


Organizing for Combat



In the Pentagon, in addition to the normal public affairs structure, the Special Plans Office was deeply involved in this effort, supported (with information) by the Iraqi National Congress. There was the Rendon Group, headed by John Rendon who gave media advice to OSD, the Joint Staff and the White House. Finally, there were connections to large PSYOPS activities.


The names of individuals came from open reports. I was given the names of people in the Special Plans Office by a press source.

The Rendon Group worked for the Government of Kuwait during the Gulf I. John Rendon proudly tells that it was he who shipped small American flags to Kuwait for the citizens to wave as troops entered Kuwait City. He suggested the same technique for this war, but the Joint Staff information operations office turned down the idea.

The Rendon Group worked for both OSD and the Joint Staff during this war. John Rendon says he was part of the daily 9:30 phone calls with the key information players to set themes.


Inside the White House there was an Iraq Group that did policy direction and then the Office of Global Communications itself.

Organizing for Combat



The *Times of London* said the Office of Global Communications was a \$200M program. That certainly raises the question of how much all of this cost, including the \$250,000 for the pressroom in Doha.

It's important to note that at times there were as many as three Brits associated with the Office of global Communications.



These assets were networked. To insure the military would be a willing part of the network, three people from the White House Office of Global Communications were sent to work with Central Command. Jim Wilkinson became General Franks Director of

Strategic Communications.

The war was handled like a political campaign. Everyone in the message business was from the political communications community. It was a political campaign.

UK Organizing for Combat

***0830 - UK Policy Meeting**
0930 - UK Information Operations Cell
works the message for the day.
• For discussions with the US
• For their forces in the field
1300 - News Release Group Meeting
...ad hoc Targeting and Info. Ops.
discussions with Washington

Twice weekly - Iraq Media Group

Every Friday - VTC with Washington

White House Office of
Global Communications

Direct Coordination

Coalition Information
Center

****P. Hamill**

****J. Pratt**

****M. Khan**

****Alison Blackshaw (Campbell's**
Personal Assistant)

*Source: Tony Rowlands, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2 July 03
** Drafted the February 3rd Dossier, *Telegraph*, 2/8/03

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In London, there was a parallel organization and a parallel coordination process. They kept the coordination with secure video teleconferences.

My concern became even greater when I attended a conference on information operations the first week in July. This was John Rendon's list of things that need fixing.

The Future

- **John Rendon, July 3rd, London conference**
 - We were on the wrong side of expectations during the conflict; we need to fix that.
 - Embedded journalists were the equivalent of reality television, and they got air time.
 - We allowed others to give the context too much; we need to fix that.
 - We were still behind the news cycle by four hours, particularly in other time zones.
 - Lanes are not important as long as an agency with the capability contributes.

He said the embedded idea was great. It worked as they had found in the test. It was the war version reality television, and for the most part, they did not lose control of the story. He said one of the mistakes they made was that they lost control of the context. The retired people in the networks had too much control of context. That has to be fixed for the next war. He said he again was made aware that lanes are not important. By

lanes he meant not letting individual organization take control the story.

The Future

- **Captain Gerald Mauer, Assistant Deputy Director for Information Operations, Joint Staff, July 3rd, London conference.**
 - Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs are slowly being integrated into information operations.
 - We are looking to have a USG Strategic Fusion Center that brings everything together.
 - The Information Operations Roadmap is being coordinated within DOD; I/O will probably go to USD (Policy).
 - We hope to make more use of Hollywood and Madison Avenue in the future.
 - “Adversary” has been taken out of the working definition of information operations; we will attempt to “disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial...decision making.”
- **15 Psychological Operations Group (UK) will grow, and strategic information operations will take on new importance.**

The information operations part of the future is frightening. He said without a sense of the implications that public diplomacy and public affairs are being integrated into information operations. He said looking ahead to the next war that the US Government needs a single fusion center that can integrate the story.

The Future

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He described a paper called the Information Operations Roadmap that was being coordinated in the Pentagon. He said when the paper was drafted by his office it said that information operations would be used against an “adversary.” He went on to say that when the paper got to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Feith), it was changed to say that information operations will attempt to “disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial...decision making.” Adversarial...decision-making will be disrupted. In other words, we will even go after friends if they are against what we are doing or want to do.

They seem to be documenting the practice that emerged during Gulf II. If you don't agree with us, you could be the target of an information attack.

Last Chart

If the democracies of the United States and the United Kingdom are based upon informed, open debate of the issues, we've got some fixing to do.

A close friend always asks about my last chart. What's your last chart? He means what are your recommendations? What do we do? He is right. It does not seem to be enough just to say things have gone bad.

Parliamentary Inquiry. In the UK, it's not enough to look at the arguments about weapons of mass destruction before the war. There needs to be an inquiry of the broader question of how spin got to be more important than substance. What roles did information operations and strategic psychological operations play in the war? What controls need to be placed on information operations?

Information Operations. Someone inside the US Government said to me as I was doing this research that there were so many offices doing information operations he couldn't even name them. We need a major investigation. We need restrictions on which parts of the government can do information operations. We should not do information operations against friends. We have to get this back in control.

Smith-Mundt Act. The law was written right after World War II. It's intent was that the American people would not become the target of our own propaganda. It no longer works. We became collateral damage, a target group of messages intended for other groups. The Internet and international media access have changed the conditions. We need to revise the laws.

Post Script

The reactions to my research have been very interesting.

When I show the stuff to individuals inside the government, mostly the career people who have been around more than one administration, they have an almost universal first reaction. They say something like, “Be careful with this; they will punish you.” I don’t hear that I have gotten it wrong. They don’t correct my research. I keep hearing the notion that, as I found in the research, punishment of those who disagree is a dimension the strategy.

Print media have been quite interested. I think reporters like the idea of someone confirming they had not been getting the true story. I have detected a major issue in these discussions in what reporters have not said to me.

I think the materials point to problems in the way newspapers did their job during the war. Why don’t they react immediately that they need to do some self-appraisal? I think one could take the stories I have highlighted and ask some direct questions. How was it that the *Washington Post* took classified information on the Jessica Lynch story and published it just the way the individual leaking it in the Pentagon wanted? Why did the *New York Times* let itself be used by “intelligence officials” on stories? Why did the *Washington Times* never seem to question a leak they were given? Why were newspapers in the UK better than those in the U.S. in raising questions before and during the war?

I’ve not heard any self-criticism from reporters to whom I have talked.

When I’ve talked to television producers and reporters my sense is they believe the whole story is just too complex to tell. That’s sad but probably true.

Cynicism is the most disturbing reaction I have found. I got from a limo driver who was taking me to the MSNBC studio for a debate on the no WMD story. He said, “It’s just what politicians do.”

I gave a briefing on my research to one of the major Washington research organizations, a think tank. A major thrust of reactions was to keep asking, “What’s new.” This kind of thing always takes place. I think I heard laughter when I said there was no passion for truth in those who were taking us to war. Didn’t I understand what goes on in government?

I pain for the limo driver because leaders have pushed him to cynical. I pain even more for the senior researcher. He seems to have no sense of a higher vision. I pain for our democratic process when I find individuals not angered at being deceived.