

tion 5232, to be assigned to a position of importance and responsibility designated by the President, in grade as follows:

To be Lieutenant general

Maj. Gen. Adolph G. Schwenk, ~~xxx-xx-xxxx~~
U.S. Marine Corps.

IN THE AIR FORCE

Air Force nominations beginning John G. Abizaid, to be lieutenant colonel, and ending Robert A. Poksay, to be lieutenant colonel, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on September 6, 1978.

Air Force nominations beginning James B.

Alford, to be lieutenant colonel, and ending George E. Stavros, to be lieutenant colonel, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on September 6, 1978.

Air Force nominations beginning John C. Aarni, Jr., to be major, and ending Ronald W. Turner, to be major, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on September 6, 1978.

Air Force nominations beginning George G. Aitken, to be captain, and ending James L. Wilson, to be captain, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in

the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on September 6, 1978.

IN THE NAVY

Navy nominations beginning Harold S. Blinka, to be lieutenant (j.g.), and ending Paul R. Woodley, to be lieutenant (j.g.), which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on September 6, 1978.

Navy nominations beginning Patricia A. Daly, to be ensign, and ending Mark A. Walker, to be ensign, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on September 6, 1978.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

HOW WE OFFICIALLY LOST BRAZIL

HON. LARRY McDONALD

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Speaker, the Carter administration "human rights" policy has turned out to be rather selective. We roar at our friends and whisper accusations at the Communist nations. In fact, we even ignore human rights violations in Communist China entirely. This policy has failed. An area of most spectacular failure has been South America. There, we have succeeded in alienating Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the so-called ABC powers and the most powerful countries on that continent. In South America we have evidenced great concern for Marxist-oriented agitators, which must have the Politbureau in the Kremlin rolling on the floor with laughter over the spectacle of the stupidity and the duplicity of the "leaders" of the West. The same policy is having similar results in Asia and Africa as the Carter administration expresses minimal opposition to Soviet adventures on both continents.

Government Executive magazine for September 1978 details the story of how "human rights" policy cost us the friendship of Brazil. It is a sad story when we recall that Brazil sent troops to help us fight in Italy during World War II and let us have bases in her land during the same war. The list of American allies and friends is growing shorter in the world. Therefore, I commend this article to the attention of my colleagues. The article follows:

U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE—HOW WE OFFICIALLY LOST BRAZIL

(By Stephen G. Saltzman)

On September 19th, the Joint Brazilian-U.S. Military Commission will close, victim of mindless United States policies and bureaucratic ineptness.

Brazil's decision to cancel this bilateral agreement after nearly four decades marks the low point of official Brazil-U.S. relations which had been rotting for years but which were finally brought down by the Carter Administration's amateurish tinkering in the affairs of others. The demise of our military cooperation with Brazil is not critical—

its shape and substance had become archaic and needed change. But this event flags problems that run deeper.

There is almost no government to government exchange between Brazil and the U.S. today. And an adversary relationship, several years of age, shows no signs of slowing.

Our long friendship with Brazil withstood decades of U.S. gaffes, unqualified ambassadors, and empty sloganeering (see Alliance for Progress, etc.). While there have been many exceptions, U.S. officials in the backwaters of their careers have found their way to Rio de Janeiro and more recently to Brasilia in a seemingly endless procession of mediocrity. We have thrown Brazil only an occasional sop in the years since World War II as our policy makers have looked instead to areas they deemed to merit higher priority.

Enough finally become enough, however. Only the stature and importance of the U.S. itself saved our recently replaced ambassador from being declared persona non grata by an antagonistic Brazilian government during the last years of his accreditation there.

The road back will be rocky and it will be slow. It will have to proceed from an understanding of what destroyed an easy-going friendship in the first place.

LITTLE ACORNS

There has always been a segment of Brazilian officialdom that was anti-U.S. But for Brazil there were so many pluses to continued good relations that this element remained quashed despite years of what can only be described as back of the hand treatment by American policy and its architects. So the sore was adequately festered and ready to run pus when the case of Frederick Morris surfaced in 1974. This American citizen, who was or posed to be a pastor in Brazil's troubled northeastern city of Recife, was arrested by Brazilian authorities and allegedly tortured during his interrogation, a matter which the U.S. press has aired thoroughly.

The Brazilians still believe Morris was a CIA agent but, in any case, the facts remain that he intruded himself into Brazilian political affairs and he associated with known subversives while being a guest of Brazil. What the Brazilians resented most about this affair was the way it was blown out of scale by two U.S. officials. This earned for these two officials and for U.S. policy in Brazil the undying enmity of two Brazilian officials who ultimately played key roles in worsening official Brazil-U.S. relationships.

The U.S. consul in Recife at the time of the Morris case Richard Brown. Brown leapt to Morris' defense with near-messianic fervor, publicly accusing Brazilian officials

of atrocities. This brought him under attack by Brazilian officials and by the Brazilian press.

Most professional diplomats would consider that the official point had been adequately made and would move quietly to drain the matter of its news value. John Crimmins, our ambassador, instead came on scene with vociferous and impassioned defense of Morris and of his consul. These acts, with their bad press, infuriated a close advisor of President Geisel, Brazilian General Moacyr Barcellos Potyguara, who was performing as Commander of the Recife-based 4th Army.

They also infuriated Ambassador Antonio Azevedo da Silveira, Brazil's Minister of Foreign Relations. Both felt they had been talked down to, that they had been exposed to unnecessary public view, and that the U.S. representatives had bungled the matter. Crimmins, who was replaced this Spring by Robert Sayre, will not be remembered kindly in Brazil after his six long years of acrimonious comment, stiff-neckedness, and icy manner which, after the Morris affair, appeared to be intentional expressions of U.S. attitudes.

SWIFT CONTRADICTION

Henry Kissinger finally was persuaded to look south toward damaged relations and, in 1976, visited Brazil for some fence mending. This visit resulted in an agreement between the two countries to consult each other on all important economic and political issues involving both countries and their relations with the rest of the world. It was good, soothing syrup. Singling out Brazil for such special treatment seemed to be the right touch. It seemed, for a brief time, that government to government relations would return to be as harmonious as ongoing unofficial economic, professional, technological, and cultural relations, which were thriving.

Almost on top of Kissinger's visit and as one of his first acts in office, President Jimmy Carter sent Vice President Walter Mondale off to West Germany in a blaze of self-serving publicity to try to pressure that country into reneging on its agreement to provide nuclear power technology to Brazil. He did this without any notice to Brazil, the freshly-consummated Kissinger agreement notwithstanding. He also dispatched Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Brazil, again with trumpets and fanfare, to pressure the Brazilians out of their deal with West Germany. Carter was going to deliver on a campaign promise to stop nuclear proliferation, damn the torpedoes.

Brazil's reaction was swift, spontaneous and unanimous. The press exploded in pro-

test against Carter's tampering with Brazil's internal affairs. In unprecedented actions, cities and citizens from every corner of the country sent messages to President Geisel pledging total support for any counter action he might take against Carter or the U.S. It is difficult to overstate the magnitude of this issue in Brazil, however overblown it may seem to us. It continues to receive some front page treatment a year and a half later.

The nature of Brazil's outrage has many components.

ICING THE CAKE

Of course there is the matter of the Kissinger agreement; clearly, there is no basis of credibility for any near- or middle-term Brazilian-U.S. agreements after this one was ignored so arrogantly. There is also the fact that Brazil has worked for years as the leader in developing nuclear non-proliferation cooperation among Latin countries and is a signatory to such a pact—an accomplishment to which Brazilians point with pride. Also, the agreement with West Germany to provide nuclear powerplant technology and hardware contains strong safeguards against misuse of the technology and its products. And then there is the matter of meddling in the internal affairs of a proud and vibrant sovereign power.

In the midst of all this, along came two more Americans, alleged priests, again in Recife, charging that they were tortured in a Brazilian prison. Once again, Foreign Minister Silveira desired to keep this matter at a quiet state level and once again John Crimmins blew it out of scale with excessive publicity. It has never been determined if Thomas Capuano and "Reverend" Lawrence Rosebaugh were indeed priests, but it didn't advance the cause of our friendship when Rosalynn Carter went out of her way to journey to Recife to pose with these two questionable characters in photographs which got worldwide distribution. One would have thought the point had already been made. What else were we trying to prove?

By this time, Ambassador Silveira, not known for a placid nature, was feverish. In an unrelated routine action, General Potyguara had been transferred to Brasilia to serve as Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, the rough equivalent of our Joint Chiefs. His rankling anti-U.S. attitude was evident in his public and private statements. Our Brazilian mission watches such matters closely. The flag had to be up. It had to be red. And it had to be waving furiously. Our ambassador presumably did not sense a need for delicacy at this time, as we shall see.

Back in the U.S., Congress had been debating very publicly the question of using foreign assistance to pressure recipient governments into human relations postures acceptable to Jimmy Carter. One result of that debate was that the Secretary of State was henceforth required to report to the Congress on the human rights records of any country proposed for assistance.

Thus, beginning in Fiscal Year 1978, the Security Assistance Program was to be published in two volumes, one being the Program and the other being Reports on Human Rights Practices. The latter document categorized various governments according to Amnesty International's notions of being "free," "partly free," "not free," and so on. By late February of 1977, advanced reports concerning certain countries began to filter into Congressional offices, and from those sieves to the press. Word got out that this internal U.S. working paper contained recommendations to cut programs in countries such as Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Guatemala. Brazil, which in fact had been categorized "partly free," was cleared for continued assistance. Although the actual

report was not in their hands, U.S. officials in Brazil were planning to go ahead on a normal basis with Brazilian security assistance.

The Argentine government, in an angry advance initiative, informed the U.S. that it would accept no assistance of any kind that was based on an attempt to mold internal policy, a position that was widely applauded by the Argentine people.

ROUTINE EXPLOSION

At this juncture, State sent to its missions courtesy copies of the human rights reports with approval to release them to host governments in advance of public release. Despite the obvious tension in Brazil and the example of the popularity of the Argentine's action against this new U.S. policy, John Crimmins decided to send this advance copy of State's report to Ambassador Silveira. He sent it over in a routine delivery by messenger.

Silveira had been spoiling for a fight since the West German affair but he didn't have the correct vehicle. Crimmins, who should have known better, provided the vehicle. The advance copy was fired back the next morning, unstudied, and accompanied by a strong note rejecting out of hand any foreign intrusion into Brazil's internal affairs. It mattered not to Silveira that Brazil's assistance package was virtually intact for FY '78. Crimmins' timing, and method, couldn't have been worse. It was only a question of time before the military assistance pact—important furniture in the showcase of official cooperation—would end.

President Geisel asked his confidante General Potyguara to recommend the future course of Brazilian-U.S. military cooperation. Behind the scene, U.S. and Brazilian officers at the working level struggled to produce a set of options that would preserve some form of continued cooperation, which they felt to be of mutual interest. In September, 1977, two days before he retired from active duty, General Potyguara took his revenge. He disregarded his staff's softer recommendations and recommended instead that Brazil unilaterally cancel the pact. President Geisel accepted his old friend's suggestion and gave the Americans a year to wind down and leave.

If you were a fly on Carter's wall you would probably know that the only reason Crimmins was not relieved immediately was to avoid the appearance of reprobation, even though Carter could claim that Crimmins was overdue for reassignment anyway. His replacement, Sayre, is finding the Brazilians to be cold and distrustful. Part of the press views him as a CIA agent and speaks often of "Crimmins' boys" whom it says are still "running things in the American embassy."

It doesn't help much that our government puts on its human rights hat when and as it becomes convenient to do so. In Uruguay, for instance, it became common for American officials to be pinned down with questions about his inconsistency. "Why," they would be asked, "do you assist a country like Iran, where human life hangs constantly in the balance, and yet you continue to try to force us to conform to your ideas of how we should act?" These questions became so frequent, and so embarrassing, that an official line was given U.S. representatives in Uruguay and some other countries. Tell them, the line went, that Iran is of great importance to the United States and that your country is not of great importance to us. You can't fault this as not being straightforward. And it is perhaps time we were honest about this ancient axiom. Jimmy Carter's human rights crusade may or may not advance humankind's lot, but it is safe to say that it has earned him and the United States some bad lumps in Latin America. ●

HOW BALTIC STATES TORMENT RUSSIA

HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, over the years, I have placed major emphasis on the tragedy of the Soviet-conquered Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. However, special importance must be given to the strong determination of the people of these nations to continue to resist, "Russification."

In the current issue of U.S. News & World Report (September 25), Robin Knight, that magazine's Moscow bureau chief, makes a similar point; namely, that the people of the Baltic States have managed to maintain their nationalistic spirit despite Soviet oppression. I wish to insert his article at this point:

HOW BALTIC STATES TORMENT RUSSIA

(The Kremlin's carrot-and-stick policies to Russify three nationalistic republics aren't paying off. Balts still stubbornly resist integration.)

VILNA.—Persistent unrest in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania underscores Moscow's inability to destroy grass-roots nationalism there even after centuries of Russian domination of the area.

Violent upheaval is not in the cards. Over the years, most of the Balts have grudgingly learned to live with Russian rule—and relish their new prosperity.

Yet spontaneous anti-Russian outbursts repeatedly emphasize how peoples of the three states oppose any and all attempts to erase their national identities in the campaign to create a single "Soviet man."

Not even harsh Moscow-imposed measures and an effort to turn the Baltic region into the Soviet Union's most economically advanced area have been successful in pruning Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from their ancient roots. Instead, there has been a resurgence of anti-Russian feelings and a very stubborn burgeoning of Baltic nationalism.

For all this antipathy, Russian control of the Baltic states is longstanding, dating back to 1710 in Estonia and Latvia and 1795 in Lithuania. Moscow's suzerainty was broken only during the 22-year period between 1918 and 1940 when all three lands enjoyed a precarious independence and in 1941-44 when Germany overran the region.

None of the states returned happily to the Russian fold after World War II, especially Lithuania, where armed resistance continued until 1955.

Encouraging the dream of some Balts that they may someday achieve independence is the continued refusal of the U.S. and other NATO nations to legally accept Russian authority over the Baltic states. This stems from the 1945 Yalta Conference when Joseph Stalin rejected plebiscites that would have allowed the republics to determine their own futures. Representatives from the prewar governments still enjoy diplomatic accreditation in the U.S.

Anti-Soviet incidents occur more regularly in the Baltic states than any other part of the Soviet Union, where national groups— notably Georgians and Armenians—have forcefully asserted their claims to maintain their religious, linguistic and ethnic traditions.

A year ago, for instance, a pop-music fes-

tival at Liepaja, a Latvian coastal resort, ended with youths running through the town shouting, "Freedom, freedom." Months earlier, a similar incident occurred in an Estonian city.

Lithuania, however, is the most nationalistic of the three states; even the smallest excuse is sufficient to touch off an incident. Success of the Vilna soccer team in the national championships last fall sparked demonstrations by thousands of Lithuanians who rampaged through the capital shouting anti-Soviet and nationalist slogans. Autos reportedly were overturned, police cars set afire, windows smashed and Soviet propaganda banners torn down.

SEETHING IRE

Mass protest is common in Lithuania. On several occasions in the 1970s, thousands signed petitions complaining of religious persecution. More *samizdat*—underground publications—emerge from Lithuania than anywhere else in the U.S.S.R. The study of the national heritage has become so popular with the young that it is now said to be supervised by the KGB, the Soviet secret police.

One consequence of this widespread unrest is that dissidents in Lithuania have very little room for maneuver. Surveillance of their activities is continuous. Viktoras Petkus, leader of a group monitoring Moscow's human-rights record in Lithuania, received a 15-year sentence in July. Other activists have been exiled, stripped of citizenship or fired from their jobs.

To ordinary Russians, the Baltic states are "the West." Hundreds of thousands flock here each summer to enjoy what they conceive to be bourgeois pleasures. This similarity to Western nations lies at the heart of the area's discontent over Moscow's rule.

In Riga, capital of Latvia, cathedrals, discotheques and Italian-style coffee bars project a flavor quite distinct from that in Russia. In the ancient Estonian capital of Tallinn, the houses, cobbled sidewalks and wrought-iron signs recall historic links with Germany.

Vilna, once center of a feudal kingdom, is the most "Western" Soviet city. Its long-haired teen-agers in jeans and Scandinavian-made T-shirts would look at home in Western Europe or America. Women are stylishly dressed, and homes and gardens reflect more careful maintenance than is usual in Russia.

A GLIMPSE OUTSIDE

Estonia may be the only place in the Soviet Union where Western TV can be seen. With a \$50 attachment sold in state stores, viewers can receive transmissions from Finland, often including such U.S. programs as "Cannon" and "Columbo."

The average Balt has an ironic, half-mocking attitude toward the Russians. Officially, the Moscow connection is justified for the economic progress it has brought since 1944. Privately, feelings are different. One *samizdat* puts it like this: "Love and friendship between Lithuanians and Russians? It's the friendship and love between a lamb and a wolf."

It is in Lithuania that the Kremlin concentrates its effort to weaken the enduring strength of the Roman Catholic Church. Despite repression, officials concede that 40 percent of Lithuania's 3.4 million population are regular churchgoers. Priests say the real figure is nearer 60 percent. In a territory no larger than West Virginia, more than 500 parishes still function.

In Vilna, the Immaculate Conception Church regularly attracts 8,000 worshipers each Sunday. The Dawn Gates Chapel is crowded with people of all ages on any day of the week.

Moscow worries that a link between the church and opponents of the regime could develop into mass resistance to Communist

rule. The fears may be exaggerated, yet they are perceptibly more real than a decade ago—due almost entirely to heavy-handed attitudes on religion by authorities.

In schools, it's not uncommon for 8 and 9-year-olds to be forced to attend lectures on atheism. Three quarters of the seminaries are closed.

Catholic resistance to such pressures is marked by the huge number of religious petitions addressed to Soviet and world leaders. One petition protesting persecution in Lithuania attracted more than 17,000 signatures. Several included not only signatures, but addresses and telephone numbers.

Faced with wide-based unrest, Moscow has adopted carrot-and-stick policies. On one hand, the Kremlin seeks to Russify the Baltic states. On the other, substantial economic assistance has been poured into the area.

In 1940, just 8 percent of the Estonian population, 10 percent of the Latvian and 2 percent of all Lithuanians were Russian. Today, the respective figures are 25, 30 and 9 percent. Most of the new Russian residents live in the cities and have taken factory and administrative jobs.

The Kremlin also has made strenuous efforts to force the Russian language on the Balts. It is a compulsory subject in schools, and television programs are heavily weighted in its favor. Nevertheless, most Lithuanians, even high officials, speak Russian only in the presence of Russians.

IRON HAND

The Baltic states are kept under tight political control by Moscow. Key posts in the Communist Party and party organizations are held by Russians or by Balts who grew up in Russia and who returned home only in the wake of the Red Army.

Real trouble in the region has been warded off over the past 30 years only by massive Soviet investments that have transformed the Baltic economy and given the people the highest living standards in the U.S.S.R.

Estonia shows the best results, with the highest per capita production in the Soviet Union. Three percent of the Soviets' overall industrial output is generated by an Estonian labor force comprising only half of 1 percent of the U.S.S.R.'s total workers.

Lithuania has moved from agricultural backwater to the dynamo of Soviet light industry. Wage levels are well above the national average. In restaurants, it's not uncommon to see female shop assistants at lunch sharing bottles of champagne selling for \$8 each. Car ownership is rising rapidly. Die's, as in Estonia and Latvia, are markedly better than in Russia, with more meat and less potatoes and bread.

A few small groups in the Baltic states still advocate independence from the Soviet Union. But for most of the region's 7 million people, prosperity—at least for now—outweighs the drawbacks of Kremlin control.

Nevertheless, defiant Baltic nationalism is viewed with concern in Moscow. The Kremlin's failure to eliminate anti-Russian fervor there could bode ill for Communist ambitions to draw all of the Soviet Union's 17 major ethnic groups into a single mold.

AFTER DECADES, A FLOW OF WESTERN TOURISTS

TRAKAI, LITHUANIA.—One plus from U.S.-Soviet détente has been an increase in the number of Western tourists, including Lithuanian Americans, permitted to visit the Baltic states.

Estimated to number 1.6 million—about half the population of present-day Soviet Lithuania—most Lithuanian Americans arrived in the U.S. immediately before World War II or soon after. Many still have relatives in the Soviet Union.

For decades, Moscow refused to allow more than a handful to return each year. But this policy has been relaxed, and about 2,000 now

visit their homeland each year, including such spots as this ancient capital of Lithuania. Many are permitted to stay with relatives—but only in one of the six towns that are currently open to foreigners.

FEW HOTELS

Soviet officials concede that many more Lithuanian expatriates would return were it not for a chronic lack of hotel rooms. In Vilna, for instance, only four small hotels are open to foreigners. Another 700-room hotel has been under construction for 15 years but is not likely to open before the early 1980s.

Several American travel agents are offering special Baltic tours. One costs \$1,250, lasts 15 days, and includes visits to all three Baltic capitals—Vilna, Riga and Tallinn.

But obtaining a visa to visit the Soviet Union remains a chancy business—particularly if an applicant has relatives living here or has a local-sounding name.

One West German travel agent says his firm made 850 applications for visas to visit the Baltic states in 1977. Only 214 were accepted.

Soviet officials insist, however, that "genuine" foreign tourists and visitors wishing to be reunited with relatives have nothing to worry about. But they must agree to visit only the few cities open to foreign travelers and to scrupulously observe the many restrictions on photography and tour arrangements. ●

SCHOOL TEACHER'S OPINION OF A CABINET-LEVEL DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

HON. PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, JR.

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, with respect to the proposed Federal Cabinet-level Department of Education, I would like to call the attention of our colleagues to a recent letter I received from a school teacher in my own congressional district:

DEAR CONGRESSMAN McCLOSKEY: In reply to your letter of September 5th, may I say how strongly I oppose a Cabinet-level Department of Education. I agree with you that educational responsibility lies at the local level.

As a school teacher, I've had experience in schools with both State and Federal aid programs, and know personally that these support programs are not as effective as they're intended to be. The rationale behind these assistance programs is often excellent, but by the time the actual funds and materials reach the school, there's often little left to affect the children's education.

It seems with every new program there's a tremendous amount of paperwork, accountability, recordkeeping, etc. Again, the rationale is understandable, but someone has to do the paperwork so some, or much, of the funds go for filling out papers.

In California we've lost, incredibly, in relinquishing control of local schools, due to Proposition 13. The people don't realize yet what they've sacrificed. Please do all you can to help things from getting any worse. Every additional control agent proportionately decreases the level of education we're able to provide at the local level.

Sincerely,

VIVIAN EFTING,
Teacher, First Grade,
Bubb School, Mountain View, Calif. ●

A TRIBUTE TO NICHOLAS J. RAIJA

HON. NORMAN F. LENT

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. LENT. Mr. Speaker, on September 29, 1978, the Cardinal Mercier General Assembly, fourth degree, Knights of Columbus, Ninth New York District, is honoring an old and good friend of mine, Nicholas J. Raia, of Massapequa, N.Y. I would like to join with the members of the Cardinal Mercier Assembly, and with Nick's many, many friends in paying him tribute as he concludes his service as the faithful navigator of the assembly.

In supervising the activities of the more than 2,000 members of the Cardinal Mercier Assembly, Nick Raia has demonstrated those outstanding qualities of persuasive leadership, unstinting personal effort, and devotion to church and country which have carried him to the top ranks of leadership in the fourth degree of the Knights of Columbus.

Nick Raia has been a member of the Knights of Columbus for more than two decades. All through those years Nick has been generous in offering his time, his talents, and his energy to further the charitable, fraternal, patriotic, and religious goals embodied in the Knights of Columbus fraternal order. Whatever the task that needed doing, Nick was there with his infectious smile to offer his capable assistance. Whether it was taking charge of arrangements for the Fourth of July parades, as chairman of the charity ball, or in the many offices he held in the memorare council and then the Cardinal Mercier Assembly, Nick always demonstrated determination to get the job done, and done the right way, which marks the outstanding leader.

Few have given as much of their time to church activities as has Nick Raia. Few have done as much to help strengthen support for the ideals and principles which have made our Nation the most envied in the world.

And we have sorely needed such devotion and dedication in past years. It had become all too popular for Americans to scoff at those of us who honor and respect our Nation and those great principles of freedom, justice, and opportunity on which it was built. The cynics and the doomsayers were filling the land with their cries of despair.

Now, that dark picture is brightening. We are seeing a new surge of pride in our Nation, its history and its accomplishments. We are witnessing a new wave of faith in our country's ideals; a new dedication to those great principles on which, under God, it was founded.

And in no small part, this great change has come about because of the tireless devotion of leaders like Nick Raia, made possible through organizations like the fourth degree of the Knights of Columbus, which strive unceasingly to strengthen love of country and responsible citizenship. In the near century since its founding, the Knights of Columbus fraternal order has grown to become a vital force in our Nation,

in helping preserve our spiritual, and moral heritage. Our Nation owes a debt of gratitude to such organizations.

So, too, does our Nation owe a debt of gratitude to dedicated citizens like Nick Raia who give so much of their lives to help preserve and strengthen our spirit of patriotism.

It is most fitting, therefore, that we join in paying tribute to Nick Raia. His accomplishments during his years of dedicated service to the Knights of Columbus, capped by his outstanding record as faithful navigator of the Cardinal Mercier Assembly, deserve the highest commendation. His record of achievement will serve as a model for those who follow for a job well done.

I extend my heartiest congratulations to Nick, for a job well done. And my warmest best wishes for the future to Nick, his lovely wife Rosalie, and to his children Frank and Dina. ●

EXCESSIVE PUBLIC WORKS SPENDING

HON. SILVIO O. CONTE

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, my strong opposition to this year's public works appropriations bill and its pork-barrel boondoggles is well known.

The following article provides some insight into the political and economic realities of these wasteful and often environmentally harmful projects and offers a regional perspective on the bill's overall impact:

EXCESSIVE FEDERAL SPENDING

(By Michael J. McManus)

WASHINGTON.—The President is expected to veto a public works bill in the next week or so, with directions to the Congress that it should remove \$1.8 billion worth of "expensive, pork barrel projects that we do not need."

Members of Congress from the Northeast and Midwest should take the lead in sustaining the President's veto, for most projects the President wants deleted are for water projects that are uneconomic and/or environmentally unsound. And most would stimulate further growth in the Sunbelt at our expense.

In fact, seven of the projects, costing more than \$600 million were supposed to have been dropped forever, in a compromise worked out last year between the White House and the Congress, after he sought to kill 18 water projects that encourage population growth in arid areas with federal subsidies.

Couriously, when an amendment was offered on the House floor to reinstate those cuts by Rep. Robert Edgar, D-Penn., 80 Northeast and Midwest voted for the Sunbelt pork barrel projects, resulting in a defeat of the Edgar Amendment by a 142-234 vote.

