


Premodern Diplomats Network  
Splendid Encounters VII, 2018



Splendid Encounters 7

# Conflict and Peace-making in Diplomacy 1300–1800

27th–28th September 2018

**Palace of the Grand Dukes of Lithuania**

Katedros a. 4, LT-01143 Vilnius  
Lithuania

## PROGRAMME





**THURSDAY  
27TH SEPTEMBER 2018**

Time	Speaker	
8.30–9.00	Registration	
9.00–10.30	Keynote presentations and opening of the conference	
	<p><b>Rimvydas Petrauskas</b> <i>Heathens and Christians: Diplomacy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the age of Crusades</i></p> <p><b>Dariusz Kołodziejczyk</b> <i>First Things First: Finding a Common Language and Date in Early Modern Diplomacy</i></p>	
10.30–11.00	<b>COFFEE</b>	
11.00–13.00	<p><b>1 ROOM</b></p> <p><b><i>Diplomacy and conflicts between states and/or sovereigns 1</i></b> Chair: <b>Anna Kalinowska</b></p> <p><b>Steve Murdoch</b> Jacobean Diplomacy and the Thirty Years War</p> <p><b>Gábor Kármán</b> Subject – Mediator-Enemy. The Prince of Transylvania and the Seventeenth-Century Peace Treaties of the Kings of Hungary</p> <p><b>P. I. Prudovsky</b> Provoking a Conflict – Settling a Conflict: How Russian and Brandenburg-Prussian Diplomats were overcoming their political and cultural differences (1650–1700)</p> <p><b>John Condren</b> Mars as broker of peace: Louis XIV, the House of Savoy and the Republic of Genoa, 1672–1673</p>	<p><b>2 ROOM</b></p> <p><b><i>Negotiations and negotiation techniques</i></b> Chair: <b>Laurynas Šedvydis</b></p> <p><b>Antanas Petrilionis</b> Prisoners of war in the diplomacy of Teutonic Order and Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 14<sup>th</sup>–15<sup>th</sup> c.</p> <p><b>Jão Carvalho</b> Challenges and disappointments of the Hispanic-Portuguese negotiations of 1725</p> <p><b>Dariko Mazhidenova</b> Francois de Caillers on the role of conducting negotiations</p> <p><b>Manuel Alejandro Castellano García</b> Hidden diplomacy: the Franco-British secret negotiations to conclude the war of Spanish Succession</p>
	13.00–14.30	<b>LUNCH</b>

14.30–16.00		<b>1 ROOM</b>	
		<b>Reporting and/or documenting the way(s) of dealing with conflict(s) 1</b> Chair: <b>Roberta Anderson</b>	
		<b>Elisa Clodelli</b> Reforming Female convents: the Role of a Venetian Ambassador in curia (1519)	
		<b>Angela De Maria</b> The diplomatic role of Venetian and Ottoman dragomans at the end of the War of Candia	
		<b>Vita Diemantaitė</b> Diplomats of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the chancellery of Leonas Sapiega	
16.00–16.30		<b>COFFEE</b>	
16.30–18.00		<b>1 ROOM</b>	<b>2 ROOM</b>
		<b>Diplomacy and the conflicts of the Baltic region in the 17<sup>th</sup> c.</b> Chair: <b>Robert Frost</b>	<b>Reporting and/or documenting the way(s) of dealing with conflict(s) 2</b> Chair: <b>Gábor Kármán</b>
		<b>Thomas A. Ashby</b> Seeking Peace by the Sword: Ambassador Sidney and Commonwealth Diplomacy in the Dano-Swedish War of 1658–1660	<b>Gleb Kazakov</b> From Russia with Caution: diplomatic reports about the Moscow musketeer uprising of 1682 and their efficiency
		<b>Paul Hulsenboom</b> Trade in Turmoil: Dutch diplomatic missions to Poland-Lithuania in the first half of the 17 <sup>th</sup> c.	<b>Emilio Pérez Blanco</b> An Ambassador's Correspondence: the case of Genoa and Francisco Moles (1694–1695) during the Nine Year's War
		<b>Kathrin Zickermann</b> Alexander Erskein (1598–1656): Swedish Resident, War Councillor, and Peace Negotiator	<b>Olga Khavanova</b> Praying for Elisabeth Petrovna's good health: Imperial Ambassador Count Nicolas Esterházy at the St. Petersburg Court during the Seven Year's War
<b>FRIDAY</b>			
<b>28TH SEPTEMBER 2018</b>			
<b>Time</b>	<b>Speaker</b>		
9.00–11.00	<b>1 ROOM</b>	<b>2 ROOM</b>	
	<b>Cultural dimension of conflict and peace: arts, language and cultural representation and diplomacy</b> Chair: <b>Dariusz Kotodziejczyk</b>	<b>Conflict and its impact on diplomatic practice</b> Chair: <b>John Condren</b>	
	<b>Luise Scheidt</b> The Peace of Venice. The Representation of Venice as a Diplomatic Force in the Palazzo Ducale	<b>Dorota Gregorowicz</b> A refused legation. Why did the primate of the Kingdom impede the papal peace-making initiative? The case of Mikołaj Prażmowski (1668–1669)	
	<b>Corinne Manchio</b> Ambiguity and inconsistency of peace in the official Machiavellian correspondence	<b>Jonathan Spangler</b> Operating from a point of weakness: Diplomats from Lorraine at the peace talks from Westphalia to Utrecht	
	<b>Ruth S. Noyes</b> <i>Sanctorum gloriam in tam remotis a Roma Provinciis propagare volerint.</i> Sacred relic translation as diplomacy in early modern Baltic 'relic states': the role of sacred in peace-keeping in boreal borderland conflicts	<b>Juliane Märker</b> Habsburg Diplomats in Venice during the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War	
	<b>Nathalie Rivere de Carles</b> Parrhesia in Early Modern Diplomatic History and Drama: an unexpected tactic of appeasement?	<b>Jiří Kubeš</b> Audiences of Imperial envoys at the English royal court and the dispute over the title of the English Kings (1660–1750)	
11.00–11.30	<b>COFFEE</b>		

	<b>1 ROOM</b>	<b>2 ROOM</b>
11.30–12.30	<p><b><i>Dealing with conflicts: Muscovite diplomacy in the 16<sup>th</sup> c.</i></b> Chair: <b>Tomasz Wiślicz</b></p> <p><b>Marius Sirutavičius</b> Means to maintain peace: paradiplomatic activities between Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Muscovy in the 16<sup>th</sup> c.</p> <p><b>Alexei Bachinskii</b> Religious propinquity and differences as instruments of manipulation and persuasion in matters of peace and war in the Russian diplomacy of the 16<sup>th</sup> century</p>	<p><b><i>Oblivion in Diplomacy</i></b> Chair: <b>Roberta Anderson</b></p> <p><b>Charlotte Backerra</b> “Willingness to forget” as the basis of Imperial–British Relations</p> <p><b>Cathleen Sarti</b> Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth. Hannibal Sehested and the treaty of Copenhagen, 1660</p>
12.30–14.00	<b>LUNCH</b>	
	<b>1 ROOM</b>	<b>2 ROOM</b>
14.00–15.30	<p><b><i>Diplomacy and conflicts between states and/or sovereigns 2</i></b> Chair: <b>Steve Murdoch</b></p> <p><b>Michael Talbot</b> “Restoring the world again to a good state”. Ottoman proposals for mediation during the War of the Austrian Succession</p> <p><b>Frederik Dhondt</b> Jean Rousset de Missy’s <i>Les Intérêts présents de l’Europe</i> (1733) as a political and legal mirror of diplomacy between sovereigns</p> <p><b>Arnaud Parent</b> Crisis in the Wild Fields: How the litigation between the Republic of the Two Nations and the Khanate of Crimea was settled (1760–1763)</p>	<p><b><i>Managing large and small-scale conflicts</i></b> Chair: <b>Darius Baronas</b></p> <p><b>Nika Kočekovskaya</b> Peace-making between negotiations and missives: two cases of conflict and peace-making in Ivan the Terrible’s diplomacy</p> <p><b>Piotr Chmiel</b> Consular protection as a way of small-scale conflict prevention: several cases coming from the activity of Venetian envoys to the Ottoman Empire, 16<sup>th</sup>/17<sup>th</sup> centuries</p> <p><b>Magdalena Jakubowska</b> Making peace or a new problem? Polish-Lithuanian negotiations in Prague and Constantinople after the fall of the Michael the Brave</p>
15.30	<b>Closing remarks</b>	
16.00	<b>TOUR OF THE PALACE</b>	

Thank you for joining the Premodern Diplomats Network for Splendid Encounters VII.

We look forward to welcoming you next year in Toulouse for Splendid Encounters VIII.



