

# THE STONE AND THE OLIVE BRANCH

Four Years of the Intifada  
From Jabalia to Madrid

December 1991

*The  
Jerusalem  
Media and  
Communication  
Centre*

***The Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre***

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**9 December 1991**

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" Dr. Haider, 'Abd el-Shafi

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Four Years of the Intifada  
From Jabalia to Madrid

*"We come to you from a tortured land and a proud, though captive, people, having been asked to negotiate with our occupiers, but leaving behind the children of the intifada, and a people under occupation and under curfew, who enjoin us not to surrender or forget. As we speak, thousands of our brothers and sisters are languishing in Israeli prisons and detention camps, most detained without evidence, charge or trial, many cruelly mistreated and tortured in interrogation guilty only of seeking freedom or daring to defy the occupation. We speak in their name and we say: set them free..."*

*Dr. Haider'Abd el-Shafi*

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## **1. PREFACE**

On 9 December 1991 the Palestinian uprising will have endured for 48 months or 1,461 days, putting the claims of former Israeli Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin that the trouble would 'all be over by Christmas [1987]'<sup>1</sup> into perspective. Contrary to the expectations of many, the intifada has sustained itself for four years in spite of overwhelming odds, and has contributed considerably to the recent political developments.

The aim of this document is to provide an overview of the activities, and an analysis of the developments, of the intifada from the first protests which erupted in Jabalia refugee camp, to the participation of the first group of Palestinian delegates drawn from the occupied territories at the Madrid peace conference. It does not seek to cover the whole range of anti-occupation activity in its minutiae, nor to produce a comprehensive record of the abuses of Palestinian human rights. At best it will offer a summary of the major elements and an analysis of the significant trends in order to contribute to a better understanding of its nature and its results.

The document will examine the four years in two distinct phases: the first two and a half years from December 1987 to August 1990 and the last year and a half which has been inevitably affected by the Gulf crisis and war. Particular attention will be given to the developments of the past year. In addition, the document will consider three separate arenas of activity: Palestinian, Israeli and international.

An essay by Palestinian delegate, Ghassan al-Khatib examines the way in which the intifada

has contributed to the convening of the peace conference. A wide variety of sources, Palestinian, Israeli and international, have been used as well as JMCC's own data base and field work. All sources are acknowledged in footnotes.

## **2. INTRODUCTION**

As the intifada enters its fifth year several trends can be identified in the nature of Palestinian protest activity and Israeli methods of control over the occupied territories.

The trend away from constant high levels of mass mobilisation has continued, although the Palestinian population has shown itself to be willing and able to take to the streets in response to particular incidents, and recently demonstrated in large numbers in favour of peace. The move towards individual acts of protest, often involving the use of force, has continued, with levels of activity generally rising in direct correlation to the use of violence against Palestinians.

The Israeli army has developed a policy of lowering the level of its military presence and activity against the Palestinian population, relying increasingly on undercover operations and the work of Palestinian collaborators to eliminate individual activists. Collective punishment, like restrictions on movement and employment, and other methods of bureaucratic control have increased, with the formalisation of the pass-system in the spring of 1991. This restricts the supply of Palestinian labour within Israel and cuts off different segments of the occupied territories from one another, denying access in particular to the cultural and commercial centre of Palestinian life, East Jerusalem. Whilst this

move towards the wholesale segregation of Palestinians from Israelis has continued, there have been recent attempts to remove some of the innumerable economic sanctions, particularly in Gaza, which restrict Palestinian industrial development. However, the degree of economic pressure imposed on Palestinian agriculture continues unabated. There has been a marked increase in the rate of land seizure and tree uprooting, coupled with the unprecedented intensity of Israel's settlement drive; it should be noted that all three phenomena have coincided precisely with the US-led peace initiative in the Middle East.

*"The Palestinian uprising, or intifada, began in December 1987. Was it designed to be yet another bloody milestone on a road with no end? Or was it in fact something quite different? Did it possibly have the potential of altering the unstable status quo in some way, perhaps by challenging Israel's superior strength in a way that previous conventional wars had not done, perhaps by creating a climate propitious for a serious diplomatic process towards a just peace, perhaps by generating new confidence and flexibility on the part of the PLO, perhaps by inducing a sense of urgency on the part of the United States and other major powers toward giving it higher priority on their international agendas?"*

Michael C. Hudson

### 3. THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING

#### Aims of the Uprising

The long-term goals of the Palestinian uprising were clearly an end to the Israel occupation and the creation of a Palestinian state. The first communique of the Unified Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) spoke of the "insistence of our national demand for self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state"<sup>2</sup>. At the meeting of the Palestine National Council (PNC) in Algiers in November 1988 the PLO clarified that the Palestinians were seeking a solution based on the terms of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and simultaneously recognised the jurisdiction of UN resolution 181<sup>3</sup> by declaring the existence of the Palestinian state. At a press conference on 14 December 1988, Arafat elaborated further: "[We] seek a comprehensive settlement among the parties concerned in the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the state of Palestine, Israel and other neighbours, within the framework of the international conference for peace in the Middle East, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and so as to guarantee equality and the balance of interests, especially our people's rights to freedom and national independence and respect the right to exist in peace and security for all."<sup>4</sup> The convening of a peace conference was seen, therefore, to be an integral stage in the long term process of creating a Palestinian state.

The intifada set itself a number of important short-term goals which can be divided into two spheres of activity; aiming to change the internal structures and attitudes which govern the lives of Palestinians in the occupied territories, to "extend the practice of refusin



to obey the orders of the occupation authorities";<sup>5</sup> and striving to alter the balance of power, thereby destroying "the myth of coexistence with the occupation"<sup>6</sup> and persuading Israel, and by extension the world, of the urgent need to find a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Internally, the plan was to disengage from the Israeli occupation infrastructure and achieve a much greater level of Palestinian self-reliance and unity of purpose in a number of different arenas. The local economy was to be bolstered whilst consumers disengaged from the Israeli one. Palestinians were no longer to participate in the controlling bureaucracy of occupation, nor were they to pay taxes and allow the Israelis to benefit financially from the occupation. Just as important, however, was the willingness to change fundamentally the attitude and spirit of Palestinians living in the occupied territories. Palestinians were to develop their sense of self-confidence and pride by means of the unifying strength of their struggle. "The ranks of the passive or resigned have been decimated by the positive measures of the intifada...The triple division of society among those who accept the occupation, those who actively and hatefully reject it and those who, while not accepting it, have chosen 'steadfastness' as their behavioural norm, has broken down. The entire society is now for resistance, and therefore the intifada."<sup>7</sup>

The short-term external aim of the intifada was to redraw the Green Line (the ceasefire line which had served as Israel's border until 1967) irrevocably and force Israel to recognise that the status quo was no longer tenable, and that there was profound opposition to their "creeping annexation" of the West Bank and

Gaza Strip. Palestinians were to force the world to listen to their "narrative"<sup>8</sup> and recognise the legitimacy of their cause. By resorting to essentially non-violent methods of protest they were to recapture the moral high ground in the struggle, harness international support and prove that weakness can be a strength.

*"The intifada is an idea, it is a frame of mind, it is a way of collective self-consciousness, it is a form of internal liberation and emancipation, and as such the intifada is a source of life, not death; and it will continue to give birth to new forms for the Palestinian's existential resistance, until freedom has been achieved...It is totally misguided to try to determine its strength or being on the basis of the number of marches that are held on any one particular day..These are, after all, determinants of form, not substance, and while forms constantly change, the substance is there to stay."*

Sari Nusseibeh,  
*Al-Fajr English*, 10 October 1990.

#### The Nature of the Uprising Mass Protest

The intifada initially found its most dramatic and visible expression in the huge demonstrations which characterised the first few months of the uprising. Literally thousands of men, women and children took to the streets in almost every town, village and refugee camp of the occupied territories to protest against the occupation. Road blocks and barricades were hastily erected, walls daubed with defiant graffiti and tyres set

alight as an entire population made manifest their protest. A consensus emerged early on in the uprising that the protesters should eschew weapons, using predominantly non-violent methods of protest. The use of stones and molotov cocktails was sanctioned, however. Stones were swiftly to take on a symbolic role, since the Palestinians were able to challenge Israel's superior power and military might through the use of mass protest and stone-throwing in a way which the combined forces of the Arab armies had previously failed to do, proving the veracity of one of the intifada's earliest slogans that "weakness is strength". The UNLU took to addressing its communiques to the "children of the stone"<sup>9</sup>, announcing that "we have beaten the 'undefeated' army and economically weakened the occupation."<sup>10</sup> Stones also provided the media with their most telegenic and enduring image; that of a Palestinian population, like David, facing the Goliath of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF).

The huge demonstrations began in Jabalia refugee camp in the Gaza Strip on the 9th December 1987, in angry protest against the killing of four camp residents the previous day, in a road collision between an Israeli truck and a car full of Gazan workers, at the Eretz Gate.<sup>11</sup> In the course of the protests which followed the IDF shot 16-year-old Hatem al-Sisi in the head. He was to be the first of nearly 1,000 Palestinians killed in the uprising.

The demonstrations spread like wildfire across the Gaza Strip and then to Balata Refugee Camp in the West Bank, and from there the short distance to Nablus, finally setting all of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, ablaze. By the end of the first week 11

Palestinians had been shot dead and countless others injured in a Israeli crackdown which was surely to contribute to the dynamics of the uprising. "Simply put, Israeli repression triggered the mobilisation of an entire population."<sup>12</sup> As 1987 drew to a close a wholesale civil revolt was already in progress and "Israel had lost complete control over the Palestinian population...The instruments of occupation were damaged beyond repair."<sup>13</sup>


It is hard to find meaningful statistics on the number of demonstrations and clashes which have taken place during the last four years, since the local press, and by extension Palestinian information offices, were only able to report on a fraction of the incidents, and were further hampered by military closures and the censorship of information. Figure 1 is compiled from Israeli army sources, but the figures exclude Jerusalem and are deceptive because they give no indication of the size and intensity of each clash; a demonstration of 3,000 people is counted as one incident; as to is a minor hit and run raid against a foot patrol organised by six boys under the age of ten. This statistical skew is particularly visible in the relatively low number of incidents recorded in the first year of the uprising.

The IDF, which had been initially unprepared to deal with a civil revolt of this nature, did gradually adapt to the new rules of the game. They were able to ensure, through the implementation of a complex series of military orders, increased repression and new tactics of engagement, that huge and uncontrollable groups of demonstrators were no longer allowed to amass. As the uprising entered its second year the pattern of mass demonstrations and clashes gave way to a

Figure 1

# CLASHES

Dec 1987 - Nov 1991



Source: Israeli Army Records

Total no. clashes = 162,759

greater number of smaller and more agile groups of protesters. It was not only Israeli army tactics which worked against the mass participation of the population in demonstrations; natural dynamics also had their effect since high levels of civilian mobilisation cannot be maintained indefinitely. The number of these smaller clashes between demonstrators and the military peaked in May 1990 with the massive wave of protests which erupted in the wake of the Rishon Lezion killings. This was a racially-inspired attack against Palestinians by an Israeli civilian who was, however, dressed and armed like a soldier. He killed seven and injured 11 when he opened fire on a group of Gazan workers at a road junction near Rishon Lezion. A further peak in demonstrations and clashes occurred in the wake of the incident at al-Haram a-Shareef (or Temple Mount as it is designated by the Israelis) in October 1990, when 17 Palestinians were killed and at least 150 injured on Islam's third holiest site.

The marked decrease in activity at the beginning of 1991 coincides with the imposition of total curfew throughout the occupied territories at the beginning of the Gulf War. Breaking the curfew became perilous in the extreme during this period since the IDF relaxed the open-fire regulations and threatened to deal with any Palestinian protest activity in the harshest of manners. Although the level of clashes and demonstrations has risen significantly since the blanket curfew was lifted, mass activity has been steadily declining during 1991. However, it is a mistake to treat an analysis of the number of stones thrown, of clashes and demonstrations as a reliable index on the 'health' or 'weakness' of the intifada.

*"In the long run, the significance of the uprising does not lie in the individual acts of resistance. Rather, a new consciousness has been created which now provides a solid foundation for future struggle. The intensity of demonstrations may oscillate, with periods of relative calm, but communities are now able and ready to mobilise."*

**Towards a State of Independence, FACTS Information Committee, Jerusalem.**

#### **Popular Committees**

From the very beginning of the uprising, the communiques of the UNLU <sup>14</sup> stressed the need for popular organisation in the form of national committees which would direct the activities according to the exigencies of each particular area, and help in the development of self-reliance and the continuation of the intifada. A Gaza communique of 8 January 1988, which preceded the evolution of a unified leadership, stressed that "the success of the strike and the continuation of the uprising depend on our ability to be creative, as witnessed by the formation of national committees and other frameworks which cannot be contained by the occupiers...Have you joined committees to support the strike? Have you joined national committees in your neighbourhood? If no such committees exist, take the initiative to form them and gather your people around you. The address of the national committees is clear: it is yours, hers, mine and we shall all rally around them."<sup>15</sup>

The previous decade had seen the development of an infrastructure of unions, committees and charities throughout the occupied territories. Profiting from these experiences in social organisation and participation, the Palestinians were able very swiftly to build a comparable network of popular committees to support and sustain the uprising. These popular committees ranged, in their focus of activity, from agriculture and the formation of a home-based economy, to medical, educational, judicial, food-distribution, and cleaning and guard duties. The great advantages of these grassroots organisations was that they were flexible, resilient and wide-ranging, drawing their members from all strata of society, and creating genuinely mass organisations. These committees created a casual hierarchy of command as they interpreted and put into action the demands of the Unified Leadership. Simultaneously, strike forces of hard-core activists were created, which operated as underground cells, and busied themselves with the more overtly dangerous tasks of the uprising such as dealing with collaborators, attacking IDF patrols and writing graffiti.

Baffled by the apparent invisibility and anonymity of the leadership of the uprising, the Israeli authorities did not act against the popular committees until 15 August 1988, when they declared them illegal and embarked on a series of mass arrests. The imprisonment of those they deemed to be committee leaders, however, did no more to halt the uprising than the assassination of Abu Jihad in April 1988 had done.<sup>16</sup> The communiqués of the uprising continued to appear in spite of occasional Israeli announcements that they had caught all the members of the Unified Leadership. The uprising was not being

directed by a leadership in the conventional sense, it was a genuine grassroots, mass movement and arrested members were quickly replaced.

The Israeli authorities are still fighting this phenomenon as former Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin testified shortly before handing over office: "Anyone who thinks that the deportation, the detention of 500, 3,000 or 5,000 people will end the intifada - doesn't understand what kind of a problem we are facing. This is not a confrontation with a terrorist organisation. This is a popular uprising by a people with a different religious, cultural and national entity."<sup>17</sup> It is difficult to obtain information about the current degree of committee activity, however, because they have been declared illegal and forced underground. This in turn has meant that the essentially popular nature of their membership has perforce been changed. Increasingly, the committees have been reduced to their activist strike forces. The genuinely popular and socially supportive committee structures have remained in place, and flicker into action erratically when required. The hardship caused by the extended "war curfew", for example, led to the mobilisation of many communities within the confines of their houses.

Graffiti immediately established itself as one of the most visible and widespread methods of protesting against the occupation, as well as operating as community bulletin boards for coordinating intifada activities, and keeping the population informed of the decisions of their committees. As the uprising gathered momentum the walls and houses of the occupied territories were plastered with slogans and statements of defiance, painted in

the colours of the Palestinian flag. Graffiti was a factor which contributed psychologically to the redrawing of the Green Line, since it became instantly clear when one was entering Palestinian territory. The Israeli authorities have responded to the writing of graffiti with great severity, making it legal for the IDF to respond to the perpetration of the act with gunfire. In addition, they have indefatigably forced local Palestinians out of their beds at night on "clean up" operations and have imposed fines of NIS150 on anyone on whose property it appears. Nonetheless, it is still a prevalent gesture of protest and communication.

### Strikes

By far the greatest proportion of intifada activity has been non-violent and has taken the form of civil, or national as some Palestinians prefer to call it, disobedience, and internal, "nation-building" preoccupations. A study conducted by the Palestinian Centre for the Study of Nonviolence in May 1989 analysed the content of the UNLU leaflets for the first quarter of 1989 and concluded that 86% of the 264 calls to various kinds of action had consisted of non-violent forms of protest.<sup>18</sup>

Strikes are the most visible and were one of the most immediately effective weapons of the uprising. One of the earliest communiqués of the uprising, issued in Gaza on 12 January 1988, stressed the value of the strikes and called on the people to chant in one voice:

"Down, down with the occupation,  
Down with the Iron Fist.  
We want self-determination,  
and a Palestinian state.  
Our weapon is the strike,

And the popular committees.  
We are behind the PLO,  
Until our cause is won."<sup>19</sup>

The uprising has two forms of strike at its disposal. The first is the general strike which has the advantage of being a highly visible expression of nonviolent protest bringing life in the occupied territories to a total standstill, preventing Palestinian workers from attending their jobs in Israel, and also unifying the population, and strengthening its resolve on these "days for the intensification of the struggle."<sup>20</sup> The second form of strike is the commercial strike which provided the uprising with its first tangible victory against the occupation.

The first general strike of the uprising took place as early as 16 December 1987. It was followed by an all-out strike on 'Peace Day', 21 December 1987, in which the participation of the Israeli-Arab and Bedouin population was considered significant.

The high number of strike days and the subsequent withdrawal of labour, particularly in the first months of the uprising, began to have an immediate effect on certain sectors of the Israeli economy, such as the construction industry, which are heavily reliant on cheap Arab labour.<sup>21</sup> Yitzhak Rabin manifested the Israeli government's sense of impotence in the face of the strike by threatening to replace Palestinian workers with imported Portuguese or Turkish workers, in an effort to force Palestinians to "understand that work in Israel is an advantage that we provide, not a favour that they extend to us."<sup>22</sup> By the end of the first year of the uprising, former Israeli Finance Minister Moshe Nissim estimated that the

overall Israeli production losses during 1988 were equivalent to 2-2.5% of the total production of the business sector, with the construction and textiles industries, along with tourism, particularly hard hit.<sup>23</sup>

The Unified Leadership has aimed to organise strike days sufficiently far in advance for the Palestinian community to accommodate. In addition, the Islamic movements, such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement), began issuing directives for their own individual strike days as early as June 1988.

The commercial strike began in Jerusalem on 14 December 1987, while tension in the city was heightened as a result of Israeli Housing Minister Ariel Sharon's well publicised take over of a house in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City.<sup>24</sup> The strike continued uninterrupted into January, and was bolstered by similar strikes in urban centres all over the occupied territories. The merchant class, effectively mobilised, began organising themselves into co-ordinating committees in order to combat the IDF's anti-strike tactics - such as forcing shopfronts open with a crowbar, or welding them shut - and to find ways to enable the strike to continue indefinitely.<sup>25</sup> By 12 January, shopkeepers announced that they would open their shops for three hours a day, thus allowing the community to purchase essential goods and themselves to stay financially afloat, whilst still maintaining the protest. The Israeli response to these strikes was later to be cited by Yitzhak Rabin in answer to a journalist's question about which were Israel's "major blunders" during the uprising; "yes, opening commercial stores by force. That was a mistake and we have learned proper lessons from it."<sup>26</sup> The Israeli

authorities were determined to prove that they still had control; throughout January and February 1988 soldiers tried to force shopkeepers to open and close their businesses according to IDF directives. It turned into a battle of wills and created unprecedented levels of cooperation within the Palestinian community, with metal-workers repeatedly repairing shop fronts free of charge, groups of boys mounting 24 hour anti-looting vigils on shops which had been broken open, and the Palestinian community doing their shopping only during UNLU-designated periods, regardless of whether the army had physically opened the shop front.

The "war of the shops" was a turning point; in the words of Palestinian historian, Mahmoud Ibrahim it "brought the bourgeoisie into the fold, participating very fully and effectively in the uprising."<sup>27</sup> UNLU communiques began referring respectfully to the merchants as "pillars of the intifada". The last battle for control over the shops took place at the beginning of May 1988 when the Israeli authorities issued a military order demanding the closure of all shops in the occupied territories from 5-8 May in retaliation for the general strike day on 4 May. After a prolonged struggle to impose this order forcibly the Israeli authorities abandoned this approach, conceding defeat.

The half-day commercial strike is still in effect. Although it is being observed with less discipline in certain areas, it remains one of the most visible expressions of the intifada.

The UNLU has recently begun calling for full shopping days as a way of breaking the monotony of the constant half-day strike. Communique 69 for example, issued in April

1991, called for three full working days within a two week period.<sup>28</sup> The shopkeepers of Jerusalem were also urged in Communiqué 74<sup>29</sup> to remain open all day for a period of one week in September 1991 in order to protest against the encroachment of Jewish settlers and to manifest that the city is the centre of Palestinian life by urging Palestinians from all over the country to visit it.

#### Disengagement from Israeli Society.

The process of disengagement from Israel's controlling bureaucracy and economy has been one of the cornerstones of the uprising's philosophy. It is a process comprised of two elements; the first is active disengagement involving a boycott of Israeli products and taxes, as well as the withdrawal of labour. The second is the ideal of self-sufficiency and the policy of strengthening the Palestinian infrastructure, by expanding economic production and developing alternative institutions. By way of example, the UNLU decided to change from winter to summertime in accordance with Arab norms rather than Israel's directives. Thus Palestinians have operated on Palestinian time and this has constituted a small gesture towards disengagement which has nonetheless provoked the IDF's wrath.

