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Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World
With the publication of her landmark bestseller Paris 1919 , Margaret MacMillan was praised as “a superb writer who can bring history to life” ( The Philadelphia Inquirer ). Now she brings her extraordinary gifts to one of the most important subjects today–the relationship between the United States and China–and one of the most significant moments in modern history. In February 1972, Richard Nixon, the first American president ever to visit China, and Mao Tse-tung, the enigmatic Communist dictator, met for an hour in Beijing. Their meeting changed the course of history and ultimately laid the groundwork for the complex relationship between China and the United States that we see today.
That monumental meeting in 1972–during what Nixon called “the week that changed the world”–could have been brought about only by powerful Nixon himself, a great strategist and a flawed human being, and Mao, willful and ruthless. They were assisted by two brilliant and complex statesmen, Henry Kissinger and Chou En-lai. Surrounding them were fascinating people with unusual roles to play, including the enormously disciplined and unhappy Pat Nixon and a small-time Shanghai actress turned monstrous empress, Jiang Qing. And behind all of them lay the complex history of two countries, two great and equally confident China, ancient and contemptuous yet fearful of barbarians beyond the Middle Kingdom, and the United States, forward-looking and confident, seeing itself as the beacon for the world.
Nixon thought China could help him get out of Vietnam. Mao needed American technology and expertise to repair the damage of the Cultural Revolution. Both men wanted an ally against an aggressive Soviet Union. Did they get what they wanted? Did Mao betray his own revolutionary ideals? How did the people of China react to this apparent change in attitude toward the imperialist Americans? Did Nixon make a mistake in coming to China as a supplicant? And what has been the impact of the visit on the United States ever since?
Weaving together fascinating anecdotes and insights, an understanding of Chinese and American history, and the momentous events of an extraordinary time, this brilliantly written book looks at one of the transformative moments of the twentieth century and casts new light on a key relationship for the world of the twenty-first century.
Margaret MacMillan is the author of Women of the Raj and Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World , which won the Duff Cooper Prize, the Samuel Johnson Prize for Non-Fiction, the Hessell-Tiltman Prize for History, a Silver Medal for the Arthur Ross Book Award of the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Governor General’s Literary Award for nonfiction. It was selected by the editors of The New York Times as one of the best books of 2002. Currently the provost of Trinity College and a professor of history at the University of Toronto, MacMillan takes up the position of warden of St. Antony’s College, Oxford, in July 2007. She is an officer of the Order of Canada, a fellow of the Royal Society of Literature, and a senior fellow of Massey College at the University of Toronto.
That monumental meeting in 1972–during what Nixon called “the week that changed the world”–could have been brought about only by powerful Nixon himself, a great strategist and a flawed human being, and Mao, willful and ruthless. They were assisted by two brilliant and complex statesmen, Henry Kissinger and Chou En-lai. Surrounding them were fascinating people with unusual roles to play, including the enormously disciplined and unhappy Pat Nixon and a small-time Shanghai actress turned monstrous empress, Jiang Qing. And behind all of them lay the complex history of two countries, two great and equally confident China, ancient and contemptuous yet fearful of barbarians beyond the Middle Kingdom, and the United States, forward-looking and confident, seeing itself as the beacon for the world.
Nixon thought China could help him get out of Vietnam. Mao needed American technology and expertise to repair the damage of the Cultural Revolution. Both men wanted an ally against an aggressive Soviet Union. Did they get what they wanted? Did Mao betray his own revolutionary ideals? How did the people of China react to this apparent change in attitude toward the imperialist Americans? Did Nixon make a mistake in coming to China as a supplicant? And what has been the impact of the visit on the United States ever since?
Weaving together fascinating anecdotes and insights, an understanding of Chinese and American history, and the momentous events of an extraordinary time, this brilliantly written book looks at one of the transformative moments of the twentieth century and casts new light on a key relationship for the world of the twenty-first century.
Margaret MacMillan is the author of Women of the Raj and Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World , which won the Duff Cooper Prize, the Samuel Johnson Prize for Non-Fiction, the Hessell-Tiltman Prize for History, a Silver Medal for the Arthur Ross Book Award of the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Governor General’s Literary Award for nonfiction. It was selected by the editors of The New York Times as one of the best books of 2002. Currently the provost of Trinity College and a professor of history at the University of Toronto, MacMillan takes up the position of warden of St. Antony’s College, Oxford, in July 2007. She is an officer of the Order of Canada, a fellow of the Royal Society of Literature, and a senior fellow of Massey College at the University of Toronto.
432 pages, Hardcover
First published September 1, 2005
About the author
Margaret MacMillan
44 books685 followersMargaret Olwen MacMillan OC D.Phil. (born 1943) is a historian and professor at Oxford University where she is Warden of St. Antony's College. She is former provost of Trinity College and professor of history at the University of Toronto. A well-respected expert on history and current affairs, MacMillan is a frequent commentator in the media.
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April 23, 2014
MacMillan entertains as well as educates readers yet again, exploring some of the most important aspects of the 20th century. Her focus, the February 1972 meeting between Nixon and Mao; her hypothesis, that it formulated a permanent change whose reverberations are still being felt around the world. While only an hour face-to-face, this meeting and its lead-up set the groundwork for lasting change in three major ways: political developments on many fronts, ideological shifts in the midst of the Cold War, and geopolitical progressions/regressions. MacMillan takes the time to lay out her arguments in a clear and thorough manner to argue that the summit was, indeed, highly effective in shaping Sino-American relations, as well as moving the world as a whole towards a better understanding of its conflicts, all while close to the lair of the Soviet Bear.
MacMillan argues that the Nixon-Mao meeting, and by extension those beforehand by Kissinger and Chou, helped to solidify many political developments that, in turn, had major and lasting effects around the world. MacMillan goes far to argue that China's role and involvement in the politics of other Asian states heaps additional power onto the PRC, offering a moniker of regional power broker. Through its summit, the US and China could forge platonic respect and understanding that would help to lessen the vilification of the former in the Asian sphere. While MacMillan does not support that the summit led directly to the end of the Vietnam War (where North Vietnamese communists signed treaties, knowing their Chinese comrades were on good relations), she is clear that there was a move in that direction. Perhaps the greatest political move to come from the summit was the US acceptance of mainland China as 'the' China, much to the chagrin of some Asian allies and to the joy of those in Europe and North America. Precarious as it was, it was also momentous in moving the political game piece forward. The opening of relations between the US and China permitted an ongoing dialogue, which, in turn, helped the two sides work towards resolution of the region's conflicts and help bolster a political position whereby two strong actors could speak in harmony, if not in unison. MacMillan argues effectively that the political power held by China over its regional 'red' governments may have gone far in paving the way to normalised political relations with the United States. It also helped show the world that there was a political alternative in the midst of the Cold War, an actor that could effect change who was not about to use faux-Marxist rhetoric and bang the proverbial shoe on the table to seek to be heard. This shift away the USSR's political influence, long seen as the other superpower and consummate communist sphere of influence holder, awoke a sleeping giant of ideological negotiating, long left to whither in the cold.
MacMillan also argues that the meeting opened the door to conversations between the leaders of the diametrically opposed ideological camps. She insinuates that the reader must accept China as the better communist representative in the discussion, clearly denoting an open dialogue speaks volumes over the rigid chest thumping and doctrine-spouting coming from Moscow. Pulling no punches in her historical groundwork, MacMillan shows how both Mao and Nixon came to hate the other's ideological stance, but were able to look past this to meet and forge great discussions. These talks superseded the ideological expectations they had of one another and laid the groundwork to prove more effective than any talks either had with the USSR to that point. Strengthened by a heightened hatred of the USSR, China sought to educate the US on how un-Marxist their communist brothers were and how the ideological differences need not be an impediment to successful relations, though both would remain leery of the other for years to come. This was, perhaps, the opening cracks in the Cold War walls and could surely have led to the beginning of capitalist-communist relations whose symbolic start is usually attributed to the Reagan-Gorbachev dialogues.
From a geographic standpoint, the opening of political relations permitted the thorny discussion of Taiwan to come to the forefront. Perhaps the strongest stalemate between the two sides, Taiwan became the issue that Mao would not permit to come up during the brief interaction with Nixon. In conjunction with the negotiations taking place, the worldview of Taiwan as the legitimate China was fast losing ground, as MacMillan writes, paralleling one of Kissinger's pre-summit meetings with Chou. The United Nations' vote in 1971 saw them expelled and the PRC take up rightful ownership of all things China. However, Nixon and Kissinger sought to come to terms with the strong Taiwan policy advocated by the US and their strong relations with the self-proclaimed rightful Republic of China. It was not until the final communique that this came to the forefront and almost cost all other progress made throughout the time Nixon spent in China. The eventual acceptance of a mainland China as 'the' China may have cemented the entire summit's progress, leaving Mao to realise he had finally scored the most important point for China since 1949. That said, the US was left to juggle all its allies and to appease some while straining relations with others. MacMillan points out how tenuous the trust became between the US and their Japanese/Philippine allies thereafter, while Canada and Western Europe applauded the result. To this day, the Taiwan situation remains somewhat clouded, though, as Mao put it, why should the world stick its nose into how the US and Delaware are getting along, as a state's internal issues are all their own?
The momentous nature of this summit cannot be downplayed. From strong enemies during the Korean War, with PoWs on both sides, the US and China chose to openly accept one another and finally meet in February 1972. Surely a pill that needed ingesting, but to see such steps being made at such a critical point in the Cold War should not escape the reader. Her frank ability to lay out the historical facts and let the reader come to their own conclusions is surely one of MacMillan's greatest gifts, as well as spinning the tale so effortlessly. She does not downplay or over-inflate the historical or political significance of this, but chooses to allow all those who've come to the table to take from it what they will, as Mao would surely have expected.
Kudos Dr. MacMillan for all your hard work arguing this most interesting point of view. I learned a great deal and am happy to have taken the time to delve into this historical landmark, told in so concise a manner.
