



**1ST MARINE DIVISION - MAJGEN J. T. SELDEN, USMC - BRIEFING ON  
DIVISION ACTIVITIES - JANUARY 1952 - AUGUST 1952**

**Korean War**

---

**Korean War Project Record: USMC-2638**

**CD: 24**

---

**United States Marine Corps History Division**

**Quantico, Virginia**

**Records: United States Marine Corps**

**Unit Name: 1st Marine Division**

**Depository: National Archives and Records Administration**

**Location: College Park, Maryland**

---

**Editor: Hal Barker**

**Korean War Project**

**P.O. Box 180190**


**Dallas, TX 75218-0190**

**<http://www.koreanwar.org>**

*for*

# 1ST MARINE DIVISION

MAJ GEN J.T. SELDEN, USMC



EXEMPTED BY 3-YEAR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 18 YEARS  
 E.O. PER 13200.10

# A7-6A

63A-2534  
 Bx 5

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Headquarters  
1st Marine Division (Reinf) FMF  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

NOTES

FOR

MAJOR GENERAL J. T. SELDEN

COMMANDING GENERAL, FIRST MARINE DIVISION

K O R E A

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

- A. INTRODUCTION
  
- B. G-1 SUBJECTS
  - 1. Personnel Summary
  - 2. Awards Summary
  - 3. Legal Summary
  - 4. Special Services Summary
  - 5. Postal Summary
  
- C. G-2 SUBJECTS
  - 1. Intelligence Summary (11 January - 24 March)
  - 2. Intelligence Summary (25 March - 31 July)
  - 3. Intelligence Summary (1 August - 20 August)
  - 4. POW Summary
  
- D. G-3 SUBJECTS
  - 1. General Summary (11 January - 20 August)
  - 2. Training Summary
  - 3. Principle Action Summary
  - 4. Naval Gunfire Summary
  - 5. Air Summary
  
- E. G-4 SUBJECTS
  - 1. General Summary (11 January - 14 March)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

2. General Summary (14 March - 20 August)
3. Logistical Movement Summary (15 April - 20 Aug)

## F. MEDICAL SUBJECTS

1. Medical Facilities Summary
2. Evacuation Summary
3. Medical Supply Summary
4. Statistical Summary

## G. ENGINEER SUBJECTS

1. General Construction Summary
2. Roads Summary
3. Bridge Summary
4. Airfield Summary
5. Operation TIMBER
6. Mine Clearance Summary
7. EOD Team
8. Division Barrier Plan (Anti-Mech Defense)
9. Amazon Plan
10. Training
11. Water Supply

## H. SIGNAL SUBJECTS

1. Personnel Summary
2. Signal Schools

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

3. Signal Supply Summary
4. Communications Summary

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION


20 August 1952

A. INTRODUCTION

Major General John T. SELDEN, USMC, assumed command of the 1st Marine Division in Korea on 11 January 1952 and commanded the Division until 29 August 1952. The following brief of the period 11 January to 20 August 1952, has been prepared for General SELDEN by his staff as a memento of a most successful and historic period in the annals of the Division.


CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED



1st Marine Division Command Post








MajGen J.T. SELDEN  
Commanding General

BrigGen R.C. BARE  
Assist Div Cmr

Col A.R. BRUNELLI  
Chief of Staff



Col J.F. DUNLAP  
ACofS, G-1

Col R.E. HONSOWETZ  
ACofS, G-3

LtCol W.R. WATSON, Jr.  
ACofS, G-2

Col R.A. MC GILL  
ACofS, G-4



Col W. F. LAYER, USMC  
Cmdg, 1st Marine Regt


R  
C  
E  
O  
M  
M  
A  
N  
D  
E  
R  
A  
L  
S



Col E. R. SMOAK, USMC  
Cmdg, 5th Marine Regt




Col T. C. MOORE, USMC  
Cmdg, 7th Marine Regt



Col F. P. HENDERSON, USMC  
Cmdg, 11th Marine Regt



Col E.M. STAAB, Jr., USMC  
Cmdg, Kimpo Prov Regt



Col KIM, KMC  
Commanding  
1st KMC Regt

LtCol J.A. SAXTEN, USMC  
Senior Marine Advisor  
1st KMC Regt

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

B. G-1 SUBJECTS

1. Personnel Summary.

a. Personnel situation as of 20 August 1952:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
On Rolls	1402	25209
Absent/Incapacitated	<u>55</u>	<u>1036</u>
Effective	1347	24173
T/O	<u>1287</u>	<u>23579</u>
Over	60	594

b. Enlisted personnel remaining who joined the Division in:

October 1951	1371
November 1951	1752

c. Company grade officers remaining who joined the Division:

Prior to 1 February 1952	24
Prior to 1 March 1952	138

d. Reserve personnel who are required to leave the Division during:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
October 1952	16	31
November 1952	30	20

e. Enlisted personnel required to leave the Division due to Expiration of Obligated Service during:

October 1952	112
November 1952	74

f. Staff NCO situation:

	<u>MSgt</u>	<u>TSgt</u>	<u>SSgt</u>	<u>Total</u>
Authorized	381	592	1323	2296
On Rolls 20 Aug 1952	668	796	1635	3099

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

g. Critical shortage by Occupational Fields as of 20 August 1952:

Occupational Field 02

	<u>MSgt</u>	<u>TSgt</u>	<u>SSgt</u>	<u>Sgt</u>	<u>Cpl</u>	<u>PFC/Pvt</u>	<u>Total</u>
Authorized	2	13	22	44	49	94	224
Actual	13	9	20	27	29	85	183

Occupational Field 25

Authorized	44	27	112	318	798	1027	2326
Actual	26	23	63	160	1054	703	2029

Occupational Field 41

Authorized	3	7	8	5	142	10	175
Actual	3	6	16	36	43	23	127

Occupational Field 52

Authorized	0	2	11	28	177	41	259
Actual	1	2	17	50	42	40	152

Occupational Field 57

Authorized	1	5	28	3	3	1	41
Actual	5	0	3	10	3	1	22

h. Officer changes by month during period 11 January 1952 to 20 August 1952:

	<u>Detached from Div</u>	<u>Jd Div</u>
January	37	60
February	146	238
March	170	213
April	175	204
May	260	240
June	229	319
July	278	215
August	102	100

i. Casualty figures during period 11 January 1952 to 20 August 1952:

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATIONBATTLE

KIA	306*
MIA	39
WIA (Evac)	1548
WIA (Non Evac)	<u>1743</u>
TOTAL	3636

NON-BATTLE

6423

-----  
 \*Total KIA as of 20 August 1952, since 25 Feb 1951: 1050  
 -----

## 2. Awards Summary.

## a. Awards made and forwarded for presentation:

	11Jan52
	<u>20Aug52</u>
Letters of Commendation	581
Bronze Star Medals	219
Silver Star Medals	43
Legions of Merit	18
Distinguished Flying Crosses	13
Air Medals	<u>410</u>
TOTAL	1284

## b. Recommendations forwarded to higher authority (including posthumous awards):

Medals of Honor	4
Navy Crosses	9
Navy & Marine Corps Medals	4
Air Medals	2
Silver Star Medals	3
Bronze Star Medals	4
Letters of Commendation	<u>5</u>
TOTAL	31

## c. Recommendations in process:

Letters of Commendation	238
Bronze Star Medals	132

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Recommendations in process (Continued)

Silver Star Medals	43
Legions of Merit	8
Air Medals	84
Distinguished Flying Crosses	7
Navy & Marine Corps Medals	2
Navy Crosses	8
TOTAL	522

3. Legal Summary.

a. Courts-martial:

(1) General Courts-Martial

Tried and forwarded	43
Awaiting trial	5

(2) Special Courts-Martial

Received and forwarded	154
Tried for subordinate units	13

(3) Summary Courts-Martial

Reviewed and forwarded	458
------------------------	-----

b. Investigations:

Reviewed and forwarded	249
------------------------	-----

c. Legal Assistance:

Cases handled	440
---------------	-----

d. Personnel:

The legal section presently has sufficient officer and enlisted personnel to discharge its function in an adequate manner. Of the six officers, five will be eligible for release or rotation in the next three months.

e. Military Justice Classes:

The training given the three classes of junior officers, the last of which was graduated on 9 August 1952,



CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

has proven so beneficial to the convening authorities, that two additional classes will be convened in September.

## 4. Special Services Summary.

## a. Entertainment:

(1) The following USO Camp Shows have been presented for the entertainment of the personnel of this command:

(a) Camp Show #1007, "The Betty Hutton Show", 27 February 1952.

(b) Camp Show #1008, "Sparks and Larks", 13 March to 14 March 1952.

(c) Camp Show #1035, "A Cartoonist and Portrait", 25 May 1952.

(d) Camp Show #1029, "Four Queens and a Joker", 29 May to 31 May 1952.

(e) Camp Show #1024, "Happy Hilarities", 12 June to 14 June 1952.

(f) Camp Show #1020, "Rhythm and Revels", 19 June to 20 June 1952.

(g) Camp Show #1028, "Western Jamboree", 29 June to 1 July 1952.

(h) Camp Show #1043, "Continental Capers", 14 July to 16 July 1952.

(i) Camp Show #1045, "Johnny Grant's Galaxy", 20 July 1952.

(j) Camp Show #1038, "Footlight Frivols", 26 July to 29 July 1952.

(k) Camp Show #1048, "Music Box Revue", 4 August to 6 August 1952.

(2) Camp Show #1052, "Hollywood Hi-Jinks", will be presented 11 September to 14 September 1952.

(3) The following Service Shows have been

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

presented for the entertainment of the personnel of this command:

- (a) 1st Marine Div. Show, "Stars Without Bars," 16 April to 1 June 1952.
- (b) 1st Marine Div. Band, 6 May to 16 May.
- (c) Army Spec. Ser. Show, "Stop, Look and Listen," 24 May to 30 May 1952.
- (d) 3rd Inf. Division, "Variety Show," 21 May to 23 May.
- (e) 1st Marine Div. Band, 28 May to 6 June 1952.
- (f) 45th Inf. Division, "The Big Show," 9 June to 16 June 1952.
- (g) 1st Marine Div. Band, 9 June to 16 June 1952.
- (h) Army Spec. Ser. Show, "Shoot the Works," 9 June to 21 June 1952.
- (i) 1st Marine Div., "Rhythm in Boondockers," 10 June to 27 June 1952.
- (j) Judo Exhibition, 21 June 1952.
- (k) 1st Marine Air Wing Band, 23 June to 25 June 1952.
- (l) Army Spec. Ser. Show, "Road to Ruin," 8 July to 26 July 1952.
- (m) 1st Marine Div. Show, "Hillbilly Hit Parade," 10 July to 22 July 1952.
- (n) 1st Marine Div., "Drum and Bugle Corps," 4 July to 26 July 1952.
- (o) 1st Marine Div. Hypnotism Act, 6 July to 31 July 1952.
- (p) 1st Marine Div., Band Performance, 17 July to 27 July 1952.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

(q) 5th Air Force Band, 27 July to 29 July 1952.

(r) "Ann Sterling Show" 30 July 1952.

(s) 1st Marine Div, Show, "Take a Break," 24 July to 4 August 1952.

(4) The following Service Shows are available for future entertainment:

(a) 1st Marine Div. Band.

(b) Eddie Fisher Show.

(c) Concert Show

(d) 1st Marine Div, Show, "Hillbilly Hayride".

b. Recreation:

Every three (3) days during the period 6 April to 10 August 1952, fifty-four (54) enlisted men of this Division utilized the facilities of the I Corps Rest Center Chosin Hotel, Seoul. Three (3) company grade officers were afforded this opportunity every two (2) days. During this period 1901 enlisted personnel and 96 officers received the benefits of this Rest Center. On 10 August 1952, the I Corps Rest Center ceased operation.

c. Reading Material:

During the period covered by this report large quantities of magazines, newspapers and book kits of a good variety were received and distributed to all units within the division:

d. Athletics:

(1) A summer athletic program for personnel of this command was instituted on 22 April 1952. This program provided for individual and unit championships on a division level. Division competition was conducted on a single elimination basis with trophies awarded to the first four place winners in each game or event. The basic size unit to enter the division competition was that of a company, with the exception of boxing and the track and field events.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

(2) The following intra-division games and sports were played on the dates indicated:

Horseshoes, singles and doubles	23 May to 26 May
Table Tennis, singles and doubles	23 May to 26 May
Badminton, singles and doubles	23 May to 26 May
Chess	23 May to 26 May
Checkers	23 May to 26 May
Cribbage	23 May to 26 May
Volleyball	20 June to 26 June
Boxing	15 June to 4 July
Basketball	15 July to 25 July
Softball	14 August to 23 August
Track and Field	15 August to 19 August

The Commanding General's Trophy for outstanding athletic achievement will be awarded to the unit compiling the highest score on the point system and plans have been approved for the Commanding General to present the trophy to the commanding officer of the winning organization on 26 August 1952, at the 1st Service Battalion Theatre.

(3) Competition in the Division Baseball Leagues commenced on 23 July 1952. The Commanding General attended the opening game and officially opened the league by throwing the first pitch. Forty (40) games have been played in the "American" and "National Leagues," by 13 teams representing the several units of this Division. Competition will conclude on 15 September 1952 with the winners of each league playing in the Division "World Series."

e. Education:

(1) There were approximately 1598 personnel who enrolled in the Marine Corps Institute during the period covered by this report.

(2) General Education Development Tests were administered by personnel from the T. I. and E. unit, I Corps to the following number of Marines.

Tests	Number
High School G.E.D. Test	265
College G.E.D. Test	49

f. Clubmobile Units:

(1) During the period 17 March to 29 March 1952, the Division Special Services Section, in cooperation

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

with the American Red Cross and the I Corps Special Services Section, operated two refreshment centers. The centers were so located as to service the movement of the Division from the East to the West Coast. The amounts of coffee and doughnuts listed below were served by the refreshment centers:

Coffee..... 6,640 gal.

Doughnuts..... 100,000

(2) Presently the Division Special Services Doughnut Shack is producing approximately 5000 doughnuts each day. One of the clubmobile units is being utilized as a Division Drive-Inn. Approximately 2500 doughnuts and 100 gallons of a drink appropriate to the season (hot coffee or a cold drink) are being served daily to UN military personnel in this sector. The second clubmobile is used for visits to forward units of this command and renders services similar to the above. The latter unit is also made available for organizational troop movements and other specific occasions.

## g. Motion Pictures:

A total of 43 different motion picture films are shown throughout the Division each evening. Motion picture films are furnished by the Far East Command Motion Picture Service on the basis of four (4) new films each week.

## h. Division Recreation Fund:

APPROPRIATED FUNDS

Athletics	\$5,163.64
Repair of Special Services Truck	350.86
Public Address Systems & Speakers, 1st Medical Bn	1,599.32
Operation & Maintenance, Special Services Station wagon	500.00
Spare Parts, R-100 Special Services Radio	2,236.38
Music & Instruments	100.08
Spare Parts, DeVry Movie Projectors	2,922.26
Operating Expense	1.10
Petty Expenditures	228.80

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Hire of Civilian Artist	75.00
Electric Hair Clippers	600.00
Entertainment, Operating Expense	1,115.05
Magazine Purchase	1,794.00
Stationery	23,670.05
Unit Allocations	34,925.07
Appropriated	<u>\$75,281.61*</u>
Non-Appropriated Surplus	
Cash	\$179,616.28
Accounts Receivable	3,299.55
Total Current Assets	<u>\$182,915.83</u>
Loss Appropriated Funds	<u>75,281.61*</u>
Total Available to be appropriated	\$107,634.22
Property	118,253.39
Surplus	<u>\$225,887.61</u>

5. Postal Summary.

a. Incoming Mail Handled:

(1) Letter Mail - 5,372 pouches containing  
13,430,000 letters.

(2) Parcel Post - 30,774 sacks.

(3) Registered Articles - 23,910 pieces.

b. Outgoing Mail Handled:

(1) Letter Mail - 5,178 pouches containing  
12,945,000 letters

(2) Parcel Post - 4,448 sacks.

(3) Registered Articles - 24,295 pieces.

c. Money Order Business:

(1) Total amount sold in dollars, \$4,546,793.86.

d. Directory (Locator):

(1) Letter Mail Processed, 869,200 letters.

(2) Parcel Post Processed, 2,311 sacks.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

C. G-2 SUBJECTS

1. Intelligence Summary (11 January to 24 March 1952)

a. TERRAIN AND WEATHER

The general area occupied by the Division 11 January 1952, consisted of a complex, mountainous structure of peaks exceeding 1300 meters in height and valleys as low as 250 meters, a maximum variant in elevation of over 1,000 meters. A major part of this mountainous terrain is covered by forests of pine and fir giving way to shrubs and scrub pines on the lower slopes. Cleared areas were generally restricted to the narrow river valleys and the "Punch Bowl" area. The Soyang-gang runs North and South through the area, providing the main avenue of approach both in and out of the sector.

Temperature during the period varied from a high forty degrees in March to a low of minus six degrees in January. Snow cover was light, with little accumulation except in the form of drifts.

b. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

The NKA units to the 1st Marine Division's front included the 89th, 90th and 91st Regiments of the 45th Division III Corps, the 14th, 2nd and 3rd Regiments of the 1st Division, III Corps; and the 4th Regiment of the 47th Division of the NK Corps.

Units in contact were estimated at 25,750, extensively dug-in in a defense zone five to six thousand meters deep. A probable secondary line of defense was developed along the ridges North of Ipo-ri. There were an estimated nine artillery battalions supporting the front line units with a total of one hundred and eight guns. Additional fire support was available from thirty-six 76mm mountain guns located within the regimental areas.

On 23 January, it was confirmed that the 45th Division had relieved the 15th Division, the latter reverting to III Corps Reserve in the Ipo-ri area.

c. ENEMY ACTIVITY

Enemy activity during the period was characterized by efforts to improve his defense, particularly

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

on reverse slopes. Tactics displayed were attempts to infiltrate and small unit probes of squad size or less. There was an increase in activity during operation "Clam Up" (10-15 February) but it dwindled to normal thereafter. Mortar and artillery fire increased somewhat with high concentrations received in the vicinity of Hill 812 which presented a serious threat to the friendly MSR. However, such concentrations were not followed by offensive ground action.

Perhaps the most significant enemy activity was centered in the Ipo-ri area. It was found from API reports and confirmed by air observers that the North Koreans were improving MSR's in that area and building it up as a main supply and communication center for III Corps sector. This buildup, particularly the construction of many shelters for vehicles, had greatly increased the enemy's capabilities for offensive action.

d. ENEMY CASUALTIES

Enemy casualties for the period were two thousand, eight hundred and one, of which 523 were counted KIA and 101 PWs. A major part of these PWs were deserters, which reflected the low morale of the new recruits and non-communists within the ranks of the North Korean units. This was primarily due to the laborious efforts in developing defensive installations, daytime confinement to living shelters, harassment by friendly artillery, air and naval gunfire, and the constant struggle to hand-carry the necessary food and ammunition to the front lines.

e. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

The enemy's most probable capability was to defend in place with a force of twenty-one battalions of infantry, supported by nine battalions of artillery. However, his offensive capability was ever present with the best route for such an effort in the 930 - 1026 hill area (DT 2241 - DT 2441). This area offered the enemy the best ground for control of the "punch Bowl", and the possibility of inflicting considerable casualties on UN forces by penetration.

