

We will pay \$12,000 to buy Junior an 11,000-hour public education, but the part we leave out of it is the "Queensbury" rules of being an American: the laws of the land.

On the rostrum at graduation, Junior will shine out bright and clear: a whiz at grammar, math and history.

But when he tries to read a contract, or stand before a judge, he will be deaf, mute, blind and illiterate.

One must ask: How effective can we expect our law system to be when nobody knows much about it, except the judges who administer it, the lawyers who practice it, and the policemen who enforce it?

Turmoil is upon us and we pound the table and thunder that ignorance of the law is no excuse.

But tomorrow morning, and every morning, five Supreme Court Justices will mount

the bench to tell the other four how the law should work.

KFWB recognizes that we have no tradition of teaching the fundamentals of law and statute law to our children; no books, no teachers and little know-how.

But we demand that they live by the rules for their entire lives, so teaching them the rules seems like a logical idea. And kindergarten might be just the place to begin.

## SENATE—Friday, November 7, 1969

The Senate met at 12 o'clock meridian and was called to order by the Vice President.

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

O God, our Father, at this season of remembrance look upon the unrest, the strife, and the warfare of the world and send Thy healing grace.

O Thou who "makest wars to cease unto the ends of the earth," provide for mankind a deeper and more lasting peace than the world has ever known.

O God to whom the cry of the captive has gone up in every age, we remember the sons of this Republic now imprisoned in distant lands, lonely sufferers, bereft of comfort, family, and friends. Be their companion in solitude, their strength in weakness, their hope in despair. Let sacred memory and the prayer of faith minister to their deepest needs. Rebuke the cruelty of their keepers, give fit employment to their minds, and finally, by Thy grace, deliver them from bondage to home and family with honor untarnished and character unstained.

O Thou who hast said, "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who despitefully use you," we pray for those who call us aggressors, imperialists, and enemies that they may discern the true intent of our hearts and with us learn the ways of peace.

Through Jesus Christ, our Lord. Amen.

### THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Thursday, November 6, 1969, be dispensed with.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

### MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States submitting nominations were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Leonard, one of his secretaries.

### EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, the Vice President laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

### MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 14465) to provide for the expansion and improvement of the Nation's airport and airway system, for the imposition of airport and airway user charges, and for other purposes, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

### ENROLLED BILL AND JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

The message also announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bill and joint resolution, and they were signed by the Vice President:

S. 2546. An act to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; and

H.J. Res. 934. Joint resolution to increase the appropriation authorization for the food stamp program for fiscal year 1970 to \$610,000,000.

### HOUSE BILL REFERRED

The bill (H.R. 14465) to provide for the expansion and improvement of the Nation's airport and airway system, for the imposition of airport and airway user charges, and for other purposes, was read twice by its title and referred to the Committee on Commerce.

### LIMITATION ON STATEMENTS DURING TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that statements in relation to the transaction of routine morning business be limited to 3 minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

### COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

### SENATE RESOLUTION 280—SUBMISSION OF RESOLUTION AFFIRMING THE SUPPORT OF THE SENATE FOR THE PRESIDENT IN HIS EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A JUST PEACE IN VIETNAM

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, on behalf of the distinguished majority leader and myself I submit a resolution for appropriate reference.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The resolution will be received and appropriately referred.

Mr. SCOTT. I also send to the desk a list of additional cosponsors, and ask unanimous consent that their names be added to the resolution.

There being no objection, the list of additional cosponsors was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Senators Allen, Burdick, Byrd (Va.), Byrd (W. Va.), Dodd, Gravel, Holland, McClellan, McIntyre, Metcalf, Proxmire, Spong, and Talmadge.

Senators Griffin, Percy, Smith (Maine), Allott, Jordan (Idaho), Gurney, Miller, Thurmond, Pearson, Hansen, Curtis, Hruska, Boggs, Hatfield, Dole, Bennett, Packwood, Cook, Williams (Del.), Young (N. Dak.), Mathias, Cotton, Baker, Tower, and Mundt.

Mr. SCOTT. Because of the absence of some Senators on both sides of the aisle who would, I feel, want to join in this resolution, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution lie on the table for 2 legislative days, through the close of business Tuesday, November 11. This should not be considered as a precedent, but is requested only because of the unusual present circumstances.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The resolution (S. Res. 280), submitted by Mr. SCOTT (for himself, Mr. MANSFIELD, and other Senators), which reads as follows, was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

#### S. Res. 280

Resolved, That the Senate affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam, expresses the earnest hope of the people of the United States for such a peace, calls attention to the numerous peaceful overtures which the United States has made in good faith toward the Government of North Vietnam, approves and supports the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese and that the United States is willing to abide by the results of such elections, and requests the President to call upon the Government of North Vietnam to join in a proclamation of a mutual cease-fire and to announce its willingness to honor such elections and to abide by such results and to allow the issues in controversy to be peacefully so resolved in order that the war

may be ended and peace may be restored at last in Southeast Asia.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I believe that this resolution, offered in a bipartisan fashion by the distinguished majority leader and myself, is the type of resolution which represents the good will of the Senate toward efforts which are being made to achieve peace in Vietnam. It represents the fact that the Senate affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace. It expresses the earnest hope of the people of this Nation for such a peace. It calls attention to the numerous peaceful overtures which our Government has made over a period of years, in good faith, to the Government of North Vietnam.

The resolution approves and supports the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections, requests the President to call upon the Government of North Vietnam to join in a proclamation of mutual cease fire and to announce its willingness to honor such elections and to abide by such elections, and to allow the issues in controversy to be peacefully so resolved in order that the war may be ended and peace may be restored at last in Southeast Asia.

This is in full keeping with the President's declaration of May 14, in which he submitted a proposal for peace to the Government of North Vietnam—the proposal for free elections, the proposal for a cease-fire, and the willingness of the United States to regard anything as negotiable with the north, with the sole exception of the right of the people of South Vietnam to free and unimpeded determination of the kind of government under which they wish to live.

This is not a guarantee of any government. This is not a guarantee of the outcome of any election. This is simply a statement whereby the Senate agrees that the President is on the right course and commends him for it.

Approximately 40 Senators already are in support of this resolution, and other names will be added, I am sure, before the close of business on Tuesday. I hope that all Senators will be so inclined in expressing this hope for a just and fair peace.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for not to exceed 10 minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I join with the distinguished minority leader, the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCOTT), in offering this resolution. My hope is that the Senate will express itself in a fashion that will strengthen the President's efforts to bring about the restoration of peace in Vietnam. I would be less than candid, however, if I were to tell the Senate that I nourished great expectations from this resolution in present circumstances.

It seems to me that the President's speech on Monday night suggested that prospects for a prompt return of peace were at least as remote as before and the response of the Hanoi negotiators in Paris to his statement underscored the

point. It is in this grim context that the resolution is submitted.

Nevertheless, when the distinguished minority leader asked me to join him in this sponsorship, I sat down with him to see if we might agree on an expression that could be helpful to the President. The resolution which is offered today is the result. Notwithstanding the grim prospects, the resolution is not offered as an exercise in futility; it is offered, rather, in good faith and purpose. If this expression, or some modification thereof, can make even the slightest dent in this stubborn and intractable conflict, the effort will have been worthwhile.

There is little that is new in the substance of the proposed resolution. By its terms, "the Senate affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam and "calls attention to the numerous peaceful overtures" which the United States has made toward North Vietnam. Notwithstanding their lack of success to date, the President has made overtures of peaceful intent; and, insofar as I am concerned, I would support him or any President, regardless of party, on that score since it involves the Nation's highest interests. Indeed, I would welcome any and all peaceful overtures, regardless of their source, for a settlement of this conflict.

The resolution would also "support the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese." I am not aware of any quarrel with that principle in any quarter. Not only has the President of the United States expressed the principle, so, too, has the Government of North Vietnam, the Saigon government, and the National Liberation Front. The issue is not in the principle of the right of all South Vietnamese to join in freely choosing their own government. On that principle all are apparently agreed. The issue is how, when, and in what circumstances can a government representing the choice of the people of South Vietnam be freely chosen?

This Nation has long since bound itself to accept the results of a free election by the South Vietnamese people. I see no reason why the Senate should not restate the principle. Nor do I see any reason why, with proper safeguards, the Government of North Vietnam, the Saigon government, and the NLF should not be asked to do the same.

Finally, the resolution "requests the President to call upon the Government of North Vietnam to join in a proclamation of a mutual cease-fire." Both the minority leader and I have asked separately in recent weeks that the element of a bona fide and unconditional mutual cease-fire be added to and moved to the forefront of the Nation's policy with respect to Vietnam. So far as I am concerned, it seems to me that the call by this Government for a mutual cease-fire, without ifs, ands, or buts, should be forthcoming without delay. It seems to me that the way to stop the bloodshed is to take the initiative to try to stop it now, if at all possible, by a mutual cease-fire.

As I have stated on previous occasions, the President appears to be moving in that direction. He has already personally ordered a change in tactics in Vietnam for U.S. forces from "maximum pressure" to "protective reaction." In my judgment, it is time to take a step to try to end the bleeding of U.S. forces in this war of Vietnamese which is not and must not be ours.

It would be my hope, therefore, that this resolution might help light at least a candle in the darkness of this tragic and barbarous war. It will now go to the Committee on Foreign Relations and, if the committee so desires, I would appreciate an opportunity to appear on behalf of this resolution. I would expect that the committee will consider the text thoroughly, very thoroughly, perhaps—as the committee in its wisdom may decide—as part of its hearings on Vietnam. It may well be the committee will want to suggest modifications, additions, or subtractions. It might be desirable, for example, to consider adding a plea with regard to information on the U.S. war prisoners in North Vietnam and for the humane treatment of the wounded, the captives, and the helpless on all sides.

Let me emphasize finally that I would expect the committee to take ample time to consider this resolution in all of its aspects. It is not submitted for purposes of window dressing or propaganda and, since it is sponsored by the joint leadership, it is not submitted with partisan intent. The day is very late for anything other than the most sober consideration of this question. There is no margin for the misunderstandings of another Tonkin Gulf resolution in terms of the Senate's responsibility and in terms of the urgent need of the Nation for an end to this war.

It would be my fervent hope that whatever action is taken by the committee and the Senate, it will be an action which will not serve to prolong this conflict. If the Senate acts at all, let it try to act with the President not to enlarge this tragic war but to shorten the path to peace.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the resolution be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

*Resolved*, That the Senate affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam, expresses the earnest hope of the people of the United States for such a peace, calls attention to the numerous peaceful overtures which the United States has made in good faith toward the Government of North Vietnam, approves and supports the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese and that the United States is willing to abide by the results of such elections, and requests the President to call upon the Government of North Vietnam to join in a proclamation of a mutual cease-fire and to announce its willingness to honor such elections and to abide by such results and to allow the issues in controversy to be peacefully so resolved in order that the war may be ended and peace may be restored at last in Southeast Asia.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 2 minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I wish to congratulate the distinguished majority leader and to join him in his declaration of a desire to appear and testify before the Committee on Foreign Relations. I would express the hope that action could be taken on this resolution or on its content, as the committee may wish to consider it, and any possible revision, as soon as possible.

I am aware of the importance of considering at that time the plight of prisoners of war. I joined in another resolution touching on the unfortunate treatment of prisoners of war and the lack of information regarding them or the treatment of them.

I would hope, therefore, that the Committee on Foreign Relations would give this resolution at least as high priority as any other matters pending before it so that the voice of the Senate may be heard in its expression of its desire for the earlier possible conclusion of the war, as well as the total concern of all Members of Congress in the plight of the prisoners of war.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 10 minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I am a cosponsor of the resolution that was submitted this morning by our distinguished majority and minority leaders.

I especially emphasize my support for that portion of the resolution which I now quote:

*Resolved, That the Senate affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam, expresses the earnest hope of the people of the United States for such a peace, calls attention to the numerous peaceful overtures which the United States has made in good faith toward the Government of North Vietnam, approves and supports the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese and that the United States is willing to abide by the results of such elections \* \* \*.*

Mr. President, that language I strongly support. I only wish it could be strengthened and made more positive that the Senate is completely behind the President in the efforts he has made and is making to bring an honorable termination of the Vietnam conflict and to restore peace in Southeast Asia.

As to the remaining part of the resolution with respect to a cease-fire, I want to make certain that no word or action of mine and no vote of mine can ever be construed that the Senate is or that I am voting for a unilateral cease-fire. As long as we are there our men must be protected and defended and I hope no one ever places such an interpretation on the language that is in this resolution.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I quote from a

statement made by the President of the United States on September 16 of this year in which he said:

*We have offered a negotiated supervised cease-fire under international supervision to facilitate the process of mutual withdrawal.*

Mr. McCLELLAN. I think I understand what the language in the resolution means, but there have been suggestions of unilateral cease-fire. I wanted the RECORD to clearly show that by my support of this resolution I do not subscribe to any such recommendation or policy.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. SCOTT. This is as good a time as any to repeat that I have suggested on one occasion a unilaterally initiated cease-fire, not a unilateral cease-fire. I was most careful to state that I did not receive approval in other quarters; this is not a new experience with me in 27 years.

I suggested a unilaterally initiated cease-fire, by which I meant if the other side responded, we would have a cease-fire; if they shoot at us, we would not.

Nevertheless, it does not figure in this resolution. This resolution relates back to the President's statement of mutual cease-fire.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I am glad to have that explanation by the author of the resolution. Insofar as we endeavor to bring the shooting to an end and stop the war honorably, and at the same time protect our troops who are there on the firing line, I am willing to do it. That approach—that objective—has my full and enthusiastic support. But I am still hopeful that in processing the resolution we can find ways to strengthen it. I want the RECORD to reflect that I am wholeheartedly supporting the President in the efforts he is making. If we do not give him the support that he deserves as Commander in Chief and President of the United States in this critical hour, when he is trying to find ways to settle this conflict and bring about peace, we will surely make his task that much more difficult and maybe impossible.

I do not intend to make any contribution by any act of word of mine that will make his task—which is becoming an almost impossible one, in view of the attitude of the enemy—any more difficult for him than it already is. I support him wholeheartedly and want to give him every assistance that I can, and I want the RECORD to so reflect.

#### THE SOURCE SELECTION PROCEDURE FOR THE F-15 AIRCRAFT

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, 7 years ago this month, in November of 1962, the Source Selection Board for the TFX aircraft concluded its deliberations and recommended that the new plane be developed by the Boeing Co., which had proposed, during four separate rounds of competitive design evaluation, to build an airplane with better operational capability than the competing aircraft proposed by the General Dynamics Corp. The Boeing design also offered a lower cost to the taxpayers. The Source Selec-

tion Board was best qualified to judge which design would be most capable of meeting the military and technical requirements to make the TFX an adequate weapons system for both the Air Force and the Navy. The Board's recommendation was four times reviewed and endorsed by the highest-ranking military officers of both services.

We all know what happened next. The recommendations of the Board were rejected by Secretary of Defense McNamara. Although he and his civilian aides were not experts in military weaponry, they arbitrarily overruled the judgment and recommendations of all the top military officers and civilian technical advisers who had four times recommended the Boeing design. Secretary McNamara directed that the TFX contract be awarded to General Dynamics, whose cost proposals were higher and whose design had been ranked second by the experts.

That decision has resulted in 7 years of largely wasted effort and failure. Last year, the Congress refused to appropriate further funds for the F-111B, the Navy version of this plane, and thus forced the Department of Defense to cancel the Navy plane production. We have seen numerous other cutbacks and cancellations in the program during the troubled years of its existence. We should remember that the F-111 weapons system was to have been the backbone of our tactical air power during the late 1960's and throughout the 1970's.

Today we have an F-111 program for the Air Force, but it will now furnish only a third of the total number of planes that were originally scheduled, and at a unit cost which is now more than three times that of the original proposal. Furthermore, the F-111 weapons system falls short of meeting most of the critical performance requirements specified in the original contract, and the program is nearly 3 years behind schedule in reaching a full operational status.

Mr. President, why did Secretary McNamara overrule the experts in the first place? We have never been able to learn why. It has been said that one factor may have been the Defense Department's desire to place the TFX contract with an aircraft manufacturer whose plant was mainly idle and who faced extreme financial difficulty. Whatever the reason may have been, it has resulted in a multi-billion dollar blunder. Therefore Congress should exert every effort—take every precaution—to prevent the repetition of further procurement mistakes of this type of magnitude.

I am making this statement today because the Air Force is now in the final process of selecting a winning design in its competition among three contractors for the F-15 fighter aircraft. The manufacturers involved are the Fairchild Hiller Corp., the North American Rockwell Corp., and the McDonnell-Douglas Corp. I have no partiality for any one of these firms, and I am not presuming to suggest which of them is the most competent manufacturer, nor which company has submitted the best bid.

However, I am convinced that every precaution should be taken not to duplicate the tragic mistakes that have

hounded the TFX program from its inception and which have resulted in the complete loss of one weapon—the Navy plane—and has tripled the cost and reduced by two-thirds the number of Air Force planes that we expected to procure. Of those we are now getting, we know that one-quarter of them likely never will be used as weapons. They are suitable only for training planes.

The proposed aircraft, the F-15, will be a light, fast, highly maneuverable fighter plane with the primary mission of achieving maximum air-to-air capability. I understand that it is designed and intended to replace the F-4 Phantom, and it is represented to be much more maneuverable and to have greater acceleration and range than any current fighter aircraft in the Air Force. It will be a single-seat plane with two engines to be manufactured under new technology specifications. It will have all-weather capabilities and fixed wings. Technical expectations are that it will have sufficient speed, maneuverability and armament to surpass the best performances of fighter aircraft now being manufactured elsewhere in the world, including the Soviet Union. It is claimed that this new aircraft, to be operational in the mid-1970's, will furnish the air superiority in combat missions that the F-111 originally was supposed to provide, because we will be about 7 or 8 years behind, where we would have been had the TFX program been successful.

Mr. President, we all hope that this F-15 program about to be launched into development will be a complete success. The three finalists in the award competition are experienced in the development and production of fighter aircraft and we should have every reason to expect that a superior aircraft will be produced. However, the question of air power is so crucial that this Nation cannot afford to have another fiasco in this vital area of military weaponry comparable to that experienced in the TFX procurement. We must not select any more "second best" candidates for air superiority. The F-111 program showed us what can happen when extraneous factors are substituted for military excellence as guides to the placement of aircraft development contracts.

I trust that we have learned a valuable lesson from the TFX procurement, and that the serious mistakes that have cost us so much in effort, time, money, and loss of weaponry in that program will not be repeated in this procurement.

I have faith in the competence, experience and technical knowledge of the aviation experts who are now judging the three competing designs in order to evaluate them. They should recommend the proposal which will best enable our Air Force to hold air superiority in combat skies. I also have faith in the established procedures of the Source Selection Board, which examines the evaluations, and I am confident that the Board's recommendation will be formulated solely and completely upon the merit of the proposals submitted to the Air Force. When these procedures are completed, the Department of Defense must act to award the contract.

Mr. President, I have great confidence in Secretary of Defense Laird. I know that it is his intention to give us the very best procurement program possible, but it is imperative that the civilian officials of the Pentagon select the aircraft among the three which is best suited to do the combat job required, and that no considerations of any kind other than merit and capability of performance be used to determine the award winner.

#### NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION AUTHORIZATION, 1970—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. ANDERSON), I submit a report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 11271) to authorize appropriations to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for research and development, construction of facilities, and research and program management, and for other purposes. I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the report.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The report will be read for the information of the Senate.

The legislative clerk read the report.

(For conference report, see House proceedings of Nov. 6, 1969, pp. 33313-33315, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.)

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the present consideration of the report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, the House conferees receded from their disagreement to the funding levels contained in the Senate-passed bill and, therefore, the program items and totals are exactly as originally authorized by the Senate-passed bill.

The Senate conferees agreed with the position of the House that the earth resources technology satellite project, under the space applications program, should be aggressively pursued in the future and that continued emphasis should be placed on aeronautical research.

The only changes made to the Senate-passed bill involve three legislative amendments originally approved by the House. The Senate agreed to accept an amendment which canceled authorizations to NASA enacted in fiscal years 1967, 1968, and 1969 for which appropriations had not been made. The Senate conferees also accepted an amendment of the House which specified that the flag of the United States and no other flag shall be implanted or otherwise placed on the surface of the moon or of any planet by members of the crew of any spacecraft making a lunar or planetary landing under any program the funds of which are provided entirely by the Government of the United States.

The Senate conferees agreed to a third amendment of the House which would prohibit institutions of higher education

from making payments funded by programs authorized by NASA to certain individuals who contribute to campus disruptions. In agreeing to this amendment the conferees modified the original language contained in the House bill so that the language conformed to the language adopted by the conferees to the conference report for the National Science Foundations Act Amendments of 1969 and to the language contained in the eligibility-for-student-assistance clause of the Higher Education Amendments of 1968.

I yield to the distinguished Senator from Maine (Mrs. SMITH).

Mrs. SMITH of Maine. Mr. President, I take this opportunity to again commend the able chairman, Senator ANDERSON, for his dedication to the space program and to the members of the staff, especially Mr. Gehrig and Mr. Parker, for their assistance and impartial help on the bill and the conference which followed. The conferees from both the House and the Senate were cooperative and considerate of individual conferee opinions on the bill.

Mr. President, as ranking minority member of the Space Committee, I would like to reiterate one rather important point on the conference meeting, and that is, your conferees were completely successful in holding to the funding amounts initially passed by the Senate.

It is my view that the amounts authorized can provide for reasonable progress in all significant aeronautical and space programs. I am, therefore, hopeful that when the corresponding appropriations bill reaches the floor of the Senate, it, too, will be passed in an amount sufficient to fund the authorizations contained in this bill.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, as a conferee on H.R. 11271, I want to congratulate our distinguished chairman and the ranking minority member, the senior Senator from Maine, for their admirable work in the conference. The quality of their leadership is clearly indicated by the results of the conference which in most instances upheld the Senate's position. I also compliment the chairman and members of the House committee who participated so capably in the conference. I believe the conference resulted in a bill that will provide a balanced NASA program, a program already endorsed by the Senate bill.

There is, however, one program on which I would like to say a few words. The House-passed bill provided an additional \$3 million for the chemical propulsion program to be used only for the 260-inch large solid motor project. The Senate deleted this amount because no role has been assigned these large solid rocket motors for the near future and because the necessary funds to accomplish the few additional tasks remaining to establish the large rocket motor technology are included in the budget request under supporting research and technology.

While no role has been assigned as yet to the 260-inch large solid rocket motor, I think the record should show that NASA continues to regard the large solid

as an alternative for future space programs.

On October 31, 1969, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences wrote to Dr. Paine requesting his views on the role of the 260-inch solid rocket motor. Dr. Paine replied in a letter to the chairman dated November 3.

Mr. President, with the consent of Senator ANDERSON, I ask unanimous consent that the two letters be included in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibits 1 and 2.)

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, in his letter, Dr. Paine makes it clear that NASA continues to regard the large solid rocket motor as one of the attractive, technically feasible alternatives for future space programs and reiterates the fact that the fiscal year 1970 budget does provide for continuing work in research and technology related to this project. Moreover, Dr. Paine points out that while the possibilities of a fully reusable space shuttle vehicle point in a direction of favoring reusable liquid propulsion systems, he does not at this time believe NASA can or should rule out entirely the possibilities of a space shuttle using the 260-inch solid rocket motor in the booster stage.

I should add that I had a personal telephone discussion with Dr. Paine prior to our Senate-House conference and prior to my knowledge of the letter which Senator ANDERSON had written to Dr. Paine. In the course of that discussion Dr. Paine made it very clear to me that he expected to continue the research and technology work on the large 260-inch solid fuel rocket out of the authorization provided for in this year's budget and which are now contained in the conference bill.

I send forward the two letters I have asked to be printed in the RECORD.

#### EXHIBIT 1

OCTOBER 31, 1969.

HON. THOMAS O. PAINE,  
Administrator, National Aeronautics and  
Space Administration, Washington, D.C.

DEAR TOM: During fiscal year 1967, NASA completed the test firing of its third half-length 260-inch large solid rocket motor. Following this, some efforts have been devoted to completing the technology for this booster. In the FY 1970 budget presentation, no provision in either the original or the revised submission was made for any further demonstration firings of 260-inch large solid motor cases.

In view of the space shuttle studies and other activities currently underway and in view of the President's Space Task Group recommendations emphasizing commonality, reusability, and economy in space transportation systems. I would like your current views as to just where you would envision a booster with the projected capability of the 260-inch large solid rocket motor would fit into the nation's requirements for large space boosters. I believe also it is very important that the Committee have an expression of your views on this inasmuch as both the House and the Senate have already approved NASA's recommendations for continued production, and therefore availability, of the Saturn V system for supporting our very heavy space booster requirements.

I would appreciate your thoughts on the projected role of the 260-inch large solid

rocket motor at your very earliest convenience.

Sincerely yours,

CLINTON P. ANDERSON,  
Chairman.

#### EXHIBIT 2

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS  
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION,

Washington, D.C., November 3, 1969.

HON. CLINTON P. ANDERSON,  
Chairman, Committee on Aeronautical and  
Space Sciences, U.S. Senate, Wash-  
ington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in reply to your letter of October 31 asking for my current thoughts on the projected role of the 260-inch solid rocket motor.

We continue to regard the large solid rocket motor as one of the attractive technically feasible alternatives for future space systems. For this reason, as you know, we have provided in our FY 1970 budget for continuing work in research and technology related to the 260-inch solid rocket motor. This work relates, for example, to thrust vector control and propellant casting and processing. We do not plan to proceed with further construction and firing of full scale rocket motors until such time as a decision is made to proceed with actual development.

Our studies to date of the possibilities of a fully reusable space shuttle point in the direction of favoring reusable liquid propulsion systems. However, I do not at this time believe we can or should rule out entirely the possibility of a space shuttle using a 260-inch solid rocket motor in a booster stage. Depending on a number of factors, it could turn out that we would decide to use the large solid rocket booster as an alternative to the fully reusable liquid propulsion system.

With respect to Saturn V, the requirements we have presented to the Committee are not affected by the possibility of a decision to develop the 260-inch solid rocket motor. If we should decide to develop the 260-inch solid for the space shuttle, we would, of course, consider utilizing it for any payloads for which it is suitable, including those which otherwise would require the Saturn V or a derivative vehicle consisting, for example, of the first and second stages of the Saturn V. However, we would not develop the 260-inch rocket motor solely for the purposes of providing a substitute for the Saturn V or its derivatives.

If I can provide any additional information, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

T. O. PAINE,  
Administrator.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, as a member of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Science, I wish to concur in everything that has been stated here in regard to the conference report. I feel that the distinguished senior Senator from New Mexico (Mr. ANDERSON), chairman of the Space Committee of the Senate, is to be congratulated upon his fine leadership in the consideration of the conference report.

I ask that the Senate now vote on it.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the conference report.

The report was agreed to.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the conference report was agreed to.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

#### PRESIDENT NASSER'S SPEECH

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, President Nasser's speech last night is highly disturbing.

The President of the United Arab Republic, speaking to the Egyptian General Assembly, called for a path of "fire and blood" in the Middle East.

The Arab's friend, he said, is the Soviet Union. He listed the United States as an enemy.

While President Nasser is known for bombast and inflammatory talk, his address last night, coupled with his actions, seems to me to be a cause for some alarm.

I have long felt that the Middle East is potentially the most explosive area in the world. I formed this view first as a newspaper editor, obligated to take a keen interest in international problems. My view has been reinforced since becoming a member of the U.S. Senate.

Eighteen months ago, on an official Senate visit to the Middle East, I had a long and frank talk with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad. He indicated some reasonableness—which, incidentally, subsequent events have not borne out.

I expressed the view to the Egyptian Foreign Minister that, to an outsider, there appear to be two fundamental steps which must be taken before permanent peace can be achieved.

One, the Arab nations must recognize that Israel is here to stay and cannot be eliminated as the Arabs sought to do in June of 1967.

And second, the leaders of the United Arab Republic must engage in direct negotiations with the leaders of Israel.

While the four major powers, namely the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France, might be able to collectively be helpful in arriving at a solution, the solution to be permanent and realistic peace must result from direct negotiations between the interested parties; namely, the Israelis and their neighbors.

In my judgment, the Soviet Union was the motivating force behind Nasser's provocative actions against Israel in 1967. Last night's speech by President Nasser indicates to me that he and the Soviet Union are adding flames under a pot which is already boiling.

#### WE MUST CUT OUR ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE AND BRING 200,000 MEN AND THEIR DEPENDENTS HOME

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, the number of men in our Armed Forces now totals more than 3½ million—larger than the regular armed forces of either the Soviet Union or China.

One of every 11 American young men between the ages of 18 and 45 is in uniform full time as a member of our Armed Forces. Another 1,200,000 civilians are employed by the Defense Department. Of this total number, 170,187 American civilians, men and women, work for our Armed Forces overseas as civilian employees. In addition, millions of Americans work in industries sustained, almost

entirely, by Defense Department contracts. It is fair to state that one in every seven wage earners in this country is dependent on the Pentagon for his or her paycheck. This includes much of the Nation's most outstanding managerial and technological talent.

Mr. President, in view of these facts, it sometimes seems futile to try to diminish and somewhat limit the power and influence of the military-industrial complex. Almost 9 years have elapsed since President Dwight Eisenhower warned of the growing menace of the power of the military-industrial complex in his farewell statement to the American people in January 1961.

The power of the military-industrial complex has continued to grow and expand. Our military and naval establishment seems to be expanding constantly. It is much larger and more costly than it was when General Eisenhower left the White House.

We now have 343 major military bases in 24 countries and seven U.S. possessions. In addition, we have 2,687 minor military installations spread throughout the world. More than 1,200,000 American servicemen are stationed in foreign countries.

The United States does not have a mandate from the Almighty to police the entire world. It is high time that the administration and the Congress review our treaty commitments and obligations. The President in his recent speech announced that in the future the United States will assist nations willing and able to defend themselves with their own forces. We should be determined never again to go through the tragedy and national insanity of another involvement in a civil war in some other Asiatic country—Laos, for example. President Johnson's intervention in a civil war in South Vietnam with American combat troops was the worst mistake any American President ever made. In view of these facts, it is clear that there is no need to continue to support the present level of our Armed Forces. It is time that the administration take drastic steps and cut the number of Americans in uniform by at least a million.

There are now more than half a million Americans of our Armed Forces stationed in South Vietnam and Thailand. Forty percent of our tremendous air power and 35 percent of our naval forces are committed to combat duty in Vietnam, Thailand, and off the coast of Vietnam.

The President has stated that he has a secret plan to end our fighting in Vietnam. His plan is still his secret. However, let us hope he will end our involvement in a land war in Southeast Asia and bring the boys home within the next 6 months.

The one place where we can and should make immediate reductions of our Armed Forces is to return forthwith most of the more than 310,000 men of our Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines now stationed in Western Europe with their 240,000 dependents. They have been maintained there over the years, since the end of World War II, at great expense to American taxpayers.

A quarter of a century has elapsed since World War II. Our massive military presence in Western Europe has become merely foreign aid, in the sum of many billions of dollars, to the West German Republic, Holland, Belgium, Spain, and other European countries.

The United States is the only NATO member that has met its commitment 100 percent. The only other NATO nation that has come up to even 80 percent of its commitment has been West Germany.

We have 220,000 servicemen stationed in West Germany, with 160,000 dependents. Based on its gross national product, the West German Republic is the third-wealthiest country in the entire world. The West German mark is one of the world's strongest currencies. In Swiss banks the mark of the West German Republic is considered more sound than the U.S. dollar. The recent revaluation of the German mark, increasing its value, will automatically cost American taxpayers at least an additional \$100 million a year for the maintenance of our forces stationed there. Also, Americans buying Volkswagens and other German-built automobiles will as a result pay a higher price for each automobile purchased, thereby increasing the outflow of money from our country. Surely, it is outrageous and unthinkable that nearly a quarter of a century following the end of World War II, the United States continues to maintain more than 220,000 officers and men of our Armed Forces in West Germany.

While we Americans conscript our young men for 2 years and send many of them to West Germany, the West German Government conscripts their young men for only 18 months. Furthermore, our other allies in Western Europe either have no draft laws whatever or conscript their youngsters for a much shorter period of time than we. Denmark conscripts for 12 to 14 months, France and Norway for 12 to 15 months, Italy for 15 months, Spain for 16 to 24 months, Belgium for but 12 months, and Great Britain not at all.

The nations of Western Europe can certainly provide the necessary troops to defend themselves. There is no reason for them to depend on us. Since the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union is no longer an aggressive threat to our NATO allies. The leaders of the Kremlin during the past 10 years have been intent on increasing the standard of living of their own people. The Soviet Union, now a "have" nation, is veering toward capitalism. Let the West German youth be conscripted and drafted into their own armed forces. Why should the lives and aspirations of our teenage young men be disrupted to form the first line of defense for the Germans and French and their European neighbor countries?

It is generally regarded we do have a national interest in defending Western Europe. It does not follow that to serve this interest we must maintain more than 310,000 troops and more than 240,000 dependents in Europe. The time is long past due for us to withdraw at least 200,000 of these men, and all dependents, from Western Europe.

The U.S. Air Force has a proven capability of flying to Europe an entire division, a fully armed and equipped combat division, and field them ready for combat within less than 36 hours.

Furthermore, whatever men of our Armed Forces are sent to Western Europe for a tour of duty in the future should be sent for a period of not more than 13 months, and with no dependents. If there is a need for our troops in Europe, then we should have a lean, trim, combat-ready force stationed there, not hundreds of thousands of men of our Armed Forces living like "squawmen" with their wives and children. At the present time, all of our officers from captain through field grade up to general grade assigned to Western Europe are living high on the hog with their families and servants, and enjoying trips to European resorts in their Mercedes and other European automobiles, which some sell at handsome profits when returning to the United States. They and their families never had it so good.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BYRD of Virginia in the chair). The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, the threat of military aggression by the Communists against Western Europe has all but vanished. The present rulers of the Soviet Union are no longer rattling their missiles and have not for years. Russian leaders are principally dedicated to the objective of raising the standard of living of their people, and building apartments.

It is the nuclear umbrella of the United States that provides the real protection for Europe and West Germany, not large numbers of ground troops. In addition, by our Operation Airlift we have proven we can airlift a combat-ready division to West Germany from the continental United States in a matter of hours.

It is stupid policy on the part of the Secretary of Defense and the generals of our Joint Chiefs of Staff to maintain in West Germany seven of our best combat divisions, made up in large part of career enlisted men. Undoubtedly, they are the finest and best equipped soldiers who have served any nation under the bending sky of God at any time in the entire history of the world.

It is certain—almost axiomatic—that military and naval leaders will resist inch by inch and dollar by dollar every effort to reduce our Armed Forces and the drain on the national pocketbook. However, time is long past due for a great reordering of national priorities. We must reexamine the policy which has led us to scatter more than 3,000 major and minor military installations throughout the world. Every last one of them that is not absolutely necessary to our national interest should be shut down immediately. The place to begin is Western Europe.

Such action would enable us to begin to solve the many crises confronting us here at home. In addition, it would pro-

duce a significant easing of world tensions and go far toward helping to promote peace and toward promoting the hope that all of us entertain—to live in a period of international contentment.

#### ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

The Vice President announced that on today, November 7, 1969, he signed the enrolled bill (H.R. 10595) to amend the act of August 7, 1956 (70 Stat. 1115), as amended, providing for a Great Plains conservation program, which had previously been signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

#### EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the following communication, which was referred as indicated:

##### AIR TRANSPORTATION NEEDS OF THE 1970'S

A communication from the President of the United States, requesting the approval by the Congress of 1,000 additional air traffic controller positions in the current fiscal year; to the Committee on Commerce.

#### PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented, and referred as indicated:

##### By the VICE PRESIDENT:

A resolution adopted by the American Academy of General Practice, Kansas City, Mo., praying for the enactment of legislation to standardize alcoholism tests; to the Committee on Commerce.

The petition of David R. Tweedy, of Seattle, Wash., praying for the enactment of tax reform legislation; to the Committee on Finance.

A resolution adopted by the Common Council of the city of West Lafayette, Ind., praying for national support in the celebration of Veterans' Day, November 11, 1969; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

#### BILL INTRODUCED

A bill was introduced, read the first time and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

##### By Mr. GRAVEL:

S. 3127. A bill to provide for the exchange of governmental officials between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

(The remarks of Mr. GRAVEL when he introduced the bill appear later in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

#### SENATE RESOLUTION 280—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION AFFIRMING THE SUPPORT OF THE SENATE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A JUST PEACE IN VIETNAM

Mr. SCOTT (for himself, Mr. MANSFIELD, and other Senators) submitted a resolution (S. Res. 280) affirming the support of the Senate for the President's efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam, which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

(The remarks of Mr. SCOTT when he

submitted the resolution appear earlier in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

#### INDEPENDENT OFFICES AND DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATION BILL, 1970—AMENDMENT

##### AMENDMENT NO. 270

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I submit for myself and the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF), the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE), the Senators from New York (Mr. JAVITS and Mr. GOODELL), and the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS), an amendment to H.R. 12307, the independent offices appropriation bill, to appropriate the full authorization for urban renewal activities. I ask that the amendment be printed and lie on the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received, printed, and will lie on the table.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, my remarks today will be brief, for I have spoken previously on the subject and will do so again in more detail when the amendment is called up.

In reporting H.R. 12307, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended appropriating \$250 million in new urban renewal funds to go with \$750 million approved in advance last year.

While the committee action meets the budget request of \$1 billion and does increase by \$150 million the amount approved by the House, the total is short of the full authorization and far short of the demand.

The Department of Housing and Urban Development informs me that it now has on hand urban renewal applications, including requests for funds under the new and popular neighborhood development program, totaling \$2.6 billion.

In justifying its request for an increase in the House-approved appropriation, the Department, at a July 8 hearing before the Senate Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee, outlined the demand in this way:

The pipeline of applications on hand is approximately \$2 billion. This demand comes from new communities that are seeking to enter the program for the first time and from communities that are seeking new projects needed to supplement and expand their existing programs. The Department expects to receive applications in 1970 that will add approximately \$2 billion. The \$1 billion appropriation would be applied against a demand of approximately \$4 billion.

Mr. President, Congress can appropriate as much as \$1,587,500,000 for urban renewal, or \$837,500,000 in new money, still far short of the need.

Congress should appropriate the full authorization to honor the commitment it made in establishing urban renewal programs to help rebuild cities.

The Senate should appropriate the full amount to honor that pledge and to strengthen the hand of our conferees when they meet with House Members to settle differences between the House and Senate versions.

Let me conclude by stating the need in terms other than money.

HUD has applications from about 400 cities for regular urban renewal funds, and from more than 300 cities for NDP funds. It is my understanding that existing commitments will take up \$725 million of the urban renewal appropriation. Unless Congress makes the full authorization available, most of the cities making new applications, including almost 300 asking NDP funds, will have to be turned down.

It should also be noted that HUD cannot make commitments under the urban renewal program totaling more than the amount appropriated for the fiscal year. That means while the appropriation might not be spent entirely this fiscal year, the amount of money Congress makes available determines the number of projects which can be approved and started.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a list of the cities which, as of August 31, had submitted or were about to submit NDP applications be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### NDP APPLICATIONS SUBMITTED OR ABOUT TO BE SUBMITTED TO HUD

##### REGION I

Bridgeport, Conn., Danbury, Conn., Danielson, Conn., New Britain, Conn., New Haven, Conn., Portland, Me., Presque Isle, Me., Boston, Mass., Haverhill, Mass., Lawrence, Mass., New Bedford, Mass.

Springfield, Mass., Woburn, Mass., Albany, N.Y., Beacon, N.Y., Binghamton, N.Y., Corning, N.Y., Elmira, N.Y., Fairport, N.Y., Fulton, N.Y., Glens Falls, N.Y., Lockport, N.Y.

Olean, N.Y., Palmyra, N.Y., Plattsburg, N.Y., Schenectady, N.Y., Syracuse, N.Y., Troy, N.Y., Utica, N.Y., Yonkers, N.Y., Newport, R.I., Pawtucket, R.I., Providence, R.I.

##### REGION II

Wilmington, Del., Baltimore, Md., Elkton, Md., Montgomery County, Md., Bridgeton, N.J., Burlington, N.J., Camden, N.J., Cape May, N.J., East Orange, N.J., Englewood, N.J., Flemington, N.J.

Hoboken, N.J., Jersey City, N.J., Lakewood Township, N.J., Long Branch, N.J., Millville, N.J., Morristown, N.J., Newark, N.J., Newton, N.J., Paterson, N.J., Perth Amboy, N.J., Plainfield, N.J.

Salem, N.J., South Plainfield, N.J., South River, N.J., Wayne Township, N.J., Wildwood, N.J., Woodbridge, N.J., Aliquippa, Pa., Ambridge, Pa., Beaver Falls, Pa.

Bethlehem, Pa., Bradford, Pa., Bridgewater, Pa., Butler, Pa., Eddystone, Pa., Erie, Pa., Franklin, Pa., Harrisburg, Pa., Johnstown, Pa., Lancaster, Pa., Latrobe, Pa.

Lebanon, Pa., Masontown, Pa., McKeesport, Pa., Middletown, Pa., New Kensington, Pa., Pittsburgh, Pa., Pittston, Pa., Pottsville, Pa., Punxsutawney, Pa., Reading, Pa., Scranton, Pa.

Tarentum, Pa., Titusville, Pa., Wilkes-Barre, Pa., Charlottesville, Va., Hampton, Va., Petersburg, Va., Portsmouth, Va., Richmond, Va., Huntington, W. Va., Wheeling, W. Va.

##### REGION III

Alexander City, Ala., Hartselle, Ala., Troy, Ala., Daytona Beach, Fla., Fort Walton Beach, Fla., Tampa, Fla., Alma, Ga., Chatham County, Ga., Columbus, Ga., Macon, Ga.

Rome, Ga., Tallapoosa, Ga., Bowling Green, Ky., Covington, Ky., Paducah, Ky., Laurel, Miss., Meridian, Miss., Chapel Hill, N.C., Charlotte, N.C., Clinton, N.C.

Greensboro, N.C., Salisbury, N.C., Winston-

Salem, N.C., Rock Hill, S.C., Bristol, Tenn., Chattanooga, Tenn., Harriman, Tenn., Huntsville, Tenn., Jackson, Tenn., Jefferson City, Tenn.

Johnson City, Tenn., Kingsport, Tenn., Lawrenceburg, Tenn., Memphis, Tenn., Morristown, Tenn., Nashville, Tenn., Newport, Tenn., South Pittsburgh, Tenn., Tullahoma, Tenn., Union City, Tenn., Winchester, Tenn.

## REGION IV

Bloomington, Ill., Carbondale, Ill., DeKalb, Ill., East St. Louis, Ill., Rockford, Ill., Springfield, Ill., Anderson, Ind., Connersville, Ind., Elkhart, Ind., Evansville, Ind.

Fort Wayne, Ind., Gary, Ind., Indianapolis, Ind., Jeffersonville, Ind., Mishawaka, Ind., Richmond, Ind., Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Ottumwa, Iowa, Waterloo, Iowa, Bay City, Mich.

Detroit, Mich., Garden City, Mich., Hamtramck, Mich., Hazel Park, Mich., Lansing, Mich., Madison Heights, Mich., Muskegon, Mich., Muskegon Heights, Mich., Pontiac, Mich., Romulus Township, Mich.

Duluth, Minn., Hopkins, Minn., Minneapolis, Minn., South St. Paul, Minn., Bismarck, N.D., Minot, N.D., Ray, N.D., Akron, Ohio, Canton, Ohio, Cincinnati, Ohio, Cleveland, Ohio, Columbus, Ohio.

Dayton, Ohio, Mansfield, Ohio, Middletown, Ohio, St. Bernard, Ohio, Steubenville, Ohio, Warren, Ohio, Fort Pierre, S.D., Mitchell, S.D., Sioux Falls, S.D., Stevens Point, Wis., Wisconsin Rapids, Wis.

## REGION V

Batesville, Ark., Blytheville, Ark., Crossett, Ark., Eldorado, Ark., Forrest City, Ark., Heber Springs, Ark., Hope, Ark., Hot Springs, Ark., Little Rock, Ark., Magnolia, Ark., Marianna, Ark.

Monette, Ark., Morrilton, Ark., Newport, Ark., North Little Rock, Ark., Osceola, Ark., Pine Bluff, Ark., Texarkana, Ark., West Memphis, Ark., Denver, Colo., Greeley, Colo., Fort Lupton, Colo.

La Junta, Colo., Longmont, Colo., Pueblo, Colo., Trinidad, Colo., Wellington, Colo., Galena, Kan., Garden City, Kan., Kansas City, Kan., Lawrence, Kan., Lyons, Kan., Manhattan, Kan.

Merriam, Kan., Salina, Kan., St. Paul, Kan., Wichita, Kan., New Orleans, La., Lee's Summit, Mo., Mexico, Mo., Smithville, Mo., St. Louis, Mo., Springfield, Mo., Albuquerque, N. Mex.