#### Tax Revolt

The issue of taxation was a focus of resentment which had been growing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the twenty years of occupation. It was a widely held conviction that the Israeli authorities had been profiting increasingly from the system of taxation - taking more out of the occupied territories in tax revenue than they were investing in them or providing as services. The

budget of the occupied territories has for many years been "an official secret" and when Al-Haq, the West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists, pressed the Civil Administration for these figures they were assured that it was a "matter of security."<sup>30</sup> However, sources such as Meron Benvenisti, the director of the West Bank Data Base Project, have stressed in response to Israeli anxieties about the cost of the occupation, that "occupying the territories was not a burden on the Israeli tax payer, rather the contrary."<sup>31</sup> While Palestinians in the territories are eligible to begin paying income tax at a much lower level than their Israeli counterparts,<sup>32</sup> it was the imposition of Value Added Tax in July 1976<sup>33</sup> and the subsequent amendments to the tax, which provoked mass protest amongst the Palestinian community. By 1987 VAT from the territories was contributing approximately US\$50 million in annual revenue to the Israeli exchequer.<sup>34</sup>

The tax boycott was perceived as the most effective way of rendering the occupation unprofitable, as well as forming an integral part of the process of disengagement from Israel. UNLU communiqués first raised the idea in February 1988 and by April they were openly encouraging the participation of both the domestic and commercial sectors in the boycott. "We salute our people and our national institutions, and especially the economic institutions, who refused to pay taxes. We issue a warning to those who paid and note that the large factories and businesses should also follow the boycott."<sup>35</sup>

The boycott was adhered to throughout the occupied territories and some groups, such as the merchants of Ramallah and Qalqilia, were quick to announce coordinated action on this



front. The Israeli authorities, for their part, were determined to break the revolt by any bureaucratic means in their power. They also turned to more brutal methods of control, most notoriously in the case of Beit Sahour. Early on in the intifada, the residents of Beit Sahour, a small town in the Bethlehem district, had decided to present a unified front involving the wholesale non-payment of taxes in both the commercial and the private sectors. By September 1989 the residents were continuing to resist extreme forms of pressure and had become something of a *cause celebre*. As they explained in a press conference: "Why do we not pay our taxes? First, the military authority does not represent us, and we did not invite them to come to our land...no taxation without representation. Second, the collected taxes are used to increase the harsh measures against our people. Must we pay for the bullets that kill our children, the growing number of prisons, the expenses of the occupying army, the luxuries and weapons provided to collaborators?"<sup>36</sup> The measures which the Israeli authorities were to apply on Beit Sahour, however, have been applied innumerable times all over the occupied territories in other, less publicised, tax raids.

Defence Minister Rabin, announced plans in September 1989 to impose a long-term curfew as well as a bureaucratic stranglehold on the residents of the town, declaring: "We are going to teach them a lesson there...We will not allow this kind of civil disobedience, and we have to pass through this test. We should tell them, forget it, even if the curfew on Beit Sahour lasts two months."<sup>37</sup> In the end Beit Sahour endured 40 days of regular raids. Mass arrests were carried out, private and commercial property to the value of an

estimated \$5 million<sup>38</sup> was seized, along with identity cards. All communication with the outside world was suspended as telephone lines were cut, the media and foreign dignitaries banned and the area declared closed. In addition the Israeli authorities imposed increasingly restrictive bureaucratic regulations which, for instance, involved the enforced renewal of identity cards, requiring the signatures of eight different departments of the Civil Administration; all activity became impossible without first paying tax.

It is hard to ascertain to what degree the tax boycott has effected the level of revenue in the long term since detailed statistics are unavailable. The initial effect was considerable, however, with Israeli officials declaring that it was down by as much as 32%. Subsequently, the Civil Administration announced that it would substantially reduce the services which it supplied in the occupied territories because of the decrease in levels of tax revenue.

#### **Economic Boycott & the Creation of a Home-based Economy**

The economic boycott was another effective form of disengagement from Israel's control, which made considerable gains for the intifada. Its purpose was two-fold; to encourage the development of an independent Palestinian economy by striving for economic self-sufficiency; and simultaneously to decrease Israel's revenue from the occupied territories by boycotting their goods. Prior to the intifada, Palestinian shops were heavily stocked with Israeli goods, even when there was a Palestinian alternative available. All that changed with the beginning of the uprising; a UNLU communique of January

*"The struggle against the occupation has essentially been a political conflict with important economic, social and cultural aspects. It is not an economic struggle with political aspects. Strikes, boycotts, refusals to pay taxes - these are primarily political tactics to mobilise as many people as possible into the struggle against the occupation. But the results have indeed transformed the occupation into an economic burden for Israel."*

**Azmy Bishara, The Uprising's Impact on Israel.**

1988 signalled the commencement of the boycott and by March it had turned into a principle factor in the drive for Palestinian self-sufficiency. Not only were factories called on to increase their output and to raise their standards, but the entire population was encouraged to concentrate on building a home economy by putting gardens and spare land to use.

The effects on the Israeli economy were immediate, and although it became clear early on in the uprising that they would not prove crippling, they did ensure that the occupation was no longer a financial asset to Israel. By the end of the first year of the uprising, MK Gad Ya'acobi announced that the value of Israeli exports to the territories had fallen from US\$928 million a year in 1987 to US\$650 million in 1988. By the end of May 1989 a Bank of Israel representative stated that Israeli export to the occupied territories had dropped by 40%. Similarly, the Civil Administration announced in May 1989 that,

in response to the decline in the level of tax revenues during the intifada, budget cuts were being implemented in health and welfare services for Palestinians.<sup>39</sup>

Certain areas of the Palestinian economy, most notably the manufacturing industries, have gone on to profit from the economic boycott. Palestinian businesses have taken advantage of the boycott to expand production, invest in new technology and improve quality. New business ventures have also been able to profit from the Civil Administration's loss of control in the first two years, by beginning production without the obligatory and virtually unobtainable Israeli licenses. Subsequently these ventures - such as the Shark electrode company in Hebron, or the Nablus nappy factory<sup>40</sup> - have been allowed to continue to operate. Other sectors of the Palestinian economy such as agriculture and tourism have not been so fortunate and they have continued to suffer extensively from Israeli punitive measures.

#### **Resignations: the Withdrawal of Labour.**

As part of the strategy of disengagement, Palestinians who were working for the police, in certain targeted departments of the Civil Administration and for the municipalities were encouraged to resign from their jobs by the UNLU. Mass resignations from the police, tax, planning and car licencing departments began in March 1988. By April of the following year, and in spite of threats, beatings and even a number of financial incentives, Palestinians in these sectors refused to return to their jobs.<sup>41</sup> Former Israeli Police Minister Chaim Bar-Lev complained that he no longer had the means to police the occupied territories due to the

mass resignations of Palestinian policemen and the prohibitively high cost of replacing them with Jewish police, who are paid on average 40% more. In the Gaza Strip only 20 out of 430 Palestinian police officers employed before the intifada remained at work.<sup>42</sup>

Democratic elections held in 1976 in the West Bank had led to the appointment of a predominantly pro-PLO mayors. However, these elected mayors were subsequently fired by the Israeli authorities and replaced with candidates of their own choice. With the beginning of the uprising mass resignations took place amongst these mayors and municipal councilors as well. The Civil Administration was forced to close down offices due to lack of staff, or funds or general inability to retain in control.

Workers in Israel were also encouraged to leave their jobs whenever possible, particularly jobs in Jewish settlements, although it was always recognised that a total boycott of work in Israel was not feasible. UNLU communique reveals this level of pragmatism: "we also call upon workers not to waste opportunities for alternatives to working across the Green Line."

However, as the uprising has endured into its fourth year, and the economy has been crippled by the Gulf war, financial resources, both of private individuals and of Palestinian institutions, have become increasingly limited. As the level of unemployment has soared to as much as 55% in Gaza, it has proved increasingly difficult for Palestinians to sustain a permanent boycott of work in Israel. One of the most poignant facts to emerge recently is that, according to Israeli sources, an estimated 20-22,000 Palestinian men are currently employed in the construction of

***"The most graphic indication of Salfit's liberation are the institutions closed by the Civil Administration, vandalised, burnt outbuildings that look as if they had been left behind by a withdrawing army and overrun by the rebels. This year, in rapid succession, the Civil Administration shut its local employment office, two vocational training centres, a health centre, the local magistrate's court, the post office and the telephone switchboard installed under British Mandate...The police station was also abandoned in a shambles."***

Jerusalem Post, 16 June 1989.

Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.

#### Arson and the Use of Arms

Arson was a method of protest which characterised the early phases of the intifada in particular, and which was one of the measures which contributed to the psychological re-drawing of the Green Line. This phenomenon mainly involved burning the parked cars of Jewish settlers, members of the Civil Administration and the Israeli military, who had crossed the Green Line, although Civil Administration offices were also targeted.

Israeli army sources have recorded nearly 1,200 incidents of arson over the past four years and the trend has been in slow but steady decline from a monthly average of 29 incidents during 1988 to an average of 15 so far this year. Israeli Ministry of Police figures have recorded a further 1,500 incidents of

Figure 2





Figure 3



arson during the past four years, most of which have occurred within the boundaries Israel, predominantly targeting the Jewish settlers in occupied East Jerusalem.

From the beginning of the intifada firebombs, better known as molotov cocktails, were sanctioned for use in the uprising against the IDF. The Israeli authorities have imposed increasingly harsh measures to combat this phenomenon. In March 1988 the open-fire regulations were extended to permit Israeli soldiers to shoot at anyone who throws or attempts to throw a molotov. The collective family punishment of house demolition against molotov throwers was also sanctioned.

Figure 2, which is compiled from Israeli Army statistics<sup>43</sup> reveals that the phenomenon of throwing firebombs increased steadily until the new open-fire regulations were established in March 1988. It then remained at a fairly constant level throughout 1989 and 1990, beginning to rise again in October 1990; this upward trend has continued into 1991.

The attitude to the use of arms during demonstrations was different; a consensus emerged early on in the uprising that protesters should eschew the use of weapons. This policy was rigorously applied during the first year of the uprising, when less than 15 incidents involving gunfire or hand grenades were reported in the territories.

Figure 3, also compiled from Israeli army statistics demonstrates that gunfire use has risen slowly throughout the past three years, although it seems reasonable to assume that a large share of these incidents are attributable to attacks against collaborators. The use of handgrenades in raids against

military targets, however, has accelerated sharply since the end of the Gulf War. It seems certain that handgrenades and guns have always been available to Palestinians, albeit in limited quantities, from existing concealed caches or from Israeli military and civilian sources.<sup>44</sup> It appears, therefore, that the recent upsurge is a result of a change in tactics rather than in availability.

The trend in other kinds of violent incidents - mainly knife attacks and deliberate vehicle assaults on pedestrians - has followed a similar pattern, with notable increases occurring during the past year.

### **Collaborators**

The question of how to deal with Palestinians known to be collaborating with the Israeli authorities has been one of the most difficult issues of the uprising. Since the Israeli authorities organise the activities of collaborators, and in the absence of a Palestinian infrastructure for policing, judging and imprisoning, other methods of controlling the phenomenon needed to be found. Al-Haq distinguishes between two types of collaborator in Palestinian society<sup>45</sup>: the first are those who act as middle-men between the authorities and the Palestinian population, obtaining permits and licenses, often for a substantial fee, and either selling land directly to Israelis or fronting land deals, and generally oiling the wheels of the Civil Administration. The other sort of collaborator is altogether more dangerous; they act as informants, keeping the Israeli authorities up to date with political developments, denouncing wanted men, helping soldiers carry out raids and arrests and sometimes also participating in the entrapment of wanted men through the undercover activities of Shin Bet.

From the beginning UNLU leaflets, describing it as a process of "national cleansing", urged collaborators to come forward, confess to the nature of their activities and hand in their weapons; forgiveness would be forthcoming, it was assured. A sizeable number of public reconciliations between collaborators and their communities did occur.<sup>46</sup> Later on in the uprising, however, as on 26 April 1989, the UNLU leaflets announced a "day of reckoning" for collaborators, specifically advocating violence against them. By December 1990, when the phenomenon of collaborator-killing seemed to be running out of control, the UNLU began issuing unequivocal orders forbidding these killings unless they were authorised by the highest Palestinian authority; orders which they continue to repeat.

As the IDF adapted its policy of dealing with the uprising by relying less on undirected, general force and more on intelligence activity to target core activists to arrest, and later sometimes deliberately to kill, the risks which collaborators presented to the Palestinian community intensified. Shin Bet was transforming itself, concentrating "on identifying activists and quickly thwarting more popular actions, like processions and demonstrations - the gist of this change being the difference between a security service and a secret police. The intifada also forced the Shin Bet to spread its own network even further and thinner, recruiting more agents and running them under conditions far more complex than in the past."<sup>47</sup> Part of the rise in the phenomenon of killing collaborators, then, can be attributed to the risks that informants pose to wanted men living underground, who view the elimination of collaborators as their only means of self-

*"At the beginning of the uprising the decision was taken to work towards 'national cleansing'. The collaborator confessed publicly and declared readiness to stop [working with the Israeli authorities]; the people declared their readiness to forgive. Those who refused to do so were expelled from their residences. This situation remained unchanged until after the Israeli authorities began to organise the collaborators and return them to their residences having first armed them. Until recently the military authorities arrested 'wanted' Palestinian activists. Now they kill them instead. This serious matter would not be possible without the help of these collaborators. The killings are carried out selectively. For example, one of the nationalists confronted a collaborator and asked him publicly to stop acting against his own people. The following day the collaborator pointed him out to the army and the activist was shot in the main square of Ramallah...Deeds such as these changed people's attitudes. It is fair to say that Palestinian killed 120 persons in the last six months; it also needs to be noted that they only killed a total of 140 [collaborators] in the last 20 years."*

Faisal Husseini, Director of the Arab Studies Society.

defence. Collaborators have been armed since the beginning of the occupation, but as the risks which they face have intensified, the Israeli authorities have offered increased protection, providing them with high-tech communications equipment<sup>48</sup>, turning their houses into military observation points or resettling a number of them inside the Green Line. By the beginning of 1990, 280 collaborators had been resettled within Israel.<sup>49</sup>

Collaborator-killing became a marked phenomenon during the spring of 1989; since then it has remained at an erratic, but high monthly level. More than 400 suspected collaborators have been killed since the beginning of the uprising. During recent months this issue has been debated in the Palestinian press, within the confines of Israeli censorship in which it operates. Al-Fajr, for instance, ran a series of editorial in June 1991 in which Palestinians called for a public campaign to put a stop to the phenomenon; quite apart from the ethical issues involved, "by killing people without proper ruling or judgement...we are playing into the occupation forces' hands."<sup>50</sup>

#### Palestinian Diplomatic Initiatives

The outbreak of the intifada marked the beginning of an intense period of debate in the Palestinian camp about the platforms for the new Palestinian programme. King Hussein's abrogation of Jordan's legal and administrative ties with the West Bank<sup>51</sup> in July 1988 was the first positive development in the international arena, and it cleared the way for a Palestinian initiative which would consolidate the achievements of the intifada politically.

The first public signal of a change in thinking was the publication at the Algiers summit in June 1988 of *Prospects of a Palestine-Israeli Settlement*, an official PLO document, written by Bassam Abu Sharif. It signalled a radical departure from traditional PLO policy, since it was an explicit endorsement of a two-state solution.<sup>52</sup> Meanwhile, residents of the occupied territories had begun calling to their leadership outside for a major political initiative. An analysis of the UNLU leaflets of this period reveals a shift away from internal preoccupations about how to organise and develop the uprising, towards diplomatic and political concerns, sometimes even incorporating direct calls to action on behalf of the United Nations<sup>53</sup> or the Palestine National Council (PNC). UNLU Communique 25<sup>54</sup>, calls on the PNC to use the intifada to achieve the national rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, repatriation and the establishment of a Palestinian state under the leadership of the PLO. Communique number 28 urges the PNC to adopt "realistic resolutions and political programmes for the sake of our people and to end the occupation and establish our independent state"<sup>55</sup>. A group of prominent Palestinians in the territories, headed by Faisal Husseini, released a '*Document for Independence*' the declared purpose of which was "to shift the intifada from the realm of stones on the battlefield to the realm of political initiative."<sup>56</sup>

This increasingly moderate spirit, combined with a determination politically to capitalise on the achievements of the intifada, culminated in the historic decisions which were taken at the 19th meeting of the PNC which opened in Algiers on 12 November 1988.

**"This [PLO two-state] peace plan could not have been offered had it not been for the intifada in the occupied territories. The intifada is the mother of the peace plan, and it will prove to be the mother of peace in our part of the world."**

Nabil Sha'ath,  
PLO advisor.

**"Arafat's speech tells the world that peace cannot be achieved through conditions or ignoring the facts, but only when enemies face each other politically, diplomatically and realistically."  
Al-Quds.**

During the course of this meeting, the PNC indicated its willingness to co-exist peacefully with Israel, through its acceptance of the terms of UN Security Council Resolutions 242, as well as announcing "the establishment of the state of Palestine over our Palestinian soil - and its capital Holy Jerusalem". In addition, the PLO called for the convening of an international conference under the auspices of the UN, reaffirmed its rejection of terrorism in all its forms, and stressed that the future relationship between the "states of Jordan and Palestine will be based on confederal foundations". Within ten days of the adoption of this new political programme, 60 nations had recognised the Palestinian state, including two of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council<sup>57</sup>. This number had risen to 160 by March 1989.

To clarify the new Palestinian position for the international community, Yasser Arafat addressed first the United

Nations at a special session convened in Geneva<sup>58</sup> on 13 December 1988, and then the world's media at a press conference the following day. Arafat proposed a new three-point plan<sup>59</sup> for the convening of a peace conference within the framework of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and reiterated his commitment to a two-state solution. To this he added an explicit renunciation of terrorism and the following day US-PLO dialogue was resumed.

***"In the past few weeks the diplomatic aspect of the Palestinian problem has changed shape more radically than at any time since Israel occupied what used to be British Mandatory Palestine in June 1967...roles have been reversed."***

Sir Anthony Parsons, former British Ambassador to Iran.

The decision to send a 14 delegate team from the occupied territories to the Madrid peace conference as part of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation marked the next Palestinian diplomatic development. The consensus of Palestinian opinion took the view, in the wake of the Gulf war, that the renewed American commitment to getting a peace conference off the ground was genuine, and that - in keeping with the spirit of the intifada - they should seize the possibility of articulating and negotiating their own position rather than relying on others to do it. Sa'eed Hammadi, deputy director of the Palestine Affairs Centre in Washington, articulated the general view when he said "through their four year



intifada, Palestinians won the right to be represented in Madrid and thus should not stay away. The tremendous energy of the intifada and the high price the Palestinians paid...by challenging the Israeli occupation have opened the doors of Madrid for them and forced United States President George Bush and other heads of state to recognise that they must play a role in the Middle East peace."<sup>60</sup>

The opportunities presented by the Madrid peace conference were numerous. The Palestinians were given the chance to relate their own "narrative" to the world, asserting the legitimacy of their cause. They were able to demonstrate their national identity in a self-confident and proud manner, thus regaining much of the world's respect and sympathy, initially earned with the intifada and then temporarily suspended during the Gulf war. In the words of Dr. Haider'Abd el-Shafi in his rebuttal speech of 1 November 1991: "the Palestinians are a people with legitimate national rights. We are not 'the inhabitants of the territories', or an accident of history, or an obstacle to Israel's expansionist plans, or an abstract demographic problem. You may wish to close your eyes to the fact, Mr. Shamir, but we are here in the sight of the world, before your very eyes, and we shall not be denied."

#### Recent Developments in the Intifada

There were two events during the course of 1990 which were to exert an influence on the nature of the intifada; these were the two mass killings of Palestinians. The first was the racially motivated killing at Rishon Lezion on 20 May. There are a number of locations in Israel, known as *slave markets*, where unemployed Palestinians who hold the

necessary permits, gather and wait to hire themselves out as day labourers. The junction at Rishon Lezion is such a place, and about 100 Gazan workers had collected there that morning when Ami Popper, dressed as a soldier, demanded to see their identification cards, before shooting into the crowd. Seven Palestinians were killed in the incident and a further eleven were seriously wounded.

A wave of protest began in Gaza as news of the incident spread across the Strip. Black flags were hung in the streets as people tried to mourn the dead. The Israeli army's response was to impose curfew and step up the military presence. Three Palestinians were killed in the demonstrations that day and a further five on the day after. In fact, the IDF registered a higher number of clashes during this month than at any other time during the intifada, with over 7,500 confrontations taking place and more than 700 Palestinians being arrested during the last week of May alone.<sup>61</sup> This was a return to the mass mobilisation which had characterised the first months of the intifada.

As well as rekindling the spark of mass protest, which even spread to Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan for the first time, the incident at Rishon Lezion exacerbated a trend towards individual acts of violence which had been growing since the end of the first year. Bomb attacks,<sup>62</sup> molotov cocktail incidents, and other forms of armed attack all rose sharply in May and June 1990.

Whilst the rest of the world shifted the focus of its attention to the Gulf after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the intifada continued unabated in the occupied territories. UNLU leaflets of this period emphasise that "we will

not halt our struggle because of the recent events in our area." <sup>63</sup> The level of Israeli-Palestinian tension had arguably never been higher, and a number of well-publicised trials, <sup>64</sup> as well as some comments on the part of the government, <sup>65</sup> encouraged Israeli civilians to think that they could attack Arabs with impunity. A series of anti-Palestinian actions, described by the Israeli newspaper, Hadashot, as an "insane wave of hatred" <sup>66</sup>, swept across Israel in response to the discovery that two Jewish boys had been stabbed to death near Beit Haneena. An estimated 10,000 Israelis took part in the racially inspired riots which ensued, and were to be dubbed the "Jewish intifada," and the Israeli security forces did little to intervene. <sup>67</sup> Two Palestinians were killed by Israeli civilians as a result of these attacks.