2. Intelligence Summary (25 March 1952 - 31 July 1952)

a. TERRAIN AND WEATHER



CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

The general area in which the Division was located during this period is described as the "West Coast Lowlands and Hills". The more immediate area is dominated by the YESONG and IMJIN Rivers. The YESONG and IMJIN River valleys are separated by a spur of the KYONGGIDO Hills. These two rivers empty into a northward extension of the HAN-GANG. The most critical terrain feature is the IMJIN River which passes in rear of the front line positions. The KYONGGIDO Hills extend North-east-Southwest, with elevations ranging up to 2,300 feet. Flat-floored, steep-walled valleys wind through the area. Rice paddies occupy most of the valley floors. Vegetation consists primarily of sparse tree-growth, brush and grass.

The last week in July effectively demonstrated the morning of the Korean rainy season. In the course of a few days IMJIN River rose from normal to 33.6' above normal at the Division East boundary and 10.2' above normal at the FREEDOM Bridge. This flood forced the retraction of pontoon and foot bridges, overflowed WIDGEON Bridge and seriously damaged the high level XRAY Bridge. The effect of flood conditions was not, by any means confined to the river. Rains overflowed roads and bridges imposing a major burden on engineering and transport efforts. Bunkers, shelters and trenches required constant care to prevent deterioration and collapse. At the same time enemy activity was at a virtual standstill, apparently limited to repair and maintenance of his installations.

## b. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

The initial disposition of the CCF opposing the Division was as follows:

From the junction of the HAN and IMJIN, North to the vicinity of PANNUNJON the 195th Division of the 65th CCF Army was deployed; from PANNUNJON, East was located the 188th Division, 63rd CCF Army; for a total of 15 infantry battalions, supported by 10 battalions of artillery. On 17 April, the 189th Division of the 63rd CCF Army was accepted in contact between the 194th Division and the 188th Division. On 26 April, the relief of the 188th Division by the 187th Division, 63rd CCF Army was accepted. That disposition was to remain until PW interrogation in June determined that elements of the 194th Division, 65th CCF Army were on line South of PANNUNJON, with a corresponding increase in enemy strength

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

in contact, now estimated at twenty-four infantry battalions supported by approximately 12 artillery battalions.

The major change in enemy disposition took place in July, with the relief of the 187th Division by the 118th Division of the 40th CCF Army. This move had been preceded by the introduction of the 40th CCF Army on line to the East when elements of the 40th CCF Army relieved the 64th CCF Army in June. Just prior to the end of the period there was a strong indication that the 189th Division, 63rd CCF Army had been relieved, probably by the 580th Regiment of the 194th Division, 65th CCF Army. This being the case, the enemy was now disposed as follows: the 65th CCF Army from the junction of the HAN-IMJIN, North and East to the vicinity of TAEDOK-SAN, with two divisions and five regiments on line; and from TAEDOK-SAN, East to the SAMICHON, the 118th Division of the 40th CCF Army with probably three regiments on line. This disposition gave a total of fifteen infantry battalions in contact, and eleven infantry battalions in local reserve supported by about sixteen artillery battalions; total infantry strength about 29,000.

Additional forces capable of acting in the Division sector during the period included the 82nd Regiment, 8th NK Division and elements of the 1st Armored Division. The 82nd Regiment had been accepted as security troops in the KAESONG area since last September, when the 8th Division moved to the East Coast. There was continued evidence of its presence through agent and PW reports until June, at which time information available indicated its return to its parent unit. The elements of the 1st Armored Division, later determined to be an unidentified armored regiment, was accepted in the Western sector. Its forty tanks or SP guns were considered capable of supporting the CCF Armies disposed to the Division front. Sightings of this armor suggested its use in a secondary mission as artillery.

The enemy was well disposed in his forward positions, well dug-in, and constantly improved his trenches, extending in depth as well as laterally. He established and improved successive defense lines and his artillery was disposed in depth. Anti-tank ditches and minefields were generally placed on roads or main avenues of approach into his positions. His security was well maintained and an intensive effort was made to deny information. His counter-reconnaissance screen had been pushed far forward and reacted immediately to friendly activity.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

## c. ENEMY ACTIVITY

Enemy activity was generally concentrated in the right Eastern portion of the Division sector. Although contacts up to company-size were made by elements of the 65th CCF Army against friendly outpost positions, they were not of the intensity displayed by elements of the 63rd and 40th CCF Armies. Toward the close of the period, there were numerous platoon and squad size probes against Hill 86.9 (BS 9593), an outpost only recently occupied full time by friendly elements. In general, the 65th CCF Army elements were constantly improving their defensive positions both west of the SACHON River and along the coast opposite KIMPO Peninsula.

The elements of the 63rd CCF Army initially directed their probes, of which the majority came at night, against the entire length of friendly OPLR positions. The attacks were up to battalion in size, were well timed, coordinated and controlled. Many times the attack was conducted in coordination with a similar attack or strong probe elsewhere. The actions were preceded by heavy preparatory artillery and mortar fires. These supporting fires varied in intensity, with totals of 3,000 rounds of artillery reported on 2 April, and 4,000 rounds of mixed artillery and mortar on 28 May. The enemy's artillery fire was not only directed against friendly MLR and outpost positions, but on 15 June, a concentrated effort was made to silence medium and heavy artillery units located in the Division sector. This counter-battery fire included 152mm, the first instance of its use on the I Corps front.

In May and June, there were positive indications that elements of the 63rd CCF Army were creeping forward and occupying high ground that could be taken without fighting. The pattern of this action was to construct forward positions during darkness and to withdraw at dawn. When positions were completed, they were occupied and defended. This provided the enemy with a strong OPLR. Just how strong was demonstrated by their determined defense of the positions forward of TAEDOK-SAN against friendly raids. Further to the East the main enemy efforts were directed against friendly outpost in the CT 0607 and CT 0909 areas. These outposts were objectives of company size attacks, one of which provided technical intelligence with the first example of CCF carrying gas masks in the attack. This was believed part of the enemy's hate campaign to impress their troops with the possible use by the UN Forces of CBR warfare.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Air observers received increased AA fire from enemy rear areas, as compared with that in the previously occupied sector on the East Central front. This AA fire was concentrated south of KAESONG and in the "boot" area (CT 0015), and included not only 12.7mm and 37mm AV fire but also 85mm; the latter, a heavier than usual AA gun for enemy forward areas.

## d. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

The Division sector presented a more difficult security problem in the control of the civil populace than that which faced the Division in the old sector. In the Division area on the Eastern front, all civilians had been evacuated; however, the Division's area on the Western front had a large number of civilians present, living in homes and tilling the soil. It was necessary for units to take particular care, consistent with military necessity, to avoid destruction or injury to crops, paddies, buildings, and other property. Civilian inhabitants were moved when their presence interfered in any way with tactical dispositions or when they presented a hazard to security. Many additional instructions and orders, plus sentries to enforce them, were required to prevent unauthorized civilians from entering unit installations. Many civilian inhabitants occupied the area between the lines, affecting operations and increased the task of evacuation and control; therefore civilians in the forward areas were evacuated.

The counterintelligence task was not only with problems of security posed by the civilians, but also with the threat of enemy agents. The major portion of those apprehended were low level agents, dispatched from the KAESONG area to provide military information on friendly forward areas. Many of the agents were boys 14 to 17 years of age, only recently recruited and sent to collect information after the briefest of training periods.

## e. ENEMY CASUALTIES

Enemy casualties for the period reflected the increased pattern of activity and is broken down by month as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>COUNTED KIA</u>	<u>EST KIA</u>	<u>EST WIA</u>	<u>PW</u>
25-31 March	29	34	114	
April	285	591	1705	10
May	566	731	1757	7
June	632	585	1630	6
July	638	944	983	18

Total 5,035 KIA, 6,189 WIA and 41 PW.

f. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

The enemy's capabilities during the period remained generally the same, with changes occurring only in enemy strengths. The most probable capability was to defend on present positions. The second capability in relative probability of adoption was to launch limited limited objective attacks at any time.

3. Intelligence Summary (1 August 1952 - 20 August 1952)

a. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

The beginning of August 1952, found the 1st Marine Division facing the 65th CCF Army and the 118th Division of the 40th CCF Army deployed West to East respectively along the general line from BS 8287 to CT 1111.

For the period 1 August to 8 August 1952, the enemy continued his active defense with an average of slightly more than two contacts daily, while busily engaged in creeping his OPLR forward. The strength of the enemy during this period was estimated as follows: 15 battalions on line; 11 battalions in local reserve and 10 battalions defending the HAN River line. This gave the enemy a total of 29,500 troops considered in contact; 8,500 engaged in river defense for an aggregate strength of 38,000 troops excluding reserve elements which could not reinforce in less than twenty-four hours.

b. ENEMY ACTIVITY

At 0100I, 9 August 1952, an estimated enemy company attacked an outpost in the vicinity of Hill 58A (CT 0204), which was the start of the struggle to command the high ground in the sector in front of the 1st Marines.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

On the morning of the 9th of August, Hill 58A had been occupied by the enemy but not before the hill had exchanged hands twice and the enemy had expended 5,000 rounds of artillery. The enemy casualties for this first day's fighting totaled 85 counted KIA; 161 estimated KIA and 320 estimated WIA.

The 10th of August was characterized by combat patrol actions against the now enemy-held Hill 58A, and on 11 August there was a definite calm until 2300I, when a friendly raiding party forced the enemy to withdraw from the area.

On the afternoon of 12 August the action shifted to the area of Hill 122 (CT 0104) where the enemy assaulted defensive positions along the ridge between Hills 122 (CT 0104) and 124 (CT 0103) hitting first in the center of the positions. After this first attack failed to penetrate the positions, there were several other attempts made at different points along the line. The rapid shifting of emphasis and persistent attacks through intense fires, both friendly and enemy, indicated that the 1st Marines had engaged an enemy that had employed the better part of a regiment in an attempt to regain this high ground. On the morning of 13 August, the enemy was forced to withdraw from the area after a thirteen hour engagement.

Meanwhile, friendly elements on Hill 48A (CT 0405) were also under attack early on the morning of 13 August. The enemy first probed outpost positions with a platoon size unit which resulted in a sporadic action lasting an hour and a half. The enemy then reinforced to company size and intensified their efforts to over-run the friendly positions. The attacking company was supported by intense fires from the West, North and East. By 0530I, 13 August, the enemy was again forced to withdraw from this hill.

The heaviest incoming fires received by the Division since coming into the present sector fell during this period. It was impossible to accurately tabulate the number and caliber of rounds, but estimates by various observers of the 1st Marines varied between five and ten thousand rounds between 121600I and 130600I.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Enemy casualties during the period 1216001 to 1206001, resulting from the attacks against Hills 124, 122 and 48A, were also difficult to determine. However, accepted figures for the period were: 226 counted KIA, 555 estimated KIA and 846 estimated WIA.

Enemy activity was at a minimum until the evening of 13 August, when an enemy battalion with a reinforced company in the assault, attacked friendly positions on Hill 122. The friendly elements forced the enemy to withdraw after a one hour and fifteen minute fire fight. The enemy suffered 20 counted KIA, 25 estimated KIA and 150 estimated WIA. Artillery was again heavy, with a reported 3,000 rounds falling in the sector.

Hill 122 was again the scene of heavy fighting with two major encounters on the 15th of August. The enemy attacked with forces of battalion and company strength and were forced to withdraw both times after heavy casualties were inflicted. The total enemy casualties for the two encounters were: 75 counted KIA, 75 estimated KIA and 250 estimated WIA. 3,500 rounds of enemy artillery was reported for the above period.

Friendly forces on Hill 122 were under enemy attack very early on the morning of 16 August. An estimated enemy battalion with a company in the assault probed the friendly positions under the protection of intense supporting fire. However, after a three hour fire fight the enemy was forced to withdraw from Hill 122. Incoming was estimated at 2,000 rounds and enemy casualties at 40 KIA and 30 WIA.

The evening of 16 August 1952, found the sector in a comparative calm with the normal of two to three minor contacts along the front. The 17th of August came and passed with nothing out of the ordinary. The sector had settled down once again.

As a result of friendly air, artillery and ground fire, the casualties suffered by the enemy during the period (406 counted KIA; 856 estimated KIA; 1626 estimated WIA) seriously reduces his offensive capability.

**CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION**

On 18 August 1952, a CCF deserter from the 3rd Battalion, 357th Regiment, 119th Division, 40th CCF Army was taken by the 5th Marines. Interrogation revealed that elements of the 357th Regiment, were occupying an area previously tentatively accepted as occupied by the 353rd Regiment, 118th Division. This change would increase enemy reserve units by possibly three (3) battalions, with no increase in battalions on line.

**4. POW Summary****a. Captured by USMC:**

284

**b. Captured by KMC:**

30



CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATIOND. G-3 SUBJECTS

## 1. General Summary (11 January - 20 August 1952)

a. In the early states of this period, the Division was engaged in an active defense of some 22,000 meters of Line MINNESOTA, occupying substantially the same positions it wrested from the enemy in the September 1951 offensive. Line MINNESOTA, within the Division zone, was generally a strong position insofar as defensive installations were concerned. However, the left central front was dominated by enemy held heights. All along the line, abnormal frontages precluded any appreciable depth, and there was a strong possibility that the enemy could, by massed attack, effect local penetration at any point of his choosing. An assault against any part of the enemy's positions would have been costly, but plans to that effect were maintained. Action was characterized by daily reconnaissance, screening, sniper and combat patrols from MLR units; security patrols in rear areas, and systematic employment of available destructive weapons - artillery, NGF, air, tanks and 90mm AT guns. Both sides were constantly duelling for prisoners.

b. In February, Operation "CLAM-UP" was ordered and put into operation. In an effort to force the enemy to patrol to maintain contact, all Eighth Army units ceased activity along the front. Deceptive measures were employed to give the appearance of general withdrawal. In results, the scheme was ineffective in the 1st Marine Division sector. The enemy losses were no heavier during the period than for previous periods due to the absence of artillery fire, and our own forces were subjected to intense artillery and mortar fire as well as uncontested probes against our MLR positions.

c. On 12 March, the Eighth Army Commander announced his decision to relieve the 1st Marine Division with the 8th ROK Division, detach it from X Corps and transfer it to I Corps, relieving the 1st ROK Division in the left of that sector. This movement was to be completed prior to 1 April. The following reasons for the move were given by the Commanding General, Eighth U. S. Army:

(1) He had been forced to abandon any hope of

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

an amphibious envelopment on the east coast.

(2) He had long been concerned by the weakness of the Kimpo defenses.

(3) He could not afford to give ground on the Army left and could give ground on the Army right.

(4) His inability to find forces with which to replace the Armored Amphibians on Kimpo, return of which had been promised to the 1st Marine Division.

On the night of 19-20 March, the first Marine units were relieved by the 8th ROK Division units. On the night of 22-23 March, the relief was completed and the sector responsibility passed to the CG, 8th ROK Division. At 0400, 25 March, the CG, 1st Marine Division, assumed responsibility of sector we now hold. At that time he had one regiment of the 1st ROK Division attached as division reserve, and the 5th Regiment was still in eastern Korea. The plan at that time called for the 5th Regiment, less a battalion, to defend Kimpo Peninsula, where it was hoped that this regiment would be able to conduct extensive amphibious training. Although two regiments of the Marine Division had relieved three regiments of the ROK Division, it was felt that we held the line in greater strength than the 1st ROK Division had been holding it. It soon became apparent that the 1st ROK Division had been in no position to hold the JAMESTOWN Line and was, in fact, only expected to delay on that line. The Corps staff verified that expectation, notwithstanding that the ROK Division had the mission of defending Line JAMESTOWN. It was pointed out to the Corps staff that the 1st Marine Division was ordered to defend Line JAMESTOWN and that unless the mission was changed, the CG intended to change his own plans in order to provide more adequately for that defense. No change in mission was forthcoming and the CG issued the Warning Order providing for the commitment of the 5th Marines between the KMC Regiment and the 1st Marines. On 28 March, the 5th Marines moved across Korea, relieved elements of the 1st Marines on position and assumed responsibility for the central sector of the Division front on the 29th. Since that time, several minor adjustments in the Division's disposition have been effected, including the commitment of one battalion of the Division reserve regiment to the defense of Kimpo. (An Army battalion from Corps reserve now has this mission and the Division reserve regiment is intact.) In that connection, the

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Kimpo Peninsula Area and the forces thereon had never been organized into a single command for defense purposes prior to our arrival. Instead, our armored amphibians, amphibian tractors, the ROK Security Battalion and the Korean Marine Battalion committed to the Kimpo area had been rather loosely organized under Corps control. Their deployment provided for fixed defenses, but allowed for no substantial maneuver force. To remedy this deficiency, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division formed the Kimpo Provisional Regiment.

d. Until 25 April, our organization for defense included the occupation of an OPLR. The OPLR was withdrawn in order to strengthen our MLR positions on that date. On 24 June, to further strengthen our position by taking more defensible terrain, approximately 5000 yards of the MLR in the 7th Marines sector was relocated forward from 400 to 1300 yards.

e. On July 13th, Corps attached an Army battalion to the 1st Marine Division for Class I, III and V supplies. This battalion was moved to Kimpo Peninsula, releasing the Marine Battalion to parent control in Division reserve. This is the first time the Division has had a complete regiment as division reserve since moving to its present position.

f. On 18 July, in order to strengthen their MLR and limit enemy patrolling in the area, the KMC Regiment established a permanent outpost on Hill 86 (BS 955929). This hill is the dominating terrain feature in the area, and by including it in our defensive organization, enemy movement throughout the entire area is seriously curtailed. A company, minus one platoon, occupies the area, with one reinforced platoon defending the hill, and the company, minus two platoons, at BS 971932. The remaining platoon is attached to an MLR company.

g. In addition to developing and maintaining Line JAMESTOWN, the Division is also required to develop two secondary lines, WYOMING and KANSAS. In event of an all-out attack threatening the integrity of the I Corps position, a withdrawal to Line KANSAS may be ordered by Corps or Army. This is a strong defensive position employing the Imjin River as a natural barrier to its approaches. The WYOMING Line is a phase line that will be used in retiring to KANSAS. Plans for the retirement and defense have been made and are kept current.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

h. Several unique features complicate the defense of this sector; first, the corridor connecting the truce cities of Kaesong, Panmunjom and Munsan-Ni runs through the middle of the Division sector. This corridor extends 200 meters on each side of the road connecting these cities. In addition, Munsan-Ni and Kaesong each have a truce area extending a radius of three (3) miles around them, and Panmunjom a circle of 1000 yards radius. By agreement these areas cannot be shot into, across, or from; an attack cannot be launched across, into, or from. This has been modified so that artillery and mortar fire can cross the truce area within, or close to, our own lines. As an added safety feature to protect the UN neutral zones, I Corps has added a No-Fire Line (O'DANIEL) to which the above restrictions also apply. The 5th Air Force has added a safety zone of a six-mile radius circle around Kaesong and a two-mile circuit around Panmunjom, inside of which we cannot fly or conduct any air strikes.