MacMillan argues that the Nixon-Mao meeting, and by extension those beforehand by Kissinger and Chou, helped to solidify many political developments that, in turn, had major and lasting effects around the world. MacMillan goes far to argue that China's role and involvement in the politics of other Asian states heaps additional power onto the PRC, offering a moniker of regional power broker. Through its summit, the US and China could forge platonic respect and understanding that would help to lessen the vilification of the former in the Asian sphere. While MacMillan does not support that the summit led directly to the end of the Vietnam War (where North Vietnamese communists signed treaties, knowing their Chinese comrades were on good relations), she is clear that there was a move in that direction. Perhaps the greatest political move to come from the summit was the US acceptance of mainland China as 'the' China, much to the chagrin of some Asian allies and to the joy of those in Europe and North America. Precarious as it was, it was also momentous in moving the political game piece forward. The opening of relations between the US and China permitted an ongoing dialogue, which, in turn, helped the two sides work towards resolution of the region's conflicts and help bolster a political position whereby two strong actors could speak in harmony, if not in unison. MacMillan argues effectively that the political power held by China over its regional 'red' governments may have gone far in paving the way to normalised political relations with the United States. It also helped show the world that there was a political alternative in the midst of the Cold War, an actor that could effect change who was not about to use faux-Marxist rhetoric and bang the proverbial shoe on the table to seek to be heard. This shift away the USSR's political influence, long seen as the other superpower and consummate communist sphere of influence holder, awoke a sleeping giant of ideological negotiating, long left to whither in the cold.
MacMillan also argues that the meeting opened the door to conversations between the leaders of the diametrically opposed ideological camps. She insinuates that the reader must accept China as the better communist representative in the discussion, clearly denoting an open dialogue speaks volumes over the rigid chest thumping and doctrine-spouting coming from Moscow. Pulling no punches in her historical groundwork, MacMillan shows how both Mao and Nixon came to hate the other's ideological stance, but were able to look past this to meet and forge great discussions. These talks superseded the ideological expectations they had of one another and laid the groundwork to prove more effective than any talks either had with the USSR to that point. Strengthened by a heightened hatred of the USSR, China sought to educate the US on how un-Marxist their communist brothers were and how the ideological differences need not be an impediment to successful relations, though both would remain leery of the other for years to come. This was, perhaps, the opening cracks in the Cold War walls and could surely have led to the beginning of capitalist-communist relations whose symbolic start is usually attributed to the Reagan-Gorbachev dialogues.
From a geographic standpoint, the opening of political relations permitted the thorny discussion of Taiwan to come to the forefront. Perhaps the strongest stalemate between the two sides, Taiwan became the issue that Mao would not permit to come up during the brief interaction with Nixon. In conjunction with the negotiations taking place, the worldview of Taiwan as the legitimate China was fast losing ground, as MacMillan writes, paralleling one of Kissinger's pre-summit meetings with Chou. The United Nations' vote in 1971 saw them expelled and the PRC take up rightful ownership of all things China. However, Nixon and Kissinger sought to come to terms with the strong Taiwan policy advocated by the US and their strong relations with the self-proclaimed rightful Republic of China. It was not until the final communique that this came to the forefront and almost cost all other progress made throughout the time Nixon spent in China. The eventual acceptance of a mainland China as 'the' China may have cemented the entire summit's progress, leaving Mao to realise he had finally scored the most important point for China since 1949. That said, the US was left to juggle all its allies and to appease some while straining relations with others. MacMillan points out how tenuous the trust became between the US and their Japanese/Philippine allies thereafter, while Canada and Western Europe applauded the result. To this day, the Taiwan situation remains somewhat clouded, though, as Mao put it, why should the world stick its nose into how the US and Delaware are getting along, as a state's internal issues are all their own?
The momentous nature of this summit cannot be downplayed. From strong enemies during the Korean War, with PoWs on both sides, the US and China chose to openly accept one another and finally meet in February 1972. Surely a pill that needed ingesting, but to see such steps being made at such a critical point in the Cold War should not escape the reader. Her frank ability to lay out the historical facts and let the reader come to their own conclusions is surely one of MacMillan's greatest gifts, as well as spinning the tale so effortlessly. She does not downplay or over-inflate the historical or political significance of this, but chooses to allow all those who've come to the table to take from it what they will, as Mao would surely have expected.
Kudos Dr. MacMillan for all your hard work arguing this most interesting point of view. I learned a great deal and am happy to have taken the time to delve into this historical landmark, told in so concise a manner.
November 23, 2020
A masterful account of one of the most dramatic moments in American diplomatic history, President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972. MacMillan provides vivid thumbnail biographies of the four major players in the drama of that weeklong visit, Nixon, Mao, Henry Kissinger and Chou En-lai, each a fascinating character in his own right. The major issues that brought the two enemies together (mutual distrust of the Soviet Union) and kept them apart (Taiwan, Vietnam) are given a welcome amount of discussion as well. What I enjoyed most was the consideration of how individuals are shaped by history even as they try to bend it to their own will. The strengths and flaws of Richard Nixon, a truly Shakespearean figure who could reach such heights as a diplomat even as the seeds of his destruction via the Watergate scandal were being sown, are shown in a most fascinating way here. This book captures his contradictions as well as any full-length biography could, making MacMillan's work essential in understanding this most confounding of presidents.
April 3, 2014
Book nine of the "Joey B reads himself some presidential goodness" series. I had been dreading reading about Richard Nixon. All I knew was that he is universally accepted as a horrible president and a horrible person. Was he? Mostly, but this book does raise some interesting issues.
I decided to read this book as opposed to a general biography because I wanted to focus on the one act of his presidency that is widely seen as a triumph: his trip to China.
I had always heard about this trip but didn't realize all the behind the scenes wrangling that had to occur to make it happen and then, once there, to make it a success.
Nixon almost completely cut out the state department and was dealing with China directly and through Henry Kissinger. You have to admire his desire to cut through all the bureaucracy. This same desire to micromanage and control everything is what would ultimately lead to his downfall with Watergate.
One of my favorite lines from the book said that Nixon wasn't a good person, but he wanted to be. He tried to be. He just wasn't that guy.
I only gave this 3 stars because there was a bit too much China and not enough Nixon for my taste. It was interesting to hear about the behind the scenes struggles in China. I suppose if it had been just the Nixon side, it would have been a very short book.
The biographical information on Nixon and Kissinger was fantastic and definitely makes the book worth a look. This helps to remember that even the worst presidents are still capable of doing good, even if it is for the wrong reasons. I mean, he founded the Environmental Protection Agency for Pete's sake!
I decided to read this book as opposed to a general biography because I wanted to focus on the one act of his presidency that is widely seen as a triumph: his trip to China.
I had always heard about this trip but didn't realize all the behind the scenes wrangling that had to occur to make it happen and then, once there, to make it a success.
Nixon almost completely cut out the state department and was dealing with China directly and through Henry Kissinger. You have to admire his desire to cut through all the bureaucracy. This same desire to micromanage and control everything is what would ultimately lead to his downfall with Watergate.
One of my favorite lines from the book said that Nixon wasn't a good person, but he wanted to be. He tried to be. He just wasn't that guy.
I only gave this 3 stars because there was a bit too much China and not enough Nixon for my taste. It was interesting to hear about the behind the scenes struggles in China. I suppose if it had been just the Nixon side, it would have been a very short book.
The biographical information on Nixon and Kissinger was fantastic and definitely makes the book worth a look. This helps to remember that even the worst presidents are still capable of doing good, even if it is for the wrong reasons. I mean, he founded the Environmental Protection Agency for Pete's sake!
July 25, 2014
I'm adding Margaret MacMillan to my list of favorite authors of history. Quite simply, she did a masterful job weaving together a complex story using the structure of Nixon's historic week long visit to China. It does not hurt that the narrator was pretty spectacular too.
MacMillan walked a delicate line as she weaved back and forth between narration of the specific events of that particular week and several background biographies of the principal characters, American and Chinese, and of the countries themselves. (Not entire biographies obviously, but biographies tailored to the theme of the book.
I have to admit though that this book requires careful attention, more than I gave it as I listened. At times the audio became a bit like background noise and I missed transitions from past to "present" or vice versa which became a bit confusing. This confusion also increased a bit as the book drew to a conclusion and the time gap between past and "present" narrowed.
That being said, this book more than peaked my interest in a whole variety of topics, such as the extremely perplexing one of how Richard Nixon was elected to the presidency, twice. :)
I definitely recommend this book.
MacMillan walked a delicate line as she weaved back and forth between narration of the specific events of that particular week and several background biographies of the principal characters, American and Chinese, and of the countries themselves. (Not entire biographies obviously, but biographies tailored to the theme of the book.
I have to admit though that this book requires careful attention, more than I gave it as I listened. At times the audio became a bit like background noise and I missed transitions from past to "present" or vice versa which became a bit confusing. This confusion also increased a bit as the book drew to a conclusion and the time gap between past and "present" narrowed.
That being said, this book more than peaked my interest in a whole variety of topics, such as the extremely perplexing one of how Richard Nixon was elected to the presidency, twice. :)
I definitely recommend this book.
May 8, 2016
Michio Kaku, in The Future of the Mind, wrote "Gossiping is essential for survival because the complex mechanics of social interactions are constantly changing, so we have to make sense of this ever-shifting social terrain... Thousands of years ago, in fact, gossip was the only way to obtain vital information about the tribe. One’s very life often depended on knowing the latest gossip.”
Margaret MacMillan is a first-rate academic gossip, wholly entertaining, with the most fascinating and humourous tidbits of trivia all strung together into such a worthwhile read. I felt some parts were a little repetitive, but as someone knowing almost nothing about either Nixon or Mao, this was an exceedingly fun read and not daunting at all as other historical writing can often present itself to me.
Margaret MacMillan is a first-rate academic gossip, wholly entertaining, with the most fascinating and humourous tidbits of trivia all strung together into such a worthwhile read. I felt some parts were a little repetitive, but as someone knowing almost nothing about either Nixon or Mao, this was an exceedingly fun read and not daunting at all as other historical writing can often present itself to me.
April 13, 2016
Ending this book with a quotation from Star Trek really rubbed me the wrong way.
March 7, 2023
Decent telling of this key moment in history, but I did not like her chronologically jumping around all over the place like a Tarantino movie.
December 10, 2017
Margaret Macmillan brings us an entertaining and very well written book that details the Nixon opening to China, and how the visit in and of itself changed the world in substantive ways that we are still feeling today. The book title implies a focus on the actual Nixon-Mao meeting, but it brings us so much more than that. The Nixon-Mao meeting ended up being a bit of a substantive disappointment for Nixon. Mao, even in poor health, was simply too cagey to allow the conversation to get into specifics. He outsourced all of the detail work to Premier Zhou en-Lai, and did so, in part, for domestic political reasons. Although not covered in this book Mao would, at a later time, use the Nixon trip as one of several battering rams against Zhou.