Artesia, N. Mex., Carlsbad, N. Mex., Santa Fe, N. Mex., Tucumcari, N. Mex., Elk City, Okla., Hugo, Okla., Miami, Okla., Oklahoma City, Okla., Sand Spring, Okla., Stillwater, Okla., Tulsa, Okla.

Wilburton, Okla., Alice, Tex., Austin, Tex., Edinburg, Tex., Grand Prairie, Tex., Hearne, Tex., Lubbock, Tex., San Antonio, Tex., San Marcos, Tex., Sinton, Tex., Waco, Tex.

## REGION VI

Ketchikan, Alaska, Eloy, Ariz., Scottsdale, Ariz., Bakersfield, Calif., Berkeley, Calif., Campbell, Calif., Coachella, Calif., East Palo Alto, Calif., Fontana, Calif., Hawaiian Gardens, Calif.

Inglewood, Calif., Kentfield Corners, Calif., Laverne, Calif., Lompoc, Calif., Napa, Calif., Oakland, Calif., Oxnard, Calif., Richmond, Calif., Sacramento, Calif., Salinas, Calif.

San Diego, Calif., San Pablo, Calif., San Mateo, Calif., Santa Barbara, Calif., Santa Rosa, Calif., Vallejo, Calif., Visalia, Calif., Hilo, Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, Havre, Mont., Helena, Mont.

Coos Bay, Ore., Eugene, Ore., Portland, Ore., Reedsport, Ore., Salem, Ore., Ogden, Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, Longview, Wash., Seattle, Wash., Casper, Wyo.

## AMENDMENT NO. 272

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio submitted amendments, intended to be proposed by him, to House bill 12307, making appropriations for sundry independent executive bureaus, boards, commissions, corporations, agencies, offices, and the De-

partment of Housing and Urban Development for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

## AMENDMENT OF FEDERAL CREDIT UNION ACT—AMENDMENTS

## AMENDMENT NO. 271

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and Senators TOWER and BROOKE, I submit an amendment to H.R. 2, the Federal Credit Union Act to establish a Federal system of insurance for savings accounts—shares—in Federal- and State-chartered credit unions.

This insurance will operate in a manner similar to the protection now provided for bank deposits by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and for deposits—shares—in savings and loan associations by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.

Federal credit unions are now the only federally chartered savings institutions not covered by a federally sponsored insurance program. The legislation embodied in the amendment would cover immediately all federally chartered credit unions and would make insurance available on a permissive basis to State-chartered credit unions.

The overall loss experience to members' accounts in credit unions has been relatively small. Yet, the losses have weighed heavily on a few credit unions and on a relatively few members. Since credit unions deal primarily with working men and women, the small savers, it is particularly important that they enjoy the same insurance protection enjoyed by savers and depositors in commercial banks and savings and loan associations. By small savers I mean the more than 7.5 million account holders in Federal credit unions, for example, who have less than \$500 in savings. This money probably represents a substantial portion of the total liquid assets of these people. Why should their money be unprotected simply because they have saved in a credit union?

Providing for the insurance of credit union member accounts up to \$15,000, as provided in my amendment, would stimulate thrift among these small savers. The millions of Americans with relatively slight savings in credit unions would have their attention drawn to the importance and advantages of thrift. The existence of a share insurance plan would provide them with a great incentive to develop a systematic plan for savings growth, and would at the same time make their savings as safe as the money of others in banks and savings and loan associations.

The insurance program contained in my amendment has the potential to cover substantially all of the savings now existing in the credit union movement, estimated at \$13,298,000,000 on September 30. The program would be supported by the credit unions themselves through premiums paid for the insurance, and it would be administered by the Administrator of the National Credit Union Administration provided in H.R. 2. The National Credit Union Administration, under H.R. 2, would assume the func-

tions of the present Bureau of Federal Credit Unions, which is a part of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

The need for share insurance has been made clear by a study of regular reserves in Federal credit unions published by the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions earlier this year. In the study, the Bureau noted that 1,204 Federal credit unions completed liquidation in the 5 years ending December 31, 1967. Sixteen percent, or 189, of this number liquidated at a loss to shareholders. Losses to the shareholders, although small in dollar amount, amounted to just over 20 percent of shares.

The majority of the credit unions which paid less than 100 percent at liquidation were small, according to the Bureau's study. Almost four-fifths had assets of less than \$25,000. These statistics concern me. The burden of loss seems to fall on the smaller credit union and the small saver, yet it is to this group that the credit union is most useful. There are over 9,500 Federal credit unions with less than \$500,000 in assets serving people who may have no other access to thrift and credit facilities. Why should these credit unions, and the working men and women who are their members, be exposed to losses simply because there is no share insurance plan for credit unions? I think it would be intolerable for Congress to let this situation continue.

In its reserve study, the Bureau found that without outside help, another 280 credit unions would have liquidated at a loss. Thus, more than one-third of all the Federal credit unions which liquidated in the 5 years preceding December 31, 1967, had at least the potential for loss. The fact that more did not liquidate at a loss is due in large measure to the efforts of State credit union leagues, which provided financial assistance to their member credit unions. Fortunately, the financial resources of the league funds appeared generally adequate to meet their members' needs during the period covered by the Bureau's study. Yet the meager resources available from the leagues to their credit unions—about .045 percent of the \$11 billion in savings held by credit unions—in 1967 indicate it would be a grave mistake to rely on this means alone as a guarantee of the shares of credit union members.

Another inherent weakness in the league organizations is that financial assistance is made available to members only. The owner of a credit union share account thus may become an unwitting victim if his credit union does not belong to the league organization. Finally, not all leagues have formal assistance plans, although most do now.

The program offered in my amendment would not interfere with the commendable efforts of the league organizations to strengthen the financial reserves of their member credit unions. These private funds could serve as useful supplements to the program of share insurance I am proposing. The share insurance plan, under my amendment would make available full and immediate protection for the vast majority of credit union savers and would place credit union

savers on the same level as savers in other financial institutions. This action is long overdue.

Some of the more significant features of the proposed insurance plan are:

First. Mandatory coverage would be provided for Federal credit unions and permissive coverage would be provided for State credit unions. This provision follows the pattern of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.

Second. State credit unions that apply for the insurance would agree to comply with appropriate standards and would be subject to examination by the National Credit Union Administration. The Administrator would be authorized to use the examinations of State supervisory authorities to the extent practicable.

Third. The proposal is designed to provide a self-financing system. All fees collected for insurance would be deposited in a special National Credit Union Insurance Fund in the U.S. Treasury. The Administrator would be authorized continuing borrowing authority in order to give the system the strength necessary to absorb losses in excess of its own immediate resources. On the basis of 35 years' experience by Federal credit unions, the insurance premium contemplated—one-twelfth of 1 percent of members' savings—should be sufficient to absorb all normal losses and to build a reasonable reserve for catastrophic losses. Interest would be paid on any loans from the U.S. Treasury.

Fourth. The annual premium rate for insurance would be one-twelfth of 1 percent of the aggregate of members' accounts and creditor obligations. Authority would be given the Administrator to double the rate in any year in which losses exceeded premium income. When the fund reached a ratio of 2 percent of the amount of insured accounts and no loans from the Treasury were outstanding, the Administrator could reduce the premium rate.

Fifth. Payment of insurance would be made at the completion of liquidation rather than when a credit union closed. This feature would enable the Administrator to utilize the manpower of the liquidating credit union in closing its affairs and thus minimize the cost of administration of the insurance program. It would avoid the need for a substantial liquidating staff in the Administration.

Sixth. The amount of the insurance coverage per account would be fixed at \$15,000. This would not cover all savings in members' accounts, but would protect the vast majority of total member savings, and would match the protection available to savers in other savings institutions.

Seventh. The Administrator would be authorized to make loans to, purchase the assets of, or make contributions to an insured credit union when in his judgment such action would further the interest of the members or protect the fund. This provision for remedial action might easily result in less losses to the fund and would avoid the need for forced liquidation when continued operations were warranted.

Eighth. Provision is made for termination of insurance for a State credit union

when it so desires or when the Administrator finds that continued violations of law or regulations have occurred.

Ninth. The amendment would make the administration of the National Credit Union Insurance Fund subject to the Government Corporation Control Act and would make the criminal provisions of section 709 of title 18 of the United States Code—relating to false advertising and misuse of names to indicate a Federal agency—applicable to insured credit unions.

Mr. President, in my view, the amendment I am proposing represents a much needed step toward the protection of member savings in credit unions. The question of share insurance has been long debated in the credit union movement and has been discussed in government as well. In fact, the 1955 Report of the Council of Economic Advisers to the President recommended that Congress consider providing share insurance for credit unions. Again early this year, the outgoing Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, in his annual report, similarly recommended such a plan.

The Committee on Banking and Currency, of which I am the ranking minority member, took testimony last year on the subject of losses in Federal credit union liquidations during hearings on S. 3002, S. 3214, and S. 3395. The House Banking and Currency Committee has also taken testimony on the same subject, including hearings on H.R. 7347 in 1967 and meetings with department and agency officials earlier that year.

In fact, Mr. President, the subject is bound to come up on a continuing basis until Congress acts to relieve the present situation. Members of credit unions will become more and more pressing in their demands that their savings be accorded the same safeguards as funds placed in other financial institutions. The time for discussion has passed, the time for action is at hand.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received, printed, and will lie on the table.

#### NOTICE CONCERNING NOMINATION BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, the following nomination has been referred to and is now pending before the Committee on the Judiciary:

Andrew J. F. Peeples, of Florida, to be U.S. marshal for the middle district of Florida for the term of 4 years, vice John E. Maguire, Sr.

On behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, notice is hereby given to all interested persons in this nomination to file with the committee, in writing, on or before Friday, November 14, 1969, any representations or objections they may wish to present concerning the above nomination, with a further statement whether it is their intention to appear at any hearing which may be scheduled.

#### ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: POLLUTION AND NATIONAL PRIORITIES

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, the Sierra Club is one of our Nation's most

worthwhile conservation organizations. With energy, skill, and a willingness to do battle when necessary, the Sierra Club is trying to protect and provide for the proper development of the natural resources of the United States. Whether it be insane projects like putting a dam in the Grand Canyon or simply unwise projects like building a massive jetport and destroying a national park, the Sierra Club is willing to fight to preserve our not unlimited natural resources.

Should we ever reverse the tide of environmental deterioration, I am confident the Sierra Club will be in the vanguard of the efforts required.

On October 24, I had the pleasure of addressing the Southeast Chapter of the Sierra Club in Pikesville. I ask unanimous consent that my address be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: POLLUTION AND NATIONAL PRIORITIES

A little over four hundred years ago the European explorers first stepped ashore and planted their flags on American soil.

In the North, French chevaliers like La Salle, Champlain and Marquette began to explore the St. Lawrence River, the Great Lakes and the upper reaches of the Mississippi.

In the South, Spanish conquistadors like De Soto and Ponce de Leon sought gold, fame, and Christian converts as they traveled through Florida and what is now the states of the Gulf coast and southwest.

In the East, English adventurers like Cabot and Raleigh were followed shortly by those hardy settlers of Plymouth, Jamestown, and St. Mary's City who themselves were followed by obstinate and courageous Dutchmen like Hudson and Stuyvesant.

While all these Europeans disagreed with each other on practically everything—particularly on who was going to own the continent—they all agreed on one simple basic fact:

That together they had discovered a continent fantastically rich in natural resources. They had happened upon a land abundant with forests, farmland, rivers, and mineral deposits. They had sailed their little boats into what would become the richest and most naturally blessed land the World has ever seen.

Robert Frost once said that "What makes a nation in the beginning is a good piece of real estate."

We have had the real estate, but a good deal has happened to it since those European adventurers began to explore America.

In 1776 in Philadelphia, a new nation was conceived while her people had already begun to move westward to the Mississippi. With boundless energy, great skill and courage, the land and its resources were molded to serve the needs of a growing country and her enterprising citizens. Mines were dug, railroads built, Indians removed, factories constructed, forests were cleared.

The result is that at the present time, 193 years after independence, the United States holds sway over the greatest industrial and commercial empire the world has ever seen. In but two years the increase in our GNP is more than twice the entire Gross National Product of the United Kingdom. The ninth largest GNP in the world belongs not to a nation, but to an American automobile company named General Motors.

Computers, plastics, instant replays and instant breakfast, space flights and skyscrapers all represent the triumph of this empire.

Yet the price of this progress, some would

term it merely "development," has been high.

The cost must be recognized in our failure to realize the political and personal humanitarian values so treasured by Jefferson and Jane Addams, and in the decline of the quality of our environment.

As the late Professor Robert McCloskey of Harvard University wrote of the years following the Civil War, an emphasis on property rights, contracts, and commercial development replaced personal rights and a basic concern for the hardworking, poor individual. The philosophies of Andrew Carnegie and Justice Stephen Field reigned supreme. This emphasis remained dominant till the 1930's, and continues to be evident today, in the area of tax reform to mention just one example.

The price has also been measured by the increasing deterioration of our environmental quality. This decline is one of the major problems now confronting our nation.

As a nation and a society we have permitted the intolerable abuse of our natural resources.

But as members of the Sierra Club I need not detail to you the way in which we've damaged these priceless and not unlimited resources.

In your charter one of the stated purposes of the Sierra Club reads, "To explore, enjoy, and protect the nation's scenic resources."

I would only ask that for the present time at least you concentrate on the last.

Any nation that permits all its rivers to become polluted, its skies filled with garbage, and its soils poisoned with pesticides—as we have—needs this protection.

A central reason for the deterioration of our environment is the enshrined position technology seems to occupy in our society.

Technology is how we do something. It is a tool, a technique, a method. It is how we apply the knowledge science has given us. It is not knowledge itself. It is not science.

Nor is it always progress. Too often we confuse the two. We assume that what is technologically feasible is also desirable. This is not necessarily the case. Technology rather than serve us may destroy us.

Unfortunately, we too often tend to forget this. In America today technology appears as an irresistible force, with a momentum of its own, beyond human direction and restraint. If it's feasible, it's desirable as well.

The true nature of technology was noted by Howard W. Johnson, the President of MIT:

"Technology is at once our blessing and our bane, the well spring of our aspirations, yet the threat to our wellbeing. Technology is both social benefactor and social calamity."

Admiral Rickover reminds us of this calamity:

"Technology cannot claim the authority of science. It has proved anything but infallibly beneficial. Much harm has been done man and nature because technologies have been used with no thought for the possible consequences of their interaction with nature."

Just because we can build an SST doesn't mean we should.

Just because we can build a dam, or fill in a bay, or strip mine an entire county doesn't mean we should.

We must learn to balance technology with ecology. We must remember that our natural resources are in large part responsible for our strength and that the Earth's life support system is as fragile as Apollo Eleven's.

And we should never forget that America is judged not only for the quantity of her factories but for the quality of her society as well.

The simple fact of the matter is that our national priorities are out of order.

We spend too little time and money on the sensible development of our natural resources and on the restoration of a quality environment.

National priorities come down to the question of choice. It is my strong belief that our nation has not chosen her priorities wisely.

Since World War II we have spent slightly less than one trillion dollars on Department of Defense projects and policies.

In the last ten years direct military outlays of the U.S. totaled more than \$551 billion. In the last eight years the military and its industries have been the highest employer in the nation. The \$551 billion figure is twice as much as the combined federal, state, and local government expenditures for education.

In this fiscal year, while we are spending more than sixty percent of our controllable federal funds for the military-industrial complex, we are spending only about \$13 billion, or about nine percent, for programs to service and improve the health of Americans.

In the past decade we have spent about \$30 billion for agricultural subsidies and \$35 billion for space exploration. Yet we have not been willing to spend even \$4 billion in the same time for water pollution control programs.

The United States has chosen to concentrate its energy on weapons to wage war rather than conquer disease, ignorance, and poverty. Instead of houses, schools, and subways, we have built tanks, missiles, and submarines, far in excess of our legitimate national security needs.

What is particularly disturbing to me is that the present Administration appears either unwilling or unable to reorder our priorities and place our own house in order.

The Administration opposed a six hundred million dollar Fiscal Year 1970 appropriation for construction of water quality treatment facilities. This is the barest minimum that should be spent and, in fact, is really too low to make much more than a medium-sized splash in the bucket required to clean up our waters. The President requested only \$214 million for this vital program.

The Administration cut thirty million dollars from the previous Administration's request for the Land and Water Conservation fund which is used to buy parklands. Instead of the \$200 million authorized the President requested \$124 million.

The Administration failed to properly protect the Everglades National Park from the new Miami Airport. And it was the Sierra Club rather than the Department of the Interior that alerted us to the threat and that was instrumental in limiting the Airport to training flights only.

The Administration has refused to call a halt to the tragic dumping of taconite tailings in Lake Superior.

The Administration has failed to act forcefully in the area of pesticides, permitting the contamination of our soils and the poisoning of wildlife to continue. With us tonight is Delegate Leonard Jacobson who has pre-filed a bill in the Maryland House of Delegates prohibiting the use of DDT and other persistent pesticides.

It is my hope that his legislation will be more successful than mine which has been referred to the Senate Committee on Agriculture.

Finally, and perhaps most disturbing, it has been reported that the Nixon Administration had delayed for nearly a month the transmittal of a report on acid mine drainage, apparently to ease pressures for greater funding for water pollution control.

Should this be true, it is most disquieting. The public's right to know must not be shelved to protect government and its officials from public oversight and criticism. Such protection is directly contrary to our system of government. Secrecy like this cannot be tolerated.

The Chesapeake Bay is the great natural treasure of Maryland. Its blue waters make up the most fertile marine pastures in this

hemisphere. Its history is an integral part of our state's past. Its recreational potential is a prime reason why Maryland is known as the land of pleasant living.

As one who lives on the Chesapeake, I can only agree with Captain John Smith's 1607 description of the Bay as "a very goodly bay."

Yet the Bay is now being damaged by pollution from industry and towns, from ships and quite possibly, from nuclear power plants. Pollutants contaminate the Bay, impair its beauty and threaten its marine productivity. The latter is particularly disturbing for the Chesapeake is a major source of crabs and oysters for the entire nation.

In order to protect the Bay we need to plan for its proper development. Yet no master plan as such now exists.

One, however, currently is being drafted by a specially appointed State Interagency Planning Commission. But we hear little about the Commission and nothing about the plan.

I therefore call upon the Sierra Club to undertake as a major project the constructive criticism of this plan and more immediately, to demand that the plan as well as the planning process itself be opened up to public scrutiny.

The Sierra Club should question the Commission's assumptions, review their objectives, analyze their data, and critique their methods.

It should see to it that the plan is comprehensive and that the public has had its chance to participate.

The project is essentially political. You have to prod legislators, push officials, write letters and generally raise hell.

But from what I read of the Sierra Club, I've come to the right people.

A master plan for the Chesapeake is absolutely essential for the maximum use of the Bay's potential.

It must provide for the growth in population and industry, yet guarantee the Bay's protection. It must ease the environmental impact of change over the next two decades.

The plan should be drawn up by ecologists, urban planners and maritime authorities. It should inventory sources of pollution and devise means to eliminate them.

Speaking on environmental quality a few years ago, John F. Kennedy said:

"Each generation must deal anew with the 'raiders,' with the scramble to use public resources for private profit, and with the tendency to prefer short-run profits to long-run necessities. The nation's battle to preserve the common estate is far from won."

The raiders are still with us today. It is the responsibility of organizations like the Sierra Club, of those of us in Congress, indeed of every citizen in every state to ensure that these raiders fall in their exploitation of our resources and that the environment we pass on to the next generation of Americans possesses the clean water, fresh air, and fertile soils that those early discoverers found so many years ago.

#### MORE RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY SPENDING NEEDED

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, yesterday the Senate considered the conference report on the military procurement authorization bill. Due to a prior commitment in New York State, I was unable to be here for the debate. I was, however, familiar with the contents of the report and asked to be positioned as voting against it.

I have read in the RECORD the exchanges which took place on the floor of the Senate yesterday. Before commenting on the report and the action taken on it, I wish to commend the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) for his handling of this difficult and impor-

tant bill. He has been patient, cooperative, and fair. His management of the bill, throughout months of heated debate, reflects how he has gained for himself the sincere respect of his colleagues.

I wish to express also my real satisfaction to the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE) for his tenacity in dealing with the chemical and biological warfare—CBW—provisions of this bill. I am grateful to him for his efforts to keep intact the Senate-passed restrictions on CBW. I want to thank him for making clear to the conferees the intent of the amendments on CBW open-air testing and delivery systems which I offered jointly with the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON).

Mr. President, yesterday, the Senate accepted the conference report on the military procurement bill. My opposition to the report is based on feelings which compelled me to vote against passage of the bill in September.

The military procurement bill now authorizes \$20.7 billion for fiscal year 1970. This is \$722 million more than the Senate-passed authorization. Let us remember that this \$20 billion spending amount is only a part of the Pentagon's total budget request of nearly \$80 billion for fiscal year 1970. It represents funds for new defense programs, such as the controversial ABM system and the advanced manned strategic bomber—AMSA. It represents funds for ongoing military expenditures in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. It counts in funds for gases and germs to add to the chemical and biological warfare program—CBW.

Today, we must guard against the false impression of accomplishment. The question of what portion of our resources should be allocated to national defense—has not been solved. The question of how much overkill is too much—has not been solved. The question of whether vast arms arsenals add to or detract from security of nations and peace among nations—has not been solved.

All of these questions relate to America's future. Answers have meaning as to where America is now on the balance-of-terror ladder and what measure of security has been gained or lost by climbing the rungs of destruction capability.

Mr. President, what happened to those Senate-passed provisions which sought to limit, reduce, restrict, and control military spending and weapons programs? I would like to focus my attention on two areas of military expenditure in this bill which are of particular concern to me. One is the military assistance program in Laos and Thailand. The other, is the chemical and biological warfare program.

#### MILITARY AID TO LAOS AND THAILAND

Mr. President, the Senate adopted an amendment offered by the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER), which placed restrictions on the use of military assistance to Laos and Thailand for support of combat operations. These restrictions signaled our concern over deepening U.S. involvement in Laos and Thailand. The amendment, passed by a unanimous vote of 86 to 0, represented our precaution against another Vietnam by way of Laos and Thailand.

The Senate wrote the following limitation on our military assistance to Laos and Thailand:

SEC. 401. Subsection (a) of section 401 of Public Law 89-367 approved March 15, 1966 (80 Stat. 37), as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Not to exceed \$2,500,000,000 of the funds authorized for appropriation for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes (1) to support Vietnamese and other free world forces in Vietnam, (2) to support local forces in Laos and Thailand, but support to such local forces shall be limited, except where protection of United States personnel is directly concerned, to the providing of supplies, materiel, equipment, and facilities, including maintenance thereof, and to the providing of training for such local forces, and (3) for related costs, during the fiscal year 1970 on such terms and conditions under Presidential regulations as the Secretary of Defense may determine."

Now we have before us the conference-approved language which reads:

SEC. 401. Subsection (a) of section 401 of Public Law 89-367 approved March 15, 1966 (80 Stat. 37), as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

(a) Not to exceed \$2,500,000,000 of the funds authorized for appropriation for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes to support: (1) Vietnamese and other Free World Forces in Vietnam, (2) local forces in Laos and Thailand; and for related costs, during the fiscal year 1970 on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine."

Mr. President, I join with Senator COOPER and other Senators who have expressed regret that the Senate language prohibiting funds for support of local forces in Laos and Thailand has been deleted from the bill.

Have we learned nothing from our mistakes in Vietnam? In view of increasing U.S. involvement in Laos and Thailand, restrictions on our military activity there are of growing importance.

In the course of Senate debate on this important matter, Senator COOPER clearly stated the points at issue: First, whether the President of the United States has the right to use combat troops in another country without the approval of Congress; and, second, whether the United States would, by use of its combat forces move into a new war in Laos and Thailand.

The Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) has said, and he is quite certainly right, that the most effective defense against U.S. support of local forces in Laos and Thailand is "the prohibition of appropriations."

Regrettably, Congress has failed to use its power over the purse strings to limit U.S. involvement in Laos and Thailand.

Yesterday, Senator COOPER indicated his intention to offer his amendment again. He can count on my active support.

#### CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM

Mr. President, now I should like to turn to the chemical and biological warfare program. The Senate passed an omnibus anti-CBW amendment. It was agreed to unanimously by a vote of 91 to 0. Passage

of this amendment signified a breakthrough in the secrecy surrounding CBW. It represented the determination of Congress to review carefully and continuously the CBW program. It represented first steps to congressional control over Pentagon activity in gas and germ weapons.

Regarding the open-air testing of deadly gas and disease-producing germs, our concern was first and foremost the health safety of the American people. The principle underlying our restrictions on open-air testing was that the security of this Nation begins with the health and safety of our people. Pentagon requests for outdoor testing of CBW would be viewed in this context.

Recognizing the dangers which outdoor testing of deadly gas and disease-producing bacteria pose to public health safety, the Senate wrote the following restrictions on open-air testing:

SEC. 402. (f) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other Act shall be used for the open air testing of lethal chemical agents, or any disease-producing biological microorganisms, or biological toxins except upon a determination by the Secretary of Defense, under guidelines provided by the President of the United States, that an open air test is necessary for the national security, and then only after a separate determination by the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, within thirty days of the determination of the Secretary of Defense, that the test proposed will not present a hazard to the public health. The Secretary of Defense shall report his determination and that of the Surgeon General, to the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and to the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives at least thirty days prior to any actual test. The Secretary of Defense shall set forth in his report the name of the agents, microorganisms, or toxins to be tested, the time and place of any test, and the reasons therefor.

Mr. President, the Senate-passed language on open-air testing of CBW would leave the option open for outdoor testing of CBW. It is my view that it should be unnecessary in the future to engage in any outdoor testing of deadly gas and germs. Nevertheless, we did leave the door open for the very unusual—and I emphasize very unusual—situation that might arise in the national security.

Senate language, however, did establish certain, definite checkpoints on outdoor testing. Congressional control is provided through several committees. The burden of proof is on the Pentagon, under guidelines provided by the President of the United States, if any further tests are to take place due to national security. The language makes it mandatory that the Surgeon General make a separate determination that the tests will not present a hazard to the public health.

Now we have before us the conference-approved language on open-air testing of CBW. We have different language here which in my opinion weakens the restrictions on outdoor testing of deadly gas and germs:

SEC. 409. (b) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any other Act may be used for the transportation of any lethal chemical or any biological war-

fare agent to or from any military installation in the United States, or the open air testing of any such agent within the United States until the following procedures have been implemented:

(1) the Secretary of Defense (hereafter referred to in this section as the "Secretary") has determined that the transportation or testing proposed to be made is necessary in the interests of national security;

(2) the Secretary has brought the particulars of the proposed transportation or testing to the attention of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, who in turn may direct the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service and other qualified persons to review such particulars with respect to any hazards to public health and safety which such transportation or testing may pose and to recommend what precautionary measures are necessary to protect the public health and safety;

(3) the Secretary has implemented any precautionary measures recommended in accordance with paragraph (2) above (including, where practicable, the detoxification of any such agent, if such agent is to be transported to or from a military installation for disposal): *Provided, however,* That in the event the Secretary finds the recommendation submitted by the Surgeon General would have the effect of preventing the proposed transportation or testing, the President may determine that overriding considerations of national security require such transportation or testing be conducted. Any transportation or testing conducted pursuant to such a Presidential determination shall be carried out in the safest practicable manner, and the President shall report his determination and an explanation thereof to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as far in advance as practicable; and

(4) the Secretary has provided notification that the transportation or testing will take place, except where a Presidential determination has been made: (A) to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least 10 days before any such transportation will be commenced and at least 30 days before any such testing will be commenced; (B) to the Governor of any State through which such agents will be transported, such notification to be provided appropriately in advance of any such transportation.

Mr. President, the conference-approved language does not require the Surgeon General to determine that future open-air tests of CBW would not present a hazard to public health. Rather, it merely permits or empowers the Surgeon General to review hazards to public health and "to recommend" precautionary measures against such hazards.

It is my frank opinion that the revised language on outdoor testing of CBW places public safety on the "back burner" of security of our people.

When the Senate passed its language restricting outdoor CBW testing, I cautioned:

If the moratorium [on CBW open-air testing] is to be meaningful, we simply must be guided by the principle that the security of this Nation begins with the health and safety of our people. Pentagon requests based on national security simply must be viewed in this context. If not, the moratorium on outdoor testing would be relatively meaningless. If CBW tests are requested, every effort must be made to confine them to the laboratory. This point cannot be emphasized enough. We all know the example at Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah where thousands of sheep were killed. Had the wind shifted farther a

large city in the United States would have been engulfed by deadly nerve gas, VX—odorless and colorless. What a disaster that would have been. We must not engage in such tests without the highest priority given the safety of our people.

Let me say again today that when any outdoor testing of deadly gas and germs is considered, we must always get back to this idea of public safety.

Yesterday, the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. McINTYRE) emphasized this point when he said:

It was clearly the sense of the conferees, when section 409(b) was passed and agreed to, that the Surgeon General would be in a position to make determinations; and not just recommendations that could be brushed aside; that the Secretary of Defense would be bound by determinations of the Surgeon General unless he got a Presidential determination that overriding considerations of national security required a specific instance of transportation or testing notwithstanding the danger to the public and safety.

I feel that this intent of the conferees is preserved in the changed version, but I want to underscore that intent at this time.

On the matter of CBW delivery systems, Senator McINTYRE made another important clarification. He said that the ceiling on procurement of chemical and biological weapons not only relates to "any delivery system specifically designated to disseminate any lethal chemical or any biological warfare agent." The procurement ceiling also applies to "any delivery system part or component specifically designed for such purpose," that is, to disseminate lethal chemical agents or any disease-producing bacteria.

Mr. President, so much for the past. Now for the present. If any one idea has dominated the Senate's long consideration of the military procurement bill, it is the idea that Pentagon spending requests simply must undergo incisive congressional review.

Congress, as a whole, let us frankly admit, has been lax in its review of military procurement practices and the significance of mounting military spending. As a result, billions of dollars have been spent on weapons of questionable defense utility. Arms arsenals have grown and too often on the fallacious reasoning of "the bigger, the better." Tax money has too often gone to prop up a sense of false security. This can stop.

My votes against the military procurement bill and the conference report register my determination that the Pentagon check and recheck every request it makes to Congress. It indicates my determination that Congress must continue to review military spending; strive to eliminate unnecessary military weapons programs; and seek to place needed restrictions on present and planned military programs. My votes reflect my resolve that this country simply cannot afford costly military programs of doubtful contribution to the defense or security of this Nation.

Voices of conscience in this country have called out for a reordering of our national priorities with emphasis on the unmet needs of our people in education, jobs, housing, and health. These voices call out for cutting out needless military

spending which adds not to national security but only to the already too heavy burden of the American taxpayer.

My votes against the military procurement bill reflect these concerns. I shall continue my protest until these concerns are heard and heeded.

#### STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE REPORT REFUTED

Mr. PROXMIRE, Mr. President, many of us who are deeply concerned with the ever escalating costs to the Nation's consumers of the oil import program have taken heart at the professional approach to oil import policies by the Cabinet Task Force on Oil Imports. The questions they have asked have shown a depth and grasp of the intricacies of the oil business seldom, if ever, seen in Washington.

Yet, now when they are close to finishing their effort, there is a growing chorus of sniping designed to discredit these competent staff members. This criticism is coming from the oil industry—the very group that asked for the Presidential study in the first place. Representative CONTE, one of the most respected Members of the House, addressed himself to this issue.

I ask unanimous consent to have his words printed in the RECORD at the end of my comments.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. PROXMIRE, Mr. President, apart from this undeserved criticism, the staff of the task force has had other burdens to bear. I refer to some of the submissions they have received from self-seeking private interests. All of us in recent months who have been looking into what the esteemed Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. McINTYRE) calls "the secret government of oil" must commiserate with the staff of the task force for having to read so many pages filled with so little substance.

The Stanford Research Institute's submission to the task force on behalf of the Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. is a prime example of the fuzzy economic thinking and unsupportable assertions being mustered to defend the oil import program. Let us examine some of the arguments that SRI attempts to use to justify the program.

#### SRI STATEMENT

There is almost no empirical evidence that can be relied upon in making the projections of the cost of the oil import program. (P. 1.)

#### REBUTTAL

The hearings being held by the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART) on the costs of the oil imports program and the submissions to the task force contain many estimates of the cost of the oil import program made by many competent economists based on hard, empirical data. All of them estimate the cost of the oil import program to the consumers to be between \$6 to \$7½ billion a year. By pretending this data does not exist, SRI sets the stage for the rest of its report which consists of a series of simplistic assumptions without a shred of statistical evidence to support them.

As a matter of fact, after making the statement that there is insufficient empirical evidence to analyze the oil import program, they go on to posit that they have the necessary experience—empirical evidence—to analyze the program and proceed to do so unencumbered by any verifiable facts.

## SRI STATEMENT

An evaluation of the potential benefits and costs associated with the existing oil import control program must be made within a framework that includes consideration of the following: the price of crude, the stability in the price of foreign crude, the price of products.

## REBUTTAL

Although SRI asserts that product prices must be included in any meaningful study, nowhere in the SRI study is there any discussion of any kind of product prices. There is no discussion of the decline in world product prices compared to the rise in domestic product prices which has increased the cost of the oil import program to the Nation. Surely, this is of some significance.

## SRI STATEMENT

Unlimited imports would lead in time to such a tremendous concentration of Free World oil production in the Arab (plus Iranian) OPEC countries that imported crude oil prices would become far more volatile, and the average price would trend upward (p. 4).

## REBUTTAL

Of course, there is already a concentration of production in the Arab—plus Iranian—OPEC countries. But if the SRI had taken the time to glance at the trends of the last decade, it would have found that there has been a tremendous diversification in crude oil production around the world. Exploration and production have been expanded or initiated in Canada, Venezuela, Nigeria, Indonesia, Angola, Cabinda, and in many other countries during this period. In addition, there have been gigantic discoveries in Alaska. This trend toward diversification in supplies would gain impetus if import controls were eliminated here at home.

At the same time, consumption in Europe, Japan, and elsewhere has risen rapidly over the last decade—so rapidly that Japan has now become the largest oil importing country in the world and Europe has outstripped the United States in its demand for oil. Yet, prices during the entire decade since the imposition of oil import controls have trended down—not up. There is absolutely no evidence to indicate that this downward trend would change if the United States eliminated oil import controls, because this trend is caused by competition among suppliers which will continue. Remember, the cost of producing a barrel of oil in the most expensive Middle Eastern country is 14 cents a barrel. This means the incremental cost of producing additional oil is so small that the best way to maximize profits would be to cut prices and sell more oil.

The SRI report chooses to ignore all these factors and trends in favor of a simple assertion that prices would rise. To state an assertion is not to prove it.

## SRI STATEMENT

(With the elimination of controls) . . . the independent producer would rapidly disappear. Even integrated companies with lim-

ited foreign crude would face several economic problems and some could disappear. Also, the independent refiner would disappear. (pp. 4 & 5).

## REBUTTAL

Another assertion without a shred of supporting evidence. SRI should have looked at what has happened abroad where there are no oil import controls. If they had bothered to look, they would have found that while production, marketing, and refining was in the hands of a very few giant corporations up through the early 1950's, since that time because there is a free competitive market there has been a proliferation of companies in all phases of the oil business. Some 250 companies, in fact, now compete for outlets overseas, competition is vigorous and consumer prices have fallen accordingly.

If we could return this country's oil operation to the competitive arena, I submit the same situation would prevail. Instead of existing on a subsidy, the independent refiner could buy his crude oil anywhere in the free world. He could shop for a price and get it. Similarly, the independent marketer could shop for his heating oil supplies or other products and free from the necessity of doing business with the major oil companies, the independent marketer could and would flourish.

SRI apparently does not like a free market economy where its clients are involved.

## SRI STATEMENT

(In the absence of controls) the margin on distillate fuel oil distribution and marketing is fairly narrow, and since only a little lower price would have virtually no effect on sales volume, it is doubtful that distillate prices would change significantly (p. 5).

## REBUTTAL

Quite frankly, I do not know where SRI got that idea. If they had bothered to read any of the literature on home heating oil, they would have realized that even the oil industry studies show that Montreal prices for home heating oil run 3½ cents a gallon or roughly \$1.50 a barrel lower than prices for the same product in Boston or New York. And that oil is transported from Portland, Maine, to Montreal—a distance greater than from Portland to Boston. In light of the facts, I cannot imagine where SRI got the evidence to make the assertion that home heating oil prices would change very little if import controls were eliminated.

## SRI STATEMENT

(Without controls) domestic production from existing wells would at the outset continue at current levels in the near term . . . (p. 5).

## REBUTTAL

Apparently, this group of "experienced" researchers either do not know about or did not take into consideration State market proration controls. All the economists who testified before Senator HART's committee indicated that these market proration laws kept our most efficient wells at a fraction of their productive capacity while allowing our most inefficient wells to run at full capacity. Without import controls, the State market proration laws make no sense and thus production from our most efficient fields would rise substantially, not continue at present levels.

## SRI STATEMENT

The effect of lowered price on the North Slope developments is extremely difficult to evaluate at this time, but it is estimated that the only economic activity would be the exploitation of the field already discovered. . . (pp. 8 & 9).

## REBUTTAL

SRI again reaches a conclusion by ignoring elementary facts. The oil industry has invested close to \$1 billion to acquire leases in the North Slope area. In light of the gigantic investment of the oil companies and the promising geological structure underlying a good part of Alaska, how can SRI seriously contend that the oil industry will not exploit this oil. This is a particularly absurd statement of SRI when one considers that the oil which has been found there already can compete economically with oil from the Middle East or any other part of the globe with or without oil import controls.

## SRI STATEMENT

An increased reliance on foreign supplies of oil and gas would have a material effect on the balance of payments. By 1980, these imports would amount to \$13 billion a year—\$10 billion higher than if import controls were maintained. (p. 20).

## REBUTTAL

This is the final Alice in Wonderland example of SRI's incompetence. The \$13 billion figure they mention is not even supported by their own evidence. The one time they quantify one of their assertions, it is unsupported by their own evidence.

The one table in their whole study that deals with uncontrolled imports shows a total import projection in 1980 of just under 11 million barrels a day. The one statement dealing with crude oil prices in their whole study asserts that, without controls, the refinery prices of domestic and imported crude would average about \$2.25 a barrel, compared with the present \$3.50. Now, if one multiplies \$2.25 a barrel times 11 million barrels a day times 365 days a year, we arrive at an estimate of \$9 billion a year cost—not \$13 billion. And even here, I am not sure where SRI got their base estimate of 11 million barrels a day of foreign imports in 1980. Even the Interior Department, which has traditionally represented the oil industry in the councils of Government, estimated that under the most adverse conditions we would have imports of less than 10 billion barrels in 1980, although they estimated more likely we would have imports of only about 8 billion barrels in 1980.

Thus, the one time SRI chose to quantify their assumptions, they made a mistake in arithmetic—an error in their favor of some 44 percent. This mistake in simple mathematics is the setting jewel in the crown of SRI's meaningless conclusions. Quite obviously, the jingle of the cash register has lulled SRI into forgetting fundamental principles of academic honesty, scholarly research, and objectivity.

In its cover letter to the SRI report, the Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. urged the Task Force on Oil Imports to completely reject the Charles River Associates report, presumably in favor of the SRI report. The staff of the task

force should recognize the SRI report for what it is—a sellout—and dismiss it out of hand.

EXHIBIT 1

REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE SILVIO O. CONTE ON THE FLOOR OF THE HOUSE, OCTOBER 21, 1969

Mr. Speaker, recent developments concerning the President's Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control present both a hope and a challenge to those of us who have long been opposed to the restrictive oil quota system.

The hope I speak of is based on several Administration submissions to the Task Force recommending substantial alterations in, if not the total abolition of, the Mandatory Oil Import Program.

The challenge is that a massive effort is now underway to discredit the Task Force staff in the eyes of both the White House and Task Force members.

Mr. Speaker, I am sure I speak for all 53 co-sponsors of my bill to end the quota system, and many more members as well, in urging both the Task Force and the President to resist these pressures.

Already, Mr. Speaker, there have been several encouraging signals coming from Administration sources.

First, and perhaps most important, Assistant Attorney General Richard W. McLaren, Chief of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, has recommended abolition of the quotas, saying they have no relation to "any reasonable national security goal."

Second, the Task Force staff itself has released a study predicting that Alaskan North Slope crude oil can be sold competitively with foreign oil—even without import restrictions.

Third, the Department of Defense has reported to the Task Force that, at a minimum, all Western Hemisphere oil sources are secure, and that the best way to assure they remain secure sources is to allow imports freely from those areas.

Finally, the Department of Interior has submitted studies to the Task Force backing up our contention that the cost of the program to consumers is considerable, and that the stockpiling of oil would be a far cheaper method of providing for emergency needs.

These and other studies, Mr. Speaker, have, according to some press accounts, led the Task Force staff to recommend substantial changes in our present inequitable and indefensible government oil policy. The staff is now circulating several of these so-called "fact papers" among Task Force members. (I include at the close of my remarks several copies of recent stories in the oil press on this subject.)

It is no surprise, then, that the major oil lobbyists are now hard at work seeking to discredit the Task Force effort.

But it is a supreme irony, Mr. Speaker, that the same oil barons who called for this task force study in the first place are now disappointed with the very creature they brought into being.

Only last February, the American Petroleum Institute and its Chairman, Mr. Michael L. Halder, who also happens to be Chairman of the Board of Standard Oil of New Jersey, urged the President to set up the Task Force. (I include a copy of that letter at the close of my remarks.)

Despite this irrefutable documentary evidence, some major oil propagandists, in their zeal to disown their unruly child, are already claiming that it was the "politicians" who caused the creation of the Task Force. Mr. Gene Kinney attempts this in a recent article in the *Oil and Gas Journal* for October 13, 1969. (I also include this article at the close of my remarks.)

But, Mr. Speaker, the oil barons cannot escape the facts. It was the oil lobby, and not the "politicians" seeking to end the

quotas, who pushed for the creation of the Task Force.

I think the evidence is clear, Mr. Speaker, that the main purpose of the Task Force proposal were to delay a decision about to be made on the application for a free port and refinery at Machiasport, Maine, and, in general, to stall any further action in the direction of reforming our oil policies.

Although I was convinced that the subject has been studied to death, I have cooperated with the Task Force, submitting my own proposal in which I explained the purposes of my bill and urged the Task Force to support it.

And, as I have pointed out, a number of excellent studies submitted to the Task Force have also recommended either abolition of the quotas or greatly increased imports.

It is, of course, too early to predict what the Task Force will finally recommend and what the President will decide.

Mr. Speaker, I certainly do not suggest that the concerted effort now underway to discredit the Task Force staff will easily sway the distinguished membership of the Task Force, or the President himself.

I believe this Administration is committed to giving this question the most objective look possible, and that it fully intends to decide these questions of oil policy on their merits.

But I am also convinced that those of us who favor serious reform must renew our efforts. We cannot permit this cynical lobbying effort to scuttle the work of the Task Force.

If the facts are made clear to the public, particularly by my colleagues from the Northeast in this and in the other body, I believe we can meet this latest challenge.

Surely all of us here know that the oil lobby can be a most powerful foe. But the truth is far more powerful.

The public has a right to know that truth. And, when they do, I am convinced that the effort of the oil industry to discredit the work of the Task Force staff will fail.

THE LATE GENERAL ROBERT E. WOOD

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I was saddened to learn yesterday that Gen. Robert E. Wood, retired chairman of the board of Sears, Roebuck & Co., passed away. General Wood was 90 years old. In his long lifetime, he was extremely successful in two separate careers—one in the military and one in private life. Both careers were equally distinguished.

I was proud to count General Wood as a friend. He was a noted exponent of Americanism and private enterprise principles. It was due to General Wood's genius that Sears, Roebuck & Co. developed into one of the most significant merchandising phenomena of our day. General Wood showed how energy and initiative when applied to the opportunities which abound in this great country, can bring a man to the principle of success. The whole world paid tribute to his merchandising genius. It was General Wood who had the foresight to have Sears enter the retail store field. It was General Wood who founded the Allstate Insurance Co., a Sears subsidiary, and the world's largest stock company automobile insurer.

General Wood's career began in the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Later he served for 10 years in Panama during the building of the Panama Canal. In my opinion, General Wood's tour in

Panama led to his deep interest in Latin America and his expansion of responsible private enterprise in Cuba and Latin America. The Sears stores throughout Latin America have served as ambassadors of good will and of better life for millions of people in these regions.

After serving in Panama, General Wood was in charge of the Army Transport Service in France and England. Later he was recalled to Washington as a brigadier general and named acting quartermaster general and director of purchases and storage for the entire U.S. Army. This experience was no doubt useful when he entered his merchandising career.

