

ORDER FOR THE RECOGNITION OF MR. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. TOMORROW

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that immediately after the disposition of the approval of the Journal and the prayer, Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. be recognized under the order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senate will come in at 9 a.m., and after two orders for the recognition of Senators the Senate will resume its consideration of S. 14.

The pending question at that time will be on the adoption of amendment No. 402. There is still 35 minutes to run on that amendment, and unless time is yielded from the bill, or an amendment is offered to the amendment, or some motion on which time is allowed into the agreement is made, the vote will occur at around 10 o'clock, and the yeas and nays have been ordered on the amendment.

I would expect several other rollcall votes to occur tomorrow in relation to amendments or motions with respect to the bill, S. 14.

It is the intention of the leadership to complete action on the bill tomorrow, so this would mean that the Senate may be in late.

If not tomorrow, then the Senate would be expected to complete action on the bill on Saturday. I hope a Saturday session will not be necessary.

RECESS UNTIL 9 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in recess until the hour of 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The motion was agreed to; and at 6:44 p.m., the Senate recessed until Friday, September 14, 1979, at 9 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate September 13, 1979:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Thomas W. M. Smith, of Maine, a Foreign Service officer of class 1, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Ghana.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

John C. Sawhill, of New York, to be Deputy Secretary of Energy, vice John F. O'Leary, resigned.

BOARD FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

Thomas H. Quinn, of Rhode Island, to be a member of the Board for International Broadcasting for a term expiring April 28, 1982 (reappointment).

GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVES

The following-named persons to be representatives of the United States of America to the 34th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

Donald F. McHenry, of Illinois.
Benjamin S. Rosenthal, U.S. Representative from the State of New York.
Larry Winn, Jr., U.S. Representative from the State of Kansas.

Esther L. Coopersmith, of Maryland.
The following-named persons to be alternate representatives of the United States of America to the 34th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

Richard W. Petree, of Virginia.
William L. Dunfee of New Hampshire.
Howard T. Rosen, of New Jersey.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Thursday, September 13, 1979

The House met at 10 a.m.

The Reverend Dr. Harvey L. Duke, pastor, First Baptist Church, Cary, N.C., offered the following prayer:

Eternal God, our Heavenly Father, we thank You for Your love and kindness to us and for life with its joys and happinesses, its challenges and responsibilities; even when it brings us sadness and sorrow, stress and strain, we are grateful.

In these difficult days of our Nation and world we pray for the Members of this body as they struggle with the hard problems before them. Give them wisdom and guidance in their deliberations and decisions. And when they leave this assembly each day may they feel confident they have done their best in serving those they represent and the God in whom they trust. Grant unto them Your divine grace, power, and strength.

In Your holy name we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Sparrow, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed a bill and a concurrent resolution of the following titles, in which the concurrence of the House is requested.

S. 1403. An act to amend the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-87) to provide an extension of time for the submission and approval of State programs or the implementation of a Federal program, to clarify the contents of a State program, to provide for increased cooperation between the Secretary of the Interior and the States with respect to the regulation of surface coal mining operations, and for other purposes; and

S. Con. Res. 29. Concurrent resolution regarding the restoration of Olympic records of the late James (Jim) Thorpe.

REV. HARVEY L. DUKE

(Mr. CHAPPELL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman who led this House in prayer this morning, the Reverend Harvey L. Duke, is well qualified to seek divine guidance for this House. I have known him for a good long while. He was a member of my Reserve squadron back in Jacksonville, Fla., for a while and, of course, he had a very fine opportunity there to work with those of us who needed the benefit of daily prayer. We were all good candidates then as we are here today. Reverend Duke is a dedicated Naval Reservist, an outstanding American with a deep love for his country.

I join the House in welcoming him to be with us this morning. We wish him Godspeed in all that he does.

REV. HARVEY L. DUKE

(Mr. ANDREWS of North Carolina asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. ANDREWS of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, ladies and gentlemen, I would just like to join my colleague, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. CHAPPELL) in welcoming our guest chaplain this morning.

I would like to say that our district, the Fourth District of North Carolina, is honored that this distinguished gentleman has moved from Florida to Cary, N.C., a very vibrant and growing community adjacent to Raleigh, N.C. Being from there I especially welcome you here, sir, and I am sure all Members do likewise.

HOUSE ACTION ON SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRATION

(Mr. ROUSSELOT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROUSSELOT. Mr. Speaker, I believe the House should be complimented for the very complete debate which it carried on yesterday relating to draft registration. I have always vigorously opposed the mandatory draft legislation except in time of a declared war. I think this House is to be complimented for the manner in which it conducted this debate. I supported the Schroeder amendment very vigorously because I think there was simply no need to reinstate mandatory registration. The President

□ This symbol represents the time of day during the House Proceedings, e.g., □ 1407 is 2:07 p.m.

● This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by the Member on the floor.

already has the power to renew registration at the stroke of a pen should we be faced with a national emergency.

By its action yesterday the House has saved the American taxpayer nearly \$70 million, the estimated cost to resurrect the registration system.

Our military manpower needs are being well served by the highly trained and dedicated men and women of our All-Volunteer Forces. Should the situation ever arise where we are faced with a national defense emergency, we can institute draft registration on a moments notice given the highly sophisticated informational retrieval systems available to us in today's complex technological world. Our goal should not be the forced conscription of more young men to shoulder rifles, but rather the upgrading of training and benefits for those who have volunteered to serve our Nation in the Armed Forces.

Studies have pointed out that we can save between \$5 and \$10 billion in taxes annually from our defense budget through the more efficient and effective manpower utilization of our current Volunteer Force.

The All-Volunteer Force has proved successful in 6½ years operation. Recruitment levels have held basically firm. The quality and fighting power of our forces has gone up. I have confidence in the men and women who man the ramparts of this Republic.

Mr. Speaker, clearly no such emergency exists today, and clearly no such need for a registration renewal exists.

THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA

(Mr. BAUMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BAUMAN. Mr. Speaker, it has been out in the open for some time now that 3,000 Soviet combat troops are stationed less than 90 miles from the beaches of Florida. Reports of Soviet submarines and advanced military equipment pouring into Cuba has also been heard in recent days. Nicaragua has fallen into pro-Communist hands and the last 2 days have seen repeated press reports of armed revolutionary activities in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, all sponsored by the Moscow puppet, Fidel Castro.

Mr. Speaker, I must say the response of the President has been less than reassuring. Despite the fact that more than 30 percent of America's oil supplies travel through the Caribbean, Jimmy Carter says, "Be calm," and the Secretary of State lunches with Communist Ambassador Dobrynin and nothing happens.

Mr. Speaker, I am sure that the spirit of James Monroe is troubled, but even more, the people of this Nation ought to be frightened at the complete lack of response of our Government. I am also sure that the awards committee of the Neville Chamberlain school of diplomacy this year will have no problem in making its awards.

TABLING OF HOUSE RESOLUTION 398 DIRECTING SECRETARY OF STATE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON USE OF AIRCRAFT BY ISRAEL

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Affairs be discharged from further consideration of the resolution (H. Res. 398) directing the Secretary of State to provide to the House of Representatives certain information with respect to the use in hostilities by Israel of aircraft of U.S. origin, and that the resolution be tabled.

The Clerk read the title of the resolution.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 398

Resolved, That not later than ten days after the adoption of this resolution, the Secretary of State shall provide to the House of Representatives the following:

(1) Information in the possession of the Secretary concerning Israeli use of military aircraft of United States origin in hostilities outside Israeli borders during 1979.

(2) Documents in the possession of the Secretary which contain or describe communications between the United States Government and the Government of Israel with respect to the instances listed pursuant to paragraph (1).

(3) Documents in the possession of the Secretary which contain or describe communications between the Government of Israel and the United States Government during 1979 with respect to the circumstances in which Israel will or will not in the future use military aircraft of United States origin.

(4) Documents prepared since January 1, 1979, in the possession of the Secretary which relate to Israeli compliance with section 3(c) (1) of the Arms Export Control Act.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Indiana?

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I would ask the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. HAMILTON) to explain the purpose of his request.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East held a hearing September 11, 1979, to consider House Resolution 398, a resolution of inquiry introduced August 2 directing the Secretary of State to provide the House of Representatives certain information with respect to the use in hostilities by Israel of aircraft of U.S. origin.

Morris Draper, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, testified and provided useful and informative answers to many questions posed by members. The State Department further agreed to provide additional material promptly in reply to questions submitted for the record of the hearing and specific requests made during the hearing for summary tables listing 1979 raids by Palestinians into Israel and raids by Israeli troops against targets in Lebanon. This material will be available in the subcommittee's offices next week, I am told.

Because of the sensitive nature of the material to be discussed, the subcommittee voted to go into executive session and the entire hearing was closed.

Following the testimony of the State Department the subcommittee, by voice vote, voted to table the resolution. Members seemed satisfied by the responses they received and the sponsor of House Resolution 398, the gentleman from Illinois, concurred in the tabling motion.

Mr. Speaker, the United States is currently involved in extensive efforts to try to bring a lasting truce to southern Lebanon. The cycle of violence and counter-violence between Palestinians residing in Lebanon and Israelis and their Lebanese Christian militia allies in southern Lebanon is a matter of grave concern to all of us and a constant source of instability in the Middle East, it has the potential of threatening the entire peace process. Innocent people in Israel and in Lebanon have suffered greatly from the events of the last few months. Our attention, at this time, is appropriately focused on bringing a stop to the cycle of violence. We should all hope for success.

Mr. Speaker, in view of the action taken by the subcommittee and the concurrence on the part of the resolution's sponsor, I urge that the resolution be tabled.

□ 1010

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, further reserving the right to object, I want to express my gratitude to the gentleman from Indiana, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, for having hearings on this resolution of inquiry. That was the purpose I had in mind when I filed the resolution, feeling that a careful examination of what is available in the executive branch concerning Israeli use of U.S.-supplied military equipment against southern Lebanon was entirely in the public interest.

Immediately subsequent to filing that resolution of inquiry, the Secretary of State did respond to inquiries I had made with a letter to Chairman ZABLOCKI in which he stated that an Israeli violation of U.S. law may have occurred.

The hearings that were held under the direction of the gentleman from Indiana, I feel, helped to clear up the issue, to settle a good many questions, and I would like to express the hope to the gentleman from Indiana that as soon as the subcommittee does get the full response from the executive branch, that an effort will be made to develop a summarized version that can be declassified and made available to the public.

I wonder if the gentleman could give me his comments on that prospect.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. First, I think the gentleman's resolution of inquiry was most useful in this instance, as was the hearing itself, and a sanitized version of the hearing, I would think, would be an appropriate measure and also useful.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Indiana?

There was no objection.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

SOLAR ENERGY INCENTIVE TAX ACT OF 1979

(Mr. LUKEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LUKEN. Mr. Speaker, today, I am introducing legislation to increase the solar energy tax credits to 50 percent.

Currently, businesses are permitted an inadequate 20-percent solar tax credit—10 percent for solar energy property and 10 percent for the regular investment credit. My legislation would up the permissible tax credit to 50 percent—40 percent for solar energy property and 10 percent for the regular investment credit.

For residences, current law grants a 30-percent tax credit for renewable energy sources—solar, wind, and geothermal—on the first \$2,000 and 20-percent credit on the next \$8,000. My legislation simplifies this by permitting one credit—50 percent of the cost expenditures up to \$10,000.

The proposed increased tax credits are needed to spur the commercialization of solar energy equipment. According to a recent study by the Harvard Business School, solar energy can replace the equivalent of 2.5 million barrels of oil per day by the year 2000. This constitutes over 10 percent of our current daily oil usage. Solar technology is here now—it is ready for widespread commercialization. My legislation provides for the necessary incentives to accomplish this goal.

The higher solar tax credit is not new to the country. Since 1976, California has allowed a 55-percent solar tax credit. The credit has been a tremendous success: Over 40,000 solar installations in the first 3 years. Revenue losses are far below projections—the impact being minimal on the State's budget.

If we are to lessen our dependency on foreign oil, we must look toward solar energy—my legislation provides the incentives to accomplish this.

CARL YASTRZEMSKI REACHES TOP OF ONE OF BASEBALL'S HIGHEST MOUNTAINS

(Mrs. HECKLER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. HECKLER. Mr. Speaker, I take this time this morning to bring to the attention of our colleagues a great event in American athletic history.

The lights at Fenway Park blazed with special brilliance last night when Carl Yastrzemski reached the top of one of baseball's highest mountains—3,000 base hits.

Only 14 other men in the history of baseball have stood on that peak. And only three others have scaled the other baseball Everest which Yaz conquered last night—3,000 hits and 400 home runs.

For almost two decades, and that is a century in baseball annals, Carl Yastrzemski has made millions of us proud to be Red Sox fans. Day after day during this season he has broken one after another of baseball's sound barriers.

He honors baseball and all American sports. He is a genuine American hero who has set a magnificent example of good sportsmanship for our children and grandchildren.

May the hits and home runs for Yaz go on and on for many, many seasons to come.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS, 1980

Mr. WHITE. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 4040) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1980 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and for research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and for civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, to authorize the military training student loads, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1980 for civil defense, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WHITE).

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. ROUSSELOT. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were yeas 370, nays 2, not voting 62, as follows:

[Roll No. 463]

YEAS—370

- | | | |
|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Abdnor | Boner | Corman |
| Akaka | Bonior | Cotter |
| Albosta | Bonker | Coughlin |
| Alexander | Bouquard | Courter |
| Ambro | Bowen | Crane, Daniel |
| Anderson, Calif. | Brademas | D'Amours |
| Andrews, N.C. | Breaux | Daniel, Dan |
| Andrews, N. Dak. | Brinkley | Daniel, R. W. |
| Annunzio | Brodhead | Danielson |
| Anthony | Brooks | Dannemeyer |
| Archer | Broomfield | Daschle |
| Ashbrook | Brown, Calif. | Davis, Mich. |
| Aspin | Brown, Ohio | Deckard |
| Atkinson | Broyhill | Dellums |
| Badham | Burgener | Derrick |
| Bafalis | Burison | Devine |
| Bailley | Burton, Phillip | Dickinson |
| Baldus | Butler | Dicks |
| Barnard | Byron | Dodd |
| Bauman | Campbell | Donnelly |
| Beard, R.I. | Carney | Dornan |
| Beard, Tenn. | Carr | Dougherty |
| Bedell | Cavanaugh | Downey |
| Benjamin | Chappell | Drinan |
| Bennett | Cheney | Duncan, Oreg. |
| Bereuter | Clausen | Duncan, Tenn. |
| Bethune | Clay | Early |
| Bevill | Cleveland | Eckhardt |
| Biaggi | Clinger | Edgar |
| Bingham | Coelho | Edwards, Ala. |
| Blanchard | Coleman | Edwards, Calif. |
| Boggs | Collins, Ill. | Emery |
| Boland | Collins, Tex. | English |
| Bolling | Conable | Erdahl |
| | Conte | Erlenborn |
| | Corcoran | Ertel |

- Evans, Del.
- Evans, Ga.
- Evans, Ind.
- Fary
- Fascell
- Fazio
- Fenwick
- Ferraro
- Findley
- Fish
- Fisher
- Flippo
- Florio
- Foley
- Ford, Tenn.
- Forsythe
- Fountain
- Fowler
- Frenzel
- Frost
- Fuqua
- Gaydos
- Gephardt
- Gialmo
- Gibbons
- Gilman
- Gingrich
- Ginn
- Glickman
- Gonzalez
- Gore
- Gradison
- Gramm
- Grassley
- Gray
- Green
- Grisham
- Guarini
- Gudger
- Guyer
- Hagedorn
- Hall, Ohio
- Hall, Tex.
- Hamilton
- Hammer-schmidt
- Hance
- Fanley
- Hansen
- Harkin
- Harsha
- Heckler
- Hefner
- Heftel
- Hightower
- Hillis
- Hinson
- Holland
- Hollenbeck
- Holt
- Holtzman
- Hopkins
- Horton
- Howard
- Hubbard
- Hughes
- Hutto
- Ichord
- Ireland
- Jacobs
- Jeffords
- Jeffries
- Jenkins
- Jenrette
- Johnson, Calif.
- Johnson, Colo.
- Jones, Okla.
- Jones, Tenn.
- Kastenmeier
- Kazen
- Kelly
- Kildee
- Kogovsek
- Kostmayer
- Kramer
- LaFalce
- Lagomarsino
- Latta
- Leach, Iowa

- Leach, La.
- Leath, Tex.
- Lederer
- Lee
- Lehman
- Leland
- Lent
- Levitas
- Lewis
- Livingston
- Loeffler
- Long, La.
- Long, Md.
- Lott
- Lowry
- Lujan
- Luken
- Lundine
- Lungren
- McCloskey
- McDade
- McEwen
- McHugh
- McKay
- McKinney
- Madigan
- Maguire
- Markey
- Marks
- Marlenee
- Marriott
- Martin
- Mathis
- Matsui
- Mattox
- Mavroules
- Mica
- Michel
- Mikulski
- Mikva
- Miller, Calif.
- Miller, Ohio
- Mineta
- Minish
- Mitchell, N.Y.
- Moakley
- Mollohan
- Montgomery
- Moore
- Moorhead, Calif.
- Moorhead, Pa.
- Mottl
- Murphy, Pa.
- Murtha
- Myers, Ind.
- Myers, Pa.
- Natcher
- Neal
- Nedzi
- Nelson
- Nichols
- Nowak
- O'Brien
- Oakar
- Oberstar
- Obey
- Ottinger
- Panetta
- Pashayan
- Patten
- Patterson
- Paul
- Pease
- Perkins
- Petri
- Peyster
- Pickle
- Price
- Fritchard
- Pursell
- Quayle
- Quillen
- Rahall
- Rangel
- Ratchford
- Regula
- Reuss
- Rhodes

- Richmond
- Rinaldo
- Ritter
- Roberts
- Robinson
- Rodino
- Roe
- Rose
- Roth
- Rousselot
- Royer
- Rudd
- Russo
- Sabo
- Satterfield
- Sawyer
- Scheuer
- Schroeder
- Schulze
- Sebelius
- Seiberling
- Sensenbrenner
- Shannon
- Sharp
- Shelby
- Shumway
- Shuster
- Skelton
- Slack
- Smith, Iowa
- Smith, Nebr.
- Snowe
- Snyder
- Solarz
- Solomon
- Spellman
- Spence
- St Germain
- Stack
- Staggers
- Stangeland
- Stanton
- Steed
- Stenholm
- Stewart
- Stockman
- Stokes
- Stratton
- Studds
- Stump
- Symms
- Synar
- Taylor
- Thomas
- Thompson
- Traxler
- Trible
- Ullman
- Vanik
- Vento
- Volkmer
- Walgren
- Walker
- Wampler
- Watkins
- Waxman
- Weaver
- Welss
- White
- Whitehurst
- Whitley
- Whittaker
- Whitten
- Williams, Mont.
- Williams, Ohio
- Wilson, C. H.
- Wilson, Tex.
- Wolpe
- Wright
- Wyatt
- Wyder
- Wyllie
- Yates
- Yatron
- Young, Fla.
- Young, Mo.
- Zablocki
- Zeperetti

NAYS—2

Wilson, Bob

NOT VOTING—62

- Addabbo
- Anderson, Ill.
- Applegate
- Ashley
- AuCoin
- Barnes
- Bellenson
- Buchanan
- Burton, John
- Carter
- Chisholm
- Lloyd
- Conyers
- Crane, Philip
- Davis, S.C.
- de la Garza
- Derwinski
- Diggs
- Dingell
- Dixon
- Edwards, Okla.
- Fithian
- Flood
- Ford, Mich.
- Garcia
- Goldwater
- Goodling
- Harris
- Hawkins
- Huckaby
- Hyde
- Jones, N.C.
- Kemp
- Kindness

McClory	Preyer	Tauke
McCormack	Railsback	Treen
McDonald	Rosenthal	Udall
Mazzoli	Rostenkowski	Van Deerlin
Mitchell, Md.	Roybal	Vander Jagt
Moffett	Runnels	Winn
Murphy, Ill.	Santini	Wirth
Murphy, N.Y.	Simon	Wolff
Nolan	Stark	Young, Alaska
Pepper	Swift	

□ 1030

So the motion was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, H.R. 4040, with Mr. MINETA (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Wednesday, September 12, 1979, sections 812 through 815 had been considered as having been read and open for amendment, and all time for debate on these sections and all amendments thereto had expired.

Are there any further amendments to section 815?

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BROOKS

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BROOKS: Page 31, line 3, strike out "(a)", and beginning on line 9, strike out subsection (b) through line 15.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Chair will ask the gentleman from Texas (Mr. BROOKS), has this amendment been printed in the RECORD?

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, the amendment was printed in the RECORD this morning. I submitted it yesterday for printing in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRIES

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. I was under the impression that when we completed sections 812 through 815 we would then revert back to title I. Are we going to complete title VIII before we go back to title I?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Only section 815, since sections 812-814 have been amended.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. We completed that?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Only debate.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. I thought that we closed that off last night when the chairman asked if there were any further amendments, and that those three sections were completed at that time.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Only the debate on those sections and on amendments thereto had been completed last evening.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. I am in error, then.

I thank the chairman.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, is it my understanding that any action with regard to sections in title VIII prior to section 812 will come up at the conclusion of the consideration of the remainder of the bill?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the remainder of title VIII is read, the gentleman is correct.

Mr. STRATTON. So that the amendment which the gentleman from Texas (Mr. BROOKS) is offering is to either section 812, 813, 814 or 815?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from New York is correct. It is to section 815.

Mr. STRATTON. I thank the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Since his amendment is in the RECORD the gentleman from Texas (Mr. BROOKS) is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.

□ 1040

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I am offering this amendment in order to remove a prohibition on executive reorganization authority, which was included in the military authorization bill as it passed the Armed Services Committee. Section 815(b) of the committee bill provides that the Selective Service System and its personnel and functions shall not be subject to any reorganization plan under the President's current reorganization authority.

Executive reorganizations by plan are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Government Operations Committee. If this restriction on reorganization of the Selective Service System had been included in the original authorization bill, the bill would have been subject to a joint or sequential referral to Government Operations. However, because the section was included in a clean bill, Government Operations did not learn of the provision until after the bill was reported and it was too late to request a sequential referral.

In addition to these jurisdictional considerations, it would be unwise to impose a piecemeal restriction on the President's reorganization authority in this manner. The present Reorganization Act, Public Law 95-17, places clear limitations and conditions on the President's reorganization authority. It is customary to consult with the congressional committees of substantive jurisdiction before proposing any reorganization plan. We should not upset these formal and informal procedures by restricting individual agencies from reorganization authority. For these reasons, I urge an affirmative vote on my amendment.

Mrs. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BROOKS. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mrs. HOLT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I certainly understand the purpose behind the amendment, but I was the author of the committee language which was put in, because I have some real concern about the Selective Service System losing its independence and being placed under the Department of Defense.

I would just like to ask the gentleman some questions, if I may, about removing this limitation on the President's reorganization authority.

Does this imply any likelihood that the Selective Service System will be consolidated in another executive agency?

Mr. BROOKS. Not to my knowledge. I have no indication of that whatsoever. It is not the genesis of this amendment whatsoever.

Mrs. HOLT. I certainly appreciate the gentleman's assurance as chairman of the Committee on Government Operations.

I would like to ask the chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel if he feels that there is any danger in any effort to reorganize the Selective Service System under the Department of Defense? I would like his assurance that if there is, that our committee will consider it and try to put a stop to it.

Mr. WHITE. The committee has no plans whatever to make any such adjustment. I might advise the gentleman that we have been advised informally by the Office of Management and Budget this morning there is no plan under active consideration in the executive branch to combine the Selective Service System with another agency, and, in fact, the President's reorganization authority terminates next spring.

Mrs. HOLT. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BROOKS. I yield to my distinguished friend from Wisconsin.

Mr. ASPIN. I thank the chairman of the Committee on Government Operations for yielding.

I would like to commend the gentleman from Maryland (Mrs. HOLT) for her amendment, and for her concern. I think that is a real concern about keeping this as an independent agency. I know the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. MONTGOMERY) has been concerned about it. I appreciate the words of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WHITE) about this, and I understand his concern about the jurisdictional problem and the problem of putting this kind of language in the bill. I think we ought to vote for the gentleman's amendment, and I appreciate his assurances on this matter, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BROOKS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BROOKS. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. Chairman, this amendment was presented to the committee several months ago by the chairman of the Government Operations Committee, Mr. BROOKS.

Mr. BROOKS' position is that subsection (b) of section 815 provides an exception to the President's reorganization authority and the Government Operations Committee is wary of providing such

exceptions as an inroad to that committee's jurisdiction.

The Committee on Armed Services is anxious to insure that the Selective Service System remain an independent agency. However, we appreciate the concerns of the Government Operations Committee and are willing to accept the amendment to strike subsection (b) in section 815 as originally reported by the committee. This amendment does not change the expression in subsection (a) of section 815 declaring Congress' view that the Selective Service System should remain administratively independent of any other agency, including the Department of Defense.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BROOKS. I yield to my distinguished friend from Mississippi (Mr. MONTGOMERY).

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas for yielding.

Through World War I, the War Department or other military authority had responsibility for military conscription. Up to and including the Spanish American War, the uniformed troops actually went in to the communities and conducted a "muster" or registration of males in specified age groups and determined who would be sworn into service "on the spot." At times provisions were made for individuals to "buy out" by paying a specified sum of money and allow someone else to take his place. Although this provision that favored the affluent members of our society had been abolished and more civilian control of registration was allowed at the local level during World War I, responsibility for conscription was still vested in the Provost Marshal General of the War Department.

Based on the experiences of World War I, the Provost Marshal General in his postwar reports, recommended, among other things, that should there ever be a need for another draft, the agency responsible for its operation should be independent and responsible directly to the President.

The Provost Marshal's recommendations were followed when the Selective Service Act of 1940 was passed by the Congress. The wisdom of this action was evident by the success of the Selective Service System's operation during World War II.

What must be remembered is that during a war when there is need for conscription, the fabric of society and production capability must be maintained—and in fact production must be intensified. This brings on a competition for manpower and womanpower between the Armed Forces and civilian production. Because of a natural self interest that will exist in those circumstances, the best interests of national security would not be served by allowing either the Armed Forces or a civilian labor department to be responsible for conscription. The best alternative is for a separate agency such as Selective Service to handle this function. Past experience has shown this is the proper way for this delicate and

personal function to be administered to the highest degree of objectivity. Like a democracy, the administration of the conscription agency is difficult and will not be perfect, but a separate agency will be the better of the alternatives.

Mr. ROUSSELOT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BROOKS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. ROUSSELOT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Will there be any attempt at all by the Committee on Government Operations, if the President requests such an action, to fold the Selective Service into the Department of Defense?

Mr. BROOKS. We have no indication they have any request to do that. We have no tendency to do that at all.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. BROOKS) has expired.

(At the request of Mr. ROUSSELOT and by unanimous consent, Mr. BROOKS was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. ROUSSELOT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BROOKS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. ROUSSELOT. If the President did make such a request, would the inclination of the chairman of the committee be to fold it into the Department of Defense or would the gentleman resist that effort?

Mr. BROOKS. I do not think it would be much for moving it into the Department of Defense. They have their hands full spending about \$120 billion or \$130 billion. I believe that they seem to be fully occupied doing that fairly well, just fairly well.

Mr. ROUSSELOT. I appreciate the gentleman's comments.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. BROOKS).

The amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Are there any further amendments to section 815? If not, the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Department of Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1980".

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

SEC. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1980 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

AIRCRAFT

For aircraft: for the Army, \$1,049,400,000; for the Navy and the Marine Corps, \$4,610,104,000; for the Air Force, \$7,816,190,000.

MISSILES

For missiles: for the Army, \$944,800,000; for the Navy, \$1,605,600,000; for the Marine Corps, \$20,500,000; for the Air Force, \$2,268,800,000.

NAVAL VESSELS

For naval vessels: for the Navy, \$7,515,500,000.

TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES

For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, \$1,797,200,000; for the Marine Corps, \$13,000,000.

TORPEDOES

For torpedoes and related support equipment: for the Navy, \$267,200,000.

OTHER WEAPONS

For other weapons: for the Army, \$196,400,000; for the Navy, \$158,000,000; for the Marine Corps, \$18,700,000.

RESTRICTION ON OBLIGATION OF AIRCRAFT MODIFICATION FUNDS

SEC. 102. Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 for the procurement of aircraft—

(1) \$454,700,000 of the amount authorized to be appropriated for the Army;

(2) \$681,400,000 of the amount authorized to be appropriated for the Navy and the Marine Corps; and

(3) \$1,495,100,000 of the amount authorized to be appropriated for the Air Force, shall be available only for aircraft modification, and none of the sums specified in clauses (1), (2), and (3) may be obligated or expended for any other purpose.

REPORT ON B-52 MODIFICATION PROGRAM

SEC. 103. Of the amount authorized to be appropriated under section 101 for procurement of aircraft for the Air Force, \$431,900,000 is authorized for the procurement of avionics and cruise missile integration for the B-52 modification program subject to the condition that the Secretary of Defense provide to the Congress at the earliest possible date, and not later than September 30, 1979, a report on—

(1) all uncertainties in the effectiveness of the B-52 as a cruise missile carrier over the next decade, including any degradation of defense penetration capabilities of the B-52 which could result from possible air defense advances by the Soviet Union; and

(2) the requirement for maintaining the defense penetration capability of the B-52 and the options available during the next decade to maintain such capability.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM

SEC. 104. There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1980 \$250,200,000 for contribution by the United States as its share of the cost for such fiscal year of the acquisition by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of the Airborne Early Warning and Control System, as such system is specified in the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Ministers of Defense on the NATO E-3A Cooperative Programme, signed by the Secretary of Defense on December 6, 1978.

CERTAIN AUTHORITY PROVIDED SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IN CONNECTION WITH THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM PROGRAM

SEC. 105. (a) During fiscal year 1980, the Secretary of Defense, in carrying out the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Ministers of Defense on the NATO E-3A Cooperative Programme, signed by the Secretary of Defense on December 6, 1978, may—

(1) waive reimbursement for the cost of work performed by personnel other than personnel employed in the United States Air Force Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) program office for—

- (A) auditing;
- (B) quality assurance;
- (C) codification;
- (D) inspection;

(E) contract administration;
(F) acceptance testing;
(G) certification services; and
(H) planning, programming, and management services;

(2) waive any surcharge for administrative services otherwise chargeable; and

(3) in connection with the NATO E-3A Cooperative Programme for fiscal year 1980, assume contingent liability for—

(A) identifiable taxes, customs duties, and other charges levied within the United States on the program; and

(B) the unfunded termination liability of the United States to any contractor whose contract is terminated.

(b) Authority under this section to enter into contracts shall be effective for any fiscal year only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts.

AUTHORIZATION OF REAPPROPRIATION

SEC. 106. There is authorized to be reappropriated for fiscal year 1980 for an additional SSN-688 nuclear attack submarine \$55,000,000 of unobligated funds previously appropriated for the DDG-2 destroyer modernization program.

Mr. PRICE (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title I be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will report the first committee amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Committee amendment: Page 2, line 13, strike out "\$4,610,104,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$4,670,004,000".

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will report the next committee amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Committee amendment: Page 3, line 2, strike out "\$7,515,500,00" and insert in lieu thereof "\$7,515,400,000".

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. PRICE TO THE COMMITTEE AMENDMENT

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the committee amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. PRICE to the committee amendment: On page 3, line 2, in lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the committee amendment, insert "\$6,790,400,000".

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of the amendment is to reduce the naval vessel count by \$725 million. That is the price of the two Iranian destroyers. They were included in the fiscal 1979 supplemental bill, and the money is no longer needed in this bill.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment to the committee amendment.

The amendment to the committee amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. FAZIO AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE COMMITTEE AMENDMENT, AS AMENDED

Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment as a substitute for the committee amendment, as amended.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. FAZIO as a substitute for the committee amendment as amended: Page 3, line 2, strike out "\$7,515,500,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$6,456,400,000".

POINT OF ORDER

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from New York will state his point of order.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I understood that the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE) had just offered an amendment that changed the figure of \$7,515,500,000 to \$6 billion-something else, and that was accepted by the committee.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The committee amendment, as amended, has not yet been agreed to, and it is open and subject to a substitute amendment.

Mr. STRATTON. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE) offered an amendment that begins with \$6 billion?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE) offered an amendment to the committee amendment, and that figure was for \$6,790,400,000.

□ 1050

Mr. STRATTON. And that has not been accepted?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. And that was agreed to.

Mr. STRATTON. That was agreed to, so the amendment of the gentleman from California is to what figure then?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman is substituting for the original committee amendment, as amended.

The Chair has overruled the point of order.

Mr. STRATTON. It was a parliamentary inquiry.

POINT OF ORDER

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, a point of order.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman will state the point of order.

Mr. ICHORD. I want to make sure in making my point of order that I understand what is going on. I distinctly heard the chairman announce that the amendment of the gentleman from Illinois, without objection, is adopted.

Then the gentleman from California arose saying he had a substitute amendment. If the amendment of the gentleman from Illinois was adopted, that figure has been amended and would be subject to a point of order, and I make that point of order that he is amending a figure already amended by the gentleman from Illinois.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Chair has indicated that the technical amendment offered by the chairman of the committee to the committee amendment has been accepted.

The committee amendment, as amended, has not yet been accepted and, therefore, is subject to a substitute amendment. That is what the gentleman from California is offering at the present time.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Chair has overruled the point of order.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry. Is the amendment of the gentleman from California to the committee amendment or to the committee amendment as amended by the gentleman from Illinois?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is a substitute for the committee amendment as amended by the gentleman from Illinois. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his substitute amendment.

Mr. FAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased that we are going to have the opportunity to debate an issue which I think is of great importance and which the House has been anticipating some discussion on. I am certainly acting in concert with the chairman of the committee who has guided me in the method by which we could bring this before the House.

This amendment is straightforward and has really no strings attached. It simply presents us with the option of adopting, instead of a nuclear propelled carrier, as the committee has recommended, or instead of going along with the administration and supporting a smaller carrier, a compromise *Kennedy* class conventionally powered large deck carrier which will have the same air power as the nuclear carrier, but for \$478 million less in initial outlays, and over the life of the ship, a reduced price tag of \$1 billion for the American taxpayer.

This is offered really in a spirit of compromise. The administration has written the chairman of the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee, Mr. BENNETT, and indicated to him that for many years they have opposed the nuclear carrier and will continue to oppose it to the extent recommending another veto of the Defense authorization bill, if it passes the Congress with the nuclear carrier in it. They have now indicated that they are willing to compromise; they are no longer rigidly holding to the CVV, the smaller carrier. They are now willing to agree that the large deck carrier has merit, that the potential capability of that carrier, the larger decked ship is something that our Navy needs, and as a result of that they are willing to sign a Defense authorization bill with that change.

I think it is most important that in this very difficult period we are going through, as we debate the level of our defense spending, trying to develop a consensus for new Defense authorizations emerging from the SALT debate, we not get hung up on the method of propulsion of this one ship. I have been convinced, and I may add, I did not come to the committee with this certainty in mind, but I have become convinced that we need this carrier. In a few months the first carrier will be going into Philadelphia Naval Shipyard for an 18-month SLEP overhaul. In the

next 20 years we will at all times have one carrier out of our carrier fleet in drydock going through this program, and we need to have another carrier available to us simply to maintain the commitments we have and the various treaty agreements we have entered into around the world.

There is no question that this ship will not be ready until 1987, even if we build the *Kennedy* class carrier, which is a design that has already been constructed and proven to be useful. I am very hopeful that the Members of this body, including the members of the Armed Services Committee, will join in the spirit of compromise that the administration has been willing to enter into so that we can finally put aside this issue which had been so divisive and has done really nothing more than prevent the Navy from having this ship they have been asking for such a long period of time.

Mr. TRIBLE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FAZIO. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. TRIBLE. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I agree that we must procure an additional large deck carrier for our Navy. Our carriers give us that slim margin of superiority over the Soviet Navy and we need at least one additional carrier to meet our minimum force requirements of 12 carriers in the years ahead.

I would, however, argue to the House that we should procure another nuclear carrier.

May I ask the gentleman from California if he would relate to the House how he arrived at the conclusion that the *Kennedy* carrier would be a better buy than the nuclear carrier? It is my judgment after reviewing both the initial cost of the *Kennedy* and the nuclear carrier and then adding the substantial cost to procure, and store and deliver the fuel oil necessary to propel the *Kennedy* carrier, that the nuclear carrier is the better buy.

Mr. FAZIO. I will be happy to answer the gentleman's question.

I might point out that I followed the gentleman's leadership in the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee when at that time he took the lead in the effort to get a large deck carrier for the Navy, and was willing to support a conventionally powered *Kennedy*-class carrier. His leadership has led me to this point today, I might indicate, and I am sorry that at this point the gentleman is not joining me once again in taking the kind of stand that I am taking.

The differences are \$477 million in initial procurement and that relates to the one time costs of the nuclear fuel. Also we incur midlife conversion costs of \$275 million.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

(At the request of Mr. TRIBLE and by unanimous consent, Mr. FAZIO was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. FAZIO. We also incur \$204 million in additional costs of personnel who are needed to man a nuclear carrier, people who have higher grades and, therefore, higher compensation. So it comes to a very significant amount of money over the life of the ship.

I might point out that we are calculating the acquisition, storage, and distribution, at a \$52-a-barrel figure. We are not underestimating the cost of oil. We anticipate that the oil will increase in cost.

Mr. TRIBLE. If the gentleman will yield further, the \$51.85 a barrel figure advanced by the gentleman is the cost of procuring, storing, and delivering that fuel oil today. Does the gentleman anticipate that there might be an increase in the cost of that fuel oil in the days ahead?

Mr. FAZIO. Well, I would say to the gentleman that the Navy, in testifying before our subcommittee, made it very clear that this was an acceptable ship to them. When the issue of fuel was raised they indicated that this would be a very, very small incremental increase in their total requirement and they did not seem to believe that this should be an impediment in terms of going ahead with this particular proposal.

The gentleman was very helpful in pointing out that the fact we need an oiler, for example, to accompany this carrier when the fleet is moving from one part of the globe to another is already a requirement, and the fact that we have an additional need for carrier fuel capacity among the existing oiler fleet is really not going to be an excessive requirement and is going to be really no impediment in terms of the ability.

Mr. TRIBLE. Will the gentleman yield for one further point?

Mr. FAZIO. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. TRIBLE. I am concerned more about the price of that petroleum and the way that petroleum costs affects the overall price of this ship that is so vital to our national defense. Using today's price for the purchase, storage, and delivery of that fuel oil, it will cost \$1.2 billion to propel a *Kennedy*-class ship during its 30-year life.

□ 1100

That is a fact that must be considered by the Members of this House. If we use today's rate and we consider that \$1.2 billion figure, the nuclear carrier produces the better buy. If we factor in a reasonable rate of inflation, even 5 percent, which would be clearly a reasonable rate of inflation, over the term of the life of that ship, we multiply the total cost of that petroleum by the factor of four or five. That is a factor that must be considered. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.

Mr. FAZIO. There is no question that there will be an increase in the cost of fuel oil, but also it has been stated that the \$1 billion difference in the cost of the *Kennedy*-class and the *Nimitz*-class carrier is a rather large difference, and it will take a great deal of time for that to be made up even with that incremental increase in the cost of fuel.

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. Mr.

Chairman, I am always delighted to hear that this is a simple little adjustment. I went through that simple little adjustment for the last 3 or 4 years, and I want to tell the folks here who may not have remembered that it was a whale of a donnybrook the last time we discussed the nuclear carrier. Here it is again. We are going to compromise the very essence of carrier operation if we vote this amendment.

Indeed, the *Kennedy*-class carrier is a good carrier. It was a great carrier when it was designed back in the 1950's. I ought to know, because I operated off one of them. As a matter of fact, I had the glorious opportunity in my lifetime to have operated off 14 carriers, and I remember the very first one, which was a Jeep carrier, which is smaller than the Trident submarines of today. Just as that was a quantum jump, then going to what we call the *Essex*-class carrier, and from there to the *FDR*-class, so too was the jump to the *Kennedy*-class, and may I say it immeasurably expanded our capability to operate.

But, it was always tied to main fleet elements, and we always had to travel at the rate of the slowest ship. Finally, we had a nuclear carrier, the *Enterprise*, and for the first time we were freed of having to stay with the fleet and all of its antisubmarine activities which were attendant, because these ships could operate at such speeds that they were better off almost in using speed rather than the normal submarine screens that were surrounding these ships which, by the way, take a great deal of fuel for all these ships which the author of this amendment has not even presented by this amendment.

Do not fool yourselves. If you operate conventional ships, you have to have conventional vessels and conventional supports, which mean antisubmarine programs which go far beyond what is required for nuclear ships. I have also heard repeatedly that what we need are nuclear support ships for nuclear carriers. Well, that has a nice ring to it, but in reality it restricts, because by the very essence of the aircraft they have on board they have their own antisubmarine capability. They do not need those surface vessels. They have what they need on board as an integral function of the total weapons system, which is the ship and its aircraft.

We also hear, "Well, we have to have more people because we have nuclear power we have to work with."

Well, the answer is that I have worked on the old eight-boiler ships, and I want to tell the Members that we have been sailing short in the fleet for years because we do not have an adequate number of people, and this powerplant demands time, particularly in the in-port time required for maintenance. They require more time than do nuclear ships. The dockside periods for nuclear ships are shorter.

We do not bring out the fact that we free up our activities to conduct aviation operations, which in the final analysis is the only reason for a carrier. We are going to talk about the economies that are presented, but maybe we are going

to save a few bucks on oil. My good friend from Virginia (Mr. TRIBLE) is absolutely right. We have no way of projecting what the year 2000 is going to bring. Remember, the vessel we are talking about will indeed be operating in the year 2000 and beyond.

I want to tell the author of this bill that I was willing to compromise. I sat there and fought with myself, and finally said, "As a person who has spent his life as a professional aviator on carriers, I would be less than honest—less than honest—with myself if I were to allow this kind of folly to be perpetrated on the Navy."

I said, "As far as I am concerned, as a Navy person and an officer of the deck underway," I said, "I will not do anything which gives somebody the opportunity to operate equipment which is inferior."

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LLOYD. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment the gentleman on his statement. I join him in his position, but in addition to the arguments he has presented today, I wonder if it is really appropriate, in deference to our President, to discuss a *Kennedy*-class carrier this morning.

Mr. LLOYD. I thank the gentleman for his comment.

Mr. BADHAM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LLOYD. I do indeed yield to my colleague from California.

Mr. BADHAM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I would like to associate myself with the gentleman's remarks, because they are absolutely true.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

(At the request of Mr. BADHAM and by unanimous consent, Mr. LLOYD was allowed to proceed for 4 additional minutes.)

Mr. BADHAM. The gentleman who proposed the amendment was not here last year. I will say that at least this amendment is superior to the one last year, and going along with the contention that there is a little bit of good in everything and nothing is absolutely bad, at least the gentleman in his amendment proposes to exchange this CVN for a carrier that we do have, that we do know about. It has got size, it has got shape, it has got reality, it has got planes.

Mr. LLOYD. Taking my time back for just a moment, I want to say that the gentleman is absolutely right. Talk about insanity, that was the presentation of something called a CVV, which no one had ever seen. We had never seen it on the drawing boards and had no idea what its operability was, and they told us that was going to be cheaper.

Mr. BADHAM. It was cheaper because there was not such a thing, and it was what we would have wanted it to be.

I would like to say that we have got to remember that the CVN *Nimitz*-class

carrier, for which plans are available, which is up-to-date technology, comes with a 13-year gas tank already loaded. In other words, it comes with built-in 13 years' worth of fuel so that it does take no tankers. It takes no support ships. It is perfectly flexible, as the gentleman from California has said, and so it is something that is really appropriate for a naval power. The *Kennedy*-class carrier is a fine carrier, as the gentleman said, but it is old and it is not up-to-date technology. If we are going to have one, in the words of the President, "Why not the best?"

I think that this amendment is unfortunate, and I join with the gentleman from California in opposing the amendment.

Mr. LLOYD. I thank the gentleman. Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LLOYD. I yield to my colleague.

Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the gentleman, who I know has a great deal of experience with naval carriers, did he imply that the CVN had larger capability in terms of air power?

Mr. LLOYD. Which? The *Nimitz*-class? Oh yes. I think there is a difference, and I will tell the gentleman why. It is because they do not have to take the time for replenishment and refueling at sea. That is one of the major reasons which really makes conventional carriers vulnerable. So, indeed I think nuclear carrier is a much more capable operating platform.

Does the gentleman have another question?

Mr. FAZIO. I think they have an equal number of planes.

Mr. LLOYD. That has no bearing on it. The gentleman does not understand carrier operations. I am not trying to put the gentleman down, but if the gentleman will let me have a minute, I would like to explain. The gentleman does not understand carrier operations if he does not understand that any time you have to take time out for handling your screen, orienting your screen, moving the screen, whatever it may be; handling your replenishment ships, and you have to do it every 4 days when you are operating heavily, oh yes, you debilitate those planes because you cannot do flight operations. This is normally on a 4-day schedule. If the gentleman does understand that it is not just numbers in the program, it is the operability of that weapons system that counts. That is what we are talking about.

□ 1110

We are not talking about just numbers. We are talking about the flight deck. The gentleman talks about the space that is available to work on an aircraft carrier. It is about the same for each ship type. We do not have as much fuel for aviation, but then that is not the issue.

Mr. FAZIO. Equal numbers of catapults. Equal numbers of elevators.

Mr. LLOYD. Yes. But the fact remains that in operating that catapult you even have to break down if you are operating heavily because you might have to take a boiler off the line to operate the steam

catapults on a conventional type. There are a lot of little nuances that go into it.

Mr. FAZIO. If the gentleman will yield further, a lot of little nuances amounting to a billion dollars are really something that this committee should take into consideration.

Mr. LLOYD. In response to the gentleman, I am saying in the nuances the gentleman is talking about, he is simply not bringing out the facts of this case. He is simply trying to add apples and oranges. This is entirely a different vessel. This is entirely different even in its method of operation. As a matter of fact, if the gentleman wants to know the truth, the Russians are now seriously considering building a nuclear carrier. They are not doing that just because we have nuclear carriers; they are doing that because they think it is the best.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LLOYD. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I want to commend the gentleman for his statement. He has hit the nail right on the head. It appears to me that the choice is very simple. On the one hand we can build a very capable nuclear-powered carrier that will not rely on fossil fuels, that will cut down not only our costs but the use itself of petroleum products which are going to continue to be in short supply. On the other hand, we can select a conventional carrier that will cost more.

In line with what the gentleman from California (Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON) was saying about *Kennedy* carriers, I think we should also avoid the temptation, to perhaps, substitute a *Brown* carrier that would be paddled, mostly on the left-hand side, with perhaps auxiliary-powered wind machines, or something of that kind.

I would hope that whatever carrier is constructed it would have an adequate rodent repellent system.

Mr. LLOYD. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. TRIBLE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Chair announces that pursuant to clause 2, rule XXIII, he will vacate proceedings under the call when a quorum of the Committee appears.

Members will record their presence by electronic device.

The call was taken by electronic device.

□ 1120

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A quorum of the Committee of the Whole has not appeared.

The Chair announces that a regular quorum call will now commence.

Members who have not already responded under the noticed quorum call

will have a minimum of 15 minutes to report their presence. The call will be taken by electronic device.

The call was taken by electronic device.