On 8 October 1990 the second major incident of brutality occurred at the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, Islam's third most holy site. A demonstration took place in the holy compound after Monday prayers in order to protest against the declared intention of the Temple Mount Faithful <sup>68</sup>, an Israeli extremist group, to lay the foundation stone for the *Third Temple* on that day. The Israeli border police responded with great violence and, in contravention to all of the open-fire regulations to which they were legally bound, shot into the densely-packed crowd with live ammunition, killing 17 Palestinians and injuring at least 150. <sup>69</sup>

The pattern of Palestinian protest and Israeli reaction in response to this incident was similar to that which had followed the Rishon killings five months earlier. A wave of mass protests demonstrated the wholesale re-mobilisation of the Palestinian community.

The IDF responded with great severity, killing a further 11 Palestinians in the course of the month. This, in turn, exacerbated the trend towards targeted attacks against Israeli individuals. The number of incidents involving gunfire escalated notably in October, as did the level of other armed attacks. A stabbing incident in the Jerusalem neighbourhood of Baka left three Israelis dead and prompted extreme moves towards the racial segregation of the two populations. The pass system, designed to control the movement of Palestinians and limit the employment opportunities for them in Israel, began to be implemented and was to be fully in place by the commencement of the war.

The war provided the Israeli authorities with an excuse to try to break the intifada with great severity out of the glare of the public eye, as we shall explore in Section 4. The economic effects of Israel's policy during the war on the already embattled Palestinian economy cannot be over-estimated. The imposition of a blanket curfew, <sup>70</sup> for as much as two months in some places, paralysed economic activity in the occupied territories in three ways. It prevented Palestinian workers from getting to their jobs and pay, including the 100,000 Palestinians who earned their living in Israel. Many of these workers were subsequently fired or were denied Israeli-issued work permits, and were unable to get even the basic financial compensation which was legally due to them. <sup>71</sup>

Secondly, it had a highly detrimental effect on the agricultural sector as farmers were unable to tend to their crops - citrus farmers were able on average to pick only 12% of their harvest during this key period <sup>72</sup> - or to feed and water their livestock, many of whom

died. Thirdly, it resulted in the total closure of all factories in the territories, with the exception of thirty food and pharmaceutical companies, and even once the curfew was lifted, these manufacturers continued to face credit, cash flow, export and supply problems which were directly related to the war. Another important factor was the substantial reduction in the level of private remittances from family members working in the Gulf in general, and Kuwait in particular, which fell from approximately \$200 million before the crisis to approximately \$50 million during the war period<sup>73</sup>. This situation has been exacerbated by the return to the territories of at least 10,000 Palestinian families who used to live and work in the Gulf. They have seen the value of their savings substantially reduced due to the decline in the value of the Kuwaiti dinar, many have lost houses and property and have returned to the occupied territories with bleak prospects.

*"The population in the Gaza Strip is approaching a state of economic exhaustion. As individuals become increasingly impoverished, their ability to withstand continued economic pressure will diminish, particularly in the absence of an acceptable political solution. A 20-year old man from Jabalia..said: 'If we get to the political extreme, economic pressure will be the train that gets us there.' The potential for increased radicalisation among Palestinians and for greater violence is real and threatens...not only the nonviolent character of the uprising, but the very nature of the Palestinian struggle for independence."*

Sara Roy, *The Political Economy of Despair: Changing Political and Economic Realities in the Gaza Strip.*

The continuance of intifada activities during the period of the Gulf war was rendered extremely dangerous for Palestinians because of the application of particularly severe open-fire regulations against anyone breaking the curfew. The level of mass protest activity did rise significantly after the war, but it has remained at a lower level than in previous years. On the other hand, the trend towards violent resistance on an individual level, which became increasingly apparent during 1990, has continued. Armed attacks have risen to their highest level, as have handgrenade incidents. Also the previously declining trend of using molotov cocktails has been reversed. The war, then, may have exacerbated a trend towards individualistic action on the part of the Palestinians, but it has not effected the

underlying aims of the intifada. "The main motive for the intifada has not been effected by the Gulf War."<sup>74</sup>

The most recent development in the Palestinian uprising has been the occurrence of peaceful demonstrations in favour of the Madrid conference. These took place throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as children carried olive branches rather than stones to the soldiers and the level of confrontation clashes visibly dropped.<sup>75</sup> There was not ubiquitous support for the conference, however, since the combined factions of Hamas, the PFLP and DFLP<sup>76</sup> called for a two-day general strike to protest the Palestinian participation, and a small number of anti-peace conference demonstrations took

place.<sup>77</sup> However, there was an unprecedented level (both in terms of dialogue between opposing factions and because the Israeli authorities were not able to ban these public meetings which would previously have been construed as seditious) of mass participation in political discussion once the delegation returned from Madrid as the members of the Palestinian team attended public debates to discuss the current peace process.

The intifada, then, which did much to persuade the world of the need finally to find a just and fair solution to the Palestinian issue, and force the concentrated drive for peace which began in Madrid and is to proceed to Washington, continues to be the main source of Palestinian negotiating strength as the peace process develops.

*"Until now the intifada was with stones. Now there is an intifada with olive branches. If the Israelis want it, the intifada can come with a new face."*

Faisal Husseini, on his return from Madrid.

#### 4. ISRAELI RESPONSE TO THE INTIFADA

##### Effects on Israeli Society

Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir's initial interpretation and comment on the events of December 1987 was that there was "no cause for concern...There is nothing new in this...we have overcome this kind of thing in the past and we will do so now and in the future."<sup>78</sup> His comments reflected a general tendency to

ignore the reality of the situation, a collective misreading of the signs, which could be construed as wishful thinking. The Israeli authorities had not countenanced the possibility of a wholesale civil revolt in their strategic planning, and nor, by extension, were they prepared for its eruption in December 1987.<sup>79</sup> Therefore, the trend among politicians and soldiers during the first few weeks was to view the disturbances as either a spontaneous outburst which would as soon dissipate, or the work of outside activists who had been inciting the population.

However, it very quickly became apparent to the world at large that Israel was in fact facing a wholesale civil revolt, shattering the myth of an enlightened occupation, which Israel had been propagating for 20 years. "What Israel had so long refused to see was

*"The intifada and its repression have had profound repercussions in Israel itself, and also on that country's image in the world....What is being questioned, not only in Israel but also in the communities of the diaspora and among American Jews, who have constantly been the main defenders of the state of Israel, is in fact its character as a democratic state based on respect for universally recognised and affirmed human rights...A dangerous process of radicalisation is underway in the country, both to the left and through the strengthening of the extreme right."*

Assembly of the Western European Union.

splashed across the horizon. All that had been suppressed, quashed, shelved, ignored, papered over, pushed aside and swept under the carpet for two decades now forced its way out into the open, tearing through the veil of hypocrisy and self-deceit that what Israel had practiced for over twenty-one years was a benevolent occupation."<sup>80</sup>

The media was to play a vital role in the first few months of the uprising. Images of soldiers shooting at unarmed civilians, particularly women and children, or pounding at handcuffed youths with rocks<sup>81</sup> had an immediate effect on the international consensus, which was used to viewing Israel as the embattled victim, rather than the oppressor. Significantly, these images began to reveal cracks in the American public's formerly enthusiastic support for Israel, particularly amongst American Jewry. Israel's public consensus was also shattered as the long-held view that the status quo in the occupied territories was tenable was destroyed seemingly overnight.

It became clear as the intifada progressed that the nation was no longer unified unquestioningly behind its soldiers. On the one hand, a large part of the population were horrified by the acts which were being perpetrated in their name against unarmed Palestinians civilians. B'Tselem, the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, was founded in February 1989 in response to this anxiety. On the other, the far right, and in particular the settlers, were shocked by the loss of Israeli control, and directed their animosity at what they perceived as the feeble and failure-infected attitudes of the military. "The Left speaks of

***"For this is what the Palestinians have brought upon us by means of the intifada: they have deprived us, in the most unambiguous way, of the possibility of an 'enlightened occupation'. They have forced us to choose: territories or decency. Occupation or fairness. And, yes, that is indeed the question of the hour. An acute and urgent question, demanding an answer at once. Is it not, at this hour, a matter of territories in exchange for peace. It is a matter of territories in exchange for our humanity."***

Ari Shavit, On Gaza Beach.

brutalisation; the Right faults the military for evading its duty to stamp out the uprising."<sup>82</sup> As the Palestinians demonstrated unprecedented levels of unity of purpose and social cohesion, Israeli society polarised; politicians blamed the military - and sometimes each other<sup>83</sup> - and the military blamed the politicians for failing to tackle the political causes of the unrest which would not subside through the imposition of force alone. As well as reactivating the Israeli peace movement and the forces on the left of Israeli society, there was a notable shift to the right amongst the general population, with extremist parties such as Molodet, Tehiya and even the overtly racist Kach party, gaining sizeable increases in support in opinion polls taken as early as March 1988.

## Trends in Controlling the Intifada

### **The Use of Force**

Faced with the first huge demonstrations of the intifada, small groups of Israeli soldiers, the "skeleton force" of the occupation, responded with the unsparing use of live ammunition. By the end of the first month of the uprising 25 Palestinians had been killed and hundreds injured. On 22 December 1987 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 605, which the US significantly failed to veto, which "strongly deplored" Israel's policies in the occupied territories, "in particular, opening fire of the Israeli army, resulting in the killing and wounding of defenseless Palestinian civilians". The following day, Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin publicly announced that a "merciless policy"<sup>84</sup> had been put into action. This policy involved the deployment of a massive military presence, of crack troops in particularly sensitive areas, and of "going after the organisers" through the use of extensive arrests and administrative detention, accompanied by the threat of mass deportations.

Figure 4 records the number of Palestinians who have been killed by Israeli army action or at the hands of Israeli settlers and civilians<sup>85</sup> in the occupied territories. JMCC's figures<sup>86</sup> include anyone who was killed by Israeli gunshot, or died as a result of beating or tear gas inhalation; it also includes those who were killed as a direct result of army orders, such as being electrocuted whilst removing a flag from a electricity pole. A total of 983 Palestinian have been killed since the uprising began four years ago; this figure includes all those killed in November 1991. Figure 4 shows the age groups and causes of death. Seventy-nine of those killed have been children under the age of 12, a further 343 are under

eighteen. Eighty-five percent of the total number of the dead were killed as a result of gun shot wounds.


It soon became clear to the Israeli authorities that the widespread use of live ammunition and the resulting high fatalities were simply fueling the uprising, as well as damaging Israel's public image. In an effort to lessen the temptation to shoot from a distance, and to avoid putting soldiers in the humiliating position of having to chase after stone-throwing children, it was decided to alter the IDF policy so as to seek more direct physical contact with the Palestinian protestors, and to initiate punitive action rather than simply reacting to each provocation. Wooden clubs were issued to the army in a change of tactic which Yitzhak Rabin described as the implementation of a "policy of might, power and beatings."<sup>87</sup>

The policy of beatings did not reduce the number of Palestinians killed, however, it simply added the problem of escalating levels of casualties. Israeli journalists Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari were to comment: "the extent of the injuries caused by the new policy was harrowing. Considering that whole corps of soldiers were engaged in battering away at defenseless civilians it is hardly surprising that thousands of Palestinian - many of them innocent of any wrongdoing - were badly injured, some to the point of being handicapped."<sup>88</sup> Take, for instance, the case of Lt. Col. Yehuda Meir, who ordered his soldiers, on 21 January 1988, to bind and gag 12 Palestinians from the village of Huwara, take them to a quiet field, and systematically break their arms and legs before abandoning them. Under pressure from the public, Meir was eventually tried in March 1990.<sup>89</sup>

Figure 4

# INTIFADA DEATHS

Dec 1987 - Nov 1991



Source: JMCC records from local press

With the uprising showing no signs of abating, the IDF extended its open-fire restrictions; previously, a soldier could only open fire if his life was in danger, in which case he was required to shoot into the air, issue a warning in Arabic, before aiming for the suspect's lower body. From March 1988 these restrictions were extended to allow soldiers to shoot in response to even the threat of a molotov cocktail attack. Plastic bullets were introduced in September 1988, a supposedly "non-lethal" bullet for which there were far laxer open-fire regulations, and which could be used in non-life-threatening situations. Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin defined the purpose of plastic bullets as being "to increase the number of [wounded] who take part in violent activities, but not to kill them."<sup>90</sup> Plastic bullets do kill, however, do kill and 47 Palestinians, roughly half of those killed by gunfire between August 1988 and January 1989, died as a result of plastic bullet wounds.<sup>91</sup> A new kind of rubber bullet, which was in fact a nut of metal covered by a thin layer of rubber, replaced a less efficacious model in January 1989.

The IDF have throughout the uprising used tear gas not only to disperse crowds, but also "in such a way as to constitute a punitive measure, to harass and intimidate Palestinian residents in the occupied territories."<sup>92</sup> Tear gas canisters have been thrown onto crowds from helicopters, fired into schools, hospitals, mosques and houses leading to widespread injuries, some miscarriages and the death of 66 Palestinians. An example of this phenomenon occurred in Rafah town and camp in Gaza in February 1990, where two Palestinians were killed and 132 injured after hundreds of tear gas canisters were thrown from a military plane. 22 canisters reportedly

fell on one house alone.<sup>93</sup> Another Israeli army innovation has been the use of jeep-mounted stone-throwing cannon as a form of crowd-control, which can fire an average of 600 egg-sized stones an hour a distance of 75 meters.

The open-fire regulations were relaxed still further in July 1989 when permission was extended to soldiers to shoot at any masked Palestinian regardless of whether the activity of writing graffiti, distributing leaflets, erecting barricades or burning tyres was endangering the lives of any member of the security forces.<sup>94</sup> A prominent member of the IDF, Brigadier General Amnon Strashnow, described the new opening fire policy thus: "We say that the masked men in the street are not innocent..This is not halloween...If they run away they are in trouble."<sup>95</sup> This was a first step in consolidating the emergence of a shoot to kill policy against the activists of the intifada. Official IDF sources announced in November 1990 that sniper-units were being placed at strategic roof-top observation posts as a way of identifying the main "trouble-makers" in a crowd.<sup>96</sup>

Police Minister Roni Milo was to confirm at a later date that the open-fire regulations did involve a policy of shooting to kill, and that these rules applied to border police as well as soldiers: "when a policeman or a security man sees an armed terrorist brandishing a knife and intending to harm people this officer must shoot to kill...the existing law permits such shootings and nobody should be afraid. If anyone in the past has had any doubts or fears about shooting to kill, today these doubts should be left behind."<sup>97</sup> An example of this policy in action took place as recently as 15 November 1991 when twenty year old Musa Ghazi Abu'Eid, was shot in the Old City of



Jerusalem whilst allegedly writing pro-peace conference slogans on the wall <sup>98</sup>.

### Lowering the Profile & the Use of Undercover Squads

It was not until the end of 1989 that the IDF began profoundly to rethink their strategy for controlling the occupied territories. In November the IDF announced that they had begun implementing a new policy of keeping away from the main streets of the Palestinian population centres, particularly during busy shopping hours, since the very fact of their presence was understood to be provocative. This heralded the beginning of a new, lower-profile, less confrontational approach to the uprising, which Moshe Arens developed and extended when he took over as Defence Minister in June 1990. At this point soldiers were encouraged to avoid engaging in clashes with Palestinians in their population centres, concentrating on securing the main roads of the occupied territories, monitoring the activities of camps and towns from roof-top observation posts, and protecting the settlements, instead of trying to impose total control. They were also issued with explicit orders to avoid causing deaths, and to be particularly careful about the use of plastic bullets.<sup>99</sup>

This new tactic had an immediate effect on the level of Palestinian fatalities, which dropped by nearly 50% in November 1989, and continued on a general downward trend which was interrupted only by the major incidents such as the killings at Rishon Lezion and al-Aqsa mosque.

A crucial facet of this new policy was the increasing reliance on intelligence to pinpoint the key activists of the uprising in order to pursue them directly. Israeli journalist, Joel

*"Defence Minister Arens was trying to kill the intifada through neglect rather than through his predecessor's policy of breaking bones. Through his orders to avoid confrontation with Palestinian demonstrators, Arens hoped to starve the intifada of media coverage and thereby to kill it; out of sight out of mind. But mothers [of the uprising's dead] won't forget."*

Hamdi Farraj, a journalist from Deheishe Refugee Camp.

Greenberg, described this new tactic thus:

"In practice, that policy means using intelligence, the Shin Bet, and specialised forces to go after the 'hard-core' activists responsible for...keeping the uprising afloat."<sup>100</sup>

News began to emerge of the deployment of specially trained undercover squads in the territories as early as October 1988 when Reuters reported on the existence of two special units named Cherry and Samson.<sup>101</sup> The IDF at first vigorously denied the existence of any "unit which is authorised to act, or which acts, against the well-known rules of opening fire which are grounded in the law."<sup>102</sup> However, they did publicly acknowledge these undercover squads in an unprecedented move when, on 21 May 1991, footage was aired on Israel television which showed several of these units in action, disguised in traditional Arab garb, and sometimes in drag, but always heavily armed, and travelling around the occupied territories in local cars on arrest raids.<sup>103</sup> These revelations created a furore in Israeli society, but IDF Chief of Staff Ehud Barak justified

the decision to publicise the activities of these squads as a measure to deter young Palestinians from joining the intifada, to sow confusion and distrust amongst Palestinians and also to warn Israeli settlers driving through the territories not to shoot at Palestinian targets unless their life was genuinely in danger since they risked hitting undercover Israeli targets.<sup>104</sup>

There has been a notable increase in the number of incidents which involve the entrapment, and subsequent killing, of wanted men and intifada activists, as a result of the activities of undercover units, who are sometimes accompanied by Palestinian collaborators.<sup>105</sup> The IDF have even been known to dress up as masked Palestinian youths in order to arrest or kill wanted men,<sup>106</sup> and sow further mistrust and confusion amongst Palestinians. Forty nine Palestinians have been killed as a result of the undercover action of the Security Forces since 1989.<sup>107</sup>

Leading members of the Palestinian community were so alarmed by the activities of these hit squads that they called a press conference on the 13th August 1991 to protest against "the escalation of such summary executions by the army...a policy directly contradictory to the current peace process, deliberately creating an atmosphere of hostility and mistrust which is not conducive to peace."<sup>108</sup>

Whatever the variations in IDF tactics of engagement, however, it should be noted that the practice of sending small groups of soldiers into the occupied territories, heavily armed with battlefield weapons rather than crowd-control equipment usually used by democratic countries such as riot shields or

water-cannon, continues to result in a high level of Palestinian deaths and casualties.

#### Arrests and Administrative Detention

Mass arrests have been a feature of Israeli efforts to control the uprising since it began. It is estimated that at least 95,000 Palestinians have been arrested during the past four years of the intifada.<sup>109</sup> In order to cope with the dramatic increase in the number of prisoners, several new detention centres have been opened during the course of the intifada, the most notorious of which is a tented camp, subject to the extremes of the desert climate in the Negev, known as Ansar Three.

Mass arrest raids were used by the IDF from the start of the intifada as a means of punishing rebellious communities. By September 1988 this tactic had been formalised into a policy of going through an area "with a fine toothcomb" in order to "break" the spirit of defiance. Curfew was imposed, phone lines cut and all contact with the outside world denied by the imposition of a military closure order; observation helicopters hovered above, whilst on ground level hundred of soldiers conducted house-to-house searches, tax raids, mass arrests and supervised the demolition of the houses of activists.

The West Bank town of Qalqilia was the first to be subjected to this treatment on 6 September. During the raid an estimated 1,000 men were arrested and four houses were demolished.<sup>110</sup>

Mass arrests have also been implemented tactically to pre-empt trouble from flaring up on Palestinian anniversary days,<sup>111</sup> and as a

means of rounding-up the core activists of the uprising. A pre-dawn raid on Nablus, for example, on 13 July 1991 resulted in the arrest of 40 'wanted' men. Ehud Barak, commented that this action was a signal of the military's intention to identify and arrest individual Palestinian activists rather than engage in open confrontation with Palestinian masses.<sup>112</sup> He was to comment several days later: "the intifada is changing form and we are looking for ways to cope with these changes by corresponding changes in our methods of operation."<sup>113</sup>

A large number of Palestinians arrested during the intifada have been held in administrative detention, rather than being imprisoned in the usual way, which involves the procedure of pressing charges, revealing evidence and having a sentence passed in court. Administrative detention is the "imprisonment of individuals by the executive without charge or trial using administrative procedures"<sup>114</sup> for a period of six months. Until March 1988 detention orders could only be issued by an Area or District Commander in the IDF, however, these restrictions were then lifted and now any military commander may do so. More significantly, the previous requirement that the military court confirm the detention order within 96 hours was withdrawn in order "to ease the overload on the military court system."<sup>115</sup> On 11 August 1989 the potential period of time spent in administrative detention was extended from six months to a year and remained renewable on completion.

