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**INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (U)**



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# DIA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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## VIETNAM AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

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
**SOUTH VIETNAM**

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**VIETNAM  
AND  
RELATED DEVELOPMENTS**



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South Vietnam Situation Report

Fighting between US Army elements and VC-NVA forces erupted in the Dak To area in the central highlands on 7 November. Although only preliminary information is available, the action could signal the start of the long-expected enemy offensive in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces. A number of reports in the past few months have referred to enemy preparations for attacks on military installations, troops, and population centers in the area.


An ARVN observation post manned by one company in Dinh Thuan Province came under attack from an estimated enemy battalion. Small arms and automatic weapons fires were exchanged; the enemy also employed 60-mm mortars. Friendly forces were supported by armed helicopters, an AC-47 and armed reconnaissance aircraft. The ARVN force was reinforced and the last report stated that contact was continuing. Interim results are 10 enemy killed and one detained while friendly troops lost 21 killed, 33 wounded and four missing.

In Binh Long Province, sharp fighting took place near Loc Ninh when elements of the US Army 1st Infantry Division engaged an enemy force near the Cambodian border. This encounter, which reportedly lasted an hour, brought enemy losses during the series of battles since 29 October to almost 1,000 killed. Allied maneuver elements are continuing to pursue enemy units subordinate to the four regiments believed to be deployed in the Binh Long area.

A press report states that a US 1st Division Battalion was ambushed in the Loc Ninh area on the 7th resulting in the death of the battalion commander and 17 of his men. Later actions resulted in 20 more US being killed and 112 being wounded. US forces reportedly killed 238 NVA/VC Tuesday in this heavy fighting on the Loc Ninh battlefield.

(Continued)

# SOVIET 122-MM ROCKET



### CHARACTERISTICS

|                |                               |
|----------------|-------------------------------|
| LENGTH         | 76 INCHES                     |
| WEIGHT         | 100 POUNDS                    |
| WARHEAD WEIGHT | 41 POUNDS                     |
| FUZE           | POINT DETONATING              |
| OPTIONS        | QUICK AND TWO DELAY           |
|                | OPTIONS                       |
| RANGE LAUNCHER | 12,000 YARDS EST              |
|                | SINGLE TUBE MOUNTED ON TRIPOD |

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Updated statistics on the previously reported engagement between South Korean Army units and NVA forces in Khanh Hoa Province on 6 November indicate that 113 of the enemy were killed and 30 wounded.

Fighting elsewhere on the 6th was at a low level. The most significant attacks were launched in Quang Nam Province; 40 rounds of mortar fire hit a Regional Forces post before an enemy assault was launched, and 100 mortar rounds struck Duy Xuyen District Town prior to an attack by a small Viet Cong maneuver element. In the Mekong Delta, Highway 4 in Dinh Tuong Province was cut at three locations by explosives. According to COMUSMACV, the road has been interdicted at 12 places in the last three days. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

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Enemy Weapon Positions in South Vietnam Similar to Those in Cambodia

Communist elements that attacked Pleiku City in South Vietnam with 122-mm rockets on 26 October may have rehearsed for that operation in Cambodia earlier this year.

Recent photographs of the Pleiku area showed 122-mm rocket positions similar to those reported in northeastern Cambodia in July. A series of excavations had been detected earlier in the Tonle San area of Cambodia, which are believed to be weapon-associated. These excavations have increased to 54 and may be used for training. ~~(SECRET)~~ Sec. 3.3  
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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Prior Planning Revealed in North Vietnamese Use of Chinese Airfields

Hanoi and Peiping apparently had prepared contingency plans for North Vietnamese MIGs to recover at Chinese bases along the border, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424

After mounting an 18-minute combat patrol from Gia Lam Airfield on 6 November, two North Vietnamese MIGs reported a low fuel state and were ordered to "follow the plan," implying that the MIGs wanted to return to Gia Lam. Later, the ground controller told the MIG pilots to land at Ningming as soon as they made "visual contact" with the field because "they have no controller" -- probably a reference to the lack of a Vietnamese-speaking tower controller at the field.

It is likely that contingency planning for the use by North Vietnamese MIGs of Chinese airfields was accomplished some time ago. They initially sought the sanctuary of China in December 1965 when more than 50 flew to Peitun-Yunnani in southwest China.

As the tempo of the air war picked up and the prospects of Phuc Yen remaining a sanctuary dimmed, the North Vietnamese and Chinese no doubt reached an agreement on the use of fields near the border for recovery purposes. The lack of a Vietnamese controller at Ningming on 6 November suggests that the plan had been agreed upon in principle but that no firm date for use of the border fields had been established.

~~(SECRET)~~ Sec. 3.3(b)

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
NR Discouragement Evident in North Vietnam

A high-level North Vietnamese diplomat in Paris -- Sec. 3.3(b) (1) - has reportedly admitted to a foreign correspondent about to visit his country that there is some discouragement with the war there. He is said to have told the newsman last month that he might meet some malcontents. 3.3 acknowledged that the government had committed errors and commented that there was always a "fringe of dissatisfied people" who were discouraged, who criticized, and even deserted.

The overseas Chinese community in North Vietnam has shown some antiregime feelings. In a mid-October letter, a Chinese in Haiphong mentioned the disrupting effects of air strikes near that city -- the people suffered greatly because there was no time to eat or sleep in peace. A note of resignation was evident in his remark that one of the interdicted bridges in the area was repaired quickly, although he supposed it would be "knocked down soon again."

The letter said that one district of Haiphong had had to refuse any more Chinese refugees because of a lack of accommodations. Twice a week, a large group of them would wait in line for passport forms, presumably so they could leave Vietnam legally. The writer thought that a wholesale evacuation of Haiphong would probably begin soon. ~~(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~~

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Summary of Air Strikes Against North Vietnam, 7 November

A total of 310 US aircraft conducted strikes against North Vietnamese targets on 7 November.

Four USAF F-105s on armed reconnaissance observed two MIG-21s approximately 56 miles north-west of Hanoi. One of the MIGs fired an air-to-air missile which passed underneath the flight causing no damage. However, the missile detonated on the aft section of an F-105 in another flight. Although damaged, the F-105 returned safely.

Four USAF F-4Ds observed one MIG-21, approximately 72 miles west of Hanoi. The MIG appeared to be trying to draw off US fighter aircraft by firing two air-to-air missiles. The F-4Ds attempted to engage but the MIG egressed the area with no damage being done.

Of the sorties flown, 47 were against the following significant targets:

| <u>Sorties</u> | <u>Target</u>               | <u>BDA (Pilot Reports)</u>                               |
|----------------|-----------------------------|--|
| 4              | Tung Tu Railroad Siding     | Numerous railcuts observed.                              |
| 8              | Thang Quang Railroad Siding | Numerous railcuts observed.                              |
| 16             | Ha Gia Railroad Bridge      | Estimate heavy structural damage to the bridge.          |
| 4              | SAM Site 234                | Four SHRIKES launched, signal intermittent thereafter.   |
| 3              | SAM Site 5                  | One SHRIKE launched, signal went down two seconds later. |
| 12             | Uong Bi Highway Bridge      | The south span heavily damaged.                          |

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Armed Reconnaissance Strike Results

|                        | <u>Destroyed</u> | <u>Damaged/<br/>Cratered/Cut</u> | <u>Struck<br/>(No Report)</u> |
|------------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Boat repair yards      |                  | 1                                | 11                            |
| Bridges                | 2                |                                  | 2                             |
| Bridge approaches      | 1                | 1                                |                               |
| Highway/road segments  |                  | 12                               |                               |
| Railroad rolling stock | 3                | 15                               | 20                            |
| Railroad segment       |                  | 1                                |                               |
| Transshipment area     |                  |                                  | 1                             |
| Trucks                 | 5                | 2                                | 112                           |
| Truck parks            |                  | 1                                | 10                            |
| WBL craft              | 30               | 17                               | 41                            |
| AAA                    | 3                | 1                                | 14                            |
| Buildings/structures   | 27               |                                  | 1                             |
| Bunkers                |                  | 4                                |                               |
| Field gun positions    | 5                | 5                                | 13                            |
| Radar sites            | 2                |                                  | 14                            |
| Storage areas          |                  | 9                                | 12                            |
| Troop concentrations   |                  |                                  | 2                             |
| Command post           |                  |                                  | 1                             |
| SAM Sites              |                  |                                  | 2                             |

Three aircraft were lost due to enemy action. A USAF F-4D on a MIGCAP mission was downed by an air-to-air missile fired by a MIG-21 about 90 nautical miles west-northwest of Hanoi. Two good chutes were observed and one beeper heard. One of the pilots was recovered. SAR for the other pilot continued. A USAF F-105D on a strike against the Dai Loi Railroad Bridge Bypass was down due to unknown causes 11 nautical miles west-northwest of Hanoi. A good chute was observed and a beeper was heard. SAR was not initiated due to hostile environment. A USAF F-100F was downed by ground fire nine nautical miles north-northwest of Dong Hoi. The crew ejected over water and was recovered. (~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~)



R [ Large Military Shipments to Southern North Vietnam  
Continue ]

The shipment of large quantities of military supplies continues to be reflected in communications by elements of the NVA's General Directorate of Rear Services located in southern North Vietnam.

Since mid-October, messages have referred to the movement or projected movement of several types of ammunition for field and antiaircraft artillery, mortars, and small arms as well as explosives, mines, foodstuffs, and POL. Units in the DMZ area are probably recipients of these supplies. The 559th Transportation Group, believed to be the major logistic unit in the area, has been frequently mentioned in the messages. (~~SECRET~~ [Sec. 3.3])

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
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# **SUPPLEMENT**

## **THE STRUGGLE FOR NAM BAC** **IN NORTHERN LAOS**



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## NR THE STRUGGLE FOR NAM BAC IN NORTHERN LAOS

The Nam Bac area -- the most northern part of Laos under government control -- is the first line of defense for the royal capital of Luang Prabang, and its loss would almost certainly have severe economic, political, and military implications for Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's government.

The Royal Army (FAR) has encountered a series of military setbacks around Nam Bac this year. In March, it suffered a defeat at Mok Plai, and in June, several battalions were made ineffective for combat when STOL Site 176 was overrun. The exposed position of the 36th Battalion at Pha Yong was seized in mid-August. An accidental bombing at Mok Loc on 31 August caused the defenders to abandon their positions and flee to Nam Bac, thus leaving the southeast anchor of Nam Bac's defenses exposed. None of these positions has been retaken.

In September, the FAR planned to use Nam Bac as a staging area for a drive east to link up with the forces of Brig Gen Vang Pao in Military Region 2 and to push west toward Muong Sai; the latter operation was abandoned because too few troops were available. The eastward offensive was intended to secure the Nam (River) Ou Valley and thereby increase security for the Luang Prabang area. By late October, however, plans for this operation were abandoned, and the defensive perimeter began shrinking in the face of heavy pressure. Defending units had suffered many casualties, primarily from mortar attacks, and morale was low.

It was under these circumstances that an estimated three-battalion enemy force -- well supported by mortars -- attacked in the Nam Bac area on 25 October. The major thrust (two battalions) was at the artillery positions at Phou Kou, slightly to the south; other attacks were made to the north and east. The Communists were, however, beaten back, and the FAR's losses were small. Air support was timely and accurate, and morale has increased since the assault was repulsed.

The military situation has been complicated by the presence of large numbers of refugees from Pathet Lao-held areas. They have caused increased security problems and have further strained the FAR's marginal supply lines. The FAR has also been weakened because it lacks an over-all defense plan, centralized command, adequate patrolling, and proper fire control. About 16-17 per cent of the FAR's combat strength is at Nam Bac, and the area can, therefore, be reinforced only at the risk of greatly weakening defenses elsewhere. Military leaders in the south, in fact, think that too many troops are already committed there; moreover, since they have had to accept units shot up at Nam Bac, they are concerned lest the enemy attack in some of their areas.

FAR forces in the area consist of 11 infantry battalions with supporting air and artillery units. There is also a significant number of irregular forces that carry out harrassing and intelligence operations. The FAR commander in chief believes that his 4,450 officers and men are more than adequate to cope with the Communists near Nam Bac.

In September, the enemy had some 1,400 troops available, organized into one North Vietnamese Army (NVA) battalion, two Pathet Lao (PL)-NVA battalions, and one PL battalion with NVA advisers. Three other PL-NVA battalions totalling 1,200 men were within two days' march and the 335th NVA Independent Regiment at Dien Bien Phu -- but probably with elements in Laos -- was four days away.

The large amount of traffic noted coming from North Vietnam recently on Routes 6 and 7 indicates that a large stockpile of supplies is now available in northeastern Laos, and continued construction on Route 19 north of Nam Bac could mean that the enemy intends to introduce additional men and materiel into the area.

The US Embassy in Vientiane believes that Nam Bac is in no danger of being overrun at this time. The FAR plans to reorganize its defensive forces, and Col Bounchanh Savathphayphane, Chief of Staff of the Northern Tactical Zone, will take personal command of

of them. More artillery will be brought in and patrolling operations will be implemented.

Nevertheless, the 26 October attack may indicate that the Communists intend to recapture this strategic position. It is estimated that they can if they draw on additional NVA forces and are prepared to accept heavy casualties. (~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~)

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