

EF-4832



April 10, 2003 7:26 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Letter from (b)(6)

Here is a letter I got from (b)(6) who is a dear friend of mine. What is he talking about, the "Project for the New American Century"? What does that mean?

Thanks.

Attach.
 4/9/03 (b)(6) ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
 041003-7

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Please respond by 4/25/03

U13381 /03

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 10 2003

April 9th 2003

Dear Don and Joyce,

(b)(6) gave me the kind message you asked her to transmit to me. I was not sure whether I could distract any of your time by imposing you to read what your old friend might have to say in the present situation, but that message prompted me to do so.

In order that you are clear about my position, let me say that I approved my government's insisting initially that the matter be dealt with in the Security Council. But I thoroughly disapproved of our claiming or better shouting in advance that we would oppose a veto to a resolution that was not even drafted then. Which focussed against us all the criticism and wrath of the American administration and people. I am old enough to have lived through the two World Wars and following almost sixty odd years, so the friendship between our two countries has always been to me one of the paramount dividends paid by more than two hundred years of history with its ups and downs. I am mad at the light heartedness with which French authorities have dilapidated that capital.

This being said, I am ill at ease with the document called "Project for the New American Century". Not that I question the interest of that document. Indeed I think it is a remarkable study of geostrategy and one that makes political and military proposals well designed to materialize United States dominance in the coming decades.

I can well see that the United States has now the trump cards it requires to attain its objectives until China does develop her own elements of strength and influence.

What worries me is that this document presents the political philosophy and ideals of the United States which depart from the image of America as a law abiding and law enforcing power, which it has stood for since President Wilson's days. Incidentally, and in that respect, I hope that weapons of mass destruction will soon be found in Iraq, so that implementing the "Project" will not be taken as the real motive for the United States to launch this war.


It goes without saying I am glad the war in Iraq is soon to be over and will rid the world of a rogue dictator. It is obvious that you yourself played probably the most important role in such a success. Congratulations for a remarkable performance.

Yours as ever to both of you

(b)(6)

PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ABOUT PNAC WHAT'S NEW



Statement of Principles

June 3, 1997

American foreign and defense policy is adrift. Conservatives have criticized the incoherent policies of the Clinton Administration. They have also resisted isolationist impulses from within their own ranks. But conservatives have not confidently advanced a strategic vision of America's role in the world. They have not set forth guiding principles for American foreign policy. They have allowed differences over tactics to obscure potential agreement on strategic objectives. And they have not fought for a defense budget that would maintain American security and advance American interests in the new century.

We aim to change this. We aim to make the case and rally support for American global leadership.

As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world's preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the United States have the vision to build upon the achievements of past decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests?

We are in danger of squandering the opportunity and failing the challenge. We are living off the capital -- both the military investments and the foreign policy achievements -- built up by past administrations. Cuts in foreign affairs and defense spending, inattention to the tools of statecraft, and inconstant leadership are making it increasingly difficult to sustain American influence around the world. And the promise of short-term commercial benefits threatens to override strategic considerations. As a consequence, we are jeopardizing the nation's ability to meet present threats and to deal with potentially greater challenges that lie ahead.

We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan Administration's success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad, and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities.

Of course, the United States must be prudent in how it exercises its power. But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or the costs that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests. The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire. The history of this century should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership.

Our aim is to remind Americans of these lessons and to draw their consequences for today. Here are four consequences:

- we need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future;
- we need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values;
- we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad;
- we need to accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.

Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next.

Elliott Abrams Gary Bauer William J. Bennett Jeb Bush

Dick Cheney Eliot A. Cohen Midge Decter Paula Dobriansky Steve Forbes

Aaron Friedberg Francis Fukuyama Frank Gaffney Fred C. Ikle

Donald Kagan Zalmay Khalilzad I. Lewis Libby Norman Podhoretz

Dan Quayle Peter W. Rodman Stephen P. Rosen Henry S. Rowen

Donald Rumsfeld Vin Weber George Weigel Paul Wolfowitz

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Primary Document

Direct From the Source

Toward a Comprehensive Strategy

By William Kristol & others

Project for the New American Century
1150 17th St NW
Suite 510
Washington, DC 20037

September 20, 2001

The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President,

We write to endorse your admirable commitment to "lead the world to victory" in the war against terrorism. We fully support your call for "a broad and sustained campaign" against the "terrorist organizations and those who harbor and support them." We agree with Secretary of State Powell that the United States must find and punish the perpetrators of the horrific attack of September 11, and we must, as he said, "go after terrorism wherever we find it in the world" and "get it by its branch and root." We agree with the Secretary of State that U.S. policy must aim not only at finding the people responsible for this incident, but must also target those "other groups out there that mean us no good" and "that have conducted attacks previously against U.S. personnel, U.S. interests and our allies."

In order to carry out this "first war of the 21st century" successfully, and in order, as you have said, to do future "generations a favor by coming together and whipping terrorism," we believe the following steps are necessary parts of a comprehensive strategy.

Osama bin Laden

We agree that a key goal, but by no means the only goal, of the current war on terrorism should be to capture or kill Osama bin Laden, and to destroy his network of associates. To this end, we support the necessary military action in Afghanistan and the provision of substantial financial and military assistance to the anti-Taliban forces in that country.

Iraq

We agree with Secretary of State Powell's recent statement that Saddam Hussein "is one of the leading terrorists on the face of the Earth...." It may be that the Iraqi government provided assistance in some form to the recent attack on the United States. But even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism. The United States must therefore provide full military and financial support to the Iraqi opposition. American military force should be used to provide a

"safe zone" in Iraq from which the opposition can operate. And American forces must be prepared to back up our commitment to the Iraqi opposition by all necessary means.

Hezbollah

Hezbollah is one of the leading terrorist organizations in the world. It is suspected of having been involved in the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Africa, and implicated in the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. Hezbollah clearly falls in the category cited by Secretary Powell of groups "that mean us no good" and "that have conducted attacks previously against U.S. personnel, U.S. interests and our allies." Therefore, any war against terrorism must target Hezbollah. We believe the administration should demand that Iran and Syria immediately cease all military, financial, and political support for Hezbollah and its operations. Should Iran and Syria refuse to comply, the administration should consider appropriate measures of retaliation against these known state sponsors of terrorism.

Israel and the Palestinian Authority

Israel has been and remains America's staunchest ally against international terrorism, especially in the Middle East. The United States should fully support our fellow democracy in its fight against terrorism. We should insist that the Palestinian Authority put a stop to terrorism emanating from territories under its control and imprison those planning terrorist attacks against Israel. Until the Palestinian Authority moves against terror, the United States should provide it no further assistance.

U.S. Defense Budget

A serious and victorious war on terrorism will require a large increase in defense spending. Fighting this war may well require the United States to engage a well-armed foe, and will also require that we remain capable of defending our interests elsewhere in the world. We urge that there be no hesitation in requesting whatever funds for defense are needed to allow us to win this war.

There is, of course, much more that will have to be done. Diplomatic efforts will be required to enlist other nations' aid in this war on terrorism. Economic and financial tools at our disposal will have to be used. There are other actions of a military nature that may well be needed. However, in our judgement the steps outlined above constitute the minimum necessary if this war is to be fought effectively and brought to a successful conclusion. Our purpose in writing is to assure you of our support as you do what must be done to lead the nation to victory in this fight.

Sincerely,
William Kristol
Gary Bauer
Jeffrey Bell
William J. Bennett
Jeffrey Bergner
Eliot Cohen
Seth Cropsey
Midge Decter
Thomas Donnelly
Aaron Friedberg
Hillel Fradkin
Francis Fukuyama
Frank Gaffney
Jeffrey Gedmin
Reuel Marc Gerechtt
Charles Hill

Bruce P. Jackson
Eli S. Jacobs
Michael Joyce
Donald Kagan
Robert Kagan
Jeane Kirkpatrick
Charles Krauthammer
John Lehman
Clifford May
Richard Perle
Martin Peretz
Norman Podhoretz
Randy Scheunemann
Gary Schmitt
William Schneider, Jr.
Richard H. Shultz
Henry Sokolski
Stephen J. Solarz
Vin Weber
Leon Wieseltier
Marshall Wittmann

4/14
04/20

4/11/03

C4/14

April 10, 2003 7:53 AM

Sir:
Working on

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: VP Speeches on Videotape

for tape
see attached transcripts
T.C.

Jaymie Duman
4/17

Jaymie Duman
4/17

I am told Vice President Cheney made a couple of speeches in Louisiana yesterday. I don't know which one it was, but in one of them he talked a lot about the battle plan. It may have been in the Q&A or it may have been in the formal speech. I am told it was excellent.

I would like to get those speeches on tape, so I can look at them. Please make sure we get a copy of each for Gen. Franks as well.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041903-11



Please respond by 4/18/03

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11-L-0559/OSD/15756

4/18

Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 09, 2003 2:29 PM
Subject: CORRECTED: REMARKS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT TO THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWS EDITORS

* "Let me quote the military historian Victor Davis Hanson ..."

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release

April 9, 2003

REMARKS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT
TO THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWS EDITORS

The Fairmont Hotel
New Orleans, Louisiana

9:00 A.M. CDT

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Good morning. Morning. Thank you. And thank you, Rena, for the introduction. I count many friends among the American Society of Newspaper Editors. And it's good to have the opportunity to join you again. And I look forward to taking your questions in a few minutes.

Three weeks into the war -- which I want to talk about this morning -- I, obviously, cannot begin my remarks without paying tribute to those that we've lost on the field of battle. Our campaign is proceeding with speed and success. But that will not ease the sorrow of the families of American and coalition troops killed in the line of duty. We're thinking of these families now with respect and gratitude. And this nation will always honor the sacrifices made in our defense.

American journalism has also lost two of its finest men over the last several days. I knew Michael Kelly and greatly admired his work. He was a superb writer. And as a reporter and editor, he upheld the highest standards of your profession. David Bloom, of NBC, impressed everyone with his skill, energy and exuberance. Both David and Michael were also very decent men with young families. And many people are feeling their loss today, the same way they feel the loss of the members of our armed forces. I also want to extend America's condolences to the families of all the foreign journalists killed in the war.

These two young reporters were among the 600 American journalists embedded in coalition military units all across Iraq. The embedding of journalists has made for some outstanding reporting. I suspect the arrangement has also led to greater respect all around. For their part, the troops have come to know reporters who are willing to accept the hardships and dangers of war in order to get the story right. And journalists have come to know our military -- not just for the power of its weapons, but by the character of the men and women who serve.

Since the war, our forces have conducted themselves with all of the skill and integrity that President Bush and the American people expected of them. They are in the field at this very hour. Operations continue all across Iraq securing cities, protecting supply lines, delivering tons of humanitarian aid. In downtown Baghdad this morning, we are seeing evidence of the collapse of any

central regime authority. The streets are full of people celebrating. While pockets of regime security forces may remain, they appear to be far less effective at putting up any resistance.

In southern Iraq today, British forces are securing the second largest city, in Basra. Across Iraq, we are beginning to see senior religious leaders come forward urging their followers to support our coalition, another sure sign that Saddam Hussein's regime is clearly doomed.

There may well be hard fighting yet ahead. Regime forces are still in control in northern Iraq -- in Mosul and Kirkuk and Tikrit. Yet the conclusion of the war will mark one of the most extraordinary military campaigns ever conducted. It's proceeded according to a carefully drawn plan with fixed objectives and flexibility in meeting them. In the early days of the war, the plan was criticized by some retired military officers embedded in TV studios. (Laughter.) But with every day and every advance by our coalition forces, the wisdom of that plan becomes more apparent. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Franks, General Myers and General Pace at Pentagon -- and their subordinates -- have done a superb job. It's been a most impressive performance. And coming on the heels of the Afghanistan operation last year, it's proof positive of the success of our efforts to transform our military to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Having been involved in planning and waging the Persian Gulf War in 1991 as Secretary of Defense, I think I can say with some authority that this campaign has displayed vastly improved capabilities, far better than we did a dozen years ago. In Desert Storm, only 20 percent of our air-to-ground fighters could guide a laser-guided bomb to target. Today, all of our air-to-ground fighters have that capability. In Desert Storm, it usually took up to two days for target planners to get a photo of a target, confirm its coordinates, plan the mission, and deliver it to the bomber crew. Now we have near real-time imaging of targets with photos and coordinates transmitted by e-mail to aircraft already in flight. In Desert Storm, battalion, brigade and division commanders had to rely on maps, grease pencils and radio reports to track the movements of our forces. Today our commanders have a real-time display of our own forces on their computer screens. In Desert Storm, we did not yet have the B-2. But that aircraft is now critical to our operations. And on a single bombing sortie, a B-2 can hit 16 separate targets, each with a 2,000-pound, precision-guided, satellite-based weapon.

The superior technology we now possess is, perhaps, the most obvious difference between the Gulf War and the present conflict. But there are many others. Desert Storm began with a 38-day air campaign, followed by a brief ground attack. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the ground war began before the air war. In 1991, Saddam Hussein had time to set Kuwait's oil fields ablaze. In the current conflict, forces sent in early protected the 600 oil fields in southern Iraq, prevented an environmental catastrophe, and safeguarded a resource that's vital for the future of the people of Iraq. During Operation Desert Storm, Saddam managed to fire Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia. This time was different, again, thanks to Special Operations Forces, which seized control of the missile launch baskets in western Iraq, preventing their use by the enemy. Our Special Ops forces -- joined by those of the British, the Australian, and the Polish allies -- have played a vital role in the success of the current campaign.

During Operation Desert Storm, we faced a massive flow of refugees in need of aid and shelter. But so far, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, we've averted a large-scale humanitarian crisis. U.S. and Royal Marines succeeded in taking the Al Faw Peninsula and cleared a path for humanitarian aid. And today, even as fighting continues, coalition forces are bringing food and water and medical supplies to liberated Iraqis.

Looking at the overall effort, Saddam Hussein apparently expected that this war would essentially be a replay of Desert Storm. And although he realized that some 250,000 Americans and coalition forces were stationed in the Gulf on the eve of the war, he seems to have assumed there was ample time to destroy the oil fields he had rigged to explode and the bridges that he had wired. But the tactics employed by General Franks were bold. They made the most of every

technological advantage of our military, and they succeeded in taking the enemy by surprise.

Let me quote the military historian Victor Davis Hanson writing several days ago: "By any fair standard of even the most dazzling charges in military history, the Germans in the Ardennes in the Spring of 1940, or Patton's romp in July of 1944, the present race to Baghdad is unprecedented in its speed and daring, and in the lightness of its casualties." Hanson calls the campaign "historically unprecedented" and predicts that its "logistics will be studied for decades". Bottom line, with less than half of the ground forces and two-thirds of the air assets used 12 years ago in Desert Storm, Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks have achieved a far more difficult objective.

Yet until this war is fully won, we cannot be overconfident in our position, and we must not underestimate the desperation of whatever forces remain loyal to the dictator. We know full well the nature of the enemy we are dealing with. Servants of the regime have used hospitals, schools and mosques for military operations. They have tortured and executed prisoners of war. They have forced women and children to serve as human shields. They have transported death squads in ambulances, fought in civilian clothes, feigned surrender and opened fire on our forces, and shot civilians who welcomed coalition troops.

In dealing with such an enemy, we must expect vicious tactics until the regime's final breath. The hardest combat could still be ahead of us. Only the outcome can be predicted with certainty: Iraq will be disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction; the regime will end; and the Iraqi people will be free.

In removing the terror regime from Iraq, we send a very clear message to all groups that operate by means of terror and violence against the innocent. The United States and our coalition partners are showing that we have the capacity and the will to wage war on terror -- and to win decisively.

When I last spoke to this organization in 1990, the Cold War was ending, and I said then that we were looking at a new era in national security policy. Today, we are not just looking at a new era, we are actually living through it. The exact nature of the new dangers revealed themselves on September 11, 2001, with the murder of 3,000 innocent, unsuspecting men, women and children right here at home. The attack on our country forced us to come to grips with the possibility that the next time terrorists strike, they may well be armed with more than just plane tickets and box cutters. The next time they might direct chemical agents or diseases at our population, or attempt to detonate a nuclear weapon in one of our cities. These are not abstract matters to ponder -- they are real dangers that we must guard against and confront before it's too late. From the training manuals and documents that we've seized in the war on terror, and from the interrogations we've conducted, we know the terrorists are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and to use them against us. With September 11th as a fresh memory, no rational person can doubt that terrorists would use such weapons of mass murder the moment they are able to do so.

The government of the United States has a moral duty to confront those threats, and to do whatever it takes to defeat them. And as the leading power, we have a further responsibility to help keep the peace of the world and to prevent terrorists and their sponsors from plunging the world into horrific violence. President Bush takes that responsibility very seriously, and he is meeting it with great resolve and with clarity of purpose.

If we are to protect the American people and defend civilization against determined enemies, we cannot always rely on the old Cold War remedies of containment and deterrence. Containment does not work against a rogue state that possesses weapons of mass destruction and chooses to secretly deliver them to its terrorist allies. Deterrence does not work when we are dealing with terrorists who have no country to defend, who revel in violence, and who are willing to sacrifice their own lives in order to kill millions of others. To meet the unprecedented dangers posed by rogue states with weapons of mass destruction, and terrorist networks with global reach, our administration has

taken urgent and, at times, unprecedented action.

One of these important things we have done is to strengthen the defense of the homeland. As the President requested, Congress created the Department of Homeland Security to mobilize against a wide range of potential threats. We have put more marshals on airplanes; stepped up security at airports, power plants, ports and border crossings. We have inoculated our troops against anthrax and smallpox and made the vaccines available for first responders, who are stockpiling enough smallpox vaccine for every American. We have proposed and urge Congress to pass Project BioShield -- a comprehensive effort to develop and make available modern, effective drugs and treatments to counter a chemical or biological attack. And Project Bioshield is a critical element of defense in this new era.

But we know that playing defense isn't enough -- we have to seize the offense against terrorists. So we are going after the terrorists, hunting them down, freezing their assets, disrupting their chain of command. We've had great successes recently with the capture of two key figures in the September 11th attacks -- Ramzi Bin al-Shibh and Khalid Sheik Mohammed. And, of course, we still have forces on the ground in Afghanistan working with that country's government to rid it of the Taliban and al Qaeda elements.

Our war on terror continues on every front, from law enforcement, to intelligence, to military action. The President has made clear from the beginning that this will be a long and a focused effort -- not only because the terrorists operate in the shadows, but also because they enjoy the backing of outlaw states. It is this alliance between terrorist networks seeking weapons of mass destruction and rogue states developing or already possessing these weapons that constitutes the gravest current threat to America's national security.

Therefore, a vital element of our strategy against terror must be to break the alliance between terrorist organizations and terrorist-sponsoring states. The chemical and biological weapons that Saddam Hussein is known to have produced are the very instruments that terrorists are seeking in order to inflict devastating harm on the people of this country, in Europe, and in the Middle East. That's why from the day the Gulf War ended in 1991, the United States has supported the efforts of the U.N. Security Council to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. And that is why the United States today is enforcing that demand.

As we meet this morning, I cannot predict with certainty how soon this war will be over. Although I am pleased, as is everyone else, to see the reports coming out of Baghdad today, I want to caution everybody that we still have a lot of work to do yet. I am certain that when it is successfully concluded, the friends of the United States -- throughout the world and in the Middle East -- will be deeply heartened by this victory and will prove far more willing to stand up to the tyrants and terrorists in their midst.

The end of Saddam's regime will remove a source of violence and instability in a vital part of the world. A new regime in Iraq will also serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom to other nations in the Middle East. As President Bush has said: "The United States, with other countries, will work to advance liberty and peace in that region. Our goal will not be achieved overnight, but it can come over time. The power and the appeal of human liberty is felt in every life and every land. And the greatest power of freedom is to overcome hatred and violence and turn the creative gifts of men and women to the pursuits of peace."

The actions of our coalition now being taken in Iraq today have come at a cost. But the cost of inaction would have been far greater. And they would have been paid, not just by future generations, but very likely by our own, as well. By their skill and courage, the American armed forces joined by the finest of allies are making this nation and the world more secure. They are bringing freedom where there is tyranny, relief where there is suffering. As a former Secretary of Defense, I've never been more proud of those who wear the uniform of the United States military.

Later this morning, here in New Orleans, my wife, Lynne, and I will visit the National D-Day Museum, the museum founded on the initiative of the late Stephen Ambrose, whose writings did so much to acquaint Americans of today with the heroism of the World War II generation. In one of his books, Ambrose related a soldier's memories of that period in our history. "In the spring of 1945," he said, "around the world, the sight of a 12-man squad of teenage boys armed, in uniform, brought terror to people's hearts. But there was an exception: a squad of G.I.'s, a sight that brought the biggest smiles you ever saw to people's lips and joy to their hearts. G.I.'s meant candy, cigarettes, C-rations, and freedom. America had sent the best of her young men around the world, not to conquer, but to liberate; not to terrorize, but to help."

Ladies and gentlemen, in the spring of 2003, the American people and the watching world are seeing another great generation. The citizens of Iraq, like so many oppressed peoples before them, are coming to know the kind of men and women that America sends forth to meet danger and to defend freedom. We can all be thankful that our country still produces such men and women -- this great force of volunteers, placing themselves between our country and our enemies. And when their mission is accomplished, we look forward to welcoming them home with pride and with gratitude.

Thank you. (Applause.)

It's my understanding the drill is, for questions, I think we've got microphones in each aisle, and anybody who wants, step up and I'll be happy to respond as best I can. Yes, sir.

Q Mr. Vice President, Edward Seaton (ph) from the Manhattan Mercury in Kansas. As you know, 11 journalists have been killed in this war. I think that represents about 9 percent of the total of U.S. and British troops who have been lost. Yesterday was a particularly grueling day for journalists, both U.S. journalists and international journalists. There were three journalists who died yesterday, and there were three strikes that have been questioned, particularly in the Arab world, that have the look of perhaps more than simple military action -- at least that's been the allegation in some quarters. Abudabi TV was hit, was struck by U.S. fire. A missile hit Al Jazeera TV, and the Palestine Hotel was struck by tank rounds. I wonder if you could speak to those allegations that we're hearing from the Arab world, and just generally, the issue of safety, particularly of journalists who are not embedded with U.S. forces or British forces.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Well, I appreciate the question. Obviously, as I mentioned in my remarks, any loss of innocent life in the military action is to be regretted. The suggestion that somehow the United States would have deliberately attacked journalists is obviously totally false. After all of the effort we went to to make the battlefield, so to speak, available to journalists, to embed hundreds of journalists, both Americans and foreigners, with our forces, to be right there on the front lines where they could report in real time what's going on, has been, I think, a very important and positive contribution. But the suggestion that having done that, we would somehow then encourage deliberate attacks on journalists makes no sense at all. You'd have to be an idiot to believe that.

The fact is that our troops have come through three weeks of fighting through southern Iraq into Baghdad. They have, during that period of time, been fired upon from mosques, from schools, from other kinds of civilian facilities. They have seen the enemy take off their uniforms and put on civilian clothes. They've seen civilians used as human shields. They've been fired upon under a white flag of truce. And they are specifically authorized under the rules of engagement, anytime they believe they believe they're fired upon to return fire, to defend themselves. And I have no reason to believe that that wasn't the case here. That is to say that their response was simply the act of troops in a combat zone responding to what they perceived to be threats against them.

It's always unfortunate -- we try to remind people, especially reporters, that when you go into a war zone it is risky. There are great dangers in that

kind of a setting, and we cannot guarantee everybody's safety. We do the very best we can, but it's still a war zone. And hopefully, the conflict will end as soon as possible and there won't be any more loss of innocent life, either civilians or reporters. So, we regret that it happened, but unfortunately, it's the kind of thing that happens in modern warfare.

Q Mr. Vice President, I'm Chris Pack (ph), the editor of the Memphis Commercial Appeal and a Wyoming native.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: -- ranger, I believe.

Q That's correct.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: A great newspaper. They used to endorse me when I ran for Congress.

Q Yes, they did. (Laughter.) You talked about the technological advantages we have in the war in Iraq. Could we talk a little bit about the psychological aspects of the war? Do you think, after this war, that we're going to have a difficult time making the case in the Arab world that we are there as liberators and not aggressors? And how do you think we're going to need to deal with the Arab leadership and the tremendous anger that's being portrayed and projected towards America as a result of this war?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Well, I think there's no question but there's work to be done in that area. I've always found a little bit frustrating, all the years that I've been dealing with problems in that part of the world, going back now, I suppose, 20-some years, to find this criticism that's sometimes leveled at the United States based on our operations out there when I think the record of the United States over the years may not be perfect, but we have gone to war now on a number of occasions, frankly, to protect Muslims, to role back Saddam Hussein's aggression in Kuwait in 1990 and '91, in the Balkans, in Bosnia, and elsewhere.

In this case, we were, after great provocation and after 12 years of unsuccessful efforts by the U.N., acting to eliminate one of the most brutal dictators of our time. A man who probably was responsible for the death of at least a million Muslims, half of them his own people. A man who ran a horrific police state. And I see that, and I see the outpouring of joy in the streets of Baghdad today by the Iraqi people at their liberation, and still the U.S. is subject to criticism from our friends in the region.

And I think we need to do everything we can, partly to tell our side of the story. I think most people who live in that part of the world don't have access to free media, and I think it would be an improvement if they did. There's clearly more work that needs to be done in that area by us. But I think, in the final analysis, history will judge us, and hopefully, the people of the region will judge us based upon what happens next in Iraq, in how we conduct ourselves going forward, in whether or not we keep the commitment we made -- which we definitely will keep just as quickly as possible, to establish a viable representative, democratic government in Iraq, and to withdraw our forces just as quickly as we can.

We are not there as occupiers. We have no interest in the oil. We have no interest in maintaining forces there a minute longer than is necessary. And I think when they see how we function, how rapidly we move in that direction, whether or not we keep the commitments we made, hopefully they'll come to judge that what we've done here was, in fact, necessary and appropriate to the circumstances, and that the people of Iraq are far better off for our having eliminated this horrific regime than they were if we had not acted.

Q Mr. Vice President, Clarence Pennington (ph), retired member. We know you have a plan to reorganize and rebuild Iraq. You, along with the President and the coalition. Could we hope that you also have a precise plan to give France and Germany a role in Iraq that is consistent with their pre-war behavior? (Laughter.) -- that will help you avoid the wrath of --

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm trying to think if this is an opportunity or if I should be scared here about the answer that I'm about to -- (laughter.)

Q And I have a follow-up.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Okay, all right. Let me say a word about the problem we encountered. Obviously, I think we're disappointed, most Americans are, at the fact that nations that have historically been close friends and allies of the United States, in this particular case, did everything they could to stop us from doing what we thought was essential, from the standpoint of our own national security, as well as the -- our friends in the region.

The President made a very deliberate decision last fall to go to the United Nations to sort of give Saddam Hussein one more chance to come clean, but also to try to restore the U.N. Security Council process to a position of competence and integrity at dealing with these kinds of international problems. There are likely to be other problems like this in the future that we'll have to deal with. And if the international community can come together effectively, obviously, that's preferable.

In this particular case, that didn't happen. And the French and the Germans, in particular, did everything they could to prevent us from going forward and enforcing the U.N. Security Council resolutions. They seemed to be less interested in solving the problem than they did in restraining the United States from taking action.

That's history, that's behind us now. It's time for us to get on with business and do what we set out to do in Iraq originally. I think the preeminent effort at this point, obviously, is going to be led by the United States and our coalition partners -- by the Brits, the Australians, the Poles and a great many other nations that have supported this effort. They've already demonstrated their willingness to be part of an effort to deal with this problem and I think we can expect them to step up and conduct themselves in the fashion that is reflective of the commitment they've already made.

With respect to others who didn't support the effort, perhaps time will help in terms of improve their outlook. I think once they see the results of our efforts, that they'll be interested in trying to help at least on the humanitarian side. And that's appropriate.

There's this debate raging over the United Nations, what kind of role should the U.N. have in Iraq. I think the U.N. has a prominent role to play. They do great things with respect to refugee assistance and coordinating the work of the non-governmental organizations and charitable organizations that are very valuable in this kind of setting.

But the key role, going forward, has to be -- especially as long as there's a security threat, which there's likely to be for some considerable period of time -- has to reside with the U.S. government. And our plan that we've talked about and that we will carry through on is just as quickly as possible to stand up an Iraqi interim authority, run by Iraqis, selected by Iraqis, that is both building the government of the future in Iraq, as well as administering the nation today. And we'll pass responsibilities off at -- just as quickly as possible.

We don't believe that the United Nations is equipped to play that central role. They'll play a very important role, but I think the central role needs to still reside with the coalition until such time as we can pass it to the Iraqi people, themselves. And, hopefully, that process will begin within a matter of days.

So we'll continue to work with our friends and allies. I guess I -- I look at Europe, and it's important for us to remember that there are a large number of European nations that stepped up and supported us in this enterprise, and we shouldn't forget that. We appreciate very much the support we got from them. And hopefully, should similar problems arise in the future, maybe our French and German friends will reconsider their position.

Q Good morning, Mr. Vice President. I'm Deanne Davis (ph) with United Press International. Within the last three weeks, we've seen a number of coalition forces taken prisoner and some gone missing. You mentioned in your remarks this morning about POWs being tortured and killed. Can you add anything this morning to what is known about the POWs or perhaps those who are missing?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I cannot. We have a very carefully developed and elaborate process for notifying next of kin when we do find people or get information about people who are either missing or possibly held as prisoners, and we don't make any announcements, except through the regular orderly process. It would be unwise for me this morning to make any announcements here. I don't have any to make, anyway. Those announcements would come out of the Pentagon, and that's how it should be.

Q Mr. Vice President, there's a growing perception among librarians, academicians, researchers, historians, reporters, editors, publishers, broadcasters that the Bush administration is a foe of openness in government. Is that an unfair perception? And if it is, what can you do affirmatively to change that?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I do think it's an unfair perception; that it's not the way I view our approach. I think the -- some people have focused on -- Rena mentioned in her introduction the work of the energy task force that I chaired two years ago. The debate has now been settled, in effect. The court has ruled in favor of the administration that we did handle it in an appropriate way. And the dispute with the GAO and the Congress on that issue has now been resolved in favor of the administration.

The issue that was involved there was simply the question of whether or not a Vice President can sit down and talk with citizens about an issue and gain from them their best advice and counsel on how we might deal with a particular issue. The charge was made that I should have to tell the Congress, specifically a Congressman, Henry Waxman of California, every time I met with somebody, on what it is they told me and what kind of advice they gave me. That was the original request.

I said, no, I didn't think that was reasonable at all. In terms of what our policy recommendations and decisions were, none of that was secret. We published a 120-page brochure, passed out thousands of copies that laid out all of our policy decisions and recommendations, so everybody knew exactly what we believed and what kinds of policies we felt we ought to pursue. But the Vice President should not have to answer any congressman and say, well, at 2:00 p.m. last Thursday I talked to Joe and here's what he recommended. That would put an absolute chill on our ability to get good advice from private citizens or anybody else. We have to be able to have those kinds of conversation.

Some people may have taken that as a, "chilling" the information process. I don't. I think it restored some of the legitimate authority of the Executive Branch, the President and the Vice President, to be able to conduct their business. And as I say, now the matter has gone to court. The GAO brought suit and the federal district court has now ruled that they were wrong, and supported the administration position.

In other areas, if we talk about openness, I can't think of anything that better demonstrates our commitment to the free flow of information about very important events than this whole exercise we're in the middle of right now, with respect to imbedding the press corps with U.S. military forces.

It's now possible, in part by virtue of technology -- 12 years ago, when we did Desert Storm, we weren't able to do it. We had a very different system for handling it that was frustrating for everybody, with pool coverage on a limited basis. I mean, if we were devoted to secrecy and trying to keep information from the press, we certainly wouldn't have taken 500 or 600 of them and put them out there with the 3rd Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne and the 1st Marine Division to be right there, side-by-side with our troops, all the way into Baghdad. So I don't accept the criticism, or I disagree with it, anyway.

Q Mr. Vice President, I'm Sandra Kies (ph), the editor of the Honolulu Advertiser, where we tend to look with equal interest on events in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also terrorism in Philippines, Indonesia, and in particular, now what's going on in North Korea, and to wonder whether the administration's focus of diplomatic attention, military strategy and so on, on Iraq now has caused a dilution of energies to confront in particular the situation in North Korea.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I don't believe it has led to a dilution of effort. I know I just finished, before I came to speak this morning, our morning intelligence brief. We have an arrangement where every morning at 8:00 a.m., Washington time, the CIA comes in and briefs the President, myself, the National Security Advisor on events around the world -- the PDB, the President's daily brief.

That was followed by a National Security Council meeting that focused on Iraq and the Middle East in particular today, Afghanistan, as well. But the PDB, sort of a -- it covers those areas that we're most interested in and following at any moment. And I can assure you that that process gives a lot of attention to other parts of the world than where the public focus might be at any particular point in time.

So we receive regular reporting on the situation in North Korea. There are ongoing diplomatic efforts to try to deal with that. It is a very serious problem, and it has not been ignored, I can assure you that. We may not have anything publicly to announce at this particular moment. The world's attention is focused on what's going on in Baghdad this morning, but that doesn't mean that we can afford to, or that we are in any way ignoring other parts of the world.

The thing that I'm struck by -- this is, I guess, my fourth administration that I've worked in, now going back over 30 years. And to a greater extent than ever before, in my past experience, there are more balls in the air now than previously. Life used to be relatively simple, when I think back to the Cold War days, and sort of gave a structure to your morning when you got up, in terms of what you had to worry about. (Laughter.) And that's no longer the case. It's a big, complicated world out there, and we're having to deal with multiple moving parts on any given day. And we do, in fact, do that.

Q May I follow? Are you --

Q -- tension to be at this time?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I'm reluctant to do that because we are involved diplomatically right now. We've spoken before, we think it's important that there not be the development of nuclear weapons capability on the Korean Peninsula. We think everybody in the region agrees with that. Certainly, in terms of the South Koreans, the Japanese, the Chinese and the Russians, they're all most directly affected by this. And we believe there ought to be a multilateral approach to persuade the North Koreans that it's not in their interest to proceed down the track of developing nuclear weapons.

But I'll just leave it at that, partly because for me to go beyond it might upset ongoing discussions, and I wouldn't want to do that.

Q Charlotte Hall (ph) from Newsday, New York. Mr. Vice President, you have alluded this morning to the administration's vision of how a civilian authority and an Iraqi government will be established. I'm wondering if you can give us any details about how the administration sees the next six months, in terms of the management of oil resources of Iraq, their production, their sale? And should any of the oil revenue go to defray our costs for the war?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: We've spent a fair amount of time thinking about how we manage that resource. We are committed to see to it that it's put to use for the people of Iraq. It's their oil, their resource. One of the real tragedies

we're finding is that not only did Saddam Hussein forego over a hundred billion dollars worth of revenue over the last 10 years, because of his refusal to comply with the U.N. resolutions, that kept sanctions on -- he wasn't able to sell over a hundred billion dollars worth of oil. That's revenue that didn't flow to the Iraqi people, obviously. And what oil revenue did come in, he spent on himself, building these magnificent palaces all over the country, and on his programs -- military programs, developing weapons of mass destruction.

So the standard of living in Iraq today is significantly below what it was 10 or 12 years ago. And one of the keys, we believe, to the reconstruction of Iraq and to getting it stood up and back and functioning again, is to get those oil fields up and functioning. And we now control virtually all of the fields in the south. I think this morning there was one well still on fire, the others had all been put out. The fields in the north are still under control of the regime, but hopefully they'll be taken over eventually without having them destroyed.

And once we can get Iraqi oil production back up and functioning, it could generate as much as \$20 billion a year for the Iraqi people. That money will go to Iraq. We'll establish, as part of a interim Iraqi authority, an organization to oversee the functioning of their oil ministry. That will be composed primarily of Iraqis. It may have international advisors from outside, as an advisory group, but they, ultimately, are going to have to make the decisions about how much they want to reinvest. And investment is needed in the fields; Saddam let them deteriorate, so they're in bad shape today. But with some investment, we ought to be able to get the production back up on the order of two-and-a-half, three million barrels a day within -- hopefully, by the end of the year. And that revenue will then flow to the Iraqi government and give them a resource base to start to do those things they need to do.

They're still going to need outside help and assistance. And we're prepared to do that. I'm sure that the United Nations is prepared to help. And that other members of the coalition will be willing to stand up and provide some additional resources, as well. But the oil revenue is not to be diverted to any purpose other than specifically to service the immediate and, hopefully, long-term needs of the people of Iraq.

Q Good morning. My name is Kevin Willey (ph) with The Dallas Morning News. My question has to do with if, in fact, a democracy of some sort is ultimately established in Iraq, how would you describe what you expect to be the response to that in some of the surrounding nations -- Saudi Arabia, Syria, Bahrain, others, both in terms of the royal families that rule those areas today, but also among the populace of those countries? What sort of a reaction do you expect?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Oh, I would hope if we're able to stand up a representative, democratic government in Iraq -- one that has due regard for the human rights of the people of Iraq, preserves its territorial integrity, isn't a threat to its neighbors and so forth -- that they will come to see this as, obviously, a significant improvement over Saddam Hussein, who started two wars, twice invaded neighbors, launched ballistic missiles at neighbors and so forth. So from that perspective, it'll be a plus.

Exactly what it will look like is something the people of Iraq are going to have to determine. I think it would be a mistake for we, as Americans, to say, well, look, here's a cookie mold, this is how we do it, this is, therefore, exactly how you have to do it. I don't think that will work. I don't think that takes into account their unique culture and historical experience and so forth. They're going to have to work it themselves and figure out what makes sense from their standpoint, given the social organization and the way their society has functioned in the past. And it'll be a difficult task. But they've got some very able people already engaged in thinking about those kinds of thoughts and issues.

What that means for the neighboring states, I think it's important for the United States -- the President has made this an important priority for us -- to continue to encourage reform in that part of the world. And reform can take

many forms. It can be economic. You've got serious economic problems among many of those nations, in terms of rapidly growing populations and inadequate economies to support them. I think it can mean educational reform, and we want to encourage that so that we end up with young populations that have got useable skills for the marketplace, rather than just -- don't finish their educational systems and don't have opportunities or have skills they can use for that purpose.

There are already growing democracy movements in some of the countries in the region. Places like Bahrain, Qatar, for example, have begun to move in that direction -- Kuwait. So exactly what it'll look like, in terms of being able to say, this is their form of government, I don't want to be prescriptive. I don't think we should be. But I do think once Iraq is given the opportunity, and the people of Iraq given their -- this was historically a sophisticated nation, with a well-educated middle class, a great deal of technical expertise, a significant resource base, second largest oil reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia -- that if there's a potential in that part of the world to create a modern state with a good, strong representative government, I think, hopefully, Iraq is it. We have to do our best to get them off and running. And if it works in Iraq, it may encourage positive trends in other parts of the region.

Q Good morning, Mr. Vice President. Amy Net (ph), the Star Ledger. With postwar reconstruction plans already in the works, I was wondering if you could give any assurances, especially in view of the large role played by foreign countries -- in particular, the British -- that the British will have an opportunity to participate in postwar reconstruction?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Oh, I think they will. But, again, a lot of those decisions are going to have to be made by the new Iraqi interim authority. As they get up and running, they'll have to decide what kinds of long-term relationships they want there. But we're not trying to exclude anybody. We've stood up an organization under Retired Lieutenant General Garner, who's got a great deal of experience in the area; he ran the relief operations for the Kurds 10 years ago in northern Iraq; he's well-known to the people in the region; he's got a very good team drawn from all over the government working with him, specialists in various fields -- the State Department is involved, the Defense Department is involved, a lot of our civilian agencies.

And they'll be making the decisions about what kind of work is needed, as well as getting, as I say, the Iraqi interim administration up and running. And in the final analysis, a lot of those decisions will be made out there in the field by those individuals. And there's no desire on our part to exclude anybody. I think the work will go to whoever is qualified to do it.

Q Mr. Vice President, Rich Oppel (ph), with the Austin American Statesman. Both the President and you in your remarks this morning have begun to sketch-out a relatively limited role for the United Nations in postwar Iraq. The outline of that role seems pretty vague at this point. You mentioned, for example, working with -- the United Nations working with NGOs, this morning. Does the United States see any role for the United Nations in formation or the development of the Iraqi interim authority? Or in the formation of an oil ministry?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: As I say, the perception we have, the concept is right now General Franks is in charge. We've got troops throughout the country. We're still conducting combat operations, so there is a major military ongoing task that's not yet completed.

At the same time, we've already begun the humanitarian relief operations. We've already got the International Red Cross operating in parts of the country. We're already delivering -- oftentimes with military units -- delivering food and medicine and water, for example, to those areas that have already been liberated. And I think we'll gradually see that humanitarian effort take on greater and greater significance.

At the same time, we're getting up and running with this organization that will be headed up by General Garner. He's already in the theater, he's already

got a lot of his people out there with him. And they will get into the business of finding out what's the status of the various ministries, what kind of shape are they in, what kinds of resources they've got; how soon can we get the health ministry up and running; how soon can we get the oil ministry up and running; are there people left in those bureaus and agencies that can be part of the new Iraq, have we gotten rid of all the Baath Party folks in there who were Saddam Hussein cronies. You've got to vet people that are going to come in and be part of that process, but to get those ministries up and going as quickly as possible.

We're going to have a meeting on the 12th, just three days from now, Attalio (ph), outside al Nasiriyah, in southern Iraq, where we will bring together representatives of groups from all over Iraq, to begin to sit down and talk about planning for the future with this Iraqi interim authority and getting it up and running.

Now, what role does the U.N. play in all of that? Well, I think the United Nations, as the President said, has got a major role to play. I would not say their role is insignificant, by any means. They bring a lot of expertise to certain types of activities -- in particular, to a lot of the humanitarian agencies that they have significant influence over, the work of the NGOs and so forth, that I mentioned earlier.

Traditionally, the Secretary General appoints a personal representative. It's what happened in Afghanistan. He sent a very able international civil servant out to represent the U.N. in a lot of the deliberations that took place in Afghanistan. Similar kind of arrangement may be the right way to go here.

But as to the question of whether or not we're going to turn everything over to the United Nations and put them in charge of this process, the President has made it clear we're not going to do that; that we want them to play a major role. Kofi Annan has indicated, frankly, that the vision he has is pretty close to the one we have. So, I think it will work.

I think there's going to be more than enough work there for everybody to do. But our objective, as I say, is to just as quickly as possible get this interim authority up and running that's composed of Iraqis and transfer authority to them; not to the United Nations, not to any other outside group, but specifically to get them in a position to be able to make decisions for themselves -- begin to deliver basic services at the local level, begin to build over time -- because it will probably take time -- begin to put together that political structure that ultimately, hopefully, will result in a new representative government for the people of Iraq.

Q Will U.N. representatives be at the April 12th meeting?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I don't know. I don't know. Yes.

Q Paul Vanslambrick (ph) of The Christian Science Monitor. Mr. Vice President, many people feel the central issue to the U.S. standing in the Arab world is the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians. Do you see the conditions now lining up post-Iraq to enable a serious push by the U.S. on that issue? And do you foresee progress on it?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I think the potential for progress does exist. I think there's some hopeful signs. The President's made it clear that he will make sure that we make a major effort in this area to try to make progress on the peace process in the months immediately ahead. I go back to the speech the President delivered last June, on June 24th, that laid out a vision with respect to the future, in terms of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He talked about the establishment of a Palestinian homeland -- the first time an American President ever called for that -- about democracy and democratic reform of the Palestinian Authority.

We made it clear that we've reached the point where we didn't believe Yasser Arafat could any longer be the principal interlocutor for the Palestinians, that that simply hadn't worked. And they now are moving on the

creation of a post of prime minister selected by the Palestinian Parliament. And those negotiations within the Palestinian Authority are continuing. Hopefully, if they can, in fact, establish a credible government under a prime minister, we can begin to make some progress.

The problems are horrendous. I don't want to underestimate how difficult it is, but I think there's no doubt we'll continue to push very hard to try to end the violence, to try to re-establish the peace process, and move in the direction laid out by the President in his speech last June 24th. So it will be a priority for us.

I'm going to do one more question, then I've got to go. Yes, sir.

Q Mr. Vice President, Neil Brawn (ph) of the St. Petersburg Times in St. Petersburg, Florida. If I could shift gears for just a second, I was wondering if you could give us your outlook on the American economy. And as a fiscal conservative who used to argue against deficit spending, are you concerned about the deficits we're running up right now?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: With respect to the economy, it's still soft. I had spent some time on Friday, I guess it was -- sat down with a group of outside economists, which I do periodically. We have a regular practice now in the White House; on Mondays, the economic team gets together. Steve Friedman is the White House Assistant for Economic Policy. Secretary Snow, Secretary Evans, myself, several others review where we are. We do that every week. And I think the general view is that the economy is still pretty soft, that it began to pick up at the early part of this year. But since about February, it's sort of been flat.

There are two views: One is that a lot of that has to do with the uncertainty created by the war - how soon is that going to get resolved, what would be the cost, how long would it last, and so forth. Hopefully, that will now recede as a factor. And if that's the case, then we would expect to see some resumption of a more normal pattern of growth.

We believe it's important now to go forward as quickly as possible with an insurance policy. That's why we recommended to the Congress a stimulus package this year, the tax reform package that we asked Congress for. There's a debate raging now between the House and the Senate -- getting ready to go to conference this week on the budget resolution that will really set the parameters of how big that package can be. And then later this year, we pass the revenue measures to actually implement it. I think that's important to do.