2. Training Summary.

a. Individual training programs were carried out by the separate battalions, artillery units, and by the infantry reserve regiment and battalions of the Division. On 23 April, the 7th Marines, minus one (1) battalion, conducted a rehearsal for the occupation and defense of Line WYOMING north of the Imjin River. The rehearsal was based on the assumption that the enemy had attacked in force, and that all bridges across the Imjin River were unserviceable. The 3d Battalion, located north of the river, moved into position by foot march. The regiment, less two battalions, south of the river, moved by foot to embarkation points, and were lifted by helicopter into position. The movement was made in a total of 243 copter loads, in one (1) hour and thirty (30) minutes.

b. In a program designed to bring this Division to a high state of readiness in amphibious operations, BLT landing exercises were begun in June. It is planned to continue on the basis of one (1) BLT every two weeks if the tactical situation and weather conditions permit. By the end of October, all infantry battalions will have completed this training. The Navy has made the following shipping available:

1 APA

1 Control Vessel

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION1 LSD  
2 LST  
3 LCU2 Section Causeway  
2 Pontoon Barges  
1 Warping Tug

During August, a CVL was available for each of the two maneuvers, but weather conditions and the tactical situation forced cancellation of the two exercises in which it was to participate. Prior to this, an adjacent island was used from which to launch the helicopters.

c. On the 18th and 19th of June, the Division participated in test exercise "EVEREADY" III, a Corps problem designed to exercise reserve elements in containing an enemy breakthrough. Messages were furnished front line units in sealed envelopes to be opened at specified times in order to develop a tactical situation. After an enemy breakthrough had been established, I Corps issued orders attaching one (1) battalion of the reserve regiment, 1st Marine Division, to I Corps. This battalion was moved by motor vehicle and helicopter to an assembly area in the 1st ROK Division sector. The attachment was ordered at 0550 and the battalion was in its assembly position, 13.5 miles to the east, at 0915 on 19 June.

d. During the period 18-19 July, a Division drill was held to rehearse the initial steps in the execution of Annex CHARLIE (revised Plan RECOIL) to Opn Plan 4-52. Participating in this drill were two battalions of the reserve regiment, (1st Marines) and the reserve battalion of the KMC Regiment. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines occupied the left battalion sector of Line KANSAS OPLR along general line CS 095976, CS 100988, CS 108992, CT 120009, and CT 131015. The first elements left their area, CS 102972, at 2015, arriving in position ready to fire at 2250. 2d Battalion, 1st Marines occupied the right battalion area of regiment sector of Line KANSAS OPLR along general line CT 128020, CT 132030, CT 158030 and CT 163020. The first elements of the battalion cleared their area, CT 118983, at 2015, arriving in position prepared to defend at 2245. On the morning of 19 July, the 1st Battalion, KMC Regiment, occupied the battalion sector north of the Imjin River on Line KANSAS. Departing the battalion assembly area at 0730, the battalion moved by foot (crossed FREEDOM GATE Bridge in 21 minutes and HONKER Bridge in 26 minutes), arriving in position ready to defend at 1145. The battalion covered the 8.2 miles from their assembly area to the assembly area on Line KANSAS in 2 hours and 57 minutes.

DECLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION****3. Principle Action Summary.**

a. On 14 January, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, (reinforced), were moved to KARI BONG (DT 4215) to participate in an anti-guerrilla operation. One unit made contact with an enemy group, engaging in a brief fire fight. Two enemy were killed and 1 PW was taken. The operation was secured 17 January.

b. On the 19th of January, a platoon size raiding party from the 1st KMC Regiment reached its objective and entered enemy positions without encounter. It advanced 20 yards further into the positions and sighted 2 enemy about 50 yards away. The patrol opened fire, causing the enemy to flee, and, in turn, received fire from enemy light and heavy machine guns. As the patrol withdrew, it received automatic weapons and machine gun fire from three sides, but were able to break contact and withdraw to MLR. One KMC WIA.

c. On the 30th of January, a raiding party (platoon reinforced) from the 7th Marines reached its objective at daylight and received enemy small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire from an estimated 50 enemy. In the ensuing fire fight, 12 enemy were killed and 7 more wounded. The patrol suffered 6 minor casualties. At 0730, patrol broke contact under cover of friendly artillery and mortar fire and returned to MLR.

d. On 23 January, one flame throwing tank operating against "Luke's Castle" was disabled by a mine approximately 100 meters forward of the MLR. Enemy mortar fire, approximately 433 rounds, made the task of retrieving the tank a hazardous operation. This tank was not retrieved until 30 January. On the same day, a raiding party from the 1st Marines engaged in a 20 minute fire fight with an enemy platoon. Nine enemy KIA, 2 WIA. Raiding party destroyed 7 enemy bunkers with demolitions. One friendly WIA.

e. At 230130I March, two groups of enemy attacked the MLR in the KMC sector. These groups, estimated to be an enemy squad at one point and a platoon at another, were supported by mortar fire. When the mortar fire lifted, an exchange of small arms ensued which lasted for two hours. The KMC's suffered 1 WIA and 1 MIA.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

f. From 012200 to 020200 April, an estimated two enemy battalions attacked the OPLR and MLR positions in the KMC sector. The attack was preceded by artillery fire and supported by mortar fire and automatic weapons from the high ground in the vicinity. The KMC's engaged the enemy with small arms, automatic weapons, grenades, and finally hand to hand combat. At 2330, the KMC positions on the MLR were penetrated, at which time their reserve battalion moved to blocking positions protecting the FREEDOM Bridge. By 0120, the enemy were repulsed and the lines restored. The KMC's suffered 2 KIA and 10 WIA.

g. At 152300I April, a ten man outpost in the 1st Marine sector was attacked by an estimated 75 - 100 enemy supported by heavy enemy mortar fire. By 2325, the friendly outpost position had been overrun by the enemy, resulting in five friendly WIA, 4 KIA, and 1 MIA.

h. At 152330I April, a 123 man combat outpost in the 5th Marines sector was attacked by an estimated enemy battalion supported by heavy artillery and mortar fire. At 160120I, the enemy withdrew, leaving 25 KIA, 3 POW, and with an estimated 70 other enemy casualties; friendly casualties amounted to 6 KIA, 5 MIA and 40 WIA.

i. On the night of 16-17 April, the enemy probed KMC positions at five different locations with various sized groups, the largest of which was estimated to be two platoons. Fierce fire fights developed at all locations with the enemy breaking contact at 0345, leaving 36 KIA and an estimated 70 WIA. Friendly casualties were 2 KIA and 5 WIA.

j. On the night of 8-9 May, a company-sized patrol from the 5th Marines was engaged by an enemy company which delivered heavy fire from positions on Hill 159, formerly OP No. 3. After a severe fire fight, lasting most of the day, the friendly patrol broke contact and returned to the MLR at 1530. During the engagement, the enemy suffered 35 KIA and 53 WIA counted, and an additional estimated 70 KIA and 105 WIA. Friendly forces took one (1) prisoner of war. Marine casualties were 5 KIA, 66 WIA and 2 MIA. A total of 462 rounds of artillery and 670 rounds of mortar fire fell on our patrol during the engagement.

k. On 17 May, an estimated 25 enemy on Hill 67

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

were engaged by a platoon-sized patrol from the 7th Marines. The patrol attacked the enemy positions using small arms, automatic weapons and bayonets. The enemy placed mortar and automatic weapons fire on the friendly unit after enemy resistance on the hill had ceased. Reinforcements were observed moving in and the friendly forces commenced withdrawal from the position. Artillery and mortars covered the return of the patrol to the MLR. Enemy casualties were 15 KIA, 13 WIA counted and 12 estimated KIA. Five (5) bunkers were destroyed, 15 damaged, 1 machine gun destroyed and 2 mortars silenced. Friendly casualties were 5 WIA.

l. On the night of 27-28 May, a reinforced company-sized patrol from the 7th Marines was sent out to Hill 104 to take prisoners. When contact was made by the patrol, the enemy employed mortar and artillery fire and began to withdraw under cover of 3,000 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery shells. The patrol took its objective, but because of heavy casualties, a platoon was sent to aid them and evacuate the wounded. When the platoon arrived on Hill 104, the patrol was ordered to withdraw. Supporting aircraft were employed to protect the withdrawal. The patrol reached the MLR after suffering 7 KIA and 110 WIA (86 evacuated - over 30 have returned to duty). There were 30 enemy KIA, 12 estimated KIA, and 15 estimated WIA.

m. In conjunction with the 7th Marines action, the 1st Marines attacked with a reinforced platoon-sized patrol as a diversion for the main action in the 7th Marines sector. The patrol departed the MLR under cover of artillery and automatic weapons fire and proceeded to its objective, where it was engaged by an estimated 85 enemy. A squad sent to reinforce the platoon was also taken under fire with small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire and all elements of the patrol were receiving heavy casualties when they were ordered to withdraw. The 1st Marines had 1 KIA and 31 WIA. The enemy suffered 20 KIA, 15 estimated KIA, and 30 estimated WIA.

n. On the night of 6-7 June, a 1st Marines outpost was attacked by an unknown number of enemy. The outpost called in artillery and mortar fire while small arms and automatic weapons fire was exchanged. After a 30 minute fire fight in which nine (9) enemy were killed, the enemy withdrew. At 0255, 70 enemy returned to the 1st Marines outpost. After a fire fight of one hour and



CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

15 minutes, the enemy withdrew. The enemy suffered 19 KIA, 10 estimated KIA and 15 estimated WIA. There were no friendly casualties. This action was noteworthy in that the second group of enemy encountered were moving toward the outpost in a mass, and not tactically deployed. They crossed a ridge line with no attempt at concealment, and panicked when friendly troops opened fire. At the end of the engagement, enemy rifles were recovered that were rusty and poorly maintained, which indicated that this unit was not the normal, well trained troops this Division has been facing.

o. On 13 June, all MLR regiments dispatched company-size raiding parties for the purpose of taking prisoners. The KMC patrol was fired on with automatic weapons but made no actual contact with the enemy and returned to the MLR at 0645 without any prisoners. The 7th Marines' company-sized patrol engaged an estimated 40 enemy in a 15 minute fire fight. Both using small arms and hand grenades. This patrol inflicted considerable damage to the enemy position before withdrawing and closed the MLR at 0415. The raiding party from the 1st Marines engaged an estimated enemy company in a 55 minute fire fight. The Marines, using hand grenades, small arms, mortar and artillery destroyed 2 heavy machine guns, 3 light machine guns and 1 60mm mortar. The enemy suffered 53 counted KIA, 50 estimated WIA and 1 POW, while friendly casualties were 21 WIA and 6 MIA.

p. On the night of 24-25 June, an estimated enemy company employing small arms and supported by heavy artillery and mortar fire assaulted outpost positions of the 5th Marines. The friendly units returned fire from small arms, artillery and mortars which forced the enemy to withdraw.

q. On the night of 4-5 July, a platoon-size raiding party from the 7th Marines engaged an estimated two platoons of enemy in vicinity CT 035057. The fire fight lasted one hour, after which the Marine patrol broke contact. Friendly casualties were 2 KIA, 4 WIA.

r. On the night of 5-6 July, the enemy made a concentrated effort against outpost and MLR positions of the 5th Marines. Commencing at approximately 1800, the enemy placed heavy preparatory mortar and artillery fire

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

on outpost and MLR positions. This continued until 2000, at which time the enemy launched an attack on the outposts. In the 1st Battalion sector, an enemy platoon advanced from Hill 137 (CT 104109) toward friendly MLR and was engaged by friendly ambush. The enemy was forced to deploy, at which time the ambush was ordered back to the MLR. Two (2) additional platoons of enemy brought heavy small arms fire to bear on BAKER Company and CHARLIE Company sectors of the MLR. The enemy was sufficiently distant from the MLR to permit them to fire a simultaneous barrage of mortars and artillery. Enemy broke contact at 2300. In the 2d Battalion sector, the enemy assaulted four outpost positions in an estimated strength of two reinforced companies. In each instance, the outposts were able to beat off the attackers with a heavy concentration of small arms, automatic weapons and hand grenades. About twenty enemy closed the outpost position at CT 068079, but were met with bayonets and quickly annihilated. Enemy losses for the entire action were 37 KIA and 4 PWs. Total friendly casualties were 8 KIA and 84 WIA. A total of 4500 rounds of mortar and artillery fell on the regimental front during the action.

s. On the night of 6-7 July, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, executed Operation "BUCKSHOT" IIB, a battalion size attack on enemy outpost positions to take prisoners. CHARLIE Company was to make the main effort with a company-size assault of Hill 70 (CT 000038). ABLE Company and a platoon of tanks were to make a diversionary effort in the vicinity of BT 990026 and were to be prepared to support CHARLIE Company on order. BAKER Company was to support CHARLIE Company by fire. CHARLIE Company reached an intermediate objective at CT 017044 with no contact. They moved on to BT 999037 where contact was made with the enemy. CHARLIE Company continued to attack against increasing enemy resistance and reached CT 001038. At which time, they were ordered to withdraw. The withdrawal was accomplished despite intense mortar and artillery fire. ABLE Company met no resistance in its attack. Friendly casualties from the action were 10 KIA, 5 MIA and 85 WIA.

t. On the night of 19-20 July, a reinforced platoon outpost of the KMC Regiment was engaged by an estimated enemy platoon in a two hour and 35 minute fire fight, at which time the enemy withdrew. Casualties for the action were two friendly WIA, 7 counted enemy KIA

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

and two PWs who died before they could be returned for interrogation. However, documents taken from the dead showed them as from the 6th Company, 2d Battalion, 584th Regiment, 65th Army.

u. The heaviest fighting of 1952 for the Division began at 0100 on 9 August when four enemy squads attacked an outpost, Hill 58 ABLE, (Vic CT 023048) manned by a reinforced squad. The enemy, after forcing the outpost to withdraw, occupied the position. At 0400, employing heavy mortar and artillery fire, the enemy were able to repulse a 1st Marine platoon-size counterattack. Air was called in, along with an artillery preparation, and at 1103 a friendly reinforced platoon assaulted and secured the position. But, before the ground could be organized, the enemy counterattacked and retook the position. At 0116, CHARLIE Company, 1st Marines, retook the position, but were forced to withdraw when at 0335 an estimated enemy company supported by artillery and mortar counterattacked.

A plan was drawn up to drive the enemy from Hill 58 ABLE and thereafter deny them its use by occupying dominating terrain (Hill 122) to the West. A feint was to be made against 58 ABLE after which a reinforced company would seize and defend Hill 122, which dominates 58 ABLE. Both attacks were to be supported by flame and gun tanks and on call artillery. The diversionary force, a reinforced platoon, would actually drive the enemy from 58 ABLE and police the battlefield before executing a planned withdrawal. Tactical surprise was achieved and the operation was conducted as planned.

At 2030, 11 August, a section of flame tanks advanced to Hill 58 ABLE and burned off the top and reverse slope. At 2133, this operation was repeated. At 2323, a reinforced platoon was approaching Hill 58 ABLE with negative enemy contact. Estimated enemy platoon engaged friendly platoon in brief fire fight at 2335, but the enemy were forced to withdraw. At 2345, the platoon withdrew on order.

At 2336, 11 August, BAKER Company (reinforced), 1st Marines, departed to seize Hill 122 (Vic CT 016045). At 0010 they received heavy mortar and artillery fire and hand grenades. But, BAKER Company pressed the attack and by 0120, had driven the enemy force from the hill.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

The afternoon of 12 August saw the action pick up again. At 1600, an estimated 400 enemy attacked Hill 122, supported again by intense artillery and mortar fire. The outpost forced the enemy to withdraw after a two hour fire fight. The enemy returned at 0105 with an estimated battalion. This attack was repulsed after a one hour and twenty-five minute fire fight. At 0005, an estimated enemy company attacked and later surrounded a friendly outpost (Vic CT 045059). A sporadic fire fight ensued for five hours and twenty-five minutes, after which the enemy withdrew. The outpost received one hundred per cent casualties, but held their position until relieved early in the morning of 13 August.

The enemy launched two more attacks on Hill 122. The first, at 2100, 13 August, was of battalion size, again supported by intense artillery and mortar fire. A sporadic fire fight continued to 2215 when the enemy was forced to withdraw. At 0225, an unknown number of enemy attacked the outpost again, but were repulsed after a brief fire fight. Since that time, the intensity of fighting for 122 has decreased somewhat. This action followed the pattern of similar action across the EUSAK front; i.e.: large scale.

4. Naval Gunfire Summary.

a. Disposition of teams:

(1) Period 11 January 1952 to 25 March 1952, while the 1st Marine Division was employed near East Coast of Korea:

(a) One Shore Fire Control Party	I ROK Corps
(b) One Shore Fire Control Party	X Corps Arty
(c) One Shore Fire Control Party	CTE 95.23 WONSON
(d) Six Shore Fire Control Parties	Asgnd to Bns on HLR
(e) Three Regimental Lsn Teams	1st, 5th, 7th Regt

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

(f) One Division NGFL Team 1stMarDiv CP

(g) One Radar Beacon Team I ROK Corps

(2) Period 25 March 1952 to 20 August 1952,  
1st Marine Division employed on West Coast of Korea:(a) Two Shore Fire Control Parties I ROK  
Corps(b) One Regimental Lsn Team I ROK  
Corps(c) One Radar Beacon Team I ROK  
Corps(d) One Shore Fire Control Party X Corps  
Arty(e) Three Spotting Teams (3/29/52 KMC Arty  
to 7/13/52) Bn(f) Two Regimental Lsn Teams CP Area  
Anglico(g) Six Shore Fire Control Parties CP Area  
Anglico

## b. Training:

(1) Period 11 January 1952 to 25 March 1952:  
All teams were employed with an operational unit and received on-the-job training by their officers and noncommissioned officers.(2) Period 25 March 1952 to 20 August 1952:  
The liaison and the spotting teams which are living in the Anglico area are undergoing an intensive training program conducted by the team officers and noncommissioned officers. Trained teams are presently being rotated between the organizations which have requested the 1st Marine Division to provide spotting and liaison teams and the Anglico School. These teams rotate about every two months and it is anticipated that this rotation will give all teams field experience.

## c. Operations:

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

(1) Period 11 January 1952 through 24 March 1952: This Division faced an enemy deeply entrenched in heavily constructed fortifications on steep reverse slopes near the East Coast of Korea. Naval Gunfire Support ships, with their mobility and range, were able to attack and destroy these fortifications from an unexpected direction with excellent results. During this period, this Division received naval gunfire support from battleships and cruisers. In spite of the spotting problems caused by difficult terrain and the extreme ranges that the ships were called on to fire, the NGF support rendered the 1st Marine Division was excellent.

(2) Period 25 March 1952 through 20 August 1952: The only naval gunfire activity by ANGLICO was performed on the East Coast. The teams assigned to the 1st ROK Corps and X Corps Arty fired whenever ships were available, which was practically a daily operation. Several NGF teams are assigned and are firing daily for the above units. These teams working with I ROK Corps and X Corps Arty are under the operational control of the Navy Liaison Officer who is assigned to the I ROK Corps Headquarters. This Division is, at present, receiving no naval gunfire support. Within this period, from 25 March 1952 through 13 July 1952, arrangements were made with the 11th Marines to include in their basic artillery school all unqualified Marine spotting officers that were assigned to ANGLICO from the incoming drafts. When these officers had satisfactorily completed the 11th Marines course of instruction, they were assigned to the KMC Artillery Battalion for the purpose of conducting fire of that artillery battalion. This program provided the officers and men with the practical work necessary to obtain and maintain a high state of readiness. These teams were rotated between CP area ANGLICO, KMC Arty, I ROK Corps and X Corps Arty approximately every sixty days. The employment of the spotting teams with KMC Arty was discontinued when these teams could be effectively used on the East Coast in the actual firing of naval gunfire.

## d. Use of Radar Beacon (AN/TPQ-7):

(1) Period 11 January 1952 through 25 March 1952: Only one naval gunfire support ship had the modified Mark 25 radar equipment which is necessary when the Radar Beacon (AN/TPQ-7) is used.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

(2) Period 25 March 1952 through 20 August 1952: Most of the ships working off the East Coast have the modified Mark 25 radar equipment. Every effort is being made to further the use of the Radar Beacon so that, through experience, all personnel can employ it more effectively.

e. Equipment and personnel:

(1) Period 11 January 1952 through 20 August 1952: All radio equipment and motor transport equipment is serviced and overhauled by the Signal Battalion. Faulty equipment is repaired and replaced as expeditiously as possible.

(2) At present, Marine enlisted and Marine officer billets are at full strength. There is a shortage of two naval liaison officers. This shortage is not serious in view of the present commitments. The naval officers are all graduates of the Naval Gunfire Support Schools, Coronado, California, or Little Creek, Virginia. Only one of the nine spotting officers has had any previous naval gunfire training except that which has been given by the ANGLICO.