Furthermore, the figures used by the Congress in estimating the costs of these projects assume that the federal government can borrow money at 3.25 percent interest or less, when the current borrowing rate is really about 8 percent. That simple figure alone means that cost of all of the deleted projects is higher than the most optimistic estimate of benefits.

How did such a bill ever get approved?

It is a tale of politics at its worst: backscratching deals made by members of Congress, trading boondoggle for boondoggle, acting in defiance of alleged interest in economies of government, coupled with the bungling of the administration which produced its list of acceptable projects only after Congressional committees had already acted to balloon up the water project costs by \$1.8 billion.

It is also a story of misplaced priorities by Northern Congressional leaders, including some with presidential aspirations: Reps. Jack Kemp, R-N.Y., Philip Crane, R-Ill.

One can understand why Sunbelt congressmen stick together on this bill. Not one dollar of TVA investments or of the \$7.8 billion spent by the Bureau of Reclamation has benefitted the North, and only 9 percent of the Army Corps of Engineers' proposed water construction budget will be spent in the 16 states from Maine to Minnesota.

For example, federally subsidized power in the Southeast wholesales for six-tenths of a penny. But it wholesales to Boston Electric for 4.35 cents, to Cleveland Electric for 4 cents and 2 cents to Duquesne Power in Pittsburgh. No wonder energy-intensive industry has moved south.

And federally subsidized water is often cheaper in the arid West than in the Northeast where water is plentiful but unsubsidized. A thousand cubic feet of water costs \$5.90 in Tucson and as little as \$2.10 in Salt Lake, but \$18.90 in New Haven, \$13.38 in Philadelphia, \$8.90 in Boston and \$7.50 in Detroit.

Since 1970, the federally irrigated Southwest and West has attracted two million residents from our region.

Why, then, did 80 northern congressmen vote in favor of a bill that added \$600 million worth of projects that had been rejected plus 27 new starts costing \$1.2 billion more than was recommended by the President?

"In any bill, there are going to be some projects better than others," said Jack Kemp. "I can't line-item veto what I don't like."

I responded, "That's not so in this case since the Edgar amendment gave you a chance of voting down seven wasteful projects while not affecting a project in your district."

Rep. Frank Horton, R-N.Y., cochairman of the Northeast-Midwest Congressional Coalition, said one reason he accepted the committee's judgment rather than the President's was his belief the President may have been threatening a veto "for PR reasons." He had seen how a dam in Rochester had prevented a flood during Hurricane Agnes. "Furthermore, I don't think our region ought to arbitrarily oppose another region's projects, particularly when there's going to be a very delicate problem down the road, when our region wants to get money to rebuild its sewers. It could cost several billion dollars in Chicago alone."

He has a point. Newark operates with century-old wooden sewers and Boston loses half of its water through leaks.

But it is going to take a lot of figuring to justify a total replacement of the sewer systems of old cities. Should the Northeast and Midwest accept pigs in a poke from the Sunbelt so we can hustle them for our own costly dreams?

This observer says no. I'd rather see our region rally around the President's thoughtful water policy which provides the first carefully considered set of ground rules upon which the economic and environmental tradeoffs of all federally funded water projects are openly proposed, debated, and decided upon without the log-rolling and chicanery that characterizes the current system. ●

INTERVIEW WITH DR. STEVEN
TANNENBAUM

HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. Speaker, as we all know there has been a lot of confusion and uncertainty regarding the use of nitrites as a preservative since the release of a study by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration carried out under contract with Dr. Paul Newberne at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Many scientists familiar with this type of research have provided valuable comment about this project. One such individual is Dr. Steven Tannenbaum who is professor of Food Chemistry at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. On August 16 Mr. John McGown of WMT-stations in Cedar Rapids, Iowa interviewed Dr. Tannenbaum. Following is the text of Mr. McGown's interview with Dr. Tannenbaum:

INTERVIEW WITH DR. STEVEN TANNENBAUM

This is John McGown reporting from WMT-Stations. We are interviewing a gentleman by the name of Dr. Steven Tannenbaum, Professor of Food Chemistry at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. We were put into contact with Dr. Tannenbaum by the Consumer Alert Council of Stamford, Connecticut.

What's involved here is the research report that received headlines and news coverage through the networks this past weekend involving nitrites in food—nitrites in tests with rats, actually. We have Dr. Tannenbaum on now and I would like to ask him a question about what he thought when he picked up the Saturday paper and first read the headline about the MIT test that the government was reporting.

TANNENBAUM. Well, I guess I was a little bit in a state of shock, because I had been somewhat familiar with the work that was going on. It was not going on in my laboratory. It was going on in one of my colleague's laboratory, but, I felt that there was a distinct air of overreaction on the part of the government, given the nature of the conclusions in the report.

McGOWN. They talked about that this might suggest that the Delaney Clause should be invoked. What is your answer to that? Do you think that we have enough evidence at this point that the Delaney Amendment could be invoked, and try to do the something they tried to do with saccharin, or do you think more data is needed?

TANNENBAUM. Well, you have a very complex situation here. We're—nitrite has been tested many times in several different countries under a variety of conditions. And, up until now no one had ever demonstrated that nitrite itself caused tumors under any circumstances in the rat or other test animals. One which already has a very high incidence of lymphomas and probably caused by a virus. And, as I understand it, it's traditional in testing of this type to not use an animal that has a natural high rate of tumors because it's difficult to interpret what a small increase means above what you would find in a control group. So, when you come down to the question of whether or not the Delaney Clause should be invoked, I think that now you're talking about a definition of terms which would be in the hands of lawyers, because I don't know whether the words in the Delaney Clause "induce cancer" apply in this particular case.

McGOWN. The Delaney Clause, I think, is very specific that if it causes cancer at any level in humans or animals it has to be invoked, so, there is probably very little choice. The question now becomes as to whether the data are sufficient in scope and statistically significant, and that type of thing. One thing that I noticed was that they used the Sprague-Dawley rats, where the Canadians in their studies used the Wistar rats. You were mentioning that there is a difference in their susceptibility to contracting cancer, of the different ones. Is that maybe why there is a difference between the Canadian test with cooked bacon with nitrite in it and this one which was done with feeding nitrite to rats?

TANNENBAUM. There are several tests aside from the Canadian tests. There is one that was done in Germany with BG rats and there was one done in Holland with a different strain of rats, and the thing that's unique about this strain is that it apparently carries this virus which causes lymphomas, whereas, the other rats did not carry anything like that. And, the conclusion of Dr. Newberne, who was the investigator who conducted the study, is that this is not an initiator of cancer, but in fact is something which may modify the carcinogenic process—the kind of substance called the promoter, which is a substance which cannot in itself cause cancer, but which can modify something else which causes cancer. So, one has to ask, then, whether given the fact that so many other negative studies have been done in similar species of rats, what the significance of the study is in the strain of rats that already has induced in it the kind of cancer that one finds from the test substance, namely nitrite.

McGOWN. I want to ask you something related to this. I noticed that it was 8.4 percent of the two control groups that contracted lymphomas, whereas, it was 12.5 percent of the nitrite-receiving groups that did. Isn't that 8.4 percent an extremely high level for any control group?

TANNENBAUM. Extremely high, is the word for it. I mean, it's almost unheard of, except in a rat that's specifically susceptible to this sort of tumor. That's my point. I think that this tends to color the nature of the results with regard to their interpretation. I mean, it's an experiment which bears, I think, repeating under the conditions where the animals don't naturally have this high rate of lymphomas.

McGOWN. I agree with you that the test probably needs to be repeated. One of the things that worried us the most is the way the news media handled it—because it received national attention with headlines, like "Nitrite Causes Cancer"—"Nitrite May Cause Cancer"—and there wasn't a newspaper in the United States, I guess, that didn't carry it either Saturday or Sunday, and there wasn't a network show that didn't have it on at least a couple of nights. This worries us as to why this happens. If you can show a negative, the news media seems to hop right in on it. If the MIT study had shown that nitrite didn't cause cancer do you think it would have gotten as much attention from the national news media?

TANNENBAUM. I'm sure it wouldn't. I think that an additional factor in this case is that it is the way the people in government associated with the release of the data, particularly Carol Foreman, handled the release. It's my understanding that it was released only to the news media and that no one else had a copy of it until several days later, and I think a lot of the way the headline writing came out had to do with the way the document was worded, particularly in the first paragraph. I think that if you would have read the articles and read past the headlines down to the second and third paragraphs, it came out reading quite

a bit differently. Even though, with respect to where the nitrite comes from, I think that the government statement shows a clear bias against nitrite from the very start.

McGOWN. I agree with you. I've read the test, the report of the test in the news release and the stories in the newspapers. I think that with each step it grew in magnitude. The test points out some things. They carefully say things, like "The data are only suggestive" and "the biological significance of nitrite associate lesions of the lymphoreticular system is unclear," and things like this—carefully wording it, like a scientist would. Then, the news release, which I have read, seemed to go further, and the newspaper stories seemed to even go further than that. I think that this is one of the great problems we encounter with this type of thing. Don't you agree?

TANNENBAUM. I think that's equally true for foreign affairs as it is for food additives. That's a problem of newspaper headline writing. I think it's something I don't have much to comment on.

McGOWN. I noticed in the wire stories that came in today that USDA and FDA have turned this over to the Justice Department, and asked if the Food Laws will allow the agencies to begin a phase in of a ban on nitrite. So, now we've moved from the scientific circles, to the bureaucratic circles, to the legal circles.

TANNENBAUM. Well, I think that that's where the final battle always takes place. I mean, there is a set of laws which governs the legislation of food additives, and the interpretation of those laws usually falls into the hands of the lawyers. And, I think it's how they ultimately will interpret the meaning of some of those words, like "induce," that I think will influence the outcome. But, I think, also, that a big problem is that the law itself doesn't allow the agencies to make value judgments on the use of an additive, for example, in comparison to the risk that would be entailed if one did not use the additive.

McGOWN. This is the same thing that occurs, I think with the antibiotic situation that's going on with the FDA and Dr. Kennedy. We have to relate risk to benefit, but the law does not allow the government to relate these two things. This is probably why there is going to have to be some action from Congress to change the Delaney Clause to bring this around to where it should be.

TANNENBAUM. Well, that's right. And, in this particular case, I mean, the risk is botulism, which I think carries with it a very serious risk of death, so that one is dealing with a very specific benefit that would result in the shortening of life, so that I think this is a case that is quite different than many of the others and I think the government has to take into consideration the risks in this particular case.

McGOWN. I noticed in Food Chemical News toward the end of last year, that you had reported on some work with nitrites, and you pointed out if nitrite in bacon were to be banned there could be up to 1,000 more cases of botulism a year. Now we're talking about taking nitrite out of hot dogs, bacon, luncheon meats, country cured hams and many other things. Obviously this risk of botulism will grow in magnitude beyond the estimated 1,000 cases—right?

TANNENBAUM. I think that the amount of risk is going to be gigantic, and I think that the cost to society is going to be gigantic because there isn't going to be any way for the commercial channels to handle this meat. You have a tremendous volume of meat that's been handled in a certain fashion and now all of a sudden the government is going to turn around and say that you can't handle it that way. You have thousands of meat produc-

essing plants. I mean, I just don't understand. What are they talking about? They'll be putting people out of work. It just doesn't make any sense, at all, except in the context that there's a political goal in mind here. And, I mean, certainly I don't see a rational health or economic goal in the kind of decision-making process that's being carried out here.

McGOWN. Dr. Tannenbaum, I appreciate you giving us so much of your time. I realize you're on vacation and we appreciate the Consumer Alert Council putting us in contact with you.

We've been talking to Dr. Steven Tannenbaum, Professor of Food Chemistry at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and this is John McGown reporting from WMT-Station. ●

SOUTH AFRICA WRONG ON NAMIBIA

HON. ANTONIO BORJA WON PAT

OF GUAM

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. WON PAT. Mr. Speaker, South Africa is wrong in deciding to reject the United Nation's proposal to give Namibia independence.

I was appalled yesterday to read of South Africa's decision to go ahead with its own plans for elections in the colony of Namibia. The attitude of the South African government is not going to bring about independence for the hard pressed residents of Namibia; rather, I and many others who are familiar with the problems in that part of the world are convinced that South Africa is courting a long and disastrous war with the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

The United Nation's Security Council reached agreement on its long debated Namibia proposal on July 27 of this year. The United States is a partner to this document which spells out clear guidelines for putting an end to South Africa's rule of Namibia which dates back to a World War One League of Nations Mandate. The U.N. revoked that mandate years ago and it has taken great effort to put forth a workable plan for Namibian independence.

It must be noted that the U.N. is not the only world group to approve the Namibia Proposal. It recently received the full support of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference in Bonn, Germany. As one of the American Representatives to the IPU meeting, I was privileged to serve on all phases of the Committee on Non Self-Governing Territories and Ethnic Questions which drafted and later approved a resolution which urged "the continuation of most strenuous efforts towards the complete elimination of colonialism in the world." This historic resolution, which was later adopted by the entire conference, urged South Africa to take the same steps in Namibia as are contained in the U.N. resolution.

It was the goal of the hundreds of international legislators representing more than 75 countries at the conference that our efforts, combined with those of

many others, would encourage South Africa to follow a moderate course of action in the matter of Namibia.

We did not ask South Africa to take any steps which could endanger its security. By its own official comments, the Pretoria government has signalled its intentions of giving the residents of Namibia a greater degree of selfgovernment. But the major difference between South Africa's proposal to hold elections by the end of this year in Namibia and that of the resolution adopted by the United Nations and the Inter-Parliamentary Conference is the question of maintaining South African troops in Namibia.

We have asked Pretoria to remove its armed forces from Namibia; it has obviously chosen not to do so. The consequences of South Africa's decision to retain full military control is bound to foster continued armed violence in Southern Africa.

Mr. Speaker, it is just this sort of situation we at the Conference attempted to avoid. On behalf of the American delegation and officials from Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand, I rose again and again to seek support for removal of language in our resolution which would approve the use of armed struggle by emerging nations to achieve selfdetermination.

My statement read in part that "we fully support the principle of full democracy in South Africa, but we seek peaceful solutions and note that violence only begets violence." The efforts of the American delegation were defeated, largely at the behest of Third World nations. Perhaps they understood better than we that South Africa will never give up Namibia except by force. This unfortunate viewpoint is held by the distinguished foreign correspondent, Mr. David B. Ottaway, who wrote in the September 21, 1978 Post that South Africa's rejection of the U.N. plan is "bound to provoke greater Soviet and Cuban involvement in the South African administered territory."

Closely echoing his views are Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and Angolan President Agostinho Neto, both of whom supported the U.N. plan and both of whom are going to be hard pressed to support SWAPO actions against South African forces without Namibia.

It would seem that no sooner have we done our level best to produce peace in the Middle East than the dire threat of war breaks out in Southern Africa. It is my observation that man can achieve anything he wishes to achieve—even peace. But it would seem that not all wish peace. For those who seem bent on maintaining a hold over a country to which they have no legal rights, I would urge that they first stop and listen to the voices of their neighbors and friends who want to put a stop to colonialism and war. The opportunity is there. They and we must accept it or face the unthinkable consequences.

Thank you.

AN UNSUNG HERO RETIRES

HON. JIM WRIGHT

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, one of the true unsung heroes of our time will be leaving the Air Force next Friday after 35 years of service, and I do not want this event to pass without notice.

The unsung hero of whom I speak is Lt. Gen. John Peter Flynn.

If I tell you that he is the Inspector General of the Air Force, that probably would not mean much.

If I tell you that he has served in three wars and received numerous decorations, including the Air Force Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit with 2 oak leaf clusters, the Distinguished Flying Cross with 6 oak leaf clusters, the Bronze Star Medal with V device, the Air Medal with 14 oak leaf clusters, the Purple Heart with oak leaf cluster and many more, that might not mean too much either.

But if I told you that General Flynn was the officer principally responsible for maintaining the morale of American prisoners of war in Vietnam for over 5 years, you might begin to get the measure of this remarkable man.

Jack Flynn began his military career as an aviation cadet in February 1943. He graduated the next year and served during the remainder of World War II flying F-51 fighter aircraft.

In that war, the Korean war, and Vietnam war he proceeded to log more than 4,500 flying hours. During the Korean war he flew F-80's. During the Vietnam conflict he flew F-105's. He also served in various responsible positions with fighter units in the United States, Japan, and Europe.

The ultimate test of his courage, strength and devotion to country, however, came during the Vietnam conflict. In August of 1967 he joined the 388th Tactical Fighter Wing in Thailand as vice commander. On October 25 of that year while flying a combat mission over Hanoi he was shot down and taken prisoner—the highest ranking allied prisoner of war held by the North Vietnamese.

For more than 5 years, until the American prisoners of war were released in March, 1973, Jack Flynn had the awesome task of providing leadership and direction to men living under the worst imaginable conditions.

In spite of the persistent efforts of his captors to prevent any unity among the prisoners, Jack Flynn organized and led the Fourth Allied Prisoner of War Wing, an organization which allowed the men to help each other survive.

It was his devotion to his country and his refusal to shirk his responsibilities to his fellow Americans, in spite of severe personal hardships, that mark General Flynn as an American hero second to none.

Under circumstances which would have overwhelmed most of us, General Flynn set an example for his followers

which instilled in them a desire to return home with honor—which they did.

Few of us who watched the airplanes land and the first of these former prisoners salute the American flag on deplaning will forget the pride we felt in these brave countrymen. That this moment could occur, that these men could return with such spirit and such a sense of honor—all this was made possible largely through the integrity, the courage, and the greatness of soul that characterize Jack Flynn.

This is the legacy that he leaves behind as he retires from the Air Force. Few men have given so much for their country short of life itself. Of course, he will be missed, but his memory will remain alive throughout the Air Force, for he is a living legend.

In paying tribute to General Flynn, I would not be telling the whole story if I did not mention Mary Margaret Flynn, the wonderful lady who provided support and understanding throughout his career, especially during those long years of confinement in North Vietnam; it was a great comfort to Jack to know that his wife could be depended upon to manage things at home. Her steadfast courage and sensitivity serve as an example of all the quiet contributions made by the family members of our service men and women.

Jack and Mary Margaret are about to put these years of active service behind them and to begin yet another phase of their lives. I know their many friends in the Air Force and the Congress join me in the hope that the best years of their lives are still to come.●

TRIBUTE TO MRS. TERRY BLAKE

HON. JOHN L. BURTON

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, on Sunday, September 10, the first National Grandparents Day was celebrated as a result of a special resolution passed by Congress and the President in August.

As one of the cosponsors of the measure, I know that a lot of credit should go to many different people who helped to make this tribute to grandparents possible, but a California grandmother deserves a few extra words of praise for her years of campaigning for a grandparents day.

Mrs. Terry Blake, a former actress and current resident of Los Angeles, has been working for a grandparents day since 1955. She claims she is the first in the field to advocate a grandparents day and has been pushing for this observance during the past 23 years.

Mrs. Blake has been a grandmother 10 times and has spent several thousand dollars trying to get a resolution passed. She has campaigned across the country three times and in 1955, she brought her crusade to Washington, D.C., with a petition containing 4,000 signatures in the hopes of seeing President Eisenhower about a grandparents day. Although she did not see the President then, her ef-

forts have now paid off in helping to launch a National Grandparents Day.●

SUSPENSION SEASON FEVER IS HERE AGAIN

HON. ROBERT K. DORNAN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, we are in the season again when there is a tendency to push through a variety of controversial measures under the suspension procedure. This procedure denies Members of the House an adequate opportunity to analyze, debate, and amend significant bills.

Recently, a major piece of health legislation, the Health Planning and Resources Development Act, H.R. 11488, was brought up under suspension and failed to pass. Members of Congress need to be alert if an attempt is made to bring up another major health measure which is even more controversial—the Health Services Amendments of 1978 (H.R. 12370). This measure needs to be fully debated and discussed on the House floor rather than rushed through under the suspension procedure.

H.R. 12370 contains funding for the controversial title X family planning grants. Despite clear prohibitions in the law that Federal money should not go to promote abortion as a method of family planning, title X provides funds for planned parenthood and other groups which promote abortion and controversial publications, films, et cetera, which undermine generally accepted standards and values about sex and sexual conduct. The granting of Federal funds to private agencies which promote abortion is a misuse of Federal funds and needs to be thoroughly reviewed by Members of the House. We need to be better aware of how the funds of the taxpayers are being used.

We should be aware that the excessive level of funding in title X will make more money available to some of the most controversial programs. (See report of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 12370, section 5, family planning, page 49.) This measure should not be rushed through on suspension. If it comes up under suspension, I urge you to vote against the bill so that the full membership of the House will have the benefit of a thorough debate and examination of the programs contained in H.R. 12370, the Health Services Amendments of 1978.

Several Members of Congress were planning to offer corrective amendment to title X, in order to bring the program back in line with the original act passed in 1970. We were aware that the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee had asked for an open rule, and we were relying upon that in our deliberations. So that everyone may better understand the serious objections conveyed to us from around the country, I will briefly outline some of the abuses under title X:

FUNDING OF ABORTION SERVICES

Section 1008 of title X states:

None of the funds appropriated under this title shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning.

Known as the Dingell amendment, this provision has never been removed from the law. Our esteemed colleague, Mr. PAUL ROGERS, in health services program hearings on H.R. 2954 and H.R. 2955 held on February 19, 1975 has also stated in a response to the U.S. Coalition for Life, Export, Pa. (page 260):

That the law is very clear as to the design and content of programs funded under Title X of the Public Health Service Act. None of the funds appropriated under Title X may be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning. This provision would not merely prohibit the use of such funds for the performance of abortions but would prohibit the support of any program in which abortion counseling or abortion referral services are offered.

In spite of these excellent efforts of Mr. ROGERS and others, HEW, Planned Parenthood, and others have chosen to ignore the clear intent of the law. Clear documentation has been prepared by Mr. Chuck Donovan of the National Right to Life Committee, that at least 117 hospitals and clinics where "abortion is a method of family planning," are receiving title X family planning grant moneys. They are in 33 States and the District of Columbia. Virtually every Member here is affected by this situation.

Furthermore, the Office of General Council for Health Services Administration of HEW has told me that:

HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
Rockville, Md., September 1, 1978.

HON. ROBERT K. DORNAN,
House of Representatives,
Cannon Office Building, Washington, D.C.:

I regret the delay in providing the requested definition of "program" as used in Section 1008 of Title X, PHS Act. Since the definition is extracted from an opinion on a case issued by the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) dated April 10, 1973, I asked that the OGC clear it since it is taken out of context.

"Section 1008 of the PHS Act provides: 'None of the funds appropriated under this title shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning.'"

"We do not believe that the word 'program', as used in Section 1008, was intended to be so comprehensive as to include any and all family planning activities carried on by an applicant for Title X funds. For example, we do not believe that a hospital offering abortions for family planning purposes, consonant with State law, would be disqualified from receiving Title X funds for the operation of a separate family planning program which utilized only preventive family planning methods.

"On the other hand . . . it is recognized that in some situations, the abortion element in a program of family planning services may bulk so large and be so intimately related to all aspects of the program as to make it difficult, if not impossible to separate the eligible and non-eligible items of cost. In such a case, we think a grant for the project would be legally questionable.

"In other words, a mere technical allocation of funds, attributing Federal dollars to non-abortion activities and other dollars to abortion activities, in what is otherwise a discrete project for providing abortion services, would not, in our opinion, be a legally

supportable avoidance of the Section 1008 prohibition.

"In our opinion, the activities (abortion and non-abortion) must be so separated as to constitute separate programs (projects). As we have already indicated, our conclusion does not require separate grantees or even a separate health facility. However, neither do we think that separate booking entries alone will satisfy the spirit of the law."

Sincerely yours,

ELSIE SULLIVAN,
Assistant for Information and Education,
Office for Family Planning.

As if that were not bad enough, I have a quote from Senator PACKWOOD, supplied me by Paul Marx, OSB., from Collegeville, Minn., showing how title X grantees can get around the prohibition on abortion. It is taken from Father Marx's book, "The Death Peddlers." He says:

GETTING AROUND THE TYDINGS ACT

Addressing himself to the law passed last year at the end of the congressional session, known as the Tydings Family Planning and Population Act, which had allocated \$382 million for fiscal 1971-73 for family-planning services and population-research activities, Packwood proclaimed himself "abhorred" that it had excluded money for abortion. He gave detailed suggestions for bypassing that prohibition:

If a national grant were made to Chicago's Planned Parenthood, for example, they could use the money for other purposes and expenses, while using their current monies to promote abortion. This would give every Congressman a way out if challenged by a constituent: he could say he voted against abortion.

Packwood surely had done his homework:

Various health acts funnel money that can be used for abortion purposes. The Public Health Service Act likewise grants to states various monies, the purpose of which is to be decided by the states. For these various acts the federal government can grant money to the states with liberal abortion laws to be used to implement abortion programs.

So, in asking for an amendment to the title, we do nothing more than ask what Congress had already thought was the case. And that hardly is a radical move.

I urge that Members listen carefully on Monday to the debate on H.R. 12370. There are a number of rather tasteless films and booklets being promoted with public money. We are the guardians of the purse. And our constituents will hold us accountable for our actions. This is supposed to be an open society. Well, then, let us have open discussion on these controversial measures, and stand up and be counted.●

THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATE SOURCES OF ENERGY

HON. PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, JR.

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, our reliance on foreign oil imports represents an increasing threat to our national security.

It is time Congress faced up to that threat.

Since the Arab oil embargo of late 1973, we alone of the major industrial nations have increased our reliance on Arab oil. We have been slow in developing alternative solutions of energy that will be reasonable in price and safe to use.

One possibility that could offer a major part of the solution is the extraction of oil from coal. In this regard, the respected journalist, Mr. Harlan Trott, formerly with the Christian Science Monitor, has recently written a very perceptive and challenging article. I insert that article in the RECORD for the information of our colleagues:

SURPRISE! WE CAN MAKE OIL FROM COAL CHEAPER THAN THE OIL WELLS CAN PUMP IT OUT

(By Harlan Trott)

In this time of brownouts and shortened work-weeks called the energy crisis, it may cheer you to know that we can make oil from coal cheaper than oil wells can produce it.

A Government scientist named Lewis Karrick had a lot to do with improving the basic process.

Federal energy officials have been suppressing it for 50 years. They blandly deny this, claiming only the inventor can suppress his patents.

By "suppress" we mean, according to Webster: "to keep from public knowledge—to refrain from divulging."

The Karrick process involves low-temperature carbonization (LTC) of coal. This means heating coal at from 680 to 1380 degrees F., in the absence of air to prevent combustion, so as to distill out all the oil and gas.