With respect to the deficit, now, I have been a deficit hawk. If you go back and look at my voting record, it was pretty conservative. But those of us, even, who are deficit hawks have always made an exception for war or national emergency. And we found ourselves, I think, with today's deficit resulting from the slowdown in the economy that resulted in lower revenues that really began the first quarter of 2001. That's continued.

Once the bubble burst in the stock market, we're not collecting those capital gains revenues any more -- the way we were for a while. That's had a big impact on revenue. The terrorism attack of 9/11 clearly didn't help. It had a significant impact. You look at industries like the airlines, the travel business, and so forth, they've all been adversely affected by that. And, of course, we've got the ongoing war on terror, and now the operations in Iraq. So, I think it's not surprising that we got a deficit at this stage.

If I look at it in historic terms, the deficit today is not nearly as large as a percentage of our total economic activity of our gross domestic product as it was, say, back in the early '80s. And in terms of our total national debt to the total size of our economy, we're in relatively good shape. We've made significant progress in recent years.

Do we have watch it? Certainly. We need to be restrained going forward with respect to spending. We've got to look especially at our mandatory programs, our entitlement programs, and to make sure that doesn't get out of

control. But, today, at this stage, with respect to where we are with the economy, as well as what our needs and requirements are, today's deficit is not as much concern as was the case, say 10 or even 20 years ago. I think we're in much better shape than we were then.

Let me wrap it up. I thank all of you this morning and for listening. These obviously are important and challenging times. But we do appreciate very much the enormously important role the free press plays in America, and all of you represent that. We'll complain from time to time, but that's our right as politicians. And you complain from time to time about us. That's your right as editors. But we really do appreciate the opportunity to spend some time with all of you this morning. So, thank you very much. (Applause.)

END

10:00 A.M. CDT



April 11, 2003 7:38 AM

TO: LTG Craddock
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Trip

ADVANCE COPY SENT

33350

When I go to Afghanistan, I want to see the girls' school in Mazar-i-Sharif and the midwifery operation in Kabul.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041103-7



Please respond by 4/18/03

11 Apr 03

U13383 /03



4/16

April 11, 2003 7:50 AM

TO: Powell Moore / Pete Geren
CC: Larry Di Rita/Jaymie Duman
Pete Geren

Jaymie Duman
4/15

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Congressman DeLay and Authorities

Tom DeLay is ready to go to work on the authorities. He wants to make reform his big push. I promised him we would get someone up there to brief him soon.

Please do so and report back to me after it is completed.

Thanks.

Brisk

DHR:dh
041103-10



Please respond by 4/18/03

4/16

RESPONSE ATTACHED

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 16 2003

SD:

Pete Geren + Powell Moore
will work DeLay as soon as he gets
back in town.

U13385 /03

Jaymie
Jaymie Duman

11-L-0559/OSD/15772 4/15

April 15, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECDEF

FROM: PETE GEREN



REF: SECDEF Snowflake Dtd April 11, 2003

SUBJECT: Congressman Delay and Authorities

SECDEF HAS SEEN
APR 14 2003

Delay will not be back in DC until April 28. I am working with his office to set up a briefing immediately upon his return. I will keep you posted on the progress.

Cc: P. Moore
J. Durnan



April 11, 2003 1:50 PM

TO: Jaymie Duman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Ambassador Celucci

Canada

Please get me the background sheet for Ambassador Celucci from Canada.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041103-15



Please respond by 4/18/03

*Done:
Gave to SD
4/15*

U13386 /03

11 Apr 03



April 11, 2003 6:14 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Detainees

ADVANCE COPY SENT

DK

383.6

I do want some people out of Guantanamo sent to their own countries. I really mean it. I want that done.

I would like a report every two days on what is happening on this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041103-24

cc: DSD

.....
Please respond by 4/16/03

U13387 /03

11 Apr 03



April 11, 2003 6:14 PM

TO: Gen. Pace
Doug Feith
Gen. Keane

*ADVANCE
COPY SENT*

CC: Gen. Myers
Gen. Franks
LTG Craddock

Prof

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: 7,000 EPWs in Iraq

I feel very strongly that we need to get teams in to do the triaging. Gen. Franks agrees. It is important that we move on it before they are there too long and become anti-American.

If they surrendered instead of running, it strikes me that we could use some of these people for jobs in Umm Qasr, or to help with police work in towns where they live or help with other things. If they are people who shouldn't have been pulled up in the first place, why don't we see if we can do something special for them.

I would like a report every two days on what is happening on this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041103-25

cc: DSD

.....

Please respond by 4/16/03

11 apr 03

U13388 /03

Snowflake

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: April 12, 2003

SUBJECT: **Calendar**

Get a wonderful letter drafted to Gen. Yeager, regretting my attendance at this function and wishing him well. He's a terrific person.

Thanks.

SWF

001.1SD

DHR/azn
041203.05

Attach: Invitation 5/1/03 to Gen. Yeager birthday

Please respond by: 4 | 24 | 03

U13389 /03

12 Apr 03

11-L-0559/OSD/15777



11-L-0559/OSD/15778

Snowflake

7:54 AM



TO: Doug Feith
 Ryan Henry

CC: Col Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

DATE: April 12, 2003

SUBJECT: Garner SVTC

Let's get Margaret Tutweiller on the SVTC with Jay Garner from now on.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041203.07

Please respond by: _____

Dave

060 SD

U13390 /03

1299203

11-L-0559/OSD/15779



TO: Steve Cambone
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: April 12, 2003
 SUBJECT: **Cards**

Get me five sets of those cards with the faces of all of Saddam Hussein's henchmen. Apparently DIA put them out.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 041203.10

Please respond by: 4 | 30 | 03

3355D

4/15

DONE - 6 SETS
 HANDED TO DELONNIE
 ON 4/14/03.
VR L

U13391 /03

129603



OB
6/2

April 14, 2003 7:57 AM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Oil in Iraq

DR

Why don't we get someone looking into this article by Scott Pardee and see if that is something that might make sense in Iraq.

Thanks.

Attach.

Pardee, Scott E. "Oil: An Equal Share for Every Iraqi," *Washington Post*, April 13, 2003, p. B3.

DHR:dh
041403-6



Please respond by 4/25/03

U13392 /03

14 Apr 03

washingtonpost.com

Oil: Give Every Iraqi An Equal Share

Sunday, April 13, 2003; Page B03

Scott E. Pardee is a professor of economics at Middlebury College in Vermont who worked for 19 years at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Back in the 1970s, when I was marketing U.S. government securities to the nations that make up the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), I was introduced to the man from Iraq's central bank who was responsible for managing the country's foreign exchange reserves. He had a reputation as a tough negotiator, fighting for every extra basis point. When we met (in Switzerland), I asked him why he drove such hard bargains. As I remember it, he said: "Five thousand years ago our country was fertile and there was great wealth. But we mishandled the land, and it became a desert, and our people have been poor for nearly 2,500 years. Now we have oil and are rich again. But the oil will run out in 40 years. I want to invest our oil money the best I can so that our people will never be poor again."

The oil hasn't run out, but most Iraqis have never seen a penny of the country's oil money. Now, with much of Europe and the Arab world suspicious about the Bush administration's motives for the war -- dramatized most vividly by the protest slogan "No Blood for Oil" -- the legitimacy of postwar Iraq and the U.S.-led reconstruction effort hinges in part on what happens to Iraq's oil industry. There is a way to both give the Iraqi people a stake in the rebuilding and avoid the charge that the United States intends to seize control of the oil fields: adopt the Alaskan model.

In 1976, voters in Alaska amended the state's constitution to set aside 25 percent of the funds received by the state in connection with the development of its oil reserves. The money goes into a permanent fund, run by a board of trustees accountable to the state government and the people of Alaska. The fund currently holds about \$23 billion in various investments, down from a high of \$26 billion before the stock market slump.

The key feature: Each year the fund pays a dividend to every man, woman and child who can prove at least one year's residency in Alaska. In 2002, the dividend was \$1,540 a person; for a family of four, this added up to more than \$6,000. Since 1982, dividends have totaled \$21,902 a person. You can't sit in a bar very long in Juneau or Anchorage without overhearing residents debating (sometimes heatedly) the fund's policies and procedures, but the dividend is a powerful tie that binds Alaskans together.

In Iraq, as well as many of the other OPEC countries, the government simply takes the oil profits and folds them into the budget. Some politically connected families become very rich, partly because oil revenues keep taxes low. But in Iraq, as in most countries (and in most oil-producing states in the United States), nothing trickles down to the general population. (Russia is another example of a political system, freed from repression, that gave away the jewels of the nation's oil industry in corrupt deals with private individuals.)

The Alaskan model fits well with the Bush administration's stated goal of developing a democratic Iraq. It could help bring that diverse country together politically by making payments to everyone -- Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, et al. -- while dramatically addressing the economic inequality that plagues and divides so many oil-rich countries.

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4/16
17:00



4/18

ER-4882

April 14, 2003 9:51 AM

Jaymie Durnan

4/17 →

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Italy

Italy

Italy offered 3,000 people when they were here at the residence.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041403-9

~~SECRET HAS BEEN~~

Please respond by 4/25/03

4/15/03

-- SSD

The Italian publisher
expressed today a
plan to send 2,500-3,000
people to Iraq including
engineers, CBM chemists,
pilots, de-mining and heavy
mine sweeping people and
communications.

DG-Feith

04-14-03 13:52 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/15784

U13393 /03

1 APR 15 11 11 AM '03

14 APR 03
4/18



April 14, 2003 9:58 AM

Iraq

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Protection of Foreign Embassies

Please give me a piece of paper that discusses any obligation we have to protect foreign embassies in Baghdad.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041403-13



Please respond by 4/18/03

U13394 /03

14 Apr 03

April 14, 2003 1:51 PM

TO: LTG Craddock
CC: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Dr*
SUBJECT: Coming Home

IR-09

Please get the dates that these major elements are coming back and where they are going to arrive—the 3rd ID, the Marines, the carrier battle groups and the like.

Torie, please think through what the President, Vice President or I ought to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041403-23

.....

Please respond by 4/18/03

U13395 /03

19 Apr 03



April 14, 2003 1:58 PM

Iraq

TO: LTG Casey
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Mobile Lab?

Please see if you can get a report from somebody on the truck that was supposedly a mobile biological lab.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041403-24

.....
Please respond by 4/25/03

U13396 /03

14 Apr 03



April 14, 2003 3:25 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: *Sixty Minutes*

You did great on *Sixty Minutes*. Good for you!

What can we do with Anan Makhia, the fellow who was on that program? He sure seems to talk good sense to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dli
041403-34

.....
Please respond by 4/25/03

000,77

U13397 103

cc: DSD : would you give SD
input? V/R

11-L-0519/OSD/15788

14 Apr 03

4/5
1700



EF-4899

April 14, 2003 3:53 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Oil-for-Food Contracts

Jaymie Duman
4/7

I would like to know where we stand on canceling a bunch of those Iraqi oil-for-food contracts. My guess is they were made with Saddam Hussein, they are bad and the country should not want them. The country should want the money more than the contracts.

Done

Please get me a report fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041403-35



Please respond by 4/18/03

4/16/03
DSD
As we discussed at yesterday's meeting, the CN Secy General is for the time being in charge of this OFF program so the USG cannot cancel any of the contracts

04-15-03 13:51 IN Doug Feith

14 Apr 03

cc: DSD

Done - 4/17

14 APR 15 2003

U13398 /03

14-L-0559/OSD/15789

11.4
400

↩

716

April 15, 2003 10:44 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Objectives

Handwritten: *Sir Attached TE*

Handwritten: *Jaymie Durnan*
Handwritten: *4/21* with arrow pointing to FROM:

Please give me a copy of the eight objectives I set forth.

Thanks.

Handwritten: *Jan*

DHR:dh
041503-4

.....
Please respond by 4/18/03

U13400 /03

Handwritten: *15 4/15/03*

DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld And Gen. Myers

March 21, 2003

Our goal is to defend the American people, and to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and to liberate the Iraqi people. Coalition military operations are focused on achieving several specific objectives:

- To end the regime of Saddam Hussein by striking with force on a scope and scale that makes clear to Iraqis that he and his regime are finished.
- Next, to identify, isolate and eventually eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, production capabilities, and distribution networks.
- Third, to search for, capture, drive out terrorists who have found safe harbor in Iraq.
- Fourth, to collect such intelligence as we can find related to terrorist networks in Iraq and beyond.
- Fifth, to collect such intelligence as we can find related to the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction activity.
- Sixth, to end sanctions and to immediately deliver humanitarian relief, food and medicine to the displaced and to the many needy Iraqi citizens.
- Seventh, to secure Iraq's oil fields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi people, and which they will need to develop their country after decades of neglect by the Iraqi regime.
- And last, to help the Iraqi people create the conditions for a rapid transition to a representative self-government that is not a threat to its neighbors and is committed to ensuring the territorial integrity of that country.



April 16, 2003 12:35 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Abu Abbas

*ADVANCE
COPY SENT*

Today at the NSC meeting, Tom Franks said "we" (meaning DoD—CENTCOM) are holding Abu Abbas. Is that true? He said they were waiting for a policy decision as to his disposition.

0005

Please get me the facts.

Gen. Myers—we should make sure we hold Abu Abbas if we in fact have him until we get a clear decision as to why we let him go and to whom we give him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041603-13



Please respond by 4/18/03

cc: DSK

U13401 /03

*16 Apr 03
10:06 AM*



April 16, 2003 12:37 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: OFF

We ought to think about calling the oil-for-food program "oil-for-palaces and weapons."

gang

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041603-14



Please respond by _____

U13402 /03

16 Apr 03



April 16, 2003 12:52 PM

TO: Doug Feith
Gen. Pace
CC: LTG Craddock
Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: "Win the Peace" Rhythm

ADVANCE COPY SENT

Would you two please get together with Ryan Henry and think through how we are going to organize for the post-Saddam Hussein briefings and management as we did for the war:

g-af

- The number of sessions per week with Garner and whoever else he wants.
- A tasking list with the due dates and who is responsible for performing.
- A list of briefings for me, the President, the NSC or the PC.
- Some metrics to track:
 - What is taking place on food, water, humanitarian assistance, security, etc.
 - Progress with respect to reestablishing the ministries.
 - Progress with respect to movement towards an Iraqi Interim Authority, etc.

Please get back to me this week with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041603-15

16 Apr 03



Please respond by 4/18/03


U13403 /03

cc: DSD

11-L-0559/OSD/15794



April 16, 2003 2:49 PM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Response to Senators Hagel and Biden

Over

Please coordinate with the White House for me in developing an answer to this letter to the President from Senators Hagel and Biden.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/4/03 Hagel and Biden ltr to POTUS

DHR:dh
041603-22



Please respond by 4/28/03

U13404 /03

16 April 03

RICHARD G. LUGAR, INDIANA, CHAIRMAN

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 16 2003

April 4, 2003

The President
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

With our troops engaged in Iraq, we know that your focus must be on winning the war. There may be difficult days ahead, but we share your conviction in the rightness of our cause, the skill of our soldiers and the certainty of our victory. Nonetheless, it is not too early to think about what the United States should do to win the peace that will follow the war in Iraq.

Last December we traveled to Northern Iraq and visited key allies in the Middle East. Nearly every leader we met stressed the importance of gaining international legitimacy for our efforts in Iraq. In our judgment, the best way to build such legitimacy is by involving our key allies and international organizations – starting with the United Nations -- in securing and rebuilding Iraq.

As you know, our decision to use force in Iraq produced deep divisions among our Security Council allies. Nonetheless, America should not, need not, and cannot take on sole responsibility for the challenges of a post-war Iraq. And we must not allow the Security Council and our Atlantic allies to become casualties of war. There are five main reasons for this:

First, building an Iraq that is secure, self-sufficient, whole and free will require tens of billions of dollars over many years. While Iraq's long-term economic promise is good, its short term prospects are bleak. Iraq's annual oil revenues, in the first years after Saddam Hussein, are projected to be no more than \$15 billion per year. Iraq is saddled with U.N. sanctions, an estimated \$61 billion in foreign debt, and approximately \$200 billion in reparations claims through the U.N. Compensation Commission. Experts who testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee put the price tag for post-conflict security, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction at between \$20-25 billion per year over 10 years. The United States should not bear this burden alone.

Second, a military occupation, even temporary, that includes only American and British soldiers could fuel resentment throughout the Middle East, bolster Al Qaeda's recruitment, and make Americans a target for terrorists everywhere. If, as is likely, the military mission stretches on for several years, the failure to include other countries would compound these problems and turn us from liberators into occupiers. We need to make the peace in Iraq the world's responsibility, not just our own.

11-L-0559/OSD/15796

Third, if the United States alone selects and seats a new Iraqi government, even an interim one, that will call into question the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people, the region and the world. Iraqis who have lived through the brutality of Saddam Hussein's rule should be given the time, space, and support to choose their own leaders and to develop the institutions of a stable, representative government. We should work with the international community to help them achieve that.

Fourth, we need to place Iraq in a regional context. We applaud your commitment to restart the Middle East peace process. True security for Israel and a better future for the Palestinians can only be achieved through a lasting settlement. Our Quartet allies -- Russia, the European Union, and the U.N. -- have worked with us to draft a Road Map out of the current impasse. In addition, we need to take real steps, beginning at the U.N., toward a new, inclusive approach to security in the Persian Gulf that builds confidence and prevents future conflicts. Pursuing Iraq's future alone could set back these efforts by alienating our partners and make Iraq's regional reintegration more difficult.


Fifth, many around the world question our motives in Iraq. Even long-time allies believe, wrongly, that we are driven by commercial interests or imperial designs. We have to convince them that they are wrong, or we risk the corrosion of our relations with key countries, the weakening of our alliances and the erosion of the U.N. That would undermine our interests, because we cannot contend with many threats to our security alone -- including the unfinished war on terrorism, the dangerous nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran, and the spread of infectious diseases like SARS. Making friends and allies who opposed the war our full partners in Iraq's peace can go a long way to dispel the hard feelings that have emerged in recent weeks.

In short, we believe it is critical to internationalize our policies for rebuilding a post-war Iraq, even as we retain full control on the security side, ideally with the involvement of NATO, the EU and countries in the region. The best way to do that is through a new United Nations resolution authorizing the necessary security, humanitarian, reconstruction and political missions.

As we were told by our allies in the region in December and in subsequent meetings, securing the U.N.'s approval would give political cover to leaders from allied countries whose people oppose the war, allowing them to justify their participation -- including financial participation -- in building the peace. It also would open the door to NATO, the European Union, and the World Bank. Without the U.N.'s endorsement, it will be difficult for governments and international organizations to buck strong public opposition and participate in stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq.


The President
Page 3

By refusing to disarm, a defiant Saddam Hussein made the fateful choice between war and peace. We must make sure that in winning the war, we also win the peace.



Chuck Hagel

Sincerely,



Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

cc: The Honorable Colin L. Powell
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld



April 16, 2003 3:22 PM

VIA E-MAIL

TO: ADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Thanks

Thanks for your e-mail. I appreciate it. Keep up the great work.

DHR:dh
041603-24



Please respond by _____

000.7700

U13405 /03

16 Apr 03

(b)(6)

From Admiral G

From: Giambastiani, Edmund P ADM J00 [edmund.giambastiani@jcom.mil]
Sent: Monday, April 14, 2003 8:55 PM
To: (b)(6) (E-mail)
Subject: great job on Sunday talk shows

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6) - please pass in.

SECDEF-- Great job on Meet the Press. You hit just the right notes including the "museum" comments. V/r Ed

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TRIP TO: CRAWFORD, TX

DATE: 8 AUGUST 2003

FLYING TIME: SEE ITINERARY
PLANE: C-9
TAIL: 31683
MSN: 6246

PASSENGERS: (SEE PAGE 2)

ITINERARY:		DETAILED ITINERARY RETAINED IN FILE	
FRI, 8 AUG 03	0630	DEPART ANDREWS AFB VIA C-9	3+00 BKFST -1
	0830	ARRIVE WACO, TX (TEXAS ST TECH AIRFIELD)	
	1535	DEPART WACO VIA C-9	2+45 DINNER +1
	1920	ARRIVE ANDREWS AFB	

CONTACTS: (SEE PAGE 3)

REMARKS:
AIRCRAFT COMMANDER (LTCOL DAVE CONN) W (b)(6) C (b)(6)
STEWARD (b)(6) C (b)(6) H (b)(6)

PREPARED BY PERSONAL SECURITY:

333 SD

8 Aug 03

MANIFEST

PASSENGER	ANDREWS - WACO	WACO- CRAWFORD	CRAWFORD- WACO	WACO- ANDREWS
RUMSFELD, DONALD SECDEF	X	X	X	X
CARD, ANDREWS HON	X	X	X	X
MYERS, RICHARD GEN (CJCS)	X	X	X	
AYERS, CARL LTC	X			X
BROWN, KEVIN MR	X			X
CAMBONE, STEPHEN DR	X	X	X	X
CRADDOCK, JOHN LTG	X	X	X	X
CROUCH, J.D. DR	X	X	X	X
DI RITA, LARRY MR	X	X	X	X
FEITH, DOUGLAS HON	X	X	X	X
MELOFCHIK, NEIL SA	X	X	X	X
MILLER, FRANK MR	X	X	X	X
MIERS, HARRIET MS	X	X	X	X
WEDIGE, TOM MSGT	X			X
TUBB, RICHARD COL DR.			X	X
TOTAL PASSENGERS	14	11	12	14



Telephone Contact Sheet



Crawford, TX 8 Aug 2003

Texas State Tech College (TSTC) Airfield (Raytheon)

Airport Supervisor Mr. Rowlan (Work)

USSS Liasion SA (b)(6) (Work)

USSS (Crawford Hard Room)

USSS (Card Detail) SA (b)(6)

Crawford Community Center

Fort Hood Protocol LTC Trip Palmaroy (Work)

OSD Security Advance (Dave Stevens) (b)(6) LaQuinta (b)(6) (Room 125)

(b)(6)

Staff Cell Numbers

Kevin Brown (b)(6)

Top Wedige

LTC Carl Ayers

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY / CLOSE HOLD~~

11-L-0559/OSD/15803



April 18, 2003 12:20 PM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Oil-for-Food

prop

This is an unacceptable answer with respect to the oil-for-food (OFF) contracts. It is true that the Secretary General is in charge of the OFF program, but it is also true, I am told, that a member of the UN Security Council can review those contracts.

I think we ought to get people up there reviewing them. Colin told me we did that all the time, anyway. Don't we?

Thanks.

Attach.
4/16/03 USD(P) response on SecDef memo #041403-35

DHR:dh
041803-10



Please respond by 4/25/03

U13408 /03

18 Apr 03

4/17
1700

67-4879 C411

April 14, 2003 3:53 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Oil-for-Food Contracts

Jaymie Durnan
4/17

I would like to know where we stand on canceling a bunch of those Iraqi oil-for-food contracts. My guess is they were made with Saddam Hussein, they are bad and the country should not want them. The country should want the money more than the contracts.

Please get me a report fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041403-35

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 16 2003

Please respond by 4/18/03

4/16/03

→ DSD

As we discussed at yesterday's Roundtable, the UN Secy General is for the time being in charge of this OIF program so the USG cannot cancel any of the contracts.

04-15-03 13:51 IN Doug Feith

cc: DSD
done
APR 15 1:20 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/15805

April 18, 2003 3:44 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Middle East Footprint

*ADVANCE
COPY SENT*

Middle East

I need a briefing for the President on the post-Iraq footprint in the Middle East and what we are going to be doing in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait and so forth.

He is interested in doing it on Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday—after he gets back and before I leave.

I would like a pre-brief on it on Monday or Tuesday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041803-11

.....
Please respond by 4/21/03

U13409 /03

18 Apr 03



April 15, 2003 12:04 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Disposition of Corpses

I hope you will get back to me with the information as to what has happened to all the corpses of the Iraqi people who were supposedly killed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041503-17



Please respond by 4/18/03

704

U13410 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/15807

15 Apr 03



April 15, 2003 12:01 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NATO Involvement in Iraq

draft

The President wants to push NATO involvement in Iraq. Let's get something going with State so we can communicate and get that done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041503-16

.....

Please respond by 4/25/03

U13412 /03

15 Apr 03

11-L-0559/OSD/15808



April 15, 2003 12:21 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Documenting Saddam Hussein's Regime

ADVANCE COPY SENT

The President wants us to pull together an effort whereby we have a major team to go in and document the Saddam Hussein regime—WMD, prisons, testimony from people, video, etc.

copy

The material could be used to prosecute individuals, to educate the Iraqi people as to what actually went on, and to educate the world.

There ought to be film, videos and tapes of the torture that we are told took place. It is partly a history project, and oral histories should be part of it.

Please get back to me by tomorrow telling me precisely who you recommend should do this task, with a timeline and charter.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041503-15

.....
Please respond by 4/16/03

U13413 /03

15-Apr-03



EF-4872
2/4/21

April 15, 2003 11:35 AM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DM
SUBJECT: Prep for Trip

ADVANCE
COPY SENT

333SD

I am going to be going out to the region on April 27. LTG Craddock will be setting up some meetings during the week of April 20 for me to get up to speed.

I think I should try to move the ball with respect to footprint in Saudi Arabia, so we will need good talking points. We will need talking points for Jordan as well.

I am probably also going to go to UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq, and Afghanistan, as well as Romania or Bulgaria.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041503-12

~~SECRET HAS BEEN~~

Please respond by 4/21/03

APR 19 2003 4/19/03

→ SD

I'm working with Bill Lutz and Andy Hocher to get you what you need on this

Doug Feith

U13415 /03

15 Apr 03

11-L-0559/OSD/15810



April 15, 2003 11:08 AM

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Metrics on Garner

Please push these guys to get a good form for Garner's people, so we have metrics we can use to track things—a report with maps, like we have been doing for the war.

bag

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041503-9



Please respond by 4/25/03

U13417 /03

15 Apr 03

April 15, 2003 10:52 AM

TO: LTG Craddock
CC: ~~Jaymie Durnan~~
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Meet w/Gen. Franks

Jaymie Durnan

4/18

Please make a note that I would like to meet with Gen. Franks on April 26 when he is up here for the White House Correspondents Dinner. Please find out when he is coming up.

Thanks.

TO SID 4/18
~~Jaymie Durnan~~

DHR:dh
041503-6

.....
Please respond by 4/18/03

[Handwritten notes and scribbles]

Sir, No He is staying in theater
COLB
11-L-0559/OSD/15812

Jaymie Durnan
4/18

U13418 /03

Carton

15 Apr 03



April 15, 2003 10:50 AM

TO: LTG Craddock

CC: Jaymie Durnan
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Change out of Battle Rhythm

Advance copy sent

334752

Please come to me with a proposal for the next week as to how we ought to do things, I will approve it and then we will work it out with the NSC. The President wants to start having NSC meetings twice a week, beginning next week. Condi is thinking of having it at 8:55 a.m.

The President is ready to have Gen. Franks do the brief on Wednesday (tomorrow).

Condi, Colin and I want to change our morning call back to starting at 7:15 a.m. beginning this Thursday and thereafter.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041503-5



Please respond by 4/17/03

U13419 /03

15 Apr 03



April 16, 2003 6:37 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Correction

Here is an article from the *Chicago Tribune* that is repeating the old statement that I damaged Shinseki by announcing his replacement more than a year before his retirement. Let's get it corrected.

Thanks.

Attach.

Tackett, Michael. "Rumsfeld Fights Battle in Pentagon," *Chicago Tribune*, April 6, 2003, p. 17.

DHR:dh
041603-1



Please respond by 4/28/03

020 amg

U13421 /03

16 Apr 03

Diplomats Cringe

By Bob Deans

Washington -- In dismissing France and Germany as "old Europe," suggesting that Israeli troops aren't really occupying Palestinian territories and laying out his vision for a democratic Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld has added statecraft to his job in ways that go far beyond the traditional bounds of a defense secretary.

Now, with the State Department and the United Nations set to play supporting roles to the Pentagon in Iraq, Rumsfeld appears to have secured a slice of the American diplomatic portfolio -- at the expense, some analysts argue, of Secretary of State Colin Powell.

The situation took on a new edge last week. Under Rumsfeld, a military strategy focused on swift and lean ground units backed by flexible air power prevailed in Iraq. Success came after weeks of second-guessing by armchair generals who favored the overwhelming force enshrined in the post-Vietnam Powell Doctrine.

The White House dismisses talk of a Rumsfeld-Powell face-off.

"This is a continuation of the great Washington parlor game of who's up and who's down," scoffed White House spokesman Sean McCormack. "They know what their jobs are, and they're doing them."

'A matinee idol'

There's good reason to wonder whether Powell, a retired Army general and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, might be more comfortable with the Pentagon running postwar Iraq than with the diplomats who advised him during months of failed efforts to win international backing for the war.

"He ran the military, he knows what the military can do," said former diplomat John Tkacik, a foreign affairs fellow at the Heritage Foundation, a Washington think tank.

Others, though, say Rumsfeld is driving outside of his lane -- pushing out Powell in the process.

"He's getting into things that should be the proper prerogative of the secretary of state," said Lawrence Korb, an assistant defense secretary in the Reagan administration. "It doesn't serve the United States, or the military, very well."

Critics argue that Rumsfeld has exacerbated long-standing frictions between career diplomats and Pentagon brass.

Last August, Rumsfeld suggested that Israel had seized Palestinian areas fair and square in war, challenging decades of U.S. policy declaring that Palestinian lands are occupied territories.

In January, he belittled French and German opposition to looming war against Iraq, undercutting Powell's efforts to bring them on board.

"I think that's old Europe," Rumsfeld said of Paris and Berlin. "The center of gravity is shifting to the east."

In March, as British Prime Minister Tony Blair was taking domestic heat for his support of the United States, Rumsfeld said he could take Blair's help or leave it.

"There are work-arounds," if the British pull out, shrugged Rumsfeld.

Rumsfeld, though, is hardly talking out of school. He increasingly speaks for the administration. Once referred to by Bush as a "matinee idol," Rumsfeld is the only Cabinet secretary who regularly takes questions from reporters -- typically twice a week, and on camera.

Profound change

To some analysts, the rise of Rumsfeld signals a more fundamental shift.

"The power that the United States has in the post-Cold War period is more in the hands of the people who are in the military establishment and the Defense Department than the diplomats," said Andrew Hess,

professor of diplomacy at Tufts University in Medford, Mass.

There's more at stake than mere turf battles.

Rumsfeld oversees unrivaled U.S. military might at a time when the Pentagon has been handed new missions as part of the global anti-terror campaign, and new authority -- a doctrine endorsing pre-emptive war.

Against that background, Rumsfeld's swats at diplomacy have sparked alarm at home and abroad, complicating Powell's job and feeding into global fears of an aggressively imperialistic American.

"I would call it kind of an arrogant unilateralism," said Korb, director of national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

Other analysts say it's no accident the tough-talking Rumsfeld has emerged as a key U.S. foreign policy spokesman.

"What they're trying to do," Hess said, "is to send a message that we have military power and we're going to use it and that people who challenge our interests in a threatening or a frivolous manner are going to be in deep trouble."

That message has been heard.

While Washington and London celebrate the demise of Saddam Hussein's regime, the military victory seems certain to aggravate fears that American influence and reach must somehow be countered.

On Friday and Saturday, Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has already signed a cooperation pact with China in part to try to offset U.S. economic and military power across Asia, hosted in St. Petersburg a meeting with the leaders of Germany and France. It's not hard to imagine the sort of conversation Putin had with Gerhard Schroeder and Jacques Chirac in the wake of a war that all three tried to scuttle.

Added to that are growing worries that military-run reconstruction efforts in Iraq

could fuel fears of a world of a long military occupation.

That's why argued that the United should lead the rebuilding Iraq. Bush rejected approach, making it clear U.N. humanitarian agencies will be welcome, provided they stay out of the way of Pentagon efforts to maintain security and manage reconstruction.

Whether he agreed or fell in line, Powell was on board by the time Bush headed to Belfast, Northern Ireland, on Monday to settle the matter with Blair.

"The military commander must be in charge for a period of time to stabilize the country," Powell told reporters aboard Air Force One. "There is enough work for everyone to have a role."

Chicago Tribune

April 6, 2003

Pg. 17

31. Rumsfeld Fights Battle In Pentagon

By Michael Tackett, Tribune Senior Correspondent

Of the many institutions around town, few can rival the Pentagon for political infighting. Republicans fight Democrats on Capitol Hill and intramural battles break out in the West Wing. But just across the Potomac River, where the generals are accustomed to salutes and "right away, sir," there long has been a sentiment that civilian leaders come and go while the brass is here to stay.

So maybe it should not have been surprising--even in the heat of war--that there would be skirmishes over the battle plan for Iraq that was approved by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and the one preferred by some generals, active-duty and retired.

As is so often the case in Washington, the fight of the moment is really a subtext for a larger conflict.

The plan approved by Rumsfeld called for a lighter,

faster force that relied more on Special Forces, precision bombing and technology than the overwhelming force of enormous numbers of troops and heavy armor.

In Iraq, it serves as a template for his broader design to transform the military, especially the Army, to fit his vision of the type of future conflicts the United States is most likely to face.

Too soon to judge

But the approach is facing an ultimate test, and how the war is resolved will go a long way in determining which view prevails. Just as it was perhaps too early to criticize the plan, as combat commanders in the field did last week, it is also too soon to judge it a success.

Rumsfeld has pushed that transformation almost from the first day of his second tour as defense secretary, and he has been critical of Army leaders, even announcing the successor to Gen. Eric Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, more than a year before Shinseki's scheduled retirement. He has questioned several expensive weapons systems programs, rankling the many constituencies with a vested interest in the contracts that go with them.

Segments of the military also have pushed back. Before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, in fact, it looked as if the military establishment might win and that Rumsfeld could be out.

Since then, his hand has been strengthened, and the war with Iraq presented the first opportunity to put his vision into practice, even though he now insists that this is "Tommy Franks' plan," a reference to the Army general who oversees the war from the U.S. Central Command headquarters in Qatar.

As long as there has been a civilian leader atop the U.S. military, there has been sniping from those in uniform. Few cultures are as tradition-bound as the Pentagon. Few bureaucracies are so dependent on pleasing the person directly

above in rank. Few organizations are as interdependent on the public and private sectors for success. And few are as resistant to change.

Most often, the fighting is not public. It is done through the command structure with assists from members of Congress whose districts include large bases or jobs from defense contractors, and along the so-called Iron Triangle alliance of top officers, defense contractors and Congress that sustains the Pentagon establishment. This time, the debate is playing out on live television.

"Old soldiers and generals, they don't fade away, they go to CNN, Fox News or MSNBC," said Jeffrey Krames, author of "The Rumsfeld Way," a 2002 book that details his management style.

"Rumsfeld came to the Pentagon with a mandate for transformation, and both he and President Bush—even, I believe, as early as January of 2001—spoke of this transformation," Krames said. "Rumsfeld's goal was to ensure that he would certainly steer the military in a way that would be able to deal with the new threats as he saw them and not the old threats."

Yet, as some of the difficulty in the fighting in Iraq makes clear—breaks in supply lines and guerrilla resistance—there are perils in Rumsfeld's design.

And any major problems are sure to be highlighted by those who oppose it. During the Clinton administration, many thought the civilian leadership was essentially quiescent to the Pentagon's wishes. Rumsfeld's style is decidedly different.

Civilian control

"The difference is that Rumsfeld is trying to, and properly so within the Constitution, to reassert civilian control over the armed forces," said Charles Moskos, an expert on military sociology and a professor at

Northwestern University. "The argument about using technology or more boots on the ground, that has to be settled by the civilian leadership."

The Pentagon hierarchy and operation, more than any other major part of government, operates along the same lines as a corporation.

"Whenever you are going to transform a huge organization, whether it is IBM, GE or the Pentagon, there are always going to be people who are not pleased with the changes," Krames said.

If the war turns out well, Rumsfeld isn't likely to stop.

"I don't think they [top military brass] have run into people who are as concerted in their determination to make something happen as Rumsfeld is," said one lobbyist with defense industry clients who has been in meetings with Rumsfeld.

And, as Rumsfeld said, it is "too early for postmortems."

Tribune staff reporter Douglas Holt contributed to this report.

Los Angeles Times

April 16, 2003

32. Suicide Too Frequently A Foe For Military

The armed forces' second leading cause of death prompts a call for greater prevention. The Marines have been hit especially hard.

By Hugo Martin, Times Staff Writer

One of the first casualties of the war with Iraq came more than a week before allied forces dropped the first bomb or fired the first bullet.

Marine Pfc. James R. Dillon Jr., who had just turned 19 in the Kuwaiti desert, apparently took his own life, stepping into a portable toilet at a Marine staging area and shooting himself in the head with an M-16 rifle.

Dillon, a Pennsylvania native who trained in

Twentynine Palms, left his comrades wondering if the pressure of the approaching war had been too much for the young man.

The death highlights a problem that has plagued the military, particularly the Marines, for years.

Suicide is the second leading cause of death in the military and a problem so serious it prompted the Defense Department to call recently for increased suicide-prevention efforts. Accidents, including motor vehicle crashes, are the leading cause.

Suicides claimed the lives of 118 active-duty servicemen and women in 2001 -- almost the number of American deaths so far in Iraq.

The overall suicide rate in the U.S. military is slightly higher than the rate for the nation's civilian population. But the military suicide rates are at least 30% lower when compared with those of civilians in the same age, gender and racial groups.

Still, military officials worry that the suicide rate appears to be on the rise in the Marines, the youngest and smallest of the nation's fighting units.

Marine Corps Gen. James L. Jones issued a statement in November warning that the number of suicides in the Corps for the fiscal year starting in October 2002 was on a pace that would double the 20 suicides of the previous 12 months. "We must focus our attention on ensuring every possible measure is taken to battle this tragic and senseless loss of life," he said.

According to Marines and other experts, the higher suicide rates could be attributed to several factors: Marines are typically younger than their counterparts in the other military branches; the Marine Corps has a reputation for imposing higher standards on its members; and there is a pervasive attitude that any Marine who speaks openly



April 16, 2003 7:49 AM

TO: Jay Garner
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DART Team

This is what I received from Colin. I have attached my response to him.

It sounds right to me. What do you think?

Thanks.

Attach.
4/15/03 SecState memo to SecDef re: DART Team
4/16/03 SecDef memo to SecState re: DART Team [041603-4]

DHR:dh
041603-6



Please respond by 4/15/03

U13423 /03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 16 2003

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 15, 2003

2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: DART Team

After discussing the issue over the weekend with Jay Garner and Andrew Natsios, I propose we apply a disciplined solution to the problem.

I need to keep command/ownership of the DART Team under USAID and me for a variety of reasons dealing mostly with relations with the NGO and humanitarian communities. However, I have told Andrew to instruct Mike Marx, the DART Team Leader, that I consider him under the operational control of Jay Garner. Mike is to respond to Jay's directions and taskings and report to him constantly. In the event of a major disagreement, or an instruction inconsistent with his USAID responsibilities, Mike is to come back to us for resolution. Otherwise, respond to Garner and keep us informed.




Colin L. Powell

cc: GARNER
DI RITA
ABIZAD
FERTT
HENRY

CLANMACK

cc: CSD
J. Dolan

April 16, 2003 7:47 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: DART Team

Thanks for your note of April 15 on the DART team. It sounds right to me. I will pass it along to Jay.

Thanks.

Regards,

DHR:dh
041603-4

11-L-0559/OSD/15819



April 16, 2003 7:57 AM

TO: LTG Craddock
CC: COL Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: C/C Call

It looks like the morning phone call with Condi and Colin will be at 7:15 a.m. beginning April 22.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041603-10

000,7150

.....
Please respond by 4/18/03

SECDEF HAS SEEN
APR 16 2003

Got it.
Will reflect that time
on your calendar
4/16

16 apr 03

U13424 /03



OB
6/2

April 21, 2003 12:21 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Tanker Issue

Please get a report back to me after you have talked to the people up on the Hill—
McCain, Hastert, etc.—and have seen what their views are of your proposed
solution on the tanker question.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042103-26

.....
Please respond by 5/9/03

452 T

U13425 /03

21 Apr 03



April 21, 2003 11:11 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Location of Forces in Phase IV

ADVANCE COPY SENT

Iraq

We simply have to get a lay down as to how these forces are going to be located in Iraq for Phase IV. I am concerned that they keep moving people to the wrong places.

Let's get it done fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042103-25


.....
Please respond by 4/25/03

U13426 103

01 Apr 03



April 21, 2003 11:08 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
 CC: David Chu
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
 SUBJECT: Stop-Loss/Reserves

I would like to see a proposal as to how we can begin fairly significantly ending stop loss and moving Reserves and Guard off active duty.

I would like a projection as to how that is going to take place over the period ahead.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042103-23

.....
 Please respond by 5/2/03


326

9/10/03

U13427 /03



April 21, 2003 9:11 AM

TO: Tony Dolan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Piece on Democracy

Your piece on democracy was excellent, helpful, instructive and informative and has now calibrated me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042103-16



Please respond by _____


092

U13429 /03

0199010



April 21, 2003 8:58 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Recovered Money

We have been finding millions of dollars in banks and from people we have arrested. I want to be able to start using that money to pay the salaries of people in Iraq.

JRH

Please get back to me and tell me if that is a problem.

Thanks.

DHR:dl
042103-13



Please respond by 4/25/03

U13430 /03

21 Apr 03

Snowflake

April 21, 2003 8:40 AM

TO: Public Affairs
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Photo Enlargement

4/21
Styvie Euman

Please give me an 8x10 enlargement of this photo.

Thanks.

Attach.
Photo of SecDef with PM Berlusconi

DHR:dh
042103-6

.....
Please respond by 5/2/03

4/22
4/22

060

21 APR 03

U13431 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/15826



11-L-0559/OSD/15827

↖

483

TAB

14
July 16, 2003

U/16
J3

1200

TO: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Train for Counter-Insurgency

You were there when Henry Hyde said that he heard the suggestion that we train and equip counter-insurgent people to deal with Iraq. Do you have any thoughts on that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071003-37

.....
Please respond by 7/25/03

14 JUL 03

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/15828

U13432 /03

05 JUL 17 AM 7:23

4/22/03
Snowflake



127

April 22, 2003 2:00 PM



TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: *National Review*

DR

Jaymie Duman

4/28

Please get me a copy of *National Review* magazine.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042203-8

TO SD



Please respond by 5/2/03

000.7

U13433 /03

22 APR 03

Ramesh Ponnuru: Colin Who?

NATIONAL REVIEW

VICTOR DAVIS HANSON:
WHAT WE DID
RIGHT

MARK HELPRIN:
WHAT WE DID
WRONG

PLUS:

JOHN DERBYSHIRE, JOHN J. MILLER,
JAY NORDLINGER, JOHN O'SULLIVAN,
DAVID PRYCE-JONES, DAVE SHIFLETT,
MEYRAV WURMSER & THE EDITORS
ON THE WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH

91003 2P00 NRV
VICTORIA CLARKE
DDO
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 88888

S/S
182
Snowflake



TAB A

#413

April 22, 2003 8:12 AM

Jaymie Durnan
5/9
TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: European MPs

Here is an article from *Newsweek* that says I refused to have European MPs. I have no recollection of anything like that. Do you?

Please get me the facts.

Thanks.

Attach.
Alter, Jonathan. "Smugness Is Our Greatest Enemy," *Newsweek*, April 28, 2003, p. 35.

000.7

DHR:dh
042203-2



Please respond by 5/1/03

Tab A

22 APR 03

U13434 /03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-929-03
5 May 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

ASMS/S

SUBJECT: European Military Police (MPs)

- In response to your question (TAB A) regarding a 28 April *Newsweek* magazine article concerning MPs not being deployed from Europe to Iraq, the following is provided.
- A review conducted by my staff, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM and the Department of the Army has been unable to identify a request that is likely to have been the basis of the allegation.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen N. A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/15832

OS

Jonathan Alter

Smugness Is Our Greatest Enemy

I KNOW IT'S A COMMON COMPLAINT, BUT WHY CAN'T PEOPLE EVER admit that their side might be wrong? The doves can't admit they were wrong about the rightness of freeing 24 million Iraqis, however chaotic the aftermath. And the hawks can't admit that they are wrong about the go-it-alone occupation, including a boneheaded Pentagon decision I came across that helped open the door for the looting of

some of civilization's treasures. Both sides are more dug in than the Third Infantry Division at Baghdad International Airport.

Let's be clear about the doves. They never said the United States wouldn't win militarily; their objection was based on other factors (rejection of "preventive" war, botched diplomacy, etc.). And they may be proved right: history's jury will be out a long time. Even so, I can't get over how churlish the left has become. When did the liberals take the "lib" out of liberation? This was a totalitarian regime we're talking about, with a boot on the face of the Iraqi people. The same folks who led the charge against fascism in Europe; who rightly spoke up against the U.S. government about "disappearances" in El Salvador and Guatemala; who carried high the banner of human rights—now they yawn at revelations of mass graves in Iraq and argue that the Iraqis will be no better off than before. Freedom's just another word that liberals have figured out how to lose.

The explanation is partly partisan politics. Many Democrats are so blinded by their loathing of George W. Bush that they can't think straight. In their hearts, they don't see Bush as the legitimately elected president, just as Tom DeLay and the right-wing attack machine tried to deny President Clinton's legitimacy from the outset, without even a Florida rationale. In both cases, this thinking can take you right over the cliff. (See Gingrich, N.)

Today too many Democrats are playing Charlie Brown to Bush's Lucy. Just as they were started talking about a quagmire, the war was won. Next football to be snatched away: WMD. At the precise moment this week or next that the liberals proclaim that Iraq has no chemical weapons after all, they'll finally turn up in Syria or some bunker. Promise. Republicans, meanwhile, remind me of Chris Rock's foc in "Head of



TAKING CHARGE: Franks exults in Baghdad

ministering their occupations. This crowd is more Kiplingesque.