5. Air Summary.

a. Close Air Support.

Any study of close air support during the period will reveal several distinct phases through which the Division progressed in its efforts to obtain an acceptable amount of close air support.

(1) Phase I began in November 1951 and ended about 29 February 1952. During that period close air support was available only in accordance with a rather strict interpretation of Eighth U. S. Army policy which was published on 30 November 1951. In brief, this policy provided that aircraft for close air support would be available only for definitely located targets of opportunity such as tanks, troops in the open or artillery, which could not be effectively engaged by artillery. In the event of an enemy attack, or friendly counterattack to regain lost positions, close air support would receive priority. Strict adherence to this policy resulted in the submission of relatively few requests for close air support and in the cancellation of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

some of those which were submitted, by X Corps and JOC. Poor flying weather during January and February further curtailed the amount of close air support flown for the Division.

(2) Phase II, which began in February and ended during the first part of May, was characterized by a training program begun by the Fifth Air Force to train its pilots in close air support techniques. The majority of close air support missions received during Phase II arrived on an unscheduled basis, for training purposes, and not in response to specific requests. Targets hit by the training missions were not required to conform to the policy mentioned above. This training program ended during the early part of May and for several weeks thereafter very few aircraft were received in answer to the Division's requests.

(3) Phase III began on 21 May and ended on 3 August. The Commanding General, Fifth Air Force and the Commanding General, First Marine Aircraft Wing agreed, in conference, to establish a training program for Marine Aircraft Group Twelve pilots. This program provided for a minimum of twelve sorties daily from MAG-12 to work on the Division's front. The objective of the program was to provide much needed training in Marine-style close air support for pilots, forward air controllers and infantry commanders, and at the same time to inflict maximum damage upon the enemy. The program was imminently successful in all respects. The Division was permitted to work directly with MAG-12 in submitting requests for air strikes. A visiting program was inaugurated, with all MAG-12 pilots visiting the Division, flying over the front in observation aircraft and going forward to the front line observation posts. This proved to be invaluable in acquainting pilots with the restricted areas to our front and in furthering mutual understanding between pilots and the ground units they were supporting. About 17 July the twelve sorties daily were increased to twenty. This increase was indicative of the overall increase in close air support and close-in interdiction effort across the Army front.

(4) Phase IV began on 3 August, when the daily training missions ceased, and that phase continues currently. During July, in letters to CG Eighth U. S. Army, the CG, 1st Marine Division requested that the excessive restrictions on close air support in the Division's sector be modified. The CG, Eighth U. S. Army concurred in that recommendation. However, he further recommended to CG, 5th Air Force that the daily allocation of training missions



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

from the 1st Marine Air Wing be terminated and that the 1st Marine Division submit its requests for air support in the same manner as other divisions on the Army front. This was concurred in by the CG 5th Air Force and on 3 August the daily training missions ceased. Since that date, the Division's requests for close air support have been submitted in accordance with procedures established by the G-3 Air, JOC.

(5) On 3 June the CG, 1st Marine Division, in a briefing for the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, General Mark Clark, pointed out the need for more close air support strikes against the enemy and stressed the effectiveness of our training missions from MAG-12. He recommended that the 1st Marine Air Wing be relieved of other responsibilities and assigned the primary mission of flying close air support across the Army front. Upon General Clark's request, a letter from the CG, 1st Marine Division was delivered to him on 9 June giving details of this Division's close air support experience. Soon after this, it became apparent that more and more of the air effort was being placed on close support across the Army front. For this Division, the increase in air support reached a climax during the period 9-13 August when the 1st Marines became engaged in a fight to hold an outpost position. In response to a declaration of an operational emergency by the Division Commander, a total of 458 close air support and 27 MQ-14 sorties were flown in 5 days. On the third day Eighth Army gave first priority on air to the 1st Marine Division. Cooperation from Eighth Army and 5th Air Force was excellent during this operation. The following table illustrates the increase in air support during the period of this report:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NO. A/C RECEIVED</u>
January	100
February	43
March	181
April	138
May	270
June	331
July	363
August (1-20)	833

(6) When the Division moved into its present sector in March, the close air support picture became immeasurably complicated by the various restrictions imposed by 5th Air Force to protect the KAESONG - PANMUNJOM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

truce areas from violation. In brief, the current restrictions require that all 5th Air Force aircraft flying over or attacking targets in the Division's sector must be under the positive control of either a TACP, MPQ or airborne controller. No aircraft may fly over, or attack targets in, the areas enclosed by a circle of six miles radius centered on KAESONG and a circle of two miles radius centered on PANMUNJOM. Furthermore, close air support along the Division's front may be flown only for minimum essential training or emergency operational purposes.

(7) Positive action taken by the Division to prevent a violation include the following:

(a) A forward air controller is stationed at an outpost very near PANMUNJOM to warn planes away from the circles.

(b) An observation aircraft carrying a Tactical Air Observer is kept on station between PANMUNJOM and the strike aircraft at all times.

(c) Familiarization tours for all MAG-12 pilots increased their knowledge of the PANMUNJOM area.

(d) Surveillance radar has been installed at the TADC to provide assistance in directing aircraft.

(8) The increase in close air support activity brought a corresponding increase in enemy anti-aircraft, in both quantity and effectiveness. Hits on aircraft and aircraft losses reached a point where it became imperative that action be taken to suppress enemy anti-aircraft fire during air strikes. During July the Eleventh Marines published a Flak Suppression S.O.P. which provided for close coordination between FACs and artillery liaison officers in the firing of flak suppression missions before, during and after air strikes. This program, although new, has been highly successful in reducing hits on friendly aircraft. As an example, on 13 August, when 124 close air support sorties were flown for the Division by the Wing, only four aircraft were hit, and those hits were minor, small arms damage. The Division is continuing to improve the flak suppression technique.

b. MASRT-1

Marine Air Support Radar Team One, a unit of the First Marine Aircraft Wing, was attached operationally

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

to the Division during the period. Using precision radar (MPQ-14) for control of close support missions during periods of bad weather and darkness, "Dev Charlie" was in an experimental, evaluation status until June. At that time, word was received from the Commandant of the Marine Corps that the MPQ-14 had successfully completed its evaluation period and become operational equipment. In July Dev Charlie began to receive regularly scheduled aircraft, mostly from VMF(N)-513, for night bombing of the enemy. Hitting supply areas, bivouac areas, artillery positions, command posts and other deep targets, the MPQ-14 has become a valuable adjunct to the air support available to the Division.

c. VMO-6

(1) Marine Observation Squadron 6, a unit of the First Marine Aircraft Wing, was attached for operational control to the Division during the period. The squadron operated a rotary wing section, with twelve small helicopters assigned, and a fixed wing section with twelve observation aircraft. Missions performed by VMO-6 during the period included evacuation of wounded, reconnaissance, liaison, artillery spotting, controlling close air support, downed pilot rescue and resupply. VMO-6 helicopter pilots continued to develop the technique of evacuation by helicopter. Many pick ups were made forward of the MLR and other forward areas. Night evacuation flights and bad weather flights requiring considerable skill were performed with safety. Many evacuation flights to hospital ships contributed materially to the rapid treatment of serious casualties and further improved the techniques and equipment required for such operations.

(2) During the period covered here, VMO-6 flew a total of 5951 combat flights totalling 10321 flight hours. Total of all flights was 10876 flights and 14599 hours. 1059 persons were evacuated from front line areas and 426 between hospitals. 3 Observation aircraft were lost over enemy territory. One helicopter was lost over enemy territory. Sixty-five aircraft were hit by enemy anti-aircraft.

d. HMR-161

(1) During the period 1 January 1952 through 15 August 1952 Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

was attached operationally to the 1st Marine Division and administratively to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The squadron, which is divided into two (2) component echelons, is presently located with its command post and forward echelon at the 1st Marine Division CP near A-17 airfield. The rear echelon and Class "C" facility is situated at ASCOM City, the Division's rear.

(2) Throughout the period, the command conducted missions of resupply, troop and cargo lift, reconnaissance, downed pilot rescue, emergency evacuation, photography, wire laying and administrative transport, with the accent on the latter. These missions were carried out in all types of terrain and in the extreme variety of weather conditions that Korea is capable of producing. Despite the fact that the aircraft of the command were grounded on two occasions by the Bureau of Aeronautics for a total of five weeks, 4,204.6 aircraft hours were logged during the first seven months of 1952. This total was attained with an average of only 78% of the fourteen planes assigned available. The low availability figure was caused by the acute shortage and occasional absolute lack of spare parts. In keeping with its primary mission of evaluation of the transport type helicopter, the squadron developed techniques for the transport and resupply of troops in mountainous terrain, in the comparative lowlands of the Korean West Coast and from island to island. In conjunction with units of the 1st Marine Division, systems were evolved for guerrilla hunts by helicopters and the airlifting of 4.5 rocket launchers from one firing site to another.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

E. G-4 SUBJECTS

1. General Summary. (11 January to 14 March 1952)

a. The period was a continuation of the defensive situation, with the Division located on the East Coast of Korea. There were no unusual demands on logistics functions or supply channels. The Division continued to receive Class I, III and V consumable supplies from the 2d Logistical Command. Unit distribution for the infantry regiments remained in effect throughout the period. The 1st Combat Service Group requisitioned, stored and forwarded to the Division, Marine Corps peculiar items, while Eighth Army furnished all items common to both the Marine Corps and Army.

b. Extensive use was made of the Division Air-head and port facilities at SOKCHO-RI. Class III requirements were trucked from SOKCHO-RI to the Service Battalion area. This called for a nine hour turnaround.

c. The WONJU service area and the TONGWA Rail-head continued to be used, with a twelve hour turnaround required.

d. The average daily truck-load requirements for the Division to maintain stock levels and effect unit distribution were as follows:

	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>March</u>
Class I	42	44	40
Class III	106	102	99
Class V	38	41	39

e. The average daily availability of Division motor transport to carry out the distribution of supplies within the Division was as follows:

(1) Operational Trucks - 235  
(2) Deadlined Trucks - 39

f. The KSC continued to be a means of logistical support. KSC personnel were available to all units, but the main effort of this support was providing supplies to the MLR regiments and road maintenance.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

## g. Helicopter logistic support.

(1) Total weight of cargo hauled - 622,574 lbs.

(2) Total casualties evacuated - 294

h. Replacement and rotation drafts continued to be handled through the port at SOKCHO-RI.

1. The activities of the Air Freight and Passenger Service Office at K-50 for the period were as follows:

	<u>IN</u>	<u>OUT</u>
Personnel	2445	2895
Mail (lbs)	832226	244038
Other Cargo (lbs)	308480	19311

K-50 was closed as Division Airhead on 23 March.

## 2. General Summary. (14 March to 20 August 1952)

a. On 14 March, the Division was alerted by General Van Fleet to move to the I Corps area. The move of the 1st Marine Division, a distance of approximately 180-200 miles, is summarized as follows:

(1) "C" Company, Shore Party Battalion, departed on 15 March, with destination ASCOM City to make preliminary arrangements to receive shipping from SOKCHO-RI at INCHON. For this move, it was planned to use trucks overland, LSTs SOKCHO-RI to INCHON and rail from WONJU.

(2) The directive issued concerning the move of the Division called for the Division tactical units to close I Corps by 1 April. This posed a problem, since the turnaround time for large convoys was determined to be three days. To assist in the move, Army provided the Division with 200 trucks for five trips.

(3) Organized convoys departed the Division area on the following schedule:

(a) 17 March - KIC Regiment, plus one artillery battalion

(b) 20 March - 1st Marines, plus units of Division Train

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

- (c) 22 March - One artillery battalion
- (d) 23 March - 7th Marines, plus units of Division Train
- (e) 24 March - One artillery battalion
- (f) 25 March - One artillery battalion
- (g) 26 March - 5th Marines, plus units of Division Train
- (h) 29 March - 11th Marines Hq, remaining echelons of ServBn, MedBn, HqBn, VMO-6, HMR-161, SigBn, EngrBn.

(4) In addition to organized convoys, all Division units used organic transportation to make shuttle trips to the new Division area. Ordnance Battalion made the entire move with organic vehicles.

(5) In general, tanks, LVTAs, artillery tractors, engineering equipment, deadlined vehicles and some general cargo were shipped by LSTs and LSDs from SOKCHO-RI to INCHON. The last LST completed loading at 1600, 31 March. This ship completed unloading on 4 April at INCHON. Some general cargo was trucked to the Division Railhead at WONJU and shipped to ASCOM City by rail.

(6) By 30 March, the Division area had been cleared except for the 1st Service Battalion area, which contained the Service Battalion rear echelon, and general cargo from Headquarters Battalion, VMO-6, HMR-161 and Engineer Battalion. Also, there were regimental rear dumps at the Regimental Rear Camp, Camp TRIPOLI. Both the Service Battalion area and regimental rear area were cleared by 8 April.

(7) In the meantime, the WONJU service area and the TONGHWA Railhead were being moved to ASCOM City by rail. These two installations were cleared on 12 April and the last railroad cars arrived ASCOM City, 13 April.

(8) The transportation required to move the Division from X Corps sector to I Corps sector is

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

summarized as follows:

2½ ton Cargo Trucks	5716
DUKWs	80
Lowboy Trailers, Heavy Lifts	63
LSTs	11
LSDs	3
RR Cars (boxcars, flats and gondolas)	83
R5Ds	2

Plus towed loads and ½ ton trucks and trailers.

Total tonnage moved is estimated to be 50,000.

b. The present logistical and supply situation is excellent. The railroad network from PUSAN, MASAN, INCHON and ASCOM City to the Division Railhead at MUNSAN-NI has greatly reduced the trucking requirements. The road network is adequate, but is requiring extensive engineering effort to surface them as all-weather roads. Railroad delivery planning times are as follows:

	<u>Preloaded</u>	<u>Not Alerted</u>
ASCOM City to DivRhd	4 hours	12 to 48 hours
PUSAN to ASCOM City	20 hours	48 hours
MASAN to ASCOM City	20 hours	48 hours

c. Trucking time from Service Battalion to ASCOM City is a five or six hour turnaround. The main Class II and IV dumps for all stock accounts are at ASCOM City, and it is the present intent to maintain the bulk of Class II and IV stocks there.

d. Class I supplies are all received by rail at DivRhd from SP 25 SUWON, and Class III supplies are received from SP 10 at YONGDONG-PO. Turnaround time for trucks from Service Battalion to railhead at MUNSAN-NI is approximately 30 minutes. Class III is drawn directly from the railroad cars at the DivRhd. A dump of Class I and III is maintained at ASCOM City to support the Kimpo Provisional Regiment and ASCOM City Command.

e. Method of distribution and supply level:

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>TYPE DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>SUPPLY LEVEL</u>
I	Unit, to Inf Regts	1 day "A" or "B" w/all units



DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

	Supply point to all others	4 days "C" w/units north of INJIN River 1 day "C" w/ServBn f/all units
II&IV	Unit, to Inf Regts Supply point to all others	15 days in the dump
V	Unit, to Inf Regts Supply point to all others	1 basic load w/troops 1 basic load w/regts 1 basic load w/Div ASP

**Peculiar Items:**

A 60 day supply of Class II and IV items peculiar to the Marine Corps are stored with the Combat Service Group at MASAN.

**Common Items:**

A 15 day supply of Class II and IV items common to the Army are stored at ASCOM City.

f. One truck company is bivouaced north of the INJIN River in the vicinity of the Division Class V dump during the hours of darkness. This is also a precautionary measure against high water and bridge damage. A helicopter resupply plan is being formulated as an additional precaution.

**g. Current status of service elements:****(1) Motor Transport:**

A satisfactory system of vehicle survey by Army Ordnance exists in all classes of vehicles with the exception of water trailers. This shortage is Army-wide and every endeavor is being made to alleviate the shortage. In some cases, spare parts are slow in supply, causing the deadlining of some vehicles. The current status of motor transport availability in the Division is as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>	<u>DEADLINED</u>	<u>OPERATING</u>
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6 cargo	760	753	50	703
Truck, ½ ton, 4x4, cargo	691	658	30	628
Truck, miscellaneous	521	483	22	461
Trailers, (all types)	1738	1507	0	1507

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

(2) General Supply:

Extreme shortages in typewriters, adding machines and in spare parts for same is currently hampering the Division. A requisition has been forwarded to the Commandant of the Marine Corps to replace this shortage.

(3) There are no critical shortages for signal, ordnance and engineer supplies and equipment.

h. Special projects:

(1) Due to the large requirements for bunker building materials and the short supply of such from normal supply sources, the Division gained permission to establish and operate a timber camp in the 45th Division sector, located about fifty (50) miles to the East of the Division area. On 12 May, a task unit composed of one platoon of engineers, one truck platoon, five hundred (500) KSCs and necessary service elements moved into the area. By 10 July, all accessible timbers had been cut and rail-shipped to MUNSAN-NI. The total timber moved amounted to thirty thousand (30,000) 12' logs and six hundred (600) 25' telephone poles. By 12 July, the task unit was dissolved and all subunits reverted to parent control. A notable achievement of Operation "TIMBER" was the fact that no personnel were seriously injured during the entire operation.

(2) Coincident with the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty and the return of occupied property to the Japanese Government, the Marine Corps facilities located in KOBE were released to the Army and the Support Company, previously located thereat, transferred to Korea. The baggage center operated by the Support Company has been relocated in ASCOM City. Resupply stock and equipment previously stored in KOBE was moved to MASAN and turned over to the Combat Service Group. The initial order for this movement was issued from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, on 25 April 1952, and the roll-up was completed with all property returned to the Army on 17 June 1952. In addition to the baggage center, a tent camp sufficient to accommodate 3000 men was erected at ASCOM City to accommodate rotation drafts. To accommodate the baggage center, it became necessary to provide suitable cover or warehouse space for approximately thirty-six thousand (36,000) pieces of baggage. It was decided to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

renovate a damaged warehouse in the ASCOM City area, construct a new roof on the building and prepare it for use as a baggage center. This was accomplished by 1st Engineer Battalion, in conjunction with 1st Shore Party Battalion.


3. Logistical Movement Summary. (15 April to 20 August 1952)

a. Traffic of loaded railcars at the Division Railhead:


	<u>IN</u>	<u>OUT</u>
Flat Cars	309	112
Box Cars	718	364
Coaches	23	17
Hospital Coaches		34
Tank Cars	29	
Reefer Cars	143	
Gondola Cars	337	209
Post Office	5	6

b. Movement at the Division Airhead at K-16:

Personnel	4301	3929
Mail (lbs)	644017	397559
Other Cargo (lbs)	539360	179588




Replacements for the 1st Marine Division  
Land at Inchon, Korea (HQMC A161037)



Incoming Supplies Being Landed at Night  
(HQMC A161937)



Advance By Helicopter - Infantry Troops Are  
Shown Moving Out After Landing By Helicopter  
(HQIC A159959)



Helicopter Lift -- A Marine Helicopter Lands With  
Troops To Reinforce A Bunker On A Korean Hillside  
(HQIC A160657)



Weary Marines Are Shown Taking A Break After A Fierce Battle With The Enemy (HQMC A161021)




The Enemy Never Got This Far - Two Machine Gunners Who Held Off A Horde of Chinese Attackers (HQMC A161025)

TANK OPERATIONS




A Marine Tank Rolls Out Of An LST Onto The Beach At Inchon During Movement Of The 1st Marine Division From The Eastern Coast Of Korea (HQIC A160882)



Moving Up - Korean Citizens Shout Words Of Encouragement As Tanks Of The 1st Marine Division Move Up To A New Sector On The Korean Fighting Front (HQIC A160985)



Marine Artillery In Support of Infantry  
(HQMC A160283)



Marine Rocket Mission  
(HQMC A159934)



CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

## F. MEDICAL SUBJECTS

### 1. Medical Facilities Summary.

a. On 11 January 1952, the 1st Medical Battalion was functioning with three (3) collecting and clearing companies in close support of units on the Division MLR and one hospital company (ABLE Medical Company) operating a 200 bed Division Hospital to the rear, approximately 20,000 meters, and near the Division CP. The second hospital company (BAKER Medical Company) was inactive, with its organic equipment and supplies being kept in a state of readiness consistent with immediate reactivation if the situation demanded. This general disposition of medical facilities continued until about 24 March 1952 when the Division was transferred to I Corps and assumed its present commitments.

b. Since 24 March, the 1st Medical Battalion has functioned with three (3) collecting and clearing companies (CHARLIE, DOG and EASY Medical Companies) in close support of units committed on the Division MLR. DOG Medical Company is located on the Kimpo Peninsula and is in support of units in that area. ABLE Medical Company, operating the Division Hospital, is located in the 1st Medical Battalion CP area to the rear of the MLR at a distance of 10,000 meters at some points and 20,000 meters at others, roughly behind the center of the Division MLR, near the Division CP. The Division Hospital and Division Dental facilities are, at the present time, almost entirely housed in semi-permanent (wood frame with plywood and beaverboard inner lining and corrugated steel outer covering) buildings and have about a 200 hundred bed capacity. They are staffed and equipped to provide definitive care for all types of cases.