Accurate figures for the numbers of Palestinians who have passed through Israeli jails and detention centres without being tried or charged are not available, but Palestinian sources have estimated that the initial level

of approximately 1,500 administrative detainees being held at any given time has fallen closer to 500 in the second half of 1991.<sup>116</sup> Labour MK, Yossi Beilin, cited a figure of approximately 15,000 administrative detainees held during the intifada when, in July 1991, he began a process of trying to ban the measure except during periods of "special emergency". He declared that "the authorities have used, and are using, administrative detention as a punishment - a long-term punishment - without having to prove anything, essentially without trial or proper judicial purposes."<sup>117</sup>

### Deportation

In direct contravention to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Israeli authorities have used the illegal practice of deportation extensively in the territories during the occupation. The practice was immediately stepped up with the beginning of the intifada and 58 Palestinians have so far been deported as a punishment for allegedly participating in the uprising.<sup>118</sup> The Israeli authorities have threatened Palestinians with the spectre of mass deportations at various junctures during the uprising. In June 1989 Defence Minister Rabin complained that the deportation procedure took too long and announced that the government was exploring ways to speed up the process. Less than a year after having succumbed to intense international pressure not to deport Palestinians, the practice was resumed when the eyes of the world were focussed on the imminent Gulf war. Four Gazans were deported to south Lebanon - with nothing but the clothes they were wearing - in January 1991. A further four Palestinians were exiled in March 1991.

As well as the deportation of political activists on security grounds, Israel has also been deporting another category of 'offender' during the uprising; the so-called illegal resident.<sup>119</sup> B'Tselem, clarifies that "the issue at hand is not one of 'illegal' immigrants as in other places in the world, but rather of children belonging to families that have resided in the territories for generations."<sup>120</sup> Since the Israeli High Court ruling of 1986 has made family reunification<sup>121</sup> even more difficult to achieve than in was in the past, numberless families have been forced to live apart or reside together without Israel's permission and risk deportation. Israel has been deporting this class of illegal resident for some time; after desisting from the practice in January 1990, in deference to international public opinion, it has been resumed in 1991.<sup>122</sup>

#### Collective Punishment

The Israeli authorities have used a variety of different forms of collective punishment in their attempts to break the civil revolt and to "show the residents [of the Gaza Strip] who is the real boss... and to prove to them that we can employ measures they haven't dreamt of."<sup>123</sup> These measures have ranged from the severing of basic amenities, such as water, electricity or telephone lines, to restricting the freedom of movement, by way of curfew or travel bans. Economic sanctions have also been applied as a form of collective punishment, as has the demolition and sealing of houses.

Particular locations have also been targeted at various stages during the uprising for intensive treatment, when all the measures mentioned above have been applied simultaneously and combined with arrest and

*"The army stages a small awakening at dawn. The men are concentrated in one place. They surround the home and Captain Yousef or Morris calls the woman by the loudspeaker to come out of her house with her children. They give her a maximum of 10 minutes. The babies are in pyjamas. There is no time to give them food and drink. They take those not registered on the father's ID card. Whoever is registered may stay at the authorities' grace. They may make them pay for a taxi to the bridge, pay a ransom (JD96) and then go over to the other side of the bridge: to the Jordanian diaspora on the other side. Many of them stay without money, a relative or acquaintance, with children, and babies for many days."*

Hadashot, 8 December 1989.

tax raids as well. Qabatia, a village in the West Bank, was the first location to be subjected to this degree of collective coercion; for a period of a month the residents were denied all amenities, any possibility of economic activity and any assistance of a medical nature from the outside world.<sup>124</sup>

#### Curfew

Curfews are the most comprehensive way of restricting freedom of movement and imposing collective punishment on a community. The IDF have made use of this measure since the beginning of the occupation, but it has been applied even more extensively during the intifada. Former Chief of General Staff, Dan Shomron, declared as early as January 1988

that curfews were "the most effective weapon to suppress the uprising."<sup>125</sup> Curfew has been imposed as a collective punishment for stone or molotov throwing; as a means of facilitating tax and arrest raids; to reassert control after demonstrations; and as a pre-emptive security measure before anniversaries, public holidays or settlement activity.<sup>126</sup>

The imposition of a curfew turns a town, a village or a refugee camp into a prison. It is a punishment which, paralysing education and health services, denies people access to their means of livelihood, forcing people to survive on limited rations, and causing high levels of stress for many of those families who live in conditions of extreme over-crowding.

JMCC has estimated that every Palestinian living in the occupied territories has spent an average of ten weeks under in-house curfew.<sup>127</sup> As well as general curfews, night curfews have also been used as a form of extended collective punishment. The entire Gaza Strip has been subject to night curfew since 14 March 1988.

#### **House Demolition and Sealing**

The demolition of houses, or the sealing of them with concrete is an extreme form of punishment which should be classified as a collective. It is a measure which can be undertaken against an extended Palestinian family, on the grounds of the intifada-related activities of one member of the family which the security forces are not obliged to prove.

Figures 5 & 6 demonstrates the trends in house demolition and sealing. JMCC has recorded a total of 1,246 of these incidents during the past four years. Houses are

demolished as a punishment for offenses (which the IDF need never prove) ranging from membership of an underground strike force to the throwing of a molotov cocktail. In addition, permission was extended to the IDF in February 1990 to destroy houses belonging to families whose underage children were involved in stone-throwing on the grounds that "this phenomenon [of stone-throwing] is still deeply rooted, and lately, to our regret, is on the increase, it was decided to widen the sanctions for this phenomenon, in order to quell it."<sup>128</sup>

Almost half of the house-demolitions have been carried out because the house has been built illegally. One of the methods through which the Israeli authorities have managed to consolidate their control over the land is through the highly prejudicial system of issuing building permits. Palestinians, particularly those with land in the vicinity of Jerusalem, have found it extremely difficult to get official permission to build on their land and have been often been left with no option but to build illegally. "The number of building permits issued is far fewer than necessary to keep pace with population growth, over half the land has been seized from Palestinian ownership, and in recent years the number of houses demolished by the Israelis because they do not have a permit is more than the number for which permits have been issued."<sup>129</sup>


#### **Sanctions Against Education**

Withholding the right to education is a form of collective punishment which has been used extensively during the intifada and for which Palestinians will continue to count the cost in the long term. The closure of schools, in particular, was the "primary means utilized

Figure 5

# TOTAL HOUSE DEMOLITIONS

December 1987 - November 1991




Total houses demolished = 1302

Source: JMCC records from local press

Figure 6

# HOUSE DEMOLITIONS AND SEALINGS

December 1987 - November 1991



Demolitions      Sealings

Total house demolitions = 1302

Total house sealings = 255

Source: JMCC records from local press

by the Civil Administration to restrain the uprising.<sup>130</sup> All Palestinian schools in the occupied territories were first ordered to close on the 21st December 1987, in a measure which was to be repeated on both a collective and individual basis throughout the course of the uprising. The children of the West Bank, in particular, have been forced to endure extended periods without formal schooling. All West Bank schools were closed for longer than eight months during 1988 and for approximately half of 1989.<sup>131</sup> Individual schools have been also been targeted for long-term closure. Additionally, access to schooling has been often denied Palestinian children due to the extended use of the curfew, most critically during the Gulf war when schools were closed for a period of two months.

Unofficial UNWRA statistics for the West Bank report that an average of 422 school days have been lost (a total of 41,333) in each of their 98 West Bank schools due to military closure, and a further 31 days as a result of the curfew. Schools in targeted areas such as Tulkarem have been particularly badly hit; each of UNWRA's five schools there have been ordered closed for in excess of 620 days between December 1987 and the end of September 1991, a further 100 days of schooling have been lost due to curfew. When schools are not formally closed, the Israeli authorities have continued to obstruct education by regularly raiding the premises and stationing themselves directly outside the school in order to conduct random arrests against purported stone-throwers.<sup>132</sup>

In addition, all six of the universities, along with 19 institutes of higher education and

training, have been closed for most of the last four years.<sup>133</sup> Bethlehem University was ordered closed in October 1987 and was joined by all the other colleges in February 1988 as part of an overt policy to deny a generation of Palestinians the right to education. This year the Israeli authorities have allowed all universities and institutions of higher education to re-open gradually, (Bethlehem was re-opened in September 1990), with the exception of Birzeit University which has just had its closure order extended until March 1992.<sup>134</sup>

#### Economic Sanctions

Early on in the uprising the Israeli authorities started to apply economic pressure on the Palestinians as a means of breaking their spirit of rebellion. The first step in this direction was the reduction in March 1988 in the amount of Jordanian dinars (the primary currency for Palestinian economic activity) which Palestinians could bring into the occupied territories. The permitted amount was reduced from JD2,000 to JD400 per person, per month, and this was further limited to JD200 in October 1988.<sup>135</sup>

The pressure was increased in June 1988 when Palestinian banking assets were frozen and families, whose underage children were accused of throwing stones, were forced to pay substantial fines or financial deposits. These were often well beyond the scope of an average Palestinian family budget.<sup>136</sup> In February 1990 the Israeli authorities raised the level of bail which parents must post to obtain the release of their stone-throwing offspring from NIS1,500 to NIS5,000.<sup>137</sup>

***"If I were to try to apply a portion of the measures I have used to step up the collection of taxes in the territories within the boundaries of the Green Line, I would be hanged in Zion Square."***

**Mordechai Bareket, Deputy Head,  
Department of Customs and Excise.**

### **Taxes**

As the Palestinian tax boycott began to gather strength and revenues plummeted, Israel launched a campaign to reassert control, which had the secondary aim of applying intense financial pressure on the Palestinians. A number of new military orders were issued which permitted aggressive measures of tax collection, and tax assessment. In addition a new vehicle tax, more popularly known as the "intifada tax", was introduced on the 17th August 1988<sup>138</sup> exclusively for the purpose of increasing revenue.

The new measures for the collection of taxes allowed the authorities to "overcome all resistance"<sup>139</sup> when raiding houses without a warrant, and often under cover of night or a curfew. The confiscation of any property, private or commercial was permitted as was the setting up of road blocks at which tax receipts could be checked and cars and driver's licenses could be confiscated until taxes had been paid; the linking of all bureaucratic procedures, including, for example, the registration of a birth, to proof of tax payment. In November 1990 the Civil Administration even went so far as to link the

distribution of the very limited supply of gas masks before the Gulf War (50,000 masks were available to the 1.7 million Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territories) to proof of tax payment. Repeated incidents also occurred when wives, and subsequently even children, were held in custody by the Israeli authorities until their husbands or fathers could produce proof of having paid their taxes.<sup>140</sup>

Arbitrary levels of tax assessment have also characterised the tax siege. Businessmen in the occupied territories, who have failed to fill in V.A.T. returns have repeatedly been issued with tax demands which clearly exceed their level of income, and sometimes apply to businesses which are long defunct. For example, the tax authorities raided Riyadh Nayef Habibeh's grocery shop in the village of Sanour which is near Jenin, on 6 November 1991 and confiscated NIS14,000 in cash along with some goods which he had in his car as a down-payment against a tax demand of NIS400,000.<sup>141</sup> Similarly, Hanni Elias Kheir of Beit Sahour was ordered to pay NIS23,000 for business transacted in a souvenir shop which has been closed for the past four years.<sup>142</sup> These sorts of incidents have been a constant feature of Israel's policy towards taxation during the intifada.

### **Agricultural Siege**

The economic siege against agriculture began in earnest in October 1988 when farmers were warned that they would be prevented from harvesting or selling their produce if they continued participating in the intifada.<sup>143</sup> Essential export permits began to be used as a means of punishment and bribery. The olive-oil producing villagers of Brukeen, for example, were informed in April 1989 that



"Dozens of different income brackets could have been included [in a tax table] but they would all be the same thing: Palestinians in the territories pay higher taxes than their Israeli . . . . And what is even more important: they pay higher taxes than Israelis living in the territories...To the brunt of the matter: the tables for the territories reveal that people begin to pay tax on NIS 325 of income per month while in Israel employees only begin to pay income tax on NIS1600 or more...For instance, Israel levies a tax on the registration of every motor vehicle. There is an identical levy in the territories - although it is not imposed in accordance with Jordanian law. But in the territories, in addition to this levy, there is yet another tax. For example there is NIS 685 tax on a 1987 BMW in Israel and the territories, but in the territories there is an additional tax of NIS 2065 a year."

Gideon Eshet, Yediot Ahronot, 7 May 1991.


livestock killed by settlers for the same alleged offence.<sup>145</sup> In March 1990 at least fifty trucks were detained at the bridge with Jordan, for up to two weeks during which their load of produce rotted, when the Israeli authorities temporarily put a stop to all economic traffic across the bridge as a punitive measure.

July 1990 marked an intensification of the pressure. Minister of Agriculture, Raphael Eitan, declared that "within the framework of its planned policy, Israel will halt the sale of seeds, fertilizers and cattle to Palestinian farmers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip...The aim of such procedures is to bar economic aid to the occupied territories as long as it helps the intifada. It is a struggle, and I will do my utmost, everything I can do legally to halt any possible economic assistance to the occupied territories which could directly or indirectly lead to a strengthening of the intifada."<sup>146</sup>

The burning or uprooting of trees was implemented as a method of punishment early on in the uprising and was generally carried out after alleged stone-throwing attacks. Figure 7 shows the number of tree uprooting incidents which have taken place during the uprising. JMCC has recorded a total of 454 incidents, sometimes involving the destruction of as many as 7,000 trees in one go.<sup>147</sup> The chart reveals that, whilst the growing trend of tree uprooting incidents began to decline in the middle of 1989, there has been a marked increase in this activity since the end of the Gulf War.

they would not be allowed to export their oil to Jordan until they had desisted from intifada-activities. Meanwhile, Gazan farmers were banned from selling their produce in the West Bank in a move which was designed to bring down the price of fruit and vegetables by restricting the market. Farmers had their sheep and cattle confiscated for allegedly grazing on Israeli land,<sup>144</sup> others had their

Figure 7



### Denying Employment

As the intifada continued unabated there was a change of emphasis in the IDF's policy of controlling the movement of Palestinians; this involved limiting the supply of labour and denying employment as and when Israel desired it. In February 1989 a system of colour-coded identity cards was introduced in the Gaza Strip. These cards would deny access to Israel, and by extension to the work-place, to any one with a security or criminal record. In addition car stickers, designed to facilitate cross-border traffic, were issued to those with

clean security records as a way of "grant[ing] to those who deserve it the privilege of working in Israel."<sup>148</sup>

On 15 May 1989 Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin warned Palestinians that Israel would implement measures to reduce its "dependence on their [Palestinian] labour in Israel and take other economic steps against them"<sup>149</sup> if they deemed it necessary. The following day all Gazans were ordered to return to the Strip and curfew was imposed on the entire area in response to several attacks which had been

perpetrated within Israel. On the 17 May all Gazan males above the age of 16 were informed that they would henceforth require an additional permit, a magnetised plastic card, to enter Israel and to find work, and that these would only be issued to people with clean security records once they could supply proof of having paid all their outstanding taxes and fines. These cards were designed to tighten Israel's control over the influx of migrant workers from the occupied territories, denying access to those without work permits,<sup>150</sup> and it had the additional aim of tying the individual to the central system of bureaucracy.

'Operation plastic card' was launched in August 1989 and severe punishments were extended to those who failed to register. The UNLU responded by calling for a protracted general strike<sup>151</sup>; only 800 of the 40,000 Gazans who worked as wage labourers in Israel failed to join this strike.<sup>152</sup> After a 40 day protest which induced much hardship, Gazans returned to work.

Israel's theoretical plan to replace Palestinian labour with Jewish workers was circumscribed by the fact that they represent a significant proportion of the total workforce, and are employed at the low-paid, undesirable, end of the market. The Director of the Labour Ministry's Manpower Planning Authority, David Katz, stressed that "if the Palestinian workers were suddenly to disappear overnight, the economy would find itself in chaos, short of 7% of its workforce."<sup>153</sup>

However, during the summer of 1989 several steps were taken in this direction due to the influx of new Soviet immigrants which was starting detrimentally to effect the level of

unemployment within Israel,<sup>154</sup> and due also to a wave of anti-Palestinian feeling which was beginning overtly to express itself, often in response to Palestinian attacks against Israeli individuals. Petah Tikva Council, for example, began constructing a pen for its Arab workers so they would not frighten the residents or loiter on the streets on their way to and from work.<sup>155</sup> The Israeli Association of Petroleum Station Owners, with the official backing of the Histadrut,<sup>156</sup> announced in July 1989 that they were replacing 2,000 of their Palestinian workers with Jewish ones who would be paid 25% more.<sup>157</sup>

It was not until the closing months of 1990 that this discriminatory policy of employment began to be sanctioned officially by the government. The IDF had started to implement the measure of sealing off the occupied territories for extended periods at the first sign of trouble. Simultaneously, the Israeli authorities began to crack down on any Palestinians working illegally in Israel, forcing the registration of limited numbers of workers at the Labour Exchanges, instituting regular spot-checks on Palestinians in Israel, and by encouraging Israeli employers to take advantage of the "large potential labour force of Jewish workers, especially new immigrants."<sup>158</sup>

Whilst Tehiya party MK, Geula Cohen, was championing the idea of a total ban on Palestinian workers as a way of "break[ing] them economically,"<sup>159</sup> levels of immigration of Jews from the Soviet Union were peaking.<sup>160</sup> Many Palestinians, therefore, found that when they were finally allowed back into Israel by the military, they had been fired from their jobs by the civilians. This pattern was to be repeated to a greater

degree and with critical effect in the wake of the Gulf War, when these methods of controlling the movement of Palestinians were formalised into a pass system.

### Since the Gulf War: Reassertion of Control

#### **War Measures**

Once the Gulf War began the IDF was able to sanction the imposition of an even harsher regime of curfews, bureaucratic harassment and economic restrictions in the territories, on the basis of the special security requirements of war, in an attempt to break the back of the intifada once and for all. Housing Minister, Ariel Sharon, urged the following course of action: "we must order the army to liquidate [the intifada]..not to calm [it] down, not to moderate it, not to make things tolerable so that life can go on - but just one word, liquidate, and deport the leadership."<sup>161</sup>

Although Israel did not take Sharon up on his proposal to deport 150 Palestinians, the illegal practice, which had been abandoned under intense international pressure after January 1990, was resumed in January 1991 with the deportation of four Gazans, for alleged membership of Hamas. Mass arrests were also carried out; with 3,647 people being rounded up in the first two weeks of the war alone.<sup>162</sup>

From 17 January an all-encompassing, 24-hour "war-curfew"<sup>163</sup> (the term is misleading since the curfew outlasted the war by as much as two weeks in some areas) was imposed on all of the occupied territories with the exclusion only of some parts of East Jerusalem, and the penalties for breaking the curfew were

extended to include shooting on sight or the imposition of crippling fines. The extended curfew, as well as paralysing social, medical and educational activity in the occupied territories, had a devastating economic effect, particularly on the agricultural sector.<sup>164</sup>

With the eyes of the world focussed on the events in the Gulf, and the occupied territories closed to the media, the IDF intensified the pressure. Eight Palestinians were killed, 1,033 people were treated for injuries from IDF beatings in the Gaza Strip alone;<sup>165</sup> 47 houses were demolished or sealed with cement; and rigorous tax raids were conducted in the Nablus, Hebron, Ramallah and Beit Haneena.

#### **Pass-System**

"Despite the claims of the Israeli authorities, life in the occupied territories has not returned to normal. On the contrary, Palestinians are being subjected to an entirely new form of domination - the pass system. All movement between and within the West Bank and Gaza Strip is now tightly controlled. No Palestinians are allowed to pass through or enter into East Jerusalem without a special permit, cutting off the majority of the Palestinian population from the commercial and cultural centre of Palestinian life."<sup>166</sup>

The Israeli authorities were able to take advantage of the blanket 'war-curfew' in the occupied territories to formalise the pass-system, whereby all Palestinian movement is controlled and restricted. Every holder of a West Bank or Gaza Strip identity card is now required to obtain a special permit from the military authorities in order to enter Israel,

***"The economic consequences of the current measures will not only surface within the next few days or weeks, but will leave their mark for coming months or even years. The worker who is absent from his job in Israel does not only lose his two week's wage but most probably his job altogether, in addition to his insurance and compensation money. The farmer who fails to sow the seeds in the rainy season, which coincided with the beginning of the war, loses a whole season of grain which is practically his livelihood and the life of his animals on which he depends. The clothing factory which fails to submit the merchandise on time, and even delays for weeks, not only loses the immediate deal, but its credibility which it has worked for years on establishing, all in one unexpected sweep."<sup>m</sup>***

**Palestinian Economic Planning & Coordinating Committee.**

and this includes Jerusalem. This has meant that the occupied territories have been geographically fragmented. Gaza is almost totally isolated since residents need a special permit, in addition to the plastic card and their colour-coded identity papers, in order to enter Israel. The West Bank has been divided into regions north and south of Jerusalem, since contact between the two requires travelling through the city, which in turn requires a pass. This has contributed to Israel's overt political policy of isolating Arab

east Jerusalem, and breaking the existing Palestinian infrastructure of commerce, health and education, much of which centres on the city.

In May the military authorities announced that all existing work permits were no longer valid; new ones were required. Simultaneously, the Civil Administration publicised the introduction of a new form of clearance, which will be computerised and valid for one year. This clearance is required in order to obtain a work permit, a driving licence or any other official document.

Clear instructions concerning the procedure for acquiring these essential permits have not been issued. All applicants must specify their reasons for requiring a permit and must receive clearance from the security forces and the tax authorities. The application process can take several hours, days or even weeks and there is always the possibility that the pass will not be granted, or that an extreme condition will be set.<sup>167</sup> Passes are issued for varying periods of time and usually set limitations concerning the hours which the holder can spend in the given location. A pass for someone working in Jerusalem, for example, may specify that the holder can only enter between the hours of 9.00a.m. and 6.00p.m. Yet another permit is required for anyone wanting to bring a vehicle with West Bank or Gazan plates into Israel or Jerusalem.<sup>168</sup>

Another aspect of this new pass-system has been the marked increase in the number of road blocks through which Palestinians have to pass, and the frequency of the random security checks which they must endure. "According to police reports, 'every day

***"Bureaucracy has become a means by which to mistreat the people."***

**MK Dedi Zucker.**

thousands of Arabs are searched according to outward appearance."<sup>169</sup> Meron Benvenisti, the ex-deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, outlined the dangers of the new Israeli policy of segregation,

comparing it to the political thinking which developed apartheid in South Africa.

#### **Confidence-building or pacification?**

A number of contradictory trends in Israel's policy of occupation and tactics of control have been in evidence since the Gulf crisis ended. A general attempt has been made to link the defeat of Saddam Hussein with the defeat of the intifada, and demonstrate that the uprising is over. Cosmetic changes have been implemented, seemingly in pursuit of an air of normality. It was recently announced<sup>170</sup> that IDF forces are to be replaced wherever possible by members of the Border Police,<sup>171</sup> and in August 1991 Chief of Staff, Ehud Barak, announced that the IDF would no longer be responsible for the job of interrogating Palestinian prisoners on the

***"The legal distinction between Israel itself and the 'territories,' still formally administered under a regime of belligerent occupation, has allowed us to live with what has become institutionalised apartheid."***

**David Kretzner, Jerusalem Report.**

grounds that "interrogating civilians is not the job of army personnel."<sup>172</sup> This can be viewed as both a 'normalising' measure and a response to the increasingly vocal charges of widescale use of torture against Palestinian detainees.<sup>173</sup>

The trend away from maintaining a high profile military presence in the occupied territories, and the use of undirected force against the masses has continued. As a result of Defence Minister Arens' new policy, the Israeli military have withdrawn a large number of men from the occupied territories and concentrated instead on targeting key activists and wanted men. Undercover agents, hit squads and Palestinian collaborators have all been mobilized for this purpose. In the words of Chief of Staff Ehud Barak, "We will divert our efforts from permanent activities which repeat themselves to activities which are less visible and more flexible...with the help of intelligence."<sup>174</sup>

Whilst the introduction of the pass system has served to stifle Palestinian economic initiative on the one hand, and put limitations on the numbers of wage-labourers in Israel on the other, the Israeli authorities have simultaneously announced a change in taxation policy, although not in the methods of tax collection and assessment. The Defence Ministry approved a plan in July 1991 which will reduce the tax burdens on residents of the occupied territories to levels comparable with Israel. The highest income tax rate is to be lowered from 52% to 48%, and those earning less than NIS7,000 a year are to be exempt from income tax altogether.<sup>175</sup> The new levels of taxation is to be implemented in 1992. However, other discriminatory forms of taxation, such as the special payment on vehicles will remain in force.

Simultaneously, there has been a change of policy away from strangling Palestinian economic development towards encouraging it. The first small step towards economic liberalisation was the lifting of currency restrictions in August 1990, which raised the amount of Jordanian dinars which Palestinians can bring into the occupied territories to 500.<sup>176</sup>

Then, in April 1991, Defence Minister Arens announced that tax exemptions would be granted to any new industrial project in the Gaza Strip and that an industrial park would be constructed on the outskirts of Gaza City in an attempt to encourage investment. Since then, 140 requests to set up factories have been approved, even when they are intended to operate competitively with Israel. This should be contrasted with the fact that the Civil Administration has approved an average of ten industrial projects a year since it was set up in 1981 and the process of obtaining a licence formerly could take as long as five years.<sup>177</sup> A similar scheme to encourage industrial development in the West Bank is currently under discussion. Palestinian businessmen, for their part, have taken immediate advantage of this new Israeli legislation, "accepting it, not because of the intentions, but because of the results" in the words of Palestinian economist Samir Hileileh.<sup>178</sup>

Conspicuous by its absence amidst all of the talk of economic regeneration is the issue of agricultural development; an area which has been worst hit by Israel's economic sanctions during the past four years. A leading Palestinian economist has commented that "the failure to include agriculture is not

surprising..that would force Israel to discuss issues of land and water."<sup>179</sup> Since the Gulf war the Israeli government has actively worked to consolidate its grasp on the land and water resources of the occupied territories and settlement activity has been conducted at a frenetic pace.

#### Land Confiscation & Settlement Activity

***"Settlement is part of the regional conflict between us and the Arab world and between us and international parties such as the United States. For me, settlement is not a big issue - it's a normal process. If we establish a settlement here or expand a settlement there, this is only natural. We are operating according to our understanding that the land belongs to us."***

**Yitzhak Shamir,  
September 1991**


Since the end of the Gulf War the Israeli authorities have confiscated, or otherwise rendered inaccessible, 187,000 dunams<sup>180</sup> of Palestinian land.

Figure 8 records the number of incidents of land confiscation since December 1987 and demonstrates clearly how the pace of activity has been stepped up since the end of the Gulf war, and the beginning of a concerted American drive for peace in the Middle East.

In one incident alone, 50,000 dunams was seized on 31 March from the two villages of Ramon and Taibe, east of Ramallah, in order to expand the settlement of Rimmonim alone.

# LAND CONFISCATION INCIDENTS

## Dec 1987 - Nov 1991



Source: JMCC records from local press

Total number of incidents = 140



There has been unprecedented levels of settlement activity this year,<sup>181</sup> with at least 15,000 new housing units currently under construction; eight new settlements have been established, as well as the takeover of sections of the Jerusalem neighbourhood of Silwan. In addition, Shilo and Kiryat Arba have begun work on two new neighbourhoods which are located at some distance from the main settlement, Ma'aleh Adunim has had city status conferred on it, and almost every settlement is expanding to some degree. NIS27 million<sup>182</sup> has been spent this year on developing the infrastructure in the occupied territories for the benefit of the settlements and with the political aim of strengthening the communication channels between the settlements and Israel, whilst weakening the former geographical integrity of the area.

It is now estimated that Israel has seized control over 65% of the Palestinian land in the West Bank and 42% in the Gaza Strip,<sup>183</sup> as well as now controlling 80% of the water resources, in a move which is the cornerstone of the Israeli government's policy of "creeping annexation."

## 5. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE INTIFADA

### Historical background

Since 1967<sup>184</sup> international efforts to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict have been largely based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 242 was passed on

22 November 1967 and it emphasised the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and called for Israel's withdrawal from occupied territories in return for the right to live in peace within secure borders. Resolution 242 established the principle of *land for peace*; a principle upon which every subsequent peace effort has focussed. Resolution 338 was passed on 22 October 1973, whilst the Yom Kippur War was in its closing phase, and it urged the implementation of the principles enshrined in 242, specifically via the framework of an international peace conference.

The first attempt at convening a Middle East peace conference on the basis of these principles took place in Geneva in December 1973, and ended in failure. The twin-track talks at Camp David in 1977 between Egypt and Israel resulted in a peace treaty between the two countries and the return of the Sinai to Egypt, but failed to achieve in its declared second aim of making peace in the Middle East in general, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular. However, the terms of reference of the Camp David talks - concepts such as autonomy, the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and the question of Palestinian representation - continue to be articulated.

The will of the international community to contribute to a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict had long been complicated by the superpower struggle for dominance in the Middle East. The USSR,

breaking diplomatic ties with Israel in 1967, committed itself to helping Syria achieve "strategic parity" with Israel. The United States viewed Israel as its principle strategic ally in the area and invested heavily in both military and economic aid. Henry Kissinger's defined one of the principle aims of US Middle East policy as being "the diminishing of the Soviet role in the Middle East since our respective interests in the region are opposed." The end of the Cold War changed all this. By 1989 Soviet Jews were being allowed to emigrate to Israel, a process of rapprochement was underway and Eduard Shevardnadze articulated the new Soviet position on the Middle East, stressing that "in these questions the Soviet Union stands for eliminating any competition among the great powers. It is necessary to renounce the policy of ousting one another from the area, and to switch over to constructive co-operation in the name of peace and tranquility in the Middle East."<sup>185</sup>

#### **Effects of the Intifada**

The strategic value of the Middle East was already in decline, then, when the intifada broke out. US Secretary of State George Shultz, who had wearily declared to an aide just two months previously "let's leave the Middle East alone"<sup>186</sup> when his proposal for convening a peace conference under a "superpower umbrella" had been rejected on all sides, was forced to refocus his attention on the area. A flurry of diplomatic activity ensued.

The intifada had an immediate effect on international public opinion, and consequently there were swift political ramifications. By 22 December 1987 the United Nations approved, almost unanimously (only the United States abstained) Resolution 605 in which it "strongly deplored" Israeli policies in the occupied territories, condemning the wholesale violation of Palestinian human rights, and "in particular, opening fire of the Israeli army, resulting in the killing and wounding of defenseless Palestinian civilians". The US did not abstain, however, from the subsequent UN Security Council resolution, passed on 6 January 1988, which called on Israel to stop the illegal practice of deportation.

Individual governments and politicians were also quick to add their voice to the chorus of international disapproval. President Reagan professed himself "upset and worried"<sup>187</sup>; the European Parliament postponed the ratification of trade protocols in mid-December 1987; Mrs Thatcher stressed the need for the immediate convening of a peace conference in response to the violence<sup>188</sup>, whilst David Mellor, her Foreign Office Minister, deplored the treatment of the Palestinians who "exist in a form of limbo..denied a range of basic human rights".

More alarmingly for the Israeli Government, however, was the critical response from the Jewish diaspora, particularly American Jewry who withdrew their previously unquestioning support of Israel's actions. The damage to Israel's vital relationship with the United

States also had considerable impact.

### Past Peace Initiatives

#### **Mubarak's Proposal - January 1988**

President Mubarak of Egypt was the first leader to respond to the political challenges thrown down by the Palestinian uprising. In January 1988 he put forward a proposal, recommending a six month moratorium on all violence and repression, with a linked freeze on all Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories, as a prelude to a UN sponsored peace conference. Israel was to recognise Palestinian political rights, and an international force was to guarantee them. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir rejected the plan on the grounds that an international conference would constitute an attempt to impose solutions.

#### **The Shultz Plan**

It was a sign of the dramatic impact of the intifada that the United States felt obliged to turn its attention back to the area so soon. After an intense round of diplomatic shuttling, Shultz presented new proposals in March 1988. This peace plan was a blend of ideas from Reagan's initiative of 1982 and the autonomy clauses from Camp David. It proposed a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and the division of administrative responsibility for the occupied territories between Israel and Jordan, with no commitment to Palestinian self-determination and little substantive change in the status quo. The Palestinians rejected it on a number of grounds,

particularly the exclusion of the PLO from the process, as did the Jordanians who feared that any interim agreement could harden into a de facto permanent settlement. Shamir also disliked the proposal, wanting the peace process to stop at limited autonomy for Palestinians and not to progress to a permanent settlement. He is reported to have said "The only word that I accept in the Shultz Plan is his signature"<sup>189</sup>.

#### **Jordanian Developments**

Jordan had formalised its links with the West Bank in 1950 in response to the creation of the State of Israel. Since 1967, a number of peace proposals had revolved around the principle of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, or at the very least of a joint delegation to a peace conference. The relationship between the two peoples was a complicated one, and was deteriorating when King Hussein greeted Arafat with a calculated diplomatic snub at the Arab Summit meeting in Amman.<sup>190</sup>

By July 1988 the intifada had proved effective at changing the balance of power and King Hussein was obliged publicly to abrogate Jordan's legal and administrative responsibilities in the West Bank, declaring that he was no longer prepared to act as the representative of Palestinians at a possible peace conference, and signalling his "willingness to step aside for the PLO". This effectively put an end to the Jordanian option, and any autonomy plans which the US or Israel might have been harbouring. The development

was greeted with enthusiasm in the occupied territories. It was evident from this first diplomatic success, that the intifada had strengthened the PLO's negotiating hand.

***"King Hussein's recent move to extricate Jordan from the West Bank is no ploy. It is a strategic step that may prove to be a turning point in the history of Middle Eastern politics. With Jordan removed as a putative spokesman for the Palestinians, Israel must face reality and sooner or later deal directly with the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Hussein's move proves that Israel can no longer afford to tarry."***

Major General Yehoshafat Harkabi,  
Former Director of Israeli Military  
Intelligence.

#### US-PLO Dialogue.

The PLO's change of policy in the closing months of 1988, and the subsequent restoration of US-PLO dialogue was to have troubling implications for Israel. Israeli Chief of Staff Dan Shomron commented in advance of the PNC meeting that "if the PLO is to cross the threshold and accept 242 and 338, then Israel will be faced with a problem."<sup>191</sup> For all Israel's subsequent rhetoric, the long-demanded recognition of Israel by the PLO called for a response; the diplomatic ball was

clearly in Israel's court.

**Shamir's Peace Plan**  
Inconclusive results in the November 1988 election in Israel resulted in the eventual formation of a coalition National Unity government, with no clear consensus on how to approach the issue of peace in the Middle East.

Under pressure from the United States, Shamir presented a peace proposal during a visit to Washington in April 1989; on his return to Israel he was to refer to it as "an idle fancy", informing a meeting of the Likud Central Committee that he had attached so many conditions to the plan so as to make it unacceptable to the Arabs.<sup>192</sup> The main

substance of Shamir's four point plan was the proposal that free elections in the occupied territories should be the first step towards

***"A monumental act of deception.. There is nothing new or surprising in the PNC decisions which are just another step in the terrorist organisation's war against Israel's independence and existence."***

Yitzhak Shamir.

***"A smokescreen... what really happened is the PNC took a more extreme position.. [the Palestinians] are not accepting 242, they are in fact rejecting it."***

Shimon Peres.

peace, with the elected Palestinian delegates going on to participate in negotiations on an interim settlement.

This proposal, designed to exclude the PLO from any future peace process involved just one concession which was over the issue of timing; whereas in the past Shamir had been prepared to countenance elections in the occupied territories only after a five-year transition period, elections were now acceptable as a first stage. The proposal made no reference to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

#### **Arab Responses to the Shamir Plan**

The PLO announced in August 1989 that it did not feel that the election proposal could be the basis for a political settlement. In mid-September, President Mubarak of Egypt invited Israeli clarification on ten points connected with the election plans and, at the same time, offered to convene an Israeli-Palestinian meeting in Cairo to discuss details of the proposed elections. Whilst the Labour party members of the inner cabinet accepted Mubarak's ten points, Likud Ministers vetoed it in October 1989 on the grounds that they did not want any direct contact with PLO delegates.

#### **Baker's First Peace Initiative**

In early November 1989, when Shamir's reluctant initiative for peace had run aground, Baker stepped in to try to keep the momentum of the process alive with a five point peace initiative of his own. Taking

Shamir's election plan as its basis, Baker's plan consisted of five concessive points which were designed to get Israel to talk directly to the Palestinians through the auspices of the Egyptians. They were to discuss the elections, which were to lead to the formation of a Palestinian delegation, who would in turn negotiate an interim settlement with Israel, which would eventually lead to long-term peace.

Israel's National Unity government collapsed in a vote of no-confidence over how to respond to Baker's proposals. The Central Council of the PLO, for their part, who had initially rejected Baker's plan at the PNC meeting in Baghdad, were in the process of responding to it with some points for clarification, when, in June 1990, Shamir put together the most right-wing government in Israel's history.

#### **Collapse of diplomatic efforts**

In May 1990 relations between the United States and the Palestinians had begun to deteriorate. The US used its right of veto against a UN Security Council Resolution calling for the implementation of an international force to protect Palestinian human rights in the wake of the Rishon Lezion killings. This was a step which the UNLU had long been calling for some time,<sup>193</sup> but the demand took on a new sense of urgency. A period of political procrastination ensued, but the United States eventually vetoed the resolution. Shortly after it broke off the hard-earned dialogue with the PLO, on 20 June

***"That question is no longer relevant"***

Israeli MK Roni Milo, in response to a question about the peace process.

***I have to tell you that everybody over there [in Israel] should know what the telephone number is: 1 202 456 1414. When you are serious about peace, call us."***

Secretary of State, James Baker, 13 June 1990.

1990, on the grounds that Arafat would not expel Abul Abbas from the PNC for his part in an armed, but aborted, seaborne commando raid by the Palestine Liberation Front on an Israeli beach on 31 May 1991.

[Image of 1990 Gulf Crisis](#)

### **The Gulf Crisis**

On 2 August 1990 Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in the middle of the night and, encountering little resistance, occupied it within two hours. The UN Security Council passed first a resolution declaring the implementation of a complete economic, military and financial embargo of Iraq by UN member states, and then a second resolution sanctioning the use of force. By the end of the month a major military build-up was in progress. A flurry of diplomatic initiatives followed, including a PLO proposal,<sup>194</sup> but they all failed.

***"The critical event that finally disabused Gazans of their faith in America and confirmed their sense of betrayal was not the actual suspension of the dialogue between the United States and the PLO...but the American veto...For the overwhelming majority of Gazans interviewed, it was only after the events in Rishon that they began seeking different paths to the establishment of their state and new ways of filling the vacuum created by the 'departure' of the US. In August 1990, Iraq became that way."***

**The Political Economy of Despair:  
Changing Political and Economic  
Realities in the Gaza Strip,  
Sara Roy.**

Palestinians in the occupied territories responded to the international developments on two levels. Sensing that the media was misrepresenting the Palestinian position, Palestinian personalities from the territories issued a public statement on 15 August in which they rejected the principle of occupation by force, but decried the double standards of the UN Security Council, which was prepared to enforce its resolutions against Iraq but ignored similar motions against Israel.<sup>195</sup> In addition, they called for an Arab solution to be found to the conflict. On a more popular level, however, there was widespread support for Iraq, particularly when

Saddam Hussein explicitly linked his withdrawal from Kuwait to the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories. In addition, the consensus took the view that Western forces should not intervene in the Middle East, particularly not when their aim was to suppress the emergence of an Arab regional superpower.

It rapidly became clear that while the Gulf crisis escalated, the prospects for any progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict were negligible. Palestinians, for their part, realised that the crisis was going to damage their cause by removing the focus of attention away from the intifada. Not only did it threaten to erode much of the international support for the Palestinian uprising, but it also resurrected Israel's image in the West as an isolated and vulnerable country. On a more positive note, however, the Palestinian community regarded any change in the entrenched status quo as an improvement. Ghassan al-Khatib was to comment several days after the invasion: "they [Palestinians] feel that no change...could make them worse off, since they are already experiencing the worst political and existential situation possible. The Gulf war was thus welcomed merely for being a change in the current adverse stalemate."<sup>196</sup>

### **Baker's Second Peace Proposal**

In the aftermath of war, US President Bush announced to Congress on 6 March 1991 that apart from seeking Saddam Hussein's removal from power, he would pursue four aims in the

post-war Middle East. The priority was the creation of a new security arrangement to ensure the safety and protection of the Gulf States, coupled with an arms control initiative to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Understanding the primary lesson of the crisis - that there would never be peace in the region without first finding a just solution to the Palestinian question - Washington sought to make peace between Israel and her Arab neighbours in general and the Palestinian in particular. Only once peace was established could the final aim of bringing prosperity on the region flourish.

Learning from the failures of the past, and able to use the newly-forged alliances of the war to his advantage, Secretary of State James Baker energetically set about convening a peace conference by relying on a policy of "constructive ambiguity" - concentrating on securing the agreement of all parties to attend the conference by postponing discussion of substantive issues until the talks got underway. It was to be a dual-track peace initiative which proposed to treat the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian question as two separate, though related, areas of negotiation.

Baker made his first visit to the region on 11 March 1991 where his proposals were greeted with caution and a barrage of demands. The first breakthrough came on his seventh visit, (21 July) when he was able to secure Syria's agreement to attend the peace conference,

along with that of Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt. Israel was urged not to forego this "historic opportunity", and by the end of August Baker had been given "the yes we were waiting for." In a bid to pressurise Israel to freeze settlement activity in the occupied territories, President Bush took the step of postponing the Congressional debate on Israel's request for \$10 billion in loan guarantees for 120 days, provoking a crisis in US-Israeli relations.

The Palestinians, for their part, had emerged from the Gulf crisis with the determination to find some way of capitalising on the changes which had occurred in the region and progressing towards peace. Finding Israel unprepared to compromise on its pre-conditions for attending the conference, the Palestinians were being invited to negotiate a two-stage plan which offered them limited self-government for a five year period, with negotiations on the final settlement to take place no later than the third year. Recognising that there was room to manoeuvre within this negotiating-structure, the PNC, meeting in Algiers on 23 September, decided that the Palestinians should attend the conference as part of a joint delegation with Jordan.

This decision had been preceded by intense debate amongst Palestinians in both the territories and the diaspora, which had taken on a factional dimension. For instance, Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar, a leading Islamacist from Gaza, argued against Palestinian attendance of the peace conference: "[we will] lose our

status as an occupied state. We will lose our case and the sympathy of the Muslim and Arab world."<sup>197</sup> The overwhelming majority of Palestinians, however, took the view that they could not afford to boycott a process which was clearly going ahead with or without their participation, where their case needed to be heard. In the words of Edward Said,<sup>198</sup> "the world has known the Palestinians as stone-throwers and has witnessed their popular resistance to the Israeli occupation...but the world has not heard the Palestinian narrative."

### The Madrid Peace Conference

The initial ceremonial phase of the first comprehensive Middle East peace conference opened in Madrid on 31 October 1991. Each of the delegations was invited to give a 45 minute speech - the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation won the concession of two 45 minute speeches - articulating their general position. The Palestinian speech, read by Dr Haider Abd el-Shafi, was particularly well-received by the world media.<sup>199</sup> The address was, in many ways a synthesis of the philosophy and spirit of the intifada, as well as a tribute to its achievements. It drew on the themes of international legitimacy<sup>200</sup> and political realism which have characterised Palestinian political thinking since the PNC made the "imaginative leap" and accepted a two-state solution in November 1988. "We pledge our commitment to the principle of justice, peace and reconciliation based on international legitimacy and uniform standards." It focused international attention



back on the Palestinian issue, impressing upon the world the urgency of the Palestinian plight. "We have returned the Palestinian cause to the centre of world attention in a good way."<sup>201</sup> It also drew on the abstract qualities with which the intifada has endowed Palestinians; the qualities of self-reliance, confidence and pride of a people "narrating their own story". Finally, it emphasised the pressing need to halt settlements; the major obstacle to peace. "The settlements must stop now. Peace cannot be waged while Palestinian land is confiscated in myriad ways and the status of the occupied territories is being decided each day by Israeli bulldozers and barbed wire. This is not simply a position; it is an irrefutable reality. Territory for peace is a travesty when territory for illegal settlement is official Israeli policy and practice. The settlements must stop now."

The frenetic pace of settlements has not stopped, or even faltered, however. Since the Madrid peace conference 26,000 dunams of land have been expropriated, or declared closed, and a major project of expansion has been started on what Israel describes as a new neighbourhood of Ariel, but which Palestinians recognise as a new settlement.<sup>202</sup> In addition, yet another settlement, Rahelim, was established on 2 December at Tapuah junction by militant members of the settler movement. Bilateral talks are, at the time of writing, scheduled to resume in early December 1991 in Washington, in spite of Israel's delaying tactics. It has also recently been announced that the multilateral phase, in which key

regional issues such as the refugee problem, arms control and water are to be discussed, will begin on 28 January 1992 in Moscow.

*"For too long the Palestinian people have gone unheeded, silenced and denied –our identity negated by political expediency, our rightful struggle against injustice maligned, and our present existence subsumed by the past tragedy of another people...It is time for us to narrate our own story, to stand witness as advocates of a truth which has long lain buried in the consciousness of the world...In its confrontation of wills between the legitimacy of the people and the illegality of the occupation, the intifada's message has been consistent: to embody the Palestinian state and to build its institutions and infrastructure....It was a sheer act of will which brought us here, the same will which asserted itself in the essence of the intifada as the cry for freedom, an act of civil resistance, and people's participation and empowerment. The intifada is our drive toward nation-building and social transformation... Let not the olive branch of peace fall from the hands of the Palestinian people."*

Haider'Abd'el-Shafi

## 6. ESSAY BY GHASSAN AL-KHATIB

The intifada contributed to the convening of the peace conference in a number of ways. Firstly, it forced the Palestinian issue back to the top of the international agenda. By increasing the amount of world attention that was being given to the Palestinian issue, the intifada proved that it would be impossible to achieve any degree of stability in the Middle East without first finding a solution to the Palestinian problem.

Secondly, the intifada changed the image of the Palestinians. The former perception that Palestinians were terrorists had prevented the world community from taking the Palestinians seriously, giving priority to their cause or viewing the Palestinian people as a viable partner in any future peace arrangements for the Middle East.

Thirdly, the intifada helped to develop the Palestinian political programme in a direction which made compromise possible. Previously the Palestinians had relied on their historical claim and natural rights to the land, but the intifada encouraged the move towards a more rational and unambiguous claim which was based on the precepts of commonly accepted legal rights, or "international legitimacy". Compromise is very difficult if one is in a weak position, and the main achievement of the intifada was that it strengthened the Palestinian hand and enabled them to start thinking pragmatically, in terms of finding a

compromise which would put a stop to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was this kind of political thinking which took the Palestinians to Madrid.

A fourth point is that the intifada is an expression of hope and belief that a political and diplomatic solution can be found to the conflict. The intifada tested the power of world public opinion as a means of influencing international, diplomatic developments; it also confirmed to the Palestinians that the international community had a key role to play in resolving the conflict. The Palestinians were convinced, therefore, of the need to work at harnessing world public opinion, by using the media and investing in the business of public relations.

Finally, before the intifada Israel was comfortable with the established status quo in the occupied territories, but as it became clear that the uprising would never be quashed by military means alone, and that the best that could be hoped for was an uneasy stalemate, Israel has had to look for an alternative solution.

The invitation to Madrid explicitly referred to the fact that the peace conference was based on the principles enshrined in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It would not have been possible for Palestinians to attend the conference without the confirmation that these were to be the terms of reference, and without the consequent understanding as to where the negotiations might lead. Now for

us, at least, it is going to lead to the implementation of 242; the most important aspect of which is the illegitimacy of the acquisition of land by force. This fact must be established, and redressed. Of course this is not the only issue which 242 deals with, for it is a very balanced resolution, recognising simultaneously the security needs of Israel. We acknowledge these needs and recognise that open discussion about the practical implications of the issue must be part of the negotiations. To sum up, then, for Palestinian there are three components to the principle of international legitimacy. The first is the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. The second is the acceptance of the terms of reference which international law and the will of the world community provide. The third is the conviction that, since Palestinian positions are in complete concordance with the terms and positions of the outside world, let the world be our judge at the peace conference.

For me, and most of my colleagues in the delegation, the most significant aspect of our participation at Madrid was that we were treated as a national delegation. The century-long fight between us and Israel has been based on their premise that the Palestinian people don't exist, and that pre-Israel Palestine was inhabited, but not by a people. Therefore, the fact that we were accorded equal rights with the other delegations who unquestionably represented their own people, was a way of emphasising that the Palestinian people do exist. It was an indirect recognition,

even on the part of the Israelis, that they were dealing with a people, who consequently should have all the rights that go with that status, namely self-determination. Of course, we were part of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, but we struggled for separate rights and status and we were accorded the right to speak at equal length to the other delegations. In all aspects of protocol we were treated as a separate delegation; our delegation head was given a special position at the table as were the heads of all of the other delegations, including the Jordanians. Moreover, we had the right to say what we wanted in our speech; and we were able to reflect the aspirations and needs of the Palestinian people as a whole, to state that we are a people with national and political rights, and to make it clear that without a recognition of this fact there can be no solution in the Middle East.

There have been two major developments since Madrid. Before the conference there was a minority, but a significant minority, who did not favour the terms for Palestinian participation in the peace conference. The first development, then, is in the degree of support and approbation which the political performance of the Palestinian delegation at Madrid has created. The opposition has been undermined and marginalised to a large extent. The delegation is receiving a reception of extraordinary warmth and enthusiasm throughout the country - in refugee camps, towns and villages. It has been accompanied, of course, by careful questioning, which

reflects that people are not only supportive, but are also monitoring the activities carefully, and trying to ensure that their anxieties and needs are taken into consideration.

The second important change has occurred in the morale and self-confidence of the Palestinian people. This was badly damaged by the Gulf war, since the Palestinian had for a number of reasons identified themselves with Saddam Hussein, and were directly affected by his defeat. This, in turn, was reflected in the nature and levels of intifada-activity. Mass participation in the intifada and enthusiasm for non-violent conflict with the authorities declined. The initial achievements of the Palestinian delegation at the peace conference has generally raised people's spirits and has led to a return to the principles of the intifada in its early days; namely, largescale, peaceful demonstrations. The people are back on the streets.

The peace conference has also effected the ways in which the Israeli authorities can respond to intifada-activity. They have not been able to use the same degree of violence to suppress large groups of demonstrators, and they have had to watch in silence as formerly illegal largescale political meetings, sometimes numbering as many as 10,000, have taken place. However, the gradual return to the old and brutal practices of repression is symbolised for me by the recent killing of the boy who was writing graffiti on the walls of the Old City of Jerusalem.<sup>203</sup>

The intifada was not only an expression of the will of the people, but was also a preparation for independence, in that it developed the principles of disengagement from Israeli authority, putting great emphasis on the need, not only to withdraw from the bureaucratic hold of the Civil Administration, but also to create an alternative, indigenous infrastructure for forthcoming Palestinian independence. Thus the practical, psychological and political preparations - for the interim stage of transferring Israeli civil control into Palestinian hands which is currently under discussion - has already started. And Palestinians view these discussions as an extension of the process which they began unilaterally four years ago.

Three kinds of committee are being formed. The first are political and strategic in their focus, and are designed to support the delegation with analysis, ideas and tactics for negotiation. They are to be made up of Palestinians from the territories and the diaspora. In addition there are technical committees made up of experts from different fields, which will define the specifics of Palestinian demands and requirements as the policies and structures of the transitional stage are being negotiated. In addition other committees are preparing the ground - in terms of both institutions and individuals - for the gradual Palestinian take over of authority.

The problem with the political committees which were publicised on the delegations

return from Madrid was that they were factional, rather than national committees. This was perceived as being an internal bid for power and as such was unsatisfactory. We are, therefore, in the process of restructuring them into national groups. This is a process of substituting the underground political structures with open and public ones.

It is not easy to predict how the future negotiations will fare since we did not discuss issues in Madrid which could have given us indicators. However, it is possible to say this much. Initially, the conflict is going to revolve around the agenda, since Israel is determined to avoid discussing the general political issues because this will raise the subject of where the interim stage will lead, and that in turn brings us to the crux of the issue which is ending the occupation. The Israelis feel in a weak position when this issue is raised, since the Palestinian case has its basis in international law and is supported by the international community. Instead the Israelis want to start by negotiating the technical minutiae of transferring predominantly municipal control over to the Palestinians. Basically, they intend to give the Palestinians control over the Civil Administration's scope of activity and no more. The Palestinians for their part cannot negotiate the details of the interim plan - which in its very name testifies to the existence of a final stage - without having any sense of what the final stage will involve. Also, the Palestinians cannot discuss any of these issues whilst the Israelis are involved in

changing the facts on the ground. It is inconceivable that the peace talks can continue whilst the Israelis are building more and more houses and expanding their settlements with every day that passes.

Without in any way underestimating the huge difficulties which lie ahead, and also fully recognising the possibilities of failure, the Palestinians have taken courage in the fact that the basis of their demands for a halt in the settlement process and eventually an end to the occupation is unequivocally rooted in international law. All of the third parties involved in the process, from the US and the USSR, to the EEC and Japan, are in agreement that there must be a freeze in the settlement process and in land confiscations. If the Israelis will not countenance putting a freeze on settlements and decide to walk away from the peace table then the Palestinian position can only have been strengthened, or at least nothing will have been lost, other than this chance to make peace.

The allusion at the end of Haider'Abd el-Shafi's speech was not a threat. We felt that all of the parties at the table should remember that what is being discussed is peace and security which will enable mutual growth and development to take place in the region. There is a dark side to the process which has to be faced as well, which is more violence and bloodshed, both in wars and in the intifada. It is not a threat, its a fact; if there is no peace, there will be war. There is no third way.

## **APPENDICES**

*Appendix A: Haider'Abd el-Shafi's Speech to the Bilateral meeting in Madrid, 4 November 1991.*

We are entering bilateral negotiations with open hearts, open minds, and sincere intentions in order to achieve a just and comprehensive settlement which will provide the Palestinian and Israeli peoples with peace and security, side by side with other peoples in the region.

Our acceptance of the phased approach is based on the belief that the phases must be sequentially connected and within the specified time. Furthermore, the twin-track course of negotiations is inherently linked and mutually dependant.

We would like to point out also that Israeli settlement activities are not only illegal, but are in direct violation of the basis of the whole process including UNSC resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace. All settlement activity must cease immediately if the integrity of the process is to be maintained and the rights of the Palestinians safeguarded. Otherwise, the purpose and foundations of the whole process will be negated.

We must condemn Israel's bombardment of Palestinian camps and Lebanese villages in South Lebanon. This creates a negative atmosphere for the continuation of these negotiations.

Throughout this first phase of negotiations, it is imperative that Israel carry out basic confidence building measures in the occupied territories. It is inconceivable that we conduct talks with an occupying authority which is daily creating facts that render negotiations of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 or the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 681 would constitute a step in the right direction in this respect.

Regarding the transitional phase, we support the rapid and orderly transfer of authority from the Israeli occupation to the Palestinian people, whereby Palestinians will gain control over political, economic, and other decisions that affect their lives and fate. Control over water, land and other natural resources, population and citizenship, as well as the legislative and judiciary branches must be included in these categories.

It is our firm position that Israeli forces be withdrawn from the occupied territories

during the transitional period to allow a full transfer of authority to the Palestinian people. Whatever arrangements are arrived at during the transitional phase pertaining to the repatriation of displaced persons does not in any way negate or adversely affect the right of return of the Palestinians dispossessed in 1948 as stated in UN Resolution 194.

Furthermore, our presence here today is grounded in our firm commitment to our right to self-determination and the national unity and rights of the Palestinian people under occupation and in exile. Confederation is a possible outcome of negotiations in this context, and we do not thereby abandon our right to independent statehood.

It is also our firm position that East Jerusalem is occupied Palestinian territory and that all transitional arrangements are applicable to it. Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem and the extension of its municipal boundaries are illegal unilateral acts and are reversible. We further affirm that the principle of territory for peace means Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, a prerequisite for genuine stability and peace in the region.

The fact that the PLO has agreed not to be directly or overtly involved in the process, does not in any way prejudice its role as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people everywhere, and the only body empowered to negotiate or to conclude agreements affecting the permanent status of the Palestinian people.

The Palestinian response and the positive efforts throughout the preparatory stages are all based on the Palestinian peace initiative as articulated by the Palestine National Council.

Our presence here is based on our firm adherence to international legitimacy and on our full confidence in the justice of our cause. Unfortunately, our participation is doubly handicapped: by the harsh and oppressive conditions of the occupation itself, and by the constraints imposed on our participation.

In spite of all these potential obstacles, we are confident that with the good will and full participation of the co-sponsors, and the sincere efforts of both our delegation and yours, we are beginning a process that will lead to a just and lasting peace for both the Palestinians and Israelis on a basis of equity, mutual respect and reciprocity. It is in this positive spirit that we are here.

*Appendix B: CHRONOLOGY OF KEY DATES OF THE UPRISING*

**8 December 1987** - An Israeli army tank transporter collides with a car full of Gazan workers at the Eretz checkpoint. Four Palestinian workers are killed and seven are badly injured in the incident which is to mark the beginning of the intifada.

**9 December 1987** - Hatem al-Sisi is shot during protest demonstrations in Jabalia. He is the first fatality of the intifada.

**11 December 1987** - The protests spread to the West Bank. Three Palestinians are killed in Balata refugee camp in Gaza, a fourth later dying from gunshot wounds. A violent protest then flares up in Nablus causing at least 50 casualties.

**13 December 1987** - The protests spread to East Jerusalem. The 40-day general strike begins.

**14 December 1987**- Israeli Housing Minister Ariel Sharon takes possession of a house in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City.

**18 December 1987** - The first uprising communique is released in Gaza and signed by "The National Forces in the Gaza Strip".

**22 December 1987** - The UN Security Council passes a Resolution 605 condemning Israel for the level of its brutality.

**23 December 1987** - Four institutions of higher learning, Abu Dis Polytechnic, Ramallah Community College, Ramallah Women's College and the UNRWA Teacher Training College are closed for one month.

**24 December 1987** - Ansar 2 prison in Gaza is expanded to contain the massive numbers of new prisoners.

**30 December 1987** - West Bank lawyers boycott military courts, describing the procedures as "humiliating and illegal".



**31 December 1987** - 160 Israeli reservists publicly declare their refusal to serve in the occupied territories.

**6 January 1988** - The UN Security Council passes a resolution condemning the planned deportation of nine Palestinians. The US votes in favour of the motion.

**8 January 1988** - The first communique of the Unified Leadership of the Uprising is issued.

**13 January 1988** - Four Palestinians are deported to Lebanon.

**17 January 1988** - The IDF announces that it will be necessary to increase the number of reservists serving in the occupied territories.

**18 January 1988** - The army escalates its policy of breaking open shops that are on strike.

**20 January 1988** - Israeli Defense Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, adopts a policy of "force, might and beatings".

**21 January 1988** - Colonel Yehuda Meir orders his soldiers to bind and gag 12 Palestinian villagers from Huwara. They are taken to a remote field and beaten until their arms and legs are broken. Colonel Meir is forced to resign.

**2 February 1988** - All institutions of higher education are indefinitely closed by the Israeli authorities.

**3 February 1988** - All West Bank schools are closed until further notice.

**5 February 1988** - The Salam burial takes place in a village near Nablus. Four Palestinians are ordered to lie in a pit while soldiers bury them with a bulldozer. They are pulled from the ground unconscious, but alive.

**8 February 1988** - Three Israeli-appointed city council mayors resign in Ramallah.

**13 February 1988** - All schools in East Jerusalem are indefinitely ordered closed.

**14 February 1988** - A second burial incident takes place in Gaza. Two youths are buried alive, but survive.

**17 February 1988** - Israeli authorities limit the amount of Jordanian Dinars which can be brought in to the country.

**24 February 1988** - A collaborator who shot and killed a child in Qabatia is hanged by villagers. Harsh sanctions are subsequently imposed on the village by the Israelis.

**6 March 1988** - Palestinian employees of the Civilian Administration in general, and the Tax division in particular, resign *en masse*.

**15 March 1988** - The Israeli authorities cut international phone lines from the occupied territories. They are not to be reconnected until the 9th of January 1989.

**17 March 1988** - Ansar 3 prison camp opens in the Negev desert.

**18 March 1988** - Gaza is declared closed to the press.

**20 March 1988** - Defense Minister Rabin authorises soldiers and settlers to open fire on Palestinians throwing petrol bombs.

**22 March 1988** - The right of judicial appeal has been withdrawn for administrative detainees (previously a judicial review was required within 96 hours.)

**30 March 1988** - Huge demonstrations take place on Land Day and the occupied territories are declared closed military zones for three days.

**6 April 1988** - During a clash between residents from the village of Beita and a group of hiking settlers, a Jewish teenager is killed by the stray bullet of another settler. In reprisal, 14 houses are demolished, hundreds of olive trees are uprooted, many villagers are arrested and six are deported.

**8 April 1988** - Eight Palestinians are deported and a further 12 are issued with deportation orders.

**16 April 1988** - PLO activist Abu Jihad is assassinated by Israeli forces in his home in Tunis, for his alleged role in directing the intifada. Protests ignite in the occupied territories; a three-day mourning strike is declared.

**17 April 1988** - The Israeli-appointed mayor of Nablus, and two other council members announce their resignation.

**25 April 1988** - Gazans are required to have a document stamped by tax, customs, VAT, electricity and water departments before they can receive new identity cards.

**11 May 1988** - Four East Jerusalem newspaper editors are placed under house arrest.

**1 June 1988** - The Civil Administration announces that, as a result of decreased revenues due to the tax boycott in the occupied territories, services will be cut.

**3 June 1988** - The Arab Summit meets in Algiers. PLO spokesman and Chief Political Advisor Bassam Abu Sharif presents a document, entitled *Prospects of a Palestine-Israeli Settlement*, which is to be the most explicit endorsement of the two-state solution to have emanated from PLO sources so far.

**6 July 1988** - The Civil Administration announces that Palestinians who are wounded must pay US \$150 before they can receive medical treatment and that all referrals to hospitals will require Civil Administration clearance.

**7 June 1988** - The Israeli appointed mayor of Al-Bireh is stabbed and later dies.

**31 July 1988** - King Hussein abrogates "all legal and administrative ties" with the West Bank and states his "willingness to step aside for the PLO".

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**6 August 1988** - Jordan abolishes the Ministry of the Occupied Territories.

**16 August 1988** - Two prisoners are shot and killed by guards at Ansar Three prison in the Negev.

**17 August 1988** - Twenty-five more Palestinians are served with deportation orders; they are later accused of membership in popular committees.

**18 August 1988** - Popular committees are declared illegal and mass arrests follow.

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**28 August 1988** - The Union of Charitable Societies, the al-Hayat Press Agency, the

professional associations complex and the Higher Education Council are all closed.

**6 September 1988** - A large-scale IDF operation takes place in Qalqilia. An estimated 1,000 males are arrested and detained. Four houses are demolished.

**13 September 1988** - The Israeli authorities ban the marketing of grapes in Halhoul, near Hebron, affecting an estimated 15,000 farmers.

**19 September 1988** - Defense Minister Rabin approves the use of a new, sharp plastic bullet with an aluminum core, saying that an increase in injuries "is precisely our aim".

**17 October 1988** - The existence of undercover Israeli hit squads, who have killed a number of Palestinians, is exposed. The Israeli authorities confiscate the press cards of the journalists responsible.

**19 October 1988** - 40 houses are demolished in one week.

**30 October 1988** - Five petrol bombs are thrown at an Israeli bus in Jericho killing a woman and three children, the first Israeli civilian deaths of the intifada.

**1 November 1988** - Elections in Israel result in the religious parties holding the balance of power between Likud and Labor. Negotiations begin on forming a coalition government.

**7 November 1988** - An Israeli soldier is stabbed to death outside a Jordan Valley settlement after an argument. The Palestinian is shot and killed by another soldier and 100 houses in Jiftlik, the Palestinian's village, are demolished in reprisal.

**15 November 1988** - The Palestine National Council, meeting in Algiers, adopts a new political programme, recognising the terms of UN resolution 242, and, by extension, Israel. They also issue the Declaration of Palestinian Independence.

**17 November 1988** - Israel publicly rejects the PNC declaration, insisting that the PLO is still committed to the destruction of Israel.

**21 November 1988** - The EEC calls the recent PNC decisions "A positive step forward".

**26 November 1988** - Secretary of State George Shultz refuses to grant PLO chairman

**Yasser Arafat a visa to address the UN General Assembly in New York; the venue is changed to Geneva.**

**13 December 1988 - Yasser Arafat addresses a specially convened meeting of the UN Security Council in Geneva, where he renounces terrorism and implicitly recognises Israel's existence.**

**14 December 1988 - Arafat holds a press conference in Geneva at which he reiterates his adherence to the principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, and renounces terrorism.**

**15 December 1988 - The United States announces that it is reopening dialogue with the PLO.**

**16 December 1988 - The IDF opens fire on a funeral procession in Nablus killing three of the mourners and injuring several others, three of whom later die of their wounds.**

**19 December 1988 - Likud and Labour agree to form a coalition government.**

**1 January 1989 - Thirteen Palestinians are deported to South Lebanon, seven from the West Bank and six from the Gaza Strip, bringing the total number of deportations to 49.**

**6 January 1989 - The Civil Administration announces that all West Bank schools, kindergartens to high schools, public and private, will be closed until further notice due to stone-throwing incidents.**

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**9 January 1989 - The IDF rules for opening fire are relaxed and a new variety of plastic bullets with a larger proportion of metal are introduced.**

**29 January 1989 - Israeli peace groups stage a three-day camp-in at the Ketziot junction in the Negev desert, to protest the detention without trial of thousands of Palestinians in nearby Ansar 3 prison camp.**

**6 February 1989 - The village of Kufr Laad begins a second month without water of electricity, as a collective punishment.**

**24 February 1989 - Palestinian owners of cars in Gaza with clean records are sold stickers**

which, when placed on their cars, will allow them to pass through military checkpoints into Israel.

**26 February 1989** - Colour-coded identity cards are introduced for Gazans. Those issued with green cards will not be allowed to enter Israel's borders, on "security grounds".

**3 March 1989** - The US administration threatens to cut off its dialogue with the PLO following a failed DFLP raid into the Lebanese "security zone".

**7 March 1989** - On one of the most violent days of the uprising, 161 Palestinians are reported injured, 47 of them by live ammunition and metal bullets. IDF troops raid the UNRWA vocational training centre and the medical clinic at Jabalia refugee camp, severely beating students, staff and shooting two nurses in the clinic.

**1 April 1989** - Prime Minister Shamir presents his peace proposal whilst in Washington.

**13 April 1989** - Dawn raid on Nahleen, a village near Bethlehem, leaves four villagers dead and 45 wounded with live and rubber bullets.

**18 April 1989** - Jerusalem police announce they have "uncovered a network of illegal classes", which Birzeit and Bethlehem University have been conducting on the premises of private East Jerusalem schools.

**26 April 1989** - The UNLU declares this a "day of reckoning" for collaborators

**5 May 1989** - The stabbing of five IDF soldiers provokes a wave of anti-Palestinian attacks.

**12 May 1989** - The Israeli High Court gives the IDF permission to demolish houses of petrol bomb throwers - even if no one is injured.

**19 May 1989** - Four Palestinians, including a five-year old girl, are shot and killed by the IDF in Rafah Refugee camp in clashes between IDF troops and local residents.

**29 May 1989** - A thirteen year old girl is killed in Kifl Harith by settlers who rampaged through the village with machine guns and petrol bombs.

**May 1989** - In Ariel settlement in the West Bank, Palestinian workers are forced to wear badges identifying them as "foreign workers". The policy is rescinded after it causes a media scandal and parallels are drawn with the Star of David badges imposed on Jews by the Nazis.

**3 June 1989** - The Civil Administration launches "Operation Plastic Card", introducing yet another form of identity card for Gazans, this time with a magnetic strip. The card is given only to those with clean security records.

**21 June 1989** - Settler Rafi Salmon opens fire on Palestinian workers who had collected at a junction near Tel Aviv, injuring one and critically wounding another. He is later released on bail.

**30 June 1989** - Two thousand settlers, accompanied by the IDF, take a synchronised "hike" through the West Bank, which culminates in the murder of a 20-year-old Palestinian shepherd tending sheep outside the village of Qarawat Bani Hassan, near Ramallah.

**4 July 1989** - The IDF announces a new policy enabling the army to shoot at any "masked" Palestinian (anyone whose face is covered by a keffiyeh or another garment to avoid identification by the authorities), who ignores army orders to halt, and at anyone erecting barricades, burning tyres or fleeing from troops.

**7 July 1989** - Fourteen people are killed and 27 injured when an Israeli bus is forced into a ravine near West Jerusalem. A Palestinian from the Gaza Strip is arrested.

**20 July 1989** - A group calling itself "The Unified Leadership of the Jewish Uprising" claims responsibility for the poisoning of hundreds of Palestinian vineyards in the Hebron area.

**5 September 1989** - In Nablus the military court sentences Palestinian Moussa Yousef to seven years for stoning a settler's car. The next day, the Jerusalem District Court sentenced Yaron Yona, an Israeli, to eight months in prison for stoning an Arab truck.

**24 September 1989** - OC Central Command Yitzhak Mordechai issues a military order giving the IDF the authority to confiscate property in lieu of tax payments.

**14 October 1989** - The tax-related confrontation between Israeli authorities and the

residents of Beit Sahour begins, in which goods, personal effects and tools of trade worth millions of dollars are confiscated.

**6 December 1989** - Faisal Husseini, the head of the Arab Studies Society, is issued with a six month military order banning him from entering the West Bank and Gaza.

**30 December 1989** - The Time for Peace demonstration: 40,000 people link hands around the walls of the Old City of Jerusalem as a protest against the occupation. The Israelis respond to the peaceful demonstration of Palestinians, Israelis and foreigners with an overwhelming display of force.

**31 January 1990** - Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin suspends the expulsion of hundreds of Palestinians who are classified illegal residents, as a result of US pressure.

**9 February 1990** - IDF sources reveal that they have begun using jeep-mounted stone-throwing cannon, which can throw an average of 600 stones per hour, at a distance of 75 meters.

**11 February 1990** - IDF announcement that the amount of bail which parents have to post in order to free children accused of stone-throwing is to be between NIS1,500 to NIS5,000. In addition, houses of stone-throwers will now be sealed

**10 March 1990** - Extended arrest and tax raid on Beit Fureek, near Nablus. An 11-day curfew is imposed, 150 arrests are made, and tax collectors confiscate furniture and cars of all those who have not yet paid their taxes.

**13 March 1990** - The National Unity government of Yitzhak Shamir collapses in a vote of no-confidence. Shamir requests \$17 million from the Knesset for settlement activity in the occupied territories.

**12 April 1990** - 150 settlers occupy a Greek Orthodox church hospice in the Old City of Jerusalem's Christian Quarter during Easter week, causing an international uproar. It emerges that the Israeli Housing Ministry supplied the funds for the purchase.

**26 April 1990** - Three Palestinians are killed in Jabalia Refugee Camp when soldiers open fire on a religious procession, returning from the camp cemetery, after early morning prayers marking the end of Ramadan.



**3 May 1990** - 1.000 settlers celebrate the inauguration of a yeshiva at Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, whilst all Nablus' Palestinian residents are confined to their houses under curfew.

**20 May 1990** - Ami Popper opens fire on Palestinian workers at Rishon Lezion. He kills seven and injures eleven men from the Gaza Strip.

**28 May 1990** - A bomb is detonated at the Mahane Yehuda market in West Jerusalem, killing one Israeli and injuring nine.

**30 May 1990** - Palestinian guerrillas in speedboats attempt seaborne raids on the Israeli Mediterranean coast. Four are killed and a further 12 apprehended. The raid was organised by the Palestine Liberation Front, led by Abul Abbas.

**20 June 1990** - The US government suspends the 18-month US-PLO dialogue after the PLO refuses to meet its demand to expell Abul Abbas from the PNC.

**28 July 1990** - A 17 year old Canadian tourist is killed by a pipe-bomb explosion on a Tel Aviv beach. Eighteen other people are treated for minor wounds. Arabs in the vicinity are attacked by Jews and 12 are arrested.

**2 August 1990** - Iraqi invades Kuwait, occupying the country within two hours.

**6-11 August 1990** - Discovery of two Israeli youths, stabbed to death, provokes massive anti-Palestinian riots during which two Palestinians are killed.

**14 August 1990** - Rabbi Moshe Levinger, head of the Gush Emunim settler movement, is released from prison after serving three and a half months of a five month sentence for the fatal shooting of a Palestinian shoe-shop owner in Hebron in September 1988.

**3 September 1990** - Bethlehem University is allowed to re-open after having been closed since October 1987. All other universities are to remain closed.

**8 September 1990** - Leading Palestinians from the occupied territories issue an open letter to Presidents Gorbachev and Bush explaining the Palestinian position vis a vis the Gulf Crisis.

**25 September 1990** - Israeli Supreme Court declares "legal" the demolition of 26 shops and seven houses in Gaza's Bureij refugee camp as a collective punishment following the killing of an Israeli reservist.

**8 October 1990** - Seventeen Palestinians are shot dead by the IDF, and more than 150 are injured, following clashes at the Haram al-Shareef, in protest against a planned demonstration by the Temple Mount Faithful.

**12 October 1990** - UN Security Council adopts Resolutions 672, unanimously condemning Israel for its attack on unarmed protesters at the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

**16 October 1990** - The Zamir Investigative Committee, appointed by Prime Minister Shamir in the wake of the Haram al-Shareef killing, hears testimony from police and Shin Bet (General Security Services) personnel.

**21 October 1990** - Three Israelis are fatally stabbed in the Baka neighborhood of West Jerusalem by a Palestinian youth avenging the recent killings at Haram al-Sharif.

**23 October 1990** - All residents of the occupied territories excluding East Jerusalem are banned from entering Israel in an effort to "curb the wave of violence."

**25 October 1990** - An Israeli gun-merchant reports a fifty percent increase in the sale of firearms since the Baka stabbings.

**26 October 1990** - A wave of replacing Arab workers with new immigrants has begun, although many Jewish workers are unwilling to work for the low wages offered.

**1 November 1990** - Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens announces that 20,000 green cars will be issued in the occupied territories to all of those with "security or criminal records." The first of 12 proposed permanent checkpoints on the Green Line is established near Tulkarem.

**5 November 1990** - Rabbi Meir Kahane is assassinated in New York City; news of his killing triggers an orgy of anti-Arab attacks, culminating in the shooting of an elderly Arab couple picking olives in Luban a-Sharqia.

**5 December 1990** - Shots are fired at a bus full of Israeli settlers from the Nablus

settlement of Alon Moreh injuring three, and at an Israeli car that was following the bus. In response Defense Minister Moshe Arens orders the confiscation of 1,000 dunams of land from 'Ain Seenia, the scene of the shooting, for the establishment of an IDF base.

**21 December 1990** - Israeli Minister of Police Roni Milo approves the use of special sniper units against stone-throwers in Jerusalem, reportedly after having observed their effectiveness when used by the IDF in the rest of the occupied territories.

**23 December 1990** - Five Palestinians are shot dead and 53 are injured in confrontations with the IDF in Rafah refugee camp.

**31 December 1990** - Record levels of Soviet immigration to Israel.

**8 January 1991** - The practice of deportation is resumed with the expulsion of four Gazans on the grounds that they are leaders of the Hamas movement.

**12 January 1991** - In the Gaza Strip all schools are closed indefinitely in anticipation of the war in the Gulf and residents are informed that, in the event of war, a total curfew will be imposed.

**15 January 1991** - Three top leaders of the Fatah movement, Salaf Khalaf (Abu Iyyad), Hayel Abd al-Hamid and Abu Hamad Omari are assassinated in Tunis.

**17 January 1991** - US-led forces begin an attack on Iraq. IDF imposes a blanket curfew on the whole of the occupied territories, excluding several neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.

**18 January 1991** - The first Iraqi Scud, fired against Israel lands in the Tel Aviv area. The majority of Palestinian residents of the territories are without gas-masks despite a High Court ruling ordering their distribution.

**29 January 1991** - International protests erupt after Dr. Sari Nusseibeh, a philosophy professor at Birzeit University, is taken into six months administrative detention for allegedly conveying security information to Iraq.

**11 March 1991** - US Secretary of State James Baker makes the first of eight visits to the region in an effort to get a Middle East peace initiative off the ground.

**23 March 1991** - Four Palestinians from Gaza are deported, bringing the total of Palestinians deported in 1991 to eight.

**29 March 1991** - Confrontations in Nablus and its surrounding refugee camps are reportedly at the level of those which occurred at the beginning of the uprising.

**31 March 1991** - As the Baker peace initiative gathers momentum the Israeli authorities engage in largescale land confiscations. Fifty thousand dunams of land in the vicinity of Ramallah are taken this month to build a new settlement road and expand the Israeli settlement of Rimonim.

**9 April 1991** - Secretary of State James Baker returns to Jerusalem amidst dissent from some Palestinians as to the wisdom of meeting with him.

**10 April 1991** - The Israeli authorities announce that only Palestinians with permits issued by the military government will be allowed into Jerusalem or Israel.

**19 April 1991** - Ten-thousand Israeli settlers march through the occupied West Bank to show their support for continued Jewish settlement and to protest relinquishing control over any territory; Palestinian residents of the Nablus area are placed under curfew.

**April 1991** - Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens announces the release of 1,000 Palestinian detainees, on the occasion of Id al-Fitr, the Muslim feast day at the end of Ramadan. Most of the detainees are nearing the ends of their sentences.

**4 May 1991** - A French pilgrim is fatally stabbed in a Bethlehem restaurant.

**5 May 1991** - A number of prominent Palestinians visit veteran Israeli peace activist Abie Nathan to show their support for his month-long hunger strike. Nathan is protesting against the law banning contact with the PLO.

**12 May 1991** - Jerusalem is closed to all Palestinians holding identity cards from the occupied territories, even those with Israeli-issued permits, due to the Israeli celebrations marking the "reunification" of Jerusalem in 1967.

**25 May 1991** - Some 14,500 Ethiopian Jews are flown to Israel in a 36-hour operation

code-named Solomon.

**1 June 1991** - The Israeli military decrees that all Palestinians working inside Israel must now obtain new permits to cross the Green Line. The measure affects tens of thousands of Palestinian workers.

**3 June 1991** - Israeli Civil Administration announces that it will be instituting a new form of clearance, which will be computerised and valid for one year. The clearance is required in order to obtain a work permit, a driving licence or any other official document.

**21 June 1991** - Israel Television reports on the existence of undercover army squads operating in the occupied territories.

**18 July 1991** - Judge Kama accuses the Israeli police of negligence in a report into the killing of 17 Palestinians at Al-Aqsa mosque in October 1990.

**21 July 1991** - Syria agrees to attend Middle East peace talks with Israel.

**23 July 1991** - Several thousand Israeli soldiers are employed in a massive pre-dawn arrest raid on Nablus where 40 political fugitives are arrested. Soldiers, accompanied by tax collectors, conduct house-to-house searches in the city under curfew. The municipality headquarters of Nablus are also raided.

**14 August 1991** - Israeli Chief of Staff Ehud Barak announces that the military will no longer interrogate Palestinian detainees from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but will hand the task over to the Israeli police and Shin Bet (General Security Services) on the grounds that "interrogating civilians is not the job of army personnel".

**1 August 1991** - Israel gives its conditional agreement to attend a Middle East peace conference.

**6 September 1991** - Israeli officials ignore a request from US President George Bush to delay their demand for US \$10 billion in loan guarantees. The following week the White House seeks and wins a 120-day delay in considering the guarantees.

**28 September 1991** - The Palestine National Council, meeting in Algiers votes overwhelmingly in favour of attending the peace conference called for by Presidents Bush

and Gorbachev.

**2 October 1991** - Two German tourists are stabbed, one fatally, while sitting in coffee shops near Damascus Gate in Jerusalem's Old City. The UNLU roundly condemns all attacks on visitors and tourists and leading Palestinian figures express doubt that any of the national factions are responsible for the incident.

**9 October 1991** - Abie Nathan begins serving an eighteen month sentence for meeting with Yasser Arafat and other PLO officials. Nathan had previously served four months prison sentence for the same offence.

**10 October 1991** - Four right-wing Knesset members and a group of some 50 armed Jewish settlers, occupy six Palestinian homes in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Silwan, with the backing of the Israeli government.

**18 October 1991** - Secretary of State James Baker makes his eighth and final visit to the region, announcing, at a press conference with Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin, that the Middle East Peace Conference will be convened in Madrid at the end of the month.

**20 October 1991** - The Israeli cabinet votes 16 to 3 in favour of attending the peace conference.

**29 October 1991** - An Israeli settler from Shilo and a bus driver are killed when shots are fired at a bus, taking settlers to a mass rally against the peace conference in Tel Aviv.

**29 October 1991** - Three-thousand Gaza residents march through Gaza City with olive branches, singing and chanting peace slogans; Israeli soldiers do not interfere.

**30 October 1991** - The Middle East Peace Conference is convened in Madrid.

**30 October 1991** - Pro-peace demonstrations take place throughout the occupied territories. Clashes erupt in Gaza City as Fatah activists try to disperse demonstrators protesting against the Madrid conference.

**3 November 1991** - IDF troops intervene in a pro-peace conference march in Hebron confiscating signs, throwing olive branches to the ground and arresting participants.

**4 November 1991** - The bilateral phase of the Middle East Peace conference begins.

**9 November 1991** - The IDF bans non-residents of Jericho from entering the town in order to greet returning Palestinian delegates from Madrid.

**11 November 1991** - Members of the Palestinian delegation begin a round of meetings and debates throughout the occupied territories to discuss the implications of the Madrid conference and the Palestinian platform in the peace process.

**24 November 1991** - Hundreds of Ramallah residents meet with Peace Now representatives at the Friends Boys School in Ramallah in a show of support for the continued peace process.

**4 December 1991** - All the Arab delegations arrive in Washington for the second phase of the bilateral peace talks. The Israeli delegation has postponed its arrival until 9 December 1991.

**ENDNOTES**

1991 - The bilateral phase of the Middle East Peace Conference begins -  
 1991 - The PLO sends non-residents of Jericho from entering the West Bank  
 and Palestinian delegates from Madrid.  
 1991 - Members of the Palestinian delegation begin a round of meetings and  
 discuss the occupied territories to discuss the implications of the Madrid  
 and the Palestinian question in the peace process.  
 1991 - Hundreds of Samalian residents meet with Peace Now representatives  
 in a show of support for the continued presence of the school in Samaria.  
 Delegations arrive in Washington for the second phase of  
 an delegation has postponed its arrival until 9 December.



1. The Guardian, 12 December 1987
2. UNLU Communique (unnumbered) dated February 1988. Published in Towards a State of Independence; the Palestinian Uprising December 1987 - August 1988, FACTS Information Committee, Jerusalem, P95.
3. UN Resolution 181, passed on the 27 November 1947, which partitioned Palestine into two states.
4. Press conference held in Geneva on 14 December 1988 at which Yasser Arafat elaborated on the points which he made during his address to the United Nations General Assembly the previous day.
5. UNLU Communique No.23, 5 August 1988.
6. UNLU Communique No.18, 28 May 1988.
7. Intifada; Palestine at the Crossroads, Edited by Jamal R Nassar & Roger Heathcock, Birzeit University & Praeger Publishers, 1991. *The Revolutionary Transformation of Palestinians under Occupation*, By Nassar & Heathcock, p202.
8. Introductory speech of the Palestinian delegation, Dr. Haider Abdel Shafi, 31 October 1991, Madrid.
9. UNLU Communique No.12, 2 April 1988.
10. UNLU Communique No.10, 10 March 1988.
11. The military checkpoint which links Gaza at its northern border to Israel.
12. Intifada Palestine at the Crossroads, Edited by Jamal Nassar & Roger Heathcock, Birzeit University & Praeger Publishers, p205.
13. Intifada - The Palestinian Uprising; Israel's Third Front, By Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari. Simon & Schuster, 1989, p113-4.
14. United Leadership of the Uprising; a multi-faction and fluid collection of people issued their first communique, directing and developing the activities of the uprising, on 18 December 1987.

15. Gaza Communiqué 8 January 1988 as cited in Towards a State of Independence; the Palestinian uprising December 1987 - August 1988 Facts Information Committee, Jerusalem. pp92-93.

16. "Other officials [in Mossad] privately admitted that the effect of the killing [of Abu Jihad] was far less than had been expected." Israel's Secret Wars By Ian Black & Benny Morris, Hamish Hamilton. 1991, p472.

17. Yitzhak Rabin quoted in the Jerusalem Post, 27 February 1990.

18. Al-Ittihad, 26 May 1989.

19. Gaza Communiqué 12 January 1988. Translated in Towards a state of independence; the Palestinian uprising December 1987-August 1988 Facts Information Committee, Jerusalem. p94.

20. UNLU Communiqué No. 21, 6 July 1988.

21. Palestinian workers in Israel save Israeli employers an estimated \$500 million annually in low labour costs; a figure which rises to approximately \$1 billion net revenue for Israel when the savings in unpaid social security are included. Tzvi Timor in Al Hamishmar, 1 January 1988.

22. Yitzhak Rabin during a lecture to building contractors. Reported in Davar, 4 May 1988.

23. Al-Quds 13 December 1988.

24. Ariel Sharon did not in fact move into his apartment on the 14th December. He hosted a party there, and has subsequently used the house as a venue for meetings and in order to make an ideological statement. In effect, a military base had been established in the centre of the Muslim Quarter, since the house needs 24 hour protection and surveillance.

25. For more information see the essay on *The Revolt of the Petite Bourgeoisie* By Salim Tamari in Intifada; Palestine at the Crossroads Ed. Nassar & Heathcock, Birzeit University & Praeger Publishers, 1991.

26. Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin quoted in Ha'aretz, 22 April 1989.

27. Mahmoud Ibrahim, quoted by Judith Gabriel in The economic side of the intifada, Journal of Palestinian Studies 69, Autumn 1988, pp 205-6.
28. Al-Ittihad, 4 April 1991.
29. Issued on 1 September 1991, reported in Al-Ittihad, 2 September 1991.
30. Taxation in the Occupied West Bank 1967-1989, By Marc Stephens, Al-Haq, 1990, p50.
31. The West Bank Handbook: A Political Lexicon, West Bank Data Base Project, Jerusalem, 1986, p92.
32. A summary of a study on Israeli Tax procedures was published in Attalia on 13 June 1991 in which it was revealed that whilst an Israeli couple are exempt from paying tax on the first NIS1,650 of their monthly salaries, Palestinians are exempt only on the first NIS355.
33. VAT was introduced in the occupied territories by Military Order No 658 which was an amendment to the 1963 Jordanian Law of Excise on Local Products. See Taxation in the Occupied West Bank 1967-1989, By Marc Stephens, Al-Haq 1990, p26.
34. Al-Farj, 21 August 1988.
35. UNLU Communique 13, April 1988, quoted in Towards a State of Independence: the Palestinian Uprising December 1987 - August 1988, Facts Information Committee, Jerusalem, 1988, p101.
36. A Call from Beit Sahour delivered at a press conference held in Beit Sahour on the 26 September 1988 and quoted in The Cost of Freedom: 1989 Palestinian Human Rights under Israeli Occupation, PHRIC annual report.
37. Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin addressing the Knesset Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee, 10 October 1989.
38. Al-Ittihad, 25 October 1990.
39. Jerusalem Post, 29 May 1989.

40. Examples cited by Samir Hileileh, a Palestinian economist from the Economic Development Group in Jerusalem.
41. After the mass resignation of the sixty Arab policemen in Bethlehem the military governor offered them a NIS120 monthly salary rise if they returned to work; they all declined. Facts Weekly Review No 2, 13 March 1988.
42. Ha'aretz, June 1989.
43. Due to Israel's censorship and sanctions against the press reliable figures compiled from the press are not available.
44. See Jerusalem Post, 26 November 1991, for report of the trial of Mordechai Ben-David, charged with selling a pistol to a resident of Gaza.
45. See Punishing a Nation, Al-Haq, 1990.
46. "During the first months of the uprising, alleged collaborators were forced to recant before the entire village, often at the mosque after Friday prayers. Israeli-supplied guns were turned in and the accused would vow 'not to repeat harm to our people'..it was a kind of political and religious repentance." Daoud Kuttub quoted in The Christian Science Monitor, 31 October 1988.
47. Intifada: The Palestinian uprising Israel's third front By Ze'ev Schiff & Ehud Ya'ari, Simon & Schuster, 1989, p161.
48. Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin informed the Knesset in February 1990 that Palestinians who work with the Israeli authorities are routinely armed with communications equipment and weapons for "self-defence".
49. Israel's Secret Wars By Ian Black & Benny Morris, Hamish Hamilton, 1991, p479.
50. Al-Fair, English June 1991, see also Al-Fair, 30 May 1991, & 5 June 1991.
51. See page 49 for fuller analysis of Jordanian political initiatives.
52. Abu Sharif defined both Palestinian and Israeli objectives as finding a "lasting peace and security". He stressed that "no one can build his own future on the ruins of another's"

and that the goal is "a free , dignified and secure life not only for our children but also for the children of the Israelis."

53. UNLU leaflet no 25, dated 7 September 1988. calls on the United Nations to halt Israel's violation of international law. Leaflet no 26, dated the 26 September 1988, requests UN supervision in the territories until Israel has withdrawn from them and an international peace conference has been convened.

54. UNLU Communique No.25, 7.9.88. cited in Israel, Palestinians and the Intifada: Creating Facts on the West Bank, By Geoffrey Aronson, Kegan Paul International & Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990, p342.

55. Israel, Palestinians and the Intifada: Creating Facts on the West Bank, by Geoffrey Aronson, Kegan Paul International & Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990, p342.

56. Ha'aretz, 12 September 1988.

57. USSR and China.

58. Since Arafat was denied a visa to enter the United States, the UN Security Council convened the session at Geneva instead.

59. Arafat called for: a) the creation of a preparatory committee to organise a peace conference, under the supervision of the UN Secretary-General. b) The placing of the occupied territories under temporary UN supervision, with the deployment of international forces to ensure the protection of the inhabitants and to smooth the way for Israeli withdrawal. c) The convening of a peace conference under the terms of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

60. Al-Fair, English, 11 November 1991.

61. Report of the Director-General, International Labour Conference, 78th Session, 1991, Geneva.

62. A bomb was detonated in Mahane Yehuda, the Jewish market of Jerusalem, on 28 May 1990, which left one dead and nine injured.

63. UNLU Communique No. 61.

64. See, for example, the case of Rabbi Levinger, the head of the Gush Emunim settler movement. He was sentenced to five months in prison for killing a Palestinian shop-keeper in cold blood, and after a long history of armed attacks against Palestinians. Judith Green, of the Israeli peace Group, Green Line, was to comment that the legal treatment of Levinger put the Rishon Lezion killing into perspective: "It is impossible not to view the massacre within the political context. Perhaps the killer was crazy, he was lovesick for his girlfriend, but he donned an IDF uniform and shot Arabs...This must be seen in the context of Rabbi Moshe Levinger getting five months for killing and Abie Nathan getting six months for talking peace [by meeting with the PLO]."

65. Police Commissioner Ya'acov Turner commented, for example, "I understand the anger. It's natural" after a number of violent, racially-motivated attacks, had occurred. Jerusalem Post, 7 August 1990.

66. Hadashot, 8 August 1990.

67. Police Inspector General Ya'acov Turner "shunned the use against Jewish rioters of tear gas and batons which are regularly used to break up Palestinian riots." Jerusalem Post, 10 August 1990.

68. The Temple Mount Faithful are a group of Jewish extremists founded by Gershon Solomon in 1967, who are committed to building a *third Temple* on the site of Al-Haram al-Sharif, or Temple Mount, where Islam's third most holy site, Al Aqsa mosque, is currently situated.

69. For more information about the sequence of events see PHRIC's report The Massacre of Palestinians at Al-Haram al-Sharif, 31 October 1990. along with Al-Haq's Reconstruction of Events at Al-Haram Al-Sharif, Jerusalem, Monday, 8 October 1990, 28 October 1990.

70. For more information concerning curfews in general and the "war curfew" in particular see No Exit; Israel's Curfew Policy in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, by JMCC, June 1991.

71. Kav La'oved, the Worker's Hotline, reported in its April-May 1991 issue that many employers were avoiding paying the legal minimum of a month's severance pay to fired Palestinian workers on the grounds that it was the government's fault, or by invoking the three months absence clause. In addition, due to the absence of any unemployment benefit

schemes for Palestinians, many of them were forced to break into their pension funds, but were illegally denied access to them.

72. Attalia, 21 February 1991, the head of the Citrus Picker's Union, Hashim a-Shawa, described it as the worst citrus season since 1967.

73. Figures cited by Palestinian economist, Samir Hileileh.

74. Anonymous Officer from Southern Command quoted in Ha'aretz, 12 March 1991.

75. The Ministries of Defence & Police reported that clashes fell by 30% in the West Bank and 70% in Gaza when the peace conference was underway. Jerusalem Post, 11 November 1991.

76. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

77. A march against the peace conference took place in Deheishe refugee camp on the 2nd November Al-Ittihad, 3 November 1991. The camp was placed under curfew for much of the following week.

78. The Guardian, 22 December 1987.

79. IDF Assistant Chief of Operations Brig. Gen. Giora Rom declared in Ha'aretz, 9 May 1988 that "the IDF was taken by surprise by the uprising in the territories."

80. Intifada: The Palestinian uprising; Israel's third front by Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Simon & Schuster, 1989, p79.

81. The Times, London, 27 February 1988, CBS News Footage, 26 February 1988.

82. The intifada: Causes and Effects, Aryeh Shalev, Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies 1991, p127.

83. Yitzhak Moda'i and Ariel Sharon, were particularly outspoken in their criticism of the actions of both Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and Chief of Staff, Dan Shomron. See Intifada - The Palestinian Uprising; Israel's Third Front, By Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari. Simon & Schuster, 1989, Chapter 5.

84. Jerusalem Post, 23 December 1987.

85. PHRIC has recorded a total of 82 Palestinian deaths as a result of Israeli civilian action, between December 1987 and the end of November 1991.

86. JMCC has cross-checked the list of intifada dead against those of several other human rights organisations and have tried to find a separate source of confirmation wherever discrepancies exist.

87. Yitzhak Rabin, Jerusalem Post, 20 January 1988.

88. Intifada: the Palestinian uprising - Israel's third front By Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari. Simon & Schuster, 1989, p150.

89. See The Israeli Army and the Intifada: Policies that Contribute to the Killings, a Middle East Watch Report, August 1990, PP104-7. Colonel Meir now runs a controversial security firm which operates according to its own rules in the occupied territories.

90. Jerusalem Post, 29 September 1988.

91. The Israeli army and the intifada; policies that contribute to the killings, A Middle East Watch Report, August 1990, p26.

92. The Misuse of Tear Gas by Israeli Army Personnel in the Occupied Territories, Amnesty International, 1988.

93. Al-Ittihad, 9.2.90. Jerusalem Post reports on the 27.2.90. that in the continuing violence in Rafah at least 100 Palestinians have been treated for teargas inhalation.

94. Al-Ouds, 5 July 1989.

95. Amnon Strashnow quoted by Dan Williams in the Los Angeles Times, 18.2.90.

96. Al-Fair, 18.12.90. This move occasioned US State Department criticism as they maintained that gunfire "is an inappropriate response to the threat caused by stone-throwers." Jerusalem Post, 18.12.90.

97. Jerusalem Post, 27 March 1991.



98. Al-Quds, 16 November 1991.
99. The Intifada: Causes and Effects, Aryeh Shalev, Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, 1991, p185.
100. Jerusalem Post, 8 December 1989.
101. "Security sources said an undercover army unit, code-named *Cherry*, deployed in the West Bank to capture Arabs throwing petrol bombs and rocks, had verbal orders to shoot and kill fugitives 'with blood on their hands'....*Cherry*, and a similar Gaza-based unit code-named *Samson*, have been deployed since the start of the uprising as a mobile force to penetrate remote villages." Reuters, 23 October 1990.
102. Jerusalem Post, 18 October 1988.
103. Al-Quds 22 June 1991.
104. Jerusalem Post, 25 June 1991.
105. A-Sha'ab, 19 July 1991. Report that Palestinians collaborating with the Israeli authorities are being used in the army's special undercover units as they are less conspicuous than Israeli soldiers disguised as locals.
106. Cf. case of Ahmad Hussein Hasan Abu al-Sa'id, of Khan Younis Refugee Camp in Gaza, who was taken from his house by a group of masked men who were later revealed to be soldiers on 10 January 1991. He was subsequently shot. PHRIC, Human Rights Update: January-February 1991.
107. PHRIC cite a figure of 47 Palestinians killed by undercover units in their Human Rights Update of June 1991. Subsequently a further two Palestinians were killed in Nablus on the 5 August 1991.
108. Al-Ittihad, 14 August 1991.
109. 1988-89 figures cited in Jerusalem Post, 8 December 1989. & by Al-Haq. 1990-91 figures cited in The Cost of Freedom: 1990 - Palestinian Human Rights Under Israeli Occupation, PHRIC Annual Report, p23.
110. Al-Ittihad, 7 September 1988 & Al-Quds, 8 September 1988.

111. Agence France Presse, 5 December 1989 & Jerusalem Post, 6 December 1989.
112. Jerusalem Post, 14 July 1991.
113. Interview on Israel Radio, 31 July 1991.
114. Administrative Detention in the Occupied West Bank, Occasional Paper No 1 issued by Al Haq, written by Emma Playfair, 1986.
115. Washington Post, 22 March 1988.
116. A-Sha'ab, 7 October 1991.
117. Jerusalem Post, 25 July 1991.
118. A Palestinian may be deported after being held for administrative detention, therefore, the Israeli authorities are not necessarily required to produce evidence against the deportee. Once a deportation order is issued by the Chief Commander, it is endorsed by the Minister of Defence. Two stages of appeal are allowed, but in practice only a handful of deportation orders have been reversed. Al-Haq.
119. After the 1967 war the Israeli government immediately set about taking a census of the Palestinian population of the occupied territories. Anyone who was not in the country at the time for whatever reason was subsequently unable to claim residency in the territories, and by extension cannot do more than visit his or her homeland.
120. Renewal of deportation of women and children from the occupied territories on account of illegal residency, Information Sheet - September-October 1991.
121. Al-Fajr, English, 10 June 1991. Cites Al Haq's figures: Between 1967-1987 85,000 people applied for family reunification and only 12,000 received it. Since 1987 only 695 of the 3,200 requests were granted.
122. See Renewal of Deportation Of Women and Children from the Occupied Territories on account of 'Illegal Residency'. Information Sheet ; Update September-October 1991, By B'Tselem for more details about the deportation of illegal residents.

123. IDF officer commenting on instructions to cut off electricity, interfere with telephone lines and interrupt water supplies to Gazan refugee camps. Hadashot, 19 January 1988.

124. These measures were taken against the village in response to their collective killing of an armed, "heavy-weight" Palestinian collaborator, who had killed a four year old girl. Israel, Palestinians and the intifada, Godffrey Aronson, Kegan Paul International & Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990. pp337-8.

125. Information Bulletin, PHRIC, 17 February 1991. p14.

126. For example, curfew was imposed in Ramallah for an entire day on the 3 April 1991 because settlers from Douleb settlement were demonstrating.

127. See No Exit: Israel's Curfew Policy in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, JMCC, June 1991, for more details on Israel's policy towards curfew.

128. Ahaz Ben Ari quoted in Jerusalem Post, 7 February 1990.

129. Urban Planning the West Bank under Military Occupation By Anthony Coon. Summary Report issued by Al Haq, June 1991.

130. The Intifada: Causes & Effects, Aryeh Shalev, Jaffee Centre of Strategic Studies, 1990, p117.

131. Periods of West Bank school closure in 1988 are as follows:  
2 February - 23 May, 21 July - mid-December. The Intifada: Causes and Effects. By Aryeh Shalev, Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, 1991, pp118-9.

132. For example, unofficial UNWRA statistics reveal that UNWRA Elementary Girls, Preparatory Girls and Preparatory Boys Schools in Deheishe refugee camp have all been ordered to close for a total of 439 days each during the course of the uprising. In addition the schools have been raided and tear gas has been liberally fired on a number of occasions such as 23 October 1989.

133. For more information see Lessons of Occupation: Palestinian Higher Education During the Uprising, JMCC, May 1990.

134. Israel Radio, 30 November 1991.

135. An-Nahar, 19 December 1988.

136. A-Sha'ab, 4 February 1989, reported that it had become common practice to demand fines of anything up to NIS1,700 for the release of detained children.

137. A new regulation was introduced on the 14 June 1988 requiring parents to post a NIS5,000 bail for the release of their underaged children from jail. This sum was to be forfeited if the child was subsequently caught throwing stones. FACTS Information Committee, Information Sheet 24. Jerusalem Post, 2 November 1990.

138. Military order 1249 *Regarding Payment of a Special Fee (Vehicles)(Temporary Instructions)* signalled the imposition of this additional tax.

139. Taxation in the Occupied West Bank, By Marc Stephens, Al Haq, 1990, p99.

140. For example, Al-Ittihad reported in December 1988 that a Nablus shoe factory worker who earns JD80 a month had been asked to pay a NIS2,000 fine, or else go to jail for an indefinite period, after his son, Hamed, was picked up for playing on the street.

141. A-Sha'ab, 7 November 1991.

142. An-Nahar 5 November 1991.

143. For example, a ban was imposed on the marketing of grapes from Halhoul on the 13th September 1988, which affected 15,000 farmers.

144. For example, 500 sheep and cattle belonging to shepherds from the Jordan valley were confiscated on the grounds that they had been grazing illegally. Al-Ouds, 7 April 1989.

145. Jerusalem Post, 10 June 1991.

146. Ma'ariv, 18 July 1990.

147. Muhammed al-Daly had 7,000 almond trees destroyed on 12 April 1989 as a precursor to the confiscation of his land on the grounds that it was 'state land'. JMCC database.

148. Yitzhak Mordechai, C.O. Southern Command. Jerusalem Post, 11 March 1989.

149. New York Times, 16 May 1989.
150. Jerusalem Post, 18 May 1989.
151. UNLU Communique No. 44, Al-Ittihad, 16 August 1989.
152. Jerusalem Post, 23 August 1989. & Al-Ittihad, 24 August 1989.
153. Jerusalem Post, 19 May 1989.
154. Jerusalem Post, 30 December 1988.
155. Jerusalem Post, 31 May 1989.
156. The Histadrut is Israel's confederation of trade unions. Palestinian workers registered at the Labour Exchanges have 1% of their wages automatically deducted as union dues. MK Ran Cohen estimates that Palestinian workers have contributed something in the region of \$30 million since 1967 to the Histadrut, which nominally represents their interests. April-May 1991 Newsletter, 'Kav La'Oved' - The Worker's Hotline.
157. Jerusalem Post, 26 July 1989.
158. Police Minister Roni Milo. Jerusalem Post, 24 October 1990.
159. Geula Cohen cited by PHRIC in their 1990 annual report, The Cost of Freedom:1990, p3.
160. 20,000 Soviet Jews immigrated to Israel in December 1990 according to Jewish Agency figures.
161. Human Rights Update: August 1990, Vol.III, No 9,
162. Army sources cited in B'Tselem's January-February 1991 Information Sheet, Human  
ian Gulf
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163. See chapter three of JMCC's report - No Exit: Israel's Curfew Policy in the occupied  
Palestinian territories for more details on the war curfew.

164. See No Exit - Israel's Curfew Policy in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, JMCC, June 1991, for more information.

165. PHRIC statistics, Human Rights Update: January-February 1991.

166. Update: The Effects of the Curfew and the New Pass System on the Palestinian Living in the Occupied Territories, 26 March 1991, CCINGO, p1.

167. Some residents of Qalqilia, for example, have been denied permits on the basis of unpaid tax claims which date back to 1985, Information Bulletin, 3 March 1991, PHRIC.

168. Restriction of Access to and through East Jerusalem, 4 April 1991, Al-Haq.

169. Segregation Leads to Apartheid, Ha'aretz, 17 April 1991, Meron Benvenisti.

170. Al-Quds, 8 November 1991, A-Sha'ab, 15 November 1991.

171. The para-military police force who similarly equipped as the IDF, but are subject to Israeli law rather than the laws of the occupied territories, and are under the authority of the Ministry of Police rather than the Defence Ministry.

172. Al-Ittihad, 14 August 1991.

173. See Israel's use of Electric Shock Torture in the Interrogation of Palestinian Detainees, PHRIC, December 1991, Israel and the occupied territories: the military justice system in the occupied territories, Amnesty International, 1991, and The Interrogation of Palestinians during the Intifada: Ill-treatment. "Moderate Physical pressure" or Torture?, B'tselem, March 1991.

174. Reuters, 30 July 1991.

175. A-Sha'ab 8 July 1991

176. Ha'aretz, 24 August 1990.

177. Jerusalem Report, 28 November 1991.

178. Interview, 24 October 1991.

179. Jerusalem Report, 28 November 1991.
180. 1 dunum = 1,000 square meters/0.25 of an acre.
181. For more information see Beg, Borrow or Steal: Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, JMCC, September 1991.
182. According to *Peace Now* sources.
183. Israeli settlement and its consequences - 1991, By PHRIC, June 1991.
184. Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai and Golan Heights during the Six-Day war in June 1967.
185. European Security and Events in the Near and Middle East, Assembly of Western European Union, Document 1202, 26 October 1989.
186. Intifada - The Palestinian Uprising; Israel's Third Front, By Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari. Simon & Schuster, 1989, p294.
187. Al-Ittihad, 20 December 1987.
188. Al-Awdah, 28 December 1987.
189. Intifada: The Palestinian uprising against Israel occupation, Edited by Achary Lockman and Joel Beinin, South End Press, Boston, 1989. Essay by Noam Chomsky, p270.
190. King Hussein failed to meet Arafat personally at the airport on his arrival for the summit meeting, as he had done for all the other Arab leaders. A more profound offence, lay in the fact that the Palestinian issue was given little prominence in the agenda.
191. Jerusalem Post, 8 November 1988.
192. Intifada - The Palestinian Uprising; Israel's Third Front, By Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari. Simon & Schuster, 1989, p320.
193. UNLU Communique No. 20, of 22 June 1988, for example called for "the provision of international protection for our people in the occupied territories through an international observer force."

194. The PLO's proposal for peace, involved Iraq's withdrawal to its international borders with Kuwait by 10 August. Subsequent negotiations were to be conducted between Iraq and Kuwait, within the framework of the Arab league, to reach a final settlement on territorial and oil disputes. The PLO proposed that the Kuwaiti people should have the right to determine their own political future on their own terms once the security of the country had been established. The oil-related agreement between Kuwait and Iraq was to serve as the foundation for unifying the oil policies of all the Arab nations. A-Sha'ab, 6 August 1990.

195. Al-Fair, English, 20 August 1990.

196. Hostility to the US is the crux of the Palestinian's position on the Gulf war, Ghassan el-Khatib, 15 August 1991.

197. The Times, 24 October 1991.

198. A prominent member of the Palestinian diaspora, he is a professor at Columbia University, New York.

199. New York Times, 4 November 1991. Washington Post, 5 November 1991. Al-Fair, English, 18 November 1991.

200. International legitimacy is the guiding principle of the Palestinian political platform. It calls for the application of the rights which are due to the Palestinian people under the terms of international law, drawing specifically on the resolutions of the UN Security Council.

201. Haider Abdel Shafi interviewed in Al-Fair English, 18 November 1991.

202. For more information see Since Madrid: Israeli Confidence-Destroying Measures, JMCC, December 1991.