Macmillan brings us the back story to the opening, covering the Nixon views on China as he took office after winning the 1968 election. The selection of Henry Kissinger as National Security Advisor brought Nixon together with an individual that is renowned for foreign policy brilliance, but is also renowned for being as much of a publicity seeker as Nixon. While the impetus for the opening came from Nixon it was Kissinger who executed the strategy through negotiations with Premier Zhou en-Lai. The detail work was handled by those two immense personalities, with that interaction providing much of the basis for the summit ending Shanghai Communique.
The book brings us some historical perspective on China, with a strong look at the events leading to the Chinese Communist Party winning the civil war with the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek, and the follow up to that victory leading to decades of diplomatic isolation between China and the U.S., including the hot war on the Korean peninsula. Without some understanding of that history the significance of the Nixon trip would be a little harder to understand.
For me the star of the show has always been Zhou, who would have to be considered one of the major figures of the 20th century. Zhou was still working one of the greatest high wire acts in political history, navigating through the horrid excesses of the Cultural Revolution, when this diplomatic break through was engineered. Kissinger, in his memoirs, called Zhou one of the most impressive men he had ever met.
“Foreigners who met him generally found him delightful and deeply civilized. Dag Hammarskjöld, the Swedish diplomat who had been the U.N.’s second secretary-general, thought he had “the most superior brain I have so far met in the field of foreign politics.”17 Henry Kissinger, usually quite critical, was completely entranced. “He moved gracefully,” said Kissinger of their first meeting, “and with dignity, filling a room not by his physical dominance (as did Mao or de Gaulle) but by his air of controlled tension, steely discipline, and self-control, as if he were a coiled spring.” Kissinger, who was to have many hours of hard negotiations with Chou, found him “one of the two or three most impressive men I have ever met”—and a worthy adversary. “He was a figure out of history. He was equally at home in philosophy, reminiscence, historical analysis, tactical probes, humorous repartee.” Kindness, compassion, moderation—these were qualities both Chinese and foreigners saw in Chou."
MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (Kindle Locations 802-804). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (Kindle Locations 796-802). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
The author brings us the complicated goals and objectives of each side, and a fair evaluation of how successful each was in achieving those goals. The clear “bear” in the room was the U.S.S.R., with both sides looking to strike a new equilibrium in world diplomacy by creating a check on Soviet influence and expansion via the new found friendship and joint antipathy towards nations that strove for “hegemony.” Nixon’s “triangulation,” was effective in creating some fear in the Soviet leadership, and without a doubt brought some short term political gains with the Soviets. Nixon was hoping for Chinese help with the intractable North Vietnamese, but on that score he came away disappointed. Zhou was not to be moved on that, but the Chinese, despite not giving Nixon the “help” he sought, took plenty of heat from the North Vietnamese for hosting Nixon while the United States was bombing their country. Zhou made clear that Nixon would leave empty handed on that issue:
“Chou, as he had with Kissinger, refused to commit himself to helping the United States. China, he repeated, when he and Nixon returned to the subject of Indochina
two days later, must support its friends, even—and this was a prescient observation on Chou’s part—if the peoples of Indochina embarked on wars among themselves after the Americans left. Whatever occurred would not be the fault of China, which only wanted peace and tranquillity in the region. If North Vietnam was expanding into Cambodia and Laos, he said, ignoring the long history of Vietnamese expansion into its neighbors’ territory, this was only because of its need to counter the United States.”
“We can only go so far,” he added. “We cannot meddle into their affairs.” China would not negotiate on behalf of the peoples of Indochina. Nixon was forced to recognize that, as with the Soviet Union, linkage did not always work: “What the Prime Minister is telling us is that he cannot help us in Vietnam.” Chou underlined the message on February 28 as Nixon was preparing to leave China: “We have no right to negotiate for them. This I have said repeatedly. This is our very serious stand.”
MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (Kindle Locations 4704-4708). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
The big elephant in the room was the status of Taiwan, an issue that could have derailed the effort. On this matter both sides had serious political issues to solve, with limited room to maneuver. On the American side Richard Nixon’s long political history had helped to create, over the years, a poisonous atmosphere for any American diplomatic effort to deal with the issue of China, and Indo-China, in a pragmatic way. The “who lost China” attacks on the U.S. State Department and the scourge that was McCarthyism drove our best talent out of the State Department, and Nixon was a big part of that effort. He was considered to be a staunch ally of Taiwan, and I think it fair to say that any effort, before 1968, to normalize relations with “Communist China” would have been met with a vociferous attack by the GOP. President Kennedy had discussions with his foreign policy team about China, and came to the conclusion that it was a subject best left for a second term, with the potential backlash from the “China lobby” not worth the political lift. (John F. Kennedy: A Biography by Michael O’Brien)
“On the right, Senator McCarthy and his supporters, who included a young Richard Nixon, made much of the fact that many American diplomats in China had predicted the collapse of the Guomindang, evidence enough for conspiracy theorists that such men had actively worked for the Communist victory. The diplomats were summoned to congressional hearings, where their motives and loyalty were freely impugned.
The impact on the State Department and on the capacity of the United States to understand what was going on in Asia was huge. Seasoned and knowledgeable experts were driven out or resigned in disgust. Those who survived were kept away from anything to do with Asia; one of the department’s leading China specialists ended up as ambassador in Iceland. The department as a whole was shell-shocked and became increasingly timid in offering unpalatable advice to its political masters. A young man who started out as a junior diplomat in Hong Kong in the late 1950s remembered older colleagues who were careful about what they sent back to Washington. “I don’t think it meant not reporting facts,” he said; “it’s just that one was cautious.” On the other hand, the experience of being in Hong Kong tended to make the American China watchers more pragmatic than their superiors back in Washington. The lack of relations between two such big countries seemed absurd, an anomaly that they assumed must be temporary. “Well, you know,” said an American diplomat, “what the hell, China’s there, we’re going to have to recognize it. I mean, it was a fact of life. It wasn’t through admiration, it was just, well, let’s get on with it.”
MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (Kindle Locations 1937-1940). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
But Nixon was not about to let his past posturing on this issue prevent progress once he deemed it necessary. While the Shanghai Communique finessed the issue of Taiwan the U.S. concessions were clear, and Kissinger privately promised more to come in a Nixon second teem. (Even Nixon remained somewhat fearful of attacks from the right on this issue.) Despite that fear Nixon’s ruthless embrace of realpolitik, and his willingness to be less than honest with prior allies, drove him forward.
“Nevertheless, in his first years as president, even while he was re-thinking his China policy, Nixon continued to reassure Chiang of his support. “I will never sell you down the river,” he told Chiang’s son in the spring of 1970. As the secret channel to Beijing began to produce results, Nixon had to face doing just that. In April 1971, as they waited anxiously for Chou’s reply to one of Nixon’s messages, Nixon told Kissinger, “Well, Henry, the thing is the story change is going to take place, it has to take place, it better take place when they got a friend here rather than when they’ve got an enemy here.” Kissinger agreed: “No, it’s a tragedy that it has to happen to Chiang at the end of his life, but we have to be cold about it.” In the end, said Nixon, “We have to do what’s best for us.” As Kissinger prepared to leave for his secret trip to China, Nixon gave him some last instructions: “he wished him not to indicate a willingness to abandon much of our support for Taiwan until it was necessary to do so.”
MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (Kindle Locations 4457-4461). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
Yet the Chinese Communists had made it amply clear that without American concessions on Taiwan, they were not prepared to move forward to put Sino-American relations on a more normal footing. Moreover, as Chou, a master at diplomacy himself, well knew, negotiations proceed by a combination of clear statements, hints, and suggestions. Kissinger, when it was necessary, gave firm commitments to the Chinese, but he also hinted at more to come once Nixon had been reelected as president in the fall of1972. The United States, he said categorically, did not support the idea of two Chinas or of a mainland China and a Taiwan. The United States accepted the Chinese claim that Taiwan was a part of China, although here he expressed himself cautiously, saying that the United States would like to see a solution of the issue “within the framework of one China.” As he said to Chou, 'There’s no possibility in the next one and a half years for us to recognize the PRC as the sole government of China in a formal way.' Once Nixon had made a successful visit to China, Kissinger promised, and once he had been reelected for a second term, the United States would be able to move ahead rapidly to establish full and normal diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. 'Other political leaders,” he told Chou in what was a familiar theme, 'might use more honeyed words, but would be destroyed by what is called the China lobby in the U.S. if they ever tried to move even partially in the direction which I have described to you.' ”
MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (Kindle Locations 4489-4495). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
The Chinese side, having the same desire for progress, took the long view on Taiwan, accepting a split view with the Americans on Taiwan, but pocketing the idea that Taiwan was part of China, and the creation of the “One China” policy, which remains U.S. policy to this day.
“Not all the concessions, by any means, came from the American side. The Chinese
accepted that the United States could not turn away from Taiwan overnight. Mao was particularly pleased, however, when Kissinger, on his first visit, promised that at least some of the American troops would be pulled out. The United States, Mao exclaimed to Chou, was evolving. Like an ape moving toward becoming a human being, its tail—its forces in Taiwan, in this case—was growing shorter. Armed with Mao’s approval, Chou talked in a friendly and positive way about the gradual lowering of tension over Taiwan and the normalization of relations between China and the United States. Although American troops were clearly going to remain in Taiwan for some time, he conceded that normalization of relations could proceed in parallel rather than, as the Chinese had first insisted, with the troop withdrawal as a precondition. In a chat that autumn of 1971 with Jack Service, a former American diplomat whom he had known during the Second World War, Chou made it clear he understood that American policy on Taiwan would have to evolve over time.”
MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (Kindle Locations 4514-4515). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
There is no question that Nixon and Mao painted the broad strokes on the canvas, but Kissinger and Zhou made this effort work. The Shanghai Communique was and is a testament to the essential brilliance and commitment to success that both had. This break-through was as much their achievement as it was their bosses. Kissinger, still alive, remains a subject of bitter controversy for some of the things he did while working for Nixon, but his work here, in my view, was first rate. Secretary of State William Rodgers was essentially ignored by Nixon and Kissinger on this initiative as well as generally. Kissinger expressed some regret over his treatment of Rodgers in his memoirs, and that dynamic is also covered here. With China now newly assertive, and becoming an economic behemoth the history of U.S.-China relations has never been more important. Did Nixon and Kissinger make the right move? There is no doubt that both believed they did, but MacMillan offers us a tidbit from Kissinger:
“In a discussion a few months later at the National Security Council, Kissinger wondered about the consequences of bringing China out of its isolation, “whether we really want China to be a world power like the Soviet Union, competing with us, rather than their present role which is limited to aiding certain insurgencies.”
MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (Kindle Locations 1053-1055). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
The idea that China could be permanently “isolated” is of course ludicrous, but how we interact with them economically and militarily remains the subject of major debate in the United States. This book helps us to understand how that debate started.
Macmillan brings us the back story to the opening, covering the Nixon views on China as he took office after winning the 1968 election. The selection of Henry Kissinger as National Security Advisor brought Nixon together with an individual that is renowned for foreign policy brilliance, but is also renowned for being as much of a publicity seeker as Nixon. While the impetus for the opening came from Nixon it was Kissinger who executed the strategy through negotiations with Premier Zhou en-Lai. The detail work was handled by those two immense personalities, with that interaction providing much of the basis for the summit ending Shanghai Communique.
The book brings us some historical perspective on China, with a strong look at the events leading to the Chinese Communist Party winning the civil war with the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek, and the follow up to that victory leading to decades of diplomatic isolation between China and the U.S., including the hot war on the Korean peninsula. Without some understanding of that history the significance of the Nixon trip would be a little harder to understand.
For me the star of the show has always been Zhou, who would have to be considered one of the major figures of the 20th century. Zhou was still working one of the greatest high wire acts in political history, navigating through the horrid excesses of the Cultural Revolution, when this diplomatic break through was engineered. Kissinger, in his memoirs, called Zhou one of the most impressive men he had ever met.
“Foreigners who met him generally found him delightful and deeply civilized. Dag Hammarskjöld, the Swedish diplomat who had been the U.N.’s second secretary-general, thought he had “the most superior brain I have so far met in the field of foreign politics.”17 Henry Kissinger, usually quite critical, was completely entranced. “He moved gracefully,” said Kissinger of their first meeting, “and with dignity, filling a room not by his physical dominance (as did Mao or de Gaulle) but by his air of controlled tension, steely discipline, and self-control, as if he were a coiled spring.” Kissinger, who was to have many hours of hard negotiations with Chou, found him “one of the two or three most impressive men I have ever met”—and a worthy adversary. “He was a figure out of history. He was equally at home in philosophy, reminiscence, historical analysis, tactical probes, humorous repartee.” Kindness, compassion, moderation—these were qualities both Chinese and foreigners saw in Chou."
MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (Kindle Locations 802-804). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (Kindle Locations 796-802). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
The author brings us the complicated goals and objectives of each side, and a fair evaluation of how successful each was in achieving those goals. The clear “bear” in the room was the U.S.S.R., with both sides looking to strike a new equilibrium in world diplomacy by creating a check on Soviet influence and expansion via the new found friendship and joint antipathy towards nations that strove for “hegemony.” Nixon’s “triangulation,” was effective in creating some fear in the Soviet leadership, and without a doubt brought some short term political gains with the Soviets. Nixon was hoping for Chinese help with the intractable North Vietnamese, but on that score he came away disappointed. Zhou was not to be moved on that, but the Chinese, despite not giving Nixon the “help” he sought, took plenty of heat from the North Vietnamese for hosting Nixon while the United States was bombing their country. Zhou made clear that Nixon would leave empty handed on that issue:
“Chou, as he had with Kissinger, refused to commit himself to helping the United States. China, he repeated, when he and Nixon returned to the subject of Indochina
two days later, must support its friends, even—and this was a prescient observation on Chou’s part—if the peoples of Indochina embarked on wars among themselves after the Americans left. Whatever occurred would not be the fault of China, which only wanted peace and tranquillity in the region. If North Vietnam was expanding into Cambodia and Laos, he said, ignoring the long history of Vietnamese expansion into its neighbors’ territory, this was only because of its need to counter the United States.”
“We can only go so far,” he added. “We cannot meddle into their affairs.” China would not negotiate on behalf of the peoples of Indochina. Nixon was forced to recognize that, as with the Soviet Union, linkage did not always work: “What the Prime Minister is telling us is that he cannot help us in Vietnam.” Chou underlined the message on February 28 as Nixon was preparing to leave China: “We have no right to negotiate for them. This I have said repeatedly. This is our very serious stand.”
MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (Kindle Locations 4704-4708). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
The big elephant in the room was the status of Taiwan, an issue that could have derailed the effort. On this matter both sides had serious political issues to solve, with limited room to maneuver. On the American side Richard Nixon’s long political history had helped to create, over the years, a poisonous atmosphere for any American diplomatic effort to deal with the issue of China, and Indo-China, in a pragmatic way. The “who lost China” attacks on the U.S. State Department and the scourge that was McCarthyism drove our best talent out of the State Department, and Nixon was a big part of that effort. He was considered to be a staunch ally of Taiwan, and I think it fair to say that any effort, before 1968, to normalize relations with “Communist China” would have been met with a vociferous attack by the GOP. President Kennedy had discussions with his foreign policy team about China, and came to the conclusion that it was a subject best left for a second term, with the potential backlash from the “China lobby” not worth the political lift. (John F. Kennedy: A Biography by Michael O’Brien)
“On the right, Senator McCarthy and his supporters, who included a young Richard Nixon, made much of the fact that many American diplomats in China had predicted the collapse of the Guomindang, evidence enough for conspiracy theorists that such men had actively worked for the Communist victory. The diplomats were summoned to congressional hearings, where their motives and loyalty were freely impugned.
The impact on the State Department and on the capacity of the United States to understand what was going on in Asia was huge. Seasoned and knowledgeable experts were driven out or resigned in disgust. Those who survived were kept away from anything to do with Asia; one of the department’s leading China specialists ended up as ambassador in Iceland. The department as a whole was shell-shocked and became increasingly timid in offering unpalatable advice to its political masters. A young man who started out as a junior diplomat in Hong Kong in the late 1950s remembered older colleagues who were careful about what they sent back to Washington. “I don’t think it meant not reporting facts,” he said; “it’s just that one was cautious.” On the other hand, the experience of being in Hong Kong tended to make the American China watchers more pragmatic than their superiors back in Washington. The lack of relations between two such big countries seemed absurd, an anomaly that they assumed must be temporary. “Well, you know,” said an American diplomat, “what the hell, China’s there, we’re going to have to recognize it. I mean, it was a fact of life. It wasn’t through admiration, it was just, well, let’s get on with it.”
MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (Kindle Locations 1937-1940). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
But Nixon was not about to let his past posturing on this issue prevent progress once he deemed it necessary. While the Shanghai Communique finessed the issue of Taiwan the U.S. concessions were clear, and Kissinger privately promised more to come in a Nixon second teem. (Even Nixon remained somewhat fearful of attacks from the right on this issue.) Despite that fear Nixon’s ruthless embrace of realpolitik, and his willingness to be less than honest with prior allies, drove him forward.
“Nevertheless, in his first years as president, even while he was re-thinking his China policy, Nixon continued to reassure Chiang of his support. “I will never sell you down the river,” he told Chiang’s son in the spring of 1970. As the secret channel to Beijing began to produce results, Nixon had to face doing just that. In April 1971, as they waited anxiously for Chou’s reply to one of Nixon’s messages, Nixon told Kissinger, “Well, Henry, the thing is the story change is going to take place, it has to take place, it better take place when they got a friend here rather than when they’ve got an enemy here.” Kissinger agreed: “No, it’s a tragedy that it has to happen to Chiang at the end of his life, but we have to be cold about it.” In the end, said Nixon, “We have to do what’s best for us.” As Kissinger prepared to leave for his secret trip to China, Nixon gave him some last instructions: “he wished him not to indicate a willingness to abandon much of our support for Taiwan until it was necessary to do so.”
MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (Kindle Locations 4457-4461). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
Yet the Chinese Communists had made it amply clear that without American concessions on Taiwan, they were not prepared to move forward to put Sino-American relations on a more normal footing. Moreover, as Chou, a master at diplomacy himself, well knew, negotiations proceed by a combination of clear statements, hints, and suggestions. Kissinger, when it was necessary, gave firm commitments to the Chinese, but he also hinted at more to come once Nixon had been reelected as president in the fall of1972. The United States, he said categorically, did not support the idea of two Chinas or of a mainland China and a Taiwan. The United States accepted the Chinese claim that Taiwan was a part of China, although here he expressed himself cautiously, saying that the United States would like to see a solution of the issue “within the framework of one China.” As he said to Chou, 'There’s no possibility in the next one and a half years for us to recognize the PRC as the sole government of China in a formal way.' Once Nixon had made a successful visit to China, Kissinger promised, and once he had been reelected for a second term, the United States would be able to move ahead rapidly to establish full and normal diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. 'Other political leaders,” he told Chou in what was a familiar theme, 'might use more honeyed words, but would be destroyed by what is called the China lobby in the U.S. if they ever tried to move even partially in the direction which I have described to you.' ”
MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (Kindle Locations 4489-4495). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
The Chinese side, having the same desire for progress, took the long view on Taiwan, accepting a split view with the Americans on Taiwan, but pocketing the idea that Taiwan was part of China, and the creation of the “One China” policy, which remains U.S. policy to this day.
“Not all the concessions, by any means, came from the American side. The Chinese
accepted that the United States could not turn away from Taiwan overnight. Mao was particularly pleased, however, when Kissinger, on his first visit, promised that at least some of the American troops would be pulled out. The United States, Mao exclaimed to Chou, was evolving. Like an ape moving toward becoming a human being, its tail—its forces in Taiwan, in this case—was growing shorter. Armed with Mao’s approval, Chou talked in a friendly and positive way about the gradual lowering of tension over Taiwan and the normalization of relations between China and the United States. Although American troops were clearly going to remain in Taiwan for some time, he conceded that normalization of relations could proceed in parallel rather than, as the Chinese had first insisted, with the troop withdrawal as a precondition. In a chat that autumn of 1971 with Jack Service, a former American diplomat whom he had known during the Second World War, Chou made it clear he understood that American policy on Taiwan would have to evolve over time.”
MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (Kindle Locations 4514-4515). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
There is no question that Nixon and Mao painted the broad strokes on the canvas, but Kissinger and Zhou made this effort work. The Shanghai Communique was and is a testament to the essential brilliance and commitment to success that both had. This break-through was as much their achievement as it was their bosses. Kissinger, still alive, remains a subject of bitter controversy for some of the things he did while working for Nixon, but his work here, in my view, was first rate. Secretary of State William Rodgers was essentially ignored by Nixon and Kissinger on this initiative as well as generally. Kissinger expressed some regret over his treatment of Rodgers in his memoirs, and that dynamic is also covered here. With China now newly assertive, and becoming an economic behemoth the history of U.S.-China relations has never been more important. Did Nixon and Kissinger make the right move? There is no doubt that both believed they did, but MacMillan offers us a tidbit from Kissinger:
“In a discussion a few months later at the National Security Council, Kissinger wondered about the consequences of bringing China out of its isolation, “whether we really want China to be a world power like the Soviet Union, competing with us, rather than their present role which is limited to aiding certain insurgencies.”
MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (Kindle Locations 1053-1055). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
The idea that China could be permanently “isolated” is of course ludicrous, but how we interact with them economically and militarily remains the subject of major debate in the United States. This book helps us to understand how that debate started.
July 19, 2021
This book by Margaret MacMillan revolves around a one-hour meeting in February, 1972 between Richard Nixon, the President of the United States and Mao Tse-tung, the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China. This rather momentous event marked the re-establishment of dialogue between the two countries after twenty years of estrangement following the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949. As it runs to 400 pages, there is much more to than that. The book is for the general reader, it outlines the circumstances that brought the meeting about, sketches out the relevant biographical details of the main people involved, and offers a short history of China to show how the Chinese Communist State had come into being and developed. There are no great insights or discoveries, but the book illustrates well how international diplomacy is conducted and narrates a story that is important in and of itself.
For their part, the American reasons for better relations with China were mostly two-fold. First, they wanted help in Vietnam. The Nixon government wanted to get out of Vietnam, “Peace with Honor”, but to do that they needed to have the North Vietnamese government be more cooperative at the Paris Peace talks. They knew the Chinese were a major sponsor of the Vietnamese Communists and wanted the Chinese to apply pressure to the Vietnamese to come to a settlement with the Americans. They also wanted help to balance their relationship with the Soviet Union. A Chinese-American rapprochement would pressure the Soviets to be more conciliatory in, for example, the ongoing SALT nuclear arms reduction talks they were having with the Americans. A lesser aim was to open China to American business, but Nixon and Kissinger, the main players in the negotiations, considered this something to be left to the State Department.
For their part, the Chinese had three reasons to bargain with the Americans. First for them was Taiwan. The Americans had about ten thousand troops in Taiwan, and the Chinese wanted them out, they wanted the Americans to not support any independence movement for Taiwan, and in fact they wanted the Americans to support a “one-China” policy. Next, they had had a terrible split with the Soviets, their former Communist allies, and it was so bad that in 1969 an open war had almost broken out. There were artillery and tank battles on their common border and the Soviets had sent bombers on simulated runs targeting Chinese nuclear facilities. Lastly, the hangover of the Cultural Revolution had left China very isolated, with few embassies in foreign countries and few foreign countries with embassies in China. They wanted to open up.
The move to open up China-US relations largely came from the Americans, but the Chinese reciprocated in their turn. “Only Nixon could go to China.” President Nixon had made his career as a red-baiting anti-Communist but by the late 1960s he was beginning to think of an opening to China. He was a realist and internationalist in foreign policy, who ran foreign policy himself by using his National Security advisor to more-or-less freeze the State Department out. Nixon first told his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger that he wanted to establish relations with the Chinese in 1969, and he started sending feelers to the Chinese in the same year. The Americans sent messages through the French, Cambodians and Poles that they would be willing to talk to the Chinese. As well, they started lifting some restrictions on travel and trade. Kissinger held talks with the Chinese ambassador in Paris, but the real breakthrough came in talks mediated by the Pakistani dictator Yahya Khan, who personally carried messages back and forth between Washington and Beijing. This was all done in secret, as Kissinger and Nixon worried that this opening would generate too much opposition. They didn’t even tell the Secretary of State or the Vice-President. Only the Joint Chiefs of Staff knew, because they had a spy on the National Security Council.
This long courtship resulted in the famous “ping-pong” diplomacy, when the American ping-pong team was invited to China to participate in a ping-pong tournament in April, 1971. This symbol of Chinese opening reached a climax when the team was received by Chou En Lai, the Chinese Prime Minister. There was one of the stranger exchanges in the history of 20th Century international relations. A long-haired American ping-pong player named Glen Cowan asked Chou, “What do you think of the hippie movement?” Chou, “Spirit must be transformed into material force before the world can move forward.”
Next followed an invitation for Kissinger to visit Beijing to arrange a visit by Nixon, which he did secretly in the summer of 1971. Over two days, Kissinger and Chou ironed out the details of the invitation and the broad strokes of their respective positions on a number of issues of importance to them both. He revealed his successful visit when he returned to the United States, and he announced that he would go again in the autumn.
In October 1971, when Kissinger was in Beijing for his second visit, the Republic of China took over the United Nations seat for China from Taiwan. Until then, the United States had led a coalition to keep the Kuomintang-led island as the official representatives for China, but over time, they continued to lose support as Communist-led China accrued supporters in the General Assembly. By 1971, the vote outcome was inevitable. George Bush, the American ambassador to the UN, led the doomed charge to keep the seat for Taiwan while Nixon and Kissinger supported him verbally but were secretly relieved that a major obstacle between China and the US was being resolved.
In February, 1972, President Nixon and his entourage, including his wife, Pat, Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State William Rogers, a whole load of other diplomats and security personnel, and 90 members of the press arrived in China for a week. They were met by Chou En Lai and a small greeting party at the airport. No crowds were allowed to watch the motorcade as the Americans were driven to their quarters for a lunch. The event was barely covered by the Chinese press. The Chinese had kept the Americans guessing about when the meeting between Nixon and Mao would take place, and even refused to guarantee that there would be a meeting. Despite this inauspicious beginning, Chairman Mao was really looking forward to it and wanted to see Nixon right away. He asked Chou to bring Nixon over that afternoon.
Mao was very sick when Nixon came. He had been bedridden for months with congestive heart failure and pneumonia. In fact, the Chinese had commandeered the respirator and oxygen that had been sent ahead for Nixon in case of emergency for Mao’s use. That equipment, along with the other medical equipment, was hidden in the room where Nixon and his entourage met Mao. A bloated Mao was propped up on a couch in a new suit and shoes, and when Nixon and Kissinger came into the room, Mao had to be helped to stand up by one of his pretty young assistants in order to shake hands. Mao was breathing heavily and speaking in bursts, so that the Americans thought that he had just had a stroke. Actually, Nixon and Mao didn’t talk about much. They complemented each other on their books. Mao mouthed pleasantries and when Nixon tried to bring up serious topics such as the balance of power in Asia, Mao wouldn’t go there. He said he was the philosopher, Chou was the politician, and these matters should be discussed with him. He only said that Taiwan would continue to be a problem and that Chinese newspapers would continue to attack the US and he expected that American newspapers would continue to attack China. After an hour, the meeting was over, but Nixon had been very touched and regarded Mao, the totalitarian mass murderer, as a great man for the rest of his life.
The rest of the week was spent in touring and negotiating. There were formal banquets and toasts, and Kissinger and Chou and the Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua spent the time negotiating a communique that would outline areas of Chinese and American agreement and disagreement in matters of international relations important to them both. All of them watched a revolutionary opera written by Mao’s bloodthirsty wife, Jiang Qing, who would be later executed for her crimes in the Cultural Revolution. As far as the communique goes, neither of them got everything they wanted. The Chinese continued to support the North Vietnamese with money, arms and troops and the Americans would not commit to a date to withdraw their troops from Taiwan.
Nevertheless, the meeting was hailed as a great success. It opened China and the US up to trade and exchanges with each other and was central to a cooling of the Cold War. Nixon believed that he would be remembered for two things: Watergate and his trip to China. Chinese and American allies in Asia were both surprised and alarmed at the rapprochement. North Vietnam and China grew so estranged that China invaded Vietnam in 1979. Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and Australia were all shocked (in Japanese shokku) by the visit; however, over the years they all normalized relations with the Chinese as well.
Tensions remained, so that official diplomatic relations between the US and China were not established until 1979. In 2021, we can see that there are still many tensions between the United States and China. Nevertheless, we are in a better place because the two countries have been talking to each other since 1972. The official Communist Party assessment on Chairman Mao was 70% good and 30% bad and perhaps we can say the same thing about the meeting itself. The right wing in America was very upset at this opening, and in the fact that Nixon was shaking the hand of a mass murderer. They compared this to Munich for a reason. In the years since, we can see that China has not become a model democratic member of the state system. It continues as a dictatorship, albeit one more open now than in 1972. The situation in Taiwan has still not been resolved and the future because of that seems very uncertain.
This book is worth reading. MacMillan is an excellent historian. She knows how to do her research and present it so that people want to read it. She has an interesting story here, and she doesn’t let the reader down. If you are a specialist in this subject, you will probably find many of her digressions on, for example, 20th Century Asian history, or short biographical sketches of Nixon or Kissinger somewhat superfluous, but these are things that really help put everything in context for the general reader. Why and how did Nixon and Mao meet in 1972? Why should we care? Now we know.
For their part, the American reasons for better relations with China were mostly two-fold. First, they wanted help in Vietnam. The Nixon government wanted to get out of Vietnam, “Peace with Honor”, but to do that they needed to have the North Vietnamese government be more cooperative at the Paris Peace talks. They knew the Chinese were a major sponsor of the Vietnamese Communists and wanted the Chinese to apply pressure to the Vietnamese to come to a settlement with the Americans. They also wanted help to balance their relationship with the Soviet Union. A Chinese-American rapprochement would pressure the Soviets to be more conciliatory in, for example, the ongoing SALT nuclear arms reduction talks they were having with the Americans. A lesser aim was to open China to American business, but Nixon and Kissinger, the main players in the negotiations, considered this something to be left to the State Department.
For their part, the Chinese had three reasons to bargain with the Americans. First for them was Taiwan. The Americans had about ten thousand troops in Taiwan, and the Chinese wanted them out, they wanted the Americans to not support any independence movement for Taiwan, and in fact they wanted the Americans to support a “one-China” policy. Next, they had had a terrible split with the Soviets, their former Communist allies, and it was so bad that in 1969 an open war had almost broken out. There were artillery and tank battles on their common border and the Soviets had sent bombers on simulated runs targeting Chinese nuclear facilities. Lastly, the hangover of the Cultural Revolution had left China very isolated, with few embassies in foreign countries and few foreign countries with embassies in China. They wanted to open up.