The following Members responded to their names:

[Roll No. 464]

Abdnor	Downey	Kazen	Pursell	Shumway	Ullman
Addabbo	Duncan, Oreg.	Kelly	Quayle	Simon	Vanik
Akaka	Duncan, Tenn.	Kemp	Quillen	Skelton	Vento
Albosta	Early	Kildee	Rahall	Slack	Volkmer
Alexander	Eckhardt	Kindness	Rallsback	Smith, Iowa	Walgren
Ambro	Edgar	Kogovsek	Rangel	Smith, Nebr.	Walker
Anderson,	Edwards, Calif.	Kostmayer	Ratchford	Snowe	Wampler
Calif.	Edwards, Okla.	Kramer	Regula	Snyder	Watkins
Andrews,	Emery	LaFalce	Rhodes	Solarz	Waxman
N. Dak.	English	Lagomarsino	Richmond	Solomon	Weaver
Annunzio	Erdahl	Latta	Rinaldo	Spellman	Weiss
Anthony	Erlenborn	Leach, Iowa	Ritter	Spence	White
Archer	Ertel	Leach, La.	Roberts	St Germain	Whitehurst
Ashbrook	Evans, Del.	Leath, Tex.	Robinson	Stack	Whitley
Aspin	Evans, Ga.	Lederer	Rodino	Staggers	Whittaker
Atkinson	Evans, Ind.	Lee	Roe	Stangeland	Whitten
AuCoin	Fary	Lehman	Rose	Stanton	Williams, Mont.
Badham	Fascell	Leland	Roth	Stenholm	Williams, Ohio
Bafalis	Fazio	Lent	Rousselot	Stewart	Wilson, Bob
Balley	Fenwick	Levitas	Royser	Stockman	Wilson, C. H.
Baldus	Ferraro	Lewis	Rudd	Stokes	Wilson, Tex.
Barnard	Findley	Livingston	Russo	Stratton	Wolpe
Barnes	Fish	Lloyd	Sabo	Studds	Wright
Bauman	Fisher	Loeffler	Satterfield	Stump	Wyatt
Beard, R.I.	Fithian	Long, La.	Sawyer	Swift	Wyatt
Beard, Tenn.	Flippo	Lott	Schroeder	Symms	Yates
Bedell	Florio	Lowry	Schulze	Synar	Yatron
Bellenson	Ford, Tenn.	Lujan	Sebellus	Tauke	Young, Fla.
Benjamin	Forsythe	Lungren	Selberling	Taylor	Young, Mo.
Bennett	Fountain	McCloskey	Sensenbrenner	Thomas	Zablocki
Bereuter	Fowler	McCormack	Shannon	Thompson	Zefeller
Bethune	Frenzel	McDade	Sharp	Traxler	
Bevill	Garcia	McEwen	Shelby	Tribble	
Blaggi	Gaydos	McHugh			
Bingham	Gephardt	McKay			
Blanchard	Gialmo	McKinney			
Boggs	Gibbons	Madigan			
Boland	Gilman	Maguire			
Bolling	Gingrich	Markey			
Boner	Ginn	Marks			
Bonior	Glickman	Marlenee			
Bonker	Goldwater	Marrlott			
Bouquard	Gonzalez	Martin			
Breaux	Gore	Mathis			
Brinkley	Gradison	Matsul			
Brodhead	Gramm	Mattox			
Brooks	Grassley	Mavroules			
Broomfield	Gray	Mazzoli			
Brown, Calif.	Green	Mica			
Brown, Ohio	Grisham	Michel			
Broyhill	Guarini	Mikulski			
Burgener	Gudger	Mikva			
Burlison	Guyer	Miller, Calif.			
Burton, John	Hall, Ohio	Miller, Ohio			
Burton, Phillip	Hall, Tex.	Mineta			
Butler	Hamilton	Minish			
Byron	Hammer-	Mitchell, N.Y.			
schmidt	Hance	Moakley			
Campbell	Hanley	Mollohan			
Carney	Hansen	Montgomery			
Carr	Harkin	Moore			
Cavanaugh	Harris	Moorhead,			
Chappell	Hawkins	Calif.			
Cheney	Hefner	Motti			
Clausen	Heftel	Murphy, Ill.			
Cleveland	Hightower	Murphy, N.Y.			
Clinger	Hillis	Murphy, Pa.			
Coelho	Hinson	Murtha			
Coleman	Holland	Myers, Ind.			
Collins, Tex.	Hollenbeck	Myers, Pa.			
Conable	Holt	Natcher			
Conte	Holtzman	Neal			
Corcoran	Hopkins	Nedzi			
Corman	Horton	Nelson			
Cotter	Howard	Nichols			
Coughlin	Hubbard	Nowak			
Courter	Hughes	O'Brien			
Crane, Daniel	Hutto	Oaker			
Daniel, Dan	Hyde	Oberstar			
Daniel, R. W.	Ichord	Obey			
Danielson	Ireland	Panetta			
Dannemeyer	Jacobs	Pashayan			
Daschle	Jeffords	Patten			
Davis, Mich.	Jeffries	Patterson			
Dellums	Jenkins	Paul			
Derrick	Jenrette	Pease			
Devine	Johnson, Calif.	Perkins			
Dickinson	Johnson, Colo.	Petri			
Dicks	Jones, Okla.	Peyster			
Dinrell	Jones, Tenn.	Pickle			
Donnelly	Kastenmeier	Price			
Dornan		Pritchard			
Dougherty					

□ 1040

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Three hundred and sixty-nine Members have answered to their names, a quorum is present, and the Committee will resume its business.

The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. TRIBLE), a member of the committee, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. TRIBLE. Mr. Chairman, let me say to my colleagues that once again the issue before us is the question of one additional carrier for our Navy.

Specifically, an amendment has been proposed by our colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Fazio), that would substitute a nonnuclear *Kennedy*-class carrier for the nuclear carrier authorized by the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. Chairman, this is not the time for extended debate. This issue has been discussed at great length in this House. Rather, it is my purpose this morning to set this debate in perspective and summarize the issues for my colleagues.

The carrier debate today is far different than it was in the 95th Congress. Today all parties agree that we need at least one additional carrier for our Navy. The President, the Pentagon, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations unanimously agree that we need at least one additional carrier in order for this Nation to meet its minimum force requirements throughout the world.

The question then becomes: What kind of a carrier do we procure? There are three choices: A repeat *Nimitz*-class nuclear carrier; a nonnuclear large-deck *Kennedy*-class carrier; or a smaller nonnuclear ship that I call affectionately the Carter carrier.

Now, there are certain points on which there is little disagreement. First of all, everyone will concede that the nuclear carrier is more capable and more survivable. What questions, then, must be resolved here today?

My esteemed colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Fazio), suggests, in supporting his amendment to substitute

a nonnuclear *Kennedy*-class carrier, two arguments: First, that it is more cost effective to buy the nonnuclear *Kennedy*-class carrier; and second, that as a matter of tactics this is the best way to procure a vital ship for our Navy.

I would like to respond to those questions. First of all, I will say to my colleagues that with regard to the matter of cost, the CVN, the nuclear carrier, is cheaper to build and procure than the nonnuclear carrier. The decisive point in the cost computations is the cost of procuring and transporting the fuel oil necessary to propel the nonnuclear carrier.

When we buy a nuclear carrier, we buy nuclear propulsion for 15 years. Therefore, if we are to accurately compare the cost of the nuclear carrier with that of the nonnuclear carrier, we have to factor in the cost of procuring and storing and transporting fuel oil for the period of those 15 years.

I have done that on the chart to my left, and I would ask my colleagues to look at these figures.

Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRIBLE. I will be happy to yield in just a moment, but I will ask the gentleman to please let me complete this summary of costs first.

The *Kennedy*-class carrier is in the column on my far left. The estimated cost of construction of the *Kennedy* carrier is \$1.8 billion. The cost of procuring, storing, and delivering the fuel oil, at current costs, at today's prices, would be \$570 million for that 15-year period. That means the total price of procuring and propelling that nonnuclear *Kennedy*-class carrier would be \$2.385 billion.

Let us compare that to the cost of the nuclear *Nimitz* carrier. The total cost of that carrier, is \$2.398 billion. To date this Congress, the House and the Senate, have appropriated and expended funds in the amount of \$268.4 million. Those are dollars that are spent and gone and will be lost unless we dedicate those to the building of a nuclear carrier.

So if we consider those appropriated funds we find that from this point on it would cost us \$2.129 billion to build a nuclear carrier. That shows us very clearly that the nuclear carrier is less costly than the *Kennedy* carrier.

□ 1150

Indeed we can procure a nuclear carrier for \$556 million less than we could procure a *Kennedy* carrier. So the nuclear carrier, I say to my colleagues, is a quarter of a billion dollars less expensive, based on the current cost of buying fuel oil for the nonnuclear *Kennedy*-class carrier.

But let me hasten to add that we cannot realistically assume that today's price will hold constant in the days ahead. Indeed, it will not. OPEC will dramatically increase those costs. We know that well.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. TRIBLE) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. TRIBLE was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. TRIBLE. Mr. Chairman, if we compute a 5-percent inflation increase each year over that 15-year period for the price of petroleum—and I would suggest that is an eminently fair and perhaps totally unrealistic figure—then the total cost of procuring and storing and transporting the fuel oil for the *Kennedy* carrier over the 15-year period would not be \$570 million but it would be \$1.2 billion.

So the bottom line is this: If you will fairly look at the cost of a nuclear carrier and compare that with the cost of procuring the nonnuclear carrier proposed by my colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. FAZIO), and you add as you must necessarily do, the cost of procuring and storing and transporting the incredibly expensive fuel oil to propel that nonnuclear ship, it becomes very clear that the nuclear ship is the best investment.

In summary then, the nuclear ship is the most capable, the most survivable, and the most cost-effective ship that we can procure, and it is vitally needed for our Navy.

The additional point made by my colleague in favor of his *Kennedy* proposal is an argument that I made to our committee 6 months ago, and it was a tactical argument. I recognized the need to procure an additional, large-deck carrier for our Navy. I realized full well that the President had seized on that nuclear carrier as a symbol of all that was wasteful and unnecessary in Federal spending. I realized, therefore, that the President might very well veto the nuclear carrier once again and deny that vital ship to our Navy. As a matter of tactics, 6 months ago I said, "Let us compromise. The *Kennedy* ship is a good ship. It is not as good as a nuclear ship, but let us compromise so that we can procure a ship for our Navy."

But times have changed, I suggest to my colleagues. I do not believe that the President of the United States can veto any defense bill at this point in our history. I do not believe that today he could veto a nuclear carrier, a ship that is so highly capable and so necessary to our national defense. At this time, when we recognize the relentless and substantial increase in military strength of the Soviet Union, and we are debating as a nation the provisions of a SALT treaty, no President can possibly veto a defense bill.

For those reasons, I would suggest that the nuclear carrier is the ship that we should buy. It is the better investment for us to make with our limited tax dollars and it will better serve our national defense. Finally, as a matter of tactics, it is a ship that we can procure.

Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRIBLE. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. FAZIO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out one thing which may be somewhat misleading and some of the Members may, from the gentleman's presentation, assume that the money which has already been appropriated for a nuclear

carrier would be wasted. The gentleman has counted those dollars in order to reach the conclusion that the CVN would be cheaper.

Mr. TRIBLE. Those dollars will be spent, if not used for the procurement of an additional nuclear carrier.

Mr. FAZIO. They could very easily retrofit into other carriers that come in to drydock and need to have their fuel cells replaced.

Mr. TRIBLE. The gentleman is absolutely right. Those dollars have been expended and nuclear parts have been procured.

Mr. FAZIO. Absolutely.

Mr. TRIBLE. They are now waiting for this Congress to have the courage to build another large nuclear carrier. But if we fail to take that action, those parts will be used ultimately as replacement parts for our other existing nuclear carriers.

Mr. FAZIO. I would not want the Members to think we would be wasting those dollars we have spent for those parts, the dollars that have been invested in them, if we did not vote for a *Nimitz* nuclear carrier. I think it is more important that they realize that we can make a direct comparison on the initial cost of either of these ships, and it is indisputable that the Defense Department statistics indicate that it is a \$477 million savings on the up-front costs.

Mr. TRIBLE. I will have to reclaim my time and suggest that there is no way anyone can seriously suggest that the *Kennedy* nonnuclear ship is a better bargain. The figures—and these are Navy figures I present to the Members here today—are indisputable. I would urge my colleague if he can convince us that the *Kennedy* is a better bargain, that he take time to come into the well and do it. But the fact is that glib conclusions about cost forced by our general view that nuclear propulsion is very expensive simply do not hold water, in view of the dramatically increasing cost of petroleum that would be necessary to propel that nonnuclear carrier.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. TRIBLE) has again expired.

(On request of Mr. DORNAN and by unanimous consent, Mr. TRIBLE was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRIBLE. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman made this case just as effectively in the 95th Congress, but now I believe the gentleman's figures are even more critical, if that is possible, because of the fuel crisis that the gentleman mentioned.

I would like to ask my colleague from California if he accepts these figures, and if we do accept the point that he brought out, that the nuclear parts are transferable as spares, then that would change the cost saving from a quarter of a billion dollars to \$12 million more, only \$12 million more for the nuclear carrier. And that, to me, is an incredible

bargain, given the nuclear capability over the petroleum prices.

So I would like to ask my colleague from California, does the gentleman accept those figures?

Mr. FAZIO. If the gentleman will yield, I have not had an opportunity to view those figures. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. TRIBLE) presented them on the floor after I made my initial presentation. I am standing by the statistics that I presented prior to the quorum, which indicate that it is a \$1 billion saving over the life of the ship and an initial \$400 million saving because of the cost of the nuclear fuel.

I will admit that, even though we have a \$52-per-barrel cost factored in here for acquisition, storage and disposal, fueling of the fleet, the carrier, we really do not, I think, reach a conclusion that nuclear fuel will not increase as well.

We have had talk about nuclear cartels in the world. Who knows, 20 years from now we may be as worried about them as we have been about OPEC. So I am not particularly willing to look too far down the road in estimating relative fuel costs.

Mr. TRIBLE. Mr. Chairman, I will simply respond to that point by saying that in procuring the nuclear carrier, we will be paying on a one-time basis the total cost for nuclear propulsion for 15 years.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRIBLE. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, that is for 15 years. The \$570 million, is that just fuel for 15 years, or is that fuel for the life cycle, 30 years?

Mr. TRIBLE. That is the fuel price for the first 15 years.

Mr. DICKS. So it is a pure comparison, that is the point I was making.

Mr. TRIBLE. It is a pure comparison of the cost of those ships.

Mr. DICKS. So the cost of procuring the *Nimitz* includes the cost of procuring the fuel?

Mr. TRIBLE. Exactly.

Mr. DICKS. Although the gentleman did not separate out the fuel cost, it is included in that?

Mr. TRIBLE. Yes. The total procurement cost of the *Nimitz* nuclear carrier includes the cost for propulsion for 15 years. If we are going to compare apples to apples and get a true cost comparison, then we must consider the price of propelling the nonnuclear carrier. That is what I have endeavored to do here with statistics offered by the Navy Department.

Mr. DICKS. The point I was trying to make is: It is not a 30-year figure?

Mr. TRIBLE. This is a 15-year figure.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. TRIBLE) has again expired.

(On request of Mr. DOUGHERTY and by unanimous consent, Mr. TRIBLE was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. DOUGHERTY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRIBLE. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. DOUGHERTY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, as a followup to the question of the gentleman from California (Mr. DORNAN), is it not true that the nuclear-powered carrier would be cheaper, even cheaper, taking in that \$13 million difference the gentleman's chart shows, dropping out the cost of spare parts? If the gentleman projects a 5-percent inflation growth over that 15-year period, what would the *Kennedy*-class carrier cost?

Mr. TRIBLE. Mr. Chairman, this is an important question. I think that 5-percent increase per year is a very reasonable one. Indeed, it is a very conservative estimate. The cost of procuring and storing and transporting the fuel oil for the 15-year period with a 5-percent annual inflation increase will be \$1.2 billion; \$1.2 billion instead of the \$570 million figure which is based on today's rates.

So what we are saying is this: The figures show clearly that the cost of the *Kennedy*-class carrier is more today. But when one looks into the future, it will be dramatically more expensive than the nuclear ship, which is also more capable and more survivable.

Mr. DOUGHERTY. To be specific, what the gentleman is saying is that if you have 5-percent inflation growth over 15 years, the *Kennedy*-class carrier is going to cost \$3 billion, the *Nimitz* class, even if we drop out the spare parts, will cost \$2.4 billion. So in effect, with a 5-percent inflation factor, the nuclear carrier would be \$600 million cheaper than the *Kennedy*-class carrier?

Mr. TRIBLE. That is exactly correct.

Mr. DOUGHERTY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with the comments of the gentleman in the well.

Mr. TRIBLE. I thank the gentleman for making that point.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRIBLE. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. McCORMACK. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one comment on the point that was made here a moment ago in this discussion, and that is about the availability or the price of uranium.

□ 1200

Is it not correct that the gentleman's figures assume the original loading of the carrier with fuel, which would last for a number of years? Is that not correct?

Mr. TRIBLE. No. Those figures include the cost of the core and also the fuel installation and refueling as well as for the 15-year period.

Mr. McCORMACK. All of the fuel for the 15-year period?

Mr. TRIBLE. Yes, Mr. McCORMACK I want to make that point. I think it is important to understand that the administration claims we have 2.4 million tons of uranium in the United States. I think that figure is optimistic. There is obviously ample fuel for aircraft carriers.

The more important point is the total price of uranium is a very, very small portion even of the cost of the nuclear propulsion part of the ship, and doubling the price of the uranium.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. TRIBLE) has expired.

(At the request of Mr. McCORMACK and by unanimous consent, Mr. TRIBLE was allowed to proceed for 30 additional seconds.)

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRIBLE. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. McCORMACK. Even doubling of the price of uranium would have practically no effect at all, measurable effect at all, on the cost of the aircraft carrier and its fuel.

Mr. TRIBLE. I thank the gentleman for his contribution.

Mr. WHITEHURST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRIBLE. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. WHITEHURST. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I want to commend the gentleman. It is one of the best explanations, best analysis, I think we have had in the comparison of the two ships.

It is unthinkable to me that anybody who has examined the two cases, that they could opt for the *Kennedy*-class ship. I want to commend the gentleman.

Mr. TRIBLE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I do not blame the gentleman from California (Mr. FAZIO) for being a little bit confused in this particular matter of a carrier for the Navy, as a new member of the Committee on Armed Services, because when we started out in the spring of this year, the chairman of the subcommittee was pushing for a CVV—that is the midjet carrier—which the administration wanted.

The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. TRIBLE), who has just made this very eloquent proposal here, was pushing for a *Kennedy*-class carrier, and I was the only member of the subcommittee. I think, who still stuck to the guns of the 1978 and insisted on a nuclear carrier. We had a tough job getting a majority on that subcommittee. I might add, for the nuclear carrier.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. BENNETT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I never supported the CVV at any time. I wanted the nuclear carrier or at least the *Kennedy*-class carrier and always preferred the nuclear carrier—I voted for the nuclear carrier.

Mr. STRATTON. I think, if I was in error, I stand corrected.

Mr. BENNETT. The record speaks for itself. I never spoke for that.

Mr. STRATTON. I did get the impres-

sion the gentleman was supporting the administration.

Mr. BENNETT. That is not the case.

Mr. STRATTON. I accept the gentleman's statement.

In any case, I think this confusion demonstrates one of the flaws of our defense policy over the past year or so, because there has been so much confusion. The administration, with or without the support of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT)—and I certainly accept his statement—the administration has been trying to buy things in defense on the cheap for a long time and never mind the quality and never mind the performance.

They came up with the fantastic idea that if we had a lot of small carriers, they would do much better than several big carriers with increased fuel capacity. That concept was the CVV. CV stands for carrier, and the last V stands for vertical landing and takeoff, a capability which we do not even have in the Navy and probably will never have. Yet, that was the type of carrier that the administration wanted, because it cost a lot less. That was the theory of the Office of Management and Budget.

Those of us on the committee who have been around for a while and knew the score, certainly believed—and that included, I think, almost every member of the committee—that the nuclear carrier was obviously the best and could obviously do the job best. We pushed for it, although some people said, "Well, you just cannot get a nuclear carrier, because the President is going to veto it, and therefore we ought to get some kind of a carrier and why jeopardize it by going for the best?"

The uniformed personnel in the Navy, who, of course, have been tyrannized by this idea that if they open their mouths before Congress too much, they are going to end up in retirement like General Singlaub, tried to steer a safe middle course by saying:

Well, of course, the CVV is a great carrier, but if you fellows want to force something down our throats, we will let you force down the *Kennedy*-class carrier, which is a great carrier.

It bears a distinguished name, particularly at this time of the season, and the only trouble is that it is hopelessly out-of-date and was hopelessly out-of-date when it was built, because in a nuclear age, it was an oil-fired carrier.

It is, I think, the recognition that this kind of confusion has characterized the Defense Department for all too many months, that finally led the Senate of the United States to the position that they have taken, that if we hope to try to compete with the Soviet Union, whether it be in terms of nuclear power or anything else, we have got to stop this business of trying to buy the cheapest trinkets on the store floor and instead must increase our defense budget by 3 percent or even 5 percent.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. STRATTON

was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. STRATTON. We have got to stop this effort to buy on the cheap. We have got to restore at least 5 percent, or 4 percent, or 3 percent to our national defense budget. Already the President has insisted on a 3 percent increase.

This, hopefully, is the change in atmosphere that the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. TRIBLE), was talking about a moment ago.

If there is such a change of atmosphere, and I still am a little cautious as far as this House is concerned, particularly after what happened yesterday, I would like to list four reasons why I think the nuclear carrier, is the only way that we should go.

First of all, the nuclear carrier represents one of the few areas where the United States of America clearly has a technological lead over the Soviet Union. The technological lead has been slipping, but we do not possess it in many fields, but we do possess it in some. The nuclear carrier is the one edge we have over the Soviet Union when it comes to naval power.

Unfortunately, the administration, in its last couple of years, has been unilaterally eliminating many of these technological edges that we have had over the Soviet Union, like the B-1, the neutron bomb and the nuclear carrier. But if we assume there has come some real change of heart, and apparently there has, this is one item we ought to put back in; and we have a much better chance of reviving the nuclear carrier than we have, unfortunately, of reviving the B-1.

The second point is that we have been told that if carriers, nuclear carriers, were so darn good, why do not the Russians have one? Well, as has already been indicated, the Russians do have. They are embarking now on building a nuclear carrier.

I am also told, by the way, that since they know that we do not want to use the B-1, they are building their own B-1. Do you worry about the Backfire bomber? They are going to have their own B-1 too. We did not want it, so the Russians are going to have it.

□ 1210

I do not think we ought to let the Russians get ahead of us in nuclear carriers and we ought, therefore, to make sure that our nuclear carrier is in the fleet and that it will continue to provide us with an edge over the Soviets.

The third point is that with the recent upheavals in the Middle East, we have begun to recognize that we have a very important military responsibility in the Middle East to protect our oil lifeline, to protect Israel and also other states that are associated with us, and that currently control the oil wells, like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the others. Even the Secretary of Defense has admitted that we need a new military presence in the Indian Ocean area to protect these very strategic areas.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

(By unanimous consent Mr. STRATTON was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. STRATTON. The Indian Ocean, if anyone has looked at a map lately, the Indian Ocean is a heck of a large place. We have only one U.S. installation in all of that Indian Ocean area. Unfortunately we had an opportunity to get another one but so far we have not taken it. That one installation, Diego Garcia, is right in the middle of the Indian Ocean; and if there were ever a place where we needed a carrier that could proceed from point A to point B, 5,000 miles away, without having to worry about keeping its speed low so as not to run out of fuel, the Indian Ocean is it. If we are to put a task force in the Indian Ocean, then we must have a nuclear carrier as a part of that task force. At the present time we simply do not have enough nuclear carriers to station one nuclear carrier permanently and steadily in the Indian Ocean.

If we had a Kennedy-class carrier that was in Bangkok, and suddenly the Russians moved in on Saudi Arabia, and President Carter ordered that carrier to proceed immediately to Saudi Arabia, they would have to limp along for a couple of weeks, with oilers following after them, to get there. And by then it would be too late.

So, we need the nuclear carrier to meet our responsibilities in the Indian Ocean.

Finally, is the point that Mr. TRIBLE has already made so very dramatically, that with the increasing cost of oil, going up as it is, the lifetime cost of fueling a Kennedy-class carrier would be much greater than the lifetime cost of fueling a nuclear carrier. And let us not forget what the President has told us, that in every conceivable way we ought not be using oil, we ought to be conserving oil, and we ought to be substituting some other source of supply. I believe we ought to follow that advice from the President's energy message.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from New York has again expired.

(At the request of Mr. SOLOMON and by unanimous consent, Mr. STRATTON was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I am glad to yield to my colleague from New York.

Mr. SOLOMON. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I just want to commend the gentleman and I want to associate myself with his remarks. The gentleman from New York is the third ranking member on the Armed Services Committee and he is one of the most highly respected and informed members of that committee. I want to thank him for clarifying the confusion on this issue along with Congressman TRIBLE, who has done an outstanding job. I want to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman.

Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentleman very heartily for his most generous remarks.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, as the ranking member of the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee, I have always been in favor of the nuclear carrier over the conventional carrier.

Think with me for 1 minute about a cartoon that I saw not long ago in a newspaper. If you have had to stand in line for gasoline, or your constituents have had to stand in line for gasoline, you might be more sympathetic. This cartoon depicted a lineup of four conventionally powered aircraft carriers standing in line at sea waiting in turn to get gasoline from a pump. I do not think I could better express the problem we have confronting us today.

Even though people may have to stand in line with automobiles to get gasoline, somehow or another we can work it out. In time of war, aircraft carriers simply cannot stand in line for their fuel oil.

We have heard all kinds of cost figures being thrown around here today. Even if one concedes the initial cost of a nuclear carrier as being more than the conventionally powered carrier, it is still more cost-effective over the life of the ship. If we consider the life-cycle cost of the carrier, the 30- or 35-year life-cycle cost rather than the 15-year cost for one core, we find that the cost of two nuclear-core propulsion systems which will carry a nuclear carrier over its entire lifetime, will cost \$390 million. Incidentally, we have already bought one of these nuclear-propulsion systems. If we count the life-cycle cost of fuel for a conventional carrier, 22 million barrels of oil, the cost will be \$1.14 billion, if we can get the fuel oil at any price in the future. Here alone we have a savings of \$700 million if we buy the nuclear carrier.

In addition to that saving, people forget that we have to add in the cost of the tankers which must supply this carrier for 30 or 35 years, plus the men required to run these tankers. And we are short in supply of tankers right now.

In addition to that, other replenishment ships will have to be provided with the men to run those ships, in order to replenish the conventional carrier. The nuclear carrier can carry more of the stores, more of the aviation fuel and those kinds of things necessary to sustain the carrier for a longer period of time since they do not need this extra space for fuel oil. Therefore, it does not require replenishment as often.

Also, we must consider the additional capability of a nuclear carrier. The conventional carrier has to refuel every 3 or 4 days. If the tanker can obtain the necessary fuel oil and find its way safely to where the carrier is, that is one thing. If the tanker never gets there, the aircraft carrier is dead in the water, cannot even operate, cannot fly airplanes. It is just dead in the water.

The conventional carrier has to withdraw from battle every couple of days to refuel. When competing with a nuclear

carrier in a battle, the issue can be forced, the conventional carrier is on the ropes, she cannot withdraw to refuel, and can be sunk at will.

I want to say one more thing about the fact that the additional ammunition and the additional aviation fuel that can be carried on the nuclear carrier, is contained in storage spaces situated below the water line and, therefore, makes the nuclear carrier more capable and less vulnerable.

The Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee has voted for the nuclear carrier. The Congressional Budget Office has also been in favor of the nuclear carrier.

Two studies by this administration, Sea Plan 2000, and the sea-based platform assessment study have also come out in favor of the nuclear carrier. Even former Secretary McNamara chose the nuclear carrier over the nonnuclear carrier.

Even the Russians are reportedly going to build a nuclear carrier. I will quote Admiral Stalbo who says that the nuclear carrier is good for all missions in a nuclear war; and that the total operational cost of the nuclear carrier is less than the conventional carrier. He gave the example of the U.S.S. *Enterprise* on a round-the-world voyage returning to port with more aviation fuel on board than the conventional carrier has when it leaves port.

If some of our colleagues do not believe us, maybe they will believe the Russians.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to first state where we are at the moment. In the President's fiscal year 1980 military budget he asked for a CVV, a small aircraft carrier. The Armed Services Committee in its deliberations decided to delete the small aircraft carrier and put in a large nuclear aircraft carrier, and that is what has been brought to the floor of Congress.

□ 1220

My distinguished colleague from California (Mr. FAZIO) in his amendment is attempting to substitute for this super nuclear carrier a super nonnuclear carrier, and that is where we are; so that the committee itself disagreed with the President's assertion that we need a small carrier. My distinguished colleague from California is suggesting that we do not need a nuclear carrier, but we need a large super carrier, so the amendment says, "Let us have a large nonnuclear carrier."

In the few moments I have before the Members, I would like to comment briefly with respect to my thoughts about a super carrier; and second, to address myself to the issue of the lifetime cost, specifically of the super nuclear carrier. A number of my colleagues who have preceded me in the well have spoken to the lifetime fuel cost, but that is a very small aspect of the incredible cost. The figures that I will use are figures that have been confirmed by the Defense Information Agency and by research from the Library of Congress.

To the question of the super carrier this is my assertions, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: That the Navy must be weaned from these large super carriers. U.S. naval policy, in my estimation, is based on yesterday's wars, not today's realities and the realities of the future. It is not rational in my estimation to expect widespread and extended conventional surface warfare with the Soviet Navy. I think that is an absolute flight into fantasy.

The cutting edge in any future global conflict will be submarines, not giant aircraft carriers as sitting ducks on the high seas. If we indeed eliminate our outmoded carrier orientation, the Navy would have more than enough capacity for a very significant mission, and that is maintaining our sealanes to Europe.

The administration and the Navy leadership, in my estimation, must hammer out some new policy on the issue of naval air. New warships must be designed to cope with long-term changes occurring in naval weaponry, particularly the development of long-range anti-ship cruise missiles. That is something that we have to address. This gung ho, tenacious clinging to this nuclear super carrier in no way addresses that reality.

Now, I would like to turn my remarks to the issue of lifetime cost. On yesterday I made an assertion that 99.44 percent of the American people have no idea of the incredible magnitude of the economics of modern warfare, and for a few moments I would like to dramatize what that means in terms of this super nuclear carrier. We must remember that the \$2.1 billion construction cost is only the beginning—\$2.1 billion. In a \$500-some odd billion budget, what is \$2.1 billion?

The point I am going to make to the Members is, that is only the beginning. In rather round terms, the aircraft carrier costs us, not just \$2.1 billion to build a modern *Nimitz*-class nuclear carrier, but another \$4.1 billion for the 15-year life cycle of its complement of approximately 90 aircraft of various types, most of them designed to defend the carrier itself. Now, we have to double that figure because the lifetime of the carrier is approximately 35 years. The lifetime of those 90 airplanes is only 15 years.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. BREAUX). The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 5 additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I will not object, but I would like to have an opportunity to make a unanimous-consent request.

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the distinguished chairman.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto close in 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is

there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

Mr. EMERY. Mr. Chairman, I object.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Objection is heard.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I amend that request and make it 1 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The unanimous-consent request is that all debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto end at 1 o'clock.

Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

Mr. BURLISON. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I am very reluctant to object but I want to observe that only members of the committee have spoken at this point, and it is obvious that there are a number of other Members who would like to be heard on the issue.

Mr. PRICE. I hope the members of the committee would cooperate and make it possible for other Members to address themselves on the amendment.

Mr. BURLISON. Unless the distinguished chairman is withdrawing the request, I would object.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Objection is heard.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw the request.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS) to proceed for an additional 5 minutes?

There was no objection.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the Chair.

Mr. Chairman, I indicated that it is not just \$2.1 billion for the construction cost, but \$4.1 billion over the 15-year life span of the 90 various aircraft. It is double that figure because the lifetime of an aircraft carrier is 35 years. Now, there will be an additional \$3 billion for about six escort ships, which without the carrier task force could be used elsewhere. Now, some people challenge the \$3 billion for the six escort ships on the ground that a nuclear carrier may not need six ships. I am willing to give the \$3 billion back, and we will get to that when we get to my final estimation.

There is another \$1.5 billion for replenishment vessels and support ships, and perhaps at least \$1.5 billion more for a carrier's share of shore facilities. When they have to be overhauled, each carrier is billed for that \$1.5 billion.

The total is now over \$16 billion just to buy this hardware. If we add some \$22.6 billion—\$22.6 billion—to operate this nuclear carrier over the lifetime of a nuclear carrier, we come to the figure of \$38.6 billion that the American people are committed to pay over the 35 years of a nuclear aircraft carrier that started off as a \$2.1 billion obscure item in a \$100-some odd billion military budget.

Now, that is not all. For each carrier task force on line—that is, out on the sea on active duty—we have to allow for two more in the rear. That has been checked out by the Navy. That is one in reserve and one in overhaul. So, the grand total to sustain one carrier task force forward over its lifetime is well over \$100 billion, just to keep one carrier

floating on the high seas, one in reserve, one in overhaul. These figures, as I said, have been verified by the Defense Information Agency and the Library of Congress. It will cost the American people well over \$100 billion.

I will give you the \$3 billion back for the six escort ships, and grant that perhaps a nuclear carrier does not need six ships. That is still a hundred billion dollars for a 35-year period. If that is not shocking enough, we must reflect on what this \$100 billion is able to give us in terms of ability to project at sea or at some distant shore. That is about 35 attack sorties a day. That is 35 individual flights carrying perhaps 6 tons of bombs, and even that presumes that each will fly its mission to the target, hit its target, and return safely. We are not talking about fat, inefficiency, goldplating, or malfeasance. What I am trying to assert here is about something much more basic, much more intractable than that.

□ 1230

What I am talking about is the incredible level of economics of modern warfare that we are not dealing with on the floor of this Congress. That is the most, 35 sorties, that we are going to get for \$100 billion that we are committing the American people to over the next 35 years. I do not think that we need it. I think that this is an incredible amount of money. No. 2, the day of the supercarrier is over. That is yesterday's war. I appreciate my colleague's offering an amendment to get us out of the restraint of this new nuclear carrier, but I would simply suggest that by replacing it with a big nonnuclear carrier also does not address many of these long-term costs, and it certainly does not deal with the implication of supercarriers being remnants of yesterday's war.

Mr. CARR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. CARR. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I thank the gentleman for his statement, and I would like to associate myself with his remarks. I think the last thing he said is even pertinent to those who are in favor of sea-based air in the future. If we invest in a *Nimitz*-class carrier or a *Kennedy*-class carrier, we are investing in the past. We are not investing in new technology. We are not investing in the wave of the future. If you favor sea-based air, everyone on this committee knows that while we are not exactly there, we do know that we are going to be going to V/STOL aircraft with large thrust-to-weight ratios.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(At the request of Mr. CARR, and by unanimous consent, Mr. DELLUMS was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. CARR. If the gentleman would yield further, we know that we are going to go to aircraft, light aircraft, with composite materials and high thrust-weight ratios, and that the entire look of the air fleet at sea is going to be a lot different. Yet we are making a mistake by committing all of this money to ships

of the past which have a 35-year-plus life. That means we are committing ourselves and we are digging ourselves into a hole and making sure that we are not even going to grow with the new technology that is coming down the line. So this is a terrible waste of money.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman for his remarks.

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LLOYD. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I would just like to respond to the comment of my good friend, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. CARR) on V/STOL aircraft. That we are considering it is certainly true, but that the technology is here presently being encountered, even considering the AV-8B, is simply not true. It is not a viable weapons system ongoing in application on aircraft carriers where they have tried it. It just simply will not work as a total system.

Mr. CARR. If the gentleman from California will yield, I completely agree with my friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. LLOYD). The only point I am making is that we are not that far away from something that is a reality, and we are certainly not 35 years away. So what we are buying here is not really a 35-year aircraft carrier; we are buying an aircraft carrier which will last 35 years, which will not have currency, that is, appropriate technology for more than 10 years. I think that we can afford the risk to wait to build the aircraft carrier to fit the need. We are not here to justify the aircraft carrier. What we are trying to do is figure out a way to get reasonable sea-based air out there.

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. In the interest of this stimulating colloquy, I will certainly yield to my colleague, the gentleman from California.

Mr. LLOYD. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I would remind my good friend, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. CARR) that the technology that we are dealing with is not V/STOL aircraft. We are dealing with the F-14.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(At the request of Mr. LLOYD, and by unanimous consent, Mr. DELLUMS was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LLOYD. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The point I am trying to make is that we are dealing with F-18's, the F-14's, and with that type of aircraft that goes out beyond the year 2000. No matter what we do in the V/STOL area, we still have to operate these aircraft, and if you operate an F-14, you simply must have the big carrier. There is simply no other way to do it.

Mr. ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I would just like not to let this figure of 35 sorties a day slip by unchallenged, because the Navy has told me that the average number of sorties per day in a wartime scenario from such a carrier would be 120 sorties a day—probably more. Of these 120 sorties from that ship, 90 would be attack-oriented. I think that this 35 figure is a highly unrealistic figure.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank my colleague. I am simply dealing with figures that have been given to me that have been confirmed, whether it is 105 or 125 or 135.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(At the request of Mr. DOUGHERTY, and by unanimous consent, Mr. DELLUMS was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. DOUGHERTY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. Let me just simply respond briefly first. I think that the basic thrust of my argument is that, No. 1, the supercarriers are remnants of the past and that the Navy has to address the present and future in much more realistic terms. The second argument I am making is that it is a sham for us here to simply discuss \$2.1 billion costs, or a few hundred million dollars on fuel costs. If we are really going to talk about the incredible cost of these weapons, then let us look at them over the 35-year period and say to the American people, "For this \$2.1 billion you are committed to a hundred billion dollar expenditure over the next 35 years. Are you prepared to pay that?" I do not think that they are justified. I have heard—and I have listened very carefully—the debate on the floor of this Congress today and in our committees and last year when we debated this question. I do not think the justification is there.

I now yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. DOUGHERTY. I think the point I would like to make, in response to the gentleman's comments, is that he is trying to blame the carrier, or charge the costs against the carrier for the entire surface Navy. I think the gentleman should say for the record, we do not need a surface Navy, because he is trying to pin the cost of the destroyers that are going to escort the carriers to the cost of the carrier. In fact he is saying, we do not need a surface Navy. That is the question I think he should present in this instance. Do not blame the carrier for the cost of the destroyers. Say either we are going to have a surface Navy or we are not going to have a surface Navy. He obviously does not think we are going to need a surface Navy.

Mr. DELLUMS. Let me respond to that. I think it is important for us to debate this here. There are not many people here listening, and maybe we can take a little more time to talk. I do not agree with the gentleman. I am capable of

expressing myself very clearly and succinctly. I do not challenge the surface Navy. I do not blame the nuclear carrier for all of the costs. If I were challenging the surface Navy, I would say that.

Let me talk about the gentleman's argument a little further. The gentleman can assert, for example, that the cost of manpower should not be charged. So you have got a big carrier sitting in the water. Do not put any food on it; it might be charged against the carrier. Do not put personnel on it; it might be charged against the carrier. Do not put fuel on it; it might be charged against the carrier. Do not put airplanes on the carrier; it might be charged against the carrier. Do not put on the escorts that would keep it survivable in the water; it might be charged against the carrier.

I would suggest to my colleague that that is absurd. Some kind of way you are going to pay for it, whether it is on this ledger or the other ledger. I simply brought them all together to show in dramatic terms that to put one on the sea, you have got to have two in back, and to put one of them on the sea for 35 years will cost \$38.6 billion.

Mr. DOUGHERTY. The point the gentleman is making about the cost of the nuclear carrier and its auxiliary ships and manpower applies equally to a CVV because you are not going to send that out without escorts. I want to clarify that in this debate. How many airplanes do you want to be able to deliver on the site? Whether you talk about V/STOL aircraft or whether you talk about traditional F-18 fixed-wing aircraft, the fact of the matter is it is still the same.

A Kennedy-class carrier or a Nimitz-class carrier is a big-deck carrier. Therefore you can carry more airplanes. And if it is a V/STOL aircraft carrier, you can carry more V/STOL aircraft on it.

The fact of the matter, in response to the gentleman from Michigan is we should judge this on the basis of what is the number of aircraft we want to be able to deliver in a given area in a time of crisis. If it is going to be a V/STOL aircraft or a fixed-wing aircraft, that is the question. A CVV does not carry the same number of airplanes as a CV or CVN. Indeed, I think the point being missed here is that not only is there a difference in the number of aircraft, but any aircraft carrier that you send out has to have a certain number of planes on board for defense purposes.

I have a study here that points out that with the CVV you are going to have 60 aircraft on board. Thirty of them must be used to defend the carrier, which means you are only going to deliver 30 planes on target. If you go to a CV or CVN which the gentleman in the well cannot support, you can deliver 58 planes on target in both instances, using only 32 planes for the defense of the carrier.

So in effect the bigger the deck of the carrier, the more planes you have available to strike to meet whatever your mission is. But when you go to that small-deck carrier, you in effect are having only 50 percent of the aircraft on board available for the mission. When

you go to a big-deck carrier, you have two-thirds of the aircraft available to deliver on a mission.

Mr. DELLUMS. Let me respond briefly to my colleague. I think the bottom line in response is, who is the ostensible enemy in any kind of surface exchange using a nuclear carrier?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. DELLUMS was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. DELLUMS. I guess that is where we differ, because obviously it is the Soviet Union. I think it is a flight into fantasy to assume we are going to have any conventional, long-term, surface naval exchange with the Soviet Union. I do not think that is the case. I believe if we go to war with the Soviet Union—God help us if we ever do—it will be a nuclear war, and in that regard a huge nuclear aircraft carrier sitting on the high seas, I would submit to my colleagues, is a \$2.1 billion sitting duck or a hundred billion dollar turkey that would be blown out of the water.

Mr. DOUGHERTY. If the gentleman will yield for 10 seconds, we have disagreed in this respect on whether it is going to be a nuclear war or any other kind of war, and we will continue to do so.

Mr. DELLUMS. I am sure we will.

□ 1240

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words and rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I have been very interested in this debate. I have heard a lot of words on the question of nuclear carriers over the years. I hate to take opposition to my good friend and colleague from California (Mr. FAZIO) who is one of the bright new members of our committee but I think he is wrong in this instance in backing the idea of substituting a Kennedy carrier for a Nimitz-class nuclear-powered carrier.

I participated in the debate in 1962 or 1963 when this committee had already approved the first nuclear carrier, the *Enterprise*. Perhaps it was on its test runs at the time we got into another debate just like this on the floor as to whether we could afford a nuclear carrier.

Mr. Chairman, although the committee that year opposed the idea of making the *Kennedy* a nonnuclear carrier, the House prevailed and it was made a nonnuclear carrier.

Mr. McNamara and his systems analysts were much interested in the cost effectiveness of the nuclear carrier. Mr. McNamara that time supported the idea of a nonnuclear carrier. Later he came in and admitted—it was perhaps the first time and one of the only times he admitted he made a mistake. He said he selected another nuclear carrier for the follow-on to the *Kennedy* carrier which later became the *Nimitz*. He supported the *Nimitz*-class carrier because the life cycle costs were only 2 to 3 percent more for the nuclear carrier than they were for the *Kennedy*.

Today, Mr. Chairman, the cost difference is only 1 percent. Mr. McNamara was advocating a nuclear carrier when it was 2 to 3 percent over the life cycle. Today it is less than 1 percent. Who knows what the cost of oil will be in the years ahead? We have seen about a 300-percent increase in the cost of oil in the past 5 years. We are trying to project what the cost of oil will be in 15 years. There is no question in my mind that the nuclear carrier will be more cost effective, will be more energy effective. If you want to vote for an oil guzzling super carrier, go ahead, this is the way to do it, support the *Kennedy* carrier. If you want a more combat effective and otherwise effective carrier, support the CVN-71 which we are advocating in the committee and which I hope the House will be wise enough to support this year.

We have had some threats of a Carter veto, as he vetoed the nuclear carrier last year, but I think we should give back to him his campaign slogan, "Why not the best?" He can get the best for less cost this year than he could have gotten it last year.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me if we have a choice between a fuel guzzler or a more combat-effective, more cost-effective, more energy-effective aircraft carrier there is only one way to go and that is with the *Nimitz*-class CVN-71.

I have some notations from the skipper of the U.S.S. *Eisenhower* which is a *Nimitz*-class which, had a couple of operations over the last year, one in the 6th Fleet where he said in a report to the CNO that he had bad weather transit, wind 25 to 45 knots, swells 18 to 24 feet, rolls up to 15 degrees, pitch up to 11 degrees, yet they continued their flight operations with the *Eisenhower* when it was impossible for other carriers to operate in that kind of a condition.

He even backed down at high speed to recover aircraft that would have otherwise been lost.

In the Caribbean they had a fleet exercise with 2 nuclear submarines and 600 U.S. Air Force sorties attacking. They kept away from the subs through high-speed maneuvering, there were very few aircraft engagements and all U.S. Air Force aircraft were intercepted. They used deception, radio silence, electronic emission control. They had 17 days of intensive operation at consistent high speed and yet they were able to return to port with two-thirds of their aviation fuel left. This is more than the *Kennedy* class can carry fully loaded.

Mr. Chairman, the most important point, it seems to me, in this whole operation, the fact we have a very small nuclear reactor as a powerplant and all of those big fuel storage tanks that have to be used normally are not needed.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. BOB WILSON was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. BOB WILSON. Instead of having those huge fuel tanks to store the oil to power the carrier, they can put aviation fuel in part of the space where those tanks would have been and can operate

for much longer periods of time without need for refueling.

Mr. Chairman, it is when carriers are refueling, as the gentleman from California (Mr. FAZIO) knows, that they are vulnerable. That is when a carrier becomes a sitting duck, when it has to slow down and become vulnerable to submarine attack and to missile attack in order to take on fuel and supplies.

The fact that the *Nimitz*-class carrier can operate for 17 to 21 days without even seeing an oiler is evidence enough for the combat effectiveness of this particular class of carrier.

Mr. Chairman, I would hope that the Congress again will see the wisdom of a nuclear carrier. I think it is the only way to go.

Mr. BURLISON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words and will speak in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss one point that was alluded to earlier by the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS). I think it was not focused in on with the specificity required in this debate.

The Chief of Naval Operations has testified a number of times on the Hill that the Navy requires in a combat situation three nuclear-powered cruisers in support of a nuclear-powered carrier. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out to my colleagues that as of this moment we only have nine nuclear-powered cruisers. Eight are now operational. The last that has been authorized and funded, the *Arkansas*, will become operational next year.

Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact we have four carriers authorized and programmed at the present time, at this moment we are three cruisers short of the necessary ships. That means if the Congress and the President approve this additional carrier, we will be six nuclear cruisers short. We have not authorized a nuclear cruiser since 1974. The obvious reason for that is because of the cost. It is enormously expensive. The CGN is drastically more expensive than the DDG destroyer that is characteristically the escort in the conventional task force.

Mr. Chairman, the point is, obviously we are not going to provide the nuclear cruisers necessary for the carrier task force.

Mr. Chairman, if that be so, then we give away the advantages of the nuclear carrier because it is held back by the same strictures that are obstacles for a conventional ship or conventional task force.

□ 1250

If the Congress were willing to program the additional cruisers which it has shown it is not willing to do it would cost between \$2 and \$3 billion more for each nuclear carrier.

So the bottom line, Mr. Chairman, is that if we continue to fund the nuclear carriers without the necessary escorts, we are going to be denied the advantages that go with a nuclear carrier, that is, the added speed, the longer survivability, a longer period of time without refueling and without taking on supplies, and so

forth. Those advantages can all be discarded because we are not going to have the necessary task force to accompany that nuclear carrier.

Therefore, I think the gentleman is eminently correct in suggesting that if we are going to have another carrier, and I am among those that believe we need 12 operational carriers, and that we are going to need another carrier to replace the *Midway* in the mideighties, that carrier ought to be a *Kennedy*-class carrier.

Mr. Chairman, I will be delighted to yield to my colleague, the gentleman from California.

Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very much. The gentleman knows how much I appreciate the gentleman yielding and the gentleman's support on the position that he has taken on this issue.

It does lead, I think, to a correction that I would like to make on a point that has been made several times in prior presentations, and that is to the effect that we are going to have to go out and build a large number of oilers to accompany a conventionally powered carrier.

I would like to read from the record of our Sea Power Subcommittee.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. BURLISON) has expired.

(At the request of Mr. LLOYD, and by unanimous consent, Mr. BURLISON was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. BURLISON. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. FAZIO).

Mr. FAZIO. To quote Mr. TRIBLE:

It is my understanding that the Navy has testified here that it would not be necessary to procure an oiler simply to serve this new oil fired carrier, but rather that the oil would be carried by ships that would be part of the fleet under any circumstances.

Admiral Turner in response said:

Yes, the existing oiler fleet that services the 12 carriers would be there with routine replacements in order to service.

So we are going to be mixing this carrier into a fleet that will have a variety of kinds of ships with different modes of propulsion among them. It can fit very well into our existing fleet. It is going to be possible to meet the fuel needs of this large deck carrier with existing shipping we currently have on the high seas without going into an expensive new procurement program. I fully appreciate the gentleman's comments but I would like also to make the point that the Senate Committee on Armed Services which has been mentioned in glowing terms today for its position in favor of an increase of 3 or 5 percent in the Defense budget is, I think, giving us some leadership by having already passed through its house a Defense authorization bill which includes a *Kennedy*-class large deck carrier, not a nuclear carrier.

So there is no question about the fact that the most forward looking committee, perhaps at this time in the minds

of those Americans interested in a strong defense has already made this compromise, gone halfway with the administration. I believe we can, as the gentleman in the well has indicated, provide the Navy with another ship that it clearly needs, a carrier that we can begin building this year, because as I indicated in my opening remarks, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) is in receipt of a letter that says that there will be no veto of the defense authorization bill if we go to a *Kennedy*-class carrier. This is I think a proper compromise which I hope the Members of the House will join us in voting for today.

Mr. BURLISON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California.

I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. LLOYD).

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I have the utmost esteem for my colleague, the gentleman from Missouri. I know also that the gentleman has based his comments on things that he believes are absolutely essential.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. BURLISON) has again expired.

(At the request of Mr. LLOYD, and by unanimous consent, Mr. BURLISON was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. BURLISON. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. LLOYD. I thank the gentleman for yielding. The gentleman firmly believes that his statement of the requirement for a nuclear cruiser to operate with the carrier is a correct statement; but I am here to tell the gentleman that there is no requirement whatsoever for a nuclear cruiser or any other vessel to operate in conjunction with the carrier, other than replenishment vessels.

As a matter of fact, a carrier by itself is a better shot, or excuse me, is a better weapons system than in conjunction with other ships wherein in heavy seas and operating where at high speeds it has to slow itself down in order to accommodate the other smaller vessel. Clearly that is the Navy's position.

I am sure the gentleman probably either asked the question and was told that if we could have everything we wanted we would love to have cruisers operating in conjunction with the carriers. I am sure that statement was made.

Mr. BURLISON. Mr. Chairman, may I reclaim my time so that I may respond to the gentleman before our time expires?

The gentleman is probably correct. In a peacetime scenario, it is certainly not as necessary to have a task force with a carrier, but certainly in a wartime period, there would be few Navy experts to suggest sending out the carrier without its escorts.

Certainly the Chief of Naval Operations would not, because he so testified last year before our Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations. That is the source of my statement.

The CNO—and I have not heard any Navy authorities contradicting—strongly recommends that with a nuclear carrier we need a CGN, a nuclear-powered CGN, three of them, in fact, to accompany that nuclear carrier.

To be more specific, Secretary of Defense McNamara in 1969 said that four nuclear-powered escorts were required for each carrier. Much more recently the CNO, Admiral Holloway, testified that a carrier-supported task group should include two or three cruisers and one to three submarines. These facts are from a Congressional Research Service study made in March 1978.

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. BURLISON. I yield.

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate what the gentleman is saying; but even in a wartime situation if you are pressed for ships, they do not need to operate with the nuclear-type carriers. They do need them to operate with the conventional carriers.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, as I am listening to the debate, the words "why not the best?" continue to haunt me as we discuss the issue of nuclear versus conventional aircraft carriers. Many of us are leaning toward a conventional Kennedy-class aircraft carrier as a compromise with the administration, simply to insure this bill against a Presidential veto.

It is a poor compromise. The men who will live, work, and may, God forbid, fight on this ship deserve the best. Even more important, our Nation deserves the best for its defense.

Let us review the facts inherent in this issue. The military facts are:

The large deck aircraft carrier remains the most potent power projection platform we have—for sea control or to exert our influence internationally. Moreover, it is our most effective antisubmarine platform, equaled only by the nuclear attack submarine.

We need another large deck aircraft carrier to meet our NATO commitments, our training and maintenance schedules, and to maintain our capability to meet international contingencies. Out of the 13 aircraft carriers we now have, the Navy says it needs a minimum of 7 aircraft carriers for the Atlantic Fleet to sustain its peacetime operations. Even this force is stretched so thin that carrier deployments have had to be extended. Next year at least one of these ships will be in a shipyard undergoing the long term and complex ship life extension program.

Nuclear power expands the capabilities of the large-deck aircraft carrier. The U.S.S. *Enterprise* returned from an around the world cruise, having covered a course of 35,000 nautical miles in 65 days, at a constant speed of 22 knots, her aircraft having flown more than 29,000 hours, with more aviation fuel on board than conventionally powered aircraft carriers carry when they leave port to join

the fleet. This unparalleled ability to carry out protracted combat operations without replenishment of stores is being cited by the Soviet Navy as the basis of its rationale for developing a nuclear navy.

We are all painfully aware of our diminishing oil reserves and our dependence on oil imports for some 50 percent of our fuel. A conventional aircraft carrier burns a prodigious amount of fuel during normal operations. On a calm day when an aircraft carrier must generate its own wind to launch and recover her aircraft by steaming at flank speed of 25 to 30 knots, it consumes some 7,500 gallons of fuel an hour. Already, the Navy has been forced to restrict its operations to the absolute minimum to train personnel due to fuel conservation efforts. In spite of a 30-percent reduction in energy use since 1973, the Department of Defense's fuel bill of over \$4 billion, was double its 1973 bill. It is difficult to imagine where the fuel for a conventional aircraft carrier is going to come from, or how much this fuel will cost, in 10 years when the ship is ready to go to sea. The political facts are:

Today, America needs a vote of confidence—a confidence based on a strong national defense, made up of the most effective systems we can produce.

There is no dispute here that a nuclear aircraft carrier is a more effective combat system than an oil powered carrier. There is no dispute that over the long term, 10 and 20 years, that a nuclear aircraft carrier is cheaper to operate. What is in dispute is the administration's approach to our national defense.

Mr. Chairman, it is time that we demonstrate the courage of our convictions. If we do not have the courage to provide for the best in our Nation's interests, then it is up to us to have that courage. We must insure that our Navy remains the strongest in the world.

□ 1300

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I never cease to be amazed at those who speak of the aircraft carrier as something out of the past. If indeed the aircraft carrier is obsolete, then so is every airfield ever built.

The aircraft carrier is nothing more than the platform, the airfield, by and through which we extend our air power. When we talk about the aircraft carrier, we are talking about air power, not surface sea power. We are talking about the extension of our air arm. That is what we are talking about.

The only issue before us today—because I think it is now generally conceded that we have to have another carrier—the real issue before us today is: How are we going to move this airfield about? How are we going to propel it? It seems to me commonsense for us to propel it with that kind of fuel which is now, and in the future will be, available to us in the most accessible way and the most expeditious form.

Can we imagine our having a fossil fueled fleet in the Indian Ocean and having the Soviets cut our sources of the fuels to propel it? What would happen if we have an aircraft carrier there that is totally dependent upon fossil fuel? Imagine for a moment one of our aircraft carriers attempting to round the Horn of Africa out of danger, or trying to execute its mission in the Indian Ocean, which depending upon fossil fuels transported by sea from our homeland because its availability has been denied by hostile forces in Africa and the Middle East. Such a situation would be disastrous.

It seems to me that such a disaster would be eliminated by the use of nuclear fuel contained aboard the carrier in 13-year quantities.

An interesting feature of the nuclear carrier is that it runs more efficiently at full speed than at slower speeds. The nuclear aircraft carrier, as a weapons system, is more efficient at high speed than at low speed. It can attack or withdraw from peril at top speed without fear of running out of fuel and at no greater cost than at slow speed.

With that capability to move the airfield in and out of danger, with its hard-hitting air arm and its defensive umbrella, we increase our ability to extend our power in a far more substantial manner than we could with the oil burning platform.

We can imagine what kind of control the Soviets are going to have around Africa if we get into a shooting war with them. The advantage of the nuclear carrier is that it only needs fossil fuel to propel its aircraft, and under heavy combat conditions it has to be refueled only about once a week, whereas the nonnuclear carrier has to be refueled for itself and its aircraft every other day, which means it is going to require only about a third of the refueling effect it required for the non-nuclear carrier.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that given the circumstances of this day and the circumstances of this day and the circumstances we can reasonably project for the future, with the oil situation being what it is and what it is likely to be in the future, we would be extremely foolish to build a non-nuclear carrier. It would be extremely foolish to attempt to fuel it with other than nuclear fuels.

So, Mr. Chairman, I, therefore, oppose the amendment and hope we will sustain in the bill the provision for the nuclear carrier.

Mr. EMERY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, as a member of the Armed Services Committee and the Sea Power Subcommittee, I have had the opportunity to study in depth the arguments for and against the nuclear-powered aircraft. In fact, for the past 3 years this House has engaged in spirited debate over this very issue.

After giving much consideration to this issue, I have again concluded that the construction of a nuclear-powered air-

craft carrier is in the best interest of the Navy and the country.

Let me discuss some of the arguments as I see them.

ARGUMENT 1

Should the Navy continue to build the fleet around the aircraft carrier, and, is the current number of carriers sufficient to accomplish the Navy's missions?

The aircraft carrier is and will continue to be the focal point of the fleet well into the future. The aircraft carrier is our first line of both offensive and defensive capability. Whether in the sea control or power projection role, the carrier, and its associated airwings, is our No. 1 naval weapon system.

The carrier is really an airbase that can be moved around a great deal of the Earth's surface. This capability gives our forces three advantages.

First, it allows the Navy to cover parts of the world oceans which we cannot cover through land-based air power. A good example of this capability was seen last spring when in the face of the turmoil in Iran and the border fighting between North and South Yemen, the President ordered first the carrier *Constellation* and then the *Midway* into the Indian Ocean to keep an eye on events taking place and to be prepared to meet any problems which might arise from those tensions. Since the United States has no land bases from which to operate in that region of the world, only the aircraft carrier could have been called upon to protect our interests there. Even our permanent Persian Gulf squadron of destroyers could not have been as effective as the carrier if called to assist.

Second, the modern air wing associated with the carrier can quickly establish the necessary air superiority needed to protect the fleet and allow it to conduct offensive, long-range operations against hostile surface, subsurface, and air forces. Cruisers and destroyers simply cannot guarantee hostile-free airspace.

Nowhere is this requirement for air superiority so critical as on the flanks of NATO. The ability to maneuver mobile air bases into positions in the North, Norwegian, and Mediterranean Seas to prevent Soviet flanking movements can only be accomplished by the carrier. Again, destroyers and frigates, no matter how capable, simply cannot meet the threat of Backfire bombers or Soviet missile cruisers equipped with antiship missiles capable of far greater ranges than missiles presently deployed on our surface warships.

Third, the carrier gives our military planners the ability to move a complete airbase—with all its people, aircraft, and spares—to remote areas and begin operations until land bases can be established or made combat ready.

Again, I refer to the events of the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf.

The Soviets already have air facilities available to them in Aden, Ethiopia, and even Mozambique. In a matter of a few hours, Soviet warplanes could be on those bases ready to strike at crude-laden tankers exiting the Persian Gulf and

destined for the United States or Europe. In addition, air power can increase Soviet and Cuban military pressure on Oman or Saudi Arabia and could prove decisive unless matched by comparable air power provided by the United States. Again, since the United States has no air bases in that region, only an aircraft carrier could provide that valuable air power until the United States could establish an air base or be granted landing rights in Saudi Arabia or Oman.

Finally, the U.S. Navy now deploys 13 carrier task forces. I believe, as do many in the Navy, that this number is not sufficient to accomplish all of the requirements established for the Navy. A good example of how thinly the Navy is currently stretched is again the recent deployments into the Indian Ocean. In order for the Navy to send the *Constellation* or the *Midway* in the Indian Ocean, it had to draw down its force in the western Pacific. In wartime, this would not be desirable as the large Soviet Pacific fleet would be very active in both the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific, including the South China Sea where it would utilize the former American naval base at Cam Rahn Bay. In addition, any naval conflict in the NATO theater which results in high attrition rates would necessitate that additional carriers from the Pacific Fleet be rerouted to Europe. Under these circumstances, I believe the Navy should be deploying at least 16 carrier task forces.

ARGUMENT 2

The aircraft carrier is a symbol of power projection. Given the emphasis placed on the likelihood of a NATO war, should this mission remain a priority?

The answer to this is quite simply, "Yes." A brief review of World War II will show how important the carrier was to the American effort to break the back of the Japanese Imperial Navy and to the ground war in helping to clear many of the Pacific islands occupied by the Japanese. Many of these islands, captured with the help of sea-based airpower, later became staging bases for land-based air attacks on the Japanese mainland.

Aside from World War II, history will show that the aircraft carrier contributed heavily to operations against enemy forces in both Korea and Vietnam.

In a NATO confrontation, it is unlikely that U.S. aircraft carriers would be sent to conduct operations against targets within the borders of the Soviet Union. However, the Soviets are sure to seek control of several strategic areas in Norway, the Bosphorus Straits and Aegean Sea, the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and South China Sea. To match this, the United States must be prepared to go on the offensive and the carrier, with its long-range aircraft, is the only ship capable of meeting these threats.

ARGUMENT 3

The aircraft carrier is a high-value target and will be extremely vulnerable to Soviet submarines, antiship missiles and Backfire bombers. Why put "all our eggs in such large baskets?"

This argument has some merit because the Soviets have a vast array of effective long-range, antiship weapons. However, the same Soviet antiship missiles make all surface ships vulnerable. Should we accept this argument and stop building surface ships altogether? And if the carrier, with all its ability to defend itself as no other ship can, is considered so vulnerable, what about those oilers and ammunition ships which are much slower and cannot defend themselves? Should we cease construction of those as well?

The fact is, all ships are vulnerable. The Soviets know it, yet they are not only building more ships, but they are also building aircraft carriers. I think we have to ask ourselves why. Why do the Soviets feel they need aircraft carriers when they have such a modern and potent surface and subsurface fleet already? I believe it is because they have finally recognized the value of sea-based air power and its influence on the outcomes of any naval engagement. As a caveat to this, I would submit that the Soviets have watched the deterioration of our own carrier fleet and the reluctance of this Nation to build the best and most effective type of carrier and are now preparing to fill the vacuum of sea power being created by the decline of the U.S. Navy.

Mr. Chairman, I have outlined what I consider the main arguments against building any more carriers and why I feel those arguments cannot stand up to the historical evidences which have time and time again proven the value and need for the aircraft carrier. I would now like to turn my attention to why we need a nuclear carrier of the *Nimitz* class rather than the CVV proposed by the administration or the repeat *Kennedy*-class carrier cleared by the Senate as a compromise measure.

Basically, there are three considerations which lend support to the nuclear-powered carrier. These include the capabilities of the ship itself, the cost of the CVN with respect to the fiscal year 1980 defense budget, and the issue of fuel availability and cost for the CVV.

First, I would briefly like to deal with the most important element in this entire debate, the capability of the ships under consideration.

Last year, the Navy released its long-awaited sea-based platform study which addressed the issue of the carrier and its future. In that study, as well as in the testimony of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, the nuclear-powered carrier was judged the best ship available to the Navy. Even those who oppose its procurement concede it to be the best ship.

I do not need to spend valuable time arguing the merits of the CVN. We have all been through this before, this House has repeatedly approved the CVN, and I do not believe anyone who has studied this issue can deny the facts which support the CVN as the most capable of all carriers. The following table compares the CVN and the CVV in certain critical areas.

Category	CVN ¹	CVV
Aviation payload (tons).....	15,000	6,200
Air wing size.....	89-94	50-64
Catapults.....	4	2
Aircraft elevators.....	4	2
Aircraft ammunition (ratio).....	2 to	1
Aircraft fuel (ratio).....	2.8 to	1
Propulsion power (ratio).....	2 to	1
Propulsion endurance.....	*13	*3-4

¹ Statistics for a repeat *Kennedy*-class carrier are similar to the CVN with the exception of propulsion endurance which is basically the same as the CVV.

² Years.

³ Days.

At this point, I would like to briefly address two factors which I feel must be given consideration. Those are: Crisis response time and vulnerability.

With respect to response time, consider the fact that it took 13 days for the oil-fired aircraft carriers to arrive on station in the Indian Ocean when the Iranian and Yemeni problems broke out. If either of these crises were significant threats to our national security, the 13-day transit time for our response may well have been too late. In 13 days, the Soviets with their bases in the Indian Ocean region, and with the help of their Cuban stooges already present in South Yemen and Ethiopia, could have launched an invasion of the Saudi Arabian oil fields, occupied the important country of Oman, and closed the straits of Hormuz to U.S. and allied oil tankers. A nuclear carrier could have made the transit in significantly less time and may have been able to prevent any disaster from occurring. Response time which will be critical in certain scenarios, definitely lies with the CVN rather than the CVV or any oil-fired warship.

With respect to vulnerability, I submit that the CVV is more fuel vulnerable than it would be missile vulnerable. The carrier, with its built-in defense systems, can successfully defend itself against the most likely Soviet threats, the submarine and the Backfire bomber with long-range, air-to-surface missiles. However, in the case of the oil-fired carrier, it is not the carrier itself that is vulnerable but the oiler ships which must accompany the carrier which is vulnerable. If the opposition can sink the oiler, which cannot defend itself, the carrier will really be in trouble.

Consider the recent Indian Ocean deployments of the *Constellation* and the *Midway*. It took each ship approximately 13 days to transit from the Subic Bay to the Indian Ocean. Along the way, the carriers were restricted to speeds of about 23 knots to allow the oilers and support ships to keep up with the task force. On at least four occasions, the carriers had to slow even more to receive fuel from the oilers. Each time a carrier would hook up to the oiler, it did become the sitting duck many claim carriers to be. A nuclear-powered ship without the constraint of having to refuel, avoids those moments when it presents itself as a fat target.

The second factor which supports the

construction of the CVN deals with the important question of fuel availability.

My colleagues know full well that this Nation is in the middle of a fuel crisis. Gasoline lines, rocketing gasoline prices, and a Presidential call for energy belt-tightening should convince us all of the folly of ordering another oil-fired aircraft carrier. This House itself, over the past few months has turned its attention to providing alternatives to our dependence on foreign oil. We have seen all kinds of plans from the approval of gas rationing to passage of legislation which is designed to increase our future use of synthetic fuels, especially within the Department of Defense. Even others have suggested that we shift auto fuel efficiency research and development to NASA in order to speed up the acquisition of more fuel efficient automobiles. I ask my colleagues whether it is somewhat ridiculous to take all these measures and yet approve an oil-fired aircraft carrier.

Many of my colleagues argue that the \$2.2 billion cost of the CVN is much too much to spend. Yet, included in that \$2.2 billion cost is the fuel necessary to power the CVN for at least 13 years. The cost of the \$1.6 billion CVV or the \$1.7 billion CV do not include a 13-year supply of oil. Now, I realize that the Navy and the opponents of the CVN possess charts showing the 13 year expected fuel expenditure of the CVV. And, if the right figures are used, it can be shown how the life-cycle cost of the CVV will always come out lower than the CVN. However, I am sure that when the administration put these figures together last year to support the cost of the CVV, they had no idea that the price of oil would jump from \$13 per barrel to \$22 per barrel in 1 year. Therefore, it is critical that the cost of the oil for the CVV be based on likely prices of oil in 1990 and the year 2000 rather than on what oil cost today. I submit that if that true figure is calculated, the life-cycle costs of the CVV will come closer to the CVN. In that case, it is much better to build the better ship.

Life-cycle costs are based on the normal operation of a ship. But let us review the recent Indian Ocean deployments as a case where the normal routine of a task force is altered rather dramatically.

According to the Navy, the round trip from the Subic Bay in the Philippines to the northern Indian Ocean is about 4,500 nautical miles. The cost of the round trip transit portion of the *Constellation* and *Midway* deployments was approximately \$1,509,000 for each ship. A total of \$3,018,000. I remind my colleagues that this cost was for the transit portion of the deployment and does not include the fuel expended for the carriers while on station in the Indian Ocean or for the fuel needed by the escort ships which accompanied the carriers.

Now if we break that single-ship cost of fuel into its components, we will see some interesting statistics. For instance, by dividing the transit cost of one carrier deployment by the distance traveled, we

can see that the Navy was spending about \$335 for each mile traveled. Now if we assume that the Navy was burning oil it purchased at bargain-basement prices, say \$0.70 per gallon, we might conclude that the carrier was burning about 478 gallons per mile. I dare say my colleagues can recognize the terrible fuel efficiency of the oil-fired carrier.

In fact, just to send one oil-burning carrier to the Indian Ocean from the Subic Bay, and not even from the west coast of the United States, the Navy consumed 2,160,000 gallons of oil. That figure represents an expenditure of 45,000 barrels of oil in 13 days. Think what our States could do with respect to gasoline lines and home heating oil shortages if they could split 2,160,000 gallons of gasoline over a 13-day period.

Mr. Chairman, at a time when this Nation, and this House, are trying to come to grips with the energy crisis, I feel one place where a positive impact can be made is by building more nuclear-powered ships like the CVN rather than by constructing inferior gas guzzlers like the CVV or CV.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, there is the question of cost with respect to the CVN and the fiscal year 1980 Defense budget. As you recall, last year the Congress added \$2.2 billion to the Defense bill for the CVN. The President, claiming that the cost of the carrier would prevent the expenditure of funds on other more critically needed items, vetoed the bill. This year, however, the administration has requested \$1.6 billion for the inferior CVV. The Armed Services Committee realizing the extra benefits gained by the CVN added an additional \$500 million for the CVN.

The issue before us is no longer \$2.2 billion for a carrier but \$500 million for a carrier. I believe that since the President has requested at least a \$1.6 billion carrier, which we know is inferior, the additional \$500 million should be considered a bargain for the type of ship we really need. Besides, now that the Congress has authorized four Iranian destroyers for the fiscal year 1979 supplemental budget, the \$750 million earmarked in this bill for two Iranian destroyers can be deleted. Thus, the committee can, by deleting the \$750 million, buy the nuclear carrier and still save \$250 million in the fiscal year 1980 budget.

Mr. Chairman, one final note. Some have suggested that the inclusion of a nuclear carrier would almost assuredly be "veto bait." I happen to disagree with this assessment. For one, I cannot see how the President or this Congress can call for control of our oil appetites and then turn around and build a gas guzzler like the CVV. And, second, I really cannot see how a President so concerned about his present image could risk tarnishing it any more by vetoing a defense bill right in the middle of the SALT debate and knowing full well the attitude of the American people with respect to the Soviet/American military balance of power. I believe any veto of

this defense bill will be a disaster for the President's SALT agreement.

In sum, the CVN is the best ship for the Navy. It is cost effective and fuel efficient and provides the kind of military power this Nation needs to protect its interests abroad. I urge my colleagues to support the committee and the CVN.

□ 1310

Mr. ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, this would be a false economy, if there ever was one, and it would further erode the future power of the U.S. Navy which might already be incapable of carrying out certain missions it might be called upon to perform.

The edge in military capability of the nuclear carrier, which could mean the difference between winning and losing in combat, is not always susceptible to precise cost effectiveness comparisons.

The committee considered as an option, procurement of a CV-71, repeat *Kennedy*-class aircraft carrier, an oil-fired ship of about 80,000 tons. That ship has nearly all the characteristics of the *Nimitz* class except for nuclear propulsion. It is estimated cost in fiscal year 1980 dollars is \$1,815 million, only \$279 million less than the CVN. The CV-71 is, according to Navy testimony, an acceptable compromise. It is a fine ship.

Why then, in the face of national budget constraints, did the committee opt for the CVN-71 at a procurement cost of \$2,094 million?

Some brief answers are:

First. The advantages of nuclear power are of inestimable strategic and tactical value in wartime.

Second. There is a significant increase in aircraft fuel capacity in the CVN since conventional fuel oil space can be used for aviation fuel—a factor that markedly increases air combat sustainability between replenishment operations.

Third. The nuclear carrier is more independent of its logistics train. In other words, the nuclear ship is capable of more sustained operations and has the unique capability to retire to relatively safe replenishment areas without concern over propulsion fuel.

Fourth. The life-cycle costs for the *Kennedy* or *Nimitz* carriers with their associated air wings are nearly even, favoring the *Kennedy* by about 1 percent.

For these fundamental reasons, particularly the last, the committee chose the *Nimitz* over the *Kennedy* class carrier at a front-end cost differential of \$279 million.

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of my very eloquent colleague, the gentleman from Maine (Mr. EMERY) in putting this nuclear versus oil-powered carrier in context with our present shortage of oil.

In addition, I would like to reflect on what I have heard on the floor of this House during this debate. I happen not to be on this committee, but I am interested in how this body deals with the

subject of "technology." It has been said—and I hear it so often said—in this body—"Let us not go forward today. Tomorrow the very latest technology will be available." Or, "Tomorrow we can do it better." Or, "There is a better technology waiting on the horizon."

It reminds me of a thirsty man crossing a desert, and he comes across a little pool of water. It is there; it is drinkable. It will save him from the ravages of the becoming very, very thirsty, perhaps even fatal thirst. And he passes it up because on the horizon there is this beautiful, glistening pool of water. It looks a lot better. There is a lot more. So he leaves the quenching of his thirst to some future day. Then he moves on and he goes miles and miles, and stumbles on yet another small pool. It is drinkable, it is there, but instead of quenching his increasing thirst, he looks out, see's again on the horizon the beautiful, large, and glistening pool and moves on. The man died of thirst and obviously the glistening pool was a mirage.

It is the same with the "new technology" that tomorrow will be superior to the nuclear carrier; V/STOL aircraft, cruise-missile-firing ships, electronic naval war strategies of the future, and so forth. However, they too are still on the horizon. In passing up presently available, buildable, pragmatic technology we end up doing nothing. And by doing nothing, we take the greatest of risks.

This debate is also reminiscent of the kind of argument you hear on the floor of this House regarding energy. Many in this body are reluctant to go ahead with energy potential that is here today, that is available now. They say that out there is a wonderful new, perfectly clean technology from which we are going to get umpteen quadrillion Btu's if we only just hold off, and wait. It is like the mirage. Tomorrow only brings new tomorrows and we suffer then for not acting today.

Mr. Chairman, I say, for the health and for the well-being of a Nation faced with increasing Soviet pressure in potential limited-scale war theaters all over this globe, we need an airbase that we can move around as quick as possible, without having to refuel, and one that is not dependent on some country saying to us, "No, you can't land here."

The fact is, listening to these arguments, the nuclear-powered ship is so vastly superior to this oil guzzler that there should not be any doubt in the minds of the Members of this House as to how to vote on the amendment before us.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to reject this amendment.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I thought I would wait to the last to make some remarks. The debate has been a very fine debate. It has brought out a lot of good points. I am not going to try to bring any degree of statistics before the Members. They have already had them presented.

As I listened to the debate, it seems to me that it is rather clear that the cost

of these two types of carriers is essentially the same, with the possibility of a few millions of dollars more for the nuclear carrier over all the life cycle; or the possibility of the *Kennedy* class, the nonnuclear carrier, being infinitely more expensive, perhaps by hundreds of millions of dollars, depending upon how much oil goes up.

So you have a chance of maybe spending a little bit more, a few million, not billions, but a few million more for a nuclear carrier in the lifespan, or you have a chance of spending hundreds of millions of dollars more for our inferior carrier if the oil situation gets as bad as most of us think that it probably will.

So you can just wipe all that out and say the cost is about the same.

Then there is no evidence at all supporting having the nonnuclear carrier over the nuclear carrier from the standpoint of combat utility. All of the military authorities, both abroad and in this country, everybody who has studied this question, says that the nuclear carrier is infinitely more valuable as a method of winning a conventional war and can thereby limit the probability of having a nuclear war, because we might be able to win a nonnuclear war. So it has its thrust against presenting a nuclear war. It has a great possibility of winning in anything it enters into.

I might address one matter that was brought up about whether or not you have to buy up all of these cruisers with it. In view of the fact that comments like that were made a year or so ago when the veto was up, I interrogated the CNO. I do not have his language before me now, but my memory is, in the reply I got back, there was no requirement for three cruisers or destroyers to be with these carriers which are able military ships by themselves.

□ 1320

First of all, I repeat that the cost of this nuclear carrier is not greatly in excess of the nonnuclear carrier. As a matter of fact, it may be much, much cheaper than the oil-burning carrier, over the life cycle.

Second, the military value of the carrier is infinitely greater. It is a qualitative jump of great magnitude.

The final thing I would like to say to everybody here, it seems to me in 1979, this is a thrust we can make for our national will, a declaration of a will to be strong and to prevent, if we can, wars and prevent, if we possibly can, nuclear wars by being sufficiently strong.

Mr. Chairman, I urge very much this amendment, before us at this moment, be defeated.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. FAZIO) as a substitute for the committee amendment, as amended.

The question was taken, and the Chairman pro tempore announced that the yeas appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic de-

vice, and there were—ayes 96, noes 309, not voting 29, as follows:

[Roll No. 465]

AYES—96

Aspin	Forsythe	Nolan
AuCoin	Frost	Nowak
Baldus	Garcia	Oakar
Bedell	Gephardt	Oberstar
Bellenson	Gialmo	Obey
Bingham	Gray	Ottinger
Bolling	Guarini	Pickle
Bonior	Hall, Ohio	Rahall
Brademas	Hamilton	Rangel
Broomfield	Hawkins	Ratchford
Brown, Calif.	Holtzman	Richmond
Burlison	Jacobs	Rodino
Burton, John	Kastenmeier	Sabo
Burton, Phillip	Kildee	Schroeder
Cavanaugh	Kogovsek	Seiberling
Clay	Kostmayer	Shannon
Cotter	LaFalce	Sharp
Daschle	Lederer	Simon
Dodd	Lowry	Solarz
Donnelly	Lundine	Spellman
Drinan	Maguire	Stokes
Early	Markey	Studds
Eckhardt	Marks	Thompson
Edgar	Matsui	Udall
Edwards, Calif.	Mavroules	Vento
Erlenborn	Mikulski	Vento
Fascell	Miller, Calif.	Weaver
Fazio	Mineta	Weiss
Fenwick	Mitchell, Md.	Williams, Mont.
Ferraro	Moakley	Wirth
Fithian	Moffett	Wolpe
Florio	Moorhead, Pa.	Young, Mo.

NOES—309

Abdnor	Corman	Hanley
Addabbo	Coughlin	Hansen
Akaka	Courter	Harkin
Albosta	Crane, Daniel	Harris
Alexander	D'Amours	Harsha
Ambro	Daniel, Dan	Heckler
Anderson,	Daniel, R. W.	Hefner
Calif.	Danielson	Hefst
Andrews, N.C.	Dannemeyer	Hightower
Andrews,	Davis, Mich.	Hillis
N. Dak.	Davis, S.C.	Hinson
Annunzio	Deckard	Holland
Anthony	Dellums	Hollenbeck
Archer	Derrick	Holt
Ashbrook	Devine	Hopkins
Ashley	Dickinson	Horton
Atkinson	Dicks	Howard
Badham	Diggs	Hubbard
Bafalis	Dingell	Hughes
Bailey	Dornan	Hyde
Barnard	Dougherty	Ichord
Barnes	Downey	Ireland
Bauman	Duncan, Oreg.	Jeffords
Beard, R.I.	Duncan, Tenn.	Jeffries
Beard, Tenn.	Edwards, Okla.	Jenkins
Benjamin	Emery	Jenrette
Bennett	English	Johnson, Calif.
Bereuter	Erdahl	Johnson, Colo.
Bethune	Ertel	Jones, Okla.
Bevill	Evans, Del.	Jones, Tenn.
Blaggi	Evans, Ga.	Kazen
Blanchard	Evans, Ind.	Kelly
Boggs	Fary	Kemp
Boland	Findley	Kindness
Boner	Fish	Kramer
Bonker	Fisher	Lagomarsino
Bouquard	Filippo	Latta
Bowen	Ford, Mich.	Leach, Iowa
Breaux	Ford, Tenn.	Leach, La.
Brinkley	Fountain	Leath, Tex.
Brodhead	Fowler	Lee
Brooks	Frenzel	Lehman
Brown, Ohio	Fuqua	Leland
Broyhill	Gaydos	Lent
Buchanan	Gibbons	Levitas
Burgener	Gilman	Lewis
Butler	Gingrich	Livingston
Byron	Ginn	Lloyd
Campbell	Glickman	Loeffler
Carney	Goldwater	Long, La.
Carr	Gonzalez	Long, Md.
Chappell	Gore	Lujan
Cheney	Gradison	Luken
Chisholm	Gramm	Lungren
Clausen	Grassley	McCloskey
Cleveland	Green	McCormack
Clinger	Grisham	McDade
Coelho	Gudger	McDonald
Coleman	Guyver	McEwen
Collins, Ill.	Hagedorn	McHugh
Collins, Tex.	Hall, Tex.	McKay
Conable	Hammer-	McKinney
Conte	schmidt	Madigan
Corcoran	Hance	Marlenee

Marriott	Quayle	Steed
Martin	Quillen	Stenholm
Mathis	Rallsback	Stewart
Mattox	Regula	Stockman
Mazzoli	Reuss	Stratton
Mica	Rhodes	Stump
Michel	Rinaldo	Swift
Mikva	Ritter	Symms
Miller, Ohio	Roberts	Synar
Minish	Robinson	Tauke
Mitchell, N.Y.	Roe	Taylor
Mollohan	Rose	Thomas
Montgomery	Roth	Traxler
Moore	Rousselot	Tribie
Moorhead,	Royer	Ullinan
Calif.	Rudd	Vanik
Mottl	Runnels	Volkmer
Murphy, Ill.	Russo	Walker
Murphy, N.Y.	Santini	Wampler
Murphy, Pa.	Satterfield	Watkins
Murtha	Sawyer	Waxman
Myers, Ind.	Scheuer	White
Myers, Pa.	Schulze	Whitehurst
Natcher	Sebellus	Whitley
Neal	Sensenbrenner	Whittaker
Nedzi	Shelby	Whitten
Nelson	Shumway	Williams, Ohio
Nichols	Shuster	Wilson, Bob
O'Brien	Skelton	Wilson, C. H.
Panetta	Slack	Wilson, Tex.
Pashayan	Smith, Iowa	Wright
Patten	Smith, Nebr.	Wyatt
Patterson	Snowe	Wyder
Paul	Snyder	Wyllie
Pease	Solomon	Yates
Perkins	Spence	Yatron
Petri	St Germain	Young, Fla.
Peysner	Stack	Zablocki
Price	Staggers	Zeferetti
Pritchard	Stangeland	
Pursell	Stanton	

NOT VOTING—29

Anderson, Ill.	Foley	Rostenkowski
Applegate	Goodling	Roybal
Carter	Huckaby	Stark
Conyers	Hutto	Treen
Crane, Phillip	Jones, N.C.	Van Deerlin
de la Garza	Lott	Vander Jagt
Derwinski	McClory	Winn
Dixon	Pepper	Wolf
Edwards, Ala.	Preyer	Young, Alaska
Flood	Rosenthal	

□ 1330

Mr. STOKES changed his vote from "no" to "aye."

Mr. GLICKMAN and Mr. RUSSO changed their votes from "aye" to "no."

So the amendment offered as a substitute for the committee amendment, as amended, was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

□ 1340

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. DELLUMS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE COMMITTEE AMENDMENT, AS AMENDED

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment as a substitute for the committee amendment, as amended.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. DELLUMS as a substitute for the committee amendment, as amended: Page 3, line 2, strike out "\$7,515,500,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$4,696,400,000".

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, we have heard a long and extended debate with respect to the question of whether we shall or shall not have a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier or a nonnuclear-powered aircraft carrier. I will not try to prolong that debate, but let me try to set the parameters of where we are.

First of all, for those Members who were not here on the flow participating in the debate, the President in his fiscal year 1980 budget presented to the United States Congress asked for a CVV, which is the nomenclature for a small aircraft carrier. The Armed Service Committee in its deliberations chose to strike

the small aircraft carrier and insert in lieu thereof a nuclear aircraft carrier, a very large one. A few moments ago, Members just had a vote on an amendment offered by my distinguished colleague from California (Mr. FAZIO), who attempted to substitute a large non-nuclear carrier for the large nuclear carrier that was in the bill. That amendment did not succeed, and so where we are at this moment is back to the original version of the bill, and that is with a large nuclear aircraft carrier.

I know that most of my colleagues would like very much to be able to vote up or down on whether we ought to have a carrier at all. What this amendment does, simply, is strike the nuclear carrier, period, from this bill. So, those who want to vote against the nuclear carrier will have an opportunity to do it.

To quickly summarize I am suggesting, first, that super carriers, whether nuclear or nonnuclear, are an aspect of yesterday's war; and second, that to suggest that we are only spending \$2.1 billion to construct a nuclear aircraft carrier really belies the reality of the economics of modern warfare. I laid out in an earlier presentation how we are not simply talking about the \$2.1 billion, but over the 35-year life span of a nuclear aircraft carrier we are committing the American people to a figure of \$38.6 billion, because for each carrier force to float on the high seas we need two in backup—one in reserve and one in overhaul, which means that we are talking about over a hundred million dollars' expenditure commitment on the part of the American people over the next 35 years.

I would conclude simply by suggesting to those Members who want a straight up-or-down vote on knocking the nuclear carrier out, that this is an opportunity to do so. I offer this amendment to provide Members that opportunity. I do not think we need these super carriers.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the Committee has just had the opportunity to do what the gentleman suggests the House have the right to do. The Committee has just expressed its will. I ask the Members to confirm that expression by rejecting the amendment now before us.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS) as a substitute for the committee amendment, as amended.

The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 112, noes 286, not voting 36, as follows:

[Roll No. 466]

AYES—112

Addabbo	Bellenson	Bonker
Aspin	Bingham	Brodhead
AuCoin	Blanchard	Brown, Calif.
Baldus	Boland	Burton, John
Barnes	Bolling	Burton, Phillip
Bedell	Bonior	Carr

Cavanaugh Johnson, Colo.
Chisholm Kastenmeier
Clay Kildee
Collins, Ill. Kogovsek
Conable Kostmayer
Conte Leach, Iowa
Daschle Lehman
Dellums Leland
Dingell Lowry
Drinan Lundine
Duncan, Oreg. McEwen
Early McHugh
Eckhardt Maguire
Edgar Markey
Edwards, Calif. Matsui
Erdahl Mikva
Fascell Miller, Calif.
Fenwick Mineta
Fithian Mitchell, Md.
Ford, Mich. Moakley
Ford, Tenn. Moffett
Frenzel Moorhead, Pa.
Garcia Nedzi
Gephardt Nolan
Glickman Oaker
Gray Oberstar
Green Obey
Hall, Ohio Ottinger
Harkin Panetta
Heckler Paul
Holtzman Pease
Jacobs Petri

NOES—286

Abdnor Devine
Akaka Dickinson
Albosta Dicks
Alexander Dodd
Ambro Donnelly
Anderson, Dornan
Calif. Dougherty
Andrews, N.C. Downey
Andrews, Duncan, Tenn.
N. Dak. Edwards, Okla.
Annunzio Emery
Anthony English
Archer Erlenborn
Ashbrook Ertel
Ashley Evans, Del.
Atkinson Evans, Ga.
Badham Evans, Ind.
Bafalis Fary
Bailey Fazio
Barnard Ferraro
Bauman Findley
Beard, R.I. Fish
Beard, Tenn. Fisher
Benjamin Flippo
Bennett Florio
Bereuter Fountain
Bethune Fowler
Bevill Frost
Blaggi Fuqua
Boggs Gaydos
Boner Gibbons
Bouquard Gilman
Bowen Gingrich
Brademas Ginn
Breux Goldwater
Brinkley Gonzalez
Brooks Gore
Broomfield Gradson
Brown, Ohio Gramm
Broyhill Grassley
Buchanan Grisham
Burgener Guarini
Burlison Gudger
Butler Guyer
Byron Hagedorn
Campbell Hall, Tex.
Carney Hamilton
Chappell Hammer-
Cheney schmidt
Clausen Hance
Cleveland Hanley
Clinger Hansen
Coelho Harris
Coleman Harsha
Collins, Tex. Hawkins
Corcoran Hefner
Corman Hefel
Cotter Hightower
Coughlin Hillis
Courter Hinson
Crane, Daniel Holland
D'Amours Hollenbeck
Daniel, Dan Holt
Daniel, R. W. Hopkins
Danielson Horton
Dannemeyer Howard
Davis, Mich. Hubbard
Davis, S.C. Hughes
Deckard Hyde
Derrick Ichord

Patten Patten
Patterson Sharp
Perkins Shelby
Peyster Shumway
Pickle Shuster
Price Skelton
Pursell Slack
Quillen Smith, Nebr.
Rallsback Snowe
Regula Snyder
Reuss Solomon
Rhodes Spellman
Rinaldo Spence
Ritter St Germain
Roberts Stack
Robinson Staggers
Rostenkowski Stangeland
Roth Stanton
Rousselot Steed
Royce Stenholm
Rudd Stewart
Runnels Stockman
Santini Stratton
Satterfield Stump
Sawyer Swift
Scheuer Symms
Schulze Synar

NOT VOTING—36
Anderson, Ill. Forsythe
Applegate Gladmo
Carter Goodling
Conyers Huckaby
Crane, Philip Hutto
de la Garza Jones, N.C.
Derwinski Lott
Diggs McClory
Dixon Murphy, Ill.
Edwards, Ala. Pepper
Flood Freyer
Foley Quayle

□ 1400

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:
Mr. Stark for, with Mr. Freyer against.
Mr. Dixon for, with Mr. Murphy of Illinois against.
Mr. Diggs for, with Mr. Hutto against.
Mr. Conyers for, with Mr. Pepper against.

Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois and Mr. PETRI changed their votes from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment offered as a substitute for the committee amendment, as amended, was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the committee amendment, as amended.

The committee amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. CHARLES H. WILSON OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Mr. Chairman I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California: Page 2, line 14, strike out "\$7,816,190,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$7,473,990,000".

Page 4, strike out lines 5 through 11 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

SEC. 103. The Secretary of Defense shall provide to the Congress at the earliest practicable date, and not later than the end of the 120-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, a report on—

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak in support of, and to urge adoption of the amendment I have just offered. Simply put, the amendment deletes \$342.2 million in procurement authorization for modifications to the B-52 aircraft. The amendment further requires that the modification program be restructured,

so that the costs of the B-52 modification program can be more carefully monitored and controlled.

My purpose in offering this amendment is to bring the attention of this body, and to debate and examine, a \$14 to \$20 billion program which will only questionably enhance the capability of the B-52 aircraft.

At the same time, I would like to make it clear that this amendment will not restrict, hinder, or slow the development and deployment of the cruise missile. In fact my amendment allows the authorization of \$79.7 million for production of cruise missile integration equipment.

Some may argue against my amendment, and claim that my motive is to "kill the B-52 so as to revive the B-1."

This is simply not true.

When the Carter administration decided not to proceed with the B-1, they announced a program to accelerate the development of cruise missiles. Under their plan, when operational, the cruise missiles would be carried by B-52 bombers until a cruise missile carrier was available.

While I disagreed with that decision, I am a realist, and have accepted the judgment of the Congress. The B-1 is dead.

Now, I am trying to make the B-52 cruise missile system work as cost efficiently as is possible.

My amendment in no way affects the development or testing of the cruise missile. As a matter of fact, three B-52 aircraft, modified to carry cruise missiles, have been operational at Edwards Air Force Base since early May.

I accept the need for cruise missiles to be carried by the B-52 in the short term; for the next 5 to 7 years. However, I believe that the Congress must now decide whether it wants to commit itself to spend billions of dollars on other, future modifications to the B-52. Modifications which are not necessary for deploying the cruise missile.

Earlier this year, Lt. Gen. Thomas Stafford, the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, told the Armed Services Committee that the cost of modernizing and modifying the B-52 G and H aircraft, for a mixture of cruise missile launchers and penetrating bombers, would cost \$14 billion during the next decade.

I believe that the \$14 billion figure used by General Stafford is an extremely conservative estimate. The \$14 billion estimate, while in itself excessive represents only those costs which the Air Force classifies as "programed or probable."

As presently planned, the B-52 modification program includes not only a program for cruise missile integration, which is the development and production of the hardware which launches the cruise missile from the B-52; the MOD program also includes a complete avionics overhaul, new electronic counter measures, and a "life extension package" including \$3.1 billion for new engines.

Alone, phase 1 of the cruise missile integration package is budgeted at \$1.07 billion. Although this represents an in-

crease from the administration's original estimate that the cruise missile integration package would cost \$440 million, standing alone, the cruise missile integration package appears reasonable. Yet, when all MOD costs are calculated, they will total \$14 to \$20 billion.

This is where I believe the Congress must draw the line. Let us take the time to get the facts, and more carefully determine whether these modifications are necessary and whether they justify the billions of dollars involved. I believe the Congress must add all the costs up, and let the taxpayers know what they will be getting for their dollars.

Will these multibillion-dollar modifications maintain or enhance the capability of the B-52 aircraft? The experts say no.

In January of 1966, then Air Force Secretary Harold Brown testified that it was not "desirable" to extend the life of the B-52 G and H aircraft beyond 1975.

Before the Budget Committee in late February, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. David Jones, expressed his concern that the B-52's will not maintain their capabilities through the 1980's.

Earlier this year, and most recently during testimony on the SALT II treaty, Gen. Richard Ellis, Commander of the Strategic Air Command, recommended that the Air Force "discontinue B-52 modifications." In his recommendation, General Ellis stated that—

"Based on the Soviet defensive environment projected for the late 1980's it will be extremely expensive—perhaps prohibitively so—to modify the B-52 sufficiently to provide it with a reasonable penetration capability beyond the late 1980's.

Further, General Ellis has urged the Air Force and the Congress to "face the reality that an aircraft which represents aviation technology of the 1940's and 1950's cannot compete with the technical advances that will be inherent in the defensive systems of the Soviet Union" by the end of the 1980's.

I hope the House will join with me in requiring that all the fine print in the contract be read before we sign a blank check for billions of dollars in questionable and unnecessary modifications to the B-52.

By adopting the Wilson amendment, the House will authorize those B-52/cruise missile mods which are essential to our national defense. However, we must delete and delay, until the Air Force restructures them into a total package, other requested modifications involving life extension and penetration effectiveness.

At a minimum, we should be able to afford the time to stop and consider the ramifications of the modifications, and the magnitude of their expense.

Mr. CARR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. CARR. Mr. Chairman, I recall that in the full committee the gentleman sought to amend the bill with a similar amendment which at that time I opposed. It is now my understanding, how-

ever, that this amendment differs from that amendment in that the modifications required to the B-52 to carry the cruise missile, including cruise missile avionics, including what are known as FRODS—that is functionally related observable differences—for the purpose of SALT verification, will not be hindered by this gentleman's amendment and that his amendment only drops those modifications that go to essentially the penetration and some update rolls.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. That is exactly right.

Mr. Chairman, I had an original amendment which was adopted in the Subcommittee on Procurement which was for \$431 million. I have eliminated the \$79.7 million which is for the actual integration, the carriage for the cruise missile and which is to carry out the integration work for the B-52 to carry the cruise missile and do the mission for which the President said he wanted it to be used for. The \$10 million takes care of the functionally related observable differences that must be added to the tail or some part of the B-52 so that it can be identified as a cruise missile carrier.

Mr. CARR. I thank the gentleman for his explanation and clarification. We have learned that these modification accounts are frequently used as slush funds for the military services to have money to reprogram and to have the extra money that they cannot get through the Congress and our committee and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations. I think the gentleman in offering this amendment is offering a real service to the House for which I commend him.

Mr. Chairman, I urge the House to support the Wilson amendment which is before us at this time.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the support of the gentleman. I think this gives us an opportunity to reduce a significant amount from the budget that is not required and is not necessary. The President has made the decision that the cruise missile carrier replace the B-1, the penetrating bomber.

I recognize that the Air Force would like to put all of this extra money into modifying the B-52 so that they can update it as a penetrator, but its function is strictly for cruise missile carrying until such time as a more modern aircraft would be created and produced that will take us beyond the 1980's. What we now ask for will do the job, will take us through the 1980's and get started on the program of doing the integrations required.

Mr. Chairman, I know the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. ICHORD) has reservations and possibly is opposed to the amendment. He is introducing an amendment which I intend to support in the next title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of Califor-

nia. The amendment which the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. ICHORD) will be introducing I think is a good amendment which I shall support. I believe the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. CARR) will also support the amendment. It is one that will beef up the testing program and will assure that every possible plane that anyone has talked about will be considered in the eventual decision on the cruise missile carrier.

□ 1410

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman stating that he is going to support my amendment in regard to the cruise missile carrier. I do not want the gentleman wrong on both counts. I am glad that the gentleman at least is going to be right 50 percent of the time.

My problem is, though, I would state to the gentleman from California, I do not understand what the gentleman is doing here in the House. The gentleman has jumped around with his figures. At one time in the committee the gentleman was defeated on a \$431.9 million cut; is that right?

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Yes.

Mr. ICHORD. Now the gentleman is cutting it down to \$342.2 million, but the gentleman is leaving in, as the gentleman from Michigan pointed out, and I cannot understand the alliance there, the gentleman is leaving \$10 million in for FROD. If there is anything that I think is rather silly about this whole program, that is it. I would support the gentleman on the elimination of the \$10 million for FROD.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Well, apparently this is something that is going to be required according to SALT in order that cruise missile carriers can be identified as such. Both sides are supposed to be playing the same game.

Mr. ICHORD. That may be true, but I think that part of SALT is absolutely silly. We might as well paint FRODS on the tail of the airplane.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Well, I think SALT is rather silly, but we are going through some exercises and there are some things that we are doing the best to comply with that we possibly can. The gentleman and myself have identical feelings as far as SALT is concerned.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I sympathize a great deal with the gentleman from California. I, too, was a great supporter of the B-1 bomber. I think we made a tremendous mistake in eliminating the B-1 bomber after spending almost \$7 billion to bring that weapons system into being. I did think very strongly that we needed a manned penetrator and I still believe there is a need.

I cannot help but think that the gen-

tleman from California, and I know how strong the gentleman was for the B-1 bomber, is really crying over spilled milk, and I will yield later to the gentleman from California. I cannot help thinking that I say to the gentleman from California, the B-1 bomber is gone. The gentleman does not offer anything in place of the B-1 bomber and that is why I must reluctantly oppose the gentleman's amendment.

Now, the only thing we are going to have between now and the 1990 time frame is the B-52 as a cruise missile carrier. With all due respect, the gentleman has jumped around all over the lot with this amendment. In the committee, as I pointed out, the gentleman wanted to cut \$342.2 million out for the avionics, which the gentleman is now cutting on the floor of the House, as well as \$79.7 million for integrating the cruise missile into the B-52-G, and the gentleman also wanted to cut out \$10 million for FRODS, which I happen to agree with. His amendment cut out \$431.9 million in the committee.

I will yield in just a minute.

Now, the gentleman comes back and offers a \$342.2 million cut with the hope, I suppose, of winning.

I cannot understand the alliance between the gentleman and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. CARR).

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, we have come to an understanding.

Mr. ICHORD. I will yield in just a minute.

Let me state to the gentleman from California that the avionics that has to be developed here is not only for the B-52-G, but also for the B-52-H.

Now, the B-52 is all we have. I agree with the gentleman from California. We should have had a B-1 bomber, but all we have as a possible penetrator today is the B-52.

I say to the gentleman from California, we just cannot continue to cry over spilled milk. All the gentleman is doing is perpetuating our stop, start and delay mentality. We have got to do something.

I think we should have proceeded with the B-1 also, but we cannot knock out our only alternative, which is the B-52.

For that reason, I would trust that the House would defeat the amendment of the gentleman from California.

I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry that the gentleman considers my amendment as a B-1 amendment. It is nothing of the kind. That is the furthest from the truth.

I recognize what has happened. I am realistic about it, but the President has decided that the cruise missile carrier will take the place of the penetrating bomber.

The avionics that is included in the \$332 million that I am trying to have removed from this is new avionics to improve the G and H versions of the B-52 as penetrating bombers.

Mr. ICHORD. OK, let me ask the gentleman, can the gentleman identify to this House how much is for any avionics for the B-52-G, which is going to be the cruise missile carrier, and how much is for the B-52-H? The gentleman from California cannot, can he? The gentleman does not even know what this amendment is going to do.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Yes, I do. General Stafford told us that the eventual cost of the new avionics would be \$14 billion. I have taken 50 percent of that and added to it and made it close to \$20 billion.

Mr. ICHORD. That is not my question. Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Because every figure that the Air Force comes up with, you can figure it is going to be 50 percent higher than what they tell you.

Mr. ICHORD. That is not my question. I did not bring this all about. This will have to be for the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. CARR), and those who are in opposition to the B-1 to explain.

My question to the gentleman from California is, how much avionics is the gentleman knocking out for the B-52-G and how much for the B-52-H? I did not hear it.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Three hundred forty-two million dollars is the amount of money that would be used.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. ICHORD) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. ICHORD was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. ICHORD. How much is for the B-52-H and how much for the B-52-G?

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. I do not know how much is involved in the G and how much for the H.

Mr. ICHORD. That is my point, and for that reason, I must adamantly oppose the amendment.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. But it is all money, though, that we should not commit ourselves to at this time, because we are going to be getting into a program that is so expensive for something that is not worth anything.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, let me state to the gentleman from California and the other Members, this is one of the places where the Congress is just as responsible as DOD and as OMB. We have got to make a decision. We made a decision on the B-1. I was opposed to our action of canceling the B-1 but we have got to go along with the B-52-G or H, like it or not. We have got to have something. We cannot continue to disarm this country and watch the capability of our potential adversaries increasing and ours going down.

Mr. Chairman, I ask that the amendment be defeated.

Mr. HILLIS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I feel compelled to rise in very strong opposition to this amendment for a number of reasons. I find myself very much in agreement with the

final conclusion of my colleague, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. ICHORD) who just preceded me in the well.

A week ago last Tuesday I had the opportunity to visit the Boeing Co. at Wichita and spend a full day viewing various activities that are taking place there, one of which is the modification for the B-52.

Now, certainly none of us wants to spend another dollar in the defense of our country that is not necessary; but the B-52's, you see, have been chosen as the prime intermediate candidate to carry the cruise missile, that is the B-52-G. There are going to be 173 of them outfitted as cruise missile carriers. They have to begin to be prepared to operate in an environment of increasing hostility, hostility of electronics. The border of the air space which they must penetrate to get to the point to release their cruise missiles is going to become more and more under hostile radar surveillance.

□ 1420

The thing we are considering here is a program to permit them to function in these intermediate years with B-52C's, 153 of them, as cruise missile carriers. There is no sense in building the pylons and modifying the bomb bays in the B-52 carrying cruise missiles on an airplane that cannot get any place. That is what we are talking about.

The genesis of this modification equipment is this: This equipment was developed by Boeing as part of the B-1 program. We are able to take advantage of the B-1 technology and update the 25-year-old technology—and that is what the B-52's have in their electronics, their navigation, and so forth—and it is going to have to be replaced. This definitely is necessary for the G's.

The 96 B-52H's are still considered to be penetrating bombers, and they absolutely have to have this equipment.

The language on page 4 of the bill, section 103, clearly denotes that if we go forward with this part of the program this year, with the \$431 million, the Secretary of Defense is to provide a report back to us concerning the effectiveness of the B-52 as a cruise missile carrier, not only today but over the next decade, and also with the options that are available over the next decade to maintain its capacity as a penetrating bomber.

If we do not do this thing and take this action today, I think—and my colleague, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. ICHORD), had it right—it is an action of unilateral disarmament. It is an act of sending our people out from SAC—and they are well trained, first-class pilots, probably the best trained aviators in the world today—in obsolete aircraft. That is the choice that is presented here.

So, Mr. Chairman, I do oppose the amendment.

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HILLIS. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I associate myself with the gentleman from Indiana's remarks.

I was out in the Boeing plant at Wichita when my friend from Indiana came to Kansas. I think the gentleman is absolutely correct on this subject, and I urge my colleagues to oppose the unwise amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON).

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HILLIS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Mr. Chairman, is the gentleman aware that General Ellis, the SAC commander, is opposed to any more modification of the B-52?

Mr. HILLIS. Mr. Chairman, I have not talked to General Ellis on this matter, but from the letter I saw here at the counsel's desk, I did not interpret it that way. I did not understand that he was opposed.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. He testified that way before the Senate on the SALT hearings, and he is also on record as being opposed to it.

Mr. HILLIS. Mr. Chairman, let me say to my colleague that my purpose here is to point out that the B-52 is the only thing we have, and until we have something better—and that is not going to come along for 10 years—I think it is highly inappropriate to rely on technology that is some 20 years old when we can take advantage of the B-1 technology and the modern electronic defenses which are now available to us.

For that reason, Mr. Chairman, I have to oppose this amendment.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I join the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. HILLIS) and the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. ICHORD) in opposition to this amendment.

The one thing to remember is that the B-52 is the only bomber we have, and there is not anything on the horizon for the next 10 years. In the meantime we have to keep the B-52 as effective as we possibly can.

I do not know of any other way to do that than to go along with the modification program that would be approved if we adopt the language in the bill and provide the amount of money in the bill for it.

Mr. Chairman, I urge the Committee to reject the amendment.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, just very briefly, let me state that I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. HILLIS), because I think he stated it very succinctly, and with the remarks of the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. ICHORD).

I have been to the Boeing plant and talked to the program manager. This was before the cancellation of the B-1, as a matter of fact. He was very proud

of the B-52 at the time, and he told me they would be flying—and Boeing has said this—in the year 2000, with or without the B-1.

The B-1 is gone now. The B-1 has gone and the reason it is gone we are told, is that we are going to shift our emphasis and we are going to a cruise missile.

But what are we going to use for a cruise missile carrier? We have to decide what will be the platform that will carry the cruise missile. We do not know. There is money in here to develop a platform or to provide a study and a test and R. & D. to come up with the best solution for a cruise missile carrier. But in the meantime the only thing that we have that is viable and that will pose any threat at all and that can actually do the job is the B-52.

With the ever increasing sophistication in the electronic warfare field, it is necessary to equip whatever plane will carry the cruise missile or any conventional weapon for that matter, with the ability of getting closer to the launch point. That launch point, because of the electronic environment, is growing further and further away from the enemy lines.

We must have the capability, whether there is going to be an actual penetration or whether they are just going to be able to get closer to the launch point, to counter the electronic threat we see in the immediate future.

Besides that, this money not only provides for the penetration capability but it has to do with conventional weaponry, with bombing aids, with navigation and other things that will be needed even if we were not going to use cruise missiles.

So what is the alternative if we do not equip and upgrade the B-52? Do we use a Piper Cub? The only thing that could possibly be considered as an alternative would be the F-111, which has a much, much shorter range. The only way we are going to lengthen its range would be to build a stretch version. But in this we are getting into a multibillion-dollar item. A whole new development program.

So this is an interim step. It is a necessary step. We want to go into it in some detail in our Subcommittee on Research and Development. We see no alternative that would be preferable to this, since we have been denied what we thought would be the most effective aircraft, the B-1.

So, Mr. Chairman, I earnestly and very seriously urge the House to vote down this amendment and keep this money in here for the upgrading of the B-52's.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to get the attention of the Members who have already spoken out on this amendment and get into a little bit of colloquy, because I am a little puzzled about the amendment and am still undecided as to how to vote.

There are three questions that I have. First of all, what are we striking out with this \$342 million?

Second, if we do this, are we strengthening or weakening the case for the Air Force to come back at another time and

want money for the resurrected B-1 or another penetrating bomber?

Third, do we need some penetration capability for a cruise missile carrier?

Let me start with the first question, if I may. The gentleman's amendment knocks out \$342.2 million, as I understand it. In the little sheet here, the fact sheet or the handout from the Committee on Armed Services, it tells us what the \$342 million is for, but the last sentence is this: "and to integrate electronically the ALCM capability on the B-52-G's."

I would have thought that was not what we wanted to be knocking out money for. There are two parts to this. The money in this part of the bill is: First, to improve penetration; and second, to make the B-52 into a cruise missile carrier. Apparently some of the money being taken out, some of the \$342 million, is to go to this second purpose, to integrate electronically the ALCM capability on the B-52-G's.

I thought that we would not want to knock that out if we were interested in the cruise missile carrier.

Mr. Chairman, can either the author of the amendment or the gentleman from Michigan respond?

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding there has to be no improvement in the B-52 avionics system in order to carry the cruise missile. The cruise missile has its own guidance system. It does not rely upon anything that is in the B-52 to take it to whatever its mission is.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I would very strongly disagree with the gentleman from California (Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON). I think the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN) will similarly agree that we have to have defense suppression avionics aboard a B-52 carrying cruise missiles. This is the reason why we need avionics modifications to the B-52-G, which will be the cruise-missile carrier, as the gentleman from Wisconsin points out.

□ 1430

Mr. CARR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. CARR. Mr. Chairman, this was a point of some confusion prior to the offering of the amendment. Certainly money for the integration in any way of cruise missiles to the B-52 ought to remain in the bill.

In my colloquy with the gentleman from California, to enhance my understanding of his amendment, I thought I got an affirmative answer on that point. If perhaps the amendment as drawn did not do in fact what the gentleman intended, we ought to nail that down. But my position on the issue is that all

modifications in whatever way related to cruise missiles, as distinguished from penetration, ought to be financed.

Mr. ASPIN. Is that the understanding of the gentleman from California?

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. That is the understanding I have, that money included in the \$342 million does not involve anything involved in the integration.

My staff has been working directly with the staff of the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. ICHORD) in trying to develop the facts on this matter, and we are depending on the expertise of the same people who are advising the committee on this.

I know there is some committee opposition, some staff opposition in some areas to it, but I absolutely have no intention of striking anything that would be involved in the integration of the B-52 as a cruise missile carrier.

Mr. ASPIN. I think that answers the question. That is the intent of the author of the amendment.

Let me raise the second question, if I may, and again engage in a colloquy with the same three Members. That is this question about whether, if we knock out capability of the penetration of the B-52, does that resurrect the possibility that the Air Force will come in later either for money to resurrect the B-1 or some other penetration bomber?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. ASPIN was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. CARR. If the gentleman will yield, my view is that, to some extent, it is a salvage operation on the part of B-1 proponents, and I would congratulate the gentleman from California, because it certainly is not he who is crying over spilled milk in this matter. What it is, however, is that an airplane can be defined in many ways. There is the airframe and there is the avionics. As the gentleman from California said, the effort here is to try to put the B-1 avionics into the B-52 airframe.

We have made a decision, the President has made a decision and this House has supported it, that we are not going the penetration route. That is no longer our strategy and, therefore, any deployment of penetration capability is a waste of money.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, I will just add to that that this is a decision that was made by the administration. The Air Force supported them in their decision to drop the B-1 and to go with the cruise missile.

Mr. ASPIN. Is it the intention of the gentleman from California to push for the resurrection of a penetrating bomber sometime in the future?

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. No. It is my understanding that the B-1 will be a candidate for the cruise missile carrier when we determine who all will be the candidates for it. I would hope that the B-1 would have a good

chance of becoming the carrier for that. I will certainly be honest about that. I think it would be the finest one that we could have. I cannot predict what I will do in the future at this time, but I am certainly not involved in anything to try to put together again a penetrating bomber.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, let me say to the gentleman from Wisconsin, first of all, that the gentleman from California, in regard to the B-52-G, stated he had been working with the staff of the Subcommittee on Research and Development, and that certainly is true. But I think there has been some misunderstanding. The staff has just reaffirmed to me that of this \$342.2 million, part of it is for the purpose of integrating electronically the ALCM capability on the B-52-G. That was my great concern. I do not know how much is for the H and how much is for the G. The money for the H is to improve the penetrating capability of the B-52. I think it logically follows—and possibly the gentleman from Michigan, not being a member of the Subcommittee on Research and Development, as is the gentleman from Wisconsin—the gentleman from Wisconsin will remember that we deleted \$5 million for a new manned penetrating bomber.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN) has again expired.

(On request of Mr. ICHORD and by unanimous consent, Mr. ASPIN was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, if you delete this money to improve the penetrating capability of the B-52-H, then I think you are automatically driven toward the development of a new penetrating bomber, and I will candidly state to the gentleman from Wisconsin that I still think we need the penetrating bomber.

What we are trying to do is play general on the floor of the House, and this is no time to play general, I will say to the gentleman.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, may I say that I have honestly tried to present this program in a way that would do what I hoped to do with it. Apparently there is an honest difference of opinion and confusion over these figures. I would hope that the committee will keep a close observation on the development of the B-52 modification program. I know they will do that anyway, without my asking for their assurance.

Mr. Chairman, because of this confusion that has come up, I ask unanimous consent that my amendment be withdrawn.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Are there further amendments to title I? If not, the Clerk will read title II.

The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

SEC. 201. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1980 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for research, development, test, and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

For the Army \$2,757,322,000, of which \$3,000,000 is authorized only for the performance and completion of a feasibility demonstration of launching Heliborne Missiles (HELLFIRE), from UH-60 helicopters.

For the Navy (including the Marine Corps), \$4,569,544,000, of which (1) \$180,000,000 is authorized only for the full-scale engineering development of the Marine Corps Harrier AV-8B aircraft, (2) \$100,000,000 is authorized only for the continued research, development, test, and evaluation of the 3,000-ton prototype Surface Effect Ship (SES), (3) \$32,000,000 is authorized only for the pilot production, shipboard installation, test, and evaluation of the MK-71 Major Caliber Lightweight Gun, (4) \$30,844,000 is authorized only for joint Navy/Air Force full-scale engineering development of the Air-to-Ground Standoff Missile system which is to be available for production on or before December 31, 1984, and (5) \$13,197,000 is authorized only for joint Navy/Air Force development of a common electronic self-protection system for integration into, but not limited to, the Navy F-18 and Air Force F-16 aircraft.

For the Air Force, \$4,940,265,000, of which (1) \$670,000,000 is authorized only for the concurrent full-scale engineering development of the missile basing mode known as the Multiple Protective Structures (MPS) system and the MX missile, as provided in section 202 of this Act, and (2) \$30,000,000 is authorized only for the research, development, test, and evaluation required for competitive flight demonstration of the Strategic Weapons Launcher and the Advanced Medium STOL Transport (AMST) aircraft in order to establish the utility of these aircraft as cruise missile carriers.

For the Defense Agencies, \$1,106,618,000, of which \$42,500,000 is authorized for the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.

BASING MODE FOR THE MX MISSILE

SEC. 202. (a) It is the sense of the Congress that maintaining a survivable land-based intercontinental ballistic missile system is vital to the security of the United States and that development of a new basing mode for land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles is necessary to assure the survivability of the land-based system. To this end, the development of the MX missile, together with a new basing mode for such missile, should proceed so as to achieve Initial Operational Capability for both such missile and such basing mode at the earliest practicable date.

(b) In accordance with the sense of Congress expressed in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall proceed immediately with full-scale engineering development of the missile basing mode known as the Multiple Protective Structures (MPS) system concurrently with full-scale engineering development of the MX missile, unless and until the Secretary of Defense certifies to the Congress that an alternative basing mode is militarily or technologically superior to, and is more cost effective than, the MPS system or the President informs the Congress that in his view the MPS system is not consistent with United States national security interests.

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit or restrict the study of alternative basing modes for land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.

(d) The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Congress in writing, not later than

March 1, 1980, a report evaluating in detail the ability of the Multiple Protective Structures (MPS) system to survive foreseeable attempts by the Soviet Union to neutralize such system.

Mr. PRICE (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title II be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. ICHORD

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. ICHORD: Page 8 line 10 of section 201, delete the following: "(2) \$30,000,000 is authorized only for the research, development, test, and evaluation required for competitive flight demonstration of the Strategic Weapons Launcher and the Advanced Medium STOL Transport (AMST) aircraft in order to establish the utility of these aircraft as cruise missile carriers." and insert in lieu thereof the following:

"(2) \$30,000,000 is authorized only for the research, development, test, and evaluation required for competitive hardware demonstration of the Strategic Weapons Launcher and a derivative of a military and/or commercial medium or intermediate-sized aircraft in order to establish the utility of these aircraft as cruise missile carriers not later than September 30, 1981.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, the amendment I offer modifies the cruise missile carrier language proposed by the Armed Services Committee by substituting commercial and/or military medium or intermediate-sized aircraft as opposed to only the advanced medium STOL aircraft to compete against the strategic weapons launcher in order to establish the feasibility of these aircraft as cruise missile carriers.

At the time the language was proposed by the committee, the Department of Defense had not yet completed its analytical studies concerning the relative cost and performance effectiveness of various aircraft including the strategic weapons launcher, the AMST and commercially available aircraft such as the Boeing 707, the Lockheed L-1011, among others. The preliminary findings of these studies are that the strategic weapons launcher and medium-sized derivative of a military and/or commercially available aircraft are the most likely candidates to meet our cruise missile carrier requirements.

The subject of cruise missile carrier aircraft has been under study by the Department of Defense for over 2 years. One purpose of this amendment is to bring these costly analytical studies to a close and initiate a competitive hardware demonstration program to be completed by September 30, 1981.

The amendment requires that at least \$30 million be made available for this competition.

Mr. CARR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ICHORD. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan, who I know does have a great interest in this subject.

□ 1440

Mr. CARR. I thank the gentleman from Missouri for yielding.

At the risk of attaching myself to his amendment and causing the same fate that it did when I attached myself to the amendment of the gentleman from California (Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON), I would like to let the House know that this is in essence the very amendment that I attempted to pass in the committee, and it was narrowly defeated. I am in complete agreement with the gentleman from Missouri, and I congratulate him for his amendment and urge its adoption.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ICHORD. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Just to make sure I understand it and all the Members understand it, as the bill was written and came out of committee, it limited the number of the types of aircraft that would be tested for a carrier. The gentleman's amendment simply broadens the number of planes by allowing commercial planes to be added to that number, and this is done at the request of the Air Force; is that correct?

Mr. ICHORD. The gentleman is correct. The competitive demonstration in the amendment originally drawn by the committee was limited to a competitive demonstration between the SWL and the AMST.

This will broaden it to admit commercial planes.

Mr. DICKINSON. To allow it to go to or at least include any commercial plane also, and it does not mandate any particular plane?

Mr. ICHORD. That is right. The Air Force will have to choose a candidate to compete against the SWL.

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ICHORD. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. BOB WILSON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I have polled the Members on our side. We have no opposition to the gentleman's amendment.

Mr. ICHORD. I thank the gentleman from California.

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

I just want to commend the gentleman, who is the chairman of the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Committee on Armed Services, for the fine work he has done, and I would like to point out to this body that he has in his leadership saved literally hundreds of millions of dollars in the area of research and development.

I would like to point out, in doing this, he has done it in such a way as to in no way debilitate our defense standing.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. ICHORD).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. PRICE

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. PRICE: Page 8, line 10, strike out "this Act" and insert in lieu thereof "the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriation Authorization Act, 1979 (Public Law 96-29)".

Page 8, strike out line 20 and all that follows down through line 24 on page 9 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

REPORT ON NEW BASING MODE FOR INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES

Sec. 202. The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Congress in writing, not later than March 1, 1980, a report evaluating in detail the ability of the basing mode for land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles known as the Multiple Protective Structure (MPS) system to survive foreseeable attempts by the Soviet Union to neutralize such system.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, this merely takes out unnecessary language as the language is already in the Department of Defense fiscal year 1979 Supplemental Appropriation Authorization Act, which has been signed into law. The supplemental was signed subsequent to reporting of the bill.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. ICHORD. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I do think that perhaps a record should be made on this. The committee in the supplemental bill mandated that the Air Force proceed simultaneously with the advanced engineering of the MX missile system and also the MX basing system. This language was written by the Subcommittee on Research and Development, and was approved overwhelmingly by this House.

I know the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS) endeavored to take the language out at that time.

I think that language is still good, and especially in view of the decision made by the President, except there was some reporting language that is definitely surplus, but I would like to ask the gentleman from Illinois, just to make a record—I see the gentlewoman from Colorado (Mrs. SCHROEDER) who may be rising for the same purpose, but the gentlewoman from Colorado did offer an amendment in committee, which would require the Secretary of Defense to report upon the status and effectiveness of the MX system. Is the gentleman retaining that?

Mr. PRICE. Anticipating what the gentleman said, we leave in the language of the gentlewoman from Colorado, and the language that was in the gentlewoman's recommendation.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE. I yield to the gentlewoman from Colorado.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I thank both the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE) and the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. ICHORD), and if the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. ICHORD) will yield, and if I may ask another question of the chair-

man, does that mean, too—I want to make it perfectly clear that the language that is in there, since we did not mention the racetracks, that it would really include the racetracks as the basing mode, because I think we want to make that clear legislatively that those would be incorporated.

Mr. PRICE. It does.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. DELLUMS

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. DELLUMS: Page 8, line 5, strike out "\$4,940,265,000" and all that follows through "and (2)" on line 10 and insert in lieu thereof "\$4,270,265,000, of which".

Page 8, strike line 20 and all that follows down through line 24 on page 9.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, the MX is a \$30 to \$40 billion waste of the taxpayer's money. We are being asked today to put down a \$670 million partial payment on a system that is expensive, unnecessary, and dangerous. A weapon that we do not need, that will stimulate the arms race and will reduce the chances for arms control. Thirty to forty billion dollars to disrupt our environment in peacetime and to increase the destructiveness of a nuclear war. And why? Why the MX?

Is it because the Pentagon wants a first strike weapon? We know the military has sought a hard silo killer for two decades. Air Force planners have wanted to make it credible that under some circumstances the United States would initiate a strategic exchange.

Why the MX? Is it part of a domestic SALT bargain? There is a feeling by many that the President feels that SALT II is only obtainable by ransoming it with the MX.

Why the MX? Is it a question of perception? Many say, "the Soviets are building," so we must build also.

I believe the real reason for the MX lies somewhere in these questions, and these cannot justify this multibillion expenditure.

But the defenders say that we need the MX because the Minuteman III is vulnerable. Two questions come to mind: First, is the Minuteman vulnerable; and second, if the Minuteman should be replaced, is the MX the only or the best answer?

Let us look at vulnerability, any vulnerability is theoretical. The Soviets must be as uncertain, as we are, as to whether in fact strategic weapons will be as accurate, as reliable and as technically capable in actual use as they appear on paper. Even if the systems worked as predicted, the Soviets face great risks. We may attack on warning. We may launch an all out retaliation.

Even if the Minuteman III's were all destroyed, we would retain upwards of 7,000 strategic nuclear weapons. These weapons are capable of a wide range of

responses. There are enough weapons to destroy the Soviet Union as a modern industrial society.

There are alternatives to the MX. The MX, as advocated by the Air Force, would not cure the "Minuteman vulnerability problem" for many years to come. Given the hypothetical nature of the problem and the unlikelihood of the Soviets gambling all on "one cosmic throw of the dice," it might well be asked whether the "problem" really requires a "solution."

One alternative to the MX would be simply to leave our ICBM's as they are. In the unlikely event of a limited tit-for-tat nuclear war, they would still be available for accuracy and precise command and control. In the event that the majority of them were destroyed in a large nuclear attack, the United States would retain thousands of retaliatory weapons in submarines and on aircraft. In fact, even with the MX, in the coming years nuclear weapons on ICBM's will constitute a declining percentage of U.S. nuclear forces.

If we really fear a Soviet gamble on an attack on our ICBM's alone, then another alternative is to remove the ICBM's altogether, thus eliminating the "counterforce" limited nuclear war option from Soviet capabilities.

Another choice would be to leave only about 200 or so Minutemen III missiles in place. Those who believe in the possibility of limited tit-for-tat nuclear war would still have ICBM's available for that purpose. At the same time, the missile force would be too small to tempt a Soviet "counterforce only" strike.

On the other hand, if it is decided that the United States must have a guaranteed survivable ICBM, other possibilities have been suggested. For example, we could deploy a missile in numbers large enough to match present Minuteman capabilities but still small enough not to threaten the Soviet ICBM force and thereby escalate the arms race. In order to insure survivability and to allow the number deployed to be easily monitored by the Soviet Union, this missile could be placed on small, cheap submarines based in the waters of the U.S. Continental Shelves.

We must remember, the MX will do more than just replace the Minuteman. It will be a vastly different weapon with dangerous implications. The MX is a new and dangerous weapon. Before the emergence of the purported need to compensate for Minuteman vulnerability, the Air Force already wanted a new "Missile X"—a silo killer. The MX is not being designed to duplicate strikes against all the civilian and military targets we can now hit. It does not make sense to use it against empty silos. Therefore it is a first strike weapon.

With 10 Mark 12A warheads, with an accuracy of 50 percent better than the Minuteman missile, the MX would be primarily a Soviet missile silo killer. Such a missile is intended to serve strategies of fighting and winning nuclear war. (The current Air Force definition of victory in nuclear war is that our country

takes fewer years to recover its economic capacity than the other side.) Two thousand or more 350-kiloton nuclear warheads with accuracies approaching 300 feet would pose a significant threat to the Soviet ICBM force. Air Force planners want to make it credible that the United States would under some circumstances initiate a strategic nuclear exchange.

A second purpose of the MX would be to destroy Soviet missiles remaining in silos after a Soviet first strike. The supposed need to do this is based on bizarre scenarios of limited nuclear war which even the Secretary of Defense finds implausible. The reason Secretary Brown hesitates to endorse a large scale ICBM-launched silo attacking capability is as follows:

As the growing Soviet threat to our ICBM force indicates, this kind of targeting by forcing the other side to respond with redesigned capabilities is bound to affect long-term stability in what could be (but need not be) a negative way.

Let us try to translate that into English. While about 20 percent of U.S. strategic nuclear warheads are on ICBM's, about 70 percent of the Soviet warheads are on ICBM's and their other forces are on lower day-to-day alert status. If some in the United States feel a need to do something about Minuteman vulnerability, what do we suppose the Soviets will do about the emergence of a major threat to the largest part of their nuclear forces? They will certainly take countervailing measures.

First, they may institute a launch-on-warning policy. According to those who worry about Minuteman vulnerability, this is a destabilizing and dangerous policy. Next, the Soviets will probably move to a land-mobile ICBM system. When they do so, we will most likely no longer have confidence in our ability to count Soviet missile launchers. There will be great pressures in the United States to react to worst case estimates of Soviet missile numbers by building more missiles of our own.

Even if mobile missile deployments remained within SALT II limits, both sides would fear the possibility of a rapid "breakout" of many additional missiles.

Let us go so far as to suppose that instead of going to land-mobile missiles the Soviets were to take the more stabilizing course of sending their nuclear deterrent to sea. Whatever steps the Soviets take to make their ICBM's mobile, they remove the major set of targets of the MX. The MX will force some reaction from the Soviets. When they react—and they will have 6 to 11 years in which to do so—the whole point of the MX will have been obviated. As soon as the MX is on line, the Soviets will be able to nullify its major military function. Thirty or forty million dollars will have been spent on a weapon without a mission.

There are serious questions regarding the environmental soundness of the proposed "racetrack" basing mode.

The MX is expensive, unnecessary and dangerous. I urge you to support the amendment.

□ 1500

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

(On request of Mr. WEISS and by unanimous consent, Mr. DELLUMS was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to my colleague.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, I want to pay my highest commendation to the gentleman in the well for the very eloquent and learned note of sanity that he has lent to these proceedings. We have been listening for the last couple of days in this Chamber, and for the better part of a year, to a national debate which seems to have totally overlooked the very purpose and very intent of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

The gentleman focuses clearly on the fact that what we really are debating, or should be debating is the survival of humanity. We seem to be adopting Orwell's "newspeak" when in the guise of arms limitations, we engage in this massive arms acceleration race. As a Congress, as elected representatives of the most powerful Nation in the world, we seem to have forgotten that our prime obligation is to make sure that the world and its people survive.

I want to extend my appreciation to the gentleman for bringing us back to face this very real crisis of humanity's survival.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank my colleague for his kind and generous remarks.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I will not take 15 minutes or 16 minutes, as did the gentleman from California, in opposition to his views. I do agree with the gentleman from California that this matter should be debated. I would point out to the Members of the House that I doubt if there is much more that we can say on this issue that was not said in the RECORD of May 31, 1979, when the gentleman from California made substantially the same remarks as he made today, and I perhaps will make almost identical remarks today.

But, I would like to take just a little different approach. May I say to the Members of the House that the gentleman from California usually differs with me on defense matters, but I think the gentleman from California plays a very valuable part, makes an important contribution, to the subcommittee that he serves on, the Research and Development Subcommittee, because we can always count on the gentleman from California to give the antidefense argument. As a Member who has been serving in a parliamentary body for now 27 years, I recognize the desirability of having that argument on the other side. There are always two sides, as all of us, I am sure, recognize—there are two sides to every question.

But, I wish that I could afford the luxury that the gentleman from California

affords himself. As I understand the logic, the reasoning of the gentleman from California, it goes like this, and I think this is where he differs from the overwhelming majority of the Members of this House: He thinks about the horrors, the devastating effects, of a nuclear war, and I agree with the gentleman that it would be a horrible event not only for western civilization, but for all civilization. Then, he states that no one but an insane man would ever engage in a nuclear war, and then assumes that our potential adversaries are reasonable people—they are not insane, anyway. They may be tough, but they are not going to start a nuclear war.

I wish that I had the clairvoyance of the gentleman from California, or the clairvoyance which I think that he has, because I would prefer, as the gentleman from California, not to spend a dime for defense. I think we could spend it for a lot better purposes, but the gentleman, I submit, does not have the clairvoyance to say that we are not going to have a nuclear war.

I will agree with the gentleman from California, I do not think we are going to have a nuclear war. I do not know what the scenario will be. I do not have the clairvoyance to say how it is going to come about. I see perhaps another Kennedy-Khrushchev confrontation somewhere in the future. I see a greater possibility of a conventional war rather than any nuclear war.

□ 1510

The President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, does not have the reputation for frivolously spending money on defense, and he has made the decision to proceed with the MX missile—and an MPS basing system. I think what we really are facing, I would state to the gentleman from California is—and I think this is where he differs from the overwhelming majority of the Members of this body, and perhaps the gentleman from Michigan—if we do not watch it, we are going to get the President of the United States into a position where he is going to have to surrender vital American interests or risk a nuclear holocaust. No President should ever be placed in that position. We must retain our nuclear deterrence capability.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. ICHORD was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. ICHORD. This is the real issue, I would submit to the gentleman from California. I hope and I pray that there will not be such a thing as a nuclear war, but if I am going to err—I would prefer not to spend a dime for defense, but if I am going to err—I want to err on the side of defense. This is what we are doing. Our policy is to deter a nuclear war.

Let me state to the gentleman from California that the experts in this field tell us—the more pessimistic tell us—that the ICBM leg of our Triad will be vulnerable in 1 or 2 years. That is the more pessimistic view. The more opti-

mistic view of the experts is 3 or 4 years. And the real pessimistic view states that our ICBM leg is already vulnerable. Regardless of which one of those views is correct, we cannot let ourselves get in the position of having our ICBM leg vulnerable. This is why the gentleman's President and my President made this decision, and I would state that it is right in line with the position that the overwhelming majority of the R. & D. Committee has been holding now for several months. We mandated in the Supplemental Bill that they proceed simultaneously with the advanced engineering of the MX missile and the MX basing system. I think we cannot continue to argue these things forever. We must proceed in a way that will deter nuclear war. I have respect for the gentleman's views, and I think that he has respect for my views. But we have got to make a decision one way or the other. I know the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS) knows that he does not have the clairvoyance to see what is going to happen out there in the future.

Mr. DELLUMS. If the gentleman will yield further, I appreciate his remarks, and I have tried to listen very carefully. I would only make two responses: No. 1, as to the question of ICBM vulnerability, my response is, (a) that is highly theoretical, and, (b), even if it is real, there are other options that are available to us that are less expensive and less dangerous than building an MX missile.

The second point I would like to make is simply that if we are suggesting that the role of strategic nuclear weapons in our lives is for deterrence, I am saying to the Members that our deterrence is not threatened at this moment. The Soviets have over 4,000 weapons. We have over 9,000 strategic weapons. Five thousand of those weapons are on sea-based submarines with such highly sophisticated technology that the Soviets do not even know where they are.

Mr. ICHORD. I decline to yield further at this point. I will yield later on to the gentleman if he wants me to. I refuse to accept the view that all of these are, as the gentleman says, theoretical. I think it is very practical. The Members of the Senate opposed to the SALT treaty are not holding SALT, hostage for an MX missile system. It is because of the imbalance in the SALT treaty that they demand the MX system to protect this country and to maintain a credible nuclear deterrence.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. ICHORD was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. ICHORD. That is the reason why we are asking that the MX system be built if SALT is ratified. Let us deal in theory. The gentleman talks about theory. What would the gentleman do if he were president of the United States and he were confronted by a potential adversary in a position where if a nuclear war would result he would lose over 100 million Americans and the enemy would lose 10 million? Would he hold tight to

vital American interests; or would be back down under that situation? He is the President of the United States. I do not want to put the President of the United States in that position. What would the gentleman do?

Mr. DELLUMS. If the gentleman will yield, I think the question is highly theoretical.

Mr. ICHORD. I do not think it is highly theoretical. The experts tell me, and I concur, that if we do not take steps to protect our ICBM leg, the Soviet Union in the mid-1980 timeframe because of tremendous throw weight capability, could with a first strike destroy our accurate ICBM and have enough missiles remaining to deter us from retaliating. That is, if we did retaliate, the Soviets would probably lose 10 million people while we lost over 100 million. The gentleman has been giving a lot of theoretical arguments on the floor of this House, and we have heard them time and time and time again. Why does he not answer that question? Does he want his President in that position?

Mr. DELLUMS. If the gentleman will yield, I do not think that is the issue here. What I am suggesting to the gentleman is that the reason why I said that the ICBM vulnerability is highly theoretical is because, I believe, first of all, we have got to deal with this question. The whole notion of deterrence—mutual destruction or deterrence—is based upon the notion that you are sane enough and rational enough to see the strength that I have and, likewise, on my side I see the same. What I am suggesting is that what we are doing when we engage in these arguments is to preclude the notion of rationality. I am saying that the whole notion of deterrence in a nuclear war is based upon rationality and intelligence on both sides.

Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SEIBERLING. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I would simply like to conclude my point. I am saying that if one stops and thinks for a moment, the whole basis of the concept of nuclear deterrence is based on some rational notion that both sides are capable of understanding the repercussions of each other's acts. It would seem to me that when you come to the floor to argue in support of increasing nuclear weapons, we all know our new generation of weapons, and then the argument is, the other side is irrational, when the whole notion of deterrence is based on rationality. If we are living in a world where there are no rational roles, then none of these weapons we can develop will keep us from devastating ourselves. That is why, while I am saying on paper we might figure out some vulnerability of the Minuteman, there is a way of dealing with it, but that does not mean the Soviets are mad enough to say on paper the ICBM's are vulnerable. Therefore, push the button and release the weapons. I do not think they are that mad, and I do not think we are that mad. What I am suggesting

is that the whole notion of nuclear weapons needs to be discussed by the American people. What is the role? If it goes beyond the question of deterrence, we are marking the devastation of mankind. I am saying (a) our deterrence is not threatened; and (b) the whole basis of deterrence is based on rationality on both sides. If we preclude rationality, then we are just harming ourselves.

Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman for his contribution and for raising this issue, which is absolutely the gut issue in terms of competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. President Carter apparently has made the decision to go ahead with the MX and the basing point mode for it, on the basis of advice of experts. Of course, the experts have been wrong before.

I believe it was Clemenceau who said, "War is much too important a matter to be entrusted to the generals." And that is true of other kinds of experts, including strategic military experts. The job of the Congress is to subject the experts views to the collective wisdom of this whole body and ultimately to the wisdom of the American people. The experts recommended the ABM, and we finally saw that was an egregious and dangerous waste of money and scrapped it after spending a billion or two dollars.

□ 1520

The experts recommended the B-1 bomber. After spending about \$2.8 billion we scrapped that one. They now recommend another costly "Rube Goldberg" contraption which will actually endanger us by creating a hair-trigger situation in the arms race.

Mr. Chairman, just consider one little aspect of it: It will require building 6,000 miles of roads just for these 200 "race tracks" they propose to create for the MX. That is one-sixth the mileage of the entire interstate highway system, which we have spent 20 years building.

Mr. Chairman, the argument for the MX has been focused on the increasing vulnerability of land-based ICBM's to a first strike by the prospective new generation of super accurate Soviet missiles. However, the solution to the vulnerability problem does not appear to require the deployment of a new ICBM but simply the redeployment of existing ICBM's in a less vulnerable mode. Conversely, without such an invulnerable basing mode the new MX missile will be just as vulnerable as the existing Minuteman. In other words, Minuteman vulnerability is not a logically valid justification for the deployment of MX.

Mr. Chairman, it also seems clear that the proposed basing mode for the MX will not eliminate the ability of the Soviets to knock out the 200 MX missiles which would be deployed, even though each MX missile will be covertly shifted among 23 separate launching points. Once the Soviets develop missiles of sufficient accuracy to inactivate one of our missiles at any particular launching point—and that is a fear that gives rise to the argument for the MX—then they could achieve the destruction of practically all of the 200 MX missiles by di-

recting one of their warheads to each of the 4600 potential MX launching points. While this may stretch out the invulnerable period a little longer until the Soviets produce a sufficient number of highly accurate warheads, and while it would mean the Soviets would have to waste over 4,000 warheads, they could still do the job and have 5,600 warheads left over, assuming the SALT II ceiling of 10,000 warheads is applicable. Of course, if there is no SALT ceiling then they can make any number of warheads they want.

In any event, Mr. Chairman, 5,600 warheads is quite a sufficient number to destroy all of our other land-based ICBM's and to wipe out all of our urban population centers several times over.

Mr. Chairman, a second argument that has been advanced to justify the MX is that if the Russians are going ahead with their deployment of first-strike capability then we must do it, too, in order to maintain equivalence. This may have some superficial political appeal but I think it will eventually become apparent to most Americans that our acquiring first-strike capability is a colossal waste and, in fact, it will make us less secure.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. SEIBERLING was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Chairman, the Soviets are obviously not going to take the risk of launching a first strike against U.S. land-based ICBM's so long as our submarine launched missiles remain invulnerable and can destroy all of Russia's major population centers and military bases. Therefore, I see no strategic justification for us to create a hair-trigger balance of nuclear terror by deploying our own array of missiles capable of taking out Soviet ICBM's in their launching silos. Any idea that we or the Soviets could launch a nuclear attack on the other side's missile silos without triggering a full-scale nuclear war is a dangerous delusion.

Now, in a larger sense one of the reasons we find ourselves in this predicament is the failure of the SALT process thus far to produce an agreement freezing the continued technological drive by both United States and Soviet military establishments toward ever more sophisticated strategic weaponry. It is undoubtedly too late to do anything about this as part of SALT II. However, it may not be too late to offer to freeze deployment of MX if the Soviets will agree to halt deployment of their new generation of strategic missiles and will agree to include a permanent freeze as one of the subjects for negotiation in SALT III.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to call attention to an article I placed in the RECORD of September 10, 1979, page 23830. The article was by Richard Barnet, formerly with the Arms Control Agency. He is a well-recognized expert in foreign affairs and arms control. He points out that a rough balance of nuclear forces now exists which, according to the administration, still favors the United States, but that the next round of the

strategic arms race can only work to the economic and strategic disadvantage of this country and create new perils for the entire world.

As he says, it hardly makes sense to destroy old weapons systems while replacing them with even more dangerous systems.

Senator MARK HATFIELD has proposed a moratorium, along the lines I have mentioned, as an amendment to the SALT treaty.

The Soviet Union has made several proposals in the past few years for a ban on all new weapons systems. This has usually been dismissed as propaganda. But, as Mr. Barnet points out, we have never put them to the test. It is time, as he says, to stop guessing about Soviet intentions and put forward agreements which require them to choose between the road to peace or further preparation for war.

Mr. Chairman, the only road to national security, Mr. Barnet points out, is to reverse the arms race, but that cannot be done without first calling it to a halt. We have the capability to match technologically any buildup the Soviets undertake but we cannot continue to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on the military without risking mortal danger to our economy which, after all, is in the end the foundation of our strategic strength.

He notes that, in times of austerity, increasing the military budget while domestic programs are slashed raises the issue not of guns versus butter but of missiles versus the local police and firefighters. The distortion of priorities, as Mr. Barnet points out, has become so acute that as the administration counsels a 5-percent real increase in military spending each year, essential services in every major American city are going to be cut. What is that going to do to the strength of our society in the future and what is that going to do to the cause of peace?

Mr. DOWNEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. I rise in support of the Dellums amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to address the whole question of deterrence for a moment. It is clear that we do not know whether the Soviets believe in a doctrine of deterrence or in the doctrine of a war-fighting capability. It is conceivable that the SS-18 is designed to do nothing else but to destroy Minuteman silos. Let us accept that just for argument's sake.

Mr. Chairman, any analysis of their capabilities in any scenario has to consider some of the thought processes they are going to have to go through. This has probably been discussed on the floor before, but we have to think about them. They have to be concerned about the reliability of their own forces.

Mr. Chairman, you have heard the story about the cosmic throw of the dice. Well that is important. I mean, anyone who is going to decide one afternoon or one evening to try to destroy the land-based deterrent in these United States has to have pretty reliable missiles, has to make sure their latest tests prove out

their accuracy and then has to hope that upon launch that the United States does not decide to abandon its policy of riding out an attack and instead launch on warning, which is a very conceivable thing we can do. The Soviet leader is never going to know, never going to know, that we would not launch on warning. Therefore, in a sense that is deterrence, too.

Mr. Chairman, the Office of Technology Assessment has done a reasonably careful and scientific evaluation of what the United States could do to the Soviet Union, even if we decided to have 90 percent of our land-based missiles destroyed, and 10 to 20 million Americans die in the consequence of that exchange.

They say that with the bombers that would be on alert, and with the submarines we have to respond, that we could remove Soviet Union from a position of power and influence for the remainder of this century. That is something also I would think that a Soviet leader would have to be concerned about.

□ 1530

I would not want to be a leader of a starving group of cavemen, which is what the United States could do to the Soviet Union, should they decide to attack our missiles and should we decide to retaliate.

I believe we need to have deterrence and that the land based leg of our triad is vulnerable; but my alternative of improving our submarine force, leaving the Minutemen as they are, is really a much more viable and less expensive option.

I think anyone who takes a look from a realistic nonscientific view has to be amazed at what we are proposing here. Multiple aim points on the soil of the United States to serve as a sponge to soak up the Soviet warheads in the event of a war; it is mind boggling, it is mind boggling.

The fact is also, for many of the people who are advocates of the MX, that unless we have a SALT agreement and unless we limit the number of SS-18's to 308 and unless we limit the warheads on the SS-18 and on the SS-19, the MX is not going to be a viable weapons system, simply because the Soviets will always be able to add more warheads than we will be able to add multiple launch sites.

So I ask the committee, please examine the realities of nuclear planning. Please examine the realities of nuclear war and let us not begin what will be a \$60 billion folly that will add very little in the way of U.S. security.

Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman wishes, I will be happy to yield to my friend, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. ICHORD).

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentleman from New York, I know when the gentleman was a member of the R. & D. Subcommittee, the gentleman stated, if I recall correctly one time in committee, that the gentleman would not object to putting Minuteman in silos scattered around. Has the gentleman changed his thinking?

Now the gentleman comes back and states that the best way to go are sub-

marines. Is the gentleman playing general?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. DOWNEY) has expired.

(At the request of Mr. ICHORD, and by unanimous consent, Mr. DOWNEY was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, let me point out to the gentleman from New York, the gentleman says anybody in his right mind would not come out with this idea.

Is the gentleman saying that the Defense Science Board, none of those gentlemen are in their right minds?

Let me point out to the gentleman from New York, this system has been advocated for how long now by the Defense Science Board. It is at least 2 years and they still maintain their position.

The gentleman from New York very eloquently tells the body that they are not in their right minds.

Mr. DOWNEY. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer the gentleman's question. I do not doubt that the members of the Science Board or the members of the Committee on Armed Services have decided that the MX missile is the right way to go or not in their right minds. They may on occasion be guided by things that I do not think are the wisest for this country, as in the case of the MX; but I think people come to decisions for a whole host of reasons.

I think that the debate that is going on in the other body on the SALT agreement is one of the reasons why we are suddenly seeing a great push toward this agreement.

I honestly believe that this is part of the price of SALT, an unfortunate price for SALT.

In answer directly to the gentleman's question, the MX missile does concern me. There is a more survivable mode for the Minuteman.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to get back to the business at hand and discuss the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the President is currently attempting to convince the Senate that it should approve the SALT II Treaty. If this amendment passes, it would make it, in my opinion, almost impossible for the President to get that Senate support. It is foolish to think that we are going to get a SALT treaty passed if we do not provide the needed improvements in our strategic capability.

The bill contains \$60 million for the full scale engineering development of the MX missile and its basing mode known as the multiple protective structure (MPS) system. In the bill that we passed last month, the fiscal year 1979 supplemental authorization, there was included a provision expressing the sense of Congress that a survivable ICBM system with a survivable basing mode was vital to the long range security of the United States. It further expressed the sense of Congress that that survivable new system

should be developed as soon as possible. It would be wholly inconsistent and make the Congress look foolish to turn around now and eliminate the funds to begin doing what we said 3 months ago was an urgent national security requirement.

The site selection for the missile will not be until the mid-1980's. The first missile test flights will be in early 1983. A production decision, which the House will have an opportunity to participate in, will not be made until mid-1983.

Therefore, voting for the bill does not commit you to any \$30 billion. It only says that we shall continue development of what the Congress describes as an urgent matter and to continue to be in a position to modernize our strategic triad.

I urge the quick defeat of the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS).

The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Chair announces that pursuant to clause 2, rule XXIII, he will vacate proceedings under the call when a quorum of the Committee of the Whole appears.

Members will record their presence by electronic device.

The call was taken by electronic device.

□ 1550

QUORUM CALL VACATED

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. One hundred Members have appeared. A quorum of the Committee of the Whole is present. Pursuant to rule XXIII, clause 2, further proceedings under the call shall be considered as vacated.

The Committee will resume its business.

RECORDED VOTE

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The pending business is the demand of the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS) for a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 86, noes 305, not voting 43, as follows:

[Roll No. 467]

AYES—86

Addabbo	Diggs	Kastenmeter
Aspin	Dingell	Kildee
AuCoin	Donnelly	Kostmayer
Baldus	Downey	Lelahan
Bedell	Drinan	Leland
Bellenson	Early	Lundine
Bingham	Eckhardt	McHugh
Bonior	Edwards, Calif.	Maguire
Bonker	Erdahl	Markey
Brodhead	Fond, Mich.	Mikulski
Burton, John	Ford, Tenn.	Mikva
Burton, Phillip	Forsythe	Miller, Calif.
Carr	Garcia	Mitchell, Md.
Chisholm	Gephardt	Moakley
Clay	Gray	MoFett
Collins, III.	Harkin	Nedzi
Corman	Holtzman	Nolan
Daschle	Jeffords	Nowak
Dellums	Johnson, Colo.	Obey

Ottinger	Russo	Vento
Panetta	Sabo	Waxman
Paul	Schroeder	Weaver
Purcell	Selberling	Wells
Rahall	Simon	Williams, Mont.
Rangel	Solarz	Wirth
Ratchford	Stokes	Wolpe
Richmond	Studds	Yates
Rodino	Thompson	Young, Mo.
Rosenthal	Vanik	

NOES—305

Abdnor	Florlo	Madigan
Akaka	Fcountain	Marks
Albosta	Fowler	Marlenee
Ambro	Frenzel	Martin
Anderson,	Frost	Mathis
Calif.	Fuqua	Matsui
Andrews,	Gaydos	Mattox
N. Dak.	Gialmo	Mavroules
Annunzio	Gibbons	Mazzoli
Anthony	Gilman	Mica
Archer	Gingrich	Michel
Ashbrook	Ginn	Miller, Ohio
Ashley	Glickman	Mineta
Atkinson	Goldwater	Minish
Badham	Gonzalez	Mitchell, N.Y.
Bafalls	Gore	Mollohan
Bailey	Gradison	Montgomery
Barnard	Gramm	Moore
Barnes	Grassley	Moorhead,
Bauman	Green	Calif.
Beard, R.I.	Grisham	Moorhead, Pa.
Beard, Tenn.	Guarini	Murphy, N.Y.
Benjamin	Gudger	Murphy, Pa.
Bennett	Guyer	Murtha
Bereuter	Hagedorn	Myers, Ind.
Bethune	Hall, Ohio	Myers, Pa.
Bevill	Hall, Tex.	Natcher
Biaggi	Hamilton	Neal
Blanchard	Hammer-	Nelson
Boggs	schmidt	Nichols
Boland	Hance	O'Brien
Boner	Hanley	Oakar
Bouquard	Hansen	Oberstar
Bowen	Harris	Pashayan
Brademas	Harsha	Patten
Breaux	Hawkins	Patterson
Brinkley	Heckler	Pease
Brooks	Hefner	Perkins
Broomfield	Heftel	Petri
Brown, Ohio	Heightower	Peysner
Broyhill	Hillis	Pickle
Buchanan	Hinson	Price
Burgener	Holland	Fritchard
Burlison	Hollenbeck	Holt
Butler	Holt	Quayle
Byron	Hopkins	Quillen
Campbell	Horton	Rallsback
Carney	Howard	Regula
Cavanaugh	Hubbard	Reuss
Chappell	Hughes	Rhodes
Cheney	Hyde	Rinaldo
Clausen	Ichord	Ritter
Cleveland	Ireland	Roberts
Clinger	Jacobs	Robinson
Coleman	Jeffries	Roe
Collins, Tex.	Jenkins	Rose
Conte	Jenrette	Roth
Corcoran	Johnson, Calif.	Rousselot
Cotter	Jones, Okla.	Royer
Courter	Jones, Tenn.	Rudd
Crane, Daniel	Kazen	Santini
D'Amours	Kelly	Satterfield
Daniel, Dan	Kindness	Sawyer
Daniel, R. W.	Kogovsek	Scheuer
Danielson	Kramer	Schulze
Dannemeyer	LaFalce	Sebellus
Davis, S.C.	Lagomarsino	Sensenbrenner
Deckard	Latta	Shannon
Derrick	Leach, Iowa	Sharp
Devine	Leach, La.	Shelby
Dicks	Leath, Tex.	Shumway
Dornan	Lederer	Shuster
Dougherty	Lee	Skelton
Duncan, Oreg.	Lent	Slack
Duncan, Tenn.	Levitas	Smith, Iowa
Emery	Lewis	Smith, Nebr.
English	Livingston	Snowe
Erlenborn	Lloyd	Snyder
Ertel	Loeffler	Solomon
Evans, Del.	Long, La.	Spellman
Evans, Ga.	Long, Md.	Spence
Evans, Ind.	Lowry	St Germain
Fary	Lujan	Stack
Fascell	Luken	Staggers
Fazio	Lungren	Stangeland
Fenwick	McCloskey	Stanton
Ferraro	McCormack	Steele
Findley	McDade	Stenholm
Fish	McDonald	Stewart
Fisher	McEwen	Stockman
Fithian	McKay	Stratton
Flippo	McKinney	Stump

Swift	Walgren	Wilson, C. H.
Symms	Walker	Wilson, Tex.
Synar	Wampler	Winn
Tauke	Watkins	Wright
Taylor	White	Wyatt
Thomas	Whitehurst	Wydler
Traxler	Whitley	Wylie
Tribble	Whittaker	Yatron
Udall	Whitten	Young, Fla.
Ullman	Williams, Ohio	Zablocki
Volkmer	Wilson, Bob	Zeferetti

NOT VOTING—43

Alexander	Dickinson	Marriott
Anderson, Ill.	Dixon	Murphy, Ill.
Andrews, N.C.	Dodd	Pepper
Applegate	Edgar	Preyer
Bolling	Edwards, Ala.	Rostenkowski
Brown, Calif.	Edwards, Okla.	Royal
Carter	Flood	Runnels
Coelho	Foley	Stark
Conable	Goodling	Treen
Conyers	Huckaby	Van Deerlin
Coughlin	Hutto	Vander Jagt
Crane, Philip	Jones, N.C.	Wolf
Davis, Mich.	Kemp	Young, Alaska
de la Garza	Lott	
Derwinski	McClory	

□ 1600

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Stark for, with Mr. Preyer against.
Mr. Conyers for, with Mr. Pepper against.
Mr. Dixon for, with Mr. Murphy of Illinois against.
Mr. Coughlin for, with Mr. Dickinson against.

Mr. LUNDINE changed his vote from "no" to "aye."

Mr. BLANCHARD changed his vote from "aye" to "no."

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. ICHORD

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. ICHORD: On Page 7, line 7, strike out the amount "\$2,757,322,000" and insert in lieu thereof the amount "\$2,772,422,000".

□ 1610

Mr. BEARD of Tennessee. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ICHORD. I yield to the gentleman from Tennessee.

Mr. BEARD of Tennessee. Mr. Chairman, I rise to join my colleagues, the distinguished chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee, Mr. ICHORD, and the distinguished ranking minority member on that committee, Mr. DICKINSON to seek your support of title II of H.R. 4040.

As you are all aware, the current SALT II treaty permits equality in numbers of strategic delivery vehicles to 2,400—and later 2,250, numbers of MIRVed strategic launchers at 1,320, numbers of MIRVed ICBM and SLBM launchers at 1,200 and numbers of MIRVed ICBM launchers at 820. Although these numbers represent equal aggregates, they should not be taken as a guarantee of equal capabilities of the strategic forces on both sides. To illustrate—although the number of Soviet strategic launchers will be reduced by some 250 to 300 from current deployed levels during the duration of the treaty, the most significant indices of nuclear power will dramatically increase particularly on the Soviet side.

By 1985 the Soviets will have an advantage of some: 50 percent in counter military potential—CMP—the ability to attack hardened military targets; that is, silos, nuclear storage sites, command and control centers, and so forth; 100 percent in equivalent megatons (EMT) area destructive capabilities; 250 percent in megatonnage; and 100 percent in throw weight.

I see no expedient way of reversing these trends through negotiations alone. No reasonable or persuasive arguments which can be advanced will cause the Soviets to abandon the thrust of their strategic programs.

Our direct expenditures on strategic nuclear forces are now about \$10 billion a year. In the period from 1956-62 they averaged approximately \$30 billion a year in today's dollars. A complete reversal of the trends in the strategic nuclear balance is simply not possible with currently projected programs and funding levels. Therefore, we must combine meaningful arms control initiatives with prudent force modernizations.

Maintaining stability implies not only aggregate equivalence in basic measures of military strength, but also a valid perception that no significant relative advantage can be gained by a first strike against our forces.

Over the past year primarily because of the testing of new Soviet ICBM guidance systems, there is general agreement that during the early 1980's our ICBM force will become vulnerable to a Soviet attack using one to two warheads per U.S. silo. Such a Soviet capability is wholly consistent with the proposed SALT II limitations.

Deployment of our ICBM's in a multiple protective shelter (MPS) basing system continues to be the most technically desirable response to the Soviet challenge to our confidence in the survivability of our ICBM force. The timely deployment of an MPS would preserve the Triad concept of well-hedged forces, negate the destabilizing impact of Soviet ICBM's, and allow modernization of our ICBM's. An MPS can add to crisis and arms race stability. The system's survivability and durability would make preemption a doubtful tactic. By responding effectively to the new Soviet programs, we tend to discourage the Soviet drive for strategic superiority. In time such action may induce them to accept more meaningful and balanced arms control limitations than those embodied in SALT II.

In summary:

The Triad concept of strategic nuclear forces provides the cost-effective diversity and redundancy needed to retaliate most effectively against a U.S.S.R. initiation of war and to protect against technological surprise.

Modernization of the Triad is needed to maintain military stability and equivalence in the face of increasing Soviet strategic nuclear offensive capabilities.

The ability of U.S. silo-based ICBM's to meet U.S. deterrent requirements will be in jeopardy by the early 1980's, even with currently proposed SALT II limitations.

A program to deploy an MPS ICBM system can add, in a timely manner, to the survivability, endurance, and capabilities needed to maintain the credibility of ICBM element of the Triad and thus to the Triad as a whole.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, before addressing myself to the subject of the amendment, I would like to make a legislative record. I am looking for the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM), who had asked about the possibility of additional authorization for money that might be needed by the Defense Department to carry out the military critical technology program. Mr. BINGHAM asked to make sure that the R. & D. community did have sufficient funds to establish that program.

I see the gentleman is not on the floor at the moment, but I would state to the Members of the House that I believe there is already sufficient money in the study program to establish the military critical technology approach which the Members of the House voted overwhelmingly for day before yesterday. But if there is not, it can be considered in the Joint Conference Committee because the House cut out some \$19 million, and there would be sufficient money in disagreement to take care of any funds needed to establish the military critical technology approach. I hope we do not need additional funds, however.

Mr. Chairman, getting to the amendment, subsequent to our markup of H.R. 4040, the Army informed the committee that the VIPER antitank program has incurred technical difficulties that will necessitate deferral of the fiscal 1980 production funding and an attendant increase in the fiscal year 1980 R.D.T. & E. funding of \$15.1 million.

The purpose of my amendment is to increase the fiscal year 1980 Viper R.D.T. & E. authorization from \$3 million to \$18.1 million, which is a net increase of \$15.1 million.

The committee has been notified by Mr. ADDABBO, the chairman of the Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, that his committee likewise intends to recommend that the total fiscal year funding for Viper be set at \$18.1 million in the Army R.D.T. & E. account.

I would point out to the Members of the House that Viper procurement, because this is ammunition, does not require an annual authorization, but Mr. ADDABBO has indicated the \$51.8 million requested for procurement of Viper in fiscal year 1980 is no longer required and will be deleted by the Appropriations Committee. The action on Viper will thus result in a net decrease of \$36.7 million in the overall defense budget.

That may sound strange, but actually by increasing to \$18.1 million, we are eventually going to have a net decrease of \$36.7 million in the program.

Mr. Chairman, I ask support for this amendment so that the Army can make the necessary technical fixes to the Viper antitank weapon.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ICHORD. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

If I understand correctly, the Viper is a hand-held antitank rocket-type weapon similar to the old bazooka which we are familiar with from World War II and the Korean war. During its development, I understand they have ascertained through operation of it that the rear end is too short and too close to the gunner's ear, and the noise level is so high that it is very injurious to the operator. They would need now to extend the length of the tube, to cut down the noise level, and in doing so they ran into some technical problems which necessitate the R. & D. effort the gentleman is requiring; is that correct?

Mr. ICHORD. That is true. It was thought the Viper was ready for production, but these difficulties were encountered, so we have to take it back in R.D.T. & E., and thus can eliminate the procurement funds.

Mr. DICKINSON. If the gentleman will yield further, none of us on this side have any objection to the amendment. I think it is necessary.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ICHORD. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. BINGHAM. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I am sorry I was not on the floor when he spoke of the matter of the funding of the DOD's activities in the field of export control.

I am glad that the gentleman seems satisfied with available funding.

It did seem to me appropriate this matter be handled in this bill rather than in the Export Administration bill.

Mr. ICHORD. I did state for the benefit of the gentleman from New York that I think there is already sufficient study money to finish the critical military technology approach. If there is not, there is certainly enough money in dispute in conference that we could earmark sufficient funds to establish the critical technology approach.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word and I would say that the committee on this side has had an opportunity to review the amendment and we are willing to accept it.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. ICHORD).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. KRAMER

Mr. KRAMER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. KRAMER: Page 9, after line 24, insert the following new section:

STUDY OF NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE FORCES CAPABILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS

Sec. 203. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a comprehensive review of the adequacy, character, and organizational structure of the present and projected capability of the United States to defend North American air space. The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Congress, on the same day that the President transmits to the Congress the Budget for fiscal year

1981, a detailed report containing the findings and results of such review. Such report shall include—

(1) a definition of the forces (including interceptor forces and warning systems) required in the future to protect North American air space against Soviet Union aircraft;

(2) a definition of the forces (including interceptor forces and warning systems) required in the future to protect North American air space against non-Soviet threats;

(3) a definition of the space-based systems, and the command structure for such systems, required to manage the strategic deterrent forces of the United States effectively in the future, including consideration of how best to consolidate operationally-related space-based systems to achieve the greatest military cost effectiveness; and

(4) a definition of the command and control and organizational structure required to manage effectively and efficiently North American strategic defense forces in the future.

(b) The Secretary of Defense shall submit with the report required by subsection (a) an integrated plan for modernization of North American air defense forces (including interceptor forces and warning systems) and shall include with such plan the projected cost of carrying out such plan.

Mr. KRAMER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Colorado?

There was no objection.

Mr. KRAMER. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this amendment is to focus the attention of the Defense Department and the Congress on what I believe to be the deplorable and declining state of our national air and space defense capabilities.

Perhaps it was natural that the emphasis on air defense which existed in the decade of the 1950's, shifted during the 1960's and into the 1970's as the character of the threat to our Nation shifted from air-breathing bombers to missiles. However, I am deeply concerned about the depths to which our air defenses have declined and the apparent continuing deemphasis on air defense, particularly in light of the obvious renewed interest on the part of the Soviet Union in high-technology manned aircraft such as the Backfire bomber and the even more advanced intercontinental bomber which has been reported.

I am not the only one who feels this concern, Mr. Chairman. I would like to insert in the RECORD a thought-provoking article by Tad Szulc which appeared in the Atlanta Constitution. Gen. James E. Hill, commander in chief of the North American Defense Command and the Aerospace Defense Command, acknowledged to the AFA symposium last October that the Soviet Backfire bomber fleet poses "a powerful threat already." He went on to say that if we had to defend against the Backfire in a comprehensive way:

We would need a very large air defense system, at least as large as we had in the 1958 to

1960 period. But even that would not guarantee that some bombers wouldn't get through. Air defense is very expensive and not leakproof.

Let us look at the air defense system we had in 1958 compared with what exists today. In 1958, the Air Defense Command had 100,000 personnel and 2,300 fighter interceptors. Today, that command has been pared to 25,600 employees and just over 300 aircraft—1950 vintage aircraft. In point of fact, Mr. Chairman, these reduced figures are yesterday's figures, because the Air Force has just recently announced its decision to reorganize the Aerospace Defense Command out of existence altogether. Frankly, I do not think that decision could have come to a worse time, because it represents a clear signal to our adversaries that we do not have the intent to upgrade our defense capability, and in fact are eliminating our only major command dedicated to air defense at a time when the Soviets are increasing development of manned bombers with an intercontinental range.

This decision also sends yet another signal to our allies of the continuing withdrawal of the United States from its commitment to defend our own interests and those of our allies at home and abroad. This perception was highlighted by the recent announcement by a top Canadian official of his early retirement because of the failure of the United States and Canada to maintain their air defense capability. Maj. Gen. Ross Barber, deputy chief of staff for plans and programs at NORAD said:

Our defenses are so poor (the Soviets) could put 10 bombers through Canada in the middle of the night and we'd never know they're there.

Barber charged that both countries are ignoring one of three major security threats by failing to upgrade their capabilities to detect and deter bomber strikes, and he noted the increased threat posed to the United States and Canada by the growing capability of the Soviets to launch cruise missiles from their bombers.

The House Armed Services Committee has recognized the problem of the inadequacy of our present air defenses in the report accompanying this bill. The committee has deferred funding for the initial phase of upgrading the Distant Early Warning System, questioning the expenditure of funds for additional detection capability when there is inadequate back-up to do anything about the penetration of our air space once we know about it. The committee has directed the Air Force to submit a justification of this budget request in the context of an integrated air defense modernization plan which would include a commitment to modernize our interceptor forces as well as upgrading of the warning systems. The Senate Armed Services Committee has similarly deferred funding DEW System improvements, and on a related measure, the military construction authorization bill for 1980, the Senate in its report directs the Department of Defense

to conduct a comprehensive review of the adequacy, character and organizational structure of our future air and space defense.

The review and report to the Congress on the space defense requirements and organizational structure is particularly important, Mr. Chairman. The space mission is presently fragmented between separate commands, and the Air Force has had this situation under study, but has issued conflicting reports about the status of that study. In response to questions raised before the Senate Armed Services Committee in hearings this spring, the Air Force responded on the one hand:

Active analysis in the space study was completed in early February . . . Several alternatives are under consideration to include an evolving structure as our space systems mature, assignment of space assets (or portions thereof) to various commands, and consolidating space resources under a new organization. . . . Recommendations will be provided to the Secretary of the Air Force in the near future.

To another question submitted at the same hearing, the Air Force responded:

The Air Force is presently considering various command alignment options which might be used to perform the space mission. Additional analysis of the alternatives is required and a decision has not been reached to date nor is one expected in the near future.

One thing which we do know about the Air Force space study is that among the options under consideration for a major role in the future space mission was the Aerospace Defense Command, which presently controls the bulk of space resources in the Air Force. However, the elimination of ADCOM, under the proposed reorganization, effectively eliminates that option before the Air Force space study is completed. I believe that the Congress should receive a full report of the Defense Department's analysis of the most effective command and control structure for space-based systems and should have an opportunity to thoroughly consider DOD plans for this important future mission.

My amendment, Mr. Chairman, seeks to merge the instructions of the House and Senate Committees into a clear directive to the Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive review of the present and projected air and space defense forces necessary to provide an adequate defense of the North American Continent from air and space threats. The Secretary would submit a report to the Congress, at the same time that the fiscal year 1981 budget is submitted, which would define the forces, both interceptors and warning systems, necessary to protect the continent against Soviet aircraft and against non-Soviet threats; would define the command and control and organizational structure required for the effective and efficient management of North American strategic defense forces; and would define the space-based systems and the space command structure necessary

to effectively manage our strategic deterrent forces and which would provide the greatest military cost effectiveness through consolidation of operationally related space-based systems. In addition, the Secretary would be required to submit with this report a plan for an integrated air defense modernization, to include both interceptors and warning systems and cost projections. This information would provide the Congress with the necessary data on which to make an informed judgment about the necessity and costs of upgrading our air defenses and to weigh those factors against other defense requirements. I believe it is essential to halt the piecemeal deterioration of our air and space defense systems and to make a conscious assessment of where we are, where we need to be, and how to get there. My amendment would start us on that path.

[From the Atlanta Constitution, Mar. 12, 1979]

DEW LINE A MAGINOT, U.S. FEARS
(By Tad Szulc)

Two months ago Washington officials received a frightening intelligence report with vast implications for United States foreign policy. The Soviet Union, the information went, had started test-firing its nuclear-armed Backfire jet bombers—something it had never done before.

While this action was considered significant in and of itself, it has thrown a scare into many Pentagon officials for a perhaps more serious reason. The Backfire bombers seem entirely capable of penetrating the DEW (Distant Early Warning) Line, the weakest link in the United States' defense system and knocking our nuclear silos out of commission.

Complicating the matter further is the fact that under the terms of the current draft of the SALT II agreement, the Backfire will not be subject to limitation, so all of North America could be vulnerable to a Russian attack—until a massive modernization of the DEW Line can be completed. Indeed, the deterioration of the DEW Line and its rapidly diminishing value as a defense system serve to demonstrate just how faulty American strategic thinking and planning have been in recent years.

Becoming operational in 1957, the DEW Line was built principally as a barrier against Soviet bombers. Its 31 radar emplacements (10 of them operated by Americans, the remainder by the Canadian military) strung over 3,300 miles along the 70th parallel in northern Canada, were designed to provide 40,000-foot high-altitude and 500-foot low-altitude surveillance to the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD).

Operated jointly by the United States and Canada under an agreement signed in 1958 and renewed most recently in 1975, NORAD's headquarters are inside Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado Springs. Its operational concept was that the approach of enemy bombers, detected by DEW Line radar, would be instantly communicated to NORAD, which in turn would activate interceptor air defenses and, if ordered by the president, trigger nuclear retaliation by the United States.

This original conception was sound because at the time manned bombers were the only Soviet long-distance nuclear-delivery vehicles. But by 1974 the strategic situation had changed radically. Now heavy Soviet missiles—notably the SS-18—not planes, were perceived as the main danger to America. The assumption was that in the event of war, the Soviet land-based ICBMs would be fired across the "top of the world" on a north-south trajectory.

As the U.S. prepared to sign the new NORAD accord with Canada, the Pentagon noted that it had to take into account "significant changes in the character of strategic weapons and the threat they pose to North America." Furthermore, with the 1972 SALT treaty limiting the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) by both sides, the United States was forced to put surveillance satellites in space over the northern tier to be assured of early-warning signals of a Soviet missile onslaught. As a result of this new emphasis, the conventional DEW Line defense was downgraded.

In 1974, then-Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that "without an effective anti-missile defense, (now) precluded to both the U.S. and the USSR . . . a defense against Soviet bombers is of little practical value." The conventional wisdom in 1974 and afterward was that the Backfire, being subsonic and having a relatively limited range, should not be considered as a strategic weapon in the same sense as the missiles.

Schlesinger, in fact, was so persuasive in downgrading the need for defenses against Soviet bombers that a debate arose in Canada over whether, under the circumstances, it was warranted to go on spending millions of dollars on the DEW Line and NORAD. Some Canadian leaders proposed the scuttling of the DEW Line altogether. Still, the Ottawa government prevailed in its view that NORAD should be kept alive—if only because of its symbolic defense value. Eventually, the 1975 NORAD agreement was signed, and the United States earmarked an unspecified number of vintage model interceptors and airborne early-warning aircraft for these missions and went on manning the DEW Line radar sites.

But it soon became clear how wrong Schlesinger had been. By 1977, even if American SALT negotiators continued to doubt the real strategic importance of the Backfire, the Air Force was taking it with utter seriousness. And once the Soviet bomber threat reappeared, the DEW Line had again to be regarded as a crucial dimension in continental defenses.

At this point, the Pentagon itself had to admit that NORAD was ill-equipped to carry out its bomber-warning and air-defense responsibilities. In testimony before a Senate panel in 1977, Air Force officials said that "it is important to note that current U.S. defenses have a very limited capability to detect and engage a bomber attack against any part of the United States or Canada" and that "our surveillance system has serious deficiencies, especially radar detection at low altitude, and our interceptor force is limited in size and performance to counter the increasing threat."

Even more to the point, the Air Force claimed that because of "gaps" in low-altitude radar coverage and improvements in Soviet bomber performance at low altitudes, "the possibility exists that they could penetrate the DEW Line gaps at low levels, cruise through central Canada at high altitude, and make the target penetration at low level or launch a cruise missile." The Air Force added that Soviet bombers had the capability "to end-run the DEW Line as it currently exists without great penalty in flight time." Meanwhile, the condition of the U.S. interceptor force attached to NORAD was described as "block obsolescence," with most of the aircraft models being 20 years old.

The Russians, unsurprisingly, have insisted that the Backfire should not be included along with the missiles in the proposed SALT II ceilings on strategic weapons. Because of Moscow's assurances that the Backfire would not be used as a strategic intercontinental weapon, American negotiators were prepared to accept the Soviet position during 1977 and 1978. For one thing, the

U.S. negotiators seemed to be insufficiently aware of the Achilles' heel that the DEW Line is for the United States.

In the light of all these considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided in 1977—belatedly—that something ought to be done about the northern defenses, which only two years earlier Schlesinger had so cavalierly downgraded.

The modernization program for the DEW Line, which is barely starting in 1979, provides for a new American-Canadian joint civil and military radar network known as the Joint Surveillance System (JSS); the modification by the United States and Canada of the fighter-interceptor-aircraft system; the earmarking for the first time for NORAD of an unspecified number of the up-to-date Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft known as AWACS; the development, also for the first time, of an over-the-horizon backscatter radar (the OTHB) designed to provide air-defense surveillance of the East and West coasts of North America as protection against Backfire end-runs of the DEW Line; and, in general, to "enhance," as the chiefs put it, the DEW Line as a whole.

The Canadians, for their part, have agreed to modernize their interceptor force through the purchase of between 120 and 150 aircraft for about \$2.4 billion. But despite a year's search for an appropriate plane, Canada has still to decide between the F-16 and the F-18-A, having discarded other possibilities. But the choice may be delayed for several more months—and it may be several years before the aircraft can be delivered.

Notwithstanding the new sense of urgency concerning the DEW Line, the United States' effort to upgrade the northern defenses is moving slowly. Thus, Defense Secretary Harold Brown said in his annual report for fiscal year 1980 that the Joint Surveillance System will be activated in Canada in 1981 and in Alaska in 1983. Technical feasibility testing of the backscatter radar, he said, will be completed by the end of 1980, and "we will then decide if system deployment would help satisfy our bomber-warning needs along the coastal air approaches to the United States." Brown also disclosed that, as a "long-term goal," the United States is studying the possibility of detecting bombers from space. This would be a new satellite surveillance system; Brown has called it the "TEAL RUBY Experiment."

Quite apart from the delays involved in modernizing the DEW Line, the question remains: How adequate will the new system be? An unpublished congressional study says that the objective in modernizing NORAD "is not to create a force capable of turning back a determined bomber attack on North America," but rather "to restore the commands ability to deny enemy bombers a 'free ride,' i.e., an uncontested attack on the continent."

In the meantime, the administration must decide rapidly what to do about the Backfire in terms of the SALT II agreement—because the realization of the weakness of the DEW Line has coincided with new, highly threatening Soviet tests of the Backfire.

At present, the tentative agreement is to exclude the Backfire—as many as 300 of these bombers are believed to be operational in 1979—from SALT II limitations through American acceptance of the argument that it does not constitute a strategic weapon. In return, Moscow does not demand that our FB-111 fighter-bombers stationed in Western Europe be included under treaty ceilings, although they clearly have a nuclear potential against Soviet targets. But, as previously mentioned, the Soviet Union has a good reason for this trade-off.

Intelligence data that reached Washington late in January show that in recent months the Soviet Union has begun testing

cruise-missile firings from the nuclear-armed Backfire. The tests have covered a 750-mile range, a matter of vast concern to the United States.

In the draft of the SALT II treaty, a medium bomber that has a range of over 375 miles is to be counted as a strategic weapon and therefore comes under the ceiling. But, as a senior Pentagon official privately remarked not long ago, the Backfire could launch a cruise missile against U.S. missile emplacements in North Dakota from a range of under 375 miles. All the Backfire has to do, he said, is penetrate the DEW Line through low-level gaps, pick up altitude to cross central Canada, and then come down again to a lower altitude to fire the cruise missile "even from 100 miles."

Now that we know this new Soviet capability—and realize the startling inadequacies of the DEW Line—the time may have come to rethink the Backfire problem in this context. And even if the terms of the treaty are changed, the United States, in practice, still remains immensely vulnerable to such attack. Thus the question: Why didn't anyone in authority think about this danger four years ago when the DEW Line was about to be given up as obsolete?

□ 1620

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KRAMER. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PRICE. I would ask the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. KRAMER) is it not the intent of his amendment to direct the Department of Defense to conduct a comprehensive study of our future air and space defense requirements and to provide this study to the Congress with the fiscal year 1981 budget submission?

Mr. KRAMER. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. PRICE. As the gentleman has noted, both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have requested that related studies be conducted, the House in its report accompanying the fiscal year 1980 defense authorization bill (House Rept. No. 96-166) and the Senate in its report accompanying the fiscal year military construction authorization bill (Senate Rept. No. 96-209). This amendment seeks to draw together these separate instructions into one common, comprehensive review and report.

I would suggest to the gentleman that he withdraw his amendment as it is not necessary to include it in our bill to have the review conducted. However, as a result of our discussion here on the floor today the Department of Defense will be directed to fully address the issues raised in the gentleman's amendment.

Our committee has expressed concern about our present air defense posture and intends to pursue the matter further on receipt of the report on this comprehensive review.

Mr. KRAMER. I thank the gentleman for that clarification and given the chairman's assurance that the committee will pursue the matter, I withdraw my amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Colorado?

There was no objection.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the attention of the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. ICHORD).

Mr. Chairman, my colleague from Alabama (Mr. EDWARDS), whose home is Mobile, had intended to be on the floor today to offer an amendment in the amount of \$25 million for a certain purpose. Unfortunately, Hurricane Frederic came ashore last night and passed over his home town of Mobile. He went to Alabama this morning and was unable to be on the floor today. So, in an effort to establish the legislative history and intent, I would like to enter into a colloquy with our distinguished chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee to discuss the effect of what his amendment would have been. I understand Mr. EDWARDS has discussed it with Mr. ICHORD, as well as with me.

Mr. EDWARDS intended to offer an amendment of \$25 million, which would be startup money for a program to develop the durability and lengthen the life and durability of aircraft engines. As the matter now stands, it takes about 12 years to develop an aircraft engine, and it takes about 4 years to develop an aircraft airframe. This program would be to set up a durability program in-house—not out of house—to marry up these engines, to give a longer leadtime so that it does not take so much time to develop the overall aircraft and marry the aircraft to the engine.

I wonder if the gentleman from Missouri has had an opportunity to discuss this, and what his opinion is.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, as the gentleman from Alabama has stated, the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON) and I have discussed this matter with the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. EDWARDS). I feel very strongly that the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. EDWARDS) has an excellent idea. In fact, I have entertained the same thought myself, and the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. EDWARDS) is to be commended for taking the lead.

I got interested in this problem of engine development when I was chairman of the Military Construction Subcommittee, and got into the matter of establishing the new testing facility at Tullahoma, Tenn. The gentleman is correct; it does take longer to develop an engine than it does an airframe. However, as the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON) well knows, and I am sure the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON) agrees with me, we need to spend more money on R. & D. But, we just cannot throw the money into the R. & D. community and expect to get the value out of the research money that we spend. A program has to be properly structured.

After talking to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. EDWARDS), I went out to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and talked to the people there who will actually be doing this work. They had not yet heard of any such program. They do not have any such program structured. So,

I do not think we could possibly accept any amendment for money now with no program structured. But, certainly I would be willing, with the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON) and the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. EDWARDS) to advise the Department of Defense to get going on such a program and give us a well-structured program so that we can receive the benefits which Mr. EDWARDS envisions.

Mr. DICKINSON. Well, as the gentleman from Missouri is aware, we have a very serious problem in our F-100 engine now, which is in the F-15. We have a serious problem with the TF-30 engine, which is in the F-14. Perhaps if we had had a durability test, if we had a long-range test to do adequately what is proposed here, we would have obviated the problems that are going to cost us millions and millions of dollars.

While I am not suggesting that we dedicate any particular amount of money to this, I think it is good for us to go on notice and advise the Department of Defense that we think this is the way we should go, and they should develop a program.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Alabama has expired.

(By unanimous consent Mr. DICKINSON was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. ICHORD. Let me state to the gentleman that I think we need to get such a program in being, and such a program does have great promise of making air frame and propulsion system developments schedules more compatible and bring them into harmony more.

I would state to the gentleman from Alabama that I am sure the gentleman from California (Mr. LLOYD), who has had considerable experience in engine development, would have something to say.

Mr. DICKINSON. I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague from Alabama for yielding to me. I would like to say that I do endorse the program. I would remind my good colleague from Missouri that while his attention may have been directed toward the necessity of this when he was on the committee, my attention was directed very directly to the necessity of an engine development program when an F-65 engine disintegrated on me when I was airborne. I want the gentleman to know that I really did want a new program very rapidly that would develop a good engine and marry it to a good airframe.

Ever since that time, I have dedicated myself, as the gentleman from Alabama well knows, to the development of a good, stable engine which we need in the F-14. Certainly, we want to stabilize the F-100, where we have had some problems, but they will be worked out.

□ 1630

But it will be worked out, and in the future using, say, the 1014 or the 504 which may be developed in the future, that needs to be done now. We need the

ongoing work, and I join with my colleagues in going forward with that step.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. DICKINSON. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. SANTINI

Mr. SANTINI. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. SANTINI: Page 9, after line 24, insert the following new section:

LOCATION OF MX MISSILE LAUNCHING SHELTER

SEC. 203. No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used for the full-scale engineering development of the missile basing mode known as the Multiple Protective Structure (MPS) system or the MX missile if more than 25 percent of the shelters for such missile are to be located in any single State.

Mr. SANTINI. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of my amendment will become more evident, I guess, as the debate unfolds. It represents an attempt by the Member of an at-large congressional district to appeal to the individual Members of this body and ask for their sympathy, their understanding, and their vote. My amendment essentially says that we want to spread a little bit of the blessings around as well as the burdens. Nevada is presently contemplated as the principal location for the proposed MX missile site. Figures vary, but approximately 70 percent of the proposed system will be located in the State of Nevada. I believe that most Members of this body would agree that Nevada as a State has made a significant contribution to the national defense effort. I support the MX missile system, but I ask for the Members' understanding and their identification in order to appreciate the magnitude and the scope of impact of this system on one State. Out of 4,600 missile sites, approximately 3,220 shelters will be located in Nevada; 140 racetracks and nuclear missile sitings will be placed in the Nevada mountains and desert areas. Sixty valleys will cut through the State from the western border almost to the eastern border. Sixty valleys of the State of Nevada would be dominated, influenced, and controlled by the missile system. This decision that the Members make this afternoon in response to my plea will have the most far-reaching implications of any land-use decision in the history of the U.S. Congress affecting the State of Nevada, to and including appropriations for the funding of the Bureau of Land Management.

Twenty-two thousand to thirty thousand proposed employees for a period of approximately 5 years will impact an area which now has only about 7,000 people. Where is the water coming from? What are the socioeconomic impacts? No one is in a posture or position to respond to that concern today, either within the Defense and Military Establishment or without. I am asking you as Members of this body to join with me in this consideration. Nevada is willing to and under this amendment would assume 25 percent of the MX missile siting, blessing,

and burden. Utah in a contiguous siting—and that is already in the preliminary plan proposal—could have another 25 percent. They would be jointly operational. White Sands, N. Mex., has already been identified as a prospective MX missile site. They could assume a 25-percent blessing and burden, and the Yuma testing site in southern Arizona could represent the balance of 25 percent for the MX missile sitings. I believe it is a reasonable proposal. I certainly know that fundamental equity would suggest that asking one State in the Nation to assume 70 to 80 percent of the blessings and the burdens of missile siting is not equitable.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. SANTINI was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. SANTINI. I am pleading and appealing to you as Members of the House of Representatives to join in an understanding of my individual congressional district concern and I hope respond as well to a national security concern of yours.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SANTINI. The gentleman from Missouri has waited patiently. I yield to him.

Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I can only make this observation when the gentleman offers an amendment such as this that the congressional district that I represent has 150 ICBM missile silos with Minuteman II located in them. NBC's John Chancellor recently did a program on our congressional district to the effect that were there an attack on my congressional district, which is a prime potential target in this country, it would be 3,000 degrees Fahrenheit in Sedalia, Mo. One hundred and ninety thousand people would be dead, and innumerable people would be injured. I must say this just for an observation. The gentleman's amendment comes too late, but I might also say this. No one in my congressional district in western Missouri with missile silos there, knowing of the dangers that are there, has said, "Move them." They accept them as part of our national defense.

Mr. SANTINI. I would interrupt my good friend and reclaim my time. I would say to my good friend, the gentleman from Missouri, that I will be happy to amend my proposal to include the 25 percent in terms of his district if it is a particular commitment and enthusiasm of his. I am only asking that, given the magnitude of a \$30 to \$50 billion project and a 10,000 square-mile-impact arena which will be the consequence of a one-State location, it would seem fair and reasonable to ask that part of it be shared.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I oppose the amendment by the gentleman as unnecessary and unwarranted. The gentleman's amendment would arbitrarily require the MX system to be put in at least four States, which would inevitably require more land, a lot higher cost, and less efficient running of the system.

The site selection for deployment of the system will be preceded by an exhaustive environmental analysis. The decision on deployment of the basing mode should be made solely on the basis of which site is the more militarily and environmentally sound.

It should be understood that only land in the immediate vicinity of the shelter is withdrawn from public use. This amounts to about 2.5 acres per shelter. Thus, about only 25 square miles would be withdrawn from public use, including land for the assembly area.

I think the Members of the House should also be aware that the Governors of Nevada and Utah have indicated that the plans for the potential location of the MX facilities in their States are acceptable.

In a letter to the President, the Governor of Nevada stated that—

It appears that adverse environmental impacts associated with the missile launching site in Nevada would be minimal.

He further stated:

As Governor of Nevada I wish to convey to you the willingness of the State of Nevada to do its part in the development of such a system should the decision be made to deploy it here.

Also, I would like to point out that a poll done by a Nevada newspaper showed that 65 percent of the citizens of Nevada supported the deployment of the MX in Nevada.

In summary, I oppose the gentleman's amendment and hope the House will vote it down.

Mr. SANTINI. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE. I yield to the gentleman from Nevada.

Mr. SANTINI. Let me say in my ongoing efforts, my communications on this issue, I have spoken with both our U.S. Senator and our Governor. Our Governor indicated he did not know that my proposal was in conflict with his interests on it.

Mr. Chairman, I think there is a great deal in terms of the pluses and the minuses of the impact of a system of this magnitude that is not known or understood, in terms of any citizen of any State in this Union, and a poll that asks citizens "Do you support an MX system?" I believe says something short of, "Do you support a nuclear fortress situated across the middle of your State that represents an impact of approximately 10,000 square miles and represents usage of 60 mountain and desert valleys in your State?"

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's concern and I certainly commend him on his diligence in speaking to this.

However, Mr. Chairman, I can assure the gentleman before this installation is deployed anywhere a full environmental study must be made and will be made. At that time I imagine his State officials would have additional opportunity to make their positions more clear.

Mr. SANTINI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from Nevada.

Mr. SANTINI. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the sentiments of the gentleman. I would only urge the Members of the House to have an open mind and a receptive concern for my problem.

Mr. Chairman, there are many, many, many unforeseeable social, economic and military implications of this kind of proposal that no one can premeditate or deliberate and no one can apprehend in terms of trying to balance out the impact and the consequence of a system of this magnitude.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. ICHORD. I think in further answer to the gentleman from Nevada, it should be pointed out that actually the only land you are going to have removed from public use in the two States—namely, Utah and Nevada—will be 25 square miles. Just 25 square miles.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(At the request of Mr. ICHORD, and by unanimous consent, Mr. PRICE was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. PRICE. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. ICHORD. It is true that it will be scattered over about 5,000 square miles but only 25 square miles will be unusable land and I would point out that this system will be located on mainly desert land which is only good for mining and grazing. You will still be able to mine and you will still be able to graze.

Mr. Chairman, the problem is if we start scattering this system out over four States the cost will increase. It is already very high. It is going to go right through the ceiling. That will be because of increased operating and administrative costs.

Mr. Chairman, I sympathize with the problems of the gentleman from Nevada but we already have the approval of the Governor. I think we should take time to read into the RECORD parts of the letter from Governor List of Nevada to the President of the United States:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I would like to take this opportunity to express my viewpoints regarding the possible development of the missile MX system in Nevada. United States Air Force officials have extensively briefed members of the Nevada Legislature as well as myself regarding all aspects of the project. During early phases of the environmental impact investigation when an "area security" approach was being considered some concerns were raised as to the possible adverse affect on minerals, exploration, and development and on other uses of the land. We have since been assured that the more recent "point security" approach would minimize any such limitations.

Mr. Chairman, I would parenthetically point out that is what we have now, the "point security" approach.

Although I know that additional details would be developed concerning the impact of the installation and while I feel that a full opportunity for public comment should then be allowed, it now appears that adverse environmental impacts associated with the

missile launching sites in Nevada would be minimal. It is my belief that the multiple protective shelters deployment system for MX is essential to the future of our national defense capability. As governor of Nevada I wish to convey to you the willingness of the state of Nevada to do its part in the development of such a system should the decision be made to deploy it here.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure Governor List of Nevada had in mind some of the economic benefits that, of course, will adhere to the State of Nevada, this land is desert land. I would seriously ask the Members of the House not to approve this amendment because there is no telling what the cost of this amendment is going to be and we would be putting it in States where the Governors perhaps would not concur as does the Governor of Nevada.

Mr. EMERY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I am not in favor of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. SANTINI), but nevertheless, I think the issue he raises is one worth discussing for a few minutes. That is the question of deploying any kind of a strategic deterrent on land—a weapon which might draw enemy fire toward land or toward populated areas.

Mr. Chairman, after considerable consideration of the MX program I have come to the conclusion that I do not support any of the three MX missile alternatives we have discussed. I think it is well to think in terms of the MX missile itself—as opposed to the three methods of deployment that we have debated; one being the trench system, one being the so-called MPS system, and the third being the transportable erector-launcher system which President Carter has chosen.

Mr. Chairman, it is my own personal feeling that our deterrent would be more survivable if a greater portion was deployed and launched from submarines similar to the submarine-launched missile systems we have now. I think there are many advantages to a submarine missile system. They are survivable. They are mobile. Recent development in missile technology, communications, and telemetry mean that submarine-launched missiles can be nearly as accurate as land-based missiles and you do not have the problem of drawing fire toward populated areas.

Certainly many of us—and my district is no different—have many targets for the Soviet missiles should war break out. I have several shipyards, oil storage depots, communication centers, and Air Force bases either in or near my district. The gentleman's district in Nevada is really not unique in that respect, nor is mine. We all share in both the burden and the responsibility of providing for national defense.

Mr. Chairman, I do think we should consider this whole question of MX deployment very carefully: Is there a more accurate system?

□ 1650

Is there a more survivable system? Is there a less costly system? Is there a

system that will draw fire away from the populations?

I did not support the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS) because I believe that the MX missile itself is a good missile and we ought to maintain superior missile technology, develop missiles that are more survivable, more accurate, that can carry modern warheads—a smaller yield and greater accuracy; so I think there is a tremendous need to develop the missile, but I do sympathize with the gentleman from Nevada that this deployment not only may not be in the best interests of his own constituents as they see it, but I am not sure it is the best way to go when we talk about improving our deterrent.

My own feelings, which I will express in the Committee on Armed Services and on the floor over the next several months, will be to explore the desirability of a greater submarine missile force and less of a dependence on any land-based missile, simply because they are going to be sitting ducks, no matter how we harden the targets or no matter how we make the launches mobile. They are still in a relatively small area. They can either be bracketed or pinned down by incoming missiles, and eventually we are going to come right back to the old concept of how many silos can be built, and how many missiles will it take to knock them out. How many tracks can you build and how many warheads the Soviets launch at us, is going to be an escalating game. I do not think we ought to be moving in that direction. I just threw out those comments for consideration as we debate the wisdom of buying the MX systems proposed by President Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. SANTINI).

The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that the yeas appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. SANTINI. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 84, yeas 289, not voting 61, as follows:

[Roll No. 468]

AYES—84

Abdnor	Hall, Tex.	Pursell
Baldus	Harkin	Quayle
Benjamin	Hollenbeck	Rahall
Blaggi	Jacobs	Ratchford
Bingham	Jeffords	Richmond
Blanchard	Johnson, Colo.	Rosenthal
Bonior	Kastenmeier	Russo
Brodhead	Kildee	Sabo
Brown, Ohio	Kogovsek	Santini
Burgener	Kostmayer	Schroeder
Burton, Phillip	Livingston	Sebellus
Carr	Long, Md.	Selberling
Cavanaugh	Lujan	Shumway
Cheney	Maguire	Simon
Collins, Ill.	Marlenee	Skelton
Dannemeyer	Matsui	Staggers
Daschle	Mikulski	Stockman
Dellums	Miller, Calif.	Swift
Dingell	Miller, Ohio	Traxler
Dodd	Mineta	Vento
Donnelly	Mitchell, Md.	Walgren
Downey	Moffett	Waxman
Erdahl	Murphy, Pa.	Weaver
Evans, Ga.	Nedzi	Weiss
Fazio	Nolan	Whittaker
Florio	Nowak	Williams, Mont.
Forsythe	Oberstar	Williams, Ohio
Glickman	Panetta	Young, Mo.

NOES—289

Addabbo
Akaka
Albosta
Ambro
Anderson,
Calif.
Andrews, N.C.
Andrews,
N. Dak.
Annunzio
Anthony
Archer
Ashbrook
Ashley
Aspin
Atkinson
Badham
Bafalls
Bailey
Barnard
Barnes
Bauman
Beard, R.I.
Beard, Tenn.
Bellenson
Bennett
Bereuter
Bethune
Bevill
Boggs
Boland
Boner
Bonker
Bouquard
Bowen
Brademas
Breaux
Brinkley
Brooks
Broyhill
Buchanan
Burlison
Butler
Byron
Carney
Chappell
Chisholm
Clausen
Clay
Cleveland
Clinger
Coelho
Coleman
Collins, Tex.
Conte
Corcoran
Corman
Cotler
Coughlin
Courter
Crane, Daniel
Crane, Phillip
D'Amours
Daniel, Dan
Daniel, R. W.
Danielson
Davis, S.C.
Derrick
Dickinson
Dicks
Dornan
Dougherty
Drinan
Duncan, Oreg.
Duncan, Tenn.
Earlv
Eckhardt
Edwards, Calif.
Emery
English
Erlenborn
Ertel
Evans, Ind.
Fary
Fascell
Fenwick
Ferraro
Findley
Fish
Fisher
Fithian
Flippo
Foley
Ford, Mich.
Ford, Tenn.
Fountain
Fowler
Frenzel

NOT VOTING—61

Alexander
Anderson, III.
Applegate
AuCoin
Bedell
Belling
Broomfield
Brown, Calif.
Burton, John
Campbell
Carter
Conable
Conyers
Davis, Mich.
de la Garza

Deckard
Derwinski
Deylne
Diggs
Dixon
Edgar
Edwards, Ala.
Edwards, Okla.
Evans, Del.
Flood
Goodling
Holtzman
Huckaby
Hutto
Hyde
Jones, N.C.
Kemp
Lott
McClory
Marriott
Michel
Mikva
Moorhead, Pa.
Mottl
Murphy, N.Y.
Murtha
Myers, Ind.
Myers, Pa.
Natcher
Nelson
Nichols
O'Brien
Oakar
Obey
Ottinger
Patten
Paul
Pease
Perkins
Petri
Peyster
Pickle
Price
Pritchard
Quillen
Rangel
Regula
Reuss
Rhodes
Rinaldo
Ritter
Robinson
Rodino
Roe
Rose
Roth
Rousselot
Rudd
Runnels
Satterfield
Sawyer
Scheuer
Schulze
Sensenbrenner
Shannon
Sharp
Shelby
Slack
Smith, Nebr.
Snowe
Snyder
Solarz
Solomon
Spellman
Spence
St Germain
Stack
Stangeland
Stanton
Steed
Steinholm
Stewart
Stokes
Stratton
Studds
Stump
Symms
Synar
Tauke
Taylor
Thomas
Thompson
Trible
Udall
Ullman
Vanik
Volkmer
Wampler
Watkins
White
Whitehurst
Whitley
Whitten
Wilson, Bob
Wilson, Tex.
Winn
Wolpe
Wright
Wydler
Yllie
Yates
Yatron
Young, Fla.
Zablocki
Zeferetti

□ 1700

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Stark for, with Mr. Preyer against.
Mr. Conyers for, with Mr. Murphy of Illinois against.
Mr. Diggs for, with Mr. Pepper against.
Mr. Dixon for, with Mr. Jones of North Carolina against.

Messrs. STAGGERS, STOCKMAN, and DASCHLE changed their votes from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

□ 1710

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Are there further amendments to title II? If not, the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE III—ACTIVE FORCES

Sec. 301. The Armed Forces are authorized strengths for active duty personnel as of September 30, 1980, as follows:

- (1) The Army, 780,337.
- (2) The Navy, 529,002.
- (3) The Marine Corps, 189,000.
- (4) The Air Force, 558,761.

Mr. PRICE (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title III be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Are there any amendments to title III? If not, the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE IV—RESERVE FORCES

Sec. 401. (a) For fiscal year 1980, the Selected Reserve of the reserve components of the Armed Forces shall be programmed to attain average strengths of not less than the following:

- (1) The Army National Guard of the United States, 355,700.
- (2) The Army Reserve, 197,400.
- (3) The Naval Reserve, 87,000.
- (4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 33,600.
- (5) The Air National Guard of the United States, 92,500.
- (6) The Air Force Reserve, 57,300.
- (7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 11,700.

(b) Within the average strengths prescribed by subsection (a), the reserve components of the Armed Forces are authorized, as of September 30, 1980, the following number of Reserves to be serving on full-time active duty for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, and training the reserve components:

- (1) The Army National Guard of the United States, 6,244.
- (2) The Army Reserve, 4,288.
- (3) The Naval Reserve, 207.
- (4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 67.

(5) The Air National Guard of the United States, 1,560.

(6) The Air Force Reserve, 681.

(c) The average strength prescribed by subsection (a) for the Selected Reserve of any reserve component shall be proportionately reduced by (1) the total authorized strength of units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component which are on active duty (other than for training) at any time during the fiscal year, and (2) the total number of individual members not in units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component who are on active duty (other than for training) without their consent at any time during the fiscal year. Whenever such units or such individual members are released from active duty during any fiscal year, the average strength prescribed for such fiscal year for the Selected Reserve of such reserve component shall be proportionately increased by the total authorized strength of such units and by the total number of individual members.

AMENDMENTS TO SELECTED RESERVE EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Sec. 402. (a) Section 2131(b)(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking out "50 percent" and inserting in lieu thereof "100 percent".

(b) Section 2133(b) of such title is amended to read as follows:

"(b)(1) A member who fails to participate satisfactorily in training with his unit, if he is a member of a unit, during a term of enlistment for which the member entered into an agreement under section 2132(a)(4) of this title shall refund an amount computed under paragraph (2) unless the failure to participate in training was due to reasons beyond the control of the member. Any refund by a member under this section shall not affect the period of obligation of such member to serve as a Reserve.

"(2) The amount of any refund under paragraph (1) shall be the amount equal to the product of—

"(A) the number of months of obligated service remaining during that term of enlistment divided by the total number of months of obligated service of that term of enlistment; and

"(B) the total amount of educational assistance provided to the member under section 2131 of this title."

(c) The amendments made by this section shall apply only to individuals enlisting in the Reserves after September 30, 1979.

DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY OF SECRETARY CONCERNED TO RETAIN CERTAIN RESERVE OFFICERS ON ACTIVE DUTY UNTIL AGE 60

Sec. 403. (a) Section 3855 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting "Veterinary Corps," after "Dental Corps."

(b) Section 3855 of such title is amended by inserting "veterinary officer," after "dental officer."

Mr. PRICE (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title IV be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Are there any amendments to title IV? If not, the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE V—CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Sec. 501. (a) The Department of Defense is authorized a strength in civilian personnel, as of September 30, 1980, of 986,292.

(b) The strength for civilian personnel prescribed in subsection (a) shall be appor-

tioned among the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy (including the Marine Corps), the Department of the Air Force, and the agencies of the Department of Defense (other than the military departments) in such numbers as the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe. The Secretary of Defense shall report to the Congress within sixty days after the date of the enactment of this Act on the manner in which the initial allocation of civilian personnel is made among the military departments and the agencies of the Department of Defense (other than the military departments) and shall include the rationale for each allocation.

(c) In computing the strength for civilian personnel, there shall be included all direct-hire and indirect-hire civilian personnel employed to perform military functions administered by the Department of Defense (other than those performed by the National Security Agency) whether employed on a full-time, part-time, or intermittent basis, but excluding special employment categories for students and disadvantaged youth such as the stay-in-school campaign, the temporary summer aid program and the Federal junior fellowship program, and personnel participating in the worker-trainee opportunity program. Whenever a function, power, or duty, or activity is transferred or assigned to a department or agency of the Department of Defense from a department or agency outside of the Department of Defense, or from another department or agency within the Department of Defense, the civilian personnel end strength authorized for such departments or agencies of the Department of Defense affected shall be adjusted to reflect any increases or decreases in civilian personnel required as a result of such transfer or assignment.

(d) When the Secretary of Defense determines that such action is necessary in the national interest, he may authorize the employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized by subsection (a), but such additional number may not exceed 1¼ percent of the total number of civilian personnel authorized for the Department of Defense by subsection (a). The Secretary of Defense shall promptly notify the Congress of any authorization to increase civilian personnel strength under the authority of this subsection.

Mr. PRICE. (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title V be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Are there any amendments to title V? If not, the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE VI—MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS

SEC. 601. (a) For fiscal year 1980, the components of the Armed Forces are authorized average military training student loads as follows:

- (1) The Army, 74,468.
- (2) The Navy, 61,913.
- (3) The Marine Corps, 22,618.
- (4) The Air Force, 43,249.
- (5) The Army National Guard of the United States, 14,616.
- (6) The Army Reserve, 6,328.
- (7) The Naval Reserve, 906.
- (8) The Marine Corps Reserve, 3,156.
- (9) The Air National Guard of the United States, 1,958.
- (10) The Air Force Reserve, 1,276.

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Mr. PRICE (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title VI be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Are there any amendments to title VI? If not, the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE VII—CIVIL DEFENSE

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 701. There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1980 for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 the sum of \$138,000,000.

ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN LIMITATIONS ON CIVIL DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 702. Section 408 of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2260) is amended to read as follows:

"APPROPRIATIONS AND TRANSFER OF FUNDS

"Sec. 408. (a) No funds may be appropriated for any fiscal year for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act unless such funds have been authorized for such purpose by legislation enacted after July 14, 1976.

"(b) Funds made available for the purposes of this Act may be allocated or transferred for any of the purposes of this Act, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, to any agency or government corporation designated to assist in carrying out this Act. Any allocation or transfer of funds under the preceding sentence shall be reported in full detail to the Congress within thirty days after such allocation or transfer."

Mr. PRICE (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title VII be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. SKELTON

Mr. SKELETON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. SKELTON: On page 16, strike all of lines 5 through 9, and insert in lieu thereof the following:

"Sec. 701. The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2251 through 2297), is amended—

(1) by adding after title IV the following new title:

"TITLE V—ENHANCED PROGRAM FOR THE 1980'S

"FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS

"Sec. 501. (a) The Congress finds that—

"(1) a program providing for relocating the population of the larger United States cities, and other risk areas, during a period of strategic warning resulting from an international crisis can be effective and cost less than alternative programs;

"(2) the present civil defense program is inadequate;

"(3) a new civil defense program can be developed immediately which, with only a modest increase in resource allocation, can enhance the civil defense capability of the United States.

"(b) The Congress determines that a new civil defense program should be implemented—

"(1) to enhance the survivability of the American people and its leadership in the event of nuclear war and thereby to improve the basis for eventual recovery and to reduce the vulnerability to a major attack;

"(2) to enhance deterrence and stability, to contribute to perceptions of the overall strategic balance and crisis stability, and to reduce the possibility that the United States could be coerced by an enemy in times of increased tension;

"(3) to not suggest any change in the United States policy of relying on strategic nuclear forces as the preponderant factor in maintaining deterrence; and

"(4) to include planning for population relocation during times of international crisis which are adaptable to deal with natural disasters and other peacetime emergencies.

"PROGRAM ELEMENTS

"Sec. 502. To carry out section 501, the President shall develop and implement a civil defense program which includes—

"(1) a survey of the shelter inherent in existing facilities;

"(2) nuclear civil protection planning for both in-place protection and population relocation, during times of international crises;

"(3) planning for the development of additional crisis shelter, of capabilities for shelter management, of the marking and stocking of shelters, and of ventilation kits for shelters;

"(4) the development of emergency evacuation plans in areas where nuclear powerplants are located;

"(5) the improvement of warning systems;

"(6) the improvement of systems and capabilities for the direction and control of emergency operations by civil governments at all levels, including development of a distributed survivable network of emergency operating centers;

"(7) the improvement of radiological defense capability;

"(8) the improvement of emergency public information and training programs and capabilities;

"(9) research and development; and

"(10) the development of such other systems and capabilities as are necessary to realize the maximum lifesaving potential of the civil defense program.

"ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

"Sec. 503. The powers contained in titles II and IV of this Act shall be used in developing and implementing section 502"; and

(2) by adding at the end of the table of contents the following:

"TITLE V—ENHANCED PROGRAM FOR THE 1980'S

"Sec. 501. Findings and determinations.

"Sec. 502. Program elements.

"Sec. 503. Administrative provisions."

"AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 702. There are authorized to be appropriated for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, in 1979 dollars, the sums of \$138,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1980, \$145,900,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1981, \$180,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1982, \$243,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1983, and \$283,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1984. The sums specified in this section shall be adjusted by the inflation factor used by the Office of Management and Budget in preparing budget estimates submitted to the Congress, so that the actual sum authorized for each fiscal year shall reflect then current dollars."

And, on page 16, line 12, strike "Sec. 702." and insert in lieu thereof "Sec. 703."

Mr. SKELTON (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. SKELTON was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, the first purpose of government is to provide for the common defense of its people, to have secure people, and a secure nation.

How is this done?

History tells us time and again that the only way to remain secure is to be strong and to be prepared to repel, survive and defeat a would-be aggressor. From the beginning of recorded mankind, we see that those nations that were not militarily strong eventually became victims of those who were stronger—either by giving way to the demands of the stronger diplomatically, or by losing in battle.

In the early days of armed conflict, governments built fortresses or walled cities to protect the population. Then, as time passed, the borders of a country were made secure to protect the country's citizens. But today, because of modern science, neither forts nor border defenses are sufficient to secure a people from an atomic weapon launched thousands of miles away by an intercontinental ballistic missile. To defend a populace from the threat of incoming ICBM's we need a civil defense program to allow for evacuation, fallout shelters or blast shelters. We need to educate the intended victims as to how they may be protected by their Government or by self-help. We must make the citizens aware that truly lives can be saved—and will be saved—should an attack occur. To be prepared, that is the answer; not only to the saving of lives, but to there being a strong deterrent to an enemy who would consider such an attack.

Mr. Chairman, the amendment I offer today, for the first time since American civil defense went into effect in the 1950's, establishes a plan, a definite program and definite goals for the civil defense of America. It would, in the first instance, do these things:

Provide for the population relocation during a period of strategic warning;

Provide for the survivability of the American population and for recovery;

Provide for civil defense being part of the strategic balance and reduce the possibility of the United States being coerced by an enemy;

Provide for planning of proper shelter that might be needed;

Provide for the saving of lives from the destruction caused by hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, and earthquakes;

Provide for emergency evacuation in the event of a nuclear plant accident such as the one at Three Mile Island;

Provide for adequate emergency warning systems; and

Provide for emergency public information and training programs.

Mr. Chairman, second, this amendment would provide for 5 years of authorized funding to meet the need of present and future planning.

It is interesting to note that the Appropriations subcommittee dealing with civil defense noted the absence of a multiyear authorization in its report. This second provision would give the demonstrated support necessary to effect a strong program that looks ahead to the future. The amendment adopts the same figure as the beginning figure the Committee on Armed Services chose, \$138 million for the first year, increasing in 1984 to \$283 million.

We must take note, Mr. Chairman, that our rival in the world community, the U.S.S.R., spends approximately \$2 billion a year on civil defense and has 100,000 full-time civil defense personnel. On the other hand, in the past we in this country have spent only \$100 million a year, which is about 45 cents a person, on civil defense, and we only have for the entire Nation approximately 10,000 people who are full-time emergency preparedness personnel. My amendment would be the first step in correcting this disparity.

I also point out the belief that if there is a nuclear war, all is lost. That belief just has no basis. Those who subscribe to the so-called mutual assured destruction theory overlook the fact that the Russians do not think that way. It is what a country perceives that is important. If Russia thinks that its population can survive a nuclear attack, then it can and will be more venturesome. Thus, the mutual assured destruction thinking is without foundation.

□ 1720

By our country maintaining attack preparedness, there will be a war-preventing value in our civil defense. The civil defense will be a stabilizing deterrent to a would-be aggressor.

If we are to be prepared, that is the question.

Mr. Chairman, we only have to look at recent examples in history, a recent example where attacks were made based upon what a country thought, not what was true.

We look at World War II, the failure of America to fortify Guam, the scrapping of our battleships; and the draft passing by only one vote caused Pearl Harbor. Nazi Germany invaded Poland and Russia on the belief that they could win. So it is what a country believes is what is important.

To be more specific, Mr. Chairman, the district I represent located in western Missouri contains 150 Minuteman missiles as part of our nuclear retaliatory force, part of the Strategic Air Command. This area is one of the 39 prime potential targets in this country.

I refer my colleagues to the map on my right showing the potential enemy nuclear targets in our country. All 39 areas in our country are literally under the enemy nuclear gun.

Further, populations in large cities are presently most vulnerable without plans or without preparedness to evacuate them or protect them. They are in serious trouble. For the proper protection of our citizens, I urge the adoption of this amendment.

Mr. MITCHELL of New York. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, I wish to speak in support of the Skelton amendment.

The Appropriations Committee reduced our authorization of \$138 million to \$95.6 million this year primarily because we did not have a full-scale, long-range plan in place for civil defense.

The Skelton amendment would overcome this objection. Apparently, they had no substantive objection to civil defense for our Nation. It was just that we did not have a plan in place.

I would like to point out that this House for the last 2 years has passed this figure of \$138 million. Our full Committee on Armed Services has passed this figure for 3 years. The last vote in our last subcommittee was 9 to 1 in support of \$138 million for a civil defense program.

What is the magic about \$138 million? Well, that just happens to be the first-year expenditure of the 5-year program for civil defense of the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON).

We need to protect our people from the danger of nuclear weapons, from the Soviet Union primarily, because they are protecting their citizens. Everyone in this Chamber wants peace, peace beyond anything else.

We are taught by our leaders, to maintain the peace, we have to have some sort of strategic balance with the Soviet Union. We cannot have any great disparity in weaponry.

We are told by our leaders also that we have something called the rough equivalent in weaponry.

From my point of view, it seems to get a little rougher every year. They say the weaponry is equal. If they can protect themselves from our weapons, and we cannot protect ourselves from their weapons, it is as if they have far more weapons, and it makes a mockery of the strategic balance. It just does not exist.

No one knows just how superior their system is, but there is no one who looks at the system or a comparison of the systems very long who does not deny it is positively superior. We are never going to know just how superior their system is until it is put in place.

We do know just by looking at the numbers that they are trying more than 10 times harder than we are to build an effective civil defense system.

First of all, we only have 10,000 people full time involved in our system. They have over 100,000.

We spend less than \$100 million a year on civil defense. They spend between \$1 and \$2 billion.

The only place we excel is in the number of casualties that would occur in the

event of a nuclear war. It is estimated that they can put their system in place, having the 3 or 4 days necessary to evacuate their cities, that their casualties would be in the range of 10 million people, but our casualties, without any program, would be in the range of 100 million people. So, once again they win by a 10-to-1 ratio.

If we want to maintain the peace, ladies and gentlemen, if we want to maintain this balance in weaponry and protection, we have two choices. We can develop a civil defense system for America which only costs about a billion dollars more than we spend now over the next 5 years, or we can build bigger and better weapons systems to be able to destroy more Soviet citizens.

I point out to my colleagues that to provide a civil defense system for our people protects their lives, and it is a much more humane approach and less expensive approach for those who are concerned about budgetary totals, than to build more exotic and more expensive weapons.

Let me refer to this chart that presents the results of a study President Carter asked for, an interagency study by the best brains in America on what would happen if there were an all-out nuclear attack by the Soviet Union.

This is a figure of comparisons of different systems. The first figure is called "Program Aid." That is about what we spend now, a little less than \$100 million. If we were attacked by the Soviet Union, only 25 percent of our American population would survive.

So with Plan A, which is where we are now, 20 percent of Americans would survive an all-out nuclear attack.

If we go with the plan of the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON), and just spend a little over a billion dollars over the period of the next 5 years, 85 percent of our population can survive, and even if our population is targeted after it is evacuated, 75 percent can survive. It is the best cost-ratio program we have invested in. We save, by investing about a billion dollars, 100 million American lives. That adds up to about \$10 per American life. Where can you buy a program like that?

I just want to point out that the full House has passed this for 2 years in a row.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. MITCHELL) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. MITCHELL of New York was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. MITCHELL of New York. Our head of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Mr. Tirana, said for the past years they can get into this program, they can use the money effectively.

As I mentioned, our subcommittee passed it by a 9-to-1 vote the last time we considered it. I would just urge support of this program. I think it is a great investment in peace.

We learned yesterday we are behind the Soviet Union in pretty nearly every category, 20 out of 23 programs for waging war find us behind the Soviets, and we are behind here also.

I would like to say for those of my colleagues who vote against the defense budget and vote against our weapons systems and vote to destroy any new programs and technology we have, that those colleagues can support civil defense in good conscience. It is a program that does not hurt anyone. It is a program that saves Americans.

For those of my colleagues who would do away with our weapons or not provide us with adequate weaponry, if those colleagues cannot give us the weapons to protect our people, at least they can give our people a place to hide.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKINSON, Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MITCHELL of New York. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I want to commend the gentleman for his long-lasting and tenacious support of the civil defense program. I would like to make the observation here on the floor I made to him privately and in committee. I really think it would be advantageous to change the name of the program to, instead of civil defense, a civil disaster program. The connotation of civil defense conjures up fall-out shelters and the era of the 1960's when right now in my district and in Mobile and in the Southern part of the United States, Hurricane Frederic has come in. We have just seen David go through.

□ 1730

That is a big function. Until we have a nuclear war that will be the principal function of this organization and we should recognize it as such. If we would label it properly we would get much greater and wider spread popular support. If we would recognize it as a civil disaster program for whatever the purpose, I think it would be much more readily accepted.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. MITCHELL of New York was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. DICKINSON, Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. MITCHELL of New York. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DICKINSON. I think funding would come more easily, I think we would have wider popular acceptance and I think people would more readily understand it if it were so labeled, and I think it would be more aptly described. I certainly hope as the gentleman continues to work in this field, which he has done for quite some time, and to his credit, he would seriously consider this and work toward that end.

Mr. MITCHELL of New York. I thank the gentleman for his contribution. I think his reasoning is sound.

I would mention one other thing that has not been mentioned as a reason, and that is every time we bring up civil defense in this program it meets with a disaster on the floor, so perhaps it would be good to call it that in anticipation of what is going to happen.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. NEDZI TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. SKELTON

Mr. NEDZI, Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. NEDZI to the amendment offered by Mr. SKELTON: Strike out "on page 16, strike all of lines 5 through 9, and insert in lieu thereof the following:" and insert in lieu thereof "Page 16, after line 9, insert the following new section:"

Redesignate section 701 of the matter proposed to be inserted as section 702.

Strike out section 702 of the matter proposed to be inserted.

Mr. NEDZI, Mr. Chairman, let me try to put into perspective what is before the committee at this time. There is an amendment on the floor, an amendment, incidentally, with which I have no quarrel in substantial degree. The difference in my amendment and the amendment presented by the gentleman from Missouri is the fact that he proposes in his amendment a 5-year authorization which totals some \$989.9 million over this period of time. This authorization is being presented to the committee without any hearings on the part of the subcommittee or the full committee or any having ever been considered.

The rest of the gentleman's amendment is something with which I agree, the administration agrees, and it represents certain findings and determinations of the Congress with respect to civil defense and encourages action in order to approve our civil defense program, which is sorely needed. That is what we are talking about at the present time.

The question is whether we want to take away from the Armed Services Committee, indeed, from the Congress, the right to renew the authorization during the forthcoming 4 years, or whether we here tonight at 5:30 are going to authorize almost a billion dollars for a program which is being managed at the present time by managers who have just gotten into office several weeks ago.

The new Civil Defense structure has just gotten off the ground. The Director for Civil Defense was confirmed by the Senate just before our congressional recess. So I think it is appropriate for Mr. Massey, the new Director, to have an opportunity to put his house in order before we endeavor to legislate a 5-year program.

This position is supported by the administration and the administration opposes the proposed funding methods and levels in the gentleman's amendment. As I said, there were no hearings held on this and if we are going to legislate properly, certainly some kind of congressional review is in order. This program which is outlined here today is not prevented from going into being, it can be done next year. The amount authorized for this year is identical in the bill and in the gentleman's amendment, so there is no quarrel about that. It is just the future authorization.

In all honesty, we just do not believe any authorizing committee should be asked to be put in this kind of a position.

Let me make one more point, and that is that we have been engaging here for

some time now, as I am sure all of the Members are aware, in something of a charade with appropriation bills coming before the Congress before authorization bills. I might say that despite the fact we have \$138 million in the bill, the House has appropriated only \$100.6 million, and the other body has appropriated \$99.1 million, so that is something of a charade. If anybody here does not think authorizing money for the next 5 years for this agency is a great charade, they are sadly mistaken. I trust that the amendment will be approved which, in effect, will adopt the findings part of the gentleman's amendment, but will eliminate the out-year authorizations.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak against the Nedzi amendment.

The gentleman in his address on his amendment, that guts the Skelton amendment, spoke of a charade. I think it is a charade if we have a civil defense plan and do not have one that works.

The people of this Nation in a recent poll felt that this country spends approximately \$1 billion a year on civil defense. In truth and in fact, we spend about \$100 million, one-tenth of that amount. It is a charade for them to believe that we have the capability to protect them, to remove them from areas that are in danger, to tell them about blast shelters, to tell them about fallout shelters.

I oppose this amendment because it would take out the multiyear funding. The reason for it is this: The chairman of the subcommittee that Mr. NEDZI mentioned, Mr. EDDIE BOLAND, in the report that refers to this says that the reason there was just \$100 million appropriated was because of the lack of multiyear funding. That corrects this. That is what the report points out. If we are going to have proper funding we must leave this intact.

I urge this body vote no on the Nedzi amendment.

Mr. MITCHELL of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. MITCHELL of New York. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

In response to the charge we should have, or the suggestion that we should have more hearings, I would point out that we have had hearings on the need for a civil defense program for the past 4 years.

I would also say that the argument objecting to the program, because we have a new organization in place is not really valid because the same people, the same experts are going to come up with the same program they have been proposing for 4 years.

Mr. SKELTON. As a matter of fact, hearings have been held for 4 years. Would the gentleman be interested in knowing in response to the question that I requested a hearing on the exact bill on March the 22d and I have not had it yet. I am forced to go this way. We must protect the people of this country, we

must do it by proper civil defense, and we must do it by multiyear funding, and that is what we intend to do.

Mr. MITCHELL of New York. Would the gentleman yield further?

Mr. SKELTON. Yes, I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. MITCHELL of New York. I would like to also point out that we are 10 years behind the Soviet Union. If we continue to postpone this thing, we are going to be even further behind.

I was a little disturbed by the characterization of a charade with the gentleman's amendment, and I think the only charade here is that the House has not done anything about civil defense. I point out that the chairman of the committee is the one person who voted against the civil defense program when we had a 9-to-1 vote in favor of the civil defense program in our subcommittee.

Mr. SKELTON. Does the gentleman mean everyone on the subcommittee voted for a civil defense program except one?

Mr. MITCHELL of New York. That is affirmative, and it is the chairman who just spoke on the program.

I would just like to see the House provide some leadership to get its teeth into a program and to do something about protecting the American people.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. I yield to the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say to the Committee that as soon as we are able to vote on this particular amendment, after that vote the Committee will rise and conclude the consideration of this bill tomorrow. If we could just wrap up the business on this amendment we could leave for the evening.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. Yes, I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. NEDZI. Is it not a fact that there is not one single dollar more of authorization for this particular year in this legislation?

Mr. SKELTON. Yes; I purposely did that. Let me answer the gentleman. I purposely did that and included a multiyear funding, because the report of the Appropriations Committee said they will not appropriate more money until there is a multiyear funding established to set forth a proper several-year plan for civil defense.

□ 1740

That is what my amendment does, and the gentleman guts it by his amendment to prohibit us from having a proper year-to-year planning in civil defense. If the gentleman's amendment to my amendment is adopted—

Mr. NEDZI. Is it not true that we have not had a word of testimony on how the authorization—

Mr. SKELTON. The gentleman did not grant me a hearing on this. On the 22d

day of March I requested a hearing. I heard nothing. As the gentleman knows, I wanted to come and present testimony. Nothing came, so we have to rely on the 4 years of testimony the gentleman from New York spoke about. Hearings have been held.

Mr. NEDZI. They did not talk about the 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984 requirements, did they, in those hearings?

That is not my fault, sir.

Mr. WHITTAKER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise to speak in opposition to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Missouri, I think, is proposing a very sound, reasonable and logical amendment. I wish to speak in favor of it but in opposition to the amendment of the gentleman from Michigan.

The amendment of the gentleman from Missouri would give civil defense work a purpose and make it a part of the Nation's strategic military thinking. This measure was introduced with the intention of giving Congress a chance to at least demonstrate its support for a civil defense policy. It provides for the protection of human lives and property during emergencies such as natural disasters, nuclear powerplant accidents, other manmade calamities as well as nuclear confrontation.

I feel that Congress is going to have to take the lead on this issue of civil defense. If this amendment passes, rather than if the amendment of the gentleman from Michigan passes, it would be a signal to the administration that the Nation is now preparing to start reappraising its attitude toward civil defense.

So, I ask the Members to vote negative on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan and positive on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. Chairman, I do not know whether 2 years or 5 years is a proper period of time for funding under this program or not, but I can say that one of the principal reasons why we have not had anything in civil defense up to this point is that we have had no discussion; we have had no capacity to learn for the future. I believe we ought to lay out a plan for the next 5 years.

What this Congress does today it can undo tomorrow or next year, but it does not hurt to give us further discussion or planning. The very fact that we authorize does not mean that the Appropriations Committee has to appropriate those specific amounts, as the authorization would propose. So, there is no harm to be done.

It seems to me that in this kind of long-range look at our civil defense we simply have not been doing anything in the past. We have had the opportunity with our natural disasters to train our

people in this country to handle nuclear disasters should they occur, but we simply have not provided the tools and have not provided the facilities and have not provided the leadership, the planning for it, the long-range direction of any sort.

I think we ought to vote down this amendment and support the amendment offered by the gentleman from Missouri.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. NEDZI) to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON).

The amendment to the amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON).

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. MINETA, Chairman pro tempore of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 4040) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1980 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and for research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and for civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, to authorize the military training student loads, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1980 for civil defense, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET TO HAVE UNTIL MIDNIGHT, FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1979, TO FILE REPORT ON SECOND BUDGET RESOLUTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1980

Mr. GIAIMO. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Budget may have until midnight, Friday, September 14, 1979, to file a report on the second budget resolution for fiscal year 1980.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Connecticut?

There was no objection.

MAKING IN ORDER ON MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1979, OR ANY DAY THEREAFTER, CONSIDERATION OF SECOND CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET

Mr. GIAIMO. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that it may be in order

on Monday, September 17, 1979, or any day thereafter, to consider the second concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 1980, revising the congressional budget for the U.S. Government for the fiscal year 1980.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Connecticut?

Mr. BAUMAN. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, do I understand that the gentleman is asking permission that the budget resolution may be considered on Monday or any day thereafter?

Mr. GIAIMO. That is right.

Mr. BAUMAN. If that permission is granted, what would be the schedule of consideration for general debate and amendments to the Budget Act?

Mr. GIAIMO. As I understand it, we would have general debate only on Monday. Then, we would continue thereafter. I do understand that there is an agreement by the leadership—and I cannot speak to this—but I am informed that we would not take up the budget resolution on Tuesday, but would go back to it on Wednesday.

Mr. BAUMAN. The tentative schedule, as the gentleman from Maryland has seen it, allows general debate on Monday, at which time I understand there are to be no rollcalls; and Wednesday would be the day amendments under the 5-minute rule will be considered on the budget resolution. Is that correct?

Mr. GIAIMO. That is my understanding.

Mr. BAUMAN. I understand the gentleman. Further reserving the right to object, I would like to observe that this request, while it comes by unanimous consent, is of great importance because of the nature of the legislation asked to be considered. If an objection were lodged to this, the gentleman would be forced to go to the Rules Committee and obtain a special rule waiving the statutory requirement of a 10-day layover after reporting. I would observe for the record that there has been much discussion in recent days of attempts by the majority leadership to limit the rights of Members to offer amendments to various pieces of legislation, to curtail debate, and perhaps even to change the nature of votes permitted on legislation. Such actions would be a serious violation of all Members' rights.

I would point out that while we are dealing here with a simple unanimous-consent request on a very important matter, if the policy I have described is adopted by the majority leadership of the House, this kind of pending request and many others could be subjected to the right of any Member to object. Such undemocratic plans could make it very difficult for the business of the House to be conducted if Members' rights are curtailed.

I thank the gentleman for his information, and I withdraw my reservation of objection, at least for this particular request.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to

the request of the gentleman from Connecticut?

There was no objection.

HOUR OF MEETING ON WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1979

Mr. GIAIMO. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns on Tuesday, September 18, 1979, it adjourn to meet at 11 a.m. on Wednesday, September 19, 1979.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Connecticut?

There was no objection.

PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE TO FILE REPORT ON H.R. 4119, FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE ACT OF 1979

Mr. JONES of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Agriculture may have until midnight tonight, September 13, to file a report on the bill H.R. 4119, the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1979.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from North Carolina?

There was no objection.

CONCERN FOR INDEPENDENT TRUCKERS

(Mr. ROTH asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Speaker, last June, throughout much of the country, traditional commerce slowed and in many areas stopped due to a strike by the independent truckers of America. Many Americans, and especially many in leadership positions, were frankly amazed at the fortitude of the independent truckers, and the impact of their actions.

It was not long before calls for action were heard from across this great country. Distinguished Members of Congress from across the Nation bemoaned the impact of the strike on commerce in their districts. Certainly, justifiable criticism was aimed at those strikers who practiced violence as their only means of obtaining public attention.

As that strike continued, public sentiment and people in leadership positions decided it was probably time to sit down and listen to some very legitimate concerns and problems of the beleaguered truckers. It became obvious that the strike was an act of financial desperation for this group.

Three major concerns were echoed in almost every meeting with the truckers across the country. A distinct lack of adequate fuel supply presented unbearable problems to those trying to make shipping deadlines, and roll up sufficient dollars to meet their financial needs. The lack of uniform minimum weight standards across the country caused tremendous inefficiency in the shipping busi-

ness. The time and energy costs of this problem are almost astronomical. The Interstate Commerce Commission's diesel fuel cost recovery program needed modification to adequately reimburse the independent trucker for his increasing costs.

Many of us who have the privilege of serving in elective office believe this privilege carries many responsibilities for leadership and service as well. Practicing this belief, we did our part to listen to the pleas of the independent truckers and determine what we could do to help them—and in doing that help the citizens affected by the strike.

President Carter sent a representative from the White House to a meeting in Madison where the truckers were promised action by their Government. These meetings occurred and were replayed throughout the country.

This very week, representatives of the independent truckers from across the country are meeting here in Washington. They are trying to determine what if anything has been done by their Federal Government. They are trying to determine what their next action must be; recognizing the intolerables still exist.

The talk of another strike is echoing across this land. The possible strike could make the first one look mild in terms of its impact on us all. At the very time we need the transportation of our fuel oil, and harvest crops, these truckers could be walking the picket lines.

If it occurs, the Federal Government must take a good share of the blame. For not only have the problems of the truckers not been solved—but more important—a promise by their Government to take action has also been broken. And thus, the tragedies of this strike would be many fold.

And so to the administration; and to the leadership of Congress, I say, "Act before it is too late." To do anything less will not only damage an already recession economy—it will also damage the integrity of the Government's commitment to past promises to an important segment of our citizens.

THE RIGHT TO EMIGRATE FROM THE SOVIET UNION

(Mr. LONG of Maryland asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material.)

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, on a recent congressional delegation visit to the Soviet Union, a letter to Leonid Brezhnev, which I drafted was signed by 12 Members of Congress:

This letter was addressed to Leonid I. Brezhnev. We have received a cable from the charge d'affaires in Moscow that the letter has been delivered to the Foreign Secretary for delivery to Secretary Brezhnev.

Mr. Speaker, I submit the letter, as follows:

WASHINGTON, D.C.,
August 21, 1979.

His Excellency LEONID I. BREZHNEV,
General Secretary,
Central Committee of the Communist Party,
Moscow, RSFSR,
U.S.S.R.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We, the undersigned members of Congress, express our deep concern both for the individuals who have sought to emigrate from the Soviet Union, and for those individuals of all faiths who have suffered because they have spoken out on behalf of their liberties and their religion.

The right of an individual to emigrate is a fundamental human right. This right has been denied to a number of religious groups, including Protestants, Pentecostals, Catholics and Jews. A number of Jewish men and women have been sentenced to prison for three to fifteen years after expressing their desire to leave the USSR for Israel. Jews have been accused of parasitism after losing their jobs following an application to emigrate; of hooliganism, for such trivial acts as bumping into a passerby causing a cake to drop on the sidewalk; and of owning anti-Soviet materials, for possessing Hebrew primers and prayer books.

We are further told that prisoners' rights guaranteed by Soviet penal codes are often denied Jewish prisoners, persecuted by both inmates and prison administrators. Anti-Jewish incidents are provoked. They are compelled to perform hard labor on low-calorie diets, they must live in unsanitary surroundings and they receive inadequate medical care.

Anti-Semitism apparently has not disappeared in the Soviet Union—restrictions against Jews attending higher institutions are tightening. Jewish religious and cultural life is restricted. Impediments to teaching Hebrew remain in effect.

We are concerned not only with the violations of human rights of Protestants, Pentecostals, Catholics and Jews, but over the damage this repression has had on the progress of detente.

When in Tashkent, the delegation was gratified to learn from the Grand Mufti that Muslim people are granted, in practice as well as in law, full freedom to observe their religion, to print religious documents, to distribute the Koran, to teach their children in religious schools, and to train religious leaders. We ask that you allow the same opportunities for other religious minorities, including the ones we have mentioned above.

In consonance with the Declaration of Human Rights to which the Soviet Union is a signator, we respectfully call upon the Soviet Union to:

- (1) Recognize, in practice as well as in law, the rights of persons belonging to religious and other minorities and interpret their rights equally before the law;
- (2) Act to prevent all harassment, intimidation and punitive action against persons wishing to emigrate;
- (3) Release all Jews as well as prisoners of other religions who decide to emigrate for reasons of conscience;
- (4) Increase the number of visas to make them equal to the number of applications or requests for applications;
- (5) Issue visas on a first-come, first-serve basis, without discrimination because of profession or place of residence;
- (6) Remove, from the paths of those wishing to emigrate, impediments—such as preventing applicants from obtaining official forms, and intercepting letters from abroad containing required documents, and eliminate all undue delays in processing and approving applications.

Mr. Secretary, your efforts on behalf of detente between our two nations are well known and deeply appreciated. It is unfortunate that our relations are constantly set back by the policies discussed in this letter, policies which gain your country nothing and which damage it in world opinion.

For all these reasons, we urge you to demonstrate your support for the spirit and substance of the Helsinki Agreement by acting promptly on these serious matters. Above all, we ask you to be generous and understanding in those cases the merits of which you may question. Such affirmative action would remove a major roadblock in the way of detente.

Sincerely yours,

Lester L. Wolff of New York, Tennyson Guyer of Ohio, Andy Ireland of Florida, David R. Bowen of Mississippi, Benjamin A. Gilman of New York, James H. Scheuer of New York, Clarence D. Long of Maryland, Robert J. Lagomarsino of California, Carlos J. Moorhead of California, Fortney H. Stark of California, Robert K. Dornan of California, and Billy Lee Evans of Georgia.

PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPING SYNTHETIC FUEL PLANTS NOW

(Mr. MOORHEAD of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MOORHEAD of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, on July 29, the very highly regarded Committee for Economic Development, a private, nonprofit research and education organization composed of the leading businessmen of America, issued a report entitled "Helping Ensure Our Energy Future, a Program for Developing Synthetic Fuel Plants Now."

Mr. Speaker, this report recommends a program almost entirely on all fours with the legislation adopted by the House of Representatives last June by a vote of 368 to 25. Today, showing that businessmen are willing to put their money where their mouth is, representatives of 18 major banks and insurance companies have issued a statement indicating that they are willing to invest their money to support private sector development of synthetic fuels.

I include this statement as part of my remarks:

NEW YORK, N.Y.—Representatives of 18 major banks and insurance companies have endorsed a limited program to spur private sector development of synthetic fuels.

Chauncey J. Medberry, Chairman of Bank of America N.T. & S.A., has announced that these institutions have agreed to support efforts to "convert into law and into reality" the recommendations made in a recent statement on synthetic fuels by the Committee for Economic Development, a private nonprofit research and education organization. The recommendations were contained in a CED report entitled "Helping Insure Our Energy Future: A Program for Developing Synthetic Fuel Plants Now," which was released on July 29. Mr. Medberry is a trustee of CED.

The report called for the creation of certain government financial incentives to assist private sector development of synthetic fuels. It also called for the expedition and modification of certain regulatory and environ-

mental requirements to make it possible for the private sector to build approximately ten first-of-a-kind plants to demonstrate the commercial feasibility of converting coal and oil shale into oil and gas.

Mr. Medberry noted that individual CED trustees have conferred with members of Congress and the Administration stressing the urgent need to begin work on a synthetic fuels program.

The banks and insurance companies endorsing the CED recommendation include:

- Aetna Life and Casualty Company.
- Bank of America N.T. & S.A.
- Bankers Trust Company.
- The Chase Manhattan Bank.
- Chemical Bank.
- Citibank, N.A.
- Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago.
- Connecticut General Life Insurance Company.
- Crocker National Bank.
- The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States.
- First City National Bank of Houston.
- The First National Bank of Chicago.
- Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company.
- Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
- Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York.
- New York Life Insurance Co., Inc.
- Prudential Insurance Co. of America.
- United California Bank.

□ 1750

DOOMSDAY DEBATE

(Mr. DELLUMS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, during the August recess, a very thought-provoking article appeared on the front page of the Washington Post's editorial section, Outlook.

Titled the "Doomsday Debate," this piece by Robert G. Kaiser and Walter Pincus, is a scenario of debate in the Soviet Union regarding a proposed nuclear attack on the United States. Mr. Speaker, we have heard much recently about a supposed vulnerability that this country suffers, in our ability to defend ourselves from such an attack. I believe that this article speaks directly to that issue and accurately describes why the Soviets can only conclude that a nuclear attack would trigger nothing short of Doomsday.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to share this important article with my colleagues and wish to insert in the RECORD at this point:

THE DOOMSDAY DEBATE

Will the United States soon be vulnerable to a sudden thermonuclear attack by the Soviet Union that could wipe out America's land-based missile force in a single blow? Yes, reply most of the experts—even the president of the United States. The 1980s will be perilous for America because of this "vulnerability," according to Henry A. Kissinger and many others.

A seemingly simple mathematical fact leads to this gloomy forecast. By the early 1980s the Soviets will have enough accurate warheads on their land-based rockets to target two bombs on every American missile silo while still holding in reserve most of their offensive forces. Theoretically, this would give the Soviets high confidence of "killing" 90 percent of the American silos.

In the past, America has relied on its "triad" of strategic forces—the combination of land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles and bombers—to insure survival of an adequate strategic force. If two or even one of those systems survived, that would be adequate to destroy the Soviet Union, according to the theory.

In a time of steadily increasing Soviet forces, however, the original "triad" theory has fallen victim to a new argument. Simply stated, the new theory is that even the appearance of a Soviet strategic advantage over one of the three elements of the "triad" would be dangerous. "Perceptions" about vulnerability are just as important as reality, according to this theory: the Soviets or other nations could misinterpret this perception as a genuine sign of American weakness. This is a theory devised and promoted entirely by Americans.

However, the most important question about vulnerability has not been asked: How would the Russians see it? The Soviet military literature contains no analysis of a possible Soviet first strike against U.S. land missiles. Then how might Soviet military planners exploit "vulnerability" five years from now, when their theoretical advantage will be greatest?

"SHALL WE ATTACK AMERICA?"

(By Robert G. Kaiser and Walter Pincus)

It is Aug. 10, 1984. The new Soviet leadership is finally in place in the Kremlin. The long bickering that followed Leonid Brezhnev's death in his sleep in late 1983 produced a showdown between the so-called *Mir* ("Peace") and *Chil* ("Strength") factions in the Politburo. This longstanding split has never been publicly revealed, but it has been the crucial division in Soviet politics since the early 1970s. Brezhnev led the "Peace" faction, and it has now been beaten. The new general secretary of the Communist Party is Vladimir Ivanov, 63, a resourceful politician who ran the Ukraine for several years. The outside world knows nothing of Ivanov's plans or policies.

In fact they are ominous. His secret platform in the just-completed leadership struggle was simple: The time has come for the ultimate showdown with the imperialists. The Soviet economy is slipping badly, Ivanov argued; oil is running out; the people are restless and hungry for consumer goods; the non-Russian nationalities are threatening rebellion. Most serious, the comrades who run the Red Army are upset by the latest developments in the imperialist camp—the new American MX missile, the stationing in Europe of new ballistic and cruise missiles aimed at the Motherland of socialism, and much more. This may be the last chance to win the ultimate showdown, so we must move now. That is what Ivanov and his colleagues argued, and they won.

Soon after taking power Ivanov had called together the seven-man team under Col. Lev Perlshtein that had long been responsible for the Soviet Union's most sophisticated strategic thinking. Ivanov asked Perlshtein and his group to produce a crash study on how the Soviet Union could initiate and win a nuclear showdown with the capitalist camp. Ivanov told Perlshtein he was especially interested in the concept of the "window of vulnerability" that he had read about in the Politburo's private translations of American publications.

On this sticky August afternoon Perlshtein assembled his group in the Kremlin's wood-paneled situation room, four stories below the ground. He brought with him all six of his team, including Vladimir Kuznetsov, an apparatchik who had worked for almost two decades on strategic issues on the secretariat of the Central Committee. Perlshtein was

particularly proud of Kuznetsov, who was his own devil's advocate, a man steeped in strategic lore whose job it was to argue against whatever course of action the colonel himself chose to argue.

Ivanov was both excited and a little nervous about this encounter. Excited because he really did hope Perlshtein could produce a workable plan. Nervous because although he had won the power struggle, the "Peace" faction was still well represented on the Politburo, and he wasn't sure he could command a majority for an aggressive policy. On this day he had invited only four colleagues to the situation room—four men who were utterly loyal to him, though only one, Marshal Nikolai Antonov, his new minister of defense, had expert knowledge of strategic matters.

The other three were former regional party secretaries like Ivanov, all of whom he had brought to Moscow in the last few months: Fyodr Trepotkin from Leningrad, Alexei Stepanov from Minsk, Archil Shevshadze from Tbilisi. All were smart; all were tough; all had helped Ivanov to power.

The room was cool, unlike Red Square that sunny afternoon. Perlshtein and his group sat on one side of the long meeting table covered with green felt and dotted with bottles of Narzan mineral water. Ivanov and his four colleagues sat across from the experts. Ivanov nodded to Perlshtein to begin the briefing. This is what he said:

"First, comrades, a warning. You have put before us an unprecedented task. No power has ever used thermonuclear weapons. (I skip over the imperialists' atomic bombing of Japan, with which you are all familiar.) Also the attack suggested by the general secretary will require launching 350 of our rockets almost simultaneously, an unprecedented feat.

"Nevertheless," Perlshtein went on, "Comrade Ivanov has indicated he hopes to pursue this course. I intend to present our best thinking on how it could be done. We are encouraged by the extensive American literature on this subject, particularly analyses by the most determined imperialist warmongers, who are obviously convinced that we could succeed with a surprise attack.

"Let me add at the outset," Perlshtein said, "that, as usual, Comrade Kuznetsov disagrees with the thrust of my briefing. He will offer his dissent when I have finished.

"Let me outline our analysis of how a surprise attack could be launched against the imperialist camp. First, we must strike without provocation, when the imperialists believe our relations are on a sound, peaceful footing. It might be advisable to pick a moment when the Bolshoi Ballet or the Moscow Circus is touring the United States.

"There can be no hint of what we plan. They are watching us intensely by satellite, and they are listening in our communications. Need I recall the embarrassing revelations in the imperialist press some years ago of conversations picked up from Comrade Brezhnev's limousine telephone as he drove to his *dacha*? We must assume capitalist agents are well placed in our country, though we are confident they are not in our strategic rocket forces' chain of command.

"Our first aim must be to prevent America from going on any alert. With no alert we have a good chance of destroying all of their Minuteman and Titan missiles, at least half of their missile-carrying submarines and more than half of their bombers, which we would catch in port or on airfields.

"No matter what we do, you should keep in mind that the Americans' aggressive policies lead them to maintain much larger submarine missile and long-range bomber forces on alert, even in peaceful times, than we do. For example, we believe that more than

100 of their bombers can be put in the air, aimed at our homeland, within 15-30 minutes of an order to do so.

"Even without an order from the President, the notoriously reckless commanders of the U.S. Strategic Air Command can more than double this number by raising the level of alert. And American naval commanders can quickly add to the number of missile-carrying submarines at sea. In peaceful times, we calculate that the Americans usually have 350 submarine missiles at sea, carrying about 3,000 warheads. With an alert these numbers would rise."

At this point Kuznetsov, the devil's advocate, quietly interrupted his boss. "One point of information," he said. "To prevent the Americans from going on alert, we cannot go on alert. We must leave 80 percent or more of our submarines in port, where they usually are. We cannot move any bombers, including our Backfires, from their normal bases or otherwise change their behavior. We cannot evacuate any civilians. It may even be impossible for all of our leadership cadre to take advantage of the shelters that have been built for us."

"Quite right," Col. Perlshtein agreed. "But we do retain the element of surprise. To continue: The objective of this attack would be to eliminate the American land-based missiles and all of the missile-carrying submarines and bombers that would remain unalerted at the time of the strike."

"To do this we would propose firing 350 to 400 of our best long-range rockets, 200 RS20s (the one the Americans call the SS18) and 150 to 200 RS18s (the SS19). These would carry 2,450 to 2,800 warheads, each with explosive power of more than 550,000 tons of TNT. This would enable us to aim two warheads from two different rockets at each of America's 1,054 missile silos, and would give us a healthy margin to compensate for possible misfirings and to attack submarine and bomber bases."

Ivanov perked up as Perlshtein completed his description of the attack. "What was that about misfirings?" he asked. His question prompted a remark from Marshall Antonov.

"Comrade Perlshtein," Antonov said, "I think you should describe some of the technical challenges involved here."

"I was just coming to that," Perlshtein replied briskly. "As I said at the outset, we have been asked to describe an attack that no one has ever attempted. By its nature it is not something we can practice. Thus we will face a number of unique 'technical challenges,' to use Marshal Antonov's expression. Let me outline the principal ones."

"To be successful, this attack must be timed with a precision that neither we nor the Americans have ever attempted. Our warheads must land within seconds of each other—to be precise, within 20 to 40 seconds of each other—on each target, each of which is at least 10,000 kilometers [6,000 miles] from our missile silos. To guarantee the destruction of each silo we attack, we will want to achieve two explosions: one at ground level, one several hundred meters in the air. If the warheads arrive at their target more than about 20 seconds apart, the effects of the explosion of the first will probably disable the second as it arrives."

"To achieve this precision at the targets, each of our rockets will have its own, precise instant of launch. Each rocket will travel a unique flight path, each over a precise and unique distance, as will each of our warheads. As you know, our missiles are based in silos that stretch across about 1,600 kilometers [1,000 miles] across our country. Naturally, our command communications to launch the hundreds of rockets in this manner will have to be perfected."

Ivanov perked up again. "What has happened in the past when our people have tried something of this kind?" he asked.

"We have never tried anything of this kind," Perlshtein responded crisply. "But we do have an advantage over the Americans in these matters. We have tested our missiles from operational silos, so we know how they will work in a real attack."

"How many have we tested at one time?" Ivanov asked.

"Usually one at a time," Perlshtein replied. "Never more than 10."

"But what about the misfirings you mentioned?" Ivanov asked.

"That is another matter," Perlshtein said. "We know from experience that some rockets will fail to ignite, fail to stick to their course, or fail to go off on time. For this reason we will fire more rockets than we think we need—a margin of safety, if you will."

"Another point of information," Kuznetsov interjected. "Col. Perlshtein has told you that some rockets—we estimate 10 percent, by the way—will misfire. Unfortunately, we cannot predict which rockets these will be. But all our rockets must be targeted in advance. This means the targets of those rockets that misfire will not be hit, or will be hit with only one warhead. But we will not know which targets these might be, so we will not know where to target the extra missiles we plan to fire to provide the 'margin of safety.' In summary, we have to acknowledge that we will miss some targets."

"Thank you, comrade," Perlshtein remarked. "Let me continue."

"Obviously, our attack must be based on the assumption that our rockets and warheads are now as accurate as even the Americans' best. We believe they are. Also, because our warheads are bigger than the Americans', we can be more confident they will actually destroy the U.S. silos, because they will have such enormous explosive power. As you know, we now believe we can hit any target in America within a margin of error of 300 meters [about 1,000 feet]."

"Before Comrade Kuznetsov offers another point of information, let me explain one small problem regarding accuracy. This is a matter that has never been discussed by even the Americans in public, but our intelligence has discovered that the Americans refer to the problem as 'bias.'"

"As some of you may know, during our rocket tests we have always had some difficulty hitting the planned target, particularly in early phases of testing. Our mathematicians tell us there are geodetic anomalies that can distort the flight path of a missile or a warhead. That means a flight path over the ocean will not be the same as a flight path over mountain ranges with high iron-ore content, to give an example. Of course you all remember that the earth is not a perfect sphere but a slightly distorted one. This too can influence flight paths."

"We have compensated for this by adjusting our targeting mechanisms. Now, when we fire our rocket systems from west to east, we can hit targets with the anticipated accuracy. Some pessimists among our scientists believe that when we fire missiles over the North Pole at the United States, we will discover that our computations no longer apply, that new factors we have never experienced will distort our flight paths. Obviously we cannot test this hypothesis."

"What do the optimists say?" Ivanov asked.

"They don't think these factors could take us far off target, and that the large explosive power of our warheads should compensate for whatever error occurs," Perlshtein said.

"A point of information," Kuznetsov interjected. "I think the Americans use the word 'bias' precisely because it is an irrational, unpredictable factor. In the end our mathematicians could not explain the constant and consistent error in our targeting systems that our test flights revealed. We have just made an arbitrary compensation

in our aiming. We don't know why we always went off target before."

This exchange elicited the first comment from Trepotkin, the former party boss from Leningrad. Had he the gift of candor, Trepotkin would already have admitted that this entire meeting was quite astounding. Instead he asked Perlshtein a question:

"I'm not sure I understand," he said, "Is Comrade Kuznetsov saying that we won't be able to hit the targets?"

"No, no," Perlshtein replied. "Comrade Kuznetsov is saying there is some possibility—some unmeasurable possibility—that we won't hit the target with each warhead."

"We might miss the targets," Kuznetsov said in a low voice. Perlshtein ignored him.

"While we're talking about targets," Marshal Antonov commented, "perhaps you should discuss what the Americans have been doing to protect their missile silos."

"I was just coming to that," Perlshtein replied. "The Americans have recently completed what they call the 'hardening' of their Minuteman silos. This involves building thick barriers of concrete and steel around each silo. The Americans claim these silos can withstand pressures of 2,000 pounds per square inch. If true, this would mean they have good protection against anything but an almost perfect direct hit. Unfortunately, the atmospheric test ban treaty prevents us—and the Americans—from knowing exactly how strong these hardened silos might be. We can't test a real silo with a real bomb in normal conditions. It seems possible the silos are only half as strong as we think."

"Or twice as strong," Kuznetsov observed.

"Let me continue," Perlshtein said. "Of course this attack will not occur in a vacuum. We have also studied the political environment. Specifically, we have considered how the American president might react."

"We conclude that American satellites will detect our first barrage of 100 or more rockets as soon as they have taken off. Infrared detectors on satellites that hover in space 25,000 miles above our territory provide that information, and it is impossible for us to eliminate those satellites. That information will go through military channels to the White House, and it is supposed to reach the president almost instantly. But, as Dr. Kisinger and others have noted, it may not be easy to find the president at once."

"But we must assume he would get word of the attack within minutes. At first he will probably question the report, since he will see no provocation for an attack. Indeed, for the same reason the American military might withhold the information for further checking before passing it to the president. But this initial confusion could not last more than five minutes or so, because the Americans will soon detect our second and third barrages, and their radar will begin confirming what their satellites have told them already."

"As you know, the American system is poorly designed. The president alone can order a nuclear attack. But we assume he would inevitably consult with his ministers and perhaps some members of Congress. He would also have to flee at once to the airplane set aside for his use as a command post during an attack. We assume the president would also try at once to contact you, Comrade Ivanov, on the hot line. All these things take time. We have high confidence that the southernmost missile silos would be destroyed by the time the president could satisfy himself that he knew what was going on. I am talking of a period about 30 minutes after the initial launches."

"This is the crucial moment. By our calculation it will take another 30 minutes to complete our attack. The president will realize what we are doing. He will also realize that we have avoided attacking any major

city, even Washington. The Americans have done studies on this kind of attack and they know that it will cause minor losses—perhaps 10 million people, perhaps 20 million."

Ivanov started at this last observation. He recalled the Great Patriotic War [World War II], when the Soviet Union was largely laid waste and 20 million people were killed. "Are you saying that 20 million dead is a minor loss?" he asked.

"Only by standards of nuclear war," Perlshtein replied. "We calculate that by targeting the American population, we could easily kill 150 million. The president knows this too. He will see it is a minor attack."

"To continue. The president will have to realize that if he retaliates with his remaining forces—the bombers that have escaped our attack and the missiles on submarines—he will use up most of his remaining weapons and can only strike at our cities and industry. Without land-based rockets, he won't have weapons of sufficient accuracy to fire at our remaining land-based force."

"But this is a horrible option for the president. If he exercises it, he knows that we will retaliate, and both our countries will be destroyed. But if he holds back and tries to negotiate, he can save his country—maybe even save the world. American presidents are romantics. We assume he will opt for negotiation, which of course will amount to surrender. And I might add, this is just what many American experts have predicted."

"We assume he will opt for negotiations," Kuznetsov interjected, "because we have to assume so. Otherwise our attack will fail. We would lose our country if the president decided to retaliate instead."

"Yes, yes," Perlshtein replied. "That is a hypothetical possibility."

Perlshtein put down his notebook and opened a bottle of Narzan. The bubbly water spilled into his tumbler. While he took a drink Marshal Antonov scribbled a note and passed it to Ivanov. The general secretary read it and turned to Perlshtein:

"I would like Marshal Antonov to ask a few questions. Marshal?"

"First let me say that Col. Perlshtein has done his usual fine job. Then let me ask some questions. First, colonel, as you know, if we saw an American attack coming at our missile silos, we would immediately launch our rockets, so they would not be in their holes when the American warheads arrived. Why wouldn't the Americans do the same thing? I know they have written about this idea as something called 'Launch Under Attack.' I remember my friend Harold Brown threatening to do just that."

"I am grateful you raised that point," Perlshtein replied. "Our people are dubious that the Americans are well-enough organized to launch under attack. Remember, they will be caught completely by surprise. And although I grant they have written and talked about this possibility, we have seen no sign that they have adopted it as a strategy."

"But what if they only began to launch their missiles after the first of ours had landed?" Antonov asked. "Couldn't they still fire off more than half of their land-based rockets before we could destroy them?"

"That is a hypothetical possibility," Perlshtein replied.

"On another matter," Antonov said, "during this attack, what happens to America's bombers in Europe and on their aircraft carriers—what we call the forward-based systems in SALT talks? Don't we know that at least 200 of them are on 15-minute alert, and can carry their nuclear weapons to our homeland in less than an hour?"

"We have two options," Perlshtein replied. "We could target those bombers with our medium-range missiles, wiping them out simultaneously with our attack on the Ameri-

can missiles. But this would mean destroying much of Western Europe, so we rejected that idea. No, we must assume that the president would be as reluctant to use these weapons as any of his others."

"Let me ask about the number of American missiles that might survive our attack," Antonov went on. "I gathered earlier that we assume that even if our attack goes very well indeed, we would miss 10 percent—about 100 missiles. Is that right?"

"Right," Perlshtein replied.

"And how did we arrive at that figure?"

"It's a mathematical probability, marshal. Our people say it is the sort of failure rate we could expect."

"Could it be 20 percent, or 30?"

"I don't know how to answer that, marshal. Ten percent is a hunch. Twenty percent could be another hunch."

"You mentioned that some American bombers would take off before we could destroy them on the ground. Wouldn't some of these bombers be the newly fitted type that can carry 20 of the most accurate cruise missiles? Wouldn't all of them at least carry potent bombs? What would happen to them?"

"Again, marshal, we have to assume that the president would decide not to use those weapons," Perlshtein replied.

"You'd also have to assume that there are no Dr. Strangeloves—wasn't that the name?" Kuznetsov interjected. "I mean, you have to assume that none of those American pilots would take it upon themselves to retaliate against the Soviet Union."

"Americans usually obey orders," Perlshtein replied.

"I should ask the same question about the Americans' submarines. You said, I believe, that there would be more than 20 of them hidden at sea during and after our attack, with more than 3,000 warheads?"

"Again," Perlshtein said, "we have to assume the president won't try to use them."

Perlshtein sat down and opened another bottle of Narzan, nodding toward Kuznetsov as he did so. The men from the Central Committee took the cue. He shuffled his notes and began to speak.

"My assignment, comrades, is to argue the weaknesses in the briefing you have just heard. Speaking frankly, I'm not certain that you need to hear any more arguments against this idea, but please permit me to add one or two new points, and then to summarize what Marshal Antonov has referred to as the technical challenges."

"All of us are familiar with the consequences of conventional warfare on a nation. The general secretary has already recalled the sufferings of our Motherland 40 years ago, from which we are still recovering. I would remind the group that we are talking about something quite different. Perhaps this is something I am especially well placed to discuss. On Comrade Khrushchev's instructions, I was present in July 1962 when we detonated the largest hydrogen bomb ever exploded—about 50 megatons, you will recall. Let me assure you that all of what the Nazis did to our Motherland did not compare with this one explosion. And the 'minor attack' Comrade Perlshtein has outlined involves the explosion of about 1,350 megatons in the center of the United States."

"I have inquired at the Academy of Sciences: Do we know what the effects of such a powerful attack would be? (Here I have in mind not the military consequences, but the impact on the land, the air, the atmosphere and, of course, the population.) The answer is, we have theories but no real idea. We have no idea whether we might crack the earth's surface, or permanently damage the ionosphere, or poison the air over the entire world. I am referring here to consequences that could affect us at home—I happily set aside consequences for the United States. I am referring also to political consequences."

Comrade Perlshtein implies that the American president would react to damage on this scale by doing nothing. That is not the way we reacted to Nazi devastation of our country. I do not think we can conclude that only Russians would react as we did to such devastation of the Motherland.

"In passing, let me note another point. Comrade Perlshtein has described an attack on the heartland of America. That, as you know, is the area that produces America's great grain harvests. For years even we have depended on those harvests. I did learn at the Academy of Sciences about the Americans' findings in the South Pacific, where they once tested thermonuclear weapons. Thirty years after the fact, on the site of much less devastating explosions than Comrade Perlshtein has proposed, the earth remains so poisoned with radioactivity that the food it produces contains unacceptable levels of radiation."

"But these are hypothetical matters, about which the best scientists can disagree. For myself, I am more concerned about those 'technical challenges.' Frankly speaking, I do not see how we can surmount them. Let me add that I do not believe the Americans could surmount them either."

"Let me review them briefly. Comrade Perlshtein asks us to consider an attack that would require perfect timing of a command system that has never been tested; that would assume a level of reliability of our rockets that is extraordinarily high, especially when we consider that most of our rockets have been sitting for years—by necessity untested—in silos; that would require salvos of hundreds of rockets when we have never experimented with such salvos; that would require accuracy that depends on untested mathematical formulas, and when we know for certain that the earth's magnetism and atmosphere have unforeseen effects on rocket trajectories; that assumes we know how well America has protected its silos, when in fact we cannot know; that assumes we understand the effect of one thermonuclear explosion on a second, incoming weapon, when we don't really know those effects; and, most crucial—and, in my view, most debatable—that assumes that having suffered this attack, the American president will react by doing nothing with the enormous arsenal he would retain even after the attack. Moreover, we must assume that even if the American president did do nothing, the notoriously reckless American military would obey his orders."

"Of course I may be wrong. It remains possible that the American president will do nothing. But as Lenin's heirs and leaders of the Motherland, we must think of the problem from the opposite point of view. What if we guess wrong? What would the consequences be if instead of doing nothing, the president opts for an all-out response?"

"We know the answer. The Americans could launch many land-based missiles during our initial attack, and these alone could destroy our industrial civilization or many of our own rockets. Their submarine missiles and bombers could continue to strike at us for hours or even days, eliminating most of our population. Yes, we might take some satisfaction from the fact that we retained powerful rockets of our own, but what will we have won? What is the gain? Both of our countries could be destroyed."

It was Kuznetsov's turn to open a bottle of Narzan. Perlshtein took advantage of the pause to speak up again:

"Comrades, please keep in mind, the proposals Comrade Kuznetsov attributes to me were not my idea. I came here today to fulfill an instruction, to present a hypothetical plan. This whole idea grew out of articles the general secretary read in the American press. It is the Americans who have always trumpeted this proposal—American generals, American cold warriors. As Marshal Antonov

will confirm, our military people have never put great stock in these ideas. Frankly speaking, I am not prepared to give answers to all of Kuznetsov's points. I have searched for similar arguments in the American literature on these subjects, but to no avail. The Americans have not questioned the idea of their own vulnerability as forcefully as Comrade Kuznetsov has questioned it."

General Secretary Ivanov did not reveal his personal disappointment with the course this briefing had taken. Instead he asked Perlshtein a question:

"Let us assume you are right, that we really could not afford the risks inherent in this adventure. Still, could we exploit the Americans' belief in this theory to our advantage? Could we somehow threaten this attack to win other important objectives?"

Col. Perlshtein volunteered a reply: "Yes, Comrade Ivanov, we can use the threat, but I think we must be honest with ourselves about the fact that we can never fulfill the threat. That means we cannot invoke it to try to defend our own central interests. We might invoke it—even without saying anything—in areas like Angola and Ethiopia."

Kuznetsov intervened: "I might recall that we achieved our objectives in Angola and Ethiopia at a time when we did not enjoy this theoretical 'advantage.' We achieved our objectives in Berlin in 1961 when it was the Americans who had this kind of 'superiority.'"

"Well," said Ivanov finally, "at least we know we have this card to play in a crisis—if we find ourselves caught with the Americans in an escalating confrontation in the Middle East, for example."

"I think not," Kuznetsov replied. "In a real crisis the Americans would be on a high alert. We would lose the element of surprise. Our attack could not be even as effective as the one outlined by Col. Perlshtein."

With that the room fell silent. Ivanov gave no hint of embarrassment as he crisply thanked the briefers for their presentation. As the meeting broke up, Ivanov turned to Marshal Antonov. "I hope you will be ready next week with the briefing on lasers and particle beam weapons," he said.

THE REPUBLICAN BUDGET IS A BUDGET OF HOPE AND OPPORTUNITY

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. MOAKLEY). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. THOMAS) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, the Democratic budget—and make no mistake about it: It is the Democrats' budget; they control both Houses of Congress and the Presidency; in fact the Democrats have controlled our House for the last 13 Congresses in succession—the Democratic budget, the Government statement on its role in the Nation's economy and indeed the entire society, is a testament to bankrupt concepts. As the American people face recession, increasing inflation, and rising rates of unemployment, along with continuing energy problems, the fact is that the Democrats' budget is a failure. It is shot through with defeatism, disappointment, and despair. The Democratic budget offers more unemployment in an attempt to squeeze out inflation. This attempt to squeeze out inflation, through unemployment is a good example of their bankrupt ideas. It is also cruel, and ironically it is also unnecessary.

Republicans believe we would reduce inflation by increasing productivity, create real economic growth through lower taxes and less Government spending. But this plan, the Republican budget—a budget of hope and opportunity, a budget that proposes to change the shape and direction as well as the size of the Federal budget—is a program that will not be known by most Americans, because the opportunity to put this budget into effect will be denied by the Democratic majority, unless among that majority we can find some reasonable and fair-thinking Democrats. To outline some of the specifics of the budget of hope and opportunity in contrast to the budget of defeat and despair, I yield to the gentleman from Arizona, the distinguished minority leader, the Honorable JOHN RHODES.

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Speaker, I wish to thank my colleague and friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. THOMAS), for taking this special order on a very important occasion and for a very important reason. That reason, of course, is to discuss the current budgetary challenge facing the Congress as the economy of our country shows definite signs of sliding into recession.

We Republicans believe it is time for some fresh thinking, some different approaches to Uncle Sam's efforts to turn the economy around. Basically, what the Democrat majority and the Committee on the Budget are offering is warmed-over New Dealism, a retreaded old formula that failed 40 years ago and certainly is not applicable to the problems of 1979 and 1980.

Recessions mean unemployment. The traditional Democrat remedy has been massive make-work projects, dead-end WPA-type jobs. Again, this time, they are not concerning themselves with real jobs, but seem resigned to recession and committed to the same old discredited formulas.

Their budget is a budget based on despair and congressional helplessness in the face of our economic problems. We Republicans believe the American people deserve something better from their Congress.

In the area of jobs, we believe that the answer lies in the free enterprise system. That is where the jobs are—some 71 million of them. Instead of beefing up programs such as CETA that have been scandal-ridden and ineffective in training workers and improving their skills in order that they may qualify for real jobs, we want more on-the-job training programs. Put the workers where the jobs are; let them learn skills that are marketable. A cooperative private-Federal program would be far less expensive to administer, far more effective in upgrading skills. In the long run it would more than pay for itself in revenues from increased productivity and the lessening of the number of people dependent on Government for their livelihood.

This, of course, flies in the face of the old Democrat fondness for bureaucratic overkill. It is just too practical to be considered by the majority, mired in the thinking of the 1930's.

It is important that we make a strong

effort to train and employ those who presently are at a disadvantage in our economic system. One of our major problems is that we have an increasing percentage of our population who are nonproducers. More and more of the resources of those who work and of the businesses that provide jobs are being drained off to perpetuate a growing population of nonworkers. This again reflects the despair of the Democrats who have given up on trying to offer hope and opportunity to the poor and are simply transferring a bigger share of the earnings of our working men and women to those who at present cannot or will not qualify for jobs in the economy.

It is long past time to take a hard look at the entire welfare system. Any honest assessment must conclude that it is not working. Expenditures continue to rise, but instead of being given a leg up, welfare recipients are only getting a hand-out. If the program were successful, after decades of professional poverty management, the numbers on welfare should be declining. Instead, we have more dependency, more abuse and fraud, and less effort to get off the dole and on the job than ever before.

The General Accounting Office estimates that \$1 of every \$10 in Federal expenditures is being wasted. That is about \$50 billion. Certainly, if Congress were to dig into Federal expenditures, weed out superfluous programs, tighten up administrative procedures, and demand accountability from the bureaucracy, we could save a lot of that money.

We could have a balanced budget and provide a really effective job training program and a tax cut for wage earners without damaging one whit the essential and legitimate functions of Government. It is time to stop raising the ante to accommodate waste in Federal programs. It is time for lowered expectations for Government, not more deficit financing of waste and mismanagement.

The Democrats have come up with the same old shoozorn policies toward a tax cut. They still have not come around to what has been public consensus for a long time: That a tax cut is needed.

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Republicans 2 months ago pleaded with the Democrat leadership in the Congress to get moving on a tax cut, to take effect by October 1 of this year, through withholding adjustments. Always, when recession comes, Democrats wait until suffering occurs, until the economy is being savaged by the downturn, and then pass a tax cut that takes effect months after it is needed. When the cut begins to affect the economy, it is already on the way up, and the cut adds to inflation.

People need the money now to pay for OPEC's oil price increases and to cope with the Democrats' 13-percent inflation and 13-percent all time record high interest rates.

The Carter administration has indicated that it will look around after the first of the year before deciding on a tax cut. The Democrat majority has adamantly shut the door on quick tax relief. Their desire to put off taking action until sometime next year on a cut to go

into effect 6 or 8 months from then is indicative that the Democrats simply do not know how to deal with the realities of the economy. They want to lock the barn door after the filly has been filched.

The purpose of our remarks today is to call public attention to the fact that the Democrats apparently intend to keep right on taking more of the public's earnings and spending more on Big Brother government. Their 5-year budget projections call for increasing the tax take from this year's \$519 billion to \$910 billion by 1984. That is an increase of 75 percent over 5 years—a rise of 15 percent a year, far above the administration's wage-price guidelines and certainly far above the public's willingness to shell out for waste and overgovernment.

Our projected 5-year Republican budgets call for substantial tax cuts and substantial reductions in Federal deficits. We realize that the Democrat recession will make it nearly impossible to balance the budget in the next fiscal year, but we project a zero deficit in fiscal year 1981.

Our 5-year plan calls for 19 percent of the gross national product to be used for Federal purposes by 1984. The Democrats want to grab off 23 percent of the GNP for Federal purposes. While their budget estimates provide for no tax cuts over the next 5 years, our Republican budget would build in more than \$150 billion in tax reductions, based on reduced growth of Government and an expanding economy.

Mr. Speaker, I think it would be well to look at that figure again. I said that Republicans would take 19 percent of the gross national product by 1984 for a balanced budget. The Democrats, if they have a balanced budget, will take 23 percent. That is a difference of 4 percent of the gross national product. If you have a \$2 trillion gross national product, it does not take much arithmetic to come up with the answer of \$80 billion, which is the figure that the Republicans will take from the taxpayer less than the Democrats would take. So it is important to understand how you balance a budget. You can balance a budget by increasing taxes and you can do it very easily but that is not what the people want. They want a balanced budget, lower taxes and with a smaller Government.

One of the problems we have had with this Government is that it has grown so fast that it has become unmanageable, unresponsive to the will of the people. It has become a subject of tyranny rather than a subject of service, as far as the American people are concerned.

Democrat policies have driven savings to only 5 percent of earnings, the lowest of any industrial nation. Republicans want to directly stimulate the economy and use our tax system to help generate capital in order to fund the expansion and modernization of facilities which are needed to provide more jobs.

The failure of the Democrats to recognize and use the potential of wise budgetary procedures to help our economy recover from recession is apparent. They have not had a new idea since 1933, and today they offer the same tired "Old

Deal" panacea: higher taxes, bigger deficits, and move Federal programs.

The high hopes that began the 1970's have soured under the Democrat control of the Congress. Repressive over-regulation, voracious taxation, and profligate spending have driven our economy into two recessions during this decade.

We Republicans believe it is time for more effective fiscal policies. We must concentrate on the supply side of our economy instead of dwelling solely on consumption. Our budget of hope and opportunity would open the way toward rebuilding our economic prosperity on a solid base. Quite simply, we are in times that call for economic renewal, not more burdensome overgrowth of the Federal Government.

This is a time when we should produce our way out of a recession, not muddle our way out of it as the majority party apparently intends to do.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California for yielding this time to me and I especially thank him for taking this very important special order.

I would like it to be noted that there are Republican Members on the floor who are here to discuss the budget of hope and opportunity as contrasted with the budget of despair of the other side.

I now yield back to my good friend from California (Mr. THOMAS).

Mrs. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentlewoman from Maryland (Mrs. HOLT).

Mrs. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for taking this time on such a very important subject.

Mr. Speaker, while the American people cry for relief from runaway Government spending and raging inflation, the Budget Committee majority has recommended a 1980 fiscal policy that promises more of both.

Spending endorsed by the proposed second budget resolution for 1980 is almost \$17 billion higher than the target resolution we approved in the spring and more than \$50 billion higher than estimated 1979 spending.

The committee majority proposes to continue the free-spending habits of recent years with an 11-percent growth rate from 1979 outlays.

A large tax increase driven by inflation is in prospect. Revenues will be up more than \$50 billion, if the committee's estimates are accurate, but this will just offset the spending increase.

All hope of reducing the budget deficit has been abandoned by the committee majority. The 1980 deficit will be roughly the same as the \$30 billion deficit estimated for this year.

The Budget Committee majority has written a prescription for high inflation and economic stagnation. On the Republican side of the aisle, we have a better plan which we will offer in the form of a substitute budget resolution.

Our substitute slows the growth rate of Federal spending to about 7 percent, allows for a \$20 billion tax reduction, and cuts the deficit to less than \$20 billion.

Our goal is to achieve a balanced budget in the 1981 fiscal year. Even more

importantly, our plan is to revive the productive sector of the economy.

The major problem afflicting the economy is the fast-rising total burden of Government spending at the expense of productive economic activity by the private sector. The answer to that problem lies in cutting the growth rate of Government and reducing taxes.

We consider our substitute budget as only a modest beginning. If we were in the majority, you could expect us to steadily reduce Government's share of the gross national product and national income and diminish the tax burden. We have the only realistic program for low inflation and less taxation.

We on the minority side of the aisle are united in our vision of a strong American economy expanding through private investment and offering opportunity for all people.

But Congress has been controlled by liberal Democrats for 30 years, and the record is one of expanding Government, soaring debt, and rising taxes that are suffocating the productive strength of the American economy.

There is only one source of wealth, the production of marketable goods and services, and we have been spending far more than we have produced. If we fail to reverse course, we will have a future of stagflation or worse.

In preparing the second budget resolution for 1980, the Budget Committee majority has shown that it lacks both the will and the ability to restrain spending with the tools available in the budget process. They cooked up some phony revenue numbers and then the committee majority ratified decisions of the authorizing and appropriating committees that ignored recommendations in our first resolution for 1980. The Budget Committee should have maintained its position and insisted on reconciliation, requiring the authorizing and appropriating committees to make the necessary cuts.

The Senate Budget Committee, which proposes to spend \$6 billion less than the House budget recommendation, has proposed a reconciliation resolution to its body.

This demonstrates some courage, some commitment to fiscal discipline, some determination that the budget process has meaning. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about the House Budget Committee majority.

Again, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. THOMAS) for yielding his time to me.

Mr. RUDD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. THOMAS. I yield to the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. RUDD. Mr. Speaker, I commend my colleagues for taking this time to discuss the legally binding fiscal year 1980 budget resolution, which has just been reported from the House Budget Committee.

As a member of that committee, I share the dismay that has been expressed over the further proposed increases in the nondefense areas of the budget.

Since 1969, when Federal outlays totaled \$184.5 billion, spending has almost tripled—increasing \$364.2 billion to the recommended level of \$548.7 billion, a 197-percent increase.

Defense spending has increased only slightly over this period. In fact, in constant dollars we are spending less today for defense than we were in 1961.

The skyrocketing increase in the Federal budget has been in the social welfare area, where there is the most waste and abuse and the most opportunity to make meaningful cuts in unwarranted Government spending.

But the majority on the Budget Committee refused to make such cuts, which means that the full House of Representatives must now show the American people whether it will carry out the public mandate for spending reductions and tax relief.

Mr. Speaker, I recently conducted a survey of the people of Arizona's Fourth Congressional District to determine their true feelings concerning Federal Government spending and taxation. More than 20,000 people responded to the survey.

I believe that their responses represent the feelings of most Americans.

Ninety-seven percent believe that Government spending is the major cause of inflation.

Eighty-six percent favor a permanent reduction in personal income taxes.

Ninety-five percent want a reduction in Federal spending and Federal services.

Eighty-five percent want a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced Federal budget.

Seventy-nine percent or more want budget cuts for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the CETA job training program, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency.

In fact, 91 percent believe that the Federal Government is hurting the economy through over regulation.

Eighty-two percent of those responding to this survey favor restricting Federal spending to no more than 7 percent of gross personal income of the people of the United States.

This should be a message to Congress, Mr. Speaker, and I would like to include all the results of this survey on Federal

spending and taxing policies at this point in the RECORD:

RESULTS OF CONGRESSMAN ELDON RUDD'S 1979 TAX BALLOT

	[In percent]		
	Yes	No	Opinion
Government spending is a major cause of inflation	97	2	1
Favor permanent reduction in personal income taxes	86	7	7
Favor reduction in Federal spending and Federal services	95	3	2
Favor a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced Federal budget	85	9	6
Favor a cut in defense spending	17	78	5
Favor a reduction in funds for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)	83	12	5
Favor a reduction in funds for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)	80	16	4
Favor a reduction in funds for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)	79	17	4
Favor a reduction in funds for Federal reclamation projects	50	39	11
Favor a reduction in funds for the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)	79	15	6
The Federal Government is hurting the economy through over-regulation	91	6	3
Nuclear power generators are safe and should be developed	69	16	15
Favor Government wage and price controls	30	61	9
Favor restricting Federal spending to no more than 7 percent of gross personal income of the people of the United States	82	6	12

Mr. Speaker, Congress must act to stop the tremendous proliferation and high cost of the wide-ranging and duplicative social welfare or public assistance programs, which number about 100 at the current time.

These programs are funded throughout the budget. Many of them are so-called entitlement programs—Federal cash subsidy programs, such as welfare assistance—for which eligibility is established by law and appropriations are set in concrete according to the number of eligible recipients who apply each year.

Total Federal spending for income transfer programs is now more than \$250 billion, and the budget resolution which has just been reported by the House Budget Committee does nothing to restrain the growth, duplication, or waste in these programs.

The food stamp program, for example, which has received deserved criticism, is increasing in cost at an annual rate of about 37 percent. It started out at a mod-

est rate of \$34 million in 1965, and has now escalated to its estimated 1980 cost of \$6.3 billion—almost 2,000 times the starting cost just 14 years ago.

I was most encouraged by the joint efforts of our distinguished minority whip, the Honorable BOB MICHEL of Illinois, and my colleague on the Budget Committee, RALPH REGULA of Ohio, to require all committees of the Congress to recommend ways to control the growing cost of entitlement programs, and where necessary their method of funding, in language that was added to the budget resolution which we will consider on the floor of the House next week.

This is perhaps the most worthwhile action taken on the second concurrent budget resolution for fiscal year 1980, and I hope that it will result in a meaningful effort to counter and reduce the spending for Federal handout programs.

Social welfare programs of the Federal Government are primary evidence of the excessive and irresponsible Government attitude that led to proposition 13 and the movement to require a balanced Federal budget.

It has become apparent that the political motivation of many welfare program supporters, who refuse to help efforts to cut unnecessary spending in these non-defense areas of the Federal budget, is to build a permanent "recipient class" of citizens through Government handouts, who will in turn show their gratitude by reelecting the big spenders to office.

Working citizens and taxpayers—the producing element of our society—have become aware that their taxes are being used in this way to "buy votes" of welfare program recipients, rather than to help the truly needy in our society.

Unless Congress takes resolute action to restrain and cut back Federal spending for extravagant and wasteful programs, public confidence in our Government and democratic processes will be further eroded. Moreover, lasting damage will be done to our people's productive and humanitarian sense of community.

Mr. Speaker, to give proper perspective to this issue of Federal spending, and our debate next week on the final fiscal year 1980 budget resolution, I would like to include in the RECORD at this point a table which shows the history of Federal spending for each function of the budget since 1969:

BUDGET OUTLAYS BY FUNCTION: 1969-80

[In millions of dollars; fiscal years]

Function	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Transi- tion quarter	1977	1978	1979 (esti- mate)	Percent change, 1979/ 1969	1980 recom- menda- tion ¹	Percent change 1980/ 1979
National defense	79,417	78,553	75,808	76,550	74,541	77,781	85,552	89,430	22,307	97,501	105,186	114,400	+44.0	128,587	+12.4
International affairs	4,573	4,297	4,097	4,693	4,066	5,681	6,922	5,552	2,193	4,813	5,922	7,500	+64.0	8,772	+16.9
General science, space, and technology	5,014	4,507	4,180	4,173	4,030	3,977	3,989	4,370	1,161	4,677	4,742	5,200	+3.7	5,662	+8.9
Energy	1,000	990	1,031	1,270	1,179	837	2,170	3,127	794	4,172	5,861	7,400	+640.0	8,801	+18.9
Natural resources and environment	2,890	3,061	3,909	4,235	4,763	5,670	7,335	8,124	2,532	10,000	10,925	11,300	+291.0	12,026	+6.4
Agriculture	5,780	5,161	4,288	5,280	4,852	2,227	1,659	2,504	581	5,532	7,731	6,200	+7.3	2,542	-59.0
Commerce and housing credit	563	2,108	2,358	2,216	924	3,925	5,607	3,792	1,392	-44	3,325	2,900	+415.1	2,828	-2.5
Transportation	6,528	7,006	8,050	8,388	9,065	9,172	10,388	13,435	3,304	14,636	15,444	17,000	+160.4	18,651	+8.8
Community and regional development	1,511	2,360	2,833	3,388	4,537	4,080	3,689	4,709	1,340	6,286	11,000	9,700	+541.9	8,289	+14.5
Education, training, employment, and social services	7,540	8,625	9,839	12,519	12,735	12,344	15,870	18,737	5,162	20,985	26,463	29,700	+293.9	31,471	+5.9
Health	11,757	13,051	14,716	17,467	18,832	22,073	27,648	33,448	8,721	38,785	43,676	49,700	+322.7	54,715	+10.1
Income security	37,285	43,073	55,426	63,913	72,965	84,437	108,610	127,412	32,797	137,915	146,212	161,100	+332.1	188,795	+17.2
Social security	(26,791)	(29,685)	(35,247)	(39,409)	(48,288)	(54,936)	(63,648)	(72,664)	(19,763)	(83,861)	(92,242)	(102,323)	+1281.9	(119,923)	+17.2
Other income security	(10,494)	(13,388)	(20,178)	(24,504)	(24,675)	(29,498)	(44,959)	(54,748)	(13,034)	(54,054)	(53,970)	(58,777)	+460.0	(68,872)	+17.2

BUDGET OUTLAYS BY FUNCTION: 1969-80—Continued

[In millions of dollars; fiscal years]

Function	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Transi- tion quarter	1977	1978	1979 (esti- mate)	Percent change, 1979/ 1969	1980 recom- menda- tion ¹	Percent change, 1980/ 1979
Veterans benefits and serv- ices.....	7,640	8,677	9,776	10,730	12,013	13,386	16,597	18,432	3,962	18,038	18,974	20,200	+164.4	20,851	+3.2
Administration of justice.....	761	952	1,299	1,650	2,131	2,462	2,942	3,320	859	3,600	3,802	4,200	+451.9	4,468	+6.4
General government.....	1,610	1,888	2,104	2,449	2,626	3,296	3,182	3,006	883	3,374	3,777	4,200	+208.3	4,301	+2.4
General purpose fiscal as- sistance.....	430	536	535	673	7,351	6,890	7,187	7,235	2,092	9,499	9,601	8,750	+1,934.9	9,075	+3.7
Interest.....	15,793	18,309	19,602	20,563	22,782	28,032	30,911	34,511	7,216	38,009	43,966	52,400	+231.8	58,038	+10.7
Allowances.....												700	NA	453	NA
Undistributed offsetting re- ceipts.....	-5,545	-6,567	-8,427	-8,137	-12,318	-16,651	-14,075	-14,704	-2,567	-15,053	-15,772	-18,100	+226.4	-19,600	+8.3
Total budget outlays.....	184,548	196,588	211,425	232,021	247,074	269,620	326,185	366,439	94,729	402,725	450,836	494,450	+167.9	548,725	+10.9
Total deficit.....	+3,000	-3,000	-23,000	-23,000	-15,000	-5,000	-45,000	-66,000		-45,000	-49,000	-33,450		-29,225	

¹ 2d Budget Resolution.
² Surplus.

Source of data: Office of Management and Budget, "Federal Government Finances" (January 1979 edition).

□ 1810

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LATTI).

Mr. LATTI. Mr. Speaker, I wish to thank the gentleman for yielding and to commend him for taking this time on this very special order. I think this is one of the most important special orders we will probably have all year. It has already been announced that we will be taking up the budget resolution next week and, hopefully, we can do something on the minority side to reduce the amount of the deficit and to reduce the amount of expenditures.

The majority of the House Budget Committee reported out a second budget resolution for fiscal year 1980 last Tuesday, and I emphasize, without Republican support. Not only would this proposed budget eliminate the possibility of achieving a balanced budget in 1981, but it would worsen an already faltering economy. I would like to call the attention of my colleagues to the particulars of this budget which the majority describes as a "restrictive fiscal policy."

Government spending under the proposed budget would be permitted to soar upward at an alarming rate. This budget resolution would permit \$549 billion of the taxpayers money to be spent in fiscal year 1980, a \$54 billion increase over fiscal year 1979. This 11.1 percent increase exceeds the rate of inflation assumed by the committee for fiscal year 1979, which means that the Federal budget would grow in real terms. During this time of high inflation when wage earners and businesses are being asked to moderate their wage and price demands, the vote by the committee majority to approve this budget resolution hardly constitutes exemplary behavior. I urge my colleagues not to make the same mistake when the second budget resolution is taken up on the floor next week.

Inflation has reached its current proportions because the same expansionary fiscal policy contained in this budget resolution has been prescribed by the Democrats since the last recession. When President Ford left office in January inflation was running at only 4.8 percent. President Carter entered office and in his first 3 years increased Government spending by 35 percent, the biggest 3-year increase in peacetime his-

tory. As a result of these massive increases in Government spending, we are currently faced with double-digit inflation and economic stagnation. However, it appears that the majority of the Budget Committee has ignored these signals of the need for a change in our fiscal policy. The second resolution they have proposed contains more of the same medicine that has been demonstrated in the past not to work.

Let us take a look at the spending record of this Democrat-controlled Congress just since 1974. Would you believe it has more than doubled the expenditures since 1974? The answer is in the affirmative. In fiscal year 1974, the outlays of our Government were \$269.5 billion. What are we saying here in this resolution that they have reported? Five hundred forty-nine point seven billion dollars, more than doubled since fiscal year 1979. I think that this is something that the American people should be aware of when they ask the question, who is responsible for inflation?

Let me say, my colleagues, we have reached a stage in the business cycle when we should be running a budget surplus. Generally speaking, at the onset of a recession revenues are relatively high because of high inflation, and expenditures are relatively low because of low unemployment. In 1970 and 1974 we entered into recessions and ran deficits in those years of \$2.8 billion and \$4.7 billion respectively, the lowest two deficits of this decade. In 1979, however, we are expected to register a budget deficit of \$29 billion, the fifth largest deficit of the decade. As the country moves deeper into the current recession, pressure on the deficit will only mount. And if the policies of recent years prevail again, the deficit will be back up to \$60 billion by 1981.

Excessive Government spending has also sharply increased the national debt through the course of this decade. In 1970, the gross Federal debt was \$383 billion; in 1979 the debt is expected to reach almost \$840 billion, an increase of \$457 billion just during the 1970's. In the 3 years that President Carter has been in office, the national debt has increased by a staggering \$204 billion. These debt increases are taking a toll on the American taxpayers of this country. Interest has become the third largest

function in the Federal budget, behind only income security and national defense, absorbing an expected \$58 billion of the taxpayers' money in fiscal year 1980 alone.

The committee-reported second budget resolution that will be up for consideration next week would increase the national debt to about \$885 billion. It would insure that the long trend of budget deficits that began in 1970 would extend through the mid-1980's. It would increase taxes by 11.1 percent over 1979, to a peacetime high of 20.8 percent of our gross national product. For these reasons I urge my colleagues to vote against it and vote for the Republican budget alternative.

The Republican alternative represents an opportunity to change the course of this Government's fiscal policy. Not only does it propose to cut taxes to restore incentives to work, save, and invest, but it restrains the growth of Government spending. Under our alternative the deficit in 1980 would be lowered to under \$20 billion, in contrast with the \$29 billion deficit proposed by the Democrats. This deficit would permit us to achieve a balanced budget in fiscal year 1981 and to begin to pay back our astronomical public debt.

The choice between continued high inflation, low productivity, and negative growth, on the one hand, and a dynamic recovery ignited by incentives to private businesses and individuals, on the other hand, will be yours to make next week. In my opinion, our deteriorating economic situation signals that it is time for a new fiscal policy.

Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. THOMAS. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. THOMAS) for taking this special order on the budget resolution. Recent polls show that for the first time in our history, Americans were more pessimistic than optimistic about the future of our Nation. A greater percentage thought the Nation would be worse off in the future than we are today. Of more concern to me was the fact that most Americans feel they do not have any say about what Government does or that they can change what Government does

to them. Americans do remain optimistic about their own personal lives and say they have faith in America's institutions. President Carter recognized this pessimism when he came down from the mountain top to deliver his "crisis of confidence" speech. He tied the crisis of confidence speech to earlier times—Vietnam, Watergate, and the oil embargo. While these events have had an effect, my mail and national opinion polls show lack of confidence in leadership closely paralleled economic trends. People became more pessimistic as the prime interest rate approaches and reaches 13 percent, an alltime high. I submit, the President and the leadership in Congress have it within their power to restore confidence in Government by bringing down inflation. This can be done by balancing the Federal budget. Government spending is the root cause of inflation. I have said this many times before as you know. I will continue to say it and push for legislation to balance the budget. The point is that the American people are telling those in positions of power—in the administration and Congress—to do something about inflation, and we will have more confidence in you. We have unusually serious policy problems this year. It is imperative that we think our economic problems through and act correctly to develop fundamental policies to cure us of the inflationary disease which is draining the motivation from many people in our country and causing a serious decline in productivity. President Carter has analyzed the country's problems and found a malaise. We Republicans analyze the country's problems and find inflation. President Carter says "say something good about your country," and we Republicans say "let's do something constructive about inflation."

What we do on this second budget resolution will have a profound impact on interest rates and on inflation. Now is our chance as Members of this Congress to take decisive action to break the cycle of higher inflation, higher interest rates, higher unemployment, higher Government deficits, and back to higher inflation.

As we all know by now, the prime rate for bank customers is at 13 percent, 15 percent for you and me, and reportedly going higher. The rate of inflation for everyone is over 13 percent. If this inflation rate continues for 1 year, prime borrowers can borrow this year's dollars at 13 percent interest and pay back the loan next year with dollars that are worth 87 cents or less. Since interest expenses are deductible for income tax purposes, borrowing money in today's environment costs nothing if you use the money to buy goods that are increasing in price by over 13 percent per year. Consequently, it seems very likely to me that interest rates will go even higher than they are now unless Congress acts to stabilize the dollar.

My expectation and yours is that inflation and interest rates are going to go higher. The expectation itself is a large part of our problem. We have to take action which will change expecta-

tions that matters will be getting worse. To change expectations of inflationary crises we need two specific dramatic developments. First, we need a balanced Federal budget. Then, we will probably need a tax cut to stimulate business. But first we must cut Government spending. Some will say—here we go again, belt tightening for the poor, the young, and the minorities who are always the first notch of the belt. Some of those against a balanced budget argue that inflation hurts everyone, but unemployment hurts those who can least handle it, and parenthetically unemployment makes the voters madder. The unemployment rate is regarded by many of you as the preeminent politico-economic statistic. The rate of inflation, the falling value of the dollar, the soaring price of gold, the foreign takeover of American business, the desertion of America by our own multinational corporates taken together, it would seem, do not add up to a fraction of the importance of the unemployment rate politically on a national basis. I am a politician too, and I share your concern. Politically, on a national basis, I know you are correct about the dominant role of the unemployment rate in policy decisions of a Democratically controlled Congress.

Nevertheless, the number one problem facing the country today, September, 1979, is inflation. The unemployment rate is 6.0 percent, and that is not unusually high by historical standards. However, the inflation rate is over 13 percent and the prime interest rate is at 13 percent, which are the highest in history. Something has to be done. What do we do? I repeat, we must balance the Federal budget as the first decisive step in changing the economic policy of the country. Where and by how much do we cut Federal spending? Enough to balance the budget—and every program must be looked at. There will be some temporary employment dislocations. From my service on the Joint Economic Committee I am convinced we could pass legislation to promote part-time work and job sharing. We have a son who works part time. I have two good staffers on my payroll who work part time. That is exactly what they want to do. They do not want to work full time. They are not the least bit lazy. They are paid for part-time work, but they are in no sense unemployed.

If 15 percent of our national work force were to be reclassified as part-time employees through job sharing, that 6 percent unemployment rate, that has most Members of the other party paralyzed on deficit spending, would fall very sharply. We would not need CETA, and we would not need the Federal component of unemployment compensation. We could balance the budget, reduce aggregate demand and national inflation, reduce Federal borrowing and national interest rates, reduce Federal taxes and promote consumer spending and encourage business investment, expand our supply capability, and restore our national rate of productivity growth.

There is a way out of our problems in this country. I congratulate the distin-

guished gentleman from California, for providing this forum for discussion of this very important subject.

□ 1820

Mr. REGULA. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. THOMAS. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. REGULA. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the gentleman from California (Mr. THOMAS) and all the members of the Republican freshmen class for their interest in budget matters.

Budget is not very glamorous, but it is the contributing factor to the No. 1 domestic problem in this Nation, and that is inflation. It is very evident that unless we do something to deal with the problems of deficits, the ever-increasing debt, and the excessive spending, which has been the pattern for the last 25 years, we are not going to solve the problem of inflation.

All of us heard that message repeatedly during August, that people are concerned about inflation, and that their purchasing power is diminishing. And yet what are they going to be offered next week? It has been called a "budget of despair," and certainly this is an accurate portrayal. I would call it also a "budget of business as usual"—business as usual along the patterns that we have had for the last 25 years.

It is interesting to note that in the August 1979 midyear report of the Joint Economic Committee some significant facts were brought out. In this report it is stated that unless we do some things differently, we are going to be faced with a cumulative total inflation rate of 140 percent over the next 10 years.

Now, what does that mean? That means a house will cost in excess of \$200,000. It means a loaf of bread could well be \$2. This is what the American public is faced with unless we as the leaders of this Nation effect change.

What does this report suggest as a way of diminishing the rate of inflation? I might say that this is the unanimous report of a committee that is 2 to 1 Democrats, and for once the members are unanimous in their recommendations. They say we can cut the rate of inflation in half. If we do what? Stimulate savings, stimulate investment, and stimulate productivity.

Yet as I look at the budget that will be before this House next week, I see no effort on the part of the majority to do any of these things.

What does this budget do? It offers no tax cut, no stimulus to productivity, no stimulus to savings, and no stimulus to investment—the very things that are recommended in the report of the Joint Economic Committee. It has no restraint on spending.

We have heard the previous speakers tell about the increases in today's huge deficit that will have to be funded by the printing press. This has been the pattern for the last many years, to print more money. In effect that is what happens. We print the money to fund the deficit. We monetize, because Congress has been

unwilling to develop prudent fiscal policies, and once again, in a business-as-usual pattern, we are going to force monetization of this deficit, increasing the debt and in the final analysis giving the American people another dose of inflation.

The Republican alternative, the budget of hope, does follow the recommendations outlined in the midyear report of the Joint Economic Committee. That budget will encourage productivity with tax cuts, it will encourage investment, it will encourage savings, and most of all, it will give the American people a sense of hope—hope that things will be better, hope that inflation will be diminished, and hope that there will be a balanced budget in their future.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. THOMAS. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this special order to call the attention of the people of this country and the Members of this Congress to the problem that we have in this Nation with deficit spending and the inflation that results from it. This special order is just one way of trying to reflect upon the real cost of inflation. Inflation is caused by this deficit spending.

The Congress of the United States is to blame for the deficit because we appropriate the funds by which this Government operates. It is real easy, as the President does with his program for voluntary wage and price restraints, to say in a sense to the businessman of this country and to the laboring man of this country, both the union member and the nonunion member, that somehow they are responsible for inflation when the constitutional fact of the matter is that only the Congress of the United States or the Federal Government has the power to coin money, print money, and determine the value thereof.

As the previous speaker said, the way this Congress finances this deficit is by monetizing that debt through the printing of money, and because the Congress of the United States is the only one that has the constitutional power to do that, there is no way that the workingman of this country and the business people of this country can be responsible for inflation.

But in a sense, when we talk about wage and price controls, voluntary or involuntary, the people involved with those programs are in effect trying to tell the people of this country that somebody else is responsible.

So the effort here tonight is to tell the people of this country that we know where the responsibility for inflation lies, and that we should not be trying to blame somebody else for something we are responsible for, because the responsibility only rests here with us, the elected representatives of the people.

Mr. Speaker, I think and know that out of a movement like this will come an

effort that will be fruitful in helping to win this battle on inflation by bringing the budget in balance.

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. GRASSLEY).

Mr. SHUMWAY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. THOMAS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. SHUMWAY. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to participate in this special order, and I sincerely thank the gentleman from California for requesting this time. There is little I enjoy as much as "spreading the word," if you will, concerning the budget of hope.

During the August recess, I was scheduled to make numerous speeches throughout my congressional district to widely divergent groups of individuals from all economic backgrounds and business interests. As one who has been newly infected with enthusiasm concerning the budget of hope, I quite naturally used it as the basis for the majority of my presentations. No matter what group I addressed, be they young or old, working or retired, married or single, Republican or Democrat, the response to my message was the same: hope, just as the title implies.

The faces of those people in the audiences were mirrors for my own opinion. I began by discussing the present practices of Government which lead to our economic woes, pointing out that, to me, the question of whether we are experiencing inflation or recession is really only a matter of semantics: Whatever it is, it hurts. Perhaps it is both, since our currency has failed to maintain its value due to Government ineptitude, and the incentive for savings, investment, production and employment is similarly being trodden under the heel of an unresponsive Government policy. Listening to that sad saga, the audience looked gloomy.

The gloom darkened when I reached the part about getting a raise actually equaling less take home pay; it positively thickened when I reminded them that money saved often equals money lost, and it reached the lowest of ebbs when I pointed out that production is penalized by taxation.

Then, however, I was able to watch despair become hope as I outlined our budget philosophy.

I mentioned tax cuts, saying "next year is an election year. We all know there will be a tax cut—but why permit it to be used as a political football? Entering a recession, as we are told we are, now is the time for a tax cut." They began to nod in agreement.

And why not prevent Americans from being pressed into unrealistically high tax brackets in the future by indexing, I asked? The nods of approval became more perceptible.

When I mentioned social security taxes, they groaned again, apparently convinced that there seemed no end to the burdens I would describe for them—until I point out that we could freeze those tax rates at their 1979 level, finding a more moderate financing arrangement

for the future. They brightened again. Adding it together in their minds, they began to see a pattern of commonsense: less taxes, protection from inflation, the possibility of an end to the social security nightmare.

I topped off those remarks by mentioning that it might very well be possible to liberalize depreciation rates to stimulate expansion and modernization of the Nation's productive plans, thereby increasing output and creating more jobs.

And the audiences before me were living proof of what, to me, is the most important concept behind the budget of hope: it not only offers hope—it restores dignity, encourages advancement, and fans the will to excel and produce back into life.

In short, those audiences proved for me that the budget of hope is not only an answer to our economic problems—it is also a giant step toward curing the ills of our national attitude. The existing economic policies have fostered a climate of mediocrity. The plan we endorse—the budget of hope—will restore American pride.

□ 1830

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his comments.

Mr. Speaker, during this special order a lot of numbers are being thrown around. All of us, ultimately, have to bring it down to the human level, after all what we are talking about is people, and the Government's effect on their lives, an effect that grows greater with each year's increase in the size and scope of the Federal Government.

Mr. Speaker, I am from California, and Californians have much at stake in the current budget process. California's economy, were California an independent country, would rank fifth among the world's nations. Its economy constitutes more than 11 percent of the national economy, and California's economy is growing a full percentage point ahead of the national economy.

But California's economic growth is beginning to slow, and the budget of despair for 1980 would insure that the national recession would not miss our State. At a time when we need to increase productivity and revitalize our economy, the Democratic budget policies are proposing nothing to help do this—only higher inflation, higher unemployment, and lowered expectation for all Americans, including Californians.

The number of Californians thrown out of work by the recession will swell to 233,500 by the end of 1980 under the budget of despair, and that's an optimistic estimate. Some predictions place the figure closer to 320,000.

In my home district in Kern County, 3,600 more workers will have lost their jobs by the end of next year if we continue the budgetary policies of the Democratic majority.

Unemployment in California, currently at about 6.5 percent, is expected to rise to 7.6 percent by the end of this year and to reach somewhere between 8½ to 9 percent under the budget of

despair. In Kern County, unemployment could reach more than 9 percent by the end of 1980.

We will not solve inflation by throwing people out of work. Rather, we must keep people on the job and boost productivity.

We will not balance the budget by crunching down the economy in the usual pattern employed by the Democrats. For every added percentage point of unemployment, the Federal Government must spend another \$20 billion to offset unemployment, thereby increasing the deficit.

The budget of hope will propose approximately a \$20 billion tax cut in 1980 to ease the coming recession's blow to working Americans. The budget of hope would also offer new tax incentives for capital investment which is so badly needed to revitalize our industry and create more jobs in the private sector.

For California, the budget of hope would mean fewer people out of work—nearly 100,000 jobs saved in Kern County, 1,500 jobs saved—and it would mean more money in the pockets of workers who need it to meet the rising cost of living.

Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. THOMAS. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I want to join my colleagues in commending the gentleman from California (Mr. THOMAS) for organizing and putting on this very, very important special order.

The point I really want to emphasize, with the help of a few charts, is that someplace in a reasonable process of self-government someone has to be responsible. The chairman of the Budget Committee, the senior Democrat from Connecticut, said on Monday, and I quote:

For a variety of reasons beyond our control, chiefly the massive inflationary pressures exerted by OPEC price increases . . .

He then went on to disown any responsibility for the inflation, for the recession, for the high cost of living, for the joblessness.

If voting makes sense, if being in Congress makes sense, if the very idea of self-government makes sense, then someone has to take responsibility. Someone has to say "yes, we write the tax laws, we approve the budget."

In his very own statement, the chairman, the distinguished Democrat from Connecticut, said

Spending restraints is the best anti-inflation contribution that Congress can make to the Nation at this time.

He cannot have it both ways. If cutting spending does have a positive impact on the cost of living, if it is possible for Government, by its behavior, to improve the way in which we live, to give us a better chance of going to work, to give us more income after taxes, then the Budget Committee and this Congress do have a real job to do. If we are responsible, then certainly the chairman of this committee cannot say, "For a variety of reasons beyond our control."

In fact, I think that the real question is: In responsible Government, the party which runs the White House, which runs both the House and the Senate, has to bear some responsibility for the economy.

I would like to turn for a moment and look at the economy and ask, first of all, the simple question: Can you afford another 15 months?

As this chart indicates, week by week, day by day, virtually, your grocery money has dropped during the last two budgets. The ability to go to the store, to buy gasoline, to buy fuel oil in the winter, your ability to buy food, goes down, down, down—because the value of the dollar goes down. The price of living goes up. And as the chairman, the Democratic chairman, said, spending restraint is the best anti-inflation contribution that Congress can make. And yet he was presenting a budget resolution which had gone up in spending at the rate of \$100 million a day for the last 4 months. He is directly accountable and his committee is accountable and the Democratic majority in this Congress is accountable for what this chart indicates has happened to your family if you are lucky enough to be working.

To put it in a different way: You can look at the price increases during the last 10 years that the Democratic Party has controlled this Congress. They controlled the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget for every one of these years. They have run this Government every year. And year in and year out through this Congress they have passed the kind of budget and the kind of taxes which lead to a huge increase in the cost of living. But not just over here in the cost of eggs, or in the cost of chickens, or in the cost of milk, but when you go all the way down to the other end of the chart, you look at the biggest single increase in the cost of living in the last decade and it is a tax increase. They have raised taxes more in the last 4 years than in any other peacetime period in American history. And they did it. They are responsible for it. They run the Congress. They control the committees. It is their tax increase that leads the way in forging a higher cost of living for the average American.

What does all this mean? It adds up to an economy that is sick in two ways, an economy is sick with higher and higher prices, giving us less and less real take-home pay, less money to spend, and the money we do have means less, and an economy that is now setting in toward a real serious, deep recession.

Look at this chart. By this Christmas, 1,400,000 Americans will have lost their jobs. That is not a Republican charge. That is not a partisan charge. That is a statement of the Federal Reserve Board. The U.S. Federal Reserve Board itself estimates that 1,400,000 Americans are going to be out of work by December. At Christmastime, if all of those Americans who are out of work stood in line, that unemployment line would then stretch from the Capitol to Plains, Ga., or it would stretch from the Capitol to Boston, Mass., and back, and then back to Boston. The people who reside in

Plains, Ga., and Boston, Mass., the Senator from Massachusetts, the Speaker from Massachusetts, and the President from Georgia, all Democrats, are responsible for an economic policy that is deliberately going to unemploy 1,400,000 Americans. That is why we call the Democratic budget a budget of disappointment and despair. It is a disappointment if you hope to work for a living. It is despair if you hope to have enough money to spend to buy groceries until the next payday.

What we are offering is an alternative, a budget which provides for a strategy of real growth in personal income, for a better chance to get a job, for real growth for America.

If I could show one last chart, in general terms, what is really important is not the precise dollar or the precise figure; what is really important is the clear-cut difference in direction. If two people stand at a crossroads and one goes to the right and the other goes to the left, the first step is very short. But over time, they get further and further apart.

□ 1840

What this shows is over the next 5 years, if you accept the Democratic budget of disappointment and despair, you get higher and higher taxes. You get more and more dollars in the Government to spend. You and I have less real income, and we have fewer jobs.

Over the next 5 years, if we pursue a Republican budget of hope and opportunity, then we have a chance to really cut taxes, to really increase the number of jobs in America to give working Americans more real take-home pay and to stabilize the cost of living and cut our price increases so that retired Americans have a decent chance to live.

I thank the gentleman, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. THOMAS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California for taking the time this evening to discuss these vital issues and I want to commend the distinguished minority leader, the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. RHODES), for his thoughtful discussion of the current budgetary challenge facing the Congress and for bringing the "budget of hope"—a budget of sound growth—before the American people.

I believe that most of us now realize the necessity for a tax cut to stimulate the private sector to achieve greater productivity. It should be obvious that simply pouring more money into the public Treasury will diminish the amount of goods and services available to the American people.

I want to take this opportunity to commend, as well, the gentleman from New York (Mr. CONABLE), the ranking minority member of the Committee on Ways and Means, who has fashioned H.R. 5050—a bill to cut income and payroll taxes and to stimulate capital investment—that, if adopted, would lead us quickly out of this recession.

I hope that the American people will heed the message delivered by our minority leader tonight and will let the administration and the majority leadership in the Congress know that they demand a responsible economic program that will get us off the economic roller-coaster and on to the path to prosperity.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. THOMAS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Speaker and my colleagues, it was not my intention to speak on this special order, for I am a relatively new Member of Congress, and frankly, I have enjoyed my 9 months here watching my colleagues work with the maze that makes up a huge and bureaucratic government; but my colleague from California (Mr. THOMAS), by this special order and his comments, stimulated me to perhaps share with the Members and with the American people some of his and my mutual experience in California, where we served in the State legislature for a number of years, preceding a thing called proposition 13.

During the last few years, it has been my questionable privilege to represent the minority party in that State legislature, attempting to bring about some sense to an inequitable taxing system there.

I will never forget the last couple of years, which clearly demonstrated two facts to me. The first was to demonstrate the reality that most Americans as well as Californians do not think simply in terms of Democrats and Republicans.

Most Americans care about solving problems and having Government make some sense. Above and beyond that, it was my own privilege to have both the Democratic and Republican nomination in California the last time I ran for the legislature. People are not looking to party alone.

In that last year I found most Democrats and Republicans became sick and tired of the leadership and legislature that was dominated so much by one party that was out of touch with its own people that they decided to bring about a change.

The average Democrat in California got the message that two-thirds controlled by one party was too much. Finally, they reacted. After years of hearing lip service to doing something about bringing sense and balance to our taxing systems, the people of California put a proposition on the ballot that was their voice.

I would like to share with my colleagues what occurred following that event.

The following week I was sitting in our budget committee representing the minority, and the leadership walked in, two-thirds of them Democrats, who were out of touch with the Democratic Party in California. They placed a sheaf on our desk that was as thick as the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, and every page was filled with items that then they were willing to cut from our budget, after the people had put a proposition on the

ballot. The people said, "Forget it." In November, they sent a message.

The one thing I would like to leave here is the fact that we are not here to condemn Democrats alone, but rather to condemn leadership of this party in this House that is out of touch with the American people, Democrat and Republican alike. It is about time the American people decided they were going to get that message across by bringing more balance to this system so that the two-party system will work, and more importantly, that those people who are elected here will be willing not just to roll over to old-time leadership. Instead, they will be willing to make a commitment to a budget of hope rather than simply vote for what the oldtimers suggest.

With that, will bring about more employment. Beyond that, old people will be able to live on incomes that are decent. Beyond that, our two-party system will work with some sense.

I want to commend the gentleman for his tremendous effort this evening and appreciate the opportunity to share it with him.

Mr. THOMAS. I thank the gentleman from California for reminding me of the recent events in our home State.

However, at the national level we do not have the initiative process. At the national level, the majority party elects the Speaker, and then every committee chairman is a member of the majority party.

The structure here is a partisan structure. We have an opportunity in the Republican budget of hope to present a program which, if enough reasonable Democrats would support, would in fact become the working plan for the Government. But my hopes are not high, for as I said, the structure in the House is of a partisan nature.

If we do not get a budget of hope here in the House of Representatives, then I think the charge has to be taken to the American people.

I think we have to clearly pin that responsibility on the majority party and to ask the American people to make a choice. Our job is to make that choice clear, a choice between the Democratic budget of despair or the Republican budget of hope.

The American people cannot continue with the present majority and expect a change in the budgetary process.

Unfortunately, this House is partisan, and the choice between a budget of hope or of despair is going to have to be made. If not in these Chambers then it must be made in the election booth.

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. THOMAS. I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. RITTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I would like to thank the gentleman from California for requesting this special order to allow this presentation to the American people and to this Congress.

Basically, this special initiative represents to me, to the steelworkers, to the auto workers to the electrical workers, to the chemical workers, to the garment and apparel workers, to the working men and women back in the Lehigh Valley of Pennsylvania, this means an end to the previous politics of scarcity.

For 22 years, the Democrats in the House of Representatives have taken the approach that the American pie is big enough as is, that the American dream already has reached its full complement.

Whereas this present initiative for a budget of hope proposes to the American people the idea that the pie can grow, that the American dream is not dead. And that indeed this United States of America can have prosperity, can increase its output, can be productive, can fight inflation in the correct way, not fight inflation by creating 1.4 million additional unemployed. In my heavy industrial district this new budget we propose may translate into hope for up to 7,000 or 7,500 individuals who would otherwise be unemployed in a year from now.

No. I say no to the loss of jobs and unemployment. The working men and women of this country do not wish to pay the dues for excessive and profligate Government spending of the past.

The American people do not want to pay the dues of not being able to purchase a home, or to get involved in a downpayment on a new home where interest rates are so high that they cannot afford it. My constituents I know feel they are being made to pay for previous excesses.

And the Government goes ahead, spends all the phony money coming from the money tree on all these wonderful programs, which then causes inflation, which cannot be controlled. How can inflation be controlled in America?

□ 1850

Well, some would propose: not by increasing our output, not by increasing our productivity, not by cutting back on some of the excesses. No. But rather by translating that burden to the backs of the working American people, by increasing the interest rates to the point where they will not be able to buy the things needed to have a decent life, to where they can participate in the American dream.

The average working man and woman is paying now for those 22 years of profligate and excessive spending. They have not been the beneficiaries of their hard work and frugality. Our workers are not on the dole. Our workers are not passing through the supermarket lines with food stamps that allow them to fill their baskets with meat as if they are having a picnic for a pro football team. No. These working men and women are simply paying the dues for others. These working men and women are paying the taxes for others excesses.

It is high time that we gave the economy the kind of tools needed to expand our horizons, not to contract them; to reduce Washington's own tendency toward expansion; and to provide greater

expansion for both the lives and the local economies of our working men and women.

Again, I would like to thank the gentleman from California for this opportunity to speak out in favor of this new budget and economic initiative for America's working men and women.

Mr. THOMAS. I would like to thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania and all of my colleagues who have participated in this special order. This is indeed the first shot to be fired in the second budget resolution fight. More shots will be fired. Hopefully the sound of those shots will be heard by the American people. They have been wounded long enough by Democratic policies.

What we want to provide is a forum which will result in a budget which offers real and significant change, conceptual change in the way the American people relate to the Government. The opportunity is now there. The budget of hope will be presented. The question is whether or not sufficient Democrats will come to the position of hope and opportunity and form a majority. It is possible. As the drama unfolds, let us see what happens.

● Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, as a sponsor of the Budget of Hope, I am delighted to join my colleagues in commending the distinguished minority leader for his initiative.

The Republican Party has proposed a plan designed to avert the worst impact of the recession that is upon us and to set the economy on a long term path to stable and healthy growth. We reject the notion that Americans must settle for a reduction in our standard of living, for a no-growth economy, for a diminution of the greatness that was ours. We are calling instead for optimism, productivity and growth.

The elements of our proposal are these:

To immediately and permanently reduce personal income tax rates by at least 10 percent, and index tax rates to protect taxpayers from inflation.

To freeze social security taxes at their present 1979 levels, and avoid the negative effects of cutting individuals' spendable income and making it more expensive to hire workers.

To provide a speedup in depreciation rates for business to stimulate a permanent turnaround in productivity rates and spur capital investment.

Mr. Speaker, we are calling on our colleagues from the other side of the aisle to join us in restoring hope to a despairing country. We are representatives of a people, not a political party. Let us take our responsibilities seriously and lead this country forward. Let us not accept economic stagnation, but adopt this workable plan and get America moving again. ●

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and to

include extraneous material on the subject of the special order today.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

EXPORT CONTROLS AND THE HONEST PUBLIC SERVANT, LARRY BRADY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. CLEVELAND) is recognized for 20 minutes.

● Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, on Tuesday of this week, the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union adopted an amendment to the Export Administration Act offered by my distinguished colleague from Missouri, Mr. RICHARD ICHORD.

That amendment requires the Department of Defense to establish a critical technologies list in order to prevent the export of materials and technologies which would jeopardize our national security.

I strongly supported the Ichord amendment and welcomed the action taken by this body. Although I did not participate in the debate on this amendment, my strong feelings were made known to each Member of this House through a letter sent to each one of them on Monday. I will place that letter in the RECORD following these remarks.

Before we begin to congratulate each other on our performance, however, we should not forget the man whose courageous testimony brought to congressional attention the serious problems which currently afflict the administration of export controls. I refer to Mr. Larry Brady, a constituent of mine, and until very recently, the Acting Administrator of the Office of Export Administration at the Commerce Department.

Despite intense opposition from political appointees in the Commerce Department, and apparent threats to his job, Mr. Brady appeared before the House Armed Services Committee and called the export control system at Commerce a shambles. In particular, he courageously called attention to the situation at the Soviet Union's Kama River truck plant where American technology and a sophisticated IBM computer are being used to produce a variety of military vehicles.

Mr. Brady's "reward" for his testimony was a prompt and unexplained demotion.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Brady's situation has been carefully reviewed by two nationally syndicated columnists, Mr. Patrick J. Buchanan and Mr. Jack Anderson, and by the publisher of the Manchester, N.H., Union Leader, Mr. William Loeb. I am inserting their remarks since, in my opinion, this matter deserves careful attention and full public disclosure.

Congress and the American people have benefited from Mr. Brady's testimony. It is only fitting that Larry Brady be assured the full protection of the U.S. Constitution rather than be punished for daring to tell the truth. I might add that

it is refreshing to call attention to the exemplary performance of a Government employee at a time when civil servants are increasingly under attack. It is easy to understand why the American Federation of Government Employees is so disturbed over the treatment Mr. Brady has received.

The commentaries of Patrick Buchanan, Jack Anderson, and William Loeb, and my "Dear Colleague" letter of September 10 follow:

[From the Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader, July 10, 1979]

WHISTLE BLOWER'S HAPPY LIFE

(By Patrick J. Buchanan)

WASHINGTON.—Few civil servants are more celebrated in the abstract than the whistle blower, "that conscientious bureaucrat who risks promotion and career to reveal the blunders of the policy-maker." The fate of the whistle blower, however is an uneven one.

When Otto Otepka, security officer at State, went secretly to the Senate with evidence of lax security procedures, he was made the victim of an official vendetta, with the blessing of the oldboy network in Washington politics and press.

When A. Ernest Fitzgerald revealed huge overruns in the C-5A program, he was on the staircase toward beatification.

Both men were prickly personalities who did their job as they thought their oath of office required.

There is a test today as to whether the whistle blower is a valued figure in official Washington—or only those whistle blowers who embarrass presidents and policy-makers that official Washington wishes to see embarrassed.

That is the case of Lawrence Brady, until June, acting director of the Office of Export Administration in the Department of Commerce.

A veteran public servant with a distinguished record on the Hill, in the White House and in the executive branch, Brady was, on the day of 23 May, placed on the horns of a dilemma. He had just heard his boss, Stanley Marcuss, testify that the controls on the transfer of critical technology to the Soviet Union were adequate.

An investigator turned to Brady to ask him if that were true. Faced with the choice of dissembling and backing up his boss, and telling the truth and contradicting his boss, Brady told the truth.

No, he said, the safeguards are not adequate; in fact, they are a total shambles, a sieve through which critical American technology is reaching the engineers who operate the Soviet war machine.

Following his dissent from the party line, Brady was called by his boss who was wondering if he were really a team player. His general counsel instructed him to follow the administration line in testimony the next day. Later, the director of his office of congressional liaison was more specific and "substantially more severe." There were threats, Brady told the committee.

In sum, an honest bureaucrat was being pressured to go before a congressional committee and stonewall about the transfer of technology to Soviet Russia—to grease the skids for the administration's program of loosening restrictions on the flow of American secrets to our partners in detente.

Brady balked. He told the subcommittee of Armed Services that, yes, he had confirmed that very morning that trucks, built with the aid of American computer technology at the giant Kama River plant, had been sighted with Warsaw Pact divisions in Eastern Europe. Yes, he conceded, the air

traffic control equipment we sold the Russians could be used equally well by Aeroflot or the Soviet Air Defense Command. He spoke of the apparent diversion of an IBM computer system at Kama River—to quasi military usage—and said had he the authority, he would pull out the U.S. computer experts and deny the Russians spare parts when the machine broke down.

For doing his job, Brady was demoted. The position he held was turned over, without competition, to a more malleable bureaucrat. Brady anticipates a punitive transfer; and Washington has greeted his treatment with a yawn.

Indeed, following Brady's testimony—greeted with private encouragement from like-minded men at Defense and the National Security Council—President Carter proposed as ambassador to Moscow, Thomas J. Watson, former board chairman of IBM.

To our resident wit, Mark Russell, Watson is one of those Fortune 500 empty-heads who think Dr. Zhivago is a Bethesda dentist and whose qualifications for the Moscow post consist of dozing through two performances of "Swan Lake."

But the jest is an understatement. Watson is a student of the Averell Harriman School of Diplomacy, a businessman cut from the same bolt of cloth as Armand Hammer. He appears to hold to the tenet that capitalist-communist trade advances mutual understanding. Some of us are rather more concerned that on the other side of those "bridges" we are building to Moscow sit 50,000 Russian tanks.

A president has a right to choose his own envoy. Yet, there is ground for alarm when a Larry Brady is effectively and quietly purged, while the White House elevates to ambassador to the Soviet Union a big businessman likely to turn Spasso House into a miniature American-Russian version of the Leipzig Trade Fair.

Watson should be put upon a Senate gridle before confirmation. The American people, shelling out 5 percent of GNP for defense against the Soviet Union, have a right to know what his company's computer is doing at Kama River, and what he thinks State and IBM should do about it.

[From the Washington Post, July 16, 1979]
SOVIETS BUYING SENSITIVE U.S. COMPUTERS
(By Jack Anderson)

Greedy American businessmen, reluctant bureaucratic regulators and detente-smitten presidents have combined to provide the Soviet Union with sophisticated militarily useful machinery from our technological arsenal.

The workings of this incredible triple whammy were described a few weeks ago to the House Armed Services Committee in secret testimony by Larry Brady, who was then the acting director of the Commerce Department's export office.

Some years ago, remembering Pearl Harbor and the U.S. scrap iron that had helped to build the Japanese war machine, Congress passed a law designed to ban the sale of "sensitive" products that could be converted to military use by our communist adversaries. Several thousand items on the "Commodity Control List" can be exported supposedly only after careful review and approval by federal watchdogs.

But Brady told the House committee bluntly: "The export control system, as it is today, is a total shambles." The safeguards written into the regulations are "not worth the paper they're written on," he said.

For example, before the Russians can get permission to purchase certain products, they must sign a statement that they won't use the American made hardware for military purposes. "Otherwise, we wouldn't approve it," Brady explained.

But sources told our associate Dale Van Atta that there is no effective way to make sure the Soviets live up to their promise. Instead, the Commerce Department relies on the fox to guard the henhouse; on-site inspections are made by representatives of the U.S. companies that sold the products. Not only are these employees often non-Americans but they have a strong motive for ignoring any Soviet violations. Explained Brady: "The company wants to sell more . . . and he knows very well that if he reports a diversion (to military use), he's not going to be able to sell more."

For the same selfish reason, American company executives are unlikely to squeal on their customers, another Commerce Department official told us. "Unless, they're super-patriots, they have a very large stake in not informing," he said.

Yet sources told us it can be assumed anything that can be used for military purposes will be put to such use by the Russians. Brady cited one example to the committee: the huge Soviet truck plant on the Kama River, largest of its kind in the world. It was built with some \$500 million worth of American designs, tools and computers.

Brady testified that he had recently confirmed the use of the Kama River plant to make military vehicles and parts. "The file indicates that we knew at the time the license was made . . . at the White House in 1974 . . . that they would manufacture more engines than trucks," he said.

Another top official told us, "Any reasonable individual knew then that the extra engines and other things would go to the military." Despite objections on the score, then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger approved the sale.

Computers are the source of the most intense controversy. "For all practical purposes, when you export a computer, you lose control over it," Brady explained. There is, he said, "no real way" it can be determined whether a computer has been diverted to military use. But last year President Carter approved the sale of a large plant for producing oil drill bits, and the plant includes a computer.

One congressman expressed concern over the sale of computers in a fully automated traffic-control system for Kova Airport in Russia, noting the presence of "many bunkers" and jet fighters at the facility.

Business firms and their political allies have been pressuring the Commerce Department to loosen the controls on exports still further. "We should begin to have a little more backbone in the process," the outspoken Brady told the House committee.

[From the Washington Post, July 17, 1979]
TWO WHO TALKED ARE SHIFTED
(By Jack Anderson)

Now and then, a brave soul will step out of the shadows of government, stand in the glare of publicity and declare the truth to all who will listen. This may lay him open to the most depressing harassments, for our society has not yet outgrown the hoodlum ethos, which honors the man who covers up his boss's deviousness above the employee who exposes it. Here is the story of two men who dared to speak up.

Larry Brady: He is a Commerce Department official who was rash enough to give a congressional committee his honest opinion about the Carter administration's dealings with the Soviet Union. His boss, Stanley Marcuss, had just finished painting a rosy picture of the export office's control over what is sold to the Russians.

As we reported earlier, Brady told the committee that the export office was approving sales to the Soviets of sophisticated computers and other technology that could be

diverted to military purposes. The testimony, taken in secret, has not yet been released to the public.

For giving Congress testimony that contradicted the official line, Brady already has been reprimanded, transferred and advised to stop talking to Congress or reporters.

Brady was acting director of the export office when he was called as a witness. He entered a mild demurrer to his superior's testimony, stating that in his opinion the safeguards against military use of American imports were not adequate.

Next day, when Brady resumed his closed-door testimony, he told the congressmen he had been called that morning by Marcuss, who "indicated he was a little uptight with the remark I had made last night about safeguards."

Chairman Richard Ichord (D-Mo.) asserted the committee's right to get straight testimony from government witnesses. He noted that the Office of Management and Budget had threatened several witnesses during the export hearings. Such threats, he warned, "could very well be the subject of separate hearings."

Perhaps emboldened by this encouragement, Brady proceeded to speak frankly: The export control system, he said, "is a total shambles." Shortly after his heretical testimony, he was bounced from his job. Yet sources told our associate Dale Van Atta that Brady had been considered "very competent" until he testified so forthrightly.

Brady wasn't actually fired. He was given the post of deputy director of the export control unit—but only on condition that he not talk to Congress or the press without prior clearance from his higherups. Our sources say he hasn't yet agreed to this condition.

When we contacted him, Brady said he couldn't comment on either his secret congressional testimony or his present job situation.

Dennis Bossard: He was a court stenographer who refused to be bullied into lying to cover up an improper remark by U.S. District Judge John H. Pratt. For defying the judge and sticking to the truth, Bossard was fired.

As we reported earlier, Judge Pratt, aware of the impropriety of a remark he had made on the bench, sent his secretary to persuade Bossard to delete the remark from his transcript of the court proceedings. Destroying court records happens to be a felony, and Bossard quite rightly refused the request. Instead, he blew the whistle on Pratt.

During the subsequent FBI investigation of the incident, Pratt denied having an incriminating conversation with Bossard—unaware that the court reporter had secretly taped the conversation. Despite the damning evidence of the tape, both Pratt and his secretary got off scot free.

Bossard was not so lucky. Though he taped the conversation for his own protection and the tape was turned over to the FBI, he was left to the mercy of the judges' wrath.

Pratt angrily notified Bossard's boss that he no longer would allow the stenographer to work in his courtroom. The judge cited other reasons for his action, but court sources told our Associate Gary Cohn there was no doubt Pratt was taking vengeance on Bossard.

Then one of Pratt's buddies, Judge John Lewis Smith Jr., also ruled that Bossard would not be allowed in his courtroom. And another, Judge Oliver Gasch, grilled court employees about Bossard and turned the results of his "investigation" over to Pratt.

The court clerk, James Davey, finally told Bossard he was fired because he had taped the embarrassing conversation with Pratt. Still hoping the system works, Bossard has filed an appeal with Chief Justice William B. Bryant of the Washington, D.C. district.

Bryant has put Bossard back on the payroll for the time being until he makes his final decision in the next few weeks.

[From the Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader, June 26, 1979]

PATRIOTISM REWARDED

It is perfectly outrageous that the reward for Larry Brady's daring to speak out and warn the United States against giving away its technology to Communist countries, where it will be used to increase their armaments and probably someday will be used against us, should be denounced by the government he is trying to save. Yet that is exactly what has happened.

Certainly, Larry Brady is a realist from the North Country of New Hampshire who understood perfectly the risk he was taking when he spoke out.

Nevertheless, he had the courage to tell the truth and to try to warn our leaders that the U.S. is insisting on its own probable destruction.

New Hampshire is very fortunate in having one of its citizens, Larry Brady, serving as a watchdog in the United States Commerce Department in Washington. He is the official responsible for monitoring and controlling the sale of advanced technology to the Communist bloc nations. As such, he told a congressional subcommittee that the United States lacks appropriate safeguards to insure that equipment shipped to Communist countries is not diverted to military uses.

This newspaper was especially interested and pleased in Larry Brady speaking out in this fashion. We have pointed out many many times in our editorial columns that a number of U.S. corporations are so eager to increase their profits, and so ignorant of foreign policy and the implications of what they are doing, that they sell very important U.S. technology to nations that, if not presently are our enemies, potentially are.

The excuse always is that more trade means more peace, and that after all, the Russians or the Chinese or some other Communist nation is using the U.S. material we sell them for peaceful purposes.

Brady, acting director of the Office of Export Administration, cites, for instance, a recent disclosure that engines produced by the Soviets' huge Kama River truck plant are not simply used in trucks (although trucks themselves are most useful in war), but also they are installed in Soviet assault vehicles and armored personnel carriers.

The Kama River truck plant, which U.S. technology helped build, was one of those projects which was supposed to be producing machines that would be useful only for agricultural and other peaceful purposes.

Believe it or not, at the moment Congress is considering amendments to the 1969 Export Administration Act which would make it EASIER for U.S. companies to obtain export licenses for advanced machinery and technology to Communist countries!

Commerce Secretary Juanita M. Kreps and Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance favors this type of increased assistance to our potential enemies. Aides in the Pentagon and the White House National Security Council feel differently.

Some time ago, Fred J. Bucy, head of Texas Instruments, spoke out very strongly against the insanity of giving away U.S. technology to potential enemies. Unfortunately, much of American industry has not followed his lead.

We are delighted to see that a New Hampshire man, Mr. Brady, has spoken out in this fashion. Prior to joining the Commerce Department, he was a senior staff member of the Council of International Economic Policy (1970-1974). He is a graduate of Berlin High School and also was former staff aide for former Senator Norris Cotton.

The argument is often heard that, if we don't sell this technology to the Russians,

the Chinese, French, Germans or the Japanese will. This really doesn't make sense because there is certain technology which is in the sole possession of the United States. Furthermore, just because some other nation wants to sell out, that is no reason the United States should follow suit.

WILLIAM LOEB, *Publisher.*

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., September 10, 1979.

DEAR COLLEAGUE: The House will this week resume consideration of H.R. 4034, the Export Administration Act Amendments of 1979. This Act would amend and replace the existing Export Administration Act, the fundamental legislative charter for the export control of civilian goods and technologies which also have military application.

You have recently been hearing a lot about export controls over technology transfer to communist countries. Although these controls affect only a small fraction of U.S. exports, this fraction carries important national security implications and must be carefully monitored.

At present, the Office of Export Administration administers export controls for the Commerce Department. One of my constituents, Mr. Larry Brady, until very recently the Acting Director of the Office of Export Administration, has stated that strong export promotion pressure at the Department of Commerce is making it impossible to effectively implement the export control function.

There is no better evidence of this than the Department's recent efforts to deny that diversion of U.S. technology has occurred at the Soviet Union's Kama River Truck Plant, the largest truck factory in the world. Using U.S. technology and a very sophisticated IBM computer, the Soviets are producing trucks for military use.

The Commerce Department has stated that the military use of these trucks does not constitute diversion. In fact, the Department maintains that no end-use restrictions whatever apply to the products of the Kama Plant.

Mr. Brady recently appeared before the House Armed Services Committee. He courageously called attention to the situation at the Kama River Plant and has used this example and others to call the U.S. export control system "a shambles." (Incidentally, the "reward" for this testimony was a prompt demotion for Mr. Brady.)

H.R. 4034 would further liberalize export control procedures over sensitive items going to the Soviet Union, despite the fact that the U.S. has support from COCOM, the International Coordinating Committee, in its efforts to delay Soviet acquisition of Western strategic technologies.

It is well known that the current declining Soviet economic growth rate has escalated the importance of Western technologies both for its consumer sector, and more importantly, for its military sector. At a time when confirmation of the SALT II Treaty is being debated, it is especially important that the United States not contribute to the effectiveness of Soviet weapons and defense vehicles by freely exporting critical quality-enhancing technologies.

I therefore urge you to support amendments which will be offered by Congressman Richard Ichord to appropriately and effectively strengthen the export control process. Our national security will tolerate nothing less.

Sincerely,

JAMES C. CLEVELAND,
Member of Congress.●

MR. ANNUNZIO INTRODUCES LEGISLATION TO CUT TAXES ON SAVINGS ACCOUNTS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentle-

man from Illinois (Mr. ANNUNZIO) is recognized for 5 minutes.

● Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing legislation to provide a tax deduction for part of the interest earned on savings accounts.

The purpose of my legislation is two-fold. It is designed to help savers obtain a better break on their income tax while at the same time providing much needed funds for the homebuilding industry. My legislation would provide a Federal income tax deduction for the first \$100 of interest on savings accounts for a single return and \$200 for a joint return. Only savings accounts in institutions which are eligible to make home mortgage or homeownership related loans would be eligible for the tax break. This was designed to encourage savers to channel their funds into institutions which lend to the housing industry.

I am not happy that the amount of deduction is limited to a maximum of \$200, but I am enough of a realist to know that is the best that the House can hope for given the current economic situation in this country. The Treasury Department has opposed every tax savings measure on the grounds that they are all too costly and would require even a larger deficit budget because of the loss of tax revenue. By limiting the amount to \$200 I am hoping that the legislation, when enacted, can avoid a Presidential veto. There are those who predict that President Carter will veto any tax cutting measure, but I am hopeful that by keeping the savings tax deduction small that we can avoid a veto.

I am no stranger to this type of legislation since I have been involved in all of the savings account tax battles in my 16 years in the House. I would remind Members that in November 1974, legislation which I sponsored along with other Members, was reported from the Ways and Means Committee to the floor allowing a \$500 deduction of savings account interest. Unfortunately, Congress adjourned before action could be taken on that legislation, but I am convinced that had there been enough time we could have passed a bill. I feel certain that this time we can achieve passage of a tax-saving measure, and more than half the Senate has already indicated their support of a tax savings relief bill.

In fact, if the House does not act on that type of measure soon we may well find that the Senate will attach such a provision to another House-passed tax bill and beat us to the punch.

Let me again point out that I am unhappy with the small size of the proposed tax deduction, but I am hopeful that once we get this legislation on the books as the budget becomes better managed, we can provide a bigger tax break for savers.

For those that feel that any tax break at this point would cause harm to the budget deficit, let me suggest a solution. The Congress should cut the budget in an amount equal to the dollars that would be lost in the savings tax deduction legislation. By operating in that manner we would be providing taxpayers with a double helping hand by both providing a tax break on savings and a reduced budget deficit.●

THE PASSING OF RABBI SAMUEL LANDA

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. ADDABBO) is recognized for 10 minutes.

● Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Speaker, a dear and beloved friend has passed away, Rabbi Samuel Landa. Though of different faiths his spiritual compassion reached out to touch and comfort myself and others.

Beloved by many, revered by all who knew him, admired and praised by all who have worked with him, his passing was eulogized by great words of feeling and remembrance, his work touching the lives of so many.

The New York State Assembly and Senate recently finalized action eulogizing Rabbi Landa. Both bodies issued resolutions expressing heartfelt sorrow at the loss of one of Queens' finest religious leaders and humanitarians.

I feel it is most appropriate for the House to recognize the services Rabbi Landa provided for the community.

The son of a Hassidic rabbi, Rabbi Landa left his native Poland at an early age and as a young man of 24 began his service in Ozone Park at what would prove to be his only congregation.

He served as chaplain at three major Queens hospitals, as well as rendering spiritual assistance at the Queens House of Detention for Men. He was also an active participant with the Queens Interfaith Council.

He earned his secular and religious degrees from Yeshiva University, and served on the board of numerous Yeshivas, including that of the Yeshiva Academy which he helped to found at the Ozone Park Jewish Center. He distinguished himself as the secretary and vice president of the Orthodox Rabbinical Council of America, and as an active participant as an executive member of the Rabbinical Association of Queens.

Rabbi Landa's concerns stretched across the ocean to the State of Israel. Listed in "Who's Who in World Jewry," the rabbi attended by invitation a special reception at the White House honoring Menachem Begin and the anniversary of the birth of the State of Israel.

Adored and loved by all who were touched by him, his passing left a spiritual void in the community. We will miss him and I join my colleagues in extending our personal sympathies to his wife Hannah and the other members of the Landa family.

LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION EXPRESSING HEARTFELT SORROW OCCASIONED BY THE DEATH OF RABBI SAMUEL LANDA OF THE OZONE PARK JEWISH CENTER

Whereas, Rabbi Samuel Landa, the spiritual leader of the Ozone Park Jewish Center for thirty-four years, passed away on December thirty-first, nineteen hundred seventy-eight; and

Whereas, The son of a Hasidic Rabbi, Rabbi Landa left his native Poland at an early age and as a young man of twenty-four began his service in Ozone Park at what would prove to be his only congregation; and

Whereas, Having earned his secular and religious degrees from Yeshiva University, Rabbi Landa served on the board of numer-

ous Yeshivas including that of the Yeshiva Academy which he helped to found and foster at Ozone Park Jewish Center; and

Whereas, Rabbi Landa further served as the Secretary and the Vice President of the Orthodox Rabbinical Council of America, as an executive member of the Rabbinical Association of Queens, as a chaplain at the city's hospitals and prisons, and was active with the Queens Interfaith Council; and

Whereas, The Rabbi attended by invitation a special reception at the White House honoring Menachem Begin and the anniversary of the birth of the State of Israel; and

Whereas, Rabbi Landa is survived by his wife, Hannah; a daughter Janet; three sons, Saul, Philip and Seth; and six grandchildren; now therefore be it,

Resolved, That this Legislative Body hereby expresses heartfelt sorrow occasioned by the death of Rabbi Samuel Landa of the Ozone Park Jewish Center, and offers sincerest condolences to Rabbi Landa's family; and be it further

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution, suitably engrossed, be transmitted to Mrs. Samuel Landa at her residence.●

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted as follows to:

Mr. GINGRICH (at the request of Mr. RHODES), for September 17, on account of official business.

Mr. HUTTO (at the request of Mr. WRIGHT), for today and Friday, September 14, on account of official business.

Mr. JONES of North Carolina (at the request of Mr. WRIGHT), for September 13 and 14, on account of official business.

Mr. MARRIOTT (at the request of Mr. RHODES), after 3 p.m. today and tomorrow, on account of official business.

Mr. WOLFF (at the request of Mr. WRIGHT), for September 13 and 14, on account of medical reasons.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Member (at the request of Mr. HINSON) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. CLEVELAND, for 20 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. AKAKA) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. GONZALEZ, for 15 minutes, today.

Mr. ANNUNZIO, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. WEAVER, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. ADDABBO, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. SKELTON, for 30 minutes, on September 14, 1979.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. KRAMER, to include extraneous matter in his remarks on the bill H.R. 4040, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. HINSON) and to include extraneous material:)

Mr. WYDLER in three instances.

Mr. FRENZEL in three instances.

Mr. PHILIP M. CRANE.

Mr. GOLDWATER.

Mr. RHODES in two instances.

Mr. GILMAN.

Mr. ROYER.

Mr. McCLOSKEY.

Mr. ASHBROOK in three instances.

Mr. TRIBLE in two instances.

Mr. CORCORAN.

Mr. DANIEL B. CRANE.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. AKAKA) and to include extraneous material:)

Mr. LONG of Maryland.

Mr. MAZZOLI in two instances.

Mr. GORE.

Mr. MAVROULES.

Mr. EDGAR.

Mr. HAMILTON.

Mr. McCORMACK.

Mr. STOKES in two instances.

Mr. SHELBY in five instances.

Mr. GUARINI.

Mr. WOLFF in three instances.

Mr. O'NEILL.

Mr. STARK in two instances.

Mr. MILLER of California.

Mr. NICHOLS.

Mr. LaFALCE.

Mr. PEYSER.

Mr. SIMON in five instances.

Mr. DINGELL.

Mr. STUMP.

Mr. McDONALD in five instances.

Mr. DANIELSON.

Mr. MIKVA.

Mr. MOORHEAD of Pennsylvania.

Mr. DRINAN.

SENATE BILL AND CONCURRENT RESOLUTION REFERRED

A bill and a concurrent resolution of the Senate of the following titles were taken from the Speaker's table and, under the rule, referred as follows:

S. 1403. An act to amend the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-87) to provide an extension of time for the submission and approval of State programs or the implementation of a Federal program, to clarify the contents of a State program, to provide for increased cooperation between the Secretary of the Interior and the States with respect to the regulation of surface coal mining operations, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs; and

S. Con. Res. 29. Concurrent resolution regarding the restoration of Olympic records of the late James (Jim) Thorpe; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 6 o'clock and 54 minutes p.m.), the House adjourned until tomorrow, Friday, September 14, 1979, at 10 a.m.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. MURPHY of New York: Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. H.R. 1198.

A bill to clarify the authority to establish lines of demarcation dividing the high seas and inland waters; with amendments (Rept. No. 96-427). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. MURPHY of New York; Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. H.R. 1196. A bill to revise and improve the laws relating to the documentation of vessels, and for other purposes; with amendments (Rept. No. 96-428). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. MURPHY of New York; Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. H.R. 1197. A bill to simplify the tonnage measurement of certain vessels; with amendments (Rept. No. 96-429). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 5 of rule X and clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. RICHMOND:

H.R. 5265. A bill: Emergency Fuel and Food Relief Act of 1979; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. PHILIP M. CRANE:

H.R. 5266. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to clarify the standards used for determining whether individuals are self-employed for purposes of the employment taxes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. LUKEN:

H.R. 5267. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to increase the investment tax credit for solar energy property to 50 percent, to increase the residential tax credit for renewable energy source expenditures to 50 percent, and to allow the residential energy tax credit for solar energy property which performs more than one function; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MOTT:

H.R. 5268. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize the Veterans' Administration to use its own legal counsel to pursue civil remedies for the collection of overpayments of educational assistance made to eligible veterans and dependents and for the collection of education loans which have been defaulted, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. MURPHY of New York (for himself and Mr. HUBBARD):

H.R. 5269. A bill to authorize appropriations for the fiscal year beginning October 1, 1979, for the maintenance and operation of the Panama Canal, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. NEAL:

H.R. 5270. A bill to prevent the increase of salary for Members of the Senate and House of Representatives; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. PASHAYAN (for himself and Mr. KEMP):

H.R. 5271. A bill to provide for permanent tax rate reductions for individuals and businesses; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. QUILLEN:

H.R. 5272. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to increase to \$6,000 the exclusion from taxable gifts for gifts made during a calendar year by a donor to a person; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. RINALDO:

H.R. 5273. A bill to amend the Older Americans Act of 1965 to provide relief for older Americans who own or rent their homes; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

H.R. 5274. A bill to amend the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to provide for postconviction proceedings in certain criminal cases; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 5275. A bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act so as to remove the limitation upon the amount of outside income which an individual may earn while receiving benefits thereunder; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

H.R. 5276. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and title II of the Social Security Act to provide a full exemption (through credit or refund) from the employees' tax under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, and an equivalent reduction in the self-employment tax, in the case of individuals who have attained age 65; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. RINALDO (for himself, Mr. SENSENBRENNER, Mr. ROE, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. CLEVELAND, Mr. YATRON, and Mr. COURTER):

H.R. 5277. A bill to amend the Trade Act of 1974 to make certain changes in procedures applicable to Presidential actions to provide relief to U.S. industries from injuries caused by import competition, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. UDALL (for himself and Mr. JOHNSON of California):

H.R. 5278. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to engage in feasibility investigations of certain water resource developments; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. ZABLOCKI (for himself, Mr. FASCELL, Mr. DIGGS, Mr. WOLFF, Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. BONKER, Mr. PEASE, Mr. GRAY, Mr. FINDLEY, Mr. BUCHANAN, Mr. GILMAN, and Ms. FENWICK):

H.R. 5279. A bill to provide for the distribution within the United States of the International Communication Agency film entitled "Reflections: George Meany"; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. BIAGGI:

H.J. Res. 398. Joint resolution making a supplemental appropriation for the energy crisis intervention program for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1980; to the Committee on Appropriations.

By Mr. CLAUSEN (for himself and Mr. LAGOMARSINO):

H. Con. Res. 185. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that there be no further consideration of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty until all Soviet Armed Forces are withdrawn from Cuba; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

DELETIONS OF SPONSORS FROM PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were deleted from public bills and resolutions as follows:

(Omitted from the Record of Aug. 1)

H.R. 4360: Mr. AU COIN.

ADDITIONAL SPONSORS TO PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were added to public bills and resolutions as follows:

H.R. 2: Mr. PASHAYAN.

H.R. 357: Mr. PETRI.

H.R. 390: Mr. PAUL.

H.R. 654: Mr. COURTER and Mr. GOLDWATER.

H.R. 1603: Mr. CAMPBELL, Mr. MATSUI, Mr. HIGHTOWER, Mr. MARTIN, Mr. LENT, Mr. HANCE,

Mr. HEFNER, and Mr. GUYER.

H.R. 2196: Mr. BAUMAN.

H.R. 2679: Mr. GUYER, Mr. PASHAYAN, and Mr. DANIEL B. CRANE.

H.R. 3609: Mrs. BOGGS, Mr. CLAY, Mr. COLEMAN, Mr. PHILIP M. CRANE, Mr. DIXON, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. FOUNTAIN, Mr. FRENZEL, Mr. GRAMM, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. GUDGER, Mrs. HOLT, Mr. JENNETTE, Mr. KASTENMEIER, Mr. LAFALCE, Mr. LIVINGSTON, Mr. LOTT, Mr. MITCHELL of New York, Mr. PASHAYAN, Mr. QUAYLE, Mr. SANTINI, Mr. SEIBERLING, Mr. STUDDS, and Mr. TAUKE.

H.R. 3990: Mr. YOUNG of Missouri, Mrs. BOUQUARD, Mr. EVANS of Indiana, Mr. GRASSLEY, and Mr. HOWARD.

H.R. 4071: Mr. DOWNEY, Mr. ERTEL, Mr. GUDGER, Mr. JACOBS, Mr. MAZZOLI, Mr. PATTEN, Mr. RUSSO, and Mr. STEED.

H.R. 4072: Mr. DOWNEY, Mr. ERTEL, Mr. GUDGER, Mr. JACOBS, Mr. LUJAN, Mr. MAZZOLI, Mr. PATTEN, Mr. RUSSO, and Mr. STEED.

H.R. 4073: Mr. AKAKA, Mr. DOWNEY, Mr. ERTEL, Mr. JACOBS, Mr. LUJAN, Mr. MAZZOLI, Mr. PATTEN, Mr. RUSSO, and Mr. STEED.

H.R. 4211: Mr. PATTERSON.

H.R. 4360: Mr. EMERY.

H.R. 4679: Mr. HANLEY, Mr. CLAY, Ms. FERARO, Mr. DORNAN, Mr. PRICE, Mr. FLORIO, Mr. QUILLEN, Mr. WEISS, Mr. LEE, and Mr. LAFALCE.

H.R. 4827: Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma, Mr. ROBINSON, Mr. DORNAN, Mrs. FENWICK, and Mr. McCLORY.

H.R. 4843: Mr. JEFFORDS, Mr. DASCHLE, and Mr. MAZZOLI.

H.R. 4892: Mr. RAHALL.

H.R. 4943: Mr. ZEPERETTI.

H.R. 4970: Mr. BENNETT, Mr. BOLLING, Mr. HEFTEL, Ms. HOLTZMAN, Mr. HOWARD, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. MATSUI, Mr. NEAL, Mr. RINALDO, Mr. ROSE, Mr. SKELTON, Mr. STEWART, Mr. SYNAR, and Mr. ZABLOCKI.

H.R. 5261: Mr. HYDE.

H. Con. Res. 183: Mr. PEPPER, Mr. LEACH of Iowa, Mr. CORCORAN, and Mr. BURGNER.

H. Res. 288: Mr. DANIEL B. CRANE.

H. Res. 374: Mr. BROYHILL and Mr. JEFFORDS.

AMENDMENTS

Under clause 6 of rule XXIII, proposed amendments were submitted as follows:

H.R. 2608

By Mr. WEAVER:

—Add a new section in title II:

"No amount authorized to be appropriated under this Act may be expended for the issuance of an operating license for a nuclear powerplant unless the Commission has received from the State in which the powerplant is sited, and has approved, an emergency evacuation plan for such State or, if applicable, a multi-State region."

H.R. 4034

By Mr. WEAVER:

—At page 28, line 15, insert a new subsection (c) as follows, redesignating succeeding subsections accordingly:

(c) (1) In order to carry out the policy set forth in paragraph 2(c) and paragraph 4 of section 3 of this Act, the Secretary shall require a validated license for the export of wheat, corn, or soybeans. In considering any application for such validated export license issued under the terms of this paragraph, the Secretary shall establish a minimum export price for the above commodities of 80 per centum of the parity price as established and periodically revised by the Secretary of Agriculture under provisions of 7 U.S.C. 1301. No export license shall issue for the commodities listed in this paragraph at a price for export which is less than 80 per centum of the established parity price for said commodity.

(2) The provisions of paragraph (c) (1)

may be waived in the case of exports to developing countries.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (c)(1) shall not apply to applications for export to any country if and when the President determines that it is in the national interest to remove the requirement of a validated license for export of said commodities to said country.

(4) The provisions of paragraph (c)(1) shall remain valid for one year after the date of enactment of this Act.

H.R. 4040

By Mr. HUGHES:

—Page 33, after line 8, add the following new section:

PURCHASES OF GASOLINE AS A FUEL FOR MOTOR VEHICLES

SEC. 818. To the maximum extent feasible and consistent with overall defense needs and sound vehicle management practices, as determined by the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense is authorized and di-

rected to enter into contracts by competitive bid, subject to appropriations, for the purchase of domestically produced alcohol or alcohol-gasoline blends containing at least 10 percent domestically produced alcohol for use in motor vehicles owned or operated by the Department.

By Mr. STRATTON:

—On page 27, line 23, section 811, delete lines 23 through 25; and on page 28, delete lines 1 and 2.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

PUBLIC ELECTION FINANCING

HON. BILL FRENZEL

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 13, 1979

● Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, in last Sunday's Post, there was a splendid article which featured the conclusion of Dr. Herbert Alexander, perhaps America's most respected observer of campaign financing, that taxpayer financing of Presidential elections may also have significantly cut the level of grass roots participation in campaigns.

The article follows:

PUBLIC ELECTION FINANCING SEEN CUTTING GRASS ROOTS

(By Fred Barbash)

Public financing of the 1976 presidential election, while cutting more established candidates down to size for Jimmy Carter, may have also significantly cut the level of grass-roots participation in campaigns.

That is one of the conclusions reached by the country's foremost analyst of election financing, Herbert E. Alexander, after four years' study of the first publicly financed campaign.

Public financing, and its accompanying limits on campaign contributions, ended the era when a fund-raiser could assemble 10 people in a room and walk out with a million dollars in contributions. So a well-known candidate like Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), who could probably have done that sort of thing, was brought down to the level of a little-known candidate, Jimmy Carter, who couldn't, Alexander says.

This was "the most important effect of the public financing system," Alexander writes in "Financing the 1976 Election," his fifth quadrennial book on presidential campaigning. "Better known candidates who had connections with wealthy contributors could have swamped Carter, and without federal subsidies, Carter would have lacked the money to consolidate his initial lead," Alexander writes.

The law, enacted in 1973, provided millions of dollars in "matching funds" to primary candidates, and full financing—\$21.8 million each—to general election candidates Carter and Gerald Ford. The act also imposed a \$1,000 limit on contributions from any individual, wiping out the so-called "Fat-cat" who donated tens of thousands in years gone by.

At the same time, the law imposed strict new accounting requirements on candidates, limits on the uses of campaign money, and state-by-state ceilings on spending.

It was these elements of the act that Alexander says reduced participation at the grassroots level in presidential politics.

The limits fostered the "most cost-effective" means of campaigning. This meant a far broader use of television advertising, direct mail solicitations for money, and centralization of campaign operations.

"Cost-effectiveness," Alexander said in a press conference last week discussing his findings, in turn "brought a kind of professionalization to the campaigns which was not evident before" and a significant decline in volunteer activity.

The Carter campaign cut bumper stickers, Alexander reports, after a cost-benefit study showed that only one in five ever wound up on a bumper.

A Texas Republican official displayed for Alexander 5,000 buttons and 75,000 stickers for the entire state Ford-Dole effort. "You want to see our entire contribution to the President's campaign?" the official said. "There it is on the shelf over there . . . The law says we can spend no more than \$1,000 and we spent \$1,020, so the last \$20 is probably a felony."

The findings of Alexander, a political science professor at the University of Southern California and director of the Citizens Research Foundation, coincide in many respects with an analysis recently done by Harvard University for the House Administration Committee.

Both are expected to fuel the movement toward eventual major modifications—including an increase in contribution limits and an end to state-by-state spending ceilings—already under way in Congress.●

SHATTER THE SILENCE— VIGIL, 1979

HON. ALBERT GORE, JR.

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 13, 1979

● Mr. GORE. Mr. Speaker, today I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues the case of Grigory Vigdorov, a young Soviet Jew. In 1973, Grigory and his family applied for permission to emigrate to Israel with his elderly parents. Although the parents' visa was approved, Grigory was denied permission on the basis of his past service in the army. Two more attempts to obtain a visa were futile.

Since that time, Grigory has repeatedly been the victim of government har-

assment and maltreatment. After his first application, he was ordered to leave his job as a pressmaker in a small button factory, and the only employment he has been able to find since is as a part-time tree surgeon. Contact with his family in Israel has been stifled by the government as well. Grigory does not receive the letters which his parents write, and telephone contact has been halted.

This kind of treatment by the Soviet Government is disgraceful, but, unfortunately, Grigory is not an isolated case. Thousands of Soviet Jews are harassed and discriminated against, because of their wish to leave Russia.

We in the United States, the cradle of freedom and liberty, cannot stand idly by—we must speak out for compassion and decency. I urge the Soviet Union to grant these persons the freedom they deserve and to recognize the rights which they have as human beings. I hope that our efforts here on their behalf will convey that message loudly and clearly.●

NEWSWEEK'S NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY

HON. JOHN W. WYDLER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 13, 1979

● Mr. WYDLER. Mr. Speaker, for only the third time in its history, Newsweek magazine has proposed an editorial policy on a major issue. The subject is energy, and in its July 16 edition the magazine has published a list of recommendations many of which I consider sensible and feasible. Unfortunately, Newsweek has a blind spot on nuclear reprocessing, but otherwise, I am particularly pleased with their suggestions for the nuclear power component and also with their synthetic-fuels emphasis.

The magazine calls for the production of 2 million barrels a day of synthetic fuels by 1990. This is the same goal set by this body on June 26 in its passage of the National Defense Production Act amendment. I agree with Newsweek that the Government's role in synfuels should be minimized but that some Federal subsidies will be necessary to encourage private investment in the production of

● This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by the Member on the floor.