When you treat a ton of coal by LTC, you get back about a barrel of oil; 3,000 cubic feet of rich fuel gas; and 1,500 pounds of smokeless solid fuel. But if you harness the process to an integrated energy plant, using the off-peak steam, the same ton of coal can produce 100 kilowatt-hours of electricity besides.

The Karrick process would combine a carbonizer, a refinery, a city gas works and a central electric station so as to produce oil, gas, smokeless fuel and electricity under the same roof at the same time.

If an LTC plant produced more smokeless fuel than it and the community could consume at the moment, you could convert the surplus to water gas. And the water gas can be converted into four barrels of oil by the (Fischer) synthesis process.

Geologists tell us there are enough latent heat units (B.T.U.s) in America's coal reserves to last us for a couple of millennia, give or take a few centuries. The LPC process is all it would take to dispel the monopoly myth that we must depend on Arabian princes to regulate our thermostats until world petroleum prices have broached some unspecified hole in the sky where it would pay us to begin using it.

The energy crisis is really only an information crisis.

The cartel is blocking LTC with help from Washington and Wall Street. These three monopoly powers—Big Oil, Big Bureaucracy, Big Banking—oppose LTC because an integrated LTC energy industry would be amendable to private enterprise initiative.

Congress is doling out millions to the energy giants to experiment on variations of Frederick Bergius' coal-to-gasoline (hydrogenation) process. Standard Oil of New Jersey (now Exxon) paid \$35 million for it in 1930.

The government even built a \$10-million 30,000 barrel-a-day pilot plant with it. But the Secretary of the Interior scrapped it in 1953 saying it was useless to keep "trying to

get more than a quart of water in a quart jar."

Exxon's Bergius process is so massive and complex it cannot be made to stand on its own financial feet. The cartel insists the taxpayers must prop it up for them with a subsidy program "comparable to the U.S. Merchant Ship Subsidy Act." This means fuel bills and taxes will go up.

Big Oil's Wall Street spokesman is H. C. Bailey, vice president at Kidder, Peabody where he is "responsible in corporate finance for petroleum." Big Banking's scheme for subsidizing oil from coal is defined in the Nov., Dec. 1973 Defense Transportation Journal.

Bailey concedes "only the largest corporations" are sophisticated or experienced enough in the promotion of massive debt to manage an open-ended pork barrel of this inflationary magnitude. Our federal energy officials endorse Bailey's concept.

Even though the Government has no viable alternative to its suppressed Karrick process, the Interior Department is calling for an "Apollo-size" oil-from-coal program.

Last September the cartel tried to ram a Ford-backed bill through the House without debate. The measure would have provided up to \$4 billion in government loan guarantees to begin building synthetic-fuels plants that aren't on paper. The House voted 193 to 192 against buying something less even than a pig in a poke.

There is nothing "miraculous" about LTC nor did Karrick invent it.

Before 1860, more than 50 plants were extracting oil and gas from coal. Boston had five LTC plants producing oil and gas for heat and light; and axle grease and paraffin for candles. But in 1873, "too much" cheap petroleum had forced the last coal-oil plant to shut down.

Free enterprise made oil from coal before the rise of the Rockefeller dynasty, and it could revive the art, especially with crude oil selling around \$12 a barrel. The prospect terrifies the cartel. A small rural co-op can make and distribute electricity. A big farmers co-op can refine and transport petroleum products. A New England town can make its own gas, its own electricity. This has been going on for years. Scores of them still do. So why can't a big city or a small village—or a Federal TVA—combine all these steps with LTC of coal under the same roof?

The fact that they can is backed by Karrick and his federal coworkers, and eight years of pilot grant tests at the University of Utah.

Every year we consume over a half a billion tons of coal. This means we destroy 400 million barrels of oil a year; and 1.4 trillion cubic feet of rich fuel gas, plus billions of dollars worth of coal chemicals used in making fertilizers and plastics.

Energy officials continue to shrug off this staggering waste. They are the ones who know, but aren't telling the public what LTC is all about. Meanwhile all this enormous energy wealth goes up the flue in the form of smoke, soot and sulfuric fumes—all for want of a national fuels conservation and development policy.

There isn't the slightest question about the economic feasibility of the so-called Karrick process. Our Government admits it. Listen to this colloquy between a senator and the Government's top synthetic fuels adviser.

"Senator Murdock: The statement by Mr. Karrick, I will read the statement and then see what you have to say about this: 'Therefore, these coals, where there is a market for the smokeless fuels and the gas, can produce oil cheaper on an average, cheaper than the average cost at the well of petroleum in the western part of the United States!'

"Dr. Fieldner: I think that is a fair state-

ment, if you can get a market for the solid products. That is the main product. They will obtain from this coal from 20 to 35 gallons of tar oil as a byproduct." (*Hearings*, on U.S. Senate Res. 53, Oct. 1942, p. 1546.)

Simply labeling LTC coal oil a "by-product" is all it takes to exclude it from our federal R&D program. If our energy officials ran out of gas on the desert, would they spurn a gallon of LTC gasoline because it was a "byproduct?" Would the engine balk? Germany fueled its wartime Luftwaffe on oil from coal. Japan bunkered her battleships with LTC oil from Manchuria shale. Did Hitler or Tojo object?

After commercial-scale test runs on Appalachian coal in 1947, Karrick told the Ohio Society of Professional Engineers it is feasible to produce oil from coal in the Hocking Valley for \$5.00 a barrel. The going market price for the upgraded coal byproducts—gas, electricity, smokeless fuel and phenols—would let you give away the oil and still net a fair return.

Today this startling economic claim for Karrick's oil-from-coal method is being demonstrated on a commercial scale in England.

The Rexco Company is using the very process our Bureau of Mines developed with our tax dollars and then discarded. Rexco owns and runs five LTC plants producing smokeless fuel for industrial and domestic users in Britain's official clean air zones.

"It is a very efficient plant," according to Rodney Coltart, "carbonizing 1,000 tons per day, 75 per cent of which is recovered as high grade smokeless fuel for industrial and home use."

This San Francisco mechanical engineer visited Rexco's Stribston plant at Coalville in Leicestershire, England, in October 1974. He was taken on an all-day tour of the plant with John Brown, director; M. J. Platts, manager; and Robert Ingliam, chief engineer.

Coltart's written report to president C. D. Allen of the Natural Resources Corp. explains: "They have to meet rigid standards on their product set up by the Government." What Coltart didn't say was that the Government is in the smokeless fuel business, too. It's a competitor of Rexco's. Only the Government's works aren't as efficient. Perhaps that's why Rexco has to operate with one hand tied behind its back. Listen.

"The original plant contemplated six retorts in line but only five were installed since the Coal Board limits their coal allocations." In other words, Rexco is bucking a state monopoly!

The Stribston plant makes 750 tons of smokeless fuel a day. At the same time the retorts produce three million cubic feet of fuel gas, and around 650 to 700 barrels of tar oil. The Coltart report states: No smoke or odors are discernible. If the tars and phenols were processed and sold, the revenue derived would pay off the cost of the entire plant in about two years, according to the Rexco people.

"The conveying and processing part of the plant involves the services of three men and a supervisor per shift. All were easily trained from scratch. Adding a few more retorts in line would not require any additional personnel."

Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover (the Bureau of Mines was then in Commerce) made Karrick—not the Bureau—custodian of the Government's pioneer oil-from-coal research data. Hoover advised Karrick to file patents—as scientists in the Department of Agriculture had been doing—rendering the broadest public service with them, and give the Government full credit.

Sixteen patents were issued to Karrick outright. One was held jointly with Douglas Gould, who was destined to have an outstanding career as a petroleum chemist with

a major oil company. One, covering underground distillation and gasification of coal and oil shales, was held jointly with his brother Col. Samuel N. Karrick, builder of the underground works on Corregidor. All of the Karrick patents have expired, either before or after his death in 1962.

If Karrick's process was any good, you say, Standard Oil would have bought him out! Actually, Old John D. tried.

In 1929, Standard Oil officials assisted in drawing up a charter for a subsidiary tentatively titled Oil & Gas Development Company. They tendered Karrick the position of vice president, chief engineer and one-third of the stock.

In exchange, Karrick was to turn over his patents and supporting data.

That offer followed months of talks between Karrick and a patent broker named Leo Ranney. Ranney was officed a few doors down a corridor from Col. Robert Hayes, at 26 Broadway. Hayes was Standard's chief counsel. Standard (N.J.) is now known as Exxon.

STANDARD OIL (EXXON) TRIED TO BUY KARRICK PATENTS IN 1930

In March 1930, Ranney wrote Standard Oil officials for advice on handling Karrick's three blanket patent applications on the underground gasification of coal. "As you know, your patent attorneys and technologists have investigated these processes since December," Ranney reminded them. "Mr. Howard [President of Esso (N.J.)] has called to my attention that there is a vast amount of work ahead in connection with hydrogenation and that there would be probable delay in the development of the gasification processes by Standard alone . . . He has asked whether I would feel disposed to fully protect Standard in any event (which, of course, goes without saying) . . ."

Ranney added that the inventions have been explained to the technologists of the Insull group, Cities Service, Columbia, United Gas Improvement, Allied Chemical and Consolidation Coal, "all of whom are interested and some of whom are waiting for me to tell them how large an interest they may secure and for how much. The reason for this rather hurried letter is that I have a telegram from the assistant to Mr. Insull that he and their engineers will be in New York on April second to see whether some sort of deal can be made."

"Considering that Standard and Consolidation are close together, I have talked the processes over several times with Mr. Barrington, and at the last conference he wondered whether the whole underground gasification business might not be a matter that Mr. Rockefeller himself would like to father to benefit both his coal and oil interests . . ."

The next day Karrick wrote Ranney: "I see no fault with the letter to President Clark of the Standard Oil Development Company of March 21, a draft of which you handed me yesterday, it being understood that it refers to our processes for the underground gasification of coal, as per our agreement of November 1, 1929. Also that Standard interests have no rights or equity at the present time in these processes."

The same day, Standard bid for Karrick's process, the New York Times reported. So, Jersey had purchased patent rights to Frederick Bergius' process for hydrogenation of coal directly to gasoline, from I. G. Farben in Germany. Thus the cartel was on the verge of controlling two contrasting and controversial methods of making oil from coal—hydrogenation and LTC.

One of the filmsier sophistries advanced by the Bureau of Mines is that the LTC process is a last-gap effort to reinstate the family coal shovel. The Bureau contends that to produce oil and gas in any appreciable

amounts, LTC would "glut the country with mountains of char." Not so. Listen:

"Congressman Barrett: Would you produce at the same time considerable amounts of gas with your process?"

"Karrick: The Rocky Mountain coals, as far north as Rock Springs, Wyoming, in Colorado and Utah, all yield from 30 to 45 gallons of oil per ton. They vary within the same seams. You get from 2,000 to 2,700 cubic feet of gas out of it, but we learned to heat only until just the last trace of oil is out. Then it can't be made to smoke under any conditions. It burns with a clear, very long, clear, blue flame. The gas yield can be varied. The more gas you drive out of this smokeless fuel, the lower the B.T.U. of the gas; so you can boost it up to 6,000 cubic feet to 800 B.T.U. gas per ton of coal processed."

"Then it was demonstrated that all of the solid smokeless fuel could be made into water gas. In that case you get about 40,000 cubic feet of 300 to 350 B.T.U. gas from a ton of processed coal. And out of that you could make four barrels of oil by the [Fischer] synthesis process."

"The thing to do is to distill the oil out of the coal, while making a smokeless fuel and high B.T.U. gas. In a national crisis you could quickly go to converting this reactive, solid smokeless fuel into oil . . . Those who have been using this smokeless fuel [i.e., industries and electric power plants] will then go to burning raw coal for the duration of the emergency. That is the way we think the national fuels economy ought to be handled." . . . (*Hearings*, H.R. 7330, May 12, 1950, p. 136, *Emphasis added*.)

As soon as Karrick and his coworkers proved they could make oil from coal cheaper than oil wells, the Government stopped work on the oil-rich coals in the Rocky Mountains. Karrick was transferred to the Bureau's Pittsburgh station where experts from the oil, steel and chemical giants, and their faculty friends at Carnegie Tech, could "assist" in the Government's work. The cartel's assistance has been largely of a mortuarial nature ever since.

A storm broke out in the early 1950s over the relative merits of the Bergius and Karrick techniques. The Bureau put out so much wrong information about both processes that Dr. Eugene Ayres was brought into the Government arena to untangle the information mishmash in private. Ayres was Director of Research at Gulf Oil, the ablest fuels economist on the cartel's prestigious Paley Commission. Ayres left the Bureau's "30 coal experts" with these blunt conclusions:

Bergius is too costly in terms of dollars and coal.

About half the thermal value of coal is destroyed.

The process requires much precious water. Bergius Hydrogenation need not be used to any large extent in the future because:

Simple, continuous LTC techniques exist, such as the Bureau of Mines developed, in which moderate yields of oil are accompanied by major yields of smokeless fuel.

The oil can be converted to liquid fuels while the smokeless fuel is an excellent fuel for steam boilers.

The Karrick method—including the conversion of the oil to motor fuel—destroys only 25 per cent of the thermal value—half as much as Bergius method.

LTC is an interesting process because of the ratio of national demands for liquid fuels for electric power and other essential coal uses is not very far away now [1952] from the ratio of yields from LTC, and is expected to balance before 1980 because demand for electric power is growing faster than demand for liquid fuel.

Welding together the petroleum, gas, coal and electric power industries to form an

integrated energy industry is plausible for several reasons.

The cheapest liquid fuel from coal will come when coal is processed by LTC for both liquid fuel and electric power.

This should also give the cheapest electricity.

The private sector can handle the job without subsidy, but not in competition with those who skim off the oil from coal and sell the residual smokeless fuel to power plants.

Federal antitrust lawyers advised Karrick not to sign up with Standard Oil, believing the cartel intended to bury him until (a) his patents covering the underground distillation and gasification of coal had all expired; (b) the country had run out of natural gas, at which time pipelines crossing the country's big coal fields would all have been paid for; and (c) the cartel would then be ready to pump gas from Karrick's underground gasification process into the hungry gas lines.

Instead, Karrick was advised to go back to Utah and teach students at the university how to produce four clean energy products from coal at the same time under the same roof; and show the people of Salt Lake City how their city-owned LTC multienergy plant could erase the state capital's bad name as the smoky "Pittsburgh of the Rockies."

A Karrick plant was built at the university large enough to be classed as a pilot plant. Here are some of the findings combed from these submitted by candidates for bachelor's and master's degrees in arts and sciences during Karrick's eight-year tenure as director of coal products research:

The gasoline obtained from Utah coal is equal in quality to any of the tetraethyl gasolines.

Yields by volume of about 25 percent of gasoline, 19 percent kerosene and 20 percent good quality fuel oil may be obtained from coal.

The smokeless fuel when burned in an open grate or in boilers delivers 20 to 25 percent more heat than the raw coal.

As a complementary product in the process of distilling coal, electrical energy can be produced at a minimum cost.

In a Karrick plant with 1,000 tons of daily coal capacity there would be sufficient steam generated to develop 100,000 kilowatt-hours of electrical power with no extra cost (except for capital investment of electrical equipment) other than the loss of temperatures of the steam passing through the turbines.

Marketing of these products in most cases will be competitive with other products of coal and petroleum, according to Clarence Schmutz, candidate for master of arts.

This coal gas should deliver more heat than natural gas, per heat unit contained, because of the greater amount of combined carbon and less dilution of the combustion gases with water vapor.

The gasoline, fuel oil and other oil products would be a small part of the volume of petroleum products now imported into the State, and therefore, should find a ready and enthusiastic market.

A 30-ton plant and oil refinery will show a profit over and above all operating and capital costs. And the products will sell at present prices for like products.

A large commercial plant treating 1,000 tons of coal per day or more will be able to effect many economies in investment and operating costs.

The process steam cost would be very low since this steam would be derived from the offpeak boiler capacity, or steam bled from turbines, in central electric stations. Fuel for raising steam and superheating would likewise be reduced in cost.

The chief criticisms voiced are: (1) that a commercial-sized plant based on the principles worked out by Mr. L. C. Karrick and his associates in the Government service will not succeed because of mechanical troubles,

reference of a plausible nature having been made to failures of other plants that treated other coals with other processes under other conditions; and (2) that the markets for the coal products described in this thesis are limited, and therefore, such a venture is economically unsound.

No difficulties whatsoever were encountered with the successful mechanical operation of the plant used for this investigation. No changes in the design of the plant were necessary for it to work smoothly.

A commercial-sized plant of a few units should be built and operated as a "ward" of a public-spirited body in Utah. The Utah Research Foundation was initiated by Mr. Karrick for the endowment of the University of Utah and to bring other public benefits.

This should be the logical organization to father this movement.

When such a plant has operated for a reasonable period it will then be time for those who oppose such development to present facts and figures, if any, in support of the claim that such enterprise is not economically feasible, according to George Carter, candidate for master of science, and S. Clark Jacobsen, coworker and coinvestigator in the engineering research contained in this thesis.

Jacobsen won the Mechanical Engineering Honor for the "best undergraduate thesis of the year" awarded by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Utah Chapter. The Carter-Jacobsen thesis was summarized in a number of scientific and industrial journals.

Carter's point—about suspending criticism until a process has been fairly tested under commercial conditions—is well taken.

The Rexco plant in Leicestershire, England, is such a plant.

Karrick was a prime mover in the early development of Rexco's basic N.T.U. retorts. More recent proof that LTC is a powerful engine for the creation of wealth is found in the fact Rexco has completed drawings of a plant that will process 1,000,000 tons of coal a year. The blueprints were ordered by a client in Denmark intending to import coal from Poland to process into smokeless fuel for markets in Sweden.●

ASSISTANCE FOR AMATEUR ATHLETES

HON. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, this body will soon be considering legislation which will mean more to amateur athletes in this country and to this Nation's participation in future games than any action taken by Congress in recent history. The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 (S. 2727), which passed the other body without a dissenting vote in May, was favorably reported to the House by the Judiciary Committee this week. With the passage of this act, every amateur athlete—from world class competitors to the weekend jogger—can look forward to better organized and more developed sports programs in this country.

This act presents the best opportunity which has existed in over 50 years to effectively reorganize our amateur sports programs. As a longtime observer of the amateur sports scene and an enthusiastic supporter of this legislation, I know that this is an encouraging prospect for all of America's athletes. This has been confirmed by conversations I have had

with several outstanding amateur athletes from my home State.

Over the years, Wisconsin has been fortunate to have several of its amateur athletes represent the United States at the Olympic games and other international athletic competitions. One of these is Dan Immerfall, an Olympic medal winner in speedskating in 1976, who, in a conversation with me, underscored the importance athletes place in the passage of the Amateur Sports Act.

As we all know, the privilege to represent our country in the Olympic games requires a proficiency of skill which can be only acquired after long and grueling training, often at considerable personal expense to the athlete and his or her family. In some cases, the financial hardship is enormous.

An important means of providing some financial relief to our athletes is to make available adequate training facilities which are geographically near and financially affordable. The financial assistance provided in the Amateur Sports Act will help provide this opportunity for more amateur athletes.

At the present time, the U.S. Olympic Committee is underwriting the full cost of operation and maintenance of two regional training centers—one in Squaw Valley, Calif., and another in Colorado Springs, Colo. Within the past 14 months, over 9,000 young athletes have used these facilities. The USOC envisions the establishment of several of these centers across the geographical limits of the United States, as well as establishing supplementary training programs at selected educational institutions where facilities and coaching expertise exist.

Since a large part of the financial hardships to amateur athletes comes from the cost of travel to athletic training facilities which often are hundreds of miles from their home, the advantage of several regional training centers which provide room and board to the athlete upon arrival is obvious. The operational cost of these training centers requires a substantial financial commitment by the U.S. Olympic Committee. Without the Federal financial assistance provided for in the Amateur Sports Act, the USOC has indicated it is questionable that it can continue to make this opportunity available to the athletic youth of this Nation.

It should be noted, however, that the USOC intends to use these funds to administer and operate these training facilities, not for construction. Construction of a training center is a multimillion-dollar venture and is currently financed by private donations. It is anticipated that once the concept of training centers becomes better known, private funds can be developed for future operational costs.

This is only one example of how the Amateur Sports Act will benefit our Nation's youth. The programs which this bill will mandate will provide many more opportunities for amateur athletes to develop their skills and fulfill the dream many of them have of representing our country in the Olympic games.

As the views of Wisconsin's Dan Immerfall are representative of many of the amateur athletes who support this

bill, I submit an interview with Mr. Immerfall published in the Wisconsin State Journal on September 9, 1978, be printed in the RECORD at this point:

[From the Wisconsin State Journal, Sept. 9, 1978]

OPPORTUNITY TO HELP FINANCE U.S. OLYMPIANS IS NOW

Madison's Dan Immerfall is a most dedicated athlete, whose exploits have become known world-wide.

The thrill of his lifetime came in winning a speedskating medal at the Winter Olympic Games in 1976, and he has hopes of doing well in the 1980 Games at Lake Placid, N.Y.

Now, the University of Wisconsin music major is supporting a cause that would keep that opportunity flourishing for other potential Olympians.

Immerfall estimates that it takes approximately \$8,000 to \$10,000 a year of his own money to participate in speedskating competition in this country and around the world.

Speedskaters have to travel almost daily between homes and the olympic-sized West Allis rink to practice. Doing a great deal of traveling seems to be the case with so many amateur athletes. And they generally pay travel expenses out of their own pockets. It's a decision to either personally finance their goals, or give up.

So, when assistance is proposed by both houses of Congress, which coincides with the strict rules of amateur status, it looms as a golden opportunity to athletes.

"Athletes of all sports need something like this," said Immerfall. "It is so important to the development of our Olympic potential."

It is surprising that the United States has done so well in Olympic competition. So many other countries are subsidized by their governments in varying degrees, but U.S. participation has existed virtually through contributions alone.

That's why Immerfall and his fellow Olympians were so enthused over proposed legislation in May.

The bill (H.R. 12626) not only would eventually lead to an athletes' bill of rights for future settlement of disputes between sports organizations, but would call for a one-time federal authorization of \$30 million to the United States Olympic Committee (USOC). Those funds would be disbursed over a four-year period to help promote a well-developed sports program and to develop new and additional training programs in support of the Olympic effort.

Part of the appropriation was to be used for expansion of programs in sports medicine and testing at the regional training centers at Squaw Valley and Colorado Springs, but not for development of training centers, which generate funds separately.

Immerfall claims the nation's amateur sports programs may now be in danger of losing that authorization.

A companion bill to the current House of Representatives bill was enacted by the Senate in May without a single dissenting vote. But on Aug. 16 the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Judiciary Committee delegated authority for federal financing of the \$30 million.

The Judiciary Committee is soon to consider the subcommittee report.

The USOC claims that "in removing the authority it was apparent that subcommittee members did not realize that funding was essential to implementation of other provisions of the legislation."

"I believe, as the USOC does, that the action does not reflect sentiments of people concerned with amateur sports," said Immerfall.

To reinstate that funding, Immerfall said,

"you must make your feelings known to your congressman.

"Every athlete with Olympic potential may lose a golden opportunity to obtain what is within our grasp if we can muster public support," Immerfall said.

He feels that if amateur sports are to continue to flourish it is vital that legislation to keep that \$30 million in the bill be enacted during the current session of Congress which adjourns in October.

If legislation is not enacted it will then become open for debate and the whole process must begin again with the new Congress, and that could result in years of lost time with no guarantee that re-introduced legislation will ever see the light of day.

Perhaps not everyone, even followers of Olympic sports, feels as strong about this "lost opportunity," but Immerfall does, and he urges action. ●

NEED TO CONSOLIDATE GRANT PROGRAMS

HON. ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Speaker, on August 17 my colleague, DON CLAUSEN, and I introduced a resolution calling for a study of the Federal categorical grants system with an eye toward consolidation. This legislation grew out of our service on the California delegation task force on proposition 13, when it became clear to us that the numerous restrictions and matching requirements of Federal grant programs are hindering the rational allocation of local funds following the passage of proposition 13.

At our request, the General Accounting Office provided a report on the effect of these requirements, in which the GAO agreed that consolidation of grant programs would lead to more effective and efficient programs and lessen the distortion of local priorities which occurs under the present system.

At the risk of embarrassing my colleague, I would like to insert in the RECORD an editorial from the Santa Rosa, Calif., Press Democrat, a paper in his district, commenting on this issue. The editorial reads as follows:

[From the Press Democrat, Sept. 20, 1978]

CUTTING DOWN ON PAPERWORK

One of the disturbing trends in government in recent years has been the growth of federal grant programs.

Today more than 52 federal agencies administer 975 federal grant programs. These grants go to state and local governments. With each grant comes "strings"—rules set up by the federal government regarding the use of grant funds. Naturally, this leads to more paperwork and an expenditure of public tax monies for administration of each funded program.

Now two California Congressmen, Don Clausen of the Redwood Empire and Bob Lagomarsino of Ojai, have introduced legislation which would provide for consolidation of grant programs to save money, reduce paperwork, and give local government agencies more control of the tax dollars.

The two Californians asked the U.S. General Accounting Office for its opinion on consolidation of the grant programs. The GAO said that millions of dollars could be saved if the grants programs would be consolidated into four or five general areas. This

would give local governments more decision-making power over the grant money.

The GAO also pointed out another obvious fault of the federal grant programs as now operated. That is that the federal government, by waving the carrot of grant money for specified programs, induces state and local governments to take up "programmatic ventures they otherwise might not have funded."

That has been one of our biggest gripes about the federal (and sometimes state) grant programs. They induce, nay, almost compel, local governments to take up certain programs, and then gradually reduce the funding. This leaves local governments stuck with federal programs while their revenue base is being reduced. This is especially true since the passage of Proposition 13.

The passage of Proposition 13 is what caused Congressman Clausen to ask GAO advice on the grant programs. He is a member of a special task force from the California Congressional delegation assigned the duty to determine the impact of Proposition 13 and its "message" to legislators.

We commend Congressman Clausen for sponsoring legislation to consolidate federal grants, and urge Congress to approve such legislation in the interest of getting the federal government off the backs and out of the pocketbooks of U.S. taxpayers. ●

TRIBUTE TO CONGRESSMAN MO UDALL'S LEADERSHIP

HON. WILLIAM LEHMAN

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, it was my privilege to follow the genuinely unself-serving legislative leadership of Congressman MO UDALL as he guided the civil service reform bill to final passage.

This was a delicate and often agonizing process. MO UDALL used his considerable prestige and unique legislative skills to work through and around the roadblocks of special interest and pressure groups to produce legislation that will benefit the common good.

The following is an article from the Washington Post of September 20. It describes in greater detail the many obstacles met and overcome by MO UDALL as he led the battle for civil service reform.