The move to open up China-US relations largely came from the Americans, but the Chinese reciprocated in their turn. “Only Nixon could go to China.” President Nixon had made his career as a red-baiting anti-Communist but by the late 1960s he was beginning to think of an opening to China. He was a realist and internationalist in foreign policy, who ran foreign policy himself by using his National Security advisor to more-or-less freeze the State Department out. Nixon first told his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger that he wanted to establish relations with the Chinese in 1969, and he started sending feelers to the Chinese in the same year. The Americans sent messages through the French, Cambodians and Poles that they would be willing to talk to the Chinese. As well, they started lifting some restrictions on travel and trade. Kissinger held talks with the Chinese ambassador in Paris, but the real breakthrough came in talks mediated by the Pakistani dictator Yahya Khan, who personally carried messages back and forth between Washington and Beijing. This was all done in secret, as Kissinger and Nixon worried that this opening would generate too much opposition. They didn’t even tell the Secretary of State or the Vice-President. Only the Joint Chiefs of Staff knew, because they had a spy on the National Security Council.
This long courtship resulted in the famous “ping-pong” diplomacy, when the American ping-pong team was invited to China to participate in a ping-pong tournament in April, 1971. This symbol of Chinese opening reached a climax when the team was received by Chou En Lai, the Chinese Prime Minister. There was one of the stranger exchanges in the history of 20th Century international relations. A long-haired American ping-pong player named Glen Cowan asked Chou, “What do you think of the hippie movement?” Chou, “Spirit must be transformed into material force before the world can move forward.”
Next followed an invitation for Kissinger to visit Beijing to arrange a visit by Nixon, which he did secretly in the summer of 1971. Over two days, Kissinger and Chou ironed out the details of the invitation and the broad strokes of their respective positions on a number of issues of importance to them both. He revealed his successful visit when he returned to the United States, and he announced that he would go again in the autumn.
In October 1971, when Kissinger was in Beijing for his second visit, the Republic of China took over the United Nations seat for China from Taiwan. Until then, the United States had led a coalition to keep the Kuomintang-led island as the official representatives for China, but over time, they continued to lose support as Communist-led China accrued supporters in the General Assembly. By 1971, the vote outcome was inevitable. George Bush, the American ambassador to the UN, led the doomed charge to keep the seat for Taiwan while Nixon and Kissinger supported him verbally but were secretly relieved that a major obstacle between China and the US was being resolved.
In February, 1972, President Nixon and his entourage, including his wife, Pat, Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State William Rogers, a whole load of other diplomats and security personnel, and 90 members of the press arrived in China for a week. They were met by Chou En Lai and a small greeting party at the airport. No crowds were allowed to watch the motorcade as the Americans were driven to their quarters for a lunch. The event was barely covered by the Chinese press. The Chinese had kept the Americans guessing about when the meeting between Nixon and Mao would take place, and even refused to guarantee that there would be a meeting. Despite this inauspicious beginning, Chairman Mao was really looking forward to it and wanted to see Nixon right away. He asked Chou to bring Nixon over that afternoon.
Mao was very sick when Nixon came. He had been bedridden for months with congestive heart failure and pneumonia. In fact, the Chinese had commandeered the respirator and oxygen that had been sent ahead for Nixon in case of emergency for Mao’s use. That equipment, along with the other medical equipment, was hidden in the room where Nixon and his entourage met Mao. A bloated Mao was propped up on a couch in a new suit and shoes, and when Nixon and Kissinger came into the room, Mao had to be helped to stand up by one of his pretty young assistants in order to shake hands. Mao was breathing heavily and speaking in bursts, so that the Americans thought that he had just had a stroke. Actually, Nixon and Mao didn’t talk about much. They complemented each other on their books. Mao mouthed pleasantries and when Nixon tried to bring up serious topics such as the balance of power in Asia, Mao wouldn’t go there. He said he was the philosopher, Chou was the politician, and these matters should be discussed with him. He only said that Taiwan would continue to be a problem and that Chinese newspapers would continue to attack the US and he expected that American newspapers would continue to attack China. After an hour, the meeting was over, but Nixon had been very touched and regarded Mao, the totalitarian mass murderer, as a great man for the rest of his life.
The rest of the week was spent in touring and negotiating. There were formal banquets and toasts, and Kissinger and Chou and the Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua spent the time negotiating a communique that would outline areas of Chinese and American agreement and disagreement in matters of international relations important to them both. All of them watched a revolutionary opera written by Mao’s bloodthirsty wife, Jiang Qing, who would be later executed for her crimes in the Cultural Revolution. As far as the communique goes, neither of them got everything they wanted. The Chinese continued to support the North Vietnamese with money, arms and troops and the Americans would not commit to a date to withdraw their troops from Taiwan.
Nevertheless, the meeting was hailed as a great success. It opened China and the US up to trade and exchanges with each other and was central to a cooling of the Cold War. Nixon believed that he would be remembered for two things: Watergate and his trip to China. Chinese and American allies in Asia were both surprised and alarmed at the rapprochement. North Vietnam and China grew so estranged that China invaded Vietnam in 1979. Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and Australia were all shocked (in Japanese shokku) by the visit; however, over the years they all normalized relations with the Chinese as well.
Tensions remained, so that official diplomatic relations between the US and China were not established until 1979. In 2021, we can see that there are still many tensions between the United States and China. Nevertheless, we are in a better place because the two countries have been talking to each other since 1972. The official Communist Party assessment on Chairman Mao was 70% good and 30% bad and perhaps we can say the same thing about the meeting itself. The right wing in America was very upset at this opening, and in the fact that Nixon was shaking the hand of a mass murderer. They compared this to Munich for a reason. In the years since, we can see that China has not become a model democratic member of the state system. It continues as a dictatorship, albeit one more open now than in 1972. The situation in Taiwan has still not been resolved and the future because of that seems very uncertain.
This book is worth reading. MacMillan is an excellent historian. She knows how to do her research and present it so that people want to read it. She has an interesting story here, and she doesn’t let the reader down. If you are a specialist in this subject, you will probably find many of her digressions on, for example, 20th Century Asian history, or short biographical sketches of Nixon or Kissinger somewhat superfluous, but these are things that really help put everything in context for the general reader. Why and how did Nixon and Mao meet in 1972? Why should we care? Now we know.
January 28, 2019
Interesting and engaging account of one of the positive things that Nixon accomplished.
Read
June 7, 2008Perhaps relevent given all the nonsense talk of "appeasement" in today's campaign.
Once again: praise be to MacMillian. Her previous book has singlehandedly overturned the Keynesian interpretation of the Versailles Tready that dominated for some 70 years. Here she gives a tremendous account of everything that went into getting the two titans together, from the grandiose to the rediculous. Each chapter provides the necessary history to give the reader the proper grounding in topics such as Chinese history recent and ancient, the political tone in the U.S., the tension in Southern Asia, and all that goes into international diplomacy. Some of it quite silly.
Chou en Lie and Kissenger play their roles like a high stake game of Go, and an underrated president gets some fair treatment. Also, MacMillan serves as a solid exception to the otherwise warrented notion that the fairer sex doesn't have the even-headedness to properly tackle history.
She's a national tresure.
Once again: praise be to MacMillian. Her previous book has singlehandedly overturned the Keynesian interpretation of the Versailles Tready that dominated for some 70 years. Here she gives a tremendous account of everything that went into getting the two titans together, from the grandiose to the rediculous. Each chapter provides the necessary history to give the reader the proper grounding in topics such as Chinese history recent and ancient, the political tone in the U.S., the tension in Southern Asia, and all that goes into international diplomacy. Some of it quite silly.
Chou en Lie and Kissenger play their roles like a high stake game of Go, and an underrated president gets some fair treatment. Also, MacMillan serves as a solid exception to the otherwise warrented notion that the fairer sex doesn't have the even-headedness to properly tackle history.
She's a national tresure.
January 31, 2014
A rare book that delivers more than it promises. Short but interesting looks at the careers of Zhou, Mao and Lin Biao as well as Nixon. And of course Henry Kissinger gets a lot of coverage too. Rich in detail about the diplomacy and planning leading up to the visit. Very readable and packed with interesting anecdotes as well as some very objective analysis. Steers clear of postmodern guilt AND imperialist propaganda. Great job.
September 24, 2008
Well structured and great overview of the event and the people involved. Has the best elements of her writing in 1919 but doesn't lose steam. As the book progresses, the tone of the perspective also shift.
April 19, 2019
Well written account of the famous 1972 trip. The author's reputation as a top rank popular historian is certainly deserved.
April 18, 2016
In February 1972, American president Richard Nixon, became the first American president to visit China. This visit was the beginning of China opening up again in some ways to the rest of the world and shifted some focus from their internal things to also being engaged with the rest of the world. It was a significant event in the Cold War as it made the USSR and other communist nations nervous that the USA and China began to get along so well.
For Nixon, the move made sense. He cared very deeply about foreign affairs and longed to do something significant in a positive way in that arena (finishing the Vietnam war was another effort that was taking much of his time and attention, he ran his first campaign on a promise to get the USA out of Vietnam). For China, they were nervous about their relations with the USSR and the border violence they were engaged in on multiple occasions. Both the USSR, China, and America saw themselves as world leaders. The book gives a brief biography of Nixon, Mao, Kissinger (the president's advisor) and Chou (the acting Prime Minister/Secretary of State of China) and a few other players. One of the fascinating things about the process is how little Nixon involved and trusted the American State Department. He kept the plan to go to China a secret from them and the nation and sent Kissinger to negotiate the visit and begin working on what they wanted to accomplish with the visit in secret.
A couple things from the biographies that stood out. First on Nixon, "He (Nixon) was generous to his staff but he seems to not have known how to treat them as human beings. He never thought for example, to ask Haldeman how many children he had. And though his Chief of Staff spent hours with him every day, the president only once invited him and his wife to a purely social dinner. Haldeman, who tried to anticipate everything, once tried to find a friend for Nixon, someone he could confide in. Nixon was astonished. In any case, he already had the perfect friend in Bebe Reboso, "a genial, discreet sponge, who sat silently for hours while Nixon held forth. Otherwise it is difficult to know who Nixon was close to. His daughters, certainly; his wife, Pat, although he rarely showed any interest in her after their first few years of marriage. He had thousands of acquaintances but very few close friends. He often talked about his mother , who was widely held to be a saintly figure who had suffered the early deaths of two of her children. She was a cold saint, however, doing her duty uncomplainingly but never showing her children any open affection or warmth. Nixon told his sympathetic biographer, Jonathan Aitken, that his mother never kissed him. When Aitken seemed surprised, Nixon grew angry. Aitken's reaction, Nixon felt, was like something from "one of those rather pathetic Freudian psychiatrists." Yet he wept in Billy Graham's arms when his mother died. Henry Kissinger, who could be so cruel about Nixon, once said, "He would have been a great man had somebody loved him."
"Although he (Mao) wrote one of his most lovely poems about her and in his old age described her as the love of his life, Mao abandoned his first wife and their young sons in the turbulent days of the late 1920s without any apparent regret. Yang Kaihui moved back to Changsha to be near her family, and Mao made no attempt to keep in touch with her. In a series of letters that miraculously survived, she wrote with increasing desperation of her continuing love for Mao, her misery at being abandoned, and her fears for herself and her children as the Guuomindang tightened its grip. In 1930, in retaliation for Communist attacks on Changsha, the local nationalist general her executed. She was only 29.
In 1928, while Yang was still alive, Moa got married again, to a young girl from the countryside, He Zizhen, who agreed, rather reluctantly, to become his "revolutionary companion." She was to pay a heavy price, suffering through the Long March and repeated pregnancies and miscarriages until Mao, in turn, abandoned her for a younger, more glamorous woman. His last and final marriage was to the Shanghai actress, Jiang Quing. When that marriage, in turn, soured, he preferred to avoid the divorce and simply took mistresses, sometimes several at once. It was easy enough for Mao to get them from among his nurses and assistants or from a special army company of dancers and singers. "Selecting imperial concubines" was how a senior general described it. Mao preferred young, simple, girls who felt deeply honored to be chosen by this great man, even to the point of catching a venereal disease from him. When his doctors suggested that the chairman might want to stop his sexual activities while the disease was being treated, Mao refused. "If it's not hurting me," he said airily "then it doesn't matter." As far as hygiene was concerned, Mao's solution was more sex: "I wash myself inside the bodies of my women."
Two things that we didn't see a lot of discussion on that I would have been interested in, Eisenhower's success in foreign policy and how Nixon never gained Eisenhower's respect and trust like Nixon wanted. Did that impact Nixon and his desire to do something significant in foreign policy? Second, a bit more explanation on how things shifted, if at all, for the military with the China visit. Interestingly, while the State Department was left in the dark, the Joint Chiefs of Staff knew what was going on with the China visit. Not because Nixon told them or wanted them to know, but because they had a spy who reported the developments with China back to the Joint Chiefs.
Overall a well written account of the meeting and fallout from the China visit by Nixon. In the polls Nixon, running for his second term, rose significantly to a 56% approval rating nationwide. Nearly 70% of those polled believed his trip had been useful. The trip in China was frequently carefully orchestrated for lots of pictures and video. It was estimated that 98% of the nation saw press coverage of the meeting with China, a massive PR victory for Nixon. However, there were some negative consequences too. Nixon by making his trip a secret until it was happening, avoided negative press inside America. But, he also offended allies who blindsided by the visit. England's Prime Minister was personally offended, thinking he had been friends with Nixon he never forgave him for not bothering to tell him about the China trip and as a result focused more on building ties with Europe and moving England away from a close relationship with America. Several other nations expressed their shock and dismay on not being brought into the loop until after the trip and agreement between the USA and China, among them: New Zealand, Australia, the Philippians, Japan and especially Taiwan. This weakened the trust between the USA and many allies. The meeting helped open the doors for China to begin becoming the economic powerhouse it grew to be. Overall, while the meeting between Nixon and Mao personally profited Nixon, and it was what he felt was his greatest accomplishment, it's not clear (to me) it was the right thing and the world is a better place for it.
For Nixon, the move made sense. He cared very deeply about foreign affairs and longed to do something significant in a positive way in that arena (finishing the Vietnam war was another effort that was taking much of his time and attention, he ran his first campaign on a promise to get the USA out of Vietnam). For China, they were nervous about their relations with the USSR and the border violence they were engaged in on multiple occasions. Both the USSR, China, and America saw themselves as world leaders. The book gives a brief biography of Nixon, Mao, Kissinger (the president's advisor) and Chou (the acting Prime Minister/Secretary of State of China) and a few other players. One of the fascinating things about the process is how little Nixon involved and trusted the American State Department. He kept the plan to go to China a secret from them and the nation and sent Kissinger to negotiate the visit and begin working on what they wanted to accomplish with the visit in secret.
A couple things from the biographies that stood out. First on Nixon, "He (Nixon) was generous to his staff but he seems to not have known how to treat them as human beings. He never thought for example, to ask Haldeman how many children he had. And though his Chief of Staff spent hours with him every day, the president only once invited him and his wife to a purely social dinner. Haldeman, who tried to anticipate everything, once tried to find a friend for Nixon, someone he could confide in. Nixon was astonished. In any case, he already had the perfect friend in Bebe Reboso, "a genial, discreet sponge, who sat silently for hours while Nixon held forth. Otherwise it is difficult to know who Nixon was close to. His daughters, certainly; his wife, Pat, although he rarely showed any interest in her after their first few years of marriage. He had thousands of acquaintances but very few close friends. He often talked about his mother , who was widely held to be a saintly figure who had suffered the early deaths of two of her children. She was a cold saint, however, doing her duty uncomplainingly but never showing her children any open affection or warmth. Nixon told his sympathetic biographer, Jonathan Aitken, that his mother never kissed him. When Aitken seemed surprised, Nixon grew angry. Aitken's reaction, Nixon felt, was like something from "one of those rather pathetic Freudian psychiatrists." Yet he wept in Billy Graham's arms when his mother died. Henry Kissinger, who could be so cruel about Nixon, once said, "He would have been a great man had somebody loved him."
"Although he (Mao) wrote one of his most lovely poems about her and in his old age described her as the love of his life, Mao abandoned his first wife and their young sons in the turbulent days of the late 1920s without any apparent regret. Yang Kaihui moved back to Changsha to be near her family, and Mao made no attempt to keep in touch with her. In a series of letters that miraculously survived, she wrote with increasing desperation of her continuing love for Mao, her misery at being abandoned, and her fears for herself and her children as the Guuomindang tightened its grip. In 1930, in retaliation for Communist attacks on Changsha, the local nationalist general her executed. She was only 29.
In 1928, while Yang was still alive, Moa got married again, to a young girl from the countryside, He Zizhen, who agreed, rather reluctantly, to become his "revolutionary companion." She was to pay a heavy price, suffering through the Long March and repeated pregnancies and miscarriages until Mao, in turn, abandoned her for a younger, more glamorous woman. His last and final marriage was to the Shanghai actress, Jiang Quing. When that marriage, in turn, soured, he preferred to avoid the divorce and simply took mistresses, sometimes several at once. It was easy enough for Mao to get them from among his nurses and assistants or from a special army company of dancers and singers. "Selecting imperial concubines" was how a senior general described it. Mao preferred young, simple, girls who felt deeply honored to be chosen by this great man, even to the point of catching a venereal disease from him. When his doctors suggested that the chairman might want to stop his sexual activities while the disease was being treated, Mao refused. "If it's not hurting me," he said airily "then it doesn't matter." As far as hygiene was concerned, Mao's solution was more sex: "I wash myself inside the bodies of my women."
Two things that we didn't see a lot of discussion on that I would have been interested in, Eisenhower's success in foreign policy and how Nixon never gained Eisenhower's respect and trust like Nixon wanted. Did that impact Nixon and his desire to do something significant in foreign policy? Second, a bit more explanation on how things shifted, if at all, for the military with the China visit. Interestingly, while the State Department was left in the dark, the Joint Chiefs of Staff knew what was going on with the China visit. Not because Nixon told them or wanted them to know, but because they had a spy who reported the developments with China back to the Joint Chiefs.
Overall a well written account of the meeting and fallout from the China visit by Nixon. In the polls Nixon, running for his second term, rose significantly to a 56% approval rating nationwide. Nearly 70% of those polled believed his trip had been useful. The trip in China was frequently carefully orchestrated for lots of pictures and video. It was estimated that 98% of the nation saw press coverage of the meeting with China, a massive PR victory for Nixon. However, there were some negative consequences too. Nixon by making his trip a secret until it was happening, avoided negative press inside America. But, he also offended allies who blindsided by the visit. England's Prime Minister was personally offended, thinking he had been friends with Nixon he never forgave him for not bothering to tell him about the China trip and as a result focused more on building ties with Europe and moving England away from a close relationship with America. Several other nations expressed their shock and dismay on not being brought into the loop until after the trip and agreement between the USA and China, among them: New Zealand, Australia, the Philippians, Japan and especially Taiwan. This weakened the trust between the USA and many allies. The meeting helped open the doors for China to begin becoming the economic powerhouse it grew to be. Overall, while the meeting between Nixon and Mao personally profited Nixon, and it was what he felt was his greatest accomplishment, it's not clear (to me) it was the right thing and the world is a better place for it.
August 23, 2020
Its a wonderfully written book by the brilliant historian Margaret Macmillan. The maneuvers of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger along with Chou-En-Lai and Mao-tse-tung that crafted the the beginning of an era where the United States and China embarked upon a new relationship is brilliantly scribbled by the author. From the Long March of 1935 to the Cultural Revolution of 1960s this book provides an insight into all the major events that shaped the contemporary Chinese history.
Richard Nixon (then US President in 1972) along with Henry Kissinger (then NSA of USA who was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to end the Vietnam War) were so desperate to open the talks with China and taking itself out of the imbroglio in Vietnam which had cost it substantially. Today the same United States seems diametrically opposite to its position - 5 decades back. Then, they paved the way for acknowledging PRC as the one china and today it backs the Taiwan as the mainland China. It is a scintillating book which travels through the Great Leap Forward of 1958 and the Cultural Revolution of late 1960s.
This book deserves to be read because it brings into light the deeds of Mao Ze Dung (founder of Communist China) who was responsible for the deaths of 4 crore people which is obviously a huge figure. It was that visit of US President only which laid the foundation of a China that lives in its own hubris, has a dream to dominate the whole world, lay claims on every part it wants be - it Ladakh in India, to Senkaku islands in Japan, which has border disputes with more countries than it shares the border with.
But at the same moment, It is dramatic how a nation has progressed so much in the past 4 decades. A nation which had a closed economy, was abysmally destitute, had nothing significant to offer to the world today has the second largest economy in the world, WHO runs on its propoganda, and is looking forward to replace US as the superpower. It seems that a New Cold War is on the verge of beginning. But this time China has replaced USSR. This book will definitely not disappoint you if you are intrigued by world politics.
Loved it!