General Wood married the former Mary Butler Hardwick of Augusta, Ga., a city only 17 miles from my home city of Aiken, S.C. I am sure that his wisdom in choosing a lovely southern lady as a wife was only the first of many wise decisions in his lifetime.

I extend my deepest sympathy to Mrs. Wood and their five fine children. They can be proud of the distinguished career of the head of this fine family.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the notice of General Wood's death, which was published in the *Evening Star* of November 6, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GENERAL WOOD DIES AT 90, RETIRED HEAD OF SEARS

CHICAGO.—Gen. Robert E. Wood, retired chairman of the board of Sears, Roebuck & Co., died today. He was 90 years old.

Gen. Wood, who was generally credited as the builder of the modern-day Sears, the world's largest merchandising firm, died in his Lake Forest home.

Gen. Wood, a retired Army officer, joined Sears in 1924 as a vice president and went on to become president and board chairman. He also founded Allstate Insurance Co., a Sears subsidiary.

Gen. Wood was regarded throughout the world as a great leader in the merchandising field.

In 1924, the year he joined the firm, he proposed that Sears enter into the retail store field. He led the company from a strictly mail order house to a combined retail store and catalogue distribution system of international scope.

KANSAS CITY NATIVE

The first Sears retail store opened in 1925 when the firm's mail order sales totaled about \$200 million a year. Now it has more than 800 retail outlets, and the company's over-all sales total more than \$7 billion a year.

Gen. Wood became president of Sears in 1928 and chairman in 1939. He retired from active management in 1954 but continued as a director until May, 1968, when he was named the first honorary chairman of the board.

His long career was distinguished by outstanding success in both military and business fields.

Born in Kansas City, Mo., June 13, 1879, Gen. Wood was graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1900 and later served 10 years in Panama during the building of the Panama Canal. There he rose to chief quartermaster in charge of all purchasing and distribution of supplies.

During World War I he was in charge of the Army Transport Service in France and England. At 39, he was recalled to Washing-

ton, promoted to brigadier general and named acting quartermaster general and director of purchases and storage for the entire United States Army.

Gen. Wood returned to civilian life in 1919 and spent five years as a vice president of Montgomery Ward & Co., where he started his career, as a mass merchandiser, before joining Sears.

FOUNDED ALLSTATE IN 1931

In 1931, after he became president of Sears, Gen. Wood founded Allstate Insurance. Allstate now is the world's largest stock company automobile insurer and a leader in other insurance fields. Gen. Wood guided Sears through the difficult depression and World War II years, continuing an aggressive expansion program. Under his direction, stores were opened in Cuba and Latin America. Gen. Wood was the oldest of five children of Robert W. and Lillie Collins Wood. Both his maternal grandfather and his father served as captains in the Union Army during the Civil War. Survivors include his wife, the former Mary Butler Hardwick of Augusta, Ga., and five children, Robert W., of Palestine, Tex.; Mrs. Hugo V. Neuhaus of Houston, Tex.; and Mrs. William H. Mitchell, Mrs. Calvin Pentress and Mrs. A. Watson Armour III, all of Lake Forest.

### STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, on November 17, the long-awaited strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the U.S.S.R. will begin in Helsinki, Finland. Secretary of State William P. Rogers has described SALT action as "one of the most important that we ever undertook with the Soviet Union." On October 17, the Fourth International Arms Control Symposium met in Philadelphia. At that time Lt. Gen. John J. Davis, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, spoke on the subject "Arms Talks With Russia." His lucid and perceptive account deserves the attention of the Members of this body. It is refreshing to read such a well-considered account by a military man. I recommend the article to the Senate and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Commanders Digest, Nov. 1, 1969]

#### SALT AGREEMENT REACHED: ARMS TALKS WITH RUSSIA

The control of nuclear weapons is one of the most serious challenges, if not the most serious challenge of our time. Yet the challenge has really been faced up to only recently.

The United States, with the Baruch Plan, took the lead in trying to bring this powerful new force under international control, but not until the current decade has there been any meaningful progress.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty were the initial steps, although they skirted the basic problem. Then came the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which is directly aimed at one important aspect of stemming the arms race—that is, helping to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which do not now have them. . . . As you know, the Seabed Treaty, which is now in the throes of multilateral negotiations, would forestall another possible form of proliferation.

But to limit or reduce nuclear weapons is clearly more difficult.

The real forerunner of our current Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) efforts, however, was the U.S. offer in 1964 to the USSR to explore the possibility of a "freeze" on the number and characteristics of both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, including bombers, missiles, and ABM's.

The USSR, although it did not categorically reject the idea, showed little interest. It asserted that the proposal was a scheme for inspecting without disarming and for perpetuating U.S. strategic superiority.

President Johnson reopened the subject in January 1967 when he proposed, in a letter to Premier Kosygin, discussions on an understanding to limit the further deployment of "strategic offensive and defensive missile launchers." When he received an encouraging reply some weeks later, we provided Moscow with broad indications of the kind of agreement we had in mind.

It would, we suggested, involve a leveling off, not an outright freeze or reduction, of strategic nuclear delivery systems, offensive and defensive. We noted that reductions could be considered at a later stage. An agreement would apply to launchers, not missiles, for purposes of simplifying verification.

Agreement was about to be reached on the date and place for the talks when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. That event disrupted the prospect of a meeting last autumn, and the change of administration in Washington necessitated further delay.

The United States stated months ago that it is ready to start the talks. . . . Meanwhile, we are persisting with our study of the very complex problems associated with strategic arms limitations.

#### ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES

We believe that there are three prime objectives:

1. To maintain and, if possible, improve U.S. security;
2. To maintain deterrence, and reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war; and
3. To limit the upward spiral of strategic arms competition and reduce arms costs.

We have been fairly secure over the last decade in the sense that a relatively stable strategic relationship between the U.S. and USSR has prevailed—insofar as the use of nuclear weapons has been concerned. At a minimum, then, limitations on strategic armaments should maintain the existing stability—stable in the sense of making the initiation of nuclear war unattractive and in the sense of controlling the arms competition.

Many people believe that the action-reaction responses in strategic hardware development and deployment of both the U.S. and the USSR have resulted from the uncertainties involved—uncertainty due to lack of complete intelligence on both sides, and resulting uncertainties as to both capabilities and intentions. This has resulted in alternating policies of "keep ahead" and catch up.

They further believe that if the uncertainties could be eliminated, then there would be good prospects for substantial strategic arms control agreements. Both sides would, of course, have to be assured that their own strategic posture was satisfactory and that their own security and that of their allies would be adequately maintained on a continuing basis.

Needless to say, that is a large order.

#### ESTABLISHING GUIDELINES

Having worked out basic objectives, the next step in developing arms control options for consideration was to establish some principles or guidelines.

It is generally acknowledged that an agreement should impose limitations on both offensive and defensive missile systems. This has been a basic principle of the U.S. posi-

tion since 1964, and it is one which the USSR has recently emphasized.

Another principle is that any agreement or reductions in strategic arms should be preceded by an agreement curtailing further build-ups. This, too, has been a fundamental U.S. view for some years.

A third guideline is that any proposal for limitations, to be negotiable, would have to be considered by each side to be in its net security interest and compatible with its national objectives. It was also agreed that any agreement would have to be subject to adequate verification.

#### A CRUCIAL ISSUE: VERIFICATION

A moment ago I alluded to one of the crucial issues, namely, the matter of verification. The basic question is whether we can rely solely on national means to verify an agreement or will have to insist on some means of on-site inspection—at least in some cases.

We all realize, of course, from the negotiating history on other arms control proposals that insistence on on-site inspection could pose a major obstacle to an agreement. The U.S. is not contemplating an arms control agreement based on faith; on the other hand, it does not insist that "adequate" verification necessarily means 100 per cent verification. The risks involved must be thoroughly understood.

To mention weapons systems is to call to mind one of the most difficult issues confronting us; that is, the critical interrelationships of various weapons systems. Here, one gets into such matters as MIRVs and ABMs.

A recent news article highlighted some of the problems by asking:

"If the Russians agree to deploy only a thin anti-ballistic-missile system, can some of their large number of surface-to-air missiles, or SAMs, be surreptitiously upgraded for attacking ballistic missiles?"

Or, again, "Once MIRVs have been successfully tested, is there any way to monitor a ban on their deployment without taking missiles apart at operational silos?"

#### WHAT ARE MOSCOW'S VIEWS

Another question [is] . . . How do the Soviets view SALT?

One obvious assumption is that the USSR has enhancement of its own national security as its primary objective. The USSR has, from time to time, expressed an interest in discussions and in doing so has noted that an agreement should apply to both offensive and defensive strategic delivery vehicles, and that the first step should be a limitation and not a reduction of armaments. But little or nothing is really known of Soviet views regarding the details of a possible agreement.

The inter-action of negotiations is almost certain to affect the way we and the Soviets answer some of the questions I've cited.

This, of course, raises the question as to what constitutes success. Certainly, a solid arrangement to limit strategic weapons systems would be a great success, and that will be our objective.

Not to achieve a specific agreement in our first efforts, however, need not signal failure. The talks could be of great value if we can establish a mechanism for contact with the USSR on strategic force matters and maintain a dialogue, which hopefully would reduce uncertainty on both sides.

#### BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY

I feel sure that all of you here would agree that the road ahead for SALT negotiations will be long and difficult. We will be undertaking serious negotiations in a field that is extremely complex, full of difficulties in both political and military matters, and is so basic in nature that it involves the very essence of our national security.

We are ready, willing and able to start the talks at any time and, as I have said before,

are hopeful that at minimum, they will lead to a lessening of uncertainty on both sides and, at maximum, they will lead to substantive agreements to limit or even reduce strategic weapons.

#### THE WORKINGS OF THE MODERN ECONOMY

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the difficulties of managing a high-employment economy, most particularly of keeping the Federal budget both fiscally responsible and socially adequate, have become familiar subjects today. Our theoretical understanding of the workings of the modern economy has increased during the 23 years since the goal of "maximum employment, production, and purchasing power" was explicitly set forth in the Employment Act of 1946, but so has our awareness of the difficulties of putting theory into practice. We have learned how a flexible fiscal policy can be much more difficult to practice than to preach. We have become familiar with the difficult dilemma presented by the independent pricing power of big business and organized labor. And we have recently begun to face up to the seemingly intractable problem of allocating our budget resources in line with rational priorities.

One of the most knowledgeable and perceptive observers of our progress and our setbacks since 1946 is Edwin G. Nourse, the distinguished first chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.

In a scholarly but highly readable article, Dr. Nourse has recently summarized what he believes to be the basic tenets which have guided economic policy during the 1960's. He concludes that the practitioners of this version of the "New Economics," in their emphasis on the need to cut taxes and thus avoid a "fiscal drag," gave too little attention to the difficulties of controlling Federal expenditure and of allocating our budget resources wisely. Now, it has become imperative that we shift more of our attention to the problem of Federal expenditures.

I should like to read Dr. Nourse's concluding remarks:

Leaders and people will have to be re-educated to the duties of citizenship, the enormous social needs of the impending years, the difficulties of curbing the arms race, the space race, and the power of the industrial-military complex. They will need to be rededicated to the basic democratic principle that the burdens of military defense and civil advancement must be shared by all.

These two dilemmas of Employment Act fulfillment are not mere mechanical maladjustments, easily corrected with tools readily at hand. They run to the very fundament of human nature and the democratic way of life. They will not resolve themselves, nor will they go away just because we elaborately ignore them. They need to be faced—now—courageously—and as objectively as possible.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Dr. Nourse's article, entitled "The Employment Act and the 'New Economics,'" published in the autumn issue of the Virginia Quarterly Review, be printed in the RECORD.

[From the Virginia Quarterly Review, Autumn 1969]

#### THE EMPLOYMENT ACT AND THE "NEW ECONOMICS"

(By Edwin G. Nourse)

Alvin Hansen, more than any other one individual the father of the Employment Act of 1946, has called it the "Magna Carta of American economic planning." That is a striking metaphor, but Magna Carta was a barons' revolt against an autocratic king, whereas the Employment Act declared the intention of an already free people to use their democratic government more actively and with greater economic sophistication to advance their common interest.

Arthur Burns, easily one of the ten most wanted economists in the country, went Hansen one better by calling the Employment Act our new economic Constitution. It does make new declarations of political purpose and establishes some new structures for economic operation. But a written constitution is, after all, only a piece of paper, however noble or shrewd the perception and intent of its drafters. It simply sets in motion an on-going process of interpretation and application that will reveal the new charter's potentialities and shape its operations to ever-changing circumstances.

For a little more than twenty-two years prior to the inauguration of Richard Nixon, such an experimental process went forward under four successive Presidents, a series of seven chairmen and twenty-three members of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the rotating chairmen and changing membership of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress. That experience falls naturally into three periods: the shake-down cruise of the Truman régime, disturbed by the storm of the Korean War; the re-examination period under President Eisenhower; and the period of dashing economic and political innovation under the Kennedy-Johnson succession, with Walter Heller as its presiding genius.

The intellectual, material, and political legacy which the third period left to Mr. Nixon and his fellow-Americans is described, fondly by some and caustically by others, as "the New Economics."

#### II

It has been remarked, quite fairly, that the New Economics is what any up-to-date economist says it is. Nor is that altogether a criticism. Economics, as a social science, must not be limited to highly generalized truths formulated from long-past experience but must also be continually advancing to the understanding of new circumstances and conditions and to the proposal of intelligent ways of dealing with them.

Probably a poll of economists and informed laymen would put "Keynesian economics" at the top of the list of explanatory labels, "Macroeconomics" might very likely come second, that is, the economics of the whole economy rather than of individual and group enterprises. Many would identify the New Economics with welfare economics or with the economics of planning. Some would see it as the economics of "deficit financing" and others more broadly as the economics of fiscal and monetary controls as a dependable apparatus of national growth and stability. Whatever the labels, one fact is clear. The New Economics is not merely an attempt to explain—and verify its explanation of—the basic forces of the economic process after the manner of a natural science. It is social and hence normative science of ends to be achieved and optimum means of reaching or consistently moving toward those objectives.

For our present purposes, the essence of the New Economics theory may be put in the form of six major propositions, with several

subdivisions. The first is really an axiom: For full use of national resources—maximum production and employment—"aggregate purchasing power" or total spendings of consumers, business, noncommercial entities, foreign buyers, and government must be equivalent to the productive capabilities of the economy. If the ability or willingness to consume and/or invest falls below this level, there will be economic slack; if it rises materially above it, there will be inflation of prices and "overheating" of the economy.

The second proposition of the New Economics is that these capabilities are now so technologically great and growing that, at full employment of national resources, there would be a surplus of goods and services above the buying power of the private sector at existing rates of taxation and government spending. These tax rates, therefore, will act as a "fiscal drag" on the economy and must be lowered (or government spending expanded) if it is to attain that full productive potential.

Third, today's econometric methods and computer facilities make it possible to project these productivity and revenue trends for several years in advance with enough accuracy so that the New Economists can prescribe both the dosage and the timing of tax (and public spending) adjustments so as to alleviate "fiscal drag" and facilitate a full-employment balance of maximum production and purchasing power.

Fourth, concern about budget deficits and the size of the national debt is relegated to the limbo of "the Puritan ethic." Removal of fiscal drag (as postulated) will so unleash productive potential that lower tax rates applied to an expanded national income will soon change deficit into surplus and call for another cut in tax rates—or facilitate the funding of larger social programs.

Fifth, this activist fiscal policy must be kept flexible. Techniques of measurement and projection and of mechanistic and psychological analysis, though impressive, are still far from perfect, and human behavior is both mysterious and fickle. Fiscal policy gives a long-run sense of direction, but fiscal programs should be able to make quick adaptation to short-run developments. And even the most distinguished of fiscal doctors frequently disagree on either medication or surgery.

Sixth, monetary policy is the natural partner of fiscal policy. The cost and availability of money—i.e., credit—can be varied locally and changed more swiftly than fiscal policy and action. Hence, it is the more flexible tool of control, and one school of theory argues that it is also the more powerful of the two or the more irresistible in its action. The other school, apparently in the majority, rate it is as auxiliary rather than basic and ultimately dominant.

#### III

These are not the business principles that John F. Kennedy had been taught at his father's knee or in the history department at Harvard. His campaign speeches and Inaugural Address had a fine progressive tone, but many prophets of the New Economics complained during the first year of his Administration about vague goals and lackluster performance—being, in effect, a replay of the Eisenhower record. But in his famous "Yale speech" of June, 1962, followed in August by a television "Report to the American People on the State of the Economy," the old Kennedy forswore the "myths" of fiscal and monetary conservatism to which he had been born, and the new Kennedy stepped forward to espouse the new economics of bold and unconventional economic statesmanship revealed to him by chairman Heller of CEA.

Specifically, he proclaimed that—

Our tax rates are so high as to weaken the

very essence of the progress of a free society, the incentive for additional return from additional effort. This administration intends to cut taxes in order to build the fundamental strength of our economy, to remove a serious barrier to long-term growth, to increase revenues by rooting out inequities and complexities and to prevent the greater budget deficit that a lagging economy would surely produce.

An Administration bill embodying these views was introduced and strongly backed by the President as a "creative tax cut running across the board and from top to bottom of the tax structure and sharing its benefits with State and local governments." Its total size was referred to at various times at various figures, running from \$10 billion to \$12 billion and its stimulative effect on the economy at three or four times that amount (the "multiplier" effect). In his last Economic Report (January, 1963), President Kennedy made "major tax reduction and revision, carefully timed and structured to speed our progress toward full employment and faster growth, while maintaining price stability and balance-of-payments improvement . . . the core of my 1963 program."

The response of the Congress to these recommendations was considerably less than electric; the business community was dubious; the general public mystified. But their visceral appeal to profit-minded businessmen and, even more, to the hungry and heedless consumer brought passage of this unprecedented tax cut in February, 1964—after vigorous prodding by President Johnson. Thus, economic theory led a pragmatic democracy into a more daring and more professionally designed experiment with a total economy than we had ever experienced before.

## IV

Lyndon Johnson had gone through no struggle of conversion to the New Economics. It all came naturally to him—Texan size. This kind of spending and untaxing offered the straight and ample highway to the Great Society—not the "straight and narrow path" of the Puritan ethic. In his first Economic Report, he sounded his keynote: "Our record \$100 billion expansion in GNP since early 1961, new high ground, is not the summit. That lies ahead. . . . For too long our country has labored under the handicap of Federal income tax rates born of war and inflation. . . . If we are to master these problems, we must above all enact the tax bill. . . . When fully effective, it will send well over \$11 billion annually coursing through the arteries of the private economy." Throwing his full weight behind it, he secured passage of the tax cut in July, 1964. Thereafter, he pushed his Great Society program with zeal even as the Vietnam drain mounted and deficits rose from \$8.8 billion in 1967 to \$25.2 billion in 1968.

In signing his last Economic Report on January 16, 1969, President Johnson pointed with pride—as all good politicians must—to the splendid achievements of the economy during his Administration. "The Nation has made great strides toward realizing the full potential of our resources. . . . Today the vast majority of our people enjoy productive and rewarding employment opportunities. . . . This has all been accomplished in an environment that preserved—indeed, enlarged—the traditional freedom of our economic system. . . ." His faith in the adequacy of the New Economics to achieve the goals of the Employment Act and advance the New Frontier to the fair horizon of the Great Society never faltered. In this last Economic Report, he asserted that "economic policies have responded to the fire alarm of recession and boom [and moved on to] a new strategy aimed at fire prevention—sustaining prosperity and heading off recession or serious inflation before they could take hold." Admitting that the huge budgetary deficit

of 1968 had exerted "an overly stimulative effect," he expressed confidence that the 10 per cent income tax surcharge would in due time correct that threat to continuing full growth and stability.

## V

For most of Mr. Johnson's Administration, Gardner Ackley served as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. A member of the Council under Walter Heller and author of the classic treatise "Macroeconomic Theory," Ackley shared the same views in general but had to wrestle with problems that arose in applying principles to developing conditions. Two corollaries of the New Economics propositions emerged under the labels "fine tuning" and "guidelines." Guidelines—or guideposts—were explained in the Council's 1962 report as follows:

The general guide for noninflationary wage behavior is that the rate of increase in wage rates (including fringe benefits) in each industry be equal to the trend rate of over-all productivity increase. . . .

The general guide for noninflationary price behavior calls for price reduction if the industry's rate of productivity increase exceeds the over-all rate—for this would mean declining unit labor costs; it calls for an appropriate increase in prices if the opposite relationship prevails; and it calls for stable prices if the two rates of productivity increase are equal. . . .

These are advanced as general guideposts. . . . Specific modifications must be made to adapt them to the circumstances of particular industries. . . .

Mr. Kennedy had early added his blessing to the guidepost prescription: "I do not believe that American business and labor will allow [their] substantial market power . . . to set off a movement toward higher price levels." And Chairman Ackley continued to manifest considerable confidence in the capability of this braking device to decelerate a price system racing out of control down an inflationary course. But the idea of voluntary control evoked little if any response in the marketplace. Indeed, many economists as well as experienced business and labor executives argued that the device was not merely too feeble in operation but basically faulty in design.

Ackley stressed the educational function of guidelines, but others saw this as an entering wedge of wage and price control. But the Executive Office moved, on occasion, to accelerate the learning process by TV and radio denunciation of specific price or wage actions, personal suasion, and the direct releasing of metal from the government stockpile.

As for the "fine tuning" proposition, that was never given the precise formulation that was given to guidelines. But to most it seemed even less credible. Doubting Thomases challenged the idea that such a concept or goal is consistent with our free enterprise ideology and free science-technology. The New Economists' response was: "Of course, we are not omniscient nor are we omnipotent. But our tools and techniques, already greatly improved, are still improving through experimental use. Our estimates of the future are much better guides to policy and program than are the hunches, guesses, and self-serving schemes of business and political fumbling. And flexibility is our watchword. After we have set the nation's forward course on a beam carefully calculated from available measurements, thorough analysis, and closely-reasoned hypotheses, we will continuously apply our scientific tools of observation and measurement of foreseen sequences and unexpected responses. These we seek to explain, evaluate, and use promptly to make corrective readjustments."

This "fine tuning" obviously presupposes a control station of established authority and utmost competence, dependable response by the mechanism and its human agents, and

full communication between the two crews. But when, barely two years after passage of the supposedly gyroscopic tax cutting legislation of 1964, it became apparent to the naked eye that it was "overheating the economy," it took many months to get a 10 per cent surcharge on income taxes as an imprecise and temporary readjustment—and only at the cost of irrelevant offsets. The benign flexibilities of sophisticated economic sciences find themselves entangled in the opinionated or venal flexibilities of "practical" politics.

A second basic issue of the linking of theoretical idealism and practical realism touches the question of how the goals of national plan and program are to be set. Has that tricky word "maximum" in the Employment Act's Declaration of Policy been interpreted in too ideological, political, or emotional terms, rather than according to the canons and methods of science? Like Oliver Twist and Samuel Gompers in the nineteenth century, the New Economists of the mid-twentieth have been prone to state their goals in the simple and repetitive formula, "More, More." That is a formula natural and appropriate for a half-starved boy and for workmen exploited by avaricious and economically unsophisticated capitalist managers of yesterday; but piling on more and more increments of "aggregate demand" that evoke less and less response in product and more and more inflation of prices and disruption of financial relations mocks the claim of scientific guidance to national policy. Adding more and more names to payrolls with scrapings from the bottom of the manpower barrel which add more to cost than they do to product feeds inflation from two sources. It leads to economic indigestion, not skilled nutrition of an athletic economic system.

And so, by the time Chairman Ackley abdicated his post as chief economic adviser and Lyndon Johnson abdicated his position as Chief Executive, the New Economics as a science-and-technology of sustained growth and stability was in some disarray. The predicament of the New Economics was like that of the Sorcerer's Apprentice, who had discovered the magic word that started the desired flow of water to his master's house but who found himself without the power to stop it after the household jars were full and overflowing onto the master's rug.

There was no questioning the dimensions of the growth spectacles that had been produced in the third period of Employment Act statesmanship. But even seven years of well-sustained prosperity do not establish a verified set of principles for future generations. And the concomitant goal of financial stability was increasingly threatened, both in domestic inflation and in recurrent foreign exchange crises. This inflationary malaise seemed to have developed immunity to any remedial treatment that did not entail a frustrating loss of production, increase in unemployment, and slowed national growth. One long-time observer of the advance of economic theory-cum-practice suggested that it is well for both theorists and administrators not to count their chickens when first hatched, but to suspend judgment until the first generation has grown up and produced offspring whose performance has, in turn, been subjected to test under varying conditions.

The somewhat equivocal state of affairs at the close of the third period of Employment Act experimentation raises two questions: (1) Is the pleasant conclusion that we now have put the cycle of boom and depression permanently behind us demonstrably valid or perhaps still premature? Or have we, perchance, been riding (with greatly improved seamanship) a particularly long wave in the endless stream of economic life, in which the conjunction of technological, socio-psychological, and demographic factors was extraordinarily favorable? (2) Do we now have the tools, the skills, and the popular accept-

ance that make the continuous successful "management of prosperity" (Arthur Burns' admirable phrase) an assimilated part of our "mixed system" of American democracy?

Professor Paul Samuelson, widely revered as the pope of American economics, titled one of his recent magazine columns, "Lessons of the 1960's." In it, he quoted as "one of the more quotable idiocies of history" the verdict of a journalist who, "after a few weeks' trip to Lenin's Russia," said, "I have seen the future. And it works." To this dictum, Samuelson immediately adds, "Now that the data for the 1960's are virtually in, I can say, 'I have seen the past. And it works.' . . . Objectivity obliges one, I think, to interpret economic experience of the 1960's as broadly confirmatory to the conventional wisdom—particularly to the avant-garde version of it that characterized the new economics on New Year's Eve, 1959"—as the third chapter of Employment Act statesmanship was about to be inaugurated. Now the fourth period is well under way, and to President Nixon and his aides, the Congress, and many citizens high and low, it may appear that the lessons of the 1960's are less clear and less reassuring than Samuelson has made them sound.

## VI

During his campaign for the Presidency, Richard Nixon, on various occasions, expressed his full commitment to the economic goals and government responsibilities set out in the Employment Act. After election, he moved swiftly to appoint an outstanding economist and former member of the Council of Economic Advisers to be Chairman of the Council and named one of its former Chairmen to be Counselor to the President, with Cabinet rank, "to head up a small group whose prime responsibility will be the co-ordination of the development of my domestic policies and programs." The following day (January 24) the President, by Executive Order, "established the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy" with himself as Chairman and the Chairman of CEA, the Budget Director, Counselor to the President, and the Secretaries of Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor as members. This committee is to advise and assist the President in the development and co-ordination of national economic programs and policies, . . . assist in the formulation of the basic goals and objectives of national economic policy, develop recommendations for the basic strategy of national economic policy to serve as guides for decisions concerning specific economic programs and policies, promote co-ordination of Federal economic programs, consult with individuals from academic, agricultural, business, consumer, labor, and other groups, and recommend procedures for evaluating the effectiveness of Federal programs in contributing to our national objectives. The Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers will co-ordinate the work of the Committee.

This prospectus of the new President's economic statesmanship became more specific when he sent his first Special Message to the Congress on March 26. The purpose of this message was to recommend a one-year continuance of the temporary 10 per cent surcharge on income taxes, due to expire on June 30. As basis for this recommendation, Mr. Nixon stated his philosophy for the management of national prosperity in no uncertain terms.

This nation must come to grips with the problem of an inflation that has been allowed to run far too long . . . already caused substantial distortions in our economy. . . . Government has two major instruments for dealing with this problem. . . . Monetary policy should continue its program of restraint. Fiscal policy . . . must turn away from budgets which have propelled the inflation, and turn to one with strong surplus. . . . The prospect of a thin budget surplus

or a return to deficits would again nudge monetary policy off course . . . further increase in interest rates, a dangerously overheated economic engine, and the threat of accelerating the advance of the price level. Because the problem of inflation was neglected far too long, we cannot risk even a neutral budget policy of narrow balance. . . . To produce a budget that will stop inflation, we must cut expenditures while maintaining revenues. . . .

This statement and subsequent words and actions of the President and his top aides suggest three broad generalizations about the apparent trend of economic statesmanship now unfolding.

(1) There is widespread consensus, public, and private professional and lay, that central government, articulated with state, municipal, regional, and local jurisdictions, has a permanently large role to play complementary to the basic private enterprise sector of the total economy. After four shifts of party power, this proposition of the New Economics may be regarded as well synthesized into our traditional two-party system. The performance of the now incumbent Administration will have momentous consequences; enlarging or foreclosing the possibility of a shattering of this consensus in a third-party revolution, such as heralded itself in the Wallace campaign of 1969—in many respects, a counter-revolution against the New Economics.

(2) There is no similar consensus as to the major strategy and style of tactics by which the 1946 mandate of responsibility for leadership and implementation is to be discharged. The Heller *et al.* massive fiscal stimulation produced an inflationary overdose not promptly correctable under our free-wheeling political structure and practice. The present Administration is presented with the task of disinflating the price structure and the structure of expectations—business, worker, consumer, and official—on which the longest-ever boom of the 1960's was built, and not permitting deflationary deceleration to exceed the bounds of popular understanding, acceptance, and unimpaired zest among the several participants for continuing their respective contributions to prosperity on a sustainable basis. Mr. Nixon expresses the generally accepted doctrine of the New Economists when he says, "Government has two major instruments for dealing with this problem . . . monetary policy and fiscal policy." But the most eminent economic doctors frequently do not agree as to which treatment to use—and with what dosage and timing. "Still to be argued out within the guild," says Samuelson, "is the proper quantitative potency of monetary versus fiscal policies." (Nor are the physicists in agreement on the effectiveness of ABM.) And a considerable representation within the guild holds the belief that market policy must be ranked as a third major tool for the effective implementation of the Employment Act purpose.

(3) Ever since the New Deal's high-minded but unsophisticated fumbblings, national events have been cramming the data books of economists and politicians, of private administrators and public officials with a rich but jumbled record of how democratic activism works in a "mixed system"—in the sunlight of prosperity and the shadow of recession. There has been an accompanying flow of academic-professional, business-professional, bureaucrat-professional, and politician-professional interpretations of this experience, some broad in scope, some quite specialized. Their message has run the scale from messianic dogma to nostalgic mugwumpery.

This overwhelming mass of empirical data cannot be classified, analyzed, and reduced to a set of "laws" or verified principles which will unequivocally explain these happenings and govern future action with the confidence and precision demanded and attained in

physics, chemistry, or biology. That is not the nature of social science. But the time is ripe for a next step in applying the basic methods of scientific analysis and generalization to the empirical observation of three periods of experience in Employment Act political economy. In particular, the intellectual community will be scrutinizing what happens in the economy in the light of what the New Economists have been teaching, and evaluating these next years' developments as verification or refutation of what they taught or what the various agencies of government did; what private business, labor, and finance did in response to those teachings or in escape from or correction of them. In a word, the third and fourth chapters of Envolement Act experience, taken together, should mark a new high level in the intellectualizing or scientizing of the politico-economic process in the United States. It should round out the scope of the New Economics, improve its balance, and correct some of its shortcomings.

President Nixon began his contribution to intellectualizing fourth-chapter activism by co-opting two outstanding scholar-specialists (unlike Colonel House and Sherman Adams) to be Counsellors to the President and co-ordinators of policy in their respective areas, international and domestic. He brought in a university president (a former agricultural economist) as Secretary of Agriculture, and the dean of a leading school of business administration as Secretary of Labor. Besides his Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy with himself as chairman and the chairman of the Economic Advisers as R&D director, he has ordered a task force in the Executive Office to draft a report setting forth our national goals—to be submitted on July 4, 1970.

Such an intellectualizing or scientizing process has been going forward even more widely in the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress and in other committees, notably the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. The Joint Economic Committee, established in the Employment Act to parallel the analytical and advisory functions of the Council of Economic Advisers, has over the years made itself into a veritable research institute, using staff work, special consultants, and public hearings to explore many topics relevant to the purposes of the Employment Act. A few titles of such studies conducted by the Committee are suggestive. They include such topics as automation; employment, growth, and price levels; relationship of prices to economic growth and stability; federal expenditure policy for economic growth and stability; and the impacts of taxation. In June, 1969, the Committee issued its 1,200 page report on "The Planning, Programming, Budgeting System" now being employed in the Executive Departments and independent agencies as means of analyzing and evaluating federal expenditures as to their cost effectiveness and as a guide to government policy decisions.

In discharging its prime function of reviewing the Economic Report of the President, evaluating its analysis and recommendations, and formulating its own views for guidance of the Congress, the Committee on April 1, 1969, issued a 150-page report, buttressed with staff papers, public hearings, etc., to a total length of 1,197 pages. A short passage from the full committee report brings out clearly the Joint Committee's concern about other than fiscal and monetary aspects of economic policy.

While appropriate fiscal-monetary policies are necessary conditions for full employment and price stability, they are not sufficient. A large role must be played by both the public and private policy-makers concerned with business competition and concentration, wage-price policies, consumer protection and even the manner in which the Government executes its own housekeeping functions.

These matters have generally been referred to as structural or micro elements in the economy. Unfortunately, the progress which we were beginning to see in these areas of public and private policy has begun to be eroded. . . . We deplore this abandonment of concern for the structural elements in our economy which hinder efforts to reduce unemployment and end inflation. Close attention to the policies that affect the detailed structural operation of the economy is a vital and unavoidable accompaniment of appropriate fiscal and monetary policies.

This would seem to be a promising position from which economists, politicians, officials, and administrators private and public could work toward a common understanding of the functional relationships and flexible frontiers between these three major provinces of a modern democratic welfare economy. Fiscal policy has been an arrogant spouse of monetary policy, domineering at times and, in a pinch, often of its own making, throwing too heavy burdens and inappropriate tasks on its monetary mate. Likewise, the New Economists have been quite cavalier about the role of the market system, which, after all, administers nearly four-fifths of the total flow of national wealth. But it is in the institutions and practices in that area that they might find the Achilles heel of the New Economics theory of high-speed growth without inflation.

## VII

Latent in fiscal-monetary theory and procedures has been the comfortable assumption of a flexibly competitive market of small or medium-sized units that would effect their own internal adjustments when aggregate demand was maneuvered up to the full-employment level. But our industrial and commercial life today is, in fact, dominated by the phenomena of Big Business, Big Labor, and Big Finance. We need wider dimensions of political economy—including the regulatory as well as the fiscal and monetary policies of Big Government to cope with these facts.

Since 1887, the Federal Government has been enacting regulatory statutes designed to preserve a maximum of market competition and at the same time impose a minimum of restraint on private enterprise and the advance of technology. Since 1914 it has been passing legislation to legitimate labor unions and co-operative associations of farmers for collective bargaining with industrial and commercial corporations. As matters now stand, the size, structure, and ideologies of these private collectivities are inimical to the theory and technology of the New Economics for achieving maximum economic growth without inflation.

The proprietors of both these giant power machines have devised and installed ratchet mechanisms by which the force of large-scale competition is constantly upward and only in extraordinary cases downward. Management sets its profits targets and accepts limitation on sales volume rather than lower them. Labor competition takes the form of competition of each union to at least match the wage gains of other unions, and acceptance of strikes and curtailing of jobs rather than falling to get annual improvement in wages and fringe benefits. They need higher pay to keep up with the rising cost of living—with merchants and manufacturers trying to keep up with rising costs of labor and materials! Fiscal and monetary measures to push aggregate demand to the full employment level feed this inflationary mechanism as well as the productive processes of industry.

A high-pressure economic policy thus creates the dilemma of market power versus market control. Mr. Nixon says he will have no part in wage and price controls, even in the attenuated form of guidelines and executive admonition or pressure, but he opened up some Forest Reserve lands when

lumber prices had skyrocketed. He does not seem likely to become a trust buster, but his Department of Justice is pressing cases against price-rigging and collusion. Other means of coping with the dilemma have not so far been unveiled.

A second dilemma here to plague the fourth chapter and subsequent chapters of Employment Act aspiration is that between the immemorial hatred of the taxgatherer and the rising expectations and multiplying needs of our fast-growing and urbanizing population. To be sure, the capacity of our technology and managerial skills to meet those demands is also rising, but there is considerable disparity in the ways and places in which the higher productivity appears and the ways and places in which the demand presses. Power to get to the moon does not alleviate the wants of low-bracket taxpayers. A "tax revolt" is being endorsed by enemies of the Vietnam War and by the unreconstructed rebels against welfare programs as such—unmindful of the fact that tax revolt is a two-edged sword that can be used also to retard industrial progress and social improvement.

The New Economists of the last eight years did not serve their generation well with their prime emphasis on the dismal dogma of "fiscal drag" and the pleasant promise of "fiscal dividends" each year. Leaders and people will have to be re-educated to the duties of citizenship, the enormous social needs of the impending years, the difficulties of curbing the arms race, the space race, and the power of the industrial-military complex. They will need to be rededicated to the basic democratic principle that the burdens of military defense and civil advancement must be shared by all.

These two dilemmas of Employment Act fulfillment are not mere mechanical maladjustments, easily corrected with tools readily at hand. They run to the very fundament of human nature and the democratic way of life. They will not resolve themselves, nor will they go away just because we elaborately ignore them. They need to be faced—now—courageously—and as objectively as possible.

#### PRESIDENT NIXON'S PROJECT ENTERPRISE

Mr. DOLE, Mr. President, yesterday Maurice H. Stans, Secretary of Commerce, announced the details of a major program to assist the growth of minority enterprise.

The Secretary of Commerce said that 18 corporations had pledged a minimum of \$150,000 each to sponsor a minority enterprise small business investment company, which would in turn finance minority business projects. The funding pledged by each corporation will be matched on a 2-to-1 basis by the Small Business Administration.

Mr. President, the Select Committee on Small Business, of which I am a member, has held a series of hearings this year on the problems faced by the minority entrepreneur. It has become apparent that the greatest difficulty at this time is obtaining the necessary money to finance minority business, or for that matter any small business. Because of budgetary restraints, there is no money available for direct loans from the Small Business Administration, the major source of Government financing for small businesses. At the same time, the monetary and fiscal restraints practiced by the Federal Government have made it practically impossible to obtain commercial bank loans except at high interest rates and for short terms.

As a result, small businessmen find themselves in a squeeze that is especially harmful to the minority businessman. The program announcement by the Secretary of Commerce is an innovative answer to this predicament. The Secretary and the Small Business Administration are to be commended for their efforts to obtain Government funds to encourage greater participation of the private sector.

With this new means of financing minority business, I hope will come increased efforts to communicate the nature of the program to potential minority businessmen. Although I do not have a complete description of the minority enterprise small business investment company program before me, it would appear that there will have to be a limitation placed on the interest the MESBIC can charge if it is to meet the present problem of high interest rates.

Mr. President, an article published in the New York Times and one published in the Wall Street Journal have described this program. I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Nov. 7, 1969]

**NEGRO BUSINESS IS ASSURED OF AID; STANS ANNOUNCES PLAN TO MAKE UP TO \$500 MILLION AVAILABLE BY NEXT JUNE**

(By Paul Delaney)

WASHINGTON, November 6.—The Nixon Administration announced today a plan to make up to \$500-million available by next June to finance Negro business opportunities.

Maurice H. Stans, Secretary of Commerce, unveiled details of the program Project Enterprise, at a news conference. It is the Administration's first major program to aid black capitalism.

The Secretary said that 18 large and small corporations had pledged a minimum of \$150,000 each to sponsor a Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment Company, which in turn would finance business projects of members of minority groups.

The funding will be on a 2-to-1 basis, with the Government doubling the amount pledged by each corporation.

#### PROSPECTS FOR FUNDS

"The amount of money available by next June could be over \$500-million, but it would take longer than June to get it into the hands of minorities," Mr. Stans said.

The Secretary set a goal of 100 small business investment companies by next June.

"The potential venture capital available to minority businessmen eventually can run into a billion or more dollars when the Mesbic program is fully implemented," he said. "I hope we can have more than 500 of them."

He said that \$15-million was available immediately to pay the Government's share. The funds are part of \$300-million announced earlier to be available for grants, loans or loan guarantees to aid minorities. Some \$225-million more would come from private business and banks, he said.

Under the plan, each of the private corporations would establish a small business investment company with \$150,000 minimum capital, to be matched 2 to 1 by the Small Business Administration, with the money to be used to underwrite black businesses.

"The 18 Mesbics announced today include a wide range of industrial and financial corporations, some in combination with civic and minority groups," Mr. Stans said.

"Business recognizes that this is a practical, effective means by which it can help

meet the capital and financial needs of minority people who are anxious to operate their own businesses and who need this kind of assistance," he said.

He stressed that the businesses would be minority-owned and independent.

"Project enterprise provides an opportunity for American business corporations, and organizations of local business and civic groups, to demonstrate their willingness and their effectiveness in meeting one of the nation's most pressing needs—increasing the number of businesses owned and operated by our minority people," he said.

"This is a significant, major program to eliminate many of the roadblocks and frustrations that have been faced by minority Americans who are eager to participate in the nation's competitive enterprise system.

"We believe this new program for capitalization and business assistance will encourage many thousands of our minority group members to seek 'a piece of the action.'"

The small business investment company is an adaption of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, which has aided thousands of small businessmen. The policies are being modified to increase aid to minority businessmen.

Mr. Stans said that one company has already been operating an investment company for a year. The Arcata National Corporation, an investment concern set up a minorities enterprise investment company that financed 30 minority businesses, ranging from a printing company to a soul restaurant.

Mr. Stans said that Arcata had 150 applications.

The 17 other sponsors, pledging to set up the new investment companies, were Pioneer Properties, New York; Varian Associates, Palo Alto, Calif.; Hartford National Corporation, Hartford; Flour Corporation, Los Angeles; S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., Racine, Wis.; International Industries, Beverly Hills, Calif.

Also, Phillips Petroleum Company, Bartlesville, Okla.; Prudential Insurance Company, Newark; Sam Wyly Foundation, Dallas; U.S. Capital Corporation, Cincinnati; Baltimore Community Investment Company, Baltimore; Miguel Hidalgo, SBIC, Oakland; San Fernando Investment Company, Los Angeles; Coronado State Bank, El Paso; Forsyth County Economic Development Corporation, Winston-Salem, N.C.; National Council for Equal Business Opportunity, Washington, and Fait Ltd., Boston.

[From the Wall Street Journal, Nov. 7, 1969]  
ADMINISTRATION PLANS INVESTMENT COMPANIES FOR MINORITY BUSINESS; STANS SAYS PROGRAM TO GENERATE \$225 MILLION TO FINANCE FIRMS OWNED BY MINORITY MEMBERS

WASHINGTON.—Commerce Secretary Stans, offering evidence that the Nixon black capitalism program has life in it after all, announced plans for an initial 18 minority enterprise small business investment companies.

He also predicted the minority enterprise program would generate an additional \$225 million in backing for minority businessmen by next June 30.

Like the regular Government-licensed small business investment companies, known as SBICs, minority enterprise small business investment companies are eligible for two dollars in Federal financing for every dollar of privately invested capital. The small concerns in which minority enterprise companies and SBICs invest also are eligible for bank loans 90% guaranteed by the Small Business Administration.

Unlike an SBIC, however, a minority enterprise company is intended only to finance minority entrepreneurs. Moreover, some probably will only break even or show a loss on their operations. Mr. Stans told a news conference. SBIC organizers, by contrast, usually expect to make a profit.

Several SBICs actually were seeking to help minority businessmen prior to the first announcement by the Commerce Department's Office of Minority Business Enterprise several weeks back that it would push the concept of minority enterprise companies. One of these, Arcata National Corp., Menlo Park, Calif., was termed by Mr. Stans as a model for the present program. Arcata received its SBIC license from the SBA in August 1968 and currently has investments in 30 minority-owned firms.

#### MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE HOPED

Commerce officials are counting on minority enterprise companies to expand the management assistance currently available to minority entrepreneurs. Each investment company would have its own small staff and also would be expected to draw on the expertise of its sponsors and local volunteer accountants and attorneys.

Minority enterprise companies also have the advantage of pyramiding a relatively modest Government outlay into a substantial pool of new funds for minority business. Assuming that the investment company backers put up the minimum \$150,000 allowed, their company then could sell \$300,000 of its 10-to-15-year debentures to the SBA. The combined funds would be invested in small companies (up to a ceiling for each portfolio company equal to 20% of the investment company's private capital, or, in this example, \$30,000 for each small firm). The small firms in turn could use the investment as their 20% equity contribution to secure SBA-backed bank loans—or, in all, \$1.8 million of bank financing for a grand total of \$2,250,000 in potential financing for each minimum-size minority enterprise small business investment company.

The \$225 million figure used by Mr. Stans is based on the expectation that 100 minimum-capital investment companies will be in existence by June 30, 1970. Only \$30 million of the total would represent the Government's investment, with the balance supplied by private business and banks.

#### BROKE BUDGET BUREAU FREEZE

In launching the program, Mr. Stans first had to overcome a Budget Bureau freeze on SBIC funds that was in effect for more than two years because of war-imposed spending restrictions. The Commerce Secretary won White House clearance for an initial \$15 million to fund minority enterprise small business investment companies during the current fiscal year that began July 1. He made it clear at the press conference that an additional \$15 million would be available when needed.