### 2. Evacuation Summary.

a. During the period 11 January to 24 March 1952, casualties were evacuated as follows:

(1) Through 1st Medical Battalion facilities to the 629th Collecting and Clearing Company (Army) at K-51 and then:

(a) Air to K-9 at PUSAN for transfer to hospital ship.

(b) Neurosurgical cases were moved by

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

air to K-16 for hospitalization in the 121st Evacuation Hospital (Army) at YONDONG-PO.

(2) By helicopter directly from front line Aid Stations to the 629th Collecting and Clearing Company (Army) and then as noted in paragraph 2.a.(1) above.

b. From 24 March 1952 to the present time, casualties have been evacuated as follows:

## (1) Hospital Ship:

(a) Hospital train or rail bus from MUNSAN-NI to INCHON, then to Hospital Ship by boat.

(b) Ambulance from Medical Battalion to INCHON, then to Hospital Ship by boat.

(c) Helicopter from point of casualty, or from units of the Medical Battalion, directly to the Hospital Ship.

(d) Ambulance train from MUNSAN-NI to PUSAN, to Hospital Ship.

## (2) Army Mobile Surgical Hospitals:

(a) Helicopter to 8228 MASH for hemorrhagic fever cases.

(b) Helicopter to 8063 MASH for neuro-surgical cases.

(c) Helicopter to 11th Army Evacuation Hospital, WONJU, for special cases which require the use of the artificial kidney.

## (3) Naval Hospital, YOKOSUKA, Japan:

(a) Army ambulance train to K-16 and thence by Air Force plane to Japan.

## 3. Medical Supply Summary.

a. Seven days supply in hands of each medical unit.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

b. Thirty days supply in hands of Medical Supply Section, 1st Medical Battalion.

c. The Medical Supply Section has established a quarterly inventory control program for all medical items in hands of units of the Division.

d. Source of medical supplies:

(See page 52)

4. Statistical Summary.


	<u>ISSUES OF:</u>		
	<u>WHOLE BLOOD</u>	<u>BLOOD SERUM</u>	<u>SERUM ALBUMIN</u>
	(Pint)	(Unit)	(Unit)
Jan	48	30	77
Feb	176	86	312
Mar	234	83	153
Apr	193	172	409
May	634	134	910
Jun	482	45	379
Jul	379	187	566
Aug	447	606	256
TOTAL	2593	1343	3063
Remaining on Sick List - 31 Jan 1952.....			177
(1st Med Bn ONLY)			
Total Admissions			7249
Battle		2204	
Non-Battle		5045	
*Total Evacuations			4343
Battle		1780	
Non-Battle		2563	
Returned to Duty			2826
Battle		281	
Non-Battle		2545	

Remaining on Sick List 2400 19 Aug 1952....233


\*Evacuations from Division, plus deaths.


CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

SUPPLY CHANNEL  
EAST COAST  
(11 Jan - 24 March)




SUPPLY CHANNEL  
WEST COAST  
(25 March - 20 Aug)





Field Medical Operation Of  
Seriously Wounded Marine  
(HQIC A160274)



Evacuation Of Wounded Personnel By Helicopter Has  
Reduced Battlefield Deaths by A Large Per Cent  
(HQIC A160263)

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

G. ENGINEER SUBJECTS

1. General Construction Summary:

a. Standard construction, precut units:

20' x 54'	bdgs	127
20' x 36'	bdgs	6
20' x 45'	bdgs	1
20' x 63'	bdgs	1
20' x 81'	bdgs	2
20' x 108'	bdgs	2
46' x 54'	bdgs	1

b. Standard construction, quonset type:

20' x 24'	bdgs	1
20' x 72'	bdgs	1

c. Constructed of native rough timber:

12' x 26'	bdg	1
12' x 70'	bdg	1
16' x 36'	bdg	1
12' x 20'	outdoor stages	2

d. Miscellaneous, wood construction:

78' x 357'	warehouse roof	1
Precut lumber for Operation Rainbow		
32' x 32'	outdoor stage	1
15' x 18'	outdoor stages	2

e. Miscellaneous, other:

8 Target Rifle Range	1
25 Target Rifle Range	1
Ammunition dump, earthwork	1
Fuel dump, earth ramps for	1
VIP Bunker 14' x 14'	1
Misc messhall and galley decks	
Misc bunker construction	
Misc levelling and camp improvement	

2. Roads Summary.

a. Seventeen and one-half (17.5) miles of laterals, access roads, tank trails and supply roads were pioneered in the Division sector.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

b. Four hundred eighty-four (484) culverts were installed.

c. Thirty-five (35) miles of road were improved to classification C22<sub>am</sub>.

d. During this period, the 1st Engineer Battalion maintained an average of 113.2 miles of road per month. At the present time, continuous maintenance is being performed on 226.5 miles of road, including 37.5 miles of MSR and 189 miles of secondary roads.

e. A road overlay showing road and bridge classification is prepared and distributed monthly.

## 3. Bridge Summary.

a. During the period, nine (9) bridges were constructed in the Division sector, including:

160'	DD Bailey-type	1
70'	DS Bailey-type	1
100'	Aluminum footbridge	1
40'	Steel I-Beam, timber trestle, 2 lane, Class 50	1
550'	Reinforced M1938 footbridge	1
48'	M-2 Treadway, 1-lane, Class 50	1
12'	Timber Trestle, 1-lane, Class 35	1
16'	M-2 Treadway, 1-lane, Class 50	1
60'	Timber Trestle footbridge	1

b. Eight (8) bridges were repaired or reinforced.

## 4. Airfield Summary.

## a. Construction:

No new airfield construction was accomplished. A preliminary survey was made of A-9 for the purpose of planning proposed extension to a length of 3600'. Six (6) helicopter landing areas were constructed.

## b. Improvements:

A 250' x 400' parking apron was constructed at airfield K-50. Airfield A-9 was extended to 1400' in length and hardstands were constructed.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

## c. Maintenance:

During the period 11 January - 20 March, continuous maintenance and repair was performed on airfields K-50 and X-83. During the period 1 April to 20 August, continuous maintenance and repair was performed on airfields A-9 and A-17.

## 5. Operation "TIMBER".

a. Logging operations located at CT 3702 to provide field fortification material for Division units began on 12 May 1952. Logs were loaded out at railhead at SOCH'ON-NI in 45th Division sector to 1st Marine Division Railhead at MUNSAN-NI. The logging operations were secured on 12 July 1952. The following quantities of logs were furnished:

Bunker Material

12' logs	34211
16' logs	125
9' logs	110

Telephone Poles

25' logs	613
----------	-----

Clothesline Poles

8' logs	<u>125</u>
---------	------------

TOTAL 35184

## 6. Mine Clearance Summary.

a. The Engineer Battalion furnished details to the infantry units for clearing paths through mine fields for infantry and tank patrols. Areas in the rear required for bivouacs, access roads, or helicopter landing areas have also been cleared. During this period, the following number of mines, flares and napalm bombs have been removed:

AP Mines	2623	Flares	210
AT Mines	151	Napalm Bombs	33

b. There are 452 friendly mine fields in the

DECLASSIFIED



CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Division sector, consisting of 52,000 mines which were laid by the 1st ROK Division, 1st Commonwealth Division and the Turkish Brigade.

c. A friendly mine field overlay is distributed weekly on regimental level within the Division.

d. Detailed reports on all known friendly mine fields are maintained.

e. An enemy mine field overlay is prepared and distributed weekly on regimental level within the Division.

7. EOD Team.

An explosive ordnance disposal section from the 1st EOD Company, FMF, Camp Pendleton, has been attached to the 1st Engineer Battalion during the period. It has been continuously clearing areas of butterfly bombs, and removing or destroying pieces of unexploded ordnance. This section is compiling an illustrated bulletin on enemy ordnance. As of 20 August, this section has answered 212 calls and has disposed of 16201 pieces of major ordnance and 46410 rounds of small arms ammunition. The team currently attached has destroyed 9.4 tons of ordnance since 16 July.

8. Division Barrier Plan. (Anti-Mech Defense)

The 1st Engineer Battalion, in coordination with the Tank Officer and G-3, located the exact positions of all mine fields, cratering charges, and AT ditches that are incorporated in the Division Barrier Plan and determined the number of mines and explosives needed and platoon hours required to implement the plan.

9. Amazon Plan.

This plan involves clearing debris, during floods, from the four bridge sites on the IMJIN River in the Division sector. "A", "B" and "D" Companies are responsible for furnishing the personnel for these details. "A" Company is working at the FREEDOM Bridge site and "D" Company at the HONKER Bridge site and "B" Company at the X-RAY and WIDGEON Bridge sites. Each company has a detail living at the bridge site for which it is responsible. Four 27 foot bridge erection boats, obtained from the Army, are used in the debris clearing operation. A

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

60" searchlight is installed at each bridge site, except HONKER, to provide night illumination of the river upstream from the bridges in order to facilitate this work. Service Company is furnishing mechanics to maintain the small-boat engines and the searchlight generators.

On 27 July, due to flood conditions, HONKER Bridge (385' M-2 Treadway) was removed to prevent its destruction. During the same flood, X-RAY Bridge (1129' timber trestle, 35' high) was washed out and WIDGEON Bridge (459' low level timber crib bridge with M-2 treadway spans) was completely submerged. Minor repairs after flood subsidence restored WIDGEON Bridge to full service. At the present time, work is progressing on construction of a new HONKER Bridge, to be the same type as WIDGEON Bridge.

River gauging stations at FREEDOM Bridge, HONKER Bridge site and WIDGEON Bridge were established on 19 July. A continuous record of hourly stage readings is maintained and the information is forwarded to higher headquarters daily.

**10. Training.**

a. During this period, schools were conducted on mines and fuzes, both friendly and enemy, and weapons including the .30 and .50 caliber machine guns and the 3.5 rocket launcher.

b. A ten hour course of instruction in Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare was given to selected personnel of the 1st Engineer Battalion who were assigned duties as Chemical, Biological, Radiological Personnel.

c. Service Company, 1st Engineer Battalion, held generator and water supply schools for its own personnel and for personnel from other units.

d. Thirty-three (33) men attended a one-day course in the operation and construction of the M-4 ferry.

e. Fifteen (15) men from "A", "B", "C", "D", and Service and "C" Shore Party Companies attended a

**CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION**

one week school held by the 61st Engineer Searchlight Company at its CP on the operation of the 60" searchlight.

f. Sixteen (16) men from "A", "B", "D", and Service Companies attended a two week school held by the 58th Treadway Bridge Company at HONKER Bridge site on the operation and maintenance of small boats.

g. Fifty-two (52) men have attended EUSAK special combat engineer school in Japan. This school has various classes from two to eight weeks duration to train personnel in critical MOS fields, such as carpenter foreman, electrician, engineer equipment mechanic and engineer equipment operators.

#### 11. Water Supply.

a. During the period, the Engineer Battalion established and maintained a total of seventeen (17) water points. At the present time, nine (9) waterpoints are in operation in the Division sector.

b. During the period of this report, the water supply section produced 22,419,542 gallons of potable water.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

H. SIGNAL SUBJECTS

1. Personnel Summary.

a. At the present time the division is approximately ten per cent (10%) below the T/O on communication personnel. This is partially caused by furnishing personnel to units not listed in division T/O's:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
Kimpo Provisional Regt	2	47
KMC Ln Gru		24
KMC Arty Ln Gru		19
KMC Tk Co Ln Gru		10
KMC Schools	1	1
Signal Sup Ln - 2d Log Comd	1	1
Island Commands		8

b. The 1st Signal Battalion has operated between the strengths of sixty-five (65) to eighty-three (83) officers and 815 to 895 enlisted personnel.

2. Signal Schools.

a. Radio Operators School: This school has held fourteen (14) classes of eight (8) weeks duration and to date graduated 121 students. Two (2) classes, with a total of thirty-five (35) men are now in session.

b. Field Wire School (on the job training).

c. Cryptography School (on the job training).

d. Radio Relay School.

e. The division continues to assign its allotted quota of personnel to the ETA JIMA Schools in Japan for instruction in the following subjects:

(1) Telephone Carrier and VHF Radio Relay  
Carrier.

(2) AN/GRC-26 (operator and maintenance).

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

f. Each regiment has conducted its own schools for radio operators, wiremen, and message center personnel.

3. Signal Supply Summary.

a. The greatly expanded front and increased depth of the 1st Marine Division Sector, since its move to the present location, resulted in a commitment to MLR sector defense of non-infantry and provisional units. The installation of practically all items of signal equipment on hand was required. In many cases units are considerably in excess of normal allowances. This results in a situation in which the spare and replacement items are extremely limited or virtually non-existent. A severe load is thereby imposed on the signal supply and maintenance facilities of the division. I Corps and EUSAK are aware of the circumstances and have supplied additional equipment and personnel when available.

b. The Maintenance Section has continuously operated a repair shop and three electronic repair trucks. The following major electronic items have been repaired since 11 January:

Vehicular Radio Equipment	887
Non-vehicular Radio Equipment	3251
Switchboards	228
Telephones	704
Power Units	488
Miscellaneous (handsets, antennas, etc.)	3594

c. In accordance with supply conservation directives considerable effort has been expended toward the recovery of field wire and its rehabilitation and salvage. During the period covered by this report approximately 4,286 miles of wire were recovered. This represents an investment of around seven hundred thousand dollars (\$700,000).

4. Communications Summary

a. The division maintains an extensive communication system to both higher and lower units.

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

(1) I Corps: radio, teletype, telephone, radio relay, courier plane and motor messenger as required.

(2) Regiments: radio, teletype, telephone, radio relay and messenger.

(3) All separate units: telephone, and messenger.

(4) 1st Engr Bn, 1st SP Bn, Recon Co, 1st Amph Trac Bn, 1st CSG: radio in addition to telephone and messenger.

(5) Air couriers to 1st MA<sup>W</sup> and 1st CSG.

(6) Radio teletype circuits are maintained to Tokyo and Corps on a twenty-four (24) hour basis to handle administrative traffic.

b. The problems encountered by the radio platoon greatly increased after the move from the east to the west coast. The distances involved were far greater and added effort on the part of all personnel was necessary in the location of sets and the installation of antennas. Radio traffic showed an increase of over one hundred per cent (100%) after the issuance of a directive to channel messages to other communication means in an effort to cut down the number of telephone calls. Correspondingly the number of calls handled by the division WIZARD and WIZARD TOLL switchboards together, dropped from an average of approximately 6100 calls per day in June and July to around 4800 calls per day in August. G-2 intelligence and G-3 tactical radio nets operated by staff officers of the G-2 and G-3 sections, were set up to provide an alternate means of voice communication on a twenty-four (24) hour stand-by basis to each regiment. Equipment and trained personnel are maintained in a constant state of readiness to provide radio communications for incoming and outgoing drafts and for special operations such as EVERREADY, BOLO or RAINBOW.

c. The division wire personnel have worked night and day to construct and maintain the 5,200 miles


CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

of wire that weave the division units together. Along with a double increase in the number of miles of wire, over that in use on the east coast, an additional 850 poles have been added bringing the total to 1400 poles in use in the present location.


d. The division message center has, during this period, logged in and out some 38,808 messages.

e. Constant experimentation is being carried on with an end to improving communication facilities, as well as improvising with materials on hand in an effort to substitute for non-available equipment. An example of this was the successful use, by a front line regiment, of SCR-536 radios, joined by field wire; an expedient in lieu of sound power telephones. The over extension of communication facilities as indicated in paragraph 3. a. is accompanied by a calculated risk in the event of a tactical displacement of the division, or major portion thereof, which requires a very sensitive and continued estimate of the situation.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION



1. VHF Carrier Bays, used for voice and teletype.



2. Division Signal Officer, Lt. Col. J. E. MORRIS, inspects a 500 Watt radio, SCR-339, in the field.


CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION




3. Section of the 1st Marine Division Message Center showing the teletypewriters in use.



4. Temporary set-up of vehicular equipment for a radio central.

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 5-YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOW DIRM 5200.10



DOWNGRADED AT 5-YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOW DIRM 5200.10


SECRET SECURITY INFO

#54

5th Mar Land D

Jan 53

# FIRST MARINE DIVISION



5<sup>TH</sup> MARINES (REINF)  
 OPERATION PLAN 4-53  
 19 JAN. 1953

SECRET

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

5th Marines (Reinf)  
1st Mar Div (Reinf) FMF  
In the Field  
191200I Jan 1953

OPERATION PLAN)

NUMBER...4-53)

Map: KOREA, 1:25,000

TASK ORGANIZATION: Annex ABLE

1. a. Annex BAKER, Current PIR's.

b. (1) 1st Mar Div continues occupation and defense of left sector of Line JAMESTOWN.

(2) 25th Brigade, 1st Commonwealth Div on Right, 7th Marines on Left.

(3) 1/11, "A" Co, 1st Tank Bn and "D" Co, 1st Motor Transport Bn in D/S.

(4) 1st Bn 623 FA Bn, USA, "C" Btry, 17 FA Bn, USA, "B" Btry 204 FA Bn, USA, 4/11, 4.5 Rkt Btry, one (1) Co, 1st Engr Bn in G/S.

(5) 1st Marines, Division Reserve.

2. 5th MARINES (Reinf)

a. Occupies and defends Right sector Line JAMESTOWN with two (2) battalions on line, improve field fortifications and defensive positions; conduct aggressive reconnaissance and combat patrols, ambushes, and raids to maintain the initiative against the enemy. (For sectors of defense, boundaries, limiting points, MLR, CP's and COP's see Annex CHARLIE, Opn Overlay).

b. Prepares for limited offensive Opns on order.

3. a. RIGHT BN (Reinf)

(1) Occupy, improve and defend MLR in assigned sector.

(2) Maintain COP's in assigned sector.

(3) Coordinate with left Bn, Commonwealth Division.

(4) Prepare for limited offensive operations on order.

b. LEFT BN (Reinf)

(1) Occupy, improve and defend MLR in assigned sector.

SECRET

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

- (2) Maintain COP's in assigned sector.
- (3) Coordinate with Right Bn of Center MLR Regt.
- (4) Prepare for limited offensive operations on order.

c. 4.2" MORTAR Co

(1) From positions indicated support MLR units in regimental sector. (See Annex CHARLIE, Opn Ovlv).

d. A<sup>1</sup> Co (-)

(1) Place two (2) sections 75mm RR D/S Left MLR Bn. See Annex CHARLIE, Opn Ovlv.

(2) Place one (1) section 75mm RR D/S Right MLR Bn. See Annex CHARLIE, Opn Ovlv.

(3) Place tank platoon under operational control D/S Tank Co.

e. RESERVE BN (Reinf)

(1) a. Prepare for defensive employment, blocking or counter attack in any portion of regimental sector on order.

b. Prepare to occupy blocking positions without advance warning.

c. Improve blocking positions.

(2) Prepare to conduct combat patrols, company and platoon raids as directed.

(3) Conduct motor and foot security patrols (day and night) in portion of regimental sector south of MLR Bn rear boundaries.

(4) Conduct maximum training consistent with assigned missions. (Pertinent provisions of Regtl Trng O 7-52 apply).

(5) Prepare for limited offensive operations on order.

(6) Prepare to assume mission of either MLR Bn on order.

(7) Submit to this Headquarters prior to 1 February detailed plans for counter attacking and/or blocking enemy penetrations.

SECRET

2

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

x. (1) Clear all civilians other than bonifide employees from sectors of responsibility.

(2) Contact Right to Left.

(3) All units will comply with current 1st Mar Div directive when referring to terrain features, patrols, ambushes, casualties etc.

(4) Report enemy air, armor, or rocket launcher (Katyusha) activity by flash report.

(5) Mines or booby traps will not be laid without prior approval this Hq.

(6) Display marking panels on reverse slopes to aid friendly aircraft.

(7) The following outposts will be maintained at the strength indicated:

48A	Plt (-)
27	Plt (-)
25	Plt (-)
21	Squad Reinf
19	Squad Reinf
19A	Squad Reinf

(8) No patrols larger than Reinf squads during daylight or Reinf platoon during night will be sent out without prior approval this Hq (S-3). Request to reach this office 48 hrs in advance.

(9) Steel helmets and armored vest will be worn by ALL HANDS forward of Bn CP's.

(10) This plan effective for planning on receipt, for execution on order.

(11) EEI's see Annex BAKER.

4. See Admin Plan I-53.

5. a. Annex FOX.

b. CP's: Annex CHARLIE.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL WALT

E. B. WHEELER  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

ANNEXES:	ABLE	Task Organization
	BAKER	Intelligence
	CHARLIE	Operation Overlay
	DOG	Counter Attack Plan
	EASY	Anti-Mechanized Plan
	FOX	Signal Annex
	X-RAY	DISTRIBUTION

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X-RAY

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L

*R. T. Dwyer, Jr.*  
 R. T. DWYER, JR.  
 Major USMC  
 S-3

SECRET

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

5th Marines (Reinf)  
1st Mar Div (Reinf) FMF  
In the Field  
191200I Jan 1953

Annex ABLE to Opn Plan 4-53

TASK ORGANIZATION

5th Marines (Reinf)

Col WALT

H&S Co

Capt CHECKLOU

Det, 1st Sig Bn

1 TACP

Det, 1st Ser Bn

1 Gr Reg Team

1 PX Team

Det, 340 MISB

5th Br, 103 Regt KSC (3 Co's)

Postal Unit '45

Right Bn (Reinf)

2nd Bn, 5th Mar

LtCol PEATROSS

Det, 1st Sig Bn

1 TACP

Left Bn (Reinf)

3rd Bn, 5th Mar

LtCol ODDY

Det, 1st Sig Bn

1 TACP

4.2" Mortar Co

Capt GILMORE

AT Co (-)

Capt SCHOEN

Res Bn (Reinf)

1st Bn, 5th Mar

LtCol PLATT

SECRET



SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Det, 1st Sig Bn  
1 TACP

BY ORDER OF COLONEL WALT

E. B. WHEELER  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Same as Opn Plan 4-53

O-U-F-I-C-I-A-L

*R. T. Dwyer Jr.*  
R. T. DWYER, Jr.  
Major USMC  
S-3

SECRET

A-2

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

5th Marines (Reinf)  
1st Mar Div (Reinf)  
In the Field  
191200I January 1953

Annex BAKER to Opn Plan 4-53

INTELLIGENCE

Maps: Korea 1:25,000, AMS L751 Sheets 6527 I NW, 6527 IV NE,  
6528 II SW, NW, and 6528 III NE, SE.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

- a. Appendix 1, Intelligence Estimate
- b. Appendix 2, Enemy Installations Overlay
- c. Appendix 3, Enemy Order of Battle
- d. Appendix 4, Mine Overlay
- e. Appendix 5, Target Overlay
- f. Appendix 6, Counterintelligence
- g. Appendix 7, Current Enemy Situation

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. Will the enemy defend on his present position? If so, in what strength?
- b. Where are the enemy defensive installations? What is the exact nature and extent of these installations, including boundaries?
- c. Will the enemy attack? If so, in what strength, with what units, where, when, what objective or objectives?
- d. Will the enemy reinforce? If so in what strength, with what units and from where?
- e. Will the enemy attack our positions? If so, at what points?
- f. Will the enemy employ armor? If so, in what strength, with what units and from where with what objective?
- g. Will the enemy use Biological or Chemical Warfare?? Where, when and what agent?
- h. What is the exact location of enemy artillery, mortar, and anti-aircraft positions?
- i. Where are the enemy minefields? What type and extent?

SECRET

Annex BAKER

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

## 3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

## a. Requests to higher and adjacent units.

## (1) Division

Request aerial photographic coverage of the regimental zone from the MLR to 5,000 meters from MLR. Vertical coverage at eight (8) day interval, scale 1:7,000, 60% overlap.

Special aerial photograph sorties will be requested as required.

## (2) Request following information as soon as observed.

(a) Location, strength, composition, time of sighting and rate and direction of movement of units moving toward or from the regimental sector, to include air and airborne movements.

(b) Location, number and type of enemy arms, vehicles, artillery pieces, CPS, supply points and OPS located to the front or adjacent to the regimental sector.

## b. Orders to subordinate units.

Units will consider EEI, paragraph 2 above and Division General Order No. 50; Intelligence SOP as basic directions for their collection efforts.

## (1) Units on the MLR and COP's.

(a) Patrols will determine location, composition, strength and identification of enemy units.

(b) Select and maintain observation posts within their sectors.

(c) Report military movements into or from your zone, to include time observed, nature, direction and speed of movement, strength and equipment.

(d) Report conditions of all roads and trails in assigned patrol sector with particular emphasis on presence of mines

(e) Capture prisoners.

SECRET

-2-

Annex BAKER

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

## (2) 4.2" Mortar Company

(a) Report as obtained, information on enemy troop concentrations, movement and installations.

## (3) Anti-Tank Company

(a) Report as obtained, information on enemy troop concentrations, movement and installations.

## (4) Reserve Units

(a) Be prepared to assume the reconnaissance and observation mission of MLR or COP units.

(b) Be prepared to conduct patrols and establish observation posts on flanks and in rear areas on order.

(c) Report any effort to infiltrate into or through your assigned area.

## 4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PWs, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL.

## a. Handling of Prisoners

(1) See Annex CC to Div Gen O. No. 50; Intelligence SOP.

(2) Interrogations of PWs by subordinate units will cover tactical information only, first priority being given to identification of PWs unit. Radio or telephone reports will be made without delay to the Regimental S-2 of each interrogation, to include substance of information obtained, time and place of capture.

## b. Captured Material

(1) See Annex CC to Div Gen O. No. 50; Intelligence SOP.

(2) Make Spot Reports to Regimental S-2 of any type or items that may be captured. Deliver captured enemy ordnance to Regimental Ordnance Officer as soon as possible.

## c. Captured Documents

(1) See Annex CC to Div Gen O. No. 50; Intelligence SOP.

(2) Captured marked enemy maps will be delivered without delay to this Headquarters, (Attn: Regimental S-2).

SECRET

-3-

Annex BAKER

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

## 5. MAPS AND AERIAL PHOTOS

a. Korea 1:25,000, AMS L751 Sheets 6527 I NW, 6527 IV NE, 6528 II SW, NW and 6528 III NE, SE.

b. Aerial Photographs

(1) Division Intelligence Memo No. 16-51 for aerial photo coverage and distribution.

## 6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. See Annex CC to Div Gen O. No. 50; Intelligence SOP.

## 7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

a. See Div Gen O. No. 50; Intelligence SOP. (Reports required and time of reporting remain unchanged.)

BY ORDER OF COLONEL WALT

E. B. WHEELER  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

## APPENDICIES:

1. Intelligence Estimate
2. Enemy Installations Overlay
3. Enemy Order of Battle
4. Mine Overlay
5. Target Overlay
6. Counterintelligence
7. Current Enemy Situation (To be issued)

DISTRIBUTION: Same as Opn Plan 4-53

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L

*J. M. Daly*  
J. M. DALY  
Major USMC  
S-2

SECRET

-4-

Annex BAKER

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

5th Marines (Reinf)  
1st Mar Div (Reinf)  
In the Field  
191200I January 1953

Appendix I to Annex BAKER to Opn Plan 4-53

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Maps: Korea 1:25,000, AMS L751 Sheets 6527 I NW, 6527 IV NE, 6528 II SW, N7, and 6528 III NE SW.

1. MISSION

Same as Opn Plan 4-53

2. THE ENEMY SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION

a. Consideration Affecting The Possible Enemy Courses of Action and Our Mission.

(1) Characteristics of the objective area.

(a) WEATHER: Weather conditions during January and February will be considerably colder than December. The climatic conditions of the winter months of western Korea are similar to the upper Mississippi region of Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin. However, the amount of snow is considerably less in Korea than in the corresponding area in the United States.

(b) PRECIPITATION: January and February will have an average of 9.8 days in January and 6.6 days in February of precipitation. Normally, snowfalls will be light with no large amount falling over a protracted period.

(c) VISIBILITY: Generally, visibility is excellent during the winter months. Normally, there will be less than two days with visibility less than 5/8 miles. The greatest frequency of low visibility is within three hours after sunrise.

(d) TEMPERATURE: Temperatures during January and February normally reach a daily maximum of 34 degrees, a daily minimum of 15 degrees and an extreme low of -8 degrees.

(e) WINDS: Prevailing winds over the lowland and hill country of western Korea are northwest in January and February. Average wind speed is 4 mph with maximum wind speed of 40 mph. Generally, there will be less than seven days a month with winds exceeding 22 mph.

(f) TURBULANCE AND THUNDERSTORMS: Thunderstorms are infrequent during the winter months.

SECRET

Appendix I to  
Annex BAKER

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

(g) TRAFFICABILITY ESTIMATE: Trafficability is considered good during January and February.

(h) ASTRONOMICAL DATA: (See Enclosure I)

b. Terrain

The immediate area of the Regimental sector is dominated by steep eroded hills that rise suddenly from flat plains and rice paddies. Major hills held by the enemy are Tumae-ri (No. 40D) (CT 045073); Kungok (No. 35) (CT 050067); Un-gok (No. 31-31a) (CT 059076-059073); Hill 150 (No. 25A) (CT 069082); Hill 90 (CT 074090); Hill 139 (No. 57A) (CT 080085); Hills 161-163.3 (Nos. 9,7) (CT 090107-093106); Hill 173 (No. 53) (CT 078106); Hill 253.5 (No. 41) (CT 050111). These hills contain many draws and steep cuts and are covered with scrub growth which offer excellent camouflage to the enemy.

Critical Terrain Features

The critical terrain feature in the regimental sector is hill 126 (CT 089065). This hill commands observation of the central regimental sector. Loss of this hill would seriously jeopardize the tactical position of the regiment.

The Imjin River is of immediate importance in the regimental sector. Although in rear of the front line positions, it affects logistical and tactical consideration. The Imjin River in the Fifth Marines' sector is 50 to 100 yards wide. It reaches its lowest stage during this period and is frozen over, and will remain frozen until approximately 15 March 1953. The average days frozen varies from 78-92 days with the average thickness of 9.4 inches. The ice will be capable of supporting foot troops and light vehicles.

Observations and Fields of Fire

Fields of fire generally are good along the flats over rice paddies and draws scattered throughout the sector. Fields of fire in the hills are short and restricted.

The enemy has observation of the MLR from one or more prominent features to the front. Hill 173 (No. 53) (CT 078106) offers the enemy observation of the right MLR sector. Hill 190 (CT 074090) offers the enemy observation of the entire Fifth Marines' MLR.

Hills 104 (No. 40) (CT 044066) and Kungok (CT 049067) offer the enemy observation of the left sector and rear areas. Hill 126 (CT 089065) masks the enemy's view of the regimental center rear area.

SECRET

-2-

Appendix 1 to  
Annex BAKER

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

### Obstacles

The Kyonggi hills to the north are the principal obstacles to movement in enemy-held terrain. Numerous rice paddies, dykes and irrigation ditches remain serious obstacles to crosscountry movement the year round.

### Avenues of Approach

The principal avenues of approach into the regimental sector, from right to left, are the valleys leading into the sector from Ung-gok at CT 0405 and Toryom at CT 0505 and the Sami-chon Valley on the left flank of the British Commonwealth Division. These valleys provide excellent routes of approach into friendly positions north of the Imjin.

### Routes

MSR leads north from Seoul to Munsan-ni and along the Imjin Corridor. There are numerous secondary roads, one of which parallels the Imjin River on the south and continues across Widgeon bridge to the right of the regimental sector. The MSR that crosses Spoonbill bridge runs north of the Imjin River and continues to the left of the regimental sector. Vehicular traffic is negotiable in the river valleys. Movement in the hilly regions becomes more difficult in the narrow valleys and higher hills. Trafficability is considered good during January and February.

#### c. Hydrography

The Imjin River is discussed under other topics.

#### d. Sociology

Civilian population should present no problem in the regimental sector.

### (2) Enemy Situation

(a) COMPOSITION: Elements of the 65th and 40th CCF Armies are deployed from west to east respectively along the general line from BS 8287 to CT 1009 along the 1st Marine Division front. These forces are infantry units with supporting artillery, signal, engineer, service and headquarters units. The Fifth Marines will be opposed by one battalion of the 352nd Regiment, 118th Division, 40th CCF Army on the extreme left flank, three battalions of the 353rd Regiment, 118th Division, 40th CCF Army in the center sector, and one battalion of the 357th Regiment, 119th Division, 40th CCF Army in the extreme right sector. One battalion of the 357th Regiment, 119th Division, 40th CCF Army is believed to be in reserve.

SECRET

-3-

Appendix 1 to  
Annex BAKER



SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

One unidentified tank regiment composed of 40 T-34/85's is deployed in the Kaesong area.

(b) NUMERICAL STRENGTHGround Forces

40th CCF Army	32,900 men
118th Division	9,000 men
119th Division	9,100 men
352nd Regiment	2,800 men
353rd Regiment	2,800 men
357th Regiment	2,800 men

Air Forces

Operations are confined to North Korea at present.

(c) ARMS AND ARMAMENT

Order of battle and Intelligence sources indicate there are five known artillery battalions opposite the Fifth Marines' positions. Supporting weapons available (under present CCF/TE) include:

27 x 75/76mm artillery pieces	10 x 37mm AA Guns
9 x 105mm artillery pieces	28 x 82mm Mortars
9 x 122mm artillery pieces	54 x 60mm Mortars
	20 x 120mm Mortars
	24 x 12.7mm AAMG
	14 x 12.7mm HMG
	20 x 3.5mm Rocket Launchers

(d) DISPOSITION (See App. 2.).

40th CCF Army: Two divisions are in the Army's forward area and one in reserve. The 118th Division occupies the area from west of Taedok-san (CP 9906) northeast to the Division's right flank. One battalion of the 119th Division occupies the area on the Division's right flank. One battalion is in reserve and occupies the area north of the Division's right flank.

Five artillery battalions have been located opposite the regimental sector. They are part of sixteen artillery battalions believed to be in the Division sector.

The known artillery positions opposite the Fifth Marines are located as follows: One battalion

SECRET

-4-

Appendix 1 to  
Annex BAKER

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

is centered around CT 0208, NE of Taedok-san, one battalion CT 0317, 1000 meters north of Panghwa-dong, two battalions CT 0510, on reverse slope of Hill 43A, and one battalion CT 0614, in the Kuk-tong area.

(e) COMBAT EFFICIENCY: Enemy combat efficiency, is considered excellent.

Morale is good. The enemy will take extra precautions to prevent the Fifth Marines from capturing prisoners.

The 40th CCF Army has developed scouting, patrolling, and night attacks to a high degree. The enemy utilizes to the maximum advantage all aspects of terrain appreciation.

(f) STATUS OF SUPPLY: Supplies are distributed to coincide with troop dispositions, but there are no large known stock piles in the immediate area. Adequate MSR's to the rear make the enemy's area fairly easy to supply. Current supply status is considered adequate for continuation of the defense and limited objective attacks.

(g) REINFORCEMENTS: The enemy has not more than nine infantry battalions in local reserve supported by about sixteen artillery battalions and forty tanks and/or SP guns, total strength about 28,000. Thirty-six battalions of infantry from the 42nd and elements of the 40th CCF Armies could reinforce within twelve hours. The enemy can reinforce with Army size units (elements of the 63rd and 64th CCF Armies) supported by one regiment of tanks within two days.

e. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

(1) Enumeration of Enemy Capabilities

The enemy can:

(a) Defend on present front lines with five infantry battalions on line and not more than one infantry battalion in local reserve and supported by six artillery battalions; total infantry strength about 6,000.

(b) Launch limited objective attacks at anytime for the purpose of improving observation of friendly rear areas and increase military pressure by "creeping tactics." The most critical area for such attacks are CT 0405 (Ung-gok), CT 0506 (Toryom) and Hill 110 (No. 15) (CT 0808).

SECRET

-5-

Appendix 1 to  
Annex BAKER

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

(c) Reinforce (a) and (b) with not more than thirty-six battalions of infantry (42nd and elements of 40th CCF Armies) within twelve hours. The enemy could reinforce with army sized units (elements of 63rd situated at Onjong-ni and 64th at Hwanju) however, none could be expected to close in less than two days.

(d) Withdraw at anytime to the Pongyang-Yangdok-Wonson area.

(e) Attempt destruction of Freedom Bridge by sabotage.

(f) Employ chemical and/or biological warfare at anytime.

(g) Attack troop movements, front lines, and installations in the rear at anytime with fighter, attack and light bomber aircraft.

(h) Enemy could agree to an Armistace, thereby obtaining cessation of hostilities.

(2) Discussion and analysis

(a) Capability: Defend on present front line. The enemy continues to present a formidable front line defense utilizing the 353rd Regiment and elements of the 352nd and 357th Regiments.

He continues to skillfully and stubbornly defend his present positions. He reacts vigorously with counterattacks up to reinforced company size when his positions are threatened. Main avenues of approach to his positions are cut by tank obstacles and ditches, mined in some cases and covered by artillery and direct fire weapons, supported by adequate infantry.

Enemy artillery is positioned in bunkers and caves which offer maximum protection against friendly artillery and air attacks.

The enemy's counterreconnaissance screen continues to be extended well forward and will be extremely sensitive to any activity in front of his positions. He has improved the already tight control over his internal security and is making every effort to deny any and all information to friendly forces. Intelligence sources report the enemy's constant and mandatory radio silence and use of telephone.

The enemy's present activity continues to be confined to counterreconnaissance limited operations to capture prisoners, repairing and strengthening his fortifications. His attitude is one of continued defense.

SECRET

-6-

Appendix 1 to  
Annex BAKER

## SECURITY INFORMATION

(b) Capability: Launch limited objective attacks: January and February are favorable months for military operations in this area, and more aggressive action by the enemy may be then expected.

