Iraq, backed up by a long history of international confrontation over it, and that threat later materialised, how would we have been judged?

I know some will disagree with this. There are those who were opposed to the war, remain so now and will forever be in that position.

I only hope that now, after two detailed Parliamentary Committee reports, a judicial inquiry more exhaustive than any has ever been in examining an allegation of impropriety against Government and now this voluminous report, people will not disrespect the other's point of view but will accept that those that agree and those that disagree with the war in Iraq, hold their views not because they are war-mongers on the one hand or closet supporters of Saddam on the other, but because of a genuine difference of judgement as to the right thing to have done.

There was no conspiracy. There was no impropriety.

The essential judgement and truth, as usual, does not lie in extremes.

We all acknowledge Saddam was evil and his regime depraved. Whether or not actual stockpiles of weapons are found, there wasn't and isn't any doubt Saddam used WMD and retained every strategic intent to carry on developing them. The judgement is this: would it have been better or more practical to have contained him through continuing sanctions and weapons inspections; or was this inevitably going to be at some point a policy that failed? And was removing Saddam a diversion from pursuing the global terrorist threat; or part of it?

I can honestly say I have never had to make a harder judgement. But in the end, my judgement was that after September 11th, we could no longer run the risk; that instead of waiting for the potential threat of terrorism and WMD to come together, we had to get out and get after it. One part was removing the training ground of Al Qaida in Afghanistan. The other was taking a stand on WMD; and the place to take that stand was Iraq, whose regime was the only one ever to have used WMD and was subject to 12 years of UN Resolutions and weapons inspections that turned out to be unsatisfactory.

And though in neither case was the nature of the regime the reason for conflict, it was decisive for me in the judgement as to the balance of risk for action or inaction.

Both countries now face an uncertain struggle for the future. But both at least now have a future. The one country in which you will find an overwhelming majority in favour of the removal of Saddam is Iraq.

I am proud of this country and the part it played and especially our magnificent armed forces, in removing two vile dictatorships and giving people oppressed, almost enslaved, the prospect of democracy and liberty.

This Report will not end the arguments about the war. But in its balance and common sense, it should at least help to set them in a more rational light; and for that we should be grateful.



SEP 28 2004

TO: Ken Krieg  
cc: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Tina Jonas  
Steve Cambone  
Ryan Henry  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Paper from Newt Gingrich

381

Attached is a paper from Newt Gingrich on strategic planning for 2004 and beyond. It is interesting and, in thinking about the Quadrennial Defense Review and our upcoming SLRG work, you folks ought to take these thoughts into account.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/13/03 Strategic Planning for 2004 and beyond  
DHR:ss  
092704-28

285444

.....  
Please respond by 10/22/04

from newt 12/13/03

## Strategic Planning for 2004 and beyond

National Security planning should always begin with capabilities rather than intentions.

After more than two years of intense effort there is much we still do not know about our opponents, their resources, their capabilities, and their organizational systems.

We have made a lot of progress from 9/11/01 if measured from where we were.

We have an even longer way to go if measured against the scale of the opposition:

- the still growing Wahhabist-Deobandi movement in Islam,
- the continued spread of terrorism as a system of war,
- the existence of huge ungoverned areas,
- the continued growth of the Gray world of people smuggling, illegal transportation, traditional international crime, narcotics trafficking, and illegal arms dealing,
- the continued efforts of dictatorships to develop capabilities that threaten America and her allies (including North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran),
- the instability of Pakistan with its implications both for Afghanistan and for nuclear weapons proliferation and use,
- the rise of societal warfare in both Iraq and Afghanistan,
- the continuing drift of European popular opinion and a number of European governments away from the US,
- the United Nations Secretariat's reluctance to cooperate with the US
- and the continuing evolution of weapons of mass murder and weapons of mass destruction.

This is a formidable list of challenges and at the historic level of grand national strategy (to use the World War 2 term) it is not clear whether, with all our efforts, we are making progress toward real security or falling further behind the curve of the challenges.

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2004

Given the uncertainties, it is necessary to plan for a September-October 2004 which could be either violent and painful or peaceful and triumphant. We have no way of knowing which will happen although the uncertainties after 27 months effort make it more likely it will be violent and painful.

This means we should be prepared to offer "blood, sweat, toil and tears" (in Churchill's phrase) so that people are prepared to endure and prevail.

This would require a much more sober and serious State of the Union outlining the long term scale of the conflict and the possibility that it will take a decade to two generations to fully achieve our goal of a safe, healthy, prosperous and free worlds in which America is relatively safe and secure.

People need to be prepared for the possibility of much more violence and much more disruption over time.

If we are measured against a goal of winning by Labor Day 2004, we will have a very difficult argument to make and be politically and in the news media on the defensive for the entire year.

If we are measured against determination to prevail and an honest acceptance that this is hard and going to remain hard we will be able to put our critics on defense because their strategic vision is incompatible with modern reality.

Put simply, if the American people have to choose between an embattled Eagle (even one that is occasionally wounded) and an Ostrich they will choose the Eagle.

Daily and weekly events in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere have to be consistently put in this larger, worldwide, and long term struggle against the forces that would destroy our way of life.

#### PLANNING AND BUDGETING FOR WAR OR PEACE?

One of the principles emerging from this grimmer, longer range view is that both planning and budgeting have to evolve to take these challenges into account.

This war will last for at least a decade. Therefore supplemental budgeting is profoundly misleading.

Planning on a campaign by campaign basis is also an inadequate basis for thinking through needed structures and needed funding.

We desperately need planning for the entire war leading to strategies and structures appropriate to winning the larger, longer conflict.

Budgeting should follow the strategies and structures and force priority setting after the initial thinking has been done. In war time budgeting cannot precede the planning and establish the boundaries of thoughtful planning.

Maintaining a peacetime budgeting process sends the signal to everyone at mid level that it is business as usual despite the hawkish speeches by the political leadership.

Even more dangerously, budgeting within a peacetime framework means that the experts never show the political leadership what is really needed because the budget constraints inhibit planning and establish invisible boundaries of what is politically permissible and therefore what career officials will raise.

We are on the edge of budgeting decisions in defense, intelligence, public information capabilities, and societal assistance that will lengthen the war, weaken our ability to win the war, and increase the risks we are running in the out years. These are peace time rather than war time calculations.

#### BUDGETING AND AUDITING IN WARTIME

The same peacetime attitudes in budgeting carry over to a system of red tape, auditing and micromanagement which will make victory in Iraq and elsewhere vastly more difficult.

At the battle of Isandlwana in 1879 the Zulus massacred over 1500 British and auxiliary troops because they ran out of ammunition. They ran out of ammunition because the quartermaster would not open the oak boxes in advance because they were afraid bullets would be wasted or lost and they would be audited and punished.

Wars are best won quickly and decisively. Societal wars require substantially different capabilities than professional military wars but the goal of winning as rapidly as possible persists.

A societal war requires a lot of decentralized decisions including spending decisions. A lot of these spending decisions will inevitably be on non-military activities in a societal campaign.

To the degree an isolated, entrenched bureaucracy can focus on process, paperwork, and audit trails it can destroy the decentralization, flexibility and application of localized judgment that is vital to winning a war.

### MOVING TO A SOCIETAL WARFARE STRATEGY IN IRAQ

Our strategy in Iraq must shift to an Iraqi-centric strategy and a decentralized implementation system.

Today we have an American-centric strategy and the CPA is trying to micromanage and to be 'fiscally prudent.'

These characteristics could lead to a catastrophic decline in support for the Americans during 2004.

Societal wars have a dynamic which is always dangerous for the dominant force.

The burden of safety is on the dominant force.

The burden of prosperity and convenience is on the dominant force.

The burden of psychological acceptance is on the dominant force.

The insurgent simply has to survive to still potentially win and that victory could come with startling speed.

The 'feel good' briefings on 'progress' are symptoms of sincere people who simply do not understand the historic dynamics of societal warfare.

### AFGHANISTAN

The strategy in Afghanistan is essentially right but under resourced.

With adequate resourcing and continuing attention to the cross border sanctuary problem in Pakistan Afghanistan should be able to grow into a success story.

The resourcing issue is important both to offset the damage done by the Taliban and to offset the growing illegal resources available through the increase in heroin production.

The civilizing modernizing forces around Karzai have to have more resources than the warlords can aggregate illegally and have to have enough resources to drown the insurgency in the south.

The strategy In Afghanistan is fine but without more resourcing it could still fail.

## A SOCIETAL WARFARE DOCTRINE

Societal warfare is the natural response of a determined enemy who cannot compete in the professional military arena.

The American military focuses so intently on winning high technology, high tempo theater campaigns that it has failed to develop a modern doctrine for societal wars.

Societal warfare is inherently Integrated (see below) and operates at a different rhythm and pattern than professional military warfare.

Developing and implementing a societal warfare doctrine should be one of the highest priorities for 2004.

## INTEGRATED OPERATIONS

Integrated operations are those activities which reach beyond the military and involve other governmental and non-governmental actors in a systematic manner.

Integrated operations are a much more explicit, coordinated, and accountable system than the current 'interagency process' which is failing to achieve the energy, drive, and decisiveness needed in winning wars.

Creating an Integrated Doctrine and getting it accepted by all the major players and implemented by them would be a major step forward in American capability to win societal wars.

### SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATION VERSUS STABILITY OPERATIONS

The American Goal in many countries is not a 'stability operation'. The American goal is to transform the society.

The President's calls for democracy in the Middle East are calls to transform civil society in every country in the region.

American goals in subSaharan Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, and a host of other places are to bring about profound change so people live in safety, health prosperity, and freedom. We need to develop a doctrine and system for 'societal transformation;' to replace the inadequate model of 'stability operations.'

This requires combining the Societal Warfare Doctrine and the Integrated Doctrine with other needed attributes that will be discovered as our efforts progress in this field.

### URBAN WARFARE/POLICING

One of the most consistent requirements of the future will be a level of sophisticated urban warfare and urban policing that is currently beyond our reach.

Developing this doctrine and capability for urban warfare/policing should be a major goal of DoD in 2004.

### INFORMATION AND PEOPLE TO PEOPLE OPERATIONS

One of our greatest current strategic weaknesses is the inability to communicate our values and concerns to the world at large.

A component of that inability is the absence of the kind of sophisticated people to people relationships which would take

advantage of the extraordinary diversity of American society (51,000 Pashtun speaking Americans even more Iraqi Americas for example).

In the age of the internet, cell phone, videoconference and jet airplane America could do stunningly more to mobilize our capabilities as a people and to communicate with and relate to the world.

America is too powerful to ignore.

If America is not effectively communicating and networking, the world will assume the worst about our goals and intentions.

This is one of the highest value areas which the White House should direct and which should bypass all the current bureaucracies to bring in civilian experts and move to a dynamic, high energy, long term strategy in both information and people to people networking.

## HOMELAND SECURITY

Homeland Security remains an underestimated challenge.

The rise of weapons of mass murder (largely biological) and the continuing spread of weapons of mass destruction (largely nuclear) makes it imperative that the intensity and drive for Homeland Security match that of combat operations overseas.

It is a fact that we would be hit at home at any time.

It is a fact that the weapons could be biological or nuclear and the casualty rates could be two or three orders of magnitude greater than 9/11 or even higher.

That means America could face losing hundreds of thousands or even millions of people in the very near future.

There is no sense of urgency comparable to that threat.

There are two areas in particular that need dramatic upgrading: responding to a nuclear event and responding to a biological event. Each should have its own focus and its own metrics for success.



In addition the Department of Homeland Security should be developing a much more high technology visa and visitation-work card system Secretary Ridge is absolutely on the right track but needs reinforcement to communicate urgency and very high standards of change to the bureaucracies he has now assembled into one agency.

## NUCLEAR REACTION AND RECOVERY IN THE UNITED STATES

Some major decisions need to be made about the scale of a potential nuclear event or series of events and the standards of response and recovery we want to establish. There is a direct correlation between rigorous, grim realism before the event and the opportunity to save lives and accelerate the recovery.

The most likely lead agency in this process is a restructured National Guard and Reserve force that has some forces dedicated to homeland security and some forces available for overseas use.

The Defense Department is clearly trying to avoid this responsibility.

If the President prefers to create new civilian capabilities reporting directly to Homeland Security that would be an acceptable solution.

If the National Guard and Reserve are reshaped to ensure they can meet the crisis of one or more nuclear events that is an acceptable solution.

Everyone should be uncomfortable about the current limited understanding of the amount of engineering, policing and medical resources that would be absorbed in nuclear events here at home.

Lack of clarity in preparation, responsibility and developing the necessary forces will lead to many more American deaths if a nuclear event occurs.

Every day that we fail to clarify this is a day Americans are at risk.

## BIOLOGICAL THREATS

Biological threats are the greatest threats America faces.

An engineered flu could potentially kill tens of millions of Americans. The 1918 flu epidemic killed more people than the First World War.

There must be three major steps toward surviving a biological threat:

1. the health system including veterinarians and retired doctors and nurses must be connected into an information system in an investment modeled on Eisenhower's National Defense Interstate Highway system (but radically smaller in expense). This investment will dramatically help with every day health requirements and will both improve healthcare and lower costs. Far more important, this investment will make it possible to detect a biological attack at the earliest moment, analyze it in the shortest time, educate the nation's health personnel in virtually real time and minimize the loss of American life;
2. There are currently two or three paths toward accelerating vaccine development and production. All should be invested in at the highest rate the research system can absorb the resources. A breakthrough in any of these areas would save a tremendous number of lives if an engineered virus were unleashed in the United States.
3. There is a potential within a decade to develop a nanomaterial approach to vaccine production that would enable the United States to respond literally overnight to an attack by mass producing a vaccine in a manner now impossible. Because of the number of lives potentially at risk this should receive the highest possible funding priority and should be monitored at the highest levels in a manner reminiscent of the Manhattan Project (although with far fewer resources).

October 1, 2004

TO: John Rood  
cc: Mira Ricardel  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Progress in Missile Defense

373.24

We've been seeing a great deal of progress in Missile Defense over the past few months. The policy side of the work is moving along, especially with the working relationship you have established with the new Commander at STRATCOM.

We're clearly on the cusp of doing some important things, and your work has been an important part of that - thanks.

DHR:ss  
093004-5

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

1 OCT 04

12/30

~~FOUO~~

DEC 30 2004

11:07 AM '04

312

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Draft Memo

Condi,

Thanks for sending me the draft memo. Please hold up on it until I get back to you. I want to think through the implications of it, and how I would respond.

Thanks.

DHR:ms  
122904-17 (8)

~~FOUO~~

30 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

November 11, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Runsfeld  
SUBJECT: Letter

Someone may want to write this person Brendan McCluskey at Convent Station a letter. It is nice.

Thanks.

Attach: 10/21/04 Star Ledger (Lincoln, NEW JERSEY?)

DIR: on  
11/11/04-30

.....  
Please respond by 11/26/04

335511

12/1  
Capt Marriott  
Mr Di Rita asked that  
we get this to Carrie  
See for action. Thx.  
George Rhynders

CSC  
Fonsc  
M

11/11/04

20996-04

READER FORUM

Stol... 10/24/02

A losing battle

It's reported that many Sunni Muslims have declared a jihad to rid Iraq of all American armed forces. Among the methods they will use, as we have already seen, are kidnappings, beheadings and bombings. This news couldn't be any sadder for our forces in Iraq.

All along, it seems we've been fighting a losing battle in Iraq. Major portions of the country are not under allied control, there are growing American casualties, there is rampant unemployment, terrorists can strike at will, Iraqis don't believe the United States is aiding their country and this administration is in a quandary as to how to conduct the "peace."

With this in mind, how can President Bush and members of his administration travel around the country proclaiming the situation is rosy? Exactly what source is he reading to make him believe the war in Iraq is proceeding smoothly?

Even now, Republican senators are questioning this president's competence. The choice in this election comes down to which candidate is competent. The way the Iraq war is being handled is a sure sign of the incompetence of this administration.

- Ronald Lieberman, Millburn

Glory days, for some

On Oct. 8, 1,800 parents jammed the gym at Rumson-Fair Haven High School to try to get an explanation of why their school's safety response program was found on a computer CD in Iraq. Parents were assured there was no terrorist intent, but then why the bomb-sniffing dogs, significant increase in police presence and review of years of police records? Since Bruce Springsteen lives in Rumson, I would have paid the \$100 he is charging for his concerts to see him stand in front of parents and tell them there was nothing to worry about, and if only the United States hadn't entered Iraq we would never have found their school's data anyway. Then again, this was a public school and "working class" Bruce would never send his kids there.

Fair? No, but the world isn't fair, otherwise it would allow each of us to have two mansions in neighboring towns with full-time security details. Springsteen can afford to insulate himself from the elements we have to face every day, and then he sings about the plight of the "common man" and charges \$100 a ticket. Glory days for sure, but for whom?

- Ken Robinson, Ocean Township

Bow out with regrets

able off more than it can chew. The United States must act in concert with the international community to the maximum extent to resolve perceived security threats from abroad.

Ferdinand Gajewski, Westfield  
One of my frequent critics

Answer to defeatism

Your editorial "Have we passed the point of no return?" suggests that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld should receive the coveted "You've got to be kidding" award for his "cheerful assertion" when speaking of the upcoming election in Iraq that "Nothing's perfect in life, so you have an election that's not quite perfect. Is it better than not having an election? You bet."

Your award selection might be premature. Here's another "Dixie" quote: "The election is a necessity. We cannot have a free government without elections; and if the rebellion could force us to forgo, or postpone, a national election, it might fairly claim to have already conquered us."



RUMSFELD

This was the reply President Abraham Lincoln made to his aides who urged him to suspend the elections of 1864, this during the Civil War, when there was every expectation that he would lose. If you are going to reopen nominations for the award, I suggest your editorial writer be put in contention.

- Brendan McCuskey, Convent Station

Right to serve

It was my son's choice: He is in the Navy and has just returned from Iraq. He is stationed on the USS George Washington, an aircraft carrier. Leonard Pitts Jr.'s Oct. 11 column ("A measure of success in the draft bill"), Michael Moore's movie and John Edwards' comments — along the lines of "Would you let your kid die in Iraq?" and "What if it was your kid?" — do little to help our servicemen and -women. This is a volunteer military. When my son told me he wanted to join the Navy, I asked him why and he said, "Dad, you did it. Now it's my turn to serve." It's people like my son who make it possible for the Moores of the world to have freedom of speech. Could you imagine what would have happened if Moore's attitude prevailed during the Second World War? It was my son's choice to join, and I am so very proud of him. I pray for him and all other servicemen and -women now in harm's way during this very necessary war on terror.

had the intent that the war would pay for itself with Iraq's oil revenues. President Bush had the intent that it was "mission accomplished" more than a year ago on that aircraft carrier. How well did all those intentions work out?

I feel like we've moved from politics into the world of science fiction. It's like we've strayed into that Tom Cruise movie, "Minority Report," in which the state imprisons people for crimes they haven't committed but is sure they will commit in the future.

- Shelley Mathias, Bloomfield

War powers

I have just reread Article 2 of the Constitution. Would Ben. John Kerry or adviser Richard Holbrooke please refer me to the section that requires the president to consult with our allies before going to war?

- Arthur F. Clarke Jr., Andover

Backwards strategy

Reader Archie Salerno's Sept. 28 suggestion that we had to invade Iraq to keep Saddam Hussein out of the race for nuclear weapons with Iran is the ultimate in backwards, nonsensical, nondiplomatic Republican strategy.

If Iran was and is the more immediate nuclear threat, why didn't we neutralize the nuclear threat in Iran and thereby convince the entire Middle East that we were not going to allow any proliferation in the region? Unfortunately, both Bushes let the Saudis play both sides of the fence and diverted U.S. attention to Iraq. Didn't the Shrub notice that most of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudis?

- William T. Fiduraki, Clark

Salute sacrifice

We cannot begin to explain our disappointment when we opened your Oct. 10 edition to look for coverage of the "Salute the Troops" deployment ceremony that took place the previous day in Trenton. As we turned page after page until we reached the 41st page, we wondered: Does anyone care about the 2,500 men and women embarking on a dangerous mission to Iraq? If the placement of the article is any indication of just how much people care, we are deeply saddened.

Our son, Chris, is one of the citizen soldiers who will risk his life in the name of liberty. He is a captain in the 642nd Aviation Support Battalion, which has joined six other battalions to form the 42nd (Rainbow) Infantry Division. This division is made up entirely of National Guardsmen and -women and will be the first of its kind deployed to Iraq. It repre-

Fran Mathias emailed Phyladane 12/7  
NJ - for lodger

John Jurich

FJ 973 392 1536  
John Jared -> 1771  
vmail 12/8  
electronic.jurich@comcast.com

11-L-0559/OSD/28448 - 164 vmail 12/15  
- talked to someone 12/15

verizon

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

1 Matching Listing

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(b)(6)

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11-L-0559/OSD/28449



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 30 2004

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. McCluskey,

I saw your article in *The Star-Ledger*. It was top notch – thank you! Keep it up.

Sincerely,

335515

30 Dec 04

11 Dec 04

OSD 20996-04



Future

May 17, 2004

*[Handwritten signature]*

Scal down

TO: Steve Cambone

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Future of the ISG

General Dayton raised an interesting issue when we were in Baghdad. He asked what the future is of the ISG.

*TRAP*

When Duelfer leaves and it ends, could it be converted to something else? Is it a model that ought to be patterned for the future? Are there other problems he could turn his attention to? Will it belong to the multi-national force? That needs to be thought through.

Please get with the right group and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051704-17

.....

Please respond by 6/4/04

*Dme*

*17 May 04*

~~January 29, 2004~~  
FEBRUARY 2

326

TO: David Chu  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Statistics on Reserves

I didn't want to take the paper at the breakfast meeting this morning because it is so complicated, and so poorly presented in terms of its utility and usability, that I didn't want to try to plow my way through it.

Could you please take it and re-present it with just the key 6, 8, 10 or 12 points on a single piece of paper with bullet points—not on your letterhead, not with sentences, but just the key things we ought to know.

I would also like you to do the same thing with the rebalancing the forces paper just produced by the DASD for Reserve Affairs, Readiness, Training and Mobilization. There ought to be a way to take one or two pages and just have bullet points, so that it is usable in a hearing or a speech.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012904-12

.....  
Please respond by 2/2/04

2 Feb 04

OSD 21022-05

72

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PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000



POLICY



INFO MEMO

04/017598

DepSecDef  
USD(P) *for Q POLUSIVE*

DEC 14 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *3* DEC 14 2004

SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board Members' Term Expiration Dates

- As you consider the list of Defense Policy Board members, I have attached their term expiration dates for your information (Tab A).

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared by: Ann Hansen, Defense Policy Board, (b)(6)

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11-L-0559/OSD/28453

Policy Info Memo Template

OSD 21034-04

|    | <b>DPB Member</b>          | <b>Board Term Expiration</b> |
|----|----------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1  | Dr. Kenneth Adelman        | May-05                       |
| 2  | Hon Richard Allen          | May-05                       |
| 3  | Dr. Martin Anderson        | July-05                      |
| 4  | Dr. Garv Becker            |                              |
| 5  | Dr. Barry Blechman         | November-05                  |
| 6  | Dr. Harold Brown           | July-05                      |
| 7  | <b>Ms.</b> Victoria Clarke | June-06                      |
| 8  | Dr. Eliot Cohen            | January-06                   |
| 9  | Ms. Devon Cross            | January-06                   |
| 10 | Gen (Ret) Ronald Fogleman  | November-05                  |
| 11 | Honorable Thomas Foley     | January-06                   |
| 12 | Honorable Tillie Fowler    | May-05                       |
| 13 | Honorable Newt Ginarich    | January-06                   |
| 14 | Gen (Ret) Chuck Horner     | November-05                  |
| 15 | Dr. Fred Ikle              | November-05                  |
| 16 | ADM (Ret) David Jeremiah   | November-05                  |
| 17 | GEN (Ret) John M. Keane    | February-06                  |
| 18 | Dr. Henry Kissinger        | November-05                  |
| 19 | Former VP Dan Quavle       | May-05                       |
| 20 | Dr. James Schlesinger      | July-05                      |
| 21 | Dr. Kiron Skinner          | May-05                       |
| 22 | Dr. Hal Sonnenfeldt        | November-05                  |
|    |                            |                              |
| 24 | Mr. Chris Williams         | June-05                      |
| 25 | Honorable Pete Wilson      | May-05                       |
| 26 | Hon R. James Woolsev       | November-05                  |

~~FOUO~~

ES-1644  
04/016678

December 9, 2004

**TO:** Doug Feith  
**FROM:**  
**SUBJECT:** Defense Policy Board

Please send me the complete list of Defense Policy Board members. I want to make some changes.

Thanks.

DHR:m  
120904-33

.....  
Please respond by 12/10/04

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

Great Xmas

November 24, 2004

1415  
11  
24

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Edits to Division of Labor Paper

02050

Please fax your edits to the Division of Labor document to me this week.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Division of Labor Paper

DHR:m  
112404-11

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*See attached.  
I'm not sure what you have in mind  
by separating PA+E from all the stuff  
in the right-hand column.*

*Paul W.*

honor he

OSD 21054-05

11-L-0559/QSD/28456

~~FOUO~~

DIVISION OF LABOR - SECDEF & DEPSECDEF

| SECDEF                        | BOTH                  | DEPSECDEF   |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------|---|
| Iraq / Afghanistan            | Sr Civilian Personnel | Procurement                                       |
| SLRG                          | Sr Military Personnel | Inspector General                                 |
| Contingency                   | Planning              | Budget/Acquisition - Are you sure about this one? |
| POTUS Interaction             | Pentagon Renovation   | Medical Affairs                                   |
| COCOM Interaction             | Global Posture        | Defense Agencies                                  |
| SRO                           | Legislative Affairs   | Reserve Affairs                                   |
| Deployment Orders             | Public Affairs        | Missile Defense                                   |
| Special Operations            | NSC Process           | Defense Business Board                            |
| Intelligence                  | General Counsel       | Defense Science Board                             |
| PA&E ?                        | OMB                   | DACOWITS  |
| Service Secretary Interaction | Outreach Meetings     | AT&L  |
|                               | Defense Policy Board  | Comptroller                                       |
|                               | Homeland Defense      | Military Commissions                              |

DRAFT

September 21, 2003  
7:10 AM

| Order | Secretary                                   | Deputy                  | Both/Split               |
|-------|---|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1     | CJCS/VJCS/<br>Combatant<br>Commanders       | Homeland Defense        | General Counsel          |
| 2     | End Strength                                | AT&L                    | Iraq                     |
| 3     | Contingency Plans                           | Comptroller             | Public Affairs           |
| 4     | SRO   | PA & E                  | Legislative Affairs      |
| 5     | Deployment Orders/<br>Force/Rotation/Morale | Air Force/NRO           | SLRG                     |
| 6     | Army  | Navy / Marines          | Outreach Meetings        |
| 7     | Special Ops/SOLIC                           | Medical Affairs         | Defense Policy<br>Board  |
| 8     | Footprint                                   | NI2                     | Personnel                |
| 9     | Intel - Steve Cambone                       | SROC                    | OMB                      |
| 10    | PC with Doug Feith as<br>+1                 | Military<br>Commissions | Defense Science<br>Board |
| 11    | Defense Business<br>Council                 | Detainees               | Afghanistan              |
| 12    |   | Inspector General       |                          |



**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
The Military Assistant**

08 Jun 2004-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR USD(P)


Subject: MEK

Sir,

The Deputy request that Dr. Luti take him through the briefings that have been provided on the MEK. Please call Stephanie to schedule a time for today.