Of the 18 sponsors described by Mr. Stans as having submitted letters of intent to operate investment companies, 11 are private concerns. These include Hartford National Corp., a bank holding company in Hartford, Conn.; Fluor Corp., Los Angeles; S. C. Johnson & Son Inc., Racine, Wis.; Phillips Petroleum Co., Bartlesville, Okla.; Prudential Insurance Co. of America, Newark, N.J.; Varian Associates, Palo Alto, Calif.; Pioneer Properties Co., a New York holding company; International Industries, Beverly Hills, Calif.; U.S. Capital Corp., Cincinnati and Coronado State Bank, El Paso, together with certain private investors.

#### A PERMIT FOR THE NOVEMBER 15 MARCH

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, I am deeply concerned about the Justice Department's decision to refuse to grant a permit for a parade route along Pennsylvania Avenue for the November 15 new mobilization march.

I have publicly stated that I will not personally support the march unless I am

convinced that its organizers are taking every possible precaution that it will be conducted overall in a peaceful, orderly and dignified fashion. I am still not convinced that these conditions have been met.

The issue of the permit, however, is separate from the question of support for the march.

American citizens have a clear constitutional right to come to the Nation's Capital to demonstrate in a dramatic fashion that they oppose the Government's policy on a particular issue. Moreover, Pennsylvania Avenue has been the traditional route for parades and marches.

I understand the administration is concerned about the possibility of violence. I am too, and I am fully aware of the potential dangers involved in the march.

If the administration denies a permit for an appropriate route acceptable to the organizers of the march, this will not reduce the likelihood of violence. It will, instead, increase it. It will engender a situation similar to that which occurred in Chicago in the summer of 1968, where the city, by denying a permit for the use of Grant Park, made a violent confrontation inevitable.

By denying the permit for such a route, the administration will create a clear and serious danger that a large number of demonstrators will attempt to take that route anyway. If this occurs, the use of force will become inevitable, and our National Capital will be marred by violence and bloodshed.

I fully recognize that if the permit is granted there still will be danger of violence by a minority of participants in the march. The way to deal with this risk, however, is not to escalate the likelihood of a violent confrontation by denying the permit and attempting to bar the route altogether. The sensible course is, rather, to grant the permit and to have the necessary security forces available to deal with any disorders, if they occur.

Accordingly, I have sent a letter today requesting him to reconsider his denial of a permit for the Pennsylvania Avenue route; and that he either grant a permit for that route or for an alternate route, such as that along Constitution Avenue, which is acceptable to the organizers of the march.

Mr. President I ask unanimous consent that my letter to the Attorney General be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

NOVEMBER 7, 1969.

The Honorable JOHN N. MITCHELL,  
Attorney General of the United States,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I am deeply concerned about the Justice Department's decision to refuse to grant a permit for a parade route along Pennsylvania Avenue for the November 15th New Mobilization March.

I have publicly stated that I will not personally support the March unless I am convinced that its organizers are taking every possible precaution that it will be conducted overall in a peaceful, orderly and dignified fashion. I am still not convinced that these conditions have been met.

The issue of the permit, however, is sepa-

rate from the question of support for the March.

American citizens have a clear Constitutional right to come to the Nation's capital to demonstrate in a dramatic fashion that they oppose the government's policy on a particular issue. Moreover, Pennsylvania Avenue has been the traditional route for parades and marches.

I understand the Administration is concerned about the possibility of violence. I am too, and I am fully aware of the potential dangers involved in the March.

If the Administration denies a permit for an appropriate route acceptable to the organizers of the March, this will not reduce the likelihood of violence. It will, instead, increase it. It will engender a situation similar to that which occurred in Chicago in the summer of 1968, where the city, by denying a permit for the use of Grant Park, made a violent confrontation inevitable.

By denying the permit for such a route, the Administration will create a clear and serious danger that a large number of demonstrators will attempt to take that route anyway. If this occurs, the use of force will become inevitable, and our national capital will be marred by violence and bloodshed.

I fully recognize that if the permit is granted there still will be danger of violence by a minority of participants in the March. The way to deal with this risk, however, is not to escalate the likelihood of a violent confrontation by denying the permit and attempting to bar the route altogether. The sensible course is, rather, to grant the permit and to have the necessary security forces available to deal with any disorders, if they occur.

Accordingly, I respectfully request that you reconsider your denial of a permit for the Pennsylvania Avenue route; and that you either grant a permit for that route or for an alternate route, such as that along Constitution Avenue, which is acceptable to the organizers of the March.

Those of us who have supported the October 15th Moratorium and other peaceful demonstrations will continue to do everything in our power to ensure that the demonstrations on the 13th, 14th and 15th of November will be conducted in the best traditions of this Nation.

Sincerely,

CHARLES E. GOODELL.

#### RURAL SOCIAL TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, Chancellor Homer L. Hitt, of Louisiana State University, in New Orleans, has brought to my attention an article written by Prof. T. Lynn Smith of the University of Florida and published in the *International Social Science Journal*. Professor Smith is a well-known sociologist with a longstanding interest in rural affairs. He taught for many years at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge and contributed a great deal to the university's program.

Professor Smith's article, entitled "Some Major Current Rural Social Trends in the United States of America," deals with what he calls the "rapid, deep-cutting, drastic social change" which is occurring in the Nation.

Although I do not agree with everything he says, his exploration of this subject does reflect my own long-term concern about the changes taking place in our countryside since the end of World War II. His findings document the trends that we have all known to be taking place. I think the article is worthy

of the attention of all who are interested in our changing agricultural picture and problems. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### SOME MAJOR CURRENT RURAL SOCIAL TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(By T. Lynn Smith)

This article endeavours to identify and portray a few of the major social changes or trends at present under way in the rural portions of society in the United States. It is written at a time in which rapid, deep-cutting, drastic social change is the order of the day throughout all parts, rural and urban, of the most populous nation in the Western hemisphere. Indeed it seems fair to characterize the present as a tumultuous period in which the forces and factors inducing change and 'progress' are greatly in the ascendancy over those making for institutionalization and stability throughout the fifty States and the federal district which make up the Union. From the Canadian border to the Gulf of Mexico and the Mexican border, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and in Alaska and Hawaii as well, innovation presses sharply upon the heels of innovation in so many aspects of the social structure and in so many of the social processes that the 'rules of the game' undergo serious modifications even while a single generation of people are at society's 'gaming table.' The components (cultural traits and courses of action), the combinations of various degrees of intricacy (cultural complexes and activity patterns), and the infinite variety of socio-cultural systems and sub-systems are all in a state of flux.

Perhaps there is no satisfactory manner of viewing and summarizing the more important changes in a large and highly diverse society such as that of the rural parts of the United States. I have found it useful for my own purposes, however, to focus attention upon the principal socio-cultural systems that may be considered as the second highest level of social integration, or those which are outranked only by the all-embracing general socio-cultural system of the society itself.

Fourteen of the socio-cultural systems of the second order that I identify are as follows: (a) the size of the landholdings, or estates, and what is generally synonymous with it in the United States, the size of the farms, or the highly institutionalized societal entity whose several varieties are designated by such names as a system of family-sized farms, *hacienda* system, a plantation system, a system of peasant proprietorships, and so on; (b) the tenure system; (c) the system of land surveys and titles; (d) the system of agriculture, or the highly standardized and value-laden ways in which people go about securing products from the soil; (e) the type of farming, or the combination of crop and live-stock enterprises used in a given farm business; (f) the family, kinship, and domestic system; (g) the educational system; (h) the magico-religious system; (i) the political, governmental, and public administration system; (j) the class and caste system; (k) the system of communication and transportation; (l) the credit system; (m) the marketing system; and (n) the locality-group system.<sup>1</sup> In this article attention is devoted to the changes currently taking place in four of these major divisions of rural society in the United States, namely, the size of the farms, the type of farming, the systems of agriculture, and the class system.

#### THE SIZE OF FARMS

Drastic change in the size of the farms is one of the most striking of the current social

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trends in the agricultural districts of the United States. Likewise it is one of the most misunderstood and erroneously interpreted of all the changes in American society. There are, however, certain basic facts which should be taken into account by anyone attempting to understand or to set forth the nature of what is happening in this important feature of the nation's rural social organization; and if this is done the diversity of the propositions to which any validity may be attached is greatly reduced. Among these facts are the following statistical data.

1. The amount of land in farms has not changed greatly in recent decades. According to the information available in the various reports of the United States Census of Agriculture, from a total of 990,111,984 acres in 1930, it rose slowly to 1,123,507,574 acres in 1959, and then dropped off slightly to 1,110,187,000 acres in 1964.

2. During the same period the number of places classified as farms fell from 6,295,103 in 1930 to 3,710,504 in 1959 and to 3,157,857 in 1964. This halving of the number of farms, with the total area in farms changing very little, produced a rise in the average amount of land per farm from 157 acres in 1930, to 303 acres in 1959, and to 352 in 1964. The size of farm as measured by area, therefore, has more than doubled since 1930, and the trend to larger units continues.

3. This rise can be very misleading, however, unless one also takes into account the size of farms as measured by the number of workers engaged in agricultural activities and the changes in the number of workers per farm. This can be done by using the compilations made monthly by the Crop Reporting Board of the United States Department of Agriculture. According to this source, the average monthly number of workers on the farms of the United States was 12,497,000 in 1930, fell sharply to 7,104,000 for the five-year period 1958-62, and dropped to only 6,110,000 in 1964.<sup>2</sup> Thus despite the fact that the average farm in the United States contained more than twice as many acres in 1964 as was the case in 1930, the average number of persons actively engaged in the work fell from 2.0 per farm at the beginning of the period to 1.9 at its close.

4. Finally, any propositions as to what is happening to the size of farms in the United States that are advanced should not rest upon the assumption that large and rapidly increasing numbers of farm labourers are available to furnish the manpower needed for the various types of endeavours. According to the compilations made by the Crop Reporting Board, the average monthly number of hired workers on farms was 3,190,000 in 1930. This number had fallen sharply to 1,907,000 in 1959 and to 1,604,000 in 1964, 0.39 during the first year in the series and 0.38 during the last one.

Taken together all of these facts certainly must mean that farming in the United States continues to be fully as much a family enterprise, and perhaps even more so, than was the case in 1930. The farm operators and their wives continue to do all the work of managing increasingly large, complex and highly commercialized businesses, and they themselves also perform the great bulk of tasks required in the conduct of their enterprises.

These facts also make it evident that several million of the smaller of the farms in operation in 1930 subsequently have been incorporated into larger units, thus swelling the average number of acres per farm and cutting the total number of farms by almost one-half. Data to indicate precisely the changes in the number of farms of less than fifty acres are presented in another section of this paper.

The facts do not preclude the thought that in a few sections of the nation, and to a limited extent, the huge corporation farm, operated by a hired manager and dependent

upon large numbers of unskilled and poorly paid labourers, may be waxing in importance. Unfortunately the materials on farm labour collected in connexion with the periodic census of agriculture must be considerably expanded and tabulated in more meaningful ways before this topic can be explored in the detail it deserves. On the basis of the information that is available however, the following extract from the report of the *United State Census of Agriculture: 1964*<sup>3</sup> does much to put this entire matter in proper perspective:

'Expenditures for hired farm labor were reported for one-half of the farms in 1964. However, more than 62 per cent of . . . [these] had an expenditure of less than \$500 and these farms accounted for only 5 percent of the total expenditure for hired farm labor for all farms. Approximately 45,000 farms with an expenditure of \$10,000 or more accounted for more than one-half of the hired farm labor expenditure for all farms.

'About one-third of the expenditures for hired farm labor were on farms in California, Florida, and Texas.'

In 1964 in these three States the number of farms on which ten or more regular hired labourers were employed was as follows: California, 2,241; Florida, 1,051; and Texas, 813. On the other hand, in a few other of the agricultural states in the Union, the comparable figures are 119 for Illinois, 94 for Indiana, 46 for Iowa, 68 for Minnesota, 94 for Missouri, 181 for Ohio, and 137 for Wisconsin.<sup>4</sup>

#### TYPE OF FARMING

A type of farming denotes the specific enterprises or combination of enterprises of which a given farm business is comprised. The types range all the way from general farming, in which the farm operator carries on a wide range of crop and live-stock enterprises and in which no one of them plays a dominant role in his farming activities, to the various kinds of monoculture, such as wheat farming, cattle ranching or tobacco culture, in which a single enterprise accounts for practically all activities on the farm, plantation or ranch. Among the most important of the traditional types of farming in the United States are general farming, the corn-hog-beef-cattle variety, dairy husbandry, cotton culture, wheat growing, the cultivation of tobacco, cattle ranching, the production of citrus fruits and the rice-beef-cattle combination of enterprises. Each of these has been the central feature of a highly symbiotic and intricately integrated socio-cultural system which has determined to a large extent the ways of life and labour of the people involved in it. At present these various types of farming are undergoing radical changes, although it is difficult to determine the common denominator, if any, which would enable us to elaborate the formula or depict the model that would be applicable to all. Therefore, we merely comment briefly upon the changes that are taking place in two of them.

#### General farming

General farming is definitely on the way out in the United States. Historically, the use of the general property tax as the basis for supporting universal public education and many other locally organized and supported services made it necessary for farmers to produce for the market rather than to concentrate upon any kind of a 'live-at-home' combination of agricultural activities. With the coming of the New Deal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (beginning in 1933) the various farm programmes and agricultural subsidies, which have continued in one form or another to the present day, have had the same effect. There is no programme for general farming, or any combination of enterprises. The benefits are available only in

connexion with the production of one specific commodity. In effect this policy penalizes the general farmer and benefits the one who engages in some type of monoculture or highly specialized combination of enterprises. As a result there has been a precipitous decline of general farming in the United States, especially since about 1940. This may be illustrated very well by what has happened in three places, two farms in Conejos County, Colorado, and one ranch in Tierra Amarilla, New Mexico, which I have known intimately for the last fifty years. During my boyhood and on into the 1930s, all of these establishments once were the locations for a broad range of enterprises including the production of potatoes, the growing of wheat, the making of large amounts of alfalfa and other kinds of hay, some dairying, the growing of garden peas for the market, the production of lettuce, the making of large home gardens, and important beef-cattle, hog, and poultry enterprises. During the months in which this article was under preparation I revisited each of these long-familiar scenes. At present the operator of one of the farms grows only alfalfa and other forage crops, on irrigated land, of course, which he feeds to cattle bought as calves and sold after a year or two for shipment to the feed lots where the fattening process is completed. The operator of the other farm follows a comparable pattern, except that he himself keeps a small herd of Hereford cows in order to produce the calves to which the alfalfa and other forage crops he grows are fed. This year his 'feeders' have already been sold to a feed lot in Ohio for finishing. There are no milk cows, hogs or chickens on either of these farms, and hardly a trace of a vegetable garden. The New Mexico rancher, in turn, has eliminated all types of activity on his establishment except the care of a small herd of beef cattle, and the production of some hay crops to help carry them through the long, cold winters. His income now comes entirely from the sale of 'feeders' to the operators of the feed lots.

That the changes on these three places are by no means unique is demonstrated rather clearly by the data showing the changes between 1940 and 1964 in the proportions of the farms in the United States having certain designated enterprises. Thus the percentages of all farms having specified enterprises in 1940 and 1964, respectively, are as follows: milk cows, 76.2 and 36.0; hogs or pigs, 61.8 and 34.3; chickens aged four months or more, 84.5 and 38.4; corn for grain, 67.9 and 43.8; Irish potatoes, 43.1 and 9.8; sweet potatoes, 19.1 and 9.8; vegetables for home use, 78.9 and 64.9; apple trees, 29.7 and 3.5; and pear trees, 15.8 and 2.4.<sup>5</sup>

#### Corn-hog-beef-cattle type of farming

In many ways the corn-hog-beef-cattle combination of enterprises which has dominated life and labour throughout the great 'corn belt' (including the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Iowa, and the most populous and productive parts of Missouri, Minnesota, South Dakota, Nebraska and Kansas, as well) has been the most effective type of farming ever developed by mankind. Certainly it is largely responsible for the 'image' of the thrifty, industrious, productive American farmer that has prevailed in the United States and to some extent abroad; it long has yielded a far greater return per man-year for those participating in agricultural activities than any other type of farming in the United States, the people who form part of this socio-cultural system enjoy the highest average levels and standards of living of any large segment of the rural population of the nation and there is much reason for considering that the system itself has provided much of the 'thrust' which has revolutionized the ways of extracting products from the soil in the course of the last century.<sup>6</sup>

The highly symbiotic system itself was originated in Kentucky and Ohio about 1810 and once implanted in the rich soils of the Ohio and Mississippi valleys it grew and waxed in importance until about 1960.<sup>9</sup> Its essential nature has never been stated more succinctly than was done by Thomas Nixon Carver, noted Harvard economist, himself born and reared on an Iowa farm, who wrote: 'Owing to the practice of allowing hogs to fatten on the droppings of corn-fed cattle, pork came to be, in a measure, a by-product of the beef-producing industry.'<sup>10</sup> However, almost a hundred years earlier a highly systematic Kentucky planter and writer on agricultural subjects specified exactly how his farm manager was to apply the practice of having 'the hogs follow the steers' in the maximum utilization of home-grown corn;<sup>11</sup> and the results of the painstaking work at the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station in which it was determined that 'in 120 days of feeding, an average pig, following two steers, picked up the equivalent of 312 pounds of corn.'<sup>12</sup>

Since about 1960, however, this rather general and long-effective type of farming is giving way before the forces of division of labour, specialization and very costly applications of science and engineering. Increasingly farmers in the corn belt are specializing in the production of beef or of pork, and even in the production of corn and soy beans. At present those fattening hogs are relying less upon the gastric processes of cattle and more upon equipment for mixing various components, in order to prepare corn for use by the pigs; and formula feeds in which as many as twenty components are included also are taking the place of corn on the cob or that which has been shelled in the fattening of beef cattle. Moreover, large, new, ultra-modern feed lots are springing up in the area that extends from western Texas to northern Colorado and western Nebraska. The men responsible for these are making use of the latest developments in the flaking of milo and other sorghums in the conduct of systems for fattening beef cattle that, for the first time in the history of the United States, is offering severe competition to the corn-belt producers of beef. It seems likely that the old-style corn-hog-beef-cattle type of farming is reaching the end of its course.

#### THE WAYS OF FARMING

In many respects the tremendous improvement in the ways of farming, or the system of agriculture, used by American farmers in order to secure crop and live-stock products from the soil is the most spectacular of all the rural social trends in the now highly industrialized United States. Moreover, if viewed from the historical standpoint, the search for new, less laborious and more efficient tools, implements, machines, vehicles, sources of power, means of controlling weeds, fertilizers, and also for new and improved varieties of plants and breeds of live-stock and poultry, has been a major factor in the industrialization of the nation and not merely a result of it.

Except for limited efforts in what is now the south-western part of the country, where a Spanish cultural heritage formed the channels in which human activities flowed until about the middle of the nineteenth century, the ways of farming transferred to what is now the United States were those already perfected to a high degree in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This means that from the very first American farmers had a plough with a metal point and were equipped with the mouldboard, the horse collar and consequently the use of a horse as a draft animal, and the four-wheeled farm vehicle. Building upon this base the agriculturists of the Ohio and Mississippi valleys, as the middle-class operators of substantial family-sized farms, made

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discovery after discovery, improvement after improvement, in all aspects of agriculture and animal husbandry until by 1940 they had by far the most advanced manner of farming that the world had ever known. Of tremendous importance in this remarkable development was the fact that millions of 'land-hungry' immigrant farmers carried and literally poured into the great sociocultural crucible, which was the American midwest, all of the knowledge about soils, crops, animals and cultural practices that had been gained by the peoples of the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries prior to 1910. Only in the south did improvement in the ways of securing crop and animal products greatly lag. There a system of large landed estates, the monoculture of cotton plantation and the tobacco plantations (and to a lesser extent, that of the rice- and sugar-cane plantations) and slavery perpetuated a system of hoe culture not entirely unlike that which still prevails in immense portions of the world. Even after the freeing of the slaves, the institution of the semi-servile labour system known as share-cropping kept the entire area in a 'developing' stage in which the excessive use (or waste) of human labour through a system of hoe culture prevailed almost unchallenged until about 1930.

By 1910 throughout all of the northern and western parts of the United States, however, the stage was fully set for the burgeoning of a mechanized or motorized system of farming. In fact, long before that many endeavours had been made to adapt the steam engine (which already was furnishing the power for the gigantic operation of threshing the bountiful crops of wheat, oats, barley and rye) to the jobs of ploughing and levelling. But all of this changed when the petrol motor was adapted for use in the farm tractor. Thereafter, within a couple of decades in most parts of the United States the horse and mule gave way to the combustion engine as the source of power for the machines and implements used for all processes on the farm from the preparation of the seed bed to the harvesting, processing and transportation of the products. Moreover, just as during the second half of the nineteenth century the railways had replaced the legs of the animals themselves in carrying cattle, hogs and sheep to the markets, from about 1925 onwards the motor truck wrested this tremendous job of transportation from the railways.

Larger, lighter, stronger, more efficient pieces of machinery and equipment have been the order of the day from 1910 to the present, but there also has been another important guiding principle; and, if they wished to sell their products, the designers and manufacturers have had to keep this uppermost in their minds. Irrespective of how large, complicated and expensive the individual tractor or attachment, and irrespective of the ways in which the implements were to be combined so as to perform more than one operation at a time (such as ploughing seeding and fertilizing) with the various pieces of equipment attached to the tractor in tandem fashion, the machine or the combination of them should require only one man to operate it. In other words, the imperative has been to direct the improvement of all the ways of preparing the soil, controlling the weeds, taking the harvest, processing the product for storage or for sale, and transporting things to and from the market, so that the farmer himself, the farmer and some member of his family, or at most the farmer and one hired assistant, could perform all of the activities involved.

Nor have the improvements been limited to those in which the motors and implements work on the land itself (the tractor and its many attachments) or in the barns and stables (the milking machines, belts for distributing food to live-stock, equipment for

preparing mixed feeds, and so on). At present the use of the aeroplane has long passed the stage in which it was harnessed to farm tasks such as spreading insecticides or fungicides. Already to a substantial degree it is being used in the chemical control of weeds, the application of fertilizers and even for the sowing of the seeds.

The results of the development of this mechanized and motorized system of agriculture are there for all to see. By 1968, a mere three million farmers, aided only by their wives and children, and less than a million and a half hired hands (considerable numbers of whom were their own children to whom wages were paid), or no more than one-seventieth of the world's farmers, are producing bounteous amounts of food, feed, fibre and other raw materials for a highly industrialized society of about 200 million persons in addition to large amounts for sale abroad, and unprecedented quantities for distribution gratis to the victims of hunger, famine, and malnutrition in many other parts of the world.

#### CHANGES IN THE CLASS STRUCTURE

An abrupt decrease in the numbers and proportions of lower-class, and lower-middle-class farm families is perhaps the most momentous and consequential of the recent social trends in the agricultural sections of the United States. This began in 1933 with the initiation of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "New Deal"; it swelled in importance immediately before and during the Second World War; and it reached climactic dimensions between 1950 and 1960. At present the trend has pretty well run its course, primarily because the vast majority of those who once were the nation's agricultural labourers and small farm operators have already transferred their residences from the rural to the urban districts.

Prior to 1933 in the United States, farm labour (including share-cropping, which prevailed throughout the heavily populated cotton-producing sections of the southern region) and subsistence farming on small establishments located in economically marginal or submarginal areas were the activities of last resort for persons who for any reason were unable to compete successfully in more rewarding agricultural pursuits or in non-agricultural endeavours. Together the two constituted the marginal industry, or the places in which those who were "crowded out" of other types of employment could and did find ways of gaining some kind of a livelihood. As late as the great economic depression which reached its most extreme stage in 1932, for example, millions of people fled the nation's cities for the rural districts and especially for the least productive parts of the same.<sup>13</sup>

All of this was drastically changed as a result of the welfare legislation which formed the very heart of Roosevelt's "New Deal." In effect the welfare rolls soon began to replace farm labour of all types, including share-cropping and subsistence farming, as the nation's marginal industry. Moreover, because of the way in which the welfare programmes were organized, those who sought to benefit fully from many of the features of public assistance found it necessary to establish their residences in or near the seats of the various counties and preferably in the larger urban centres.<sup>14</sup> This and related factors produced a mass movement of persons, largely those of lower-class and lower-middle-class status, from the farms to the cities in the years from 1933 on, and this huge migration has profoundly changed the class structure of rural society in the United States.

Even in this short article it is essential to present some of the data upon which the above generalizations are based. Consider first, in this connexion, that the rural-farm population of the United States, that is, the persons living in rural territory on tracts of

land that are classified as farms, dropped precipitously from 30,157,513 in 1930 to 13,444,898 in 1960. During the same period the non-white (predominantly Negro) portion of this category, almost exclusively those of lower-class status, fell from 4,931,268 to 1,593,098.<sup>15</sup>

The United States Bureau of the Census has estimated that "from 1940 to 1964, there was a net transfer of approximately 17 million persons from farm to non-farm residence"<sup>16</sup> and if the years 1934 to 1940 were included the total undoubtedly would be more than 20 million.

That the vast majority of the persons and families involved in this mass transfer were of lower- or lower-middle-class status also can be demonstrated rather conclusively. In the first place it is easily shown that the semi-servile system of share-cropping has almost disappeared from the scene. This system was introduced about 1868, shortly after the freeing of the Negro slaves and the end of the Civil War, when it was found that cash wages would not elicit regular work from the freed men; and it waxed steadily in importance until 1933, with hundreds of thousands of families of white people joining the ex-slaves and their descendants in its demeaning way of life. Thus in 1930 there was, according to the census enumeration, a total of 776,278 share-croppers in the southern region of whom 383,381 were whites and 392,897 were non-whites (Negroes). By 1959 the total had fallen to 121,037, of whom 47,650 were classified as whites and 73,387 as non-whites.<sup>17</sup> Subsequently the Bureau of the Census abandoned the use of the category of share-croppers as such, and placed the few that remained in 1964 with those classified as share tenants. The number in this combined category, however, fell from 248,039 in 1959 to 146,633 in 1964.

A part of the human drama reflected in these cold statistics is conveyed in a letter to the editor which was published in the September 1968 issue of the *Farm Journal*, a national magazine published in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and now in its ninety-second year. The editor, who might very well have begun such a series some thirty years earlier, introduced the communication under a caption "Who Should Feed the Poor?" and placed it first item in the section. The letter reads as follows:

"Are farmers really responsible for the rural poor, as some 'poor leaders' and politicians claim?

"Many Southern farmers already are carrying a heavy share of the load. For example, the illiterate father of one of our tenants (share-cropper) families is not capable of driving our new eight-row tractors. With chemical farming, we no longer need them as hoe hands. But he has ten children and two illegitimate grandchildren, for whom we have compassion and have tried to help.

"My dilemma: Am I morally obligated to feed these people from here on? Or should I advise them to go to town and get on welfare?"

"Larry Woodard, Arkansas"

The problem posed was important enough to the editor to cause him to publish the following invitation:

"Since many farmers are in the same dilemma, we would like readers' opinions on who should be responsible, what is being done and what should be done to help the rural poor?"

From what has been said above, it should be apparent that the dilemma of this particular planter, and the invitation to discuss similar ones in the pages of the *Farm Journal*, come after the changes have been at work for several decades and have pretty well run their course. If the average family of share-croppers is assumed to consist of

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5 persons, and not 14 as in the case mentioned above, between 1930 and 1964 this group alone included about 3.5 million of those who made the migration from farms to cities and towns. The exodus of the sharecroppers alone has produced a profound change in the class structure of the densely populated rural districts of the southern region, an area which in 1960 still contained 44 percent of the rural-farm population of the United States.

Let someone think that the former sharecroppers may have remained in the rural areas as wage hands or as small subsistence farmers, let us next consider the facts that the numbers in both of these categories likewise have fallen precipitously during recent decades. Thus the comprehensive materials gathered monthly by the Crop Reporting Board of the United States Department of Agriculture indicate that the monthly average number of workers on the farms of the United States fell from 12,733,000 for the year 1935 to 4,903,000 for the twelve months ending in August 1967. During this period the number of farm operators and the unpaid members of their families decreased from 9,855,000 to 3,650,000, and that of the hired workers (which includes considerable numbers of the children of the farmers themselves) fell from 2,878,000 to 1,253,000.<sup>18</sup> The decrease in family workers reflects, of course, the decline in the number of sharecroppers and the unpaid members of their families, but the number of hired labourers fell by 56.5 per cent; and this alone is indicative of a transfer of three or four million persons of lower-class status from the agricultural to the non-agricultural portions of American society during the period under consideration.

Finally, some consideration of the drastic reduction in the number of operators of small farms is also required. As in the case of the sharecroppers, the persons involved did not merely change from one tenure category to another and remain in the agricultural districts. Unlike the sharecroppers and the hired workers, however, they can hardly be assigned to lower-class status. The fact that they exercised the managerial function, were responsible for the decisions affecting their farming activities, places them in an entirely different social position from those who never shoulder the responsibilities of management. Therefore, despite the fact that the incomes of most of them were low, they are properly classified as being of lower middle-class status. The classifications employed in the United States Census of Agriculture being as they are, one must choose between three possibilities in drawing the line between "small farmers" and those in the next higher category. These are below 10 acres, below 50 acres, or below 70 acres. For present purposes we have chosen the second of these, and consider operators of farms of less than 50 acres in size to fall in the lower-middle-class category.

In 1935, exclusive of what then were the territories of Alaska and Hawaii, the Census of Agriculture enumerated a total of almost 2,700,000 farms of less than 50 acres; and in 1964, including the new states of Alaska and Hawaii, there remained only 820,000 agricultural and pastoral establishments of this size. Of the decrease of 1,880,000 farm operators shown in these figures, probably as many as 700,000 are the sharecroppers already taken into account. Even so, however, these data unquestionably show a tremendous displacement of the farmers of lower-middle-class status, perhaps by about 1,200,000 heads of households, or some 6,000,000 people.

By summing the three estimates presented above, we arrive at a total of about 13,000,000 persons of lower- and lower-middle class status involved in the mass transfer of population from the farms to non agricultural districts during the period between 1935 and 1965.

In an endeavour to determine roughly the extent to which the mass movement just analysed has affected the class structure of society in the agricultural sections of the United States, the following procedures were used: (a) the number of farm operators, including the number of sharecroppers who have mistakenly been classified as such in the Census of Agriculture, is considered to represent the same number of families; (b) the number of hired farm workers is considered to represent one-half that number of families; (c) all farm labourers and all sharecroppers are assigned to the lower-class category; (d) all operators of farms of less than 50 acres in size, with the exception of the sharecroppers, are placed in the lower-middle-class category; and (e) all operators of farms of 50 acres or more are classified as being above lower-middle-class status. On this basis the following are the changes in the class structure of rural society in the agricultural sections of the United States between 1935 and 1964.

1. The number of agricultural families fell from 8,251,350 in 1935 to 3,938,857 in 1964.

2. Lower-class agricultural families dropped in number from 2,215,278 in 1935 to 781,000 in 1964 or from 26.8 per cent to 19.8 per cent of the total. (The total for 1964 includes an extremely liberal estimate of 40,000 sharecroppers.)

3. Lower-middle-class agricultural families fell in number from 1,918,148 in 1935 to 780,015 in 1964, or a decrease of from 23.2 per cent to 19.8 per cent of the total.

4. Families ranked as being above lower-middle-class status declined in number from 4,117,924 in 1935 to 2,377,842 in 1964, but on the relative basis they increased from 49.9 per cent to 60.4 per cent of the total.

Finally, it seems essential to mention that the urban problems generated by the movement of millions of people of lower-class status from the farms to the cities and towns of the United States are so massive that even journalists and publicists of various categories exhibit concern about them. Illustrative of this is this quotation from an editorial in the daily *Florida Times-Union* of Jacksonville, Florida, of 23 September 1968: "Big cities are caught in the vise-grip of decreasing revenues and "high cost citizens". For example, Baltimore has only 27 per cent of Maryland's population, but 71 per cent of the state's welfare-dependent children."

#### CONCLUSION

In the agricultural sections of the United States, the forces bringing about change currently are greatly in the ascendancy over those making for stability and institutionalization. This is illustrated by what has happened since 1935 in four of the most important features of rural social organization, namely, to the number and size of farms, the type of farming, the ways in which farmers and animal husbandrymen go about extracting products from the soil and the class structure of the agricultural portion of the society. The number of farms has fallen to less than one-half its magnitude in 1935, and the size of the average farm has more than doubled, but agriculture and stock-raising still remain largely family enterprises. General farming as such has disappeared for the most part, and even such a general type as the corn-hog-beef-cattle combination (which brought agricultural renown and prosperity to the great corn belt of the United States for over a century) is giving way to highly specialized types of farm organization and management. Even in 1935 throughout most of the United States there remained only a few relics of hoe culture and other labour-devouring ways of wresting products from the soil; but by 1968 with very few exceptions (of which the large-scale production of vegetables in parts of Florida and California supplies some of the most notorious examples), hand or "stoop" labour

performed by large numbers of unskilled workers has been replaced by effective, ultra-modern machines and implements powered by petrol and electricity. By 1965 there were already 102 tractors for every 100 workers on American farms, and this does not include the hundreds of thousands of self-propelled grain and bean combines, corn pickers, cotton pickers, and so on. Even the aeroplane is at present used to sow, fertilize and spread insecticides and fungicides on millions of acres which only a few decades ago were worked exclusively by equipment powered by draft animals. Partly as a response to the improved system of agriculture, and to a large extent as the cause of it, many millions of farm labourers and small subsistence farmers have left rural districts and farming activities and taken up residence in the nation's cities and towns. By the millions they have found the welfare rolls to be a substitute for the economically marginal activities they once carried on in agriculture. As a result there has been a profound change in the class structure of society in the agricultural portions of the United States. In 1935, according to certain criteria described in this paper, the line separating the lower from the middle part of the middle socio-economic class divided the agricultural families into two almost exactly equal proportions, 49.9 per cent being below it and 50.1 per cent above. By 1964 however, so pronounced have been the changes, the same criteria indicate that only 39.6 per cent of the families were below that line and that 60.4 per cent above it. Moreover, those of strictly lower-class status fell from 26.7 per cent to only 19.8 per cent of the total.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> For the results of my endeavours to ascertain, analyse, and set forth the nature and characteristics of some varieties of all of these socio-cultural systems except (e), (k), (l), and (m), see: T. Lynn Smith, *The Sociology of Rural Life*, third edition, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1953; T. Lynn Smith, *Brazil: People and Institutions*, third edition, Baton Rouge; Louisiana State University Press, 1963; and T. Lynn Smith, *Colombia: Social Structure and the Process of Development*, Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1967.

<sup>2</sup> Crop Reporting Board, United States Department of Agriculture, *Farm Labor*, 9 October, 1953, 10 February 1965 (mimeographed).

<sup>3</sup> Vol. II, p. 694, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1967.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 718.

<sup>5</sup> United States Bureau of the Census, *United States Census of Agriculture: Vol. II*, p. 44, 313-29, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1967.

<sup>6</sup> For highly perceptive observations by a visitor about this portion of agriculture in the United States and its importance in affairs at home and abroad see: Salvador Camacho Roldan, *Notas de Viaje*, p. 677-83, Bogotá, Librería Colombiana, 1897; and the translation of the same in: T. Lynn Smith, *Agrarian Reform in Latin America*, p. 80-4, New York, Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1965.

<sup>7</sup> For the most detailed analysis and description available of social organization and life in the "corn belt" see: Carl C. Taylor and Associates, *Rural Life in the United States*, p. 360-82, New York, Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1949.

<sup>8</sup> For a capsule statement of its origin, development and spread, see T. Lynn Smith "Statement on the Problems of Agriculture in Latin America", in: U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress*, p. 24-5, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1968; and for a fuller exposition of the same consult: T. Lynn Smith, "Agricultural-Pastoral Conflict: A Major Impediment in the Process of Development", to be published in the January 1969 issue of *The Journal of Inter-American Studies*.

<sup>10</sup> *Principles of Rural Economics*, p. 104, Boston, Ginn & Company, 1911.

<sup>11</sup> Adam Beatty, *Southern Agriculture, Being Essays on the Cultivation of Corn, Hemp, Tobacco, Etc., and the Best Method of Renovating the Soil*, p. 265-7, New York, C. M. Saxton, 1843.

<sup>12</sup> Charles Wayland Towne and Edward Norris Wentworth, *Pigs: From Cave to Corn Belt*, p. 211, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1950.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. T. Lynn Smith, *The Sociology of Rural Life*, p. 167-77, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1940; and T. Lynn Smith, 'Recent Changes in the Farm Population of the Southern States', *Social Forces*, Vol. 15, No. 3, March 1937, p. 381-401.

<sup>14</sup> For an early indication of this see: Homer F. Hitt and T. Lynn Smith, 'Population Redistribution in Louisiana', *Social Forces*, Vol. 20, No. 4, May 1942, p. 442-3.

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census, *United States Census of Population: 1950*, Vol. II, *Characteristics of the Population*, Part I, p. 87, United States Summary, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1953; and U.S. Bureau of the Census, *United States Census of Population: 1960, General Social and Economic Characteristics*, United States Summary, Final Report PC(1)-1C, p. 199, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1962.

<sup>16</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census, *United States Census of Agriculture: 1964*, Vol. 3, Part 2, p. 7, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1968.

<sup>17</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census, *United States Census of Agriculture: 1959*, Vol. II, p. 1032, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1962. For an analysis of the movement of Negroes from the rural districts, see T. Lynn Smith, 'The Redistribution of the Negro Population of the United States, 1910 to 1960', *Journal of Negro History*, Vol. LI, No. 3, July 1966, p. 155-73.

<sup>18</sup> Crop Reporting Board, United States Department of Agriculture, *Farm Labor*, 9 October 1953, 10 September 1968 (mimeographed).

#### PUBLIC INTEREST DEMANDS ADEQUATE PROTECTION FROM TANKER AND OIL INTERESTS

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, on October 8, 1969, the Senate, by a vote of 86 to 0, passed S. 7, to amend the Federal Water Pollution Act. The chairman of the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Public Works Committee, the distinguished junior Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE), and the other members of that subcommittee labored on this legislation for more than 2 years. They are to be commended on the outstanding results they produced.

The bill is at present being considered in conference. Very important differences exist between the bill which the Senate unanimously passed and the bill approved by the House of Representatives. How these differences are resolved in conference will affect all taxpayers. In addition, it is of vital concern to millions of Americans who live, or own property, along our Nation's shorelines.

Among the most critical differences are those pertaining to the terms for determining legal responsibility and limits of financial liability of owners of oil tankers and others responsible for spills that cause pollution. We in the Senate approved relatively strict terms for determining legal responsibility for damage resulting from such pollution, and comparatively high limits of financial liability for owners of the ships involved. On the other hand, the House bill cre-

ated relatively loose and inadequate terms for determining negligence and established low limits of financial liability.

The control of pollution, particularly by oil spilling from tankers or from offshore drilling operations, is a matter of extreme importance and urgency to all of us who are concerned lest our beautiful seacoasts, beaches, and shores may soon become filthy stretches of oil slick, dirt, and grime. This must not be permitted to occur.

Every effort must be made to assure that those who cause such pollution be required to make adequate financial restitution for cleaning it up. Our beaches and shores belong to all Americans. They are not the private dumping grounds of owners of oil tankers and offshore drilling operators.

I am hopeful that our colleagues serving as Senate conferees will stand firm for the liability provisions which we in the Senate approved. We cannot afford to wait until a terrible disaster, such as the *Torrey Canyon* disaster, afflicts our shores before taking action to provide for reasonable and orderly compensation for those who might suffer damage.

I firmly believe that oil companies and the oil tanker industry can and must find the insurance that will be necessary to protect them against those limits of liability which Senator MUSKIE and the members of his subcommittee considered minimally essential to protect the American public. I also believe that the American public and individual property owners are entitled, in the event of oil spills, to recover adequate damages against the tanker owner on terms other than simple negligence.

It is grossly unfair that a beach-front homeowner should, in the event of an oil spill from a vessel with which that property owner has absolutely no connection, be required to prove negligence on the part of the owners of the vessel in order to be able to recover damages.

The approach to this problem which we in the Senate took is proper, not only from an economic point of view, but is essential from the point of view of the public interest. The huge oil companies owning large fleets of tankers and the insurance companies insuring ocean-going vessels will certainly fight these proposals every inch of the way. However, if adequate protection by law is not provided now, when the giant oil tankers are just beginning to make their appearance, it will be infinitely more difficult to enact adequate legislation once the shipping industry and the oil industry have grown accustomed to the cost savings they realize from the lower levels of financial responsibility and terms of liability.

#### ADDITIONAL ALABAMIAN CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM WAR

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I have placed in the RECORD the names of 942 Alabama servicemen who were listed as casualties of the Vietnam war through October 3. In the period from October 4 through November 5, the Department of Defense has notified eight more Alabama

families of the death of loved ones in the conflict in Vietnam, bringing the total number of casualties to 950.

I wish to place the names of these heroic Alabamians in the permanent archives of the Nation, paying tribute to them, on behalf of the people of Alabama, for their heroism and patriotism. May the time not be distant when there will be no occasion for more of these tragic lists.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the names and the next of kin of the eight Alabamians.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### LIST OF CASUALTIES INCURRED BY U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM THE STATE OF ALABAMA IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONFLICT IN VIETNAM, OCTOBER 4 THROUGH NOVEMBER 5, 1969

##### ARMY

First Lt. Walter J. Hogans, husband of Mrs. Barbara L. Hogans, 203 Scott Street, Tuskegee, 36088.

Sgt. Robert Kennedy, Jr., son of Mrs. Jettie M. Kennedy, 2852 28th Street North, Birmingham, 35207.

Sp. 5. Adrian A. Akins, son of Mr. and Mrs. Ollis B. Akins, 508 Mound Avenue, Cordova, 35550.

Cw. 3 Ferman B. Hodges, husband of Mrs. Mitzie D. Hodges, 249 Howard Drive, Gardendale, 35071.

##### MARINE CORPS

Pfc. Claude E. Ellard, Jr., son of Mr. and Mrs. Claude E. Ellard, Sr., 1280 West Carlton Acres, Mobile.

Pfc. Stevie Taylor, son of Mr. Roy Taylor, 1727 14th Avenue South, Birmingham.

Pfc. Michael K. Price, son of Mr. and Mrs. Bruce K. Price, Route 2, Jemison.

Pfc. William L. Dawes, son of Mr. and Mrs. Legrand Dawes, Jr., 8512 2nd Avenue South, Birmingham.

#### UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY TO EARLIER HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, the current deadlock over the ratification of human rights treaties by the United States has not always existed. Due to extreme delay in ratification of these conventions, the impression that the United States has never been a party to a human rights treaty has been created. Almost unconsciously, many have simply assumed that since we have never ratified a human rights treaty, there is no precedent or real imperative for action now. This is a serious misconception which needs immediate clarification. We have been parties to previous human rights treaties.

We are an adherent to a Convention of Slavery which was first proposed during the administration of President Coolidge, and which was ratified with the advice and consent of the Senate during the administration of President Herbert Hoover. We are also a party to a Convention on the Nationality of Women which was ratified during the administration of President Franklin Roosevelt.

Thus, we are not breaking new ground. We are now proposing that the United States enter into an agreement which has no precedent. In the words of Arthur Goldberg, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations:

We are proceeding in that very honorable bipartisan tradition of manifesting concern on the part of our country with the question of human rights.

Unfortunately we have been proceeding very slowly, if at all, in recent years. We have let our great tradition of leadership in the human rights field lapse. We have been content to give lip service instead of leadership to the movement to promote expanded human rights. At the same time, we have fallen in the eyes of the rest of the world. Newly developing nations which once looked to us for inspiration and leadership in organizing their governments, now view us with quiet contempt. The hypocrisy of our position grows stronger each year as the gulf between our words and our actions to promote human rights grows wider.

Mr. President, the time to regain our once lofty position as the leader in the human rights field is now. By ratifying the three human rights treaties concerning forced labor, the political rights of women, and genocide, we would once again seize the initiative in this important field and provide the world with a clear demonstration of our renewed determination to support fundamental human rights. The costs of ratification are very small; the benefits, however, to our international standing would be very great. Here is an opportunity to regain much of our lost standing in this field with little sacrifice on our part. The time for action is now. Let us start moving toward ratification as soon as possible.

#### VIETNAM—AN OPEN LETTER TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a letter addressed to the Vice President, together with an open letter to demonstrators, with respect to the war in Vietnam.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GLEN ELLYN, ILL.,  
October 28, 1969.

The VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,  
Washington, D.C.