Enemy troops are well deployed in forward areas in sufficient strength to launch limited objective attacks up to battalion size with little or no warning. His artillery is concentrated in the areas best suited to provide defense against Fifth Marines' positions. His artillery is registered on the MLR positions; and is capable of supporting limited objectives at night.

## (3) Relative probability

Courses of action are listed as the order of relative probability of adoption.

(a) Capability (a): To defend on present front line positions with five infantry battalions on line and not more than one infantry battalion in local reserve, supported by six artillery battalions, total infantry strength about 6,000.

(b) Capability (b): To launch limited objective attacks at anytime for purpose of improving observation of our rear area and increasing military pressure by "creeping tactics."

(c) Capability (d): Withdrawl of the enemy from his present position is not likely at this time.

(d) Capability (g): The CCF is training 5,000 aviators in Mukden and Harbin. Soviet Russia has assigned 80,000 airforce technicians to assist the CCAF.

(e) Capability (h): The enemy may conclude an armistice agreement if sufficiently favorable conditions are offered.

## 3. AFFECT OF ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION ON OUR MISSION

The present enemy situation and activity will not prevent the Fifth Marines from accomplishing its mission.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL WALT

E. B. WHEELER  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Same as 4-53

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L

*J. M. Daly*  
J. M. DALY  
Major USMC  
S-2

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Enclosure (1) to Appendix 1 to Annex BAKER to Opn Plan 4-53

SUN AND MOON TABLES FOR KIMPO AREA IN I TIME FOR

January 1953

<u>DAY</u>	<u>RISE</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>	<u>EENT</u>	<u>MOONRISE</u>	<u>MOONSET</u>	<u>PHASE</u>
19	0646	0746	1743	1843	0958	2211	
20	0645	0745	1744	1844	1025	2322	
21	0644	0744	1745	1845	1054		
22	0644	0744	1746	1846	1123	0032	F <sub>2</sub>
23	0643	0743	1747	1847	1157	0142	
24	0643	0743	1748	1848	1236	0250	
25	0642	0742	1749	1849	1321	0356	
26	0642	0742	1750	1850	1413	0455	
27	0641	0741	1751	1851	1510	0548	
28	0640	0740	1752	1852	1611	0633	
29	0640	0740	1754	1854	1712	0711	
30	0639	0739	1755	1855	1813	0742	FM

DURATION OF CIVIL TWILIGHT. . . . . 28 Minutes  
DURATION OF NAUTICAL TWILIGHT: . . . . . 60 Minutes

February 1953

<u>DAY</u>	<u>RISE</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>	<u>EENT</u>	<u>MOONRISE</u>	<u>MOONSET</u>	<u>PHASE</u>
1	0639	0737	1756	1854	2008	0834	
2	0639	0737	1756	1854	2105	0856	
3	0638	0736	1757	1855	2203	0918	
4	0637	0735	1758	1856	2320	0955	
5	0636	0734	1800	1858		1003	
6	0635	0733	1801	1859	0003	1032	
7	0634	0732	1803	1901	0106	1102	
8	0633	0731	1804	1902	0211	1142	2
9	0632	0730	1805	1903	0316	1231	
10	0631	0729	1806	1904	0417	1331	
11	0630	0728	1807	1905	0515	1441	
12	0629	0727	1809	1907	0605	1556	
13	0628	0726	1810	1908	0645	1715	
14	0627	0725	1811	1909	0721	1832	N
15	0626	0724	1812	1910	0752	1951	
16	0625	0723	1813	1911	0821	2105	
17	0624	0722	1814	1912	0850	2219	
18	0623	0721	1815	1913	0922	2330	
19	0621	0719	1816	1914	0954		
20	0620	0718	1817	1915	1034	0041	

SECRET

Enclosure (1) to  
App. 1 To Annex BAKER

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

<u>DAY</u>	<u>BMNT</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>	<u>EENT</u>	<u>MOONRISE</u>	<u>MOONSET</u>	<u>PHASE</u>
21	0619	0717	1818	1916	1116	0151	Q
22	0617	0715	1819	1917	1206	0251	
23	0616	0714	1820	1918	1303	0346	
24	0615	0713	1821	1919	1404	0434	
25	0614	0712	1822	1920	1505	0513	
26	0612	0710	1823	1921	1605	0546	
27	0611	0709	1824	1922	1704	0612	
28	0609	0707	1825	1923	1802	0639	F

DURATION OF CIVIL TWILIGHT. . . . .27 Minutes  
 DURATION OF NAUTICAL TWILIGHT. . . . .58 Minutes

SECRET

Enclosure (1) to  
App.1 to Annex BAKER

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION5th Marines (Reinf)  
1st Mar Div (Reinf)  
In the Field  
191200I January 1953

## Appendix 6 to Annex BAKER to Opn Plan 4-53

## COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Special CI Measures	Orders and Requests	Reports; Remarks
1. Security	All Units	<p>Maintain blackout of all installations. Vehicles forward of the Light Line after dark, drive with black out lights,</p> <p>" " Maintain interior guard adequate to secure unit area.</p> <p>" " Apprehend all indigenous personnel who are outside of assigned areas after dark without specific authority.</p> <p>" " A thorough police and inspection will be made of all vacated areas to insure that no documents or material classified or otherwise remain in the area being vacated which would be of assistance to the enemy. Such as: maps, overlays, messages, photos, negatives, ammunition, clothing and equipment. All foxholes, bunkers and trashpits, whether in use or previously abandoned, will be searched for the above mentioned items. Particular attention will be given to the search of Command and Observation Posts.</p> <p>" " Marked maps giving location of command posts, battalions or higher headquarters; or the disposition of units of corresponding size will not be taken forward of battalion command posts.</p>

SECRET

-1-

Appendix 6 to  
Annex BAKER

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Security All Units

It is expected that the CCF will make a strong effort to obtain UN PW information.

" " All persons subject to capture will be warned not to divulge military information. All personnel will be notified that if captured they are not required to give any information except their name, rank, serial number, and date of birth. Personal documents of intelligence value will not be taken into the combat zone.

" " Commanders must destroy the following when capture is imminent; Code books, SOI, Orders, Operation Maps and Overlays, Intelligence Studies, all classified and compromising material.

" " Handling, transmission and destruction of classified documents-USM Manual for Security of Classified Matter.

All Personnel

Observe signal security; all electrical communication systems can be tapped or intercepted.

CIC Detachment

Make Security Inspections of all battalion and regimental observation and command posts vacated. Make security inspections of all areas vacated by supporting units of less than battalion size. Security inspections will be instituted after the area is cleared of all personnel. Results of inspection will be reported to Regimental S-2.

SECRET



SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Security CIC Detachment

Screen all suspicious personnel delivered to it by regimental units, patrols and road blocks.

Report result to S-2 and Army CIC.

" Maintain daily road patrol; spot check all indigenous personnel.

Report positive results to S-2.

" Advanced party will establish liaison with local police and other agencies available on counterintelligence activities.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL WALT

E. B. WHEELER  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Same as Opn Plan 4-53

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L

*J. M. Daly*  
J. M. DALY  
Major, USMCR  
S-2

SECRET

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

5th Marines (Reinf)  
1st Mar Div (Reinf) FMF  
In the Field  
191200I Jan 1953

Annex DOG to Operation Plan 4-53

BLOCKING & COUNTER ATTACK PLAN

Map: KOREA, 1:25,000

1. a. Annex BAKER, current PIR's.
- b. See Opn Plan 4-53.
- c. Assumptions:
  - (1) That enemy penetration must be contained in immediate vicinity of the MLR.
  - (2) That contained enemy penetration must be reduced and the MLR restored.
2. 5th Marines blocks enemy penetration(s) and counterattacks to restore MLR Pans. Probable enemy routes and assumed penetrations see Appendix 1.
3. a. REGIMENTAL RES
  - (1) Be prepared to block enemy penetration(s) or or near positions shown in Appendix 1.
  - (2) Be prepared to counter attack contained enemy penetrations on order from vicinity blocking positions.
- b. H&S Co:
  - (1) Organize provisional rifle company for employment as support for Regimental Reserve.
  - x. (1) Be prepared to execute assigned missions by motor and/or foot march.
  - (2) Prepare and submit detailed plans.
4. See Admin Plan 1-53

SECRET

- 5. a. Annex FOX.
- b. Report CP location(s) to this Hq (S-3).

BY ORDER OF COLONEL WALT

E. B. WHEELER  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

APPENDIX: 1 Blkg & CATk Ovly

DISTRIBUTION: Same as Cpn Plan 4-53

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L

*R. T. Dwyer Jr.*  
R. T. DWYER, JR.  
Major USMC  
S-3

SECRET

D-2

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

5th Marines (Reinf)  
1st Mar Div (Reinf) FMF  
In the Field  
191200I Jan 1953

Annex EASY to Opn Plan 4-53

ANTI-MECHANIZED DEFENSE PLAN

Map: KOREA, 1:25,000

1. a. (1) See Annex BAKER, current PIR's.  
(2) Assumed enemy mechanized penetration(s) ABLE through EASY. See Appendix ONE (Amezc Ovlv).
- b. 1st Mar Div Def Line JAMESTOWN in assigned sector against enemy mechanized attack utilizing maximum capabilities of support weapons (See Annex EASY, 1st Mar Div Opn O 31-52).
2. a. 5th Mar (Reinf) as R MLR Regt Prep to:
  - (1) Defend Div Right flank against enemy tank attack with special attention to probable tank routes of approach ABLE, BAKER, CHARLIE, DOG and EASY.
  - (2) Coordinate with 1st CW Div on Right.
  - (3) Coordinate defense of probable routes DOG and EASY with Center MLR Regt.
- b. See Appendix ONE (Amezc Ovlv) for tank blocking positions.
3. a. Left Bn (Reinf) prepare to:
  - (1) Defend in assigned sector against enemy tank attack with special attention to probable enemy tank routes of approach DOG and EASY. (See App ONE).
  - (2) Coordinate defense of probable routes DOG and EASY with Right Bn of Center MLR Regt.
- b. Right Bn (Reinf) prepare to:
  - (1) Defend in assigned sector against enemy tank attack with special attention to enemy tank route of approach CHARLIE. (See Appendix ONE).
  - (2) Be prepared to defend in conjunction with extreme Left Bn of Commonwealth Division against enemy attack using probable enemy tank routes of approach, ABLE and BAKER. (See Appendix ONE).

SECRET

E-1

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATIONc. AT Co

(1) 75mm RR Section in D/S MLR Bns. Cover likely avenues of approach - provide Amecz defense for MLP Bns.

(2) Be prepared to provide Amecz defense in any area threatened in Regtl sector.

d. 4.2" Mortar Co:

(1) Initiate from present positions support action in defense of the regimental sector against enemy mechanized attack.

e. Reserve Bn (Reinf):

(1) Prepare to move into blocking positions, to reinforce MLR Bns, or to block enemy mechanized attack. (See Appendix ONE).

(2) Be prepared to move infantry units in support of tank action against enemy mechanized attack.

x. (1) This Plan effective for planning on receipt; for execution on O.

(2) With assistance from 1st Engr Bn prepare to:

(a) Place AT mines, on order, for local security.

(b) Lay AT minefields and tank barriers. (See Appendix TWO).

(3) Coordinate closing and marking of AT minefield exits with tank battalion.

(4) Coordinate location of AT minefields and tank barriers at limiting points with adjacent units.

(5) First target priority to enemy tanks for all weapons capable of bearing.

(6) Approval this Hq will be obtained prior destruction bridges in assigned sector.

(7) Construct primary position with overhead cover for each recoilless rifle and rocket launcher.

4. a. See Admin Plan 1-53.

b. The following minimum amounts of AP ammunition will be readily available at all times:

SECRET

E-2

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

- |     |                        |   |
|-----|------------------------|---|
| (1) | Tanks                  | 14 Rds per tank   |
| (2) | 75mm RR                | 10 Rds per weapon on Primary Psn.<br>5 Rds per weapon each Alt Psn. |
| (3) | 3.5" Rkt Launcher      | 16 Rds per weapon on Primary Psn.<br>6 Rds per weapon each Alt Psn. |
| (4) | Rifle Grenade (Energa) | 30 Per Inf Bn.  |
5. a. (1) All vehicles display panels in accord with SOI-6.
- (2) Display marking panels during Amecz alerts except when enemy aircraft in vicinity.
- (3) Flash report of actual sighting of enemy armored vehicles by fastest means available containing the following information:
- (a) What has been sighted, approximate number, type and formation.
  - (b) Location of enemy armor.
  - (c) Route and direction of movement.
  - (d) Estimated speed of unit.
  - (e) Time sighted.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL WALT

E. B. WHEELER  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

APPENDICIES: I - Amecz Overlay  
II - AT Minefield Tank Barrier Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Same as Opn Plan 4-53.

SECRET

P-3

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 30 AT minefield from CT 090081 to CT 093082, length 300 yards. Bounded on East by Corps field nos., 321 and 322 and on North by #341 - other AP mines in area are unmarked and would necessitate clearance of entire area before new field is installed. Recommend AT minefield from CT 084071 to CT 084074, length 300 yards, and from CT 087074 to CT 088071, length 300 yards.
- 33 AT minefield from CT 106082 - CT 109088, length 800 yards. Additional 300 yard belt from CT 111084 to CT 113086. AT minefield from CT 109088 to CT 112088, length 300 yards.
- 35 AT mine belt from CT 106067 to CT 106065, length 700 yards.
- 36 AT mine belt from CT 098057 to CT 105060, length 850 yards.

SECRET

A-2-K-2

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

5th Marines (Reinf)  
1st Mar Div (Reinf) FMF  
In the Field  
191200I Jan 1953

Encl ABLE to Appendix 2 to Annex EASY to Opn Pln 4-53

SPECIFICATIONS OF AT MINEFIELDS & TANK BARRIERS

- | <u>AREA</u> | <u>PROPOSED OBSTACLES</u>  |
|-------------|--|
| 17          | Crater in defile at CT 067019 is easiest way to block route 1-Y. There are hill barriers on other side. 200 yard mine belt from CT 067016 to CT 068016 to CT 068018.   |
| 18          | Crater road in defile at CT 050031. 200 yard mine belt from CT 048029 to CT 051030.  |
| 19          | (Center MLR Regt) Place 25 mines in by-pass along blown bridge at CT 032036 to augment 25 M2 mines stockpiled by Center MLR Regt to mine road at CT 032036. Area to west of blown bridge is impassable to tanks. The M7 mines should be laid in pairs. 150 yard mine belt from CT 033033 to CT 034034 to tie in with dike. |
| 20          | Double AT minefield CT 057036 to CT 060036, length 350 yards each belt - belts separated by 50 yards. Bridge abutment and by-pass to be destroyed.   |
| 21          | Crater road at CT 055042 and lay 200 yard mine belt from CT 053043 to CT 056044. 150 yard mine belt from CT 055039 to CT 055038. 300 yard mine belt from CT 057042 to CT 056038. 100 yard mine belt from CT 055038 to CT 056038.   |
| 22          | 200 yard mine belt from CT 047048 to CT 049049 and 200 yard belt from CT 049046 to CT 050047.  |
| 23          | AT mine belt from CT 054054 to CT 057056, length of field 400 yards. Corps minefield 406 crosses this belt.  |
| 24          | Crater road at CT 087047 - standard crater to be used.   |
| 25          | AT minefield from CT 087061 to CT 088064, length 400 yards. crater road at CT 086059. 1,000 yard minefield from CT 090055 to CT 091058.  |
| 26          | Two AT minefields: (1) CT 070069 to CT 072069 length 150 yards, (2) CT 073067 to CT 074066. Corps field #351 passes between two proposed belts.  |
| 29          | Two AT minefields: (1) From CT 113068 to CT 116069, length 350 yards. (2) CT 111073 to CT 113068, length 500 yards. Crater road at CT 117062. 300 yards mine belt from CT 115074 to CT 117073.   |

SECRET



SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

5th Marines (Reinf)  
 1st Mar Div (Reinf) FIF  
 In the Field  
 1912001 Jan 1953

Enclosure BAKER to Appendix 2 to Annex EASY to Cpn Plan 4-53

ESTIMATED TIME AND MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PROPOSED BARRIERS

AREA	DELIBERATE CRATERS	AMOUNT OF CHARGING CHARGE	TIME PLATOON HOURS	MINE BELTS	LENGTH (Yds)	NO. OF	
						MINES (M6 AT)	PLATOON FOURS
17	CT 067019	320 lbs	1.5	CT 067016 - CT 068016 CT 068018	200	300	2
18	CT 050031	320 lbs	1.5	CT 048029 - CT 051030	200	300	2
19				CT 032036 CT 033033 - CT 034034	15 150	25 250	2 2
20	CT 060033	840 lbs	2.5	Double: CT 057036 - CT 060036	350	1050	10
21	CT 055042	320 lbs	1.5	CT 055039 - CT 056038 CT 053043 - CT 056044 CT 057042 - CT 056038 CT 055038 - CT 056038	150 200 300 100	225 300 450 150	7.5
22				CT 047048 - CT 049049 CT 049046 - CT 050047	200 200	300 300	4
23				CT 057056 - CT 054054	400	600	10*
24	CT 067047	320 lbs	1.5				

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

<u>AREA</u>	<u>DELIBERATE CRATERS</u>	<u>AMOUNT OF CRATERING CHARGE</u>	<u>TIME PLATOON HOURS</u>	<u>MINE BELT</u>	<u>LENGTH (yds)</u>	<u>NO. OF MINES (115 AT)</u>	<u>PLATOON HOURS</u>
25	CT 086058	320 lbs	1.5	CT 090055 - CT 091058 CT 087061 - CT 088064	1000 400	1500 600	12
26				CT 070069 - CT 072069 CT 073067 - CT 074066	150 200	225 300	6* 7*
29				CT 113068 - CT 116069 CT 111073 - CT 113068 CT 115074 - CT 117073	350 500 300	525 750 450	4.5 7 4
30				CT 090081 - CT 093082 CT 084081 - CT 084074 CT 087074 - CT 088071	300 300 300	450 450 450	8* 4 4
33				CT 106082 - CT 109088 CT 111084 - CT 113086 CT 109088 - CT 112088	800 300 300	1200 450 450	10 3.5 4
35				CT 106067 - CT 106065	700	1050	8
36				CT 098057 - CT 105060	850	1275	10
Totals		<u>2440</u>	<u>10</u>		<u>9215</u>	<u>14,375</u>	<u>131.5</u>

\* Night Hours

SECRET

B-2-E-2

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION5th Marines (Reinf)  
1st Mar Div (Reinf) FMF  
In the Field  
191200I Jan 1953Annex FOX to Opn Plan 4-53  
SIGNAL COMMUNICATION

1. a. See current PIR's.
- b. See Annex CHARLIE Operations Overlay.
2. a. Install, operate and maintain continuous communications for the 5th Marines (Reinf).
3. a. Message Center:
  - (1) Normal
- b. Messenger:
  - (1) Scheduled messenger service will be operated from Regimental Hq to all regimental units daily at 1000I and 1500I.
  - (2) Units, to include battalions, be prepared to operate message drop and pickup stations.
- c. Radio:
  - (1) Radio nets will be manned as indicated.
    - (a) Div Comd ABLE (M-500): Regtl Hq, manned continuously.
    - (b) Div Comd BAKER (M-503): Regtl Hq be prepared to activate on Div order.
    - (c) Div Intel (M-400): Regtl Hq on 24 hour standby status. Equip check 0900I and 1800I daily.
    - (d) Div TAC (M-434): Regtl Hq on 24 hour standby status. Equip check 0900I and 1800I daily.
    - (e) 5th Marines Comd (M-518): 1/5, 2/5, 3/5 and 4.2/5 on 24 hour standby status. Equip check 0900I and 1800I daily.
    - (f) 5th Marines TAC: (M-211) 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 4.2/5 and AT/5, manned continuously.
    - (g) 5th Marines AUX TAC: (Regtl Intel) (M-427) 1/5, 2/5, 3/5 and Regtl OP's as directed by Regtl S-2.
  - (2) Right Bn and Left Bn assigned (M-206) and (M-207) respectively for use of Bn Wdns Co's.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

(3) The following frequencies for radio Set AN/PRC-10 are available for use by patrols:

- (a) 1/5 (M-605)
- (b) 2/5 (M-606)
- (c) 3/5 (M-607)

(4) The 5th Marines frequency (M-604) will be available to Bn Comm Os upon request to Regtl Comm O.