Thank You.

Very Respectfully



Stephen T. Ganyard  
Colonel, USMC  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense: COB 8 Jun 04

cc: DJS  
VCJCS EA

OSD 21139-05

383,6

8 June 04

8 Jun-04  
Scanned

June 7, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: MEK

Let's get hot on the MEK and figure out what to do. My instinct is to get them passed over to the Iraqis.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060704-1

.....  
*Please respond by* 6/18/04

11-L-0559/OSD/28460



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JAN 2 2004

His Excellency General Thammarak  
Isarangun na Ayutthaya  
Minister of Defence  
Ministry of Defence  
Bangkok, Thailand

293

Dear Minister Thammarak:

I offer my condolences on the deaths of the **Thai** soldiers killed in Karbala. We were saddened by the tragic loss in these recent terrorist attacks.

Please convey my sympathies to the families of the victims.

We are grateful for the continued commitment Thailand is making in the global war on terror and to the reconstruction efforts in **Iraq**.

**With** deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,

25 Jan 04

U21497 /03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JAN 2 2004

The Honorable Nikolay Svinarov  
Minister of Defense  
Ministry of Defense  
Bulgaria 1000 Sofia  
3 Diakon Ignatii St

Dear Minister Svinarov:

I offer my condolences on the deaths of the **Bulgarian** soldiers killed in Karbala. We are saddened by the tragic loss in these recent terrorist attacks.

Please convey my sympathies to the families of those lost. They **are** in our thoughts during **this** difficult **time** and we wish those who were injured a speedy recovery.

We are grateful for the continued commitment **Bulgaria** is making in the global war on terror and to the reconstruction efforts in **Iraq**.

With deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,

U21497 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/28462

His Excellency General Thammarak  
Isarangkun na Ayutthaya  
Minister of Defence  
Ministry of Defence  
Bangkok, Thailand

Dear Minister Thammarak:

I offer my condolences on the deaths of the Thai soldiers killed in Karbala. We were saddened by the tragic loss in these recent terrorist attacks.

Please convey my sympathies to the families of the victims.

With deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,

*We are grateful for the continued commitment Thailand is making in the global war on terror, and to the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.*

army Di RR

*TSA,  
Thai letter  
for final review.  
J.R. Stone*

LEAD DEIR  
1/2

*sem*



EF-7934  
I-03/017528

December 27, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Letter to Bulgarian Mo

*ISA,  
Proposed Bulgaria  
letter.  
v/R Stim*

*JEM  
12/27/03  
1/2*

If we lost some Bulgarians in Iraq, I ought to get a letter off to the Minister of Defense of Bulgaria.

Thanks.

DRR:sh  
122783-10 (to computer)

*SD  
Snowflake*

.....  
Please respond by 12/30/03

**Policy ExecSec's Note**

December 31, 2003

CDR Nosenzo,

- The attached letter was forwarded electronically to Bill Marriott and Monica Generous on 30 Dec 03 in response to this SecDef note.

*C. L. O'Connor*

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC  
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

29-12-03 13:49 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/28464

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Marriott, William P, CAPT. OSD  
**Sent:** Tuesday, December 30, 2003 5:57 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Bulgarian condolence

(b)(6) please turn this into a good condolence letter-per USD(P) for Mr D's approval...thx, m

~~-----Original Message-----~~  
**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, December 30, 2003 5:52 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Bulgarian condolence



The Honorable  
Nikolay Svinarov...

The Honorable Nikolay Svinarov  
Minister of Defense  
Ministry of Defense  
Bulgaria 1000 Sofia  
3 Diakon Ignatii St

**Dear** Minister Svinarov:

I ~~offer~~ my condolences on the deaths of the Bulgarian soldiers killed in Karbala. We are saddened by the tragic loss in these recent terrorist attacks.

Please convey my sympathies to the families of those lost. They are in our thoughts during ~~this~~ difficult time and we wish ~~those~~ who were injured a speedy recovery.

We ~~are~~ grateful for the continued commitment Bulgaria is making in ~~the~~ global war on ~~terror~~ and to the reconstruction efforts in ~~Iraq~~.

With deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,





**CNN.com.**

 **PRINT THIS**

Powered by  **clickability**

## Karbala attacks kill 12, wound dozens

### Bulgarians, Thais suffer first deaths

**BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) -- Insurgents struck three targets in the holy city of Karbala in Iraq on Saturday, killing four Bulgarian soldiers, two Thai army engineers and six civilians, and wounding dozens of troop and civilians, coalition authorities said.**

At least 37 troops, including five U.S. soldiers, were hurt in attacks that targeted a police station, the town's city hall and Karbala University, where the six killed soldiers were living in barracks. More than 100 civilians were injured in the closely coordinated strikes, coalition authorities said.

The Bulgarian and Thai troops, the first from those countries to be killed in the Iraqi war, were part of a Polish-led multinational coalition force patrolling south-central Iraq.

In Sofia, the Bulgarian Defense Ministry reported the four Bulgarian deaths and said several other soldiers were wounded. In Bangkok, a Thai military spokesman told CNN that two army engineers were killed. Thailand has a noncombatant force in Iraq.

In Iraq, a Polish military spokesman said the attackers used four suicide car bombs, machine guns and mortars. The strikes hit two coalition compounds and the provincial governor's office.


Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, deputy chief of operations for U.S. forces, said the insurgency responsible for such attacks appears to be small, loosely coordinated cells throughout the country.

"It takes a very few number of people in the country to create the kind of damage we are seeing," said Kimmitt.

Local police and witnesses said they saw a booby-trapped truck carrying gasoline slamming into a Karbala University building at 12:30 p.m. local time. There were many casualties, the Polish military headquarters in Karbala said.

Police and witnesses said that 15 minutes later, rockets were fired at the provincial governor's office, also referred to as city hall. It was packed with people on what is a regular business day in Iraq. Casualties were numerous, a witness told CNN.

The city south of Baghdad had suffered under Saddam Hussein, who oppressed the Shiite community



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JAN 6 2004

248.7

The Honorable Jim Ramstad  
United States House of Representatives  
Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515-2303

Dear Representative Ramstad:

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter concerning the rest and recuperation leave program for U.S. forces serving in Iraq.

You may know that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19<sup>th</sup> of December.

Mr. Abel is available to brief you or your staff in greater detail if you desire.


With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

A large, bold, handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'C. Abell'.

6 Jan 04

U21538 /03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JAN 6 2004

The Honorable Dennis Moore  
United States House of Representatives  
Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515-1603

Dear Representative Moore:

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter concerning the rest and recuperation leave program for U.S. forces serving in Iraq.

You may know that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19<sup>th</sup> of December.

Mr. Abel is available to brief you or your staff in greater detail if you desire.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. Moore".

U21538 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/28469

December 11, 2003

TO: ~~Jaymie Dunham~~ Larry D. Rite

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
David Chu  
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Expenses for Soldiers to Get Home

At the President's Congressional Ball, one of these two Congressmen handed me the attached "Dear Colleague" letter on soldiers still paying their own way home.

Would you please read it, develop an appropriate answer, tell me if you think we ought to fix the law and then let's get back to them in an appropriate way.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/8/03 Congressional "Dear Colleague" letter signed by Ramstad and Moore  
12/12/03 letter to SecDef

DHR:dh  
121103-16

.....  
Please respond by 1/9, 04

12/15

*12/22*  
*Carrie Live -*  
*Please draft response to just report, but no policy in it say Dr. Chu is available for substitution.*

*xxxx Sec*  
*Please get the wife on this.*  
*D, Rite*

*LARRY D. RITE*  
*12/22*

Larry D. Rite

11-L-0559/OSD/28470

U21545 <sup>12/16</sup> /03

**Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD**

---

**From:** Harrison, Richard A, CPT, OSD  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 18, 2003 1:26 PM  
**To:** Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD  
**Subject:** FW: snowflake: expenses for soldiers to get home

Sir,  
Below is an update on the R&R travel snowflake from SD to Mr. DiRita. I'm still awaiting for a response on the policy memo that Mr. Abell will sign. More information to follow.

v/r  
Rich

Richard A. Harrison  
CPT, USA  
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Executive Secretariat  
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Loo, Bradford G, CIV, OSD-P&R  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 17, 2003 5:09 PM  
**To:** Harrison, Richard A, CPT, OSD  
**cc:** Ellison, Lisa, CIV, OSD-P&R; Mack, Paris COL Army G1; Pendleton, Chris L, CDR, OSD-P&R; Darden-Ogbonnah, Chenetta Dr., CIV, OSD-P&R  
**Subject:** snowflake: expenses for soldiers to get home

cpt harrison, because my office has policy for leave and liberty, lisa ellison passed me the snowflake for action for payment r&r travel.

the short answer is the department of defense, iaw p.l. 108-106, will start paying service members air fare from the aerial port of debarkation (apod) to the airport nearest the service member's leave destination. the policy memorandum will be sent today or tomorrow to mr abell, pducd (p&r) for approval.

the army is executive agent for the centcom r&r leave program and to date, has not set the date for implementation -- but it will be sooner than later.

if you need something more let me know.

brad  
Acting Director, OEPM

(b)(6)

12-8-03

Mr. President -  
If you could make  
this happen, it would  
be a wonderful gift  
to our military  
personnel!!  
More  
More

# Soldiers Are Still Paying their Own Way Home!

December 8, 2003

Dear Colleague:

We are sure you are as concerned as we are to find out that our soldiers are still paying their own way home from Iraq and Afghanistan. This is especially concerning after Congress amended the FY 2004 Iraqi supplemental appropriations bill (P.L. 108-106) to include \$55 million in funding to reimburse soldiers who qualify for rest and recuperation (R&R) leave for their U.S. domestic travel.

According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) our "language is not law, and is permissive and not mandatory in nature." But it does allow the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide assistance for travel-related expenses (such as emergency hotel accommodation for service members or travel to their homes) not otherwise specifically authorized in law.


In a letter regarding R&R domestic travel Rep. Moore received November 4, 2003, from Bradford Loo, Acting Director for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management at DOD, "the unprogrammed additional cost to the Army would be \$16 million." CRS, however, quoted an unnamed defense official as saying the R&R program total cost would be \$1 billion.

We need to make our intentions very clear to the Defense Department that we want our soldiers to be reimbursed for their domestic travel while on R&R. Please join us in sending the attached letter to Secretary Rumsfeld, respectfully requesting that our soldiers be reimbursed.

This is not a Democratic idea or a Republican idea: it is just the right thing to do for the men and women of the Armed Forces who put their lives on the line for our country and our freedom.

Very truly yours,

  
JIM RAMSTAD  
Member of Congress

  
DENNIS MOORE  
Member of Congress

Please join us -  
for our troops!  
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

# *U.S. House of Representatives*

December 12, 2003

THE HONORABLE DONALD H. RUMSFELD  
SECRETARY  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
THE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20350-0001

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are writing today to clarify Congress' intent with regard to funding domestic travel for soldiers returning to the U.S. on rest and recuperation (R&R) leave from Iraq or Afghanistan.

The intent of our recommendations in the FY 2004 Iraqi appropriations supplemental (P.L. 108-106) is to reimburse soldiers who qualify for R&R leave for their domestic travel. This R&R reimbursement should also include those soldiers who have already taken qualified R&R leave. The reimbursement includes air travel, bus, train, ferry, and vehicle rental expenses incurred in getting to and from the port-of-entry (Baltimore, Atlanta, Dallas, Frankfurt, or Los Angeles) to the soldier's choice of home-of-record or current military base of residence (*i.e.*, wherever his or her spouse resides at this time). In addition, personal vehicle mileage may be paid for the distance between an airport, or a train or bus depot, and that home. If travel distance is longer than 50 miles and extends over meal times, reasonable per diem expenses should be reimbursed. If travel is overnight and requires a hotel stay, that should be reimbursed.

Given that all the forms, procedures, and staff are already in place to reimburse soldiers, we see no reason that this policy cannot be made effective immediately, and retroactive to October 1<sup>st</sup>. If the Department of Defense (DOD) wishes to create a procedure for directly buying plane tickets in the future, that is understandable.

We appreciate that the DOD may have concerns about this program due to its significant change in leave policy, but we feel that our troops should not have to bear any more burdens – financial or otherwise – than their extended service to our country already demands. It is our intention that the federal government covers all travel and transportation costs necessary to return military personnel to their homes and families. In a letter received on November 4, 2003, Bradford Loo, Acting Director for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management wrote, “the unprogrammed additional cost to the Army would be \$16 million.” Congress has provided \$55 million to assist soldiers in covering domestic travel expenses. We respectfully request that you to use those funds as we intended.

Thank you for your consideration.

Very truly yours,

cc: General Richard Meyer, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff  
cc: Army Chief of Staff  
cc: Admiral Vernon E. Clark, Chief of Naval Operations  
cc: John P. Jumper, USAF Chief of Staff  
cc: General Michael W. Hagee, Marine Corps Commandant

11-L-0559/OSD/28473



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



DEC 19 2003

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

SUBJECT: Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave Program

References: (a) Congressional Conference Report 108-337, 30 October 2003, "Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2004, and for Other Purposes."

(b) USD (P&R) Memorandum, 29 September 2003, subject: Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave Program for USCENTCOM

As recommended in reference (a), the R&R destination for a military member on active duty (Active and Reserve Components) serving in a contingency location providing support to Operations ENDURING or IRAQI FREEDOM is changed to the Aerial Port of Debarkation and then onward to the airport nearest the member's R&R leave destination. This change will also apply to a civilian authorized R&R leave in accordance with reference (b).

In accordance with reference (b), as Executive Agent, the Army is responsible for managing implementation in coordination with the DoD Comptroller, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), and the Joint Staff.

  
Charles S. Abell  
Principal Deputy



TOTAL P. 82

11-L-0559/OSD/28474





Force Management Policy

THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(Personnel and Readiness)  
4000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000

# Facsimile Cover Sheet

|                           |                        |
|---------------------------|------------------------|
| <b>From:</b> CPT Albright | <b>To:</b> Mr. Lohse   |
| <b>Office:</b> OUSD(P&R)  | <b>Office:</b> ERIC SC |
| <b>Phone:</b> (b)(6)      | <b>Phone:</b> (b)(6)   |
| <b>Fax:</b>               | <b>Fax:</b>            |

Number of Pages with Cover: \_\_\_\_\_

**Comments:**

*As requested. Sorry for the delay.*

1/2  
1/20

CED  
SMOOTH & SOM

MCD: SOM  
~~SMOOTH~~  
FOR REVIEW  
M 1/2  
Purman  
1/5

The Honorable Jim Ramstad  
United States House of Representatives  
Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515-2303

Dear Representative Ramstad:

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter concerning the rest and recuperation leave program for U.S. forces serving in Iraq.

You may know that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19<sup>th</sup> of December.

Mr. Abel is available to brief you or your staff in greater detail of you desire.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dennis Moore  
United States House of Representatives  
Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515-1603

Dear Representative Moore:

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter concerning the rest and recuperation leave program for U.S. forces serving in Iraq.

You may know that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19<sup>th</sup> of December.

Mr. Abell is available to brief you or your staff in greater detail if you desire.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/28477

2 ITRs  
- Ramstad  
- Moore

The Honorable Jim Ramstad  
United States House of Representatives  
Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515-2303

Dear Representative Ramstad,

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter <sup>concerning No rest and recuperation</sup> on P.L. 108-106. <sup>Am program for</sup>  
~~I am happy to report that~~ <sup>You may know that</sup> Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for <sup>of US forces serving</sup>  
Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding <sup>&</sup>  
Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19<sup>th</sup> of  
December.

~~If you would like additional information in the month~~ <sup>to brief you on your staff's</sup>  
~~I appreciate your strong support of our troops.~~ <sup>greater detail if you desire.</sup>

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,



Larry Di Rita  
12/30

Note: ITR from JCS asks this to be  
retroactive to 1 Oct. - it appears  
this did not happen.

The Honorable Dennis Moore  
United States House of Representatives  
Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515-1603

Dear Representative Moore,

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter on P.L. 108-106.

I am happy to report that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19<sup>th</sup> of December.

I appreciate your strong support of our troops.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,



720  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

2004 FEB 17 05:10

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1525-04

17 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*RBMY 2/14*

*322*

SUBJECT: Getting Joint

- **Question.** "Do you feel we are pursuing these 'getting joint' items I mention in the attached memo? We have to figure a way to get joint earlier, to get responsibilities from the Joint Staff down to Joint Forces Command, to develop initiatives and suggestions, and to instruct the Service Secretaries." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** We have made significant progress in each of these areas, and are pursuing meaningful, relevant answers. "Getting joint" is the focus of on-going actions and initiatives in the Service headquarters, selected combatant commands, and the Joint Staff. Specific details concerning on-going actions are contained in the information paper at TAB B.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments

As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director J-3;

(b)(6)

*17 FEB 04*

July 30, 2002 7:05 AM



**SUBJECT: Getting Joint**

**We have to figure out a way to get joint earlier.**

**Some thoughts:**

- 1. Get the joint responsibilities from the Joint Staff down to Joint Forces Command.**
- 2. Instruct the Service Secretaries.**
- 3. The best joint service is with the CINC, rather than the Joint Staff.**
- 4. Ask Cebrowski for initiatives.**
- 5. Ask Buck Kernan to give us a series of suggestions.**

DHR:dh  
073002-1

Tab A

28 January 2004

TAB B

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Getting Joint

1. Purpose. To provide additional information the SecDef's questions concerning "gettingjoint."

2. Key Points

- SecDef memo dated 30 July 2002 articulated a need to "figure out a way to get joint earlier," and articulated several thoughts along those lines.
- Pursuing meaningful, relevant answers to the "gettingjoint" items listed by the SecDef is the focus of related, on-going projects/actions in the Secretariat, Service headquarters, selected combatant commands, and the Joint Staff. They include:
  - US Strategic Command: Unified Command Plan (UCP) assumption of responsibility for Global Strike, C4ISR, integrated missile defense, and DOD Information Operations.
  - US Special Operations Command: When approved, UCP assumption of responsibility as the supported combatant commander for planning selected global war on terrorism missions and for exercising command and control of missions in support of selected campaigns if directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense.
  - US Transportation Command: When approved, UCP assumption of responsibility for global patient movement, redeployment, terminal management and joint distribution process ownership.
  - US Joint Forces Command:
    - Developing a capability to monitor and report to OSD the status of Operational Availability capability packages in support of providing immediate response, focused and conclusive campaign forces to the combatant commanders. This initiative directly supports the CJCS efforts on Global Force Management/Joint Force Manager.

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/28482



- Standing Joint Force Headquarters. To improve combatant command joint warfighting capabilities, USJFCOM is fielding the Standing Joint Force Headquarters prototype to the five regional combatant commands by FY05, to include enabling prototypes for joint command and control that push jointness to operational level and below.
- Developing the Joint Manpower Exchange Program, a Permanent Change of Station exchange of officers and senior enlisted personnel among USJFCOM Service component operational headquarters (e.g., Marine Expeditionary Forces, Army Corps, Navy Fleets and numbered Air Forces), designed to improve joint expertise in training, planning, and operations, as well as provide a “jump start” in response to potential tasking to establish a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters.
- To further improve joint warfighting at the combatant command and lower levels, USJFCOM is undertaking a concerted effort to collect, assess and disseminate joint lessons learned from on-going operations. Once validated, joint lessons learned are utilized to improve concept development, training, integration, and deployment.
- USJFCOM UCP designation as:
  - Lead joint force integrator, including responsibility for:
    - Supporting the development and integration of fully interoperable C4ISR systems and capabilities for joint warfighting.
    - Serving as the DOD executive agent for Joint Concept Development & Experimentation, including development and integration of Joint Operating Concepts and associated Joint Integrating Concepts that improve future joint warfighting and coordinate the joint experimentation efforts of the combatant commands and Services.
    - Serving as the Joint Deployment Process Owner, responsible for maintaining the global capability for rapid and decisive military force power projection, including collaborative efforts to improve joint, multinational and interagency deployment operations. This initiative effectively moves responsibility for joint deployment from the Joint Staff to USJFCOM.
    - The lead agent for joint force training, including combatant command battlestaffs, JTF headquarters, JTF functional component

commands and their staffs, as well as interoperability training of forces that are to operate as part of joint/combined task forces (including interagency and multinational participation in current and future training). In 2004, USJFCOM will establish the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) by linking previously independent Service ranges together in a network that can be used for joint training and experimentation.

- Joint force provider of assigned CONUS-based forces, responsible for deploying trained and ready joint forces in response to supported combatant command requirements.
- CJCS with Joint Chiefs
  - Developing the Global Force Management (GFM) process that integrates apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodologies to better align planning and defense strategy requirements.
    - Working the GFM-related effort to designate an organization as the single Joint Force Manager responsible for executing the GFM process.
  - Developing force allocation processes based on articulating capabilities desired to achieve effects and outcomes rather than requests for troops or platforms. As these processes are developed, they will be codified through development of the *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System* and CJCS Instruction 3170.01C.
  - Developing and implementing changes in how we educate and train the joint force. This includes enhancements to Joint Professional Military Education, to include programs designed to foster an understanding of joint warfighting earlier in a Service member's career as well as programs to increase the number of senior officers skilled in joint operational art and campaign planning through the establishment of a Joint Advanced Warfighting School. Senior general/flag officer courses are also in development. Changes in joint force training include, in conjunction with USJFCOM, establishing the JNTC in FY04.
  - Maintaining a robust Chairman's Exercise Program that directly supports combatant command joint exercises, and promotes joint, interagency, and--where possible--multilateral participation.

- Secretariat
  - OSD(P&R): Developing the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) to establish a capabilities-based, adaptive, near real-time readiness reporting system. DRRS will have an initial operating capability in FY04, and full operating capability in FY07.
- Services
  - Developing modular force design concepts that describe the Service capabilities required to drive modular design at appropriate levels within each Service and develop options for implementation and integration.
- Pursuing answers and developing implementation plans for these multiple, crosscutting initiatives will inevitably create seams and friction points among the multiple stakeholders that are responsible for these actions. The Joint Chiefs are committed to minimizing these points of friction.
- Full implementation of selected long-term solutions to these “getting joint” items may require statutory changes, regulatory changes, or delegation of Secretarial authority.

TAB A

December 27, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Getting Joint

Do you feel we are pursuing these "getting joint" items I mention in the attached memo?

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/30/02 SecDefMFR [073002-1]

DHR:dh  
122703-35 (to computer)

.....  
Please respond by 1/31/04

22\*

~~FOUO~~

December 31, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Donald Rumsfeld*  
SUBJECT: Article by Victor Davis Hanson

*ITM*

Mr. President,

Attached is an article I hesitated to send to you, but when we talked on the phone yesterday, this subject came up. Fortunately, there are thoughtful folks who agree with what we are doing and are willing to put it down on paper with some historical context.

I believe you read some of Victor Davis Hanson's books.

Happy New Year.

Respectfully,

Attach.  
12/23/04 *National Review* article by Victor Davis Hanson

DHR:sp  
123004-15 (ts)


*31 DEC 04*

~~FOUO~~

USD 00001-05

11-L-0559/OSD/28487

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**Victor Davis Hanson**  
NRD Contributor



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December 23, 2004, 8:21 a.m.


## Leave Rumsfeld Be

He is not to blame for our difficulties.

The *Washington Post* recently warned that doctors are urging interested parties of all types to get their flu shots before the "scarce" vaccine is thrown out. But how is such a surfeit possible when our national media scared us to death just a few months ago with the specter of a national flu epidemic, corporate malfeasance, and Bush laxity? That perfect storm of incompetence and skullduggery purportedly combined to leave us vulnerable to mass viral attack. So how can the *Post* now characterize something as "scarce" that is soon to be discarded for a want of takers? Was there too much or too little vaccine?

The answer, of course, is the usual media-inspired flight from reason that overwhelms this country at various times — hype playing on our fears and groupthink to create a sudden story when there really is none. And now with the renewed attack on Donald Rumsfeld we are back to more of the flu-shot hysteria that has been so common in this war. Remember the pseudo-crises of the past four years — the quagmire in week three in Afghanistan or the sandstorm bog-down in Iraq?

Let us not forget either all the Orwellian logic: Clinton's past deleterious military slashes that nevertheless explained the present win in Afghanistan, or his former appeasement of bin Laden that now accounts for the successful doctrine of fighting terror. Or recall the harebrained schemes we should have adopted — the uninvited automatic airlifting of an entire division into the high peaks of Islamic, nuclear Pakistan to cut off the tribal fugitives from Tora Bora? Or have we put out of our memories



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[Dennis: Holiday](#)  
[\(Thanksgiving\)](#)  
12/23 12:57 p.m.

A38-3

the brilliant trial balloons of a Taliban coalition government and the all Islamic post-Taliban occupation forces?

So it is with the latest feeding-frenzy over Donald Rumsfeld. His recent spur-of-the-moment — but historically plausible — remarks to the effect that one goes to war with the army one has rather than the army one wishes for angered even conservatives. The demands for his head are to be laughed off from an unserious Maureen Dowd — ranting on spec about the shadowy neocon triad of Wolfowitz, Feith, and Perle — but taken seriously from a livid Bill Kristol or Trent Lott. Rumsfeld is, of course, a blunt and proud man, and thus can say things off the cuff that in studied retrospect seem strikingly callous rather than forthright. No doubt he has chewed out officers who deserved better. And perhaps his quip to the scripted, not-so-impromptu question was not his best moment. *But his resignation would be a grave mistake for this country at war, for a variety of reasons.*

First, according to reports, the unit in question had 784 of its 804 vehicles up-armored. Humvees are transportation and support assets that traditionally have never been so protected. That the fluid lines in Iraq are different not just from those in World War II or Korea, but even Vietnam, Gulf War I, Mogadishu, and Afghanistan became clear only over months. Yet it also in fact explains why we are seeing 80 to 90 percent of these neo-Jeeps already retrofitted. In an army replete with Bradleys and Abramses, no one could have known before Iraq that Hummers would need to become armored vehicles as well. Nevertheless all of them will be in a fleet of many thousands in less than 18 months. Would that World War II Sherman tanks after three years in the field had enough armor to stop a single *Panzerfaust*. At war's end German teenagers with cheap proto-RPGs were still incinerating Americans in their "Ronson Lighters."

Second, being unprepared in war is, tragically, nothing new. It now seems near criminal that Americans fought in North Africa with medium Stuart tanks, whose 37-millimeter cannons ("pea-shooters" or "squirrel guns") and thin skins ensured the deaths of hundreds of GIs. Climbing into *Devastator* torpedo bombers was tantamount to a death sentence in 1942; when fully armed and flown into a headwind, these airborne relics were lucky to make 100 knots — not quite as bad as sending fabric Brewster *Buffaloes* up against *Zeros*. Yet FDR and George Marshall, both responsible for U.S. military preparedness, had plenty of time to see what Japan and Germany were doing in the late 1930s. Under the present logic of retrospective perfection, both had years to ensure our boys adequate planes and tanks — and thus should have resigned when the death toll of tankers and pilots soared.

Even by 1945 both the Germans and the Russians still had better armor than the Americans. In the first months of Korea, our early

Robbins: You Have to Believe  
12/23 12:33 p.m.

Novak: The Power of Christmas  
12/23 11:43 a.m.

Woodlief: My Christmas Story  
12/23 11:39 a.m.

Kaza: Kaza: A Merry Corporate Christmas 12/23 11:09 a.m.

Levin: RE: Mark R. Levin, A Great But Misguided American 12/23 10:41 a.m.

Derbyshire: 2004 Sing Along 12/23 10:33 a.m.

Q&A: Good Stuff  
12/23 9:57 a.m.

Norman: A Christmas Brawl  
12/23 9:54 a.m.

Loconte: They All Want Him... 12/23 9:51 a.m.

Basham: All Secure at Christmas 12/23 9:45 a.m.

Campbell: What Child Is This?  
12/23 9:42 a.m.

Goldberg: Down With the French!  
12/23 9:38 a.m.

Tanny: The Savings-Rate Myth 12/23 9:30 a.m.

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squadrons of F-80s were no match for superior Mig-15s. Early-model M-16 rifles jammed with tragic frequency in Vietnam. The point is not to excuse the military naiveté and ill-preparedness that unnecessarily take lives, but to accept that the onslaught of war is sometimes unforeseen and its unfolding course persistently unpredictable. Ask the Israelis about the opening days of the Yom Kippur War, when their armor was devastated by hand-held Soviet-made anti-tank guns and their vaunted American-supplied air force almost neutralized by SAMs — laxity on the part of then perhaps the world's best military a mere six years after a previous run-in with Soviet-armed Arab enemies.

Third, the demand for Rumsfeld's scalp is also predicated on supposedly too few troops in the theater. But here too the picture is far more complicated. Vietnam was no more secure with 530,000 American soldiers in 1968 than it was with 24,000 in 1972. How troops are used, rather than their sheer numbers, is the key to the proper force deployment — explaining why Alexander the Great could take a Persian empire of 2 million square miles with an army less than 50,000, while earlier Xerxes with 500,000 on land and sea could not subdue tiny Greece, one-fortieth of Persia's size.

Offensive action, not troop numbers alone, creates deterrence; mere patrolling and garrison duty will always create an insatiable demand for ever more men and an enormously visible American military bureaucracy — and a perennial Iraqi dependency on someone else to protect the nascent democracy. Thus if the argument can be made that Rumsfeld was responsible for either disbanding the Iraqi army or the April stand-down from Fallujah — the latter being the worst American military decision since Mogadishu — then he deserves our blame. But so far, from what we know, the near-fatal decision to pull-back from Fallujah was made from either above Rumsfeld (e.g., the election-eve White House) or below him (Paul Bremer and the Iraqi provisional government).

In truth, the real troop problem transcends Iraq. Our shortages are caused by a military that was slashed after the Cold War and still hasn't properly recouped to meet the global demands of the war against Islamic fascism — resulting in rotation nightmares, National Guard emergencies, and stop-order controversies. The amazing victories in Afghanistan and Iraq not only set up unrealistic expectations about the ease of implementing post-bellum democracy among tribal Islamic societies, but also allowed the public, the Congress, and the president not to mobilize to confront the strategic challenges facing the United States that now pose a more serious threat than did the 1980s Soviet Union.

We are left with an unhinged nuclear dictatorship in North Korea





threatening an increasingly appeasing and pacifistic South. Taiwan could be swallowed up in days or destroyed in hours by a bullying, resource-hungry China staking out a new co-prosperity sphere in the Pacific, one every bit as ambitious as imperial Japan's. Iran's nukes will soon be able to hit a triangulating Europe, and Islamists seek our destruction at home while we implement liberal governments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

All this peril came on us suddenly and without warning — at a time of recession and following the vast arms cuts of the 1990s, a trillion in lost commerce and outright damage from 9/11, oil spikes, huge trade deficits, increased entitlements, and tax cuts. If Mr. Rumsfeld is responsible for all that, perhaps then we can ask him to step aside as culpable for our present absence of enough soldiers in the U.S. military.

In reality, he has carefully allotted troops in Iraq because he has few to spare elsewhere — and all for reasons beyond his control. If Senator Lott or kindred pundits first show us exactly where the money is to come from to enlarge the military (tax hikes, cuts in new Medicare entitlements, or budgetary freezes?), and, second, that Mr. Rumsfeld opposes expanding our defense budget — "No, President Bush, I don't need any more money, since the Clinton formula was about right for our present responsibilities" — then he should be held responsible. So far that has not happened.

Fourth, we hear of purportedly misplaced allocations of resources. Thus inadequate Humvees are now the focus of our slurs — our boys die while we are wasting money on pie-in-the-sky ABMs. But next month the writs may be about our current obsession with tactical minutiae — if Iran shoots off a test missile with a simultaneous announcement of nuclear acquisition. So then expect, "Why did Rumsfeld rush to spend billions on Humvee armor, when millions of Americans were left vulnerable to Iran's nukes without a viable ABM system come to full completion?"

Fifth, have we forgotten what Mr. Rumsfeld did right? Not just plenty, but plenty of things that almost anyone else would *not* have done. Does anyone think the now-defunct Crusader artillery platform would have saved lives in Iraq or helped to lower our profile in the streets of Baghdad? How did it happen that our forces in Iraq are the first army in our history to wear practicable body armor? And why are over 95 percent of our wounded suddenly surviving — at miraculous rates that far exceeded even those in the first Gulf War? If the secretary of Defense is to be blamed for renegade roguery at Abu Ghraib or delays in up-arming Humvees, is he to be praised for the system of getting a mangled Marine to Walter Reed in 36 hours?

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And who pushed to re-deploy thousands of troops out of Europe, and to re-station others in Korea? Or were we to keep ossified bases in perpetuity in the logic of the Cold War while triangulating allies grew ever-more appeasing to our enemies and more gnarly to us, their complacent protectors?

The blame with this war falls not with Donald Rumsfeld. We are more often the problem — our mercurial mood swings and demands for instant perfection devoid of historical perspective about the tragic nature of god-awful war. Our military has waged two brilliant campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. There has been an even more inspired postwar success in Afghanistan where elections were held in a country deemed a hopeless Dark-Age relic. A thousand brave Americans gave their lives in combat to ensure that the most wicked nation in the Middle East might soon be the best, and the odds are that those remarkable dead, not the columnists in New York, will be proven right — no thanks to post-facto harping from thousands of American academics and insiders in chorus with that continent of appeasement Europe.

Out of the ashes of September 11, a workable war exegesis emerged because of students of war like Don Rumsfeld: Terrorists do not operate alone, but only through the aid of rogue states; Islamicists hate us for who we are, not the alleged grievances outlined in successive and always-metamorphosing loony fatwas; the temper of bin Laden's infomercials hinges only on how bad he is doing; and multilateralism is not necessarily moral, but often an amoral excuse either to do nothing or to do bad — ask the U.N. that watched Rwanda and the Balkans die or the dozens of profiteering nations who in concert robbed Iraq and enriched Saddam.

Donald Rumsfeld is no Les Aspin or William Cohen, but a rare sort of secretary of the caliber of George Marshall. I wish he were more media-savvy and could ape Bill Clinton's lip-biting and furrowed brow. He should, but, alas, cannot. Nevertheless, we will regret it immediately if we drive this proud and honest-speaking visionary out of office, even as his hard work and insight are bringing us ever closer to victory.

— *Victor Davis Hanson is a military historian and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. His website is [victorhanson.com](http://victorhanson.com).*

• • •

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December 31, 2004

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Possibilities for the Team

*Italy*

I got a call from Antonio Martino, the MOD of Italy. He said he's got a retired three star who has been in Iraq, speaks perfect English, who is excellent, and he'd like to put him on the team. He also has a brigadier general who does not speak English, but is very good. He is Carabinieri and he's very good on the mafia aspect of it, and he thought maybe he should send both of them. Why don't you talk to Gary Luck and see what they think?

I  
DHR:ms  
123104-9 (m)

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*31 Dec 04*

OSD 00002-05

11-L-0559/OSD/28493

~~FOUO~~

DEC 21 2004  
I-04/017321  
ES-1771

TO: Ken Krieg  
Ryan Henry

**FROM:**

**SUBJECT:** Ed Giambastiani's Views on the QDR

Have you taken into account Ed Giambastiani's views on the QDR?

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/17/04 ADM Giambastiani memo to SecDef re: QDR Issues

DHR:ss  
122004-41

.....  
Please respond by 12/29/04

~~FOUO~~

22-12-04 08:10 0458

OSD 00017-05

11-L-0559/OSD/28494



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
COMMANDER  
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND  
1502 INTSCHER AVENUE SUITE 200  
NORFOLK, VA 23511-2000

08-12/20

17 December 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Issues

I appreciate the opportunity to provide you my thoughts on key issues for consideration during the upcoming QDR. The following issues are proposed for study in the 2005 QDR to move toward a coherently integrated Department of Defense.

- **Integrate Tactical Aviation Across DOD**
  - DoD should integrate tactical aviation capabilities to eliminate excess capacity.
- **Integrate Ground Forces Across DOD**
  - DoD should assess overall ground requirement (Army, USMC, Special Operations) to deliver the proper military capability.
- **Improve Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) for the Joint Warfighter**
  - Operational commanders require a timely, adaptive, and responsive capability.
  - DoD should deliver a flexible, persistent, and responsive ISR capability that balances space-based, theater-based, and organic assets.
- **Review Special Operations Forces Capabilities and Force Structure**
  - Call out Special Operations Forces force structure separately in the QDR when assessing Service and Joint force capabilities
  - Integrate Special Operations Forces capabilities with conventional forces in joint warfighting concepts, planning, and joint training.
- **Develop Special Access Program Concepts to Inform DOD's Acquisition Strategy**
  - Special access program concepts are not included within Joint Operating Concepts and therefore they are not translated into an acquisition strategy.
- **Implement Goldwater-Nichols Type Reforms for Acquisition**
- **Formalize Joint Processes and Authorities for Oversight and Management of the Acquisition of All Command and Control Systems**

The following subjects, although more narrow in scope, should also be addressed in QDR 2005:

- **Charter Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) at each Combatant Command with adequate manning resources from across the US Government**
  - Implement an operational JIACG at each regional combatant command with Interagency and DoD agency personnel to execute plans in consonance with approved policies.
- **Increase the Level of Effort in Combating Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)**
  - While we have made progress in this area since my last report to the Chairman, we haven't gone far enough.
  - IEDs are the "weapons of precise destruction" that the US and its Allies will face for decades to come. We need a "Manhattan Project"-like program to tackle this threat.

QDR 2005 should focus on a small number of key issues such as those forwarded above.

  
E. P. GIAMBASTIANI  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

~~FOUO~~

ES-1693  
04/016918

December 14, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg  
Ryan Henry

SUBJECT: QDR Items from Paul Wolfowitz

Let's make sure Paul Wolfowitz's QDR items are featured.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/12/04 DSD Memo to SecDef re: QDR Issues

DHR:sa  
121404-11

.....  
Please respond by 12/22/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 00018-05

15-12-04 A10:56 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/28496

~~FOUO~~

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: December 12, 2004

CC: General Myers  
General Pace  
Ryan Henry  
Ken Krieg

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*

SUBJECT: Request for QDR Issues

Don,

The following are my proposed Top 5 QDR issues, in more or less priority order:

1. What capabilities does the Department (and the **USG**) need to have **for** counterinsurgency warfare (as opposed to peacekeeping):
  - Focus particularly on: intelligence issues **and** on building capacity of indigenous security forces (including funding, training and language capabilities).
2. What is the right balance of **risks** between capabilities needed **for** the **Global War on Terrorism** **and** capabilities needed to manage the emerging military competition in East **and South** Asia.
3. **What** capabilities should DoD have for homeland security, particularly to prevent or deal with a catastrophic attack
  - Particular emphasis on **biological terrorism**.
4. Persistent surveillance is taking precision targeting to a new level.
  - **What** capabilities should we have in manned, unmanned and space systems for persistent surveillance;

~~FOUO~~

11-I -0559/OSD/28497

~~FOUO~~

- What changes are needed in organization, decision processes, force capabilities, etc. to properly exploit this development.
5. What is the right balance of investment in tac air relative to other DoD needs.

~~FOUO~~



~~FOUO~~

DEC 28 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
cc: PAUL BUTLER  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld JR.  
SUBJECT: Art Cebrowski

020 FTD

Please draft a note to Art Cebrowski, then return this letter to me and let's talk about it at Roundtable some morning, how we ought to move forward.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/22/04 Letter from A.K. Cebrowski to SecDef

DHR:as  
122704-11

.....  
Please respond by 1/7/04

28 Dec 04

SIR —

Draft letter  
at tab. I'll  
tickle the topic  
for personnel meeting  
~~FOUO~~ + roundtable.

22 Dec 04

V/R [Signature]

Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski, USN (Ret)  
Director, Office of Force Transformation  
Address

OK

Dear Art,

With both regret for your departure and admiration for your accomplishments, I accept your request to be relieved of duties as Director of Force Transformation on 31 January 2005.

You can be justifiably proud of all you have done for the Department and the Nation, and your work to embed the idea of transformation into the Department's efforts will endure – especially your vision of Network-Centric Warfare.

I wish you the very best in the time ahead, and thank you for a job well done.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

QW 12/27

FORCE TRANSFORMATION  
OFFICE

December 22, 2004

020 FTA

Dear Mr. Secretary,

This letter is to request that I be relieved of my duties as Director, Force Transformation as of 31 January, 2005.

Working under your dedicated leadership in pursuing the President's transformation objectives has been rewarding and professionally satisfying. However, I must step aside due to personal commitments and health issues.

The Office of Force Transformation is successful for several important reasons. First, without your personal strong commitment to leadership of transformation the task would be impossible. Second, we report directly to you and the Deputy, and you allow us to work outside the normal course in an organizational arrangement that protects powerful ideas from bureaucratic tyranny. Finally, we have assembled a small, but talented inter-disciplinary team, both uniformed and civilian. And we have built a virtual team of vast dimensions. While there is much to be done, the accomplishments of the office are what we had hoped from the beginning. For example:

- Transformation is now integral to national strategy and DoD corporate strategy.
- Network-Centric Warfare has emerged across the Department as the theory of war for the information-age and well supported by rigorous analysis.
- The culture is changing. Transformational leadership chairs and research projects have been established across the war colleges and service academies

OSD 00054-05

22 DEC 04

11-L-0559/OSD/28501

- Powerful new concepts are in prototype or experimentation, including a new business model for space, Sense and Respond Logistics, controlling engagement timelines in urban combat, high speed distributed capabilities for naval forces, redirected energy for both lethal and non-lethal applications, and many others.

Our latest assessment of the Transformation Roadmaps is encouraging. I will provide you with an overall strategic transformation appraisal soon.

My interest in advancing national security policy and the President's transformation agenda is enduring. I hope to be able to continue to contribute in some capacity.

Sincerely,



A. K. Cebrowski

Director, Force Transformation

cc:  
Deputy Secretary of Defense



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JAN 3 2005

020 FTD

Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski, USN (Ret)  
Director, Office of Force Transformation  
Room 3A287  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Art,

With both regret for your departure and admiration for your accomplishments, I accept your request to be relieved of duties as Director of Force Transformation on January 31, 2005.

3 JAN 05

You can justifiably be proud of all you have done for the Department and the Nation. Your work to embed the idea of transformation into the Department's efforts will endure – especially your vision of Network-Centric Warfare.

I wish you the very best in the time ahead. Thank you for a job well done.

Sincerely,

OSD 00054-05

22 DEC 05

11-L-0559/OSD/28503

January 3, 2005

TO: ~~Vice~~ President Richard B. Cheney  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Report

We have all been concerned about the absence of a fully-coordinated, comprehensive U.S. Government strategic communications effort. And we have all been concerned about the resulting strong opposition to U.S. efforts in the world. Because of those concerns, some ten months ago I invited Dr. Ed Feulner, Mr. Joe Duffey and Mr. Lewis Manilow to dinner. They had been active in the U.S. Information Agency's Advisory Board over the past several decades, prior to its being abolished.

311

Attached is a private report to me they prepared as a result of that discussion. I found it interesting.

Attach.  
11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:dh  
010305-5

3/2/05

OSD 00076-05

1/2/05

*Private Report to the  
Secretary of Defense*

311

Submitted Respectfully by:  
Joseph Duffey  
Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.  
Lewis Manilow

*November 2004*

1 added

## Executive Summary

To win the War on Terror, the United States must capture, **kill**, or deter more terrorists than our extremist allies can win over to their side. Moreover, it is crucial that we convince a significant number of people to be actively on our side. As such, the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital **and** central component of the War on Terror. Dozens of studies offering prescriptions for the deficiencies in America's foreign communication effort have **already** been produced. This paper does not seek to add to this cacophony of voices. **Rather**, we present two substantial **and** vital recommendations, which will allow America to bring to bear the full force of the greatest communications society in the history of the world to **the** challenge of shaping hearts and minds and changing viewpoints in the **War on Terror**.

It is important to note from the start, however, that any attempt at changing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign publics towards the United States is futile unless it enjoys the full support of the President. Just as the President **serves** as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly **view** himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to the citizens of foreign nations beyond foreign government leaders. This role must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and is an integral component of each of the President's decisions.

In order to communicate with foreign publics in a manner that changes attitudes and behavior towards America, the United States government should:

### 1) Establish a Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis

**OBJECTIVE: Listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages.**

It is startling how little the **U.S.** government (USG) currently engages in public opinion polling and how irrelevant much of the research it does **do** is. An effective public diplomacy effort must monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and then inform policymakers of these **changing** sentiments. **By** listening to the opinions of various groups **and** tailoring our message **and** – to an



appropriate degree – our policies to the information they we giving us, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Winning the War on Terrorism will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. To this end, the Administration should establish a private sector institution **similar** to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the USG to advance America's position in the communications aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) will be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It will be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is not being done today, as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages. Crucially, **CFOA** would only provide the research product – coordination of **message** and broad strategic decisions must be made through the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense, and relevant agencies.

## 2) Prepare the Government Bureaucracy to Apply Information

**OBJECTIVE: Provide senior policy makers with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.**

**Because** the USG has so many official messengers, the need to have **all** of them singing off the same sheet **is** especially important. **CFOA** will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and refine the U.S. government's message into the future. The USG must create a mechanism by which it can utilize **this** information effectively.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should **be** created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with providing senior policy makers with immediate input based on **CFOA** data so that they **are aware** of the effect an impending policy action

or statement will **have** on foreign public opinion. Further, a senior interagency group should be created that brings the **NSC** staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs **together** with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc **basis**.

A dialogue between America and the rest of the world must be seen as a **long-term** commitment central to America's vital national interest. The creation of a private institution, **performing** government contract work, charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the USG the **real-time** information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world. Further, bringing public diplomacy to the highest level of NSC deliberation will ensure that we communicate **our** message more effectively in the future.

## Introduction

Shortly after the American Revolution, John Adams **was** asked who supported it and who didn't. He said about a third of the population had supported it; about a third had opposed it; and about a third was waiting to see who won. In **many** ways, this is the situation America is faced with today in the court of world opinion – and of particular importance in the Arab and Muslim World. The scorecard in the **War** on Terror, however, is not simply one of battles or casualties. The simple (in theory) challenge of the War on Terror is to capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist **adversaries** can win over to their side. **As** such, the communications challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a viral and **central** component of the war.

**As** the 9/11 commission bluntly stated, "The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin's version of Islam are impervious to persuasion."<sup>1</sup> To win the War on Terror, America needs a **strong** policy aimed at increasing the ranks of our supporters, decreasing the small percentage of Muslims who are "impervious to persuasion," and impacting those who, while not actively supportive of extremists, have sat on the sidelines **dire** to **resentment** of America. Put bluntly, America needs to embark on a long-term project to improve her **standing** in the public opinion of individuals in other nations around the world.

There have **been** a number of recent studies looking at the problem of public diplomacy. All have acknowledged a problem exists and there is significant agreement that there must be reform of the **U.S. government's** public diplomacy infrastructure.<sup>2</sup> Yet just as the War on Terror has required a rethinking of many aspects of American foreign policy, it similarly justifies a **strategic reevaluation** of our public diplomacy efforts. Changing foreign public opinion is not simply a matter of **allocating more** resources or reshuffling bureaucratic boxes. Rather, the U.S. government needs to consider all **available** tools of public diplomacy – old and new – and how they can be properly targeted at **various** audiences in order to reach them **effectively**.

<sup>1</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 375.

<sup>2</sup> Studies by The Heritage Foundation (including Heritage Backgrounder 1645 as well as a section in the 2005 *Mandate for Leadership*), The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency, along with the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have all come to the same conclusion that there is a need to improve Islamic world perceptions of the United States and that there is inadequate structure to the U.S. public diplomacy effort.

This project must be whole-heartedly embarked upon by the Administration not because it will play well in the American media or because of a philosophical commitment to Wilsonian multilateralism. Rather, it is a challenge that lies at the very core of America's own vital national interest.

### **I. Wow America Is Viewed Abroad**

America's standing in the rest of the world has taken a beating in recent years. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 50% of respondents to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 have a negative view of the United States. This negative view of the U.S., however, is sharply divided based on the respondent's age: only 30% of respondents over 50 had a negative view of the U.S. while 71% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 view America unfavorably.<sup>3</sup> This stark contrast suggests that older Koreans are perhaps more cognizant of the North Korean threat - and, therefore, look more favorably on the security provided by the United States - than the younger generation, and that older Koreans remember the shared sacrifices of the United States and South Korea in the 1950s.

America's standing is also highly negative in the Arab and Muslim World. A Zogby International Poll taken in March 2003 finds only 14% of Egyptians, 11% of Jordanians, 9% of Moroccans, 3% of Saudis, and 11% of citizens of the United Arab Emirates hold a favorable view of the United States.

These numbers are particularly shocking in light of the fact that in that same month Zogby found strong similarities between the citizens of the Arab World and Americans. Arabs, for example, list "Quality of Work," "Family," and "Religion" as the three most important concerns of their personal life; Americans list "Family," "Quality of Work," and "Friends" as their three most important values. "Foreign policy," seen by many as an important cause of the strained view many Arabs hold of the United States, is only the eighth most important concern for Arabs.

In addition to sharing values on a personal level, Americans and Arabs share core political values. 92% of respondents in Turkey, 92% in Lebanon, 53% in Jordan, and 79% in Uzbekistan and Pakistan feel it is important to be able to criticize their

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<sup>3</sup> "International Public Concern About North Korea," *The Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2003.

government. There is also strong support among Arabs for honest elections, a fair judicial system, and freedom of the press.<sup>4</sup> The question these statistics beg is: "Why, given the amount we have in common, is the United States seen in such a negative light in the rest of the world?" While each of us could come up with a number of answers to this question - some of which might even prove accurate - the best way to reverse this troubling trend of anti-Americanism is to comprehensively study the question and formulate policy based on accurate, scientific data. Collecting these data is a crucial first step towards engaging the rest of the world in a public diplomacy dialogue.

## II. If It Isn't Measured, It Won't Be Improved

It is startling how little the U.S. government currently does by way of public opinion polling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government only spends \$5 million annually on this type of analysis.<sup>5</sup> Further, much of the research the U.S. government does fails to address important questions. For example, *The Washington Post* has reported on a draft report prepared by the State Department's inspector general on the effectiveness of Radio Sawa, a key organ of the United States government's Middle East public diplomacy effort:

The draft report said that while Radio Sawa has been promoted as a "heavily researched broadcasting network," the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not on measuring whether Radio Sawa was influencing its audience. Despite the larger audiences, "it is difficult to ascertain Radio Sawa's impact in countering anti-American views and the biased state-run media of the Arab world," the draft report said.<sup>6</sup>

Comprehensive research into how foreign audiences feel about America, specific American policies, and how the United States can best change attitudes and behavior needs to be conducted.<sup>7</sup> Doing so would require a significant increase to the miniscule

<sup>4</sup> Hady Amr, "The Need to Communicate: How To Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World," *The Brookings Institution*, January 2004.

<sup>5</sup> 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Glenn Kessler, "The Role of Radio Sawa in Mideast Questioned," *The Washington Post*, October 13, 2004, page A12. The draft report was leaked to the *Post* "by a source who said he feared that the inspector general's office was buckling under pressure and would water down the conclusions."

<sup>7</sup> U.S. foreign opinion polling and analysis is fragmented and poorly focused. Senior State Department managers moved USIA's Office of Research and Media Reaction out of the public diplomacy hierarchy when the agency was folded into the Department in 1999. Today, it sits in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) where it contributes more to all-source intelligence reports than to strategic communication efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has contracts with Intermedia, a private firm, which conducts surveys of audience share. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) collects and assesses print,

budget public diplomacy research currently receives. This investment is essential to building an effective program.

An effective public diplomacy effort would monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and would inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. Public diplomacy experts have long sought to have public diplomacy present at the "takeoff" as well as the "crash landing" of American policy. Rather, public diplomacy should be seen as a crucial component of the aircraft itself.

At its best, information gathered by public diplomacy researchers would be passed along to policymakers in relevant agencies. As a result, policymakers would be aware of the implications of policy decisions and statements on foreign public opinion and public diplomacy officers would be able to honestly inform foreign publics that their opinions were considered – if not always agreed with – in the formation of American policy.

Clearly, American officials should be making public policy decisions based on America's vital national interest; they should, however, recognize that it is conceivable the benefits of a policy might in fact be outweighed by the negative impact that policy has on foreign public opinion. Informing policymakers of how an issue will "play" in foreign public opinion can help them determine whether a seemingly beneficial policy will unintentionally create more terrorists than it deters, captures, or kills.

Up-to-date information on foreign publics is not only important for policy makers, but also for public diplomacy officers. With a wide variety of tools at their disposal – from visas to speeches, advertisements to interviews, and so forth – information about the people with whom they are communicating can only help public diplomacy officers in applying the correct tools to the correct audience at the right time and in the right proportion. In this way, public diplomacy research allows for a dialogue between America and the rest of the world by seeking feedback from foreign audience. Public diplomacy is not just about getting our message out, but also listening to the sentiments

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radio, TV, and Internet-based publications. Some U.S. Embassies, individual military commands, and the CIA also engage in limited opinion and media research. None of these products are combined and analyzed in ways for policymakers to use. Many are available to restricted user sets. Collection takes precedence over analysis and "issue of the day" polling often trumps media content and trend assessments. See the "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, September 2004, p. 26-27.

of foreigners. By incorporating a serious research component into the overall public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world. It is a dialogue that has been ignored for too long.

### III. A Serious Reevaluation of Public Diplomacy in the War on Terror

The U.S. government might be well-advised to remember the words of MIT professor Norbert Wiener, who said "I never know what I say until I hear the response." This is certainly not the case for the U.S. government, which consistently fails to attempt to research the reasons for anti-Americanism abroad or to use research in formulating a clear communication strategy that engages foreign audiences in a dialogue. As the General Accounting Office found in its 2002 analysis of the State Department's public diplomacy efforts, "State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs."<sup>8</sup> America is the best in the world at market research – it is a crucial part of domestic politics – but we are notably uninformed about audiences abroad. Changing this situation must be an immediate priority of the U.S. government.

In trying to improve America's standing in the eyes of the rest of the world American public diplomacy officers need to understand that public opinion cannot be changed either solely on the basis of reason nor solely on the basis of emotion. Rather, it requires the foundation of reason to persuade people and the associated emotional relevance to motivate their decision-making and behavior. Further, the bottom line of public diplomacy ought to be changing the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics. If the end product of a particular program is only a change in mental state, it is not effective public diplomacy.

Underlying this change in behaviors is an exchange process between the U.S. (including the U.S. government as well as the private sector) and foreign audiences. To be successful, foreign audiences must believe that the ideas advocated by the United States are better than any reasonable alternative – including world views promoted by their governments, other segments of the population they are exposed to, and extremists who can often be quite persuasive. This relationship between the United States and foreign audiences can only be cultivated if the United States pursues a broad strategy that

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<sup>8</sup> U.S. General Accounting Office, "U.S. Public Diplomacy," September 2003, pg. 13



identifies what audiences we are trying to persuade and what tools we have at our disposal to attempt to influence these audiences as well as how and when these tools should be utilized.

In order to convince foreign audiences to support America's vision of freedom and prosperity under the rule of law (or, at the very least, oppose extremist visions of death and destruction), we must begin by identifying the different segments that exist around the world that we are trying to persuade. That is, a one-size-fits-all public diplomacy effort is less likely to be successful than one that recognizes that the arguments that are successful in the Muslim world might be different from the persuasive arguments we should highlight in Asia. Further, we might package our message differently to one religious or ethnic group within a country than we would another group. The same could be true for different age groups - older Koreans who remember the Korean War, for example, will be persuaded by a different message than their younger countrymen who only know of the war from distorted history books accounts.

Crucially, this does not mean America should be delivering contradictory messages to different groups. Not only does delivering false messages or propaganda go against many of the basic principles our country stands for, but also it would be unwise from a practical standpoint, as audiences worldwide would quickly catch on to any contradictions. Rather, America should simply recognize that our message should be delivered differently to different groups.

To spread our message, the U.S. government should employ all available tools of public diplomacy. This would include utilizing the President, the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet officers and senior government officials as well as Americans in the private sector, including teachers, students, journalists, business people, and so forth. These "public diplomacy ambassadors" can speak to foreign audiences using a variety of promotional tools such as advertisements, speeches, interviews, lectures, and educational exchanges. The key is for the U.S. government to invest in the research necessary to effectively pair a message with a messenger and a medium.

The U.S. government should also not be hesitant to use the private sector in doing research into foreign audiences and their reactions to the United States. As an Independent Taskforce sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in 2003:



The "U.S. private sector leads the world in most of the **key** strategic areas required for effective public diplomacy: technology, film and broadcast, marketing research, and communications."<sup>9</sup> Ultimately, effective communication with the rest of the world will require not only the tools of traditional government-run public diplomacy (though these tools will remain vital), but also the resources and expertise of the American **private** sector.

#### IV. Incorporating Research Into the US Government Bureaucracy

A vital part of this new framework for engaging the public opinion aspect of the War on Terror is making sure that American policy makers and advocates **have the most** accurate and up-to-date information about foreign audiences available to them **at all** times. Doing so requires two important actions from the Administration that will **allow** the **U.S.** government to bring the best work of the American public and private sectors to bear in the fight to shape the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics.

##### *The U.S. Government should create an independent foreign public opinion institution*

At the conclusion of World War II, the **Commanding** General of the Army Air Force, Hap Arnold, wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson:

"During this war the Army, Army Air Forces, and the Navy **have** made unprecedented use of scientific and industrial resources. The conclusion is inescapable that we have not yet established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of teamwork among the military, other government agencies, industry, and the universities. Scientific planning **must be years** in advance of the actual research and development work."<sup>10</sup>

Out of this understanding of the importance of technology research and development for success on the battlefield, representatives of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and **private** industry established Project RAND, the precursor of today's RAND Corporation. The Articles of Incorporation bluntly set forth RAND's purpose: "To further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare and security of the United States of **America.**"

<sup>9</sup> Peter G. Peterson, et al., "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East", The Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, pg. 6.

<sup>10</sup> The Rand Corporation. "History and Mission" (<http://www.rand.org/about/history/>)

Similarly, winning the War on Terrorism will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. In order to best utilize those resources it is vital to insure the teamwork of the State Department, Defense Department, other government agencies, universities, and the private sector. To this end, the Administration should push for the creation of a private sector institution similar to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the U.S. government to advance America's position in the ideological aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) would be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It would be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask question, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is simply not done today. There are knowledge gaps with regard to issues of anti-American sentiment and this institution would be tasked with reviewing all existing data plus contracting for any original research needed to fill remaining knowledge gaps."

There are a number of significant advantages to creating this corporation. First, the corporation's independence avoids creating bureaucratic fights over what budget the money for foreign public opinion research comes from, who controls the focus of the research, and so forth. Second, CFOA would provide a useful product for consumption across many areas of government - from the Broadcasting Board of Governors to the National Security Advisor - and keeping it independent would allow its resources to be used by a wide-range of interests. Finally, it would provide a method for coordinating different aspects of government engagement with the rest of the world while still maintaining crucial separation between various entities. That is, given how vital it is that public diplomacy be differentiated from public affairs, public relations, information warfare, and psyops, creating an independent corporation would allow each to continue to work completely in its own sphere while still having access to research when necessary.

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<sup>11</sup> See the testimony of Keith Reinhard, President of Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc., before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations (August 23, 2004) for an excellent analysis of how America's communications expertise can be applied to the communication aspect of the War on Terror

*Create a mechanism for using CFOA*

Because *the* U.S. government has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. Yet, over recent years, public diplomacy coordination has deteriorated.<sup>12</sup> CFOA will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and revise that strategy into the future. The U.S. government **must** create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

A vital first step is to make sure that someone is empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy. The current Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy position is clearly not this empowered individual as he or she lacks authority over both budgets and personnel assignments. It is also vital that this individual have the ability to easily get information to the highest levels of government.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with receiving information from CFOA and disseminating it to policy makers so that they are aware of the effect a policy action will have on foreign public opinion. This coordination does not currently exist. As the 2004 report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy states, "Along with the White House and the Department of State, nearly all government agencies engage in

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<sup>12</sup>The former U.S. Information Agency had a Director and senior staff that coordinated with other government agencies, and a budget to accomplish its mission, even though it declined toward the end of the Cold War. Moreover, a public diplomacy coordinator position was staffed in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. Since President Clinton issued PDD 68 (Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information) April 30, 1999, there has been no Presidential directive on public diplomacy. The NSC terminated it in 2001 pending a review of U.S. public diplomacy policy. Since then, the Department of Defense created and abolished the Office of Strategic Influence. The State Department has had two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy with large gaps in service. In June 2002, the White House created the Office of Global Communications which keeps U.S. officials "on message" but does not direct, coordinate, or evaluate public diplomacy activities. And in September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency activities. It reportedly met twice and has had little impact. A small inter-agency working group was created within the State Department Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy, but lacks a budget, contracting authority, sufficient communications support, and attention from State and other Cabinet agency leaders. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," p. 25, 26.

some public diplomacy efforts. While a few structures link federal officials, coordination often does not extend to embassy practitioners.””

In order to keep all parts of the government bureaucracy moving towards the same goal, a senior interagency group (SIG) should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis. This formal consulting mechanism would encourage closer cooperation among the various parties involved. Acting on the information provided by CFOA, this SIG would allow the relevant Under Secretaries to implement the government's long-term communications strategy.

The NSC staff member would also be responsible for ensuring that all U.S. government messengers are given the information required to effectively communicate with their audiences. Something similar to the daily "Talking Points from the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs" or "The Global Messenger" produced by the White House Office of Global Communications should be disseminated to all U.S. government messengers as well as information that is specific to particular audiences.<sup>14</sup> Thus, a U.S. government public diplomacy officer in the Republic of Korea should be given instructions as to what information the U.S. government communication strategy calls for him or her to communicate to young Koreans, old Koreans, businessman, opinion makers, and so forth. Once again, it is vital that each of these segments only be given accurate information from the U.S. government, but the style and tone of America's message must be fine-tuned for various foreign audience segments. Importantly, this fine-tuning must be based on continuous research.

#### *A Serious Commitment From the President*

Regardless of how well-structured the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus is, however, it will only be effective if changing foreign public opinion is signaled as a

<sup>13</sup> 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 8.

<sup>14</sup> The effectiveness of these talking points would be drastically improved by comprehensive audience research allowing them to explain not only what America wants to say, but how it should be said as well as what questions audience segments around the world are looking for America to answer. Further, it is striking that the State Department does not appear to produce any daily talking points.

national security **priority** by the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly **view** himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to foreign nationals beyond foreign governmental leaders. This commitment must be made not only through public statements and **private** consultation and analysis within the White House, but also in the President's continuing contacts with Department of State officials, including diplomatic **Chiefs** of Mission. It must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and in each of the President's decisions. Foreign public opinion is no less important to American national security than American public opinion is to an election.

### **Conclusion**

While one might be understandably skeptical of a proposal for "further study" of a problem, in the case of altering foreign beliefs and behavior a short pause to hammer out a comprehensive strategy is called for. The temptation of **many** in Washington – including many who have written reports on how to revitalize public diplomacy – is to **try** and rekindle the glory years of the United States Information Agency (USIA) during the Cold War. While USIA-type programs are important – and should be seen as **vital** components of the War on Terrorism – it is far more important for the **U.S.** government to fully understand and conceptualize a long-term communications program with the rest of the world. **America** needs to do more than broadcast our **message** to foreign audiences; we need to **listen** to their complaints and respond to them appropriately.

The framework **laid** out in this **paper** does just that. It starts with an intense stage of information gathering where American government officials – with the help of the private-sector – evaluate all of the information currently **available** and procures whatever other information is needed to accurately and fully understand foreign public opinion at a specific point in time. This baseline is then given to policy **makers**, so prior policy can be reevaluated and future policy evaluated in light of the benefits **America** gains and the cost it may or may not have on foreign public opinion. Further, this information is given to American public diplomacy and public affairs officials – under the guidance of a newly created NSC staff member chairing a **SIG** – who **use** this information to craft an effective, informed, and flexible communications effort for America.



Finally, this dialogue between America and the rest of the world – and the responsive framework established that incorporates government and the private sector – is seen as a long-term commitment. The creation of a private institution charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the U.S. government the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world.

As John Adams famously observed, "The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people." For a small, extremist segment of the world population values like freedom and prosperity are meaningless. Yet the vast majority of people around the globe is more interested in security for themselves and their families than war and destruction. America has a peaceful message and strives to be a force for Freedom and prosperity around the world. Yet we are doing incredible harm to ourselves by not advocating for ourselves effectively. As the 9/11 commission stated: "If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us."<sup>15</sup> Richard Holbrooke put it best, "How can a man in a cave out communicate the world's leading communications society?"<sup>16</sup>

American national security requires that we harness the wealth of resources we have available to communicate with the rest of the world. We must speak and listen to the rest of the world clearly, accurately, and effectively. If we do so, we will prevail.

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<sup>15</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 377.

<sup>16</sup> Richard Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out," *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7

January 2, 2004

381

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

cc: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Counterinsurgency

I read your November 11 memo on elements of successful counterinsurgency.

You are right—it is interesting.

What do you propose?

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/11/03CENTCOM memo to SecDef

DHK:dh  
010204-22

.....  
Please respond by 1/31/04

2 Jan 04

OSD 00108-04

CCCC

November 11, 2003

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FROM GEN ABIZAIID

Mr. Secretary:

Counter-Insurgency

Sir, our doctrine states: "Counterinsurgency—those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency." (Joint Pub 1-02) Clearly we must integrate elements of national power in any effort to defeat an insurgency.

Attached is 'Elements of Successful Counterinsurgency' [Low Intensity Conflict) worthy of your time to digest'

V/R

John

Copy to: CJCS

②  
what page

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## Elements of Successful Counterinsurgency (U)

Counterinsurgency (COIN) practitioners and academic experts on insurgency generally agree on an interrelated set of prerequisites for a successful counterinsurgency strategy:

Separate the insurgent cadre from the rank and file by addressing local grievances that feed the insurgency. Calculated reforms, such as infrastructure and social service enhancements and land reform, that address material grievances are widely viewed as effective in undercutting insurgent appeal and gaining support for the government.

**Strengthen the rule of law. To bolster legitimacy, experts maintain that COIN operations and policies must be legal. Emergency measures should be proportionate to the threat with appropriate legal safeguards established.**

Develop a coordinated, integrated plan based on an accurate assessment of the insurgency's goals, techniques, and strategies. Successful plans blend political, judicial, administrative, diplomatic, and economic policies with appropriate security and military measures and clearly delineate roles and responsibilities.

**Unify COIN management. Although experts differ over the degree of centralization necessary, all prescribe development of an organizational infrastructure capable of coordinating all aspect-civilian and military-of the COIN effort.**

Demonstrate a will to win by devoting adequate resources to the COIN effort, assigning the best and brightest to work on COIN, and exhibiting a willingness on the part of the public and government to sacrifice to support the COIN effort.

**Enhance political legitimacy and develop a peaceful path for political resolution. Accomplishing these goals, according to COIN experts, often requires open and honest elections.**

Ensure civilian oversight and authority over military operations. Experts insist that successful COIN campaigns require that political goals take precedence over military goals if they conflict. An apolitical military, concentrating on the military aspects of the conflict, and healthy political-military relationship are required.

**Control troop behavior and firepower, ill-disciplined troops using indiscriminate firepower drive the population into backing the insurgency. Precise control of firepower and troops to prevent damage and injury to the civilian population will minimize inadvertently feeding the insurgency.**

Employ sound COIN tactics. An insurgency relying on low-level guerrilla tactics is best confronted, according to COIN experts, by employing unconventional strategies and tactics that emphasize small-unit operations, sustained and aggressive patrolling, and rapid-reaction forces.

**Establish an effective intelligence apparatus that targets the insurgent organizational and leadership structure and shares intelligence among the military services and echelons and the police.**

Employ integrated psychological operations that are tailored to domestic, insurgent, and international audiences.

**Field popular militia. Firmly controlled and adequately equipped local defense forces free up regular forces and increase security for local officials and a government presence.**

Eliminate the insurgents' foreign support. Through diplomacy, international information operations, and possibly military action, deny the insurgents foreign sanctuary and material assistance.

ADVANCE COPY



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

ACTION MEMO

12/19/2004 3:04 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Letter to Senator McCain Regarding Changes to Joint Ethics Regulation

- Attached for your signature is a letter to Senator McCain describing the recent changes to the Joint Ethics Regulation to strengthen our programs to prevent violations of conflicts of interest statutes by personnel who are leaving public service for employment by private enterprise.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letter

COORDINATION: Legislative Affairs

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DECISION:            <sup>JAN 5 2005</sup> Approve and sign letter  
           Disapprove

Prepared by Steve Epstein (b)(6)

*Sir,  
I recommend Larry D. Rota have an opportunity to provide his views on the letter.  
WJ Haynes*

*2522*

*19 Dec 04*

OSD 00202-05

*17 Dec 04*





SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable John McCain  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator McCain:

I am writing to apprise you of recent changes the Department of Defense has undertaken to strengthen our programs to prevent violation of conflicts of interest statutes, particularly those dealing with the transition of DoD personnel from public service to private enterprise. *As stated*

On October 25, 2004, the ~~Deputy Secretary of Defense~~ *Department* implemented changes to three sections of DoD Directive 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation. The first change requires all senior DoD personnel (civilian and military) who file the public financial disclosure report (SF 278) to certify annually that they are aware of the disqualification and employment restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207 (which bars certain activities after leaving public service), 18 U.S.C. 208 (which bars Federal personnel from participating in official actions that involve a private enterprise in which that employee is negotiating employment), and 41 U.S.C. 423 (the Procurement Integrity Act.) This certification, which is already in effect, also requires senior DoD officials to attest that they have not violated the above statutes.

The second change modifies the requirements for annual ethics training: adding a new requirement to expand the training on post-Government service employment restrictions included in all annual ethics training, regardless of other topics presented in that training.

The third change mandates that all DoD personnel, when leaving Federal service, receive guidance on post-Government service employment restrictions. Although many DoD commands and other organizations currently provide this guidance as part of their out-processing, this change in the Joint Ethics Regulation will require such guidance.

I am enclosing a copy of the change to our regulation along with a copy of a recent press release discussing these initiatives.

Sincerely,

Encl: As stated



11-L-0559/OSD/28525

## ANNUAL CERTIFICATION

**As a member of the Department of Defense who files a public financial disclosure report (SF 278), DoD 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), requires you to certify each year that you are aware of the restrictions that three statutes place on you during your Federal service when you are negotiating employment and after you leave Federal service. You are also required to certify that you have not violated these statutes.**

**The statutes, with brief definitions of terms, are summarized below. If you have any questions, please contact your ethics counselor.**

### **18 U.S.C. 208: Restrictions On Negotiating Employment:**

Federal employees are prohibited from participating personally and substantially in an official capacity in any particular matter in which, to their knowledge, they, or any person or organization with whom they are negotiating or have any arrangement concerning prospective employment, have a financial interest, if the particular matter will have a direct and predictable effect on that interest.

“Particular Matter” - matters that involve deliberation, decision, or action that is focused on the interests of specific persons or a discrete and identifiable class of persons. These matters may include a contract, claim, application, judicial or other proceeding, request for a ruling or other determination, controversy, investigation, or charge. A “particular matter” could even include legislation or policy-making that is narrowly focused on the interests of a discrete and identifiable group of parties or organizations, *e.g.*, DoD policy affecting only military aircraft manufacturers.

“Personal and Substantial” Participation – To participate “personally” means to participate directly. It also includes the direct and active supervision of the participation of a subordinate. Participation is substantial if it is of significance to the matter, and may occur through decision, approval, recommendation, investigation, or advice. One act, such as approving a critical step, may be substantial, but an entire series of peripheral acts may not be.

“Direct and Predictable Effect” - a close, causal link between **any** action taken on the matter and **any** expected effect of the matter on the potential employer’s financial interest. An effect may be direct even though it does not occur immediately, although effects on the general economy are not direct. There must also be a real, not speculative, possibility that the matter will affect the financial interest, but the size of the gain or loss is not relevant.

“Negotiating” - any discussion or communications with the organization or **an** agent, with the mutual view of reaching an agreement regarding possible employment. It is not limited to just discussing specific terms and conditions of employment in a specific position.

Please note that regulations place similar restrictions when you are seeking employment. Please also note that your disqualification remains in effect until it may be withdrawn or your participation is authorized by appropriate authority.

11-L-0559/OSD/28526

#### **41 U.S.C. 423: Restrictions On Seeking Employment:**

DoD personnel may not participate personally and substantially in a DoD procurement valued at more than \$100,000 when seeking employment with a bidder or offeror. The rules require that personnel file written disqualification statements with the contracting officer, source selection authority, and immediate supervisor. They must identify the procurement, describe the nature and specific dates of participation in the procurement, and identify the bidder or offeror and describe its interest.

DoD personnel must promptly report, in writing, to their supervisors and ethics officials, any employment contact with a bidder or offeror in a DoD procurement valued at more than \$100,000, even when they promptly reject the employment contact.

“Seeking employment” - includes inquiries regarding potential future employment, including negotiations, and responses, other than immediate and clear rejections, to unsolicited communications regarding possible employment. It does not include requesting a job application, but does include a 2-month period after forwarding a resume unless the possibility of employment is rejected prior to that time.

“DoD Procurement Valued at More Than \$100,000” - DoD acquisition, using competitive procedures and appropriated funds, for a contract in excess of the simplified acquisition threshold, currently \$100,000.

“Personal and Substantial Participation” - active and significant involvement in any of the following activities directly related to the procurement:

- drafting, reviewing, or approving the specification or statement of work;
- preparing or developing the solicitation;
- evaluating bids or proposals;
- selecting a source;
- negotiating price or terms and conditions; or
- reviewing and approving the award.

Unless and until you have received written authorization from the Head of the Contracting Authority, you will remain disqualified.

#### **18 U.S.C. 207: Post-Government Service Employment Restrictions:**

##### Senior Officials -

For 1 year after leaving a senior position, they may not make any communications or appearances on behalf of any other person before any officer or employee of the agency or agencies in which they served within 1 year prior to leaving the senior position, with the intent to influence in connection with any matter on which official action is sought by the other person.

For 1 year after leaving a senior position, they may not aid, advise, or represent a foreign government or foreign political party with the intent to influence any officer or employee of any Federal department or agency, or Member of Congress.

"Senior Officials" - flag and general officers, and civilian personnel whose basic rate of pay is at or above 86.5% of the basic rate for Executive Schedule Level II (at or above \$136,757 in 2004).

"Agency" -

For Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed appointees: all of DoD, including the Military Departments and DoD Agencies.

For general and flag officers and all other covered civilian personnel: their component within DoD: the Military Departments, DISA, DIA, DLA, NGA, NRO, DTRA, and NSA. For flag and general officers assigned outside of their Military Department, their agency will include their Military Department in addition to other components in which they served during the last year of service.

Very Senior Official (Secretary of Defense) - additional 1-year ban on communications or appearances before all employees in positions on the Executive Schedule in all agencies of the executive branch.

All Personnel -

Forever after terminating Federal service, they may not make a communication or appearance on behalf of any other person before any officer or employee of any Federal agency or court with the intent to influence in connection with a particular matter in which they personally and substantially participated, which involved a specific party at the time of the participation and representation, and in which the U.S. is a party or has a direct and substantial interest.

"Specific Parties" - identifiable parties other than the Federal Government.

For 2 years after terminating Government service, Government officers and employees may not make a communication or appearance on behalf of any other person before any officer or employee of any Federal agency or court with the intent to influence in connection with a particular matter which they reasonably should have known was actually pending under their official responsibility within 1 year before they left Government service, which involved a specific party at that time, and in which the U.S. is a party or has a direct and substantial interest.

"Official Responsibility" - direct administrative or operating authority to approve, disapprove, or otherwise direct, Government actions. It includes a supervisor at any level having responsibility for the actions of a subordinate employee who actually participates in a matter.

For 1 year after terminating Government service, they may not represent, aid, or advise someone else on the basis of covered information concerning any ongoing trade or treaty negotiation in which they participated personally **and** substantially in their last year of Government service.

“Trade Negotiations” - those undertaken pursuant to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (19 U.S.C. 2902).

“Treaties” - international agreements that require the advice and consent of the Senate.

“Covered Information” - agency records accessible to the employee but exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.

There are exceptions to the restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207.

#### **41 U.S.C. 423 Post-Government Service Employment Restrictions :**

For 1 year after a designated date, covered DoD personnel may not accept compensation from the prime contractor on a DoD contract valued in excess of \$10,000,000.

“Designated Date for Covered Personnel” – Date of selection or award of contract for service by procuring contracting officers, source selection authorities, members of source selection evaluation boards, and chiefs of financial or technical evaluation teams;

Last date of service on the contract for program managers, deputy program managers, and administrative contracting officers;

Date of decision for officials who personally made any of the following decisions:

- 1) to award contracts, subcontracts, or modifications of contracts or subcontracts, or task or delivery orders in excess of \$10,000,000,
- 2) to establish overhead or other rates valued in excess of \$10,000,000,
- 3) to approve issuance of a contract payment in excess of \$10,000,000, or
- 4) to pay or settle a claim in excess of \$10,000,000.

“Valued in Excess of \$10,000,000” -

contract, including all options: value or estimated value at the time of award

indefinite-delivery/indefinite quantity or requirements contract: total estimated value of all orders at the time of award

any multiple award schedule contract: estimate, unless contracting officer documents a lower estimate

Basic Ordering Agreement: value of delivery order, task order or order claims: amount paid or to be paid in settlement

negotiated overhead or other rates: estimated monetary value, when applied to the Government portion of the applicable allocation base.


They may accept compensation from any division or affiliate of the contractor that does not produce the same or similar products or services as the entity responsible for the contract.

“Same or Similar” - a product or service must be “dissimilar enough” from that under the contract to warrant use of the exception.

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**I certify that I am aware of the restrictions set forth above. I further certify that I have not knowingly violated those statutes that apply to Federal personnel while they are in Federal service.**

Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Printed Name

  
Signature

Dec. 10, 2004  
Date

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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Release

On the Web:

<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041220-1882.html>

Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact:

<http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html>

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**IMMEDIATE RELEASE**
**No. 1309-04  
December 20, 2004**

### Post-Government Service Employment Restriction Changes Announced

The Department of Defense recently modified its ethics regulation to ensure DoD personnel, when leaving federal service, do not inadvertently violate federal "revolving door" statutes.

In a memorandum dated Oct 25, 2004, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz directed three changes to the departmental ethics regulation, DoD Directive 5500.7-R.

The first change requires senior personnel, including admirals, generals, and senior civilian officials, to certify annually that they are aware of the requirements of three statutes, and have not violated them. The three statutes bar conflicts of interests by procurement officials, all federal employees when negotiating for employment, and all federal employees after they leave the department.

The second change mandates that information on these post-government employment restrictions be included in the annual ethics training program for DoD personnel. This amplifies the current requirements for annual training.

The third element establishes a requirement that all DoD personnel who are leaving federal service receive guidance on the restrictions that will affect them during and after their transition. Many DoD organizations already provide this information as part of the personnel checkout process and briefings.

According to William J. Haynes II, the general counsel and chief ethics officer of the department, "These changes should further strengthen our program of ethics education to help DoD personnel know and appreciate how our ethics laws apply to them."

The modified regulation is available online at: [http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/defense\\_ethics/](http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/defense_ethics/)

 [Printer-friendly Version](#)
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**11-L-0559/OSD/28531**
[http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr2004\\_1220-1882.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr2004_1220-1882.html)
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INFORMATION FOR PRESS RELEASE ON RECENT CHANGE TO DOD  
REGULATION INVOLVING POST-GOVERNMENT SERVICE EMPLOYMENT  
RESTRICTIONS

POC: Steve Epstein, DoD Standards of Conduct Office, (b)(6)  
[epsteins@dodac.osd.mil](mailto:epsteins@dodac.osd.mil)

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