SIR: As the mother of a son killed in Viet Nam, most people simply assume that I am in sympathy with those Americans who advocate peace at any price, immediate withdrawal, and complete capitulation. They also assume that I am in sympathy with those who participate in demonstrations against the war. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

I have longed to speak out against their form of dissent because I happen to believe that they are abusing their rights as citizens. In their zeal they seem to have forgotten that our President, who was elected by a majority of voters, has been denied their support and encouragement in his attempts to bring the war to an honorable conclusion and that their actions are being construed by the communists to be support for their cause. Somehow I must tell them that I think they are wrong.

It would be impossible for me to address all those demonstrators in person so I would be most grateful to be able to reach them through an open letter, which is enclosed, in the hope that you might see fit to use it in any way you can.

Sincerely,

Mrs. JOHN F. SCULL.

GLEN ELLYN, ILL.,  
October 28, 1969.

To All Demonstrators Against the War in Vietnam:

So you hate war.

You hate it because it kills, wastes, and destroys.

Other Americans have also despaired of the killing, the waste, and the destruction in Viet Nam; but they did not surrender, they did not demonstrate, and most did not complain. Their commitment to democracy was firm and unyielding. These Americans served their country, obeyed its laws, fought and died, probably hating war more than you do.

As demonstrators for immediate withdrawal you have chosen to abandon them, to "bug out" on responsibilities that are distasteful to you and, inadvertent as it may be, to aid and abet the cause of communism.

You vigorously pursue the rights bestowed upon you with the blood of generations of American men who fought to keep alive the democracy that many of you have not helped to earn and that some of you are unwilling to defend. I submit that most of you have squandered their magnificent legacy upon yourselves with no thought of generations to come.

It may well be that destiny has been kind to my beloved son, whose death among thousands of others you profess to mourn, for he is not here to endure the treachery of your pursuit of peace at any price and your willingness to deny the value of his participation in a war he felt to be justified.

The memory of my sweet, gentle son is vivid and needs no prodding from demonstrations of those who hate war but not enough to hate both sides of it—theirs and ours.

When you are ready to take your long list of war dead to the streets of North Viet Nam, to sing your songs in the by-ways of Red China, to utter your prayers and shout your speeches in the factories of Russia . . . then I will be ready to clasp you to my heart, join you in your pleas and stand beside you in your cause . . . unto death . . . because you see my son, too, hated war.

#### MEMBERS OF DANISH PARLIAMENT URGE END TO VIETNAM WAR

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I have received a message, signed by 72 Members of the Danish Parliament, the Folketing, urging an end to the war in Vietnam. I have been asked to bring the message to the attention of Members of Congress and the American public. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CHRISTIANSBORG, DENMARK,  
October 15, 1969.

Mr. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,  
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate.

SIR: The long and tiring peace talks, held in Paris between yourselves and the Vietnamese, reached no positive results; and yet a new flame of hope has lightened the gloom which the prospect of the continuance of war in the world brought with it.

The storm of protest which has arisen amongst the people of the U.S.A. against this war in Vietnam is growing in strength and in depth. We in Denmark are following its growth with anxious intensity.

Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, Democrats, Republicans all have found a meeting point in the pressing need which exists to stop hostilities in Vietnam before the end of 1969, and to work towards

the total withdrawal of American forces from that war-torn country.

In this situation, those members of the Danish Folketing, whose signatures confirm the feelings expressed in this appeal, wish to make you aware of our solidarity with those in all spheres of American life who have taken up, so positively, the fight to end this unhappy war in Vietnam.

We, who ourselves are so closely engaged in the political life of our country, both internally and externally, wish to send a particularly heartfelt greeting to those American Congressmen who demand the end of the war in Vietnam. We support wholeheartedly every effort which they are making to bring peace to the world. It is our common, ideals of freedom, justice and human rights which must win the real victory for us. In Vietnam and elsewhere.

This message will not reach you through the usual diplomatic channels. We, whose names are appended to it, have preferred that it come to you in a less formal manner than is normal in communications from the politicians of one country to those of another. We address it to you, Mr. William Fulbright, as Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, with the request that its message be passed on to your colleagues of the Congress of the United States of America, and to the American people.

[Signed by 72 Members of the Danish Parliament.]

#### TRIBUTE TO MRS. MILDRED GEARE ON HER 40TH ANNIVERSARY AS A JOURNALIST

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, Mrs. Mildred Geare has been serving the News American in Baltimore for the past four decades. Recently, she was honored as she celebrated her 40th anniversary as a journalist. Those in attendance included the Governor of Maryland, the mayor of Baltimore, and some 150 friends and associates. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the report of "Millie" Geare's anniversary.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MILLIE'S 40 YEARS TOASTED  
(By Lee Belser)

Mildred Geare, Women's Club Editor of The News American, grabbed her first exclusive (with Mrs. Woodrow Wilson) in the powder room of a local hotel and thought nothing of it, but the honors heaped upon her on her 40th anniversary yesterday nearly overwhelmed her.

"Millie," as almost everyone calls her, flicked a tear from her eye as she heard a salute from Gov. Mandel extolling her "exemplary contribution to the public and to the profession of journalism," then flashed a wide grin as Edward Ballard, American, affectionately toasted her as "the only woman I ever knew who never cooked a meal."

He also told 150 guests at a luncheon for Millie at the Belvedere Hotel that she is the only reporter he ever knew who chased her own copy all the way through the composing room "to make sure it gets in the paper."

Mrs. Geare was feted by the Friendship Association of Baltimore and its nine affiliated civic and professional women's groups for her 40 years' of reporting clubwomen's activities in Baltimore and around the state.

Among the honors given on her were an initialed gold-and-silver pin in the shape of a reporter's notepad and pen, the Distinguished Citizen's Award from the governor; a citation from Mayor D'Alesandro; and enameled red, white and blue elephant pin

from two women's Republican clubs; a gold membership card from the Maryland Federation of Republican Women; a gold bracelet charm from the Baltimore City GOP club and other gifts.

The programs, festooned in red yarn, were models of the pages of *The News American* with "Salute to Mildred" splashed in red.

Mrs. Geare, who came to *The News* following its purchase of the *Post*, started out as a member of the latter paper's woman's department.

Known as a bright, friendly and aggressive reporter way back in the 20's, Millie still retains that reputation. Her working day often long and her telephone buzzes continually with news of business and professional women's activities.

Rumor has it that the only time she nearly missed a day's work was when she broke her arm and had to be hospitalized.

But even then, she dictated her next day's column from a hospital bed.

She has made numerous trips to Europe (including one to Russia), but she's always had her column in on time.

During her four-decade career, she has met queens and presidents and was present at every Democratic and Republican National Convention from the era of Woodrow Wilson to that of Lyndon Johnson.

As City Editor Ballard put it, "She is the best known woman among women in Baltimore."

Wearing a tall, multicolored turban (she is known for her hats), Mrs. Geare told a reporter before all the speeches began: "I feel like a million dollars."

But when she started to speak, she admitted: "I feel a little nervous."

Mark Collins, publisher of *The News American*, described Mrs. Geare as "one of our most valued employees."

"Her devotion and dedication to the paper and to our readers has reflected great credit on our paper. Millie is one of our favorite people.

\*\*\* presenting Mayor D'Alesandro, referred to Mrs. Geare as a "great lady, an outstanding citizen" in delivering greetings on behalf of the mayor and the City Council.

Mrs. Geare took all the praise with a smile, even when Ballard told of a newsgathering feat that contrasted with her usual dignified demeanor: "Once she jumped out of a window to get a story back to the paper," he recalled.

Oh, Millie.

### RIISING COSTS AND THE HOUSING CRISIS

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, yesterday, I had the pleasure of testifying before the Committee on Housing and Urban Development of the New York State Senate on the first day of its hearings regarding the housing problems in New York City.

The distinguished chairman of that committee, the Honorable Roy M. Goodman, called these hearings, which conclude today, in order to conduct a broad-gauge investigation on the city's housing crisis.

Chairman Goodman invited testimony on a variety of interrelated housing problems such as rent control, rent stabilization in uncontrolled buildings, landlord-tenant relations, relocation, deterioration, abandonment, residential zoning, and economic factors affecting new building construction.

The hearings were most informative and constructive, and I commend State Senator Goodman on his initiative in organizing them.

A principal theme of the day-long

hearings was the widespread problem of abandoned buildings in New York City which now total about 10,000. Landlords, not being able to secure rehabilitation loans, desert the buildings—which soon become decayed, deteriorated, and subject to structural fires.

The city's housing vacancy rate is its lowest in history—1.2 percent. The city has suffered a net loss of 21,000 housing units from 1965 to 1968. Because of these facts, tenants, living in substandard abandoned buildings, cannot move easily and are forced to live in these inadequate quarters.

All those who testified at the hearings including Edward J. Logue, chairman of the New York State Urban Development Corp., and Charles J. Urstadt, New York State Commissioner of Housing, urged increasing funding of Federal housing programs to remedy these problems.

It has been estimated that the city will need \$1 billion a year in Federal funds for 5 years to reverse the spiral of housing decay in the slums. In contrast, the city received a little over \$100 million for housing from the Department of Housing and Urban Development last year.

This same problem is experienced by countless other cities in this Nation.

This inability to meet housing needs with adequate funds has been a prime reason for the failure of many of our Federal housing programs.

In order to begin a reversal of this trend, I have cosponsored the amendment to the Department of Housing and Urban Development appropriations bill, H.R. 12307, introduced by my distinguished colleague from Michigan (Mr. HART) which calls for full funding of urban renewal at its authorization level of \$1.6 billion. I hope my colleagues will support this amendment on Monday when the bill is considered on the floor.

For the benefit of my colleagues, I have asked that my testimony before the New York State Senate Committee on Housing and Urban Development be included in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the testimony was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### RIISING COSTS AND THE HOUSING CRISIS

The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 set a national housing goal of 26 million new and rehabilitated housing units by 1978. This goal has been used as a yardstick to measure our housing programs.

Too often, however, we have allowed ourselves to assume that the mere declaration of this housing goal will produce a flurry of activity.

It is now time for us to examine the hard facts about the housing goal.

It is now time to admit the failures of our housing programs.

It is time for us to face the fact that, at present production rates, we will not be able to produce 26 million more units within the next decade.

Despite the enactment of the 1968 Housing Act, the housing crisis is getting worse, not better.

On a nationwide basis, housing starts have declined from 1.5 million in 1968 to an estimated 1.1 million in 1969. Only 100,000 low income units were built last year. 20 million Americans still live in substandard housing.

The plight is particularly desperate in New York City.

450,000 units are in a deteriorating or dilapidated condition.

140,000 eligible families are on the waiting list for public housing.

Housing starts have decreased from 18,500 in 1967 to 16,184 in 1968.

10,000 buildings have been abandoned this year, a substantial increase over previous years.

These grim facts mean that we have failed. Government housing programs, although well intentioned and ambitious, have not met the needs in New York City and other cities.

#### FUNDING LEVELS

The prime reason for our failure to meet housing goals has been inadequate funding.

Housing for low and moderate income families requires the expenditure of large amounts of Federal money. This money has not been forthcoming.

The 1968 Housing Act established major innovative action programs to increase our Nation's supply of housing for low and middle income families. Unfortunately, this bold legislative package was not supported with an adequate commitment of our financial resources.

This year, despite the housing crisis and the national attention given to the problem, we may very well experience another appropriations setback.

Early this year, the Department of Housing and Urban Development submitted a budget request to Congress for a little more than \$2 billion for fiscal year 1970. This, incidentally, amounts to less than one month's expenditure for the Vietnam War.

The House of Representatives responded in July by slashing this budget by 20%, or almost \$400 million.

In 1968, New York received roughly 10% of the funds spent by HUD on housing programs. Assuming the City receives the same proportionate share this year, then the House cut would reduce the City's allocation by about \$40 million below what it would be under the HUD budget request.

This is a loss which the City cannot afford.

Cuts have been made by the House in all the major innovative housing programs of the 1968 legislation which have the potential for easing our housing crisis.

Section 235, Homeownership and Section 236, Rental Assistance were cut \$20 million and \$30 million respectively. In the first year of operation, these programs have proven most effective and the demand for assistance quickly exhausted available funds.

Rent Supplements, another new and promising housing program was cut from \$100 million to \$50 million. This program was created for a two fold purpose; as an incentive to increase the housing stock and as a rental assistance program for the poor. Unfortunately, this program has suffered since its inception from underfunding and has not been able to fulfill its role in supplying new housing. The House appropriation will only serve to make its success more unlikely.

The appropriation for Model Cities, has been reduced by the House from \$675 million to \$500 million, just as the program has begun to develop as planned.

The Senate should restore these funds cut from the HUD budget by the House. In September, I requested the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee reviewing the fiscal 1970 housing appropriations to take this action.

One area where lack of funds is particularly acute is urban renewal.

The Administration has requested \$1 billion for urban renewal, and the House cut this by \$150 million.

Almost 85% of the funds expended by HUD in New York State are earmarked for urban renewal.

This program is hit particularly hard by inflation and soaring construction costs.

To offset these inflationary pressures, I have urged the Senate Appropriations Sub-

committee to fund the urban renewal program at its full authorization level of \$1.6 billion—rather than at the \$1 billion level requested by HUD.

The Construction Cost Index (CCI) compiled by the Department of Commerce indicates that construction costs will rise 7.2% this year, based on national estimates. In New York, these same costs may rise 10%. If the CCI is applied to the HUD \$1 billion budget request for urban renewal, the funds in terms of actual purchasing power will be worth only \$933 million. Therefore, the effects of inflation cut into the appropriation before the funds are even available.

Conventional urban renewal programs, because of their scope and complexity, often take 10 years and in some cases longer to complete. Due to the annual increase in construction costs, cost over-runs and other results of inflation, the sums originally reserved for a project normally will not be sufficient for completion. As a result, amendatory grants must be allocated by HUD to city officials to meet the higher costs. The Department estimates that of the \$1 billion requested, about \$400 million will be for amendatory grants attributable to past cost increases.

Inflation, therefore, consumes over 40% of the Department's \$1 billion budget request. This would leave only about \$500 million for new urban renewal programs.

The increased demands for urban renewal funds far exceed the available supply of funds. The Department of Housing and Urban Development needs more than \$2 billion to fund existing applications—\$1.5 billion for conventional urban renewal and \$692 million for the Neighborhood Development Program. This does not include new applications which will be submitted during the course of the fiscal year and I understand that applications received by HUD total \$200 million each month.

An appropriation of \$1.6 billion would yield almost \$1 billion for existing and new applications. Needless to say, this amount will not be sufficient fully to meet actual needs. However, it will provide twice as much money for new urban renewal programs as the HUD request, after the effects of inflation are taken into account.

It is false economy not to provide adequate funding for these housing programs. The funds spent for them bring economic returns by creating jobs and a stronger tax base in blighted areas.

In addition, if we fail to act now, decay will continue to spread, and the cost of correcting it will continue to rise with soaring construction costs. Ultimately, we will be faced with a far greater—and much more costly—task of renewal than if we take action now. In the meantime, millions of Americans will be forced to continue to live in substandard and deteriorating areas.

#### CONSTRUCTION COST LIMITS

Unrealistic statutory cost limits in HUD programs have seriously impeded badly-needed new production.

In the Senate, we have sought this year to replace the rigid existing cost limits with more flexible, realistic limits that will respond to changes in construction cost levels.

In Committee and on the Floor of the Senate, I proposed an amendment which would have replaced the present room cost limits for public housing by a flexible limit under which:

Existing statutory cost limits of \$2400 per room could be increased by the Secretary of HUD to reflect increases in the nationwide construction cost since 1965, on the basis of cost indices approved by the Secretary.

These limits as adjusted by this sliding scale could be further increased by the Secretary in high cost areas by the amount of 45%.

The Committee and the Senate also

adopted a similar sliding scale for the Section 235, Home Ownership, and Section 236, Rental Assistance Programs.

An important, although seemingly technical problem that arose in the Senate in connection with these sliding scale limits was the selection of the base year.

The Senate Committee adopted a base year of 1967. I urged a base year of two years earlier—1965—and successfully offered this as an amendment on the Floor of the Senate.

Room cost limits for public housing were last examined in 1965. Mortgage limits for the Section 235 and Section 236 programs were based on 1965 figures. Since that time, there has been a construction cost increase of over 26%. The 1967 base year formulas would have allowed only a 15% construction cost increase.

I felt strongly that the new room cost limits should reflect the present changes and actual experience in construction since the last revision by the Congress.

For public housing, a 1967 base year would have yielded a room cost limit of approximately \$4,000; the 1965 base year produced a limit of over \$4,300. The latter figure is the minimum necessary to proceed with public housing construction in New York City.

The House did not adopt these flexible cost limits, and instead merely passed a flat 10% increase over existing limits. This is simply inadequate in New York City.

The Senate and House bills will be considered in Conference shortly. It is essential that the sliding-scale cost limits passed by the Senate be adopted in Conference.

#### NEW YORK CITY HOUSING NEEDS AND THE CONGRESS

One reason for the difficulties New York City is facing in these housing areas is that it has not been effective in making its needs known in Congress.

It has been my experience as a member of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee—which has jurisdiction over housing legislation—that the Committee members and staff are not sufficiently aware of New York City's special housing needs.

Part of the job of making the Committee and the Senate aware is my responsibility. I will, however, have to have the full assistance of your Committee, of the groups appearing before you at these hearings, and of all others interested in improving housing in New York City.

It is equally essential for those of us interested in New York City's housing problems to get together with groups from other cities having similar problems. This has not been done.

For example, during the Senate hearings on the 1969 housing bill this summer, representatives from only one city—New York—testified on the problems of cost limits for public housing. Officials from other cities, many of whom were experiencing the same problems with public housing, did not stress a need for a change in cost limits. It would have been much easier to secure action had the New York City testimony and recommendations been followed by a multi-city lobbying effort supporting cost limits revisions.

I understand that a multi-city campaign can be difficult to coordinate. Nevertheless, in order to secure funds and housing programs responsive to current needs, it is needed if we are to get the job done.

#### A RIGHT TO PROTEST

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, in a free society people have the right to speak, write, and demonstrate to express their feelings, hopes, and wishes about the policies of their government.

In his Friday commentary in the Washington Post, Nicholas von Hoff-

man addressed himself to this question with perception and eloquence.

On the same day, an excellent Post editorial also discussed this issue.

I ask unanimous consent that these articles be inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THE LIBERTY TO LOUSE UP

(By Nicholas von Hoffman)

Whenever a big demonstration is shaping itself into a fist getting ready to hit, our public wise men come forward with advice for the protesters. Since a monster march is preparing itself for Washington on Nov. 15, there will be a correspondingly monstrous amount of helpful hinting and kindly comment. Whatever the cause or the occasion, the advice from politicians and editorialists is always the same.

"If you do this, you'll only hurt your own cause. You'll produce a backfire, backlash, backroar, etc." It wouldn't be surprising to learn that the driver of the bus which Rosa Parks integrated in Montgomery, Ala., so many years ago had attempted to get her back in the segregated section by explaining she was only hurting her own people by carrying on so. All his public life, the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King was warned that if he sat in, picketed, marched or tried to register to vote, he ran the risk of setting back the black man.

Who usually gives this advice? The fellows on the other side. The Segs used to say that to Dr. King, and it's the war hawks who say it now to the peaceniks. The source alone makes it suspect. What really is meant by this small bit of statesmanly help is, "If you march and anything bad happens, we'll do our best to blame it on you and get as many people as possible against you for it."

One of the marks of operative political freedom is the liberty to louse up your own cause by poor judgment and bad tactics. We've been over this again and again with the blacks, who've insisted that a white man can't general a black man's cause. If the cause is lost the black man must pay; the same holds true for the peace movement, which essentially is a young people's movement because the burden of the war falls heaviest on them.

Another category of remarks and admonitions centers around "sincerity." There are a number of variants but the gist is, "If you want to prove your sincerity, you won't march on the grass without a permit, you will submit to arrest and go to jail, or you will act responsibly, i.e., you will do what we want you to do."

If sincerity were a test in politics, nine out of ten public officeholders would be turned out tomorrow morning. Sincerity is a private virtue, and people who demand it only demand it of their enemies. If you disagree with me, the only way I'll believe you're sincere is if you change your mind and join me.

Next we have the double-mouthed critic who wants to get a leg up on both sides. He likes to say, "Your cause is fine, noble, generous and public spirited, but your leaders and/or some of your followers are terrible. Why don't you throw out the Communists, radicals, activists, and lunatics on your steering committee, and pick some good, moderate, middle-of-the-road, responsible people?"

Politics is tough enough without each side letting the other pick its leaders. The blacks have had to suffer through this again and again—"We're for equality, but we won't negotiate with militants." Often what this translates into is, "We don't mind you messing around as long as the people leading you are compliant and ineffective, but we don't want you being influenced by some bunch that knows what it's doing."

There is a degree of seeming plausibility

to this criticism. Some of us are jarred and disconcerted when we learn there are two Communist Party members on the board of a local peace committee. For people who fear violence, the presence of CP members should be reassuring. Old line Reds tend to be law and order types who're as suspicious of unsupervised, popular demonstrations as any White House aide. But the point is that there is no way to bar the door to Communists or SDS members or Trotskyites because the peace movement is a movement not a political party.

In American politics the parties are run by one half of one per cent of the membership—the silent minority, you might call it—so they can control what kind of person is allowed into influential positions. A social movement, by definition, is a different species of animal. It has no stability, it shrinks and swells, it takes cues from people in leadership positions, but its awesome strength derives from the millions of individuals making up their own minds to join in. This is why the government can continue to indict leaders without any visible effect on the movement's strength. It is not controlled by tiny numbers of people who have power to keep out Communists but admit moderates.

Most of the people who will be coming to Washington next week won't know the names or politics of the people who thought up the idea of the moratorium or the march. The marchers are led not by leaders but by an idea. Leaderlessness isn't a characteristic of all mass movements, but it's an important element in this one because it heightens the feeling of uncertainty surrounding what may happen. Under other circumstances, there would be political figures in Washington to act as leaders, but most of the logical candidates for leadership roles either have discredited themselves or will be too chicken to stand on the speaker's platform.

Another argument you frequently hear is, "If you do this there may be violence and the blood will be on your hands." Sometimes that's true, but if we look at the history of civil conflict in the United States it's clear that often the responsibility for blood being shed has to be assumed by the authorities. Flirtatious delays in issuing parade permits, the use of agents provocateurs are instances of officials inciting to riot. In the last few days it hasn't been the antiwar leaders who have crossed state lines to give kid-baiting, incendiary talks and you know these speakers aren't going to be indicted under the Rap Brown Act.

For a demonstration to remain peaceful, there must be lawful conduct both from the marchers and the authorities. If it's true that violence will hurt the peace movement, then there are others besides a few demented kids from SDS who stand to gain by fulminating it.

Next we get to the unity-divisiveness theme. Somebody gave a classic expression of it on the tube the other night: "Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand: North Vietnam cannot defeat the United States. Only Americans can do that."

It is by uttering such words, especially behind the presidential shield, that a "silent majority" is created. A silent majority is a large, flaccid glop of people who thoughtlessly give assent because the question doesn't matter enough to them to think it through. People are silent because they are gagged, despairing or indifferent. This majority is silent because it doesn't care enough.

Taken on their face, these calls for unity make no sense, but they're comprehensible if you understand unity to mean obedience—"Be obedient for peace. Be obedient against defeat." Except in rare moments of self-evident, not government-proclaimed, national crisis, unity is antithetical to the democratic process. Our whole theory of ruling ourselves is based on the assumption that

rival ideas and policies must be encouraged to have it out so that we may pick the wisest and best.

We've had 30 years of unity, of bipartisan foreign policies, of obediently cheering while our presidents roam infinitely about the planet, lamp in hand, like Diogenes, trying to find a peaceful nation. An end to unity. Bring on division and debate. It's terrible on the ears and the nerves, but it's never been claimed that democracy is the easiest form of government, only the best.

#### PREPARATIONS FOR THE MORATORIUM

Citizens may disagree with official policy, even in time of war, and still be patriots. But they must be free to express their disagreement. Dissent that is suppressed tends inevitably to become rebellious, just as any force too narrowly confined tends to become explosive. That is why protest against prevailing policy—even when a President feels that it may hamper the execution of that policy—needs to be accorded the fullest freedom consonant with public safety.

Nothing is clearer from the Constitution and the traditions of the American people than that citizens have a right to come to the Capital of the United States and demonstrate dramatically to their representatives in Congress and to their President that they oppose a national policy. It is true that such a demonstration may cause a lot of inconvenience; it may snarl traffic, interfere with people engaged in their normal activities, put the government to great expense in maintaining order. But to forbid or frustrate such a demonstration would be at once dangerous and un-American in the truest sense of that abused term.

We set forth these general observations with the thought that they ought to guide the government in dealing with the antiwar demonstration planned here for Nov. 13, 14 and 15. It would be folly to ignore the potential dangers involved in this demonstration. No one can say with any certainty how many demonstrators will come here. No one seems able to speak with authority for the demonstration as a whole. While there is no doubt that an overwhelming majority of those who will assemble here mean to do so peaceably, there is evidence that others mean to take advantage of the occasion to foment disorder and violence; and there is always a risk that excitement can lead to upheaval even among the well-meaning.

So there is every reason for the District authorities and the Department of Justice to take precautions and to be prepared to deal with trouble. The sooner the rules governing the demonstration can be clearly fixed and made widely known, the better the chances for avoiding disaster. Those rules ought to be generous and reasonable. In a statement Tuesday night, Justice Department officials indicated that they want to scale the Nov. 15 march down to a "symbolic" movement of a few people. There is no warrant for such constraint. Pennsylvania Avenue is a traditional place for parades; and there is no good reason why the demonstrators should not use it if they do so lawfully and in good order.

The aim ought to maximize the opportunities for orderly expression, while minimizing the opportunities to foment violence. If there are to be several hundred thousand demonstrators here next week, there is good reason for forbidding them to ring the White House itself because of the dangers that grow out of confining so large a number in so small an area. But they could safely, we should suppose, be allowed to march around the complex comprising the White House, the Treasury Department and the old State, War and Navy building.

Latitude and hospitality in dealing with demonstrators worked well for this city in the great Civil Rights March of 1963, in the creation of Resurrection City and in the Moratorium Day of last month. They worked

a great deal better than the hostility and repression with which the Chicago authorities greeted the demonstrators at the Democratic National Convention of 1968. Local as well as national authorities ought to participate in the planning for this event, for local as well as national interests are involved, and the people who live here need full representation.

Specifically, both Mayor Washington and the city council ought to be speaking out and exerting their influence in every way possible, publicly as well as privately, to maintain the record that has been established here of respect for liberty as well as order.

Let the rules be respectful of freedom. Let them be promulgated with as much clarity as possible. And let the force be on hand to see that they are resolutely maintained. The Americans who live here need not then be fearful of fellow-Americans who come to the Capital to exercise their right as free men.

#### ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon Monday next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### INDEPENDENT OFFICES AND DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS 1970

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate turn to the consideration of Calendar No. 514, H.R. 12307. I do this so that the bill will become the pending business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 12307) making appropriations for sundry independent executive bureaus, boards, commissions, corporations, agencies, offices, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Appropriations with amendments.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, no consideration will be given to the pending business this afternoon.

#### ORDER OF BUSINESS

It is my intention, when the distinguished Senator from Alaska completes his remarks, to explain to the Senate in a somewhat brief manner, with additional brief information to be incorporated in the RECORD, the status of the consular convention with Belgium and the agreement with Canada on adjustments in flood control payments.

It will be my intention to go through the reading of these two treaties or agreements and to request at that time that the vote take place at 2 o'clock Monday afternoon next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant to the order of yesterday, the Senator from Alaska is recognized for 30 minutes.

**S. 3127—INTRODUCTION OF A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR THE EXCHANGE OF GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIALS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I introduce a bill and ask that it be appropriately referred.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 3127) to provide for the exchange of governmental officials between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, introduced by Mr. GRAVEL, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

**SAINTS AND DEVILS THRIVE ON DISTANCE**

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, the time has come for the American political leadership to visit the Soviet Union. And the time has come for the Soviet political leadership to see what the United States is really like. The time has come to do what perceptive political observers have long proposed. We should expose each country to the observation of the political leadership of the other side.

I propose that we make it possible for 1,000 leading American elected officials in local, State, and National Government to go to the Soviet Union with their wives for up to 2 weeks at Government expense. And I propose that we facilitate the travel here of 1,000 members of the Soviet leadership with their wives, should they choose to come. This proposal has potential for improving relations, and for providing a political climate in which the arms race can be slowed. Certainly, relations between our two countries will become more normal when such visits become an accepted state of affairs.

There are two aspects of my proposal and both deserve support on their merits alone.

First, there is the enormous desirability of having our political leaders visit the Soviet Union. Consider what a strange state of affairs now exists. Since the Second World War \$1 trillion has been appropriated principally for our defense against the Soviet Union. Yet most Congressmen and Senators who cast their votes have never been there. Appropriations continue at such a rate that in the next 10 years, we will have spent an additional trillion dollars. No Senator or Congressman spends one-millionth of that sum without going to see the site of the dam or airport for which the money is being spent.

Every Congressman bears direct responsibility for decisions affecting the conduct of defense and foreign policy. Each must consider his vote on defense matters to be among the most important votes he casts.

In our political process decisions are not only made in Congress. Elected officials at the State and local level also shape national policies through their influence on candidates and issues. How many mayors, Governors, and leading members of State legislatures have been to the Soviet Union? And how many of

these officials will be tomorrow's national leaders?

Everyone who has been to the Soviet Union—everyone who has traveled anywhere—knows the importance of a visit in understanding another culture. Sociologists, specialists in cultural exchange, political and social scientists will tell us that there is no substitute for travel as an educational and cultural addition to the perspective of our political leadership. Some believe we are entering an era of educational and cultural relations which itself must be better understood by our political leadership.

Every year since 1958, we have sent to the Soviet Union between 500 and 3,000 scientists, sportsmen, doctors, educators, and specialists of other kinds. Has not the time come to send political leaders who must, after all, make the decisions upon which our future depends?

In recent years, between 10,000 and 20,000 American tourists have gone to the Soviet Union annually. In time, an informed portion of our American society will have a clearer mental picture of the Soviet Union than that held by most American political leaders.

In the beginning of the cold war, travel to the Soviet Union was difficult and hedged with restrictions. But since the middle fifties, and increasingly in the sixties, many cities have been opened up for even nonofficial travel.

Mr. President, I returned in August from a short visit to Moscow. I can tell you what many thousands of Americans can now report first hand. It is possible to walk the length and breadth of these many cities. It is possible to see the way people dress, the homes they live in, the newspapers and posters they read, the monuments they visit. One can see how they treat one another, the courtesies they show the visitors and the emerging and disappearing styles of behavior.

We in the Congress are politicians. We are good ones, or we would not be here. We know the importance of seeing, feeling, touching, smelling reality. We know what reaching out to people is like. We know how much can be learned and gained from experience. And we know how important it is to let others see us, and hear from us, what we stand for. Why, then, have we failed to apply this rich instinct for human relations to foreign affairs, our most important problem?

There is no good reason. Some Congressmen and Senators have already traveled—some more than once—to the Soviet Union. And they can testify, as I testify, to the importance of such travel in their thinking and perspective. But many other Congressmen and Senators have never found the occasion. Some are inhibited by shortages of time. Some are inhibited by fear of the charge of "junketing." They do not wish to ask a committee for funds for travel when that travel is not imperative to that particular committee assignment.

Not only Congressmen should visit the Soviet Union. It is abundantly clear today that there must be continual examination and reexamination of our national priorities in our national expenditures. The needs of our States and our

cities must be balanced against the demands of national security. Fully one-half of our budget is being spent on defense. In the attitudes and in the positions taken by State and local leaders there are always echoes of opinions of the cold war. Whether he wants roads, schools, or health care, each State and local leader should want to have an informed appraisal of the kind of adversary we face.

Therefore, our 50 Governors should be given an opportunity to visit the Soviet Union. They especially provide the citizens of their States with a sense of the relative urgency of domestic versus defense expenditures.

Inside the State legislatures, where the political process is shaping domestic programs, it is desirable that respected men of long experience be available to convey their sense of the state of Soviet progress. In our Nation, there are 99 houses of the State legislature. Each has a speaker or president and each has a majority and minority leader. I propose that these three men in each of these 99 parliaments be given the same opportunity to travel.

Finally, I believe that we should accord the same privilege to the mayors of our 100 largest cities, cities with well over 100,000 population and sometimes several million. These mayors are also urgently seeking some personal basis for shaping the national priorities that are so critical to the demands of their cities.

In other words, this program would insure that leading and representative figures throughout our political process had some firsthand experience with the most salient features of Soviet life.

Obviously, a proposal this far reaching and novel will need continual overseeing. Discussions with Soviet representatives about the program will undoubtedly be necessary. And Congress will want to be ready to hear U.S. and Soviet comments on how the program is going. Therefore, I am proposing that a Joint Committee on U.S.-U.S.S.R. Political Exchanges be set up for the explicit purpose of overseeing this program. It would have no other purpose.

This is a sensible proposal. And it is an idea whose time has come. The proposal can be justified in many different ways and does not assume an improvement in United States-Soviet relations. Some may wish to be certain that their perspective on Soviet development is accurate and up to date. Some may believe that one should "know one's adversary."

This is not a proposal to brainwash the American political leadership. Historically, those most sympathetic to the Soviet Union have been disillusioned by their visits. In 1936, Andre Gide's report on his trip "Return From the U.S.S.R." created a sensation. Three years before, Gide had declared his "admiration," his "love" for the Soviet Union. He returned deeply troubled and said:

Good and bad alike are to be found there; . . . the best and the worst.

He was not the first. In 1839, a contemporary of De Tocqueville, Nicholas de Custine, produced an extraordinary report on his visit to Russia. His insight

into Russian character is as valuable as De Tocqueville's analysis of our own. De Custine reported that he went to Russia "in search of arguments against representative government" but returned a "partisan of constitutions." These observers were far more sympathetic to what they set out to see than our political leadership would be.

Our political leadership cannot be fooled. It is true that the Soviet leadership, and Soviet society both, will try to show visitors only the best, much as a housewife insists upon tidying up the home before guests are received.

And of course, for traditional social and political reasons, the Soviet Union wants to make the best possible impression on foreign visitors. But this makes no important difference. Many differences between American and Soviet ways of life are so visible that they cannot be hidden from the traveler for even 30 minutes, much less 2 weeks.

It is not only the political left that is traditionally disillusioned by contact with the Soviet Union. The far right will also be startled. The Soviet Union is far behind us in living standards. They will see that the Soviets are not 10 feet tall.

There is much evidence that the more conservative the American politicians are, in economic and political philosophy, the more favorably impressed they are likely to be by the Soviet Union.

In other words, some of our political leaders with exaggerated stereotypes will lose them. This is not brainwashing. This is broadening. This is education. People often fear and often they idolize what they do not know. That is what Dr. Harold Lasswell meant when he said: "Saints and devils thrive on distance."

My proposal that we arm ourselves with information, is something we ought to do in our own interest. We should do it regardless of the Soviet response. But obviously, it is just as important for Soviet officials to see our country as it is for us to see theirs. We should not forget that only one group in the world has the power to destroy us and this is the ruling group in the U.S.S.R. Whether we communicate well with that group could, quite literally, determine whether we and they survive.

The best way to improve such communication is to remove Soviet stereotypes about us and permit this group of leaders to see us as we are. An important study, entitled "How the Soviet System Works," lists typical Soviet opinions and the effect of contact with the West on those opinions. Soviet citizens thought Americans were aggressive and bent on world domination. But contact with the West decreased the force of that belief. Soviet citizens respected America for its technology and its material power; contact with the West reinforced this view. Soviet citizens thought capitalism was decadent, surviving only by exploitation of workers, and the artificial stimulation of armament production. This notion has been pretty well destroyed by contact with the West. Finally, our standard of living was underestimated. The magnitudes of difference that did exist surprised Soviet citizens who came here.

But perhaps most important of the

impressions that visits to America will leave in the minds of Soviet officials is the impression that an arms race with a country so rich is so futile. This alone is reason enough for the passage of this bill.

My proposal is not the first effort by the United States to welcome foreign leaders in our political interest. In 1948, Congress passed the International Information and Educational Exchange Act, better known as the Smith-Mundt Act. At first this was directed toward encouraging visits by intellectuals and scientists. It then became, under the pressures of the cold war, a program to convey a more accurate picture of American democracy to foreign leaders in the massive struggle for men's minds.

Thus, the foreign leader program of 1952 was designed for those who exercised, or would probably soon exercise, unquestionable influence over a substantial segment of public opinion in their own countries. They were to be provided with a full and fair picture of American life.

From 1949 to 1954, a great emphasis was placed on exposing German leaders to American democracy. Are we any less interested in showing America to the Soviet leadership with its power of war or peace, than to the leadership of a defeated Germany?

Unfortunately, negotiations on Soviet visits of this kind could bog down through Soviet reluctance to send their leadership in these numbers. This proposal may seem frightening to many Soviet leaders of conservative bent who fear ideological penetration and do not wish to have so many of their colleagues exposed to Western influences and Western standards of living.

For this reason, the United States should simply move ahead on that part of the program that it can control by itself—the sending of our political leaders to the Soviet Union. The best way to insure Soviet participation is not to wait for their agreement.

I propose that, in passing this bill, we announce our readiness to welcome 1,000 Soviet officials from the Communist Party Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers.

The proposed Joint Committee on U.S.-U.S.S.R. Political Exchanges, through the U.S. State Department, can discuss with the Soviet representatives any proposals they may wish to make about financial reciprocity. It is entirely possible that we shall wish to defray Soviet expenses in this country, and in return have the Soviet Union defray the expenses of our visitors. This is a minor question, from our point of view.

The exchanges between officials of the two societies is not an exchange between the Congress and the Supreme Soviet. It is obviously much broader than that. The fact that our political figures participate in our social system in different ways than the Soviet figures participate in theirs does not constitute a valid basis for rejecting this program.

We can reasonably assume that, for the most part, the most influential Soviet political figures will be sent. After all, a trip to the West is interesting to Soviet

citizens just as a trip to the Soviet Union is interesting to our citizens. There will be some competition over who is permitted to take advantage of this offer: presumably the most influential will win. But it does not matter. All who are sent will be important figures and opinion leaders in the Soviet Union. All should see us as we really are. We have nothing to hide and much to be proud of.

Many Members of the Congress may fear that such an exchange will require enormous quantities of official hospitality and time—resources of which parliamentarians in our social system have very little. But this need not be so. There are private institutions quite capable of arranging the appointments and visits of the 1,000 Soviet visitors who may come.

Most of the visitors will be interested in seeing the country rather than exchanging speeches. Anyone who has accepted official hospitality in trips to the Soviet Union may wish to reciprocate. But no individual will be under any obligation. We do not want this program to disintegrate into a series of ceremonial events, this would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of the program. Every effort will be made to keep such events at a minimum.

Finally, my program includes the spouses on both sides. The purpose of this proposal is to observe the life of another society. In this evaluation, women have an important perspective.

The wives will observe important aspects of life that would otherwise be missed. The wife provides a useful, trusted, and valued sounding board on which to test his conclusions. Our wives give balance to our views.

Some will say that if we spend money for travel to the Soviet Union, why not other countries?

I see a special relevance in visits to the Soviet Union, the only other really major power, a nation that has 1,000 missiles aimed at us. So I restrict my proposal to this country.

Not all of what travelers learn is good. But all of it is real. A picture is worth a thousand words. A visit is a million pictures. No one can be sure, using words alone, that his judgment on Soviet policy is sound, unless he has exposed himself to at least one visit. This, in a nutshell, is my argument.

The total cost of this program would be \$5 million. Let me recapitulate what we are getting for this sum. One thousand influential officials of our society, with their spouses, will be exposed to the Soviet Union as it is. Each will be in a position to transmit, through his vote, and to the groups he influences, exactly what he has learned.

And, in addition, we will likely trigger from the Soviet Union visits of 1,000 influential persons and their wives from their society. They would see us as we are.

Defense expenditures over this period of 5 years are likely to be at least \$350 billion or about \$1,500 per person in the United States. My program will cost less than 2 cents per person over the same 5-year period. If we and the Soviet Union cut our defense costs some infinitesimal amount as a result of this ex-

change, the entire project will have been a success.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GRAVEL. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, this is a most interesting speech. It raises a very intriguing question.

The question of exchanges between parliamentarians has been brought up from time to time, and I believe that the Soviet Union has indicated great interest in bringing about an exchange between parliamentarians from their country with Members of Congress in this country. So far this proposal has not achieved importance in the way of success because, I think, of the inherent or latent hostility which is still a factor between the two countries and which will not be relieved until better relations are achieved.

I wish to ask the Senator a few questions which may help to indicate his particular interest in the intriguing possibility he has raised.

Aside from Canada and Mexico, what country is our closest neighbor?

Mr. GRAVEL. Geographically, it is the Soviet Union.

Mr. MANSFIELD. What is the status of the Diomed Islands; and what is the distance between the two islands?

Mr. GRAVEL. Between Little Diomed, which is U.S. territory, and Big Diomed, which is Russian, the distance is about 2 miles.

Mr. MANSFIELD. So the largest State in the Union is the closet neighbor to the largest nation in the world.

Mr. GRAVEL. The Senator is correct.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Many people are not aware of the fact that we are a very close neighbor of the Soviet Union, based on the distance between these two islands. As the Senator indicated, 2 miles separate the United States from the Soviet Union. I bring out this point because it helps explain in part why the distinguished Senator from Alaska, who, in effect, is a next-door neighbor, would be interested in a suggestion of this kind.

I want to assure the Senator, assuming that this matter will go before the Committee on Foreign Relations, as I think it will, that what he has suggested will receive every consideration and, hopefully, in the not too distant future.

I commend the Senator for a most interesting speech.

Mr. GRAVEL. I thank the Senator from Montana very much.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, will the Senator from Alaska yield?

Mr. GRAVEL. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I found the speech of the Senator from Alaska most interesting. I thought his presentation was splendid.

I am not prepared at this time to endorse the specifics of the legislation which the Senator is introducing today but I find his idea intriguing.

I endorse the central theme; namely, the importance of individuals, particularly the leaders of a country knowing better the leaders and conditions in other countries. I think that is extremely important.

Mr. President, in private life and before coming to the Senate, I was a newspaper editor. I felt it an obligation to know not just my circulation territory, but I also felt it an obligation on the part of those in the news gathering and news publication business to know the conditions existing throughout the world. Therefore I made it a special point of frequently going to a particular country or countries. I found this to be of tremendous benefit.

I think that is what the distinguished Senator from Alaska has in mind when he seeks to encourage an exchange of leaders of government between the two greatest nations in the world, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

I concur in his view that not all of what travelers experience is good. But I like his words, "But all of it is real." I like what he says, "A picture is worth a thousand words." As a newspaper editor, I certainly agree with that.

Then he says, "A visit is a million pictures." I think that is a beautiful phrase he has used and one with which I fully concur.

Mr. President, I do not think that we can best grasp the problems on which we have to legislate in Congress when we have had first-hand experience.

I remember vividly when Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba—January 1, 1959—just a little over 10 years ago.

I remember that many of the great newspapers in this country told the American people what a great liberator Fidel Castro was, that his coming to power would give freedom to the Cuban people, who, prior to that time, had been under the domination of Batista and his rather corrupt regime.

With that in mind, and because I did not approve of the corruptness of the Batista regime, I went to Cuba in the early days of Castro's coming to power. I wanted to see for myself just what kind of individual he was and the conditions that were developing in Cuba.

I went to Cuba several times during 1959. It did not take me long to learn that what we had read in the influential press in this country, particularly one paper in the city of New York and various news magazines, was completely inaccurate.

It was in October of 1959 that I stood in the public square at the Presidential Palace in Havana, with a crowd which Cuban officials had estimated to be 1 million persons, that had converged on the Presidential Square. Fidel Castro spoke for 3 hours and 12 minutes.

I listened to his speech from the apartment of the editor of the Times of Havana, whose apartment overlooked the Presidential Square. With me was the late Jules DuBois—at that time Latin American correspondent for the Chicago Tribune.

It was at that point that Fidel Castro began to denounce the United States. Bear in mind that he had been in office for only 10 months.

I came away from those visits to Cuba in 1959 believing that he was not only a very dangerous man, but also one who would not bring freedom to the people of Cuba, and that he was not a man who

would be helpful to democratic governments or friendly to the United States.

As the months and years went by, of course, it became obvious—and Castro finally admitted—that he was, in fact, a Communist and was throwing in his lot with the Soviet Union and was bringing communism to Cuba.

By doing that, Castro has ruined a wonderful little island, and the futures of 6 million wonderful Cubans.

To cite a converse example, I went to Poland a few years ago expecting to find oppression—but found it was not so tight a dictatorship as I had believed.

Mr. President, I cite these facts only to say I feel that the Senator from Alaska is rendering a fine service in pointing out the importance of the leaders of Government seeing at first hand the conditions as they exist in other countries throughout the world.