UDALL'S DELICATE COALITION PUSHED THROUGH CIVIL SERVICE BILL

(By Kathy Sawyer)

In the double glow of television lights and victory last Wednesday, just after the House had given overwhelming approval to President Carter's landmark civil service overhaul legislation, Rep. Morris K. Udall spoke briefly on the phone with the President at Camp David.

As the lanky Arizonan listened, his face crinkled in a tired smile. The President had said "something about who might have been elected president in 1976," Udall said later.

It was Carter's acknowledgement of the irony that the man who had made this widely heralded triumph possible was his former adversary in the '76 campaign, who had only reluctantly bowed to the president's personal request last spring that he take charge of this bill, a top domestic priority for Carter.

If Udall had declined that dubious honor,

parties on all sides agree, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 would now be in the dusty grave so many had predicted for it all along. Instead it is in the hands of House-Senate conferees, meeting today and next week to resolve the conflicts between the two versions, before what is expected to be smooth final passage.

"The single most important factor in that bill's success has been Mo Udall's unbelievable integrity, and the fact that he kept on pushing," said one lobbyist, summing up the sentiments expressed by many.

Udall had himself taken up interest in the issue of government reform. Also, more importantly, the Arizonan was viewed as the only member of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, which had jurisdiction over the bill, who could serve as a trusted mediator among the disparate elements that had threatened to sink the bill.

Udall is credited, among other things, with putting together, through arduous negotiation, the crucial compromise on a labor-management section of the bill—the issue that more than any other had threatened to kill the bill.

The "unsung hero" in this saga, Udall said, is Rep. William Ford (D-Mich.) who played a "quiet but critically important role" in that particular struggle.

It was Ford, a staunch supporter of labor, who fought from the beginning against a labor package, favored by the administration, that would satisfy the Republicans but would divide Democrats and would have the administration "running over" the federal employee unions, Udall said.

It was Ford's eventual approval of a compromise on the scope of bargaining to be given federal employee unions, plus his efforts to persuade other labor supporters to join him, that led to what Udall termed "that remarkable spectacle" last week of conservative Republicans, led by Rep. John Erlenborn (R-Ill.), and liberal Democrats, led by Ford and Rep. William Clay (D-Mo.), joining in a 380-to-0 House approval of the labor package.

"The bill would have sunk if Ford and Clay and organized labor had decided to go after it," Udall said. "As it is, they (labor) are coming out with substantial gains."

Ford called his feat "nothing fancy. It's the way the system is supposed to work around here."

He criticized the administration for some early misjudgments, such as not consulting properly with unions and their allies, baiting federal workers by emphasizing the need to get rid of incompetents, and the like. He said he foresaw a resulting backlash "which would make it difficult for members to support the bill, especially Democrats."

"We urged that the new powers the bill would give to managers be balanced off with fair play for employees," he said. "But it took some time to convince the administration that we were serious, and not just trying to spoil the president's bill."

Some other sources on the committee still grumble about "bumbling" and a lack of political savvy in White House dealings with them. Last spring, for instance, just as Carter was gearing up to woo the committee on this bill, a top administration official went campaigning for the opponent of the committee chairman, Robert N. C. Nix, who was subsequently defeated.

Even Udall, who has praised administration efforts, this week went so far as to say "there was a certain naivete in the beginning" on the part of the Carter team.

However, he said that Civil Service Commission Chairman Alan K. Campbell "is extremely bright and learned quickly." Campbell has led a White House task force in pushing the president's plan on all fronts, including a massive nationwide public relations effort.

"I was naive," Campbell said yesterday, "but I got over it."

In the area of labor-management issues, he said the administration's early recommendations were the result of an intense dispute within the administration on how much to give the unions. This left the Carter forces "little room for bargaining and maneuvering."

As the bill progressed through one crisis after another, Udall said, the president kept in close touch with him. "But he also told me 'you're the quarterback' and gave me rather complete authority" to make decisions, including some not so pleasing to the administration.

For example, with time running short on the congressional calendar Udall made a "battlefield decision not to fight an amendment offered in committee by Rep. Gladys Noon Spellman (D-Md.) that had been vigorously opposed by the administration. The amendment limited Carter's new Senior Executive Service, a key part of his plan, to an initial experimental phase before it can expand throughout the government. That change is one of the major differences to be reconciled in conference.

It was partly because of what Udall called the "vicious crosscurrents in the committee" that he resisted the president's urging last spring that he become the bill's shepherd. Not only was he busy with major projects of his own, but he had "considerable doubts at the time that we could pull it off at all," Udall said this week.

But the president had appealed "to my patriotism and my friendship," Udall said. "I'm an old Hubert Humphrey Democrat—a sucker for that kind of appeal."●

MORE STUDY NEEDED

HON. IKE SKELTON

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, Missouri pork producers are deeply concerned about the possible Federal response to a recent study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology which "suggests" that nitrites cause cancer in laboratory animals. As a resident of the leading pork producing county in Missouri, I fully understand this concern. These pork producers see this as another in a long list of actions coming out of Washington which have brought confusion and uncertainty to their industry, and seriously threatened its future stability.

Mr. Speaker, if ever a situation called for a risk-benefit approach to Federal regulation, this is it. In the MIT study, a cancer-prone rat species, fed a high dose of sodium nitrite, showed a slightly higher incident of lymphomas—cancer—than when not fed sodium nitrite. The author of the MIT study has summarized his own results as "somewhat less than convincing," and has called for more studies in other species of test animals. Moreover, an examination of the MIT study by the highly respected College of Agriculture of Iowa State University concluded that because of inappropriate statistical methods used and the lack of important data, the MIT report does not clearly establish carcinogenic activity by nitrite itself.

Balanced against this, Mr. Speaker, is the well documented evidence of the

benefits of nitrites. Nitrites have been used in meat products for hundreds of years. They are essential in preventing the development of the deadly botulinum toxin and other food poisons. They retard spoilage and impart flavor and color to cured meat products. Nitrite preservatives are used in 66 percent of the total pork produced in the United States. The pork producing industry would suffer disastrous economic consequences if nitrites could no longer be used. In addition, consumers would suffer increased prices because of the high cost of currently available alternative preservation systems.

Mr. Speaker, any action to ban or phase out nitrites at this time would be precipitous. Regulatory agencies must base their decisions on unequivocal, sound, repeatable scientific information. We do not have this kind of information on nitrites at this time. When it becomes available, then the benefits of nitrite use must be balanced against whatever risks are determined to be present.

This is why, Mr. Speaker, that I am cosponsoring legislation which would prohibit a ban on the use of nitrites as a food preservative unless there is evidence which proves beyond a reasonable doubt that nitrites as a food preservative have a significant carcinogenic effect on humans, or unless an economically feasible substitute preservative which will protect the public against botulism and other food poisoning becomes available. This is the reasonable way to proceed, Mr. Speaker, and I urge all my colleagues in the House to join in support of this approach.●

SUPPORT FOR WIRETAP BILL

HON. ROMANO L. MAZZOLI

OF KENTUCKY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Speaker, today, the House Judiciary Committee authorized the appointment of conferees on the H.R. 7308, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. This step now clears this important bill for conference, and I hope, swift passage into law.

As the following September 21, 1978, editorial from the Louisville Courier Journal points out, H.R. 7308 is a carefully balanced measure.

In committee markup and on the floor last week, every effort was made to reconcile the competing interests of national security and individual privacy. I believe that we were largely successful in our efforts.

I hope that my colleagues will take a moment to read this thoughtful editorial.

CONGRESSIONAL GOOD SENSE ON WIRETAPPING

Congress is near the end of a long search for the right sort of controls on government wiretaps in the foreign intelligence field. That's tribute to Capital Hill persistence in the face of the unusual coalition that emerged during House debate.

The House, like the Senate last April, voted this month to extend to "foreign" wiretaps the requirement already imposed on the domestic variety—that agents first obtain

federal court warrants. The leading foes of this change were former federal agents who repeatedly waved the "national security" banner.

Admittedly, this view was tempered by a wish to clarify the legal status of intelligence agents, a situation clouded by such events as the indictment of a New York City FBI supervisor in an illegal mail-opening campaign. But mostly the ex-agents argued that the necessity of first obtaining warrants before tapping the conversations of suspected spies, saboteurs and terrorists would delay critical investigations. They said it would be better to rely on implied presidential powers, asserted by successive administrations and recognized in court, to order wiretaps in the national interest.

Also opposing the House and Senate bill during the three-year legislative struggle were many liberals who believe any wiretapping to be an encroachment on the precious right of privacy. But a majority took a view between these two extremes. It concluded that more had to be done to curb intelligence abuses, such as those unearthed during Watergate. Probes turned up evidence of such abuses as taps on the phones of White House aides, harassment of opposition candidates (under both Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon), and the use of wiretap information to divide legitimate dissent organizations.

Among those leading this centrist coalition in the House were Morgan Murphy of Illinois and Romano Mazzoli of Kentucky. Their opposition largely came from Republicans and Southern Democrats who tried to gut the bill by asserting that existing executive orders on wiretaps would assure sufficient restraint.

The reply to this argument, as Representative Mazzoli observed, is that the absence of a law would give a future president the opportunity to discard the present administrative restrictions on eavesdropping. Thus, the best safeguard for citizens' rights would be passage of checks and balances that not even a future Richard Nixon could alter.

Similarly, in rebutting the argument that the bill would hamper investigations, its sponsors noted that emergency wiretaps would be allowed, so long as judicial approval was obtained within 24 hours.

The sponsors also accepted the suggestion of Robert McClory of Illinois, leader of the opposition, that agencies be exempted from obtaining warrants to intercept communications between two parties who were not U.S. citizens or resident aliens.

Another important provision of the bill is a requirement that the judge issuing a warrant for foreign-intelligence wiretapping be shown evidence of criminal activities, not merely suspicions that might mask political motivation. This, too, was opposed by Representative McClory. He contended that judges are not competent to properly assess intelligence-gathering needs. But the House, in a 429-128 vote, rightly rejected this argument.

The McClory coalition did manage to eliminate a proposal, approved earlier by the Senate, that the Chief Justice name special judges to hear warrant requests and monitor legal wiretaps. The Senate-House conference should restore this special panel, whose members would have time to develop expertise. Their knowledge would be an additional safeguard against promiscuous issuance of warrants.

As Congress heads down the home stretch, this delicate compromise should win a place high on the priority lists of the Carter administration and Capitol Hill leadership. The political abuses of the past could be a problem in the future unless a well-balanced wiretap act is adopted. ●

THE DANGEROUS ARMS RACE

HON. DON EDWARDS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Speaker, I want to comment to my colleagues the recent comments of Mr. Tokuma Utsunomiya, a member of the House of Representatives in Japan, regarding an issue of great importance to our country and the international community—the defense needs of Japan. Mr. Utsunomiya is a valued friend with great foresight. I think his unique perspective on this issue will be of great benefit to the Members and the American public in assessing our future policies toward our ally, Japan:

[From the June 6, 1978, issue of the Economist, Japan]

THE DANGEROUS ARMS RACE

(By Tokuma Utsunomiya)

I cannot but feel deep anguish when I think of the future of Japan to see the recent rampancy of unthinking expressions of hawkish ideas and statements around us. There is the danger of Japanese politics being swept along in one direction before the people of Japan can engage in adequate discussion. I have written the following article in order to resist and block this trend.

I do not believe that Japan has abandoned its right to individual self-defence in its Constitution and I believe it would be better if Japan's self-defence capabilities were made more disciplined, stronger and more effective under the ultimate control of the National Diet.

However, I feel that the arguments in favor of strengthening Japan's self-defence and rearming Japan, which have been voiced in the past and are being voiced today, contain certain dangers. These arguments are based on the excessive trust in armed might that prevailed in pre-war Japan and on a subservience to the Cold War policies of the United States. Moreover, those who put forth these arguments are persons who have not been able to rid themselves of the habit of placing military affairs and administrative processes before politics.

As a matter of fact, the Japanese politics, which permitted the great destruction of Japan's natural environment evident around us today for the sake of economic growth, are capable of seeking the expansion of Japan's self-defence capabilities not for the sake of the Japanese people but for the benefit of corporations and as a means of stimulating the economy. Indeed, we cannot deny the fact that just such extremely dangerous trends are evident in the arguments calling for Japan to lift its ban on the export of arms and in expressions of hopes of a war breaking out in the near future.

However, this does not mean I am denying Japan's right to expand its self-defence capabilities in keeping with needs and for the sake of the Japanese people, provided this expansion is carried out under proper political control. Japan's "peace" Constitution and its three non-nuclear principles (not to possess, produce and import nuclear arms) are the products of the wisdom of Japan's post-war politics. To indiscriminately abandon or overthrow our "peace" Constitution and the three non-nuclear principles is tantamount to permitting ultra-

rightist totalitarianism, in all its stupidity, to destroy Japan once again.

Japanese politics should hold high Japan's "peace" Constitution and its three non-nuclear principles, not as a sop to Japan's pacifist opposition parties or to domestic public opinion, but to all countries of the world and should strongly advocate in the United Nations and in other international forums the abolition of nuclear arms and large-scale disarmament.

To do so would be to provide a grand vision to the Japanese people and, at the same time, would be in keeping with Japan's vital national interests. Japan, with its dense population crammed into a small space and with its advanced industrialization, is extremely vulnerable to destructive nuclear weapons from both the air and the sea.

The range of today's nuclear weapons is very great. They can be aimed from anywhere at a given target with great accuracy. Of all parts of the world, the areas in which a single nuclear missile can wreck the greatest destruction possible are the Tokyo-Yokohama, the Osaka-Kobe and the North Kyushu districts in Japan. Further, Japan's economy depends on marine transportation and, in the case of oil alone, Japan imports close to 300 million tons from abroad in tankers. If a large-scale attack were launched against Japan's commercial sea lanes, we must expect immediate paralysis of Japan's economy and its national livelihood. Even if the Japanese people may not be aware of this fact, foreign military experts know this all too well.

Japan, by its very geophysical structure, does not have today the ability to wage a war. It can only repel small-scale armed attacks.

If Japanese politics were foolish enough to drag Japan a large-scale war, the first and probably the last fight the Japanese people can engage in would be the struggle of doctors and nurses to accommodate and care for countless young and old and male and female non-combatants. For this reason, "hawkish" patriots should not exist in Japan in the first place. If any such patriots are to be found, they would either be mad men or the mouthpieces of foreign countries.

Peace is as necessary as the sun for Japan. For this reason, Japan must work to create internationally an atmosphere of peace and to make the peace-keeping structure of the United Nations into a powerful organ. For this, it would be in Japan's greatest national interest to call actively for the abolition of nuclear arms and for general disarmament.

However, the world reality today is one in which the arms buildup and the play at soldiery have spread to such an extent that arguments for disarmament and peace seem only a conceptual game.

Both in the USSR and in the United States the military technocracy has become extremely strong and, although the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War appeared to have set back the industrial-military complex, it has already staged a come-back. In the midst of the opposition to President Carter's Panama Canal agreement and his plans to withdraw troops from South Korea, there has become noticeable a joining together of the forces of the industrial-military complex and right-wing organizations.

The world-wide struggle for hegemony between the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, has become critical and both nations now possess nuclear arms in quantities several times greater than that needed to completely destroy all living things on the face of this earth. An arms race between the two nations still continues—an arms race centered on nuclear weapons and fraught with the danger of the product of the highest wisdom of human civilization being used in the most foolish manner.

The military budget of the USSR in fiscal 1977 was \$127,000 million, according to figures announced by China. This added to the military budget of the United States means that close to \$300,000 million was spent during the past fiscal year for military purposes. The U.S. budget for fiscal 1977 lists military expenditures of \$101,500 million. This represents an increase of \$11,000 million over fiscal 1976. Besides military expenditures, there are disbursements for pensions to military personnel, space development and foreign intelligence activities. This forms the basis for the estimate of the close to \$300,000 million in military and military-related spending of the United States and the USSR in fiscal 1977.

This enormous sum is one-third of the total value of world trade and three times the total value of U.S. trade in 1975. It means that vast economic energies are being kept out of economic circulation and prevented from enriching human lives.

In the case of Socialist societies, it is clear that a 20 percent increase in military expenditures means a 20 percent decrease in the real incomes of their peoples. However, in capitalist societies, it is said that increases in military expenditures stimulate the economy and result in an increase in real incomes.

It is certain that in present-day Japan, at a time when one-third of the nation's steel production capacity and over 50 percent of Japan's shipbuilding capacity remain idle, orders for arms would save the plight of iron and steel and shipbuilding companies and would enable them to return profits. However, for the people as a whole, it would mean an increase in their tax burden and a drop in their real incomes.

Generally speaking, if we lived in an age today in which we did not have to worry about the finite nature of resources and industrial sites, arms orders, incapable of contributing on their own to the improvement of the lives of the people, would, nonetheless, stimulate the expansion of production facilities, would have so-called "spinoff effects", would trigger a business boom and would have the effect of increasing the real incomes of the people.

However, at present, the military spending and arms exports of both the USSR and the United States and the vast military expenditures of other countries in the world are sucking the life-blood of the world's economy and the expansion of production aimed at supplementing this loss of economic blood is being limited by shortages of resources and industrial sites and is not contributing to the improvement of economic conditions and to the increasing of real incomes.

Rather, military spending brings about stagflation, or recession accompanied by high commodity prices, and brings about a weakening of the economies and an impoverishment of the lives of the people of the countries involved.

In short, the reason why so-called modern economic sciences appear impotent is because they cannot clearly point out the fact that under the present arms race economic growth brings in its train severe pollution and the wasteful dissipation of resources and the fact economic growth under these conditions cannot contribute to the welfare of mankind.

BALANCE(S) OF POWER SERIES

HON. JOHN B. BRECKINRIDGE

OF KENTUCKY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Mr. Speaker, the Intentions Series now focuses upon

the role which managerial power in the Soviet defense sector plays in various policy decisions affecting U.S./Soviet relations. In "Defense Industrialists in the U.S.S.R.," Karl F. Spielmann describes the functions of the defense industrialists in Soviet society and analyzes their potential influence in defense and foreign policies of the Soviet Union. The author emphasizes two key areas in which they are most likely to play an important role: the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the effort to improve the Soviet economy through the acquisition of Western technology.

"Defense Industrialists in the U.S.S.R." first appeared in *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1976.

The first part of Mr. Spielmann's article follows:

DEFENSE INDUSTRIALISTS IN THE USSR

(By Karl F. Spielmann)

At this stage in the evolution of Soviet society, the defense industrialists of the USSR have considerable stakes in the decisions which that country's leaders have to make in two major areas. As managers of traditionally the most privileged segment of the Soviet economy, the defense industrialists cannot help but be concerned with the decisions confronting the leadership how best to cope with the ills of the flagging civilian economy. As the armors of the Soviet State, they also have an obviously large stake in the leadership's decisions on how best to build upon the Soviet Union's newly acquired status as a strategic equal of the United States.

The defense industrialists have reason to sense both opportunities and challenges in these not unrelated sets of decisions. New vigor for the economy as a whole would obviously be welcomed by them. However, as the regime casts about for economic cures, they are doubtless attentive to the potential threat of encroachments on their longstanding privileges. Similarly, the defense industrialists have reason to anticipate a rich and varied menu of defense programs from a regime appreciative of their recent achievements and tempted to exploit the USSR's new strategic status for foreign-policy gains. Yet, at this point in the arms "race," some of the dishes on this menu might not be too appealing. If the Soviet Union should have to place increasing emphasis on technologically adventurous weapons systems to keep pace with (or try to outpace) the United States, the defense industrialists could find themselves subject to disturbing pressures to modify tried and true organizational arrangements and practices in their sector.

It follows from the preceding statements that the defense industrialists are vitally concerned with decisions affecting the future course of the Soviet regime's current policy of détente toward the West. The regime's decisions regarding the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT) and its effort to secure doses of Western technology to nurse the Soviet economy are most prominently involved. It is thus a matter of more than passing interest to Western policymakers trying to divine the nature and depth of the USSR's commitment to détente whether the defense industrialists are in a position to translate these concerns into an impact on policy and what this impact might be.

SOVIET MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXITIES

To suggest that the question of managerial power in the Soviet defense sector—i.e., of the degree to which managers and administrators in this sector can or do influence national policy—may now have a particular relevance to pressing policy decisions affecting Soviet-US relations does not mean that one should have high hopes of satisfactorily re-

solving it. Over the years, the Soviet defense industrialists have received much less scholarly attention in the West than either their military customers or their managerial counterparts in the Soviet civilian economy. The reason for this lies in the extraordinary dearth of available information on the operations of the Soviet defense industries, which has caused Western scholars, by and large, to heed the counsels of prudence and adopt a policy of benign neglect toward the defense industrialists. Such an attitude, however, carries certain risks of its own. For one may then be tempted to make judgments about the defense industrialists on the basis of one of two alternative assumptions: either (1) that the attitudes and interests of the defense industrialists, as managers, coincide with those of Soviet industrial managers in general; or (2) that the defense industrialists, who are simultaneously members of the Soviet military establishment, fully share the interests and attitudes of the professional military. Neither of these assumptions, however, has been definitely established. As a consequence, the scholar faces a difficult choice: either he can go ahead and focus specifically on the defense industrialists as a particular group, in the face of admittedly incomplete evidence; or he can continue to make inferences about their attitudes and policy impact on the basis of the unproven assumptions just described. In the author's view, there are good grounds for choosing the former course.

For while the territory of the defense industrialists may be difficult to chart, it is not to be regarded as totally alien. Without succumbing to the illusion that methodological niceties can somehow make up for a lack of evidence, one can draw some useful guidance from other analytical settings in broaching the issue of managerial power in the Soviet defense sector. Since this article represents only a first step in trying to focus attention on the defense industrialists, it will not attempt a detailed discussion of the utility and disutility of applying concepts from related analyses. However, where particularly appropriate in the discussion, the apparent relevance of various approaches which have been utilized in other areas will be noted. The three principal sources that might be tapped to shed light on the defense industrialists' situation—provided that in doing so one does not lose sight of the peculiarities of these industrialists—are: (1) recent evaluations of US foreign-policy and weapons-system decision-making;¹ (2) studies of industrial decision-making in the Soviet civilian sector;² and (3) analyses of the Soviet defense research and development (R&D) process.³

THE WORLD OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIALISTS

The limited nature of the evidence available on the question of managerial power in the defense sector is readily apparent from a survey of the most significant published information on the defense industrialists' domain. As analysts who have grappled with the problem are painfully aware, it is difficult to calculate the magnitude of the overall annual Soviet defense budget,⁴ much less arrive at a reliable estimate of the budget share for each of the Soviet defense-industrial ministries. It is generally agreed, however, that the defense-industrial ministries are privileged in respect of both the volume and quality of their share in certain key resources, such as R&D inputs (both manpower and equipment), and that, also in contrast to the civilian economy, they tend to utilize these resources more efficiently.⁵ Finally, while there is very little direct information on enterprise-level operations in the defense-industrial bailiwick, one can at least tentatively derive some inferences about the

Footnotes at end of article.

attitudes, roles, and relations of personnel at this level from what is known about: (a) the R&D process and its relations to production; (b) enterprise-level activities of the military customer; and, most important, (c) the basic structure and responsibilities of the defense-industrial ministries.

The most important defense industrialists are the heads of the individual defense-industrial ministries. There are currently eight defense-industrial ministries as well as at least four "quasi"-defense-industrial ministries (contributing to Soviet defense production) that have been identified. The ministries in the former category, together with their current ministers (in parentheses) and basic production responsibilities, are as follows:

Ministry of the Defense Industry (S. A. Zverev)—artillery, tanks, armored vehicles, small arms, fuses, primers, propellants, explosives, and possibly tactical guided missiles;

Ministry of the Aviation Industry (P. V. Dement'yev)—aircraft, aircraft parts, and probably aerodynamic missiles;

Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry (B. Ye. Butoma*)—naval vessels of all sorts;

Ministry of the Electronics Industry (A. I. Shokin)—electronic components and parts (subassemblies rather than finished electronic equipment);

Ministry of the Radio Industry (P. S. Pleshakov)—electronic systems, including radio and communications equipment, navigation aids, radars and computers;

Ministry of General Machine-building (S. A. Afanas'yev)—strategic ballistic missiles and space vehicles;

Ministry of Medium Machine-building (Ye. P. Slavskiy)—nuclear devices and warheads;

Ministry of Machine-building (V. V. Bakhirev)—possibly some portions of ballistic missiles and space vehicles or a portion of the Ministry of the Defense Industry's responsibilities.⁶

The category of "quasi"-defense-industrial ministries includes those of Tractor and Agricultural Machine-building; the Chemical Industry; the Automobile Industry; and Instrument-making, Automation and Control Systems.⁷

A notable feature of the defense-industrial sector is the durability of its administrators. All of the current defense-industrial ministers have spent long years in this field of work in various capacities, rising typically from enterprise-management posts to deputy minister and then minister. Moreover, most have long tenure in their ministerial posts. Apart from P. S. Pleshakov, who only assumed the post of Minister of the Radio Industry in 1974 upon the demise of V. D. Kalmykov, V. V. Bakhirev is the most "junior" minister, with 8 years of experience as head of the Ministry of Machine-building (i.e., ever since its creation). S. A. Afanas'yev has been a minister for 11 years, and S. A. Zverev for 13 years. Among the "senior" ministers, P. V. Dement'yev has headed the Ministry of the Aviation Industry for 23 years; B. Ye. Butoma* and Ye. P. Slavskiy have led their ministries for almost 19 years; and A. I. Shokin has headed the Ministry of the Electronics Industry since its founding 15 years ago. V. D. Kalmykov, had been minister of the Radio Industry for over 20 years at the time of his death in 1974.

The basic lack of turnover in the ranks of the top defense industrialists probably attests at least in part to the Soviet political leadership's general confidence in their capabilities as administrators. Since several of them have weathered two successive leaderships, the top defense industrialists' grip on their posts may also testify to considerable political acumen on their parts—either in picking the winning side on key issues that have divided the leadership over the

years or in wisely maintaining a low profile when it was politically expedient to do so. Except for P. S. Pleshakov, all of the current defense-industrial ministers are full members of the party Central Committee,⁸ but none has gained entry to the Politburo. This contrasts with the situation in the early 1950's, for example, when defense-industry ministerial posts were occupied by Politburo members M. G. Pervukhin and M. Z. Saburov. (Since then, only D. F. Ustinov, whose unique role we shall consider presently, has risen from the ranks of top defense-industrial administrators to membership on the Politburo.)

Not only has the durability in office of the top defense industrialists provided an important element of continuity in this vital sector; it has also apparently helped to sustain a network of personal relationships that may be significant in reinforcing a community of defense-industrial "interests."⁹ These relationships are not limited to long-term personal contacts among the defense-industrial ministers themselves but also extend to the ministers' working relationships with the principal overseers of the sector. D. F. Ustinov, who was the party's chief watchdog over defense industry until his recent promotion to the post of Minister of Defense, and L. V. Smirnov, the Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission (*Voyenno-Promyshlennaya Kommissiya*—VPK),¹⁰ both previously served as Minister of the Defense Industry and no doubt have had a longstanding personal acquaintance with the current defense-industrial ministers as well as with one another.

Notwithstanding the long tenure of the key defense-industrial administrators, there have been several organizational changes within the sector since it first attained separate existence almost 40 years ago.¹¹ While some of these changes no doubt have been reflections of broader organizational shake-ups in the Soviet bureaucratic structure,¹² some changes probably also have taken place to meet specific needs arising out of the exploitation of new areas of military technology. The creation in 1961 of the State Committee for Electronics Technology (which in 1965 became the Ministry of the Electronics Industry) probably falls into this category. The establishment of the Ministry of General Machine-building in 1965 presumably was also prompted by evolving military requirements. (It is curious, however, that creation of this separate ministry to administer missile R&D and production came only some five years after the Soviets saw fit, in late 1959, to create a separate service in the military to accommodate the ICBM—the Strategic Rocket Forces.) Since the establishment of the Ministry of General Machine-building, only one new ministry has been added—i.e., the Ministry of Machine-building (in 1968).

In addition to these organizational accommodations to technological change, the defense sector in general has apparently benefited from other practices to keep the gap between R&D and production—which has been a source of particular concern in the civilian sector in recent years¹³—from yawning wide. Besides special supervisory efforts by the top leadership directed to this end, this seems to be basically a consequence of efforts by the individual ministries to attain and retain under their own authority the necessary R&D and production resources to turn out weapons systems; the clout given to individual designers in both the R&D and production processes; and the attention given to special experimental plants which construct weapons-systems prototypes.¹⁴ It is noteworthy, however, that the defense-industrial ministries were apparently among the first to adopt the new system of economic accountability called for under the 1965 economic reform.¹⁵ (Indeed, in 1964, S. A. Afanas'yev—soon to become Minister of General Machine-

building—explicitly endorsed the need for economic reform based on the Liberman proposals.¹⁶) That the leadership saw fit to extend the reform to the defense sector suggests that the sector may not be altogether free of the ills besetting the civilian economy—which the reform in part was supposed to help remedy. If the presumed goals of the regime as evidenced on the civilian side are any guide, the intent would have been, among others, to improve production efficiency in the defense sector and in particular to encourage the defense managers to be more receptive to technological innovation.¹⁷

A final aspect of the defense-industrial setup that bears mention also illustrates that the dividing line between civilian and defense industries may not be as sharp as it at first appears. While it is impossible to arrive at any trustworthy calculation, the civilian production commitments of the defense-industrial ministries seem to be considerable. This is quite evident if one takes into account, for example, that the production of all civilian aircraft in the USSR falls under the Ministry of the Aviation Industry in the defense-industrial sector. Brezhnev himself told the 24th CPSU Congress in March 1971 that 42 percent of the defense-industrial ministries' efforts went into production for the civilian sector.¹⁸ Soon thereafter, P. V. Dement'yev, Minister of Aviation Industry and, S. A. Zverev, Minister of Defense Industry, both published articles bolstering Brezhnev's claim.¹⁹ The latter cited an impressive array of civilian products produced by defense-industrial plants—ranging from oil-drilling equipment to the Moskvich automobile.

DEFENSE PRODUCERS AND THE MILITARY

The foregoing survey of various aspects of the Soviet defense-industrial establishment provides only a rough starting point for assessing managerial power in this sector. It is necessary to fit these elements into a more sharply-focused picture of the defense industrialists' relationship with their military customers as well as with the Soviet political leadership.

While the nature and impact of managerial power in the Soviet defense-industrial sector must ultimately hinge on the relationship between the defense industrialists and the political leadership, these matters cannot be properly evaluated without first taking a look at the relationship between the industrialists and their most important customers, the Soviet military. In broad terms, one might reasonably take for granted a basic commonality of interests between those who produce Soviet weapons systems and those who use them. To the extent it could be shown that such a commonality of interests exists and can be translated into pressure on the Soviet leadership to pursue defense (and foreign) policies which it would not otherwise adopt, one would have a classical example of the operation of a military-industrial complex in the Soviet setting. There are, however, significant nuances and distinctions in the Soviet case that may limit the validity of this military-industrial "model" in analyzing the policymaking process in the USSR.

First, the model oversimplifies matters for the reason that, notwithstanding the aggregative role which the Ministry of Defense may play for the military, in reality the defense-industrial/military relationship is one between a collection of producers on one side and a collection of customers on the other. The eight defense-industrial ministers turn out weapons systems for five different military services. Accordingly the Ministry of General Machine-building, for example, can be expected in the main to have a greater interest in the fate of weapons systems for the Strategic Rocket Forces than in those desired, say, by the Ground Forces. Similarly, the Ministry of Shipbuilding would obviously have a

Footnotes at end of article.

greater stake in the Navy's programs than in the programs of the other services. Consequently, just as there may be categories of decisions which find the defense-industrialists as a whole and the military as a whole in agreement, so there may also be categories of decisions in which certain military services and certain defense-industrial ministries "ally" themselves against other services and defense-industrial ministries.

It is necessary to go beyond even these distinctions. While particular defense-industrial ministries may have service customers that are basically more important for them than other service customers, the range of production responsibilities of these ministries indicates that their ties with their principal customers are by no means exclusive. For example, the Ministry of the Radio Industry would doubtless have a high stake in supplying the radar systems which the Air Defense Forces (Protivo-Vozdushnaya Oborona—PVO) desire but it would also have an obvious stake in the production of radars for the Air Force and Navy. Likewise, the Ministry of the Aviation Industry would presumably have a major interest in production for the Air Forces, but it would also have a stake in meeting the needs of Naval Aviation and the PVO.

As a consequence of the breadth of the defense-industrial ministries' production responsibilities, identification of basic alliances between services and specific defense industries can on occasion prove difficult. To take a hypothetical case, the Long-Range Air Force (LRA) plumps for a new bomber which top officials in the Ministry of Defense (or in the Politburo) view as feasible only if plans for a new fighter-interceptor desired by the PVO are scrubbed. In this situation, can the Minister of the Aviation Industry, P.V. Dement'yev, be reliably identified as a backer of the LRA case? Or should he be regarded as a PVO ally?

In this context, it is also worth noting that the various armed services under the Ministry of Defense cannot do much shopping around to get their desired weapons systems produced. While it is undoubtedly true that on the whole the Ministry of Defense enjoys considerable market power as the only substantial customer for new weapons in the USSR,²⁰ the bargaining leverage of the defense-industrial ministries is hardly inconsequential. The PVO after all has to deal with the Ministry of the Radio Industry to get the radars it wants; the Air Forces have to deal with the Ministry of the Aviation Industry to secure aircraft, and so on. This sort of dependency does not, of course, justify the conclusion that these defense-industrial ministries would be likely to affront a major service customer. It does suggest, however, that even when a defense-industrial ministry does not have to choose between competing proposals of two different services as in the case described above, it may still be less committed to a new weapons system than the particular service which is promoting it.

In light of these considerations, it would appear to be among personnel operating below the ministerial level in the defense-industrial ministries that one is likely to find the greatest congruence of interests with those of service proponents of particular weapons systems.²¹ Here the role and attitudes of weapons-system designers are probably of key importance in the Soviet military-industrial equation. Memoir material²² and recent analyses based on that material indicate that on occasion weapons-system designers themselves have taken the initiative in proposing new weapons systems (sometimes seeking the backing of top political leaders) to the military customers. Such indications, plus the fact that extensive competition may occur among design shops before a choice of weapons system for production is made,²³ would suggest that individual designers may have

considerably higher stakes in particular weapons decisions than do the top defense industrialists. In a design competition for a new aircraft for the PVO, for example, what would be a loss to a designer would not be a comparable loss to his minister—since the winning design would be produced in the ministry in any event.²⁴

Besides these incentive considerations, intensity of interest in decisions on particular weapons systems may also be affected by the quality of communications between service proponents of the systems concerned and the design shops in the defense-industrial ministries which would develop these systems. Memoir material indicates that these contacts may be highly developed and effective. Evidently, personnel with appropriate technical qualifications are assigned by the military services to monitor weapons efforts in the defense-industrial ministries.²⁵ One might infer from the technical expertise required of these military monitors to perform competently, as well as from their basic responsibilities,²⁶ that they are likely to be quite specialized and, in consequence, to be associated with technical organizations located in particular services.²⁷ If this is the case, they would seem well suited to act as a channel for transmitting particular weapons-system ideas from their respective military services to individual designers, as well as conveying the designers' ideas to their service superiors.²⁸

To what extent such opportunities for the development and communication of common weapons-system "interests" at the lower levels of the defense-industrial ministries and in the services affect managerial authority in the defense sector is difficult to say. It seems likely that the monitoring activities of the military personnel and the clout that has been ascribed to designers in the production process would, at the very least, heavily impinge on the authority of managers at the enterprise level.

At the upper levels of the managerial hierarchy—i.e., among the defense-industrial ministers and deputy ministers—the situation may be much more complicated. These individuals may be in a position to block ideas for new weapons systems put forward by the most concerned individuals in their respective spheres, or alternatively to advance them further—e.g., to a hearing by political and military decision-makers at the highest levels.²⁹ The receptivity of the defense-industrial ministers (and deputy ministers) to such new ideas is likely to depend in part on the sorts of distinctions between military and defense-industrial "interests" adduced earlier. In addition, much might depend on the top defense industrialists' view of the degree of technological adventurism involved in a proposed weapons system.

Without ascribing to military personnel and designers unbridled enthusiasm for forcing the pace of military technology, there are reasons for believing that they would be more inclined to promote technologically adventurous ideas than would the top defense industrialists. To be sure, analyses which have underscored the large role of designers in the Soviet weapons-acquisition process have stressed the basically conservative approach of the designers over the years—which has resulted in the relatively simple but reliable weapons systems said to have characterized much of the Soviet arsenal in the past.³⁰ However, even if we grant this to be an accurate description of the situation in Soviet weapons development in the past,³¹ the designers may be less conservative today, even if not as inclined as military service personnel to see technologically adventurous weapons systems developed and produced. The element of competition is likely to continue to induce a relatively greater cautiousness on the part of designers, but in light of the considerable personal stake a designer may have in weapons "contracts" with a particular service, he may not

be in the best position to fend off technologically adventurous proposals advanced by that service (especially if the service insists that keeping pace with U.S. weapons programs requires that such proposals be carried out). It is also possible that an increase in the predisposition of the Soviet military services to accept technologically adventurous ideas might tend to induce individual designers to push similar ideas of their own.

On the other hand, such ideas may well encounter their least enthusiastic reception among the top defense industrialists. This perspective does not necessarily reflect a conservatism resulting from old age and long tenure in the same posts. (Resort to actuarial tables to identify who stands where on Soviet policy matters is, in any event, a questionable analytical device.³²) A far more important reason for the top defense industrialists' wary attitude is their concern that pushing the pace of military technology might lead to infringements on their individual domains and/or complication of their management responsibilities. They have before them a number of examples of organizational changes in the not too distant past which were certainly prompted in part by the need to keep pace with advancing military technology and which resulted in losses of resources by older ministries to newly-created ones. The Ministries of the Electronics Industry, General Machine-building, and Machine-building, which were established in the 1960's, were after all hardly created out of whole cloth.³³

The top defense industrialists may also be uneasy that acceptance of technologically adventurous weapons systems may entangle them in new dependencies, even if they manage to avoid large-scale reorganizations. An increasing need to turn to the Academy of Sciences, for example, rather than to rely heavily on in-house R&D resources would seem to be a likely prospect. A greater dependence on other defense-industrial ministries for subsystems and components for ever more complicated and advanced weapons systems is another possibility that might add to the individual management burdens of the top defense industrialists. A final prospect that might also be less than welcome is the possible assumption by the political leadership of a greater and more direct role in managing operations in the defense-industrial sector. This role is already considerable, but the increased problems of coordination among the defense-industrial ministries and between them and outside institutions (such as the Academy of Sciences) that would result from commitment to a more technologically adventurous policy of weapons development could make the hand of the political leadership weigh even more heavily on the defense-industrial managers.

None of this is to suggest, of course, that the top defense industrialists are predisposed to treat every indication of determined technological advance in weapons systems like the plague. Nor is it to suggest that they would necessarily have the power, even if they had the desire, to block those who wished to push the pace. After all, reorganizations have been successfully imposed on the defense-industrial sector in the past; and there are indications that, even in a simpler age, top weapons designers like A. S. Yakovlev and S. P. Korolëv were able to gain access to the top leadership to push through their ideas, whatever the wishes of their immediate superiors. Rather it is to emphasize that, although the Soviet military and the defense industrialists are in many respects natural allies, it is also necessary to appreciate the elements of heterogeneity that enter into the relations between them—elements that could make for a less than solid military-industrial front as particular policy decisions arise for the Soviet political leadership to consider.

Footnotes at end of article.

As indicated earlier, the priority status which the Soviet leadership, as a whole, has accorded to the defense effort over the years has probably accounted for the relatively greater economic privileges the defense industrialists have enjoyed in comparison to their counterparts in the civilian sector. This status has also brought a heavy measure of direct involvement in, and close scrutiny of, weapons development and production efforts by the top political leadership. This applies not only to special crash defense (and space) programs that may have been undertaken from time to time, but also to the "normal" operations of the defense-industrial sector. Let us therefore look at the relationship between this sector and its political overseers.

FOOTNOTES

* After this article went to press, the author learned that Butoma had died on July 11, 1976. He was replaced by M. Yegorov, his principal deputy since 1958. Yegorov is neither a candidate nor a full member of the Central Committee.—Eds.

¹ See, for example, Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," in Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter, Eds., *Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1973; James R. Kurth, "Aerospace Production Lines and American Defense Spending," in Steven Rosen, Ed., *Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex*, Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1973; and Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Sherer, *The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1962.

² The following excellent efforts deserve particular mention: Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969; David Granick, *Soviet Metal-Fabricating and Economic Development*, Madison University of Wisconsin Press, 1967; Barry M. Richman, *Soviet Management With Significant American Comparisons*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1965; Joseph Berliner, *Factory and Manager in the USSR*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1957, and *The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1976; and Jeremy R. Azrael, *Managerial Power and Soviet Politics*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966.

³ See, for example, Arthur Alexander, *R & D in Soviet Aviation*, Santa Monica, Calif., The Rand Corporation, 1970, and *Weapons Acquisition in the Soviet Union, the United States, and France*, Santa Monica, Calif., The Rand Corporation, 1973; also Nancy Nimitz, *The Structure of Soviet Outlays on R&D in 1960 and 1968*, Santa Monica, Calif., The Rand Corporation, 1974.

⁴ See the useful discussion of this problem in Herbert Block, "Value and Burden of Soviet Defense," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973, pp. 175-204.

⁵ See, for example, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Science Policy in the USSR*, Paris, 1969, p. 435. For a persuasive dissent from the general view that the defense sector received the lion's share of total Soviet R&D outlays in the 1960's, see Nimitz, *op. cit.* in seeking to explain the superior performance of the sector in contrast to the civilian economy, Nimitz emphasizes the efficiency factor.

⁶ Unless otherwise indicated, the description of these ministries and their ministers are drawn from: Andrew Sheran, "Structure and Organization of Defense-Related Industries," in Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union*, Washington,

DC, US Government Printing Office, 1970; Institute for the Study of the USSR, *Prominent Personalities in the USSR*, Metuchen, NJ, Scarecrow Press, 1968; Institute for the Study of the USSR, *Officials of the Soviet Union, 1917-1967*, Metuchen, NJ, Scarecrow Press, 1967; CIA Reference Aid, *Directory of Soviet Officials, Vol. 1: National Organizations*, Washington, DC, November 1973; and CIA Research Aid, *Evolution of the Central Administrative Structure of the USSR, 1917-1972*, Washington, DC, August 1972.

⁷ See Vernon V. Asaturian, "The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex: Does It Exist?" in Rosen, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

⁸ Pleshakov only attained the rank of candidate member of the CC at the recent 25th CPSU Congress. [The new Minister of Shipbuilding has no Central Committee status at present—see editors' note above.]

⁹ Graham Allison's analyses of US decision-making (see, e.g., *loc. cit.*) suggest the importance of the personality factor in a bureaucratic setting. Emphasizing the significance of personal ties, personal bargaining skills, etc., Allison differentiates a bureaucratic-politics model of decision-making from the organizational-process model. Whereas the latter relies on organization charts and standard operating procedures of organizations to establish pertinent policy differences and pressures, the former is based on the premise that the personality factor is likely to modify such conclusions because people heading organizations may, for example, have stronger or weaker ties to particularly powerful individuals and have different bargaining skills. Given the long tenures of the Soviet defense-industrial ministers, it seems likely that the latter considerations would have an impact on managerial power in the Soviet defense sector.

¹⁰ Smirnov was identified in this post by Raymond Garthoff in "SALT and the Soviet Military," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1975, p. 29. The likely role of the Commission is discussed below.

¹¹ The early years of this evolution are described in Marshal M. V. Zakharov, "On the Eve of World War II; May 1938-September 1939," *Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya*, (Moscow), No. 5, October 1970.

¹² For an illuminating analysis of the defense industries' relations with the Soviet economy as a whole, and particularly of their reflection of the evolution of that economy over the years, see David Holloway, "Technology and Political Decision in Soviet Armaments Policy," *Journal of Peace Research* (Boston), No. 4, 1974, pp. 257-79.

¹³ Of the many Western discussions of Soviet efforts to come to grips with the problem, the most comprehensive is Joseph Berliner's recent *The Innovation Decision . . .*, cited in fn. 2.

¹⁴ See Alexander, *Weapons Acquisition . . .*, pp. 4-5. Other analyses have argued, explicitly or implicitly, that superior performance of the Soviet defense sector has been due in part to the use of modern management techniques—e.g., Soviet versions of program evaluation and review techniques (PERT) and critical-path methods (CPM). Since, on the basis of Western experience, we know these techniques to be particularly suited to weapons efforts and since the Soviets show signs of trying to "transfer" such techniques to the civilian sector, it is tempting to assume that they have been widely and effectively used in the Soviet defense sector in the past. Available evidence would seem to warrant the conclusion that these techniques have at least been used selectively or on a trial basis in the defense industries. However, the extent of use and the degree to which it has positively affected performance remain very much open questions.

For discussion of the Soviet effort to transfer defense management practices to the civilian sector, see Robert W. Campbell, "Man-

agement Spillovers from the Soviet Space and Military Programmes," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), April 1972, and Paul Cocks, "Science Policy and Soviet Decision-Making: PPB Comes to the Kremlin," a paper prepared for the 1975 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

¹⁵ David Holloway, *Technology, Management, and the Soviet Military Establishment*, Adelphi Paper No. 76, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971, p. 6. Holloway argues that the defense industries may have been encouraged by the profitability performance criterion (inherent in the reform) in a manner not originally intended by the reformers—i.e., to try to resist innovation. While there is scant firm evidence to this effect, K. N. Rudnev, Minister of Instrument-making, Automation, and Control Systems recently gave a strong hint that the primary interest at least of the top defense industrialists in the new principles of economic accountability may be basically to preserve or enhance their prerogatives (e.g., vis-a-vis the central economic authorities), with questions of production efficiency and innovation taking second place. As he put it, "Why aren't these principles being extended to other branches? Aren't our economic agencies being overly cautious here where the relevant concern is to increase the economic rights of the (branch) ministries?" See *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Dec. 10, 1975.

¹⁶ See Sherer, *loc. cit.*, p. 130.

¹⁷ Holloway, "Technology and Political Decision . . .," p. 268.

¹⁸ Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter—FBIC), *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, D.C.), No. 62, Supplement 17, March 31, 1971, p. 3.

¹⁹ *Izvestiya*, May 22 and July 1, 1971, respectively.

²⁰ See, for example, Nimitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-45.

²¹ This is not to assume that a particular service would necessarily have a monolithic weapons "interest." Indeed, differences among branches of a service may be on occasion quite virulent with respect to weapons-system priorities—such as between artillery and armor partisans in the Ground Forces; Frontal Aviation and LRA advocates in the Air Forces; and fighter-interceptor and SAM proponents in the PVO.

²² See, for example, A. S. Yakovlev, *Tsel' zhizni: zapiski aviakonstruktora* (The Goal of Life: Notes of an Aircraft Designer), Moscow, Politizdat, 1966.

²³ According to Alexander, success or failure in such competition means state prizes and awards for the winner and, in extreme cases perhaps, dissolution of the design bureau headed by the loser. See *Weapons Acquisition . . .*, p. 10.

²⁴ As noted above, there is another kind of competition in which designers might also have more direct stakes than the head of their ministry, e.g., in a decision whether to build a new bomber or a new fighter-interceptor. Such a "competition" would put design shops within the Ministry of the Aviation Industry (as well as the two services involved) at loggerheads. Which designer the minister would be likely to back is no more clear than which service interest he would promote. Similarly, to refine the analysis further, there could also be instances in which weapons-system choices involve branches of the same service and a single defense-industrial ministry. A choice between a new tank and a new artillery piece, for example would find design shops within the Ministry of the Defense industry at odds as well as artillery and armor partisans in the Ground Forces. Which system Minister Zverev would back would be an open question, but his commitment to one or the other options would seem likely to be less intense than that of any other of the above-named principals.

²⁵ See, for example, B. L. Vennikov, "From the Notes of People's Commissar for Armaments," *Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 2, 1962, pp. 79-86, and Sheren, *loc. cit.*, p. 126.

²⁶ Sheren asserts that "a major function of the team (of military monitors) is to maintain quality control at each step in the production process and to insure that the product meets prescribed specifications." *Loc. cit.*

²⁷ The existence of such technical organizations has been noted, for example, in the case of the Air Forces and Ground Forces. See Raymond Garthoff, "Soviet Air Power: Organization and Staff Work," in Asher, Lee, Ed., *The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces*, New York, Praeger, 1959, p. 181, and John Millsom, *Russian Tanks, 1900-1970*, Harrisburg, Pa., Stackpole, 1971, p. 80.

²⁸ The production responsibilities of the military monitors and the involvement of the designers in monitoring the production process (see Alexander, *Weapons Acquisition* . . . , p. 4) would at the least give military monitors and designers a basis for sustained contact.

²⁹ As will be noted below, there are a number of formal bodies that bring top military, defense-industrial, and political leaders together. Within the military domain *per se*, service backers of new weapons ideas would no doubt have to contend with ministry-level organs and personalities concerned with defense R&D and production. General N. V. Ogarkov, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General-Colonel N. N. Alekseyev of the Engineering-Technical Service, and General-Lieutenant K. A. Trusov (all of whom have "represented" the Soviet military at SALT) are probably among the key officials to be dealt with at this level. If top defense industrialists should try to block new programs proposed by designers, the "channel" from service backers of the programs to top Ministry of Defense officials such as these may afford the proponents a means to try to overcome such resistance. However, support at the top level of the Ministry of Defense for ideas that had won the backing of a particular service would not necessarily be automatic either. See Garthoff, "Salt and the Soviet Military," *loc. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

³⁰ See Alexander, *Weapons Acquisition* . . . , pp. 8-11.

³¹ There is already some questioning of this image of past Soviet weapons programs and of the consequent burden they have represented for the Soviet economy. Since roughly the mid-1960's, this image may have been appropriate for much, but certainly not all, of the Soviet arsenal. As one analyst has written, "This presumption of relatively unsophisticated weaponry may no longer be justified. Recent analyses indicate that the major Soviet land armaments and tactical aircraft introduced since 1965 are substantially more complex than the weapons they have replaced. There are some cases in which the increased complexity and associated increase in capability entail lower dollar costs. But in most cases the unit-production costs for the present generation of Soviet land arms are substantially higher than for older equipment performing similar missions." See Andrew W. Marshall, "Estimating Soviet Defense Spending," *Survival* (London), March-April 1966, p. 77.

³² Moreover, some of the defense-industrial ministers are not that old—Afanasyev, for example is only in his late 50's.

³³ It is possible that deputy ministers in existing ministries could have a different perspective on the matter. Judging from past practice, the creation of new ministries could increase their chances of attaining ministerial rank. Shokin, for example, was First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee of the Radio Industry before becoming Chairman of the new State Committee for Electronics Technology in 1961. (This body be-

came the Ministry of the Electronics Industry, with Shokin as Minister, in 1965.) *Prominent Personalities in the USSR*, p. 569. Similarly Bakhirev was Deputy Minister of the Defense Industry before moving to head up the new Ministry of Machine-building in 1968. Sheren, *loc. cit.*, p. 131.

³⁴ The Academy would seem to be a natural source of new expertise. However, the extent of its past contribution to the defense effort is difficult to assess. It may be noted that Alexander's analyses (see fn. 3) stress reliance on in-house ministerial resources as a factor that has facilitated efficient weapons development and production. As a further corrective to the tempting assumption that the Academy's contribution in the past has been extensive, we have the observation that "in 1942, the . . . Academy was able to accept only 22 of the 175 research projects proposed to it by the People's Commissariat of Defense." See OECD, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

³⁵ Since some of the defense-industrial ministries appear to be mainly subsystems producers (e.g., the Ministry of the Electronics Industry), there is clearly some interdependence in the production of particular weapons systems, even if the effort has apparently been to minimize it. Alexander has noted, for example, that "of the thousands of components going into aircraft, 90 to 95 percent are produced in the aviation ministry itself." *Weapons Acquisition* . . . , p. 2.

³⁶ This list of concerns is not meant to exhaust the factors that would affect the perspectives of the defense industrialists. These concerns may be reinforced for, alternatively, mitigated to some extent) by pricing policies and other economic measures that might be adopted concurrently with an effort to push technologically adventurous weapons programs. For a discussion of the relevance of such economic incentive considerations to technological innovation in the defense sector, see Holloway, "Technology and Political Decision . . ." *loc. cit.*

³⁷ See Yakovlev, *op. cit.*, and L. Vladimirov, *The Russian Space Bluff*, New York, Dial Press, 1973, p. 56.

LEGISLATION TO ABOLISH COMPULSORY OVERTIME AND SHORTEN THE STANDARD WORKWEEK

HON. JOHN CONYERS, JR.

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, a great many different approaches to solving unemployment will have to be tried in the future. Structural unemployment requires a focused and targeted response—vocational education and job training; further removal of barriers to equal employment opportunity; the industrial and commercial redevelopment of inner-city communities. Cyclical unemployment will require innovative programs of job sharing and spreading existing work among the greatest number of workers. Legislation I introduced last March 22—H.R. 11784, that amends the Fair Labor Standards Act—mainly addresses the issue of spreading work.

The provisions of the fair labor standards amendments (H.R. 11784) are the following:

Raises the statutory premium for work in excess of 40 hours from time and a half to double the regular hourly rate;

Requires employers to obtain the consent of employees for overtime;

Reduces in stages the standard workweek from 40 to 37½ hours after 2 years of enactment and to 35 hours after 4 years;

Keeps in force for their duration existing collective-bargaining agreements.

This legislation will be reintroduced in the 96th Congress and I am hopeful that hearings on it will be held.

Last April 11 I had the honor of participating in the First National All-Unions' Conference To Shorten the Work Week, which was held in Dearborn, Mich.; 700 labor leaders representing more than 800,000 workers in 25 international unions attended. That conference resolved overwhelmingly to launch a national campaign to abolish compulsory overtime and reduce the workweek. Since then, the All Unions Committee To Shorten the Work Week has established an impressive nationwide public education campaign, collected tens of thousands of signatures in support of the legislation, and won endorsements from a number of leading local and State labor coalitions. Among the labor groups that have endorsed the legislation I introduced are:

New York Central Labor Council; Alameda County, Calif., Labor Council; Iowa State Federal of Labor (AFL-CIO); Indiana State Federation of Labor (AFL-CIO); Illinois State Federation of Labor (AFL-CIO); New York State Federation of Labor (AFL-CIO); United Electrical Workers; International Typographical Union; Graphic Arts International Union; Retail Clerks International Union; United Furniture Workers; District 31 Labor Council of the Steelworkers Union; District 12 of the Amalgamated Meatcutters Union; and the Communications Workers of America who have endorsed the ban on compulsory overtime.

The All-Unions Committee to Shorten the Work Week has also set up active regional committees in Chicago, Cleveland, San Francisco/Oakland, Pittsburgh, and Birmingham, Ala.

A recent pamphlet published by the All-Unions Committee explains the background of, and reasons for, shorter workweek legislation, and I commend it to the attention of my colleagues.

The pamphlet on abolishing compulsory overtime and reducing the workweek follows:

ENACT H.R. 11784: SHORTER HOURS CREATE MORE JOBS

At the end of World War II the official rate of unemployment was somewhere in the neighborhood of two percent. In the years since, it has wavered up and down until it stood at six percent in April 1978.

When April's six percent rate of unemployment is transferred into human terms, it means that approximately 5½ million people were out of work.

Actual unemployment was much higher than that. If those who have been dropped from the unemployment rolls because they have given up looking for work and those who are forced to work part time because they can't find full time jobs were added in, nearly 7½ million workers were without

jobs in April and the actual unemployment rate was about 8.2 percent.

An eight percent unemployment rate means that one out of every twelve workers in the United States is without a job. But, bad as that is, things are even worse for women, Black and young workers.

Thus, the labor movement faces a new challenge: To create jobs at union wages and conditions for all who need and want them.

Jobs must be created for those who are presently out of work. More jobs are required for those young workers who enter the workforce every year. And even more jobs must be found each year for those workers who will be displaced by new technology. To provide these jobs—to meet this challenge—will require the creation of more than 110,000 jobs every week.

Historically, organized labor has fought for shorter hours as the best means of creating jobs and reducing unemployment. Our labor movement was born in the battle for shorter hours. It grew to maturity in the campaigns that reduced the work week by 35 percent in the first 40 years of the twentieth century.

THE HIDDEN COSTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT

The social costs of unemployment were revealed by the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress. It found that between 1970 and 1975 every one percent increase in the official rate of unemployment resulted in even larger increases in mental illness, alcoholism, suicide, murder and crime.

4.1 percent more suicides.

3.4 percent more admissions to state prisons.

5.7 percent more admissions to mental hospitals.

5.7 percent more homicides.

2.0 percent more deaths from cirrhosis of the liver.

But, for all intents and purposes, the movement for shorter hours has lain dormant for the last 40 years. Despite paid holidays, paid vacations and early retirement programs, neither the work week nor the number of unemployed have been reduced. And worse yet, the eight-hour day, 40-hour week is being undermined by a concerted campaign of forced overtime.

In April, U.S. Labor Department figures showed that just over 36 million workers were working 40 hours a week and slightly more than 22 million workers worked longer than that.

If the work week of these 58 million-plus workers was reduced by one hour, that alone would create jobs for about 1,500,000 workers working a 39-hour week. If the work week were cut to 35 hours for everybody, then there would be 8,750,000 jobs.

Needed: 5,800,000 new jobs per year.—None of the existing government proposals will come close to meeting these needs.

1,800,000 number of young workers entering workforce each year.

2,400,000 number of workers displaced by new technology each year.

1,600,000 number of new jobs needed each year to re-employ those presently unemployed within 4 years.

5,800,000 total number of new jobs needed each year to provide jobs for all who need and want them within 4 years or 110,000 jobs per week.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE

A national campaign to enact H.R. 11784 with its provisions for a 35-hour week, double time for overtime and a ban on forced overtime, is a place to begin. The All Unions Committee to Shorten the Work Week calls upon every union member and every labor leader, without regard to craft, industry or affiliation, to join this effort.

The All Unions Committee to Shorten the Work Week worked very closely with Mr. Con-

yers in preparing H.R. 11784. Its basic provisions were endorsed by the 1977 AFL-CIO Convention. Now the Committee is working to organize a national campaign to win enactment of this legislation.

But, as we have learned from the struggle to get Congress to pass the Hawkins-Rumphrey Bill, it's a long way between the introduction of a bill and enactment of a law. In the final analysis, it all boils down to who has the ability to put the most pressure on Congress. You can help in this effort by:

(1) Getting your local and international union to endorse H.R. 11784.

(2) Getting your local union and central labor body to participate in a petition campaign in support of H.R. 11784. (Petitions may be ordered from the All Unions Committee to Shorten the Work Week, 4300 Michigan Avenue, Detroit, MI 48210.)

(3) Organizing delegations of union leaders and members to meet with Members of Congress in order to get additional sponsors of H.R. 11784. (Congress will be in recess during the first two weeks of July and again during the last two weeks of August. That's a good time to arrange these meetings.)

"Our's is a program of positive action and this organization is working to bring together all unions without regard to industry, craft or union affiliation. It is not our intention to tell any union how they should work to reduce the hours of labor for their members nor is it our intention for this organization to become involved in inner-union politics." Frank Runnels, Key Note Address, First National All Unions Committee to Shorten the Work Week, Dearborn, Michigan, April 11, 1978.

For further information, call or write: All Unions Committee to Shorten the Work Week, 4300 Michigan Avenue, Detroit, Michigan 48210, Frank Runnels, President (313) 897-8850. ●

CALIFORNIA'S FESTIVAL OF THE ARTS

HON. BOB WILSON

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Speaker, for the past few years my wife Shirley and I have been privileged to attend the annual festival of the arts in Laguna Beach, Calif.

This is one of the most unique pageants in the world and deserves the attention of my colleagues and others.

I ask unanimous consent to include as a portion of my remarks an article by Douglas Reeve "From Fence-Board to Fame: The Story of Southern California's Festival of Arts."

The article follows:

FROM FENCE-BOARD TO FAME: THE STORY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA'S FESTIVAL OF ARTS

(By Douglas Reeve)

We'll never know for sure, of course, but if the United States had not experienced the economic depression of the 30's the little seaside community of Laguna Beach, California might not have become the setting for its uniquely famous and firmly established Festival of Arts, to which people annually beat a path in their hundreds of thousands.

At any rate, conditions were as bleak in Laguna as anywhere else back in 1932, and the residents of the tiny colony were acutely aware of the fact that a near-perfect climate and an unusually beautiful coastline were simply not enough to make life complete.

Painfully lacking was something rather more down-to-earth; specifically the wherewithal to pay for such things as food and rent.

Happily, someone came up with an idea: to hold an outdoor exhibit of the artists' work in some conspicuous spot that would assure maximum exposure and thus maximize the likelihood of stimulating sales, even at giveaway prices. Someone else came up with a title: Festival of Arts.

On El Paseo Street, an area was roped off with canvas and boards and the beginning of a now great cultural institution of California took its first breath of life—and hope. The festive spirit that entered into the open-air affair helped dispel thoughts of the dire and dismal economic conditions of the times.

It was a colorful celebration. Entertainment (including music and dancing) was sometimes planned, but often was spontaneous. Mainly, of course, there were the paintings. They hung from the limbs and trunks of eucalyptus trees; they were nailed to, or propped up against, fences; they were supported by makeshift easels. Anything and everything was done to create a gala atmosphere.

Somewhat to the surprise of the exhibitors and others, the event was a slambang success. People not only paused to look; they also bought. They did even more than that: they spread the word, and out-of-towners soon began pouring into Laguna to see the art display. Many headed for home with paintings they had liked enough to buy.

Clearly, the Festival was worth repeating; so the following year, 1933, Laguna's artists again staged a public display of their work—with one or two changes: for example, they set up booths and gave the event a touch of elegant atmosphere by charging 10 cents admission.

Success again crowned the occasion. It looked, in fact, as though something had begun that might develop into a really big annual event. Little did the organizers realize how big!

Also in that second year, something special was added: the presentation of living pictures—recreations of great works of art with living models and called "The Spirit of the Masters Pageant." The show was unique; still is, in fact, because, according to many globetrotting visitors from foreign countries, there is nothing to equal Laguna's famous pageant, which in 1935 was given its present more streamlined name, "Pageant of the Masters."

The early Thirties certainly marked the beginning of what is now Laguna's biggest and brightest annual event: the Festival of Arts and Pageant of the Masters, nowadays presented for seven weeks each summer on some six acres of land acquired by the City in 1941.

On display are paintings, sculptures, ceramics, jewelry and many other creations by artists and craftsmen of the area. A marionette show has become a traditional part of the Festival as has a junior art gallery which features 150 works by Orange County schoolchildren (kindergarten through high school) selected from some 3000 submitted.

The many display panels and booths on the grounds are by no means static; many are manned by the artists concerned—and those artists are often to be seen working on new creations, discussing their work with visitors and doing what their predecessors did back in 1932: exchanging their products for what it takes to buy food and pay rent.

Nightly at 8:30, the center of gravity shifts to the adjacent 2662-seat Irvine Bowl, where the Pageant of the Masters is presented to capacity audiences. In addition to the recreation of paintings, living-model reproduction of sculptures and other artifacts are featured not only on the stage, but also on the dramatic wooded hillsides that flank it.

A theatrical phenomenon, the Pageant is always completely sold out for its entire season months before it opens.

Statistics rarely fail to impress those who inquire about the Festival. Literally hundreds of persons are needed to pose for the various works in the Pageant, and hundreds are miraculously available—strictly on a volunteer basis.

In addition to cast members, many backstage workers are needed to help with costumes, makeup, "props" and countless other details that have to click. Most of them, too, are volunteers.

Since that trees-and-fences beginning, Laguna's Festival has missed only four years: those during World War II. Now a non-profit corporation with about 3600 members, it is headed by a nine-person board of directors and staffed by a few paid professionals.

Among the 300,000 visitors who converge on the Festival annually are State Department guests, who are routed through Laguna to attend the one-of-a-kind event; also senators, congressmen, famous movie and television personalities—VIP's from all walks of life, in fact so magnetic is the show.

On Sunday afternoons, Festivalgoers enjoy a sparkling free extra: dancing on the green by members of Laguna's noted Ballet Pacifica. A daily attraction is the first rate marionette show by Tony Urbano housed in a cozy 232-seat theatre.

In the past ten years, the organization has paid the City over one and a quarter million dollars in rent; and spent some \$800,000 in capital improvements that became the property of the City. Cultural contributions have amounted to over \$300,000 and another \$208,000 has been distributed in the form of scholarship awards to young people to help further their education in their chosen fields.

Altogether, the Festival of Arts has helped support the community, culturally and artistically, to the tune of two and a half million dollars in just the past decade alone.

However, money isn't really the name of the game—important though it is to the exhibitors individually and the Festival as an organization. Instead, what really counts is the good it does to many, and in so many ways.

As an "immediate experience," it provides wholesome, varied, thoroughly enjoyable hours in a beautiful setting. It stimulates interest in art, crafts and the performing arts. It provides a colorful breathing spell in a glorious park—and perhaps that sums up the over-all delight of Laguna's big annual event, constituting as it does a sort of spiritual oasis that everyone who attends quickly recognizes as just what we all need: a change from the everyday world, and a chance to see and enjoy people and things at their very best. ●

MICHAEL HARRINGTON
PATHFINDER

HON. FORTNEY H. (PETE) STARK

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, yesterday's Wall Street Journal had a fine portrait on a rare and courageous colleague, I commend it to the attention of the whole House.

The article on MIKE HARRINGTON entitled "A Congressman Takes His Leave" describes well the emptiness, the frustration, even the bitterness, that many of us, regardless of party, all too often feel as "politicians" within the House of Representatives.

Some of us, I for one, are sticking it out a little longer. MIKE's departure will make the House yet a lonelier place in the next year and the years afterward. We will miss his honesty, his integrity, his indignation. We wish him well.

The article follows:

[From the Wall Street Journal, Sept. 21, 1978]

A CONGRESSMAN TAKES HIS LEAVE

(By Dennis Farney)

WASHINGTON.—In his own words, Mike Harrington ran for the House of Representatives in 1969 already suspecting the "irrelevance" of that proud institution—and is leaving the House in 1978 "confirmed in that belief."

Right off, this should tell you something about Rep. Michael J. Harrington, a 42-year-old Massachusetts Democrat who represents the North Shore above Boston. He's a maverick, an iconoclast. (Not to be confused with another maverick of the same name who is leader of the U.S. Socialist Party). Congressman Harrington is also wary, brooding, hot-tempered and thoughtful. And although his voting record is certified 100 percent liberal by the Americans for Democratic Action, he's neither a conventional liberal nor a conventional member of the House.

This is what makes Mike Harrington's thoughts upon retirement, his deep misgivings about current trends in liberal thought and what he sees as built-in pressures toward timidity and mediocrity in Congress, so provocative.

He thinks, for example, that history will be far kinder to Richard Nixon than are most observers today. "Look, I never liked the guy," he says, "but at least his policies took chances, tried to alter things fundamentally." He thinks the government needs more, not fewer, men like Bert Lance—"agreeable villains" who, for all their ethical blemishes, have vigor and drive and try to get things done. He thinks liberals have run out of ideas and are offering "warmed-over New Dealism."

But most of all, he thinks Congress may be fundamentally flawed, fundamentally incapable of making broad policy decisions or of shaping any vision for the nation. He thinks the 535 members of Congress practice "collective avoidance"—immersing themselves in trivia and routine, while ducking the truly important questions.

"I'm not sure we really want to participate," he says.

HIS VIEWS MERIT ATTENTION

Mike Harrington's views are so at odds with the usual flood of self-congratulatory rhetoric coming out of Congress—and out of such high-minded organizations as Common Cause, the self-styled citizens lobby—that they merit attention, if only as a kind of dissenting opinion to the conventional wisdom of the day. We are living, after all, in a period of "congressional government" and White House eclipse; and in a period, too, when post-watergate "reforms" have changed not only the way that Congress does business but the very type of individual likely to be elected to Congress.

Mike Harrington suspects that, in each case, the pendulum has swung over too far.

This reporter talked with Representative Harrington on one moderately hectic weekday recently—the kind of day, filled with many votes and much debate on essentially minor issues, that lends support to his contention that Congress, for all its frenetic activity, is essentially adrift and ducking the truly important questions.

"I'm optimistic by nature," he began. "I believe problems can be solved. But I'm not

sanguine at this point that we even know what the problems are.

"We've got a lot of guys in Congress now who have mastered those techniques that will keep them in office. But how many can offer you a coherent sense of the whole? How many would even try? I'd like you to give me five names."

A new kind of Representative is rising to power in the House today, and the new breed bothers Rep. Harrington. These Representatives, particularly the "Watergate Class" of 1974, seem more concerned about means than about ends. They're more interested in cleaning up "the process" than with the actual decisions the process is supposed to reach. They're clean and they're open, but they're also gray and uninspired—"managers," not innovators.

To Mike Harrington, the rise of this new breed is bound up with the rise of Common Cause, itself preoccupied with reforming "the process." He suspects the result is to deprive government of the sprinkling of "agreeable villains" it needs.

"Take Bert Lance, for example," he says. "I would bet you that the citizens of Calhoun, Ga., would say that Bert Lance and his bank have enriched their lives, made them better—regardless of whether or not he's also done things that outrage the Securities and Exchange Commission, the press and other commentators on the mores of the times.

"Now, would I ideally like to have a Bert Lance who'd met every test of probity along the way? Sure. But I'll take a Bert Lance, with all his imperfections, to the pale naysayers we avoid in."

A buzzer sounds in the Congressman's office, summoning him to another rollcall vote. The House has had about 700 rollcall votes so far this year—a few of them truly important, most of them forgettable, many of them demanded by what he says are "eight or 10 guys who want to rollcall everything in sight."

He walks down a dim, echoing passageway, merging with a stream of other Congressmen also on their way to the House chamber. The question before them is whether to designate 927,550 acres in Montana's Glacier National Park as "wilderness."

Few of the hurrying lawmakers have actually followed the debate on the question. So, as they file into the House chamber, the principal proponents and opponents of the measure are waiting at the door, flashing thumbs-up and thumbs-down signals, slapping backs and whispering hurried exhortations. The arriving Representatives then make their choices, which are instantly registered on a big electronic scoreboard overhead.

The whole process, with its hectic almost mechanistic quality, rather resembles an assembly line in Detroit.

This isn't what Mike Harrington had in mind when he first ran for Congress in a special election in 1969. He believes Congressmen should be thoughtful "pathfinders," addressing and shaping the great issues that determine the nation's course. He ran as an antiwar candidate, and as a reformer who would challenge the House's then-autocratic ways of doing business.

Named to the hawkish Armed Services Committee, he had so many shouting matches with committee members that, in 1973, he switched to the Foreign Affairs Committee. There, outraged by U.S. support for a repressive dictatorship in Chile—and by misleading testimony on that support by Henry Kissinger and others—he leaked classified information on the Chilean situation to The New York Times. A colleague then moved to have him censured. Mr. Harrington never denied leaking the information—indeed, he regards calling attention to Chile as his proudest congressional accomplishment—but the censure motion was finally dismissed on a technicality.

Today, while Mike Harrington remains as fiercely opposed as ever to propping up dictatorships abroad, his views have changed subtly in some other areas. There are ironies in these changes and, with the Glacier park vote behind him, he explores them over the background clink of silverware in the House restaurant.

He now feels that moves to democratize the legislative process haven't noticeably improved the quality of legislation. What's more important, he says, is getting good legislators—thoughtful individuals, visionaries, risk-takers. This leads him to a certain grudging nostalgia for his old foe, Henry Kissinger.

"I thought it was fun to match wits with Mel Laird or Henry Kissinger, to watch those guys scheme and plot," he says. "At least they came in with initiatives, ideas you could quarrel with."

A VIEW OF RICHARD NIXON

"Nixon's initiative to China, for example. I think Nixon is going to be much more warmly evaluated historically than he is now. Look, I never liked the guy. But put him alongside the guys in government now—where are the guys willing to make a decision, take a chance, try to alter things fundamentally?"

"We can respond to Proposition 13, for example, by finessing it—offering 40,000 amendments and 5% across-the-board cuts. But the Proposition 13 raises fundamental questions; it indicates hostility toward the political process and its relevance. I don't see us responding to those kinds of questions."

"I've always said Jerry Ford was brighter before he came to Congress than he was by the time he got to the White House in 1974—only because the mindset required to survive in Congress is debilitating. It says, 'Let somebody else take the risks, let somebody else initiate things, just react.' Ford's congressional experience debilitated him."

Last June, in the midst of a tough primary race for reelection, Mike Harrington decided to get out. He could have won that race, he says; the real reason for his decision, he explained at the time, was something else: "A widening gap between my sense of what is important about being in Congress, and what the public and press seem to think is important."

"I did what I said I'd do, which was to try to be a pathfinder," the Congressman says of his career. Shortly afterward the harsh buzzer sounds again, and Mike Harrington leaves the restaurant for another rollcall vote.

The issue this time is whether to add 4,400 acres to the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area. At the door to the House chamber, the proponents and opponents are waiting for him, flashing their thumbs-up and thumbs-down. ●

IRANIAN TERRORISTS IN THE UNITED STATES

HON. LARRY McDONALD

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Speaker, even as a loose federation of Marxist revolutionary and Islamic extremist terrorist groups continue to spearhead a drive to overthrow the Government of Iran and its leader, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, their support groups in this country have been carrying out a multifaceted attack, attempting to isolate Iran from the United States. The tactics include virulent anti-Shah propaganda,

economic warfare, and terroristic street violence. New evidence indicates that members of certain internationally active Iranian terrorist groups with ties to the West German Baader-Meinhof gang are residing in the United States, and that international terrorist acts may be planned.

An anti-Iran "people's hearing" propaganda circus is planned for Raleigh, N.C., on September 30, 1978. The event is being organized by the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), an organization that calls for "thoroughgoing revolution" in this country while upholding the use of terrorist violence by Soviet-supported terrorist organizations—the Vietcong, Pathet Lao, and Palestine Liberation Organization, for example. AFSC intends to put pressure on the North Carolina Ports Authority, which administers the State-owned Port of Wilmington through which arms are exported to Iran, not to renew its Iranian contract that expires on October 31.

The AFSC has announced two principal speakers at its anti-Iran affair, Michael Klare and Reza Baraheni. Baraheni, a writer, is most active as co-chairman of a Trotskyite Communist front called the Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran (CAIFI).

My colleagues will recall my October 1, 1976, report documenting CAIFI's origins as a front set up by the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the U.S. section of the Fourth International that is engaged in terrorism in Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. CAIFI was formed from a SWP effort during 1972-73 to prevent the deportation of Babak Zahraie, an Iranian citizen and SWP member who led at that time a small faction in the Iranian Students Association, U.S.A., the American branch of an internationally active revolutionary student organization. Zahraie was not deported, because he had married a U.S. citizen, also a member of the SWP, while attending the University of Washington.

The Zahraie effort led to formation of CAIFI, whose first campaign was for the release of Baraheni, who was jailed by Iranian authorities for 3 months in the fall of 1973.

The SWP has used CAIFI, whose offices in room 414, 853 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10003, form part of the suite occupied by the SWP's New York City headquarters, to organize the Sattar League, the Iranian section of the Fourth International. With Baraheni and Zahraie among its leaders, the Sattar League remains primarily an overseas student movement organizing support for revolutionaries inside Iran.

CAIFI held a press conference on Capitol Hill on September 13, 1978, that was reported as follows in the SWP newspaper, the Militant:

Speakers at the press conference demanded an end to martial law in Iran, freedom for all those arrested in the recent upsurge, and safety for . . . Iranian dissidents being hunted down by the shah.

Speaking along with Baraheni were Babak Zahraie, CAIFI national field secretary; former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark; and U.S. Representatives Fortney Stark and Tom Harkin.

Zahraie described the casualties in the shah's bloodbath grim facts grossly misre-

ported by the American press. In Teheran alone, Zahraie reported, one cemetery received 3,897 bodies on the second day after martial law was decreed.

Since the U.S. press has tended to over-report casualty figures during the rioting in Iran, Zahraie's claims to such amazing precision about the numbers of burials at one cemetery, numbers patently erroneous, indicate that the ancient "big lie" technique is being used. This was confirmed when Zahraie asserted that those involved in the rioting and terrorism "are clamoring for freedom and democracy." The Marxists are trying to impose the customary Communist dictatorship and their Islamic Savonarola allies want to impose a repressive theocracy.

The second principal speaker at the AFSC's planned anti-Iran event in Raleigh, is Michael T. Klare, a "red-diaper baby" and "counter-counterinsurgency" research specialist for the Castroite left, has long been associated with the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), which not only collects all available public information on defense contractors and the U.S. military and police; multinational corporations; U.S. industry and business and political leaders, but which also operates a network of clandestine radical contacts within the U.S. Government. Klare has also worked with a similar group run by the AFSC, National Action/Research on the Military-Industrial Complex (NARMIC).

Klare has had intimate associations with the subversive organs of Cuba and the Soviet Union. For example, he has been published by Tricontinental magazine, the publication of the Cuban front for exportation of revolution, the Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa Asia and Latin America (OSPAAAL); and he has played a prominent role in conferences of the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council that operates under the direction of the KGB and the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee's International Department.

Klare has been a frequent traveler to Cuba where he is reported to lecture to some rather select seminars at the University of Havana on topics such as U.S. arms sales policies and the "hardware" of U.S. counterinsurgency planning. Klare, who left a post at Princeton in order to work full time as director of the Institute for Policy Studies/Transnational Institute (IPS/TNI) Project on Militarism and Disarmament with a salary of \$18,000 underwritten by the Field Foundation, appears to do some of his "research" in Havana, somewhat in the manner of Philip Agee. For example, late last fall, Klare went to Cuba for an extended period. Within days of his return, he had a lengthy, highly detailed article published in U.S. newspapers on the overseas financial operations of a U.S.-owned company that manufactures the sort of light aircraft flown by private citizens, but which in an emergency could be used for observation purposes against terrorist insurgents in rural areas. Klare's article contained various information not available from public sources.

The Institute for Policy Studies and its foreign affairs project, the Transnational Institute (TNI), of which Chilean KGB

agent, Orlando Letelier, was a leader, is also involved in coordinating anti-Iran campaigns in Western Europe. Klare's British counterpart, IPS/TNI fellow Fred Halliday, delivered an analysis of Iran's economy and its areas of vulnerability to organized pressure tactics at an International Symposium on Iran held in Brussels, Belgium, May 6-7, 1978.

IPS/TNI, which also has on its staff leaders of the Trotskyite terrorist Fourth International that is headquartered in Brussels, was joined in the meeting by representatives from the Communist Party of France, Communist Party of Belgium, the British Labour Party, the British Tobacco Workers Union, the Committee Against Repression in Iran of London (CARI), the French Association for Friendship and Solidarity with the People of Iran (AFASPI) of Paris, the West German Iran Committee, and two Belgian solidarity groups.

The groups decided that the anti-Iran campaign in Western Europe should concentrate on generating propaganda publicizing allegations of human rights violations and on trying to stop the export of weapons to Iran by organizing a boycott by trade unions involved in the exporting process.

The close parallels between the United States and European anti-Iran campaigns are obvious.

UNITED STATES-IRAN TERROR LINK

On July 16, 1978, U.S. customs officials detained Kristina Katharina Berster, 27, a fugitive suspected member of a West German Marxist terrorist network, when she entered the United States using a stolen Iranian passport. Berster, accompanied by two men and a woman, entered the United States near Burlington, Vt. Berster's companions were Iranians resident in the United States who were using their own genuine documents to reenter this country. Press reports of an FBI investigation note that it is believed that members of the Organization of People's Fedayee Guerrillas (OIPEG), an Iranian Marxist terrorist group with close ties to Cuba and the Palestine Liberation Organization, helped Berster enter this country.

Berster is known to have been a member of the Socialist Patients Collective in Heidelberg, a group which dissolved into the Red Army Fraction or Baader-Meinhof gang. In 1971, Berster was detained for 7 months in "investigative custody" as a suspect in a terrorist bombing conspiracy before being released. She has been a fugitive since 1973 when she was indicted for bombing conspiracy, involvement in counterfeiting identity documents, and membership in a criminal organization.

On July 27, Berster was indicted by a Federal grand jury on seven counts and held on \$500,000 bail. Her defense team is headed by William Kunstler, a member of the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) and attorney with the Center for Constitutional Rights. The NLG, which is the U.S. section of the Soviet front for lawyers, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, had two observers present at the trials of Baader-Meinhof gang members, some of whom were lawyers, in 1977. Those

two observers, William Schaap and Ellen Ray, recently took prominent roles in the denunciation of the CIA staged by the Cuban DGI in Havana during the 10th World Youth Festival and are working closely with Philip Agee in coordinating attacks on the U.S. intelligence community. It will further be recalled that William Kunstler, William Schaap, Peter Weiss, and former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, a CCR cooperating attorney, attempted to join the Baader-Meinhof defense team, but were denied permission by West German authorities.

Berster was using a passport belonging to Shahrzad S. Nobari that was one of several passports stolen from the Iranian consulate in Geneva in June 1976, during a sit-in by members of the Iranian Students Association (ISA) which has its international headquarters in West Germany. Significantly, Berster was able to provide U.S. customs officials with details about Miss Nobari's family and life, such as the fact that her father owned an export company in Hamburg, during the time she was trying to convince them her passport was genuine.

Particularly significant is the fact that another Iranian passport stolen during the same Geneva demonstration by the ISA was being used by Baader-Meinhof terrorist Brigette Folkerts when she was arrested in May of this year at Orly Airport in Paris. Folkerts' arrest led to the arrests in Yugoslavia of four top Baader-Meinhof terrorists intimately connected with the Carlos Group. Apparently the international network of Palestinian and West German terrorists has been using Communist Yugoslavia as a secure safety zone. The Yugoslavian Communist regime, which under Tito has some independence from Moscow in its internal policies, has backed the U.S.S.R.'s policy regarding terrorist national liberation movements consistently. Tito has not permitted the four terrorists to be extradited by West Germany, and is demanding that various anti-Tito Croats be exchanged for the Baader-Meinhof fugitives.

A number of investigators believe that the arrest of Kristina Berster and the Federal investigation into her OIPFG comrades in this country may have forestalled a terrorist attack that would have coincided with the 25th anniversary of the Shah's overthrow of the pro-Soviet Mossadegh regime.

Published press reports of the investigation also state that the leaders of the several factions of the Iranian Student Association are under investigation to determine the extent of infiltration by terrorists from the OIPFG, Maoist Revolutionary Organization of Tudeh (ROT), and the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Peoples of Iran (OMPI), which its supporters say has "tried to combine the Islamic revolutionary spirit with the Marxist method of analysis and class outlook."

ISA RIOT IN LOS ANGELES

Whether or not plans for international terrorism in the United States have been

disrupted by Federal investigation, the Iranian revolutionaries in this country have continued their established record for mass violence in the streets of American cities.

Continuing to use tactics exhibited during rioting in November 1977 here in Washington, D.C., and in early 1978, in Chicago, members of the Iranian Students Association (ISA) climaxed a week of small demonstrations outside the offices of the Los Angeles Times with a march by more than 500 masked militants that erupted into a club-swinging melee with police that ended in the arrest of nearly 200 demonstrators and injuries to 9 police officers and nearly 40 rioters.

Using leaked press accounts of Presidential Review Memorandum No. 10 to indicate why Iran is the priority target for revolutionary destabilization in the Middle East at present, the ISA in the United States (ISAUS), a member of the Confederation of Iranian Students (National Union) (CIANU), said in its newsletter, Resistance, published from P.O. Box A3575, Chicago, Ill. 60690, that a special 100,000-member U.S. rapid reaction strike force specialized in desert fighting was being trained.

According to the ISA, in the event of "limited contingencies" or "local war," with U.S. support Iran might act as a regional surrogate against:

All liberation movements, all democratic and revolutionary struggles of the peoples of the Persian Gulf region * * * where the economic investments of U.S. corporations and/or the strategic war plans of the imperialists are being directly challenged by struggles of the people in that area for their freedom and independence.

With one of the chief stated aims of the ISA being to forestall any possibility of U.S. intervention in support of the Government of Iran, some 500 ISA militants gathered on September 1, 1978, at noon outside the Federal Building in Los Angeles to protest claimed "impending military intervention of the United States in Iran."

Marching without a permit and led by organizers using bullhorns, the masked militants, accompanied by small contingents of supporters from U.S. revolutionary groups including the Trotskyite Revolutionary Socialist League (RSL) and Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP), became increasingly disorderly as they marched through streets and sidewalks to Times-Herald Square. Traffic was blocked and pedestrians were pushed into the street.

Three of the demonstrators set effigies of the Shah and Hitler afire on the sidewalk outside the Times building.

The ISA had been picketing the Los Angeles Times for a week complaining of "falsification" of reports in disturbances in Iran, particularly of reports on the movie theater fire in the oil port city of Abadan that killed more than 375 men. During the weeks of violence preceding the burning of the movie theater, Islamic extremists following a radical Iranian religious leader, Khomeini, exiled in Soviet-aided Iraq, had burned 29 movie theaters and dozens of restaurants and other entertainment facilities. Khomeini, who has circulated cassette tape recordings to his Iranian followers urging them

to use terrorism and violence to topple the Shah's government, has refused to condemn the Abadan theater massacre. His ISA supporters in Los Angeles said their demonstration against the Los Angeles Times was to deny the fire was set by Islamic extremists and to publicize their wild claim that the Shah of Iran himself had had the Abadan theater burned.

With few police officers in evidence so far on their march, the ISA leaders clearly expected to be able to continue to march at will, masked and using sound equipment, through the streets of Los Angeles, disrupting traffic, and intimidating peaceful citizens.

At this point Lt. Larry Welch ordered a police line of some 50 helmeted officers set up across the street to block the march. An arrest team was sent to make selected arrests of individuals who had been observed violating a wide range of laws and ordinances by blocking traffic, burning effigies, and using sound equipment without a permit. In response, the Iranian militant group, still numbering over 350 persons, began to throw bolts and other hardware and to shout, spit, and brandish their clubs at police.

As the arrest team moved to make its sixth arrest, a group of 30 ISA members attacked police with sticks, fists, and kicks. To facilitate these arrests, the police line separated the two groups and concentrated attention on the 30 cadre fighters. However, the larger ISA group was led in chanting by a militant carrying a camera who proceeded to give a distinctive signal to the group, motioning downwards with his hands five times. There was a second of silence, and then the larger group charged forward into the police line.

Although the ISA members used clubs and sticks 4 feet and longer, the well-trained Los Angeles police, using their clubs alone, were able to subdue the rioters within 5 minutes, and have 171 rioters lying face down in orderly rows in the street, their hands secured behind their backs with plastic handcuffs.

A mobile booking station, designed for mass arrest situations, was set up on the sidewalk where those arrested could be fingerprinted and photographed. Charges ranged from riot and inciting to riot, assault with a deadly weapon on a police officer, and arson to blocking sidewalks and noise.

As could be expected, after the arrests lawyers Richard "Dick" Eiden and John Michael Lee of the Los Angeles chapter of the National Lawyers Guild which took up the defense of the ISA rioters made assorted allegations of "brutality" against the Los Angeles police. One of the Los Angeles City Councilmen, Zev Yaroslavy, also complained of what he viewed as use of "excessive force" by police, but he did not gain the support of other city officials. The week after the riot, the Los Angeles City Council passed a new resolution outlawing the use of heavy wooden sticks for posters and banners in parades. The new law was signed by Mayor Bradley immediately.

Since the September 1 riot and mass arrest situation, the ISA has held a

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number of small demonstrations in Los Angeles in which they, and their U.S. supporters, have brought small children to carry banners and act as shields between the militants and the police.

The "peaceful" tactics will continue only as long as the police authorities demonstrate by a sufficient show of strength on the street that violations of human and civil rights of Americans will not be tolerated. The ISA's violent proclivities have attracted a number of U.S. groups who would like to pick up on revolutionary street fighting, a tactic that the Weathermen used in preparing their group to become underground urban terrorists.

The Maoist Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP), although weakened by a split, works with ISA chapters in a number of cities. The more orthodox, pro-Peking Communist Party, Marxist-Leninist (CPML) is on good terms with the ISA factions that support the Revolutionary Organization of Tudeh terrorists. And the Revolutionary Socialist League (RSL), which although Trotskyite in ideology has been cooperating in street riots against KKK and Nazi groups with the Progressive Labor Party (PLP), distributed the following statement at the September 1 ISA riot. Under the slogan, "To Stop the Cops—Organize Self-Defense," RSL said:

To defeat police terror once and for all, workers and other oppressed people must be organized, armed, and prepared to fight back. The Watts Rebellion of 1965 and the Chicano Moratorium Rebellion of 1970 showed the need for armed workers defense groups to resist cop attacks.

In addition, we need a revolutionary party based in the working class to give leadership to the overall struggle. The Revolutionary Socialist League is trying to build this kind of workers' party to fight both the capitalist bosses and their police goons.

We are fighting for a government of revolutionary workers, which will wipe out groups like the LAPD, and replace them with an armed workers' militia—a powerful army of all the oppressed. The capitalist police cannot be made less brutal. They must be smashed, and never allowed to rise again.

TERRORIST INVOLVEMENT IN THE ISA

The involvement of the Iranian Student Association's factions in terrorism both in Iran and elsewhere is open and easily documented from ISA publications. For example, early in 1977, the ISA of New York City, operating from P.O. Box 1639, New York, N.Y. 10001, issued a pamphlet, *Iran*, which provided biographical data on ISA members who had been killed or arrested while leading terrorist groups in Iran. Recent leaflets and pamphlets, such as a December 1977 leaflet by the ISAUS chapters in Los Angeles and College Park, Md., state their support for the "anti-imperialist, democratic struggle": That been given "new momentum by the beginning of armed struggle in Iran waged by the Organization of Iranian People's Fedayee Guerrillas (OIPEG) and the Organization of Mojahedin of the People of Iran (OMPI)."

Another faction, the Union of Iranian Students in the U.S. (UISUS), with headquarters at P.O. Box 744, Berkeley, Calif. 94701, wrote in its June 1978 newsletter, "Iran in Struggle," that—

O.M.P.I. is the best reflection of the revolutionary camp for its uncompromising struggle against any liberal and conciliatory demands.

UISUS opposes the "united front" call for restoration of the old Iranian constitution supported by the pro-Soviet Communist Tudeh ("masses") Party, and the National Front factions descended from Mossadeq's movement. UISUS states:

* * * The Union of Iranian Students in the United States, in its second nationwide conference (January 1978), decided to direct all its energy and forces to serve the democratic program of the Organization of Mojahedin of the People of Iran (O.M.P.I.), and decided to propagate the democratic tasks of the O.M.P.I. in the student movement abroad.

The democratic program of O.M.P.I. (which centers around (1) defining the revolutionary classes * * *; (2) calling for the overthrow of the Shah's fascist regime, the puppet of U.S. imperialism, through the organized violence of the masses; and (3) the need for the establishment of (a) People's Revolutionary Democratic Republic which will represent the interests of the revolutionary classes) is presently the political platform of U.S.U.S.

In demonstrations in this country, the Organization of Iranian Moslem Students (OIMS) and Young Muslims Organization (YMO) have both marched behind banners calling for terrorist "armed struggle" in Iran and bearing placards praising various terrorists and revolutionaries. The main ISA grouping, ISAUS, P.O. Box 4002, Berkeley, Calif. 94704, describes itself as "an open, democratic and anti-imperialist organization." ISAUS says it "works to mobilize international public opinion in support of the just struggle of the Iranian people for liberation."

ISAUS demonstrations have featured large banners bearing the distinctive globe and AK-47 logo of the OIPFG terrorists. These banners were carried during the Los Angeles riot, as was a banner proclaiming, "Victory to the Armed Struggle in Iran." It is noted that one segment of the OIPFG terrorists has joined with the pro-Soviet Communist Tudeh Party. In a 1977 pamphlet, "Iran: The Struggle Within," published by the Support Committee for the Iranian People's Struggle, P.O. Box 671, New York, N.Y. 10011, which has an introduction by Palestinian terrorist leader George Habash, the preface states that the OIPFG's first "armed action" took place on February 8, 1971, at Shakkal, a village in the woods of northern Iran. OIPFG has concentrated on urban terrorist actions. The Support Committee's preface continues:

Contrary to similar warfare in Latin America and elsewhere, the movement in Iran started on a strictly ideological basis, from the beginning aiming toward the formation of a communist party. OIPFG has been and continues to be a Marxist organization and considers itself the nucleus of a communist party in Iran. (Emphasis in the original)

The pro-Soviet Tudeh Party and its youth arm, the Organization of Democratic Youth and Students in Iran (ODYSI) have their main strength in Western Europe, not in Iran. However,

during 1977, radical sources report that Tudeh Party members began publishing a newspaper in Tehran called Nuyid, and that it is continuing its efforts to subvert Iranian unions by having its members and sympathizers gain positions of leadership and influence. Tudeh is reportedly working with the Union of National Front Forces composed of nonreligious former followers of Mossadeq, a group that is viewed in some U.S. circles as the Iranian "Third Force."

In the United States, the members and supporters of the Tudeh Party and ODYSI are working with the Communist Party, U.S.A. (CPUSA) and its youth group, the Young Workers Liberation League (YWLL), particularly around the YWLL's "front" newspaper, The People's Herald, and the U.S. section of the World Peace Council.

The intimate relationships between the Iranian Student Association factions and the Palestinian terrorist organizations, particularly with the PFLP and the "Carlos group," have become even more ominous this week with statements from both official PLO spokesmen and from George Habash that the United States will now be the main target for their terrorist attacks in retaliation for the Middle East summit peace agreements between Egypt and Israel.

Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar, the official spokesman for the PLO Executive Committee, released a statement on Wednesday, September 20, threatened:

The continuation of the conspiratorial U.S. policy against the Palestinian people and the Arab nation will undoubtedly cost the United States and those who participate in its policy dearly. * * *

He continued:

The Palestine revolution, which has many weapons, some of which have not been used so far, reaffirms its determination to use all weapons capable of foiling any conspiracy against the Arab cause. * * *

Following a meeting in Damascus, also on September 20, of the leaders of the "Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation" composed of both the main PLO grouping under Yassir Arafat and the Rejectionist Front led by George Habash. Habash told U.S. television interviewers that the terrorists "will do all we can to make America's present leadership pay the price for what it is doing" in the Middle East.

Activation of its Iranian terrorist allies in the United States to carry out a campaign of violence and assassination is a real possibility. Deportation of militants who have been involved in violence in this country would be a help in preventing such violence.

ARREST LIST OF IRANIAN RIOTERS IN LOS ANGELES

When considering the activities of an active terrorist support organization like the ISA, it is important to determine who its leaders and activist members are. Those so committed to revolution that they are willing to battle police should not be permitted to remain in this country. I am suggesting to the Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service that appropriate deportation procedures be taken in these cases.

The list follows:

NAME AND DATE OF BIRTH

Ryan, Mayme, June 6, 1958.

Moeeni, Ebrahim, May 20, 1948.

Majd, Jamshid, March 2, 1954.

Manoo, Yassamane, July 3, 1954.

Hossian, Nhie, May 20, 1953.

Gholianhossien, Habibzader, August 2, 1959.

Jaffari, Ali, October 21, 1940.

Fayazmanesh, Sasan, May 10, 1950.

Jalali, Seyed, September 31, 1958.

Sabbagh, Ali, May 17, 1942.

Kavousi, Mohammad, December 14, 1950.

Akbar, Jamalzade, August 28, 1959.

Akhlaghi, Mohamed, January 25, 1947.

Darhrabadi, Majid I., March 19, 1960.

Saadatian, Mahmood M., January 17, 1948.

Heshmati, Behzad, March 21, 1960.

Jamnessau, Mhra, December 12, 1954.

Vazi, Flora, February 20, 1958.

Kagebi, Sholeu, March 5, 1958.

Ghods, Hahra, November 5, 1951.

Khossqussi, Gita, July 20, 1959.

Afatiatab, Khdeji, February 2, 1953.

Mohal, Miho, February 26, 1959.

Lala, Opooram, January 21, 1952.

Magide, Ashia, September 23, 1951.

Jonaear, Elitty, April 25, 1956.

Honelle, Noosa, September 18, 1959.

Rahbar, Narces, January 9, 1942.

Shllan, Moullia, June 1, 1965.

Moosavi, Sadichen, December 7, 1958.

Barati, Mina, July 31, 1959.

Voustan, Kereshte, December 18, 1955.

Kashachi, Pary, January 9, 1955.

Mahmoudi, Mihoo, March 22, 1960.

Hezar, Massriem, September 27, 1949.

Biganpaur, Hooriyen, January 1, 1960.

Bazzal, Mitra, January 7, 1958.

Zangeneh, Zohleeh, Age 20.

Sangera, Martha, May 5, 1925.

Saidian, Shahin, Age 24.

Hamedany, Zohreh, Age 20.

Thran, Lodan, 1955, Age 23.

Mirkhani, Majid, December 24, 1953.

Asmon, Allmohmed, June 5, 1951.

Cepahri, Mohammed, January 24, 1955.

Orad, Ali, 51, Age 27.

Omidvar, Ahad, October 24, 1948.

Afshar, Bijan, January 10, 1953.

Hamidi, Vahid, March 8, 1956.

Sadaghiani, Alpal, 48, Age 30.

Asgari, Afsin, August 28, 1955.

Omran, Gholam Rela.

Faham, Zia.

Tirani, Sepa, January 18, 1948.

Behrooz, Farhad, May 15, 1953.

Sadeghzaden, Mehrdad, July 10, 1956.

Kardevani, Hashem, February 10, 1947.

Royan, / mir, January 11, 1951.

Rezal, Reza, July 2, 1956.

Sattari, Rasule, March 27, 1957.

Vloghadden, Kalvan Kanany, September 6, 1959.

Bathi, Fried, December 5, 1951.

Alavi, Seyed Hossein, March 21, 1956.

Ravanshid, Ejmali Farhang, November 10, 1946.

Mehrtak, Mohamad, October 20, 1945.

Bahadori, Majid, March 21, 1959.

Mehrassa, Abbas, December 18, 1956.

Mahmoody, Nhood, April 11, 1952.

Ahmadi, Mohammad Reza, October 23, 1949.

Eftekhari, Mohammad, March 5, 1953.

Moradi, Mehrdad Hajl, January 1, 1960.

Barati, Ismail, September 15, 1953.

Safael, Abdali, March 22, 1949.

Mojadeh, Cherlc, June 2, 1951.

Omran, Heidar Ali, December 13, 1954.

Mojadeh, Ali, March 20, 1952.

Gholmai, Nassar, September 15, 1954.

Arjmandi, Manouchehr, April 25, 1948.

Monazzam, Jafar M., February 9, 1954.

Rad, Farzin, January 2, 1955.

Bazzal, Iraj, February 3, 1956.

Gharaghani, Manouchehr, February 24, 1954.

Darash'ti, Saeed, July 25, 1951.

Shafael, Mostafa, February 22, 1958.

Ghader, Changiz R., November 1, 1957.

S Jegt, Kharazi, December 30, 1950.

Hamidi, Farid, December 19, 1958.

Mobarz, Kam, January 21, 1955.

Bakhtiarha, Mostara, March 30, 1942.

Soltani, Abolfazl, March 9, 1951.

Bazargon, Mohammad, December 26, 1952.

Tehraul, Au Bavafayle, April 18, 1954.

Marnani, Ali, May 11, 1953.

Irani, Taher, April 6, 1957.

Baba-Ahmadi, Atta M., January 21, 1951.

Rahimi, Reza, September 9, 1951.

Balali, Mehrdad, October 5, 1955.

Yanzaden, Morteza K., April 1, 1955.

Almasi, Asmail, December 9, 1955.

Balali, Mahmood, August 6, 1958.

Tavakoli, Asgaur, December 5, 1958.

Mohashemi, Mehdi, October 11, 1959.

Kazemi, Samad.

Moshen, Abbasi, July 11, 1951.

Ve'zadeh, Massoud, December 3, 1949.

Massoom, Rasoul, Sherlat, December 5, 1947.

Fakhimi, Mahmood Reza, November 25, 1955.

Lavassau, Kavlan, July 10, 1952.

Karimi, Farzad, June 3, 1960.

Nadershahi, Shereh, October 8, 1952.

Rimeznzadeh, Mahammad, February 20, 1948.

Tehrani, Slavash Fallah, December 7, 1947.

Molavi, Mohamad Reza, June 15, 1956.

Mashouri, Abbas, September 2, 1953.

Fathi, Behrooz, 1953.

Majd, Homayoon, February 9, 1953.

Madgmoli, Jaddavd, March 20, 1953.

Abdoulani, Abdolriza F., March 21, 1953.

Hooshye, Yousei N., December 27, 1957.

Kouchehbagh, Hassan, March, 1959.

Borzeshi, Mohamad Zare, May 20, 1950.

Vanky, Abbas, January 14, 1952.

Phadhi, Ahmer, August 27, 1957.

Nematollah, Au Mohmmad, July 10, 1946.

Samu, Saed Rahamat, March 14, 1946.

Haery, Hossein, April 28, 1952.

Khon, Abollas, February 25, 1951.

Najafabadi, Davood J., September 3, 1957.

Kashavarz, Mohammed Nabl, February 15, 1946.

Saabet, Ahmad, June 20, 1950.

Mambar, Prasad, December 29, 1951.

Muhammad, Farnad Malek, April 3, 1959.

Rezale, Bahram, January 20, 1952.

Naelyni, Manouchehr, April 10, 1952.

Azizi, Omid, May 21, 1948.

Mahmoudi, Mehran, May 10, 1950.

Tehrani, Parvin, January 7, 1946.

Vaziri, Kamran, July 30, 1956.

Sohola, Sarch, January 1, 1960.

Seyfollan, Naghani, September 14, 1952.

Jallan, Farkhondeh, December 22, 1952.

Matin, Asgari Afsaneh, December 12, 1956.

Afainesh, Hossen, March 26, 1942.

Reza, Mohammad, October 8, 1961.

Hosseinzaden, Farnaz, December 6, 1961.

Noozan, Ali, January 24, 1961.

(AKA Nowrorzian, Faribarg)

Baratimarnani, Masout, March 8, 1962.

Pechrakmanesh, Pirouz, February 18, 1961.

Djafari, Shahin, October 13, 1960.

Mahmodi, Mahmood, September 16, 1962.

Mehdi, Jafari-Najafabad, October 6, 1960.

Ahamed, Zahra.

(AKA Heshnati, Ghareh)

Kak, Vand J., July 30, 1953.

(AKA Aham, Bakhsh)

Monazzan, Safel, age 43.

Serajha, Mina, May 4, 1961.

Rahbari, Bizhan, December 25, 1962.

Soufi, Baram Samil, May 17, 1948.

Shakery, Ali Mohammad, March 21, 1948.

Smalla, Zidia, June 18, 1946.

Najafi, Nader T., November 20, 1947.

Jammessam, Slavosh, May 21, 1959.

Firooz, Afatiatab, May 26, 1949.

Tagharobi, Khosrow, March 11, 1952.

Kharazmi, Davood, September 27, 1952.

Saderi, Hosein, December, 1949.

Zia, Abdemanati, December 22, 1941.

Nikhbaht-Hanadani, Fayar, July 13, 1953.

Afshar, Hani, July 9, 1948.

Foroohar, Manzar, May 15, 1948.
Fajhar, Mehdi, January 7, 1943.
Fardi, Mohammed, December 25, 1950. ●

NEW HOPE FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

HON. DON BONKER

OF WASHINGTON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. BONKER. Mr. Speaker, the recent Camp David agreement offers renewed hope for resolving the many issues that divide Israel and her Arab neighbors in the Middle East. Whether the time has arrived when a peaceful settlement is acceptable to all parties, only time and events can tell.

Occasionally, I write a column on foreign policy for the Washington State Teamsters and would like to have this latest piece printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

NEW HOPE FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

It was an historic moment.

Indeed it was a rare moment as Congress convened in joint session to receive the President who had just concluded the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel.

Joint sessions are not uncommon. Usually it is a state of the union message, or there are emergency sessions, such as the times when Lyndon Johnson and Gerald Ford unexpectedly assumed the Presidency, and on occasion the President will use a joint session to address an issue like the energy crisis. These sessions are generally partisan and the topics are rarely pleasant.

But this was different. There was high expectation, even euphoria. Perhaps even relief. Speaker O'Neill said that not since Winston Churchill appeared had there been such enthusiasm.

We in Congress know the most persistent, insoluble problem in the world is the Middle East. Nothing compares with it. Every President in three decades and countless world leaders have wrestled with it. Kissinger devoted his diplomatic skills and billions of U.S. dollars to the cause without success. Now, suddenly there is an electrifying feeling in official Washington that if it can establish peace in that beleaguered area, anything is possible.

At one time the Middle East was a clear-cut issue for U.S. policy makers. Our fervent support of Israel was unquestioned. Having the Russians in Egypt also made it a convenient East-West issue. That is no longer the case. Anwar Sadat replaced Nasser's pro-Communist policies, and has since gained respect and commendable support in the United States. The 1973 war brought an oil embargo which dramatized our heavy dependence on Arab oil. Recently we sold sophisticated weaponry to Egypt and Saudi Arabia for the first time, placing the United States in the awkward position of giving arms to all sides in that hostile area.

All of a sudden, the Middle East seemed hopelessly complicated. Jimmy Carter has been carrying this awesome burden ever since he entered the White House. Now, after twelve intense days at Camp David, he proudly announced to Congress and the world that after thirty years of bitter conflict, peace has finally come to Egypt and Israel.

This week new hope emerged in the closing hours of the Camp David meeting. The three leaders held a dramatic press conference at the White House. Then a briefing of congressional leaders the following morn-

ing, and that evening the President addressed Congress and the diplomatic corps. The next day, our committee on International Relations met separately with Sadat and Begin. These two courageous leaders then returned home to report to their own public.

Is it really possible that peace has finally come for two peoples whose common history is one of hatred and hostility? Is it possible that two leaders whose earlier careers were marked with intense radicalism can now accept and trust one another?

Some might also ask whether an American-sponsored settlement that does not include new or higher levels of assistance to all sides is possible? (Indeed, Carter said the only U.S. commitment was his personal pledge to visit Egypt and Israel sometime soon).

There are also the imponderable pitfalls. What will happen if moderate Arab states like Jordan and Saudi Arabia refuse to go along? What if the Israeli Knesset fails to ratify the portion that deals with settlements in the Sinai? Certainly the PLO and radical Arab states will be violently opposed—one wonders what action they will contemplate to destroy the agreement? Much rests with these two great leaders themselves, both of whom are vulnerable—Begin because of failing health and Sadat because he is a walking target for Palestinian terrorists.

Indeed, it is something of a miracle we even have a "framework" for peace. Anyone close to events in the Middle East appreciates the delicacy of the agreement and can quickly predict the threats and challenges that lie ahead. But instead there is a mood of optimism. The agreement must succeed for the alternative is unthinkable.

Fortunately, the leaders involved are all strong and courageous men. They are not mere politicians playing to the emotions of their constituencies or jockeying around for power and prestige. They are devout men who are genuinely committed to peace. They all have a vital stake in the outcome of Camp David. ●

BALANCE(S) OF POWER SERIES

HON. JOHN B. BRECKINRIDGE

OF KENTUCKY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Mr. Speaker, since the manner in which foreign relations are conducted by a given country has effect on the success or failure of its foreign policies, a significant element in the strategic balance, as is being elaborated in this series, the quality of the diplomacy used by the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the past, superior authority and professionalism of American diplomacy has been considered to result in greater effectiveness than the stereo-typical brusque and single-minded efforts by the Soviets. As the following article by Helmut Sonnenfeldt suggests, however, the Soviet Union is emerging from its previous isolation to compete squarely with the United States in the use of its economic and military resources to strengthen its diplomatic effectiveness. Entitled "Russia, America and Détente," the following article shows that although the United States is attempting to draw the Soviet Union more into the constraints of the international system, the development of Soviet diplomacy will challenge the United States as an in-

creasingly effective instrument of Soviet goals.

This article first appeared in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1978 and is partially reproduced below:

Possession of military power does not necessarily determine how, and how effectively, that power is used. External powers, notably the United States, have had little ability to influence the growth of Soviet military power. Nor are they likely to have anything but a modest direct influence in this respect in the future. But they must and can be concerned with the uses to which that power is put. For the United States, broadly speaking, the purposes of policy toward the Soviet Union must be, on the one hand, to prevent injury to American interests and, on the other, to avoid open warfare. Policy must operate within these limits.

The question with which American statecraft must cope is how to maximize the restraints upon the uses of Soviet power. Part of the answer, as already indicated, is to seek to maintain a military balance, where possible in direct or indirect association with others who share our interest in restraining the uses of Soviet power and the potentially detrimental effects of its existence. This raises complex problems in addition to those alluded to earlier about the size and types of forces we must maintain and acquire over the rest of the century and beyond. Without addressing details here, the general point should be made that military deterrence requires forces that are generally thought to be usable for defined ends should fighting break out with the U.S.S.R. or its clients. To the extent this can be done, it is likely to place restraints on direct and indirect Soviet use of force, because it serves to impose upon Soviet decision-makers substantial uncertainties regarding the outcome.

But the problem does not end or begin with military measures alone. The Soviet Union, both as a polity and as an actor on the world stage, has developed unevenly. The international environment in which its power has developed and can be used is itself in a state of dynamic evolution. Military power does not translate automatically into influence and even less into control. Even in regions where Soviet military power goes essentially unchallenged, such as Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union has not been able to control or prevent developments which sap Soviet hegemony or, at any rate, undermine the kind of uniformity which Soviet rulers used to consider essential to their own well-being and security.

Elsewhere, in more distant areas, where the projection of Soviet power at one time appeared to confer upon Russia a potentially dominant influence, indigenous and external factors have diluted it or, in some instances, even reduced it to the vanishing point. This is not a law of nature and cannot be relied on to work automatically, specially if the United States itself is uncertain about the Soviet role it prefers to see in these regions. But the history of the last 20 years or so of Soviet "imperial" penetration into distant regions does provide a useful corrective to earlier fears—and Soviet expectations—that Soviet influence once established will become dominant and can only rise.

Among the reasons for the spotty Soviet record is that the Soviet mentality does not adapt easily to the nationalism and peculiarities of other peoples; Soviet ideology and institutions have not proved to be readily applicable or even appealing in other places and societies; Soviet political support is equivocal and frequently self-serving; and Soviet contributions to social and economic development are often inept, inappropriate and irrational, reflecting, as they do, Soviet society itself. For all the Soviet efforts during the last 20 or more years, it is the Western industrial-

ized nations, and the international institutions they have been instrumental in erecting, which have played the greater external role in the development of the new nations around the world. All these factors have limited or even counteracted the effects of Soviet military power in advancing Soviet influence.

One is tempted to conclude from the history of the postwar period, which includes also the increasing diversity within the international communist movement itself, that socialism—Soviet-style—in one country, once a temporary expedient, has in fact become a hallmark of our era. Whether it will remain so will depend, in part, on the evolution of Soviet society itself, on the people who run it after the present generation leaves the scene, and on whether Soviet military power will continue to be balanced so that it cannot become so overwhelming in some place or region as to enable the U.S.S.R. to determine the course of events there for a substantial period of time.

IV

Meanwhile, the steady though uneven expansion of Soviet external influence has been accompanied by, and has indeed contributed to, the gradual emergence of the U.S.S.R. from its isolation. This is most notably the case in the area of economics. Burdened as it is with enormous and constantly rising military expenditures as well as by ponderous and over-centralized bureaucratic controls and a rigid social structure, the Soviet economy has been unable with its own resources to provide for the broad modernization of Soviet life. While impressive, by the indices of the 1950s, the Soviet economy lags well behind other industrial countries in technical sophistication and productivity. Trade with the outside world has long been used to fill gaps that the Soviet economy itself could not fill. But the volume and diversity of this trade have steadily increased in recent years; the methods have evolved from barter or straight cash deals to more complex commercial arrangements, including considerable reliance on foreign credits. These latter have now risen to some \$40 billion for the Soviet bloc COMECON countries as a whole; Soviet hard-currency indebtedness is in the neighborhood of ten billion dollars. A substantial volume of economic activity in the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern countries must now be devoted to earning hard currency to finance imports and to service mounting indebtedness.

Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders have affirmed Soviet interest in an international division of labor, though they certainly have not meant by this any total Soviet reliance on certain external sources of supply. Indeed, in their foreign economic policies the Soviets have sought to minimize extended foreign reliance by trying to get foreigners to build up within the U.S.S.R. economic and technical capabilities which the Soviet Union is unable or unwilling to create with its own resources and skills. The Soviets no doubt continue to hanker for some form of autarky even if, for a time, they are prepared to accept something called a division of labor. But there is no reason why the external world needs to accept this Soviet preference. It is true that a systematic long-term policy by the industrialized nations to maximize Soviet economic reliance on the outside world would encounter formidable difficulties. In particular, Western political and economic systems do not readily lend themselves to long-term economic policy-making of any sort, but this is especially so since the long-term management of economic relations with the U.S.S.R. would require large-scale and sustained government involvement. The difficulties in coordinating the policies of several of the principal industrial countries are even greater, despite the fact that these nations should have the incentive to do so since they are linked to

each other by security alliances and numerous other institutional arrangements as well as common interests and broad values.

Despite the difficulties, there is scope for an economic strategy that uses Soviet needs to draw the U.S.S.R. into the disciplines of international economic life. The United States, for example, although unable to use periodic Soviet need for grain for specific political purposes, e.g., to affect Soviet conduct in a crisis, did prove able to negotiate an agreement that imposes more orderly practices on Soviet behavior in this field. The 1975 grain agreement requires the Soviets to consult the U.S. government before it can purchase agricultural products above eight million tons a year;² it requires the Soviets to purchase a minimum quantity of six million tons of certain specified products from the United States each year even when they would not otherwise do so because of a satisfactory harvest; and it places upon the U.S.S.R. obligations to permit U.S. vessels to ship the products Russia buys.

In the future, it should not be impossible to reinstitute Soviet eligibility for U.S. government export-financing facilities and thereby to influence the flow of credits and the degree to which the Soviet Union balances the reliance on credits with the use of exports to finance its imports. In general, it would be desirable to encourage the U.S.S.R. to pay for more of its imports with exports and to reduce the share of credits in financing imports. If the issue of tariff discrimination were at some point separated by the United States from issues of Soviet emigration policy, to which it is now linked, the Soviet Union might have incentives to devote more high quality resources to exports. Soviet economic planning and priorities could thus become somewhat more susceptible to external demands. Moreover, it would be both desirable and feasible for Western nations to evolve harmonized concepts in these respects, with the goal of reducing the autarkic nature of Soviet economic decision-making and complicating Soviet resource choices.

Soviet economic connections with the outside world seem, in any case, destined to become more extensive and complex. Already, the Soviets are not immune to currency fluctuations and inflationary trends beyond their own borders. Their planners and hard-currency managers must take account of them, and Soviet economic officials have an obvious stake in operating in foreign markets to minimize injury to Soviet financial interests. Western governments should consult and work with one another to ensure that the U.S.S.R. operates responsibly in the international financial community and that individual Western lending institutions do not become excessively exposed vis-à-vis the East.

Over the somewhat longer run, the Soviets may get caught up in international energy shortages and price rises. Russia's own resources, while large, will evidently become increasingly expensive to recover, and international dealings in the energy field on a growing scale may well become part of Soviet economic life. Planning should be undertaken sooner rather than later for the time when the Soviets may become large-scale petroleum buyers in international markets. There may be similar needs and opportunities with respect to other commodities. The needs of Moscow's East European allies in these areas may provide useful leverage to

² According to press reports, the Soviets may have found a way to circumvent this consulting requirement in signing contracts to buy grain to make up shortfalls in the 1977 harvest. While the purchases involved will apparently be from American sources and thus benefit American farmers in a surplus period, it would be desirable to correct any loophole in the 1975 agreement.

help induce Soviet interest in more orderly international arrangements.

Many other fields of actual or potential Soviet involvement in the international system can be cited.

For some years now, the Soviets have sensed the need to participate in international efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapon manufacturing capacities around the world. Indeed, because most potential nuclear weapons states are not friends of the U.S.S.R., Moscow seems to have sensed the need for restrictive actions even before some Western nations. So far, the Soviets seem to have imposed fewer limitations on their domestic nuclear power development than the United States. The future of the breeder reactor and the "plutonium economy" is uncertain as the United States debates its merits, and other Western nations experience domestic opposition toward these and other kinds of nuclear power facilities which may make the pursuit of coherent nuclear energy policies difficult if not impossible for some years to come. It remains to be seen to what extent these problems, including that of waste disposal, spill over into the U.S.S.R. At any rate, however, Soviet export policies are becoming part of an international regime in this area, and the utility of Soviet nuclear exports for political purposes, by "underselling" Western suppliers, is now probably minimal.

The regime of the world's oceans is another area where the Soviet Union is compelled to participate in international discipline if it does not wish to deny itself the benefits of the available resources. Similarly, the U.S.S.R. should not expect to be able to operate in outer space without submitting to legal and other constraints developed by the international community. Incentives also exist for Soviet participation in international arrangements to curb environmental pollution. The international civil aviation regime is still another example.

V

In these and other ways, the Soviet Union has slowly and often grudgingly accepted foreign constraints on its freedom of action. Will these constraints also affect the way in which the U.S.S.R. pursues its geopolitical interests and ideological ambitions through the use of its military power? The answer depends in part on the extent to which external powers see international politics as composed of interrelated parts. But there can be no definitive answer because the processes whereby the U.S.S.R. is becoming more involved in the international system are frequently only in an early stage and far from fully understood. And even when adequately appreciated, it is not always simple to utilize them for broader political purposes; nor is it obvious how to do so. Moreover, the cost of depriving the Soviet Union of some of the benefits of international interaction may fall not only upon the Soviets. We have, for example, seen how American farmers were opposed to our own government's using possible embargoes on grain exports in order to exert political pressures on the U.S.S.R. Western bankers may well fear the effects of massive defaults by their Eastern clients if economic relationships become hostage to political vicissitudes.

Yet these are issues that have to be faced. The growing needs of the Soviet Union for access to the assets and products of the West should be satisfied to the extent that Moscow conducts itself with restraint internationally. It is probably not workable to deny a particular benefit or break a specific contract in an effort to affect Soviet conduct in a crisis. But given the interactions that have already evolved, a strategy should be possible whereby these evolving mutual reliance can over time moderate any disposition to let competition drift into crises of such intensity that they will inevitably tear the fabric of interconnections. But, to re-

peat, such a strategy can work only if the military risks for particular Soviet geopolitical excursions continue to be kept high.

VI

There is a further and perhaps even more controversial and contingent set of factors that needs to be put in the balance. Inflation, environmental pollution and the other issues alluded to above are not the only external forces that fall to respect national or ideological boundaries. Soviet society, in part because of the broadening and intensification of Soviet external relations in the 1970s, is no longer hermetically sealed off from the outside. Blue jeans, rock music, literature and pop art are but a few, and probably the least significant, of the foreign habits and activities that have begun to affect Soviet life.

More significant, there probably would never have been major Jewish emigration pressures in 1971-72 if there had been no leap forward in the Soviet Union's relationship with the United States. There probably never would have been any Soviet response—however reluctant and sporadic—to the demands of foreign constituencies of some sections of Soviet society leaders had not begun—however hesitatingly—to calculate their interests in terms of their reputation abroad. It is worth noting that even after the Jackson Amendment was enacted and the Soviets angrily rejected their trade agreement with the United States, Jewish emigration continued at over 12,000 a year and individual "hard-core" cases continued to be acted on favorably. As we have learned this past year, Soviet toleration of these kinds of external intrusion is not unlimited, and foreign powers, to be effective in influencing Soviet practices, must calibrate their strategies and tactics with some care. But the principle has been clearly established that the state of human rights within a country is now a matter of legitimate international concern.

The Jewish population is not the only minority in a state composed of minorities. Thus, in the case of ethnic Germans wishing to leave, the Soviets have also been prepared to respond to outside pressures and inducements. Who is to say how foreign constituencies may someday manifest their interest in the condition of the Soviet Union's large and growing Muslim population? And who is to say how the long-suffering Soviet consumer may some day find his frustrations adopted as a cause abroad? Will Soviet youth be forever kept on an intellectual starvation diet compared to their counterparts in other industrial societies?

These lines of speculation should not be pushed too far. The Soviet system is traditionally repressive. Its aristocracy has a vigorous sense of survival in the face of real or imagined threats to its monopolistic hold on power. It possesses a vast panoply of instruments of power to contain unwanted intrusions.

Yet, the Soviet Union can never return to the isolation cell to which Stalin condemned it to make his brand of socialism in one country a reality at home and virtual impossibility abroad. That isolation is now past history, though there is probably little the Soviets can do for years to come to make themselves "beautiful Russians" around the world. By the same token, the costs and risks of using power for political ends, and the impediments to doing so, are amply present in the world at large. And the world at large, in all its variety, increasingly stretches its influences into domains hitherto controlled by the Soviet rulers.

VII

We have thus entered an era in which the United States and the external world generally can seek increasingly to draw the Soviet Union into the constraints and disciplines but also the advantages of the international

system. To do so requires conscious strategies and policies. Passive reliance on historical trends will not suffice. Much progress was made during the 1970s, building on some progress before that, to devise "rules of conduct" for the restrained uses of power. The American-Soviet understandings arrived at during the three summit conferences of the early 1970s, the Helsinki Final Act, and numerous similar understandings between the U.S.S.R. and various Western nations such as France and Germany, have probably gone as far as negotiated documents can go in laying down ground rules for competition. None of these understandings are, however, self-enforcing in the sense that they will be adhered to simply because they have been put on paper. Nor can they be instantly or systematically implemented except where very precise obligations are involved, as in arms control agreements. Many of the understandings, such as the Joint Statement of Principles of 1972, the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War of 1973 and the Helsinki Final Act provide standards and goals rather than enforceable commitments to specific, unambiguous modes of behavior.

The Soviets have undoubtedly contravened some of the principles, and they probably consider that we and others have also contravened them. Notions about eschewing efforts at obtaining "unilateral advantage," in particular, are difficult to nail down in the shifting sands of international alignments and in circumstances where the successor states of the old colonial empires continue to be embroiled in territorial and other conflicts and seek external support for their causes. The effects of Soviet, or American, efforts to gain "unilateral advantage" are often unpredictable. The United States has not resisted, and sometimes has sought, opportunities to diminish Soviet influence in places where it had previously flourished—for example, in the Middle East—though this has not always resulted in corresponding American gains.

The Soviets for their part were quite prepared to seek a new role for themselves in southern Africa when the decisions of the U.S. Congress made the risks of doing so seem manageable while the benefits of not doing so were not evident. Their use of Cuban proxy troops—though in fact the Cubans probably pursued objectives of their own as well—opened disturbing vistas of new forms of Soviet expansion.

But it also drew the United States and other Western powers more actively into the affairs of southern Africa. The Soviets were not uninvolved in the outbreak of the 1973 October War and the oil embargo, though their role was less active and direct than critics of the policies of the last Administration would have had us believe. But whatever the precise Soviet role, the outcome did nothing to impede, and actually speeded up, the decline of Soviet influence in parts of the Middle East.

Rules of conduct and other formal arrangements to limit the intensity and dangers of competition must thus be buttressed by other policies, furthering the trends discussed above, to reduce over time incentives to adventurism and to strengthen the incentives for restraint and greater interrelatedness.

This necessarily involves arrangements from which the U.S.S.R. can draw benefits, be it in the form of economic relationships or in its ambition to be accepted as a power with global interests. For Americans, this side of the equation has been a difficult one to accept and has given rise to the notion of détente as being a "one-way street." But it is almost certain that disappointments about expected benefits from détente have also led the Soviet Union to question whether or not the costs—in terms of external intrusion, limitations on Soviet freedom of action, reductions in hard-won foreign influ-

ence, restiveness in Eastern Europe, diversity among communist parties, continued high levels of American military preparedness, the unpredictability of American conduct and many other equivocal trends from the Soviet standpoint—are worth paying.

Many observers have stressed that U.S.-Soviet relations can no longer be seen as operating independently of other major trends in international politics, even if in military terms the relationship remains largely bipolar. As noted at the outset, it is often suggested that we should rid ourselves of our fixation with the Soviet Union. The time has come, says one commentator, when "at least for a while, the best way to conduct U.S.-Soviet relations may be to reduce the intensity of the relationship, to cool it."³ The new Administration, like virtually all its predecessors, entered office with the hope that it could reduce the preoccupation with the Soviet relationship in order to concentrate on "world order politics" and global "architecture."

Yet Soviet military power continues to grow and Soviet involvements in world affairs, whatever the fluctuations, remain on the rise. World order politics which fall to envisage the inclusion of the U.S.S.R. in the disciplines, constraints, and advantages of the international system would hardly be consonant with the facts of the age. Despite its hopes, the new Administration has found itself heavily engaged with the U.S.S.R. and seems to devote as much energy to that relationship as to any other, if not more. It may be that, as President Carter said at Notre Dame, " . . . the threat of conflict with the U.S.S.R. has become less intensive even though the competition has become more extensive." But the distinctions are not always obvious. And there can be no assurance that an intensification of conflict could not rapidly return.

Thus, given the pervasiveness of U.S.-Soviet interactions, geographically and functionally, our policies toward the U.S.S.R. are likely to remain the most active and far-flung among our external policies. Certainly, because of the military aspect, they will continue to place the largest single external demand upon our resources and the federal budget. And however much we may seek to "de-link" issues in given instances, we will not be able to avoid the essential interrelationship between them. Nor should we. Efforts to regulate military competition by negotiation and agreement will not stand alone as an island in a sea of crises or virulent antagonisms. On the contrary, though it is likely to be limited in impact on military programs, the effectiveness of SALT and other negotiations will depend heavily on the rest of the relationship. Similar points can be made about virtually every major facet of U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Above all, it is unlikely that the incidence and intensity of crises, whatever our diplomatic skill and other restraints, can long be held to moderate levels unless there is in operation a whole range of constraints and incentives that give each side a stake in restraint.

What is involved is, of course, a long-term evolution which requires constant attention and effort and which will see many occasions that will defy clear characterization as to whether they represent progress, retrogression, success, failure or "irreversibility." There is no joy in ambiguity, especially for Americans. But that is precisely what will mark our relations with the Soviet Union for a long time to come. We will probably never stop arguing over whether we actually have a détente that, in the President's words, constitutes "progress toward peace." That will have to be a judgment of history. ●

³ Seyom Brown, "A Cooling-Off Period for U.S.-Soviet Relations." *Foreign Policy*, Fall, 1977, p. 21.

EAST ROCKAWAY, N.Y.—HOST OF LONG ISLAND'S NAUTICAL FESTIVAL

HON. NORMAN F. LENT

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, September 22, 1978

● Mr. LENT. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues the fact that the month of September 1978 has been proclaimed by New York's Governor as "Long Island Nautical Festival Month." This is a most important and historic event. It is a celebration of the pride and glory of industrious Long Island and our marvelous maritime heritage. The focal point of this year's inaugural festival is the *Unicorn*, one of the most beautiful sailing ships in the world, which is scheduling a series of port calls on Long Island's north and south shores during this month.

During the period of September 26–October 1, 1978, the *Unicorn* will make a port of call at East Rockaway on the south shore of Long Island, my home village. The East Rockaway Cultural Arts Council is the sponsoring organization, and our theme is "East Rockaway, a cultural expression of the Long Island Nautical Festival."

When the *Unicorn*, a two-masted brig, 136 feet in length, 81 feet high, and carrying 5,000 square-feet of sail, arrives at the port of East Rockaway, with Capt. Samuel Gehring at the helm, it will be welcomed to Bay County Park dock by East Rockaway's mayor, Ted Reinhard and the village's board of trustees, together with officials of the Cultural Arts Council led by cochairmen Mrs. Rosalie Monaco and Mrs. Emma Tolmach, and the chairman of the East Rockaway Grist Mill Museum Committee, Mrs. Mildred Roemer.

The *Unicorn*, called the most beautiful sailing ship in the world, was a star of

OP SAIL '76, and was seen on television as the slave ships in the series "Roots." It will be open to the public for inspection and photography during its stay at Bay County Park. Music, entertainment, lectures and a photo contest are planned for this great nautical event. School groups are encouraged and welcome to visit the *Unicorn*.

The visit of the great ship *Unicorn* will provide not only a spectacle of beauty and excitement, but also an unforgettable learning experience. The *Unicorn* is an authentic handcrafted brig, a two-masted ship with square sails on both masts. This was the most popular rig in the presteamship era. The brig *Unicorn* sailed as the last square-rigged vessel to carry cargo in the Western Hemisphere. It is hoped that the *Unicorn* will visit Long Island each September as the exciting focal point of the month-long celebration of the marvelous maritime and waterfront opportunities and benefits Long Island offers its residents and its visitors.

As the star of the Long Island Nautical Festival, the *Unicorn* serves as a sea-born time machine, taking us back to the days of our forefathers who lived much closer to nature than we. In beautiful ships of wood and sail—like the *Unicorn*—they braved the vast and mighty oceans where unpredictable wave, wind, and storm brought constant challenge, and required constant study of the natural forces arrayed against the sailor. In those days, East Rockaway was an important port of call for the sailing vessels. And East Rockaway villagers contributed much to the early vitality of Long Island, and knew the excitement of the hustle and bustle of a busy seaport. Thus the *Unicorn* serves as a reminder of our generation of the spirit and atmosphere which prevailed through much of Long Island's and East Rockaway's history.

That is why, Mr. Speaker, I am proud, indeed, that my own village is playing such a vital part in this nautical festival. During the 6 days the *Unicorn* will

be docked at Bay County Park, the village is planning a number of special events, including a concert by the Hofstra University Jazz Repertory Company, a performance by the Hempstead Colonial Dancers; special nautical exhibits at the East Rockaway Public Library; special hours at the Grist Mill Museum, and a number of receptions honoring Luis E. Bejarano, Lynbrook, and Frank O. Braynard, Sea Cliff—founders of the Long Island Nautical Festival.

I would like to offer my heartiest congratulations to all those who have assisted in making this exciting festival possible, especially Mayor Ted Reinhard; the village board of trustees; village clerk Bill Overs; the East Rockaway Cultural Arts Council and its cochairmen, Mrs. Rosalie Monaco and Mrs. Emma Tolmach; the East Rockaway Grist Mill Museum Committee, and its chairman, Mrs. Mildred Roemer; the Hewlett Point Yacht Club; the Woodmere Bay Yacht Club; and the many volunteers who have contributed so much of their time to this worthwhile project.

And, of course, a special salute to the founders of the Long Island Nautical Festival, Luis Bejarano, Lynbrook, and Frank O. Braynard, Sea Cliff. Their vision, dedication, and just plain hard work turned a magnificent dream into a brilliant reality. The Long Island Nautical Festival demonstrates to the entire Nation the magnificent attractions of our favored land. We Long Islanders know and appreciate the benefits of our rich and verdant land, our beautiful beaches, and some of the greatest fishing and sailing waters to be found anywhere in the world. Now, through the Long Island Nautical Festival, others have an opportunity to experience these bountiful blessings which have been afforded us.

Mr. Speaker, I wish all of my colleagues to join us on Long Island in this monthlong nautical salute to the maritime wonders to be found on Long Island. As a lifelong resident of this fortunate island, I can tell you in all earnestness, it is a most wondrous land. ●

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Monday, September 25, 1978

The House met at 12 o'clock noon and was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. WRIGHT).

DESIGNATION OF SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. WRIGHT) laid before the House the following communication from the Speaker:

WASHINGTON, D.C.,
September 25, 1978.

I hereby designate the Honorable JIM WRIGHT to act as Speaker pro tempore for today.

THOMAS P. O'NEILL, Jr.,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

PRAYER

The Reverend James David Ford, Chaplain, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., offered the following prayer:

Let us pray:

Almighty God, Creator and Sustainer of the world, how excellent is Thy name in all the Earth.

We give Thee praise for the abundant mercies that Thou hast shown to Thy people in days past, and for the promise of hope for the days ahead. We thank Thee that when we have fallen, Thou hast lifted us up, when we have been weary, we have been given strength, when we have been afraid, we have received courage, when the concerns of life have seemed to overwhelm, we have received faith in the promise of a new and better day.

Bless us now as we face our tasks and cause us to be responsible stewards in service to Thee and to our country. In the name of the Lord, we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Without objection, the Journal stands approved.

There was no objection.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Sparrow, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment bills of the House of the following titles:

H.R. 8812. An act to name a certain Federal building in Jonesboro, Arkansas, the "E. C. 'Took' Gathings Building"; and

H.R. 9071. An act to confer jurisdiction upon the United States Court of Claims to hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claim of John T. Knight.