## **ABSTRACTS**



**Thomas Ashby**, European University Institute (Florence)

**‘Seeking Peace by the Sword’: Ambassador Sidney and Commonwealth Diplomacy in the Dano-Swedish War of 1658–1660**

In 1658, Sweden invaded Denmark, unexpectedly violating the recent Roskilde Treaty, and swiftly advanced to Copenhagen. This alarmed England and the United Provinces, who now found their Baltic interests at threat. After the invasion was stalled by the arrival of Dutch and English fleets, the two republics negotiated to act together, with French diplomatic co-operation, to mediate a peace, by force if necessary, between the two monarchies. After much delay, and some diplomatic incidents, a treaty was finally signed by the warring kingdoms and all three mediating powers in May 1660.

The English envoys to the Sound were led by Algernon Sidney (1623–1683), a key interlocutor in Commonwealth foreign policy and a senior member of its Council of State. Despite safeguarding English interests, the Copenhagen Treaty was of little consolation to Sidney, however, for not only had the talks failed to satisfy his desired co-operation with the Dutch, his own republic had collapsed. Two days later Charles II entered London. Sidney would not return to England until 1677, where in 1683 he was executed, his soon-to-be famous Discourses concerning government cited as a witness to treason.

This paper will seek to investigate Sidney’s embassy to the Sound and illustrate a case study in the relationship between his thought on politics, religion, and the relations between states, and his diplomatic practice in seeking peace. To understand this practice, which proved deeply problematic, I will explore Sidney’s relations with colleagues, foreign counterparts, and the monarchs, particularly the Swedish king, Karl X Gustav (1622–1660), prior to his premature death midway into the negotiations. Alongside published correspondence and a range of commentaries, including that by Samuel Pufendorf, a host of neglected manuscripts will also be used, some of which are in Sidney’s own hand.

The real Sidney was far from the stoical martyr of mythology. Contemptuous of ceremony and overbearing in temper, he was ill-suited to the stage and manners of seventeenth century diplomacy. Contrary to his upbringing within a diplomatic family, he held an aloof unwillingness to concede independence, whether it be to the rules of etiquette or to the counsels of allies. This tendency mirrored the brash manner of his antimonarchism and idiosyncratic Reformed theology. By exploring this little-discussed episode I will seek to provide an example of how intellectual and diplomatic histories can fruitfully intersect, sensitive to the context of contemporary diplomatic culture.

**Alexei Bachinskii**, The Russian State University for the Humanities (Moscow)

**Religious propinquity and differences as instruments of manipulation and persuasion in matters of peace and war in the Russian diplomacy of the 16th century**

The policy of Ivan the Terrible was often justified by religion. In this regard, the issue of the use of religious themes for diplomatic purposes, both for resolving conflicts and for demonstrating aggressive intentions, becomes important. This paper will examine:

1. Ivan IV had repeatedly criticised Protestantism. The most stinging criticism had been used in the initial period of the Livonian War, when the tsar informed the Lithuanian ambassadors that he was punishing Livonians for turning away from Catholicism. In turn, in the phase of the tsar’s rapprochement with the Magnus of Denmark, Ivan IV gave him a guarantee of the preservation of religion of the population of Livonia.
2. Religious issues were presented in different ways in relations with Christian and Islamic rulers.
3. In relation to the ‘Islamic theme’ was the subject of persuasion and manipulation. Thus, in his correspondence with Rudolf II, Ivan IV hinted at possible joint action against the Sultan and Stephen Bathory’s connection with Turkey.
4. The discussion of which of the Christian confessions is the true one could be raised in two diplomatic contexts. First, when Ivan IV was criticising the opponents who were Protestants. The other context is an appeal to the religious affinity of the Orthodox people in Russia and Lithuania, which sometimes was used in peace negotiations.
5. The topic of the closeness of all Christians is more common than the theme of the differences. In relations with the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth it has acquired an ambivalent meaning.
6. The topics of other faiths were practically not addressed neither in the context of peace negotiations nor during conflicts.

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**John Condren**, British School at Rome

**Mars as a broker of peace: Louis XIV, the House of Savoy and the Republic of Genoa, 1672–1673**

In the late summer of 1672, when French forces were engaged in the United Provinces, an unexpected war broke out in northern Italy. The protagonists were Carlo Emanuele II, Duke of Savoy-Piedmont, on the one hand; and on the other, the Genoese Republic, a long-time rival of the House of Savoy. The clashes in the frontier regions between these two states attracted the attention of the

French and Spanish governments, each of whom desired to prevent the other from exploiting the situation to their own advantage. Louis XIV of France dispatched one of his *gentilhommes de la maison*, Nicolas de Gomont, as envoy extraordinary to both the Duke of Savoy and the Republic of Genoa in the autumn of 1672. Gomont was tasked with negotiating a ceasefire between the two parties. The Sun King did not wish to be dragged into a conflict in northern Italy. If French troops were to be garrisoned close to the Spanish Milanese as allies of Savoy, it might stimulate Spanish determination to check Louis's intended advances on their possessions in the Southern Netherlands.

However, Louis and Gomont had to deal with a multitude of obstacles as they tried to mediate between the two parties. This paper analyses the difficulties Gomont encountered both in Turin and in Genoa, as he worked closely with Ennemond Servien, the long-serving French ambassador to Carlo Emanuele II and Marchese Giannettino Giustiniani, French resident in Genoa, to bring a speedy end to the conflict. The paper places these ambitions in the context of an Italian peninsula which was slowly emerging from the shadow of Spanish hegemony, and also establishes and discusses the factions at the Sabaudian court which dictated the conduct of the duke's policies. This example demonstrates the extent of French ambition in northern Italy, and also shows how Louis XIV was willing to undercut the traditional roles of the papacy, the King of Spain and the Holy Roman Emperor in brokering and maintaining peace among the Italian states. Louis's own irritation at the possibility of being dragged into an Italian war as the House of Savoy's ally dictated his keenness to rapidly end the conflict. He hoped that a successful mediation would reflect well upon his reputation as a peace-loving monarch – a reputation which his armies' actions in the Netherlands were even then undermining.

**Charlotte Backerra**, TU Darmstadt

### **'Willingness to forget' as the basis of Imperial – British Relations**

Early in 1727, King George I accused Emperor Charles VI of supporting the Jacobites, those rebels who urged for a restoration of the Stuart dynasty and its Catholic champion James Edward Stuart. The Imperial court answered in the negative with a Latin pamphlet by the high chancellor, which was also published with an English translation a day later. After a public outcry in London, George I reacted by declaring the Imperial resident, Palm, *persona non grata*; in turn, the British representative at the Court of Vienna was also expelled. Beneath this issue lay disputes between George as prince elector of Brunswick-Lüneburg and the Emperor, as his liege over money, religion, and feudal rights in the Empire. Only two months later, it became obvious that an exchange of diplomatic personnel of higher status was needed to discuss mutual concerns and to secure the peace of Europe and of the Empire. The instructions given to the new British envoy were based on the king's 'willingness to forget past injuries', everything that had happened 'should

be buried wholly in oblivion'. The Emperor in return send an envoy with similar instructions. This paper will look at the renewal of the British-Imperial relations in 1727/28 as a classic case of 'prescriptive forgetting'. Even though the rulers, ministers, and diplomats all knew about the past grievances, as did the public, through the news sheets and papers printed all over Europe, no one mentioned previous offences in meetings. Over time, some questions became irrelevant, while solutions were found for others.

**Cathleen Sarti**, University of Mainz

### **Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth. Hannibal Sehested and the Treaty of Copenhagen, 1660**

The Scandinavian kingdoms of Sweden and Denmark-Norway were, for most of the early modern period, closely connected by fighting against each other as well as by claiming the same territories, noble families, and the *dominium maris Baltici*. The situation between them was complicated enough for any of the numerous peace treaties, but it turned out to be too much when other European powers tried to 'help'. The Treaty of Copenhagen (1660) was the official end to the Dano-Swedish War of 1658–1660, which was part of the larger Second Northern War, ending the conflict until once again war broke out in 1675. However, this peace treaty nearly did not see the light of day because in addition to the main parties, Denmark-Norway and Sweden, representatives from the Dutch Republic, on the Danish side, and from England and France on the Swedish side, tried to enforce their interests. In the end, the leading Danish diplomat, Hannibal Sehested, suggested he directly negotiate only with Sweden, leaving the Dutch, English, and French out, and was successful in concluding the treaty. The treaty of 1660 confirmed the treaty of Roskilde of 1558, and in the end was an important step to the establishment of Danish Absolutism in 1660. This paper will discuss the problems Sehested faced against too many parties interested in the outcome of the peace negotiations. In particular, the problem of arranging a peace treaty between two long-term rivals who were now allied by 'honest friendship', will be discussed from the perspective of 'necessary' forgetting in diplomatic relations. The peace treaty of Copenhagen shows the importance of negotiation and allowing the right amount of information: too many interests, as well as remembering centuries of conflict 'would spoil the broth'.

**Piotr Chmiel**, independent researcher

### **Consular protection as a way of small-scale conflict prevention: several cases coming from the activity of Venetian envoys to the Ottoman Empire, 16<sup>th</sup>/17<sup>th</sup> centuries**

According to a view diffused in contemporary diplomacy there is a clear distinction between the activity of



diplomats, concentrating their work on international relations among states or other subjects, and consuls whose main task is to provide citizens (individuals) of their sending states with a consular assistance. From this perspective the prevention of conflict should be classified as purely diplomatic work. However, in many cases it turns out that it is impossible to clearly divide both spheres of activity of diplomatic agents due to complex legal and practical conditions which regulated international affairs. This observation seems to be even more valid for the early modern Venetian diplomatic/consular agents sent to the Ottoman Empire.

The aim of this paper is to present the activity of Venetian diplomats and consuls in Constantinople and Aleppo in the late 16<sup>th</sup> and early 17<sup>th</sup> centuries in regard to the protection of their nationals, understood as a way of small-scale conflict prevention. In many cases it seems that the main scope of protection of an individual in the Venetian diplomatic practice was focused rather on resolving a potentially bigger conflict that involved the individual in question and the local – or even central – Ottoman authorities. Based on reports, dispatches and instructions preserved in the State Archives of Venice I will also try to answer the following questions: how did the Venetian envoys identify risks of potential conflicts? What role was played in these situations by missionaries and priests acting in the Ottoman Empire? What use did the Venetian representatives make of consular acts (certificates, patents, financial aid etc.) in order to prevent conflicts with the Ottoman authorities? Finally, is it possible to apply the present-day concept of ‘consular diplomacy’ to the early modern Venetian foreign service?

**Elisa Clodelli**, La Sapienza – University of Rome

#### **Reforming Female Convents: the Role of a Venetian Ambassador in Curia (1519)**

On the 6th October 1519, the Venetian diarist, Marin Sanudo, reported a commotion which had occurred that morning at San Zaccaria, one of the most ancient monasteries of the city. The nuns cried from the balconies and made a hideous assertion: ‘we are being assassinated’. Even if their lives were not in danger, their style of life was on the edge of a dramatic change. Indeed, since his election in 1508, Patriarch Antonio Contarini, was trying to discipline Venetian female monasteries, imposing a more rigorous way of life for the nuns. However, these women belonged to noble families, and most of them were used to enjoying luxurious lifestyles and opulent habits – having lovers, for example. The government had tried to prosecute *monachini*, that is people who had carnal relations with nuns, since the 14th century, so it was also supportive of Contarini’s plan. Nevertheless, the nuns and their families opposed these proposed changes, writing pleas directly to Rome, to stop the Patriarch’s reforms.

To prevent a more chaotic situation, the Heads of the Council of Ten—one of the most important governing

bodies of the Republic—contacted the Venetian ambassador in Rome, Marco Minio (1516–19), in the summer of 1519, to ask him to intercede with the Pope, in order to encourage him to confirm Contarini’s reform through a papal brief.

Therefore, my paper will examine this conflict between political and religious power, between some of the most important noble families of Venice, on the hand, and the government of the Republic, on the other. I propose, firstly, to uncover Minio’s character, his family background and political career; then, I will analyse the ambassador’s correspondence prior to the papal brief, of autumn of 1519. Female monasteries in early modern Venice would have a strong symbolism to the whole city, since they represented the honour of the Republic itself. However, monasteries were also tenacious social groups, which were not inclined to lose their privileges, so they fought for them. This study will reveal the careful attempts made by the Venetian ambassador to intercede in the Curia, and also the composite web of relations, from government magistrates to cardinals loyal to the Republic, in the pursuit to discipline female monastic life right at the threshold of Luther’s Protestant movement.

**João Oliveira de Carvalho**, Centre for History – Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University of Lisbon

#### **Challenges and disappointments of the Hispanic-Portuguese negotiations of 1725**

As a consequence of the huge costs Portugal had to support from its involvement in the War of the Spanish Succession, it was decided the kingdom should maintain a neutral position in relation to the conflicts still affecting Europe. There were hegemonic ambitions from the two alliances that had been formed. On one side, the Holy Roman Empire which had been joined by Spain, and on the other side, Great Britain, France and Prussia formed the League of Hanover. Both parties tried to convince Portugal to join them so they could guarantee a good number of allies across the continent regarding their dominance. In the meantime, Philip V of Spain started negotiations with John V of Portugal to marry their corresponding heirs, which the latter would have a positive view on. While the Spanish side aspired to gain another ally with this arrangement, Portugal wanted to keep its neutrality in order not to jeopardise the long-term alliance it had with Great Britain, which could provide a secure defence of Portuguese territories both in Europe and in the colonies. Thus, negotiations developed in Madrid with each party trying to secure as many benefits as possible. The negotiations became quite tense when both parties engaged on discussions about Colonia de Sacramento, in South America.

The main objective of this paper is to define the challenges arising during these negotiations, held within the framework of the talks to marry the Prince of Asturias, heir to the Spanish Crown, to Barbara of Portugal and the Prince of Brazil, heir to the Portuguese King, to

Marianna Victoria of Spain. Although Philip V and Jo o V were willing to marry off their children, negotiators from both sides had been apprehensive even before the talks started, trying to win the upper hand on the way in which to define the clauses towards the establishment of peace between these neighbouring kingdoms. This paper will also cover the leverage used to reach each side's objectives, how each party bluffed the other and what was agreed upon, at the end. Unfortunately, this did not solve the conflict in South American territories and further treaties had to be negotiated later, in 1750 and 1773.

**Manuel Alejandro Castellano Garc a.** Institut d'Hist ria Jaume Vicens Vives. Pompeu Fabra University (Barcelona)

### **Hidden diplomacy: The Franco-British secret negotiations to conclude the war of the Spanish Succession**

Finalising the war of the Spanish Succession was an arduous diplomatic task. After nearly a decade of conflict and several previous diplomatic failures, it was essential for the opening, in 1710, of a bilateral and secret route through which France and Great Britain, acting apart from their respective allies, could reach a series of key preliminary agreements to conclude the conflict.

The limited number of people involved and the necessary secrecy with which the initiation of these contacts was agreed upon and was later carried out, has led to the existence of uncertainties within their historiographical knowledge, especially in regards to the initial stages. This paper will clarify the negotiating process by examining the delicate structure around which the Franco-British secret contacts were conceived, and to provide a global vision of a challenging negotiation that decisively defined the agreements subsequently signed in Utrecht.

In order to achieve this objective, special emphasis will be placed on the various diplomatic strategies used, the performance of the characters who, acting in an official or unofficial position, played the most relevant roles, and the significance of the personal relationships that were established between them. Simultaneously, it will analyse the influence that the changing British socio-political situation and the changes produced in the war context, especially those that occurred in the Iberian Peninsula, had on the development and outcome of the negotiations. French primary sources from Les Archives Diplomatiques du Minist re des Affaires  trang res, in which can be found the secret correspondence used by the French agent in charge of initiating contacts, and the available British sources at The National Archives and The British Library will be examined.

These facts will allow us to reconstruct the negotiation process, assess its difficulties and, in general terms, expand the knowledge about the complicated political game developed between the French and British courts to conclude the war of Spanish Succession.

**Angela De Maria,** University of Saint-Marin – University of Bordeaux Montaigne

### **The diplomatic role of Venetian and Ottoman dragomans at the end of the war of Candia**

The Republic of Venice was the first European State creating an official system of dragomans in 1551. Basically, dragomans were interpreters who worked in the Venetian embassies and consulates. However, far from being just translators, they became important intermediaries between Venetian and Ottoman ministers. Due to their linguistic skills, they were constantly in touch with local communities and their authorities. Therefore, they collected diplomatic, political, military and cultural information and actively collaborated with their chiefs.

This paper, by means of the many documents kept in the Venetian State Archive, shows that there was a network of dragomans who were in touch and managed Venetian-Ottoman diplomacy. The peace negotiations at the end of the war of Candia were particularly representative of the dragomans' important role: they guided, together with their ministers, the peace-making policy. Even during the war, they already worked to bring an end to the conflict by defending the political, territorial and economic interests of their States. The disputes over strategic territories, such as the island of Crete, required all the linguistic, diplomatic and persuasive skills of dragomans.

The Venetian dragomans, Grillo, Tarsia, Parada and Pirone, and the Ottoman 'Grand Dragoman', Panagiotti, were the protagonists in the guiding negotiations. Indeed, Venetian dragomans communicated and negotiated not only with Ottoman ministers, but primarily with Panagiotti. Panagiotti was not a mere intermediary, but the first collaborator of the Grand Vizier. Therefore, he was able to handle the most important issues of the Empire and sometimes even to manage the delicate relations with the Christian negotiators.

Panagiotti was also the author and translator of the treaty agreement, the Capitulations, in 1671. Because of a different interpretation of some articles, such as the capitula about the delivery of slaves and the Dalmatian frontier, the Venetian ambassador, Alvise Molin and his dragomans, suspected Panagiotti of infringing upon the pacts. This shows how crucial translation is, as one of the most delicate and important diplomatic strategies.

To conclude, during the war of Candia and especially at its end, the negotiations took place largely thanks to dragomans who appeared to be the main diplomats collaborating with the Venetian and Ottoman ministers.

**Vita Diemantait ,** Vilnius University

### **Diplomats of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania at the chancellery of Leonas Sapiega**

Even though the chancellery of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania [hereinafter GDL] was established in the

fifteenth century, it was particularly active in the sixteenth century during the adoption of three Statutes and implementation of other important state reforms. The chancellery secured the role of public administration, the lord's court, courier services and other services. The scribes working at the GDL had not only to sign documents in its name, but also to ensure their legitimacy, go on missions and enter international peace treaties. Egidijus Banionis, who has studied the service of couriers of the GDL concluded that it was never intended for service to grow into a separate institution – this function was usually carried out by the employees of the chancellery, therefore in the historiography, the chancellor was reasonably considered the head foreign policy maker. One of the most prominent Lithuanian personalities in the beginning of seventeenth century was Leonas Sapiega, who, while still a chancellor, was able to exert a strong influence on the ruler and was very active in the negotiations for the throne of the Commonwealth of Both Nations after the death of Stephan Bator. Having elected Zigmund Vaza as the new ruler of the Commonwealth of Both Nations, Leonas Sapiega brought his reliable people to the chancellery of the GDL to help him in his relations with Moscow and Sweden.

Substantial historiographic attention has so far been focused on the Leonas Sapiega's embassy to Moscow in 1600–1601. This mainly happened because of the well-preserved and published diary of the envoy by Elijah Perlgrymowski. However, most of the work of L. Sapiega as a diplomat of the GDL, as well as the chancellery of the GDL itself has been scarcely investigated. There are no studies of the chancellery of the GDL that would consider the problems of documentation issuing or its formulation. It is also hard to find studies that analyse specific personalities and their influence on the processes of state significance. The purpose of this article will be to characterise and define the services of the GDL couriers in the office of Leonas Sapiega.

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**Frederik Dhondt**, Vrije Universiteit/University of Antwerp

### **Jean Rousset de Missy's, *Les Intérêts présents de l'Europe* (1733) as a political and legal mirror of diplomacy between sovereigns**

International relations after the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) were characterised by a quest for interpretation of the agreement that had brought the conflict to an end. Franco-British understanding made the end of the conflict possible. Yet, could this be lasting? France and Britain were geopolitical competitors. Moreover, the cornerstone of the agreement was the renunciation of Philip V of Spain to his hereditary rights to the French throne, in order to safeguard the balance of power in Europe. Its solidity depended, in practice, on the willingness of the French court to prefer treaties over the *lois fondamentale*—fundamental laws or unwritten principles of constitutional order. Finally, the treaties concluded in April 1713 (Utrecht), March 1714 (Rastatt) and September 1714 (Baden) left many questions

unanswered, especially in case new succession quarrels would pop up. Diplomats had recourse to legal advisers, treaty collections and doctrine, and gradually instated a system whereby the peace treaties of 1713–1714 became a blueprint to solve new quarrels.

*Les intérêts présents de l'Europe* (1733, 1735, 1741) by the Huguenot Jean Rousset de Missy (1686–1762), a two-volume collection of pretensions and published legal documents dedicated to the House of Orange, presents a precious mirror of past, pending and potential new quarrels between European sovereigns. Together with Jean Du Mont (1666–1727), Rousset was involved in the *Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens* (1726–1731), the most illustrious early modern collection of treaties between sovereigns and other legally relevant material. Rousset's collection is inspired on Schweder's *Theatrum Historicum Praetensionum* (1727) initiated by Christoph Hermann Schweder and continued by Adam Friedrich Glafey (1692–1753), professor of the law of nations in Saxony, but merits more than a mere mention as a copy.

Rousset's work is presented as a princely education manual, to introduce the young William Friso (1711–1751), who would become stadholder in 1747. Rousset presents not just the *intérêts & Prétensions des Puissances de l'Europe*, but foremost in a rigorous analysis, *examinées avec soin, d'après les Preuves tirées des Traitez & des Ecrits publiez pour les soutenir*. Rousset staunchly defended the diplomacy of the French Regent, Philip of Orléans (1715–1723). Orléans chose to continue the Franco-British alliance. He went to war against Philip V of Spain. Rousset regularly indulges in political advice, conformably to his numerous journalistic writings. This first layer of interpretation would do no justice to the intellectual complexity of Rousset's work. Rousset synthesizes arguments on both, or all sides in succession quarrels, territorial disputes or debates on over-lordship. This sticks closely to the practical operation of diplomacy in his age. Only arguments acceptable to one's interlocutor could truly constitute a part of the law of nations applied between sovereigns, from the pope and the emperor to the republic of Venice and Genoa. Jean Rousset de Missy juggles with roman law, canon law, the law of nations, treaties, custom, feudal law, constitutional law, succession pacts or imperial law. His powerful and rich analysis combines the chessboard of European sovereigns with the argumentative positions. Rousset unites geopolitical interest and law as a system of legitimacy, exceeding by far a listing exercise of the *Intérêts* and their *Preuves*.

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**Dorota Gregorowicz**, University of Silesia (Katowice)

### **A refused legation. Why did the primate of the Kingdom impede the papal peacemaking initiative? The case of Mikołaj Prażmowski (1668–1669)**

This paper will illustrate the reasons of refusing the papal legation of Clement IX in the matter of John Casimir Vasa's abdication (1668) and Michael Korybut Wiśniowiecki's

election, by the primate of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Mikołaj Prażmowski, together with the political practice he had undertaken in order to achieve it.

After the arrival of the official information regarding the decision of the royal abdication of John Casimir Vasa to Rome, the cardinal protector of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Virginio Orsini presented to the Pope the idea of sending a legate, a *latere*, to Poland-Lithuania, in order to guarantee peace and advantage for Catholic progresses in the upcoming interregnum and of the new king's election. This project was then very seriously considered by Clement IX, who consulted with Apostolic Nuncios in Poland-Lithuania (Galeazzo Marescotti) and in Wien (Antonio Pignatelli). The whole issue of the prospective legation, boycotted by the primate, Mikołaj Prażmowski, has not been mentioned in the existing literature yet.

The ceremonial aspect of the papal diplomat's participation in the abdication of John Casimir Vasa (1668) and election of Michael Korybut Wiśniowiecki (1669), seems to be crucial for the position of the primate, Mikołaj Prażmowski, refusing to comply with the precedence rules traditionally granted to the representatives of the Holy See during similar ceremonies, based on a generally accepted 'international *ordum*'. Prażmowski emphasised the traditional qualification of the Gniezno archbishops as papal *legati nati*, standing above the Nuncios in the hierarchy of Apostolic diplomacy. It seems that the primate considered it superior also to the legate a *latere* authority.

Based on the diplomatic dispatches of the Apostolic Nuncios and their instructions, this paper will show the problematic relations of Mikołaj Prażmowski with papal diplomats in Poland-Lithuania, as well explain the origins of his attitude towards the unrealised papal legacy.

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**Paul Hulsenboom**, Radboud University (Nijmegen)

### **Trade in Turmoil: Dutch diplomatic missions to Poland-Lithuania in the first half of the 17<sup>th</sup> c.**

Early modern diplomats reported their findings and the outcome of their missions to the authorities in their homeland, for example by way of accounts which were meant for that purpose specifically. Sometimes, however, such an account was written for private use only, or, on the other hand, became widely distributed amongst the population.

This also happened in the case of a number of 17<sup>th</sup> century diplomatic missions from the Dutch Republic to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It is a well-known fact that the Republic of the United Provinces depended heavily on its trade with the Baltic. From the Polish port of Gdańsk (Danzig) in particular, Dutch merchants from the late 16<sup>th</sup> century onwards imported many thousands of

tons of grain and other products, which were necessary to fuel the Republic's economy, and Poland itself, therefore became known as the 'granary' of Holland. The year 1660 is often taken to mark the end of the Republic's dominance on the Baltic.

When, during the 17<sup>th</sup> century Dutch trade with the Baltic was disturbed several times due to struggles over the so-called *dominium maris Baltici*, fought primarily between Sweden, Denmark and Poland, the Dutch States-General reacted accordingly and sent out a number of diplomatic missions to the southern Baltic coast, for example in the years 1627, 1635 and 1656, in order to bring an end to the conflicts. Some of the people on these missions, both the actual negotiators and the secretaries, wrote reports and accounts, either meant for themselves, the States-General, or the broader public. Indeed, an account of the 1627 mission was even published in Amsterdam in 1632.

This paper will discuss the ways in which these various accounts of Dutch missions to Poland specifically reflect on the diplomatic voyages, particularly when it comes to the peace-making process itself. What recognisable patterns are there in these descriptions, for example concerning the matters which do, and those that do not receive attention? What differences are there between the various accounts and why are they there? By looking at the case-study of these 17<sup>th</sup>-century Dutch accounts of missions to Poland, I hope to shed light on one of the most important and fascinating by-products of early modern diplomacy, and what they reveal about the ways in which diplomats worked.

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**Magdalena Jakubowska**, University of Warsaw

### **Making peace or a new problem? Polish-Lithuanian negotiations in Prague and Constantinople after the fall of the Michael's the Brave**

On 20<sup>th</sup> September 1600, the Polish-Lithuanian army, led by Grand Chancellor and Hetman Jan Zamoyski, defeated Michael the Brave at Bucov. This victory was the beginning of the end of the Michael the Brave's reign in Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia. Deposed, Michael was under the protection of the Emperor. The ultimate end of Wallachian Vayvoda came with his death in 1601. During his last year the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth sent embassies to Emperor Rudolf II and Padishah Mehmed III. The first one was led by Andrzej Opaliński in the year 1600, the other was under the leadership of Krzysztof Kochanowski in 1601. Both missions were dedicated to negotiations around the future of the Danubian Principalities.

This paper will present the Polish vision of the rule in the Danubian Principalities under Movilă's family, Ieremia in Moldavia and his brother Simion in Wallachia. I find this deliberation as a part of the bigger policy making closely

connected with the Long Turkish War (1593–1606). By comparing two instructions for the Polish envoys sent to Prague and to Constantinople I would like to show how Sigismund III and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Diet decided to help Movilă's family gain the throne in Moldavia and Wallachia. I am trying to examine the content of these texts and answer a question whether these documents were similar? What was the most crucial part for policy making? Were there any signs of co-work declarations with the Habsburgs or rather with Ottomans? What was the actual political aim of these two embassies sent to both conflict sides? Finally, I would like to show how the flexible conflict management helped to implement an own policy by using a neighbouring country.

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**Gábor Kármán**, Hungarian Academy of Sciences,  
Research Center for the Humanities, Institute of History

**Subject – Mediator – Enemy: The Prince of Transylvania and the Seventeenth-Century Peace Treaties of the Kings of Hungary**

Until the Ottoman conquest of the central parts of the Kingdom of Hungary in the sixteenth century, Transylvania was an integral part of the realm, with limited autonomy, and it was due to the sultan's support that the Szapolyai family managed to establish themselves as rulers of an Ottoman tributary state, which enjoyed independence from Habsburg-ruled Hungary. The legal status of the principality, nevertheless, remained an object of constant reinterpretation during the seventeenth century, and the Hungarian kings, who were also Holy Roman Emperors during most of the period, never gave up their claims of being the overlords of the territory. This interpretation was also confirmed by their treaties with the princes until the 1620s, but even afterwards, the idea that Transylvania was an integral part of Hungary and the princes were subjects of the king, kept resurfacing in official documents. At the same time, towards the Ottomans the princes maintained the discourse according to which they were faithful subjects of the sultan. The character of the interpretation of the princes' status left its mark on the peace treaties that they concluded with the kings of Hungary during the seventeenth century after campaigns in which the princes served as the leaders of the Hungarian estates rebelling against their rulers. The paper will present how the procedure of the peace negotiations, as well as the final texts mirror the changes of the interpretation of the princes' status on the basis of the peace treaties between the king and the prince on the one hand; and on the basis of the peace treaties between the king/emperor and the sultan on the other – where, in some cases, the princes were also involved from the Ottoman side, which made the Habsburg interpretation even more complicated to maintain.

**Gleb Kazakov**, Albert-Ludwigs University of Freiburg

**From Russia with Caution: diplomatic reports about the Moscow musketeer uprising of 1682 and their efficiency**

It is a fact that the reports of early modern diplomats to the governments of their home countries were in most cases dealing with different kinds of international conflicts. However, it was not only wars which made an agenda in diplomatic correspondence, but also all sorts of internal unrest – rebellions, plots, urban revolts etc. – were frequently and eagerly reported. While reporting about a revolt from a foreign country a diplomat had to take into consideration two major factors. On one hand, he had to report things in due time, so that the authorities in his home country could react quickly to the important news, and on the other hand, he had to exercise caution while reporting in order not to get into any trouble with the authorities of the host country, who were usually not willing to let foreigners know too much about internal disturbances.

This paper will present a case study of diplomatic news reporting from Moscow in 1682, when a major revolt, known as the Musketeer Uprising, occurred in the Russian capital. The uprising led to a peculiar political situation in Muscovy, for two tsars – half-brothers Ivan and Peter – occupied the throne simultaneously. Many members of the Russian political elite perished in the revolt. The changes in the government made the Russian foreign diplomatic partners quite interested in obtaining detailed news from Moscow, especially because Muscovy was regarded at that time as a potential ally by competing coalitions of European powers: Sweden, the Netherlands and the Empire on one side, and France, Denmark and Prussia on the other.

The paper will examine, how diplomatic representatives of Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, who were present in Russia at the time of the uprising, reported the events of the uprising to their home countries. Based on archival research, a comparison of the speed and efficiency of news reporting will demonstrate how the diplomatic agents were confronted with the problem of censorship by Muscovite authorities.

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**Olga Khavanova**, Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

**Praying for Elisabeth Petrovna's good health: Imperial Ambassador Count Nicolas Esterházy at the St. Petersburg Court during the Seven-Years War**

Count Nicolas Esterházy (1711–1764) was the first Hungarian aristocrat to have a long diplomatic career. In the middle of the eighteenth century, he represented the Viennese Court in London, Lisbon, Dresden, Madrid and St. Petersburg. Sent to Russia in 1753 as a result of intrigues around prestigious diplomatic missions, he was promised to be called back in three years. Nonetheless,

the Seven Years War was broken on the eve of his much-desired return and forced him to stay in St. Petersburg for five more years to provide communication between the Austrian monarchy and the Russian Empire. Despite his deteriorating health, Esterházy acted as the ambassador until September 1761, preparing Russia's acceding to the Austrian-French alliance, smoothing out permanent contradictions between the allied armies, and confronting the pro-Prussian factions at the court. He became a good expert in the realities of the Russian court and clearly saw that the Austrian cause in the war could be saved only if the peace congress began during the life of the sick Elisabeth Petrovna. He left Russia a few months before her death having no illusions about the coming turn in Russia's participation in the war.

This paper is based on Count Esterházy's reports to Maria Theresa, State Chancellor Count Wenzel Anton Kaunitz and Imperial Vice-Chancellor Count Rudolf Colloredo, as well as instructions and orders pertaining to the ambassador from Vienna. It strives to show the diplomat's communicative strategies with Elisabeth Petrovna, her influential statesmen and courtiers, and foreign diplomats. Special attention is paid to such issues as presents- and rewards-exchange, services and courtesies in regards of key politicians, intimate friendship with the court physicians and so forth. Finally, the paper considers the ambassador's failure to secure the Russian-Austrian alliance in terms of confrontation of two irreconcilable political cultures.

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**Nika Kochekovskaya**, Higher School of Economics/  
Russian State University for the Humanities (Moscow)

### **Peace-making between negotiations and missives: two cases of conflict and peace-making in Ivan the Terrible's diplomacy**

One of the most important specifics of Ivan the Terrible's diplomacy was the frequency of the conflicts originated from Ivan's accusations about the irresponsibility of his diplomatic counteragents. This problem seems to be very important for the determination of Ivan's diplomacy as a phenomenon, because it makes the borders of his diplomacy very ambiguous: Ivan's confidence in his counteragent's being of a low status and lack of dignity led to his requirement to interrupt the correspondence, meanwhile the condition of its continuation was the substitution of the diplomatic rhetoric in the missives by the 'petition' rhetoric. This requirement was offensive for Ivan's counterparts and burst the conflicts into the diplomatic intercourse; in these cases, diplomats, ambassadors and their negotiations became a much more efficient implement of the peace-making, because the correspondence had collapsed by the disagreement between the rulers about the rhetoric, formulas and the titles written there. Simultaneously, if Ivan or his ambassadors were admonished to write the missive in a way they believed to be 'petition' and disrespectful, the same disagreement raised and begot a number of

sophisticated manoeuvres in the following negotiations. The aim is to analyse these situations by the comparison between two cases of the conflict and diplomatic ways of peace-making from Ivan's diplomacy.

The first case is a conflict between Ivan and the Sweden king, Johann II, who was believed by Ivan not to be respectful enough for direct and unmediated correspondence with him. A study is provided of Ivan's letters to Johann and the definitions suggested in these letters between the alternative of Johann's writing as Ivan's subject, on the one hand, and of their interconnection only via Ivan's vicars, on the other hand. In this suggestion, Ivan seems to be turning his diplomatic correspondence into a kind of negotiations between him and another ruler. The reason for this interpretation lies in the collapse occurred in Russian-Sweden relations on that moment not only in the letter-writing, but also in the diplomatic negotiations, which caused in 1572 not a peace but another diplomatic conflict connected with the plot against Johann and the kidnapping of his wife. Another reason for Ivan's correspondence with Johann as a kind of negotiations is the frequency of the letter-exchange which simultaneously was keeping an ambiguous status, when Ivan's letters had as its main goal and content a cessation of this exchange.

The second case is a conflict which took place in 1574 in the Holy Roman Empire between the foreign office of Maximilian II and Ivan's ambassador Konstantin Skobeltsyn. The latter expressed a disagreement with the formulation of the emperor's missive he was obliged to deliver to Ivan, and this expression was estimated as offensive towards the emperor. Finally, this collision turned into an accusation of Skobeltsyn in the number of offences against the diplomatic order and norms. In this case I am going to consider the multiplicity of letters which expounded the emperor's complaints to Ivan. The main conclusion is that these complaints posed the diplomatic correspondence on the brink of a petition, because Ivan should be asked for punishing his ambassador; this seems to be a reason for the accompaniment of the emperor's letter, which included the description of Skobeltsyn's sins, with the letter from the emperor's ambassador Magnus Pauli, which contained not only practically the same description but also a request for such a punishment. Meanwhile, Magnus Pauli's own accusations of Skobeltsyn in the theft was formulated in another letter, which was stick to the different and frankly 'petition'-like kind of rhetoric. So, the correspondence was mixed with the negotiations via the multiplicity of letters and sending them not only from Maximilian, but also from his ambassador.

The aim of my paper is to compare the rhetoric of these conflict situations and ways of peace-making in a view of the discrepancy (and playing on this discrepancy) between negotiations and correspondences as a diplomatic tool.

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Jiří Kubeš, University of Pardubice

### Audiences of Imperial envoys at the English royal court and the dispute over the title of the English Kings (1660–1750)

This paper will outline the periods of the long-time lasting conflict between the English kings and the Habsburg emperors regarding the appropriate title that should be given to the English king by the Emperor and his imperial chancellery, Reichskanzlei. English kings obtained the *Serenitas* title from Vienna but desired to be addressed with *Majestas*. Everything started at the end of the reign of Charles II, and his brother, James, was the first English monarch who tried to solve it directly in Vienna but failed to manage it. In the second period, after 1702, queen Anne and her advisors adopted an adamant attitude and refused to accept Imperial diplomat's credentials and there was a danger that mutual relations would be broken. During the reigns of both George I and II, a compromise was settled but there were still certain tensions remaining in the middle of the 18th century. I will try to show the strategies of the Imperial diplomats who wanted to defend the original style of the traditional title and the ways used by their counterparts who desired to change it as well.

Juliane Märker, University of Mainz

### Habsburg Diplomats in Venice during the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War

During the eighteenth century, the Habsburg monarchy was embroiled in several wars not only against the threat of the expanding Ottoman Empire – which was slowly being driven back – but also against its neighbours, predominantly Prussia, which was competing against Austria in the bid for dominance over Middle Europe.

The city state of Venice on the other hand, once a highly sought-after ally in the fight against the Ottomans, had lost its political and military influence during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, having slowly but surely reduced its military and its once famous fleet, until all that was left was a paltry militia and a handful of armed ships, whose only task was to protect their merchants from pirates, a task in which they rarely succeeded. Therefore, Venice empathetically eschewed any and all involvement in foreign conflicts, practised a policy of strict neutrality, and could no longer be counted as ally nor for the Habsburgs nor any other European court.

The Habsburg monarchy, nonetheless, entertained an embassy in Venice, one of their oldest and most long-lived ones, and their ambassadors had orders to try and win any possible favour from the Venetian government in the war effort, predominately goods to feed their troops and permits to march them through Venetian territory. However, such tasks brought with them a slew of troubles and hurdles, many of them unique to Venice and its particular treatment of foreign diplomats. For

an ambassador had only limited access to the Venetian government, none at all, legally, to the Venetian aristocracy, and had to navigate the pitfalls of the strained relationship between a once great city state in decline, and the still expanding Empire of the Habsburg monarchy on the height of their power, which shared a border and had conflicting economic interests.

This paper will analyse the constraints and liberties Austrian Ambassadors worked under in Venice during times of war, especially during the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War. Main focus will be the rules and regulations which limited their scope of action and curtailed their freedom to act, as well as the question, when and how the ambassadors could nonetheless influence proceedings through personal effort.

Corinne Manchio, Université Paris 8

### Ambiguity and inconsistency of peace in the official Machiavellian correspondences

In accordance with the duties incumbent upon him in the second chancery, Machiavelli had to manage the administrative correspondence within the city, and from 14th July, 1498, he joined the *Dieci di Balìa e Libertà*, the magistracy which deals with issues relating to war and internal security. He also assumed, from 12th January 1507, the office of Secretary to the Nine of the Ordinance, responsible for the creation and administration of the troops of the Florentine militia. In these three charges, Machiavelli made the radical experience, for fourteen years, of the state of war as a state of permanent instability.

The intention of this paper is to show how wars induce important changes in the political practice of which we find traces in the linguistic uses and in the rebalancing processes that the actors try to put in place, in response to the 'disorder' induced by the conflicts. This idea is articulated in two stages: firstly, we can observe the presence of grey areas in the practice by means of a linguistic blur, then we can identify attempts to react to the disorder.

To understand the ways in which the words of war in the *Legazioni*, *Commissarie* and *Scritti di governo* were articulated, it seems inevitable to start with peace or, to be fair, we must simultaneously think about war and peace, since these two states almost always go hand in hand. To the extent that they represent the two traditionally opposed issues in conflict management, it is not surprising to find them contiguous in the reasoning that interests us. Indeed, out of 154 occurrences of *pace*, 6 of *paci* and *pacem*, 40 are used in a sentence where we also find the word war, of which there are 201 occurrences in the singular and 11 occurrences in the plural. What relations unite war and peace? We will try to show that the articulation of these terms does not only refer to a traditional dichotomy of political thought and that the pair is, so to speak, contaminated by the extreme instability of the times.

Our method combines philological analysis and computer-assisted text analysis. We focused on a small number of tools such as concordances to establish lexicons, co-occurrences to clear the polysemy, collocations to identify semantic nodes, and statistical calculations to describe the relationship between the words. The software MACHIATO was built to travel in the letters and has become, gradually, an exploratory tool.

**Steve Murdoch**, University of St Andrews

### Jacobean Diplomacy and the Thirty Years War

This paper looks to the Jacobean diplomacy conducted at the outbreak of the Thirty Years War. In particular it will seek to explain the methods by which James managed to anchor his Calvinist diplomats in the Scandinavian courts. In the Swedish case in particular, this should have proved awkward given a supposed carpet ban on Calvinists within the realm. This paper both overturns that myth then follows the progress of the British ambassadors through until the conclusion of the Treaty of the Hague in 1625.

**Ruth Noyes**, National Museum of Denmark Copenhagen, Novo Nordisk Mads Øvlisen Fellow

### *Sanctorum gloriam in tam remotis a Roma Provinciis propagare voluerint. Sacred relic translatio as diplomacy in early modern Baltic 'relic states': the role of the sacred in peace-keeping in boreal borderlands conflicts*

Retracing the transcultural trajectories of translated relics according to a practice in the Catholic tradition termed translation, the performative relocation of the remains of holy persons, within and between Catholic Europe's Baltic and Italian borderlands over the *longue durée*, this paper takes up the question of the idea of the Baltic states as 'relic states'—as material condition and discursive formation that changes over time and is evidenced in ritual. Mapping a series of movements proceeding geographically and chronologically from the 16<sup>th</sup>–19<sup>th</sup> centuries to plot case studies against sites in current-day Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Belarus, I explore the changing morphologies of relic translations that occurred throughout the duration of shifting Catholic prerogatives and colonial presences in the Baltic. The very physical and discursive mutability of relics as religious, political and cultural indexical signs evinces their continuing and evolving role as not only symbols of the region's shared past, for Catholics and non-Catholics alike, but also diplomatic agents in shaping the region's culturally distinct representation within larger everchanging European nation-states, suggesting a relationship between the figure of saints and that of states, wherein a story of mutation is echoed in both sites, whereby death of a saint is used to revitalize life of a state through repeated display. Here the architecture of sacred ritual-as-diplomacy gets folded into many forms

of governmentality, religiosity, spirituality, and affect at different historical moments to suit different agendas, collective and individual.

**Dariko Mazhidenova**, Institute of Diplomacy (Astana, Kazakhstan)

### Francois de Callières on the role of conducting negotiations

The Thirty Years' War put an end to the system of relations in Europe that allowed hegemony of supranational factors in the person of the Pope or Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. By eliminating the medieval unity of Catholic Christianity, the Westphalian world changed the system of international relations to the increasing priority of national interest of this or that realm.

Diplomatic service was evolving together with the current demands of states foreign policy, especially France. Consolidating France as a leader in the XVII century facilitated its reach of zenith in diplomacy and improvement of diplomatic and protocol practice. It is not only the practice of the Westphalia Treaty but the Ryswick and the Iberian Peace Treaties, trade agreements and military unions had a decisive influence on the dynamic development of the French diplomatic service.

In 1716, the book of the French political figure, diplomat, Francois de Callières *On the manner of negotiating with sovereigns* was produced. As the accredited envoy he served in the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, he took part in negotiations on the Peace of Ryswick of 1697 between France and its adversaries united in the League of Augsburg. He was awarded the title of the Plenipotentiary in the course of the Peace conference.

The problems analysed in the works of de Callières, particularly the range of negotiating problems, had never been studied before by researchers, therefore, it became unique. The author managed to summarise the experience of the European diplomacy in general and the French one having described institutions of the diplomatic service of the 17<sup>th</sup> and early 18<sup>th</sup> centuries and historically formed norms of the diplomatic protocol. For the first time in the history of diplomacy the negotiation process was analysed that was conditioned by the role it played at that period. There was an increasing interest in the process of conducting negotiations.

It is known that negotiations have had an ancient history; they have been the instrument of settling disputes and conflicts between realms. This instrument had never been the subject of special consideration before. This classical work was a big success among contemporaries up to the 19<sup>th</sup> century and has been a valuable guidebook on diplomatic practice.

According to de Callières, the negotiations are a complex process of fight, mutual dialogue, and search for rapprochement, concessions and compromises.



Some ideas are certain to have been embodied in the negotiation strategies in the modern diplomacy, for example the so-called 'joint problem-solving'.

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**Arnaud Parent**, Mykolas Romeris University (Vilnius)

### **Crisis in the Wild Fields: How the litigation between the Republic of the Two Nations and the Khanate of Crimea was settled (1760–1763)**

In 1761, a serious dispute arose between the Republic of the Two Nations, or Poland-Lithuania, and the Tatar Khanate of Crimea. The Khan of the Tatars, Kırım Giray, complained about the Polish Prince Stanislaw Lubomirski, *podstoli koronny*, the Crown Deputy Master of the Pantry. In 1760, some Nogay tribes, who lived in the north of the Khanate, rebelled against the Khan, after he had significantly increased the contributions. These tribes then crossed the border to settle in the south of Poland, in the domains of Prince Lubomirski. Responding to this intrusion, the Prince's men robbed the goods of the Nogays. In retaliation, the Khan arrested citizens from the Republic who were in Crimea, and demanded a reparation of 150,000 *pistras*. As to Prince Lubomirski, he reminded them that Nogays, in trespassing along the border to establish themselves in Podolia, infringed the Karlowitz treaty of 1699. For this reason, he demanded the departure of the tribes and the payment of 155,568 *pistras* as a compensation for the revenues he says he had been deprived of during the occupation of his lands.

Such a stand by the two parties could have led to a *casus belli* between the two states. Fortunately, thanks to the mediation of French ambassador in Warsaw, the French ambassador in Turkey, the French consul in Crimea, the Prince of Moldova, and the good will of the Polish, represented by the Great-Hetman Branicki, and Tatar parties, the matter was solved in 1763. Would the negotiations have failed, a war between the Republic and the Khanate would have broken out, with unpredictable consequences for the stability of south-eastern Europe.

Though this litigation is known, the details of its resolution are not. Diplomatic correspondence found at the Wroblewski Library at the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences sheds a new light on the settlement of the dispute: the different stages of the negotiations, events that jeopardized their successful ending, and the ways the mediators found to overcome the obstacles to reach an agreement satisfying to both Poles and Tatars.

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**Emilio Pérez Blanco**, Universidad Complutense de Madrid

### **An Ambassador's Correspondence: the Case of Genoa and Francisco Moles (1694–1695) during the Nine Year's War**

At the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Europe was immersed in war. In 1688, France launched a vigorous offensive

that soon mobilised all of Europe against the imperial pretensions of Louis XIV of France. Spain joined the war in 1689. Due to its scattered territories around France and the significant amount of material and diplomatic resources it could offer, the Spanish Monarchy was a fundamental part in the war effort against France.

The reign of Charles II of Spain is being reviewed by historians as a key period in both Spanish and European history. In particular, a network of fine diplomats from every part of the European territories held by Madrid was displayed throughout Europe in an attempt to underpin the defence of the Monarchy. This paper studies the diplomatic efforts of Francisco Moles at the embassy of Spain in Genoa in a critical moment for the traditional alliance that had linked both Mediterranean powers since the French bombing of Genoa in 1684. Moreover, a new battle front appeared in Northern Italy where Savoy fought also as Spain's ally until 1696. In this paper, the role played by this ambassador is explained, by analysing the embassy accounts and Francisco Moles' letters sent to the Governor of Milan and the Spanish ambassador in Rome. It will focus on two different events/sources: the embassy accounts and Genoa as an observatory post of the Hispanic monarchy in the Mediterranean Sea. The analysis of this correspondence and the accounts allows to demonstrate the importance of the Western Mediterranean Sea as an operational area in the Nine Year's War for Madrid and its allies.

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**Antanas Petrilionis**, Vilnius University

### **Prisoners of war in the diplomacy of Teutonic order and Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 14<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> centuries**

In June 1383, the grand master of the Teutonic order, Konrad Zöllner von Rotenstein declared war on the grand duke of Lithuania, Władysław Jogaila. Amongst many reasons for such a declaration was that instead of releasing the Teutonic Knights from their captivity, Jogaila sold them as serfs to Ruthenians, in that way breaking all previous agreements to maintain peace. The goal of this paper is to present research on how prisoners of war were used as a means of conduct for negotiations between the Teutonic Knights and grand dukes of Lithuania. One of the components reflected in the peace negotiations between Teutonic order and Lithuania during fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was the question of prisoners of war. In this period of conflict there were numerous instances of Teutonic Order's officers doing their best to free their brethren from pagan, later Christian, captivity. Likewise, we find the grand dukes of Lithuania seeking to ransom their subjects, too. Eventually 'friendly meetings', as contemporaries called it, at the border of both countries became not just an opportunity to exchange captives but also a chance to start negotiations on other matters as well.

Although the peace treaties instructed both parties to release prisoners as soon as possible, the reality was different and the accomplishment of such terms was disturbed by the

tension of conflicting sides. Valuable and important captives that could potentially bring handsome ransoms or political benefits were kept for an extended period of time. On one hand captives were used to pressure other side in ongoing conflicts, on the other hand they were released faster in attempt to improve the relationships between the Knights and Lithuanians. Due to that, negotiations were conducted more often. This paper focuses on the importance and status of captives in truces and peace treaties and also analyses how both dealt with delays or other circumstances that hindered diplomatic negotiations and exchanges. if necessary in cooperation with other imperial ambassadors.

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**Petr Prudovskiy**, Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA)

### **Provoking a Conflict – Settling a Conflict: How Russian and Brandenburg-Prussian Diplomats Were Overcoming Their Political and Cultural Differences (1650–1700)**

The relations between the Tsardom of Moscow and Brandenburg-Prussia in the half-century preceding the outbreak of the Great Northern War (1700) and Frederic III's elevation to become 'the king in Prussia' (1701), were the two events that marked Russia's and Prussia's struggle to join the ranks of European great powers, are commonly perceived as a succession of loosely linked episodes in the story of the clash for power in Europe. Seen as a continuous evolutionary process, however, their bilateral relations, as will be demonstrated in this paper and as corresponds to the way they were construed by the actors themselves, show a completely different picture. Seen through this optic, Russo-Brandenburgian contacts can be placed within a narrative framework of initial collision followed by the gradual overcoming of differences, reaching a compromise and a search for cooperation. This logic can be demonstrated both on political and cultural levels.

Political controversies and conflicts during negotiations were initially caused by Brandenburg's and Russia's polar positioning on the emerging map of European alliances. The settlement of these conflicts can be linked to the gradual realization by both parties that they had common interest in resisting the Swedish imperialism as well as Polish-Lithuanian 'anarchy'.

In the cultural dimension the two states' interactions developed against a background of steady growth of knowledge about the partner's circumstances, ways and traditions. This helped to placate the initial apprehension, on the elector's side, against Muscovite 'barbarians' and their presumed threat to 'civilized nations' and gradually to reach a certain degree of common ground on the political level. However, this pattern was punctuated several times by fierce ceremonial conflicts, as in a clash between the elector Frederic-William and the Russian secretary Grigorii Bogdanov (1656), which caused much confusion in historiography. Based on new archival evidence and contemporaries' accounts, this study explores

the semantics, genesis and particularly the ways of settlement of both heated political disagreements and violent ceremonial outbreaks between Russian and the electors' diplomats, and demonstrates how these appeasing efforts led to the ultimate conclusion of an alliance between Peter the Great and the elector Frederic III on the eve of the Great Northern War.

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**Nathalie Rivere de Carles**, University Toulouse Jean Jaurès

### **Parrhesia in Early Modern Diplomatic History and Drama: an unexpected tactic of appeasement?**

Early modern theorists recommended that the ambassador speak with measure and great care. Such prudence became associated with a form of cryptic servility. However, in *The Ambassador* (1603), Jean Hotman promoted a more direct speech style as he argued that the ambassador should not 'mignonize and painte out his speeches' (I, §7). Hotman insisted that 'an ambassage and a comedie are different things' and required truthfulness. Contrary to Wotton's stance then, the ambassador's rhetoric is not solely based on lies and dissimulation, it can include bold and frank speech, a type of speech known as parrhesia.

This paper intends to probe the existence of parrhesia as a possible form of diplomatic speech. It will explore the existence of an unexpected broker of agreement: the diplomat as parrhesiastes. Parting with Demosthenes' indictment of actors as ambassadors in *On the False Embassy*, we will confront historical examples and theoretical views of frank speech in diplomacy with stage experimentation of diplomatic parrhesia in two of Shakespeare's plays: *Henry V* (c. 1599) and *The Winter's Tale* (1611). Using the prism of theatre presents an opportunity to stress the symbiotic relationship between theatre and diplomacy and the wargaming role of drama when it comes to diplomatic tactics.

First, we will examine two historical cases of parrhesia in Renaissance diplomacy (Bianca d'Este and Jean Bodin) and Hotman's response to one of them in *The Ambassador*. As Michel Foucault defined parrhesia through the observation of Euripides' tragedies, we will then turn to early modern theatre and see how it offers a refined definition of diplomatic parrhesia emphasizing its anti-tyrannical function. Finally, we will see that theatre is not only a method of definition but an exploration of the performativity of parrhesia in a diplomatic context, and more particularly when dealing with a tyrannical authority.

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**Marius Sirutavičius**, Vytautas Magnus University (Kaunas)

### **Means to maintain peace: Para-diplomatic activities between Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Muscovy in the Sixteenth century**

Relations between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Muscovy in the sixteenth century were relatively

complicated due to territorial claims followed by military conflicts. However, even during the peaceful periods they remained tense due to mutual accusations regarding the violations of peace or truce treaties and not being able to agree on the prisoner exchange question, reoccurring attacks on merchants or armed clashes on the border. Inter-state relations were also significantly impeded by the disagreement on the titles of the rulers, when Lithuania refused to acknowledge new titular components of Muscovite monarch's title, which were put into place to ensure the increasingly higher status of the ruler. As neither side agreed to compromise, official relations between the main representatives of the state rulers were broken off, and inter-state interaction was relegated to a lower level – contacts between high ranking officials of both states. Although these contacts were often initiated and controlled by the Muscovite and Lithuanian monarchs, but they were treated as semi-official and unofficial contacts of an interpersonal nature. This paper will look into these para-diplomatic practices, with a more detailed analysis of the situation when these forms of contact were chosen, in order to reveal more on the topic of the main participants of these contacts, their competencies and responsibilities. We will also discuss equally important problem of the contents of these contacts – the questions of inter-state relations, which were to be solved with the help of the aforementioned diplomatic communication. We will also discuss the formal aspects of para-diplomatic contacts by discussing the ceremonial used during these contacts and will look into any possible correlation with official methods of diplomatic interaction.

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**Luise Scheidt**, University of Cambridge

### **The Peace of Venice. The Representation of Venice as a Diplomatic Force in the Palazzo Ducale**

In 1577, a great fire consumed large parts of the Palazzo Ducale in Venice and destroyed most of the interior decoration. In line with the exterior restoration of the Gothic palace, the Senate decided to commission a new programme of interior decorations. Soon after the fire, two noblemen were appointed with the task to design an iconographical programme for the decoration of the entire Great Council chamber and the adjacent chamber. According to the manuscript, the paintings were supposed to 'represent diverse enterprises of the Republic of Venice' as well as numerous examples of the virtues of the Venetian citizens (Copies of the manuscript can be found in Venice, Biblioteca del Museo Correr, Cod. Cicogna DLXXXV–105, and Libreria Marciana, Mar. It IV, 22 (5361). After the programme was approved by the Senate, several of Venice's most distinguished artists were commissioned to provide paintings for the vast project that would continue for several decades. This paper will explore a crucial part of this decorative programme that has received little scholarly attention to this date, focusing on a picture cycle depicting the 'Peace of Venice' which represents the Venetian

Republic as a crucial diplomatic force in twelfth-century Italy. The new picture cycle draws on the original fourteenth-century frescoes in the chamber which also portrayed the conflict between the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa and the Pope Alexander III, during which Venice acted as a mediating force. According to the Venetian narrative of these historical events of the twelfth century, the Venetian Republic lay on the interface of the conflict between these two main powers, who split the political scene in the Italian peninsula at the time, but was ultimately able to negotiate a peace treaty in 1177. Yet, scholars have pointed out that the events depicted and their literary representations do not accurately portray the historical events and rather exaggerate the importance of the Venetian Republic and her diplomatic involvement. As in other parts of the myths of Venice, the story about Venice's involvement in the negotiation of this peace treaty was a 'falsified history', used in order to represent the Republic in a specific light. This paper will briefly outline the historical events that surround the Peace of Venice, before tracing the development of this fabricated history through early modern Venetian sources. The paper will then analyse the representation of this story in the council chambers in order to shine light on the relevance of this self-representation as a major diplomatic force for the Venetian Republic.

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**Jonathan Spangler**, Manchester Metropolitan University

### **Operating from a point of weakness: Diplomats from Lorraine at the peace talks from Westphalia to Utrecht**

Most diplomatic studies focus on the actions of representatives of the great powers as directors of major shifts in European alliances and policies. As is becoming increasingly known, however, a large proportion of European states were of the small to middling sort, and the diplomatic activities of these minor players could often be crucial to the development of negotiations for war or peace on the wider stage. The Duchy of Savoy stands out as punching above its weight in terms of size, partly through skilful dynastic strategies of its ruling house, but also the simple fact of its strategic location—and famously 'winning the peace' in the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713. A duchy of similar size and a similar history of strategic dynastic alliances, Lorraine, did not enjoy as much success, in part due to a lack of natural frontiers. Easily occupied by France in times of war during the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the dukes of Lorraine thus had few cards to play when it came to sending representatives to the major peace talks of the period: Westphalia, Nijmegen, Rijswijk, Utrecht. For the first three of these, the duke of Lorraine was dependent on the goodwill of a patron, first the King of Spain, then the Holy Roman Emperor. At Utrecht, the Duke sent his own representatives, laden with the requisite gifts and bribes, but they were forbidden from even entering the formal discussion rooms, again, as the French argued that an occupied state had no official ranking or place in negotiations. Nevertheless, even at this point, the Duke

of Lorraine relied on a more powerful patron, this time from the unexpected quarter of Queen Anne of Great Britain. This paper will examine the various envoys sent by the dukes of Lorraine to peace talks from Westphalia to Utrecht to see how, from a position of weakness, they attempted to gain advantages for their master in the limited means available to them.

**Michael Talbot**, University of Greenwich

### **‘Restoring the world again to a good state’: Ottoman proposals for mediation during the War of the Austrian Succession**

Following the successful conclusion of the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699, the Ottoman Empire increasingly sought and offered mediation during periods of conflict with and between its European enemies and allies. States



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that had previously been primarily trading partners, the French, the British, and the Dutch, took on a new role as the *mutavassit*, mediator, in times of conflict and, as part of the reciprocity of the notion of friendship so central to Ottoman diplomacy, the Sublime State in turn proffered its mediation to its allies when they fought each other. This paper will consider the ways in which the Ottoman Empire in the mid-eighteenth century attempted to employ ideas of justice and equity in time of war, strongly linked to solidifying and protecting its borders in order to justify conflict or conflict resolution. Letters in Ottoman Turkish, Italian, and English sent to London from Istanbul during Ottoman-Russian wars, and British-French conflicts that spilled into the Ottoman Mediterranean, provide an insight into how the Ottoman state developed a diplomatic language that used tropes and terms firmly rooted in the Ottoman tradition, but that was also specifically aimed at an international audience. Focusing on Ottoman-British correspondence during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–8) an analysis of Ottoman official letters to London provides insights into a little-known feature of Ottoman diplomacies of peace-making in the eighteenth century.

**Kathrin Zickermann**, University of the Highlands and Islands, Scotland

### **Alexander Erskein (1598–1656): Swedish Resident, War Councillor, and Peace Negotiator**

Alexander Erskein was one of the most complex and significant personalities within the Swedish military apparatus of the Thirty Years War. Born to Scottish parents in Greifswald he embarked on a remarkable career in Swedish service from the late 1620s which encompassed administrative as well as diplomatic duties. The growing trust in his abilities as war councillor and resident culminated in Queen Christina's order that Erskein should become involved in the negotiations of the military settlement at the peace congress in Westphalia. In light of the multiple important positions Erskein maintained it is surprising that the existing scholarship has so far neglected his role. This paper aims to close this gap by focusing on Erskein's career and his identity as a Scottish-Pommeranian man in Swedish service.