I should like to see more Members of Congress, more newspaper publishers, more mayors and Governors, visit not only the Soviet Union but visit also Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. The world is getting smaller these days. In this age of jet travel we can get from one place to another very quickly. With the world shrinking in time, I believe it is important we know as much as we can about conditions as they exist in all areas of the world.

I am convinced, too, that the more the citizens of other nations see of the United States the more they will realize the advantages of democratic government and of the free enterprise system.

So while I am not prepared to endorse the specifics of the legislation introduced by the distinguished Senator from Alaska, I think he has rendered a service in bringing out, on the floor of the Senate, the importance of Members of Congress and other public officials seeing firsthand conditions existing elsewhere in the world.

I notice that the distinguished senior Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER) has come into the Chamber. Of all the Members of the Senate, I doubt if any other Member has traveled so widely and has gathered first hand so much information on so many countries as has the distinguished senior Senator from Louisiana. I feel that his many trips have been most helpful and the reports he has made to the Senate have been most helpful to the Senate and to the Congress as a whole.

Again, I am pleased that the distinguished Senator from Alaska has brought this proposal before the Senate. I hope the Foreign Relations Committee will give it careful study.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I wish to thank the distinguished Senator from Virginia, a very close friend of mine.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield once more?

Mr. GRAVEL. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I am delighted that the distinguished senior Senator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD) raised the question of the prestige and standing of the distinguished senior Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER). No Member of this body or this Congress, and very few people in this country, if any, are as aware of the situation as it

exists now, and has for the past decade or more, in the Soviet Union, than is the Senator from Louisiana. Few have traveled and observed more widely and thoroughly in the Soviet Union. Not only has he traveled and written reports, but he has also taken motion pictures of his journeys, in the Soviet Union and in other parts of the world.

The thing that disturbs me is that he comes back with so much valuable information and receives so little publicity and so little credit. Some of the rest of us, who do not have a fraction of the experience that the distinguished Senator from Louisiana has, get more attention for our reports. I only hope that from now on the reports which the distinguished senior Senator from Louisiana makes, which I believe are masterpieces, will be given more attention and study. They are worth every bit as much as or more than the reports which are put out by some of us who travel abroad.

So I am glad the Senator from Alaska has referred to the Senator from Louisiana, who has done sterling work over the years and decades, and has done so unselfishly, at great personal expense, and under most difficult circumstances.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I am overwhelmed by these words of praise. I greatly appreciate the very kind comments of the Senator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD) and of the distinguished majority leader.

Yesterday the Senator from Alaska sent to my office the measure that he presents today. I am in thorough accord with it. The only criticism I had of it, as I have written him, is that he is providing for a separate congressional staff to handle this matter.

As the Senator knows, I have been opposed to the creation of many subcommittees and ad hoc groups. At the same time it is easy to see that having Members of Congress serve on such a commission would help to create support for its work in the public's mind and in the Congress itself. In any event, I hope that when the bill comes before the Senate, it is limited in its staff, because that can get into quite a bit of money and provide little accomplishment.

But, going back to the subject of Russia, as I said on returning from my last trip there, I cannot foresee world peace unless and until the suspicion that now exists between us and Russia is somewhat dissipated. As long as that fear and suspicion remain, I cannot see that world peace will prevail.

It is up to us to do what we can to work side by side with Russia, without in any manner embracing its Communist government. I believe that can be done, and I am not advocating communism, or unilateral disarmament, or anything of the sort.

As I pointed out on many occasions to the Senate, particularly in my reports of 1961 and in 1968, there is no doubt in my own mind that the seeds of free enterprise are alive and growing in Russia, and that the people there are making progress because of the incentives that have been made available to them. Economic incentives I consider to be the cornerstone of our free enterprise system. Much more food is today produced

there because the farmers are being better paid.

Russia is now permitting, for instance, the ownership of homes. The government may now contribute at least 80 percent of the cost of building a home. The Russian people have to pay only 1 percent interest on whatever they borrow from the Government to construct their own homes. That is a step in the right direction.

It is my considered judgment that we should try to encourage what is going on in Russia now. The only way to do that, as I said, is to trade with them, deal with them, and have visits by people in all walks of life.

My good friend from Alaska has limited the visits to political officials, more or less. I would like to provide that people in all walks of life could come here and see what we have. I am sure, if we are able to do that, it would not take very long for the people of Russia to become envious of our democratic and free enterprise form of government. They might follow it more closely and come nearer to our way of life than the life they are pursuing. Political change is dependent upon economic and social change, particularly in such a vast and underdeveloped country such as Russia. We should do everything possible to encourage the process of change.

As I have said on many occasions, I see no possibility of destroying communism by force. We can no more destroy communism in Russia by vilifying it or by force of arms than religion can be destroyed. Yet we have been trying for 20 years to fight Russia and destroy its form of government. Instead of destroying it, today Russia is as strong as if not stronger than, she has ever been.

I am hopeful that the contemplated visits will come to pass and that we can add to the number of exchanges between the two greatest powers in the world. I have no doubt that better relationships can be attained.

If we continue on the path we are now pursuing for the next 5 years, I believe we will destroy our own economy.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from Montana and the Senator from Virginia concerning the ability, the knowledge, and the valued service of the Senator from Louisiana.

I yield the floor.

#### AUTHORIZATION FOR COMMITTEES TO FILE REPORTS AND FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE SENATE TO RECEIVE MESSAGES DURING ADJOURNMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, during the adjournment of the Senate, from the conclusion of business today until noon on Monday next, all committees be authorized to file reports, including minority, individual, or supplemental views; that the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to receive messages from the President and the House of Representatives; and that the Vice President, the President pro tempore, or the Acting President pro tempore, be authorized to sign duly enrolled bills.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate go into executive session to consider two treaties on the calendar.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider executive business.

#### CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH BELGIUM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Chair lay before the Senate Executive F, 91st Congress, first session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the Senate, as in the Committee of the Whole, proceeded to consider Executive F, 91st Congress, first session, the Consular Convention with Belgium, which was read the second time, as follows:

#### CONSULAR CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM

The President of the United States of America and His Majesty the King of the Belgians,

Being desirous of determining the conditions for admitting consular officers to their respective territories and of establishing their reciprocal rights, immunities, and privileges and defining their functions,

Desiring thus to facilitate the protection of nationals of each High Contracting Party in the territories of the other,

Have agreed to conclude for that purpose a Consular Convention and have designated as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States of America:

William P. Rogers, Secretary of State of the United States of America, and

His Majesty the King of the Belgians: Baron Scheyven, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Belgium,

Who have agreed as follows:

#### TITLE I—APPLICATION AND DEFINITIONS

##### Article 1

The territories of the High Contracting Parties to which the provisions of this Convention apply shall be understood to comprise all areas of land or water subject to the sovereignty or authority of either High Contracting Party except the Panama Canal Zone.

##### Article 2

As used in this Convention:

(a) the term "sending state" means the High Contracting Party by whom the consular officer is appointed;

(b) the term "receiving state" means the High Contracting Party within whose territory the consular officer performs the functions of his office and includes the states, provinces, municipalities, or other local subdivisions of which it is composed;

(c) the term "consular officer" means any person duly appointed and authorized to exercise consular functions in the receiving state as consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent;

(d) the term "consular employee" means an individual who, after the notification stipulated in Article 5, performs administrative or technical tasks in a consulate of the sending state;

(e) the term "consulate" means any consular establishment, whether a consulate general, consulate, vice consulate, or a consular agency;

(f) the term "consular archives" means the papers, documents, correspondence, books, films, tapes and registers of the consulate together with the ciphers and codes, the card-indexes, and any article of furniture intended for their protection or safe-keeping;

(g) the term "consular district" means the territory in the receiving state within whose limits a consular officer exercises his functions;

(h) the term "vessel", as used in Title VI of the present Convention, means any ship or craft registered under the laws of the sending state, including those owned by the sending state, with the exception of warships.

#### TITLE II—ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULATES

##### Article 3

(1) The sending state may establish and maintain consulates at any locations agreeable to the receiving state.

(2) The limits of the consular districts shall be fixed by agreement between the sending and receiving states.

##### Article 4

(1) The diplomatic mission of the sending state shall notify the receiving state of the appointment or assignment of an individual as a consular officer. The document of appointment or assignment shall define the consular district.

(2) The receiving state shall issue to the head of the consulate and to other consular officers assigned thereto, as soon as possible and free of charge an exequatur or other authorization. This document shall define the consular district.

(3) As soon as the exequatur or other authorization has been received, a consular officer shall be admitted to the exercise of his functions and shall be entitled to the benefits and be subject to the obligations of this Convention. Pending the issuance of the exequatur or other authorization, the receiving state may agree to admit him provisionally to the exercise of his functions.

(4) The exequatur or other authorization may not be refused or withdrawn except for good cause, the reasons for which need not be communicated to the sending state.

##### Article 5

(1) The receiving state shall be notified of the assignment of any consular employee to a consulate and shall be kept informed of his home address in the receiving state.

(2) The receiving state may refuse or, at any time, cease to recognize an individual as a consular employee. In such event the sending state shall, as the case may be, either recall the individual concerned or terminate his functions at the consulate.

##### Article 6

The sending state may, with the consent of the receiving state, designate one or more members of its diplomatic mission accredited to the receiving state to perform consular functions in addition to diplomatic functions. Such a designation must be made in conformity with the provisions of this Convention. Individuals so designated shall be entitled to the benefits and be subject to the obligations of this Convention, without prejudice to such privileges and immunities to which they may be entitled by virtue of being members of the diplomatic mission of the sending state.

#### TITLE III—GENERAL RIGHTS, IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES

##### Article 7

(1) A consular officer shall be entitled to the respect and high consideration of the authorities of the receiving state with whom he comes in contact in the performance of his functions.

(2) The receiving state shall take all appropriate steps to ensure the protection of consulates and residences of consular officers.

##### Article 8

(1) A consular officer or consular employee shall not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the judicial or administrative authorities of the receiving state in respect of acts performed in the exercise of consular functions, except as provided in paragraph (4) of Article 32.

(2) A consular officer or consular employee shall be exempt in the receiving state from arrest or prosecution except when he has been charged with the commission of an offense under the laws of the receiving state which, upon conviction, would subject the individual guilty thereof to a sentence of imprisonment of at least one year.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article shall not apply in respect of a civil action either:

(a) arising out of a contract concluded by a consular officer or a consular employee in which he did not contract expressly or impliedly as an agent of the sending state; or

(b) by a third party for damage arising from an accident in the receiving state caused by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft.

(4) The sending state and its consular officers and consular employees shall comply with any requirement imposed by the laws and regulations of the receiving state with respect to insurance against third party risks arising from the use of any vehicle, vessel or aircraft.

(5) The authorities of the receiving state shall notify without delay the diplomatic mission of the sending state whenever a consular officer or consular employee has been arrested or detained.

##### Article 9

(1) A consular officer or consular employee shall, upon the request of the administrative or judicial authorities of the receiving state, appear in court for the purpose of giving testimony. The administrative or judicial authorities requiring such testimony shall take all reasonable steps to avoid interference with the performance of his consular functions and wherever possible arrange for the taking of such testimony, orally or in writing, at the consulate or residence of the consular officer or consular employee.

(2) A consular officer or consular employee shall have the right to refuse a request from the administrative or judicial authorities of the receiving state to produce any documents or articles from the consular archives or to give testimony relating to matters connected with the exercise of consular functions. Such a request, however, shall be complied within the interests of justice if it is possible to do so without prejudicing the interests of the sending state.

##### Article 10

The sending state may waive, with regard to a consular officer or consular employee, any of the privileges and immunities provided for in this Convention. The waiver shall be express and shall be communicated to the receiving state in writing.

##### Article 11

(1) Consular archives shall be inviolable, and the authorities of the receiving state shall not, on any pretext, examine or seize the documents or articles of which they are composed.

(2) The archives shall be kept completely separate from the documents and objects having nothing to do with the performance of consular functions.

##### Article 12

The authorities of the receiving state shall not enter that part of the consular premises which is used exclusively for the work of the consulate except with the consent of the head of the consulate or of his designee or of the head of the diplomatic mission of the sending state. The consent of the head of the consulate may, however, be assumed in case of fire or other disaster requiring prompt protective action.

##### Article 13

(1) A consular officer or consular employee and members of his family forming part of his household shall be exempt in the receiving state from any requirements with regard to the registration of aliens and the obtaining of permission to reside, and shall not be subject to deportation. Such members of the family of a consular officer or consular employee shall not receive the benefits of this paragraph if they carry on any private gainful occupation in the receiving state.

(2) An appropriate identification document may be issued by the competent authorities of the receiving state to the persons entitled to the benefits of this Article.

(3) The receiving state shall, if required by its laws or regulations, be notified:

(a) of the arrival of consulate officers and consular employees after they have been assigned to a consulate, as well as of their final departure from the receiving state or of the termination of their functions in the consulate;

(b) of the arrival in and final departure from the receiving state of members of the family forming part of the household of consular officers and consular employees and, if applicable, of the fact that such an individual joins their household or leaves it;

(c) of the arrival in and final departure from the receiving state of private staff members who are not nationals of that state and are in the sole employ of consular officers and, if necessary, of the fact that they are entering their service or leaving it;

(d) of the hiring and termination of functions in a consulate of consular employees engaged in the receiving state.

##### Article 14

A consular officer or consular employee shall enjoy exemption from military, naval, air, police, administrative or jury duty of every kind, and from any contribution in lieu thereof.

##### Article 15

(1) The sending state may:

(a) acquire or possess, in full ownership or under any other form of tenure provided by the laws of the receiving state, land, buildings, parts of buildings, and appurtenances required by the sending state for diplomatic or consular purposes, including residences, or for other similar purposes to which the receiving state does not object;

(b) erect buildings and appurtenances on land which it has acquired under subparagraph (a) of this Article;

(c) convey the land, buildings, parts of buildings and appurtenances so acquired or erected.

(2) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article do not exempt the sending state from compliance with the laws of the receiving state, including local building, zoning, or town planning regulations applicable to all land in the area in which such land, buildings, parts of buildings or appurtenances are situated.

##### Article 16

(1) The coat of arms of the sending state and an inscription designating the consulate may be affixed to the outer enclosure and outer wall of the building housing the consulate, or on or by the entrance door to the consulate.

(2) The flag of the sending state or the consular flag may be flown at the consulate as well as at the residences of consular officers.

(3) The coat of arms and flag of the sending state, as well as its consular flag, may be affixed to or flown on all vehicles and vessels which consular officers use in the performance of their official functions.

##### Article 17

(1) The sending state shall enjoy an exemption from all military requisitions, contributions or billeting with respect to prop-

erty forming part of its consulates in the receiving state, including all vehicles, vessels, and aircraft. Immovable property may, however, be seized or taken for purposes of national defense or public utility in accordance with the laws of the receiving state.

(2) A consular officer or consular employee shall enjoy an exemption from all military requisitions, contributions or billeting with respect to his private residence and the furniture and other household articles and all vehicles, vessels, and aircraft held or possessed by him. Such private residence may, however, be seized or taken for purposes of national defense or public utility in accordance with the laws of the receiving state.

(3) In any of the cases referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article, every effort shall be made to avoid interference with the performance of consular functions.

(4) The sending state or the consular officer or consular employee shall receive, within a reasonable period of time, due compensation for all such property seized or taken. Compensation shall be payable in a form readily convertible into the currency of and transferable to the sending state, not later than three months from the date on which the amount of compensation has been finally fixed.

#### Article 18

(1) The receiving state shall permit and protect freedom of communication on the part of the consulate for all official purposes. In communicating with the Government, the diplomatic missions and other consulates, wherever situated, of the sending state, the consulate may employ all appropriate means, including diplomatic couriers and consular couriers, diplomatic and consular pouches and messages in code or cipher.

(2) The official correspondence of the consulate, regardless of the means of communication used, and the sealed diplomatic pouch bearing visible external marks of official character, shall be inviolable.

(3) The consular pouch shall be neither opened nor detained. Nevertheless, if the authorities of the receiving state have serious reason to believe that the pouch contains something other than official correspondence, documents or articles intended for official use, they may request that the pouch be opened in their presence by an authorized representative of the sending state. If this request is refused by the authorities of the sending state, the pouch shall be returned to its place of origin.

#### TITLE IV—FINANCIAL PRIVILEGES

##### Article 19

The sending state shall be exempt from all taxes or other similar charges of any kind levied or collected by the receiving state for the payment of which the sending state would otherwise be legally liable:

(a) with respect to the acquisition, ownership, occupation, construction, or improvement of land, buildings, parts of buildings or appurtenances used exclusively for diplomatic or consular purposes, including residences for diplomatic agents, members of the administrative or technical staff of the diplomatic mission of the sending state, and consular officers and employees, who are not nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving state and do not carry on any private gainful occupation in the receiving state, other than taxes or other assessments imposed for services or local public improvements by which and to the extent that such property is benefited;

(b) with respect to the acquisition, ownership, possession, or use of all furniture, equipment, supplies, building materials and other articles, including vehicles, vessels and aircraft, which the sending state utilizes for diplomatic or consular purposes.

#### Article 20

(1) No tax or other similar charge of any kind whatever shall be levied or collected by the receiving state on:

(a) the fees and charges collected in the name of the sending state as remuneration for consular services, or the receipts attesting to the payment of such fees and charges;

(b) the official emoluments, wages salaries, and allowances received as remuneration for consular functions by consular officers and consular employees.

(2) The sending state or its consular officers or consular employees shall be exempt in the receiving state from all taxes or other similar charges of any kind levied by the receiving state in respect of acts performed by a consular officer or a consular employee in his official capacity and falling within the limits of his consular functions. This exemption shall not apply to taxes or other similar charges in respect of which some other person is legally liable, notwithstanding that the burden of the tax or charge may be passed on to the sending state or on to the consular officer or consular employee.

#### Article 21

(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article, a consular officer or consular employee of the sending state shall be exempt in the receiving state from all taxes or other similar charges of any kind whatever imposed by the receiving state for the payment of which such consular officer or consular employee would be legally liable.

(2) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article shall not apply with respect to taxes or other similar charges of any kind for which some other person is legally liable, notwithstanding that the burden of the tax or other similar charge may be passed on to such consular officer or consular employee.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article shall not apply to taxes or other similar charges of any kind whatever levied or collected:

(a) on the acquisition, ownership, mortgaging or occupation by a consular officer or consular employee of real property situated in the receiving state;

(b) on income, other than that referred to in Article 20(1)(b), derived from sources within the receiving state;

(c) by reason of or incident to the transfer by gift of property;

(d) by reason of or incident to the passing on death of property;

(e) on instruments affecting transactions, such as stamp duties imposed or collected in connection with the transfer of property, or taxes on the transfer of securities;

(f) in connection with the performance of services by any administrative or judicial authority.

(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (3) of this Article, the movable property belonging to the estate of a deceased consular officer or consular employee and used by him in connection with the performance of his official functions shall be exempt from all estate, inheritance, succession, or similar taxes imposed by the receiving state. Any part of the estate of a deceased consular officer or consular employee which does not exceed in value two times the amount of all official emoluments, salaries, and allowances received by such consular officer or consular employee for the year immediately preceding his death shall be deemed conclusively to constitute property used by him in connection with the performance of his official functions.

#### Article 22

(1) All furniture, equipment, supplies, building materials and other articles, including vehicles, vessels and aircraft, intended

for official use in the receiving state in connection with any diplomatic or consular purposes, including residences, shall, on a basis of strict reciprocity, be permitted entry into the receiving state free of all taxes or duties imposed upon or by reason of importation.

(2) Baggage and effects and other articles, including vehicles, vessels and aircraft, imported into the receiving state by a consular officer or consular employee exclusively for his personal use and the use of members of his family forming part of his household, shall, on a basis of strict reciprocity, be exempt from all taxes or duties imposed upon or by reason of importation, whether accompanying him to his consulate, either upon first arrival or upon subsequent arrivals, or subsequently consigned to him at his consulate and imported at any time while he is assigned to or employed at such consulate.

(3) It is understood that nothing herein shall be construed to permit the entry into the receiving state of any article the importation of which is specifically prohibited by its laws.

#### Article 23

The sending state and its consular officers or consular employees shall comply with the formalities prescribed by the authorities of the receiving state regarding the application of the provisions of Title IV.

#### TITLE V—CONSULAR FUNCTIONS GENERALLY

##### Article 24

(1) Consular officers shall be entitled to protect nationals of the sending state and to defend their rights and interests. For this purpose they may, in particular:

(a) apply to the authorities of the receiving state with regard to ensuring that nationals of the sending state enjoy rights accruing to them by treaty or otherwise;

(b) interview, communicate with, and advise any national of the sending state;

(c) inquire into any incident which has occurred affecting the interests of any such national;

(d) assist nationals of the sending state in their relations with the judicial or administrative authorities of the receiving state, help them in their proceedings before those authorities, arrange for legal assistance for them if the laws of the receiving state so permit and, with the consent of the said authorities, serve as interpreter for such persons or obtain an interpreter.

(2) Consular officers may, when authorized by the laws of the sending state, deliver to any beneficiary in the receiving state the allowances or payments due him under the law of the sending state.

##### Article 25

(1) Nationals of the sending state shall have the right at all times to communicate with the appropriate consular officer and, unless subject to lawful custody, to visit him at his consulate.

(2) Consular officers shall, on the demand of a national of the sending state who has been taken into custody, be notified immediately by the authorities of the receiving state.

(3) Consular officers may:

(a) arrange to visit promptly any national of the sending state who has been taken into custody in the receiving state;

(b) converse privately with such national in any language;

(c) arrange for legal representation for such national.

Any written communication between such national and the consular officer shall be transmitted without delay by the authorities of the receiving state.

(4) Consular officers shall be entitled, upon request to the competent prison authorities and in conformity with the penal regulations,

to have reasonable access to and opportunity of conversing with a national of the sending state who has been convicted and is serving a prison sentence. Consular officers shall also be entitled, in conformity with the penal regulations, to transmit communications between such national and other persons.

#### Article 26

Consular officers shall be entitled to:

- (a) issue passports and other travel documents to nationals of the sending state and any other person qualified to obtain them;
- (b) issue identification documents to nationals of the sending state;
- (c) grant any visa or document permitting entry into the sending state;
- (d) issue with regard to goods certificates of origin and other necessary documents for use in the sending state;
- (e) prepare, attest, receive the acknowledgments of, certify, authenticate, legalize, and in general, take such action as may be necessary to perfect or to validate any act, document, or instrument of a legal character, as well as copies thereof, including commercial documents, declarations, registrations, testamentary dispositions, and contracts, whenever such services are requested by a national of the sending state for use outside the receiving state or by any person for use in the sending state;
- (f) take evidence, on behalf of the courts of the sending state, voluntarily given by any person in the receiving state, and administer oaths to such persons, in accordance with the law of the sending state;
- (g) obtain copies of or extracts from documents of public registry.

#### Article 27

Consular officers may translate into the language or languages of one of the High Contracting Parties acts or documents of any character drawn up in the language or languages of the other High Contracting Party and certify to the accuracy of the translation thereof.

#### Article 28

Consular officers shall be entitled to:

- (a) receive any declaration required by the laws of the sending state with regard to nationality;
- (b) register the birth or death of a national of the sending state and record a marriage celebrated under the law of the receiving state when at least one of the parties is a national of the sending state;
- (c) serve judicial or extra-judicial documents or take evidence on behalf of the courts of the sending state, in conformity with any special arrangements made in the matter between the High Contracting Parties.

#### Article 29

Consular officers shall be entitled to issue notices intended for nationals of the sending state and to receive their voluntary declarations with regard to:

- (a) compulsory national service;
- (b) any other matter relating to the rights, obligations, or interests of such nationals, provided that such notices and declarations are not contrary to the laws of the receiving state.

#### Article 30

The acts and documents specified in Articles 26 and 27, duly certified by the competent consular officer and bearing the official seal of the consulate, shall be receivable in evidence as officially certified acts and documents and shall have the same force and effect in the receiving state as if they had been drawn up or certified before the competent authorities of the receiving state, provided that the said documents have been drawn up and executed in conformity with the laws of the state where they are to take effect and that, if necessary, they have been subject to the stamp duty, registration, and all other

formalities governing the matter in the state where they are to take effect.

#### Article 31

If it should come to the attention of the competent authorities of the receiving state that a minor or incapacitated national of the sending state (not permanently resident in the receiving state) is present in the receiving state, and his parents or legal guardian or other representative are not present or able to protect him and defend his legal rights and interests, such authorities shall notify the appropriate consular officer accordingly. The consular officer in like circumstances has a similar obligation to inform the competent authorities of the receiving state. In taking the appropriate legal measures for the protection of the person and property of such minor or incapacitated national, the competent authorities of the receiving state may request the assistance and participation of the consular officer.

#### Article 32

(1) In the case of the death of a national of the sending state in the receiving state, without leaving in the receiving state any known heir or testamentary executor, the appropriate local authorities of the receiving state shall as promptly as possible inform the appropriate consular officer of the sending state.

(2) A consular officer of the sending state may, within the discretion of the appropriate judicial authorities and if permissible under then existing applicable local law in the receiving state:

(a) take provisional custody of the personal property left by a deceased national of the sending state, provided that the decedent shall have left in the receiving state no heir or testamentary executor appointed by the decedent to take care of his personal estate; provided that such provisional custody shall be relinquished to a duly appointed administrator;

(b) administer the estate of a deceased national of the sending state who is not a resident of the receiving state at the time of his death, who leaves no testamentary executor, and who leaves in the receiving state no heir, provided that if authorized to administer the estate, the consular officer shall relinquish such administration upon the appointment of another administrator;

(c) represent the interests of a national of the sending state in an estate in the receiving state, provided that such national is not a resident of the receiving state, unless or until such national is otherwise represented; provided, however, that nothing herein shall authorize a consular officer to act as an attorney at law.

(3) Unless prohibited by law, a consular officer may, within the discretion of the court, agency, or person making distribution, receive for transmission to a national of the sending state who is not a resident of the receiving state any money or property to which such national is entitled as a consequence of the death of another person, including shares in an estate, payments made pursuant to workmen's compensation laws, pension and social benefits systems in general, and proceeds of insurance policies. The court, agency, or person making distribution may require, among other things, that the consular officer comply with conditions laid down with regard to (a) presenting a power of attorney or other authorization from such non-resident national, (b) furnishing reasonable evidence of the delivery of such money or property to such national, and (c) returning the money or property in the event he is unable to furnish such evidence.

(4) Whenever a consular officer shall perform the functions referred to in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article, he shall be subject, with respect to the exercise of such functions, to the laws of the receiving state and to the jurisdiction of the judicial and

administrative authorities of the receiving state.

#### Article 33

The provisions of this Convention relating to the functions which a consular officer may perform are not exhaustive. A consular officer shall also be permitted to perform other functions, provided they involve no conflict with the laws of the receiving state, and the authorities of the receiving state have no objection to the exercise of such functions.

#### Article 34

It is understood that in any case where an Article of this Convention gives a consular officer the right to perform any functions, it is for the sending state to determine the extent its consular officer shall exercise such right.

### TITLE VI—CONSULAR FUNCTIONS IN MARITIME MATTERS

#### Article 35

(1) Consular officers may assist vessels of the sending state during their stay in the receiving state.

(2) Consular officers may, in the performance of the duties enumerated in this Title, go personally on board the vessel accompanied, if desired, by consular employees on their staff, as soon as the vessel has received pratique. If the consular officers request the assistance of the authorities of the receiving state in any matter concerning the performance of these duties, such assistance shall be given, unless special reasons fully warrant a refusal in a particular case.

(3) The master and members of the crew may communicate with the appropriate consular officer and, subject to the immigration laws of the receiving state, go to the consulate.

#### Article 36

Consular officers may:

(a) question the master and members of the crew of a vessel of the sending state, examine and certify the vessel's papers, take statements with regard to the vessel's voyage and her destination, and, generally, facilitate the entry, stay in port, and departure of the vessel;

(b) arrange for the engagement and discharge of the master or any member of the crew;

(c) make necessary arrangements for the hospitalization and the repatriation of the master or any member of the crew;

(d) receive, draw up or sign any declaration or any other document prescribed by the laws of the sending state concerning the nationality, ownership and mortgages, conditions, and operation of a vessel of the sending state;

(e) take necessary measures for the maintenance of order and discipline on board the vessel;

(f) take necessary measures in accordance with the shipping laws of the sending state;

(g) give aid and assistance to the master and members of the crew of a vessel of the sending state in any dealings with the courts and authorities of the receiving state. For this purpose, consular officers may make necessary arrangements for legal assistance and interpreting.

#### Article 37

(1) The authorities of the receiving state may exercise jurisdiction over:

(a) offenses committed on board a vessel of the sending state which are of a serious character or disrupt the tranquility or the safety of the port or violate the laws of the receiving state regarding security, public health, the admission of aliens, safety of life at sea, customs, and similar matters; or

(b) other offenses committed on board a vessel of the sending state:

(i) by or against a national of the receiving state, or

(ii) by or against any other person, pro-

vided he is not the master or a member of the crew; or

(c) any offenses committed on board a vessel of the sending state, at the request of or with the consent of, the consular officer.

(2) When, in the cases specified in paragraph (1) of this Article, the authorities of the receiving state decide to arrest or question a person or to attach property or institute an official inquiry on board a vessel the master or any other officer acting in his name shall be given an opportunity to inform the consular officer and, unless it is impossible owing to urgency of the matter, to give him sufficient advance notice to permit the consular officer to be present. If the consular officer has not been present or represented, he shall have the right to receive from the authorities of the receiving state, upon his request, full information about the measures taken.

(3) The provisions of this Article shall not affect the routine examinations made by the authorities of the receiving state with regard to security, public health, the admission of aliens, safety of life at sea, and customs, or the detention of the vessel or of any portion of her cargo arising out of civil or commercial proceedings in the courts of the receiving state.

#### Article 38

(1) Subject to authorization from the master of the vessel, a consular officer shall have the right to visit a vessel of any flag bound for a port of the sending state, in order to procure the necessary information to prepare and execute such documents as may be required by the laws of the sending state as a condition of entry of the vessel into the ports of the sending state, and to furnish the competent authorities of the sending state such information regarding sanitary or other matters as may have been requested by them.

(2) In exercising the rights conferred upon him by this Article, the consular officer shall act with all possible dispatch.

#### Article 39

(1) If a vessel of the sending state is wrecked in the receiving state, or if articles forming part of the cargo of a wrecked vessel of a third state but belonging to a national of the sending state are found on or near the coast of the receiving state or are taken into a port of the receiving state, the competent authorities of the receiving state shall inform the consular officer of that effect as soon as possible.

(2) The authorities of the receiving state shall take all practical measures for the protection of the wrecked vessel, the lives of the persons on board, the cargo and other goods on board, and for the prevention and suppression of plunder or disorder on the vessel. These measures shall also extend to articles belonging to the vessel or forming part of her cargo which have become separated from the vessel. When possible, such measures shall be taken in collaboration with the master of the vessel and the consular officer or the person acting on behalf of the latter.

(3) When a wrecked vessel of the sending state, or articles belonging to it or forming part of such vessel, are found on or near the coast of the receiving state or are taken to a port of the receiving state, and the master, the owner of the vessel, his agent, or the underwriters are not present or cannot make arrangements for custody or disposal, the appropriate consular officer, acting as representative of the owner of the vessel, shall have authority to make such arrangements as the owner could have made for the same purposes had he been present, in accordance with the laws of the receiving state.

(4) When articles forming part of the cargo of a wrecked vessel (other than a vessel of the receiving state) and belonging to a national of the sending state are found on

or near the coast of the receiving state or are taken into a port of the receiving state, and the master of the vessel, the owner of the articles or his agent, or the underwriters are not present or cannot make arrangements for the custody or disposal of such articles, the appropriate consular officer, acting as representative of the owner, shall have authority to make such arrangements as the owner could have made for the same purposes had he been present, in accordance with the laws of the receiving state.

(5) No customs duties (including other duties imposed upon, or by reason of, the importation of the goods into the receiving state) shall be levied by the authorities of the receiving state on the cargo, stores, equipment and fittings, or articles, carried by or forming part of the wrecked vessel, unless they are delivered for use or consumption in the receiving state, but these authorities may, if they think fit, require security for the protection of the revenue in relation to such goods.

(6) No charges (other than customs duties, when they are applicable in accordance with paragraph (5) of this Article) shall be levied by the authorities of the receiving state in connection with the wrecked vessel, any property on board, or her cargo, other than charges of the same kind and amount as would be levied in similar circumstances upon or in connection with vessels of the receiving state.

#### Article 40

Whenever the master or a member of the crew of a vessel of the sending state dies aboard such vessel while in the receiving state, the master or his substitute shall have the authority, if such deceased is a national of the sending state and there is no testamentary executor or administrator duly authorized in the receiving state, to take custody of the unpaid wages and personal property of the estate which is on the vessel, for return to the sending state for settlement in accordance with its laws.

### TITLE VII—GENERAL PROVISIONS

#### Article 41

Consular officers may further the development of economic, commercial and cultural relations between the sending state and the receiving state.

#### Article 42

In the performance of their official functions, consular officers may apply to and correspond with the appropriate authorities in their consular districts. They may apply to and correspond with the Department of State or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the case may be, only in the absence of a diplomatic agent of the sending state.

#### Article 43

In the performance of his official functions, a consular officer may levy the fees and charges prescribed by the sending state. The fees and charges so collected must be freely convertible and transferable in the currency of the sending state.

#### Article 44

Articles 5, 8(4) and (5), 9(2), 10, 13(3) (a) and (b), 14, 17(2) and (4), 20(1) (b), 21(4), and 45(1) (with the exception of the immunity provided under Article 8(1)), 45(2) and (3) shall be applicable to persons who are employed in the domestic service of a consulate of the sending state.

#### Article 45

(1) Except in so far as additional facilities, privileges and immunities may be granted by the receiving state, consular officers or consular employees who are nationals of or permanently residents in the receiving state or who carry on any private gainful occupation in the receiving state shall enjoy only the immunities provided by Articles 8(1) and 9(2) of the present Convention.

(2) (a) Members of the families of the

persons referred to in paragraph (1) of this Article shall enjoy only the facilities, privileges and immunities granted to them by the receiving state.

(b) Members of the families of consular officers or consular employees who are themselves nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving state shall enjoy only the facilities, privileges and immunities as may be granted to them by the receiving state.

(3) The receiving state shall exercise its jurisdiction over the persons referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article in such a way as not to hinder unduly the performance of the functions of the consulate.

(4) Article 7(1) of the present Convention shall be applicable to consular officers who are nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving state or who carry on any private gainful occupation in the receiving state.

#### Article 46

Any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the present Convention should be settled by negotiation. Any dispute not settled by negotiation may be referred, at the initiative of either High Contracting Party, to the International Court of Justice for decision, provided:

(a) that neither Party shall submit to the Court any matter falling within the discretion of either Party under the Convention; and

(b) that neither Party may submit a dispute to the Court until all legal remedies relating thereto have been exhausted in the territory of the other Party.

#### Article 47

The present Convention shall replace and terminate the Convention between the United States of America and Belgium concerning the Rights, Privileges and Immunities of Consular Officers signed at Washington on March 9, 1880.

#### Article 48

1. This Convention shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Brussels. The Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

2. The Convention shall remain in force until the expiration of six months from the date on which either High Contracting Party informs the other of its intention to terminate it.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Convention, and affixed their seals thereto.

DONE in duplicate at Washington, this 2nd day of September, 1969 in the English, French and Dutch languages, all language versions being equally authentic.

For the President of the United States of America:

[SEAL]

WILLIAM P. ROGERS.

For his Majesty the King of the Belgians:

[SEAL]

BARON SCHEVVEN.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I urge the Senate to vote favorably on the Consular Convention with Belgium signed September 2, 1969. Since the Senate recently voted on the multilateral Vienna Convention on Consular Relations there is no need to go into great detail about this bilateral treaty. Generally speaking it covers the same subjects as the Vienna Convention, some of them in greater detail, such as maritime matters which are of special interest to Belgium and the United States, and others in less detail, such as the rights of honorary consuls. Again generally speaking, the convention provides on a reciprocal basis for somewhat greater privileges and immunities than those provided in the Vienna Conven-

tion, but lesser than those in the Soviet Consular Convention approved in 1967.

Mr. President, for the further information of the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that an excerpt from the committee report be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the excerpt from the committee report (Executive No. 91-10) was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXCERPT FROM COMMITTEE REPORT  
PURPOSE

This bilateral convention deals with consular relations between the U.S. and Belgium and sets forth, as customary, the functions, privileges and immunities of consular officers. It covers such matters as free communication between a citizen and his consul, notification of detention of nationals, issuance of visas and passports, the performance of notarial services, the inviolability of consular communications, documents and archives, and protection of consular premises.

BACKGROUND

This convention will replace one of 1880 and represents a step in the continuing effort of the United States to expand and upgrade consular treaties. It also illustrates the policy of the U.S. to seek bilaterally standards of consular privileges and immunities that are higher than those in the recently approved Vienna Convention, to which Belgium is not a party. The convention is generally modelled on the postwar conventions with the United Kingdom (1951), Japan (1963), and France (1966). It is unlike the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union which provides for full immunity from criminal jurisdiction in that it provides such immunity only for lesser crimes like misdemeanors.

COMMITTEE ACTION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Convention was signed on September 2, 1969, and transmitted to the Senate October 8, 1969. On November 4 the Committee held a public hearing at which the Honorable John R. Stevenson, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, testified and the next day ordered the convention reported favorably to the Senate. Mr. Stevenson's statement contains a full explanation of the convention and is appended to the report for the information of the Senate.

The Committee knows of no opposition to this treaty. It has continuously supported consular conventions as being in the interests of the United States and does so again in this instance. It recommends that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the Consular Convention with Belgium.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no objection, Executive F, 91st Congress, first session, will be considered as having passed through its various parliamentary stages up to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification, which will be read for the information of the Senate.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

*Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium, signed at Washington on September 2, 1969, and two exchanges of notes related thereto. (Executive F, Ninety-first Congress, first session.)*

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote on Executive F, 91st Congress, first session, the Consular Convention with Belgium, occur at 2 o'clock p.m. on Monday next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AGREEMENT WITH CANADA ON  
ADJUSTMENTS IN FLOOD CONTROL PAYMENTS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Chair lay before the Senate Executive H, 91st Congress, first session, the agreement with Canada on adjustments in flood control payments.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, proceeded to consider Executive H, 91st Congress, first session, the agreement with Canada on adjustments in flood control payments, which was read the second time, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, August 18, 1969.

HON. PETER M. TOWE,  
*Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Canada.*

SIR: I refer to paragraph 11 of the Annex to the exchange of notes dated January 22, 1964, between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States regarding the Columbia River Treaty. Pursuant to that paragraph, consultations have taken place between representatives of the two Governments concerning adjustments in the flood control payments by the Government of the United States to the Government of Canada as a result of early completion of projects contemplated by subparagraphs (B) and (C) of Article II(2) of the Columbia River Treaty.

Duncan Dam, constructed pursuant to Article II(2)(C), commenced operation on July 31, 1967, thereby providing two extra years of flood control benefits to the United States. Arrow Dam, constructed pursuant to Article II(2)(B), commenced operation on October 10, 1968, thereby providing one extra year of flood control benefits to the United States.

It is the understanding of my Government that as a result of the consultations referred to above it has been determined by representatives of both Governments that an adjustment to the flood control payments should be made in accordance with the principles established in the said paragraph 11. Consequently, I have the honor to propose that the United States pay to Canada \$82,000 (U.S.A.) for the early completion of Duncan Dam and \$196,000 (U.S.A.) for the early completion of Arrow Dam, such amounts to be paid within a reasonable period that takes into account any United States domestic procedures related to the making of such payments.

If this proposal is acceptable to your Government, I have the honor to propose that this note, together with your note of acceptance on the part of your Government, shall constitute an agreement between our Governments which shall enter into force on the date on which the Government of the United States notifies the Government of Canada that it has completed all internal measures necessary to give effect to this agreement.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

For the Acting Secretary of State:  
MARTIN J. HILLENBRAND.

CANADIAN EMBASSY,  
Washington, D.C., August 20, 1969.

No. 224.

HON. WILLIAM P. ROGERS,  
*Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.*

SIR: I have the honour to refer to your Note of August 18, 1969 which proposed, in accordance with the principles established in

paragraph 11 of the Protocol annexed to the exchange of Notes dated January 22, 1964, between the Governments of Canada and the United States regarding the Columbia River Treaty, a payment by the United States to Canada of \$278,000 (U.S.) for the early completion of Duncan and Arrow Dams constructed under the Columbia River Treaty.

I wish to inform you that the Government of Canada accepts the proposal set forth in your Note and agrees that your Note together with this reply which is authentic in both the English and French languages shall constitute an agreement between our two countries which shall enter into force on the date on which the Government of the United States notifies the Government of Canada that it has completed all internal measures necessary to give effect to this agreement.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

P. M. TOWE,  
*Chargé d'Affaires, ad interim.*

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, Executive H—91st Congress, first session—consists of the text of two notes, which constitute an agreement by the United States to pay Canada for flood control benefits derived from the early completion of two dams under the Columbia River Treaty. The amount involved is \$278,000 covering additional benefits received by the United States by these early completions—2 years in the case of Duncan Dam and 1 year in the case of Arrow Dam. The Committee on Foreign Relations believes that it is a matter of equity to compensate Canada for the additional protection from floods which the United States has enjoyed.

The agreement is further described in the committee report, and I ask unanimous consent that excerpts from it be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the excerpts from the committee report (Executive No. 91-11) were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXCERPT FROM COMMITTEE REPORT  
PURPOSE

The basic purpose of this Agreement with Canada is to provide for the payment to Canada of \$278,000 in compensation for the additional flood control benefits resulting from early completion of two dams constructed pursuant to the Columbia River Treaty.

BACKGROUND

This Agreement, concluded by an exchange of notes between the United States and Canada on August 18 and 20, 1969, provides for adjustments in the flood control payments by the United States to Canada as a result of early completion by Canada of the Arrow Dam and Duncan Dam projects, built under the Columbia River Treaty of 1961.

The Columbia River Treaty provides that the United States pay Canada specified sums for the flood control benefits to be derived from the Duncan and the Arrow Dams in British Columbia. These amounts were calculated on the basis of 55 years of flood control benefits and it was expected that the projects would be completed sometime after the Spring of 1969. In fact, the dams were completed well before the target date. Duncan Dam commenced operation on July 31, 1967, and Arrow Dam on October 10, 1968. Thus, the United States has received two years of additional flood control benefits in the case of Duncan Dam and one year of extra benefits from the Arrow Dam.

Although the treaty provided that the United States payment to Canada would be less if the dams did not begin operation on schedule, it did not provide for additional

payments if the dams were completed ahead of schedule. In 1964, before the treaty went into force, the United States and Canada agreed to consult concerning payment adjustments if the dams should be completed early. Subsequently, both countries agreed that, on the basis of calculations used for the original amounts in the treaty, \$82,000 would be appropriate payment for the two extra years of benefits from Duncan Dam and \$196,000 for the one extra year of benefits from Arrow Dam.

\* \* \* \* \*

COMMITTEE ACTION AND RECOMMENDATION

Executive H (91st Congress, first sess.) was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on October 14, 1969. The Committee held a public hearing on the Agreement on November 4, 1969, receiving testimony from Mr. John R. Stevenson, Legal Advisor to the Department of State, Mr. Fred L. Thrall, United States Army Corps of Engineers, and Mr. William Johnson, Jr., Office of Canadian Affairs, Department of State. The Committee considered the Agreement in executive session on November 5 and ordered it favorably reported to the Senate.

The Committee believes that the payment provided for in the Agreement is fair and reasonable compensation for the additional flood protection the United States has received as a result of the early completion by Canada of Arrow Dam and Duncan Dam. It would not be in keeping with the cooperative spirit underlying the Columbia River Treaty for the United States to fail to compensate Canada for these extra benefits.

The Committee on Foreign Relations believes that the arrangement is in the public interest and recommends that the Senate give its advice and consent to the Agreement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no objection, Executive H, 91st Congress, first session, will be considered as having passed through its various parliamentary stages up to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification, which the clerk will read for the information of the Senate.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

*Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present and concurring therein), that the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the texts of two notes, signed at Washington and dated August 18 and 20, 1969, constituting an agreement between the government of the United States of America and the government of Canada concerning adjustments in the flood control payments by the United States government to the Canadian government as a result of early completion of projects (Arrow Dam and Duncan Dam) contemplated by Article II (2) (b) and (c) of the Columbia River Treaty. (Executive H, 91st Congress, 1st session.)*

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote on the agreement with Canada follow the vote on the Consular Convention with Belgium on Monday afternoon next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The unanimous-consent agreements concerning the foregoing executive matters were subsequently reduced to writing, as follows:

*Ordered, That on Monday, November 10, 1969, at 2 o'clock p.m., the Senate proceed to vote on the resolution of ratification to Executive F, 91st Congress, first session, the Consular Convention with Belgium; to be followed by a vote on the resolution of ratification to Executive H, 91st Congress, first session, an Agreement with Canada on Adjustments in Flood Control Payments.*

Mr. MANSFIELD. For the information of the Senate, there will be two yeas-and-nays votes at that time, and I hope that the attachés will inform all Senators, so that they will be on notice.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate return to legislative session.