Smugness can kill. It may be satisfying to say "Screw you" to the United Nations, and the United States got away with it during the war. But in an occupation, it's not smart. Isn't it about time the DOD started playing some defense? Which is the more likely target of suicide bombers: a barracks full of American soldiers or a barracks full of peacekeepers—including Muslim troops—from around the world? You'd think we could figure out how to run the occupation without presenting such a fat target.

In short, the fighting was brilliant; the immediate "follow-on" a failure. Donald Rumsfeld was right to have a light, speedy war plan. Another division wasn't necessary. But the "retired officers embedded in TV studios" (to quote our draft-deferment vice president about former generals Barry McCaffrey and Wesley Clark, who have four Silver Stars between them) were not entirely wrong. I learned last week that many Army officers wanted to airlift in 3,000 MPs (military police) from Europe

Today, many Democrats are playing Charlie Brown to Bush's Lucy. Just as they were talking about a quagmire, the war was won.

State." His slogan is "God Bless America—and no place else." Ari Fleischer says the White House can't keep the Rev. Franklin Graham, who has called Islam "a very evil and wicked religion," from performing Good Friday services in Baghdad and trying to Christianize the country. How about a phone call from his good friend the president (at whose Inaugural he spoke)?

Then there are those images all over the Arab world of Gen. Tommy Franks & Co. smoking cigars and getting comfortable in Saddam's presidential palace, as if they were the pigs in George Orwell's "Animal Farm" celebrating their revolution by moving into the farmer's house. Doesn't look too good to the other animals—or the Iraqi people. Gens. Douglas MacArthur and Lucien Clay took great pains to understand Japanese and German society before ad-

to protect supply lines and police Baghdad. That would have aided the drive to the capital and helped to protect institutions like hospitals and museums once forces arrived there. As it was, the main hospital wasn't even secured until an officer was alerted to the looting by New Yorker reporter Jon Lee Anderson.

But Rumsfeld apparently decided: no MPs. The European MPs would have had to be replaced by reservists. And if more reservists had been called up in the middle of the war, it would have reinforced the criticism that Rumsfeld hadn't sent enough troops. When the real history is written, we may find out that some of the world's oldest treasures were lost to looters in part because someone at the Pentagon suffers from the oldest of human sins—pride.

Tab A

TAB B

COORDINATION

US Army	COL Chappell	29 Apr
USCENTCOM	Col Halverson	29 Apr
USEUCOM	CAPT Cragg	29 Apr
USJFCOM	Col Day	29 Apr



April 23, 2003 6:52 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TA*
SUBJECT: Talking Points for ROK

We need to make sure we have the right talking points for the President when he meets with President Roh of South Korea.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042303-1

.....

Please respond by 5/5/03

KOREA

U13435 /03

23 APR 03



April 23, 2003 6:54 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: ROK Footprint

We have to brief the President on our Korea footprint.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042303-2

.....

Please respond by 5/5/03

*Currently scheduled
for Friday NSC*

U13436 /03

KOREA

23 April 03



April 23, 2003 7:00 AM

ADVANCE COPY SENT

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Phase IV in Afghanistan

We want to plan to go to Phase IV in Afghanistan while I am there next week on Monday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042303-6

cc: DSD
CJCS
AFGHANISTAN

.....
Please respond by 4/25/03

U13437 /03

23 APR 03



April 23, 2003 7:00 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Paying Bills in Iraq

ADVANCE COPY SENT

I simply have to know when we can start using the Iraqi money to pay bills.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
042303-7



Please respond by 4/25/03

IRAQ

23 APR 03

U13438 /03

4/25
11:30



April 23, 2003 3:48 PM

TO: LTG Craddock
Jaymie Durnan
CC: Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Henry Kissinger to Singapore

If I go to Singapore, Henry Kissinger may want to ride out or back with me. He is a member of the Defense Policy Board, so I suspect that is fine.

Thanks.

4/25/03
Dan Dell DR10
Worked

DHR:dh
042303-11

SINGAPORE

.....
Please respond by 5/9/03

SD:

- ① If you want to speak with Henry re official business, or Henry is going in an official capacity, no problem.*
- ② If not, he can still go, but must reimburse the government for full coach fare.*
- ③ The DPB role is not dispositive.*

23 APR 03

U13439 103

11-L-0559/OSD *Jaymie Durnan*
4/28

Jaymie



April 23, 2003 4:35 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: POTUS Events

The President said he is going to go meet the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN, probably around May 2, and he may want to do the announcement on Phase IV in Iraq. I wonder if we should try to have Tom Franks back for that event.

The President is also thinking about a possible event on Flag Day (June 14). I have him thinking about how we honor the troops, Tom Franks, et. al.

DRH

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042303-13



Please respond by 4/25/03

cc - dso

23 APR 03

U13440 /03



April 23, 2003 4:40 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Gen. LaPorte and NSC

ADVANCE COPY SENT

DONE

I told Condi I thought we ought to get Gen. LaPorte to brief the Korea plan via SVTC for the NSC on Friday, so the President can see it.

Let's push ahead on that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042303-14

KALGA

.....

Please respond by 4/24/03

cc: DSD

23 Apr 03

U13442 /03

125
1830

Snowflake

↑

April 24, 2003 6:54 PM

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CODELs in CENTCOM

Please get with Paul Wolfowitz and Jaymie Durnan and figure out how we handle the CODELs for the CENTCOM area. Give me a proposal either by fax while I am gone or on paper when I get back.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042403-23

*Powell:
ANY IDEAS?*

.....
Please respond by 5/2/03

*Jaymie Durnan
4/28
CENTCOM*

U13444 /03

24 April 03



April 24, 2003 6:57 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressional Piece

Please make sure you keep track of the Congressional piece of this thing for Tom Franks et. al.—the idea that he could speak in open session to the Senate Armed Services Committee on his AOR and then to the House side and then in the House chamber to both the House and Senate members who want to attend. I like that idea.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042403-24

.....
Please respond by 5/9/03

U13445 /03

↑

03
5/20

April 24, 2003 6:42 PM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Policy for Iraq

For Iraq, we have the responsibility to develop the overt policy that ties with the covert.

We also have an obligation to develop the concept for the policy for Iraq.

Why don't you get with Steve Cambone and others and get working on this, so we can do it ~~in the next short period~~ ^{over the next several} ~~period~~ of days.

DR

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042403-21

.....

Please respond by 5/9/03

cc: OSD

24 Apr 03

U13446 /03

↖

April 24, 2003 6:39 PM

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Tariq Aziz

Please find out where Tariq Aziz is physically located and whether I am going to be in that location when I am over there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042403-19

INFO

.....
Please respond by _____

Sir,

TARIQ AZIZ IS IN CUSTODY AT BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT UNDER TF-20 SUPERVISION.

SECDEF WILL BE IN THAT LOCATION - WE CAN REQUEST THAT CENTCOM MAINTAIN HIM IN BAGHDAD THRU 30 APRIL (DAY SD. VISITS BAGHDAD).

24 APR 03

U13447 /03

_____ YES _____ NO _____ PSM

v/r
COR S.

11-L-0559/OSD/15845

April 24, 2003 6:36 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*
SUBJECT: Press Briefing Material

ADVANCE COPY SENT

Please give me a copy of the material I cut out of my press briefing materials on the subject of whether or not we are going to have bases in Iraq. You were going to give that back to me, and you have not done so.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042403-17

.....
Please respond by 4/25/03

TRAD

U13449 /03

24 Apr 03



April 24, 2003 10:01 AM

TO: Andy Hoehn
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Security Cooperation Guidance

Good job on the Security Cooperation Guidance. I have signed it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042403-11



Please respond by _____

091.3

24 Apr 03

U13450 /03



April 24, 2003 9:53 AM

TO: LTG Craddock
 CC: Col. Bucci
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: General Renuart on Trip

ADVANCE COPY SENT

Tom Franks and I agreed that Gene Renuart would be with me on my trip in the Middle East this week, which I am glad to have.

We also agreed that he would not be with me on UK, Afghanistan or Iraq. He is going to be with me for the UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. We did not discuss Kuwait.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042403-9

.....
Please respond by 4/25/03

U13451 /03



April 24, 2003 9:26 AM

TO: Chris Williams
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

Thanks so much for your note and suggestion. We are working the problem and appreciate your thoughts.

Regards,

DHR:dh
042403-7

U13452 /03

cc. DST

11-L-0559/OSD/15849

(b)(6)

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 24 2003 April 21, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD

FROM: Chris Williams *CAW*

SUBJECT: Iraq Political Reconciliation Process

SD:
I have asked Policy to pull a paper together on this, with a recommendation
4/23
Jaymie

Sir, congratulations to you, General Myers, General Franks, and the entire DOD team – especially the brave men and women in uniform who continue to this day to risk much and exhibit extraordinary bravery – on a truly remarkable military accomplishment in Iraq. You are to be commended for your insistence on innovation and flexibility in the warplan – characteristics which were unfortunately in scarce supply in early 2001 when I had the privilege and opportunity of reviewing several of the then-CINCs’ warplans for you.

Jaymie Durnan
4/23

I recently came across a reference to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission established soon after apartheid collapsed. My limited understanding of that process is that it served a valuable purpose in allowing various elements of society to speak out and ultimately to come to terms with the actions taken by their government against the people.

Although I am no expert in the Truth Commission, I wonder whether it would be wise to explore the idea further, to see whether this same model (or something like it) would make sense in the Iraqi context. I suspect there are experts on the Commission to be found that could help shed light on this suggestion.

Please do not hesitate to let me know whether or how I might assist you in the future – whether in the context of the Defense Policy Board’s deliberations or in any other matter. Again, congratulations, sir. Best regards.

cc: Doug Feith



April 24, 2003 8:46 AM

TO: LTG Craddock
 CC: Col. Bucci
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Visiting Wounded on Trip

ADVANCE COPY SENT

Please see if there is a hospital in one of the countries I am visiting that I could stop by and see the wounded—Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Iraq or Afghanistan.

I would like to do that in even more than one place. That is a good stop for me. It is a good thing to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042403-5

.....

Please respond by 4/25/03

U13453 /03



April 24, 2003 8:42 AM

TO: Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Hospital Visit May 4

On the Sunday when I get back from my trip to the region, I want to go to either Walter Reed or Bethesda and see any wounded.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042403-4

.....


Please respond by 5/2/03

U13454 /03



April 25, 2003 8:09 AM

TO: Gen. Jumper

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Flowers

Thanks so much for the flowers for Joyce. She was most appreciative.

(b)(6)

Regards,

DHR:dh
042503-3

U13456 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/15853



April 26, 2003 3:09 PM

TO: Powell Moore
Jaymie Durnan
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Congressman Blount

I want to get to know Congressman Roy Blount. Let's get him down for lunch.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042603-18

.....

Please respond by _____

U13457 /03



April 26, 2003 3:09 PM

Done

TO: Powell Moore
Jaymie Durnan
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Getting Transformation Package Through

To get our transformation package through, I think we are going to have to get a commitment from the Speaker and Bill Frist.

Let's figure out what we think we want from them, and then have a meeting on it. Then we can think about meeting with them one at a time and getting their commitment, meeting with Frist first.

Thanks.

DHR:Jh
042603-21



Please respond by 5/16/03

U13458 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/15855



April 26, 2003 3:27 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Detainees

Colin Powell tells me that our folks have not loosened up those requirements on getting rid of the detainees at all, that his people came back in and said, okay where is our flexibility and even after that PC meeting we had, nothing was changed. What's up?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042603-23

.....


Please respond by _____

U13459 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/15856



April 26, 2003 3:27 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Articles from *NR* in *Early Bird*

You may want to put both the good and the bad article from *National Review* in the *Early Bird*.

Thanks.

DHR.jh
042603-25

.....
Please respond by 5/2/03

U13460 /03



April 26, 2003 4:34 PM

TO: Volko Ruehnke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Mullah Omar

I would like to know why we are not able to get any information on Mullah Omar in Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042603-28



Please respond by _____

U13462 /03



April 26, 2003 4:37 PM

TO: Marin Strmecki
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PRTs

DONE

Who thought of the idea of Provincial Reconstruction Teams?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042603-29



Please respond by 4/17/03

U13463 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/15859



April 26, 2003 3:00 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoS and Footprint Changes

I am concerned that the Department of State is starting to mess with our footprint around the world. That is the kind of thing we ought to do, and we ought to do it with the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commanders and OSD, not through the Department of State operating on their own like that.

They don't know what we need, and they shouldn't be working with the Combatant Commanders directly anyway.

Thanks.

DHR dh
042603-13



Please respond by 5/9/03

*SD
out box
DONE?*

U13464 /03



April 26, 2003 2:48 PM

TO: VADM Jacoby
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: DIA Paper

Thanks for your paper on Iraqi base realignment—a good idea.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042603-9

.....

Please respond by _____

U13465 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/15861



OB
5/20

April 26, 2003 2:40 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraq's Debt

Are you folks screwing your head into whether or not we ought to recommend Iraq just saying they are not going to repay their debts—that they don't have the money to do it.

Thanks.

DIR dlt
042603-o



Please respond by 5/2/03

U13466 /03



April 26, 2003 10:43 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
CC: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brief Gen. Franks

I think you ought to brief Gen. Franks on the plans we are considering for recognizing the troops and get his input, possibly with Gen. Craddock and me present, so we can have a discussion on that.

John should allow some time for that.

Thanks.

DHR dh
042603-5



Please respond by _____

U13468 /03



Handwritten mark or signature at the top right corner.

April 26, 2003 10:12 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Chart DSB to Do Lessons Learned

Please talk to ADM Giambastiani about this memo. My instinct is he is right, and someone ought to talk to Bill Schneider about it.

I saw Bill Schneider briefly, and he wanted to talk to me, but I told him I was leaving the country. See if Bill Schneider is comfortable with that and let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/23/03 Giambastiani (JFCOM) memo to SecDef re: Joint Lessons Learned

DHR dh
042603-2

.....
Please respond by 5/9/03

U13469 /03

4/24



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMMANDER
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 200
NORFOLK, VA 23551-2488

IN REPLY REFER TO:

(Handwritten mark)

J00
23 April 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Joint Lessons Learned

1. The purpose of this note is to offer a suggestion on how to put together a way ahead with respect to our Defense-wide and Joint and Combined Lessons Learned effort. After discussions with Gen Myers and Gen Larry Welch at the Institute for Defense Analysis, it seems to me that the best use of the DSB team to complement the JFCOM work and produce the best overall product would be to:

(1) Charter the DSB to bring together the Pentagon/Washington arena lessons learned as the Gen Myers has suggested and

(2) Charter the DSB to conduct a comprehensive process review of all our lessons learned efforts since World War II (the Strategic Bombing Survey) through Operation Enduring Freedom. Most of our Lessons Learned efforts are haphazard and late to form up with very mixed results in implementation. For example, I found no useful model to build the JFCOM lessons learned effort. It seems to me that a complete end-to-end review of the process asking questions such as those listed below would benefit DOD in the long run:

- What are the lessons learned from "Lessons Learned"?
- What processes existed?
- Which of them resulted in good data and good analysis?
- What long term organizational or process changes are required to institutionalize an effective "lessons learned" process for DOD
- Which "lessons noted" resulted in positive change for the Armed Forces?

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION	
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RB	X
LTG Campbell	X
CABLE CH	
FILE	

(Handwritten signature)

E. P. GIAMBASTIANI
Admiral, U. S. Navy

✈

#427

MAY 6, 2003

April 26, 2003 4:52 PM

(done on trip)

TO: Gen. Myers
 CC: LTG Craddock
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Vaught Letter

What do you think of this letter from General Vaught?

Thanks.

Attach.
 1/5/03 Vaught ltr to Cody

DHR:dh
 042603-30

.....

Please respond by _____

OTCS RESPONSE

5/22

ATTACHED

V/R

U13470 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/15866

5/21
0900



OSD

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2003 MAY 20 AM 7:41
CM-941 03
19 May 2003

Jaymie Duman

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3/22

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

AM 5/19

SUBJECT: Vaught Letter

- In response to your inquiry (TAB), the following information is provided.
- While Lieutenant General (Ret) Vaught's wealth of experience has allowed him to provide many thought-provoking ideas, his lack of involvement with the planning for the transformation of the forces in Korea leaves him unaware of the broader spectrum of missions envisioned for those transformed forces. Consequently, he misses the mark on some key points.
- The Future of the Alliance initiative is a phased effort, in part because of the assessment that the South Korean military is not currently able to defend the peninsula on its own. I therefore disagree with General Vaught's bottom line that US Forces should immediately draw down to a 7,000-person force, large enough only to assist South Korea in case North Korea launches an attack. He does not consider the strategic advantage of the proposed hub structure, which will provide peninsular and regional defense capability.
- The United States must have an active role in resolving the North Korean issues - any push, as General Vaught suggests, to have only "resident Asian powers" solve the issues without US involvement misses the point that this is a global, international issue.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5;

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT	<i>Duman 5/22</i>
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUGGI	<i>5/23/22</i>
EXECSE!	<i>5/10</i>

007483 03

2

**LT. GENERAL JAMES B. VAUGHT
(U.S. ARMY RETIRED)**

(b)(6)

January 5, 2003

FAX LETTER for LTG "Dick" Cody
G-3, U.S. Army

Dear Dick,

Happy New Year! This year can be the best or the worst, for the world, since the end of WWII. Referring to the Korea paper left with you on December 9th, 2002, what follows may be useful to you while the Korea issue is now on one of the two front burners. Listed below are some additional thoughts for your consideration.

1. Please see enclosed letter to Dr. Kim who has a very influential conduit to China.
2. Since we owe China nearly \$100 billion in trade deficit, China is unlikely to run the risk of aggravating its U.S. trade relationship by backing a loser called North Korea.
3. China has a larger, growing and more beneficial trade relationship with South Korea than it does with North Korea.
4. Russia badly needs our economic help and access to our oil market. The last thing Mr. Putin needs is a lessened economic and political relationship with the U.S.
5. Japan will stand back in fear of North Korea and wait things out. Many Koreans North and South still do not trust Japan who occupied, enslaved, and exploited all Korea from 1910 to 1945.

11-L-0559/OSD/15868

- 2 -

③

6. The resident Asian powers – China Japan, and Russia should resolve this issue. As a first step, they and we should demand that the president of North Korea come to the UN and explain why his country is violating its pledge to conform to the UN charter.
7. The UN command in South Korea should request all eighteen countries that fought there during the Korean War 1950-53 to send liaison teams back to Seoul to display UN solidarity against any invasion or attack by North Korea.
8. The modern South Korean Joint Armed Force are fully capable of defending South Korea against any evasion by the larger obsolete mass ground forces of North Korea. (Have the intel community do a net capability analysis of North and South Korea)
9. Some self appointed "Korea experts" are making some bad suggestions which are alarming the public around the world. It may be time for a reality check in the form of a "white facts paper".
10. An example of a bad idea is the suggestion that the 2nd I D be repositioned south of Seoul. Were this foolish idea implemented millions of South Koreans who now live north of the Han River would quickly conclude that the U.S. is not telling them that the north is about to attack. Residents north of the Han would pack up quickly and head south.
11. Finally – yes, we should withdraw our combat ground forces from Korea for two reasons
 1. They are not needed. 2. Our withdrawal will stop all claims that we intend to invade North Korea. Withdraw one Brigade equivalent NLT than the end of February and remainder NLT 30 June 2003. Withdraw troops only by air through Inchon, the world's most modern International airport. Between now and June 30th, tailor and position, primarily at Osan, a 7000 person joint strategic stay behind force to assist South Korea in case the North launches an attack.

(b)(6)

- 3 -

4

12. Remember - all three resident Asian powers may not really want Korca to become one nation, which could quickly become a strong competition.

Please pass any and all of the above to others that you believe may find it useful

Warm Regards,


Jim Vaught

PS, copies have been sent to LT 63
Abuzoich, Casey and Craddock.

7

LT. GENERAL JAMES B. VAUGHT
(UNITED STATES ARMY RETIRED)

(b)(6)

COVER SHEET: November, 2002

The enclosed paper was prepared a few days after the author returned from a trip around the world during the period September 28 to October 26, 2002. Major cities visited were: Helsinki, St. Petersburg, Moscow, an eight day stint on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, to Vladivostok, Seoul and Seattle.

The author has served three military tours in Korea since June 1950, and visited Korea dozens of times since his retirement from the Army in 1983. He is a founding Member of the Council on U.S. Korean Security Studies which completed its 17th annual meeting on October 15th 2002, in Seoul. CAUTION: Readers should anticipate that a majority of the conventional minded Admirals, Ambassadors and Generals who claim to be experts on Korea will quickly say the proposal is ridiculous. These are the same kind of conventional last war thinkers who said Jim Vaught was crazy when he led the Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt in 1980, and then insisted that the Joint Special Operation Command (JSOC) be organized, prepared, and made available to National Command Authorities as our nations first response to terrorism. He was also the person who organized and trained the Strategic 75th Rangers and the 160th Special Operation Aviation Regiment, "Night Stalkers" in 1979-80. After his retirement from the Army in 1983, as Commander of the ROK-US combined Field Army in Korea, he continued to work at all levels of the Armed Forces to create the unified Special Operation Command now known as SOCOM and its three service components: AFSOC, ARSOC and NAVSOC.


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(b)(6)

P. 08
8

2

Since most of the 47 million persons now living in South Korea were less than 10 year old or born since the truce was signed and the DMZ was established in mid 1953, it is understandable that they believe their 22 million North Korean relatives will not initiate a war against their modernized peace loving country. For fifty years South Koreans have relied upon and still expect the United States to defend them. It's time to ask them to defend themselves. The best way to send that message is to withdraw 30,000 of the 37,000 Americans now stationed in South Korea.



Jim Vaught

(9)

LT. GENERAL JAMES B. VAUGHT
(UNITED STATES ARMY RETIRED)

(b)(6)

12 November 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of The National Security Council
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
The Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff

CONCEPTUAL STRATEGY FOR FUTURE U.S. SUPPORT OF SOUTH KOREA

I. FACTS:

- A. North Korea (NK) has admitted that it has violated the 1994 nuclear accords and now possesses weapons grade plutonium.
- B. Unchecked NK can blackmail its neighbor South Korea (SK) into another period of prolonged negotiations while it perfects and produces biological, chemical and nuclear and weapons of mass destruction (WMD's) along with State of the Art delivery systems which will enable it to continue to threaten South Korea, China, Japan, Russian and US interest in the Region
- C. Certain SK political elements are still trying to justify and sustain the "Sunshine Policy"(appeasement by another name) which is the very policy that provided cover and enabled the NK's to violate the 1994 agreement.
- D. While the SK economy is currently functioning below capacity. It is nonetheless at

(10)

least 10 or more times stronger than the net capability of NK. It has strong and growing ties with China, Japan, Russia and several other East Asian Economic partners.

- E. North Korea with a population of 22 million has an active military force of more than 1.2 million with an equal or greater number of quick deployable reserves. South Korea with a population of 47 million has an active armed force of 620 Thousand plus 400,000 ready reserves. In sum there are nearly 4 million persons in the combined armed forces of NK and SK. Clearly the assets used to support these large single purpose forces could better be used to build a unified Korean nation at peace.
- F. The US, as the continuing UN agent in SK, maintains a 37,000 person force in Korea with other forces ready to reinforce if the 50 year old truce is violated. US forces in the event of renewed combat would fight along with SK as part of the SK lead Combined Forces Command (CFC).
- G. I was in SK during October, 2002, when the announcement was made that NK had admitted it had violated the 1994 accords. Immediately, well placed influential SK's began asking me how will the US defend us now. They never suggested they should defend themselves.

II. ASSUMPTIONS:

- A. An all out attack by NK from the vicinity of the so called DMZ which is in fact a heavily militarized zone (HMZ) would result in heavy damaged to the greater Seoul area which now has a population of more than 18 million.

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- B. Properly led the SK combined forces command could begin a Conventional Counterattack within 10 days or less with an objective of moving north and destroying the NK armed forces.
- C. Scenarios A and B above would result in 3-5 million civilian casualties and 200-300 thousand military casualties and several billion dollars worth of lost or damaged infrastructure.
- D. The NK's are using the oil, food and other assets provided by the US per the 1994 accords to sustain approximately 3 million persons, primarily government workers, and their nearly 2 million person armed forces. The remaining 17 million NK's are virtually starving. While the US and several smaller outsiders provided food programs have helped the people in the countryside to survive conditions get worse with each passing day. There are now an estimated one-half million undernourished mothers with dry breast trying to give milk to their newly born babies. Well intended US policy has enabled these terrible circumstances.
- E. Unless the US adopts a drastically revised strategy the SK's will continue to rely on the US to defend them while they try to talk the NK's into some new worthless agreement to buy more time and put off doing what is necessary IE: (devising a political economic and military policy they can execute with United Nations backing that will force an end to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) and enable the beneficial use of the several billion dollars of assets which are now being wasted each year on the maintenance of the 4 plus million persons armed forces now resident on the Korean peninsula.

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- F. China, Japan and Russia may see a unified Korea as an unwelcome competitor. Hence, a request that they join or support this initiative may receive a lukewarm or negative reply..

III. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE:

- A. Announce that the US intends to withdraw approximately 30,000 of its forces from SK during the next six months (approximately 7,000 persons would be left in SK to support the combined forces command). Most of the stay^{behind} force would be stationed at ~~Osan~~ ^{Osan,}
- B. The US would continue to provide C4-I and other critical unique US enabling power to the CFC
- C. Most of the US equipment and supplies now in SK would be turned over to the CFC (Note: A few items which are badly needed elsewhere in the US Armed Forces would be withdrawn.)
- D. The SK armed forces should be asked to provide a 10,000 person cadre and fillers to add to the existing 5,000 KATUSA's, who are already serving in US units and are familiar with US equipment, to form another SK division to reinforce the CFC Counterattack Force.
- E. Encourage the CFC to withdraw its forward deployed divisions which are stationed along the HMZ to positions out of range of the DPRK's fixed bunked artillery now deployed along the HMZ. This action would enable several beneficial advantages to the CFC such as:
1. Preclude more than 1/2 of SK's best front line divisions from being

13

devastated by the DRP's dug in forward deployed artillery in an initial attack.

2. Provide a 10 thousand meter wide killing zone where an attacking NK ground force could be devastated by CFC's combined air and Ground counter-fires.
3. Enable a largely intact CFC counterattack force to move against the attacking DPRK force on familiar ground while being supported by heavy volumes of CFC air and ground firepower.
4. Enable the CFC to take the fight to the enemy and move into NK territory in less than 10 days after any NK attack.
5. The CFC could use superior US C4-I to preclude the DPRK's surprise use of weapons of mass destruction (NOTE: the US should provide an early warning to the DPRK that in effect says, "Should you the DPRK prepare to use or actually use any weapon of mass destruction, Biological, Chemical or Nuclear, the US will attack and destroy all such weapons without further warning." (China, Japan and Russia would be made aware of this reality).
6. The DPRK would be informed of our ability to implement the above policy and encouraged to withdraw its armed forces from the HMZ and immediately begin demobilizing. They could be told that their demobilization would be monitored by UN observers and that SK's CFC would also demobilize on a *quid pro quo* basis until both armed

14

forces are reduced to below a combined total of no more than 100,000.

The resources saved by the above actions would enable the emergence of a new unified Korean Nation which would become a political economic and military democracy at peace and in full compliance with and in support of the UN charter.

7. The withdrawn 30,000 US Troops could be used to reinforce Special operations structure (For example: activate 4 new Ranger battalions, 2 more Special Forces Groups and reinforce Other Special Operations elements). Other spaces would be used to speed up transformation.

IV RECOMMENDATIONS:

- A. Form an Economic-Political-Military study group to examine the above concept and provide a preliminary report within 30 days or less.
- B. Devise a phased implementation plan to be announced as soon as we know the Iraq issue is resolved.
- C. Revise the (ROK-US) bilateral treaty as needed
- D. Since the US has been the UN's agent in Korea since 1950 timely and appropriately notification needs to be made to that body.
- E. Use the removed 30,000 US Military manpower and recouped funds to:
 1. Strengthen Special Operations forces
 2. Facilitate transformation and modernization
 3. Improve the overall US capability to conduct broad spectrum 21st


15

Century Military Operations

F. Use the funds saved and recouped for higher priority missions and to reduce the national debt.

V. COMMENT:

In Sum, the above Concept would enable Korea to resolve the expensive 50 year old wasteful "jostling" contest and liberate 15 million + oppressed starving North Koreans from the yoke of an untrustworthy rogue dictatorship, namely Kim il Sung and his 5 million plus fellow travelers. A unified Korean Democracy would put a smile on the face of God.



Jim Vaught

↩

C4/28

April 27, 2003 5:44 AM

TO: Bill Luti
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ^{DR}
SUBJECT: Contributions

Please have someone write in by hand the numbers Dov suggested we ask the three countries to help Poland.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042703-2

.....

Please respond by 4/28/03

DOVÉ

DOV. Z SUGGESTED:

SAUDI ARABIA : \$40M
QATAR : \$30M
UAE : \$20M

U13471 /03



April 27, 2003 5:46 AM

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: David McCullough Statement

Please get me a copy of the prepared statement David McCullough gave on April 10 to a special hearing of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions. There was a write up in the April 11 issue of the *Washington Times* by George Archibald titled, "Ignorance of U.S. History Called Threat to Security."

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042703-4

.....
Please respond by _____

U13472 /03



April 27, 2003 3:55 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Franks on CNN International

Please get the CNN International Focus profile on Tom Franks that was broadcast on April 27. It had various people on, including Dan Christman and Michael O'Hanlon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042703-6

.....
Please respond by 5/9/03

U13473 /03



April 27, 2003 3:55 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: No Embassies in Baghdad for Now

Please tell the Department of State that they ought to send out a cable discouraging countries from going into Baghdad with embassies. The city is not safe. They ought not to be in there. We cannot and will not try to protect them.

And if they come in, they are making a mistake. We will let them know when the environment is sufficiently permissive to come in. If they come in, they are coming in at their own risk and they ought not to ask us for any assistance whatsoever. We are still engaged in a conflict.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
042703-9

.....

Please respond by 5/2/03

U13474 /03

April 27, 2003 3:55 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: MEK

We have to figure out what we are going to do with the MEK. It turns out that a number of the commanders are women, and a lot of them have MBA degrees. These are some very talented people.

Is there anything we think we ought to do besides lock them up?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042703-10

.....
Please respond by 5/9/03

U13475 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/15884


I need

27.7.03



OB
5/20

April 27, 2003 4:04 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Selling Oil

We simply have to solve the issue of how we can sell the oil and provide funds to support the Iraqi people. They need help.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042703-11



Please respond by 5/2/03

U13476 /03

5/14 1600

↑

Snowflake

April 27, 2003 4:18 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
 SUBJECT: Thoughts for POTUS Events

Sir:
 Please see attached.
 T.C.

Jaymie Durnan
 5/23

Why don't you think about whether or not the President ought to come out and do a meeting in Kuwait with the troops, and then have a meeting with the heads of state of the GCC countries, possibly in Saudi Arabia.

It's a thought. Please check it out with your friends.

Thanks.

Sir, 5/14
 COPY PASSED TO
 SD PER MS CLARKE.
 V/R
 CDR SEMELE

DHR:dh
 042703-14

.....

Please respond by 2/9/03

U13477 /03

14 May 2003/0930

TO: SecDef

FROM: Terie Clarke

SUBJECT: Thoughts for POTUS Middle East Trip

Assumptions:

POTUS visit to Middle East will be:

- Welcomed by many as sign of his commitment to peace process.
- Exploited by some as sign of U.S. intent to dominate region.
- Viewed through prism of evolving U.S.-Arab relationships and changing "footprint" in region.
- A spotlight on U.S. presence in Iraq -- how long, how many?

Objectives:

- Demonstrate sincerity and long-term nature of U.S. commitment to a Middle East peace process.
- Emphasize U.S. respect for Arab culture and heritage.
- Thank U.S./Coalition troops for job well done but make clear there is still hard work ahead in the global war on terrorism (GWOT).
- Make clear we said what we meant about Iraq: we'd stay as long as necessary, but not one day longer.

Strategy:

- Manage expectations -- about Middle East and GWOT.
- Demonstrate sincerity and respect through tangible signs of commitment on both fronts (Middle East and GWOT) and tangible signs of respect for their culture and heritage.

11-L-0559/OSD/15887

Major Elements:

Before trip:

- POTUS presents "Mohammed" with a commendation at White House (White House has under consideration).

On trip:

- Visit 5th Fleet HQ in Bahrain. While there, visit DoD school attended by Bahraini children.
- GCC meeting in Kuwait in which POTUS participates.
- Darryl Worley concert in Kuwait for troops or concert by Arab/Western duo. POTUS introduces entertainer(s).

In Baghdad:

- POTUS gets briefed by Jay Garner and Iraqis on humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.
- POTUS announces return dates for 3rd ID and 1st MEF.
- POTUS delivers message to Iraqi people via Commando Solo and other transmission capabilities.

In An Najaf:

- POTUS, with appropriate escort, visits Ali Mosque in An Najaf, one of the most important mosques in the world and protected by U.S. troops.

In Afghanistan:

- POTUS visits KMTC and watches ANA training. Depending on timing, could be there for a graduation.
- Potential announcement with Karzai of additional PRTs.
- POTUS and Mrs. Bush visit a school.

5/1/03



→ MPP

April 29, 2003 1:59 PM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Recruiting and Retention Since the Start of Operation Iraqi Freedom

Your report of April 11 [U06866-03] doesn't say compared to what. I need to see trends or comparisons.

Thanks

DHR:dh
042903-3



Please respond by 5/5

cc: DSD

U13478 /03

7/6
1720



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET

2003 JUL -03 PM 6:27

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

July 3, 2003, 12:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

David S. C. Chu 7 July 03
(Signature and date)

SUBJECT: Recruiting and Retention Since Start of Iraqi Freedom

- You asked about recruiting and retention since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and I responded (~~7/1/03~~). You requested trend data (~~7/1/03~~). This responds.
- Retention is strong with overall retention the highest in six years. Even amidst Stop Loss, troops may reenlist — and they are doing so in numbers sufficient to meet retention goals of the Services. Pocket skill shortages continue, but are not as severe as over the past six years. Table 1 shows the percentage of the enlisted force retained over the fiscal year, as a fraction of those who started the year.

	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03*
Total Continue	82%	85%	85%	85%	85%	85%	86%	87%

* FY 2003 to Date

Table 1 - Retention - DoD Components (Active)

- Recruiting news also is good. Annual goals were missed in FY 1999-2000, but were met in FY 2001-02, and have been exceeded for FY 2003 to date. See Table 2.

	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03*
Recruit HS Grad	96%	90%	91%	93%	94%	94%	96%	96%
Top Half Aptitude	71%	66%	66%	66%	63%	69%	69%	71%
Recruiting Goal Met	102%	100%	100%	96%	97%	100%	100%	102%

* FY 2003 to Date

Table 2 - Recruiting - DoD Components (Active)

- The proportion of high school graduates among recruits matches its high point over the past six years, and the representation of top-half aptitude recruits (math and verbal aptitude, which correlates strongly to job performance) is at its highest level in six years.
- The numbers look good, but factors today operate in our favor: unemployment levels conducive to recruiting and retention; strong patriotism; and atypically strong compensation for many (e.g., tax free income in combat zones). As these change, solid pay raises will help guard against any quick downward shifts.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: LtCol Gina Grosso, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	7/10
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	7/9

11-L-0559/OSD/15890

U10703 / 03



April 29, 2003 1:58 PM

TO: ExecSec
CC: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Response to William Grant

ExecSec—Please have the writing team type up the following letter, then SOM and send it out for me. (b)(6) Please send a copy of Bill's letter and the poem home to Joyce. C&D has the original on file.

*Mr. William R. Grant
Chairman
Galen Associates
610 Fifth Avenue
Rockefeller Center
New York, NY 10020*

Dear Bill,

Thanks so much for your note of April 25 and the poem from your granddaughter.

Keep your eye on that 11-year-old young lady—she is going to be something very special one day! Do extend my best wishes and appreciation to (b)(6)

Regards,

DHR:db
042903-2



Please respond by _____

U13479 /03

24/2



GALEN ASSOCIATES

**WILLIAM R. GRANT
CHAIRMAN**

April 25, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon (Room 3E)
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Don,

In your pressured life I thought you would find the enclosed a relaxing read of a poem by my eleven-year-old granddaughter.

It is encouraging that there will be some in the coming generations that have the feeling for "what is right".

All the best.

Sincerely,
Bill
William R. Grant

SECRET/ CABLES	
DISTRIBUTION	
SECRET	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DEFENSE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
REL ASST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DIAGNOSIC	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
UNDP	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
UNM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CRD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
OOD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CC	
IS	
CABLES CH	
FILE	

610 Fifth Avenue, Rockefeller Center, New York, NY 10020

(b)(6)

FAX (b)(6)

4/20

And those free of it were few

*The march went on
The days were long
But the U.S. of A lived on*

*When it was clear
That the end was near
Those protestors were silenced*

*When it was clear
That the end was near
Those supporters found their voices*

*"There was a war," the supporters said
Their confidence quickly building
"There was a war," the supporters said
"With the United States defeating!"*

(b)(6)



April 28, 2003 8:00 AM

TO: ExecSec
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Letter to David McCullough

Please have the Writing Team type up the letter below to David McCullough, the historian, then SOM and send it out for me.

Dear Mr. McCullough:

I saw an article in the Washington Times of April 11, 2003, that reported on a presentation you made to a Senate panel on April 10. It reported that you emphasized the importance of knowing history.

You are right on the mark! I hope you will keep spreading the message.

With my best wishes,

DHR:dh
042603-31

.....
Please respond by _____

*Zeno -
Please do -
Thanks.*

Jaymie Durnan

4/28

U13481 /03



April 24, 2003 7:43 AM

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Singapore and SARS

We might want to think carefully about whether or not I go to Singapore.
Apparently SARS is big there.

I am not sure I want to take a plane full of our folks in there until we see what happens.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042403-2




Please respond by 5/9/03

U13482 /03



April 21, 2003 8:48 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Doug Sears

Here is another note from (b)(6) The e-mail to her is from the former president of St. John's College at Delattre, and he is recommending a man named Doug Sears. It is self-explanatory.

Would you please see that it is fed into the process of people who could be helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/18/03 E-mail to (b)(6)

DHR:dh
042103-9

.....
Please respond by 5/2/03

U13483 /03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 21 2003

Subj: **Fwd: resume**
Date: Friday, April 18, 2003 2:20:08 PM
From: (b)(6)
To:
cc:

*Ed
DeLaHue
Summer President
St John's*

(b)(6)

* I learned earlier this week that Don Rumsted and the Pentagon are looking for suitable people from the United States to advise the Education Ministry in Iraq. Obviously, the worst thing we could do is send the kinds of educators from the education establishment here at home who have ruined

so much of our own public education with fads and fashions and phony research and political correctness and educationist prejudices. But such people, along with their associations and advocacy groups always jump in and try to corner such opportunities.

So, I thought it might be useful to put forward a man who would be ideally suited to serving in such an advisory capacity to the Ministry in Iraq. His resume is attached below, and I am also sending you a copy, along with a copy of this message, by FEDEX.

The man is Doug Sears. He served with distinction in the U.S. Foreign Service in the 1980s, earned a Ph.D. in political science from Penn State in 1987, and became John Silber's Chief of Staff here at BU just before 1990. In 1995, we named him Superintendent of Schools in the Boston University/Chelsea Partnership; in 2000, we named him chairman of the management team of the partnership (a position he still holds); and, on my recommendation in which John Silber concurred, Doug has now succeeded me

as

Dean of our School of Education.

Doug is a man of great practical wisdom, intellectual refinement, integrity, and tact when it is needed. He knows the facts of life in international politics and has no naivete in him; and he understands that some issues cannot be settled honorably or prudently by compromise. He and his wife Mary are very close to Alice and me, and their daughters Sarah (14) and Hannah (9) bring much joy to us.

Don would be able to trust Doug as thoroughly as I do, and education in Iraq would benefit profoundly from Doug's service. Please do let me know of anything else I should do to bring Doug to Don's attention. I hope you will convey Alice's and my fond and respectful regards to Joyce and Don.

(b)(6)
Ed

>
>

----- Headers -----

(b)(6)

Date: Fri, 18 Apr 2003 13:33:37 -0500

(b)(6)

Subject: Fwo resume

(b)(6)

Content-Type: multipart/mixed;

boundary="===== (b)(6) ====="

Douglas Sears

(b)(6)

EMPLOYMENT

- Dean and Professor, Boston University School of Education.
January 2003-present.
- Dean, *ad interim* and Professor, Boston University School of Education.
September 2001-December 2002.
- Associate Dean and Professor, Boston University School of Education.
February 2000-August 2001.
- Superintendent, Chelsea, Massachusetts Public Schools.
July 1995-January 2000.

As Superintendent, responsible for day-to-day management of the schools under the Boston University/Chelsea Partnership agreement. The school system enrolled over 5,800 students and had an annual operating budget of over \$40 million.

- The combined average SAT score in Spring 1995, shortly before assumption of superintendency, was 727. In Spring 2000 combined average was 868, a gain of 149 points.
- Advanced Placement courses were introduced to Chelsea High School in 1996. The overall number of AP tests taken rose from 13 in 1996, when the average score was 1.62, to 115 in Spring of 2000, when the average score was 2.56.
- A \$115 million school construction project was completed on schedule and on budget. Seven new schools were built and an eighth, the nationally recognized Early Learning Center, was completely renovated.
- Average daily attendance, first tallied in a systematic and accurate way in the 1996-1997 school year, rose consistently from 88.6 percent to 93.3 percent in Spring 2000.
- Assistant to the President, Boston University. September 1988-July 1995.

Senior staff position with chief executive of research university enrolling 30,000 students. Principal responsibility was for troubleshooting in all areas of university life including admissions, financial aid, housing, discipline, and personnel.

EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

- United States Foreign Service Officer. August 1984-August 1989 (includes leave of absence August 1988-August 1989).

Tenured, September 1988. Meritorious Honor Award, 1988. Second Secretary (Economic Section), American Embassy, Bern, Switzerland, December 1986-August 1988. Vice Consul and Third Secretary, American Embassy, Manila, The Philippines, January 1985-July 1986.

- American Embassy Bern

Represented United States government positions to government of Switzerland and prepared analytical reporting cables on economic and political issues including civil aviation, technology transfer, GATT, European integration, and agriculture. Screened and assigned priority to ambassador's cable traffic and prepared speeches and remarks for the ambassador's public appearances. Because of personnel shortages and reassignments served variously as acting chief of economic, political, and treasury sections of the embassy. Designated as embassy contact officer with Swiss Foreign Ministry during crisis following U.S. shutdown of Iranian civilian jetliner and as part of that responsibility relayed U.S.-Iranian communications via Swiss Foreign Ministry.

- American Embassy Manila

Assignment coincided with period of political upheaval that resulted in the collapse of the Marcos regime and establishment of the Aquino administration. As Vice Consul, conducted interviews to determine eligibility of applicants for immigrant and non-immigrant visas and issued and renewed American passports. As Third Secretary, traveled to northern Philippines to collect information and prepare reports in anticipation of a disputed election. Served as election observer in the province of Ilocos Norte. Contributed to reports that served as basis for White House conclusion that election was corrupt. Served on joint U.S.-Philippine Fulbright scholarship selection panel.

EDUCATION

- Ph.D. in Political Science. May 1987, Pennsylvania State University.

Dissertation: "Strategic Ambivalence." Adviser: Dr. Robert Harkavy.
Comprehensive Examination Fields: International Relations,
Comparative Politics, American Politics. Geographic area
Concentration: Eastern Europe/Soviet Union.

- International Summer Course on National Security. Summer 1982, Christian Albrechts University, Kiel, Germany. Non-degree.

1
Douglas Sears
Page Three

EDUCATION (cont.)

- M.A. in Government. June 1977, Lehigh University.

Master's Thesis: "A Critique of Selected Radical Revisionist Historical Contentions Regarding the Origins of the Cold War." Adviser: Dr. Nils Wessell (currently Professor at the Coast Guard Academy.)

- B.A. in History. December 1974, Bates College.

LANGUAGES

- German, fluent. Last tested November 1986, Foreign Service Institute (FSI), score 3+/3+. Maintained through regular reading and practice.
- Russian, reading knowledge. Last tested 1984, FSI, score 1/2.

PUBLICATIONS

- "No Good Deed. . ." *Connection*, Volume XVI, Number 2, Fall 2001.
- "Das Chelsea Projekt: Eine Partnerschaft zwischen Universitaet und Schule," with Dr. Thomas Kingston. *Bildung und Erziehung*, 50. Jg. Heft 2/Juni 1997.
- "The Partnership: the Present." *Journal of Education*, Volume 176, Number 1, 1994.
- "Soviet Control Mechanisms and Enticements: Military Alliances and Arms Transfers." *Soviet Union*, Volume 13, Part I.

BOARD MEMBERSHIPS

- Chairman, Boston University Management Team for Chelsea. February 2000-present.
- Treasurer, Board Member, American-Swiss Foundation. March 1998-present.

AVOCATIONS


Fitness (running, rope jumping), reading and language study, music and dancing.

PERSONAL

Married to (b)(6) Two children, (b)(6) and (b)(6)



April 21, 2003 8:44 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Kevin Woelflin

Here is a note (b)(6) sent Joyce from a man who is interested in helping with Iraqi reconstruction. It is self-explanatory.