Richard Nixon (then US President in 1972) along with Henry Kissinger (then NSA of USA who was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to end the Vietnam War) were so desperate to open the talks with China and taking itself out of the imbroglio in Vietnam which had cost it substantially. Today the same United States seems diametrically opposite to its position - 5 decades back. Then, they paved the way for acknowledging PRC as the one china and today it backs the Taiwan as the mainland China. It is a scintillating book which travels through the Great Leap Forward of 1958 and the Cultural Revolution of late 1960s.
This book deserves to be read because it brings into light the deeds of Mao Ze Dung (founder of Communist China) who was responsible for the deaths of 4 crore people which is obviously a huge figure. It was that visit of US President only which laid the foundation of a China that lives in its own hubris, has a dream to dominate the whole world, lay claims on every part it wants be - it Ladakh in India, to Senkaku islands in Japan, which has border disputes with more countries than it shares the border with.
But at the same moment, It is dramatic how a nation has progressed so much in the past 4 decades. A nation which had a closed economy, was abysmally destitute, had nothing significant to offer to the world today has the second largest economy in the world, WHO runs on its propoganda, and is looking forward to replace US as the superpower. It seems that a New Cold War is on the verge of beginning. But this time China has replaced USSR. This book will definitely not disappoint you if you are intrigued by world politics.
Loved it!
April 5, 2021
This was one of the more nuanced and neutral Western perspectives on China matters that I've read so far. The chapters were quite self-contained and beginner friendly so I can generally recommend it, maybe accompanied with some Chinese first-hand reports.
The chapters were a tiny bit spoon-feeding but not to the detriment of the nonprofessional. Interspersions of biographies on Kissinger, Nixon, Mao, and Zhou introduced some variety in the more linear depiction of the visit itself. Later chapters explain other things happening in the world like Korea, Vietnam, and Indo-China. The reactions of other nations with special emphasis on the USSR were also included and all rounded off with the American aftermath, Mao's death, and the 'cherry' of Watergate.
The painstaking writing of the communique was especially interesting and should be read in parallel (it's very short). It was fought over so many phrasings and word choices, Kissingerian "constructed ambiguity" abound such that it is hard to say what the communique really tries to say.
Towards the end I felt that some more critical questions were in order, especially for Kissinger. It irked me a bit that MacMillan decided to end with a redemptive note on both of them. She was able to penetrate a lot of propaganda and failed (in my unprofessional opinion) a bit to do the last step.
The chapters were a tiny bit spoon-feeding but not to the detriment of the nonprofessional. Interspersions of biographies on Kissinger, Nixon, Mao, and Zhou introduced some variety in the more linear depiction of the visit itself. Later chapters explain other things happening in the world like Korea, Vietnam, and Indo-China. The reactions of other nations with special emphasis on the USSR were also included and all rounded off with the American aftermath, Mao's death, and the 'cherry' of Watergate.
The painstaking writing of the communique was especially interesting and should be read in parallel (it's very short). It was fought over so many phrasings and word choices, Kissingerian "constructed ambiguity" abound such that it is hard to say what the communique really tries to say.
Towards the end I felt that some more critical questions were in order, especially for Kissinger. It irked me a bit that MacMillan decided to end with a redemptive note on both of them. She was able to penetrate a lot of propaganda and failed (in my unprofessional opinion) a bit to do the last step.
June 12, 2018
This is a thorough, well-researched and well-written book on a significant event in modern world history. The author delves into the psyches of the main players (Nixon, Mao, Kissenger, Chou), their governments, their countries and to a degree their histories. She includes some perspective on the politics among the various factions in both countries. I found it interesting and informative. It was mentioned on a news show by someone asked what advice he would give Trump before meeting with Kim and he said "I'd tell him to read 'Nixon & Mao'." So I did. Nixon's week in China was far too nuanced for anyone in today's White House but it will be interesting to see if there are ANY bits of similarity other than the obvious one that one side wants/wanted an opening to the world stage and one side wants/wanted a grand photo op before an election. With Nixon and Mao, it was much more, of course.
I don't know if that week and all that led up to and away from it "changed the world" but I suspect that over the following years it did. It would have happened anyway at some point no doubt. But still. It was historic. And China is now, 50 years hence, poised to take over what has been USA purview around the world since 1945 -- unless of course Russia does it first.
I don't know if that week and all that led up to and away from it "changed the world" but I suspect that over the following years it did. It would have happened anyway at some point no doubt. But still. It was historic. And China is now, 50 years hence, poised to take over what has been USA purview around the world since 1945 -- unless of course Russia does it first.
December 17, 2022
What I very much enjoyed in MacMillan's 1919 was her incredible gift or historical storytelling; what frustrated me in that book was her enthusiasm for old-school great man history, which filtered the complexities of the diplomacy that ended World War I through the personalities of the (admittedly, larger than life) figures involved. Those same tendencies are on display here, but this time entirely appropriately; the story of Nixon's historic first visit to China really is the story of a handful of great men -- though in some ways Mao is the least of them (she'd lose the parallelism, but the book should really be called Nixon and Chou; it made me want to read a good biography of Chou En-Lai, who seems like one of the most consequential figures of the 20th century as well as a protagonist out of a sweeping Chinese historical epic). That is not to say she ignores the wider political currents of both U.S. and Chinese history; on the contrary, she does a superb job of contextualizing the week-long visit in both the aftermath of China's disastrous Cultural Revolution and Nixon's strategy for his 1972 re-election. But personalities dominate here, as they should, and it makes for a terrific, informative read.
September 6, 2023
Nixon and Mao provides an in-depth look into one of the most important events of the 20th century. US President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972 reopened relations between the two countries. For better and for worse, the event had major consequences for world politics. Perhaps most notably, it helped open the floodgates for China to become a massive economic superpower using capitalist means that is radically different from the Socialist Utopia that the ruthless dictator Chair Mao Zedong envisioned. Margaret MacMillan avoids making the material dry by providing great insight into the important and deeply flawed statesmen involved, including Nixon and Mao, and their second-in-commands Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. I was surprised to find myself most touched by the story of Nixon’s wife Pat, who suffered much for her insecure and deeply strange husband’s political career.
Title: Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World
Author: Margaret MacMillan
Year: 2005
Genre: Nonfiction - History, politics, & economics
Page count: 544 pages
Date(s) read: 8/31/23 - 9/4/23
Reading journal entry #166 in 2023
Title: Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World
Author: Margaret MacMillan
Year: 2005
Genre: Nonfiction - History, politics, & economics
Page count: 544 pages
Date(s) read: 8/31/23 - 9/4/23
Reading journal entry #166 in 2023
June 23, 2020
Finished this quite some time ago. Nixon is a lot fucking smarter than Trump and Trump is too stupid to embody the evil and yet complex motivations of Nixon. Nixon comes across as a very aggressive and ambitious politician wanting peace. Mao seems more hands off. They only actually meet for an hour in China. Mao's decision. Nixon was overly ambitious to make history as a former anti-Communist dude who indicted Mr. Hiss to Mao's negotiator. Many delicious meals given to these diplomats--pretty damn good for a Communist country. The shrimp is just amazing. Nixon and Mao agree on one thing: the pathology and untrustworthiness of the Soviet Union, which is what Russia was called at the time. Kissinger comes off exceedingly sycophantic and not trustworthy..historically accurate. A good read for our times and back then.
March 14, 2023
A very different stage of history from her other books on WW1 & the peace - Nixon and Mao still caries with it MacMillan’s engaging narrative style. We get interesting portrayals of the central figures as real people without getting bogged down in unnecessary psycho-analysis. We get global and national context without being burdened by detail. In short we get an accessible and relatable well-rounded account of the China/US rapprochement. Read this book quickly despite not being the biggest fan of Cold War history. Conclusions are interesting as well, this being a book written 5 years prior to the start of the Xi Jinping era & a reminder how much things have changed.
March 8, 2019
Basically, a bunch of really powerful men get their feelings hurt very easily. That being said, it was quite fascinating to listen to considering the current political climate, Chinese-U.S. relations, relations with Asia in general right now, etc. All the major players in this diplomatic endeavor get a mini-biography to provide background and context for the myriad underlying issues and tensions going on. I found myself alternately bored and riveted. Not much actually happened during that week, yet it set the stage for the China we're currently dealing with today.
May 13, 2019
I had two problems with this book. One was the pacing. MacMillan sometime is so invested in explaining the background and history of every aspect of this week in Sino-American diplomacy that she sacrifices narrative flow. The details are valuable; the story gets lost.
The second problem: MacMillan assumes more than shows the claim that Nixon's trip to China was really really important. I *believe* it, but really thought at the end of the book I would be able to say with some clarity why it was so important and ... it's still pretty vague.
The second problem: MacMillan assumes more than shows the claim that Nixon's trip to China was really really important. I *believe* it, but really thought at the end of the book I would be able to say with some clarity why it was so important and ... it's still pretty vague.
January 27, 2022
A good, comprehensive take on the diplomatic back-and-forth of Nixon's trip to China. The focus on his brief meeting with Mao is, somewhat contrary to the title, not the whole focus here. It is only one episode in the larger event. But since it made the punchiest title, I guess that's how they chose to package this.
It could more accurately be called a detailed look at the relations between the US and PRC at a particular and fascinating point in time, culminating with a week-long diplomatic visit during which a lot of tensions were present and some ultimately resolved.
It could more accurately be called a detailed look at the relations between the US and PRC at a particular and fascinating point in time, culminating with a week-long diplomatic visit during which a lot of tensions were present and some ultimately resolved.
February 27, 2020
Impressive for its detail and research, and also a real slog through those details. It helps to have lived through it to think about the extensive preparation that was going on, and there are many comparisons to be made with current attempts at dictator breakthroughs. Recommended for diplomacy wonks.
October 12, 2020
MacMillian creates another stellar lesson in history and its effects on the present. Her usual thorough research and presentation of the facts, as well as the cultural and emotional sense of the times, and insight into the actors makes this book a "go to" book for China scholars and readers for years to come.
August 12, 2020
A Great breakdown of a monumental meeting of two controversial leaders. Neither for or against either man the book is strictly factual and gives great depth to the challenges both sides faced in aranging the meeting.
December 31, 2020
This is the history of the opening of US and China relations made by Nixon in 1972. It is covered extensively in Kissinger's memoirs but it was interesting to get an objective version of it. 6/3/07
March 16, 2023
Listened to the audiobook. Learned quite a bit of background regarding China, Mao, Taiwan that makes me want to know more about Mao’s long life and rather awful-sounding rule. Gives a very human portrayal of Nixon and Kissinger. It wandered a bit and could be repetitive.
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