The motion was agreed to.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is there further morning business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

INDEPENDENT OFFICES AND DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS, 1970

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. MANSFIELD. What is the pending business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is H.R. 12307, the independent offices appropriation bill.

The hour of 2 o'clock p.m. having arrived, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which the clerk will state.

The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 12307) making appropriations for sundry independent executive bureaus, boards, commissions, corporations, agencies, offices, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senate will proceed to its consideration.

NOVEMBER MORATORIUM UNNECESSARY

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I recently read that the president of the Vietcong's provisional revolutionary government wrote an open letter to the American people wishing "yet greater success in the fall offensive" to get U.S. forces out of Vietnam. I resent this attempted interposition in internal affairs of the United States.

Although I doubt its sincerity, this letter does point out the danger of providing encouragement to the North Vietnamese in their uncooperative attitude in Paris and unyielding determination on the battlefield.

I have serious misgivings about the planned November moratorium.

In the first place it is unnecessary. The October moratorium clearly made its point.

Second, the real possibility that the next moratorium might result in violence and disruption outweighs whatever slim benefits might be gained by it. The leadership of the November moratorium

have not pledged themselves to the avoidance of violence. A serious, disruptive confrontation between the demonstrators and the Government would do nothing to promote peace and could provide Hanoi with valuable propaganda leverage.

As my distinguished colleague from Oregon pointed out on Monday, those who are concerned with peace should turn their attention from the streets to their neighborhoods and from mass demonstrations to community relations.

I support Senator HATFIELD's views and call upon all Americans to work for peace this November and December and throughout 1970—and to build better neighborhoods and communities. Peace work on this scale will bring meaningful results here at home while the administration seeks real peace throughout the world.

VIETNAM

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the essence of the democratic system of government is its constant attempt to reach decisions on the basis of free and open discussions and in a climate of mutual respect and forbearance. I speak today on Vietnam. I do so because I believe the Nation has not yet reached a clear understanding and reasoned decision on what we should do to end our involvement and the war. I do so because I believe we need more free and open discussions on the issue before we can reach such an understanding and such a decision. I hope those discussions will be carried out in a spirit of mutual respect and forbearance.

The deep national divisions over Vietnam and our involvement there reflect sincere differences of opinion. The differences are very wide, ranging from the few who feel that our national interest requires that we persevere there, for whatever period and at whatever cost, to the limited number who regard our presence in Vietnam as immoral and advocate our immediate withdrawal, and those who feel that the cost of our continued involvement is no longer justified by our vital national interests, and should be rapidly, but responsibly, reduced.

Reactions to President Nixon's speech have been prompt and predictable. There has also been a predictable response of support for what the President called his plan to "end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal of a just and lasting peace." However, I believe that the great majority of the American public, that "silent majority" of whom the President spoke, remains unclear as to our present purpose and the practicality of the plan for ending the war to which the President referred, but which he incompletely described.

In short, I believe the great "silent majority" of Americans does not find itself on either extreme of this issue. This is true, I suggest, because the choice before us in Vietnam is not, despite the President's rhetoric, between the continued and indefinite involvement of our military forces and their immediate and disorderly withdrawal. On the contrary, the choice is between continued Amer-

ican involvement in the war and settlement arrived at by the South Vietnamese people on terms which are acceptable to them.

The path to political settlement is not easy, and it is not obvious. It will require imagination, resourcefulness, and steadfastness by our Government. It cannot succeed without broad understanding and support from among our people—understanding and support which must be available not only in the days immediately following a presidential address, but in the difficult weeks and months ahead.

I regret to say that President Nixon's November 3 address did not reveal a determination to direct us toward a political settlement, and I do not believe it can sustain the kind of broad, public support the Nation needs in this time of bitter trial.

The President's talk revealed a distressing tendency—too often present in discussions of Vietnam—to divide the issue and the American people into two extremes. On the one extreme was a strawman—"immediate, precipitate withdrawal"—which the President contends would bring about a "disaster of immense magnitude." Those who support such a course were symbolized by a sign which read, "Lose in Vietnam, Bring the Boys Home." Into this strawman the President bound, by inference, all who dissent from present policy—the small minority which wants our troops out tomorrow, whatever the consequences, and the many millions who want an end to the fighting and an orderly withdrawal of American combat troops from Vietnam. It was a debater's device. It was not a fair description of public opinion.

At the other extreme the President put his policy of ending our involvement through Vietnamization. But his presentation was long on rhetoric and short on analysis.

There was no explanation of what we hope to achieve at the negotiating table. There was no reference to the need for a political settlement among the Vietnamese. There was no suggestion of an initiative to end the killing and permit the two sides to begin working out political arrangements. There was no talk of the need for reform and wider participation in the Government of South Vietnam.

There was a rejection of any kind of announced timetable for the withdrawal of American troops. Withdrawal will take place, in the President's words, on the basis of three factors: first, the rate at which South Vietnamese forces become stronger; second, the level of enemy activity, and third, progress in American efforts to achieve peace in Paris.

In other words, the rate of withdrawal of American forces is out of our hands. The disposition of our military strength in the world, the commitment of hundreds of thousands of American men, is to be determined by the governments in Saigon and in Hanoi.

All of the President's talk about his policy—all of his references to his plans for peace—were hedged about the "if's." If Saigon increases its military strength, we can decrease our presence. If Hanoi and the National Liberation Front do not

increase their military activities, we can cut down on the number of our combat troops. If nothing comes of the Paris peace talks, we can pursue our other plans, and increase the Vietnamization of the war.

There is an ominous possibility in the President's speech, the possibility that if our full objectives are not met, in Paris or in Vietnam, on terms acceptable to us and to the Saigon government, we will be committed to supporting a continuation of the war in the belief that a military victory is still possible.

Thus, the President's speech promised continued support for the status quo in Saigon and ignored the central fact that a political compromise on the part of the Saigon government is inevitable if there is to be a genuine political settlement to this war.

Last, there was in the President's speech a verbal reescalation of the definition of our interests in South Vietnam, suggesting that the preservation of the existing government in South Vietnam is essential to the cause of peace "not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world." That suggests a commitment to military victory by the South Vietnamese and by us.

What we should seek today is neither an American military victory nor simply a Vietnamization of the war. Our goal is not perpetual conflict in which only the Vietnamese continue to die, but genuine peace. What we should seek is peace for the Vietnamese, a peaceful settlement acceptable to the silent and suffering majority of the South Vietnamese people themselves.

The President had sharp words for those who have demonstrated their concern for peace and their doubts about the likelihood that his announced policies could bring peace. He suggested that they are actually prolonging the war. What is prolonging the war is not the desire of the American people for peace. Our people do want the war to end. They want the administration and Congress to understand that fact, and their attitude is consistent with, and indispensable to, the nonmilitary solution which the President has repeatedly stated as our objective.

The roadblocks to peace cannot be removed simply by exhortations to the American people to follow their leader. We need instead to create both in Hanoi and in Saigon an attitude of willingness to work toward a political settlement. These attitudes cannot, in my opinion, be brought about by warning Hanoi of new and greater military pressures or by encouraging Saigon in false hopes that no concessions and no compromises will be necessary. Neither can peace be promoted by further polarization of American sentiment.

Since we have renounced any intention to seek a military victory in Vietnam—and the President here said that we have—we must accept the fact of a settlement on terms less than ideal from our point of view. Saigon, Hanoi, and the National Liberation Front will have to accept the same kinds of limitations on their own hopes.

Any speech on Vietnam must be considered from the standpoint of its three

important audiences—in the United States, in Hanoi, and in Saigon. To each of these audiences such a speech conveys either a warning or a promise, or both.

In the past, most of the public utterances about Vietnam have warned the American public of the dire consequences of American failure there. That was a major theme of the President's speech last Monday. Such utterances contain little in the way of promise that our costly and divisive efforts can be brought to an end in the reasonable future.

As directed at Hanoi, our statements have usually warned of the application of ever greater military force, but they have promised little hope that their supporters in South Vietnam could genuinely participate in a political settlement.

To Saigon, we have continued to promise much in the way of continuing military and political support, but we have conveyed little warning that American military support will not continue forever and that reasonable political concessions on their part are necessary if there is to be an end to the war and a genuine political settlement in South Vietnam.

It is in this area that President Nixon's speech revealed one of its most serious shortcomings. There was not one word of incentive for the South Vietnamese to accelerate the strengthening of their forces or to make political efforts to end the war. So long as the United States commits its foreign policy, as well as its ground combat troops, to the successful prosecution of this war by military means, the authorities in Saigon are under no pressure to make the political or military effort that is necessary if they are to take full responsibility for bringing the conflict to a close. General Thieu and General Ky could have written the three conditions for U.S. withdrawal contained in the President's speech. It is no wonder the speech was so well received in Saigon.

If the President's speech had implemented what he called his "Guam principles," it would have included an announcement to the American people of a schedule of withdrawal of at least all American ground combat troops from Vietnam. This would not mean a "precipitate" withdrawal with all its potentially disastrous consequences. It would not be a signal that we are ready to "lose in Vietnam, and bring the boys home." Instead, it would carry a message to Saigon that it must increase its efforts; it would bring to the military leaders of North and South Vietnam a message that America does not plan to intensify the war, but neither does it plan callously to jettison an ally; and would indicate to our own people that the administration is responding to their deep desire that the loss of American lives in Vietnam be ended. General Ky has felt free to tell us when all U.S. combat troops can be withdrawn from South Vietnam. He did so within the last 2 or 3 days. Why, then, cannot the President himself?

If we are to create the conditions for a political settlement in Vietnam—a settlement which the South Vietnamese must reach themselves—we must proceed—and proceed promptly—to remove

the overwhelming American presence which now appears to inhibit political compromise. An announcement of our intention to do so, and to do so in accordance with a definite schedule, will not erode our bargaining position in Paris.

A timetable for removing our ground combat troops, if coupled with plans for later—but undefined dates—for removal of our air support and logistical support forces, will offer incentives to both Saigon and Hanoi to come to terms at the negotiating table. Saigon will realize that it cannot depend on our support indefinitely. Hanoi will realize that the alternative to a negotiated settlement is the possibility of an indefinite conflict.

Any meaningful bargaining position will remain impossible under present circumstances, and it has been rendered more remote by some portions of the President's speech. The speech may, indeed, deepen the impression that the administration is downplaying the role of diplomacy as a means of ending the war, rather than reinvigorating its efforts to reach a negotiated settlement.

Looking back, the President said that "no progress whatever has been made" at the Paris talks since the agreement on the shape of the bargaining table, which occurred before his administration took office. He then went on to disclose a number of hitherto private ventures which had failed to bring results.

He went further, and revealed to the world a private exchange of letters between himself and Ho Chi Minh, last summer. He called this revelation "unprecedented." There is a good reason why such a step is "unprecedented," and one which our Government has traditionally avoided. If all letters between heads of state had to be written with an eye toward early publication by the recipient at a time of his own choosing, the utility of such exchanges would be reduced to mere propaganda. But obviously this is a disadvantage the President decided to accept for whatever advantages he felt he might gain in using the letters for his speech.

Since the President has made us privy to that exchange, I think some comments about the letters are justified. I would note that the President's letter is primarily a restatement of U.S. positions previously made public on repeated occasions. He referred to the reasonableness of the administration's May 14 proposal and stated, as we had declared in Paris and elsewhere, that we were ready to discuss "other programs as well, specifically the 10-point program of the NLF." He urged progress at the conference table. Except for the act of writing the letter, the move contained no new substantive initiatives and he found this a criticism in Ho Chi Minh's reply.

Ho's reply did, as the President indicated, reiterate "the public position North Vietnam had taken in the Paris talks" and repeated the well-worn charge that the United States should "cease the war of aggression and withdraw troops."

But the Ho letter was not without its points of interest.

It referred to the NLF 10-point program as "a logical and reasonable basis for the settlement of the Vietnamese problem"; not as "the only basis for set-

tlement" or the "only correct basis of settlement" as many earlier public statements of Hanoi had done.

It referred to "the right of the population of the south and of the Vietnamese nation to dispose of themselves without foreign influence." These terms are not dissimilar from the President's own references to the importance of giving "the people of South Vietnam an opportunity to choose their own future." On these two points, then, where did the two letters come into direct conflict?

And Ho's concluding sentence—that "with good will on both sides we might arrive at common efforts in view of finding a correct solution to the Vietnam problem"—was probably as forthcoming a generality as the old revolutionary had ever addressed in confidence to a Western leader at any time in his long lifetime.

It seems to me that this reply invited a further communication from us to Ho's successors, building on the stated common goal of self-determination of the Vietnamese people and the final expression of good will.

Some or all of these steps may have been taken in the "other significant initiatives" which the President referred to, but in his speech he described Ho's letter as a flat rejection which I do not think is a fair interpretation of his letter. I cannot see how the goal of a negotiated peace is promoted by the publication of private diplomatic exchanges.

I cannot see how Ambassador Lodge's task of getting meaningful private discussions underway is served by revealing the 11 times he has been able to meet in private with the Communist representative to date.

For the future the President offered nothing new on the diplomatic scales and appeared to place little importance on the effort. He recapped our prior diplomatic initiative. He said we would persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement "if possible." But the much publicized "plan" which is referred to six times in his speech dealt exclusively with military matters—our hopes for withdrawal, and only if and when the South Vietnamese "become strong enough to defend their own freedom."

There was no explanation of what we hope to achieve in a negotiated settlement.

There was no reference to the need for a political settlement between the Vietnamese themselves—an objective toward which we must devote far more efforts than have been evidenced to date.

There was no hint of the terms under which we would seek and accept a ceasefire now that would put an immediate end to the killing and force the Vietnamese factions to begin to work out their political relationships.

There was no talk of the need for wider participation in the Government of South Vietnam, if Saigon's authority is ever to be secure enough to win a political settlement, let alone to stand up unassisted against internal challenge.

Let us hope that this impression that diplomacy has been downplayed is one of those accidental byproducts of speechmaking.

Let us hope that despite our failures on the diplomatic front, to date, the administration has not wearied after only 9 months in office of the arduous task of pressing new diplomatic initiatives to create the conditions under which the war-weary people of South Vietnam may at long last find, not a Vietnamese war, turned over to them by Americans, but a true peace on political terms of their own choosing.

I have suggested several initiatives we might pursue, including: an orderly, announced withdrawal of our combat troops, coupled with air and logistical support for the South Vietnamese for a longer period; a proposal for a standstill cease-fire; and the possible use of the good offices of United Nations Secretary General U Thant as an "honest broker" in paving the way for the various groups in South Vietnam to reach a political settlement.

The President has said he wants to operate from a position of strength. I believe these proposals would permit him to do that. Unfortunately, I believe his speech of November 3 has weakened his position. He has weakened his long-term support at home by polarizing opinion in the United States. He has weakened his ability to stimulate a broadened and stronger government in South Vietnam by continuing his unqualified support for the status quo in Saigon. And he has weakened his options in Paris by revealing secret letters and secret talks, and by rejecting the letter from Ho Chi Minh and not following through on it.

Mr. President, I had hoped that I would be able to give my unqualified support to President Nixon's policy in Vietnam as a result of his long-heralded speech of November 3. As President, he is ultimately responsible for the conduct of the war and the search for peace. I wish it were possible to say that the course he has described seems most likely to result in an early termination of the war. But in fact it seems to be a prescription for its indefinite prolongation. It does not contain the vital elements which will, in my view, bring the war to an end and enable the South Vietnamese to determine their own destiny.

I pray, Mr. President, that I am wrong and that he is right, and that his policy will succeed. In the light of my evaluation of his speech, which I have tried to make as dispassionate and objective as possible, I do not think it will. So until the President takes account of those elements, I deem it my duty to speak out.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUSKIE. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Kansas.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I listened with great interest to the distinguished Senator from Maine. Apparently I interpret the letter from Ho Chi Minh differently than the Senator from Maine because, in the next to the last paragraph in the letter from Ho Chi Minh dated August 25 and received, I understand, on August 30, the indication is that there can be peace and talk about peace only if we withdraw our troops from Vietnam.

The Senator from Maine indicates there is still room for further response.

But as I read it, there is no reason for any response unless all our American troops are withdrawn from South Vietnam.

In the next to the last paragraph, it says: "For this the United States must cease the war of aggression and withdraw their troops from South Vietnam."

That is the same story we have heard time and time again from the North Vietnamese. The Senator is indicating that there was a basis, after President Nixon received this letter, for further contact with the Hanoi Government. Certainly not Ho Chi Minh, because he died 3 days after the letter was received so it is not possible to communicate with him. In my opinion Ho was closing the door as he had in the past. Unless we would first withdraw all our troops from Vietnam, they are saying, "we are not prepared to do anything." Perhaps the Senator interprets it differently or the statement he has made would so indicate.

Mr. MUSKIE. In my prepared remarks, as the Senator knows, I analyzed the reason why I think there was a softening of Ho's position in that letter. But I would be glad to respond further. One of the President's criticisms of the whole letter was that it did nothing but repeat positions previously taken by Hanoi. So that criticism, if it is one, could also be directed at the President's letter because it contained nothing but a repetition—

Mr. DOLE. Except in the —

Mr. MUSKIE. Of previous statements which we have made.

Mr. DOLE. Except in the President's letter. As a matter of fact, he made reference to the National Liberation Front's 10 points. The President specifically said, as I remember it, that he would be specifically interested in discussing the 10 points of the NLF, but then they come back in the letter from Ho Chi Minh, saying, "Yes, as soon as you withdraw your troops we will discuss that."

Mr. MUSKIE. The President's reference to our willingness to discuss the 10 points of the NLF had been previously made by the President. That was not a new offer on his part.

Mr. DOLE. In the past, we have stated, "Are you prepared to discuss this," and the President again indicated a willingness to discuss the 10 points. He did this again in his letter to Ho Chi Minh.

Mr. MUSKIE. Then, let us look at Ho's reply. The first point I make is that of the criticism of Ho's letter, and the President's letter being subject to the same criticism, and no new substantial positions offered by the President. I am not saying it could have been. Perhaps the initial step should have been made more than the mere fact of writing a letter; but if there is a basis for criticism of such letter, then the President's letter is subject to that same criticism.

Second, in many previous responses to such an offer, Hanoi has always been "hard line." But let us look at Ho's language in this one, on the question of the 10 points.

He states:

The overall solution in ten points of the National Liberation Front of South Viet-

nam and of the provisional revolutionary government of the Republic of South Vietnam is a logical and reasonable basis . . .

Now, this is something different than saying, "You accept the 10 points without change and get out." This is a much softer reference to the NLF's 10 points than any previous reference I can recall.

He talked about "overall solutions," obviously applying the possibility of negotiation or elimination of the 10 points. Then he said, "is a logical and reasonable basis." Well, the "basis" is something different than a blueprint or a rubber-stamp.

Mr. DOLE. The communication, in the next paragraph, second sentence, takes the same hard line position taken time and time again by the Hanoi Government: that they will not discuss any settlement until all American troops are withdrawn.

Mr. MUSKIE. But he does not say that here—

Mr. DOLE. He does not?

Mr. MUSKIE. No. Let me read it:

In your letter you have expressed the desire to ask for a just peace. For this the United States must cease the war of aggression and withdraw their troops from South Vietnam, respect the right of the population of the South and of the Vietnamese nation to dispose of themselves without foreign influence.

There is not a word in here to suggest that any part of this must be done before talks began. So many times in the past, they have clearly stated that, "You must stop your aggression and withdraw your troops before we will talk." That qualifying language is not in this letter.

Now when we take that with the last paragraph in the letter—let me read it:

With good will on both sides we might arrive at common efforts in view of finding a correct solution of the Vietnamese problem.

If that language does not suggest the possibility of a solution that is not found in the proposals of either side up to this time, then I do not understand the meaning of language. That is not a hard-nosed, flat rejection, as in the words of the President. That language, if it means anything, is an invitation.

May I point out that this letter was received, according to the President, 3 days before Ho's death. He did not publicize this for propaganda purposes. His successors did not. It seems to me that, however pessimistic one might be in interpreting Ho's letter, it gave the President an opportunity to write to the new leader to say, "We have just received this letter from Ho and in it we see some indication of a willingness to discuss these questions. We ask whether you so interpret his letter and, if so, whether you would be willing to pursue this initiative that has been begun by Ho Chi Minh."

It seems to me that, however pessimistically we might interpret the language which the Senator and I have discussed in our colloquy here, such an initiative would have done no harm whatsoever, and it might have opened up a diplomatic initiative of great value.

Mr. DOLE. Let me say to my distinguished colleague from Maine that I suppose we can interpret this letter any way

we wish, but how do the Senator's specific proposals for peace in Vietnam differ from those being pursued now by President Nixon.

Where is the difference?

I have just read a document of some interest; namely, the Democratic platform of August 28, 1968, in which Vietnam is discussed. One of the statements is as follows:

We reject as unacceptable a unilateral withdrawal of our forces which would allow that aggression and subversion to succeed. We have never demanded, and do not now demand, unconditional surrender by the Communists.

We strongly support the Paris talks and applaud the initiative of President Johnson which brought North Vietnam to the peace table.

Troop withdrawal—negotiate with Hanoi an immediate end or limitation of hostilities and the withdrawal from South Vietnam of all foreign forces—both United States and allied forces, and forces infiltrated from North Vietnam.

Now, Mr. President, with reference to what the Senator apparently finds to be a mistake in trying to Vietnamize the war, this is what the Democratic platform had to say—

Mr. MUSKIE. Let me interject there, I did not say I was opposing Vietnamizing the war. I said I was opposed toward making that our objective, or our only objective—just an arrangement for the Vietnamese to continue to die rather than Americans. I think we should be working toward a settlement of the war.

With respect to the history the Senator has just read, unfortunately, President Nixon gave us no positions, no plan, in the last campaign, that would give us an opportunity to cite his record.

Mr. DOLE. Well, his record is—

Mr. MUSKIE. Wait a minute—if I may finish, please. President Nixon made clear in his last speech, and in his speech of May 14, that he was carefully reviewing and that he did carefully review our policies, and the underlying assumptions of positions previously taken, and that as a result of that review and his evaluation of that situation, he was proposing the initiatives which he outlined in his May 14 speech, and he has given us this policy statement of November 3.

I take it we have as much right to review what has happened since last fall, to review our policy and its underlying assumptions and what has taken place, and modify our positions as well.

What we are talking about is what our present view of the situation is, and of the problem, and generating the best wisdom we can to come up with solutions.

Mr. DOLE. But in fairness to President Nixon, it should be pointed out that there has been talk on this floor and talk around the country by certain leaders that President Nixon had no plan, he has no plan now, and no plan on Monday evening. I pointed out before that President Nixon is bringing American troops home. That was not the plan of the last administration. I never criticized President Johnson or the Senator from Maine—

Mr. MUSKIE. May I point out that Vice President Humphrey, in last year's campaign, announced there would be a

troop withdrawal by the middle of this year, and he was criticized by his opposition for holding out such optimistic hopes.

Mr. DOLE. But the point is that there have been troop withdrawals. The Senator has suggested that there should be a timetable. I assume the Senator means bringing home so many thousands this month and so many thousands next month.

Mr. MUSKIE. I have stated my proposal. I do not think it is the only proposal. I certainly have not rejected the President's consideration—

Mr. DOLE. How does the Senator differ with what the President has proposed?

Mr. MUSKIE. I have announced a timetable for the withdrawal of troops—like that of Secretary Clifford—by the end of 1970. I can see the value of withholding the date for final and total withdrawal of our forces, but I think we need some kind of commitment to a scheduled withdrawal in order to impose pressure on both Saigon and Hanoi. The President has said he is going to be flexible in all respects in connection with withdrawal. I am delighted he has committed himself to negotiating a settlement. I am delighted with and applaud the decision to begin withdrawal of troops. I do not criticize that. What I am objecting to is the extension of the withdrawal concept and the time to do it in, with the conditions which I have suggested.

Mr. DOLE. One reason why the President recited the secret talks, and the letters, and the private meetings of Mr. Lodge in his speech to the American people, was to point out to the American people what had happened since January 20, 1969. He could have announced on the afternoon of January 20 that we were going to withdraw, on a unilateral basis, from South Vietnam. That was the easy choice from a political standpoint.

Mr. MUSKIE. I do not think it is the easy choice with the "silent majority" behind him. That would be the tough choice.

Mr. DOLE. You stated that President Nixon's speech was going to polarize the people. The Gallup poll showed that 77 percent were for the President, 6 percent were against him, and the rest were undecided. If there is going to be a polarization, I would say it is that of the great majority of the people supporting the President's proposals. He made it clear on Monday that we had not succeeded in negotiations. He has turned from an Americanization of the war under the past administration to a Vietnamization of the war under this administration. We have tried time and time again to negotiate. What has been accomplished? Nothing. Does the Senator believe that is not true?

Mr. MUSKIE. Is it the Senator's suggestion that the President should no longer make efforts?

Mr. DOLE. No. He has to find an alternative course. Negotiation was probably tried yesterday and probably will be tried again next week. If we cannot negotiate, we must find some other honorable way out of Vietnam. I fail again to perceive much difference between the

Senator's analysis of how to end the war and what is now being done.

Mr. MUSKIE. If there is not much difference, I would be happy to have the President adopt my plan.

Mr. DOLE. Perhaps the Senator copied it from the President's speech on Monday, because it sounds very much like it.

Mr. MUSKIE. Having just listened to my speech—and I appreciate the attention the Senator gave it—I suggest he now read it. I think if he sees no difference as a result of having heard it, he may see some after having read it.

Mr. DOLE. I want to develop the differences on the floor of the Senate, for the benefit of all Americans. If the Senator can expound the differences between his plan and the one being implemented by President Nixon, it may be of help to President Nixon.

Mr. MUSKIE. I am at some disadvantage in this connection, because President Nixon has not told us—

Mr. DOLE. He is doing it by action.

Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator has asked me a question. I would like to answer it. He has not given us the details of his withdrawal plan. One thing that distinguishes our views is the time with respect to withdrawal. I think we ought to announce a date for withdrawal of our combat forces.

Mr. DOLE. What date does the Senator have in mind?

Mr. MUSKIE. As I said a moment ago, the end of 1970.

Vice President Ky, just the other day, in a press conference in Saigon, said that, in his judgment, this could be possible. So he has announced it. I have advocated it.

Mr. DOLE. What advantage is this for anyone to say we are going to do it by the end of 1970, or in fact do it on any specific date?

Mr. MUSKIE. I think the advantage is that it puts pressure on Saigon then to put its ducks in order, militarily and politically. Vietnamization of the war is going to require more than an American effort. It is going to require a Saigon effort. And if there is no commitment for withdrawal of our combat support, I suspect there is not much pressure felt by Saigon to exert that effort which it must exert.

Secondly, such a commitment which would then be credible to Saigon would put the pressure on Saigon to broaden its political base. I just do not happen to believe that the present Saigon government, if it is not changed and broadened, can survive our withdrawal, whether that withdrawal comes as a result of whatever the President's timetable may be, or as a result of some other timetable.

I assume—and I would be interested to have the Senator's view on this—that what the President is talking about is complete withdrawal at some point, and not an indefinite prolongation of American support at some level, unspecified and unidentified.

What the Senator is talking about, and what the President is talking about, is complete withdrawal of American forces at some time in the reasonably near future, in 1971, or 1972. Whatever

it is, we do not know. Then we have to be concerned, and Saigon has to be concerned, with whether or not it has the political viability and the political strength to survive.

I think that if we announce a date for withdrawal of combat forces, perhaps Saigon will begin to believe that what we are talking about is not an indefinite prolongation of the war, at some reduced level of American support, but an end to American military support—combat, air, logistical—and some point for which they must prepare themselves politically. I think that point has to be made clear, and I think they have to accept it as part of their policy.

Mr. DOLE. If I may respond to that, we are not talking about putting pressure on Saigon. We are actually taking troops from South Vietnam. By December 15, the number is going to be 60,000. Yesterday there was a bipartisan meeting, composed of George Meany and others, who reported to the President that we are making great progress in South Vietnam. There is going to be more. More is being done so far as pacification is concerned. There is more support for the Government. There is a feeling in Saigon that it can take over more military responsibilities.

Mr. MUSKIE. May I respond to that?

Mr. DOLE. In just a moment.

Statements have been made about advance notice putting pressure on Saigon. I think we can deal with our allies without advance notice. If we give advance notice, we only give information to the enemy; if we say that, in 6 months, for example, we are going to take our troops out of there, it does a disservice. It does not help Saigon, it does not help us, and it does not help the American troops that are there.

Why should we telegraph our plans to the enemy that by the end of 1970, if they can hold out that long, all the American combat troops are coming home? I think it would be a mistake.

Mr. MUSKIE. May I respond?

Mr. DOLE. I yield.

Mr. MUSKIE. My response to that question, and the Senator's response, must depend upon whether this administration is committed, at some point, to withdrawal of American combat forces.

Mr. DOLE. It is committed now.

Mr. MUSKIE. That has to be in connection with some date, disclosed or undisclosed. The President has permitted our allies in Saigon to announce dates after which they think they can take over the war. He did so the other day—the end of 1970, the same date I am suggesting here today.

With all this speculation suggesting that some time before 1971 we are going to withdraw our combat forces, there is little element of surprise left for Hanoi. So the question then is—and I repeat it, and I should like the Senator's answer to it, if he knows—are we committed, in our policy? Is the President's scheduled program, or scheduled timetable, committed to some date for total withdrawal of our forces, and if so, is it a date that Saigon knows?

He has said that there is a program

worked out with Saigon. I am not asking for the date, if the Senator knows what the date is. I am simply asking, is there such a date?

If there is not, then the possibility that the President is holding out to Saigon by his present method of withdrawal is that we will reduce to some level, and then continue American support at that level for some indefinite period, the end of which will depend upon Saigon's ability to take over the war.

If there is such a date, if both sides are committed to it and it is written in bronze, I would be interested to know it.

Mr. DOLE. If I might respond, there is probably no date. The Senator does not have a date, either. There is, however, a commitment and this is the important thing: There is a commitment by this administration to withdraw U.S. combat troops?

The most unwise thing the President could do would be to set some arbitrary date, say September next year or September the following year, to have the last combat soldier out of Vietnam.

I really do not see any difference, the more I discuss the matter with the Senator, between the Nixon position and what he suggests, except for this magic he seems to associate with reference to a specific date:

If the President will just say that on some date next year we are going to bring all the troops, then the Senator would support him wholeheartedly.

Mr. MUSKIE. I did not say "all the troops." I said, "all combat troops."

Mr. DOLE. All combat troops. But if he will not set some specific date, then the Senator is opposed to him.

Mr. MUSKIE. Well, let me say this: The Senator says he sees little difference between our positions. I see a great deal of difference, and the President obviously sees a great deal of difference, because he has so stated. I suggest there is a great deal of difference.

It is a question of how you interpret that difference, what effect that difference would have on the ability and determination of Saigon to broaden its base and take over the war, as well as the determination of Hanoi to continue the war.

The Senator has cited some sort of "new optimism" that seems to pervade the country.

Mr. DOLE. That was in the Democratic platform.

Mr. MUSKIE. No, I am not talking about that. I am talking about the new optimism discussed in recent press stories from South Vietnam, about the state of our military effort in South Vietnam. The Senator referred in his remarks to the success of our pacification effort, the growing political stability in the south, and so on. If the optimism is justified—

Mr. DOLE. It is the optimism of the committee which reported to the President yesterday, George Meany, Mr. Gullion, and others—bipartisan committee.

Mr. MUSKIE. I am not attributing the optimism to anyone. I am simply saying that if it is justified, then I suggest the best way to crystallize Saigon policy and

Saigon determination is the kind of commitment to withdrawal that I have suggested. If it is not justified, if we still have to have rubber clauses in our commitment that permit us to modify it with the unfolding of events, that is something else.

I think that we ought to make these decisions about withdrawal of our troops. I do not think we should, any longer, be committed to rubber clauses that leave the control in Saigon and Hanoi. I think it would serve a very useful purpose to make it clear to Saigon that we are determined to withdraw, and that the decision is ours to make and not theirs.

Mr. DOLE. I do not have any great quarrel with that. I did want to again quote another of the statements from the Democratic platform:

Until the fighting stops, accelerate our efforts to train and equip the South Vietnamese Army so that it can defend its own country and carry out cutbacks of U.S. military involvement as the South Vietnamese forces are able to take over their larger responsibilities.

For some reason President Nixon, a Republican, has carried out that plank in the Democratic platform. He has carried out that plank at an accelerated rate.

Mr. MUSKIE. May I say to the Senator again, the President has made it quite clear that his policy of May 14 was responsive to a change from whatever his policy was last fall. I think I have as much right to change my view, of what our current policy ought to be, from what I felt it should be at the time that platform was written, as he does.

Mr. DOLE. I have not quite finished. There has been a change. Maybe a change on both sides.

Mr. MUSKIE. But what the Senator is saying is that the President's policy is now that of the Democratic platform?

Mr. DOLE. No; but he has helped it a lot. I would say this seriously: I listened to the four or five points the Senator recited as suggested ways to end the war. The key to his program apparently is in orderly withdrawal, as of some specific date.

Mr. MUSKIE. Not at all. I think we have to press the diplomatic front. The responsibility here, obviously, to one who is outside the administration, is not that of the administration; but as to the exchange of letters which we discussed earlier, I think there was an initiative which I would have taken, which the President clearly did not take, and I think there may have been others. If the President so interpreted those letters as to call them a flat rejection of his offer, then it seems to me he may not be as sensitive to the possibilities for diplomatic initiative as in my judgment he ought to be. This is one of the points.

Second, I think that the whole idea of the withdrawal schedule that I have suggested, and the standstill cease-fire, and the U Thant approach, are all designed to promote a political settlement in South Vietnam.

The President, in what he has said publicly, has given the Saigon government no reason to change its political structure to broaden its base, to bring

in elements and tendencies in the south which are not represented in the current government, to discontinue its repression of those who disagree with it politically, or to lift censorship of the press. There is nothing in the President's speech of November 3 or his speech of May 14 to suggest that he regards this as an important area for initiative and pressure. I think we have to do that. I do not think we are going to end the war—which I think is a more important objective than Vietnamization of the war—unless we do something about the political questions without solving which we cannot hope to end the war.

Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I did not have the benefit of being present for the entire speech of the Senator from Maine. I did hear the end of his speech, and I had a chance to look at the text and have listened to the colloquy.

I congratulate the Senator from Maine on his speech and its general approach.

We cannot forget, however, that things are better now than they were a year ago. As the Senator from Idaho (Mr. Church) put it the other day, we as Democrats will have to wear the hair shirt for a while longer, because the fact is that fewer young men are being killed each day, each week, and each month at this time and fewer American troops are in Vietnam.

The point of difference is whether we are moving fast enough and in a sufficiently certain manner and what our ultimate objective is. If the ultimate objective is a permanent enclave of American supporting forces in the manner of the Korean pattern, I think that would be a great mistake.

The Senator from Maine has made a great contribution because of his emphasis on the fact that we are trying to achieve more than a Vietnamization of the war—that we are trying to achieve peace for the area.

A couple of times the Senator from Kansas has touched upon the Democratic National Convention's platform at Chicago last year. As the only Member of the Senate who was a member of both the Platform Committee and the Drafting Committee at that time, I was quite familiar with all of the travail that went into our platform.

The Senator from Kansas may recall that the so-called majority platform was not overwhelmingly supported. It passed by a relatively narrow margin. Both sides at the convention were dug in.

I remember that I had a compromise peace plank proposal. I presented it to both the drafting committee and the full platform committee. In each case it was turned down. And in each case individual committee members came to me afterwards and said they believed that while my plank had merit, the lines were drawn too hard and it had to be either one thing or the other.

While platforms are meant to be taken seriously, I was struck by the fact—if the Senator from Maine will forgive me—that both the Democratic and the Republican candidates for President and Vice President were eventually following

a platform that was more along the lines of the platform that was rejected at that convention.

I was distressed in the course of Mr. Nixon's speech by the way in which he read his letter and more or less glossed over Ho Chi Minh's response.

When we read both of the letters in context, they do not come out all black and white. I think that the last paragraph of Ho Chi Minh's letter when he said, "With good will on both sides we might arrive at common efforts in view of finding a correct solution of the Vietnamese problem" is not a warlike or belligerent statement. It did leave the doors wide open.

It is for these reasons that I support the thrust of the remarks of the Senator from Maine.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, in closing my part of the colloquy, let me say that I have the greatest respect for the Senator from Maine. I would not want anything that I have said to be construed as an attack on him.

The Senator has been helpful, as I stated earlier. Discussing and debating the issues can be constructive. Certainly the war in Vietnam is something we all want to resolve as quickly as possible.

We have different viewpoints. I happen to be very much impressed by what the President said on Monday. Perhaps I did interpret it differently than did the Senator. However, it does seem that the President did present in a very concise chronological way what had happened from January 20 of this year to the present date. Perhaps there are other things he could have done or said. However, if we look at the whole record, I feel the great majority of Americans—Democrats, Republicans, and independents—would give the President an "A" for effort and say that he had been trying to resolve the conflict in Vietnam.

I recognize that when the President announced the withdrawal of 25,000 men, some said it should have been 50,000. When he announced the withdrawal of 35,000 men, some said it should have been 70,000.

We can have these differences of opinion. However, the point is—and I believe it to be symbolic—the President is bringing boys home. The one difference is that the Senator says he should have a timetable and that some specific withdrawal date should be set. I believe we should continue to negotiate, and that there should be a political settlement. Perhaps this can be accomplished by negotiation.

I point out that the President is trying to end the war. And when he cannot negotiate a settlement, his alternate was orderly withdrawal.

The negotiation doors are still open. They are as wide open as they ever were. But if we cannot make any progress at the Paris peace table, the President has an alternate plan to withdraw our combat forces in an orderly manner. Perhaps he will have them home before the date the Senator from Maine has in mind. However, it seems to me in all fairness and candor that the solution advanced by the distinguished Senator from Maine is very much in accord with what the President has done or is doing now.

If I misinterpret that, I regret it. However, it appears that there is not much difference at all.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I point out to the Senator from Kansas that I made a conscious effort not to cast the speech in the context of a partisan attack or criticism.

I listened to the speech. I have read it several times. I have taken it apart—not for disruptive reasons, but to try to identify what I consider to be the shortcomings, not in a partisan or political way, but in a substantive way and in terms of the objective we all share—to end our involvement and to insist on doing other things which would be useful initiatives.

So I felt the obligation today to make my speech on that basis. I grant the Senator that until we are out of the war, there will continue to be disagreement as to exactly what the tactics ought to be.

As I said in the close of my following remarks, whatever my differences with the President, I pray that his policy will succeed. That is the ultimate test, as he recognized in his closing remarks in which he said in substance, I believe, "If I am right, it does not matter what my critics will say now. And if I am wrong, it will not matter what they say then."

That is what the historic significance will be.

My speech was made for these reasons. First, it pinpoints what I think were the shortcomings of the President's speech. And it may be that those shortcomings do not reflect omissions in the President's speech. They may simply be points that he did not cover in his speech. If so, they will appear. Second, I thought that I ought to make a speech in the hope of lending whatever pressure I might—and it may not be necessary—behind the need for diplomatic action and the need for reform in Saigon, broadening its base, and the need to withdraw completely all our forces at some point in accordance with my remarks here.

Finally, I thought I should make the speech to contribute whatever I might to a constructive dialog about our policy on the war.

My speech is not meant to be destructive.

The President is the only instrument we have until 1972 with which to implement whatever policy we have.

Mr. DOLE. It may go beyond that.

Mr. MUSKIE. It may go beyond that; and if it does, we ought to be all the more careful about what our policy should be in the meantime.

I wanted to contribute constructively. I would hope that my efforts to cast this matter in a constructive form will prompt those involved in policymaking to consider the suggestions.

There is nothing new in any of them. I do not think there are any new ideas at all. They may be new combinations of ways to take advantage of our opportunities and events and incidents.

But the basic idea of withdrawal, of cease-fire, of negotiation, and so forth—all these have been thrown out in any variety of combinations. The distinguished Senator from Rhode Island has suggested initiatives from time to time.

So I think we ought to contribute to a

constructive dialog—not to destroy the President's capacity to lead, but in order to strengthen it by putting together a policy which can command the widest possible support.

Mr. DOLE. I agree with what the Senator says, and I know that is what he has in mind. But I am afraid it may be interpreted differently by the American people. I can see the headlines: "Muskie Assails Nixon Policy in Vietnam." That is not the avowed purpose of the Senator's statement.

The Senator indicates that there is nothing new in his speech. Some have indicated that there is nothing new in the President's speech. Perhaps there is nothing new to contribute.

I think there is a sincere desire on the Senator's part and on the President's part to end the war in Vietnam with honor, and this is what I think all of us in this body and everywhere else in America want to do.

So, from that standpoint, I appreciate the contribution the Senator has made, and the fact that I was present to hear the Senator's speech and to exchange some ideas about it.

Mr. MUSKIE. It is always good to have an audience. I thank the distinguished Senator from Kansas.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.  
(At this point, Mr. SCHWEIKER assumed the chair.)

#### TOWARD A SOLUTION OF THE INTERCITY RAIL CRISIS—II

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, yesterday I discussed the reasons why I believe Congress and the administration should give immediate consideration to legislation designed to assist intercity rail passenger service. Today I plan to discuss, first, some general principles which I think should be followed in the preparation of such legislation, and second, the elements of a short-run plan which I believe would provide the most effective means of Federal aid for intercity rail service.

The responsibility of the Federal Government for intercity and interstate rail transportation extends beyond regulatory control. The Federal Government has a positive responsibility to insure the existence of adequate interstate passenger service in whatever modes are best suited to meet passenger demand. A balanced national transportation policy requires Federal fiscal aid for the motorist, the bus passenger, the air passenger, and the rail passenger to be in a complementary form, and in an amount sufficient to meet effectively the transportation demand at the most efficient level for each mode of interstate travel, and at the lowest cost possible to the transportation consumer.

The Federal Government has the primary responsibility for national transportation planning. A balanced transportation policy can be best implemented by conditioning Federal financial assistance upon conformance to local, State, and national transportation plans.

Short-distance intrastate passenger service should be considered as the primary fiscal responsibility of the States or local areas, while interstate passenger

transportation should be the primary fiscal transportation concern of the Federal Government.

The Federal Government should, except on an experimental basis, avoid direct involvement in the actual management of any form of interstate transportation. As far as practical, it should deal at an arms length with the different private and public bodies having operational responsibilities for interstate transportation.

Federal fiscal assistance should make maximum utilization of the private money market. Direct operational subsidies should be avoided to the maximum extent possible and should be undertaken only after a thorough consideration of capital assistance alternatives such as loan guarantees, forgiveness of Federal bankruptcy notes, and grants for the purchase of modern equipment and improvements in the right of way.

#### A SHORTRUN PLAN

The threat of a complete disappearance of intercity passenger service in the United States demands that Congress and the administration consider first a shortrun solution to the rail crisis before it undertakes extensive deliberations on a longrun solution to the Nation's intercity transportation problem.

I would suggest that the more reasonable course for the Congress to follow in the short run would be the immediate passage of legislation designed to provide limited financial assistance for rail transportation in transportation corridors of the emerging megalopolitan areas of the country. The east coast megalopolis and the potential megalopolises of the Great Lakes region, the Northwestern Pacific region, southern California, the Dallas-Houston-New Orleans area, and the Kansas City-St. Louis area are areas of increasing urban density where intermediate distance rail passenger service can be expected to be the most economical and efficient mode of travel in the coming years. It is in the major urban corridors such as those I mentioned where there is the greatest potential demand for rail passenger service; and where, I believe, the Federal Government would be well-advised to initiate its rail assistance programs.

#### ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF FEDERAL AID

There are many possible forms in which the Federal Government can provide financial assistance for intercity train service in megalopolitan areas of country. In my mind, if the States could be encouraged to take the initiative, the first element of a shortrun plan to provide Federal assistance to the railroads would be the plan I described in my book, "Megalopolis Unbound," and encompassed in my bills, S. 914 and S. 924.

I would like to see interstate compacts established in the megalopolis of the eastern seaboard and in those emerging megalopolises in other areas of the country. These compacts would create public authorities to own, operate, and maintain railroad passenger service within their own areas.

There would be several distinct advantages to such arrangements.

First of all, those authorities would place regional rail passenger operations

under one coherent, separate management thus removing passenger service from its traditional position as a stepchild to freight service.

Second, the megalopolitan authorities, being the creature of government, could be exempt from all property and income taxes that are burdensome and unfair to the competitive position of private railroad lines.

Third, the public authorities, standing astride the breadth of the megalopolitan areas, could coordinate and resolve, as no other agency could, the multitudinous local interests of the dozens of city, town, and county governments involved, as well as the States.