(5) Radio transmissions will be kept to a minimum.

d. Wire:

(1) Normal

(2) Regtl wire section install and maintain two (2) wire lines to each battalion and one (1) line to separate companies. Additional wire lines as directed.

(3) Existing wire will be utilized wherever practicable.

(4) Wire will be cabled, overheaded or buried as circumstances dictate.

(5) Submit line route maps and traffic diagrams weekly as of 1800I each Sunday to reach this Headquarters prior to 1200I Monday.

(6) Bns on MLR will install and maintain a minimum of two (2) lines to each MLR Co CP. Alternate routes will be utilized wherever practicable.

(7) Manual Teletype Normal.

(8) Radio Relay Normal.

e. Visual

(1) Vehicular identification panels will be displayed only forward of MLE Bn CP's.

(2) Air-ground recognition panels will be displayed by MLR units in defiladed Pens to prevent observation by En units.

(3) Pyrotechnic

(a) White Star Cluster      Illuminate my position.

(b) Amber Star Cluster      Box me in (Arty def fire)

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINES  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE  
O/O FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

29 January 1953

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Modification #1 to  
OPERATION ORDER)  
NUMBER.....2-53)

Ref: (a) Operation Order 2-53

1. Subparagraph 3. e. (3) (g) of Annex FOX to reference (a) will be modified as follows.

Delete:

(g) 2 Red Smoke                      Friendly troops

Substitute as new subparagraph 3. e. (3) (g) the following:

(g) Green Star Cluster              Assigned Fight Marine  
   Infantry Regiment for  
   specific local meaning

2. A Green Star Cluster has been assigned the following local meaning:

"Have casualties, Need assistance"

BY ORDER OF COLONEL WHEELEP

E. B. WHEELEP  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Same as Opn Order 2-53

O-P-F-I-C-I-A-L

*MA Smiley*

R. T. DWYER, Jr.  
Major              USMC  
S-3

SECRET

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

- |     |                      |  |
|-----|----------------------|--|
| (c) | Green Star Parachute | Fire VT on my position<br>(Arty def fire)  |
| (d) | Red Star Cluster     | Friendly gunfire, bombs,<br>aircraft rockets, or<br>bullets falling within own<br>lines. |
| (e) | Red Star Parachute   | Cease Fire   |
| (f) | 2 green smoke        | Need Aid   |
| (g) | 2 red smoke          | Friendly troops  |
| (h) | Yellow Smoke         | Assigned right Marine<br>Infantry Rest for specific<br>local meaning                     |

f. Sound

(1) Air Raid Warning: Condition Red, ten (10) second blast of the alarm-siren at 5 second intervals for a period of two (2) minutes. All Clear: One (1) long blast of the alarm-siren for a period of about one (1) minute.

x. (1) Modified-plain radio and teletype messages will not include geographical locations with target area. Unit names when mentioned in text, will be designated by their radio call sign equivalent.

(2) AFPSAL Code is an operations code to be used within units of the Div when other authorized cryptographic means are not available or impracticable. It is to be used on telephone and voice radio transmissions.

(3) Following crypto-aids effective for use within Div: CSP-1500, (M-209), for confidential and restricted traffic only, and PAC-8 (F).

(4) The combined assault code PAC-8 (f) is a naval code book, and is not held by army or other attached units. Classified messages sent to multiple addressee's in which army or other units are included, will be encrypted using CSP-1500, (M-209).

(5) Responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of signal communications is from left to right between adjacent units unless otherwise directed.

4. a. See Admin Plan.1-53.

b. (1) Regtl signal supply dump at Regtl CP.

SECRET

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

(2) Regtl signal repair at Regtl CP.

(3) Bns consolidate and submit requisitions to Regtl Comm  
O for own and attached units.

5. a. Refer to 1st Marine Division SOI-6 with current change.

b. Item time will be used on all messages within this Div.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL WALT

E. B. WHEELER  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Same as Opn Plan 4-53

O-F-F-I-G-I-A-L

R. T. DWYER, JR.  
Major USMC  
S-3

SECRET

4

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

5th Marines (Reinf)  
 1st Mar Div (Reinf) FMP  
 In the Field  
 1912001 Jan 1953

Annex X-RAY to Opn Plan 4-53

DISTRIBUTION

1st Mar Div	(3)	1st Engr Bn	(1)
1st Bn, 5th Mar	(5)	DS Engr Co	(1)
2nd Bn, 5th Mar	(5)	1st Mar	(1)
3rd Bn, 5th Mar	(5)	7th Mar	(1)
AT Co, 5th Mar	(2)	KMC	(1)
4.2" Mort Co, 5th Mar	(2)	1st CW Div	(1)
H&S Co, 5th Mar	(1)	11th Mar	(2)
S-2, 5th Mar	(1)		
S-3, 5th Mar	(1)	File	(10)
S-3A, 5th Mar	(1)		
S-4, 5th Mar	(1)	TOTAL	(53)
Comm C, 5th Mar	(1)		
MTC, 5th Mar	(1)		
Supply O, 5th Mar	(1)		
Arty Ln O	(1)		
DS Arty Bn	(1)		
TACP	(1)		
1st Tk Bn	(1)		
DS Tk Co	(1)		

BY ORDER OF COLONEL WALT

E. B. WHEELER  
 Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Same as Opn Plan 4-53

O-P-F-I-C-I-A-L

*R. T. Dwyer Jr.*  
 R. T. DWYER, JR.  
 Major USMC  
 S-3

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED



SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

LEFT-BN.

1st Battalion (Reinf)  
7th Marines (Reinf)  
1st Mar Div (Reinf)  
In the Field  
13 March 1953

Composition, Statistics, and Deployment of an IIR Battalion

A. General:

1. The Bn sector is made up of a Main Line of Resistance composed of three (3) reinforced rifle companies and a series of six (6) Combat Outposts forward of the IIR.

2. The Bn is supported by:

- a. 81mm Mortar Platoon and M41 Platoon from Wpns Co.
- b. Elements of 4.2" Mortar Co.
- c. Elements of 1 Tank Co.
- d. Elements of AM Co.
- e. Elements of 11th Marine West.
- f. Elements of 1st H&M.

3. The Bn carries Wpns in excess of T/E. In addition there are other excessive weapons designated as sector or area weapons. Among these are Thompson Sub-Machine Guns, .50 Cal machine guns, A-4 light machine guns and A-3 light machine guns.

4. The Bn reserve is composed of a "clutch platoon" consisting of 1 officer and 56 enlisted men from H&M Co. Breakdown as follows:

- a. S-1, S-2 and S-3 = 3 men
- b. Cooks and Messmen = 16 men
- c. Motor Transport = 7 men
- d. Supply = 12 men
- e. Guard (A 27 man GP security detachment in excess of S/O) = 13 men

LEFT  
BN.

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Composition, Statistics, and Deployment of an IIR Bn (Cont'd)

B. Main Line of Resistance:

1. Obstacles: #
  - a. Bn Frontage = 4,700 Meters.
  - b. Average Co Frontage = 1587 Meters.
  - c. Average Plt's Frontage = 529 Meters.
  - d. Average distance between A/W Bunkers = 112 Meters.
  - e. Average distance between riflemen with no patrol out and a 100% watch in effect = 24 Meters.
  - f. Average distance between riflemen with an average patrol out and a 100% watch in effect = 62 Meters.

C. Combat Outposts:

1. Composition:

- a. COP #1; 1 officer, 2 S/COs, 4 riflemen, 13 AMGs, 6 IIR men, and 1 Corporal. A total of 30 men. Weapons = 2 3.5" Rockets, 2 A-4 MGs and normal individual arms.
- b. COP #2; Able Co (-), 8mm mortar section, and Artillery FO Team. A total of 206 men. Weapons = 2 .50 Cal MGs, 4 A-1 MGs, 13 A-4 MGs, 1 Flame Tank, and normal individual arms.
- c. COP #3r ("Toothache"). 1 officer, 6 IIR men, 6 ATs men, 1 Rifle Squad, 1 Radioman, 1 Wireman, 1 Corporal. A total of 29 men. Weapons = 1 A-4 LMG, 1 A-6 LMG, 2 Flamethrowers, 1 3.5" Rocket, and normal individual arms.
- d. COP #92 (Manlym) 1 officer, 1 Rifle Squad, 2 IIR men, 1 8mm mortar FO, 1 Radioman, 1 Corporal. A total of 24 men. Weapons = 1 .50 Cal MG, 1 A-6 LMG, 3 A-4 LMGs, and normal individual arms.

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Composition, Statistics and Deployment of an MBR Pn (Cont'd)

e. COP #198 (Kate)  
1 officer, 2 Rifle squads, 7 LMG men, 1 Comman, 2 AT/ men. A total of 37 men.  
Weapons = 2 A-4 LMGs, 2 A-6 LMGs, 1 3.5" Rocket and normal individual arms.

f. COP #64s (Ingrid)  
1 officer, 2 Rifle squads, 10 LMG men, 1 Comman, 4 AT/ men. A total of 29 men.  
Weapons = 2 A-6 LMGs, 3 A-4 LMGs, 1 3.5" Rocket, 1 Flamethrower and normal individual arms.

2. Statistics: #

a. COP Frontage: 2,915 Meters (Total)

D. A kind of protective wire covers the MBR and all COPs. It consists of a minimum of 2 double apron fences filled with barbed wire 3 feet high and 10 feet wide.

E. Neutrality Restrictions

1. General

a. It is vital that all elements of this command be fully cognizant of the security agreements pertaining to the conduct of the armistice negotiations. The agreements, neutral zones and restrictions listed herein supersede all others.

b. It has been mutually agreed by the United Nations and the Communists that no hostile act by forces under their control will be made within the following areas:

(1) A circular area having a radius of three (3) miles centered on the traffic circle in Kaesong.

(2) A circular area surrounding the camp area of the UNCA delegation having a radius of three (3) miles centered at OS 920000.

(3) A circular area surrounding the conference site at PANNUKION having a radius of one (1) thousand yards centered at PW 951000.

(4) The Kaesong - Panuncheon - Unsan area road and all roads connecting the highway on each side of that road.

- 3 -

SECRET

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

-----  
Composition, Statistics and Deployment of an MLR Bn (Cont'd)  
-----

c. Except for Military Police detachments of two (2) officers and fifteen (15) enlisted men from each side, no armed personnel of either side will be permitted in the conference site. The Military Police will be armed with small arms only (pistols, rifle, carbines). Both delegations and their parties shall have free access to and free movement within the conference site area.

d. Restrictions imposed on the operation of aircraft in this area are as follows:

(1) All air support missions flown anywhere on our present front must be under positive control, either by FAC, FAC or MFR Team #1.

(2) Fifth Air Force aircraft are restricted from flying over the area covered by a circle of six (6) miles radius with center at the traffic circle in Koesong.

(3) All aircraft are restricted from flying over the area covered by: (1) a circle of three miles radius with center at traffic circle in Koesong; (2) the neutrality corridor from Koesong to Panmunjon; (3) a circle of two (2) thousand yards radius with center at Panmunjon.

(4) The FAC, FAC and MFR Team #1, when controlling missions, will exercise maximum care and discretion to insure that no attacks are victored into the above areas. F-4 planes will not fly over the areas set forth in (3) above, nor over the neutral corridor between PANMUNJON and the MLR.

2. Interpretation of Agreements

a. No member of the 1st Marine Division will enter nor fire into the Koesong circular area, the Panmunjon circular area or into the restricted area along the Koesong-Panmunjon Road.

b. No F-4 attack will be launched from and no fire will be delivered against hostile forces from the Koesong area or from the restricted area along the Koesong - Panmunjon Road.

c. High trajectory weapons may fire across the neutrality corridor, past our present front lines to Panmunjon circle but not into this corridor.

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

-----  
Composition, Statistics and Deployment of an M.P. Bn (Cont'd)  
-----

d. Military aircraft may fly over the Pusanjon-Munsongni corridor in rear of our M.P. Unarmed helicopters may use this corridor up to our CPD or landing sites for administrative purposes, as in the case of medical evacuation.

3. Responsibility of Unit Commanders

a. Commanding Officers of all units in this command will insure that the following measures are complied with.

(1) All personnel are fully aware of the neutral zones restrictions on the commission of hostile acts and all other restrictions set forth in this Annex.

(2) Special care will be observed at all times in firing artillery, small arms and other high trajectory weapons to insure that no rounds land in the neutral zones, including the Corps Commanders No Fire Line.

(3) The commanding officer of the battalion whose sector includes the high ground east of and dominating Pusanjon, will insure that each individual of his unit has been fully instructed on neutrality restrictions and warned to do no firing except in case of attack by the enemy.

(a) Firing Lines for this covering force will be so sited as to insure against any violations by fire on the conference area as set forth in 1.b.(3) above.

b. In the event of an enemy attack by maneuver on this covering force position, personnel may fire, but then only within the limitations imposed in 2.c. above. An enemy attack may be interpreted to include an attack by fire but this interpretation will be made at Division level except in extreme emergency or communication failure at which time the interpretation will be made at the highest level of command available. Such attack by fire must reach serious proportions before fire will be returned and then only within limitations of 2.c. above.

c. All incidents pertaining to these troops will be reported to this Headquarters (S-3) immediately utilizing the most expeditious means.

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

-----  
Composition, Statistics and Deployment of an MLB Bn (Cont'd)  
-----

d. The commanding officer of the battalion whose sector Panmunjom falls will maintain a record of all incidents and hostile acts (to include the apprehension of enemy agents and suspicious persons) that occur in the vicinity of the UN Base Camp, the conference site of Panmunjom, Kaesong area, or areas adjacent to the Kaesong-Panmunjom-Munam-ni Road. Submit verbal reports to be followed immediately by written reports of any such incidents, to this Headquarters (S-3) within 24 hours. These reports are to be specific as to the incidents including date, time, places, persons involved and witnesses. Upon relief, the record will be passed to relieving unit.

e. Every effort will be made to apprehend all infiltrators into any of the restricted areas.

f. Psychological warfare measures will be limited as follows:

No Loudspeaker Line: From north or west of the following outlined restricting lines: South along 00 NS grid line from CT 0010 to CS 0026, thence west along EW 98 grid line from CS 0026 to BS 7196.

No Leaflet Line: No leaflets in the area north or west of the following outlined restricting lines: South along 03 NS grid line from CT 0310 to CS 0327, thence along INJI River to CS 0392, thence west along 92 EW grid line to BS 7192.

\* No allowance made for elevation in any measurement. Figures constitute level map measurement.

#### F. Communications

1. Wire - This Bn has a network of 45 miles of wire. To maintain this network the wire section is augmented by 3 men in each company. Telephones in use total 55 FE 8 and 120 M'K10 Soundphones.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

-----  
Composition, Statistics and Deployment of an M/R Bn (Cont'd)  
-----

2. Radio - Each company uses 2 AN/PRC-10 radios, 1 on the company tactical net and 1 on the Bn tactical net. Companies have in use 3 AN/PRC-3 radios. The Bn CP guards the Bn Tactical net, Regt Tactical net, Regt Command net, Regt Intelligence net and monitors various company tactical nets.


3. Message Center - The CP operates two daily messenger runs to the company CPs.

4. Supply & Repair - Limited repair facilities are available at the Bn. Most repair work is taken to higher echelon which takes about 1 week.

5. Electrical Power - The Bn has 2 PE 75 Generators powered by Jeep engines and 1 3.5 Kw Army type generator for the lighting system. The Bn maintains in the CP approximately 3 Kilowatts of power continually for lighting purposes.

6. General - As can be seen from the above, communications in this sector required a 100% average in wire equipment and counting company personnel a 150% average in wire personnel. Radio equipment is sufficient at T/E as are medics sufficient at T/O.

CONFIDENTIAL  
Security Information




Charlie Co  
Sound Power Net

00129842/100




CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION




"E" Company  
Sound Power  
Net

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL  
Security information

Baker Co.  
Sound power net  
CONFIDENTIAL



Able Co.  
Sound power net  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

RIGHT- BN. 3/7

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

LEGEND

MLR	LMG	HMG	.50 Cal
George Co Sector-----	6	2	1
How Co Sector -----	11	1	1
Item Co Sector -----	6	3	2
ATA Sector <del>(CIVILIAN SERVICE)</del> -----	4	4	2

Personnel & MGs on COPS

	Personnel	LMG
HEDY	17	2
BUNKER	32	4
GINGER	14	1
ESTHER	18	2
DAGMAR	28	4
CORINNE	21	2

Wpns Company has three (3) positions firing indirect fire.  
 ATA Platoon on MLR.  
 Heavy Black indicates positions physically occupied.  
 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Reinf) FMF

RIGHT  
BN.

DECLASSIFIED

R-O-U-G-H

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH MARINES  
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REINF) FMF  
c/o MEET POST OFFICE  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

*Early Mar 53*

*from Mar. 4.  
25 Mar 62*

COMMENT - CO - 7TH - MAR.

It will be noted that the MLR as organized on these two battalion fronts exemplifies the linear type defense. It is believed that the word "Line" in the term "Main line of Resistance" is taken too literally when laying out this type of defense. It is realized that such a defense creates a feeling of security for rear area units, however, as a line of resistance it can be an illusion. Such a distribution of our strength along a shallow over extended line tends towards converting our defenses into a combat sentry line, not strong in any one place and few if any parts of the line mutually supporting. It is further believed that such a concept of defense does not provide for receiving the shock of an attack in such a manner as to stop the enemy or grind him down so that he will be softened for the necessary counter-attack. This type of defense is usually the outgrowth of the infiltration factor. Perhaps the word "infiltration" has become a bugaboo that has been exaggerated out of all proportion to its actual seriousness. It is questionable whether any enemy is inclined to infiltrate a strong defense organized in depth - he only lends himself to being cut off and trapped. Actually - to consider that a solid line drawn across a map as an MLR reflects security against infiltration is also an illusion particularly when that line is so over extended that there are large gaps between the individual marines along that line. The British forces in Korea organize their defensive area in perimeter defenses in depth with large open areas in between which are patrolled and they have no more infiltration than we do. It will be noted that our employment of our outposts as combat

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

outposts, not to be withdrawn but to be held against strong attack, is actually an attempt to give depth to our defenses which it is believed should have been organized with more depth in the first place. As the MLR is the place where the main effort of defense is executed we find a situation exists wherein our line of outposts are actually doing the job of <sup>the</sup> Main Line of Resistance while we support them the best we are able to from a continuous ditch or trench line of thinly distributed troops which on the map is ~~conceived~~ conceived as the "MLR".

It will be noted that the right flank battalion has taken the existing MLR fortifications and has grouped the defensive units in such a manner as to concentrate their strength at those areas which it is determined are the most vital to the defense of the battalion sector.

In some cases the forces were thinned along the so called MLR in order to add depth to the defenses down critical corridors leading into the battalion defense zone. Further defense in depth was organized through the use of indirect fire MG; used at extreme ranges. This battalion's defenses were an attempt to convert as much as possible a linear defensive layout to a defense in depth without completely reorganizing existing fortifications.

The terrain in the left battalion's sector was not particularly suited to such readjustment.

DECLASSIFIED