Would you please see that he gets an acknowledgement and that his capabilities are fed into the process.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/12/03 Woelflin e-mail to (b)(6)

DHR:dh
042103-8

.....
Please respond by 5/2/03

U13484 /03

Kevin Woelflein

(b)(6)

SECDEF HAS SEEN
APR 21 2003

Dear

(b)(6)

As I watched the TV coverage of the events in Iraq and of the G-7 Meeting here in Washington, I thought that my experience should be of interest somewhere in the U.S. government. Thus, I thought I would refresh and focus your understanding of my background in hopes that you may guide me in my search to find the right place where I may help the Iraq reconstruction effort in any way.

April 12, 2003

Most importantly, I believe that I may be among the very few Americans who had the Finance Minister of Iraq as immediate boss for about seven years. His name was Fawzi El Kaissi, who held responsible positions in Iraq before and during the Saddam Hussein era. Rather, he was a respected international banker who attended G-7 Meetings. He earned a PhD at the University of California and he was the founding Chairman of the UBAF Arab American Bank, an Arab consortium bank with a New York State bank charter and member of the Federal Reserve. I was the founding President, CEO and Chairman of the Executive Committee. Charles Scanlon, UBAF Director and retired General Motors executive and former President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago replaced me temporarily when I was recruited to be President of American Security Bank in Washington.

The UBAF Arab American Bank (later Arab American Bank) had 16 Arab Banks and 4 American Banks as stockholders. The four American banks were Bankers Trust, First Chicago, Texas Commerce Bank and Security Pacific Bank. Among the Arab banks was Arab Bank, Jordan, Central Bank of Egypt, Central Bank of Morocco, Commercial Bank of Syria, Riyadh Bank, Saudi Arabia, National Bank of Abu Dhabi, Alihali Bank of Kuwait, Central Bank of Oman, Libyan Arab Foreign Bank plus sister consortium banks in England, France, Germany, Italy and Japan.

The Arab consortium bank in New York was not the first banking institution that I founded. Prior to being selected by First Chicago, with approval of the Arab banks, as founding President of UBAF, First Chicago sent me to be the founding General Manager of the Tokyo Branch, which I ran for 3 years before moving to New York.

I also was recruited by The Massachusetts Company, Boston, to structure a non-bank bank reporting to the Keystone Mutual Funds, then wholly owned by Travelers Corporation.

11-L-0559/OSD/15903

I have traveled extensively in the Middle East, Asia, West Africa and Europe. I also was stationed for most of my two year Chemical Corps military service in eastern France. I graduated with a BS in Chemical Engineering from MIT, MBA Wharton School of

M. Robson

April 12, 2003

Page two

Finance, University of Pennsylvania and completed all the course work and preliminary exams for PhD in Business and Applied Economics, Graduate School of Arts and Science, University of Pennsylvania. I received a Corporate Leadership Award from MIT.

In my opinion, what makes me particularly qualified for an assignment in the reconstruction of Iraq is my experience in dealing with all the unstructured banking situations outlined above in Japan, New York and Boston. Most importantly with exposure to many bankers from a broad cross section of the Arab world, in particular the Finance Minister of Iraq.

With the exception of American Security Bank, all my work experience has been in situations where no one held the particular job before me. It seems to me that the work ahead in Iraq requires such professionals. I would be pleased to be part of a team that must function in a dynamic supercharged environment without a known structure.

My MIT Chemical Engineering education prepared me to deal with the unknown and the unfamiliar. For example, before starting my banking career, I worked in the chemical and oil industry and was part of a 3 man team to develop the first complete refinery simulation at Atlantic Refining Company(now ARCO) in Philadelphia.

And finally, I would be pleased to help America, in some small way, win the peace.

Sincerely yours,

Kevin G. Woelflein

. I sincerely hope that I can be involved in the reemergence of Iraq. The professional financial Iraqis I encountered were outstanding men, particularly Dr. El Kaissi

An after thought, to my letter of April 12, which I think is very important, is the link to the Palestinians through the Arab Bank, Jordan.

The owner and Chairman of the Arab Bank, Amman Jordan is Abdul Majeed Shoman. His father formed the bank and it now is the foremost bank in the Arab World with about 300 branches and subsidiaries, many outside the Region including facilities in the U.S.

When war raged in Lebanon, the major buildings in Beirut were savaged. But the Arab Bank stood tall, virtually unscathed. The reason being that the Arab Bank is directly linked to the Palestinians.

Mr Shoman was a founding Director of UBAF Arab American Bank in New York and he was the Chairman of the Compensation Committee. Fast forward to the 2001 meeting of the IMF/World Bank Annual Meeting in Washington. I had a one hour exclusive personal meeting with Abdul Majeed Shoman in his suite at the Four Seasons Hotel in Georgetown arranged by the General Manager of the Arab Bank branch in New York. That General Manager, Nofal Barbar, was hired by me to be head of the UBAF Arab American Bank Loan Department.

Mr. Shoman was also one of the Founders of the Union de Banque Arabe Francaise ("UBAF") Paris France along with Dr. Fawzi El Kaissi and Dr. Mohammed Abushadi and other prominent Arab bankers. UBAF (France) formed the Arab consortium banks around the world by linking a group of Arab Banks with indigenous local banks, like they did in America.

That is how UBAF Arab American Bank had sister banks in London, Rome, Frankfurt, Tokyo(thru Hong Kong) and naturally Paris. In each of the countries the major banks were shareholders like First Chicago, Bankers, Texas Commerce and Security Pacific were in the U.S. About two years ago Arab American Bank was acquired by the National Bank of Egypt and is now the New York branch.

I generally met with the CEOs of these sister banks roughly every quarter in exotic places like Manila, Cairo, Paris, London, Tokyo, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Bahrain, Rabat, Madrid, Rome, Frankfurt, Florence as well as in the U.S. I also attended the meetings of UBAF Paris when all the bank participants from all the countries met on a regular basis in Paris.

When the mainland Chinese made the first \$ 500 million Loan Agreement with Western banks, the Arab banks, with UBAF at the core, were favored exclusively with the syndication. That is how , UBAF Arab American Bank participated.

The key to U.S participation in the American Arab consortium was Bob Abboud, Chairman of First Chicago, who incidentally is of Arab(Lebanese)extraction. It was Abboud who sent me to form the bank's branch in Tokyo and later recommended me to be the President of the UBAF Arab American Bank in New York.

Once again thank you for your interest.

Regards, Kevin

4/17
Snowflake

Ⓢ

Sir:
1) We can probably get him.

CS/R/16

April 14, 2003 11:01 AM

2) Attached

Jaymie Duman
4/28

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Toby Keith at Pentagon

What do you think about getting Toby Keith here for the second anniversary of 9/11 and having him sing that song out in the courtyard?

Also, would you please get his address so I can write him and thank him for what he has said and done—you can give the address to (b)(6)

Thanks.

DHR,dh
041403-21



.....
Please respond by 4/22/03

U13485 /03

Memorandum

To: Torie Clarke

From: Brent Krueger

Re: Address for Toby Keith

Date: April 16, 2003

Per request, Mr. Keith's address is as follows:

Mr. Toby Keith
TKO Artist Management

(b)(6)

Telephone: (b)(6)

Fax: (b)(6)

Assistant's Name: Joanne Ritchey

Email: (b)(6)



April 14, 2003 9:55 AM

TO: Gen. Franks
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Toby Keith

*TO: Torie Clarke
SD would like a
copy of video for*

I saw a brief video of some country music awards where Toby Keith praised you and the men and women in uniform. You deserve it!

Tommy Franks.

He sang a song he dedicated to the Armed Forces. I will try to get you a copy.

Regards,

*Also thinking
about inviting
Toby Keith*

DHR:dh
041403-11

Please respond by _____

*T ~~4/22~~
4/22*

*here.
1/2*

J

U13486 /03

7:42 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: April 12, 2003
SUBJECT: **Dr. James Q. Wilson**

Dr. James Q. Wilson is brilliant. He is a good friend of mine. Here is a copy of his letter to me, and my response. Do what you can to help him.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041203.02

Attach: 4/4/03 Correspondence from Dr. Wilson to SD and response of 4/12/03

Please respond by: _____

5/12/03

U13487 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/15909

(b)(6)

April 5, 2003

Donald Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

Dear Don:

I am writing an essay about the origins of terrorists and suicide bombers. Since DOD has a large number of terrorists of various sorts at Quantanamo and may well have inquired into the backgrounds of terrorists elsewhere, I am writing to see if there is someone in the DOD or CIA to whom I can turn for data. I am not interested in intelligence, only in information on personal backgrounds and (if available) psychological profiles.

If you can suggest a name and perhaps kick open the door for me, I would be immensely grateful. In return, I will send you a copy of the essay, no matter how bad it is.

Regards,

11-L-0559/OSD/15910

U

Dr. James Q. Wilson

(b)(6)

Dear Jim:

The person I suggest you deal with is Dr. Steve Cambone. He is a close associate of mine and is now the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. I will ask him to be helpful.

His contact points are attached.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be the name "J. Q. Wilson" written in a cursive style.

GE

April 10, 2003 7:13 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan

CC: (b)(6)

Assume
not sent

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TD

SUBJECT: Saturday Dinner

Someone see me with the materials on the buffet dinner we are having on Saturday night. I want to see who has been invited, who has accepted and have someone explain to me why what we are doing is right.

I want to know whether the Saudis were invited and accepted and why we invited Turkey.

Thanks.

Yes
- Bandar wants to send his Brother

↓
Fertv

DHR,dh
041003-3

.....
Please respond by 4/10/03

W.D. asked all invitees about special dietary requirements they said no

Done - 4/10/03

U13490 /03



April 7, 2003 8:02 AM

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Rumsfeld's Rules

Please add the following in the section on defense:

Commenting on the numerous retired four-star military officers and pundits who have criticized the Iraq war plan "they had never seen," General T. Michael "Buzz" Moseley said: "I am amused by the way they critique it. But in the end, it is a whole lot like listening to a cow pee on a flat rock—it just doesn't matter."

DHR.dh
040703-8



Please respond by _____

U13491 /03



April 11, 2003 7:32 AM

TO: Mary Claire Murphy

(b)(6)

ADVANCE COPY SENT

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Dr*

Jaymie Durnar
4/11

SUBJECT: Ambassadors Function

Someone from Protocol ought to be there to get the names of the ambassadors and the countries, so that when they come in Joyce and I can meet them and say something about their country and the help they have given us. It would be nice if someone were at the residence to do that. I cannot imagine there is any problem with that from the standpoint of ethics. Please check it, though.

Please see if Torie Clarke and Steve Cambone would like to come.

Protocol check

I believe the government should pay for this whole thing. (b)(6) didn't you tell me there was some reason the government couldn't pay for some portion of it? I cannot believe that. Everyone who is coming is foreign.

Jaymie Durnar

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041103-4



Please respond by 4/11/03

Jaymie Durnar

- Mary Claire will be there. Okay w/G.C.
- ORF will pay for this (Dignitaries provision)


U13492 /03

April 11, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: Jaymie Durnan

FROM: Mary Claire Murphy, Director of Protocol




Re: Ambassadors Function

Sir,

I will be at your residence on Saturday evening in order to introduce the Ambassadors to you and Mrs. Rumsfeld. I have checked with Ethics, and there is absolutely no problem whatsoever with my doing this. This sort of function is exactly what Protocol assistance was intended for.


Likewise, there is no problem with the government paying for this function using Official Representation Funds. It is DOD policy that:

"ORF shall be used to host official receptions, dinners, and similar events, and to otherwise extend official courtesies to guests of the United States and the Department of Defense for the purpose of maintaining the standing and prestige of the United States and the Department of Defense." This includes such events hosted and official courtesies extended for: "Civilian or military dignitaries and officials of foreign governments."



11-L-0559/OSD/15915

April 7, 2003 10:21 AM

TO: Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: ORHA Paper

ADVANCE
CIP-1 E MAIL (L)

The format Jay Garner used in the attached paper, "ORHA Plan for Disposition," does not work and needs to be changed. They should use larger font type, separate info from action items, and clearly indicate what needs action.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/5/03 "ORHA Plan for Disposition of Frozen Iraqi Assets"

DHR:jh
040703-19

.....
Please respond by 4/11/03

U13493 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/15916

4/5/2003

ORHA PLAN FOR DISPOSITION OF FROZEN IRAQI ASSETS**Overall Framework:**

These assets should be used to fund the operations of a new Iraqi government. Absent reliable information on the budgetary requirements of the administration of government, ORHA cannot accurately allocate resources for these operations at this time. However, broad categories of requirements have been identified as necessary and unfunded: salaries, Ministry/government operating expenses, repairs and maintenance of Ministry and other government assets, and limited capital expenditures.

ORHA requests \$100 million be immediately released to ORHA to fund emergency payments. ORHA proposes authority over the remaining assets be delegated to Commander-CENTCOM, with authority to further delegate. Alternatively, a tranche process could be established whereby periodic transfers of authority are given to ORHA, with ORHA providing reports for the ultimate allocation and execution of transferred assets. Until a process is determined, requests for allocation of assets will be based on the identification of immediate needs. A comprehensive budget for the future Government of Iraq will be developed based on reliable records and data as soon as possible.

Immediately, ORHA proposes:

- **Emergency Payments.** ORHA proposes emergency payments of a flat rate of \$20 to civil servants who return to work to be implemented in those areas falling under coalition control. Transparent procedures for identifying appropriate recipients and disbursement are outlined in *Emergency Payment, Civil Servant Salaries, and Payments to Pensioners*, (attached). We intend to provide up to \$100 million for emergency payments for up to 2.5 million civil servants for two months. Execution of disbursement may require the use of a contractor.
- **Pensioners.** We intend to provide emergency payments to other government dependants and pensioners, although it is likely that reliable pension records may not be available. ORHA continues to develop options for this requirement.
- **Salaries.** When we have access to reliable information about wage levels, a wage policy will be determined based on assessment of actual records.
- **Operating Expenses** A comprehensive assessment of needs for administration of the Iraqi government will include requirements for operating expenses and repairs and maintenance of government assets. A framework has been established for creation of administration budgets.
- **Maintain frozen assets for the sole use of the future Government of Iraq.** Remaining assets should be preserved until ORHA can develop a comprehensive plan for overall requirements for the administration of government functions. It should be noted that these frozen assets included foreign currency reserves of the Central Bank of Iraq and some portion will be required to establish a currency reserve of the future Government of Iraq. The remainder should be set aside as resources for the budget that will be developed with assistance from Treasury for the Iraqi Government.

5 April, 2003

EMERGENCY PAYMENT, CIVIL SERVANT SALARIES, AND PAYMENTS TO PENSIONERS

BACKGROUND

It is well known that intelligence about the financial sector in Iraq is limited in both quantity and quality. The implementation of a plan to make an emergency payment to civil servants¹, pay civil servant salaries², and make payments to pensioners is subject to modification as field conditions dictate. The following plan is based on the best information available at this time, although much of it is anecdotal.

REQUIREMENT

Establish and implement a mechanism to distribute US dollars in initial emergency payment and, subsequently, wages/pensions to verified civil servants and pensioners.

METHODOLOGY

Step 1 -- Implement Emergency Payments in Areas under Coalition Control

- Establish policy of making emergency payment to all verifiable civil servants who return to work, beginning with areas under Coalition control and expanding nationwide, when a permissible environment becomes available.
 - Anticipate making one emergency payment, but ORHA needs flexibility and authority to make additional emergency payments if circumstances dictate.
 - ✓ Subject to availability and quality of payroll records.
 - ✓ Dependent on condition of banking and payments system and how long it takes to reconstruct, at a minimum, a rudimentary system.
- Payments to areas under coalition control should, if possible, utilize CFLCC Civil Affairs personnel as facilitators to gather accurate information on numbers of employees, available payroll documentation, payee identification, and potential disbursement points.
- Quickly begin making emergency payments in areas that come under Coalition control. The recommended amount needed for this activity is \$20 million, which is based on a fixed payment of \$20 for each civil servant who returns to work. Although data are limited for most of Iraq, \$20 appears to be the approximate median monthly income for most civil servants and is nearly equal to the generally recognized international poverty level. It also reflects that most citizens will have access to free food and other subsidies in the near term. The emergency payment program would be implemented through the following mechanisms:
 - Immediate priority -- Initiate payments for workers in the southern oil fields and dock workers in Umm Qasr using either the reconstituted Iraq Oil Company; oil reconstruction contractor Kellogg, Brown, and Root; or a combination of the two as disbursing agents.

¹ Payments will only be made to civil servants who return to work.

² Ibid.

5 April, 2003

- Immediate priority — Initiate payments for workers at Umm Qasr port facility using the reconstituted Port Authority, Coalition forces (UK), or a combination of the two as disbursing agents.
- Be prepared to initiate emergency payments in Basrah when there is a permissive environment.
 - ✓ Optimal initial step would be to send a small ORHA-Treasury team forward to Central Bank Regional Office in Basrah to evaluate the payments/banking system, if one remains, as well as the availability and quality of payroll/pension data.
 - ✓ If payments/banking system can be resurrected quickly, utilize the Central Bank Regional Office in Basrah and banking system to make disbursements.
 - ✓ Utilize this approach as model for use nationwide when conditions permit.
- Be prepared to initiate payments in Kurdish-controlled territory.
 - ✓ Optimal approach would be to send a small ORHA-Treasury team forward to assist ORHA Regional Coordinator with evaluation of the payments/banking system, as well as the availability and quality of payroll/pension data.
 - ✓ A basic banking system exists in the north, and it is believed to be sufficient for making disbursements.
 - ✓ As with Basrah, utilize this approach as model for use nationwide when conditions permit.
- Initiate well-designed public affairs campaign to announce the emergency payment policy, emphasizing that these are only emergency payments and not a determination of salary levels.
- Defer decision on level payments to pensioners and recipients of "social safety net" programs until solid data can be located and evaluated. (We have practically no reliable data and probably won't until we deploy into Iraq.)

Step 2 — Implement Emergency Payment Nationwide

- Using experience gained in Step 1 above, implement emergency payment plan nationwide.
 - Dependent on permissible environment.
 - Subject to access to reliable records at ministries.
 - Reliant upon banking/payments system that can be resurrected quickly.

Step 3 — Resume Payment of Civil Service Salaries Nationwide

- It is estimated that there are up to 2.5 million civil servants nationwide, although this is still a soft number. As assessments are completed, some groups of employees are likely to fall out of the equation, while those in Kurdish-controlled territory will be added.

5 April, 2003

- Does not include pensioners and recipients of "social safety net" payments.
- As with the implementing an emergency payment, the resumption of salary payments nationwide should, if possible, utilize CFLCC Civil Affairs personnel as facilitators to gather accurate information on numbers of employees, available payroll documentation, payee identification, and potential disbursement points.
- Using experience gained from implementation of nationwide emergency payments, implement a nationwide system of paying civil service salaries.
 - Options for implementing this nationwide system include:
 - ✓ Utilization of the banking/payments system,
 - ✓ Using a combination of the banking system and ministry/governance paying agents (with oversight by ORHA-associated parties), or
 - ✓ A private contractor experienced in this type of activity.
 - Dependent on having access to centralized ministry and Central Bank facilities, the payments system, and information in Baghdad and the governances.

Step 4 – Implement Payments for Pensioners and Recipients of "Social Safety Net"

- The availability of information about the number of pensioners and recipients of social safety net payments is practically non-existent. Data about the amount of individual payments are also sketchy, but anecdotal information implies that these payments are very low.
- It is believed that the central ministries in Baghdad might have sufficient data to permit the implementation of at least a rudimentary social safety net payment plan.

Source of Funds for Emergency Payments, Civil Service Salaries, and Pension/Social Safety Net Expenditures

- Recently seized Iraqi assets are to be used for the reconstruction of Iraq.
- It is recommended that at least \$100 million be earmarked for immediate needs to make the proposed emergency payments, civil service salaries, and pension/social safety net expenditures, with the immediate release of a \$20 million tranche.
- Once sufficient reliable data are available upon which to base future decisions, it might be necessary to earmark further funding for this purpose.

Legal Authority and Accountability for Transferred Funds

- Legal authority for the transfer, control, and chain of accountability is being developed in Washington between Treasury and DOD, with input/oversight by the NSC.

5 April, 2003

Transport, Security, and Custodianship of Transferred Funds

- Initial transport of currency to the region should occur quickly if the immediate need to disburse emergency payments and civil service salaries is to be fulfilled.
- First shipment is projected to be \$20 million — 75% \$1 bills, 15% \$5 bills, and 10% \$10 bills.
 - ✓ Would be sufficient to meet the near-term estimated needs for port and oil workers.
 - ✓ Would achieve goal of limiting initial transport to one trailer transport and one armored truck.
- Transport, security, and custodianship arrangements for initial transfer are in process in Kuwait and DC. Preparations are expected to be completed by the time legal authority and accountability agreements are finalized.
 - Transport to Andrews AFB would be under Treasury control, in cooperation with Federal Reserve. Transport to Kuwait would be controlled by DOD.
 - Security to Andrews AFB would be responsibility of Treasury and Federal Reserve. Security at Andrews AFB and Kuwait would be responsibility of DOD and CFLCC Finance Command, respectively.
 - CFLCC Finance Command would be responsible for providing secure vault for storage of currency in Kuwait.
 - ✓ ORHA Treasury inspected CFLCC Finance Command vault on March 31 and found its size and security acceptable.
 - ✓ If larger transfer is necessary in the future, an adjacent vault of the same size would be made available by CFLCC Finance Command.
 - CFLCC Finance Command would be responsible for providing secure transport of currency to forward distribution points in Iraq.
 - Central Bank of Iraq and/or commercial bank vaults would be utilized for local storage of currency on a short-term basis immediately prior to distribution.

TO: Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force

CC: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: July 28, 2003

SUBJECT: **Educational Institutions**

I continue to be concerned about the situation that occurred at the Air Force Academy. I know that Jim Roche and John Jumper have been working hard on that problem. I am concerned, however, that similar problems conceivably could exist at other educational institutions in the military.

I would like each of you to review your Service's circumstance and get back to me with your personal account. Certainly there are lessons learned with respect to the Air Force situation that can be helpful to the other services.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
072803.22

8/8/03

Please respond by: _____

0801.5

28 Aug 03



OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TO: Secretary of Defense

CC: USD (P&R)

203 AUG -8 PM 5:00

FROM: Secretary of the Army

Secretary of the Navy --- *HT Johnson 8/8/03*
In coordination with the Secretaries of the

Army and Air Force

Secretary of the Air Force

DATE: August 8, 2003

SUBJECT: **Military Schools**

Per your "snowflake" on the above subject (7/28/03) our respective staffs are working together with the CJCS to review current education and training initiatives, looking at ways to improve jointness. The attached outline illustrates our approach to this challenge. In addition our Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and the J7 will be attending the *Collaborative DOD Leadership Learning Strategy Workshop* sponsored by the Force Transformation Office, on 26 -28 August. They plan to discuss the issue there.

We expect to be able to meet with you next month to discuss the way forward.

Attachment-

U13535-03

11-L-0559/OSD/15923

8 August 2003

1. **Purpose.** To outline a Service Secretariat/Service/Joint Staff collaborative effort to review ways to improve the level of jointness within the military school management system.

2. **Objective.** In response to a SECDEF request, a working group was formed to develop a desired endstate, analyze current processes, and develop a methodology to **optimize** the level of jointness within the military school system.

- The **Assistant Service Secretaries** (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and **Vice Director J7** will meet weekly to review the O-6 level Working Group progress and provide guidance.
- The O-6 level **Working Group** of Joint Staff and Service representatives has been tasked to explore all possible options in developing a solution. Tasks are:
 - Define the **endstate** and develop a **plan** of action to accomplish that endstate.
 - Evaluate potential **transformational designs** that could be implemented to **optimize jointness**.
 - Ensure the selected options **maintain a balance** between **warfighting effectiveness** and **business efficiency** within the military school system.

3. **Methodology.** Will ensure a level of consistency and logic to the evaluation process. To this end the Working Group will:


- **Review Services' Military School management** (course length, faculty/student mix, course content and the interval between PME opportunities).
- Conduct an indepth **analysis** of the **JPME framework** (review of CJCS Officer Professional Military Education Program).
- Explore every opportunity to improve jointness, to **include interagency and multinational interactions**.
- **Establish milestones** of achievement to measure progress.

CJCS JPME initiatives will continue to be implemented.

The SECDEF will be given an interim report o/a 30 Sep 03.

TO: Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force

CC: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 


DATE: July 28, 2003

SUBJECT: **Military Schools**

I would appreciate it if the three of you folks would get together and talk a bit about how we might improve jointness in the services by making some adjustments in how the services manage their military schools.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
072803.24

Please respond by: _____ 



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-1141-03
11 August 2003

✓
8/12

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

8/12
Mr. Secretary, I think this is a good way to go and should provide some interesting results.
VR
Dick

SUBJECT: DATTs and Offices of Military Cooperation

- The following is in response to your request for a proposal on how we might get an appropriate study done on the relationships between Defense Attachés (DATTs) and Offices of Military Cooperation (OMC).
- The DATT is the senior diplomatically accredited Defense representative in each US diplomatic mission. However, there are some instances where the Chief of the OMC (or a similar security assistance officer) is senior to the DATT and is the US Defense representative advising the Chief of Mission. The focus of the DATT and the OMC are obviously different, and each has its own reporting chain (DATTs report to DIA and OMCs to Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)).
- To effectively study the relationship between the two and to uncover potential areas for change, I believe that at a minimum the views of DIA, DSCA, the combatant commanders and State Department must be sought. Because this issue involves multiple organizations with varied equities, an independent third party should be engaged to conduct the study such as a federally funded research and development corporation. For example, RAND is currently conducting a study of Army International Activities, and may have the expertise and orientation to rapidly engage in a comprehensive study on a timeline of our choosing.

0914

RECOMMENDATION: Commission RAND to conduct a study. After establishing the parameters of the study with RAND, I will prepare a memorandum for your signature to DIA, DSCA, combatant commanders and State Department requesting their assistance and cooperation.

Approve VR **AUG 12 2003** Disapprove _____ Other _____

11 Aug 03

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

²¹
July 18, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DATTs and Offices of Military Cooperation

Please have your folks give me a proposal as to how we might get an appropriate study done of the relationships between DATTs and offices of military cooperation in this new security environment we are in.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071803-33

.....
Please respond by ~~8/8/03~~

✓ 8/12
8/11

Sur,
CJCS response
attached
✓
CDR Nosewo
8/11

08 JUL 24 04:12:21



21
July 18, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DATTs and Offices of Military Cooperation

0960

Please have your folks give me a proposal as to how we might get an appropriate study done of the relationships between DATTs and offices of military cooperation in this new security environment we are in.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071803-33



Please respond by ~~8/2/03~~

21 Jul 03

'03 JUL 24 PM 12:21

11-L-0559/OSD/15928

U13597 /03



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET
2003 AUG 11 01:48:57

INFO MEMO

August 8, 2003, 2:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director of Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Snowflake on Lights

- In the subject snowflake (TAB A), you asked, "Why are the light bulbs out in corridors in the Pentagon? I notice only about half are on in the corridor I looked at. Do they just burn out and no one bothers to replace them?"
- The Energy Policy Act, signed in 1992, required agencies to reduce lighting levels to 10 foot-candles in public areas (hallways, corridors, stairways, and restrooms) of Federal Buildings.
- In many areas of the Pentagon, we accomplished this by disconnecting every other light fixture ballast or removing the bulbs, as required, to reduce lighting levels and electrical consumption. The actual lighting levels vary by location. Some wall and floor treatments are more reflective than others, and some areas require more lighting to illuminate displays, or for other reasons.
- Regarding maintenance, due to the vast number of fixtures in the building, we rely extensively on our customers to notify us when bulbs burn out in their office fixtures or in nearby hallways. Our facilities staff also routinely checks hallways for outages, but there is still some potential for lag time in replacing burned out lights.
- The facilities staff inspected the areas adjacent to the SecDef suite yesterday. We have reconnected and cleaned light fixtures, and replaced burned out bulbs, as required. Please advise me if you would like us to increase illumination in other corridors or selected portions of the building.

COORDINATION: NONE


Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Anthony Conques, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/15929

U13633 /03

July 31, 2003

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Lights

Why are the light bulbs out in the corridors in the Pentagon? I notice only about half are on in the corridor I looked at. Do they just burn out and no one bothers to replace them?

Thanks.


DHR:dh
073103-9

.....
Please respond by 8/8/03



July 31, 2003

412

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Lights

Why are the light bulbs out in the corridors in the Pentagon? I notice only about half are on in the corridor I looked at. Do they just burn out and no one bothers to replace them?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
073103-9



Please respond by 8/8/03

3124103

↑

EF-6206

July 18, 2003

I-03/010060

Korea

CC: INFO

NES/A

AP for

Action

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Dr*
SUBJECT: ROK to Iraq

We should ask the Republic of Korea to send an infantry brigade to Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071803-19

.....
Please respond by 8/1/03

CC: DASH. AP
PKW Dir
Cecile King

18 JUL 03

U13635 /03

07-18-03 14:14

11-L-0559/OSD/15932

April 21, 2003 12:40 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan

CC:

(b)(6) *Your action?*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: USS HOLLANDIA Reunion

Please make a note that (b)(6) wrote me saying that they are going to have a USS HOLLANDIA reunion in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on September 9, 10 and 11 at the Holiday Inn South.

Please tickle this so I can take a look at it August 1.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042103-27

.....
Please respond by 8/1/03

U13665 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/15933

001,1SD

21 Apr 03

(b)(6)

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

03 APR 15 PM 3:56

Sunday 4/13

Dear Don,

Since my first letter, you certainly have been busy!

I received yesterday, information about this year's Ships Reunion and wanted to pass it on to you ASAP.

BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA
SEPTEMBER 9, 10, 11
HOLIDAY INN SOUTH

I sincerely hope you and Mrs. Rumsfeld will be able to join us this year.

I can think of several reasons for you to attend but your schedule and responsibilities may dictate your decision.

Your return letter to me made me somewhat of a celebrity within my Book Group. All nine of us are or have been teachers and most think HARRY POTTER RULES.... so it's a group easily impressed.

As my Dad would say, "God willing and the tide right", we'll see you in September.

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

U05652-103

SUN 4/13

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

To save sometime you may wish to contact
Larry D. Rita to confirm who I am
Only one thumb print this time

(b)(6)

No threat of keel-hauling this time!
The Ship ReUnion info is important
to get to the Secretary
God Bless you All !!

Respectfully

(b)(6)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 28 2002

(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)

Your letter reached me. I am sure that the only reason it did reach me is because you so skillfully threatened my staff, including supplying your thumbprints! I particularly like your threatening "keel-hauling." My Special Assistant, Larry Di Rita, is a former Naval officer and understood it perfectly.

I am disappointed that I didn't know about the event in Albuquerque. I would enjoy coming to a future ship's reunion of the USS HOLLANDIA. You mentioned it is going to be sometime next year. Do let me know when and where it will be.

The picture of my Dad brought back such wonderful memories. He died back in 1974 and was a dear person. Amazingly, I still have the shoes he was wearing in the photograph.


I suspect that the men on cots on the hangar deck of the USS HOLLANDIA were survivors from the USS INDIANAPOLIS that was sunk. I can remember meeting the HOLLANDIA when my Dad arrived home, and the big celebration for the survivors of the INDIANAPOLIS.

I remember (b)(6) well. As I recall, she was a cheerleader for Coronado High School back in those days. My mom, my sister and I lived at (b)(6) during the period that CVE-97 was out in the Pacific. I remember meeting your father, with his wonderful smile, and being there for the commissioning of the ship in Bremerton, Washington, I believe.

If business or pleasure brings you to Washington, D.C., do give me a call. I would enjoy having a chance to say hello.

With my appreciation and best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a large, stylized 'D' followed by a large 'A' and a long horizontal line that ends in a flourish.

(b)(6)

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 OCT 15 PM 3:17
Wed 10/9/02

Don -

Several weeks ago I returned from Albuquerque where the crew of the USS HOLLANDIA (CVE97) held their Ship's Reunion.

One of the crew - (b)(6) - mentioned that he still remembers my Mom and I visiting the Ship when it put in to San Diego. He said that he remembered you and your Mom visiting also.

I've enclosed a copy of two pages from the book published after Dad left the Ship. Your father and his listing in the Ship's Company are shown.

Were you in Colorado? If so I can't believe our paths didn't cross. I don't remember your playing "Kick the Can" with (b)(6) ! Do the names (b)(6) ring a familiar note?

(b)(6) "B Division" publishes a Ship's Newsletter - EIGHT BELLS. He said he had Emailed you, inviting you to this year's reunion. I commented that at your position and with your schedule the Email was probably "filtered" and you may have never seen it. I told (b)(6) I'd write this personal letter with hopes it'll make it to your desk!

Two other sons and one daughter of crew members made it to Albuquerque this year.

You are invited to next year's reunion - time and place will be firmed up shortly. Needless to say you will find a very warm and supportive "environment" I've threaten whoever "filters" this letter with "keel-hauling" if it doesn't make it way to you. You'll probably have to explain that method of punishment to your staff... *LOL*

My kindest regards to you. I think you're the right man in the right job at the right time.

God Bless

W116055910SD11583 (b)(6)

2003 AUG 12 PM 12:31

TO: Secretary of Defense

CC: USD (P&R)

FROM: Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy ---- *NT Johnson 8/8/03*
In coordination with the Secretaries of the
Army and Air Force
Secretary of the Air Force

DATE: August 8, 2003

SUBJECT: **Military Schools**

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 - Ensure the selected options **maintain a balance between warfighting effectiveness and business efficiency** within the military school system.
3. **Methodology.** Will ensure a level of consistency and logic to the evaluation process. To this end the Working Group will:
 - Review Services' Military School management (course length, faculty/student mix, course content and the interval between PME opportunities).
 - Conduct an indepth **analysis** of the JPME framework (review of CJCS Officer Professional Military Education Program).
 - Explore every opportunity to improve jointness, to **include interagency and multinational** interactions.
 - **Establish milestones** of achievement to measure progress.

CJCS JPME initiatives will continue to be implemented.

The SECDEF will be given an interim report o/a 30 Sep 03.

3:11 PM

TO: Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force

CC: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

DATE: July 28, 2003

SUBJECT: **Military Schools**

I would appreciate it if the three of you folks would get together and talk a bit about how we might improve jointness in the services by making some adjustments in how the services manage their military schools.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
072803.24

Please respond by: 8/8/03



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

FORCE TRANSFORMATION
OFFICE

27 June 2003

The Honorable William A. Navas, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
US Navy
1000 Navy Pentagon
Room 4E788
Washington, DC 20350-1000

SUBJECT: Collaborative DOD Leadership Learning Strategy Workshop
August 26 -28, 2003 - Wye Conference Center

The Secretary has emphasized culture as a core element of our transformation. Education of the Department's current and future leaders is a key element of the cultural transformation, and is integral to our overarching transformation strategy. To examine how the Department educates senior leaders, the Office of Force Transformation (OFT) initiated an effort to explore the creation of a Department-wide education framework. The result of this effort, developed through more than 100 interviews with current and retired senior leaders in the DOD, academia, and industry, is a notional Senior Leader Learning Framework. Key elements of the framework include understanding the new strategic globalized environment, new and emerging enterprise processes and logic, and the underlying principles of a new theory of war and information-age warfighting.

I invite you to join me in a two-day workshop, organized by the Partnership for Public Service, to identify and sharpen issues arising from the notional Senior Leader Learning Framework. Dates are August 26- 28, 2003, at the River House (Wye Conference Center) in Wye Mills, MD. The objective of this session is to develop a shared leadership vision and key elements of a DOD strategy for education, and identify potential early actions to enhance and implement the education framework.

I look forward to joining with you in further developing this strategic framework and related issues vital to the Department's cultural transformation. Please send RSVPs to Matthew Lindsey (b)(6) of the Partnership for Public Service. I look forward to meeting with you and engaging in a collaborative effort as we proceed with this initiative.

Sincerely,


A. K. Cebrowski
Director

Attachments

1. Workshop Agenda
2. Invitee List

11-L-0559/OSD/15942

**Collaborative DOD Leadership Learning Strategy Workshop
August 26 - 28, 2003**

**Aspen Wye River Conference Centers
Queenstown, MD**

Workshop Agenda

Tuesday, August 26 th		
5:00 – 7:00 pm	Arrival and Check-In	River House (RH) Front Desk
7:00 – 8:30 pm	Reception	RH Drawing Room
8:30 – 9:30 pm	Dinner	RH Dining Room
	Introductions and Opening Remarks - TBD	
Wednesday, August 27 th		
7:30 – 8:30 am	Breakfast	RH Dining Room
8:30 – 9:00 am	Conference Overview - TBD	RH Main Conference Room
9:00 – 10:00 am	Best practice thinking in leadership requirements for Global competitiveness (Part I) – Presentations from major global private sector representatives - TBD	RH Main Conference Room
10:00 – 10:30 am	Break	
10:30 – 11:00 am	Leadership requirements from the private sector (Part II) - TBD	RH Main Conference Room
11:00 am – 12:00 pm	Discussion on the elements of the private sector world that work for the Department of Defense - TBD	RH Main Conference Room
12:00 – 1:00 pm	Lunch	RH Dining Room
1:00 – 1:30 pm	Break	
1:30 – 3:00 pm	Service Branch Presentations on Recent Efforts (Leadership Development)	RH Main Conference Room
3:30 – 6:00 pm	Bringing it All Together-Developing a Common Learning Framework (Broad) - TBD	RH Main Conference Room
6:00 – 8:00 pm	Dinner	RH Dining Room

**Collaborative DOD Leadership Learning Strategy Workshop
August 26 - 28, 2003**

**Aspen Wye River Conference Centers
Queenstown, MD**

Workshop Agenda

Thursday, August 28th		
7:00 - 8:00 am	Breakfast	RH Dining Room
8:00 - 9:00 am	Developing a Common Learning Framework (Broad) - Continued	RH Main Conference Room
9:00 - 10:30 am	Refining the Common Learning Framework - TBD	RH Main Conference Room
10:30 - 11:00 am	Break	
11:00 - 11:30 am	Federal Innovations in Leadership Development (Part I) - TBD	RH Main Conference Room
11:30 am - 12:15 pm	Federal Innovations in Leadership Development (Part II) - TBD	RH Main Conference Room
12:15 - 2:30 pm	Working Lunch - Development Needs for DOD	RH Dining Room
2:30 - 3:30 pm	Review of DOD Services' "Best In Show" Practices that Can Serve as Guidelines for DOD - TBD	RH Main Conference Room
3:30 - 4:00 pm	Closing and Next Steps - TBD	RH Main Conference Room

Collaborative DOD Leadership Learning Strategy Workshop

Aspen Wye River Conference Center
River House

Aug 26 – 28, 2003

DOD Invitee List

Mr. Ken Krieg
Dir, PA&E

Honorable William A. Navas, Jr.
Assistant Secretary MR&A/ Navy

BG Mark Hertling
Dir, J7

Lt Gen Robert Wagner
Vice Commander JFCOM

VAdm Alfred Harms, Jr.
Commander, Naval Education and Training

Lt Gen Edward Hanlon, Jr.
Commander General MCCDC

VAdm Thomas J. Barrett
Vice Commandant, US Coast Guard

BG Rich Hassan
Dir, Air Force Senior Leader Management Office

Honorable Reginald Brown
Assistant Secretary MR&A/ Army

Honorable Michael Dominguez
Assistant Secretary for MR&A/AF

Capt Stephen Camacho
Acting Vice Dir of PME

MG James Dubik
Dir of Experimentation, JFCOM

VAdm Gerald L. Hoewing
Chief of Navy Personnel, N1

MG Thomas Jones
CG Training and Education Command, MC

Dr. Stephen Wehrenberg
Chief, HR Capability Dev, US Coast Guard

Frank Anderson (BG ret)
Pres DAU

Navas, William A

From: Mitzi Wertheim (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 10, 2003 11:16 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Per our conversation



mitzi's matrix start chart_bigpicture_04Come Think with Us
the conve... 0303.xls cover040903...

Secretary Navas,

Attached are:

1. the matrix we used to get the conversations going,
2. the "work in progress" DOD Learning Framework
3. Skate to Where the Puck Will Be.

Do you think I could get a copy of your photo with the Marine?


By the way, the Marines are only sending two military people to my MIT Seminar this year. Learning is always viewed as not important enough to be put in the budget.

I was a pleasure meeting with you yesterday. I hope we keep the conversations going.

mitzi

Skating to Where the Puck Will Be

Designing a DOD Learning Framework for the Information Age



Please come think with us.

What should the DOD Learning System look like for the Age of Information?

Help us develop the questions and ideas about how we might move into 21st Century Learning.

Who needs to know WHAT, WHEN, in order to do WHAT?

Let's try on some ideas!!!

Mitzi M. Wertheim
CNAC

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/15947

April 1, 2003

What Do You Want Them to Know? Be Able to Do? When?

RANK		CONTEXT	MILITARY	Enterprise Capabilities							
		"The Big Picture" Globalization	What We Do & Who We Do It With?	How?							
Rank	GS SES	Geo Political Global/Local Econ, History Social, Religion Culture	Joint Coalition Inter Agency Advisary	Incentives	Technology	Business PPBS Commercial Practices etc	Bonding Connectivity Culture Incentives Collaborate	Communicating So the Receiver Gets It LISTENING	Innovative Thinking Change Management	Leadership Subordinate Development	Life Skills Ask ? Share what don't know
O10											
O9						Nets/Global Integration Connectivity Institutional					
O8		Nets Global			Network Infrastructure Policy		Co-Production		Creative Incenting	Investing Mentoring Follow-ons	
O7			Network Role								
O6	GS 15	Languages Culture Understanding									Organizational Learning
O5	GS 14								Managing		
O4	GS 13		Subsystem Job			Individual Local Process					
O3	GS 11	Individual Roles Local					Motive Sharing				
O2	GS 9				Platform Subsystems Applications				Generating		Becoming Leaders
O1	GS 7										

Enterprise Capabilities
Spell?

How Delivered:	Individual	Team
Web		
Classroom		
Experience		

Receptivity
Ready to Learn

Learning Styles

Assessment Tools:
Myers Briggs
LSI, 16 PF
CLI, HBDI

Alignment
Integration

Systems Thinking

Life Long
Learning

Mitzi Wertheim CNA

WORK IN PROGRESS

<p>PREMISE</p> <p>APPENDIX A</p>	<p>DOD has four distinct but intertwined functions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) <i>Warfighting (must do), and war prevention</i> 2) <i>Running the largest, most complex business in the US and probably the world</i> 3) <i>Understanding the nation's evolving role in the world.</i> 4) <i>Running a "life" system for 1.4 million service members and families.</i> 			
	<p align="center">Context</p> <p align="center">Big Picture</p>	<p align="center">As Is</p>	<p align="center">How?</p> <p align="center">Enterprise Capabilities</p> <p align="center">Transformation Enablers</p>	<p align="center">"Could Be"</p>
<p>COURSE CONTENT</p>	<p>Three Star Course - 3 days</p> <p>America in the World Religion and Politics Ethnic Conflict Motivation</p> <p>or</p> <p>Country based: Saudi Arabia, Iraq Israel - Palestine Indonesia, Argentina</p> <p>History - how things evolved Values & Beliefs Economy Geopolitics Ideology Ethnicity Water</p> <p>Two Star Course - 5 days</p> <p>America in the World Ethnic Conflict Religion and Politics Motivation Extremism, Terrorism and Homeland Security The Persian Gulf The Future of World Politics South Asia Internat'l Political Economy in a Globalizing World</p>	<p>Culture and Behavior</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sharing information, collaboration, working in teams, bonding - Working the seams - expanding organizational boundaries - Sensing future needs being receptive to external stories and lessons - Creating effective and timely ways to generate and manage innovation - Disruptive concepts, technologies, ideas, ... effect of, response? - Building and using common mental models - Giving and Receiving Good Feedback - Challenging status quo and what you "know" - Cognitive - understanding is power, dissonance, limitations <p>People Management</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Operational, Universal and Personal Competencies - Assessment tools - Align talent with job needs - Align incentives with desired behavior - Understanding HR Management Principles and how they relate to and integrate with our "current systems" - Conflict management <p>Communications</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Active listening to understand before being understood - Media - Congress - Generating understandable presentations, arguments, so receiver "gets it" - Building and using a common lexicon while understanding service uniquenesses - Systems thinking - integration and interoperability, seamless connectivity - Storytelling <p>Business Processes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establish and benchmark relevant business models - Alignment of doctrine and operations; incentives with desired behavior - Removing unnecessary irrelevant processes (cleaning out the attic) - Simplify existing processes, richly connect, value at each step - Removing conflict and disagreement among "rules" - Cycle time reduction - Maximize effectiveness by using existing resource management systems / nuances (incl: HR) 		



Snowflake

August 12, 2003

TO: Honorable Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Investment Strategy

Here is a memo I sent to Dov Zakheim and his response to me. I thought you might want to see it.

Attach.
7/14/03 SecDef memo to USD(C)
8/12/03 USD(C) memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
081203-9

1201

12 Aug 03

U13723 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/15950

08/12

July 14, 2003

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Investment Strategy

Gordon England urged us to try to implement an investment strategy more in line with industrial companies.

He pointed out that present budget does not discriminate between a capital expenditure account and an operational account. That, he says, is the crux of the problem regarding split funding of hugely expensive capital assets, such as nuclear powered aircraft carriers and submarines. Full funding of capital assets that have a 30 to 50 years' service is inconsistent with prevailing business practices. Differentiating capital from other expenses, such as operations and personnel costs, would be a dramatic improvement in our budget process.

What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071403-60

.....
Please respond by 8/8/03 extended by *COJ.*

✓ 8/12

*Sir,
Response attached
VIR
CDR Nosenzo
8/12*



COMPTROLLER


UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

✓
8/12

INFO MEMO

August 12, 2003, 2:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Investment Strategy

- You asked me to propose a course of action related to Secretary England's urging that we implement a capital investment strategy more in line with industrial companies. I have three recommendations: 1) we continue to implement a system of accounting similar to the private sector that depreciates assets over time, 2) we revisit an incremental funding policy, especially for large capital assets, and 3) we build a supporting capital budget.
- There are two aspects to how capital investments are handled in the financial world: how the acquisition of those capital assets is financed, and how the assets are accounted for after they are acquired.
- *Accounting for assets after they are acquired.* Gordon England is correct when he states that, in the private sector, capital accounts are *expensed* differently from operating accounts. For operating costs, expenses are essentially the same as expenditures, whereas capital assets are *depreciated* over time. Under the Department's Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP), we are taking steps to implement a system of property accounting that depreciates assets over time. The impetus for this initiative is the requirement that the Department have an auditable consolidated financial statement. Once fully implemented, we will account for capital assets more in line with the private sector, as advocated by Secretary England.

11-L-0559/OSD/15952

- *Financing of capital asset acquisition.* The acquisition of capital assets (i.e., how the purchaser of the capital asset pays the supplier of the asset) is not very different in the Department from the private sector. If the asset is purchased off the shelf, payment is made upon delivery. If the asset is built to the specifications of the purchaser, progress payments or milestone payments are made over time, sometimes 7 years or longer in the case of warships. The difference is that in the private sector, the payments are normally financed in one of three ways: from profits, from borrowing, or from additional stock offerings. The Department, however, finances its payments with funds appropriated by the Congress.
- Gordon England rightly complains that the current policy of both OMB and the Congress to require that the full cost of the capital asset be appropriated in a single fiscal year rather than over several years makes budgeting for capital assets difficult. I previously described for you how Gordon, Paul Wolfowitz, and I attempted last fall to get OMB to agree to change that policy. We were, on the whole, unsuccessful (although we did get some flexibility to incrementally fund some shipbuilding programs). With Josh Bolten now in charge at OMB, I believe it is worth surfacing this issue again, although OMB staff-even more than Congress-opposes the idea, because it locks future Administrations into current decisions.
- Other than the Working Capital Fund, the Department does not categorize the budget into separate operating and capital budgets like the private sector. I agree with Gordon and we should pursue this. If for nothing else, it provides a way to clearly discern the Department's investment plan from its annual operations plan.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: Caral Spangler, (b)(6)



COMPTROLLER


UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

✓
8/12

INFO MEMO

August 12, 2003, 2:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Investment Strategy

120.1

- You asked me to propose a course of action related to Secretary England's urging that we implement a capital investment strategy more in line with industrial companies. I have three recommendations: 1) we continue to implement a system of accounting similar to the private sector that depreciates assets over time, 2) we revisit an incremental funding policy, especially for large capital assets, and 3) we build a supporting capital budget.
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12 Aug 03

U13726 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/15954

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COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: Caral Spangler (b)(6)

08/12

July 14, 2003

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Investment Strategy

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120.1

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What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071403-60

.....
Please respond by 8/8/03 extended by *ca.j.*

✓ 8/12
1450103

*Sir,
Response attached
VIR
CDR Nosenzo
8/12*

U13727 / 03



08/12

July 14, 2003

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Investment Strategy

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.....

Please respond by 8/8/03 extended by *comd.*

✓ 8/12
1450103

*Sir,
Response attached
v/r
CDR Nosenzo
8/12*

U13727 / 03



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

✓
8/12

INFO MEMO

August 12, 2003, 2:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Investment Strategy

120.1

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12 Aug 03

U13726 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/15958

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COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: Caral Spangler (b)(6)



3:11 PM

TO: Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force

CC: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

DATE: July 28, 2003

SUBJECT: **Military Schools**

I would appreciate it if the three of you folks would get together and talk a bit about how we might improve jointness in the services by making some adjustments in how the services manage their military schools.

352

Thanks.

DHR/azn
072803.24

Please respond by: _____ *8/8/03*

2850103

U13728 /03

Office of the Secretary of the Navy
1000 Navy Pentagon
Washington, DC 20350-1000

Office of the Secretary of the Army
101 Army Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-0101

Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1670

18 DEC 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: SECDEF Snowflake, Jointness in Military Schools (dated 28 Jul 03)

On 28 Jul 03 you wrote, "I would appreciate it if the three of you folks would get together and talk a bit about how we might improve jointness in the services by making some adjustments in how the services manage their military schools." This memorandum presents our collective product. If you agree with our thinking, we will take the next steps described, as well as initiate a dialog with the appropriate Members of Congress.

Our approach to your tasking was systematic and included multiple facets. First, we three met to scope the problem and define the vectors we wanted to explore. To follow up on our start, we formed a working group led by our three Assistant Secretaries (Manpower/Reserve Affairs) and the Joint Staff J7. The working group met weekly to review and refine the way ahead. In late August, VADM Cebrowski brought to Wye River a diverse group of thinkers, military educators, business leaders, and DoD leaders including key players from our working group and Joint Forces Command. Together, these activities generated the ideas we three discussed and which we forward to you today.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) has served us well. We are more joint today than ever before, but more needs to be done. The efforts of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to improve Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) are described in the memorandum at Attachment 1. Specific opportunities for us to improve Joint thinking through Service schools include:

- Incorporating into our company grade officer courses the Chairman's JPME I01 curricula;
- Increasing sister Service faculty representation at War and Command and Staff level schools; and
- Allowing CJCS the statutory authority to certify Service-delivered education as sufficient for JPME II qualification. (Under existing legislation, JPME II qualification can be obtained only through in-residence work at one of the colleges of the National Defense University).

These are excellent ideas and we commit to their implementation. These efforts alone will not, however, yield the transformational break through we need. To make really profound changes, we must build on recent advances in the science and practice of leader-development.

352

18 Dec 03

U22026 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/15961

Specifically, we believe it possible to define "jointness" as demonstrated mastery of a set of competencies appropriate to an individual position (inside a Service or in the Joint community and grade. To aid in your understanding, Attachment 2 describes a model of leadership competencies now being applied to leader development in one of our military Services. (Joint competencies have yet to be defined.) While this is still theory for most of the DoD, we note that competency based leader development schemes:


- Are in place in many of the most successful private sector companies;
- Were key to the successful transformation of the Internal Revenue Service;
- Are the foundation for the Air Force's approach to force development; and
- Have long been used by the Navy as a vehicle for establishing the technical qualifications of officers at sea.


Once we have shifted from an activity-based concept of jointness ("to be "joint" you must first go to this school and then go to this assignment"), we have opened the door to a world where experience counts as much or more than formal education. Interestingly, a recent study not directly associated with our effort recommended moving in this same direction. Each Service has numerous examples where our troops are performing in joint operations but do not receive joint credit. The 82nd Airborne Division Commander and senior staff work closely with supporting Air Force airlift and close air support units. Indeed, there are airmen assigned to the Division. Similarly, the commander of a numbered Air Force and staff will often be involved in planning and execution of joint force exercises and operations, and during these exercises will frequently serve as the Joint Force Air Component Commander. Equally compelling examples exist for the Navy and Marine Corps. An officer development scheme based on mastery of joint competencies can recognize, account for, and reward the joint-officer skills developed through experience, and, most importantly, incorporate recognition of those demonstrated competencies into promotions and assignments.


Our military schools will continue to be critical participants in the creation of joint competent officers, but their role will change. First, it is our military schools that must accomplish the basic research and scholarship around joint competencies. Joint competencies have to be defined and described in ways they can be objectively tested. Then each assignment and each grade must be analyzed to determine the joint competencies with which it is associated. Next, the schools will need to help develop the criteria and standards for evaluating and assessing attainment of those competencies. As assignments will be associated with a defined set of competencies, schools must provide focused education to fill competency gaps in officers heading to their next assignments. Finally, our schools should continue providing robust in-residence education programs because focused, in-residence professional military education experiences will continue to be important in our force. Equally as important, however, a vibrant graduate education community is essential for maintaining a critical mass of scholarship that will support the enhanced role of our schools in broadening our understanding of joint competencies.

If you concur, we propose to meet with key Members of Congress to seek assistance and support for these ideas. We will, in addition, together with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, task the National Defense University and our Service schools, to begin developing, defining, and describing "joint competencies" for an initial set of senior leader positions.

We look forward to continuing this important discussion.


Gordon R. England
Secretary of the Navy


James G. Roche
Secretary of the Air Force


Lee Brownlee
Under Secretary of the Army
acting

Attachment:
As Stated



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SEP 10 11 09 31

INFO MEMO

August 12, 2003, 3:45 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *Harold G. Becker, Acting*
Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Snowflake on Pentagon Interns

- In the snowflake at TAB A, you had asked how many interns we have in the Pentagon and where they work.
- As of July 31, 2003, we had 353 civilian interns working in the Pentagon. Following is a breakout by Component and type of internship:

TYPES OF PENTAGON INTERNS AND WHERE THEY WORK

<u>Component</u>	<u>Presidential Management Interns (PMIs)</u>	<u>Student Summer Interns</u>	<u>Other Student Interns (Various Programs)*</u>	<u>Total</u>
OSD/WHS	8	42	86	136
Army	19	31	0	50
Air Force	0	60	80	140
Navy	7	0	12	19
Marine Corps	7	0	0	7
DISA	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	41	133	179	353

* Includes unsalaried interns; student interns working part time during school year and full time during summers/breaks; and special intern programs for disabled, minority, and disadvantaged youth.

Attachment
As stated

Prepared by: Laura Devlin, WHS, (b)(6)

18
July 15, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Interns

I have been meeting interns all over the government. They come up and want their picture taken and all of that. How many interns do we have in the Pentagon, and who do they work for?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071403-67



Please respond by 7/15/03

Handwritten: ~~Donald Rumsfeld~~ Larry Di Rita
please advise.

Handwritten signature: L. Di Rita

Larry Di Rita
7/18



18
July 15, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Interns

230

I have been meeting interns all over the government. They come up and want their picture taken and all of that. How many interns do we have in the Pentagon and who do they work for?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071403-67



Please respond by 7/2/03

Handwritten signature: Larry Di Rita
Please advise.

Handwritten signature: Larry Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

7/18

18 Jul 03



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SEC 2
200 AUG 13 11:14:00

INFO MEMO

August 11, 2003 1:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *for* William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

DJH *Acty* 8/11/03

SUBJECT: Meeting Regarding "17 November" Trial

- On August 26 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will host a meeting for victims, family members, and others involved in the ongoing Greek prosecution of the alleged "17 November" terrorists. An attorney from the Department of Justice will provide a detailed briefing on developments in the trial.
- Ambassador Tom Miller will be in town and plans to attend. Director Mueller will be there, and either my Principal Deputy or I will attend.
- Over the past year lawyers on my staff and from the Military Departments have assisted DOJ in arranging for victims and family members to participate in the prosecution. We also have kept them informed of developments and have assisted with travel arrangements to Greece for those who wanted to observe the proceedings and offer statements in court.
- The trial is entering its final phases. After its August recess, the court will issue a number of important rulings, and we expect a verdict in the fall.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: None

Prepared By: Robert Easton, Associate Deputy General Counsel (LC), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/15967

U13761 /03



August 13, 2003

AFGHANISTAN

TO: The Honorable Ann M. Veneman
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: USDA Initiative for Afghanistan

Attached is a letter from my friend, Marty Hoffmann. He was Secretary of the Army from 1975-1977, when I was Secretary of Defense the first time. He is a first-rate individual. He was at the meeting we had at the White House that day.

In any event, it is self-explanatory. If you feel you can urge dispatch in bringing the application forward and acting on it, needless to say, he would be appreciative. I have a lot of respect for him.

I hope you will take a look at it. Thanks so much, Ann.

Regards,

Attach.
 8/12/03 Hoffmann memo to SecDef, "USDA Initiative for Afghanistan"

DHR:dh
 081303-19

13 AUG 03

U13783 / 03

✓ 8/13

(b)(6)

8/12/03

Memo For : The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
U. S. Secretary of Defense

Subject : **USDA Initiative for Afghanistan**

From : M. R. Hoffmann

Mr. Secretary, this letter derives from your meeting with Secretary Ann Veneman in February at the White House, specifically your request for USDA assistance to Afghanistan. That meeting resulted in several subsequent outreach and assistance activities by the Agriculture Department (USDA).

It also resulted in an impressive initiative which now needs a boost from Secretary Veneman. Could you alert her to this opportunity so that it does not languish in the bureaucracy there ?

Shortly following your meeting and pursuant to her initiative, USDA earmarked P. L. 480 funds (originally "Food for Peace", now "Food for Progress") in an amount of \$15 Million for Afghanistan. Minister of Finance Ashraf Ghani was immediately enthusiastic. You may recall the pattern : USDA uses its own funds to purchase U. S. commodities; the commodities are sold ("monetized") in the beneficiary country; the proceeds of the sale are used within the beneficiary country for agricultural development or other approved purposes.

The \$10 Million proceeds of this initiative will be used to create an agriculture development fund in Afghanistan. The Fund will be professionally managed, and its mission will be to stimulate enterprise-driven, citizen-targeted Afghan agricultural development. This is a particularly valuable program when one considers that 80% of the Afghan population depends on agriculture for their livelihood, and that the program impact will occur in the countryside prior to the election in Afghanistan next June.

There is no apparent controversy about the value and appropriateness of this initiative for Afghanistan and USDA's willingness to move forward. The Program application has been endorsed by the Afghan Government. It has been researched and filed by CNFA at Minister Ghani's request. Under usual P. L. 480 process the commodities would be sold in Afghanistan where the proceeds would be applied. However, under extraordinary circumstances – which clearly exist in Afghanistan - this requirement for local sale can be waived by the Secretary of Agriculture, and the commodities sold in a Third country (in this case, Turkey).

Given the lack of organized markets and infrastructure, and absence of the usual commercial capabilities for sale of the commodities in Afghanistan (banks and bankers, storage, transportation, etc), Minister Ghani and CNFA have recommended the sale of soybean meal and corn in Turkey (a so-called "third-country monetization"). As a practical matter, such a sale will meet important, current USDA objectives in Turkey.

Since the commodities currently cannot be sold in Afghanistan, Secretary Veneman's waiver to allow a third country sale is required to allow the program to go forward. As a practical matter the waiver will enable a faster and less expensive sale, and therefore faster and less expensive creation and launch of the development fund in Afghanistan.

If you could call or drop a note to Secretary Veneman in the spirit of the earlier meeting to urge dispatch in bringing the application forward and acting on it, it would be most timely. She may not be aware of the critical time frame for Afghanistan assistance contemplated in the Strmecki Initiative. If the Secretary will indicate to her staff that, knowing what she knows about Afghanistan, she will issue the waiver, the application will move quickly.

Many thanks for your consideration.

Sincerely,

/s/ Mart


Marty Hoffmann

ADDENDUM : For reference, the application was filed 28 July '03 as follows :

USDA Food for Progress
ATTN. Ms. Robin Tilsworth, Director
Program Planning, development and Evaluation Division
1400 Independence Ave SW
Ag. Box 1034
Washington, D. C. 20250-1034



August 13, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Power Plants

Iraq

I have been told by some folks here that maybe the people we ought to get working on the power plants in Baghdad and Iraq are not the people who build power plants, but the people who maintain power plants. Ron Fogleman said we should also talk to the people who built the Baghdad and Iraqi power plants—the Japanese and ABB, I believe.

Have we really looked into figuring out how we can get that task done?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081303-12



Please respond by 8/22/03

13 Aug 03

U13801 /03



August 14, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Supplemental

We will start working on the Supplemental you discussed in your August 6 memo.

Regards.

DHR:dh
081403-10

.....

Please respond by _____

110.01

14 Aug 03

U13844 /03



August 14, 2003

TO: Honorable Josh Bolten

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
 Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
 Paul Wolfowitz
 Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Supplemental for CPA

110.01

Attached is a memo I received from Jerry Bremer. As you will see, he expects to be running out of funds in the early part of the next calendar year. That means it will need a supplemental in the latter portion of this year.

You will see that his hope is that it will be submitted in early September, to provide some leverage for the Donors Conference.

Let's discuss it.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/6/03 CPA memo to SecDef re: Supplemental

DHR:dh
081403-9

14 Aug 03

U13847 /03

copy
✓
8/11

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
Baghdad

6 August 2003

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Paul Bremer <signed>
SUBJECT: Supplemental

Mr. Secretary

As I mentioned to you, we have concluded that we must urgently seek a supplemental. It will serve three purposes:

1. It will help us head-off going broke. By our current estimates, this will happen in January.
2. Early action gives the U.S. a unique opportunity to leverage other countries to contribute to Iraq's reconstruction at the Donors Conference in October.
3. Such a substantial increase in resources allows us to create a "safety net" of economic activity during the difficult political and social transition here.

We propose to ask Congress for \$18 billion. The spending will be concentrated on security, infrastructure, health and education. Additionally, to encourage other donors, we will ask Congress to match other countries' donations dollar-for-dollar up to a limit of \$7 billion. This will answer those who keep harping on "internationalization."

The timing is critical. We need the money by year's end and, to leverage donors, would like to have it in our pockets before the Donors Conference. This means submitting the bill as an FY '03 supplemental on September 2.

Tom Korologos believes that it is impractical to attach the bill to the defense bill which is already pretty much done. He suggests we try to attach it to the Foreign Operations appropriation which has passed the House and is pending in the Senate. Of course this is a tactical call for your advisors.

We have a number of important CODELS coming through over the next ten days. Assuming you and the President agree, we need to start socializing this proposal with them as soon as possible.

We are ready to provide additional details to Dov Zakheim.

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION				
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Frederick			Naplan	
	Smith			

11-L-0559/OSD/15975



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

Aug 15, 2003, 15:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

SUBJECT: DoD Manpower by Category (U)

- After we met with Senator Stevens earlier this month, you asked for a table that detailed all the people connected with DoD. You were particularly interested in a civilian breakout that showed the different civilian categories that I talked about with the Senator.
- The attached table provides the information that you requested. It shows the active duty military in the services to include cadets attending the service academies, civilians broken down by category, and the various components of the Reserves.
- What is not reflected in these numbers is the growth in contracts over the years that offsets some of the manpower decreases.

Prepared by: Col Jeffrey Mayo, (b)(6)

U13913 03



11-L-0559/OSD/15976

TOTAL DoD MANPOWER

Manpower Category		FY75	FY87	FY91	FY02
Military					
	Officers	292,424	307,387	290,879	222,954
	Cadets	10,715	13,490	13,084	12,519
	Enlisted	1,824,981	1,853,340	1,681,592	1,176,161
Total Military		2,128,120	2,174,217	1,985,555	1,411,634
Civilian					
	US Direct Hires	1,086,311	1,050,541	978,857	655,746
	Foreign National Direct Hires	44,395	39,477	33,859	14,420
	Foreign National Indirect Hires	88,877	84,808	70,131	38,530
	Non-Appropriated Fund (NAF) Hires	N/A	219,522	224,700	135,413
Total Civilian		1,219,583	1,394,348	1,307,547	844,109
Reserve Manpower					
Ready Reserve					
Selected Reserve					
	Drilling in Units	817,372	962,358	985,305	714,219
	Active Guard Reserve	9,451	68,933	71,567	66,384
	Individual Mobilization Augmentees	24,931	27,463	30,594	19,872
	Training Pipeline	56,866	92,101	67,104	73,851
Total Selected Reserve		908,620	1,150,855	1,154,570	874,326
Individual Ready Res/Inactive Guard		636,347	469,041	603,574	312,062
Standby Reserve		413,083	37,503	28,184	22,812
Total Reserve (Excluding Ret Res)		1,958,050	1,657,399	1,786,328	1,209,200
Total DoD Manpower		5,305,753	5,225,964	5,079,430	3,464,943

- Notes:
- 1) Source of data Defense Manpower Data Center and WHS DIOR
 - 2) Includes manpower in DoD for both military and civil functions (Corps of Engineers)
 - 3) Military technicians are included in both US Direct hires & Selected Res to reflect their dual status
 - 4) Coast Guard data not included in Reserve numbers
 - 5) Retired Reserve numbers not included in reserve total
 - 6) NAF data not available for FY75
 - 7) Civ data does not include strengths for agencies that do not report data to OPM: DIA, NSA, NIMA
 - 8) AGR program growth didn't begin until late 1970's so FY75 appears low but is correct; similarly FY75 data for standby reserves is high due to holdovers from Vietnam

11-L-0559/OSD/15977

PI 1 8/4/03

August 4, 2003

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD

You cited a bunch of numbers I have never heard before when we were meeting with Ted Stevens. Please give me a paper that shows me the total number of people connected with DoD—active, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, reserve, guard, civilians of all those four or five types you talked about, contractors, whatever. I would like to see the full list.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
089103-8



Please respond by 8/15/03



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

203 AUG 15 10:48:54

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

August 14, 2003 - 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

David S. C. Chu 15 Aug 03

SUBJECT: Job Offer - SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

292

- We plan to make the Home Depot offer part of our Transition Assistance Program, which provides employment assistance to all separating Service members. We work closely with private industry, Federal, state and local government agencies to help match separating military personnel with current and future employment needs.
- Indeed, on May 20th, Mr. Robert Nardelli, Chairman, President, and CEO, the Home Depot, wrote to you about the offer he reiterated at the outreach meeting. We responded on June 6th, saying that we would be glad to partner with them in offering job opportunities to our separating Service members (Tab B).
- We are tentatively scheduled to meet with the Home Depot Vice President of Government Relations the week of August 18th to put this partnership in place.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

COORDINATION: None

ATTACHMENTS:
As stated

PREPARED BY: Ollie Smith, Educational Opportunities, ODUSD(MC&FP),

(b)(6)

14 Aug 03

U13916*03



PDUSD(P&R)


Charles S. Abell

C. Abell 8-6-03

11-L-0559/OSD/15980

Snowflake

²¹
July 18, 2003

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Job Offer

Home Depot offered jobs to anyone leaving the military. What do you do with a thought like that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071803-26

.....
Please respond by 8/1/03



2455 Paces Ferry Road • Atlanta, GA 30339-4024
(770) 384-3622 • Fax: (770) 384-3633

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 MAY 23 11 08:54

Robert L. Nardelli
Chairman, President & CEO

May 20, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you may be aware, the National Hiring Partnership between The Home Depot and the Department of Labor is approaching its first anniversary. Through this partnership, we have been working with Secretary Chao and the Administration to assist in hiring some of the 400,000 people who are currently unemployed in the United States.

Last year, The Home Depot hired 40,000 new associates. This year, I would like to propose a partnership that would allow us to match current and future scheduled Home Depot job opportunities with returning military personnel. It is our practice to reach out to attract and select a high-performing, diverse workforce. I believe a partnership with the Department of Defense would be highly beneficial for all parties.

The Home Depot has a proud and long-standing tradition of supporting our military servicemen and women. On April 4th, we launched Project Homefront, which is our effort, in partnership with Rebuilding Together and with the support of USA Freedom Corps, to support our troops and their families by taking care of home repair and maintenance needs while they are away. The Home Depot has committed one million volunteer hours and \$1 million to the more than 900 projects we have recorded to date.

In keeping with our values and commitment to 'giving back' and 'doing the right thing,' we stand ready and willing to do our part in the rebuilding of Iraq. We have been in contact with Bechtel and are actively engaged in discussions. We would certainly welcome the opportunity to work directly with your office to supply key merchandise and materials.

Mr. Secretary, we would be proud to partner with the Department of Defense to identify job opportunities for our discharged military personnel. And as the humanitarian restoration of Iraq moves forward, please keep us in mind and know that we are prepared to respond to that need as well.

Sincerely,

0084203

Enclosures (3)



11-L-0559/OSD/15982



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

JUN -6 2003

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

Mr. Robert L. Nardelli
Chairman, President & CEO
The Home Depot
2455 Paces Ferry Road
Atlanta, GA 30339-4024

Dear Mr. Nardelli:

Thank you for your recent letter to Secretary Rumsfeld regarding a partnership with the Department of Defense to match separating military personnel with future job opportunities at Home Depot.

The Home Depot support of troops and their families through Project Homefront is commendable. We are most appreciative of the help provided in home repair and maintenance.

We welcome the opportunity to partner with you in providing job opportunities for our separating military personnel. Our Transition Assistance Program provides employment assistance to our separating military personnel. The individual responsible for the Transition Assistance Program (TAP) is Ms. Ollie Smith. She can be reached at (b)(6) or email, (b)(6) Ms. Smith will be able to help match separating military personnel with current and future employment needs of your company.

Thank you for your interest in the welfare of our separating Service members and their families.

Sincerely,

Otto J. Thomas
Director

Educational Opportunities Directorate

D10 706310 07804-05

2



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

23 AUG 15 10 51

August 14, 2003, 1600

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)

David S. C. Chu 15 Aug 03

SUBJECT: BRAC (Snowflake) Consolidating Service Schools

In a Snowflake (Tab A), you asked what we think about how the various schools in the Services might be consolidated to save money and enhance jointness. This memo responds.

352

- On November 15, 2002, you initiated the 2005 Defense Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. In that memo you established the authorities, organizational structure, goals, and objectives for the Department's implementation of the 2005 BRAC. Among the objectives you established was the transformation of the Department through the BRAC process.
- The Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) named Charlie Abell as the Chair of the Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group (E&T JCSG). He is taking your direction to transform the Department through the BRAC process seriously. His Education and Training JCSG will submit closure and realignment recommendations to you via the ISG and the Infrastructure Executive Council. Charlie plans to examine a broad series of options to consolidate schools that will enhance jointness and garner savings. A potential option might be the consolidation of professional development schools into a single campus creating a major Defense University that would enhance jointness. This would also permit sharing of cross-Service instructors and guest lecturers as well as use of a single library and research facility.
- Using the guiding principles (TAB B) that you approved as part of its report on functions for joint cross-service analysis, the E&T JCSG will develop and give you closure and realignment recommendations on specialized skill training, flight training, professional development education, and training and testing ranges.

14 Aug 03

COORDINATION: OGC Nicole D. Bayert August 14, 2003

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Charles S. Abell, PDUSD (P&R), (b)(6)


U13917 03

Mr Abell

11-24-03

Snowflake

July 23, 2003

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Consolidating Service Schools

I don't know who is in charge of it, but I would be curious to know if you could give me a clue as to how you think the various schools in the Services might best be consolidated to save money and to enhance jointness.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072303-2

.....
Please respond by 8/22/03

Sir -
I gave a copy
to MPP also -
Cheryl

Guiding Principles of the Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group

The guiding principles and methodologies displayed in the table below were developed by the Education and Training Joint Cross Service Group (E&T JCSG) to facilitate initial discussion and were used by the group in development of this Initial Report.

Guiding Principles	Methodology
Advance jointness	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Declare jointness as paramount for specific functions (e.g., JCAS, JMOUT, PME)• Establish Joint National Training Capability, create live-virtual-constructive training environment• Enhance Joint Operational Effectiveness
Achieve synergy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Jointly construct, co-locate or put in close proximity multiple functions that are mutually supportive• Increase cross-functional use of training and testing ranges
Capitalize on technology	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Institute a life-long learning ethos• Leverage distance learning technology to significantly reduce residential requirements• Broaden access, expand throughput, create means to retrain/cross-train, develop training reach-back
Exploit best practices	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Extend current/past successful efforts (Navy-Marine tactical-air integration, pilot/helo trng)• Establish centers of excellence (Fort Sill field artillery school)• Outsource to alternative providers, certify education/training (Task Force Excel)
Minimize redundancy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Define education/training universe• Identify common functional areas• Eliminate unnecessary duplication, reduce or avoid costs, standardize instruction, increase efficiency



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

203 AUG 15 2003

INFO MEMO

August 15, 2003 – 5:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu 15 Aug 03*

SUBJECT: Appointment with Senator Alexander—SNOWFLAKE

- Senator Alexander is on a trip to Africa, but his office will work on an appointment for me to see him and hear his ideas in early September.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

U13922 03



11-L-0559/OSD/15987

8/4/03

August 4, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Senator Alexander

We met with the Senators the other day, and Senator Lamar Alexander of Tennessee said there are a number of ideas that don't cost an awful lot that involve the forces.

I hope you will go up and see him for me. Please tell him you are there because I asked you to go and talk to him about the ideas he has. He is a fine man, and I know he wants to be helpful.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080103-14

.....
Please respond by 8/22/03



July 23, 2003

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Consolidating Service Schools

I don't know who is in charge of it, but I would be curious to know if you could give me a clue as to how you think the various schools in the Services might best be consolidated to save money and to enhance jointness.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072303-2



Please respond by 8/22/03

Sir -
I gave a copy
to MPP also -
Cheryl

352

23-1-03

U13931 / 03

JUL-28-2003 10:56

ODASD MCFP

(b)(6)

P.04/04
1/22/03

Snowflake

²¹
July 18, 2003

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Job Offer

Home Depot offered jobs to anyone leaving the military. What do you do with a thought like that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071805-26

.....
Please respond by 8/1/03

292

2150103

U13932 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/15990

TOTAL P



8/4/03

August 4, 2003

TO: David Chu
 CC: Powell Moore
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Senator Alexander

We met with the Senators the other day, and Senator Lamar Alexander of Tennessee said there are a number of ideas that don't cost an awful lot that involve the forces.

322

I hope you will go up and see him for me. Please tell him you are there because I asked you to go and talk to him about the ideas he has. He is a fine man, and I know he wants to be helpful.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 080103-14



Please respond by 8/22/03

Y Aug 03

U13934 / 03



IN REPLY REFER TO:

EF-6266

23 I-03/010302
July 21, 2003

C 8/15

TO: Gen. Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hostages in Colombia

What should we do about the DoD contract hostages in Colombia?

I would appreciate it if the two of you would come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/16/03 SecDef memo and 7/18/03 CJCS response re: Message from General Hill

DHR:dh
072103-2

Colombia



Please respond by 8/16/03

✓ 8/18

Sir,
Response attached.
Coordinated with
DASD NHA and DASD CN
8/13/03.
Vr / CDR Nosenzo
8/15

2350102

U13938 /03

↻



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET
783 11/11/03 10:10

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

August 15, 2003 – 5:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

353

SUBJECT: Redstone Arsenal Visit—SNOWFLAKE

- Senator Stevens' Redstone Arsenal trip is planned for 8 or 15 September. I will join if Senator Collins accepts his invitation to go.

Attachment – snowflake

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

15 Aug 03



U13949 03

August 4, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Redstone Arsenal

As you know, you may be invited to go to Redstone Arsenal with Senator Stevens and Senator Susan Collins. It would be a good idea if you could do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080103-17



Please respond by 8/22/03



August 18, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Gen. John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Security for Pipeline

Iraq

What do you think about getting the Peshmerga to provide security for the pipeline going into Turkey?

My recollection is they are pretty well trained. They need work, and it is their area. We could put them to work as a paramilitary element under CENTCOM and make them responsible for guarding the pipeline.

Is there a good reason to not do that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081803-35

.....

Please respond by 8/22/03

18 Aug 03

U14011 /03



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

October 18, 2003

FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: L. Paul Bremer III, Administrator (**signed**)
SUBJECT: Pipeline Security

1 RMD

Regarding your inquiry concerning the Peshmerga guarding the Iraq Turkey Pipeline, any actual or perceived use would result in both internal civil unrest and external repercussions.

- During the war and immediately after the Peshmerga participated in a fair amount of the looting and senseless damage.
- Turkey would look at any movement by the Peshmerga below the green line as a move to destabilize the area and potentially take control of the northern oil fields.
- Additionally, most Iraqis who also live below the Green Line would also view this as an encroachment and move by the Kurds to take over their land.
- Task Force Shield (TFS) has been set up within the Iraqi Oil Ministry to secure the oil infrastructure of which the Iraq Turkey Pipeline is a major part of. TFS is currently staffing its ranks and will consider hiring any individual, including Peshmerga, where the pipeline crosses through the Kurdish area.

Recommendation: Abandon the idea of deploying any Peshmerga force to guard any oil infrastructure irregardless of the location.

Drafted: Gary Holcomb, Ministry of Oil

Coordinated: CJTF-7, MFA, Security Affairs

R 0114011-03

~~CPA0034203~~

(18 AUG 03)

11-L-0559/OSD/15996



August 18, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Iraq

Iraq

Attached is a paper that discusses how things are being handled in Iraq. I am curious to know if you have any evidence that suggests the same thing or to the contrary.

Thanks.

Attach.
Smith, Ray L. and West, F. J. Bing, Undated partial paper, no title available

DHR:dh
081803-11



Please respond by 8/29/03

18 Aug 03

U14012 /03

may be done by the joint special operations command. The possibility is that the niche of the future Marine Corps will be in expeditions at the battalion, regiment and division level. This is not an altogether salutary trend. As SOC becomes the tip of the spear, many young men attracted to the Marine Corps will contemplate an alternative service as the stepping stone into SOC, with institutional loyalty and career path determined by that organization and not by the parent service.

Third, after the war there was a period of considerable turbulence in adjusting to a peacekeeping force. It is in our interest to have a written, joint doctrine for actions after a war. In three months, the Army suffered fifty killed in action and the Marines one. This is ticklish to delineate, as there are clearly demographic differences between the operating areas of the Army and the Marines.

However, eighty percent of the casualties have occurred in vehicles. The Army forces -- driven by their force structure -- conduct most of their patrols mounted; the Marines are almost exclusively patrolling dismounted. The dismounted Marine patrols assault into the ambush force. The Army tactic makes perfectly good sense in a conventional warfare scenario -- where the ambush force may be superior to the mounted force in the killing zone. In the current environment, however, it allows one or two 'guerrillas' to hit and be gone before the mounted force finishes blowing its way out of the "kill zone". It seems apparent that a mostly mounted force is at a distinct disadvantage in an urban guerrilla environment. Hence it is hard to hammer out a joint doctrine for peacekeeping when the on-the-ground experiences have differed dramatically based upon different demographics, different operational philosophies and different force structures. That said, it is hard to argue with success and the decentralized, constant patrolling and presence approach of the MEF in the Shiite south deserves being chronicled and studied for application elsewhere.

Lastly, from Iraqi Freedom it is manifest that there is not a joint concept for seizing a city. Baghdad was not taken in a seriously contested fight. Before that city fell, the concept of the Army was to encircle and to raid, attacking in and out with columns of tanks. This was a tactic of attrition based on superior firepower. The Marine concept was to seize and hold, employing armor protected by dismounted infantry. The stark contrast in the two approaches was in part driven by the difference in force structure, the Army

being mainly armor and vehicular-mounted and the Marines with proportionately many more dismounted infantry. The British chose yet a third approach at Basra, where they surrounded and wore down the defenders by psychological pressure as well as by firepower. There was no reconciliation among these three strategies before or after Iraqi Freedom. This is a serious subject which requires joint addressal.

Conclusion. Iraqi Freedom was a remarkable military victory. What stood out were the speed and the logistics movement. Potential adversaries of America took note and deterrence was enhanced. The Marines demonstrated innovation in planning and tenacity in execution, completing a campaign which will be studied for years to come. Maneuver Warfare moved from being a theoretical doctrine to a real battlefield, where it proved itself.

MajGen Ray L. Smith, USMC (ret.) is one of the most decorated Marines since World War II and commanded infantry units at all levels. F.J. Bing West, a former Marine and former Assistant Secretary of Defense, is author of The Village and The Peppercorns. Their book, The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st Marine Division, is a first-hand account of the tactics and strategy of the war.



August 18, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid -

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Guerilla Warfare

381

Attached is an excerpt from a book that offers another comment on guerrilla warfare—Che Guevara's thoughts.

Thanks.

Attach.

Guevara, Che. "Guerilla Warfare." Monthly Review Press, 1961, p. 52.

DHR:dh
081803-28



Please respond by _____

18 Aug 03

U14013 /03

Our task at the moment is to find the basic principles of this kind of fighting and the rules to be followed by peoples seeking liberation; to develop theory from facts; to generalize and give structure to our experience for the profit of others.

Let us first consider the question: Who are the combatants in guerrilla warfare? On one side we have a group composed of the oppressor and his agents, the professional army, well armed and disciplined in many cases receiving foreign help as well as the help of the bureaucracy in the employ of the oppressor. On the other side are the people of the nation or region involved. It is important to emphasize that guerrilla warfare is a war of the masses, a war of the people. The guerrilla band is an armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard of the people. It draws its great force from the mass of the people themselves. The guerrilla band is not to be considered inferior to the army against which it fights simply because it is inferior in firepower. Guerrilla warfare is used by the side which is supported by a majority but which possesses a much smaller number of arms for use in defense against oppression.

The guerrilla fighter needs full help from the people of the area. This is an indispensable condition. This is clearly seen by considering the case of bandit gangs that operate in a region. They have all the characteristics of a guerrilla army: homogeneity, respect for the leader, valor, knowledge of the ground, and, often, even good understanding of the tactics to be employed. The only thing missing is support of the people; and, inevitably, these gangs are captured and exterminated by the public force.

Analyzing the mode of operation of the guerrilla band, seeing its form of struggle, and understanding its base in the masses, we can answer the question: Why does the guerrilla fighter fight? We must come to the inevitable conclusion that the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer, that he takes up arms responding to the angry protest of the people against their oppressors, and that he fights in order to change the social system that keeps all his unarmed brothers in ignominy and misery. He launches himself against the conditions of the reigning institutions at a particular moment and dedicates himself with all the vigor that circumstances permit to breaking the mold of these institutions.

When we analyze more fully the tactic of guerrilla warfare, we will see that the guerrilla fighter needs to have a good knowledge of the surrounding countryside, the paths of entry and escape, the possibilities of speedy maneuver, good hiding places; naturally, also, he must count on the support of the people. All this indicates that the

GUERRILLA WARFARE

guerrilla fighter will carry out his action. Since in these places the struggle is limited primarily and almost exclusively to the question of land ownership, the guerrilla fighter is a revolutionary. He interprets the desires of the owners of land, owners of their means, of all that which they have long had that constitutes their life and will

It should be noted that in current different types of guerrilla warfare, one is seeing great regular armies such as the Red Army in the Soviet Union—does not exist in the other type, the case of the struggle against the constituted power in rural areas. In all such cases, whatever inspires the fight, the economic aim is toward ownership of land.

The China of Mao begins as an oppressed South, which is defeated and almost annihilating itself and begins its advance from Yenan, it takes up its base in rural areas to reform its fundamental goal. The Chinese in the rice-growing peasants, who are under a colonial yoke; with this force it is going against the Japanese invaders, but the economic aim has not disappeared. In the case of the nationalistic movement in Algeria, the arable land of Algeria is utilized in some countries, such as Puerto Rico, the island have not permitted a guerrilla war deeply wounded by the discrimination against its basis the aspiration of the peasants (who are already a proletariat) to recover the land seized from them. This same center inspired the small farmers, peasants of Cuba to close ranks and defend during the thirty-year war of liberation.

²The war fought by Cubans for independence ended in 1898, with a period of peace for

CHE GUEVARA

GUERRILLA

WARFARE

THE AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION

Translated from the Spanish by J. P. Morray

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

AUG 22 2003

1600

Chief John J. Jester
Director
Pentagon Force Protection Agency
9000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-9000

Dear Chief Jester,

I recall asking you to come into the office many months ago and telling you that I was concerned about the tone and manner of the guards at the Pentagon complex. You said you would get on it.

This note is to let you know that I know you got on it! The change has been dramatic. Everyone I talk to is pleased and appreciative of the leadership you have provided on this matter. The pleasant, professional manner of the guard force certainly makes working in the Pentagon pleasant for everybody. I thank you.


Regards,

22 AUG 03

U14229 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16003

August 13, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Pentagon Force Protection Agency

I am thinking about asking Chief Jester, head of the Pentagon Force Protection Agency, to come in so I can have a brief visit with him.

I called him in some time ago and told him I was unhappy with the way the guards conducted themselves at all the entrances. The improvement in this building in 2½ years is like night and day. Everywhere I go, the guards are smiling and happy, and they greet you pleasantly. I like it, and I want to tell him that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081303-3

.....
Please respond by 8/22/03



000.5

²⁹
July 24, 2003
IN REPLY REFER TO:
EF-6317
I-03/010567

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Rewards

I would like a report on all the rewards that have been paid by State, CIA and DoD since 9/11. Then I think we ought to get a monthly report.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072403-45



Please respond by 8/8/03

29JUL03

INFO MEMO

CLASSIFIED BY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TOP SECRET FROTH

22
August 22, 2003 ~~xxxx~~ AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Washington Headquarters Services

Ray DuBois

SUBJECT: OIF - U.S. Military Casualties by Week

IRAQ

- The following information responds to the SecDef snowflake of 12 Aug 03.


OIF U.S. Military Casualties by Week	Total Deaths	KIA	Non-Hostile	WIA
Combat Operations - 19 Mar thru 1 May	139	115	24	552
19 Mar - 22 Mar *	10	8	2	23
23 Mar - 29 Mar	46	42	4	146
30 Mar - 05 Apr	44	40	4	131
06 Apr - 12 Apr	22	22	0	164
13 Apr - 19 Apr	8	1	7	47
20 Apr - 26 Apr	7	2	5	28
27 Apr - 01 May *	2	0	2	13
Post Combat Ops - 2 May thru Present	132	61	71	468
02 May - 03 May *	1	0	1	2
04 May - 10 May	7	1	6	6
11 May - 17 May	6	1	5	11
18 May - 24 May	9	0	9	4
25 May - 31 May	13	5	8	22
01 Jun - 07 Jun	6	3	3	38
08 Jun - 14 Jun	4	2	2	33
15 Jun - 21 Jun	8	5	3	18
22 Jun - 28 Jun	10	8	2	42
29 Jun - 05 Jul	5	1	4	46
06 Jul - 12 Jul	11	5	6	32
13 Jul - 19 Jul	9	4	5	58
20 Jul - 26 Jul	15	13	2	57
27 Jul - 02 Aug	7	6	1	39
03 Aug - 09 Aug	11	2	9	28
10 Aug - 16 Aug	7	4	3	25
17 Aug - 21 Aug *	3	1	2	7
* Partial Week				

22 AUG 03

Prepared by: Roger D. Jorstad (b)(6)
11-L-0559/OSD/16006

U14253 / 03

August 12, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: OIF Casualties

I think March 19 was D-Day for the war. Please have someone figure out how many U.S. people were wounded and killed between the beginning of the war and the end of major combat operations on May 1. Then I would like to know how many were killed and wounded per week during that phase, and how many have been killed and wounded per week since May 1.

Thanks.


DHR:dh
081203-14

.....
Please respond by 8/22/03

11-L-0559/OSD/16007

August 12, 2003

IRAQ

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: OIF Casualties

I think March 19 was D-Day for the war. Please have someone figure out how many U.S. people were wounded and killed between the beginning of the war and the end of major combat operations on May 1. Then I would like to know how many were killed and wounded per week during that phase, and how many have been killed and wounded per week since May 1.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081203-14

.....

Please respond by 8/22/03

12AUG03

(b)(6)

8:58 PM

TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: August 25, 2003

SUBJECT:

Attached is a letter I received from Retired Lt. Gen. James B. Vaught. I thought it had some interesting ideas, and you might be interested in reading it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
082503.41

Attach: Letter to SD from LTG Vaught 8/21/03

ITag

25 Aug 03

AUG-21-02 THU 02:00 PM LT. GEN. (RET) J. J. VAUGHT (b)(6) P. 01

Fax for LTG Craddock, O&P -
Please pass to your leader. Thanks [Signature]

LT. GENERAL JAMES B. VAUGHT
U.S. ARMY RETIRED

U.S.

(b)(6)

1

21 August 2002

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Thanks for your continuing, determined leadership in the Global War Against Terrorism (GWAT). Listed next are some thoughts, for your considerations, to help stabilize the situation in Iraq, a confrontation some now say is beginning to turn negative in the eyes of your former supporters. Without a lot of elaboration, I suggest the following:

- A. Impose a dusk to dawn curfew each night along all of Iraqi's international borders. Announce via all media that all person within 10,000 meters of the border who move around during curfew, will be shot by American Aircraft (AC-130's or other weapons platforms). During daylight hours, the borders will be surveilled by air and ground patrols. This action will stop the outsiders and Saddam sanctuary loyalists.
- B. Activate several thousand former Iraqi professional soldiers and place at least one (unarmed) in or on each American vehicle, positioned so they are visible while the vehicle is outside a secure base. General Patton did this with great success in the U.S. Zone of occupied Germany during 1945-46.
- C. Recall B/G Dave Grange to active duty, appoint him to the grade LTG. and make him the special security advisor to Ambassador Bremer (CIA and other advisory representation notwithstanding). His presence would not undercut Gen. Abizaid's authority. On the contrary, he would facilitate the CENTCOM liberation and security goals. (Note: I have not talked to Dave or Pete Schoolmaker. However, I am sure they both would concur) Dave knows what to do. He does not need a long list of guidance. There may be others who believe they are equally qualified, however, I don't know who they are and would like to compare their credentials with Dave Grange's. He has done it all, served at all levels, and still knows how to work as a member of a multi-discipline allied civilian/military team. He has served with me four times, (in peace and war) beginning when he was a Lieutenant.

Thanks again and press on with your VISION TO VICTORY!.

[Signature]
Jim Vaught

CC LTG Cody, B-3, US Army
LTG (P) Doug Brown, US CENTCOM

3



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

203 AUG 2 11:00 AM '03

INFO MEMO

August 28, 2003, 11:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Snowflake on John Stenbit - Defense Science Board

- In the attached snowflake to Jaymie Durnan which found its way to my desk last week, you asked if Bill Schneider thought it made sense to put John Stenbit on the Defense Science Board (DSB).
- We consulted with Bill and he is receptive to putting John on the DSB. However, Bill wants to hold off working this action until John announces his departure.
- Action will be coordinated with DSB Executive Secretary and AT&L Administrative Office.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Linda Roper, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/16011

U14553 /03

Snowflake

May 7, 2003 5:04 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: John Stenbit

Please ask Bill Schneider if it makes sense to put John Stenbit on the Defense Science Board. I would like to do that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050703-13

.....
Please respond by 05/30/03

11 7/11

AUG 25 2003

From: Assistant Director, Executive and Political Personnel Office

To: *Chi Kouma*
Director, Personnel and Security
Deputy Director, Administration and Management
Director, Administration and Management

Judy

8/26/03

Subject: Snowflake – John Stenbit/DSB

In a snowflake, Secretary Rumsfeld requested the following: "Please ask Bill Schneider if it makes sense to put John Stenbit on the Defense Science Board (DSB). I would like to do that." (Tab 1)

Contact was made with Mr. Schneider through his assistant Judy Jolly. Judy spoke directly with Mr. Schneider who confirms his intent to put Mr. Stenbit on the DSB. He wants to hold off working this action until Mr. Stenbit announces his departure.

Additionally, Judy indicated that Mr. Schneider and Mr. Wynn ^(P) decided to add Rich Haver and Edward Aldrich to the DSB. As you know, Mr. Aldrich is currently on a consultant appointment assigned to the front office working a special project/report for the Secretary. Mr. Haver recently resigned his career SES position to return to private industry. Staff will follow up with the AT&L administrative office to alert them to the new additions.

An Info Memo responding to the Secretary is at Tab 2. Recommend your signature.

11-L-0559/OSD/16013

4-02-1475



May 7, 2003 5:04 PM

TO: Jaymie Duman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: John Stenbit

334 DSB

Please ask Bill Schneider if it makes sense to put John Stenbit on the Defense Science Board. I would like to do that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030703-13

.....
Please respond by *25/20/03*

11 7/11

7 May 03

U14555 /03



PDUSD(P): instructed me to respond directly

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Marshall Billingslea, PDASD (SO/LIC)

MB
4/29/05

SUBJECT: U.S. Personnel in UN Peace Operations

- You asked me to come by and explain some charts that we sent you regarding UN peacekeeping missions, and how many U.S. personnel are involved in those efforts.
- I am at your disposal to walk you through the charts, but in the interim, I offer the following Q&As:

Question: How Many U.S. Military in UN-run Peace Ops?

Answer: 14 U.S. military personnel.

- There are 15 extant Peacekeeping Operations "mandated" by the UN Security Council. "Mandated" means that the peacekeeping mission is done under UN auspices, run by the UN, and paid for by the UN assessment mechanism.
 - NOTE: There are other U.S. citizens who work in specific peacekeeping missions, but they are not USG employees. They are police, who are hired by State Department as contractors. There are 506 of these people (reduced by 18 since June).

What Has Been the Percentage Reduction in U.S. Military Personnel in UN Peace Ops since January 2001?

Answer: 68%, from 44 to 14.

What non-UN-run "Peace Operations" do U.S. Military Personnel Participate in?

Answer: The data SO/LIC has says: SFOR (1,800 troops); KFOR (2,500 troops); MFO in the Sinai (850 troops (to be reduced further)).

EF-6117

July 14, 2003

TO: Marshall Billingslea
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: U.S. Personnel in UN Peace Operations

You are going to have to personally explain this memo of yours to me. I want to talk about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/27/03 PDASD(SO/LIC) memo to SecDef re: U.S. Personnel in UN Peace Operations
[U10519/03]

DHR:dh
071403-13



Please respond by 8/1/03

USDP- 7/15
Marshall has copy and
will connect w/SD
office.
YR 1A

EF-5913

USD(P) *RZBIN'S*

Wilea
SECRET

2003 JUL -7 11 2:16

INFO MEMO

I-03/008913-SO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict *Marshall Billingslea 6/27/03*

SUBJECT: U.S. Personnel in United Nations Peace Operations

You asked what the United States is doing in each of the United Nations peace operations listed on the chart at TAB A.

The 539 U.S. personnel consist of two types: Military personnel and civilian police. 97% of these U.S. personnel are civilian police; only 3% are military. The breakdown is as follows:

*15 U.S. military
524 U.S. civ. police.*

Military Personnel (15 total U.S.)

MB

- 7 serve in UNMEE (Ethiopia-Eritrea)
 - 3 serve in UNTSO (Israel and neighboring states)
 - 2 serve in UNMIK (Kosovo)
 - 2 serve in UNOMIG (Georgia)
 - 1 serves in UNIKOM (Iraq-Kuwait)
- (Note: We will end our participation in UNIKOM on/about July 29, 2003, when our U.S. officer completes his tour and redeploys. We anticipate UNIKOM will close in October 2003.)

- 14 of the 15 U.S. military personnel serve as military observers.
 - Military observers' duties typically include monitoring and reporting on cease-fires and truce agreements, patrolling buffer zones and demilitarized areas, liaison with host-country and other military forces, planning, logistics support, and serving in headquarters staff.
- The one U.S. officer who is not a military observer serves as the Chief of the Civil-Military Operations Center for UNMEE in Ethiopia-Eritrea.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>7/8</i>
SR MA CRADDOCK	<i>7/9</i>
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	<i>4 7/7</i>

06-07-03

Civilian Police (524 total U.S.)

66+

11/12

483 serve in UNMIK (Kosovo)
41 serve in UNMISSET (East Timor)

- Civilian police advise and train local police forces. In some peace operations, they serve as armed law enforcement officers, with executive authority to detain and arrest.
- The State Department (through DynCorp) hires U.S. civilian police serving in UN peace operations.

The chart at TAB B, prepared by SO/LIC's Stability Operations office, provides further detail on personnel numbers in UN and selected non-UN peace operations.

- The chart at TAB B also shows the reduction of U.S. military personnel in these operations since January 2001, including the 66% reduction of U.S. military personnel in UN peace operations (from 44 to 15) during this period.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:


As stated

Prepared by: Jim Alverson, SO/LIC (Stability Operations), (b)(6)

Approved by: Joseph Collins, DASD for Stability Operations, (b)(6)

DJF to find out what US does in each case

United Nations Ongoing Peacekeeping Missions (U)



The 15 current UN peacekeeping operations worldwide utilize 37,000 military personnel and civilian police from 89 countries, plus an additional 10,000 local and international civilian staff. The peacekeeping budget for the 2002-03 fiscal year totals \$2.63 billion.

	Began	Total Personnel	US Personnel	Budget
1 UNTSO (Israel/Palestine)	May 1948	369	13	\$26 million
2 UNMOGIP (India/Pakistan)	January 1949	176		\$9 million
3 UNFICYP (Cyprus)	March 1964	1,412		\$48 million
4 UNDOF (Israel/Syria)	June 1974	1,178		\$41 million
5 UNIFIL (Lebanon)	March 1978	2,402		\$117 million
6 UNIKOM (Haiti/Kouvet)	April 1991	240	51	\$53 million
7 MINURSO (West Sahara)	April 1991	534		\$45 million
8 UNOMIG (Georgia)	August 1993	394	2	\$33 million
9 UNMIK (Kosovo)	June 1999	8,518	485	\$345 million
10 UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone)	October 1999	15,695		\$700 million
11 MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo)	November 1999	6,020		\$608 million
12 UNMEE (Ethiopia/Eritrea)	July 2000	4,568	7	\$231 million
13 UNMIST (East Timor)	May 2002	6,396	41	\$305 million
14 MINUCI (Cote d'Ivoire)	May 2003	26		\$27 million (estimated)

UNCLASSIFIED

30612074383A (00052) 1-01

TAB A

UN and Selected Other Peace Operations as of June 1, 2003

Operation	Location	Total Personnel	Total Personnel by Component		U.S. Personnel			Start	End	Funding Source
			UN	Other	Active	Available	On Order			
Africa										
MINURSO	Western Sahara	254	27	202	25			Apr-91	31-Jul-03	UN Asmt-PK Budget
MONUC	D. R. of Congo & neighbors	4,575	3,981	534	60			Nov-99	30-Jun-03	UN Asmt-PK Budget
UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone	13,203	12,830	254	119			Oct-99	30-Sep-03	UN Asmt-PK Budget
UNMEE	Ethiopia / Eritrea	4,077	3,855	222				Jul-00	15-Sep-03	UN Asmt - PK Budget
Balkans										
* SFOR	Bosnia-Herzegovina	12,900	12,900					Dec-95	INDEF	NATO pay-as-you-go
UNMIK	Kosovo	4,135		38	4,097			Jun-99	INDEF	UN Asmt-PK Budget
*KFOR	Kosovo	24,800	24,800					Jun-99	INDEF	NATO pay-as-you-go
Middle East										
UNTSO	Israel / neighboring states	154		154				Jun-48	INDEF	UN Asmt-Regular Budget
UNDOF	Syria / Israel (Golan Heights)	1,043	1,043					Jun-74	30-Jun-03	UN Asmt-PK Budget
UNIFIL	Lebanon / Israel	2,029	2,029					Mar-78	31-Jul-03	UN Asmt-PK Budget
*MFO	Egypt / Israel	1,800	1,800					Aug-81	INDEF	Shared, per Protocol
Other Eurasia										
UNFICYP	Cyprus	1,283	1,248		35			Mar-64	15-Jun-03	Shared+UN Asmt-PK Budget
UNOMIG	Georgia	116	9	107				Aug-93	31-Jul-03	UN Asmt-PK Budget
UNMOGIP	India / Pakistan	45		45				Jan-49	INDEF	UN Asmt-Regular Budget
UNIKOM	Iraq / Kuwait	13	9	4				Apr-91	INDEF	UN Asmt-PK Budget+Kuwait
UNMISET	Timor-Leste	4,014	3,393	104	517			May-02	20-May-04	UN Asmt-PK Budget
ISAF*	Afghanistan	5,000	5,000					Dec-01	20-Dec-03	pay-as-you-go
Summary										
UN PKOs Total		34,841	28,424	1,664	4,853	1	14	524		
Grand Total (UN, + non-UN w/ US military)		79,441	72,924	1,664	4,853	5,166	14	524		

(approximate) (approximate) (approximate)

Grand Total (UN, + non-UN w/ US military) (approximate) (approximate) (approximate)

Grand Total (UN, + non-UN w/ US military) (approximate) (approximate) (approximate)

* Indicates a non-UN operation. Numbers for non-UN operations are approximate.
 Table includes all UN peace operations (as of May 31, 2003), and all non-UN peace operations with US military participation.

11
B



EF-6117

July 14, 2003

TO: Marshall Billingslea
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: U.S. Personnel in UN Peace Operations

You are going to have to personally explain this memo of yours to me. I want to talk about it.

UN

Thanks.

Attach.
6/27/03 PDASD(SO/LIC) memo to SecDef re: U.S. Personnel in UN Peace Operations
[U10519/03]

DHR:dh
071403-13



Please respond by 8/1/03

VSDP- 7/19
Marshall has copy and
will connect w/SD

1456100

office.
v/r LA

0336717

U14605 /03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-1177-03

28 August 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBM/18/28

SUBJECT: Buying Weapons

- In response to your inquiry concerning Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) purchase of the AK-47s (TAB A), the following is provided.
- CPA reports that there are only 700 serviceable captured AK-47 rifles under the control of CJTF-7.
- CPA identified a requirement for approximately 90,000 rifles for Iraqi police, security guards, Civil Defense units, personal security for key Iraqi leaders and the New Iraqi Army over the next 2 years (see CPA report at TAB B).
- CPA selected the AK-47 in order to reduce training time for Iraqi forces, avoid perceptions of 'Americanization' of Iraq by using foreign weapons and to standardize weapons systems throughout all Iraqi forces.
- Because of shortfall in available weapons, CPA purchased 48,000 AK-47 assault rifles from Jordan. The total cost for these rifles was approximately \$2.8M.
- The new rifles and accessories were delivered to the CJTF-7 depot at Taji on 19 August and are being distributed by CJTF-7.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments

As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3;

(b)(6)

U14608 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16022

TAB

A

TAB A

August 11, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Buying Weapons

Please find out why the U.S.-led occupation is trying to buy thousands of AK-47 assault rifles when we have captured thousands of them. What is going on? See the attached article.

Thanks.

Attach.

Fineman, Mark. "Arms Plan for Iraqi Forces Is Questioned," *Los Angeles Times*, August 8, 2003, p. 1.

DHR:dh
081103-11

.....

Please respond by ~~8/15/03~~

Tab A

TAB

B

TAB B

Memorandum for: Ambassador Bremer

From: Walt Slocombe

Subject: Justification for AK-47 purchase

Date: August 17, 2003

The SECDEF recently asked, "Please find out why the US-led occupation is trying to buy thousands of AK-47 assault rifles when we have captured thousands of them. What is going on? See the attached (LA Times) article."

Proposed response:

As part of our strategy to put Iraqis increasingly to work on security, we need weapons for police, security guards, Civil Defense units, personal security for key Iraqi leaders, and the new army. For the reason explained in detail below, AK-47s are the weapon of choice for this purpose.

The simple fact is that, whatever may have been the case in April, we do not and did not have thousands of AK-47s to meet this need. (We are not really so stupid as to buy what we can get free, despite the LA Times implication that we are.)

Before the purchase, the military conducted a thorough search, pursuant to repeated orders and a specific personal directive from CG to search for and turn in every captured serviceable AK to a centralized depot. In the process, we ran down any number of urban legends and rumors, but, by the end of the month there were less than 700 serviceable weapons under CJTF-7 control. Those were all issued for use by Iraqi Police in Baghdad and elsewhere. [The one exception is the MEK stocks: They do have in coalition monitored storage, several thousand new AK-47s, and we have SecDef authority to use them, but we concluded that it was not worth a likely crisis with the MEK to take over their rifles - a step that would not, in any case, have satisfied more than a fraction of the demand.]

Accordingly, the CPA took the following steps to refine the requirement for security force AK-47 rifles and obtain them from a variety of sources:

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/16026

- CPA Ministries and Baghdad Central identified an immediate need for 21,560 AK-type weapons. This amount covers Police, Facility Protective Services, the municipality of Baghdad, and an initial issue of 1000 for the first battalion of the New Iraqi Army.

- To achieve the SECDEF-approved goal of 1 Division by summer 2004 and 3 by summer of 2005, the New Iraqi Army will require an additional 3,000 weapons every 3 months beginning in October 2003 and continuing tri-monthly for the next 2 years. The total amount is 39,000.

- In addition, CJTF 7 identified an immediate need for a further 12,421 AK-type weapons for police, FPS guards and border police plus 15,300 more weapons for the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps.

- This totals to an immediate CPA/CJTF 7 requirement for weapons totaling 49,281, plus 39,000 over the next 2 years for the New Iraqi Army. Even if this 90,000 requirement includes some double counting of currently foreseeable specific needs, it also seems likely that the expanded police force, specialized electric power and oil protection forces, and other requirements will need additional weapons.

-- Rifles, rather than pistols, are necessary for these military and security units on grounds of firepower, accuracy, and symbolic (deterrent) effect. In any event, pistols are not available anywhere we checked in the numbers we need. (Pistols will be issued to police as they are available.)

-- AK-47s are the appropriate rifle in the circumstances on the basis of familiarity, availability of ammunition, standardization, and need to avoid the appearance of "Americanizing" the arms of Iraqi security forces. Moreover, alternative potentially adequate rifle types are not available at no, or below-market, cost in anything like the necessary numbers, and are likely to be much more expensive than AK-47s on the open market.

- The cost of purchasing these rifles is not included in the respective ministry budgets because we had initially expected to be able to meet these AK-47 weapons requirements from captured Iraqi stocks. However, as noted above, a rigorous search throughout Iraq for captured or confiscated stocks of suitable weapons found only a few hundred serviceable rifles remaining. Those were distributed. We explored various non-purchase options, some of them involving sensitive diplomatic approaches to third countries. While those avenues may in the end provide some weapons, it is clear that, even on optimistic projections, they will not meet the total need, nor be quick enough to meet immediate needs. Accordingly, it is necessary,

if we are to address the requirement, to seek to purchase AK-47s on the open market.

- Accordingly, on 30 July, Ambassador Bremer approved PRB recommendation #265 apportioning \$6.125M from seized / DFI funds for the purchase of these rifles.

- Jordan immediately provided 1000 rifles and ancillaries (magazines, slings, bayonets, etc.) on 31 July for the initial battalion of the New Iraqi Army at a cost of \$175 ea, the going market price.

- An open competition for 34,000 more new AKs then ensued through early August. 20 bids were received; Jordan was the low bidder by far with a bid of \$59 per weapon. Due to the low cost of these weapons, 14,000 more were added at a total cost of \$2,832,000.

- These weapons, with ancillaries, will be delivered to the CJTF-7 depot at Taji on 19 August and distributed through the Major Subordinate Commands of CJTF-7.

- Sufficient ammunition, almost 6.5 million rounds, is on hand for these weapons.

TAB

C

TAB C

USCENTCOM
CPA

CAPT Swingle
Mr. Walt Slocombe

August 18, 2003
August 18, 2003

TAB A

August 11, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Buying Weapons

Please find out why the U.S.-led occupation is trying to buy thousands of AK-47 assault rifles when we have captured thousands of them. What is going on? See the attached article.

It's a 9

Thanks.

Attach.

Fineman, Mark. "Arms Plan for Iraqi Forces Is Questioned," *Los Angeles Times*, August 8, 2003, p. 1.

DHR:dh
081103-11

.....
Please respond by ~~7/15/03~~

11 Aug 03

Tab A

11 AUG 11 2003
4610 / 03



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

SEP 10 2003

An Open Letter to America's Employers:

Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the Department of Defense has mobilized more than 295,000 Reservists and National Guardsmen in response to the ongoing Global War on Terrorism. These dedicated men and women—citizen Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen—have been engaged in and around the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as providing security here at home and in other critical locations around the world.

This would not have been possible without the strong backing of America's employers. I want to express my gratitude to all employers who have demonstrated support for this national crisis by swiftly releasing your valuable employees for military service. It is equally gratifying to see how you are welcoming back these returning warriors and reinstating them in their jobs. During the period of mobilization, many of you did more than was required by law by voluntarily offering continued benefits, pay differentials, and additional, creative forms of family support which made the period of separation so much easier to bear. I know of no other time in our nation's history when so many employers have voluntarily offered this level of support and benefits.

335 SD

I recognize that these generous actions have not been without sacrifice. Each of you has earned the deepest appreciation of this Department and the United States Government for your unswerving support of our nation's military. Without this continued support, we could not maintain a strong military or sustain the current effort to overcome the international terrorist threat directed at our country, our citizens, and all who love freedom.

You have my deepest thanks. Your direct contributions and support are another illustration of America's greatness as a nation.

Sincerely,

10 Sept 03



U14685 /03



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET

2003 SEP -2 11 4 19

ACTION MEMO

August 29, 2003 1600

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USDP(P&R)

David S. C. Chu 8/29/03

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation to America's Employers--SNOWFLAKE

- You asked if you should send a thank you letter to employers.
- It is appropriate to acknowledge employers who are supporting our men and women in uniform. Your July 18th meeting with CEOs recognized employers, and it would be appropriate for you to present the annual SECDEF Freedom Award to the five outstanding employers on November 14 at the National Chamber of Commerce.
- The community that employs and supports Reservists and Guardsmen is extensive, with over 100,000 employers, including private sector sole proprietors, Fortune 500 companies, federal, state, and municipal agencies.
- Given the size of this community, recommend an "open letter" to employers be published through a variety of outlets including the US Chamber of Commerce, the National Federation of Independent Businesses, the National Governors Association, the International City Managers Association, the National League of Cities, the National Conference of Mayors, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the International Association of Fire Chiefs, as well major newspapers and business publications.
- Individual letters to the Cabinet Secretaries and the Postmaster General would be appropriate.
- Distribution could be timed to coincide with the events commemorating the anniversary of September 11 or the SECDEF Freedom Awards Presentation on November 14.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Approve concept (draft letter at Tab B)
Present Freedom Awards on 14 November

see cd's
DR
MA Bucci
Col Permi

COORDINATION: ASD (PA) Attached (Tab C)

Attachments: As stated

Prepared By: LtCol Ian Ferguson (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	9/3

014685 03





UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

ACTION MEMO

August 29, 2003 1600

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)
SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation to America's Employers--SNOWFLAKE

- You asked if you should send a thank you letter to employers (Tab A).
- It is appropriate to acknowledge employers who are supporting our men and women in uniform. Your July 18th meeting with CEOs recognized employers, and it would be appropriate for you to present the annual SECDEF Freedom Award to the five outstanding employers on November 14 at the National Chamber of Commerce.
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- Given the size of this community, recommend an "open letter" to employers be published through a variety of outlets including the US Chamber of Commerce, the National Federation of Independent Businesses, the National Governors Association, the International City Managers Association, the National League of Cities, the National Conference of Mayors, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the International Association of Fire Chiefs, as well major newspapers and business publications.
- Individual letters to the Cabinet Secretaries and the Postmaster General would be appropriate.
- Distribution could be timed to coincide with the events commemorating the anniversary of September 11 or the SECDEF Freedom Awards Presentation on November 14.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Approve concept (draft letter at Tab B) _____
Present Freedom Awards on 14 November _____

COORDINATION: ASD (PA) Milit 9/3
DIRTA

Attachments: As stated

Prepared By: LtCol Ian Ferguson (b)(6)



9/3
1000

Snowflake

01/07/2000 07:12

(b)(6)

TADS GUEST HOUSE

8/24/03

PAGE 09

12:07 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
DATE: August 25, 2003
SUBJECT: Employers

Do you think I should send a letter, personally signed, to all the employers who are doing so much for the men and women in uniform? Could you draft a good letter to them and thank them and tell them how important it is, and how we appreciate their support.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
082503.20

Please respond by: _____ 9/6

7/6
Draft attached

(9)

SUBJECT: Draft Letter for Private Sector Employers of Guardsmen and Reservists

An Open Letter to America's Employers:

Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the Department of Defense has mobilized more than 295,000 Reservists and National Guardsmen in response to the ongoing Global War on Terrorism. These dedicated ~~young~~ men and women—citizen Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen—have been engaged in and around the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as providing security here at home and in other critical locations around the world.

Here This would not have been possible without the strong backing of America's employers. I want to express my ~~sincere~~ gratitude to all employers who have demonstrated support for this national crisis by swiftly releasing your valuable employees for military service. It is equally gratifying to see how you are welcoming back ~~our~~ returning warriors and ~~quickly~~ reinstating them in their jobs. ~~And~~ during the period of mobilization, many of you did more than was required by law by voluntarily offering continued benefits, pay differentials, and additional, creative forms of family support which made the period of separation so much easier to bear. I know of no other time in our nation's history when so many employers have voluntarily offered this level of support and benefits.

I recognize that these generous actions have not been without sacrifice. Each ~~and every one~~ of you has earned the deepest appreciation of this Department and the United States Government for your unswerving support of our nation's military. Without this continued support, we could not maintain a strong military or sustain the current effort to overcome the international terrorist threat directed at our country, our citizens, and ~~toward~~ all who love freedom.

You have my deepest thanks. Your direct contributions and support are another illustration of America's greatness as a nation.

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/16036



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET

2003 SEP -2 PM 4:17

INFO MEMO

September 2, 2003 – 2:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

SUBJECT: How Did the Iraq/Afghanistan Pay Issues Arise—SNOWFLAKE
(Tab A)

- In the April Supplemental process, Congress decided to show support for troops in Iraq and Afghanistan by a step above and beyond the Administration's actions. It increased Imminent Danger Pay (sometimes called "combat pay") from \$150 to \$225 per month, and the Family Separation Allowance (paid to married personnel separated 30 days or more from their families) from \$100 to \$250. Because the initiative rode on an Appropriations Bill, it expires on September 30.
- By definition, there was no proposal to increase either in the President's budget request. The Armed Services Committees took different approaches for FY 2004, with the Senate extending the increases (but funding only 40% of the cost in its Appropriations Bill to date), while the House would restrict them to the combat zones. (Under current law they're paid world-wide.)
- The House approach is clearly preferable, but still flawed, because 55% of the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan are single and not eligible for the bulk of the payment, which comes through an increased Family Separation Allowance. In our appeal, therefore, we asked that Congress sustain the status quo ante. (We were separately working on how to use existing authorities to reward properly those in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially those who will be in theater six months or more, but this was a matter not yet ready for a public announcement.) Hence the controversy: The Service Times' editorial denounced our appeal, and the issue was picked up by several seeking the Democratic nomination for President. The public assurance we provided that we would not cut compensation for those in Iraq and Afghanistan received balanced, thoughtful coverage in the Service Times (Tab B), but not in all media outlets. We will need to continue to work to get the word out.

U14686 03



11-L-0559/OSD/16037

- In the meantime, OMB has charge of the Administration's position on the issue. Subject to your guidance, we will press OMB for an increase in the ceiling on Hardship Duty Pay so that we can indeed easily sustain compensation in Iraq and Afghanistan, regardless of how the Authorization Bill conference comes out.


RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

8/19/03

August 18, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Combat Pay

We have to make sure we don't get ourselves positioned like we did this past week, looking like we are against pay for the people in Iraq and Afghanistan. I cannot imagine how we arrived there.

Please explain.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081803-5

.....

Please respond by 8/29/03

Most dangerous places = most money

White House wants to make sure special pays go to certain locations like Iraq and Afghanistan

By Vance Crawley
Times Staff Writer

Bush administration officials are huddling during the next few weeks to discuss pressing their case in Congress for revamping deployment pays so troops in the most dangerous places — Iraq and Afghanistan — get the most money.

In a hastily arranged news conference meant to defuse growing criticism, David S.C. Chu, the Pentagon's personnel chief, promised Aug. 14 that no one in Iraq or Afghanistan would see a reduced paycheck under contemplated changes. But Chu left open the possibility that those serving elsewhere might see lower deployment pays.

The Pentagon's idea could provide pay increases for single troops in combat zones, but at the expense of married and single personnel serving in relatively less risky assignments.

Defense Department officials said it is premature to publicly

discuss the possible changes, but Chu told reporters that troops in combat zones might receive geographically targeted hikes in hardship-duty pay or the new assignment-incentive pay.

At issue are family separation allowances and imminent-danger pay. Currently, eligible troops all over the world get temporarily higher levels of these deployment pays because of a law passed by Congress in April at the height of the Iraq war. Lawmakers increased monthly family-separation allowance — which goes to those separated from their families at least 30 days — from \$100 to \$250, and boosted monthly imminent-danger pay — which goes to all who serve in designated danger zones — from \$150 to \$225. Lawmakers set the temporary increases to expire Sept. 30, but the slow progress of the Iraq campaign has meant troops likely will remain under fire long past that date.


The Pentagon in early July sent

a legislative appeal to the House and Senate Armed Services committees proposing that both pays be restored to prewar levels, in part because the temporary hikes would cost more than \$500 million per year.

The issue quickly caught the public's attention. Troops and families, citing Air Force Times stories and editorials, started to complain about possible pay cuts. Democratic presidential contenders began hashing the plan, which led to Chu's news conference.

Chu said no one in Iraq or Afghanistan would see a pay cut. Instead, the Pentagon wants to use alternatives to accurately target more pay only to those in the combat zone — the intent of Congress when it raised the pays in the first place, he said.

Family-separation allowance goes to tens of thousands of people worldwide who are spending a month or more away from home for training reasons or in concur-



Paratroopers deployed to Baghdad International Airport participate in a ladder extraction exercise on an HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter. The White House wants to revamp danger pays so that troops in Iraq and Afghanistan — the most dangerous combat areas — get the most money.

bat deployments. Danger pay also goes to many locations, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, where troops face a relatively low threat compared to those being attacked daily in and around Baghdad, Iraq.

So far, the Pentagon has done little to sell its proposal. Both the Senate and House have funded slightly different plans for continuing to pay higher rates of family-separation allowance and danger pay into the new fiscal year that begins Oct. 1.

"We've been hearing from ... the Defense Department that for some reason or another, they can't afford to keep the promises we made to these young men and women who are putting their lives on the line for freedom," said Rep. Jerry Lewis, R-Calif.

"As far as I'm concerned, we sure as hell can afford this, and we will," said Lewis, chairman of the House Appropriations defense subcommittee.

A better way?

But in his meeting with Pentagon reporters, Chu argued the family and danger pays aren't necessarily the best way to compensate those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"Too broad-based," he said. "It's like using a sledgehammer to hit a small nail."

Another official said closed-door discussions are taking place among Pentagon and White House officials on whether to make a strong pitch to Congress for changing the danger-pay plans now underway.

Currently, troops in the combat zones receive \$430 in deployment pays if they are single and \$690 if they have families. Of that, the

temporary increases in danger pay and family allowance total \$75 for single people and \$225 for married personnel.

Chu named hardship-duty pay and assignment-incentive pay as possible ways to add \$225 to monthly paychecks for those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Currently, troops who receive danger pay in those areas also receive \$100 per month in hardship-duty pay. The special pay was created by the Defense Department in 2001 and is paid in three increments — \$50, \$100 and \$150.

Assignment-incentive pay was introduced just this year as a pilot program for the Navy. Under current policy, sailors bid on how much extra monthly pay they would be willing to accept for positions that the service finds particularly difficult to fill. Bids typically top out at \$400 to \$500 per month, and the pay is based on geography and actual duties to be performed at the duty location.

However, the law authorizing this special pay is so broadly written that it might be tailored to fit special circumstances — including, perhaps, paying \$225 to anyone in Iraq or Afghanistan.

In either of these cases, single service members would end up getting more than they do under the plan making its way through Congress.

Unlike danger pay and family allowance, the two newer pays can be targeted to specific nations or even specific cities and bases within a nation. This would follow the practice of the State Department, which targets danger pays for its employees to certain countries and cities and offers a range of danger pays based on the level of risk. □

Coors salutes the men and women fighting to protect our country. We wish you a safe return.



SECRET
2003 SEP -2 11:17

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1180-03
2 September 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers 8/29*

SUBJECT: Blue Force Tracker

- In response to your request concerning the Blue Force Tracker (TAB A), the following is provided.
- The Department has made significant investments in the Blue Force Tracking (BFT) area. However, the BFT issue is more than not buying sufficient numbers. The larger issue concerns dissemination of the integrated picture created by the devices to the joint warfighter. Recent lessons learned from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) highlighted a major BFT interoperability problem between the US Army and US Marine Corps.
- The primary source of tactical BFT information in OIF was the Army's Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) system. In support of USCENTCOM and the Coalition Joint Forces Land Component Command, the Army fielded over 1000 systems to Army, Marine Corps and United Kingdom ground forces before the beginning of hostilities as part of a truly joint battle command system. The overall command and control (C2) system consisted of the joint Global Command and Control System, the Marine Corps's C2 Personal Computer system, the Army's FBCB2 system and a network and mission management infrastructure dedicated to support the ground component commander.
- The current USMC C2 system is not compatible with the USA C2 system to support joint BFT. The Army and Marine Corps acknowledge this interoperability shortfall and have initiated efforts to formulate a common joint solution. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) directed both Services to provide an integrated plan on the way-ahead toward a joint BFT solution no later than October 2003.
- The following has been or needs to be accomplished:

11-L-0559/OSD/16041

U14718 /03

- JROC designated the Army as Lead Service to spearhead efforts for effective and efficient joint BFT integrated solutions through concept and architecture development. The joint BFT architecture will be completed in FY05.
- The Army received BFT funding in the FY 03 Supplemental (OIF Fund) and the Marine Corps is upgrading hardware and software applications. This addresses near-term solutions based on OIF feedback by operational units.
- Continue to seek better technology. The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness (JBFSAs) and combat identification are funded by the Army to demonstrate and assess core technologies for mid- to long-term use by the Services.
- As lessons learned are better understood and the architecture is being developed, other short-term JBFSAs shortfalls will be funded. While gaining this understanding, all funding vehicles including supplementals should be considered.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Prepared By: Lt Gen James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

TAB

A

TAB A

²¹
July 18, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: LTG Craddock
Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Blue Force Tracker

Please have your folks examine the reasons that we seem not to be buying sufficient numbers, and come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071803-32



Please respond by ~~8/1/03~~

03 JUL 24 PM 12:21

Tab A

TAB

B

TAB B

USA	LT COL(P) HOOKER	13 AUGUST 2003
USMC	COL VAN DYKE	7 AUGUST 2003
USJFCOM	COL HAYWARD	5 AUGUST 2003

TAB A

²¹
July 18, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: LTG Craddock
Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Blue Force Tracker

Please have your folks examine the reasons that we seem not to be buying sufficient numbers, and come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071803-32

.....
Please respond by ~~8/1/03~~

320.2

21 Jul 03

Tab A

U14719 /03

03 JUL 24 PM 12:21

11-L-0559/OSD/16047

TAB

2:56 PM

381

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Adm. Ed Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: July 28, 2003

SUBJECT:

I am concerned about the slow progress on Joint Concepts of Operation. I have a feeling that it is lagging.

Is there anything I can do to be helpful?

Thanks.

DHR/tzn
072803.23

Please respond by: _____

3874103

91 PM 12:47

U14722 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16048

Tab

September 3, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Testimony

D.R.

UN

Please go ahead and get testimony from Major Ward, who I met at Brooke Army Medical Center, on what he told the UN Security Director.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090303-14

.....

Please respond by 9/12/03

3 SEP 03

U14748 /03

U14748-03

September 3, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

D.R.

SUBJECT: Briefing

337

When I get back, Condi wants me to get briefed by the Department of Justice and some intelligence people on a finding issue.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090303-20

.....

Please respond by 9/12/03

3 Sep 03

U14749 /03

U.14749-03

September 3, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Plan

D.R.

IRIS

When the President does his speech, we are going to have to have what we could call a plan that would be supported by the Supplemental.

Let's start fleshing that out—please get an outline.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090303-21

.....
Please respond by 9/15/03

3 Sept 03

U14750 /03

U-14750-03

11-L-0559/OSD/16051

September 3, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
 SUBJECT: Killed and Wounded in Accidents

Please send me a copy of what you develop with respect to the number of people killed or wounded in accidents in the U.S. military worldwide, excluding Iraq and Afghanistan. Then let's compare it to the number in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 090303-15

.....
 Please respond by 9/5/03

3 SEP 03

U14751 /03

September 3, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
 SUBJECT: France

Please let J.D. Crouch know that the decision for the moment is to leave the French program as it is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090303-18

.....
 Please respond by _____

U14752 /03

U. 14752-03

11-L-0559/OSD/16053

Vertical handwritten mark

Vertical handwritten mark

September 3, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Points for POTUS Speech

D.R.

357-011-02

You were there when Condi said she would like four or five points to be included in the possible Presidential speech—certainly the importance of will; why it is important for the young men and women and their families to be doing what they are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan; and the desire to have increased Iraqi forces and increased international presence, rather than additional U.S.

Please get something over to Condi in the next 48 hours and then let me see a copy.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090303-13

.....
Please respond by 9/5/03

357-011-02

U14753 /03

U. 14753-03

September 3, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Liberia

D.R.

Liberia

When are we planning to move the MEU away from Liberia?

When and if we do, do we plan to leave a liaison unit with the ECOWAS, and ultimately the UN people, or not?

Let's come up with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090303-17

.....
Please respond by 9/15/03

SEP 03

U14755 /03



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

SEP 10 2003 11:37 AM
SEP 10 2003 11:37 AM

September 5, 2003, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Money Allocated for AOR Combatant Commands (COCOMs)

- You asked for the basis of the funding levels of the regional COCOMs that we provided to you previously.
- We have identified the major Operations and Maintenance (O&M) expenses in FY 2003 below for each COCOM as provided in the FY 2004 President's Budget submission. Each COCOM's O&M funding is allocated through their executive agent. O&M primarily funds administrative and logistics support of the headquarters, for example:
 - Central Command (\$102.0 million): Headquarters operations, communications including Joint Communications Support Element and headquarters communications; General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) activities.
 - European Command (\$192.4 million): Headquarters operations; intelligence and counter-intelligence activities.
 - Northern Command (\$90.0 million): Headquarters operations, security programs.
 - Pacific Command (\$116.4 million): Headquarters operations; GDIP activities.
 - Southern Command (\$107.7 million): Headquarters operations including State Partnership program, Unit/Individual Exchange program, Distinguished Visitor/Observers program, Antiterrorism/Force Protection training.

Comparable funding levels for the other COCOMS are:

(O&M Dollars in Millions)

<u>Combatant Command (Executive Agent)</u>	<u>FY 2003</u>	<u>FY 2004</u>	<u>FY 2005</u>
Joint Forces Command (Navy)	130.2	254.8	264.9
Transportation Command (Air Force)	16.4	15.6	14.1
Strategic Command (Air Force)	202.6	287.7	312.2

U14879 03

- The above cost estimates do **not** include:
 - Contingency funding from supplementals and the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund,
 - Military personnel assigned to work at the COCOM headquarters,
 - Procurement costs for joint communications systems or GDIP investments,
 - Additional funding that may be provided to the COCOMs throughout the year of execution.

- You also asked how you could get involved in the allocation of funds for the COCOMS. My staff, in coordination with the Joint Staff, will be reviewing and assessing the COCOM Budget Change Proposals (BCPs) which will be submitted through the Military Department Executive Agents during the upcoming review. This will allow you to provide direction or decisions on the most urgent COCOM requirements.

- In addition, U.S. Central Command requested a review of DoD Directive 5100.3 which defines the role of the Service Executive Agent. My staff is developing a response to this request, in consultation with the Joint Staff and PA&E, which would clarify procedures for addressing urgent COCOM resource needs during the execution year. New procedures would allow for your increased involvement in evaluating routine requirements for COCOM logistics and administrative support.

RECOMMENDATION: None. Provided for your information.

COORDINATION: Attached.

Prepared By: John Evans,

(b)(6)

COORDINATION PAGE

The Joint Staff (J8)

RDML Daily

September 3, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/16058

August 14, 2003

TO: Dov Zakheim
CC: Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Funding for AOR Combatant Commands

In the future, I want to get involved in the allocation of funds for the combatant commands.

Next, I wonder why there isn't any funding for Joint Forces Command.

These allocations do not look right to me. On what basis are they made? Please advise.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/5/03 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Money Allocated for AOR Combatant Commands (COCOMS)

DHR:dh
081403-8

.....
Please respond by 9/5/03



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000


INFO MEMO

August 26, 2003, 3:30 PM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)


Signature & Date

SUBJECT: Olmsted Scholar and Foreign Area Expert Programs, and a "Transformation Plan" for DoD's Language Capability

- You asked me about my plans for Olmsted Scholar and foreign area expert programs (TAB A).
- I believe both of these programs need to be viewed in the larger context of how language and regional area expertise are valued, developed and employed, a subject on which you have pressed me on several occasions for a "transformation plan" (TAB B). I propose that we:
 - Work with the Combatant Commanders to integrate language capability needs into the operational planning process. Assign a foreign area officer to their personal staffs.
 - With the Military Services, work toward every newly commissioned officer having an educational background in an "investment language and region" (see attached list at TAB C). The curricula at the Service Academies and educational requirements in the Reserve Officer Training Corps should be aligned with this goal.
 - Take steps to provide adequate language ability to operational units:
 - (1) Ensure that the Defense Language Institute is capable of addressing our demand for numbers and types of highly proficient language speakers. Ensure that the graduates are assigned to jobs using the skill they acquired.
 - (2) Develop a "crash course" of basic language training for non-language trained Service members in preparation for deployment (DLI has developed a concept for 1-, 3-, and 6-month courses that General Casey and I are discussing).
 - (3) Assess the feasibility of offering "extra credit" to recruiters who recruit personnel who are bi-lingual in an investment language.
 - (4) Establish a Direct Entry Individual Ready Reserve program for all Services to take advantage of native language speakers in the United States (already underway as a pilot program in the Army).



11-L-0559/OSD/16060

U149401/03

- Revise Foreign Language Proficiency Pay to ensure that it adequately rewards those with investment language ability and is sufficient to encourage the development and maintenance of language ability within the force.
- The Olmsted Scholar Program, of course, is a voluntary program administered by a private foundation. The foundation prefers candidates who are in combat or combat arms specialties. I will ask the Services to encourage applications from combat and combat arms specialties and encourage the completion of a related graduate degree as a part of the program. I will also direct the assignment of graduates to an appropriate utilization tour that takes advantage of the foreign language and regional expertise gained.
- We will meet with the Deputy Secretary to review this plan. Steve Cambone and General Pace agree with it. Steve has also forwarded to me a draft language strategy compiled by his staff that we will incorporate.
- In order to do all this in an expeditious manner, I am asking the military services to designate a full time member of a time-limited (six month) Language Transformation Team.
- To truly accomplish transformation, it will be necessary to have the American educational system engaged for the long term. If you agree, I will engage national language associations in discussion of our plan and how we might work together to improve language capability.

COORDINATION: VCJCS; USD (I) (at TAB D)

Prepared by: Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD (P), (b)(6)

TAB

A

5/29/03
0830
Snowflake

Sent 5/29 07:00
May 27, 2003 3:31 PM

TO: David Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pace
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Olmsted Scholar/FAO Programs

What do you propose we do about the Olmsted Scholar and foreign area expert programs?

Please give me a proposal after talking to Steve Cambone, Paul Wolfowitz and Pete Pace.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/26/02 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Olmsted Scholar and Foreign Area Expert Programs [U00066/03]

DHR:dh
052703-30

.....
Please respond by 6/27/03

TAB

B

2
1700



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 JAN -2 PM 1:07

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 27 2003

INFO MEMO

S. L. ...

December 26, 2002, 1:28 PM

FOR: Secretary of Defense

FROM: *Dr.* Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S. C. Chu December 31, 2002
Signature & Date

SUBJECT: Olmsted Scholar and Foreign Area Expert Programs

- This provides an interim response to your November 9, 2002 request to determine if the Olmsted Scholar and foreign area expert programs are being properly utilized.
- The Olmsted Foundation Board of Directors is concerned that the time required to complete the program coupled with Service utilization policies may be discouraging quality officers from applying, decreasing the Department's ability to produce the best officers with regional expertise and cultural understanding.
- The Olmsted Scholar Program provides studies in a foreign language and culture abroad for military line officers with 3-10 years of commissioned service. Services screen nominees via a board process and the Olmsted Directors select scholars.
- Around 9 scholars are selected each year, but the number increased in the past two years, (11 scholars in 2002 and 18 scholars in 2003). The Olmsted Board of Directors has expressed concern that the quality and quantity of candidates is not at the desired level.
- Since 1960, there have been 366 Olmsted Scholars, of whom 28 (7.6%) reached flag or general officer rank, with details provided at (Tab A).
- We have asked the Services to provide information on the quality and utilization of their Olmsted Scholars and to comment on how this program can best meet their future requirements for foreign area expert needs (Tab B).
- Additionally, the Services, Combatant Commands, and Defense Agencies have been asked to provide information on their requirements for language and foreign area experts as part of an ongoing review of the Department's Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program and on projected needs, not on current manning authorizations.
- Once all data is received and compiled, a report on both programs will be provided.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>1/16</i>
SR MA CRADDOCK	<i>1/17</i>
MA BUGGI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>1/12</i>

11-L-0538 OSD/16065



1100066 102

Olmsted Scholars
General/Flag Officers by Cohort Year Groupings

Department of Defense

Olmsted Cohort Year Group	Cohort Size	GO/FO in Cohort	% GO/FO
1960-1964	30	8	26.7%
1965-1969	30	7	23.3%
1970-1974	39	4	10.3%
1975-1979	40	5	12.5%
1980-1984	42	4	9.5%
Total	181	28	15.5%

Department of the Army

Olmsted Cohort Year Group	Cohort Size	GO/FO in Cohort	% GO/FO
1960-1964	10	3	30.0%
1965-1969	10	1	10.0%
1970-1974	14	2	14.3%
1975-1979	10	2	20.0%
1980-1984	15	0	0.0%
Total	59	8	13.6%

Department of the Navy

Olmsted Cohort Year Group	Cohort Size	GO/FO in Cohort	% GO/FO
1960-1964	10	2	20.0%
1965-1969	10	3	30.0%
1970-1974	13	1	7.7%
1975-1979	15	2	13.3%
1980-1984	13	3	23.1%
Total	61	11	18.0%

Department of the Air Force

Olmsted Cohort Year Group	Cohort Size	GO/FO in Cohort	% GO/FO
1960-1964	10	3	30.0%
1965-1969	10	3	30.0%
1970-1974	12	1	8.3%
1975-1979	15	1	6.7%
1980-1984	14	1	7.1%
Total	61	9	14.8%

BornNameOlmsted Scholar Class1 Star

1936	BGEN Anthony Alan Smith, USA (Ret.)	'62
1939	BGEN Wilfred Leon Goodson, USAF (Ret.)	'64
1941	BGEN Howard Taft Prince II, USA (Ret.)	'65
1942	BGEN Robert Bruce Giffen, USAF (Ret.)	'70
1942	BGEN Frank Ralph Giordano, USA (Ret.)	'71
1949	BGEN James William Morehouse, USAF (Ret.)	'77
1951	BGEN Emerson N. Gardner Jr, USMC	'78
1952	RADM Miles Benton Wachendorf, USN	'79
1952	RADM Jacob L. Shuford, USN	'80
1952	RADM William Douglas Crowder, USN	'80
1956	BGEN Silvanus T. Gilbert III, USAF	'83
1954	RADM Deborah Ann Loewer, USN	'84

2 Star

1936	MGEN Jack O'Brien Bradshaw, USA (Ret.)	'62
1935	MGEN Richard Barron Goetze Jr., USAF (Ret.)	'63
1937	MGEN Wayne Otto Jefferson Jr., USAF (Ret.)	'63
1935	RADM Raynor A. K. Taylor, USN (Ret.)	'67
1940	MGEN Peter Dodd Robinson, USAF (Ret.)	'68
1941	RADM Larry Roy Marsh, USN (Ret.)	'68
1943	MGEN Stanley George Genega, USA (Ret.)	'71
1944	RADM Thomas Fletcher Marfiak, USN (Ret.)	'73
1950	MGEN Bruce Kenyon Scott, USA (Ret.)	'79

3 Star

1934	LGEN Frederick Joseph Brown III, USA (Ret.)	'60
1930	LGEN Clyde Dixon Dean, USMC (Ret.) (Deceased 12/23/01)	'62
1936	VADM Ronald M. Eytchison, USN (Ret.)	'65
1951	LGEN John P. Abizaid, USA	'78

4 Star

1930	ADM Carlisle A. H. Trost, USN (Ret.)	'60
1939	GEN George Lee Butler, USAF (Ret.)	'65
1940	GEN Henry Viccellio Jr., USAF (Ret.)	'67

1 star = 12	USA = 8
2 star = 9	USAF = 9
3 star = 4	USN = 9
4 star = 3	USMC = 2

<u>Totals</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>28</u>
---------------	-----------	-----------

Snowflake

11/13/02

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 9, 2002
SUBJECT: Programs

1/7

Look into the Olmsted Scholars program and see if we are properly using it.

Also look into the area expert programs in the services and see if we are properly using them. I think we need to get the department squared away in these areas.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
110902.03

Please respond by:

11/23

1/7

Response Attached

1/7

TAB

C

INVESTMENT LANGUAGES/REGIONS

- Arabic *
- Chinese*
- Spanish
- Korean
- Farsi
- Indonesian*
- Philippino*
- Kurdish
- Turkish
- Hindi
- Central Asia*
- Russian
- Sub-Saharan Africa
- Serbo-Croatian

* Multiple Dialects

TAB

D



THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CH-1058-03
3 July 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
PERSONNEL AND READINESS

Subject: Olmsted Scholar and Foreign Area Expert Programs

Thank you for the opportunity to review¹ the enclosed draft response to the Secretary of Defense regarding proposals for the Olmsted Scholar and the Foreign Area Expert Programs. I concur in the memorandum as written.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Peter Pace", with the initials "VR" written above it.

PETER PACE
General, United States Marine Corps
Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

Reference:

1 SecDef memorandum, 27 May 2003, "Olmsted Scholar/FAO Programs"

INFO MEMO

June 17, 2003, 2 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

Signature & Date

SUBJECT: Olmsted Scholar and Foreign Area Expert Programs

- You asked me about my plans for Olmsted Scholar and foreign area expert programs.
- I believe both of these programs need to be viewed in the larger context of how language and regional area expertise are valued, developed and employed. To jump start a transformation of this process, I plan to pursue the following course of action:
 - Address the foreign area officer issues by working with the Combatant Commanders to require the assignment of a foreign area officer to their personal staff. This will enhance the value of the career field and promotion opportunity, thus attracting more officers to this area.
 - Work with the Combatant Commanders to configure command headquarters to better integrate language capability into the operational planning process.
 - With the Military Services, devise plans whereby every newly commissioned officer will have an educational background in an "investment language" (see TAB A). This will need to be phased in over a number of years.
 - Ensure that the Defense Language Institute is capable of addressing our demand for numbers and types of language speakers. Ensure that the graduates are assigned to jobs using the skill they acquired.
 - Take steps to adequately provide language ability to operational units.
 - Assess the feasibility of offering "extra credit" to recruiters who recruit personnel who are bi-lingual in an investment language.
 - Establish a direct entry Individual Ready Reserve Program for those who speak investment languages (Army is currently conducting a pilot program for Arab language speakers.)
 - Refine our data bases and our assignment processes to make use of language and foreign area expertise at large in our military and civilian force, regardless of whether individuals are identified as "linguists" or "foreign area officers".

11-L-0559/OSD/16073

- The Olmsted Scholar Program is a self-volunteer program administered by a private foundation. The foundation prefers candidates who are in combat or combat arms specialties. I think there is value in having these individuals experience foreign culture and language. To strengthen the use of this program I will ask the Services to encourage applications from combat and combat arms specialties and encourage the completion of a related graduate degree as a part of the program. I will also direct the assignment of graduates to an appropriate utilization tour that takes advantage of the foreign language and regional expertise gained.

Prepared by: Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD (P), (b)(6)

11-L-0559/QSD/16074



INTELLIGENCE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

AUG 12 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL & READINESS)

SUBJECT: Defense Language Program, Foreign Area Expertise

I concur in your plan to transform the Defense Language Program with emphasis on the larger context of value, development and employment of language and foreign area expertise.

Attached is a draft Defense Foreign Language Program Strategy that has been developed over several years by a panel of intelligence agency and service action officers under ASD (C3I) leadership and ASD (MPP) participation. The goals and objectives of the strategy coincide to a large degree with your planned course of action.

The intelligence aspects of language and area specialist capabilities (such as an expanded Foreign Area Officer program and an OSD foreign language program function) have been topics of discussion as we look to improve language and area knowledge support in the Global War on Terrorism. As you stand up teams to work foreign language issues, I request that you consider including our representatives and the attached strategy in their work.

My point of contact in this matter is Mr. Glenn Nordin, (b)(6)


Stephen A. Cambone

Attachment
As stated

cc:
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



11-L-0559/OSD/16075

5/29/03
0830

SENT 5/29 0700
May 27, 2003 3:31 PM

TO: David Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pace
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Olmsted Scholar/FAO Programs

350

What do you propose we do about the Olmsted Scholar and foreign area expert programs?

Please give me a proposal after talking to Steve Cambone, Paul Wolfowitz and Pete Pace.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/26/02 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Olmsted Scholar and Foreign Area Expert Programs [U00066/03]

DHR:dh
052703-30

.....

Please respond by 6/27/03

29 May 03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1188-03

4 September 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 9/3*

SUBJECT: General and Flag Officer (G/FO) Ratios

- In response to your query (TAB A), why there is a disparity in the G/FO ratios per 10,000 Service members, the following is provided.
- To meet National Security Strategy objectives, the Services manage their G/FOs to match the demands of their operational and joint warfighting needs (including medical, legal and chaplains). Title 10 limits the number of G/FO on active duty to 889 billets: Army – 302, Air Force – 279, Navy – 216 and Marine Corps – 80; including 12 billets for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Since 1954, DOD has relied on studies to determine the number of G/FOs (TAB B). The FY03 NDAA directed DOD to conduct a review of active and reserve G/FO billets and submit a report to Congress. That review, conducted by the Logistics Management Institute, did a billet assessment and validation of current active and reserve G/FO requirements; did not recommend a change to the number of G/FO billets, but does recommend expanding the review to include senior civilians. The report was forwarded to Congress by PDUSD(P&R) on 28 March 2003 (TAB C).
- There is no direct correlation between the number of G/FOs and overall end strength. The unique roles, missions and force structure of each Service are factors that drive differences among the Service ratios.

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Brig Gen Maria I. Cribbs, USAF; Director, J-1; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/16077

U14956 / 03

TAB

A

TAB A

July 23, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Gen. Keane
 ADM Clark
 Gen. Jumper
 Gen. Hagee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: General and Flag Officer Ratios

I am told that the ratio of general and flag officers per 10,000 service members is as follows:

Air Force	7.49
Army	6.22
Navy	5.76
Marine Corps	4.59

I would be curious to know why the disparity.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072303-16

.....

Please respond by ~~8/8/03~~


03 JUL 24 PM 4:23

TAB

B

G/FOs Over Time

General and Flag Officers 1951-2003



Tab B

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB

C



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



MAR 28 2003

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The attached report responds to a Congressional request in Section 404(c) of the FY 2003 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (Public Law 107-314), that the Secretary of Defense conduct a review of the existing statutory active and reserve general and flag officer authorizations and submit to the Congress the results of the review together with any recommendations for revisions to those authorizations.

The Department is not requesting, at this time, any change to the number of active or reserve general or flag officers authorized nor is this report requesting any specific legislative revisions. However, it does convey current thinking of the Department regarding the issues raised in the NDAA and is consistent with legislative proposals submitted through normal channels or proposals being considered for future submission. For example, the Department plans to pursue a legislative proposal to eliminate the 50 percent grade distribution for officers serving above the grade of brigadier general or rear admiral (lower half). Other possibilities suggested in the report, such as allowing the Army and Air Force to fill their reserve chief positions with active officers, reflect the Department's desire for personnel management flexibility rather than any intention to actually place an active officer in such a position. In fact, the Army and Air Force oppose filling such positions with other than reserve officers and at this time, the Department will not initiate legislation that would impose this change. As noted in the report, the Department intends to expand its review to include senior civilian positions and to explore innovative ways to manage its entire senior leadership corps to facilitate the transformation of the Department. That further review may prompt changes to the overall general officer inventory.

The NDAA requires any comments or recommendations from the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) be transmitted to Congress. The RFPB has not yet completed their review; however, to be responsive to Congress the Department is submitting the report now. As soon as the RFPB completes their review their comments will be promptly forwarded to Congress.

Sincerely,


Charles S. Abell
Principal Deputy

cc:

The Honorable Carl M. Levin
Ranking Member



TAB

D

TAB D

COORDINATION PAGE

USA	COL Wright	7 August 2003
USN	CAPT Thompson	7 August 2003
USAF	Col Murphy	19 August 2003
USMC	Col Bultemeir	20 August 2003

Tab D

11-L-0559/OSD/16085

TAB A

July 23, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Gen. Keane
ADM Clark
Gen. Jumper
Gen. Hagee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: General and Flag Officer Ratios

012 210

I am told that the ratio of general and flag officers per 10,000 service members is as follows:

Air Force	7.49
Army	6.22
Navy	5.76
Marine Corps	4.59

I would be curious to know why the disparity.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072303-16

.....
Please respond by ~~8/8/03~~

235103

03 JUL 24 PM 4:23

U14958 /03

0730
6/30

SENT 6/30
June 25, 2003

Centcom

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld) A
SUBJECT: Letter Provided by Senator Bill Nelson

Please see me on the letter Bill Nelson gave me from the family asking that a high level person be appointed to report to Bremer. I said I thought that the reporting should go through Central Command, so they could be reporting to Abizaid through the Iraq Survey Group.

Thanks.

DHR:cm
062603-1

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

30JUN03

U14962 / 03

September 9, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. John Abizaid
Doug Feith
Dov Zakheim

CC: Jim Haynes
Powell Moore
Pete Geren
LTG John Craddock
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Legislative Authorities

110.01

When we pull the supplemental appropriations request together, we must include whatever legislative authorities we need. Several times during my recent trip I heard from both the civilian and the military leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq that there are impediments to how we spend money.

We simply must go after those restrictions. It will involve the State Department, so we should get the right people involved early.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090903-13

.....
Please respond by 9/26/03

9 SEP 03

115019-03

September 9, 2003

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell (by fax)
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Amendment to Law of Estate Lease

FYI.

Attach.
9/7/03 CPA Order Number 29

DHR:dh
090903-4

IT 09

9 Aug 03

C 9/9
✓ 9/9

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 29

AMENDMENT TO LAW OF ESTATE LEASE

Pursuant to my authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), under the laws and usages of war, and consistent with relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003),

Noting that Law No. (56) of 2000 amended the Law of Estate Lease No. (87) of 1979 to give greater rights to residential landlords to terminate leases beginning in October of 2003,

Understanding that the current economic conditions created by the former regime limit the ability of many Iraqi people to pay rent in a timely manner or incur significant increases in rental rates,

Concerned that widespread eviction of tenants will have a destabilizing effect on the security and well-being of Iraqi citizens,

Realizing that landlords can enforce rent collection through Iraqi courts,

Desiring to balance the rights and obligations between landlords and tenants in a fair manner,

I hereby promulgate the following:

**Section 1
Extension of Current Leases**

Article 15 of Law No. (56) of 2000, Amendment to the Law of Estate Lease No. (87) of 1979, is amended as follows:


- (a) Article 15, Paragraph 2 is amended to provide that the right specified in Article 4, Paragraph 5 of the Law of Estate Lease to request an assessment of the property for the purpose of adjusting the rental rate shall not be exercisable before 16 October 2004.
- (b) Article 15, Paragraph 3(A) (56) of 2000 is amended to provide that leases in existence for 12 or more years shall not be terminated, at the instance of the landlord, in the absence of other reasons authorized by law, before 16 October 2004.

Section 2
Limitation of Eviction Remedy

- 1) The remedy of eviction under Article 17, Paragraph 1 of the Law of Estate Lease, as amended by Article 10 of Law No. (56) of 2000, allowing landlords to evict tenants who fail to pay rent when due, is suspended for failures to pay the rent due for any period during the months of April to December 2003 inclusive.
- 2) Tenants remain obligated to pay rent as it becomes due. Tenants who fail to pay rent when due violate their contractual obligations. These obligations may be enforced by recourse to the courts for the collection of such debts.

Section 3
Entry into Force

This Order shall enter into force on the date of signature.



L. Paul Bremer, Administrator
Coalition Provisional Authority

September 9, 2003

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by fax)
CC: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Ukraine

Attached is a note from Brzezinski that merits our attention.

Attach.
9/8/03 Brzezinski memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
090903-2

Review

9/5/03

✓ 9/9
CAF



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

September 8, 2003

FAX TO: The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
COPY TO: The Honorable Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Zbigniew Brzezinski *ZB.*
RE: Ukraine

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One of the first official acts that the new Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Kostyantyn Gryshchenko, will confront involves the formalization of the "Agreement on Establishment of the Single Economic Space" between Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Intensely promoted by Viktor Chernomyrdin, it will entail a significant step (by stealth) toward a Slavic or a Eurasian Union, an objective long sought by those in the Kremlin who still deplore the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

My friends in the Ukrainian government are concerned that the USG takes no position on this subject. They fear that the potential implementation of this scheme will significantly narrow Ukraine's freedom of action. It will become more difficult for Ukraine to seek NATO membership, and its prospects for an eventual membership in the EU will become increasingly dependent on the willingness of the EU to consider also the simultaneous membership of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. In effect, Ukraine will gradually lose its freedom of action.

Given the fact that President Kuchma recently indicated an inclination to move more rapidly toward the West (reflected also in the sudden change in the top leadership of Ukraine's security services in favor of a strongly pro-Western nominee), it strikes me as regrettable that the USG appears to be indifferent. At the very least, the USG should indicate to Kyiv that Kyiv should undertake consultations both with Washington and with Brussels before becoming irrevocably committed. These consultations should review the implications of the so-called Single Economic Space for Ukraine's sovereignty and freedom of action.

One may add that Russia's eventual adhesion to a larger Western community is not going to be made easier by the re-creation of a union in which non-democratic and imperial tendencies are likely to be reinforced.

The matter is of some urgency, given the fact that the CIS summit, designed to consummate the above, is to take place within the next two weeks or so.

*Regards,
ZB.*

TO: Amb. Jerry Bremer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: September 8, 2003
RE: **Property Settlement in the North**

I understand the issue of property settlement in the North is a complicated one, and that it is important that it be done right. However, if the Commanders up there believe they can do it now, and that not doing it now hurts, then it may be better to have an 80% solution now than 100% solution a year from now.

Iraq

What do you think?


DTR/azn
090803.23b

Please respond by: _____

8 Sep 03

U15053 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16094

TO: Honorable George Tenet
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: September 8, 2003

I've received mixed opinions as to what the circumstance of the Karzai government is in Afghanistan. There seems to be broad disagreement between the State, Defense and the Agency. I wonder if someone could pull together some information that might help me better understand what the different views are and why there are such differing opinions.


They have a constitutional convention coming up and the elections next June. It would be important to know as much as we can about what the circumstance of their government is, and where the soft spots are and where the strengths are.

DFIR/azn
090803.31b

Afghanistan

8 Sep 03

U15054 /03

TO: Secretary Colin Powell
CC: Vice President Dick Cheney
Honorable Andy Card
Honorable George Tenet
Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: September 8, 2003
SUBJECT: **U.N. Resolution**

UN

Having been in Iraq and Afghanistan, I don't have recent visibility as to what is taking place with respect to the U.N. negotiations on the possible U.N. Resolution on Iraq.

I understand that all agree that there is no way we can compromise with respect to the military chain of command. I would appreciate being able to see any language that touches on that issue before it is agreed.

In addition, Amb. Bremer is very concerned, and has communicated his concerns to both State and DoD, that any non-military responsibilities assigned to a U.N. representative be described as "in coordination with" or, "in cooperation with" the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Given the existence of the Governing Council and the new Cabinet that has been appointed, if there is any ambiguity as to authority or if there is divided authority on the political side, members of the Governing Council will play the Coalition Provisional Authority off against the U.N. and it will lead to damaging divisions.

For these reasons I would ask that we have an opportunity to discuss any language on this subject before it is agreed.

8 Sep 03

DHR/azn
090703.05

U15056 /03

9:56 AM

TO: Dick Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: July 19, 2003
 SUBJECT:

Let's get a proposal on how Saudi, Jordan, Turkey and Kuwait can work their borders for us and how we can beef up what we do on Syria and Iran, possibly with UAVs.

092

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 071901.08

Please respond by: 7/31/03


19 Jul 03

'03 JUL 24 PM 12:21

U15065 /03

Tab A

TO: Combatant Commanders

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: September 8, 2003


Attached is an email by the author Robert D. Kaplan who just spent a month in the Philippines. He makes some interesting observations about our efforts there.

Thank you.

DIR:jm
090803 46b

Philippines

Attached: Email to SecDef from Robert D. Kaplan Re: Basilan Island

Please respond by: _____ 

8 Sep 03

U15096 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16098

I just returned from over a month in the Philippines with some thoughts.

In 2002, the island of Basilan - the main island in the southern Sulu chain - was an Army Special Forces laboratory for using humanitarian relief to flush out international terrorists.

Basilan had been the lair of Abu Sayyaf guerrillas. It made sense. Basilan is a poor, largely-Moslem island that the Christian mestizo oligarchy in Manila ruled but made no effort to responsibly govern. Whether the dictator Marcos was in power or democrats like Corey Aquino, it has made no difference to these southern Moslems, who still lacked potable water and basic security from bandits and pirates. Their kids still died from meningitis, scabies, malaria, etc. Abu Sayyaf, through killings and kidnappings, drove out the doctors and teachers, closed the schools and hospitals.

PACOM, as you know, was limited by strict ROEs regarding its role in hunting down these terrorists. But the solution that it and Army SF came up with bears studying for future application:

International Islamic terrorism is, among many other things, a classic insurgency: something the U. S. military learned by trial and error how to deal with in the Philippines between 1898 and the end of the Islamic Moro rebellion in 1913, put down by Capt. John "Blackjack" Pershing. To my mind, the most important lesson of that episode in our nation's history was that in order to defeat terrorist insurgents, you must sever the link between them and the indigenous population. Only then can terrorists be isolated and destroyed.

That happened in 2002 in Basilan without firing a shot.

About a dozen SF "A" teams were deployed, with administrative "B" teams. American contractors came in. Roads were built, water wells dug. We bought locally and hired locally, right down to the aggregate for the roads. "A" teams encamped to train Filipino army units. SF team medics conducted MEDCAPS and DENTCAPS continually all over the island. Schools were built, and even a few neighborhood mosques with the help of SF teams. To call all this "soft" humanitarian relief is to see only one layer of reality.

The MEDCAPS, etc. spun the local Filipino media and intellectuals into writing nice things about the U. S. military for the first time since we lost Clark Field and the Subic Bay Naval Station. The MEDCAPS, etc. were useful venues for gathering native intelligence on local terrorists, which could then be passed on to the Filipino military. The very presence of U. S. forces, in small numbers, got Abu Sayyaf to flee the island, to more remote places. Furthermore, it accomplished something quite radical:

It shamed the corrupt Manila oligarchy into paying more attention to its own Moslem south. And it showed Filipino Moslems that everything that Abu Sayyaf said about Americans was not true. That, ultimately, is what severed the link between Abu Sayyaf and the island's inhabitants.

The Northwest Frontier of Pakistan, as I know from much personal experience, is another area long forsaken by its own government, democratic or dictatorial, it never made a difference. No insurgent can hide without some assistance from the indigenous inhabitants. I wonder what a Basilan-approach would do to improve native intelligence for us in that region, and others?

In a world where host countries regularly put restrictions on what we can and cannot do, we must more creatively use the leeway within the ROEs that we do have.

I will write all of this and much more in future books and articles, but felt that as a citizen these ideas should make it to your desk soonest.

Warmest regards,

Bob Kaplan

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: September 8, 2003
SUBJECT: **Turnover**

I enjoyed our visit. I mentioned turnover both in Afghanistan and in Iraq as a serious problem, both on the civilian side and the military side.

I believe very strongly that continuity is critical and relationships are critical, as well as knowledge. Everyone makes their mistakes – particularly new people - and we don't need to keep making the same ones as new people coming in every three, six or twelve months.

I asked some questions about Fallujah, Baghdad. Here's the response I received. You might want to take a look at it and think about how we ought to manage the future.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
090803.10

Attach: Memorandum 9.7.03

Please respond by: 9/23

U15097 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16100

Iraq

8 Sep 03

MEMORANDUM
September 7, 2003

Rapid turnover of personnel is hurting the CPA, the ISG and our Armed Forces in Iraq, in Afghanistan and I would suggest in the world.


Example:

Fallujah. In four and a half months, Fallujah, Iraq – a difficult area - has been under the supervision of the 82nd Airborne, followed by the marines, followed by the Third Calvary, followed by the Third ID, followed by the Third Calvary, followed by the 82nd Airborne Brigade. People in Iraq, tribal people need to know people to trust them. It takes time to develop trust. If in four and a half months we go through six different military units, no trust can be developed. Continuity is critical.

Baghdad has a similar problem. It is the most difficult area. It has gone from the Third Infantry Division, to a divided command with the Marines in the 101st and the Third ID, to the First Armored Division. We are not going to get ahead of the curve if we continue this. I can remember telling Tom Franks that I thought he ought to put people there who were just coming in, rather than people who were just getting ready to leave. That was when he put the Third ID there.

DHR/azn
090703.03

11-L-0559/OSD/16101

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: September 8, 2003

Attached is an interesting article from *The Atlantic Monthly* on Rand's look into the future that I thought you might find of interest.

092

DHR/azn
090803 02b

Attach: *The Atlantic Monthly*; pgs 84-90

85ep03

U15098 /03

HEADLINES OVER THE HORIZON

Analysts at the RAND Corporation lay out ten international-security developments that aren't getting the attention they deserve

THE WALL

Whenever hopes for peace between Israelis and Palestinians rise, a new surge of bloodshed extinguishes them. Palestinian suicide bombings provoke Israeli military attacks, which provoke more suicide bombings, which provoke more military attacks. Now the Israelis are trying to stop the violence by building a 225-mile wall—variously consisting of concrete, barbed wire, electronic fencing, motion detectors, and trenches—that will separate the Jewish state from the West Bank. It will be completed this year and will profoundly change the geographical and political landscape of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The wall is the most ambitious attempt by Israelis to reclaim the relative quiet they enjoyed before the second intifada, which began in September of 2000 and has since subjected Israel to a relentless wave of suicide terrorism. The logic behind the wall is unassailable. Israel's other borders (with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Gaza) are fairly well protected; none has the security problems with terrorist infiltrators that exist on the frontier with the West Bank. The Gaza Strip, for example, was a major departure point for Palestinian terrorist strikes into Israel before it was fenced off, in 1994. Since the current intifada began, no Palestinian suicide bomber has entered Israel from Gaza.

Polls show that at least 70 percent of Israelis support physical separation from the West Bank. However, many of the 200,000 Jewish settlers who live there oppose the wall, for a simple reason: once it is finished, the Israeli army will no longer provide the level of protection settlers currently enjoy. Few settlers are likely to want to remain outside the wall, given their increased vulnerability to attack; most will probably move back to Israel. Thus the wall could spell the

death of the attempt to settle Greater Israel, which encompasses the biblical lands of Judea and Samaria and includes the West Bank. It will also create a de facto international border.

The idea of the wall also makes many Palestinians unhappy, because it will not exactly follow the Green Line—Israel's pre-1967 border with the West Bank. Instead it will reach into the West Bank to embrace some nearby Jewish settlements. Palestinians consider this a land grab. In addition, the wall will further weaken the already severely damaged Palestinian economy in the short run, since entry into Israel will be more difficult. As Palestinians are forced to turn elsewhere for jobs and income, however, the impetus for a more self-reliant and robust Palestinian economy could emerge.

But the wall could also deepen Palestinian rage and enmity, of course, prompting escalated mortar and ground-to-ground missile attacks against targets inside Israel. Hamas has already launched such attacks from the Gaza Strip, and it may now do so from the West Bank. The wall could also prompt further attacks on Israelis overseas, like the suicide bombing last November of a Mombasa hotel filled with Israeli tourists and the accompanying attempt to shoot down an Israeli chartered plane. —BRUCE HOFFMAN

A SHRINKING RUSSIA

The population of Russia is getting smaller and older. In 1992 the country's population was estimated at 148 million; today the number is 145 million. That's an absolute decline greater than that in any other nation during the past decade—and some analysts predict that the number of people in Russia will drop below 100 million by 2050. The number of Russians aged fifteen to twenty-four, though temporarily growing because of high birth

rates in the 1980s, may shrink by nearly half over the next fifteen years, because of low birth rates in the 1990s. This will greatly strain a country that is already struggling to cope with a daunting array of security challenges, including controlling the world's longest borders and largest land mass, maintaining the world's largest nuclear arsenal, and reining in one of the world's most serious weapons-proliferation problems.

The security implications of this demographic change become clear when one examines its effect on Russia's military, police, border guards, and other security forces, which in coming years won't be able to fill their ranks. And more is at issue than a simple decline in numbers. Young Russian men, the population from which the military and other security agencies draw most of their personnel, are today plagued with health problems, among them alcoholism (a long-standing problem), tuberculosis (a returning scourge), and HIV/AIDS (a rapidly emerging new epidemic). The mortality rate among Russian men aged fifteen to twenty-four nearly doubled in the 1990s and is now almost three times that among American men of the same age. The rate of death from suicide, one of the leading killers of young Russian men today, is more than three times that for young American men. And many young Russians who are fit for (ostensibly compulsory) military service bribe their way out of it, leaving a force even less healthy than the military-age population as a whole.

Unlike many European states that also have shrinking populations of young people, Russia isn't currently in a position to compensate for a loss of manpower by putting more money or technology into its military and other security organs, because the country's economy and scientific sectors have suffered considerably during the past

decade. And as the country's population ages, burgeoning pension obligations will drain away resources that could otherwise have been devoted to security. Although immigration might mitigate some of the population loss and help to fill the ranks, the trend is not encouraging: immigration has plummeted from more than 1.2 million in 1994 to fewer than 185,000 in 2002. Russia could try to expand its military ranks, at least, by relying more on women soldiers, but the military's attitude toward women is hostile in many ways, and cultural adjustments simply will not come quickly.

Without enough manpower to police its extensive borders and to respond effectively to internal and external security problems, Russia could well lose its battles against smuggling, terrorism, and weapons proliferation—all threats that pose dangers far beyond Russia's borders. —*JULIE DAVANZO, OLGA OLIKER, & CLIFFORD GRAMMICH*

THE HINDU-MUSLIM DIVIDE

A defining element of Indian politics since independence has been a commitment to secularism. That commitment is now at risk from an aggressive brand of Hindu nationalism that equates Indian national identity with Hindu religious identity. The country's radical nationalists view the secular political system as a threat to Hindu identity, largely because of the power it offers India's 140 million Muslims. Weakening, or even abolishing, the secular state has therefore become part of the radical-nationalist agenda. This may force Indian Muslims—traditionally moderate and supportive of the secular state, even on the sensitive matter of Kashmir—to shift their allegiance from the state to some sort of larger international Islamic movement, as many Muslims have done in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Such a radicalization of religious identities is a matter of serious concern in a nation of a billion people that possesses the world's seventh largest nuclear arsenal and has had troubled relations with its populous and nuclear-armed Muslim neighbor, Pakistan.

Radical Hindu nationalism is already a dominant force in mainstream

Indian politics. A Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, has led the country's coalition government for five years, and extremist Hindu organizations with explicitly anti-Muslim sentiments have heavily influenced the party's agenda. Strife between Hindus and Muslims has been the predictable result. Last year a group of Muslims burned a train full of nationalist Hindus in the state of Gujarat; the attack killed fifty-eight people and led to Hindu reprisals that killed about 2,000 Muslims. An Indian tribunal investigating the massacres found that Hindu nationalist groups had methodically targeted Muslim homes and shops. It even charged that one important group, the VHP, had recruited and trained militants for the violence, and had provided them with computer printouts of names and addresses. Local and national security forces failed to respond adequately to the crisis as it unfolded: initially the state police did not intervene, and the central government only belatedly sent troops to Gujarat to restore order. Although thousands of extremist Hindus were involved in the violence, few were arrested. On the whole, the Gujarat episode has left Indian Muslims feeling neglected by the government.

The radicalization of India's Hindus and Muslims poses obvious domestic-security challenges. According to recent reports, Muslim militants based in Kashmir have been working with Pakistani groups to target the VHP and other groups in retaliation for the massacre in Gujarat. Militant Hindu groups have vowed to destroy Muslim mosques throughout India, and to build temples in their place. —*ROLLIE LAL*

AIDS AND AFRICAN ARMIES

The devastating impact of the AIDS pandemic in Africa is well known. According to the United Nations, some 28 million people in sub-Saharan Africa now live with HIV/AIDS, and in some countries the rate of HIV infection approaches 40 percent of the adult population. AIDS claimed more than 900,000 lives in southern Africa during 2001, and has left more than three million children without one or both parents. The strain on Africa's social

fabric is hard to overestimate, and the problem is finally getting widespread attention—beyond just the medical community. In January of 2000 the U.S. National Intelligence Council issued its first-ever national intelligence estimate on the global impact of infectious diseases, in which the HIV/AIDS pandemic was identified as a serious threat to U.S. national security.

One little-noted aspect of this threat will become increasingly clear in the decades ahead: AIDS is decimating the ranks of African armed forces. A 2000 survey by the Civil-Military Alliance to Combat HIV and AIDS noted that by the mid-1990s several African defense ministries were reporting significant rates of HIV infection among their armed forces. Today the militaries hardest hit by HIV/AIDS infections include those of Zimbabwe (with a 50 percent infection rate), Angola (40 to 60 percent), Tanzania (15 to 30 percent), Congo-Brazzaville (10 to 25 percent), Côte d'Ivoire (10 to 20 percent), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (40 to 60 percent), Eritrea (10 percent), and Nigeria (10 to 20 percent). In South Africa the pandemic has reached biblical proportions, with HIV-infection rates in some units of the South African National Defence Force—which happens to be the biggest peacekeeping-capable military in southern Africa—reaching as high as 90 percent. The rate of HIV infection, like the rates of infection for other sexually transmitted diseases, is two to five times as prevalent in African armies as in corresponding civilian populations. And the soldiers themselves—often prone to sexual promiscuity and illicit drug use—are a major factor in the spread of the virus, both domestically and internationally. Many of the African countries with the greatest prevalence of HIV infection are engaged in conflict of one kind or another, and rape is often a tactic or a byproduct of war.

As the pandemic claims more lives, African militaries will lose the manpower they need to carry out their missions. It will deplete many armies' officer corps, leading to a loss of command capacity, and will drain defense budgets, as unprecedented resources are channeled

to the care of infected service members. The effects of the pandemic on African armed forces are already profound. In 1999, for example, when members of numerous southern African militaries came together for a peacekeeping exercise known as Operation Blue Crane, more than 30 percent of the South African participants turned out to be medically unfit for deployment, primarily because of HIV infection.

African armies are often seen as problems, not as forces for good, but in many cases only they have been able to ensure national and regional stability. Many countries, with their armies dramatically weakened by AIDS, are likely to lose control over national security, territorial integrity, and public order. —KEVIN A. O'BRIEN

THE TEHRAN-NEW DELHI AXIS

Iran, with its Islamic regime, seems a strange ally of India, a predominantly Hindu democracy. But the two nations have been overcoming past antagonisms and developing closer ties that will affect not just Southwest Asia and the Middle East but also the United States. Their new relationship could powerfully influence such important matters as the flow of energy resources, regional and worldwide efforts to combat terrorism, and political developments in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other states in Central Asia. The consequences will not always suit U.S. interests.

Before the Islamic revolution, in 1979, Iran's ties with the West greatly vexed India, which had championed the non-aligned movement. Those concerns disappeared after the revolution, of course, but were soon replaced by concerns about Iran's support of Kashmiri aspirations and its efforts to spread Islamic revolution to other Persian Gulf states. Nevertheless, after the Cold War ended, Iran and India discovered that they shared a stake in checking U.S. global power, opposing the Taliban in Afghanistan, fighting narcotics trafficking in Asia, and developing mutually beneficial energy options.

More recently New Delhi and Tehran have found common ground in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and in the preservation of Pakistan as a

functioning state (because its collapse would pose even more of a threat to India than its survival). The two have also recognized that closer ties would help each nation meet important needs of its own: for Iran, India could be a source of technical expertise, industrial goods, and foreign investment; for India, Iran could be a much needed additional source of energy and could serve as a gateway to Central Asia (which India seeks in order to develop new markets) and as a new military flank against Pakistan. In the realm of domestic politics, too, India has strong reasons for wanting improved relations with Iran. As India witnesses a surge in Hindu nationalist politics and sentiment, it needs to signal to its increasingly marginalized and disaffected Muslim population (the second largest in the world) that it has Muslim interests in mind.

The most important milestone in the development of Indo-Iranian ties came this past January, when Iran's President Mohammad Khatami visited New Delhi as the chief guest for the Indian Republic Day parade—an honor reserved for the closest friends of India. During the visit Khatami and India's Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee signed an accord that focuses on economic, scientific, and technological ties between the two countries and that also provides a framework within which to explore a defense relationship. This new relationship began to take shape in March, in a small-scale naval exercise that Indian diplomats refer to as a "port call." Meanwhile, Iran seeks to buy arms and spare parts from India, which is steadily acquiring the capacity to manufacture a wide array of Russian military hardware, and India sees Iran as a major buyer that could help to defray the costs of this manufacturing program. —C. CHRISTINE FAIR

ANTI-SATELLITE ATTACK

Within the next five years not only Russia and China but also Pakistan, North Korea, and even Iran may acquire the ability to carry out a nuclear attack against satellites. Launching such an attack would be much simpler technically than launching a nuclear attack against a distant city; only a primitive nuclear

program and basic missile technology are required. And as the importance of satellites grows, so will the destructive potential of such an attack, adding a significant new dimension to the politics of preventing nuclear war.

An anti-satellite attack could be mounted in a variety of ways, but a high-altitude nuclear detonation would create by far the most extensive effects. It would destroy satellites near the detonation point, of course; but, more significant, it would also expand and intensify the power of the Van Allen radiation belts, clouds of high-energy particles that encircle Earth. Satellites passing through the region after a nuclear attack—among them hundreds of low-orbiting communications, weather, imaging, and scientific satellites, including the International Space Station and the Hubble space telescope—would be subjected to greatly increased levels of radiation, against which civil and commercial systems are not protected. (The satellites of the Global Positioning System are not nuclear-hardened either—but they operate in higher, less vulnerable orbits.) Such radiation would progressively degrade the satellites' solar panels and onboard electronic systems, and within months, or even weeks, after a nuclear explosion every satellite orbiting at the affected altitudes—aside from a few military systems that are protected against nuclear attack—could be disabled. It would take many months for the excess radiation trapped in the Van Allen belts to dissipate.

A nuclear anti-satellite attack would do the most harm to the United States, which owns most of the more than 250 satellites that might be affected, and which depends more than any other country on space systems. Such an attack would substantially damage the U.S. and world economies (replacing the ruined satellites could cost tens of billions of dollars, in addition to the costs of losing their services) and would seriously inconvenience the U.S. military, which relies heavily on civil and commercial satellites for functions such as communications and weather forecasting. Although no nation is likely to attack satellites as a short-term military strategy (the full effects would take too

long to accumulate), someone might well consider using the tactic as a deterrent, as a coercive threat, or to strike a painful blow against the United States and its allies without the difficulties or obvious risks of attacking a target on American soil. —*KARL P. MULLER & ELWYN D. HARRIS*

DEFENSE-INDUSTRY GOLIATHS

In recent decades so many U.S. defense contractors have merged or been taken over that a few giant companies now dominate the industry. Initially companies chose to combine forces, to cope with the increasing complexity of new technologies and weapons systems; but the trend intensified significantly after the end of the Cold War, when Washington curtailed defense procurement and formally endorsed consolidation as a way to cut costs. The Pentagon today deals with a dramatically limited number of firms to research and develop new systems for defense, and it is almost certainly not giving those firms enough work to sustain their teams of engineers and managers. The consolidation of the defense industry has been so drastic, in fact, that the U.S. military—which must now be able not only to prevail in battle but also to do so quickly and with minimum loss of life—could see its vast technological superiority erode.

Virtually all major classes of defense equipment, including surface ships, armored vehicles, and helicopters, are threatened by consolidation. But nowhere is the threat more apparent than in the case of tactical aircraft systems. In the 1950s at least eleven firms had the engineering know-how and experience to design military aircraft for the Navy and the Air Force. More than forty different designs reached the flight-test stage during that decade—an average of roughly four per company. Keen intercompany competition provided the military with a rich menu of choices and the defense industry with a wealth of design and engineering experience. Today only three American companies—Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman—are capable of leading the design of a manned military

GLOBAL INSECURITY

Conflicts and international terrorism worldwide

CONFLICTS & INSURGENCIES*

Active conflict

Cease-fire but no peace treaty

ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM**

From September 12, 2001, to March 31, 2003 (limited to countries with five or more incidents or deaths)

■ # of incidents


● # of fatalities

* Conflicts are defined as armed and international involving two or more governments. Insurgencies are defined as armed and internal between government forces and organized groups that control sufficient territory to sustain coordinated military operations. In some cases, active conflict may be restricted to small regions of the countries highlighted.

** Defined as attacks in which terrorists target a foreign interest within their immediate area of operations or enter another country to conduct an attack. These numbers do not account for insurgencies or domestic affairs, independently administered territories and areas under serious contention (Kashmir, Israel, Occupied Territories) are considered separate countries.

THE LATIN CONNECTION

In recent years South America has played host to a surprising number and variety of international terrorist groups. Al Qaeda and Hizbollah have used the border region between Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina as an operational or financial center, and the Colombian group FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) has allegedly received training from the Irish Republican Army.



aircraft, and major contracts for which they can compete will emerge only once every other decade or so. For perhaps the first time the U.S. military is relying on only one prime contractor to design and build its new tactical fighters: Lockheed Martin, an amalgamation of more than a dozen former major aerospace companies, is developing the F-22 and the F-35. If either program runs into trouble (and few programs of comparable ambition and complexity escape it), the Pentagon's fallback options will be scarce. —*MICHAEL RICH, JOHN BIRALLER, & MARK LORELL*

THE CARRIER SHORTAGE

As the recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated, the United States relies more than ever on aircraft carriers to meet its military and foreign-policy objectives. The advantages of aircraft carriers are obvious: they can quickly move large air forces and their support to distant theaters of war; they can respond rapidly with tremendous firepower to changing tactical situations; they can support several missions at once, with a great number of flights per day; and deploying them in international waters requires no negotia-

SOURCES: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES; RAND-MIPT; PERFORMA INCIDENT DATABASE; CRAIG AND DOORNY; OPEN


tions with other nations. But the United States has no plans to expand its fleet of aircraft carriers, which numbers twelve, four of them dating back to the 1960s. (Current plans call for one carrier to be replaced about every four or five years during the coming several decades.) And even if the U.S. government decided tomorrow to add three carriers to the fleet, as the Navy has argued it should, more than a decade would pass before they would all be in service.

The United States has by far the largest fleet of aircraft carriers in the world; the United Kingdom operates

three carriers, and Brazil, France, India, Italy, Russia, Spain, and Thailand each operate one. But the numbers are somewhat misleading, because a carrier spends less than a third of its life in actual deployment; crew training, maintenance, and overhaul take up the rest. During the recent Iraq war only eight of the twelve U.S. carriers were deployable; five played important roles in the conflict, leaving only three available for action elsewhere. Simply keeping even those eight carriers deployable required that maintenance and crew-rotation plans be deferred—something

that can't be done indefinitely. If a nuclear standoff with North Korea had escalated to war, or if Israel, Japan, or Taiwan had required U.S. military assistance, or even if the United States had simply needed to project power into the Indian Ocean or the Philippine Sea, taking adequate action would have been difficult.

Can the United States afford a fifteen-carrier fleet? The price would be impressive: each carrier would cost around \$6 billion to build; operation and support for each one could be expected to cost several hundred million



dollars a year. But considering the international military and security challenges that the United States is likely to face in the years and decades ahead, twelve carriers may simply not be enough. —JOHN BIRKLER & JOHN SCHANK

THE INDUS WATER FIGHT

India and Pakistan have a long history of conflict: they have fought three limited territorial wars (in 1947, 1965, and 1999); a larger war (in 1971); and a protracted proxy war (since 1989) over the disputed Kashmir region. Now they are embroiled in a high-stakes dispute over water, an issue on which they had managed to cooperate for years. If it is not resolved, it could become a serious new source of conflict.

The dispute has its roots in the 1947 partition that split Pakistan from India. Pakistan received most of the western Punjab region, which was irrigated by canals that used water from the Indus River system. (The Indus River originates in western Tibet, flows through China and the Indian-held portion of Kashmir, and then turns south into Pakistan.) At the time of partition Sikh and Hindu farmers living in predominantly Muslim areas fled to the Indian-controlled eastern Punjab, which was relatively dry and had few canals; to address their water needs India began, in 1950, to build a canal system that diverted some of the flow from Pakistan. Eventually the World Bank and the United States brokered the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, which stipulated that India would control the eastern rivers of the Indus River system, with the remaining waters going to Pakistan. Both sides were satisfied with the treaty, possibly because it required little interaction, but it has come under increasing strain. Aquifers are being depleted, water tables are falling, waterways are severely polluted, and soils are becoming acutely saline from the overuse of underground water supplies. Yet both countries must not only maintain a supply of food and potable water for their populations but also develop the hydroelectric potential of the river system that runs through the borderlands.

In December of 2001, following the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament

(which precipitated an extensive Indian military buildup along the Pakistani border), India openly raised the possibility of revoking the treaty, as part of a strategy of coercive diplomacy with Pakistan. The Indian Cabinet Committee on Security identified the cutting of a major water supply as a threat to use against Pakistan. For its part, Pakistan began to argue that India had already effectively suspended the treaty that same month, when the Indian commissioner for the treaty severed all contact with his Pakistani counterpart and canceled a visit by Pakistani engineers.

Allowed to fester, the dispute over the Indus Water Treaty could fundamentally transform the Kashmir conflict, already one of the major threats to regional stability. Pakistani militants now operate in Kashmir; India has taken aggressive action against them; and demands are growing within India for a war against Pakistan to stop the proxy war. The Indus dispute may end up being the crisis that finally makes that pressure too much to contain. —C. CHRISTINE FAIR

URBAN WARFARE

Future adversaries of the United States will not want to fight battles on open terrain, where their forces and equipment will be relatively easy for American forces to find and destroy. The world's population is increasingly migrating toward ever larger cities, and finding and fighting a determined enemy in these new urban environments—characterized by dense civilian populations, complex indoor spaces, “canyons” between buildings, and subterranean mazes of sewers and other infrastructure—will be very difficult. Urban warfare is not new, of course; often it has been the hinge point of a conflict (consider Stalingrad in World War II and Mogadishu in 1993). It has always been challenging and costly. Yet we will certainly be seeing more of it.

Defense planners are now addressing this challenge, researching and developing new technologies, systems, and concepts that will render the urban battlefield as transparent as possible. One example is micro-air vehicles. Six inches wide or less, these could be carried in a soldier's backpack and

would provide real-time video information about a situation by flying over it or “perching and staring” at it; the vehicles would be controlled by hand-held devices that would also receive and display the images being sent back. Researchers are also working on inexpensive micro-robot scouts that could one day carry visual, auditory, chemical, and other sensors from building to building.

Another possibility is “smart dust”—tiny, cheap electromechanical sensors that could be spread through an enemy area to collect raw data on motion, sound, heat, and magnetic fields. Such devices would use lasers, micro-mirrors, and other methods to feed a hand-held device that soldiers could consult to monitor the battlefield from afar. Under consideration, too, are robotic insects that could use flapping-wing flight to carry similar sensors into, or even collect samples from, hostile areas both indoors and out. Researchers are also looking into how information might be collected from real-life insect populations and used to map threats from chemical and biological agents. Bees, whose bodies collect airborne bacterial spores during flight, naturally search wide areas and can be examined for dangerous spores on return to their hive. Indigenous insects can also be lured and trapped to identify local environmental pathogens.

Successfully developing such systems will take years or even decades, but many have already been shown to be feasible. —EUGENE C. GRITTON & PHILIP S. ANTÓN

The authors are all employed by the RAND Corporation. PHILIP S. ANTÓN is a senior information scientist. JOHN BIRKLER is a senior policy analyst. JULIE DAVANZO is the director of the Population Matters project. C. CHRISTINE FAIR is an associate political scientist. CLIFFORD GRAMMICH is a member of the Research Communications Group. EUGENE C. GRITTON is the director of the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center at RAND's National Defense Research Institute. ELWYN D. HARRIS is a senior policy researcher. BRUCE HOFFMAN is the director of the Washington, D.C., office. ROLLIE LAL is an associate political scientist. MARK LORELL is a senior political scientist. KARL P. MUELLER is an associate political scientist. KEVIN A. O'BRIEN is a senior policy analyst with RAND Europe. OLGA OLIKER is an associate political scientist. MICHAEL RICH is the executive vice-president. JOHN SCHANK is a senior operations research analyst.

TO: Jim Schlesinger
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
DATE: September 8, 2003
SUBJECT: **Attached**

Here's a copy of that End Strength memo I did.

I read your interview with Naval Institute Proceedings, and it struck me that you might want to have a copy.

Best regards!

DHR/azn
090803 06a

Attach: End Strength Memorandum

320.2

8 Sep 03

U15170 /03

SUBJECT: “End Strength”—Are current U.S. military forces sufficient for the challenges facing our country? What are ways DoD can reduce the stress on the force, maintain recruiting and retention targets, and make the Department more efficient and cost effective?

Summary: The U.S. can afford whatever military force level (end strength) is determined to be necessary and appropriate for our nation’s security. The men and women in uniform are the Department’s most valuable asset. Our people—military and civilian—appreciate in value, while equipment decreases in value. It is our people who distinguish the U.S. military from other forces. For the present, analysis by the Joint Chiefs indicates that the U.S. military currently has sufficient active and reserve forces to execute its assigned missions. If at any time that is not the case, it would be DoD’s responsibility to recommend to the President appropriate adjustments. Absent analysis that indicates that U.S. forces are not able to meet their assigned missions, it would be an expensive mistake to increase the size of our forces. To the extent we increase our investment in end strength, we may likely increase risk in other key areas, such as readiness, procurement and research and development.

Background: The operational tempo of U.S. forces during the two years after September 11, 2001 has been significant. In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, some have called for an increase in the end strength of the U.S. military. Although this may appear to be a straightforward solution, it is neither easy nor quick. Adding uniformed personnel to the defense establishment is expensive.

- The cost is substantial over the lifetime of a service member. A number of the most costly add-ons to military pay and benefits have been for retired, not active duty personnel.
- Increased end strength has second and third order effects. The more end strength, the more force protection that is required; the more end strength, the more infrastructure that is required; the more end strength, the more pensions and healthcare for life that are required.
- It takes time to recruit, train and integrate new personnel into the Armed Forces. As a result, there is a considerable lag between when the additional personnel are recruited and the costs begin, and when the added capability is received.

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- At present, all four Services' recruiting and retention goals are being met or exceeded. Whether these favorable results will continue as we move through the coming months and years remains to be seen. These key indicators must be closely watched.

The current stress on the force is very likely a "spike," and we hope it will not be permanent. In any event, that stress, as well as respect for the taxpayers' dollars, requires DoD to make every effort to achieve the most efficient use of the forces. That same respect for the taxpayers' dollars mandates that we aggressively address the alternative contractor and civilian employee cost impacts as well.

Following is, I am sure, an incomplete but illustrative list of activities DoD is currently executing and/or examining for implementation. As appropriate, we must exploit each of these areas to reduce stress on the force, both active and reserve. Though it may appear that some of these areas do not directly benefit end strength, nor assist in reducing stress on the force, in a variety of ways we believe they can have positive, indirect impact. To the extent we are successful in improving performance in these areas, it should relieve pressure on the force and likely reduce the current calls for end strength increases, or, at the minimum, reduce the size of any end strength increase that analysis might later indicate is necessary in the future.

1. Lessons Being Learned

- Contingency Plans. DoD is currently reviewing and revising all contingency plans to take account of the lessons learned thus far in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Global War on Terror. Among the lessons is the need to take advantage of the tradeoffs between numbers of people and things—"mass"—versus the increased lethality from speed, agility, precision munitions and the leverage available in the information age. "Overmatching power" is replacing "overwhelming force."
- Jointness. DoD is achieving greater jointness worldwide, so combatant commanders should be able to tailor forces creatively among the Services to gain added synergy and lethality, as in the Iraq war. Coherently joint forces create power that exceeds the sum of individual military—U.S. and international—elements.
- Training and Exercises. Training matters; joint training matters more. It creates an asymmetric advantage for U.S. forces. Training and exercises need to take account of recent real world experience.
- Global Force Management. DoD is exploring methods of replacing the concept of "forces for a specific combatant commander" with a "Global

WORKING PAPER

Force Management Availability System,” which should lead to more efficient management of the forces and the process by which they are provided to Combatant Commanders in support of their essential missions.

- Reserve/Active Force Balance. DoD is rebalancing the reserve components with the active components to achieve the appropriate mix for the 21st century. The task is to avoid having to call up certain specialties repeatedly for tasks we know DoD is and will continue to be called upon to execute regularly (civil affairs, etc.). The new active-Reserve mix must also be designed to enable more immediate action, as appropriate.
- Realignment of Manpower Levels and Skill Sets. DoD will review active and reserve components to determine how the Department can best allocate manpower levels and specific skill sets, within existing end strength limits, to best satisfy the demands of the 21st century.
- Time on Operational Duty. For Reserve Components, DoD will seek ways to increase the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation/mobilization a unit is actually performing the mission for which it was called up. We can improve on those instances where it is as low as 6 months out of a 12-month call-up.
- Precision Weapons. Our use of precision weapons, with greater accuracy, can maintain lethality while reducing both the operational footprint and the logistics tail, thereby reducing force requirements.
- Deployments. The old Industrial Age process is broken. An approach that permits only peace or war, with little or no nuance, is out of date. The process is currently being streamlined to take less time and permit more nuanced management of mobilization and demobilization, deployment and redeployment, and recovery operations.
- Relief-in-Place. The Services need to establish a common definition of “relief-in-place” and then implement measures to shorten the relief in place system from 45 – 60 days to a shorter period, as appropriate.
- Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. The world is moving so fast that Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are necessary. If it takes one to three months to staff up a headquarters, the wars of the future may be over before the staff is in place. Where appropriate, we must invest in and sustain surge capability.

2. People

- Military Out of Non-Military Jobs. DoD requires Congressional cooperation to pass the personnel reform legislation so it can get closure on the studies that suggest there are some 300,000 to 380,000 positions that military personnel are currently serving in that might be performed by civilians. Managers have to be freed up so they can make greater use of the civil service, rather than being forced to use military personnel or contractors because they cannot efficiently manage the DoD civilian workforce. If only one-sixth of those 300,000 positions were freed up for military duty, it would increase usable “end strength” by 50,000. We won’t know what can be achieved until the current analysis is completed.
- Core Competencies. OSD is aggressively working to move the military out of activities that are not core competencies or inherently governmental. For example, housing privatization has allowed DoD to get better value and speed modernization for the same expenditure of funds.
- Contract Employees. For shorter duration missions and missions that are not military core competencies, DoD will have to make more judicious use of contract employees. This will require that we organize so we have Congressional authority and the ability to properly engage contract assistance.
- Education. The Department is working to improve joint education to create a culture that empowers younger leaders to think beyond their parent Services for creative solutions to the challenges our nation faces.
- Coalition Forces. The U.S. must organize its alliances and relationships to increase the availability and readiness of coalition forces—the speed of their availability and the readiness of their equipment. This will require a diplomatic effort to substantially reduce the current restrictions and caveats many countries have that reduce the availability of their forces and also a long-term commitment from other countries to help finance less wealthy nations’ ability to recruit, train, deploy and sustain their forces.
- Allies. We must assist treaty partners, where appropriate, to assume greater responsibility for their defense more rapidly.
- Backfill. During a crisis, we need to arrange for other countries to backfill for U.S. troops in some of our long-term commitments, such as

WORKING PAPER

the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. Additionally, the U.S. will have to tackle the tough political challenge of ending some commitments.

- Indigenous Forces. The U.S. must organize and fund to be able to use more host nation security personnel in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo to ease the burden on coalition forces. This will require Congress approving DoD's proposed "train and equip" legislation.
- Reserve Forces. DoD has established a policy whereby it will, to the extent possible, first use Reserve forces that have not recently been mobilized.
- Volunteers. DoD will continue to use volunteers from the Reserve force, to the extent available.
- Holidays. To the extent possible, DoD force mobilizations will be respectful of major holidays.
- Call-ups. DoD is revising the process so as to protect the goal of 30 days' notice for mobilization of reserve units, if at all possible, and will consider a tiered arrangement whereby some reserve units might be compensated and trained to maintain a readiness level to be available and ready for prompt deployment with a shorter call-up.
- Incentives. DoD will consider offering incentives for extended deployments.
- Peace Operations. The USG is considering a "Peace Operations Initiative" with the goal of increasing the worldwide availability of peacekeepers, peacemakers, military police, constabulary, etc. for peacemaking and peacekeeping operations.
- Intelligence. DoD is working to strengthen actionable intelligence, and improve humint in key areas of interest, by prioritization of effort and by assuring seamless exchange of information among U.S. agencies.

3. Technology

- Information Age. DoD will accelerate use of new information technologies to reduce the need for forward deployed personnel and thereby reduce the rotation rate the Services require to support a deployed person.

- Logistics. DoD will continue to emphasize systems with smaller logistics requirements and footprint, simplified designs with fewer and more interchangeable parts.
- New Technologies. DoD will invest in technology to substitute for human force protection—sensors, intelligence, etc. Additionally, the Services will be encouraged to consider the approach the Navy is using to reduce personnel needed for ship manning (by as much as 50 percent in some cases) and invest in less manpower-intensive platforms (UAVs), and technologies and processes, in and out of the defense industry.
- Lethality. Services are working to lighten their footprint, while increasing lethality, to the extent possible.
- U.S. and Coalition Transformation. DoD will work to improve its interoperability with coalition partners through the Joint Forces Command.

4. Efficiency

- Organization of Forces. In the 21st century one size doesn't fit all. DoD will modernize the Services' force organizations to achieve improved modularity, so combatant commanders can more readily organize units to task. This should allow commanders to build capability by adding modules and right-sizing the force to their missions. The goal is to achieve greater interchangeable and combined arms effects to increase flexibility. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are ideally suited to integrate and operate this approach. Interchangeable divisions could provide improvements in force allocation, force rotation, and employment flexibility.
- Global reach back. DoD will organize to conduct more non-spear point activities for deployed forces back in the U.S., thereby reducing both the number of forces deployed as well as the rotation base multiple needed to maintain that number of troops forward-deployed. Organizing the Reserve Components to optimize reach back opportunities may yield significant personnel tempo savings.
- Force Allocation. OSD and the Joint Forces Command will work to be able to provide combatant commanders the joint force capabilities they need to achieve desired "effects" and "outcomes," rather than simply responding to requests for numbers of things—troops or platforms.

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- Procurement. DoD will continue to invest to achieve greater lethality per unit of force structure.
- Strategic Lift. DoD will continue investing in strategic lift to assure timely mobility, e.g., high speed transport. Leveraging new technologies in this area should also reduce the associated logistic footprint. Additionally, the Department must continue to support participation in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Act as a supplement to our national mobility capability.
- Rotation Ratio. The Services will work to find ways to reduce the rotation ratio and consider opportunities to transport crews to their equipment.
- Headquarters Layering. DoD components' reduction in the number of headquarters will free up some of the manpower currently staffing those organizations. The flattening of headquarters hierarchies is desirable and viable given existing and planned communications technology.
- Best Practices. DoD will work to move best practices from inside and outside DoD throughout the Department.
- Planning Tools. DoD is developing tools to enable it to plan more rapidly to produce more refined force requirements, both in terms of numbers and timing of their movement and arrival.
- Operational Availability. DoD will implement the appropriate JROC "operational availability" studies' recommendations.
- Strategic Warning. Intelligence capabilities will be tasked to see if it is possible and cost effective to increase strategic warning, thereby reducing the portion of the force that must be forward-deployed.
- The Right Skills. DoD will develop the ability to more rapidly adjust forces in the field, so as to put the right capabilities in the right places at the right time and to be able to make rapid adjustments as circumstances change.

5. Policy

- U.S. Foreign Commitments. DoD will continue to work to pare down long-term U.S. commitments such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. We will advise nations at the outset that deployments are not forever and that the U.S. requires the ability to redeploy for other

WORKING PAPER

contingencies and ease of transit. DoD will also use care in adding new commitments of forces.

- U.S. Non-Military Skills. The USG needs to strengthen the international capability to help countries establish and execute civil implementation tasks; only if we are successful will the U.S. and coalition forces be relieved of peace operations earlier than tends to be the case, such as in Bosnia.
- U.S. Worldwide Footprint. DoD will work to improve the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. forces by adjusting U.S. forward-deployed forces in Europe and Asia, by repositioning and making greater use of pre-positioned equipment to improve our capabilities for rapid deployment from the U.S. and elsewhere, and by investing in necessary infrastructure where required. DoD will consolidate locations worldwide to reduce the number of troops required for support, including force protection and, in addition, will use host nation forces, where available, to provide protection for deployed U.S. forces.

Conclusion

In a war—in this case, the Global War on Terrorism—it cannot be “business as usual.” During a crisis, when there is an understandable spike demand on U.S. forces, DoD cannot behave as though it is “business as usual.” It isn’t. DoD needs to act promptly to reduce or stop activities such as exercises and other “business as usual” activities, as appropriate.

The task of DoD is to manage the force within acceptable levels of stress. Key measurements are recruiting and retention metrics. We must monitor all activities to see that we achieve solid progress on each of the above tasks, before taking the easy and more expensive course of increasing force levels. We owe the American people no less.

DHR:dh
Current MFRs/ End Strength

8/12

29
July 24, 2003

2000
9/2

EF-6316
03/010564

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Al Jazeera

We need to plan on what we are going to do about Al Jazeera.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072403-34

091.412

.....
Please respond by 8/9/03

TEN
9/11

29
50103

U151912 03

September 10, 2003

TO: Paul Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
LTG John Craddock
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT: CPA Communications

Iraq

Here's a memo written by a smart guy Dan Bartlett sent out to Baghdad for a week or so. It contains some pretty interesting observations about the press operations in Baghdad. I understand the individual met with your people while he was out there; you may have spoken with him, too.

You may find his ideas helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated memo: "Iraq Summary"

DHR:dh
091003-4

.....
Please respond by _____

10 Sept 03

IRAQ SUMMARY

COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE SCENARIO

CPA Strategic Communications Office –The Office of Strategic Communications is located at CPA headquarters in one of Saddam Hussein's former presidential palaces (In Green Zone – Safe Zone). Per the Communications personnel list, the entire communications staff includes the Communications Deputy Director (Dan), the Press Secretary, Charles Heatly (UK), five press officers (divided by issues and regions), an Internet Coordinator, and an Arabic spokesperson. All communications staff works at the palace location. Psy-ops military communications, Joint Task Force 7, and some Iraq Media Network (IMN) personnel also share the same workspace. As far as press access to the palace is concerned, no members of the press have access to the palace unless they make an appointment with a hard pass staff member. All members of the media must be escorted at all times once they arrive at the main gate. Journalists with an appointment are required to pass through three to four checkpoints before arriving at the main gate, which can delay entry into the compound by as much as one hour. All journalists have living / office quarters in the Red Zone – Danger Zone).

Strategic Communications Breakdown

The Command Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF7) (Col. Guy Shields, Soon to be Col. Darling) - is responsible for commenting on all military related issues, such as the number of wounded and those soldiers killed in action (KIA's), raid patrols, and weapons recovery teams. Col. Shields also conducts weekly press briefings with the press secretary at the CPA Briefing Facility located at the Convention Center.

Psy-Ops (Lt. Col. Chad Buehring) - is responsible for daily operations (missions) for propaganda operations such as posters, bumper stickers, and other printed material distribution to the Iraqi population. There are frequent day trips to small towns throughout central Iraq to complete missions with and without media coverage from the Iraqi Media Network. It does not appear that the Psy-Ops team has ever had members of any other media organizations accompany them.

Press Officers – The five press officers are assigned to a variety of issue topics that deal with economic issues, utilities, women, the environment, security, etc. From what I gather, there is somewhat of a disconnect in the procedure that the media uses to get in touch with the individual press officers. I will explain this in greater detail shortly.

The Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC) (Major Thurmond) – handles immediate and routine press calls. They are headquartered in the Convention Center. They also serve as the notification conduit to the press for all press events involving Ambassador Bremer, the Press Secretary, the military, and the Governing Council. Since they cannot comment on the record about anything without permission from the Press Office, they are charged with the responsibility of tracking down the press officer responsible for any given issue.

OVERALL IMPRESSIONS

- **Office Structure** – Since the Communications Office is isolated in the Presidential Palace, the communications staff has no immediate access to the media, and the media has no access to them. All CPA press briefings with Ambassador Bremer, General Sanchez, the Press Secretary, and Army PAO are held at the Convention Center (approximately 10-minutes away from the palace). The military public affairs staff in the CPIC is the only full-time presence at the Convention Center.
- **The Press Corps** - Members of the media, including all big five American networks are scattered across Baghdad in houses that the networks have purchased for lodging. Press are prohibited from coming to the Media Center unless there is an announced event. So basically, you have the press scattered in locations throughout the city, the communications staff in the palace (where no press is permitted), and the military personnel running the CPIC. The CPIC personnel spend half their day searching for press officers in the Communications Office so that they can pass on questions they are not permitted to answer. To further complicate the situation, press notification for upcoming events is done via e-mail, since almost all members of the press have different types of cell phone providers that cannot connect with coalition cell phones. Press notifications are frequently made at the last minute, and start times are rarely adhered to. This causes press members to scramble. By the time journalists arrive at the Convention Center, they will have passed through several checkpoints, undergone a car inspection, stood in line to have their bags checked, followed by a full body frisk. There is no central location for the press to be located, and there are no press credentials to speak of. This further complicates the check in process at the Convention Center whenever Ambassador Bremer or anyone else briefs. Last weekend, several protesters were admitted as members of the press and began yelling and holding up signs during General Sanchez's press conference. They were forcefully removed by military personnel, and the incident was recorded on camera. Some of the networks are now permitted to have dishes at the Convention Center. So far CNN and Fox News have decided to install separate satellite dishes on the roof. All over networks have satellite trucks. We are trying to work out a rotating schedule arrangement in the event that the networks are permitted to have workspace at the Convention Center. This would provide the live link necessary to broadcast all Convention Center events.
- **Other Issues** - Safety for the media is also a major issue. Members of the media are not permitted to stay inside the Green Zone, thus they have resorted to staying in rented or owned housing in the Red Zone. Most of the press are afraid of going home at night, and they are subjected to the same inconveniences that the Iraqi people are exposed to – intermittent running water, frequent power outages, and no air conditioning, which is not the case in the Green Zone. Various military groups have been given deeds to several former Bathest houses in the Green Zone and are staying there for protection. There are many other homes like this that are unoccupied and available.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

- A major step in improving the press infrastructure would be to relocate most of the press / communications staff to the Convention Center. There is plenty of room to accommodate a separate area for the Press and Communications Office at the Convention Center. I'm sure it's necessary for one or two people to work from the palace, but there is absolutely no reason why the rest of the staff could not work out of the Convention Center. I spoke with the ABC News Bureau Chief to get an idea of what the other networks and media would think about the idea of having workspace at the Convention Center. They were ecstatic. A hard pass credential could be issued to press members that qualified for workspace. Since the Iraqi Media Network studio is located at the Convention

Center, they are fine, at least until 7:00pm; then they are kicked out of the building. No Iraqi's are allowed in the Convention Center after 7:00pm due to a curfew rule, and no one is allowed on the streets after 11:00pm. Nevertheless, it is clear that if the press had access to the press office staff and the press staff had access to them; some good relationships could be developed. As it stands now, there is a lot of resentment from the press, who feel like they're being treated horribly. Giving them access to the Convention Center would also give media member's easy access to the new Governing Council press facility that is located next door. Both are in the Green Zone. In order to improve communications in the short term, Ambassador Kennedy has approved the distribution of CPA cellular phones to all the frontline reporters and media organizations.

- In addition to the workspace and notification issues, there is a desperate need to have continuous live broadcast capability from the CPA Briefing Center and the Governing Council facility. As stated in the previous section, I think a deal could be worked out whereby the various networks could take turns being the broadcast POOL each week. Combat Camera, which is owned and run by the military, shoots video of events and places where no civilian cameras are permitted. A daily or twice a week feed could be fed out for everyone to downlink. In addition to tape feeds, having the press in one location would make the mobilization of press for impromptu site visits or preplanned events easy. In an area where protection is one of the greatest concerns, this would encourage reporters to travel to areas where we think there is good news to report.
- **Governing Council Press Center Update** – The Governing Council Press Center renovation is well underway. The new briefing center will be located in the auditorium of the new Governing Council building, which is undergoing substantial renovations after it was vandalized during the war. Based on our meetings with the building engineers, they have managed to re-carpet the floors and front stage area, apply new acoustical wall panels, install a new lighting grid / sound system, and custom design curtains that will cover the back stage area. The Governing Council Building should be fully operational by September 14th, after the installation of new generators that are being shipped from Europe.
- **CPA Briefing Center Update** – The CPA Briefing Room is in the process of being fully converted. We have removed the dais and two upper levels of the platform. We have also replaced the podium with a glass toast lectern, removed have the curtain directly behind the podium area, and made new backdrops for the room. We should it operational by Thursday.

Future Network Interviews / Sweeps Week

- With the rapid approach of sweeps week, there has been a great increase in the number of anchors traveling to Baghdad in the next few days. It's definitely an opportunity for the coalition to get some good stories out there. It sounds like Dan Rather is heading out to interview General Sanchez, and Ted Koppel is coming out to broadcast some shows. There are a lot of good stories they could be directed to – on a day trip, for example.

September 10, 2003

TO: Paul Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
LTG John Craddock
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT: CPA Communications

*Gen Abizaid
copy*

Iraq

Here's a memo written by a smart guy Dan Bartlett sent out to Baghdad for a week or so. It contains some pretty interesting observations about the press operations in Baghdad. I understand the individual met with your people while he was out there; you may have spoken with him, too.

You may find his ideas helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated memo: "Iraq Summary"

DHR:dh
091003-4

.....
Please respond by _____

*✓ 9/17 (10 Sep 03)
C 9/17/03*

*Sir,
AMB Bremer
response attached.
Original memo included
behind for reference.
v/r CDR Nosenzo
9/16*

11-L-0559/OSD/16123

11/5/93-23



✓
9/17

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

17 September 2003

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Paul Bremer <signed>
SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake, CPA Communications, 10 September 2003

We valued Scott Sferza's visit and comment on his points below. In the past 2 weeks, our team has been greatly strengthened by the arrival of Gary Thatcher, Dorrance Smith and a number of additional press officers. Our Strategic Communications staff in Baghdad now numbers 69 and we are also flowing officers to our provincial CPA offices.

FILING CENTER: We had already planned to establish a credentialing system for the U.S. and Iraqi press; a filing center to complement it would be helpful too.

Building both will require the full attention of two communications staffers for approximately two weeks. Until State and DoD meet our personnel request list, our existing team is spread too thin to handle it. Many important day-to-day tasks would lay dormant if current personnel were assigned to work on the highly technical filing center effort. I request that the White House send an expert to work on this for as long as it takes. Jim Van Keuren, from White House Communications Agency, is already here and working on the Governing Council Press Center and he should stay as well.

RELOCATING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS STAFF TO CONVENTION CENTER: This will be difficult. The Palace is the nerve center for policy meetings, decision-making, and other CPA business. To move the Baghdad press staff out of headquarters will move them out of the information flow, into an environment in which telecommunications are unreliable. One solution is to have our spokespersons spend a designated few hours at the Convention Center each day, to be available to reporters working out of the filing center.

PSYOPS TRAVEL: The purpose of their trips is to execute information operations directed at the indigenous population; tactics that may not be appropriate to showcase to U.S. media. I recommend against inviting press to accompany these missions.

Today, however, we organized a separate trip (100 reporters) to tour the New Iraqi Army base in Kirkush. This could be the model - albeit for smaller groups of reporters -

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION				
SECDEF	DDP/SEC	DEF. ASST	DDO/SEC	USDP
USDI	CD	CD	CABLE CH	PRD

11-L-0559/OSD/16124

whereby we would organize trips frequently and exclusively for the press, all dependent on the availability of military assets (helicopters, humvees, etc.) and staff.

HOUSING FOR KEY MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS: We have no spare hotel capacity within the Green Zone. We will see if there are any other options available to us. Perhaps it would be tied to long-term commitments of their correspondents/producers to their Iraq bureaus; a condition we believe directly affects the fairness of their coverage and one we also want to require in return for any credentials.

PRESS BRIEFS: The memo from Mr. Sforza indicates that the CJTF-7 and CPA hold joint press briefings weekly. That is incorrect. There is a daily briefing.

SECURITY: My final caveat with all these constructive suggestions is that force protection requirements in the Green Zone present obstacles that we will do our best to work around, but it may not always be possible.

September 11, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Reuben Jeffery
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Recognition of Governing Council

Iraq

Since we are looking for the Arab League to recognize the Governing Council, why don't we recognize the Governing Council by having them send someone approximating an Ambassador to the United States and have him stationed here in Washington.

It seems to me it could help our cause if there were a talented, articulate Iraqi available for the media every day explaining the views of the Iraqis who favor freedom and self-government.

Thanks.

DHR:db
091103-21

.....
Please respond by 9/10/03

11 Sep 03

U15230 /03

September 12, 2003

TO: The Honorable John Snow

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraq

John—

I hope you can get to Iraq and Afghanistan when you are in the Middle East. I think it would be helpful for you and the people traveling with you to have a good sense of it and get a current update on what is taking place there. If it fits your schedule, I hope you will do it.

Regards,

DHR:dh
091203-10

Iraq

12 Sep 03

U15238 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16127

September 12, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
Paul Bremer

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Reuben Jeffery

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Reporting on Security Issues

Iraq

It seems to me that reporting from now on about security issues ought to include U.S. forces, international forces and Iraqi forces. We need to array them all, because they are now what comprise the security forces for Iraq.

Our goal should be to ramp up the Iraqi numbers, try to get some additional international forces and find ways to put less stress on our forces, enabling us to reduce the U.S. role. The faster the Iraqi forces grow, the lower the percentage will be of U.S. forces out of the total force.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091203-4

.....
Please respond by 9/19/03

12 SEP 03

U15240 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16128

September 12, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Relief in Other Gulf States

Iraq

It seems to me if some countries are worried about sending their troops into Iraq from a danger standpoint, we ought to have proposals ready that they could go into the Gulf states and relieve some of our forces there.

From a rotation standpoint, it benefits us every bit as much. Every person we can get replaced in the Gulf states means there are three folks who don't have to get in the queue for rotation.

John, please see that CENTCOM focuses on that and thinks through what kinds of tasks in the Gulf states could be performed by other countries. Please get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091203-12

.....
Please respond by 9/26/03

12 Sep 03

U15242 /03

August 18, 2003

2003 SEP 11 11:51:33

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Richard McCormack

Please take a look Richard McCormack. Has anyone considered him to go to Baghdad? Has Doug Feith ever looked at him for the Policy shop?

Thanks.

Attach.
8/18/03 SecDef response to McCormack
8/1/03 McCormack correspondence to SecDef

DHR:dh
081803-8

.....
Please respond by 9/12/03

*Copy to - Leuter Jeffrey
- Jim O'Beirne*

Larry Di Rita
9/4

U15260 / 03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

8/18/03

The Honorable Richard T. McCormack
1601 Walden Drive
McLean, Virginia 22101

Dear Dick,

Thank you so much for your recent letter and kind offer of assistance. I will move your information around to the right people for consideration.

Regards,



OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY

Secretary of Defense



SA0028561

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GERALD R. FORD
RONALD W. REAGAN

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
The Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

August 1, 2003


Dear Don;

Thanks for your kind note of July 9.

I am not bored by what I am currently doing, but if I can help you in any way, you have only to ask.

With every good wish;

Sincerely;


Richard McCormack

U13820-103



CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY

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RICHARD T. MCCORMACK

CURRENT ACTIVITIES

August 1, 2003

1. Counselor for the Center for the Study of the Presidency. Monitors and reports on global areas of instability. Involves extensive international travel.
2. Board of Advisors; American Foreign Policy Institute. Participates in a high level U.S. Russian policy consultation in Moscow and Washington on issues relevant to the Bush Putin summit exercise. Both governments recently requested that these useful consultations and reports continue for the year ahead. AFPI also organizes regular trips to China for high level consultations.
3. Consultant to the IMF. This involves direct interaction with Dr. Horst Koehler, Managing Director of the IMF, and IMF funded international travel.
4. Member of a Congressionally mandated commission to generate new initiatives for the problems of sub Saharan Africa. Reports to the Secretary of State.
5. Drafts periodic reports on complex Japanese financial situation. This is an on-going effort to monitor and assess the complicated banking, financial, and economic problems of Japan, and grew out of my earlier Chairmanship of the Structural Impediment Initiative with Japan in an earlier U.S. Administration.
6. Visits Argentina and Brazil twice a year to report on their on going political and financial problems for clients.
7. In June of this year, engaged in an extensive series of policy discussions with the political, religious, and academic leaders of Iran, as part of a delegation headed by Cardinal Theodore McCarrick. My report from this two week exercise was widely read within the U.S. Government.
8. At the request of President Kufuor of Ghana, I engaged with the President of Ivory Coast to help facilitate a peace process to avert a threatened civil war. These efforts contributed to an agreement which prevented the expansion of the conflict, and broadened the base of the Government of Ivory Coast.
9. Participates in a regular consultation with large investors in New York City.
10. Chairs the U.S. delegation to a major NATO country related foreign policy conference that occurs twice a year, and reviews global political, military, and economic stress points.

11-L-0559/OSD/16133



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 LAWRENCE HENRY

Aug. 1, 2003

John Roseman

John:

Is there anything I can do to help you and George beyond what I am already doing? If so, let me know.

Best Wishes;

Richard McCormack

8/1/03

Dick:

Your notes and thoughts are much appreciated. I gave your note regarding oil wells to David Kay.

We'll continue to be under political fire until David pieces together what we all know to be a complex series of WMD programs, almost every element of which will have features of deception and deniability. He is making progress and will be cautious before coming to conclusions.

You are a great resource and as things continue to develop we'll see what else needs to be done to help calm the waters in the Fall.

Warmest regards,



United States Department of State

*Under Secretary of State
for Economic, Business, and
Agricultural Affairs*

Washington, D.C. 20520-7512

April 23, 2003

Dear Dick:

Thanks for yesterday's fax. I always appreciate hearing your insights.

Just wanted to let you know that I have alerted Embassy Buenos Aires that you will be coming down this weekend for a few days and would like to drop by. Please give a call to DCM Milt Drucker (b)(6) or Econ Counselor Perry Ball (b)(6) to make arrangements.

I'll be interested to hear your latest assessment of the situation in Argentina.

Sincerely,

Alan Larson

Richard McCormack,
Center for the Study of the Presidency,
1020 Nineteenth Street, N.W.,
Suite 250,
Washington, DC 20036.

FAX:

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/16135



CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY

Ambassador Richard T. McCormack

(b)(6)

HONORARY CHAIRMEN:
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JIMMY CARTER
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
GERALD R. FORD
RONALD W. REAGAN

Former Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Richard T. McCormack has extensive experience and considerable expertise in international economic, financial, and diplomatic matters.

For the past ten years, Mr. McCormack has served as a private consultant for mainly American companies, financial institutions, and think tanks with interests in many parts of the globe. Within the past two years, Mr. McCormack has traveled extensively in Asia to review the implications of the Asian financial crisis and Japan's ongoing banking problems; met with top Chinese leaders to discuss aspects of China's WTO application; visited 11 countries of the former U.S.S.R. to consider the evolving economic and political situation; consulted with top European central bankers and other officials on the prospects for the Euro, and potential vulnerabilities in international derivative markets; examined the potential for various telecommunications projects in Latin America; visited countries in west, central, east, and south Africa to consider regional problems; and reported to clients on the latest Middle East crisis, and the potential impact on energy and financial markets.

Mr. McCormack published an article on "Western Hemispheric Integration: The Global Political Context" in the Spring 1999 edition of The Southern Methodist University School of Law Journal. He delivered the main lecture entitled "The Global Economic Situation and Dilemmas for Central Bankers" at an international conference held in Penang, Malaysia in December 1999. He also drafted numerous other reports and presentations that have been circulated privately to clients and individuals interested in public policy matters.

During the Administration of President Bush, Mr. McCormack served as Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and the G-7 Sherpa. He was awarded the State Department's highest award, the Distinguished Service Medal, by Secretary James Baker. In President Reagan's Administration, Mr. McCormack served as the United States Ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS), and was awarded the Superior Honor Award for Outstanding Sustained Performance. Prior to that, he served as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs; advisor to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; and senior staff member of the President's Council on Executive Organization at the White House under President Nixon.

He received his PhD, Magna cum Laude, from the University of Fribourg, Switzerland in 1966, and his BA from Georgetown University in 1963.

Mr. McCormack is married to Karen Hagstrom McCormack, a communications specialist at the Environmental Protection Agency. They live with their three children in McLean, Virginia.



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



2003 SEP 15 11 53

INFO MEMO

September 12, 2003, 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Afghan National Army (ANA) Funding

- In a note dated September 8, 2003 (Tab A), you asked Doug Feith "On the accelerating the ANA for Afghanistan, what's the issue; has Dov Zakheim found the money for the barracks?" The short answer is "yes."
- I worked closely with the Office of Management and Budget and the State Department, and together we identified funding sources for all fiscal year (FY) 2004 ANA requirements.
- The total FY 2004 ANA requirement, including the \$155 million acceleration, is \$584 million.
- We plan to resource this requirement as follows:

(Dollars in Millions)

FY 2004 State Department FMF:	\$150
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Drawdown:	135
Defense Emergency Response Fund:	77
Supplemental (State Department FMF):	<u>222</u>
Total:	<u>\$584</u>

Afghanistan

12 SEP 03

COORDINATION: Tab B

Prepared by: Frank Murphy (b)(6)




U15261-03

11-L-0559/OSD/16137

TAB

A

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: September 8, 2003

EF-6747
I-03/012396-ES

On the accelerating the ANA for Afghanistan, what's the issue; has Dov Zakheim found the money for the barracks?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
090803.10b

Please respond by: _____

9/15

Signature: Sep. 12

09-08-03 1:33 PM

TAB

B

COORDINATION SHEET

SUBJECT: Afghan National Army Funding

USD(Policy)

Doug Feith

September 11, 2003

General Counsel

Dan J. Dell'Orto
Principal Deputy

September 11, 2003

September 13, 2003

TO: Paul Bremer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: No Quick Fix on Sovereignty

I agree with your memo and will send it to POTUS and members of the NSC.

You're on the mark.

IR 59

cc
x
13 SEP 03

U15263 / 03



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

SFC :
2003 SEP 15 PM 3:26

NETWORKS AND INFORMATION
INTEGRATION

INFO MEMO

September 11, 2003 4:27 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Info _____

FROM: ASD(NII)

JPS

SUBJECT: Your August 13, 2003, Memo on GPS

- You asked me to review Dr. Schlesinger's briefing (attached) and tell you what I think we should be doing with GPS.
- Overall, I think the DoD has a reasonable plan for delivering incremental improvements in GPS capabilities over the next 10-15 years, however our history of execution is not great.
 - The plan is to field three incremental increases in system accuracy, Anti-Jam (AJ) protection and integrity over the current satellites on orbit today, along with new military and civil signals for increased robustness. Initial fielding of these incremental capabilities in FY04, FY07 and FY12, are concurrent with control segment upgrades, platform AJ enhancements and new user equipment.
- I agree with Jim Schlesinger's view of GPS as "an overall system," and I think we properly emphasize the space segment but we tend to ignore the ground control segment and the user equipment. These other elements of the program could provide a steady improvement over time, but we tend to starve them of resources and do not end up with the best system we could have at any point in time.
- We need to be proactive in deploying improvements in these neglected elements, while keeping the space segment evolution on track. I'd be glad to discuss the details if you wish, but Jim is correct that we need to emphasize the "overall system."

Attachment:
As stated

cc: USD(AT&L)
USD(I)
USD(C)
USecAF
Joint Staff(J8)
Director, PA&E

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11-L-0559 OSD/16143

U15356^{NSC} / 03

Snowflake

August 13, 2003

TO: John Stenbit
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: GPS

I received the attached briefing from our mutual friend, Jim Schlesinger.

Would you please take a look at it, and tell me what it is you think we are not doing that we ought to be doing on GPS?

Thanks.

Attach.
"Some Realities of the GPS"

DHR:dh
081303-15

.....
Please respond by 9/1/03

11-L-0559/OSD/16144

At 10:00 AM
19/1/11


Some Realities of the



11-L-0559/OSD/16145

GPS — is a service

- An overall system, not just a satellite program
- Depends on ground stations receivers, clock accuracy, etc.
- Number & geometry of satellites in the constellation



Some Salient Points from PA&E Analysis

- **Focus on services rather than satellite**
 - *Accuracy -- Improve near term inexpensively by better clocks, improved OCS (on IIRm & IIF)*
- **Vulnerability to jamming grows with time**
 - *Most effective is anti jam antenna (AJA) equipment, but most systems not funded for AJA*
 - *Better phasing [e.g. GPS III satellite schedule far ahead of m-code receivers deployment]*
 - *Flex-power & m-code receivers with AJA on them better than GPS III with spot beam, w/o AJA*
- **Budget Questions**
 - *Substantial cuts in GPS III funding had no effect on the initial launch for GPS III*

•Recognized limitation: Analysis based on "current snap shot of GPS III [consequently higher risk]

•**Additional limitation: Assumes 24 satellites constellation as a given

U.S. Military Depend on GPtS

For

- *Information dominance*
- *Precision operations and targeting*
(but very weak signal)

- **Need for Greater Robustness**

- *Anti-Jam*
- *Increased Accuracy*
- *Greater Availability*



Jamming

- **Good deal of consternation over potential IRAQI jamming capability**
 - *Belated*
 - *Back to business as usual*
 - “Killed jammer with GPS weapon!?”

**Some day soon somebody will develop &
market something good**

Multiple Jammers

History of Program

- **Promise the future-- short change the present**
- **Recent actions result in program slippage**
 - *In the attempt to (hopefully) move 1st flight of GPS III to the left*
 - *In practice move effective GPtS service levels to the right* ✓
 - *More dollars for space in Fy 04 but cuts in GPS program* ✓

GPtS

- **Seeks earlier 1st flight of GPS III**
 - *Likely technical problem(s) to solve (as with IIF - spot)*
 - *But 1st flight of 1st satellite not IOC for the users*

Capability not till around 2020

Example of flexpower on IIF

- **10 dB target in PDM IV**
- **Now 7-8 dB**
 - *Reduction of factor of 25 (to 4%)*
 - *Achieved mostly without power increase*

“Transformation”
Depends on Improving GPtS Service

Achieved through “Spiral Improvement”

- Invest in modest, continuous near-term improvements which increase robustness of capability well before 2020***

Programmed vs. Actual launches of GPS Satellites

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
PROGRAMMED	5 (in 2000)	5	5	5	5	4	4
ACTUAL LAUNCHES	Flew 2 (1 success)	0	1	3	1	0	3??

Programmed Launches for year shown

Number programmed for that year

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
1995		3	4	5	5	5	5						
1996			3	4	5	5	5	5					
1997			2	4	5	5	5	5	5				
1998				3	5	5	5	5	5	5			
1999					5	5	5	5	3	3	3	3	3
2000						3	1	4	4	4	3	4	3
2001						2	2	3	4	3	4	4	
2002						2	0	3	4	4	5	3	2
2003													

Programmed Launches for year shown

Number programmed for that year

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
1995		3	4	5	5	5	5						
1996			3	4	5	5	5	5					
1997			2	4	5	5	5	5	5				
1998				3	5	5	5	5	5	5			
1999					5	5	5	5	3	3	3	3	3
2000						3	1	4	4	4	3	4	3
2001						2	2	3	4	3	4	4	
2002							0	3	4	4	5	3	2
2003													
Actually Launched	3	2	0	1	3	1	0	3??					

Programmed vs Funds Provided for GPS Satellites

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Programmed	174.8	170.8	180	282.6	353.4
Provided	93.6	125.4	173.4	201.5	236.1
Delta	-81.2	-45.4	-6.6	-41.0	117.3

[-417 for FY 03--05]

- **Observations**

- *GPS Program as been a major source of funds for other AF Programs*
- *Budget requests to launch 4 or 5 satellites/year (1997-2002)*
- *Launched none, one or two a year - implies more than \$1 B available for other programs*

August 13, 2003

413.77

TO: John Stenbit
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: GPS

I received the attached briefing from our mutual friend, Jim Schlesinger.

Would you please take a look at it, and tell me what it is you think we are not doing that we ought to be doing on GPS?

Thanks.

Attach.
"Some Realities of the GPS"

DHR:dh
081303-13

.....

Please respond by 9/12/03

13 AUG 03

U153571/03

At Keep
19/10/20


Some Realities of the



11-L-0559/OSD/16159

GPS — is a service

- An overall system, not just a satellite program
- Depends on ground stations receivers, clock accuracy, etc.
- Number & geometry of satellites in the constellation



Some Salient Points from PA&E Analysis

- **Focus on services rather than satellite**
 - *Accuracy -- Improve near term inexpensively by better clocks, improved OCS (on IIRm & IIF)*
- **Vulnerability to jamming grows with time**
 - *Most effective is anti jam antenna (AJA) equipment, but most systems not funded for AJA*
 - *Better phasing [e.g. GPS III satellite schedule far ahead of m-code receivers deployment]*
 - *Flex-power & m-code receivers with AJA on them better than GPS III with spot beam, w/o AJA*
- **Budget Questions**
 - *Substantial cuts in GPS III funding had no effect on the initial launch for GPS III*

•Recognized limitation; Analysis based on “current snap shot of GPS III [consequently higher risk]

•**Additional limitation: Assumes 24 satellites constellation as a given


U.S. Military Depend on GPtS

For

- ***Information dominance***
- ***Precision operations and targeting
(but very weak signal)***

- **Need for Greater Robustness**

- ***Anti-Jam***
- ***Increased Accuracy***
- ***Greater Availability***



Jamming

- **Good deal of consternation over potential IRAQI jamming capability**
 - *Belated*
 - *Back to business as usual*
 - “Killed jammer with GPS weapon!?”

**Some day soon somebody will develop &
market something good**

Multiple Jammers

History of Program

- **Promise the future-- short change the present**
- **Recent actions result in program slippage**
 - ***In the attempt to (hopefully) move 1st flight of GPS III to the left***
 - ***In practice move effective GPtS service levels to the right*** ✓
 - ***More dollars for space in Fy 04 but cuts in GPS program*** ✓

GPtS

- **Seeks earlier 1st flight of GPS III**
 - *Likely technical problem(s) to solve (as with IIF - spot)*
 - *But 1st flight of 1st satellite not IOC for the users*

Capability not till around 2020

Example of flexpower on IIF

- **10 dB target in PDM IV**
- **Now 7-8 dB**
 - ***Reduction of factor of 25 (to 4%)***
 - ***Achieved mostly without power increase***

Low level

“Transformation”
Depends on Improving GPtS Service

Achieved through “Spiral Improvement”

- Invest in modest, continuous near-term improvements which increase robustness of capability well before 2020***

Programmed vs. Actual launches of GPS Satellites

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
PROGRAMMED	5 (in 2000)	5	5	5	5	4	4
ACTUAL LAUNCHES	Flew 2 (1 success)	0	1	3	1	0	3??

Programmed Launches for year shown

Number programmed for that year

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
1995		3	4	5	5	5	5						
1996			3	4	5	5	5	5					
1997			2	4	5	5	5	5	5				
1998				3	5	5	5	5	5	5			
1999					5	5	5	5	3	3	3	3	3
2000						3	1	4	4	4	3	4	3
2001						2	2	3	4	3	4	4	
2002						2	0	3	4	4	5	3	2
2003													

Programmed Launches for year shown

Number programmed for that year

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
1995		3	4	5	5	5	5						
1996			3	4	5	5	5	5					
1997			2	4	5	5	5	5	5				
1998				3	5	5	5	5	5	5			
1999					5	5	5	5	3	3	3	3	3
2000						3	1	4	4	4	3	4	3
2001						2	2	3	4	3	4	4	
2002							0	3	4	4	5	3	2
2003													
Actually Launched	3	2	0	1	3	1	0	3??					

Programmed vs Funds Provided for GPS Sa

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Programmed	174.8	170.8	180	282.6	353.4
Provided	93.6	125.4	173.4	201.5	236.1
Delta	-81.2	-45.4	-6.6	-41.0	117.3

[-41]

- **Observations**

- ***GPS Program as been a major source of funds for AF Programs***
- ***Budget requests to launch 4 or 5 satellites/year (2002)***
- ***Launched none, one or two a year - implies more \$1 B available for other programs***

11-L-0559/OSD/16171



September 15, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tariffs

Syria

Someone in the paper is writing that Petraeus's folks are extracting customs tariffs from people coming in through Syria. If it is true, how does that connect to the Coalition Provisional Authority?

Thanks.

DHR:db
091503-12

.....
Please respond by 9/19/03

15 Sep 03

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