Fourth, the new public authorities having the prospect of revitalized and competitive service would offer a "new deal," new and increased job opportunities, and, in fact, a new opportunity for labor.

Finally, and most important of all, the new authority would have the resources to make technological innovations. By virtue of its special status as a semi-public agency, it would be able to raise ample capital on extremely favorable terms, thus acquiring for the passenger service the wherewithal for refurbishment, for which it has starved in recent years.

I believe, too, that the proposed authority should enjoy a Government guarantee of its financing and thus be able to raise easily and on favorable terms substantial amounts of capital from the private sector of the economy. The Government would guarantee to pay back the debt only in the event that an authority could not do so.

Such a procedure, I believe, makes far more sense and is apt to cost the public far less than outright subsidization because subsidies, once granted, are very difficult to discontinue; companies, like people, can become very comfortably accustomed to an assured handout of public money. A guarantee constitutes only a contingent liability for the Government—one that will not be invoked unless all other means fail to make ends meet—so there will be continuing pressures from public budget makers to keep costs down while still maintaining high quality service to attract maximum patronage.

As attractive as the State guarantee plan seems, it is rendered problematic in several instances by State constitutional restrictions against pledging State credit. The alternative, which would be almost as advantageous, would be for the Federal Government to guarantee the authority's bonds.

Even accepting the Federal Government's reluctance to grant tax-exempt status to such bonds, the bonds would still enjoy special status and far more favorable terms because of the Federal guarantee. But the greatest benefit of the Federal guarantee, aside from the general assurance of stability, probably would be an extension of the term of debt. Basically, the authority could take 30 to 40 years to pay off its debt instead of being saddled with the high initial costs of quick debt retirement.

The precedents for this sort of Federal guarantee are the authorities of the Civil

Aeronautics Board to guarantee loans for purchase of aircraft for local air services and small airlines, the authority of the Maritime Administration to insure private construction loans and mortgages on most types of passenger and freight-carrying vessels, and the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission to guarantee short-term loans for the railroads.

The second element of a shortrun plan to provide Federal assistance for intercity rail service, I believe, should be a Federal program of direct grants, guarantees, and loans for capital assistance and seed money to nonprofit rail passenger service corporations, such as the one now being formed in the New England area, the Geo-Transport Foundation.

If the States are reluctant to form a compact or if there is already in existence a regional governmental body, such as the New England Regional Commission, which has the capacity to act as an appropriate conduit for Federal funds, I believe the Federal Government should have the authority to provide seed money and capital support to nonprofit regional rail passenger corporations which have the support of the States within the region and are willing to take over rail passenger service from the profitmaking railroad corporations in its region.

A third element of a short plan to provide Federal assistance for intercity rail service would be a limited Federal authority to give direct capital assistance to the railroads for the purchase of passenger equipment and other capital improvements until such time as a nonprofit corporation or a regional authority could assume management of the passenger service. I believe direct Federal assistance to the railroads should be provided on very cautious and conservative terms, so that the Federal Government's assistance to their rail service would not inhibit the rail companies from transferring their passenger service operations to public and private nonprofit authorities while they used their passenger subsidies to increase their profit margin in their freight and real estate operations.

A fourth element of a shortrun plan would be authority for the Interstate Commerce Commission to require minimum standards for passenger rail service. While I do not believe this authority itself would provide the panacea for the problem of train discontinuances, I believe it would prevent the railroads from fostering unnecessary discontinuances through the discouragement of passenger service by poor service.

In the long run, I hope we can look toward Federal support for multimode intercity transportation through the provision of funds for regional transportation planning, the development of high-speed prototypes for intercity travel, such as tracked air-cushioned vehicles, and the purchase of new interstate rights-of-way for new forms of high-speed ground transportation. I am hopeful that the passage of an excellent bill, such as S. 2425, the National Transportation Act, introduced by Senator MAGNUSON, would serve these purposes.

Mr. President, I believe our responsi-

bility for the future demands that steps be taken to save intercity rail passenger service. I hope that action along the lines I suggest can be taken in this Congress with the support of the administration to meet the rail passenger problem.

#### FREE SPEECH AT JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, as were many other Senators who have mentioned the matter to me, I was disappointed and even shocked by the disgraceful conduct of various members of the student body at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore one evening last week when one of our distinguished Senators, the great junior Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), went to that venerable institution, which is generally spoken of as one of our most respected institutions of higher learning, by invitation to address the student body or a large portion thereof as to his views on disarmament or the limitation of arms.

It is difficult for me to describe the feeling of disappointment and disillusionment I felt when I heard about that disgraceful incident.

I am glad to note from the pages of the Baltimore Sun that citizens of that community also made note of the episode and voiced clear rebuke of the conduct of those students who acted so discreditably. Among other things appearing in the Baltimore Sun on this same subject, I wish to place in the RECORD a thoughtful letter from a contributor to that great daily newspaper, entitled "Free Speech at Hopkins."

The letter, which is signed by Helen Hutson—and incidentally, I do not know Helen Hutson—and which was published in the Baltimore Sun yesterday, so clearly states what I think is the proper attitude toward that incident that I shall read it as follows:

#### FREE SPEECH AT HOPKINS

SIR: Apparently, President Lincoln Gordon has taken few pains to preserve free speech on the Hopkins campus. What else can I infer, after Senator Stennis' recent speech on that campus?

A minority of radicals persistently hooted and laughed at the speaker, made uncouth noises, and clapped and shouted "sieg hell." Two radicals stood before the audience throughout the Senator's speech in Ku Klux Klan outfits.

No move was made to silence these destroyers of free speech by having them removed so that those who came to listen could listen. The Senator, on the other hand, deserves to be praised, for he stood above his detractors and retained his temper despite such abuse.

HELEN HUTSON.

BALTIMORE.

Mr. President, I repeat the last sentence of that very fine letter:

The Senator, on the other hand, deserves to be praised, for he stood above his detractors and retained his temper despite such abuse.

Those of us who have known Senator STENNIS for so many years expect such dignified and clearly honorable conduct from him, reflecting credit upon himself, his State, and this institution, the Senate of the United States.

I wanted this article to appear in the RECORD first, as a tribute to him and his restraint, patience, and always gentlemanly conduct, even under great stress; and second, as a rebuke to those in that great institution of learning who would sully the reputation of their alma mater.

A first cousin of mine was a graduate of that institution, and he honored both it and the profession which he served so ably prior to his death a few years ago. I honor that institution. I regret this incident. I hope those in authority there will never again permit such a disgraceful occasion to occur within its hallowed halls.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I associate myself with the remarks of the senior Senator from Florida. I share his regard and respect for the Senator from Mississippi, whom I admire very much indeed, and I equally share his feeling with regard to the rudeness and the offensive behavior to which the Senator from Mississippi was subjected when he was in Baltimore. I would hope that these statements are taken seriously as people exercise the right to free speech all around our Nation.

#### CBW AND DISARMAMENT

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, in past weeks I have commented on the need for the United States to limit the chemical and biological arms race. I had noted that I was particularly concerned about the references the Secretary of Defense had made about the strategic uses of chemical and biological weapons.

Recently there have been newspaper reports that the Secretary of Defense now believes the United States should stop the production of biological agents for use in warfare.

I am very encouraged by this report and I commend the Secretary of Defense for his position. I am hopeful that the Secretary's position will be reflected in the final report of the President's Policy Review Committee on Chemical and Biological Weapons.

#### THE NATIONAL SEA GRANT PROGRAM

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, we have just observed the 4th anniversary of a national conference that many of us in both houses of the Congress consider an extremely important landmark in the development of a national ocean program. Four years ago I inserted in the RECORD a report of the First National Sea Grant Conference, held at the University of Rhode Island. At that conference, leaders in marine affairs from all over the Nation helped to shape the sea-grant college legislation, which Representative PAUL ROGERS and I introduced in the Congress.

During its relatively short life, the national sea-grant program already has become a major force in the development of our marine resources, and in the maintenance and protection of the Nation's marine environment. Its activities have been directed primarily to the Nation's endangered coastal zone. Under Robert Abel and Harold Goodwin, who

have drawn together what many of us believe to be the most competent and dedicated staff in any Federal marine program, sea grant has had important effects far beyond the limited funds with which it has had to work. I am told by leaders in the marine community that sea grant has served as a catalyst, to bring together universities, industries, and State agencies in cooperative arrangements that already have benefited and will continue to benefit both our economic position and the management of our marine environment.

Under the program direction of Arthur Alexiou, the sea-grant institutional program from which our sea-grant colleges will be named, has made rapid progress. Indeed, this essential base for the national sea-grant program began producing positive results for our people even sooner than many of us had hoped. The success of the institutional program at this early stage is a tribute to Mr. Alexiou's executive ability, and the friendly—even familial—relationships the sea-grant staff and institutions enjoy speaks for itself of his attitude of helpfulness and understanding. Eight of our finest universities are now sea-grant institutions, and they will be joined by others until the basic network of sea-grant colleges is bringing to bear the highest competence in the Nation on the problems and opportunities of the marine environment.

Robert Wildman, as program director for sea-grant projects, has brought into the program 45 valuable projects in 41 institutions and organizations representing 18 States and the District of Columbia. Under these projects essential personnel are being trained, and concentrated research programs are advancing the art of aquaculture, development of ocean engineering, and legal and economic studies. Under sea-grant project support, universities in regions of the United States where there is no long tradition of marine competence are being helped to develop significant programs that will have profound effects on the areas they serve.

It is perhaps worth noting that just one institutional program combined with just one sea-grant project has produced an economic potential of far greater value than all the sea-grant funds appropriated to date. The definition of manganese deposits in Lake Michigan under the University of Wisconsin institutional program, and the discovery of significant sand deposits by the University of Rochester under a sea-grant project have an estimated combined value of well over \$100 million. The cost to the taxpayers of these two sea-grant projects was \$115,000.

With returns like these—and before long I will be able to report many others—it is clear that the sea-grant program defined by that conference only 4 years ago not only pays for itself, but is capable of making a contribution to the national economy far in excess of the funds we allot for its support.

#### THE VIEW FROM THE TREASURY

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, on October 9, Secretary of the Treasury David

M. Kennedy delivered a most thought-provoking speech to the Economic Club of Chicago. Coupled with President Nixon's firm stand to put a stop to inflation, Secretary Kennedy's warnings merit the attention of all who are concerned with the problem.

I ask unanimous consent that the address be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE VIEW FROM THE TREASURY

(Remarks of Hon. David M. Kennedy,  
Secretary of the Treasury)

Thank You, Mr. Chairman, it is good to be home. I welcome this opportunity to see so many of my old friends again and to have the privilege of addressing the Economic Club of Chicago.

As you may know, this is my second tour of duty in Washington, and I must confess that I am learning more about life on the Potomac than I did the first time around.

For one thing, I've learned that I'm no longer Chief Executive. I have found that I have many bosses, including individual Congressmen and Senators, other departments, the press and last, but certainly not least, the President. I've also found that a Secretary of the Treasury has much more to do than simply worry about inflation, tax reform, international financial policy and the public debt. Since taking office, I've also been deeply involved in such subjects as gun control, silver and coinage policy, reversion of Okinawa to Japan and the fine points of stopping drug traffic along the Mexican Border. It's a varied and fascinating life—the more so because it gives me a chance—indeed it absolutely requires—that I develop new skills in public relations as well as a high degree of political sensitivity.

All of these efforts by one old dog to learn some new tricks are fun in themselves, but they also have a more serious objective. I hope they will contribute to solving some of the very serious problems that confront our country. All of us who went to Washington last January as part of President Nixon's new Administration recognized that we had inherited a ship of state heavily laden with troubles—troubles not of our making but nevertheless our accepted responsibility. There is no need to catalog here the problems that confronted the new Administration on January 21, 1969, but chief among them were, and are still, the tragic war in Vietnam, the quality of life in our cities, and the eroding impact of inflation on the American standard of living.

My principal official concern is the control of inflation. The rapid rise in the cost of living is the most immediate domestic issue confronting us. If inflation is permitted to run unchecked, all hope for dealing successfully with our other problems will go down the drain.

And so I am here tonight with a direct, unambiguous message which, I hope, will serve as a guide and a signal to those who make private decisions that importantly affect the Nation's economy.

For eight months, we have followed vigorously and unremittably a policy of fiscal and monetary restraint to halt an inflationary surge that had been gathering momentum for four years before this Administration took office.

That policy is now beginning to show results. And those results will become increasingly visible in the months immediately ahead. They will be visible even to those who have been skeptical that inflation could be brought under control gradually and without a serious slowdown in economic activity, as this Administration is trying to do.

The businessman who undertakes an un-

necessary capital expansion or inventory accumulation today in the expectation of higher prices or higher interest rates tomorrow is betting that we are going to lose this fight. So is the union leader who demands wage increases that far outrun productivity gains. And so is the consumer who plunges headlong into debt on the theory that his dollars will be worth less tomorrow. I believe they are seriously mistaken.

An appeal to patriotism and the national welfare undoubtedly would be listened to attentively, but, too often, then blithely ignored. I suggest, rather, that business, labor, and consumers look to their own economic self-interest—to their enlightened self-interest.

As our policy of economic restraint increasingly becomes effective, many of those who bet on continuing inflation will be hurt. Past periods of economic restraint were filled with cases where overpriced goods did not sell, overpriced labor was not hired, and credit repayment took a bigger bite out of consumers' incomes than they had expected during the more euphoric period of overly rapid expansion and inflation.

If government persists in a policy to control inflation—as this Administration intends to do—those who bet on inflation are bound to be hurt as that policy begins to take hold. Once business, labor, and the individual citizen learns that lesson, the fight on inflation will be won, with a minimum of pain, and the economy will be poised for a period of healthy and sustainable growth.

In short, betting on inflation is betting against yourself. The true interest of this country, and of every citizen, lies in the restoration of a stable economic base from which we can move forward to the rebuilding of our cities, to the upgrading of our educational system, to full opportunity for our minority citizens, to the attainment of all the priority objectives of our public policy.

How are we in government meeting our responsibility to this national interest?

Let me review briefly some of the events and actions of these past eight months.

This Administration took office in a serious inflationary situation caused by inappropriate government policies. A massive buildup in Federal spending starting in 1965 and not covered by revenues culminated in a \$25 billion deficit for the 1968 fiscal year. What had started as a brush fire was beginning to reach for the tree tops. The previous Administration itself recognized the gravity of the situation when it belatedly asked for the 10 percent tax surcharge in late 1967.

Since government policy was at the root of the problem, the Nixon Administration felt that it could not in good conscience place the entire burden for controlling inflation on the private sector. All of us, from the President on down, felt that before we could expect restraint in private economic decision-making, government itself had to put its house in order.

This Administration has now demonstrated beyond question that it is doing its part of the job.

As a result of rigorous budget reductions throughout every department, bureau and agency of government, and imposition of the income tax surcharge, the \$25 billion deficit of fiscal 1968 was turned into an anti-inflationary Federal surplus of \$3.1 billion for fiscal 1969. That was the first surplus since 1960, and we are determined to work for a 1970 budget surplus of approximately \$6 billion.

A surplus of that magnitude is essential if we are to bring this inflationary fire under control. To this end, the President has:

1. Proposed that the surtax be extended at 5 percent through June of 1970 and that the investment credit be repealed.

2. Imposed a strict limit of \$192.2 billion of Federal spending for this fiscal year—thereby requiring that \$7.5 billion be cut

from expenditures which would have resulted from the January budget submitted to Congress.

3. Ordered postponement of 75 percent of all new Federal construction projects and strongly urged state and local governments and business firms to cut back their own construction plans.

No one, least of all myself, would claim that these actions have yet produced a dramatic turn-around in our situation. Dramatic action of the kind some critics have been clamoring for undoubtedly would have made headlines; but it might also have brought on recession and an intolerable rise in unemployment. Personally, I am willing to forgo the drama and concentrate on results.

Let's look at the results—none of them dramatic, some too recent to indicate a definite trend, but taken together suggesting that this long-overheated economy is beginning to cool down.

The rate of growth of real Gross National Product has slowed significantly since the beginning of the year. We had an average growth rate of 5.1 percent for the four quarters of 1968. The average for the first half of this year was slightly over 2 percent, and the third quarter figures, which will be available in the next few days, are expected to show a very similar rate of growth.

The growth of final sales of goods and services slowed sharply in the second quarter of this year, to \$16 billion from \$20 billion in the first quarter and an average of \$19 billion for all of 1968.

I will not wear you out with figures, but I would like to mention that industrial production dropped in August; so did the volume of new orders received by durable goods manufacturers; so did the unfilled orders for durable goods. New orders for machinery and equipment fell by 4.6 percent in that month. That was the second decline in a row, suggesting that the demand for capital investment has begun to ease. And the reported 4 percent unemployment rate for September suggests that the long period of extreme tightness in the labor market may be ending.

Not long ago, we were told that business as a whole planned a \$2 billion increase in spending for plant and equipment in the fourth quarter of this year. More recent figures show that no such increase is contemplated. This may reflect in part the capacity limitations of producer goods industries, but the pattern is very similar to that of past periods when capital spending began to flatten.

Wholesale and consumer prices have not turned down, but their rate of increase has slowed perceptibly, and retail sales have been essentially flat for the past six months.

No one of those indicators offers proof that we are out of the burning woods. But they do tell us that the firemen have arrived and things are beginning to happen.

In view of these signs of easing in the economy, it may be asked whether or not the time has come to let up on the brakes. The question is especially relevant because the repeal of the investment credit and extension of the tax surcharge at 5 percent through mid-1970 are now before the Senate.

Let me emphasize as strongly as I can that this Administration continues to believe that these tax measures are essential to our overall strategy of inflation control. Without their enactment, the budget in the current fiscal year would be perilously close to deficit rather than in a position of healthy, non-inflationary surplus.

Certainly we will be alert to the moment when policy should change course. The careful transition to a more stable, less inflationary economy is an exacting exercise in economic policy-making. During this transition, the most important and difficult decisions are those which involve the proper timing of policy changes.

Not until we have reasonable evidence that inflation and inflationary expectations are definitely receding can we consider any relaxation of present policy. Inflation is too deeply embedded for us to ease up until such evidence is unmistakably clear. Our past experience indicates the danger of changing the direction of policy too soon. In fact, a premature reversal contributes to the build up of basic inflationary conditions, requiring an even more painful adjustment in the end.

I should point out to you, however, that when the time arrives for such a change in policy we will be equipped with a variety of automatic and discretionary tools for implementing that change. Not only do we have the traditional monetary and expenditure actions which can be undertaken, but also there are a number of built-in features which will operate to sustain the economy in the coming year and to support those segments of society who are least able to protect themselves from any economic reversal.

If approved by the Congress, the income tax surcharge will drop to 5 percent on January 1, 1970, and disappear completely on June 30, 1970.

Enactment of the Family Assistance Program for reforming our welfare system will assure income support for a large number of low-income and dependent families.

Enactment of our tax reform proposals—especially the low-income allowance—will remove millions of low-income individuals from the tax rolls.

Enactment of the President's proposed reforms in the Social Security System will provide both increased payments and protection from inflation to those living on fixed incomes.

Enactment of our proposals to modernize the Federal-State unemployment insurance system will provide us with a more responsive mechanism for stabilizing the economy automatically.

I have dwelt at some length on government's role in this national effort to control inflation. But all of us are aware that government is only the economic weather-maker; Washington's function is to try to create the climate in which this complex market economy can function successfully.

Government alone cannot put out the inflationary fire. Business and labor alike must make their contributions to economic stability. And it is most certainly in their self-interest to do so.

Leadership in business and in labor carries with it a high public responsibility. In these difficult times, it calls for economic statesmanship of the highest order. It calls for restraint in private decision-making, for resistance to the all-too-tempting line of charging what the traffic will bear.

This kind of statesmanship is neither easy nor painless, as those of us in government who are charged with carrying out an anti-inflation policy know all too well. But its successful achievement is vital to the best interests of every working man and woman in America, and of every businessman as well.

Inflation control also ranks as one of our top international priorities. The world financial outlook is much brighter today than it has been for many years. With the decision taken at last week's meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund to create substantial amounts of Special Drawing Rights, we can look forward to an orderly increase in international liquidity.

In addition, a number of important recent developments have strengthened the world financial system. The United Kingdom has moved into a noticeably stronger position. The French parity was adjusted without serious disturbance. The German government has taken significant action to deal with speculative threats. The International

Monetary Fund staff will begin studying various proposals for limited exchange rate flexibility. And perhaps the most important stabilizing factor—in the view of many Finance Ministers with whom I visited last week—has been the strong efforts taken by the United States to control inflation. The dollar is a key international currency. The United States has a major responsibility to preserve confidence in the value of its currency in order to maintain an open world economy in which mutually beneficial trade, travel, and investment can flourish.

Until this inflationary spiral was set in motion four years and more ago, our progress in terms of economic growth and individual betterment was manifest. Reasonable price stability made it possible for working people to transform wage increases directly into higher standards of living. The same stability made possible a real growth rate of 5 percent annually for the national economy as a whole.

It is our firm purpose to restore that stability, to permit the resumption of productive economic growth, to give the working people of this country an ever-rising standard of living instead of the paper pay raises of inflation which is all they have received for the past three years.

These are troubled times, and ours is a deeply troubled society. But we are not a fearful society. We know the job that has to be done, and we have set about doing it, as we have before in other troubled times.

As one who is proud to be a member of the Nixon Administration, I can assure you that your government is going to continue to follow an enlightened economic policy which will meet the basic economic objectives of our Nation—rising employment, productivity, and purchasing power in a noninflationary environment.

#### SERVICE OF VICE PRESIDENT AGNEW AS PRESIDING OFFICER OF THE SENATE

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, in 1965, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey fulfilled his constitutional duties in the Senate by presiding for 56 hours and 24 minutes. In 1966, Vice President Humphrey presided over Senate deliberations for 25 hours and 6 minutes, and in 1967 for 25 hours and 11 minutes.

Vice President AGNEW, as of October 23, 1969, has presided over the Senate for 58 hours and 38 minutes, a fact carefully noted by our distinguished junior Senator from California.

Perhaps it would be well to note that the time thus far spent in the chair by Vice President AGNEW is more since January 21, 1969, than Vice President Humphrey accumulated from January 1966 to December 1967.

This information seems to be particularly applicable to the Senator's October 22 suggestion to the Vice President, and I trust he will find it useful.

#### MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE— ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled bill (H.R. 11271) to authorize appropriations to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for research and development, construction of facilities, and research and program management, and for other purposes.

#### COMMENDATION FOR SENATORS ON PASSAGE OF FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, yesterday, the Senate passed S. 823, the consumer protection—or, as popularly called, the fair credit reporting bill. The Senate may be proud of this achievement, and I think the RECORD should show clearly that it was the devotion and untiring efforts of the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) that made possible such an outstanding success. Senator PROXMIRE can add this as another fine contribution in his abundant record in behalf of the American consumer. In steering this important measure through the Senate, the able and outstanding legislative skill that is so apparent on every proposal handled by Senator PROXMIRE was once again evidenced. The American public is deeply grateful. Senator PROXMIRE is to be commended.

Joining Senator PROXMIRE to assure such an outstanding success was the distinguished senior Senator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT). His cooperation, devotion, and able assistance was deeply appreciated as well.

#### ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT FROM MONDAY TO 11 O'CLOCK A.M. ON NOVEMBER 11

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at 11 a.m. on November 11, 1918, the First World War came to an end as a result of an armistice signed at that particular moment.

It is, therefore, particularly fitting that the Senate should convene at 11 o'clock on next Tuesday, November 11, so that the prayer by our Chaplain may have particular significance for those who served in World War I, as well as to honor those who have died, those who have been wounded, and those who have served in all our wars.

Therefore, in view of the fact the Senate will meet on Veterans Day, formerly known as Armistice Day, on behalf of the distinguished minority leader (Mr. SCOTT) and myself, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business on Monday next it stand in adjournment until 11 a.m. Tuesday morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ADJOURNMENT TO MONDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1969

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 12 noon on Monday next.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 3 o'clock and 18 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until Monday, November 10, 1969, at 12 o'clock meridian.

#### NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate, November 7, 1969:

## IN THE NAVY

The following-named officers of the U.S. Navy for temporary promotion to the grade of captain in the staff corps, as indicated, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

## MEDICAL CORPS

Balyeat, George E.  
Baxter, Donald L.  
Blair, Donald F.  
Brown, James M.  
Davis, Milton D.  
Dean, Harold N.  
Dutton, Bythel D.  
Fosburg, Richard G.  
Gates, Clifford W.  
Golden, Patrick E.  
Gunning, Jeanjacques  
Jackson, Frederick E.  
Johnson, John W.  
Knox, Paul R.  
Leblanc, Gilbert A.  
Lewis, Norman G.  
Linaweaver, Paul G.  
Lukas, John R.  
McClard, Gerald J.  
Miller, George L.

Miller, Richard J.  
Mullen, Joseph T.  
Pischnotte, William O.  
Powell, Alton L., III  
Robins, John C.  
Ronis, Norman  
Rosborough, James F., Jr.  
Shefstad, Wilbur J.  
Schmitz, Nicholas W.  
Schrader, William A.  
Stiemmons, Barton K.  
Thomas, Wendell C.  
Valaske, Martin J.  
Vasquez, Mario A.  
Viele, Billy D.  
Vincent, John T.  
York, Elihu  
Young, James M.

## SUPPLY CORPS

Anweiler, Calvin R.  
Bliss, Roger C.  
Cefalu, Dominic V.  
Cloutier, Norman L.  
Coons, William W.  
Daniel, James C.  
Dauchess, Edward G.  
Ely, William B., Jr.  
Emery, William M.  
Hassenger, William E.  
Hendon, Paul C.  
Higgins, Everett C.  
Killebrew, Thomas E.  
Lynn, James W.

Malone, Francis E.  
McClintock, Harry C.  
Mehaffey, Donald C.  
Nicol, Robert G.  
Owens, Andrew J.  
Piazza, Thomas J.  
Puleo, Joseph A.  
Roberts, Calvin W.  
Sappanos, Louis M.  
Sharp, Herbert C.  
Smith, Charles M.  
Stubbs, Raymond C.  
Tapp, James G.

## CHAPLAIN CORPS

Dimino, Joseph T.  
Doermann, Martin J.  
Ferreri, Peter J.  
Gibbons, Martin F.  
Hill, Rodger F.  
Howard, William R.  
Hunter, William M.  
Iyers, Victor J.  
Jones, Asa W.

McDonald, Leo J.  
Moore, Ernest W.  
Moore, Withers M.  
Moye, Thomas E.  
O'Connor, John J.  
Osman, Robert E.  
Ryan, Joseph E.  
Stewart, Dell F., Jr.  
Trett, Robert L.

## CIVIL ENGINEER CORPS

Bartley, Delmar A.  
Clements, Neal W.  
Dunn, Robert H. P.  
Forehand, Paul W.  
Loomis, Raymond W.  
Phelps, Pharo A.

Wagner, Walter R.  
Whipple, Caryll R.  
White, Lawrence M.  
Wittschiebe, Donald W.

## JUDGE ADVOCATE

Andry, Walter G.  
Conkey, Carlton G.  
Driscoll, William T., Jr.

Phillips, Lawrence E.  
Robertson, John W.  
Sabalos, Nicholas  
Sely, Donald E.

## DENTAL CORPS

Abbott, Paul L.  
Baird, Daniel M.  
Bohacek, Joseph R.  
Cowen, Charles E., Jr.  
Demaree, Neil C.  
Elliott, James E.  
Fields, Robert E.  
Freeburn, Harold E., Jr.  
Garman, Thomas A.  
George, Raymond E.  
Granger, Ronald G.  
Heinkel, Erwin J., Jr.  
Hoffius, Edwin L.  
Hylton, Roscoe P., Jr.  
McKean, Thomas W.

McWhorter, Howard B.  
Moore, Frank B.  
Nolf, Robert S.  
Perand, Steven W.  
Sazlma, Henry J.  
Shreve, William B., Jr.  
Smith, Albert R.  
Smith, Scott M.  
Thomason, Robert R.  
Thompson, Robert G.  
Tow, Herman D., Jr.  
Westcott, Maurice E.  
Woody, Wilton G.

## MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS

Beam, Walter E., Jr.  
Broulik, Frank  
Green, Irving J.  
McMichael, Allen E.

Still, Donald E.  
Testa, Michele J.  
Werner, Gordon W.

## NURSE CORPS

Brennan, Mary P.  
Brooks, Helen L.  
Cornelius, Dolores

Troskoski, Dolores  
Upchurch, Ouida C.  
Yankoski, Adelyn M.

The following named officers of the U.S. Navy for temporary promotion to the grade of commander in the staff corps, as indicated, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

## MEDICAL CORPS

Amalong, Ronald J.  
Ambur, Richard F.  
Anderson, Robert L.  
Basiliere, James L.  
Bishop, Hal D.  
Bolter, Delano W.  
Boyd, Dale W.  
Bradley, Mark E.  
Byrd, Thomas R.  
Cantow, Edward F.  
Cordray, Douglas R.  
Cotten, Charles L.  
Crawford, William R.  
Crow, Judson L.  
Davies, Raymond O., Jr.  
Decker, John S.  
Deignan, William E.  
Duff, Donald F.  
Duhamel, Robert R.  
Fogg, Charles D.  
Fornes, Michael F.  
Frensilii, Frederick J.  
Fulwyler, Robert L.  
Gibbons, James A.  
Gilbert, Edward C.  
Gregonis, Joseph G.  
Grossman, Marvin  
Hall, James N.  
Harrington, Randall L.  
Hoback, Daniel P.  
Hoertz, John H., Jr.  
Hudson, Royal C., Jr.  
Hussey, Michael B.  
Izuno, Gene T.  
Jeffrey, Clyde G., Jr.  
Jewusiak, Edward M.  
Johnson, Walter T.  
Johnson, William W.  
Johnson, William C., Jr.  
Jones, Edward M.  
Jones, George R.  
Kessler, Carl P.  
Knight, Jimmie H.  
Langston, Randall A.

Larsen, Reynold T.  
Leisse, Fred C.  
Majors, Robert P., Jr.  
Martin, William A.  
Mattern, Allan L.  
Mauk, Sid F., III  
McGeoy, Thomas J., Jr.  
McGlamory, James C.  
McGrall, John F.  
Melton, Russell W.  
Meyer, Russell  
Miller, Jay H., Jr.  
Nuss, Robert C.  
O'Donnell, Joseph E.  
Olsen, James A.  
Page, Crockett H.  
Patlovich, Joseph  
Perlin, Elliott  
Preuss, Donald G.  
Robbins, Thomas O.  
Roeder, Donald K.  
Rogers, Albert K.  
Ruggiero, Joseph A.  
Russo, John F.  
Schwartz, Bradford B.  
Secrist, Wilbur L.  
Skinner, Wendell L.  
Sponaugle, Harlan D.  
Stoop, David R.  
Strom, Clarence G.  
Stucker, Fred J.  
Swan, Robert J.  
Swanger, Roland F.  
Tate, Harry R.  
Tenney, Richard L.  
Thomas, Jackson W.  
Thompson, Robert L.  
Tompkins, Albert E.  
Vanburen, William E.  
Wallin, John D.  
Williams, John E.  
Wilson, Cecil B.  
Winans, Robert G.  
Zelles, Gary W.

## SUPPLY CORPS

Ault, William U.  
Barnett, Andrew F., Jr.  
Beck, Kermit E.  
Bedenbaugh, Jack R.  
Boike, Robert J.  
Bosco, Clement, Jr.  
Brookes, Jack E.  
Brown, Troy L.  
Buckley, John E.  
Bulluck, Edgar G.  
Burns, Richard C.  
Butts, Whitmore S., Jr.  
Connolly, George S., Jr.  
Cornett, Fred O.  
Crutchfield, Franklin D.  
Daddona, John M.  
Dickey, James A.  
Dolenga, Harold E.  
Eaton, Thomas E., Jr.  
Erickson, Douglas L.  
Estes, Arthur, Jr.  
Evans, Lloyd R.  
Fidd, Joseph A.  
Fitzpatrick, Edmond J., Jr.  
Flach, Lynn R.

Frampton, Robert T.  
Fries, Paul A., Jr.  
Gaddis, Carl K.  
Gerstenberger, Wayne W.  
Gorenflo, Louis W.  
Goulette, James D.  
Harmon, Robert G.  
Hart, James J., Jr.  
Hatcher, Harold S.  
Hinds, Duane E.  
Hughes, Harold M.  
Hummel, Don F.  
Hurst, Harvey R.  
Jantz, Jack L.  
Jones, Channing E.  
Jones, Rial C.  
Kalafut, George W.  
Kitko, John A.  
Kruise, William E.  
Kunkle, John H.  
Langer, Gerald D.  
Larsen, Henry O.  
Leavitt, Jack B.  
Leblanc, Joseph F., Jr.  
Lemay, Jerome S.  
Locke, Olive C.  
Loveday, William G., Jr.

Maxwell, Thomas A.  
McCullers, Lawrence E.  
McFarland, Wayne B.  
McGarvey, John J.  
McKinnon, Daniel W., Jr.  
McMullen, Franklin D., Jr.  
Meiners, Arthur C., Jr.  
Meyers, Walter T.  
Mitts, Joseph P.  
Morgan, Richard E.  
Murphy, Joseph J.  
Olivier, Denny R.  
Olson, Gene P.  
Pace, Earl H.  
Parr, Harold S.  
Peters, William A.  
Pistolessi, Vincent J.  
Plante, Rene E.  
Prokop, Jan S.  
Raffels, John F.  
Ranieri, Richard A. J.  
Raymond, James A.  
Reed, Dale R.  
Rice, Henry L., Jr.  
Rounds, Richard N.  
Rubenstein, Ralph S.

Ruehlin, John R.  
Schaaf, Alvin D., Jr.  
Shaughnessy, John M.  
Smith, Franklin D.  
Smith, John A., Jr.  
Sorenson, Jackie R.  
Stanton, James M.  
Starrett, William I., Jr.  
Stone, Donald R.  
Tannone, Rocco J.  
Tobin, Isidore L., III  
Todd, Blaxton V.  
Trawick, George L.  
Vanhouten, Richard E.  
Vannaman, Thomas L.  
Vinson, Johnnie H.  
Walsh, Richard M.  
Walters, Robert A.  
Webb, James R.  
Webster, John C.  
Westmoreland, Perry L.  
White, James A.  
Whitman, Earl E.  
Williams, Robert L.  
Willis, John J.  
Young, Benjamin L.  
Young, Ronald A.  
Yongblood, Norbert V.

## CHAPLAIN CORPS

Bedingfield, Robert W.  
Davis, Lex L.  
Gaughan, Geoffrey E.  
Jerauld, Phillip  
Kase, Mark  
Kelly, Henry T.  
MacCall, Harry F., III  
Maritato, Victor J.

McDermott, Thomas J.  
McPhail, Clark B.  
Parker, Joe H.  
Patton, Darrell P.  
Pirto, John A.  
Voth, Murray H.  
Westlund, Orville A.  
Whitaker, Frederick E.

## CIVIL ENGINEER CORPS

Ahrens, William N.  
Baggs, Charles C.  
Bradt Miller, Paul H.  
Brockwell, Sterling M., Jr.  
Burton, Joseph T., Jr.  
Cerrera, Ralph M., Jr.  
Collins, Allan W.  
Crosson, William E.  
Deady, Ralph E.  
Dickpeddie, John I.  
Dobler, Leland R.  
Ford, James E.  
Glover, William F.  
Godsey, Jack L.  
Goodman, Robert F.  
Groff, James B.  
Kartalis, Andrew  
Kenny, Robert E.

Keppel, Henry E., Jr.  
Kimmons, Victor H.  
MacDonald, Malcolm J.  
McHugh, Robert J., Jr.  
McPartland, Eugene J.  
Newcomb, Frank M.  
Petersen, Norman W.  
Popowich, Clyde V. W.  
Quinn, Robert E., Jr.  
Schade, Robert A., Jr.  
Schumann, James F.  
Shanley, John J., Jr.  
Shirley, Ronald G.  
Shumate, James W.  
Wilson, Robert B.

## JUDGE ADVOCATE

Abernathy, Kenneth L.  
Fasanaro, Michael F., Jr.  
Keeney, David J.  
McMillan, Edward W.

GENERAL'S CORPS  
Palmer, William R.  
Pinsonneault, Richard J.  
Redding, Robert M.  
Toms, James E.

## DENTAL CORPS

Albers, Delmar D.  
Anderson, John W. R.  
Annis, Robert B.  
Baker, Terrance W.  
Ballard, Gerald T.  
Besley, Keith W.  
Box, John M.  
Brown, Charles A.  
Chapman, Thom H.  
Clegg, Milton C.  
Cowen, Carlton R.  
Crawford, John D.  
Cronin, Thomas J.  
Cushing, John R., Jr.  
Douglas, Robert J.  
Ebert, Walter H.  
Eden, George T.  
Eklind, Ronald R.  
Fishel, David L.  
Fitzgerald, Donald E.  
Foley, John M.

Hansen, Duane A.  
Hatrel, Paul P.  
Hillenbrand, Ronald E.  
Howarth, Hugh C.  
Hube, Albert R.  
Hudson, Elmer R., Jr.  
Johnson, Charles M.  
Kravets, Thomas F.  
Krzeminski, Arthur E.  
Lekas, James S.  
Lindsay, John S.  
Linkenbach, Charles R.  
Loizeaux, Alfred D.  
Lowe, Cameron A.  
Mason, Billie M.  
Maw, Ralph B.  
McCall, Frank J., Jr.  
McWalter, George M.

Monasky, George E.  
Mosby, Edward L.  
O'Shields, Paul W.  
Rochford, Phillip  
Rudolph, Jerome J.  
Scott, Gale L.  
Shaffer, Richard G.  
Shelin, Ronald A.

## MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS

Bailey, Jack S.  
Barboo, Samuel H., Jr.  
Boone, Harry M., Jr.  
Boudreau, Harold J.  
Clark, James L.  
Davis, William P.  
Devane, James J.  
Fletcher, William E.  
Fowler, Ephraim E., Jr.  
Fussell, Edsel M.  
Gallagher, Thomas J.  
Hawkins, Kenneth L.  
Lachapelle, Norman C.  
Mohler, Clarence B.

## NURSE CORPS

Barker, Elizabeth A.  
Bednowicz, Eleonore A.  
Bove, Mary L.  
Brakus, Josephine D.  
Butler, Phyllis A.  
Carleton, Ethel R.  
Davis, Kathryn A.  
Dunn, Dorothea J.  
Elsass, Phyllis J.  
Fisher, Mildred K.  
Fitzgerald, Helen M.  
Florence, Mary E.  
Gampper, Mary E.  
Hanes, Wave J.  
Higgins, Helen B.  
Hinckley, Colleen  
Humphreys, Regina B.  
Jacques, Nancy J.  
Jones, Bernice E.  
Jones, Ellen J.  
Jones, Kathaleen R.  
Liakos, Angeline G.

The following-named women officers of the U.S. Navy for permanent promotion to the grade of lieutenant commander in the line, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

Acosta, Delores Y.  
Bole, Barbara  
Bostwick, Sally L.

Short, George A.  
Stevens, Mark M.  
Terhune, Raymond C.  
Toth, Wayne J.  
Williams, Robert E., Jr.  
Wingard, Charles E.  
Yacabucci, James E.

Myers, James I.  
Nichols, Lloyd B.  
Palmer, Jack J.  
Pittington, Francis C.  
Pribnow, James F.  
Roberts, Billy D.  
Rooney, Mary L.  
Shuler, Donald E.  
Sickels, Forman J.  
Spahn, James A., Jr.  
Ulmer, Fred C., Jr.  
Wherry, Robert J., Jr.  
Wilcox, James G.  
Ziegler, Harry F., Jr.  
Zselitvay, Andrew J., Jr.

Hankey, Joan R.  
Hersley, Janet L.  
Holway, Nancy H.  
Johnston, Edith E.  
Kelly, Barbara J.  
Kent, Ruth W.  
Lee, Linda M.  
Mohorich, Helen M.  
Peterson, Doris A.  
Richardson, Linda P.

Wilma E. Lewis, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy, for permanent promotion to the grade of captain in the Supply Corps, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law.

Margaret B. Swayne, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy, for permanent promotion to the grade of commander in the Supply Corps, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law.

David W. Konold, Jr., U.S. Navy, for transfer to and appointment in the Civil Engineer Corps in the permanent grade of lieutenant (junior grade) and the temporary grade of lieutenant.

Richard S. Farwell, U.S. Navy, for temporary promotion to the grade of lieutenant in the line, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law.

Phelps Hobart, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy, for temporary promotion to the grade of lieutenant in the Supply Corps subject to qualification therefor as provided by law.

William R. Hudgens, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy, for permanent promotion to the grade of lieutenant commander in the Medical Corps, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law.

The following-named officers of the U.S. Navy for permanent promotion to the grade of lieutenant (junior grade) in the line and staff corps, as indicated, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

Burnett, William H.  
Fears, John A.  
Fernando, Sharon R.  
Johnson, Daniel E.  
Marks, William L.

## LINE

Neville, William J., Jr.  
Razzetti, Eugene A.  
Steel, James R., Jr.  
Tincher, Edward S.  
West, David J.

## SUPPLY CORPS

Dingeldey, Peter E.

## CIVIL ENGINEER CORPS

Bankert, Frederick  
B, III

## MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS

Borgia, Julian F.  
Chitwood, Carl S.

The following-named officers of the U.S. Navy, for temporary promotion to the grade of lieutenant (junior grade) in the Medical Service Corps, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

Roberts, Suzanne  
Schlapak, Elaine M.  
Snodderly, Sandra L.  
Sowersby, Twila J.  
Suse, Barbara J.  
Underwood, Shirley J.  
Walters, Angalena F.  
Watlington, Sarah J.  
Weber, Joyce A.  
Yeoman, Marjorie A.

Ackley, Paul N.  
Alewine, Charles M.  
Aubin, John E.  
Bauley, Raymond P.  
Benedict, Walter F.  
Benedito, Jose P., Jr.  
Bielawski, Jerome J.  
Bolster, Harold G., Jr.  
Brubaker, Ralph W.  
Buckley, William M.  
Bufano, Thomas J.  
Cagle, Eddie C.  
Campbell, Robert E.  
Daniel, Paul E.  
Donohue, Avon R., Jr.  
Gardner, Gerald L.  
Giron, Sagat M.  
Gray, Donald R.  
Hazeltan, Robert H., Jr.  
Holstein, Elmer, Jr.  
Hopkins, Robert F.  
Jackam, David C.  
Kennedy, Arthur E.  
Lamasters, Michael B.

The following-named (Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps Candidates) to be permanent ensigns in the Line or Staff Corps of the Navy subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

Davis, John C.  
Kenney, Daniel F., III

## IN THE MARINE CORPS

The following-named women officers of the Marine Corps for permanent appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel:

Barbara J. Lee  
Ellen M. McMahon

The following-named women officers of the Marine Corps for permanent appointment to the grade of major:

Jeanne A. Botwright  
Manuela Hernandez  
Mary S. Howard  
Vera M. Jones  
Mary S. League

The following-named women officers of the Marine Corps for permanent appointment to the grade of captain:

Joan M. Collins  
Paula J. Dietz  
Marie L. Hallman  
Jeanne L. Harfin  
Kathleen D. Kupferer  
Aniela Kwiatkowski  
Shirley E. Leaverton  
Donna R. McClennan  
Antoinette E. Meenach  
Barbara A. Schmidt

Janice C. Scott  
Donna J. Sherwood  
Amy E. Spratlin  
Joanne L. Stangenberger  
Karen J. Tomlinson  
Norma L. Tomlinson  
Clara L. Tucker  
Martha S. Webb  
Harriet T. Wendel

## EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

## DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MEALS ON WHEELS

## HON. HUGH SCOTT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Friday, November 7, 1969

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, today I am contacting members of the District of Columbia Zoning Commission, urging swift amendment of the restrictions preventing the sponsors of a meals on wheels program from servicing the elderly in the area near St. James Lutheran Church, 16th Street and Eastern Avenue NW.

The Zoning Commission holds that the church's plans to provide cooked meals, delivered by volunteers, to elderly shut-ins for the cost of the food constitutes at least technically a commercial catering service. In order to permit this worthwhile program to be carried out in the District of Columbia, the Zoning Commission should make whatever innovations are necessary to permit the sponsors of the meals on wheels program to begin providing nutritious meals to shut-ins who are homebound and physically unable to prepare meals.

In his column, "Potomac Watch," William Raspberry gave a second report on the status of the attempt to conduct

a meals on wheels program in Washington. He points out that Congress is preparing to approve my proposal to provide food stamps which the elderly can exchange for cooked meals in our country's quest to end hunger and malnutrition. These food stamps would be designed specifically for use in conjunction with the meals on wheels and similar food and nutrition programs.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Raspberry's article, entitled "Food Plan for Elderly Aired," be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: