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On Escape: De l'évasion
First published in 1935, On Escape represents Emmanuel Levinas's first attempt to break with the ontological obsession of the Western tradition. In it, Levinas not only affirms the necessity of an escape from being, but also gives a meaning and a direction to it. Beginning with an analysis of need not as lack or some external limit to a self-sufficient being, but as a positive relation to our being, Levinas moves through a series of brilliant phenomenological analyses of such phenomena as pleasure, shame, and nausea in order to show a fundamental insufficiency in the human condition. In his critical introduction and annotation, Jacques Rolland places On Escape in its historical and intellectual context, and also within the context of Levinas's entire oeuvre, explaining Levinas's complicated relation to Heidegger, and underscoring the way Levinas's analysis of "being riveted," of the need for escape, is a meditation on the body.
136 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1936
About the author
Emmanuel Levinas
150 books349 followersEmanuelis Levinas (later adapted to French orthography as Emmanuel Levinas) received a traditional Jewish education in Lithuania. After WWII, he studied the Talmud under the enigmatic "Monsieur Chouchani", whose influence he acknowledged only late in his life.
Levinas began his philosophical studies at Strasbourg University in 1924, where he began his lifelong friendship with the French philosopher Maurice Blanchot. In 1928, he went to Freiburg University to study phenomenology under Edmund Husserl. At Freiburg he also met Martin Heidegger. Levinas became one of the very first French intellectuals to draw attention to Heidegger and Husserl, by translating Husserl's Cartesian Meditations and by drawing on their ideas in his own philosophy, in works such as his The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, De l'Existence à l'Existant, and En Découvrant l’Existence avec Husserl et Heidegger.
According to his obituary in New York Times,[1] Levinas came to regret his enthusiasm for Heidegger, because of the latter's affinity for the Nazis. During a lecture on forgiveness, Levinas stated "One can forgive many Germans, but there are some Germans it is difficult to forgive. It is difficult to forgive Heidegger."[2]
After earning his doctorate Levinas taught at a private Jewish High School in Paris, the École Normale Israélite Orientale, eventually becoming its director. He began teaching at the University of Poitiers in 1961, at the Nanterre campus of the University of Paris in 1967, and at the Sorbonne in 1973, from which he retired in 1979. He was also a Professor at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. In 1989 he was awarded the Balzan Prize for Philosophy.
Among his most famous students is Rabbi Baruch Garzon from Tetouan (Morocco), who learnt Philosophy with Levinas at the Sorbonne and later went on to become one of the most important Rabbis of the Spanish-speaking world.
In the 1950s, Levinas emerged from the circle of intellectuals surrounding Jean Wahl as a leading French thinker. His work is based on the ethics of the Other or, in Levinas' terms, on "ethics as first philosophy". For Levinas, the Other is not knowable and cannot be made into an object of the self, as is done by traditional metaphysics (which Lévinas called "ontology"). Lévinas prefers to think of philosophy as the "wisdom of love" rather than the love of wisdom (the literal Greek meaning of the word "philosophy"). By his lights, ethics becomes an entity independent of subjectivity to the point where ethical responsibility is integral to the subject; hence an ethics of responsibility precedes any "objective searching after truth".
Levinas derives the primacy of his ethics from the experience of the encounter with the Other. For Levinas, the irreducible relation, the epiphany, of the face-to-face, the encounter with another, is a privileged phenomenon in which the other person's proximity and distance are both strongly felt. "The Other precisely reveals himself in his alterity not in a shock negating the I, but as the primordial phenomenon of gentleness."[3]. At the same time, the revelation of the face makes a demand, this demand is before one can express, or know one's freedom, to affirm or deny.[4] One instantly recognizes the transcendence and heteronomy of the Other. Even murder fails as an attempt to take hold of this otherness.
In Levinas's later thought following "Totality and Infinity", he argued that our responsibility for the other was already rooted within our subjective constitution. It should be noted that the first line of the preface of this book is "everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality."[5] This can be seen most clearly in his later account of recurrence (chapter 4 in "Otherwise Than Being"), where Levinas maintai
Levinas began his philosophical studies at Strasbourg University in 1924, where he began his lifelong friendship with the French philosopher Maurice Blanchot. In 1928, he went to Freiburg University to study phenomenology under Edmund Husserl. At Freiburg he also met Martin Heidegger. Levinas became one of the very first French intellectuals to draw attention to Heidegger and Husserl, by translating Husserl's Cartesian Meditations and by drawing on their ideas in his own philosophy, in works such as his The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, De l'Existence à l'Existant, and En Découvrant l’Existence avec Husserl et Heidegger.
According to his obituary in New York Times,[1] Levinas came to regret his enthusiasm for Heidegger, because of the latter's affinity for the Nazis. During a lecture on forgiveness, Levinas stated "One can forgive many Germans, but there are some Germans it is difficult to forgive. It is difficult to forgive Heidegger."[2]
After earning his doctorate Levinas taught at a private Jewish High School in Paris, the École Normale Israélite Orientale, eventually becoming its director. He began teaching at the University of Poitiers in 1961, at the Nanterre campus of the University of Paris in 1967, and at the Sorbonne in 1973, from which he retired in 1979. He was also a Professor at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. In 1989 he was awarded the Balzan Prize for Philosophy.
Among his most famous students is Rabbi Baruch Garzon from Tetouan (Morocco), who learnt Philosophy with Levinas at the Sorbonne and later went on to become one of the most important Rabbis of the Spanish-speaking world.
In the 1950s, Levinas emerged from the circle of intellectuals surrounding Jean Wahl as a leading French thinker. His work is based on the ethics of the Other or, in Levinas' terms, on "ethics as first philosophy". For Levinas, the Other is not knowable and cannot be made into an object of the self, as is done by traditional metaphysics (which Lévinas called "ontology"). Lévinas prefers to think of philosophy as the "wisdom of love" rather than the love of wisdom (the literal Greek meaning of the word "philosophy"). By his lights, ethics becomes an entity independent of subjectivity to the point where ethical responsibility is integral to the subject; hence an ethics of responsibility precedes any "objective searching after truth".
Levinas derives the primacy of his ethics from the experience of the encounter with the Other. For Levinas, the irreducible relation, the epiphany, of the face-to-face, the encounter with another, is a privileged phenomenon in which the other person's proximity and distance are both strongly felt. "The Other precisely reveals himself in his alterity not in a shock negating the I, but as the primordial phenomenon of gentleness."[3]. At the same time, the revelation of the face makes a demand, this demand is before one can express, or know one's freedom, to affirm or deny.[4] One instantly recognizes the transcendence and heteronomy of the Other. Even murder fails as an attempt to take hold of this otherness.
In Levinas's later thought following "Totality and Infinity", he argued that our responsibility for the other was already rooted within our subjective constitution. It should be noted that the first line of the preface of this book is "everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality."[5] This can be seen most clearly in his later account of recurrence (chapter 4 in "Otherwise Than Being"), where Levinas maintai
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
August 23, 2012
The thing about philosophy books is you never fully realise you have understood a book until much later. After several readings I still felt I didn't fully understand the book; I may have in an intellectual sense, but the very best philosophy books move you, correspond to experiences in your life.
"Thus escape is the need to get out of oneself, that is, to break the most radical and unalterably binding of chains, the fact that I is oneself"
Levinas successfully shows that nearly every philosopher everywhere has been wrong. Death is not what produces trauma in human life: life is the problem. Being is the problem. A radical response not only to Heidegger but to the entirety of Western philosophy, Levinas explains to us exactly what escape is not. Escape is not the escape of the poet who seeks to move away from the mundane to the romantic and the beautiful, escape is not the liberty imagined by political thinkers and freedom is not achieved by grasping the possibility of death as Heidegger believes.
Most importantly, escape is not suicide. Yes the trauma of life comes from being-oneself but existential nausea cannot be broken by eradicating the self. To do so would be to abdicate responsibility, or rather, to attempt to do the impossible, to gain control at the very moment that one loses all control. The point of death cannot be controlled. Levinas tells us it is an unreal escape; the solution to world-weariness is not the abdication of the world but throwing oneself totally into it, accepting the crushing weight of responsibility. Action. Response.
This isn't to be mistaken with Sartre's assertion that the problem of choice is what causes existential angst; trauma is in fact far more basic. Levinas likens it to insomnia: true insomnia is where one is filled with exhaustion but nevertheless cannot sleep, therefore it isn't insomnia from too much thought, but from too little. The true insomniac is a vacuous hole, much like the world-weary self, selfness itself is the problem.
Levinas' solution is by no means an easy one. Suicide is far easier and it took me a while to accept (or even understand) it as a non-escape. It is a shame that this essay is obviously not read often; it goes straight to the heart of the matter and any 'insomniac' out there would find it comforting to have a decent prognosis: world-weariness.
"Thus escape is the need to get out of oneself, that is, to break the most radical and unalterably binding of chains, the fact that I is oneself"
Levinas successfully shows that nearly every philosopher everywhere has been wrong. Death is not what produces trauma in human life: life is the problem. Being is the problem. A radical response not only to Heidegger but to the entirety of Western philosophy, Levinas explains to us exactly what escape is not. Escape is not the escape of the poet who seeks to move away from the mundane to the romantic and the beautiful, escape is not the liberty imagined by political thinkers and freedom is not achieved by grasping the possibility of death as Heidegger believes.
Most importantly, escape is not suicide. Yes the trauma of life comes from being-oneself but existential nausea cannot be broken by eradicating the self. To do so would be to abdicate responsibility, or rather, to attempt to do the impossible, to gain control at the very moment that one loses all control. The point of death cannot be controlled. Levinas tells us it is an unreal escape; the solution to world-weariness is not the abdication of the world but throwing oneself totally into it, accepting the crushing weight of responsibility. Action. Response.
This isn't to be mistaken with Sartre's assertion that the problem of choice is what causes existential angst; trauma is in fact far more basic. Levinas likens it to insomnia: true insomnia is where one is filled with exhaustion but nevertheless cannot sleep, therefore it isn't insomnia from too much thought, but from too little. The true insomniac is a vacuous hole, much like the world-weary self, selfness itself is the problem.
Levinas' solution is by no means an easy one. Suicide is far easier and it took me a while to accept (or even understand) it as a non-escape. It is a shame that this essay is obviously not read often; it goes straight to the heart of the matter and any 'insomniac' out there would find it comforting to have a decent prognosis: world-weariness.
March 25, 2020
في هذا المقال يحاول ليفيناس في ثمانية مقاطع ان يجري تحليلا لا يمكن القول عليه فينومينولوجي خالص هو مشوب بملامح هيدغر فالوجود في كل مكان في العار و الرغبة والغثيان (والذي يذكرنا بروح سارتر) لكن ليفيناس لديه نظرته الخاص�� بحيث يموضع كل هذا الحسي في رغبة هروب لا اين لها تماثل موضعة الذات في الوجود
يصل ليفيناس الى ان الغثيان هو التمثل الاقوى لتجربة الوجود بحيث انه من الداخل و يحاصرنا من كل اتجاه ولا يمكن الفرار منه وفي قمة عجزنا نصل الى معنى قمة عجزنا عن ان نهرب من الوجود ، الذي فيه رغبتنا ليست ناتج قلة بل كثرة واعياء الرغبة محاولة لكسر وضع قائم وهروب لكن الهروب هنا مخادع لان في قمة نجاحه يصل إلى الفشل ، اما العار فهو ناتج تجربة الحس الحميمة رغبة اخفاء ما لا يمكن اخفاءه ، الانا في عري الذات والالتصاق الذي تحاول الانا الهروب منه لكن لا شئ يماثل الغثيان في هذه التجربة لان ليس لديه البعد الاجتماعي في العار فهو داخلي بل وربما تحتاج لوجود طرف اخر فيه لتنظر اليه كانه مجرد علة
يبدا ليفيناس ويختم مقاله بنقد تجاوز الفلسفة الاوروبية لمسألة الوجود وبالاخص المثالية وينبه الى اللحظات التي كانت هنالك محاولات ولو فاشلة للتنبيه عليه
مقدمة رولاند تعيد الكثير من المقال لكنها تربط بين ليفيناس هيدغر وسارتر في مكان واحد :D
يصل ليفيناس الى ان الغثيان هو التمثل الاقوى لتجربة الوجود بحيث انه من الداخل و يحاصرنا من كل اتجاه ولا يمكن الفرار منه وفي قمة عجزنا نصل الى معنى قمة عجزنا عن ان نهرب من الوجود ، الذي فيه رغبتنا ليست ناتج قلة بل كثرة واعياء الرغبة محاولة لكسر وضع قائم وهروب لكن الهروب هنا مخادع لان في قمة نجاحه يصل إلى الفشل ، اما العار فهو ناتج تجربة الحس الحميمة رغبة اخفاء ما لا يمكن اخفاءه ، الانا في عري الذات والالتصاق الذي تحاول الانا الهروب منه لكن لا شئ يماثل الغثيان في هذه التجربة لان ليس لديه البعد الاجتماعي في العار فهو داخلي بل وربما تحتاج لوجود طرف اخر فيه لتنظر اليه كانه مجرد علة
يبدا ليفيناس ويختم مقاله بنقد تجاوز الفلسفة الاوروبية لمسألة الوجود وبالاخص المثالية وينبه الى اللحظات التي كانت هنالك محاولات ولو فاشلة للتنبيه عليه
مقدمة رولاند تعيد الكثير من المقال لكنها تربط بين ليفيناس هيدغر وسارتر في مكان واحد :D
September 24, 2019
it's a game-changer.
August 13, 2007
"this term escape [...] is world-weariness, the disorder of our time" (52)
"being naked is not question of wearing clothes" (65)
i decided one day that i wanted to stop exising. not really die. not really get away to some spa where they put mud on your face and make you feel like a million bucks. just...lie on my bed and not have to get up until millions of years later.
levinas taught me about leaving myself and the obsession with being in oneself.
"being naked is not question of wearing clothes" (65)
i decided one day that i wanted to stop exising. not really die. not really get away to some spa where they put mud on your face and make you feel like a million bucks. just...lie on my bed and not have to get up until millions of years later.
levinas taught me about leaving myself and the obsession with being in oneself.
January 26, 2022
De l'Evasion is one of the most remarkable and original works of Levinas. I think that it is proof that Levinas' interlocutor is, - at least in his early work-, Sartre as much as Heidegger. I particularly am touched by Levinas' affective writing style and his insight that one is not nauseated by the lack of being but by the fact that one is tied to one's existence, - an existence that is not chosen nor willed.
December 26, 2022
Emmanuel Levinas explores the concept of escape as it relates to freedom and responsibility. He argues that escape can be seen as a way of seeking to evade the demands of the other and avoid responsibility, but he also suggests that it can be a way of expressing a desire for independence and freedom.
Levinas begins by discussing the idea of escape as a form of evasion. He argues that when we seek to escape from something, we often do so in order to avoid taking responsibility for our actions or to avoid facing difficult situations. For example, we might try to escape from a problem by denying that it exists or by shifting the blame onto someone else.
However, Levinas also notes that escape can be seen as a way of asserting one's own independence and autonomy. He argues that when we seek to escape from the constraints of social and cultural norms, we are expressing a desire to be free and to shape our own lives. In this sense, escape can be seen as a way of asserting one's own identity and individuality.
Escape can also have negative consequences. The book suggests that when we seek to escape from our responsibilities and our engagement with the world, we can become isolated and disconnected from others. This can lead to a lack of fulfillment and a sense of emptiness.
Ultimately, Levinas argues that escape is a paradox, as it involves both a desire to be free and a desire to be bound. He suggests that we must find a way to balance our desire for independence and autonomy with our ethical responsibilities to others, in order to live meaningful and fulfilling lives.
"On Escape" delves deeper into the complex and often conflicting meanings of escape. Levinas suggests that escape can be seen as a way of avoiding the demands of the other and avoiding responsibility, but it can also be seen as a way of expressing a desire for freedom and independence.
Levinas argues that escape can be a response to the constraints and expectations placed on us by society and culture. When we seek to escape from these constraints, we are expressing a desire to be free and to shape our own lives. At the same time, the book recognizes that escape can also have negative consequences, as it can lead to a lack of engagement with the world and a sense of isolation from others.
Despite these potential negative consequences, Levinas suggests that escape can also be a source of liberation. He argues that when we escape from the expectations and demands placed on us by others, we are able to reclaim our own autonomy and agency. In this sense, escape can be seen as a way of asserting our own identity and independence.
Ultimately, Levinas suggests that we must find a way to balance our desire for freedom and independence with our ethical responsibilities to others. He argues that this balance is essential for living meaningful and fulfilling lives.
Emmanuel Levinas's ideas about escape as it is discussed in his essay "On Escape" can be compared and contrasted with those of other philosophers, such as Søren Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul Sartre.
One key difference between Levinas's ideas and those of Kierkegaard is their perspective on the role of escape in personal fulfillment. Kierkegaard argues that escape is ultimately an empty and unfulfilling pursuit, as it leads to a sense of emptiness and lack of fulfillment. In contrast, Levinas suggests that escape can be a source of liberation and a way of asserting one's own autonomy and agency.
Another difference between the two philosophers is their perspective on the relationship between escape and responsibility. Kierkegaard sees escape as a way of avoiding the demands of the self and the responsibilities of freedom, while Levinas sees it as a way of reclaiming autonomy and agency.
Sartre's views on escape also differ from those of Levinas in some key ways. Like Levinas, Sartre recognizes that escape can be a way of avoiding responsibility and evading the demands of the other. However, Sartre takes a more negative view of escape, arguing that it is a form of "bad faith" that involves denying one's own freedom and responsibility. In contrast, Levinas sees escape as a way of reclaiming autonomy and agency.
Overall, while there are some similarities between the views of Levinas, Kierkegaard, and Sartre on the concept of escape, there are also significant differences in their perspectives.
Levinas begins by discussing the idea of escape as a form of evasion. He argues that when we seek to escape from something, we often do so in order to avoid taking responsibility for our actions or to avoid facing difficult situations. For example, we might try to escape from a problem by denying that it exists or by shifting the blame onto someone else.
However, Levinas also notes that escape can be seen as a way of asserting one's own independence and autonomy. He argues that when we seek to escape from the constraints of social and cultural norms, we are expressing a desire to be free and to shape our own lives. In this sense, escape can be seen as a way of asserting one's own identity and individuality.
Escape can also have negative consequences. The book suggests that when we seek to escape from our responsibilities and our engagement with the world, we can become isolated and disconnected from others. This can lead to a lack of fulfillment and a sense of emptiness.
Ultimately, Levinas argues that escape is a paradox, as it involves both a desire to be free and a desire to be bound. He suggests that we must find a way to balance our desire for independence and autonomy with our ethical responsibilities to others, in order to live meaningful and fulfilling lives.
"On Escape" delves deeper into the complex and often conflicting meanings of escape. Levinas suggests that escape can be seen as a way of avoiding the demands of the other and avoiding responsibility, but it can also be seen as a way of expressing a desire for freedom and independence.
Levinas argues that escape can be a response to the constraints and expectations placed on us by society and culture. When we seek to escape from these constraints, we are expressing a desire to be free and to shape our own lives. At the same time, the book recognizes that escape can also have negative consequences, as it can lead to a lack of engagement with the world and a sense of isolation from others.
Despite these potential negative consequences, Levinas suggests that escape can also be a source of liberation. He argues that when we escape from the expectations and demands placed on us by others, we are able to reclaim our own autonomy and agency. In this sense, escape can be seen as a way of asserting our own identity and independence.
Ultimately, Levinas suggests that we must find a way to balance our desire for freedom and independence with our ethical responsibilities to others. He argues that this balance is essential for living meaningful and fulfilling lives.
Emmanuel Levinas's ideas about escape as it is discussed in his essay "On Escape" can be compared and contrasted with those of other philosophers, such as Søren Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul Sartre.
One key difference between Levinas's ideas and those of Kierkegaard is their perspective on the role of escape in personal fulfillment. Kierkegaard argues that escape is ultimately an empty and unfulfilling pursuit, as it leads to a sense of emptiness and lack of fulfillment. In contrast, Levinas suggests that escape can be a source of liberation and a way of asserting one's own autonomy and agency.
Another difference between the two philosophers is their perspective on the relationship between escape and responsibility. Kierkegaard sees escape as a way of avoiding the demands of the self and the responsibilities of freedom, while Levinas sees it as a way of reclaiming autonomy and agency.
Sartre's views on escape also differ from those of Levinas in some key ways. Like Levinas, Sartre recognizes that escape can be a way of avoiding responsibility and evading the demands of the other. However, Sartre takes a more negative view of escape, arguing that it is a form of "bad faith" that involves denying one's own freedom and responsibility. In contrast, Levinas sees escape as a way of reclaiming autonomy and agency.
Overall, while there are some similarities between the views of Levinas, Kierkegaard, and Sartre on the concept of escape, there are also significant differences in their perspectives.
December 12, 2018
I consider this to be the most existential of Levinas’ writings I’ve so far read. Whereas his major works deal with elaborating on the phenomenological theme of his ethics as first philosophy, On Escape is concerned primarily with a mood or disposition within which it is possible to negate the Other or the world. Buber, who Levinas premises much of his ethics on, put out that the I was not an essence in the proper sense but was embodied in the relation between the subject and the Thou. This did not preclude our ability to treat others as an It, but regarded the task of philosophy as a positioning and an awareness of oneself within these relations. Levinas elaborates on this theme in this work. Of particular significance to his ethico-phenomenology is the notion of nausea wherein he speaks of “an impossibility of being what one is,” “enclosed in a tight circle that smothers,” – the fundamental contradiction of individuality whence arises our understanding of subjectivity. This is a great work for those approaching Levinas from a Heideggerian perspective, for many of the themes originate from Being and Time and therefore work to elaborate on Existence and Existents as well as Totality and Infinity without being as jargon heavy as his latter works like Otherwise Than Being.
March 19, 2024
We are “rivetted” or “held fast” to Being, without the possibility of escape, not through the ecstasy of pleasure, nor through the false leaving of suicide (you do not leave into non-being through death since non-being is shot-through or entirely encompassed by its existence), hence the need to escape, to get out of immanence, an immanence that cannot fail to give existence to the thought of nothingness, while always already only referring to itself... and so in response we express the drive to escape, all the more direly sought for its seeming impossibility, for our powerlessness to take leave of either the presence of being or the being of absence.
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September 3, 2023„Jede Zivilisation, die das Sein, die tragische Verzweiflung, die es mit sich bringt, und die Verbrechen, die es rechtfertigt, hinnimmt, verdient den Namen der Barbarei.“
March 8, 2008
One of my all time favorite "little" books. The themes here are accessible and cataclysmic. If there is ever a reason to learn French (besides Proust, who Levinas is no stranger of) this is it!
September 18, 2015
"we are there, and there is nothing more to be done"
April 26, 2024
He gets me. I'm so held down by being, I'm so riveted, there wasn't even a war this time.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews