The Psychology of Humiliation:

Somalia, Rwanda / Burundi, and Hitler's Germany

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Contents

Acknowledgements[1]

This manuscript builds on a research project that examined Rwanda and Somalia and compared their cases with Hitler's Germany. The project has been carried out at the University of Oslo (1997-2001) and is entitled *The Feeling of Being Humiliated: A Central Theme in Armed Conflicts. A Study of the Role of Humiliation in Somalia, and Rwanda/Burundi, Between the Warring Parties, and in Relation to Third Intervening Parties* (see www.uio.no/~evelinl). It has been funded by the Norwegian Research Council and the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I am extremely grateful for their support. Their yearly conferences were an immeasurable help to me, I would like to thank Leif E. Christoffersen, Kjell Halvorsen, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Stein Tønnessen, Ida Blom, Nina Gornitzka, Anette Haug, Kristin Sverdrup, Helge Ole Bergesen, and all the others who with their innovative vision and determination founded the Multilateral Development Assistance Programme (and successor programmes) and form these programmes into platforms for new ideas, thereby always drawing upon the very special and valuable Scandinavian tradition of searching for peace and developing better solutions of organising the global community in more just and fair ways than is being achieved today.

Since many of my interlocutors and informants in and from Africa survive under the most difficult life circumstances I also wish to extend my especially warm thanks to them. I hope that at some point in the future I will be able to give back at least a fraction of all the support I received from them. I also thank my interlocutors from all parts of the world who work with genocide, conflict resolution, peace, development, and humanitarian aid in international and national organisations, from United Nations to international and national NGOs, all of whom helped me understand their fields of activities by letting me participate in their lives.

My funds for fieldwork were limited and did not allow for stays in hotels, meals in Western style restaurants, or use of expensive transport such as taxis too much. Both in Europe and in Africa I depended on finding people who would house me, and help me with transportation in regions where public means such as buses would not suffice or be safe. In Africa I travelled for months, often on overcrowded rusty buses under breathtaking circumstances, with a backpack containing only my computer, and my digital audio and video equipment; there was no room in my bag for clothes or other personal things. Wherever I was

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[1] Titles such as Dr. or Professor will not be used in this book. The only exception will be made for physicians.

[2] See for his publications for example Ross & Ward, in Brown, Reed, & Turiel, 1996; Ross & Ward,

welcomed into a house I received help with basic personal needs. Furthermore, I had no office facilities, and could not afford expensive hotel business centres for communication or for making interview appointments. In many cases, if available, I was generously offered some communication facilities by my hosts, such as use of telephone, or sometimes even Internet access. Thus I moved from home to home, on the average every week to a new place, for almost a year in Africa (also in Europe, only there for longer periods of several weeks or even months in one place), always looking for new hosts who would kindly house me and give me the invaluable opportunity to get involved in their lives and acquire an understanding of their perspective on life, an opportunity that hotel rooms would have foreclosed.

I thanked all my hosts, of course, by buying food and contributing to other expenses, sometimes, for example, buying bits of furniture for them; as a result, I did not feel I was being exploitative, and, furthermore, I used the available funds in ways that were in many aspects more useful than spending it on hotels.

I managed, under these circumstances, to carry out 216 major interviews with people from all segments of national and international society including key opinion leaders, along with hundreds of less formal encounters; I succeeded in recording more than 100 hours of interviews on audio tape, 10 hours of digital video film, and extensive notes that I would take during an interview or the same evening. I would not have been able to achieve these results without extensive and generous practical support wherever I knocked at a door. I would therefore like to thank very warmly all the people who extended their practical help to me, - there were even some airplane tickets in Africa I did not have to pay for.

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me on yet another fact finding mission to the Rwandan countryside concerning humanitarian and development aid. Jaap Aantjes, Lutheran World Foundation, and Danae Meacock-Bashir, environmental scientist, integrated me into their world and with Danae I started up a think tank for improving development aid. My great appreciation for their support also goes to Rita Richter and all the others from UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees) in Bujumbura, capital of Burundi, as well as to Gudrun Engstrøm, Norwegian Refugee Council. My warmest thanks I also extend to Prosper Mpawenayo, Minister of National Education of Burundi, and all others from the Ministry of Education who welcomed me at the 'International Conference on the Role of Education in Promoting a Culture of Conviviality and Community Building, 23rd – 26th February 1999 in Bujumbura.

Also in Europe I would have to thank hundreds of people for keeping me afloat wherever I asked for help, I name here, representing many others also, Evelin and Carsten Frerk (Hamburg), Dorothea Bringmann (Bonn and Berlin), and, very importantly, my family in all parts of Germany and also in Belgium.

The academic support for the project came from a network of more than 400 academic contacts around the world, but primarily from the Department of Psychology at the University of Oslo. I would like to thank the Department of Psychology at the University of Oslo very warmly for hosting the project. I am extremely grateful for the kind welcome and the home I was granted at this institute. I especially thank Reidar Ommundsen for taking up the heavy and difficult task of being my academic supervisor. I thank Reidar for his continuous critical support and encouragement, together with Hilde Nafstad, who continuously kept my often faltering courage afloat. I also wish to express my great gratitude to Jan Smedslund, Finn Tschudi, Jon Martin Sundet, Rolv Mikkel Blakar, Kjell Flekkøy, Carl-Erik Grenness, Anna Louise von der Lippe, Astri Heen Wold, Karsten Hundeide, Ellen Hartmann, Kirsti Monsen, Mary Theophilakis, Gudrun Fleischer Eckblad, Fanny Duckert, Hanne Haavind, Steinar Kvale, Astrid Bastiansen, Tor Endestad, Lutine de Wal Pastoor, Nora Sveaass, - all at the others at the institute of psychology in Oslo, who helped me during various phases of my research in a wide range of ways.

Malvern Lumsden, psychologist and at the time peace researcher at PRIO (International Peace Research Institute, Oslo) was a major support in developing the project in 1995 and 1996. Also psychologists from other parts of Norway and Scandinavia, from Trondheim, Bergen, Tromsø and Stockholm, helped in many ways: Britt-Marie Drottz Sjöberg (Trondheim), Hroar Klempe (Trondheim), Günter Bierbrauer (Trondheim and Osnabrück), Jostein Rise (Bergen), Bas Verplanken (Tromsø), Nora Ahlberg and Ragnhild

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[2] See for his publications for example Ross & Ward, in Brown, Reed, & Turiel, 1996; Ross & Ward, 1995; Ross, in Arrow, Mnookin, Ross, Tversky, & Wilson, 1995; Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Ross & Samuels, 1993.

[3] See for his publications for example Bond, 1986; Bond & Venus, 1991.

[4] See for his publications for example Smith, 2000a; Smith, 2000b; Smith, 2000c; Smith, 1999; Smith, 1997a; Smith, 1997b; Smith, 1991; Smith, 1984a; Smith, 1984b; Smith, 1983; Smith, 1981.

sociology, history and social psychology in the attempt to build a theory of humiliation. Without his never faltering help the project would not have reached its current state. I very warmly thank him for his intense intellectual interest in the topic of humiliation and his support in anchoring it in a broader academic context. Furthermore I would like to thank William Ury, Director of the Project on Preventing War at Harvard University, and author of *Getting to Yes*, and *Getting to Peace*,[5] whom I met in Belfast in 1999 and whose anthropological work I draw upon.

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[5] Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Ury, 1999.

Houston, Texas), Kenneth E. Goodpaster (Harvard Business School, USA, and ENCEAD, Paris), Christian P. Scherrer (at the time Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, COPRI), Uli Windisch (Départment de Sociologie, Université de Genève), Georges Charrière (Coordinateur, Réseau Documentaire International Sur La Region Des Grands Lacs Africains, International Documentation Network On The Great African Lakes Region, Genève, Switzerland), Eric Burnier (Institut Universitaire d'etudes du developpement Genève), Jean-Pierre Gontard (Institut Universitaire d'etudes du developpement Genève), Professor Norman Sartorius (President, World Psychiatric Association, Professor of Psychiatry, University of Geneva), André Guichaoua (l'Université des Sciences et Technologies de Lille), Ildefonse Nayigizente (Beziers, France), Danielle De Lame (Anthropologie sociale et culturelle, Koninklijk Museum voor Midden-Afrika, Musée Royal de L'Afrique Centrale, Ethnosociologie & Ethnohistoire, Tervuren, Belgium), Filip Reyntjens (Institute of Development Policy and Management, Antwerpen), Ruth Lister (Social Policy, Loughborough University, UK), Paul Collier (Oxford, now World Bank), Ioan M. Lewis (legendary Somali expert, anthropologist, London, UK), Keith Webb (International Conflict Analysis Programme, University of Kent), Cheshmak A. Farhoumand (Department of Political Science, York University), Stephen J. Mennell (Department of Sociology, University College Dublin Belfield, Republic of Ireland), Paul Richards (TAO/TCT, Wageningen, The Netherlands), Mats R. Berdal (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London), Godfried van Benthem van den Bergh (Institute of Social Studies, ISS, The Hague, The Netherlands), Johan Goudsblom (Department of Sociology, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands), Julia Chaitin (Department of Behavioral Sciences, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel), Norbert Ropers, Berghof (Research Center for Conflict Management), Volker Rittberger (Department of Political Science, University of Tübingen), Wolfgang Heinrich (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Evangelischer Kirchen, Bonn), Helga Nowotny (Philosophy and Social Studies of Science at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETH, Zürich).

I built a network of altogether more than 500 interdisciplinary academic contacts, a network of conversation on the topic of humiliation. To date, autumn 2000, the actively maintained academic network has grown to 532 researchers from all over the world, and the network of individual informants and/or representatives of organisations to 537. However, the numbers increase continuously, because almost daily I receive messages from researchers and practitioners who have heard about the humiliation project. It is impossible to name everybody. I beg anybody who does not find his or her name in this list to be assured that I

highly appreciate every contribution that was given to me. But space does not permit to give due respect to all people who generously gave their time and reflections to this project.

Finally I would like to thank my parents. I have 'non-roots,' in other words, I am born into a family that is known in Germany as a 'refugee family' (correctly 'Vertriebene,' or 'internally displaced persons') from a region in Central Europe that does not 'exist' anymore, meaning that refugees such as my family cannot return 'home.' My family originates from Schlesien, Silesia, which became part of Poland after the Second World War. I have a father whose kind nature, more concerned with respecting human rights than waging war, corresponded badly with World War II requirements. Although I was born long after the World War II in West Germany, I grew up with the debate around the atrocities of the two World Wars, and my father's courageous and bitter struggle has given direction to my interests, and, very early in my life guided me towards wanting to learn from Germany's gruesome past and help others avoid a similar journey into horror.

Introduction

On the 1st September 1999 a Burundian who lives in Europe and whose name I do not want to disclose wrote this intensely-felt message to me: 'Sometimes, when I see how Europe avoids examining its own responsibility in the tragedy [of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda] and obsessively tries to attach criminal culpability to one ethnic group [the Hutu] and not to the real political authors of this Hecatomb, I ask myself whether the Rwandese drama is not being lived in the West as 'therapy' for the Jewish Shoah: the transfer of humiliation to another far-away, unknown, non-historical culprit. Il y a tellement à décrire, à écrire, à rire et à ire. Surtout à crier: There is so much to describe, to write about, to laugh about and get angry about (so much ire). But most of all, so much to cry about.'[6]

This quote shall serve as the opening statement for this manuscript.

After about twenty five years of international experience, having worked and studied in Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the United States, in the fields of both psychology and medicine, - after learning many languages and having lived among people of many cultures, I developed a 'gut feeling' that the dynamics of humiliation may be more relevant to understanding the human condition than has hitherto been acknowledged. Clearly, 'gut feelings' are not, in themselves, 'scientific' - but they may serve as a valuable entry points into innovative and creative new research.[7]

An important entry point for my interest in the dynamics of humiliation was the widely accepted argument that Germany welcomed Hitler because Germany felt humiliated after World War I by the Treaty of Versailles (28th June 1919).[8] After World War II the

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[6] Translated by the author from French: 'Des fois, quand je vois comment en Europe on ne veut pas examiner sa propre responsabilité dans la tragédie et que l'on veut absolument coller l'imputabilité criminelle à une ethnie et non aux vrais auteurs politiques de cet hécatombe, je me demande même si le drame rwandais n'est pas vécu en Occident en thérapeutique de la Shoah juive: le transfert de l'humiliation vers un autre, éloigné, inconnu, non historique. Il y a tellement à décrire, à écrire, à rire et à ire. Surtout à crier.'

[7] 'In qualitative inquiry the researcher is the instrument. Validity in qualitative methods, therefore, hinges to a great extent on the skill, competence, and rigor of the person doing fieldwork' (Patton, 1990, 14, italics in original). Patton continues on the same page and quotes Guba and Lincoln: the naturalistic 'inquirer is himself the instrument, changes resulting from fatigue, shift in knowledge, and cooptation, as well as variations resulting from differences in training, skill, and experience among different "instruments," easily occur. But this loss in rigor is more than offset by the flexibility, insight, and ability to build on tacit knowledge that is the peculiar province of the human instrument' (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, 113)

[8] This treaty included the now infamous war-guilt clause imposing complete responsibility for the war on the Germans and demanding that they 'make complete reparation for all… loss and damage' caused: 'The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated

victorious allies took care to not humiliate Germany again, so as to avoid World War III, so-to-speak. Instead, Germany received Marshall Aid and was integrated into Western alliances. High politics thus demonstrate the influence and applicability of psychological reflections: humiliation has, indeed, been identified as a cause of world wars. I wondered why humiliation was not more widely researched in psychology. Supposing that humiliation really does have the potential to trigger world wars? I set out to have a closer look at its role.

The Innovative Approaches Adopted Within This Text

This text will provide the reader with the insights flowing from a number of innovative approaches; one is the point just mentioned which is that, as a psychologist, I take lay assumptions concerning the importance of the psychological causes of war more seriously than psychology has done so far, since, if their existence is substantiated, such causes may be very significant.

The next innovation, a creative challenge for both the reader and the author, is the broad interdisciplinary approach envisaged here for understanding the issue of humiliation, branching out from a secure base in psychology. The topic of massacres[9] and mass killings – ranging from the Holocaust and other forms of genocide and ethnic cleansing to terrorism and war - requires an interdisciplinary analysis. Psychology cannot make its full contribution except in this broader context that recognises the embeddedness of inter-personal humiliation processes within specific types of social hierarchy and a broader context of socio-political structures with distinctive patterns of historical development. I believe that this text, though thoroughly rooted in social psychology, will be relevant also for a wide range of other academic fields, including political science, sociology, conflict resolution studies and peace studies.

Several implications make such interdisciplinary work challenging. For example, language has to be kept as neutral as possible in the face of disciplinary identities that all have their own rules, ideologies, and 'initiation rites' regarding language and method. I will deliberately avoid over-use of 'insider' terminology and will heed Gergen's reflections: '…we can speak with some confidence about the emotions of fear, anger, and sadness, because these

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Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies' (Versailles Treaty 1919, part VIII, section I, article 231). See also Sebastian Haffner & Bateson, 1978, and Norbert Elias, 1996.

[9] Robert B. Zajonc uses the word 'massacre' to subsume for example Holocaust, genocide, and ethnic cleansing, see Robert B. Zajonc's forthcoming book, Zajonc, 1999.

terms are constituents of a widely shared vocabulary (of approximately a dozen "emotion" terms) employed with a high degree of frequency within the culture. To admit ignorance of such feelings or to declare them to be absent from one's makeup – would be to render doubt about one's membership in the human species. Would a person be altogether human if he/she could feel no anger or sadness? Other psychological predicates, shared by smaller and sometimes more marginal groups within the culture, fail to command such credibility. Terms like existential anxiety, post traumatic stress disorder, spiritual awareness, flow, and channelling command respect in various pockets of the culture, but for vast numbers may be discounted as jargon or cult language. More extremely, to claim oneself to be overwhelmed with acidae, a term popular in medieval monasteries; suffering from a strong bout of melancholy (a term of great interest to 19th century poets and novelists); or seized by mal de siecle (a term that moved many to suicide less than a century ago) would probably raise queried looks among one's companions' (Gergen, in Grodin & Lindlof, 1996, 3).

The reader will be invited to share the insights flowing from yet another innovation. Through my background as a physician and a clinical psychologist I am accustomed to using the paradigm of diagnosis – prognosis – therapy, and this will be the overarching approach in this text.[10] I will expand this three-step pattern to include also prevention so that it figures as diagnosis – prognosis – therapy/prevention. Prevention is the best therapy for the future, based on diagnosis of the past, and the prognosis drawn from it. My past experience has taught me to envisage the diagnosis – prognosis – therapy/prevention paradigm at the micro and meso level, and now I am extending this approach to encompass the macro level. During my training as a physician I learned about the micro level, the human body in its physical and social environment, and through my education as a Western clinical psychologist in the

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[10] I received support for this approach in 1998 from Magdy A. Hefny, Egyptian diplomat and expert on the 'OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution' in the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Furthermore, Johan Galtung, at the conference Higher Education for Peace, 4th – 6th May in Tromsø, North Norway, reported that his family is a family of doctors, and that he was supposed to become one himself, which he fulfilled, so-to-speak, by advocating the paradigm of diagnosis – prognosis – therapy for the field of peace studies. Johan Galtung states furthermore that according to his experience diplomats are not very well prepared to become good mediators, while psychotherapists are often better suited, because, he explains, 'problems at the geopolitical level resemble family problems; micro, meso and macro levels are connected; compassion and perseverance are important!' Also Paul Ricoeur, renowned French philosopher, recommends this approach, and this is taken very seriously in Rwanda; his article 'Le pardon peut-il guerir? [Can pardon heal?]' (Ricoeur, 1995) has been reprinted in the Rwandese journal Dialogue, Revue d'information et de réflexion which is currently published from Belgium. Ricoeur's article is the opening article in the journal's special issue 'Two Years After the Genocide,' 'Le Génocide Rwandais: Deux Ans Après.' Last but not least Jürgen Habermas can be drawn upon; Anthony Giddens refers to him when he advocates the therapy approach in *New Rules of Sociological Method* (Giddens, 1976, see further down for more details).

Rogerian tradition I learned much about relationships between individuals. Later, during my medical work in different cultures, but especially during my seven years (1984-1991) of work as a clinical psychologist in Cairo, Egypt – a rather collectivistic society – my attention turned to family relations and how they may contribute to constructive diagnosis – prognosis – therapy/prevention sequences. In this research I approach even larger groups, ranging from clans to nations and ultimately to the so-called international community.[11]

At this point both author and reader face up to new challenges, namely the need to avoid the potential danger of patronising or even unsolicited therapy and, in intercultural settings, the additional problem of overcoming ethno-centrism. When I finished my education as a physician I decided not to work in this field, because medicine in Western contexts, - perhaps less so in a number of non-Western contexts, - has long been a stronghold of conservative hierarchical approaches to the world in general and patients in particular. In other words, in my research I had to be aware of the danger that a self-appointed therapist like myself may be unwelcome, or that therapy may be perceived as nothing else but intrusion, or as a badly disguised attempt to exercise power.

Furthermore, in Egypt I understood from 'first hand' experience that what is called 'psychology' or 'therapy' is a Western product and thus ethno-centric.[12] Over the years, through my work with people of the many nationalities that live in Cairo, I developed a cognitive approach to therapy and conflict resolution in which I tried to model the process of finding diagnosis - prognosis - therapy as a dialogue between equal partners. In other words, I avoided having 'clients,' or 'patients' who would encounter me as the therapist and supposed 'possessor of all wisdom.' 'Therapy' would, instead, become a shared common journey into knowledge of Western culture with its specific ideals of health, quality of life, and happiness, combined with a similar journey into the non-Western culture of my respective dialogue partner, a journey in the course of which we detected both, different, and analogous ideals of health, quality of life, and happiness.

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[11] Thomas J. Scheff supports this endeavour: 'In claiming an isomorphism between interpersonal and international relations I realize I challenge an article of faith of modern social science: that structure and process at the societal level are fundamentally different from those at the level of persons… I show parallels between the communication tactics and emotion that occur in families and in relations between nations' (Scheff, 1997, 75). Also Johan Galtung confirms (May 2000 in Tromsø) that micro, meso and macro levels can be viewed together.

[12] See Harry Charalambos Triandis chapter on 'Theoretical Concepts That Are Applicable to the Analysis of Ethnocentrism' (Triandis, in Brislin, 1990).

My encounters with 'clients' thus turned into shared 'archaeological projects'[13] combined with 'architectural projects.'[14] The archaeological approach attempted to unearth underlying structures of their individual and family situations and placed them in their historical and cultural context by drawing upon various disciplines, not only psychology but also anthropology, sociology, philosophy, history, and political science. Openings for healing, or the construction of new social realities, often emerged when synergies between the different cultural perspectives reinforced each other in novel ways, and innovative perspectives shed new light on old problems. The aim of this book is to move this 'archaeological/architectural project' approach from the micro and meso level to a macro level and find similar synergies for larger groups.

What I struggled with in Egypt was the complicated three-sided relationship between the 'problem' or 'case' (disease, symptom), the client who 'has' the problem, and, finally, the therapist. Does the therapist treat the problem? Does the therapist treat the client? Or, do therapist and client attend to the problem together, as 'co-subjects'? 'Deltakar og tilskodar' ['Participant and Observer'] is a classic text of unique clarity in which Hans Skjervheim (drawn upon and highly regarded by Jürgen Habermas[15]) gets to the very heart of the problem by suggesting that the 'ego-alter relation' has to be divided into two components, 'at first the ego and alter (i.e. I and the other) are together on some third thing, we have the same problem, ego and alter are co-subjects who together confront the same case. In the second case the alter and what the alter does is a fact in the world of the ego. There is no longer a shared participation in the same case. Each lives in his/her own world where the alter has facticity for the ego in the world of the ego. There is, however, a further alternative. The ego may, instead of listening to what the alter says, listen to the sounds which the alter produces, and thereby turn the alter into a pure physical object in its world. This is the programme of behaviourism, one which that school, understandably enough, has not followed through. In daily life it is not a question of one or the other or the third, but about all the three attitudes at the same time. Therefore the situation of the fellow human being is, in principle, not unambiguous, but "ambiguous." It is this ambiguous situation within which the human

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[13] Claude Lévi-Strauss uses the image of archaeology for his work in anthropology; he superimposes different stratae and searches for structures that would not be discernible from only one strata.

[14] See Steinar Kvale's discussion of the researcher as a 'miner' or a 'traveller' further down.

[15] I am very grateful to Jon Hellesnes for introducing me to Hans Skjervheim and his work (personal conversation on 28th October 2000), as well as to Habermas, 1996, *Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*.

sciences are embedded, and it is here that the roots of the complicated fundamental problems of these sciences are to be found.'[16]

Research on humiliation, genocide and war, is, unavoidably, a journey into the abyss of this 'ambiguous' human condition, and such a journey cannot be confronted from within an academic field or discipline, it has to begin with a distancing step away from well-established paths, with an acceptance of Heidegger's notion that all human beings – be they therapist, scholar, client or patient – are 'thrown into the world.' In *Sein und Zeit* [*Being and Time*], Heidegger's purpose is to bring to light how it is to 'be,' and what it means to ask, 'What is the meaning of Being?' According to Heidegger these questions lie behind the obviousness of everyday life and, therefore, also behind the empirical questions of natural science.

Paul Stenner discusses Heidegger's contributions to phenomenology, hermeneutics and existentialism in terms of distinctions between truth and correctness, the ontological and the ontic, and Being and beings, and uses Heidegger to offer 'deep reflexivity' to psychology. 'Heidegger's arguments concerning ontology before the subject/object distinction, his discussion of enframing, his concern with the understanding of being, and his distinction between modes of being are all important for a rethinking of psychological practice' (Stenner, 1998, Abstract).[17]

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[16] Translated by the author from Nynorsk, a Norwegian language of particular historic standing, richness and clarity: 'Vi har således løyst ego-alter relasjonen opp i to komponentar, først der ego og alter (d.e. eg og den andre) er saman om noko tridje, vi har eit sams problem, ego og alter er medsubjekt i høve til det sams sakstilhøvet. I det andre tilfelle er alter og det alter gjer, eit faktum i ego sin verden. Ein deler ikkje same sakstilhøvet lenger. Ein lever i kvar sin verden, der alter er eit faktum for ego i ego sin verden. Det finnes rett nok endå eit alternativ. Ego kan, i staden for å hoyra etter kva alter seier, lytta til dei lydane som alter produserar, og med det gjera alter til eit reint fysikalsk objekt i sin verden. Dette er behaviorismen sitt program, men som rimeleg er har dei late vera å fylgja det. I dagleglivet er det ikkje tale om det eine eller det andre eller det tridje, men om alle tre holdningane på same tid. Difor er den mellommenneskelege situasjon prinsipielt ikkje eintydig, men "tvetydig". I denne tvetydige situasjonen er vitenskapane om mennesket opphengde, og der er rota til dei kompliserte grunnlagsproblema når det gjeld desse vitskapane' (Skjervheim, in Slagstad, 1976b, 205).

[17] Hermeneutics ask, 'What are the conditions under which a human act took place or a product was produced that makes it possible to interpret its meanings?' (Patton, 1990, 84). Hermeneutic philosophy, as developed by Wilhelm Dilthey and other German philosophers, is the study of interpretive understanding, or meaning, of *verstehen*, with special attention to context and original purpose. Patton writes: 'The term *hermeneutics* refers to a Greek technique for interpreting legends, stories, and other texts. To make sense of and interpret a text, it is important to know what the author wanted to communicate, to understand intended meanings, and to place documents in a historical and cultural context' (Patton, 1990, 84, italicisation in original).

Questions to Be Asked

The sequence of diagnosis – prognosis – therapy/prevention evidently has to start out with the therapist who, together with the patient, is 'thrown into the world,' and asks questions concerning diagnosis that, as in the case of this project, address the role of humiliation. Questions such as the following may be formulated:

Is the lay-hypothesis introduced above – the one so often repeated with reference to the Versailles Accords – that humiliation may lead to war, correct? Among all the reasons that have been discussed as causes of violence and war, is it possible that *humiliation* plays a role? And, does *humiliation* contribute – not only to war – but also to Holocaust, genocide and ethnic cleansing? Could also terrorism and suicide bombings have roots in *humiliation*? Could, furthermore, even benevolent acts have *humiliating* effects? Could it be possible, for example, that organisations such as the United Nations or international humanitarian organisations might at times *humiliate* those they want to help, even without noticing it? Could thus *humiliation* be a virulent agent involved in starting and maintaining conflicts, conflicts concerning not just the initial opponents, but also third parties attempting to mediate? And might it not be the case that unless *humiliation* is addressed and healed no reconciliation or peace can be lasting?

These questions are not meant to imply that objective factors of *Realpolitik* such as competition for scarce resources do not play a role in violent conflicts. Nor do they claim that conflict in itself is negative since, for example, power imbalances might need conflict to be adjusted, and conflict may also, at times, facilitate creativity.[18] But they do suggest that struggles around objective factors or power imbalances do not necessarily generate violence. Conflicts around objective factors and power imbalances may also lead to non-violent confrontations, and eventually to compromise and co-operation. Behind the questions enumerated above regarding the role of humiliation lies the suggestion that it might often be the other way round, namely that feelings of humiliation may feed on objective factors and then create violent conflict. Hitler's Germany may serve as an awful example: economic hardship and unemployment combined with feelings of humiliation after World War I are widely believed to have made the German population susceptible to Hitler's demagogy.

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[18] 'Modern researchers argue that conflict is a necessity if cognitive change is to occur. The problem is, as stated before, that the utility of a conflict lies in its management. Under good conflict management, conflict can be a necessary precondition for creativity' (Leymann, in Leymann, 2000, 3).

The Research Project

The research project that is the basis for this text has been designed to explore these questions, not only with respect to Hitler's Germany, but also in the context of more recent incidents of war and genocide, and it is being conducted at the University of Oslo (1997-2001).[19] It is entitled *The Feeling of Being Humiliated: A Central Theme in Armed Conflicts. A Study of the Role of Humiliation in Somalia, and Rwanda/Burundi, Between the Warring Parties, and in Relation to Third Intervening Parties*.[20] 216 qualitative interviews have been carried out, from 1998 to 1999 in Africa (in Hargeisa, capital of Somaliland, in Kigali and other places in Rwanda, in Bujumbura, capital of Burundi, in Nairobi in Kenya, and in Cairo in Egypt), and from 1997 to 2000 in Europe (in Norway, Germany, Switzerland, France, and in Belgium).

As the title of the project indicates, three groups had to be interviewed, namely both the conflict parties in Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi, and representatives of third parties who intervene. These three groups stand in a set of triangular relationships, at least this is the minimum version, - where there are more than two opponents, as is the case in most conflicts, the pattern, obviously, has more than three corners. Both in Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi, representatives of the 'opponents' and the 'third party' were approached, as were witnesses of Hitler's reign in Germany. Some of my interview conversations were filmed (altogether I produced 10 hours of film, comprising many interviews, but also images of Somaliland and Rwanda), other interviews were taped on mini discs (altogether more than 100 hours of audio tape), and in situations where this seemed inappropriate I made notes. The following people were included in the 'network of conversations' that was created in the course of the research:

- Survivors of genocides were interviewed, that is people belonging to the groups that were targeted for genocidal killing. In Somalia this included, among others, the Isaaq tribe, in Rwanda the Tutsi, in Burundi Hutu and Tutsi. The group of survivors is typically divided into two parts, namely those who survived because they were not in the country when the genocide happened, - some of them returned after the genocide, - and those who survived the onslaught inside the country. The German background of this fieldwork consists of the network of contacts that I have established, over some decades, with survivors from the Holocaust and, especially, their children.

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[19] See project description on www.uio.no/~evelinl.
[20] For articles written so long, see Lindner, 1999b; Lindner, 2000g; Lindner, 2000h; Lindner, 2000f; Lindner, 2000i; Lindner, 2000b; Lindner, 2000j; Lindner, 2000a; Lindner, 1999a; Lindner, 2000d; Lindner, 2000k.

- Freedom fighters were included into the 'network of conversation.' In Somalia, interviews were conducted with SNM (Somali National Movement) fighters in the North of Somalia, who fought the troops sent by the central government in Mogadishu in the South; in Rwanda the interviewees were the former Tutsi refugees who formed an army, the RFP (Rwandese Patriotic Front), and attacked Rwanda from the North in order to oust the extremist Hutu government which carried out the genocide in Rwanda in 1994; in Burundi there were also Hutu rebels. In Germany, the equivalent of these contacts were my exchanges with those aristocratic circles in Germany that fed opposition against Hitler, but also with those, especially from my family, who advocated human rights in the middle of World War II and paid a high price for their human compassion. Furthermore, my contacts with people from the occupied countries who tried to sabotage German oppression, for example the Norwegian resistance movement, belong into this group, as well as representatives of the allies who finally put an end to German atrocities.

- Some Somali warlords who have their places of retreat in Kenya were interviewed.

- Politicians were included, among them people who were in power before the genocide and whom survivors secretly suspected of having been collaborators or at least silent supporters of those who perpetrated the genocide. The equivalent in Germany is the atmosphere of underlying suspicion in which I grew up, generally a mistrust towards everybody of a certain age, but in particular suspicion towards the past of those people in power, a suspicion that only diminishes as the years pass and people die.

- Somali and Rwandan/Burundian academicians who study the situation of their countries were interviewed. For Germany the last striking manifestation in this field, and a focal point for discussions, has been Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's book on *Hitler's Willing Executioners*.

- Representatives of national non-governmental organisations who work locally for development, peace and reconciliation were included. In Germany, the response to the atrocities of World War II permeates everybody's life – even the generation born after the war – and my intimate knowledge of a culture of German self-criticism may stand as an equivalent to the pre-occupation with past, present, and future anticipated bloodshed that characterises people's lives in Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi.

- Third parties were interviewed, namely representatives of United Nations organisations and international non-governmental organisations who work on emergency relief, long-term development, peace, and reconciliation in all parts of the world.

- Egyptian diplomats in the foreign ministry in Egypt who deal with Somalia were visited; Egypt is a heavyweight in the OAU.

- African psychiatrists in Kenya who deal with trauma and forensic psychiatry were asked about their experience with victims and perpetrators from Rwanda/Burundi and Somalia. In Kenya many nationals from Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi have sought refuge, some in refugee camps, others through various private arrangements. Some, both victims and perpetrators, seek psychiatric help. The equivalent in Germany are those researchers who focus on the effects of the German Holocaust and other World War II atrocities.

- Those who have not yet been interviewed are the masterminds of genocide in Rwanda, those who have planned the genocide, and organised it meticulously. Some of them are said to be in hiding in Kenya and other parts of Africa, or in French-speaking parts of Europe, or in the United States and Canada. Some are in prisons in Rwanda and in Arusha, Tanzania. However, accounts of people who were close to Somali dictator Siad Barre have successfully been collected. In the case of Hitler and those who supported him, a culture of openness and frank discussion is currently unfolding in Germany – the whole country has entered into a phase of 'working through' these past experiences, and people who never talked before, do so now, more than 50 years after World War II.

- As mentioned above, the topic has also been discussed with more than 500 researchers working in related fields. The current state-of-the-art has been mapped, showing that few researchers have turned their attention to this field. A Theory of Humiliation is currently being developed by the author, and a larger book project is envisaged.[21]

The empirical work will be explained further down in more detail and will not be expanded further in this introductory section. At this point I would rather like to give the reader an initial impression of how the dynamics of humiliation may be seen at work at micro, meso, and macro levels. I will start with the already mentioned case of Hitler's Germany.

Introductory Examples of the Dynamics of Humiliation

After Germany's defeat in 1945, care was taken not to repeat the humiliation of 1918. Instead of facing draconian demands for reparations, Germany was given help to rebuild its industrial economy and was brought into NATO and the European Community (now the European

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[21] In partnership with Dennis Smith, Loughborough University, UK. Smith is professor of sociology at Loughborough University (UK), see his publications in the bibliography.

Union). The clear intention was to avoid a third world war against Germany with all the terrible costs that would entail' (Lindner, 2000a, 2).

The Marshall Plan was central to preventing a renewed humiliation. Willy Brandt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, confirmed this when he spoke at Harvard University 5th June 1972 at the commemoration of George Marshall's speech 25 years earlier (Brandt, 1999). Brandt's speech was entitled: '1945 Different Than 1918.'

Willy Brandt, with his own talent for making historic speeches, declared: '...Victories, too, can be bitter, especially if they carry the seed for future conflicts as in 1918, when the war was won, and peace was lost for want of reason on the part of the winners and the losers, through stubborn mistrust on the one side, through resentment of the humiliated on the other... George Marshall and others agreed that victory did not relieve his country of its responsibility. The United States did not for a moment claim that responsibility for itself, it shared it with its allies...With his plan George Marshall roused Europe's stifled self-confidence. He gave many citizens of the old continent a concrete stimulus to bring down from the stars the vision of a Europe united in lasting peace... the Marshall Plan was productive proof that America needs a self-confident Europe capable of forming a common political will... it waits for Europe to grow into an equal partner with whom it can share the burden of responsibility for world affairs...1947 marked the beginning of the Cold War, not because of, but in spite of the Marshall Plan.'

An example of humiliation at the international level	
Humiliation	The Treaty of Versailles humiliated a defeated Germany and – together with economic hardship – prepared Germany for Hitler.
Consequences of humiliation	• World War and Holocaust. • As a consequence, all Germans acquired the reputation of being 'willing executioners' who do not deserve sympathy or help.
Reconciliation	The Marshall Plan provided Germany with new dignity, and instead of an excluded pariah, Germany is a member of NATO and EU.

Table 1: An example of humiliation and its aftermath at the international level

The two world wars thus seem to support the proposition that humiliation may lead to war, Holocaust, genocide, ethnic cleansing and terrorism. At the turn of the millennium those very issues are still all very high on the world's political agenda. In recent years, genocide has

occurred in Rwanda and Burundi, ethnic cleansing in ex-Yugoslavia, atrocities have been committed in East-Timor and many other places.

To take Rwanda, Clark writes about the genocide in 1994: 'The Rwandan genocide of 1994 was the execution of 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu by Hutu-supremacists in the name of Hutu superiority. It took place at a pace three times that of the Nazi Holocaust of the Jews. This genocide I find to be, with no hyperbole, perhaps the single worst, most immoral, tragic, and horrific event of human history; for a few reasons. First, the genocide was committed not by a military elite but by the populace at large, using crude weapons (mostly machetes). Second, the international community (read: the United States and Western Europe) did almost nothing to stop it, despite repeated warnings. Third, the size and rapidity of the genocide was astounding. Fourth, it was the archetype of genocide, nothing motivated the killers besides a hate that had accumulated over the centuries' (Clark, 2000, 1).

Rwanda could be added to the list of sad examples illustrating the dynamics of humiliation. Table 2 proposes a possible version of these dynamics, this time not between states, as in the case of Germany, but within a single state.

An example of humiliation at the national level	
Humiliation	Extremist members of the Hutu ruling class – Hutu being the former 'underlings' in the traditional Tutsi kingdom of Rwanda – feared the return of past humiliation if their former Tutsi masters were to regain influence.
Consequences of humiliation	• Genocide. • As a consequence, all Hutu acquired the reputation of 'genocidaires' who do not deserve sympathy or help.
Reconciliation	Yet to be fully achieved.

Table 2: An example of humiliation and its aftermath at the national level

Examples are not restricted to the national or international level; the global multilateral level is equally affected. In 1993 an angry crowd dragged a dead American soldier through the streets of Mogadishu in Somalia.[22] On New Year's Eve 1998 I interviewed a Somali warlord

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[22] On 9th December 1992, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), or Operation Restore Hope, was launched in Somalia by the United States, as a response to the failing of the first United Nations operation UNOSOM. However, UNITAF also came to fail, as did UNOSOM II. Especially, the hunt for Somali General Aidid undermined UN impartiality and turned the UN and the US into targets of Somali mistrust and revenge.

(Osman Ato, a former ally of General Aidid) who was just one of many Somali voices who insisted that in the eyes of many Somalis (and others) the UNOSOM operation was a big humiliation. This was especially true, he maintained, when a house was attacked and bombed where respected elders had a meeting. He felt even more humiliated, he was adamant, by the cynical and humiliating justification that was given for the bombing, namely that this meetinghouse was supposedly a headquarters. He argued strongly that 'when the Americans feel humiliated because their soldiers' bodies were shown in the streets, they should ask themselves why this happened. They should be aware of the fact that killing elders, for example, is a deep humiliation in Somali society.' The helicopters, the bombing, all this, he maintained, were acts of humiliation that united Somalis against the UN. Osman Ato's views illustrated that he, a warlord, and himself an 'organiser of violence,' fervently thinks in terms of humiliation and 'counter-humiliation,' as do wide circles of the Somali people, who united together with him under the banner of 'necessary' counter-humiliation.

But not only Osman Ato saw humiliation at work. Even some of the most earnest, humane and well willing helpers on the American side felt uneasy. Sam Engelstad, UN's Chief of Humanitarian Affairs, and, on several occasions Acting Humanitarian Coordinator in Mogadishu in 1994, wrote[23]: 'During my own time in Somalia in 1994, humiliation was never far from the surface. Indeed, it pretty much suffused the relationship between members of the UN community and the general Somali population. In the day-to-day interaction between the Somalis and UN relief workers like ourselves, it enveloped our work like a grey cloud. Yet, the process was not well understood, and rarely intended to be malevolent.' Engelstad adds that 'Among the political and administrative leadership of the UN mission, however, humiliation and its consequences were far better understood and were frequently used as policy tools. Regardless of intent, it was pernicious and offensive to many of us.'

A cycle of humiliation was put in motion in Somalia, see Table 3: First the Somalis felt humiliated, and then they responded by inflicting humiliation upon dead American bodies. The latter phase of this cycle is still relevant today to any traveller, especially from the rich world, as incidents of kidnappings and bombings show, which limit the freedom to move internationally because of fear of terrorist attacks. Not even humanitarian workers such as Red Cross and Red Crescent staff are safe from kidnap incidents, such as the one that

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[23] Personal communication from Sam Engelstad (28th September 1999), quoted with his permission.

occurred in Somalia in April 1998.[24] Anti-Western terrorism in Egypt (for example Luxor, 1997), or the 1998 bombings of the American embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania, are further examples that have filled the media. The recent kidnap drama on the Philippines may also serve as an instance; an American hostage was 'worth' much more than hostages with other passports, namely claims of ten million dollars and the release of prisoners in the United States (1st September 2000, ARD 'Tagesschau,' Germany).

The humiliating ending of the UN operation in Somalia had profound effects at the global multilateral level, as this quote illustrates: 'The international community's intervention in Somalia has become synonymous with the prevailing mood in many quarters against international intervention in far-flung civil conflicts, against the broadening of peacekeeping into "nation-building" operations, and against the United Nations in general' (Jan, 1996, 1).

Rwanda paid a high price for this 'mood against international intervention': When the genocide started in Rwanda in 1994 the international community left Rwandans to slaughter each other, because nobody wanted a 'second Somalia.'[25] This is the more shocking since as few as 5000 troops could have saved almost a million lives: 'A modern force of 5,000 troops... sent to Rwanda sometime between April 7 and April 21, 1994, could have significantly altered the outcome of the conflict... forces appropriately trained, equipped and commanded, and introduced in a timely manner, could have stemmed the violence in and around the capital, prevented its spread to the countryside, and created conditions conducive to the cessation of the civil war…' (Feil, 1998, 3, quoted from The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 10, paragraph 9).

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[24] Eight Red Cross and Red Crescent staff were kidnapped at the airport in Mogadishu North. See further down my interviews with hostages, among others the head of the group, Ola Skuterud from the Norwegian Red Cross, as well as with the chief negotiator of the Red Cross.
[25] See for example O'Halloran, 1995.

An example of humiliation at the global, multilateral level	
Humiliation	Somalis felt humiliated by certain operations that were part of an international intervention that was intended to help Somalis.
Consequences of humiliation	• Somalis killed UN peacekeepers, and publicly humiliated the dead bodies of U.S. pilots. Also today, especially Western tourists are at risk of being kidnapped or even killed in some world regions. • As a consequence, people in need in some world regions have acquired the reputation of being unthankful recipients who do not deserve sympathy or help. The international community, for example, hesitated to protect Rwandans against genocide.
Reconciliation	Yet to be fully achieved.

Table 3: An example of humiliation and its aftermath at the global, multilateral level

Similar dynamics of humiliation may be diagnosed at the intercultural level. As discussed above, Western psychology is ethno-centric. I will relate a story that reinforced my interest in studying this topic; it also connects to the first part of Sam Engelstad's quote. I learned to understand how Western psychology may be inadequate within the framework of other cultures, and may have a humiliating effect, though unintended, upon these other cultures.

I would like to recount one exemplary story, representative for a larger number of examples, in order to illustrate how the situation became obvious to me: I remember how disturbing it was to see how some of my Western colleagues 'humiliated' their Egyptian clients without noticing it, even believing that their actions were for their clients' 'best.' A Western colleague, for example, advised young Egyptian girls who sought her advice because they suffered from problematic family situations, to get their own apartment in order to 'cut the umbilical cord' and, 'by God, get on their own feet!' My Western therapist-colleague was unwilling to understand, when I explained, that in most Egyptian contexts it would be quite harmful for a young girl to move into her own flat, that she rather should move to her grandmother, aunt, or some other relative. My colleague defended her approach and explained to me that she felt that the Egyptian population was disadvantaged because they 'had not yet had the chance' to learn enough about the Western way of life, and were 'deprived' of relevant Western knowledge about how healthy people should behave. When the girls in question did not actually move to a flat of their own, the therapist drew the conclusion that the

girls 'did not wish to get better.' The therapist told the girls that they were 'wasting the therapist's time,' and should 'come back when they were serious.'

This example may tentatively be systematised in Table 4 and thus provide an example for the dynamics of humiliation at the intercultural level:

An example of humiliation at the intercultural level	
Humiliation	Some instances of 'helpful' intervention by Western counsellors were not well enough adapted to Egyptian culture. What was intended as help proved to be humiliating in its effects.
Consequences of humiliation	• Some Egyptian clients stopped accepting 'help' from their Western helpers. • As a consequence, these Egyptian clients acquired the reputation of being unthankful recipients who do not deserve sympathy or help.
Reconciliation	Yet to be fully achieved.

Table 4: An example of humiliation and its aftermath at the intercultural level

Finally, the interpersonal level shall be briefly touched upon in this enumeration of illustrative examples of the dynamics of humiliation. On the basis of many years of international experience, I suggest that it is a universal human experience to feel terrible if put down and humiliated. I believe that humiliation is especially salient if your love is being rejected in the very act of humiliation; even worse, if the wish to be loved back is being denied at the same time.

I had a client whose mother-in-law enjoyed saying, in front of the whole family, with disgust in her voice: 'And you want to be part of our family? Who do you think you are?' My client reported to me what she felt when confronted with this behaviour for the first time: 'I was deeply shocked and petrified; I felt cold, could hardly breath, and I was unable to answer.' She came to me because she felt that she was not addicted to alcohol or cigarettes: much worse, she was caught in her own pain. She could not distance herself, could not develop any leisure interests or relaxing hobbies. Her entire life was consumed by her relationship with her in-laws, a relationship that was filled with a continuous flow of incidents of humiliation and counter-humiliation, sometimes minute, sometimes overwhelmingly vicious; she could not stop being obsessed with imagining all kinds of revenge. After her husband's death her in-laws tried to trick her out of her inheritance and she was locked in

bitter court-cases with them for many years. She repeatedly became so desperate that she did 'stupid' things as she called it – for example writing 'hysterical' letters, or starting to shout at her adversaries in the court room – behaviour that did not earn her the respect she wished to receive from the judge, her lawyer and others involved in the case.

An example of humiliation at the family level	
Humiliation	My client is being humiliated by her in-laws.
Consequences of humiliation	• My client is obsessed by dreams of revenge. She occasionally gets 'crazy,' writes 'hysterical' letters, or shouts at her adversaries. • As a consequence, she acquired the reputation of not deserving sympathy or help.
Reconciliation	Yet to be fully achieved.

Table 5: An example of humiliation and its aftermath at the intercultural level

These exemplary snapshots indicating the relevance of the dynamics of humiliation are intended to give the reader a taste of what humiliation may entail, and where to find it. Further down in the text some of these examples, especially those at the macro-level, will be examined in more detail.

Tentatively, one may conclude, from the list of examples presented, that the war-torn first half of the twentieth century in Europe suggests that humiliation can lead to war, to Holocaust, genocide, ethnic cleansing and terrorism, while the second half of the century indicates that the same proposition may be true in other parts of the world as well. Furthermore, the examples presented give a taste of the wide range of consequences flowing from humiliation. Incidents of humiliation may lead to extreme reactions such as massacres, but may also be relevant in the more subtle undermining of, for example, intercultural relations. Moreover, these examples make it, perhaps, clearer how humiliation may be played out at all levels, affecting relations between individuals as well as groups.

In other words, these introductory remarks highlight incidents and processes that invite the hypothesis that deeply damaging experiences of humiliation may be a major cause of the widespread occurrence of the break-down of relations around the world, leading to outcomes ranging from hidden animosity to open violence such as war, genocide, terrorism and kidnapping. The characteristics of humiliation merit detailed investigation. If people feel humiliated, they may strike back when they can, and this may lead not only to extreme

outcomes such as war and violence, but also to more muted consequences, such as the hampering of constructive relations, strategies and conflict solutions that otherwise would be attainable.

What Is Humiliation?

The reader who has followed this argument will now ask: But what is humiliation and what makes humiliation so special that it can be hypothesised to lead to all kinds of rifts between people, even to massacres and unspeakable atrocities?

The very word 'humiliation' gradually altered its meaning as the idea of universal human dignity slowly percolated through Western societies and then became global. For example, 'According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* the earliest recorded use of *to humiliate* meaning to mortify or to lower or to depress the dignity or self-respect of someone does not occur until 1757. Its usual sense prior to the mid-eighteenth century is more closely related to the physical act of bowing, or prostrating oneself … The metaphoric underpinning of *humiliate* connected it more to humility and making humble than to what we now think of as humiliation' (Miller, 1993, 175, italics in original).

The word 'humble' with its meaning 'having a low estimate of oneself' is first recorded in English in the 13th century (see *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology* by Hoad, 1986, 222). In the 14th century 'humble' means 'of lowly condition.' The Middle English word '(h)umble' stems from Old French 'umble' and (also modern) 'humble,' which is formed on the Latin world 'humilis' which means 'low,' 'lowly,' 'mean.' 'Humilis' in turn is formed on the substantive 'humus,' 'earth,' and is also relative to 'homo,' 'man.' The verb 'humiliate' was first used in English in the 14th century. The verb 'to humiliate' meant 'to humble' in the 16th century, but this use is indicated as 'obsolete' for today's use in the dictionary. In the 18th century the verb 'to humiliate' means 'reduce the dignity of.' It stems from the Late Latin verb 'humiliare,' which in turn is formed on 'humilis.' The substantives 'humiliation' and 'humility' are first used in English from the 14th century.

Apart from etymology – that indicates a downward movement, being put with your face into earth – what is humiliation? Somalia expert Aisha Ahmed (11th January 1999 in Nairobi) explained to me that humiliation can happen at many different fault lines – cultural, religious, political, nation, clan, and individual. Edna Adan, former wife of today's President

of Somaliland, Mohammad Haji Ibrahim Egal,[26] defines humiliation in the following way (3rd December 1998 in Hargeisa, Somaliland): 'Humiliation is when someone tries to bring someone down to their level. They think that you are above them and they want to hurt you, humiliate you, bring you down to their level, so that you have no more self-respect, so that you lose the respect you have for yourself and others lose the respect they have for you.' Avishai Margalit defines humiliation as the 'rejection of persons of the Family of Man,' as injury of self-respect, or, more specific, as failure of respect, combined with loss of control (Margalit, 1996).[27]

My preliminary, tentative answer is the following[28]: Humiliation means the enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, honour or dignity. To be humiliated is to be placed, against your will (or in some cases also with your consent[29]) and often in a deeply hurtful way, in a situation that is greatly inferior to what you feel you should expect. Humiliation entails demeaning treatment that transgresses established expectations. It may involve acts of force, including violent force. At its heart is the idea of pinning down, putting down or holding to the ground. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of humiliation as a process is that the victim is forced into passivity, acted upon, made helpless. However, the role of the victim is not necessarily always unambiguous – a victim may feel humiliated in the absence of any deliberately humiliating act – as a result of misunderstandings, or as a result of personal and cultural differences concerning norms about what respectful treatment ought to entail – or the 'victim' may even invent a story of humiliation in order to manoeuvre another party into the role of a loathsome perpetrator.

People react in different ways to being treated in humiliating ways: some just become depressed, others get openly angry, and others again hide their anger and plan revenge. The person who plans for revenge may become the leader of a movement. Hitler, for example, began his adult life as a humiliated underdog who badly wanted recognition and acknowledgement but failed to achieve these things. He later identified with German humiliation and put the whole German population to the task of 'remedying' it.

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[26] Egal also served as Somalia's Prime Minister from 1967, during the latter period of Somalia's democratic era.

[27] His position is disputed, however, for example by Quinton, who argues that self-respect 'has nothing much to do with humiliation' (Quinton, 1997, 87).

[28] Revised from Lindner, 2000g.

[29] See Stoller's work on sado-masochism (Stoller, 1991).

In short, the issue is complicated. One might, for example, find a case where the 'humiliator' deliberately sets out to humiliate somebody, but the targeted person simply does not feel humiliated, and just laughs; or, at the other extreme, imagine you want to be helpful, and unexpectedly, your help is interpreted as being humiliating; or, to take a third case, you might observe a couple and see that the husband continually treats his submissive wife in such a way that you think that she must surely feel humiliated and protest, and yet she does not; not to forget cases where people in fact enjoy being humiliated in sado-masochistic sex-practices or religious self-humiliation.

These examples suggest that a perpetrator might want to commit humiliation but not succeed, that a 'benefactor' might humiliate while trying to do good, that a third party might observe 'victims' who do not see themselves as such (or fail to see victims in cases where they do exist), or that humiliation is sought instead of despised.

Furthermore, the word humiliation has an extremely complicated semantic field, because the word humiliation indicates both an act and a feeling. Humiliation is an act that is perpetrated by an actor, intentionally or not, as a brief event or a long-term oppressive infliction – and, as described above, it entails a painful downward push at its core, namely looking down, putting down, lowering, degrading, debasing, abasing, demeaning, belittling, subjugating, oppressing, tainting, besmirching, tarnishing, treating with contempt or disgust, bullying, mobbing, abusing, dishonouring, or disgracing. On the victims' side humiliation is a feeling. The victim may fight off a humiliating assault immediately, by aggressive retaliation and counter-humiliation. Feelings of humiliation, however, may also be long-term; in this case they may well be characterised by feelings of entrapment and depression, embarrassment or shame, and in their extreme form may be so traumatic that they lead to processes such as mental dissociation.[30] However, neither aggressive counter-humiliation nor depression usually solve the problem, cycles of depression, aggression and counter-humiliation do not stop unless underlying feelings of humiliation are healed.

In this thesis I will use the word humiliation both for the act and the feeling, because language becomes too complicated otherwise; hopefully the reader will understand from the context in which the word appears which kind of humiliation is meant.

My research became even more complicated when I discovered that two very different definitions of humiliation seem to exist in today's world: one form of humiliation is

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[30] Research on trauma describes the phenomenon of dissociation, 'Dissociation, a splitting in awareness, is not mentioned by either the DSM III or IV as a symptom of PTSD, but there is growing debate in the professional literature as to whether PTSD is a Dissociative Disorder' (Rothschild, 1998, 4).

connected with equality, while another is connected with the negation of equality. The more recent version of humiliation, the one connected with equality, relates to the deeply wounding violation of my dignity as a human being, where my dignity draws its justification from the Human Rights notion that 'all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' (U.S. Declaration of Independence). By contrast, there is an older view of humiliation illustrated by the case of aristocrats who oppose each other in a duel, each one seeking to defend his 'honour.'

A further complication, already mentioned before, is introduced by the fact that the humiliation felt by an individual might not be the same as the humiliation felt by a group or a nation. One might ask: Is it really possible for a country, a clan or an ethnic group to 'feel humiliated'? What about the case of humiliated leaders who generalise their own personal feelings and incite their followers to believe in some more or less fabricated version of history that contains supposed humiliations that 'must be avenged' with the leader's help? Would the followers of such leaders have actually undergone humiliating experiences themselves? Or would they only have the illusion of feeling humiliated, by being coerced into it by propaganda? Or, perhaps, do some of them just 'pretend' to feel humiliated in order to please their leaders?

On this point Michael Bond, Professor at the Department of Psychology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, wrote to me (1999): 'I believe that you must draw a fundamental distinction between individual humiliation [you humiliated me] versus group [or national] humiliation [you or your group humiliated my group]. This personal/group distinction is important since people may act to avenge different sorts of affront [and create different sorts of affront for others]!'

Another difficulty forced itself into the process of my research, also this issue already touched upon earlier in the context of psychological therapy in Egypt: As soon as I started to collect data, I found that research on humiliation in itself might humiliate those who are the object of the research. I found that it is paramount to address the question of research methodology and how it may contribute to deepening rifts instead of healing them. In the course of my research I discovered that the methodology initially attempted was itself humiliating to the people being questioned. This discovery gave rise to deep feelings of embarrassment and shame in me – shame about conducting unethical research. But worse, methods that have humiliating effects are bound to deeply threaten the validity of any research that involves relations between human beings. 'Informants' who feel humiliated will,

at best, give irrelevant answers or tell what they believe the researcher wants to hear, or they will say nothing, or react with aggression. It was deeply humiliating and humbling for me, the researcher, to discover this; I was so-to-speak 'forced down' from the pretentious 'heights' of 'science' and my face was – metaphorically – thrown down into earth. As a consequence of these experiences and discoveries, I subsequently underwent a very rapid learning process guided by a commitment to achieving a dialogue about experiences and feelings that was as authentic and open as possible. A critical discourse analysis of the interviews led to the conclusion that the method chosen was in fact patronising and humiliating for the interview partners and that certain social psychological methods may have a humiliating effect, especially in cross-cultural contexts with a colonial backdrop and within populations that have suffered greatly from war and genocide.

Gary Boelhower applies the notion of deep listening and transformative dialogue to the field of leadership (Boelhower, 1999, in the editor's introduction for the 1998-1999 Annual Edition of the *Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict*). I found that this notion may be applied to other fields as well, as for example, to methods of research. Boelhower writes 'there is a growing recognition that authentic leadership must be defined as the coordination and affirmation of partners rather than the management and persuasion of subordinates. There is a growing body of literature that reimages the posture of authentic leadership as one of attentive listening and open dialogue rather than one of proclamation and defense.' Boelhower calls for 'each of us to take that posture of deep listening and transformative dialogue, to recognize again the need to expand our vision but also our reach.'

In the course of my fieldwork I attempted to put into practice, in the field of research, what Boelhower calls for in the realm of leadership. Boelhower's plea also links up to my above-described experience with Western clinical psychology in Egypt, and my uneasiness with certain patronising traits of healing professions such as medicine and clinical psychology. As explained above, during my work as a clinical psychologist I tried to develop different, more respectful ways of dealing with 'clients;' the same learning process seemed to be necessary concerning research methodology. I will expand on this topic further down.

At this point in the introductory chapter the reader has been presented with an overview regarding the innovative approaches to be expected from this manuscript, has received some brief exemplary flashlights on the dynamics of humiliation at different societal levels, and has been tentatively introduced to the field of humiliation itself. This short introduction will now be rounded up by looking back to the initial project description from 1996 that served as a platform for the subsequent empirical and theoretical work.

The Original Project Description

The project started out with a project description that included a number of hypotheses, such as the following: 'I hypothesise that the significance of feelings of humiliation is universal or culture-independent, and that these feelings carry the potential to hamper conflict solutions described by rational choice theory. What is rather culture-dependent is according to my experience the way humiliation is perceived and responded to. If this double-layer hypothesis is correct then third parties intervening in a violent conflict could develop and use a two-mode strategy which contains one basic module which deals with universally present fundamental questions of humiliation, and one rather culture-dependent module which addresses the specific ways of dealing with humiliation in the cultural domain in which the third party is operating at present (note: culture or cultural domain is here not understood as closed, self-contained entity).'

The project description continues: 'I hypothesise that it could be in many cases more effective to address and attend to feelings of humiliation, than neglecting these feelings and facing their violent effects. This requires a widening of the time perspective, placing an acute conflict into a discourse before and also after the acute conflict phase. I take it that the new notions of Common Security, and also Human Security, are open to this view, as are programmes as UNESCO's Culture of Peace Programme.

'Hypothesis Ia:

In most cultures feelings of humiliation are a central determinant in violent conflicts, hampering conflict solutions described by rational choice theory.

Hypothesis Ib:

What is perceived as humiliation and how it is responded to, varies across cultures.

Hypothesis II:

Feelings of humiliation can be attended to, its violent effects can be defused.'

The project description then specifies questions that have to be addressed and asked in order to illuminate humiliation: 'What is experienced as humiliation? What happens when people feel humiliated? When is humiliation established as a feeling? What does humiliation lead to? Which experiences of justice, honour, dignity, respect and self-respect are connected with the feeling of being humiliated? How is humiliation perceived and responded to in different cultures? What role does humiliation play for aggression? What can be done to overcome violent effects of humiliation?'

What to Expect

This manuscript is part of current and envisaged future work attempting to integrate the above-stated hypotheses into a wider model in which humiliation has its place. The concept of humiliation has, in my view, the unique potential to connect basic research in psychology, as for example research on emotions, with large macro-political analyses that include anthropology, sociology, philosophy and political science. However, one thesis cannot cover the whole range. This thesis will be addressing the intersection of anthropology, sociology, political science and social psychology. The psychological anchoring in research on emotion, stress, trauma, mobbing/bullying and psychological abuse is carried out in other places, as is the integration of the concept of humiliation into a macro analysis of globalisation. This manuscript is, so-to-speak, placed in the middle of the spectrum that is marked by basic research on the neuro-psychology of emotions at one extreme pole and theories of globalisation at the other pole, see Table 6:

The notion of humiliation connects macro, meso and micro levels		
the neuro-psychology of emotions	← →	theories of globalisation
	↖ ↑ ↗ focus of this manuscript	

Table 6: The notion of humiliation connects macro, meso and micro levels

As explained above, this thesis follows a model that has a pattern of three elements, namely diagnosis – prognosis – therapy/prevention, as has the empirical part of the study that features the triad of Germany, Somalia, and Rwanda / Burundi. I will seek to reflect these triadic patterns and organise the book in three main chapters that are preceded by a short presentation of the state-of-the-art of research on humiliation, and a presentation of the historical background of the three cases.

The manuscript is designated to constitute part of a therapeutic dialogue with my interlocutors in Germany, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi, as well as an academic dialogue with the network of researchers that study related fields. It focuses on the three cases of the research project, namely Somalia, Rwanda/Burundi, and Hitler's Germany and it builds up the sequence of diagnosis – prognosis – therapy/prevention in a stepwise manner. After this

introduction 'biographical data' of the three cases will be presented, with Hitler's Germany as background, followed by Somalia and Rwanda / Burundi. The first chapter focuses on the particulars of the therapeutic relationship that was formed during fieldwork. It includes reflections on methodology that will be revisited throughout the entire book; methodology is so intricately interlinked with the topic of humiliation that it cannot be 'put aside' into a separate chapter. The second chapter probes the role of humiliation within the paradigm of diagnosis – prognosis – therapy in the three cases, and the third chapter addresses therapy and prevention. In the conclusion the question is addressed how the international community may prevent genocide. These themes will be developed further in future work.

In other words, the architecture of this book represents not only a three-layered paradigm applied on three cases, but also a three-fold 'hermeneutic circle'[31] that mirrors the many hermeneutic circles that I, as a researcher, 'travelled through' every day during my fieldwork: often I began in the morning by co-authoring 'data' together with my interlocutors, analysing them together with my interviewees, and building theory in the evening, only to be back, next morning, to co-authoring new data, and – through this shared experience – constructing new social realities in co-operation with my conversation partners; even more, not only the course of a day, every minute entailed numerous journeys from 'data' to 'theory.' In this way, I followed my own version of the famous hermeneutic circle whereby the analyst journeys back and forward between the particular and the general, producing generalisations in which the subtleties of particular cases are embodied.[32]

The form of presentation in this manuscript is organised such that the circular character of arriving at 'justification' is made visible by 'excavating' the material three times, each time deepening understanding and discovering new meanings in the evidence. Firstly, the macro-historical landscape in which genocidal events took place is established (historical background, or first meeting with 'biographical data'). Secondly, the therapist, or the author, encounters many different people who 'populate' this landscape and who helped to provide

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[31] The idea of the 'hermeneutic circle' was introduced by Wilhem Dilthey (1833-1911), a philosopher and literary historian who is generally recognised as the 'father' of the modern hermeneutic enterprise in the social and human sciences. 'Dilthey argued that the human world was sufficiently different from the natural world that special methods were required for its study. Hermeneutics, the deliberate and systematic methodology of interpretation, was the approach Dilthey proposed for studying and understanding the human world' (Tappan, 2000, Abstract). Dilthey's intellectual biographer H. P. Rickman explains, 'We cannot pinpoint the precise meaning of a word unless we read it in its context, i.e. the sentence or paragraph in which it occurs. But how can we know what the sentence means unless we have first understood the individual words? Logically there is no escape from this absence of priority; in practice we solve the problem by a kind of mental shuttlecock movement' (Rickman, 1979, 130).

[32] See further down for the related concept of the 'reflective equilibrium.'

orientation within it (first chapter, on fieldwork). Thirdly, I draw upon the resources I discovered in the first two circles to tackle the large problems of humiliation as embedded in culture, as for example humiliation in relation to violence versus co-operation. In carrying out the third of these three 'journeys through the evidence,' I engage in diagnosis and this, in turn, makes a contribution also to the tasks of prognosis, therapy and prevention.

I would like to end this introductory chapter with another quote from the letter from my Burundian colleague that I cited in the very beginning: '…your research is very interesting. It concerns scientific work that touches upon sociology and war studies. I do not know how you are going to interpret humiliation, a sentiment that is psychological and individual par excellence as a social fact. It is exactly here your originality will lie! I encourage you intensely to pursue your research and I am willing to humbly contribute and shed light on the multiple zones of shadow and oversimplification that dominate and surround the humanitarian crisis of Rwanda.'[33]

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[33] '... votre recherche est très intéressante. Simplement, s'agissant d'un travail scientifique touchant à la sociologie et à la polémologie, je ne sais pas comment vous aller interpréter l'humiliation, sentiment psychologique et individuel par excellence en un fait social. C'est cela peut-être aussi votre originalité! Je vous encourage vivement à poursuivre votre recherche et pourrais humblement contribuer à éclairer les multiples zones d'ombre et le simplisme dominant qui entourent la crise humanitaire rwandaise.'

Current State-of-the-Art

May I introduce this section on the current state-of-the-art with yet another quote from the letter written by my Burundian colleague:

'Your project appears to me to be very stimulating and original. In the case of Rwanda, it [humiliation] is even the motor. How otherwise understand that the belligerents were not able to negotiate an acceptable compromise four years before the conflict would end in genocide? The compromise itself was considered as a weakness, as humiliation. The adversary, the enemy, has to be beaten to the ground, so that he never rises again and is irreversibly subjugated to the winner. In this line the genocide could be interpreted as part of the strategies of liberation of two belligerents. And my humble person, who has witnessed the development towards the unspeakable, I can report that the final solution was part of a plan of one belligerent towards another, … with the aim to ultimately humiliate the other who is considered as non-human.'[34]

The questions that seem to be appropriate at this point are: What makes humiliation so special? Why has it not been studied more?

Few researchers have studied humiliation explicitly, although it seems to have the potential of causing intense suffering, probably more so than any other kind of assault. In many cases the term humiliation is not differentiated from other concepts; humiliation and shame, for example, are often used exchangeably, among others by Silvan S. Tomkins (1962–1992) whose work is carried further by Donald L. Nathanson. Nathanson describes humiliation as a combination of three innate affects out of altogether nine affects, namely as a combination of shame, disgust and dissmell (Nathanson in a personal conversation, 1st October1999; see also Nathanson, 1992; Nathanson, 1987).

The view that humiliation may be a particularly forceful phenomenon is supported by the research of, for example, Suzanne M. Retzinger and Thomas J. Scheff (Retzinger, 1991; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991) who studied shame and humiliation in marital quarrels. They show that the suffering caused by humiliation is highly significant and that the bitterest divisions

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[34] Translated by the author from: 'Votre projet de thèse m'apparaît très stimulant et original. Dans le cas rwandais, il en est même le moteur. Comment en effet comprendre que les belligérants n'aient pu négocier des compromis acceptables quatre ans auparavant avant que le conflit ne débouche en génocide. Le compromis a été lui-même considéré comme une faiblesse, une humiliation. Il faut battre à plate couture l'adversaire, l'ennemi, pour qu'il ne se relève jamais et soit définitivement soumis au vainqueur. En cela le génocide peut être interprété comme faisant partie des stratégies délibérées des deux belligérants. Et mon humble personne qui ai assisté au développement vers l'innommable, je puis témoigner que la solution finale faisait partie des plans de l'un et l'autre belligérants,... pour humilier définitivement l'autre considéré comme non-homme.'

have their roots in shame and humiliation. Also W. Vogel documents 'unforgivable humiliation' as a very serious obstacle in couples' treatment (Vogel & Lazare, 1990).[35] Robert L. Hale addresses *The Role of Humiliation and Embarrassment in Serial Murder* (Hale, 1994).[36] Humiliation has also been studied in such fields as love, sex and social attractiveness,[37] depression,[38] society and identity formation,[39] sports,[40] history, literature and film.[41]

Linda Hartling (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999) pioneered a quantitative questionnaire on humiliation (Humiliation Inventory) where a rating from 1 to 5 is employed for questions measuring 'being teased,' 'bullied,' 'scorned,' 'excluded,' 'laughed at,' 'put down,' 'ridiculed,' 'harassed,' 'discounted,' 'embarrassed,' 'cruelly criticized,' 'treated as invisible,' 'discounted as a person,' 'made to feel small or insignificant,' 'unfairly denied access to some activity, opportunity, or service,' 'called names or referred to in derogatory terms,' or viewed by others as 'inadequate,' or 'incompetent.' The questions probe the extent to which respondents had felt harmed by such incidents throughout life, and how much they feared such incidents.

Scheff and Retzinger extended their work on violence and Holocaust and studied the part played by 'humiliated fury' (Scheff 1997, 11) in escalating conflict between individuals and nations (Scheff, 1988; Scheff, 1990; Scheff, in Kemper, 1990; Scheff, 1997[42]). Also psychiatrist James Gilligan focuses on humiliation as a cause for violence, in his book *Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and How to Treat It* (Gilligan, 1996). Vamik D. Volkan[43] and Joseph Montville[44] carry out important work on psycho-political analysis of intergroup conflict and its traumatic effects.[45] Furthermore, Ervin Staub's work is highly significant; he

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[35] Anatol Rapoport who writes that '... the most intense feelings experienced by human beings are probably those engendered by conflict and by love' (Rapoport, 1997, xxi).

[36] See also Lehmann, 1995; Schlesinger, 1998.

[37] See, for example, Baumeister, Wotman, & Stillwell, 1993; Brossat, 1995; Gilbert, 1997; Proulx et al., 1994.

[38] See, for example, Brown, Harris, & Hepworth, 1995; Miller, 1988.

[39] See, for example, Ignatieff, 1997; Markus, Kitayama, & Heimann, in Higgins & Kruglanski, 1996; Silver et al., 1986; Wood et al., 1994.

[40] See, for example, Hardman et al., 1996.

[41] See, for example, Peters, 1993; Stadtwald, 1992; Toles, 1995; Zender, 1994.

[42] See also Masson, 1996; Vachon, 1993; Znakov, 1990.

[43] See, for example, Volkan, 1988; Volkan, 1992; Volkan, 1994; Volkan & Harris, in Ettin, Fidler, & Cohen, 1995; Volkan, 1997.

[44] See, for example, Montville, in Sandole & van der Merwe, 1993; Volkan, Demetrios, & Montville, 1990; Montville, in Volkan, Julius, & Montville, 1990.

[45] Together with their colleagues at the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction of the University of Virginia, Max Harris (Harris, 1993; Harris, 1994), Maurice Apprey (Stein & Apprey, 1990; Stein & Apprey, 1985; Apprey, 1994), and Marc H. Ross (Ross, 1993; Ross, 1995).

is a great name in peace psychology (Staub, 1989; Staub, 1990; Staub, 1993; Staub, 1996). [46] The *Journal of Primary Prevention* devoted a special issue to the topic of humiliation in 1991,[47] 1992,[48] and 1999,[49] as did the journal *Social Research* in 1997, stimulated by Avishai Margalit's *Decent Society* (Margalit, 1996).[50]

Dov Cohen and Richard E. Nisbett examine an honour-based notion of humiliation (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). The honour to which Cohen and Nisbett refer is the kind that operates in the more traditional branches of the Mafia or, more generally, in blood feuds.[51] The present author is familiar with this scenario as a result of working for seven years as a psychological counsellor in Egypt. Within a blood feud culture it may be honourable and even highly obligatory to 'heal' humiliation by killing a targeted person. The opposite is true in a society where universal human rights are recognised and 'healing' humiliation means restoring the victim's dignity by empathic dialogue, sincere apology, and finally reconciliation.

William Ian Miller wrote a book entitled *Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and Violence* (Miller, 1993), where he links humiliation to honour as understood in *The Iliad* or Icelandic sagas, namely humiliation as violation of honour. Miller explains that these concepts are still very much alive today, despite a common assumption that they are no longer relevant. Miller suggests, "that we are more familiar with the culture of honor than we may like to admit. This familiarity partially explains why stories of revenge play so well, whether read as *The Iliad*, an Icelandic saga, *Hamlet*, many novels, or seen as so many gangland, intergalactic, horror, or Clint Eastwood movies. Honor is not our official ideology, but its ethic survives in pockets of most all our lives. In some ethnic (sub)cultures it still is the official ideology, or at least so we are told about the cultures of some urban black males, Mafiosi, Chicano barrios, and so on. And even among the suburban middle class the honor ethic is lived in high school or in the competitive rat race of certain professional cultures" (Miller, 1993, 9).

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[46] See for more literature on psychological approaches to the field of international relations, for example, Cviic, 1993; Luo, 1993; Midiohouan, 1991; Steinberg, 1991a; Steinberg, 1991b; Steinberg, 1996; Urban, in Prins, 1990.

[47] Klein, 1991.

[48] Barrett & Brooks, 1992; Klein, 1992; Smith, 1992.

[49] Hartling & Luchetta, 1999.

[50] Frankfurt, 1997; Honneth, 1997; Lukes, 1997; Mack, 1997; Margalit, 1997; Pettit, 1997; Quinton, 1997; Ripstein, 1997; Rorty, 1997; Schick, 1997.

[51] See other evidence relating to blood feuds in Boehm, 1984, Malcolm, 1998, and Rodina, 1999. I owe these references to Adam Jones.

There is a significant literature in philosophy on 'the politics of recognition,' claiming that people who are not recognized suffer humiliation and that this leads to violence (see also Honneth, 1997 on related themes). Max Scheler set out these issues in his classic book *Ressentiment* (Scheler, 1961).[52] In his first period of work, for example his *The Nature of Sympathy* Scheler focuses on human feelings, love, and the nature of the person. He states that the human person is at bottom a loving being, *ens amans* (Scheler, 1954) who may feel *ressentiment*.[53]

This overview does not exhaust the contributions to be found in the literature on the topic of humiliation - or rather on related issues, since, to my awareness, only Miller, Hartling, and the two above-mentioned journals explicitly put the word and concept of 'humiliation' at the centre of their attention. In later chapters other authors will also be introduced and cited.

However, as soon as we turn to issues that are related to humiliation then a wide field of research opens up: Research on mobbing and bullying touches upon the phenomenon of humiliation and should therefore be included.[54] Research on mobbing and bullying leads over to the field of prejudice and stigmatisation,[55] which in turn draws on research on trauma and

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[52] See also Liah Greenfeld, who suggests that ressentiment plays a central role in nation building (Greenfeld, 1992; Greenfeld, 1996).

[53] It was Dagfinn Føllesdal, later Thomas Cushman, editor of Human Rights Review, and Reidar Ommundsen, who drew my attention to Scheler and Honneth.

[54] See especially Heinz Leymann for work on mobbing (Leymann, 1990; Leymann, 1993; Leymann, in Zapf & Leymann, 1996; Leymann & Kornbluh Hy, 1989; Leymann & Gustafsson, in Zapf & Leymann, 1996), and Dan Åke Olweus on mobbing and bullying at school (Olweus, 1993; Olweus, 1997). The confusion around the use of the terms mobbing and bullying stems from the fact that these phenomena are addressed differently in different countries. Leymann suggests to keep the word bullying for activities between children and teenagers at school and reserving the word mobbing for adult behaviour at workplaces.

[55] Edvard E. Jones, 1984, Social Stigma - The Psychology of Marked Relationships, is a central book on stigmatisation.

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder PTSD,[56] aggression (see further down), power and conflict,[57] stress,[58] and last but not least emotions.[59]

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[56] There exists a huge body of research and literature, see, for example, Bremner et al., 1992; Eitinger, 1990; Everly, 1993; Figley, 1989; Gerbode, 2000; Havermans, 1998; Horowitz, Weine, & Jekel, 1995; Kardiner, 1941; Lavik et al., 1999; McCann & Pearlman, in Sakheim & Devine, 1992; Nadler & Ben Shushan, 1989; Pearlman, 1994; Pearlman, 1998; Perry, in Murberg, 1994; van der Kolk et al., 1984; van der Kolk, 1994; van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000; van der Kolk & van der Hart, 1989; van der Kolk & van der Hart, 1991; van der Kolk & Kadish, in van der Kolk, 1987.

[57] Political scientists P. Bachrach & Baratz.M., 1962, were among the first to address power and conflict in their article 'The Two Faces of Power' that is placed within the context of the civil rights movement in the USA of the nineteen sixties. See also Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1973 on Conflict, Power, and Games: the Experimental Study of Interpersonal Relations.

[58] Standard reading on stress psychology is Richard S. Lazarus, 1966, Psychological Stress and the Coping Process and Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, Stress, Appraisal and Coping. Stress is not necessarily negative, it may also be a stimulating challenge, - and there are individual differences why some people thrive under stress and others break. See, for example, Resilience and Thriving: Issues, Models, and Linkages by Carver, 1998; Embodying Psychological Thriving: Physical Thriving in Response to Stress by Epel, McEwen, & Ickovics, 1998; Quantitative Assessment of Thriving by Cohen et al., 1998; Beyond Recovery From Trauma: Implications for Clinical Practice and Research by Calhoun & Tedeschi, 1998; Exploring Thriving in the Context of Clinical Trauma Theory: Constructivist Self Development Theory by Saakvitne, Tennen, & Affleck, 1998.

[59] I thank Reidar Ommundsen and Finn Tschudi for kindly helping me to get access to psychological theories on emotion, especially as developed by Tomkins and Nathanson.
Antonio R. Damasio, 1994, with his book Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, provides a perspective on the important 'constructive' role that emotions play for the process of our decision making; it shows how the traditional view of 'heart' versus 'head' is obsolete. Daniel Goleman, 1996, in his more widely known book Emotional Intelligence relies heavily on Damasio. Goleman gives, among others, a description of the brain activities that lead to post-traumatic stress disorder. The Handbook of Emotion and Memory (Christianson, 1992) addresses the important interplay between emotions and memory.
Humiliation is a process that is deeply embedded in the individual's interdependence with her environment, and therefore relational concepts of mind such as Gibson's ecological psychology of 'affordance' are relevant. Gibson 'includes environmental considerations in psychological taxonomies' (de Jong, 1997, Abstract). M. A. Forrester, 1999, presents an related approach, that he defines as 'discursive ethnomethodology,' that focuses on 'narrativization as process bringing together Foucault's (1972) discourse theory, Gibson's (1979) affordance metaphor and conversation analysis. He writes that he conceptualises 'theorized subject positioning as participant-oriented social practices, arguably understood as social affordances produced and recognized dynamically in context' (Abstract).
Silvan S. Tomkins, 1962, developed one of the most interesting theories of the human being and emotions (see his four volumes of Affect Imagery and Consciousness; see also Virginia Demos, 1995, editor of Exploring Affect, a book that eases the otherwise difficult access to Tomkins' thinking). Donald L. Nathanson builds on Tomkins' work; he writes on script, shame, and pride. Scripts are 'the structures within which we store scenes;' they are 'sets of rules for the ordering of information about SARS' (Stimulus-Affect-Response Sequences) (Nathanson, 1996).
Tomkins does not always differentiate between humiliation and shame and uses it exchangeably, while Nathanson describes humiliation as a combination of three innate affects out of nine, namely a combination of shame, disgust and dissmell (Nathanson in a personal conversation, 1st October1999 in Oslo).
See for work on scripts also Eric Berne, 1972, with his book What Do You Say After You Say Hello? that illuminates Script Theory from the clinical perspective, while Abelson, in Carroll & Payne, 1976 (see also Schank & Abelson, 1977) addresses the issue from the cognitive perspective, and Tomkins

Conflict and peace are topics that have been widely studied; thousands of publications are to be found that cover a wide range of conflicts, from inter-personal to inter-group and inter-national conflict. For a social psychology of conflict see Stroebe, Kruglansky, Bar-Tal, & Hewstone, 1988, *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict*. Instead of presenting large lists of publications at this point I would like to mention some of those that had particular significance for this research project on humiliation. Lee D. Ross, principal investigator and co-founder of the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation (SCCN), addresses psychological barriers to conflict resolution.[60] William Ury, Director of the Project on Preventing War at Harvard University, and author of *Getting to Yes*, and *Getting to Peace* (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Ury, 1999), focuses in his anthropological work on conflict. In the past years innumerable university departments and institutes have been created that carry in their names terms that address conflict and peace. I was in touch with many institutions, centres, departments, and programmes, among others with UNESCO's 'Culture of Peace' Programme (www.unesco.org/cpp/),[61] as well as with the Eastern Mennonite University, EMU, Harrisonburg, with Howard Zehr,[62] Hizkias Assefa,[63] and Ronald S. Kraybill,[64] and the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, in Sweden. In Norway the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO, the first peace research institute ever founded), the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, the Norwegian Nobel Institute, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), as well as the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, are central to the international discourse on conflict and peace, and many of the researchers working at these institutions gave invaluable advice to the humiliation project. Norway has also produced one of the most renowned peace researchers, Johan Galtung, whose broad peace activities now cover the globe and have grown far beyond his beginnings in Norway. Johan Galtung amalgamates various approaches that touch upon humiliation into a larger analysis of society and humankind.[65] His life work covers vast areas, both discipline-wise and

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from the personality-psychological perspective.59 Also the sociology of emotions is relevant; see especially the work of Thomas J. Scheff on violence and emotions such as shame.

[60] See, for example, Ross & Ward, in Brown, Reed, & Turiel, 1996; Ross & Ward, 1995; Ross, in Arrow, Mnookin, Ross, Tversky, & Wilson, 1995; Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Ross & Samuels, 1993.

[61] I thank particularly Ingeborg Breines, Director of 'Women and a Culture of Peace,' for her encouraging support, as well as David Adams whom I met already in 1994, as well as Timothée Ngakoutou, John Aglo, Jacqueline Nzoyihera, and Alpha Oumar Diallo.

[62] See, for example, Zehr, 1990.

[63] See, for example, Assefa, 1987.

[64] See, for example, Kraybill, 1996.

[65] It is hard to choose from the vast amount of Galtung's publications, see, for example, Galtung, 1996 for recent work and Galtung, 1969 for his earlier writing.

geographically; and he is far from slowing down, as he eagerly warns his many 'dear enemies.' [66]

In cases where humiliation shall be studied in cross-cultural settings, cross-cultural psychology has to be included,[67] and the anthropological, sociological and philosophical embeddedness of processes of humiliation in different cultural contexts has to be addressed. If humiliation between groups or even nations is to be studied then history and political science play a central role, too. However, this is not the place to give an overview over literature in these fields, relevant literature will be introduced in the course of the argument.

Finally, very relevant for any research on humiliation are historical dimensions of psychology and psychological research, as well as its epistemological anchoring. Kurt Danziger, 1990, and his classic book *Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research* may be mentioned, and, for example, Kenneth J. Gergen, 1999, with articles such as 'Agency - Social Construction and Relational Action.' A. P. Craig, 1999, in 'What Is It That One Knows When One Knows 'Psychology?'' advocates a 'continuous interplay between stories and science because, in this way, we are better able to account for and configure who we are and how to live' (Abstract). See also Stam & Egger, in Joy, 1997, 'On the Possibilities of a Narrative psychology' in *Paul Ricoeur and Narrative.* As already mentioned above, Paul Ricoeur, renowned French philosopher, is listened to also in Rwanda; his article 'Le pardon peut-il guerir? [Can pardon heal?]' (Ricoeur, 1995) has been reprinted in the Rwandese journal *Dialogue, Revue d'information et de réflexion* where his article serves as the opening article in the journal's special issue 'Two Years After the Genocide.'

In the sections on methodology, further down, epistemology as it pertains to psychology will be addressed in more depth. Jan Smedslund, for example, and his profound psycho-logic criticism of mainstream psychological research will be introduced. At this stage, however, the journey through the state-of-the-art will be rounded up. Another current state-of-

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[66] At the conference Higher Education for Peace, 4th – 6th May in Tromsø, North Norway.

[67] See, example the work of Michael Harris Bond that has been already mentioned (I can only present a small selection of important books and some articles, Bond, 1988; Bond, 1996a; Bond, 1996b; Bond, 1997; Bond, 1998; Bond & Chan, 1995; Bond, Leung, & Schwartz, 1992; Smith & Bond, 1999a). Bond co-authored many publication with Geert Hofstede (see, for example, Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede, in Deregowski, Dzuirawiec, & Annis, 1983; Hofstede & Bond, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Hofstede et al., 1989; Hofstede, 1991; Hofstede, Bond, & Luk, 1993; Hofstede, 1993; Hofstede, 1996a; Hofstede, 1996b; Hofstede, 1998). Harry Charalambos Triandis is an important name as well (see, for example, Triandis & Triandis, 1962; Triandis, 1971; Triandis, 1980; Triandis, in Brislin, 1990; Triandis, 1995; Triandis, 1997; Triandis & Singelis, 1998; Schwartz, in Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi, & Yoon, 1994). Richard W. Brislin is another very relevant name (see, for example Brislin, 1993; Cushner & Brislin, 1996; Brislin & Yoshida, 1994; Brislin & Tomoko Yoshida, 2000; Landis & Brislin, 1983).

the-art will be presented in the following section, namely the state-of-affairs in the countries that are included in this study, namely the historical background of Somalia, Rwanda / Burundi, and Germany.

Historical Background

This section of the introduction aims at making the reader familiar with the three cases that are at the basis of this research on humiliation, namely Somalia, Rwanda / Burundi, and Hitler's Germany. This introduction into the historical background will serve as an overture to the field, - it represents the first 'leg' in the three-fold hermeneutic circle of this book, a circle that is envisaged to lead to a comprehensive diagnosis that extends beyond superficial labels.

Diagnosis, the first part in the paradigm of diagnosis – prognosis – therapy, typically begins with the collection of biographical data about the patient or the client. Often preliminary diagnostic labels are already attached to clients. '…Most reporters naturally gravitate to the same bars, where they repeat to each other the latest gossip and rumours, which then become the headline of the day. In Rwanda, an implicit, matter-of-fact racism soon took hold, as reporters quickly instructed each other and their audiences back home that the entire crisis was little more than the resurgence of ancient ethnic hatreds among Africans… Here was yet another example of African "tribes" slaughtering each other, a simplistic notion good for an effective 10-second sound bite. As it happens, that Rwanda was nothing more serious than a case of Africans killing other Africans was precisely the line being spun by the genocidaires in a systematic and sophisticated campaign of disinformation shrewdly designed to disguise the reality of the genocide' (The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 19, paragraph 12).

In the case of wars and genocides first-hand diagnoses usually relegate perpetrators to the level of animals or devils: 'People who commit such horrifying atrocities and hack each other to death, like in Rwanda, are no human beings, they are worse than animals!' Or perpetrators are diagnosed as victims of psychiatric disorders: 'They surely are crazy!' This is a common commentary I am typically presented with when I report on my work to people who normally do not reflect on such topics, a commentary that I do not perceive as ill-intentioned, but as an expression of helplessness and fear in front of unfathomable atrocities.

In the face of 'animals,' 'devils,' and 'lunatics,' a therapist is well advised to try to get access to information about them from a multitude of sources. The first round in a hermeneutic circle is the first attempt to approach a subject, and it will therefore be carried out by selecting the voices of many scholars and leave interpretations by the author out, to give an as complete and balanced picture as possible of the historical background of the cases presented here.

A historical overview will now be presented of the three cases of this research, Somalia, Rwanda / Burundi, and Hitler's Germany. Germany will only figure in the background, since its history is more widely known. Somalia will serve as main entry point, followed by Rwanda / Burundi.

Hitler's Germany

The pattern of German history is more widely known than Somali or Great Lakes history. There is a sea of literature available, which will not be discussed at any significant length here; only some perhaps less well- known aspects of its history will be highlighted. Germany is a latecomer within European countries. France, England, Spain, Portugal, each already looked back on a long national history when Germany was created as a state in 1871. As a newcomer, Germany began to compare itself with the rest, and became aware of the fact that the others were far ahead, for example in acquiring colonies. However, the young national enthusiasm that existed at the outset of World War I was thoroughly destroyed by the defeat and the ensuing humiliating Versailles Accords. Germany was now a pariah in Europe, and not what it had wished, an important and respected player.

After World War I the Germans were thoroughly and deliberately humiliated. It is now widely recognised that this had disastrous results. As suggested by many[68] the hurt of humiliation created a hunger for retaliation. Hitler promised to do the job. He claimed that he could restore Germany's power and pride, putting it beyond the reach of enemies who wished to impose further humiliations upon it.

Hitler grew up in Austria, with a harsh father on one side and a loving supportive mother on the other (Bullock, 1991). In his book *Mein Kampf* (Hitler, 1999), the blueprint of immense suffering-to-come, Hitler elaborates on his father's authoritarian behaviour and how he, as a young boy resisted humiliation and instead stubbornly insisted on carrying out his dreams of becoming a painter. He writes about his father: '…the old man began the relentless enforcement of his authority' (Hitler, 1999, 9). Hitler, perhaps, displays already here his tendency to transform deep anger, in this case towards his father, into patronising 'understanding' of the weaknesses of the object of his anger, a psychological mechanism we will see him use later in his life as well, with disastrous consequences.

Hitler devotes another part of *Mein Kampf* to less well-known historical facts, namely the humiliating position Germans suffered from in Austria. Hitler describes how the Czechs tried to 'eradicate' German influence, and how enraged he was that only a handful of Germans in the Reich had any idea of the 'eternal and merciless struggle' under way 'for the German language, German schools, and a German way of life' (10). This piece of evidence illustrates that Hitler started his career in a very complicated situation, - not as a subject of the powerful and prestigious German Empire, but as a member of the German population in

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[68] See for example Sebastian Haffner & Bateson, 1978, or Norbert Elias, 1996.

Austria who felt increasingly excluded and humiliated by Czech influence, and, even worse, who felt thoroughly neglected and betrayed by their own kin, namely the Germans in the Reich, who did not take their brothers' sufferings in Austria seriously at all.

Hitler's relationship with 'Germanness' thus was intriguingly problematic. Hitler's German 'family' neglected him, - him, their German brother in Austria. What options does one have when let down by one's own family? Hitler, instead of getting mad at them, was to clemently translate their unfaithfulness into what he interpreted as their lack of awareness of the necessity to be better Germans. Hitler swallowed his disappointment and chose to teach the Germans in the Reich to improve, how to be 'real' Germans. His anger would not disappear though, it reappeared when they failed him at the end; it was as if he was pleased about the destruction of Germany just before everything collapsed (and he took his life).

Humiliation did not end for Hitler in Austria; he participated in World War I on the German side and experienced its humiliating defeat. He finds that German strategy was lousy. *Mein Kampf* is a training manual for students who want to learn about good propaganda (the allies in World War I), and how to mess it up (German propaganda in World War I). Again and again, it is the Germans themselves who were the ones to disappoint Hitler. Instead of abandoning them in anger, he again set out to 'develop' them and started this endeavour by writing *Mein Kampf*, a title that could properly be understood as '*My struggle to be loved by my German kin who deserves punishment for neglecting and humiliating me instead of loving me, or who is, at best, too naïve to understand what is good for them*.'

It was perhaps more difficult for Hitler to swallow his anger than he wants the reader to believe. While still in Austria, he developed an additional strategy for dealing with his disappointment about his unfaithful German 'clan.' He started to divert his bitter feelings, at least partly, to another humiliator, a 'super-humiliator,' as was in his eyes the 'Weltjudentum.' He suspected Jews of planning to dominate the world and relegate Germany, together with all other nations, to a humiliating slave role. 'Providence,' as he liked to call it, gave him the task of protecting not only his unfaithful Germany, but the entire world against this evil. I discussed these points with Holocaust survivor John Steiner, Emeritus Professor of Sociology at the Holocaust Studies Center at Sonoma State University in California, whom I met on 18th July 1999 in Baden-Baden.

During his last weeks, Hitler stated that he had planted a good seed: 'he had been the first to tackle the Jewish question realistically, that was the merit of National Socialism and therefore - in Hitler's last words during his last conversation on April 2, 1945 - "the world

will be eternally grateful to National Socialism that I have extinguished the Jews in Germany and Central Europe."' (Jäckel, 1991, 64).

When Germany was about to be utterly destroyed at the end of World War II, Hitler had, so-to-speak, the proof that 'his' Germans, repeatedly letting him down and ultimately disappointing him, had not really deserved him. They had not lived up to the ideal of 'meine Ehre heißt Treue' ['my honour is called loyalty']. But at the end, unlike before, there was no mercy to be had. They had brought upon themselves their 'just' punishment, namely total destruction, a punishment that Hitler might well have wished upon for them during his younger years when they neglected him, when he was suffering as a German outcast among the Czechs and Jews in Austria.

Somalia

	International boundary
	Region (gobolka) boundary
★	National capital
⊙	Region (gobolka) capital
	Railroad
	Road
	Track

Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.

Base 802101 (B00621) 12-92

Somalia[69]

The Somalia of today is unique in its apparent failings and its apparent failure. The South has oscillated between high and low intensity civil war for about a decade. Never-ending in-fighting and violence inflict unceasing sufferings on all inhabitants. There has been no government since 1991; no ministries; no systematic maintenance of infrastructure; Somalia cannot ratify any international convention since it 'does not exist;' a Somali, whose passport has expired, cannot renew it anywhere since there is no functioning bureaucracy inside the country and no Somali embassy abroad (this was the state-of-affairs at the beginning of 2000, later developments are reported at the end of this section on Somalia).

As almost every Somali I spoke to during my fieldwork confirms, it is immensely humiliating to be virtually 'non-existent' as a citizen of this world, to be a suspect 'nobody' at every passport control (therefore many do not venture out anymore, in order to avoid exactly this humiliation), or to be a refugee from a country that has 'messed it up totally,' begging for benevolence in such far-away places as Norway or Canada.

'My emotions for Somalia are used up!' says a widely respected Somali professor, Ahmed I. Samatar, James Wallace Professor and Dean of International Studies and Programming, at Macalester College, in Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA, in a personal conversation.[70]

He writes: 'Somalia has a new global reputation - the world's stereotype of abject, total and violent failure. This image is the consequence of the implosions of early 1991, subsequent events of mutual predation and mass starvation, failed international intervention, and a continuing absence of even the rudiments of viable national institutions. Given up on as an unsalvageable people and place, popular as well as official interest in Somalia has all but evaporated. What references to Somalia that are made, they are usually uttered with a sense of combined foreboding and despair. Hence, a once proud people, grudgingly admired for their dignity and self respect, are now reduced to either exist in the foul debris of their

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[69] There exists a confusing plethora of ways in which Somali words and names are written. Somalia is an oral society; it was only in 1972 that an official script was introduced. The major clan of the North of Somalia, for example, is called Isaak, Issaq, Ishak, etc. Or, the name Mohamed Abdille Hassan is written Maxamed Cabdille Xasan in Somali, the 'x' indicating, for example, that the 'h' is strongly emphasised. Almost every author who writes about Somalia uses a different spelling, especially those publishing before 1972. I will not attempt to unify other people's writing, and Somali words and names will therefore appear in different versions in the subsequent text.
[70] Conversation at the International Congress of Somali Studies, 6th –9th August 1998 in Turku.

socioeconomic and cultural ruin, or for those who can flee, condemned to the status of scruffy refugees in almost every corner of the world' (Samatar, 1998, 11).[71]

How did Somalia end up in this abyss of civil war and self-destruction? Lately, the term 'ethnicity' has acquired a certain status in media coverage and academic writing whenever a civil war erupts in some remote corner of the world and nobody knows why. Then the mere utterance of the word 'ethnic conflict' makes everybody nod with 'understanding.' - Ethnicity is accepted as an ultimate explanation now that imperial warfare has faded away. Many analysts may, therefore, be tempted to hypothesise that Somalia is yet another case where people are at each others' throats because of 'age-old ethnic hatred.'

However, research on Somalia (and also on Rwanda and Burundi) soon indicates that 'ethnic division' as an explanation is too simplistic or even wrong. Anybody who studies Somalia is quickly informed that hardly any people in this world are as united as Somalis. Somalis are united ethnically, by language, by culture, religion, and by social institutions.[72] They belong to one single family of African peoples inhabiting the Horn of Africa, known to linguists as Cushitic (Hamitic).[73] Some Somalis argue that they are descendants of old Egyptian tribes who migrated to their present region.[74] Not only their linguistic belonging, but also their traditional lifestyle unites Somalis, 'nomadism is the basic economy with the camel as burden animal'[75] (Lewis, 1998, 11). Seventy five percent of the Somali population are traditionally pastoral nomadic clans (Dir, Daarood, Isaaq, and Hawiye) in the vast arid savannah grasslands of Eastern Africa[76] (the state of Somalia covers an area of almost double the size of Germany, or Norway, or Malaysia, and is about 25 times larger than Rwanda). Somali pastoral nomadic clans are united by their pristine pride, their interdependence in rather egalitarian, horizontal societal relations of alliances and conflicts with great autonomy

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[71] See also Bradbury, 1993; Farah & Lewis, 1993; Ghalib, 1995; Ihonvbere, 1996; Laitin & Samatar, 1987; Mazrui, in Adam & Ford, 1997; Sahnoun, 1994; Samatar, 1988; Samatar, 1995; Simons, 1995; The Africa Watch Committee, 1990.

[72] See for further reading on Somalia the work of THE great Somali expert, anthropologist Ioan M. Lewis, Lewis, 1957; Lewis, 1961; Lewis, 1980; Lewis, 1994b; Lewis, 1994a; Lewis & Mayall, 1995; or Farah & Lewis, 1993; Farah & Lewis, 1997.

[73] 'Major Cushitic representatives include the Oromo (known in earlier texts by the pejorative name of Galla) who number an estimated 18 million, the 'Afar (Danakil) who straddle the Rift Valley between Ethiopia and tiny Djibouti, the Reendiile, and Boni (Aweera) peoples of Kenya, and the Beja and Saho tribes in eastern Sudan' (Samatar, 1995, 10).

[74] Interview with former Ambassador Hussein Ali Dualeh, 9th January 1999 in Nairobi.

[75] 'though among the Saho and in some parts of southern Somalia, camels are few and oxen replace them as beasts of burden' (Lewis, 1998, 11).

[76] except the agricultural Digil and Reewin (often pronounced and ascribed mistakenly as Rahanweyn or Rahanwein, says Ahmed, 1995, 24) who constitute about 20 percent of the population in the South of Somalia, and a minority of occupationally specialised caste-like groups that is not included in the major clan-families and lives dispersed among them.

for each grouping; in other words they live in almost 'unconnected coexistences' (Max Weber's terminology[77]), as opposed to societies with strictly hierarchical vertical societal structures. Moreover, Somalis are united by their devotion to Islam (Sunnite, of the Sha'afi-ite, Lewis, 1994a, 9); Somali clans even claim to be the descendants of Arab ancestors, 'Many Somali nomads felt the need for the prestige that comes from an identification with Arab ancestry. They absorbed individual Arabs who provided them with new tribal lineages whose names were adopted as the tribal eponyms'[78] (Ahmed, 1995, 7).

Ali Mazrui puts into words how unique Somali 'oneness' is compared to the rest of Africa: 'Most other African countries are colonially created states in search of a sense of nationhood. The Somali, by contrast, are a pre-colonial nation in search of a unified post-colonial state. Most other African countries are diverse peoples in search of a shared national identity. The Somali are already a people with a national identity in search of territorial unification' (Mazrui, 1986, 71).

Do Mazrui's words indicate that colonialism is at the core of all current Somali ills? Many of my interlocutors in Somalia indeed pointed at colonialism as the main culprit, others opposed this view as too easy a way out. In order to analyse this position, Somali colonialism has to be examined in more detail. Sir Richard Francis Burton was one of the earliest Europeans who made the journey to Somalia, and called this experience *First Footsteps in East Africa* (Burton, 1987). As elsewhere, those who were visited upon and 'discovered' by romantic Western travellers were soon colonised. Anna Simons (1995) describes how the Horn of Africa became the field for European 'chess games' and Somalis were reduced to playing pieces: 'The European scramble for control over eastern trade (with the ultimate prize being India) led to protectionist and counter-protectionist seizures across the globe. If Britain acquired Aden to protect its Suez routes to the subcontinent, then France had to acquire something nearby as counterweight (hence, Djibouti)' (Simons, 1995, 34).

The crucial point during the colonisation process was that the Somali nation was divided into five parts. The first one, Djibouti, was under French rule and included ethnically related Afar tribesmen. 'Next came the British Somaliland Protectorate which had Hargeisa as its main town, and its neighbour Italian Somalia, with Mogadishu as its capital. Other Somalis eventually came under the British flag in Northern Kenya. Finally, the fifth division consisted of that large area known after its main Somali residents as the Ogaden, and the Somali territory round Dire Dawa (Dire Dabbe in Somali). This was the Ethiopian portion…These

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[77] See Gerth & Mills, 1958, 189.
[78] 'However, it is hard to find evidence to support any Arabic or Islamic legacies' (Ahmed, 1995, 16).

five divisions of the nation are represented in the five-pointed Somali star, the national emblem adopted by the Somali Republic at the time of independence in 1960' (Lewis, 1994a, 26, 27).

After independence in 1960, the North of Somalia, former 'British Protectorate of Somaliland,' and the South, emerging from the 'Italian Trust Territory of Somalia' united, formed the Republic of Somalia and lived through a few years of political democracy (1960 - 1969), during which the hope of incorporating the missing three parts of the nation never ceased to figure prominently. But 'neither Kenya nor Ethiopia were prepared to relinquish those areas of their colonial boundaries which were inhabited by ethnic Somali. As for French Somaliland, this became the separate independent Republic of Djibouti' (Mazrui, 1986, 71).

'*Assabiya* (or '*asabia*) is a concept that may be well suited to capture the Somali dream of unity. It was introduced by Ibn Khaldun, the great 14th century North African philosopher (and, in today's nomenclature, also social psychologist). 'Ibn Khaldun attributed the origins of states, including large and powerful ones, to a key factor he called '*asabia* which may be roughly slated into "social solidarity," "group feeling," or "group consciousness." A primary source of social solidarity is the group to which an individual feels most closely attached, namely his clan or tribe, people with whom he shares a common descent' (Adam, in Adam & Ford, 1997, 113, italicisation in the original).[79]

However, Somali democracy, jubilantly welcomed on the date of independence from colonial rule in 1960, lost credibility very fast; it was increasingly perceived as anarchic and corrupt. 'The Somali nationalist '*asabia* believed in a centralized state. It sought to unite all Somalis including those in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti into one unitary state. Failure to achieve maximum objectives resulted in electoral chaos, corruption and elites living in luxury' (Adam, in Adam & Ford, 1997, 115, italicisation in the original).

The March 1969 presidential elections, the last democratic elections in Somalia so far, saw 62 parties being created at the national level, and 1002 candidates standing for 123 seats. 'In national politics, the most abiding interest of each major local voting block is to place a kinsman in a "chair" (as they expressively put it) in the national assembly. Under what political party banner this is achieved is of secondary importance, for even if it turns out that a member is returned on a minority party ticket, he can always change his party allegiance once he is home and dry' (Lewis, in Gulliver, 1969, 353).

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[79] Said S. Samatar informs us (Samatar, 1995, 25) that modern study of this principle in social relations has been largely the achievement of British social anthropologists; he names Bronislaw Malinowski, Evans-Pritchard, and Ioan M. Lewis. Samatar emphasises especially Lewis' work on A Pastoral Democracy (Lewis, 1961).

The fact that democracy did not deliver unification, but instead exhibited corruption and chaos, allowed a dictatorial 'saviour' to seize power. A Somali refugee, an engineer, gave this summary to me (16th May 1997 in Oslo): 'Before 1969 Somalia had a parliamentary system, democratic, peaceful, but with a lot of corruption, especially among members of parliament. Elections were held in quite a disgusting and illegal way. In October 1969 the newly elected President Shermarke was killed (apparently in some kind of personal dispute) and next morning a general, Siad Barre, seized power. He built a socialist system with one single socialist party, and attracted the Soviet Union as 'eternal friend,' advisor and financier.'

President Mohammed Siad Barre from the Marehan sub-clan in the South of Somalia initially gave people new hope. He condemned tribalism and clanism. He seemed to stand for a government that wished to care for all Somalis and not just for one clan, - at least this was his rhetoric, perhaps in the beginning also his conviction. He lifted up the economy by shrewdly capitalising on the Cold War and the support of the Soviet Union.

The first years of Barre's rule were perhaps the only years of relative peace and almost inclusive national development Somalis experienced in the whole of the twentieth century. Times were so peaceful that even a census could be carried out (though the numbers should only be regarded as an estimation; Mohamed Abdulgader (I do not want to disclose his real name) took part in this census and reported to me in an interview on the 24th December 1998 in Mombassa that it was impossible to get exact figures from anybody, - colonial times had taught mistrust of authorities, - that only tribal chiefs would have exact knowledge[80]). The total population according to the 1975 census was 3.3 million (the United Nations estimated Somalia's population in mid-1991 at nearly 7.7 million) with the most lightly populated zones (fewer than six persons per square kilometre) in northeastern and central Somalia (compare for example Norway with 13 persons per square kilometre, but Rwanda with 300 persons).[81]

Most significantly (and perhaps also disastrously), Barre built the largest army of the entire region. Somalia had something like 4000 men after independence in 1960 and about 30

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[80] I will quote more from my conversations with Mohamed Abdulgader further down.

[81] Retrieved from http://rs6.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+so0047) in May 1997, titled Somalia: Population and Settlement Patterns. Ioan M. Lewis believes that there are some 5 million Somalis living in Somalia (Lewis, 1994a, 9); Said S. Samatar underlines that figures on Somalia represent guesswork rather than reliable census data, which do not exist for this part of Africa: 'Occupying nearly 1,036,000 sq. kms. (400,000 sq. miles) of an arid savanna grassland in eastern Africa, the Somalis are estimated to number some six to seven million. Two-thirds of these approximately four million live within the boundaries of the modern Somali state 637,600 sq. kms. (260,000 sq. miles), two million in Ethiopia's Ogaadeen (Ogaden) region, 240,000 in northern Kenya (in the former Northern Frontier District (NFD) of the British administrative period, an estimated 100,000 in the republic of Djibouti where a Somali ethnic majority, the 'Iise clan-family, has held the lion's share of that tiny republic's resources' (Samatar, 1995, 6).

000 soldiers in the seventies (Hansen, 2000). Riding on the public wave of national 'Assabiya' enthusiasm Barre set out to fulfil Somalia's great dream of unification: Counting on his 'friend,' the Soviet Union, Somalia attempted to capture the Ogaden from Ethiopia, and invaded Ethiopia in 1978.

Stig Jarle Hansen calls this war the 'Armageddon' of East Africa and writes: 'The Ogadeen war saw the largest tank battle south of Sahara, it saw one of the few Soviet led air assaults and one of the largest strategical airlift operations during the cold war. The conflict between Somalia, Ethiopia and the pre-independent Eritrea involved over 300.000 Eritreans, Ethiopians, Somalis, Soviets, Cubans and Yemenites' (Hansen, 2000, 1).

Said S. Samatar bitterly reflects on an unprecedented historic twist that subsequently turned a near Somali victory into a devastating defeat: 'The resourceful Ethiopians, as usual, bushwhacked the Somalis through international diplomacy. They declared themselves socialist and appealed for help from their "fraternal Soviet Socialist" people. The Soviets were only too happy to oblige. Switching support from the Somalis, they shipped into Ethiopia in February and March 1978 some $US 1.5 billion in military hardware, together with two leading Soviet generals and 1500 advisers. The majority of the advisers went straight from their advisory positions in the Somali army and, in a tragicomic turn of events in keeping with Somali history, took with them practically all of the Somali maps of the region, showing to the enemy the troop movements and disposition of the Somali army. For good measure, the Soviets directed Fidel Castro, wager of Soviet proxy wars in Africa, to pitch in with 11,000 Cuban troops. Ethiopia, by the region's standard, had now an awesome force. Within weeks they had the Somalis ejected from the Ogaadeen' (Samatar, 1995, 18).

Somalia's defeat was a devastating humiliation. Samatar continues on the same page: 'Defeat in the battlefield often deals a disastrous setback to military regimes…Incredibly, Mr. Barre's power survived the humiliating trouncing in the Ogaadeen.'

Barre survived national humiliation and secured his own power position because he was alert enough to stifle coup attempts, but mainly by means of an age-old strategy: finding scapegoats. In particular, he put the blame upon the Somalis from the Northern parts of his country, formerly under British tutelage. At first he targeted the Majerteen, destroyed their villages and wells, and later the Isaaq people. 'You Isaaq, you are so arrogant,' were Barre's words to a Somali woman (who wants to stay anonymous) as reported to me during my fieldwork on 30th November 1998; she met the dictator when she pleaded for her imprisoned family members. She confirmed that she believes that the dictator, - himself without formal

education, but gifted with a sharp mind, - must have suffered personal humiliation at the hands of Isaaq colleagues who were more educated than him.

The 'Morgan Report,' an official top secret report on 'implemented and recommended measures' for a 'final solution' to Somalia's 'Isaaq problem' was written by General Mohammed Sidi Hersi 'Morgan,' Siad Barre's Majerteen son-in-law, on 23rd January 1987. Morgan writes that the Isaaq and their supporters must be 'subjected to a campaign of obliteration,' in order to prevent that they 'raise their heads again.' He continues: 'today, we possess the right remedy for the virus in the [body of the] Somali State.' Among other 'remedies' he proposes: 'Rendering uninhabitable the territory between the army and the enemy, which can be done by destroying the water tanks and the villages lying across the territory used by them for infiltration,' and 'Removing from the membership of the armed forces and the civil service all those who are open to suspicion of aiding the enemy - especially those holding sensitive posts.'[82]

Members of the Isaaq clan became potential suspects everywhere, in the South they lost their jobs, they were detained, some executed. Abdulqadir H. Ismail Jirdeh (Deputy Speaker of the Parliament of Somaliland in Hargeisa), and Ahmed El Kahin, (legal advisor of the parliament, both interviewed on 19th November 1998 in Hargeisa) are witnesses:[83] 'After 1981, and the failed coup attempt against Barre, the North did not receive anything anymore. Even the hospital equipment was dismantled and shipped to the South. The Northerners suffered discrimination in many ways: they did not get licences or letters of credit (LCs) anymore, meaning that a Southerner had to be found to provide a facade, while the actual importer was an Isaaq; the MOD faction (Majerteen, Ogaden, Darood) took advantage of that. In short, the South robbed the North. Curfew was at five pm, people were counted in the houses, one had to report even when a brother came and visited, *khat* [a mild stimulant that was illegal] was put into a car as a pretext to frame the owner and confiscate the car; Hargeisa was a big military garrison. The elders always said that this had to stop, they never stopped protesting, but to no avail!'

Also the 'Hargeisa group' tried to do something.[84] They were a group of young Somali intellectuals who tried to rehabilitate their neglected city. They started with the dilapidated hospital and persuaded, among others, the German Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) to help them improve its standards. Siad Barre regarded this with

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[82] A worn-out copy of this report was shown to me in Hargeisa, November 1998.
[83] Further down more quotes from this interview will follow.
[84] Hargeisa is the capital of the North. Members of the Hargeisa group later founded the SORRA group (Somali Relief and Rehabilitation Association) in 1990.

great suspicion, and the group was imprisoned in 1981. Fourteen of its members lingered in solitary confinement in one of the worst jails of the country for eight years. They were released on 16th March 1989 following international pressure on Barre.

Perhaps only a Somali, tough and unbreakable, could survive such an experience. An 'average' Westerner cannot fathom the accounts I was presented with. Many listeners' minds tend to close down in horror when hearing about cruel physical torture, because a person who has never experienced torture has no frame of reference within which to grasp such cruelties, - average Westerners take their insights into violence from films in which brutality disappears at the end of the film. Therefore enumerating physical brutalities here would perhaps not promote empathy and real understanding. But almost everybody has been lonely at some point in life and can ask herself 'How would I cope with being alone, never seeing another human being for eight years, while at the same time never knowing whether I may be executed tomorrow, or even the next minute?' Or, 'How would I tackle the challenge and compete with the cockroaches that throw themselves from all four walls of my tiny hot and insect-infested cell-hole, onto the little food I get, at night during Ramadan (where you do not get food during the day), in absolute, total darkness?'

The prisoners did not see each other, but they detected that it was possible to communicate with the cell-neighbours, without the guards hearing it, by knocking on the thick walls and listening with the ear pressed to the wall. One of them invented a knocking language, similar to the Morse code, with two sounds representing the whole alphabet. He taught his neighbour, who taught his neighbour, and so on, - it took several years until the last cell was reached… One prisoner had managed to hold on to a book, it was Tolstoy's 'Anna Karenina,' a thick book, which he 'read' to his cell-neighbour through the wall…

Subsequently the dictator ordered the military to run riot against the Isaaq population with quasi-genocidal results.[85] The biggest blow hit Hargeisa, the capital of the North, when it was bombed and reduced to rubble in 1988. Edna Adan, lived through hell, she says: 'The regime began to try to impose its authority by force. You have the airport here, just 5 km from us where we sit now. The airport where you just landed, Hargeisa airport. Russian MIG airplanes, fighter planes, would take off from that airport to come and bomb the city here, where we are. Bomb civilians, women and children, and homes. And do a 4 km circle and just

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[85] These atrocities are being labelled 'quasi-genocide,' since Isaaq were not systematically exterminated, different to Rwanda, where even 'half-blood' were potential targets for extermination, and because until the end there were Isaaq ministers, something that would not have been thinkable in Rwanda (report by a United Nations employee who does not wish to be named, December 1998, Hargeisa).

go and land again at the airport, just 5 km away' (interview in Hargeisa, 3rd December 1998[86]).

The Africa Watch Committee reports on *Somalia: A Government at War With Its Own People* (The Africa Watch Committee, 1990) and gives documentary evidence of torture, killings, and suppression of opposition on a massive scale.[87] Government forces were 'determined to suppress grass roots rebellion among the northern clans. As many as 100,000 people are thought to have died as a result of the attacks. Some 250,000 sought refuge in border camps in Ethiopia, or fled to the countryside for safe haven. Thousands more citizens in the eastern and middle regions of the country had, over the years, their villages burned, livestock looted, and their families made destitute or killed by the soldiers of a government which would not tolerate criticism - a government which was at war with its own people. Because of the atrocities which were being committed against them, many people fled their homeland and became exiled abroad, or became refugees in camps across the borders in neighbouring countries. The Somali people have suffered a diaspora, and can be found in exile today in all countries of Europe, the Middle East, and North America. There are more than 50,000 Somali refugees in Britain today, and an estimated 65,000 in Canada' (Anita Suleiman, 1997, *Somali Study Materials*).

I do not want to expand on the description of atrocities here; this has been very thoroughly documented in the Africa Watch Committee report and in other places.. To illustrate their severity, the reader might imagine what it would be like if the American President ordered the American army to reduce San Francisco to rubble, or if the British Prime Minister sent military planes to destroy Scotland, promising its territory, once its inhabitants had been destroyed, to other groups. (Siad Barre promised Isaaq land to Ogadenis). I received many accounts of the horrors that the targeted people were subjected to. From several sources I got reports of the endured by those who fled; women and children hid under trees on their way to safety in Ethiopia, they were followed by planes who bombed them; suddenly the family under the neighbouring tree was killed…

The Barre regime collapsed in 1991 and the dictator was forced into exile. He was brought down by military factions who fought him.[88] In the aftermath Somalia lost all its

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[86] Edna Adan will be quoted further down again, from the same interview.

[87] See also the Amnesty International Publication Somalia: A Long-Term Human Rights Crisis, London 1988 (Amnesty International, 1988).

[88] Stig Jarle Hansen (1998) summarises not only the downfall of Siad Barre, but gives also a feel for the constantly changing alliances of armed factions, so characteristic for the Somali way of handling war and peace: The Somali Patriotic movement (SPM, evil tongues say that this organisation was

public and governmental institutions, and is still without any such services Instead of rebuilding the state, the Somali clans went back to their traditional, pre-colonial tribal independence.[89] Bitter faction fighting ensued[90] and resulted in bloodshed and endless sufferings for the civilian population during the entire decade of the 1990s, atrocities being carried out on all sides.

However, the Isaaq in the North stood out as an exception. They held a successful peace conference and managed to pacify their region. They went as far as to proclaim their own state, 'Somaliland' (Somaliland is not recognised by the international community or by other Somali leaders, who bitterly resent this secession.[91]) Samatar understands that this deep rift between the North and the South may be the result of what may be called 'humiliation that went too far': 'Somaliland's decision to declare independence in May 1991 was a result of massive popular opposition to further rule from Mogadishu. This hostility resulted from the suffering inflicted on the north by the Barre regime' (Samatar, 1995, update).[92]

Practically everybody I talked to during my fieldwork spoke with some awe about this legendary Isaaq peace conference. However, Somalis from the still war-torn South, and international advisers would only reluctantly acknowledge its success, since this conference brought relative peace to the North without depending on expensive conference arrangements provided by the United Nations or neighbouring countries, like those that have till now characterised the numerous – and usually unsuccessful - peace conferences and meetings addressing the troubled rest of Somalia.

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formed by Barre supporters that found his cause lost) was based on 3000 Ogadenis that deserted from Siad Barre's army in 1989. Colonel Omar Jess was its commander. Colonel Omar Jess was soon joined by former Defence Minister Adan Abdullahi Nur 'Gabeeyow,' a long-time Siad Barre stalwart who had been dismissed by the dictator. SPM and USC where the two organisations that ousted Barre from Mogadishu in January 1991. After January 1991, the two men radically diverged, Colonel Jess joined forces with General Aydeed while 'Gabeeyow' allied himself with his former colleague and rival in the Siad Barre entourage, General Mohamed Said Hersi 'Morgan,' the SNF leader. Omar Jesse switched sides again after massacres against Ogadenis initiated by SNA, but later again came back in Aideed's alliance. SPM was a major and important force when it was united' (unpublished text leading up to a research report).

[89] See also Ken Menkhaus, 1995 on The Radical Localization of Somali Politics.

[90] See A. A. Mohamoud, 2000, on 'Somalia: a Political Circus.'

[91] It is a political statement to write Somaliland with inverted commas as in 'Somaliland' since this highlights the fact that it is not recognised, - or writing it without inverted commas because this indicates that the author actually recognises it. As a neutral observer I do not want to be caught up in this discussion. I deeply respect the efforts of the people in the North of Somalia to pacify their region, and I was also touched by the intensity of the wish related to me to be recognised. I will write Somaliland without inverted commas in this manuscript.

[92] The North was not without violence though: 'The stability experienced in the north after the Borama conference was shattered by eruption of violence, over control of Hargeisa Airport…' However, 'the government came out stronger…' (Farah, in Haakonsen & Keynan, 1995, 35).

The legendary Borama National Reconciliation Conference started in January 1993 and lasted for four months. It 'was attended by 150 voting delegates, comprising elders from all clans in Somaliland, accompanied by a further 150 observers and advisers. An estimated 2,000 people participated in the meeting at different stages. A National Peace Charter was formulated including details on registration and storage of weapons, demobilization of militias, disarming of bandits, and the formation of local police forces and judicial institutions. In addition, the Charter defined the role of elders and communities and a code of conduct. Further, it set out the transitional government structure and emphasized the principle of decentralization and the creation of regional and district councils. The government was to draft a full national constitution within two years. On 5 May 1993 the Borama Conference elected Mohammed H. Ibrahim Igaal as the new President of Somaliland. The election of Igaal was met with general approval. The Borama Conference was politically the most telling achievement of northern local level clan democracy' (Samatar, 1995, update). (Later the Majerteen clan followed the Isaaq example and created 'Puntland' in the Northeast, with Abdullahi Yusuf as President of the self-proclaimed state of Puntland.[93])

Down from high politics to the grassroots, the following account of one of the above-introduced Hargeisa group members who spent eight years in solitary confinement is presented at this point to provide a more personal insight into how the struggle, disruption and hope for reconstruction in Somaliland are being played out in daily family life (interview 9th December 1998 in Hargeisa):

E. (Lindner): In 1981, you got married, and you got your job.

B. (from the Hargeisa group): Exactly.

E: And you came to Hargeisa. And already one year later... it was finished.

B: It was finished, yes. I was only married for six months. Five months, in fact, when I was arrested.

E: And your wife was... I read that many women were forced to divorce...

B: Forced to divorce, yes.

E: And how did this go with your wife?

B: She was working at the bank here. And she was really harassed for quite a while; she was transferred to very old facilities, away from her family and all. She was asked to... almost every night asked to come and… women were being taken from their homes… because Somalia at that time was supposed to be a socialist country. And she was very tough, really,

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[93] Puntland is not claiming independence as Somaliland does, but has set up a regional administration, for example to collect taxes and get some development projects off the ground.

but they harassed her, and her family as well. That's why she left in 1985. She left to Germany.

E. To Germany?

B: Yes. She stayed in Germany for quite a number of years. But later she moved to Holland. There were some bombings and stuff like that in Germany for hostels or something like that. So she stayed in... in fact, when I came out of prison, and I went to America, I came back through Germany, and they were still in Germany. Near Bonn. That's where they were staying.

E: So you did not meet your wife immediately after being released?

B: No, she was away. She was in Germany when I was released.

E: So after being released, you went to the United States?

B: Yes, and stayed there for six months, to get a residence. And I was only on a visit to Germany.

E: And this was the first time you saw your wife again after so many years?

B: The first time. No letters, no communication, because it was impossible.

E: How was it to meet her again, she was another person and you were another person...

B: Of course. We were strangers for the first... absolutely, for the first few months we were really strangers, because so much had happened to her and to us, it was very difficult to... It's only recently that we are becoming more... accustomed to each other. After three kids. We have three sons now. She's still in Holland now. But she's supposed to move if everything stays like calm here. I hope they'll move to Hargeisa.

E: So the sons get education in Holland?

B: They get education in Holland. They were here recently, for three months. They learned Somali.

E: They speak Dutch?

B: They speak Dutch (laughter).

E: So your wife has Dutch citizenship, and you have American citizenship? (laughter)

B: Yes, and the eldest can get German papers when he's 18. But he can also apply for Dutch.

E: He has a big choice.

B: Yes, a big choice. And they can become American as well.

E: Amazing!

Also the South of Somalia saw a series of peace conferences, with the aim of rebuilding Somalia. The conference of 1991 in Djibouti led to the establishment of an interim government, with Ali Mahdi Mohamed of the United Somali Congress (USC) faction as

President. 'This arrangement was, however, soon challenged by the chairman of the USC, General Mohamed Farah 'Aidid,' who had led the final military offensive that drove the Barre regime out of the capital, Mogadishu. Intense fighting between Ali Mahdi and Aidid broke out in November 1991, resulting in widespread loss of life and destruction of physical infrastructure in the capital. Fighting soon spread into the southern regions of Somalia and, combined with the "scorched earth" practices of the retreating Barre forces earlier that year, resulted in an inability of the local population to farm the land or graze livestock. Increasing malnutrition in these areas rapidly led to the onset of a famine by early 1992' (Jan, 1996, 3).[94]

Ameen Jan summarises the situation that subsequently lead up to the involvement of the United Nations and the United States: 'The delivery of humanitarian relief by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), various international NGOs, and UN agencies was made exceedingly difficult by the prevailing general insecurity, the increased incidence of banditry and theft, and the extortionist practices of the faction militias whose support was required to guarantee safe access by the humanitarian community to the suffering populations. As a result, several UN agencies withdrew altogether from Somalia during 1991, including UNDP which functioned as Resident Coordinator of all UN agencies in the country' (3).

Jan continues: 'The UN established its first operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in May 1992. It was a traditional observer mission of fifty (later increased to 500) unarmed military observers in Mogadishu who were assigned to observe a UN-brokered cease-fire in the capital.' Jan recalls that the mission failed and the humanitarian and security situation worsened. On 9th December 1992, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), or Operation Restore Hope, was launched by the U.S. Its mandate was simply to establish a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief. In Jan's view, 'UNITAF's impact was immediate and positive. High expectations among the Somali population of what the U.S. would be able to do to quell the fighting, including disarmament of the factional militias, resulted in the faction leaders hunkering down. Delivery of humanitarian assistance was thereby eased, and UNITAF succeeded in saving thousands of human lives in the areas most affected by the

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[94] Ameen Jan's briefing (1996) Peacebuilding in Somalia
(http://www.ipacademy.inter.net/somalia2.htm) was initiated by the International Peace Academy in New York. This briefing was based on a field visit to Nairobi and Mogadishu from 11th to 25th March 1996, an IPA Policy Forum entitled 'Peacebuilding Efforts in Somalia: Legacies of the International Intervention' held in New York on 23rd April 1996, and on over 60 interviews conducted in the U.S., Kenya and Somalia between November 1995 and April 1996.

famine.' However, Jan points out that the failure to actively disarm the factions of their heavy weapons encouraged the faction leaders all over again.

The humanitarian emergency wound down and the United States prepared to hand over its functions under UNITAF to the UN. UNOSOM II was established to undertake the task of peacebuilding. As Jan puts it, 'This task failed. Especially the military objective to marginalize and eliminate General Aidid after the attack on Pakistani peacekeepers on 5 June 1993 stripped the UN of the impartiality that it required to perform a useful role in civilian peacebuilding efforts. By the time these military objectives changed in October 1993, UNOSOM II had become too discredited to be seen as an honest broker in the political process (Jan, 1996, 3).[95]

Today Somalia is so deeply divided, so war-torn after almost a decade of conflict, so full of bitterness and torment that aid organisations are reluctant to come to Somalia; most organisations 'retreated' to Nairobi or other nearby places, and representatives I spoke to could count the number of Westerners they knew who were holding out in Somalia with one hand. Understandably enough: for example, in April 1998 Ola Skuterud, head of the Somalia Delegation of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and Resident Representative Norwegian Red Cross, who regularly ventured into Somalia with his helpers, was kidnapped in a dramatic incident directly upon arrival at the airport near Mogadishu together with about ten other people. He related the details of this incident to me, explaining how he experienced it from the 'inside' (4th January 1999, later I also talked to two other hostages), while the main negotiator (the Somali Secretary General Somali Red Crescent) who worked through long sleepless nights to get the hostages free (9th January 1999) provided me with the view from 'outside.' Their accounts throw into sharp relief all aspects of Somali volatility of alliances: kidnappers are not necessarily in total control of the situation; they face those among them who want a bigger share, and others who do not approve at all…

Sam Engelstad supplements: 'If three clans are prominent in one town, an international NGO working in the community must generally negotiate with representatives loyal to all three. Each group will expect to be provided with resources commensurate with their clan's perceived strength. And when things go wrong, as they always do – when

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[95] See also: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Operation in Somalia: At the Strategic and Operational Levels 19-20 June 1995 by The Lessons-Learned Unit of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations & The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs UN Programme, 1995. See also Clarke & Herbst, 1997.

"promised" resources don't materialize – death threats and kidnappings often follow'
(Engelstad, in Haakonsen & Keynan, 1995, 62).

Not everybody comes back alive from kidnapping incidents. On 23rd April 1999 IRIN
(The English service of the UN's IRIN humanitarian information unit,
http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN) reports: 'The international humanitarian community on
Thursday "condemned in the strongest possible terms" the abduction of an Italian aid worker
in the Lower Juba Region of southern Somalia, and recommended the suspension of aid
activities in the region. The man, a veterinarian working with the Italian NGO, Terra Nuova,
was kidnapped on Friday in the town of Hagar by an armed militia whose identity is as yet
unknown. In January another Terra Nuova veterinarian, Dr. Manmohan Bhogal, who was
working on the same animal vaccination programme in the Gedo Region of southern Somalia,
was murdered. Nobody has yet been held to account for that killing.'

Together with a colleague of late Dr. Manmohan Bhogal I went through all possible
theories of what exactly might have got Dr. Manmohan Bhogal killed (beginning of 1999,
Terre Nuova in Nairobi).

Though Somaliland is relatively peaceful today, and Puntland is following suit, the
rest of Somalia is still war-torn and instable; everybody living there is forced to subsist in a
state of constant alertness and anxiety to fall victim to violence at almost any time. The South
is less homogenous than the North, has stronger warlords, less respect for elders, and less
control over youths who have got accustomed to war, to enumerate just a few reasons why the
South seems to fall victim to violence more than the North (summarised from Samatar, 1995,
update).

The last point is especially interesting; it addresses the phenomenon of the *Mooryaan*
(*Mooryaan* in Mogadishu, *Jirri* among the Majerteen, or, *day-day* among the Isaaq). They are
young men, usually heavy drug users (including the ubiquitous *khat*[96]), living in houses that
they (in some cases together with almost equally 'courageous' and tough girls) seized with
their weapons. 'The term "Mooryaan" designates the looter and is, in fact, applied today to
those young boys, chewing qaat and carrying weapons as tall as themselves, who indulge
regularly in "delinquent" activities' (Marchal, in Adam & Ford, 1997, 196). When I asked

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[96] Or qaat, or qaad, or miraa. 'One of the contexts in which men, particularly, are most relaxed is when
they meet socially to chew the leaves of the stimulant plant qat. Whereas qat-chewing sessions were
once special and occasional pastimes, in the 1980s and 1990s the consumption of qat, during the day
as well as in the evening and individually, became pervasive in urban centres such as Mogadishu. The
young militia figures tended to chew it regularly and were provided with supplies by their leaders.
Marketing qat became in the 1990s big business and played an important role in the political economy
of the "warlords"' (Lewis, 1994a, 19, 20, italicisation in original).

about those young bandits in Somaliland and about why banditry seems to be such a minor problem in the North as compared to the South, I got the answer that some of these 'boys' gave up their banditry under pressure of the elders, while some others, those who were less open to prosocial change, were killed, even by their own families.

Incidentally, the case of these young men epitomises how volatile clan fault lines can prove to be: 'In September, 1991, some Abgal Mooryaan were intent on pillaging a repair station in Shibis; the inhabitants tell them to go away, since the owner of the station and those of most of the cars belong to the same clan. Alas! our young warriors made them into Habar Gedir to gain clan justification. In one word, if the clan did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it' (Marchal, in Adam & Ford, 1997, 207).

An article in *The Economist* may serve as a conclusion to this short walk through Somali history; it also highlights the global repercussions of the international community's 'humiliating failure' to 'rescue' Somalia: 'In March 995, the last United Nations troops packed their kit and fled from Somalia. It was not just the country that was left in ruins. Their departure was also a turning-point in the UN's post-cold-war role. The organisation's humiliating failure to pacify Somalia killed the hope, probably always unrealistic, that it could become the world's police force. The United States, which lost 18 of its soldiers in one bloody night in October 1993, was, from then on, opposed to almost any forcible UN intervention. It has not, since then, sent its troops to keep peace in Africa' (The Economist, 1999a, 31).

However, *The Economist* comes to a surprising conclusion, 'Without a government for almost ten years and with little outside assistance, Somalis have not exterminated each other. In various ways, many have been doing quite well, a lot better than might have been expected and better than some Africans whose governments are under the tutelage of western donors, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The average Somali, self reliant and tough, is probably no worse off than the average Tanzanian or Zambian' (31).

The article concludes with hope for the future: 'the UN would be ill-advised to try to reconstitute Somalia as a centralised state. Instead, it should encourage its dismembered parts to form reasonably democratic administrations and secure nationwide agreement on common issues such as a central bank, roads, schools and health programmes. Can these be achieved without a central power? Maybe. But the six or seven entities that make up Somalia now should be left autonomous and the boundaries between them as flexible as possible. In time, with good fortune, they may come together in a loose confederation which would suit Somali social structure' (33).

Peace efforts to pacify Somalia have been made all along since the failed UN intervention, - by the UN, and by neighbouring states, - but they regularly endedin disaster. However, there seems to be hope now. IRIN reports on the latest attempt that is currently under way and is welcomed with cautious optimism by observers, even sceptical ones: 'The Somali peace conference held in Djibouti is coming to the end of its consultative phase, after composition of the predominantly clan delegations was slowed down by disagreement, diplomatic sources told IRIN on Friday. Debate focused particularly on numbers regarding sub-clans, women and minorities. The final composition of the delegations is likely to be four groups of 160 representatives, with smaller groups representing minorities' (IRIN, 9th June 2000). Many obstacles have been overcome since June, and on 21st August 2000 a big step ahead was taken when Abdillahi Deroow Issack, the newly-elected speaker of Somalia's Transitional National Assembly (for a transitional period of three years) was officially sworn in, and on 27th August 2000 a new president, Abdulqasim Salad Hasan, was elected.

Somalis in Norway follow the conference proceedings via their Satellite dishes with which they capture Djibouti television programmes that have been set up especially for this conference; otherwise it is difficult to be informed about the progress of this conference. Hassan A. Keynan (former UNESCO secretary general in Somalia) reports to me on the 25th of August 2000 in Oslo: 'In this conference representatives from all clans participate, even from Somaliland and Puntland, although both refuse to take part in the conference and have given orders to arrest these representatives upon arrival in Somaliland and Puntland. Also the warlords, except for one, refuse to take part; but their clans are represented. The conference is hosted by Djibouti and, although it is sympathetically viewed by the United Nations, care has been taken to keep distance from outside control such as from the UN, because that would create suspicion that hidden agendas are being pushed through.' Keynan is one of the above mentioned Somalia experts who is cautiously optimistic and believes that Somalia, as soon as its problems are settled, has the potential to become a very special and interesting place, even a success in Africa.

Further down I will try to show why I agree with Keynan. I will round up the account of Somalia's history here. Evidently, Somalia's predicament is much more complicated than this brief overview indicates. Anybody who delves into Somali clan relations, for example, can write several books only on clan alliances and breaches of alliances. But, hopefully the aim of this section has been achieved, namely to introduce a reader to Somalia who previously was not familiar with it.

Rwanda / Burundi[97]

As indicated at the beginning of this manuscript, the entry point into this research was the humiliation thesis explaining Germany's lust to go to World War II, namely the thesis that Germany felt humiliated after World War I by the Versailles Accords. Interestingly, part of the Versailles humiliation was that Germany not only lost German East Africa, but that this was also not subtracted from the claim for damages. Øyvind Østerud[98] made me aware of this intriguing link between Germany, Rwanda / Burundi, and deliberate humiliation. The League of Nations gave Belgium colonial tutelage over Rwanda, 'as a device for depriving Germany of its colonies without subtraction from the claim for damages,' and this 'added to the humiliation of the peace accord' (Øyvind Østerud).[99]

Anybody who is searching for more common points linking the cases of this book, will be disappointed and find that they are worlds apart: Somalia and Rwanda / Burundi are extreme opposites, at least at the first glance. Somalia is an immensely large and scarce country at the margins of Africa towards the sea, with proud, aggressively honest (in expressing dislike), egalitarian, and mobile inhabitants, while Rwanda and Burundi are tiny fertile hilly countries, landlocked in the heart of Africa, with people who are bound to their farming land, locked into rigid social hierarchies, and who have the reputation of hardly ever saying directly what they think.

Pre-Hitler's Germany, with its strict Prussian militaristic hierarchy and culture of obedience and orderliness clearly falls into the category of the Great Lakes, and not of Somalia. With its hills and neatness, The Great Lakes were known as the Switzerland of Africa.

However, there are also 'connections' between Somalia and Rwanda / Burundi, - apart from the fact that they all are African countries. One peculiar connection is provided by a Burundian Prime Minister, Michel Micômbéro, from a lowly Tutsi lineage, who was deposed in 1976 and exiled to Mogadishu, Somalia, where he placed himself under Siad Barre's protecting hand, and died, under suspect circumstances, in 1983. Micômbéro also links up to

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[97] In the Kinyarwanda language, Ba- is a noun prefix that signifies 'people,' as in Ba-twa, Batutsi, Bahutu. The singular form is Mu-, as in Mu-twa. I will use the plural forms Tutsi and Hutu.
[98] In a personal message on 8th November 1999.
[99] Dorsey, in his Historical Dictionary of Rwanda reports: 'On May 6, 1919, members of the council - Great Britain, the United States, France, and Italy - decided that the German colonies would be administered as mandates by the "Great Powers," which meant that Great Britain received the lion's share - German East Africa and the eastern part of Rwanda' (Dorsey, 1994, 214).

Hitler's Germany, since many Hutu describe him as a Hitler figure who forced the population, including his Hutu victims, to use an equivalent to the 'Heil Hitler' salutation.

Another 'connection' between Somalia and Rwanda / Burundi is the 'Hamitic hypothesis' which argues that the Tutsi of the Great Lakes invaded the Great Lakes region from somewhere between Egypt and the Horn of Africa; Tutsi bodies, slain in the 1994 genocide, were thrown into rivers by their Hutu killers to be 'shipped back' to their 'nilo-hamitic origins,' – a cruel 'go home' message so-to-speak.

A further linkage is the 'Somalia Syndrome' that prevented the international community from becoming more active in Rwanda, precisely at the moment when Rwanda needed an alert and strong-willed international community to protect it from the 1994 genocide.

Another link between Somalia and Rwanda / Burundi is Somali expertise on genocidal killings, an expertise that was needed in Rwanda; the 1994 genocide in Rwanda became the field of examination for a Somali expert, Rakiya Omar, who has co-directed the African Rights report on *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance* (1995).[100]

The international community provides a further commonality: expatriates share a common feel towards both regions, namely that they feel unwelcome; many expatriates would like to leave if their work did not keep them. If I were to create a sentence that summarises the numerous opinions related to me during my fieldwork, then this sentence should perhaps go as follows: 'In Somalia people are unfriendly, overly suspicious and brutally direct, in Rwanda they are unfriendly, overly suspicious and unbearably secretive, - people are much more friendly in West Africa.' Admittedly, for many expatriates these 'unpleasant places' are highlights in their careers nevertheless, but only because they are the hardest posts to be found and thus represent something like a hard-to-pass examination, that gives, if successfully mastered, higher marks, and the well-earned right to relax in more hospitable regions of the world.

Perhaps linked to this extreme picture that most expatriates have of both Somalia and the Great Lakes region, is the fact that both regions at times were 'the best' and also see themselves as 'the best.' For many years Somalia and Rwanda were exemplary and respected nations, under Siad Barre Somalia was a proud member of the Arab League and several relevant African groupings, and Rwanda was equally respected by neighbours and aid donors.

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[100] See also Rakiya, De Waal, & African Rights, 1993. See other reports, for example Amnesty International & Amnesty International, 1997, Des Forges & Human Rights Watch, 1999, and The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000.

One expert on the Great Lakes (we had several meetings in the French speaking part of Europe during 2000, I do not want to disclose his name), told me 'off the record' that the Great Lakes region is peculiar insofar as 'people there believe that they are 'the best,' and, conversely, whatever ills befall them, they see them as 'the worst' of what humankind ever had to endure.

The last common point is Nairobi, where both Somalis and Rwandans / Burundians flee from the terror of their countries; Nairobi is the first point of escape for people from the Great Lakes as well as from Somalia.

At this point, I believe, I have exhausted my current knowledge of similarities and differences between Somalia and the Great Lakes (and pre-Hitler's Germany) and can proceed. I will now look at the Great Lakes region's past and put forward the first question a therapist asks when a new patient comes: 'Who is this patient?'

The first white man to set foot in the enigmatic mountain region of the Great Lakes in the heart of Africa was the German Count von Goetzen. He was born in Schloss Scharfeneck, Silesia,[101] on May 12, 1860. The *Historical Dictionary of Rwanda* reports: 'On his first voyage to Africa in 1891, he was a lieutenant of the Imperial Guard at Uhlans. He also accompanied von Prittwitz and Kersting on their transafrican expedition in 1893 and 1894. The first Europeans to enter Rwanda, they explored Nyragongo and Lake Kivu on an essentially scientific and military expedition that stretched from India to East Africa and the Atlantic Ocean. The explorers remained in Rwanda for several weeks' (Dorsey, 1994, 242).

What did von Goetzen and his successors see? What did the colonial powers find when they first 'discovered' their future underlings? What is the pre-colonial history of this region? They found 'a thousand hills,' the legendary *mille collines*, figuring in many names,[102] in an area that is, as mentioned above, a fraction the size of Somalia, but the more fertile (before the events of 1994, Rwanda was the most densely populated country of the African continent, 7.1 million inhabitants for 26,338 square kilometres. Ninety per cent of the population live on agriculture).

This is the only part of the region's history that is completely undisputed. Almost everything else that the reader might expect to find in a short overview of history is passionately debated: Different parties involved in the current conflict paint it in different ways and 'imagine' different kinds of communities (Anderson, 1991). As Lemarchand

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[101] Also my family originates from Silesia. I found German literature about von Goetzen in the bookshelves of Médecins sans Frontières in Kigali. See Durch Afrika, von Ost nach West (Götzen, 1899).

[102] Hotel des Mille Collines is one of the central meeting places in Kigali.

formulates it, 'the historical message is radically different among Hutu and Tutsi. For the Hutu, resurrecting a fictitious past gives their collective self-awareness as an oppressed majority a powerful primordial appeal; for the Tutsi, on the other hand, investing the past with an assumption of unadulterated harmony and equality between groups allows them to claim that Burundi is a basically healthy society, only periodically perturbed by malcontents and "selfish" politicians' (Lemarchand, 1994a, xiv, xv).

I will, in the following, attempt to let different voices speak, in order to give the reader the opportunity to develop a personal 'feel' for the delicacy of the situation. The *Encarta Concise Encyclopedia*[103] presents the 'primordialist' 'three-wave' version of Rwandan history that is also the most widely used in the typical international media coverage on the Great Lakes: 'The original inhabitants of Rwanda were the Twa people. The Hutu were also established by the 15th century, when the Tutsi conquered the area and made the Hutu a caste of serfs.'

Or, in a little more detail, starting with the first wave: 'Between 2000 BC and 1000 AD, people migrated in successive waves into the area between the Rift Valley lakes of Central Africa. These pygmoid people lived by hunting and gathering in the forests. Their descendants, who are still hunter-gatherers, are known as Batwa' (Waller & Oxfam, 1996, 4). (The Twa now form less than one per cent of the total population of Rwanda.)

Waller continues with the second wave: 'For the next 500 years new people migrated into the area. They concentrated on clearing the land for cultivation. Their society was organised in small monarchies, based on clans of related families. Their social and cultural life was geared to preserving and promoting the interests of these clans and their alliances. This population of cultivators is often presumed to be Bahutu' (4). (They now form almost ninety per cent of the population.)

In his account on the third wave, Waller uses the word 'emerged,' instead of 'conquered,' or 'invaded,' perhaps as an indication that he does not want to commit himself to just one version of history: 'Then, between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries AD, a taller group of people known as the Batutsi emerged as the dominant military and economic force. It was they who introduced the lyre-horned Ankole cattle into Rwanda. They reinforced their military strength by developing an oral mythology which taught that the Batutsi' dominance over the Bahutu and Batwa was ordained by God, and that the Batutsi and their Mwami (king) were omnipotent in all walks of life. Even though they were a minority in society, the Batutsi

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[103] See http://links.expedia.com/am/.

controlled all areas of the country, except the north and west, by means of a complicated administrative system. Bahutu were tied to their Batutsi chiefs by a system of 'clientage' in which the Mututsi patron could deny his Muhutu client access to pasture, or to cattle, or to military protection, if the client did not provide free labour and a proportion of his crops to the patron. The Batutsi Mwamis also manipulated a complex web of spies, and thus not only maintained their power, but developed a capacity for political intrigue and paranoia that remains to this day throughout Rwandan society' (4).

René Lemarchand found a caricature of this 'primordialist argument' in *The Economist*: 'The Hutu are small, thick-set, deep-brown farmers. The Tutsi minority are tall, slim, very dark cattle drivers whose forefathers conquered the Hutu some four centuries ago. The two people have lived as nobles and serfs ever since.... The Tutsi have always disdained foreigners and preferred their cattle to a European idea of God. While the Hutu ran the civil service, the Tutsi manned the army, and kept the upper hand by shooting complainers' (The Economist, 1988, quoted in Lemarchand, 1994a, 7). *The Economist* continues, 'The Tutsi stratagems… are said to include offerings of cattle and gifts of "beautiful women," both designed to hoodwink the unsuspecting Hutu agriculturalists. The Tutsi's occupational status as pastoralists and the proverbial beauty of their women (tall and thin) were supposedly key ingredients in the historical process of feudal domination of Tutsi over Hutu' (6).

From this extreme caricature of the 'primordialist argument' we may now turn to the opposite extreme. Pierre Erny (Erny, 1995, 29) reminds us of Anicet Kashamura, who puts forward a contesting 'neo-Tutsi' version of history, for example in his *Essai sur les moeurs sexuelles et les cultures de peuples des Grands Lacs africains* (Kashamura, 1973). This version accuses Western ethnology of having invented the thesis of the existence of different ethnic groups that invaded the region in waves. The neo-Tutsi version states, that, on the contrary, Twa, Tutsi and Hutu belong to one single ethnic group within which a differentiation 'emerged.' Indeed, when I was in the region, I was intensely urged never to use categories such as Tutsi and Hutu in order to not contribute to this rift, and never to ask a person of her origin. I followed this advice, and would not touch upon this delicate subject unless my interlocutors did it themselves, in the same way that I would not ask Somalis for their clan affiliation.

Every researcher or visitor of the region faces this dilemma; namely that nobody advocates partiality openly, - neutrality is the official ideology in most discourses, - while at the same time reality seems to be dominated by exactly this rift. Whatever publication one consults on this subject, the struggle for truth and objectivity is intertwined with sympathies

for one or the other conflict party, and for a novice it is extremely difficult to get an idea of where reality stops and ideology begins. Academic scholar Filip Reyntjens, based in Antwerp in the Flemish part of Belgium, for example, is known to be Hutu-oriented, - many characterised him to me as 'extremely knowledgeable but biased,' and a UNHCR employee in Burundi reported to me that his books are banned in Burundi.[104] Jean-Pierre Chrétien, based in Paris, is reported by many not to be Hutu-oriented.[105] Some recommended to me René Lemarchand for his balanced account,;they found his book *Rwanda and* Burundi the best in this field (Lemarchand, 1970[106]). Others related to me that they learned most from Gérard Prunier's book *History of a Genocide* (Prunier, 1995a[107]). Hhowever, Prunier is not uncontested either, and many criticise him forf 'never having lived in the region he writes about.' This list of scholars hopefully will be supplemented by more local expertise, as there is André Guichaoua from Burundi, based in France.[108]

Where are the facts, and where is ideology? The novice is lost. As soon as I thought that one version was perhaps more likely, I was presented with evidence that supported the other. Lemarchand, for example, points at the puzzling piece of evidence that the same person (in Burundi) 'might assume a double identity and be identified as both Hutu and Tutsi' (Lemarchand, 1994a, 9). He explains: 'The key to the puzzle lies in the different semantic fields associated with the term *Hutu*. In Kirundi, the term has two separate meanings: one refers to its cultural or ethnic underpinnings, the other to its social connotations. In the latter sense, Hutu refers to a "social subordinate" in relation to somebody higher up in the pecking order. The definition given by Father E. Rodegem - fils social, or "social son" - is perhaps even more accurate, since it denotes not just social inferiority but a measure of affectivity (Rodegem, personal communication, 1991). Thus a Tutsi cast in the role of client vis-à-vis a wealthier patron would be referred to as "Hutu," even though his cultural identity remained Tutsi. Similarly, a prince was a Hutu in relation to the king, and a high-ranking Tutsi was a Hutu in relation to a prince' (9, 10).

'Does this mean that the neo-Tutsi version is correct?' asks the novice with some hope of finally reaching the bottom of it, only to be reminded by Erny that nobody in Rwanda and

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[104] See, for example, Reyntjens, 1993; Reyntjens, 1994; Reyntjens & Minority Rights Group, 1995; Reyntjens, 1995; and Marysse & Reyntjens, 1997.

[105] See for a selection of his work, Chrétien, 1976; Chrétien, 1991a; Chrétien, 1991b; Chrétien, 1992; Chrétien, 1993; Chrétien, 1996; Chrétien, 1997.

[106] See, for example, Lemarchand, 1970; Lemarchand, 1994b; Lemarchand, 1994a; Lemarchand, 1996, and Kay & Lemarchand, 1987.

[107] See also Prunier, 1995b.

[108] See, for example, Guichaoua, 1994; Chrétien, Guichaoua, & Le Jeune, 1989.

Burundi can stay neutral in these matters (he himself included).[109] He takes a stance and proposes that the neo-Tutsi version of a common origin of Hutu and Tutsi may be Machiavellian ideology, that it may be nothing but a Tutsi attempt to cover up for Tutsi oppression, and more importantly, to confuse the international community.[110] One has to admit that Erny has psychological likelihood on his side, such a version may be expected from masters who wish to camouflage their domination, perhaps even in front of themselves, by pretending that their slaves in fact are perfectly happy 'children,' who, in addition, all are members of the same family, and that outsiders are the ones guilty of disturbing this happy idyll, - a tactic of denial, combined with the strategy of accusing the messenger.

If I put this, crudely and impolitely, into words taken from social work, then Erny's view would fit with the experience social work professionals have with husbands who beat their wives, and who, to the social worker's disgust, remain convinced that their battered wives are perfectly happy. Since the social workers are appalled and convinced they know better, they 'rescue' the wife. However, and here social workers share the struggle of the historian in the Great Lakes, repeatedly and painfully they have to discover that black-and-white views are too simplistic: even badly beaten wives often appear to 'love' their husbands and frequently return to them, in spite of the fact that they had just been 'heroically rescued' from their plight by the social worker who, disappointed and exhausted, asks whether, perhaps, the husband (master/Tutsi) was right after all…?

Waller addresses this problem as follows: 'There are differences of perception [of Rwandese history], and the most important relates to the question of who exactly the Batutsi are, and the precise nature of their relationship to the Bahutu' (Waller & Oxfam, 1996, 5). Waller then asks the important questions: 'Did they dominate them in a semi-feudal hierarchy of master and serf, or was their relationship mutually beneficial?'

As indicated above, the delicate topic is difficult to talk about. Waller, in his Oxfam publication, - and Oxfam surely does not wish to be declared non-grata in the region, - formulates it with care and tact: 'Ever since aristocratic German explorers first pronounced the Batutsi to be an elite of nilo-hamitic origins, the Bahutu and the Batutsi have been

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[109] 'Il existe sur le Rwanda une littérature scientifique considérable, mais je crois pouvoir dire qu'aucun écrit n'est totalement exempt de parti pris: comme 1'opposition viscéralement passionnelle entre Tutsi et Hutu conditionne tout le reste, on est toujours, d'une manière ou d'une autre, à des degrés certes très divers, favorable à l'un ou l'autre camp. Je ne prétends nullement échapper à la règle' (Erny, 1995, 25).
[110] 'J'ai d'ailleurs le sentiment que le discours anthropologico-historique véhiculé par le mouvement neo-tutsi est destiné essentiellement aux gens du dehors, à l'opinion internationale, à la galerie' Erny, 1995, 35).

regarded as separate ethnic groups. But some authorities now suggest that the differences between all three 'ethnic' groups result from social differentiation within the clan system, and not from the successive waves of immigration of different groups. The evidence from archaeological, linguistic, and comparative sources is inconclusive, and each group tends to believe the theory that suits its interests best. Although it will be hard to establish an objective version of history, endorsed by all ethnic groups, in the end it will be essential to work out a truly national and non-sectarian interpretation of Rwanda's past, if the current wounds of ethnic conflict are to be healed' (5).

Should one be so impartial in the face of a history that led to genocide, and resolve to 'let them find out by themselves'? Does not such a 'neutral' stance resemble the infamous 'hands-off' attitude that made the international community become guilty of not intervening when the genocide started? Erny proposes that the 1994 genocide especially the ease with which Hutu could be convinced of its necessity, the passion with which they engaged in it, and the vividness with which historic horrors could be invoked and 'heated up' in the face of a Tutsi attempt to 're-conquer' them - could be regarded as a kind of proof for the version that Hutu in fact were cruelly oppressed, and perhaps at some time in history brutally conquered by Tutsi.[111] And just before independence the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR), a royalist Tutsi party, could be said to deliver the proof herself, when it clearly states that the 'vulgar thoughts of ordinary persons' [Hutu] could not be valorised in the same way as the 'sharp judgement of a capable man' [Tutsi], and that democratic elections regrettably put a literate minority at the mercy of a majority without culture.[112]

What cannot be denied, in any case and independently of any discussion on roots, is that 'Rwanda was a complex and an advanced monarchy. The monarch ruled the country

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[111] Une chose est apparue clairement au moment des troubles au Rwanda: ce qui a compté de fait, ce n'était pas une quelconque verité historique, mais la représentation que l'on avait du Tutsi dans l'imaginaire du peuple. Si les propagandes ont eu un tel effet, si l'on a massacré avec une telle facilité, si les gens ont fui aussi massivement devant le FPR, c'est que tout le monde vivait plus ou moins intensément sur l'image ("d'Epinal") d'un Tutsi qui est l'ennemi séculaire, l'oppresseur, le tueur, telle que la véhicule, vraie ou fausse, la culture populaire. Et à force d'être enfermé dans une image on finit par s'y conformer et à répondre à l'attente générale... Le stéréotype s'était sans doute estompé dans la fraction instruite de la population qui ne ressentait plus le Tutsi comme une menace directe, et il fallait hautement se réjouir de cette évolution positive des mentalités. Mais après l'attaque de 1990 et surtout l'invasion de 1994, tout un passé resurgissait, fait de peur, de rancœur et de haine: le Tutsi redevenait l'envahisseur d'autrefois revenu asservir un peuple qui avait réussi a s'en libérer. C'est là qu'il faut chercher les causes profondes du massacre. Quand l'émotion prend le dessus, la rationalité s'effondre' (Erny, 1995, 34, 35).

[112] 'Bien que la societe rwandaise soit composée d'individus de valeur très inégale et qu'il n'est pas équitable d'accorder la même valeur a la pensée vulgaire de l'homme ordinaire qu'au jugement perspicace de l'homme capable..., bien que le suffrage universel aboutira infailliblement à l'asservissement de la minorité lettrée par la majorité inculte' (quoted in Erny, 1995, 54).

through his official representatives drawn from the Tutsi nobility. Thus, there emerged a highly sophisticated political culture which enabled the king to communicate with the people. Rwanda then, admittedly, had some eighteen clans defined primarily along lines of kinship. The terms Hutu and Tutsi were already in use but referred to individuals rather than to groups. In those days, the distinction between the Hutu and Tutsi was based on lineage rather than ethnicity. Indeed, the demarcation line was blurred: one could move from one status to another, as one became rich or poor, or even through marriage.' This is the way the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda describes the historic state of Rwanda in *The Jean Paul Akayesu Judgement* (http://www.un.org/ictr/english/judgements/akayesu.html).[113]

The International Tribunal, in its attempt to understand the background on which perpetrators of the genocide, such as Jean Paul Akayesu, committed their deeds, invited also scholars, for example Alison Des Forges,[114] a highly respected expert on Rwanda (see her very well researched Human Rights Watch report *Leave None to Tell the Story*, Des Forges & Human Rights Watch, 1999). The International Tribunal writes in *The Jean Paul Akayesu Judgement*: 'Both German and Belgian colonial authorities, if only at the outset as far as the latter are concerned, relied on an elite essentially composed of people who referred to themselves as Tutsi, a choice which, according to Dr. Alison Desforges, was born of racial or even racist considerations. In the minds of the colonizers, the Tutsi looked more like them, because of their height and colour, and were, therefore, more intelligent and better equipped to govern.'

Des Forges thus suggests that the 'Hamitic hypothesis' - meaning that the Tutsi were a superior, 'Caucasoid' race from North-Eastern Africa responsible for all signs of true civilisation in 'black' Africa[115] - was, partly at least, a mapping of racial or racist colonial views onto an essentially unknown African reality. And, certainly, there are facts that support her view. For a long period the colonialists favoured the Tutsi, and educated them to be leaders, even more, they fixed a reality that was much more fluid into 'hard' categories: 'In the early 1930s, Belgian authorities introduced a permanent distinction by dividing the

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[113] 'On September 2, 1998, the tribunal found Jean-Paul Akayesu, former burgomaster of Taba, guilty of nine of fifteen charges, including genocide, inciting to genocide, and rape. He was the first person to be convicted of genocide after trial by an international court. The verdict was also the first to recognize rape as a form of genocide' (Des Forges & Human Rights Watch, 1999, conclusion).

[114] I find this name being spelled in various ways, namely Des Forges, or Desforges. I will use Des Forges in my text, but leave Desforges in quotes.

[115] 'Tutsi have longer faces, their ladies are beautiful, they have long nails, they come from Arab countries, they are a mixture of Arab and white blood, therefore nearer to the whites than other Africans, they are almost relatives of the whites.'

population into three groups which they called ethnic groups, with the Hutu representing about 84% of the population, while the Tutsi (about 15%) and Twa (about 1%) accounted for the rest. In line with this division, it became mandatory for every Rwandan to carry an identity card mentioning his or her ethnicity. The Chamber notes that the reference to ethnic background on identity cards was maintained, even after Rwanda's independence and was, at last, abolished only after the tragic events the country experienced in 1994' (*The Jean Paul Akayesu Judgement*).

Perhaps the discussion concerning historical facts will be decided some day in the future. What is clear is that 'In the late 1800s Europeans arrived, and Roman Catholic clergy established missions. Rwanda and Burundi (known as Urundi) were incorporated into German East Africa. Belgium occupied the country during World War I (1914-1918), and after the war the area became known as the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi. After World War II (1939-1945), the Hutu began protesting the political and social inequalities in Rwanda. Antagonism between the Tutsi and Hutu erupted into violence, and in 1960 the Tutsi king fled the country, along with 200,000 of his people' (*Encarta Concise Encyclopedia*).

The encyclopaedia misses an interesting historic detail in its short ride through history: The Hutu were not alone in their uprising; they had part of the Belgian colonial powers behind them. 'The early leaders of the Catholic church in Rwanda such as Mgr Hirth or Mgr Classe had been upper-class men with rather conservative political ideas which were followed by the rest of the white clergy' (Prunier, 1995a, 44).

In parenthesis, let me make the suggestion that the *Bible*[116] might have helped these conservative colonial masters find an explanation from the Christian creed. The *Bible* recounts a story that could have been written by aristocratic masters who want to explain to their lowly farmers why they have to obey and not become 'arrogant': God (the aristocratic master) was furious with Adam, Eve and the serpent, - three offenders against his will and command, - and God humiliated them all. The serpent was made the most cursed of all beasts and forced to go about on its belly: 'dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life' (*Genesis* 3, 14). Eve was forced to accept the obedience of her husband: 'and he shall rule over thee' (*Genesis* 3, 16). She went with Adam as he was ejected from Paradise. By this act, humankind was removed permanently to a lower plane. Adam had enjoyed an easy hunter-gatherer existence in God's well-stocked heavenly fields. After expulsion he was forced to accept the back-

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[116] I thank Howard Adelman for pointing out to me how important a source the Bible may be for the subject of humiliation. He recommends, on 13th January 1997 in a personal message: 'Read Genesis 33:18-34:31, the story of the Simeon and Levi revenge for the rape of Dinah, to see how a cycle of humiliation is set off, beginning with desire and love, not hate.'

breaking toil of the farmer's life. Along with Eve, he was 'sent…forth from the Garden of Eden to till the ground from whence he was taken' (*Genesis* 3, 23). The *Bible* story has other implications also: What about Cain, the farmer, who kills Abel, the pastoralist and was punished terribly by God for that, condemned to become a fugitive and a vagabond, to be killed by anybody who could find him?[117]

Prunier continues his account of Belgian rule: 'But in the late 1930s and increasingly after the war, these men were replaced by clerics of humbler social origins, from the lower middle class or even the working class and increasingly Flemish rather than Walloon. They had no sympathy for the aristocratic Tutsi and identified more readily with the downtrodden Hutu. The combination of changes in white clerical sympathies, struggle for the control of the Rwandese church and increasing challenge of the colonial order by the Tutsi élite, all these combined to bring about a slow but momentous switch in the church's attitudes, from supporting the Tutsi élite to helping the Hutu rise from their subservient position towards a new aspiring middle-class situation' (Prunier, 1995a, 44).

The *Historical Dictionary of Rwanda* explains under the keyword 'Flemish': 'A language and group of people from Flanders, often discriminated against by the French-speaking Walloons of Belgium. Those who were members of the colonial service tended to be relegated to Rwanda, especially after 1940. Flemish administrators and young Catholic missionaries tended to have much more in common with and sympathy for the Hutu intellectuals and peasantry. Together, according to one well-placed source, they "took to their protégés, the Hutu leaders, more readily than to the Tutsi," and therefore may have been biased in their favour during the push for independence' (229).

Humiliated Flemish colonialists identify with humiliated Hutu. Many of my Tutsi interlocutors accuse Belgium of having sown the seeds for genocidal thinking at exactly this historic juncture. They accuse Belgians to have created conditions under which the latent resentment of the humiliated Hutu 'underdog' - or, as many Tutsi would claim, the non-existent Hutu resentment - could find expression in acts of counter-humiliation against the old ruling group, the Tutsi.

One man in particular, Guy Logiest, born in Gent (a Flemish region, his family was equally French and Flemish-speaking), and sent to Rwanda as a colonial officer to restore calm and order, brought about a turn-over, single-handedly, in one day. On the 17th November

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[117] R. M. Schwartz, 1997, wrote a book about The Curse of Cain: the Violent Legacy of Monotheism.

1959, judging that Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs were oppressors, he replaced them with Hutu.[118] In other words, one could correctly recount Great Lakes' sufferings from colonialism as colonialists initially enforcing a rigid hierarchy of 'worthy' Tutsi as opposed to 'unworthy' Hutu, only to reverse this situation later, after mysteriously having 'discovered' pity and mercy with the underdog.

Was this colonial 'pity and mercy with the underdog' authentic? Colonial sympathy for Hutu may have had more causes than just Flemish underdogs sympathising with Hutu underdogs. Also, the mapping of the master-slave cleavage among colonial masters onto the master-slave cleavage among their subordinates may include more shades. The Rwandan Embassy in Washington (Rwanda has been ruled by a Tutsi based government since the 1994 genocide) sees this sequence of Rwandan history more as a Belgian preference for malleable Hutu followers instead of proud and strong-willed Tutsi[119]: 'In 1935 the Belgian colonial administration introduced a discriminatory national identification on the basis of ethnicity. Banyarwanda who possessed ten or more cows were registered as Batutsi whereas those with less were registered as Bahutu. At first, the Belgian authorities, for political and practical reasons, favoured the king and his chiefs, who were mostly a Batutsi ruling elite.' Now comes the significant point: 'When the demand for independence began, mainly by a political party - Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) - formed by people from the mentioned ruling elite, the Belgian authorities hastily nurtured another party called PARMEHUTU that was founded on a sectarian ethnic ideology. Under the Belgian supervision, the first massacres of Batutsi at the hands of PARMEHUTU occurred in 1959. With Belgian connivance, PARMEHUTU abolished the monarchy amidst widespread violence.'

This account leads the reader staunchly to agree that Tutsi have a right to accuse Belgians of having supervised Tutsi humiliation and extermination already during colonial times, because Belgians found Hutu, already used to subjugation, more subservient to Belgian domination than Tutsi; in other words: Belgian masters tried to kill their rival Tutsi masters and benefited from the fact that the Tutsi had done the 'job' for them to 'teach' the Hutu how to obey.

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[118] 'Et dès le 17 novembre, ce pur néophyte en politique rwandaise, réunissant les administrateurs de territoire, décide d'assurer l'avenir en renversant d'un seul coup, brutalement, la politique traditionnelle menée par la Tutelle belge depuis les origines: à la place des chefs et des sous-chefs tutsi, il décide de nommer systematiquement, en masse, des Hutu' (Logiest, 1982, I, in the 'Préface du Professeur Stengers').

[119] http://www.rwandemb.org/info/geninfo.htm, retrieved 1998.

However, again, is this the whole truth? Perhaps some Belgians felt authentic sympathy with downtrodden Hutu? And perhaps the Hutu really did suffer? In March 1957 a group of nine Hutu intellectuals (containing two future Rwandese Presidents, Grégoire Kayibanda, and Juvenal Habyarimana) published a text called *Notes on the Social Aspect of the Racial Native Problem in Rwanda*, better known by the name *Bahutu Manifesto*: 'The problem is basically that of the political monopoly of one race [sic], the Mututsi. In the present circumstances, this political monopoly is turned into an economic and social monopoly…' (quoted in Prunier, 1995a, 45). Gérard Prunier writes (45): '…the reality they [the Hutu intellectuals] referred to, namely the humiliation and socio-economic inferiority of the Hutu community, could not be doubted.' At this point it becomes palpable that Hutu actually did feel humiliated.

In the preface to Logiest's book the reader feels that this is an account of Logiest's authentically felt deep repulsion against what he perceives as cruelty and perfidy on the part of many Tutsi chiefs, and especially of the king, who 'perpetrates torture in his own palace.' The preface explains how Logiest was upset by the intolerable oppression under which Hutu masses suffered, and how he won the friendship of intellectual Grégoire Kayibanda,[120] the Hutu leader.[121] Later in his book Logiest shares with the reader his joy in having fulfilled a historic mission in helping the downtrodden Hutu people. Kayibanda, the Hutu leader, thanks him 1963 in a farewell letter (Logiest is to leave for Congo):

'Dear Monsieur Logiest,

As your friend, my wishes accompany you, not only to Congo, but wherever duty may send you.

It is my conviction that God's providence has utilised you to save our country. Your arrival in Rwanda in November 1959 has marked the hour of the final liberation of the Rwandese masses.

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[120] 'Born in 1924, Kayibanda had been a seminarist at Nyakibanda, the main gateway to social improvement for the nascent Hutu counter-élite. After being a primary school teacher from 1948 till 1952, he became secretary of the Amitiés Belgo-Congolaises and chief editor of the Catholic periodical L'Ami (1952-6). When the agricultural cooperative TRAFIPRO was created in 1956, he was made its first chairman while at the same time becoming chief editor of Kinyamateka. Soon after he became the private secretary to Mgr Perraudin, the Swiss vicar apostolic of Rwanda' (Prunier, 1995a, 45).

[121] The preface explains that the reader will understand 'la répulsion qu'inspirent au Colonel Logiest la cruauté et la perfidie de nombre de chefs tutsi, et du Mwami en premier lieu, qui torture dans son propre palais, le sursaut qu'il a devant l'oppression que les Tutsi font peser sur la masse hutu, et dont il apprend les aspects intolérables, la sympathie que lui inspire la cause d'une masse écrasée et qui cherche à secouer le joug, la sympathie personnelle aussi qu'il éprouve pour le leader hutu Gregoire Kayibanda, qui deviendra son ami' (Logiest, 1982, III, in the 'Préface du Professeur Stengers').

You have contributed, fundamentally, to the success of the Hutu movement of which I was the leader. You will always be "The Friend of the Rwandese People."

However, your action carries further: it has proven, in a concrete way, that idealism is not just vain smoke, but an efficient force provided by God in the course of the world's history.

Could other people follow your example, not only in Africa, but also in those countries where riches are equalled by savagery, where technological progress is equalled by fundamental errors, because a number of their leaders have not understood the primordial significance of Love.

Your righteous conduct will serve as an example for generations to come.

Your friend,

(signed) Gr. Kayibanda.'[122]

This is the riddle of Rwanda: Here are those who are educated at colonial catholic seminars, those who rise from oppression and speak about love, Love with a capital L, and about God; some of them will later become 'genocidaires,' those who perpetrate genocide.

On 1st July 1962 Belgium granted formal political independence to Rwanda. The Rwandese Embassy, part of today's government since 1994 that is largely perceived as Tutsi-directed, fails to notice any 'Love' originating from Kayibanda, and does not share Logiest's empathy for Hutu sufferings. It pinpoints the opposite, namely Tutsi torment at Hutu hands when it describes Rwandese history as it unfolded from independence onwards[123]: 'The first republic under President Grégoire Kayibanda institutionalised discrimination against Batutsi and periodically used massacres against this targeted population as a means of maintaining the status quo. Some Rwandese groups in the diaspora attempted, without success, to stage a

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[122] Translated by the author from Logiest, 1982, 210, 211:
'Cher Monsieur Logiest,
En tant qu'ami, mes vœux vous accompagnent, non seulement au Congo, mais là aussi où le devoir vous enverra.
Ma conviction est que la Providence de Dieu a utilisé votre caractère pour sauver notre pays.
Votre arrivée au Rwanda en novembre 1959 a sonné l'heure de la libération définitive des masses rwandaises.
Vous avez contribué essentiellement à la réussite du Mouvement hutu dont j'etais le leader. Vous restez « l'Ami du Peuple Rwandais ».
Mais votre action porte plus loin: elle a prouvé concrètement que l'idéalisme n'est pas une vaine fumée mais une force efficace prévue par Dieu dans la marche de l'Histoire du monde.
Puissiez-vous avoir des imitateurs non seulement en Afrique, mais aussi dans ces pays dont la richesse égale la sauvagerie, dont les progrès techniques égalent les erreurs fondamentales, parce que bon nombre de leurs leaders n'ont pas vu la primauté de l'Amour.
Votre conduite droite servira d'example aux générations qui nous suivent.
Votre ami,
(signé) Gr. Kayibanda.'
[123] http://www.rwandemb.org/info/geninfo.htm.

comeback through armed means. In 1965 Rwanda was declared a one-party state under MDR/PARMEHUTU, which is the architect of the racist ideology which was to be consolidated in the second republic under President Major General Juvenal Habyarimana. In 1973 the late President Kayibanda was deposed in a coup d'etat that brought Major General Habyarimana to power. Subsequently, the first President and many prominent politicians of the first republic were killed. More Batutsi were killed.'

Readers who are confronted with this text are appalled and may decide once and for all who are the 'bad guys,' - and this paragraph suggests that the Hutu regime was 'bad,' and the direct opposite of 'Love.'

The same report on Rwandese history continues: 'In 1975 President Habyarimana formed the Mouvement Revolutionaire Nationale pour le Developpement (MRND), a single ruling party that was to promulgate, in 1978, a sham constitution that repeatedly returned him to office by organising "elections" in which he was the sole candidate. Both the first and second republics repeatedly stated that Rwanda was a small overpopulated country that could not accommodate Rwandese refugees if they were to return. Increasingly, the population across the ethnic lines was marginalised and impoverished while Habyarimana's regime became more violently intolerant.'

So, President Habyarimana obviously was a despot. Or perhaps not? Many described him to me as a moderate man. Habyarimana 'instituted a more moderate stand on the issue of Hutu-Tutsi relations than had been the case under the previous administration' (Dorsey, 1994, 246). Erny describes him as a man of evident charisma, moderate and reasonable (homme doté d'un charisme évident, modéré et raisonnable, Erny, 1995, 19). Erny asks suspiciously who actually made it impossible for him to control his rather extremist entourage.[124] Many explained to me (January 1999 in Kigali) how under Habyarimana there was the 'équilibre ethnique' which meant that 9% of all positions in the government, or places in school were reserved for Tutsi, 90% for Hutu, and 1 % for Twa. (I was told that this meant that only the best Tutsi were selected, and at university level more Tutsi made it than Hutu, because they were 'better,' a fact that sometimes humiliated Hutu colleagues.)

Many publications try to capture the last years leading up to the 1994 genocide, a genocide that was thoroughly planned and set in motion at the day of President Habyarimana's death in a airplane accident, an accident that is unexplained even today:

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[124] 'Comment cet homme doté d'un charisme évident, modéré et raisonnable qu'etait le général Habyarimana en est-il arrive à ne plus contrôler un entourage trouble et les dérives extraordinairement dangereuses qui avaient pour point de départ le palais de la présidence? (Erny, 1995, 19).

On 3rd March 1999 I met Lisbet Palme who is member of the 'International Panel of Eminent Personalities, appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity to investigate the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the surrounding events' at the opening session of the Panel, together with Folke Löfgren, Swedish Ambassador in Switzerland. On 8th September 2000 Folke Löfgren informed me that the report was finished and to be found on the Internet, www.oau-oua.org. The Panel writes in the covering letter, 29th May 2000: 'We also understand that not all truths are welcome to everyone with an interest in Rwanda. Many people have strikingly different interpretations of the genocide, views they hold with great passion. For our part, we have pursued the evidence wherever it took us, without bias or prejudice. We were rigorous in our research and scrupulous in our analyses and findings, and we stand firmly by our conclusions. But we have no doubt our views will not please everyone.' This letter may serve as an introduction into yet another passionately disputed chapter of Rwandan history.

Gérard Prunier points to economic reasons for the genocide, contained in a larger global context. He claims that 'the whole system went wrong for reasons which at first were economic and then turned politico-cultural' (Prunier, 1995a, 350). He proposes that 'Rwanda's slide from relative heaven to absolute hell is a perfect textbook illustration of the theory of dependence. The Third World in general, and Africa in particular, might have been in the past victims of what Pierre Jalée and Samir Amin called "looting". But this is definitely no longer the case. In Africa today it is infinitely more profitable for Europeans to loot the UN or bilateral aid than an African peasantry that owns little that can be looted anyway. But far from making the situation any better, it makes it worse. Because there is nothing of interest left to loot in Africa except aid contracts, Europeans have lost interest in the intrinsic workings of the African economies... They have been left to stagnate in a kind of postcolonial aftermath, producing increasingly useless products which compete savagely on the world markets with the same commodities turned out more efficiently in Asia' (350).

Prunier continues his ruthless report: 'In the case of Rwanda, the free fall of world coffee prices in the late 1980s corresponded with the political disintegration of the regime. The murder of Colonel Mayuya can even be said to mark a sort of official beginning. The elite… had been kept reasonably satisfied with the proceeds of coffee, foreign aid, tin and tea, roughly in that order. By 1989 coffee and tin prices were both near to total collapse, and foreign aid was shrinking. The elite started tearing each other apart to get at the shrinking spoils' (350). Prunier does not forget to address the fact that women also had lust for power, as had Siad Barre's wives in Somalia: 'Mme Habyarimana, nicknamed "Kanjogera" in

memory of the murderous nineteenth-century *Nyina Yuhi*, emerged at the top of the heap as the best player; she was the true mistress of the country, not her big *umugabo* of a husband' (350, 351, italicisation in original).

Des Forges describes the period just before the genocide: 'President Juvenal Habyarimana, nearing the end of two decades in power, was losing popularity among Rwandans when the RPF attacked from Uganda on October 1, 1990. At first Habyarimana did not see the rebels as a serious threat, although they stated their intention to remove him as well as to make possible the return of the hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees who had lived in exile for a generation. The president and his close colleagues decided, however, to exaggerate the RPF threat as a way to pull dissident Hutu back to his side and they began portraying Tutsi inside Rwanda as RPF collaborators. For three and a half years, this elite worked to redefine the population of Rwanda as "Rwandans," meaning those who backed the president, and the "ibyitso" or "accomplices of the enemy," meaning the Tutsi minority and Hutu opposed to him' (Des Forges & Human Rights Watch, 1999, Introduction, Genocide).

Des Forges continues: 'In the campaign to create hatred and fear of the Tutsi, the Habyarimana circle played upon memories of past domination by the minority and on the legacy of the revolution that overthrew their rule and drove many into exile in 1959. Singling out most Tutsi was easy: the law required that all Rwandans be registered according to ethnic group. Residents of the countryside, where most Rwandans lived, generally knew who was Tutsi even without such documentation. In addition, many Tutsi were recognizable from their physical appearance.'

However, and this is an important point, '… shattering bonds between Hutu and Tutsi was not easy. For centuries they had shared a single language, a common history, the same ideas and cultural practices. They lived next to one another, attended the same schools and churches, worked in the same offices, and drank in the same bars. A considerable number of Rwandans were of mixed parentage, the offspring of Hutu-Tutsi marriages. In addition, to make ethnic identity the predominant issue, Habyarimana and his supporters had to erase - or at least reduce - distinctions within the ranks of the Hutu themselves, especially those between people of the northwest and of other regions, those between adherents of different political factions, and those between the rich and the poor' (Des Forges & Human Rights Watch, 1999, Introduction, Genocide).

When the genocide started, it was not, as naïve media reports suggested, an outburst of popular fury, but a bureaucratically organised campaign directed by the Hutu government. Michael Chege excellently describes the academic input into the planning of the genocide in

his article 'Africa's Murderous Professors' (Chege, 1997). And it was not only a well-planned genocide, but also a genocide 'according to the book': Alain Destexhe is the former Secretary General of *Médecins sans Frontières* and author of *Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century* (Destexhe, 1995). He reckons that the massacre of the Tutsi in Rwanda is the first incontestable case of genocide since 1945. 'Yet the term has been frequently used by the media to emphasise the horror of many of the world's mass killings: from Cambodia and East Timor to Somalia and Bosnia' (Destexhe, 1995, introduction). Destexhe urges to limit the term to situations 'where it is clearly applicable under the terms of the UN Convention on Genocide, we are detracting from the gravity of the offence. Setting the study in its historical context by analysing the Armenian and Jewish genocides, Destexhe concludes that a failure to grasp the reality of the situation in Rwanda undoubtedly explains the failure of the international community to take adequate action' (Destexhe, 1995, introduction).

The *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1948 and came into force on January 12, 1951. According to article II 'genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Genocide is 'massive category killing by direct / structural violence plus legitimacy from cultural violence. Genocide is *direct violence* that kills quickly, *structural violence* kills slowly, and *cultural violence* provides the justifications (traditionally the clergy does the cultural violence, the merchants the structural violence and the aristocrats the direct violence).' This is the analysis of peace researcher Johan Galtung (at the Conference of Higher Education for Peace, 4th – 6th May 2000 in Tromsø, North Norway).

Instead of enumerating horrific statistics to introduce the genocide here, I would like to give the reader the opportunity to get a feeling for the situation by presenting the account of a young boy, Jean-Hubert, with Hutu background, who was in danger because his mother was a human rights activist:

'I arrived in Montreal in July 1994 after a long and difficult journey from Rwanda. I am nineteen years old. When the genocide started in April 1994, I lived with my mother, my younger brother William, and my sister Sylvie in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. My father had died long before the war. To avoid trouble we hid in our house. Through the windows we could see people being killed or running to escape. We heard many cries of pain. Soldiers and militia trained by the government carried lists of people to kill. My mother called people she knew in Kigali. They told her that killing was going on throughout the city. The National Radio was being run by extremist elements of a new government. It was encouraging the population to "look for the enemy." "Enemy" meant the Tutsi, members of the political opposition, and all those who had criticized the regime of President Habyarimana.

We knew that we were in danger because my mother was a well-known human rights activist. Human rights activists and journalists were two groups of people who were massacred in the first hours of the killing. The fact that there had been a murder attempt on our mother in 1993 made us extremely nervous. We thought we would all die. We sat in the house waiting and getting as much information as we could' (Twagilmana, 1997, 35, 37).

Hubert reports that through connections in Kigali, his mother arranged to send her children to an aunt in Save, near the southern city of Butare, the second-largest city in Rwanda, the university city, and also the city that initially did not join in to the genocide, but had to be coerced into participating, through the murder of opposing persons and their replacement by extremists especially brought from the capital. Hubert: 'My mother could not go. She was well-known and would be recognized at the numerous roadblocks inside Kigali and between Kigali and Butare. She said she was ready to die alone, but could not bear to be killed with her children. So it was with much pain that we left her alone in the house and ventured through the city. With our identity cards that showed that we were Hutu, we passed the roadblocks without a problem. Roadblocks, as everybody knew, were established not really to check people's identities but to check which ethnic groups they belonged to. All those whose cards showed that they were Tutsi were killed on the spot, beaten, or stabbed with machetes. We saw many dead bodies at the various roadblocks' (37, 38).

Although the region surrounding Butare resisted the call to kill and remained relatively calm for two weeks, the killing started there too. Hubert: 'we hid in our aunt's house. We were saved because she had a watchman. But the threat to kill us increased when my aunt hid a Tutsi. People said that he used to brag about a Tutsi victory. My aunt had hidden him in the ceiling. It was a very tiny and dark space, but he had no choice. The killers somehow got word that he was at my aunt's house. They eventually forced the door open and killed him.

We thought we would be killed, too. We had hidden a person they called an enemy, thus we were friends of the enemy. We were saved at the last minute by a soldier who had been a friend of my father in the army. Otherwise our tears and pleas would not have saved us. I will never forget the cruelty with which the Tutsi was killed, despite his pleas for mercy. We felt helpless because there was nothing we could do to save him' (38).

Hubert's mother managed to flee to Canada. From there 'she arranged for us to join her with the help of Rwandan and Burundian friends. First we were taken to Burundi, where we stayed for a short time. From there we flew to Kenya and then to France. Since we did not have Canadian immigration papers, the police at the airport in Paris did not allow us to board the plane. William, Sylvie, and I were quite upset. This was our first time ever out of Rwanda, and we did not know about immigration requirements. We assumed that because our mother was already in Canada, we would also be able to go there. Eventually, the airport authorities received a message from the Canadian ministry of foreign affairs allowing us to enter Canada. We later found out that our mother had obtained help from people in Ottawa' (39).

This was Hubert, a Hutu, who 'will never forget the many neighbors killed, the numerous corpses on the roadblocks, the Tutsi killed at my aunt's house, and the innocent children murdered without even knowing why. I felt sad at being unable to do anything. I knew that it was terribly wrong for innocent people to be killed.'

Father Vito Misuraca, born in Catania, Italy 1950, had consecrated his life to the service of Africa, and of Rwanda in particular. In his diary he makes the following notes for the 23rd April 1994: '6 o'clock p.m. Claudine Nyiraneza, a seven year old girl, arrives at the Nyanza orphanage. She has walked for about 30 kms or maybe more, her right foot has been injured after been hit by a machete, she leans on a stick. Her family has been killed, and she hasn't been eating for days. We hope that others will be able to make it here, as she has, thus escaping the massacre. We put her up as well as possible, we feed her a little, and we give her some medical treatment. Her slash is very bad, but it will heal. She is terrified. Maybe she will tell us her story tomorrow' (Misuraca, 1995, 46).

During my stay in Rwanda and Burundi in 1999 I was presented with very many horror stories of this kind, often several each day. For example: A young Tutsi, I choose to call him Charles, was in Kigali during the genocide in 1994. A Hutu friend of his hid him in his house. Whenever Hutu militia came to search the house for Tutsi, Charles got into a hole that was dug in a rubbish heap in the garden. There he stood, only his nose poking out, covered by a plastic sheet, for hours, until the soldiers went away. This went on for weeks. During this whole time his Hutu friend had to participate in the Tutsi killing outside in the

streets, in order not to be killed himself; and his Hutu friend was telling everybody, that Charles was dead, in order to protect him. Even Charles's family believed that he was dead, until only a few days before they themselves where killed. His grandmother was already old, almost 90, and weak. She was locked into a room with a hungry dog, which ate her.

The gruesome stories that were related to me did not end, of grandmothers forced to parade naked in the street before being killed, of people systematically cut up, starting with their legs - the tall 'arrogant' Tutsi were thus 'shortened' and literally humiliated - or of Tutsi paying for bullets to be shot instead of being mutilated to death. 'There had not been enough guns to go around, and in any case bullets were deemed too expensive for the likes of Tutsis: the ubiquitous flat-bladed machetes (pangas), or any farm or kitchen implement, would do the job just as well. Thus the Rwandan tragedy became one of the few genocides in our century to be accomplished almost entirely without firearms. Indeed, it took many strong and eager arms to carry out the strenuous work of raping, burning, and hacking to death a half-million people (and mutilating many thousands more by slicing off their hands, their breasts, their genitals, or their ears) with pangas, kitchen knives, farm hoes, pitchforks, and hastily improvised spiked clubs' writes Elliott Leyton in his report on *Médecins sans Frontières* Leyton, 2000, 3).

I saw many scars on the bodies of survivors, caused by machetes; I was accustomed, through my medical training, to notice scars on other people's bodies, and I was used to assuming that they were caused by accidents; the fact that it is much more likely that they stem from genocidal killings was new to me.

Psychological scars, though equally present, were less visible. Apart from a strange rigid emptiness, a kind of frozen sadness on many faces, nothing in Kigali 1999 betrayed that it had been the scene of atrocities a short time ago. Even close friends would not talk to each other about their nightmares. Rape, especially, had been employed as part of the genocide, and women told me that they would only realise that their closest friend had been raped, when she asked to be accompanied to take a HIV test. 'In attacks on Tutsi before 1994, women and children were generally spared, but during the genocide - particularly in its later stages - all Tutsi were targeted, regardless of sex or age. Especially after mid-May 1994, the leaders of the genocide called on killers not to spare women and children. The widespread incidence of rape accompanied this increase in overall violence against groups previously immune from attack. "Rape was a strategy," said Bernadette Muhimakazi, a Rwandan women's rights activist. "They chose to rape. There were no mistakes. During this genocide, everything was organized. Traditionally it is not the custom to kill women and children, but this was done

everywhere too"… Other Rwandans characterized the choice of violence against women in the following ways: "It was the humiliation of women;" or "It was the disfigurement of women, to make them undesirable;" or, "Women's worth was not respected."' (Human Rights Watch, 1996, 41).

The United Nations and the humanitarian aid organisations failed to prevent or at least halt the genocide, holding to a post-Somalia hands-off policy. 'A January 11, 1994 telegram from General Roméo Dallaire, commander of the U.N. peacekeeping force, to his superiors was only one, if now the most famous, warning of massive slaughter being prepared in Rwanda' (Des Forges & Human Rights Watch, 1999, Introduction). But Dallaire did not get help.

In *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families* (Gourevitch, 1998) Philip Gourevitch sharply criticises the lack of UN responsiveness to the signs of looming danger and cries for support. He reports General Roméo Dallaire's appearance on Canadian television, 1997, where Dallaire professes: 'I haven't even started my real mourning of the apathy and the absolute detachment of the international community, and particularly of the Western world, from the plight of Rwandans. Because, fundamentally, to be very candid and soldierly, who the hell cared about Rwanda? ... How much is really being done to solve the Rwandan problem? Who is grieving for Rwanda and really living it and living with the consequences?'

In the chapter 'April 1994: "The Month That Would Not End"' in *Leave None to Tell the Story* (Des Forges & Human Rights Watch, 1999) the situation is described that in April 1994 led to the death of Belgian peacekeepers: 'Rwandan soldiers took the fifteen UNAMIR peacekeepers prisoner and, at about 9 a.m., delivered them to the Kigali military camp, only a few hundred meters from the prime minister's residence. There the five Ghanaian peacekeepers in the group were led away to safety and the ten Belgians were left at the hands of a furious crowd of soldiers, including a number who had been wounded in the war. The Rwandan soldiers had been prepared to hate the Belgian troops by months of RTLM broadcasts and believed the rumor - spread by their officers and later broadcast by RTLM - that the Belgians had helped the RPF shoot down Habyarimana's plane. They set upon the Belgian peacekeepers and battered most of them to death. The surviving Belgians took refuge in a small building near the entrance to the camp. They killed a Rwandan soldier and got hold of his weapon. Using that, they fought off the attackers for several more hours.'

Almost all foreigners fled from Rwanda ('re-formed' elsewhere), in a hurry, leaving behind to be slaughtered all those they were supposed to protect. However, Dallaire writes: 'It

should also be noted that, unlike most of the other international organisations and foreign nationals, a small UN civilian humanitarian cell and the magnificent and courageous ICRC stayed in Rwanda. The remainder of the NGOs reformed and operated from Nairobi, with advance stations in either Bujumbura and/or Kabale, Uganda. The problem with these moves, and with Nairobi in particular, was that the coordinating staffs were too distant and too limited in experience (with the exception of some distinguished individuals) to be able to coordinate all of the NGOs and UN Agencies in any coherent planning process' (Dallaire, in Whitman, 1996, 210). I had the opportunity to talk to one of those courageous individuals.

In May 1994, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali admitted that the international community had failed the people of Rwanda in not halting the genocide. '>From that time through 1998, when U.S. President Bill Clinton apologized for not having responded to Rwandan cries for help and Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed regret in vaguer terms, various world leaders have acknowledged responsibility for their failure to intervene in the slaughter. The archbishop of Canterbury has apologized on behalf of the Anglican Church and the pope has called for clergy who are guilty to have the courage to face the consequences of their crimes' (Des Forges & Human Rights Watch, 1999, Conclusion).

The end of the 1994 genocide is quite well known. 'Rwanda Background'[125] reports: 'The Tutsi rebels defeated the Hutu regime and ended the genocide in July 1994, but approximately 2 million Hutu refugees - many fearing Tutsi retribution - fled to neighboring Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire, now called the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC). According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, in 1996 and early 1997 nearly 1.3 million Hutu returned to Rwanda. Even with substantial international aid, these civil dislocations have hindered efforts to foster reconciliation and to boost investment and agricultural output. Although much of the country is now at peace, members of the former regime continue to destabilize the northwest area of the country through a low-intensity insurgency. Rwandan troops are currently involved in a crisis engulfing neighboring DROC.'

In the meantime, the victorious Tutsi diaspora 'seized control of Rwanda's government and claimed it wished to create a remodelled non-racist state,' says Elliott Leyton, 2000, 17.[126] The man in power in Rwanda is Major Kagame, a former Tutsi refugee

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[125] http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rw.html, retrieved 1999.
[126] A Swiss embassy employee in Kigali informed me in January 1999 that many people are leaving Rwanda again: 'They came after the genocide, with hopes, and now they leave again. A doctor gets circa 200 US Dollars as salary at a state hospital; the Swiss embassy paid a returnee doctor married to

who lived in Uganda. When I saw him at a meeting at the parliament in Kigali where a government reshuffle was presented (9th February 1999), I was surprised to see a tiny frail young man, almost nothing but controlled tense energy. 'As a refugee in Uganda, he became head of the Uganda National Revolutionary Army's military intelligence from November 1989 to June 1990. He also spent seven years fighting guerrilla campaigns with Yoweri Museveni, the president of Uganda. Major Kagame is considered to be a brilliant military strategist and was enrolled in the United States Army Command and General Staff College at Leavenworth, Kansas, to learn how to become a general when the October invasion of Rwanda began. As chairman of the high command, Major Kagame established his base of operations in the heavily forested Virunga Mountains in northwest Rwanda. He has reportedly rebuilt the RPF from a ragtag band of 2,000 men to a 15,000 efficient guerrilla army' (Dorsey, 1994, 267).

Very recently, Africa News Online distributed the news (24th March 2000) that Rwanda's Hutu President Pasteur Bizimungu, in power for almost five years since the genocide of 1994, had resigned: 'As of today, March 23, 2000, for personal reasons, I give up my duties as the president of the Rwandan Republic,' Bizimungu said in a letter to the speaker of parliament and to political parties (New Vision, 2000). The article explains further: 'Bizimungu, a member of Rwanda's majority Hutu ethnic group, was installed as head of state in July 1994 after the mainly Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), now the dominant political party in Rwanda, routed Hutu soldiers and militias held responsible for the genocide. The development comes in the wake of internal RPF rows over the formation of a new government which was announced on Monday. The president had threatened to resign if these internal squabbles were not resolved. Bizimungu has on several occasions crossed swords with Vice-President and Defence Minister Paul Kagame, who led the RPF as a rebel force and is a more powerful actor on the Rwandan political stage.'

Rwanda is currently attempting to consolidate and build a 'good image': 'Rwandan President Paul Kagame on Monday said insecurity was not a problem in the country after he visited the eastern prefecture of Kibungo from where thousands of refugees have crossed into neighbouring Tanzania. They fled, citing instances of "mysterious disappearances and deaths". The Rwandan leader blamed "rumours being spread by genocide perpetrators to create confusion". He urged local leaders to ignore the "rumours" and "protect the good image of Rwanda."' (IRIN, 22nd August 2000).

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a French lady 8000 Dollars in addition for staying here. Now he is without job and might return to France.'

Or, 'The Rwandan government has appealed for international help to secure the return of an estimated 30,000 children who were flown out of the country during the 1994 genocide. Some of the children taken by charity organisations have since been adopted in European countries such as Italy, Belgium and France, as well as neighbouring African countries. "The issue of children that left the country during the bad days of the 1994 genocide needs to be sorted out," the minister of state for social affairs, Odette Nyiramirimo, told IRIN. "These children were adopted in foreign countries under unclear circumstances. Some of them have parents who want to know their whereabouts. In case of adoption, the laws of this country demand that the parents and government be involved."' (IRIN, 12th -18th August 2000).

Clearly, the situation in Rwanda is part of a greater contestation for control between the francophone and anglophone world: 'In Uganda and Rwanda, the U.S. remained close to President Museveni and Vice-President Kagame and muted public criticism of their actions. Although the U.S. continued to claim that they did not have much leverage, especially with Rwanda, it seemed clear to outside observers that the U.S. was the most important foreign power in that country. The U.S. could have used its influence to press for human rights improvements and specifically for restraint on the part of what seemed to be an increasingly erratic and adventurous government. Not surprisingly, its close identification with Rwandan and Ugandan governments led to substantial criticism of Washington among African leaders, especially those who were allied with Kabila, overtly and covertly' (Human Rights Watch Report, 1999).

France figured prominently in all my conversations on the genocide, as being a supporter of it. Repeatedly, it was hinted at me that French military advisors taught how the Achilles tendon must be cut if a victim is to be prevented from running away. On many occasions I had to confirm that, although I spoke French, I was not a French national; otherwise I would not have been welcome. Many asked me this question before even opening the conversation with me; in other words, they would not talk to me if I were French. And clearly, the dispute about French involvement is still touchy, even after many years. From the newsroom of the BBC World Service we hear (7th April 1998): 'A former French minister says France continued to supply arms to the Rwandan government after the start of the genocide - but only for a few days. Bernard Debre - who was a minister for cooperation at the time - said the French government was not aware of the genocide. French press reports had said France continued to send arms to the Hutu-led army for up to a month after the beginning of the massacres. Mr Debre also rejected reports that a French missile was used to shoot down

the plane carrying the former Rwandan and Burundian presidents, whose deaths are widely believed to have triggered the genocide.'

Clearly, the generalisation that 'all French' are guilty is wrong. It was precisely a French interlocutor who experienced the onset of the genocide from within official organisations (and who does not want to be named), who reported to me 'off the record' (1999 in Kigali): 'The French parliamentarian commission to examine the French involvement in the genocide was in Kigali, and the government wanted me to talk to these people. Many times an attempt was made during an evening of an official dinner. After a long time (first there was a meeting with journalists, then dinner, then....) I was asked about what I thought about Opération Turquoise.[127] I said that it came too late, when the genocide was already almost over. The French delegation got very angry and criticised me: How could I put doubt on an operation that saved so many people...! I did not say anything anymore and was angry that I had lost a whole evening, only to be criticised and not listened to.'

The African Rights report, and the African Rights co-directors Rakiya Omar and Alex de Waal are suspicious of French motives for Opération Turquoise: 'The French intervention appears to have been launched for a range of motives, including playing to the domestic humanitarian constituency and reassuring francophone African leaders that France would remain loyal. The worst potential result of the intervention was the strengthening of the extremists in power. That was fortunately averted as a result of the outright military victory of the RPF shortly after French troops arrived. Operation Turquoise brought some modest benefits, but also considerable solace to the killers. The manner in which the operation was decided upon and launched casts the gravest doubts on the integrity of the U.N.' (Rakiya, De Waal, & African Rights, 1995, xxxi).

As a response to French involvement, Rwanda is to replace French with English as its official language. 'President Bizimungu said the reason for the change was due to France's involvement in the 1994 genocide, the weekly "The East-African" reported. "If you followed the recent report of investigations from the French Parliament, it is clearly indicated that France has been involved in the genocide in Rwanda and in the events which proceeded the

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[127] 'On the ground in Kigali on April 6th when the genocide commenced were UN peacekeeping troops serving under the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). These were first reduced in number by Security Council action --and then, well after the genocide had run its course, augmented later in the year. Soon joining the action in two separate stand-alone initiatives of two months' duration each were French soldiers in Operation Turquoise in June and U.S. troops in Operation Support Hope in July. Responding to the deteriorating situation in the latter half of the year was a third configuration of forces: national contingents deployed to the region in support of, and at the request of, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)' (Minear, 2000).

massacres, because they wanted to 'defend their own language'," Bizimungu was quoted as saying' (IRIN, 22nd January 1999).

Up to now this historic introduction to the Great Lakes region has mainly concentrated on Rwanda. Burundi is both similar and different to Rwanda. Or, as Jean-Pierre Chrétien argues, 'the fate of the two countries [has been] parallel, as in a game of mirrors in which each reflects the fantasies of the other' (Chrétien, 1996, abstract). Clearly, this view is too simplistic, and contested, but may serve as an entry point.

The genocide provides a gruesome connection between Burundi and Rwanda: 'Among the killers who have inspired the greatest fear in Rwanda have been refugees from Burundi. Their reputation for brutality became so widespread in several regions that militias would use the threat of taking victims to the Burundi refugees, with comments like "Of course there will be nothing left you if they get their hands on you." Some of the people we interviewed were visibly shaking when they spoke of the cruelty of some of the refugees from Burundi. Villagers who were under official pressure to kill their neighbours sometimes looked for Burundi refugees to "do the job."' (Rakiya, De Waal, & African Rights, 1995, 63).

The African Rights report continues: 'The arming and training of militiamen among the refugees was well-attested in 1993. The Kigali office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees formally protested in a letter in November, 18 in which it pointed out that training refugees in military activities was contrary to Article 3 of the OAU convention on refugees, and requested an end to this practice. Needless to say, the protest had no effect' (64).

Incidentally, neighbouring Zaire was not unaffected. Hutu extremist propaganda at the border crossing from Cyangugu to Bukavu says: 'Attention Zaireans and Bantu people! The Tutsi assassins are out to exterminate us. For centuries the ungrateful and unmerciful Tutsi have used their powers, daughters and corruption to subject the Bantu. But we know the Tutsi, that race of vipers, drinkers of untrue blood. We will never allow them to fulfil their dreams in Kivuland' (The African Rights report finds this information in Crawford, 1994).

'Rwandan President Paul Kagame, in an interview with Reuters, on Wednesday defended his country's occupation of neighbouring Congo saying it was to guard against a repeat of the 1994 genocide. The Rwandan leader said Hutu militia and former Rwandan government soldiers, who fled to Congo when Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) came to power and ended the killings were now fighting alongside Kabila's army' (IRIN, 7th September 2000).

Like Rwanda, Burundi is part of the hilly mountain region of the Great Lakes; it is as tiny a country as Rwanda, about as populated and fertile; and it has historically been ruled by kings drawn from a Tutsi elite, who dominated Hutu underlings. However, one significant difference between Rwanda and Burundi is the fact that in Burundi a Hutu revolution never occurred; the 'slave' never became the 'master' so-to-speak, meaning that Burundi traditional power structures stayed much more untouched after independence than in Rwanda.

Both countries are similar insofar as they have experienced more or less widespread genocidal killings after independence. 'Nowhere else in Africa has so much violence killed so many people on so many occasions in so small a space as in Burundi during the years following independence. Since 1965, when thousands perished in what turned out to be only the premonitory sign of even greater horrors, Burundi society has been torn by ethnic conflicts of unprecedented scale in the country's history. The 1972 bloodbath took the lives of an estimated one hundred thousand - some say two hundred thousand - in what must be seen as one of the most appalling human rights violations in the annals of post-independence Africa. Informed estimates suggest that as many as twenty thousand may have been killed by government troops in 1988 and another three thousand in 1991. Seldom have human rights been violated on a more massive scale, and with more brutal consistency, anywhere else on the continent. Whether the demons of regionalism and ethnicity can be exorcised long enough for democracy to put down roots remains an open question' (Lemarchand, 1994a, xi).

The above-mentioned Michel Micômbéro (1940-1983), Burundi military and political leader, Prime Minister in 1966, and President of the country from 1966 to 1976, ruthlessly crushed a revolt against his government by Hutu in 1972: 'Hundreds of thousands of Hutu were killed, including many of the educated Hutu elite, and many sought refuge in Rwanda and neighboring countries. Between 80,000 and 200,000 Hutu and Tutsi died in the disturbances, and about 100,000 Hutu sought refuge abroad, mainly in Tanzania. In November 1976, Micômbéro's army chief of staff, Jean-Baptist Bagaza, overthrew him in a non-violent coup' (Dorsey, 1994, 295).

As reported above, Micômbéro represents an interesting link both to Somalia and to Hitler. Micômbéro was exiled to Mogadishu, Somalia, after having been overthrown. He was welcomed by Somali dictator Siad Barre, and died in Somalia in 1983 (Marc Minani reports that his death in 1983 was suspect[128] Minani, 1992, 168). And, 'All civilians, military and religious representatives, men and women, the old and the young, all adopted the Nazi "Heil

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[128] 'Micômbéro passa trois mois en résidence surveillée à Ngozi avant d'être exilé à Mogadiscio, en Somalie, où il mourut en 1983 d'une mort que certains trouvent suspecte' (Minani, 1992, 168).

Hitler" in the following way: "Gira amahoro!" which has to be answered with: "Na Micômbéro yayaduhaye!" ("Peace be upon you!" "With us also Micômbéro, whom we have to thank for this peace!"). Even the widows and orphans, victims of the regime Micômbéro have to salute in this way and have to respond with this provocating slogan.'[129]

'Heil Micômbéro,' does link up to Hitler and the Holocaust, and this is exactly the mapping done by many Hutu, that Lemarchand questions: 'For many Hutu, the "Simbananiye Plan" provides irrefutable evidence of the extraordinary combination of cunning and perversity that lies behind the physical liquidation of hundreds of thousands of Hutu civilians in the spring and summer of 1972. Like most conspiracy theories, this one reduces an inherently complex and tragic sequence of events to the logic of a master plot. At the heart of the "Simbananiye Plan," we are told, lay one single overriding objective: to kill enough Hutu to achieve ethnic parity in the countryside. The master plotter behind this diabolical plan was Artemon Simbananiye, at the time minister of foreign affairs in the Micômbéro government.'

However, René Lemarchand calls for caution when making comparisons with Hitler. Conspiracy theories characterise oppressed communities anywhere in the world and are especially widespread in Africa. Lemarchand states: 'Note, for example, the extent to which conspiracy theories have penetrated the cognitive map of African-Americans. In the words of one journalist, "Many blacks live with the fear of being killed or physically harmed by whites. They often use the word "conspiracy." There is, some believe, a final solution for blacks like the one Adolf Hitler invented for Jews - a genocidal scheme to inflict [sic] blacks with AIDS, drug addiction, crime, poverty, welfare dependence and scant education' (Lemarchand, 1994a, 26).

In an excellent passage of writing, Lemarchand illustrates how what I call the 'yes – but' structure of all discussions on the Great Lakes could be understood: 'Pending a more detailed account of the 1972 killings, we can note that the consensus of opinion among impartial observers is that there is no basis whatsoever for assuming that the carnage was part of a master plan drawn up well ahead of time by Simbananiye or anybody else or that ethnic parity was ever considered as an ultimate goal. If there is any evidence of plotting, it must be found among those Hutu politicians and army men who unsuccessfully tried to overthrow the Micômbéro government in April 1972. This is not to imply that Simbanamye does not bear

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[129] Translated by the author from: 'Tous, civils, militaires et religieux, hommes et femmes, vieillards et enfants, tous ont adopté le "Heil Hitler" nazi en ces termes: "Gira amahoro!" Il faut repondre: "Na Micômbéro yayaduhaye!" ("La Paix soit avec vous!" "Avec nous aussi Micômbéro, grâce à qui nous bénéficions de cette Paix!") Même les veuves et les orphelins victimes du régime Micômbéro sont tenus de saluer et de répondre par ce slogan provocateur' (Kiraranganya, 1977, 102).

responsibility for the extreme brutality of the repression. The intent to physically annihilate all Hutu elites and potential elites and the degree to which this macabre endeavor was put into effect leave no doubt as to its genocidal character. But it is one thing to view the 1972 killings as a Tutsi response to the perceived threats posed to their security by the Hutu attacks, and it is quite another to describe such killings as the outcome of a longstanding, carefully calculated plot aimed at the statistical "equalization" of Hutu and Tutsi' (Lemarchand, 1994a, 27).

Burundi has been placed under an embargo by its neighbours, in order to coerce it into more democratic dealings with its population, - the embargo was lifted during the time I was in Burundi in February 1999. Parallel to the embargo the Arusha peace process has been going on, led by former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, until his death, followed by Nelson Mandela as Burundi peace mediator. Here is a piece of the Arusha proceedings: 'The fourth round of Burundi peace talks opened in Arusha last night with an appeal to participants by mediator Julius Nyerere not to "unnecessarily prolong" the process. He added: "We can't end this century without giving hope to the people of Burundi," the independent Agence Hirondelle reported…The Arusha peace process has cost US $1.1 million between June and December 1998 and is projected to rise to US $6 million by June 1999. Nyerere stressed donors would be unwilling to fund endless talks' (IRIN, 19th January 1999).

Clearly, Burundi's neighbours are increasingly impatient with Tutsi 'superiority': *Mandela Blasts Tutsi* is the title of an IRIN notice: 'Mandela said that all 19 parties had accepted the draft accord, and particularly promised not to question the final proposal. He said a group representing mainly the Tutsi community "which is a minority of 14 percent in Burundi forgot about the agreement". "They wanted to reopen almost everything," Mandela added. "Now I do not think there are many countries in which some leaders will take a solemn decision on very important matters, when their people are being killed inside their own country, who do not care for that massacre, for that slaughter, and wanted to drag out these proceedings," Mandela said' (IRIN, 28th August – 1st September).

The Burundi peace agreement is seen by many observers in the context of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda: "In the case of Rwanda, the region was not united. Today we cannot allow genocide to happen anywhere, let alone Burundi," Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, the chairman of the regional initiative on Burundi, told delegates during the signing ceremony. A total of 200,000 people estimated to have been killed since the murder of democratically elected Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye in 1993…"What is important is

to avoid a vacuum. We have to start implementation of the process as soon as possible,"
Professor Haysom told IRIN' (IRIN, 29th August 1000).

'We have done it together,' were the words of Nelson Mandela at a conference hall
packed with Burundi delegates, African heads of state and international envoys as the signing
ceremony for a peace accord finally started in the northern Tanzanian town of Arusha late on
Monday, 28th August 2000. Mandela 'was referring to the last-minute agreement by Tutsi
parties to join Hutu parties in signing the regionally brokered agreement. But the togetherness
referred to by Nelson Mandela was not shared by the Burundi parties, whose sharp
differences almost caused the signing ceremony, attended by US President Bill Clinton, to
abort. "The Hutu think they have an agreement and the Tutsi think they still have room to
negotiate, because they signed with reservations. All the same it is a good start," a Cape
Town-based consultant in political analysis, conflict resolution mediation and advocacy, Jan
Van Eck, told IRIN. Despite Tutsi parties signing with reservations, delegates hugged and
congratulated each other after the signing and speculated on the future' (IRIN, 29th August
2000).

This means that at the end of the year 2000 hope reigns both in Somalia and in the
Great Lakes Region. Conferences seem to have gone the right way, both in Djibouti and in
Arusha, Tanzania. Neighbours are helping neighbours to achieve peace. May hope be
justified.

1. Fieldwork, or Building a Therapeutic Relationship

This first chapter will focus on the relationships I, as a person with a specific background (clearly not able to live up to the myth that therapists are neutral and all-knowing), was able to build with Germans, Somalis, Rwandans, Burundians, as well as with so-called expatriates working in the region, and scientists studying it. This will represent the second 'expedition' in the course of the three-fold diagnostic hermeneutic circle of this text, and the first one that the therapist is performing as a person, - while the first 'leg' of the circle, the historical background leading up to this first chapter, was an overview mainly built upon other scholar's documentation and interpretations. However, at first suitable research methods had to be found and prepared.

In this chapter I will explain how I learned that the appropriate way for me to study humiliation was through authentic dialogue and not a preconceived questionnaire, - not at this stage at least, - because this was the only way for me to avoid humiliating the 'object' of the study, namely the human beings involved in processes of humiliation. I believe that the same is valid for the relationship between author and reader. Authentic dialogue means that the reader meets me, the author, who is a human being, and that I should avoid trying to dupe the reader with a pretence of objectivity that nobody would be able to fulfil anyhow. I will therefore try to document in the section on my fieldwork how I as a person approached my 'clients.'

Preparation and Method[130]

Humiliation, in its relation to war and genocide, how can this be studied? Which methods would the reader employ? How would the reader, for example, attempt to convince survivors of genocide to talk? How would the reader persuade traumatised Africans to talk to former colonisers about their failing? Would the reader expect traumatised victims, or perpetrators, to happily fill out questionnaires? Or obediently say the truth in 'scientific interviews'? How would the reader defend the 'need' for research to nations who are just about to come out of war and destruction, are hardly able to cope, and are confronted with Western scientists who fly in and out, perhaps, who knows, only to improve their portfolio of published articles? Why should traumatised persons have an interest in tearing open wounds and talking about

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[130] This chapter draws on a revised version of Lindner, 2000l.

traumata that they, perhaps, do not want to be reminded of? Just for the sake of science? Or, to satisfy Western scientists?

Michael Quinn Patton writes: 'The high esteem in which science is held has made it culturally acceptable in Western countries to conduct interviews on virtually any subject in the name of science. Such is not the case worldwide. Evaluation researchers cannot simply presume that they have the right to ask intrusive questions. Many topics may be taboo. I have experienced cultures where it was simply inappropriate to ask questions of a subordinate about a superordinate. Any number of topics may be taboo, or at least indelicate, for strangers - family matters, political views, who owns what, how people came to be in certain positions, and sources of income' (Patton, 1990, 339).

Patton recounts a story from his own research: 'I remember with great embarrassment going to an African village to interview the Chief. The whole village was assembled. Following a brief welcoming ceremony, I asked if we could begin the interview. I expected a private, one-on-one interview. He expected to perform in front of and involve the whole village. It took me a while to understand this, during which time I kept asking to go somewhere else so we could begin the interview. He did not share my concern about and preference for privacy. What I expected to be an individual interview soon became a whole village focus group interview!' (Patton, 1990, 339)

Research on humiliation, however, particularly when related to genocide and war, is to be expected to be much more difficult than Patton's story portrays. I was being prepared for my fieldwork by Westerners who had been doing research in the Great Lakes region (I do not want to disclose names) in the following way: 'Meet for interviews at neutral places; Hutu can be put in danger when you talk to them. Never talk about your topic on the phone. Never ask a person whether he or she is Tutsi of Hutu. Better ask: What is your background? Where were you in 1994? When did your family leave Rwanda? You can then deduct the background because those who left between 1954 and 1960 (or their fathers) are Tutsi; those who left 1994 and were back 1996 are Hutu. Be prepared that nobody will talk to you! You really have to make an effort and make contact by smiling and greeting first. Be also prepared that Tutsi are hostile to whites because the UN soldiers just took the Western people out of the country and allowed the massacre to happen; the Hutu are afraid to talk about their suffering, but they do like the white people, they are not hostile.'

How would the reader handle research on people that would, perhaps, be in danger for life, just because they talked to the researcher? How would the reader, in this case, approach

issues concerning qualitative and quantitative methods, about validity,[131] reliability,[132] utility and morality?

David Straton frequently assesses veterans of World War II and Vietnam who are claiming a war-related injury pension. He writes about reliability, validity, utility, and morality: 'Reliability basically means the degree to which several different clinicians, working from the same criteria, will come up with the same answer. The issue arises in all areas of medicine, and a good figure is 80%. The more tightly defined the criteria, the better the figure' (Straton, 1999, 5). He continues: 'Validity means the degree to which the diagnosis corresponds to some external measure of whether the condition exists. In much of medicine that can be measured against pathology findings including post-mortems. In psychiatry, it usually is linked to response to treatment, or prognosis.' Then he addresses utility: 'Utility means usefulness. This may be influenced by the availability of effective treatments. For example, before the discovery of lithium the utility of differentiating Schizophrenia from Manic Depressive Psychosis was limited, because both conditions would have been treated the same, usually with antipsychotics. After lithium, the utility of the Manic Depression diagnosis went up.' At last he highlights morality: 'Morality is primarily whether the act of applying the diagnostic label to someone is beneficial to them. Claude Steiner used to say that any diagnosis ending in '-ic' was not a diagnosis, it was an insult. E.g. schizophrenic, or alcoholic.'

Dalton points out that 'These four tests are the ones used for the development of medical diagnoses. Similar ones are used for the development of psychological tests and questionnaires,' and he cautions that 'that Reliability and Validity may have a reciprocal relationship; if you define things extremely tightly, you may get better reliability, but your validity figures may go down because you have left out cases who have the essence of the condition.'

If we carry out the four tests that Dalton suggests, do we then arrive at science? Later, during my fieldwork, I was to learn from my African interlocutors their cynical view, - I paraphrase it by (ab)using Dalton's framework: 'Science is when Western researchers employ questionnaires (the best way to safeguard reliability), to find out that genocide is horrific (validity), so that they can write reports home and get paid (utility), and insult their research 'objects' as 'ethn-'ic'' (morality).' This is how many in Africa feel.

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[131] '...the degree to which a test or other instrument of measurement does indeed measure what it purports to measure' (Reber, 1985).
[132] '...the extent to which repeated measurements using them under the same conditions produce the same results' (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1994).

Dr. Mengele, in Auschwitz, probably, was convinced that he performed science that was reliable (for example, if you put human bodies into ice water for a sufficiently long time, they will die, and this can be repeated), valid (low temperatures lead to death), useful (medicine profits from such data), and moral (science gains knowledge).

Clearly, ethics are at stake here. Behaving like Mengele is criminal, this is the verdict - if not from his colleagues during World War II - certainly from every scholar who moves within today's accepted frameworks of science. However, and this is the core question, does this mean that ethics foreclose science? Do ethics just make science inapplicable in certain cases? Is it that we, unfortunately for science, cannot behave like Mengele, and thus must abstain from his strategy for gaining scientific knowledge, at least in those cases where particularly sensitive issues are to be addressed? In other words, does science end, where ethics start? Or is it possible to link science and ethics in another way? I came to see, in the course of my fieldwork, that the topic of humiliation is central to this question.

However, it is too early to present my conclusions concerning methodology at this point, I will return to the beginnings of the project when I struggled to find the right methodological tools. I asked: should I decide that it was not possible to perform scientific investigation in this project, since the topic forecloses, on the grounds of ethical evaluations, any method that yields scientific results? Or should I expect to be 'shipwrecked,' as Kvale calls it?

Steinar Kvale presents the struggle that characterises any therapeutic approach, let alone an approach that aims at studying such issues as genocide: 'A therapeutic research project can be a dangerous voyage, a cruise between anecdotal case stories with little method on the one hand, and quantified physiological and behavioral measures with little psychological content on the other. Clinical research has produced a long history of rejected articles and shipwrecked dissertations. A therapeutic research voyage can be likened to Odysseus sailing the narrow strait between Charybdis and Scylla on his return from Troy, a passage that he declared was the most dangerous part of his long research voyage' (Kvale, 1996, 79).

Kvale continues: 'On one side of the perilous strait waits the monster Charybdis, swallowing whole ships and their crews. Here, the therapeutic researcher gets carried away by entertaining and exciting case histories, often with the therapist as the hero. There is seldom any methodical reflection on how the evidence for the story is obtained, nor analyses of the narrative structures involved, nor of the validity of the knowledge presented… Odysseus tried so hard to avoid Charybdis that he came too close to the other side of the narrow strait, where

the sixheaded monster Scylla devoured six members of his crew. Contemporary therapeutic researchers may try so hard to avoid therapeutic anecdotes that they get caught in the positivist straightjacket on the other side and lose the lived therapeutic relations in a multitude of statistical correlatic and significances that may be insignificant to the therapeutic situatic In this form of imitative scientism, the clinical researcher may become "more Catholic than the Pope" – or, in psychoanalytical terminology – identify with the aggressor' (79, 80).

Ragnar Rommetveit[133] summarises the Scylla and Charybdis dilemma in another way: 'Current representational-computational approaches to human cognition and communication, it is argued, represent natural-scientifically coached ramifications of an analytic-rationalist philosophical tradition concerned with formal features of 'pure' and de-contextualized human reason. Scholars conducting their inquiries within hermeneutic-dialogically founded traditions, on the other hand, are seriously concerned with the inherent perspectivity of human cognition and the embeddedness of linguistically mediated meaning in pervasive background conditions and fluctuating human interests and concerns. The epistemological gulf between analytic-rationalist and hermeneutic-dialogical approaches is reflected in their answers to the question whether the researcher's and informant's mastery of meaning 'from within' should be considered a cumbersome residual or an opaque, yet indispensable resource. What has to be dealt with as a residual to get rid of in attempts at externalization and machine representation of human knowledge and reasoning, it is suggested, may constitute an indispensable resource in any potentially emancipatory study of language and mind' (Rommetveit, 1998, Abstract).

In other words, an epistemological debate among philosophers of science and methodologists about how best to conduct research is at the core here. 'This debate has centered on the relative value of two fundamentally different and competing inquiry paradigms: (1) logical-positivism, which uses quantitative and experimental methods to test hypothetical-deductive generalizations, versus (2) phenomenological inquiry, using qualitative and naturalistic approaches to inductively and holistically understand human experience in context-specific settings (Patton, 1990, 37).

Evidently, this connects to the positivism debate that was raging in the nineteen sixties.[134] Hans Skjervheim wrote: '…there are two antagonistic philosophical currents that

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[133] See, for example, Rommetveit, 1958; Rommetveit, 1960; Rommetveit, 1968a; Rommetveit, 1968b; Rommetveit, 1974; Rommetveit, 1998.

[134] I am very thankful to Jon Hellesnes for introducing me brilliantly into the details of this debate; see correspondence in 1999, but pertaining to this topic particularly a personal conversation on 28th October 2000.

stir the intellects of our day. On the one hand we have the naturalistic-positivistic-pragmatic trend in modern thought, on the other the phenomenological-existentialistic trend. They are even geographically distributed. In the Anglo-American world and Scandinavia the former trend is dominating, the great names being Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, James, Dewey, Hägerström. In Germany and France as well as in the Spanish-speaking world the latter trend dominates, there the great names are Husserl, Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre, Scheler, Merleau-Ponty. Both trends are in sense more "climates of opinion" than definite schools of thought' (Skjervheim, in Slagstad, 1976a, 186, in 'Objectivism and the Study of Man').

How should research on humiliation, in relation to genocide and war, be placed in the context of this epistemological duel? Kvale reports that traditional positivists would suggest that 'the young social sciences should follow the experimental quantitative methods of the established natural sciences, in particular of the most advanced science at the turn of the century – physics. Social science should aim at the prediction and control of behavior. Scientific statements were to be based upon observable data; the observation of the data and interpretation of their meanings should be strictly separated. The scientific facts should be objective and quantifiable. Data should be unambiguous, intra and intersubjectively reproducible. Scientific statements ought to be value neutral, facts were to be distinguished from values, and science from politics' (Kvale, 1996, 62).

Conversely, according to Hellesnes,[135] Skjervheim rejects the possibility that quantitative methods can be used to study social phenomena altogether. Others, such as Adorno and Horkheimer, occupy a kind of middle stance, and, although critical to positivism, do not reject quantitative methods in the same way as Skjervheim but include them into their own work.

Times have changed since positivism was the all-encompassing paradigm and only had a few critics; qualitative methods have become more accepted. Some qualitative researchers even sway to the other extreme. 'From a postmodern perspective issues of reliability, validity, and generalizability are sometimes discarded as leftovers from a modernist correspondence theory of truth. There are multiple ways of knowing and multiple truths, and the concept of validity indicates a firm boundary line between truth and nontruth. In contrast hereto, Lather, 1995, from a feminist poststructural frame valorizing practice, addresses validity as an incitement to discourse, a fertile obsession, and attempts to reinscribe validity in ways that use the postmodern problematic to loosen the master code of positivism'

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[135] Conversation on 28th October 2000.

(Kvale, 1996, 231). Other qualitative researchers, however, such as Lincoln & Guba, 1985, 'have gone beyond the relativism of a rampant antipositivism and have reclaimed ordinary language terms to discuss the truth value of their findings, using concepts such as trustworthiness, credibility, dependability, and confirmability' (Kvale, 1996, 231).

Kvale deplores the fact that, 'Until recently, the field of qualitative inquiry was fragmented into different disciplines with communication gaps across interpretative communities. With an absence of common literature, procedures, and criteria, interviewers have to a large extent had to rely on their individual creativity. One consequence is that isolated researchers have invented small qualitative wheels over and over again' (9).

Kvale concludes: 'This state of affairs is now changing with the increasing number of books, journals, and conferences in the field of qualitative research' (9). Cross-disciplinary works have been published, and Kvale mentions the *Handbook of Qualitative Research* edited by Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, the *Handbuch qualitative Sozialforschung* edited by Flick, v.Kardoff, Keupp, v.Rosenstiel, & Wolff, 1991, as well as several journals dedicated to qualitative research, such as *Qualitative Sociology* (first published in 1978), *Qualitative Studies in Education* (first published in 1988), *Qualitative Health Research* (first published in 1991), and the cross-disciplinary *Qualitative Inquiry* (first published in 1995). Kvale point out that 'With the new literature, a common knowledge base is available for methodological and theoretical development of qualitative research' (9).

Quantitative and Qualitative Method, or Part/Whole Analysis

A strategic overview discussing the relationship between quantitative and qualitative research approaches is available from Scheff (1997) who recommends proceeding from 'the ground,' comparing data from different locations in a 'part/whole analysis,' and, finally, developing hypotheses that can be tested quantitatively: 'Quantitative analysis leads to verification or disconfirmation of a hypothesis. But verification is the third step in part/whole morphology. Before taking the last step, it is usually necessary to take at least one of the earlier steps: exploration (conventional eyewitness field work using qualitative methods), and/or microanalysis of single specimens and comparisons of specimens' (Scheff, 1997, 9).

Scheff describes his Part/whole analysis as follows (Scheff, 1997, 9): 'The approach … is one that attempts to generate increasingly accurate and general hypotheses by close examination of the actual reality of social life. By grounding investigation in examination of the "minute particulars" as Blake said, the least parts of single cases, and later in the

comparison of these cases with one another in the context of larger wholes. One may generate hypotheses that are general and important.'

Colin Robson defends Scheff's position: 'There are strongly held views that the divide between qualitative and quantitative represents an ideological divide and that that particular twain should never meet. Following Bryman (1988a), my view is that many of these differences are more apparent than real and that there is in practice a considerable underlying unity of purpose' (Robson, 1993, 6, see Brymann, 1988).

What Scheff calls 'investigation' seemed especially necessary in the case of humiliation in genocide, since humiliation in such a context is clearly more dramatic and painful than the terms in the above-introduced questionnaire by Hartling suggest. How would one, for example, approach questions such as whether such practices as rape in war are humiliation turned into a weapon? And how should culture difference be reckoned with? Somalian, Rwandan and Burundian culture could be expected to have different concepts of humiliation than those embodied in the questionnaire.

In order to find a suitable stance on methodology, the original project description of 1996 had to be re-evaluated.

The Original Plan

The original project description of 1996 that provided the starting point for the research on humiliation, entailed the following plan of action (Lindner, 1996, 3): 'The empirical part of the project will include several methodological strategies: 1) Existing literature and statistics will be used as basis. 2) Qualitative data will be collected in interviews with (a) the involved population in the conflict region, (b) with key opinion leaders in the region (see Schou, 1996 for selection criteria) and (c) with international bodies involved as third parties. 3) Quantitative data will be collected via Cantril's well-established Self-Anchoring Scale (Cantril, 1965, 22), which will be adapted to the notion of humiliation.'

The question to be asked at the outset of the fieldwork was: is this plan of action really valid?

Focus Group, Experiment, Interview, Scenario, Survey?

The original plan reads: 'Data will be collected in interviews.' Was this the right approach? What kind of interviews? Open interviews, semi-structured, or a structured ones? Or, perhaps

focus groups were to better suited? Reidar Ommundsen[136] suggested the 'focus group method' as used in marketing. He had employed this method successfully in connection with the issue of contraception methods: Four students were put to discuss the topic under the guidance of two moderators, setting in motion thoughts and reflections which otherwise would have stayed opaque, unreflected or not conscious. Validity was addressed by asking the participants individually after the discussion whether they actually said what they meant. The resulting opinions could then be analysed in terms of whether they agreed or contradicted each other.[137]

Or should I use experimental methods? Nisbett and Cohen employ experimental methods in their research on cultures of honour, as can be found for example in Texas, where the rate of violence is high (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). For example, they place people in a room, let a co-worker 'bump into' a person and then examine whether this person becomes angry. Levels of testosterone were measured and showed that they were higher in Texas in such situations than elsewhere.

Or, was there yet another methodological approach? Should I ask people to comment on scenarios? Lee D. Ross[138] recommended that I should use scenarios instead of experiments in the special case of genocide contexts. He spoke of scenarios as a kind of simulated experiments, experiments happing so-to-speak in the interviewee's head (Lee D. Ross in personal conversation at the Sommerakademie für Frieden und Konfliktforschung, Loccum, Germany, 20th –25th July 1997). Ross proposed to develop scenarios or stories entailing i) incidents of humiliation, ii) stories without such incidents, and iii) stories with some ambiguous, 'bad' situations but not necessarily humiliating ones. Subsequently people could be asked questions such as, 'what do you think about this scenario? or, 'look at this response to this situation, how do you feel, how do you think others feel, what would a woman feel, your mother, father, brother, and so on.' The material used in such scenarios would have to be cultural specific (in some cultures, for example, to spit on a grave would be very humiliating, more than in another culture).

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[136] In personal conversation 1997.

[137] See for further literature for example Barbour & Kitzinger, 1998; Greenbaum, 1988; Greenbaum, 1998; Morgan, 1988; Morgan, 1993; Morgan, 2000.

[138] Ross is a professor of psychology at Stanford University and is a principal investigator (and co-founder) of the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation (SCCN). The author or co-author of four books and scores of chapter and journal articles, he was elected in 1993 to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Ross' seminal research on attributional biases and other shortcomings in human inference exerted a major impact not only within social psychology but also in the emerging field of judgment and decision-making. In the event it proved difficult to construct scenarios with culture sensitive material before having studied the cultures involved.

Survey and archive research were other alternative ways to examine humiliation in armed conflict. However, it was clear that the notion of humiliation had to be better explored and defined before venturing into survey research. The project's resources would not make a large survey possible. In contrast, archive research was to be included wherever possible. However, archive research would be difficult, especially in Somalia where the state collapsed in 1991 with all its institutions, and security is very fragile.

Are All Bachelors Males?

A further consideration was the question of whether humiliation was perhaps a universal that needed not to be researched altogether, and to which also cultural differences were 'irrelevant.' Jan Smedslund, the founder of 'Psycho-Logic,'[139] for example, argues that 'even though ordinary words have very variable meanings, they also have a stable core meaning, and many partly overlapping words may also refer to the same core meaning. In summary, it may be possible to explicate a skeleton system of important concepts underlying the complex surface of an ordinary language… A formulation of such a system can only approximate some of the psychologically relevant features of ordinary language and must necessarily ignore others. However, one may envisage successively more complex scientific language, including an ever higher number of psychologically important distinctions' (Smedslund 1988, 5).[140]

Jan Smedslund cautions psychological research not to overlook core meanings, rules and elements. He warns psychologists against trying to appear 'scientific' by mistaking 'scientifically looking' methods for sound science in places where core rules are blatantly apparent and studying 'infinite objects' would be silly. He writes: 'The finding that all bachelors are in fact unmarried males cannot be said to be empirical.' Smedslund warns that a lot of psychological research is as pointless as trying to make surveys in order to find out 'whether bachelors really are all males' (Smedslund, 1988, 4). This, Smedslund states, would be an inexcusable waste of time and resources, and in addition a basic confusion of "the

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[139] 'The key concepts in this system are given definitions, and the basic assumptions are presented in the form of axioms. A number of corollaries and theorems are formally proved. The text also contains numerous notes in which the formal propositions and their broader implications are discussed. It is assumed that the relationship between psycho-logic and empirical psychology is analogous to that existing between geometry and geography. Psycho-logic and geometry both provide a formal system in terms of which one may describe and analyze respectively psychological phenomena and geographical terrains' (Book-cover text of Psycho-logic, Smedslund, 1988). See also Smedslund, 1997, and Smedslund, 1998.

[140] Smedslund asserts that human beings create 'meta-myths' that are explicable in terms of common-sense psychology or 'Psycho-Logic' (Smedslund, 1988).

ontological status" (4, italics in original) of psychology's research object. Certainly, I did not want to waste resources and do pointless research!

Adopting a 'Psycho-Logic' approach to the word 'humiliation' and its correlates 'debasement,' 'abasement,' or 'degradation,' one observes that it entails a spatial orientation, a downward orientation, connotated by the prefix 'de-.' Other languages follow suit, as is shown by words as 'ned-verdigelse' (Norwegian), 'Er-niedrig-ung' (German), 'a-baisse-ment' (French), all meaning 'de-gradation.' All these words are built on the same spatial, orientational metaphor.[141] Smedslund's argument, taken to its extreme, implies that the only research necessary is the linguistic analysis of these metaphors and no fieldwork.[142]

However, while the core of the notion of humiliation may be universal, there may be individual and cultural differences in its expressions, as indicated in the double-layer hypothesis proposed in the original project description. For example, Lee D. Ross disputes Smedslund's position (and I assume that Smedslund, indeed, agrees with Ross) and argues that psychology is not about asking whether phenomena exist or not, but about the question of how they exist, to what extent and in which way.[143]

Can Trauma Be Studied At All?

However, even if we were to decide that research was desirable, useful and necessary, was research at all possible? Perhaps trauma is of a nature that evades being 'pinned down' altogether, irrespective of the kind of method employed? Although humiliation is not always traumatic, it may be traumatic, particularly if it occurs in the context of war and genocide

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[141] Lakoff and Johnson (1988) describe orientational metaphors as up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral. Humiliation clearly is 'down.' 'These spatial orientations arise from the fact that we have bodies of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our physical environment. Orientational metaphors give a concept a spatial environment: for example, HAPPY IS UP' (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 14, capitalisation in original).

[142] Smedslund's 'Concept of Anger' is related to humiliation as it builds on lack of respect (Smedslund, 1993, 13, italics in original): 'The feeling of anger consists in awareness of the relationship between the belief that someone one cares for has been treated wrongly and the want to correct or undo this. Everyone has a right to, and wants to, be treated courteously and justly, that is, respectfully, and when this right is violated, there is anger. What exactly constitutes courtesy and justice for a given person in a given context varies both with the culture and the person involved.' Smedslund formalises the definition within the system of Psychologic as follows (page 14): 'P in C at t is angry at Q' = df 'P in C at t believes that at least one person whom P in C at t cares for has, intentionally or through neglect, been treated without respect by Q, and P has not forgiven Q.' Also Lakoff examines the notion of anger (Lakoff, 1987, 408): Anger is 'structured in terms of an elaborate cognitive model that is implicit in the semantics of the language. This indicates that anger is not just an amorphous feeling, but rather that it has an elaborate cognitive structure.'

[143] Personal communication with Ross January 2000, quoted with his permission.

(trauma is typically defined as an inescapably stressful event that overwhelms people's existing coping mechanisms). 'Traumatic memories are difficult to study, since the profoundly upsetting emotional experiences that give rise to PTSD cannot be approximated in a laboratory setting: even viewing a movie depicting actual executions fails to precipitate post-traumatic symptoms in normal college students (Pitman, personal communication, 1994)… Clearly, there is little similarity between viewing a simulated car accident on a TV screen, and being the responsible driver in a car crash in which one's own children are killed' (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 2).

Van der Kolk and Fisler continue: 'Without the option of inflicting actual trauma in the laboratory, there are only limited options for the exploration of traumatic memories: 1) collecting retrospective reports from traumatized individuals, 2) post-hoc observations, or 3) provoking of traumatic memories and flashbacks…' (2).

Van der Kolks' and Fisler's option 1) was clearly the available methodological strategy for the research on humiliation in the context of this project. However, trauma may lead to silence, to amnesia, or to 'speechless terror,' and in this case any method based on verbal communication would be inapplicable to capture particularly such phenomena. Careful observation of the embodiments of amnesia or 'speechless terror' would be the only option.

 Christianson, 1984, has described how, when people feel threatened, they experience a significant narrowing of consciousness, and remain merely focused on the central perceptual details. 'As people are being traumatized, this narrowing of consciousness sometimes evolves into amnesia for parts of the event, or for the entire experience. Students of traumatized individuals have repeatedly noted that during conditions of high arousal "explicit memory" may fail. The individual is left in a state of "speechless terror" in which the person lacks words to describe what has happened (van der Kolk & Kadish, in van der Kolk, 1987, 6). However, while traumatized individuals may be unable to give a coherent narrative of the incident, there may be no interference with implicit memory: 'they may "know" the emotional valence of a stimulus and be aware of associated perceptions, without being able to articulate the reasons for feeling or behaving in a particular way' (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 6).

One may conclude so far, that qualitative methods, if applied, should include observation, and not just verbal communication. 'Participant observation,' a term familiar to anthropology, and widely accepted there, needs clearly to be included. Kvale addresses this issue as follows: 'If you want to study people's behavior and their interaction with their environment, the observations of field studies will usually give more valid knowledge than merely asking subjects about their behavior. If the research topic concerns more implicit

meanings and tacit understandings, like the taken-for-granted assumptions of a group a culture, then participant observation and field studies of actual behavior supplemented by informal interviews may give more valid information' (Kvale, 1996, 104).

However, validity is not the only thing at stake. Kvale explains: 'If the purpose of a study is to obtain deeper knowledge about a person, focusing on personal emotional conflicts, then this may best be obtained through the trust developed in the close, personal interaction developed through a long and emotional therapy process. The challenges to a person's established self-image and the strong feelings provoked are necessary parts of therapy, as in the session reported by Rogers (Chapter 2, A Therapeutic Interview on Hate). Creating these kinds of strong emotional dynamics merely to serve research purposes would be unethical' (104).

My background in psychology, influenced by, among others, Reinhard Tausch, the main German representative of Rogers' approach, made me deeply aware of Kvale's reflections.

Interdisciplinary Research

There is another caveat to be kept in mind when doing research on humiliation. This research is bound to be, as indicated above, interdisciplinary. And this should have implications for the methodology applied. Anthropology and sociology employ a wide range of qualitative methods. Sociologist Ragnvald Kalleberg, and author of a number of publications in the field of epistemology and methodology, [144] described in a conversation on 28th February 2000, how qualitative methods are much more common in sociology than in social psychology - and how astonishing this state of affairs is to sociologists.

Kvale underpins Kalleberg's view: 'Sophistication in qualitative research is today rather unevenly distributed in the social sciences. Although much of what is said here may be old news within anthropology and sociology, it can be relatively new, and perhaps shockingly unscientific, within some departments of psychology. One might have assumed that the production of knowledge through the human interaction of the interview might be a central concern in psychology. In the psychological profession, the interview is an essential tool – for example, in personnel selection, in counseling, and in therapy. A scientific psychology leaning heavily on natural sciences has, however, generally neglected the human aspects of

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[144] See for his publications, for example, Kalleberg, 1989; Kalleberg, 1994; Engelstad & Kalleberg, 1999; Engelstad et al., 1996; Kalleberg & Horkheimer, Kalleberg, 1973.

knowledge production, including the knowledge potentials of the human conversation' (Kvale, 1996, 9).

Intercultural Research

As soon as one sets out to conduct research that includes people with different cultural backgrounds, a host of problems arises: words, terms, and concepts cannot be translated, what means one thing in one culture, means something else in another cultural context, - even worse, particularly problematic is the situation when researcher and informant speak together in a language that is a second language to them both, and both believe that they understand each other, not noticing that they are duped into the illusion of mutual understanding by the superficial use of identical words.

Geert Hofstede has developed a classic systematisation of culture dimensions; initially he detected four dimensions of culture. The first dimension is '*power distance.*' Power distance is 'the extent to which less powerful members of institutions and organizations accept that power is distributed unequally' (Hofstede & Bond, 1984, 419). Hofstede had carried out research on IBM employees around the world and had found that there are countries where subordinates follow their superiors' orders rather blindly, where organisations are centralised, with many levels within the hierarchy, and where employees on the lower levels tend to have low levels of professional qualification, - these are the countries with a high power distance, for example Mexico, South Korea, or India. Countries with low power distance have rather decentralised organisational structures and flat hierarchies, and highly qualified employees are to be found at any level of the hierarchy (for example USA, or Scandinavia).

The second dimension is '*uncertainty avoidance*,' which is the extent to which people feel threatened by ambiguous situations, and have created beliefs and institutions that try to avoid these (Hofstede, 1980). People in countries with high uncertainty avoidance have a great need for security and a rather big trust in the opinion of experts (Germany, Japan, Spain). Cultures with low uncertainty avoidance are readier to accept risks, they have fewer written laws, individual initiative within organisations is furthered more, and it is presumed that people are responsible for their acts (for example Denmark and Great Britain).

Individualism (versus *collectivism*), the third dimension, is described by Hofstede as tendency to rather care for oneself and one's own core family; collectivism is the tendency to keep groups and collectives together, as compensation for loyalty. According to Hofstede, rich countries have higher levels of individualism, poorer countries are rather collectivist.

USA, Canada, Australia, Sweden and Germany for example exhibit individualism (combined with a high gross national product); in such countries performance is prioritised and is more important than being part of a group. On the other hand, countries such as Pakistan, Peru and other South American countries, also South Korea, are characterised by high levels of collectivism (and at the same time lower gross national product); those societies are rather built on the principle of group affiliation.

The fourth dimension, *masculinity* (versus *femininity*) 'is a situation in which the dominant values in society are success, money and things.' Femininity 'is a situation in which the dominant values in society are caring for others and quality of life' (Hofstede, 1980, 419-420). In countries with high scores of masculinity, as in the USA or also in Germany, income, recognition, upward social mobility and challenge are of particular importance. Individuals are being encouraged to take independent decisions, as expressed in the German proverb 'Jeder ist seines eigenen Glückes Schmied' ['Everybody is master of his own luck'].' Economic growth is valued higher that the protection of the environment, the school system is built on the principle of performance and competition, and there are few women in higher positions. Countries with stronger femininity on the other hand rather emphasise co-operation, a friendly atmosphere, and a secured working place. Individuals are being encouraged to work in teams, success is rather being measured in terms of human contact and quality of life, and the working place is characterised by less stress and by a participative managerial style. There are more women in leading positions, and they are not obliged to mark their stance by appearing overly self-confident.

It is to be expected that in countries with high individualism and low power distance individuals attend more to their own preferences and less to hierarchical structures. In countries such as the USA, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Great Britain and Holland, people learn that all people are equal and they are less impressed by titles and positions. Less developed countries or recently industrialised countries, however, such as Columbia, Mexico, China, Portugal, Singapore are rather characterised by higher power distance and lower individualism. Hierarchical structures count more and titles are important. The Anglo-Saxon countries are characterised by lower power distance and weaker uncertainty avoidance; there is less emphasis on hierarchy and risks are being taken. Italy, Spain, Portugal and Latin-American countries, as well as countries in the Far East, such as Japan and Korea, exhibit rather high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance. Most of the other Asiatic countries show relatively high power distance and weak uncertainty avoidance. High

uncertainty avoidance and high masculinity is to be expected from countries such as Japan, Germanic and Latin countries.

Later Hofstede developed his system further and included a fifth dimension, namely *orientation in time*, either long-term or short-term. '…we believe that cultural systems vary in the extent to which they encourage various forms of relationship and are characterized by such different types of relationships. Although no direct evidence exists to support this belief, Hofstede's (1991)[145] five dimensions of cultural variation suggest some testable conjectures. We hypothesize that cultural uncertainty avoidance is related to greater formality in relationship, masculinity to greater task-orientation, power distance to greater hierarchy, individualism to greater superficiality, and long-term orientation to greater competitiveness' (Smith & Bond, 1999b, 18).

Clearly, Somalia may be expected to fit into Hofstede's system where power distance and uncertainty avoidance are low, time horizon short, masculinity high, and, where, paradoxically, strong individualism combines with strong collectivism. Rwanda and Burundi would figure as places where power distance and collectivism are high, perhaps also uncertainty avoidance, and compared to Somalia, also feminism would perhaps measure higher, and be combined with a somewhat longer time horizon than in Somalia.

Kluckhohn und de Strodtbeck (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961) have developed a six dimensional categorisation of cultures. They believe that cultures can firstly be divided according to their beliefs concerning the *nature of the human being*, in other words, according to their answer to the question, 'Is the human being inherently "good" or "bad"?' The authors argue that important consequences follow from this answer: A person for example, who is convinced that people are 'bad' by nature, will tend to be more suspicious and afraid when she has to deal with people she did not know before. The second category is a culture's *relationship to nature*. The Inuit say '*Ayorama*,' meaning 'There is nothing to be done,' signifying subjugation under nature. The Arabic '*inshallah*,' meaning 'as God wishes,' signifies harmony with nature and subjugation under God, an attitude that is contrasted by the American '*can do*,' that means 'I will manage,' 'I will prevail,' or dominance over nature. The authors relate the story that when Sir Edmund Hillary reached the top of Mount Everest this was hailed as 'subjugation of the mountain' by Western media, whereas Chinese media wrote that he had established 'friendship' with the mountain. The third cultural dimension

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[145] Hofstede, 1991.

addresses interpersonal relations similar to Hofstede, namely individualism versus collectivism.

The fourth dimension relates to '*being' versus 'acting*;' cultures are differentiated according to their evaluation of time. Work and recognition has much more significance in cultures that emphasise action as compared to cultures where work is regarded as mere means for survival, the United States being the epitome of the country of action. A further dimension addresses the *orientation towards the flow of time*, namely the future, the past or the present. In a culture that emphasises the past innovation is more difficult, while societies that look into the future evaluate new plans according to their potential to improve the future. The authors relate the story of an American and a Bahraini coming to a restaurant where they find a sign saying that the kitchen will be closed for the coming six months. The American reacts with anger while the Bahraini says: 'We have lived without this kitchen for thousands of years, we will also survive the next six months without it!' The last dimension addresses the use of space as *public or private space*. In the United States people prefer to work in separate rooms and have important negotiations with a few people in closed rooms. In other parts of the world, as for example in Japan, important conversations are being held in the presence of many people.

After many years of psychological counselling in Egypt, and many more years of international experience in many contexts, I had familiarised myself with the cultural dimensions as described above. Over the years, a way of communicating in cross-cultural contexts emerged, without me intentionally construing it, that is characterised by the use of much longer hermeneutic circles than are usually employed in mono-cultural settings, - hermeneutic circles that are furthermore based on a much more pronounced foundation of respect for the other than in mono-cultural settings – otherwise it would not be possible to inquire into possible misunderstandings, – and these hermeneutic circles are in addition carried out in co-operation with the interlocutor. Having accumulated experience in this way for many years, I now seem to employ exactly that way of communication also in mono-cultural settings, or, in other words, for me the problem of culture difference has changed character. I focus much more on the individual person and her unique intricate composition of many different elements of identity, an identity that is formed by a universal core – everybody desires to be recognised and respected, – and a multitude of diverse aspects that are at the periphery, and which I have learned to 'bypass,' to a certain extent, by focusing on the core identity that I qua human being share with everybody. I try to formulate my reflections regarding this issue in two articles 'Recognition or Humiliation - The Psychology of

Intercultural Communication,' and 'How Humiliation Creates Cultural Differences and Political Divisions' (Lindner, 2000).

Gergen addresses such co-operation in communication when he advocates participatory action research in cross-cultural setting; he writes in his chapter 'Sensitivity to the influences of diverse cultural traditions' that is part of the book *Toward a Cultural Constructionist Psychology*: 'To assist in this effort new methodologies have emerged attempting to dismantle research hierarchies, and replace the traditional autonomy of the researcher (an invitation to cultural blindness) with more collaborative forms of inquiry. Perhaps the most visible form of collaborative research is that of participatory action research' (see for example Reason, 1994 in Gergen & Gergen, 2000).

Pilot Study

As already described above, it was at some point decided to go ahead with a pilot study in an initial exploratory phase in order to arrive at a preliminary mapping of the field. A snowball system was used, including friends, colleagues, and Somali and Rwandan citizens living in Europe. Everybody was asked about his/her understanding of the term humiliation. Some interviews were taped, some lasted for ten minutes, others for two hours, some text fragments were sent as letters or e-mails, some of which I received a long time after having opened the subject with a person, indicating that people had been thinking about it for some time. In a paper submitted to the annual seminar of the Research Programme of the Multilateral Development Assistance Programme at Soria Moria, $19^{th} – 20^{th}$ February 1998, entitled *Humiliation As Psychological Variable in Armed Conflict: What Is Our Common Sense Definition of Humiliation?* (Lindner, 1998) I differentiated fifteen cases of humiliation based on 52 texts that were collected during the period of March 1997 to December 1997. This pilot study formed the background on which my fieldwork in Africa would unfold.

The results of this pilot study were sobering. The interviews opened up more questions than they indicated answers. The concept of humiliation appeared to be extremely complicated and multi-layered. To select just two aspects that were already mentioned in the introduction, the word humiliation has an extremely complicated semantic field - humiliation is, for example, both an act and a feeling, and, it can furthermore be a short or a long process, see Table 7:

Humiliation is an act and a feeling - brief or long-lasting
Humiliation is an act that is perpetrated by an actor, intentionally or not. The act of humiliation entails a painful downward push at its core, namely looking down, putting down, lowering, degrading, debasing, abasing, demeaning, belittling, subjugating, oppressing, tainting, besmirching, tarnishing, treating with contempt or disgust, bullying, mobbing, abusing, dishonouring, disgracing.   ↓
On the victims' side humiliation is a feeling that may be short-term or long-term.   ↙   ↘

The victim may fight off an attack of humiliation immediately by aggressive retaliation and counter-humiliation, and the story of humiliation may end here; or, in the worst case may lead to an endless cycle of counter-humiliations that requires intense efforts of reconciliation and forgiveness to heal.	The victim may feel unable to react, may feel entrapped and caught in endless humiliating depression and be embarrassed or even ashamed of her helplessness. In its extreme form the whole process may be so traumatic that it leads to symptoms such as dissociation. Also this long-term state of feeling humiliated may lead, eventually, to aggression and counter-humiliation, if it is not healed.

Table 7: Humiliation is an act and a feeling – brief or long-lasting

It became increasingly evident that it would be vastly premature to rely heavily upon a quantitative method for the topic of humiliation in its connection with genocide in Africa. Hartling's work, for example, seemed to be adequate in the cultural setting, within which it was being developed, but it was too early to know to what extent it could capture the notion of humiliation in other cultures, and also to what extent such extreme situations such as genocide could be described by it.

The method to be used in this project is closely related in some respects to be Grounded Theory, as first developed and presented by Glaser & Strauss, 1967. It shares the emphasis on the interactive nature of qualitative research as developed in Strauss & Corbin, 1990. Kvale reports, 'Strauss and Corbin depict a continual interplay among conceptualization, field studies, analyses, and new contacts with the field' (Kvale, 1996, 87). Using Grounded Theory means trying to avoid applying existing theories to data (usually interviews, taped and written down), or merely accepting conventional explanations, but

instead being as open as possible and developing arguments and categories out of the data, as they emerge.

Since the aim of the project was to link micro, meso and macro levels, a questionnaire addressing individuals would not suffice. The explorative and qualitative approach, including quantitative elements from Cantril's Self-Anchoring Scale, seemed to be the correct way for a start.[146] This would slightly modify Scheff's approach and combine qualitative and quantitative methods from the first stage of the research.

The Researcher

'The validity and reliability of qualitative data depend to a great extent on the methodological skill, sensitivity, and integrity of the researcher. Systematic and rigorous observation involves far more than just being present and looking around. Skillful interviewing involves much more than just asking questions. Content analysis requires considerably more than just reading to see what's there. Generating useful and credible qualitative findings through observation, interviewing, and content analysis requires discipline, knowledge, training, practice, creativity, and hard work.' (Patton, 1990, 10)

Sensitivity is central. 'Different interviewers can produce different statements on the same themes, depending on their sensitivity to and knowledge of the interview topic' (Kvale, 1996, 31) 'Interviews obtained by different interviewers, using the same interview guide, may be different… Thus an interviewer who has no ear for music may have difficulties obtaining nuanced descriptions of musical experiences from his or her interviewees, in particular with probing more intensively into the meaning of the music. If a common scientific requirement of obtaining intersubjectively reproducible data were to be followed here, the interview form might have to be standardized in a way that would restrict the understanding of musical experiences to more superficial aspects understandable to the average person. A qualitative

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[146] Cantril's original version was adapted to the research of humiliation in Africa by introducing 'respect' and individual and group level. The question went as follows: There is a ladder from 0 to 10 (IMAGE OF LADDER). Suppose we say that the top of the ladder (POINTING) represents the highest amount of respect for you and the bottom (POINTING) represents the worst possible humiliation for you. Where on the ladder (MOVING FINGER RAPIDLY UP AND DOWN LADDER) do you feel you personally stand at the present time? Where on the ladder would you say you stood five years ago? And where do you think you will be on the ladder five years from now? Where would you put (name of group, for example Tutsi or Hutu) on the ladder (MOVING FINGER RAPIDLY UP AND DOWN LADDER) at the present time? Where did (name of group) stand five years ago? Just as your best guess, where do you think (name of group) will be on the ladder five years from now?

research interview would instead seek to employ the varying abilities of the interviewers to obtain different nuances and depths of the themes of the interview' (Kvale, 1996, 35).

However, what about objectivity? Kvale admits that there may be a problem and explains that sensitivity has to be combined with 'deliberate conscious naïveté': 'The requirement of sensitivity to, and a foreknowledge about, the topic of the interview contrasts with the presuppositionless attitude advocated above. The tension between these two aspects may be expressed in the requirement for a deliberate conscious naïveté on the part of the interviewer, which is demonstrated in Socrates' interview of Agathon' (35).

The question to be answered was: was the researcher 'up to the job'? I look back on many years of 'inter'-experience, namely inter-national, inter-cultural, inter-class experience. as a psychology student in Germany, Israel and West Africa (1974-1978), and as medical student in the Germany, Norway, the U.S., Malaysia, Thailand, China, and New Zealand (1978-1984). Thereafter, as described above, from 1985 to 1988 I worked as a psychological counsellor at the 'American University of Cairo' in Egypt. Clients were students and teaching staff from many nations. I was presented with the challenge of understanding that in Egypt Western psychological concepts may not hold, that for example the image of the self may be different as compared to what is taught and internalised in the West, and that Western 'prescriptions' about what makes a human being healthy may not fit. As reported earlier I attempted to develop new strategies of counselling bridging Western and Egyptian cultural views.

From 1984 to 1991 I had my private psychological practice in Cairo, in collaboration with the German Embassy physician. Clients came from Europe, the Middle East and Africa, languages ranged from English, French, German, and Norwegian to Egyptian Arabic. Both Western oriented as well as more traditional oriented Egyptians came as clients, and non-Egyptians of all nations, such as members of Western embassies, institutes and schools, managers of Western companies, partners in mixed marriages and their children. Especially working with Western companies in Egypt, or with partners in mixed marriages, often meant primarily mediating and translating cultural differences. I found that feelings of humiliation were permeating cross-cultural relations almost everywhere, a fact usually invisible to even the most well-intentioned Western person, but intensely felt by non-Western counterparts.

I wrote, furthermore, my doctoral thesis in medical psychology about the definition of quality of life in Egypt as compared to Germany (Lindner, 1994). Many results of this research pertain to the topic of humiliation, not least that a lack of national resources has a humiliating and weakening effect on its citizens (Inkeles & Diamond, in Szalai & Andrews,

1980). National contexts seem to impinge significantly on individual life satisfaction, and the general economic situation, for example in Egypt is very difficult.

There are few researchers with a similar background. Many academicians 'visit' 'other cultures' for fieldwork and hardly experience how it feels to become, at least to a certain extent, part of this 'other culture.' Even many anthropologists are used to 'visiting.' Certainly, there are people, who lead international lives, diplomats for example. However, they most frequently stay in small social ghettos of likeminded people, and are at home in the culture of expensive international hotels. Even the backpackers who travel with little money from one low-cost beach to the other typically stay in ghettos, even if they are cheaper than those occupied by diplomats.

Admittedly, there are people who really become part of other cultures, particularly those who marry a partner from another part of the world, have children together, and cut their links with 'back home.' Many of my clients in Egypt were among this group. Typically, European and American women who felt rejected 'back home' embraced their new home whole-heartedly, only to be met with psychosomatic symptoms and severe emotional problems after a certain number of years, - maybe there is a critical amount of time, after which 'going native' in another culture as a way to 'heal' past rejection from the family one was born into, fails, and emotional problems persist, if a 'third identity' is not built. There is, however, today a group of people, whose numbers are growing, who have this 'third identity' without effort, for example many of the children born into families where the parents have different cultural backgrounds.

My particular 'refugee'-background, from a family that has roots in a territory and a culture that have 'disappeared,' provided me with a lack of roots that I answered by identifying with global citizenship. At the same time the history of Hitler's Germany painfully marked my life and motivated me to turn my entire life into a 'research project' with the aim to find out more about the inner workings of conflict, violence, and peace by setting out and trying to become part of many cultures. What I believe I have learned about more than many others by living this kind of life, is continuously dis-engaging and carefully re-constructing new engagements: bearing the uncertainty of 'not-knowing' for a long time, refraining from judging prematurely, on the contrary, always remaining within a process of trying to understand the other – while extending respect – without ever arriving or pretending to have arrived at full understanding, constantly separating and disentangling the process of observing from understanding and judging.

I believe that few people would have been capable of carrying out the research project on humiliation the way I did it, with only basic funding, investing my whole being into the quest and search for pieces of evidence, being at the same time detached observer and deeply compassionate '*Mitmensch*' or co-subject in a world of creatures who live short lives within which they can experience precious closeness, loyalty and love, but also incapacitating fear and raging disappointment and resentment.

Interview Guidelines

The approach ultimately envisaged before leaving for Africa was multi-layered, combining 'Psycho-Logic' reasoning, Grounded Theory, and Part/whole analysis. Against this background, a semi-structured interview guideline (see Appendix) was developed addressing questions such as: Can humiliation lead to war, to Holocaust, genocide and ethnic cleansing? Can humiliation lead to international terrorism? And also the more fundamental questions such as: What is humiliation? What happens when people feel humiliated?

For the interpretation of the collected material it was planned to develop sets of innovative classifications and differentiations that, hopefully, would shed new light on old and new problems – such as for example the phenomenon of genocide – and thus help find new and creative solutions to these problems. 'Classification is at the heart of every intellectual, empirical, and pragmatic endeavor. It helps to establish the boundaries of a given topic under consideration, and paradoxically it enables the topic to be broken into manageable parts for closer scrutiny and comparison. It is also a process to use when modelling complex problems before developing practical solutions' (Taylor, 1999).

The discussion on method was not at all finished at this point. My hopes that I could travel to Africa and administer my ready-made interview guidelines were soon to end in disappointment. I will explain further down how the struggle with methodology evolved in Africa. As indicated earlier the issue of method will be revisited throughout the entire book, since it is so closely interwoven with the topic of humiliation. Therefore it cannot be 'relegated' into a separate chapter in the same way as the chronology of the project was much more interactive and flexible than a simple sequence of 'constructing a methodological approach' – 'applying it' – 'analysing the results' – and 'presenting them.' The circle through these stages was continuously performed, every day, and every minute.

Off I Go, or the 'Interviewer As a Miner' or 'the Interviewer As a Traveller'

Steinar Kvale explains (Kvale, 1996, on pages 3, 4 and 5) that there are two contrasting metaphors of the '*interviewer as a miner*' or '*the interviewer as a traveller*' that can illustrate the implications of different theoretical understandings of interview research.

In the *miner metaphor*, knowledge is understood as 'buried metal and the interviewer is a miner who unearths the valuable metal.' Kvale skilfully describes how 'Some miners seek objective facts to be quantified, others seek nuggets of essential meaning' and how 'In both conceptions the knowledge is waiting in the subjects' interior to be uncovered, uncontaminated by the miner.' 'The interviewer digs nuggets of data or meanings out of a subject's pure experiences, unpolluted by any leading questions. The interview researcher strips the surface of conscious experiences, the therapeutic interviewer mines the deeper unconscious layers.'

Kvale very subtly, with a twinkle of the eye, exposes how little he appreciates empty attempts to appear scientific that may be connected to the *miner metaphor*: 'The precious facts and meanings are purified by transcribing them from the oral to the written mode. The knowledge nuggets remain constant through the transformations of appearances on the conveyor belt from the oral stage to the written storage. By analysis, the objective facts and the essential meanings are drawn out by various techniques and molded into their definitive form. Finally the value of the end product, its degree of purity, is determined by correlating it with an objective, external, real world or to a realm of subjective, inner, authentic experiences.'

Conversely, says Kvale, 'The *alternative traveler* metaphor understands the interviewer as a traveler on a journey that leads to a tale to be told upon returning home. The interviewer-traveler wanders through the landscape and enters into conversations with the people encountered. The traveler explores the many domains of the country, as unknown territory or with maps, roaming freely around the territory. The traveler may also deliberately seek specific sites or topics by following a method, with the original Greek meaning of "a route that leads to the goal"' (italicisation in original).

Kvale reminds us of the etymology of the word 'conversation' and its fit with the *traveller metaphor*: 'The interviewer wanders along with the local inhabitants, asks questions that lead the subjects to tell their own stories of their lived world, and converses with them in the original Latin meaning of conversation as "wandering together with."'

Kvale clearly is a master of aesthetic form, when he writes: 'What the traveling reporter hears and sees is described qualitatively and is reconstructed as stories to be told to

the people of the interviewer's own country, and possibly also to those with whom the interviewer wandered. The potentialities of meanings in the original stories are differentiated and unfolded through the traveler's interpretations; the tales are remolded into new narratives, which are convincing in their aesthetic form and are validated through their impact upon the listeners.'

As if Kvale knew what would happen to me in Africa, he writes: 'The journey may not only lead to new knowledge; the traveler might change as well.' However, my twenty-five years of international life had already thoroughly taught me that 'The journey might instigate a process of reflection that leads the interviewer to new ways of self-understanding, as well as uncovering previously taken-for-granted values and customs in the traveler's home country.'

However, 'Through conversations, the traveler can also lead others to new understanding and insight as they, through their own storytelling, may come to reflect on previously natural-seeming matters of course in their culture.'

Kvale quotes from Richard Rorty's chapter 'The Pragmatist's Progress' in *Interpretation and Overinterpretation* edited by Eco (1992), where Rorty writes on 'inspired criticism' and how it pertains to a transformative conversation that is 'the result of an encounter with an author, character, plot, stanza, line, or archaic torso which has made a difference to the critic's conception of who she is, what she is good for, what she wants to do with herself; an encounter which has rearranged her priorities and purposes' (Rorty, in Eco, 1992, 107).

Kvale concludes that the two metaphors – of '*the interviewer as a miner*' and '*the interviewer as a traveller*' – represent different concepts of knowledge formation. 'Each metaphor stands for alternative genres and has different rules of the game. In a broad sense, the miner metaphor pictures a common understanding in modern social sciences of knowledge as "given."'

The traveller metaphor, however, refers to a constructive understanding that involves a conversational approach to social research. With this preparation in mind, the reader is now invited to participate in my journey to Africa.

I will begin with a short description of my personal approach to Somalia, then I will focus on Rwanda and Burundi, and how it presented itself to me in the course of my fieldwork; thereafter I will proceed to Germany. This sequence parallels the chronology of my fieldwork: I travelled first to Somalia in November 1998 and from where I reached Kenya, Burundi, and Rwanda in 1999. Germany serves as background; it is the country in which I grew up, and to which I have kept ties despite of living outside of it. Interviews in Germany

were carried out during 'in between' periods, throughout the whole project period from 1997 to today, as were interviews in other parts of Europe, namely Belgium, Switzerland, and France.

I will use a mixture of past and present tense in order to make the reader participate in my journey as closely as possible. In most cases I will introduce a person or event in the past tense and then switch to present tense and describe my experience as it was there and then.

As already recounted earlier, from 1997 to 1998 I concentrated on collecting literature and getting in touch with knowledgeable people in Norway and around the world, with experts researching on Africa, particularly Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi, on international organisations, on Holocaust and genocide, and on social psychology. I built a network of more than 500 interdisciplinary academic contacts, a network of conversation on the topic of humiliation; I named some of them in my acknowledgements at the beginning of this book. To date, autumn 2000, the actively maintained academic network has grown to 532 researchers from all over the world, and the network of individual informants and/or representatives of organisations to 537. However, the numbers increase continuously, because almost daily I receive messages from researchers and practitioners who have heard about the humiliation project.

As explained earlier, during my fieldwork in Africa from 1998 to 1999, I moved from home to home, on the average every week or ten days to a new place, for almost a year, always looking for new hosts who would kindly house me and give me the precious opportunity to participate in their lives and learn about their views, views that I would not have understood from a hotel room, or hotel bar, where I would have encountered I have already quoted above as a 'routine …[that]…rarely varies anywhere in the world… Most reporters naturally gravitate to the same bars, where they repeat to each other the latest gossip and rumours, which then become the headline of the day' (The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 19, paragraph 12).

As a result, my fieldwork resembled anthropological and sociological participatory fieldwork to some extent, and it is difficult to count the major interviews that I carried out. In the beginning in Somalia I had a number of quite formal interviews, later I rather had relationships, or a network of communication. These relationships were embedded into a broader social context of reciprocity, not one of exploitation. As I have already mentioned, I thanked all those who hosted me by buying food and contributing to other expenses, for example by participating in the costs of weddings or educational courses, sending emails and

faxes to inquire about scholarships all over the world, as far as trying to find used computers, - the list is long.

When I sat with people, I made notes, or taped the conversations on audio or videotape. All audio or video tapings were preceded by preparatory visits or meetings, in an effort to build a relationship of mutual understanding and trust, one that would make it possible for both sides to be open, and not just deliver propaganda statements. Apart from incessant encounters with people, each mapping out another fragment of African predicament, I carried out altogether 216 full interviews, as specified in Table 8. Interviews lasted from one hour to several hours, in one piece, or on several occasions. Altogether I have collected 100 hours of audio taped interviews and 10 hours of digital video.

Distribution of Interviews	
58 interviews	with Somalis in Africa and Europe
26 interviews	with third party representatives working with Somalia
45 interviews	with Rwandans and Burundians in Africa and Europe
54 interviews	with third party representatives working with Rwanda and Burundi
30 interviews	with third party representatives in general in Africa

Table 8: Distribution of interviews with respect to Somali, Rwanda and Burundi

In the following, in many cases I will not expose the identity of an interlocutor in order to protect his or her safety or political survival. I bear a great responsibility in this respect since I intend this manuscript to be read not only by Western academics, but also by my friends in Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi who kindly provided me with all the insight I am now able to present, as well as politicians who hopefully will be able to draw lessons from this text, lessons that help them to build more peace and not more violence. Especially in Rwanda and Burundi, people have not stopped being afraid, 'to-kill' lists are not just a problem of yesterday, and forces are still poised to re-conquer Rwanda. I hope that I will show enough sensitivity and not quote utterances that would hurt the person who confided in me. Confidentiality is an important reason for not listing the interviews that have been carried out more openly, or publish any systematisation of them in this book. It would be too easy to identify interviewees whom I want to protect.

The interviews and conversations were conducted in different languages; most of them in English (Somalia) and French (Great Lakes), many in German, and in Norwegian. In the

following I will present only English translations, all translated by the author, without always indicating in which language they were conducted.

Somalia

The First Encounter

The first Somali I ever met was a refugee from the Ethiopian Ogaden who was my client in Egypt when I was a psychological counsellor in Cairo (1984-1991). He later went on to Germany and disappointed those helping him there bitterly; he grossly betrayed the trust and faith they put in him, he stole and deceived. In other words, my first encounter with Somalia was sad, also I felt personally let down, because I had put in my name for him. I believe, however, that this was my last sad experience concerning Somalis. From now on my relationships with Somalis were characterised by me appreciating with a great deal of admiration and understanding their specifically difficult background and the way they had to learn to handle it.

I would like to add another story that is intended to 'wake up' my readers and slightly provoke them at the very outset, thus letting them participate intimately in my 'learning-curve' from exasperation to deep respect: A Norwegian mother reported to me how her son, 10 years old, came home in horror. He had been out in the Norwegian woods with his Scout group. In the late afternoon they planned to have a campfire and were told to collect wood. They did. The Norwegian boy, I call him Ragnar, was happily heaping up branches in his arms. Then came a Somali boy, I call him Musa, part of the same group, equal in age. The two boys were alone. The Somali boy took out the knife that every Scout carries, put it to Ragnar's neck and asked him to hand over the wood to him. Ragnar asked him, 'why?' The Somali boy replied: 'Because I have a knife!' Ragnar was terrified, handed over the wood to Musa and later did not even dare to talk to the group leader or his friends about this incident. He arrived home still shaking. This happened in 1999, the mother gave her permission to me for quoting this story, however, without using real names.

What are we to think of a people, who, being guests in Norway, on human rights grounds, educate their young sons to be extortionists of their very hosts?

I put these reflections at the outset of this section on Somalia, because they parallel my views both on Rwanda/Burundi, as well as my 'learning-curve' on Germany: Initial repulsion was typically followed by a more respectful attempt to better understand the roots of those deeds that initially caused my repugnance.

I will now recount the journey into 'understanding Somalia' that I undertook as part of my research on humiliation.

Outside of Somalia

In 1997 I got acquainted with several Somalis in Norway. I became aware of the groups of Somali men gathering in the streets of Oslo in front of Somali meeting places. At the office of Hirad (an NGO whose aim is to integrate Somalis better into Norway and to support emergency relief to Somalia) I met Farah Hussein Ahmed (16th May 1997), an engineer educated in Weimar, - wise, intelligent, the opposite of an extortionist, - who brilliantly introduces me into Somali history; I later see him again in Hargeisa.

On 4th July 1997 I visited the Somalia-researcher Katrin Eikenberg at the Institut für Afrika-Kunde in Hamburg in order to learn more about non-Somali experts' views on Somalia from as many perspectives as possible. Wanting to understand more about conflict in Africa in general I later initiated regular working meetings in 1998 with the Egyptian Ambassador in Oslo, Magdy A. Hefny, who was Ambassador in Addis Ababa (1989 – 1995) and involved in the operationalisation of the 'OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution' in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and Stig Jarle Hansen, University of Oslo, writing his Master's thesis in political science on Somalia, who later joining me during the first part of my stay in Somalia.

Through Magdy A. Hefny I learn not only more about the OAU's view on African matters, but also about the Egyptian views on Somalia. Later, on 11th March 1999, I would meet with Medhat Kamal El Kady, Head of East African Affairs at the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Cairo, and gain more insight into Egyptian opinions on Somalia, - on whether it should be united, or whether Somaliland should be acknowledged (according to Egyptian views, it should not be acknowledged).

1997 I got to know Hassan A. Keynan, a brilliant thinker and former UNESCO secretary general in Somalia (1985-1988), who had left his tormented country for Australia, the USA and then Norway. Keynan concentrates in his work on masculinity and how Somali male role prescriptions may figure as core explanations for Somali violence (see for example Keynan, 1997). He personally decided to renounce clan-identity, and explains (25th November 1999) that he is very 'annoyed' with foreigners who believe that Somalis are 'helpless victims of their 'age-old' clan-affiliation.' He criticises foreigners who do not understand that the rules in a worn-torn country like Somalia are different from those in peaceful Norway; that

living in constant conflict and emergency, often under humiliating circumstances, has effects that alter everything, from 'communication styles to the sense of self and reality;' and that it leads to survival strategies that a Westerner may be blind to, strategies entailing not least the 'intentional manipulation of the topic of humiliation.'

Through Keynan, but also through the press, I learned that Somali refugees are perceived as the most difficult and disruptive of all refugee groups in Norway, Canada, and other places. 'Difficult,' 'disruptive,' 'aggressive,' but also 'proud,' these were words that accompanied my research on Somalia from then on, 'honest,' but not honest in the way that they would tell you everything, but insofar as they would not hide their dislike of you.

For example, before travelling to Somalia for fieldwork in 1998 I contacted various organisations in Africa and explained that I wanted to do research on humiliation. I recall a member of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) telling me on the phone from Nairobi that 'the NGOs and UN people are fed up with these arrogant and impertinent Somalis.' My interlocutor, who did not want to be named, presented much evidence, for example that Somali refugees in refugee camps would not be happy with corn, they wanted rice, or that the women in the camps wanted money for luxurious cosmetic products, - in brief, Somalis apparently did not appreciate the efforts of the international community to help them out of their crisis, but seemed to define this help as their rightful 'pasture.' He said: 'No NGO will support your work if you aim at depicting Somalis as victims!' He concluded that many helpers, especially those who started out as idealists, think that the Somalis 'deserve what they get'!

Later on humanitarian aid workers repeatedly asserted to me that Somalia is the most difficult place in the world to work in 'because Somalis are aggressively honest and tell you right in your face if they don't like you.' However, some added, 'but at least you know where you stand' (as compared to, for example, Rwanda).

Former Somali Ambassador Hussein Ali Dualeh confirms this view on his fellow countrymen in an interview on 9th January 1999 in Nairobi:[147] 'Somalis are nomads and nomadic life is a violent society. A nomad is the proudest man on earth, although he has nothing. But a man in that harsh environment with a hundred camels and his gun, he believes there is no human being who is as high as him. He is the proudest man on earth! This nomad's pride is still the culture even for those born in the city. The man is basically a nomad, so you

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[147] Further down Ambassador Dualeh will be given more space, all quotes will be taken from the same interview.

can never shake off that feeling of pride. The education and the living in towns only blunt this pride.'

Abdirazak Osman writes to me on the 5th October 1999: '…being a nomad is being noble, Evelin. And therefore it's only understandable to see a former nomad seeking a high status city job: they both are of a high position job with a respect and good income. A Somali wouldn't work as a garbage collector, gravedigger, bricklayer, etc. Even if he never learned to read. He still would like to rule!'

'Laziness,' or 'Being Poised'?

Such nomad pride is easily interpreted as arrogant and malevolent laziness, as Anna Simons illustrates, when she reports on expatriates' views on Somali which she encountered during her fieldwork in Mogadishu in 1988 and 1989: 'the universal belief among expatriates [was] that Somalis lacked the ability to maintain anything - roads, equipment, offices, projects, or, essentially, themselves. This lack of maintenance was epitomized by the phrase *inshallah*, which, to most expatriates, stood for and summarized Somali laziness, irresponsibility, and lack of vision. Not only did expatriates tend to interpret *inshallah* literally to mean, "if Allah wills" or "if Allah says" (which is also how Somalis translated it into English for non-Arabic speakers) but they also often understood it to mean something like mañana… (Simons, 1995, 15, italicisation in original).

Seven years of living and working within all segments of Egyptian and expatriate circles and ten years of travelling and working in other cultures before that, had given me some insight into the phenomenon that Simons describes. In every place of the world where Allah is the name of God in 'if God wills' I encountered the deep misunderstanding this saying produces in expatriate circles: any American will respect a devout fellow American who pays God tribute by alluding to God's will; Muslims, however, although they pay the same tribute to the same God, hardly earn the same recognition.

According to my observations, quite a number of expatriate Westerners appear to be driven by fear of the strange environment they find themselves in, fear that they do not admit to, but cover up for with 'tough' self-serving language such as 'these bastards do not impress me!' Such language provides the opportunity to snuggle up in a protective expatriate group of 'we, the minority who knows better' against 'them, the majority who is not enlightened enough to know what is best for them.' Such markers of expatriate identity, - apart from official talk about human rights and the necessity of everybody respecting everybody, - seem

serve the purpose to be soothing and comforting. There is the only exception of those moments where expatriates boast that they in fact 'love' some of these 'natives,' and are 'loved' back, meaning that they have 'bravely' 'mastered' at least some of these 'wild animals' of strange 'natives,' be they Egyptians, or others.

Apart from fear, the other, and much deeper incompatibility for expatriates may be the antagonism between 'free nomads' and 'bonded underlings,' that Simons touches upon in her book *Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone,* and that may lie at the heart of Somali problems with being 'liked' by expatriates. I will return to this point later.

My yearlong experience with the relationship between expatriates and their local counterparts made me wary of straightforwardly siding with expatriate views and condemning Somalis as impertinent and lazy. However, as I only knew too well from my previous experience, blindly subscribing to Somali views that 'the world is against us' would be just as unwise. I therefore tried to keep an open mind, searching for my own, third position, hoping that both expatriates and Somalis will benefit from such a perspective.

Simons beautifully formulates the typical relations between expatriates and local counterparts, - a mixture of elements that in the case of Somalia lead to disaster: 'Expatriates in Somalia misunderstood Somalis, Somalis misunderstood one another, the West misperceived the "state" of Somalia, the regime in Somalia misunderstood its exact place in the world, and all sides mistook the extent to which they could or could not influence events and each other. And the compounded result of all of this misunderstanding has been singular disaster' (Simons, 1995, 4).

So, who are the Somalis? Simons reports on the expatriate view: 'Self-reliance, then, in at least three senses was at the root of what expatriates believed Somalis were missing. First, they would not fix anything themselves because someone else was always there to help them (i.e., expatriates). Second, Somalis could not manage anything properly because they did not have the capacity to (although it was also acknowledged that wilful mismanagement in the form of corruption was what made some of them so rich). This fed directly into the third sense in which Somalis lacked self-reliance: They had no civic motivation or drive to better themselves in any but corrupt terms' (Simons, 1995, 15).

These words may even have won Ibn Khaldun's approval. Ibn Khaldun writes: '...savagery has become [the Bedouin's] character and nature. They enjoy it, because it means freedom from authority and no subservience to leadership. Such a natural disposition is the negation and antithesis of civilization… The very nature of their existence is the negation of building, which is the basis of civilization. Furthermore, since they do not see any value in

labor and craftsmen and do not appreciate it, the hope for profit vanishes, and no productive work is done. The sedentary population disperses, and civilization decays… The Bedouins are not concerned with laws, or with deterring people from misdeeds… They care only for the property that they might take away from people through looting ... Under the rule of Bedouins, their subjects live as in a state of anarchy. Anarchy destroys mankind and ruins civilization…' (Ahmed, 1995, 17).[148]

Somali Intellectual Brilliance

The first time I met a larger group of Somalis in more intimate circumstances was at Turku, Finland, at the 'International Congress of Somali Studies,' 6th – 9th August 1998. I am surprised by something I had not expected: elegance! Never before had I met so many stylishly clothed men in one place (stylish in a Western sense, meaning that they wore Western labels, while many of the women, beautiful as they were, were dressed in traditional clothes). I ask myself: Does this male elegance signify something? Is it designed to express Somali 'nobleness'? Or, perhaps it is just another aspect of a relative lack of hierarchy? In patriarchal Germany many males are seemingly so convinced that they will be able to attract a beautiful woman as a companion, by their mere capacity of being males - higher in hierarchy - that many do not waste time on making themselves attractive for the female gaze. The more egalitarian society in Norway on the other side exhibits much more sporty men, men who see themselves also as object, not just as subject, among others as object of the female gaze. Perhaps the egalitarian Somalia was similar? Or, was I wrong, and this elegance was not a sign of nobleness, or egalitarianism between women and men, but a remnant of Italian colonialism, Italy being a European cradle of design?

And, hardly ever before had I met as many sharp and independent minds, more likely to criticise brilliantly than to praise. And, I realise that almost everybody is a Shakespeare; poetry is at times being used to open a presentation of a paper (for example by Hassan A. Keynan), - poetry that a Shakespeare would have envied. My conclusion is: These are intellectuals who can be taken to epitomise the mobile elite of independent individuals needed in a modern global knowledge society; no lack of self-reliance, rather the opposite.

In Turku I am able to speak to many of the most prominent, renowned and fascinating intellectuals of Somali origin, who live dispersed throughout the whole world, from Ahmed I.

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[148] Ahmed quotes from 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Muhammad Ibn Khaldun's al-Mugaddimah, translated by Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, 1967, 120).

Samatar (James Wallace Professor and Dean of International Studies and Programming, Macalester College, Saint Paul, Minnesota), to Mohamed H. Mukhtar (Savannah State University, Savannah, Georgia, USA), to Ali Jimale Ahmed (Chairman of the Somali Studies International Association, SSIA, of North America and author of books such as *The Invention of Somalia*, 1995 or *Daybreak is Near*, 1996), and Hussein M. Adam (founding president of Somali Studies, College of Holy Cross, Massachusetts., USA).

I furthermore learn a lot from speaking to Abdi M. Kusow (Central Michigan University), as well as to Abdullah A. Mohamoud (University of Amsterdam), Hamdi S. Mohamed (University of Ottawa, Canada), Ibrahim M. Mursal (writing in the Netherlands), or Abdirizak A. Osman (author of *In the Name of the Fathers* and telling me that his only home is his email address), and Salada M. Robleh (Stockholm University), Mohamed-Rashid Sheekh Hassan (anthropologist, research journalist and broadcaster, BBC), and Ali Moussa Iye (Unesco, Ethiopia), or Sadia Arif Gassim (World Wide Opportunities for Women Inc., Ontario, Canada), and Asha-Kiin F. Duale (a lawyer from London).

Among the non-Somali experts Lee V. Cassanelli attends the conference (University of Pennsylvania, USA), giving witness to special Italian connections to Somalia, as well as Annarita Puglielli (Universita degli Studi di Roma). It is Suzanne Lilius (Helsinki University), who chairs the organising committee of the conference. Anita S. Adam is present, the managing director of Haan Associates who have published so many of significant books on Somalia over the years. I also learn much from speaking to John William Johnson (Indiana University), and Jim Adams (International Organization for Migration, IOM).

Hibo, the famous singer from the North of Somalia, now living in Germany, entertains the conference. There are only very few people present who were able to travel from Somalia to Finland. There is Abdirahman Yusuf (Bobe), senior editor of the Jamhuriya journal, Hargeisa, and Mohamed Abdillahi Rirache, a historian and co-author of *Spared from the Spear*, Djibouti.

Abdulrahman Moalin Abdullahi (Chairman, Somali Reconciliation Council Mogadishu), and Dr. Ali-Bashi Omar (physician at Digfer Hospital, Mogadishu) are the only ones visiting from Mogadishu. Abdulrahman Moalin Abdullahi invites me to Mogadishu, an invitation I gladly accept, but later financial restraints will make it impossible to realise this visit; to my greatest regret costs, especially for security, were too high for an academic on a small scholarship.

Somaliland

In November 1998, from Dubai, I finally headed for Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland in the North of Somalia (largely the land of the Isaaq clan). From Dubai I try to phone Ahmed Al-Azhari, founder and executive director of the 'Horn of Africa College' in Hargeisa, whose name I had found on the Internet and who had volunteered to guide me and my colleague, Stig Jarle Hansen, after arrival. (Later I learn that Ahmed Al-Azhari in his personal biography embodies much of the history of Somalia, from national hope to despair, however, always standing up and trying to find new ways to rescue the situation.) Phoning from Dubai to Hargeisa proved to be very difficult, and I did not know whether I would be expected upon arrival or not. Sitting in the plane, I knew that the journey was into the unknown, a situation that epitomised the tough circumstances people of Hargeisa find themselves in all the time.

I travelled from Dubai with a local airline that was unknown to any major travel agency I had contacted in Norway, and was handled separate from any mainstream airport dealings at Dubai airport. Stig Jarle Hansen and I fly in an age-old Russian airplane whose least problems are loose seats that lack security belts, - only the dignity of the Somali fellow passengers forecloses the immediate panic that would otherwise befall any inexperienced average Western traveller.

We arrive in Hargeisa. Hargeisa is difficult to describe. Yellow sand covers everything; at times a strong desert wind produces a hollow sound that makes one shiver, feel lonely, and realise humankind's vulnerability on their tiny planet; the wind regularly overrides the faint Somali music from creaking radios; the sun brings heat during the day; few trees give shadow; the nights can be chilly; the nights are also dark, paraffin lamps creating tiny spots of light, a few generators noisily powering scattered illumination. During the daytime, goats promenade everywhere, eating leftovers and being very effective users of biodegradable waste; the only things they should not eat are the plastic bags blown around by the wind and generously decorating the few trees; goats get sick when they try to eat plastic bags.

Some houses are rebuilt, some still in ruins; nomadic huts at the entrance of the city house returning refugees, - although it is difficult to decide where is 'city,' and where is semi-desert with its thorny bushes. Tall nomads with their stick and their *mawiss* [traditional Somali dress, a cloth fastened around the waist] majestically and slowly walk the wide dusty streets; women border the streets with their tea stalls [something unheard of in former times, I am told, wartimes having disrupted society to the extent that women have to go out and earn even their husband's living, - while their husbands often sit at home and wait for well-paid

office jobs]; some women also sell *khat*. The streets are mostly sandy trails; however, there is one main street with a central crossroad, regulated by traffic police in the uniform of 'Somaliland.' No guns are to be seen in the streets; in front of a hotel a large sign reminds the passer-by that this has not always been like this: the sign shows a crossed out machine gun, indicating that guests with machine guns are not welcome. I am not recommended to walk around in the streets alone, because 'there may be boys…'

Somaliland's main income stems from selling livestock to Saudi Arabia. However, this export was blocked at the time I visited, by a Saudi Arabian ban on Somali livestock, officially out of fear of disease, but, some maintained, in order to protect Saudi investment in Australian sheep farming. Many in Somaliland, as in the rest of Somalia, therefore depend even more than usual on the financial support they get from their family members who are dispersed in the whole world, as for example in Norway, Canada, and the United States. They receive these funds in ways that epitomise the Somali puzzle of abject disorder on one side and genial organisation on the other side: 'Somalia's tight clan bonds have helped to set up worldwide banking networks. Someone in Ontario, for example, can give dollars to his local clan banker, and the equivalent will be collected by his family from the remittance bank in Galkayo within 24 hours. There are no receipts and no disputes. These remittances, hundreds of millions of dollars a year, keep Somalia going' (The Economist, 1999b, 32).

Not just people in Galkayo, but also inhabitants of Hargeisa receive money through these miraculous channels. Even I, taken by surprise by the fact that none of my money reserves (such as traveller cheques) were of any use, draw money from my Norwegian bank account by using such a local organisation that works more efficiently, and on a global scale, than any Western bank I ever encountered. And this under circumstances where Hargeisa can not even be phoned without problems, having two small local private telephone networks that in addition are not linked with each other (however, this situation is in rapid change, a mobile phone system was in its making when I visited).

Upon arrival in Hargeisa Stig Jarle Hansen and I become aware that a cross-cultural misunderstanding has occurred. When we were promised help from the Somali side, it had been assumed, perhaps stimulated by Stig's worries about security, that we 'needed' a house in a compound with high walls around it, with a translator, and former freedom fighters as driver and guards, all of whom are being presented to us upon arrival. An empty house had been rented, Italian style, luxurious according to local standards, two Western style beds had been bought, some chairs and a table, - while our 'employees' were to sleep the traditional way on mats. All this was, as was pointed out to us correctly, still cheaper than staying in the

local hotel that normally caters to visiting Westerners. At first we are but shocked, - we are not an NGO with funding for such unaffordable amenities as a house in a compound with employees, - but we cannot escape totally, only partly. Subsequently we understand that a Westerner is seen by Somalis as an 'animal' that is unable to live differently - and expatriates in Hargeisa do indeed live in a way that is even more protected and 'Western' than our 'set-up.' We understand, therefore, why we are being met with total disbelief when we explain that we would have been much more comfortable in a family or in a small local hotel.

This experience confirms to me that the way I am used to travel, very low-key and with ad hoc preparations for housing, a way that I had diverted from because I did not want to risk Stig's security, is not only more practical, but at the end even safer. Our 'set-up' is not only much too costly, - we hardly can come up with the money for all demands, although we strip the arrangements offered to us down to the core, - but also unsafe, because it frames us in a way that is not necessarily the way we want, namely as targets to be fought for in the all-encompassing and fierce Somali competition for resources. Stig leaves after three weeks, and I continue my stay alone. Further down I will describe the little hold-up that, upon leaving, would be my last farewell from Hargeisa.

Somali fierceness is related to Somali pride. Although I met many people in distress in Hargeisa - economic problems, poverty, and traumatisation from civil war clearly take their toll - the   legendary Somali nomad pride permeates the atmosphere of the city and the body language of everybody in the street. As an Australian humanitarian aid worker confirms in an interview (29th November 1998), this pride may have been the reason for a very equal colonial relationship in the North of Somalia. He says: 'The North of Somalia was a British protectorate. There was respect for the Somalis; there was a kind of equal relationship. When England gave away the Ogaden [or Haud, a semi-desert that England gave to Ethiopia against the promises they had made to the Somalis], the Somalis were very angry: "You are our friends (!), how can you betray us!" And the British officers were also annoyed with London, who just gave the Haud away as a kind of usual bargaining chip. So, there was a kind of partnership [between the Somalis and British].' In other words, the Northerners, mainly Isaaq, always maintained a spirit of un-subjugated pride, obviously to a greater extent than the Southern Somali population who learned Italian and was dominated and influenced by Italian colonial culture to a greater extent.

Somali Pride and Collective Attachment

I am not the first Western visitor to be intrigued by nomad pride. Gerald Hanley, a British soldier during World War II and stationed in the Somali semi-desert, describes the Somali bravery, toughness and unbreakable pride, and his admiration for this, in a blood-freezing book (Hanley, 1971). Also Jeanne D'Haem joins ranks, she was in Somalia in 1968 as a Peace Corps volunteer and exclaims: 'The best trait of the Somali people - independence and a strong will to survive under any circumstances - has been honed for centuries in the difficult, unforgiving climate. The struggle for water rights is not won by the indecisive or the passive. Ironically, however, these traditional Somali strengths are a weakness as they confront a world in which machine guns have replaced sticks and shouting. Aggressive tendencies ensured survival in the nomadic societies of the past, but these proclivities, tangled with tribal obligations and the infusion of modern weapons, have played a large part in creating the current chaos in that country' (D'Haem, 1997, xii).

Lewis reports that the peoples of the Horn of Africa are 'extremely individualistic and this is consistent with their segmentary political structure. Each order of tribal segmentation has its representative head, so that the power and authority with which particular chiefs are invested is a function of the segments involved in any given situation. There is generally no overriding centralized political organization... In essence the tribal chief is a representative figure with powers limited by the council which he convenes.' (Lewis, 1998, 11).

What Lewis touches upon here is the first question mark that quickly arose in my mind when I met proud Somalis. How could their individualism link up with their apparent collectivistic attachment to groups (for example their clan)? I repeatedly was told the following joke about a nomad coming to town: He camps a little to one side, discreetly, and expects to be fed. But everybody ignores him. He goes through the streets and says: "No matter how much you ignore me, I am still your guest!"

There is *qaaraan* and there is *dia*. The *qaaraan*-giving group is often the same group that also pays *dia* (blood money), or, the other way round, you are reminded of which group you belong to when asked to participate in *qaaraan* and *dia* payments (in one case I was included and also paid *qaaraan* for a person who needed to travel and buy a plane ticket). These payments identify the group boundaries. Virtually everyone is part of these rather small amounts of money that circulate as *qaaraan* or *dia*. Simons reports from her stay in Mogadishu in 1988/89 that everybody 'claimed he or she (or a household head) paid it when asked (so long as money was available). Who paid *qaaraan*, then, delimited the group. However, *qaaraan* was only selectively collected and distributed, often as cases arose but

sometimes only annually (although one person told me his group collected a set fee once a month). In instances in which people I spoke with had received *qaaraan*, it was usually used to offset mourning costs (here it should be noted that mourning was public in the sense that mourners [lineage members and others] were provided with refreshments if not a meal, paid for through *qaaraan*). Other times it was collected to help the family when someone had been jailed, or it was requested because a family member accidentally caused the death of someone else and *dia* had to be offered. This last suggests the urban elision of *dia* and *qaaraan* and the complexities of assigning blame in such "modern" entanglements as automobile accidents' (Simons, 1995, 120, italicisation in original).

Also Said S. Samatar tries to explain the unique Somali linkage of unprecedented pride and collective attachment. He approaches the subject from the angle of individual guilt or culpability. 'The Somali *Heer*, or traditional political contract, functioned by a system of collective punishment or reward, scarcely ever by appreciation of what Westerners call "individual merit or demerit". Survival in a harsh environment of desiccated heat and camels required that kinspeople act in concert instead of as individuals. In their personal autonomy, Somalis are extremely individualistic, in their attribution of privilege and obligation, they are inflexibly collective-oriented' (Samatar, 1997, 26, italicisation in original).

Samatar then explains what *Heer* entails: 'The law of *Heer*, for example, held that when a man - or woman - committed a murder, the guilt is immediately transmitted to the culprit's kinspeople collectively. By theory and practice, the aggrieved party were entitled to take vengeance not just on the culprit but on any member(s) of the guilty person's kinspeople that they chanced upon. To pacify the aggrieved, the *mag-* or *dia*-paying unit (*mag*, *dia*: blood money; the *mag* paying unit is the lowest level of the lineage at which members receive and pay compensation collectively) of the guilty individual settled collectively with the deceased's people. (Incidentally, in traditional sanctions, male homicide's blood money was pegged at 100 head of camel, that of a female at 50.)' (Samatar, 26, italicisation in original).[149]

Samatar then points out that in this system a murderer gets away with murder, and how this principle has disastrous consequences in the politics of the modern state: 'modern politicians and men - women, too - of power remain respected and protected members of their immediate kin no matter how blatantly they abuse the public office. Thus General Barre, though he has divided and oppressively ruled his nation, remains a hero to his immediate kin in the Mareehaan clan. The dreaded Red Hats are to a man drawn from his clan. They do not

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[149] During my fieldwork 1998 and 1999 I learned that 100 head of camel are still the amount to be paid for a male homicide.

see President Barre, the ruthless despot who has ruined an entire nation, only their remarkably successful and fortunate kinsman. For a similar reason the various clan-based opposition groups are led by former Barre loyalists who fell out with him because they found their political ambition thwarted by the Machiavellian old man. Leaving the regime, they are allowed into the opposition as leaders, and no one dare ask awkward questions about their past complicity with Mr. Barre's regime; looking into their past will cause the clan - hence the opposition - to splinter into component lineage fragments' (26).

Samatar refers to this point when he reflects upon what the international community can and cannot do to help the Somalis: 'How, for example, can a political abuser of power be held accountable and punished for "crimes" against the "public trust" when his kinspeople are ready to defend him to the bitter end regardless of how corrupt, incompetent or ruthless he may have been in office? In other words, the collectivist clan ideology that was essential for survival in the "bush" setting now wreaks havoc on society in the new urban environment. Again, can the system be tinkered with? Can an outside intervention be made to modify the culture from being informed by a collectivist clan ideology to one that responds to the notions of individual merit and achievement, or individual demerit and failure' (28).

Should Not Guests Bring Gifts?

These extended quotations from Samatar are justified because they have such a pertinent bearing upon my own experience during almost all my fieldwork. More and more questions arise, any answer that I thought I had found crumbles, theories and hypotheses just rush in and out of my head, and, above all, I am forced to be more than an observer; I am drawn into the game as an actor: I am approached as a Westerner with access to ideas where to apply for scholarships, I am a physician and clinical psychologist with access to psychiatric treatment methods, and, - above all, - as soon as I arrived in Somaliland I am 'beleaguered' by Somalilanders who urge me to promote their dream of becoming an internationally recognised independent republic. They argue that they had been humiliated to such a degree by their Somali brothers and sisters that they were no longer able to be part of a united Somalia. They insist that the 'cultural' differences between them and the other Somalis were, after all, too significant:

Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan (this is not his real name, 19th November 1998 in Hargeisa)[150] states: 'Independence of Somaliland is the result of humiliation by the South.'

Muusa Bihi Cabdi, Interior Minister in Somaliland until 1995 also finds the widespread reluctance to appreciate and recognise Somaliland's efforts humiliating and frustrating; he writes (see also my interview with him further down): 'I am a Government Minister of a country which, at the highest levels of the international community, is totally ignored. This would not matter if the Republic of Somaliland were like the Republic of Singapore – healthy and wealthy – but it does matter when, through no fault of our own, our country has been devastated and our people crippled by the actions of a tyrant. We need to shout louder than most to make ourselves heard, for we need help to rebuild our shattered country' (Cabdi, in Salih & Wohlgemuth, 1994, 83).

Sheikh Ibrahim Sheikh Yussuf Sheikh Mader, the religious head and so-to-speak the 'King of Somaliland' gave me an audience (26th November 1998) and asks me to become an international ambassador for this plight.

What was I to make of my situation in this political drama? Here I am, after my 'scientific' struggle with 'method,' in the middle of a political hotspot among fierce and proud warriors! The South has humiliated the North so that the North does not want anything to do with the South anymore! On the contrary, they want to be an independent state!

Method?

Surprisingly (or rather not surprisingly!), when I later will show film fragments of interviews that I record in the North, to Somalis from the South, they will react with passionate anger, because they disagree with what the interview partners from the North say in the film. Some will bitterly complain to me: 'You know, these people from the North, they were humiliating others before, but this they do not tell you! They behaved arrogantly and humiliated us!' (conversation in December 1999, the interlocutor does not want to be named).

How should I assemble the puzzle or summarise it? Perhaps as follows: In the South the 'secession' of the North is seen as an insult, while people in the North feel that they should not have united with the South in the first place after independence, or at least should have better secured their interests in a united Somalia from the very beginning, - and furthermore, as the Northerners point out, - had not the South decided on a new successor to Barre without asking the North first?

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[150] All further quotations from Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan will be taken from this interview.

So, where was reality, did the Somalis from the North lie when they professed to feel humiliated by the South? Who had actually humiliated whom? The South the North, or the North the South? Obviously all parties feel humiliated. What am I to make of this?

Later, back in Norway, Hassan Abdi Keynan will address these questions and share important reflections on research in war-torn countries with me (interview 25th November 1999 in Oslo). In this interview he tries to explain that objectivity of research can be undermined by several factors, by the ignorance of the Western researcher, but also by the fact that virtually everything in a protracted conflict becomes politicised (and an ignorant researcher may misunderstand politically motivated and manipulated statements as objective truth), and furthermore by the way proud Somalis counteract arrogant and humiliating Western ways of approaching them by not telling Westerners the truth. I will quote from this interview in some length, since it is central to research in war-torn regions in general:

Hassan Abdi Keynan: '…it is not really easy to do research in a war-torn country like Somalia, if you are not aware about many things. I haven't seen many researchers talking about the methodology in war-torn countries. I really believe that for everybody who wants to do research in a country that has been torn apart by conflict for so long, and in a country, whose society is divided, bitterly divided, it is important to take into consideration many things. One of the things that characterises war-torn societies is that everything is politicised. And this includes the smallest thing: if you talk it is politicised, if you keep silent it is politicised, if you visit one part of the country it is politicised, if you don't visit the other country it is politicised, if you have worked in one part of the country it is politicised, - virtually everything is politicised.'

Keynan continues: 'I should make two points: The first is that objectivity can be undermined in two ways, it can be undermined by the foreigners, foreign scholars coming to a country without really trying to understand the country and the people of that country, making their own judgements and doing what they want to do. So, the perceptions with which they come to the country really matter a lot. The other problem is that the Somalis have had their experiences with foreigners, for most of the past century; they have been abused, dominated, insulted and humiliated by foreigners on so many occasions. And generally Somalis are proud people; many foreigners find it very difficult really to see that there are non-Westerners who can be really PROUD! So when Somalis see that people come who look down on them and who don't recognise their humanity and their pride, then the Somalis have their own ways of challenging and resisting that. And one of that is to just not tell the truth, to confuse the foreigner, this is also a tradition; because you treat people the way they treat you. But this is

when they see that foreigners who are coming to their country are not really objective, not fair in the way they deal with the Somalis.'

Keynan now comments on what other Somalis say in the film about the ways they felt they were humiliated: 'I am not in any form or shape trying to belittle or trivialise what any person says [in the film]. The Somalis have enough experience with people trying to tell them things, and to trivialise them, to humiliate them, and I share that experience myself. But, I think, it would be a tragic mistake, if I also don't give the element [of the status of objectivity] the attention that it deserves, because I think it is very important for both the researchers and for the Somalis. By definition, truth is like beauty. For me truth is in the eyes of the beholder. People always say it is beauty that is in the eyes of the beholder, but in certain situations it can be truth that is in the eyes of the beholder. Because, - I have seen so many people, and when you ask the same questions, you get different answers! It is therefore very important to check and re-check everything and try to understand. Of course it depends on what the researcher is trying to do at that particular time. I understand that you are researching humiliation and it is a particularly nebulous concept, that cannot easily be defined, and it is extremely subjective. So, in that context really what you need, maybe, is how people view things, regardless of whether this is true or not. So, you may be a bit luckier than people who are trying to do other things. So, I am not suggesting that this is irrelevant to your topic - it is again very relevant to your topic to understand how people think in situations like that.'

Keynan now reflects on the concept of humiliation: 'But I generally agree that the nature of humiliation is such that it is very difficult to dispute what people say, because it is highly subjective. And if somebody tells a story saying that what was done to me by so-and-so government official, and so-and-so person, or so-and-so clan humiliated me, you cannot argue with that, it is very difficult to argue with that, because it is that person who has experienced that kind of feelings. And since humiliation cannot be quantified, cannot be touched, is not tangible, I think, you have to accept what people say. Generally I understand that point. But, I still suggest, that there must be a particular type of methodology, you know, tailor-made for countries torn apart by war for a long period of time. If there is a war, and the war was brief, and reconciliation has already started, and stability has come back, that is fine. But if it is a protracted conflict that has been going for so long, and it has affected people's lives on a daily basis, it would be foolish if we did not take into consideration that this also affects how people think and what kinds of stories they tell. So, this is the point that I am trying to make and I hope some day it will come in the form of an article.'

At that junction I ask Keynan whether he wishes to point at the difference between authentic feelings of humiliation and the use of a 'rhetoric of humiliation.' He responds: 'Yes. On a personal level people's experiences are there and they are authentic. But, with regard to all Somali groups, particularly those with their own political agendas, and in any other society similar to Somalis, rhetoric of humiliation and rights is used to score a political point. People use political rhetoric including humiliation and violation of human rights, - particular those aspects that the Western world really gives attention to, that attracts the ears of the Western world, - people in other parts of the world try to use and manipulate these aspects, - and that manipulation will even be greater if the researcher is really a novice, and does not know anything about that particular society. General political rhetoric and political manipulation is used even in the most democratic societies, in the most stable and economically better-off countries, but its use in war-torn societies assumes particular poignancy, really, and that is when a researcher trying to be objective must try very hard to discriminate what is authentic and what is political rhetoric aimed at achieving a political objective. I think, that is the most important point. This is not an easy job. But, I think, if the person is aware of that then he or she will take that into consideration, he or she would factor it into the methodology of the research.' [151]

Following this discussion I would introduce a 'disclaimer' into the film: 'Somalia is a deeply divided country today, where almost everything is politicised, and almost everybody seems to have a political agenda. This film touches upon many very sensitive political topics. It has to be kept in mind that the interview partners speaking in this film respond to an interviewer who is a white woman, and thus a member of the international community who is not neutral, but part of the overall political arena.'

A Naïve Lady With Human Rights Ideals, a Soft Heart, and Blue Eyes?

Did all this mean that everything I observed and learned in Somaliland was politically manipulated rhetoric to influence me as a representative of the international community? Was I manipulated as a naïve lady with human rights ideals, a soft heart and blue eyes? When I later ask Southerners whether their brothers and sisters from the North are telling lies when giving gruesome accounts of harassment and quasi-genocide, I learn: 'Sure, many of them have suffered terribly, and sure many feel thoroughly humiliated. But they forget to tell you

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[151] Gadamer discusses truth and method (Gadamer, 1989). See also Spencer's account of Narrative Truth and Historical Truth Spence, 1982.

what they did to others, this is one thing, and the other thing is that they politicise their originally authentic feelings and exploit and instrumentalise these feelings for political aims' (my interlocutor does not want to be named).

This is my situation in Somaliland: A researcher being a representative of the international community, influenced and manipulated for political causes. I tell myself that I can shrug my shoulders and say to Northern Somali requests for me to become their ambassador and promote their desire to become a separate nation: 'So what, you want a nation, this is not my business; on the contrary it is just another facet of humiliation to be studied by me, namely that humiliation is like a disease, - you may have it and need help, or you may pretend to have it because you want to display the symptoms that justify asking for and receiving help.' Or, I can conclude, as a distant and neutral researcher: Humiliation rhetoric is as much my topic as authentically felt humiliation.[152]

But what about those I speak to who are performing the horrible task of digging out graves filled with victims from the genocidal onslaught, and who search for support for documenting it? They invite me, offer me their tea that they can hardly afford, and hope that I can help them bring funds to study the mass-graves and document the killings that had happened! What about this situation? Or, what about the appeal to me on behalf of al those people, who are traumatised by the brutalities of the war, who would need psychological or psychiatric help, and, because this is lacking, are (quite literally in some cases) chained like animals in their houses since their families are afraid that they may wander off into the desert and not find their way back again? Is not the neutral attitude of a 'scientific observer' at times as immoral as the 'hands-off' strategy of the international community in genocidal Rwanda?

Research Humiliates

There are many more sides to my growing feeling that my identity as a Western scientist entailed humiliation for the 'objects' of this science. Consider an 'interview' with Muusa Bihi Cabdi, Somaliland's Interior Minister until 1995, a man in his fifties, a tough man with a life experience that hardly any Western man or woman would have survived. He is a former nomad who trained already as a small child to survive in one of the harshest environments of the world, Somali semi-desert. He recounted how he learned already as a six years old boy to never really sleep, to always be alert to danger, and how he learned to discern the traces of

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[152] This paragraph opens up the discussion on how research itself can humiliate and the text is revised from my article 'How Research Can Humiliate,' Lindner, 2000l.

dangerous animals and enemy clans. Later on he left the desert and became a MIG airplane bombardier and studied in Russia. In the Ogaden war in 1978 he participated in the bombing of Ethiopia. As reported above, Russia abandoned Somalia during this war and sided with Ethiopia, inflicting a humiliating defeat on Somalia. Somalia was subsequently supported by the United States and he studied also there at a military academy. When his Isaaq clan was threatened with eradication in the 1980s, he joined the guerrilla forces and became a commander, responsible for the lives and deaths of many. Later he became a minister in the government of Somaliland. I ask him what he would change if he could live again. He answers that he would change everything: 'I was always in war, tribal war; looting each others' camels; as a kid I was raised in terror; I was six years old when I saw the first person being killed; when I joined army, there was always fighting, and I saw a lot of my friends being killed. If I could live again: not all these wars!'

Since Somaliland is poor, this remarkable man lives now in a deprived context that has few means to provide a dignified life to him and all the other brave fighters who are proud that they put their lives against a dictator and helped oust him.

In the middle of my 'fieldwork' in Somaliland I ask myself: Is this not ridiculous, here I come from abroad in order to apply Western theory, and 'collect data' on this basis, to a warrior who knows more about life, death, strategy, responsibility and a thousand other things, all under life threatening conditions, than we, those in the rich West with our 'cute little theories'?

I start doing discourse analysis of my own actions:[153] How can I dare to call a conversation with such a man 'data collection' from an 'informant'? How can I come with my theoretical reflections about whether I should use a structured or semi-structured interview? How can I ask this man pre-meditated questions from a 'structured' interview? How can I call it 'fieldwork' when I drop in from the rich West to study the sufferings and pride of the poor? How can I 'steal' their feelings in order to write a scientific report so that I 'earn' my scholarship? Is not this obscene, immoral, and unethical? I feel humble; and I sense that it is a necessary humbling. To start with I even feel humiliated; it is a kind of self-humiliation

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[153] For discourse analysis and how discourse is shaped by and shapes power relations, for example by 'turn taking,' etc., see, for example, Bourdieu, 1977; Burke, 1998; Foucault, 1980.
See for discourse and power in cross-cultural contexts Bandlamudi, 1999; Bremer, 1996; Clyne, 1994; Crawford, 1999; Gumperz, 1982; Henwood, 1998; MacMartin, 1999; Morgan, 1998a; Morgan, 1998b; Scollon & Scollon, 1981; Sitaram & Prosser, 1998; Valsiner, 1999; Wetherell & Potter, 1998; Wethrell & Potter, 1992; Williams & Chrisman, 1994.

caused by my own initial acceptance of a version of 'scientific' method that appears to be inhuman now.

In my defence I put forward the fact that I bought the local dress the day I arrived and did not wear Western outfits, and though the house in which I stayed was a palace compared to many other houses, it was not the expensive hotel either. But still. Here I am, a representative of the West, despite of all my modesty displaying Western riches and superiority, trying to collect data from these proud, war-torn 'wild animals' as if they were in a zoo? I feel that I am violating basic laws of human rights, namely respect for every human being's dignity. I feel that I, believing myself to be strongly grounded within a human rights framework, am humiliating all those I talk to as long as I blindly use Western theory as a starting point.

What Is Respect for Another Culture?

But, so comes the next question: What is respect for my Somali interlocutors? Does respect mean to forget about any Western 'bias,' 'go native' and subscribe to everything I learn from the Somali side? If I want to respect human rights because I believe in them, how can I then, for example, respect a Somali framework of thinking that often does not seem to adhere to precisely these human rights? There are many aspects in Somali culture that I would reject, not least female genital mutilation. How should I 'respect' the 'culture' of this practice?

There are other, more subtle examples. I meet with survivors of the quasi-genocidal onslaughts and I put myself into their shoes, as far as I can, and try to empathise with their perspective. I am very moved by the survivors' accounts. At the end of each interview I ask what forms of healing might be envisaged. I think, for example, of truth commissions like in South Africa. I imagine victims and perpetrators talking to each other, the perpetrators asking for forgiveness after having listened to the victims' accounts, and the victims reaching a kind of 'catharsis' by opening up, speaking about their feelings, and being able to forgive. I imagine that such a process would conclude in a mutually satisfactory way to be followed by peaceful co-existence between opponents. My way of thinking and feeling is in line with a human rights definition of humiliation as being a violation of the deepest core of personal dignity (see also Lindner, 2000a).

However, in the interviews another answer to the question about strategies for healing is being given, repeatedly. It goes as follows (1997, 1998, and 1999): 'The elders of the opposing groups (clans, sub-clans, or so-called dia-paying groups) must sit together and talk.

They should decide on the amount of compensation to be paid. Finally, in order to stabilise the situation in the long term, women should be exchanged between the groups for marriage. These women will embody the bridges between opposing groups, since they have their original family in one group and their children in the other.'[154]

Whenever I get this response I am brusquely reminded of my Western individualistic background as opposed to the much more collectivistic and group-oriented Somali view. Paying compensation and exchanging women is certainly the last thing I, as a European woman, would be willing to participate in myself. If I were one of the victims concerned, knowing that my clan had received compensation and that women were being exchanged would hardly satisfy me. I would certainly feel that my personal dignity required another kind of healing. And I as a woman would not want to be used as a 'token' or an 'object' in any negotiation or group-process, even if it served peace; I would want to have the freedom to decide myself who to marry, or if to marry at all.

Where am I then? 'Going native' is no option, nor being an arrogant Western researcher. During my seven years of being a counsellor in Egypt (1984-1991) I had acquired a gut feeling for both traps. I know what anthro-pornography[155] is, and how blind Western arrogance can be. I know that I have to find a way along the lines of humility, and humbleness as Robert Merton describes (Merton, 1949), especially in his chapter *Science and Democratic Social Structure*.[156] I have to exercise humility not only towards the subject, and towards the research carried out so far by other researchers, but, and this is the point here, towards those who know more about the subject than me (also called 'informants').

I remember that Gergen (Gergen, in McGarty & Haslam, 1997, 1) addresses similar processes of questioning: 'My commitment to social psychological inquiry has now exceeded three decades; the commitment has been a passionate one throughout. However, the nature of this passion - the sense of the inquiry and its significance - has changed substantially over this period. The "message" of the discipline, as it initially kindled my excitement, now seems deeply mistaken - in certain respects even injurious to the society.'

Further down in the same text Gergen summarises the view of social psychology that he later learned to criticise, and that may have stood at the beginning of my project: 'To summarize, the message of social psychology inherent in the prevailing Zeitgeist was that empirical research can furnish an unbiased and systematic description and explanation of

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[154] Revised from Lindner, 2000a.
[155] I owe being reminded of this word to Barbro Bakken, Oslo, Norway.
[156] I owe this reference to Ragnvald Kalleberg, sociologist at Oslo University; see also chapter 3.3 in Engelstad et al., 1996.

social behavior, that the accuracy and generality of these theoretical accounts are subject to continuous improvement through research, and that there is nothing so practical for society as an accurate, empirically supported theory. In effect, scientists can offer the society enormous riches in terms of principles of human interaction, and with these principles the society can improve itself. With respect to our understanding of selves, progress in knowledge is interminable' (4).

In the ensuing section in his paper, 'The Early Impasse: Social Psychology as History,' Gergen admits that it was difficult for him to write the above quoted paragraph. I appreciate the way that Gergen narrates his own development, since this is what I am trying to do in this current discussion.

As Gergen puts it, 'The preceding pages were difficult to write, much like attempting to reignite the naive idealisms of adolescence. No, I don't wish to abandon all the premises and certainly not the optimistic sense of potential for the discipline. However, it was essential to squarely face the foolishness if some sort of salvaging was to take place. For me, the first step in critical self-reflection was the growing realization of the historical perishability of social psychological knowledge. Much of the above enthusiasm depends on the belief that knowledge accumulates: each experiment can add to the previous and the accretion of findings gives us an improved fix on the realities of social life. But what if social life is not itself stable; what if social patterns are in a state of continuous and possibly chaotic transformation? To the extent this is so, then the science does not accumulate knowledge; its knowledge represents no more than a small, and perhaps not very important history of college student behavior in artificial laboratory settings' (4).

Towards the end of his paper, Gergen presents the 'The Creative Challenge': 'For the constructionist, the discourses of the profession are themselves constitutive of cultural life. When they serve to mold the intelligibilities of the culture - making distinctions, furnishing rationales for action, and implicitly evaluating forms of conduct - they also prepare our future. This may be a future which simply recapitulates the past, which sustains the taken-for-granted assumptions of the culture. Such are typically the effects of a social psychology based on a realist (or objectifying) account of science. However, for the constructionist, social psychological inquiry can enter into the creation of new forms of cultural life. With the development of new theoretical languages, research practices, forms of expression, and practices of intervention, so does the field invite cultural transformation' (15).

The following quote from the end of Gergen's text will become important for the ensuing period of my research in Somalia, and thereafter in Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Egypt,

and various places in Europe. '… constructionist psychologists have also pursued alternative forms of methodology, reasoning as they do that research methods also convey values and ideologies. Feeling that experimental technologies place a divide between the scientist and subject, privilege the scientist's voice over the subject's, and invite manipulation, they seek means of broadening the range of research methods. Qualitative methodologies (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994) are one significant step toward an enriched social psychology, as are discourse analytic procedures. Further, we are invited to experiment with our very forms of scientific expression. Professional writings in social psychology inherit stale traditions of rhetoric; they are intelligible to but a minute community of scholars, and even within this community they are overly formal, monologic, defensive, and dry. The nature of the social world scarcely demands such an archaic form of expression. Constructionism invites the scholar to expand the repertoire of expression, to explore ways of speaking and writing to a broader audience, perhaps with multiple voices, and a richer range of rhetoric' (17).[157]

The New Method: Dialogue, Authenticity, and Continuous Re-Conceptualisation

Dialogue is the answer to my struggle for method.[158] Steinar Kvale writes, 'The conversation … is not only a specific empirical method: it also involves a basic mode of constituting knowledge; and the human world is a conversational reality' (Kvale, 1996, 37).

This is the answer: I have to enter into dialogue with people who know much more about the subject I want to examine than me, namely about feelings in war and genocide, especially feelings of humiliation. I have to consider them as the experts.[159] I have to become more aware of the social relations I actually form by entering the scene as a researcher.[160]

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[157] See related texts Burr, 1995; Danziger, 1990; Edwards, 1998; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Edwards, 1999; Campos, Ramos, & Bernal, 1999; Billig et al., 1988; Edwards, 1988; Gee, 1999; Shotter & Gergen, 1989; Gergen, 1965; Gergen, 1973; Gergen, 1982; Gergen & Gergen, 1986; Gergen & Gergen, in Berkowitz, 1988; Gergen, 1994; Gergen, 1997; Gergen, 1999; Gergen, 2000b; Ibanez, 1991; Mead, 1934; Middleton & Edwards, 1990; Moscovici, 1998; van Rappard, 1997; Potter & Edwards, 1999, Rorty, 1991; Sampson, 1978; Sampson, 1991; Shotter, 1993; Spence, 1982; Vygotsky, 1978; Wetherell & Potter, 1998; Woofitt, 1992; and see for emotions in this context: Lutz, 1988; Tavris, 1989.

[158] See on dialogue, among many, Bakhtin, 1981; Buber, 1944; Wold, 1992; Billig, 1998; Campos, 1998; Josephs & Rommetveit, 1998; Hermans, 1999a; Hermans, 1999b; Prosser, 1978; Tappan, 1998.

[159] Beynon, 1984 defines the Ford workers in this way, - I owe this reference to Ragnvald Kalleberg.

[160] Argyle writes extensively about social relations, see Argyle & Henderson, 1990; Argyle & Cook, 1976; Argyle, 1994; Furnham & Argyle, 1981; Argyle & Colman, 1995; Argyle, Collett, & Furnham, 1995; Argyle, 1992; Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Argyle, 1974; Humphrey & Argyle, 1962; Argyle, Furnham, & Graham, 1981. I thank Ragnvald Kalleberg for introducing me to this literature.

However, in order to enter into dialogue, I have to be authentic; Taylor writes about *The Ethics of Authenticity* (Taylor, 1990). Being authentic means to disclose my biography. I understand that I have to explain to my 'informants' why I am in Africa and how the project idea has developed. I have to reveal that I have been deeply formed by the aftermath of World War I and II in Europe. I have to tell the story of my father who lost an arm, part of his body, because he, being a young adolescent and at the same time soldier, did not want to be an oppressor but a friend of those his country had conquered, and how he was severely punished. I have to recount how I grew up in my father's head, in his imagination of the farm he was due to inherit, but lost when the part of his country where this farm was located was handed over to another country, and he had no more home, no place to go back to. I have to describe how this fate deeply wounded him, how he never really smiled for 50 years. I have to share how I grew up in a so-called 'refugee-family,' always feeling like a guest in my environment, feeling foreign, never being at home. I have to explain how I later tried to live and work in as many cultures as possible in order to acquire a gut feeling for how human beings in different cultures define and handle, life and death, love and hatred, peace and war. I have to conclude by explaining how all this led up to the research project.

Disclosing this account, being authentic, entering into dialogue, was to dramatically change the relations I hitherto had in Africa. Before I opened up in the way described, I met polite faces, telling me, if they gave me their time at all, what they thought I wanted to hear, but deep down not believing for a minute that I could understand even one tiny percentage of their reality. This I was told later.

After opening up, I learned many new things. I learn that the average African view of the European visitor could be described as follows: 'You from the West, you come here to get a kick out of our problems. You pretend to want to help, but you just want to have some fun. You have everything back home, you live in luxury, and you are blind to that. You arrogantly and stupidly believe that you suffer when you cannot take a shower or have to wait for the bus for more than two hours! Look how you cover our people with dust when bumping childishly and proudly around in your four-wheel drive cars! Look how you enjoy being a king, while you would be a slave in your country! All what you want is having fun, getting a good salary, writing empty reports to your organisation back home, in order to be able to continue this fraud. You pay lip service to human rights and empowerment, but you are a hypocrite! And you know that we need help – how glad would we be if we did not need it! And how good would it be if you were really to listen to us once, not only to the greedy among us who

exploit your arrogant stupidity for their own good!' (this is a condensation from statements that were repeated in Somalia and Rwanda, Burundi, and Kenya).[161]

Not only did I learn more after my opening up, I felt that also many of my African friends learned. Many have little knowledge of the fact that Europe had not always been rich and peaceful. For many of them World War I and II are bloodless images from history. Through my account it becomes palpable to them how terrible the suffering was that people in Europe had endured. This surprises many and it humbles them. I feel that many stop being arrogant towards me. I observe how they hesitate pushing me into the category of those Westerners who do not even have the guts to admit that they want to have fun when they set out to 'help,' and who deceive themselves and others when professing to high ideals. I see how automatic this line of thought is, and how eyes and mouths stand still for fractions of seconds in astonishment when I talk about my background. I observe how I escape the contempt felt on the African side for Westerners who expect to be thanked for being altruistic while being hypocrites.

And I feel that Africans learn even more, namely that there is hope. The extent of division and violence in the 20th century in Europe is breathtaking, and still there is peace today (except the Balkans). Thus the example of Europe embodied in me and in the painful past of my family, creates hope. More, I am considered by many as 'one of us,' as somebody who can, perhaps, fathom the extent of suffering they go through. I approach everybody as a fellow victim, a co-researcher on the way out of violence and war. And I feel that, though it is difficult to get through the wall of disgust towards 'Western hypocrites' I manage in many cases to get on board those who really struggle for peaceful change.

Authentic dialogue means also that I cannot pretend. I have to approach people around me in the state I am in. I continuously struggle with the topic of humiliation in my head, I almost never think about anything else. I pursue a multitude of hypotheses and lines of thought and I draw every interlocutor into this process. Thus my fieldwork becomes one large dialogue, an inner dialogue and an external one. From the long list of questions from my interview guideline, only a few central questions 'survive': *Who are you? Tell me about you and your life! What do you think humiliation is? Does it play a role? If yes, how and where?*

Many of the people I talk to become friends and will also be part of my future network. Thus the initial question of structured versus non-structured interview is being transformed into an existential undertaking where I go in with my whole being. My research

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[161] See also Maren, 1997 and Hancock, 1989.

thus begins to resemble, at least partly, my past experience as a clinical psychologist, for example in Egypt, where I did the first step in this direction by adapting Western methods of therapy to my non-Western context by revising rigid Western ideologies of therapy and mental health.

Somali Journeys

Those who taught me most about Somalia before I actually headed for Africa was, as explained above, Hassan Abdi Keynan and also Farah Hussein Ahmed, from Hirad Integration office in Oslo. From Norway I made also contact with Ahmed Esa. I had found his name on the Internet; he is the co-founder of the Institute for Practical Research (IPR) in Hargeisa that hosted the First Conference on Reconstruction Strategies and the Challenges beyond Rehabilitation from 20th October to 1st November 1998. I later met him in Hargeisa, where he explains the state of Somalia, Somaliland, education in general, and his institute in particular.

One person who is like a history book and has seen with his own eyes and lived through as active participant the British colonisers, the democratic period of Somalia, Siad Barre's reign, and the founding of Somaliland, is the octogenarian Ali Sheikh Jirdeh, co-ordinator of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in Somaliland; he will get to speak further down. Ali Sheikh Jirdeh contains in himself knowledge of everything, from the nomadic lifestyle to Western education, from countryside traditions to modern urban tendencies, and from being a Somali to understanding foreigners.

A similar journey from the city to the countryside was the visit into the 'interior' ('interior' is the word Somalis use for the semi-desert stretching as far as into the Haud in Ethiopia where they graze their life-stock), that I undertake, together with Stig Jarle Hansen, our 'translator,' a policeman, our driver who was a freedom fighter and whose family in the bush we visit, and finally some guards, also former freedom fighters. Later I will participate in another trip to the countryside where I will visit a traumatised man who, as mentioned above like so many others in the region, is (literally) chained in his hut. I am used to extensive travel in the Libyan desert in Egypt or in the Sinai, but still, through these trips I get a better feel for the shades of nomadic life, with camels owned by men, the rest of the livestock largely cared for and owned by women, with some patches of earth being cultivated for sorghum or maize.

And I see how life looks like in a grouping of huts. A school child who uses Anita Suleiman's *Somali Study Materials,* learns about Dahabo and how she helps her mother build the hut, the *aqal*: 'The *reer* [members of the *reer* live and work and travel together] has just arrived at a new camping ground… When the big family left its old encampment, all the portable houses were dismantled, and the houses and belongings of each family were carefully packed on the backs of the pack camels. The fathers, mothers and children then walked beside the camels and other animals, as they journeyed to the new place. They did not ride on the camels. Somalis do not ride their camels. Only if somebody is ill, or is very old, or very, very young will he or she be carried on a camel. The family's new site has plenty of water, and grasses and thorn trees. It is time to set up camp. Everybody will help, even the boys and girls. The women and girls have their special jobs to do, and so do the men and boys… Dahabo will help her mother set up the family house, called an *aqal*. The house is made of curved branches, poles, skins, and grass mats. When Mother was young, the *aqal* was made entirely of things that the nomads could make for themselves. But today most families have waterproof sheets and tarpaulins, and nylon ropes to add to the traditional materials for making the house. Building the house is women's work. First they will secure the long arched branches which will become the frame of their round 'tent.' The curved branches are tied together with rope or with animal sinews. Dahabo's mother used dry grasses to weave the mats for the house. She wove different sorts of mats, some to cover the hut, some to use as a door, and some to decorate the inside walls… (Suleiman, 1997, 6).

Dictator Siad Barre

But, of course, war has affected this nomadic idyll. Scorched earth strategies did not spare the 'interior.' In my interviews I am always interested to find out more about dictators such as Siad Barre, - after all, trauma is a well-studied subject today, while the perpetrators often go rather unstudied. I find several people who could bear witness to Siad Barre's reign. Someone who was especially close to him is Dr. Gaboose, his personal physician; he will speak later. Mohamed Hawadle at 'Solteco,' one of the phone companies of Hargeisa, and last Prime Minister of Siad Barre, is another witness who knew Siad Barre's times in detail; he will also be quoted later.

Both, Dr. Gaboose, and Mohamed Hawadle, epitomise a situation that resembles all periods in the aftermath of dictatorship. As in Germany, where Hitler, just like Siad Barre, was initially welcomed as a saviour, it is difficult to deal with memories following the

dictator's disastrous downfall. Some profess never to have 'believed in him,' some do not want to remember that they ever believed in him and are accused of being liars by those who know that this is not the truth, while again others feel that their efforts during the dictators reign were authentically positive and that not all was bad… - the list of variations on this theme is almost endless. It was clear that several factions in Somaliland do have problems with each other in this respect.

Everybody near the Somali National Movement (SNM) feels that they fought hard against the dictator. Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan, Muusa Bihi Cabdi, Ahmed Al-Azhari, explain how the Isaaq got together and fought the dictator (they all speak more in other places of this text). Professor Al-Azhari opens up his Horn of Africa College' in Hargeisa for me and Stig Jarle Hansen, and takes kind daily care of us. We understand the almost impossible circumstances under which he educates his students - we try to help several of them with applications for scholarships - and we see in what dire need of computer equipment they all are, to meet a hunger for education among his students that deeply impresses and humbles us, - we, who are so lucky to be born in a more privileged region of the world. He opens up his institute for interviewees who can meet us there.

For example, Abdirahman Hussein (interview 10th December 1998), an engineer, visited us there and describes how humiliation can lead to war, how from receiving a continuous current of small and big humiliations and harassments the motivation may grow in a clan to get together and organise an uprising. Hassan visited us there as well (24th November 1998), Hassan, the big Somali football idol living in Norway and trying to get Somali youth away from the streets into such activities as football training.

I keep closely in touch with the SORRA group during the whole of my stay in Hargeisa in November and December 1998. The SORRA group is the former Hargeisa group who spent eight years in solitary confinement in adjacent cells. Several of their members I interview more closely, especially Mohammed Barood Ali, SORRA executive director, Dr. Osman Abdi Maygag, a medical doctor, Ahmed Mohamed Madar, a secondary school teacher who had been in Norway, Abdillahi Ali Yussuf (Olad), and Esa Mohamed Hussein, engineers, and later also Dr. Adan Abokor, a medical doctor. I also sit with all of them together and film their breathtaking, extremely humbling account of their experiences, feelings, and coping strategies during their prison stay. The material from these encounters alone fills a book on its own, and I hope that SORRA members will receive enough support from publishers to be able to bring the drafts they have already written to publication. Our

session represent, in fact, informal focus groups that discuss the topic of humiliation in all its shades for many hours in one stretch.

Dr. Hussein A. Bulhan's work and breadth of experience also deserves a book of its own, - he is a businessman, a medical doctor, a peace advocate, and a thinker: he has written the book *Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression* (Bulhan, 1985). I talk to him on several occasions, for the first time on the 24th November 1998. He was at that time preparing to open the 'Center for Development and Peace' with the War-torn Society Project (WSP, initiated by, among others, as he told me, Hassan Abdi Keynan).

Mohamed Abdulgader reports (we spent several days discussing with him, starting on the 24th December 1998, thus bridging Western holidays and New Year celebrations with my work) that the War-torn Societies Project is one of the best among all actors in Somalia: 'They do not implement projects, but call people together and ask: What is needed? Where is the problem? They have for example addressed education and got all school headmasters together, also Koran schools, parents, ministers, and elders, just everybody who had an interest in that matter. And then they typically make brain storming, open discussion, and collect the needs. They then ask: Who can do what? What can the parents do, what can the others do? Only at the end they ask: Do we need to try to get funds from outside to solve those problems that cannot be solved locally?'

Later in Nairobi I will keep in close touch with the WSP office,[162] with Matt Bryden, Adam Biixi, working in Puntland, and Ahmed Yusuf Farah who has published together with Ioan M. Lewis.[163] I will speak several times with Bryden (for the first time on 15th January 1999), with Farah on 24th May 1999, and with Biixi on 18th February 1999. Later I will get the sad email from Matt Bryden: 'I'm very sorry to inform you that Adam Biixi died in June…, in a car accident between Garoowe and Gaalka'yo.'

Altogether I talked to many Somali women, starting in Turku; in Africa I speak to three women extensively. The first one is Edna Adan, already introduced above, whom I visit on several occasions. I film her in front of the hospital that she builds on land that was formerly used for executions. She does this completely on her own, with her own resources, for example with the pension she gets from her former engagement in the United Nations. Edna Adan with her energy and strength was admired wherever I heard her spoken of.

Edna Adan relates to me how she on several occasions resisted humiliation; this is one from the times of the Siad Barre regime: 'Once they said I was planning to escape from the

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[162] See http://www.unicc.org/unrisd/wsp/index.htm.
[163] Farah, 1999; Farah & Lewis, 1997; Farah & Lewis, 1993.

country, and I spent six days in jail for that. (Why didn't they wait until I tried to escape, why arrest me from my house!) They put me in a cell of my own, but I didn't have a toilet. And right in front of the place where they put me, there was a toilet, and it had no doors. And there was the cell next to me, it was full of men, of criminals, of thieves, I don't know, just men, men all behind the bars. And, so I called out, and I said, - you know, - "I, - I, - I need to go and use the bathroom!" And that is after I had been the first lady of the country! And they said: "Well, you want to use the bathroom? There is the bathroom! You use everybody's bathroom! There! You are not better than the others! There is the bathroom they use!" And I thought - how can I use the bathroom with no doors facing a cell full of men! Full of criminals and people who, - you know, - and I just came out of my cell and I just looked at those men, and I said: "Listen. I am going to use this bathroom. And - would you be watching your mother or your sister if she was using a toilet and she had no door - is this the kind of men you are that you would watch a woman using a bathroom?" And they said, "No." And the first one said "turn around," and they made everyone turn the other way, until I finished using the bathroom. And that was one of the most emotional moments of my time. And the police was so shocked, because they couldn't get their objective, they couldn't get me to be humiliated and using a bathroom with all these men watching and shouting at me. So, this is another form of resistance, and resisting humiliation!'

I ask Edna Adan: Does humiliation lead to war? Edna: 'I would answer that question by saying, "Yes, it does!" You can push human beings too far, just far enough until they turn back and say, "Hey, wait a minute, enough is enough!" And then they begin to resist with violence, with strength, with force, with whatever way they know. And, I think a good example of resisting humiliation through war is what has happened to our country!'

Fadumo Ahmed Sheikh (interview 30th November 1998 in Hargeisa) is the Chairperson of the National Organisation for Woman and Children Development NOW. She explains to me in detail how she experienced the Isaaq persecution under Siad Barre. The witness accounts she gives can fill a book; how she managed to hide Isaaq men in her house in Mogadishu, how she travelled pretending not to be Isaaq…

Later I met Marian Farah Warsame (3rd January 1999 in Nairobi) who defines humiliation as follows: 'Humiliation is to lose your pride. Somalis have destroyed and lost nationhood: We are ashamed! One part is caused by us, another part is caused by foreigners. Being a refugee in a foreign country is humiliating! Before people were a minister or a doctor, and today the same person is a refugee in another country and this is extremely humiliating!'

As already introduced above, I met also the religious head and, one could say, the 'King of Somaliland' who gives me an audience (26th November 1998 in the parliament of Hargeisa). And I speak to Abdulqadir H. Ismail Jirdeh, Deputy Speaker of the Parliament of Somaliland in Hargeisa, and Ahmed El Kahin, legal advisor of the parliament.

Furthermore I speak to Said Shukri, Chairman of Sooyaal, the SNM veteran organisation (interview 18th November 1998 in the Sooyaal offices in Hargeisa). With Mohamed Hussein Oday, political scientist, we, Stig Jarle Hansen and me, have long discussions. He advises us to read Michael Maren's book *The Road to Hell* (Maren, 1997), and Hancock's *The Lords of Poverty* (Hancock, 1989).

I visit the Genocide Research Centre Genocide Research Centre (8th December 1998) and meet with Rashid Sheikh Abdullahi, Rashid Sheikh Cabdilaahi Axmed, Rasheed Sheikh Abdillaahi Ahmed, Chairman, and Xasan Aw Barakaale Mohamed (John) who welcome me all, and each has a story to tell that, again, would fill a book. Their 'concept letter' explains:

'As a result of heavy rains, that Hargeisa experienced during mid May 1997, the ensuing floods exposed around 600-700 human skeletons in a mass grave situated about 300 metres from the headquarters of the 26th sector of the Somali National Army, that commanded all armed forces were stationed in the northern regions. The consequences of this ample evidence created an atmosphere in which the government of Somaliland considered as most appropriate and inevitable to appoint a high powered ministerial commission assigned to the task of investigation, preparation of reports, opinions, suggestions and recommendations relating to all aspects of human rights violations committed in the territory of Somaliland or perpetrated against the citizens and residents of Somaliland in places beyond its borders.'

I visited one of the victims of Siad Barre's reign, J. O. Samatar, in his bookshop just behind Ahmed Al-Azhari's school, who gives his personal account of how he was tortured (23rd November 1998). On the same day I also meet Dr. Hussein Ismail, a gynaecologist who, returning to Hargeisa from London, just opens his Haringey Hospital and urgently invites co-operation from any Western hospital. With him my identity as a physician is emphasised and I learn from his perspective on Somali society as a doctor. He knows much about morals as connected to the female hymen, - traditionally high morals in the North as compared to the South where Italy had dissolved them to a certain extent, - meaning that 'in old times a mother in the North had stricter control on morals for example by checking her daughter's hymen when she came home.' I also get confirmed what I heard from others, namely that raped women would not talk about their suffering, but, perhaps, come to the doctor with stomach ache.

Also Omar Awal, psychologist (22nd November 1998 in Hargeisa), approached me as a clinician, this time as a clinical psychologist interested in trauma. He - and also Ahmed Al-Azhari - point to the fact that there is little appropriate psychiatric care and that many traumatised people are chained in the houses since the family does not know how otherwise handle disoriented people. Omar Awal explains how a traditional sheikh would treat such cases and that his treatment is not to be underestimated, in some cases perhaps even the best. I want to attend the sheikh's healing sessions, and make an attempt to find him, - he was not at home. The second attempt fails because the problem somehow becomes significant that I have to buy *khat* as a gift for him. Although *khat* is used widely, it is also seen as one of the main culprits currently destroying Somali society, because it keeps men in their best years idle for hours each day, providing dreams, but no real life. (I did not dare to make up my own mind, but, since *khat* is a very mild stimulant and no heavy drug, it seemed to me to be equivalent to the use of beer in the West; it is evident that although beer may be part of a perfectly successful lifestyle, it may also contribute to the devastation of an alcoholic.)

I later go to visit the psychiatric ward of the Hargeisa hospital and understand that virtually everything is missing, - the patients are lying on the floor in empty rooms. I am asked to find help for this forgotten problem. As my stay in Hargeisa becomes more widely known, I am increasingly approached as a psychologist/psychiatrist; patients come to me, - a schizophrenic woman for example, and others with milder symptoms.

As already reported above, one Friday (the Muslim holiday) I travelled outside of Hargeisa to pay a visit to a chained man, highly educated, but traumatised, in the neighbouring city of Gabiley (4th December 1998). I do this together with Jeremy Cosmo Davies from VetAid, an old Somali hand who once worked closely together with this man and considers him his friend. Driving with Jeremy through the Somali semi-desert for one day is extremely educating. While he reminds me that one has to avoid mines, he explains everything to me, from the problems with 'enclosures' [fences protecting patches of cultivated land that hinder pastoralist mobility] to the fate of big agricultural projects, and last but not least the reasons why livestock currently can not be exported to Saudi Arabia. We travel together with a Somali friend and visit her father in Gabiley, welcomed by his new wife. This is an occasion that gives me the chance to understand how it feels to live in a traditional house with a courtyard and several rooms around it. It gives me also a closer insight into the difference between the Western ideal of a marriage as eternal bond, and the Somali reality of a man marrying several women, either at the same time, and/or sequentially (something that is increasingly becoming a Western reality also).

On 29th November I visited Ibrahim Hashim Ahmed at the Hargeisa rehabilitation centre (Norwegian Red Cross, SRCS/NORCROSS Rehabilitation Programme for the Disabled). I am deeply humbled by his dedicated effort, supported by the Norwegian Red Cross, to make artificial limbs for the countless victims of mines all around the country. I later will meet Ibrahim again in Nairobi where we will talk for many hours. Ibrahim, an American citizen with Somali background, has a unique insight into what Anna Simons so eloquently describes in her book about the misunderstandings between Somalis and non-Somalis (Simons, 1995).

Also, Mohamoud Abdi Abdillahi had worked closely with non-Somalis, in his case with the German Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), he speaks German. He visited me (7th December 1998) because he had heard that I was in town. He has first hand experience of the kidnapping incident that made GTZ leave Somalia. He makes me better understand the different forces in Somalia that make kidnapping in some situations for some Somalis 'perfectly legitimate.'

2nd December 1998 I visited Jamar Mahmoud Omar at the Life and Peace Institute (Uppsala, Sweden) in Hargeisa, and learn about their training programme on conflict resolution that I would like to have the time to participate in.

During all this inquiry I understand that many Somalis suffer deeply from trauma, that their coping mechanisms have been painfully overwhelmed in many cases, and that dissociation is sometimes their way of survival. I understand also, more than ever, that such predicaments cannot be studied in laboratory experiments: 'Since trauma is an inescapably stressful event that overwhelms people's coping mechanisms it is uncertain to what degree the results of laboratory studies of ordinary events have relevance to the understanding of traumatic memories' (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, abstract).

In their article van der Kolk and Fisler present evidence, that also I encounter every day during my fieldwork, that points at 'dissociative processes as the central pathogenic mechanisms that give rise to PTSD.' The authors present the results of a systematic exploratory study of 46 persons with PTSD which indicates that traumatic memories are retrieved, at least initially, in the form of dissociated mental imprints of sensory and affective elements of the traumatic experience: as visual, olfactory, affective, auditory and kinesthetic experiences. Over time, 'subjects reported the gradual emergence of a personal narrative that can be properly referred to as "explicit memory"' (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, abstract).

When I walk in Hargeisa I encounter, virtually everywhere, what Teresa Descilo describes as follows: 'I think we have all seen that someone who is grief-stricken, is less able

to control their attention and so motivate himself or engage in activity, whereas an enthusiastic person is far more able to direct their attention and to motivate himself easily and engage in any activity that interests him. It appears that where a particular emotion fits on the … scale correlate with consciousness, awareness of self and environment, ability to choose, and degree of control of one's life'[164] (Descilo, in Figley, 2000).

More than eighty years ago, Janet[165] observed: '"Forgetting the event which precipitated the emotion ... has frequently been found to accompany intense emotional experiences in the form of continuous and retrograde amnesia" (Janet 1909, 1607). He claimed that when people experience intense emotions, memories cannot be transformed into a neutral narrative: a person is "unable to make the recital which we call narrative memory, and yet he remains confronted by (the) difficult situation" (Janet 1919/1925, 660). This results in "a phobia of memory" (661) that prevents the integration ("synthesis") of traumatic events and splits off the traumatic memories from ordinary consciousness. Janet claimed that the memory traces of the trauma linger as what he called "unconscious fixed ideas" that cannot be "liquidated" as long as they have not been translated into a personal narrative. Failure to organize the memory into a narrative leads to the intrusion of elements of the trauma into consciousness: as terrifying perceptions, obsessional preoccupations and as somatic re-experiences such as anxiety reactions' (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 7).

The Expatriate Community

To a certain extent, I became part of the expatriate community in Hargeisa and get an understanding of how diverse it is. Jeremy Cosmo Davies, already introduced above as an old hand, has different views on Somalia from many expatriates who are new in Somalia. In other words, I find the same three rough categories of expatriates in Somalia that I had encountered in Egypt: (1) Some newcomers know nothing, they may even idealise the new place they are posted to; (2) after a while a newcomer believes he or she knows everything; and (3) only after many years does a newcomer understand that he or she will never 'know;' experienced cosmopolitans place themselves immediately in the last category and the wise ones among them reach a unique level of a rare combination of compassion and caution, - caution especially towards one's own judgements.

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[164] Descilo adds: 'Support of the view that different emotions effect our consciousness, awareness, and ability to learn can be found in Bower, in Christianson, 1992; Leichtman, Ceci, & Ornstein, in Christianson, 1992, and Nilsson & Archer, in Christianson, 1992' (Descilo, in Figley, 2000).
[165] See Janet, 1889; Janet, 1893; Janet, 1909; Janet, 1925.

Niels Nikolajsen (Nordic Repatriation and Development Programme) is such an experienced cosmopolitan. I visit him regularly in his office. I meet also Jørn Melgaard from Denmark (Arbeidsmarketsnetværk, Århus Kommune, Familie og Beskæftigelsesforvaltningen), who, like Nikolajsen, is interested in helping Somalis return home to a liveable life (meeting 22nd November 1998).

On 28th November I met Linda Cook and Zahra Adan Gulaid (Health Unlimited, UK); I later will receive a lot of help from Linda in Nairobi and meet Zahra again in Rwanda. Their work with radio programmes, both in Somaliland and Rwanda, is fascinating to be introduced to.

On 29th November 1998, and later on several occasions in Nairobi, I met Gary Page Jones (Resident Representative, Norwegian People's Aid, Somalia Programme). He has been introduced above already and gets to speak at different places in this manuscript.

On 6th December 1998 I also met Dennis Pain (Social Development Adviser of the British government, Department for International Development) who comes to Hargeisa for a very brief visit together with his delegation. He is on a round trip to different parts of the region with the aim of mapping out the current situation. He grew up in Africa, as have several of other government advisors or UN officers I meet, and who are deeply interested in finding a way for Africa to emerge from poverty and insignificance. His delegation includes Somali expert Mark Bradbury through whom (and through Dr. Adan Abokor) I learn about 'CODEP - The UK Network on Conflict, Development and Peace.'

Stig Jarle Hansen and I were invited to dinner by Barry Clarke (24th November 1998), the representative of the European Union in Hargeisa (Somalia Rehabilitation Program Northern Somalia, European Union, European Commission - Somalia Unit). Apart from a lot of practical help for which we thank him, Barry Clarke gives us deep insight into the perspective on Somaliland and its international relations from the point of view of a seasoned global citizen who with his Somali wife cannot be imagined as the neighbour of a British citizen who has never travelled abroad, but rather links up with the times where the British were at home all over the globe. Later (2nd December 1998 in Hargeisa) I also met other European Union representatives, among them Walid Musa from Sudan (Senior Adviser Political Affairs and Governance, European Union Delegation of the European Commission, Somalia Unit), not only an experienced but also an extremely wise observer of the world's fate. I will try to incorporate his views into another book, about international organisations and how they may avoid humiliation. He will be quoted later.

I will meet Walid Musa briefly again later in Nairobi where I will also have more, extremely educative and informative interviews with two other Somali experts of the European Union, on 8th January 1999 with Christoph Langenkamp (Food Security; he was also one of the group of hostages who were kidnapped together with Ola Skuterud), and on 12th January 1999 with Leo Schellekens (Education).

On many occasions I spoke to United Nations personnel, especially those branches dealing with refugees (UNHCR) and children (UNICEF). Stig Jarle Hansen and I paid official visits to Anton Verwey (resident representative of UNHCR, in Hargeisa 28th November 1998) and Walter Eshenaur (UNICEF Resident Project Officer in Hargeisa, 30th November 1998). The United Nations, under-funded, and at the same time the world's hope for solutions for its many global problems, struggles with manifold problems that were brought home to me in several further conversations.

I also talked to stranded businessmen, for example seasoned Englishmen, who introduced me to the advantages and especially the pitfalls of doing business in the region. Later, from Nairobi, I would help one of them to be released: He had a quarrel with Somali businessmen and was kept in Somaliland in a hotel during the court case; I witnessed how he was stopped when he approached the gate of the hotel.

I became also part of the Russian (and Ukrainian) team of six, belonging to a Russian airplane that was grounded in Hargeisa. I am fortunate enough to share their flight in a small plane from Somaliland to Nairobi and learn how these non-Western expatriates manage in Africa. I am extremely impressed by the level of psychological training for such a team. I had always been intrigued by Russian knowledge and use of psychology and here I saw it at work under extremely adverse circumstances: This team of engineers and pilots uses intricate psychological methods to keep the team together, to balance moods, and to ensure that nobody freaks out. All these measures are spelled out to me in great detail by the English-speaking member of the group (with the help of some Russian, that I had studied twenty years earlier).

Somali Farewell and Arrival in Nairobi

I got very short notice that the plane was coming. I had booked myself into a hotel during the last day of my stay in Hargeisa because I wanted to have a warm shower before travelling. I am just standing under the shower when the message comes that the plane will be at the airport in half an hour, one day earlier than expected. One of my Western expatriate friends

rushes me to the airport in his car. Outside of Hargeisa, in the middle of nowhere, suddenly my driver and my guards, the freedom fighters, appear in their car. I had paid them and had said good-bye to all of them before disappearing into the hotel. They speed, get ahead of my car, stop my car, and, with their weapons in their hands, tell me that I have to pay more to them. I do. I am impressed that they honour even me, the insignificant researcher, the Somali way, keeping an eye on me from the moment I say good-bye and 'disappear,' finding out where I am and within minutes following me when I leave to the airport, holding me up, and asking for money!

I arrive in Nairobi, together with six polite and protective Russians and Ukrainians, just before Christmas 1998. I join them on their way from the airport into town and to a hotel. It is an expensive hotel. Tourists who venture out are quickly fetched back by hotel personnel who then explain to them that they could not just wander around with their cameras on their bellies in Nairobi, that they may risked to be mugged.

I look for a cheaper place to stay the next day and set out to 'experience' Nairobi. I take a taxi for several hours and ask the driver to explain to me where in the city I can walk and where not, and how to use public transport. I subsequently would walk for hours in Nairobi, would take buses, and, particularly, I would take *matatus*, privately run, overloaded, minibuses manoeuvred by young hot-blooded 'pilots' with a reputation for reckless and dangerous driving. I always carry my computer and my digital video camera with me, in a grocery bag - and I am never mugged, because, perhaps, no respectable Westerner with such valuable possessions would put a foot into *matatus*. Once I need to get to an interview appointment very fast and consider taking a taxi, which is very expensive, but I cannot find one. I approach a *matatu*, and ask whether it could function as a taxi if I paid them half of what the taxi would cost. The driver and conductor agree, divert from their fixed route, take only passengers who wish to go into the same direction as me, and deliver me to the place I have to go to. Neither expatriates nor Kenyans at the place where I arrive had ever done that or thought that this was possible. My experience is met with disbelief, because I had by then somehow become more familiar with certain aspects of Kenya than their longstanding inhabitants themselves. This scene may serve as an example of the way of using my entire person for research that I had learned, not just for passive observation, but also for actively confronting new situations.

Since Kenya is very Christian; Christmas matters in Kenya for many (except of course for Somalis, who are Muslims). When I arrived, the city was just about to close down for the Christmas holiday. Through Ken Menkhaus, a distinguished Somali scholar, who will be

quoted further down, I am invited by a group of people from Diakonia Sweden, Swedish Church Relief, and Life and Peace Institute (Sweden), - all active in Somalia, - to accompany them to Mombassa, on Christmas holiday. They have Mohamed Abdulgader travelling with them, who works for Diakonia Sweden in Garowe, and, since he is a Muslim, I feel that I have not to respect his need for Christmas holiday that much, and I therefore sit with him and my computer for several days, drawing on his vast knowledge of both Somali life and expatriate activities. Later, back in Nairobi, I will have a long interview with another member of the group, Sven Jönsson (Swedish Church Relief), who explains to me the problems that may arise in the long-term when aid agencies give help, for example build wells, without putting long-term co-operation plans in place to maintain them.

I find it very interesting to talk to people like Mohamed Abdulgader or Ibrahim Hashim Ahmed, the expert on artificial limbs, who are, so to speak, both Somali and expatriate. On 11th January 1998 in Nairobi I meet also the brilliant Somali Aisha Ahmed, Information/Dissemination Officer at the Somalia Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross. She and internationally experienced Isabelle Bourges, Co-operation Delegate, International Committee of the Red Cross, explain their efforts to enter into dialogue with Somalis on subjects as human rights; the book *Spared from the Spear* written by Somali scholars is one of the most striking and interesting products (International Committee of the Red Cross Somalia Delegation, 1997, see more further down).

I met several high-ranking Somalis in Nairobi, for example former Somali Ambassador Hussein Ali Dualeh (9th January 1999) with whom I have a long conversation that I film. I quote from this interview at several places in this manuscript.

Somali Warlords

I also met Somali warlords in Nairobi, Osman Ato (see more further down) and Omar Jess. I meet Omar Jess on 8th January 1999 while waiting for Hussein Aidid, son of late General Aidid at luxury Safari Park Hotel in Nairobi. I wait for three days (having spoken to Abdulatif M. Afdub head of Hussein Aidid's Liaison Office, who promised to introduce me to Aidid), sharing the experience with about fifty Somalis, - from businessmen to family members or military leaders, - who are sitting in the lobby or wandering about in the garden of the hotel, leaving and returning, always discussing, and never losing patience. In the end I will not succeed in seeing Hussein Aidid, but, as mentioned above, several high-ranking personalities and so-called warlords share the 'waiting ceremony' that gives me the opportunity to

interview them. It also gives me the chance to experience and participate in typical Somali 'plots,' - for example to somehow 'catch' Hussein Aidid in other places, - 'plots' involving highly volatile and changing alliances and scary car-rides at night-time from the luxury hotel to Eastleigh, the amazing 'Mogadishu' of Nairobi, a neighbourhood that is feared and despised by all non-Somalis I speak to.

Nairobi, A Platform for Somalia

I met Yassin Hersi Jama at the German embassy in Nairobi on 14th of December 1998. He is a member of the Somali *Madiban* minority. He, his wife and his nine children give much of their free time to me, welcome me at their house, introduce me to Somali music (Yassin being a very good guitar player and singer), and into the world of Somali minorities. I will report in more detail further down; I meet, for example, *Hebrew* (or *Yebir*) Sultan Ahmed Jama Hersi, and Abdulaziz Ahmed Farah, chairman of the Madiban Minority Refugees at the Kakuma Refugee Camp, through Yassin.

Yassin had been a contact man into Somali society for the German embassy in Mogadishu and was, as he reports, the only Somali the German embassy brought out of Somalia when they left, because they were sure that he would otherwise be killed. With his amazing contact network he helps me meet many people.

In Nairobi I was able to have long conversations with many important witnesses of the Somali predicament, including some from the major clan families or Siad Barre's sub-clan, for example (1st January 1999) the former commander of Siad Barre's garrison, and guard of Siad Barre, involved in the liberation of the kidnapped Lufthansa airplane in 1977, and in 1977 also involved in the coup d'état against Barre for which he subsequently was punished. I also speak to the man who was once second in command at the Mogadishu prison. All these people are deeply involved in reflecting on the past and on the confusing web of currents and undercurrents that had shaped their lives. They are clearly suffering. Quite opposite is M. A. Jama (Director of the Somali Organisation for Community Development Activities, SOCDA) whom I meet on 13th January 1999 in his downtown office, and who rather looks ahead, actively planning for development projects.

On 17th December 1998 I paid a visit to Per Haugestad, Norwegian ambassador in Nairobi, who gives me a lot of insight, as does Christoph Bundscherer whom I had met in Hargeisa on 22nd November 1998 and visit again at the German embassy in Nairobi on 14th December 1998. Rolf P. Helmrich (Counsellor at the German Embassy) took part in

UNOSOM and gives me the opportunity to feel, through his account, and through the pictures he shows to me, how the situation on the ground presented itself to its participants (12th January 1999). Werner Grohé (Deputy Head of Department, Economic Cooperation, interview on 21st December 1998) gives me insights into the economic situation of African countries such as Somalia and Kenya and how their prospects are evaluated by Europe, while Dr. Rolf Stumpenhorst, the physician of the German Embassy provides me with his very knowledgeable view on the region (12th January 1999) as a health expert, an account to which Rotraud Uta (Medical Technical Assistant, MTA, 14th December 1998) insightfully contributes, and more, - she very generously opens her house for me and allows me to share her life and experience of Nairobi.

On 17th December 1998 Carl Tinstman (Coordinator United Nations Operation Lifeline Sudan) recommended that I should talk about humanitarian aid with Hamish Young. I interview Hamish (UN Humanitarian Principles Project Officer) on the 18th December 1998 and strongly urge him to write down the wealth of his knowledge and reflections in a book. I speak to several other high-ranking United Nations representatives, among others to Cheikh Oumar T. Sow (Représentant Régional Adjoint et Directeur Adjoint, Burau Régional pour l'Afrique, Programme Des Nations Unies Pour L'Environment) on 14th January 1999. He, being an African and at the same time member of an international community that mainly has a Western perspective, sees how and where humiliation may be at work in international organisations. His valuable insights will hopefully be used in the handbook for the United Nations that I plan to write. On 18th of January 1999, I had a long and extremely interesting interview with Alexander von Braunmühl, who had been working for the United Nations World Food Programme for Somalia.

On 21st December 1998 Ken Menkhaus brings me together with Don Teitelbaum (Charge d'affair for Sudan) at the American Embassy, who gives me the most valuable insights into the political web of strategies relevant to Africa, especially the Horn of Africa, from the American point of view. I then spend New Years Eve at a United Nations party in one of Nairobi's loveliest compounds, where I meet Philip Winter, the prototype of a British man who has deeply anchored his life in Africa and cannot imagine living elsewhere anymore.

On 4th January 1999 I was fortunate enough to meet Ola Skuterud (Head of the IFRC Somalia Delegation and Resident Representative of the Norwegian Red Cross) who supports my research on so many levels that I hardly know how to thank: he opens his house for me, he gives me practical support wherever he can, he shares with me his extreme experiences as a

hostage in Mogadishu, and he allows me to learn from his familiarity, understanding and reflections on Somalia, Kenya and humanitarian aid in general. At his house I meet also Atle Hetland (International Consortium for Educational Development, 6th January 1999) and I learn immensely from being part of a discussion on the above-mentioned topics. I remember the story of the organisation set up to help street children [who by definition have no home] that was checked upon by Hetland at Christmas time. There was no street child to be seen and Hetland got the following explanation: 'They are all back home for Christmas!'

On 22nd March 1999 I talked to Bertha Beachy (Somalia/Somaliland Representative of the Eastern Mennonite Missions and Mennonite Central Committee) who at the age of over seventy fervently works for Somalia, where she taught as a teacher for almost all her life and is warmly remembered by her students such as, for example, Mohamed Abdulgader from Diakonia-Sweden with whom I had been sitting over Christmas. I tape a long and intense interview with her. I later read D'Haem, 1997, who explains how she cried when she had to leave Somalia. Bertha Beachy, I think, is also at home in Somalia and resents the state of insecurity in Somalia that forces her to be in Nairobi.

On 15th January 1999 I met Jennifer Graff, who organises a workshop for 'National Health Accounts' for the region, in which ten countries participate, financed by USAID, and Canadian International Development Agency CIDA. She touches upon the extremely difficult relationship between recipient and donors and reports that such efforts often suffer from lack of motivation on the recipient side.

Egypt and Somalia

Later, on the 11th March 1999 I pass through Cairo, Egypt, and meet with Somalia expert Medhat Kamal El Kady, Head of East African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt. He explains to me the Egyptian view on Somalia. As from Ambassador Magdy Hefny, I learn much about the self-confidence with which Egypt, with a history that dwarfs almost any other region of the globe, feels to a certain extent in charge of civilisation on the African continent. During my seven years of living in Egypt I had accustomed myself to seeing it from the inside, and now I learn to grasp Egyptian positions in the web of international relations.

London, Ioan M. Lewis, and the BBC

Coming from Africa back to Europe, via London, I hand-deliver a manuscript from Ahmed Yusuf Farah (War-torn Societies Project, Somalia Country Project), to the eminent Somali anthropologist Ioan M. Lewis in his London home. I visit Lewis and his wife together with Dennis Smith on 31st May 1999. It is extremely impressive to talk to the person who has written on Somalia over so many decades, a man who is quoted in virtually any publication on Somalia, and whose name is omnipresent wherever one has to do with Somalia. The rather distant image of Lewis that I had before condenses into the understanding that I am sitting and talking to a vigorous intellect and at the same time an extremely nice and pleasant person with a wife of equal stimulating intellect and kindness.

Also together with Dennis Smith I pay a visit to Mohamed Abdullahi, Head of the Somali Service at the British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Bush House in London, on 23rd November 1999. Mohamed Abdullahi explains how difficult his many years in this position have been, since he has to stay neutral and not be pulled into the faction-fighting going on in Somalia. Wherever I met Somalis I learned that they would listen to the BBC every day, and that this was the trustworthiest source. To meet the man who is responsible for this extraordinary achievement is a special occasion for me. He had taken up humiliation in an acclaimed and provocative radio programme, to be translated as *Is Humiliation Justifiable*?

This is but a selection of the contacts I had in Somalia, or contacts related to Somalia, I try to stay in email contact with everybody I met, and with some this succeeds. Many contacts are not mentioned here, but are touched upon in other places of the manuscript, among others John Drysdale in Hargeisa, Ali Sheikh Hussein (Somali businessman in Nairobi), Colonel Nur Hassan Hussein, Ali Said Haji (both Red Cross and Red Crescent), Carsten Pötzsch (Terra Nuova). I would like to conclude this account of my fieldwork with my warmest thanks to all those who gave their time and resources to me. Many of them will read this text, and I hope very much that they find that their effort has been repaid.

The core aim of my research is to contribute to create better mutual understanding and more empathy in what we call the global village, - better understanding between, for example, Western and non-Western parties. I hope that my research will indeed contribute to this goal, and not only my research, but that the same spirit will increasingly guide global relations at national levels, group levels and individual levels. To end this section on Somalia I would like to tell a story that illuminates this learning process at the inter-national level: On 24th April 1998 I get a message from Denmark explaining the following case (that is also documented in

Politikken, 1998 with the title 'Danish police recognizes mistake: The national head of police accepts to travel to Somaliland to solve the problems of returnees').

My Danish friend, whose name I do not want to expose, explains the case to me as follows: 'Five fully adult Danish police officers escorted three rejected asylum seekers – women and children – back to Somaliland, but "forgot" the agreement with Somaliland to orient the authorities in Somaliland about their arrival. Somaliland, realising that the Danish police operates on their territory, immediately abrogates the agreement with Denmark to accept rejected Somali asylum seekers. Now the Danish Interior Minister has apologised profusely, as you see from the article I send you. The incident has become a diplomatic incident; the Foreign Minister is involved, etc., etc. And all this happens, according to my interpretation, because the Danish authorities do not have any understanding of honour and have humiliated the Somali authorities by behaving as if they could ignore an agreement. They send a clear signal: God, this are only some half wild apes there, who play government, there are limits to how seriously we can take them, and after all, what is this, that they do not want their own people back…'[166]

As my friend reports: the Danish Interior Minister apologised profusely! Perhaps humiliation will decrease and relations will improve?

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[166] 'Fem fuldvoksne danske politifolk eskorterede tre afviste somaliske asylsøgere - kvinder og børn - tilbage til Somaliland men "glemte", som det ellers var aftalen, at orientere de somalilandske myndigheder om at de kom. De ser så dansk politi operere på deres territorium og opsiger straks aftalen med Danmark om at modtage afviste somaliske asylsøgere. Nu har den danske indenrigsminister apologized profusely, som det fremgår af et udklip jeg sender til dig. Sagen er blevet en diplomatic incident, udenrigsministeriet er indblandet, etc etc.
Og alt dette er efter min tolkning fordi de danske myndigheder ikke har nogen fornemmelse af ære og har ydmyget de somaliske myndigheder ved at opføre sig som om de kunne blæse på en aftale. De sender et klart signal der siger: herregud, det er jo bare nogle halvvilde aber der leger regering, der er da grænser for hvor alvorligt vi skal tage dem, og hvad ligner det også, at de ikke vil have deres egne folk tilbage...'

Rwanda / Burundi

The First Encounter

As in the case of Somalia, I would like to open this section on Rwanda and Burundi with a quote that is intended to engage the reader and slightly provoke him or her at the very outset, thus tracing my 'learning-curve' from exasperation to respect that also characterises Somalia and Germany. In 1999 I have the following conversation with an experienced Africa expert from Switzerland whose name I do not want to disclose because her words are 'too' blunt and she talks to me 'off the record': 'After more than twenty years of knowledge of Africa I do not like the Great Lakes very much. This "double and triple language" that is so unique for the 'collines,' it is already much weaker in Tanzania. Nowhere is information manipulated as much as in the Great Lakes.' I ask her whether the reason is that people live in isolated compounds, and have no villages? My friend responds, with a sigh: 'Not even a bistro! And markets are no more than some stalls at a cross-road!' Then we discuss the names that can be found in Rwanda and Burundi, such as 'Son of Hatred,' and whether the mountains in Switzerland have a similar effect…

Indeed, the atmosphere in Rwanda and Burundi was to present itself to me as different as in Somalia. It will become clear in the course of the following section that I feel much more obliged to protect the names of my interlocutors in the Great Lakes than in Somalia, - and I record much less video interviews in Rwanda or Burundi than in Somalia. In Somalia I met many outspoken people and they will be proud to see their names in this book and read how I treated them with respect and give them recognition for their contribution and analysis. As for Rwanda and Burundi, I am much more cautious.

The first paragraph of this section expresses expatriate aversion to Rwandans and Burundians. However, I also meet expatriates who love the people from the Great Lakes! I had been in email contact with a Genocide Response Officer for United Nations Human Rights Field Operations in Rwanda (HRFOR), whose name I do not want to expose, and I visit him on 9th August 1998 in Stockholm, Sweden, just some months after he, together with his colleagues, had to leave Rwanda from one day to the other. He advises me, as does later Gerald Gahima (Secrétaire Général, Ministère de la Justice), to contact IBUKA, an umbrella organisation for the genocide survivors' organisations, and AVEGA, an organisation for widows from the genocide. Being extremely competent and poised to substantially contribute

to an improvement of the Rwandan plight, he was very sad about this forced departure. For a whole evening he explains to me what he had experienced during his stay in Rwanda and how he learned to develop great sympathy with its people, - unlike many of his colleagues, as he admits. He verbalizes his experiences and views so remarkably well that I almost feel I had been there with him.

I start understanding that the Great Lakes have a similarly polarising effect on expatriate visitors, as does Somalia: Some love it warmly and some despise it intensely.

However, not just expatriates but also Rwandans are actors in this relationship. After the 1994 genocide 'Some 154 NGOs had materialized [in Rwanda], with minimal co-ordination among them and little concern for working within the priorities of the new government… Few of them seemed to have a grasp of the situation into which they had jumped. One long-time aid official despaired: "There are hundreds of inexperienced [NGO] kids running around here who know nothing about Rwanda. Worse still, they are not interested."… Disorderly, competitive, and often unco-operative, these newcomers had infuriated the RPF leaders, who could hardly lay their hands on a paper clip, while young foreigners from the West zapped around Kigali in their new, expensive, gas-guzzling, four-wheel-drive vehicles and monopolized scarce office space and equipment… One year later, fed up with their uncooperative behaviour, the government expelled 38 NGOs entirely and suspended the activities of 18 others…' (The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 19, paragraph 42).

Later, in January 1999 I would discuss these matters with a member of the German Embassy in Rwanda, whose name I do not want to disclose. His comment to the 1996 NGOs expulsion from Rwanda: 'They acted too self-serving and arrogant.' He understands that 'it was humiliating for the Rwandans, - these young NGO guys with a three-days' beard sitting together with respectable government representatives!' And, 'experts flying in and out on business class to study the situation, this is also humiliating,' he adds.

I wondered how I would feel after having finished my fieldwork in the Great Lakes. Would I love it, or be appalled? To start with I was cautious and prepared to proceed slowly.

Outside of Rwanda and Burundi

Even before the onset of my project, in 1996 (7th November 1996) I travelled to London in order to talk to International Alert (IA)[167] and its Rwanda experts. I meet several people, among others Tony Jackson who brilliantly introduces me into the problems of the Great Lakes. Jackson summarises the problems of Burundi with just a few shorthand remarks that may serve to open this section on Rwanda and Burundi: 'Who is in the army? Ninety-nine percent of the officers are Tutsi in a country where Hutu comprise 85% of the population. What is the role of the army? The army should not act as police as they do now. Impunity? You can kill without being charged. Where are secure jobs? Only in the civil service.' Jackson tells me that the IA Burundi Programme enjoyed a good relationship to local UN representative Ahmedou Ouid-Abdallah, former foreign minister of Mauritania, an 'especially dedicated man.'

On 12th March 1997 I was able to meet Ahmedou Ouid-Abdallah in Oslo, author of *Diplomacie pyromanique* (Ouid-Abdallah, 1996). At that moment he was no longer UN representative in the Great Lakes but Executive Secretary of the Global Coalition for Africa in Washington DC. He reports to me what he also writes in *The Interdependent* (September 1997): 'Most stumbling blocks [to reconciliation] are psychological because there is a lack of trust. In fact, the reason there's a conflict in the first place is because people don't trust each other. A conflict occurs because people are frightened. The first thing to do is to try to tackle these psychological obstacles - the absence of trust and the fear. To do this, you have to invite people, not to discuss the issues but to have a drink together, to meet each other. That's how I started in Burundi: I invited the people to my home to meet each other, to talk, to have a drink. But not to negotiate or to talk about substantive problems. The idea is to talk about things in general, just to say hello, because these people come from the same country, they must have attended the same schools and the same universities, and they live in the same area... In Burundi, for two years, even when we were working on the agreements, I continued to invite people in this way, to come for a drink, or for lunch so that on every occasion, at last once a week, people saw each other to discuss rumours and misunderstandings, and I invited not just politicians but people from the business community, mothers, ambassadors and so on. But contact needs to be on-going if it is to dissipate misunderstandings and fear' (Ouid-Abdallah, 1997).

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[167] IA is a non-governmental organisation active in preventive diplomacy, founded by the former head of Amnesty International, Martin Ennals.

As for Somalia, I also paid a visit to the Institut für Afrika-Kunde in Hamburg (4th July 1997), where Marianne Weiß explains to me brightly the who-is-who of the expert community on Rwanda and Burundi, what to expect from Prunier, Chrétien, Lemarchand, Reyntjens and many more; who is regarded as more Hutu-oriented, who has the reputation of siding with the Tutsi, and who may be rather neutral.

On 15th July 1997 I travelled to Brussels and visited the premises of the Rwandan journal *Dialogue, Revue d'information et de reflexion,* that currently operates from Belgium. I collect volumes 185, 187, 190 from 1995, 191, 192, 194, from 1996, and 197 from 1997, and meet Charles Karemano, who kindly gives me his time for an analysis of humiliation that I will present further down. In the editorial to volume 197 Karemano writes on forgiveness and pardoning (Karemano, 1997, 1): 'Rwanda has undertaken to judge the presumed architects of the genocide and crimes against humanity. Justice is the basis of peace; forgiveness, asking for forgiveness, and being forgiven, are the ways to access social harmony.'[168]

At the 10th Annual Conference of the International Association for Conflict Management (IACM) in Bonn, Germany, 15th –18th June 1997, I met the fervent and tremendously knowledgeable Christian Scherrer,[169] who at that time was based at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, COPRI, and who allows me to share his vast experience; he very kindly provides me with a lot of my most valuable contacts, many of whom I will not disclose here. In September 1997, at a UNESCO Expert Group Meeting on Male Roles and Masculinities in the Perspective of a Culture of Peace in Oslo, Norway, 24th – 28th September 1997 I met young and brilliant Jacqueline from Burundi, who brilliantly introduces me to Burundi's history.

On 7th March 1998 I visited Elisabeth Knox-Seith, and on 8th March 1998 Anne Paludan in Copenhagen, both working with DanChurchAid, among others in Rwanda, and I receive very rich support for my reflections on humiliation. Both Elisabeth and Anne are extremely well experienced practitioners; Anne writes to me later: 'Humiliation is one of many facets of conflict and conflict resolution and prevention, so for me it is also relevant in relation to reconciliation. Humiliation is another side of shame and honour, basic cultural concepts in both the old Nordic culture and in the Semitic, and clearly all non-industrial

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[168] 'Le Rwanda a entrepris de juger les auteurs présumés du génocide et des crimes contre l'humanité. La justice est à la base de la paix ; l'aveu, la demande de pardon et le pardon sont des voies d'acces a l'harmonie sociale' (Karemano, 1997, 1). See also his editorial 'Au mépris de la vie!' (Karemano, 1996).

[169] See for his publications, for example, Scherrer, 1996a; Scherrer, 1996b; Scherrer, 1997a; Scherrer, 1997b.

societies. A Danish Muslim has just published a book on "honour and shame" where he addresses these phenomena in the modern Islamic context. As a theologist I know these terms from the Old Testament... My spontaneous reaction to your emphasis on feelings of humiliation is my question whether humiliation is a feeling, or whether it is formed within specific situations and actions in relation to their collective context of family, village, clan, etc.?'[170] She recommends to me Wolfgang Sofsky, 1997, *The Order of Terror. The Concentration Camp*, and Jungian psychologist Leo Eitinger, Retterstøl, & Dahl, 1991, *Kriser og nevroser*. As mentioned above, I built a network of more than 500 of such contacts and email conversations; the here enumerated are but a few fragments of the overall body of material collected.

Just before leaving to Africa in autumn 1998 I went to visit Gerd Inger Polden at the Norwegian television NRK. Gerd Inger Polden had received several prizes for television programmes, for example on Burkina Faso, and she had just returned from filming in Rwanda. She provided me with yet another angle of analysis through her work with women in Rwanda and gave me invaluable advice on how I should collect video material, with which camera, and what I had to consider when doing this work alone on my own.

From 1997 to 1998, in Oslo, I put all my effort into getting in good fax, email or letter communication with all the addresses I was collecting, addresses in Africa, Europe and North America. However, communication with Rwanda and Burundi it is not very successful. After some time of fruitless attempts I give up and hope that I will be doing better once I am in Rwanda and Burundi and can use local telephone services to make appointments. Today, email coverage is slowly improving, and this facilitates contact with all those who have email access.

On 26th August 1997 I wrote to Jean-Pierre Chrétien, and to Filip Reyntjens, who recommended that I should get in touch with Danielle de Lame, Musée Royal de L'Afrique Centrale, Ethnosociologie & Ethnohistoire, Tervuren, Belgium, an anthropologist specialising in the Great Lakes region. He writes to me that Danielle de Lame had carried out field

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[170] Translated by the author from Danish: 'ydmygelse er en af de mange facetter af konflikt og konfliktløsning og forebyggelse, så for mig er det også relevant i en forsonings-sammenhæng. ydmygelse er en anden side af ære og skam, kulturelle grundbegreber i både den gamle nordiske kultur og i den semitiske og vel i alle ikke-industrielle samfund. Der er netop kommet en lettilgængelig bog af en dansk muslim om "ære og skam" som behandler disse fænomener i moderne muslimsk sammenhæng. Som teolog kender jeg begreberne fra det gamle testamente… Min spontane reaktion da jeg så din vægtlæggen på følelsen af ydmygelse var spørgsmålet, om y. er en følelse, eller om y. er konstitueret af bestemte situationer og handlinger, den pgl. bringes i i forhold til sin kollektive sammenhæng: familien, landsbyen, klanen etc?'

research at the micro level in the Rwandan countryside and used a psychological/cultural approach. I get in touch with Danielle de Lame on 19th September 1997, and a fruitful contact begins. Her doctoral dissertation (de Lame, 1997) that she sends to me is an overwhelmingly rich piece of work.

On 7th June 1998 I entered into long conversations by fax and letter with extremely knowledgeable Emmanuel Mugumyankiko in Denmark, and equally with Jean Kachiga, born in Bukavu, now in Germany. Kachiga writes to me (June 1998, he writes in English although he is francophone; I will quote his letter as an example of hundreds of similar conversations per letter, fax, or email from 1997 on): '1. Although the concept of humiliation is more to be found in the field of psychology, it is nevertheless a political one as well. The concept does become political after the link has been established between the sentiment of humiliation as motive of a political act. Which is a proven fact in some cases as you pointed out. In my work, exploring the nature of conflicts in African politics, I speak of frustration and exclusion. 2. The psychological factor is also instrumental in conflict resolutions, you say. Indeed, it is almost impossible to understand the hatred between some Tutsi and some Hutu, which led to the genocide, without the psychology of the actors involved and the psychological dimension of the conflict as hole. I hope we will get the chance to discuss further this point. 3. You have asked a question whether there are fundamental psychological mechanisms, which play an important role in armed conflicts in more than one culture. I personally believe that armed conflicts are fundamentally politically motivated. They constitute a result of policies that are conflictual and therefore meet resistance. It is only once policies have created resistance that the situation does call for psychological aspects that motivate or influence the potential belligerents. Here is where mediation has to intervene and consider the psychological dimension, something which has not always been the case with the rational choice theory. And if the mediation fails, conflict usually erupts and breaks out into war. So, I do not presuppose humiliation as a source of conflict, rather as a factor entertaining conflicts. You rightly mentioned that neglecting this dimension in time simply means to get ready to face its violent consequences later. I consider the act leading to humiliation as a source of conflict. In the definition you gave, it says humiliation is a sentiment felt by oneself or a group, after being degraded by the attitude of another or a group. So I presuppose the degrading attitude as a source of conflict and the feeling of humiliation as a form of retaliation once the mediation, if at work, has failed. This judgement does not value either retaliation or degrading attitude. It nevertheless introduces the aspect of retaliation as linked to humiliation in order to establish the final equation which will than be: Humiliation Retaliation = War? 4.

You have also brought up the notion of cultural psychology, as a necessity for third parties to understand, in order to get their job done. My own field of research is the influential power of culture in political and economic processes. Recently expressions such as "face saving-" ways out of conflicts have been used in mediation, implying the psychological dimension of shame in political processes. Since H. Mead we can establish the link between culture and the personal identity process. Social individuals whose identity has been forged by the same culture does develop to some extend, a common psychology. This does explain the concept of cultural psychology as a social reality, which occasionally becomes a political factor. Your project is therefore interesting for sociologists, political scientists (which I am), psychologists, anthropologists, and philosophers (remembering Hegel's thoughts on recognition, pride and shame).'

The stock of information and opinions that I collected slowly accumulated; it ranged from theoretical analyses to historical mappings, and last but not least to some down-to-earth cross-cultural advice: 'Greet everybody by shaking hands. Put your left hand on your right lower arm while doing it. When an elder person greets you she might touch both arms, do likewise. Wear a long shirt; the hips are the erogenous zone, not so much the breasts as in Europe and America.'

About Hutu, Tutsi, and Intellectual Brilliance

On 5th March1998 in Oslo I met a highly educated and sophisticated, very tall, attractive, and charming Rwandan, whose family had not fled Rwanda in 1959 but had endured multiple humiliations inside the country, - a fact that made me understand that he was from Tutsi background. I kept in touch with him since; he prefers not to be named. I will call him Paul. Later, in August 1998, at the 'International Congress of Somali Studies' in Turku, Finland, the Somali participants will remind me of him: many are as elegant as him, both in clothing and intellectual style, they combine as much sharp thinking with beautiful poetic intellectual style, they are provocatively charming, like him. Perhaps, he is more refined and reserved, more controlled than my Somali acquaintances. Thus, I am immersed in the dispute about the origin of the Tutsi; I ask myself: Are Tutsi quasi-Somalis after all? Or has this elegance nothing to do with national origin? Maybe anybody who becomes an intellectual transforms in this way? Unlikely (readers exempted), as anybody visiting academic conferences will agree.

Paul, my sophisticated Rwandan friend, speaking several languages perfectly and elegantly, with a superbly controlled and soft voice, not expressing shyness through his gentleness, but radiating aristocracy, seems to come directly out of Kashamura's manuscript: 'The different castes after all differ, not only through social and economic status, but also through character, customs, conduct and even language. Tutsi pride is unparalleled; the Tutsi considers himself as the measure of all things. All those who do not resemble him, even Europeans, are barbarians (*i nya matswa*); he disposes of a collection of biting injuries to express his contempt: *i bi simba*, spicy insects, meaning non-human; *i nyama tswa*, badly educated, vulgar person, *mu shi*, pariah, man without honour, who eats whatever; twa, pygmy, or clochard, hippie. The Tutsi speaks little. Acts, gestures, and words, everything is balanced and staged. He is secretive, haughty, and does not accept to be commanded. He has a soft and little violent temperament, but he always aims at the highest place. From young age on, Tutsi children are impregnated with this mentality, and their most lively ambition is to incarnate the virtues of their parents. The Hutu is a much more open man, even if he, out of snobbism, sometimes imitates Tutsi comportment… The Twa is vive, spontaneous, choleric, he is not impressed by the majestic and reserved attitude of Tutsi. He does not guard the secret of his intimate relations; voluntarily he adopts a provocative and bizarre language, different from the others… It happens that the men of the Great Lakes consider the other Africans as Twas, because of their vivacity and their exuberance, but also because of certain morphological traits.'[171]

Of course, I was looking forward to getting introduced to somebody with a Hutu background, after having met a person who seemed such a cliché Tutsi. I soon made the acquaintance of a highly educated Burundian, working with an international organisation that

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[171] Translated by the author from: 'Les différentes castes diffèrent néanmoins, non seulement par le statut social et économique, mais aussi par le caractère, les coutumes, les manières et même le langage. L'orgueil tutsi n'a pas son pareil: le Tutsi se considère comme la mesure de toute chose. Tous ceux qui ne lui ressemblent pas, fussent-ils Européens, sont des barbares (i nya matswa); il dispose d'une collection d'injures mordantes pour exprimer son mépris: i bi simba, insectes piquants, c'est-à-dire sous-hommes; i nyama tswa, civette, personne mal élevée et grossière; mu shi, paria, homme sans honneur, mangeant n'importe quoi; twa, pygmée, c'est-à-dire clochard, hippie. Le Tutsi parle peu. Actes, gestes, paroles, tout chez lui est pesé et concerté. Il est secret, hautain, et supporte mal d'être commandé. Il est d'un tempérament doux et peu violent, mais il vise toujours la place la plus haute. Dès leur plus jeune âge, les enfants tutsi sont imprégnés de cette mentalité, et leur ambition la plus vive est d'incarner les vertus de leurs parents. Le Hutu est un homme beaucoup plus ouvert, même si par snobisme il imite parfois le comportement tutsi... Le Twa est vif, spontané, colérique, il ne se laisse pas impressionner par l'attitude majestueuse et réserve des Tutsi. Il ne garde pas le secret de ses relations intimes; volontiers il adopte un langage provoquant et bizarre, différent des autres... Il arrive que les hommes des grands lacs considèrent les autres Africains comme des Twa, à cause de leur vivacité et de leur exubérance, mais aussi à cause de certains traits morphologiques' (Kashamura, 1973, 48-50, quoted in Erny, 1995, 28, 29, italicisation in original).

does not allow him to step forward with personal views and be identified. Therefore I will not give name, place or date of the meeting, but call him Joseph. About half way through our first conversation he 'admits' to having a Hutu background, but I had started to 'suspect' it before. I will present this interview in its chronology, though shortened, in order to give the reader a direct impression; I translate from French:

Joseph: 'Before the Europeans came, there were many small kingdoms in Burundi and Rwanda. In each country there was one kingdom which was the strongest, both Tutsi dominated. Germans and Belgian colonial powers ruled by indirect rule. Between 1929-1932 an administration reform was carried out. The number of administrative entities was decreased. Many chiefs and sub-chiefs were dismissed, and most of them were Hutu, following the theory by archbishop Monsignore Classe from Alsace-Lorraine that Tutsi are born to rule, and Hutu should be utilised as workers in agriculture, mining, handicrafts, and so on. The administrators were always Belgians, blacks were assistants, and they were exclusively Tutsi.'

Joseph continues: 'Tutsi children were sent to special schools, where they learned how to rule. Only Tutsi had access. The colonialists' theory of Tutsi origin indicated that they had longer faces, beautiful ladies with long nails, and that they came from Arab countries. The whites thought that Tutsi were a mixture of Arab and white blood, therefore nearer to the whites, - relatives of whites. When Tutsi were admitted to college, they were prepared to be in power, while Hutu entered in catholic seminars to become teachers and fathers. There were also some Hutu intellectuals, but the way to power was blocked for Hutu. In short: Rulers: Tutsi; servants: Hutu. The concept of humiliation is therefore related to tradition and culture: Tutsi are convinced that they are "born to rule," they cannot imagine how they can survive without being in power.'

Joseph carries on to trace history: 'When the Belgians opened the door, the Hutu intellectuals organised a revolution, 1st November 1959, completed with independence on 1st July 1962. During the revolution in Rwanda, Tutsi power was deposed of, democratic elections were organised under UN supervision, and Hutu power was officially promoted. Tutsi reactions went two ways: (1) Some realised that they were not numerous enough against the Hutu and could not win a war (they were fighting with arrow and machete, not with the gun); they fled. I lived in the North of Burundi and Tutsi refugees came. I am from a Hutu family and I remember how my father welcomed a Tutsi who came as a refugee and gave him permission to harvest from his fields. (2) Some other Tutsi thought that they were there to rule. They organised resistance, thinking that they could stay in power; some were killed.'

At this point it becomes clear which message Joseph wants me to understand, namely that not all Hutu are 'genocidaires,' - he continues: 'There were also some tyrannical Tutsi in some regions; they were also killed. But they were not all targeted; there was no genocidal thinking from Hutu side. Those who fled took their herds with them, their animals; they were not prevented from doing that, they were just pushed away. Those who killed were only the ones who organised resistance and the tyrannical rulers.'

Joseph explains: 'In Burundi the phenomena were similar to Rwanda, with only one difference: the Hutu did not organise a revolution; the Tutsi stayed in power after independence. Tutsi refugees came from Rwanda into Burundi (as I experienced as a child). The Tutsi refugees who came convinced the Tutsi in Burundi that they should kill the Hutu intellectuals in order to prevent to be ousted by them. There were massive killings in 1965, 1969; and in 1972 a major genocide was perpetrated. 1988 and 1993 more killings followed. Tutsi invaded Rwanda in tentative invasions several times; they always failed, but succeeded in1990.'

Joseph now analyses differences in Tutsi and Hutu group attachment: 'There is a different degree of consciousness of belonging to a group. Tutsi have a high degree of consciousness, for them it is connected to their physical survival, some Tutsi politicians say that they will be physically eliminated if they do not fight. The Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi are 'brothers.' This degree of group consciousness has never developed among the Hutu. The Hutu are more difficult to mobilise for fighting. People say that the Tutsi came from the Horn of Africa and are fighters, warriors, ready to fight and lose their lives for a cause. Hutu are not ready to lose their lives for power. The Tutsi have (a) a collective consciousness, they fear to disappear as a group, and they have (b) a prejudice that they were born to rule (and cannot survive without power, cannot survive under Hutu domination, they are therefore frustrated when out of power).'

Joseph identifies the culprit: 'The problem is culture: The ruling system in Rwanda and Burundi was a centralised monarchy, promoting the wealth of the ruling people, based on ownership of cows. People without cows were considered poor. Pastoralist Tutsi had the monopoly. They sometimes gave cows to Hutu in order to bind the Hutu into giving the Tutsi services. The richest Hutu were given cows by the Tutsi. This was a way to give Hutu status as servants. In this culture, a son of a Tutsi gets the conviction that he is born to rule, that he is above the servants, while a son of a Hutu learns to be convinced that he is a servant, therefore he learns to be polite and humble, while a Tutsi is proud. A Tutsi boy learned that he could kill a Hutu at any time.'

At the end of our conversation Joseph tries to find explanations for the ultimate failure of Hutu endeavours to rule Rwanda successfully and peacefully: 'When Hutu got power they had no experience of ruling, which means that Hutu just did the same as the Tutsi before. Hutu have an inferiority complex. Power changed hands but not mentality; those Hutu who came into power just imitated the Tutsi, they tried to be like the Tutsi, marry Tutsi women...'

Joseph rounds up the interview with an emotional appeal that Hutu humiliation ought to end: 'The problem today is generalisation, the confusion of the individual with the group! Now everybody regards all Tutsi as victims and all Hutu as 'genocidaires,' although most Hutu were not involved! This is the worst humiliation today!' He reports how painful and humiliating it is for him to be met with disdain, suspicion and stigmatisation wherever he goes, just because he is Hutu, although he never participated in any genocide.

Joseph is as highly educated as Paul, even higher. He expresses himself in beautiful French, much better than mine, but without any aristocratic mannerism. His physical appearance follows as perfectly as Paul's the book of clichés: Joseph is broadly built, - the complete opposite to Paul. He reminded me of Maoris in New Zealand (or people from Samoa and other pacific islands), the only people I ever met before who amazed me with the broadness of their setting, - a build that is regarded by some as ugly, but admired by me since I personally find beauty in diversity. Joseph seemed to me much more straightforward than Paul; Paul appeared to have a multitude of strategic thoughts, he was much more controlled and never expressed emotions in a direct way. I was surprised to be confronted with so much cliché, a cliché that forced itself upon me as much as I tried to put question marks. Later in Africa I understood that by chance I had met two 'ideal' types, and that it was not at all so clear in all cases.

Later a French expert on the Great Lakes will explain to me ('off the record'): 'Concerning the feeling of Hutu inferiority: It is the fear that the other party will after all be able to carry out their hidden intentions of dominating "us." How must I feel as a Hutu, coming from an uneducated provincial background, when I encounter people who really are arrogant, who really look down on me? How do I tackle these feelings? How must I feel, as Hutu elite in Rwanda for example, when I sense that I am unable to integrate these sophisticated Tutsi people? "Slaves" think in old terms, they expect domination; this is not what masters usually expect. Therefore extermination may appear as the only solution for a slave-turned-into-a-master for handling this challenge, while for self-confident masters oppression of rebellions is sufficient. Hutu inferiority has been heightened through the fact that the Tutsi went out and lived all over the world some decades before the first Hutu did

that. A cosmopolitan Tutsi diaspora has existed for a long time, while a Hutu diaspora exists only since 1994. Tutsi have had time to get used to exile and its problems, to meet other cultures, to learn new languages and found journals that cater to Rwandan culture abroad. Those who go out, acquire "recul," a capacity to see things from a distance, they learn to see that things are relative, they become less narrow-minded. It is very difficult to have some inner distance as long as one is in Burundi, Rwanda. One has to have some distance!'

Are Women Different to Men?

My first encounters almost compel me to map onto the Hutu-Tutsi struggle the troubled essentialist discourse of women's emancipation, starting with the question: Are women different to men? And, if yes, does this prove that women are 'less' or 'more' than men? As is well-known, those women who fear that females are 'less' tend to profess that men and women are alike, while those women who believe that females are 'more,' prefer to advocate difference. The problem obviously is the confounding of two categories, namely difference and ranking; logic ordains that the discourse of difference ought to have precedence over the discourse of ranking; however, human beings, in a self-serving manner, seem to like to do the opposite.

Tutsi would take the place of males in the male-female dispute, being strategic thinkers who cannot afford to let emotions reign (males, in former times, were trained to be warriors, and to control fear is central for a good warrior), while Hutu would represent women, who, safely 'protected' against outside attacks by their Tutsi/male warriors, would have the 'luxury' of not having to grow up, but would instead remain emotional and open like children in their 'Doll's House' (Ibsen). This would be the male/Tutsi view. However, women/Hutu would get furious at this version of history. They would demand to be given a voice; they would insist that the 'subaltern' should be allowed to speak for themselves. 'Subaltern' is Gramsci's term identifying the economically dispossessed, and has been re-appropriated by Ranajit Guha in order to locate and re-establish a 'voice' or collective locus of agency in post-colonial India. Ranajit Guha initiated a project called 'Subaltern Studies' searching for the voices and agency of the subaltern, those people subordinated in society on the basis of class, caste, gender, or age.[172] The 'subaltern' women/Hutu would narrate a different story, namely that males/Tutsi oppress females/Hutu under the cynical pretence that

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[172] See, for example, http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/subaltern/ssmap.htm. See also Spivak's seminal essay 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' (Spivak, in Nelson & Grossberg, 1988).

they protect them. A neutral observer would perhaps conclude that in the Western world males have largely lost their 'job' as warriors, thus male and female role descriptions approach likeness, and the discourse about ranking difference versus ranking equality follows suit. The same social change clearly befalls the Tutsi-Hutu cleavage these days.

On My Way to the Great Lakes

Since it was Somalia that took up the first part of my fieldwork, Rwanda and Burundi initially stayed 'far away.' However, I met humanitarian aid organisations that operated in both regions and could compare both. As mentioned above, in Hargeisa I met Linda Cook and Zahra Adan Gulaid (Health Unlimited, UK) who showed me their radio studio in Hargeisa; later, in Kenya (3rd January 1999), I also met Mark Bickerton who was on his way to Rwanda and explains to me in detail how he writes soap operas that are intended to transport health messages regarding such topics as HIV and hygiene. For example, he says: 'If you want to effectively advocate the use of condoms in a country like Rwanda, you have to take into account whether there is electricity at night in the houses, - how is a guy to find the condom in the dark? Or, does he dispose of it correctly?' And, I ask myself, how not to let the delicate Hutu-Tutsi problem undermine the whole programme? Later, in Belfast (May 1999) I will meet another organisation that deals in 'constructive' media work, namely Search for Common Ground who supports Studio Ijambo in Burundi that produces the radio soap opera, *Our Neighbors, Ourselves*. The latest Search for Common Ground Fall 2000 Newsletter (6th September 2000) reports that a survey indicates that an 'astounding 87%' listen to the radio soap opera, and '82% of those surveyed believe that Studio Ijambo's programs greatly help reconciliation.'

Before travelling to Africa I had contacted Klaus Töpfer (Executive Director of UNEP, the United Nations Environment Programme, seat in Nairobi); he had asked Maria De Amorim, former deputy of the regional office for Africa, to give feedback to my work. On 15th December 1998 I pick up her response in Nairobi. She lets me know that she thinks that this is a very positive and interesting project, but that I should include frustration. De Amorim points out that Somali and Rwandese people are frustrated by the inequitable distribution of power and resources, and the inequitable use of law in both countries.

In Nairobi I met furthermore a highly qualified and gifted Tutsi, who had survived the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, together with his wife and children, only because he was in Nairobi and not in Rwanda. I do not want to reveal his name. He hesitated very much about

whether he should speak to me. He is extremely hurt and traumatised. What particularly devastates him, are Western double standards, as they unfolded before and during the genocide, but, worse, even at the time we speak together. He is shattered by the genocide and Western neglect of the victims, and support for the genocidaires. Shortly after the genocide he travelled to Rwanda and found and buried the dead corpses of almost twenty of his family, including parents and siblings. Back in Kenya, he subsequently lost his ability to work; he could not even hold a pen. His wife has to support the family. Full of bitterness he accuses: 'There is this Rwanda trauma, and nobody helps! Because of this apathy in the international community! And out of political reasons! France, for example, wanted to keep Anglo-Saxons out and let one million people be killed to protect their francophone sphere of influence! And the UN is a bunch of mercenaries!' He knew people that worked with UNDP in Kigali, 'everybody thought they would be protected, but on the contrary, they were betrayed by Hutu UNDP employees, who, with the help of radio communication, could identify the hiding places of their Tutsi colleagues and send killers to them!' I kept in touch with my Tutsi friend since, we met several times, and I hope sincerely that he will collect the courage and write the book that has been forming in his head for many years.

        I subsequently prepared to leave Nairobi for Rwanda and Burundi. As discussed above, since I had limited funding, and could not afford expensive hotels or taxis, I often had to depend on my feet, on local transport and on people housing me. I could hardly ask those Africans who lacked resources for themselves to help me, and therefore I turned to those 'Westerners' who, in African eyes, came to 'enjoy themselves,' namely members of Western NGOs and multilateral organisations like the UN. As to be expected, the African stereotype of these people is oversimplified, and I met very sincere men and women in this group, typified by Sam Engelstad and his empathic words, quoted above, about humiliation.

        Only once I was rejected. I phoned an international organisation in Rwanda (13th January 1999). I speak to a high-ranking Swiss male who aggressively refuses to help. He strongly affirms that the security situation in Rwanda prohibits completely helping researchers like me, or sponsoring me. He calls my behaviour 'begging.' With annoyance he tells me that I could check into a hotel like any other researcher, and that there are many researchers coming, without begging. Of course, I agree with him. The last thing I wish to become is a burden in an already tense situation. I do not want to be one of those idle onlookers of accidents who disturb efforts to rescue the victims. On the other hand, living with people proved to be immeasurably more fruitful than getting into the 'safe' distance of a

hotel room. Therefore, looking back, I do not regret having insisted on finding private homes with people willing to include me in their lives.

Burundi

Burundi was served by UNCAS flights, meaning that the UN would fly their personnel in small planes to areas that were not easily reachable, in the case of Burundi because of the embargo. I was kindly allowed to join such a flight to Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi, on 19th January 1999. In the plane I become, so-to-speak, part of the UNHCR team on board and the first thing to do in Bujumbura is to make an appointment for an official visit to the UNHCR head Ulf T. Kristoffersson, Délégué, Haut Commissariat Des Nations Unies Pour les Réfugiés (I have a brief meeting on 19th January 1999, and a longer one on 16th February 1999 on which I will report further down).

A lot of remarkable contacts were made for me by my friend Marianne, whose life in Bujumbura I am privileged to share. I learn about the views and feelings 'inside' the often dangerous assignments of UNHCR personnel in emergency crises. How does it feel, for example, to be assigned to the task of standing on a bridge and counting dead bodies in a river? When I reflect on this question I become aware that many times, in Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi, I perceived a kind of breathlessness among aid workers, combined with a professional distance from horror and death that went further than the detachment physicians learn during their studies, presumably because it is compounded by fear for the helpers' own lives and a thorough and devastating disillusionment concerning human nature. A physician meets suffering patients, often surrounded by pitiful family members; a helper like Marianne meets immeasurable suffering intermingled with very little pity. I also remember Torill Egge Grung, whom I had met on 6th May 1998 in Oslo. She had been in Rwanda the year before, assigned to interview prisoners in Rwandan prisons.

Torill Egge Grung explained to me that she is convinced that helpers are not being well enough prepared for such tasks and that it is unprofessional that helpers never talk about their own feelings, keep stone faces, and believe that this is 'tough.' She says (translated from Norwegian by the author): 'One has to learn to handle what one is living through as a human being! One needs the opportunity to talk, also in the field! The UN should put in place mobile teams of psychologists! Because helpers experience a horrifying reality compounded by double helplessness (because they cannot help those in prison who are helpless themselves). In such situations helpers feel humiliated (a) by their helplessness, and (b) they are being

humiliated by local authorities.' She illustrates the last point: 'Once, unwilling authorities locked me and another woman in a cell with two hundred young men, at fifty degrees Celsius, and the men were quarrelling…' She concludes: 'Humiliation and insult are big topics for helpers: Helpers feel intensely how little life is being valued, their own lives included!'

Having become part of the expatriate community in Bujumbura I also learn a lot about the city, about where danger starts at the outskirts for an expatriate, for a Hutu or a Tutsi, how careful one has to be, and where expatriates had been killed and why. And I see Marianne's employees - those who guard her walled compound and take care of her household - descend from the hills around Bujumbura, as part of caravans of Hutu who live in the hills and come to work in Tutsi-Bujumbura during day-time, just to disappear again in the evening. In the morning smoke spots on the hills surrounding Bujumbura bear the evidence of fighting - yet another home had been set on fire - and sometimes Hutu would be 'unable' to come to work, after nights of fear, whether of government troops or Hutu rebels. I feel with all my senses what I had read in a 12th February 1998 meeting report: 'Bujumbura is as tense as ever, a result of the recent attacks in and around the city. In broad terms, Tutsis appear to fear an invasion of rebels into the city, and Hutus fear that frightened Tutsis will launch an attack on them within the city. The need to have a formal negotiating framework to which all parties, internal and external, are engaged is more imperative than ever' (Meeting Report by Howard Wolpe, Presidential Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region and Marie-Elena John Smith, International Human Rights Law Group' Wolpe & John Smith, 1997).

Marianne looks back on a broad spectre of international experience, as do most of her colleagues who have passed through a number of posts; it is an experience that is unparalleled, since even the golden card holder of a transnational corporation, who moves about the globe more frequently than her, would not see the whole range of the human condition, with its extreme poles of genocidal slaughter, hunger and disease on one side and international luxury hotels on the other.

When Children Have to Kill

Marianne brings me together with Stephen V. Gerardo, Resident Representative of the Dutch Relief & Rehabilitation Agency, DRA (Reconciliation Programme) and responsible for community building. I met him for the first time on 20th January 1999. His dedicated work together with Jean-Chrys Biseta, the Project Counterpart, by far exceeds the imagination of what usually is understood as professional life; both invest their whole existence, and

basically are prepared to risk their lives. On 12th February 1999 Stephen takes me to a youth camp where circa three hundred Hutu and Tutsi youth came together for *bushingantahe* (or *bashingantahe*) discussions, a traditional form of respectful problem solving through talking. We drive through outskirts of Bujumbura where almost all houses are destroyed. Stephen explains the precarious situation to me, namely that in the mountains surrounding the city there are around 20 000 Hutu rebels, and in town perhaps as many Tutsi soldiers; Hutu fathers often stay in the mountains, their wives as "widows" in town. In other words, some Hutu youth I am to meet in the youth camp probably have their fathers in the mountains.

When we arrive at the camp, a large group of youth, mostly around sixteen is having lunch. Many have visible scars on their bodies, scars that speak an infallible language. I meet Joseph Bigirumwami, Dr. Sciences du Langages, a brilliantly wise *ubushingantahe*, or traditional conflict solver. We speak about a possible editor for his doctoral thesis *Nomination des espaces et topologie fictive au Burundi* at the university of Toulouse, and I hope intensely that he will be able to publish his invaluable work. After a while the *bushingantahe* session starts. Several people translate for me. I am thoroughly amazed by these children answering the *ubushingantahe'*s questions like: 'Who is responsible for the fact that you participate in killings'? The discussion is extremely lively, many hands go up, and many different opinions are aired. Some identify politicians as inciters of killings; others accept that also those who allow themselves to be incited might be guilty.

I realise, more than ever, that crisis management usually builds on the assumption that there are long stretches of 'normality' and short incidents of 'crisis.' Here it is the other way round. I wonder how the lives of these children will continue after this session, when I am back in town and safe. 'Thousands of minors (children and adolescents) have participated in genocides and in assassinations. Adults used bribery, drugs and personal influence to incite these young people to consider killing trivial. Many adolescents have been drafted into the militia and the army. They have lost all notion of respect for human life. Just as in the case of adults guilty of such crimes, these minors - at the same time both executioners and victims - must be identified and judged. Whatever the outcome, they should be entitled to therapy to facilitate their reeducation and their social rehabilitation. Simple confinement would make these "executioner" children even more violent and would represent a great potential danger for the societies of the region. It is an acute problem requiring the rapid establishment of specialised structures' (Institut Universitaire d'etudes du developpement Genève (IUED), 1995, 5,6).

What happens to children who are, at a very young age, traumatised and humiliated? 'Affective blindness' may be the most severe outcome, a consequence that confronts any society who has to care for such children with extreme challenges. Perry explains 'affective blindness' with the following case: 'A fifteen year old boy sees some fancy sneakers he wants. Another child is wearing them – so he pulls out a gun and demands them. The younger child, at gunpoint, takes off his shoes and surrenders them. The fifteen year old puts the gun to the child's head, smiles and pulls the trigger. When he is arrested, the officers are chilled by his apparent lack of remorse. Asked later whether, if he could turn back the clock, he would do anything differently, he thinks and replies, "I would have cleaned my shoes." His "bloody shoes" led to his arrest. He exhibits regret for being caught, an intellectual, cognitive response. But remorse – an affect – is absent. He feels no connection to the pain of his victim. Neglected and humiliated by his primary caretakers when he was young, this fifteen year old murderer is, literally, emotionally retarded. The part of his brain which would have allowed him to feel connected to other human beings – empathy – simply did not develop. He has affective blindness. Just as the retarded child lacks the capacity to understand abstract cognitive concepts, this young murderer lacks the capacity to be connected to other human beings in a healthy way. Experience, or rather lack of critical experiences, resulted in this affective blindness – this emotional retardation' (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 128).[173]

The problem of 'affective blindness' links also back to the above mentioned *Mooryaan* in Mogadishu, *Jirri* among the Majerteen, or, *day-day* among the Isaaq, or, any similar occurrence of violence that may, at least partly, be connected with 'affective blindness.'

The Expatriate Community

On 16th February 1999 I had a long meeting with Ulf Kristoffersson, introduced above. Incidentally, he had been the one to open the UNHCR office in Hargeisa and had been responsible for the Horn of Africa in Geneva before that. He describes his strategy as a leading representative of an international organisation as one of 'neutrality and distance towards local governments,' a neutrality that ought to characterise the international community altogether. He skilfully describes the Great Lakes' dilemma of Tutsi fearing extermination (genocide in Rwanda, and still 150000 Hutu *interahamwe* in Congo who want to attack and take over Rwanda), and Hutu wishing to rise from being excluded from power

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[173] See also P. Mones, 1991, When a Child Kills: Abused Children Who Kill Their Parents.

and resources. He agrees with my proposition that the extremists in both camps are the ones that have to be pacified. I ask him whether the situation could be compared, as I had heard, to the old colonial times, only that the Tutsi were the colonisers and could not go home, or whether the situation resembled South Africa. He said, 'no, a dynamic like here I have not seen anywhere!' In his doctoral dissertation he had portrayed the situation quite negatively and his thesis had been rejected because of that; however, he says, his judgement had been only too correct, events subsequently proved that 'my description of the situation had not been negative enough!'

Ulf Kristoffersson also addresses the question of who is better prepared to govern effectively, Hutu or Tutsi, or, in my words, those who have the experience, or those who have to grow into it. Ulf Kristoffersson puts great hopes on the Arusha talks and sees signs of improvement; he reports that there is now a Hutu president of parliament. Under such circumstances, he says, it is admirable that Burundi, even under the embargo, pays the salary to every state employee (even though the value of the salary is eaten up by inflation, he admits, but still), and that Burundi always honoured its debts. Furthermore, he rounds up our conversation, one cannot see the Great Lakes isolated from Africa and its problems: '30% of the population is HIV positive, soon we will only have young and old people and those who produce are not there; we cannot fathom how it will be in ten years.'

Regarding the management of international organisations Ulf Kristoffersson agrees with what Ola Skuterud had also mapped out to me. He explains that he tries to employ as many local staff as possible and that he avoids having expatriates costing 7000 US Dollars a month, while a more experienced local person is available. Although, he emphasises, 'one has to apply this strategy with care,' because 'local people are not the solution to everything' (I assume he means that local people may sometimes be too vulnerable since they at times may be confronted with expectations from family and friends that go too far).

I later get fervent accounts from other members of the international community who are less neutral than Ulf Kristoffersson, who rather identified with Hutu sufferings. I do not want to disclose the name of the interviewee, who judges ruthlessly: 'Tutsi do not seem to remember 1972, when circa 300 000 Hutu were killed and nobody has been made responsible. No investigation! Those who did it are today driving around in their Mercedes and are in power! The international community did not say anything; neither block in the Cold War was interested at that time! The OAU even congratulated the regime for keeping law and order! This must be terrible for the Hutu and must contribute to radicalising them! The 1993 killings of Tutsi by Hutu, on the other side, were labelled as genocide by the UN! I believe that this

was one of the gravest mistakes made by the international community. This must be very difficult to understand for the Hutu that he is labelled "genocidaire" in 1993, while the Tutsi get away with 1972 without a word, without any persecution or labelling. 1972 around 300 000 Hutu were killed, and then they killed circa 30 000 Tutsi... There must be a lot of frustration and anger among the Hutu.' And he continues: 'It is here that humiliation is happening! And humiliation is furthermore a daily experience in the field of justice. The prisons are full, with Hutu. The judges and lawyers are Tutsi...'

And, he continues: 'Tutsi in Rwanda say that the genocide started 1959 with the Belgians. They do not acknowledge their own responsibility! You should not think, that the Burundian Tutsi are in Arusha out of their free will! They are pressed to it by the rebels and by the international community! Of course, through the genocide in Rwanda, they have the air of victims. But they are also oppressors! The Tutsi elite likes to hide behind some kind of metaphysical talk, like "Yes, we have problems, but we Burundians must solve them ourselves." And this in a situation where Burundi is not a country, but a place owned by a few Tutsi families from the South; they have their bank accounts in Switzerland, the profits from the "loot" go entirely there. The majority does not profit. It is not like in other places where all get more, when the rich get more.' And he concludes with the only positive aspect of money he can find: 'The businessmen in town want peace, because they want to earn money.'

I am not sure, but I develop a feeling that those expatriates in higher positions in the hierarchy of international organisations have a visceral understanding for the Tutsi fear to be killed - and Tutsi 'defence,' even in form of oppression - while those in lower positions are rather touched by the plight of the Hutu underdog. I cannot present statistical data for this hypothesis.

I then confront a member of the Tutsi ruling elite in Burundi (whose name I do not want to reveal) with the accusation that Tutsi do not acknowledge their own responsibility. He agrees. He says that, while Hutu suffer from an inferiority complex, Tutsi are afflicted with a superiority complex. But, he exclaims (translated from French), 'the Hutu in Rwanda had no reason to kill the Tutsi in a genocide! The Tutsi in Rwanda had nothing, no Tutsi was in any high position!' He continues: 'I knew Habyarimana quite well and there was not more than one single Tutsi minister in the government in all these years, - why on earth did they have to even kill Tutsi babies? When a Rwandan Hutu officer in the army wanted to marry he had to prove that his wife was not a Tutsi! This genocide of the Tutsi, while the Hutu actually were the ones in power and dominating the country 100%, does this not show this inferiority complex that causes a Hutu not be at ease, not to be relaxed with a Tutsi, but embarrassed

('gênée')? My mother, and half of my family were killed after Ndadaye was killed [Ndadaye was a democratically elected Hutu President in 1993 who was assassinated a few months after his election]. The Hutu came and said: "You have killed Ndadaye!!!" Even children were killed, how could they have killed Ndadaye? Among the Hutu there is a visceral hatred! There is a group of Hutu who feel uneasy with Tutsi, are full of complexes, and see as the only solution the extermination of even the last Tutsi!'

Wherever people talked about the predicament of the Hutu, the term 'inferiority complex' was in use. In the field of psychology this term is connected with the name of Alfred Adler (1870-1937), a psychiatrist born in Vienna. In 1911 he broke with Freud and investigated the psychology of the individual person. Scheff (1990) links the 'inferiority complex' with shame. In 'Socialization of Emotions - Pride and Shame As Casual Agents' (Scheff, in Kemper, 1990) he explains that Adler's (1956) theory of human development anticipated Lewis's discovery of the two basic types of unacknowledged shame.

Scheff writes on page 289, 'Although he [Adler] did not use the term shame, a cognate, "the feeling of inferiority," played a central role in his theory. He argued that children's primary need is for love [for what Bowlby, 1969, calls a "secure attachment"]. If love is not available at crucial points, the child can proceed along one of two paths: either develop an "inferiority complex," that is, become prone to overt, undifferentiated shame, or compensate by seeking power, that is, avoid feeling shame by bypassing it, through incessant thought, speech, and/or actions.'

On the 15th of February 1999 I paid an official visit to very knowledgeable Peter Wijnenga, Deputy and Head of Protection, UNHCR, Bujumbura and had a long and tremendously informative interview with him. On the same day a long and equally interesting official meeting with Libère Bararunyeretse, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and head of the NGO, Compagnie des Apôtres de la Paix (CAP) takes place. Libère Bararunyeretse is also advisor to President Buyoya. President Buyoya looks back on a long career. Lemarchand, in his book *Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice,* writes about Buyoya as follows: 'President Pierre Buyoya deserves full credit. By committing his government to a genuine political opening and creating the conditions for a level playing field, Buyoya did more to bring his country onto the path of democratization than any of his predecessors. Today the country stands at the threshold of a new era; for the first time in Burundi history the key decision makers, including the newly elected president Melchior Ndadaye, are drawn from the

Hutu community' (Lemarchand, 1994a, preface, xv. As already explained above, Ndadaye was killed very soon after Lemarchand wrote this preface. [174])

Later I visited another Burundian politician with Tutsi background, I will call him Christian, and his wife Sophie, at home, where I meet their children, together with the orphaned children of the family living with them, - a sad situation in so many homes in this region. I am welcomed and cared for by Sophie in an amazing way; she includes me among her relations, accompanies me through town, and examines with me African clothing designs. Wherever I am later discussing the issue of national identity, I will explain that I have proud and independent women friends in Africa who are much closer to me than any inhabitant of a small European village who has never acquired a larger horizon than this village. Sophie is one of those friends. All potential cultural barriers are contained by a common way of being a particular kind of woman.

What draws me to the Senegalese tailors? In Burundi, as in other parts of Africa, Senegalese tailors stand for a non-Western African style, namely beautiful West African clothes. I admit that I feel personally ashamed that colonialists left behind a legacy of bad taste in so many African countries (obviously particularly there were they succeeded in converting the population to Christianity). In Somaliland, two hours after arrival, I had bought a Somali dress with a veil (under which I would hide my video camera) that I wore every day all day until I left and gave it away; in Somalia every woman wore such clothes. It was totally different in Kenya, where a selection of dull Western cloths of an especially outdated style fills the stalls. Upon arrival in Kenya, as in Somalia, I bought an African style costume in a shop for African heritage, quite elegant and beautiful, produced in West Africa. I did not wear anything else for the coming months; it was to become my 'working uniform.' I believe it helped me a lot, because it made people curious, because nobody wore African clothes in Kenya (not in Rwanda and Burundi either); it foreclosed any superficial immediate categorisation of me, the white blonde women with long hair, alone, in a beautiful African dress, instead of dull skirt, or jeans, and T-shirt: I could neither be a Western diplomat, nor a normal tourist, and least of all could I be a worn-down backpacking Western drug addict.[175]

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[174] Lemarchand's book came out in 1994 and he dedicates it to late Melchior Ndadaye and writes 'To the memory of Melchior Ndadaye, Pontien Karibwami, and Gilles Bimazubute – may their ultimate sacrifice inspire future generations of Hutu and Tutsi in their quest for peace.'

[175] P. Golde, 1970, writes about Women in the Field - Anthropological Experiences.

Peace Negotiator

Peter Wijnenga recommended to me that I should meet Jan van Eck, consultant in political analysis, conflict resolution, mediation and advocacy, former ANC member of South Africa's Parliament, and working with the Centre for Conflict Resolution of Cape Town, who is regularly meeting with Hutu and Tutsi leaders to try to strengthen moderates and increase their political participation.

On 20th January 1999 I met van Eck and explain my project to him. He reflects and then says that he, in the beginning, could not really see the relevance of humiliation, but, 'as soon as I started thinking and especially after talking about it, I feel that humiliation is central.' He explains: 'In conflict resolution you must have a win-win situation, not a win-lose situation, otherwise no agreement will last. As soon as you have a win-lose situation, one side feels defeated and thus humiliated.' He introduces a very interesting metaphor that illustrates that both conflict sides must want a solution, that it must be voluntary: 'It is not so important to get a solution, it is especially useless to press for a too quick solution; what is important is the process, not the solution. The process can be compared with courtship. In Africa everybody understands what that means. One has to meet the parents of the lady, agree on how many cattle has to be paid, find the cattle, - one has to meet with the parents many times. It is a long process. If one makes mistakes in the course of this process, then the marriage will not take place. If you do not make mistakes, the marriage might take place; at every point during the process, both parties can say no. And you have to agree beforehand which colour the bedroom shall be, if the wife likes to paint it black and you do not like it black, this will be a problem…'

Later, on 29th August 2000, I read, in connection with the signing of the Arusha peace accord: '"All the same it is a good start," Cape Town-based consultant in political analysis, conflict resolution mediation and advocacy, Jan Van Eck, told IRIN. Despite Tutsi parties signing with reservations, delegates hugged and congratulated each other after the signing and speculated on the future' (IRIN, 29th August 2000).

The translator of van Eck, who drives me back down from the hill of Eck's house to town, tells me that he thinks that humiliation is a very strong and direct word: 'I feel that politicians often talk about "minimiser," which I would translate with "undermining." This "undermining" is done very indirectly, a person is made to wait, the red carpet is not there, the protocol is not followed as it should, this is the way politicians make somebody smaller. I would suggest that "minimiser" is the weaker version of humiliation.'

19th January 1999, I met Siegfried Rapp, Chancellor at the German Embassy in Bujumbura, who stated that whoever wants to find humiliation has to visit Burundi and Rwanda; both groups have mutually slaughtered and humiliated each other. He loves Africa, and he and his wife committed themselves to helping; his wife helps street children in Nairobi. He advises me not to take the minibus through rebel areas to Rwanda, and, if I did, I would have to do this at my own risk; embassy personnel, for example, would not get permission.

The Minibus to Rwanda

I take the minibus. I am the only white person. About twenty people are squeezed into a small vehicle; nobody talks, I am never addressed. Unapproachable, closed faces around me, - not hostile, just very controlled. A concentrated, intense, enforced emptiness is written in these faces, expressing a desperate attempt to look 'normal.' Perhaps, I think, this is how fear looks when one cannot escape, when one is compelled to make this journey. The driver drives so fearfully fast so that the greatest danger does not seem to come from rebels but from a road accident. Passengers tell him to calm down: otherwise nobody would survive; the occasional car-wreck along the road speaks its own language. The bus leaks; the weather is stormy, cold, and it rains; everybody gets wet. After a day of such travelling through forests and hills, after having passed lengthy controls at the border between Burundi and Rwanda the bus (not we, since no 'we' feeling had developed on this journey) arrive in Kigali where the passengers disappear almost within seconds in all directions.

I believe I got a glimpse of the 'survival strategies' that my co-travellers, who - unlike me - were forced to subsist under continuous traumatic circumstances, employed in this situation, survival strategies that include 'dissociation.' And dissociation leads to the 'speechless terror' that I so often observed. This minibus trip was yet another informal 'application' of the 'method of focus group,' only that the 'unsaid' and the 'unspeakable' was what was communicated.

It is dark, I am wet and freezing; I find a hotel, simple and not luxurious; however, expensive. From there I phone Norwegian People's Aid. Many had spoken very highly about Milan Sannerkvist, whom I had phoned from Norway earlier, in 1998. He is not in Rwanda when I arrive, but Oddny Bjøros, in the middle of a dead-line for a report, takes a minute and explains to me that there are three Norwegians in Kigali, that she had forwarded my email that I had sent from Norway to them, and that she recommended to me to get in touch with

Øyvind Olsen, an investigator at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. I phone him, and an hour later I stand in the middle of a high-level reception, with all important people of the Tribunal present, in a compound in the hills of Kigali, there where streets are not paved and four wheel drive cars seem indispensable. Øyvind and Laila, his Lebanese wife, take unparalleled care of me. And, it is a tremendous opportunity for me to become acquainted with Deputy Prosecutor Bernard Acho Muna from Cameroon, and all the other experts, and start learning about the workings of the Tribunal.[176]

Curfew was at eleven o'clock and Swiss Alain (I do not wish to disclose his real name) from the Tribunal, leaving the next day for a week, offers me his studio for that period. However, before leaving, being an expert on German history, he educates me on the humiliation thesis in Germany: 'In 1933 the Germans were not necessarily all for Hitler, but in 1940, when he took the Alsace after only three weeks of fighting and thus "healed" the humiliation of Versailles, nearly 100 % of the population, even the communists, were behind him. For the subsequent "peace accord" with France, Hitler used the same train railway wagon in which the humiliating Versailles Accords had been signed in 1919!'

Next morning I woke up to a sunny day in the 'Swiss village' in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. I go out and find that not only the Swiss village, the whole city centre of Kigali honours Rwanda's reputation of being the Switzerland of Africa: clean, neat, orderly; with a population of highly cultured, aristocratic demeanour, many speaking French and/or English elegantly. This style, I tell myself, connects Kigali and Bujumbura, - both after the 1994 genocide Tutsi-dominated, - except that Kigali is hilly, while Bujumbura stretches along the flat shores of the deepest lake of Africa, as I had been proudly told, or even the deepest of the world, Lake Tanganyika. But this style also connects to Hargeisa, where a Somali nomad, in his traditional cloths, using a long stick, would stride as measuredly, and majestically as many of the inhabitants of these two cities. And similar to Bujumbura, Kigali also hosts excellent French or Italian cuisine that, admittedly, only the very rich, for example expatriates, can pay for.

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[176] 'Judge Louise Arbour (Canada) is the head of the Tribunal's Prosecutor's office, which also serves the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The Deputy prosecutor is Mr. Bernard Muna (Cameroon), who deals exclusively with the Rwanda Tribunal' (United Nations, 1998).

The Tribunal

The Tribunal gives me the opportunity to meet the whole of Africa, learn about African's opinions about their own continent, and understand more about the Great Lakes region in a larger regional context. I meet, for example, Matar Diop, Senegalese lawyer with sparkling intelligence and passionate aristocratic bearing - again somebody with a French so sophisticated that few in France would be able to reach this level - who is appalled that people in the neighbourhood where he was born had four meals per day when he was young, but hardly have two meals today - what can be done? I meet Fanta Traore from Mali who together with Virginie Pisteur from France becomes part of the common ground that I find with women in Africa concerning the specific difficulties women face worldwide. Both, Matar and Fanta include me into their daily lives and I thank them for that. I meet also Nasser Zakr from Brazil who brings me together with Rwandese intellectuals of the highest calibre. I meet Richard Karegyesa, a lawyer from Uganda, English speaking, with whom I sit for many extremely interesting and intense hours; he recommends to me the very interesting writings of Deepak Chopra. I also meet Clemens Bessem-Asu, legal officer from Cameroon, who worked in Somalia and Angola and suggests that humiliation is of elementary relevance in both cases. Here is an African elite at work that is so similar to intellectuals in other countries that I feel compelled, more than ever before, to categorise all of us together as one kind in one common global culture, a culture that bridges differences of nationality, skin colour or ethnicity. Even more, this global intellectual elite even shares the same problems, namely that its women pay an often painfully high price in their personal lives because their intellectual independence requires too much from a partner, namely an innovative egalitarian relationship instead of simple old-fashioned ranking and domination that is difficult even for men of the same intellectual elite group.

I also met Ntabiri Kamanzi, for two meetings of several hours on 24th January and 2nd February 1999. Ntabiri Kamanzi is a pseudonym that he used for his book *Rwanda. Du Génocide à la Défaite* (Kamanzi, 1997), and I am not authorised to disclose his real name. Ntabiri Kamanzi writes in the introduction of the book: 'Le genocide rwandais donne à tous une leçon d'humilité [the Rwandan genocide teaches a lesson of humility to everybody]. According to his view one has to search in France and Belgium, among the catholic fathers that educated the Hutu elite, if one wants to really understand the roots of the genocide. Again, as in the case of my Norwegian-Rwandese friend Paul, who seemed to surpass even the most extreme cliché image of Tutsi pride and elegance, I was amazed by Ntabiri Kamanzi. He was as sophisticated as Paul, his French of an elegance that few French linguists would

master and his intellectual style of poetic and majestic beauty. The use of his pseudonym reminded me of the sad fact that in this part of the world intellectuals often are the first on 'to-be-killed' lists; many of those in power regard them as a threat, instead of understanding that intellectuals are part of the riches of a country that have to be nurtured.

Refinement, and What to Do With It

Ntabiri Kamanzi also gives me the opportunity to reflect on the fact that refinement always has two sides, or, in other words, I acquire a gut feeling for how the very admiration for Tutsi refinement may transform into hatred, for example in a less 'refined' Hutu. Refinement is an expression of cultural accomplishment, however, at the same time deplorably often a symbol of exploitation: only the rich in human history could afford refinement for their children, and riches only too often have their origins in the oppressive looting of others' resources. Refinement, or its visible expressions such as cultural artefacts and its bearers, has therefore always lived a dangerous life. Temple figures in China were smashed for being symbols of bourgeois decadence and exploitation of the masses, or its human representatives killed like in the genocide in Rwanda. In the now bygone socialist world where only the worker had status, not the intellectual, admiration for refinement was almost seen as immoral, former bourgeois villas or palaces were neglected or destroyed (although, in reality, the petit-bourgeois style that characterised socialist design, architecture and morals, was nothing but an imitation of what officially was to be avoided).

Undoubtedly, there is some truth in the view that much of the refinement created in the past was built on blood and oppression. The pyramids in Egypt, the tombs, the temples, or European palaces and castles; they are all to a large extent built on coercion. But, I ask myself, should therefore admiration for refinement be immoral? Should its representatives be despised or killed in a genocide? I try to 'get under' Hutu skin and find that I am in an ideal position to reflect on the feelings accompanying such reflections: I, though an educated physician and psychologist, still speak no more than an average French and have a non-aristocratic refugee background, and thus resemble an educated Hutu facing a much more refined Tutsi. Should I allow myself to admire Ntabiri Kamanzi's gracious manner, and be in humble awe and recognition of my inferiority in front of Tutsi sophistication? Or should I despise it as a product of past oppression and rather identify with Hutu suffering? Identifying with Hutu suffering and despising Tutsi sophistication: was this not in addition too sweet a temptation to let pass unused, namely that I could live in the illusion that my lack of skills

could be remedied by looking down on the skilled? I decide not to confound the category of beauty of refinement with the category of its (potentially unjust) procurement; in other words, I allow myself to admire Ntabiri Kamanzi's and Tutsi finesse altogether, at the same time accepting the unpleasantly sobering fact of my own lack of sophistication. Yet, I choose to do so 'under the condition' that I at the same time will commit myself to work for a world where people are able to attain any level of sophistication they wish for without exploiting others, and without creating suffering masses.

Muslims Did Not Kill

On the 3rd February 1999 I went to the car park of the Tribunal and visited the little barrack where the Tribunal's drivers have their office. The drivers of the Tribunal were Muslims, as in many other organisations, as I later find out. I go into the office and inquire whether I could ask some questions with the aim to try to understand why the Muslim community to a great extent did not participate in the genocide. They explain to me that Muslims in Rwanda are a minority that never was trusted, that was, therefore, also not entrusted with genocidal plans and preparations. Furthermore, they report that they had, by several times daily coming together for prayer, developed a community spirit that was unusual in a Rwanda of scattered and isolated compounds; Tutsi in their midst were protected.

Women and Men

Timothée Ngakoutou, UNESCO Paris, with whom I was in touch in 1998, had recommended that I contact Marlene (I do not disclose their real names) who together with her friend Anna had started a company importing pharmaceutical products. I met both on 25th January 1999 and am again amazed how similar the problems are that strong and independent women face all over the world, - there seems to be little cultural diversity at that point, - and how defiantly these women not only master obstacles but insist on building a life, in the case of Marlene and Anna a company of quality and excellence. I was privileged to become included into their lives, join them in the evenings after work and experience Rwanda with their eyes.

How to Adapt to Humiliation and How to Fight It

At about the same time I was confronted with the fact that Tutsi are split into two major camps, those who fled in 1959 or later, and built their lives outside of Rwanda, only to come back after the 1994 genocide and populate 'empty' Kigali, and the other group, those who had survived the genocide within Rwanda. Both groups, I am told, do not mix, but stay among themselves. Those Tutsi who lived inside Rwanda accuse those who came back: 'If you had not tried to come back to Rwanda, our families would still live today! We were safe and well before, until you tried to come back! You triggered the killing!' A Tutsi from the other camp responds: 'You were comfortable before? Are you sure? You did not have a full life, you had half a life!' And addressing me: 'It seems that people get so used to having limited rights that after a while it seems normal. Constant humiliation leads to the acceptance of a limited life with limited rights!' Comes the reply from the other side: 'You can talk easily; you built good lives abroad, while we did the suffering!' This does not go unanswered: 'Do you think it was easy to be a refugee? It was extremely humiliating to be a refugee from Rwanda in Africa! My father, an excellent specialist in his field, just one example, could not take exile! He became depressive, obsessively paranoid, violent against the family during these phases, the family had to separate from him in order to protect itself!'[177]

Twice in January 1999 I had the chance to briefly talk to Rakiya Omar, one of two co-directors of the influential report *Rwanda: Death, Despair, and Defiance* on the phone (25th January and 2nd February 1999). It was just before meeting young and brilliant Kennedy Ndahiro, journalist at *The New Times*, 'Rwanda's Leading Weekly,' who takes me on his personal journey of death, despair and defiance that he endured during the genocide. He talks about all the horrifying details that are documented in Omar's report; dogs eating the elderly; elder women forced to undress, - an utmost humiliation, - before being killed; rape to death, hacking to death. He talks about all this calmly, as if he were an old man who is beyond the sufferings of this world. He reports that foreigners often wonder how Rwandans cope, and that they urge Rwandans not to repress their agony. I admit to Kennedy that I feel ashamed and perhaps even humiliated by the naïve proposals from those among my colleagues who travel to places such as Rwanda for a short trip and return home to safety after some weeks without having attempted real understanding. I ask, humbly: 'How can one "work through" agony, when this agony is overwhelming, and perhaps not finished?' (Not finished, because many Rwandans I speak to do not seem to be so sure whether the end of the tragedy is yet

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[177] See also a book written by L. H. Malkki, 1995, Purity and Exile:Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania.

reached, it is not certain that lists with names 'to-be-killed' are not still being written somewhere.) Perhaps focusing on daily tasks is a good way to 'work through'? Perhaps getting married and having children is the best 'therapy'? Surely, building sustainable peace in a global context will be the only real 'therapy.'

Again, Western 'experts' have to learn that the Western concept of a short 'crisis' in a sea of 'normality,' may be reversed in some parts of the world such as Rwanda. The rich of the world have to understand that they are today's equivalent of the former royal court, namely removed from the sad 'normality' of the poor, and Western 'experts' should take care not to follow the example of spoiled French Marie Antoinette who, sitting safely in her luxurious horse carriage, noticing beggars, naïvely proposed to the poor that they should eat cake if they did not have bread.

However, there are many expatriates who actually understand this situation with a high degree of empathy, and who do not merit a generalised African contempt for the West. Everywhere in Kigali, but especially on 31st January 1999, sitting in a car, I am caught in between these two camps, - fervent Rwandan disgust of the double standards of the international community on one side, and expatriate humanitarian aid personnel deeply hurt by this generalised contempt on the other side. The expatriate helper whose name I do not want to disclose exclaims: 'I feel humiliated, because I am here to help! I would have a more comfortable life back home! This is real sacrifice for me! It is not my wrongdoing that caused the UN disaster in 1994, but decisions far away in New York that made helpers helpless and humiliated them thoroughly in front of those they wanted to protect! Being a helpless helper is the worst humiliation you can imagine!' Rwandans react with fury: 'Expatriates were living together with Tutsi women, supposedly "loving them," only to abandon them to be killed when the genocide started!!!' Sadly enough, the Rwandan voice tells the truth: 'Millions of viewers around the world have seen the television documentaries showing western soldiers escorting white people to safety through crowds of Rwandans who would soon be slaughtered.[178] We condemn those countries and those UN bureaucrats who were guilty of this flagrant double standard' (The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 15, paragraph 7).

I talked to a young man (several times during January 1999), who is a particular close witness of foreign neglect; we speak French or English and I do not want to disclose his

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[178] 'The Triumph of Evil,' PBS Frontline, USA, 1995; 'Rwanda: triumph of a Genocide,' CBC, Prime Time Magazine, Canada, 1994; 'Rwanda: the Betrayal,' Channel 4, UK, 1995; 'The Bloody Tricolour,' Panorama, BBC, UK, 1995. Frontline.

name. He is taking care of the nineteen years old son of his sister who was killed in the genocide: 'The boy's father is a Belgian, who lives in Brussels, and kept in touch with the mother for six months after leaving the country, and then disappeared. The Belgian embassy traced him, the boy wrote a letter, no answer. The boy is very unhappy, angry. His skin is quite white, while his hair is African, he does not fit in any group. He took the name of his mother; he does not like the strange Flemish name of his father.' The young man continues his sad account: 'Surely this man had a wife in Belgium, perhaps already with children, and just needed somebody to "go out with" while being in Rwanda for two years.' The young Rwandan man, earning very little himself, pays everything for the boy and for an orphaned girl, from food to education, and says that it is 'normal' that he 'assumes this responsibility.' But, he says, 'I know that the father of the boy would have the means to help me, for example with the education of the boy, instead he leaves the responsibility to the brother of his mistress!'

Marlene and Anna brought me to yet another impressive woman, Mary Balikungeri (25th January 1999), Programme Coordinator of the Rwandan Women Community Development Network, Rwandan Women Net for Economic Justice. Mary has a background that reflects a peculiar transition that affects many in this century, including myself, namely the transition from the label of 'refugee' to the label of 'global citizen.' She started out as a child of a refugee family, in Uganda, Tanzania, then studied in France, worked in Switzerland, where she met her husband, who eventually became a professor of environmental chemistry at the university in Geneva. They are Swiss citizens. Her husband died unexpectedly during an operation, leaving her and their two children behind. Already in Switzerland she had been involved in fighting racism, a good preparation for her advocacy work in Rwanda now. Her key word is 'empowerment,' real partnership between donors and recipients. 'Lack of empowerment is deeply humiliating!' she firmly exclaims. The video recording I make with her is an intense message to the international community. Mary generously and repeatedly involves me in her family life, including her little daughter and her whole household.

Rwandan Journeys

On 28th January 1999 Mary and Henri-François Morand from the Swiss Embassy took me on a field trip to the countryside, to visit shelter programmes, another application of the 'focus group' method. Henri-François Morand has been working in many parts of the world and

many different crises, - Afghanistan earthquake, China floods, - the list is long. In Lebanon he got his eye hurt by an anti tank missile injury. Francois has seen humiliation at work everywhere, he reports: 'Many Russians used humiliation in Afghanistan systematically; they humiliated Mullahs publicly. Also in Lebanon girls were raped in front of their families, this is the worst humiliation.'

Eventually I participated in several fieldtrips that came to represent a long chain of informal focus groups to me since I discussed the topic of humiliation whenever it was possible. Particularly during these fieldtrips I did not only address other people's feelings of humiliation, but also mine. With many people I shared my deep shock, and feelings of humiliation that developed in me, about the way shelter programmes are being built. Not so much that water has to be fetched from sources that are too far away, and that the distance to the fields is too great in many cases, as is the case of many such 'villages' in Rwanda. To me, these 'villages' represent more; they are part of a general problem, namely the flagrant humiliation of humanity through an uninformed admiration of outdated concepts of 'modernity.' The design of these artificial 'villages,' that invade Rwandan landscape, corrugated iron sheets on huts set in a military camp layout, remind me of the same anti-human philosophy that stood behind the 'Plattenbauten' (ugly tower blocks) architecture in the socialist East, but also in the West, that today are regarded as a shame by almost everyone in the very same West or East.

Obsession with rectangularity and military uniformity is an obsolete concept of modernity and few in the West today are proud of having admired it once. The socialist belief that uniformity (from clothing style to architectural design) would heal wounds of bygone humiliation inflicted by past oppressive hierarchies obviously commits the same category mess-up that was above discussed concerning the confounding of categories of difference and ranking between women and men or Tutsi and Hutu. Clearly, difference is first of all a term that describes diversity; it can perfectly well exist independently of ranking and untouched by humiliating pecking hierarchies. Uniformity, meant to introduce equality, destroys this diversity, and thus, as I see it, introduces a new kind of humiliation, because the loss of diversity is not a small loss. Human beings are diverse, at least to a certain extent, and human identity seems, at least partly, to depend on diversity markers. And uniformity neglects precisely this basic human reality and need; instead, uniformity relegates and humiliates the human being down to the status of robots, of machines, or at best animals. This is endured by those who are forced to live in uniform rectangular blocks or 'rabbit boxes,' they feel indeed

humiliated and abased to the level of rabbits, a reaction involuntarily 'proven' by the architects who would never live in the very blocks they designed.

I find myself hoping that international organisations, used to care for emergencies and development, will plan better for emergencies that are coming in the future. Arguments that only rectangular military uniformity is efficient and practicable, and that poor refugees or returnees should be happy with what they get, are not good enough arguments to me. Such arguments remind me of my decision not to work as a doctor in Western hospitals where patients are prevented from getting better by having to deliver, upon arrival, their individual personality to hospital uniformity, supposedly because hygiene and efficiency under emergency requires this. I would agree to a certain extent with the functional part of this argument, however, I would not subscribe to the in many cases overdone and even obsessive use of uniformity as an identity marker for the profession of helpers. How is a helpless person, struggling to heal and build a new life, to be expected to become better, if her basic individual particularity is removed and humiliated into even more helpless uniformity? Is not this humiliation of humanity itself?

'Empowerment' to Imitate By-Gone Masters?

In this context the concept of empowerment becomes especially complicated. What about recipients' indignant insistence to be provided with outdated technology and strategies, just because they are badly informed? How can they learn that the West has left behind, in many walks of life, the misconception of human beings as simple factory automats, and has discovered that human beings in fact are living creatures with such characteristics as motivation and creativity that may be undermined by too much uniformity and military-style? What about so many Egyptian pupils who learn by heart instead of learning to reflect (in the case of Egypt compounded by the legacy of some Muslim education-styles), what about Marie-Anne's (this is not her real name) account (27th January 1999) that in Rwanda midwives' education is much too theoretical because this is believed to be 'modern'? And what about Peter's report that the Vietnamese he worked with insisted on having outdated East European technology because they considered it 'modern'? Or what about my experiences in Egypt where I regularly came across examples that illustrated how outdated technologies/strategies were insisted upon only because they had, somehow, through misinformation, retained the status of modernity, and how technologies/strategies that were suitable elsewhere were blindly transplanted to unsuitable conditions?

Admittedly, Westerners often earn money with misinformation and cynically laugh about their ridiculously 'empowered recipients' when they come home. However, not all fault has to be ascribed to Westerners, I believe, the attempt to become part of the rich West by blindly imitating misunderstood concepts of modernity, - modernity being another word for being rich and respectable, - translates to me too often into self-humiliation of the subaltern, or 'making a fool of oneself,' throwing away potentially creative diversity. And this is committed in Europe in relation to the United States as much as in Africa in relation to richer parts of the world. The word 'handy' for a mobile phone in Germany is a small and humorous recent European example; Germans using this word for their mobile phones proudly believe that it includes them into the global English speaking information society that they struggle hard to become part of - the problem is only that they have not detected that the English speaking world laughs about the word 'handy' - I have not yet been able to find a respectable reason why this word entered German language.

I thus reflect on the difficult question: How should I, or could one, address self-humiliation of the subaltern? How should I talk about the slaves' voluntary abandonment of independent thinking in favour for subservience to their own, often faulty, nebulous and illusionary insights into their admired masters' attitudes? How should I address a subservience that costs much and still misses its aim; quite the opposite, as seems to me, it frequently fails to provide even the most modest ascent on the ladder of ranked hierarchies? Or, I ask myself, are not such reflections humiliating? Do I not apply an arrogant notion of 'false consciousness' as a psychological and cognitive affliction supposedly suffered by the 'less enlightened'?

Later, on 4th February 1999, I participated on another field trip to the North of Rwanda and was confronted with many examples illustrating these reflections. We were proudly presented with a Friesian (Dutch) cow, - modern times so-to-speak, 'improvement.' I learn from a visiting expert that the Friesian cow is sensitive, while the local cow is more resistant. My expatriate interlocutor, whose name I do not want to disclose, says, 'First, one has to really give the local cows better conditions, then one can attempt to "improve" the genetic make up of cows. But in fact I believe that the local cows do not need any improvement, they are a good century-old selection. The Friesian cow requires not less than optimal treatment, and that cannot be given.' I ask the man presenting the cow to us about disease and he replies that there was a problem with tics, but that a treatment had in the meantime be found, which of course costs money. Another visitor asks about calf mortality, which obviously was high, circa 30%. My expatriate co-traveller continues: 'Only when Friesian cows are given optimal

treatment they will give more milk and meat than the local ones. But what if one of these valuable and expensive cows dies? The farmer we visit has two, - then half of his property is gone, while when he has a flock of 20, he will lose less. If I were a farmer I would want to have a local flock (troupeaux), the pasturage is best suited for them.' Those from the Rwandan side who present the cow projects to us explain that the farmers are currently being educated that they have to opt for quality and not quantity, - 'two good cows are better than 20 bad ones!' they say. I ask the expatriates around me whether it is not possible to explain to Rwandese authorities that they at times may sit on outdated concepts of modernity. One discussant replies that there is a psychological blockage, especially if he as a white person would say that. He would get the answer: 'Do you want that we stay backwards?' He concludes: 'They would consider the demand to stick to traditional material/ methods as humiliating!'

Another discussant addresses a related point: 'Cutting out single aspects, as for example milk production, and improving it, without looking at the whole context, this is a related problem. A solution may be good under certain circumstances, but not under different ones.' In the same line he responds to the remark of a Swedish discussant who claims that Eucalyptus is 'bad.' He responds: 'Eucalyptus is bad in a certain area and good in another, for example where we are here, it is only *sometimes* bad.'

I discussed this and much more with many people doing emergency relief and/or development work, for example at length with Jaap Aantjes, Country Representative, Lutheran World Foundation, LWF, (25th and 26th January1999), who has such a broad spectre of international experience that the book he plans to write after retirement will be a must in his field. He explains that the protestant church is currently rather welcome in Rwanda, since the Catholic Church, through her involvement in the genocide, tarnished her reputation. He recommends that I should talk to Alphonse Ntaganzwa, a journalist, and responsible for information at the Lutheran World Foundation. I met young and extremely dedicated Alphonse Ntaganzwa on the 25th January 2000 and on several later occasions for long conversations. He deeply reflects on the issue of reconciliation: 'The big question is: Who is reconciling with whom? The international community says that Hutu and Tutsi should reconcile. This is dangerous to say! Because this is the same mythology which created the genocide! In reality both groups were not that clearly divided before the colonisers gave them identity cards, in which Hutu or Tutsi was marked, and the genocide was equally unclear: the moderate Hutu were also killed! The extremist Hutu have committed the genocide! Not all

Hutu are "genocidaires"! And not all Tutsi are victims! As soon as one says that Hutu and Tutsi should reconcile, one is perpetuating the old mythology which led to the genocide!'

Jaap Aantjes also brought me together with Danae Meacock-Bashir (29th January 1999; I stay at the guest house of the Lutheran World Foundation), a young environmental scientist, - a highly skilled and at the same time extremely beautiful Julia Roberts in Africa, - who spent five years in Tanzania working on integrated sustainable development in villages: 'I am now working as a food security officer for Christian Aid in the Great Lakes region, my work comprises an integrated perspective on development. Primary emphasis is on crop diversification, livestock diversification, food resources diversification as agriculture and aquaculture, harvesting and transformation techniques including oil pressing, solar drying, jam and juice making, sustainable irrigation technology as for example rain water harvesting, and other methodology which lead to rural sustainability such as efficient stoves, good storage, and so forth.' Danae is married to an African and therefore especially interested in sustainable development in Africa. 'I would like to develop a model for a sustainable village, which is capable of continuous learning and adaptation.' Danae feels that a lot of current efforts to intervene are 'pigeonholed,' follow a 'top-down approach,' use a 'tunnel vision,' and 'do not consider the whole picture of the situation.'

German Views

On 26th January 1999, I visited Johanna König, Ambassador at the German Embassy in Rwanda. Since Hitler's Germany is to serve as the backdrop for my research it is important for me to be in touch with Germans who are knowledgeable with respect to Somalia and the Great Lakes region. The Somali expert at the German Embassy in Nairobi as well as the Embassy in Burundi and Rwanda are therefore important addresses. Johanna König reflects on unintentional humiliation, 'I remember a refugee camp that I visited where people had no other shelter than some plastic sheets; there were no trees, and they were exposed to strong wind. The Mormons from Utah had sent trousers for the women, already a little shabby cloths, and the women felt that it was humiliating for them that they had to wear these trousers instead of their indigenous cloths (four sheets of tissue). Furthermore they were fed on lentils, while they since centuries eat maize and beans.' The Ambassador suggests: 'Perhaps one has to consider such parameters when helping?' And, she supplements, 'even I myself, by driving into a refugee camp with an armoured car and military escort, a camp where there is not enough to eat, I humiliate the refugees, - and I cannot even avoid it, it is

automatically there. The cleavage between rich and poor is automatically humiliating.' I ask Johanna König what she thinks about the African allegation that many expatriates arrogantly enjoy this cleavage; she believes that perhaps 10% do, and 90% do not. Her family background is one of an old German Junker family of aristocratic landowners and patrons, and she explains that hierarchy may not always be oppressive, but can also be caring. During her childhood in Germany as well as in Africa she reports, she met patrons who demonstrated 'gelebte Zwischenmenschlichkeit von hoher Qualität,' loyalty of high quality with those they were in charge of.

On 26th January1999 I also met Thomas Lenk, Chef de Coopération, for an official visit at the German Embassy. His biography, like mine, confirms that a refugee past may lead to an open, more global identity - as if one does not stop migrating, once started. His German father stems from the Sudetenland, today the Czech Republic. Many of his colleagues have similar backgrounds, he reports. In his view the most striking and literal example of intended humiliation in Rwanda, is the fact that during the genocide Tutsi feet were cut off, to make them shorter. Not surprisingly, he reports, 'Hutu and Tutsi identity are much more pronounced after the genocide, mixed marriages are absent.' Understandably: 'Hutu women married to Tutsi men were sometimes compelled to murder their Tutsi children to demonstrate their commitment to Hutu Power. The effect on these mothers is also beyond imagining' (The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 16, paragraph 4).

With another German expatriate whose name I do not want to disclose (I will call him Klaus), I discuss two possible views of the role of humiliation in situations such as the Rwandan genocide, either as coldly calculated rhetoric of humiliation utilised by Machiavellian politicians who want to stay in power, or as authentic feelings of humiliation. Klaus, a former student of philosophy, believes that feelings are always predominant and are rationalised only later. 'The threat of losing power arouses feelings,' he says, 'it produces fear.' 'And when 1990 the RPF approached from Uganda, the Hutu in Rwanda felt threatened.' Furthermore, he states, 'there is, indeed, a shortage of land, 0,6 hectare land for 5-6 persons is extremely limited. And encouraging people to have fewer children, after a genocide, would be too delicate.'

We discuss the options a country may have in a situation of land shortage. I try to think up all options that present themselves before questions of morality are discussed and exclude the unethical ones: (1) one lets half of the population emigrate (half Ireland or Norway went to the United States a century ago), (2) one kills each other, (3) one conquers

neighbours (Hitler's 'Lebensraum'), (4) one limits population growth, (5) one depends on international aid, and (6) one diversifies in industry. Klaus finds (5) currently being realised to a large extent. The government also tries to liberalise industry, he reports, and the potentially constructive role of such income sources was demonstrated when 'dwindling tea and coffee prices in 1989 were playing a role in the hardening of the situation' says Klaus. Rwanda is rather unimportant for German industry, he reports, except as recipient of development projects which are numerous, from education to health, infrastructure, self-help and the judicial system.

Klaus relates to me that he had come to understand that survivors of the genocide often feel guilty for having survived, similar to Holocaust survivors, and that they, apart from that, are at times met with mistrust because of the belief that they survived only because they betrayed someone. But, Klaus adds, one has to be careful with generalisations, one of the chief architects of the genocide brought food to a Tutsi woman who survived in the hotel Mille Collines.

I inquire about the African allegations I had been presented with earlier that expatriates merely exploit African sufferings, and that the last thing Africa should do is give thanks for help. Perhaps, he says, it is difficult to thank because by thanking one acknowledges the obligation to return something; but, without any doubt, he says, 'in Rwanda the genocide weighs extremely heavily on the shoulders of the international community as an obligation.' Klaus describes the scene where the Rwandan Prime Minister made a speech saying, 'Europe is responsible for these atrocities and therefore you have to help us' in front of bones and skeletons still nauseatingly smelling.

Those in Power

On 3rd February 1999 I met anglophone Gerald Gahima, Secrétaire Général, Ministère de la Justice, with the aim of asking for permission to talk to 'genocidaires' in prison who had pleaded guilty, - something that only three to four months ago had happened for the first time.

I ask him questions such as: 'At what point do feelings of humiliation translate into hatred which cannot be healed anymore?' 'At what point is a person so full of hatred that he or she cannot be reconciled to peace anymore?' 'Or does inability to compromise only occur when somebody is power hungry?' And, 'Can all humiliation be healed or some not?' And, 'Regarding reconciliation, how can power-hungry people like Hitler be convinced of the normative stance that living together is better then cleansing?' 'Is not the only effective

hindrance to committing genocide for Machiavellian power-hungry people the fact that cleansing is impossible to succeed with - one can put a single criminal into prison and keep him there, or execute him, but not a whole group; somebody will escape and encourage retaliation?'

Gerald Gahima listens carefully. He asks me about Germany, its history, where my family comes from, and what kind of refugee background I have. When I ask him whether he thinks that my project could be useful for Rwanda, he answers, 'Perhaps yes: if we know how atrocities come about, we might better be able to avoid them.'

He explains that the Tutsi were always used as scapegoats, already before the genocide. 'The Hutu were made feel bad by their Hutu leaders, they were not made to forget that they suffered from forced labour under the Tutsi, from beatings, and from economic deprivation: their anger was whipped up, newspapers were used, and schools. Hutu were made feel humiliated in order to justify atrocities.'

Gerald Gahima recommends to me that I should meet Emmanuel Rukangira, Procureur de la République, Republique Rwandaise, Ministère de la Justice for getting access to prisons. I met him on 8th February 1999 in his office. As Gerald Gahima, he is carefully reserved, and at the same time of an intense personal presence and intellectual capacity, noticeably experienced and disillusioned after many encounters with visitors who have had more than one agenda. I will quote his opinion on the Rwandan plight further down. I made an appointment with Emmanuel Rukangira that I should come and enter the prison next day, however, this did not materialise because of a government reshuffle.

Helping

On 30th of January 1999 I met the Chef de Mission of the Rwandan Médecins sans Frontières mission. I met also his wife and several others working with Médecins sans Frontières. I am to share their lives from then on; I am being welcomed at their home, keeping discretely to my room when they discuss their job. Elliott Leyton, author of *Touched by Fire. Doctors Without Borders in a Third World Crisis*, had written to me already in 1998 that he was extremely impressed by Médecins sans Frontières, that they supported him and his research in an remarkable way, and that I should approach them. Here I am, and I am allowed to stay until the end of my research in Rwanda, participating in paying my share for food and the local personnel that cares for the compound, and enjoying, at special occasions and adapted to Rwandan circumstances, Marc's (I do not want to disclose his name) unparalleled Belgian

cuisine that I already had learned to admire in Belgium and had recognised in restaurants in Bujumbura and Kigali; the special Belgian-African connection so-to-speak. Magdalena (this is not her real name) will later carve out time for me for a long interview, amidst the intense stress that often characterises the daily work of Médecins sans Frontières, also after long working hours. The Rwandese men and women that take care of house, garden and security at the gate are very helpful and kind to me, and I learn a lot when I accompany them to the market and the shops.

When I arrived at Médecins sans Frontières my first ambition was once and for all to get an understanding of the totally confusing terminology of humanitarian organisations; I learn, for example, that chef de mission corresponds to the ICRC délégué, and that 'finance,' 'logistique,' and 'médicale,' are different task areas in the central base, with project co-ordinators, medical doctors, and nurses on the ground, and, at last, the local staff. But I learn much more. For example, I learn a lot from the broad experience everybody at Médecins sans Frontières had accumulated at different posts. Karl (this is not his real name), for example, explains to me that in the Armenian case, Armenians inside the country were more moderate than the diaspora Armenians, similar to the Rwandan situation. And I learn from friends who drop by. Pierre Pvandermosten, Société pour l'hydraulique et l'équipement rural, a.s., for example, explains to me the perspective of a business company on Rwanda.

Over time, accumulating and recapitulating my impressions from different organisations, I understand better the position of humanitarian organisations in relation to their recipients: The relevant line between 'adversaries' is not necessarily the line between the international community and recipient countries, but often rather the line between elites in countries and organisations versus their subordinates. It seems that a pattern of important fault lines and significant dichotomies is crystallising, it is not 'Hutu' versus 'Tutsi', and not 'international community' versus 'recipient country,' but rather 'those people interested in guarding power for themselves in organisations or countries' versus 'those who aim at co-operation and are willing to share power.'

Later I will meet more helpers from various other organisations and learn from them that only those helpers feel humiliated who keep up high expectations, but that others, after having lowered their expectations, just feel frustrated: 'Here I come, perhaps with one million Dollars for projects that are supposed to do good to the country, and there are so many obstacles, 200 000 Dollars for tax, a lot of regulations, - where is the aim of helping? It is this aim that is being humiliated by the recipients!'

The Panel

On the 2nd February I met Dr. Jacques Bihoxagara, Minister of Culture, who proposes that I should phone him for a longer meeting next day; but when I phone some days later the government reshuffle had transferred him and he is perhaps already on his way to become an ambassador. Also on 2nd February I attended the opening of the OAU genocide commission. In his opening speech Sir Ketumile Masire, Chairman of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events in the Great Lakes Region (IPEP), says: 'Let me begin by saying how much my colleagues and I appreciate the warm reception accorded us on arrival in this beautiful city of Kigali. I would, therefore, wish, Honourable Minister to request you to convey to His Excellency the President of the Republic, the government and the people of Rwanda our gratitude for the fraternal welcome extended to us. Our visit to Kigali as Members of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events in the Great Lakes Region (IPEP) is significant for a number of reasons. It readily brings to one's mind the tragic events of April to June 1994 and the trauma and devastation that this country and its people went through in those fateful months. As we embark on our work, the people of this country are still trying to come to terms with those events and their effects. I believe I am speaking for my colleagues when I say that within the short period we have been here we have noticed considerable achievement in terms of the rehabilitation of the people and the reconstruction of the country. As you know, our visit here is in pursuit of our mandate as entrusted to us last June by the African leaders to investigate the 1994 genocide and the surrounding events. This task is by no means easy. I have no doubt, however, that as we interact with various government leaders and people, especially those of your citizens who experienced those catastrophic events, we shall gain an insight into and an understanding of those events. We shall do our utmost to gather as much information and documentation as possible.'

As already reported above, after the opening session I met Lisbet Palme, widow of late Olof Palme, together with Folke Löfgren, Swedish Ambassador, in Switzerland. Over lunch and in the evening we discuss Rwanda. Folke Löfgren later writes to me (24th April 1999): 'I certainly think that it must be worthwhile to study the concept of humiliation. It is certainly, sadly enough, almost an instrument in many of today's conflicts, for instance in all the violence against women. Less obvious, but also of importance, is the other kind of humiliation, when a whole people is "demonised" and later "dehumanised", i.e. the Serbs today, or the Hutu; that is another kind of side effect worth studying, I think. I fear that the

long term effects might be quite grave.' In September 2000 he sends me a note informing me that the Panel's report on the genocide is finished and can be found on www.oau-oua.org. It is entitled *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*.

UNDP and More Rwandan Journeys

From 3rd February 1999 on I attended the 'Sectoral Thematic Consultations on Education, Food Security and Private Sector Promotion in Rwanda,' Kigali, 2nd –5th February 1999. During pauses I met many eminent personalities, all superbly French-speaking, for example Gérard Rotazimba, Doyen Faculté des Sciences economiques sociales etude gestion, UNR-Butare, Professor and coordinator of a trauma-youth project together with the Norwegian organisation Redd Barna. I report to him and his colleague that I had been asked by the organisers to look for people who could participate in a peace conference in Belfast later this year and that I had the task to find one person from each side, Hutu and Tutsi. He and his colleague react with fury: 'This is superficial, this is a humiliation!' they exclaim. 'Also people who killed the children of their sister are traumatised!'

I met furthermore William Ntidendere, Director of Vocational Training, Ministry of Youth, Sports, Culture and Vocational Training, as well as Déo Mushaidi, Journalist, Directeur du Journal "Le Baromètre," Président de l'Association Rwandaise des Journaliste, and Victor Shingiro, who had been working within the UN system and was now Professor in Butare, as well as consultant.

The next day I have the privilege to participate in a UNDP field trip to Kibungo and Umutara. A long convoy of mostly white four-wheel drive cars hastily passes through the countryside, up to the less fertile areas in the Northeast, - Somalia-type landscape so-to-speak. We stop and meet Antoinette Uwimana, Sous-préfet de Affairs Socio-Culturelles, Préfecture Kibungo, a young and very intelligent woman, with whom I try to stay in contact. Later the whole group is welcomed for lunch. I speak to my neighbour who tells me that he had been a student in Butare before the genocide and had left the country in 1989, only to return recently. All his family had been killed. He confessed to me that he has grave problems with coping. He got married and has now two children, 'that helps,' he says. But he feels that he lives among 'animals,' he feels that the official order to reconcile is impossible, is imposed by the government: 'I see the murderers walking around, sometimes I just try to forget, and get on with life, but I feel so alone.'

On the further trip I join a French FAO official in the car. Past European atrocities become immediately the subject of our conversation. His father was in a German prisoner of war camp as an officer in World War II and was respectfully treated. Therefore he does not hold any grudge against the Germans. His mother learned German and feels close to Germany, although the village she comes from was destroyed during World War I. Can it give hope to Africa, that nationals of former arch-enemies, - having acquired a European identity in the meantime, or even a global identity, - can speak about their families' sad past on opposing war sides without fear and apprehension?

Later I would be able to meet the UN officer who was responsible for a certain region of Rwanda at the beginning of the 1994 genocide. In Burundi I had talked to somebody who was one of those 'under' him. I thus got two accounts of the dramatic hours and days at the outset of the genocide and the terrible and nightmarish dilemmas typically forced upon those who are locally responsible for an international organisation in such situations. In the case of the Rwandan genocide the dilemma was, for example, whether to condemn people to certain death or not, in other words whether to save only expatriate lives or also local peoples' lives. I find that my interlocutor was immensely brave and I would be glad if those Rwandans who focus upon expatriate males abandoning their Tutsi wives would know that he saved his wife's life.

On 9th February 1999 I met Bisa Octavien Samali, francophone, an extremely knowledgeable Rwandan intellectual. I learn a tremendous amount from him. He draws my attention to what he sees as cultural humus for genocidal strategies that I will report on further down.

Getting from one place to another in Kigali was difficult (expensive taxis). However, after a while I knew so many organisations that I often found help. One driver always helped me particularly kindly. He usually looked sad and closed, never talked much, until, on the 2nd February 1999 on the way to the Parliament where I attended the government reshuffle ceremony, he talks: 'My elder brother and my sister and all their children and spouses were killed. A friend and I gave a soldier money, 100 000 Amafranga, to hide us on his pick-up and bring us to Burundi. It was God who helped us; I myself did not master the situation. My father was Adventist pastor in the countryside. First the countryside was calm, killing happened in Kigali. But at a certain point there was an announcement in the radio to the villages: "What are you waiting for! Start killing!" I came back after the genocide and felt very alone. I got married and have two children now. Also my wife lost everybody, she is the only survivor.' I understood more than ever what fills the minds of people in Rwanda,

whether they talk or not. I learned to discern and palpate the somehow calm intensity of bereavement that permeates Rwandese society, similar to genocide survivors in Somalia.

On uncountable other occasions I get similar accounts. For example, I talk to a man, whose name I do not want to disclose, who explains to me how his wife reacted to the genocide. 'She was not killed, because she was in Paris at the time. Her father had been killed already in 1973, now it was her mother, sisters, brothers, and nephews. Members of her family got their heads cut off, dogs were put into a room and ate bodies, young women were raped, elder women forced to undress, - an utmost humiliation. And all this was committed by the neighbours! I went to Rwanda just after the genocide and found destroyed houses and dead bodies. I informed my wife, who came a little later, and we collected and buried the corpses. My wife spat at a neighbour who wanted to give her his hand, and she told a woman who wanted to greet her: "What do you want, do you want to finish me too!?" We have a little daughter now and only since her birth my wife slowly is getting back the taste of life. Also our house was completely emptied when we came back to Kigali. During the first two years after this she did not want to buy anything for the house or herself, only the necessary things for the daily survival.'

On 5th February 1999 I joined the second UNDP field visit, led by Prime Minister Pierre Célestin Rwigema, this time to Ruhengeri - Gisenyi (Rwere, Ruhengeri, Kinigi, Ruhondo) in the North of Rwanda, - it is here that the forests begin where Dian Fossey lived with her gorillas. People in this region have a history of violent uprising against authorities and intruders: 'In 1911 resentment against the Germans, the Batutsi chiefs, and the Catholic Church led to a short-lived popular uprising in the north of Rwanda, near Ruhengeri. It was crushed militarily, but left continuing bitterness among northerners towards those whom they considered outsiders, and in particular towards the Batutsi' (Waller & Oxfam, 1996, 4).

Also tourists can be intruders, eight tourists were hacked to death just outside of the Rwandan border shortly after our visit; on 5th March 1999, IRIN reports that 'Rwandan and Ugandan forces launched a manhunt in the northeast of the DRC for members of a 150-strong Rwandan Interahamwe militia group who hacked to death 12 persons - four Ugandans and eight foreign tourists from Britain, the United States and New Zealand - earlier in the week. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni vowed the killers would be captured or killed and disclosed that a battalion of Ugandan troops was in pursuit' (IRIN Weekly Round-up covering the period 26th February – 4th March 1999). On the 30th June the situation seems to be under control again: 'It appears there has been some success in tackling the Interahamwe problem, at least in North Kivu/Masisi and northwest Rwanda. The authorities on both sides

of the border have been involved in an intensive campaign to persuade the "resistants", as the militias call themselves, to leave the bush, lay down their arms and undergo "re-education". Mpabuka said that since January, 15,000 Interahamwe - mostly in the Rutshuru area of Masisi region - have returned voluntarily to Rwanda. The authorities use "re-educated" former militia fighters and their supporters to return to the bush and convince their colleagues to stop fighting and reintegrate into society. The current mayor of Gisenyi town is said to be a former "resistant"! The Rwandan authorities are so confident security has returned to the region, that the Kigali-Ruhengeri-Gisenyi road – a notoriously dangerous route during the insurgency - is now noticeably devoid of military roadblocks and the usual patrols of soldiers. Even the Virunga national park near Ruhengeri has reopened to tourists' (IRIN 30th June 1999).

However, in February, when we visit, fear is obvious on the Kigali-Ruhengeri-Gisenyi road. When the convoy stops in the midst of fertile fields, soldiers form a tight ring around us. They are as alert when we visit settlement sites for the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the hilly wet forest of the North: 'The food and nutritional situation of these IDPs is reported to be precarious. Recent estimates indicate that 300,000 persons are displaced in Ruhengeri, 250,000 in Gisenyi and 100,000 in Gikongoro. Food aid provided by WFP in these areas has doubled in the past six months' (IRIN, 8th January 1999). Or, 'Some IDP camps in northwest Rwanda are closing, and the displaced are being resettled in new, smaller sites, humanitarian sources report. With improved security, the displaced are establishing new homes and farms. They also have greater access to their fields and harvest. Meanwhile, the nutritional situation in Gisenyi has improved and wet feeding centres are reverting to dry rations. But pockets of malnutrition are reported in Ruhengeri. A nutritional survey is underway' (4th February 1999). And, 'Almost 300,000 displaced people have been resettled so far to new sites in the northwestern prefectures of Gisenyi (118,730) and Ruhengeri (176,363). UNHCR has not been involved in the transfer of these IDPs, but continues to distribute blankets, soap and other items. The Government estimates that 24,400 remain to be resettled in Gisenyi, while the Ruhengeri figure may be as high as 185,000' (IRIN, 15th February 1999).

The Prime Minister and the local prefects hold speeches when we arrive in the North of Rwanda. We, the audience, having left the cars behind, stand in the wet and darkish hillside and listen. People around me explain to me: 'Security reasons make the Rwandan authorities want to concentrate people who traditionally live scattered in the hills in villages (looking like camps). Furthermore, as soon as people are centralised it is easier for them to get access to schools, pesticides, etc.; their fields can be concentrated and agriculture be better planned.

The authorities usually confirm that the people live in these villages out of their free will, that they have dissociated themselves from the infiltrators, and that they are comfortable and happy.' A man from Kigali testifies, he explains to the visitors that he intends to return to his home commune soon.

During our visit in the cool and wet mountain forest, spotted with signs of resettlement ranging from sheets to camps of huts, and with people walking and standing in between, looking at their guests with empty eyes and stone faces, I feel the same shame or humiliation that Johanna König had described. Here I am, part of a convoy, that drove so fast through the countryside that people risked their lives who did not get out of the way quickly enough; I feel that I demonstrated to these people: 'I am afraid here, but you, you live here.' Or, 'my mission is important, more important than you.' This makes me especially sad because during the whole journey I am impressed by the beauty of the landscape and imagine flourishing tourism that could provide this magnificent country with new income. The people in charge of such difficult circumstances impress me even more, those who try to solve problems that would dishearten everybody in the orderly and neat parts of the rich world, because there, luckily, one is not used to overwhelming problems anymore, at least for the time being. I say to myself: how can people in the West worry about their lawns and colour of carpets?

In the morning, for the first part of the trip, I join Norwegian Håkon Hansen (this is not his real name), UNDP, based near Nyanza in the South of Kigali in his car. He comes with 'Mirco' (this is not his real name) from Moscow, 37, and 'Rade' (this is not his real name), from Ukraine, now Moscow, and a little older. Mirco is Indochina expert, explains Håkon, and Rade specialist for French regions; he was in Algeria and speaks French very well, while Mirco speaks English. Mirco drives the car (with big letters on it saying 'Russia, UNDP') with special lamps on the car, which creates a lot of authority, says Håkon. The contrast between the relaxed and informal Norwegian and his Russian colleagues is striking: the Russian's body language is military, - they constantly keep a straight back, they never relax.

Håkon reports to me that the Russians have a lot to offer, they have, for example, a lot of equipment, such as big planes, with which they can carry helicopters to emergency regions; so they were asked by UNDP if they could do a job in Rwanda helping with a vocational school. There are thirteen Russians now, before there were even more. Håkon is the only non-Russian foreigner. They train people to become lorry drivers (3 months) or car mechanics (6 months). 70% of their trainees get a job immediately after finishing, say the statistics that they get from the ministry. Rade explains that the students are very happy and thankful, and that it

happens many times, when he is in Kigali, that people stop him in the street, and ask how the school is doing. I tell Rade that this was nice to hear, because many expatriates to whom I talked felt that their work was not sufficiently appreciated. He answers that they live in a compound that resembles a camp, and that it is very transparent to everybody what they do; there is no way for onlookers to imagine that they secretly live in luxury. Håkon explains that the Russians have their families back home, and stay in Rwanda for circa six months. They think about what they will buy back home with the money they earned; they do not use it on prostitutes and not on alcohol either, they save the money. And, he explains, they are not interested in the local population the way he is; he tries to learn their language and understand their culture. I carefully inquire into a related topic and mention that the expatriates I spoke to told me that the Rwandans make it perfectly clear to them that the international organisations have the duty to help, because they let the Rwandese down during the genocide. Mirco remembers, when he first came, that there was a Rwandan man who said in a very harsh tone: 'Do not think that this UNDP money is yours, it is ours!'

Self-Humiliation of the Subaltern?

Later on the journey I join the Ambassador of Burundi in Rwanda, Antoine Baza, in his car. He was born in the interior of Burundi, and, he admits, this is the region he likes most in the world. He studied in Bujumbura, Paris and the Provence. In France he prefers Provence, because people there welcomed him very kindly. Still, after twenty years, he has friends there with whom he is in constant contact. He explains that Burundi and Rwanda are often said to be different, but that he thinks they are rather similar: '1993 was difficult in Burundi, almost as difficult as in Rwanda in 1994; 1972 was difficult in Burundi, 1973 in Rwanda; while it was difficult in 1959 in Rwanda, and beginning of 1960s in Burundi.' He explains how Burundi was always Tutsi-led, while Rwanda was Hutu-led, and that we have a totally new situation today: 'both are Tutsi-led.' One has to wait to see what will bring stability, he says, 'I hope that the current structures will bring stability.' He explains that proposals have been made to create one country for the Hutu and one country for the Tutsi. He believes, however, that this is a bad idea, because, he says, 'the mentality in both countries is too different.'

During all my fieldwork I inquire into the question of difference or similarity between Rwanda and Burundi. I collect answers from different sources, such as: 'It is completely wrong to believe that the Hutu who fled to Rwanda during difficult times, who were refugees in Rwanda, were well treated. No! They got double disappointed! They expected help, but did

not receive it! They were treated as second class citizens, they had little rights, they felt not at all at home in Rwanda!' Conversely, a former Tutsi refugee from Rwanda in Burundi reports precisely the same story to me, only reversed, on Tutsi refugees in Burundi. Quite the opposite, I get an account that states that Tutsi in both countries are 'brothers.'

The Ambassador tells me that people in Africa do not appreciate what they have, for example social cohesion. He points at the local people we pass with the car and says: 'They all know each other and help each other, while in Europe they suffer from loneliness. People here do not realise how hard life is in Europe, and then they believe they are unhappy!'

I carefully introduce to him my view that many in Africa may at times hang on to outdated concepts of modernity, and that this in my eyes is nothing but self-humiliation. I explain that I have the impression that often everything which is rectangular is still being regarded as modern, as are non-local materials; corrugated iron sheets (CIS) make a few entrepreneurs wealthy, while the villagers could produce tiles, - just as examples. He replies, that admittedly these sheets are more durable than the old grass roof. I explain to him the Western transition from concepts of strict machine-like order to the acceptance of the fact that human beings are living creatures. I select for him the example of Western women who once were taught that a baby needs to be fed every 4th hour precisely and is not to be disturbed in between, as much as it may cry, and that today such practices are regarded as ridiculous.

I report to him, furthermore, my experience with Ibrahim at the outskirts of Cairo. Ibrahim is a villager who got rich and replaced his old mud brick house with a modern concrete villa, a villa that was 'modern' but completely dysfunctional. I describe how Ibrahim proudly used to show his villa to Western friends, who in secret were horrified, a villa in which his wife lacked her most important space, namely the courtyard where she used to cook on a gas stove together with her seven daughters; the Western kitchen of the villa was utterly useless to her. As was the entire layout of the house and the furniture; by placing himself on the carpet Ibrahim unwittingly demonstrated to his Western friends how little use he had for the huge sofas and armchairs that filled up his vast living room, that only Westerners ever entered and used, while his family of twenty, - ten children and a lot of uncles and nieces, - sat in the corridor, being limited to a tiny space for enjoying their customary way of sitting on cushions and carpets. The ambassador understands the example very well and admits that Europe is full of bad architecture: 'And we imitate it and believe that it is good!' And, 'You should stay and teach our cadres!'

The Ambassador explains to me the main fields of activities of his embassy, that are related to the sad history of the Great Lakes region: 'There are many refugees who returned to

Burundi and who have their files still in Rwanda (regarding property, social security, and so forth) and the embassy has to help. The same is happening in Burundi, refugees from Rwanda returned to Rwanda and have their files still in Burundi. Or, diplomas have to be recognised. The returning refugees are thus reason number one for quite a lot of work. Then there is task area number two, which is the embargo. Although Rwanda did support it (or had to support it), every delegation who wanted to travel from Burundi out into the world, passed through Rwanda, also South African mediator Jan van Eck, whom I know very well. So the embassy was sometimes a kind of travel agency,' he reports.

The field trip includes interesting discussion rounds, where Carol Webster (this is not her real name), black American woman, Country Representative of Africare Rwanda with its head office in Washington D.C., impresses me with her extremely to-the-point questions, again and again breaking through up the over-polite reservation with which many participants keep their thoughts to themselves, or only mumble to their neighbours. She noticeably uses the privilege of being a black woman in Africa, but not from Africa, to be almost shockingly blunt. Respectable men declaiming balanced and quasi-dignified words, keeping up a smokescreen by using grandeur, do not have a chance with her.

Zang Zhu (this is not his real name), third Secretary of the Chinese Embassy and responsible for strengthening the economic ties between Rwanda and China reminds me once more that Western reports on expatriates often forget non-Westerners such as Chinese and Russians, and the fact that many of these individuals put in a very quiet and disciplined effort in whatever project they are assigned to carry out. I was, for example, very astonished, both in Somalia and Rwanda, to hear that the Chinese were the ones to build roads; many roads had been pointed out to me as 'good' and 'built by the Chinese.'

Later I meet another Chinese whose name I am not authorised to disclose; he explains to me that he is in Rwanda with his wife, who cooks Chinese food for him at least once a week, otherwise he could not survive this stay, he admits. He reports that 'before it was not allowed to have a wife accompanying her husband, now it is, but without children.' Apologetically he explains that 'China is a developing country and has very little money, therefore it is like this.' He says that infrastructure is needed in China. I remark that it is strange that they build very good roads in Rwanda, while they need roads themselves! He laughs. Then he suddenly jumps up, because his superior needs to have his cigarette lit.

Hierarchy

This scene gives me another chance to reflect on the topic of hierarchy, hierarchy as expressed in Russia, China, Germany or Rwanda. Rwanda with its traditional strict hierarchies would score high on cultural measures of hierarchy (Schwartz, in Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi, & Yoon, 1994), and power distance (Hofstede, 1980).

Many expatriates relate to me their opinion that they feel that the genocide, - especially the ease with which it could be implemented, and neighbours be incited to become murderers, - did not only stem from hatred, either authentic or instilled, but also from a culture of obedience. I do not want to expose the name of the person who said: 'The Rwandese society is extremely hierarchical and illiterate. What the higher person says will be done! The Prefecture is the highest level with a Préfet as the head, then comes the Commune with the Bourgmestre at the top, thereafter the Secteur led by a Conseilleur, the Cellule with a Responsable at the top, and at the lowest level the Nyamakumbie, a group of ten families' (quoted from an interview in August 1998, the expatriate interviewee does not want to be named). A German expatriate in Rwanda (I will call him Manfred), reports to me that Rwanda has a strict hierarchy in common with Germany, not only a genocidal past. In Germany the word 'Obrigkeitsdenken' describes this, which can be translated into 'subservience towards authorities within a strictly ranked hierarchy,' something that is regarded as typical for historic Germany. My German interlocutor describes one consequence of this: 'In Rwanda, as in Germany one can deeply hurt a person by using "tu" instead of "vous," because "tu" ["Du" in German, as opposed to "Sie"] represents a humiliation that is used in strict hierarchies to address or debase underlings; patrons addressing their children so-to-speak.' He explains how quickly people are hurt and feel humiliated in this way and that this phenomenon is only visceral to French and German visitors in Rwanda, not to English-speaking expatriates.

Colleagues

On 7th February 1999 I was fortunate to meet Philibert Kagabo, anthropologist, born in Ruhengeri, now at the University of Butare. He explains to me with great expertise that Western psychology tries to understand individuals, but that in Rwanda people work in groups: 'People are not addressed as individuals, but as group, such as: "Your family has done that and that…" Reconciliation only works in groups,' he concludes.

Also on 7th February 1999 I met Athanase Hagengimana, a Rwandan psychologist, who works at the National University in Butare as Philibert Kagabo. He lets me know that he

has a mixed background, but that he 'officially' is Hutu. He and his wife very kindly include me into their lives; I accompany them for example when he brings his wife to a concert in a church house. He lets me see Rwanda with his eyes by describing brilliantly his experiences.[179]

Cosmopolitans

Then, on the 8th February 1999 I met Otmar Oberländer, Directeur Général, Boucherie-Charcuterie de Kigali, BCK, a man with a family background similar to mine, namely from a 'displaced family' from Oberschlesien, formerly Germany, now Poland, meaning that there is no way to 'return home.' Also he had acquired what could be called a rather global identity. He explains to me that he has worked in the Arab world and has learned that humiliation is a very fine instrument there to punish people. He also worked in many parts of Africa and came to Rwanda some years ago, where he built up BCK, as a share holding company. After the genocide he was asked to become a member of the company and build it up again, an offer he gladly accepted.

Elites

From several sides, especially Tutsi, I was urged to meet Emmanuel Ndahimana, Secrétaire d'Etat au Finance, Ministère des Finances et de la Planification Economique, with a moderate Hutu background from the South of Rwanda, coordinating the financial assistance coming from outside Rwanda. I was provided with a lot of positive portrayals of him, for example, from Tutsi side: 'Emmanuel Ndahimana is a man of self-respect and self-confidence, unlike the mixture of "inferiority complex" and aggression that betrays other citizens with Hutu background.' I met Emmanuel Ndahimana, as impressive as reported to me, on 8th February 1999 in his office for a long interview. We would stay in email contact thereafter.

On 9th February 1999 I immersed myself into the group of guests that gathered at the parliament where new ministers were sworn in after a government reshuffle. I sit beside Marie (I do not give her real name), a journalist from Radio-Rwanda in Kigali. I explain my project to her and she responds immediately: 'There are several occasions on which people feel humiliated: For example, a wife feels humiliated who has her husband in prison; she

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[179] See for research in Africa: Africa and the Disciplines: the Contributions of Research in Africa to the Social Sciences and Humanities by Robert H. Bates, Mudimbe, & O'Barr, 1993.

meets people in the street, who know that her husband has raped women and killed children, and she feels profoundly humiliated. But also survivors of the genocide feel humiliated, especially when they remember the humiliating treatment they and family members had to suffer from the "genocidaires," - what about if your aunt, or your mother had to walk naked for kilometres before being killed?! When you remember that you feel utterly humiliated!'

Back to Bujumbura

On 10th February 1999 I ventured back to Bujumbura, with the same local minibus operator that first brought me to Kigali. Back in Bujumbura the first person I talk to is a man from Belgrade who works with an international organisation and has no permission to be named. 'I come from a region, the Balkans, where everybody has strong opinions,' he says, 'and there it is almost impossible to be neutral.' 'I am glad that I can earn my living outside of this polarised world there,' he confesses. He is only too familiar, he says, with the fact that stories of humiliation are used as propaganda that whips up feelings that then create a polarised situation from which nobody can escape. 'The media first stress these aspects, the people obviously do not reject it, but go along; after a while feelings of humiliation become authentic to them, even if they were not before.'

On 11th February 1999 I paid an official visit to ambassador Bernd Morast at the German Embassy in Bujumbura. He is a political scientist and immensely knowledgeable. He wrote his doctoral dissertation on South Africa and Apartheid. He reflects on the difference between Burundi and South Africa and believes that people in South Africa are able to live together today precisely because there was no genocide. He says: 'Burundi and Rwanda, if pacified, would be the very first examples in history where a people who committed genocide live side by side in peace.'

Later on 11th February 1999 I sat with extremely knowledgeable and wise Gudrun Engstrøm from the Norwegian Refugee Council in Bujumbura. She talks to me for many hours. She shares her experiences with me, explains her view on humiliation, and lets me view Burundi with her eyes. She has an extremely caring, balanced, and fair view, unlike some of her expatriate colleagues who clearly hide their fear and insecurity behind slightly more black and white judgments of the predicament of local people.

In the evening of the 11th February 1999, I met James J. Hunter, Second Secretary at the American Embassy in Bujumbura. It is a pleasure to speak to somebody so erudite who

can so well make me understand the official view of the world's superpower, the United States, on the situation in Africa in general and the Great Lakes in particular.

Also in Burundi I talked to another expatriate whose name I do not want to expose, because he does not restrain his words and may not want to see his words quoted: 'Tutsi, well educated, in their twenties and thirties, the elite of tomorrow, start talking "bile" when they get drunk. They say words about the Hutu that are not nice to hear, such as "cockroaches." When they are sober, they talk about reconciliation, but not when they are drunk! I believe that 50 % or even 90 % of the Tutsi are extremists; or that the mainstream is so extreme that there is hardly space for more extremism. According to what I see the Tutsi are convinced that the Hutu are inferior; a Hutu aspiring to become a ruler is for them like a Chimpanzee aspiring to rule!' He continues: 'But, how good is Tutsi rule? Burundi is one of the worst countries concerning torture, among the bottom ten. The Tutsi government pretends that everything is okay, but - oh boy!'

On 12th February 1999 Dr. Harakeye Goretti, highly qualified medical consultant for the 'Projet Santé et Population,' talks to me about 'la méfiance', or mistrust, and how widespread it is in the region of the Great Lakes (and in East Africa altogether, as other Africa experts also tell me). She brings me to one of the places at the shores of the Tanganyika Lake where people enjoy sitting, and talks to me for many hours on a broad spectrum of issues. Again I am impressed by the aristocratic and highly cultivated manner with which not only men but also women with Tutsi background show strong-willed independence; Goretti gives me the opportunity to understand the way women like her combine family and marriage with their strong personal views and self-determined will. I hope we will be able to realise our plans for common projects.

On the 15th February 1999, I attempted to learn more about the views of white people with African nationality, for example, white Kenyans. I meet a man who came to Kenya when he was a child. He and his family live in Karen, a part of Nairobi, not far from Karen Blixen's estate, where many white Kenyans live. He currently works in Burundi, but knows Somalis as well. He confirms the view of many others, namely that the white Kenyan community is keeping itself quite isolated, and that there are some 'nice' people there, but also some very 'strange' ones. He also agrees with those who find that Somalis are more 'honest' than anybody: 'Somalis tell you if they do not like you, they spit at you, they tell you even that they want to kill you. In the Great Lakes region people smile and you never know what they think, you never know why something goes wrong. They among themselves know exactly

why today is a good day to kill this or that person, or why this or that person was killed yesterday, but you would not know!'

On the 15th February 1999 I met Oscar Nibogora, from the opposition party Front pour la Democratie, FRODEBU; he is Représentant du Peuple, Circonscription Makamba, Président du Groupe Parlementaire FRODEBU, Coordonnateur du Programme AWEPA, Président de la Commission de la Défense et de la Sécurité, Assemble Nationale, République du Burundi, Bujumbura. I attempt to get a feeling for the political situation in Burundi and check the fragments of impressions that I had in the back of my head, opinions that I had collected so far.

I do not want to name the expatriate source who gave me a very frank overview over Burundi's plight, because he talks to me 'off the record': 'Burundi is a primary example of selective perception: For the Tutsi 1972 has somehow not happened! In 1972 Hutu were slaughtered, and the killers were the security forces, army, police, or extremist Tutsi youth organisations.' My source continues his report with disbelief, 'I was told that some Hutu obediently followed orders to come to the gendarmerie where they then were killed, worse even, when the evening came, they were told that it was now 18.00 and they could not be finished today, that they should come back next day, - and,' he exclaims 'they came back!' This, my source assumes, 'must be utterly humiliating and shameful for the Hutu, to know that some of them accepted being slaughtered like lambs! This must be similar to the feelings of Jews who are ashamed that their people did not rise up against the Holocaust in Germany!' He concludes: 'The entire history of the Hutu is a story of humiliation, even more so since 1972; many educated Hutu have been killed; the opposition has very few educated people!'

My highly experienced source explains further, 'The Tutsi have always kept their pride, they were never submissive; a Hutu on the other side you can recognise because he acts meek. But this changes today. Hutu were much more subservient before, they have built up strength especially since 1972.' 'However,' and he points now at the blind spot on the Hutu side, 'the Hutu on the other side do not see that the Tutsi have reason to be afraid, just remember 1959 and 1994 in Rwanda!' His conclusion is: 'Empathy is missing on all sides!' Although, he admits, empathy may be difficult for people who got all their family members murdered: 'One has to understand that a person who lost all their family might not be able to be neutral; there is so much humiliation and traumatisation in this country! From a psychological point of view one can understand that people have blind spots!'

And, he informs me: 'What is happening today in Burundi is a low intensity genocide: here two hundred dead, next week another fifty or hundred; the army is the perpetrator, the

dead are civilians. One has just to compare the number of deaths: 1993 circa 200 000 dead; in 1972 300 000 or more were killed, - compared with other civil wars, these are huge numbers!'

Now my interlocutor calls for caution: 'Hutu/Tutsi is not that simple! UPRONA (Union pour le Progres national), a radical Tutsi opposition, has a leader, Mukasi, who is a Hutu! This party criticises Buyoya as being too weak and goingtoo far in his so-called 'peace policy'! They say that FRODEBU is disqualified as a political force because of the genocide! One should not give them anything!' I remembered reading: 'There has been a significant split between the UPRONA parliamentary group on the one hand and the Mukasi-led faction of UPRONA on the other. The former is supportive of peace negotiations, while Mukasi remains opposed to any negotiations with armed rebel groups' (Wolpe & John Smith, 1997).

The Queen of Saba

My source tells me furthermore about a rumour that was related to him. Somebody told him that in Arusha a radical Tutsi said to his Hutu adversary: 'We are the chosen people, we are descendants of King Solomon and the Queen of Saba, we have the right to rule!' The Hutu leader, leader of the armed rebellion is said to have responded: 'As you say, you are foreigners, and we chase you back to where you come from!' Another says: 'The Tutsi are snakes, they are trained from childhood to lie and to deceive!'

A Woman

After a short return to Nairobi I flew back to Bujumbura on the 22nd February 1999 on board a Boeing 707, half cargo plane, half filled with passenger seats, with only two passengers turning up, me and Arlene (I do not give her real name). Arlene is a young twenty-three years old elegant, kind and brilliantly sharp Burundian woman. The flight is not on the departure screen; it seems to be one of the flights that had been reported to me as circumventing the embargo (although the embargo had been lifted by now). Clearly the cargo on board had paid for the flight so that paying passengers are not really needed. When we are about to enter the plane Arlene is being subjected to difficult interrogations and I help her through insisting that I want to accompany her. Finally in the plane, we sit together in the vast empty space and talk during the whole journey. She starts touching upon her sad experiences when we are being served food: fish repulses her, she explains, because the bodies of her parents were thrown into the river and eaten by the fish. She escaped being raped and killed only because her

tormenters got into a fight among themselves. She has several orphaned children to take care of and is on the way back to them from Nairobi where she just passed her last exams. After the genocide she had run into Swiss people, just by chance, who offered to pay for her education in Kenya. She is now on her way back planning on finding work and taking care of the children. I will stay in contact with her from then on.

A Minister and a Conference

I was on my way to Burundi in February because I was invited to speak on humiliation at a conference in Bujumbura. From 23rd to 26th February 1999 the Burundian Ministry of National Education, the Ministry in Charge of the Peace Process, the Ministry of Human Rights, Institutional Reforms and Relations with the National Assembly, CONFEMEN, UNICEF, UNESCO, ACCT, and the State of the World Forum organised The First International Conference on 'The Role of Education in Promoting a Culture of Coexistence and Community Building.'[180] Participants are the Education Ministers from countries well experienced in conflict resolution (such as Uganda, Rwanda, Guinea, and the Comoros), university departments staff, academicians, and peace dedicated foundations. Prosper Mpawenayo, Minister of National Education is the driving force, an amazing man, a brilliant intellectual (he studied physics), and courageous strategist from the majority group in Burundi; to accept the post of education minister in such a polarised country, in a Tutsi dominated government, is not a small deal. On the first day, when I see the people attending the conference, largely members of the Burundian Tutsi elite, I wonder how he feels towards them, and how they feel towards him. And I wonder what I should say later, in my talk on humiliation. For the first time I realise with my own whole being, how it feels to live in an environment where your name may figure on 'to-kill' lists, with or without you knowing it. What if I provoke people with my talk to the extent that I end up on such a list myself? Humiliation addresses the hot core of conflict, this is what humiliation is all about, there is no way to make the topic less sensitive; humiliation addresses precisely the touchiest aspects of any conflict. Of course, I am a foreigner, and can just leave, I remind myself, but I also realise that nobody would actually miss me if I disappeared on the way to the airport after the conference.

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[180] Conférence internationale sur le rôle de l'éducation dans la promotion d'une culture de convivialité et d'édification des communautés.

The conference is beautifully arranged in the Swiss-like clean and neat centre of Bujumbura, at the hotel Novotel; it is more professionally organised than many other conferences I have attended so far. The contrast cannot be greater between this high level of professionalism and the view from the hotel on surrounding hills with rebels hiding, and occasional smoke in the morning signalling that yet another hill-home was on fire.

Kumar Rupesinghe, State of the World Forum, former secretary general of International Alert, and author of many books in the field of early warning, peace building and reconciliation,[181] had encouraged Prosper Mpawenayo to arrange this conference and he is one of the keynote speakers. I have known Rupesinghe since 1994 as a strong-minded and often provocative supporter of the underprivileged in the world, not fearing any confrontation, much loved by many, much criticised by others, himself from a surprising background, namely a combination of Buddhist-Catholic education in Sri Lanka.

Further keynote speakers are the brilliant Ambroise Niyonsaba, Peace Process Minister, and Eugène Nindorera, Minister of Human Rights, Institutional Reforms and Relations with the National Assembly. Two other speeches touch me deeply, namely the words found by Diallo Alfa Oummar, CNG/UNESCO, from Conakry, Guinea and Geneva, Switzerland, and the intense language of the Ugandan Minister of Education and Sports Kweronda-Ruhemba, who shocks me and others by blunt self-criticism of the African elite: 'When we fight for peace,' he says, 'do we want peace, or do we want power?' This he pronounces very slowly, powerfully, and repeatedly.

Diallo Alfa Oummar and I are the only participants at the conference in traditional West African clothes (both in clothes for males), reminding the others that a diversity of style does exist and campaigning, so-to-speak, for cultural diversity and self-respect. I increasingly learn to get a feeling for the fact that this self-respect is more difficult to develop for Africans, since discouraging obstacles seem to be everywhere: For example, such basic structures as transport throughout the continent still use colonial languages. Diallo Alfa Oummar would have been able to come to Bujumbura from Guinea via Brussels much faster (five hours to Brussels and eight hours back to Nairobi and Bujumbura) than the journey that he in fact chose took him: he travelled altogether for four days, sleeping at the airports, from Conakry to Abidjan, from there to Lagos, to Douala, Kinshasa, Nairobi, and at last Bujumbura; in addition he needed a visa and had to show return tickets for all the countries where he had to stop. Also the Minister of Education from the Comoros travelled for four days.

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[181] See, for example, Rupesinghe, 1988; Rupesinghe, 1995a; Rupesinghe, 1995b; Rupesinghe, 1996; Rupesinghe, 1999.

At the conference I meet Christian Scherrer again, and I get acquainted with highly intellectual, compassionate and ethical Jan Øberg, who, together with Christina Spännar, founded the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research (TFF) and is its President. TFF is an 'independent, not-for-profit foundation since 1986, in academia, in conflict areas, in media, on Internet.'[182] Interestingly, Jan and his wife worked in Somalia for four years, starting in 1981; he reports that they loved it, among others because the Somalis resist any subjugation.

Paul K. Ngarambe, UNESCO, and Professor at the University of Burundi in Bujumbura, gives a very interesting talk on *L'éducation traditionnelle au leadership* (Ngarambe, 1999) that highlights the role of such institutions as *ubushingantahe*. Very knowledgeable Bonaventure Bandira, Professor of History at the University of Burundi, leads the discussion group on the founding of an institute that would give the message of this conference more substance and carry it further into the future. Mukuna Tshinyingunyingu, a psychologist who works in Belgium contributes captivatingly to the discussions of the conference with his expertise of Africa and Europe from a psychologist's point of view. At the end of the conference I talk to Usama Tharwat Amanious, Egyptian diplomat in Bujumbura and prepare my later visit to the Egyptian foreign ministry in Cairo.

My Talk

On 24th February 1999 I give my talk. I open it by explaining my personal biography that so well illustrates the European history of atrocities, thus trying to escape from being categorised as a former coloniser and instead include African struggles into the problems that the human species has to solve together. Notes are taken by the conference secretariat and the report of the conference later summarises my talk (Lindner, 1999a). I will quote it further down.

Many come to me after the talk and thank me for having been so open. My talk had been televised, and later I am stopped in the streets and asked about it. A letter is handed to me signed by Venant Bamboneyeho, President of the Association Pour La Lutte Contre Le Genocide, where he writes: 'Thank you for your presence in Burundi. Your visit has encouraged us.' People come to me and expose their sufferings, clearly relieved that there is a person outside of their country who seems to really understand their suffering. One man, whose name I do not want to disclose, explains: 'I am mixed Hutu/Tutsi and am in danger whenever one of those groups is massacred. In 1993 I learned that I was about to be killed by

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[182] See http://www.transnational.org.

three youths; I invited them and convinced them that they should not do that. I told them that my kids look just like them. This was the second time that I saved my life by talking to my killers; before it had been the other group that wanted to kill me. I actually feel continuously humiliated, because I can be as qualified as anybody, I will never get any position of significance and influence, because nobody trusts me, everybody knows or fears that I will not side with one camp, therefore no camp wants me in. I was supposed to move into an important position in my region, I did not get it!'

After the conference, on the 27ᵗʰ February 1999, Jean (this is not his real name), a high Burundian official, kindly brings me to the airport from where I return to Nairobi. On the plane I reflect on the Great Lakes region that lies behind me and think of those people who still are afraid of being killed. Does this sympathetic academician whom I had met and talked to for hours really plan to kill his colleague, who confessed to me his terrible fear? Are such accusations true or just paranoia? Sadly enough, I know that there is a possibility that it is not just paranoia; peace is not guaranteed yet in this tortured region.

Does Status Trump Utility?

Also on the plane, I try to figure out my position on what I call self-humiliation by the subaltern, or the attempt to gain status by imitating the master, or better, a nebulous image of a former master or far-away master. In the USA the rich build villas that are, according to the French, embarrassingly overdone replicas of houses dating from glorious French times, when France still was the epitome of culture par excellence. In this case the subalterns are Americans who feel at a loss concerning tradition and culture and the master is the former royal court in France. Meanwhile, the French have problems keeping Anglicisms out of their language. Although the master/underlings relation is reversed in the latter case, in both cases it seems that imitation, costing much, is not really the path to the recognition and fame that it aims for. Often it is not only costly, but also immensely impractical. On several occasions I understood that Western style bungalows are dysfunctional in Rwanda in several ways, for example the cooking is better done behind the house with charcoal. When I summarise my experience from having been a guest in Rwandan homes, then my impression resembles my observations in Egypt. Western style furniture is seen as high in status and therefore bought if possible, but it is neither functional nor does it convince a Westerner. Westerners who would buy such furniture for their own use in Europe or the United States would be disappointed that the pieces are bad imitations, partly broken, clearly showing that there is no traditional

relationship between the local user and this kind of furniture. A Westerner would insist on better craftsmanship, would repair broken parts and in fact use the furniture instead of only let it fill up space. For a Westerner like me, who does not like most Western furniture, but would be happy about much more cultural diversity in the world, a diversity that could also fertilise and improve Western style, the disappointment is even greater.

In Egypt there exists a local production of armchairs that resemble those that a tourist knows from French royal palaces such as Versailles, and that betray an Egyptian admiration for the former French colonial master that squarely contradicts the otherwise professed disgust of colonialism. More, even centuries after the French masters left, the colonialist's style is still imitated, voluntarily. At the same time local style is despised; in Egypt architects such as the late Hassan Fathy suffered rejection for trying to revive old Egyptian architectural styles that are both functional for the local climate and aesthetically convincing. Even when rich Americans ordered Fathy's houses for their villas in New Mexico, Egypt rejected their own prophet. In Rwanda, on my trip with Mary, we visited a traditional Rwandan house made of local material, both beautiful and functional, now a museum. I would assume that modern amenities such as electricity or water supply could surely be integrated in a way that up till now only luxury hotels such as Nairobi Safari Park Hotel demonstrate.

In all cases it seems that 'slaves' who protest against their oppressive masters, in this case Africans who suffered from Western colonialists, still admire the despised oppressor to the extent that they more or less blindly imitate the masters' style, neglecting their own daily life needs and their own cultural and environmental context. This subaltern self-humiliation betrays an admiration for the master, a wish to at least look like the master, that puts a big question mark to the 'official' yearning to abolish oppression. Does it not more look like the slave does not want to abolish oppressive hierarchy, but only wants to take the master's place? And, indeed, many African dictators succeeded.

In order to not let this sound arrogant, it must be said that Western homes are equally full of imitations of the style of long bygone masters, - the former French royal court for example. I admire French culture and would not mind a castle, an authentic old one. However, though often less dilapidated and more in use than in Africa, the modern imitations of such design used in Europe (so-called 'Gelsenkirchener Barock' is an example from Germany) are in many cases dysfunctional and ugly (to my taste), and more obstacles to human well-being than contributors. The slaves' subaltern willingness to suffer for imaginary high status is as known in Europe as in Africa, and lately much half-understood import of

Americanisms carries this tradition further; potential cultural diversity that could enrich the world is lost for a sad replacement.

Back to Nairobi

Back in Nairobi, on 2nd March 1999, I succeeded in finally meeting Dr. Ahmed, physician, and President of the Somali Red Crescent. Many people had recommended to me that I should talk to him; I was told that he has a lot of experience, that he would be a very good president of Somalia, that he co-ordinated the whole relief from North to South in 1990 to 1993, when Somalis were killing each other, that he knows how to co-ordinate projects in Somalia in case I needed a documentation about humiliation. He explains to me that humiliation is very relevant in his work, especially unintentional humiliation. He explicates also that people are actors and stakeholders even in emergency situations; they are not just helpless beggars!

In March and May 1999 I spend a lot of time at the United Nations Development Office for Somalia, UNDOS, where Abdirahman Yabarow, Manager of the Documentation Center, Data and Information Management Unit, and Ali Swaleh generously support me in my search for literature on Somalia.

Psychiatry, Trauma, Debriefing, and PTSD

From 24th - 25th May 1999 the Kenya Psychiatric Association organised the 1st Regional Meeting of the World Psychiatric Association and the Kenya Psychiatric Association at Intercontinental Hotel in Nairobi.[183] The motto is 'African Psychiatry in the new millennium: Challenges and opportunities.' I accept the kind invitation to this very first psychiatric conference, and later attend also the XI World Congress of Psychiatry (in Hamburg, Germany, 6th – 11th August 1999) out of two reasons: At first I would like to be up-to-date concerning PTSD (Posttraumatic Stress Disorder) and its possible treatment (Dan Stein, PTSD expert from South Africa, reports on 11th August 1999 at the conference in Hamburg that, according to the latest state-of-the-art, in acute PTSD neither psychotherapy nor drugs help, while both help in chronic PTSD). Secondly, as mentioned above, my aim is to avoid duplicating research on victims, survivors and trauma, - that I instead would want to try to understand more about why atrocities such as genocides are perpetrated, who plans them and who carries them out. In short, I am interested in knowing more about perpetrators, and not

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[183] See G. Devereux, 1980 for Basic Problems of Ethnopsychiatry.

just any perpetrator, but masterminds. My hope is that such an understanding could help prevent genocide more than studying the suffering of victims, - whereby the conceptualisation of a victim/perpetrator cleavage evidently is problematic, since perpetrators most often are former victims. I had therefore attempted to enter prisons and speak to high-level prisoners who had pleaded guilty. I later will try to get in touch with perpetrators hiding in the French-speaking parts of Europe, but clearly another journey to the prisons of Arusha and Rwanda is still needed.

'Sadistic Personality Disorder'?

Dan Stein agrees with me that perpetrators get much too little academic attention. He reports that the diagnosis 'sadistic personality disorder' has been quietly dropped in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) because it was controversial and insufficiently researched. Dan Stein's colleague, Soraya Seedat, who works with victims in South Africa, joins the discussion and explains that she does not think that sadistic personality disorders exists, according to her experience perpetrators may have an 'antisocial personality.'

In Nairobi I had heard many accounts of perpetrators, hiding in Kenya, needing psychiatric help, - reports would go along such lines as that people, after having killed children, suffer from seeing small children's fingers on the plate every time they eat, a case that is reminiscent of the Hutu mother who was forced to show loyalty with the Hutu cause by killing her children that she had with her Tutsi husband; clearly another case demonstrating the problems surrounding perpetrator/victim distinctions.

I speak about this topic to the great old man of Kenyan psychiatry, Dr. Gulam Mustafa from the Aga Khan Hospital, - he covers also forensic psychiatry, - as well as to Dr. Frank X. Njenga, well-known and respected psychiatrist in Nairobi who had invited me to attend the conference. Dr. Njenga also introduces me to Norman Sartorius, President of the World Psychiatric Association, and Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Geneva, Switzerland. In his talk Sartorius addresses two aspects that are related to humiliation, human rights and hierarchies. He firstly discusses the fact that economic indicators are mainly used to measure the level of development and reflects on Ali Mazrui's proposal that the level of civilisation of a society should be measured according to how it treats their feeble ones, like people in prisons and people in mental health institutions. Secondly he addresses the mistakes that seem to be made, when building down centralised hierarchies, namely that responsibility is being

decentralised without also decentralising authority. In Spain, he reports, it takes eight years for any change to seep through the system. He presents a positive example from Thailand where a minister travelled through the country and gave each head of a village or town the funds for health services for a year, in public, so that everybody could watch. 'Surprisingly, this worked!' he exclaims. The funds were mainly used sensibly, the public transparency stopped embezzlement. Later, on 16th June 1999 Sartorius writes to me: 'I am convinced that the feeling of humiliation and loss of self-respect are of central importance not only in the times of war but also in many situations of peace. I would therefore suggest that you consider exploring the effects of loss of self-respect or of regaining self-respect in other groups, e.g. in mentally ill people who often complain that they have no self-respect and who are humiliated in all cultures without reasons and frequently.'

I benefit from listening and talking to many more participants of the Nairobi conference, to Dr. Geoff van der Linden from South Africa, who does interesting research on social anxiety, to Dr. Fred Owiti, who brightly speaks about psychiatry and religion, to lawyer Githu Muigai who brilliantly talks about the perspective on psychiatry from outside (that the psychiatrists are regarded as 'mad' themselves, that their method is unscientific trial and error and that they are the successors of the witch doctors), to Dr. Rachel N. Kang'ehte and Dr. J. M. Mburu, who was in Rwanda after the genocide and professes that he got traumatised as a helper.

Trauma Is 'Normal'

I am very touched by Dr. Caroline Nyamai, who talks about the help Kenya received from American psychiatrists after the bomb blast of the American embassy in Nairobi in 1998, where those who survived the blast received psychiatric counselling. She explains with great appreciation how Kenyans benefited from the opportunity to learn from their visiting American colleagues. On 25th May 1999 I talk to one of those American psychiatrists who came from the USA in connection with the bomb blast, it is Dr. George W. Woods, who calls for a new, global psychology, that contains not only Western psychology, but draws upon the psychology of all cultures.

Several papers at the conference address the 1998 bomb blast and the treatment of its traumatised victims. It is embarrassingly clear to everybody in the conference, although nobody dares to bluntly verbalise it, that Africa is full of potential patients for such treatment,

and that they go without it, exactly because it is African 'normality' and not a quickly passing event such as the blast that also affected Westerners.

Back in Europe

During the rest of 1999 I concentrated on Europe and those Somalis, Rwandans and Burundians, as well as researchers on Africa and/or genocide, as well as scholars in the field of peace studies and social psychology, whom I could meet in Europe. There are many Somalis living in Norway and Sweden; they are mostly speaking English. Some Rwandans and Burundians live in Denmark or Germany, - I reported on my contacts with some of them further above. However, the majority of Rwandans and Burundians live in the French speaking part of Europe.

On 17th August 1999 I met Georges Charrière, Coordinator of the International Documentation Network On The Great African Lakes Region, at the Institut Universitaire d'études du développement Genève. He recommends Nobel laureate Elias Canetti and his book *Crowds and Power* (Canetti, 1984) where Canetti writes: 'Anyone who wants to rule men, first tries to humiliate them, to trick them out of their rights and their capacity for resistance until they are as powerless before them as animals.'[184] Charrière furthermore confirms my caution (as a woman) with regard to the myth that women inherently are more peaceful than men; he reports that more than 50% of the perpetrators in the Rwandan genocide were women. He provides me with invaluable scholarly work concerning therapy of traumatised Rwandans, namely James, 1997, and Uwanyiligira, 1997.

On 22nd July 1999 I got acquainted with Jean Damascène Gasanabo, in Geneva, Switzerland. It is Pierre Dasen, whose great support for my work I introduced in the acknowledgements, who brings me together with this brilliant and ambitious student of educational systems who wants to contribute to making Rwanda a better place. On 22nd July 1999 Jean Damascène Gasanabo and I visit Dr. Eric Burnier, Responsable du Secteur Santé, for a very interesting meeting and on 28th July 1999 we visit extremely knowledgeable Jean-Pierre Gontard, Directeur-adjoint, Institut Universitaire d'etudes du developpement Genève. When I will later open the brilliant CD-ROM that Gontard and his people (Georges Charrière is the co-ordinator) have produced on the Great Lakes region, I will be amazed by their fascinating work and so much excellent material.

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[184] Quoted in Jacobs, 1995.

Jean-Pierre Gontard explains that according to his view it is not hatred, but fear that makes people plan genocide and similar atrocities: 'The people of Rwanda and Burundi live in fear. Everybody is afraid of everybody and it is this fear that generates hatred' (translated from French by the author).' Then Gontard addresses another, significant problem: 'Another big problem in Rwanda and Burundi is that people there have the feeling that their problems are exclusively specific to them. These two countries suffer from isolation. Many people there believe that they are condemned to be inflicted with the worst misery of the world. Once I held a colloquium there, in front of circa sixty people from the university, and I talked only about Chile, Guatemala, and other non-African tragedies. Afterwards people came to me and said: "Thank you! You opened our eyes for that we are not the only ones in the world who suffer!"'

Gontard recommends Sven Lindqvist's book *Exterminate All the Brutes* (Lindqvist, 1996), as resembling my approach: 'Together with the English writer Bruce Chatwin (in Patagonia) and the Italian writer Claudio Magris (Danube), he has pioneered a genre where to travel in space is also to travel in time. Who else would have thought of embarking on a philosophical inquiry into the origins of European genocide by setting off with a laptop computer into the heart of Joseph Conrad's Africa? Everything that Lindqvist writes is hard-won fact based on sharp-eyed observation and diligent research. His books are informed by the analytical skills of a philosopher and constructed with the care and attention of a novelist' (book cover text). Gontard furthermore recommends André Guichaoua publication *Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-1994)* (Guichaoua, 1994) and gives me the amazing IUED publication *Breaking with the "Culture of Impunity" in Rwanda and Burundi* (Institut Universitaire d'etudes du developpement Genève (IUED), 1995) that I already quoted above.

Albert Bandura is an important name not only regarding work on how aggression may be learned, but also on 'moral disengagement.' He addresses this issue in his recent article 'Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities' (Bandura, 1999), and earlier in his chapter on 'Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement' (Bandura, in Reich, 1990) where he highlights all mechanisms that make it 'easier' to perpetrate atrocities, such as 'obscuring causal agency,' 'distoring consequences,' 'blaming and devaluating the targets,' 'moral justification of counterterrorist measures,' 'public intimidation and judgments of retaliatory violence,' 'euphemistic labeling,' 'disregard for, or distortion of, consequences,' 'dehumanization,' 'attribution of blame,' and 'moral disengagement and self-deception.'

On 20th August 1999 I met Elise (this is not her real name), former Minister of Women's Affairs and Peace in Burundi (Ministre des Droits de l'Homme et de la Condition féminine), who has a Hutu background, and now, having taken refuge in Switzerland with her four children and the fifth child she assumed responsibility for, collects material for a book on the plight of the Great Lakes region. I hope sincerely that this admirable woman will succeed in finding a good publisher for her brilliant insights. Later I contact the excellent Nkiko Nsengimana who, with a strong voice, reminds us of the need for differentiation and faithfulness to meticulous exactitude as opposed to effortless generalisation, an approach that I find so important also with regard to Germany. He points out that the 1994 genocide is not the only atrocity that happened in the Great Lake region, and that the Tutsi are not the only victims; there are victims on many sides. Nsengimana, 1996, writes carefully on this issue in the 1996 'Two Years after…' volume of *Dialogue*: 'Génocide Rwandais: Deux ans après...' (Dechamps, 1996).

I would like to round up this section on my fieldwork in Rwanda and Burundi with an experience that links back to the first section, namely Germany, both geographically and politically. Since the onset of my work I gave several papers at various occasions and explained the concept of humiliation to many people, for example in Belfast, Northern Ireland, at the conference on The Challenge of Reconciliation: Diversity and Community in a Global Age, 3rd – 9th May 1999, and later, on 16th May 2000 at the Cross-cultural Research Group led by Pierre R. Dasen, Professeur en approches interculturelles de l'éducation, Université en Genève, Departement de Psychologie, where I give a paper titled 'How Humiliation Creates Cultural Differences.' I find that many of my interlocutors from other conflict regions react with great interest to the concept of humiliation and immediately relate to me stories of humiliation from their own experience:

Dusa Hibon-Zgonec, for example, from Slovenia, tells me about the dynamics of humiliation on the Balkans, in particular those she experienced in Slovenia. She explains (16th May 2000): 'Slovenia lies in the North of the Balkans, more in contact with Austria and Italy than the other parts, and, very importantly, it has its own language, different from Serbo-Croatic. Tito held the country together, Serbia keeping the military supremacy, while Slovenia was economically strong. After Tito's death the Serbs started a campaign, around 1985 and 1986, to create a kind of common Yugoslavian language, a Yugoslavian "Esperanto." They created "community focal points" ["skupno jedro"] for that purpose. For the Slovenes, who had been without a state of their own since more than thousand years, the only marker of their identity was their language. The attempt to implement another language

went therefore too far for Slovenes; it was a national humiliation that set in motion separatist tendencies. Nobody understood and helped us, to our great astonishment, - until, after a while, it was Germany who supported us.'

Germany[185]

My personal goal has always been to comprehend the full meaning of why Hitler could gain so much power, to grasp how atrocities like the Holocaust could happen, and how such mayhem against large parts of Europe could be carried out. Since I was a child I have gathered all the evidence I could in the hope of finding answers to questions such as 'Did Hitler seduce the broad masses? Did he intend to do so and succeed?' And 'To what extent were the Germans "willing executioners" as Goldhagen claims?' (Goldhagen, 1996).

Over many decades, on trains, in shops, or waiting in queues, whenever I travelled in Germany, I attempted to catch a glimpse of the uncensored voice of the 'little people' or 'the Volk' in Germany. There were many opportunities and I used them well. Countless times I overheard conversations between people who lived during Hitler's regime. These conversations were far from historical reflections, but pieces of day-to-day talk that somehow, by chance, included the past.

Today the situation has changed. Germany is currently undergoing a period of 'working through' the 'Nazizeit' [Nazi period]. 'Zeitzeugen' [witnesses of history] are interviewed before they die and it is too late, in documentaries and chat shows that fill German TV programmes. Not only on television, also in private homes people reflect more openly than ever before and 'unearth' their memories, people who have been almost completely silent for over 50 years. This may indicate that the 'Unfähigkeit zu trauern' [the inability to mourn], described by Mitscherlich & Mitscherlich, 1982, had its origins in an inability to talk. The only ones who always had a voice where those few 'Unverbesserliche' [those who cannot be reformed], who at the far right of politics have continued to broadcast Nazi ideals ever since World War II, or those few critical intellectuals with historical interests who have written books. Now however, more than 50 years after 'der Zusammenbruch' ['the collapse,' meaning the collapse of Hitler's Germany], the 'little people' are beginning to reflect. Anyone who thought those times were forgotten has been misled by a façade of silence.

During my fieldwork in Germany, especially during the years of my research on humiliation, I immersed myself in this discourse. When I began thinking around the idea that led to the project in 1994 and started my research on the concept of humiliation in 1997, the term humiliation was marginal; now, in 2000, the whole German nation seems to talk about humiliation.

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[185] This section on Germany is revised from Lindner, 2000i, and Lindner, 2000m.

I hear people talk about World War II, people who avoided this subject before, and they say things that amaze, stun and move me. Obviously, memories had been lingering under a thin cover for decades, waiting for the right time to come out. And astonishingly enough, even small details are remembered, both in the conversations I have and in the television documentaries or talks I monitor, details in all their multi-facetedness, memories so alive that it is as if the war had ended only yesterday, and the torment is still vivid.

Hitler was obviously very competent at putting into practice what he calls the 'correct psychology' of seduction, especially in the beginning of his career as 'Führer.' He writes on page 165 of his *Mein Kampf* (Hitler, 1999): 'The art of propaganda lies in understanding the emotional ideas of the great masses and finding, through a psychologically correct form, the way to the attention and hence to the heart of the broad masses.' And on page 167 he continues: 'The broad mass of a nation does not consist of diplomats, or even professors of political law, or even individuals capable of forming a rational opinion; … The people in their overwhelming majority are so feminine by nature and attitude that sober reasoning determines their thoughts and actions far less than emotion and feeling. And this sentiment is not complicated, but very simple and all of a piece. It does not have multiple shadings; it has a positive and a negative; love or hate, right or wrong, truth or lie, never half this way and half that way, never partially, or that kind of thing.'

He continues his lesson in successful propaganda on page 168: '… the most brilliant propagandist technique will yield no success unless one fundamental principle is borne in mind constantly and with unflagging attention. It must confine itself to a few points and repeat them over and over. Here, as so often in this world, persistence is the first and most important requirement for success.'

Simplicity and persistence, this was the recipe Hitler advocates to get the masses moving, and it is chilling to see how well Hitler put this into action as soon as he became 'Führer': 'The purpose of propaganda is not to provide interesting distraction for blasé young gentlemen, but to convince, and what I mean is to convince the masses. But the masses are slow-moving, and they always require a certain time before they are ready even to notice a thing, and only after the simplest ideas are repeated thousands of times will the masses finally remember them.

When there is a change, it must not alter the content of what the propaganda is driving at, but in the end must always say the same thing. For instance, a slogan must be presented from different angles, but the end of as remarks must always and immutably be the slogan itself. Only in this way can the propaganda have a unified and complete effect' (169).

Everybody who ever heard recordings of Hitler's speeches has an inkling of the emotional power with which he conveyed his message, and the emotional response he received. An elderly man illustrated that fact in an interview (1999, on German television): 'I was a boy in my teens when I heard that Hitler would visit our little town. Already many hours in advance I went to the square where he was to arrive. I tried to stand on my toes, to put my head up, in order to get a glimpse of Hitler behind the masses of people who stood in front of me. A man told me that I should not worry; first I would see yellow banners, and motorcycles. Twice I thought I saw yellow banners, but each time it was false alarm. Then, finally, Hitler came, but I saw nothing, because I fainted.'

This account highlights the refrain I encounter during my research in 2000: 'You could not say anything against 'die Bewegung' ['the movement,' meaning Hitler's movement], there was this enthusiasm! My elder brothers and also my elder sister experienced 'den Aufschwung' [literally the 'upswing,' i.e. the first period of Hitler's reign when the economy improved]. You could not say a word! They were taken in by it! I was the younger one, I did not dare to talk, and at the end of the war I had to take the shit! By then my brothers were dead! Killed as soldiers before they were 20! What could I have done? I am just disgusted, I can hardly see all these television programmes about the 'Hitlerzeit' [Hitler's times] now! I get sick! It is so humiliating how we were duped! I lost my brothers, I lost my father, and I lost 'Haus, Hof und Heimat' ['house, farm, and my home region;' the speaker, whose name I do not want to disclose, is referring to the part of Germany that became Polish after World War II - the region where his family's farm was located that he, like hundreds of thousands of others, was due to inherit but lost].'

Another voice adds: 'The most disgusting and humiliating thing is the trace of belief and enthusiasm that was once also in me! But I was young, what could I have done? Of course everybody wanted to be part of it! Nobody wanted to be an outsider! When I had to become a soldier the war was hell. It made me sick. Ever since then all this makes me sick!' (interview with a man now in his seventies, April 2000).

Many years ago, when I first started trying, discretely, to overhear conversations that were going on in buses or trains or waiting halls, between people who had lived during Hitler's reign, I initially expected that Hitler would be attacked in such conversations as having been part of 'die da oben' ['them up there'] who 'messed it up' terribly. To my great surprise I heard more: Hitler, in such conversations often called 'der Führer,' seems to be part of the 'little people's' family life. He is sometimes talked about like a dead brother or uncle who gambled away everything, - but who still is a family member. I got the impression that

people are somehow ashamed about him, in other words they would not admit to him publicly, but that he still is a family member for whom people had a kind of pity. Hitler had obviously succeeded in becoming a member of the 'little people' much more than any other leader before or after him. The exclamation 'Wenn das der Führer wüßte!' ['If 'der Führer' knew that!'] illustrates this. 'Wenn das der Führer wüßte!' 'little people' used to say when Hitler still was in power and when something went wrong in the administration or government. They said this because they trusted that he would fix the problem if he knew about it, that he would put 'die da oben' who 'did what they wanted' back in their right place.

I always tried to acquire a deeper understanding for this relationship between the 'little people' and Hitler. Why were they so susceptible to his influence? How could he become the leader of the 'little people' against 'die da oben'?

I remember an old German woman saying: 'Wir kleinen Leute haben sowieso nichts zu sagen. Die da oben machen doch was sie wollen!' ['We 'little people' have nothing to say anyhow. Those 'up there' do what they want anyhow!'] With these words the old woman expressed the worldview of many 'little people' in Germany, especially of today's elder generation. Germany was a society in which humiliation was a daily experience for social inferiors. Since at least the eighteenth century, 'Particularly at the smaller and relatively poorer courts of the German empire it was customary to make social inferiors emphatically aware of their subordinate position' (Elias, 1993, 95). The humiliated helplessness of the 'little people' in Germany was 'commonsense,' part of their 'life-world,' or their 'habitus.'[186]

I believe that the humiliated helplessness of the 'broad masses' was Hitler's 'royal way' into the hearts of these people. He utilised a humiliation that had nothing to do with Versailles, it was the humiliation of the 'slaves' in an oppressive hierarchy. By giving the 'little people' the mission of healing national humiliation Hitler lifted them up and managed in an ingenious way to be perceived by the 'little people' as part of them, as their hero, as being in the same boat with them in opposition to 'those up there' - and all this while he in fact was leading the country. He managed the impossible, namely to escape responsibility for problems in the country while leading it. He not only escaped responsibility, his own position

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[186] 'In every society there is an "attitude of everyday life," a life world, which most of its members assume, indeed, take for granted, most of the time. This world goes without saying to the point that it is invisible under most conditions. Elias and Bourdieu referred to it when they spoke of the habitus, our second nature, the mass of conventions, beliefs and attitudes which each member of a society shares with every other member. The habitus is not the whole culture, but that part which is so taken for granted as to be virtually invisible to its members. As Geertz suggested… for the members of a society, the habitus is just "commonsense"' (Scheff, 1997, 219).

was even strengthened by problems, because responsibility for problems was ascribed to others.

The Italians freed themselves from Mussolini in 1943 when they saw that he was about to destroy the country. The Germans did not do the same; Germans obviously reacted much more emotionally and less rationally. I take this as a support for the humiliation thesis insofar as 'average Germans,' the formerly insignificant and routinely humiliated underlings in German hierarchy, in order not to lose the self-respect that Hitler had instilled in them, loyally accepted a degree of destruction of their lives that went far beyond the economic crisis at the outset of Hitler's reign. If economics had counted alone, or rational and detached military analysis had reigned, Hitler would have been 'out' much earlier. During the last days of the war, when everybody saw the end, it was more than legendary German 'Obrigkeitsdenken,' or the tradition of obedience, that kept simple people fighting 'bis zum letzten Mann' ['until the last man'], it was in many cases real attachment to a leader that had lifted them up. Italians obviously were less emotionally involved with Mussolini, either because he had been less gifted in elevating their self-respect or because they did not need to be lifted up to the same extent as German underlings.

The 'broad masses' loved Hitler, and they legitimised him. This was infuriating for many members of the aristocracy. On the 3rd August 1999, near Bonn, I visited the representatives of important families of the German aristocracy. They come from families of Hitler adversaries and grew up with the image of Hitler as 'the demon.' I sincerely hope they will one day write the book that they began many years ago; the material they have collected and the memories they carry are invaluable.

To be ruled by a lowly little painter from Austria, who was, furthermore, hiding behind the masses, this was, in my view, the third big humiliation faced by the aristocracy in the time span of only a few decades. The first humiliation was the loss of World War I and the Versailles Treaty; since the aristocracy were the primary carrier of national sentiment, they, above all, experienced the national humiliation resulting from the Versailles Treaty. But humiliation did not end there for the aristocracy. The abdication of the emperor, and the founding of the Weimar republic was the next blow. It entailed the destruction of the divinely 'ordained' aristocratic order and caused constant humiliation, leading to the establishment of so-called 'Freikorps.' And thirdly, the rise of Hitler was the most unbelievable humiliation. The aristocracy thought at first, quite falsely, that they could 'domesticate' Hitler. For them he was a parvenu who hijacked their dearest theme, national sentiment, and worse, incited 'the masses,' making himself irreplaceable as their master. For those among the aristocracy

who collaborated with Hitler, the need to do so must have been felt as utter humiliation: they were forced to work with the 'demon,' because the 'demon' had control over the feelings of the nation. What could have been worse?

Hitler was thus both a reason for new-won pride and honour among the 'broad masses,' who learned that 'my honour is called loyalty' ['meine Ehre heißt Treue'], and equally he was a cause of humiliation, humiliation for the aristocracy.

On 18th July 1999 I met John Steiner, Holocaust survivor and now Emeritus Professor of Sociology at Sonoma State University, the California State University, and its Holocaust Studies Center.[187] John Steiner is a Christian, born in Prague from Jewish parents. The whole family was sent to Auschwitz, only he and his father survived. He explains to me that he survived because he had the will to survive, and that this will somehow remained strong, although in his head he had already given up. After being freed he came to the United States, via Australia, studied there, and then at some point went to Sonoma.

I find John Steiner's approach to studying the Holocaust and Hitler's reign unique, and I hope he receives due recognition for the potential for reconciliation which is entailed in his methodology. His whole life concept aims at overcoming polarisation (I mean the simplistic polarisation of 'perpetrators = devils and victims = angels' that often is combined with the equally simplistic 'all Germans = devils and all Jews = angels,' or mapped onto other Holocausts, 'all Hutu = devils and all Tutsi = angels') in unparalleled ways, for example by getting access, himself being a victim, to circles who stood near to perpetrators. I gather that he does this in order to better understand their views on the world and bond with them in order to not only initiate change, but also embody change. In a most insightful message on 6th October 1999 he writes to me: 'Just in a nut shell we are really talking about dependency relationships which are out of balance in which one party tries to either get more power to dominate or reduce the power of the other, or attempts to balance power so that some equity can be established. In all this interaction humiliation may play an important role but most likely is not the basis of an escalating conflict. This research cannot be viewed from a mono-causal perspective, as you know and therefore needs to be broadened accordingly.' In our conversation on the 18th July 1999 he explains more about dependencies: 'Jews depended on the Germans, and vice versa. Then absolutist ideology came along, which has the characteristic that - after a while by more and more people - it is treated as if it is reality. Reality concepts differ, in terms of who has more or less power; the one with more power will

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[187] http://www.sonoma.edu/.

impose his ideology on the powerless. This is the crux, we all deal with ideologies, but not all are absolutist ideologies. Humiliation happens when I cannot defend myself, in situations where I depend on you, in marriage, in friendships, in situations where I need you. Here comes humiliation. I try to respond and hurt you by humiliating you. The only thing I can do to you is to humiliate you, even if you dominate me. Thus a cycle of humiliation, an escalation of violence into genocide starts.'

2. Diagnosis – Prognosis – Therapy, and How Humiliation May Be Inscribed

In the following section I will systematise my search for the significance of humiliation in Somalia and the Great Lakes region, and also Hitler's Germany, and will start drawing upon theoretical tools, as for example the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Security Dilemma know from International Relations Theory, or social psychological theory. My aim is to build up the argument so that it - hopefully - slowly will crystallise into a coherent model in which humiliation takes its place.

I will form this section as a journey, a journey both through Somali and Great Lakes history (primarily Rwanda, unfortunately space prohibits due attention to Burundi), but also through possible theoretical perspectives on their predicament and their relevance for humiliation, all underpinned by my interview material and literature. I will try to undertake this task by using the following chronology: I will start with the state of affairs before colonisation, then during colonisation, followed by the post-colonial decade, that in Somalia began with a democratic period that subsequently was overturned by a socialist dictator, Siad Barre, whose reign I will split into two parts, namely the period before the Ogaden war, and the period after the war, until Barre's fall. I will parallel Siad Barre's time in power with Rwandan history where two presidents, Grégoire Kayibanda and Juvenal Habyarimana, ruled during the same period. In the case of Habyarimana as well as for Siad Barre it was their entourage that at the end or their reign seems to have had a powerful influence on the hardening of the situation that subsequently led to genocide and quasi-genocide. However, it is perhaps Burundian Micômbéro who resembles Siad Barre the most, and also Hitler, and it was perhaps therefore that he sought Siad's protection after being ousted. UNOSOM I+II, UNITAF interventions in Somalia and UNAMIR in Rwanda will be addressed thereafter, and from there I will arrive at today's state of affairs. Germany will serve as background and will be paralleled with the other two cases only in the section on genocide.

However, before setting off to another the journey through Africa, the methodological approach has to be re-evaluated.

Method Revisited

I started my journey to Africa with a pre-conceived interview guideline and changed to creating networks of authentic conversations and dialogues. Was this justified? Was it useful? What is my post-hoc conclusion of this change?

Humiliating Methods Foreclose Validity

It may be concluded that the change in methodology was not only more ethical, but 'rescued' validity. A humiliated person, a person who feels patronised and exploited, will not provide any valid 'data' and thus undermine any scientific evaluation. Science will not be possible, unless a person opens up and tries to be a fully active co-author of 'data.' This can only be achieved by non-humiliating methods. It is not sufficient to just ask 'informants' at the outset of an interview whether they give their 'consent' to be asked questions in an interview. It is a serious scientific error to believe that such a consent is a cognitive act that can be performed once and for all by the interviewee and will carry through the whole interview. On the contrary, consent must be 'earned,' continuously, by the researcher, who, as a dialogue partner, must incessantly build and maintain authenticity so that the other may be enabled to trust the situation to an extent that genuine opening up is at all possible for him or her. This is already the case when people are asked in the street for market research, how much more must it apply to research on genocide, war, suffering, and trauma?

However, clearly it would be much easier to analyse pre-coded data for a final report than a mountain of unstructured material. How can 'results' from 'networks of authentic conversations and dialogues,' namely gigabytes of notes, 100 hours of audio tape, and 10 hours of video tape, combined with years of theoretical reflection and practical experience, be at all analysed? And how can the respect for interlocutors that formed the core of the fieldwork be expressed in the report that presents the 'results'?

Sailing Between Scylla and Charybdis

Earlier I introduced Steinar Kvale's 'vessels sailing the current qualitative research wave' between the legendary Scylla and Charybdis. Sometimes, these vessels 'appear be caught in the narrow strait, blown back and forth between a "no-method" Charybdis and an "all-method" Scylla' (Kvale, 1996, 80). Kvale warns that 'Interview versions of this research can even fall prey to both monsters. On the one side there is hardly any methodological account

of, or reflection on the productions of, the texts in the original conversations, or on the transformations from living conversations to written texts, or on the validity of the interpretations of meanings of the text. On the other, there is a qualitative hyperempiricism of quantified categorizations and endless quotes from interview transcripts. Such interview reports lose the lived reality of the conversation as well as the human situation portrayed in the subjects' stories.'

Being reminded of my dangerous predicament my courage falters. How am I to steer in the middle? I have to avoid any 'secretive language' that often obstructs the access to academic disciplines except for the 'initiated.' This is the task at hand for any researcher who wants to develop a topic within an interdisciplinary context. I will try to explain that I believe that a combination of only a few 'logics' may form the core skeleton of the human condition, deriving from Game Theory (philosophy), International Relations Theory (political science), time horizons (cross-cultural psychology), and Social Identity Theory (social psychology). I will argue that the interplay between these basic structures may also have guided the way humankind developed 'cultures' of pride, honour, dignity, humiliation and respect.

The Reflective Equilibrium

How did I arrive at this model? I did not impose this theoretical framework on the material, but kept many meta-theoretical approaches in my mind, during my fieldwork as well as during the writing of articles and this book. I went through uncountable 'turns' of the above described 'hermeneutic circle,' always asking myself and others 'maybe it works like this, but are we sure, have we sufficiently searched for counter-arguments?' and 'waiting' until the criterion for justification that the 'reflective equilibrium' (see Figure I) requires, namely 'coherence,' would emerge, always being aware of the other feature of the 'reflective equilibrium,' namely 'total corrigibility.'

Dagfinn Føllesdal,[188] renowned Norwegian philosopher, explains 'circular thinking,' or 'reflective equilibrium,' [189] as employed in Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* (Rawls, 1971), and as defended, also, for example, by Nelson Goodman. Føllesdal points out that Aristotle still rejected 'circular thinking' as 'circular fallacy,' and that philosophy always concentrated on deduction, but that precisely this circular thinking is 'en vogue' since the nineteen-fifties.

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[188] See for his publications for example Føllesdal, in Robert Sokolowski, 1988, and Føllesdal, 1996a.
[189] Føllesdal, 1996b, in a presentation at Det Norske Vitenskaps-Akademi (Norwegian Academy of Science), 30th January 1996.

Føllesdal explains that the 'reflective equilibrium' has six features: it is 1) a method of justification,[190] 2) it emphasises coherence, 3) it entails total corrigibility, 4) it includes different fields of academia (not just mathematics), 5) it does not exclude pre-reflective intuitive acceptance, and 6) it draws on different sources of evidence.

Figure 1: Reflective Equilibrium

Six Steps of Analysis

Steinar Kvale's 'Six Steps of Analysis' (page 189 and 190, italicisations in original) may be taken to represent elements that support the circular movement of a 'reflective equilibrium': 'A first step is when *subjects describe* their lived world during the interview. They spontaneously tell what they experience, feel, and do in relation to a topic. There is little interpretation or explanation from either the interviewees or the interviewer.' A second step would be that 'the *subjects themselves discover* new relationships during the interview, see new meanings in what they experience and do. The interviewees themselves start to see new connections in their life worlds on the basis of their spontaneous descriptions, free of interpretation by the interviewer.' In a third step, '*the interviewer, during the interview, condenses and interprets* the meaning of what the interviewee describes, and "sends" the meaning back. The interviewee then has the opportunity to reply, for example, "I did not mean that" or "That was precisely what I was trying to say" or "No, that was not quite what I felt. It was more like…" This dialogue ideally continues till there is only one possible interpretation left…' In a fourth step, 'the *transcribed interview is interpreted by the interviewer*, either alone or with other researchers.' A fifth step would be a *re-interview*. 'When the researcher has analyzed and interpreted the completed interviews, he or she may

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[190] Or at least a method to settle disagreement; this was the position to which Rawls later retreated, a move that is not shared by Føllesdal.

give the interpretations back to the subjects. In a continuation of a "self-correcting" interview, the subjects get an opportunity to comment on the interviewer's interpretations as well as to elaborate on their own original statements.' A possible sixth step would be 'to extend the continuum of description and interpretation to include *action*, in that subjects begin to act from new insights they have gained during their interview. The research interview may in such cases approximate a therapeutic interview. The changes can also be brought about by actions in a larger social setting such as action research, where the researcher and the subjects together act on the basis of the knowledge produced in the interviews.'

Kvale discerns three parts of the analysis interview material: 'first, *structuring* the often large and complex interview material for analysis. This is usually done today by transcription and by programs for computer analysis of qualitative material. The next part consists of a clarification of the material, making it amenable to analysis; for example, by eliminating superfluous material such as digressions and repetitions, distinguishing between the essential and the nonessential. What is essential or nonessential again depends on the purpose of the study and its theoretical presuppositions. The analysis proper involves developing the meanings of the interviews, bringing the subjects' own understanding into the light as well as providing new perspectives from the researcher on the phenomena. Five main approaches to the analysis of meaning are condensation, categorization, narrative structuring, interpretation, and ad hoc methods' (190).

This means that condensation, categorization, narrative structuring, interpretation, and ad hoc methods of analysis have to be employed on the material. And 'the analysis of the interviews may be part of generating a theory, as well as an application or a testing of theories. In the grounded theory approach developed by Glaser and Strauss there is an attempt through the analysis of the data to develop theoretical interpretation of what is seen and heard (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The field studies here involve observations as well as informal or formal interviews. There is a continual coding and recoding of the observations, as the researcher's insight grows during an investigation, working toward an empirically grounded theory.' (206)

Coding and Recoding, and the Five Main Approaches to the Analysis of Meaning (Condensation, Categorization, Narrative Structuring, Interpretation, and Ad Hoc Methods)

I will now demonstrate a 'small' journey through a hermeneutic circle that illustrates the interdisciplinarity of the concept of humiliation. Humiliation grows out of historic roots and therefore accounts of it are initially described within academic fields such as history and anthropology, then by political science and sociology. My task is to inscribe psychology into this discourse, in particular the psychology of the term of humiliation that is my special interest.

I will now quote an account that I received in 1999 because it demonstrates the subtle transition from anthropology to modern politics, and how it may relate to humiliation (I do not want to disclose the name of my friend who confided in me): 'I was born in the Burundian countryside in a Hutu family. When I grew up I did not notice that, although my family had Tutsi friends and I played with their children, it was Hutu children who fetched the water, not the Tutsi children, it was my mother who ground the flour, not the Tutsi women, - the list of the chores that were done by the Hutu serfs was long, and the Tutsi were the 'seigneurs,' the masters. Poor Tutsi were there, but they were only few. It was structural humiliation that I did not feel [anthropologists would describe this state-of-the-world as 'how-Burundians-live'].'

My friend continues his account: 'I only slowly understood the inequality in this situation, for example when my father asked me if I had money to buy a piece of land that my family always had worked on and that I had considered ours. My father also had cows, and as a child I believed they were ours, but at some point I learned that a Tutsi family had given the first cow as token for patronage [here my friend documents how he started understanding structural humiliation, and how the issue moves from anthropology to other fields, as for example psychology].'

He resumes his report which now turns into a painful account: 'Only later I was systematically humiliated in a way that made me suffer and at the same time be conscious of it: At school I was ridiculed when we were playing Volleyball, - I was too short!; I was a brilliant student, but suddenly I was not the first in class anymore, but number eight or nine or ten; and whenever I made a mistake the teacher openly ridiculed me [at this point, clearly, structural humiliation transformed into open humiliation and became visible as a political tool, to be studied for example by political scientists, as well as turning into a field for psychological research on trauma and stigmatisation, or bullying].'

My friend carries on: 'Later I became a teacher myself, a French teacher. After having worked for five years at a school I one day came to work in the morning and was told that I was not listed as a teacher there anymore. I was in deep shock. I inquired and was told that I had a dossier at the secret service, saying that I was having meetings in the forest at night with students. Again some time later kids would come to my house telling my people working in my house that they should tell me to leave this part of the city that was a Tutsi quarter, because I would make it "smell bad" [here is the start of the dehumanisation process that typically characterises societies in which genocidal killings are seen as a viable strategy].'

Now my friend blends the psychological concept of humiliation into the domain of political science and history: 'After independence there were elections and a very good and authentic Hutu president was elected, who would have done a good job. He was killed. Micômbéro, a Hima (Pariah Tutsi) took over, he himself a very humiliated man! With him systematic torture of the worst kind started!'

Some months later my friend writes to me: 'Concerning your project on humiliation, I now read everything with a lot of interest. I agree totally with your reflections. Indeed, humiliation is the hard core of any conflict. It is absolutely necessary to take account of it in order to solve problems between conflict parties. Remember, for the case of Burundi, the Hutu have experienced infantilisation for the past four centuries; the Hima have been humiliated all their lives by the other Tutsi, who today take revenge on the Hutu. They kill them, torture them, push them into exile, and imprison them at all occasions. All those who want to help the Burundians have to play on this theme. Since we met, I have not stopped thinking of it. Humiliation, this is daily life in my home country!'[191]

After this demonstration of a journey through history and interdisciplinarity, I would like to invite the reader to participate in more journeys that start with pre-colonial traditions in Somalia and Rwanda / Burundi.

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[191] Translated by the author from: 'A propos du projet sur l'humiliation, je l'ai lu avec beaucoup d'intérêt. Je suis tout à fait d'accord avec ta réflexion. En effet, l'humiliation, en tant que cause, effet ou moyen reste pour la plupart des conflits le noyau dur. Il faut absolument en tenir compte pour résoudre les problèmes entre les partis au conflit. Souviens-toi, pour le cas du Burundi, les Hutu ont connu plus de quatre siècles d'infantilisation; les Hima ont été humiliés toute leur vie par les autres Tutsi. Aujourd'hui, ceux-ci se vengent sur les Hutu. Ils les tuent, les torturent, les poussent à l'exil, les emprisonnent à toutes les occasions. Tous ceux qui veulent aider les Burundais doivent jouer sur ce thème.'

Pre-Colonial Traditions

This section will entail considerable anthropological sequences, as well as introduce a concept from Political Science, namely the Security Dilemma, a notion that is used in International Relations Theory. The reason for this is, as explained above, my belief that humiliation as a social psychological dynamic can only be understood if placed in a larger theoretical and historic framework.

Somalia

William Ury, and the Question 'Are Nomads the Exemplary World Citizens of the Future?'

If we consider human history, then we may assume that hunters and gatherers were the first to populate the globe. The Harvard anthropologist William Ury presents three phases of human existence on this planet and links these phases to the changing nature of conflict resolution (Ury, 1999): The first phase, and the longest, until about ten thousand years ago, saw hunter-gatherer groups wandering over the earth and living in relatively peaceful co-existence. Although nomadic hunter-gatherer societies were not free from conflict and violence, Ury points out, there was a great emphasis upon co-operation within and between groups; disagreements were debated until a consensus emerged.

For a period of ten years Ury studied the Bushmen in the Kalahari Desert and tribes in Malaysia; he views these groups as 'Islands of History' (Sahlins, 1985) – as perhaps Somalia and Rwanda may be perceived as well. He analysed their societal structure and how conflict is dealt with within this structure. He found that these tribes have no central government. Bushmen for example live in egalitarian groups of 250-500 people and have no formal leaders; everybody is headman. Every member of the group takes conflict extremely seriously; no effort is spared to defuse conflict, since every member of a group lives with the notion that conflict, even if it is only a conflict between two members, threatens the whole group.[192]

In Ury's view, the situation changed about ten thousand years ago when systematic cultivation of the earth began. Human groups became less mobile, they settled permanently in well-demarcated spaces. Farming proved to be more productive than hunting and gathering, and, as a result, population densities increased and land became scarcer relative to people.

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[192] The notion that conflict, even if it is only a conflict between two members, threatens the whole group, is a notion that I first learned to know in more depth during the seven years I spent as a psychological counsellor in Cairo, Egypt.

Coercion became widespread. Winners subjugated losers and unequal relations between masters and subordinates were enforced. Practices such as slavery and similar forms of oppression were thus introduced. They were 'perfected' as history went on: 'Slavery appears to have been a less extensive and less oppressive institution in the early civilizations than it was in classical Greek and Roman society' (Trigger, 1993, 52).

History also teaches us that the inner core of unequal relationships between masters and underlings, wherever they are played out are an intriguingly double-edged sword, because such relationships may entail not only oppression but also protection: 'Peasants were locked into a situation in which their well-being depended on rulers who could defend them from external attack and maintain the internal order on which the systems of production had come to depend… Hence, so long as rulers did not exploit their subjects beyond conventional limits, their rule was accepted.' (Trigger, 1993, 53, 54). History even went as far as turning definitions upside down; hierarchy became identified with 'civilisation' and freedom and equality with 'barbarism': 'If egalitarianism was known, it was as a feature of some of the despised, barbarian societies that existed beyond the borders of the civilized world' (Trigger, 1993, 53-54).

Ury believes we are entering a third phase now in which many of the conditions that were favourable to peaceful co-existence in the first phase are reappearing. One reason is that the 'Knowledge Revolution' (Ury, 1999, 83) is altering the way in which human beings relate to each other. In all spheres of life, - society in general, or families, businesses, and all kinds of organisations in particular, - old hierarchies of coercive control are being transformed into self-organising, co-operative networks indicative of hunter-gatherer societies. Today leaders have increasingly to persuade and convince, not to intimidate. This is because, unlike land, knowledge is not a 'fixed pie' (Ury, 84) but an expandable one.[193]

Following Ury's thoughts, the inner core and drive of historic development could be pinned down to the availability of resources, either as a fixed or expandable pie, and human history could be hypothesised as a transition from an expandable to a fixed and back to an expandable pie context, accompanying the conversion from hunter-gatherers to farmers and finally to today's global nomadism in a modern knowledge society.

In order to survive, humankind has to rediscover the skill of resolving conflicts through negotiation. This is Ury's main message. In the final part of his book, Ury presents a methodology for preventing, resolving or containing conflict. He distinguishes between ten

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[193] See related to Ury's argument Mowlana, 1997, 'Global Information and World Communication: New Frontiers in International Relations.'

roles that Homo Negotiator may adopt: the provider, the teacher, the bridge-builder, the mediator, the arbiter, the equalizer, the healer, the witness, the referee and the peacekeeper.

Are Somali Nomads the Exemplary World Citizens of the Future?

Reading Ury, the question arises to what extent the Somali nomad background may fit into Ury's description of the requirements and advantages of the global knowledge society. Following Ury nobody would be better prepared for a global information society than Somalis who are used to independent and individualistic mobility, always searching for the best pasture, never bowing to any master, but taking their fate into their own hands.

However, the sad state of today's Somalia seems to prove the very opposite. Nobody can want the global village to look like Mogadishu, torn apart by warring factions, without functioning infrastructure and public services. On the other side, the 'International Congress of Somali Studies' in 1998 in Turku, Finland seems to support Ury's views with its display of intellectual brilliance exhibited by internationally experienced and versatile individuals. Is it that proud nomads are well equipped for the global knowledge society as soon as they learn to renounce impatient violence, that they are better equipped than former underlings who do not know how to be proud? And what role does humiliation play? Do Somalis have to teach the world something after all? And what has the world to teach Somalis? In order to analyse these questions, the pre-colonial situation of Somali clans will be looked at in the following paragraphs.

We find mainly four groups of people living in Somali society, pastoral nomads, settled agriculturalists, traders, and lower castes. Somali identity is primarily linked to the lifestyle of the first group, the major pastoral nomadic clan families (Dir, Daarood, Isaaq, and Hawiye), who are all united in that they routinely humiliate and look down onto two of the other groups, the so-called lower castes or minorities who live dispersed among the major clans, and those settled Somalis engaged in farming in the fertile land around the Juba and Shebelle rivers.

Somali Nomads Admire and Humiliate Their Outcast Minorities

The lower castes or *sab* (as opposed to 'noble' or *gob*), today also called 'minorities' (who may be in the majority in certain places), are the *Yebir* (or 'Hebrew'), *Madiban* (also called *Midgan*, a derogatory name, as their members told me) and the *Tomal*: 'Physically, the lower

caste groups do not look different from the other Somalis, but they had different social status and were not mixed in marriage with the other Somalis. The *yebir* group were occupied with leather work, e.g., saddlery, scabbards, shoe making. The *midgan* were normally armed with small daggers, bows and poisoned arrows; they engaged in hunting and mainly collected myrrh and frankincense for which the land of Punt was famous. The *tomal* were the blacksmiths. They engaged in iron work and fashioned all kinds of traditional arms' (Hussein, in Adam & Ford, 1997, 167, italicisation in orginal).

Lewis draws on Enrico Cerulli's writing from 1919 when he explains: 'The *sab*… are not land-owning groups, and for this and other reasons it is quite erroneous to describe them as "tribes," as all the English writers have so far done... They only appear in Somali social relations through the Somali clans and clan segments, into which they are adopted, at first, on a markedly inferior footing, although later often becoming completely absorbed into the noble clans to which they are attached... Through their patrons they stand with the clan of attachment in relation to other tribes, but are distinguished from noble free-born Somali within the segment to which they are attached. *Sab* have no recognised genealogy of their own and can only have relations with noble Somali by courtesy, through their respective patrons, from whom they are sharply distinguished in jural procedure, having no right to claim compensation for homicide from Somali nobles except through the patron to whom they are attached... They cannot contract legitimate marriage with Somali... The child of a union between a Somali and a *sab* woman takes the caste of his mother unless his father recognizes him, thereby forfeiting his right to contract legal marriage with a free-born Somali woman. The child of a *sab* father and Somali woman is killed at birth. *Sab* cannot own cattle or horses, noble possessions, and are entitled to keep only donkeys and sheep...' (Lewis, 1998, 52).

I met the first member of such a minority group in Hargeisa 18th November 1998; he was a *Madiban* doctor, a psychiatrist. I hear him exclaim bitterly and angrily to the 'nobles': 'It is us who do not want to let our daughters marry you! Not the other way round as you believe!!!' Later I was supposed to meet the only *Madiban* member of the Hargeisa parliament, but he did not come to our appointment. Only in Nairobi in January 1999 was I successful in getting in closer touch with these groups. I was guest in a *Madiban* (midgan) family and conducted extensive interviews not only with this family, but with many of their

acquaintances, as for example with the 'Sultan'[194] of the *Yebir*, and the Chairman of the *Madiban* Minority Refugees, Abdulaziz Ahmed Farah, at the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya (3rd January 1999).[195]

The accounts I received from these people were indeed appalling, for any human rights advocate, giving ample evidence of daily humiliation suffered at the hands of major Somali clan members. I am , for example, told that the legendary General Aidid is said to have told his fellow men in the 1990s: 'Even while you pray you can shoot a *Midgan*, and you can continue to pray thereafter, you do not even have to wash!' In other words, Aidid suggested that killing a low caste would be so irrelevant that it would not even make you unclean, thus going a step further than what anthropologist Ioan Lewis describes: 'In addition to the stigma which attaches to *sab* and appears in jural relations, their practice of ignoble and debasing activities, their willingness to eat "dead meat" as the Somali call the head, tripe, and claws (or hooves), portions never touched by free-born Somali, keep them in a condition of perpetual ritual impurity (*najiasi*)... in the Mohammedan sense although, of course, this is quite unorthodox in Islam' (Lewis, 1998, 53).

After the Hebrew Sultan had left the house where we conducted the interview (January 1999), my *Madiban* host tells me: 'Do you understand, today the Hebrew Sultan came in a white suit to you, for this interview, here in Nairobi. In Mogadishu he would be killed for that. People there would say: "How can you as a Hebrew wear such a beautiful suit!!!"' He exclaims: 'This is humiliation!!!'

The Chairman of the Madiban in the Kakuma refugee camp shows me a worn photocopy of a letter written by 'Prof. J. Bauer of the NGO ECO'TERRA International on 12th April 1994.' The chairman had handed this letter over to European Union authorities to bring more attention to his minority's plight (he reports that he had never received an answer). Bauer writes: 'The Gaboye People (called also Madibaan or insulted by the Somali as Midgaan), who certainly are ethnically more close to the Somali, are still kept more or less as

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[194] Heads of clans have different titles, according to the respective clan he is called 'Sultan,' 'Ugaas,' 'Boqoor,' 'Garaad,' 'Beeldaje' or 'Islaw.'

[195] For an account of life in a refugee camp, see the report about Hartisheik in Ethiopia written by UNHCR staffers, on http://www.unhcr.ch/pubs/rm105/rm10501.htm. This report also contains figures about Somali refugees outside of Somalia: 'The Somali refugees began arriving in Hartisheik in 1988, at the start of the rebellion against the Siad Barre regime that was triggered by various clans vying for power. By the time the government in Mogadishu fell in 1991 and famine subsequently swept the country, close to 1 million Somalis had fled to neighboring countries. Of that peak number, about 600,000 came to Ethiopia, including 220,000 who settled in Hartisheik camp. The majority of these refugees have returned home spontaneously, but there still are some 426,000 in the asylum countries, including 275,000 in Hartisheik and seven other camps in Ethiopia. Kenya hosts 126,000 Somali refugees, Djibouti 20,000 and Yemen 5,000' (Mundo, Kessler, & Maasho, 1998).

slaves by those Somali clans, in whose areas they live. In the presence of other Somali these intimidated and horrified people mostly even do not clarify their ethnic origin to the foreign observer.'

History shows that the plight of the lower castes was likely to improve whenever and wherever Islam was strong (with its rejection of caste cleavages), or under United Nations tutelage (with its notion of 'rights of man'[196]), and their status also advanced under dictator Siad Barre's rule. Barre raised the low caste peoples up (for example, he made one of them into a general, General Samatar, thus getting some of his most dedicated supporters from low caste ranks). Barre's rule opened up a space for relationships that were highly taboo before (and are taboo again today). A highly educated member of the *Madiban* reports on 3rd January 1999: 'When I graduated from university I had a fiancé, a lady from a major clan. We loved each other very much, and finally we got married. But she immediately got in trouble, her family pressured her, and she said to me: "Please do not say that you are Madiban, let us keep it secret!" I rejected this and she became very afraid. I was tormented, because if I rejected her wish, she was in trouble, if I agreed, I betrayed myself. This dilemma was the worst humiliation in my entire life. After three years she could not stand the pressure anymore and we divorced, although we loved each other. I have lost contact with her since. I assume she got married to a man who does not cause her this trouble. When I married in 1986, the government accepted such a marriage, but today, this is as impossible as before. I would be killed now if I tried!'

Already before travelling to Somalia, the international experts I had talked to all agreed on the point that the so-called minorities in Somalia suffer utmost humiliation. Also many Somali intellectuals, such as Hassan A. Keynan as well as members of the SORRA group in Hargeisa, made it very clear that it was here that humiliation was played out in its worst form, perpetrated by Somalis against their fellow Somalis. According to what I learned from my Somali contacts in the Kakuma refugee camp, the international community, for example UNHCR, is well aware of this, and members of the minorities have indeed a greater

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[196] The 'gradual closing of the sab/noble cleavage can be readily seen to be the result of several factors. From the side of the Somali it represents the gradual spread of the tenets of Islam and more particularly the Shariah, opposed to caste distinction, into the customary procedure of the Somali. It is associated also with the opening up of the country to Western influence and the eclipse, at least to some slight extent, of tribalism by a growing consciousness of a Somali nation united within Islam in world relations. It has also been greatly influenced by a Western Administration imbued with ideas of the "rights of man," especially since Somalia came under the nominal "tutelage" of the United Nations...' Lewis, on pages 52 and 53, refers to an Italian Report to the UN saying: 'It goes without saying that no discrimination is made by the Administration towards these people' (Report, 1952, 8).

chance to be accepted as refugees abroad. However, there seems to be a problem. I am told, for example by the Chairman of the *Madiban*, that this fact provides Somalis from the major clans with the opportunity to doubly humiliate the minorities, namely by pretending to be members of these disadvantaged groups (physical appearance being so similar that uninitiated Westerners cannot tell the difference); the major clan members thus acquire refugee status and leave for Norway or Canada, while the less resourceful, but 'real' members of these minorities are prevented from attaining the very protection that is meant for them. This is the most pressing grievance brought to me by representatives of the low castes, that they are being prevented, by fraud and oppression perpetrated by the members of the major clans, from getting the refugee status designed for them. The Hebrew Sultan exclaims: 'Those [the 'noble' Somalis], who humiliate others, are not educated, they are illiterate, and they know nothing. Somalis use humiliation against their own minorities, while the world is ashamed to use humiliation on them.'

During the course of my fieldwork I ask virtually everybody I meet from both sides, from the low castes, and from the 'noble' major clan members (who were simply called 'Somalis' by my low caste interlocutors), why this discrimination survived so many centuries and why it continues today. I ask, for example: 'Why did low castes never follow the age-old example of 'Somalis' who would do what they always describe to me as *THE* 'right' response to those 'grievances' that could not be settled peacefully, namely to get together and send the young men to attack the humiliators?' Or, 'on the other hand,' I ask, 'why do modern human rights principles of regarding every human being as equal not make such cleavages redundant altogether?'

The status quo of routine humiliation is frequently being presented to me by both sides as a 'fact of life' for which there is no real explanation: 'a low caste is a low caste, and his daughter cannot marry a noble man, this is somehow the state of the world.' Ambassador Dualeh maintains even that there is no humiliation going on at all, only a recent rhetoric of humiliation: 'Yes, as a matter of fact, later on the educated class, and because of the civil war, the minority groups are now very vocal, very active and vocal. And they want to show their point of view. They want the world to accept that they have been enduring humiliation for the last five hundred years. And most of them would like to show how they feel humiliated so that they get sympathy. And in a few years time the minorities will rise. And most of the educated Somalis are even prepared to make sure that the minorities rise.'

Dualeh explains further: 'These people typically were adopted by the major clans, they were for example military leaders, - the blacksmiths were mostly leaders, they would lead the

army of a clan against another clan, they had loyalty!' And he adds: 'When there is a cultural parting the person doesn't see it as humiliation. When two clans don't intermarry for some reason or the other, it just is like that, it doesn't feel humiliating… This feeling of humiliation was not there. The cultural parting makes you accept… To the outsider's eye it seems a bit odd. But not for the man for whom that cultural parting is part of life… And in the case of the Somali society, the first vice-president in Siad Barre's regime was an untouchable, Samatar was the first vice-president, the minister of defence, he was the commander of the army. And nobody saw him as any different, he was accepted, was respected. It was only intermarriage that was the issue. But this was normality, it was never discussed, never put on the table.'

He continues: 'So, you know when you are satisfied with your women folk you don't bother. If you tell a Somali that whites would not allow a Somali to marry a white woman he would not bother because he is satisfied. He would be surprised, but not angry. He would say: "Why should I care, they are crazy! I have got so many Somali girls!" So, he would be surprised, but not angry, he would not take a stick to fight - he would just laugh! So, the feeling would be different. Not anger, but ridicule, surprise, believe me! Humiliation is, as I told you, when you cannot hit back. The minorities were never humiliated in the sense that they were shown that they are not part of the clan. And that's why they survived and lived with the clans.'

Wherever I find the opportunity I ask people how this 'cultural parting' as Ambassador Dualeh calls it has come about in the first place. Ambassador Dualeh thinks that 'professional groups are looked down upon by the nomads *not* because they are of lesser quality.' He explains: 'On the contrary, they are very intelligent. But the story is that they were powerful clans, then, at the centre part of history they became oppressors. And so all the other clans ganged against them and defeated them. This is part of our mythology.'[197] Another 'noble' clan member explains to me about the *Madiban*: 'When you look at them you see that they are extremely intelligent and could be very dangerous, they have, after all, the tradition of making secret poison,[198] perhaps it is therefore that we [the free-born and 'noble' Somalis]

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[197] '…the Somali themselves... and various writers... consider these outcaste peoples to be the remnants of previous populations indigenous to Somaliland whom the Hamites conquered' (Lewis, 52).

[198] 'They hunt with bow and arrow poisoned with an alkaloidal extract (wabayo) obtained from a species of euphorbia' (Lewis, 1998, 51).

keep them dispersed so that they cannot unite and hit back at us. I believe we are actually very afraid of them!'[199]

This view on the difference between minorities and Somalis is being matched by the standpoint of some of my low caste interlocutors (January 1999 in Nairobi): 'Somalis are killers; we minorities are not killers. We Midgan made a secret poison for hunting, a secret that we never revealed, because we knew that they [the Somalis] would start killing people if they knew how to make this poison… We are skilled professionals, we are the forerunners of modern scientists, we know how to work [as opposed to 'free' nomads who somehow just wait for their animals to eat by themselves], and we renounce violence; altogether, we represent the seeds of modern civilisation within Somali society... We are low castes, but in our hearts we feel superior and think that we deserve higher respect and recognition… But they will learn. Until recently a young Somali man would brag about his father and say: "My father has killed ninety-nine men!" Today increasingly more people would ask: "Why do you sit with this person??? He has killed people, he is a criminal!"'

To summarise, the humiliation played out between Somalis and *sab* seem to fit Edna Adan's definition of humiliation: 'Humiliation is when someone tries to bring someone down to their level.' It seems that the *sab* share the fate of the Isaaq, and of the Jews in Germany: they are admired and feared by their humiliators.

Somali Nomads Despise and Humiliate Their Farmers

However, *sab* are not the only people looked down upon in Somalia. The Digil and Reewin, about 20% of the Somali population, who live as farmers in the South of Somalia share this fate. In their case, however, no admiration or fear seems to play a role. 'Noble' Somalis view them with outright contempt; they are regarded as mere slaves. Their sufferings are acknowledged by all international experts and by many Somali intellectuals.[200] As in the case of the occupationally specialised low caste groups, these farming communities are less prone to resort to violence than their nomadic brothers, and it is precisely for this reason that they are more vulnerable to their attacks. 'The farmer is more peace-loving because he cannot flee so easily' (interview 3rd January 1999 with the Chairman of the *Madiban*).

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[199] This informant refers to the Madiban, but they are not the only ones to incite fear: 'The Yibir are despised by all Somali, who never speak to them if they can avoid doing so, and are feared for their skill in witchcraft. Whenever a son is born to a noble Somali the first Yibir who approaches the family has the right to a gift, samanyo' (Lewis, 53).
[200] See, for example, Eno, in Adam & Ford, 1997.

Lewis explains: 'The oldest established riverine cultivators are people of mixed Somali and Swahili origin, some the descendants of former slaves imported from East Africa to serve as agricultural serfs for pastoral Somali landlords. Known as "tough-haired" (*tima-adag*) and traditionally despised by the nomads, these people still provide the bulk of the unskilled labour force in the riverine plantation industry, and live in villages under headmen. They suffered terribly at the hands of Somali militia in the conflict of the early 1990s in southern Somalia' (Lewis, 1994a, 56, 57).

In January 1999 a 'noble' Somali, well travelled in the United States and Europe, asks me whether I would be able to marry him. He explains to me: 'We Somalis cannot marry slaves, such as all those Africans with hard hair.' He makes a swirling movement with his hand above his head indicating thick curly African hair. 'We cannot marry girls from Asia either, for example Chinese girls. When you look at their bodies you see that they have the bodies of slaves, short and somehow rectangular.' He searched for words and used his hands to delineate something bulky. 'But we can marry Europeans like you, you are tall, slender, elegant, and beautiful.'

Somali Nomads and the Underling/Master Cleavage

These descriptions throw into sharp contrast an underling/master cleavage that characterises many cultures of this world, both present and past, including Western history. I encountered this cleavage everywhere I travelled in Africa, and in all contexts: here I met 'noble' and proud Tutsi who have built century-old kingdoms in Rwanda and Burundi as patrons of Hutu farmers; there I sit with a highly-educated, elegant and Westernised Mali woman, engaged to an equally sharp Senegalese lawyer, telling me that they are both 'noble,' a term that, she explains, fits about 50% of their countries' populations. Always the 'free' and 'noble' people stem from mobile and warrior-spirited owners of camels or cows, as opposed to those who, somehow, do not have the right to own camels or cows (who may at maximum get them on 'lease,' as in the case of the Hutu).

Sensible questions to ask seem to be: Under what circumstances do such aristocratic warriors maintain their 'superiority'? How do they fare in other parts of the world and during history? How is this related to humiliation? What can the world learn? In what way are, for example, 'rogue states,' dictators, and terrorists to be understood in terms of this cleavage? Is an aristocratic warrior tradition nothing but a threat to the peace in the world, or does it also have positive and constructive aspects that could nurture peace?

Simons, having lived in Mogadishu during the end of Barre's fall, approaches these questions and links them with the expatriates' fury over Somali 'unwillingness' to 'work.' Also I came frequently across expatriate contempt for Somali 'laziness,' and 'love' for 'idleness.' And, as Simons writes, this phenomenon does not only concern Somalia: 'Even casual visitors to developing countries often comment on the lack of productivity and people's penchant for inactivity' (Simons, 1995, 111). Simons tries to 'rescue' Somali reputation and explains their 'idleness' in a very interesting way: 'What is particularly striking about this spin on the classic pastoralist/agriculturalist dichotomy (Goldsmidt, 1971; Goldsmidt, 1979) is the historical fact of slavery and the extensive documentation in the travel literature describing artisan castes composed of "lesser" Somalis… Such distinctions tautologically helped guarantee the self-definition of Somalis as pastoralists. Pastoralists (Somalis) raised animals; others (non-Somalis) performed other essential functions… Doubtless the presence and use of slaves (as well as members of the Migdan, Tomal, and Yibir smithing, hunting, and tanning "castes") for "dirty" work reinforced pastoral Somalis' cultural attitudes about eschewing dirty work themselves' (Simons, 1995, 110).

Simons carries her analysis further: 'Certainly, there was a fortunate historical congruity in capitalism (via a plantation and money economy) moving inland along with slaves in the nineteenth century…, such that (noble pastoralist) Somalis were rarely forced to work as manual laborers themselves, although they could choose to... This not only preserved, but arguably even furthered the tautological - and thus perhaps viciously cyclical - nature of Somali self-identity with livestock as a means of (clean) production.' (Simons, 1995, 110).

Why did 'noble' Somalis avoid the fate of being traded as slaves? And why do even today expatriates not succeed in putting them under their tutelage? It seems that 'noble' Somalis are managers rather than factory workers who succumb to a Strict Father conception of morality (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), - and some do get rich. Why? 'Believing themselves to be "more" Somali because their parents or grandparents were pastoralists could then enable many urban-based Somalis to carry on with these distinctions. Even more to the point, this might also explain their affinity for what, at a distance, could be regarded as the pastoralist idyll. Not getting involved in dirty work still influenced the behavior of people who had never lived as nomads themselves but could still draw on a mythologized and golden past, particularly since this past still lived in places. Perhaps then it is no coincidence that those behaviors that expatriates found most incommensurable with their own emerged out of pastoralism, evolving out of a disdain for manual labor and a preference for management over

production or hands-on maintenance. In many senses the expatriate take on Somalis' work habits really does represent the agriculturalist/pastoralist dichotomy' (Simons, 1995, 111).

Now Simons comes to the interesting point: 'Ironically, though, it may reveal more about the settled and/or agriculturally grounded origins and biases of the expatriate work ethic (having to do with direct productivity) than make any sense about Somali realities' (111). I will come back to this discussion further down when I will make the point that the modern global citizen may want to learn something from Somali 'idleness,' an 'idleness' that is viewed by most expatriates as hair-raising arrogance that ought to be humiliated or humbled.

Attempts to Humiliate Proud Somali Aristocrats Do Not Succeed

As every expatriate knows (and as I also experienced in Egypt), attempts to humiliate 'nobles' by force or humble them by persuasion typically fail. When I mention humiliation to members of 'noble' groups - Ambassador Dualeh is only one example among many - they look at me with an air of disdain, as if they want to say: 'This does not apply to us! We are upset or infuriated, but never humiliated! We suffer from grievances and wrongs, which we will put right immediately! Humiliation is something for the weak who cannot hit back.' My findings could be summarised as follows: 'Noble' warriors are too proud (or 'arrogant') to even consider being humbled or humiliated.

However, 'grievances' and 'wrongs' seem at least to be equivalent to 'attempted humiliation.' Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan: 'Humiliation is bad treatment from somebody. It could be an insult or a man might hit you, or do something that you feel he shouldn't have done to you… The worst humiliation is insult. And the worst insult would be if a man tells something bad about you; if he for example says that you are not a good person, that you are tall or ugly, - I mean something that you cannot change. For example, I was born in Somaliland, I cannot be born in Europe. So he has no right to put me down.'

Colonel Nur Hassan Hussein, from the Red Cross, Secretary General of the Somali Red Crescent, relates to me on 9th January 1999 in Nairobi[201] that the worst humiliation in traditional Somali clan life would be to slap a man with a shoe (because this is done to women). Next would be rape and thereafter killing with mutilation, especially of the ears. He says: 'Slapping with the shoe is extremely shameful, it creates a big problem with the other clan, it will mobilise the whole clan. As is mutilation, and rape. Killing and beating alone has fewer consequences. Because with the shoe and with mutilation you give a message! You are

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[201] I will quote more from this interview further down.

not just having a problem, losing your temper, or having a fight with a respected adversary, but you degrade the other intentionally!'

Others, two respected men from the North, Muusa Bihi Cabdi (1st December 1998 in Hargeisa) and Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan agree that the prototypic, archetypal instance of humiliation that could happen to a man 'is when another man takes your wife.' Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan: 'The betrayed man traditionally has the right to kill the wrongdoer straight away, and the clan of the wrongdoer will not ask for compensation. If somebody steals camels, then killing the perpetrator is not just, one has first to negotiate compensation and can only kill if compensation is not given.' Ambassador Dualeh (also from the North) contributes in Nairobi: 'Evelin, humiliation as I told you before, was not known to the Somali before Siad Barre came to power. Somebody, but it happened very rarely, somebody would think twice before he took another man's woman, believe me. There was no case before Siad Barre came to power, that somebody's wife was taken by another. Never. Because the consequences were so severe that a man's clan would say: "Don't do it, you don't have to die for the sake of one woman. There are millions of women, so don't!" They would shoot you, the clan!'

Others maintain that being ignored is the worst humiliation. On 3rd of December 1998, when I was a guest in a *khat* chewing 'focus group' session in Hargeisa (which typically lasts for many hours, starting in the afternoon and running through half of the night; it is not attended by respectable women, - I tried therefore to keep 'decent' by at least not chewing *khat* myself!), I ask the men in the round about humiliation or *quudhsiga* (belittling = humiliation). The hours are well invested and yield many proverbs, such as the following: 'Hadellca xun ayaa ka xanuun kulul xabada,' meaning 'Humiliation is worse than killing; in times of war words of humiliation hurt more than bullets' or 'Rag waxaaa ku maamula agaan ama ku maamuusi,' meaning 'I can only be with people who are equal,' or 'Masse inaanu nahay oo tollim meerto no tahay ,' meaning 'A man deserves to be killed and not to be humiliated.'

These proverbs, and my presence in a *khat* chewing round of bright and educated Somalis, blessed with an outstanding oral talent, remind me of Margaret Laurence, who in 1951 went with her husband, Jack, a civil engineer, to what was then the British Somaliland Protectorate and stayed there for two years, not remaining obediently at home, but going out and learning about Somalia. She collected and translated Somali prose and poetry, including the following *gabei,* that was 'composed by an Ogaden chieftain whose son had been killed by another tribe. The chieftain asked the other tribe for a compensation of 200 camels, instead of the usual 100, and the tribe refused. Warfare resulted. This is the chief's war pledge, and is

addressed to his horse 'Aynabo, although in actuality, of course, to the enemy. The Ogaden are a section of the Darod Somalis, and live close to Ethiopia. They are famed for their warlike spirit, and they still attack and raid the Ishaak Somalis. Their nickname is "Libahh" (lion):

If you, oh 'Aynabo, my fleet and fiery horse,

Do not grow battleworn, and slow of foot, and weak;

And if your shining flanks and finely arching neck

Do not grow gaunt and thin as the branch on the dry grey thorn;

And if your frenzied hooves do not flail through the dead,

The bodies piled as high as ever grew the grass;

And if a man among us can draw the name of peace

Forth from the deepest well where I have flung it down;

And if the strong-limbed spearmen of all the Bahawadleh

Do not now fight in fury, and fight unto the death;

And if our enemy's food is not scant meat alone,

With milk gone from the land, and their camels seized as loot;

And if my dead son, Ali, is not greater in their eyes

Than his craven murderers thought when they stabbed away his life;

And if the sky in future does not its colour change,

Filled with the dust of death, reflecting the flare of the fray;

And if all that I swear does not, as I swear it, come to pass -

Then the warrior son of my father has become a witless fool'

(Laurence, 1993, 56).

At a later stage of the *khat* chewing session my friends admit, half laughingly, half serious that humiliation plays a role after all: 'Sometimes men fight only because they fear humiliation from their women. Women can stop and fuel fighting! When they want their men to fight, they insult them and tell them that they are women, they show them skirts and say: "Look, do you wear skirts?" Then men fight just because their women humiliate them, they want to avoid feeling humiliated by their women!'[202] I remember a related account that I got earlier, where a fight is described to me as follows: 'The men shoot their way into the centre of the city, they are repulsed, they retreat into their quarters, and there they are met by their

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[202] This reminded me of the female Palestine clients I had in Cairo, Egypt, between 1984 and 1991. Some suffered from states of depression because they reproached themselves that they were leading an easy student-life in Cairo instead of giving birth to sons who could fight Israel.

women who show them their skirts and force then to proceed again into the city centre and continue fighting.'

To Be a Man Is to Be Like a Noble Somali Warrior. Or, Emergency Takes Precedence Over Maintenance

Hassan A. Keynan argues that Somalia suffers from problems related to masculinity. I would like to dig deeper at this point and introduce my experience as a physician. I wonder whether the nomad existence exposes in a particularly clear way a structure of logic that rules life in general, including pastoralist life with its heightened version of masculinity, namely: *Emergency takes precedence over maintenance*. The body (human and animal) may serve as an example with its 'fight and flight reactions' in moments of stress: stress hormones are released, blood is pooled in 'emergency' organs of the body, and 'maintenance' processes such as digestion have to wait until the state of emergency is over. Clearly the body cannot tolerate constant emergency and stress, a heart attack may terminate the overburdened body's life at some point, but still, maintenance is the slow and quiet underlying process, while emergency takes spectacular precedence whenever it arises. Or, to use an example from the biosphere, forests grow in silence, while cutting trees is dramatic. Perhaps it is this dramatic precedence that facilitates the conception of emergency reactions as being superior. The fast runner, the strong muscular man, the fearless general, all are regarded highly, usually more highly than those who do silent maintenance work.

Traditionally women have been assigned to maintenance work, while men are proud of their readiness for emergency. Said S. Samatar points out that the Somalis are not the ones who invented the word 'Rambo,' but that this word actually is American, indicating that, perhaps, 'Rambos' were the ones who even 'created' America: 'The Somali "Rambo" [and those of you who are not familiar with that term, Rambo refers to the name given to the male character of an American male fantasy, a swashbuckling white male who is synonymous with random violence and daring-do] had a long, and in Somali eyes, and honourable tradition – the earliest reference to the Somalis refers to them as famous for road ambushes' (Samatar, in Haakonsen & Keynan, 1995, 37). (And, Samatar's argument could be taken even further, not only are Rambo fantasies still highly regarded by American men, but America does not dare to take their guns from them.)

Bruce D. Perry et al., 1995, address response patterns to traumatic assaults, such as 'fight and flight,' as follows (284): '…there is a clear sex difference in response patterns;

females utilize dissociative adaptations more than males. Some insight into these clinical observations can be found in examining the relationship between these responses and the underlying purpose of all brain related functions—survival. In order to persist over thousands of generations, each response pattern must have some adaptive advantages.' Perry argues that the aggressively defensive hyperarousal/fight or flight response in adult males confers an adaptive advantage: 'One can only imagine what would have happened to the human species in the face of threat if adult males always dissociated in the face of threat. A group of numb, passive and immobile humans would be easy prey for natural predators.'

Perry, expert on childhood trauma and the neurobiology of adaptation, sets out to explain human survival: 'Humans evolved over the last 250,000 years in the presence of two major predators: large cats (e.g., tigers, panthers) and, the most dangerous predators, other hominids, including humans (see Leakey, 1994). To the cats, all humans (males, females and children) – were roughly equivalent prey, with some preferences for the small, slow and weak. To other hominids, however, there was a dramatic difference between males, females and young children. As described extensively in anthropological literature, it was likely a common practice for clans of hominids to raid a competing clan's camp, drive away or kill the males and take the females and young children as property (not unlike the recent history of Western 'Civilization'). It promoted survival of the species if young children and females survived these raids. It was more adaptive for children to dissociate and surrender than to be hyperaroused and try a fight or flight response. In the face of threat, it was self-protective to become numb, non- hysterical, compliant, obedient and not combative. Running would result in isolation and sure death. Fighting would be futile.'

Now Perry addresses the condition of women: 'The same is likely true for adult females. One need not imagine long the response of a violent human male when faced with one female who will willingly comply with the commands to move to his camp and with another who is screaming, yelling, hitting, fighting and trying to run away. Hyperarousal (fighting or fleeing) would clearly reduce the 'property' value of a female, reducing the probability that her genes would be passed to another generation. Both the hyperarousal and the dissociative continuum were selected as adaptive advantages through thousands of generations of clan/tribal intra-species warfare.'

Perry then explains that as the human animal matures and grows more capable of fleeing and fighting, the predominance of the dissociative adaptation appears to diminish. It continues to be an extremely important adaptive response in the face of threat, however. In large part because dissociation allows one to maintain or even diminish the internal state of

physiological hyperarousal, thereby allowing cognition and problem-solving at a higher level of capability than would be possible in a state of absolute terror.

Perry concludes: 'While there are undoubtedly many other possible reasons for the evolution of dissociation and hyperarousal response, there are clear sex and age differences in predominant adaptive style. This is obvious when examining epidemiological data related to the incidence of neuropsychiatric disorders in male compared to female children. The three to one (male to female) ratio of childhood neuropsychiatric problems disappears in adolescence and, suddenly, in early adulthood shifts to become two to one (female to male). In childhood more boys have met diagnostic criteria for externalizing disorders such as ADHD,[203] conduct disorder, and oppositional-defiant disorder while more girls have a higher incidence of internalizing disorders such as depressive, anxiety or dissociative disorders.'

Ekelund & Tschudi, 1994, have approached the same topic with Tomkins' Script Theory as an interpretative framework for a phenomenological understanding of abusive men, an understanding that they find is lacking in the literature, especially a perspective focusing on emotional factors. They find two contrasting script structures: 'A hypermasculine Macho script where violence is an instrumental and more or less effective means to dominate women, and a Nuclear script where violence by definition is an ineffective strategy which is related to deep and unresolved problems not necessarily connected to a need to control and dominate women. The authors conclude that the results (based on their sample of Western men) 'conform best with a Nuclear script interpretation, where the man's relationship to his father seems to be an unresolved and deeply problematic theme' (Abstract).

Africa is a place where one can observe men sitting and waiting, idle and proud, letting their women maintain every day's life, because the men see themselves as warriors, superior to daily chores. Chewing *khat*, in those regions of Africa where this is the custom, certainly heightens this experience; *khat* makes the chewer feel courageous and fearless, and lets him dream of big deeds the next day. Staying up late nights may be another feature of this continuous readiness for emergency and exitement; many Somali leaders are known to give 'audiences' at four o'clock at night. As already reported, for a period of three days I participated in waiting for Hussein Aidid (January 1999), the son and successor of late General Aidid, together with about fifty high-ranking Somalis, in the lobby of Safari Park Hotel, a luxury hotel in Nairobi: one typically expected to be invited to his room for a meeting

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[203] Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.

long after midnight. Siad Barre, Osman Ato, virtually every leader seemed to have this day rhythm.

Are emergency reactions functional? As Perry makes clear, yes. The body's readiness for 'fight and flight reactions' is not redundant, and it would be a mistake to describe these reactions as 'wrong.' However, the occurrence of heart attacks shows that they can 'go wrong'! It is therefore little fruitful to accuse men of aggressiveness or laziness, and idolise women who appear more 'peaceful' just because they push their men to war from behind; it is more beneficial, I believe, to reflect upon the roots of masculine aggressiveness, and the logic that lets women send their husbands and sons into war. As reported above, I got a breathtaking account (1st December 1998 in Hargeisa) of the upbringing of a boy in the arid planes of the 'interior.' Muusa Bihi Cabdi, born 1948 in Hargeisa district, was raised as a nomad in the 'interior.' He says his childhood was 'thrilling;' he was trained to be 'tough and endure pain;' he learned to 'recognise the traces of wild animals and enemies;' to never really sleep, but always be alert. He learned, as he puts it, 'how to live in the difficults,' and he admits that he 'owes his live to the interior': 'many city boys were not tough enough in wartimes and lost their lives.' Does not this mean that the Isaaq, when they rose against dictator Siad Barre, only succeeded because of those tough men with a 'masculinity' that in peace times is criticised?

Gary Page Jones, Resident Representative, Norwegian People's Aid, Somalia Programme (interviews 29th November 1998 and 30th December 1998) remembers an incident that illustrates this: 'When I laid off two watchmen, illiterate young lads, I was with two ministers, and, wow! What kind of deference the ministers showed! It would be unthinkable that a poor Kikuyu [in Kenya] would sit with a Kikuyu minister: they would be worlds apart! But the young Somali men are the warriors, important people for a tribe!' Perhaps it is the same self-confident dynamic that makes poor aristocrats in Europe retain their bearing and self-categorisation as aristocrats despite their poverty?

Where Do Emergency and Danger Come From?

However, the argument of functionality is so easily tautological. Is it really the harsh desert environment that makes belligerence 'functional' and 'forces' it upon its inhabitants, whether they want it or not? Does, for example, shortage of food forcibly lead to camel raiding? Obviously not. Many Somalis tell me that looting camels from other clans was done during times of abundance and not, as maybe expected, in times of need, - to me the accounts of

camel raids that I get sound as if they were pursued as a kind of 'sport' to keep warriors fit, a sort of desert hooliganism… And more importantly, not all nomads in harsh environments are equally ferocious: 'Water is a scarce resource in Borana (Southern Ethiopia) and one of the most characteristic features of Borana pastoralism is the orderly and peaceful way in which the Borana organize access to it through the operation and maintenance of the wells. The contrast with the intensely competitive and sometimes violent Somali way of organizing access to water is striking' (Helland, in Hogg, 1997, 76). It is therefore perhaps not surprising that 'in particular the Borana have lost large tracts of land to the expanding Somali clans on their eastern border. The Somali westward expansion is still continuing…' (Helland, 64). In other words, the Borana pastoralists live in a similar environment as Somali pastoralists, and still, they are more peaceful than the Somalis. Perhaps ferocious masculinity, once it is invoked, even if it were only invoked 'by mistake,' maintains itself by either pushing out peaceful neighbours or inciting them to develop equal ferociousness, - almost independently of the environment?

At this point in the analysis many intellectual themes are in discussion: harsh environment, pastoralist lifestyle, masculinity, pride, humiliation and humility. The final aim of this book will be to put all this together. But first it may be beneficial to have a closer look at pastoralism: 'One of the main difficulties in discussing pastoralism has been that the debate has been hijacked either by romantics (often anthropologists) who idealise the pastoral way of life or pessimists (mainly range ecologists and economists) who talk of overgrazing, range degradation and desertification as the inevitable consequences of a pastoral way of life' (Hogg, 1997, 1). 'There are almost as many "pastoralisms" as pastoralists. Boran pastoralism [in Ethiopia] is fundamentally different from Somali pastoralism. This difference is partly a function of their different environments and cultures, but also their different combinations of stock, territorial and social organisation, and orientation to the market' (9). 'Boran pastoralism, Afar pastoralism, Somali pastoralism are all products of an historical process which is unique to each of them. This process cannot be reduced to a simple form of environmental determinism, …' (Hogg, 16). 'Somali camel pastoralists fight enclosure [fences that block free movement] not because it is a "practical" threat to their way of life (at least not yet) but because it threatens their system of values' (17).

The Security Dilemma, Fear, Danger and Emergency. Or, How Resources Are Being Distributed

I conclude from these quotations that culture and environment interlink, that pastoralism shapes pastoralists, and pastoralists shape pastoralism, in the same way culture (or the group that is the bearer of this culture) shapes every human being that is born into it, and every human being, by making choices, in turn shapes culture. However, as long as no neutral super-ordinate structures attenuate and mediate vying for resources and power, pastoralists are, as anybody else in the same situation, victims of a merciless and dictatorial logic, namely what International Relations Theory[204] calls the Security Dilemma. Classical and Structural Realism see the world as being guided by 'anarchy' - anarchy as the 'state of nature' (Hobbes, 1962). In this context the Security Dilemma is unavoidable: 'I have to amass power, because I am scared. When I amass weapons, you get scared. You amass weapons, I get more scared'… and thus an arms race and finally war can be triggered.'[205] Though International Relations Theory addresses relations between states, the same logic also reigns between groups; Posen, 1993, describes the effects of the Security Dilemma between ethnic groups and shows that the group who fears most goes to war (see also Roe, 1999).

We may ask to what extent the Security Dilemma is an all-compelling and inescapable logic, or whether it can, logically and practically, be heightened or attenuated. Indeed, one may expect that the fear that is central to the logic of the Security Dilemma will be intensified whenever the danger gets greater. The greater the danger, the greater also the fear will be, and this will encourage the development of a culture of even fiercer male prowess. Admittedly, and this is why the Security Dilemma is a dilemma, more male prowess may prove to be, on the whole, counterproductive and increase fear instead of diminishing it. This is because male prowess will tend to make the 'environment' more 'dangerous' for possible victims, who in turn will not survive, unless they also champion male warrior talents. In other words, the Security Dilemma gets 'worse,' if people develop a culture of aggressive competition, instilling more fear in their neighbours and thus setting off a vicious circle; and it may get 'better' wherever people try to co-operate. To use traffic as a metaphor: A culture of co-operation is when all agree to adhere to red and green traffic lights; a culture of war is when warriors fight their way through at every crossroad.

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[204] See, for example, Woods, 1996.

[205] Beverly Crawford at the Sommerakademie für Frieden und Konfliktforschung, Loccum, Germany, 20th – 25th July 1997.

Many Somalis are wary of co-operation, because they believe that they may gain more by war. Male Somalis in particular display an air of toughness and readiness to be aggressive. My *Madiban* interlocutors, critical of 'noble' Somalis, agree among themselves, that 'Somalis do not learn about politeness' (1st January 1999 in Nairobi): 'Somalis are very rude. A Somali would just take a cigarette from your package, and if you were astonished, he would shout, "Do you think I cannot buy my own cigarette, here take your cigarette back!!!" Or when a Somali wants somebody to come, he or she would just shout, "Hey man! Come!" No words such as "Please," no "Sorry!" Or, if a Somali walks by and by mistake steps on the foot of another person, he or she would not apologise. But if the same person would be hurt, he or she would scream "What are you doing! You hurt me!!!..."' Simons contributes to this topic: 'The fact that Somalis often addressed one another in the imperative also made it particularly convenient that the expatriates happened to learn only the gruffest of commands [when they attempted to learn the Somali language]' (Simons, 1995, 13).

The aggressive-suspicious attitude reigning among many Somalis ('honest,' perhaps, when expressing dislike) is furthermore expressed by their rule of confusing outsiders by not telling them the truth, but deliberately keeping them in the dark, a maxim that was reported to me by Keynan and those who apologised to their fellow Somalis when talking truthfully to me. This is also expressed in the fact that a foreigner turns into a persona non grata if he or she understands too much: Simons reports: 'if I learned Somali too quickly or too proficiently I would find myself with a one-way ticket out of the country. People knew of cases in which this had happened. Indeed, the one anthropologist who had worked for CRDP had been declared persona non grata and he apparently spoke fluent Somali, which he had learned in a mind-bogglingly short period of time' (Simons, 1995, 7).

Again, I do not believe that it is helpful to point at Somalis and accuse them of deliberately wanting to be nasty people. The Hobbsian 'logic of anarchy' with the Security Dilemma attached to it, assumes that the world is a fixed pie and a zero sum game, and zero sum games are inherently more merciless than win-win games, - even the nicest cultural ways of handling zero sum games cannot undo that. And, to a large extent, pastoralist resources are a fixed pie. William Ury's reflects on the fixed or expandable pie in his tour through history, and maybe the fixed/expandable pie logic is at the core of human history (and also the different forms of humiliation). Often the Prisoner's Dilemma (P.D.) is used to illustrate the logic of such concepts as win-lose, win-win, or zero sum. The Prisoners' Dilemma goes as follows: Two burglars are caught with stolen goods. The police says to A: 'If you confess, then you will only get 3 months, but B will get 10 years.' The police tells A that they are

making the same offer to B. In fact, if they both squeal, they will both get 8 years. If nobody squeals, they will each get one year.

		Prisoner B	
		Not Confess ('Cooperate')	*Confess ('Defect')*
	Not Confess ('Cooperate')	1 year each	10 years for A and 3 months for B
Prisoner A			
	Confess ('Defect')	3 months for A and 10 years for B	8 years each

Table 9: 'The payoff matrix for the prisoner's dilemma. Each player must decide, in isolation from the other, whether to confess to a crime that the judge is sure they both committed. By confessing, each will implicate the other; their joint best strategy is for both to keep quiet' (Easterbrook, 1992, 10).

Beverly Crawford links the P. D. to world affairs and says: [206] 'Even "nice" leaders or countries have to "defect" when the Security Dilemma effects a spiral of insecurity and preventative war. World War I illustrates how Russia mobilised troops, and Germany and Austria, seeing this, mobilised even quicker. Later Hitler wanted more territory to be more powerful than the allies who had "defected" Germany before.'

   International Relations Theory initially (in Classical Realism) favoured the assumption that man is aggressive by nature; later developments of International Relations Theory (Liberalism and Structural Realism) do not have this assumption anymore. This transition supports my cautionary remarks that it is wrong to attribute aggressiveness and lack of civility to any evil 'essence' of Somaliness (or maleness), but that, instead, the logic of anarchy may be at the core, embedded in cultural ways of handling it in one way or another. The Borana handle their affairs more peacefully, in an environment similar to those of the Somalis, who are much more violent and competitive, more like Germans before World War I. Crawford (1997) writes: 'Before World War I there was a "Cult of the Offensive" in Germany, a "Cult of Militarism," a "cult of having to hit before being attacked;" this increased the problem.'

   This means that nobody can escape the Security Dilemma as long as there are no super-ordinate structures (cultural and/or insitutional) that guarantee neutral 'traffic rules.'

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[206] Beverly Crawford at the Sommerakademie für Frieden und Konfliktforschung, Loccum, Germany, 20th – 25th July 1997.

The Security Dilemma can only be attenuated by a culture of co-operation, which, however, will be destroyed (the carriers of co-operation will be killed) or subjugated (the carriers of co-operation will be enslaved) as soon as a neighbouring culture of war, - Vikings, Mongols, Somalis - appears at the horizon. See Table 10.

Security Dilemma, super-ordinate structures and co-operative culture		
The Security Dilemma is attenuated	➔	under conditions where super-ordinate structures or a culture of co-operation ensure that 'traffic rules' are being created in a fair way and then respected.
A culture of co-operation is vulnerable	➔	to being destroyed by 'defectors' who either kill or subjugate the carriers of co-operative culture.

Table 10: Security Dilemma, super-ordinate structures and co-operative culture

Three Variables: The Environment, Culture (With Its Response to the Security Dilemma), and the Individual Actor

Three variables thus interact in this analysis, the environment (zero sum or win-win), culture (a group of people that is the bearer of a culture of co-operation or war and educates the next generation in the same spirit), and the individual actor (who may preserve or change culture), see Table 11:

The environment, culture and the individual actor		
Variable 1	Environment	Zero sum, win-win, fixed or expandable pie.
Variable 2	Culture (group level)	Distribution of the pie ruled by co-operation or by war (Security Dilemma being heightened or attenuated).
Variable 3	The individual actor	Preservation or change of culture.

Table 11: The environment, culture and the individual actor

In some world regions the innovative idea of agriculture was invented within the framework of hominid culture (variable 2) about ten thousand years ago (perhaps there was an individual, variable 1, who would have received the Nobel Prize for an invention that changed an age old hunter-gatherer culture?).

The food surplus (humans force nature to give them a bigger pie, variable 1) enabled people to develop new hierarchically ranked cultures (variable 2). They were able to build empires in which an elite managed a majority of underlings and kept them in a state of what Galtung calls 'structural violence' (Galtung, 1996; Galtung, 1969) which could perhaps also be called 'involuntary peace.' 'Involuntary peace' because in such hierarchies underlings typically are both oppressed and protected (the pie is distributed in ways that can be seen as fair or unfair by different actors, variable 1 and 3).

Therefore 'structural violence' may be described as 'enforced peace within' or 'peace defined as the absence of war among underlings who are not given a choice' (the masters, variable 3, force rules of distribution onto their underlings, variable 3, trying to prevent them from reacting freely to the Security Dilemma, variable 2).

However, at the highest level, namely between neighbouring empires, there where no overarching structure enforce this involuntary peace, or at least guarantee co-operation, Hobbesian anarchy with its Security Dilemma is exposed to the players in its bare structure, which means that the top dogs are 'victims' of a logic that almost compels them to go to war with each other (meaning that top dogs may manage the distribution of the available pie by war or voluntary co-operation, with voluntary co-operation being extremely vulnerable to attacks from defectors and the logic of war being much more 'stable,' variable 2, so that even 'nice' leaders, variable 3, have little options but to go to war if attacked).

The whole world, not only Germany, Rwanda and Burundi, has witnessed this drama being played out in many variations by rulers of hierarchical societies during the course of history, while Somalia's scarce soil clearly precluded the formation of such hierarchical societies. Before the inception of agriculture Somalia with its pre-agricultural culture was no exception, but today it is an exception; and expatriates, mostly coming from old farming cultures themselves, are surprised and puzzled.

The reason why Somalia was 'left out' when the world proceeded to develop agriculture and hierarchical societies may be two-fold. On one side Somali warriors were perhaps so ferocious that nobody dared to touch them (and surely no slave trader would have imagined them as slaves, on the contrary, 'noble' Somalis would be users of slaves from other parts of Africa), but on the other side Somalis may have to accept the humbling view that Somali male prowess could only survive and flourish so long, because Somalis happen to live in a region of the world that has little to offer to potential big conquerors, no gold, no other riches, - apart from frankincense and myrrh that may not have been sufficiently attractive to make unfertile plains of thorny bushes worthy enough for any neighbouring emperor to make

the effort to subjugate its people and 'cut their males down to size,' such as the French emperor did with his unruly aristocracy, so well described by Elias (Elias, 1994).

Scarcity, just like islands and mountains, may give their populations protection that they do not earn themselves. This is a version that clearly is far from the Somali view of the world. They assume that anybody who travels to their country does so out of some kind of self-interest, meaning that it must be either potential oil wells near the coast of Somalia that attract people to them, or the geopolitical location of Somalia, or the fact that humanitarian aid workers need emergencies to earn their salaries. The thought that some idealists may include them into the 'in-group of human kind,' and that their mutual killing therefore may hurt human 'in-group-feelings,' is not (yet?) part of their worldview.

Every Somali Is an Empire

I think the lack of long-established hierarchical structures is one key to understanding Somalia. In a harsh environment that does not give rise to empires, elders, a category that includes virtually every man who has reached a certain age and founded a family, are the equivalent of rulers of empires. Elders are masters with no super-ordinate structures overriding their decisions. Whatever Machiavellian strategy any emperor of human history was or is versed in, or has been forced to learn under conditions of anarchy, every pastoralist knows as well. In such harsh environments as the Horn of Africa the 'ceiling' of a super-ordinate structure is at the level of the heads of families, not at the level of kings, emperors or governments. Every nomad is, so-to-speak, to a certain extent an empire with its own government. Even Somali women, although they are officially under the tutelage of their fathers or husbands, are brave and strong-willed, not subdued, a fact I had already learned in Egypt and got confirmed in Somalia. And this makes Somali culture, in turn, interesting for citizens of the global village – in line with Ury's linkage of the modern global knowledge society with traditional nomadism – because in our days both men and women are encouraged to go out into the world as independent individuals and reduce the role of formerly paternalistic governments (by taking over welfare tasks such as old age insurance or unemployment benefits, and so forth).

As discussed above, the Security Dilemma makes it difficult to create an environment that is characterised by peaceful co-operation. One may ask: Why did the Borana in Southern Ethiopia then succeed in developing more peace-full co-operative cultural rules than the rather aggressive Somalis, although both, the peaceful and the aggressive pastoralists find

themselves living in Hobbsian anarchy? The answer could be that peoples such as the Borana may be able to hold on to their co-operative culture only as long as they are relatively few and no aggressive neighbour conquers them, - meaning that no 'defector' turns up. Perhaps their state of affairs can be called the 'pre-Security Dilemma,' meaning that they can hold on to their co-operative culture only as long as they are not yet hit by the full strength of the 'Security Dilemma.' As soon as increasing population pressure makes peaceful resource management more difficult, and/or they experience the onslaught of aggressive warrior-neighbours, they may have to succumb, a hypothesis that seems to be supported by reality (see for a thorough discussion of Borana struggles Hogg, 1997 and particularly Helland, in Hogg, 1997).

In other words, relative isolation and the absence of aggressive neighbours may make the Security Dilemma less overriding, while population pressure and near-by aggressive conquerors may make it so pressing that it takes priority over all other cultural rules, - because, as discussed above, *emergency overrides maintenance*, at least in the short run. And pastoralists may be expected to be affected by the Security Dilemma even harder than empires, because being conquered by other pastoralists typically means being killed, or early death because the means of livelihood are destroyed, since an attacking nomadic warrior clan does not enslave conquered clans, as does an organised empire.

This means that Ury's hunter-gatherers, and also pastoralists, may by hypothesised to feel 'masterly freedom,' practice peaceful co-operation, and regard the world as an expandable pie, only as long as they are few, and pasture is abundant. Then they live, so-to-speak, in the 'illusion' that the pie is infinite. This would differentiate them starkly from those who have learned to increase the pie, as Ury hypothesises for the modern global knowledge society. As soon as population pressure increases and/or one group develops 'innovative' ideas about conquering others, then only the most aggressive conqueror in a region can preserve 'masterly freedom' and regard the world as an infinite pie, while those who are killed or enslaved lose this pristine freedom. Those who are killed lose their piece of the pie and thus betray through their fate what environmentalists try to teach, namely that the surface of the planet is indeed fixed, and not infinite. Those who are not killed but subjugated, for example the farmer who is integrated into a larger imperial unit and taxed by officials sent out by its elite, trades parts of his piece of the pie to the elite for protection; in turn he renounces being a master himself, and bows to coercion from above.

Noble Warrior Nomads Are Proud, Arrogant, and Not Humble

How are humiliation and humility played out in these contexts? The hunter-gatherer may be proud and humble, perhaps both at the same time, in short, egalitarian; the warrior nomad or the ruler of an empire is proud, arrogant, and not at all humble; only the underling in a hierarchy routinely experiences humiliation (seen from his point of view) or a necessary humbling (seen from the master's point of view). In other words, the Borana and the hunter-gatherers studied by Ury are pristine masters perhaps only as long as they do not yet have enemies to subjugate or kill them, and the Somalis are masters because they indeed do kill! See Table 12.

Humiliation and humility among hunter-gatherers, masters and underlings	
Hunter-gatherers (as long as they are few and undisturbed by conquerors)	have the opportunity to be both proud and humble at the same time, in short, egalitarian.
The warrior nomad, or the ruler of an empire	monopolises the right to be proud, arrogant, and not at all humble.
The underling in a hierarchy	Is forced to experience humiliation (seen from his point of view) or a 'necessary humbling' (seen from the master's point of view).

Table 12: Humiliation and humility among hunter-gatherers, masters and underlings

The 'Tragedy of the Commons' and the 'Security Dilemma'

Can citizens of the global village learn from harsh environments such as those to be found in the Horn of Africa? Yes, I believe, they can study the state of the world before large structures such as empires or modern state enforced 'peace' upon their underlings. The citizen of the global village can learn how 'pristine masters' handle the state of anarchy and make war, alliances and peace agreements.

The well-known Tragedy of the Commons is related to the Security Dilemma. Lee D. Ross explains (Sommerakademie Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 11th – 16th July 1999, in Clemenswerth, Germany): 'During Medieval Ages people had common grazing grounds. It was beneficial for everybody to have more and more animals. At a certain point, however, there was not enough grazing ground for all anymore. At this point the commons typically get

exhausted and people may agree to have fewer animals. At that junction a 'defector' will always win: he puts one more cow, and gets the benefit, while the others share the cost; all other cows get a little less fat. The defining property of the tragedy of the commons is: you are always better off having one more animal! And history does unfold like that, in the USA, in Europe and elsewhere: Some people restrain themselves, some are greedy, some people will want to co-operate, if the others also co-operate, but not if others defect. As soon as some people get less through restraining themselves, the pressure to just have one more cow increases!' Ross then addresses the situation of the newcomer: 'In the USA people might have agreed that everybody has as many animals as the grandfather, but what about the newcomer who has nothing? After a while all will defect and destroy the resources. This is the situation of the earth spaceship with all its resources, and the commons' dilemma models it.'

The same principle is known from modern business. In management courses short-term management 'by helicopter' (flying in, looting resources, and flying out again) is contrasted with strategic planning whose aim is to sustain a business for a longer time span. The problem for long-term planners is that short-term looting pays as long as one uses short time frames to measures success. Somali raiders follow precisely the same principle, they take what is there and leave, they let others work, they let their camels eat by themselves, the grass grow by itself, the farmers farm by himself, - they just watch and 'harvest,' - something that gives them the superiority of masters, masters in the sense of dominators who can force their will upon others, not masters who nurture. And, it is not only in Somalia that this approach characterises the traditional aristocracy. In the middle of Europe, in today's England the 'Queen Mother' is renowned for her enthusiastic conformity with the aristocratic principle that it is 'vulgar' to concern yourself with 'trivial' details relating to how much things cost; her overdraft is legendary and runs into millions of pounds: an aristocrat is meant to harvest!

Thus sedentary farmers may painstakingly accumulate resources, but when their nomadic neighbours ransack them, they lose everything in a single day. Likewise, the peace-loving Borana in Southern Ethiopia, though not sedentary farmers but pastoralists themselves, may develop sound long-term co-operation strategies for water management, but as soon as they are exposed to Somali warriors who are proud of their ability to wage war, they are pushed out of their territory. The *sab* are probably just too dispersed to resist, 'They have no tribal organization of their own, and are known as "the people without brothers" which has the sense of without agnatic kin...' (Lewis, 1998, 51). The Chairman of the *Madiban* in the Kakuma refugee camp points out to me that that the refugee camp has one good side because

it is the first time that the minorities are in one place together and can exchange opinions and experiences, - and organise resistance.

The Tragedy of the Commons, analysed in the light of the above-discussed Security Dilemma highlights the logic of circumstances in which either pressure on resources increases, and/or 'newcomers' arrive. As long as pasture is sufficient and no newcomer appears, all commons may be egalitarian masters who nurture their environment in peaceful co-operation, - and this is what the global society currently tries to learn on a large scale, - while severe pressure on resources and/or aggressive newcomers may turn the balance, and abase 'nurturing masters' to mere slaves to be exploited or killed by a new brand of masters, namely 'looting masters' and 'oppressive masters.' 'Looting masters' (Somalia) and 'oppressive masters' (Rwanda/Burundi) are thus perhaps the most pressing problem that today's global village has to control and therefore should study.

Noble Warrior Nomads As Looters, Maximisers of the Security Dilemma and Masculinity, Defectors in the P.D., and Aggressive Newcomers Among the Commons

When studying 'looting masters,' an initial question may be asked: Which circumstances lend a hand to masters who are proud of their ability to quickly seize others' resources? Several aspects seem to be instrumental: It seems to be beneficial to be mobile; it seems to be advantageous to maintain male warrior prowess; and it seems to be useful to sustain tight in-group-relations with clear demarcating lines defining enemy out-groups against 'brothers who help each other,' and new technology sometimes helps as well.

'Looting masters' profit from:
Mobility
Male prowess
Tight in-group-relations
New technology

Table 13: Characteristics that make 'looting masters'

Mobility (as opposed to sedentary exposure) is a feature that facilitates the practices of 'looting masters.' This is best demonstrated when analysing mobility as tool for resisting domination: A great nuclear superpower such as the United States saw its strength

undermined by guerrilla warfare in Vietnam. Admittedly, it is not the mobility of the drunken vagabond or tramp that is effective, but the highly disciplined mobility of small bands. Governments at all times in history knew that, and settling their nomads has always been high on their agenda, perhaps precisely for that reasons. On the other side, as mentioned above, modern businesses try to break up large units into small and effective entities; they want to reap the clear advantages of the 'nomad' approach.

Male prowess has been discussed at length already. As quoted above, until recently a young Somali man would brag about his father and say: "My father has killed ninety-nine men!" And as Samatar correctly notices, even the United States are proud of their Rambo image. Male prowess, played out in this way, does not meet the acceptance of today's human rights advocates and seems obsolete, but in sports or business many of its characteristics are increasingly sought after. The future global information society needs the daring, creative, self-steering person who is not afraid of responsibility.

The extreme extent to which group-cohesion can be driven has been described further above; Somalia provides first class study material. As much as Somali clan-fault-lines are open to construction and re-construction and alliances are volatile, still, as long as a group is actually defined as an in-group, the notion of suspicious exclusion versus trusting inclusion is extremely strong. Not telling strangers the truth excludes them effectively, and sending money from as far as Canada to family members in Hargeisa strongly includes 'brothers,' to the extent of even keeping them alive. In other words, Somalis have a strong sense of demarcation, even though demarcation lines may be open to change. In-group and out-group ethics are very different: in-group members can count on staunch support, out-group members are rapidly categorised as 'enemies,' even in the most extreme sense of the word, namely that enemies are best dead.

A whole wealth of social-psychological research relates to in- and out-group categorisations. The famous Robbers' Cave experiment (Sherif et al., 1988, 'Realistic' Group Conflict Theory) involved boys in a summer camp: The boys were split into two groups engaging in competitive activities with conflicting goals (zero sum, as, for example, in football games). Intergroup hostility evolved astonishingly fast and almost automatically; other experiments confirmed the same dynamics also for adults (Tzeng & Jackson, 1994). The 'minimal group paradigm' shows that no conflicting goals are even necessary to 'elicit intergroup behaviour' (Brown, in Hewstone, Stroebe, Codol, & Stephenson, 1994, 394): Tajfel et al., 1971, assigned schoolboys arbitrarily to two groups, and even under such

minimal circumstances the boys favoured their in-group when they were asked to allocate money.

All these experiments feed into Social Identity Theory, which is a hotly discussed field.[207] Why, for example, is the in-group favoured? A Somali nomad would explain to the social psychologists that in a dangerous environment (intense version of Security Dilemma) it would be suicidal to not be part of a strong in-group for protection. Many Somalis owe their lives to clan-affiliation: when fleeing, they can count on clan-members they never knew existed before for help wherever they stray. However, many would also admit, that the opposite is also true, namely that overly rigid in-group demarcations perpetuate the very danger they aim to protect against. This becomes clear at points of transition: As Muusa Bihi Cabdi professes to me, his heart was pounding when he flew to Addis Ababa for the first time (long time after the Ogaden war), his whole body 'expected' that the Ethiopians would kill him upon arrival. Instead they offered him tea! He almost did not dare to fly to Ethiopia and, if his fear had taken over, he would have missed the experience that fault lines are perhaps not as eternal as his body told him.

Another point that human history teaches is that paradigm shifts may occur which for a limited time span give an advantage to those adhering to the new paradigm. Kuhn's famous book on paradigm shifts (Kuhn, 1962) addresses *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,* and scientific revolutions may also bring about cultural and technological revolutions. The 'invention' of agriculture was such a revolution, but innovations improving weapons, or navigation and mobility, or communication also give an advantage to their users, because they surprise and undermine rivals still wedded to earlier sets of beliefs and practices. What about the Somali spear as opposed to the *Madiban* arrow? Viking longships were a technology that gave them the 'comparative advantage' that enabled them to behave as 'Super-Somalis' and invade half the globe.

Noble Warrior Nomads As Advocates of a Global In-Group Living in Egalitarian Democracy

Somali in-group practices would indeed be beneficial for the management of the global in-group, the global village. Because Somalis do not only illustrate to the world how cruelly the

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[207] I thank Reidar Ommundsen for introducing me into this debate, and especially for his thought-provoking and innovative reflections on the assumption of Social Identity Theory that every individual wishes to have a 'positive' social identity.

Security Dilemma can be played out, but also know much about democracy and mediation. Elders not only promote Machiavellian alliances with out-groups (whose boundaries may change), but also maintain cohesion in their in-group (whose boundaries may change as well). Lewis, the well-known Somalia-expert, tries to draw lessons in his book *A Pastoral Democracy* (Lewis, 1961). As mentioned above, the most eminent characteristic of this pastoral democracy is that the heads of families (the elders) are at the highest level of independent decision-making. Elders meet when super-ordinate problems between two groups have to be discussed, such as compensation for homicide, and they discuss until they reach consensus. Those who preside over such meetings[208] only summarise what has been said, they never 'decide,' although they, like every other member of the meeting, may use the power of their oral talent to influence the overall process.

At the Conference of Higher Education for Peace (4th – 6th May 2000 in Tromsø, North Norway), the peace researcher Johan Galtung praises Somali pastoralist democracy as a model for modern global dealings because it entails respect for independent minds (5th May 2000, italicisation added): 'A man leading a Somali *shir*, or a woman leading a Polynesian *ho'o pono pono*, they know it all! Problems at the geopolitical level resemble family problems. Micro, meso and macro level are all connected. Compassion and perseverance are important!' (At the 'Finnologisk Seminar' on 15th August 1998 in the Norwegian mountains Johan Galtung explains that *Ho'o pono pono,* means 'putting right,' and is a series of meetings practised in Polynesia, in which 20-30 people come together, for example the victim of a crime, the perpetrator, the family of both, and one or more facilitators.)

'Respect,' 'perseverance,' and 'mutual consent,' these are all terms characteristic for a *shir* and a *ho'o pono pono*, and incidentally also for creative networks in the modern business world. They also characterised the peace conference that successfully pacified the North of Somalia. Adam writes in his chapter entitled *Hobbes, Locke, Burke, Ibn Khaldun and Reflections on the Catastrophe in Somalia:* 'By mutual consent, they also created a supreme legislative body, divided into a council of elders (*guurti*) and a popular chamber; and an

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[208] See Lewis, 1998, 99: 'It is particularly unfortunate that no really satisfactory accounts have been given of the nature of Somali chieftaincy, probably partly because in the segmentary lineage system chiefs do not wield great power and are often religious rather than political figures. At least a lack of clear distinction between ritual and political functions seems characteristic of the Cushitic Somali social order, and partly explains why immigrant Arab sheiks play such a large part in the history of the Somali.'
Or, see a more recent account (Simons, 1995, 185, italicisation in original): 'Prior to colonialism, even up through the late 1970s according to some Somalis, it was sheikhs who had been the men of respect, who could mediate between lineages, between men and God, and between right and wrong.'

executive power headed by a president, vice president and cabinet built on clan diversity and representation' (Adam, in Adam & Ford, 1997, 109, 110).

What is the *shir* that Galtung refers to? 'In the smallest structural unit, the *rer*, which is the tertiary section of tribes whose segmentation is tripartite, and which is also a minimal lineage, the council regulating and controlling the affairs of the group is composed of the heads of the families which it comprises... The council (*shir*) is open to all adult free-born males (*hubqad*) who are entitled to carry spear and shield. This excludes attached occupational-caste *sab*... Any adult can speak at the deliberations of the council, but the views of family heads carry the greatest weight. The elders sitting in council (*ashiar*)... with their elected head (*gob*) control the relations of their own group with other sections and regulate their own internal affairs. The ultimate sanction for conforming to the decisions of the council is expulsion from the group... Among the Helai, if a man absconds after committing a wrong and does not stay to face the consequences, the elders direct the systematic looting of his property, which he has forfeited by deserting the tribe... Elders have fairly strong powers of compulsion for they can hand over a man guilty of homicide to the family of his victim if its members are unwilling to accept compensation...' (Lewis, 1998, 97).

To summarise this section on Somalia with its pre-colonial traditions and the role of humiliation during this period, it is certainly safe to state that 'noble' Somalis look down and routinely humiliate *sab* who they also admire and fear, and sedentary farmers, who they disdain; but they do not administer them, just as Mongolian nomads under Genghis Khan, or the Vikings, swept over vast stretches of land without building empires. 'Nobility,' or a conviction of superiority may have been sustained by several factors, such as scarcity that kept potential large-scale conquerors away and at the same time forced its inhabitants to maintain a mobile lifestyle in small cohesive groups. Thislife-style provides advantages in war, and, in an self-perpetuating spiral, enforces ever more mobility and in-group cohesion, since the overall sense of threat and fear of each other is heightened in the affected region. As discussed above, humiliation is not compatible with the pristine nomadic pride of independent masters. When I asked the *khat* chewing party reported above about the well-known fact that clans would forget grievances as soon as a bigger enemy would unite them, they answered: 'Clans can set aside grievances, but they do not forget! Alliances can shift, yes, but humiliation is only dormant.'

Rwanda and Burundi

Fertile Soil Provides the Surplus for Hierarchical Societies in the Great Lakes

Somalia is a   country of scarce resources. And, as discussed above, maybe this is why it escaped the fate so many other of the world's peoples endured; during its history Somalia was never confronted with neighbouring empires who really wanted to take the trouble to conquer it thoroughly and teach its population how to be obedient underlings; only the fertile river valleys were interesting for Italian colonialists for introducing large-scale banana farms; but the Italians fetched slaves from elsewhere to work on them.

Rwanda and Burundi are different. They are like the Somali river valleys; they are fertile. 'Most historians agree that the first inhabitants of Rwanda were hunter-gatherers, whose modern-day descendants are the small minority of Twa. Later, cultivators ("Hutu") and cattle-herders ("Tutsi") arrived, and Rwanda consisted of a patchwork of small chiefdoms and principalities, with the groups living side by side. It is widely believed that pastoralists arrived in Rwanda at a later date than farmers - but when the Tutsi arrived, it was certainly not as a centralized conquering and colonizing elite. The claim made by an earlier generation of writers that the Tutsi "invaded" and "conquered" Rwanda, imposing a centralised monarchy, is now universally rejected by historians.[209] The "migration/conquest hypothesis" is more in the nature of a bad habit, left over from now-discredited racial theories of ethnicity in Africa, than a fact established by rigorous inquiry. What appears to have happened is that, about twenty generations ago, one Tutsi clan, the Nyiginya, achieved political dominance in central Rwanda. Over several centuries, the Nyiginya formed the core of a state that expanded to cover most of the modern-day territory. But the political institutions that followed were in fact a fusion of Tutsi and Hutu' (Rakiya, De Waal, & African Rights, 1995, 2).

Could Somalis have done what Tutsi did? I did not get a chance to ask Rakiya Omar, co-director of African Rights that published the above-cited text, who, with her Somali background, certainly has an interesting personal perspective on the issue. 'Noble' Somali clans engage in clan-wars, but they do not subjugate each other; and even if they have outcast minorities living 'under' them, these outcasts are not integrated into a complex hierarchy, they are quite juxtaposed. And Somali farmers are not integrated into any intricate hierarchy either, they are, at times, raided and plundered. Somali raiders normally appear from the

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[209] B. A. Ogot, 'The Great Lakes Region, in UNESCO, General History of Africa,' Vol. IV, Heinemann, 1984, is given as source.

desert, loot, and disappear again, leaving victimised farmers destitute. 'Noble' Somalis, though proud masters, never developed a tradition of creating empires and administrating them.

However, some Somali looters have shown that they may be able to do cognitive learning, namely that it is better to leave the 'cow alive if you want milk': 'In the Lower Juba Valley, …very weak minority farming communities exist which were among the principal victims of the famine for a long time. One of the reasons that they were victims of famine is because armed bandits would come in, arbitrarily loot them of everything, raid them, kill them and leave them unable to feed themselves after prolonged banditry. But over time these bandits settled in to a pattern of a more normalised relationship with these villagers, and began extorting half of the crop instead of just taking everything at random. If you want to be scientific, they went from being a malignant host to a benign parasite. They learned not to kill their host. At a certain point I found that these agricultural villagers with whom I once lived doing my dissertation research, found this much more preferable. They did not like it, it approached them as kind of feudal "fiefdom" on the part of these little bands of militia men up and down the river valley. But is was predictable, and it offered them at least minimal protection, the deal was they provided half of their crops, and these bandits would serve as some sort of policemen against outside bandits. Sometimes it worked, sometimes it did not. Again a grey area between extortion and taxation, between vigilantism and policing' (Menkhaus, in Haakonsen & Keynan, 1995, 31).

Could such a paragraph not also be written by a Hutu-sympathiser? In Burundi, an expatriate source whose name I do not want to disclose, relates to me in February 1999 the rumours he had heard, namely that during the Arusha negotiations a radical Tutsi said to his Hutu adversary: 'We are the chosen people, we are descendants of King Salomon and the Queen of Saba, we have the right to rule!' The Hutu leader, leader of the armed rebellion is said to have responded: 'As you say, you are foreigners, and we chase you back to where you come from!'

Similarly, an infamous and unspeakable practice was employed during the Rwandan genocide in 1994 when Hutu killers threw Tutsi bodies into the river shouting: 'Now you can go back to where you came from!' meaning that the river would carry the dead Tutsi bodies back to their nomad homeland from which they supposedly had migrated some centuries ago in order to arrogantly subjugate the Hutu, the humble farmers.

I certainly do not want to get entangled in the quarrel about the origin of the Tutsi. For my analysis it is unimportant whether they came from far away or not, or whether they

conquered Hutu in a centralised campaign or not. My aim is another, namely to map out what Menkhaus calls the 'grey area between extortion and taxation, between vigilantism and policing' in relation to the above introduced concepts of Security Dilemma, the cleavage between pastoralists and agriculturalists, and the building of hierarchical societies.

Masters and Underlings: The Grey Area Between Extortion and Taxation, Between Vigilantism and Policing

Melchior (9th February 1999, this is not his real name), a brilliant Rwandan intellectual, introduces me to the traditional values a boy in the Rwanda of former times would learn at the traditional school. He explains that a boy would leave for this school with his cows that were to feed him with milk, - therefore only circa 25% of the boys had Hutu background because the boy had to have a 'troupeaux,' Melchior points out. He continues: 'The boys learned two values: (1) *ubutwari,* bravoure, vaillance, héroïsme, or bravery, and heroism, and (2) *ubupfura*, grandeur d'âme, or big-heartedness, similar to Mahatma Ghandi's teaching.' The boy also learned to say 'his name of bravery,' to 'dire son nom de bravoure,' which meant to tell about his valour, about what he had accomplished (how many people he had killed for example), what he could perform, and in which courageous tasks he had prowess. For finding out more about these topics Melchior recommends Alexis Kagame, historian and ethnologist, and his book , *Un abregé de 1'ethnohistoire du Rwanda précolonial* (Kagame, 1872), as well as Donat Murego's *La Revolution Rwandaise* (Donat, 2000).

Later another Rwandan friend would demonstrate this to me. He would get up, after having switched of my recording machine, in his Western suit with his neat tie, in the middle of his Western office, and he would spread out his arms widely, move slowly, swaying majestically in wave-like body movements, and recite his name, singing it, fixing me proudly with his eyes. I felt that this was an experience from another world; it was extremely impressive. He explained that men would sit in the evening and share banana beer, and then they would invite each other: 'Say your name!' This request would have a melody, a very beautiful melody. Then the boy or man would get up, take his stick and declaim his name.

Melchior makes the point: 'To be a Tutsi traditionally equalled having *ubupfura*!' As translated above, meaning everything from kindness to charity. He explains that Christianity took the old values away: 'Before the advent of Christianity everything happened in a group, and for a group, afterwards the individual could sit in a corner and pray, and be saved just

himself or herself. The Christian values of love for your enemy, values that could be said to be similar to *ubupfura*, were not taken in, they were not understood.'

Melchior then explains *ubuhake*. I find a comprehensive account in Dorsey: *Ubuhake* is 'A form of cattle clientship or lease, in which a powerful person, or patron, provided protection for a weaker individual, who could be either a peasant or a noble herder. *Ubuhake* comes from *guhakwa*, a verb meaning to pay one's respect to a superior in his Court. It denoted the relationship that existed between a person called *garagu*, or client, and another called the *shebuja*, or lord. A grant of a cow infeudated the arrangement. In return for protection, the *umugaragu*, or client, had to build the *shebuja*'s residence, cut lumber for him, serve as his messenger, and accompany him when he was in trouble and when he became old. The duties performed depended upon the rank of the individual. If he were a notable, he could delegate others to perform the actual duties for him. Beginning in 1945, the administration attempted to suppress the *ubuhake* contract but with very little success; by 1951, with goals assigned in the Ten-Year Plan to meet pressures of land and population, it became apparent that the institution had to be abolished. An additional rationale was that its abolition would assure the reduction of the excess cattle population. *Ubuhake* was abolished in April 1954 by *umwami* Mutara Rudahigwa on the advice of the Belgian Resident, in a three-stage process. The first year required the consent of both parties; in the second year, unilateral dissolution of the contract was permitted; and in the third year, all other contracts had to be terminated' (Dorsey, 1994, 387).

Melchior gives me a 'feel' of *ubuhake*: I ask him to describe how I would go about if I were a head of a family and in a situation where I wished to build an alliance as a client with his father who was a patron (translated from French):

Evelin: The head of a family, so-to-speak, comes, he greets your father. And what happens now.

Melchior: First you get acquainted.

E: That's it.

M: And then, after having made acquaintance, well, you go home, and the next day you return. Well, you try to integrate yourself into the family and to be pleasurable. When one has an honest intention to ask to become a client, then one tries to do some services, some tasks, and after this, quite fast, it becomes clear that this signifies the intention precisely to offer one's services and ask for this alliance.

E: Was it formal? Was it a formal act?

M: Well, it was not a special ceremony, no. But it was a very intimate relationship.

E: Like a marriage, almost, perhaps?

M: Not really, but it is a kind of secret negotiation, it is not an ordinary kind of relationship.

E: It was an economic relationship?

M: A privileged relationship. It was not only economical. Because for the *mugaragu* to have a cow, … and when you accepted someone as an ally you gave him a cow…

E: And the protection?

M: He took this cow. Well, I will explain to you later why the cow was considered as an element of richness. Because this question you will ask, won't you?

E: Yes, that is a question, and the other question relates to protection; protection against what?

M: Protection, this means being able to assist in whatever circumstances, when there is a problem, you intervene, that's it! Whenever your *mugaragu* has a significant problem, be it a problem with the authorities, if somebody wants to hurt him, or steal resources from him, you could intervene, because you had more influence.

E: I understand.

Melchior explains the entire universe of traditional Rwanda to me and ends with describing that his father was both a giver and receiver of cows – in theory – because he would not accept a cow from his 'super-ordinate,' because he knew that seigneurs could say one day: 'Oh, I want to end our relationship and wish to get my cow back - and all the other cows that you have and that were surely born from my cow!'

To summarise this journey through pre-colonial traditions in Rwanda, one may attempt to conclude as follows: The fertility of Rwanda and Burundi gave the opportunity foro pastoral warriors to 'sell' their skills (their warrior prowess in handling the Security Dilemma) to farmers (who typically are 'handicapped' through their attachment to land). In other words, Hutu provided 'services' in return for Tutsi protection in the Hobbsian state of anarchy that reigned between the neighbouring kingdoms of the region.

It seems that there is a spectrum of ideal-types to be observed, see Table 14. At one pole there are Ury's egalitarian hunter-gatherers who do not subjugate anybody. Then there are mobile warriors who compete with each other on an equal footing and at the same time raid and plunder the vulnerable (the hunter-gatherers and the farmers). Then there are those mobile warriors who acquire the label of 'noble aristocrats' and subjugate the vulnerable, integrating them into strictly organised hierarchies and protecting them against attacks from outside. At the opposite pole we may position a modern complex democratic society with

super-ordinate structures that are ideally managed by institutionalised non-violent mechanisms for solving conflicts between parties, instead of one party dominating the rest.

From hunter-gatherers to modern democracy			
Hunter-gatherers do not subjugate anybody.	Noble aristocrats (mobile warriors) compete with each other on an equal footing, and raid and plunder the vulnerable (hunter-gatherers and farmers).	Noble aristocrats rule over the weak (farmers) and integrate them as underlings into strictly organised hierarchies; underlings pay 'protection money.'	Representatives of societal stakeholders receive a salary for using tax money to maintain a culture of managing conflicts through non-violent institutions at a super-ordinate level.
Batwa (bushmen and similar groups)	Somalis (Vikings, Mongols)	Feudal arrangements such as in historic Rwanda, Burundi, and Germany	Modern democratic societies

Table 14: From hunter-gatherers to modern democracy

Why Masters and Underlings Often Have Such Different Perceptions of the Same Reality

The master-underlings relationship introduces a particular complexity. Any clever Mafia boss who deals in protection money knows that it helps to remind underlings of the danger they are buying protection against; in other words, a certain amount of terror perpetrated by the masters keeps underlings servile and willing to pay; and fuelling continuous enmity with neighbouring warrior kingdoms 'helps' as well. Elite warriors know that they will 'earn' more for their services the more they succeed in keeping up fear among their underlings, - fear of imminent attacks from outside, fear of disrupting and life-threatening emergencies, in preparation for which the warrior elite has to be fed. Therefore underlings are never sure to what extent they have to thank their protectors for being ready to die in defence against attacking enemies, - they are never sure how far they have to love their protectors for caring patronage, or whether they should suspect that the protectors create the dangers themselves they then pretend to contain. Conversely, a warrior elite becomes rather redundant as soon as

neighbouring empires begin co-operating peacefully, a context in which fear is being diminished.

However, the Security Dilemma is no joke wherever it holds sway, dangers may be more than real without being strategically reinforced, and being a courageous warrior may be a less than enviable lifestyle at times of brutal battle. Furthermore, elites, according to the evidence of, for example, Johanna König, may well be *bona fide* and full of good will; they may indeed provide protective and nurturing patronage. These characteristics are, for example, strongly prescribed to Chinese rulers by Confucianism. And some aspects of patronage may very well convince underlings. Examples can be taken even from current politics: Not all ex-DDR citizens welcome capitalism, some wish the old times back, when socialist dictatorship provided them with a life in which they 'did not have to think,' where everything from birth to death was planned out for them (Lindner, 2000b). And at the political macro-level the protective umbrella of a superpower is something that keeps alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) together. Also the European Union has eager applicants, even though this requires members to share sovereignty and give Brussels a say over them: super-ordinate structures may be seen as so beneficial that 'masters' are accepted voluntarily.

Even more, masters may go so far as to encourage slaves to rise. Many of those who identify with the plight of the poor and the weak, - human rights activists, protectors of endangered species, advocates of women's rights, - are offspring of rich families, who often would have more comfortable lives 'making money.' Not least, Marx and many of his followers were bourgeois intellectuals who in many cases may be trusted to have felt authentic pity with the plight of exploited workers (whereas a Stalin surely did not).

What I describe here is the basic structure of the relationship between protectors and protected. It applies to many relationships, including those between helpers and recipients, children and parents, women and men, or nations in alliances. The outer poles are illustrated in Table 15:

The protector and the protected		
Parents who faithfully and lovingly protect their children against dangers deserve to be thanked by their protected children; 'recipients' of this kind of protection live in a state of 'grateful humility.'	← →	Racketeers who make a living from creating dangers they then 'protect' against deserve resentment from their exploited victims; 'recipients' of this kind of 'protection' live in a state of painful humiliation.

Table 15: The protector and the protected

Culture and Identity of Masters and Underlings

In the case of Rwanda and Burundi the Hutu are not just 'loved children or exploited victims', and the Tutsi are not just 'well-intentioned protectors of the weak or mercenaries who look for dangers they can contain and be paid for.' The situation is much more complex than that. A long-standing culture has developed around the patterns mapped out in Table 15. Peoples like the Germans, Rwandans and Burundians, accustomed through centuries to hierarchical structures, have attached their identities to their respective positions in the pecking order. Underlings may be so full of subservient humility that their masters do not have to humiliate them anymore in order to keep them down (Hutu 'inferiority complex'). Even more, underlings may go so far as to request parental care and guidance from their elites, and find masterly freedom frightening. Equally, masters will have developed a deep conviction of their call to lead (Tutsi 'superiority complex') and be convinced that their protégées will not be able to survive without their protection. For underlings, colonialism does not bring much novelty. Only their masters resent getting something they never had before - bosses.

As reported above, on 15th July 1997 I visited the Brussels premises of the Rwandan journal *Dialogue, Revue d'information et de reflexion,* that currently operates from Belgium. Charles Karemano kindly gave me his time for an analysis of humiliation (translated from French by the author): 'It is not sure that humiliation can be translated into French. I prefer the word frustration. A group of people who has no access to schooling, power, and resources feels frustrated. Humiliation is usually accompanied with a visible act. Rape for example is a humiliation, it is not done to make love with the women, but to humiliate the women. And this is the consequence of a conflict. Typically, those who have power commit acts of

humiliation, for example, they say: "You are brainless anyhow, therefore there is no need for education and schools for you."'

I ask: 'What can one do when confronted with this kind of humiliation?' He replies: 'At first it is necessary to become aware of it, there are people who find this normal, for example a worker who believes that this is how life normally is, that it even ought to be like that, - perhaps that God wants it thus. At the moment where one is aware, one has three options; (1) one can accept humiliation in the same way a buffoon at court does, who accepts it in order to make a living; (2) one may become aggressive, for example start a war of uprising; (3) one can become apathetic.' He continues, 'for example regarding development, there is something paternalistic in the inequality between North and South; giving and helping can be gestures of humiliation, not aggressive, but through expressing lack of respect.'

Karemano points at precisely the fact that many 'slaves' typically accept their lot as God's will or nature's order and turn this into 'their culture,' in other words the concept of 'learned helplessness,' is turned into long-term cultural beliefs. 'Learned helplessness' is 'a term coined by M. Seligman to characterize the generalization that helplessness is a learned state produced by exposure to noxious, unpleasant situations in which there is no possibility of escape or avoidance' (The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology, Reber, 1985[210]). Also the discussion of the 'Stockholm Syndrome' may have its place here. The 'Stockholm Syndrome' is 'An emotional bond between hostages and their captors which is frequently observed when the hostages are held for long periods of time under emotionally straining circumstances. The name derives from the instance when it was first publicly noted, when a group of hostages was held by robbers in a Stockholm bank for five days' (Reber, 1985). Johan Galtung's notion of 'penetration,' or 'implanting the topdog inside the underdog' (Galtung, 1996, 199) illustrates the fact that acceptance of subjugation may become a culture of its own even better, as does Ranajit Guha's understanding of the term 'subaltern.' 'False consciousness' is another term that comes to mind, a concept known from the traditionalist Marxist perspective indicating that workers live in a reality that oppresses them, a reality that ought to make them feel humiliated, a feeling that in turn should make them want to rise (something that they actually did, at least in the West, just not in the same way as communist ideology prescribed it). Or, in short, summarising all enumerated perspectives: What to do with a happy hostage? Further down I will come back to this discussion which is central to the concept of

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[210] See also Peterson & Maier, 1993.

humiliation, since it is often a third party that 'informs' a 'hostages' that they are hostages who ought to feel humiliated and rise.

To conclude this section we may hypothesise that, similar to Germany, hierarchy in the Great Lakes was a precondition for the later willingness of the underlings to be overly loyal to leaders who would lift them up and give them the feeling of being taken seriously, even if the ultimate result would be self-destruction (a devastated Germany and Great Lakes region).

Méfiance, Mistrust and Suspicion, the Legacy of Fertile Soil on Hilly Land In a Remote Geographical Location

There is another partly unrelated aspect that signifies Rwanda and Burundi, namely the fact that their citizens never developed villages. Families live scattered in the hills; there are no city walls such as those that protected for example medieval villages and towns in Europe against attackers. I assume that the enabling conditions for this scattered housing are provided by an environment of large areas of relatively equally distributed fertile soil in Rwanda and Burundi, allowing for a pattern of scattered dwellings, combined with a considerable remoteness on the roof of Africa. These conditions saved the area from the many waves of attackers of the kind that European villagers in the centre of Europe endured and built walls against. Softly undulating mountains and valleys, compounding the isolation stemming from remoteness, may have helped to heighten the cultural result of a lifestyle of division, namely mutual mistrust.

A German UN officer (I met him on 19th January 1999) explains (translated from German by the author) that according to his view 'mountain people are generally distrustful, even in Europe, for example Switzerland, - understandably enough, since they only see their small valley. In Burundi each family has a high fence around its house and court.' I suggest Egypt as a reference point, a country which he also knows well, and he explains that 'in Egypt social structures are much older, people are used to living in bigger groups, united by the rhythm of the river Nile, - while in the hills of the Great Lakes people are used to living with their much more limited little family.' He once did research on the evil eye and is amazed to what extent people in the Great Lakes region talk about poisoning or 'mauvaises esprits' (bad spirits). He contrasts the Great Lakes with 'no mobility, each family in its compound, with high fences, and mistrust to the neighbour' with Egypt, 'where co-operation was necessary and villages existed.'

The Genocide Response Officer for United Nations Human Rights Field Operations in Rwanda who I met on 9th August 1998 in Sweden confirms this view: 'In Rwanda and Burundi people never formed villages. Everybody has his compound and within this they live self-sufficiently. A lot of mistrust towards the other compounds develops.' I report to him a proverb of the German Alps: If you want to bring three farmers under one hat, then you have to kill two. Norway is also characterised by scattered farms and a lack of villages; there also sayings illustrate the fact that every farmer is his 'own king.' Environments that allow for isolated survival of micro-groups seem to support the development of a culture where many mini-in-groups guard their 'frontiers' against their neighbours whom they see as multiple out-groups.

In Rwanda I get a related account of traditions of mistrust (from an informant with a Tutsi background whose name I do not want to disclose): 'There are Hutu names that illustrate that there must be quite a large amount of suspicion or méfiance in the Hutu population.' Names may mean: 'I am surrounded by hatred' ('je suis dans la haine'), 'they will kill me' ('ils me tuerions'), 'I am not there because they want it,' or, 'if they could do as they like I would not live' ('je ne suis pas là grâce à eux'), or 'I am there only because of God.' Norbert Elias would perhaps call this 'Homo clausus,' the 'closed man' (Elias, 1978, 119).

However, méfiance is perhaps not just a Hutu problem. Waller writes: 'The Batutsi Mwamis also manipulated a complex web of spies, and thus not only maintained their power, but developed a capacity for political intrigue and paranoia that remains to this day throughout Rwandan society' (Waller & Oxfam, 1996, 4).

In Burundi, I hear from a physician (also with Tutsi background): 'When I visited my grandmother in the 'collines' (the hills in the country side) as a child, I was told to smile to the neighbours, but not to accept even a glass of water since this could be poisoned. Everybody was seemingly very kind to visitors, but when the visitor was away again, one behaved quite differently! When I worked at the hospital as a doctor, just in the beginning, and I had, say, twenty patients I was responsible for, I asked myself: This patient has tuberculosis, this patient has malaria, this patient has diabetes, this patient has this or that. Where are the patients who have 'des esprits'? I still was somewhere convinced that 'des esprits' cause illness! Because this was what people in the 'collines' think. When somebody falls sick, then they believe that the neighbour has poisoned or bewitched the victim.'

In *Proverbes du Rwanda* I find many proverbs that illustrate these points, proverb 3785 may serve as an example: 'Umwânzi akubaliliza nk'úmukûnzi'[211] meaning 'The enemy tries to know everything about you to better prepare his coup;' also proverb 3789: 'Umwânzi ntâbà kure'[212] meaning 'The enemy is not far;' as well as proverb 3792: 'Umwânzi ntânùká'[213] meaning 'One is often not aware of the enemy' (Crépau & Bizimana, 1979).

Incidentally, I also find a proverb that underlines what many expatriates relate to me, namely that they tend to prefer Somalis, 'who would spit into your face if they do not agree with you;' and who find the 'soft smile where you never know where you are' more difficult. Perhaps proverb 2121 that I find in *Proverbes du Rwanda* illustrates that: 'Kurárama sî kó kuramukanya'[214] meaning 'Disdain transpires even when the rules of politeness are scrupulously observed' (Crépau & Bizimana, 1979).

In February 1999 I met a German expatriate in Bujumbura whose name I do not want to disclose, who also collects proverbs, some from the Great Lakes region, and who shows me a list that he found in the writing of Father E. Rodegem[215]: 'Mpemuke ndamuke'[216] meaning 'It is better to betray than to die;' or proverb number 395 in Rodegem: 'Kmênyo agusekéra niyo akurya'[217] meaning 'The same teeth that smile at you will eat you;' proverb 161: 'Akabanga gasumba ingabíre'[218] meaning 'The guarded secret is worth more than a cow received as a gift.' Later I hear about a Tutsi proverb: 'Never teach a Hutu to shoot with bow and arrow, because he will kill you with it.'

In Rwanda / Burundi Honour Is Attached to Hierarchical Rank, while Somalia Stands For Egalitarian Pride

The pattern of humiliation is much more complicated in a hierarchical society than between 'noble' Somalis. A 'noble' Somali may try to humiliate another clan (for example by slapping a member of this clan with a shoe, or killing and mutilating him) and the other clan will act immediately and try to prevent the attempted humiliation from succeeding. In Rwanda and

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[211] 'L'ennemi s'enquiert de toi comme un ami.' Or, 'L'ennemi cherche à tout savoir de toi pour mieux préparer son coup.'
[212] 'L'ennemi n'est pas loin.' Or, 'Tout homme a des ennemis.'
[213] 'L'ennemi n'a pas d'odeur.' Or, 'On ignore souvent ses ennemis.'
[214] 'Lever les yeux, ce n'est pas saluer.' Or, 'Le mépris transparaît même lorsque les règles de politesse sont scrupuleusement observées.'
[215] Rodegem, 1983.
[216] 'Il vaut mieux trahir que mourir.' Or, 'Besser Verrat üben als sterben.'
[217] 'Les dents que te sourient sont celles qui te mangeront.' Or, 'Die Zähne, die Dich anlachen, sind die, die Dich fressen werden.'
[218] 'Le secret (gardé) vaut mieux qu'une vache recue en cadeau.'

Burundi hierarchy introduces an additional myriad of small and big institutionalised rituals of humiliation and humility between masters and underlings, see Table 16. While 'noble' Somalis are masters among themselves, without underlings to administer and guide, in Rwanda and Burundi, as in any other hierarchical society, the master-underling relationship is added to the master-master relationship. In a hierarchy, humiliation may potentially develop along many fault lines: A Tutsi king will use humiliation towards a neighbouring king in order to keep a fragile balance of war and alliances going with him, just as Somali warriors do. In addition a Tutsi master may use humiliation as a device to keep Hutu down. However, a Tutsi master may also be a benevolent and wise ruler, and, as discussed above, even a Hutu underling may believe in well-intentioned Tutsi patronage.

Yet another, significant, variant of humiliation may be evoked in cases where the high ideal of benevolent patronage is violated; the Hutu underling may feel humiliated by a Tutsi patron who pretends to be caring but in reality only exploits, and conversely, an authentically well-intentioned Tutsi patron may feel humiliated by false accusations that he is a fraud. This variant of humiliation is significant because it has already dominated vast stretches of this book, namely the entire discussion on the 'correct' history of Rwanda: Well-intentioned Tutsi are convinced that their traditional rule was benevolent, at least at its core, - and examples can indeed be found, - and therefore they feel unfairly insulted and humiliated by accusations that they were, supposedly, ruthless torturers; while the Hutu on the other side learned at some point, for example from their Belgian friends, that their Tutsi masters were less well-intentioned than they wanted to appear, and that therefore Hutu were entitled to feel humiliated by Tutsi oppression and use these feelings as justification for a revolution.

Humiliation multiplies in hierarchies			
	Humiliation and counter-humiliation are regularly employed as a tool between masters to calibrate the power balance; nobody feels permanently disadvantaged through humiliation.	Humiliation is employed as a tool by masters on underlings in order to maintain hierarchy; some underlings feel insulted through humiliation, while others accept it as a justified humbling.	Humiliation is felt as an unjustified wound by both masters and underlings when the high ideals of well-intentioned patronage are being 'unfairly' tarnished.
Egalitarian warriors (such as in Somalia), and rulers of hierarchical societies	X		
Hierarchical societies (such as Rwanda, Burundi, Germany)	X	X	X

Table 16: Humiliation multiplies in hierarchies

The key words characterising Somalia may be identified as 'egalitarian pride,' with humiliation being proudly fended off or paid back wherever it is attempted. The keywords for Rwanda and Burundi seem to be rather 'honour attached to hierarchical rank,' with humiliation being a tool used by the rulers towards their underlings and a feeling potentially felt by all participants at different occasions. To be abased within a hierarchy is a humiliation that is equal to losing honour. In Somalia, subordination within a hierarchy is not an acceptable option for proud warriors: 'a man should be killed and not humiliated' (see above quoted Somali proverb). In Rwanda and Burundi there are many levels ranked into a hierarchy, each with its own honour attached. Every superior has to be 'honoured' and can be humiliated by a lowering of honour, either inflicted on him by others of himself. It starts with the family: 'In the heart of the family, education is not egalitarian: the young owes honour and respect to all ancestors, to all those of the superior generation, and all those in one's own

generation who are older.'[219] (As in Somalia, the notion of outcasts exists also in Rwanda and Burundi, as is illustrated by Melchior, but it is supplemented with much more organised and integrated hierarchical structures than in Somalia.)

To summarise this section on pre-colonial traditions and their relationship with humiliation, it may be proposed that Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi all have started out, far back in history, as thinly populated regions in a 'pre-Security Dilemma' situation, proud and humble just as the hunter-gatherers that Ury studied. Scarcity protected Somalia from being conquered by neighbouring empires and scarcity also foreclosed homemade empires; perhaps remoteness did the same for Rwanda and Burundi, protecting it against being conquered, - perhaps not, depending on which version of Tutsi origin one believes in. In any case, Rwandan and Burundian fertility fed so many people that a hierarchical society could develop. When competition for resources became fiercer and the Security Dilemma imposed its logic on Somalia, proud and mobile masters found out how to stay free in a Security Dilemma context, namely by fierce aggression in the face of whatever obstacle; thus they kept each other in check, pushed weaker competitors into outcast exclusion (*sab*) or away (Borana), and occasionally robbed the helpless farmers in the fertile valleys at their borders.

Nomadic pride is ferocious and attempts of humiliation are not allowed to succeed. Unlike in Rwanda and Burundi, where pastoralists and farmers are not merely neighbours, but also intertwined in an intricate culture of institutionalised rites of honour, humiliation and humility, a culture that acquired the colour of 'méfiance' perhaps because of a fertile mountainous remoteness that allowed micro-groups to subsist in self-sufficient division. In Somalia one culture dominates, the culture of those who confront the Security Dilemma as independent players. In Rwanda and Burundi, as in other hierarchical societies, there are two cultures, the leaders carry a proud 'Somali-like' culture, and the underlings a culture of humble limitation, limitation of both the danger and freedom that accompany the Security Dilemma.

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[219] 'Au sein d'une famille, l'éducation est inegalitaire: le jeune doit honneur et respect à tous les anciens, à toutes les personnel de la géneration supérieure et à toute personne de sa génération plus âgée que lui' (Ntampaka, 1997, 11).

Colonial Times

Somalia

Somalis Join the Rest of the World

Colonial times gave Somalia a significance that it never had before. Suddenly Somalia's geopolitical location was important. Colonial powers vied for control or influence in the region and Somalia was part of this pie. Something that Somalis had never experienced before, namely super-ordinate institutional structures, accompanied by a culture to maintain it, was suddenly imposed, by bribery and/or by force; and the Somalis were exploited. What other, more fertile regions in the world had experienced ages ago, befell Somalis at the onset of colonialism: the subjugation of pristine 'noble' Somali masters by stronger masters overpowering them from outside - at least this is what colonial powers intended, although they could not really carry it out. Most colonial powers, particularly the British in the North, opted for 'indirect rule,' meaning that they used the existing local power structures and did not bother to really work themselves into the whole society. But still, these new super-masters attempted to build hierarchies and state-like organisations that went far beyond the traditional Somali juxtaposition of low castes with 'nobles.' The noble Somalis thus joined the rest of the world, as latecomers, in the experience of humiliation stemming from being conquered and subsequently being routinely humiliated as defeated underlings.

Somalis and Resistance to Humiliation: The First Air Battle in Africa

However, as stated above, Somalis are used to responding quickly to humiliation, they are the last ones to simply succumb to it. They are proud even today that they did not meekly accept Christianisation and 'lick the hands of Christian missionaries' as so many other Africans did, but that, instead, they kept their own religion.

The first renowned figure who powerfully resisted colonisation was Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hassan who lived from 1860 to 1921. He is a very interesting figure in Somali history. Global society may learn many things from him, for example about the power of speech and how words can create cohesion even when cohesive structures are absent (a good lesson for the global information society); but he also made mistakes. He gave up military advantages for modern technology that at the end did not hold its promise. This could be a lesson to all so-called developing countries, not only Somalia, who, just to appear 'modern,'

commit what I would call self-humiliation by believing that they should adopt and imitate any Western technology' even if it is not functional for them.

First to the power of the word: Ali Mazrui familiarises us with Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hassan and with the role of the Somali language that 'has been particularly striking.' He writes: 'No society in Africa is as deeply wedded to poetry and verse as the Somali, and no society has evolved as elaborate a culture of verbal composition and eloquence, a ritual use of the Muse, as these nomads have done. Their greatest hero of the twentieth century was Muhammad Abdilleh Hassan, whom the British designated as the "Mad Mullah". He fought the British and Italians with great cunning and dexterity; but he was also a great user of the Somali language. The so-called "Mad Mullah" was in fact an inspired Muse. In a land where almost every third person is a poet, Muhammad Abdilleh Hassan stands out as one of the greatest Somali poets of all time. In him patriotism and poetry were married to each other, resounding among the hills and sand-dunes of the Horn of Africa. The career of Muhammad Abdilleh Hassan was probably the most dramatic illustration of how the Somali as a stateless society managed to achieve substantial social cohesion partly through the role of language among the clans. In the place of structures of control the Somali evolved a culture of co-operation' (Mazrui, 1986, 69).

Or, as B. W. Andrzejewski, renowned translator of Somali poems, wrote about the Sayid (or Maxamed Cabdille Xasan in Somali writing): 'He received a very thorough Islamic education in Somalia and later travelled to Arab countries, where he further advanced his knowledge and became familiar with the revivalist trends in Islam at the time. On his return he organized a Dervish Movement to oppose the foreign powers (British, Italian and Ethiopian) who ruled the Somali territories, and proved to be an astute war leader, fighting for about twenty years until his defeat in 1920 and death in exile a year later. He was an outstanding poet, using his poems as an effective form of propaganda, and he is often called simply the Sayid, ("Lord" or "Master") the title his followers gave him' (Andrzejewski & Andrzejewski, 1993, 27).

There are many poems that could be quoted here to illustrate Somali oral prowess and particularly the Sayid's ability to create cohesion with words. In *Perhaps the Trumpet Has Sounded* the Sayid 'laments over the disaster [that the whole of Somali society was torn apart by war] and over the moral degradation for which he blames his Somali opponents, accusing them of supporting the colonial powers' (Andrzejewski & Andrzejewski, 1993, 42):
Grievous times are now upon us, times of death and woe.
The sky has turned to smoke,

There is uproar and shrieking, columns of dust, attacks –

In truth this world is smouldering with strife

And with forebodings of war.

Friends part and head their different ways,

Close kinsmen align themselves in rival factions

And pierce each other's flesh with spears.

Loyalty to one's kin, and respect for the parents of one's spouse,

Are ways of life which are now dead.

Men run wildly about in pursuit of vengeance,

Supporting the unbelievers, who offer them grain for food.

Foreign soldiers are the ones they choose

In preference to the Prophet, on whom be peace.

They are besotted with these tufted officers

And declare themselves men who belong to Swayne,

Meekly accepting his rule in the places where he makes his camp.

…

The observance of the Tradition

And of binding obligations,

The feeding of guests,

The giving of charitable gifts on feast days,

Wise discourse and Sufi piety,

Forgiveness for the sake of the Faith –

These happy practices of holy joy are all forsaken

And goodness now is spurned'

(42, 43).

As mentioned above, the Sayid also made some crucial mistakes. He gave away the advantage of mobility, built garrisons in the middle of the desert, and tried to meet the British in open battle: 'Although the building of the fortress gave the Daraawiish the appearance of supremacy in the area, it was also a complete contradiction of the guerrilla warfare tactics that the Daraawiish had adopted in previous years, and would give the enemy a fixed target to attack and a defined territory for battle' (Issa-Salwe, 1996, 31). The Sayid was finally defeated by British air bombardment, the first time Africa witnessed such weaponry.

Master Meets Master: Ali Jimale Ahmed and Ioan M. Lewis

Undoubtedly, the Sayid contributed much to Somali national identity and their emotional attachment to an overall Somali unity. He is a Somali hero, in the eyes of Somalis. The British, on the other hand, were most probably astonished, or even furious at so much unexpected resistance. Since he was their enemy he was not the 'Sayid,' the 'Master' for them, but the 'Mad Mullah.' Today, colonialism is gone, and very few are proud of it. Having forcefully subjugated colonial 'subjects' is no longer a source of Western honour; on the contrary, it is a source of shame. A person who is proud of past colonial 'victories' is called a 'racist' today.

And this is exactly what has happened to the renowned anthropologist and Somali expert Ioan M. Lewis, who is caught in the course of changing definitions of what is honour and what is humiliation, and for whom. Ali Jimale Ahmed, teaching comparative literature at Queens College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, bitterly accuses Lewis of racism and colonial arrogance. According to him, 'Lewis's racist position became very clear in 1992 when, in the columns of the *The Times* of London, referring to the resignation of the Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun from his UN post in Somalia, he wrote [Lewis, 1992]: "Nearly 80 years ago a brave servant of the empire called Richard Corfield also tried to bring order to the Somalis, when they were rebellious under a religious leader dubbed the Mad Mullah by the British. All Corfield got for his pains was a bullet in the head in battle and a place in the epic poetry of Somalia - a bloodthirsty hymn to victory that has lived on in a society steeped in antagonism to outsiders"' (Ahmed, 1995, 76).

Ali Jimale Ahmed clearly is deeply hurt and feels painfully humiliated by the way his people's uprising against British oppressors is depicted by the former oppressor: 'He [Lewis] continues his indoctrination on Somalia by saying, "first to understand about the Somalis is that they are not as other men.... they take orders from nobody; and their sense of independence is matched by a supremely uncentralized and fragmented degree of political organization, a kind of ordered anarchy."… This rhetoric reveals unequivocally Lewis' deep racism and his defense of colonialism and domination. It is hard to believe that he is talking about human beings and not about wild horses. It should be noted that he specifies that Corfield was not killed in his bed, but in battle, because for the author he is a hero. I.M. Lewis "the Somalist" does not care in the same way about those killed by the British who resorted to air bombardment against the Somalis; he merely says, en passant: "But the rebellion of the Mad Mullah (Mohamed Abdille Hassan) lasted 20 years and eventually had to be put down by air power." The colonial literature is full of such obscenities, in which there is no

condemnation of the atrocities committed by the European powers but rather an emphasis on the ignorance, the violence, and the barbarism of the natives. Some may use a milder rhetoric which blends paternalism with contempt, but in essence they are the same' (Ahmed, 1995, 76, 77).

Somalis Never Benefited From Super-Ordinate Structures. Or, Why Somalis Did Not Learn That Bowing to Red Traffic Lights May Be a Good Idea

The quote from Ali Jimale Ahmed illustrates how colonialism has impinged on Somali identity. Hassan Abdi Keynan says in an interview: 'Foreigners have dominated literature and the discourse about Somalia; foreigners coming to Somalia and trying to educate other foreigners about what they have seen. So, there has been a tradition of foreigners asking other foreigners about the Somalis, but never, never really having real contact with the Somalis themselves. I think that this is a very dangerous thing' (25th November 1999 in Oslo).

These voices illustrate how Somalis interpret colonialism, and how their cultural background guides their responses to it. Undoubtedly, being cruelly and ignorantly subjugated is a terrible experience. The first reaction, especially by proud masters, must be expected to be uncompromising resistance in the line of 'rather dead than red,' as explained by a Somali father to his son (in the novel *In the Name of Our Fathers*): 'There are certain things that people should live for, fight for, or even die for… Freedom is only one of them' (Osman, 1996, 22).

In other parts of the world, where hierarchy was institutionalised ages ago, long before Somalia tasted it, people had to a certain extent learned to cope with it in a more 'flexible' way. The Czech 'good soldier Schweik' (a figure created by Jaroslav Hasek, 1983-1923) is an example of a person who resists oppression in very subtle ways, he resists with humour, by appearing stupid, with well-hidden sabotage, and with especially clever argumentation. The Czech population as a whole is said to have the abilities of the 'good soldier Schweik.' Many call Egyptians, having been occupied for more than 2000 years (until 1952), 'the Czechs of the Arab World.' Conceivably, oppressed populations develop special abilities in the field of communication, abilities that cover a whole range of subtle manipulation methods, in between the categorical 'either/or' of taking up arms, or completely losing self-respect. Charlie Chaplin's films are archetypical expressions of the sabotage of oppression by the underdog.

This links up to the discussion already opened about the benefits of super-ordinate structures and, also, to the discussion on zero sum games and expandable pies. Keynan says

(interview in Oslo, 25th November 1999): 'There is a tradition in the clan system which I call a zero sum game. When people are trying to play politics within the context of the clan system there is a tendency to reduce everything to a zero sum game, so that everybody can be challenged ad infinitum, you know: regardless of whether you are objective or not, it is sufficient for anybody to say that since you are from a different clan what you say cannot be objective at all. So, that is an exaggeration really, but there is that kind of tradition is in the clan system.' What Keynan warns against here is that a super-ordinate view is judged as being impossible and that this condemnation forecloses all benefits that may be introduced by a super-ordinate position.

The important point in Keynan's argument, both logically and practically, is that super-ordinate structures may increase the pie, not just diminish it. Clearly, there is no doubt that an oppressive and thieving elite, stealing from everybody, diminishes the pie. I repeatedly heard a joke that illustrates that: Three African dictators sit together and brag about having the largest palace. They decide to visit all three palaces and judge by themselves. They come to the first one and find quite many rooms, many cars, and many wives. The proud owner goes to the window and says to his friends: 'Do you see? There is a stadium, an airport and a street connecting both with the palace [implying that the country otherwise is without infrastructure].' He then raises his finger and explains: 10 %! [meaning that he stole from the funds available for infrastructure 10% for building his palace]. His friends are impressed. Soon they arrive at the second palace. They find even more rooms, cars, and wives! The owner leads his friends to the window and shows them the stadium, the airport and the street. He raises his finger and proudly exclaims: 20%! The others are even more impressed. They finally come to the third palace and find significantly more rooms, cars, and wives! The proud owner goes to the window. His friends follow and see nothing, no stadium or street, only desolation. He triumphantly calls out: '100%!' This joke identifies one extreme pole of a spectrum of what super-ordinate structures may be used for, namely the pole of exploitation.

But there is also another pole. An elite may, either in a parental and nurturing way, or in an egalitarian manner, regulate and manage a complex system of super-ordinate institutions, rules, regulations, in short, traffic rules, that may increase the overall cake, and not loot the surplus, but distribute it so that everybody gets a larger piece. The patronising/nurturing version is connected to hierarchical societal structures, while the egalitarian/nurturing version of team members co-ordinating such super-ordinate structures fits the modern knowledge society, see Table 17.

Proud Somalis have a tradition that lends itself to the modern egalitarian type of super-ordinate structures that are based on voluntary co-ordination, such as expressed in their traditional Council of Elders. But they are certainly not compatible with being oppressed, for example by colonial masters. They may, and this seems to have happened in some cases, learn to appreciate the nurturing services of an elite. However, they may falsely categorise these services as rightful pasture, forgetting that a certain degree of subordination under a common rule is paramount for the functioning of super-ordinate structures: when you want to enjoy the green traffic light, then you have to stop at the red light. In other words, a super-ordinate structure such as traffic rules, based on a contract of common consensus, offers both rights and duties. Newcomers to the system may want to have green lights all the time and interpret red lights as humiliation; this is at least to be expected when masters are newly integrated into a super-ordinate structure. And this is how some 'noble' Somalis may be characterised.

In other words, sometimes it is necessary to bow, for example to consensual rules such as traffic regulations. Somalis never had a chance to see that, at least not at a level that was higher than their Council of Elders. They did not have much chance to learn that super-ordinate structures may increase the cake for everybody and that they have to be managed and maintained in a certain way. What they were presented with was a system under which colonial masters forced super-ordinate structures upon them, in a humiliating way, and drew resources from their colonies for their own use.

Super-ordinate structures
Super-ordinate structures ↓ if nurtured and well managed (by maintaining and 'bowing' to super-ordinate needs without interpreting such bowing as undue humiliation) ↓ may yield a surplus that may be ↙   ↘
Looted by an elite   ←   →   distributed fairly to the benefit of all

Table 17: Super-ordinate structures

I will use the term 'super-ordinate structures' frequently in the rest of this thesis. It is time to explain in a more detail what I mean when I use this term. I subsume a host of aspects in this term, I conceptualise 'super-ordinate structures' as an 'experience' that leads to certain 'framing,' that in turn helps to form institutions, that, in an interwoven circular movement, again influence experience and framing, see Table 18:

Super-ordinate structures entail experience, framing, and institutions	
Experience ↓↑	Through travelling and media we learn to 'see' larger entities. Ultimately, it is the spaceship that provides humankind with the highest possible super-ordinate view, since it shows the planet from afar and gives its inhabitants a sense of its oneness. Today television news all over the world begin with the image of the globe.
Framing ↓↑	The word 'nation,' for example, gives its citizens a framing according to which they organise their behaviour; the ultimate super-ordinate framing is the word 'global village.'
Institutions	Clans, tribes, fiefdoms, nations, empires, all have institutions that bind them together at the top level; in the case of democratic nations, there are legislative, executive, and juridical institutions. The ultimate super-ordinate institutions are currently been built within the United Nations.

Table 18: Super-ordinate structures entail experience, framing, and institutions

When I refer to 'experience,' then I mean, among others, those experiences that bind people together, such as 'super-ordinate goals' that are studied, for example, by Samuel L. Gaertner and John F. Dovidio.[220] An environment that is formed as a win-win situation may be expected to lend itself to bringing people together, while zero sum circumstances, for example, may increase the likelihood of divisions between people.

The term 'framing' in Table 18 I use in the way Lee Ross introduces it (Sommerakademie Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 11th – 16th July 1999, in Clemenswerth, Germany): Ross could show that players of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game 'defected' when the game was presented to them as a 'Wallstreet game,' and 'co-operated' when the game was presented as a 'community game' (see Ross & Samuels, 1993). These results weaken three

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[220] See, for example, Dovidio & Gaertner, in Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; Gaertner et al., Stroebe & Hewstone, 1993; Gaertner et al., 1999; Gaertner, Sedikides, & Graetz, 1999; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1999).

common beliefs, namely i) that human beings only act according to their character (that they are either aggressive defectors, or peace-loving co-operators), ii) that people always want to get the biggest piece of the cake, and iii) that in case of a struggle for scarce resources the game unavoidably turns into the Wallstreet game.

These experiments draw attention to the importance of the 'label' of a situation (or the 'framing'), they highlight the fact that the same situation, with identical aspects, can be played out in very different ways just because they carry different labels. In an experiment a label is given to the game by those who lead the experiment, but also in real life labels occur. Lee Ross mentions (1999, at Clemenswerth) the election of the pope, which should be impossible to solve given the vast divergent positions involved. The negotiations are carried out, however, in the spirit of 'we must have a pope!' 'Failure is not an option,' Ross affirms, the label of the Pope election 'game' is 'that co-operation is unavoidable.'[221]

Colonial Somalia was characterised by quite a high degree of regional variation, or, in other words, by diverging patterns of experience-framing-institutions, illustrating the complex range from exploitation to patronage. In the South of Somalia Italian colonisers introduced banana plantations that required a higher level of management (and another kind of super-ordinate structurs) than traditional farming and they largely enjoyed the profits themselves, while the British in the North bothered less with imposing structures, since they 'only' needed Somaliland for geopolitical reasons and some meat supplies for Aden. The British had a very limited presence, only a few were stationed in 'British Somaliland' and they obviously displayed quite a few nurturing traits. Abdulqadir H. Ismail Jirdeh, and Ahmed El Kahin were appreciative of the British colonial presence and made it very clear act that the North had never been a 'colony,' but a 'protectorate' (interview 19th November 1998).

Eighty-four years old Ali Sheikh Jirdeh is a voice that speaks out for the nurturing aspects of elites and super-ordinate structures. He was born in Sheikh in the North of Somalia in 1916 (interview 23rd November 1998 in Hargeisa[222]). His father was the last person the

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[221] Lee Ross designed various experiments with the intention to shed more light on these mechanisms. For example, he asked students to find a solution to a problem and told one group that 'success is inevitable' and another group that 'success would be difficult, but possible.' Those students who were told that 'success is inevitable' were more likely to solve the problem. In everyday life we are confronted with such framing processes all the time, Ross explains, when we go to play tennis, for instance, we assume we enter a 'Wallstreet game,' when we work as social workers, we assume we enter a 'community game.' Often both games occur together. Different professions, for example, entail varying combinations of both, lawyers' daily professional life entails the 'community game' as far as they are not allowed to sell their client out, and 'Wallstreet game' as far as they are adversaries to the opponent in the judicial argument.

[222] Ali Sheikh Jirdeh will be given the word also further down; the quotes stem from several meetings.

British sent to the 'Mad Mullah' to negotiate with him. The sheikh explains that the Mad Mullah was fighting the British, while the Majerteen were fighting the Italians, and that they protected each other's backsides. He remembers that 'when the British chased the Mad Mullah away, by land and air, the Italians had a better chance to attack the Majerteen, by sea and land. The Majerteen Sultanate had strong trading connections with Saudi Arabia, and the Italians wanted to block that.'

He explains further that his father was a religious man, and a friend of the British governor. He, the son, went to a Koranic school. His father subsequently accepted a British scholarship to send his son to Sudan, still as a child, for schooling. The people in Sheikh 'criticised my father that he should send the child to Sudan for education, because people feared that everybody who took education, became a Christian.' But his father sent him anyhow. He became an engineer, and was accepted as a civil servant in 'British Somaliland' when he came back. When the Italians conquered British Somaliland during World War II, he fled to Aden. There he worked as an engineer. When the British gained control of their Somali protectorate again, he returned with them and started building government buildings for them, schools, altogether public buildings, everywhere in the country.

Ali Sheikh Jirdeh explains that the British did not intermarry with the Somalis. He says that the Italians were much more part of the local community. 'When the British gave up their colony, no British person stayed, but half of the Italians stayed. The British educated the local people, but the Italians did not.' He continues: 'The British had their headquarters in Sheikh. There were only about 200 British here.' He explains, that he even had British labourers working under him. The British sent him also to Uganda because they needed his expertise there. They did not send him to Kenya though, 'because they had a colour barrier there, a black person could not enter all places.'

I ask Ali Sheikh Jirdeh whether he felt humiliated by the British, he says 'no.' He repeats: 'Look, they were only 200! The Somalis wanted independence, because they had enough well educated Somalis who could run the country, not because they felt humiliated.'

Sheikh Jirdeh is not the only case, there are many such biographies: 'Suleiman Mohamud Adam was born in Ainabo in 1936 in the then British Somaliland Protectorate. During his early childhood he lived with his nomadic pastoralist family before winning successive scholarships to be educated at the Sheikh and Amud boys boarding schools which the British established in the Protectorate. He completed higher education in the UK, reading History at Leeds University, before returning home in 1964 to a by now independent Somalia.' (Biography of Adam, 1998). Adam describes how the British tried to 'convince the

Somalis of British Power' and built a radio station (regular broadcasting from Hargeisa started in 1943): After nine months of Italian rule, the British reoccupied the then Somaliland Protectorate in 1941. War was still being waged in Europe and the Far East, and the British Government was making all efforts to recreate a favourable picture of their rule, system of Government and mode of life. Moreover, Britain had to convince the Somalis of British power. After all, the Italians drove the British out of the Protectorate in 1940 and the impression was created that Italy was perhaps the greater of the two powers. Thus, although Britain had worsted Italy on the battlefield in 1941, it could not leave anything to chance. It wanted to impress on the Somalis that British power was impregnable. Radio propaganda was the answer' (Adam, 1998, 10).

Abdilkarim represents the voice emphasising the exploitative aspects of elites and super-ordinate structures. He has a less positive view of both colonialism and missionaries and makes clear to me that for him they were the worst humiliation: 'For example, Somalis, or Africans altogether, we were colonised. In this colonial era, they divided our countries. They did it for their own sake. We felt that they had no right to do so; we felt it was unjust and no good. From there came hatred.' He then addresses missionaries: 'Why did they want to force me? Why not let me chose? We felt that it was not right. Those things were the most humiliating!'

What was it then Somalis learned during colonial times? The 'noble' Somalis were subjugated, more than ever and for the first time in their history. They were certainly used to humiliating others, their *sab* and their farmers, but not to suffering this fate themselves. This was a major humiliation. This humiliation united them, and the 'Sayid' stands for their attempt to fight back. As Somalis say, when somebody tries to humiliate them, they will fight back and avoid being humiliated. Against the superior weapons carried by their colonial masters, however, they could not win. They therefore tasted the state of humiliation. In the North this experience was attenuated, at least for some, for those who enjoyed almost egalitarian relations with the British and learned, perhaps, something about nurturing super-ordinate structures that could later translate into democratic institutions. Admittedly, the pie of resources cannot increase much in such a scarce environment as the North of Somalia (unless one finds oil or makes it the heaven of adventure tourism), only in the more fertile parts of the South did Somalis learn that complex structures such as for example banana plantations yield a profit. Since the Italian colonisers siphoned off this profit, Somalis may not have learned well enough that such profit, apart from being harvested, needs to be nurtured, maintained, managed and distributed to more than just a few by impartial care-takers of

super-ordinate institutional structures. Thus they were not prepared for the idea of a democratic state.

Rwanda and Burundi

Tutsi Masters and Hutu Underlings meet Walloon Masters and Flemish Underlings

Dorsey explains that 'The League of Nations conferred mandatory status upon the Belgian acquisition of Ruanda-Urundi on August 23, 1923. Its confirmation made Belgium responsible "for peace, good order, and good administration" of the territory. Belgians were to abolish slavery, protect all inhabitants against fraud, and enhance, "by all means in her power," the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants.' Belgium had been criticised and attacked 'from members of the United Nations Trustee Council and Visiting Mission, who had accused Belgium of exploiting its African charges,' and had attempted to counter criticism of their rule by the so-called Belgian Thesis, in which Belgium outlines 'the moral obligation to bring civilization and self-government to its African dependents' (Dorsey, 1994, 183, 184).

A Rwandese intellectual who does not want to be named, related to me on 24th January 1999, in Kigali, that he believes that the Belgian colonisers 'imported' a much starker humiliation than had existed before: 'Belgians suffer from severe divisions since a long time, this is known. When Belgium was our colonial master, the French speaking Belgians, the Walloons, were the "topdogs," and the Flemish speaking Belgians were the humiliated "underdogs." (This has been somewhat turned upside down today since the Flemish are economically more successful than their French speaking compatriots.) They projected their deep division onto Rwanda. They "imported" their psychological map and their feelings. The topdogs identified with the Tutsi and the underdogs with the Hutu.'

My interlocutor continues his account: 'Before the advent of the colonisers the hierarchical structures that existed in Rwanda where highly interwoven, there were nothing like two clear-cut camps. My father, for example, gave cows to others in order to ally himself with them, but he also was the receiver of cows from a family who was superior to him. There was peaceful co-existence and to a certain extent reciprocal relations of mutual protection between protectors and protected, patrons and patronised. The Belgians introduced something new and destructive, namely a clear bifurcation and feelings of worthiness and unworthiness.'

However, as to be expected, a Hutu from Burundi writes to me on 9th January 2000: 'I think that we exaggerate when we say that Belgians have introduced the system of inequalities among "Hutus" and "Tutsis". This is above all inherent of a very vertical feudal regime like Rwanda where farmers (Hutus) and breeders (Tutsi) struggle to monopolize the economic surplus.'

This account is underpinned by the more than cordial and close relationship that is expressed in the words of Hutu Minister of the Interior and Social Affairs, B. Bicamumpaka, words of farewell for Guy Logiest when he is leaving for the Congo: 'You will remain, despite your departure, among us, and, from mouth to mouth, from father to son, our nation will speak of your courage, of your justice, of your equity, in one word of the man who helped us to liberate us totally from feudalism and colonialism: of YOU, my Colonel! Kigali, the 1st June 1963 For the Republic of Rwanda The Minister of the Interior and Social Affairs, B. Bicamumpaka' (Logiest, 1982, 214, translated by the author, capitalisation in original[223]). These are words of true thankfulness from a 'slave' who has been freed.

Understandably, the dethroned Tutsi master does not appreciate such words. This is what the Tutsi side (UNAR, Union Nationale Rwandaise, a royalist Tutsi party) says about Logiest's departure: 'Now, liberated from the old chief of the colonial administration of Rwanda, freed from all successors to that regime, and proud of our independence, we can say without regret: Adieu my "Colonel"' (Logiest, 1982, 212[224]). Logiest seems to quote this passage from his 'enemies' in his book almost with pleasure, because he regards himself as the saviour of the oppressed Hutu who had endured the 'collective crimes' of an 'oppressive caste.' He writes: 'I understood the joy of the UNAR about the prospect of my departure. I had not spared this party that always defended the privileges of an oppressive caste. It had too many crimes on its collective conscience' (212[225]).

Logiest identifies closely with the role of the benevolent patron that has been discussed above and shows this clearly when he admits that he thought that he would also be

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[223] 'Vous resterez, nonobstant votre départ, parmi nous et, de bouche en bouche, de père en fils, notre Nation parlera de votre courage, de votre justice, de votre équité, en un mot de l'homme qui nous a aidés a nous libérer totalement de la féodalité et du colonialisme: de VOUS, mon Colonel!' Kigali, le 1er juin 1963 Pour le Peuple de la République Rwandaise Le Ministre de l'Intérieur et des Affaires Sociales, B. Bicamumpaka' (Logiest, 1982, 214, capitalisation in original).
[224] 'Alors, libérés de l'ancien chef de l'administration coloniale au Rwanda, exempts de toutes les sequelles du régime, et fiers de notre indépendance, nous pourrons dire sans regret: Adieu mon "Colonel."' (Logiest, 1982, 212).
[225] 'Je comprenais la joie de l'UNAR, à l'annonce de mon départ. Je n'avais pas épargné ce parti qui défendait toujours les privilèges d'une caste oppressive. Il avait trop de crimes sur sa conscience collective' (Logiest, 1982, 212).

welcome in Africa after independence: 'What were our thoughts during the last months of the year 1959 [before the Congo where he was stationed became independent], at a point when we confronted a political change that came much faster than expected? We, the European cadres of the public authorities, we imagined, quite naïvely, that the mission to maintain public order and the mission of defending the territory would stay the same, that we would be staying in our posts irrespective of the form of the future government. Today, such opinions seem utopian. It is now unthinkable that officers and sub-officers should serve in the ranks of a foreign army. But in 1959, such thoughts still seemed normal and even logical to us. Clearly we did not expect that the independence would be total from the very beginning. There was talk of autonomy with certain areas reserved, such as undoubtedly public order and defence. But it has to be said also, that whatever the political decision was to be, we thought that we would stay in our posts because we felt that the Congo was our home' (Logiest, 1982, 31, translated by the author [226]).

The reflections presented above may clarify the situation. Table 11 may be adapted and yield Table 19:

[226] 'Quelles étaient nos pensées au cours des derniers mois de 1'annee 1959, alors que nous nous attendions à un bouleversement politique beaucoup plus proche que prévu? Nous, les cadres européens de la Force publique, nous nous imaginions assez naïvement que, la mission de maintien de 1'ordre public et la mission de défense du territoire restant les mêmes, nous serions maintenus à nos postes quelle que fut la forme politique du futur gouvernement.
Aujourd'hui, de telles opinions paraissent utopiques. Il est impensable actuellement que des officiers et des sous-officiers servent dans les rangs d'une armée étrangère. Et cependant, en 1959, ces pensées nous semblaient normales et même logiques. Nous ne nous attendions évidemment pas que l'indépendance soit complète dès le début. On parlait plutôt d'autonomie avec certaines matières réservées, dont sans doute l'ordre public et la défense. Mais il faut dire aussi que, quelle que fut la décision politique, nous pensions rester à nos postes parce que nous nous sentions chez nous au Congo' (Logiest, 1982, 31).

The environment, culture and the individual actor in Logiest's Rwanda		
Variable 1	Environment	Masters and underlings struggle to safeguard their piece of the pie in a zero sum game where the cake is a fixed pie (land is limited).
Variable 2	Culture (group level)	There are two cultures, the culture of masters and the culture of underlings: Tutsi masters compete within the context of the Security Dilemma with neighbouring masters (see also free and noble Somali warriors). Hutu underlings co-operate with their masters and with each other, either voluntarily or by being oppressed.
Variable 3	The individual actor	Guy Logiest sets out to change both Rwandan cultures. He teaches Hutu underlings that the treatment they receive is humiliating for them and that they have the option to abolish underling culture and become masters themselves.

Table 19: The environment, culture and the individual actor in Logiest's Rwanda

It is now known that thirty years later the oppressed Hutu underlings that were supported by Logiest perpetrated a horrific genocide. Was this Logiest's intention? I believe not. His writings give evidence of sincere empathy and care for the fate of African countries, and especially the oppressed among them, and considerable pride of having been a 'good' and benevolent patron, even a liberator, a hero. If we take Table 15 and transform it into Table 20 we may perhaps be entitled to map his views as follows:

Benevolent patrons and evil exploiters in Rwanda		
Logiest sees himself as a parent who faithfully and lovingly protects his Hutu children against dangers and deserves to be thanked by the protected children; and they do, they thank him.	← →	Logiest perceives Tutsi masters as cruel oppressors who make a living from creating dangers they then 'protect' against, and who deserve to be toppled by their exploited victims. And they despise him.

Table 20: Benevolent patrons and evil exploiters in Rwanda

The Significant Fault Line Runs Between Moderates and Extremists

How can genocide be the result under such 'benevolent' circumstances? I believe that at this point something becomes clear that should have been noticed all along by all players (and is in fact acknowledged by many I met in Rwanda and Burundi), namely that another categorisation must take place. At the Conference of Higher Education for Peace (4th – 6th May 2000 in Tromsø, North Norway), the peace researcher Johan Galtung, travelling around the globe several times a year and closely involved in numerous peace processes, explains: 'There is always a hard and a soft version of each religious creed. The soft ones have to unite and get into dialogue with the hard ones! If one gets the hard ones to the negotiation table they will come only for the 'per diem'! And will repeat in words what their comrades do with weapons.' Galtung furthermore identifies three culprits for the current ills of the world, namely (a) the Western obsession with what he calls the Manichean dichotomy of 'good' against 'evil' derived from the Biblical scenario of Armageddon, (b) the Darwinist belief of the 'survival of the fittest,' combined with (c) the conviction of economic experts that 'weeding out' the 'unworthy' is the royal way to well-being, and the welfare state a sin against this.

I would like to calibrate Galtung's arguments in a slightly different way: I believe that he is right with the 'soft' and 'hard' versions, not only of religion, but many more categories typically being employed for identifying groups. I believe that all categories so far used in this text would benefit from being relegated to 'folkloric' categories rather than significant ones, because each of these 'groups' entails the much more significant dichotomy, namely 'soft' and 'hard,' with its representatives, the 'moderates' and 'extremists,' see Table 21. As discussed above, it is not 'Hutu' versus 'Tutsi,' 'colonisers' versus 'colonised,' not 'international community' versus 'recipient country,' or 'men' versus 'women' but rather 'those people interested in guarding power for themselves' (the 'hard' ones, or the 'extremists,' who elevate 'folkloric' categories to significant categories for purposes of misuse) versus 'those who aim at co-operation and are willing to share power' (the 'soft' ones or 'moderates').

And, differentiating Galtung's criticism of Western obsession with dichotomies, I believe that the moderate-extremist dichotomy is extremely important, I would claim that it may even be a good idea to be obsessed by wanting to detect it, - not because it is a dichotomy of 'good' and 'evil' (since it is well-known that extremists may be former victims and thus not inherently evil), - but because it has a decisive effect on peace and war.

Moderates know that the anarchic 'state of nature' and the Security Dilemma are not to be idolised, as those Darwinists and economists do who are criticised by Galtung.

Moderates know that societies and their citizens are better off in an environment where the anarchic 'state of nature' and the Security Dilemma are attenuated by constructive co-operation and not intensified in a way that leads towards destructive war. Moderates know that individuals and groups need a certain amount of nurturance in order to be 'fit' (see also Lakoff & Johnson's discussion of the Strict Father conception of morality as opposed to the Nurturance metaphor of morality in the chapter on morality in Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Moderates want enabling nurturance for all, while extremists typically want nurturance for their own people only and justify their victory with their 'fitness' - a sweeping tautology.

Moderates are also less prone to be swayed by barriers to conflict resolution of the kind described by Lee D. Ross (Ross & Ward, 1995), namely reactive devaluation in negotiation and conflict resolution (Ross, in Arrow, Mnookin, Ross, Tversky, & Wilson, 1995). Reactive devaluation means that any proposition for compromise that is put forward by an adversary is rejected, regardless of its contents, while the own group's arguments are regarded by its members with sympathy, just because they come from the own group. The characteristic of moderates is to rise above the level of opposing sub-groups, perceive all members as part of a larger in-group, and employ impartial empathy, compassion and understanding on all members of all sub-groups.

The significant fault line runs between moderates and extremists	
'Moderates' (Tutsi, Hutu, colonisers, colonised, men, women)	← → 'Extremists' (Tutsi, Hutu, colonisers, colonised, men, women)

Table 21: The significant fault line runs between moderates and extremists

The ideal model of modern democracy consisting of citizens who enjoy human rights (Table 22 as adapted from Table 17) will only 'work' if moderates lead it. Then it has a chance to yield revenues that may benefit all and not be siphoned off by an elite of thieves.

| **Moderates can manage super-ordinate structures for an egalitarian society built on human rights** |
|:---:|
| Super-ordinate structures
↓
if nurtured and well managed by impartial 'moderates'
(by attending and bowing to super-ordinate needs without interpreting this as undue humiliation)
↓
may yield surplus that may be
↓
to the benefit of all |

Table 22: Moderates can manage super-ordinate structures for an egalitarian society built on human rights

It is becoming clear that moderates and extremists are not juxtaposed at the same level in a society, but that they can be seen as related to different levels. Moderates are often those who have the interest of all in mind, of super-ordinate structures that benefit of all; they do not focus on their immediate in-group only. Moderates have a helicopter-view, or eagle-like perspective on their own groups' limited interests, while extremists, fighting for precisely this in-group, interpret any inclusion of the 'enemy's' interests as treason. See Table 23. Or, one could also formulate it in another way. Extremists identify with small immediate in-groups, while moderates identify with larger in-groups that contain all those different sub-groups that are led by extremists.

Moderates, extremists, and democratic super-ordinate structures
Super-ordinate structures may unite sub-groups in a society and guarantee fair distribution of benefits to all of them. Moderates often stand for this principle, voluntarily and with humility. They do not want to debase or humiliate any sub-group.
↙   ↓   ↘

Sub-group 1 with its particular interests.	Sub-group 2 with its particular interests.	Sub-group x with its particular interests.
Extremists often stand for their own sub-group as opposed to other sub-groups and tend to find compromise with other sub-groups humiliating.		

Table 23: Moderates and democratic super-ordinate structures

Mangala Moonesinghe, High Commissioner of Sri Lanka to London, says on 9th October 2000 on BBC World 'Asia Today' that there are large groups of Singhalese and Tamil 'moderates' who do not agree with the 'extremists' on both sides who accuse their respective leaders that they give too much away.

The important question at the outset of independence for Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi is: are there enough individual actors who represent, maintain and enforce a culture of moderation, of voluntary co-operation, and of deliberate humility? Personalities who, if extremists set out to destroy democratic structures, would resist, both as bystanders and as leaders?

Independence

Somalia

South and North Humiliate Each Other

Ali Sheikh Jirdeh remembers the year 1960, the year of Somali independence and unification of North and South: 'When Somaliland united with the South, it became apparent that the people in the South were different, I mean they did not have a good education.' As an example of the better education of the Northerners Ali Sheikh Jirdeh recounts the story of the pilots: 'The country could train eighteen pilots and there was an exam selecting the candidates. The results showed that sixteen out of the eighteen accepted students would be Northerners. The Southerners became jealous and thought that the Northerners had cheated. They repeated the exam and this time all eighteen were from the North!'

Also Abdulqadir H. Ismail Jirdeh and Ahmed El Kahin agree (19th November 1998): 'The Northerners were better educated, better businessmen, and better administrators than the Southerners. In fact they had to teach the Southerners how to make business. Many of them entered, for example, administrative positions in Mogadishu, especially under the very good Prime Minister Abdirazak H. Hussein. He recognised and respected people with education, and it became known how good the Northerners were; he emulated the Northern education system. The British had good vocational schools, while the Italians did not care, but only wanted to make money out of their colony. The Northerners moved to the South, all intellectuals were in Mogadishu (perhaps later also because Barre wanted better control over the intellectuals).'

Altogether, the Northerners brought three 'advantages' into their 'marriage' with the South. The English had educated their underlings better than the Italians had done, secondly the English acquired from the colonisers in the North was more useful in a modern world than Italian (Somali script did not yet exist, so that the country used the languages of the colonisers as lingua franca, at least in writing and in the educational system), and thirdly many Northerners had a cosmopolitan past as traders and livestock exporters. The overall atmosphere in the North confirmed to me, the visitor, that the Northerners believe themselves to be superior to the Southerners regarding diligence, intelligence and experience. The subsequent onslaught on the North by Siad Barre, understandably, confirmed to the North their view of all-encompassing deficiencies and enmity of the South. As may be expected,

many Southerners perceive this attitude as arrogant and humiliating. As reported above, passionate reactions of Southerners to my film material from the North exposed the hot feelings that were created by this humiliation.

Democracy Humiliates

Another cause of humiliation during the democratic decade was democracy itself, or more specific, majority rule. Abdulqadir H. Ismail Jirdeh, Deputy Speaker of the Parliament in Hargeisa explains in an interview on 19th November 2000, that democracy with its majority rule violates the old nomad tradition of decision by consensus of the elders. He explicates that majority rule has the potential to deeply offend and humiliate those who lose out. He describes in detail how he would prevent violent responses by approaching losers after voting, how he would express appreciation for their views and show confidence that their views would be honoured at a later stage.

'Lack of Justice' Humiliates

Ali Sheikh Jirdeh identifies a third source of humiliation that characterised the decade of Somali democracy: the 'lack of justice.' Perhaps this was the most significant problem, which leads back to the discussion on fixed or expandable pies, zero sum game or win-win. Democracy may be conceived as a means to increase the cake for all citizens through impartial super-ordinate structures whose neutrality is safeguarded by institutionally balanced and constantly reconstructed conflictual relations between interest groups. The managers of such super-ordinate structures, politicians and officials, only regulate, - they are not meant to exploit these structures; they are fulfilling their designated task only as long as they identify with the protection of neutrality of these super-ordinate structures. Traffic rules are, again, a good example: A policeman should regulate the traffic, he should identify with this neutral role; he should not extort money from the drivers, and not provide the green light only to those who pay him.

Somalis are not un-accustomed to this logic. One of the traditional neutral mediators in Somalia has always been the religious man; 'the sheikh was supposed to be impartial, balanced, and removed from secular affairs. After all, the whole point of a sheikh's position was to bridge, not embody lineage differences. Once the sheikh began acting just as anyone else would - putting his family first - he and his family's *successful* scramble for advantages

set in motion reactive competition' (Simons, 1995, 44, italicisation in original). Such a sheikh typically comes from a family who teaches and safeguards a culture of neutrality. Neutrality never meant poverty, on the contrary, it could mean gaining precisely through this neutrality; and neutrality could be capitalised on from father to son: 'children… if they were clever, could turn their father's *baraka* [charisma] into their own *barwaqo* [prosperity] by either becoming sheikhs themselves or availing themselves of their father's sheikhly networks' (41, italicisation in original).

Somali sheikhs have a tradition of neutrality, they helped attenuate the Security Dilemma between clans and avoid to a certain extent the 'Tragedy of the Commons.' But, as discussed above, such systems are vulnerable and can easily be destroyed by aggressive 'newcomers.' Somali politicians did not have the sheikh's culture of neutrality. Public resources were regarded as pasture for one's clan, no voice was representing and identifying with the neutrality of a super-ordinate structure that could make the cake bigger for all and create a win-win situation.

At several occasions Somalis, independently from each other, formulated to me: 'It was the coffee-boys who became the rulers of the country, the coffee-boys who had helped the colonisers in their offices.' Ali Sheikh Jirdeh joined the civil service of the new-born country in Mogadishu (since Mogadishu had become the capital of Somalia, everything important happened there). He quit the civil service in 1962, because 'the minister was so incompetent. For example, the minister himself signed the fuel coupons. This was humiliating! It was humiliating for a well-educated person to have such uneducated superiors!'

This shows that Somali politicians during their democratic period obviously did not have much education, and, perhaps therefore, not enough of a culture of impartiality. But they also seemed to have lacked a culture of balancing interest groups, although Somalia had developed what Marlowe calls co-dependency. Anna Simons introduces us to David Marlowe's ethnography of the Galjaal Barsana of central Somalia[227] (Marlowe, 1963) and reports: 'Indeed, the gist of Marlowe's sophisticated thesis is that it was the codependency of the sheikh, *tariqa* [path] members, and lineage elders (along with everyone's dependence on agriculture) that was critical to maintaining *jamcaa* [community]. For instance, the sheikh (who embodied the community's religious center) would risk losing his followers if he

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[227] Simons: 'Although fieldwork for this study was conducted in 1958 (around the time I. M. Lewis was first working in northern Somalia), many of Marlowe's findings and conclusions continue to shed light on the shape of lineage re-ravelings today' (Simons, 1995, 42).

alienated the elders and the lineage elders would risk losing ritual efficacy (and, they believed, the rainfall only a sheikh could bring) if they offended the sheikh (155-156). Although analytically such interdependencies may have appeared consensual and engineered, what Marlowe's work points out is that they really worked because no one could afford risking their not working' (Simons, 1995, 42, italicisation in original).

Instead of balancing interest groups to the benefit of a neutral super-ordinate structures that would bring more prosperity to all, politicians did the opposite: 'Indeed, competition for new, state-constructed opportunities were turning rural areas into resource preserves and folding economics into the political equation across the landscape, only for elites, newly emerging out of the rural areas, to then have to compete with one another at the center. According to the political histories already written (to which I would refer interested readers see Pankhurst, 1951; Kaplan, 1960; Touval, 1963; Lewis, 1965; and Samatar 1988) such re-sorting came to define "national" politics - the eventual politics of dissolution… In a decade of jockeying for representation under the guise of democracy, politics came to be about gaining access not just to the levers but to the resources of the state. The state, we must remember, putative democracy or not, itself amounted to Somalis' most concentrated source of resources' (Simons, 1995, 44).

Somalis, fervent masters, did not accept the pillage of their country by a corrupt elite. Dalka ('The Homeland,' independent English-language monthly), a symbol of critical democracy in Africa founded in 1965, writes in volume I, number 1, 1965, on page one: 'We are not for or against the Government as such. We are definitely against one thing. The System. We believe the present set-up has failed to fulfil our aspirations of five years ago. We believe that it lost us golden opportunities in our endeavour for re-unification and the struggle for better conditions for the common man. We believe that it has proved inefficient, ignorant, selfish and corrupt. We believe that a radical change is an absolute necessity. We do not pretend to know the best direction that such change should take. But we are convinced of the necessity of the change' (Duhul, 1965, 1).

The authors of this article hoped for more freedom, self-respect and quality of life for all Somalis; they could not know that the opposite fate would befall them. Siad Barre, a military man, would indeed rise to save Somalia from its corrupt parody of democracy, but only to subsequently lead them into the ultimate abyss.

Division Humiliates

A further, national humiliation was inherited from colonial times, when Britain gave away the Ogaden to Ethiopia. This was a sore wound in the '*asabia* of Somalia. Ali Sheikh Jirdeh gives an impression of how the newly born democratic state of Somalia, in need of weapons to capture the Ogaden from Ethiopia, made the most out of the Cold War: He recounts how he and the Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Shermarke (who had studied political science in Italy) went to Khrushchev, Adenauer, and Kennedy, asking for weapons. He remembers 'how Kennedy said "no" (except for mechanical help), how Adenauer said "no," apparently after Kennedy phoned him,' how he then wanted to go to the Chinese, but how 'Shermarke returned a second time to the Russians and there – there we got everything we wanted!'

To conclude, four humiliating dynamics may be identified during Somalia's 'democratic period' after independence: firstly the North-South dynamics, partly introduced by historic arbitrariness that brought the North under British colonial rule; secondly the humiliating aspects of majority decisions entailed in democratic procedures, as opposed to decisions based on consensus; thirdly the humiliating lack of impartiality of super-ordinate structures; and finally the Ethiopia/Somalia antagonism related to Somali unity.

The most damaging dynamic was, perhaps, the failure to make democracy work. The nurturing aspects of super-ordinate structures did not become more obvious than during colonialism; their abusive and exploitative aspects overshadowed them. The highest level of super-ordinate structures that ever had worked constructively in Somalia was the level of the Council of Elders, in co-dependence with sheikhs. Somalis obviously did not succeed in transferring this culture to a higher level. Instead the state's resources became a 'pasture' that was vied for, and the public institutions were hijacked by those who took part in this competition.

Siad Barre 'Saves' Somalia From Humiliation

'For most people… the new regime was, at the moment of its birth, a *deus ex machina* sent to save a nation on the brink of disaster. Siyad Barre was a diabolical genius who had understood the mantle history had accidentally placed on his shoulders. To authenticate his assumed historical role, Barre initiated several progressive projects meant to alleviate chronic hunger and widespread unemployment among the urban youth. For the first two or three years, a new Somalia was born in which respect for justice, law, and order contributed to the construction of a new ethic' (Ahmed, 1996, 101).

However, like in Germany, it is taboo today in Somalia to admit that one once admired a dictator who initially was a saviour, and later turned out to be a destroyer. None of my contacts in Hargeisa who were close to the SNM (who had liberated the North from the dictator) wanted to introduce me to Mohamed Hawadle, last Isaaq Prime Minister of Siad Barre. I arranged for an interview with him, together with Stig Jarle Hansen, on 25th November 1998 in Hargeisa.[228] When we met Hawadle, he was managing 'Solteco,' one of the private telephone networks of Hargeisa.

Mohamed Hawadle was born in Hargeisa, his father was a trader. He holds a university degree in electrical engineering from Russia. Mohamed Hawadle told us about great achievements at the beginning of Barre's rule - from 1969-1977. He remembers that 'we were real patriots.' He advises us to see the film 'Lost Paradise' in order to better understand. He relates to us the story of an airstrip that they built in 21 days. He exclaims: 'It was almost impossible, but we did it! There was a drought, and the Russians were willing to fly the victims to other regions, but they needed a landing strip!' And, another miracle was achieved, 'when we were able to use the water of the Shebelle river up to 80%, almost nothing went into the sea! We developed one of the most prospering areas!'

Mohamed Hawadle worked in the ministry of public works for six years, 'then I was shifted to post and telecommunication, and finally became a member of parliament, and the head of the economical committee of the parliament for two years. Then I was appointed Minister of Planning and after a short while became the Second Speaker of the Parliament. I was Prime Minister in 1989 for a period of less than one year.' Hawadle informs us that he was the chairman of the group comprising people from all Somalia and told Barre, at the end of his reign, to resign.

A few days later I met a man in his fifties who was a high official when Somalia still put all hopes on Siad Barre. I am not authorised to disclose his name and will call him Karim Hassan. He explains that the people in the North are more oriented towards private economy and not so much to socialist planning. They are rather individualistic. Socialism did not fit them; they were always critical of socialism, while the people in the South had less of a political orientation. But still there was some development in the North, the cement factory, an extension of Berbera port, and some roads.

Karim Hassan thinks that Barre was a patriot in the beginning. He explains how good a speaker Barre was, how good an orator. And, 'as an ex-policeman he was able to know what

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[228] Further quotes from Mohamed Hawadle will be derived from the same interview.

was going on in the country; he was a very hard worker and could sit at his office desk for three days. He wanted to be a great leader.'

Ali Sheikh Jirdeh is somewhat more sceptical. In 1973 Barre ordered the execution of three officers, on the encouragement of the Russians, says Jirdeh. 'The Russians said that he should make the three major clans (Isaaq, Majerteen, Hawiye) afraid.' Jirdeh recounts that he went to Barre to tell him not to execute these officers. He told Barre that he would then not have clean hands anymore, but blood on his hands, which would eventually lead to his downfall. He would be forced to suppress disobedience with violence all the time.

Dr. Gaboose, personal physician of late Somali dictator Siad Barre and member of his cabinet fled the country when he felt that he could no longer support the regime. In several long interviews in November 1998[229] he reflects on the dictator's personality and why he succeeded in staying on so long (1969-1991). He recounts, using a form of English that reveals the style of Somali language and shows the oral talent that Somalis are famous for and proud of: 'I think that Siad Barre was different compared to the majority of the people. Probably that difference made him a dictator. He got some unique characteristics in his personality: vigorous, - active, - and charismatic. He got that ability of attracting the people around him, that energy, that atmosphere of making you secure!' (see also Lindner, 2000c, where I juxtapose Hitler with Siad Barre).

Dr. Gaboose continues: 'Siad Barre, I think, - he was brave, - I think many dictators have got this, - but perhaps it is not braveness, it is madness. These people confront challenges where the normal intelligent man would say, "no, no, don't do that!" But they have got this personality to go beyond normality, beyond the common people. So you think it is brave. But I think that it was not - it was just beyond the normality of common people. Siad Barre was very intelligent. He had very little education in his life even though he was the General of the nation. When he was participating in a discussion or giving a speech - without writing, without preparing anything - the way he was articulating was just beyond imagination! Probably because of those speeches, that were so talented in the way they were articulated, he attracted many people, many Somalis.'

Ahmed agrees with Gaboose: 'Barre's ingenuity in manipulating emotions through oratorical excellence had won him the respect of many great poets…' (Ahmed, 1996, 103). Former Ambassador Omar writes: 'Whatever one's personal view of the President, he was undoubtedly a very strong character. When he addressed the people he had the knack of

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[229] Dr. Gaboose's interviews will be quoted also further down, see also my article Lindner, 2000c where I compare Hitler and Siad Barre.

making his words stick in the minds of his audience. He could address and hold the attention of a mass rally for hours – a three-hour speech was not unusual – though he never took a written speech or notes impromptu. Although he wanted to implement a scientific socialism based on the ideas of Marxism-Leninism he quoted neither Marx nor Lenin. Moreover, he always used the Somali idiom and conventions of oratory' (Omar, 1992, 118).

Gaboose continues 'So, he was intelligent, but more than that, he always tried to get close to the community. He was an expert in the Somali way of seeing things. Many Somalis believe that he did so many good things. Because he built roads, he built universities; he built so many things in the nation. But not only Siad Barre, all dictators in the first years build their nation.'

'So, I think that a dictator becomes a dictator because he thinks that he has got some talents, and in these talents he sees himself above other people, above everyone. So, he believes, at the end, that he is more intelligent than others, that he sees things farther than others, that he is more sincere, that he is more, more, more ...! So, of the word 'more' in every respect regarding humanity, he convinces himself. And the rest of the people become like children listening to him, - not like comrades or colleagues who are discussing, giving and taking ideas from each other!'

Hadrawi, 'perhaps the greatest poet that Somalia had ever produced,' (Ahmed, 1996, 102) ridicules Barre's narcissism in a poem:

'I am the President

I'm also the Chairman

I'm the peoples' eyes

their ears

their brain

their teacher

their father

I alone over this land

Am the boss

Who will never be unseated'

(Ahmed, 1996, 103).

To conclude this section on Somalia after independence and during the first part of Barre's rule, it may be summarised that the attempt to build democracy failed and that Siad Barre came to personify the super-ordinate structure that democracy did not provide. I believe there are some elements that Somalis may be proud of: They rejected corrupt quasi-

democracy and were enthusiastic in uniting for a common Somalia. Barre introduced bold reforms, he outlawed clanism, gave women[230] and minorities more rights. And, as Karim Hassan testifies, 'we were all patriots.' There was a feeling, an *'asabia* of unity and strife for the common good. The willingness to sacrifice for common goals was there. It was there just after independence, when the North and the South joyfully joined together, with the aim to build a successful united Somalia, and again it was there during the first part of Barre's regime. And, looked at in today's light, it was not a small thing for proud nomads to follow a ruler!

Genocidal killings and national humiliation were still far away, but, unfortunately, they were to come.

Rwanda and Burundi

Rwanda and Burundi should not be treated in one section, but separately, especially from this point onwards, since their political paths headed into, in some respects, opposite directions. Already before independence there where significant differences, especially the parting of the Tutsi elite into different sub-groups in Burundi, however, after independence Burundi can surely not be put together with Rwanda in one category. Unfortunately, space prohibits more attention to Burundi in this manuscript, a failure that, hopefully, can be remedied in another publication. I beg my Burundian readers not to perceive this lack of attention as humiliating which it is certainly not intended to be. The knowledge I have been able to acquire about the Burundian situation is one of the important sources of the analysis that I have developed to explore the Rwandan and Somali cases

The Reality of the Nation Does Not Fit National Identity

Somalia and Rwanda both went into independence with a significant national problem that eventually led to violence. Both countries wanted to change the relation between borders and citizens. Somalia had some of their brothers and sisters in neighbouring countries and

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[230] 'Meanwhile, Siad Barre had to have also been influenced by his forebears and peers in the world of military dictators: Mussolini (whose impact on Somalia he had experienced firsthand), Nasser - an ally, Gadhafi - another ally, Nimeiri - again someone whom Siad Barre dealt with, and a host of other neighbors, acquaintances, and even foes. Certainly, Siad Barre had much to gain from paying attention to dictatorial successes elsewhere. It may not be mere coincidence that Yemen banned tribal clubs in 1970, with Siad Barre subsequently outlawing clannism in Somalia, or that Yemen adopted Family Law (which emancipated women) in 1974, something the Somali regime also enacted despite much conservative Islamic criticism in January 1975' (Simons, 1995, 60).

therefore wanted to capture the Ogaden from Ethiopia, while in Rwanda many Hutu felt that the Tutsi were far from being their brothers and sisters and therefore not part of their nation. Somalia's national humiliation was that their brothers and sisters in the Ogaden, Kenya and Djibouti were 'cut off,' while this was exactly what many Hutu in Rwanda wished to do with their unwanted 'Tutsi intruders.' In Somalia the borders were perceived as not inclusive enough for all citizens, in Rwanda the borders were seen as too inclusive; there were unwanted citizens within its borders. (Later on Siad Barre was to 'change his mind' and join the Rwandan view that part of the population, in the case of Somalia the arrogant Northerners, should be thrown out or killed.)

Pierre Erny maps out the different views of history, and how both Kayibanda and Habyarimana may be placed in them: '… we have passed through three different affirmations: 1. The Tutsi form a class (or a race) superior, predestined to govern; 2. The Tutsi are the representatives of a socio-political system of injustice that has to be reversed; 3. The Tutsi are invaders, who therefore have to be treated as such, be it (a) by integrating them under certain conditions in the same way foreigners are integrated, be it (b) by chasing them away for good, be it (c) by exterminating them' (Erny, 1995, 58, translated by the author[231]).

Erny now places various Rwandese actors into this mapping:
'One finds in those propositions future political strategies:

Position 1. is explicitly taken by the exiled monarchists, and implicitly by the extremist FPR factions,

Position 2. corresponded to the official vision chosen by the regime Habyarimana,

Position 3. (a) combined with position 2. has been taken by President Kayibanda,

Position 3. (b and c) are the ones taken up by extremist Hutu in all époques' (Erny, 1995, 59[232]).

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[231] 'En l'espace de quelques années on a ainsi passé par trois affirmations différentes :
1. Les Tutsi forment une classe (ou une race) supérieure appelée a gouverner;
2. Les Tutsi sont les représentants d'un système socio-politique injuste qu'il faut renverser;
3. Les Tutsi sont des envahisseurs pays, qu'il faut donc traiter comme tels
- soit (a) en les intégrant à certaines conditions comme on intègre des étrangers
- soit (b) en la chassant pour de bon,
- soit (c) en les exterminant' (Erny, 1995, 58).
[232] 'On trouve dans ces diverses propositions les lignes directrices des futures politiques:
- l'affirmation 1 est reprise explicitement par les exilés monarchistes et implicitement par les factions extrémistes du FPR
- l'affirmation 2 correspondait à la vision des choses officielle du régime Habyarimana,
- l'affirmation 3 (a) mélangé à l'affirmation 2 a été celle du président Kayibanda,
- les affirmations 3 (b et c) sont celles des extrémistes Hutu de toutes les époques (Erny, 1995, 59).

This account describes the Rwandan and also the Burundian struggle to find a national identity. Significant questions are: Who is the in-group? Are Tutsi the out-group for Hutu? Are only Hutu legitimate Rwandan citizens? Or Tutsi also? Or both groups?

Most likely the best answer, in line with the dichotomy of moderates versus extremists discussed above, would be that moderates of both camps are citizens that help to build a thriving Rwanda and Burundi, while extremists, wherever they come from, are not.

Emmanuel Rukangira, Procureur de la République, Republique Rwandaise, Ministère de la Justice explains to me on 8th February 1999 that the genocide started in 1959 and 'not earlier!' He says that the Hutu (80%), and Tutsi (20%) were one unit, one people (with the 1% of Twa being insignificant). 'In 1959 Belgians created a distinction. The Hutu tried to chase away the Tutsi, they did not want to kill them, only expel them. Later a story of humiliation was fabricated, and systematically taught, in schools, and at churches, namely the story that Tutsi are humiliating or want to humiliate Hutu, - and this was so even though there were poor Tutsi and rich Hutu already before 1959, and the Tutsi had been humiliated since 1959.' What Rukangira describes here, sounds like the transition from a more moderate Hutu strategy to a rather extremist Hutu tactic.

Helplessness Humiliates

However, what would we imagine a moderate Hutu should do? What is a former 'slave-turned-into-master' to do who wants to integrate the former 'masters,' rather than expelling them or killing them? (The French aristocracy got their heads cut off at times of revolution, while the English aristocracy was integrated.) What is a former underling to do who is confronted with former rulers who are far superior in knowledge and sophistication, because higher education was precisely what they acquired as former masters? Surely, former slaves would want to help their fellow slaves, at least in a transition period, to rise in society despite their lack of skills, and, perhaps, they would want to consult the masters for help? Emmanuel Rukangira reports on Hutu attempts to do precisely that, and how this, sadly enough, may have had adverse consequences and increased what he calls the Hutu 'inferiority complex': 'Tutsi needed 75%, and a Hutu 55% in order to succeed at school under Habyarimana's rule. Whenever a Hutu who "succeeded" with 55% would meet a Tutsi who had succeeded with 75% the Hutu would feel shame, would not feel at ease.'

Does this sequence parallel Somali accounts of the superiority of the Northerners as compared with their fellow country people from the South? In both cases the inferior party, at

some points in time, perpetrates genocidal killings on their 'superiors.' What about Hitler's fear that Jews would take over 'die Weltherrschaft' and rule the world? Hitler, an 'autodidact,' void of any sophisticated background, describes in his book *Mein Kampf* at length how he studied Austrian politics, and how he at some point 'found out' that Jews, with superior sophistication, dominated the scene.

A high Rwandese official whose name I do not want to expose, reports to me on the humiliating effects of helplessness: 'All this happened with the support of the French and also the Belgians, who had their own interests, and,' he analyses, 'in fact this had a humiliating effect on the Hutu who were to the French like children, who had to "ask" their masters thousands of kilometres away for advice, and did not understand that they were the victims of a global power game, namely Belgium with its problem of the Flemish and Walloons, and France being humiliated as a superpower by the anglophone countries.'

'Lack of Justice' Humiliates. Or, What Extremists Do When They Want to Marginalise Moderates

Rukangira continues his account: 'During the eighties the Hutu people in power saw that there was a lot of intermarriage - that their fabricated humiliation story did not work anymore so well - and that furthermore the Tutsi refugees wanted to come back. Those in power feared for their power. They created a new division: "les Nordistes" (Hutu of the North, of Habyarimana's family), and "les Sudistes" (moderate Hutu who had an alliance with the Tutsi in the South of the country). A Sudiste could not get any high position in the country.' Here Rukangira addresses directly the issue of moderates versus extremists and how extremists may gain influence.

This paragraph parallels the equivalent paragraph on Somalia and underpins the discussion on super-ordinate structures that has been opened earlier. Super-ordinate structures may either be maintained and used for the benefit of all, or be hijacked by the extremists of one group.

Democracy Humiliates

Since the issue of moderates versus extremists is not limited to Hutu, the question may be asked where the moderate and extremist Tutsi are to be found. As quoted earlier, just before independence the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR), a royalist Tutsi party, explained that

the 'vulgar thoughts of ordinary persons' [Hutu] could not be valorised in the same way as the 'sharp judgement of a capable man' [Tutsi], and that democratic elections regrettably put a literate minority at the mercy of majority without culture.[233] Here speaks a master for whom democracy is a humiliation.

However, there are other Tutsi voices. The official voice of Rwanda's post-genocidal government explains: 'Against a background of entrenched divisive and genocidal ideology, repeated massacres, the persistent problem of refugees in the diaspora, and lack of avenues for peaceful political change, the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU) was born in 1979 by some Rwandese in the diaspora with an objective of resolving these problems. Almost a decade later, in 1987, RANU became the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), whose objectives were and remain:

i)   To promote national unity in our country;

ii)   To establish genuine democracy;

iii)   To provide security for all Rwandese;

iv)   To build an integrated and self-sustaining economy;

v)   To eradicate corruption in all forms;

vi)   To repatriate and resettle Rwandese refugees living in exile;

vii)   To devise and implement policies that promote the social welfare of all Rwandese;

viii)   To pursue a foreign policy based on equality, peaceful co-existence and mutual benefit between Rwanda and other countries' (http://www.rwandemb.org/info/geninfo.htm, Rwandan Embassy in Washington).

This seems to be a moderate programme, geared at building a country for all, humble, non-arrogant. However, even the most moderate Tutsi, being in a minority, will have problems in carrying it out, they need the strong support of moderate Hutu.

To conclude this passage on the years after independence, it is clear that the challenges of the Great Lakes and Somalia's struggles were not that far apart. I began the section on Somali independence with the heading 'South and North Humiliate Each Other.' This parallels the passage 'Helplessness Humiliates' in Rwanda. In both cases one group is more experienced and sophisticated (real and/or convinced to be) and is interlinked in mutual humiliation with the other group that is (and/or believes to be) less erudite. 'Democracy Humiliates' was the next heading of the Somali section, a heading that is equally valid in the

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[233] 'Bien que la societe rwandaise soit composée d'individus de valeur très inégale et qu'il n'est pas équitable d'accorder la même valeur a la pensée vulgaire de l'homme ordinaire qu'au jugement perspicace de l'homme capable... bien que le suffrage universel aboutira infailliblement à l'asservissement de la minorité lettrée par la majorité inculte' (quoted in Erny, 1995, 54).

case of Rwanda, and also Burundi. Masters have to put aside their masterly arrogance when they enter democratic structures, they have to 'come down' and acquire a certain amount of humility; however, they may interpret this, at least initially, as undue humiliation (in the case of Rwanda the 1994 genocide would turn out to be exactly that, an undue and horrific orgy of humiliation, that makes it almost impossible for the genocide survivors to be moderate, because they are afraid that this may cost them their lives).

'"Lack of Justice" Humiliates' was another Somali heading. Again, this issue applies to Rwanda and Burundi where many feel that existing super-ordinate structure are not catering to all, but protecting a few. Somalia had a Siad Barre who came as a saviour, this was the last heading of the section on Somalia; the closest equivalent in the Great Lakes region, as already reported above, may have been the Burundian Prime Minister Michel Micômbéro. He came from a lowly Tutsi lineage, a humiliated member of the elite so-to-speak, just like Hitler who felt badly neglected and humiliated as a German in Austria. Micômbéro forced people to greet him with a 'Heil Micômbéro' salutation and, after being ousted, he fled into exile to Siad Barre. Furthermore, Somalia's path after independence from quasi-democracy to a one-party system resembled Rwandan history insofar as also Rwanda was declared a one-party state (in 1965, the ruling party being MDR/PARMEHUTU). In Somalia Siad Barre oscillated between being a constructive and a destructive force, with an increasing thrust towards destruction. In Rwanda, and in Burundi, similar oscillations took place, with some attempts to liberalise the situation; in both cases, however, at the end, destruction was the result.

Genocide

Somalia

A Great Nation Ends in Utter Humiliation

Somali national enthusiasm carried them towards war. They felt deeply wronged by the fact that parts of Somalia were held by neighbours, and they wanted to put these grievances right. They wanted to be a united and respected nation in Africa, instead of a humiliated coward. But then the Russians failed them in their struggle. Ali Sheikh Jirdeh recalls that they 'really' had believed that the Russians were 'sincere friends' and that they were extremely surprised when Russia changed sides in the Ogaden war. He says: 'The Russians and Cubans wanted to have a big Horn of Africa Socialist Republic with Somalia and Ethiopia together. The Somalis did not agree.'

Karim Hassan remembers: 'Barre wanted to be a great leader, but lost the faith of the people after the lost war in Ogaden. Then he only was sticking to his seat and making more and more enemies. He could then not care less whether people were suffering; he became abnormal, mad, only thinking how to stay in power. He did ridiculous things, had no feelings, insane. 1986 he had a car accident, and his people [meaning his entourage of clan and family members] were by then so afraid to lose power themselves that they, instead of bringing the unconscious man into hospital, brought him to the palace first, and only later to the hospital.'

Karim Hassan continues: 'The lost war was a major blow. The whole country wanted to win. Barre had to wage this war, because the people wanted it, he would not have stayed in power, if he had not started it. After the lost war, in 1978, he knew that a coup attempt was planned. He collected all the officers and gave a speech, where he said that they should save their lives, not his. Barre knew the day the coup was planned, and this man started therefore the coup some days earlier without the others knowing, and it failed.'

Karim Hassan analyses the breakdown: 'The war against Ethiopia was also a big drainage of resources. After this war Barre started to be afraid to be overthrown. *His mind changed from a mind of development to a mind of security.* As already mentioned earlier, Christianson, 1984, has described how, when people feel threatened, they experience a considerable narrowing of consciousness, and begin to merely focus on central perceptual details. One may hypothesise that fear of losing power may have such a narrowing effect also

on leaders, and that this would hamper their ability for rational long-term thinking. Under different circumstances the same leaders would, perhaps, react much more constructive, for themselves and their followers.

Hawadle carries his analysis further: There was a budget deficit after the war. Before the war the aid that came in had been put into the normal budget and had inflated it. After the war, no aid came anymore. *Before the political collapse there was an economic collapse.* IMF made it worse by asking that the currency should be devaluated. But this would have driven the average income under the poverty threshold; it would have lowered the salaries too much. There was high inflation, I myself earned in 1975 3000 $ and in 1985 250 $.'

Besteman & Cassanelli, in their book on *The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia* (Bestemann & Cassanelli, 1996) summarise the changes that came together during this period: 'Five interrelated processes converged to intensify the competition for resources in Somalia after 1970. First, agricultural land became more valuable in relation to other sources of investment and speculation. Second, new wealth in the form of foreign aid, overseas remittances, live-stock export earnings, and military subsidies accelerated the process of class formation. Third, the growing concentration of state power in the hands of one segment of the Somali population led other segments to seek alternative sources of wealth and power. Fourth, the militarization of the Horn of Africa resulting from the Ogaadeen war and the cold war produced an environment in which the transfer of resources by force became more common. And fifth, the urbanization of Somali society (symbolized by the explosion of Mogadishu's population) intensified regional migration and put new demands on the country's natural resources. The causal relationships among these five trends are difficult to pinpoint, but their interrelation is clear' (19).

This is the situation: New 'pastures' had opened up for Somalis in a short period of time: Modern urban life with its multitude of formerly unknown sources for 'green grass,' ownership of farmland ('noble' Somalis had taken the idea from Italian colonisers that masters may do more than occasionally rob poor farmers, namely exploit farmland by owning and administering it), and government jobs. The last form of 'pasture,' salaries and other privileges from government jobs, was just about to vanish, in a breathtaking speed, leaving their receivers in humiliating penury. In addition, an unfathomable national humiliation had afflicted the country. Furthermore, several more dynamics of humiliation were active inside the country, North versus South, 'noble' warriors versus occupational minorities and 'noble' warriors versus farmers, plus the global men versus women dynamic, and the worldwide antagonism between representatives of humankind's tradition of being an exploitative

dominator of nature versus those activists who identify with a sustainable use of nature. This makes, in all, seven examples of the dynamics of humiliation at work.

Feelings of Humiliation Breed Acts of Humiliation. Or, How a Victim Turns into a Perpetrator

For Siad Barre himself, with his core persona of an uneducated but very bright autodidact, the South-North dynamics were, perhaps, the most personally hurtful. It was here, within this dynamic of humiliation, that he as an individual was the underdog. 'You Isaaq, you are so arrogant,' were Barre's words to a Somali woman I quoted earlier. Other dynamics of humiliation had seen him as a 'Robin Hood,' as the saviour of the humiliated: He had elevated the status of women by reforms and improved the plight of the minorities; and he had wanted to heal humiliated nationhood by capturing the Ogaden and making a home for all Somalis inside national borders. He had failed disastrously to save nationhood, he had deepened national humiliation instead of healing it, and, in addition, he had caused his helpers humiliating penury, a penury that could, as he well knew, bring about his downfall if the victims ascribed responsibility to him and ganged up against him. However, he was enough of a Machiavellian to know that he could also capitalise on their struggle.

At that point Barre began playing out one clan against the other. Ambassador Dualeh believes that 'Barre knew that clan A never liked clan B, but they coexisted through intermarriage, through elders who were very wise and kept peace through balance. And he knew one dangerous thing to do was to mess up with the balance of the clans, believe me!'

Ahmed Omar Askar, 1992 in his novel *Sharks and Soldiers* describes how Barre may have reasoned. He describes a meeting Barre has with the elders of his clan: 'Siad Barre broke into laughter and said: 'Comrade Sultan, the other Darod subclans, for example the Majertens, are power thirsty and I do not want them to be a part of this business. The Ogaden and the Dulbahante are poor nomads. I will accept them as soldiers. They will defend the revolution. The Isaak are cunning. I warn you of their conspiracy. They were responsible for the defeat of Mohamed Abdulla Hassan by the British in 1920. They are infidels as the Ogadens call them *Gaalka Iidoor*. I will drive them out of the government positions. The Hawiye will be busy with their agriculture and they will never realize what is happening' (7).

Barre, trying to stay in power, subsequently unleashed a 'scorched earth' onslaught on the Majerteen and thereafter quasi-genocide on the Isaaq. He attempted to annihilate the Isaaq clan, and the rape of women in front of their families was one of his soldiers' especially cruel

tactics. My Somali interlocutors talked about the weight and severity of the problem of rape only after many hours or days of conversation. Somali women usually spoke more openly to me about the impact of rape than Somali men, although, as already mentioned, many would only complain of stomach ache, as the gynaecologist Dr. Ismail explained (25th November 1998 in Hargeisa).

Karim Hassan explains that the North could not take this for long: 'people can take hunger, but not humiliation. Morals have more effect than material goods. The people in the North are proud people, and even though they may not have education, they do not accept humiliation. The salary can be low, they can live in poverty; still they do not accept humiliation.'

Karim Hassan continues: 'The worst humiliation is when women and children are touched. What the men in the North will never accept is that ladies or children are maltreated. They will prefer to die in defence. A man can kill a man, but he cannot kill a lady or a baby. Barre's soldiers took girls to the garrisons by force, had parties, and the people had to stay at home, because of the curfew.'

Karim Hassan confirms what many others also said: 'Rape was new, it was a change of culture.' Asha Ahmed, Information/Dissemination Officer at Somalia Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, explains to me on 11th January 1999 in Nairobi how the ICRC invited historians from all Somali clans to do research and come up with what eventually became the "Spared from the Spear" booklet (International Committee of the Red Cross Somalia Delegation, 1997). This booklet shows that women and children traditionally were 'spared from the spear' and that Somali war code explicitly protects civilians against warrior onslaughts. Women are not to be touched! It is only in this way that women could embody bonds between clans, because they could move freely, even in wartime. Asha points out: 'When you look at this booklet, the Geneva Convention is all in there! At first the Geneva Convention was like Latin to the Somalis!'

Ambassador Dualeh backs this up (see also Lindner, 2000d): 'There is one thing which never was part of traditional quarrelling between clans, and this is rape, especially mass rape in front of the family. This is new. It happened for the first time when Siad Barre's dictatorial regime sent soldiers to annihilate us. Soldiers would rape our women in front of their husbands and families.'

'It is somehow a 'tradition' that young men of one clan steal camels from another clan, and sometimes a man gets killed. But women were never touched, never. There might have been a rare case when a girl was alone in the semi-desert guarding her animals, and a young

man having spent a long time in the desert lost control and tried to rape her. She would resist violently, and at the end the solution would perhaps be that he had to marry her. But mass rape, especially rape in front of the family, this never happened before, this is new.

…

Have you noticed how many Somali families live apart? Have you ever thought about the reason why so many Somali women with their children live apart from their husbands? It is because the men cannot live with the humiliation that they were not able to defend their women against the soldiers who raped them. The husband cannot live together with his wife, because he cannot bear to be reminded of his inability to protect her. The perpetrators intended to humiliate their enemies and they succeeded thoroughly. Rape creates social destruction more 'effectively' than any other weapon.

…

This is the reason why today Somalia is so divided. We Somalis are united through our common ethnic background, we speak one language, and are all Muslims. Why are we divided today? Humiliation through rape and its consequences divides us. The traditional methods of reconciliation are too weak for this. It will take at least one generation to digest these humiliations sufficiently to be able to sit together again.'

As already quoted above, Dualeh confirms all this, saying: 'Evelin, believe me, humiliation, as I told you before, was not known to the Somali before Siad Barre came to power!'

Table 24 tries to summarise the development of the cycle of humiliation that led to Siad Barre's genocidal onslaught on the North. It is revised from Lindner, 2000e.

Genocidal dynamics of humiliation in Somalia			
	Pre-colonial times	**Colonial and post-colonial times**	**Post-colonial times**
'Topdogs'	numerous egalitarian nomadic clans, none of them topdog or underdog	Isaaq clan in the North of Somalia / English Protectorate in the North of Somalia	Isaaq clan (also Majerteen clan, former topdogs, then harassed, and subjected to acts of humiliation and quasi-genocide)
Degrees of humiliation and counter-humiliation	←→ (egalitarian relations between the major clans, no common state exists)	↓ (strong humiliation, English-speaking, diligent Isaaq were perceived as arrogant by Southerners in the new state of Somalia that comprised the North and the South)	↑ (maximum counter-humiliation: public rape and quasi-genocide)
'Underdogs'	numerous egalitarian nomadic clans, none of them topdog or underdog	Somali clans in the South, among others the Marehan, dictator Siad Barre's sub-clan / Italian colonial rule in the South of Somalia	Dictator Siad Barre, former underdog (Southern Marehan clan member, no formal education, politically now the topdog, emotionally still suffering from former humiliations)

Table 24: Genocidal dynamics of humiliation in Somalia

Table 25 tries to address the possible effects of humiliation on the rational long-term appreciation of super-ordinate structures in Somalia, and how Siad Barre shifted from long-term nurturing leadership to short-term oppressive leadership, when he saw his power threatened by his 'unthankful' followers (see Dr. Gaboose further down), see also Lindner, 2000e.

Short-term and long-term profit in Somalia		
	short-term (what happened)	**long-term (what could have happened)**
Profit for the leader	(1) In the 1980s, especially 1988, dictator Siad Barre was so caught up in the dynamics of humiliation and that the penalisation of 'them' as opposed to 'us' seemed the only option. He orchestrated a quasi-genocide, was ousted in 1991, and died in exile.	(3) Achieved by taking care of (4).
Profit for all	(2) The dictator Siad Barre promised land, dignity and general well-being to all Somalis (except most of the Isaaq/Majerteen), if they were loyal and followed their leaders' quasi-genocidal ideology. Barre started out his career by giving Somali a short-lived economic 'upswing,' meaning building roads and creating jobs; later he 'distributed' Isaaq property to, for example, Ogadenis.	(4) Sustainable social and environmental development = implementation of all aspects of human rights (civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural rights) for all Somalis.

Table 25: Short-term and long-term profit in Somalia

Barre was brought down eventually. Dr. Gaboose reflects on dictators and why their end is so drastic (see also Lindner, 2000c). He explains: 'But, they are not building the nation, they are building just roads, they are building just streets - but not for the people, but for their egos: to see the roads done by me, Siad Barre, or to see that this or that big huge building is done by me, Siad Barre. So, probably dictators are identifying all these achievements with themselves, not to build the nation. Because if they had really helped the people, if they really had built the nation, the end would not have been so drastic.'

He continues: 'Hitler became so drastic, - Siad Barre became so drastic, - Mussolini also. I don't want to take only Hitler; the end of every dictator was horrible. Because they never build their nation, with the nation I mean the people. The most important aspect for a nation is to build the people, not the roads, or the universities - I mean, the buildings - if the people are built enough then the nation will be sustained, will survive. Otherwise it will

collapse with the dictator. Because if the nation was the dictator, the nation will disappear with him. So, Somalia doesn't exist any more, it disappeared with Siad Barre!'

'I believe, if we take only the first ten years he could be described as a very nice ruler. But all dictators have got two faces. That was the first face and then comes the other face, which is not any more intelligent. Then you see him: Very unstable government, unstable economy, unstable military, and at the same time he is making a war here, a war there and a war every place! So you see that he is not any more the kind of man that you had seen before. Sometimes you think that this sort of men has used, has consumed his energy before, and in the later years just sits on his seat because of the energy of the past. But he is not any more the same person. Probably he used in his campaigns all his personality and all his energy. And then what comes... first it is up and then down, down, down. And you cannot stop him, whatever happens, because the energy is less and less to stop. So, I think he was a person that many people will make a dispute in what they will write on him. Because he has got so many faces that everyone can write whatever he wants.'

The Dr. Gaboose then reflects on the feelings of betrayal, both in Siad Barre's followers, but also in Siad Barre himself. First, Dr. Gaboose describes the process of disappointment how it unfolded in him (see also in Lindner, 2000c):

'What I found in him [Siad Barre] and the humiliation that I - not only me but I think many of my colleagues - found, was that his plan and his intention was a road in his mind and he expected you to just follow, and not to judge, or not to discuss, or not to give any different opinion about that. So, you got just a path drawn before you, by him, and the whole cabinet, the state instrument, should follow that. And even if you saw that the end was dark, you had to tell others that it is not dark, but that there is light, there is paradise we see after that. So, when the line of communication is cut off, when you find a person who is leading the country, and you are so close to him, and the result is always a deaf ear, than you feel that the noble gift of all humans is misused, it is not valued any more, which is to communicate to each other; that through talking we can understand each other, that through talking our ideas and achievements could be larger than "I and I and I." Then when I understood that I could not reach any more that membrane of the ear that became so hard to me, I fled outside. I chose to be a refugee rather than a minister in that government.'

Dr. Gaboose finally describes how not only the Somalis, but also Siad Barre felt betrayed, just like Hitler, how he felt that he had sacrificed everything for his people, '...later, he sees that his people were not grateful for what he did for them in the past. Because he sees himself as the one who was always right, he always gave them the best of his life and at the

end there is sadness and sorrow, - not from any foreigners, but from his own people. Because from them he expected the greatest appreciation. But he does not see that they have given him the highest appreciation for years: there were years that his name was like religion, that his personality arrived near to God and they did what ever he wanted and was always right. But at the end, when the things get to the end of the track, the blame was to the same people of the nation. He was right even at the end of his life. He helped the Somalis, he helped the Germans, he helped the Italians, but the Italian were not good, the German were not good, and the Somalis were not good.'

Hitler's Germany was conquered, but the Germans were not pitted against each other. Hitler did on a small scale what Barre did nationwide, Hitler kept his followers divided, for example by putting two men who disliked each other to the same job, forcing them to compete for his, Hitler's, sympathy. In the case of Somali clans, however, the whole country was affected by this divide and rule strategy, - deeply affected. Vital traditional limits had been breached, rape being the most striking example. These breaches are beyond easy healing, and cannot be tackled simply with traditional methods.

Ambassador Dualeh: 'This... really, the civil war in Somalia has done a lot to every Somali. There is not a single Somali who has not been traumatised by the effects of the civil war. And especially when people are of the same culture, of the same religion, of the same background, it is worse. It is worse because his suffering is through his own brother, through his neighbour. Suddenly his neighbour becomes an enemy, he spies on him, he kills him, loots him, rapes his wife and his daughters... a neighbour! It is so much heavier on a person when you are molested by your neighbour! It is lesser when it's somebody from the outside that you have never met before. So what happens in Somalia is, believe me, I never thought this could happen in Somalia. Twenty years ago, twenty-five, thirty years ago, when i was a student, I never thought this could happen in Somalia, believe me. And it is very difficult to explain.'

Barre thus was like a Trojan horse who first came as a saviour to then hijack the country for his close followers (mainly his family). He thoroughly disappointed his country - as in Germany all those who ever believed in the dictator later had to cover their faces in shame. Any person who ever believed him is later humiliated by evidence of her earlier trust. He undermined Somali unity, because he himself betrayed it; worse, he introduced enmities and an intensity of abhorrence among Somalis that never existed before. In my article *Were Ordinary Germans Hitler's 'Willing Executioners'? Or Were They Victims of Humiliating Seduction and Abandonment? The Case of Germany and Somalia* (Lindner, 2000c) I analyse the humiliating sequence of seduction followed by abandonment.

Barre humiliated those who trusted him, he degraded the value of trust altogether. He discredited any super-ordinate structure. And he makes it today doubly difficult for anybody to gain trust again, because he sneaked his way into the hijacker's seat, disguised as a benefactor. Who will ever believe a benefactor again?

Rwanda and Burundi

There Is No Need for a Single Dictator

As mentioned above, Siad Barre had a car accident in 1986, and many people are unsure to what extent his mental capacities were reduced after that, giving his entourage of clan and family members more influence than before. As reported by many, this entourage was so afraid to lose power that they, instead of bringing Barre into hospital, brought him to the palace first, and only later to the hospital. The issue of 'entourage' relates directly to Rwanda and the *akazu*. 'The *akazu*, or "little house," was a special circle within the larger network of personal connections that worked to support Habyarimana. It was composed mostly of the people of Habyarimana's home region, with Madame Habyarimana and her relatives playing a major role' (Rakiya, De Waal, & African Rights, 1995, chapter about history). And, 'Mme Habyarimana, nicknamed "Kanjogera" in memory of the murderous nineteenth-century *Nyina Yuhi*, emerged at the top of the heap as the best player; she was the true mistress of the country, not her big *umugabo* of a husband' (Prunier, 1995a, 350, 351, italicisation in original).

'The Akazu (little house) was the special inner circle of advisors to Habyarimana, most of whom came from his north-western prefecture or were relatives of his wife. Their close personal ties to the President made them the centre of political, economic, social, and military power in Rwanda. The Akazu, which included one of Madameme. Habyarimana's brothers, bankrolled the interahamwe (the MRND militia) and death squads known as Network "Network Zero" and Amasasu, (Bullets), both of which had carried out political killings prior to April 6 and during the genocide. Madameme. Habyarimana herself would have been involved in some of the initial political decisions made before April 9, when she was among the first to be evacuated to Paris by the French' (The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 14, paragraph 43). And further: 'The government, the military, and the

politicians worked virtually as one. Colonel Bagosora of the Rwandan Armed Forces effectively guided the genocide and operated as head of the army. He was assisted, militarily, by the commanders of the Presidential Guard, elite units and other senior military leaders. The army played a key organizational role and lent its skills and weaponry to every large-scale attack and operation. The army also provided important logistical help with military vehicles and communications systems, which was vital to the effectiveness of the genocide' (paragraph 44).

The question arises: Who is the actor? Is it the ruler himself or is he only a puppet? If a puppet, then a puppet of whom? Did Hitler have a similar 'entourage' around him? And why did the 'entourage' of Mussolini oust him, instead of intensifying the hardening of cleavages as in the case of Somalia and Rwanda? As is apparent in today's Burundi, Israel, Palestine, Iraq, and many other places, an elite may sway towards moderation or extremism, with the leader and/or his entourage working together or not. Habyarimana was shot down, perhaps by his own people, and Yitzak Rabin was not killed by Palestinians. There are people today who are afraid for the life of Burundian President Buyoya: 'The Burundi peace agreement is seen by many observers in the context of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda' (IRIN, 29th August 1000).

The hardening of cleavages leading up to genocidal killings, after a period of experimentation with democracy and fragile attempts to liberalise and reform the country, led by one man or a small elite: this pattern connects the fate of Somalia (Said Barre, his sub-clan, and especially his family), Rwanda (Kayibanda, Habyarimana, the North-Western Hutu of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, and especially Habyarimana's family), and Burundi (Micômbéro as representative for a hardening of cleavages; Buyoya standing for the current, and hopefully successful, attempt to soften them).

A Great Nation Ends in Humiliation

Rwandan Hutu had high ideals. Grégoire Kayibanda wrote to Guy Logiest (see earlier quote): 'However, your action carries further: it has proven, in a concrete way, that idealism is not just vain smoke, but an efficient force provided by God in the course of the world's history. If only other people would follow your example, not only in Africa, but also in those countries where riches are equalled by savagery, where technological progress is equalled by fundamental errors, because a number of their leaders have not understood the primordial significance of Love. Your righteous conduct will serve as an example for generations to

come.' For long Rwanda was the 'best' (Somalia also wanted to be the 'best,' and many told me that there were years where Mogadishu indeed once was one of the best places in Africa): 'In the 1970s and '80s, Rwanda was a favourite for aid donors, receiving perhaps two hundred million dollars annually. In the 1970s, Rwanda enjoyed a reputation for a well-managed economy and a commitment to rural development that attracted official and non-governmental aid agencies alike' (Rakiya, De Waal, & African Rights, 1995, 23).

The African Rights report highlights a Rwandan scenario that remarkably parallels Somalia's fate after the disaster of the Ogaden war: 'A certain disillusion with the government began to creep in during the later 1980s, but the aid kept flowing. The government could not only direct aid projects to its favoured regions, but ministers and civil servants could receive generous payments themselves. Leading members of the government and army owned large buildings in Kigali which they rented out to foreign companies and aid agencies. These were the prizes that the Akazu enjoyed, and did not want to relinquish. By the late 1980s, Rwanda's relative prosperity began to unravel, and the western donors pressed for a package of "structural adjustment". This entailed the standard measures of slimming down the public sector payroll, liberalizing prices and devaluing the currency - all of which entailed cutting into the privileges and patronage of the ruling circle. The collapse of coffee prices did not push the donors towards any greater leniency. After 1990, the simultaneous threats of multi-party politics and the RPF meant that the ruling clique was faced with the likelihood of being forced to share its already dwindling privileges more equitably' (23). Leif Ohlsson highlights furthermore the increasing problem of land scarcity, and describes 'in detail the specific and important role environmental scarcity of land played in making it possible for the genocidal regime in Rwanda to mobilize such a large part of the population as perpetrators in the final solution. As motivated by the enormity of genocide, a special discussion of the role of evil in explanatory models is carried out' (Ohlsson, 1999).[234]

In the case of Somalia I counted seven dynamics of humiliation, namely humiliating penury, especially for an elite, national humiliation, North versus South, 'noble' warriors versus occupational minorities, 'noble' warriors versus farmers, men versus women, and exploiters versus protectors of nature. All of those dynamics are also to be found in Rwanda and Burundi. The *Akazu* in Rwanda, similar to Barre's entourage, did not want to let go of privileges, just like other elites around the world who tend to interpret overdue humility as undue humiliation; their 'problem' matched a much more vital problem for the masses,

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[234] I thank Folke Löfgren for having brought me in touch with Leif Ohlsson.

namely land shortage. National humiliation, Somali inability to build a safe nation for all Somalis, was paralleled in the Rwandan case, at least for many Hutu, by the inability of their military forces to efficiently win over RPF attackers, or worse, by their moderates' willingness to allow 'occupants' to share power.

North versus South, Isaaq against Barre, may be paralleled in the Rwandan rift between Northern extremists and Southern moderates. 'Noble' warriors versus occupational minorities may be found in the Burundian contempt of Pariah Tutsi, Hima, a dynamic that was less relevant in Rwanda. 'Noble' warriors versus farmers, this certainly is a relevant dynamic in Rwanda and Burundi, namely the Tutsi-Hutu cleavage. Men versus women, this dynamic was important insofar as Hutu women were compelled to live with the humiliating knowledge that they were regarded as much less beautiful than their Tutsi sisters (see more on that issue further down), and after the genocide many more facets of man-woman inequality became significant, because many households are headed by women, their men having been killed. The cleavage between environmentalists versus exploiters of nature becomes relevant wherever population pressure increases and war endangers natural parks, as is the case with the natural parks at the Rwandan-Ugandan border that house unique gorilla populations.

Feelings of Humiliation Breed Acts of Humiliation. Or, How a Victim Turns into a Perpetrator

Like Siad Barre, also Grégoire Kayibanda and Juvenal Habyarimana were 'Robin Hoods' (as Hitler saw himself and was welcomed by many). They experienced personal humiliation at Tutsi hands, wanted to lead the rise of the oppressed, and co-authored the *Bahutu Manifesto* as their programme - 'self-made' revolutionary thoughts similar to Siad's 'self-made' socialism. However, hurtful as the situation must have been for Hutu men, it must have even been worse for Hutu women. I frequently was told that a Hutu man who gets rich 'buys a house, gets a Mercedes, and marries a Tutsi woman.' How undesirable must a Hutu woman have felt who needed the 'help' 'against' her beautiful Tutsi sisters provided in the infamous *Hutu Ten Commandments*? 'Hutu Power propaganda routinely contrasted trusted Hutu women with treacherous Tutsi women… The first three commandments spoke directly to this caricature of Tutsi women as subversive temptresses who should be avoided at all costs: 1. "1) Each Hutu man must know that the Tutsi woman, no matter whom, works in solidarity with her Tutsi ethnicity. In consequence, every Hutu man is a traitor: - who marries a Tutsi woman, - who makes a Tutsi woman his concubine, - who makes a Tutsi woman his secretary

or protegée. 2. 2) Every Hutu man must know that our Hutu girls are more dignified and more conscientious in their roles as woman, wife, and mother. Aren't they pretty, good secretaries, and more honest! 3. 3) Hutu women, be vigilant and bring your husbands, and sons to reason!'" (The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 16, paragraph 3).

The Panel continues: 'Women, in other words, constituted a secret, sexual weapon that Tutsi leaders used cynically to seduce and weaken Hutu men. The extremist newspaper Kangura, which frequently ran pornographic cartoons featuring Tutsi women, explained: "The inkotanyi [members of the RPF] will not hesitate to transform their sisters, wives, and mothers into pistols to conquer Rwanda." The conclusion was irresistible: Only when no Tutsi women were left could Hutu men be safe from their wicked wiles' (The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 16, paragraph 3).

This means that Madame Habyarimana was perhaps the one whose inner core of self was more hurt by the humiliating Tutsi-Hutu dynamic than her husband's? The Tutsi-Hutu cleavage was perhaps not just folklore to her, the first lady, not just rhetoric, but a deeply felt double humiliation as a Hutu and as a woman? I did not have the chance to investigate this point further yet. But, if reports are correct that she and her entourage were in fact the masterminds of the genocide - and she surely had a personal stance towards this issue of Hutu women being uglier than their Tutsi sisters - it is not unlikely that she harboured resentful feelings that may have provided the necessary motivation for acts of cruel counter-humiliation.

Table 26 tries to summarise a possible view of the dynamics of humiliation and counter-humiliation in Rwanda, a view that builds on the assumption that relations between Hutu and Tutsi were more peaceful and less tainted by acts and feelings of humiliation before the advent of colonisers than after their intrusion.

Genocidal dynamics of humiliation in Rwanda		
	Pre-colonial times	**Colonial times**	**Post-colonial times**
'Topdogs'	Tutsi	Tutsi / French speaking Belgians	Tutsi (former topdog, then harassed, subjected to acts of humiliation and genocide)
Degrees of humiliation and counter-humiliation	↓ (weak humiliation, hierarchy with a high degree of mutually accepted patronage)	↓ (strongly felt humiliation)	↑ (maximum counter-humiliation: genocide)
'Underdogs'	Hutu	Hutu / Flemish speaking Belgians	Hutu, especially Hutu women (former underdog, politically now the topdog, emotionally still suffering from former humiliations)

Table 26: Genocidal dynamics of humiliation in Rwanda

If this analysis is correct, and much of my fieldwork in Rwanda and Burundi seems to support this, then it may be concluded that their past history of suffering humiliation led those in power in Rwanda to be guided, at some point in time, by short-term rationality. This form of rationality led the Hutu regime to mastermind the genocides directed against the Tutsi. Furthermore, the dynamics of humiliation fostered a form of rationality that underestimated the actor's social embeddedness within a larger, global context. In the case of Rwanda the humiliated 'underdogs' who had gained power were not able to include the former 'topdogs' in their range of sympathies and societal structures.

Humiliation seems to set in motion strong feelings, including a deep fear of being humiliated again after having escaped it. The result can be destructive for all. Rwanda as a whole certainly did not gain any long-term social, economic or political viability through the genocide. Destroying a Tutsi elite (plus moderate Hutu opponents to the genocide) has most probably been as damaging to Rwanda as the destruction of Jewish intelligence was to Germany. And even the members of the Hutu government who perpetrated the genocide would certainly find themselves in a much better situation today, if they had peacefully

accepted into their midst the Tutsi refugees who wanted to return home, and if they had positively integrated those Tutsi who lived within Rwanda.

Short-term and long-term profit in Rwanda		
	Short-term **(what happened)**	**long-term** **(what could have happened)**
Profit for the leaders	(1) In 1994, the Hutu extremist government in Rwanda was so caught up in the dynamics of humiliation that the penalisation of 'them' as opposed to 'us' seemed the only option. The government orchestrated a genocide, was ousted, and the perpetrators are now on the run.	(3) Achieved by taking care of (4).
Profit for all	(2) The Hutu extremist government in Rwanda promised land, dignity and general well-being to all (Hutu), if they were loyal and followed their leaders' genocidal ideology.	(4) Sustainable social and environmental development = implementation of all aspects of human rights (civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural rights) for all (Hutu and Tutsi).

Table 27: Short-term and long-term profit in Rwanda

Germany

Table 28 and Table 29 try to summarise the development of the cycle of humiliation towards genocide in Hitler's Germany and the effect humiliation may have had on rational long-term thinking, especially for Hitler. It seems that the feelings of humiliation and the apprehension of future humiliation clouded Hitler's long-term rationality to the extent that he saw only one solution, namely the extinction of the feared humiliator. However, he started out with buying his people's approval by setting in motion a short-lived economic upswing, paralleled in Somalia by the comparably 'better' times at the outset of Siad Barre's rule and in Rwanda by the improvement of Hutu life under Hutu rule. With skilled propaganda techniques, later so chillingly duplicated in Somalia, Rwanda and other places, he then tied his people up in the bifurcated discourse of 'we' or 'them' that made an enemy of every dissenter. When the end

came, not long before committing suicide, he judged that the Germans had not lived up to his expectations, and that they therefore deserved to be destroyed.

Genocidal dynamics of humiliation in Hitler's Germany			
	Beginning of colonial times	**Before and after World War I**	**Before and during World War II**
'Topdogs'	Europe with England, France, Spain, Portugal as growing colonial powers	Allies winning World War I	Jews (perceived by Hitler as wanting to dominate the world as global 'super-humiliators')
Degrees of humiliation and counter-humiliation	↓ (weak humiliation perceived in Germany in the process of its national awaking)	↓ (strong humiliation, including violence, dividing 'worthy' from 'unworthy' beings)	↑ (maximum counter-humiliation: Holocaust)
'Underdogs'	Germany realising that it was hanging behind, e.g. concerning possession of colonies	Germany humiliated in Europe after lost World War I (Hitler humiliated in Austria as a boy by his father, and his beloved Germans humiliated in Austria by Czech 'influence')	Hitler (former underdog, now politically a topdog, but feeling triple humiliation (at least): by his father, by Czech influence in Austria, and by German defeat in World War I)

Table 28: Genocidal dynamics of humiliation in Hitler's Germany

Short-term and long-term profit in Hitler's Germany		
	Short-term **(what happened)**	**Long-term** **(what could have happened)**
Profit for the leader	(1) Hitler was so caught up in the dynamics of humiliation that penalising 'them' as opposed to 'us' seemed the only options. He orchestrated a Holocaust against an imagined 'super-humiliator,' the Jews; he was defeated, and committed suicide.	(3) Achieved by taking care of (4).
Profit for all	(2) Hitler promised 'Lebensraum,' land, dignity, and general well-being to all 'Aryans,' if they were loyal and fulfilled their leaders' vision of them as superior. Hitler started out by giving Germany a short-lived 'Aufschwung' ['upswing,' meaning building roads and creating jobs]; later he 'distributed' Jewish property to 'Aryans.'	(4) Sustainable social and environmental development = implementation of all aspects of human rights (civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural rights) for all (citizens of Europe and the world).

Table 29: Short-term and long-term profit in Hitler's Germany

UNOSOM I + II, UNITAF, UNAMIR

Somalia

'Moderate' Caretakers of Super-Ordinate Structure Versus 'Extremist' Faction Leaders: Mahdi Versus Aidid

When Siad Barre finally was in exile and Somalia was 'free,' Somalia could have rebuilt itself and created sound democratic super-ordinate structures that were nurtured by people who knew that such structures were not to be regarded as private 'pasture.' Perhaps Ali Mahdi would have been such a caretaker of democratic super-ordinate structures in Somalia (see Table 22 and Table 23), if extremist faction leaders had not foiled his efforts.

Karim Hassan believes 'that war in the South would have been avoided if Barre had left in 1989, because the Mogadishu people did not want to replace a soldier with a soldier, - and Aidid [a soldier from an especially fierce warrior clan] was poised to become president. If Barre had left in 1988 then perhaps there would have been a chance (because Aidid was not yet there/big, later Aidid became the victorious hero, who ousted Barre). Ali Mahdi [a businessman] was elected president in Mogadishu purely to avoid another military man, namely Aidid. Aidid stood 90 km away from Mogadishu.' Karim Hassan reckons that to elect Mahdi in this situation 'was a guarantee for war, and I asked the Mogadishu people why they did it. They said they did by all means not want another soldier; the Hawiye elected Mahdi in order to avoid Aidid.'

Warring factions in the South of Somalia brought so much disaster that the humanitarian situation cried out for help. The United Nations and the United States of America intervened. As reported above, this intervention ended in disaster.

'Moderate' Caretakers of Super-Ordinate Structure Versus 'Extremist' Faction Leaders: The UN Versus the UN

31st December 1998 I met warlord Osman Ato in Nairobi. I had been told that 10 000 dollar would not get me to meet Ato, so I paid him a surprise visit. When I approached the place where he stayed, I at first met many children playing and remembered that I had been told that he might have more than fifty children with different wives. I knocked at the door and his wife opened. She said that he was in bed and could not talk. He finally came, a warrior radiating a degree of cautious alertness that 'normal' people would not be able to even imagine and that I had only met once before, in Hargeisa, when I spoke to Muusa Bihi Cabdi. Like with Muusa Bihi Cabdi it was like meeting human history, meeting a man from former times, times that also existed in now peaceful Europe, where many more people's survival than today depended on the same kind of alertness. This intensity seems to stem from being constantly on guard to not being killed, from incessantly being in a Machiavellian chess game and trying to come up with the pre-emptive strategy that gives yet another opening for not being shot by some enemy or worse, by an allied warlord… Just the preceding night quite a number of Ato's men had been killed in Somalia, I had been told. It seemed to me that this man represented the psychological effects of being in an un-attenuated Security Dilemma without pause, a psychological state that in turn may make this person aggravate the Security Dilemma.

As already reported, Ato explained to me: 'UNOSOM was the biggest humiliation ever. Especially when the house was attacked where elders had a meeting and it was said that it was a headquarters or something like that. When the Americans feel humiliated because their soldiers' bodies were shown in the streets, then they should ask, why. The killing of the elders was not good either. The helicopters, the bombing, this was humiliation.'

Ato, as a warlord surely not as helpless a victim he wants to portray himself as, however, is not alone with his judgement that the UN bombing of elders was a big mistake, - and it was not the only 'blunder.' I met John Drysdale, a British who is part of Somalia, in Hargeisa in November 1998, and he invited me to his house not far away from Hargeisa. Unfortunately I subsequently did not manage to visit him. He writes in his book *Whatever Happened to Somalia? A Tale of Tragic Blunders* (Drysdale, 1994) how careful military strategists have to plan their actions, and that mere parading of military power does not lead anywhere. He describes how four hundred Rangers, flown in at General Howe's request with the objective to capture Aidid together with some of the Delta Force 'mistakenly dropped on to the roof of the UNDP Resident Representative's house in South Mogadishu, at 3 p.m. Firing through closed doors from the hip they entered, and bound four international staff members; these including the acting Resident Representative...' (208). Some male visitors of the house were blindfolded and announced as successfully captured Aidid supporters. This was not the only blunder. 'A man believed to be General Aideed who was arrested turned out to be a senior member of the UN-backed Somali police force' (209).

Ameen Jan's briefing on the Legacies of the International Intervention in 1996 confirms Drysdale's view I many ways. Ameen suggests that 'soft tools' should have been used to bring down General Aidid or punish him for having killed twenty-three Pakistani peacekeepers: 'One particularly efficacious approach in the circumstances might have been to appeal to the peoples' sense of honor and justice by publicizing how shameful it was for an attack to have taken place on fellow Muslims who had come to help the Somali people. If used in an appropriately subtle manner, this kind of appeal to the people may have helped to erode support for Aidid, if not result in his being apprehended. Instead, a clandestine military operation, including psychological warfare, was launched against Aidid. Wanted posters with Aidid's picture were posted and dropped all over south Mogadishu, and a price of $25,000 was placed on his head. UNOSOM II's "hunt and kill" mission went so far as to bomb the house of a Habr-Gedir elder on 12 July (Abdi House) when it learned that a meeting of clan elders, including Aidid, would be taking place. In the event, Aidid did not attend; but according to the International Committee for the Red Cross at least fifty-four Habr-Gedir clan

members, mainly civilians, were killed without any provocation… These activities clearly transformed UNOSOM II to the extent that it became known as the "sixteenth Somali faction"' (Jan, 1996).

Ato reports furthermore that it was more humiliating for him to be in an American or Kenyan prison than in the prison of Barre. 'When I was in Barre's prison my wife would bring me three meals a day. When UNITAF imprisoned me for 5 ½ months, I was handcuffed and blindfolded, got canned cold pork meat, which I did not touch (I got biscuits then, and got only one hot meal in these months, from an Indian), and only two bottles of mineral water per day. I dehydrated (which was diagnosed by a Red Cross doctor), because one needs two bottles to drink, then something to make tea, and to wash for prayer. I feel that those who preach human rights did not treat me well!'

Osman Ato recalls with satisfaction how he wrote a letter that he smuggled out of the UNITAF prison. He remembers that the Americans were very humiliated by the fact that this letter went out. 'It was my handwriting. They wanted to know how this letter came out and I said that one of the Marines took it. They wanted to know how I did it, I refused to tell.' Ato concludes: 'They try to humiliate us, but we humiliate them, we take revenge!'

Ato says (however, many Somali readers will not believe that he wants his words to be applied to himself) that the 'Somali leaders must curb their ambitions and work together. Somalia cannot have democracy at once, but slowly. I do not want to become the president of Somalia, I think a council of presidents would be good, circa fifteen.' I ask: 'like the European Union'? He agrees. I ask: 'Like the Council of Elders?' 'No,' he answers. This would not be a broad enough representation. Not elders alone. Elders, religious leaders, politicians, many groups must be represented.'

Many in the UN were 'moderates,' who wanted to implement something in the line with what Ato formulates, namely fair and impartial super-ordinate structures for Somalia, while others in the UN system preferred to abase themselves to the level of extremist faction leaders (see Table 22 and Table 23).

Dualeh's analysis goes further, and like many others, he accuses the UN of even having fed the warlords: 'I hope that the international community will ask well-meaning Somalis! We once played an effective role in the Islamic league, Arab league, and East Africa, and now we start at zero. The international community complicates our situation, we are blamed, we are blamed as nomads, warriors, while 99 % of the Somalis are blameless! 1% are warlords and their supporters, and they have the guns. I hope the international community will blame the warlords and help the people to remove them! Some warlords were even paid

by UNOSOM protection money! Half a million dollars! Before UNOSOM came, the warlords were on their way out, UNOSOM gave them the muscles to buy guns, and to hire young men. UNOSOM left us with the warlords! The international community has to be blamed partially for the situation in Somalia today, not only the Somalis! The warlords, and especially the UN, which came with the agenda that they know what is good for the Somali people! They got entangled to fight Aideed, there was so much money spent on that! The result was death of not less than ten thousand Somalis! And of twenty soldiers of the American Marines, and Pakistanis, nearly fifty! A clan will lose pride if a leader is caught, thus those who chased Aidid made a whole clan to their enemy, everybody had to protect Aideed, and Somalis were killed because of that mistake!

Ameen Jan agrees with Dualeh on the problem with the warlords: 'At a structural level, the massive foreign presence that began with UNITAF and continued with UNOSOM II resulted in vast amounts of foreign currency being suddenly pumped into the Somali economy. This effect was most evident in the rising value of the Somali Shilling, which appreciated one hundred percent, from a rate of approximately SoSh 8000 to SoSh 4000 for one U.S. dollar. Most significantly, UNOSOM II's presence, primarily in south Mogadishu where it was headquartered, fuelled the local economy with its rental of houses and vehicles. Rather than helping to create conditions that would generate sustainable employment in Somalia, which would contribute significantly to long-term peacebuilding… Salaries for these employees were exceedingly high, particularly for security guards, many of whom were also militia members. Aside from sustainability considerations, these high salaries made continued insecurity lucrative for the factions that provided security guards' (Jan, 1996). In another publication Jan adds: 'UNOSOM II was the single largest employer of Somalis, engaging approximately 3000 local staff, primarily in Mogadishu… Aidid's faction controlled south Mogadishu, where UNOSOM II was headquartered, and this sub-clan therefore benefited disproportionately from UNOSOM II's presence, though both creation of employment and rental of houses and cars. Ironically, when the UN went to war against Aidid, its presence continued to enrich him at the same time. When UNOSOM II withdrew, the economy of Mogadishu suffered tremendously since many Somalis lost their jobs' (Jan, 1998).

People Find Losses More Negative Than Gains Positive

Perhaps the United Nations intervention would have been more successful if they had succeeded in disarming all factions. However, disarmament is admittedly extremely difficult.

Lee Ross recounts[235] his involvement in peace efforts in Northern Ireland. He describes the difficult moment of putting down weapons, and the psychological barriers making this almost insurmountable (see also Ross & Ward, 1995): 'If I put down my weapons first, will not you exploit the situation? Can I trust you?' Ross relates: 'In Northern Ireland gunmen are now the leading peace activists, because they were in prison together with the opponent, and had to learn to co-operate. They made their common enemy the British, the guards. They learned to trust each other. Those gunmen are for disarmament; it is the political wing, which is against. There is this loss aversion; it is too substantial a thing to give up arms, a concession, which cannot be repeated, and this within a process with only the hope that things will become better. The problem is that people's risk aversion makes them forget the risk in the status quo. They believe there are no risks associated with doing nothing.' Ross explains the psychological dynamics of 'loss aversion': 'People find losses more negative than gains positive. If I say: what do you prefer, $10 in the pocket for sure, or I flip a coin and if you win you get $20, but if you lose, you get nothing? People will choose the sure gain, and only 12% -13% will flip the coin. But this becomes very different if you *lose* $10 for sure! Then 50% flip the coin! This means that people are reluctant to trade land or weapons for an uncertain future!'

Also Ato's sentence 'Somali leaders must curb their ambitions and work together' is easily said, but history shows how difficult it is to put in practice. To give up immediate privileges, in order to wait for fairly managed super-ordinate structures to make the cake bigger for all at some time in the future, this is tough. Demonstrators currently beleaguering World Bank and International Monetary Fund meetings urge the rich West to go down precisely this ally, and they generally are not welcome.

However the dynamic that people find losses more negative than gains positive is being attenuated by another dynamic, namely that people are quite willing to share equally. Lee D. Ross carried out experiments that partly contradict the minimal groups paradigm that indicates in-group favoritism when goods are divided; he finds that the balance between fairness and self-interest is slightly different. His experimental evidence shows that 'people are willing to share equally, but those who have more justify inequality once it is there.'[236] Ross illustrates this as follows: 'In an experiment students were asked how scholarships should be divided between Stanford students and less well-off students from other schools.

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[235] At the Sommerakademie Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 11th – 16th July 1999, in Clemenswerth, Germany.
[236] At the Sommerakademie Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 11th – 16th July 1999, in Clemenswerth, Germany.

Their response was: Share equally! However, when the participants in the experiment got to know that the decision had been made, they found justifications for those who had received more.' To put it in my words: When the dividing process happens at present or in the future, I am willing to share equally, however, I find the outcome of former dividing processes 'just,' if I got more. This means that past divisions will be contested as 'unjust' by those who got less, while elites will find that it is precisely this protest that is 'unjust.' However, for future divisions there is hope for less bias.

Lack of Empowerment and Inclusion Humiliates

Also Ambassador Dualeh is bitter when talking about the United Nations and United States interventions, but it is not disarmament that occupies him, but Somali empowerment and inclusion: 'The UN said they would help the Somali people, but when it came to the implementation, they never asked the Somalis what are their priorities! UN officials would not even bother to ask! Somalis are thankful for help, but they feel humiliated by this kind of help. This humiliates nomadic culture: A foreigner comes from far away and tells the Somali what is good for him! UNISOM, though they had good intentions, never bothered to ask the Somalis, it became a failure and bloodshed - humiliation!'

Dualeh continues: 'We have educated Somalis around, but they are not employed, Somalis are not appointed into senior position! Younger boys from abroad come, and the senior Somali people have to work under them! The young boy earns a lot, the Somali little: also this is humiliation! This underlying humiliation of the Somali pride makes all efforts fail! The young man cannot know what is good for the people! The UN is groping in the dark! Somebody is shouting for help, but you cannot see! The UN cannot do anything effective. The UN has never experimented with putting senior Somalis into position and seeing what will happen! This is humiliation of our own educated elite; some of them could be very beneficial!'

Warlords or 'Extremist' Faction Leaders Cannot Deliver Impartial Super-Ordinate Structures

Dualeh clearly feels humiliated and offended by the 'category mistake' that he sees constantly being committed by outside observers between the moderate and the extremist (see Table 22 and Table 23): 'What happened in the civil war, the UN, and the international community had

a role in complicating the situation. After the fall of Barre, the international community accepted the warlords as those who could deliver whatever they signed. They never realised that the warlord cannot deliver what he signs. By holding conferences, where warlords are guests, signing for what they cannot deliver, Somalia lost credibility. The international community did not see the warlords are part of the problem. The UN, and well-meaning governments never bothered to ask traditional leaders of Somalis. Whenever a meeting fails, Somalis are blamed as hopeless warriors, not prepared to reconcile, but they never blame the warlords. But the truth is that none of the credible Somalis was involved! However, they carry the blame! With warlords nothing will come out and all will lose credibility! Therefore: leave us alone! We will solve it ourselves! When we reach that level then we will call you! Before that do not call the warlords! They have guns, they have five hundred young men, but they are not in control. The chiefs are in control, but they are quiet, because each clan has their own warlord. Until we reach the level where chiefs of all clans are invited to talk about what happened the warlords can never deliver a government to Somalia! It is a waste of effort!'

What is the conclusion of this section on Somalia and the UN? In short, the UN was another Trojan horse. They came, like Siad Barre, as benefactors and ended as the sixteenth Somali faction, as 'white warlords.' They came and promised to help implement a neutral super-ordinate structure that would look after the interest of everybody; instead they failed to disarm those who vied for the cake. Worse, they even made the warlords richer than they were before. Again, trust was betrayed. All Somalis who had put genuine hope in the international community had to conclude bitterly that they were duped; their good will was devalued in a shameful manner. Again, hope for the successful development of a culture of co-operation for the common good was lost and discredited.

As Simons points out when she writes about biases of the expatriate work ethic that may have their origins in the cleavage between the culture of settled, agricultural people and mobile pastoralists, there may be another bias on the expatriate side (UN, US, international community): what about the hawk/dove cleavage, or an honour/human rights dichotomy? Military personnel obviously thought of Somali warlords as leaders in command, not grasping that Somalia perhaps is more 'democratic' (or, unruly) than that. The West, especially as viewed from the military perspective, has a tradition of strict hierarchies with obedient underlings led by men in control. This hawkish honour tradition of obedience does not suit modern knowledge society anymore, certainly not in the West, but, even more - and this is the point - - it never suited Somalia, where a culture of obedience never was enforced. Western leaders, particularly with military background, perhaps recognise themselves in warlords

more than they would want to admit, and they gave Somali warlords not only more money, but also more weight than they actually had, because of their own, outdated, belief in enforced hierarchies.

Should Peacekeeping Be Abandoned?

Should peacekeeping therefore be abandoned? The 1994 genocide of Rwanda made this option immoral. Hirsch & Oakley, 1995, reflect on the future of peacekeeping (172): 'Even if there is an improvement in preventive diplomacy, however, the future will certainly see more peacekeeping operations. There are too many people competing for too few resources in a world where national and international institutions inspire diminishing respect. Ethnicity, religion, clan and tribal differences, and other potentially divisive forces are increasingly becoming sources of identity, means for mobilizing political support, and causes of conflict in a world seen by many as humiliating and hostile.' Is a standing UN peace force the solution? Hirsch & Oakley argue that this is not to be expected very soon and that the United States have to be international leaders 'willing to commit financial, humanitarian, military, and political resources to international peacekeeping' (173). As Hirsch & Oakley remind us, there is a 'world seen by many as humiliating and hostile' out there, and any peacekeeping or peace enforcing intervention has to avoid compounding humiliation with humiliation.

Aisha Ahmed illustrates with a small example how feelings have to be taken into account whenever the international community again plans another intervention. She explains that the Red Cross and Red Crescent started with 'dissemination' in Somalia in 1994, meaning that people are taught, for example, how to prevent the misuse of guns, how to respect women, children, and elderly. She reports: 'In 1995 the ICRC together with the BBC and the national society produced a drama which was called "Aqara" [the name of a village]. This was a failure, because the actors all came from the Siad Barre clan. There was an outcry that those people would always be in power. ICRC understood and tried to amend that! All clans had to be included!'

Necessary Humbling or Outrageous Humiliation?

What do we learn? Military strikes meant to 'teach a lesson' (in other words to humble the opponent) may altogether prove more difficult than imagined, and even be counterproductive because such lessons may not be welcomed as 'necessary' humbling by the targeted

'apprentices,' but effectively opposed to as outrageous humiliation. This opposition could turn out to be insurmountable. Not only ethical problems, but also purely practical problems are the result, for example regarding information and intelligence gathering from an alienated and internally united group targetted for such humbling: 'Foreigners cannot do the job because they do not have the local knowledge and would be too conspicuous. To use an agent outside his own clan territory renders him suspect, and to use an agent from within his own clan risks misinformation. The highly sophisticated military intelligence gathering that the US possesses was also ineffective because it could not really pick up the low technology used by Somalis, such as the use of couriers rather than electronic transmissions' (Drysdale, 1994, 209).

Drysdale (1994) highlights that the international community itself has to abandon the hawkish hope that 'teaching lessons' works, or that humbling, perceived by its recipients as humiliation, may lead to real peace. The international community has to learn that they have to respond to Somali hawks [or any other unruly group] with other measures than trying to put them down. Many regret that Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun - obviously a 'moderate' - who served as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Somalia in 1992, could not stay on. 'He understood the complexity of such an intervention… and realised that the UN needed all the support and advice it could get before it entered into the reconciliation process in Somalia. He needed to consult with the experts on Somalia, and he also needed financial support for a process of peace. There was money for the military, there was money for the humanitarian input, but not a cent for this political intervention. Sweden was approached, I do not know why, and the Life and Peace Institute was called in to assist in this very complicated endeavour' (Normark, in Haakonsen & Keynan, 1995, 38, 39).

So, obviously, more people like Sahnoun are needed and more resources for the right measures. Sahnoun himself says: 'How can we create a relatively secure environment? …With two billion dollars and thirty thousand strong army, the UN has not been able to resolve that problem. In fact, if it has done anything, it has probably compounded the security problem. The security environment with which we are dealing today is probably much worse than the one I had to deal with when I was in Somalia' (Sahnoun, in Haakonsen & Keynan, 1995, 78). Sahnoun proposes: 'What is important is to be able to show the people that you are not coming to impose a solution for security, but you are there to help them talk to each other, and to provide a framework in which they can meet, and discuss and exchange views and experiences. I think people would appreciate this kind of approach. As you know, many

Somalis have become suspicious and mistrustful of the UN' (80, see also Sahnoun, 1994, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities*).

The United Nations and the United States wanted to *teach a lesson* to Somalis, especially to warlord General Aidid. Teaching a lesson means humiliating the opponent while believing that this is a necessary humbling. The result was a *lesson taught* (hopefully) to the United Nations, or the humbling or even humiliation of the United Nations, expressed in, for example, a series of seminars such as the *Seminar on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia At the Strategic and Operational Levels* (19th –20th June 1995 in New York).[237] The report of this seminar points out the lack of clear goals, and the lack of unity, co-ordination and effective distribution of funding (7-10).

Moderate Caretakers Versus Extremist Faction Leaders: The 'Human Rights Camp' Versus the 'Conservative Camp' of the International Community

The above-mentioned cleavage between hawks and doves, or adherents of military honour codes as opposed to egalitarian human rights ideologists, obviously has to be better understood and resolved in the future, on the psychological and the strategic level, before 'lessons' can be taught to others again: 'the components in the field – especially the humanitarian providers and the military – had very little experience working with each other and began the undertaking with a considerable degree of mutual suspicion, even mutual stereotyping' (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung et al., 1995, 8).

Edna Adan has a message to the global village: 'The international community is usually the one who encourages dictators and the oppressors to progress. Without mentioning any names, you have government dictators who have millions and billions of dollars in banks. Those billions of dollars were not generated through a salary that they earned or a reward that they were given by the people they were heading. Those billions came from the money that belongs to the people, that was given by the international community. The international community should act intelligently, and fairly and honestly and not feed, not allow oppressors, to accumulate so much of the people's money. They should not give them arms, they should not give them money and they should not help them to remain in the power. Because it is the international world that maintains dictators in power. The bombs that were

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[237] See, for example, Allard & National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995;Clarke & Herbst, 1997; The Lessons-Learned Unit of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations & The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs UN Programme, 1995.

being thrown on my people in Hargeisa in Somaliland, were not manufactured by Siad Barre. They came from all corners of the world; they were American, Pakistani, Egyptian, Chinese, Russian, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav - any body who made arms, who made tanks, who made ammunition sold it or gave it to Siad Barre, to use against his people. So, where was the international world when that was being used against the weak? It should have said "no," it should have stopped the inflow of arms to Somalia in that time. It should have prevented the slaughter of the civilians.'

Edna Adan concludes that an international community with double standards is humiliating: 'I think the international world has different standards. It preaches human rights, and fairness and so on, in literature! In Europe! But then when that humiliation, and that aggression, and that hurt, has taken place in a poor, remote, developing country like Somaliland, no one wants to be bothered, let them stew in their own juice! And these are divided standards, and unfair standards ... It is a humiliation! So, the international community is to blame and I hope you have very strong cupboards in which you can lock up your conscience! Because all the civilians who died here died from bombs that were manufactured by people in the developed countries.'

Dr. Gaboose has a similar message to the global village. He explains that he would not like donors to dominate like masters, but: 'I would like a friend everywhere on the globe. After all, even though he is much more developed than my country, after all we are human beings! I can see what he cannot see, if he accepts the sharing.... Otherwise, the powerful countries would become dictators themselves for the poor countries. They would become Siad Barres themselves. They'll impose their line of ... they put a line, they draw a line and the others should follow! And I don't think that we can reach, through that way, a consensus for the developing globe! The idea is global; I have my right to participate in building it. Not because that country has got money, or is more powerful - a family member could be uneducated, … but we are one family! So, lets first of all respect every member of this village. Through respect for every member of this village, then I think the more powerful will understand later that they need the poor to sustain themselves. It is not just the poor who need the rich! … So, I think global could be global… if the powerful members of this village would accommodate the poorer, or the sick of the village. Otherwise, there would be a global Siad Barre, a powerful member of the village imposing on the others to obey. He is the master and the others would be the slaves. And I don't think in that way we can build a nation. … The law of Siad Barre was the destruction of whole Somalia. If we work in that way, the

powerful nation, when it comes to the end, - the whole globe would be destroyed! … So, we have to give space to everyone in the global village!'

Rwanda and Burundi

The UN 'Overdid' Somalia and 'Under-did' Rwanda, Ending in Painful Humiliation in Both Cases

'In October 1993, the first UN mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), was set up, notable mostly for its weak mandate and minimal capacity. No amount of credible early warnings could persuade either the members of the Security Council to treat the mission seriously or the UN Secretariat to authorize the mission to interpret its mandate flexibly. The single occasion in the life of UNAMIR when it was authorized to go beyond its passive observer mandate was at the very outbreak of the genocide, when several European nations evacuated their nationals. UNAMIR was in this case authorized not only to assist the evacuation, but also to go beyond its mandate, if that were required to assure the safety of foreign nationals. Never was such permission granted for the protection of Rwandans' The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, Executive Summary, paragraph 35).

The international community has since deeply regretted their lack of commitment to human rights, and sincerely apologised to Rwanda. That UN hawks 'overdid' it in Somalia was no reason for 'under-doing' it in Rwanda. Or, in other words, human rights 'moderates' are sometimes too reluctant to act as police and use violence in the face of 'extremists.' Lakoff and Johnson write: 'Nurturant Parent morality is not, in itself, overly permissive. Just as letting children do whatever they want is not good for them, so helping other people to do whatever they please is likewise not proper nurturance. There are limits to what other people should be allowed to do, and genuine nurturance involves setting boundaries and expecting others to act responsibly' (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 316).

Globalisation Lets War and the Security Dilemma Wither Away, and Calls For Responsible Policing

This leads back to the discussion on democratic super-ordinate structures and the Security Dilemma, and connects this with the widely disputed 'Just War' debate.[238] I propose to inscribe this global debate into the well-known national debate on the state (as the institution that, according to Weber, has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force), and to draw a line to globalisation in the sense that United Nations structures may be seen as the beginnings of global super-ordinate structures. Since the Treaty of Westphalia (24th October 1648) that concluded the Thirty Years War in Europe, the state is 'entitled' to wage war (if declared), meaning that not the individual citizen, nor the 'noble' warrior or feudal master, but the government of a state is the 'legitimate' level at which from 1648 on the Security Dilemma was 'legitimately' played out and confronted.[239] As mapped out in Table 19, in such a context there are two cultures, the culture of masters and the culture of underlings: Somali 'noble' warriors or Tutsi masters traditionally competed within the context of the Security Dilemma with neighbouring masters, while Hutu underlings were coerced into co-operating with their masters and each other and/or sought their masters' protection.

Democracy ideally takes out the coercive aspect of hierarchy, and aims at providing all citizens with the benefits of the surplus they may acquire through co-operating within a larger entity under the umbrella of super-ordinate structures. The caretakers of such super-ordinate structures are to be impartial and given the right to 'protect,' if necessary by police force, the super-ordinate structures and also each citizen against 'extremist faction leaders' who want to highjack the super-ordinate structures for their own group's benefit.

One could summarise by arguing that that the level at which the Security Dilemma is being played out has historically moved up from the level of 'noble' warriors to the level of nation states, and, during Cold War times it moved even further 'up' to the level of only two major blocks. Today, in a unipolar/multipolar world we witness another transition: The Security Dilemma starts withering away completely (and for the first time in human history): A state that abuses human rights cannot anymore trust that its sovereignty will prevent

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[238] See, for example, Brien Hallet, 1991; Bond, Leung, & Schwartz, 1992; Campbell, 1999; Cuomo, 1996; Enders & Sandler, 1999; Figley, 1995; Gouaux, 1991; Johnson & Kelsay, 1990; Mueller, Iverson, & Jo, 1999; Nanjundan, 1999); Neier, 1998; Peach, 1994; Solomon et al., 1992; Walzer, 1992; Zehr, 1990.

[239] 'The modern nation-state system had its beginnings in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. Its core principles were that states were sovereign in that they had no ruling bodies above them, and no state was permitted to interfere in the internal affairs of any other. Within states, however, people lived at the mercy of their rulers, their sovereigns' (Kent, 2000).

inference from newly emerging super-ordinate structures at the highest, the global level, and dictators from around the world observe with special attention how Chile's General Augusto Pinochet was apprehended in London. The adoption of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court on 17th July 1998 represented a historic breakthrough for international criminal justice.

In other words, traditional imperial warfare was played out within the Security Dilemma logic (as was traditional civil war that wanted to break up a state and create new ones within the same logic). Today the Security Dilemma disappears at the same rate with which global super-ordinate structures appear - this is an inevitable outcome that only could be reversed if another planet was to attack the earth: there is just no more higher level available above a global umbrella. Therefore the terms 'war,' or 'Just War' are according to my view non-terms for a world with a functioning global umbrella, because their precondition, the Security Dilemma, is not structuring this global world anymore. The only area where weapons, force and violence are needed, as much as ever before, is the policing of the 'inner' troubles of the globe. This is already put in practice by today's UN peacekeeping forces who, indeed, turn from soldiers who wage *war* to global *police forces*. Table 23 can thus be adapted as follows:

Moderates, extremists, and democratic super-ordinate structures at a global level
Super-ordinate UN structures may unite sub-groups in the global society (states and groups within states) and guarantee fair distribution of benefits to all citizens of the globe. Moderates often stand for this principle; they are human rights advocates who willingly act with humility. They do not want to debase or humiliate any sub-group.

Sub-group 1 with its particular interests.	Sub-group 2 with its particular interests.	Sub-group x with its particular interests.
Extremists often stand for their own sub-group as opposed to other sub-groups and tend to find compromise with other sub-groups humiliating.		

Table 30: Moderates and democratic super-ordinate structures at a global level

As much as any police in a democratic system has the responsibility of protecting this system against 'extremist faction leaders' who violate the basic human rights of equal citizens, the international community has the responsibility to protect human rights globally, even if this

means the use of police force. The police have to stop those who want to shoot their way through crossroads instead of waiting for the green light. Such machos may personally be the fittest of their gang (according to the survival of the fittest view), but a society, including global community, which allows such machismo, will not be fit.

Currently, the transition between the old and the new 'set-up' of the world is the source of much misunderstanding; human rights activists may oppose the necessary policing of human rights abuses because they interpret it as illegitimate war; they may get support for their views from the perpetrators who are unwillingly policed (worse even, they may, at least partly, be right, since some police officers may, in their hearts, be old-fashioned soldiers who fight for their 'honour' and not for human rights). This is the line of argument that accompanies interventions from Somalia to the Balkans: Slobodan Milosevic's regime violated human rights and was met with military intervention; rightly, say some human rights activists, wrongly say others.

The discussion resembles the 1968 struggle over whether super-ordinate structures in Western democracies were in fact democratic and caring for all, or whether they were oppressively and exploitatively attending only to the needs of a conservative elite. The German RAF, just like similar movements in other countries, felt that they had to bomb the way free for the oppressed masses, against an elite; they lived in a world where they saw two groups pitted against each other. By contrast, the masses seem to have regarded their elite rather as caretakers of super-ordinate structures that benefited all; they lived in a world where they saw everybody sitting in one boat. The conclusion to be drawn presents itself as follows. Super-ordinate structures must be democratically controlled and impartially managed, only then does their policing neither represent destructive war nor humiliating oppression.

Today

Somalia

'Extremist' Faction Leaders Thrive on Fear

'…there are out there in Somalia still today vested interests in statelessness and even anarchy. There are those who benefit enormously from an economy of plunder, from a mafia-like control of particular sectors, from various unlawful activities which range from laundering drug money to actually producing and selling drugs. And there are those whose political

constituency is enhanced and increased by fear and instability, not the normalisation of politics' (Menkhaus, in Haakonsen & Keynan, 1995, 29). In other words, fear is what heightens a Security Dilemma and this is what warlords give protection against. Their livelihood is a 'functioning' Security Dilemma. Somali warlords can only expect being paid for their 'services' as long as these services are needed. Especially businesspeople pay for protection; when I waited for Hussein Aidid in Nairobi for three days (1999), the 'waiting party' entailed numerous businessmen, - the reason for their visit was surely more than politeness. However, as soon as factions co-operate, warlords lose their 'job,' as do military institutions, for example, in an increasingly uniting Europe. Whatever the reasons a warlord may have for wanting to continue being a warlord, - maintenance of insecurity and fear is always the royal way to 'success.'

Where Are the 'Moderates' Who Can Put Super-Ordinate Structures in Place and Extremists in Check?

Ambassador Dualeh advises: 'Before you form a government in Somalia, all clans have to come together, accept that each clan carries blame for what happened, and when the blame is accepted, forgiveness is offered. Only then we can form a government of Somalia! Clans have broken all the rules which make clans co-exist - only after forgiveness trust will come, and after that government comes. All clans took part in killing one another, and unless they come together, led by their traditional chiefs, and unless forgiveness is sought, there will be no solution - we have to involve the traditional leaders to meet and forgive each other. After that it will not take more than a month to form a government! Before Siad Barre, it was good! Nomadic culture is based on forgiveness! Once we have that, we can form a government! There are so many things that Somalis have not talked about, because of nomadic pride: To a forum of Somali clans everything should be put on the table, from looting, to killing, to rape! From there we then start to accept blame, and to apologise. This is the way out, and I hope the international community will accept that!'

Dualeh sends the following message to the world: 'We always tell those well-meaning governments: "Call traditional chiefs, all segments of society, businessmen, intellectuals, former ministers, former ambassadors!" I appeal to the UN of calling the traditional chiefs - because as long as clans have not apologised, formation of a government will be impossible.'

The international community seems to have understood that, even during the ill-fated UN operations, but obviously it did not follow its own goals stringently enough. Sture

Normark states: 'A blueprint for the UN operation in Somalia was formulated at the meeting, including some important recommendations: 1. The key actors of the process must be the Somalis themselves. 2. The search for peace in Somalia must be from the bottom upwards, starting in the districts and the regions, building on traditional structures. 3. Elders, traditional and religious leaders, women and other representatives from the civil society must be involved and empowered to play the main role in peace-making in Somalia. To the same extent that these groups are empowered, war-lords and "self-appointed" political leaders must be marginalised. 4. The whole process must be given time; nothing should be rushed. It is too early to speak about national reconciliation at this stage' (Normark, in Salih & Wohlgemuth, 1994, 43).

Why did this blueprint not get the chance to be put into practice? Because it did not receive sufficient recognition and support within the UN operation. This is yet another piece of evidence that proud and competing soldiers - Somali as well as Western 'warlords' - are poor leaders, unless they learn to act as police forces who are faithful to building society instead of putting each other down. Trying to put Somalis down ends in a spiral of humiliation, this is what the international community learned.

Is Somalia a Hopeless Case? No.

Dualeh addresses humiliation: 'I would never have thought that this could happen to Somalia! That people with the same language and culture, could be such enemies! We have to study the humiliation that stands behind that! What a nomad hates is humiliation. Right down from Barre's government, clan humiliation, senior leaders humiliating the people, women raped which was not customary in traditional nomadic culture (in former times clan warfare could be started if a woman was slighted, the breast was touched, then clans would fight!) This protection of the woman was destroyed by Barre! The most humiliating is if your women are touched! When clans used to fight, they never touched the women folk, because this would cause war that lasts for hundred years, and exactly this happened to Somalia!'

Dualeh finally comes back to the confusion of arguments he perceives on the side of the international community: 'Evelin: the Somalis are warriors, this is what they like, we have to leave them. The international community does not understand that traditional fighting is different from today's problems. When I was young, once in four or five years clans were fighting, because camels were stolen - and the looting would be done by young men without being authorised; then shooting; then killing; then the elders would come together and make

peace. This clan warfare lasted for a month, and then the leaders would come together, and through compensation, exchange of the camels, peace would be restored. Today's problems are different! The institutions of the state were hijacked by Barre, they became like a new clan, which oppressed the rest with new methods!'

But are not warlords with their guns inconvincible? Can Somalia return to more peaceful proceeding? Obviously yes. Colonel Nur Hassan Hussein was the Red Cross and Red Crescent negotiator who freed the hostages around Ola Skuterud in April 1998. He explains what has to be done in cases where gunmen hold control: 'Gunmen have their own language. Middlemen can talk to them. It needs *khat*, food, and sitting with them, convincing them that what they did was wrong. Some will, after a while, understand that, and they will feel ashamed of the fact that they humiliated themselves through their action in front of everybody. They will not be able to go back, because they are afraid of their colleagues. For example, the kidnappers who kidnapped Skuterud will not look up; they will hide their faces, when they meet people in the street [who know about the kidnapping]. Some of such kidnappers are steered by emotions, others less. There are reasonable ones, and less reasonable ones. There are those who are easily going to action, others are calmer. Some think of consequences, others not. You cannot discuss with all at the same time, because the violent and unreasonable ones will dominate the discussion. You have to separate the group and get the reasonable ones on your side.' Obviously, this report can be inscribed into the discussion on moderates versus extremists; the 'reasonable ones' are so-to-speak 'on their way' to become 'moderates.'

The first thing Colonel Nur achieved during his negotiations was to convince the kidnappers to put what he calls 'reasonable' people into the compound to guard the hostages, who would defend them against the other ones, the more 'violent' ones who wanted to enter the compound. The elders helped: '*khat* and food must be provided to the kidnappers, they have to be kept happy. Otherwise they will not allow the food supply to the hostages.' Nur continues: 'The kidnapping incident started with criminals, but then the politicians interfered.' Colonel Nur asked them to stay out. 'For example, Osman Ato wished the hostages to be handed to him, and some were in favour, some not. They refused eventually.'

Colonel Nur then explains how a woman could solve such a situation by using humiliation as active tool: Once an Italian nurse had been kidnapped who had worked in Somalia for thirty years: 'The mother of one of the kidnappers threatened to strip naked in front of her son if he did not release the kidnapped woman - because she used to deliver meat to the Italian nurse and brought up her son on the profit from that. He had no choice; he had to

free the hostage. He took his gun, went in, and freed her. He did not ask his colleagues, because he knew they would object. He then explained later. He would have been a bastard; his mother would have shown that he is not her son anymore.' Similarly, a Western humanitarian worker later explained to me that he once had an employee, whose father was sick and told the son that the son had to pay the operation, if not, the father would not consider him his son anymore. The son came with that problem to his boss and received advance payment, which he then paid back in the following months.

To strip naked in front of the child or directly renounce the parents-child bond thus figures as the strongest way to force children to do or give up whatever, including 'war games,' and this can effectively be done by women, who, as pointed out above, can also incite men to fight by telling them that they are women. In both cases those women threaten to humiliate their sons - to lower their status - either to the level of women or to the level of what they call 'bastards.'

This evidence supports the view that men as well as women are players in a world that is, as Table 11 illustrated, an intricate web formed by the variables of environment, culture and individual actor. Actors are part of a culture, they can use this culture to give it another direction, if they want, and thus they contribute to shaping the environment. The evidence illustrates furthermore that 'moderates' in any society and culture may find numerous tools of humiliation that they can use in order to stop and contain extremists.

Is Meaninglessness Humiliating?

Young men who have guns and nothing else are a problem everywhere, not only in Somalia. Paul Richards observes the same phenomenon in West Africa and warns against demonising youth who may not have any alternative but a 'career' with the gun (Richards, 1996). Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan, a wise man who has seen too much, explains (19th November 1998) how the SNM freedom fighters in the North fought, suffered, and how they had expected more from independence than they got, and how they expected it much faster, wealth for example: 'All of the SNM fighters believed that with independence comes wealth. But this did not happen. The fighters, son and father, sit now and eat Khat. The women try to stop that, but the men are frustrated. They sit together in small groups, chew khat and talk all night, they sleep two hours maximum. They try to forget the world. Those young men have no future, no means to get married, have a wife...'

I asked around in Hargeisa and was informed that a man has to give circa 1500 US dollars to the family of the girl he wants to marry, and then he has to build or rent a flat or house (my informant's house, for example, costs 150 US dollars a month, paid by his wife who is a 'commercial' operator in the market), furthermore the man has to buy furniture, which altogether costs some more hundreds of US dollars, and 'if there are problems the girl returns to her parents.'

Is it poverty then that frustrates and humiliates the most? Gary Page Jones reflects on poverty and says that it is relative. 'Somalis are better off than many people in other parts of Africa. They have their animals and big remittances coming from the Somalis in the diaspora. They have quite a high disposable household income compared to others. They are nomads, and thus the prototype of the oldest form of human life, and at the same time they blend very well with modern times cash society, because they roam the world for "waterholes" while they keep their family ties, and by being traders: they part astonishingly easily with their animals, as much as they might love them. They have their animals, and that makes a difference to sedentary farmers.' Gary explains that he feels that poverty is not the basic cause. Gary thinks that poverty is not a taboo, and that people are not ashamed of it. A person gets his or her self-confidence from being part of a noble family. Gary thinks that only a person who has lost much of his or her family, this person might truly feel bad, ashamed, humiliated.

Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan explains that these boys feel useless, not wanted; they feel that they gave their blood and they do not get anything in return. From another source that I do not want to name, I hear: 'The young ones want to fight again; the elders calm them down.'

Is Humiliation Universal?

Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan explains that the reactions to humiliation and frustration are universal, and that only the means are culture-dependent. He says: 'First comes depression, then come drugs (*khat* in Somalia, in the West alcohol), and/or religion (fundamentalist Islam, or Christianity), finally there may come aggression.' I asked Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan what was necessary to heal the young men's humiliation, whether they needed first a job, or first recognition for their brave fighting.

He answered:

1. recognition (which would give them self-confidence and hope, anti-dote to humiliation)

2. job

3. place to live, house, flat

4. marriage, family

5. after many years perhaps also wealth.

Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan's account confirms what the members of the Hargeisa, or SORRA group related to me: They said that they were able to survive almost a decade of solitary confinement because they felt that they were martyrs, heroes. They knew that their martyrdom was useful, they were right and they did it for their people. And it amends what Mohamed Abdulgader from Garowe, Central Somalia (24th December 1998 in Mombassa, Kenya), and also Ahmed Al-Azhari (whole November 1998) believe, namely that abject poverty is at the root of Somali suffering. And it concludes this section on Somalia today with a reminder of the universal human need for meaning, respect, recognition, and belonging.

Somalia and the International Community

In which global context does Somalia find itself today? Is today's global context characterised by the sharp version of the Security Dilemma that Somali culture had shaped and been shaped by? Obviously, it is the opposite. Somalis today find themselves in a global village, in which co-operation attenuates the Security Dilemma, and in which knowledge, the new resource, is much more expandable than green grass in the desert.

Perhaps it is useful for Somalis to watch Scandinavia. Vikings were once 'Somalis.' Through their culture of ruthless mobility combined with the innovative technology of longships, Vikings had an advantage that allowed them to overpower Europe, Russia and even 'discover' America long before Columbus.

Today Scandinavia is leading Europe in information technology (Ericsson is Swedish, Nokia Finnish), leaving behind all those other less flexible European countries that are tied down by their hierarchical structures and traditions. And, furthermore, Scandinavia is one of the foremost advocates of human rights. Not only is the Nobel Peace Prize awarded in Norway, also the 'hard facts' speak for themselves, namely the percentage of the Scandinavian budget that is earmarked for supporting development and human rights around the world. This present research was perhaps only possible in Norway.

Scandinavia was also at the forefront of the welfare state, or, in other words, a culture of respect for egalitarian structures, as opposed to hierarchical structures. Admittedly, at some point the welfare state could be not financed any more. However, the necessary restructuring

has succeeded better in Scandinavia than in other European countries such as Germany. Young Swedish information technology experts are currently being invited to top discussion rounds of politicians and business people in Germany, and literally asked how they would 'save' Germany ('Sabine Christiansen,' high level discussions every Sunday evening in 'Erstes Deutsches Fernsehen, ARD' which is the first German television channel).

This means that former nomads with an egalitarian culture are today at the forefront of the international human rights and information technology community. What about Somalia? Will they one day look back on their traditions as the young Norwegian student does, whose Internet site I will now quote? This is a young man who in Somalia would be a traditional nomadic warrior, or an urban militia boy. He writes on behalf of the Norwegian students abroad (ANSA). I quote this text, because it illustrates today's young Norwegians' views on the male prowess and pillaging spirit of their forefathers, a view that may surprise today's Somalis, because it betrays humour rather than admiration or condemnation:

'By AD 700 they [the Vikings] were fully fledged and raring to go. The homestead and the clan were by now well established, and society was properly divided into masters and serfs, as shown by the medieval Frostating Law, which states that he who pokes out the eyes of another shall pay a fine of a farm and 12 head of cattle, two horses and two slaves. By now neighborhood feuds were the accepted pastime and passion, the Viking ships had been invented, and general fury was at boiling-point. They were now ready and could overcome half Europe, invade Ireland and take on England (though it was actually the Danes who did that), they could found Russia (or was it a Swede who did that?) and they could discover America (that we do know was a Norwegian, even if in his heart he was perhaps Icelandic or a Greenlander). When it comes to claiming great deeds we have elastic notions of nationality. What drove them to this? What makes people abandon hearth and home, concubines and swine, in order to court the dangers of the unknown, drink themselves into a frenzy, rape, loot and pillage, and generally make themselves at home in another land? It seems there were three reasons: 1) They had killed someone and needed to flee. 2) They had no clue as to where they were sailing. 3) They were bored' (ANSA, 1996).

The young Norwegian men demonstrate a humoristic distance from male role models that entail masculine pride, a distance that Somali men may not (yet?) have. It may be assumed that a proud Somali nomad would feel insulted by such an account of his national past.

Table 11 may be adapted as follows, see Table 31:

The environment, culture and the individual actor in today's Somalia		
Variable 1	Environment	Somalia, like other countries, has the potential to increase the pie by implementing impartial super-ordinate structures and hooking up to the global knowledge society.
Variable 2	Culture (group level)	The old Somali culture of distributing the available pie by war (Security Dilemma being heightened), meets a new culture of increasing the pie by co-operation within the global in-group of the global village on the background of a withering Security Dilemma.
Variable 3	The individual actor	Some try to preserve the old culture, some try to change towards the new; everybody confronts the psychological law that people find losses more negative than gains positive, and that traditional privileges are regarded as 'just' by elites.

Table 31: The environment, culture and the individual actor in today's Somalia

I was told about a meeting that was organised by the War-torn Society Project in Puntland to address security. It illustrates how players are caught in the middle of the difficult transition away from a warrior's culture. Many parties were invited, from businessmen to worried parents, all lamenting on the awful security situation in town. One party was missing, however, the young militia boys who in fact were the ones who produced insecurity. The following day they were invited. They were outraged by the accusations against them, they pointed at the businessmen in the room and told the audience that the businessmen were the ones paying them for their protection services. I only got a second-hand account of this scene, but I quote it because it illustrates the same grey area that Menkhaus mentions - some of the militia boys may perceive what they do as an honourable job for which honourable people pay them, while others define them as criminals - and it shows that young men should be paid for surfing on the Internet, rather than for toting their guns through the town.

Rwanda and Burundi

Who Wants to Be a Dead Democrat?

The Report *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide* states that today's ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF, the children of the Tutsi refugees who had earlier fled into Uganda and who emerged as a rebel army), faces an impossible dilemma: 'It is difficult to see how it [the Tutsi minority] can ever win a free election. However many Hutu or moderate Tutsi have held prominent positions in the government, most observers agree that the majority of the Hutu population have perceived it as the embodiment of Tutsi Power' (The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, Chapter 17, paragraph 36). This paragraph is generally valid for the Great Lakes region. How is a Hutu majority to believe that a Tutsi moderate may be as good a caretaker of super-ordinate structures as a moderate Hutu? And how are Tutsi to trust the opposite? And how are the moderates from both sides to marginalize their extremists? The prize is high, it is life; as is well known, the extremists in the Great Lakes region look back on a tradition of *méfiance* and killing.

Is Meaninglessness Humiliating?

Like Somalia, Rwanda also has its *Mooryaan*, *Jirri*, or, *day-day*: 'Insecurity in Kigali is on the rise. Armed robberies and banditry are on the rise in Kigali, forcing the police into a fresh crackdown, according to a Rwandan news agency (RNA) report. Police spokesman Tony Kurumba was quoted as telling RNA that: "following the new wave of banditry and armed robberies in Kigali, the police had caught six bandits and killed two others. The Rwandan police spokesman told RNA: "such banditry acts are carried out by demobilised soldiers, unemployed youths and army deserters who possess guns and use them as means of survival." Diplomatic sources told IRIN that armed robberies have been on the rise for the last two months (IRIN, 11th September 2000).

A Young Woman Speaks

In September 1999 Simone (this is not her real name) writes me a long letter on humiliation. She is a young energetic Burundian woman, who, having seen her parents being killed, with

her own body covered with scars, has many plans to help Burundian women. I would like to give her the floor for the concluding words on this section.

'In Burundi, the feeling of humiliation exists between ethnic groups (Hutu and Tutsi). The notion of ethnicity was born with colonialism. In order to take control the colonisers (at first the Germans, then the Belgians) attached two types of ethnic identities to the Burundian population (Hutu-Tutsi). In order to divide us, they removed all the Hutu leaders in 1920 and replaced them by Tutsi. It is from this moment on that they considered the Hutu as unfit to rule. They thus installed the feeling of humiliation between the brothers and sisters of the same fatherland. After the departure of the colonisers, these ideas have been revived by the political class that utilises them to reach their goals. The consequence of this state of affairs is that the population of Burundi - at least those who are not informed, who do not have the capacity to criticise and to judge the information they receive - adhere totally to the demagogy of the politicians. It is thus that the people are incited against each other and end up killing each other. In order to overcome the violent effects of humiliation, a number of actions must be undertaken, starting with instructing the young, those of school age. The population ought to be informed about the origins of the teachings of humiliation and their falsity. Among other things, political power should not continue to be the only source of wealth.'[240]

'I completely agree that the feeling of being humiliation generally lies at the base of armed conflicts; I say this while knowing that there are other parameters that activate these conflicts. Humiliation is established as a feeling from the moment on when the individual becomes aware of the cause of his or her humiliation. What is felt as humiliating is the fact of feeling oppressed, discounted, not to be like the others, this creates a feeling or a complex of inferiority in a person. When people feel humiliated, they develop a complex of inferiority

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[240] 'Au Burundi, le sentiment d'humiliation existe entre les ethnies (Hutu et Tutsi). La notion ethnie est elle-même née avec la colonisation. Pour s'installer les colonisateurs (d'abord allemands puis belges) ont collé au Burundi 2 types d'ethnies (Hutu-Tutsi). Dans le but de diviser, ils ont limogé tous les dirigeants Hutu en 1920 et les ont remplacés par des Tutsi. C'est à partir de ce moment qu'ils ont commencé à considérer les Hutu comme inaptes à diriger. Ils venaient d'installer donc le sentiment d'humiliation entre les frères et sœurs d'une même patrie. Après le départ des colonisateurs, ces idées ont été récupérées par des hommes politiques qui les utilisent pour atteindre leurs buts. La conséquence à cet état de fait est que le peuple Burundais (la partie non instruite de la population qui n'a pas la capacité de critiquer, de juger les informations, qu'elle reçoit), adhère totalement à la démagogie de ces politiciens. C'est ainsi que des gens sont dressées contre d'autres et finissent par s'entre-tuer. Pour surmonter les effets violents de l'humiliation, plusieurs actions doivent être menées en commençant par instruire tous les jeunes en âge de scolarisation. Il faudrait informer la population sur l'origine des enseignements d'humiliation et leur fausseté. En outre, il ne faudrait pas que le pouvoir politique reste la seule source de richesse.'

accompanied by frustration. They develop at the same time a defence mechanism by avoiding shame, in order to defend their honour and dignity; this ends in armed conflicts.'[241]

'The greatest consequence of humiliation is the act of eliminating the cause of the humiliating act by following steps: In a society, the feelings of humiliation are not coming to awareness in all individuals at the same time. Some individuals start feeling this humiliation and they try to explain this to their people and convince them. A whole segment of the society becomes thereby contaminated and frustrated; this ends, generally, in armed conflicts. Two camps are thus created: the camp of the humiliated who launch the war and the camp of those issuing the humiliating act who in turn have to defend themselves. Like this, these intestinal wars ('*guerres intestines*') become cyclical.'[242]

'How are justice, honour, dignity and respect linked to the feeling of being humiliated in an individual? It is known that justice and respect are rights of all humans, while honour and dignity are, according to my view, virtues which belong to human nature. Whenever these rights and virtues are absent, this gives place for a feeling of being humiliated, followed, as described above, by armed conflicts.'[243]

'How is humiliation perceived and treated in different cultures? What is humiliating in one specific culture is not humiliating in another culture. In order to perceive humiliation, one

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[241] 'Je suis tout à fait d'accord que le sentiment d'être humilié est, d'une manière générale, à la base des conflits armés; tout en sachant qu'il y a d'autres paramètres qui activent ces conflits: Quand l'humiliation est-elle établie comme sentiment? L'humiliation est établie comme sentiment à partir du moment où l'individu devient conscient de la cause de son humiliation. Qu'est-ce-qui est éprouvé comme humiliation? Ce qui est éprouvé comme humiliation; c'est le fait de se sentier opprimé, déconsidéré, ne pas être comme l'autres ce que développe en soi un sentiment ou un complexe d'infériorité. Que se passe-t-il quand les gens se sentent humiliés? Quand les gens se sentent humiliés, ils développent un complexe d'infériorité accompagné d'une frustration. Ils développent également des mécanismes de défense en d'éviter la honte tout en défendant leur honneur et dignité; ce qui aboutie à des conflits armés.'

[242] 'Quelles sont les conséquences de l'humiliation? La plus grande des conséquences de l'humiliation est le fait d'éliminer la cause de l'acte humiliant en suivant certains étapes: Dans une société, le sentiment d'être humilié ne naît pas en même temps pour toutes les personnes. Quelques individus commencent à sentir cette humiliation et essaient de convaincre les leurs. Toute une partie de la société devient alors contaminée et frustrée; ce qui aboutie généralement à des conflits armés. Il se crée alors deux camps: le camp des humiliés que déclenchent la guerre et celui des personnes recteur de l'acte humiliant qui à leur tour doivent se défendre. Ainsi, les guerres intestines deviennent cycliques.'

[243] 'Comment est-ce-que justice, honneur, dignité et respect sont-ils liés au sentiment d'être humilié pour un individu? On n'ignore pas que justice et respect sont des droits à tout homme tandis que honneur et dignité sont d'après moi des vertus qui réclame la nature humaine. Dés que ces droits et vertus manquent, ils donnent place à un sentiment d'être humilié suivi par des conflits armés comme on l'a dit dans les lignes précédentes.'

has at first to focus on its cause, in order to understand the humiliating act and its negative effects in the specific culture.'[244]

'In treating humiliation it is necessary to find an efficient and intermediate solution that brings the opponents (the belligerents) together and leaves nobody between them. Humiliation plays a large role in aggression because the person who is humiliated wants to degrade or even eliminate all those who he believes to be the origin of his humiliation. In turn, the attacked people want to protect their security by defending themselves, and finally the conflicts become a vicious cycle, as long as the parties of the conflict have not found a solution that satisfies all.'[245]

'What has to be done to overcome the violent effects of humiliation? One has to act with prudence because one has contributed to disaster by wanting to solve the conflict by using foreign mediators (facilitators) or international forces. On the other hand the parties of the conflict should not be left alone either, because it will be difficult for them to sit together and find a solution that is suitable for all… People do not like foreigners who come to interfere in their internal conflicts. It is true that one of the parties in the conflict might want foreign intervention, but the mediators or facilitators must pay attention. It is necessary to firstly take enough time to study the psychology of the people, in relation to their socio-cultural structures, otherwise one runs the risk of working on false grounds and subsequently ending up in a discouraging result.'[246]

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[244] 'Comment est-ce-que l'humiliation est-il perçue et traitée de la même façon dans les cultures différentes. Ce qui est humiliant dans telle culture ne l'est pas dans telle autre. Pour percevoir l'humiliation, il faut d'abord bien cibler sa cause, à savoir l'acte humiliant ainsi que les effets négatifs de ce dernier et cela dans une culture bien déterminée.'

[245] 'En traitant l'humiliation, il faudrait trouver une solution efficace et intermédiaire qui rapproche et que ne laisse personne d'entre les parties en conflit (les belligérants). Quel rôle l'humiliation joue-t-elle dans les agressions? Elle joue un grand rôle parce que celui qui est humilié veut dégrader voir même éliminer toutes les personnes qu'il croit à l'origine de son humiliation. A leur tour, les personnes agressées cherchent leur sécurité en se défendant et finalement les conflits deviennent un cercle vicieux, aussi longtemps que les parties en conflit n'auront pas trouvé une solution que les satisfait toutes.'

[246] 'Qu-est-ce-qu'il faut faire pour surmonter les effets violents de l'humiliation? Il faut agir avec prudence pour les surmonter car on a assisté à des échecs quand on a voulu résoudre les conflits en passant par des médiateurs (facilitateurs) étrangers ou par des forces internationales. Il ne faut pas non plus laisser les parties en conflits à elles-mêmes parce-qu'il leur sera difficile de s'assoir ensemble pour trouver une solution que les arrange toutes. ... Cela fait alors que les gens n'aiment pas des personnes étrangères que viennent s'ingérer dans leurs conflicts internes. Il est vrai que l'une des parties en conflits peut souhaiter l'intervention étrangère mais les médiateurs ou facilitateurs doivent faire attention. Il faut d'abord prendre assez de temps pour étudier la psychologie des gens ainsi que leurs structures socioculturelles, si-non, on peut travailler sur des fausses bases et ainsi aboutir à un résultat décourageant.'

'The mediators must not impose peace by force, because one cannot maintain a peace that is not there. Facilitators and mediators must therefore come with an impartial and broad mind. Taking enough time to get acquainted with the sociocultural realities of the local people constitutes a very important element of their mission. Knowing what these people like and what they do not like. At first listening to both conflict parties to get acquainted with and understanding the genesis and evolution, in space and time, of their problems. Uncovering where this or that other party is left. After having collected enough material and information that is not misleading, mediators and/or facilitators can call together the conflict parties in order to fundamentally deal with their problems by proceeding as follows. As one has passed through a process of learning in order to overcome the hatred and war between each other, it is necessary to pass also through a process of teaching the conflict parties about human rights (rights of life, respect and justice, etc.), the wrongdoings of the war and the unavoidable necessity of reconciliation.'[247]

'The themes to be taught must be chosen in relation to the problem around which the conflicts pivot. Thus, sitting around the same table, the concerned parties may find a durable solution to their problem. The observers do nothing more than orienting and facilitating, and in case the leaders arrive at mutual understanding, they can establish the bases for a durable peace. Regarding the common population, ignorant and often manipulated since not educated, they just have to follow what is understood and agreed between the parties.'[248]

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[247] 'Les médiateurs ne doivent pas imposer une force pour le maintien de la paix parce qu'on ne peut pas maintenir une paix qui n'est pas là. Facilitateurs et médiateurs doivent donc venir avec un esprit sans partie prise et compréhensif. Prendre assez de temps pour connaître les réalités socioculturelles des gens en place constituerait aussi pour eux un élément très important pout leur mission. Savoir ce qu'ils aiment et ce qu'ils n'aiment pas. Écouter d'abord chacun des parties en conflit pour prendre connaissance et comprendre la genèse et l'évolution, dans l'espace et dans le temps de leur problème. Découvrir en quoi telle ou telle autre partie est laissée. Après avoir recueilli assez de données et d'information qui ne trompent pas, médiateurs et/ou facilitateurs peuvent alors mettre ensemble les parties en conflit pour traiter à fond leur problème en procédant comme suit: Comme on a passé par des enseignements pour convaincre de la haine et de la guerre contre autrui, il faudrait de même passer pour des enseignements pour convaincre les parties en conflit des droits de l'homme (droit à la vie, au respect, à la justice etc.), des méfaits de la guerre et de la nécessité incontournable de la réconciliation.'

[248] 'Les thèmes à enseigner doivent être choisis en fonction du problème autour duquel tournent les conflits. Ainsi, autour d'une même table, les concernés pourront alors trouver une solution durable à leur problème. Les observateurs ne feront qu'orienter et faciliter seulement et si les meneurs parviennent à s'entendre, ils peuvent établir les bases d'une paix durable. Quant au bas peuple, innocent et souvent manipulé parce que non formé, il ne fera que suivre ce qui est entendu et convenu entre les parties.'

Another Woman Speaks

At the First International Conference on 'The Role of Education in Promoting a Culture of Coexistence and Community Building.'[249] (23rd to 26th February 1999 in Bujumbura) I presented a paper. The conference organisers took notes: 'This paper was presented in Burundi, in an environment of ongoing violence and low-intensity warfare in the hills surrounding the capital. The presentation tries to draw lessons from clinical psychology and attempts to apply them to social and political psychology. It starts with the assumption that even the most rational human beings are not always able to master themselves. There are urges and desires, which have a mighty strength and power. Humiliation is among the strongest.'

'We currently observe a worldwide tendency for societies to transform from hierarchical to more egalitarian democratic structures that are built on human rights. Three "categories" of actors can be differentiated who influence this transition: (1) the rising "slave" (the "category" of the oppressed, for example former colonised populations, black people, women, also nature, together with related phenomena as feelings, creativity, and individual privacy), (2) the affronted "master" (the "category" of the oppressors, for example colonisers, white males, also human control over nature, together with related phenomena as ratio, intellect, normative control), and (3) third parties coming from outside, for example the international community, entailing both "master" and "slave" tendencies.'

'Feelings of humiliation are released during the transition of societies to more democratic concepts and structures and this can lead to violence and extremism on all sides. The task to be tackled is to transcend extremism and strengthen more moderate standpoints. The following recommendations are made:

- Moderate members on both sides (on the "master" and rebelling "slave" side) have to form alliances and approach their extremist wings by respectful recognition of their plight in order to pacify them and marginalize violent tendencies.

- Moderate leaders have to minimise humiliation and frustration in the population in order to reduce the "weaponry" which can be instrumentalised by extremist leaders.'

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[249] Conférence internationale sur le rôle de l'éducation dans la promotion d'une culture de convivialité et d'édification des communautés.

3. Therapy As Prevention, Damage Reduction, and Healing, and the Creation of a Therapeutic Dialogue

Earlier, Steinar Kvale's 'Six Steps of Analysis' were presented. The sixth step would be 'to extend the continuum of description and interpretation to include *action*, in that subjects begin to act from new insights they have gained during their interview. The research interview may in such cases approximate a therapeutic interview. The changes can also be brought about by actions in a larger social setting such as action research, where the researcher and the subjects together act on the basis of the knowledge produced in the interviews' (Kvale, 1996, 190). This quotes indicates that this chapter is dedicated to the sixth step in the analysis of interviews, to the application of the diagnostic hermeneutic circles to therapy, an application that itself is expected to feed back on future diagnosis.

Habermas argues that the relationship between the critical theorist (in other words the theorist who wishes to create a rational and emancipated consciousness) and society has some resemblance to the relationship between the expert therapist and her patient.[250] And, as reported above, also Galtung advocates a therapeutic approach to peace at all levels, from family to global levels. My personal professional course, combining therapy-oriented disciplines such as medicine and clinical psychology with social psychology, anthropology, sociology, philosophy, history, and political science, lends itself to the therapy approach.

Diagnosis – prognosis – therapy/prevention: Many elements of diagnosis have been touched upon by now in the course of this manuscript, also elements of therapy, and wherever diagnosis was framed in rather general and theoretical terms it may serve as a tool to give a prognosis in cases other than the ones addressed here, - and prognosis may serve prevention. It was for example asked, whether Somali culture could 'heal' the world community and the answer was no, at least while it contains aspects that regard short-term looting as a success. Somalis' sharp and independent mind, their marvellous oral talent, their amazing ability for in-group support (for example through *qaaraan*), however, were highlighted as elements of Somali culture that may provide enrichment to a world community.

Reidar Ommundsen (in a personal note, 26th October 2000) points out that therapy entails the idea of healing. He asks: What if healing is not possible? Should a further term be introduced, namely 'damage reduction'? Clearly, to my view, Ommundsen's argument is

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[250] Anthony Giddens builds on Habermas, amongst others, in New Rules of Sociological Method. He writes: 'It is the aim of the analyst to understand the verbalisations of the analysand, to explicate (hidden) meaning – an aim which is accomplished through dialogue (Giddens, 1976, 59).

paramount to any approach to therapy. The inclusion of the idea of 'damage reduction,' alongside with healing and prevention is significant. Ommundsen's comment makes me aware of my use of the term 'therapy' in this chapter, namely as humble 'attempt to arrive at improvement.'

Good diagnosis, prognosis, therapy and prevention hinge on the quality of the dialogue between therapist and client. I can only hope that what I had to contribute to this dialogue, my willingness to listen, my attempt to be authentic and open suffced. This text is a central part of this dialogue and is therefore written for both, a Western and a Somali, Rwandese and Burundian audience; it is not just a Western academic report on 'research objects' out there in Africa.

Short-Term Emergency Management Versus Long-Term Nurturance

I would like to begin my quest for ways of therapy by asking: Which elements of the Somali and Rwandan predicament can serve as therapeutic and preventive insights both for Somalis, Rwandans and the global knowledge society? Table 32 shows a spectrum from short-term emergency management to long-term nurturance.

Short-term emergency management versus long-term nurturance
Seizure of resources (not nurturing them), pride in male aggression, emphasis on short-term gain   ← →   Nurturance of resources, pride in the maintenance of resources (as traditionally often carried out by females), emphasis on long-term sustainability

Table 32: Short-term emergency management versus long-term nurturance

Archetypical Somali pastoralists would figure far to the left pole of Table 32, not only men, but also those women who encourage male prowess. A farming population would figure more on the right side of the spectre. Every Somali interlocutor I talked to agreed that pastoralists (and to a lesser extent also their farming neighbours) find themselves in an environment that is basically characterised by zero sum game or win-lose logic. The overall 'cake' or 'pie' of resources can only be increased to a very limited extent: more wells, for example, will quickly

exhaust grazing grounds (while farmers have more methods at their disposal to increase output). However, pastoral resources may at least be safeguarded in their status-quo by co-operation, or they may be re-distributed by looting, and/or destroyed altogether. This means that the pie, if not expandable too much, may be preserved, redistributed, or diminished. Those who loot only expand their piece of the cake, not the overall cake; they may even disrupt the maintenance of the resources to an extent that the overall pie gets smaller. However, looters not only exploit the fact that *emergency takes precedence over maintenance,* but they furthermore derive a definition of success from it: *creating an emergency for others, by surprise attack, is a success*! And they are right, as long as nature (rain lets green grass grow) or other people (neighbouring pastoralists and farmers) provide the nurturance and maintenance of resources to loot, this may, indeed, look like a success. It only ceases to be a success, when the resources are ruined altogether, as the fate of Somalia proves.

The global village certainly needs emphasis on long-term sustainability, and a short-term seizure culture does not seem very beneficial. The planet is small, and the looting of resources diminishes the overall cake so that at the end everybody is in danger. Global citizens should therefore aim at learning nurturance and place themselves near the left pole of the spectre. And also Somalis may have to listen to Helander, and to their farming brothers, as well as to their shoemakers: If a complex state is to function, the hot-blooded short-term seizure of resources may not lead anywhere but to destruction. 'Noble' Somalis may have to renounce humiliating others and try to become more humble themselves.

Bernhard Helander, in Adam & Ford, 1997, identifies the drawbacks of 'noble' nomad clan identity as one major culprit of Somali ills, and he suggests that the warriors among the Somalis may have something to learn from their 'slave' farmers. As a way forward for the whole of Somalia Helander recommends to the 'nobles' that they stop imposing contempt and humiliation upon their 'slaves,' and instead strive to follow their example. They after all have managed to live relatively peacefully in villages in which clan identities have been diluted in favour of more local and land-based identities.

Looters may be described as 'children in the supermarket,' who see resources, and just want them, instantly. The gun provides a kind of short-cut access to the fulfilment of all desires for immature youth, - until resources are destroyed, and the 'child' understands that it had better grow up. However, in Somali warrior culture young men, the army so-to-speak, traditionally enjoyed quite a 'leeway' to 'practice,' for example by carrying out camel raids. This is because a 'good' warrior needs to be able to be hot-blooded and ready for aggression even at slight insults. The entire Somali culture thus provides young men with 'cues' telling

them that it is okay to be able to become aggressive quickly, in line with the teachings of Berkowitz, the social psychologist who initiated research on the link between frustration, anger, aggression and 'cues,' called the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis (Berkowitz, 1993).[251]

There are many theories in social psychology that address aggression[252]: aggression as hostile instinct or death instinct; aggression as a 'steam boiler;' frustration and aggression; aggression as learned behaviour. Variables that mediate aggression are described as arousal, norms, and the social construction of aggression. 'In the psychological research on aggression, there are two basic and influential positions: one sees aggression as a form of behaviour which is governed by innate instincts or drives; the other sees aggression as a form

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[251] See also Berkowitz, 1964; Berkowitz 1964; Berkowitz, 1972; Berkowitz, 1974; Berkowitz, 1978.

[252] The neurobiology of violence is this: 'The brain's impulse-mediating capacity is related to the ratio between the excitatory activity of the lower, more-primitive portions of the brain and the modulating activity of higher, sub-cortical and cortical areas… Any factors which increase the activity or reactivity of the brainstem (e.g., chronic traumatic stress) or decrease the moderating capacity of the limbic or cortical areas (e.g., neglect, EtOH) will increase an individual's aggressivity, impulsivity and capacity to display violence (Halperin et al., 1995) see below). A key neurodevelopmental factor which plays a major role in determining this moderating capacity is the brain's amazing capacity to organize and change in a 'use-dependent' fashion' (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 127).

Perry explains that early neglect of a child can lead to brain dysfunction, that in turn may cause the neglected individual to commit horrific deeds later in life, such as for example murder, as 'remorseless violent child': 'Very narrow windows - critical periods - exist during which specific sensory experience is required for optimal organization and development of any brain area (e.g., Singer, 1995; Thoenen, 1995). Absent such experience and development, dysfunction is inevitable (e.g., Carlson et al., 1989). When critical periods have been examined in great detail in non-human animals for the primary sensory modalities, similar use-dependent differentiation in development of the brain occurs for the rest of the central nervous system (Diamond, Krech, & Rosenzweig, 1964; Altman & Das, 1964; Cragg, 1967; Cragg, 1969; Cummins & Livesey, 1979). Abnormal micro-environmental cues and atypical patterns of neural activity during critical and sensitive periods can result in malorganization and compromised function in other brain-mediated functions such as empathy, attachment and affect regulation (e.g., Green et al., 1981). Some of the most powerful clinical examples of this are related to lack of "attachment" experiences early in life. The child who has been emotionally neglected or abandoned early in life will exhibit attachment problems which are persistently resistant to any "replacement" experiences including therapy (Carlson et al., 1989; Ebinger, 1974). Examples of this include feral children, Spitz's orphans (Spitz & Wolf, 1946), the Romanian orphans (Chisholm et al., 1995) and, sadly, the remorseless, violent child (Ressler, Burgess, & Douglas, 1988; Myers et al., 1995; Mones, 1991; Hickey, 1991; Greenberg, Speltz, & DeKlyen, 1993)' (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 128).

However, Perry explains further, that not all neglected children become murderers: 'It is important to emphasize that the majority of individuals who are emotionally neglected in childhood do not grow into violent individuals. These victims carry their scars in other ways, usually in a profound emptiness, or in emotionally destructive relationships, moving through life disconnected from others and robbed of some of their humanity. The effects of emotional neglect in childhood predispose to violence by decreasing the strength of the sub-cortical and cortical impulse-modulating capacity and by decreasing the value of other humans due to an incapacity to empathize or sympathize with them. This decreased value of humans means that there is a much lower threshold for the unattached person to act in an antisocial fashion to gratify their impulses' (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 6).

of behaviour which like other behaviour is acquired through individual experience. There is also a third, intermediate position which integrates the concepts of drive and learning – the frustration-aggression hypothesis' (Mummendey, in Hewstone, Stroebe, Codol, & Stephenson, 1994, 265).

'Frustration does not immediately evoke aggression, but generates in the individual a state of emotional arousal, namely *anger*. This aroused anger generates an inner readiness for aggressive behaviour. But this behaviour will only occur if there are stimulus cues in the situation [for example weapons] which have an aggressive meaning: that is, cues which are associated with anger-releasing conditions, or simply with anger itself' (269, italicisation in original, see Berkowitz, 1974 and Berkowitz, 1993 for his Cue-arousal Theory that is the revised version of the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis).

When we look at a Somali looter or kidnapper then we see that his frustration tolerance is very limited. He quickly translates frustration into anger, much faster than an average Westerner may expect - and weapons are at hand without delay. As Colonel Nur, reports, kidnappers are very nervous, they must be kept happy! They need *khat* and food to keep their guns down. However, as my Somali intellectual friends around the world prove, Somalis are not 'naturally' aggressive, many of them are extremely refined; and even nervous kidnappers can become 'reasonable.' As Colonel Nur reports, they can even be brought to be ashamed of what they did. In other words, the frustration – anger – cue sequence is embedded in a cultural context, where also Social Learning and Social Modelling play a role (Bandura, 1973).

Young Somali author Abirazak Osman, in his gripping novel *In the Name of the Fathers* (Osman, 1996), describes how aggression is something that must be learned. He introduces his young hero Ali and describes how Ali is drawn from his studies and girlfriends, within a matter of days and to his own amazement, into a completely different life, as one of five on the top of a vehicle that is sent into battle against Siad Barre's troops in Mogadishu, into the very battle that drove out Barre: 'My companions, whose names I don't know to this day, took up the fight and did their part. "Fill the chain!" one of them yelled at me. I sat upright and filled the long chain with bullets then placed it in a small box from where it fed directly into the gun. I didn't look at the scene and I was really glad my job could be done from a sitting position. The fighting went on and on without any mercy, though so far nobody had been hurt from my group of five. In time I found myself watching the fight whenever I was between re-loadings. We kept fighting and they kept fighting, so bravely, too. I could see men falling hard on the ground. Some were screaming with pain, others lay still. They were

all red. I didn't feel sorry for them. I had no feelings at all. It was as if my heart had been removed from inside me. The tragedy, however, was that nobody was enjoying the occasion, yet everybody was participating in it. I wondered why. The battle continued without change, except for the increase in dead bodies, until about five o'clock, when the Daroods started to withdraw' (103, 104).

In contexts where young men are 'required,' 'suddenly,' to become violent 'warriors,' as happens in the case of Ali, those will be more prone to actually become violent, who were exposed to chronic violence during childhood; they are more likely to be violent when they grow up.[253] They may, furthermore, not want to stop their violent behaviour later and turn their environment into an unsafe neighbourhood, in case this neighbourhood provides them with a belief system that justifies violence: 'There are multiple pathways to engaging in violent behavior (Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967). Some are defensive, some are predatory, some are impulsive. All of these pathways, however, are facilitated by the individual practitioner's belief system (MacEwen, 1994; Burton et al., 1994). The majority of neglected children never become violent. The majority of traumatized children never become violent (e.g., Belmore & Quinsey, 1994). Even the majority of traumatized and neglected children do not become remorselessly violent. Belief systems, in the final analysis, are the major contributors to violence. Racism, sexism, misogyny, children as property, idealization of violent "heroes", cultural tolerance of child maltreatment, tribalism, jingoism, nationalism— all unleash, facilitate, encourage, and nurture violent individuals. Without these facilitating belief systems and modeling, neglected and abused children would carry their pain forward in less violent ways—as silent, scarred, adult members of the vast army one commentator has termed the "Children of the Secret"' (Vachss, 1991, 56)' (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 10).

Perry describes the dangerous path that societies walk that expose particularly their males at a too young age to too much neglect and psychological abuse, that, in other words, provide their children with a profoundly humiliating instead of a nurturing childrearing context. Such societies achieve that cycles of humiliation and counter-humiliation are inscribed in the neural system of children: 'The implications of this for the violent youth are profound. First, any child exposed to chronic intrafamilial violence will develop a persisting fear-response. Because there are marked gender differences in this response… with females more likely to dissociate and males more likely to display a classic "fight or flight" response, more males will develop the aggressive, impulsive, reactive and hyperactive symptom

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[253] See, for example, Loeber et al., 1993; Lewis, Mallouh, & Webb, in Chiccetti & Carlson, 1989; Koop & Lundberg, 1992; Hickey, 1991; Halperin et al., 1995.

presentation. Males will more likely be violent... This can be explained, in part, by the persistence of this "fight or flight" state—and by the profound cognitive distortions that accompany this neurodevelopmental state. A young man with these characteristics, then, will very easily misinterpret a behavior as threatening and will, being more reactive, respond in a more impulsive and violent fashion. Literally, using the original (childhood) adaptive "fight or flight" response in a new context but, now, later in life, in a maladaptive fashion' (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 9).

Alice Miller has worked extensively on this topic and attempted to explain Hitler's plight with humiliating child rearing practices. She writes: 'It has been scientifically proven in the last few years that the devastating results of the traumatization of children are inescapably thrown back onto society. This knowledge concerns every single person and must - if spread sufficiently - direct basic changes in our society, especially the stopping of the blind escalation of violence' (Miller, 1983, 1).

Societies that allow such violent sub-cultures to develop, will thus create for themselves a chronic *day-day* problem (as explained above, I was told that those *day-day* who could not be 'pacified' were even 'eliminated' in the North of Somalia). Perry explains that many factors lead to the persistence of such violent behaviour, 'including modeling and learning that violent aggression is acceptable, even a preferable and honorable, solution to problems… This violence is often interpreted by the perpetrators as defensive. "If I didn't shoot him, he would have shot me." "I could tell that he was going to jump me—he looked me in the eyes." "Listen, man, I just did him before he did me. So." These verbalizations reflect the persistence of a state of fear, literally, a persisting "fight or flight" state which these adolescents are unable to get out of. The persistence of this originally adaptive internal state is due to growing up in a persistently threatening environment (Perry, in Murberg, 1994; Perry, 1996)' (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 8).

Neglect and trauma, this is, according to Perry the 'Malignant Combination'. 'Developmental neglect or traumatic stress during childhood can profoundly alter development. Unfortunately, emotional and cognitive neglect usually occur in combination with traumatic stress. The combination of a lack of critical emotional experiences and persisting traumatic stress leads to a dramatic alteration in the brain's modulation and regulation capacity. This is characterized by an overdevelopment of brainstem and midbrain neurophysiology and functions (e.g., anxiety, impulsivity, poor affect regulation, motor hyperactivity) and an underdevelopment of limbic and cortical neurophysiology and functions

(e.g., empathy, problem solving skills). This experience-based imbalance predisposes to a host of neuropsychiatric problems—and, violent behavior' (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 20).

However, 'elimination' of violent youth is just the last resort, prevention should be chosen, as explains Perry in his section on 'Public Policy Implications': 'Ultimate solution to the problems of violence—whether from the remorseless predator or the reactive, impulsive youth—is primary prevention.' Perry addresses Western societies that have problems with violent youth:[254] 'Our society is creating violent children and youth at a rate far faster than we could ever treat, rehabilitate or even lock away (Groves et al., 1993; Garbarino, 1993; Sturrock, Smart, & Tricklebank, 1983; Richters, 1993). No single intervention strategy will solve these heterogeneous problems. No set of intervention strategies will solve these transgenerational problems. In order to solve the problems of violence, we need to transform our culture' (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 12).

The fact that aggression can be learned, even without previous neglect and trauma, has been studied systematically by Bandura (Bandura, 1973), who proposed 'that the first step towards acquiring a new form of aggressive behaviour was the process of modelling: individuals acquire new and more complex forms of behaviour by observing this behaviour and its consequences on other people – or models' (Mummendey, in Hewstone, Stroebe, Codol, & Stephenson, 1994, 272). Mummendey describes one of the classic experiments that were carried out by Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961, and Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1963, where a man kicks a Bobo doll 'with a rubber hammer, and then kicked and yelled at it' (272). The results showed that the children who had watched this 'imitated the model's behaviour when they had seen it rewarded' (272).

And reward from his father is what the young lad Ali, not even twenty years old, in Osman's novel is seeking: 'It was a while since I last thought of Dad, but I thought of him

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[254] 'The most dangerous among us have come to be this way because of a malignant combination of experiences—lack of critical early life nurturing (Radke-Yarrow et al., 1995), chaotic and cognitively impoverished environments (Carlson et al., 1989), pervasive physical threat (O'Keefe, 1995), persisting fear (Schwab-Stone et al., 1995) and, finally, watching the strongest, most violent in the home get what he wants, and seeing the same aggressive violent use of power idealized on television (Miedzian, 1991) and at the movies (Figure 9). These violent offenders have been incubated in terror, waiting to be old enough to get "one of those guns", waiting to be the one who controls, the one who takes, the one who hits, the one who can "make the fear, not take the fear." Nowhere is this predatory food chain more evident than in juvenile justice settings where, too often, the youth is either victim or predator—with no third option. Due to clear socio-cultural devolution in some segments of our communities, there are more and more undersocialized, traumatized children (Horowitz, Weine, & Jekel, 1995; Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development, 1995). These children get little cognitive stimulation—the public schools are falling apart; their lives are devoid of emotional contact—mom is a child herself and pregnant again; no predictability, structure or nurturing can be found out of the home—the community has dissolved' (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 10).

now. I wished that he was there to see me. I wanted him to know that I was a man. Yes, a brave one, too. I wanted him to be proud of me. I wanted him to know that I was not only fighting to liberate my people, but that I was actually chasing the President of Somalia. Yes, the very man who put Dad behind bars for years, and killed and tortured many of his friends and colleagues' (110).

Osman continues and describes how difficult it is to learn aggression: 'Those days everybody was high. Some drank liquor, others chewed khat non-stop, or smoked hash, marijuana or even heroin. Those who were not using things were also high. The flames, the smoke, the smell of the bullets fired, the smell of the bodies were all making the people drunk. I can't remember anybody who was in his complete senses so long as he was in that war' (111). The novel's hero somehow does not know anymore who he is and who the others are. Deindividuation is the relevant social psychological term, that describes this state as a mediating variable in aggression (see Diener, in Paulus, 1980 and Zimbardo, in Arnold & Levine, 1969): 'Deindividuation refers to a special individual state in which control over one's own behaviour is weakened, and there is less concern about normative standards, self-presentation and later consequences of one's behaviour' (Mummendey, in Hewstone, Stroebe, Codol, & Stephenson, 1994, 285).

Killing is not that easy after all, learning it takes time and effort (105, 106): 'One day our group of three captured an old man with a radio. I was told to hand him over, so I led him to the garage at gunpoint. "Please don't turn me in," he begged when we were halfway to the garage. We were only the two of us. "Just walk, you old bastard," I told him and pushed him with my gun. "Please," he repeated. "I was forced to spy. I'm not even a Darood." I decided to let him talk. He told me that he belonged to one of those small tribes who were not even supposed to be fighting. I somehow believed him, and let him go. A few days later we again captured an old man whom I was instructed to turn in. When he had made sure it was only the two of us he tried to run away. "Stop!" I shouted running after him. He ignored me. He kept running. "Stop, or I'll kill you!" I repeated. He wouldn't listen. I fired my gun a couple of times and he was suddenly on the ground. I reached him. He was bleeding like hell in his back, and his body moved slowly every now and then. I laid my gun on the ground beside the man and bent down to peer more closely at him. Even though I had been seeing human beings killed every day for the last fifteen days this man's death was different to me. I took a deep breath and closed my eyes. If only he'd obeyed my orders! I wished. He wouldn't have been dead. I could even have freed him if he really wanted. I don't know how long I had my eyes closed but when I opened them again the man was lying quite still. None of his limbs was

moving. He was completely dead. I knew he was dead. The funny, thing was, I felt such remorse and at the same tune pride about that old man's death. I experienced joy at having killed the enemy with my own gun for the first time, yet it filled me with horror that I'd killed a fellow human being. For a moment I hated myself for not having spared his poor life. After taking another long deep breath, I stood up slowly and told myself not to weep for an enemy who was leading artillery towards us. I pushed the memory of him away after that. If I did remember it was only for a very short time afterwards, maybe for the few days following the incident. I didn't have time to remember him' (105, 106).

This quote reminds of another passage that also indicates that killing is not easy and has to be 'learned': When the killing had already started in Kigali 'Nothing happened in Butare for two weeks till, angered by his "inaction", Interim Government President Sindikubwabo (one of the rare Butare men in the government) came down and gave an inflammatory speech, asking the people if they were "sleeping" and urging them to violent deeds. On the 20th the prefet was replaced by the extremist Sylvain Ndikumana, GP elements were flown down from Kigali by helicopter, and the killing started immediately' (Prunier, 1995a, 244).

These two quotations play out all mediating variables in aggression such as arousal, aggression as social construction, the interpretation of individual behaviour as aggressive, attribution and aggression, as well as the role of norms in perceived injustice and the norm of reciprocity.

Mummendey addresses Coercive Power and refers to Tedeschi, Lindskold, & Rosenfeld, 1985, and their seven factors that increase the probability of threats and punishments in the course of a social interactions: 'These factors are: (1) norms of self-defence, reciprocity and distributive justice; (2) challenges to authority; (3) intense conflict over resources; (4) self-presentation and face-saving; (5) need for attention; (6) desire to control immediate behaviour of others; (7) failure to consider future consequences' (282). All aspects seem to be relevant for the young fighter in Mogadishu. Ali fights a just cause and should win, he is convinced - his adversaries are equally convinced that they should win - but whether it is always right what he does in the particular situation, he sometimes doubts; but mostly he is too stoned to think clearly, and possible consequences in the future he prefers to screen out.

The global village would surely be well advised to structure itself in such a way that young lads such as Ali can continue their studies instead of plunging into solving their fathers' problems by Coercive Power. And Somalis would prefer that too, as is clear from the

beginning of Osman's novel where Ali resists his father's attempts to educate him about Somali clan-politics. When his father gets tired of his unwilling son, Ali explains: 'I do understand but I'm not interested in politics. I'm interested in education' (7, 8). And, as we heard above, Muusa Bihi Cabdi, after a long life of war, professed that he would have preferred a life without war.

This means that Somalis do not necessarily enjoy aggression, but that there are strong pressures towards male prowess. It takes Ali's father much trouble to explain to his son that fighting is the only way out. When Ali says to his father: 'I'm interested in education and I don't have any, because my father's not rich enough to send me abroad to study, and he's not smart enough to find a place for me in the local universities!' his father 'smiles sourly' and replies to his son: 'It's not being smart to do those things, it's being corrupt. Do you want me to take part in this corruption?' His father gets angry: 'For God's sake, I wouldn't have gone to jail for four years if I wanted to take part in the corruption that's rife!' A friend, listening to this father-son drama intervenes: 'Calm down, Farah, … He's only a child.' (7, 8).

This means that a global village that wants to avoid following the path Somali self-destruction should counteract extremist elites preferably before they really blossom, and by other means than war, so that the Alis in the world may have another future to look forward to than the unfortunate hero of Osman's book. Somalia has discovered that hot-blooded young men can surely be employed as protectors, but they may, if employed in an 'overdose,' instead break down the whole organism of a society. As in the case of the human body, 'fight and flight reactions' may be useful at times, but the body breaks down if this state lasts too long. Young males proud of their masculine abilities are perhaps good policemen in an orderly society, or UN peacekeepers in an otherwise pacified global village, but no more.

What about Rwanda and Burundi? At the highest level of the society, where the Security Dilemma reigns, the traditional Tutsi elite very much resembled Somali clans in their fragile alliance/opposition relationships with each other. Lemarchand writes the following about the structure of power in pre-colonial Burundi: '…the dynastic dimension is evocative of endless struggles for power among royal claimants…Beginning in the 1850s, with the death of Mwami Mare Rugamba, conflict and fragmentation became part of a remarkably repetitive rhythm in Burundi history, with the mwami relegated to the status of a primus inter pares among the princes of the blood (ganwa)' (Lemarchand, 1994a, 36). Or, 'If a prince of the blood is sent to govern a distant province what is more likely than he should try to develop a local dynasty of his own?' (Richards, 1960, 143, in Lemarchand. 36).

However, as discussed above, in any hierarchical society there are two cultures, the fickle and competitive 'state of nature'-culture of the elites, and the 'obedience/co-operation'-culture of the underlings. See this description of Burundi: 'Sabwa Ganza ("The king [mwami] rules and reigns"). This phrase distils the normative essence of kingship. Evocative of virtue, benevolence, and authority, it conveys a vision of the monarchy that gave purpose and meaning to the traditional order. The cohesiveness of the whole stemmed from the corporate membership of its parts in the monarchical order. Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa shared the same symbolic universe; they all identified with the emblems of the mwami: the drum (karyenda), the royal tombs, the annual propitiating rites of a bountiful harvest (umuganuro). In short, they all participated in the sacredness of the exemplary center in ways that enabled them to come to terms with the visible and invisible realities of power. As the symbolic embodiment of Imam, the supreme creative principle… the mwami was unlike any other mortal: Umwami aca amateka ntaca agasunikano ("The king makes laws, he never makes troubles")' (Lemarchand, 1994a, 36).

In 1997 I got the following account of the Burundian pre-colonial and colonial past from a Burundian whose name I do not want to disclose because he was uneasy about it: 'Traditionally the *Mwami*, the king, stood at the top, then came the strata of *Ganwa* aristocrats (possessing more than 30 cows), followed by the bourgeois rich Tutsi (owners of more than 10 cows), the poor Hutu (with less then 10 cows), and the Twa at the bottom. The opulent calcium intake of the *Ganwa* and Tutsi from milk caused them to become taller, while manioc and sweet potatoes did not have the same effect on the poorer people, so that they stayed shorter. The conflict is not an ethnic conflict, because there is one language, *Kirundi*, one culture, and one God, *Imana*.' He continues: 'Before colonisation there was a system in place that unfortunately was broken down with colonisation, a system called *bushingantahe*, meaning a group of men, of wise elder men, who mediated in conflicts. They were so powerful, that even the king once lost a case against them; he had taken land from a farmer, was convicted, and had to pay compensation. Thus there was a division of power. This system broke down. Another system that broke down was that of the value of cows. Education substituted this to some extent.' Lemarchand underlines (39): 'Hutu "notables" (bashingantahe) often played a critically important role in adjudicating local disputes; in the opinion of some observers, these local notables formed the democratic core of Burundi society… However much one may quibble… one thing is beyond dispute: as a symbol of power and institution, the mwami served as a powerful unifying bond and a prime focus of popular loyalties.'

This shows to what extent the Burundian rulers had acquired 'professionalism' in administrating their underlings. 'Noble' Tutsi masters thus presumably accumulated much more knowledge about sustainability than their 'noble' Somali warrior colleagues, since the intricate system of hierarchical structures in Rwanda and Burundi required constant maintenance. Perhaps a moderate Tutsi ruler, a ruler who never would intensify the Security Dilemma wilfully but confront it skilfully wherever it would come down on him, and who would nurture cohesiveness and co-operation among underlings without stretching oppression beyond policing, would be the ruler closest to a modern caretaker of democratic super-ordinate structures. Any rising underling, uninitiated to the art of leadership, but poised to rule and be a good moderate leader of the oppressed, would be well advised to learn from an experienced moderate noble.

The image of such a caretaker-ruler is embodied by the 'anti-roi': 'The imminent arrival of the "ideal king," harbinger of a new social order, messenger of rewards to the meek and of retribution to the tyrants, is a familiar theme in the history of traditional societies undergoing major strains and dislocations. In Burundi, the ideal king, often referred to by historians as "anti-roi," occupies a central space in the social landscape of the precolonial society. Rwerekanabirenge in the northeast, Biroro and Rwoga in the southwest, and Kibango in the north all stood as the self-proclaimed standard-bearers of an impending restoration of the *mwami*; they all endeavored, according to Max Gluckman, "to reestablish the kingship in all its ideals, by making a true prince, with the king-becoming graces, into the king" (Gluckman, 1963, 43, in Lemarchand, 39, italicization in original). Perhaps Kigeri IV Rwabugiri, Umwami of Rwanda, who reigned from 1860 to 1895, during the last phase of expansion before the arrival of European colonialism came near to this ideal? At least he is 'considered the last of the great reformers. He is also referred to as the great warrior king (Dorsey, 1994, 355). Or, Burundian Prince 'Rwagasore [who] was equally popular among Hutu and Tutsi (Lemarchand, 1994a, 26).

As discussed above, in the global village the Security Dilemma is bound to wither away (because there are no other villages) and warrior talents are less in demand. What still is in demand, however, are leadership and management skills such as those possessed by Somali, Rwandan and Burundian 'nobles,' skills that must be combined with the traditional ability of the underling to co-operate and bow under common rules.

Passive Dependence Versus Active Self-Management

Fierce Somali mentality must be attenuated. However, its positive aspects have to be appreciated and preserved, see Table 33. To keep pristine pride and confidence thriving and not falter under adverse circumstances is surely not that easy; it requires individuals with strong mental forces. Many Westerners would have to admit that they would face the same circumstances perhaps with depression or even suicide. Somalis are amazingly effective in their self-management and many take their fate into their own hands quite successfully; otherwise they would not manage to disperse themselves over the entire world, feed their families in the Somali desert from far-flung places, and keep business going in the absence of functioning infrastructure in what many call the duty-free shop Somalia. Also Rwandan Tutsi, who after 1959 either dispersed in Africa as refugees or were humiliated in their own country, have still managed to build up admirable lives; and creating a functioning refugee army is not a small achievement. These people have knowledge of a repertoire of individual survival techniques that are astonishing. Passively waiting is not their way to behave, if they wait, then they wait 'actively,' as the former freedom fighters in Hargeisa do, who sit together, sometimes literally, on the beds under which they have their guns, and chew *khat* while expecting government recognition and government jobs as return for their courageous deeds.

Passive dependence versus active self-management		
Passive dependence on others, waiting for others to provide, closing one's eyes to change	⬅ ➡	Active self-management, taking one's fate into one's own hands, rich repertoire of individual resources to survive, being well informed

Table 33: Passive dependence versus active self-management

Simons addresses this specific Somali idleness and how it may be misunderstood: 'Here I also want to make a clear distinction between fatalism, the passive response of people with no room to maneuver, and the inactivity Somalis I refer to displayed. After all, expectation is not about being passive. Nor does waiting have to be. Instead, waiting can be about *being* poised and about being ready to take action if an opportunity for action presents itself' (Simons, 1995, 111, italicisation in original).

Simons stayed in Mogadishu just before Barre's fall, when unemployment was rampant. She describes K-5, a teashop, in the middle of Mogadishu: '…expectation is also heightened by the bustle of government employees who stop quickly (when technically they should be elsewhere) but whose stops are crucial for the circulation of information that may well be *the* ulterior reason people frequent this particular tea shop. For instance, no matter what the distraction, no matter how deep in conversation people might be, they are always cognizant of what is happening around them, who has come in, with whom, from where, and so on. Hence, the only real difference between people who are clearly on their way back or forth from somewhere and those who have been seated for a long time, with nothing seemingly pressing to do, is that the latter only *look* less active. They have time (which is not money in Somalia) to look leisurely. Yet, given enough time they know from past experience that something (or someone) interesting (i.e., useful) will come along. Their waiting thus amounts to tending a sort of a trapline, and it is this act of lying in wait that I think expatriates misinterpret as mere idleness… It is not jobs or employment per se that necessarily provide or secure money in Mogadishu. Rather, it is often the parlaying of job-related advantages into other advantages that can provide real income equivalents. One way to achieve solvency in such an economy is to indeed treat networks as traplines; they must be regularly - but not too regularly - tended to or they will not yield results' (112, 113, italicisation in original).

Simons links the tea shop networks of Mogadishu with pastoral experience: '…although environmental conditions might be unpredictable from moment to moment, the very fact that uncertainty is so predictable in this environment means that those who are dependent on nature's beneficence can also assume that sooner or later disaster will strike. For instance, if drought conditions exist once every three years (CRDP 1986 [Central Rangelands Development Project]) and major diseases opportunistically feed on drought, then raids are also likely to follow. Thus, although it may be impossible to prepare for these specific moments - since water and grazing are not preservable, nor diseases or raids preventable - pastoralism, as a system borne of this environment, has programmed into itself responses, which themselves, are systematic. As we have just seen, raiding is one of these. However, the obverse to raiding is even more helpful: the giving and loaning of livestock…' (114).

The modern global citizen may learn from Somali habits to sustain self-management and pride by collecting information and maintaining ties. Already Richard Burton noticed that. 'It is significant that Richard Burton, the explorer and author of *First Footsteps in East Africa*, who visited Somaliland in the early 1850's, comments that he was surprised at how

quickly the Somalis got news about events in the Crimean War, in fact within a matter of weeks, and how they followed its course with keen interest' (Adam, 1998, 8). This has not changed since, and every global citizen may learn from Somali ability to stay informed.

Ambassador Dualeh points at another advantage of Somali pride:

Dualeh: We were never fundamentalists.

Lindner: Yes, religion is a thin layer.

D: The Somalis would get surprised if somebody is too much religious. Somalis are very liberal in religion; that is why fundamentalism can never take much root in Somalia.

L: I try to understand this better, is this also perhaps linked to Somali pride, I mean that a proud nomad would not even bow too much for a God?

D: Yes, God gave him instructions, to pray five times a day, and that's all. And he will not allow anyone to say: 'I am the leader and I dictate you, do this, put a bomb around your waist and blow up something.' A Somali will not obey orders. A nomad is by nature very anti-establishment. Anti-anybody who tells him orders. He will not accept anybody to boss over him and say you are my flock.

Incidentally, Somalis, unlike for example Kenyans, Rwandese and Burundians were not converted to Christianity by their colonial masters. Abdirazak Osman writes to me on 5th October 1999: 'Evelin, Somalis are extremely proud people. This had and has both positive and negative sides. During slavery and colonization Somalis lost and gained a lot. Perhaps more than the rest of other Africans. Because of their pride they succeeded to hold onto their language, culture and religion where virtually ALL the other black Africans "accepted" the languages and religions of the European masters. Somalia is the only black African nation-state whose national language is hers except for Ethiopia who was NEVER colonized... In the same token Somalis did not benefit from the Europeans in the sense that they did not inherit universities and schools after they left their country like the rest of black Africa. In a way that explains why Somalis are not as "educated" as their brothers and sisters in the Mother Continent. It's only now we can see "educated" Somalis around and that's mainly due to the fact that many Somalis left for the "West" after the war.'

Dualeh addresses the same point: 'Somalis saw the British as partners; they never saw the colonial man as superior. They saw them as another tribe who comes from somewhere, and they could coexist.' And, Dualeh explains that Islam fits Somali nomads best: 'Once you become a Muslim you are a brother; in Islam we are all equals, we are all brothers, there is none down and none up.' Dualeh believes that the first Somalis to encounter Islam saw it as

liberation: 'They did not really know what Islam is, but they saw the symptoms as liberation: Come, sit down beside me!'

At least, Somalis would not perpetrate coldly planned genocides out of obedience, one may conclude. As discussed above, Somalis seem to represent the complete contrary to Adorno's authoritarian personality Adorno et al., 1950. Wherever atrocities are perpetrated Adorno's views are discussed, as in the final report of the truth commissions that was presented to President Nelson Mandela on 29th October 1998:

'… it is worth asking whether perpetrators are not self-selected, that is, people with particular kinds of personality predispositions who are drawn to certain careers and circumstances to emerge as killers and torturers. The theory of the authoritarian personality presents such a view. Rooted in earlier thinking from the 1920s, the authoritarian thesis was made famous in a major book published in 1950... A particular kind of person, the 'authoritarian personality', it was claimed, emerged from rigid and punitive family structures. Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, it was argued that children of such families split off and repressed feelings of hostility and resentment towards their parents and projected these hostile feelings towards members of weaker and stigmatised groups. As Adorno once put it, authoritarians metaphorically resemble cyclists: "above they bow, below they kick". Authoritarians as a type also manifest a particular pattern of social attitudes: ethnocentrism (or favouritism towards their own group), prejudice towards out-group members, anti-democratic views and a propensity towards conservatism and fascist ideology' (Tutu, 1998, 94).

The report confirms: 'There is solid and reliable recent evidence that authoritarianism was manifest among white South Africans, that it was correlated with anti-black prejudice and anti-democratic tendencies, and was more prevalent among Afrikaans rather than English-speakers, and among those who regarded themselves as conservative' (95).

The report also acknowledges that 'In recent years, the theoretical base of authoritarianism has been revised.' The reports recognises the upcoming significance of the concept of social identity: 'It is no longer seen as rooted primarily in either intrapsychic conflict or in strict, hierarchical and rigid family socialisation. Rather, it is a set of beliefs expressing strong and loyal identification with one's own social or cultural group – ethnic, national, racial, religious – with strong demands on group togetherness (cohesion). Respect and unconditional obedience is given to own-group leaders and authorities (an attitude of bowing to the top) while authoritarian aggression reflects negative prejudice, intolerance and

punitiveness towards out-group members (the kicks below). Authoritarianism in this view is a form of social identity rather than a particular personality type (96).

In the case of 'noble' Somalis, their identity may be described as follows: Somalis (males, but also females) learn to guard their own interest; they will hardly become unconditionally obedient and turn into passive objects in a master's hands. They will not kill out of mere 'duty.' If they believe they can benefit from following a leader they will follow and participate in eradicating a whole clan, but they will define their relationship to this leader as alliance, not as subservience, and they will change alliances easily. A Siad Barre had to bargain his way, he had, for example, to promise Isaaq resources to the Ogadenis; he could much less draw upon orders and obedience as a Hitler or Rwandan genocidal elite could, - although, admittedly, also Hitler's followers greedily stole and exploited Jewish resources, and Rwandans were promised the land of the killed.

In short, leaders, independently of whether they want to build or destroy society, have an extremely difficult task with Somalis: they are not ready just to obey. Conversely, as quoted above, 'the Hutu were to the French like children,' in other words, they were perhaps too obedient. Civil disobedience, a fundamental necessity if the global village is to be democratic, may draw lessons from 'noble' pride. It is not without reason that Hans von Sponeck, a United Nations official with German aristocratic background, showed what he certainly defines as civil disobedience against the Iraq embargo; his father, a general, had been executed by Hitler, because he refused to let his soldiers be slaughtered in situation that was already hopeless.[255] Sponeck says in an interview on the BBC World channel ('hardtalk' with Tim Sebastian in May 2000): 'You have pulled down the Iraqis to a level which is inhuman… Around half a million children die prematurely because of the sanctions… The "Oil for Food Program," even Kofi Anan knows, is not sufficient. The policy that has been adopted has failed... Iraqis have been badly demonised… You try to catch a tiger, but you kill

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[255] 'In a move that will certainly embarrass the United States, Hans Von Sponeck, the head of the United Nations humanitarian programme in Iraq, resigned after he publicly criticised the economic sanctions imposed on it. Von Sponeck, a German career UN official, who assumed office in Baghdad in 1998, has asked to leave his post as of 31 March, one month before his term would have ended. On Monday, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who has consistently defended Von Sponeck, said he had accepted the resignation of the UN official "with regret". Annan also praised Von Sponeck as an international servant "who has served the United Nations well for 36 years". Annan did not explain why he agreed to let his man in Baghdad leave, although he had previously rejected an American request to remove him from the post after Washington declared him persona non grata. Diplomats, who asked not be identified, said Von Sponeck decided to go after the United States expressed impatience with Annan because of his employee's repeated criticism of Washington's Iraqi policies' (Hemeid, 2000, retrieved from from http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/2000/469/re2.htm on 20th May 2000).

a beautiful bird… Anti-Western sentiment, among students in Baghdad for example, is on the rise, and this although Iraqis are gentle and tolerant people.'

Inertia Versus Flexibility

There are more aspects to Somali nomadism, see Table 34. What about their alertness and quick adaptability? The global information society needs mobile and alert individuals, just as Ury points out. Here Somalis are tremendously talented. Somali women and men make their own individual decisions and move about the globe with unprecedented courage, under the most adverse circumstances. Tutsi cosmopolitans are equally versed. Any member of the global elite may learn from them.

Inertia versus flexibility		
Inertia,		Flexibility,
lack of adaptability,	← →	innovation,
overrating of structures,		quick adaptability,
underrating of processes,		alertness,
interpreting change as		mobility,
humiliation		individual independence

Table 34: Inertia versus flexibility

A researcher can learn much about how to survive in small flexible units under uncertain conditions when studying harsh environments such as to be found in the Horn of Africa. Modern global businesses should be able to benefit from this knowledge, since they increasingly try to operate in smaller units. Since, as mentioned above, such harsh environments typically do not give rise to large empires, the number of 'kings' of small units is big. The pool of ideas to tap into concerning war and peace is equally large; businesses may learn from this diversity of strategic thinking.

And what about the necessity for change that may be halted by people who hold on to old paradigms out of inertia, and undue adherence to fixed structures? Quick decisions are necessary, for example if the globe is to survive, bold changes have to be made; new technologies should replace old ones that intoxicate the ecosystem. Where are the people fearless enough to initiate and promote such changes? Somalis certainly are bold.

Often those who hold on to old paradigms interpret change as humiliating because they attach too much of their identity too strongly to old times. The United States currently enjoys a strong economy, among other reasons, perhaps, because many Americans are prepared to leave everything behind if necessary; they are ready to interpret change as the start for a new life rather than as a humiliation. To a certain extent and in this respect, Somalis could be called good Americans, perhaps better prepared than some Europeans who may cling too long to outdated schemes.

For Rwanda and Burundi the situation may be more complicated, because today it is not so much a question of inertia versus activity, but to a large extent a problem of fear that lets Tutsi parties in Burundi protest against democratic change, and a Tutsi-dominated government in Rwanda postpone national elections.[256] However, with regard to inertia, presumably pastoral Tutsi developed more of it than their Somali colleagues, because they did not move about as habitually as Somali pastoralists, unless one counts wars and rivalries at the royal court as culture of quick change. Still, those who grew up in 'noble' cultures may have learned skills that give them an advantage when flexibility is in demand, while underling culture, in any society, may be expected to cause their 'children' a disadvantage as soon as structures change towards more equality; subordinates, in any society, may have learned too well to limit self-propelled change in order to adapt to the 'system,' an inertia that will hinder quick transitions when the same person tries to live in an egalitarian society.

However, underling culture also has advantageous aspects. It may be expected to guard against the overdoing of flexibility and change, namely instability. People who grew up in tight hierarchical orders may therefore be encouraged to shed the hierarchical aspect as soon as they enter global egalitarian teams in a information societies, and very profitably hold on to their skills of guarding stability.

Exclusion Versus Inclusion

Table 35 refers to another feature of Somali culture, namely their racist arrogance and intolerance for out-groups, as compared to their steadfast backing of in-groups. If Somalis could learn that all humankind is their in-group, and nothing less than that, then their loyalty to humankind would be exemplary in the eyes of all those who wish to promote prosocial behaviour, altruism, or social cohesion. What both Somalis and the world can learn from the

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[256] However, 'no-party' elections are being held at lower levels, the last one from 27th – 29th March 2000 at lowest "cellule" and "secteur" levels.

Somali example is that demarcation lines have a very destructive potential, and that defining larger in-groups (at best the entire global village) may carry higher results.

Exclusion versus inclusion		
Exclusion,		Inclusion,
racism,	← →	help,
routine humiliation		support,
enmity,		super-ordinate structure
division		

Table 35: Exclusion versus inclusion

Henri Tajfel, 1981, and Michael Billig, 1976, are key names for Social Identity Theory.[257] As discussed above, their experiments show that there is no need for conflicting goals or competition for resources to create demarcation lines between 'us' and 'them' that lead to intergroup animosity; the mere fact that there are two distinct groups seems to suffice (minimal group paradigm); competition between these groups simply intensifies the already present demarcation lines.

One may ask: How, under such circumstances, can there ever be co-operation? Under the heading 'Creating super-ordinate goals' Michael Harris Bond, renowned cross-cultural psychologist based in Hong Kong writes: 'Social polarizations may be transcended through groups' and their members' uniting successfully around a common purpose or goal (Sherif & Cantril, 1947). This might involve local tasks such as constructing community facilities. Community service projects, especially if involving younger students from various ethnic groups serving members of various other ethnic groups, may be especially effective in building trust and good-will across group lines.... National tasks, such as protecting the shared environment or indeed, fighting off an invader, will accomplish the same unification. Social capital will then develop out of the experience of working together and subsequently out of shared pride in the ongoing benefit from the actual accomplishments themselves (Bond, 1998).

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[257] See for more literature, for example, by Billig, Billig, 1976; Billig, 1987; Billig et al., 1988; Billig, 1991; Billig, 1995; Billig, in Robinson, 1996; Howitt, Billig, & Loughborough University of Technology.Social Psychology Group., 1989, and Tajfel Tajfel, 1978a; Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel, 1978b; Tajfel & Minority Rights Group, 1978; Tajfel, Fraser, & Jaspars, 1984; Tajfel & Turner, in Worchel & Austin, 1986; Turner, in Tajfel, 1982.

Bond's statement that 'National tasks, such as protecting the shared environment or indeed, fighting off an invader, will accomplish the same unification' indicate what Somalis did when they united after independence and later, when they fought to have their Ogaden back. They united. But, unity was betrayed. This is the lesson they learned first and foremost. Furthermore, as discussed above, Somalis never had the opportunity to experience the benefits of super-ordinate societal structures. During colonialism they could perhaps grasp parts of their utility and also during the first part of Barre's reign. But most of the time the beneficial aspects of a super-ordinate societal structures was overshadowed by the destructive use of it by colonisers, by a dictator, and later by the international community.

How can people under such circumstances learn to renounce demarcation lines and unite under a common roof? Abdulqadir H. Ismail Jirdeh and Ahmed El Kahin agree 'that before the advent of colonial power there was only moral authority, namely the elders. Colonial powers then implemented political authority. When the state collapsed, the elders filled the gap in the North, but not in the South.'

The result is that Somalis negotiate, so-to-speak, green and red traffic lights at nearly every cross-road, out of fear that the other may have an advantage when driving first; or a war-lord regulates the traffic and takes 'taxes' from all passers-by; nobody maintains the roads.

Abdulqadir H. Ismail Jirdeh and Ahmed El Kahin point out that it is not easy to make the transition from the level of the elders to the level of stately structures and for example administer Somaliland: 'Governments do like farmers more than nomads, because farmers cannot run away when the government comes and wants to collect taxes. There is a traditional form of taxation within the clans, *qaaraan*, which you pay to the clan, for example for the building of a well, and this is very transparent. But nobody could understand why the colonisers wanted money to administer the colonised! You can therefore never try to get income tax for example here in Somaliland, even not from companies. However, you have at least one form of leverage, namely that they need licenses from the government. Indirect taxes are therefore the answer, mainly on import (and a small service tax when life stock is exported), and this is also according to Islam.'

The challenge is, obviously, to build a culture where the functions of super-ordinate structures are understood, supported, and identified with by a sufficiently large group of people, see Table 42 and Table 44. Abdullah A. Mohamoud gave a paper on human resources in Turku (Mohamoud, 1998) where he draws attention to Abdirazak H. Hussen, Prime Minister during Somalia's democratic decade, who still actively participates in the debate on

Somalia. Abdullah A. Mohamoud quotes Abdirazak H. Hussen as follows: 'The core of the whole problem is not, in my view, constitutional structure, but rather the human factor. On paper, any system of governance may sound good and workable. But whether such a constitutional institution is, in actual fact, good or not will depend on the ability, dedication and good faith of those who are called upon to make it work on the ground. I would suggest that the focus and attention should be directed on how to provide such qualified man-power. Worrying and doing something about the human aspect of the problem is more crucial and urgent, at this stage, than worrying about constitutional structure, important though it is' (Hussen, 1996, 6-7).

Keynan writes: 'The exact number of fault lines underlying the Somali equation is not easy to determine definitively. For our purpose here five major fault lines can be identified: the clan fault line, the North-South fault line, the linguistic fault line, the urban-rural fault line, and the Islamic fault line' (Keynan, in Tesli & Hansen, 1999, 153).

How can fault lines be transcended? Can Somalis learn? Keynan explains in the interview 25th November 1999 in Oslo that he finds it most annoying that even non-Somalis support that view: 'I remember I participated in a conference in Geneva, I was invited, and I remember a lady who was working for a Canadian international development agency, who was originally from Turkey. She came one day and told me: "You are talking about Somalia. How can you talk about Somalia!" I said: "Why can't I talk about Somalia - so many other people are talking about Somalia, - and I am no less educated than you are, I am no less qualified than you are, how come! Surely, I can talk about Somalia!" She said: "You Somalis are divided into clans, and you belong to a clan, so you can't be objective for the whole of Somalia; a foreigner can be more objective than you are." I think that concept, that kind of attitude is destructive, and it also is a condescending attitude, because there is a tendency among many foreigners and also among some Somalis, to reduce every Somali, to say that he or she cannot transcend the clan sentiment. And I think that is an insult that contravenes the basic decency of humanity, and also does not recognise that Somalis like any other people can learn! They have high levels of education; they can be objective as anybody. So that is one attitude which I have a great deal of problems with.'

I understand Keynan's reaction. Somalia can teach the world a lot. I learned a lot. I learned to admire Somali elegance, intelligence, pride, independence, and survival abilities. However, I also understand people who are furious at Somalis. Those who are considered as members of out-groups by Somalis have 'not much to laugh about' because their services may just be perceived as pasture that is to be consumed by using trickery if necessary; for example

humanitarian aid may be looted by those clans through whose territory the trucks drive that try to bring help to another, destitute, clan.

What about Rwanda and Burundi? How are they to achieve inclusion instead of exclusion? How can Tutsi include Hutu while being afraid that Hutu secretly have them on their 'to-kill' lists, and how can Hutu include Tutsi when they feel that this means nothing but humiliating subjugation? There is, clearly, only one way out: The moderates of Rwanda, Burundi and in the world community have to resist extremists in any camp, and work together so that the Tutsi-Hutu fault line becomes but a folkloric one. It is not yet a folkloric cleavage today, since different cultures have developed in the four camps (extremist Hutu and extremist Tutsi, versus moderate Hutu and moderate Tutsi), cultures that do not change from one day to the other, and that require special attention if they are to change: The moderate Hutu and Tutsi (and moderate human rights advocates from all over the world) have to attend to the extremist Tutsi camp and help them learn humility and empathy for Hutu suffering. They have to attend equally to the extremist Hutu camp and help them cope with their ambivalent admiration for Tutsi sophistication and their lack of confidence in their own abilities to   incorporate a Tutsi minority peacefully.

Women As Tokens Versus Women As Players

I admired the strong Somali women I met. However, when I learned that in order to reach long-term peace between warring groups, women should be exchanged between them for marriage - because women will then embody the bridges between opposing groups, since they have their original family in one group and their children in the other - I felt that I myself would not want to heal the problems my in-group has with another group by getting married to one of them. In other words I would place myself on the right side of Table 36. And I expect, the more Somali women gain self-confidence they may refuse being the token of male deals, as honourable and traditional as they may be. (However, it is not just female resistance that may change traditions, but also the fact that women no longer can be sure of moving freely between warring clans because 'new' practices of war indicate that they risk being raped and killed - and this may make it less 'functional' in any case to exchange women as a bond between opposing groups.)

Women as tokens versus women as players		
Women are tokens of male pride and honour, protected/oppressed by their male warriors, who 'take care' of the Security Dilemma.	← →	Women and men are equal players in a global village in which the withering Security Dilemma requires less male warrior protection.

Table 36: Women as tokens versus women as players

Women are one constituency named by Lyons, Samatar, & Brookings, 1995, as those who will have to contribute to a new beginning: 'Severely marginalized by the patriarchal weight of Somali tradition and currently paying the greatest cost for the prevailing degeneration, Somali women will miss the past the least. More than any other segment of the society, their burning need for security, democratic life, material well-being, and respect and equality is a critical piece of the puzzle' (66). The authors list altogether five constituencies: the traditional elders, the *Ulema* or *Sheikhs*, the oracles and poets, the modernisers, and the militia leaders. They point at *heer* and Islam as 'the twin pillars of the Somali tradition,' that 'include retrievable values and an ethos that enshrine individual dignity, justice and generosity, collective struggle, and intergenerational obligations. Additionally, modernism offers new capacities (for example, reason, rationality, efficiency) that are not necessarily antithetical to the traditional mode of livelihood. A worthwhile effort toward reclamation as well as synthesis requires a new discourse of politics' (65).

In Nairobi I talked to a well-educated Somali (he does not want to be identified) about Edna Adan and what a strong woman she is. Edna Adan is far from being what she calls a 'decoration of the house, or poupé du salon,' and she refuses to accept such a lowly position. My Somali interlocutor comments: 'She is very much right: Somali men are in fact terrible; women are seen as "decoration of the house"! Even if I know theoretically that I should not do that, in the back of my head I want a woman to be the decoration of the house. This is really a field where humiliation is relevant! What happens to women in the West is 1000 times worse in Somali culture! I think that Edna is a very tough and strong woman.'

Many times Western NGO officials admitted to me that they would rather work with Somali women and bypass Somali men completely. A Western NGO person recounted the

following incident to me on 30th December 1998 in Nairobi: 'Once I gave a contract to one applicant and not to the other. This led the loser to ambush me and try to kill me (nobody was actually killed, but one person in my party, who was shooting back, got his shoulder blown off). And this was perfectly okay and normal, that a person, who loses a contract, tries to kill the one who turned him down! Later in the evening, I was in my compound, the streets were empty, a sort of electric atmosphere was in town, on the roof of my house men with guns were on the lookout for snipers... Then the women came to apologise! I was there, somehow looking gravely hurt, and the women came - and the woman who spoke most English started apologising - but in the middle of the sentence, she started laughing! And all others laughed heartily! Very infectious laughter, they cried with laughter, held their bellies, so I, also, could not avoid laughing! They then had to leave, because their sides hurt!… I ask you: What is this! Is this the welcome to a city? They try to kill you, and this is even perfectly okay, and then this is the biggest joke???'

How does the issue of women as token versus player present itself in Rwanda and Burundi? The Hutu woman has long suffered from being looked down upon as not as beautiful as her Tutsi sister, and her Tutsi sister has suffered from being demonised and abused as a supposedly evil seducer. Rwandan and Burundian women have endured unfathomable pain in their role as the 'object of desire' for men, both Tutsi and Hutu. The way out for women of all groups is to define themselves as players, as agents, who do not figure in a male world as token of male prowess (a Mercedes and a Tutsi wife). The examples presented in this book, of courageous women, both Tutsi and Hutu, may give hope for such a healing of past wounds.

When Co-operation is Deadly and When Not

Somalia is the toughest place in the world to work in; therefore hardly any Westerner is currently (beginning of 2000) to be found there. It would be beneficial for the world, if the Somalis, as talented and resourceful as they are, would learn to feel responsible for nurturing and maintaining the world's resources, not only consuming or looting them and reserving their remarkable ability to care for a tiny in-group. It would be beneficial if they accepted the invitation by the global village to become part of it, not just as beneficiaries, but also as problem solvers. And a little humility would perhaps be wise also: Somalia is not the navel of the world; in fact the world obviously can do without Somalia. Not without reason is Somalia the 'forgotten Somalia.' This means that some of those Westerners, who come and want to

invite Somalia into the global society, may not have any self-interest apart from extending precisely this invitation. Somalis may therefore accept this invitation as a generous one from a family member.

'I have been to Somalia last year. And since I was coming from the States, everybody was telling me that the United States' interest in Somalia is economic, and that is why they are here. I was in a situation where I could not give a proper answer. It is hard for me to understand the logic behind this argument. Where is the wealth in Somali that has attracted the Americans? Realistically speaking, for the last fifty years of Somalia, no administration, whether foreign or Somali, ever relied on its own resources. All relied on external aid. To give you an example, in the 1950s southern Somalia was under what we call United Nations Trusteeship System. The UN funded that independence in the 1960s. All the successive governments always depended in international dole provided by the EEC, or the USA or what was the Soviet Union. What does that tell us? It is very clear that we are a poor nation. I think we need to accept our poverty. This will enable us to find reasonable solutions to the grim realities that we face' (says Mukhtar, in Haakonsen & Keynan, 1995, 28, at a conference titled *Somalia after UNOSOM*).

Furthermore, former Ambassador Omar, 1996, warns that lamenting about the past only paralyses: 'We, the Somalis, when we blame someone of the past we say: "Ayax Tag Eelna Reeb" (The Locust is gone, but left the disaster behind). So, for what is happening in Somalia even after such a long time we blame Siad Barre and we say this is his legacy. As far as the continent of Africa's situation is concerned, we blame the colonialists for all that is happening.' Oman concludes that the whole Africa has to become more sincere: '…those who have toppled Siad Barre did not only fail to deliver better goods, but they destroyed the little the country had. Thirty five years have passed since the majority of the countries in Africa gained their independence and one can hardly pin-point any country in the continent that has given its people a comfortable and decent standard of living and political freedom apart from the few elite that have manipulated the economies and the political system of the continent' (294, 295). This paragraph may also be applied to Rwanda and Burundi.

Certainly, in order to make a global co-operation work, it is not just Somalia, or Rwanda and Burundi that have to learn. The world has to learn as well, namely that the times are gone where orders and obedience reigned the world, and that the global citizen, member of creative networks in a global knowledge society, is a flexible and independent personality who will resist being 'taught lessons' just as do Somalis, and who may require as much

respect on an egalitarian basis as Somalis. Equally, citizens of the Great Lakes have to be offered, and create, a culture of respect.

Perhaps the Somali and Rwandan/Burundian predicament can be inscribed into a larger model, see Table 37:

When co-operation may be deadly and when not

When co-operation may be deadly and when not

(1) In a group of hunter-gatherers who have never been attacked co-operation is always beneficial ('pre-Security Dilemma').
The lesson learned is that co-operation is 'good.'

← →

(2) As soon as looters threaten a neighbourhood, co-operation with the looting enemy may be deadly; under such circumstances co-operation becomes only beneficial within a clearly defined in-group (clan versus clan, Hutu versus Tutsi) (Security Dilemma at its peak). The lesson learned is that co-operation is 'bad' outside, and 'good' inside.

↘ ↙

(3) The benefits of co-operation can only be fully harvested where short-term looting is prevented by growing global interdependence (as globalisation currently provides) and impartial protective super-ordinate structures (as the United Nations attempts to become) in a new global in-group in which the Security Dilemma can wither away (no out-group) and any attempt to re-create it can be controlled (by UN).

Table 37: When co-operation may be deadly and when not

Hunter-gatherers in a 'pre-Security Dilemma' state (see cell 1), not under threat by warring neighbours and largely on their own, living in the illusion that the pie of resources is infinite, do not have much to worry about except wild animals and natural disasters. They are only subjected to minimal group differences. These they can bridge with the help of a culture of egalitarian mediation, just as Ury describes. They are in a position to be proud and humble at the same time, proud as free men and women and humble as part of nature; perhaps they resemble Rousseau's 'noble savages' more than anybody else. By being 'good' commoners and using a co-operative culture and norms they can, if not really expand (since the planet is

finite), but at least maintain, the resources they have at hand. The important point is: Co-operation has a chance to play out its beneficial effects under such conditions.

As soon as one neighbour finds out that raiding others' resources may be called a 'success,' at least in the short run, the Security Dilemma begins forming the overall framework of relations. Cell 2 marks the outer pole of this state. In-group cohesion versus out-group exclusion is not any longer based on the minimal group paradigm only (see above), but quickly becomes a question of life and death. In the beginning of this new era, looters perhaps kill their victims after raiding. It is only later, with the development of with agriculture, that raiders also learn to enslave and administer their victims. The head of a small looting gang is proud, a primus inter pares, a first among equals. Their raids make the size of their piece of the cake infinitely large, however at the price of redistributing or even diminishing the overall pie. In the long run, too much looting plays out its overall destructive effects, as is being seen in Somalia.

In small nomadic groups every man learns 'maintenance of pride' by being constantly alert and translating frustration into aggression without delay. The same applies to rulers of empires who are not only be proud, but furthermore, may learn to be arrogant and haughty, and routinely and legitimately put down their slaves by means of utmost humiliation. The heads of nomadic groups, as well as imperial rulers, have the social identity of free, proud, and even arrogant men with endless resources. They would answer with Ambassador Dualeh that Somali nomads cannot be humiliated, because humiliation is something for the weak.

Slaves, at the bottom of empires, on the other hand learn to be careful about showing aggression and curb their desire to counter-humiliate their humiliators. This is what minorities in Somalia say: 'Somalis are killers, we are not.' But slaves and other underlings are not always humiliated. Under certain circumstances they may also enjoy protection from nurturing rulers who build up super-ordinate structures for their in-group that would make the pie for everybody larger. Complex irrigation systems, for example, could feed quite large numbers of people, and very well. Many ancient civilisations can serve as examples, from Egypt to Mesopotamia. Also Rwandan and Burundian history tells the story of the ambivalent relationship between protected/oppressed underlings and their protectors/oppressors. In an empire, where the balance hovers to the protection side, the benefits of co-operation could be combined with the benefits of super-ordinate structures within an in-group and lead to great results; indeed, magnificent empires have been built on that combination. However, this combination has never been successful for long - soon raiders came, looted and destroyed.

Today's global village does not have to fear the 'outside' anymore; there is no space on the globe for an unknown 'outside' from where looters may unexpectedly appear - the only remnants are terrorists within the 'inside.' The global village's current task is thus clearly to embody cell 3 by building and maintaining institutional and cultural structures that are democratic and super-ordinate, and police them well - and indeed, the global village is precisely moving in this direction, with its advocacy of egalitarian creative networks that are guided by human rights.

In all three cells a different mix of pride, humiliation, humility and arrogance is to be expected, and in various ways, by various groups within them. Aggression is contingent on the framework in which a person or group finds itself. Today the international community of the global village encourages people to learn to curb frustration and not translate it into aggression. The international community, at least those parts that advocate human rights, condemn not only slavery but also weaker forms of it, at all societal levels - ranging from racism between different groups in a nation, to bullying at the work place. The human rights advocates of the global village teach respect for equality and the avoidance of humiliation. Somalis are invited.

Somalis could contribute to human rights advocacy on a global scale. Somalis are not helpless underlings that need pity, they are not 'slaves,' they are managers and masters - and it is precisely because of this that they are not 'busy' following orders like some foreigners would like them to be. The world could benefit from Somalis putting their managerial talents into human rights advocacy.

The Djibouti conference of this year is perhaps a beginning. I ask Keynan how the conference overcame the rifts that were created by the atrocities that were perpetrated by all sides during the years of civil war. Keynan explains that in the beginning of the conference elders sat together for about a month and talked about all the atrocities that had been committed between them, and that they then asked each other for forgiveness. I inquire whether anybody attempted to put in place the old system of compensation for killed clan members and Keynan points out that this would not have been possible since nobody could find out and agree upon what a clan had done in the name of the clan and which damage in fact had occurred. Hassan explains that a government with a functioning court system is needed, and perhaps something like truth commissions, in order to really achieve justice.

There is also hope that moderates among the current Tutsi-dominated governments in Rwanda and Burundi may understand the dynamics of humiliation and counter-humiliation

that accompany the transition from inequality to equality, and the transition from former oppressive/protective hierarchies to modern egalitarian societies.

The Most Difficult Part, the Humbling of the Masters

In order to achieve a global community that is protected by human rights, extremists among traditional 'masters' who believe that humiliating underlings is their legitimate duty, have to learn humility. And this is what human rights advocacy attempts to do. Humbling means to bring somebody down from arrogant, conceited, supercilious and overstretched heights, see Table 38.

The transition to an egalitarian human rights culture

Masters — Top of hierarchy

Line of equality

Under-lings — Bottom of hierarchy

Table 38: The transition to an egalitarian human rights culture

Hunter-gathers who lived in egalitarian societies only knew one line, the line in the middle of Table 38. Agriculture enabled humankind to draw two new lines, namely the line of the master and the line of the underling, thus creating a 'power distance' (Hofstede, 1980). Today's human rights advocates in the global village try to create a new culture that, as Ury suggests, resembles former egalitarian structures that only had one line, the line in the middle. Masters have to come down, and slaves to rise. However, as has been described in this book, this is not at all an easy transformation and transition, see Table 39. It is especially difficult for 'Islands of History' (see above mentioned Sahlins, 1985), such as Somalia and Rwanda and Burundi, who were a certain degree removed from the fast change that afflicted other world regions; at present they enter, quite suddenly, into the realm of global human rights

culture that translates former, legitimate, versions of humiliation into illegitimate violations of human rights.

‘Masters,’ ‘slaves,’ and equality		
	Non-Western cultures	**The ‘West’**
‘Masters’ adhering to an honour code	‘Masters’ adhering to an honour code may be expected to want to stay at the top of the pyramid of power. They will call for ‘respect’ of ‘their’ culture and ‘their’ sovereignty. They will reject equality. They will suspect any Western human rights advocacy as an attempt to humiliate them. They will sympathise with other ‘masters’ as being of ‘one mind’ and will interpret any uprising from ‘underlings’ as an attempt to topple them.	‘Masters’ adhering to an honour code may be expected to want to stay at the top of the pyramid of power. They will sympathise with other ‘masters’ around the world and think in terms of ‘up’ and ‘down.’ They may use human rights rhetoric if it helps protect their power position.
‘Slaves’ who want to become ‘masters’	‘Slaves,’ at least some of them, may be expected to want to topple their ‘masters.’ They will call for human rights support on their way ‘up,’ but will disappoint their human rights supporters and replace the ‘master’ if they can, instead of stopping at a level of equality.	‘Slaves,’ at least some of them, may be expected to want to topple their ‘masters.’ They will identify with the plight of the oppressed around the world and may idealise other cultures as quasi-divine in order to throw into stark contrast the wrongdoings of their own ‘masters.’
Human rights advocates who believe in equality	Human rights advocates aim for equality. They are well advised to differentiate which meaning of respect and recognition they are confronted with at the time: ‘respect for hierarchy,’ or ‘respect for equality.’	Human rights advocates aim for equality. They are well advised to differentiate which meaning of respect and recognition they are confronted with at the time: ‘respect for hierarchy,’ or ‘respect for equality.’

Table 39: ‘Masters,’ ‘slaves,’ and equality

Research is Also Therapy: A Special Message to the Scientific Community[258]

The argument of this book is that when investigating humiliation, especially in a culture unfamiliar to the researcher, the overriding objective must be to discover the most effective strategy for achieving authentic dialogue. Once that dialogue has been opened, there is a greater chance of discovering how the culture and the society actually 'work.' As argued above, invalid science is no science at all. The research being described in this manuscript has the ultimate objective of building a theory of humiliation. Such a theory will, hopefully, illuminate a wide range of human situations and, perhaps, suggest ways of working towards a healing of the wounds of humiliation, especially those wounds aggravated by violent conflict.

The methodology that emerged in the course of this research overlaps in an intriguing way with the approach taken by initiatives such as the War-torn Societies Project in Somalia.[259] Wherever I went this NGO received a lot of praise for being different from the common run of aid agencies. These were often described to me in terms of a parody that contains elements of truth: They come along, build wells (or some other installations or services liable to be ecologically unsound or unmanageable in the longer run), create a few jobs for some chauffeurs, secretaries and security personnel, and then disappear again.

The War-torn Societies Project, in contrast, concentrates on participatory action research and attempts to develop an agenda for development together with the communities concerned; it thus tries to 'empower' people and turn them from 'recipients' into 'actors.' Empowerment means undoing humiliation; and 'research' means moving - intellectually and psychologically - more often and more carefully between, on one side, the 'incoming helper's perception or ideology of what people need as aid,' and the 'support that local people *really* need' on the other side.[260]

For future research and also NGO activity a greater application of action research seems therefore to be useful. 'In spite of the fact that War-torn Societies Project methodology was directly derived from some of the basic ideas and experiences of PAR (Participatory Action Research), what makes WSP methodology different and unique is that it represents a quantum leap from a research methodology designed to be implemented at the micro level to

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[258] This section is adapted from a revised version of Lindner, 2000l.

[259] See http://www.unicc.org/unrisd/wsp/index.htm.

[260] See literature about Action research in the ejournal Action Research International, http://www.scu.edu.au/schools/gcm/ar/ari/arihome.html, and Atweh, Kemmis, & Weeks, 1998; Boyarsky & Murphy, 1998; Carson & Sumara, 1997; Greenwood & Levin, 1998; Gustavsen, 1998; Kalleberg, 1989; Marrow, 1964; McNiff, 1992; Neal, Watts, and Calhoun 1995; Reason, 1994; Reason & Rowan, 1985; Reason, 1988; Srivastva & Cooperrider, 1990; Stringer, 1999; Torbert, 1991; Whyte, 1991; Zuber-Skerritt, 1991.

implementation at the macro level, addressing broad issues by providing a neutral space and involving a variety of actors, internal and external, who play key roles at the macro level. Four years (1994-1998) of participatory action-research carried out by the War-torn Societies Project (WSP) in four carefully selected countries (Eritrea, Mozambique, Guatemala and Somalia) have produced innovative and practical projects, the operational experience and an overview of the project have been produced' (Farah, 1999 in *Assessing the viability of War-torn Society Project (WSP). Participatory action research in a stateless situation: in case of the WSP Somali programme*).

In *Organizational Science in a Postmodern Context* Gergen points out that action research (Reason & Rowan, 1985) and 'appreciative inquiry' (Srivastva & Cooperrider, 1990) have developed forms of research in which the researcher and the researched collapse their traditional roles to collaborate in what may be viewed as the realization of local knowledges' (Gergen, 2000a).[261]

This approach is illustrated by the Ethnic Conflicts Research Project ECOR[262] whose organisers take the position that 'Field studies in conflict areas are only possible on the base of mutual confidence through long-standing personal contacts with members of the respective political or ethno-nationalist movements. We understand our work as a form of participatory action research. A central activity is building up conjunctural teams of local researchers through training courses and learning by doing. Since collaborators usually are members of indigenous communities, our work contains elements of community development, but limited to funds made available. Traditional anthropological methods such as interviews and participating observation are honoured. Core principles of scientific research such as objectivity and impartiality are maintained. In the process the chimera of neutrality has been given up in favour of an approach which allows a degree of active participation. Solidarity with the plight of threatened peoples may produce dilemmas but does however not force us to cross the borderline and to adopt a partisan position.'

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[261] 'Appreciative inquiry' shifts the focus from who is right and wrong, fostering tolerance, or developing rules of proper conduct, to modes of collaborative action. This is used when organizations confront conflict - between management and workers, men and women, blacks and whites and so on (Gergen, 1995).
[262] See http://www.oneworld.org/euconflict/guides/orgs/eu_h-s/366.htm.

Discussion, Conclusion, and the Prevention of Genocide in the Global Village

In February 1999 I sat together with a young, admirably moderate Tutsi in Kigali, he is the lone survivor of a large family and I do not want to disclose his name. We try to analyse the situation of Rwanda and construct a skeleton of factors that contributed to the outbreak of genocide, a skeleton that would perhaps be useful as a guideline for prognosis in other cases.

I start by asking questions about humiliation, reconciliation, leaders and masses. I ask: Humiliation is a feeling that only individuals have, does it also translate into group actions and political decisions? If yes, how? Are only people at the grassroots, the so-called broad masses, affected by such feelings and the leaders not? If the leaders are affected, then how? If not, why do leaders instrumentalise the feelings of the masses? Would leaders fail to fan hatred, if feelings of humiliation were not present in the masses? Or can these feelings be created out of nothing, even if they are not there to begin with?

Based on our conversation I later work out the following reflections:

Diversity

In any society there is *diversity* (fault-lines between 'clans,' 'races,' 'ethnic' groups, 'religious' groups, 'class,' 'gender,' 'age'-groups, 'lifestyle'-groups, and so forth). Diversity may very well lead to co-operation and to sublimation of difference into constructive purposes: Fault-lines between sub-groups may lead to the enrichment of the whole group, - through the multitude of perspectives each sub-group provides and the creativity this may incite. The May 1999 conference in Belfast mentioned above was dedicated to 'celebrating diversity.' However, as history sadly demonstrates, diversity may also be exploited to lead to war and genocide. The significant question is: When is the second path chosen and by whom?

The Pie Diminishes

Clearly the second path was chosen in Somalia, Rwanda and Germany at times of economic crisis when resources became scarcer and the *pie diminished*. In Somalia this was caused by a lost war and dwindling aid money, as in Rwanda, where also coffee and tee prices fell, refugees came back, and the land/population ratio worsened; in Germany the 1929 world economic crisis brought unemployment. In other words, the first and universally present pre-

condition being diversity, the second pre-condition may be the dwindling of overall resources and/or rising competition for existing resources. However, as in the case of diversity, dwindling resources do not necessarily have to lead to genocide. On the contrary, they may very well bring people together in a common attempt to reverse this tendency. And, as is evident to everybody, the killing of diligent compatriots such as Isaaq, Tutsi and Jews is counterproductive to increasing a country's capacity to earn money. Even genocide masterminds typically see that, and no perpetrator puts much effort into the argument that the presently endured shortages are the ones to be countered by genocide.

Imagined Future Destitution and Humiliating Subjugation of One Group at the Hands of Another

In all three cases, Somalia, Rwanda and Germany, it was rather the fear of *imagined future destitution and humiliating subjugation of one group at the hands of another* that typically figures as justification for genocidal killings: In Germany it was the fear, projected into the future, of lack of 'Lebensraum' [land to live] for the 'Aryan race,' and of a future 'Weltherrschaft des Judentums' [the world dominated by Jews]; in Rwanda it was the fear that future democratic power-sharing with Tutsi would mean but Tutsi domination; and also Somalia's future was regarded as threatened, - by the Isaaq. The significant question is: Which additional conditions compound the suffering from dwindling resources so that people want to exterminate imagined future dominators? And: How is it possible that minorities (Isaaq, Tutsi, Jews), who are already quite subdued and marginalised, can still figure as so threatening that their extermination seems to be the only solution? Why is marginalisation not 'enough'?

'Inferiority Complex'

In Rwanda, Somalia and Germany, instead of working for the common good of all its citizens (Isaaq, Tutsi, Jews, and the rest) the leading elite defined itself not as the caretaker of impartial super-ordinate structures, but as representing the 'masses' who, they claimed, had to be 'protected' against another elite that purportedly was poised to oppress them in the future. Here it becomes even clearer that the problem lies neither in existing fault lines, nor in dwindling resources, but in the psychological workings of the masterminds of genocidal killings. They would evidently gain much more by including the minority they fear within the

workings of their country, but instead they ascribe astonishingly high abilities to this minority, namely the ability to dominate the rest, and surprisingly low abilities to themselves, namely their inability to integrate this minority peacefully, - in other words, they have an *'inferiority complex.'* Why do they not plainly welcome a minority that they clearly admire for their capacities? Why do they not ask this minority whose talents they so evidently acknowledge to advise them how to lead the country out of penury? A competitor can be a co-operation partner, and not necessarily an enemy.

Personal Humiliation

Evidently, the masterminds of genocide in Germany, Somalia and Rwanda ascribed not only talent to the targeted minority, but also the intention of inflicting unbearably humiliating subjugation upon the rest. Where does this suspicion come from? Is it pure fabrication by masterminds who want to stay in power? Do they believe in their own propaganda? Did Hitler, Barre and the Akazu authentically believe that killing their competitor was a 'rational' plan and would help them stay in power, even though they eventually all ended up ousted or dead? Obviously the mission was to humiliate the humiliator and not personally to stay in power or even alive, at least for Hitler. As quoted above, 'Hitler's last words during his last conversation on April 2, 1945' were: '"the world will be eternally grateful to National Socialism that I have extinguished the Jews in Germany and Central Europe."' (Jäckel, 1991, 64). Hitler seems to have gladly sacrificed his and his Aryan's lives for his 'mission' to exterminate the Jews. Jäckel writes about the end of World War II: 'Did Hitler begin to doubt the final victory? He would not admit it, but it now became obvious that the extermination of the Jews became increasingly the most important aim of the war as such; as the fortunes of war turned against Germany, the destruction of the Jews became National Socialism's gift to the world. That became totally clear towards the end of the war' (Jäckel, 1991, 63, 64). Also Barre is being described as 'not any more intelligent' but suicidal (see interview with his personal physician).

Suicide is clearly not a way to stay in power. Where does this overstretched and suicidal obsession with killing come from? Does it have its roots in earlier experience? May we conclude - also as a prognosis for similar cases - that those members of an elite who experienced *personal humiliation* at the hands of people they admire, may be expected to incite genocidal killings of precisely the people they look up to? May we expect a suicidal-genocidal tunnel vision that discards rational long-term strategy, in cases of humiliation in

general, and in cases of personally humiliated leaders in particular? May we hypothesise a relation between the leading perpetrators of a genocide and the victimised group, a relation in which humiliation figures prominently, and which reaches beyond general humiliating childrearing practices that somehow also affected the leaders' childhoods (as suggested, for example, by Alice Miller, and described by Perry)? As Edna Adan expresses it: 'they want to bring you down to their level'? Jäckel suggests that Hitler became Anti-Semite 'during his years in Vienna (1907-1913)' (Jäckel, 1991, 48), and Hitler describes this fervently in *Mein Kampf*. Barre felt humiliated by the Isaaq (see interview above). And what about Habyarimana's wife (see reflections on this question above)? Clearly, more evidence has to be collected to underpin this point.

A Specific Group Membership Is 'Diagnosed' As the Essential Core of Their Members' Identities

The poised masterminds of genocidal killings in all three cases were experts in social psychology and well-versed manipulators of media. Hitler's book *Mein Kampf* is a gruesome handbook for propagandists. It has been widely documented how masterminds set out to convince their followers to relinquish their inclination of treating the targeted victims as friends, neighbours, benign compatriots - in short, basically as individuals. The first step masterminds typically take is to aggravate fault lines and declare that a specific group membership ('Isaaq' versus the rest, 'Tutsi' versus 'Hutu,' 'Jews' versus 'Aryans') overrides other group memberships (such as class or gender) and individual variation. A *specific group membership* is 'diagnosed' as the *essential core* of their members' identities; a specific version of 'Social Identity Theory' is 'prescribed' as the only truth.

Moral Ranking

The next step for a mastermind of genocide is to rank the groups thus created and their supposed core identities into 'evil' and 'good,' declaring that the 'others' are but ill-intentioned 'extremists,' while 'we' are but well-willing 'moderates,' negating reality that teaches that usually moderates and extremists are to be found in all groups. Or, linking up to the earlier discussion of categories, the category of diversity, of pure neutral difference is linked with the category of *moral ranking*, moral 'up' and 'down.' (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). A confusion of categories is 'prescribed.' Those in the mastermind's group who indeed are

moderates and show understanding, compassion and empathy with both sides are branded as traitors; the masterminds, who in fact are extremists, baptise themselves as moderates, supposedly protecting the public's well-being against enemy extremists. Moderates on the victim side are the first to be killed (those Jews who would not want to believe what Germans did to them). The masterminds' aim is to incite so much hatred that later killings become possible.

Refrain of Humiliation

The strategies used by masterminds to instigate hatred are widely documented. They follow a *refrain of humiliation* well known to clinical psychologists and especially forensic psychiatrists, a refrain presented by any person who feels unbearably humiliated and rages at her humiliator as follows: 'You have humiliated me so deeply!, and what you did was so immoral!, and you do not belong here anyway - go back!, and surely your only intention is to humiliate me and my people again!, I want to counter-humiliate you!, and not only you, but all of you!, even more, I loathe you so much that I do not deem you worthy of even my hatred!, - you are but a weed to be trampled upon!' Or, in the case of genocide, 'they' are collectively declared as 'arrogant' and in need of being put down, 'they' are seen as morally unworthy (all Tutsi women are prostitutes, Jews eat babies), 'coming from far away and not belonging here,' and 'they' are defined as nothing but 'pollutants' (cockroaches, rats, weeds).

Markers of Difference

Masterminds try use bureaucracy to create or emphasise *markers of difference* (such as the Jewish star or Rwandan identity cards).

Impunity

Furthermore, a series of 'successful' micro-genocides in Rwanda and Burundi 'introduced' the average population to the 'idea' of genocide and taught people the lesson that genocide was a viable strategy; *impunity* made genocide increasingly seem 'normal.' Similarly Somali soldiers must have 'learned' that rape was a legitimate weapon, contrary to all traditional rules. The 'Reichskristallnacht' was one of Hitler's Germany's attempts to 'accustom' Germans to abusing Jews.

Loyal Helpers

What is the role of bystanders and followers of the masterminds of genocide? *Authoritarian hierarchical structures* seem to be at most a facilitating factor for genocide. Admittedly, people in Rwanda and Germany (Adorno's 'authoritarian personalities'[263]) were used to following orders; however, since Somalis pride themselves of not following orders they should not have perpetrated genocidal killings. Therefore obedience does not seem to be a significant ingredient for genocide. In Rwanda a culture of obedience may have facilitated genocide though; nowhere did the 'average person,' the neighbour, kill as much as they did in Rwanda, making it surely the least costly genocide ever perpetrated; the 'special forces' did not have, to speak in gruesome Rwandan language, the 'job' alone. On the other side, most average authoritarian Germans did not kill themselves, the killing 'had to be delegated' to SS-'experts;' the overall population was not involved in the practical procedures of the killing (also in Somalia the quasi-genocide was largely a military action). Again, this shows that obedience does not seem to play a central role, since Hitler's Germany should then parallel Rwanda more than it did.

As is well documented, a genocide is typically carried out by 'loyal' groups, loyal not only out of obedience, but for many other reasons. Masterminds use a combination of top secrecy and public propaganda to build key groups of '*loyal helpers,*' containing those who are loyal because they a) share the masterminds' feelings and are authentically convinced of the cause, b) those who obey whatever orders they get, c) those who are being bribed, and d) those who are terrorised and blackmailed into loyalty.

Table 40: Conditions for genocide, and Table 41: How masterminds perpetrate genocide, as well as Table 42: Some lessons for the future, try to summarise the key points developed above:

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[263] Adorno et al., 1950. See also Altemeyer, 1981; Altemeyer, 1988; Hawkins, 1997; Ilie, 1980; Peterson, Doty, & Winter, 1993; Whitley, 1999; Zurbriggen, 1998.

Conditions for genocidal killings		
Fault lines delineate differences and create diversity	➔	Fault lines are universally present without causing genocide; they may enrich.
The pie of resources diminishes	➔	Frequently pies diminish without causing genocide; co-operation may help.
One group fears and imagines future destitution at the hands of another group	➔	Fear is very common without causing genocide; the building of impartial super-ordinate structures may soothe this fear.
Those in power have a story of personal humiliation with an minority they admire, or even once loved, and they respond to as follows: 'You have humiliated me so deeply!, and what you did was so immoral!, and you do not belong here anyway - go back!, and surely your only intention is to humiliate me and my people again!, I want to counter-humiliate you!, and not only you, but all of you!, even more, I loathe you so much that I do not deem you worthy of even my hatred! - you are but weeds to be trampled upon!	➔	Specific to genocide.

Table 40: Conditions for genocide

How masterminds perpetrate genocide
Masterminds use media to aggravate fault lines and declare that a specific group membership ('Isaaq,' 'Tutsi,' 'Jew' versus 'South,' 'Hutu' and 'Aryan') overrides other group memberships (such as class and gender), as well as individual variation. ↓
Masterminds use media to rank the so created groups and their supposed core identities into 'they = evil extremists' and 'we = good moderates;' impartiality and empathy for 'we' and 'them' is being defined as treason. Moderates from both sides are the first 'enemies' of the masterminds and the first to be killed in the genocide. ↓
Masterminds use media to declare 'them' collectively as 'arrogant' (and in need to be put down), to define 'them' as morally unworthy (all Tutsi women are prostitutes, Jews eat babies), and as 'coming from far away and not belonging here,' and 'they' are furthermore stigmatised as 'pollution' (cockroaches, rats, weeds). ↓
Masterminds use bureaucracy to create or emphasise markers of difference (Jewish star, identity cards). ↓
Masterminds unleash unpunished micro-genocides to lower the populations' threshold of acceptance. ↓
Masterminds use a combination of top secrecy and public propaganda to build key groups of 'loyal helpers,' containing those who are loyal because they a) share the masterminds' feelings and are authentically convinced of the cause, b) those who obey whatever orders they get, c) those who are being bribed, and d) those who are terrorised and blackmailed into loyalty.

Table 41: How masterminds perpetrate genocide

Table 41 may be used to draw lessons for the future, see Table 42:

Some lessons for the future
Be watchful when resources diminish for an elite who is in a position to instigate a genocide. The international community has to step in and 'treat,' where they are present, feelings of humiliation among elites (and also whole populations) in order to defuse these feelings' potential for genocide.
Moderates of all camps have to guard against extremists. Moral courage and civil disobedience of bystanders (see Staub, 1989) have to be strengthened - the camp of moderates to be increased so-to-speak - since genocide can be prevented if moderates outdo extremists. The currently unfolding global interdependent knowledge society may be a primary force to increase the number of moderates since interdependence (ranging from rising business connections to increasing empathy for others) creates an ever-stronger global village in-group that marginalizes the Security Dilemma, and knowledge is an expandable pie.
Arrogance is unwise, especially for minorities; the future might bring retaliation (see today's rich West in its relation to the poor South).
Every individual is to be given the opportunity to develop a multitude of identities and carry any identity marker s/he wishes, and not be forced to carry a specific label (such as in identity cards or on clothes).

Table 42: Some lessons for the future

If it is correct that personal feelings of humiliation, particularly among an elite, figure at the centre of suicidal-genocidal atrocities, a conclusion that follows is that humiliation is to be avoided if atrocities are to be prevented. Humiliation as an act is something that the world community is indeed in a position to try and avoid. Since arrogance is its primary tool modest humility is the main form of prevention. However, not all incidents of humiliation can be avoided, feelings of humiliation may be evoked by misunderstanding or by attempt to help. Table 43 tries to discern the balance between violence, genocide and its counter-forces:

Violence, genocide and its counter-forces		
(1) Extremists who want violence and genocide. Humiliation is 'healed' by killing.	← → ↓	(2) Moderates who want co-operation. Humiliation is healed by reconciliation.
	(3) The current unfolding of an interdependent global knowledge society may be a primary force to tip the balance towards moderation, because knowledge is an expandable pie, and interdependence (ranging from rising business connections to increasing empathy for others) creates an ever-stronger global village in-group.	

Table 43: Violence, genocide and its counter-forces

At this point we may link up back to Table 11 in order to place environment, culture, and the individual actor (including masterminds of genocides and their followers, as well as moderates and extremists), in the global village, see Table 44:

The environment, culture and the individual actor in the global village		
Variable 1	Environment	Any sub-group of the global society (be it called states, nations or 'ethnic' groups) has the potential to increase the overall pie and also their piece of it by contributing to impartial super-ordinate structures and hooking up to the global knowledge society.
Variable 2	Culture (group level)	The old culture of distributing the available pie by war (Security Dilemma being heightened) with male pride and honour attached to it, meets a new gender-neutral human rights culture of increasing the pie by co-operation within the in-group of the global village on the background of a withering Security Dilemma.
Variable 3	The individual actor	Some individual actors are 'moderates,' some are 'extremists,' some try to preserve the old culture (and masterminds of genocides try to 'freeze' the old way), some try to change towards the new, human rights oriented global community; everybody confronts the psychological law that people find losses more negative than gains positive, and that traditional privileges are regarded as 'just' by elites.

Table 44: The environment, culture and the individual actor in the global village

It is obvious that a humiliated elite has to find other ways to deal with their feelings than genocide. My Kigali friend reflects: 'For somebody who felt humiliated reconciliation has something to do with truth, with regret, apology, and perhaps reconciliation has to be defined as acceptance of tolerance, not more.' However, he continues, when genocide has happened, it is too late: 'For somebody who fanned feelings of humiliation in the masses for his or her power-goals, reconciliation is something completely different.'

But the international community also has to improve its performance. Walid Musa addresses the relationship between donor countries and recipients: 'Humiliation is institutionalised in the relation between the international organisations and the recipient countries. The principles of empowerment are there, but they are not sufficiently followed yet. What is needed today is the exercise of empowerment: co-operation, not assistance! Joint management of projects, with local partners; slow phasing out the international organisations... Of course humiliation should not now be moved from the recipient to the donor, there must be a balance! The bottom line is always: Avoidance of corruption, transparency, good governance, and accountability!'

The international community has also to learn how to approach old-fashioned dictators and teach them about the transition from an old world of honour, an honour that is 'paraded' by proud masters who 'courageously' confront the Security Dilemma and are convinced that to humiliate underlings is their legitimate right ('don't interfere in our sovereign state!'), to a new world of human rights, in which every human being is ascribed an inner core of dignity that ought not be violated. On the 6th October 2000 the world feared that the Serbian ruler Slobodan Milosevic would interpret his imminent downfall as major personal humiliation and violation of national honour, and unleash bloodshed. New Yugoslav President Vorislav Kostunica expressed fear that Milosevic would view power as 'absolute' and not 'relative.' Instead, Milosevic was 'taught,' perhaps by the visiting Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov, on 6th October 2000, to interpret defeat in an election as event that could be accepted with dignity, and would enable the loser to continue as opposition leader: old-fashioned honour had – we do not know whether authentically, or just as pretence – been transformed into modern dignity.

The Environment, Culture, This Book, and Humiliation

Table 45, the last one adapted from Table 11 in this book, may serve as the final word. It inscribes this book and its intentions into the framework that has been developed so far.

The environment, culture, this book, and humiliation		
Vari able 1	Environ- ment	1. Hunter-gatherers live with the illusion that their resources represent an expandable pie. 2. Hierarchical agricultural societies live in a fixed pie environment; masters try to increase their piece by force. 3. Underlings in hierarchical societies live with what the masters leave them from the fixed pie. 4. Citizens of a global knowledge society live in an environment of an expandable pie.
Vari able 2	Culture (group level)	1. Hunter-gatherers live in an egalitarian culture that combines humility and pride. 2. Masters in hierarchical societies live in a culture of 'arrogance,' they may treat due humility as undue humiliation and believe that humiliating underlings is a matter of honour and their legitimate duty. 3. Underlings in hierarchical societies live in a culture of humbleness combined with more or less silent resentment at being routinely humiliated by their masters. 4. Citizens of a global knowledge society live in an egalitarian culture, where humiliation means to violate a person's human rights and inner core of dignity, and nobody regards humiliation as legitimate.
Vari able 3	The individual actor	This manuscript is inscribed in culture 4 insofar as it attempts to increase understanding and empathy for the views of people within different cultures and tries to make transparent that the transition from culture 2 and 3 to culture 4 is fraud with pitfalls that have to be mastered without demonising any party. Especially underlings that rise to be masters are at risk of 'counter-humiliating' bygone masters-who-turned-into-minorities, instead of subscribing to culture 4.

Table 45: The environment, culture, this book, and humiliation

If we differentiate variable 1, the environment, into four historic stages (that also co-exist today), then we have to place this book in the fourth stage. If we look at variable 2, culture, than we see that four related cultural 'universes' have developed in the course of human history, cultural codes that co-exist in today's world in more or less constructive and peaceful ways. This manuscript is clearly inscribed into the last cultural 'code book,' as are all human rights endeavours that share this book's goals. This book is inscribed in culture 4 insofar as it attempts to increase understanding and empathy for the views of people from different cultures and tries to make transparent that the transition from culture 2 and 3 to culture 4 is fraud with pitfalls that have to be mastered without demonising any party. Hopefully this book indeed contributes to the goal it tries to advocate.

Is the Human Being 'Evil'?

Behind this endeavour stands a deep and frequently asked question: 'Is the human being aggressive, or 'evil' by 'nature'?' I believe not (except in some cases of damage, for example chromosome aberration,[264] or certain brain damage at birth, or damage caused by profoundly humiliating instead of nurturing child rearing practices that lead to 'affective blindness').

Ury argues that human beings are inclined to avoid violence. He points out that the archaeological record of organised violence and warfare is almost completely restricted to the last ten thousand years – and this period represents just a tiny proportion of all human existence, namely one percent of the two and a half million years during which human societies have been evolving on earth.

I believe that the Security Dilemma is a cruel dilemma, a dilemma that has the potential to make human beings appear much more 'evil' than they otherwise would be. As Beverly Crawford formulated it: Even 'nice' leaders start wars under the conditions of the Security Dilemma. Around ten thousand years ago the Security Dilemma was severely intensified, because it was combined with the, at that time, 'innovative idea' of agriculture that gave rise to the creation of empires. This had the devastating result that the Security Dilemma did not only pit heads of relatively small families against each other, but huge societal entities with massive capacities – with massive capacities to develop gruesome weapons, as well as to create ghastly honour codes that embedded and idolised the Security Dilemma within culture, and, in cases where humiliating child-rearing practices were

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[264] For example YYX.

employed, formed people without empathy. I believe that Hobbes is correct in arguing that only a 'social contract' for the creation and maintenance of super-ordinate structures can provide a framework within which such 'evil' is, so-to-speak, 'superfluous.'

I furthermore believe that the current process of globalisation, at least those aspects that increase interdependence and the awareness of being in 'one boat,' will in the long run have beneficial effects, even though the word globalisation at present is a sad synonym for the obscene increase of the gap between the rich and the poor.

I am acutely aware of critics such as Benjamin R. Barber, 1996, who, in his book *Jihad Versus McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World* draws up an extremely bleak vision for our age – either tribalism or globalism – as threatening to both thin and thick versions of democracy. Barber 'discerns in the forces of tribalism the "jihad" principle, where "culture is pitted against culture, people against people"; while the pressures of homogenising globalization, that "onrush of economic and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity, that mesmerise the world with fast music, fast computers and fast food" delivers only "McWorld". On his reckoning, neither of these forces respect democracy nor have they any moral currency with which to sustain it' (Axford & Huggins, 2000).[265]

However, I believe, that 'we have no choice, the United Nations are all we have,' and 'we better try our best to make it work.'[266] And I believe also that there are already beneficial effects to be felt, insofar as globalisation begins to remove the Security Dilemma from the globe. This happens because never in human history has humankind witnessed one single 'village' encompass the whole planet, never before has one single 'in-group' of 'we, humanity,' those who live on 'our'(!) planet earth populated the globe. Technologies enhancing communication and mobility have set off an entire cascade of changes, bringing people together and promoting what Ury calls the 'ingathering of humanity into one interactive and interdependent global community' (Ury, 1999, 98). Super-ordinate structures at a global level, even though still very weak at the institutional level, such as the United Nations who frequently find itself in the roles of either humiliator or humiliated, have begun to grow culturally, through global communication networks and mobility that leaves no spot on the globe unvisited. An interdependent global village does not leave any space for another

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[265] Axford and Huggins recommend 'for an elegant and sceptical treatment of the prospects for cosmopolitan society' the book by Danilo Zolo, 1997, Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government. See also Ulrich Beck's work on World Risk Society (Beck, 2000a), or 'The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity' (Beck, 2000b).

[266] See my article 'Money and Humiliation: Why the Corporate Sector Should Support Global Social Policy' (Lindner, 2000n), or my research application for a project called 'Transnational Corporations and the Global Poor: From Humiliation to Dialogue.'

village, no space for an unknown '*outside*' from where enemies may overrun the rest. Certainly, this does not signify an end to all violence, however, the violence still to be expected stems from people *within* the global village.

I believe that the advent of the notion of human rights is another effect of this 'ingathering' of human kind, - and human rights have introduced a new definition of humiliation, namely humiliation as the violation of the inner core of dignity of a human being, a dignity that is enshrined in the human rights code. This new version of humiliation adds to the old versions that were used as tools to negotiate the Security Dilemma between masters and as means for masters to keep underlings down.

Not only do human rights as a codified legal body increasingly permeate modern society, but there is also a culture and psychology of human rights unfolding at present. What earlier was the legitimate 'breaking of the will of the child' (Alice Miller), has transformed into illegitimate 'child abuse,' or 'bullying' at school. Formerly legitimate routine humiliation of underlings is today called 'mobbing' at the work place. Lakoff's Nurturant Parent model is advocated in family therapy as well as in management courses (in the 'Strict Father model moral strength is given top priority as the key to acting morally, whereas in the Nurturant Parent model moral strength is also important, but it does not override empathy and responsibilities for nurturance,' Lakoff, 1996, 312). And human beings are, as Ury indicates, increasingly expected to be autonomous individuals who do, indeed, only benefit from a Nurturant Parent model: 'Evidence from three areas of psychological research - attachment theory, socialization theory, and family violence studies - shows that the Strict Father model does not, in fact, produce the kind of child that it is supposed to foster. It is supposed to develop children who have a conscience and who are morally strong, capable of resisting temptations, independent, able to make their own autonomous decisions, and respectful of others. But such research, especially socialization research, shows the Strict Father family tends to produce children who are dependent on the authority of others, cannot chart their own moral course very well, have less of a conscience, are less respectful of others, and have no greater ability to resist temptations' (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 327).[267]

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[267] Lakoff links a political analysis to the discussion of moral uprightness and proposes that Western political liberalism and conservatism are ultimately based on different models of the family. Mainstream conservatism, he claims, is grounded on a 'strict father' model, whereas mainstream liberalism is based on a 'nurturant parent' model. 'Since each family model includes its own morality, political liberalism and conservatism express different views of morality. Each family model organizes the culturally shared metaphors for morality in different ways, giving priority to certain metaphors and downplaying others. Moreover, each particular metaphor for morality (e.g., Moral Strength or Moral

As the Security Dilemma disappears, the old versions of humiliation slowly wither away, and humankind is left with human-rights humiliation as core cause of cycles of violence. Human rights prescribe equal respect for every human being, qua birth as a human being, and, accordingly, any violation of this principle is felt as deep humiliation. In such a context, people can be expected to be 'good' as long as their needs to be recognised, included and respected are fulfilled, however, they may be expected to act in 'evil' ways, as soon as they feel humiliated and their dignity violated.

Therefore the citizens of the global village have to study the dynamics of humiliation more thoroughly than ever before. This book makes, hopefully, a contribution, not only to diagnosis, but also to the other elements of the overarching paradigm of this manuscript. Therapy for example entails detecting synergies that could be pursued, and 'errors' that should be avoided. Could humankind, for example, benefit from forming synergies between, let us say, Chinese Confucianism on one side - with its attention to the collective - and fierce Somali independence on the other side, – and develop a description of the 'ideal' citizen of the global knowledge society from there?[268] Or, regarding conceptual errors that humankind frequently commits, what does humankind learn from Lakoff pointing out that, for example, the Strict Father model of child rearing does not yield autonomous adults?

The now bygone debate between 'capitalism' and 'communism' could, for example, be viewed as a therapeutic discourse that entailed conceptual errors and therefore failed, - and it was incidentally a case where the errors could only be uncovered by psychology. The 'therapeutic' conversation between 'capitalism' and 'communism' may be described as follows: Communism had 'pity' with the unhappy 'slaves of capitalism' - the workers; it set out to 'heal' this state of malady and 'free' the poor creatures from their unhappiness. However, in practice, communism unfolded to be an attempt to turn 'unhappy slaves' into 'happy slaves,' instead of 'free people.' The experiment did not succeed, and the fundamental conceptual error of the practice of communism as 'therapy' was, apparently, the faulty assumption that human beings have the capacity to be 'happy slaves' of beneficial masters (some may be happy slaves, and it may work in the short term, but – apparently- not in the long term).

The contribution of psychology lies at the core of this therapeutic discourse. Why is it impossible to create 'happy slaves'? The answer may read: Psychology shows that human

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Nurturance) gets a more unique interpretation depending on which family model it is identified with (Lakoff, 1996, 312).

[268] The highly reputed scholar in social psychology in Germany, Alexander Thomas (see, for example, Thomas, 1993) has widely studied synergy effects between the West and China.

beings - as creatures who can be motivated and be creative - are halted, or even destroyed by disrespect and humiliation, and that beneficial aspects of teamwork only come to the fore if each individual is respected in his or her own right; it is not so important how many people participate in a task, it is very important how motivated they are. The human capacity to feel humiliated and react with disruptive resentment gives therefore rise to present buzz words such as 'empowerment,' because it has been understood that any imposition of solutions, even the most well-intentioned solutions, may have humiliating effects.

The Pie, the Security Dilemma, the Time Horizon, and Humiliation as the Most Significant Creator of Rifts within Social Relationships

To summarise the theoretical evaluations that have permeated this book, we may hypothesise, (see Table 46), that a small number of 'logics' are at the core of the human condition: the question of whether and to what extent resources are expandable (Game Theory located in philosophy), whether the 'Security Dilemma' is weaker or stronger (International Relations Theory, located in political science), to what extent long-term or short-term horizons dominate (as described in many academic disciplines, among others cross-cultural psychology), and how the human capacity to either deepen or loosen identifications and demarcation lines is calibrated (Social Identity Theory, located in social psychology).

Social identity entails the problem of humiliation that, in its manifestations as both act and feeling, represents, perhaps, the most significant creator of rifts within social relationships at all levels. This is the case even in situations where the other 'logics' would indicate co-operation. The interplay between these basic 'logics' may have guided the way humankind has developed 'cultures' of pride, honour, and dignity, and the particular manner in which each of them responds to humiliation.

The Human Condition						
		The Time Horizon		Social Identity		
		short	long	respect	humiliation	
The Pie	fixed	1	5	9	13	
	expandable	2	6	10	14	
The Security Dilemma	strong	3	7	11	15	
	weak	4	8	12	16	

Table 46: The Human Condition: The Pie, the Security Dilemma, the Time Horizon, and Humiliation

The argument I have made in this thesis suggests that the most benign scenario is a combination of weak Security Dilemma, expandable pie, long time horizon, and an atmosphere of respect. Conversely, the worst scenario brings together a short time horizon, positioned in an environment that represents a fixed pie of resources, combined with a strong Security Dilemma, within which individuals or groups are exposed to humiliating assaults. As already mentioned, feelings of humiliation and their consequences may be so strong that they override and undermine otherwise 'benign' scenarios, in a downward spiral.

We may hypothesise that the destructive nature of the dynamics of humiliation become the more visible the more the various parameters veer to the benign side. The more expandable the pie becomes (knowledge society), the more the Security Dilemma withers away (interconnectedness in a single global village with emergent democratic super-ordinate structures[269]), and the longer the time horizon stretches (the advent of the term 'sustainability' giving witness to the 'lesson' humankind is currently being taught by its biosphere, namely that new technologies may have destructive long-term effects – ozone layer depletion being one example), the more we may expect the malign effects of humiliation to be brought to the forefront of public consciousness. This is because the extreme potential of humiliation for creating rifts between people is thrown into starker contrast as the other 'logics' cease to have malign effects. Furthermore, although humiliation has always had destructive effects, these effects are, as explained earlier, intensified in a human rights context. Today it becomes more palpable than ever how damaging the consequences of humiliation can be, and to what extent

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[269] As indicated above, I am very aware of critiques who fear that there will be no democratic super-ordinate structures at the global level; I suggest, however, not to forget that even the fact that many people are appalled by 'double standards' may be interpreted as an indicator of the success of human rights, however slow. Clearly, people are deeply affected by the human rights ideology. And even those people who start their engagement for human rights by paying no more than lip-service, may have to learn what Lee Ross said (1999): 'You are, what you pretend to be.'

they are capable of undermining the movement of the other parameters towards the benign pole. This may answer the question, asked earlier, about why the notion of humiliation has not been studied more in the past. The reason may be that the notion of humiliation becomes a relevant field for research only as the effects of humiliation become more visible. The rise of attention that is currently being given to human rights[270] and to concepts such as forgiveness and reconciliation may represent other signs of this transition.

In the task of understanding this transition, psychology is at the forefront, conceptually and practically. It calls for careful research, and for the contribution from all those people who have special skills in communication, empathy, and understanding. The researcher, herself having been forced into an extreme form of global identity – among other causes through her background in a refugee family that cannot 'go home' – is, perhaps, able to sense this transition with particular poignancy.

Concluding Reflections on Method and Future Research

Clearly, this manuscript has to become part of a larger body of work that aims at building a 'theory of humiliation' that connects social psychology even more with sociology, social anthropology, history and political science, and, not least, epistemology. In a paper that is in process, 'Globalisation and humiliation: towards a new paradigm' (Lindner, 2000f) I try to link epistemology with the changes that are brought about by globalisation.

As discussed above, 'A humiliated person, a person who feels patronised and exploited, will not provide any valid "data" and thus undermine any scientific evaluation. Science will not be possible, unless a person opens up and tries to be a fully active co-author of "data."' This can only be achieved by non-humiliating methods.

The critical factor is 'consent.' A person will clearly not give her consent to being tortured for the sake of science, as Dr. Mengele and his colleagues practised it. However, a cancer patient, awaiting death, may give her consent to rather painful examinations, and she may do this for the sake of the development of future medical interventions that would save other people from having to endure the same plight.

One might expect that some genocide survivors might follow the example of the cancer patient and agree to talk about their painful memories, in order to help social science find ways to prevent genocide in the future. And, indeed, I found such people. However, in

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[270] Increasing awareness not only of political and civil human rights, but also other aspects such as economic human rights.

the case of the cancer patient, it is enough – to be severely pragmatic – if consent is given at the outset of examinations and tests. The patient may lose consciousness and still the tests may be carried out. Her state of mind will not significantly disturb the necessary data collection. The situation is fundamentally different in the case of people who are asked to talk about their deepest feelings of traumatising humiliation. It is paramount that they 'co-operate' during the entire encounter with the researcher. And this 'co-operation' must be 'earned' by the researcher, continuously. An atmosphere of trust has to reign, and trust cannot be maintained through trickery. The researcher must expose herself as authentic human being and dare to enter into a close relationship with the interlocutor. If not, there will be no validity.

Does this mean that there is no science? Are we confronted with the dilemma of trust and validity without reliability and objectivity, and thus no science, – or reliability and objectivity without trust and validity, and thus no science in this case either? Or can science be reconciled with such 'unscientific' terms as 'trust' and 'authenticity'?

Steinar Kvale reports that the qualitative research interview is often accused of lacking objectivity, 'due in particular to the human interaction inherent in the interview situation' (Kvale, 1996, 64). Kvale, however, reminds us that the term objectivity is far from clear, about a dozen meanings of objectivity may be found (see, for example, Polkinghorne, in Kvale, 1989). Objectivity is often discussed as one side of a polarity: 'objective/ subjective; unbiased/biased; public/private; intersubjective/personal; reflects the nature of the object/personal impressions only; reality as it exists independent of the observer/reality as dependent on the observer; value free/value laden; impartial/partial; facts/values; physical/meaning; behavior/consciousness; quantitative/qualitative; stable/changing; and universal/local' (64).[271]

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[271] I asked a mathematician, Joke Blom, who currently works at the intersection of biology and mathematics, namely on mathematical modelling of living cells, how she evaluates the power of mathematics for describing life, in her case 'just' a cell and not the human psyche. She writes in a personal message on the 30th October 2000: 'I think that mathematical modelling is the art of simplification. Living cells are extremely complicated structures and even a comprehensive mathematical model can only describe the processes partially. And even IF you would know every detail (data, physical and chemical laws) and incorporate all this knowledge into a mathematical model what would be the benefit? Such a model exists already, it is called reality. Ideally, a (mathematical) model should be the smallest and simplest possible (Occam's razor!) and still (re)produce the processes you are interested in. Then you get real insight in what is important in those processes and what not (but what of course could be of extreme importance under different conditions or for a different task). So I think a virtual cell will consist of a number of different [functional units / mathematical models] valid under different conditions and describing a specific process in the cell. But how the grand ensemble works: who knows. It is probably not even deterministic. And precise

Kvale takes the position that 'the interview as such is neither an objective nor a subjective method – its essence is intersubjective interaction' (66). Clearly, as Kvale explains, the dichotomy of objectivism and subjectivism in Western thought discussed earlier in this manuscript is at the core. Kvale reminds us: 'A realist version of objectivism implies that an objective reality exists independently of the observer and that only one correct view can be taken of it. The counterposition of relativism involves a view that all concepts of knowledge, truth, reality, and goodness are relative to a specific theoretical framework, a form of life or culture' (66).

Kvale draws on Bernstein's advocacy in favour of reaching beyond objectivism and relativism (Bernstein, 1983) and argues for a dialogic conception of truth, where participants in discourse seek true knowledge through rational argumentation. And the medium of discourse is language, which is neither objective, universal, subjective or individual, but inter-subjective.

Bernstein's position clearly relates to the 'reflective equilibrium,' providing its justification, and reinforcement for the method of the hermeneutic circle that has formed the inner rhythm of this book.

In conclusion, my own methodological position as developed during the work on humiliation is centred upon a dedication to the employment of non-humiliating methods for achieving a greater understanding of humiliation as a process and an experience. Humility seems to be the central requirement, especially humility towards the experience of people who survive under circumstances to which many Western researchers are novices. Furthermore, authenticity in a dialogue between equals seems to be elemental. Humility and authenticity, then, were the criteria that guided my approach. I believe I have shown that research conducted according to these criteria can make an important contribution to the discipline of psychology and advance our understanding of humiliation as a process and an experience. The notion of humiliation, as described in this book, presents itself as an important field for future research in several scholarly disciplines. It not only connects academic fields in an interdisciplinary manner, but also permeates macro, meso, and micro levels of society – and this is, to my view, the richness of the concept of humiliation.

My talk in Bujumbura in February 1999 was a major test of validity. I spoke in front of people from both of the camps that are entangled in a bitter and bloody history of protracted conflict, a conflict that entails so much fear, hate, and suffering that many live their

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measurements in biology labs are very far future. At the moment you can "look" at dead cells or follow vaguely some enzymes by sticking an unnatural and relatively large "light" on them.'

lives in 'speechless terror'[272] – it is furthermore a conflict that is far from over – and since my topic was humiliation I had no choice but to touch upon the most crucial, controversial, painful and hate-inspiring issues this audience of politicians, academicians and practitioners from the Great Lakes could be presented with.

I am proud of the fact that my presentation was more than validated, in the terms just described. I was warmly thanked from all sides. People who had seen parts of the talk on television stopped me in the street, even when I was leaving, at the airport, and they asked me to explain more about the workings of humiliation.

The Bujumbura talk and the response it received gives me confidence that I had been able to provide my 'difficult' and 'dangerous' audience with an account of their psychological reality that empathised with their situation while being at the same time detached, objective and reflexive. I recount this final anecdote not from any lack of humility but as a small but significant indication of the power and usefulness of the methodology I was able to develop in Africa.

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[272] See van der Kolk & Kadish, in van der Kolk, 1987, 6).

Appendix

Interview Guidelines

Oslo, 25.8.1998

Summary of questions (see Dagfinn Føllesdal's formulation of questions 1997):
What is experienced as humiliation? What happens when people feel humiliated? When is humiliation established as a feeling? What does humiliation lead to? Which experiences of justice, honour, dignity, respect and self-respect are connected with the feeling of being humiliated? How is humiliation perceived and responded to in different cultures? What role does humiliation play for aggression? What can be done to overcome violent effects of humiliation?

Start of the interview:
The interviewer writes down:
date of the interview,
time of the day,
place where the interview takes place,
weather conditions,
with whom he/she was talking in order to get in contact with the interviewee.

The interviewer asks the interviewee for consent, and lets the interviewee sign, if he or she wishes that. Oral consent is sufficient as well (we would want to avoid being mistaken for a government official or tax collector).

The interviewer collects biographical data from the interviewee, but only as far as the interviewee agrees to give them. Like: "Tell me a bit about your family, how many brothers and sisters do you have, …" (gender, ethnic background, religion, highest level of education, family background, marital status, occupation, economic status, whether or not s/he owns own land or is an agricultural or urban worker, political preference)

The interviewer asks the following questions:

Definition of humiliation:

"If you should define and describe the term humiliation, what would you say?"

Prototypes of humiliation:

"What is the worst instance of humiliation you can think of?"

"What is the most common instance of humiliation you can think of?"

"What is the prototypic, archetypal instance?"

Personal experiences with humiliation:

"Did you yourself live through situations where humiliation played an important role?"

"How exactly did it happen?"

"What did you do, what did the others do?"

"What did you feel, what did the others feel?"

"Do you think that your reactions are universal, i.e. that all people in the world would react like that?"

"Or do you think that people of other cultures would react differently?"

Humiliation in history and society:

"Do you know about events in your near environment where you think that humiliation was important?"

"How exactly did it happen?"

"What did the people who were involved do?"

"What did the people who were involved feel?"

"What made the situation humiliating?"

"When you think of the examples you told me, how do you explain what the people in situations of humiliation did?"

"What would you have done?"

Cantril's "Self-Anchoring Scale" (1965) concerning respect (Cantril's original version adapted to "respect"):

Here is a picture of a ladder:

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Suppose we say that the top of the ladder (POINTING) represents the highest amount of respect for you and the bottom (POINTING) represents the worst possible humiliation for you. Where on the ladder (MOVING FINGER RAPIDLY UP AND DOWN LADDER) do you feel you personally stand at the present time? Step number. Where on the ladder would you say you stood five years ago? Step number. And where do you think you will be on the ladder five years from now? Step number. Where would you put (name of group) on the ladder (MOVING FINGER RAPIDLY UP AND DOWN LADDER) *at the present time?* Step number. Where did (name of group) stand *five years ago?* Step number. Just as your best guess, where do you think (name of group) will be on the ladder *five years from now?* Step number.

Universality of the humiliation, and its culture-relative triggers:
(see hypotheses in the project description)
"Do you think that peoples' reactions to humiliation are universal, i.e. that all people would react in the same way?"
"Was it right, or proper, inevitable for those people you described to behave like that?"
"Which choice did they have?"
"Could it be that all people know about humiliation, but that they react differently to different triggers?"
"Could it be that all people feel humiliation, but that the reasons for feeling humiliated vary? What are the 'triggers' which can make Americans feel humiliated, Europeans, other

Africans, your fellow countrymen, the members of your group, your family, you? Please give examples if possible."

Retaliation for humiliation:

"At what point is a humiliation so big, that you think it is right to risk ones life in the course of retaliation?"

"What would you die for?" "Is any insult worth dying for?"

"At what point is a humiliation so big, that you think you would sacrifice your life in the course of retaliation?"

"If you think of a prototypical situation of humiliation, what could heal this situation?"

Humiliation and respect:

"What would make a man/woman lose respect for himself/herself?"

"What would make you lose respect for yourself?"

Humiliation, justice and fairness:

"Has life been fair to you?"

"Is life fair to anybody?"

"Is it ever just or fair to humiliate somebody else or some other group?"

Humiliation and power structures:

"Is it all right for people with power to hurt other people?"

"When is it all right?"

"When is it not all right?"

"What about husbands and wives?"

"What about chiefs and fellow tribe members?"

Other views on the subject humiliation:

"What other thoughts do you have when you think of the notion of humiliation?"

Humiliation as cause of violent and armed conflict:

"Do you think that humiliation can escalate conflict to violent conflict?"

"Which other factors except humiliation do you think play a role in escalating conflicts to armed conflict?"

Genocide (Rwanda) or civil war (Somalia) in general:

Genocide/war, who talks about it and who participated:

"Is it okay to talk about the genocide/war?"

"Who does talk openly to whom about that?"

"Will perpetrators talk with each other, will bystanders talk, will rescuers talk?"

"Do you know about people who did not participate in the genocide/war?"

"Why did they not participate?"

"Do you know people who actively rescued people from the 'other side' who were in danger?"

"What did they do, much or little?"

"Why did they do that?" (perpetrators, victims, rescuers, and bystanders: e.g. international community was bystander, people could have done something if only written letters to their governments).

Helpers and perpetrators:

"What would you do, if somebody from your adversary group stood in front of your door and asked you for help?"

Level of analysis:

"Who is important in such situations, the individual, the group, or the leaders?"

"How much influence do particular individuals have?"

"How much influence did you have, your family, your village, your tribal leaders?"

Gender relevance:

"Do you feel that your mother, your aunts, your sisters and female cousins think and act different from your father, your uncles, brothers, male cousins?"

"Do women and men think and act differently concerning topics of violence?"

Aggression, violence, and control:

"What makes you angry?"

"What could get you to become violent?"

"How do you express your anger?"

"Do you think anger should be controlled?"

"By whom (by yourself or others)?"

"Why?"

"Is it wrong if anger is uncontrolled?"

Enemies and friends:

"Who is your friend, who is your brother, and who would you call your enemy?"

"What is an enemy for you?"

"Who is it your job to look after?"

"Whose job is it to look after you?"

How does your map of the world look like?

"Which groups of people (e.g. clan, sub-clans) are friends and which are enemies of your group of people?"

"Which other countries are friends and which are enemies of your people?"

"Which geographical distances have you covered in your lifetime?"

"Which other means of communication do you use? Telephone, fax, email? How often?"

"Do you listen to radio? Do you watch TV? Which radio and TV? How often per month?

"How many hours?"

Prevention of genocide and war:

"How do you think the bad things which you experienced could have been avoided and prevented?"

"How do you think genocide/war could be avoided and prevented?"

Role of third parties:

"Did you or your group feel humiliated by foreigners in your country, or foreign powers?"

"How do you feel about a foreigner trying to understand you, and posing you questions?"

Cantril's Self-Anchoring concerning the personal future:

All of us want certain things out of life. When you think about what really matters in your own life, what are your wishes and hopes for the future? In other words, if you imagine your future in the best possible light, what would your life look like then, if you are to be happy? Take your time in answering; such things aren't easy to put into words. (PERMISSIBLE PROBES: What are your hopes for the future? What would your life have to be like for you to be completely happy? What is missing for you to be happy? [Use also, if necessary, the words

"dreams" and "desires."] OBLIGATORY PROBE: Anything else?). Now, taking the other side of the picture, what are your fears and worries about the future? In other words, if you imagine your future in the worst Possible light, what would your life look like then? Again, take your time in answering. (PERMISSIBLE PROBE: What would make you unhappy? [Stress the words "fears" and "worries."] OBLIGATORY PROBE: Anything else?). Here is a picture of a ladder (see above). Suppose we say that the top of the ladder (POINTING) represents the best possible life for you and the bottom (POINTING) represents the worst possible life for you. Where on the ladder (MOVING FINGER RAPIDLY UP AND DOWN LADDER) do you feel you personally stand at the present time? Step number. Where on the ladder would you say you stood five years ago? Step number. And where do you think you will be on the ladder five years from now? Step number.

Cantril's Self-Anchoring concerning the country's future:

Now, what are your wishes and hopes for the future of our country? If you picture the future of (name of country) in the *best possible* light, how would things look, let us say, ten years from now? (OBLIGATORY PROBE: Anything else?) And what about your fears and worries for the future of our country? If you picture the future of (name of country) in the worst possible light, how would things look about ten years from now? (OBLIGATORY PROBE: Anything else?) Now, looking at the ladder again, suppose your greatest hopes for (name of country) are at the top (POINTING); your worst fears at the bottom (POINTING). Where would you put (name of country) on the ladder (MOVING FINGER RAPIDLY UP AND DOWN LADDER) *at the present time?* Step number. Where did (name of country) stand *five years ago?* Step number. just as your best guess, where do you think (name of country) will be on the ladder *five years from now?* Step number.

"Satisfaction with Life Scale,"
(Ed Diener, http://www.psych.uiuc.edu/~ediener/hottopic/hottopic.html):
Below are five statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 7 scale below indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding that item. Please be open and honest in your responding. (7 - Strongly agree, 6 – Agree, 5 - Slightly agree, 4 - Neither agree nor disagree, 3 - Slightly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 1 - Strongly disagree)

_____ In most ways my life is close to my ideal.

_____ The conditions of my life are excellent.

_____ I am satisfied with my life.

_____ So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.

_____ If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.

Planning a questionnaire:

"A questionnaire shall be developed which examines humiliation." "Which questions should be put in a questionnaire?"

Interviewer's observations.

The interviewer describes the situation in which he/she finds the interviewee (refugee-status, living in a house/tent, living conditions, etc.) insofar as the interviewee has not yet given this information.

End of the interview.

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